YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

LIFE OF
VISCOUNT PALMEESTON

VOL. IL

LONDON : PRINTED BY
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., HEW-STBEET SQTJABE '
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

4 t i

S

i^

THE
LIFE AND COEEESPONDENCE OP
HENEY JOHN TEMPLE
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

HON. EVELYN ASHLEY, M.P.

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II.

LONDON
RIOHARD BENTLEY & SON, NEW BURLINGTON STREET
llnUi.^y-Ei-s hi ©rbitiBirtt to iitr Ps.ttsitj} tijt (iJiueii
1879

CONTENTS OF
THE SECOND VOLUME.

CHAPTER L

PAGE

Third Tenure of the Foreign Office — Switzerland — Spanish Mar
riages — Portugal — Annexation ol the Punjaub ... 1

CHAPTER IL
Lord Minto's Mission to Italy — Ireland — Sicily

CHAPTER III.
Arbitration — Movements in Italy — French Eevolution — Chartist
Agitation in London — War between Austria and Italy — Sir
Robert Peel at the Mansion House — French Occiipation of
Rome — Debates in PaVliament — Cholera — Naples . , . 59

CHAPTER IV.
War in Hungary — Question of the Hungarian Refugees . . 103
CHAPTER V. ':
Greek Affairs and ' Don Pacifico ' Debate  12S

VI CONTENTS OF

CHAPTER VI.
PAKE
Letters — General Haynau at Barclay's Brewery — Ecclesiastical
Titles Bill — National Defences — Mr. Gladstone's Letters about
Neapolitan Prisons — Ionian Islands — Defence in Parliament —
Question of ' Holy Places ' . . . . , . 164

CHAPTER VII.
Removal from the Government — Explanations in the House of
Commons ........... 193

CHAPTER VIII.
Fall of the Russell Administration — Lord Derby's Governriient
— Dissolution — Speeches at Tiverton and Lewes — Letters —
Defeat of the Derby Cabinet  229

CHAPTER IX.
Goes to the Home Office in the Aberdeen Administration — Work
at Home Office — Temporary Resignation . . . . - 258

CHAPTER X.
Russian Policy — Occupation of Principalities ; movements of
English Fleet — Lord Aberdeen — Active preparations for war —
Reform Club Banquet — Proposes Crimean Expedition — 1855
• — Motion of Mr. Roebuck — Resignation of Lord John Russell —
Defeat of the Government  272

CHAPTER XI.
Becomes Prime Minister — Attends to State of the Army — Negotia
tions at Vienna — Reforms for Turkey — Conference breaks up . 304

CHAPTER XII.
Renewal of Negotiations— Peace Signed — Declaration of Paris —
Disputes about execution of Treaty — Misunderstanding with
the United States —Death of Sir William Temple — Egypt —
Persian Affairs  322

THE SECOND VOLUME. vii
CHAPTER XIII. PAGK
Quarrel with China — Resolution carried by Mr. Cobden against
the Government — Dissolution — Indian Mutiny — Government
India Bill — Defeat on Conspiracy Bill — Resignation . . 344

CHAPTER XIV.
Out of Office — Goes to Compi^gne — Derby Government defeated
on Reform Bill, 1859 — Dissolution — Outbreak of Franco-
Austrian War — Vote of Want of Confidence iu Ministers
— Second Premiership — Italian A:ffairs — Spain and Morocco —
Fortifications  358

CHAPTER XV.
France and the Italian Duchies — Syria — Emperor Napoleon's
Schemes — Neutrality of Savoy— Altitude of France — The
' Derby ' of 1860 — Conflict between Lords and Commons on
Paper Duties — Discussion about the ' Press ' . . 370

CHAPTER XVI.
State of Parties — Lord WardensMp of the Cinque Ports — Civil
War in America — Cotton Supply— J'uiiisli.Finances — Visit to
Harrow — Father Daly — Death of Prince Consort — ' Trent '
Affair — National Expenditure — Church Patronage . . . 402

CHAPTER XVII.
Russia and Poland — Visit to Scotland — Proposed Congress — Den- '
mark and Sleswig-Holstein — London Conference — Danish
Debate — Visit to Northamptonshire — Criminal Lunacy — Cu
ban Slavery — Irish Catholics — Convocation — Last Illness and
Death . . .... 410

CHAPTER XVIII.
Character — Characteristics of Style of Writing and Speaking . 458
Index  487

LIFE AND COEEESPONDENCE 01'
HENEY JOHN TEMPLE
THIRD VISCOUNT PALMERSTON, K.G., G.C.B.
BOOK IL
CHAPTEE I.
THIRD TENURE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE — SWITZERLAND —SPANISH
MARRIAGES— PORTUG-AL— ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.
LoED PALMEESTON was close upon sixty-two years of
age when, in 1846, he went to the Foreign Office for
the third and last time. Nearly twenty years elapsed
before he died, but death found him still in harness
and the working head of a powerful Administration.
During this long space, with only two short intervals,
he was continuously in office — first as Foreign Secre
tary, next as Home Secretary, and twice as Prime
Minister. Of these years the five given up to 'Foreign
Affairs ' were the most unquiet which, with his own
country at peace, could fall to any man's lot, and
culminated in his abrupt retirement at the close of
1851. The year which immediately succeeded his
taking the seals was sufficiently full of anxious events,
VOL. II. B

2 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
such as the Spanish marriages, civil wars in Spain and
Portugal, and the disturbances in Switzerland, which,
at one moment, seriously threatened the independence
of that sturdy little republic ; but these formed but a
fit prelude to the storm which broke over Europe in
1848, and continued to rage throughout the following
year. To aid, by his countenance and counsel, the triumph
and maintenance of constitutional freedom, was Lord
Palmerston's desire. He foresaw clearly enough the
results of despotic repression. The events of the revo
lutionary year were, in his opinion, but the natural
fruits of the growths planted by the hands of absolute
sovereigns. To prune betimes was, as he incessantly
pointed out, the only check which kings, ministers, and
patriots could usefully apply. In fact, during the
whole of 1847, he was bent on giving such aid as was
in his power to those Governments which were willing
and able to ' put their house in order.' While, how
ever, he recognised the necessity, he was little hopeful
in the prospect. History admonishes us, he used to
say, that rulers seldom have the forecast to substitute,
in good time, reform for revolution. They take no note
of changes around them, and forget that it is the pre
existing spirit of slavery in the people that has made
tyrants in all ages of the world. No tyrant ever made
a slave who was not one already — no community, how
ever small, having the spirit of freemen ever had a
master for long. When subjects change their spirit,
they will also restrain or else change their rulers.
The following extract from a circular despatch sent
to the British representatives in Italy, in January, 1848,
gives such a clear compendium of his views and of his
previous endeavours in other directions that I here
insert it : —
The situation of the sovereigns of Italy towards their sub
jects is one of which advantage may be taken by the enemies of
both. It is not difficult to convey to the sovereigns false re
ports that risings are intended, and to create in their minds

ADVICE TO ITALY. 3
unfounded impressions that revolutionary plots are in agitation.
On the other hand, the same agency may be employed to repre
sent to the people that their sovereigns are insincere in their
promises of concessions, and thus the people, being stimulated to
use force for the purpose of securing political reforms, the very
acts to which they may have been delusively led on may be con
verted into a pretext for depriving them of the objects of their
legitimate expectations.
It will be your duty to counteract, as far as possible, these
sinister efforts. You are instructed to say to the Minister that
the direction of the progress of reform and improvement is still
in the hands of the sovereigns, but that it is now too late for
them to attempt to obstruct reasonable progress ; and that re
sistance to moderate petitions is sure to lead ere long to the
necessity of yielding to irresistible demands. That it is better
for a Government to frame its measures of improvement with
timely deliberation, and to grant them with the grace of sponta
neous concession, than to be compelled to adopt, on the sudden,
changes perhaps insufficiently matured, and which, being wrung
from them by the pressure of imperious circumstances, invert
the natural order of things, and being of the nature of a capi
tulation of the sovereign to the subject, may not always be a
sure foundation for permanent harmony between the Crown and
the people.
To the popular leaders with whom you may have inter
course, you should use language of the same tendency and argu
ments drawn from the same considerations. You should tell
them that force put upon the inclinations of their sovereigns
will produce ill-will and repugnance, which must lead their
rulers, on their part, to be constantly looking out for an oppor
tunity of shaking off the yoke which they may have been obliged
to bear. That mutual distrust will thus be created between the
governors and the governed. That this distrust will break out
in overt acts on each side, intended perhaps defensively by those
by whom done, but regarded as offensive by the other party.
That open discord will thence ensue, and .foreign interference
may be the liltimate result.
It was imbued with these sentiments that Lord
Palmerston scanned the horizon, and one of the first
matters to attract his attention was the state of Swit
zerland. He naturally viewed with the greatest concern
the possibility of any such interference by the Great
B 2

4 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Powers with that free confederacy as might com
promise her political independence, or endanger the
position which she held as the home and refuge of
liberty on the Continent. His influence, as will be
seen, contributed very materially to avert any such
intervention. To understand the events which were occurring in
that country, it is necessary to remember that, up to
the commencement of the present century, the con
dition of a Swiss canton was like that of a feudal lord
with an aggregate of seigneurial and subject properties.
It had two councils, great and small, but the real
powers of government were all exercised by the small
or executive council, while the great or legislative
council had neither initiative, independence, nor pub
licity of debate. In 1846, of the 2,400,000 inhabitants
of Switzerland, about 900,000 were Eoman Catholics,
andthe remainder Protestants, while each ofthe twenty-
two cantons had an equal voice in the Diet whatever
the disparity as to size, wealth, or, we may add, intel
ligence. In the Catholic cantons the clergy enjoyed
great privileges and power, and the people generally
were in a state of ignorant submission to their direc
tions. The French Eevolution of 1830 gave an impetus to
a movement towards more liberal and popular institu
tions, and the Eadical party became speedily opposed
to the Conservative. The Eoman Catholic priests and
Jesuits in three of the small cantons took, as might
have been expected, an active part on the Conservative
side, and were incessant workers in a series of counter
revolutions. The introduction of the Jesuits into the important
canton of Lucerne, which had, up to the year 1844,
been free from their noisome presence, put the torch to
materials which had thus long been piUng up ready for
the flame. The seven Eoman Catholic cantons found
it necessary, if they wished to resist the decrees of the
rest of the Federation, to form themselves into a

TEOUBLES IN SWITZEELAND. 5
separate league — offensive and defensive. This new
Confederacy took the name of the ' Sonderbund.'
On the 20th of July, 1846, the Federal Diet voted
the Sonderbund illegal, and decreed, on the 3rd of Sep
tember, the expulsion of the Jesuits from the four can
tons of Lucerne, Schwytz, Freyburg, and Valais, in
which they were established. A civil war was the in
evitable consequence.
Meanwhile, however, the French Government had
proposed that England, France, Austria, Eussia, and
Prussia should make a collective declaration recom
mending the arbitration of the Pope in the dispute
about the Jesuits — proposing a conference for modify
ing the Federal compact, and announcing to the Swiss
Diet that if they refused these propositions and pro
ceeded with the war, the five Powers would consider
the Confederation as no longer existing — in other
words, a proposal to compel the Swiss by force of
arms to adopt the views of the Great Powers. Lord
Palmerston, on behalf of the British Government, re
fused to accept this proposal. He stood at first alone,
because the rights of Prussia over Neufchatel prompted
her to interfere, although, as a Protestant Power, she
felt no sympathy for the seceders ; and the Austrian,
followed by the Eussian, was not more with him than
the Frenchman. The view that Prince Metternich took
was, that the neutrality of Switzerland could only be
respected so long as she was one Federal Eepublic —
her neutrality being founded on her Federal consti
tution ; but the view of Lord Palmerston was, that her
independence would be equally necessary and equally
right whether she was federated or not. Metternich
and Guizot were both jealous of Switzerland becoming
a united and, therefore, powerful military state. They,
accordingly, secretly aided the seven cantons, and, in
the words of Lamartine, almost treated the Diet as a
' faction.' The matter was, no doubt, for a time one fuU of
anxieties. Mr. Morier had reported from Berne in

6 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
October, 1846: 'Altogether it may be safely affirmed,
that from this time forth the Federal Bund is virtually
dissolved, and Switzerland, as a political body, in a
state of decomposition ;' and Chevalier Bunsen, Prussian
Minister in London, becoming at length alarmed, wrote
to Lord Palmerston: 'Don't let the affair slip out of
your hands ; it is very serious.'
The following letter to Lord Minto, who had gone
on a mission to Italy, gives the views of the British
Government : — F. 0. . November 11, 1847.
If the Diet get possession of the canton of Ereybui'g and
dispose of the Jesuits there, it will go some way towards settling
the pending questions, and if the Diet can also get a fiiendly
Government established at Lucerne, and by that means drive
the Jesuits out of that canton, I should think that they need
not very much care about their remaining in some of the smaller
cantons. But the best would be if the Pope would take some
step to induce them to evacuate Switzerland altogether.
Brogiie ' says that there will be no difficulty in getting the
Pope to take some steps about the Jesuits, but then he says that
they are not the real object, but only a pretence, and that when
they are got rid of some other demand will be made which will
be found unreasonable. I say, in reply, yield to-day that which
is reasonably asked, and resist to-morrow that which you will
be borne out in resisting, but do not let us put ourselves in the
wrong to-day merely for fear that we may find ourselves in the
right to-morrow. I send you copies of the communication which
we have received from the Erench Government on Swiss .affairs ;
I am going immediately to write an answer. It will be in
substance that we are willing to join the other Powers in an
endeavour to put an end to the civil war by an offer of media
tion, but not willing to meddle with the revision of the Federal
compact. But that before the five Powers make a joint offer of
mediation, it seems desirable that they should be agreed as to
the conditions of settlement which they would think fair between
the parties. That our notion is this : We think that the Jesuit
question is a political as well as, and much more than a reUoious
question, and that it is at the bottom of the whole of the present
quarrel. We therefore propose that the Sonderbund cantons
' French ambassador in London.

THE JESUITS IN SWITZEELAND. 7
should declare themselves ready to abide by any decision which
the Pope may make on that question, and that the five Powers
should pledge themselves to the Diet to use 'all their influence
at Rome to obtain from the Pope the recall of the Jesuits from
the whole of Switzerland, they receiving, of course, compensa
tion for lands or houses which they might be thus obliged to
leave. This grievance removed, we should propose that the
Diet should renounce all hostile intentions against the seven
cantons, and should renew their often-made declaration that
they acknowledge and mean to respect the sovereignty of the
separate cantons of which the Confederation is composed. This
done, the Sonderbund having no further pretence for their
union, that union should be dissolved, and then the whole matter
is settled. The Swiss would then go to work, in the manner
prescribed by the Federal compact, to make any alterations or
improvements in that compact which they might wish or want.
I do not expect that the five Powers will agree to this scheme ;
for Austria, Prance, and perhaps Russia take part openly with
the Sonderbund, and Guizot's despatch only repeats the propo
sition made by the Sonderbund, and rejected by the Diet, and
any proposal to that effect made by the five Powers would of
course share the same fate. Guizot's object, of course, is to try
to put the Diet apparently in the wrong, so as to afford him
and Austria some kind of pretext for violent measures after
wards. The draft of note is a paraphrase of the manifesto of
the three Powers last year about the extinction of Cracow. I
could not possibly put my name to such a paper, and I wonder
how Guizot would defend himself to the deputies for having put
his name to it.
And on November 17 he writes to the same : —
Guizot will have to choose between us and the three Powers ;
for I conclude that his draft of note was suggested by Austria.
Russia will follow Austria ; and the Prussian Government have
at once accepted his plan. Brogiie, however, says his own per
sonal and private opinion is with us ; and it seems to me that
pubUc opinion in Prance would not go along with Guizot in the
course he has proposed to us. We shall lie on our oars till we
get an answer from Paris to the despatch which went thither
last night. In the meantime, if the Pope would take any steps
about the Jesuits, he would increase the chances of peace ; but
they have gone too far in Switzerland to admit of a settlement
on the principle of the mere recall of the Jesuits from Lucerne.

8 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
France having accepted the modifications proposed
by Lord Palmerston in the plan of mediation, he writes
to Lord Ponsonby at Vienna on the 20th : —
F. 0. : November 20, 1847.
You -n-ill see that the French Government are willing to
agree to our proposal as to the offer of mediation between the
contending parties in Switzerland. The explanations which
they wish us to accept, and to which we have no objection, are,
that the Jesuits should be withdrawn, by the joint concurrence
of the seven cantons and of the Pope. All we require is, that
the foundation of the arrangements should be that the Jesuits
should be removed from the whole of the territory of the Con
federation, because we are now quite convinced that things have
now gone so far, and poptdar feeling has been so strongly roused
against them, that unless they leave Switzerland entirely there
is no chance of peace in that country. The next explanation of
the French is, that they understand the separate sovereignty of
the confederated cantons to carry with it the result, that no
change can be made in the Federal compact without the consent
of all the cantons, and they hold that this principle ought to
be admitted by the Diet. We think this reasonable, and are
willing to agree to it as the foundation of the settlement which
is to be proposed. The French, thirdly, say that, in agreeing
to our proposal that the refusal of the joint offer of mediation, if
it should be unfortunately refused, is not to be used as a pretext
for armed interference, they must make this reserve, that all
parties are to remain after such refusal possessed of all the rights
in regard to measures with respect to Switzerland which they at
present possess. To this we can, of course, make no objection.
The French agree to the conference being in London, and
we hope that P. Metternich will not object to this. I do not
think that we should willingly consent to join a conference to
be held anywhere but here.
Meanwhile, however, the capture of Freyburg by
the forces of the Diet under General Dufour brought
the war to an abrupt termination, and obviated the
necessity of the proposed mediation. Lord Palmer
ston's object had been gained, and the delay had been
of incalculable service to the cause of Swiss inde
pendence.

BEITISH POLICY IN SWISS AFFAIES. 9
Sir Stratford Canning, who was on his way to his
post at Constantinople, had been instructed by Lord
Palmerston to take Berne on his way, where his cha
racter and abilities might be of service in enforcing
the counsels of the English Foreign Office. Lord Pal
merston writes to him : — F. 0. . December 18, 1847.
I hope you may be able to persuade the Diet to give up
their vindictive measures against their opponents at Freyburg
and Lucerne. It really would be very disgraceful of them if
they made such a bad use of their victory ; and they might re
member that the wheel of fortune has many turns, and that it
might happen that, in some future change of things, the measure
which they now mete out to others might be measured back
again to themselves. At all events, such confiscations and
punishments leave enduring resentments and perpetuate party
animosities, without any counterbalancing advantage, except
to the individuals who thus transfer to themselves the property
which rightfully belongs to others. Besides, there is not in
this case a shadow of a principle to justify their proscriptions.
If a set of Russian, or Polish, or Galician nobles revolt against
their sovereign, they are clearly on the wrong side of the law ;
and if they fail, they must abide by the consequences. If a
Polignac violates the constitution of his country, and fails in
his attempt, he may partly be made to pay in person and in
fortune the penalty of his illegal acts. But in the case of Frey
burg and Lucerne there was no violation of the laws of the
canton. There was a decision taken by the sovereign authority
of the canton which the Federal Government thought at variance
with the Federal obligations and engagements of those cantons ;
but this cannot, by any fair construction of words, be called
high treason. Treason means the violation of some duty to
wards the sovereign power of the state of which the accused is
citizen or subject ; but such a crime cannot be committed by
the government of a sovereign state towards the confederates
of that state. Freyburg and Lucerne were not subjects of the
Confederation, and could not be guilty of high treason towards it.
There being still some danger of an Austrian inter
vention, Lord Palmerston sent the following to Lord-
Ponsonlay : —

10 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. F. 0. ; December 21, 1847.
It seems to me, from Canning's accounts of his conversa
tions with Ochsenbein,' that the Swiss will pursue a more
moderate Hne of conduct than at first appeared likely ; and it
seems quite certain that they will afford the four Powers no
valid reason for interference. At the same time, I wish you to
lose no opportunity of endeavouring to dissuade Metternich
from any attempt of the kind. He could not interfere without
France doing so too ; and whatever may be the professions or
even the sincere intentions of Louis Philippe and Guizot, he
may depend upon it, as sure as he is alive, that any interference
of France in the internal affairs of Switzerland would turn to
the account of France, and would be adverse to the interests of
Austria. In fact, if French troops were to enter Switzerland, they
would sympathise with the Liberals, and not with the party
which Mettemich would wish to favour. If there is one
maxim of policy which Metternich ought to hold by more than
another, it is to keep the French out of Switzerland and out of
Italy ; but if Austrian troops enter one or the other, French
troops will follow, and Austria will rue the day when she paved
the way for such a military movement by France.
Spain was once described by the Duke of Welling
ton as the only country where two and two did not
make four, and the unexpected events of which it has
so often been the theatre might appear to justify the
assertion. Few of them, however, have been so whim
sically sudden, or so uselessly mischievous, as that which
towards the end of the year 1846 startled and irritated
England under the name of the ' Spanish Marriages.'
Queen Isabella and her sister the Infanta were
young and unmarried. To secure the succession it
was necessary to find them husbands. The question in
debate was, who these were to be.
It had been the settled policy of England — as
indeed of the other European Powers — ever since the
War of the Spanish Succession, to provide against the
contingency of a union of the crowns of France and
Spain, in the person of one sovereign or in the same
' President of the Diet.

THE SPANISH MAEEIAGES. 11
Hne, and the Treaty of Dtrecht gave solemn expression
to this agreement. The rulers of England felt that,
bad as it was for her in the last century to find herself
engaged in differences and wars with Spain, not upon
Spanish but upon French grounds, it would be still
worse now, when France occupied 500 miles of the
opposite coast of Africa with a large naval station at
Algiers. It was held, therefore, to be a great and
paramount object with us, that Spain should be com
pletely independent, and that her policy should not be
founded upon French considerations; so that if ever
we found ourselves at war with France, we should not
merely on that account find ourselves involved in war
with Spain also. Lord Palmerston, therefore, when he
succeeded Lord Aberdeen at the Foreign Office, re
iterated the views which had been expressed by his
predecessor, and which had elicited from the French
Government distinct pledges that no son of Louis
Philippe should marry Isabella, or even the Infanta
until the succession to the Spanish throne had been se
cured by the Queen becoming a mother. These pledges
were in the autumn of 1846 broken both in their
letter and spirit. It was suddenly announced that the
Queen would marry her cousin, Don Francisco, and
that her sister would on the same day become the wife
of the Duke of Montpensier, the youngest son of the
King of the French. Apart from the discreditable
breach of faith which characterised this intrigue, the
peculiar foulness of the transaction lay in the fact that
the French King and his Minister had ascertained that
there could be no issue of the marriage between the
Queen and her cousin, and calculated on securing by a
disgusting fraud that which they were solemnly bound
by their own engagements to prevent. Yet Guizot's
ideas of right and wrong, of honour and dishonour,
had become so warped by his feelings of antagonism to
Lord Palmerston, that, regardless of the universal con-,
demnation which his conduct and that of his master
elicited both in England and throughout Europe, he

12 LIFE OP LOED PALMEESTON.
actually boasted to the French Chamber, when they
met, that the Spanish marriages constituted the first
great thing France had accomplished completely single-
handed in Europe since 1830. Eetribution, however,
soon fell on all concerned, and the objects aimed at
were not attained. Montpensier's wife never came to
the throne, while Louis Philippe had to descend from
his own. The fall of his Government and of his dynasty
was undoubtedly hastened by the position of isolation,
distrust,, and contempt in which they were placed by
this act and by the feelings which it provoked among
the French people themselves as well as abroad. Eng
land only suffered in this respect, that from the date
of this transaction the close alliance between the two
countries was broken — distrust succeeded to confidence,
causing, indeed, one of those periodical invasion scares
to which the English people are liable — and the abso
lutist courts of Europe took advantage of this state of
things to carry out their high-handed proceedings in
Poland and elsewhere.
The following letter is amongst the first private
papers of Lord Palmerston after his return to office.
It is interesting, because we see in it the germ of his
policy as to Italy, which found so many detractors and
defenders. He foresaw that if Eome remained as it
was, a French army would eventually enter it. He
foresaw also, that if Italy remained as it was, a war
between France and Austria was inevitable : —
Foreign Office : July 30, 1846.
My dear John Russell, — I send you a copy of the Memo
randum which, in 1831, was presented to the Pope on behalf of
the five Powers, and which was defeated by adverse influences,
although the recommendations which it contains were entirely
approved by Cardinal Bemetti and others in authority at
Rome. The matter is really one of great and serious importance,
and has bearings much more extensive than at first sight
might appear. Italy is the weak part of Europe, and the next
war that breaks out in Europe will probably arise out of Italian

DISTUEBANCES IN ITALY. 13
affairs. The government of the Papal States is intolerably
bad ; nothing can make men submit to such misrule, but phy
sical force and despair of external assistance.
These States had formerly municipal institutions of great
antiquity, which gave them much civil security. These insti
tutions were swept away by the French invasion, and were not
re-established at the peace of 1815. Outbreaks and insurrec
tions and conspiracies bave followed each other in rapid succes
sion, sometimes when there was, often when there was not, a
prospect of succour from without. The French Revolution of
1830 produced an explosion in the Roman States, and that
explosion led to the conferences out of which the Mem. arose.
Nothing was done, and discontent has more than once been since
manifested by overt acts. Leave things as they are, and you
leave France the power of disturbing the peace of Europe when
ever she chooses. Two or three millions of francs, properly
applied, will organise an insurrection at any time, and the as
cendancy of the Liberal party at Paris, whenever it may happen,
either by the result of an election or by the death of the lang,
wiU soon be followed by an outbreak in Italy. That is the
point to which the French Liberals look ; they know that if
they tried to get back to the Rhine they would have against
them all Germany united, Russia, and more or less England ;
but in supporting an insurrection in Italy against Papal mis-
government, they would stand in a very different position.
England would probably take no part against them ; Prussia
would not stir a foot ; Russia would not be very active, and,
perhaps, secretly not displeased at anything that might humble
and weaken Austria. But Austria would interfere, and could
scarcely help doing so, even though not very efficiently backed
by Russia ; France and Austria would then fight each other in
Italy, and France would have all the Italians on her side. But
the war, begun in Italy, would probably spread to Germany,
and, at all events, we can have no wish to see Austria broken
down and France aggrandised, and the military vanity and love
of conquest of the French revived and strengthened by success.
If these things should happen, and they may not be so distant
as many may suppose, people will naturally ask what the Whig
Government of 1846 was about, and why they did not take
advantage of the liberal inclinations of the new Pope to en
courage and induce him to make reforms, which, if then made,
might have prevented such events. I own that I for one should
be altogether at a loss for any answer to such an interrogation.

14 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
If, on the other hand, we take the step which I propose to take
towards the other four Powers, we shall either succeed or fail.
If we succeed in getting any one or more to join us, I believe
we shall be doing a thing agreeable, as well as useful^ to the
Pope, and shall strengthen and support him in effecting reforms
which every enlightened member of the Roman Government
has long seen and acknowledged to be necessary. If, on the
contrary, we faU, and if all four should refuse to do anything,
we shall at least stand justified, and shall be able to show that
we are wholly absolved from the responsibility of any misfor
tunes which may hereafter arise from that quarter.
Far from being animated by the passions of the
revolutionist — as it was the fashion of party then to
describe him — Lord Palmerston wished to turn revolu
tion everywhere aside by compromise.
His error, if error it was, consisted in thinking that
a government of priests would willingly resign any
portion of their power to laics ; and that men of the
istamp of Mazzini and his disciples would care two
straws about moderate constitutional government.
The first idea was to open diplomatic relations with
Eome, and send a regular ambassador. No regular
ambassador or minister, however, was ever named ; and
thus Lord Minto was ultimately sent on a special
mission, which will presently be spoken of. The affairs
of Italy were not alone in demanding attention at this
time. In Portugal, the intrigues of France and Spain
to undermine the traditional influence of England
had created a confused variety of factions ; whilst the
want of tact and judgment on the part of the Court,
both as to the measures it adopted and the men it em
ployed, had produced dissatisfaction, terminating in
insurrection. The civil war which broke out with the
revolutionary supreme Junta was caused by the alTbi-
trary acts of the Eoyal Government, who hoped for a
Spanish intervention in their behalf. As the Crown
could neither subdue the rebels, nor the rebels triumph
over the Crown, the country was in a state of anarchy
amidst which the Queen was not unlikely to lose her

CIVIL WAE IN POETUGAL. 15
throne, and Portugal its last chance of reviving pros
perity. Lord Palmerston's endeavours, from October, 1846,
to the following .March, were directed to persuade the
Portuguese Government to come to terms with the
Junta, and to prevent Spain from interfering by force
of arms. In the spring of 1847, he found that the
Portuguese Government would not come to terms with
the Junta, and that the Spanish Government would
interfere, in spite of England, if the throne of Donna
Maria should be in imminent danger. None could
deny that her throne was in such danger, and that the
whole country was going to ruin by reason of the war.
The British Cabinet therefore, at last, determined to
intervene, and, in conjunction with the naval forces of
France and Spain, brought the conflict to an end on
the basis of an amnesty and the constitution. By this
means, while serving the interests of British commerce.
Lord Palmerston was enabled to secure to the Portu
guese nation those concessions which would not have
been made if Spain had interfered singly at the request
of the Absolutist Party, and saved the Portuguese
Government from that political dependence on Spain
which would have been the result of obligations due to
her alone.
A more glaring violation of the Whig principle of
non-intervention could hardly be cited ; but it was a
useful one, and served to add to the many proofs that
might be given of the absurdity of establishing general
theoretic rules to be practically applicable to every
variety of case. In the mutable condition of human
affairs there is but one universal doctrine that a states
man should preach to a sensible people — the necessity of
acting in such a manner as, according to circumstances,
may be the best for the particular country he governs,
and most advantageous to mankind at large.
The following correspondence gives somewhat more
in detail a consecutive account of the action taken by
the British Government in the matter : —

16 LIFE OF LOED tALMEESTON. Foreign Office : Oct. 30, 1846.
My dear Normanby, — I am this afternoon returned from
Windsor, where I have been for two days. The Queen and
Prince are very anxious and uneasy about the state of Portugal.
We send off to-morrow Colonel Wylde, who goes in the Cyclops,
from Portsmouth to Oporto and Lisbon, to see and report on
the state of things, and we shall order a reinforcement of our
naval force in the 'lagus. But this is all we can at present do,
and our interference must be confined to giving advice and
taking care of the personal safety of the Queen. It is a most
unfortunate state of things ; but I trust the danger is somewhat
exaggerated ; still it is great ; and what makes matters worse,
it has been brought on by the folly of the Court, instigated I
believe by the German tutor, Diez. ' It was foreseen that, if
the elections went on and the new Chambers should meet, one
of their first acts would be to address the Queen to remove the
intermeddling tutor. Thereupon he set to work to secure him
self, little caring for or little foreseeing the danger in which he
was involving the King and Queen. The only way, as he
thought, to avoid the address was to prevent the meeting of the
Cortes, this could only be done by getting rid of the Govern
ment which was pledged to call them ; the way in which that
could be accomplished was by making a coup d'etat ; and so it
was made, against the advice of all persons whose judgment was
worth having, and without consulting Lord Howard, because
they knew he would have been against it ; and contrary to the
opinion of our Court, though I believe that opinion arrived too
late. Carlton Terrace : Nov. 1, 1846.
My dear Normanby, — We have heard of Parker's arrival
at Lisbon, with his whole squadron, so that our naval force in
the Tagus wiU now be respectable. No doubt his presence will
produce a useful effeqt ; when people see a strong force, they do
not exactly know how far such a force may be authorised to act
and they fear the worst, and guide themselves accordinslv.
Parker will be instructed to protect the persons of the Roval
Family, if they should be obliged to take refuge on board theii-
own Ime-of-battle ship in the Tagus, or on board one of ours •
and in case of need he will be authorised to garrison the fort of
Belem with his marines ; but you had better say nothing about
' This gentleman had been placed by his family about the vouno-
King. ¦' =

INFLUENCE OF CABEAL'S POLICY. 17
this latter point, lest the French should intrigue to prevent it.
But if you should hear of its having been done, you will know
that it will have been sanctioned by the British Government.
Rothschild said to me last night that he heard from Paris that
the Government there said they should not mind our squadron
going into the Tagus provided we did not send any land troops.
I think they can hardly have said this, because they know well
that we are bound by old and special treaties with Portugal,
and that if the casus fcederis were to arise we should not inquire
whether the French Government minded or not that which we
might feel ourselves called upon by our treaty engagements
to do. It had been under the influence and auspices of
Costa Cabral, who was once termed in a debate in the
House of Commons the ' Jonathan Wild ' of European
diplomatists, and who had started life as a furious
Liberal, that the Portuguese Government had entered
on their course of exasperating tyranny. Soon after
Cabral had been compelled to fly, the Marquis de Sal-
danha occupied the post of President of the Council,
but he succeeded to the taint of Cabral's policy and
reaped its fruits. The head-quarters of the rebels
under the revolutionary supreme Junta of Government
was at Oporto. Lord Palmerston, on the eve of an
attack upon that place by the Eoyal troops, determined
to try to negotiate between the parties, and so avoid
the loss of life and property which the capture of
Oporto by storm would necessarily involve. He vwote,
therefore, to Colonel Wylde, under the date of January
26, 1847, instructing him to go to Oporto and to enter
on the following negotiation :- —
The basis of negotiation must be a declaration and engagement
made by the Queen, to you, as the representative in this matter
of the British Government, that immediately on the termination
of the civil war, she will establish constitutional government,
and call a Cortes without delay. Unless this assurance is given
in the most formal and positive manner, we cannot meddle with
the matter. She ought, I think, also to assure us that she
will not, for the present at least, bring into office the Cabrals,
against whom the revolt has taken place. Of course she would
VOL. II. C
^1

18 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
not be expected to exclude them for ever ^om pow; then-
turn may come ; but to replace ^^^^ ^^^ ^^.^^'^^^ttht^^'se
tate and provoke a large portion of the country, vv
assurances in your hand, you may be well entitled to urge the
Junta to lay down their arms and submit to ^^^^ Q^eens^u
thoritv Of course they would say, the assurances given may
be sSfac?ory a^ to theLtion, but what is to become of us as
individuals, and how are we to be secured ( -r think be
The general basis of the conditions should, I thmk, De
amneX forX m-s of the ins^n-gents ; precautions as to some
^le chiefs and leaders. That security was wisely and M
stated in Saldanha's Articles to consist in their temporary
fe&em^t from Portugal ; the military so retirmg to have half-
^avfm their support." For the civilians no provision was pro-
?:LX SaldaZ^ because, I P---«' j^-'tr tnd tlel
of them' had means of their own; and I "^f^^.^^^^Jff; f°^
granted, that no confiscations or sequestrations of pioperty^e
thou-ht of. The difficulty, and it is one which we m this
countrv h^c no personal knowledge which would enable us to
X is how far these voluntary and temporary banishmente
aret^'o There may be a certain number of men whom it
Tolie better for their own sakes and for the peaceof the
.<;ountry for a short time to remove from Portugal. But il the
^Us made large, and I think Saldanha's Articles make it much
too comprehensive, the Queen will lose the services of many
men who, though they have been opposed to her Government
and Ministers on the present occasion might, when the conte t
is over, become very useful servants of the Crown ; and it must
also be remembered that if all the leadmg men of the Liberal
party are to be compelled to leave the country, though only tor
a time, the conduct of affairs must necessarily fall mto the
hands of the opposite set of men, who haye been clearly proved
to be hateful to a large portion of the nation ; and that is not
the way to restore contentment in the country.
Sir Hamilton Seymour had now succeeded Lord
Howard as English Minister at Lisbon.
Carlton Gardens : Feb. 6, 1847.
My dear Seymour,— The Queen should remember that un-
r .s she shows herself to be the sovereign of the whole nation,
..ne cannot expect the whole nation to regard and love her as
their sovereign ; and that a throne whose stabihty rests on the
point of the bayonet has a very ticklish and uncertain basis.

BANEFUL INFLUENCE OF DIEZ. 19
Pray preach all these things, and such others as may occur to
you in the same spirit ; and make the Court and the Govern
ment clearly and distinctly understand that they must expect
no support from England to help them to continue a system of
misgovernment ; and that England will take care that no sup
port for that purpose is given them by Spain.
Foreign Office : Feb. 17, 1847.
' Moncorvo has written for full powers to conclude some fresh
engagement, if necessary, in the event of Don Miguel's returning
to Portugal ; but pray warn the Court against giving in to the
delusion that they wiU by such means obtain aid against the
Junta and the Liberal party ; we shall take uncommon good
care to prevent that. If the Queen fears Don Miguel, she must
make haste to make up matters with the Junta, and to be able
to unite all the parties who are for constitutional government
in a compact band against the adherents of Don Miguel. If
Portugal is to be governed despotically and by sword and bayonet,
a man is as good as a woman for such purpose, and it matters
little whether the despot is called by one Christian name or
another. Pray make this very civUly to be understood by the
King and Queen ; and endeavour also to explain to them in
courtly terms that the sending off the Torres Vedras prisoners
to the coast of Africa' has done the Queen irreparable injury in
public opinion here ; and if it turns out that they ai'e sent to a
milder destination, you may observe how unfortunate it is that
the Queen should have incurred unnecessarily the odium of a
severity which she did not mean to inflict.
I hope and trust that Diez will be shipped off too ; but
the ' evil that men do lives after them,' and the mischief done
by Diez will continue to be felt long after he has re-crossed the
Bay of Biscay. It will be something gained, however, not to
have such an evU counsellor always at the Royal ear ; and
better advisers will have more chance of swaying decisions upon
new events as they arise.
I am inclined to think that Miguel has no intention at
present of going to Portugal, and that he will not do so untU,
and unless, there is a considerable force in the field under his
banners. He came overland from Italy as servant to a Captains'
Bennett, and arrived here on the 2nd inst. from Calais.
• They had capitulated on honourable terms, but were shipped off to
Angola. c 2

20 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. Foreign Office : Feb. 26, 1 S47.
I wish you to press in the strongest manner upon the
Queen and King, and on any of the people about them who may
be worth talking to, that it becomes every day more and more
absolutely necessary for them to make overtures to the Junta,
and to come to some amicable settlement, so as to put an end to
the civil war. Tell them plainly that if they speculate upon a
Miguelite insurrection, to bring in foreign troops to put down
the Junta, they deceive themselves. We shall take good care
that any measures to be adopted against Miguel, if he should
return to Portugal, which he will probably not do, shall not
be perverted into an interference between the Camarilla and
Junta, between whom in reality the civil war is waged.
Tell them as to our guaranteeing a loan, they might as well
ask us to give them a slice of the moon.
The only way in which the Queen can make herself strong
against Miguel is by rallying again round her that portion of
her subjects by whose exertions, devotion, and sacrifices she was
placed upon the throne ; but if the Constitution on which she
rode in triumph is to be abrogated, and despotism is to be set
up in its stead, such of the Portuguese vho are for despotism
will naturally say that it is Miguel, and not Maria, who is best
entitled to be their despotic sovereign.
In the following Memorandum, Lord Palmerston
puts on record the views which were afterwards embodied
in the formal Convention of Ma.j, made between Eng
land, France, Spain and Portugal: —
Carlton Gardens r March 25, 1847.
I entirely concur in the view taken by Lord John Russell,
of the nature of the present state of affairs in Portuo-al, and of
the bearing of the letter and spirit of the Quadruple Treaty
upon that state of things ; and I am decidedly of opinion with
him, that ' there is at present no case for interference, either by
the letter or the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty.'
But it may be argued, by those who ask for interference
that there may be ground for such interference, independently
of that treaty, upon general principles of policy, and not in
virtue of any anterior engagements. The Quadruple Treaty
itself was, it may be said, the record of a determination taken
upon general grounds of policy, and was not the fulfilment of

INTEENATIONAL EIGHTS IN CIVIL WAE. 21
any anterior engagement ; and the question may be asked, is
there now a sufficient reason for interfering by force of arms in
the civU war in Portugal, on grounds of general policy, and
withoub reference to any anterior engagements ?
It is acknowledged by writers on the Law of Nations that,
when civil war has been regularly established in any country,
and when the nation has been divided into two contending
armies, and has been marshalled in two opposing camps, foreign
States may treat the conflicting parties in the same manner as if
they were two separate nations ; and may allowably side with
one or the other party in the civil war, as they would with one
or the other belligerent in a war between two independent
nations. The right to do so is acknowledged to exist in all
such cases; the expediency of doing so must depend on the
oircumstances of each particular case.
The decision of any third party in such a case must depend,
upon the answer which it could give to two questions — Fii'st,
Is the cause of the party whose side we think of taking, a just
one 1 Secondly, Is it for our interest to give that just cause
active assistance 1
Now, in the case of a civil war which originates in a dis
puted succession, both of these questions may generally be
answered without difficulty, either one way or the other. _ The
Government of a foreign State may easily make up its mind as
to which party is right in regard to a disputed succession,
because the facts upon which the decision is to turn are known
as well out of the country where the dispute exists as in it; and
the interest which such foreign Government may have in the
matter can be easily appreciated. Such was the case out of
which the Quadruple Treaty arose. The civil war arose out of
a disputed succession in Portugal and in Spain ; and the inte
rest which England had in the matter was a matter of compai-a-
tively plain and simple calculation.
But it is different when a civil war arises out of a contest
between political parties in a country, who differ in regard to
principles and forms of government, and who, without pretend
ing to change the reigning dynasty, stand up for different
systems of internal organisation.
It is more difficult, in such a case, for the Government of
another country to pronounce with certainty that either party
in such a civil war is absolutely in the right; and when the
struggle for conflicting systems of government is mixed up with
mutual accusations of Ulegal or unconstitutional proceedings,

22 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the task of ju:dging between them is rendered still more difficult.
In such a case, too, it is far less easy to answer the second of th&
above-mentioned questions, even after having formed an opinion
on the first ; for, supposing the right to be pretty clearly on
one side or the other, there are a vast number of considerations-
to be taken into account before a foreign Government could
decidedly determine that it was for its well-understood interests
to interfere by force of arms. But this is the present case of
Portugal ; and there would be much difficulty for the English
Government to answer the two foregoing questions affirmatively
in favour of the Queen of Portugal. At the same time, England
has a great interest in the welfare of Portugal as a State ; and
the present course of events seems likely to ruin Portugal for a
long time to come as a European Power.
Is there, then, any way open for England by which, with-
, out violating principles on which her foreign policy has always
been founded, and without taking steps which would make
enemies of the majority of the Portuguese nation, she might
speedily put an end to this disastrous war 1
England has offered the Queen of Portugal mediation
between her Government and the Junta; the offer has been
declined, because Marshal Saldanha does not choose the war to
end by negotiation and reconcilement, and because he insists
upon it that what is plainly the minority of the nation shall, by
aid of a Spanish force, be enabled to crush the majority. But
such an end would not be lasting ; the defeated majority would
wait their opportunity, and, whenever a party sympathising
with them should rise to power in Spain, they would again try
the fate of arms in Portugal. Saldanha's plan is, therefore,
objectionable in policy, as well as in principle.
But might not the English Government renew its offer;
but giving to its offer the character of arbitration rather than
of mediation 1 Might some such communication as the following
be made to the Queen ? — The course you are following is fatal,
end as it may ; for it is evident that it will not end in your
Majesty's triumph over the Junta and their adherents, by your
own means. England is your ancient ally, and is bound to
come to your aid in times of difficulty and danger. She is ready
to do so now ; but you must allow her to prescribe for Portugal
such remedies as her disorders require. We demand, therefore
pf you carte hlanche as to the offers which we require you to
authorise us to make in your name to your revolted subjects.
. These offers, however, we intend to be generally these : General

ENGLAND DEMANDS AN AMNESTY. 23
annesty for all who shall tender their submission on or before a
specified day ; such amnesty, of course, to include retention of
titles, honours, and property ; and of military commissions,
either on full or half-pay, for officers, according to the discretion
of the Government ; and restoration to the Queen's service for
such non-commissioned officers and privates as choose to be so
restored. Some few, and very few — prohahly not above ten — of
the leading members of the Junta to retire for two or three
years froTTh Portiigal. A new Ministry to be formed, consisting
of men belonging neither to' the Junta nor to the Cabral
party. All edicts by which the Constitution has, in any of
its parts, or in the whole, been suspended, to be immediately
rescinded, and the Constitution, as it stood before the 6th of
October last, to be immediately restored. The Cortes to be
summoned to meet on some specified day, not too distant ; and
the elections to take place at a proper interval before their
meeting. M. Djiez to leave Portugal by the very next packet ;
and the system of Camarilla Government to be for ever left off.
If the Junta should agree to these terms, the civil war would
be over; and the fair and just demands of the Portuguese
nation would be satisfied. The Junta, therefore, might be told,
when those conditions were proposed to them, that if they should
refuse them, the British Government would then be prepared
to take an active part in favour of the Queen, and would join
its forces to hers in order to restore peace to Portugal. Of
course, in such case, the British Government must, however
inconvenient it might be to do so, guarantee to the Junta the
faithful performance of these conditions by the Queen; and
probably there would, in such a case, be no difficulty in en
forcing their execution. There can be Kttle doubt that such a
coiirse would put an end to the war in a fortnight after it was
resolved upon.
If the Queen should say that she could not adopt such a
plan, because Sa.ldanha would resign, the answer would be :
That plan would render his resignation a matter of indifference ;
but we will offer you Colonel Wylde to take his place at once,
or Colonel Wylde shall be Chef d'Etat-Major, to assist, with his
skill and judgment, any Portuguese General whom you may
place in nominal command.
If the civil war could be terminated in this manner, by
England alone, without Spanish or French interference, the
honour of the Queen would be saved, the liberties of the Por
tuguese nation would be respected, and the tie between England

24 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and Portugal would remain unbroken. The despatches received
this afternoon, from Lisbon and Oporto, seem to show the
urgency of some energetic measure for putting an end to the
calamities with which Portugal is now afflicted. PALMEESTON'.
Foreign Office : April 3, 1847.
My dear Seymour, — I send you instructions which I hope
will put an end to the civil war. The only difficulty which I
anticipate will be with the Queen, and with the people who
govern her without her knowing it. But the recent change of
Ministers at Madrid will probably help us,' because if the new
Ministers have any predilections towards Portugal, I should
think it might be rather towards Oporto than towards Lisbon.
At all events, we may be pretty sure that they will not let their
troops enter Portugal without our consent^ and, therefore, the
Queen of Portugal must feel that her chances of assistance from
Spain are much lessened, if not extinct. I trust she will agree
to our terms. If she does not, we must rest upon our oars, and
wait till one side or the other is fairly worn out by fatigue and
exhaustion. I say in my despatch that the amnesty ought to be full and
general ; and you should try all you can to get it made so. The
Queen must be made to understand that we are greatly streteh-
ing our established principles of foreign policy by engaging to
coerce the Junta in any case, and that unless she gives us the
broadest possible ground to take our stand upon, we could not
justify our course to Parliament and the country; and therefore
she ought to make the amnesty without exception.
There certainly was little in the conduct of the
British Foreign Office compatible with the principle of
non-intervention, and it was only on the ground that
we were saving the Sovereign from ruin, and the country
from confusion, and establishing something like a
system of liberality, moderation, and equity, that we
could justify our course ; but if we did that, we might
fairly contend that we did justify it, considerino- our
peculiar relations with Portugal, and admitting that
States, like individuals, have duties which may inspire
them with an interest in their neighbours' welfare.
' The Pacheco Government.

EESISTANCE OF THE PORTUGUESE COUET. 25
The Portuguese Government, however, as the next letter
shows, raised difficulties which were unworthy of them,
and fitting only the character of men who were being
saved in spite of themselves. F. 0. ; April 30, 1847.
My dear Normanby, — Our monetary affairs look better ;
panic is subsiding, and the funds rising ; and the notion, which
seems well founded, that the Emperor of Russia is going to
invest a few millions sterling of his hoardings in our funds has
had a cheering effect in the City to-day.
You will see that the Queen of Portugal, or rather her
advisers, stand out about sending a dozen men to live at the
expense of the Portuguese Government for six months at Paris.
If the subject-matter were less serious, one should call this
childish. It is infatuation. They seem determined to put the
throne of the Queen upon the result of a battle. If they have
the best of the flght, they will not essentially mend their position,
and if they have the worst of it, the Queen will be in great peril ;
and at all events, if saved by us, will undergo the humiliation
of submitting, after defeat, to terms which, before the battle,
she might have worn the appearance of imposing. If we were
merely messengers between the Government and the Junta, we
should willingly have conveyed the Queen's demand for the
temporary banishment of the sixteen or eighteen persons in
question, but we had taken the resolution to combine with
France and Spain to compel the Junta to submit, on the terms
to be announced to them. It was necessary that we should be
careful that the terms were such that a refusal of the Junta to
agree to them would justify us and our allies in undertaking the
conquest of Portugal, for such the compelling operation would
be ia the present temper of the Portuguese ; and whether that
conquest might be difficult or easy, whether a short or a long
operation, it would be an undertaking to which heavy responsi
bility woidd necessarily attach, and which the English Govern
ment at least ought to be able to justify to Parliament and to
the world. Now we think that, supposing, as is probable, that
the Junta should agree to submit on the terms offered them,
provided the amnesty were general, but should refuse to consent
to their own banishment, the expulsion for sis months of a
dozen and a half of men would not be an object of sufficient im
portance to justify the conquest and subjugation of Portugal in
order to attain it.

26 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Firmness, however, carried the day, as it usually
does when it has right on its side. F. O. : May 6, 1847.
My dear Seymour, — We have received your despatches,
giving us an account of the Queen's acceptance of our terms. I
am delighted ; it is indeed good news, and I trust we shall soon
hear that the Junta have accepted also, and that this calamitous
civil war has been brought to a close.
The Cortes ought to meet as soon as the preliminary arrange
ments can be made for it, and the sooner the Queen can substi
tute tongues for muskets, as instruments of civil and pohtical
strife, the better for her and her kingdom.
Saldanha's army is full of Cabralist officers. It is not very
likely that Saldanha and his officers should attempt any prank,
and fall back towards Lisbon, to coerce the Queen, and prevent
her from acceding to our terms ; but if he were to do so, he
might be told that we will coerce him just as readily as the
Junta, and that he had better take care what he is about.
The British fleet was now directed to protect the
Queen of Portugal's Government from an attack by the
Yiscount Sa da Bandiera, or any other of the leaders
of the Eevolutionary party. But Lord Palmerston con
sidered the desired work was only half done so long
as the constitution was dormant, and Parliamentary
government not firmly re-established. C. G. : May 26, 1847.
My dear Seymour, — I hope you vdll not have had occasion
to employ force to protect Lisbon from attack by Sa da Bandiera :
but if it has become necessary, I have no doubt it will have
been done with effect, and the means at Sir William Parker's
disposal will have proved amply sufficient. As to the demands
of the Junta, we must be as firm in resisting any unreasonable
pretentions of theirs as we were in refusing to comply with the
overstrained expectations of the Court. Napier has been ap
pointed to the St. Vincent, that he may go to Lisbon and take
the command there when Parker moves on to the Mediter
ranean. We want to collect a larger force within that sea than
we now have there ; and with Parker and Napier, both with their
flags flying there and thereabouts, we shall probably have Join
ville on his good behaviour.

SUBMISSION OF THE JUNTA. 27
C. G. : June 13, 1847.
Nothing can be more satisfactory than the course of things
in 'Portugal, as far as we have hitherto learned them, and I
trust that by this time the Junta will have submitted, and
Bandiera also, and that the people in Algarve and in the other
provinces having followed the example thus set them, the civil
war will have become completely ended, and tranquillity Will
have been entirely restored. Now then comes the time for
keeping a tight hand on the Portuguese Government, as to
the faithful and immediate execution of the four conditions,
which they must not, under any pretence whatever, evade.
The men now in power will try to put off the elections and
the meeting of the Cortes, because they will fear that the
elections will go against them, and that the majority in the
Cortes, being for the Liberal party, will turn them out, and put
another set of men in. But to this they must make their minds
up. What we have intended to do, and what the Portuguese
Government is pledged to us to do, is to transfer from the field
of battle to the floor of Parhament the conflict of political
parties in Portugal. The people, or at least a large portion of
them, said they had grievances which required redress. The
Queen's Government told them they should have no Parhament
in which to state and represent those grievances. The reply of
the people was natural and just : they flew to arms. Driven
from the hustings and from Parhament, they sought refuge in
the field. We have said to the Queen's Government that they
must give back a Parhament, and that then the people must
lay down their arms. The people have laid down, or are about
to lay down theh arms. The Queen must give back the Parha
ment ; upon this point there must be no mistake. C. G. : July 6, 1847.
I am just come home, at half-past one, from the House of
Commons, so my letter will not be long. I am glad to find
that the Oporto Junta have at last given in. This puts an end
to the civil war for the moment ; whether it will be renewed or
not depends on the Queen. If she fulfils faithfully her engage
ment, and governs in the true spirit of the Constitution, the
Liberal party may be content with wielding power according to
law ; and being no longer fearful of being stripped of it, may be
satisfied without upsetting or attacking the throne. But if the
Queen breaks faith, or allows herself to foUow the lead of the
Cabral party, she wiU be, as you said in a former letter, a

28 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
doomed woman. We must try to save her against her will and
against her tendencies; you cannot therefore be too firm in
insisthig upon the fulfilment both of the letter and spirit of the
Four Articles. The Torres Vedras prisoners must be sent for
immediately, and I would rather that an Enghsh ship of war
were sent to fetch them than that they were left to the careless
ness and delays of a Portuguese ship of war, such as it probably
would be, with ostensible orders for despatch, and secret in
structions to be slow. I should wish, therefore, that you and
Parker should determine at once to send off the Sidon, or any
other vessel of suitable dimensions, which Parker can spare, to
bring these people back, and the ship should be off immediately.
She ought to carry out orders open and unsealed, and none
others, to the Governors of Angola and Benguela, to collect and
give up all the prisoners at once, in order that they may be
brought back. ' A list of them should be sent, and the ship
should carry medical means for such as may be suffering from
wounds or sickness, and bedding and other accommodation for
them. The honour of the British Crown and the good faith of the
British Government is pledged to the strict fulfilment of the
Four Articles, and there must be no exceptions. You will see
that the tone of the debate last night was not a bit more
favourable to the Queen, her present Ministers, and the Cabral
party than the discussion which took place before. Moncorvo
came to me this morning, and was evidently nettled at the
things which were said, but I told him that Parliamentary pri
vilege has no limit.
Portugal was not the only case in which — non
intervention being laid down as the Whig rule — inter
vention was the exception. The war between Monte
Video and Buenos Ayres had long been the curse of
La Plata, aud not only injurious to the belligerents
themselves but to the trade of the world. The Speech
from the Throne, while Sir Eobert Peel was still in
office, announced an alliance between the French and
English Governments for the purpose of suppressing it.
This alliance was maintained by Sir Eobert's successor,
although Lord Palmerston clearly intimated to the
French that the game of Algiers was not to be played
over again in the river Plate ; and, though the agents of

SUGGESTED UNION OF SPAIN AND POETUGAL. 29
the two Governments differed wherever their instruc
tions enabled them to differ — the French showing a
decided partiality for the Monte Videans — the final
result was successful, and peace and commerce once
more expanded their wings in that quarter of the
world. In 1834 Prince Talleyrand had incidentally re
marked to Lord Palmerston that Spain had always
been to France in the same relation which Portugal
had stood to England. Monsieur Guizot is known to
have repeated the same sentiment in 1847, and, further,
to have indicated that such close dependence was one
of the principles of French foreign policy. It is not,
therefore, a matter of wonder that the prospect of the
succession of the Infanta with the Due de Montpensier
to the throne of Spain alarmed English statesmen, the
only alternative being Montemolin, son of Don Carlos,
symbol of absolute monarchy, and condemned before
hand by the Quadruple Treaty to be expelled the
country by foreign forces. Portugal, meanwhile, torn
by violent factions, offered a sorry prospect to those
who desired her independent stability. Thus it hap
pened that the idea of a union of Spain and Portugal
under a Portuguese Prince, after the death of the
Spanish Queen, found some favour. The view taken,
was that a great free State extending from the Pyrenees
to Lisbon would in all future times be a counterpoise
to France, and thus save Belgium and the Ehenish
provinces from the invading propensities of the French
democracy. It was also asserted that the Progressists
in Spain were ready to hold up their hands for the
Prince of Portugal as a successor to Queen Isabella.
Lord Palmerston, however, did not at all fall in with
this plan, as is shown in the following letter : —
Broadlands : August 9, 1847.
My dear John Russell, — With regard to the possible
union of Spain with Portugal, or, rather, the incorporation of
Portugal with Spain, it may be said that if Spain is not now

30 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
by itself a great free State forming a counterpoise to France,
and securing by that means Belgium and the Rhenish provinces,
it is not because Spain is not large enough in territory, popu
lation, and natural resources ; nor would the acquisition of
Portugal give her, in this respect, any means the want of which
cripples her at present, neither can it be said that by such in
corporation Spain would be freed from controlling dangers in
her rear which prevent her from facing France boldly to her
front ; because as long as Portugal is closely connected with
England, Portugal would be a help and not a clog to Spain in
the pursuit of such a pohcy. There seems no reason, therefore,
to think that Spain, after having swallowed up Portugal, would
be a bit more pohtically independent of France than she is or
will be, without having so absorbed her neighbour, and, con
sequently, the probable result of such an annexation would be,
that some fine day England would not only find Spain become
a satelhte of France, but would lose all the counterbalancing
resources which, in such a case, Portugal, as a separate State,
would afford us. Those advantages are many, great, and
obvious ; commercial, pohtical, military, and naval, and if we
were thus to lose them, some of them would not be mere loss,
but would become formidable weapons of attack against us in
the hands of a hostile Power. For instance, the naval position
of the Tagus ought never to be in the hands of any Power,
whether French or Spanish, which might become hostile to
England, and it is only by maintaining Portugal in its separate
existence, and in its intimate and protected state of alliance
with England, that we can be sure of having the Tagus as a
friendly instead of its being a hostile naval station. Only fancy
for a moment Portugal forming part of Spain, and Spain led
away by France into war vrith England, and what would be
our naval condition with all the porte from Calais to Marseilles
hostile to us, St. Malo, Cherbourg, Brest, Rochefort, Corunna,
Vigo, the Tagus, Cadiz, Carthagena, Port Mahon, Toulon, and
with nothing between us and Malta but Gibraltar, the capture
of which would be the bait which France would hold out to
Spain to induce her to go to war with us. If, on the contrary,
the Tagus were at our command, we should occupy an inter
mediate position greatly impeding the naval movements of
France and Spain. Perhaps, if the scheme of an Iberian Re
public could be realised, such a State might be more hkely to
remain independent of France than a Spanish Monarchy
promises to be ; 'but such a republic would soon fall back to be

'THE HOLY ALLIANCE' AND CEACOW. 31
a monarchy, and could not be created without sweeping away
two existing dynasties alhed to us by treaty engagements, and
for which France would certainly take the field.
Among the other matters which engaged the atten
tion of the Foreign Office at this time was the violence
done by the ' Holy Alliance ' to the Eepublic of Cracow.
In November 1845, a conspiracy was discovered in
Posen to restore the independence of Poland. An
advance was made in the early part of the following
year upon the city of Cracow, and the Senate applied to
Austria, Prussia, and Eussia for their intervention.
Austrian troops shortly after occupied the city, but
were quickly expelled, and Eussian troops, coming to
their assistance, recaptured it. Although the inde
pendence of the Eepublic had been guaranteed by the
Treaty of Vienna, the three protecting Powers pro
claimed its annexation to Austria in November 1846,
and thus accomplished the extinction of the last rem
nant of Polish nationahty.
Lord Palmerston says to Lord Normanby : —
Nov. 19, 1846.
I have prepared an answer about Cracow, which I shall
send off to Vienna without waiting for Guizot. Our answer is,
that we don't admit the necessity of doing what the three
Powers are going to do ; and that we deny their competency to
do it, and protest against it as a clear violation of the Treaty of
Vienna. It comes very awkwardly at the present moment.
Metternich has no doubt long intended it, and thinks the time
propitious when England and France have differed, and when
he thinks each would be wilhng to gain his support about Spain
by being easy with him about Cracow.
Guizot will make a show of resistance, but the fact is that
even if France and England had been on good terms, they have
no means of action on the spot in question, and could only have
prevented the thing by a threat of war, which, however, the
three Powers would have known we should never utter for the
sake of Cracow. The measure is an abominable shame, and
executed by the most hoUow pretences and the most groundless
assertions. I suspect that Prussia consents to it unwillingly; that

32 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Austria is urged on by her own covetousness and hatred of
freedom and independence, even in name, and is pushed on by
Russia, who wants to have an example set, which may here
after be quoted by her as an excusing precedent when she
swallows and assimilates the kingdom of Poland.
Foreign Office : Jan. 21, 1847.
My dear Ponsonby, — I have seen Hummelauer and have
had a preliminary conversation with him and Dietrichstein.
He is to send me his papers to read. I have told him that if
he is able to show that Cracow was the source of danger to the
Austrian dominions, and if I am authorised to publish the
proofs, that may go far to mitigate public opinion here ; though,
of course, the question will still remain why the three Powers
did not previously consult England and France, and the other
parties to the Treaty of Vienna ; and the stronger the case the
three Powers can make out for the necessity of some alteration
in the pohtical condition of Cracow, the less reason there was
for fearing that they should not obtain the consent of those
other Powers to some reasonable and fair arrangement.
Dietrichstein, Brunnow, and Bunsen stayed away from the
House of Lords when the Queen made her speech, and I think
that they were right," as it might have been unpleasant for them
to have stood by to hear their Courts taxed with having violated
a treaty.' During the first Session of 1847, Mr. Hume moved
a resolution condemning the conduct of Eussia, Prussia,
and Austria in the affair of Cracow, and declaring that
the payments to Eussia by Great Britain on account of
the Eusso-Dutch Loan should be discontinued on ac
count of her violation of the Treaty of Vienna without
any previous communication with this country. A long
discussion followed, one prominent feature of which was
an eulogium of the conduct of the three despotic Courts
by Lord George Bentinck as the leader of the Tory
party. In a letter to Lord Normanby, Lord Palmerston
' ' The extinction of the free State of Cracow has appeared to me to
be so manifest a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, that I have com
manded that a, protest against that act should be delivered to the
Courts of Vienna, Petersburg, and Berlin, which were parties to it.'
{Extract from, Queen's Speech, January 19, 1847.)

THEEATENED TEOUBLES IN CHINA. 33
says of this debate, ' Peel made a very good and very
friendly speech; George Bentinck distinguished him
self in his own way, in which he is likely also to extin
guish himself as a candidate for office.' Lord Palmerston
himself spoke very briefly, merely declaring that the
incorporation of Cracow by Austria was undoubtedly
a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and had received
universal condemnation, but that to meet it by such a
pecuniary fine upon the Eussian Government was, in
his opinion, neither a legal nor a dignified course of
action. Mr. Hume, after this, withdrew his motion.
The following letter ' is quoted because the course
we should pursue with Asiatic countries has sometimes
been questioned, and the principle maintained that
we should treat them exactly as we should European
states ; that is, according to a policy which they can
not understand, and will not appreciate. When their
notions and usages become European, then we should
of course deal with them as Europeans ; but as long
as their notions and usages are Chinese, Ave must
treat them as Chinese. The moral nature of these
Asiatics is the point to be considered, and that is not
dealt with in treatises on international law : —
Broadlands : January 9, 1847.
We shall lose all the vantage ground which we have gained
by our victories in China, if we take the low tone which seems
to have been adopted of late by us at Canton. We have given
the Chhiese a most exemplary drubbing, and that brought
them, not to their senses, because they never were deceived
as to what we were; but it brought them to leave off the
system of pretended contempt, under which they had so long
concealed their fear. They will not forget that drubbing in a
hurry, unless we set them the example by forgetting it ourselves ;
and we must take especial care not to descend from the rela
tive position which we have acquired. If we maintain that
position morally by the force of our intercourse, we shall not
be obliged to recover it by forcible acts ; but if we permit the
Chinese, either at Canton or elsewhere, to resume, as they will,
' To Sir John Davis.
VOL. II. D

34 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
no doubt, be always endeavouring to' do, then- former tone of
affected superiority, we shall very soon be compeUed to come to
blows with them again.
Of course we ought— and, by we, I mean all the English
in China — to abstam from giving the Chinese any ground of
complaint, and much more from anything hke provocation or
affront ; but we must stop on the very threshold any attempt
on theh part to treat us otherwise than as their equals, and
we must make them all clearly understand, though in the
civillest terms, that our treaty rights must be respected, unless
they choose to have their seaports knocked about their ears.
The Chinese must learn and be convinced that if they attack
our people and our factories they will be shot ; and that if they
illtreat innocent Englishmen who are quietly exercising their
treaty right of walking about the streets of (janton, they wUl
be punished. So far from objecting to the armed association,
I think it a wise security against the necessity of using force. ,
Depend upon it, that the best way of keeping any men quiet is
to let them see that you are able and determined to repel force
by force ; and the Chinese are not m the least different m this
respect from the rest of mankind.
The Irish famine occupied so entirely the attention
of the country and of Parliament that little else was
debated in the House of Commons during the session
of 1847. The subject of education, however, was taken
up by the Government, but they had to encounter the
jealousy which various Dissenting bodies felt at any
further sum being placed under the control of the
J]stablished Church.
When, therefore, Lord John Eussell proposed an
additional grant of 100,000Z., Mr. Duncombe moved an
amendment, not, as he stated, from want of confidence
in Her Majesty's Government, but from distrust in the
Committee of Privy Council, who were to administer
the grant. In spite of strong opposition the vote was
carried, and Lord Palmerston comments on this result
and on the general state of parties as follows : — '
You will have been as much surprised and pleased as we
have been at the division last night about the Education question.
' To Lord Normanby, April 23, 1847.

VICTOEIES IN THE PUNJAUB. 35
It does great honour to the House that, with a general election
coming on, and with a combination of Dissenters against our
measure, there should have been such an overwhelming majo
rity in favour of it ; and it is creditable to the Government that
the meaisure which it has proposed should have been intrinsi-
<!aUy so good, that the great body of the House should have
braved the displeasure of their constituents from approval of
the scheme. I do not suppose that the result of last night will
be equaUy gratifying to Louis Phihppe and Guizot. It must
convince them, however, that, for the present, we are the only
Government that can be found to stand; and, unless I am
much deceived, the general election wiU not materially alter
that state of things.
Peel seems to have made up his mind that for a year or
two he cannot hope to form a party, and that he must give
people a certain time to forget the events of last year ; ' in the
meanwhile, it is evident that he does not wish that any other
Government should be formed out of the people on his side of
the House, because of that Government he would not be a
member. For these reasons, and also because he sincerely
thinks it best that we should, for the present, remain in, he
gives us very cordial support, as far as he can, without losing his
independent position. Graham ^ — who sits up under his old
piUar, and never comes down to Peel's bench, even for personal
communication — seems to keep himself aloof from everybody,
and to hold himself free to act according to circumstances ; but,
as yet, he is not considered as the head of any party. George
Bentinck has entirely broken down as a candidate for minis
terial position ; and thus we are left masters of the field, not
only on account of our own merits, which, though we say it
ourselves, are great, but by virtue of the absence of any efficient
competitors. The battles of Moodkee, Sobraon, and Goojerat had
given us possession of the Punjaub. The question
arose whether we were to annex it. Lord Palmerston's
views as to this, and the opinions of Lord Hardinge
and the Duke of Wellington, are still interesting, as
bearing on the relations of England and Eussia in the
East. ' Eepeal of tlie Com Laws.
' Sir James Graham had been Home Secretary under Sir Eobert Peel.
n 2

36 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. Carlton Gardens : June 9, 1847.
My dear John Russell, — I return you Hardinge's letter
and the Duke of Wellington's. These two generals are great
mihtary authorities ; but the Duke is a far greater one than
Hardinge, of whose judgment I have no opinion, though his
bravery in the field is undoubted. Both seem to agree in
thinking that the Russians cannot conquer India, and in this
opinion they are clearly right. I do not think, however, that
Hardinge has demonstrated that the Russians might not give
us much trouble and put us to much expense in India.
I, would observe that Hardinge seems to think Scinde of
no value in a mihtary point of view, whereas the Duke con
siders the possession of it as a great security ; and, as regards
the Punjaub, Hardinge is evidently against our possessing it,
while, on the other hand, he says that the only gate through
which an invader could attack India is through the Khyber Pass,
which cannot be occupied and defended by us unless we do
possess the Punjaub ; and he shows the necessity for this, be
cause he says that it is only to the eastward of the Chenab that
a large army could find subsistence. It is only there, conse
quently, that we could station a large army ; and, therefore, as
the Khyber Pass, being narrow, could be penetrated by only one
column at a time, our best means of stopping an invading
enemy would be either to occupy the pass with a small force
beforehand, or to station a small force at the outlet of the passj
to attack in succession the heads of the columns of march as
they might open out into the plain. But, to do this, we must
have the country up to the pass ; for we could not in such a
case risk a small force three hundred miles from our main body
through a country which, not being ours, might at the moment
become hostile. If the Khyber Pass is the only gate to India,
and if it is there we are to defend India, we ought to have, and
must have, mihtary occupation of the country up to that gate ;
otherwise the pass is of no more defensive value to us than any
other defile which the invaders would have to pass between As-
trabad and Cabul. The advance of a Russian army is, however^? ,
far from being as impossible as Hardinge seems to think it.,
Persia must, I fear, now be looked upon as an advanced post
for Russia, whenever she chooses to make use of it. She wiU
command it either by overpowering force or by bribing the'
State by prospects of acquisitions in Afghanistan. There would
be no insurmountable difficulty to prevent Russia from assem^ ,
bhng a considerable force at Astrabad. The roads throut^h.

LOED HAEDINGE ON THE INDIAN FllONTIEE. 37
Persia are, good, and the Caspian gives additional facilities.
From Astrabad through Afghanistan are very practicable mih
tary roads ; and the distance from Astrabad to Attock is not
much, if at all, more than eight hundred miles, considerably
less than the distance from Attock to Calcutta.
A Russian force in occupation of Afghanistan might not
be able to march to Calcutta, but it might convert Afghanistan
into the advanced post of Russia, instead of that advanced post
being in Persia ; and, whatever Hardinge may say of the secu
rity of the rest of our frontier, you would find in such case a
very restless spirit displayed by the Burmese, by the Nepaulese,
and by aU the unincorporated States scattered about the surface
of our Inchan possessions. These things would lead to great
expense, would require great efforts, and might create consider
able damage. The best method of preventing these embarrass
ments seems to be to take up such a mihtary position on the
frontier, not in posse, as Hardinge would do, but in esse, as
would make it plain to everybody that we could not be taken
by surprise; that the decisive position could neither be snatched
from us by a rapid movement, nor be wrested from us by a
forcible assault.
Of course there are further considerations to which Har
dinge does not advert, namely, that while Russia was thus
marching on India, we should not be icUe in Europe ; but still
Russia is strong in her European defences, whether in the
Baltic or in the Black Sea, and it is well that we should be able
to defend India in Asia, as well as in Europe.
Extract from Letter of Lord Hardinge, dated Simla,
April 20, 1847.
As regards the intentions of Russia, I am confident no
hostile attempt will be made. They are confined to the exten
sion of her trade with China and parts of Central Asia. A
Russian force can only enter India through Afghanistan and
by the Khyber Pass.
A Persian and Afghan force intermixed with Russians, on
the same principle as in our Indian Army, would be required,
on the modern system of war, to be supported by a large and
well-equipped field-train of artillery, with all its numerous
stores. This modern necessity entails great difficulty in moving
an army through a sterile and mountainous country. The more
you attempt to make your army efficient in artillery in such

38 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
countries, the greater becomes your difficulty of rapidly moving
forward. If Russia could afford the means of getting through the
Khyber Pass vdth a well-equipped army, it must be an operation
of time, and could not be disguised. The concentration of om-
military means would be comparatively easy. We have now
50,000 men and 100 field pieces, and 100 siege guns, with 500
rounds a gun, on this frontier. We should have the choice of
meeting this Russian army where we pleased. Peshawur is a
very small and poor district; Attock still more; and the
country between the Indus and the Jehun, or Hydaspes, is so
poor and barren it could not support an army. Between the
Jehun and the Chenab, or Acesines, the case is the same, and
it is only on this side, between the Chenab and the Sutlej, that
a large army could be subsisted, with rivers intersecting the
approach at right angles, of which we have no idea in Europe,
one, two, and even six and seven miles broad, from June till,
October, when the snow melts and the rain faUs, running five
or six knots an hour.
Look at the map and you will find, from our new frontier
on the Byar at Noorpor, passing to the eastward along the
mountains which now bring us into contact with Chinese Tar-
tary at Spitti, and the Nepaul hills, and thence by the Tennas-
serim provinces to the Straits at Singapoor, that there is no
enemy which can give this Government any uneasuiess by an
external attack for a distance of nearly 6,000 miles of land
frontier. Passing from Noorpoor to the westward, down to Kurra-
chee on the sea, the only entrance into India is by the Khyber
Pass. No general in his senses would attack India through the
Bolan Pass for the sake of occupying Scinde, having then an
impassable desert before him, or a flank movement of 700 miles
through Bhawulpoor before he could reach this frontier.
Consequently, any attack on India is limited to a space of
about 100 miles on the Sutlej, from Ferozepore to Rampoor.
For 100 miles from Ferozepore down to Kurrachee no hostile
attack could be made. Our coast, from Kurrachee down to the
Straits, is between 5,000 and 6,000 miles. The land frontier
from Kurrachee to the Straits, about 7,000 miles. Therefore,
out of 13,000 miles of sea and land frontier by which thq em
pire is enchcled, the only practicable attack is confined to 100
miles between Ferozepore and the foot of the hills at Rampoor
pr, if you please, the Khyber Pass, 300 miles in advance of the
Sutlej.

OPINION OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 3&
If the Indus had turned out to be a navigable river, and
that our military communications for troops and stores could
have been secured from Kurrachee by the Indus, the Punjaub
would have been of some mihtary value ; but that route has
failed us, and there is no real military communication between
this frontier and Scinde. However, I won't enter into the
question of the annexation of the Punjaub. I have shown you
that no external attack of any importance can be made except
for 100 miles on the Sutlej ; and, lastly, I give you my opinion
that this entrance by the Khyber Pass for a Russian army with
all the equipments and munitions of war is very nearly as im
practicable as any other of the entrances into India.
The Afghan war has solved the problem of the possibility
of Riis.sian invasion. Afghanistan has no resources : it is by
nature too poor to feed a large invading army; and even if
such an army could reach the Indus, our British means are at
all times ample to overwhelm it.
The schemes of Russia are restricted, I should say, to the
extension of her trading speculations. She now supphes Chinese
Tartary, Thibet, Cashmere, and Turkestan with broadcloths,
velvets, leather, hardware, &c., and receives shawls and shawl
wool, tin, furs, &c., in return. We should, in addition to what
Russia supplies, export opium, sugar, indigo, and Enghsh cotton
manufactures. Here you have no cause for apprehension. . Let us get rid
of a nine-years' annual deficit by a siu-plus ; pay off the five per
cents. ; improve the country — and you may do what you hke ;
but as to a Russian invasion of India, depend upon it, my dear
Lord, that it is a pohtical nightmare.
Extract of Letter from Duhe of Wellington, dated. Windsor
Castle, June 3, 1847.
' Lord Hardinge is quite correct in his account and descrip
tion of the frontier. You may rely upon it that you have
nothing to apprehend from Russia in that quarter. The pos
session of Scinde is a great security.'
The corrupt system of government, which was ruin
ing the monarchy in France, produced a scandal, to
which reference is made in the following letters.
General Cubieres was a Peer of France, and M. Teste
was Minister of Public Works. In order to obtain a

40 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
concession of a salt mine for a company in which he
was interested, the General had given large bribes to
the Minister. In July a State trial took place with
reference to these transactions, and the culprits were
condemned to fine and imprisonment. Meanwhile,
however, M. Teste had attempted suicide by placing a
pistol to his mouth, which missed fire. He then dis
charged a second, so close to his breast that the ball
did not penetrate, but fell to the ground, leaving only
a bruise. Lord Palmerston seems to have had his
doubts about the intensity of M. Teste's desire to die.
F. 0. : May 7, 1847.
My dear Normanby, — These revelations about Cubieres
and Teste will, no doubt, lead to other disclosures of a similar
kind, because such exposures follow each other as murders do
in this country; and if the system by which majorities have
hitherto been obtained is laid bare, either the Ministry must
fall by pubhc disrespect for it, or it will be weakened by the
cessation of the abuses upon which it lived. In either way,
these things must be a blow to Guizot and the Phihppine system,-
What dashing fellows our cousins Transatlantic are ! Who
would have thought of Ulloa' surrendering without being at
tacked 1 1 remember a Greek line which says that " silver spears
will conquer all things." No doubt the fort was a little bom
barded with dollars while they were shelling the town. The
Yankees will end by becoming masters of the greater part of
Mexico. We cannot prevent it without going to war with the
United States ; and to go to war with them for such a set of
people as the Mexicans would not go down with the House of
Commons in the best of times, and least of aU juSt now. If the
Union becomes very large, it will either split, or else the multi
tude of conflicting intereste which will belong to its various
component parts will be an obstacle to any unnecessary war with
a great maritime Power and wealthy customer like England.
Moreover, a great extent of fine land to the south will render
the Americans less anxious to strip us of Canada. I hear that
they are already become careless about Oregon, satisfied , with
having the ownership.
' The fortress of St. John d'Ulloa, which commanded the town of
Vera Cruz.

ATTEMPTED SUICIDE OF M. TESTE. 41
C. G. : July 16, 1847.
Do you think Teste's attempted suicide was a reality, or
anything got up for effect ? It looks like the latter. In former
times, a Sir William Meadows, in our service, was brought into
trouble about some affairs of the same kind which had happened
in India, and he discharged a pistol at his own head ; the ball
grazed his forehead, and friends who heard the report rushed in
and found him bathing his forehead in cold water ; and he said,
in reply to inquiries, that he had had an affair of honour with
himself, and having stood the shot, he had declared himself
satisfied. But, though Teste has escaped the shot, the Ministry
has had one between wind and water, which, sooner or later,
must tell ; and even if it tells in no other way than by making
bribery more difficult, because more dangerous, it will in that
way weaken a Government which relies so much upon such
methods for its support. I get on very agreeably with Brogiie,
but as yet we have only talked about Switzerland and Greece,
in regard to both of which we 'agree to differ.' We shall
probably wind up by Thiu-sday or Friday of next week, then
dissolve, and then comes the tug of war. It is said we are to
have in the new Parhament an absolute majority of our own of
twenty to thirty out of the whole House. Be this as it may,
we shall certainly win many seats.
Parliament was dissolved on July 23. There was
little enthusiasm on either side during the general
election which followed. The Free Trade question
appeared settled ; and though a more vigorous policy
was anticipated from a Eussell than from a Melbourne
Administration, no great organic changes were expected
from it. On the other hand, the remnants of the Con
servative party had nothing to hold out beyond vague
professions of attachment to our ancient institutions.
In this absence of party feeling the men in possession
gained a few votes, although among their nominal sup
porters were many independent members in no way
pledged to go with the Government if they disapproved
of its measures.

42 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE II.
LOED MINTO'S MISSION TO ITALY — IRELAND — SICILY.
Lord Minto, as has been stated above, went about this
time to Italy, on a mission which deserves some notice.
The whole land was in a ferment, and was clamouring
for liberal institutions. Sardinia led the way, despite
the unconcealed disapproval of her Imperial neighbour.
Tuscany followed, though with laggard steps, and the
Papal Court suffered for its prostration under the
general fever by the occupation of Ferrara by Austrian
forces. Charles Albert at once notified to the Pope his
readiness to assist him with a Piedmontese army if the
Imperial troops made any further advance. Meanwhile
Pius IX., being engaged in administrative reforms, had
expressed to the English Government a wish to have
the assistance of some person of rank and experience
who might aid him by advice, and at the same time
afford him the moral support of England. Lord Minto
therefore went off to Eome in November, 1847, with
directions to visit Turin and Florence on his way. His
aim was so to represent the English Government as to
strengthen the authority of the constitutional govern
ments in Italy, but he did not profess to believe that
English mediation or interposition in territorial questions
was likely to turn to much account. He only thought
it probable that, by taking a firm and decided line,
England might enable the wise friends of order and
freedom to cope in their domestic affairs with the sedi-
tion of the young Italy and Mazzini firebrands.
Lord Palmerston's instructions to Lord Minto were
first of all, to convey to the King of Sardinia the

ITALY AND AUSTEIA. 43
sympathies of the British Government, and the ex
pression of its surprise and regret that Austria should
have intimated the possibility of an entry by her troops
* upon Sardinian territory, if the King, in the exercise
of his indisputable rights of sovereignty, should make
certain organic arrangements within his own dominions
which would be displeasing to the Government of
Austria.' Lord Minto was to add that Her Majesty's
Government had learnt with much pleasure the assur
ances of friendly and defensive support which his Sar
dinian ' Majesty had recently caused to be conveyed to
the Pope, and which did great honour to His Majesty
as a generous Prince and as an Italian Sovereign.'
To the Grand Duke of Tuscany Lord Minto was
instructed to address himself in a tone of encourage
ment, urging him to persevere in that independent
course of enlightened progress which he at that moment
seemed inclined to pursue.
You will be at Rome [proceeded Lord Palmerston], not as
a Minister accredited to the Pope, but as an authentic organ of
the British Government, enabled to explain its views and to
declare its sentiments upon events which are now passing in
Italy, and which, both from their local importance and from
their bearing on the general interests of Europe, Her Majesty's
Government are watching with great attention and anxiety.
Her Majesty's Government are deeply impressed with -the
conviction that it is wise for sovereigns and their governments
to pursue, in the administration of their affahs, a system of pro
gressive improvement ; to apply remedies to such evils as, upon
examination, they may find to exist, and to remodel, from time
to time, the ancient institutions of their country, so as to render
them more suitable to the gradual growth of intelligence and to
the incseasing diffusion of pohtical knowledge; and Her Ma
jesty's Government consider it to be an undeniable truth, that
if an independent sovereign, in the exercise of his deliberate
judgment, shall think fit to make within his dominions such
improvements in the laws and mstitutions of his country as he
tnay think conducive to the welfare of his people, no other
Government can have any right to attempt to restrain or to
interfere with such an employment of one of the inherent attri
butes of independent sovereignty.

44 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Lord Palmerston concluded by authorising Lord
Minto to say ' that Her Majesty's Government would
not see with indifference any aggression committed
upon the Eoman territories, with a view to preventing
the Papal Government from carrying into effect those
internal improvements which it might think proper to
adopt.' Lord Minto was received with great ovations. At
Avezzo, Genoa, and other places, he was called upon to
address the people from the balcony amid flags and
music. With wise discretion, he usually confined his
speech to a cry of ' Viva 1' Indipendenza Italiana ! '
which satisfied the crowds and caused their dispersion,
to the sound of ' Viva F Italia ! '
On reaching Eome he placed himself in communica
tion with the Papal Government, so as to carry out his
instructions. Pio Nono was at this time axDparently
about to enter on a career of progressive and successful
reform, but Lord Minto was evidently not sanguine as
to His Holiness's ability 'to ride the whirlwind and
direct the storm.' Writing home during the early
troubles of 1848, he says : —
The Pope is a most amiable, agreeable, and honest man,
and sincerely pious to boot, which is much for a Pope ; but he
is not made to drive the State coach. To-day he is in very good
spirits, although he foresees the dangers of the country, because
he has recovered a saint's skull which had been sacrilegiously
stolen. The fact is that Pio Nono was at that time, and
always remained, far more anxious for his power as
Head of the Catholic Church than for his position as a
temporal sovereign ; but the British Government sought
to turn to account whatever anxiety he might feel in
his temporal capacity by obtaining, in return for their
good ofRces, the exercise of his influence in Ireland to
second their efforts in the cause of national education,
and to restrain the lawlessness of the priests.
In the following letters Lord Palmerston refers to

PEIESTLY INFLUENCE IN lEELAND. 45
the Papal rescript against the newly- established Queen's
Colleges, and to the fact that agrarian outrages were,
if not sanctioned, at any rate not condemned by the
spiritual guides of the people. England had commu
nicated to Austria, as her old ally, her hope that the
Pope would not be interrupted by foreign force. She
was also considering the means of opening formal com
munications with Eome, and naturally expected mean
while a friendly attitude on the part of the Head of
that Church which had many adherents across the Irish
Channel. F. 0. : October 29, 1847.
My dear Minto, — Nothing could be better nor, I trust,
more useful than your negotiations at Turin, upon which I
have written to you official approvals. That Italian Commer
cial League wiU be an excellent thing if it is placed upon a
proper footing, commercial and pohtical.
As to the Austrians, they have been headed, and will not
break cover towards Italy. Many things have contributed to
this, but we have had our share in the merit, and were the first
to set up the view holloa which scared them. The Pope ought
to feel grateful to us for this, and if he does so, he ought to give
us some tokens of his thankfulness. I send you a copy of
Memorandum sent some httle time ago by Clarendon for your
use. It is, in the main, good. There is a little inconsistency
in the parts, for in one part he assumes that the priests have no
influence in Ireland, and in another part he assumes that they
have a great deal. But the fact is so : they have influence and
they have not; they have it in some things and not in others.
But we wish to make to the Pope the plain, and simple, and
reasonable request that he would exert his authority over the
Irish priesthood, to induce them to abstain from meddling in
pohtics, but, on the contrary, to confine themselves to their
spiritual duties ; and in these duties to exhort their flocks to
morality, good conduct, obedience to the law, and abstinence
from acts of violence and crime, and, moreover, to inculcate on
their flocks the propriety of not only obeying the law them
selves, but of aiding honestly and fearlessly in the execution of
the law, and in the attainment of the ends of justice by faith
fully performing their functions, as magistrates, jurymen, and
witnesses. I disagree entirely with Clarendon as to the expe
diency of advising or inviting the Pope to send any confidential

46 . LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
agent to Ireland. I should fear that such person, unless very
well chosen indeed, would be got hold of by McHale rather than
by Clarendon, and then if his reports were to be unfavoui-able
to us, we should have increased our difficulties instead of dimi
nishing them. I shall be able to send you by the next messenger
a Memorandum about the letter which has recently been received
by McHale from Rome, upon the subject of Irish colleges.'
This is an unkind and a most mischievous measure, and was
little to be expected at the hands of the Pope at the very
moment that we were stepping out of our way to be of use to
him. It is an ungrateful return, and can only be explained on
the supposition that it was extorted by intrigue and false repre
sentations made at Rome by McHale, and that the Pojae acted
ignorantly and without knowing the mischief he was doing.
But you should lose no time in making him aware of his mis
take, and you should say that if he expects the English Go
vernment to be of any. use to him, and to take any interest in
his affairs, he must not strike blows at our interior. You may
also say that an Act of Parliament wiU be necessary to enable
us to estabhsh diplomatic relations with him. Things of this
kind may have so bad an effect upon pubhc opinion in England
as to make it impossible for us to obtain the consent of Par ha?
ment to any such measure.
• ' College of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the
Faith, Rome, Octoher 9, 1847. The Sacred Congregation has felt it its
duty to caution the archbishops and bishops of Ireland against taking
any part in establishing them. But as it would have wished, before
some of the prelates had entered into any negotiations with the
Government for amending the law regarding the aforesaid colleges and
procuring other measures in their favour, that they had taken the
opinion of the Holy See, so it doubts not but that, from the profound
obedience which the prelates of Ireland have invariably exhibited
towards it, they will retract those things which they have done to the
contrary. ' Above all things, the Sacred Congregation would deem it advan
tageous that the bishops, uniting their exertions, should procure the
erection in Ireland of such a Catholic academy as the prelates of Bel
gium have founded in the city of Louvain.
*»* **»*»
' "With these things you will, we are sure, comply with the greater
alacrity since they are in all points in conformity with the judgment
of our most Holy Lord Pius IX., who has sanctioned with his appro
bation the decision ox the Sacred Congregation, and gave to it the
supreme weight of his authority. 'J. Phil. Caedinal Fransoni, P.D.P F
'Alexander Barnabo, Pro-Secretary.' '

THE POPE AND THE lEISH COLLEGES. 47
Commercial distress is lessening, but still severe, and will
so continue for many months to come. The grain which was
imported into the United Kingdom in the first nine months of
this year cost in prime cost and freight rather more than twenty-
six milhons sterling. We had to advance upwards of six
mUhons for public works in Ireland, and the nation has spent
this year forty-five milhons in railways at home, and upwards
of ten millions in railways abroad. The wonder is not that we
ai-e distressed, but that we ai-e not all of us bankrupt.
The Memorandum on the ' Irish Colleges ' referred
to in the foregoing letter was as follows : —
"Whether intentionally or ignorantly I know not, but the
Pope, by his rescript against the Irish colleges, committed a
hostile, ill-judged, and unnecessary act. It was hostile, because
he pubhcly denotmced and directed the Roman Catholic
hierarchy to oppose a measure which had received the sanction
of the Sovereign and Parliament of England. It was ill-judged,
because he showed no regard for the opinion of the Roman
Catholic prelates and a great proportion of the Roman Catholic
laity of Ireland, who consider the colleges an important boon,
and well calculated to supply a want that has been long and
severely felt, and who are determined not to be deprived of
institutions from which they expect much good. It has pro
duced feelings of resentment and irritation among the Pro
testants of Great Britain, and, I may add, among many of the
Catholics of Ireland, that wQl not easily be aUayed, and that are
much regretted by all those who desire to soothe animosity be
tween the two creeds, and to promote the estabhshment of
friendly relations with Rome.
The Lord Lieutenant was in communication with the
Primate, Dr. Crolly, with Archbishops Murray and Nicholson.
Every suggestion of theirs had been scrupulously attended to
for securing the rehgious instruction and moral conduct of the
Roman Catholic students, and in conformity with their wishes
the statutes were under revision as soon after the long vacation
as the Presidential Board could assemble. When these facts
are brought to the knowledge of the Pope, it is hoped that His
Holiness will see that he has been led into error, and that
greater circumspection will be desirable in hstening to malicious
and unfounded reports transmitted from Ireland, and which
have been hitherto too readily behoved at Rome. There are
among the Roman Catholic prelates of Ireland men of great

48 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
inteUigence and activity, who lend themselves to pohtical
agitation, and who seek to obtain the sanction of the Pope's
authority towards the maintenance of hostile feelings agahist
the British Government, and between the Protestants and
Catholics of the United Kingdom. These men untruly assume
to speak in the name of the entire hierarchy, and their state
ments have in consequence had an importance given them at
Rome to which they are not entitled. It is probable that by
this time the Pope has received certain resolutions against the
colleges, and against the national system of education in the
name of the archbishop and bishops of Ireland in Synod
assembled ; but these resolutions were not passed in Synod at
all. Many of the prelates had left Dublin at the time they were
framed, and even Archbishop Murray, who was in Dubhn,
never heard of or saw them till he read them in the newspapers,
when he highly disapproved of them, and felt sure that many of
his brethren would do the same. His example, among many
that might be quoted, will show the unscrupulous character of
certain prelates, and the necessity of receiving with caution any
facts or opinions put forward by them. The best course for the
Pope now to pursue is to remain enthely passive until he
receives further and more correct information. He may rest
assured that in the establishment of these coUeges the British
Government have had no other object than to supply the best
possible education to the middle classes in Ireland, and, as a
consequence of that object, to promote rehgion and morality
among the students of different denominations alike. The
British Government has no ulterior or sinister design, as has
been most falsely asserted. It uses no disguise. The Lord
Lieutenant has freely communicated with the Primate, and
Archbishop Murray has received and acted upon their sugges
tions, and will communicate to them the statutes as soon as they
are revised, and before they are definitively determined upon.
It may perhaps be deshable, in whatever form Lord Minto
shall think best, to let the Pope understand that the Roman
Cathohcs of Ireland have neither the means nor disposition to
establish at then- own expense such seminaries as are recom
mended in the rescript, and that they can only be provided for
out of the pubhc funds. That a large proportion of the Roman
Cathohc laity are so convinced of the desirableness of these
colleges, that nothing will prevent them from sending their sons
there when once they are satisfied that rehgious instruction is
duly provided for, and that if the opposition of Dr. McHale and

LOED CLAEENDON ON lEISH AFFAIES. 49
others should unfortunately prove successful under the supposed
sanction and authority of the Pope's name against the national
system of education, by which four himdred thousand children
are rescued from ignorance and its consequences, the large
funds annuaUy devoted to this object by the Legislature will
probably fall under the exclusive management of the Pro
testants, by whom a large proportion of these children will be
educated. For all who are acquainted with Ireland must be
aware that not even the influence of the priesthood can check
the uncontrollable deshe for education that exists among the
people. They will greatly prefer to receive it from Cathohcs,
but, rather than forego its benefits, they will gladly accept it
from Protestants. Clarendon.
November 20, 1847. F. 0. : December 3, 1847.
My dear Minto, — I send you a letter from Clarendon, the
whole of which you may, I think, read to anybody with whom
you are in communication on the part of the Pope. But you
may safely go further than Clarendon has chosen to do, and
you may confidently assure the Papal authorities that at
present, in Ireland, misconduct is the rule, and good conduct
the exception, in the Catholic priests. That they, in a multi
tude of cases, are the open, and fearless, and shameless in
stigators to disorder, to violence, and murder, and that every
day and every week the better conducted, who are by con
stitution of human nature the most quiet and timid, are being
seared by their fellow-priests, as well as by their flocks, from a
perseverance in any efforts to give good counsel and to restrain
violence and crime. Major Mahon, who was shot the other
day, was denounced by his priest at the altar the Sunday before
be was murdered. He might have been murdered all the same
if the priest had not denounced him, but that denunciation of
course made all the people in the neighbourhood think the deed
a holy one instead of a diabohcal one. The irritation and ex
asperation thence growing up in the public mind against the
Cathohc priesthood is extreme, and scarcely anybody now talks
of these Irish murders without uttering a fervent wish that a
dozen priests might be hung forthwith, and the most effectual
remedy which has been suggested, and which seems the most
popular, is that whenever a man is murdered in Ireland the
priest of the parish should be transported.
In the meanwhile I begin to doubt whether it would be
VOL. II. E

50 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
prudent at present to bring in our proposed Bill for Legalising
Diplomatic Intercom'se with the Court of Rome. The sectarian
prejudices which, 'under any circumstances, would give much
opposition to such a Bill, but which, in a better state of things,
we should be able to conquer, would find such sympathy in
public opinion at present, that our task would be more difficult ;
however, we do not give up our intention, bu.t must postpone
its execution till after the Christmas recess. I really believe
there never has been in modern times, in any country profess
ing to be civilised and Christian, nor anywhere out of the cen
tral regions of Africa, such a state of crime as now exists in
Ireland. There is evidently a dehberate and extensive con
spiracy among the priests and the peasantry to kill off or drive
away aU the proprietors of land, to prevent and deter any of
their agents from collecting rent, and thus practically to trans
fer the land of the country from the landowner to the tenant.
I trust, however, that some of these murderers will be taken ;
some indeed have already been apprehended, and if evidence can
be got against them, the hanging of a dozen of these miscreants
all in a row may have some effect in deterring others fi:'om
following their example, and if we could but get a priest in the
lot it would be like a ptarmigan in a bag of grouse, or a pied
or ring-necked pheasant in a battue.
Extract from Letter of Earl of Clarendon, dated V. R. Lodge,
November 26, 1847.
McHale is a dangerous demagogue, whose proceedings as
a citizen, and irrespective of their ecclesiastical indecorum, no
Government in the world but ours would tolerate. Political
agitation, popular elections, and inflammatory pubhcations are
his favourite pursuits. His object seems to be to set the people
against their rulers ; and if he could have his way their ignor-<i
ance and their turbulence would be perpetual, and throughoU^^
his province those priests have the gi-eatest share of his favourti
who most promote his sinister designs. The majority of the
bishops dislike his proceedings and his character, but they sue-"
cumb because he is audacious and overbearing, and they are
afraid of miaking public the grave dissensions that exist among
the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Such a man, however, and such
a bitter opponent of the British Government and the true
interests of Ireland, is not an adviser upon whom the Pope
should rely.
With respect to the priests, I must again repeat that, as a

ACTION OF DE. McHALE. 51
body, there is not in the world a more zealous, faithful, hard
working clergy, and most of the older prieste are friendly to
order, to education, and to the general improvement of the
people. There are, however, some unfortunate exceptions, but
it is among the younger clergy, the curates and coadjutors, that
the real mischief-makers are to be found, and if they could be
held in check, great scandal to religion and social order would
be prevented. Things, however, cannot much longer go on in
their present state : the duty of a Government towards the
peaceable and weU-disposed portions of the community will
render special legislation necessary for a state of things which
has become intolerable, if the existing laws should become in
sufficient, and if the timely exercise of spiritual authority be
much longer withheld.
There are at this moment numerous cases in which, if
evidence could be procured, a prosecution could be sustained
against priests as accessories to atrocious crimes, by the inciting
language they have held to people over whose minds they exer
cise an absolute control.
I have endeavoured to procure such evidence, because it is
the duty of Government to punish misconduct that tends to the
disruption of every social tie, and in the administration of the
law no distinction of persons can be admitted ; but such evidence
in an available form is not to be procured. From different
parts of the country, and from persons upon whose veracity I
can confide, I hear either that a landlord has been denounced
by name from the altar, in a manner which is equivalent to his
death-warrant, or that persons giving evidence against criminals
are held up as pubhc enemies and traitors, or that people are
advised to assemble in mobs and enforce their demands upon
individuals. It was only yesterday that I heard of a priest (in
the diocese of Dr. McHale) addressing a man in the chapel, and
teUing him that he would not curse him, because the last man
he had cursed died directly, but that before the blossom fell from
the potato he would be a corpse. This man's offence was having
given evidence in a court of justice against a party that had
broken into his house and robbed him. I have sworn deposi
tions now lying on my table in proof of acts of this kind, but
the deponents dare not come forward and openly give their
evidence, for they say — and I know it to be true — that their
lives would not be worth four-and-twenty hours' purchase. In
deed, to prevent any misunderstanding upon the subject, the
E 2

52 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
priest usually defies any person to give information of what he
has been saying, and warns them of the consequences.
The result of all this is, not only that crime is encouraged,
but that the priesthood must fall into contempt, and that the
wholesome restraint and humanising influence of rehgion will
dechne ; that the people will become more barbarous ; and that
the clergy, to maintain their position, must still pander to the
passions of their flocks. In places — and there are many — ^where
a priest friendly to order and anxious for the real welfare of
his people has given good advice, and intimated that among
those present in the chapel there were some who had been
guilty of such and such crimes, the individuals alluded to
will come forward and bid him hold his tongue, and threaten
him with vengeance if he proceeds. I could multiply facts and
details ad infinitum,, for every day some fresh ones come to my
knowledge, but the above are sufficient to exhibit the state of
things in certain parts of Ireland, and all its evil tendencies ;
for wherever the priests so misconduct themselves, there the
people are always found to be the most turbulent and wretched.
The indignation, and I may add shame, of the respectable
Roman Cathohc classes are extreme : they consider that the
course pursued by these unruly priests is calculated to give a
false impression of their (the Roman Cathohc) rehgion and
their pohtics ; to exasperate against them the enthe Protestant '
people of England, and to check effectually any intentions on
the part of the Government to place the two churches on a
footing of equality.
The Pope may well hesitate to beheve in things the like of
which exist in no other part of the world ; but we don't ask
him to take our words for them. He has himself proposed to
send some person over here to examine and report, and I am
sure that will be the best mode of proceeding, if any one suffi
ciently unprejudiced, and likely to resist the evil influences by
which he will be surrounded immediately on his arrival, can be
found to undertake the mission. He should not come in any
pubhc capacity, or with pomp and circumstance, but privately,
and with instructions whom he should consult, and with powers
to act, but not to go beyond the sphere of spiritual jurisdiction.
The Primate and Archbishop Murray, and some of the metro-
pohtan clergy, who weh understand the interests of theh Church,
and are acquainted with aU that is going on in the country,
would be safe guides; and I feel sure that a Papal prohibition
to take part in political agitations, and to make use of the

'DIPLOMATIC EELATIONS WITH EOME.' 53
places of worship for secular purposes, would be received as a
great boon by the well-disposed priests (i.e. the majority of the
clergy), who, when they become agitators, yield to intimidation,
and are compelled to act against their judgment. If they could
appeal to the sanction of the Pope's authority for confining
themselves to their spiritual duties, they would not fear to have
their chapels deserted, and thus find themselves destitute of the
means of subsistence.
To the best of my belief, the bishops are not in the habit of
punishing such misdeeds as those I have aUuded to. They may
do so ; but I have neither official nor private knowledge of the
fact, and if they do, their interference is not very successful.
Lord Minto had several interviews with Pius IX.,
both about the Papal rescript against the Queen's
Colleges and also about the conduct of certain bishops
and priests in Ireland who took so leading a part in the
work of agitation and terrorism. Neither the Pope
nor Cardinal Eerretti was versed in public affairs, and
they were evidently much astonished at the state of
things which enquiry revealed to them as existing in
Ireland. The Pope expressed his entire disapprobation
of the political activity of the Irish clergy, and he
assured Lord Minto not only of his readiness but of
his great desire to do whatever might be in his power
to apply a remedy to these clerical disorders. He also
spoke with regret of the effect which the missive of the
Propaganda against the new Colleges appeared likely
to produce, saying that he had postponed as long as he
could giving his sanction to the report of the Sacred
College, which he had finally done as undertanding
that it represented the deliberate opinion of the great
majority of the Irish Bishops.
The ' Diplomatic Eolations with Eome BUI,' to
which Lord Palmerston refers, passed through Par
liament, but Lord Eglinton, in the House of Lords,
carried a clause against the Government by which the
reception of an ecclesiastic as Papal Nuncio in London
was forbidden. This condition was regarded at Eome
with such dislike that the Pope refused to send any

54 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Minister, and also declined to receive an envoy from
England on a unilateral footing. The truth was that
representations made to him from Ireland induced him
to imagine that we were in such straits in Irish affairs
that we should be compeUed to yield. When Lord
Minto asked whether he would, on his part, receive
as English Minister one of our Archbishops or the
Moderator of the Church of Scotland in full canonicals,
he frankly owned that he could not ; but reciprocity
has never been a weakness of the Vatican.
Lord Palmerston was in favour of the Eglinton
clause. To Lord Clarendon he writes : — '
I could not have consented to make myself responsible for
receiving an ecclesiastic as Roman envoy, and it is much better
that our refusal should stand upon a prohibitory law than upon
our own voluntary determination. I quite concur in the view
taken of that question by Aberdeen and Stanley, and I am con
vinced, by my diplomatic experience, that there would be no
end to the embarrassments and inconveniences which we should
suffer from having a Roman priest invested with diplomatic
privilege holding his court in London, surrounded by Enghsh
and Irish Cathohcs, and wielding a power of immense though
secret extent, and capable of becoming an engine of pohtical in
trigue to serve aU kinds of foreign interests.
As for the idea that we could manage the Irish priests by
means of a Roman priest in London, I am convinced that the
presence of such a man would only have given the Irish priests
an additional means of managing us.
Cappucini, a liberal and enlightened man, was offered to be
nuncio at Paris; he declined, and gave to his private friends
the reason — that he knew he should have been obhged, by his
official position, to side with the most ultra of the Catholic and
Jesuit party in Prance, and as his opinions were against them,
he would not place himself in so disagreeable a position.
Very shortly after Lord Minto arrived in Eome—
namely, in January, 1848 — an insurrection broke out
at Palermo, the Sicilians demanding from the King of
Naples the Constitution of 1812. Both parties applied
to Lord Napier, then our charge d'affaires at Naples, to
' F. 0., March 9, 1848.

EEVOLUTION IN SICILY. 55
mediate between them. The SiciUans founded their
application upon the former connection between Eng
land and Sicily, and upon the share which the British
Government had had in the remodeUing of the Sicilian
Constitution in 1812. The Neapolitan Government
founded their application upon the well-known interest
which had always " been taken by the British Govern
ment in the welfare of the kingdom of Naples. Lord
Napier, however, did not undertake the office, because
the Neapolitan Government was not willing at that time
to authorise such proposals as were alone likely to lead
to any arrangement. Soon, however, the King invited
Lord Minto to Naples, and requested him to employ
his good offices to effect a reconciliation between the
Sicilians and the Home Government. Foreign Office : Feb. 24,' 1848.
My dear Minto, — I have now but five minutes to write to
you, more than enough to give you all the instructions you
need, which are to act according to your own good judgment as
events succeed each other. I most sincerely hope that you will
have been able to bring the Naples Government round to your
views about SicUy. Your scheme of amalgamation is excellent,
and would afford the best chance of a permanent connection
between the two countries ; but one fears the blind obstinacy
of the King. The Sicilians, moreover, doubt his futiu'o good
faith, but things have gone much too far for it to be possible for
him hereafter to retract ; and as to our guarantee, that is out
of the question, and would lead us into future embarrassments
and responsibilities of the most difficult and inconvenient kind.
In short, the position of a foreign Power who should be guaran
tee between a sovereign and a portion of his subjects would be
embarrassing for such Power, and inconsistent with the inde
pendence of such sovereign. Probably the King of Naples
would not consent to it.
As to the poor Pope, I hve ui daUy dread of hearing of
some misadventure having befallen him. Events have gone too
fast for such a slow sailer as he is. I only hope he will not be
swamped by the swell in the wake of those who have outstripped
' Two days before the Eevolution at Paris,

56 LIFE OP LOED PALMEESTON.
him, for this would perhaps bring the Austrians into the Roman
States; and then we should have a regular European row.
One thing, however, might prevent tins, and that is, the
change of Government which happened yesterday at Paris; *
for Metternich, if he hears of it in time, will not be disposed to
take any step which will irretrievably commit him until he is
able to learn the views and intentions and pohcy of this new
Government in France. It will, however, of course, be much
more liberal than Guizot's, both at home and abroad, and espe
cially in regard to Italian affairs. What had been happening
in Italy ought to have been a warning to Guizot; what has
now happened to Guizot ought to be a warning to Italy.
Guizot thought that by a packed Parliament and a corruptly-
obtained majority he could control the will of the nation, and
the result has been that the will of the Crown has been con
trolled by an armed popular force. People have long gone on
crying up Louis Philippe as the wisest of men. I always have
thought him one of the most cunning, and therefore not one
of the wisest. Recent events have shown that he must rank
among the cunning who outwit themselves, and not among the
wise, who master events by foresight and prudence. This sur
render of the King of the Barricades to the summons of the
National Guard is, however, a curious example of pohtical and
poetical justice.
After much discussion with the King and his
Ministers, Lord Minto was authorised to propose an
arrangement which, in his opinion, the Sicilians might
reasonably and probably accept. He - then sailed for
Palermo. Meanwhile, however, arrived the news of
the French Eevolution. This was a spark that set fire
to all that was combustible in Italy. The news turned
the heads of the Sicilians, and they suddenly deter
mined no longer to acknowledge the King of Naples as
their sovereign. This was what Lord Minto found to
be the state of affairs on his arrival. He refused to
land unless the Sicilians consented to the union of the
two crowns, and he found it eventually impossible to
carry out his mediation, owing to the ferment caused
by events in France. Lord Palmerston writes pro-
' M. Guizot's resignation.

PEOPHECY OF A UNITED ITALY. ' 5*7
phetically, though, as it turned out, ten years were to
elapse before the fulfilment. Foreign Office : March 28, 1848.
My dear Minto, — Was there ever such a scene of confusion
as now prevails almost all over Europe 1 Eortnnate, however,
has it been for Italy that you crossed the Alps last autumn.
If the Italian sovereigns had not been urged by you to move
on, while their impatient subjects were kept back, there would
by this time have been nothing but Repubhcs from the Alps to
SicUy. I hope you wUl have been able to settle matters between
the SicUians and the Government of Naples without a separa
tion of the crowns, though your last accoimts, written just after
your arrival at Palermo, inspired us with some doubts on that
point. This is one more in addition to the numberless proofs of the
danger of delays. If Bozzelli had not been so obstinate, you
would have been able to settle it all before the news of the
French Revolution reached Sicily.
The greatest and most important event of these last few
weeks is perhaps the retirement of Metternich. Happy would
it have been for the continent of Europe if this had happened
some years ago. But better now than later. We have just
heard of the entrance of Sardinian troops into Lombardy to help
the MUanese. Northern Italy will henceforward be Italian,
and the Austrian frontier will be at the Tyrol. This will be
no real loss to Austria. If North Italy had been well affected,
it would have been an element of strength. Discontented as it
was, it has proved a source of weakness. Of course Parma and
Modena will follow the example, and in this way the King, no
longer of Sardinia, but of Northern Italy, wUl become a sove
reign of some importance in Europe. This will make a league
between him and the other Italian rulers still more desirable
and much more feasible. Italy ought to unite in a Confederacy
similar to that of Germany, commercial and political, and now
is the time to strike the iron while it is hot. Austria may
perhaps lose GaUicia also. I hope her losses will go no further ;,
but enough will even then remain to her to make her, if well
governed, a most powerful State. The question is, has she any
men capable of making any State a powerful one by good
government 1
This counti-y is for the present quiet, though the Repealers
and the Chartists meditate some movement. I think, however,

58 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
that we shaU be fully a match for them. The country is soimd
at heart, and there is a gallant pubhc spirit which wUl show
itself at the first intimation of real danger.
On the failure of Lord Minto's mediation the
Sicilians proceeded to decree the separation of the
crown of Naples and Sicily, and proposed to the Duke
of Genoa to become their king, which he, however,
declined. The King of Naples, on the arrival of this
news, despatched ships and troops against Messina and
Palermo. The bombardment of these towns was at
tended by such acts of violence and cruelty on both
sides, that the English and French fleets interfered
to procure an armistice. The period for cessation of
hostilities expired, however, without any arrangement
being arrived at. The fight was renewed; and the
Sicilian revolt was finally put down by the middle of
the year 1849.

EEPEAL OF THE NAVIGATION LAWS. 59

CHAPTEE III.
AEBITEATIOSr — MOVBMBITTS IS ITALY — PEENCH EEVOLUTIOBT —
CHAKTISX AGITATION IN LONDON — WAE BETWEEN AUSTEIA AND
ITALY — SIE EOBEET PEEL AT THE MANSION HOUSE — PEBNCH
OCCUPATION or EOME — DEBATES IN PAELIAMENT — CHOLEEA —
NAPLES.
The repeal of the Navigation Laws -was one of the
most prominent measures promised in the Queen's
Speech at the opening of the new Parliament. The
Government having thus pledged themselves to deal
with the question. Lord Palmerston saw that such a
step would advantageously affect our foreign relations
with maritime powers, and especially with the Hnited
States of America. He desired that the obstacles which
such a measure would remove from the way of our free
intercourse with the latter country should be succeeded
by a cordial aUiance. The following letter contains his
views, and it is interesting as showing how different
was the spirit with which he approached these subjects
from that usually ascribed to him both at home and
abroad. Even as early as 1848, anticipating Cobden
and the Declaration of Paris, he was suggesting the
principle of arbitration, and advocated the abolition of
letters of marque : — \
C. G. : January 20, 1848.
My dear John Russell, — If, as I hope, we shall succeed in
altering our Navigation Laws, and if, as a consequence. Great
Britain and the United States shaU place their commercial
marines upon a footing of mutual equahty, with the exception
of the coasting trade and some other special matters, might not
such an arrangement afford us a good opportunity for endeavour
ing to carry in some degree into execution the wish which Mr.
Fox entertained in 1783, when he wished to substitute close

60 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
aUiance in the place of sovereignty and dependence as the con
necting hnk between the United States and Great Britain ?
A treaty for mutual defence would no longer be apphcable
to the condition of the two countries as independent Powers ;
but might they not, with mutual advantage, conclude a treaty
containing something like the following conditions : —
1st. That in aU cases of difference which may hereafter, un
fortunately, arise between the contracthig parties, they will, in
the first place, have recom-se to the (SfiaUon) of some friendly
Power ; and that hostihties shall not begin between them untU
every endeavour to settle their difference by such means shall
have proved fruitless.
2nd. That if either of the two should at any time be at war
with any other Power, no subjeqt or citizen of the other con
tracting party shall be allowed to take out letters of marque
from such other Power, under pain of being treated and dealt
with as a pirate.
3rd. That in such case of war between either of the two
parties and a third Power, no subject or citizen of the other
contracting party shall be allowed to enter into the service,
naval or mihtary, of such third Power.
4th. That in such case of war as aforesaid, neither of the
contracting parties should afford assistance to the enemies of
the other, by sea or by land, unless war should break out be
tween the two contracting parties themselves, after the failure
of all endeavours to settle their differences in the manner speci
fied in Article 1.
As to this arbitration question, however, he would
in practice have tempered theory with prudence. In a
debate in 1849 he spoke — I might almost say pro
phetically — ofthe disadvantages which England would
probably have to encounter before such international
tribunals. It was on the 12th of June, on a motion of
Mr. Cobden's. Lord Palmerston combated vigorously
the proposition that we should in any way pledge our
selves to submit to the arbitrament of a third party.
He said : —
I confess also that I consider it would be a very dangerous
course for this country to take, because thel-e is no country
which, from its pohtical and commercial circumstances, from its
maritime interests, and from its colonial possessions, excites

DEFENCE OF HIS FOEEIGN POLICY. 61
more envious and jealous feehngs in different quarters than
England does ; and there is no country that would find it more
difficult to discover really disinterested and impartial arbiters.
There is also no country that would be more likely than Eng
land to suffer in its important commercial interests from sub
mitting the case to arbiters not disinterested, not impartial, and
not acting with a due sense of their responsibihty.
The fact is that, in weighing our position, whenever
we have to consider such a proposal, we must not forget
that no powerful nation can ever expect to be really
loved or even liked by any other. The interests and
views of nations perpetually clash, and men are apt to
be angry with those who stand between them and the
accomplishment of their wishes.
At the outset of the session a most violent onslaught
was made upon Lord Palmerston and his policy by
Messrs. Anstey and Urquhart, and an impeachment be
fore a committee of inquiry demanded in two speeches
which occupied nearly the whole of a Wednesday's
sitting. He had scarcely begun his reply when the
sitting came to an end by the six o'clock rule ; and in
the stirring times that were coming on the House had
something better to do than to listen to the outpour
ings of such men, who for many years would insist that
in all his actions he was the secret agent of Eussia.
The few words, however, which he had time to say
contained the following manly and statesmanlike de
claration : —
I am conscious that during the time for which I have had
the honour to direct the foreign relations of this country, I have
devoted to them all the energies which I possess. Other men
might have acted, no doubt, with more ability. None could
have acted with a more entire devotion both of their time and
faculties. The principle on which I have thought the foreign
affairs of this country ought to be conducted is the principle of
maintaining peace and friendly understanding with all nations,
as long as it was possible to do so consistently with a due regard
to the interests, the honour, and the dignity of this country.
My endeavours have been to preserve peace. AU the Govern

62 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ments of which I have had the honour to be a member have
succeeded in accomphshing that object.
I hold, with respect to alliances, that England is a Power
sufficiently strong to steer her own course, and not to tie herself
as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Govern
ment. I hold that the real pohcy of England is to be the
champion of justice and right; pursuing that course with mode
ration and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world,
but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever
she thinks justice is, and whenever she thinks that wrong has
been done.
As long as she sympathises with right and justice, she wiU
never find herself altogether alone. She is sure to find some
other State of sufficient power, influence, and weight to support
and aid her in the course she may think fit to pursue. There
fore I say that it is a narrow pohcy to suppose that this country
or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual
enemy of England. We have no eternal alhes, and we have no
perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and
those interests it is our duty to follow. And if I might be
allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think
ought to guide an Enghsh Minister, I would adopt the expres
sion of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the
interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his pohcy.
He used also frequently to combat the romantic
notion that nations or governments are much or per
manently influenced by friendships, or that you could
apply to the intercourse of nations the same general
rules as to the intercourse of individuals. The only
thing which makes one Government foUow the advice
or yield to the counsel of another is the hope of benefit
to accrue from adopting it or the fear of the conse
quences of opposing it.
At the opening of 1848 Italy was agitated, by the
most violent heavings. To the thirst for social ame
lioration and political power were added aspirations
for national unity. The reforms of Pio Nono, and the
democratic concessions of Charles Albert and of the
King of Naples, had so strongly stimulated the revo
lutionary passions, that it seemed only a question of

AUSTEIA AND ITALY; A CEISIS AT HAND. 63
time when the smothered flames would break out in
one general conflagration. Austria saw all this with
declared uneasiness, and seemed inclined to interfere.
This it was Lord Palmerston's object, if possible, to
prevent. P. 0.: February 11, 1848.
My dear Ponsonby, — I send you an important despatch to
be communicated to Prince Metternich, and I wish you to re
commend it to his most serious consideration. It is worded, I
trust, in such a way as not to be hable to give offence ; but it
must be understood as meaning and implying more than it ex
presses. The real fact is, that upon Metternich's decision in
regard to the affairs of Italy depends the question of peace or
war in Europe. If he remains quiet, and does not meddle with
matters beyond the Austrian frontiers, peace will be maintained,
and aU these Itahan changes wiU be effected with as httle dis
turbance as is consistent with the nature of things. If he takes
upon himself the task of regulating by force of arms the internal
afiairs of the Itahan States, there will infalhbly be war, and it
will be a war of principles which, beginning in Italy, wiU spread
over all Europe, and out of which the Austrian Empire will
certainly not issue unchanged. In that war England and
Austria will certainly not be on the same side — a circumstance
which would occasion to every Enghshman the deepest regret.
In that war, whatever Louis Phihppe and Guizot may promise,
the principal champions contending against each other would be
Austria and France ; and I would wish Metternich well and
maturely to consider what would be the effect on the internal
condition of Germany which would be produced by a war be
tween Austria and France, in which Austria was engaged in
crushing and France in upholding constitutional hberty. It
would be weU for Prince Metternich to calculate beforehand,
not merely what portion of the people of Germany he could
count upon as allies in such a contest, but how many of the
Governments even would venture to take part with him in the
struggle. If he wished to throw the greater part of Germany
into close alhance with France, he could not take a better method
of doing so.
He best knows the disposition of his own States; but I
should greatly doubt his receiving any support in such a struggle
from Hungary or Bohemia; and he would of course have all the
Emperor's Itahan subjects against him.

€4 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
When one comes to reflect upon aU the endless difficulties
and embarrassments which such a course would involve, one
cannot beheve that a statesman so prudent and calculating, so
long-sighted and so experienced, could faU into such an error ;
but the great accumulation of Au:strian troops in the Lombard
and Venetian provinces inspires one with apprehension.
The recent debates in the French Chambers will have shown
to Prince Metternich how little he can count upon the support
or even the neutrahty of France ; and he may depend upon it,
that in defence of constitutional liberty in Italy the French
nation would rush to arms, and a French army would again
water their horses in the Danube.
Pray exert all your persuasion with the Prince to induce
him to authorise you to send us some tranquiUising assurances
on this matter. We set too great a value upon the maintenance
of Austria as the pivot of the balance of power in Europe to be
able to see without the deepest concern any course of action
begun by her Government which would produce fatal conse
quences to her, and which would place us probably, against our
will, in the adverse scale.
At the same time he was consistently using his in
fluence to keep the Italian Governments in the consti
tutional path on which they appeared to have entered.
Mr. Abercromby was our Minister at the Sardinian
Court. ¦ F. 0. : February 12, 1848.
My dear Abercromby, — I send you a despatch wliich I had
prepared before I received yours, which reached me this morn
ing, stating that the Cabinet at Turin were dehberating about
the grant pf a constitution. I hope their deliberation will have
ended affirmatively, and in that case our exhortations wiU apply
only to the method of carrying their assent into execution. If
they should have refused, you will then have to exert your elo
quence in trying to persuade them and the King to reconsider
and to reverse their decision. Arguments wiU not be wanting.
If the King resolves to oppose himself to the wishes and de
mands of his subjects, he must be prepared for one of two
courses. He must either abdicate or call in foreign aid. The
first alternative would be unwise and unnecessary, and would,
moreover, be like a man shooting himself to avoid a danger
which might threaten him with death.
As to calling in foreign aid, we cannot believe that, with his

ADVICE TO ITALY. 65
high and patriotic feehngs, he would consent to hold his throne
by means of French or Austrian bayonets, and to become there
after the mere puppet of Austria or of France. It is possible,
indeed, that he may have a more high-minded feeling on this
subject, and that, having committed himself in some way or
other against a Constitution, he may think it derogatory to his
conastency now to accept one. It is needless to point out how
untenable such a notion would be, and how futile any such
pledge or any such former resolution ought to be deemed as an
obstacle to prevent him from now performing a great and im
portant duty, as Sovereign, towards the nation which Providence
has committed to his charge.
From the first moment that one heard that the King of
Naples had consented to a Constitution, it was easy to foresee
that the rest of Italy must have one too.
To Sir George Hamilton, at Florence, he writes : —
I conclude that before this reaches you the question whether
there is or is not to be a Constitution in Tuscany will have been
decided ; but pray do all you can to persuade the Government
to yield with good grace to the wishes of the people, and upon
no account whatever to think of caUing in or of letting in the
Austrians to coerce the subjects of the Grand Duke. The first
thing of aU is national independence, and nothing can make up
for the loss of that.
The Eevolution at Paris came, however, like a thun
der-clap to scatter aU the timid compromises and falter
ing concessions of kings, emperors, and grand-dukes.
In France the blind obstinacy of a self-willed King, the
corruption of the Government and governing classes,
as illustrated by the Cubieres-Teste and Petit scandals,
¦ and by the Praslin tragedy, the anti-Liberal and un
popular policy of the French Foreign Office, partly the
result of estrangement from England caused by the
' Spanish Marriages ; ' these all had combined to bring
to a climax discontent, which a long period of commer
cial and financial distress had greatly fomented. The
different sections of malcontents agreed to unite on the
basis of a demand for parliamentary reform. Banquets
were organised in different parts of France, when ex
citing speeches were made, and complaints found audible
VOL. II. F

66 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
expression. The Assembly met on the 28th of Decem
ber. Upon the Address arose a debate, which lasted
twenty days, and during which Guizot and Duchatel '
had in vain tried to make head against the attacks of
Thiers, Lamartine, BiUault, and De'Tocqueville. The
Ministry kept a servile though a decreasing majority in
the divisions which took place ; but the victory lay vrith
the others. The debate closed on the 7th of February.
' The war of words,' said the ' National,' on the 9th, ' is
at an end. That of deeds is now to come.'
A political banquet, which had been originaUy fixed
for the 19th of January in Paris itself, had been post
poned in consequence of an interdiction by the police.
On the day after the rejection of the amendment on
the Address, the Liberal deputies met and determined
to persevere in their design. The revived banquet was
fixed for the 22nd, and was publicly announced. At
this crisis Louis Philippe's obstinacy showed itself most
disastrously. The death of his sister, the Princess
Adelaide, a few weeks before, had removed his best
counsellor. ' I never will consent to Eeform,' he de
clared with cynical contempt for constitutional doctrine.
' Eeform is another word for the advent of the Oppo
sition ! '
VaciUation, however, often hangs on the skirts of
obstinacy. With Louis Philippe it was always so, and
this occasion formed no exception. The Liberal chiefs
were as anxious as the Government itself to avoid any
violent collision. A compromise was agreed to, by
which there was to be a procession, but no banquet.
When it appeared likely that the multitude woiUd be
great, the authorities took alarm, again changed front,
and, on the very morning of the 22nd, covered the walls
of Paris with placards forbidding any assembly in tlie
streets. The crowds, however, had coUected, and all
day thronged the central parts of the city. Their
leaders had stayed away.
' Guizot was a briUiant orator, but neither a statesman nor a man
of business. Duchatel had great aptitude, but was an idle man, and
not an efEeotive speaker, except on finance.

THE EEVOLUTION IN PAEIS. 67
Lord Normanby sent Lord Palmerston the follow
ing record of his personal observations during these
events : — Paris : March 13, 1848.
There are some scattered incidents in the last days of Louis
Phihppe and his Minister which came within my personal
observation, which I should hke to take this early opportunity
of collecting and recording, as they have their bearing upon
the great pohtical moral to be derived from the astounding
catastrophe. I ventured, in the middle of last year, to call your lordship's
attention to the state of pohtical feehng in the country, and to
remark that nothing could save the dynasty of July but an
immediate change of men, and measures of reform at once
prompt and sincere. Not one measure of a concihatory descrip
tion was from that time even contemplated by the Government,
and yet there was a moment when the very extent of the general
discontent appeared to hold out hopes of a peaceful solution of
the question. The danger had always been that the King,
supported by a packed majority of the Chamber, would persevere
to the last to resist the popular vsdU, but this will had latterly
acquired such an irresistible impulse that it had even found its
way into the constitutional channels hitherto choked up by
corruption. When one saw, in the course of the debates on the
Address, the effect of pubhc opinion in reducing even such a
majority from 120 to 30, one had even hopes that a vote of the
Chamber, by upsetting the Ministry, might preserve the throne.
As I attended personaUy every one of these sittings, which
lasted three weeks, I could observe that the decline of the
numerical force of the majority was not so strong an indication
as the changes in its tonei There was still a disposition on the
part of many to prolong, for a short time, the existence of the
Ministry, in order to avoid the probable 'dissolution of the
Chamber, but during the whole of that discussion of unexampled
length, there was hardly an independent member, or one not
actually in office with the Government, who said one word in
favour either of their foreign or domestic poUcy; and it was
also remarkable that, often as M. Guizot had upon former
occasions recovered himself from surrounding difficulties by the
exercise of his extraordinary talent in the tribune, he never
once, during the debates on the Address, made a single effective
rally.
f2

68 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
He heard, without an attempt at reply, the Spanish mar
riages stigmatised as a selfish and anti-national pohcy, amidst
the cheers of his opponents, and without one dissenting mur
mur from |that majority which had supported them last year.
It was proved by the admission of his ovsoi Minister of War
that at the time when he was proposing to Europe a mediation
in Swiss affi,irs, he had smuggled, for the benefit of the Sonder
bund, arms and ammunition out of the Royal Arsenal at
Besan§on, concealed in the shape of other merchandise, and
with a fake declaration to their own Customs. The only excuse
he attempted of his Itahan pohcy was to say that there could
not be a thought of a Constitution in Italy for the next five or
ten years, and this dictum was uttered on the very day the
Constitution was proclaimed at Naples.
The miserable figure which the Government made during
the whole of the debate was in no small degree caused by the
profound sensation produced in the Chamber and in society by
the incident with which it commenced. The personal integrity
of M. Guizot had, next to his oratorical superiority, been the
throne upon which his supporters had distinguished him from
his feUows. That which was caUed ' I'affaire Petit ' was, there
fore, calculated to make a great sensation, not so much from its
individual importance as from the system which it showed up.
M. Guizot was not so much injured by his evident participation
in it as by the callous audacity with which he treated the matter.
M. Bertin de Vaux, a peer of Prance, and a part proprietor
of the ' Journal des D6bats,' desired to procure a place for M.
Petit, the husband of his mistress. As what M. Bertin desired
was employment for M. Petit, and as M. Petit was not particulaJ-
at what price his ambition was gratified, M. Guizot told M.
Bertin de Vaux that, provided M. Petit would buy the resignar
tion of a better place, he should himself possess a smaUer one
then vacant. This bargain was executed, but the exigencies of
parliamentary corruption at that time pressing hard upon M.
Guizot, he gave awa^, without reference to M. Petit, both the
place he desired and that which he had bought, endeavouring
to put him off with a promise of an early vacancy ; but at this
both M. Petit and his patron, M. Bertin de Vaux, were indig
nant, and the 60,000 francs which M. Guizot himself repaid
M. Bertin de Vaux for M. Petit, as the price he had paid for
the place, were obtained for that purpose out of the Secret Ser*
vice Money. This was the real history of the first part of this
affair, and yet M. Guizot had the effrontery to say from the tri-

INFATUATION OF LOUIS PHILIPPE. 69
bune that he was not personally acquainted with any of the
details of the affair. There was not one of his majority who
beheved a syUable of this assertion, and how could they, as,
when asked how then M. Bertin de Vaux came to assert in his
letter that he had received the money from him, he was forced
to remain silent %
It was under the general impression thus produced that the
question of the banquet arose.
I have aheady, in former despatches, mentioned to your
lordship the exasperation caused by the hostile phrases in the
King's Speech. When, in addition to this, in assertion of the
iUegahty of the banquets, the Minister of Justice made the
astounding declaration from the tribune that every act that was
not expressly permitted in the charter was thereby forbidden,
the Opposition thought it necessary to make a striking demon
stration in vindication of their rights.
The night before that appointed for the banquet I went to
the Tuileries without knowing the decision of the Opposition
deputies. As His Majesty had often volunteered to speak to
me upon his own affairs, I thought it possible he might do so
then, and I was prepared, if the occasion was thus offered,
humbly to represent to His Majesty the danger, in the then state
of the pubhc mind, unnecessarily to provoke a coUision in the
streets. But I was told by one of the Government whom I met
on the stairs that the Opposition had given up the banquet, and
I found the whole Court in an ecstasy of dehght, as if they had
gained a great victory. The King spoke to me for some time
with great animation, but never once aUuded to the passing
events. He adverted to our proposed diplomatic intercourse
with Eome, to the difficulty of receiving a priest at St. James's
in fuU canonicals ; told a story of the Archbishop of Narbonne,
who, in the days of his emigration, had got over this difficulty
by going to George the Third in a court dress with a sword. I
only allude to these trivial subjects of conversation because I
foimd afterwards that the King had been studying effect to the
last, and that he had said to those to whom he spoke immediately
afterwards, ' I am very well satisfied with Lord Normanby to
night,' as if he had been speaking to me of the pressing concerns
of the moment, and that I had approved the course of his
Government. The infatuation of the King during the whole of the debates
on the Address was very remarkable. Several of the repre
sentatives of the smaller Gei-man Courts went to him with

70 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
letters of condolence on Madame Adelaide's death, and to some'
he said, 'TeU your master not to mind having popular assem-
bhes ; let them only learn to manage them as I manage mine ;
see the noise they are making now ; I shall soon have them in
hand again ; they want me to get rid of Guizot ; I will not do
it. Can I possibly give a stronger proof of my power ? '
Although the Government had forbidden the meet
ing, they kept no troops to overawe the mob. Eioting,
therefore, began towards the evening of the 22nd, and
troops were sent for during the night. On the 23rd a
collision took place in front of the Foreign Office be
tween the soldiers and the people. Lives were lost,
and the Eevolution was started. During the foUowing
night the Guizot Ministry resigned, and was succeeded
by Thiers and OdUlon Barrot. Marshal Bugeaud and
General Lamorici^re were placed in command of the
troops and National Guard. The Marshal lost no time
in securing the control of Paris,' and daybreak of the
24th found the whole city in possession of the army.
Had he been allowed to act as he had arranged, the in
surrection would have been easUy suppressed ; but an
order from the Palace to cease the combat and with
draw the troops sealed the fate of the Monarchy. Sore
and disheartened, those of his soldiers who retired on
the Tuileries made but a feeble resistance to the mob
which broke in, whUe the King, after signing his abdi
cation, was escaping with his family by a back door.
The Duchess of Orleans forced her way to the Chamber
of Deputies, and made a courageous effort to secure the
throne for her son, the Comte de Paris, but all in vain.
Thus in two short days the Monarchy was swept away,
and the Provisional Government of a Eepublic substi
tuted in its stead.
The news of these startling events arrived in Eng
land on the night of the 25th. As they reached the
lobby of the House of Commons the murmurs of con
versation spreading from the door right through the
crowded benches caused the unparalleled spectacle of
a complete, although informal, suspension of business'

ATTITUDE OF ENGLAND. 71
for several minutes, every member being engaged in
close and earnest colloquy with his neighbour.
Lord Palmerston acknowledged the news as follows
to Lord Normanby : — F. O. : February 26, 1848.
I received at half-past eleven last night in the House of
Commons your despatches of Thursday. What extraordinary
and marveUous events you give me an account of. It is hke
the five acts of a play, and has not taken up much more time.
Strange that a king who owed his crown to a revolution brought
about by royal bhndness and obstinacy should have lost it by
exactly the same means, and he a man who had gone through
all the vicissitudes of human existence, from the condition of a
schoolmaster to the pomp of a throne ; and stiU further that his
overthrow should have been assisted by a Minister deeply read
in the records of history, and whose mind was not merely stored
with the chronology of historical facts, but had extracted from
their mass the reasons of events and the philosophy of their
causes. I can give you but provisional instructions. Continue at
your post. Keep up unofficial and useful communication with
the men who from hour to hour (I say not even from day to
day) may have the direction of events, but commit us to no
acknowledgment of any men, nor of any things. Our principles
of action are to acknowledge whatever rule may be estabhshed
with apparent prospect of permanency, but none other. We
desire friendship and extended commercial intercourse with
France, and peace between France and the rest of Europe. We
wiU engage to prevent the rest of Europe from meddhng with
Prance, which indeed we are quite sure they have no intention
of doing. The French rulers must engage to prevent France from
assailing any part of the rest of Europe. Upon such a basis
our relations with France may be placed on a footing more
friendly than they have been or were hkely to be with Louis
Phihppe and Guizot.
The pacific intentions, however, of the Provisional
Government began to be doubted, and a report got
abroad that they were about to declare war against
Austria at once, and also to annex Belgium on the in
vitation of the Eepublican party in that country. The
ex-King was making for the coast, hoping to reach

72 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
England, and the British Government was taking steps
to assist him in his flight. F. 0. ; February 27, 1848.
My dear Normanby, — I send you a hundred sovereigns by
this messenger, and will send a hundred more by the next. You
must use your discretion about going away or staying. It is
desirable that you should stay as long as you can do so with
safety both to yourself and to the dignity of the country, because
your presence protects British subjects ; and your coming away
would be a measure of much import, and therefore of importance.
Your accounts of Friday night, received to-day, and the far
ther reports that reach us, are fearfuUy ominous for the peace of
Europe. A general war seems to be impending at the moment
when we aU were flattering ourselves that peace would last
thirty years to come. One felt yesterday that the French army
had till then counted for nothing in the events which had taken
place in Paris, and that it was impossible that the French army
should count for nothing in deciding the destinies of France.
One therefore felt that it might be in the power of any popular
general to march fifty or sixty thousand men into Paris, and
decide matters according to his vdU, in spite of the armed mob
or of the National Guard; this thought seems also to have
occurred to those who are for the moment at the head of affairs,
and they seem to propose to send the army to attack the neigh
bours of France instead of letting it come into Paris to upset
them. It remains to be seen whether the army wUl take this
bait. One fears that it may. If this should be, the British
Government will have to come to a grave and serious deter
mination. We cannot sit quiet and see Belgium overrun and
Antwerp become a French port; and even a war in other
directions will sooner or later draw us into its vortex.
We have taken such measures as are within our power to
afford the means of coming over to such passengers as may
come to the coast, including the persons to whom you aUuded
in your last.
MontebeUo says that he sent a message to the Duchess of
Orleans on Thursday morning, which did not reach her, warning
her not to rely on the Parhament, against whom, as much as
against the King, the revolution was directed, but to take her
son into the streets and throw herself on the National Guard.
Perhaps if she had received this advice and acted upon it, things
might have gone differently.

ATTITUDE OF THE PEOVISIONAI GOVEENMENT. 73
C. G. : February 28, 1848.
My dear Normanby, — I received at 11 o'clock this evening
your very important despatches. AU are important, but pre
eminently so your short note of yesterday reporting the pacific
assurances made to you from the Provisional Government, and
especiaUy their resolution not to accept the incorporation even
if offered. This is a most wise resolve ; for if they wiU look to
the stipulations of the treaty finally concluded between the five
Powers, Belgium, and the Netherlands, they wiU see that there
are in it guarantees which would have a very awkward bearing
upon any attempt by France to annex Belgium to its territory.
In fact, the peace of Europe is now in the hands of the French
Government, and with them rests the question of peace or war.
You will have received before this time my despatch desiring
you to stay where you are till you receive other instructions,
and authorizing you to hold such unofficial communications with
the Government as may be necessary for the pubhc service. Of
course the French Government cannot expect that we shoxdd
send you formal credentials to a Government professedly pro
visional and temporary, but we shaU take no hostUe step towards
them, and shaU not bring you away as long as they continue to
maintain their authority, and to use it with moderation and for
purposes of order. Whenever a permanent Government shall
have been estabhshed, then vriU be the time for deciding as to
renewed credentials ; and you know that the invariable principle
on which England acts is to acknowledge as the organ of every
nation that organ which each nation may dehberately choose to
have. But it must be an organ likely to be permanent, for it
woiUd not be consistent with the dignity of England to be send
ing to her ambassador fresh credentials every ten days, according
as the caprice of the people of Paris might from time to time
change the form and substance of French institutions. I grieve
at the prospect of a republic in France, for I fear that it must
lead to war in Europe and fresh agitation in England. Large
repubhcs seem to be essentiaUy and inherently aggressive, and
the aggressions of the French wUl be resisted by the rest of
Europe, and that is war ; while, on the other hand, the example
of universal sufirage in IVance wiU set our non- voting population
agog, and wiU create a demand for an inconvenient extension of
the suffi-age, baUot, and other mischievous things. However, for
the present, vive Lamartine !
It was fortunate for the peace of Europe that a

74 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Whig Cabinet and a Liberal Foreign Secretary were
in office at this time. If there had been in London
an illiberal and anti-democratic Cabinet, imbued with :
the maxims of Burke and the traditions of Pitt, a
monarchical coalition against France might again have
been formed. The friendly relations of England with
France were of great service to the cause of peace. No
less an authority than the King of the Belgians bore
testimony to this at a later period in a letter to Lord
Palmerston,' in which he said : —
I must take this opportunity to express to you my con
viction that the acting together of England and France has been
most useful, as it has facihtated to the French Government a
system of moderation which it could but with great difficulty
have maintained if it had not been acting in concert with
England. Lord Palmerston's great anxiety at this critical
moment was to preserve peace by preventing any act
hostUe to the French Eepublic on the part of the Great
Powers. On the other hand, he hoped by a speedy re
cognition of the new form of government in France to
bring the legitimate influences of Europe to bear upon
it. He writes to Lord Westmorland at Berlin, and to
Lord Ponsonby at Vienna : — P. O. : February 29, 1848.
My dear Westmorland, — I firmly beheve Lamartine to
mean peace and no aggression ; it will be of importance, there
fore, that the three Powers should not take any steps which
might look like a threat of attacking France, or an intention to
interfere in her internal affiiirs. The only thing to do is to wait
and watch, and be prepared. A.S for us, whenever there is a
settled Government estabhshed, we shaU, according to our usual
custom, acknowledge it by sending fresh credentials to our am
bassador. But we should hke to do this in concert with the
other Powers ; only we should not be able perhaps to wait for
them if they were disposed to hesitate or demur when the pro
per time may come ; and we may not think it expedient to wait
till after the constituent Assembly shall have met. All men of
> January 23, 1849.

HIS CONFIDENCE IN LAMAETINE. 75
mark of aU parties, including the Legitimists, are supporting
Lamartine's Government as the only security at present against
anarchy, confiagration, and massacre. It must be owned that
the prospect of a repubhc in France is far from agreeable ; for
such a Government would naturaUy be more hkely to place
peace in danger than a monarchy would be. But we must deal
with things as they are, and not as we would wish to have them.
These Paris events ought to serve, however, as a warning to the
Prussian Government, and should induce them to set to work
without delay to complete those constitutional institutions of
which the King last year laid the foundations. P. O. : February 29, 1848.
My dear Ponsonby, — Here is a pretty to-do at Paris ; it is
plain that,, for the present at least, we shall have a repubhc in
France. How long it may last is another question. But, for
the present, the only chance for tranquiUity and order in France,
and for peace in Europe, is to give support to Lamartine. I am
convinced this French Government will not be aggressive, if
left alone ; and it is to be hoped that Apponyi and others will
be aUowed to remain in Paris tiU things take a decided turn.
If a republic is decidedly estabhshed, the other Powers of Europe
must, of course, give credentials addressed to that Government,
or they will have to give biUets to its troops. I have no time
to write more, but nothing can be more positive, or, as I beheve,
more sincere than Lamartine's declarations of a peace pohcy,
and you wiU observe that, by saying that France has not changed
her place in Europe, he virtually acknowledges the obhgations
of existing treaties. He could not well have done so at present
in more distinct terms.
I should advise the Austrians to come to a good understand
ing with Sardinia as to mutual defence if attacked, which, how
ever, they are not at present hkely to be. But if the Austrian
Government does not mitigate its system of coercion in Lom
bardy and grant hberal institutions, they wiU have a revolt
there ; and if there shaU be conflict in Lombardy between the
troops and the pubhc, and much bloodshed, it is to be feared
that the French nation wiU break loose in spite of Lamartine's
efforts to restrain them.
Lamartine now issued a very able circular or mani
festo to the diplomatic agents of France. It deprecated
any idea that the Eepublic of 1848 must necessarUy

76 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
follow the warlike principles of 1792, but went on to
declare that, in the eyes of France, the treaties of 1815
existed no longer as law, and that she would not look
with indifference on any forcible attempt to repress the
nascent aspirations of oppressed nationalities. Lord
Palmerston writes to Lord Clarendon on March 9 : —
Any Government which wished to pick a quarrel with
France might find ample materials in tins circular. But it
seems to me that the true pohcy of Europe at present is, to say
as httle and do as httle as possible, so as not to stir matters in
France beyond their natural turbulence, and to watch events te
be prepared for them. The circular is evidently a piece of
patchwork put together by opposite parties in the Government,
the one warhke and disturbing, the other peaceful and concilia
tory. I should say that if you were to put the whole of it into
a crucible, and evaporate the gaseous parts, and scum off the
dross, you would find the regulus ' to be peace and good-feUow-
ship with other Governments.
There soon arose an occasion for testing the truth
of this opinion. The Irish revolutionists, confident
that they would get sympathy and aid from the French
Eepublic, were sending over deputations to Paris ; and
at the interviews which they obtained Irish questions
were very freely discussed. Lord Palmerston thought
it weU to speak out at once before much harm was
done : — P. O.: March 21, 1848.
My dear Normanby, — I have written you an official despatch
about M. de Lamartine's aUocutions to Irish deputations and
his direct aUusions therein to our internal affairs, such as
Cathohc Emancipation, Irish agitation. Repeal of the Union,
and other matters, with which no foreign Government had any
right to meddle. I wish you to convey to him, in terms as civU
as you can use, that these speeches, and especiaUy that to which
my despatch refers, have given great offence in this country to
many persons who very sincerely desire to see the most friendly
relations maintained between England and France, and that if
this practice of interfering in our affairs, and of giving in this
> The pure metal, which in the melting of ores falls to the bottom
of the crucible.

LAMAETINE'S PEOMPT ACTION. 77
manner direct encouragement to pohtical agitation within the
United Kingdom, shall continue to be persevered in by the
French Government, a cry wiU soon arise in this country for
the withdrawal of our embassy from Paris. This has aheady
been suggested to me by many of the supporters of the Govern
ment as an appropriate mark of our disapprobation of the
proceedings of the French Government in these matters.
This remonstrance was not without effect. A de
putation, headed by Smith O'Brien himself, received
from Lamartine an answer which must have dashed
all their hopes. He told them that it was not ' con
venable ' for the French nation to intervene in the
affairs of a country with which they were and wished
to remain at peace. Lord Palmerston acknowledges
the straightforward conduct of the French Foreign
Minister : — F. O.: April 4, 1848.
My dear Normanby, — ^Pray tell Lamartine how very much
obhged we feel for his handsome and friendly conduct about the
Irish deputation. His answer was most honourable and gentle-
manhke, and just what might have been expected from a high-
minded man hke him.
I forgot in the hurry in which I have been living to teU you
that I had Guizot and the Lievens to dinner on Sunday week
last, with half-a-dozen people to meet them ; but I took care
that it should not he put into the paper. Nobody, I imagine,
can suppose that there is any pohtical sympathy between Guizot
and me ; we have been opposed to each other as pubhc men,
both as representing adverse systems of general pohtical prin
ciples, and as acting upon conflicting views of international
interest. But Guizot and I were upon very good terms person
ally while he was ambassador here ; and he was particularly
civil to me when I was at Paris two years ago. He is now in
misfortune and adversity; and though I may agree with most
other people in thinking that his own pohtical errors have been
the true causes of his present condition, yet it would, I think,
have been ungenerous in me if I had not shown myself as sen
sible of his former civihty to me as I should have done if he
had come here imder circumstances more fortunate for himself.
I am sure that no reasonable Frenchman can find fault with those
small attentions which are merely the expressions of personal feel-

78 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ing, and which have nothing whatever to do with any pohtical
matters. I shaU, on the same principle, have the Duchatels to
dinner in a quiet and unostentatious manner ; I saw a good
deal of them on the Rhine, and they also gave us a very hospit
able reception when we were at Paris.
In Italy the news of the French Eevolution had
a prodigious effect. Everywhere the aristocratic had
to yield to the democratic party. Venice broke away
from Austria, and proclaimed a Eepublic. MUan re
volted, and compeUed the Austrian troops to commence
a retreat which only ceased beyond the Mincio. Charles
Albert, King of Sardinia, resolved to embrace the cause
of Italian independence, and to bring the regular forces
of the Piedmontese monarchy to the aid of insurgent
Lombardy. On March 25 his army crossed the Ticino
and entered the Austrian territory. On March 31 Lord
Palmerston writes to Lord Normanby : —
Our attitude with regard to what is passing in the north of
Italy is that of passive spectators. Abercromby made no pro
test, though he urged aU the arguments which suggested
themselves to him against the advance of the Sardinian
troops. It maybe questionable how far Charles Albert was justified
by the rules of good neighbourhood in seizing an Austrian pro
vince ; my own behef is that he could not help doing so, and as
Europe is now undergoing great changes, I cannot myself regret
that the establishment of a good state in Northern Italy should
be one of them. As to your not always getting letters from me
by every messenger who passes through Paris, never wonder at
that nor think it extraordinary. Wonder rather when I am
able to find time to write at all ; I am sure you would if you
saw the avalanche of despatehes from every part of the world
which come down upon me daily, and which must be read, and
if you witnessed the number of interviews which I cannot avoid
giving every day of the week. Every post sends me a lamenting
Minister throwing himself and his country upon England for
help, which I am obhged to teU him we cannot afford him.
But Belgium is a case by itself, and both France and England
are bound by treaty engagements in regard to that country,
which it is most desirable for the repose of France and England
that no events should call into active operation.

ENGLAND'S POLICY IN THE EUEOPEAN CEISIS. 79
With Eussia he wished to be on good terms, as
the only State left erect amid the general downfaU;
although he frankly stated to the Government of the
Czar that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government,
Poland was entitled to a Constitution under the terms
of the Treaty of Vienna ; so he says to Lord Bloomfield
at St. Petersburg : — '
Assure Count Nesselrode that our feehngs and sentiments
towards Russia are exactly similar to those which he expresses
to you towards England. We are at present the only two
Powers in Europe (excepting always Belgium) that remain
standing upright, and we ought to look with confidence to each
other. Of course he must be aware that pubhc feehng in this
country runs strong in favour of the Poles ; but we, the Govern
ment, wiU never do anything underhand or ungentlemanlike on
those matters. I wish we could hope that the Emperor might
of his own accord settle the Pohsh question in some satisfactory
imanner. While aU these conflicts were surging in Europe,
and threatening to wipe out almost every line of the
Treaty of Vienna, the British Foreign Office had, as
may be supposed, plenty of work to engage its atten
tion. Its policy at this crisis may be thus sum
marised : —
To maintain peace as long as possible, but to main
tain it by exerting, and not by foregoing, English in
fluence. To support the integrity and independence
of Belgium so long as the Belgians were themselves
willing to uphold it. To favour the development of
German unity — whether in the shape of one or two
German Powers — strong enough to make head against
any attack from France or Eussia. To advise Austria
not to keep up a bloody struggle for the maintenance
of the Lombard kingdom. Lastly, not to interfere in
any way with the form of government in France, but
not to slacken or part with any means of resistance
should the French seek to relieve internal embarrass
ment by external aggression.
1 To Lord Bloomfield. P. 0., April 11, 1848.

80 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
England felt also in her home affairs the events in
France, for they stirred up the revolutionary spirit, such
as it was. The Chartists, with mad Feargus O'Connor
at their head, prepared a demonstration for April 10,
when they proposed, after meeting on Kennington Com
mon, to march to the House of Commons with a monster
petition. On the day named they were quietly informed
by the police officers on the ground that they would not
be aUowed to cross the Thames. The whole affair
ludicrously coUapsed, although it had created serious
alarm in London. Lord Palmerston reports the result
as follows to our ambassador at Paris : —
P. 0. : April 11, 1848.
Yesterday was a glorious day, the Waterloo of peace and
order. They say there were upwards of one hundred thousand
special constables — some put the number at two hundred and
fifty thousand ; but the streets were swarming with them, and
men of aU classes and ranks were blended together in defence of
law and property. The Chartists made a poor figure, and did
not muster more than fifteen thousand men on the Common.
Feargus was frightened out of his wits, and was made the hap
piest man in England at being told that the procession could
not pass the bridges. The Chartists have found that the great
bulk of the inhabitants of London are against them, and they
wiU probably he by for the present and watch for some more
favourable moment.
Meanwhile, the result of yesterday wiU produce a good and
cahning effect all over this and the sister island. The foreigners
did not show ; but the constables, regular and special, had sworn
to make an example of any whiskered and bearded rioters whom
they might meet with, and I am convinced would have mashed
them to jeUy.
Smith O'Brien surpassed himself last night in dulness, bad
taste, and treason.
The speech here referred to was on the discussion
of the ' BiU for the more effectual Eepression of Trea
sonable Proceedings,' and was the last occasion on
which Smith O'Brien appeared in the House of Com
mons previous to taking the field ! The contemptuous
indignation with which he was received by the House

LOED BEOUGHAM IN FEANCE. 81
was overwhelming. In the next letter we get a very
neat retort of Sir Eobert Peel's, which shows him
capable of humour when occasion offered. P. 0. : April 18, 1848.
My dear Normanby, — Lamartine is reaUy a wonderful
fellow, and is endowed with great quahties. It is much to be
desired that he should swim through the breakers and carry his
country safe into port. I conclude that he has escaped one dan
ger by the refusal to naturahse Brougham ; for it is evident
that our ex-ChanceUor meant, if he had got himself elected, to
have put up for being President of the Repubhc. It is woful
to see a man who is so near being a great man make himself so
small. We have just been sending up to the Lords from the House
of Commons our BiU for the Security of the Crown. Peel made
a good hit in the debate. Feargus O'Connor aUuded to the pos
sible case of Beelzebub being sovereign, and Peel said that m
that case Feargus would certainly enjoy the confidence of the
Crown. Hume, at the close of the debate, blamed us for not
having put down the Convention,' which, he said, ought not to
be permitted to go on, and which, he contended (though erro
neously), comes within the prohibitive provisions of our existing
laws. What we hear from Ireland talhes with what you wrote me
a few days ago, that there can be no decided and extensive out
break tUl the potato and grain harvest is in, as men must eat to
be able to fight. I trust we shall be able to keep them quiet
after aU.
Leopold, King of the Belgians, was all through his
long and useful life one of Lord Palmerston's constant
correspondents. His sagacity and . liberal views won
the respect of the English Minister, who was always
ready frankly to interchange ideas with him. Since
February, Paris had passed through a series of convul
sions, and, at the moment when the following letter
was written, the French Assembly, engaged in a struggle
with the Socialists, exhibited the strange spectacle of
a Legislature elected by universal suffrage deliberating
under the protection of cannon pointed against its own
• Chartist Convention.
VOL. II. Gr

82 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
constituents. In Italy the tide had not yet turned in
favour of the Austrians, and they were stUl entrenched
in their lines beyond the Mincio. Lord Palmerston
foresaw that their success, even if it did come, would
be but temporary. Carlton G.: June 15, 1848.
Sire, — I was much obhged to Your Majesty for the letter
which I had the honour of receiving from Your Majesty some
httle time ago ; and I am happy to have the opportunity which
is thus afforded me of congratulating Your Majesty upon the
continued tranquiUity and stability of your kingdom. It would
seem as if the storms which have shaken everything else aU over
the continent of Europe had only served tb consohdate more
firmly the foundations of Your Majesty's throne. As to France,
no man nowadays can venture to prophesy from week to week
the turn affahs may take in that unfortunate country. For
many years past the persons in authority in France have worked
at the superstructure of Monarchy without taking care of the
foundation. Education and rehgion have been neglected, and
power has now passed into the hands of a mob ignorant of the
principles of government, of morahty, and of justice; and it is
a most remarkable fact in the history of society that in a nation
of thirty-five milhons of men, who have now for more than half
a century been in a state of pohtical agitation, which, in general,
forms and brings out able men, and who have during that time
been governed by three dynasties, there is no pubhc political
man to whom the country looks up with confidence and respect,
on account of his statesmanlike quahties and personal character
combined ; and there is no prince whom any large portion of
the nation would make any considerable effort to place as sove
reign on the throne. The principle of equahty seems to have
been fully carried out in one respect, and that is that all pubhc
men are equaUy without respect, and aU candidates for royalty
equally without following.
As to poor Austria, every person who attaches value to the
maintenance of a balance of power in Europe must lament her
present helpless condition ; and every man gifted with ever so
httle foresight must have seen, for a long time past, that feeble-.
ness and decay were the inevitable consequences of Prince
Metternich's system of government ; though certainly no one
could have expected that the rottenness within would so soon
and so completely have shown itself without. Lord Bacon says

LETTEE TO KING LEOPOLD. 83
that a man who aims at being the only figure among ciphers is
the ruin of an age ; and so it has been with Metternich. He
has been jealous of anything like talent or attainment in indi
viduals, and of anything like hfe in communities and nations.
He succeeded for a time in damming up and arresting the
stream of human progress. The wonder is, not that the accu
mulated pressure should at last have broke the barrier and have
deluged the country, but that his artificial impediments should
have produced stagnation so long.
I cannot regret the expulsion of the Austrians from Italy.
I do not beheve. Sire, that it wiU diminish the real strength nor
impair the real security of Austria as a European Power. Her
rule was hateful to the Itahans, and has long been maintained
only by an expenditure of money and an exertion of mihtary
effort which left Austria less able to maintain her interests else
where. Italy was to her the heel of Achilles, and not the shield
of Ajax. The Alps are her natural barrier and her best de
fence. I should wish to see the whole of Northern Italy united
into one kingdom, comprehending Piedmont, Genoa, Lombardy,
Venice, Parma, and Modena ; and Bologna would, in that case,
sooner or later unite itself either to that State or- to Tuscany.
Such an arrangement of Northern Italy would be most condu
cive to the peace of Europe, by interposing between France and
Austria a neutral State strong enough to make itself respected,
and sympathising in its habits and character neither with France
nor with Austria; while, with reference to the progress of civi
lisation, such a State would have great advantages, pohtical,
commercial, and inteUectual. Such an arrangement is now, in
my opinion. Sire, inevitable; and the sooner the Austrian
Government makes up its mind to the necessity, the better con
ditions it will be able to obtain. If Austria waits tUl she be
forcibly expeUed — which she will soon be— she wUl get no con
ditions at all. I have the honour to be. Sire,
Your Majesty's most obedient humble Servant,
Palmerston.
Soon after the first successes of the Italians the
Austrian Government asked for the 'good offices' of
England. Baron Hummelauer came from Vienna instructed
to propose the erection of Lombardy into a separate
duchy, with an Austrian prince, but under the suze-
G 2

84 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
rainty of the Emperor. Lord Palmerston told him that
things had gone too far for that. He then said that he
would recommend to his Government the abandon
ment of Lombardy on condition that she took on her
shoulders part of the Austrian debt. Lord Palmerston
replied that, with Venice already in Italian hands,
neither Charles Albert nor his people would be satisfied
with this, and suggested that a part at least of Venetia
should be included. Baron Hummelauer then said that
he would go back and submit this to his Government.
It was certainly a tribute to British influence that
it should have been sought thus early by a Power
which was not at any rate very weU inclined to the
man who represented England with foreign nations.
Prince Metternich had detested Canning, and nursed
the greater part of his antipathy for the benefit of Can
ning's distinguished disciple. Prince Schwarzenberg,
when he succeeded to Metternich's place, succeeded
also to his prejudices, and brought at the same time a
more passionate nature to bear. The consequence was
that the spirit of Lord Palmerston's policy and pro
ceedings towards Austria was entirely misunderstood
by the Imperial Cabinet. The preservation of the Aus
trian empire was one of the leading considerations
which bore upon his different projects for the settle
ment of the Italian question. Certainly, in 1848, he
apprehended its downfaU, but he only participated in
the fears of every statesman in Europe, including the
Austrians themselves. To concentrate her resources
upon her own important territories appeared, in the
summer of that year, the only way for Austria to extri
cate herself from her difficulties, and to save her Gier-
manic crown.
In the following letters we find evidence of the
general feeling at the time, shared by the Austrians
themselves, that the independence of Lombardy was
won. Lord Palmerston's suggestion as to the abdica
tion of the Emperor Ferdinand only anticipated what
took place some months later. The present Emperor,

FOEESEES ABDICATION OF FEEDINAND. 85
at that time, ' the lad of sixteen or twenty,' mounted
the throne, saved the Austrian empire, and has since
shown himself a wise and patriotic ruler. P. 0. : April 21, 1848.
My dear Ponsonby, — I have, at the request of Dietrichstein,*
instructed Abercromby to recommend to the Sardinian Govern
ment a suspension of arms, in order to give Count Hartig an
opportunity of trying negotiation with the MUanese ; but the
success or failure of Abercromby's application will depend en
thely upon the state of military operations at the time when my
despatch reaches him ; and, to say the truth, I have little expec
tation that his apphcation wUl be successful, unless for the
attainment of an armistice of a few days. Of course, the Sar
dinians and Lombards will consider the armistice as a pretence
bywhich to gain time for the advance of Austrian reinforcements
under Count Nugent. I have received your note stating the
three degrees of arrangement which Hartig is authorised to pro
pose. The first and second, I am quite sure, wUl not be listened
to. Things have gone much too far to admit of the possibihty
of any future connection between the Italians and Austria.
Either of those two first arrangements might have been received
with thankfulness six months ago, but they now come too late.
Whether the third will be agreed to or not, will probably de
pend on the turn which the war wUl have taken. If the
Austrians stUl retain a strong mihtary position, from which
they could not be driven without much expense of time, blood,
and money, the Italians may consent to buy them out ; but even
in this case there wiU most likely be a wide difference between
what one party asks and what the other would give. If, on the
other hand, the Austrians should be evidently losing ground when
Hartig arrives, the chances are that the Itahans wiU not consent
to pay anything to Austria, and wiU only agree to give the
A.usfrian troops a lasoia passare for their retreat to their own
homes. I certainly quite agree with you and your Austrian
friend that Austria would be much better out of Italy than in
it. Italy can never now be a useful possession for Austria.
Natipnal antipathy has been so |powerfuUy excited that Lom
bardy could be kept only by the sword, and that tenure would,
under the most favourable circumstances, be very insecure, and
would render the occupation far more expensive than valuable.
I should say that the Austrians would be right in trying to
' Austrian ambassador in London.

86 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
drive a good bargain with the Lombards, provided they do not
stand out too long, nor for terms over-high : anything would be
better than a prolonged contest ; for that would infalhbly bring
the French into the conflict, and then Austria would have on
her hands a war which every prudential reason should teach her
not to provoke, though, of course, she would meet it stoutly if it
came upon her unprovoked and without any reason.
On the whole, the conclusion to which I should come is,
that the cheapest, best, and wisest thing which Austria can do,
is to give up her Itahan possessions quietly and at once, and to
direct her attention and energy to organising the remainder of
her coast territories, to cement them together, and to develop
their abundant resources. But to do this there ought to be
some able men at the head of affairs, and our doubt is whether
there are any such now in office. First and foremost, what is
the animal implumis bipes caUed Emperor ? A perfect nullity ;
next thing to an idiot. What is the man who would succeed if
the Emperor was to die ? A brother scarcely a shade better
than the Emperor. Who comes next? A lad of sixteen or
twenty ; and what else he is, nobody seems to know ; but what
ever he may become hereafter, he cannot now be competent to take
any part in political affairs. If the next heir to the crown were
a man of energy and capacity, I should say that the only way of
saving Austria would be to persuade the Emperor to abdicate
in favotu- of that successor ; and I presume that if the Emperor
was told that he must abdicate, he would do as he was bid.
But to do any good in this way would require three successive
abdications, so as to set aside the present, the next, and the
next but one Emperor, and thus to pave the way for the acces
sion of the Archduke John, though I do not know that even
then we should be in the regular line of succession. But every
body seems to agree that he is the best man, if not the only
man, among them all. Now, three abdications are not easily
obtained without a revolution ; even after the three glorious
days of July there were only two, namely, that of Charles X.
and that of the Duke of Angoul^me. But the Archduke John
might be brougl^t forward and be placed in some situation of
commanding influence. These are not times for standing upon
ceremonies, and the Austrian empire is a thing worth saving.
You cannot do amiss by suggesting this to any persons who may
have infiuence in such matters.
And a few weeks later, in another letter, he says : —

HAEMFUL INFLUENCE OF A WEAK MONAECH. 87
How can an empire stand in these days without an emperor
at its head ? And by an emperor I mean a man endowed with
intellectual faculties suited to his high station. A mere man of
straw, a Guy Faux, hke the present Emperor, may do very weU
in quiet times, when a Metternich, who never leaves his study,
can govern a great country by his unopposed wUl, and can draw
on, by his personal influence, various other Governments, de
spotic hke his own, to pursue the same pohcy, to prevent all
improvement, to stifle all symptoms of hfe among nations, and
to enforce the stillness of death, and to boast that such a state
of tranquilhty is a proof of contentment and a guarantee for
happiness. But the present year has dashed Europe abruptly
in a far different condition. There is a general fight going on
aU over the Continent between governors and the governed,
between law and disorder, between those who have and those
who want to have, between honest men and rogues ; and as the
turbulent, the poor, and the rogues are in this world, though
perhaps not always the most numerous, at aU events the most
active, the other classes require for their defence to be led and
headed by intelhgence, activity, and energy. But how can these
quahties be found in a Government where the sovereign is
an idiot ? Pray, then, teU Wessemberg from me, but in the
strictest confidence, that I would entreat of him and his col
leagues to consider, for the salvation of their country, whether
some arrangement could not be made by which the Emperor
inight abdicate, for which his bodily health might furnish a fair
reason, while some more efficient successor might ascend the
throne in his stead. I fear that his next brother is httle better
than he is ; but could not the son of that brother be caUed to
the succession ? And though he is young, he yet could mount
his horse, and show himself to his troops and his people, could
excite some enthusiasm for his person as weU as for his official
staticm, and, by the aid of good Ministers and able generals,
might re-estabhsh the Austrian empire in its proper position at
home and abroad. I am sure that Wessemberg will forgive the
hberty I am taking, but the maintenance of the Austrian em
pire is an object of general interest to all, Europe, and to no
country more than England.
Whatever chance, however, the Italians may have
had of being able to cope single-handed with the A.us-
trians was thrown away by a want of cordial co-opera
tion between their different forces. They soon lost all

88 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the ground which they had gained. Complete victory
crowned the efforts of Marshal Eadetsky, and Milan
surrendered on August 6.
The question of mediation between Austria and
Sardinia had been under discussion between France
and England previously to the great reverses sustained
by the Sardinian troops. When their utter destruc
tion seemed inevitable, and intelligence of the capture
of Milan was daily expected, the French Government
represented that nothing but an assurance that Eng
land would join in mediation could prevent them from
marching to the assistance of the Sardinians ; ' and so
urgent were they on this point, that Lord Normanby,
before he received his instructions, found it indispen
sable, on the faith of a private letter from Lord Pal
merston, to engage that England would concur.' The
instruction to this effect was sent to Lord Normanby
on August 7, and with it were sent instructions to be
forwarded to Lord Ponsonby and Mr. Abercromby in
the event of the French Government agreeing to the
basis of mediation laid down by Lord Palmerston.
Even if the French Government had not concurred,
the instructions were to be sent on, in order that those
Ministers might tender the single mediation of England
between the contending parties.
France, however, joined with England, and an armis
tice was concluded between the contending parties.
Then ensued a long and infructuous negotiation. The
object of Lord Palmerston was to persuade Austria,
while retaining Venice, to give up Lombardy, and re
ceive in money an equivalent for its loss.
P. 0. ; August 31, 1848.
My dear Ponsonby, — The real fact is that the Austrians have
no business in Italy at aU, and have no real right to be there.
The right they claim is founded upon force of arms and the
' General Oudinot came to Paris for orders, and told Cavaignacthat
if he was not allowed to lead his army to Italy to assist Charles Albert,
his army would go without him, and that many of his officers had
already gone privately to offer their services.

EXPLAINS VALUE OF NATUEAL BAEEIEES. 89
Treaty of Vienna. The Treaty of Vienna they themselves set
at nought when they took possession of Cracow, and they have
never fulfilled their engagement to give national institutions
and a national representation to their Pohsh subjects. They
cannot claim the treaty when it suits their purpose, and at the
same time, when it suits their purpose, reject it. Moreover,
there was no guarantee in the Treaty of Vienna for any of its
arrangements, except for those relating to Prussian Saxony and
to Switzerland. But we offer them an equivalent for that which
they are called upon to give up, and they get, therefore, a sub
stitute for what the treaty assigned them.
As to their title founded on force, force may be employed to
defeat it, and with just as much right.
But the people at Vienna think, perhaps, that force will not
be so employed. If that is thefr opinion, the sooner they are
undeceived the better. I know very well that Mettemich and
others here keep up an active correspondence with Germany,
and no doubt amuse their correspondents at Vienna with aU
kinds of hopes and expectations of the support which Austria
will receive on this Itahan question from hence, and of the want
of power in France to go to war. Wessemberg knows Metter
nich and England weU enough not to be misled by these tales of
emigrants. He well knows that private and personal intrigues
can accomplish nothing here ; and he will easUy understand that
Mettemich wUl do no more than was Zuylen able to accomplish,
nor even so much. Pray request him not to be misled on this
point. And as to the interference of France, it wUl be given if
Austria is stubborn ; and if a French army enters Italy, the
Austrians will be driven, not to the Mincio, or to the Adige, or
to Piave, but clean over the Alps. I do not wish to see the
French in Italy ; there are a great many sfrong and weighty
reasons why I should disUke it ; but I would rather that they
should go in than that the Austrians should retain Lombardy ;
and the people at Vienna may depend upon it that if, owing to
their obstinacy, our mediation should fail, the French wUl enter
Italy, and with the consent of England, and we shall not then
be content with Hummelauer's Memorandum.
Providence meant mankind to be divided into separate
nations, and for this purpose countries have been foimded by
natural barriers, and races of men have been distinguished by
separate languages, habits, manners, dispositions and characters.
There is no case on the globe in which this intention is more
marked than that of the Italians and the Gormans, kept apart

90 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
by the Alps, and as unlike in everything as two races can be.
Austria has never possessed Italy as part of her empfre, but has
always held it as a conquered territory. There has been no
mixture of races. The only Austrians have been the troops and
the civU officers. She has governed it as you govern a garrison
town, and her rule has always been hateful. We do not wish
to threaten ; but it is the part of a friend to tell the truth, and
the truth is that Austria can/not, and must not, retain Lombardy •
and she ought to think herself weU enough off by keeping Vene
tia, if, indeed, that province is really advantageous to her. They
will twit you at Vienna with Ireland, and say what should we
reply if they were to ask us to give up Ireland ; but the cases
are wholly different. In Ireland the races are mixed, and almost
amalgamated ; and, at all events, the Celts are in Scotland, and
Wales, and Cornwall, as well as in Ireland. The language is
the same ; for Enghsh is spoken aU over Ireland, and the land,
and wealth, and inteUigence ofthe country is for the connection.
None of this can be said of Italy in regard to Austria.
Time presses. The French are growing very impatient. We
are holding them back, because we wish these things to be settled
amicably ; but they cannot be withheld much longer ; and if the
mediation is refused, some energetic decision wiU infalhbly be
taken. Exert yourself to the utmost to prevent a crisis, which
must end in the humihation of Austria.
North of the Alps, we wish her all the prosperity and success
in the world. Events have rendered it unavoidable that she
should remain, in some shape or other, south of the Alps, and
as far west as the Adige. Beyond that hne, depend upon it, she
cannot stay.
Brussels, after many pourparlers, was fixed upon as
the place of meeting for the mediation Conference. But
Lord Palmerston writes to point out that at such a con
ference nothing but matters of detaU could be settled.
The principles must be conceded beforehand.
Brocket : November 12, 1848.
My dear Ponsonby,— The true and real seat of the negotiation
is Vienna, and, unless the Austrian Government agree to our
proposed basis for an arrangement, I foresee no good to come
out of the mediation ; and as sure as fate Austria will find her
self involved in a serious war before next Midsummer Day. It
is totaUy and absolutely impossible that she can keep quiet

SHOWS EESULTS OF DESPOTIC POLICY. 91
possession of the Italian provinces ; and all you hear at Vienna
to the contrary is nothing but the bon d, dire of the Mettemich
school, and is the result of the established practice of the dis
ciples of that school, to go on asserting as facts that which they
know to be false, but wish to be true, under the absurd notion
that by frequent repetition falsehood may become truth. The
only consequence of this system is, that those who act upon it
and those who are misled by it govern their conduct upon en
tirely erroneous data ; and the results of such false pohcy are,
that men hke Metternich and Guizot meet in exile in London ;
that sovereigns hke Louis Phihppe drink unwholesome water
and sour smaU beer at Claremont, instead of champagne and
claret at the Tuileries ; and that ancient emphes hke Austria
are thrown into anarchy and confusion, and are brought to the
very verge of dissolution.
I quite understand the drift and meaning of Prince Windisch-
gratz's message to our Queen; but pray make the CamarUla
understand that, in a constitutional country like England, these
things cannot answer ; and that a foreign Government which
places its rehance upon working upon the Court against the
Government of this country is sure to be disappointed.
Austria, however, was not in a temper either for
reason or conciliation. Broadlands : December 28, 1848.
My dear Abercromby, — I have received your letter with the
MUanese paper enclosed in it. I am very glad that you pre
vented CampbeU from taldng any official notice of the attack
upon me which that paper contains. All I should wish is that
that attack should be circulated and read from one end of Italy,
and from one end of Europe to another. As regards the Aus
trians, it shows that our Austrian policy has excited the old-
womanish anger of some very smaU minds at Vienna ; and the
idea of punishing us for our course by not sending an Archduke
to London to announce the accession of the Emperor is truly
characteristic of the State pohcy of European China ; one should
he tempted to laugh at it outright if one did not feel grieved to
see the destinies of a great empire in the hands of men who can
conceive and boast of such a chUdish revenge. Ponsonby wrote
me word that Schwarzenberg had announced to him that no
Archduke would be sent, because they would not place a member
of the Imperial family in contact with a person who had proved
himself so great an enemy as I have shown myself to be of

92 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Austria. I told Ponsonby in reply, that I am sincerely grateful
to the Austrian Government for having spared me the trouble-
and inconvenience which, amid a heavy pressure of business^.
such a mission would have occasioned to me. I am almost
afraid, however, from what I have since heard, that they havft
thought worse of their first determination, and that some Arch
duke is coming to us. As to the abuse of me and my pohcy in
the newspaper of Milan, I look upon aU it says, considering
whence it comes, as a comphment ; and if there is any truth in
the saying, Noscitur a sociis, I feel much obliged to the writers
for classing me with three of the most enhghtened statesmen of
the present day — Espartero, Reshid Pasha, and Mavrocordato..
As to the warhke announcements of the Itahans, they must, I
fear, end in smoke or in defeat. I heartily wish that Italy was
piii forte ; but weak as she is, a contest single-handed with
Austria would only lead to her more complete prostration, and
I doubt whether France is as yet quite ready to take the field in
her support. I do not wish to see Italy emancipated from th&
Austrian yoke by the help of French arms, but perhaps it would
be better it should be so done than not done at all; and if it were
so done at a time when England and France were weU together,
we might be able to prevent any permanently bad consequences
from resulting from it. But the great object at present is to.
keep things quiet ; to re-estabhsh peace in Northern Italy, and
to trust to future events for greater improvements.
Austria never sent a plenipotentiary to Brussels. The
mediation and the Conference feU to the ground. In
the spring of 1849 the armistice came to an end, andthe-
disaster of Novara sealed the fate of Italian independence
for another ten years. The British Government, how
ever, did not cease its efforts to obtain better terms for
the conquered. There was the question of payment for
the expenses of the war. This still offered an oppor
tunity of being of service to the Italians.
The following letter was in reply to one from the
Premier finding fault with a despatch as being too ' dry
and disparaging ' to Austria. Admfral CecUle was French
Minister in London. The Eussians were occupying the
Principalities, in consequence of their intervention on
the revolt of Hungary.

OUE POLICY IN ITALY DEFINED. 9.3
Broadlands : April 9, 1849.
My dear John Russell, — I merely repeat in my draft what
Cecille said a few days ago. He said that, as a Frenchman and
looking merely to French interests, he could not object to the
heaviness of the proposed payment, because it would necessarUy
tend to weaken Piedmont and drive her into the arms of France ;
hut he thought it a measure as cruel and oppressive as it was
for Austrian interests impolitic. I do not see why we should
foUow the Tory example, and abandon our friends merely be
cause they have been unfortunate ; and if it is said that the
Turin Government and Charles Albert made war against our
advice and in defiance of common sense, it ought to be borne in
mind that it is not Charles Albert nor the late Turin Govern
ment by whom the contribution is to be paid, and that the
pressure of the inihction wUl fall upon those who had no share
in the foUy of which it professes to be the punishment. General
recommendations of moderation wUl be of no avaU ; if we want
to produce any effect at Vienna, we must come to specific de-
taUs. There is no doubt that, as you say, the present moment is
one full of danger ; but I should hope that a firm attitude on
•our part, assumed in conjunction with France, may avert any
serious or permanent consequences. Austria seems to have
paused in Italy, and not to have sent troops as yet to Florence
and Rome. But there is evidently a close connection between
Austria and Russia, not closer, however, than has existed at
any time since the French Revolution of 1830 ; and we are so
far better off than we have hitherto been, that there are only
two Powers linked together instead of three, as there used to be,
as Prussia has broken off and looks to be the leading Power of
independent Germany instead of being the kettle tied to the
tail of her two great military neighbours. When Minto was at
Berlin, and wanted to know the pohcy and views of Prussia
upon any great question, we used to be told that we must go
:and ask St. Petersburg and Vienna. That serfdom is now
broken. You say that we must either support France or court Aus
tria. I beheve that by the first course we may restrain France,
and control both Austria and Russia ; by the second course, if
pushed beyond civUity, and carried to the extent of any sacrifice
•oi truth, principle, or justice, we should lose France without
gaining Austria, just as we should lose our supporters at home
without concUiating a single Tory. Austria keeps hold on to

94 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Russia for the present, as a bad swimmer keeps close to a good
one. She has hard and heavy work to do in Hungary, 'fiaa-^
sylvania, and other provinces, and the Russian armies are at
hand to help her if need be. We cannot outbid Russia in these
matters ; no fair words of ours can outweigh the fine divisions
of the Autocrat. It is unfortunate for Austria and for Europe
that the Austrian GrOvemment should place itself in this state
of dependence upon Russia, because it disqualifies Austria from
being hereafter a check upon Russian ambition and encroach
ment ' Hold your tongue,' the Russians will say, ' and remem
ber that we saved you from dismemberment and ruin.' Per
haps the Austrians may not, if they become strong, mind such
reproaches ; but still this sort of mUitary assistance must he
paid for one way or another. However, we must hope for the
best ; and if England and France are steady, I have no doubt
we shall get the Russians out of the Principahties. Austria,
be she ever so subservient to Russia, cannot submit to see her
get possession of those military positions; and Russia, not
knowing the full extent of the moral prostration of England as
a European Power, would not hghtly encounter the risk of
being opposed by England, France, and Turkey united; and
Turkey is now iu a much more respectable condition as to
her army and navy than she was in during the campaigns of
1828-29. In August, Massimo D'Azeglio sent from Turin an
acknowledgment of Lord Palmerston's aid to Italy ia
the negotiation.
Au moment oil nous venons de conclure la paix avec I'Au-
triche, je manquerais ^ un de mes principaux devoirs, si, inter-
prfete des sentimens dont le Cabinet de S. M. est anim6, je ne
m'empressais de faire parvemr k Votre Excellence le tribut de
notre vive gratitude pour le bienveUlant appui que, dans le
sincere interSt qu'eUe porte k I'ltahe et surtout au Pigment,
Votre Seigneurie a bien voulu nous prater, durant le cours de
nos longues et difficUes negociations. Le Roi et son Gouverne
ment, qui avaient invoqu6 cet appiii avec une entiere confiance,
se plaisent k reconnaitre que c'est principalement k son efficacit^
qu'Us doivent d'avoir obtenu des conditions meUleures, et teUes
que pouvaient les admettre la dignity et I'honneur toujours in-
tacts du Pigment. L'assistance soutenue que nous avons ren
contre de la part de V. S. a d'autant plus de prix k nos yeux.

DISEAELI'S LAST EFFOET FOE PEOTECTION. 95
qu'en r^ahsant Tespdrance fondle que nous avions d'arriver avec
son secours k ce resultat, elle nous a donn6 une nouvelle preuve
de la Constance et de la franche et loyale amiti6 qui unit, depuis
tant de si^cles, la Sardaigne et I'Angleterre, sa plus puissante et
sa plus fideie alli^e.
Before the end of the session the leader of the Pro
tectionist party in the Commons made a final effort to
gain the sanction of the House to the principles of com
mercial policy which he had espoused. He accordingly
moved for a Select Committee on the state of the nation.
He asserted that distress and disgrace had been pro-
g-ressive since the accession to power of the Whig
Administration. Sir Eobert Peel warmly supported the
Government. C. G. : July 7, 1849.
My dear WUham, — Our session is drawing to a close, and
wUl probably finish by the first week in August. After all the
trumpetings of attacks that were to demolish first one and then
another member of the Government — first me, then Grey, then
Charles Wood — we have come tritunphantly out of all debates
and divisions, and end the session stronger than we began it.
Our division this morning, on Disraeh's motion ' On the State
ofthe Nation,' was 296 to 156 — a majority of 140 ! on a motion
declared to be a question of confidence or no confidence in the
Government. The French are by this time in Rome.' I send you de
spatches explaining our views on these matters. If you have an
opportunity of mentioning them to the Neapohtan Ministers,
take those despatches for your text, and say that it is impossible
that the Pope can return to Rome — or even if he returned,
that he could permanently maintain himself — unless he grants,
or confirms rather, to the Romans the Constitution which he
gave them last year ; and the Neapolitan Government would
be contributing usefully to the peace of Italy and would be
promoting the interests of the Pope, if they were to concur
with France in strongly urging the Pope to pursue such a course.
It is by no means certain that he would be taken back by the
Romans even on those conditions, but the probabUity is that
' Lord Palmerston once said, when asked for an illustration of the
difference between ' business ' and ' occupation,' ' The French undertook
the occupation of Eome, but they had no business there.'

96 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
he would ; and it is almost a certainty that upon any other con
ditions he would be rejected.
If it should be impossible to bring the Pope and his subjects
to terms, a very inconvenient state of things will arise. The
French will never allow the Pope to be forced back uncondi
tionally on the Romans ; some other independent Government
must therefore be estabhshed at Rome, that would perhaps be
a republic ; and a repubhc at Rome would be an inconvenient
neighbour for the King of Naples. But for my part, I should
not see any insurmountable objection to acknowledging such a
Government, if the return of the Pope on the basis of a Consti
tution should be impossible. CoUoredo has always said to me
that the Austrians do not insist upon the unconditional return
of the Pope. It seems quite clear that the Pope never can
again be what he has been, and that his spiritual power will be
much diminished by the curtailment or loss of his temporal
authority. This is surely a good thing for Europe, both Ca
thohc and Protestant, and if it ends in very much nationalising
and localising the Catholic Church in every country, that alone
wUl be a great point gained, and will be a material step in the
progress of human society.
Lord Brougham was this session in one of his
harassing moods, and had given notice of a motion in
the House of Lords, expressive of regret that the Govern
ment had shown in its conduct of foreign affairs a want
of friendly feelings towards the aUies of Great Britain.
Lord Palmerston availed himself of the notice given to
press on the French their questionable conduct at Eome.
P. O.: July 16, 1849.
My dear Normanby, — The debate on Brougham's motion on
Friday will turn chiefly on Itahan affairs, and of course Sicily,
Lombardy, and Rome will be the main topics on which Broug
ham, Stanley, and Aberdeen — the three witches who have filled
the cauldron — will dUate. As to Sicily and Lombardy, our
Peers wUl be at no loss what to say ; but the Roman affair is
not so clear, and it would be very useful — not only for us, but,
as it seems to me, for the French Government — if Lansdowne
and whoever else may speak on our side from the Ministerial
bench, were able to say something positive and definitive as to
the intentions of the French Government.
The questions which wUl naturaUy be asked are : In what

COMMENTS ON POSITION OF PIO NONO. 97
character has the French army taken possession of Rome 1 — is
it as conquerors of a city to be added to France 1 Of course
not ; that answer is easily given. Is it then as friends of the
Pope, or as friends of the Roman people ? This question it is
hard to answer ; and for us, unaided by the French Govern
ment, impossible.
My own belief is that the priestly and Absolutist party is
beginning to prevail in the French Cabinet about the affairs of
Rome, and that the French Government is preparing to re-
estabhsh the Pope, leaving it to his generosity (which is hke
the honour of Shakespeare's knight) to grant de novo to his
subjecte such reforms of the Gregorian abuses as he may on re
consideration think expedient ; but that they, the French, and
he, the Pope, are to concur with the Cardinals, the priests, the
Austrians, the Neapohtans, and the Spaniards in deeming all
that was done by the Pope last year as null and void. Now,
such a course would be well enough for Schwarzenberg, Nar
vaez, Ferdinand of Naples, and Lambruschini, but it would be
highly discreditable to the French Government.
Tocqueville may say, ' But if we propose conditions to the
Pope, he wUl refuse them, and what are we to do then 'i^are
we to remain for ever at Rome ; or are we to go out, and let
either the Austrians or Garibaldi in ] ' My answer would be,
that if they who are in possession of Rome make the Pope and
his Cardinals and the Austrian Government clearly understand
that the Pope cannot come back except upon the before-men
tioned conditions, the Pope will put his allocution of April 20
into a drawer, and will accept the conditions. But if he refuses :
what then ? Why, if I was the French Government, I would
then say that I withdrew my interference, and should leave the
Pope and the Romans to settle their disputes as they could ;
but that I would not allow Austria, or Naples, or Spain to exer
cise any interference either ; and that, in withdrawing my
troops from Rome, I would, if it was worth while, reqmre from
the Roman Municipahty, or whatever the ruling authorities
were, that no foreigners — that is to say, no persons not Itahans
— should be admitted to power within the city. I say not
Italians, for it is pedantry to call men belonging to other parts
of Italy ' strangers ' at Rome.
But the French would say, ' The result of this would be the
continuance of a republic at Rome.' Well, and what if it was ?
It would not be the first time that an Itahan adopted a repub-
hcan form of government ; and it cannot be feared that the
VOL. II. H

98 ¦ LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
modem republic of Rome would conquer Europe, hke its ancient
predecessor. My own behef is that, sooner or later, Rome will become a
republic, and that nothing but overmling and foreign military
force can prevent such a result. There are mutually repelling
properties between a reasoning people and an elective priestly
Government. The Roman people have tasted too much of the
spring of knowledge, both religious and political, during the
last fourteen months — or, I may say, now nearly three years—
not to be determined to ' drink deep,' and in the present state of
Europe no human power can long prevent them from so doing.,
The Papal supremacy, both spiritual and political, has received
an earthquake shake from which it never can recover, and aU
that can be done is to patch up the rent as well as circumstancesi
permit, so that the fabric may last for a time ; but there will
be shock after shock, till it all crumbles to the ground, The
Cathohc Powers say to the Romans that they must submit to,
the worst and most anomalous Government in the civUised world,
because they are Papists ; the Roman people will ere long reply
by saying, ' We are no longer Papists ; take your Pope and
give him as sovereign to those who are Papists stUl.'
The Reformation in Europe was as much a movement te
shake off political oppression as it was to give freedom to reU-,
gious conscience, and similar causes are apt to produce similar,
effects. F. O. : July 24, 1849. ,
My dear William, — ^We are finishing our session ; the pro-.
rogation will be next Tuesday or Wednesday. We end it
triumphantly in the Lords as well as in the Commons ; and I
individually leave off, as I began, with a personal Adctory, for
the motion by Brougham last week was in fact aimed at me
speciaUy.' I had an opportunity on Saturday of paying off Aberdeeiii
for his repeated and Very ungentlemanlike attacks upon me. I
just gave him enough to show him that, if I had thoughfcit
worth whUe, I could have given him more ; and the House of
Commons was quite with me, at least the members present. ¦
This was in a debate on the Hungarian war. Several
Liberal members took the opportunitj' of replying to
speeches made in a reactionary spirit in the House of
' It was rejected by a majority of 12.

TOEY LEANING TOWAEDS AUSTEIA. 99
Lords. Lord Palmerston, in the course of his remarks,
said : —
There are some persons who see in the relations of countries
nothing but the intercourse of Cabinets. It is not as the ancient
ally of England, during war ; it is not as the means of resistance
in the centre of Europe to any general disturbance of the balance
qf power ; it is as the form or symbol of resistance to improve
ment, political and social, that Austria has won the affections of
some men in the conduct of public affairs. Sir, there are men
who, having passed their whole hves in adoring the Govern
ment of Austria, because they deemed it the great symbol of the
opinions which they entertamed, at last became fickle in then-
attachment, and transferred their aUegiance to the Government
of France, because they thought that in that Government they
saw an almost equal degree of leaning to the arbitrary principle,
and because they, forsooth, suspected the Government of designs
hostile to the interests of freedom. We have heard of persons
of that sort making use of the expression old women.' Pubhc
men ought not to deal in egotism, and I will not apply to them
the expression that has faUen from their own mouth. I will
only say that the conduct of such men is^ an example of anti
quated imbecility.
The foUowing letter to Mr. Charles Murray, the Con
sul-General at Alexandria — though stating what is well
known to all Englishmen as the rule of our public
service — would astonish the great men of some other
countries, where presents are regarded as a considerable
source of official remuneration : — P. 0. : August 30, 1849.
My dear Murray, — In working up the chaotic arrear which
accumulates during a session of Parhament, I have come upon
your letter of the 10th May, in which you say that Ahmed Bey,
the eldest son of Ibrahim Pasha, had intimated an intention of
sending me some horses as a present. I hope no inconvenience
¦wUl have arisen from my not having answered your letter
sooner ; but if he should mention his intentions to you again, I
' Lord Aberdeen, a few days before, in a laboured attack upon Lord
Palmerston's policy, had said that Lord Minto had only been received
by the King of Naples iEor the same reason that the ' old woman ' of
Syracuse ' acquiesced in the tyranny of Dionysius — lest the devil should
come next.'
H 2

100 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
wish you to say that you wUl make known to me his kind in
tention, and that you are sure that I shall be much flattered by
the intended compliment, and much gratified by the friendly
feeling of which it is a proof ; but that you know that it is a
positive and invariable rule for British Ministers not to accept
presents of any kind from anybody, and that, consequently,
although there is nobody from whom I should be more gratififed
by receiving such a mark of goodwill, I should be obhged, as a
matter of duty, to decline the present, and it is better, therefore,
that he should let the matter drop.*
There was one form of present, however, which his
position did not forbid him to accept, and which, under
the circumstances, was even more gratifying than a
horse from a Pasha. Just before the end of the session
he received a deputation of members of the House of
Commons, who asked him to sit for a fall-length por
trait, to be given by them to Lady Palmerston, 'as a
small memento of his great abilities, high honour,
noble-minded independent policy, warm-heartedness,
and worth.'
As soon as he gets out of town he sends his brother
the local news, and an account of his country pursuits.
Brocket: September 23, 1849.
The present moment is the moment of reaction in Europe.
The Revolutionists have had thefr swing ; the tide is turned,
and the Absolutists are for the time in the ascendant. But
this state of things cannot last, and the Governments of Europe
cannot finally settle down into the same practice of abuses and
oppressions which was the real cause of the outbreaks of last
year. Here in England everything is quiet. Our harvest is good,
and the potatoes not much diseased ; trade and manufactures
are rallying, and all interests tolerably well off. Cholera has
been very active, and has been so spread over the country that
hardly any place or town has been exempt from it. But it may
almost everjrwrhere be traceable to noxious effluvia, arising
from accumulations of dh t and of animal and vegetable matter,
', The same rule applies to foreign 'orders.' Queen Elizabeth used
to say that she would not allow ' her sheep to be tarred by another
shepherd,'

CHOLEEA IN ENGLAND. 101
choked-up drains, stinking sewers, and things of that kind ; and
few persons have anywhere been attacked by it who have not
been exposed to these operating causes. There were several
cases at Romsey at the end of July and in the beginning of
August, but none since, and they were almost all in Banning
Street and in the hundred, where bad drainage, or rather no
drainage at all, occasioned the presence of bad exhalations.
Emily,' who like other ladies, is nervous about these things, had
a disinchnation to go to Broadlands till cholera shall be quite
over. We were detained in London till the end of August by
Lady Ashley's confinement, and since then we have been at
Panshanger and here. It does not much matter to me where I
am, as red boxes make almost aU places equal. I am, however,
very weU, and yesterday managed to take four hours' partridge -
shooting. Broadlands : January 1, 18S0.
Our shooting has been but indifferent, owing to a bad breed
ing season following upon two previous years of the same kind,
together with a good poaching season at Romsey; but I bave
been able to get out three or four times with the hounds, which
always does me more good than anything else.
Our session will begin the last day of this month. We shall,
probably, have a sharp fire from the Protectionists at starting ;
but they can make no permanent or material impression either
on the House or the country ; and they are whoUy unable to
form a Government, even if the offer to do so could be made to
them. How do you get on with your demands on the Neapohtan
Oovernment for compensation for the merchants for losses
during the civU war 1 We have given Parker instructions to
go to Athens, when he leaves the seas of the Levant, and to
back up Wyse in enforcing certain demands, which have been
long pending before the Greek Government, for compensation
for British subjects for various wrongs at different times done
to them. When the account of Parker's visit to Athens reaches
Naples, you may as well confidentially, and not in pursuance
of instructions, but as the result of your o-wn good wishes to
avert disagreeable events from Naples, suggest to the Neapohtan
Minister the possibihty that Parker might receive orders to
pay a similar visit to Naples for a hke purpose; and that
it might be as well for the Neapohtan Government to prevent
' Lady Palmerston,

1,02 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
this by doing with a good grace that which, in such a case,
they might find it best pohcy to db, although with a bad grace,
and with some derogation to the dignity of the King.
We shall come later on to the history of these demands
upon the Greek Government, but the foregoing passage
shows that the strong measures which Lprd Palmerston
felt himself bound to take at Athens were prompted
not merely by wrongs endured ther^, but also by his
conviction that, at many other points, the prestige of
England would suffer, and difficulties would arise, if
she allowed herself to be baffled in the East by a Power
whose weakness was its strength, and duplicity its
weapon.

103

CHAPTEE IV.
WAR IN HUNGARY— QUESTION OP THE HUNGAEIASI REFUGEES.
The revolution at Yienna had been quickly followed by
a rising in Hungary. The civil war raged for many
months, and success had attended the Magyars, so far
as operations in the field were concerned. In her dire
strait- Austria had called in the aid of Eussia. The
Emperor Nicholas quickly responded with 150,000 men,
seeking to justify his act in the face of Europe by con
siderations of safety for his own possessions. This
intervention decided the contest, and Hungary lay
prostrate at the feet of the two great military empires.
The sympathies of men like Lord Palmerston were with
¦ the Hungarians, because, if they were revolutionists,
they were so in the same sense as the men to whose
acts, at the close of the seventeenth century, it is owing
that the present Eoyal Family of England, happily for
the nation, are seated on the throne of these realms.
Hungary had long had its separate Constitution, Par*
liament, and laws. The crowns of Austria and Hungary
had devolved upon one head, because the same person
had by different and separate titles become, in order,
of succession. Sovereign of each of the two countries.
The Emperor of Austria became King of Hungary
by virtue of his coronation at Pesth, on which occasion
he took an oath to observe and maintain its Constitu
tion. The Austrian Cabinet wished entirely to destroy
that Constitution, and incorporate Hungary with the
aggregate mass of the empire. Whether this was
or was not a good arrangement for the parties, the

104 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Imperial Government had no right to impose it by
force without endeavouring to obtain the consent of
the Hungarian Diet. This is, however, what they did,
and the Hungarians were fully justified in resisting
force by force. Supposing that at the time of the
union of Scotland and England, the English Govern
ment, instead of proposing a Treaty of Union and
obtaining the legal consent of the Scotch Parliament,
had issued an Order in Council summarily terminating
their separate existence and functions. The Scotch
would have resisted. If then the King of England
had sent his army over the Border to subdue the
Scotch, and, finding the task too hard for him, had
ended by calling in the French to help him, the parallel
would have been complete.
In the earlier part of the year Lord Palmerston had
vainly attempted to mediate between the contending
parties in Hungary, so as to avert the Eussian inter
vention, of which he here chronicles the result : —
P. 0. . August 22, 1849.
My dear Ponsonby, — We heard yesterday from Warsaw
that which must be considered the conclusion of the war in
Hungary. I must own I am glad that it is over, for though
aU our sympathies in this country are with the Hungarians,
yet it was scarcely in the nature of things that they should be
able, against such superior forces, to hold out long enough to
compel the allies to treat with them on equal terms, and a pro
longation of the war would therefore only have led to the same
result after the slaughter of many more thousands of brave men
on both sides, and after still greater devastation of the country,
than has aheady taken place. Now is the time for the Austrian
Government to redeem itself in the opinion of Europe : a just
and generous use of the success which has been gained would
re-estabhsh Austria in public estimation, and would again place
her in the front rank among the great Powers of Europe. If
the Austrian Government listens to passion, resentment, and
political prejudice, they wUl enhst against them every generous
and just mind in the civilised world, and vsdll lay the founda
tion for permanent weakness and decrepitude in the Austrian '
empire. I shall write to you offi.cially in this sense in a day or

HIS SYMPATHY WITH HUNGAEY. 105
two ; but, in the meanwhile, shape your language to this effect.
The thing evidently to be done is to re-establish the ancient
Constitution of Hungary, with the improvements made in it
last year, as to the abolition of feudal ser-vice, and exemption of
privUeged classes from public burthens, and to publish a real
and complete amnesty. If Austria wishes for a legislative
union with Hungary, it should be proposed in a legal way, like
om- unions with Scotland and Ireland, but I much fear that
legislative assemblies are not in favour at present at Vienna ;
and yet such assemblies founded upon election by intelhgence
and property, and not by universal suffrage, are the only sure
foundations of pubhc order and permanent monarchy. It will
be curious if the Emperor of Russia should take the Hungarians
under his protection as against the Austrians, just as he pro
tects the Danube Principalities against the Tiu'ks.
The fight between the master and the revolted sub
jects had not merely been a calm and strategical
encounter: it had been a war of passion, bitter and
ferocious. I quote the following letter to illustrate the
warmth and strong sympathy of Lord Palmerston's
character. He bounded like a boy at any cruelty or
oppression. Many years later, during his second Pre
miership, at the time when the Federal General Butler
outraged public opinion by proclaiming at New Orleans
that ladies who showed discontent either by their dress
or demeanour would be treated like women of the town,
he sent to the American Minister an indignant letter
of remonstrance so strong and outspoken that Mr.
Adams refused to receive it, and ran off with it to
the Foreign Office in the utmost consternation. The
youthful impulse of indignation against a cowardly
bully never died out with him. It survived even in his
old age, the advent of which is too often accompanied
by cynical indifference to the sufferings of others : —
Panshanger : September 9, 1849.
The Austrians are really the greatest brutes that ever called
themselves by the undeserved name of civilised men. Thefr
atrocities in Galicia, in Italy, in Hungary, in Transylvania are
only to be equaUed by the proceedings of the negro race in

106 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Africa and Haiti. Their late exploit of flogging forty odd
people, including two women at MUan, some of the victims
being gentlemen, is really too blackguard and disgusting a pro
ceeding. As to working upon thefr feelings of generosity and
gentlemanhkeness that is out of the question, because such feel
ings exist not in a set of officials who have been trained up in
the school of Metternich, and the men in whose minds such in
born feelings have not been crushed by court and office power
have been studiously excluded from public affairs, and can only
blush in private for the disgrace which such things throw upon
their country. But I do hope that you will not faU constantly
to bear in mind the country and the Government wliich you
represent, and that you wiU maintain the dignity and honour
of England by expressing openly and decidedly the disgust
which such proceedings excite in the public mind in this
country ; and that you will not allow the Austrians to imagine
that the public ophiion of England is to be gathered from arti
cles put into the ' Times ' by Austrian agents in London, nor
from the purchased support of the ' Chronicle,' nor from the
servile language of Tory lords and ladies in London, nor from
the courtly notions of royal dukes and duchesses. I have no
great opinion of Schwarzenberg's statesmanhke qualities unless
he is very much altered from what he was when I knew him ;
but, at least, he has lived in England, and must know some
thing of Enghsh feelings and ideas, and he must be capable of
understanding the kind of injury which all these barbaritie?
must do to the character of Austria in pubhc opinion here ;
and I think that, in spite of his great reliance upon and fond
ness for Russia, he must see that the good opinion of England
is of some value to Austria ; if for nothing else, at least to act
as a check upon the iUwiU towards Austria, which he supposes;
or affects to suppose, is the great actuating motive of the revo
lutionary firebrand who now presides at the Foreign Office in
Downing Street.
You might surely find an opportunity of drawing Schwar^
zenberg's attention to these matters, which may be made inteh
hgible to him, and which a British ambassador has a right to
submit to his consideration. There is another view of the
matter which Schwarzenberg, with his personal hatred of the
Italians, would not choose to comprehend, but which, neverthe
less, is well deserving of attention, and that is the obvious
tendency of these barbarous proceedings to perpetuate in the
iriinds of the Italians indelible hatred of Austria ; and as the

THE FUGITIVES DEMANDED OF TUEKEY. 107
Austrian Government cannot hope to govern Italy always by
the sword, such inextinguishable hatred is not an evil altogether
to be despised.
The rulers of Austria (I call them not statesmen or states-
women) have now brought theh country to this remarkable
condition, that the Emperor holds his various territories at the
goodwUl and pleasure of three external Powers. He holds
Italy just as long as and no longer than France chooses to let
him have it. The first quarrel between Austria and France
wUl drive the Austrians out of Lombardy and Venice. He holds
Hungary and Gahcia just as long as and no longer than Russia
chooses to let him have them. The first quarrel with Russia will
detach those countries from the Austrian crown. He holds his
German provinces by a tenure dependent, in a great degree, upon
feehngs and opinions which it will be very difficult for him and
his Ministers either to combine with or to stand out against.
The remedy against these various dangers which are
rapidly undermining the Austrian empire would be generous
concihation ; but instead of that, the Austrian Government
know no method of administration but what consists in flog
ging, imprisoning, and shooting. ' The Austrians know no
argument but force.'
As soon as Hungary Avas subdued, a joint demand
was made upon the Porte by Eussia and Austria to
deliver up the fugitives who had sought safety at
Widdin, within the Turkish frontier. Prince Eadzivil
and Baron de Titoff for Eussia, and Count Stiirmer for
Austria, urged at Constantinople the surrender of these
refugees, among whom were Kossuth and Zamoyski.
The Sultan, however, firmly resisted this attempt to
induce him to violate the laws of humanity by giving
up to the vengeance of the conquerors those who had
fled to his territory for refuge. As no threats could
shake the resolution of the Ottoman Government, the
ambassadors notified to the Porte the suspension of all
diplomatic intercourse between their own Courts and
that of the Sultan. Lord Palmerston determined to
support the Sultan. Carlton Gardens : September 29, 1849.
My dear Normanby, — I received yesterday afternoon, at
Brocket, by a letter from Drouyn de Lhuys, the telegraphic

108 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
message announcing the breaking off of diplomatic relations by
the Austrian and Russian Ministers at Constantinople. lam
unable at present to send you anything but my own opinion of
the matter. I am much inchned to think that this step of the
two Imperialist Ministers is only an attempt to bully, and that
if it fails, as it seems hitherto to have done, it will be disavowed
or retracted by their Governments. But then it seems to me
that the only way of bringing about that result is to give the
-Sultan the cordial and firm support of England and France,
and to let the two Governments of Russia and Austria see that
the Turk has friends who will back him and defend him in
time of need. This might be done, first, by firm though friendly
representations at Vienna and St. Petersburg, pointmg out that
the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what has been required,
and that, not being so bound, he could not have done it without
dishonour. Secondly, we might order our respective squadrons
in the Mediterranean to take post at the Dardanelles, and to he
ready to go up to Constantinople if invited by the Sultan, either
to defend Constantinople from actual or threatened attack, or
to give him that moral support which thefr presence in the
Bosphorus would afford. I feel the most perfect conviction
that Austria and Russia would not, in the present state of
Germany, Poland, and Northern Italy, to say nothing of only
hatf-pacified Hungary, venture upon a rupture with England,
France, and Turkey upon such a question as this. But aU this
is only my own personal opinion, and I cannot answer for the
Broadbrims of the Cabinet ; therefore do not, before you hear
from me again, commit the Government to any opinion or to
any course of action.
The Eussian ambassador in London lost nb time in
calling on the Foreign Secretary. What took place is
told in the following Memorandum : —
Carlton Gardens : October 2, 1849.
I had a conversation of some length this afternoon with
Baron Brunnow. His object at first was to show that the best
course for England and France to pursue was to remain per
fectly quiet, to wait for events, and to trust to the moderation
and good feeling of the Emperor to settle the matter amicably
with the Sultan, without any injury to the independence of the
Porte. In other words, to leave the Emperor time to frighten
the Sultan into acquiescence.

DISCUSSION WITH BAEON BEUNNOW. 109
I said I agreed with him that the affafr is in itself of very
shght importance, and that I could not but believe with him
that the moderation and good feeling of the two Imperial Govem
ments would lead them to respect the Sultan's repugnance to
give up men who have thrown themselves on his protection ;
and that Austria and Russia would be satisfied with that secu
rity which they had a right to ask, and which the Sultan is ready
to afford them, and which would be given by sending into the
interior of Turkey such of the refugees as may have no means of
supporting themselves, and by requiring those who are better off
to leave Turkey and come to France or England. With regard
to our doing nothing, I said we could not take that course, be
cause the Turkish Government had officially asked us for help in
their embarrassment, and we had determined to address a friendly
representation in favour of the Sultan to the Austrian and Rus
sian Govemments. He said he hoped our representation would
be carefully worded, in order that it might not do harm instead
of good. That all men have thefr faults as well as thefr merits.
That the fault of his Emperor is that he is very sensitive, and
that anything like the language of menace might prevent him.
from doing what he inight otherwise be disposed to do. I said
that nothing of that kind would be sent ; that we should express
our hope, and the French Government would probably do the
same, that the two Emperors would be satisfied with the removal
of danger from thefr frontiers, and would not insist on the sur
render of men whom they would not know what to do with
when they got them. For it would not be supposed, for in
stance, that the Emperor of Russia could take any pleasure in
shooting a cripple like Rem. Brunnow said it would be a pity
that such representations should be made by England and France
jointly or concurrently; that the joint action ofthe two would
of itself have the appearance of something hke menace. I said
that this was the unavoidable result of the fact that the Porte
had made application to the two Powers ; but he should remem
ber that this system of duality did not begin with us ; that the
two Imperial Governments have been jointly pressing and
threatening at Constantmople, and the Sultan being hard driven
by his two great, strappmg neighbours, naturally looked about
him to see where he could find two friends to come and take his
part. That the two Imperial Ministers, no doubt from over-
zeal, or from a wish to cai-ry thefr point by a coup de main, and
gain credit with thefr Govemments, had gone probably further
than they had been instructed to do, and had not only held very

110 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTOF.
high and threatening language, but had suspended their diplo
matic intercourse, a thing of no real importance, but meant as
a means of intimidation. I' said that the two Imperial Govem
ments were no doubt entitled to ask for the surrender pf their
respective subjects, though the Russian demand, being founded
upon the events of the Pohsh war of 1832, and not upon the
Hungarian war of 1849, was somewhat out of date; but that,
on the other hand, the Sultan was entitled by his treaties to
dechne to surrender, and to prefer the other alternatives of
either sending the refugees into the interior of his territory, or
requiring them to leave Turkey. Brunnow entfrely agreed -with
me in this interpretation of the treaty between Russia and
Turkey. He said the Treaty of Kainardgl had, hke aU treaties
between Russia and Turkey, been drawn up by the Russian
negotiators, and that they had purposely and intentionally left
a choice, because it was much more likely that Turks would fly
to Russia than that Russians would fiy to Turkey ; and the
Russian Governinent did not wish to be obliged to give up
pohtical refugees to be handed over to the bowstring. With
men guilty of ordinary criminal offences the case was different,
and the obligation more strict to give such persons up. Brunnow
fully and distinctly admitted that the treaty, while it autho
rised the Emperor to demand surrender, equaUy authorised the
Sultan to dechne surrender, and to prefer the sendmg out of his
country. And Brunnow's o-wn opinion seemed to be that the
Emperor would, or at least ought to, acquiesce in the Sultan's
decision. But it must be borne in mind that his object was
avowedly to persuade us to do nothing, and that he professed
himself to be without communications from his own Govern
ment. There was considerable opposition in high quarters
to any interference on the part of England, but Lord "
Palmerston's colleagues acquiesced in his proposals, and
he sends to Paris the decision arrived at,
F. 0. : October 2, 1849.
My dear Normanby,— The Cabinet met to-day, and deter
mined that the Sultan must be supported, and byaU means and
to all extent that may be necessary, and that for this purpose
the co-operation of France must be sought. What we propose
to do is that which I stated in my private letter a few days ago,,
namely, that a friendly and civU representation should be made

TUEKEY SUPPOETED BY ENGLAND. Ill
to the two Governmente at Vienna and Petersburg, to express
a hope that the two Emperors wUl not press the Sultan to do
that which a regard for his honour and for the laws of hos
pitality and the common dictates of humanity forbid him to do,
and which no engagement of treaty binds him to do ; and, that, at
the same time, the two squadrons should move up to the Darda
nelles,, with orders to go up to Constantinople if invited so to do
by the Sultan, either for his immediate defence, or to afford him
moral support by thefr presence. Of course this decision m-
Yolves a determination to go all further lengths that cfrcum-
Stances naay render necessary ; and we trust confidently that we
shall be able to rely entirely upon the co-operation of France,
and also upon her being wUling to be as moderate in the manner
of making the first, steps as she may be firm and determined as
to ultimate results. . I have seen the Turkish ambassador, who
has written me a note asking the moral and material assistance
of England. I have told him the decision of the Cabfret, and
that we are going to enter into communication with the French
Government on the matter. He says that the Turkish squadron
in the Bosphorus, and the Turkish mihtary force round Con
stantinople, are quite sufficient to secure Constantinople against
any surprise by the fleet from Sebastopol.
I have since seen Brunnow, who professes to have heard
nothing from Petersburg, and to know only what the papers
report ; but he seems uneasy. He endeavours to represent the
matter as one of small real importance. His object was to per
suade me that we ought to take no step, but wait to see what
the Emperor would do, or at all events to delay ; that is to say,
he wants us to give the Emperor full time to buUy the Sultan
upon this question, as we let him do some months ago about the
Wallachian occupation. I told him that the Cabinet has deter
mined that representations should be made at Vienna and Peters
burg, but that we should take care to make them in such a
manner as not to justify any mauvaise reponse. I said that the
threatening language and deportment of Radzivil, Titoff, and
Stiirmer had compelled the Porte to ask us for support, and that
we could not under such cfrcumstances abstain from friendly
i^epresentations to the two Imperial Governments. I of course
abstamed from saying anything about squadrons or material
assistance, but joined with him in considermg it impossible that
the Emperor should not be satisfied with the departure of his
Poles from Turkey, observing that they must be very unreason
able men if they did not prefer France or England to Turkey as
a residence.

112 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
He also communicates the decision to the English
Minister at Constantinople, who had strongly urged
the Turkish Government to remain firm.'
Foreign Office : October 2, 1849.
My dear Canning, — As it is of importance to reUeve you as
soon as possible from anxiety in regard to the responsibihty
which you may think you have incurred by the advice which
you have given the Porte, and as it is also essential not to lose
an hour unnecessarUy in reheving the Porte from its doubts as
to whether it will find aid and support froin its friends, I send
you this private letter by a special messenger, to say that the
Cabinet has to-day decided to give an affirmative answer to the
application for moral and material support which the Turkish
ambassador, by order of his Government, has presented to us.
We are, therefore, going to enter immediately into communica
tion with the Government of France, in order to settle the
course of proceedings, assuming that which we cannot doubt,
namely, that the French Government is willing and prepared to
co-operate with us. What we mean to propose is, that the two
Govemments should make friendly and courteous representa
tions at Vienna and Petersburg to induce the Imperial Govern
ment to desist from thefr demands, ui-ging that the Sultan is
not bound by treaty to do what is asked of him, and that to do
so would be dishonourable and disgraceful. We mean to pro
pose, at the same time, that the two Mediterranean squadrons
should proceed at once to the Dardanelles, with orders to go up
to the Bosphorus, if invited to do so by the Sultan, either to
defend Constantinople from actual or imminent attack, or to
give him the moral support which thefr presence would afford.
I think it possible, however, that the admfrals may aheady
have gone up to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, in con
sequence of the letters they will have received from you and
' ' If I had suspended my support for a moment, the Porte, I have
no doubt, would have given way ; and on almost any question but one
involving such obvious considerations of humanity, honour, and per
manent policy, I might have been inclined, while left to myself, to.
counsel a less dangerous course, in spite of reason and right. As it
is, I have felt that there was no alternative unattended with loss of
credit and character. The dishonour would have been oiirs, for everyone
knows that even Eeschid himself, with all his spirit aud humanity,
would not withstand the torrent without us, and Prance on almost
every subject here follows in our wake, from 'the necessities of its-
position and in generous reliance on your policy.' — Sir S. Canning t»
Lord Palmerston, Sejrt. 17, 1849.

THE FLEET AT THE DARDANELLES. 113
from Aupick. I think it, however, much better that the Porte
should be advised not to send for the squadrons to enter the
Dardanelles without real necessity. The example might be
turned to bad account by the Russians hereafter ; and it would
be too much of an open menace, and the way to deal with the
Emperor is not to put him on his mettle by open and public
menace. In this affair we are trying to catch two great fish,
and we must wind the reel very gently and dexterously, not to
break the hne. The Government have indeed resolved to sup
port the Sultan at all events, but we must be able to show to
Parliament that we have used all civihty and forbearance, and
that if hostilities ensue, they have not been brought on by any
fault or mistake of ours. The jDresence of the squadrons at the
outside of the Dardanelles, or in thefr neighbourhood, would
probably be quite sufficient to keep the Sebastopol squadron at
anchor or in port ; and the Turks have besides some naval and
mUitary force at and about Constantinople sufficient to make a
resistance till our squadrons could get up. We have steamers
that could tow the Ime-of-battle ships. We have, I believe, six
or seven liners ; the French about the same number. The
Russians, I believe, twelve or fourteen.
What I wish you to impress upon the Turks is that this
communication is confidential, to keep up their spirits and
courage ; but that they must not swagger upon it, nor make it
public'till they hear it officially. From Brunnow's language,
and I have also seen him since the Cabinet, I should infer the
matter will be amicably settled.
He makes Austria understand no less clearly and
emphatically that England is going to stand by the
Sultan. P. 0. : October 6, 1849.
My dear Ponsonby, — I send you a despatch to be communi
cated to Schwarzenberg. We have endeavoured to make it as
civU as possible, so as not to leave him any ground for saying
that he cannot yield to threats. We make none ; and in my
verbal communications with Brunnow and CoUoredo I have
said nothing about our squadron being ordered up to the Dar-
daneUes. But it is right that you should know and understand
that the Government have come unanimously to the deter
mination of taking this matter up in earnest, and of carrying
it through. We have resolved to support Turkey, let who wiU
be against her in this matter. It is painful to see the Austrian
VOL. II. I

114 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Government led on in its blindness, its folly, and its passionate
violence into a course utterly at variance with the established
policy of Austria. If there is one thing more than another
which Austria ought to do, it is to support Turkey against
Russia ; and here is Schwarzenberg, in his fondness for bullying
the weak, co-operating with the Russian Government to humble
Turkey, and to lay her at the feet of Russia.
But you understand these questions so thoroughly that you
wUl no doubt have been able to lay before the Austrian Govern
ment and CamarUla the full extent of the mistake they are
making. They are besides uniting England and France in
joint action, which is not what Austrian Governments have
hitherto been particularly anxious to do. I cannot beheve that
the two Governments will push this matter further. The
rights of the case are clearly against them. Both CoUoredo
and Brunnow, though I beg they may not be quoted, acknow
ledge that the Sultan is not bound by treaty to do what is
required of him. Metternich, I am told, says it is a great
mistake. What could Austria hope to gain by a war with Turkey,
supported, as she would be, by England and France ? Austria
would lose her Itahan provinces, to which she seems to attach
such undue value, and she never would see them again. What
she might gain to the eastward I know not ; but perhaps she
might not end by extending herself in that direction. At aU
events, I cannot conceive that, in the present state of Germany,
it would suit Austria to provoke a war with England and
France ; and I do not think that such a war would be of any
advantage even to Russia. Pray do what you can to persuade
the Austrian Government to aUow these Hungarians either to
leave Turkey, if they are able to do so, or to remain in Turkey
quietly. The leaders would of course pass on to other parts of
Europe ; the bulk of the emigrants might be settled somewhere
in the interior of Turkey, and would make a useful colony.
There is a notion that Austria means to try to turn a penny
by this transaction, and to caU on the Turks to pay a large
sum, which it suits the Austrian Government to say that these
emigrants have carried away with them ; but this dodge will
not do, so pray try to persuade them not to attempt it.
The bold attitude of England and France soon pro
duced its legitimate effect.

XTi^flTED ACTION OF ENGLAND AND FEANCE. 115
P. 0. : October 23, 1849.
My dear Normanby, — I have a private letter to-day from
Ponsonby, in which he says that the Austrian Government has
distinctly declared that it does not mean to insist on the sur
render of the Hungarian refugees, and that the Russian Govern
ment has no objection to this decision of Austria. But he says
that he cannot as yet officially announce this decision. We
hear from Warsaw that the Russians are indignant at the
execution of the Hungarians who had given themselves up to
the Russians, and that this feehng wiU probably make it more
easy for Russia to desist from a demand which was made chiefiy
in support of Austria.
Brunnow's language has not altered. From the first he
admitted that, although the treaty of Kainardgi gave Russia a
right to demand the surrender, it equaUy gave Turkey a right
to choose the other alternative. He asked me the other day,
with what intention, and within what hmits, our squadrons
were to act? I said within the Mediterranean as at present
ordered, and with the intention of giving comfort and support
to the Sultan, who had been so vehemently threatened by thefr
two men at Constantinople. That our sending one squadron
up the Mediterranean was, for the Sultan, hke holding a bottle
of salts to the nose of a lady who had been frightened.
He asked whether it woidd not have been better to have
waited for the answer from Petersburg. I said that in that
case we might perhaps have been too late to prevent accidents
which might have happened before our fleets had arrived. But
I said that as long as our squadrons were in that part of the
Mediterranean they could threaten nobody. If England and
France had sent large fleets into the Baltic, then, indeed, Russia
might have said. This must be intended for me; what does it
mean? And I have desired Ponsonby to say that if our
squadron had gone up the Adriatic, it might have been a threat
against Austria. But our ships, where they are, threaten
nobody, and only hold out to the Sultan assistance at hand m
case of need.
An indirect benefit accrued from the action of our
Government in this matter. The unanimity of pubUc
feeling elicited in its support, as soon as it had declared
its intention of supporting Turkey to the fuU extent of
going to war, had a great and excellent effect m Europe,
I 2

116 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
as showing that we were not quite so incapable of
being moved to manly action as some speeches in Par
liament and at peace congresses might have led people
to suppose. A cavU was now raised that we had violated the
terms of a treaty by the presence of our fleet at the
DardaneUes. Lord Palmerston controverts this.
p. 0. : October 23, 1849.
My dear Ponsonby, — We are quite aware that the treaty 'of
the Dardanelles of July, 184:1, forbids foreign ships of war
from entering either the Dardanelles or Bosphorus while the
Porte is at peace. But that treaty does not prevent succour
from being ready at hand, to help the Sultan in case war should
come suddenly upon him. And the two Imperial Govemments
should remember that Stiirmer and Titoff declared to the Porte
that if the Turkish Government allowed a single man of the
refugees to escape, it would be considered by Austria and Russia
as a declaration of war.
Such a communication may not have been authorised,
though, from the arrogant and insolent tone of the despatches
from Schwarzenberg and Nessefrode, which were communicated
to the Turkish Government, I am inchned to think it was;
but, at all eVents, such a communication ha-ving been made,
there was evidently no time to be lost by those .Governments
which meant to defend Turkey against the two Imperial and
imperious bulhes.
Lord Palmerston, when he had undertaken the task,
was not the man to leave it half-way to take care of
itself. Even to please an ally he was not disposed to
run the risk, however small, of having to begin all over
again. He felt sure that he had won, but would leave
nothing to chance. p. 0. . November 7, 1849.
My dear Cannmg, — I may, I think, now congratiUate you
upon the peaceful termination of the question about the refu
gees. Brunnow has just been with me, and says very quaintly,
that it has from the first been raised to undue proportions, and
that it ought to have been treated as an ' affafre de pohce, et
non pas comme une affaire de pohtique.'

NATUEALISED SUBJECTS DEFENDED. 117
The three demands, as we understand them, now are, 1st,
the expulsion of the Poles from the Turkish territory; 2nd,
the removal of the converted Poles to Diarbekir; 3rd, an
engagement that the Porte should apply to foreign Govern
ments, and specially to England and France, to consent that
Russian subjects who may become naturalised or denizens in
England or France should not thereby be exempted from being
treated in Turkey accordmg to their original nationahty. The
first condition is just what the Sultan proposed to do. The
second seems as a temporary arrangement unobjectionable, it
being always understood to be only temporary, and that these
men are not to be kept for the rest of their lives at Diarbekir.
To the thfrd we shaU probably not be found wilhng to consent :
a foreigner acquires by naturahsation the character, and -with
it the rights, of a British subject ; he acquires these by law,
and I do not see how the Enghsh Government could undertake
to withhold from any man the protection to which he has
become legally entitled. Naturahsation would not give a Rus
sian subject British rights in Russia, but it would do so in
every other country ; but this is a question to talk about, and
not to be fought about. I therefore look on peace as secure,
and as soon as we get the next despatches from you we shall
send orders to Parker to return to his usual station. The
French are impatient to get their ships back, in case they should
want them against Morocco, where a petulant and self-sufficient
consul of thefrs has been trying to get up a quarrel with the
Moors. I am glad their squadron has been out of reach ; this
may give time to settle the dispute peaceably. Buchanan, who
has just come from Petersburg, says that the Russians in general
are much nettled at the check which thefr Emperor has received
in his Turkish policy, and that they say he will take some
opportunity to pay us off; and the way in which they anticipate
that this wiU be done, is by fomenting insurrections m Bosnia
and elsewhere among the Christian subjects of the Porte; and
even Brunnow cannot refrain from adverting to this, as a way
in which Russia holds in her hands the good and evil destinies
of the Turkish empfre. The Turkish Government ought to be
made well aware of this, and should lose no time in preparing
measures to remove from the Christian subjects of the Porte
all just cause of discontent, and should thus place the Sultan's
throne upon a broad and sohd foundation.
These late changes of Ministers in France will make no
other change in the foreign pohcy of the country except to ren-

118 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
der it more conformable with the personal feelings and views
of the President, and he is more disposed than some of his late
Ministers were (though we have no great fault to find with
them) to follow a course of foreign pohcy calculated to create
community of -views and action between England and France.
Broadlands : November 16, 1849.
My dear Cannmg, ^The French are in a monstrous hurry
to get their fleet back from the neighbourhood of the Darda
neUes. But yesterday I received from Normanby a proposal
from the President that we should give you and Aupick dis
cretionary power to send away the squadron whenever and as
soon as you should think thefr presence no longer necessary,
and this was so reasonable a proposal that we at once closed
with it.
Our own view is that it is desfrable that our squadron
should return towards Malta whenever its presence near the
DardaneUes is no longer wanted ; but that it should stay where
it is as long as its presence is of importance as a moral support
for the Sultan. Whenever the Porte and the two Imperial
Courts have come to an agreement upon the main points, the
squadron might well come away ; but it would not do for us to
bring it away whUe any material point was unsettled, and that
we should thus have the appearance of leavmg the Sultan in
the lurch.
Moreover, it would not do that the Russian agents at Con
stantinople should have a j)retence for saying that Russia had
ordered our fleets off, and that as we had thus yielded to the
demands of Russia, the Porte had better do so too, because
experience in this instance would show her that though we
might swagger at first, yet when it came to the point, we were
sure to knock under, and that thus Turkey would always find
us ready to urge her on to resistance, hut backing out ourselves
when Russia began to hold high language to us and to show us
a bold front.
They would represent us as a barking cm' that runs off with
its tail between its legs when faced and threatened. We should
thus lose all we have gained and most of what we had before.
You wiU, of course, not fail to bear all this in mind in
using the discretionary authority now sent to you ; and though
we shaU be glad to find the presence of the fieet no longer
necessary, it is better that it should stay there a week or a fort
night too long than that it should come away too soon.

DEFENCE OF ACTION OF THE FLEET. 119
If you should think the continuance of our fleet for a fm^ther
time important and essential, and Aupick should, under his
instructions, declare himself of opinion that the fleets are no
longer necessary, and if he should make a great difficulty in
commg round to your opinion, there would be no great harm
done if you were to split the difference, and if the French fleet
— which has been specially ordered to keep separate from ours
— was to work its way towards Toulon, while ours remained a
little while longer, cruising or anchoring in the Archipelago.
Broadlands : November 14, 1849.
My dear Normanby, — It would have been quite ridicidous
and mean to have ordered back our ships at the bidding of
Russia, and merely upon her assertion of what she had sent as
an answer to the Porte. Great countries ought not to act with
such precipitate levity, and should put some degree of method
and deliberation in their conduct. We sent our fleet up to the
Dardanelles to be ready to support the Sultan in case of attack,
and in order that his knowledge that our fleet was there for
that purpose might give him courage to hold his own in his
negotiations with Russia. That negotiation had not yet reached
Constantinople when our last accounts came away ; it would
turn upon demands some of which the Porte might object to ;
the buUying system might again be resorted to, if our ships
-came away before everything was settled, and thefr departure
during the negotiation would be represented by the Russian
agents at Constantmople as an abandonment of Turkey in defer
ence to the remonstrances of Russia. We ought either never
to have sent our fieet, or to keep it there till matters are settled.
The French, however, are of course at hberty to do what they
like -with thefr own ; but they ought to have pointed out to
them that the hasty retreat of their squadron will be represented
by the Russians at Constantinople as a concession by France to
Eussia. Of course, as you say, disappointed ambition -will try to turn
popular feehng against an Enghsh aUiance which thwarts per
sonal projects; but we must deal with this as best we can.
There is always some difficulty or other to be striven agamst in
pubhc matters, 'For the current of pohtics doth seldom run
smooth.' With reference to our alleged infraction of treaty
stipulations. Lord Palmerston writes : —

120 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

Broadlands : November 22, 1849.
My dear Canning,- — Do not l^t Parker again anchor or
enter within the outer castles of the Dardanelles ; his doing so
has a very bad effect; it is difficult to argue that it is not
entermg the Straits of the DardaneUes, and that therefore it is
not a violation of the Treaty of July, 1841.' Nesselrode seems
to have taken the matter quietly, and no wonder ; for such a
nibbling at our Dardanelles Treaty is just what the Russians
would hke to see us establish as a precedent, and they would
not be slow to follow our example. The port regulation of the
Turkish Government by which the anchorage within the outer
castles is allotted for ships-of-war of aU nations to wait in till
they know whether they can be permitted to go up to Constan
tinople, can fairly and logically be apphed only to such ships-
of-war as may by permission go up to Constantinople; but
those are only hght vessels for the use of the embassies and
missions, and that port regulation cannot be deemed to apply
to a squadron of line-of-battle ships, which cannot, according to
treaty, go up to Constantmople while the Porte is at peace : at
all events, it is close shaving and nice steerage, and exposes us
to a disagreeable discussion about words, and puts us to prove
that being within the Straits is not entering the Straits ; and
that is not an easy demonstration to make good. If Parker is
blown away from Besika Bay, let him go to Enos, or Jaros, or
anywhere else where he may find shelter, never mind how far
off; for wherever he goes he can always be back in time, and
any attack of the Turkish territory by a Russian fleet or army
is at present quite out of the question. We shall send you on
in a few days our decision about the demands of the two Empe
rors. I should guess, from Brunnow's language to me to-day,
that the Russian Government would be content to have the
renegade Poles eloignes from the frontier, and made to reside —
but not as prisoners — in Asia Minor ; and Brunnow affected to
treat very lightly the Austrian demand, representing that as a
matter the Porte could easily dispose of if she had settled satis
factorily with Russia.
' The words of the treaty were : 'All ships-of-war of all nations-.
coming to the Dardanelles are to stop and wait at the anchorage
between the outer and inner castles till they know from Constantinople
whether a firman will or will not be granted to allow them to proceed
further on.'

HIS OBJECTION TO THE MODIFIED DEMANDS. 121
When the two Powers were baffled in their demand
for the surrender of the fugitive Poles and Hungarians,
Austria substituted a request that Turkey should keep
them in conflnement, and not allow them to emigrate
to any other country. The Sultan indeed had originally
proposed something of the sort when their extradition
was summarily demanded, although he had never
offered to keep his captives at the good pleasure of a
foreign Government, but only for a time, and at his
own discretion. In the following letter Lord Palmer
ston protests against the Austrian demand.
F. 0. : November 27, 1849.
My dear Ponsonby, — I have only time to write two hnes
before the post goes. You say you do not understand what the
objections are which Canning alludes to as hable to be urged
against the demand now made by Austria upon Turkey about
the refugees. Those objections are, that it is unreasonable and
incompatible with the dignity and independence of the Sultan
that he should be made the gaoler of the Emperor of Austria, to
take charge of persons whom the Austrian Government may
consider pohtically dangerous ; and that the performance of his
duties as such gaoler should be subject to the superintend
ence of the agents of a foreign Power, and should continue
untU that foreign Power should consent to the cessation of
his gaoler's duties. The Treaty of Bucharest does not give
Austria a right to exact this ser-vitude from the Sultan, and the
duties of good neighbourhood do not require it at his hands.
That which the Sultan is bound to do, is to prevent his terri
tory from being made a place of shelter from whence machina
tions should be carried on to disturb the internal tranquUlity of
neighbouring States ; but this obhgation would be fully per
formed if the Sultan sends out of his dominions those subjects
of foreign Powers who may justly be suspected of having in
tention so to abuse his hospitahty. All, therefore, that Austria
can require on the score of good neighbourhood — and this is
more than by treaty she can demand — is that the Hungarian
refugees should be sent out of Turkey ; but to require that they
should be detained and kept under restraint in Turkey is an
unreasonable demand, and one which if Turkey were to com
ply with, it would do more harm to Austria in public opinion
in Europe than could be counterbalanced by any conceivable

122 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
advantage to be derived from it. As to pubhcations which these
Hungarians might make in France or England, there are Hun
garians enough come away to publish everything that can be
said or revealed ; and as to the sympathy which Kossuth would
excite here or in France, they may depend upon it that he will
be a much greater object of interest while unjustly detained in
Turkey than if he was hving at a lodging in Paris or London.
It is bad pohcy in the Austrian Government, as well as in
justice. Pray endeavour to persuade them of this, and to pre
vail upon them to be content with the expulsion of these
Hungarians. I write you this, and desfre you to do your best, though I
hear from many quarters that you oppose instead of furthering
the policy of your Government, and that you openly declare that
you disapprove of our course. No diplomatist ought to hold
such language as long as he holds his appointment. It is idle
trash to say that we are hostile to Austria because we may dis
approve of the pohcy of a Metternich or the cruelties of the
Manning Administration which now governs Austria; you
might as well say that a man is the enemy of his friend because
he tells that friend of errors and faults which are sinking him in
the esteem of men whose good opinion is worth having.
And three days after to the same : —
F. O. : November 30, 1849.
The requirement of Austria about the Hungarian refugees
is preposterous, and quite inconsistent with a due regard to the
dignity and independence of the Sultan. It is as incompatible
with the dignity of an independent Sovereign to make himself
the gaoler for the State offenders of his neighbours as it would
be for him to make himself purveyor for the executioner of that
neighbour. Schwarzenberg, in his note of reply to Musurus, in
pretending to quote what Musurus had said, put words into
Musurus's mouth which Musurus did not use, and which mate
rially alter the sense of the offered engagement. Musurus did
not use the word ' Dorenavant ; ' and he said nothing about the
arrangement lasting as long as the Austrian Government might'
choose. But what a childish, silly fear this is of Kossuth. What
great harm could he do to Austria while in France or England ?
He would be the hero of half-a-dozen dinners in England, at
which would be made speeches not more -violent than those
which have been made on platforms here within the last four
months, and he would soon sink into comparative obscurity;

THE CZAE AND LOED BLOOMFIELD. 123
while, on the other hand, so long as he is a State detenu in
Turkey he is a martyr and the object of never-ceasing interest.
As to any exposure which he might be able to make of the mis
deeds of the Austrian Government, generals, and troops, there
are others enough coming to England to lay bare to the public
of Europe everythmg of that kind, and the detention of Kos
suth would only mfuse greater bitterness into the feehngs with
wliich such disclosures will be made. The Austrian Govern-^
ment, therefore, would do weU, for its own sake and with a -view
to its own mterest, to consent to the expulsion of the Hun
garians from Turkey. But whether it consents or not, you may
rely upon it that get away they wiU, by hook or by crook, and
the Austrian Government will then cut a silly figm-o by being
outwitted. The contents of the foUowiag letter illustrate the
imperious and sensitive character of the Emperor
Nicholas, which, later on, came out so forcibly and
painfully during the Crimean War. The audience, how
ever, was given to the English ambassador a few days
later ; but it is probable that when Prince Menschikoff'
was sent to Constantinople in 1853, his Imperial master
had not forgotten the mortification of 1849.
Broadlands : November 27, 1849.
My dear Bloomfield, — I have received your letter of the
8th, in which you say that the Emperor has not given you
the usual audience on your return to your post, and that
you have been privately informed that he means to see you
only on pubhc occasions. I am sorry for this, because
I regret that these late Turkish affafrs should have pro
duced such an effect upon the Emperor's conduct towards the
British representative at his Court, but still I scarcely think
that it would be useful that the Queen should retahate upon
Brunnow. But, indeed, the habits of our Court scarcely leave
room for retahation. The Queen sees the foreign Ministers
at levies, at concerts, and at balls, when aU, or nearly all, are
generaUy present, and about once a year she has the representa
tives of the principal Courts to dinner ; but that woiUd be later
in the year, and by that time the Emperor may have altered his
conduct towards you. We must make great aUowances for the
effect which a great pohtical check must have produced upon
the Emperor's mind ; and his annoyance at so pubhc a thwart-

124 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ing is probably increased by the circumstance that it has been
in some degree brought upon him by the injudicious zeal of
Titow and Radzivil, who probably went beyond thefr instruc
tions, and committed the Emperor further than he intended.
The mortification also is the greater because it has foUowed
so quickly upon his great successes in Hungary, and has enthely
dimmed the lustre of those successes; and, moreover, it must be
galling to the lord and master of so many hundred thousand
men and of near fifty saU of the hne to be baffled by a squadron
of seven sail of the hne and by the time of the year. Our best -
course is not to take much notice of his iU-humour, and to try to
brmg him right again.
But though the Emperor wiU probably long remember what
has happened, and -will be long ready to take advantage of any
opportunity to pay us off, yet when the Constantinople business
is settled he will probably resume his usual cordiality, at all
events in outward manner ; and it may be some good long time
before he may find an opportunity of giving us any serious em
barrassment. Nearly two years elapsed, however, before the
Turkish Government could muster up courage to fly in
the face of its powerful neighbour and liberate Kossuth
with his companions. During this interval they were
kept in honourable captivity at Kutayah. Much interest
was taken in their fate, both in the Hnited States and
in England. Lord Palmerston writes to urge their
release. C. G. : February 10, 1851.
My dear Canning, — I have written you a despatch about
Kossuth and his fellow exiles. I have made it as gentle as was
possible ; but pray let Reschid and Aali know privately that it
is but a faint expression of the pubhc feeling in this country on
that subject.
You will have seen how the matter was noticed in the House
of Commons in the debate on the Address ; and I have repre
sentations coming in from large towns and smaU — ^from Eng- .
land, Scotland, and Wales.
There was last year great enthusiasm throughout the whole
country in favour of the Sultan, because people here beheved
that the Turkish Government was animated by a generous and
manly determination not to be the executioner or the gaoler of

'THE JUDICIOUS BOTTLE-HOLDEE.' 125
either of the Emperors ; and it was that belief which led the
country, from one end of it to the other — Whigs, Tories,
Radicals — to applaud and back up the defiance which, by our
advice and our squadron, we fiung in the teeth of the two
Imperial Governments. But the ground on which we took our
stand is fast sinking under our feet, and the bright hopes which
the nation entertained are rapidly fading away. The Sultan
has certainly rescued the Poles and Hungarians from the rope
and the bullet ; but he is making himself the degraded slave of
Austria to consign the Hungarians to the fingering but not less
certain doom of the prison.
I am ashamed of our prot6g6s, the Sultan and his white-
livered Ministers; andyoumay tell the Ministers, confidentially
but confidently, that if they go on in this way, not only not a
squadron but not a cockboat would we, or could we, send in any
case to thefr assistance, and the enthusiasm of last year is rapidly
turning into contemptuous disgust at their ser-vile consent
to perform the most degrading office of turnkey for Prince
Schwarzenberg. In September the men were freed. Shortly after
wards a deputation from Islington that went to the
Foreign Office, to congratulate Lord Palmerston on the
event, caused some stir, owing to the language of the
address and the tone of Lord Palmerston's reply.
Among other things, he said that to gain the day
*much generalship and judgment had been required,
and that during the struggle a good deal of judicious
bottle-holding was obliged to be brought into play.'
This simUe, borrowed from the prize-ring, tickled the
fancy of the public, and for mahy a day after. Lord
Palmerston, drawn with a sprig in his mouth, figured
in the pages of 'Punch' as the 'judicious bottle-
holder.'

126 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE V.
GREEK AFFAIRS AND ' DON PACIFICO ' DEBATE,
Just as some unsightly knoll or insignificant stream has
won imperishable fame by the accident of its crest or
banks being the scene of a great battle, so did the name
of a paltry adventurer become famous, in 1850, by its
connection with a memorable debate. The fate of the
Ministry as well as that of a Minister was involved, for
the wi'ongs of Don Pacifico and the manner of their
redress were only the battle-field on which a policy was
attacked and bitter antagonisms fought out. The aUied
troops who led the attack were English Protectionists
and foreign Absolutists. Victorious in their first onset
among the Lords, they met with signal defeat in the
House of Commons, after one of the most remarkable
displays of eloquence and feeling that the walls of Par
liament have witnessed.
Although the matters at issue were far wider than
the narrow boundaries of Greece, it was round that
centre that the contest principaUy raged ; and it wiU be
necessary, therefore, briefly to scan the ground-plan of
the fight, and to recall the course of • events which at
last led the British Government to employ force.
Of aU the races of Europe, none is more interesting
than the Greek. It is singular to observe how many of
its ancient characteristics have remained immutable
amongst the varying misfortunes with which two thou
sand years have afflicted it. The same enterprising,
speculative, and brilliant intellect which causes us to
linger over the records of those three hundred years

INSINCEEE CONDUCT OF GEEEK GOVEENMENT. 127
that ennoble the history of the world is still alive, though
scattered over the counting-houses and dispersed
amidst the professional celebrities of Europe. It can
hardly be denied that, amongst the men engaged in
political affairs in Greece itself, have appeared gentle
men who, alike distinguished for their manners and
their ability, might take place amongst the accomplished
statesmen of their time. In the people are still found
the virtues of industry and hospitality. But by a sin
gular contrast, whilst the Greek' nation might be es
teemed and admired, the Greek Government never,
during its varying vicissitudes, obtained or merited
either estefem or admiration. The assassination of the
illustrious citizen who had dedicated his life to her
service ; ' the refusal to acknowledge as a debt the money
which, in her most desperate need, was advanced to
rescue her from despair, commenced a series of events
that tarnished the lustre of a revolution which an un
deniable right had sanctioned and an unquestioned
heroism achieved. From the moment, in short, in
which the agony of her glorious struggle was passed,
and she had it in her power to realise the generous
dreams of those whose hearts and hopes had accom
panied her throughout it, Greece, or at least, the rulers
of Greece, seemed bent on converting expectation into
disappointment. We have seen that, when the question of establish
ing Greek independence was being agitated. Lord
Palmerston was amongst the first to feel the generous
sentiments which animated the last days of Canning
and Byron. Nor did his interest in the cause cease
when it appeared triumphant. Although he did not
accept the young Bavarian prince as a desfrable candi
date, he still entertained hopes that, aided by the
counsels of Europe, he would be able to establish a
government sufficiently just and stable to permit the
fortunes of the country to grow up gradually under it.
It was, perhaps, as a compliment to his patronage that
' Capo d'Istria.

128 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
it was determined that the newly-elected sovereign
(aged 18) should land in his dominions from an English
ship of war ; and the vessel selected was the ' Bellero-
phon,' commanded by Captain Lyons. The naval
profession at that time did not seem likely to offer
those chances of distinction which the heroic in Captain
Lyons' character would have preferred to any other. It
struck him, then, that to be British Minister at a Court
which was certain to concentrate on itself much of the
attention of Europe, would be a desirable post; and
with this idea before his mind, it is easy to conceive
how he insinuated into the mind of King Otho the
Idea that he was precisely the man who, in such a
situation, would be most agreeable and useful to him.
A request was made in his behalf, and complied with.
By this transaction the King expected he had got a
staunch supporter, and Captain Lyons a docile pupil.
Both were soon disappointed, and very angry at being so.
It is no use disguising the fact, Captain Lyons,
though a very good officer, and a very clever as well as
agreeable man, was not a very good diplomatist.
The position was a false one, since each was likely
to expect too much from the other. It was rendered
more false by the character of the King being slow and
cautious to a fault, and that of Captain Lyons being
in the same degree hasty and impetuous. The King's
natural counsellors were, moreover, Germans ; and
German statesmen could not be expected to entertain
the same views of government that were likely to be
entertained by English statesmen. Add to this, that
as all Greeks who had the slightest pretension to places,
expected to have them, there was certain, whatever party
was in power, to be a strong party in opposition.
It has been the fashion of late years to consider, in
the Foreign Office, that the country is made for the
diplomacy, and not the diplomacy for the country ; and
that a Minister's duty is to see that so many thousands
a year are divided with as much impartial indifference
as possible, between so many gentlemen, who are pre-

VALUE OF PEEMANENT DIPLOMACY. 129
sumed, by having passed certain examinations, to have
acquired a claim on the fund.
A Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs being once
asked why he did not appoint a very able and ex
perienced diplomatist, then receiving a pension, to an
important post that was then vacant, instead of another
man much his inferior, replied, ' Your man has had his
innings ; it is another man's turn now ! ' It never
struck the Minister that the question was not which
man had been employed, but which was best for the
public interest to employ. So an unthinking cry has
been raised as to what is called ' a block in the service ;'
that is, as to pushing some men out of their places, and
others into them, with a more rapid movement ; and a
Committee ofthe House of Commons once recommended
that no Minister or Ambassador should be left more than
five years in his post.
Yet anyone who has reflected on these subjects
knows that the knowledge of most value in any pro
fession, but especially in diplomacy, is that which you
acquire daily, hourly, without being sensible that you
acquire it, by practice and experience. It is quite true
that a very clever man is more useful with a year's
experience than a very stupid one with twenty years',
for there are men so stupid that experience is thrown
away on them. But take two men of equal ability, and
the man who has been five years Minister or Ambassador
at any place, is at least twentj' times more fit for it than
the man who has been wishing five years to be Minister
or Ambassador at that place. It is not merely that
one learns to do things better by habit in a particular
caUing — one learns what not to do.
Let us exercise but a little common sense. Would
any great banking or mercantile house lay down, as a
rule, to be always shifting its agents, and remove an
agent who had been doing his business well at a par
ticular place, to put another man, who perhaps had
never seen the place, in his stead?
The folly of such a system is too apparent to need
VOL. II. K

130 LIE|E of LOED PAI.MEESTON.
proof; but if it/ were wanted. Captain Lyons was a
capital instance of it. Captain Lyons was an active,
abloj ambitious, astute man ; a man of the world, too :
but he wanted experience in the business he had been
plunged into, and consequently he was often firing off
very big guns at very small affairs. Nevertheless, that
his language and conduct in the main, as the represen
tative of a State which had bestowed its countenance,
given its assistance, and lent its money to Greece, were
no more violent in their reprobation than circumstances
fully justified, may be amply proved by the following
•exposition of the Finance Minister at Athens in 1846.
Gentlemen, — Some days ago you sent for me to give you
some account of the state of our finances ; and I excused myself
on the plea of having just taken office. I now come down to
this House to tell you that the finance department is in a com
plete state of disorganisation and paralysis : that no accounts
«xist either as to the revenue or the expenditure, and that it
wUl be utterly impossible to furnish you with anything in the
shape of a correct budget. In consequence of the dishonesty
and incapacity of the public functionaries, the pubhc accounts
are in a state of chaos. AU that M. Provilegio and others have
told you respecting every honest man having been dismissed,
and of the spoliation of the public money at Syra and else
where, is perfectly true. MiUions are due to the State; and
we do not know our debtors, as the revenue books have disap
peared. This is the financial statement I have to make.'
This was surely enough to account for aU that could
be thought of or said to the Government of Greece by
the British Minister. But a diplomatist is frequently
perched on the horns of a double dilemma. He strives
by the courtesy and amiability of his personal relations
to soften the character of official communications ; and
it is said of him, ' You will never do anything with that
man: he is too polite: they don't believe him in
earnest ; ' or, on the other hand, he seeks, by a some
what stern and severe manner, to give additional weight
to the observations he is charged to make use of; and
' Annual Ucgistcr, 1846, p. 30.S.

CONTINENTAL INFLUENCES IN GEEECE. 131
then the good-natured critic of the Foreign Office
shrugs up his shoulders, and says, ' That fellow renders
himself so cursedly disagreeable; who would do any
thing to oblige him, if he could help it?' However,
the great crisis in Greek affairs took place not under
the warlike regime of the naval captain, but under the
mild one of the library philosopher.'
When England, France, and Eussia had brought
Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece, the
three Powers settled that the form of Government for
the new kingdom should be a Monarchy ; but England
attached to her assent as an indispensable condition that
it shorJd be a Constitutional Monarchy. Consequently,
when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was called
to the throne, the three Powers, on announcing the
choice they had made, declared at the same time that
constitutional institutions would be given by Otho as
soon as he came of age. This declaration was ratified
by the King of Bavaria, in the name and on behalf of
his son, the young King of Greece.
This promise was not kept. The despotic Courts of
Eussia, Prussia, and Austria, naturally averse to consti
tutions, gladly availed themselves of the plea that the
Greek was not yet ripe for representative government,
in order to avoid pressing on Otho the fulfilment of his
pledges. France kept aloof on the same ground, Guizot
philosophising the while with his favourite simile, that
if a six hundred horse-power engine is placed in a small
skiff, it must tear it to pieces instead of moving it for
ward. England, therefore, stood alone in her remon
strances, and naturally incurred the dislike of those
whom she considered that it was her invidious duty to
reproach. In other matters, also, she was on the un
popular, while France, for her own objects, took the
popular, side. Monsieur Guizot, in his Memoirs,^ tries
to distinguish in the following words between their
respective attitudes : —
' Sir Thomas Wyse, who succeeded Lord Lyons.
= Vol. xii. p. 324.

132 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Tandis qu'4 Londres on acceptait I'ind^pendance de la Grfece
comme une malencontreuse n6cessit6, nous n'acceptions k Paris
que comme une n6cessit6 facheuse les 6troites limites dans
lesquelles on resserrait cette mdependance.
But then he points the moral of his reflections by a
very significant remark : —
Mais en repoussant toute tentative d'extension contre la
Turquie, nous n'entendimes point interdfre aux Grecs les
grandes esperances.
Thus, while England saw well enough the difficulties
which the Greeks would find in self-government, and
considered the important matter was to urge them to
learn the habits and practice of a Constitutional Mon
archy, France, in order to retain a special influence, was
secretly fostering hopes of future conquests and idealised
glories. On England, therefore, fell the burden of remon
strance against the evils of a constitution without free
government, the fruit of which was licence without
liberty. In the words of Lord Palmerston, the whole
system grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice
could not be expected where the judges were at the mercy
of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not
be in any order where there was no public responsibility
on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the
revenue. Every sort of abuse was practised, from bri
gandage in the country to ' compulsory appropriation '
in the capital itself, and the tyranny of the police was
almost unbearable. To recall such a state of things is
to provide some excuse for the English Minister at
Athens, for the fact that a chronic ill-feeling existed
between the two Governments, and prepared the way for
an explosion. That explosion, as usually happens in
such cases, was lighted at last by a very small match.
There were in every town of Greece a number of
persons whom England was bound to protect — Maltese,
lonians, and others. It became the practice of this
Greek police to make no distinction between them and

ILL-TEEATMENT OF BEITISH SUBJECTS. 133
their own fellow-subjects. Compensation was from time
to time demanded for many acts of violence to lonians,
frut all in vain, till at length an outrage on the boat's
crew of Her Majesty's ship Fantome, and the cases of
Mr. Finlay and Don Pacifico, exhausted Lord Palmer
ston's patience, and determined him to insist on an
immediate compliance with his just demands. Mr.
Finlay was a Scotchman, whose land was taken to round
off the palace gardens at Athens, and no payment could
be wrung from the appropriators. Hnlike Frederick
the Great, who pointed with pride to the mill in his
grounds at Sans Souci as a proof that in his empire the
rights of every subject, however humble, were respected,
Otho could only show a heap of diplomatic notes and
private petitions seeking justice, as a proof that in his
kingdom it could nowhere be found.
M. Pacifico was a Jew, a native of Gibraltar, whose
house was pillaged and gutted, in open day, by a mob
headed by the sons of the Minister of War. , While it
was occurring no attempt was made by the authorities
of Athens to protect him. During three years Sir E.
Lyons and Mr. Wyse had pressed his claims for com
pensation without success. That some of his demands
were extortionate there can be little doubt ; but there
can be even less doubt that he had been most grossly
injured, and had a right to redress.
It was not without giving notice that Lord Palmer
ston determined to act. As long before as August 1847,
•he had written to Lord Bloomfield, our ambassador at
Petersburg : —
No orders have as yet been sent to Parker to compel the
Greek Government to comply with our various demands ; but
you should not conceal from Kessehode and the Emperor that
such orders must soon be sent, if Coletti does not render them
unnecessary by voluntary comphance. There is not the shght-
est danger that Joinville should give Parker the trouble of
gi-ving him a passage to Portsmouth, because we are too palpably
in the right to make it possible for France to oppose us by force
of arms ; and we are stronger than she is in the Mediterranean,

134 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and therefore there is the best possible security for her good
behaviour. Tell Nesselrode and the Emperor that if they
think the enforcement of our demands would be injurious to
the stabihty of Greece, an opinion which we in no degree
share, the only way of preventing it is to persuade Coletti to
do what we requfre, as the Greeks have ample means to pay us
if they choose.
Monsieur Coletti, 'chef de Pallicares,' the crafty
physician of Ali Pacha, and erewhile the adventurous
chief of half-savage insurgents in Epirus, having been
for eight years Greek Minister at Paris, had returned
to Athens after the constitutional revolution in 1843,
and was now Prime Minister. He was a fit subject for
a pen such as Monsieur About's. His character is thus
traced by Lord Palmerston: ' —
I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says,
prefer Prance to the gallows, but I do not see why he should be
reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St. Aulaire said to me
the other day that Coletti was a necessary Minister, for that he
is the chief and- leader of all the robbers and scamps of Greece,
and that if he was turned out of office, he would put himself at
theh head, and either make incursions into Tu.rkey or ravage
the provinces of Greece. To this I replied that it seeined an
- odd qualification for a Minister that a man was a robber by
profession, but that I did not share St. Aulaire's apprehension
of what might happen if Coletti was turned out, because if in
that case he invaded Turkey he would probably be shot, and if
he plundered Greece he would no doubt be hanged. But he
wUl not be turned out ; Otho loves him as a second self, because
he is as despotic as Otho himself; and as long as a majority
can be had for Coletti in the Chambers, by corruption and
intimidation, by the personal influence of the King, and by
money from Prance, Coletti will remain Minister. With this
we cannot meddle ; all we can insist upon is justice for our
subjects and payment of the interest on that part of the debt
which we have guaranteed. If we cannot get these things, we
must have recourse to compulsion. If we do get them, we
cannot interfere further; and I daresay Coletti will be wise
enough to satisfy our demands, and not to drive us to extreme
measures. ' To Lord Normanby, F. O., April 20, 1847.

BEITISH ULTIMATUM TO GEEECE. 135
As to Lyons, there has been a standing conspiracy against
Mm for several years past among all his diplomatic colleagues,
headed by the Greek Government. Lyons has been looked
upon as the only advocate of constitutional government. Otho
and Coletti wish it at the devU. Piscatory detests it, because
the French Government think they can exercise more influence
over Mmisters and Coiu-ts than over popular assembhes ; the
Bavarian Minister has, hke his King, been hitherto all for
despotism ; Prokesch, obeying Metternich, goes into convul
sions at the very notion of popular institutions ; the Prussian
Minister has been told imphcitly to follow the Austrian ; and
the Russian only dares support the Constitutional party when
there is a chance of Otho being frightened away and of his
- making room for the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. All these
gentlemen, therefore, combined to suppress all information as
to the disorders and abuses going on in Greece, and united to
run down Lyons.
Lord Palmerston at last notified formally to the
English Minister at Athens that the end of British for
bearance had arrived. F. 0. : December 3, 1849.
My dear Wyse, — I have desfred the Admfralty to instruct
Sfr Wilham Parker to take Athens on his way back from the
DardaneUes, and to support you in bringing at last to a satis
factory ending the settlement of our various claims upon the
Greek Government. You wUl of course, in conjunction with
him, persevere in the suaviter in 7nodo as long as is consistent
with our dignity and honour, and I measure that time by days
— ^perhaps by some very smaU number of hours. If, however,
the Greek Government does not strike, Parker must do so. In
that case you should embark on board his fleet before he begins
to take any hostUe steps, in order that you and your mission
may be secure against insult. He should, of course, begin by
reprisals ; that is, by taking possession of some Greek property ;
but the King would probably not much care for our taking
hold of any merchant property, and the best thing, therefore,
would be to seize hold of his httle fleet, if that can be done
handily. The next thing would be a blockade of any or aU of
his ports ; and if that does not do, then you and Parker must
take such other steps as may be requisite, whatever those steps
may be. I remember that at one time it was thought that a

136 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
landing of marines and sailors at some town might enable us to
seize and carry off public treasure of sufficient amount. Of
course, Pacifico's claim must be fully satisfied.
You should intimate to the Greek Government that although
we do not this time come to levy the amount due to us on
account of the Greek loan, yet we abstain from doing so in
order to give them an opportunity of doing the right thing of
their own accord ; but that we cannot go on requfrmg the
people of this country to pay fifty thousand a year to enable
King Otho to corrupt his Parliament, bribe his electors, bmld
palaces, and lay up a stock purse for evil times, which his bad
pohcy may bring upon him.
The fleet arrived at Athens, but the demands made
upon the Greek Government were not complied with.
The French and Eussian Ministers were furious at our
prompt action, and did their best to spirit up the King
of Greece to resistance.
'-j^ P. 0. : February 1, 1850.
My dear Normanby, — An agricultural speech of Granby
enables me to leave the House and add a few hnes to what I
have already -written to you about Greek affafrs. I think you
may put to Lahitte what a contrast there is between the con
duct of Enghsh agents towards Prance and that of French
agents towards England. The Prench representative in Mo
rocco, partly out of his own head, and partly by instructions
from home, made demands on the Morocco Government, some
of which were unusual and some exaggerated, and which the
Moorish Government was most unwiUing to accede to. Our
Consul-General, Mr. Hay, first spontaneously, and then by
instructions from me, bestfrred himself -with as much zeal and
activity as if the case had been one in which his own Govern
ment had been concerned, and by an infinity of trouble per
suaded the Morocco Government to comply -with the Prench
demands, and thus saved Prance from the necessity of employ- ,
ing force to obtain redress. In Greece we have demands for
redress which have been pending for years, and the neglect and
refusal of which we have borne with most exemplary patience,
and when at last we find it necessary either to abandon or en
force them, and not being able consistently with our duty to
give them up, we send our fieet to support the demands of our
diplomatic agent, we find the French Minister, faithful to the

HIS DEFENCE OF OUE ACTION. 137
course which French diplomacy has for years past pursued in
Greece, encouraging the Greek Government to refuse, and thus
doing all he can to drive us to the necessity of employing force
to obtain redress. I must say that we have good ground for
complaining of the ungrateful return which we receive for our
good offices in aid of France.
As to the melodrama which you talk of, it seems to me to
have been quite the right course. Our squadron arrived, and
Parker would not have been justified in assuming beforehand
that the demands, which Wyse was to repeat, would be refused.
Parker, therefore, on his arrival saluted as usual, and with his
officers paid his respects to the King before Wyse repeated his
demands. This was in good taste and well judged, because it
took off from his arrival the public appearance of a menace,
and left the Greek Government at hberty to yield without the
appearance of constraint.
I should have blamed Parker if he had come in with a
swaggering air of threatening preparation, with his tompions
out and his men at their quarters, so as to have made it impos
sible for Otho not to appear to be passing under the- Caudine
Forks. But Prench diplomacy has ever been bitterly hostUe
to us in Greece ; and as the Prench Government has chosen to
retain there its former diplomatic agent, the same spirit of
petty jealousy and national enmity prevails in the Prench
mission at Athens which we have had to lament and to cope
with during the whole reign of Louis Philippe.
What is it the French object to as to our proceedings t We
have demanded redress for wrongs committed towards our
subjects; our demands have been long treated with neglect,
silence, or refusals. We send at last our squadron to enforce
them. Does not France act in a similar way in similar cases,
only with far more -violence and less justice 1 Witness her
exploits at Tahiti and Sandwich Islands, where she, on false
pretences, bulhed the Queen of the first into a. surrender of her
independence and plundered the King of the other because he
would not alter his tariffs on brandy and compel his Custom
house officers to learn Prench.
But we have all along been thwarted in Greece by the
intrigues and cabals of French agents, who have enc9uraged
the Greek Government to iU-use our subjects and to refuse us
satisfaction, and of course Thouvenel is frantic that we have at
last lost patience.
On the refusal of the Greek Government to accede

138 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to our demands, the British admiral proceeded, accord
ing to his instructions, to lay an embargo upon certain
vessels at the Pirseus. Lord Palmerston thus communi
cates these proceedings to Drouyn de Lhuys, French
Minister in London : — C. G. : February 8, 1850.
Mon cher Ambassadeur, — Voici un extrait d'une depeche de
I'amiral Parker au Chevaher Baring, en date du 22 jan-vier.
The Greek vessels herein referred to (as having been de
tained) include, I beheve, all that the Greek Government have
in commission. The whole are of httle value, and in the pre
sent temper of the Greek Government, supported, as it seems,
by the counsels of the Prench Minister and of the Prussian
charge d'affaires, the mild measures hitherto adopted, I fear, are
not hkely to produce the desfred comphance with our demands.
Je suis pein6 de vofr que Taction de la mission fran^aise k
Athtoes continue -k nous etre si hostile, mais du moins ceux qui
nous forcent k des mesures de s6v6rit6 ne doivent pas nous en
faire un sujet de reproches. Mille amities, Palmerston.
Je -viens d'apprendre que M. de Thouvenel a appele I'escadre
frangaise k Athlnes ; nous souhaitons rester bons amis, mais
cela pourrait devenfr s6rieux.
Monsieur Thouvenel had caUed upon the French
fleet to come to Athens. The admiral had, however,
sufficient discretion to wait for further instructions
from home. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord Nor
manby : — F. 0. : February 14, 1850.
I have had despatches and letters from Wyse up to January
30. Thouvenel was continuing to pursue his system of reckless
hostility, and doing all the mischief he could by stimulatit^
Persiani to join him in improper notes to Wyse, and in en
couraging Otho to refuse compliance with our demands,
Thouvenel had written to the Prench admiral to come to
Athens, of course to oppose our proceedings ; but the admiral
ha-ving more sense than the diplomatist, declined to do so with
out orders from home.
Some of the notes -written by Thouvenel, and, at his sug-

EEPEISALS MADE. 139
gestion, by Persiani, are really laughably absurd and ridiculously
impertinent. As an instance of the latter, he expresses his
astonishment that Parker should have presumed to detain a
Greek steamer before the eyes of the commander of a Prench
corvette, which was actually lying in the Pfrseus at the time ;
and, as an example of the former, he protests against our get
ting compensation for wrongs done to British subjects, because
he says the Greek Government is bound to apply the first pro
duce of its revenues to the interest and sinking fund of the
guaranteed debt, an engagement which the Greek Government
has never fulfiUed, which we should be glad if Prance would
join us in compeUing King Otho to fulfil, and which, if fulfiUed,
would still leave ample funds out of which our demands could
be satisfied. This protest is really a burlesque. In the mean
while the Greeks were beginning to understand the rights of
the case, and when they saw us detaining the Otho, they said
we w^ere taking away the wrong one.
Parker had been obliged to begin reprisals on merchant
ships, and he expected to have in that way sufficient value to
cover our claims.
The surprise of Lahitte ' that we were going on -with repri
sals is hke the exclamation of the Neapohtans about the
Austrian troops, ' Ma cfe canone ! ' or the reply of the aide-de
camp sent out, when our troops first landed in Portugal, to see
what the outpost firmg was, who came back and said, ' Why,
they are actuaUy firing ball cartridge.' I think it not unhkely
that Otho (for it all depends on him) may have given way
before the French negotiation begins, but we cannot suspend
our operations more than such time as may be reasonable to
aUow the Prench negotiator a fair opportunity to persuade
Otho to give in.
Our case is good; our right indisputable; Greece is an
independent State and responsible for the acts and misdeeds of
her Government, and redress must be had. If the Prench are
unreasonable and angry, I am sorry for it ; but justice to our
own subjects is a paramount consideration.
The French Government, finding we were in earnest,
and that we were not to be intimidated by any action
of the Powers at Athens, began to fear lest the matter
should be settled without their having any share in it.
" Gen. Lahitte, Prench Minister for Foreign Affairs.

140 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
They had, accordingly, offered their good offices. Lord
Palmerston had accepted their offer, but only on the
understanding that there was to be no discussion on
the principle of our demands, and even on the amount
only as to some of them.
Baron Gros was ordered to Athens by the French
Cabinet as mediator. The blockade and reprisals were
to be suspended during the continuance of his efforts
to accommodate matters. Lord Palmerston writes to
his brother : — P. 0. : February 15, 1850.
We accept the good offices of Prance in regard to Greece in
the same way in which we did so in the case of Naples in 1840,
to obtain for us satisfaction, but not to arbitrate about our
claims. King Otho is the enfant gdte de I'absolutisme, and
therefore all the arbitrary Courts are in convulsions at what we
have been doing ; but it is our long forbearance, and not our
precipitation, that deserves remark. The papers to be laid
before Parliament will be ready in a day or two, and wiU show
this. What has happened may serve as a hint to other Govern
ments who turn a deaf ear to our remarks, and think to wear
us out by refusals or evasions.
I conclude that by this time Parker will have got together
Greek vessels enough belonging to the Government and to pri
vate individuals to be a sufficient security for payment of what
is claimed. And, of course, we shall not let this security out
of our hands till the money we claim is actually paid to the
persons for whom it is demanded.
Pohtical matters are looking well here. Our majorities in
the two Houses have been decisive, and the measures we have
brought in and announced seem to give satisfaction. There will
he no change of Government this year, nor probably the next.
Peel finds it impossible to discover a party who wiU accept him
as leader to form a Government ; and Stanley, though he has a
party as Opposition leader, is judged by them as by his own
son, who says, ' My father is a very clever man, but he has no
judgment, and would not do for a Minister of this country.'
And the same day to Mr. Wyse at Athens : —
Nothing could be better than the manner in which you
and Sir William Parker have conducted the affair to which your

FEENCH PAETIAL MEDIATION. 141
communications relate. You have both of you combined
firmness, decision, and promptitude with aU the moderation,
forbearance, and courtesy compatible with the execution of your
instructions. My despatches give you full instructions for the
future. Baron Gros is, I beheve, as good a choice as the Prench
could have made, but he is a Frenchman, and of course an
Othoist. I have purposely fixed no time for the duration of
the suspension of reprisals, but you will put him on his honour
to tell you when he has failed, if fail he should. Perhaps,
however, he may succeed. All depends on his instructions.
We accept good offices to procure a settlement of our demands,
and not arbitration as to the amount of them. In fact, the
only one which could admit of discussion in regard to its
amount is that of Pacifico ; but if his documents are right, as
I beheve them to be, his claim is as clear as the rest. We must
have money, tocccmte sonante, and not promises to pay. Those
promises would infallibly he broken, and we should have to
begin all over again. The word of the Greek Government is
as good as its bond, and the bondholders can tell us what that
is worth. Besides, after the systematic violation of the article
of the Treaty of 1832, as to applying the first proceeds of the
revenue to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the
debt, no confidence can be placed, even in a treaty engagement,
if such should be offered to us. The plea of poverty cannot
be hstened to at a moment when fresh expenses, diplomatic and
mihtary, are without any necessity incurred.
Monsieur Thouvenel, however, did not cease from
his active though secret opposition to the action of the
British Government. Such an old diplomatist as Lord
Normanby should hardly have required such a hint as
the following : — P. 0. : February 22, 1850.
My dear Normanby, — One word more about Thouvenel and
I have done with him. In your private letters and pubhc
despatches you argue that Thouvenel cannot have done certain
thfrgs because you are told by the Prench Ministers that he
has not reported having done so; or because you have had
shown to you despatches in which he makes no mention of ha-ving
done such things ; , or because you have seen or have heard of
private letters written by him to his friends implying that he
has pursued a different hne of conduct. All I can say in reply
is, that against these negative inferences I place the positive

142 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
assertions of our Minister and Admiral and the tone and sub
stance of Thouvenel's, own notes, which latter are quite irre
concilable with the statements in his private letters. But you
are surely too good a diplomatist not to be aware that there are
such things as private letters and pubhc despatches written
expressly that they may be shown, and you must, moreover, he
aware that the mere fact that a foreign agent is said by his
employer not to have mentioned that he did a particular thing,
is no proof that he did not do it. Nessefrode stoutly asserted
that Titow had never told the Turkish Government that the
escape of any of the refugees would be tantamount to a declara
tion of war against Russia and Austria, but we are morally
certain that such a declaration was made both by Titow and
Stiirmer. Thouvenel may be a very gentlemanhke man in
private society, but that does not prevent his being a reckless
intriguer in a pohtical crisis, and there is nothmg m the pohtical
habits of Prench diplomatists, especially of those of the Guizot
school, that can render it improbable that he should be so.
A fortnight later, the same accounts arrive : — ,
P. 0. : March 12, 1850.
I am somewhat afraid that when Gros gets to Athens, he
wiU find Prance so engaged in support of the Greek Govern
ment that he will scarcely be able to disentangle himself from
the meshes spread for him by Thouvenel ; but if he does not do
so, his mission wiU be a failure. We have got, I imagine,
vessels enough to make good our demands, and we shall cer
tainly not let one of them go till we, or those on whose behalf
we make our demands, have been paid in hard cash the amount
of thefr just claims.
The Eussian Government was not less hostile than
France, although more decorous in its hostility. It
had expressed its disapproval in a strongly-worded
despatch. Lord Palmerston writes to the English
Minister at St. Petersburg : — C. G. : March 27, 1850.
We do not mind the Russian swagger and attempt to bully
about Greece. We shall pursue our own course steadily and
firmly, and we must and shall obtain the satisfaction we
require. The amount of money which we demand is reaUy so
small that the bottleholders of Greece ought to be ashamed of

EUSSIAN COMPLAINTS OF THE LONDON PBESS. 143
the rout they make about it. But it is not the money that
makes the essential part of the case in their eyes ; they are
furious at seeing that the spoilt child of Absolutism, whom they
have been encouraging on for many years past to insult and
defy England, should at last have received a punishment from
which they are unable to protect him. It is not the number of
stripes that he has received which they care about, but the fact
that we have laid our stick over his back and that they have
not been able to prevent it. As to Nesselrode's mysterious
hints of evil consequences which may follow if we contmue to
detain the Greek merchant ships, he may be assured that we
shall detain them till we get paid, or rather till the persons for
whom we make our demands shaU have been paid, barring the
Portuguese claims of Pacifico, which are matters for investiga
tion, and may probably admit of considerable abatement. But
the number of merchantmen detained has been much exagge
rated, and does not, I beheve, exceed forty, or, at the utmost,
fifty. The Eussian ambassador having written to com
plain of the language of the ' Globe ' and ' Morning
Post' about the Emperor's acts and policy. Lord
Palmerston's answer is as follows : — P. 0. : May 16, 1850.
My dear John Russell, — I return you Brunnow's letter.
Any articles in the newspapers to which he aUudes were dra-wn
upon the Russian Government by the unprecedented publica
tion of Nessehode's despatch of the 17th March, and by the
boastful threats made by the 'Times' newspaper as to what
Russia would do to put a stop to our proceedings in Greece.
This war of words is, no doubt, much to be' deprecated, but the
responsibihty for any evils which it may produce must rest
with those by whom it is begun. With regard to the Russian
despatch, the feehng in this country has been but one, and that
one universal; and I happen to know that a leading man
among our opponents in Parhament said lately that he must
withhold his approval of our conduct with regard to Greece
until he knew whether we had answered it in a manner befit
ting the dignity of England.
Baron Gros was very dUatory, and by his conduct
gave 9olour to the suspicion that he meant to fail in
Ms good offices, trusting that the English Govern-

144 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ment would not venture to renew the embargo, and
that thus the whole matter would be transferred for
consideration to London or Paris. It was gall and
wormwood to the French and Eussians that the nego
tiations should be going on at Athens, with the guns of
the British fieet on the spot ready to support the
Minister, and to coerce if aU proposals were refused.
P. 0. ; May 7, 1860.
My dear Wyse, — Gros had, up to the date of your last
received despatches, been jierpetually trying to shde out of his
character of organ of good offices, and to place himself in- the
position of arbiter. He was sent, under our acceptance of the
good offices of France, to endeavour to prevail upon the Greek
Government to agree to our demands, and his whole labour
and exertions seem to have been dfrected to prevail upon yon
to give up, or greatly to modify, those demands. In short, he
has acted as the avowed advocate of Greece ; and I much
admfre the coolness with which, when asked by you whether,
if you agreed to his requhed abatements, he could answer for
the consent of the Greek Government, he rephed that he could
do no such thing. His game was first to beat you do-wn as low
as he could, and then to come back and to say that he could
not bring the Greek Government up to that point, and that
you must therefore come down lower stiU, or else he must go
away. When Drouyn ' has held this sort of language, and said
that Gros would be obhged to renounce his task, I have always
said, ' Well, what of it ? so much the worse for the Greeks,
that's all.' Drouyn, however, has behaved very well aU along.
As to the claims of foreigners, Prussians or others, on
account of the detention of their cargoes in Greek vessels, our
answer would be, that a man who chooses to put his property
on board a vessel belongmg to another country must take his
chance as to any difficulties into which that country may get
with other Powers, and all the remedy which he can justly
have is to get his cargo back again on proof that it really
belongs to him. Last year, during the Danish hostilities
against Germany, many of our merchants had cargoes on board
German ships. Those ships were captured by the Danes, and
the only remedy our merchants had was to prove ownership
before the Prize Court at Copenhagen, and thus to get their
goods dehvered up to them.
' Prench ambassador in London.

ULTIMATE SUBMISSION OF GEEECE. 145
While the convention with the French Government
— which was to form the basis of their exercise of good
offices — was being settled in London, matters were
advancing at Athens. Baron Gros, after long and
tedious negotiations, threw up his office as mediator,
and thereupon Mr. Wyse renewed the embargo and
seized anew several vessels. This at length brought
the Greeks to terms, and they finally agreed to send a
letter of apology for the affair of the Fantome, to pay
a sum of 180,000 drachmas for Finlay and Pacifico, and
not to aid or put forward any claims for compensation
for the ships that had been detained, which were, in
return, to be immediately released. This was a great
triumph for Lord Palmerston. His resolution and calm
persistency had attained the desired end, in spite of
difficulties and opposition which might well have daunted
a smaller man. But his troubles were not yet over.
The French were beyond measure annoyed that the
dispute should at last have . been settled by our own
means and not by their good offices. They tried to
fix a quarrel upon England on the ground of breach
of faith, in recurring to the employment of force with
out waiting for the result of their intervention. As
Baron Gros had notified both to Mr. Wyse and to the
Greek Government, two days before the renewal of
hostilities, that his mission was at an end, this was an
entirely baseless charge. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, how
ever, was recalled from London ; and General Lahitte,
the French Foreign Minister, read a despatch in the
Chambers in which he openly charged the British
Government with duplicity. Anxious questions were
put in both Houses of Parhament, and many thought
we were on the verge of war.
Lord Palmerston knew better, and writes to Lord
Normanby : — p. 0.: May 17, 1850.
It is clear that the French Government think a quarrel
with us would be useful to them at home. In my answer in
the House yesterday I purposely abstained from stating that
VOL. II. ^

146 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Drouyn was ordered back to Paris as a mark of dissatisfaction,
because it wotdd have been very improper in me to proclaim a
difference which I hoped might be adjusted. Of course, Lahitte
was at hberty, if he thought fit, to announce the terms of his
own instructions to his own ambassador. It was not for me to
do so unless I had intended to -widen the breach.
" C. G. : May 19, 1850'.
Drouyn came to me on Tuesday, and I spent four and a
half hours in going through the papers -with him, and in
explaining' our course. On Wednesday he came back to me,
and began by reading to me Lahitte's despatch. Nevertheless,
we went on for a couple of hours going through some of the
papers which we had not gone through sufficiently the day
before. As he was lea-ving me he said he should start that
evening, as the next day his Government would lay papers
before the Assembly, and it was important that he should he
able to communicate with his Government before the Chamber
met. I said I thought he was quite right, aiid I begged him
to give the substance of the explanations I had given hitd.
I farther assured him that we never had intended any dis
respect to the Prench Government, and did not think that we
could be justly charged with ha-vfrg broken any engagement;
and I said that, considering the many great and important
interests, not merely Enghsh and French, but also European,
which requfre that a good understanding should be maintamed
and a close connection kept up between England and Prance,.,!
did earnestly hope that his Government would not set up a
quereUe d'Allemand between the two countries ; 'but that the
decision rested -with them, as there were certain thmgs which
we could not do, and which they ought not to ask us to do.
We parted -with many friendly personal assurances mutually
exchanged ; though I by no means pretend to assert that on
the points at issue I succeeded in satisfying him.
The best and shortest account of the matter of Drouyn's
recall was given by the Duke of Welhngton, at a party given
at Lord Anglesey's, on Thursday evening, to celebrate his.
Lord Anglesey's, birthday. When the Duke came in, several
people fiocked round him and asked him what he thought of
the matter. His reply was, 'Oh, oh, it's aU right; it's all
nonsense ! ' I see clearly that there was a combined and con
joint operation, and that it was preconcerted somewhere, and
by some of our good friends and alhes, that Drouyn should
receive his order to return on the Queen's birthday, and that

A SOP TO FEENCH SUSCEPTIBILITY. 147
Brunnow and Cetto should send excuses and not attend my
dinner on that day; All this was what the Americans would
say 'cruel smaU,' and savours much of the strategy of the
'Tambour Major' of Paiis, as I am told our old friend the
Princess • is caUed. The Duke of Devonshfre, when he heard,
at his party on Wednesday evening, that Brunnow and Cetto
had excused themselves from the dinner, said it was a proof
how far democratic principles and feelings had spread, for that
in former times no diplomatists would have been guilty of so
great an impropriety. I have seen neither of them since.
The bolt has missed its aim, however, and people here
pretty plainly understand the whole affafr. I suppose that by
this time the Parisians also begin to see through -the millstone.
However, those who meant to punish me have in one respect
gained thefr object, for I cannot, in the present state of things,
go down to Broadlands for the four days of Whitsuntide.
Lord Palmerston had now to exercise his diplomatic
ingenuity in order to smooth over French susceptibility.
He sought, therefore, some means of putting France
forward as a successful mediator, and he managed it
thus. There were some further claims of Pacifico's
which were based upon the loss of papers which were
his vouchers for certain demands upon the Portuguese
Government. In the agreement with Mr. Wyse it had
been arranged that a joint inquiry of the two Govern
ments should ascertain whether they were well founded
or not, and that meanwhile a deposit should be paid by
the Greek Government. Lord Palmerston wished to
propose to France, that, instead of a joint inquiry by
the two Governments concerned, there should be arbiters
and an umpire, to be named by the joint concurrence
of the British, French, and Greek plenipotentiaries.
There was besides, as we have seen above, an engage
ment enured into with Mr. Wyse that the Greek
Government should not put forward or support any
claims for compensation for the detention of ships.
Lord Palmerston suggested that there should be sub
stituted for this engagement the good offices of France,
' Princess Lieven, whose husband had been Eussian ambassador in
London. T O

148 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
who should advise the King of Greece neither to start
nor to aid any such claims. The French Foreign Minis
ter was, however, in no humour to be appeased.
C. G. : May 22, 1850.
My dear John Russell, — You will see that Lahitte, who, I
take it, is pretty nearly the mere organ of Piscatory and Thiers,
simply refuses our proposal, without giving reasons or proposing
anything else. His view of the matter seems to be that ' the
quarrel is a mighty pretty quarrel as it stands, and it would be
a pity to spoil it by explanation.'
But Normanby's conversation with the President briiigs
another question under the consideration of the Cabmet. Louis
Napoleon would be satisfied, as I infer, if to the arbitration we
added the restitution of the deposit, and this the Cabmet wiU
have to consider to-morrow. The reasons for arid agamst seem
to me to be much as follows. In favour of it, may be said that
the Parliament and the pubhc woiUd be glad of a settlement of
the dispute, and would not examine very mmutely the con
ditions of the arrangement ; that they would not much like a
¦¦prolonged estrangement between England and Prance, merely
on account of the question as to the manner of settling the
very doubtful claims of Pacifico in regard to his Portuguese
documents, and they might not easily understand why we
should face a quarrel with Prance rather than accept now a
diplomatic security which we were willing to think sufficient on
the 19th of last month. This would, probably, be the broad
view of the matter taken by those who look only to the surface
of things, and they are the majority here as well as elsewhere.
On the other hand, it must be owned that if, in order to
appease the anger of the Prench Government (I do not say
Prance, for I do not believe the Prench people care a straw
about the matter), we return to Otho the deposit which he was
compelled to place in our hands, the relandmg of that sum
from the British steamer in the Piraeus will be looked upon in
Greece and in Europe generally as an act of submission by
England to Prance, as a haisse de pavilion, and that it will very
much affect om^ moral position among the nations of the world ;
at least, this would be the tendency of the act as regards the
impression to be produced upon those classes of men whom I
have mentioned, who do not look below the surface of things,
and who take only a broad view of affairs. Prance would be in
some degree acting the part of the constable who comes up Mid

'THE AET OF DIPLOMACY.' 149
bids Griffin restore twenty pounds which he had compelled
PigskuU to lend him against his wiU.
Lord Palmerston was, however, equal to the occasion.
He suggested that this objection would be obviated if
the restitution of the deposit was accompanied by an
engagement to adhere to their promises on the part of
the Greek Government in the form of a convention to
be signed in the presence ofthe French plenipotentiaries,
who would thus indirectly act as guarantors of the
undertaking. This ingenious device to save English
honour while soothing French susceptibilities is a fair
sample of one branch of the 'art of diplomacy.' It
proved ultimately successful, but the next letter to St.
Petersburg shows that there were meanwhile various
agencies at work trying hard to keep the two nations
apart : — P. 0.: May 24, 1850.
My dear Bloomfield, — I have been so busy fighting my
battle with Prance that I have been obliged to put off for a
time taking up agam my skhmish with Russia, but I have
written a short answer to Nesselrode's last long despatch about
Greek afiairs and a reply to Brunnow's protest, and you shall
have them both by the next opportunity. I think we shaU be
able to come to an understandmg with Prance, unless the
French Government want to pick a quarrel with us, and if that
is their mtention, of course they can carry it into effect. This
storm got up at Paris has had, however, a double object, first
to knock me over, next to sever the connection between England
and Prance. The Orleanist chque and Madame Lieven aimed
at the first result ; the Russian party, led and aided by Madame
Lieven, calculated upon the second. There have been in
London -within the last week letters from Madame Lieven to
friends of hers here, abusing me hke a pickpocket, and full
of indignation and disappointment that we did not send for
Normanby the moment the French Government sent for
Drouyn. She was unable to suppress her mortification that
they had not succeeded in producing a decided rupture between
the two countries. Of course, she and Easseleff* hunt in
couples, and we well know that Kisseleff's language at Paris
' Eussian ambassador in Paris.

150 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. ,
and Brunnow's at London are both of them adapted to the
purposes of the Russian Government at each place.
All the accounts which come from Greece state that the
Greeks Complain, not of what we have done, but of what we
have not done ; they say the English brought Otho, the Enghfeh
ought to have taken him away.
The French were delaying Coming to a settlement
knowing that the Opposition were stirring in Eng
land, and hoping to get some aid from the debates in
Parliament. On June 17, Lord Stanley moved in the
House of Lords the following resolution : —
That while the House fuUy recognises the right and duty
of the Government to secure to Her Majesty's subjects residing
in foreign States the full protection of the laws of those States,
it regrets to find, by the correspondence recently laid upon the
table by Her Majesty's command, that various claims against
the Greek Government, doubtful in pomt of justice or
exaggerated in amount, have been enforced by coercive
measures directed against the commerce and people of Greece,
and calculated to endanger the continuance, of our' friendly
relations with other Powers.
Lord Stanley's fervid attack upon the conduct of
the Foreign Secretary was supported with much
energy by Lord Aberdeen and Lord Brougham. His
motion was carried by a majority of thirty-seven;
and Lord Palmerston wrote next morning to Paris as
follows : — P. 0. : June 18, 1850.
We were beaten last night in the Lords by a larger majority
than we had up to the last moment expected, but when we
took office we knew that our opponents had a larger pack in
the Lords than we had, and that whenever the two packs were
to be fuUy dealt out, theirs would show a larger number than
ours. When the Protectionists have thought that a defeat on any
particular question in the Lords would make us resign, such as
would have been the case -with regard to the Na-vigation Laws,
for instance, last year, they have carefully abstained from
mustering their whole strength. Last night they felt confident
that we should not go out on account of an adverse vote of the

SUCCESSFUL DEFENCE OF HIS POLICY. 151
House of Lords, and they brought up aU thefr men, even the
hospital invahds.
What the Commons may do remains to be seen, but I
greatly doubt the Protection party there venturing to propose
resolutions similar to those of the Lords. If they do, I think
we know pretty well what the result would be.
Not only was no adverse motion made in the House
of Commons, but, on June 24, Mr. Eoebuck moved,
as a reply to the vote of the Lords, the following resolu
tion : —
That the principles on which the foreign pohcy of Her
Majesty's Government have been regulated have been such as
were calculated to maintain the honour and dignity of this
country, and in times of unexampled difficulty to preserve peace
between England and the various nations of the world.
A debate of four nights' duration foUowed. On
the second night Lord Palmerston rose, and in a speech
of four hours long, which was a masterpiece of argu
ment and of detailed reasoning, vindicated his whole
policy. He began by expressing his opinion that those by
whose act the question had been brought under the
discussion of Parliament had not conducted themselves
with a sufficient sense of the gravity and importance of
the issues involved.
For if that party in this country imagme that they are
strong enough to carry the Government by storm, and to take
possession of the citadel of office, or if, -without intending to
ineasure their strength with that of their opponents, they, con
ceive that there are matters of such gravity connected with the
conduct of the Government, that it becomes their duty to call
upon Parliament solemnly to record its disapprobation of what
has passed, I thirik that either in the one case or in the other
that party ought not to have been contented with obtahung the
expression of the opinion of the House of Lords, but they ought
to have sent down thefr resolution for the consent and con
currence of this House ; or, at least, those who act with them
in pohtical co-operation here should themselves have proposed

152 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to this House to come to a similar resolution. But, be the road
what it may, we have come to the same end ; and the House is
substantially considering whether they wiU adopt the resolution
of the House of Lords or the resolution which has been sub
mitted to them by my hon. friend the member for Sheffield.
Now, the resolution of the House of Lords -involves the
future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a
prmciple of national policy which I consider totally incom
patible with the interests, with the rights, with the honour,
and with the dignity of the country, and at variance with the
practice, not only of this, but of all other civihsed countries in
the world. The country is told that British subjects in foreign
lands are entitled to nothmg but the protection of the laws and
the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The
country is told that British subjects abroad must not look to
thefr own coimtry for protection, but must trust to that in
different justice which they may happen to receive at the hands
of the Government and tribunals of the country in which they
may be.
Now I deny that proposition, and I say it is a doctrine on
which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the
people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act.
Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above
the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the
land in which they live ? I mean no such thing. I contend
for no such prmciple. Undoubtedly, in the first instance,
British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the
means which the law of the land affords them when that law is
available for such purpose  It is only on a denial of
justice or upon decisions manifestly unjust that the British
Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may
be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals,
those tribunals being, from thefr composition and nature, not of
a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them.
I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an
instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would
not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the laws
of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not
going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to
Siberia; nor of a country, the Constitution of which vests
despotic power in the hands of the Sovereign. I wiU take a
case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree
was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms

MEMOEABLE SPEECH IN THE COMMONS. 153
in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and,
if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An
innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, accused
under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had
discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a
knife, which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses
having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated
that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof
that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was
in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant
said, that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecu
tion, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he
left his chent in the hands of the court. The court, however,
nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought
against him, and the next morning the man was shot.
Now, what would the Enghsh people have said if this had
been done to a British subject? and yet everything done was
the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence
by a tribunal of the country.
I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance,
redress should be sought from the law courts of the country ;
but that in cases where redress cannot be so had — and those
cases are many — to confine a British subject to that remedy
only would be to deprive him of the protection which he is
entitled to receive.
He then proceeded with a short sketch of English
relations with the Greek kingdom and of the deplorable
state of law, justice, and police in that country, and
continued : —
We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that
if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones
placed upon their breasts and police-officers to dance upon
them ; if they are liable to have their heads tied to thefr
knees, and to be left for hours in that state ; or to be swung
like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners
have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no
business to complain if the same things are practised upon them.
Wo may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I be
lieve it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that
in considering the cases of the lonians, for whom we demanded
reparation, the House must look at and consider what was the
state of things in this respect in Greece ; they must consider the

154 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON,
practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop
to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects
by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nommal
in some cases, but the grantmg of which would be an acknow
ledgment that such things should not be done towards us in
future. In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say
that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere m a
spirit and in a tone which I think was neither befitting . the
persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the
persons before whom, the discussion took place. It; is often
more convenient to treat matters -with ridicule than with grave
argument, and we have had serious things treated jocosely, and
grave men kept m a roar of laughter for an hour together at the
poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another,
at the nationahty of one mjured man, or the rehgion of another,
as if because a man was poor he inight be bastinadoed and
tortured with inipunity, as if a man who was born in Scotland
might be robbed without redress, or because a man is of the
Jewish persuasion he is fafr game for any outrage. It is a
true saying, and has often been repeated, that a very moderate
share of human wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human
affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which
is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind ought to bring to
the task generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and
noble and elevated thoughts.
After relating the story of Finlay and Pacifico in
some detaU, he proceeded : —
M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either
with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal,
or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that
his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursu
ance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year
or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of
enforcing the claim. ' Oh ! but,' it is said, ' what an ungenerous
proceeding to employ so large a force agamst so smaU a Power.!'
Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its eVil
acts ? Is it to be held that if your subjects suffer violence, out
rage, plunder in a country which is small and weak, you are to
tell them when they apply for redress that the country is ao
weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation !
Thefr answer would be that the weakness and smallness of the

MEMOEABLE SPEECH IN THE COMMONS. 155
coimtry make it so, much the more easy to obtain redress. ' No,'
it is said, ' generosity is to be the rule. We are to be generous
to those who haye been ungenerous to you ; and we cannot give
you redress because we have such ample and easy means of pro
curing it.'
But, it was urged, Pacifico is such a notorious
scoundrel. I say with those who have before had occasion to advert to
the subject that I do not care what M. Pacifico's character is.
I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted
amiss on some other occasion, and m some other matter, he is to
be wronged with impunity by others.
The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular
case ; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to
give redress to a man because in some former transaction he
may have done something which is questionable. Punish him
if you wiU, pimish him if he is guilty, but do not pursue him as
a pariah through hfe.
, , He then entered on a long and lucid history of the
various transactions already recounted, justifying both
his action towards the Greek and his negotiation with
the French Government.
Having thus disposed of the matter of Greece, he
turned to the affafrs of Portugal and Spain, about which
he had been attacked, by Sfr James Graham, then mem
ber for Eipon. He pointed out that ' his little experi
mental Belgium monarchy,' as it had, been sneeringly
called, had been constituted by British intervention not
dissimilar in kind from that .employed in the former
countries : that it had proved a secure and beneficial
creation; and that he hoped for Portugal the same
prosperity and happiness. He then went on : —
Portugal is now in the enjoyment of, a Constitution, and
practicaUy it is working as weU as under aU cfrcumstances, and
considering how recently it has been established, could perhaps
have been expected. ' Oh, but,' said the right hon. Baronet,
' you have Costa Cabral as Minister, and your object, was to get
rid of him.'' Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond
of attacldng me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in

156 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
others, is, that they try to brmg down every question to a per
sonal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England,
they say, ' Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the
organ of that policy.' Why, it is hke shooting a policeman.
(Laughter, and cries of ' Hear, hear.') As long as England is
England, as long as the Enghsh people are animated by the
feehngs, and spfrit, and opinions which they possess, you may
knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another, but de
pend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon
the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of
my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the
immediate cry is, ' Oh, it's all spite against this man, or that
man, Coimt this, or Prince that, that makes you do this ! '
After reciting the events in Spain which induced the
British Government to interfere under the Quadruple
Treaty, he added : —
If England has any interest more than another with refer
ence to Spam, it is that Spain should be independent, that
Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards is the maxim
upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain.
Much evU must ever come to this country from the fact of
Spain bemg under the dfrection of other Powers. It is emi
nently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be
m dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not,
merely on that account, and without any offence to or from
Spain herself, be at war with Spam also. We considered that
the mdependence of Spam, was more likely to be secured by a
Government controlled by a representative and national As
sembly than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting
merely of the members who might form the Administration.
Therefore, on grounds of strict pohcy, independently of the
general sympathy which animated the people as well as the
Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we
thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against
the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful ; the
Carlist cause failed ; the cause of the Constitution prevaUed.
Very dexterous was the next part of his speech, in
which, while apparently talking of France and Guizot,
he drew an unmistakable picture of England and her

MEMOEABLE SPEECH IN THE COMMONS; 157
Foreign Minister. The House caught the portrayal at
once, and showed their appreciation by loud applause.
However, sir, the right hon. Baronet (Sir J. Graham) says
that these affafrs of Spam were of long duration, and produced
disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events
of the greatest importance as regards another country, namely,
Prance. He says that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish
marriages there arose differences between England and Prance
which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the
Prench Monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for
narrowmg down a great and national question to the smallness
of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, for
sooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew
his administration, and with it the throne of France ! Why,
sir, what wUl the Prench nation say when they hear this 1 They
are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of a sense of
their own dignity and honour — what will they say when they
hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to
overthrow thefr Government and thefr monarchy? (Much
cheering.) Why, sfr, it is a calumny on the French nation to
suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to thefr
Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous,
and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a
foreign conspfracy had been formed against one of their ministers
— (tremendous and prolonged cheeiing, which prevented the
noble Viscount from concluding the sentence) — I say, that if
the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspfra-
tors were caballing against one of their Ministers, and cabaUing
for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived,
the dignity and interests of his own countiy, and if they had
thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors
in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that
brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the in
trigues of such a cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and
have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot
had been made. If, then, the French people had thought that
I, or any other foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M.
Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting
the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever in the
post which he occupied. No, sfr, the Prench Minister and the
Prench Monarchy were overthrown by far different causes.
And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would

158 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
have done well to have read a better lesson from the events
which then took place.
Leaving, to use his own words, the sunny plains of
Castillo and the gay vineyards of France, he next betook
himself to the mountains of Switzerland, and entered on
an elaborate justification of the charges brought against
him in connection with the civil war between the
cantons. After that, in his own language again, travel
ling from the rugged Alps into the smiling plains of
Lombardy, he pleaded his cause as foUows : —
With regard to our pohcy -with respect to Italy, I utterly
deny the charges that have been brought against us of ha-ving
been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution.
It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform
and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters
of; revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down;
it is the veceivei formula. It is the estabhshed practice of
those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say^
' Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with
them ; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer ; he is suoh
a plausible man ; the only way of gettfrg rid of him is to set
the world at him by caUing him a revolutionist.
Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this worlds
In the first place, there are those violent, hot-headed, and un
thinking men who fly to arms, who overthrow estabhshed
Governments, and who recklessly, -without regard to conse
quences, and -without measuring difficulties and comparing
strength, deluge thefr country -svith blood, and draw down the
greatest calamities on thefr feUow-countrymen. These are the
revolutionists of one class. But. there are revolutionists of
another kind : bhnd-mmded men, who, animated by antiquated
prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the
current of human improvement until the irresistible pressure of
accumulated discontent breaks down the opposing barriers, and
overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which
a timely apphcation of renovating means would have rendered
strong and lasting. _ Such revolutionists as these are the men
who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions
that Lord Minto went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the
Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation be
tween contending parties.

MEMOEABLE SPEECH IN THE COMMONS. 159
- He then dealt successively with Lord Minto's mis
sion to Italy, with the events in Sicily, and with the
support given to Turkey in the matter of the Hungarian
refugees, and ended as follows : —
I beheve I have now gone through all the heads of the
charges which have been brought against me in this debate.
I think I have shown that the foreign pohcy of the Govern
ment in all the transactions with respect to which its conduct
has been impugned has throughout been guided by those prin
ciples which, according to the resolution of the honourable and
learned gentleman, ought to regulate the conduct of the
Government of England in the management of our foreign
affafrs. I beheve that the principles on which we have acted are
those which are held by the great mass of the people of this
country. I am convinced these principles are calculated, so far
as the influence of England may properly be exercised wdth
respect to the destinies of other countries, to conduce to the
maintenance of peace, to the advancement of civihsation, to
the welfare and happiness of mankind.
I do not complain of the conduct of those who have made
these matters the means of attack upon Her Majesty's Ministers.
The Government of a great country hke this is, undoubtedly,
an object of fafr and legitimate ambition to men of aU shades of
opinion. It is a noble thing to be aUowed to guide the pohcy
and to influence the destiny of such a country ; and if ever it
waS an object of honourable ambition, more than ever must it
be so at' the moment at which I am speaking. For while we
have seen, as stated by the right hon. Baronet, the pohtical
earthquake rockmg Europe from side to side — while we have
seen thrones shaken, shattered, leveUed, institutions overthrown
and destroyed — while in almost every country of Europe the
conffict of civil war has deluged the land with blood, from the
Atlantic to the Black Sea, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean,
this country has presented a spectacle honourable to the people
of England, and worthy of the admiration of mankind.
We have shown that hberty is compatible with order ; that -
individual freedom is reconcilable -with obedience to the law.
We have shown the example of a nation in which every class
of society accepts with cheerfulness the lot which Providence
has assigned to it, while at the same time every individual of
each class is constantly striving to raise himself in'the social
scale — not by injustice and wrong, not by violence and iUegahty,

160 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
but by persevering good conduct, and by the steady and ener
getic exertion of the moral and intellectual faculties -with which
his Creator has endowed him. To govern such a people as this
is indeed an object worthy of the ambition of the noblest man
who hves in the land, and, therefore, I find no fault with those
who may think any opportunity a fafr one for endeavouring to
place themselves in so distinguished and honourable a position ;
but I contend that we have not in our foreign pohcy done any
thing to forfeit the confidence of the country. We may not,
perhaps, in this matter or in that, have acted precisely up to
the opinions of one person or of another ; and hard indeed it is,
as we all know by our individual and private experience, to find
any number of men agreemg enthely in any matter on which
they may not be equaUy possessed of the details of the facts,
chcumstances, reasons, and conditions which led to action.
But, making aUowance for those differences of opinion which
may fafrly and honourably arise among those who concur in
general views, I maintain that the principles which can he
traced through all our foreign transactions, as the guiding rule
and directing spirit of our proceedings, are such as deserve
approbation. I therefore fearlessly chaUenge the verdict which
this House, as representing a pohtical, a commercial, a consti
tutional country, is to give on the question now brought before
it — whether the principles on which the foreign pohcy of Her
Majesty's Government has been conducted, and the sense of
duty which has led us to think ourselves bound to afford pro
tection t(5 our feUow-subjects abroad, are proper and fitting
guides for those who are charged with the government of Eng
land; and whether, as the Roman in days of old held him
self free from mdignity when he could say, ' Civis Roma/nm
sum,' so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be,
shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of
England will protect him against injustice and wrong.
As Lord Palmerston sat down the House greeted
him with loud and prolonged cheers, echoing, as it
seemed, by anticipation, the words extorted later on in
the debate from his generous antagonist. Sir Eobert
Peel, when he declared, ' It has made us all proud of
him.' This, as is weU known, was Peel's last appear
ance in the House. He was killed next day by a fall
from his horse.

COMPLETE SUCCESS OF THE GOVEENMENT. 161
Towards the early dawn of the fifth day of discussion
a division of 310 against 264 gave a majority of 46
in support of his conduct of foreign affairs. In the
following letters he announces the result to his corre
spondents : — F. O. : June 29, 1850.
_ My dear Normanby, — Our debate in the House of Commons
finished at near four o'clock this morning, and we had about
the majority which we had reckoned upon; our calculation
fluctuated between forty and fifty. Our triumph has been com
plete in the debate as weU as in the division ; and, all things
considered, I scarcely ever remember a debate which, as a dis
play of inteUect, oratory, and high and dignified feehng, was
more honourable to the House of Commons.
John Russell's speech last night was admirable and first-rate;
and as to Cockburn's,' I do not know that I ever, in the course
of my hfe, heard a better speech from anybody, without any
exception. Gladstone's was also a first-rate performance, and Peel and
Disraeh both spoke with great judgment and talent with refer
ence to thefr respective positions.
But the degree of public feehng which has been excited out
of doors upon the matters on which the debate and di-vision
turned is mo.st remarkable, and would have led to very strong
manifestations if the result of the di-vision had been to throw
the Government into the hands of our opponents. C. G. : July 8, 1850.
My dear WiUiam, — You will have seen before this time how
completely the House of Commons have reversed the petulant
and factious and foohsh vote of the House of Lords, but you can
not appreciate from newspaper reports, nor know from newspaper
columns, the admfrable and enthusiastic sphit displayed on this
matter by the majority of the House of Commons, and by all
the leading county papers, and by the nation at large. The
attack on our foreign policy has been rightly understood by
everybody, as the shot fired by a foreign conspiracy, aided and
abetted by a domestic intrigue ; and the parties have so entirely
failed in the purpose, that instead of expelhng and overthrowing
me with disgrace, as they intended and hoped to do, they have
rendered me for the present the most popular Minister that for
a very long course of time has held my office.

VOL. IT

' Now Lord Chief Justice cf England.

162 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. '
The speech I had to make, which could not be comprised
within a shorter time than from a quarter before ten to twenty
minutes past two, was listened to very patiently and attentively
by the House, and has had great success with everybody.
Two hundred and fifty members of the Reform Club have
invited me to a dinner next Saturday to celebrate my -victory,
and if we had not thought it better to hmit the demonstration
to a small scale, the dinner would have been given ia Covent
Garden Theatre, and would have been attended by a thousand
people. I myself, the Government, and the country are much
indebted to the Burgraves and to Stanley. But the House of
Lords has been placed in an unfortunate position, and Stanley
has not raised his reputation as a statesman.
Peel's death is a great calamity, and one that seems to have
had no adequate cause. He was a very bad and awkward rider,
and bis horse might have been sat by any better equestrian ;
but he seems, somehow or other, to have been entangled in the
bridle, and to have puUed the horse to step or kneel upon him.
The frjury to the shoulder was severe but curable ; that which
killed him was a broken rib, forced by great -violence inwards
into the lungs.
Immediately after this successful combat the por
trait of Lord Palmerston, by Partridge, which was so
well known in later years to the frequenters of Cam
bridge House, where it hung on the staircase, was
presented to Lady Palmerston by a hundred and twenty
members of the House of Commons. They added to it
a written address, expressive of ' their high sense of his
public and private character, and of the independent
policy by which he maintained the honour and interests
of his country.'
It was altogether a great triumph for Lord Pal
merston. ' His speech,' according to the testimony of
Sir George Levds,' 'was an extraordinary effort. He
defeated the whole Conservative party. Protectionists
and Peelites, supported by the extreme Eadicals, and
backed by the " Times," and aU the organised forces of
foreign diplomacy.'
' Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head, page 227 of ' Letters.'

'A MINISTEE OP ENGLAND.' 163
Every element of hostUity and of pent-up animosity
which had been long gathering against him were on
this occasion brought into one focus, but he only ex
panded the more instead of shrivelling under the burn
ing-glass. He vindicated both with courage and, as we
have seen, with eloquence all his actions at the Foreign
Office, as being dictated solely by his care for the position
and weU-being of his country, and stamped himself
upon the mindi of the English people, according to Lord
John EusseU's long-remembered words, as emphatically
and in a special sense, a Minister of England.

164 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE VI.
LETTERS — GENERAL HAYNAU AT BARCLAY'S BEBWEEY — ECCLESIAS
TICAL TITLES BILL — NATIONAL DEFENCES — MR. GLADSTONE'S
LETTERS ABOUT NEAPOLITAN PRISONS — IONIAN ISLANDS— DE-
FENCE IN PARLIAMENT — QUESTION OP ' HOLY PLACES.'
While still detained in town by the arrears of the
session of 1850, he sends to his brother a report of- his
own position and of the state of parties. His estimate
of Lord Aberdeen's capacity for the Premiership was
destined to be tested within two years.
C. G. : September 1, 1850.
I have been more entirely swamped by busmess durmg the
whole of this last session of Parhament than I ever was at any
former time, and I have not even yet been able to work up the
arrear of various matters which has accumulated by the regular
overflowing of almost every day. But I have no reason to find
fault with the session, for it has left me at its close m a very
satisfactory and gratifying position. I have beaten and put
down and silenced, at least for a time, one of the most wide
spread and mahgnant and active confederacies that ever con
spired against one man without crushing him. But I was ia
the right, aiid I was able to fight my battle ; and John Russell
and my coUeagues behaved most handsomely and honourably,
and my triumph has been m proportion to the magnitude of
the struggle. The death of Louis Phihppe delivers me from
my most artful and inveterate enemy, whose position gave him
in many ways the power to injure me; and though I am very
sorry for the death of Peel, from personal regard, and because
it is no doubt a great loss to the country, yet as far as my own
political position is concerned, I do not think that he was ever
disposed to do me any good turn. It is difficult to say what
effect his death will have on the state of parties in Parhament.
He had not much of a foUowing latterly, though the men who

HIS ESTIMATE OF LOED ABEEDEEN. 165
stUl stuck to him, such as Goulbourn, Robert Chve, Cardwell
and Banks, and the like, were the most respectable of the
party. Perhaps Sidney Herbert, or Aberdeen, or Gladstone
may set up for leader of the Conservative Free Traders, or the
Free Trade Conservatives ; and perhaps Stanley may invite a
junction with him by some compromise about putting off Pro
tection. I have been told by a person who had it from Stanley
himself, that during the time when a change of Government
was expected, Aberdeen said to Stanley that in that case he,
Aberdeen, would be commissioned by the Queen to form a
Government ! This would have been a curious dish to set
before a Queen ! On the whole, I rather am inchned to think
that the Government is made stronger by the events of last
session, and that we may look forward to getting successfully
through the session of next year.
I made acquaintance lately with a Sicihan Princess —
Montevoyo, I think, she calls herself — a widow, and one of
the ladies of the Queen of Naples. She spoke highly of you ;
but then I must add she spoke also highly of the King of
Naples, which makes her praise of less value.
What Lord Palmerston, a wise friend to Turkey,
thought and said about it, is still of so much interest
that I here quote three or four letters on its affairs
written about this time. They at any rate show that
she has not continued to sink for want of warning. She
was at the time contemplating her first loan, and Lord
Palmerston's prognostications addressed to Sir Stratford
Canning proved very correct. C. G. : August 7, 1850.
My dear Canning, — I am sorry to hear so indifferent an
account of ' progress ' in Turkey as that which your letter
of July 19 contains. I will exhort through the ambassador
here. But how is it supposed that a foreign loan would help
the Porte ? Would not such a loan add, by the amount of its
interest and smking fund, to the burthens of the State 1 and
would there not be a danger that a large part of it would
somehow or other find its way into the pockets of private
individuals 1 As to Douad Pasha, or Douad Effendi, he has, I
think, lost all power of doing mischief here, and perhaps that
may be the reason why he tarries in the East ; or maybe he
thinks that, as the wise men are said to have come from thence,
he may pick up there some of that wisdom which he so much

166 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
lacks. But the Arabs have a proverb which says you may
send a jackass to Mecca, and he will come back a jackass stiU.
Lord Palmerston's ' exhortation' was as follows: —
Broadlands : September 24, 1850.
Mon cher Ambassadeur, — Permettez que je vous renouvelle
par 6crit la prifere que je vous ai faite verbalement pour vous
engager a tfrer I'attention la plus s6rieuse de votre Gouverne
ment au memorandum que Sir S. Cannmg a presents au Sultan ;
je voudrais y aj outer la demande que votre Gouvernement
veuille bien prendre en consideration des observations que Ig
Colonel Rose ' a faites au sujet de votre arm6e, et que Sir S.
Canning aura d6ji soumises au grand vizier.
Pardonnez-moi si j'ai I'afr de m'ing6rer dans des affiifres qui
ne me regardent pas, et croyez bien que ce que je dis, je le dis
uniquement dans I'interSt du Sultan et de son Empfre. L'Em-
pire Ottoman n'est pas encore en 6tat de maintenir son inde-
pendance, et de defendre son vaste territofre contre les ennemis
qui le menacent sans I'aide et I'appui de temps en temps de la
Grande-Bretagne. Le Gouvernement Anglais a le sincere desh
et la ferme intention de vous donner toujours dans des momens
de diflSculte I'appui dont vous aurez besoin. Mais le Gouverne
ment anglais le pent agir qu'en autant qu'U est soutenu par le
Parlement et par I'opinion pubhque; et ces soutiens nous
manqueraient si nous ne pouvions pas d6montrer que le Gou
vernement Ottoman a fait tous les efforts en son pouvofr pour
mettre toutes les branches de I'administration de la Turquie
dans le meilleur 6tat possible, et n'a rien omis qui pourrait
contribuer k mettre la Turquie en 6tat de se defendre en ddve-
loppant toutes les grandes ressources naturelles dont la Provi
dence I'a dou6e.
Jusqu'4 pr6sent il faut I'avouer ceci ne peut pas se dire.
Votre Gouvernement a; eu sans doute k lutter contre maints
obstacles ; mais pour accomplir de grands resultats il faut de
grands efforts, et de la determination, et de la perseverance. ^
A ConstanjiinQple on chancelle, on hfeite, on s'arrete. Mais
le moment actuel est favorable pour fafre des r6formes,,et des
ameliorations. Le proverbe anglais dit qu'U faut faire le ,^ine
pendant que le soleil luit. II faut reparer sa maison, pendant
qu'il fait cahne, afin d'etre en mesure contre I'ouragan..
Les points- principaux que je voudrais signaler comme
demandant I'attQntioa pratique de votre Gouvernement sont-: ,.
' Now Lord Strathnairn.

UEGES EEFOEMS ON TUEKEY. 167
TJne perception plus exacte du revenu, sans exiger de qui
que ce soit plus qu'il ne doit payer ; et cessation du systfeme par
lequel on afferme la collection des imp6ts.
Economie dans les depenses, choisissant d'abord les depenses
necessafres et remettant ce qui ne Test pas.
Par consequent ne perdant pas de temps k construfre des
Routes de Commerce, des fortifications pour le Bosphore, k
reparer les forteresses sur la frontiere, k etabhr des ouvrages
pour la defense de la capitale.
L'administration de la justice devrait Stre sans reproche;
on pretend que maintenant cet etat de choses n'existe pas, et
les preuves en sont nombreuses.
Toute distinction pohtique et ci-vile entre les differentes
classes des sujets du Sultan par raison de difference de rehgion
devrait 4tre abolie, afin que le Sultan puisse devenfr egalement
le Souverain de toutes les populations qui habitent son Empfre.
Quant k I'armee il parait que I'artUlerie est exceUente,
les h6pitaux admirables ; mais que I'infanterie est susceptible
d'andehorations, et que la cavalerie en a grand besoin. Que
les cavahers ne sont pas bien armes, ayant quitte une exceUente
epee qu'ils avaient autrefois pour en prendre une assez mauvaise,
et qu'en general Us ne sont pas fort adroits dans le maniement
ni de I'epee ni de la lance.
Bon voyage. Je vous souhaite personellement tout le
bonheur possible, et je fais des voeux pour que votre pays
attienne une prosperite rapide et avec cela sohde.
Mille complimens, Palmerston.
S. E. Mehemet Pasha. Broadlands : September 24, 1850.
My dear Canning,^ — I have just taken leave of the Turkish
ambassador, who starts on Thursday for Constantinople. I
took the opportunity of requesting him to impress upon his
Government the necessity of improvement and reforms, and of
putting an end to the prevalent system of corruption and in
justice; and I begged him to recommend strongly to the
attention of his Government the Memorandum which you had
given to the Sultan. There is obviously a great deal wanting
to be done in every way. and in every branch of administration
to bring Turkey into line with other Powers, and to put her
into a condition to defend herself. But much has already been
accomphshed, perhaps more than ever yet was done in the
same space of time in any country in which there was so much

168 LIFE OF LOED. PALMEESTON.
room for improvement ; and I am not discouraged, therefore,
by the apparent slowness of progress, but only encouraged to
urge them on to further advance. It may be true that much
of what has hitherto been done exists more in regulations and
orders than in actual execution ; but one ought not to under
value the worth of rules, and laws, and institutions, even when
they are not practically acted upon to the extent of thefr letter
and spirit. As long as forms remain they are a fixed point
to refer to ; and as men improve and opinion grows more power
ful, those forms become more and more the guide for conduct
and events, and that which at first is only theory in course of
time is converted into practice.
As to foreign officers in the Turkish service, such men would
necessarily impart to the Turkish officers notions and knowledge
that would be very useful ; and the mere fact of Christians
ser-ving in this way in the 'Turkish army would have its effect
in breaking down that exclusive and fanatical feeling which is
represented as a bar to the admission of Christian subjects of
the Porte to situations of mihtary command.
Why does the Turkish Government not get some Prussian
instructors for their cavalry ] The Prussian cavalry is excel
lent, and, indeed, the Turkish infantry could not be drUled and
organised upon a better model than that of the Prussian service.
I remember at the reviews in 1817 or 1818 of the armies of
occupation in Prance, the Duke of Wellington being asked
which he thought the best army, the Austrian, the Russian, or
the Prussian. His reply was : ' To say which are the best troops
is to say a great deal more than I will take on myself to affirm;
but I will tell you which of the three I should hke best to
command in action. I should decidedly prefer the Prussians ;
they are the handiest, the best organised, and the most in
telligent.' Lord Palmerston was always especially emphatic
in his declarations that it was necessary for the pros--
perity of Turkey that her Christian population should
be placed and treated on a footing of absolute equality
with the Mussulman. He urges it in the foregoing
communication to Mehemet Pasha, and a year later he
repeats it to M. Musurus, in reply to a note expressing
the ambassador's regret at the events which caused
Lord Palmerston's retirement from the Government.
The letter is dated December 30, 1851, and runs as
follows :—

ATTACK ON GENJIEAL HAYNAU. 169
Agreez, je vous en prie, mes remerciments les plus sincferes
de votre aimable lettre, et soyez persuade que, quelle que soit la
position politique dans laqueUe je pourrai me trouver, je serai
toujours fideie aux principes qui me font voir un interSt non-
seulement Anglais, mais Europeen dans I'independance et le
bien-^tre de I'Empfre Ottoman, et vous connaissez bien mon
intime conviction que la prosperite de cet empfre ne reposera
jamais sur une base vraiment sohde tant que les sujets Chretiens
du Sultan ne sont pas places sur un pied d'egahte devant la loi
avec les sujets de la religion Musulmane.
I add also a passage from a letter to Sir Stratford
Canning : —
Ought not this consideration to show the Turkish Govern
ment how important it is that they should lose no time in
removing all civil and political distinctions between Mussulmen
and Rayahs 1 I pressed this yesterday on the Turkish ambas
sador, and represented that, at present, the Sultan not only
deprives himself of the use of his left arm, but runs constantly
the risk of being himself belaboured by it. Mehemet Pasha
acknowledged the justice of the remark.'
An attack upon General Haynau by the men of
Barclay's brewery gave Lord Palmerston some trouble
in the autumn of this year. General Haynau, an
Austrian general, who had won an evil reputation in
the Hungarian war for great cruelties and alleged flog
ging of women, came to London and went to visit the
premises of Barclay and Perkins. As soon as his
presence was known, a number of draymen came out
with brooms and dirt, shouting out, ' Down with the
Austrian butcher ! ' He fled with the mob at his heels,
and took refuge in a public-house by the river-side, till
the police came to his rescue and took him away in a
police-galley to a place of safety. The following letter
about it is to Sir George Grey, who was then Home
Secretary : — Broadlands : October 1, 18S0.
My dear Grey, — KoUer^ is very reasonable about the
Haynau matter, and I believe that Schwarzenberg makes his
' To Sir Stratford Canning, P. 0., October 11, 1849.
- Austrian ambassador.

170 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.-
move more to satisfy the feehngs of the Austrian army than
from any interest he himself takes about Haynau, who is in
disgrace with the, Austrian Government, and has, beep much
blamed in Austrian society at Vienna for his afrocities.
I told KoUer that it is much better that no prosecution
should take place, because the defence of the accused would
necessarily be a minute recapitulation of all the , barbarities
committed by Haynau in Italy and Hungary, and. that would
be more injurious to him and to Austria than any verdict
obtained against the draymen could be satisfactory.-
I must own that I think Haynau's coming here, without
rhyme or reason, so soon after his Itahan and Hungarian
exploits, was a wanton insult to the people of this country,
whose opinion of him had been so loudly proclaimed at public
meetings and in aU the newspapers. But the draymen were
wrong in the particular course they adopted. Instead of
striking him, which, however, by Roller's account, they did
not do much, they ought to have tossed him m a blanket, rolled
him in the kennel, -and then sent him home in a cab, paying
his fare to the hotel.
Metternich and Neumann strongly ad-vised him, as he
passed through Brussels, not to come to England at present ;
and KoUer tried to persuade him to cut off his long yeUow
moustaches. But he would not shave, and he professed to
think that his presence in England could turn pubhc opinion
in his favour.
I explained to KoUer that the people of this country treat
with respect, and even with kindness, their bitterest pohtical
enemies when duty or necessity brings them here. Buonaparte
received no insult at Plymouth, Soult was received with
enthusiasm, Metternich, Louis Phihppe, and Guizot with
courteous and kind hospitality ; but Haynau was looked upon,
no matter wrongly or rightly, in the same hght as the
Mannings and TaweU, and he ought to have had a couple of
pohcemen to go about with him to protect him from the honest
indignation of the mob. The Austrian Government, however,
think that the proceedings at Barclay's were got up by a Dr.
•Trencke, formerly editor of a Liberal paper at Vienna, now an
exile here, and employed as a clerk in Barclay's estabhshment.
The rivalry between Austria and Prussia for tlie
leadership of Germany was complicating matters in
that country. On the question of the entrance of

PEUSSIA AND SLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 171
Austria into the German confederation, France and
England had initiated an understanding. Both Govern
ments feared the effect that might be produced on the
relations of the Great Powers by the carrying out of
the Austrian plan.
Lord Palmerston had been engaged during the year
in a tedious and vain mediation between Denmark and
Prussia about the interminable Sleswig-Holstein dis
pute. The details of all these events are no longer of
interest ; but the contents of the following letter fore
shadow the events of 1866 : — P. 0. : November 22, 1850.
My dear Cowley, — German affafrs are indeed come to a
state of chaos. The only thing that seems pretty clear is, that
all parties are more or less in the wrong. But Prussia seems
to bear away the palm in this respect. Her course has been,
indeed, dishonest, inconsistent, and irresolute and weak. In
regard to the Sleswig-Holstein question, she has throughout
acted with the greatest duplicity and bad faith ; in regard to
German affairs, her only object from beginnmg to end seems to
have been her own aggrandisement, which, at moments when
much was within her grasp, she had not courage or steadi
ness successfully to pursue. Her partisans try to make out
that the contest between her and Austria is a struggle between
constitutional and arbitrary government; but it is no such
thing, it is only a conflict between the two leading Powers in
Germany as to which should be pohtically preponderant. We
should have had no objection to see Prussia take the first
place; on the contrary, a German Union, embracing all the
smaUer States, with Prussia at its head, and in aUiance with
Austria as a separate Power, would have been a very^ good
European arrangement ; but when the empire was offered to i
Prussia, the King shrank from the hazardous position thus j
proposed to him, and dechned to accept it till he should be
asked to do so by the Sovereigns. That decided the question,
for it was pretty certain that the Sovereigns would never
trouble him with such a request. But the empfre having
been thus negatived, Prussia ought to have taken at once the
only other possible course, and to have come to an agreement
vidth Austria for reconstructing the German confederation on
the principle of the treaty of 1815, with such modifications as
the establishment of parhaments in Prussia and Austria and

172 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
all the other States might render necessary. Instead of this,
Prussia went on pottering about an Erfurth Union, which
never could end in anything but smoke, and then she chose
dehberately to expose herself to the humiliation of being
obliged by mihtary threats to retreat step by step from all the
positions she had taken up in regard to almost all pending
affafrs. All this is lamentable, and is a fresh proof that
honesty is the best pohcy. What Austria means to do remains
to be seen. The Austrians declare that they mean to have a
Parliament of thefr own, and not to put down constitutional
government in any other country. We shall see. In the
meanwhile enormous armies have been put into the field on
both sides just as winter is setting m, and -without any inteUi-
gible question to fight about. The only thing that both sides
ought immediately to do is to send these useless soldiers home
to their stoves and pro-vision stores. In the meanwhile, Russia
on one side and Prance on the other, not-withstanding their
fafr professions, must be inwardly chuckling at seeing Germany
come down in so short a time from Einheit to intense exas
peration and to the brink of civil war.
The Papal aggression and the passing of the
Ecclesiastical Titles Bill was now occupying public
attention. Lord Palmerston expounds his views of the
question to his brother. C. G. : January 27, 1851.
During the month at Christmas that we spent at Broad
lands I broke loose, and, instead of working aU day long in
my north room and only rushing out at sunset, as I did in
September and October, I took a fling, and went out several
days hunting and shooting in the fine of the early day, coming
home, of course, for work earher than if I had been only a
sportsman. Pubhc affairs are going on as well as they can ever at any
time be expected to do. Food has been abundant and cheap, the
labouring classes fuUy employed, and in all respects better off
than they have been for a very long period of time. Poor rates
are greatly reduced, and though formers complain, and rents
have been generally lowered, yet, all things considered, neither
the owners nor the occupiers of land have any great cause
to complain. The cheapness of all things makes up in some
degree for smaU diminutions of income. In Ireland, too,
things are looking better, and rent is not that absolutely

THE PAPAL AGGEESSION. 173
unknown quantity which it has been for some years past. The
revenue has been productive, and we shall have a surplus of
about two miUions. This will not, however, enable us to take
off the income tax, which will expire this year, and which we
must propose the renewal of. This will produce some trouble
some debates, but I have no doubt of its being carried; we
shall be assisted in carrymg it by many who want particular
taxes taken off, which cannot be repealed or modified if the
income tax is not renewed, because in that case, instead of a
surplus to scramble for, there would be a deficit to provide for.
The income tax produces upwards of five milhons.
The Papal aggression question will give us some trouble
and give rise to stormy debates. Our difficulty -will be to find
out a measure which shall satisfy reasonable Protestants,
without violatmg those principles of liberal toleration which
we are pledged to. I thmk we shall succeed. But aU the
newspaper stories of divisions in the Cabinet on this or any
other question are pure inventions, wholly devoid of any foun
dation. The Pope, I hear, and the people about him by whom
at present he is guided, affect to treat hghtly the excitement
which his measures have produced in this country, and they
represent the clamour as a thing got up by the Church — a
parson agitation. They deceive themselves; the feehng is
general and intense all through the nation, and the sensible
Cathohcs themselves lament what has been done.
The thing itself, in truth, is httle or nothing, and does not
justify the irritation. What has goaded the nation is the
manner, insolent and ostentatious, in which it has been done.
The Cathohcs have a right to organise their church as they
hke; and if staff officers caUed Bishops were thought better
than staff officers caUed Vicars Apostohc, nobody would have
remarked or objected to the change if it had been made quietly
and only in the bosom of the Church. But what offended —
and justly — all England was the Pope's published Allocution
and Wiseman's announcement of his new dignities. The first
representing England as a land of benighted heathens ; the
second proclaiming that the Pope had parcelled out England
into districts — a thing that only a Sovereign has a right to do
 and that he, Wiseman, and others were sent, and to be sent,
to govern those territorial districts, with titles belonging
thereto. This could not and would not have been done or
attempted in any other country without the consent of the
Government. The Pope or his advisers pretended at first that they had

174 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the consent of the Enghsh Government, through Minto, in
November, I8i7— three years a.go; but they v/ere soon driven
out of that assertion ; and then Wiseman brought it down to
a mere statement that the intention was made known to Mmto
in 1847, and that he said nothing and made no observation.
Now even this did not take place ; and if it had, in a matter
of such importance, silence cannot be construed into consent.
Moreover, Minto was at Rome upon quite another matter, and
had no instructions on this subject; and if the Pope wanted
the consent of the Enghsh Government, he should have asked
for it ; and not having asked for it or obtained it, he should
not quote it as a justification of his course. He might m the
three years have asked the question ; and there was one oppor
tunity specially of doing so, for in August, when Wiseman was
on the point of setting out for Rome to settle aU these matters,
he wrote to ask an interview with John Russell, and was mth
bim more than half an hour ; that was the time to have ascer
tained from the head of the Government himself what would
be thought of the cut-and-dry measure ; but not a word did
Wiseman say on the matter, and his excuse for his silence now
is that he did not then think the measure hkely to be so im
mediate. But he must have thought it as near as the Pope is
supposed to have thought it in November 1847, when he pre
tends to have spoken to Minto about it (which, however, he
did not) ; and so far from Wiseman not supposing the measure
to be near, we know fuU weU that the Pope's excuse, as put
forward, is that Wiseman pressed the measure upon him, said
he knew England and the Enghsh people, and would be
answerable that it would go off smoothly.
We must bring m a measure ; the country would not be
satisfied without some legislative enactment. We shall make
it as gentle as possible. The violent Protestant party wiU
object to it for its mildness, and will endeavour to drive us
further. The Pope might help us to resist that pressure if he
would do certain things that would allay pubhc feelmg. For
instance, if he would disclaim any pretension to govern by his
bishops any but the Cathohcs in the districts to which those,
bishops are appointed. It sounds almost childish to suggest
such a truism; but many people, forgettmg that he can no
more claim jurisdiction or authority over Protestants than over
the winds and waves or the tides of the ocean, and looking to
the words of the Allocution and of Wiseman's announcements,
imagine that he does, and some pubhc disclaimer would be
useful. Again, offence has been taken at the territorial titles.

POSITION OF CAEDINAL WISEMAN. 175
These are unnecessary. Instead of appomting an Archbishop
of Westminster, and Bishops of this or that place, the Pope
might have appointed Archbishops and Bishops for the gover
nance of the Roman Cathohcs (the word Roman is essential) in
Middlesex, Hertfordshire, &c., as the case might be, thefr epis
copal locality for titles contiaumg to be places in partibus infi-
delium. These two measures, if adopted by the Pope, would
go far to allay the storm and restore harmony between Protes
tant and Catholic. But what would complete the calm would
be his writing to Wiseman to say that he would not go on
without his personal advice at Rome. The departure of the
Cardinal would be the pledge of restored peace. If you should
have an opportunity by chance of meeting the nuncio, you
might throw out these suggestions ; not as demands made by
the Enghsh Government ; not as a commission given you from
hence to be executed, but as what you know to be, and what
you know in consequence of communications made to you from
hence ; and you may say that what you tell him is quite pri
vate and confidential, to be made known by him to his Court
or not, as he may think best, but that you throw out the sug
gestion in the most friendly spirit, and that you know that the
British Government are most desfrous of maintaining for the
Roman Catholics in the Queen's dominions all the freedom and
civil and political rights which existmg laws have conferred
upon them.
Lord Palmerston was always very earnest in his view
of the necessity for England being strong in her home
defences on land as well as by sea. Sir John Burgoyne
had, in May 1850, written a Memorandum which called
attention to our deficiencies in this respect. Lord
Palmerston sends it to the Premier with the following
observations : —
I send you, to keep and ponder over at your leisure, a copy
of a Memorandum on our want of national defence, drawn up
by Sfr John Burgoyne, and lent to me some months ago by
Lord Anglesey. It is worth reading, though it is only a repe
tition of the opinions entertamed and expressed by all men who
know what war is, either by sea or by land. But I am well
aware that it is ahnost as difficult to persuade the people of this
country to provide themselves with the means of defence as it
would be for them to defend themselves without those means.

176 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and that although our internal condition may still be the ' en-vy
of surrounding nations,' yet we have neither
' Hearts resolved nor hands prepared,
The blessings we enjoy to guard.'
He also writes to Sir Charles Wood, then Chancellor
of the Exchequer, about fortifications : —
C. G. : January 22, 1851.
My dear Wood, — I am glad to hear that you mean to take
£8,000 for going on with the fortifications at Pembroke, in
addition to what is to be taken for the detached outworks at
Portsmouth ; but could you not take a sum, however small, to
make a beginnmg, for similar defences at Plymouth? Bur
goyne will tell you that Plymouth Dockyard is, if possible, stUl
more exposed than the Portsmouth yard to be destroyed by
sheUs from a small force landed in its neighbourhood. If 8,000
or 10,000 men were landed at Whitesand Bay, or anywhere
thereabouts, they might estabhsh mortar batteries on shore
opposite Plymouth yard without, I beheve, being under fire
from any existing work. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Cherbourg,
Brest, and Toulon bristle with guns, and are secure against any
attack by sea or land. Our yards, full of valuable materials,
and containing the elements of our naval defence, are now
indeed pretty safe from any attack by sea, but still at the
mercy of an enemy on the land. The French proverb says,
' C'est I'occasion qui fait le larron ; ' and the anore the French
shaU see that our most important points are safe against a sur
prise, the greater will be our chances of continued peace. A
session of Parliament is always fuU of unforeseen and unfore
seeable accidents ; ' and it would be a good thing, in the event
of our official life being unexpectedly cut short, that we should
leave behind us indisputable proofs that we had made at least
beginnings for the full protection of aU our great dockyards.
C. G. : January 24, 1851.
As to Head's ' book, I own I thmk it contains matter
deserving of the most serious consideration of every English
man, and more especially of all those who are charged with the
destinies of the country. I mean those parts of his book which
detail the aggressive means of Powers who may become hostUe,
and the slenderness of our own means of defence, together with
the ruinous effects of even the temporary occupation of the
,' Sir Francis Head.

UEGES NECESSITY OF LAND DEFENCES. 177
country by a foreign army. As to his remedy, the amount of
standing army which he proposes is not to be attained ; but I
hold that no Government wUl have done its full duty to the
country which has not organised some dormant but partially
trained force, of the nature of a mUitia or landwehr, which
could be called out under arms in a fortnight or three weeks to
the aggregate number of one hundred thousand in the two
islands upon the first breakmg out of a war. Every other
country that deserves to be caUed a Power has this kind of
reserve force — France, Austria, Prussia, the United States.
Russia has it not, but merely because she keeps up a war estab
lishment in time of peace; though she, too, has in time of
peace part of her regular army on furlough. England alone,
with a peace establishment inadequate for the defence of the
country against invasion, has no means of increasing her defen
sive garrison on the outbreak of a war except by the tardy
process of voluntary enhstment into the line, or the equally
slow operation of passmg a Bill to repeal the Act suspending
the ballot, going through the tedious and comphcated operation
of a baUot, of assembling, clothmg, arming, officering, and
training an army of men who never handled a musket or fixed
a bayonet. Then we are told that in a moment of crisis the
nation would rise like one man — a mere bitterly sarcastic
truism ; for a nation armed, as the Enghsh -would be, with
broomsticks and pitchforks, would be agamst a disciplined army
about as formidable as one man would be.
On May 1 the Great Exhibition of all Nations was
opened in Hyde Park. Lord Palmerston went to the
ceremony, and gives an account of the scene. England
was still full of refugees, cast upon her shores by con
tinental revolutions, and their presence had inspired
those who were responsible for the maintenance of order
with some anxiety. C. G. : May 2, 1851.
My dear Normanby, — Many thanks for your friendly good
offices about ' La Patrie.' Such articles, however mtrinsically
sUly, ought certainly not to appear in newspapers known to be
in partial communication with the Government; but Leon
Faucher has, I know, always had a dislike to me, or at least to
my particular domgs ; and as to Guizot, I make allowances for
and forgive the rancour of his feelings toward me. Winners
can not oidy laugh, but pardon.
TOL. II, "^^

178 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
But yesterday is the topic of thought and of word with
everybody in London. It was indeed a glorious day for
England ; arid the way in which the royal ceremony went off
was calculated to mspfre humUity into the minds of the repre
sentatives of foreign Governments and to strike despafr into the
breasts of those, if any such there be, who may desire to excite
confusion m this country. There must have been nearer a
milfion than any other number of people who turned out to
post themselves as they could to see some part of the show ;
and Mayne, the head of the pohce, told me he thought there
were about thfrty-four thousand in the glass buUding. The
Queen, her husband, her eldest son and daughter, gave them
selves m full confidence to this multitude, with no other guard
than one of honour and the accustomed supply of stick-handed
constables, to assist the crowd in keepmg order among them
selves. Of course there were in reserve, m proper stations,
ample means of repressfrg any disorder if any had heei^
attempted ; but nothing was brought out and shown beyond
what I have mentioned ; and it was impossible for the invited
guests of a lady's dra-wing-room to have conducted themselves
with more perfect propriety than did this sea of human beings. .
The royal party were received with continued acclamation
as they passed through the parks and round the Exhibition
House ; and it was also very mteresting to witness the cordial
greeting given to the Duke of WeUington. I was just behind
him and Anglesey, within two of them, during the procession
round the building, and he was accompanied by an mcessant
running fire of applause from the men and wavmg of handker
chiefs and kissing of hands from the women, who lined the
pathway of march during the three-quarters of an hour that it
took us to march round.
The buUding itseh is- far more worth seemg than anything
in it, though many of its contents are worthy of admiration.
Yo-u ought to contrive to run over to take a look at it before
its final close.
Though this first day of the campaign has passed off so well,
of course we shall have to keep a watchful eye during the whole
four months upon those who inight be disposed to take advan
tage, for purposes of mischief, of the congregation of foreigners
in London ; but with the means we have of makmg such people
pay dearly for any such attempt, I do not entertain any appre
hension as to the result of any schemes they may plan.
The Ministry had been in rather a tottering con-

EESIGNATION AND EECALL OF THE MINISTEY, 179
dition for the last twelvemonth. Lord Palmerston's
triumph on the Greek debate had acted as a decided
tonic, but stiU its health was feeble. On February 3 3,
it had a majority of only eleven against a Protectionist
motion of Mr. Disraeli's ; and a week later it was
defeated on a motion for the extension of the county
franchise. Accordingly, on February 22, Lord John
Eussell resigned. Lord Stanley tried in vain to form
a Ministry. Lord John in vain tried to form a
coalition with the Peelites ; so it ended in the Whig
Ministry coming back just as it was before, though.
only to survive for one more year — the usual fate of
Cabinets which come back after a defeat. Lord Palmer
ston says to his brother : — C. G. . April 3, 1851.
AU things, pohtically, are looking tolerably weU, and I
tliink we may reckon ourselves pretty secure of remaining in
office till next year. It would be ridiculous for us to resign
now, after the failures to form another Government, imless
the House of Commons were to pass a vote of censure or a
resolution of no confidence, and that they are not hkely to do.
We may have some changes forced upon us in our financial
arrangements for the Budget ; but that -wiU not much signify^.
I see the Roman papers exulted greatly at our fall ; they will
have learnt soon afterwards the melancholy news of our re
storation. Gladstone and Molesworth are full of the abominable
tjrranny exercised by the Neapohtan and Roman Governments.
Gladstone says the Neapohtan is a Governo infernale, and that,
as a gentleman and a Christian, he feels it his duty to make
known what he has seen of its proceedings. Both of them say
that they were wrong last year in their attacks on my foreign
policy ; but they did not know the truth. This is satisfactory
as far as I am concerned, though very unsatisfactory as regards
the state of Italy.
Our Papal Aggression BiU will be carried in spite of the
opposition of the Irish members, who are driven on by the
influence of the priests over the Irish electors. But the feehng
in England against the Cathohcs is deep, strong, and general,
and what the Pope and his priests have lately done has
materially injured the Cathohc cause. AU these exposures,
N 2

ISO LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
moreover, about Miss Talbot and Mr. Carre have tended to
throw great discredit on the Catholic priesthood.'
I went one day to hear Gavazzi's harangue against the
abuses of the Cathohc Church. He spoke in Itahan for an,
hour and a half to several hundred hearers, with much eloquence.
and effect.
Soon after this, two letters, addressed to Lord
Aberdeen by Mr. Gladstone on the subject of the State
prosecutions and the State prisons of the Neapolitan
Government, were published in the form of a pamphlet.
The effect produced by these letters was very great.
The high character and position of the author gave
authority to his narrative of facts, attested as they
were by personal observation. He asserted that vast
numbers of innocent and untried men were confined in
the prisons of Naples for alleged political offences under
circumstances of great barbarity. Lord Palmerston, in
the House of Commons, paid an emphatic tribute to
the course taken by Mr. Gladstone. He added that,
concurring with the author of these letters that the
influence of public opinion in Europe might have some
effect in setting such matters right, he had sent copies
of the publication to the British Ministers at the various
Courts of Europe, directing them to give copies to each
Government. When the Neapolitan envoy in London saw the
account of what Lord Palmerston had said in the
House about the Gladstone letters, he wrote forwarding
a pamphlet which had been written to order by a Mr.
Macfarlane, in reply to Mr. Gladstone, and requested
Lord Palmerston to send it round also to the several
' ' The feeling is more political than religious. The people of this
country bear with great composure mere differences in religious
opinions. They are too much accustomed to such differences among
Protestants themselves to look with any hatred on such differences
when exhibited between Protestants and Catholics ; but the English
nation are deeply impressed with the feeling that Catholic, ascendancy
and civil and political freedom are incompatible. The history of their
country teaches them that opinion, and it is that chord which has been
made to vibrate from one end of the land to the other.' — Lord Palmer-
ston to Mr. Shiel, April 3, 1851.

GLADSTONE'S CHAEGES AGAINST NAPLES. 181
European Courts. Lord Palmerston declined being
accessory to giving circulation to a document which he
characterised as ' only a tissue of bare assertion and
reckless denial, mixed up with coarse ribaldry and
¦commonplace abuse of public men and political parties.'
He then added, that as Prince Castelcicala had ad
dressed him on the subject, he felt compelled to say
that —
Mr. Gladstone's letters to Lord Aberdeen present an afflict
ing picture of a system of iUegahty, mjustice, and cruelty,
practised by the officers and agents of the Government in the
kingdom of Naples, such as might have been hoped would not
have existed in any European country at the present day ; and
the information which has been received upon these matters
from many other sources leads, unfortunately, to the conclusion
that Mr. Gladstone by no means overstated the various evils
which he describes. But Mr. Gladstone's letters were evidently
written and pubhshed not, as the pamphlet which you have sent
me insinuates, in a spfrit of hostility to the King of Naples, or
with feehngs adverse to the parliamentary and monarchical
constitution which his Sicihan Majesty has granted to his sub
jects, and has confirmed by his royal oath. Mr. Gladstone's
object seems, on the contrary, to have been the friendly purpose
of drawing public attention to, and of dhectmg the force of
pubhc opinion upon, abuses which, if allowed to continue,
must necessarily sap the foundations of the Neapolitan
monarchy, and prepare the way for those violent revulsions
which the resentments produced by a deep sense of long-con
tinued and wide-spread injustice are sure sooner or later to
produce. It might have been hoped that the Neapohtan
Government would have received those letters in the spirit in
which they manifestly were written, and would have set to
work earnestly and effectually to' correct those manifold and
grave abuses to which thefr attention has thus been drawn. It
is obvious that, by such a course, the Neapohtan Government
would do more to frustrate the designs of revolutionists, and to
strengthen the monarchical institutions of thefr country, than
could be effected by the most vigorous proceedings of the most
vigilant Minister of Police.
While he thus addressed the Neapolitan Minister,
he wrote as follows to his brother : —

182 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Broadlands ; September 7, 1851.
Your account of the effect produced by Gladstone's pairiphlet
is highly interesting and curious. The Neapohtan Government
wUl not have been much pleased and edified by my answer to
Castelcicala about Macfarlane's pamphlet, nor would they he
much gratified if they were to receive a collection of aU the
articles which have appeared on this subject in the various
newspapers in England and in Germany.
I still hope that the discussion may do some good and excite
some shame in thefr mmds ; one might ahnost hope it would
work some change in their conduct.
The Prench, as you say, defend as well as they can the
Neapohtan Government ; but they every now and then let out
thmgs which undermine thefr defence. Walewski told Milnes
the other day, as a proof of the goodness of heart of the King
of Naples, that at his, Walewski's, request the Kmg had at
one time promised to set free three hundred prisoners against
whom no charge or no proof had been established. ' How
grateful [said Milnes] these men must have been; did they
not come to thank you for thefr release ? ' ' Why [said Wa
lewski], you see, after the King had made the promiscj'the
chief of the pohce came to him and said that if the men were
set free, he could not answer for the King's life ; and so you
see the men were not set free.'
I sent you a copy of my answer to Castelcicala to be given to
the Neapohtan Government, because I thought that my friend
the Prince would probably not send them exactly a correct copy,
but would probably leave out the words about the King's oath.
This ' answer to Castelcicala ' was kept back from
the King by his Ministers. Lord Holland, writing from
Naples, about two months afterwards, says : — •
The Ministers keep back from the King any despatches that
are disagreeable. He had only heard of your answer to Castel
cicala, but had never seen it till last Wednesday. It had only
been described to him as ' une della solite impertinenze di Lord
Palmerston' — one of his usual impertinences ! Sabatelli read
it to him ; it made a deep impression on him, and he said that
it was a most important and ' bien redige ' document.
To his brother, still British Minister at Naples, he
again writes about Neapolitan affairs.
' Lord Holland to Lord Palmerston, October 13, 1851.

EECEPTION OF KOSSUTH. 183
Brocket: ITovember 6, 1851.
What a picture you give of the state of things in Naples !
Can. such a condition of things last ? But the Prench — at least
the society of Paris — are all for the Neapolitan Government,
but only out of general spite and hatred to us ; and a cousin of
Gladstone's was blackballed the other day at a club in Paris
because he bore the same name as the writer of the letters to
Aberdeen. As to Castelcicala's recall, I am neither glad nor sorry. He
is a vulgar, coarse-mannered man ; but I do not suspect him of
political intrigue beyond a certain average amount, and he gave
me no trouble. As, to Oasini, we shall probably be able to
keep him in order ; and I believe it is rather useful than not
that ultra Tories of other countries should be sent here ; it
generally has the effect of somewhat modifying thefr violence.
Kossuth's reception must have been gall and wormwood to
the. Austrians and to the Absolutists generally. His reception
would probably have been much better if he had not published
or written that absurdly violent production at MarseUles. But
it has been remarked that at none of the meetings which have
been held to greet him have any gentlemen appeared except
Dudley Stuart, and, on one occasion, John Abel Smith. He is
going to the United States on the 14th; and I beheve that,
after remaining there some little time, he intends to return here.
But perhaps he may stay there longer than he now proposes to
do, for his avowed Republican theories of government will find
more sympathy there than here.
We have unpleasant accounts from the Cape ; but these are
only small and partial checks, and Sfr Henry Smith, when he
wrote last, said that as soon as the reinforcements then on thefr
way should have reached him, he should be quite able to deal
with the Caffres, and he would get a battalion more than he
expected. StUl, however, this war costs us some valuable hves,
and wUl absorb a large part of oiu- surplus revenue.
I do not see any rock ahead which is likely to wreck the
Government ; we shall have some difficulty, perhaps, about the
extension of sufirage next session, but I understand, privately,
that Lord Derby &ids himself so liable to repeated attacks of
gout, that he begins to be less desfrous than he used to be to
become Prime Minister. Perhaps also the possession of a large
estate gives him as much employment as he wants, and he may
think it enough to be able to make flashy speeches now and then
in the House of Lords.

184 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
I fear that Panizzi will not have been able, even -with the
assistance of Aumale, to persuade the King of Naples to change
his systein towards his wretched subjects. ReaUy, such sove
reigns as those who rule over Naples and Greece are enough to
make men Repubhcans.'
The Ionian Islands had recently received a new and
more liberal constitution. With the enlarged oppor
tunities for agitation thereby acquired the Ionian Par
liament had become unmanageable, and attempted to
pass a resolution in favour of annexation to Greece. Sir
Henry Ward, the British Commissioner, had much
trouble in keeping matters quiet. Lord Palmerston
corresponds with him on the subject, and favours the
retention of Corfu, whatever might be done with the
other islands. He naturaUy saw that it would be useless
to hand over Corfu to any great Power that \yas not a
great maritime Power. Hence, when on one occasion
the question was raised of giving it to Austria, he sum
marised his opinion by saying, ' To give Corfu to Austria
would be like entrusting a duckling to a respectable old
hen.' Broadlands : December 26, 1850.
My dear Ward, — I have received yours of the 13th, with
the copy of the resolution for union -with Greece. If we wished
reaUy to punish the lonians, we should grant this request and
hand them over to the constitutional Government of King
Otho. But this would be too severe a chastisement upon a
nation for the sins of a few. There is, as you probably weU
know, a foohsh and pedantic notion among some of the clerks
in the Colonial Office that it would be better to get rid (as they
term it) of the Ionian Islands. This notion was, I beheve, first
taken up by Stephen,^ an excellent and very learned, but ex-
ceedmgly wrong-headed, man. My opinion is very different.
I consider Corfu as a very important position for Mediterranean
interests, in the event of a war, and I hold that it would be a
great act of folly for us to give it up. It could not be kept
permanently by any Power that was not strong at sea, and it
' This reminds one of Madame de Coigny, who, when asked by the
Prince of Wales (afterwards George IV.), ' Pourquoi done Stes-vous si
dfimocrate ? ' replied, ' Mais o'est que j'ai vficu tant avec des princes.'
' Sir James Stephen,

DISAFFECTION IN THE IONIAN ISLANDS. 185
would therefore, sooner or later, fall into the hands of Russia
or Prance, to neither of- which it could belong without much
damage to us.
And, a little later on, to the same :—
F. O. : February 18, 1851.
You will have no visit from a Russian fleet this year. We
are on the best possible terms with Russia, and she will do
nothing openly to disoblige us. I should even doubt her being
the instigator of the disturbances which give you trouble, though
it would be quite in keeping with her standing policy to have
fomented them by money and intrigues. But just at the present
time I thmk Austria is more likely to have done us an. ill turn.
Schwarzenberg and the Vienna Camarilla, Archduchess So
phia, and others, hate us with the bitterest hatred for the part
which the English Government, Parhament, and people have
taken during the last three years about Italy, Hungary, and
Germany, and these worthies would be glad to revenge them
selves for our sympathy in favour of thefr insurgents, by creat
ing insurrection anywhere and anyhow against British authority;
and though the Austrian Government is nearly bankrupt, yet,
like other spendthrifts, it can always bring out money for its
menus plaisirs.
About the plots which were going on, he says to the
High Commissioner : — C. G. : November 19, 1851.
These conspirators may be confident — as all conspirators are
apt to be — that the day of thefr triumph is approaching ; so say
the French Red Repubhcans in England; but those days of
triumph will recede as time advances, just as the mirage of the
desert retires before the slow march of the caravan. It is well,
however, to be on our guard, for it is only over-confidence and
apathy in governors than can give such ragamuffins a chance of
success. I am amused at the notion that I am to be accused of
having excited and paid for the recently attempted inroad upon
the Ionian Islands. I remember to have heard that, in former
times at Cambridge, it was the fashion for the young men to
mob each other's rooms, that is, to turn everything topsy-turvy;
and one foolish fellow got drunk and mobbed his own rooms,
not bemg able to get at a friend's. I am still, however, sober
enough not to play such pranks with our own house. I daresay
the Greek Government is very angiy with me for having shown

186 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
them up about robbery to all the Govemments of Europe, and
no doubt they have had admonitions ' even from those Govern
ments which pretended to us that they would not and could not
meddle in the matter. The more angry they feel, however, the
more hkely it is that they will bestfr themselves to improve
matters ; still, I fear that as long as Otho sits like an incubus
on the Greek throne, no Greek progress wUl be made in that
career of improvement which the Greek nation is destined ulti
mately to run.
For my part, I should not object to an arrangement by
which Corfu should be annexed to the British Empfre and the
other islands added to Greece. Corfu is an important mihtary
and naval post, and ought never to be abandoned by us ; the
other islands might go to Greece -without inconvenience, I
should think, to us, though at present such a transfer would he
attended -with much inconvenience to them. No such arrange
ment, however, could be made without the formal concurrence
of all the Powers who were parties to the Treaty of Vienna, by
which the Seven Island State was placed under our protection ;
and it is not very hkely that France, Austria, and Russia
would consent to give us Corfu ; and perhaps Russia would not
fancy any addition to the Greek State, though she may hke to
keep up a disturbmg agitation in the Ionian Islands. AU this,
however, is a speculation in the clouds ; but whenever you write
to me again, let me know what you think of it.
Lord Palmerston, however, modified his views later
on, and, in 1862, cordially agreed to hand over all the
Ionian Islands to the new kingdom of Greece if the
Greeks would choose a king approved of by England,
which they accordingly did. The neutrality of the
islands was, however,to be declared by the Great Powers,
and the fortifications of Corfu demolished, both of which
conditions were observed.
Meanwhile things in France were hurrying to a
crisis : Lord Palmerston watching the game, and not
concealing his preference for the cause of the President.
C. G. : November 20, 1851.
My dear Normanby, — Yom- accounts of what is passmg in
Paris are very full and satisfactory as convejdng aU details.
Satisfactory as to detaUs which they announce is another thing.
But it seems to me that Louis Napoleon is master of the field

HIS LEANING TOWAEDS LOUIS NAPOLEON. 187
of battle, and will carry the day. I have always thought that
such a result would be the best thing both for France and for
England. There is no other person at present competent to be at
the head of affafrs in France ; and if Louis Napoleon should end by
founding a dynasty, I do not see that we need regret it, as far
as Enghsh interests are concerned. The family of Bourbon
have always been most hostile to England, and those members
of that famUy who have owed us the greatest personal and poli
tical obligations have, perhaps, in thefr hearts hated us the
most. What should we gain by substituting Henry V. or the
Orleans famUy for the race of Buonaparte ? At all events, I
say of Louis Napoleon laudo manentem. If he should fall, we
should of course endeavour to be on equally good terms with
those who, after him, might be the official organs of the French
nation ; but we have no wish to see him fall. If success is any
test of measures, he has not as yet played his cards iU ; and
some of the thmgs which he has done, and which have been repre
sented as mistakes, have perhaps contributed to his success. Je
marche, suivez-moi was certainly a good declaration, and showed
that he knew the faintness of heart of those who were trying to
overthrow him. If the Bourgraves would fafrly say they want
to re-establish a monarchy, one might -wish them success ; but
they do not seem to be ready for that, and yet they want to
overthrow that which, in the present state of affiifrs, seems the
next best thing to a monarchy, and the only thing calculated to
give any chance of order.
During the session of 1861 Mr. Cobden renewed his
motion, having for its object a pacific understanding
among nations, by a mutual reduction of armaments.
Lord Palmerston took occasion in this debate to vindi
cate himself from the charge of being a promoter of war
and an enemy to peace.
He said that, however little he might think the
method by which Mr. Cobden endeavoured to give effect
to his principles the best calculated to attain the end he
proposed, he subscribed implicitly to the general ten
dency of his views. He first, however, claimed some
credit for the results of his own policy.
I trust the part it has been my lot to take in administering
one department of the affairs of this country has shown that
there has been nothing in my conduct in any degree inconsistent

188 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
with the opinions I am now professing ; for however much it
may be the fashion with some persons, in that easy, colloquial,
jaunty style in which they dismiss pubhc matters, to declaim
against modern diplomatic and international intermeddling,
yet at least I can appeal to facts. I can appeal to the fact that
during the considerable period for which I have been responsible
for the conduct of the foreign relations of this country, though
events have happened in Europe of the most remarkable kmd,
and attended with great commotions of pubhc feehng, and great
agitation in the social and pohtical system of the Continent —
although during that period events have happened which have
brought the interests of England, I wiU not say mto conflict,
but into opposition to the mterests of other great and powerful
nations, yet, at least, the fact is that we have been at peace;
and that not only has peace been preserved between that
country and other nations, but there has been no mtemational
war of magnitude between any of the other great Powers of
Europe. If, then, on the one hand, we are taunted with per
petually interfering and meddhng in the relations of other
countries, we ought at least, on the other hand, to have the
credit of the fact that that interference and mtermeddling have
been accompanied by the contmuance of peace. It is too bad
that we should be accused, on the one hand, of interfering con
stantly in the transactions cf other countries, and at the same
time that we should be denied the credit of those results which
accompanied that course of policy.
But now a cloud, no bigger at first than a man's
hand, was growing on the horizon ; but, small as it was,
it was fated to burst eventually into the Crimean War.
So fully recorded are all the details of the dispute, of
which Lord Palmerston notes the commencement in the
foUowing letter, that they need not be repeated here ;
but it may be well just to recall their outline. France
had in 1740 obtained from the Sultan 'capitulations'
securing to the Latin Church in Palestine certain privi
leges in connection with the Holy Shrine. Since that
date the Greeks, supported by Eussia, had obtained
firmans granting them advantages in derogation of
the Latin capitulations. These firmans had been long
acquiesced in. Suddenly, for no apparent cause, the
French ambassador at Constantinople, M. de Lavallette,

THE DAWN OF THE CEIMEAN WAE. 189
was instructed to demand that the grants to the Latin
Church should be strictly executed. This was impossible,
without annuUing some of the privileges of the Greek
Church, nine illw lachrymcB ! — Which of the two sets
of monks at Jerusalem should have the keys of certain
doors; and whether the Latins might have a cupboard
and a lamp in the tomb of the Virgin ! Such were the
questions which convulsed diplomacy on the Bosphorus,
and, in the opinion of the French ambassador, justified
his threats of force. It is thus clear that the first step
was taken by France.
Lord Palmerston tries a little oil for the troubled
waters : — C. G. : November 25, 1851.
My dear Normanby, — I was in hopes, from the manner in
which Walewski had spoken of this Church question between
the French and Russians in Turkey, that the French Govern
ment took a quieter view of it than seems to be the case.
Walewski agreed -with me that le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle,
and that it would be very unwise for France in the present
critical and unsettled state of affairs all over Europe to get
into a quarrel with Russia and Turkey about a matter in itself
of such very trifling importance ; and he quite admitted that
Lavallette had gone much too far, and he seemed to agree vrith
me that this is a discussion which might prudently be adjourned,
and be allowed, in the Turkish fashion, to sleep tUl a fitter
season. As to the merits of tlie case, I am not able to state or
form an opinion, for Stratford Canning has kept studiously
aloof from the discussion, and has only from time to time
explained the general outhne of the points at issue. But the
broad way in which you put it to the President is the just way
to look at it. Here are a few Catholics in Turkey, and many
milhons of Greeks ; here is a colossal power close on the Sultan's
back, and here is Prance a long way off; here are fourteen or
fifteen Christian churches m Asia Minor, of which the greater
number are in the possession of Greek Christians and the
smaller number in the hands of the Catholics ; and the French
Government insists that the Sultan shall, by making a half-and-
half distribution of these holy places between Greeks and
Cathohcs, give a division unequal as with reference to the
relative numbers of the two Christian communities, disgust a
large body of his own subjects, and offend a powerful neighbour

190 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
who can plague and annoy him in a hundred ways and places
beyond the reach of France to protect him. This seems an
unreasonable course to pursue, unless reaUy the object in view
were of essential national importance ; but if T mistake not,
there can be but very few Frenchmen locally interested in this
matter ; the few who are in the Levant must be chiefly monks
in some convents — men who have abandoned thefr own country
and never think of returning to it. The real object which the
President has in view must of course be to get favour with the
Catholic clergy in France; but he should seriously consider
whether he is not paying too dear for that addition of favom-
from them by engagmg France in a great, quarrel about so
small a thing. But suppose he goes on and sends a fieet to the
DardaneUes, what is that fleet to do 1 It must either blockade
the Dardanelles or force them and make its way up to Con
stantinople, m order to give the law at the cannon's mouth at
the Seragho point. Now a blockade of the DardaneUes is, of
course, a very easily accomphshed thmg. The French fleet
would take up its position within the outer castles in Barber's
Bay, where Parker anchored, and it could there effectuaUy
prevent any vessel from going up or coming down. But the
maritime trade up and down those straits communicating with
the Danube, with Odessa, with Taganrog, and with Trebizond
is a matter of most important interest to many nations of
Europe, and especially to us English ; and an interruption of
that trade, without any real and adequate necessity, would
raise an immense outcry agamst France aU over Europe and
even in America, for it must be borne in mind that such a
blockade would differ essentiaUy from blockades in general.
In ordinary cases, when you blockade a port, you blockade that
port, and that port or country only ; but here the blockade
would apply, not merely to Constantinople and Turkey in Asia,
but to the southern ports of Russia and to the Danube-bordering
countries ; and if the French should find themselves obhged —
as probably in point of justice and international right they
would be — ^to let the Russian flag pass and repass, then the
blockade of the Turkish ports would of course be reduced
to a nullity. But, supposmg they were to try to force the
Dardanelles, that would be an operation not to be performed
without much loss if attempted by ships alone. The batteries
have been greatly strengthened of late years, and the wind and
current downward to the Mediterranean generally expose ships
going upwards to long-continued fire from the land batteries.

THE EMPEEOES NICHOLAS AND NAPOLEON. 191
They might send also a land force to disembark and take the
batteries, but that would make the operation one of time.
In the meanwhUe the Russians would not be idle, and
somehow or other they would probably contrive to send succour
to the Sultan ; and if it should so happen that, by reason of
any of these obsitacles and resistances the attempt should fail,
the French Government would have lost caste in Europe and
would have made itself ridiculous ; and, moreover, the French
Government would have done more than Russia unaided could
do in half a century to coimteract and upset the pohcy which
England and France have hitherto pursued in regard to Turkey
—a pohcy the great object of which has been to foster the
independence of Turkey and to get her out of the hands and
influence of the Russian Government.
He then proceeded to offer the mediation of Eng
land to compose the quarrel — not as a partisan of either
side, but as a sincere well-wisher to all three powers,
and as an earnest promoter of peace on earth. But a
few days later he finds that Eussia was not in a humour
for ' good offices.' '
I see, by despatches lately received from Stratford Canning,
that the question about the churches m the Levant is stiU under
discussion and consideration at Constantinople, and that there
could be no pretence at present for any violent proceeding on
the part of France. But from a httle conversation I have had
on the subject with Brunnow, I am inclined to think that
Kussia would not be disposed to accept our good offices if they
were tendered. The Turkish Government, Canning says, seems
rather to lean to the side of France. But reaUy and truly this
is a quarrel fitter for times long gone by than for the days in
which we hve.
Allthough after the coup d'etat at Paris the French
pressure was violently renewed, in the meanwhile, on
the eve of the blow and in the uncertainty of its result,
the Turk was left free to act for himself by the tem
porary removal of the instrument of coercion.
C. G. : December 1, 1851.
My dear Canning, — Lavallette may represent his gomg away
on leave of absence as a mark of the displeasure of the French
' To Lord Normanby, November 28.

192 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Government at the conduct of the Porte on the question about
the holy buildings, but I happen to know that he has had leave
of absence sent him because the Prench Government thought
he had gone too far, and they considered his temporary absence
on leave as likely to be the best way of letting the question
drop down into its proper proportions. Say nothing about this
unless you find Reshid frightened, and then you may whisper
it gently and secretly into his ear.
But oflGLcial mediation, though it may frequently
succeed in modifying public demands and poUtical
objects, cannot equally infiuence personal aims and
ambitions. After the crisis at Paris an Emperor in
France confronted an Emperor in Eussia. The first
had to vindicate his newly-won position in the eyes of
Europe and of his own country. The second had a
long score of checks to wipe out, which to his violent
temperament had been most galling. It was not likely
that under such circumstances the questions at issue
would be allowed to drop. Before, however, they had
ripened into a war in which England was involved.
Lord Palmerston, as we shall now see, had been driven
from the direction of our external affairs.

FIEST DIFFEEENCE WITH LOED J. EUSSELL. 193

CHAPTEE VIL
REMOVAL PROM THE GOVERNMENT — EXPLANATIONS IN THE HOUSE
OF COMMONS.
Cassio, I love thee.
But never more be officer of imne— Othello, Act. II. So. 3.
We now arrive at a critical period in the lives of two
•of the most eminent statesmen of their day. Lord John
Eussell, from the traditional recollections of his family,
from the course of his own studies, and from the ten
dency of his own opinions, was the statesman whom the
Liberal party of his own time most trusted in domestic
affafrs. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, from
long experience, decided character, and enlarged views,
¦enjoyed the confidence of the same party in foreign
affairs. Both statesmen were said to have their faults ; and
now and then a portion of their general followers broke
off from one or from the other. But, on the whole,
taking each in his own specialty, there were no men in
the country to match them ; alid they had hitherto,
though not always agreeing, stood firmly together.
Hut circumstances had of late tended to dissolve this
union. Lord John Eussell, not only as Prime Minister,
but as leader of the Liberal party, felt himself to be
invested not only with great authority, but great re
sponsibility, and was not unfrequently reproached by
some of his colleagues, who, without considering our
foreign policy in its general aspect, were prone to criti
cise its details, for allowing the Foreign Office too much
'¦ To Lord Normanby, November 28.
VOL. II. O

194 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
independence. On the other hand. Lord Palmerston,,
who had acquired a complete mastery over the business
of his department, who always acted on a thorough con
viction that his views were undeniably right, and who
refrained from any interference in the internal policy of
the country, was disposed to think that very great lati
tude within the sphere of his own attributes should be
allowed to him. His notion was that a Foreign Minister
ought to be strictly bound to pursue the policy of the
Cabinet he belonged to, but that he ought to be left
free to follow out that policy in the ordinary details of
his office, without having every despatch he wrote sub
mitted to criticism and comment. There is this, more
over, to be said, that whereas in home affairs nothing
important is done without the decision of a Cabinet,
and the leader in Parliament has only to explain the
resolutions of the Cabinet, in foreign affairs a Minister
is caUed upon every day of the week and at any time to
write and speak to foreign Governments, or their re
presentatives, on current business. If he could not do
this with a certain degree of promptitude and freedom,
he would lose all weight and influence with his own
agents and with the agents of other Powers.
If, then, there is to be a Minister of Foreign Affairs.
fit for his post, he must have the thorough confidence
of the Premier, and act as if he had it.
Lord Palmerston especiaUy required this ; first,
because he held an important post in a Whig Cabinet,
not being a Whig ; and, second, because his policy —
that of constantly maintaining the dignity, power, and
prestige of England unimpaired — was not only one of
constant attention, but, necessarily, of constant action.
Nor was this all : Lord Palmerston had not merely
to satisfy Lord John Eussell, he had also to satisfy the
Sovereign under whom Lord John held his appointment.
Foreign policy is that policy in which Sovereigns, who
are thus brought into competition with their equals, .
take the most interest. The Prince Consort, with whom
Her Majesty lived on such terms of confidence as ren-

INTEEFEEENCE OF THE COUET. 195
dered her application to him on questions of importance
a matter of course, was not only a Prince of considerable
ability, but one who gave a minute and scrupulous
attention to any business on which he was consulted.
He was naturally slow and cautious of judgment ; and
although his opinions were conscientiously and entirely
directed towards English objects, he had not entirely
an English mind ; and in a German gentleman (Baron
Stockmar) much in his confidence, and who deserved,
from his great knowledge and abilities, to be so, he had
for adviser a man who, though well qualified to have
taken a place amongst the first statesmen in Europe,
was clearly no admirer of popular or Parliamentary
control over foreign affairs, which he regarded as the
special concerns of royal and imperial minds.
Sufficient has thus been said to show that the royal
authority was likely to 'be exercised in our foreign
relations, and that the decided views which Lord
Palmerston was accustomed to form or be disposed at
once to carry out, and the strength of the language
in which he often embodied those views, jarred at times
with the disposition towards more consideration and
deliberation at Windsor. More caution, more delibera
tion was requfred of him; and, in fact. Lord John
Eussell, with a double view, I am quite ready to sup
pose, of paying due deference to the Crown and of
serving his colleague, made Lord Palmerston a com
munication in 1850 to this effect. Such restrictions
could not be agreeable to the person on whom they
were imposed, and, though conformable with the spirit
of our Constitution, were hardly compatible with the
prompt and practical despatch of business which every
day was complicating and increasing, and which fre
quently required for a successful issue the transmitting
of an immediate reply. During the discussions about
the Spanish marriages Lord Palmerston lost three weeks
in answering a Communication from Guizot, by having
to send drafts backwards and forwards while the Court
was moving about in a cruize on the Western Coast.;
0 2

196 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Guizot, in his subsequent notes and despatches, was
always throwing this delay in his face ; but his tongue
was tied, and he was obliged to accept the rebuke in
silence. It is not necessary to discuss here the exact consti
tutional position of the Crown in these matters, because
that was not really at issue on the occasion to which
reference is about to be made. It wUl suffice to em
phatically repudiate the doctrine which has been re
cently approved in certain anonymous quarters, that
the Head of the State is entrusted in a special manner
with the decisions upon foreign affairs, and to claim
for a free people a voice in their foreign' equally as
in their domestic concerns. But much has also been
said and written lately about the share which the
Sovereign takes, or ought to take, in the daily conduct
of our foreign negotiations. The truth is that, with a
pliant minister and under ordinary circumstances, the
Crown has very great opportunities for impressing upon
foreign affairs that tone and direction which it, for
the moment, desires. Even when an important differ
ence between Crown and Cabinet on a question of
general policy has disappeared, by the former yielding
to the representations of the latter, there still remain
to the Sovereign many ways of influencing the course
of negotiations in accordance with his original views.
Draft despatches, embodying the Cabinet policy, must
be sent to him for approval. They may be returned
accompanied by objections to such and such passages,
as not fairly representing the decisions arrived at—
by complaints of one paragraph as being too strong — ¦
while another is pronounced too weak. The Cabinet
may be scattered, as, indeed, it always is during a por
tion of the year ; or, if aU its members are at hand, stUl
the occasion may not be deemed by the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary sufficiently grave to warrant
the issue of a summons. The peccant pa.ragraphs are
accordingly recast and a doubtful instead of a clear and
strong expression of opinion or intention is transmitted

VALUE OF AN ABLE FOEEIGN SECEETAEY, 197
to the foreign Court. Nor is this all : the Secretary of
State, in such a supposed case, knows when preparing
his draft that it is about to be submitted to a hostile
critic — hostile, I mean, in the sense of being adverse
to the policy of which he is the exponent — a critic
moreover who must be heard and answered, not one
who can be met by real or simulated indifference. He
begins, therefore, insensibly by a compromise, and pre
pares, subject to further modification, an already mo
dified version of the views of his Government. How
great an influence may be exercised by means of this
censorship will be evident to any person conversant
with diplomatic language, and therefore aware of the
important difference which even a slight alteration may
imply. Now, it is not contended that, on the whole, within
its proper limits, the existence of this warning and
criticising power, outside of party ranks, is otherwise
than beneficial — especially as a good Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs is one of the rarest of our various
political species. It is, however, certain that to Lord
Palmerston, conscious of his knowledge and patriotism,
earnest and eager in his aims, and thoroughly confident
that his ways of attaining the end proposed were the
surest, the delays and obstacles not unfrequently thus
placed in his way were most irksome; and in the ardour
of the chase he was too often tempted to leap the gate
sooner than lose the time necessary to stop and open
it. It must also be remembered that he had, off and
on, held the seals of the Foreign Office for a long term
of years, during the greater part of which he had been
accustomed to be left very much alone. He was, in
deed, already a veteran in foreign administration at the
time when his two able German critics first appeared
on the scene. But, whatever opinion may be formed
as to his independence and promptness of action, his
motives at any rate must be admired, and it is not pos
sible for anybody who was acquainted with his character
to clothe it with any colour of disrespect for the Crown.

198 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
There had, however, been friction — and its natural
effects, though as yet latent, were undoubtedly still
at work, when there suddenly occurred a new and
important phase in the neighbouring kingdom. Prince
Lodis Napoleon, who had been elected President of the
French Eepublic, was in a position that threatened new
and serious complications in that country, remarkable,
during the last hundred years, for its vicissitudes. This
Prince, at the time of his election, did not pass in Eng
land, where he then resided, for having any superior
ability, nor, as it has been said, had he acquired such
a reputation with leading men in Prance. None had
been willing to connect their fates with his. M. Odillon
Barrot and M. de Tocqueville were the only two men of
any reputation who had served under him, and both of
these told their friends that it would be impossible to
serve him long, because they knew they could not
satisfy his ambition. M. de Tocqueville had been
willing to make a compromise, and would have conceded
the presidency for life, and a revenue, say, for that
position, though inferior, doubtless, to the civil list of
an emperor. The Prince himself had, possibly, at first no fixed
idea but that of governing France with as much power
as it would accord him. That which, according to report,
was said of him by his cousin at the time of his greatest
prestige is probably near the truth. ' For a time the
world thought my cousin an idiot ; now they think him
a genius. He was not an idiot, and is not a genius.'
He was not a great man, but he had a fair idea of what
a great man should be ; and he could in certain situa
tions play the part of one. But, at all events, his
talents, whatever they were, had no clear development
in any visible dfrection. His conversation, simple and
natural, was in no wise striking. He could not sustain
an argument ; and his written composition, which was
certainly remarkable, appeared so much above the
capacity he had otherwise evinced that he did not get
credit for it. His unsuccessful attempts to make in-

LOUIS NAPOLEON AND THE ASSEMBLY. 199
surrection during the reign of Louis Philippe had
•created too high an opinion of his spirit of enterprise,
and too low a one of his intellect.
None or few of the thinking classes then either in
France or England considered his reign otherwise than
ephemeral; and the longer his power continued, the
more impatient those who thought they could cut it
short when they pleased became of it. This impatience
had of late visibly increased. The Assembly had boldly
set itself up as his rival, and he had at last found it
impossible to name a Parliamentary Ministry.
Lord Palmerston, as far back as January 24, in a
letter to Lord Normanby, had given his views of what
Louis Napoleon's course should be in such a contingency.
He wrote : —
If I was the President I should not trouble myself as to
whether the Assembly supported my Ministers or not, whether
they censured or approved them. I should say to the Assembly
I cannot get rid of you and you cannot get rid of me, and your
censures do not change my opinions of my own conduct. For
that conduct I am not answerable to you (as long as I keep
within the law), but to France. My Ministers are acting by
my instructions, and they are responsible to me and not to you.
If you reject good laws which I propose to you, yours be the
blame. If you will not vote money to keep up an army, navy,
and civil government, let the nation call you to account for
thus betraymg your country ; but that which I wiU not do is
¦to appoint Ministers who shall be your instruments and not
.mine. The analogy of our Constitution in regard to the relation of
Mmisters to Parliament and to the Crown does not hold good
as to the position of the French Ministers. The Constitutions
of the two countries arc wholly diBferent.
The Assembly met after the recess in November of
1851. The crisis arrived on December 2, when the
leading members of the Opposition were arrested in
their beds, and a purely military rule was estabhshed
pending an appeal to universal suffrage as to the future
government of France.

200 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
On December 3, Count Walewski, the French am
bassador, called upon Lord Palmerston to inform him
of what had taken place, and in the course of conver
sation Lord Palmerston expressed the view which he-
held as to the necessity and advantage for France and
Europe of the bold and decisive step taken by the-
President. The following Memorandum, written several years.
later, shows that he was well aware what was going
on at this moment in England as weU as in France
among those who were seeking to cut short Napoleon's;
term of power : —
Memorandum of certain Circumstances connected with the
Coup d'etat.
The coup d'etat took place on Tuesday, December 2, 1851^
and was known in London by the next day. On Wednesday,
the 3rd, Mr. and Mrs.  dmed with us ia Carlton Gardens,
and told me that they had been down to Claremont on the
preceding Friday to visit the Queen Amelie ; that they found
the ladies of the French Court in a great bustle ; and that they
told Mrs. ¦  as a great secret that they were making up their
paquets, as they expected to have to go to Paris at the end of
the then next week, that is to say, at the end of the week in
which the coup d'6tat took place.
On the Sunday following, that is to say, on December 7,
Mr. Borthwick, editor of the ' Morning Post,' came to me. He
said he had a communication to make to me which it might he
important for me to receive, and which he considered himself
at hberty to make. He said that the day before, that is, on
Saturday the 6th, General de Rumigny, attached to the Prench
Court, had come to him and said that as he, Mr. Borthwick,
had been civil and attentive to the ex-Royal FamUy, he (General
Rumigny) had been desfred to say to Mm that, if it would he-
useful to his paper, he should have daily accounts of the mili
tary operations that were about to commence in the north of
Prance ; that the Prince de Joinville and the Due d' Aumale
were gone to Lille to take the command of troops to act against
the President ; that the Royal FamUy had endeavoured to dis
suade the Prince de Join-ville from this step, but in vain ; and
that, finding him determmed on doing so, the Due d'Aumal& ^
had said, ' My brother is a sailor, he .knows nothing of mihtaiy

THE BOUEBON'S TAKE ACTION. 201
operations ; I am a soldier, I will go with him and share his^
fate and fortune.' Mr. Borthwick said he had declmed the
offered communications, as he did not -wish his paper to be
considered the organ of the Orleans family ; and as the com
munication had not been made to him under the condition of
secrecy, he came at once to tell me of it.
I immediately wrote to Sir George Grey, then Home
Secretary, to ask him to make inquiry through the detach
ment of police stationed at Claremont for the protection of the
ex-Royal Family, to know whether all the French princes were
there, that is to say, those who were in England. I said that
General de Rumigny or Borthwick must have made a mistake
m naming D'Aumale, because he was then at Naples, and it
must be the Due de Nemours who had gone with Join-ville.
In the course of the afternoon I received from Sir G. Grey
a report that both Nemours and JoinvUle were still at Clare
mont. That JoinvUle had been several times in London in the-
course of this week, and was that day at Claremont. That
Joinville had been very UI for several daiys, and had been con
fined to his room, and nobody had seen him but his medical
attendant, who visited him twice a day. This report at once
showed that Joinville was off, as I afterwards heard was the-
case. He went as far as Ostend, but found that the attempt
would not succeed, and he came back again. I beheve the
garrison of Lille had been changed. This confirmed the story
as to Joinville, but left unexplained the statement as to
D'Aumale. But some days afterwards I received a letter
from my brother, Minister at Naples, written before the news
of the coup d'etat had reached Naples, saying that the Due and
Duchesse d'Aumale had received alarming accounts of the
health of the ex-Queen of France, and that in consequence-
thereof the Duke had suddenly set off for England. That two
days afterwards the Duchesse d'Aumale had received better
accounts, and she regretted that her husband had not waited a
day or two longer, as he would then have been spared a fatiguing-
joumey in the depth of winter.
This statement confirmed the whole of General de Rumigny's.
story, for D'Aumale had evidently, by preconcerted arrange
ment, left Naples to meet Joinville on a given day at a given
place ; and this proved that there had been a plot long proposed
for an attack upon the President.
About a fortnight or three weeks afterwards Count Lav-
radio, the Portuguese Minister in London, went to Claremont

202 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to visit the Prmcesse de JoinviUe, who is a Brazihan, and he
said he found her toute eplorSe at the turn of affafrs m France,
and that she said it was most afflictmg : ef pour moi qui devoit
itre ct Paris le 20 \
All this clearly proves that if the President had not struck
when he did, he would himself have been knocked over.
P., 29-9, 1858.
On the same day as his conversation with Count
Walewski Lord Palmerston wrote privately to Lord
Normanby as foUows : — C. G. . December 3, 1851.
Even we here, who cannot be supposed to know as much as
people at Paris did about what was going on among the Bour-
bonists, cannot be surprised that Louis Napoleon struck the
blow at -the time which he chose for it ; for it is now well
known here that the Duchess of Orleans was preparing to be
caUed to Paris this week with her younger son to commence a
new period of Orleans dynasty. Of course the President got
an inkling of what was passing, and, if it is true, as stated in
our newspapers, that Changamier was arrested at four o'clock
in the mommg in council with Thiers and others, there seems
good reason to beheve, what is also asserted, that the Burgraves '
had a stroke prepared which was to be struck against the
President that very day, and that, consequently, he acted on
the principle that a good thrust is often the best parry. I
have reason to thmk, because I have heard it from several
quarters, that the President has been sometimes led to infer,
from your social intimacy -with the Burgrave party, that your
pohtical sympathies were more directed towards them than
towards him. Of course a Minister or Ambassador cannot be
expected to adapt his social relations to the party jealousies of
the Government to which he is accredited, but if it so happens
that personal friendships and private and social mtimacies lead
him into frequent communication with persons who are hostile
to the Government, it is the more necessary for him to take
-care to destroy in the mind of the Government any misappre
hension which this circumstance might give rise to ; and I
have no doubt that you have been careful to do so. As to
' The majority, comprising Thiers, Tocqueville, Odillon Barrot, and
others, in the Assembly. It -was a nickname, taken from the title of .i
play by Victor Hugo, in which a similar party -was represented.

DIFFICULTIES WITH LOED NOEMANBY. 203
respect for the law and Constitution, which you say in your
despatch of yesterday is habitual to Englishmen, that respect
belongs to just and equitable laws framed under a Constitution
founded upon reason, and consecrated by its antiquity and by
the memory of the long years of happmess which the nation
has enjoyed under it; but it is scarcely a proper apphcation of
those feeehngs to requfre them to be directed to the day-before-
yesterday tomfoolery which the scatter-brained heads of Marrast
and Tocqueville invented for the torment and perplexity of the
French nation; and I must say that that Constitution was
more honoured by the breach than the observance.
It was high time to get rid of such childish nonsense ; and
as the Assembly seemed to be resolved that it should not be
got rid of quietly and by dehberate alteration and amendment,
I do not wonder that the President determined to get rid of
them as obstacles to all rational arrangement.
If, mdeed, as we suppose, they meant to strike a sudden
blow at him, he was quite right on that ground also to knock
them down first.
I find I have written on two sheets by mistake ; the blank
leaf is an appropriate emblem of the present state of the Prench
Gonstitution. It is curious that such a nation as the Prench,
after more than sixty years of political struggle and five revo
lutions — countmg the assumption of power by Napoleon as
one — should at last have arrived at a point where aU Constitu
tion is swept away, and where they are gomg to give a practical
example of that original compact between the people and the
ruler which is generally considered as an imaginary iUustration
of a fanciful theory.
One of Lord Palmerston's difficulties was the ill-
disguised hostility of the British ambassador to the
Prench President, which Lord Palmerston had to re
buke in terms which were naturally distasteful to Lord
Normanby. The Government, indeed, at the request
of the President, were obliged to recaU him shortly
after. Count Walewski very naturally communicated at
once to the French Foreign Office the tenor of what
Lord Palmerston had said to him. Meanwhile Lord
Normanby had applied for instructions as to his future
conduct, and received the foUowing official reply : —

204 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Foreign Office : December 6, 1851.
My Lord, — I have received and laid before the Queen your-
Excellency's despatch of the 3rd instant, requesting to be fur
nished with instructions for your guidance in the present state-
of a&frs in France.
I am commanded by Her Majesty to instruct your Ex
cellency to make no change in your relations with the French
Government. It is Her Majesty's desfre that nothing should be done by
her Ambassador at Paris which could wear the appearance of
an interference of any kind m the internal affairs of France.
I am, &c., Palmerston.
Lord Normanby hastened to the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs in order to communicate to him the
tenor of this despatch. M. Turgot, who had been
piqued, as Louis Napoleon himself had been, at the
hostile language held by the English representative,.
replied tartly that such a communication was unneces
sary, as M. Walewski had already informed him that
Lord Palmerston entirely approved of what the Presi
dent had done. This statement Lord Normanby re
ported home in the following despatches, to which I
append two side-notes which appear in Lord Palmer
ston's handwriting, and his despatch of December 16,.
pointing out the unreasonable character of Lord Nor
manby's complaints : — Paris : December 6, 1851.
My Lord, — I this moming received your Lordship's despatch.
of yesterday's date, and I afterwards caUed on M. Turgot, and
informed him that I had received Her Majesty's command to-
say that I need make no change in my relations
'¦"' -with the French Government in consequence of
what had passed. I added that if there had been some little'
delay in making this communication, it arose from some mate
rial circumstances not connected with any doubt on the subjeeti
M. Turgot said that delay had been of less importance
as he had two days smce heard from M. Walewski that your
lordship had expressed to him your entfre approbation of th&
act of the President, and your con-viction that he could not
have acted otherwise than he had done. I said I had n(>

DESPATCHES TO LOED NOEMANBY. 205
knowledge of any such communication, and no mstructions
beyond our invariable rule to do nothing which should have
the appearance of interfering m any way in the internal affahs
of France, but that I had often had an opportunity of showing,
under very varied cfrcumstances, that whatever might be the
Government here, I attached the utmost importance to main
taining the most amicable relations between the two countries.
I added that I was sure, had the Government known of the
suppression of the insurrection of the Rouges at the time I had
heard from them, I should have been commissioned to add their
¦congratulations to mine.
I have thought it necessary to mention what was stated
about M. Walewski's despatch because two of my colleagues
here mentioned to me that the despatch containing expressions
precisely to that effect had been read to them in order to show
the decided ophiion which England had pronounced. I have, &c.,
NoEMANBY.
Paris : December 15, 1851.
My Lord, — In my despatch of the 6th instant, notifymg my
¦communication of my instructions to M. Turgot, I reported
that his ExceUency had mentioned that M. Walewski had
written a despatch m which he stated that your Lordship had
expressed your complete approbation of the course
statement taken by the President m the recent coup d'etat.
in bis / digQ reported that I had conveyed to M. Turgot
my belief that there must he some mistake in this
Matement, and my reasons for that belief.
But as a week has now elapsed -v^ithout any explanation
from your Lordship on this point, I must conclude M. Walew
ski's report to have been substantially correct.
That being the case, I am perfectly aware that it is beyond
the sphere of my present duties to make any remark upon
the acts of your Lordship, except inasmuch as they affect my
own position. But within these hmits I must, with due
¦deference, be permitted to observe, that if your Lordship, as
Foreign Minister, holds one language on such a dehcate point
in Do-wning Street, without giving me any intimation you had
done so — ^prescribing afterwards a different course to me,
namely, the avoidance of any appearance of mterference of
.any kind m the internal afefrs of France — I am placed thereby
in a very awkward position.

206 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
If the language held in Downing Street is more favourable
to the existing order of things in France than the instructions
on which I am dfrected to guide myself upon the spot, it must
be obvious that by that act of your Lordship's I become subject
to misrepresentation and suspicion in merely domg my duty
accordmg to the official orders received through your Lordship
from Her Majesty.
All this is of more importance to me, because, as I stated
before, several of my diplomatic coUeagues had had the despatch
read to them, and had derived from it the con-viction that, if
accurately reported, your expressions had been those of un
qualified satisfaction. I have, &c.,
NoEMANBY.
Foreign Office : December 16, 1851.
My Lord,- — I have received your Excellency's despatch of
the 15th instant, referring to the statement made to you by the
French Minister for Foreign Affafrs on the occasion of your
communicating to bis ExceUency the instructions with which
you have been furnished by Her Majesty's Government for
your guidance in the present state of affairs in Prance, and I
have to state to your Excellency that there has been nothing
in the language which I have held, nor in the opmions which I
have at any time expressed on the recent events in France,
which has been in any way inconsistent with the instructions
addressed to your ExceUency, to abstain from anythmg which
could bear the appearance of any interference in the internal
affafrs of France. The instructions contained m my despatch
of the 5th instant, to which your Excellency refers, were sent
to you, not in reply to a question as to what opinions your
Excellency should express, but in reply to a question which I
understood to be, whether your ExceUency should continue
your usual diplomatic relations with the President during the
interval which was to elapse between the date of your Excel
lency's despatch of the 3rd mstant and the voting by the
French nation on the question to be proposed to them by the
President. As to approving or condemnmg the step taken by the
President in dissolvmg the Assembly, I conceive that it is
for the French nation, and not for the British Secretary of
State or for the British Ambassador, to pronounce judgment
upon that event ; but if your Excellency wishes to know my

EXPLANATION TO THE PEEMIEE. 207
own opinion on the change which has taken place in France, it
is that such a state of antagonism had arisen between the
President and the Assembly that it was becommg every day
more clear that their co-existence could not be of long duration ;
and it seemed to me better for the interests of Prance, and,
through them, for the interests of the rest of Europe, that the
power of the President should prevail, inasmuch as the cout
tinuance of his authority might afford a prospect of the main
tenance of social order m France, whereas the divisions of
opinions and parties in the Assembly appeared to betoken that
thefr victory over the President would only be the starting-
point for disastrous civU strife.
Whether my opinion was right or -wrong, it seems to be
shared by persons interested in property in France, as far at
least as the great and sudden rise in the Funds and in other
investments may be assumed to be indications of increasing
confidence in the improved prospect of mternal tranquillity in
France. I am, &c.,
Palmeeston.
These despatches, however, of the English am-
basador came in due course before the Queen and the
Premier ; and Lord John Russell, on the 14th, called
the Foreign Secretary to account for what he appeared
to have said in the matter. Lord Palmerston answered
by a detailed exposition of his view of the whole
affafr, and gave the grounds on which he had formed
his opinion. Carlton Gardens : December 16, 1851.
My dear John Russell, — I return you the Queen's Memo
randum and the despatch from Normanby to which it relates.
To say that I expressed entfre approbation of what the Presi
dent had done, and that I stated my con-viction that he could
not have acted otherwise than he had done, is giving a high
colouring to anything that I may have said to Count Walewski
on the 3rd instant, the date, apparently, of his despatch to
Mons. Turgot ; but it must be borne in mind that Normanby
writes his recoUections of what Mons. Turgot said to him;
that Mons. Turgot spoke to him, apparently somewhat piqued
at the delay of his communication, and also from recollection,
and that it was natural that Count Walewski in -writing his

208 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
¦despatch should colour highly what anybody about whom he
wrote had said to him on the events of the preceding day.
But the opinion which I entertain of this grave and important
matter, and which, no doubt, I expressed is, that so decided
•an antagonism had grown up between the President and the
Assembly that it was to be foreseen that they could not long
-coexist, and that each was planning the overthrow of the other
— either meanmg aggression or behe-ving that their course was
only self-defence : there are circumstances which seem to
¦countenance the supposition that the Assembly intended in
the course of that very week to have struck a blow at the
President, and to have deprived him of his position. Now, as
between the President and the Assembly it seems to me that
the interests of France, and, through them, the interests of the
rest of Europe, were better consulted by the prevalence of the
President tlkn they would have been by the prevalence of the
Assembly ; and the great rise which had taken place in the
Prench Funds from 91 to 102, together with the sudden spring
which has been made by commerce in general, seem to show
that the French people in general are of the same opmion, and
that what has happened has inspired the nation vdth a feehng
of confidence which they had not before.
Indeed, to account for this we have only to look at what
¦each of the two parties offered to France as the result of their
victory over the other party. The President had to offer unity
of authority and of purpose and the support of the whole army
against the anarchists for the maintenance of order. The
Assembly had to offer immediate di-vision among themselves,
a division in the army, and, in all probabihty, civil war, duriag
which the anarchists would have had immense opportunities
and facilities for canying thefr desolatmg schemes into execu
tion. If the Assembly had had any acceptable ruler to propose
to the nation instead of Louis Napoleon they might, with theh
opinions and preferences, have been acting as true patriots by
overthrowmg the President. But there were scarcely more
than three alternatives which they could have proposed. First,
Henry Y., who represents the principle of Legitimacy, and who
has a devoted and a considerable party in France ; but that party
is still a mmority of the nation, and a minority cannot govern
the majority. Secondly, they might have proposed the Comte
de Paris, but he is only about twelve years old ; and a six
years' minority with a regency, and with Thiers as the Prime
Minister, was not a proposition which a nation hi the state in

EXPLANATION TO THE PEEMIEE. 209
which the French are was at aU hkely to accept. Thhdly,
they might have offered the Prince de JoinviUe as a President,
or three of the generals as a commission of government, but
neither of these arrangements would have been acceptable to
the whole nation. The success, then, of the Assembly would,
in aU human probabihty, have been civil war, while the success
of the President promised the re-estabhshment of order.
This bitter antagonism between the President and the
Assembly was partly the consequence of the arrangements of
1848, and partly the result of faults on both sides, but chiefiy
on the side of the Assembly.
It may safely be affirmed that k long duration of a cen
tralised, as contradistmguished from a Federal Repubhc, in a
great country hke France, with a large standmg army, and the
seat of government not in an unimportant place hke Washing
ton, but in a great capital which exercises ahnost paramount
influence over the whole country, is a pohtical impossibihty,
let the arrangement of such a Repubhc be ever so well or so
-wisely constructed.
But the arrangements of 1848 greatly increased that general
impossibihty, and, indeed, the work of Messrs. Marrast and
Tocqueville would more properly be called a dissolution than a
Constitution, for they brought the political org,q,nisation of
France to the very brink of anarchy.
Not to more than mention, among other defects, that there
were two great Powers, each deriving its existence from the
same source, almost sure to disagree, but with no umpfre to
decide between them, and neither able by any legal means to
get rid of the other — not to dwell upon that, the question m
regard to which the rupture took place was sure to bring about
sooner or later collision, and probably violence.
The Constitution contamed a regulation that the same per
son should not be twice running elected as President ; that is
to say, that at the end of the first and of each successive term
of Presidentship the French nation should not be allowed to
choose the person whom they might prefer and think fittest to
be at the head of thefr Government. _ Now, there seemed every
reason to expect that the vast majority of the nation would re
elect Louis Napoleon, and the great majority of the Conseils-
G6n6raux petitioned that the Constitution might be altered,
meaning specifically m this respect. But another regulation of
1848 interfered. A certain proportion of the Assembly was
requfred to give validity to a resolution that the Constitution
VOL. II. P

210 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
should be revised, and this majority the Assembly did not give.
It had been generaUy expected that the actual conflict would be
put off tiU May of next year, but the measures of both parties
brought it on sooner.
The proposal of the President to restore universal suffrage
was evidently intended for the purpose of securing for him such
an overwhelmmg number of votes, that the Assembly would
not have set his election aside. The Assembly tried to parry
this by various schemes, either projected or actually put for-
wai-d. One plan was a law attaching punishment to any elector
who might vote for an ineligible candidate ; but this, I believe,
was not actually brought forward. Another was what was
called the Questeur proposal, which went to place a portion of
the army under the orders of the Assembly. This, indeed, was
negatived, but it showed what its proposers intended. Then
came the proposal to declare it high treason in an existing
President to take any steps to procure his re-election — a law
which, if it had passed, would obviously have placed the Presi
dent at the mercy of the Assembly, unless he could rely upon
a sufficient portion of the army to fight against that part of it
which might go over to the Assembly. It is said, with what
truth I cannot tell, that it was the intention of the leaders of
the majority of the Assembly, if that law had been carried,
immediately to have arrested within the walls and on the spot
such of the Ministers as were members, among whom was the
, Minister of War, and to have also endeavoured to send the
President to Yincennes, so far as I know ; at least it was told
to me on the Tuesday or Wednesday that those who were about
the Royal FamUy at Claremont expected somethmg which they
considered favourable to thefr interests to happen at Paris
before the end of that week. I mean that this expectation had
been expressed in the course of the week precedmg the 2nd of
this month.
It seems to me, then, it is fair to suppose that Louis Napo
leon may have acted from mixed motives. There is no doubt
that he was impelled by ambition, and by a rooted behef which
he is well known to have entertained from a very early age,
that he was destined to govern France. But he may also have
felt thatj m the present deplorable state of society in France,
he was much more capable of promoting the interests of the
country than his antagonists were ; and a man even with less
personal ambition might, in his situation, have thought salus
Reipublicce suprema lex.

DISMISSAL FEOM OFFICE. 211
His justification will, no doubt, very much depend upon the
degree of proof which he may be able to adduce that he was
acting at the moment in self-defence, and was only anticipatmg
an impending blow, and also upon the use which he may make
of the ascendancy which he has acquired.
I do not agree with the opinion which I understand Macau
lay has expressed in a letter to Lord Mahon, that the French
nation are only fit for mUitary despotism ; nor can I believe
that any Government which is not what we mean by the term
¦Constitutional, can have a long duration in France.
I have said nothing of the events of Thursday and Friday,
but there can be but one feeling as to the wanton destruction
of life which the soldiers appeared to have inflicted on the
people of Paris.
To this came a reply that the question at issue was
not the grounds for the judgment he had formed, but
whether he ought to have given any opinion without
previously consulting the Cabinet and taking the orders
of the Sovereign. Lord Palmerston rejoined that the
opinion given by him was given as his own and in an
unofficial conversation, and that it in no way fettered
the action of the Government; that if it were laid
down that a Secretary of State was to express no
opinion on passing events in conversing with foreign
Ministers, except as the organ of a previously-consulted
Cabinet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar
personal intercourse which is so useful for the mainte
nance of friendly relations with foreign Governments.
This did not satisfy the Premier, who, in the following
letter, ended the debate by a verj-- summary decision : —
Woburn Abbey : Deo. 19, 1851.
My dear Palmerston, — I have just received your letter of
yesterday. No other course is left to me than to submit the
correspondence to the Queen, and to ask Her Majesty to appoint
a successor to you in the Foreign Office.
Although I have often had the misfortune to differ from
you in mmor questions, I am deeply convmced that the pohcy
which has been pursued has maintained the interests and the
honour of the country. I remain, yours truly,
J. Russell.

212 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
To soften the blow, however, he immediately after
wards made a proposal almost comical in its character^
and offered to Lord Palmerston the viceregal dignity at:
the Court across the Irish Channel. This was of course
civilly declined, but the retort which such a communi
cation afforded to one who had been charged with con
duct both imprudent and indecorous was too good to
be neglected. Broadlands : Deo. 23, 1851.
My dear John RusseU, — I have received your letter of yes
terday; I cannot, however, allow our correspondence on this
matter to close without saying that I do not admit your charge-
of -violations of prudence and decorum, and I have to observe
that that charge is refuted by the offer which you made me of
the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland, because I apprehend that to
be an office for the due performance of the duties of which pru
dence and decorum are quahties which cannot weU be dispensed
with. That the dismissal of Lord Palmerston sooner or
later was an event which had been long contemplated,
is evident from the foUovdng letter of the Prince Consort
to the Prime Minister published in Martin's ' Life of the
Prince Consort,' vol. ii. p. 418 : —
Windsor Castle : Dec. 20, 1851.
My dear Lord John, — . . . It was quite clear to the Queen
that we were entering upon most dangerous times, in which
mihtary despotism and red repubhcanism wiU for sOme time he
the only powers on the Contment, to both of which the constitu
tional monarchy of England wiU be equally hateful. ,That the
calm influence of our mstitutions, however, should succeed in as-
siiagmg the contest abroad must be the anxious wish of every
Englishman, and of every friend of liberty and progressive
civihsation. This infiuence has been rendered null by Lord
Palmerston's personal manner of conducting the foreign affairs,
and by the universal hatred which he has excited on the Conti
nent. That you could hope to control him has long been
doubted by us, and its impossibility is clearly proved by the
last proceedmgs. / can therefore only congratulate you, that
the opportunity ofthe rupture sliouM have been one in which all
the right is on your side.

DELIGHT OF FOEEIGN COUETS. 213
The Cabinet was summoned on the 22nd to receive
the news of Lord Palmerston's dismissal and the
¦appointment of Lord Granville in his stead. Lord
Palmerston, meanwhile, was silent except to his most
intimate friends, for, as he said to Lord Broughton,
^ When a man resigns, he is expected to say why; when
he is removed, it is for others to assign reasons.'
But no reason was assigned and the public had to
wait for the meeting of Parliament. Meanwhile the
long-cherished hostUity of certain foreign Courts and
¦Governments found vent in notes of exultation at the
fall of the man who had so long occupied a position of
antagonism towards them. AU over Europe the result
was regarded as a triumph for the absolute and a blow
for the Liberal cause.
From the British embassy at Vienna, Mr. Murray
vrrote to a friend : —
Lord Palmerston's retfrement is received with the most
profound regret by the Liberal party in Austria, who look
upon it as the utter annihilation of thefr hopes. It wiU hardly
be beheved that these arrogant fools here actually think that
they have overthrown Lord Palmerston ; and the vulgar triumph
of Schwarzenberg knows no bounds. Not content with pla-
¦carding the news with lying comments of aU sorts, and des
patching couriers mto the provinces to cfrculate the most mon
strous fictions about the ' Yictory of Austrian Pohcy,' his bad
taste has actuaUy gone far enough to make bim give a ball in
consequence. I believe if an earthquake had swallowed up
England, Queen, Lords and Commons, Constitution, Free Press
and all, it would not have created more sensation than this
sudden and strange change in the Enghsh Cabinet.
We must recall the German doggrel, in vogue at
the time, if we wish to understand the excited feelings
•of the moment : — Hat der Teufel einen Sohn,
So ist er sioher Palmerston.
¦Some mad enthusiasm might be forgiven at the pro
spect of getting rid of the devU's son !

214 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
From Madrid Lord Howden at once sent in his.
resignation to Lord Granville, alleging that he could
no longer be of any use there, as ' the retirement of
Lord Palmerston either actually is, or most certainly
will be, believed to be a direct concession to the re
actionary spirit which is riding rough-shod over the
world, and which is nowhere more to be apprehended.
than in Spain.'
It was the same everywhere abroad.
At home the feeling of astonishment overcame for
the moment every other feeling : an astonishment not.
confined to the general public, but extending even to
some of his colleagues. Lord Palmerston received
letters from all sides expressing regret and asking for
explanation. He contented himself with acknowledg
ing their sympathetic communications. I shall only
quote one letter addressed to him on the subject, and
that is one from Lord Lansdowne : —
Bowood : December 20.
My dear Palmerston, — I cannot resist the deshe I feel to-
write to you, and give some expression to the deep concern I
feel at the event which has just occurred, of the probabihty of
which I was only made aware the day before the last Cabinet,
by two letters from J. Russell, which, owfrg to the accident of
my being absent from home, reached me at the same time, when
there appeared to be no reason left for further and more satis
factory explanation.
I have felt this concern the more deeply because I am per
fectly convinced there was and is no difference in the Cabinet
with respect to the neutral position to be maintamed in French
affairs, and because I have felt mclined from the first to the
same individual opinion, the grounds of which you stated in
your letter to J. Russell, as to the necessity of a coup d'Hat by
one person to give France any chance of a peaceable future,
though I wish such opinions had not been expressed to an
ambassador, apparently not very well disposed to receive them,
without having been previously communicated to J. Russell
and to the Queen, knowmg as I long have known the extent of"
susceptibihty which prevailed in that quarter on these matters,.
and greatly lamented, and which I have unsuccessfully laboured
to combat.

HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF THE AFFAIE. 215
What I chiefly wish, however, to say to you on this occa
sion is, that not only have I approved of every essential act
during your administration of foreign affairs at the time, but
that there is not one with respect to which upon subsequent
reflection I could wish to recall my approbation. Your pohcy
will never, whUe you live, want the ablest of all defenders, but
whether in or out of office (and J. RusseU is well apprised upon
what a slender thread my own tenure of office now hangs), I
can never hear it impugned in pubhc or m private without
expressing my conviction and admiration of its great abihty,
and real consistency with the mterests, and, above all, the
honour of the country. Yours sincerely, Lansdowne.
The following letter to his brother gives, in Lord
Palmerston's own words, a full story of the whole
matter : — Broadlands : Jan. 22, 1852.
I have not been able to write to you sooner except by the
common post, and I did not hke to send you details by that
conveyance. The history of my dismissal is short and simple.
I had, like all the rest of the world, long considered the French
Constitution of 1848 as one that would not long work, and as
an arrangement which approached to the very verge of anarchy.
The course pursued by the Assembly — and more especiaUy after
its meeting in the beginning of November — showed that a con
flict between that body and the President was inevitable ; that
there was no way out of the difiiculty in which Prance was
placed except by some act of -violence against the law and Con
stitution ; and it seemed to me better that in such a conflict
the President should prevaU over the Assembly, than that the
Assembly should prevail over the President. Therefore when
the coup d'etat took place, and Walewsky came to me on the
Tuesday (December 3) to teU me of it, I expressed to him
these opinions. The President could offer to France settled
government, with order and internal tranquiUity ; the Assembly
had no eligible candidate to offer in the room of the President.
Henry Y. had only a mmority with him, and could not with
that govern the majority of the nation. The Comte de Paris
is only about twelve years old, and France could not now accept
a regency of six or eight years' duration, with a foreign
and Protestant princess as Regent, and Thiers as Prime

216 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Minister. The Triumvfrate of the Generals Cavaignac, Chan-
gamier, and Lamoricifere would be mihtary despotism; and
¦Joinville as President would be a pohtical solecism. Any one
of these arrangements would have been civU war and local and
temporary anarchy ; and the Assembly had nothing else to offer.
Walewsky -wrote on the 3rd a private letter to Turgot, giving
him an account of what I had said, the sum and substance of
which was, that I thought that what the President had done
the day before was the best thing for France, and, through
Prance, for the rest of Europe. On the 3rd, Normanby, who
had for some time been on very bad personal terms with the
President, wrote a despatch to ask whether in consequence of
what had happened, he should alter in any way his relations
with the Prench Government. On the 5th I sent him a de
spatch, saymg that he was to make no change in his relations
with the French Government, nor to do anything which would
wear the appearance of any interference in the internal affairs
of Prance. He received this despatch on the 6th, and went
immediately to Turgot to tell him of it — a step wholly unneces
sary, because all he was told to do was to make no change in
his relations with the French Government. Turgot, who was
nettled at the existence of any doubt on the subject, said that
the communication was unnecessary, as he had two days before
received an account from Walewsky, saying that I had entirely
approved what the President had done, and thought he could
not have acted otherwise. This despatch having been read by
the Queen and John Russell, the latter wrote to me to say that
he hoped I should be able to contradict that report of what I
had said. To this I rephed that the particular expressions
ascribed to me were rather a highly-coloured version of what I
had said, but that it must be remembered that Normanby
reported what Turgot had said to him verbally ; that Turgot
stated from memory what Walewsky had -written in a despatch
or letter received two days before ; and that Walewsky gave
the impression which he had derived from our conversation, but
not the particular words which I had used. But I stated to
John Russell, at considerable length, my reasons for thinking
that what had been done was the best thing for Prance and for
Europe. To this John RusseU rephed that I mistook the pomt at
issue between us. That the question was not whether the
President was or was not justlJSed in doing what he has done,
but whether I was justified in expressing any opinion thereupon

HIS OWN ACCOUNT OF THE AFFAIE. 217
to Walewsky without having first taken the opinion of the
Cabinet on the matter. To this I answed that his doctrine so
laid down was new, and not practical. That there is a well-
known and perfectly understood distmction in diplomatic
intercourse between conversations which are official and which
bind Govemments and conversations which are unofficial and
which do not bind Govemments That my conversation with
Walewsky was of the latter description, and that I said nothing
to him which would in any degree or way fetter the action of
the Government ; and that if it was to be held that a Secretary
of State could never express any opinion to a foreign Minister
on passmg events, except as the organ of a previously-consulted
Oabmet, there would be an end of that easy and familiar inter
course which tends essentiaUy to promote good understanding
between Ministers and Governments.
John Russell rephed to this that my letter left him no
«.ltemative but to advise the Queen to place the Foreign Office in
¦other hands ; but he offered me the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland,
or any other arrangement which I might prefer. Of course,
having been so cavalierly sent to the right-about, I told him
there were obvious reasons which prevented me from avaUing
myself of his offers, and that I only waited to learn the name
of my successor to give up the seals. John Russell distmctly
aiarrowed down the ground of my dismissal to the fact of my
having expressed an opinion on the cowp d'itat without refer
ence to the nature of that opinion, Johnny saying that that
was not the question. Now, that opinion of mine was expressed
in conversation on Tuesday, the 3rd ; but on Wednesday, the
4th, we had a smaU evening party at our house. At that party
John Russell and Walewsky were, and they had a conversation
on the coup d'Hat, m which Johnny expressed his opinion,
which Walewsky teUs me was in substance and result pretty
nearly the same as what I had said the day before, though, as
he observed, John Russell is not so expamsif as I am ; hut,
further, on Friday, the 6th, Walewsky dined at John Russell's,
and there met Lansdowne and Charles Wood ; and in the course
of that evening John Russell, Lansdowne, and Charles Wood
;aU expressed thefr opmions on the coup d'etat, and those
¦opinions were, if anything, rather more strongly favourable
than mine had been. Moreover, Walewsky met Lord Grey
Tiding in the Park, and Grey's opinion was likewise expressed,
and was to the same effect. It is obvious that the reason
assigned for my dismissal was a mere pretext, eagerly caught

218 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
at for want of any good reason. The real ground was a weak
truckling to the hostile intrigues of the Orleans family, Austria,
Hussia, Saxony, and Bavaria, and in some degree also of the
present Prussian Government. All these parties found theh-
respective -views and systems of pohcy thwarted by the course
pursued by the British Government, and they thought that if
they could remove the Minister they would change the policy.
They had for a long time past effectually poisoned the mind of
the Queen and the Prince against me, and John RusseU giving
way, rather encouraged than discountenanced the desire of the
Queen to remove me from the Foreign Office.
In the meanwhUe the papers, having but little to discuss,
have all over the country — both London and provincial papers
— been full of my removal; and the general tone has been
highly complimentary to me, and far from agreeable to John
Russell. This, of course, has much annoyed him ; and I think,
if known by the Court, must afford them matter for reflection.
The general opinion is that the Ministry wUl not stand long
after the meeting of Parhament. Indeed, it is hkely that they
wiU be wrecked upon the Reform BUI. At alU events, it is
scarcely probable that they should get through the session.
without some defeat which would lead to their resignation. In
that case the Queen would send for Lord Derby, who would
probably be able to form a Government even without the
Peelites ; but they would most likely join him. However, all
these things are matters of speculation.
Parliament met on February 3. Immediately after
the speeches of the mover and seconder of the Address
were concluded, the Prime Minister was asked to explain
the reason for Lord Palmerston's removal from office.
Lord John Eussell began by saying : —
It will be right that I should first state to the House what
I conceive to be the position which a Secretary of State holds
as regards the Crown in the administration of foreign affairs,
and as regards the Prime Minister of this country. With
respect to the first, I should state that when the Cro-mn, in con
sequence of a vote of the House of Commons, places its con
stitutional confidence in a Mmister, that Minister is, on the
other hand, bound to afford to the Crown the most frank and
full detail of every measure that is taken, or to leave to the
Crown its full liberty, a liberty which the Crown must possess,-

THE PEEMIEE'S STATEMENT. 219
of saying that the Minister no longer possesses its confidence
Such I hold to be the general doctrine. But as regards the noble
lord, it did so happen that in August, 1850, the precise terms
were laid do-wn in a communication on the part of Her Majesty
with respect to the transaction of business between the Crown
and the Secretary of State. I became the organ of making
that communication to my noble friend, and thus became re
sponsible for the document I am about to read from.
I shall refer only to that part of the document which has
reference to the immediate subject : —
' The Queen requfres, first, that Lord Palmerston will dis
tinctly state what he proposes in a given case, in order that the
Queen may know as distinctly to what she is giving her royal
sanction. ' Secondly, ha-ving once given her sanction to a measure, that
it be not arbitrarily altered or modified by the Mmister. Such
an act she must consider as failing m sincerity towards the
Crown, and justly to be visited by the exercise of her constitu
tional right of dismissmg that Minister. She expects to be kept
informed of what passes between him and the foreign Mmisters
before important decisions are taken based upon that mtercourse ;
to receive the foreign despatches in good time, and to have the
drafts for her approval sent to her in sufficient time to make
herself acquainted with thefr contents before they must be
sent off. The Queen thinks it best that Lord John Russell
should show this letter to Lord Palmerston.'
I sent that accordmgly, and received a letter in which the
noble lord said : —
' I have taken a copy of this Memorandum of the Queen,
and will not faU to attend to the dfrections which it contains.'
Lord John Eussell then proceeded to remark that—
The first important transaction in which Lord Pahnerston
had taken part since the end of the last session of Parhament
was the reception of a deputation of delegates from certain'
metropohtan parishes respecting the treatment of the Hungarian
refugees by the Turkish Government. On this occasion he
(Lord John Russell) thought that his noble friend had exhibited
some want of due caution ; but he gave him the credit of sup
posing that this was through an oversight.
The next occasion to which he thought it necessary to refer
related to the events which had taken place on December 2,
-in France.

•220 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
The mstructions conveyed to our ambassador from the
•Queen's Government were to abstain from all interference in
the internal affairs of that country. Being mformed of an
alleged conversation between Lord Palmerston and the French
ambassador repugnant to these mstructions, he (Lord John)
had -written to that noble lord ; but his inqufries had for some
days met with a disdainful silence. Lord Palmerston having
meanwhile, without the knowledge of his colleagues, written a
despatch to Lord Normanby, in which he, however, evaded the
question whether he had approved the act of the President.
'The noble lord's course of proceeding in this matter he con
sidered to be putting himself in the place of the Crown, and
passing by the Crown, while he gave the moral approbation of
England to the acts of the President of the Republic of Prance,
in dfrect opposition to the policy which the Government had
hitherto pursued.
Under these cfrcumstances, he (Lord John Russell) had no
alternative but to declare that, while he was Prime Minister,
Lord Palmerston could not hold the seals of office ; and he had
assumed the sole and entire responsibihty of advising the Crown
to requfre the resignation of his noble friend, who, though he
had forgotten and neglected what was due to the Crown and
his colleagues, had not, he was convmced, intended any personal
¦disrespect. Lord Palmerston then rose, and the foUowing is a
Teport of what he said : —
He should be sorry if the House and the country should
run away with the notion which Lord John RusseU seemed to
entertain, that he had abandoned principles. He concurred in
Lord John's definition of the relations between the Foreign
Minister and the Crown, and he contended that he had done
nothing inconsistent with these relations. With reference to
the deputation on the subject of the release of the Hungarian
refugees, he had thought it to be his duty to receive it. He
had repudiated certain expressions contamed in the address, and
Tie had said nothing upon that occasion which he had not
uttered in that House and elsewhere. He then entered into a
lengthened statement of the transactions in reference to the
¦coup d'tstat in Prance, which had been represented by Lord John
HusseU as forming the groundwork of his removal from office.
After recountmg the interview with Count Walewsky on Decern-

palmeeston's eeply. 221
ber 3, he said that on that same day Her Majesty's ambassador
at Paris wrote a despatch to ask what instructions he should
receive for bis guidance in Prance during the interval before the^
vote of the French people on the question that was to be pro
posed to them, and whether in that interval he should mfuse
into the relations with the French Government any greater
degree of reserve than usual.
I took [Lord Palmerston proceeded to say] the opinion of
the Cabmet on that question, and a draft of that opinion was
prepared and sent for Her Majesty's approbation. The answer
could only be one in consistence with the course we had pursued
since the beginning of the events alluded to, and was such as
the noble lord has read. Her Majesty's ambassador was in
structed to make no change in his relations with the French
Government, and to do nothmg that should wear the appear
ance of any interference with the internal affafrs of Prance..
There was no instruction to communicate that document to the
French Government; it simply contained instructions, not m
fact what the English ambassador was to do, but what he was,
to abstain from domg. The noble lord, however (the Marquis
of Normanby), thought it right to communicate to the French
Minister for Foreign Affiifrs the substance of that document,
accompanying his communication with certain excuses for the
delay, which, however, did not rest with that noble marquis, as
his despatch to the English Government was dated December 3.
The IVench Minister stated that he had nothmg to com
plain of with respect to the delay, and the less, mdeed, because
two days before he had received from the French ambassador in
London a statement which the noble lord (Lord John RusseU)
has read, viz., that I entirely approved of what had been done, and
thought the President of the' French fully justified. That was a
somewhat highly-coloured explanation of the result of the long
conversation we held together. Those particular words I never
used, and probably the French ambassador never would have
conceived it consistent -with the dignity due to his country to
ask the approval of a Foreign Secretary of State. Consequently
the approval was not given, and was not asked. When the
Marquis of Normanby's despatch reached my noble friend (Lord
John Russell), he -wrote to say he trusted that I could contra
dict that report. There was, as he has stated, an interval
between the receipt of the noble lord's letter and my answer.
The noble lord's letter was dated the 14th, and my answer the
16th. I was at the time labouring under a heavy pressure of

222 LIFE OF LORD PALMEESTON.
business, and wishing fully to explain the opinion I expressed,
it was not until the evenmg of the 16th that I was able to
¦write my answer. The noble lord got it early next moming,
on the 17th.
This letter has already been given above as well as
the history of the correspondence which ensued, and
Lord Palmerston's claim for the unfettered action of a
foreign secretary. He then continued : —
Now, I expressed this opinion to which the noble lord has
referred to the French ambassador on December 3 ; but was
I the only member of the Cabinet who did thus express an
opinion on passing events ? I am informed that on the evening
of that very day, and under the same roof as I expressed my
¦opinion, the noble lord at the head of the Government, m con
versation with the same ambassador, expressed his opinion.
(Hear, hear, and laughter.) I cannot tell what that opinion
was, but from what has fallen from the noble lord this evening,
it may be assumed that that opinion was not very different
even from the reported opinion which I am supposed to have
expressed. Was that all 1 On the 5th, and in the noble lord's
own house, I have been informed that the French ambassador
met the noble lord, the President of the CouncU, and the Chan
cellor of the Exchequer. The noble lord again expressed an
opinion, and the President of the Council and the Chancellor
of the Exchequer also expressed an opinion. (Cheers and
laughter.) And be it remembered that the charge is not the
nature of the opmion, for the noble lord distinctly told me,
' You mistake the question between us. It was not whether
the President was justified or not, but whether you were
justified in expressing an opinion on the matter at all.' I beheve
that the noble lord, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, did
also, in those few days, express an opinion on those events ; and
I have been informed also that the then Yice-President of the
Board of Trade, and now the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, also expressed his opinion. Then it follows that every
member of the Cabinet, whatever his political avocations may
have been, however much his attention may have been devoted
to other matters, is at liberty to express an opinion of passing
events abroad ; but the Secretary of State for Foreign Affahs,
whose peculiar duty it is to watch those events, who is unfit
for his office if he has not an opinion on them, is the only man

ITS APPAEENT INEFFICIENCY. 223
not permitted to express an opinion ; and when a foreign
Minister comes and teUs him that he has news, he is to remain
silent like a speechless dolt or the mute of some Eastern pacha.
(Cheers and laughter.) Now I am told, ' It is not your con
versation with M. Walewsky that is complamed of, but your
despatch to the Marquis of Normanby.' What had I stated in
that despatch in reference to which a great parade has been
made, as if I had been guUty of breach of duty to the Crown
«,nd of my obligations to the Prime Minister, in sendmg it
without previously communicating with the noble lord ? No
man can lay down the matter more strongly than I have in
reference to the obhgations of the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. I have always admitted, that if the Secretary of State
for Foreign AJfairs sends a despatch of importance to an am
bassador abroad without ascertaining the opinion of the Prime
Minister of the Crown, he is guilty of a breach of duty. But
there are many cases m which it is perfectly well known that
he is only expressing the opinion of the Government, and in-
¦convenience might arise from delay.
Lord Palmerston then concluded his statement by
miaintaining that it was a misrepresentation of the fact
to say that he had given instructions to Lord Normanby
inconsistent with the relations of general intercourse
between England and France. It was no instruction
at all. He did not profess to give the opinion of the
Government or that of England. It was his own opinion,
and whether right or wrong, it was shared by numbers
in France. Therefore the charge made against him by
Lord John Eussell, founded on this despatch, had no
foundation either in justice or in facts.
He resumed his seat with the House only partially
with him. The attack had been very vigorous : his
defence had been incomplete. The motives that actuated
him in his comparative reserve may be gathered from
the following details as to these events, which he gave
in a letter to Lord Lansdowne,' relating a conversation
with the Duke of Bedford in October, 1852.
The reason assigned by John Russell, in his letters to me,
for his abrupt dismissal of me, was an opinion which I had ex-
' Dated Broadlands, October 1852.

224 LIFE OF^LOED PALMEESTON.
pressed to Walewsky about the President's coup d'Hat, in a.
moming conversation at my house, the day after that event had
happened — that opinion being to the effect that the President-
had acted in self-defence, and that what he had done was, m the
circumstances of the case, the best thing for France. Now, I
said to the Duke, m regard to the vahdity of that ground, I
have only to repeat to you what Count Walewsky told me,
either the day (or two days) before the matter was discussed in
the House of Commons.
Count Walewsky then said to me that he had the day before
had with John Russell a conversation which concerned me, and
which he thought it right to report to me. He said that Lord
John had sent for him, and had said he -wished to ask him a
question. He had been told that Count Walewsky had said that
he. Lord John, had expressed to him. Count Walewsky, in re
gard to the coup d'etat, opinions similar in substance and effect
to those which had been expressed to him by me, and he wished
to know if that report was true. . Count Walewsky said that
his reply to Lord John was, that that report was perfectly true ;
that it was true that he had said so, and that what he had said
was true. He told Lord John that he. Lord John, had upon
two occasions expressed such opinions. The first occasion was
on the evenmg of Wednesday, the 3rd of December, the same
day in the mpming of which I had expressed to him. Count
Walewsky, the opinion which he. Lord John, had found fault
with. That he. Count Walewsky, had that evening met Lord
John at a party at Lady Palmerston's, and that then and there
Lord John had spoken of thfe event of the day before in terms
similar to those used by me in the moming. The second occa
sion was the Friday foUowmg, when he. Count Walewsky, dined
with Lord John, and met there some other members of the
Cabmet, and that evenmg, said Count Walewsky to Lord John,
' upon that very sofa ' (pointing to one m the room), ' you ex
pressed opinions if anything stronger than what Lord Palmer
ston had said to me on the Wednesday ; and whereas I had
contented myself with reporting what Lord Palmerston had said
in a private letter to Monsieur Turgot, I made what you had
said the subject of an official despatch.' Count Walewsky said
to me that after this Lord John asked bim whether he had told
all this to me ; and Count Walewsky said that, having recently
passed a day at Broadlands, he had talked over with me the
cfrcumstances connected with my dismissal from office, and that
he had stated to me aU that he had then repeated to Lord John.

EEAL EEASON OF HIS SILENCE. 225
* But,' said Lord John, ' does Lord Palmerston mean to say all
this in the House of Commons?' 'Of that,' said Count
Walewsky, ' I know nothing.'
I may here observe that I stated in my speech in the House of
Commons the general result of this communication made to me
by Walewsky ; but I did not hke to be too precise, or to go
into details, out of dehcacy to Count Walewsky, though he
would have had no objection to my making the assertion on his
authority. I then observed to the Duke of Bedford that the ground on
which Lord John Russell had, in his letters to me, placed my
dismissal, even if it had had any intrinsic validity, which it had
not, was destroyed by this statement, which showed that I had
done and said no more than John Russell himself had said and
done. But I went on to say to the Duke that I had still further
to complain of the maimer in which John Russell had made his
statement in the House of Commons; for that, finding his
original ground, as put forward in his letters to me, thus rendered
imtenable, he had, in his speech, adopted another ground, and
liad put my dismissal partly on the ground — ^first, that I had
taken two days more than I ought to have taken to answer a
demand for explanation made to him by the Queen, and sent
on to me; and, secondly, on the ground that, by sending a de
spatch to Normanby -without previously sending the draft to the
Queen, I bad incurred the penalty of dismissal, mtimated by
the Queen's Memorandum of August 1850, as likely to be the
result of such an omission. I said to the Duke that the Queen's
demand for explanation as to what I had said to Count Walewsky
came to me from John Russell at a moment when I was over
whelmed -with pressing office business, thrown mto arrear by
my time ha-ving been occupied by a succession of Cabmet meet
ings ; that the explanation to be given by me was nec.essarUy a
long one ; that, in order to -write it, I had to sit up one night
tUl half-past four in the moming, having put a messenger under
orders to take it down to Woburn in an office-box by the first
train of the next day ; and that in the box which contained my
explanation I put a short note, saying that it was then half-past
four in the moming, that I could not sit up any longer to take
a copy of my paper, and that I begged that John Russell would
at his leisure either send me a copy of it or let me have it agam,
that I might copy it. 'WeU,' said I to the Duke, *if John RusseU
thought that the Queen would consider the two or three days' de
lay in the transmission of my reply to her inqufry as disrespectful
VOL. II. Q

226 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to her, what was it his duty to do when my explanation reached
him ? Why, of course, to send it off immediately to Osborne,
where the Queen then was. But what did he do ? Why, that
very afternoon he quietly sent my paper back to me, that I
might take a copy of it ; and he added that when I returned it
to him he would transmit it to the Queen, with a copy of the
answer which he intended to write to it. Thus interposing a
further delay of at least three days, in addition to the previous
delay which he made the subject of complaint against me.'
'Then I said to the Duke that I thought it was unhandsome
by me, and very -wrong by the Queen, for him, John Russell,
to have read in the House of Commons the Queen's Memoran
dum of August 1850, hinting at dismissal. In regard to the
Queen, he was thus dragging her into the discussion, and mak
ing her a party to a question which constitutionally ought to be,
and before Parliament could only be, a question between me
and the responsible adviser of the Crown ; and I said that this
mention of the Queen as a party to the transaction had given
rise to newspaper remarks much to be regretted, and which the
Piime Minister ought not to have given an occasion for.
I said that, as regards myself, the impression created by his
reading that Memorandum was, that I had submitted to an
affiront which I ought not to have borne ; and several of my
friends told me, after the discussion, that they wondered I had
not sent in my resignation on receivmg that paper from the
Queen through John Russell. My answer to those friends, I
said, had been, that the paper was written by a lady as well as
by a Sovereign, and that the difference between a lady and a
man could not be forgotten even m the case of the occupant of
a throne ; but I said that, in the first place, I had no reason to
suppose that this Memorandum would ever be seen by, or be
kno-WTL to, anybody but the Queen, John Russell, and myself;
that, secondly, my position at that moment, namely, in August
1850, was peculiar. I had lately been the object of violent
pohtical attack, and had gained a great and signal victory in the
House of Commons and in pubhc opinion : to have resigned
then would have been to have given the fruits of victory to
adversaries whom I had defeated, and to have abandoned my
pohtical supporters at the very moment when by their means I
had triumphed. But, beyond all that, I had represented to
my friends, by pursuing the course which they thought I ought
to have followed, I should have been bringmg for decision at
the bar of pubhc opinion a personal quarrel between myself

LOYALTY ABOVE ALL! 227
and my Sovereign — a step, which no subject ought to take, if
he can possibly avoid it ; for the resiUt of such a course must
be either fatal to him or injurious to the country. If he should
prove to be in the wrong, he would be irretrievably condemned;
if the Sovereign should be proved to be in the wrong, the
Monarchy would suffer.
This resort to the Memorandum of August 1850,
for the purposes of debate in the House of Commons,
gave Lord John EusseU an unexpected success in the
discussion. It was an unfair advantage, because, as we
see from the foregoing letter. Lord Palmerston con
sidered his tongue to be tied in the matter. In con
sequence the general impression on the House was, no
doubt, for the moment, unfavourable to Lord Palmerston.
In a reminiscence of this debate which Lord Hailing left
behind him, the scene is described as foUows : —
I happened to be under the gallery on the night in which
Lord Russell made his explanations.
His speech certainly was one of the most powerful I ever
heard delivered. It was e-vidently intended to crush an expected
antagonist, and, by the detaUs into which it went, took Lord
Palmerston completely by surprise. I listened to his reply
with the more affectionate interest, since he was kind enough
to mention my own name with praise ; but I felt, and aU his
friends felt, that it was feeble as a retort to the tremendous
assault that had been made on him.
I remember Mr. Bemal Osborne coming to the bench where
I was sitting, and expressmg to me a regret similar to that which
I felt myself; and I think it was the night after, in debate,
that, meeting Mr. Disraeh on the stafrcase of Ashbumham
House, which was then the Russian embassy, he said in his
peculiar manner, ' There was a Palmerston ! '
'Palmerston is smashed,' was, indeed, the expression
generally used at the clubs ; but it did not in the least convey
€he idea that Lord Palmerston had formed of his own position.
I must say, in truth, that I never admired him so much as
-at this crisis. He evidently thought he had been Ul-treated ;
l)ut I never heard him make an unfafr or irritable remark, nor
¦did he seem in anywise stunned by the blow he had received,
•or dismayed by the isolated position in which he stood.
q2

228 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
I should say that he seemed to consider that he had had a
quarrel put upon him, which it was bis wisest course to close by
receiving the fii-e of his adversary and not retummg it.
He could not, in fact, have gained a victory against the
Premier on the ground which Lord John RusseU had chosen
for the combat which would not have been more permanently
disadvantageous to him than a defeat. The faults of which he
had been accused did not touch his own honour nor that of his
country. Let them be admitted, and there was an end of the
matter. By-and-by an occasion woiUd probably arise m which
he might choose an advantageous occasion for giving battle, and
he was willing to wait calmly for that occasion.
It came soon enough.

229

CHAPTEE YIIL
PALL OF THE RUSSELL ADMINISTEATION — LOBD DERBY'S GOVBBN-
MENT — DISSOLUTION — SPEECHES AT TIVERTON AND LBWES —
LETTERS — DEFEAT OF THE DERBY CABINET.
Yom: power and your command are taken off,
And Cassio rules in Cyprus. — Othello, Act V. Sc. 1.
In February Lord J. Eussell brought in a MUitia BUI
which was intended to develop a local militia for the
defence of the country. Lord Palmerston at once ex
pressed his dissatisfaction at the form of the measure,
and in committee on the BUI moved as an amendment
to omit the word ' local,' so as to constitute a regular
militia, which should be legally transportable aU over
the kingdom, and so be always ready for any emergency.
This he carried against the Government by a majority
of eleven, and the EusseU Administration came to an
•end. The event created little wonder, as the progressive
feebleness of the Cabinet, since one of its steongeSt
members left it, had for some time prepared the public
mind for a change. We have, however, Sir George
Lewis's testimony * that the division on the amendment
•was a surprise, and that Lord Palmerston himself did
not wish to turn out the Government ; but the cup
laeing fuU, a little movement was sufficient to make it
run over. Lord Derby formed a Government, after
having invited the co-operation of Lord Palmerston,
who ¦IJbus ¦writes to his brother : —
' Sir G. Lewis to Sir E. Head. ' Letters,' p. 251.

230 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. C. G. : February 24, 1852.
I have had my tit-for-tat with John RusseU, and I tumeJ
him out on Friday last. I certainly, however, did not expect
to do so, nor did I intend to do anything more than to persuade
the House to reject his foolish plan and to adopt a more
sensible one. I have no doubt that two things induced him
to resign. First, the almost insulting manner towards him in
which the House, by its cheers, went with me in the debate ;
and, secondly, the fear of being defeated on the vote of censure
about the Cape ' aflafrs which was to have been moved to-day.
As it is, the late Government have gone out on a question
which they have treated as a motion, merely asserting that
they had lost the confidence of the House, whereas if they had
gone out on a defeat upon the motion about the Cape, they
would have carried with them the dfrect censure of the House
of Commons. Lord Derby has formed his Government solely
out of his Protectionist party — none of any other party would
join him. He njade me on Sunday, immediately after he had
seen the Queen, a very civil and courteous offer to join him,
but of course it was impossible for me to do so on account of
my entire difference with him on the question of imposing a
duty on the importation of com even if there had been no other
reasons, but there are many other reasons against it. _ The
House is adjourned tiU Friday, and then it wiU probably adjourn
again for ten days to aUow time for the new Mmisters to be
re-elected. They are not going to dissolve immediately, but
wiU do so as soon as the Estimates are voted and the Mutiny BUI
passed. I cannot conceive that such a Government can stand
long, or can even get a majority by a fresh general election.
And to his brother-in-law, Mr. Laurence Sulivan, he
writes the same day : —
Lord Derby invited me to join him, but as he said that hiS
adherence to or abandonment of protective duties on corn was
to depend on the result of the next general election, that
announcement created a prehminary obstacle which rendered
aU further discussion as to any other points needless. I could
not, however, have jomed him even if that objection had been
removed, because his Government was not to be formed upon
any broad principle of a general union of parties, but he meant
me to come in singly ; and the office of all others which he had
» The Caffir warof 1851.

STJEPOETS THE TOEY MILITIA BILL. 231
intended to propose to me was that of Chancellor of the
Exchequer, which is, of course, departmentaUy subordinate to
the First Lord of the Treasury. I do not mean to say that,
irrespective of the question of Protection, I should have been
much disposed to join him in any case ; but if his Government
had been framed on a comprehensive principle, and Protection
had been thrown overboard, the matter would have required
consideration. Ministers brought in and carried their own Militia
Bill, which Lord John Eussell opposed, but which was
strongly supported by Lord Palmerston on the second
reading. In the following letters he describes with an
accurate forecast the position of affairs ; but it is curious
to notice that Lord Aberdeen, who was to be Prime
Minister within eight months, is not even mentioned as
a possible choice : — Carlton Gardens : April 30, 1852.
My dear William, — It is a long time since I wrote to you,
but one finds one's time nearly as much occupied out of office
as in ; there are so many things one has been obliged to leave
undone during a five years' mcessant Downing Street toil. But
I am gradually getting through a mass of accumulated confusion.
I am, however, a member of a committee on ventUation, which '
takes up much of my mornings, in addition to House of
Commons attendance in evenings.
Our new Government gets on pretty well ; Disraeli has
this evening made a good financial statement. His speech of
two hours was excellent, well arranged, clear, and well dehvered,
but it made out the complete success of the financial and
commercial measures of the last ten years, of the Peel and of
the Whig Administrations, which, while they were in progress
and urider discussion, he and Derby were the loudest to con
demn. He was vociferously cheered by Liberals and Peelites,
but listened to in sullen sUence by the supporters of the
Government. His only proposal is that the income tax, which
expfred on the 5th of this month, shall be continued for one
year longer, to give the Government time to consider what
permanent system they wiU propose; but he has entfrely
thrown over the idea of import duty on com, or, in other
words, the principle of Protection. Opinions differ as to the
probable duration of the session, but the chances are that the

232 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
dissolution will not be tiU the end of June. I do not see that
we need care much when it may be, now that by general con
sent it is agreed that the new Parliament is not to meet tiU
November. The only mconvenience of delay is that people are
put to trouble and expense by the measures necessary to guard
against contests. In the meantime it is a real pubhc advantage
that the Tory party has come into office, and has had an oppor
tunity of seemg and learning and judging as responsible
Ministers many things of which in Opposition they had very
imperfect knowledge and conceptions. They do better than
was expected of them, but, nevertheless, it is scarcely possible
that they should stand as they are ; and if they do not get
some material reinforcement, they will probably not live over
next Christmas, notwithstanding any addition to the number
of thefr supporters (and that wiU not be great) which a general
election may bring them. The most natural reinforcement for
them to look to would be the Peel party, not very numerous,
counting about fifty or sixty, but containing a good many men
of capacity. But as yet it seems to me that the Peehte leaders
have not softened the bitter animosity they have hitherto felt
for the Derby Protectionists. There is no knowing, however,
how far a liberal offer of places in the Government might alter
those feelings, still I think it unlikely. I believe the Derby
Government rather calculate upon inducing me to join them
when Protection has had its pubhc funeral ; on this point of
course I am studiously sUent, but I have no intention or incli
nation to enlist under Derby's banners. I do not think highly
of him as a statesman, and I suspect that there are many matters
on which he and I should not agree. Besides, after having acted
for twenty-two years with the Whigs, and after ha-ving gained
by, and whUe acting with them, any httle pohtical reputation
I may have acquired, it would not answer nor be at aU agree
able to me to go slap over to the opposite camp, and this merely
on account of a freak of John Russell's which the whole Whig
party regretted and condemned ; moreover, I am in no great
hurry to return to hard work, and should not dislike a httle
more. holiday. On the other hand, I o-wn that it would be a
very pressing public emergency which would induce me to place
myself again under John Russell, not on account of personal
resentment, which I have ceased to feel, and he and I meet in
private as good friends as ever, but he has shown on so maiiy
occasions such a want of sound judgment and discretion that I
have lost aU pohtical confidence in him. This last frohc of his

DECLINING POWEE OF LOED J. EUSSELL. 233
in opposing the organisation of a mUitia by the present Govern
ment after ha-ving two months ago resigned the Government
because, as he said, he was prevented (though he was not) from
bringing in a BiU for the same purpose, and after having stated in
Parliament that his reason for resigning instead of dissolving
was that he did not thmk it right to deprive the country during
the time necessary for a .general election of the means of passing
-a law for the national defences — ^this frohc has astounded and
disgusted the whole Whig party and aU other parties into the
bargain. The truth is tlmt the Whigs would be glad to get rid
of John Russell and to have me m his stead if this change could
well be accomplished. But such a substitution is not an easy
thing. It is difficult to reduce to the second place a public man
who for many years has occupied the first place both as leader
of Opposition and as head of a Government ; and such an active
man as John RusseU cannot be put upon the sheh. The fact is,
he has great talents, brilliant abihties, extensive knowledge ;
but he wants judgment, and acts perpetually from sudden and
ill-considered impulse.
If the present Government should be overthrown, the
decision the Queen would make as to the person she would
send for to make a new Administration would of course much
depend upon the circumstances attending the defeat of the
present Government. But John RusseU, if she sent for him,
would have much difficulty in forming a Government. He
would try to get Graham and the Peehtes ; with Graham alone
he could not do. If the other Peehtes were to jom him he
might make a strong Government, though he himself would be
an element of weakness in it. If I was sent for, which, from
the feeling towards me at Court, is highly unlikely, I should
have some difficulty in forming a Government, but I think I
¦could do it ; and though I should be conscious that I am
wanting in many of the requisite qualifications for the post of
Prime Minister, yet I think, on the whole, my deficiencies are
not greater than those of Derby and John Russell, or of any
other person who at present could be chosen for such a duty.
If our session is not of long duration, and the general election
is over by the middle of July, I thmk that EmUy and I shall
probably go over to Ireland for a month, that we shaU then
pass the end of August and the month of September at Broad
lands, and run over to Paris for a fortnight or three weeks in
October, before the meeting of Parhament in November. It
-wUl not be unuseful to have some communication with the

234 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
President, or, as he -will by that time perhaps be, the Emperor.
My Tiverton friends are staunch, and I am not hkely to have
any contest there. I have received many overtures from other
places, but had the offers been ever so plainly demonstrative of
success I should still have preferred keeping a good and safe
seat when I have been lucky enough to get it.
There was to be a dissolution at the end of the ses
sion, and speculation as to its result was afloat.
C. G. : May 23, 1852. ,
My dear William, — Those who have looked mto the chances
of the general election, like Tufnell,' for instance, thmk that
the next Parliament -wUl in its subdi-visions not differ very
much from the present one, and that the Government wUl not
have a majority. If that should so be, and it seems probable,
this Government can scarcely long survive the meeting of the
new Parliament unless it is kept ahve by the difificulty of
formmg another Administration ; but difficulties of that kind
seldom prevent the overthrow of what is, though they may
embarrass those who have to build up something else to succeed
what they have thrown do-wn. John Russell would naturaUy
be the person to be sent for to form a new Government, but he
has gone down wofuUy in public opinion of late, and especiaUy
in the opinion of his o-wn party. His talents are beyon(J
dispute, but the infirmity of his judgment seems equaUy Un
deniable. At the same time there he is, at all events leader
par droit de naissance, even though his title by conquSte has
been somewhat shaken ; and he is so circumstanced that while
he cannot be dealt with as if he were not, and while he must
always be an important man while his health and strength
lasts, yet he does not inspire that confidence which a Prime
Minister ought to enjoy in order that he may be useful, and if
he were again called upon to form a Government he might find-it
difficult to raUy round him such colleagues as he would like
to have. However, all speculations as to the future are at
present idle. Much will depend upon the result of the general
election, and the present Government are safe till the end of
the year at all events.
Young Stanley (Derby's son) is just come back ; he is a
promising young man, and, if he trains on, he may be of much
• Had been ' Whip.'

TEANSLATES GAETEE-OATH FOE VICTOE EMMANUEL. 235
service to his father's Administration. My position in the
meanwhile is a very agreeable one. As I have no office which
other people want, nobody abuses me m order to knock me
down ; while both the Grovernment and the Liberals, wishing
to get me on thefr side, are -vying with each other in ci-vUities.
This is all very weU as long as it lasts, and after five years and
a half of galley-slave labour, I find it not disagreeable to have
some command of my time.
While Aquila* was here I caUed upon him, and took that
opportunity of teUing him what I thought about the system of
government in Naples. He asked me to put in writmg what
I had said to him, and I did so.
Lord Palmerston, who spoke and wrote Italian
fluently and correctly, availed himself of his comparative
leisure out of office to pay Count Aquila the compliment
of corresponding with him in his own language. When
Victor Emmanuel was made a Knight of the Garter at
Windsor Castle, the Queen wished that he should have
some notion of the oath which he was about to take.
Lord Palmerston accordingly wrote out a translation in
Italian and handed it to the King. Cavour, when he
heard of it, was so interested in the incident that he
asked for the paper, and, having ascertained that it was
in Lord Palmerston's own handwriting, put it away, as
an historical relic, among the archives under his control.
In the early part of June there was a debate in the
House of Commons on the general conduct of our foreign
affairs by the Tory Government. The immediate oc
casion was the question of compensation to a Mr. Mather,
an Englishman, who had been cut down in the streets of
Florence by an Austrian officer. Lord Palmerston found
fault with the faltering action of the Foreign Office ;
and the next letter shows that he regarded the state of
public affafrs as merely provisional : — C. G. : June 20, 1852.
My dear WiUiam, — Poor Malmesbury has got into sad
disgrace by his diplomatic mismanagement and his ungram-
matical despatches ; but every trade requfres an apprenticeship,
' One of the Eoyal Princes of Naples.

236 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and a man cannot expect to start at once into being a good
Foreign Secretary any more than into being a good performer on
the violin. He is, however, naturaUy a clever man, and, -with
practice, may become a good Minister ; but it was a hard trial
for a man who had never been in any office whatever to underr
take at once the management of our foreign affiiirs.
We are now on the eve of our dissolution, which is expected
to happen about Tuesday or Wednesday week. The House of
Commons will have finished all its business by Friday week,
and the Lords -ndll wind up thefrs in two or three days after^
wards. Those who have studied the matter, and are able to
judge, think that the general election will send us back a House
of Commons divided into fractions, not very different in theh
relative proportions from those which exist in the present
House. Some say the Derby party wiU gain from ten to
twenty votes, some say it -will lose from ten to twenty; but
that gain, if they make it, -wiU not give them a majority of
thefr own ; and it may fairly be assumed, therefore, that the
Government, as it now is constituted, cannot long survive the
meeting of the new Parliament, if, indeed, it shaU contmue to
exist as it now is until then.
The fact is, that this Government has only two real men in
its ranks — one in the Lords, and one in the Commons — Derby
and Disraeh. The rest are all cyphers as to debate, though
many of them are, I fancy, inconvenient entities in councU.
¦rhere will, however, be great difificulty found in the im
provement of this Government, or in the construction of a new
one. The Peelites are the only party who could as a body join
Derby, and they are at present very hostUe to him, and seem
to me to think more of forming a Grovernment upon the ruins
of his than of entering into a combmation with him. StiU, a
liberal offer of places might alter their feehngs ; and they must
be conscious that they are not numerous enough as a party to
make a Government by themselves. John Russell, on the
other hand, still cUngs to the position of leader of the Whig
and Liberal party ; but a great number of the Whigs openly
express thefr opinion that he has sho-wn himself unfit to lead a
large party or to be the head of a Government, and that he has
in a great measure • lost thefr confidence. He certainly has
entfrely lost mine. I feel no resentment towards bim personaUy
or privately ; but it would require strong inducements to per
suade me to become again a member of a Government of which
he was the head. I could feel no .confidence in his discretion

INDEPENDENCE OF HIS POSITION. 237
or judgment as a political leader, and could place no trust in
bis steady fidelity as a coUeague having my official position at
his mercy. The best arrangement that could be made would
probably be to place Lord Lansdo-wne as head of the Govern
ment, and under him John RusseU and myself with other
Whigs, who with the best of the Peelites might serve as col
leagues on equal terms. But Lansdo-wne's friends and famUy
say that he would not undertake such a task. We shall see.
I am told that the Court does not hke the present Govern
ment, and I can beheve it. AU royal persons like acquiescence
and subserviency of demeanour and conduct. Peel and his
Government, with Aberdeen as Foreign Secretary, spoilt them
in this respect ; but Derby has an off-hand and sarcastic way
about him, which is not the manner of a courtier, and has, I
know, fought stoutly and successfuUy on the Danish question.
As to me, my position is as agreeable as it is possible for
any public man's position to be. The Court, indeed, are cold,
though civil. Either they are conscious of having made a
mistake in thefr passionate hostihty to me, and do not hke to
acknowledge it, or else they stUl dislike me, and only are, just
civU enough to prevent remarks. But the public, the press,
the Parhament, and pohtical parties are all well disposed and
civU. Being free to act individually, I can express my o-wn
opinions without caring for others, and those opinions have
generally been lucky enough to meet with concurrence. The
Government are civil to me, hoping I may join them. The
Whigs are civU to me, hoping that I may not leave them.
We have got a new gardener at Broadlands ; our former
one had^ dwindled do-wn into a smoking sot. It is a trial to a
man to be left as much alone and unlocked after as the gar
dener of a Secretary of State necessarUy is.
I hear that Aquila has been told at Naples to hold his
tongue about anything he heard or saw in England, and not to
obtrude the revolutionary doctrines of the northern barbarians
upon the more civihsed sages of the south of Europe.
On the dissolution of Parliament Lord Palmerston
in the first week in July went down to Tiverton, and
was re-elected ' without opposition. At the former
general election the Chartists had brought down a
weU-known lecturer, Mr. Julian Harney, to oppose
him ; but on this occasion their hearts faUed them
at the last moment. The only opponent, therefore.

238 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
that he ha.d to encounter was his old friend Eowcliff,
the Tiverton butcher, whom he disposed of in his
happiest manner, as will be seen by the following
characteristic extracts from his speech on the hustings.
Much speculation was afloat as to whether or not he
would join the Conservatives, now that he had broken
from his former leader. Eeporters flocked from aU
parts to gather any stray indications of his future
conduct. These he dexterously baffled all through a
humorous speech; and when the Eadical elector, im
patient of this evasion, boldly put the direct question,
he was no less successfuUy parried. After thanking
the electors for the honour which they had conferred
on him for the fifth time. Lord Palmerston proceeded : —
We were told when we came to this place that we should
not only have hot weather and a warm reception, but also a
hot contest. We were told, in mysterious language, in hand
bills cfrculated throughout the town, that an unkno-wn candi
date would appear — a gentleman of ' independent principles.*
I have heard, gentlemen, of an mdependent fortune ; I have'
heard of independent conduct; I have heard of independent
character ; but the handbiU does not condescend to explain what
is meant hy ' independent principles.' I presume the aUusion
is to principles whoUy independent of common sense, of justice,
and of liberahty. (Laughter.) I am glad, gentlemen, for the sake
of the constituency of Tiverton, that such a man has not been
found. We have been told that the general election in which
this country is now engaged is to determine finally and for ever
one great question — I mean the question of Protection or no
Protection. It is my bumble opinion that that question has
been long since settled. I took the hberty of telhng you last
autumn, when I had the pleasure of being here, that when you
saw the River Exe running up from the sea to Tiverton,
instead of running do-wn from Tiverton to the sea, you might
then, and not until then, consider certainly that the revival of
Protection was near at hand. I see no change in the current
of the Exe. I don't even see that in the construction of your
bridges you have taken any precautions to secure them against
a turn of the stream. What, gentlemen, after all, is this great
question which is caUed Protection? Why, Protection is a
single word which represents a not very complex idea. Pro-

DEMONSTEATES SUCCESS OF LIBEEALISM. 239
tection is a term something hke that of ' independent princi
ples,' to which I before referred ; but Protection, stripped of its
.generality, means practically taxing the food of the many for the
sake of the interests of the few. I have that notion of the good
sense and the good feeling of the British nation, that I am con
vinced they never will consent to revert to a system which is
founded upon injustice and mistake. (Cheers.) If you -wished to
know what has been accomphshed by the Liberal commercial
measures which have marked for some years past the course of
legislation, I should give you an answer simUar to that in
scribed upon the tablet which records the burial-place of the
great architect who built the magnificent cathedral of St.
Paul's. You know very well that it is usual to adorn the
place of sepulture of eminent persons -with marble statues, or
groups representing different ideas connected with them. The
burial-place of the architect of St. Paul's has no such ornaments.
You find a simple inscription of his name, and it is added, ' If
you seek for his monument, look around you ' — look around at
that magnificent structure which bears witness to the skill he
had attained in his profession. WeU, gentlemen, if I am asked
what is the merit of those commercial measures which have of
late been formed into laws, I answer, ' Look around you.'
Look around you, beghming with the prosperity of the princely
merchant in his counting-house, and descending to the humble
peasant reposing in his cottage. Ask the mother who carries
her babe in her arms ; ask the father whose children are
¦clinging around him ; ask them what has been the benefit of
the commercial relaxations of late years. They -wiU tell you
the benefit is felt both physically and moraUy, and they will
¦entreat you not to revert to a system which would deprive
-them of the enjoyments -with which they have been blessed.
We are, nevertheless, told that there is one class which, amid
this general prosperity, has suffered in some degree — namely,
-the owners and occupiers of land. If I am asked what is the
real protection for them, I say thefr protection lies mainly in
the happiness and contentment of the rest of thefr fellow-
¦countrymen. Is that a vain assertion t Why, look what hap
pened only three or four years ago. In 1848, when all Europe
was convulsed, when thrones were overturned, when constitu
tions, ancient and modem, were ahke leveUed in the dust, what
was the example shown by this great country 1 There were a
few men who, unjustly and un-wisely dissatisfied -with the con
dition of this country, wished for a -violent change ; but the

240 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
moment that change was threatened you saw every man in the
great city of London, from the highest peer do-wn to the hum
blest labourer, mingling in honourable fellowship, and stepping
forward to defend the laws and institutions of their country in
an array so formidable that it prevented even the shghtest
manifestation of disorder. Now, I beheve that could not have
happened if the people of this country had not felt that the
course of legislation had been directed towards the general
good. Now, gentlemen, those persons and those parties who
wish to improve the institutions of a great country like this
are bound to go slowly and dehberately, and they are sure to
meet -with great resistance at every step which they take. I,
for one, do not complain of that resistance. It belongs to the
character of the country, and it has this advantage, that it pre
vents sudden and iU-considered alterations, and that measures
proposed as improvements receive that due consideration and
discussion which renders them ultimately better adapted to the
condition of the people to whom they apply. A love and affec
tion for ancient practices and institutions is an honourable and
peculiar characteristic of the people of this country, and I am
the last to -wish that that honourable and useful sentiment
should ever be discarded from their minds. There are some of
the nations of the Contment who are more volatUe and more
apt to change, and national character is often evinced by cir
cumstances apparently trifling in themselves. Now, in many
parts of the Continent if an innkeeper wishes to recommend
his inn, he hangs up a sign of 'The New White Horse,' or
' The New Golden Cross.' The last novelty is that which is
considered the most attractive. Here, gentlemen, a contrary
course is pursued, and, if the o-wner of a country alehouse
wishes tO' draw custom, he hangs up the sign of ' The Old
Plough New Revived.' There is at a place caUed HanweU,
not fiir from London, an inn to which gentlemen who, vf-ere
fond of pigeon-shooting used to resort to practise their skiU.
WeU, what is the sign of that inn? It is the 'Old Hats.'
Not that anybody -was thought to prefer an old hat to a new
one, but it was expected that gentlemen would come to ' The
Old Hats ' in preference to ' The New Hats.' Now, a rival inn
was set up; and what was its sign ? Why, ' The Old Old Hats,'
and much it profited by that superlative designation. I was
looking, as I came do-wn here, at the railway time-table book,
and I saw among the advertisements that a firm in the PoiUtry
announce an inn as the ' Old King's Head ; ' and, in order that

ADVOCATES NATIONAL DEFENCES. 241
they may combine the attractions of national feeling with the
attractions of good living, they add that it is the oldest turtle
house in London. The people of this country, too, when they
-wish to express their attachment to the land they live in, call
it, with affectionate endearment, ' Old England ; ' but that does
not prevent them from repafring what may have got into decay,
or from improving, or ornamenting, or embellishing that which
is still good, but may be made better.
Lord Palmerston then turned to the Militia BiU
which the Government had just passed, and which he
had supported, though many of his constituents dis
approved of it.
I suppose that no man in this country, except the few who
think in agreement -with the author of a pamphlet which I felt
it my duty to mention in the House of Commons, and who,
good man ! recommended that we should quietly submit to be
invaded and conquered, in the hope that the conqueror would
be so astonished at our submission that he would grow ashamed
of himself, and would go away after having taken some
£50,000,000 of our money — I presume, with this exception,
that there is no man who has an English heart in his bosom
who does not feel that England is worth defending, and that he
ought to make any sacrifice rather than aUow his country to be
conquered. WTiy, I may say, gentlemen, that this country is
the heart of ci-vil and political liberty, and that the conquest of
this country would not only be one of the greatest calamities to
the country itself, but would be a misfortune to the whole of
the civUised world. A poet, Campbell, who died not long ago,
says, in lines describing the fate of Poland, that —
Hope for a season bade the world farewell,
And Freedom shrieked when Kosciusko fell ;
but Hope would indeed for ever bid adieu to the world, and
Freedom would die and not shriek, if England were to be con
quered. You have for the last two days had bands of music
parading your streets, followed by all the healthy-looking chU-
dren of the place, some toddhng along in the ranks who were
scarcely able to keep thefr feet ; but that peaceful display has
only manifested the joy and contentment of all the people of
the town. What would you have said, however, if these bands
had preceded a hostUe force — if the armed hosts following the
musicians had come to occupy at free quarters every house of
VOL. II. E

242 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
your town, and, having occupied every house, to make them
selves perfectly free with everything and everybody therein
contained ? I may be told these are vain apprehensions —
appeals made to the fanciful fears of the country simply for the
purpose of obtaining the means of adding to the pubhc expendi
ture. That reminds me of a story which I remember ha-ving
heard of an elderly lady who hved near Henley-on-Thames,
and who, when an invasion was expected by Napoleon Bona
parte, said she did not believe he would ever come, because she
had been told in her youth the Pretender was ' coming, and, as
he never came to Henley, she believed Napoleon Bonaparte
never would come there either. Now, I do not quote this story,
gentlemen, to throw any reflection upon the inteUigence of the
elderly portion of the fafrer sex, because I remember to have
heard that the Duchess of Gordon, in the time of Mr. Pitt,
talking to an elderly statesman, was told by him, with regard to
something in which he thought he had acted unwisely, ' ReaUy,
Madam, I feel that I am growing an old woman ; ' upon which
the Duchess replied, ' I am glad to hear that that's all, for I reaUy
thought your Grace was growing an old man, and that's a much
worse thing.' (Great laughter.) Now, I say that those men
who tell you that because you have had no invasion since the
Norman Conquest you never wUl have one, and that you need
not guard against it, are old men. Though they may not be
old in years, they are old in imbecUity of inteUect. AU those
who are most able to judge of mUitary and naval operations
tell you that an invasion is perfectly possible ; that it is more
possible now than it ever was before, mamly on account of the
great change which has been made hy the application of steam
in naval and mUitary operations ; and to tell you that you are
safe from invasion now because you were able to prevent it
before, to tell you that you are safe from invasions now without
precautions, because hitherto you have prevented it by precau
tions, is the greatest of all possible absurdities. Why, how
happened it that you had no invasion at the time of wMch the
good old lady at Henley spoke ? Because you had then a large
standing army -within the kingdom ; you had your whole
mUitia organised, enrolled, and on permanent pay; you had,
besides, four hundred thousand volunteers, the whole country
was in arms, and the enemy could not have made an effectual
attempt; but even then, I beheve, and I have been told on
good authority, it was only in consequence of the failure of a
naval operation, by which the Prench fleets were to have

EEPLY TO 'THE TIVEETON BUTCHEE.' 243
formed a junction, that an attempt to invade you was not made.
The result would have been such as it always will be when
Enghshmen are armed and prepared ; but I say that, if
Englishmen are not armed, and are not prepared, they are
doing injustice to themselves, and are not showing themselves
worthy of those great and inestimable blessings which it has
been the -will of Providence to bestow upon them.
Mr. Eowcliff then came forward and put several
¦questions, the nature of which will be fuUy apparent
from Lord Palmerston's reply.
My good friend, Mr. Rowcliff, has reproached me for not
coming often enough among you. I must say that he does not
appear disposed to make my visits here particularly agreeable
to me. (Laughter.) I cannot say that the manner in which
he receives me affords much encouragement to cultivate the
society of persons of his way of thinking. Whether Mr. Row
chff is a Radical, a Chartist, or a Tory, I reaUy cannot say. I
believe that all parties may have some reason or other for
claiming him. Mr. Rowchff says that I only told you of the
good that Govemments and Parhaments have done, and that I
have myself done, and that I have not told you of the bad.
Why, God bless me ! it was quite unnecessary for me to do
that when he was here. (Loud laughter.) • If there was a bad
thing to be recorded, to be mvented, or to be imagined, I am
quite sure Mr. Rowcliff would be the first man to tell you of it.
(Laughter, which was increased when Mr. Rowcliff called out
' Question ! ') Well, Mr. Rowcliff is impatient under this
castigation. I wiU hit lower or higher, just as he pleases ; but
he must aUow me to bit somewhere. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me
what Government I mean to join. Now, that is a question
that must depend upon the future ; but I will teU him what
Government I do not mean to join. I can assure you and him that
I never will join a Government called a Rowcliff Administration.
(Great laughter and cheering.) Now, gentlemen, do not you
imagine, because you deem it very absurd that there should be
such an admmistration, that my friend Mr. Rowcliff is at aU
of that way of thinking ; for I beheve I am not far mistakesi
in the opinion that he will consider everything going wrong in
this world and in this country until the Rowchff Administra
tion shaU govern the land. Mr. Rowcliff has raked up old and
bygone commonplaces about pensions. He ought to know —
S 2

244 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
because he has no right to talk upon the subject without in
forming himself about it — ^that pensions are now extremely
hmited in amount, and that they are only given for acknow
ledged public services. All those abuses of sinecures, of inor
dinate pensions, and of misbestowed pensions, which existed in
former times, have been corrected, and the pension list has been
enormously reduced. Mr. Rowcliff says I voted for the-
Mihtia Bill. As I have aheady explained to you, the material
difference between the Militia Bill which I opposed and the
Mihtia Bill which I supported was, that the former was founded
upon compulsory ser-vice as the rule, admittmg voluntary
service as the exception, while the BiU of the present Govern
ment, which I supported, was founded upon voluntary service
as the rule, and admits of compulsory service as only the remote-
and contingent exception. The militia now to be raised -wUl be
raised by bounty, and, if I have any fault to find -with the Act, it
is that I think the bounty is rather too high. That, however,
I presume, can be no ground of objection to young men who
may be disposed to enhst. My behef is that you wiU have
no ballot, but that you -wiU gain all your men from the spon
taneous patriotism of the people, aided by the inducement of
the bounty. I do not think so ill of the young men of England
as to beheve that they wiU be afraid of twenty-one days'
service during the year in the mihtia. I commanded a regi-
raent of local militia, which used to assemble for twenty-eight
days' training, and I knew only one instance of a man who-
wished to go home before the twenty-eight days were over.
He was one of the privates, who came to me and said, ' My
lord, I wish you would let me go home.' I replied, 'Why?'
You have only a week to serve now.' 'Well,' said he, 'thg
fact is that before I comed here I promised a yoimg woman in
my parish that I'd marry her, if so be as I surwived the cam
paign.' (Great laughter.) I rephed, ' Heaven forbid that the
young woman should be disappointed ! Go home and marry
her, and tell her the campaign has not been so dangerous as she
may have thought it.' (Laughter.) I am convinced that the
young men of England wiU not be afraid of three weeks'
campaign in a mihtia regiment. Mr. Rowcliff has asked me
my notions of Parhamentary reform. Now, Mr. Rowcliff is a
Chartist, and is for the five or six or any other number of
points of the Charter. I am not a Chartist, and I am too old
to become a Chartist. I am quite satisfied with the constitution
of the coimtry under which I have been bom, under which I

OPINION ON THE BALLOT. 245
have hved, and under which I hope to die. I am for a limited
and constitutional monarchy ; I am not for a repubhc. I have
seen what republics are in other countries. I have seen that
they cannot maintain thefr ground, and that when you try to
establish them you invariably lead the way to a military
despotism. I am for septennial Parliaments. A septennial
Parliament, practically, is not a Parliament that lasts for seven
years, for we all know that the average duration of the Parlia
ments during the last thirty or forty years has not been more
than three or four years. If you establish annual Parliaments
you will have the coimtry in a perpetual commotion. Your
members of Parliament -will not have time to learn their duties,
and your business will be ill done. In the same way, if you
have triennial Parhaments, during the first year the members
-wiU be learning their business, in the second year they -wiU
just be beginning useful measures, and in the third year they
wiU be thinking of the Rowcliffs of their respective consti
tuencies (laughter), and endeavouring to shape their course,
not for the good of their country, but in order to conciliate the
most noisy of thefr constituents. With regard to vote by bal
lot — secret voting — I object to it, because I think it at variance
with the national character, and with the principle of our
constitution. I think a true Englishman hates doing a thing
in secret or in the dark. I do not believe that a majority of
Enghshmen would consent to give their votes in secret, even
if the law permitted them to do so ; and I think if the law
compeUed them to do so, it would be a debasement of the
national character. But I have a higher objection. I hold
that the right of voting is a trust reposed in the elector for
the pubhc good. I do not think that a vote is given for the
benefit of the man who possesses it, and that he can take it to
the best bidder and get £5, iglO, or £20, as the case may be.
The vote is given as a trust for the public and for the nation ;
and I say that any trust reposed in a man for the public good
he ought to perform in pubhc. I say, that for men who are
charged -with the high and important duty of choosing the best
men to represent the country in Parliament to go sneaking to
the ballot-box, and, poking in a piece of paper, looking round
f o see that no one could read it, is a course which is unconsti
tutional and unworthy the character of straightforward and
honest Englishmen.
From Tiverton he went to Lewes to attend the
meeting of the Eoyal Agricultural Society. In his

246 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
speech on this occasion occurred that definition of dfrt
which has become a household word. The toast which
he had to propose was, ' Prosperity to the Borough,' and,,
after remarks on its antiquity and its history as dating
from the time of the Eomans, he spoke as follows : —
Now, gentlemen, the Romans were great agriculturists, and
drew great supphes of grain from this island. But to them
was closed that wonderful book of knowledge which the scientific
investigations of the present day have opened to you in that
inysterious science of chemistry which was then imknown. If
ever there was a case in which it was true that knowledge is
power, that maxim is pecuharly true in reference to the aids
which chemistry affords to agriculture. Allusion has been
made to the question of guano, and it has been mentioned,
what is perfectly true, that when I held an office which would
have enabled me, if it had been possible, to assist the farmer
with regard to guano, my endeavours proved fruitless. In fact,
the Peruvians were not more disposed to let us put a price on
their guano than the British farmer would be to have a price
put upon his com. But, gentlemen, I cannot but think that
the progress of chemical science, and the apphcation of that
science to practical agriculture, may lead you to something
which will render you less anxious and sohcito'us about this
same guano, and that mstead of sending to the other end of the
world for more manure for our fields, we shaU find something
nearly, if not quite, as good -within a few hundred yards of our
dwellings. Now, gentlemen, I have heard a definition of dfrt.
1 have heard it said that dirt is nothing but a thing in a -wrong
place. Now, the dfrt of our towns precisely corresponds -with
that definition. It ought to be upon our fields, and if there
could be such a reciprocal community of interests between the
country and the to-wns, that the country should purify the
to-wns, and the to-wns should fertihse the country, I am much
disposed to think that the British farmer would care less than
he does, though he still might care something, about Peru-vian
guano. Now, we aU acknowledge that there are certain laws
of nature, and that those who -violate those laws invariably suffer-
for it. WeU, it is a law of nature that nothing is destroyed!
Matter is decomposed, but only for the purpose of again assuming
some new form useful for the purposes of the human race.
But we neglect that law. We aUow decomposed substances in
towns to pollute the atmosphere, to ruin the health, to produce

HIS EENOWNED DEFINITION OF 'DIET.' 247
premature misery, to be pestdent to life and destructive of
existence. Well, gentlemen, if instead of that there could be
a system de-vised by which those substances which are noxious
where they now are should be transferred so as to fertilise the
adjoining districts, I am persuaded that, not only would the
health of the town populations be thereby greatly improved,
but the finances of the agricultural population would derive
considerable benefit from the change. I therefore recommend
you gentlemen to ponder the maxim that ' Knowledge is power,'
and as the diffusion of the most useful kind of knowledge is
one of the main objects for which the Royal Agricultural
Society was established, I am persuaded it will tend mainly
and most efficiently to the advancement of the interest and the
power of the agricultural class of the country.
He returns to town, and sends off a report to his
brother at Naples of what he has been doing, and what
was the result of the general election. C. G. : July 24, 1852.
My Tiverton election went off very weU, and my little
speeches there, as well as my speech at the Lewes Agricultural
Meetmg afterwards, have had much more success and praise
than they reaUy deserved. It is a comfort, however, when the
world errs on the right side.
The only thing that everybody, except a few family ad
herents, now consider impossible is, that John RusseU should
form a new Administration. He has lost immensely in pubhc
confidence and consideration. Some of the most sensible of
the Whigs are trying to put Lord Lansdowne up as head of the
party, and the man to form the next Administration. That
would do, and it seems to me that John Russell as weU as I
might serve under Lord Lansdowne, but I would certainly not
serve again imder Johnny, and Johnny, I should think, would
scarcely serve under me, at least at present ; and he is too
considerable a man, with aU his faults and failings, to be put
on the shelf and entfrely passed by. Lansdo-wne would, I
think, be willing to undertake such a task if he was called
upon to do so. The Government seem to have gained by the
elections just strength enough to make it impossible to carry,
at the beginning of the session, whether it be October, Novem
ber, or January, or February, a vote of no confidence, and I
should expect that no such vote -will be attempted ; but they

248 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
have not gained strength enough to carry them through their
measures in the session, and what I expect is, that they -wlU be
beat upon some of their fanciful schemes for reheving everybody
and mcreasing nobody's burdens. This is too mountebankish
to be practicable.
Indirect overtures have lately been made to me from some
members of the Government, but I at once made my excuses,
saying, I am well content at present with my present position.
Many people, and more than might have been supposed, talk of
me as the next Minister, but I do not think that hkely, and
there would be at once the difficulty about John Russell. If I
was Minister I should ask him to take the Foreign Office, and
go to the House of Lords to assist Lansdo-wne, or to lead if
Lansdowne should not choose to do so.
I have only one horse in training this year, and have won
four races with him, two of which, however, were only walks
over. He is three years old, and hkely to -win me several more
races. He runs next week for the Goodwood Cup, but I doubt
his winning, as he Would have to meet some very good horses.
He is by Yenison out of an Emihus mare that I have had
some time.
We have lost some good men in this new Parhament,
George Grey, Cardwell, Mahon, GrenfeU, and several others,
but then we have got rid of some bad ones, Gebrge Thompson,
TJrquhart, and the like. I do not reckon Anstey among the
riddances, for though he came in to impeach me, he has latterly
become one of my warmest friends and supporters. The fact
is that Urquhart and Anstey were brought in at the election
of 1847 in order that they might be set at me and demohsh
me if they could. TJrquhart's seat at Stafford, and Anstey's at
Youghal, cost many thousand pounds, and neither of them had
any mciney to throw away.
Allusion is made in the foregoing letter to incidents
of political warfare which attracted much attention at
the time. Lord Palmerston, in the earlier part of his
career, and especially about the time of his vigorous
action, in 1840, against Mehemet Ali, in despite of
France, had to encounter attacks more -venomous and
more unscrupulous than often fall to the lot of a pubhc
man, however eminent. There went about the country
a knot of men, half of them fanatical and the other

CUEEENT LIBELS EFFECTIVELY SILENCED. 249
half sUly, who, holding meetings in our great towns,
issuing pamphets, and gaining some of the provincial
newspapers, proclaimed the Foreign Secretary as a
traitor to his country, and as having sold himself to
Eussia for hard money. If more recent instances of
popular delusion were not too fresh in our minds to
permit any excessive wonderment, we might well feel
amazed that even a small section of their hearers should
have given ear to thefr assertions. But so it was ; and
Lord Palmerston, however imperturbable by nature, felt
bound to take counsel's opinion as to the proprie-ty of
filing criminal informations against the authors of these
libels. This course, however, was, on consideration,
not adopted ; and, indeed, it would have been giving
the agitators an importance which they did not deserve.
Yet a short time previously he had been obliged to take
before the Court of Queen's Bench the pubUsher of the
* Albion,' in the columns of which he had been accused
of using his official knowledge for stockjobbing pur
poses ; and he obtained from another newspaper, without
legal proceedings, an apology for a suggestion that he
was concerned in a disreputable mining adventure
abroad. He received, therefore, his fuU share of the
shafts dfrected by political malice during the years
while he was making his way to the unassailable position
which he latterly occupied.
But, returning to 1852, we find him describing to
his brother the state of parties during the pause be
tween the general election and the meeting of the new
Parliament : — Brocket : September 17, 1852.
Men seem generaUy disposed to wait to see what measures
the Government propose, and to deal -with those measures
according to thefr merits, and I think the chances are that
some of those measures will be deemed objectionable, and
-wiU be rejected by Parhament. It will then remain to be
seen whether such rejection -will be considered by the Go
vernment a sufficient reason for resigning. The" probabihty
is that Lord Derby wUl not easUy take such a hint, but will
stand his ground until he is forced to retfre. His language

250 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
is that his is the last Conservative Government, and that after
him comes the Deluge. But if he begins to be beat, he -wiU
find it hard to get any fresh troops to join him, and out of his
own corps he can draw httle additional strength. When he is
forced to reth-e great difficulties wUl arise. John RusseU
chngs pertinaciously to his former position of Prime Minister,
and -wiU not serve under any other chief. On the other hand,
the Whig and Liberal party have greatly lost confidence in his-
capacity as a leader, and he would find it very difficult to form
such a Government as would be strong enough to stand. I do
not thmk the Peehtes would join him. I certainly would not
serve under him again, though I might serve -with him under
a thfrd person. Thus he would be driven either to take back
his old chque of Greys and Barings, of whom the country is
tfred, or to aUy himself with Graham and the Radicals, of
whom the country is afraid, and agamst him he would have aU
the supporters of the present Government, numbering about
290, the Peelites, about 50, and a certain number of members
who would be disposed to look to me, perhaps 20. This -would
make a majority against him, besides the general impression in
the country that he has not the qualities requfred for a first
Minister. The way of avoiding these embarrassments would
be to place Lansdowne at the head of the Government, but at
present Johnny wiU not hear of ser-ving under anybody. It is
probable, however, that somehow or other this difificulty may
be got over, and that thus a Liberal Government may be
formed, supposing always that Derby should not be able to
maintain lumself However, time -will show.
So we have at last lost our great Duke.' Old as he was,
and both bodily and mentaUy enfeebled by age, he still is a
great loss to the country. His name was a tower of strength
abroad, and his opinions and counsel were valuable at home.
No man ever hved or died in the possession of more unanimous
love, respect, and esteem from his countrymen.
I have been rather lucky this year on the turf, having had
only one horse (Buckthorn *) m training, and ha-ving won six
races with him. Some who have had six horses have only won.
one race.
The Liberal party were now looking out for a policy
and a leader. Lord John Eussell was discredited.
' Duke of Wellington.
* Won the Ascot Stakes. He looked at one moment so out of the
race that, during the running, 100 to 1 was offered against him.

ON LOED LANSDOWNE AS PEEMIEE. 251
Lord Palmerston had given too recent a blow. In a
letter, to which the following is a reply. Lord Fitz-
wUliam suggested the Marquis of Lansdowne as a
possible leader, although he aUuded to his age as being
against him, and referred to declarations made in the
House of Lords as to his wish for retirement.
Lord Palmerston, as we have seen, had afready
thought of him as the best man for the post.
C. G. ; September 24, 1852.
My dear Lord Fitzwilham, — Seventy-two is certainly, as
you say, an advanced period of life, but if health and faculties
are unimpafred, lapse of years can be no objection. Cardinal
Pleury was seventy-three when made Prime Minister ; and we
are now lamenting the loss of a man who continued in the
active admmistration of an important office till the age of
eighty-four.' Leave-takings, announced in Parhament, should be construed
-with reference to cfrcumstances, and they sometimes only mean
that the person who pronounces them does not intend again to
place himself in the particular and relative position from which
he has just been freed. But your pre-vious question — unlike
those which are moved in Parhament— is a very practical one.
You doubt whether ' it is desirable at present to overthrow the
present Government.' To this I would add another doubt,
namely, whether it is possible to do so ? I apprehend that
there are in the House of Commons many men who rank as
Liberals, and who differ from the supposed principles of the
present Government, who, nevertheless, would not join in any
vote at the opening of the session, the avowed object of which
would be to overthrow the present Government. Thefr motives,
I conceive, would be ; first, that there is no existmg party
organisation which would at once present the elements of
another Government to succeed the present one ; and, secondly,
that in such a state of things, the best course to pursue is to
allow the presont Government to explain thefr intended
policy, and to develop their proposed measures, and to deal
with that pohcy and those measures according to thefr intrinsic
merits. I o-wn that such appears to me to be the best course.
If the present Government propose good measures, why should
the country not have the benefit of such measures ? If the
• Duke of Wellington.

252 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
measures they propose are bad, let them be rejected, and let
the Government abide the consequences of their own want
of judgment and skiU. It is indeed hard to imagine that the
Government wiU be able to make good all the expectations of
rehef which they have held out to various classes of the com
munity ; and the chances seem to be that they -will sustain
some defeats when these measures come to be discussed.
Moreover, the composition of the Government is not one that
promises long duration without material changes. The Govern
ment contains two men of first-rate abilities, one in one House,
the other in the other — Derby and Disraeli; but it maybe
doubted whether the other members of the Cabinet are weU
equal to sustaining the rude shock of parhamentary conflict
through a difficufi session. What you say about organic
changes is perfectly true. They ought not to be proposed
unless they are really needed for the pubhc good, and they
should not be launched by a Government as a clap-trap for
fancied popularity without any fair prospect of their beiag
carried. I do not myself see any reason why we may not go on very
Well without any such organic changes. It would, I think, be
an improvement (if there would be no obstacle in the detaUed
execution of such a measure) if the present system of contested
registration could be got rid of, and if the poor-rate register
Were made also the register for the right of voting ; and if suofi
a change were accompanied by some small diminution in the
qualification for electors, no harm would be done. I should
not be surprised if the present Government were to propose
some measures of this kind. It would not be out of character
for a Government of which one member proposed to give every
mihtiaman a vote, and of which another member, on a motion
for Parliamentrry reform, talked very freely about the expe
diency of emancipating the labouring classes.
The great frankness of Lord Palmerston's character
comes out in the next letter. He remained on perfectly
friendly terms with Lord J. Eussell, but, as wUl be
seen, he had not hesitated to teU him openly that his
confidence in him, as a leader, was shaken, and that he
would be unwilling, therefore, to serve under him again.
This was all received in good part by the ex-Premier ;
for offence can never be taken at an open expression of
honest opinion, whether it be right or wrong.

ESTIMATE OF LOED JOHN EUSSELL'S POSITION. 253
Broadlands : October, 1852.
My dear Lansdo-wne, — The Duke and Duchess of Bedford
came to Brocket for a day while we were there ; and as I found
from Melbourne that the Duke was desfrous of knowing my
feelings as to serving in any Government that might be formed
by John Russell, I sought an opportunity of a conversation
with him, and as he led to the subject, I spoke my mind to him
freely and in detail. I said that my private and personal regard
and friendship for John Russell remain unaltered, and that I
must always entertain towards him individually those senti
ments of kindness which one feels for a private friend with
whom one has been acting in pubhc life for more than twenty
years. But I said that my pohtical confidence in him is gone,
and that I woidd not again act under him as a chief who
should be the arbiter of my official position or the guide of my
pohtical course. That as a pohtical leader he is not to be
depended upon : is infirm of purpose, changeable in his views,
and perpetuaUy swayed by influences which are known and
felt only by thefr results.
So much I said as to my pohtical confidence in John Russell
as a Prime Minister. In regard to my own feelings as to a
return to my former official dependence upon bim, I said that
the more and the longer I refiected upon his conduct towards
me last year, the more I felt those sentiments which induced
me at the time to write him a note to beg that he would not
suppose from the quiet manner in which I took what he had
done, that I did not feel that just indignation which bis con
duct must necessarily inspire.
The letter here goes into details connected with his
dismissal in December, 1851, which have already been
quoted, and then continues : —
I said to the Duke of Bedford that the upshot of aU this
was that I could not again serve under John RusseU, but that
I should not object to serve with him on equal terms under a
third person. But I said that indeed it seemed to me impos
sible that, in the event of the present Government falhng John
RusseU should be able to form a Grovernment ; that I do not
think the Peehtes would join him ; and that he would therefore
have against him the two hundred and ninety who are reckoned
as supporters of the present Government, the forty or fifty
Peehtes, and a certain number, however smaU, who are hkely

254 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to ask what course I should under such circumstances pursue.
In conclusion, I said to the Duke that which indeed I had
stated to bim some weeks before — ^that in the present broken-
up condition of parties it seems to me that you are the leader
the most likely to reconcile and reunite the sections of the
Liberal party, and also to receive support from some moderate
men whose present tendencies would lead them to rank as
.adherents of the existing Government.
The Duke expressed himself pleased with my personal
feelings towards John Russell, and acknowledged the fair
manner in which, according to my o-wn view of the matter, J
had stated my o-wn case.
I do not think, however, that he seemed to be of opinion
that John Russell shares my con-viction as to the impossibihty
of his now forming another Government.
Lord Lansdowne, however, pleaded age and desire
for repose in reply to those sections of the Liberal party
who called upon him to come forward and fill the breach.
Upon this Lord Palmerston remarks : —
Broadlands : October 14, 1852.
I can easily understand that you should, after many years
of ministerial labour and confinement, prefer freedom to con
straint, but —
When Honour calls, where'er she points the way,
The sons of Honom- follow and obey ;
and if the course of events should render a sacrifice on your
part necessary, that sacrifice wUl undoubtedly be made.
I should not be surprised, however, if Derby's Government
were to have more hfe in it than people generally imagkie.
Protection Derby wiU openly throw over, and if the measures
which he proposes are tolerably good they wUl be accepted, and
any proposal of a vote of no confidence would probably fail ;
and if Derby would recruit a httle more debating power from
out of his o-wn followers, which may not be impossible, he
might be able to struggle on for some considerable time. If
there was an obvious prospect of forming a good Liberal
Government, aU these resources would be too httle for Derby;
hut if there can be no Liberal Government but one under
John Russell, Derby may have a longer tenure of office than
was at first imagined.' ' To Lord Lansdowne, October 14, 1852.

LOED LANSDOWNE'S CONDITIONAL ASSENT. 255
The new Parliament met for business on November
11. The dissolution had little altered the balance of
parties, so that the Government were stUl in a minority.
The Liberal leaders, as wiU be seen, had adjusted their
internal difficulties, and were prepared to form a Cabinet,
if necessary. C. G. : November 17, 1852.
My dear WiUiam, — I think the chances are that the
¦Government wUl faU by thefr measures if they are measures
of any magnitude and importance, because any such measures
must involve changes in the distribution of -taxes ; and though
the persons who are to be lightened may like such changes,
they who are to be burthened will object, and the measures will
most likely be thrown out. If the measures are very small
they wUl disappoint the expectation which has been excited ;
anyhow, it seems hkely that this Government -wUl not last
long, and now there is another formation ready to take thefr
place. Lord Lansdo-wne would consent to be chief if asked
by the Queen to do so. John Russell would take office under
Lansdo-wne, and would, moreover, if it were wished, go up to
the House of Lords, and I should then be left to perform that
honourable but frksome task of conducting the business of the
'Government in the House of Commons. In that case I should
have the Home Office, and Johnny the Foreign. I should, in
any case, much prefer the Home Office to going back to the
immense labour of the Foreign Office. J'y ai He, as the
Frenchman said of fox-hunting. The Peelites would form
part of such a Government, and we should have the support
of a good few of those who are now adherents of the present
Government. However, all this is as yet in the clouds ; one
¦should not dispose of the bear tiU the bear is taken and slain,
and one ought not to make a Government for the Queen till
one is quite sure what her intentions are upon that matter.
I think, however, that this Government -will sink under its
o-wn feebleness before Easter.
The Austrians have distinguished themselves by declining
to send anybody to the funeral of the Duke, and I am told
that our Queen is very angry with them. The papers say it is
the Emperor himself who took this decision ; and I am told he
is quite a fanatic, sleeps on a hard mattress on the floor, stints
himself in sleep, and mortifies the body in all ways. This is a
pity; an enhghtened and sensible Emperor of Austria would

256 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
be a great acquisition for Europe, though, to be sure, he would
be a novelty. But the Austrians hate England and the
English nation, notwithstanding the ci-vil compliments inter
changed between the Austrian Government and the Derby
Administration when Derby came into office last spring. WeU,
we can do without them, and I hope they can do -without us.
It is desirable for their own sakes that they should be able to
do so, for help from England they are not very likely to get.
The Queen's Speech at the opening of Parliament
had been very ambiguous on the subject of Free Trade.
In the opinion of many it was studiously so ; and it was
therefore considered necessary to elicit, without delay,
a parliamentary declaration, in order to show to the
world that a free-trade policy had been irrevocably
adopted. Accordingly, on November 23, Mr. Charles
VUliers moved a resolution which was so worded that
the Government could not possibly accept it, and, there
fore, had the House adopted it, the Ministry must at
once have retired from office. It was, however, not the
general wish to turn out the Government before they
had proposed their Budget ; so Lord Palmerston came
to the rescue, and proposed an amended resolution
worded with more regard to Tory susceptibUities. The
difference between the two resolutions was, that while
they both unequivocally affirmed the doctrine of Free
Trade and its permanent estabUshment, Lord Palmer
ston's did not compel those who agreed to it publicly
to recant the private opinions which, at a former period,
they may have honestly entertained. The Government
accepted it, and it was carried by a large majority.
This debate finally closed the discussions on Free
Trade, which had for so many years proved the subject
of controversy in Parliament. ¦
The result of the division in the House of Com
mons did not, however, deceive the Ministry as to the
weakness of their position, and they naturally looked
round to see how they could strengthen it. There was
no time to lose ; so on the following day Mr. Disraeli
made a formal proposal to Lord Palmerston to join Lord

EESIGNATION OF THE DEEBY MINISTEY. 257
Derby's Government. He declined ; saying that he
could not do so singly, and that the Peelites with
whom he was then acting showed no disposition to
approximate to the Government. The Ministry, there
fore, had to face without any new aUies the battle over
their Budget which Mr. Disraeli, as Chancellor of the
.Exchequer, introduced on December 3. The principal
features were, besides a diminution of the tea duties a
reduction of the malt tax, which created a large deficit,
and a doubling of the house tax, to supply the void.
The farmers, expecting something better, did not care
about the reduction made in their favour, while the
townsfolk did care very decidedly about the increase
made at their cost. The Budget was generally con
demned, and, in spite of an energetic ' whip,' the
Government were beaten by 19 in a very full House.
They accordingly resigned.

VOL. II.

258 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE IX.
GOES TO THE HOME OFFICE IN THE ABERDEEN ADMINISTKATION-^
WOEK AT HOME OFFICE — TEMPORARY RESIGNATION.
LoBD Aberdeen was charged with the formation of a
new Government. He at once sought the co-operation
of Lord Palmerston, who, at first, withheld it, being
unwilling to share the responsibility of a Cabinet whose
foreign policy, he anticipated, would be of a character
to merit his disapproval. But he was indispensable. A
general though undefined feeling among the public had
already marked him out as the coming man. Lord
Lansdowne therefore renewed Lord Aberdeen's solici
tations, and induced Lord Palmerston to reconsider his
decision. He selected the Home Office as his depart
ment, and gives to his brother the following account of
his feelings and motives: — C. G. . December 22, 1852.
I have accepted the Home Office in the new Government.
When first Lansdowne and Aberdeen asked me to join the new
Government I declined, giving as my reason that Aberdeen and
I had differed so widely for twenty-five years on all questions of
foreign policy that my joining an Administration of which he
was to be the head would be liable to misconstruction both at
home and abroad. But the next day Lansdowne came again
and urged me strongly, and I found that the Foreign Office,
which I had determined not myself in any case to take, would
be held either by Clarendon or John Russell, whose weU-estab-
hshed reputations for liberahty would give a security in regard
to our foreign relations.
Lansdo-wne's representations of the great importance, in the
present state of things at home and abroad, that the new Govern
ment should be as strong in its fabric as the materials avaUable

ACCEPTANCE OF HOME OFFICE, AND EEASONS. 259
for the purpose can make it, determined me to yield to his advice
and to accept the Home Office ; and the more I have thought
the matter over, the better satisfied I have felt that I have
acted right. The Foreign Office will be taken by John RusseU,
but if he finds the business too much for him, in addition to his
employment as leader in the House of Commons, he will then
give it up to Clarendon. The Home Office was my o-wn choice ;
I had long settled in my own mind that I would not go back to
the Foreign Office, and that if I ever took any office it should
be the Home. It does not do for a man to pass his whole life
in one department, and the Home Office deals with the concerns
of the country internally, and brings one in contact with one's
feUow-countrymen, besides which it gives one more influence in
regard to the mihtia and the defences of the country.
This Government wiU combine almost all the men of talent
and experience in the House of Commons except Disraeh ; but
the Opposition will be numerically strong, as they reckon about
310. , A good many of these, however, will probably be disposed
to give the new Government a fair trial.
And to Mr. Sulivan, his brother-in-law, he writes: —
Carlton Gardens : December 24, 1853.
On Tuesday I positively dechned joining the new Government,
first to Lansdowne, who was nearly an hour talking to me, and
afterwards to Aberdeen, who came and offered me carte blanche
as to departments ; but on Wednesday morning Clarendon
came to tell me he had had the Foreign Office offered him, and
that he was disposed to accept it. That removed much of the
objection which I had felt. When he left me, Lansdowne came
again earnestly to press me to take office ; and I at last con
sented to take the Home Office, the department which I had
mentioned as the one I should have preferred if I had been
wUling to join the new regiment. Reflection has satisfied me
that I have acted rightly. The state of the country in all its
interests, foreign and domestic, requfres a Government as strong
as there are elements for making it ; and if my aid is thought
by Lansdo-wne and others likely to be useful, I ought not to let
personal feelmgs stand in the way. As regards myself indi
vidually, it must be borne in mmd that when the Whigs and
Peehtes unite to form a Government and to support it, I
should, if I had persisted in standing aloof, have been left in a
little agreeable pohtical sohtude. I am glad, therefore, that I
have not adhered to my first determination ; and I am sure
s 2

260 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
that the course which, on second thoughts, I have pursued is
:the best for the public interest and for my own comfort.
There was a large body of men, however, who would
have been only too glad to relieve Lord Palmerston from
the ' political solitude,' which he here mentions as the
alternative to joining Lord Aberdeen's Government.
The Tories were discontented with their House of
Commons leader. They further had been so demo
ralised by recent party cfrcumstances as to have come
to doubt all political morality, and to regard statesmen
as mere party swordsmen ; when, therefore, at the outset
of the year they saw the Foreign Secretary summarily
turned adrift by the Whig leader they began looking
towards him with the same anxiety and yearning with
which an Italian little state in the Middle Ages would
have looked for some condottiere of good repute who was
about to be out of employment. They would gladly
have hailed him as their new chief had he been minded
to join them. But between these three hundred and
odd gentlemen and Lord Palmerston there was little
common political creed; andthe members ofthe Oppo
sition who indulged in such a dream as this only showed
thereby how completely they misunderstood his position,
his character, and his political principles.
On December 27 the new Government appeared in
their places in Parliament, when Lord Aberdeen, in the
House of Lords, gave a sketch of its intended policy.
With regard to foreign affairs, he said that it would
' adhere to the principles which had been pursued for
the last thirty years, and which consisted in respecting
the rights of all independent states, while, at the same
time, we asserted our own rights and interests; and
above all, in an earnest desire to secure the general
peace of Europe.'
Considering that Lord Palmerston had been at the
Foreign Office during more than half the period named, .
Lord Aberdeen was paying an indirect tribute to his
policy. As for Lord Palmerston himself, he quickly

OPINION OF NAPOLEON'S MAEEIAGE. 261
settled down to his new duties, and writes thus to his
brother : — Carlton Gardens i January 31, 1853.
We (the Government) are now preparing for the renewal
of the session on the 10th of this next month. We shall be
strong on the Treasury bench, and I hope not weak in the
division lobby. . It is clear that if we were to be turned out,
the only Government that could be put in our stead would be
Derby's, and experience has proved that his Government could
not stand. We may therefore expect that the moderate men
who supported him will not be disinchned to give us a fair
support, and it -will be our business to deserve it. Though the
Cabinet consists of men of various parties and shades of opinion,
all having agreed to unite, wUl, I doubt not, unite to agree,
and in that case we shall go on very well.
We are labouring to place the country in a state of defence,
and our only limit is the purse of the Chancellor of the Ex
chequer; but whatever may be at the bottom of the secret
thoughts of the French Emperor, into whose bosom no man can
dive, yet I see no reason to apprehend an immediate or even an
early rupture with France ; and if we have two years more of
preparation aUowed us, we shall be in a good defensive position.
In the meantime we do not aUow that we are even now de
fenceless. The increase of navy, artiUery, marines, and the
organisation of the militia, have placed us in a very different
condition from that in which we stood two or three years ago.
Napoleon's marriage seems to me a most sensible one. He
had no chance of a pohtical alliance of any value, or of sufficient
importance to counterbalance the annoyance of an ugly or epi
leptic wife whom he had never seen till she was presented to
him as a bride ; and he was quite right to take a wife whom
he knew and liked. I admire the frankness with which he
declares himself a parvenu, and the assertion of that truth,
however it may shock the prejudices of Vienna and Petersburg,
wiU endear him to the bulk of the French nation.
As Home Secretary Lord Palmerston astonished
everybody except those who knew him well, by the vigi
lance, care, inteUigence, and originality with which he
discharged his duties. No details were too small if only
they were important to those concerned. He paid a
visit to Parkhurst Prison, and wrote a Memorandum on

262 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the ventilation of the ceUs with just.' as much zeal and:
thoroughness as if he were conducting a Government
measure in full view of the country. A standing monu
ment of this period of his career is the system of grant
ing tickets of leave to convicts; Hazardous as the
experiment was at that time considered, it- proved
successful, and solved the difficulty which stared us ia
the face when the Colonies declined any longer to allow
us to shoot our refuse on their shores. It devolved on
him to find a substitute for transportation, which had
become no longer available, and he carried through the
House of Commons a Bill constituting the new system
of secondary punishment, which, in its main features,
is still in force.
Many other useful measures owed their birth to his
activity during the two years that he was at the Home
Office. The abatement of the smoke nuisance in the
metropolis, whereby to a great extent its atmosphere
¦vvas purified^ — the cessation of intramural interments, of
Aj^iich people could only have been induced to tolerate
the evils by the influence of long custom — the extension
of the Factory Acts,* and the more general holding of
winter assizes for the trial of prisoners awaiting gaol
delivery, were among the most prominent of the un
doubted boons which his practical mind devised for the
benefit of the country.
He was especially happy in his manner of receiving
those numerous deputations which always converge
towards the Home Office. Deputation has been wittily
defined as ' a noun of multitude which signifies many, '
but does not signify much.' However accurate this
may be as a definition, it would be a grave error to
undervalue the importance to a minister of possessing
the art of listening patiently, and giving a straight-
' The ten and a half hours of work were by existing Acts to be be
tween six a.m. and six p.m. " This was a great guarantee against evasion
of the law. It was foundt ho-wever, that the wording of the Acts did
not extend this limitation to children, but only to young persons.
Lord Palmerston warmly took up the cause of the children w^eathis
was brought to his notice, and rectified the law. -' • ¦

ABLE EECEPTION OF DEPUTATIONS. 263
forward though civil ' No.' Lord Palmerston had it in
a notable degree. His prompt but cordial refusal was
often more palatable than another man's cold and
doubtful acquiescence.'
He aUudes to some of his work in the foUowing
letter : — C. G. : April 3, 1853.
My dear WUham, — It is now a long while, I fear, since I
last wrote to you, but ever since the meeting of Parliament I
have been living as people do during a contested election, talked
to from moming tUl night, and with no time to do anything.
The mere routine business of the Home Office, as far as that
consists in daily correspondence, is very far lighter than that of
the Foreign Office, but, during a session of Parhament, the
whole day of the Secretary of State, up to the time when he
must go to the House of Commons, is taken up by deputa
tions of all kinds and inter-views with Members of Parliament,
militia colonels, &c. But on the whole it is a much easier
office than the Foreign, and, in truth, I really would not, on
any consideration, undertake again an office so unceasingly
laborious every day of the year as that of Foreign Affafrs." I
shaU be able to do some good in the Home Office. I ana?
shutting up all the graveyards in London, a measure authorised
by an Act of last session, and absolutely required for preserva
tion of the health of the town. There is a company who are
going to make two great tunnels under London, fiity feet below
the surface, one north, the other south, of the Thames, running
nearly alongside the river, beginning some way above the to-wn,
and ending some way below it. These tunnels are to be the
receptacles into which all the sewers and drains of London are
to be discharged, so that nothing is to go into the Thames, and
the contents of these tunnels are, at the point of termination,
to be dried and converted into manure to be sold to agricul
turists as home-made guano. I shall try to compel, at least,
"the tall chimneys to burn thefr o-wn smoke, and I should hke
to put down beershops, and to let shopkeepers sell beer like oU,
' His reception of certain inhabitants of Eugely, who wanted a new
¦name for their town, which had acquired an unenviable notoriety owing
to its having been the residence of the poisoner Palmer, gives a
specimen of the way in which he could deal with requests that could
not be treated seriously. He got rid of them by offering his own name
aud asking how Palmerstown would suit them.

264 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and vinegar, and treacle, to be carried home and drunk -with
wives and children.
Our session will be long but not dangerous. We shall have
to renew the income tax and the East India Charter. These
and other matters will take time, but I do not see that any
other Government is, at present, possible. The last Cabinet has
been too much discredited to be put back again, and Derby, hav
ing failed in his experiment to make a Cabinet out of men who
knew nothing of public business, would scarcely hke to make
another trial with a new lot equally ignorant and incapable.
Besides, if we were beat by mere numbers, there would be
the resource of a dissolution, to which I conclude we should
have recourse rather than at once give up our posts; We may
have some difficulty next year about Parhamentary Reform,
but enough for the year are the troubles thereof. As yet,
nothing can be more harmonious than our Coalition Cabinet.
I dare say you have heard at Naples much about our har
bouring conspiring refugees. The answer I make to those who
complain of those matters here is, that a handful of refugees in
London cannot arrange a revolution in a foreign country, and
send out the plan to be executed off-hand. They must, in the
first place, have associates and instruments many thousand in
number in the country to which the plan is to be apphed,
because a revolution cannot be acted by a handful of men..
They must have much local knowledge to make thefr arrange
ments, and this knowledge, bearing upon chcumstances which
vary from day to day, is not possessed by men in London, and
can only be furnished by men on the spot. Therefore these
London conspfrators can do nothing without the co-operation of
a great number of people in the foreign country, with whom
they must have long and detailed communication either by
letters or by messengers. But what are the Governments of
the foreign countries about if they cannot, by thefr police and
their passport system, find out the proceedmgs of the large
mass of these conspirators who are in their own country, and if
they cannot intercept the letters or discover and arrest the
messengers ? It is plain that the real and practical conspiracy
is worked out in the foreign country and not in England ; and
these foreign Governments try to throw upon us a blame which
really belongs to them, and if arms and ammunition are sent or
provided, it is the foreign Government that ought to be able to^
find that out.
The coimtry generally is highly prosperous, trade flourish-

THE CHOLEEA AND ' A DAY OF FAST.' 265
ing, the revenue good, and the emigration ha-ving gone just far
enough to raise wages to a proper amount without making
labour inconveniently scarce. 'The Irish emigration will, I
hope, go on, and it would be a good thing if a larger number
would go off to America. The priests are, of course, furious,,
every emigrant is so much out of thefr pocket.'
I am very glad that Clarendon ^ has got the Foreign Office.
He will do the business well, and keep up the character and
dignity of the country.
The cholera appeared this year in the United King
dom, and in the autumn the Presbytery of Edinburgh
wrote, through their Moderator, to Lord Palmerston^
asking whether, under the circumstances, a national
fast would be appointed on Eoyal authority. The Home
Secretary, like CromweU, who supplemented his exhor
tation to his men to put their trust in God by a caution
to keep thefr powder dry, sent the following answer : —
Whitehall : October 19, 1853.
Sfr, — I am dfrected by Viscount Palmerston to acknowledge
the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst., requesting, on behah
of the Presbytery of Edinburgh, to be informed whether it is
proposed to appoint a day of national fast on account of the
visitation of the cholera, and to state that there can be no doubt
that manifestations of humble resignation to the Divine Will,.
and sincere acknowledgments of human unworthiness, are
never more appropriate than when it has pleased Providence
to afflict mankind -with some severe visitation ; but it does not
appear to Lord Palmerston that a national fast would be suit
able to the circumstances of the present moment.
The Maker of the Universe has established certain laws of
nature for the planet in which we hve, and the weal or woe of
mankind depends upon the observance or the neglect of those
laws. One of those laws connects health -with the absence of
those gaseous exhalations which proceed from over-crowded
human beings, or from decomposing substances, whether animal
or vegetable ; and those same laws render sickness the almost
' Lord Palmerston for many years spent a large portion of his.
Irish income in enabling those of his tenants to emigrate who wished
to do so.
' He had succeeded Lord John Eussell.

266 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
inevitable consequence of exposure to those noxious mfluences.
But it has at the same time pleased Providence to place it
within the power of man to make such arrangements as wUl
prevent or disperse such exhalations so as to render them harm
less, and it is the duty of man to attend to those laws of nature
and to exert the faculties which Providence has thus given to
man for his own welfare.
The recent visitation of cholera, which has for the moment
been mercifully checked, is an awful warning given to the
people of this realm that they have too much neglected their
duty in this respect, and that those persons with whom it rested
to purify towns and cities, and to prevent or remove the causes
of disease, have not been sufficiently active in regard to such
matters. Lord Palmerston would, therefore, ^Suggest that the
best course which the people of this country can pursue to
deserve that the further progress of the cholera should he
stayed, will be to employ the mterval that will elapse between
the present time and the beginning of next spring in planning
and executing measures by which those portions of thefr towns
and cities which are inhabited by the poorest classes, and
which, from the nature of things, must most need purification
and improvement, may be freed from those causes and sources,
of contagion which, if allowed to remain, will infallibly breed
pestUence and be fruitful in death, in spite of aU the prayers
and fastings of a united but inactive nation. When man has
done his utmost for his own safety, then is the time to invoke
the blessing of Heaven to give effect to his exertions.
I am, Sfr, your obedient servant,
Heney FitzeoY.
This letter created a great stir, and some indigna
tion among certain sections of the community ; but it
was, after all, the embodiment of common sense. It
reminded those in authority that it was their bounden
duty not to neglect the teachings of science or the spirit
of practical Christianity. It suggested that until they
had fulfiUed their duty to their neighbour, they could
not lift up clean hands in prayer and fasting. The
lesson which it thus sought to inculcate on the munici
pal authorities of Scotland was greatly needed. Sani
tary laws were at that time even less known and less
cared for than now ; and in the terror excited by the

¦ EXCEPTIONS TO HIS SENSIBLE EEPLY. 267
mysterious appearance of this terrible disease, the fact
was overlooked that the conditions under which it was
developed and diffused were under human control, and
grew out of the negligence and folly of individuals and
local authorities. To substitute a national fast for the
paramount duty of cleansing the drains and purifying
the streets, would have been a strange misunderstand
ing of the Divine Will, as revealed in the operations of
natural causes.
The free wits of the day averred that Lord Palmer
ston had brought into his new office the proclivities of
his former department, and that in his answer to the
Presbytery he treated Heaven as a 'foreign power.'
The joke was, however, wide of the mark, if it meant
to insinuate any irreverence for sacred things on his
part, as he never either showed such a feeling himself,
or encouraged its manifestation in others.
There was yet another occasion, about this time,
when, owing to a speech, he found himself made into a
theological target. In the winter of 1854, presiding
at a labourers' meeting at Eomsey, he told them that
they would find that all children were born good, and
that only bad education and bad associations corrupted
the mind. There might be exceptions, as there are
men born physically defective ; but that the heart of ¦
man was naturally good, and that it depended upon
training whether that goodness, implanted at birth,
should continue to display itself. This apparent piece
of heresy as to the doctrine of ' original sin ' greatly
stirred the clerical world, appearing as it did at the
duU season. One leading organ had an amusing but
reproachful article, saying that if Lord Palmerston had
been a nurse he would have known better. ' If any
body,' it continued, 'could teach a child to smile away
its tears, to bear abstinence with fortitude, rebukes
with patience, and inward commotions with grace, Lord
Palmerston is the man to do it ; nevertheless we feel
sure that he would soon find he had as difficult subjects
to deal with as he ever found in perverse princes and

268 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the evU associations of Courts.' But others were not
disposed to deal with it so lightly, and discussed it very
gravely. The truth being all the time that the Premier
had not the remotest idea of touching upon such an
abstruse topic as ' original sin,' but was talking to la
bouring men about those ordinary features of generally
good or generally bad conduct which could be evident
to every one of them.
One of the provisions of the Act forbidding intra
mural interment gave power to the Home Secretary to
make exceptions in cases which he might deem fit.
Lord Palmerston, however, appears to have deemed none
fit, as may be gathered from the following answer to a
request for special permission in the case of a deceased
dignitary of the Church : — Broadlands : January 3, 1855.
My dear Stanley,^ — -I am sorry to say that I have aheady
felt myself obliged to decline compliance with the request con
tained in the enclosed letter. The practice of burying dead
bodies under buildings in which li-ving people assemble in large
numbers is a barbarous one, and ought to be at once and for
ever put an end to, and I have made this a general rule in all
cases. But a rule is no rule if partial exceptions are made ;
the rule then degenerates into an in-vidious selection of particular
persons for its application, and other particular persons for its
relaxation. And why, pray, should archbishops and bishops, and deans
and canons, be buried under churches if other persons are not
to be so? What special connection is there between church
dignities, and the pri-vilege of being decomposed under the feet
of survivors 1 Do you seriously mean to imply that a soul is
more likely to go to heaven because the body which it inhabited
lies decomposing under the pavement of a church instead of
being placed in a churchyard i
If commemoration is what is wanted, a monument may be
placed in a church though the body is in the burial-ground ;
but why cannot the monument be equally well erected in the
consecrated burial-ground 1
As to what you say about pain to feelings by shutting up of
burial-grounds, that is perfectly true. I am quite aware that
' Lord Stanley of Alderley.

EESIGNATION; BUT NOT ACCEPTED. 269
the measure is necessarily attended with pain to feehngs which
excite respect, as well as to pressure upon pecuniary interests
which are not undeserving of consideration. But no great
measure of social improvement can be effected -without some
such temporary inconvenience to individuals, and the necessity
of the case justifies the demand for such sacrifices. To have
attempted to make the application of the new system gradual
would have reduced it to a nulhty. England is, I beheve, the
only country in which, in these days, people accumulate putre
fying dead bodies amid the dwellings of the li-ving ; and as to
burying bodies under thronged churches, you might as well put
them under hbraries, drawing-rooms, and dining-rooms.
During the first year of his renewed tenure of office
he very nearly parted from his colleagues. In the
' Annual Eegister ' for 1853 occurs this passage : —
On the 16th of December an important ministerial crisis
was occasioned by the announcement that Yiscount Palmerston
had resigned his office. His resignation, however, was not
accepted, and, after an interval of some days' suspense, the
noble lord was prevaUed upon to withdraw it. The opponents
of the Government asserted that Lord Palmerston's secession
from office was occasioned by a difference of opinion on his part
as to the pohcy of the Cabinet upon the Eastern Question. On
the other hand, it was strenuously contradicted by the adherents
of the Ministry ; but as all explanation upon the subject was
dechned in Parhament, the motive for a step so dangerous to
the stability of the Earl of Aberdeen's Cabinet must remain
matter for conjecture.
I quote a letter to his brother-in-law, the Right
Hon. Laurence Sulivan, which states the case : —
C. G. : December 19, 1853.
The state of the matter is plain and simple. I told Aberdeen
and Lansdowne last year, when I joined the Government, that
I felt great doubts as to my being able to concur in the plan of
Parliamentary reform which John Russell might propose this
ysar. The other day I was put on the Committee of Cabinet to
prepare the plan. John Russell stated his scheme. I wrote
to him next day to state my objections. I re-stated them

270 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
verbaUy in the Committee, and stated them again to the
Cabinet when John RusseU explained his scheme to the
Cabinet. I stated them in a private inter-view afterwards, on
two occasions, to Aberdeen. I stated them afterwards to him
in writing. In reply to that communication, I was first told
by him that he would communicate with the Queen and his
coUeagues. He then afterwards wrote me word that he had
communicated with John RusseU and Graham ; that they said
my objections were inadmissible; and that he concurred in
their decision. I had then nothing left for it but to resign.
My office is too closely connected with Parhamentary changes
to aUow me to sit silent during the whole progress of a Reform
Bill through Parliament ; and I could not take up a Bill which
contained material things of which I disapproved, and assist to
fight it through the House of Commons, to force it on the
Lords, and to stand upon it at the hustings. I am sorry to
leave an office in which I took interest, and pohtical associates
whom I hke ; but I could not do other-wise.
The Times says there has been no difference in the Cabinet
about Eastern affairs. This is an untruth ; but I felt that it
would have been silly to have gone out because I could not
have my own way about Turkish affairs, seeing that my presence
in the Cabinet did good, by modifying the -views of those whose
pohcy I thought bad.
What were the ' differences ' on Turkish affairs will
be seen later on, when we come to the Eastern Ques
tion; but they concerned the moving of our fleet up
to the scene of conflict. However, Lord Palmerston
withdrew his resignation, as is shown by the next
letter : — C. G. : December 25, 1853.
I remain in the Government. I was much and strongly
pressed to do so for several days by many of the members of
the Government, who declared that they were no parties to
Aberdeen's answer to me, and that they considered all the
details of the intended Reform measure as stiU open to dis
cussion. Their earnest representations, and the knowledge
that the Cabinet had on Thursday taken a decision on Turkish
affairs in entire accordance with opinions which I had long
unsuccessfully pressed upon them, decided me to withdraw my
resignation, which I did yesterday.
Of course, what I say to you about the Cabinet decision on

' THE BACKBONE OF THE MINISTEY.' 271
Turkish affafrs is entfrely for yourself, and not to be mentioned
to anybody. But it is very important, and wUl give the allied
squadrons the command of the Black Sea.
The French ambassador rejoiced at the return of
the Home Secretary to the Cabinet. As soon as he
heard that the resignation was withdrawn, he wrote to
him : —
Au d6but de la campagne que nous aliens fafre ensemble,
c'est un grand confort pour moi et une grande garantie pour
I'Empereiir que de vous savofr I'ame des conseils de notre allie.
Votre concours d'aiUeurs pfese d'un poids tr^s-reel dans la
balance, et on salt k Paris en apprecier toute la valeur.
Abroad as weU as at home Lord Palmerston was
regarded as the backbone of the Ministry.

272 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTER X.
nUSSIAN POLICY — OCCIIPATION OP PRINCIPALITIES ; MOVEMENTS OF
ENGLISH FLEET — LORD ABEEDEEN — ACTIVE PEEPAEATIONS FOE
WAR — EEFORM CLUB BANQUET — PEOPOSBS CRIMEAN EXPEDITION
— 1855 — MOTION OP MR. ROEBUCK— RESIGNATION OP LOED JOHN
EUSSELL — DEFEAT OP THE GOVEENMENT.
It can hardly be doubted that the prospects of peace
were darkened during the eventful preliminaries of
1853 by the fact of Lord Palmerston's absence from the
Foreign Office. He had won a character in Europe for
being resolute, and was regarded as the embodiment of
English pugnacity. That a statesman of his undoubted
prestige should at this crisis in foreign affairs be rele
gated to the Home Office meant, in the opinion of the
adversaries of England, that his policy was at a discount,
and that the tide of national spirit was ebbing which
had formerly floated him through so many foreign difE-
culties. Lord Palmerston, all the same, was not so
thoroughly engrossed by questions of health, police, and
local administration as to view with any indifference the
dispute between Eussia and Turkey. On the contrary,
he watched every turn with the keenest interest, and
held himself not only entitled but bound to evince his
active concern in the progress of the negotiations.
Many a man, ousted from his old post, would have
shown, or at any rate would have felt, some slight jea
lousy -towards the person who had been preferred to him.
Lord Palmerston, so far from being influenced by any
such feeling or indulging in any carping criticism,
frankly acknowledged that Lord Clarendon was the
more fit Minister to be at the Foreign Office at this mo
ment. His reasons for saying so may be gleaned from

PREDICTS EUSSIAN DESIGNS. 273
the following extract from a letter to the Foreign Secre
tary : —
I admired greatly your writhing letter, but I did not hke
to say too much in its praise at the Cabinet, for fear that by so
doing I might lead others to think that it was too strong. I
can assure you that it is a great comfort and satisfaction to me
to know the conduct of our foreign relations is in such able
hands as yours, and your administration of your important
department is attended with this great advantage to the
country, that, from a variety of circumstances, you can say
and do things which could not so easUy have been said or done
by me.' He hated war as much as any man, but he hated
humiliation more ; and he thoroughly understood the
character of the adversary against whom England and
France were entering the diplomatic lists in a struggle
which he very soon saw involved far more than the mere
questions immediately at issue. He thus describes the
usual tactics adopted by Eussia in any acts of aggres
sion : —
The policy and practice of the Russian Government has
always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as
far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Govemments
would aUow it to go, but always to stop and retfre when it was
met -with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next
favourable opportunity to make another spring on its mtended
victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Govern
ment has always had two strings to its bow — moderate language
and dismterested professions at Petersburg and at London;
active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If
the aggression succeed locally, the Petersburg Government
adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but
cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they
are disavowed and recalled, and .the language pre-viously held is
appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their
instructions. This was exemplified in the Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simoni-vitch and Viko-pitch in
Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the Treaty of Unkiar-
' To Lord Clarendon, July 31, 1853.
VOL. II. T

/274 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
¦ Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden
thought, suggested by the circumstances of the time and place,
- and not the result of any previous instructions ; but ha-ving
been done, it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simoni-
vitch and Viko-vitch failed in getting possession of Herat, in
consequence of our vigorous measures of resistance ; and as
they failed, and when they had failed, they were disavowed and
recalled, and the language previously held at Petersburg was
appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although
no human being with two ideas in his head could for a moment
doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.'
As soon as the question of the ' Holy Places ' haS
been settled, through the intervention of Sir Stratford
Canning, Eussia had put forward her claim to a Pro
tectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey. On the
refusal of this demand by the Sultan, Prince Menschi
koff left Constantinople, and, on July 2, the Eussian
army crossed the Pruth and occupied the Danubian
Principalities. The combined English and French
fleets' were at Besika Bay, at the entrance to the Dar
danelles. Lord Palmerston was meanwhile writing to
..the Premier as follows : — C. G. : July 4, 1853.
I quite agree with you that we ought to try whether we can
devise any proposal which, without involving any departure hy
the Sultan from the ground of independence on which he has
taken his stand, might satisfy every just claim which the
Emperor can put forward. In the meantime, however, I hope
you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the
Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the
Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at
liberty to go into the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the
protection of Turkish territory.
The advantages of such a course seem to be —
1st. That it would encourage and assist the Tnrks in those
defensive arrangements and organisations which the
present crisis may give the Turkish Government
faculties' for making, and the benefit of which, in
' To Lord Clarendon, May 22, ] 853.

ADVISES ENTEY OF THE BOSPHOEUS. 275
strengthening Turkey against attack, will continue
after the crisis is over.
^ndly. It would essentially tend to prevent any further
inroad on Turkish territory in Europe or in Asia, and
it is manifest that any such further inroad would
much increase the difficulties of a settlement.
Srdly. It would act as a wholesome check upon the Em
peror and his ad-visers, and would stimulate Austria
and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian
Government to reason.
4thly. It would relieve England and France from the dis
agreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting
without venturing to enter the back door as friends,
while the Russians have taken forcible possession of
the front hall as enemies.
If these orders are to be given, I would suggest that it is
very important that they should be given without delay, so
that we may be able, when these matters are discussed this
week in Parhament, to say that such orders have been sent off;
of course they would at the same time be communicated to the
Jlussian Government.
I am confident that this country expects that we should
pursue such a course, and I cannot beheve that we should
receive anything but support in pursuing it from the party now
in Opposition. Lord Aberdeen replied, that although the invasion,
of the Principalities was an iudefensible act, and one
that gave to every European Power a right of inter
ference, still, as the Emperor had made no declaration
of war, but, on the contrary, notified that he would not
make war, it became very doubtful how far it would be
justifiable for our fleet to violate the treaty of 1841 by
passing the Dardanelles. As to Lord Palmerston's
assertion of the general approval which a bold course
would receive. Lord Aberdeen concluded his letter by a
eharacteristic paragraph to the effect that in a case of
this kind he dreaded popular support, just as on some
occasion, when the Athenian assembly vehemently
applauded Alcibiades, he asked if he had said anything
particularly foolisn.

276 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Meanwhile the representatives of the four Powers,
England, France, Austria, and Prussia, were conferring
in the Austrian capital and drawing up a document,
which soon became known to Europe under the name
of the ' Vienna Note.' It was an abortive attempt to
reooncUe conflicting views. The English Cabinet were
busy on a simUarly hopeless task : — C. G. : July 7, 1853.
My dear John Russell, — The Cabinet yesterday agreed pro
visionally to an amended draft of Convention to be proposed
for Russia and Turkey, simply rene-wing the engagements of
Kainardjy and Adrianople without any extension. This was
to be communicated fitrst for approval to the Prench Govern
ment, and, if finally agreed to, it was proposed that it should
be sent by Vienna to Constantinople, and, if not strongly
objected to by the Porte, to be returned to Vienna, and to be
sent on thence to Petersburg -with any recommendation which
the Austrian Government might be inclined to give. This
Convention made no mention of the Holy Places, because the
Prench would not agree to a Convention between Russia and
Turkey on that matter. All this is very well for effect and for
a Blue Book, but, in my opinion, the course which the Emperor
has pursued on these matters from his first overtures for a
partition of Turkey, and especiaUy the violent, abusive, and
menacing language of his last manifesto, seem to show that he
has taken his hne, and that nothing will satisfy him but com
plete submission on the part of Turkey ; and we ought, there
fore, not to disguise from ourselves that he is bent upon a
stand-up fight.
I tried again to persuade the Cabinet to send the squadrons
up to the Bosphorus, but failed; I was told that Stratford and
La Coiir have powers to call for them. This is, no doubt,
stated in public despatches, but we all know that he has been
privately desired not to do so. I think our position, waiting
timidly and submissively at the back door wbUe Russia is
violently, threateningly, and arrogantly forcing her way into
the house, is unwise with a view to a peaceful settlement, and
derogatory to the character, and standing, and dignity of the
two Powers. I think that when pressed on this point, as of
course we shall be in both Houses, we shall have no good
answer or explanation to give. We cannot say that the pro-
vfr.ces are not parts of the Tui-kish empfre, because treaties

MEMOEANDUM ON NESSELEODE'S CIECULAE. 277
have made them so, and it is as such that Nicholas seizes them,
as a way of compelling the Porte to submit to his demands.
We cannot say that Turkey is at peace, because no
country is at peace when important parts of its territory are
invaded as a means of coercion, with a threat of further advance
if stubbornness and blindness should make such a step, in the
opinion of the invader, necessary. We cannot deny that the
presence of our squadrons in the Bosphorus would greatly
encoui-age the Porte, greatly discourage insun-ections in any part
of Turkey, and greatly tend to make the Emperor pause. The
only reason we can give for our inactivity must be a yielding to
Brunnow's advice and a fear of displeasing the Emperor. But
these motives ought to have led us to leave Turkey to her fate.
Words may properly be answered by words, but acts should be
replied to by acts ; and the entrance of the Russians as invaders
into the Turkish territory ought to be followed and replied to by
thfe entrance of the squadrons into the Bosphorus as protectors.
Much, however, of the effect of such a measure must depend
on the promptitude of its execution, and it would have this
advantage that, while it indicated spirit and determination on
the part of England and Prance, it could not by any perversion
be represented as an act of hostihty against Russia. We
should be relieved from much embarrassment in the approach
ing debate if we could say that orders for this purpose had
actually been sent, and the actual advance of the squadrons
ought surely to accompany any overtures made to Russia.
The Eussian Government now addressed a despatch
to its diplomatic agents, the burden of which was to the
effect that the occupation of the Principalities was in
answer to the presence of the British and French fleets
outside the Dardanelles, and would only cease when
they retired.
In the following Memorandum, sent round by Lord
Palmerston to the members of the Cabinet, he states
how he would wish to meet this declaration : —
C. G. : July 12, 1853.
The Circular of Count Nessefrode, dated July 2, and pub -
lished in the newspapers of this moming, shows how imper
fectly we have understood the character of the Russian Govern
ment, and how entirely thro-wn away upon that Government

278 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
has been the excessive forbearance with which England and
Prance bave acted. But the result might have been foreseen.
It is in the nature of men whose influence over events and
whose power over others are founded on intimidation, and kept
up by arrogant assumptions and pretensions, to mistake for
bearance for frresolution, and to look upon inaction and hesita
tion as symptoms of fear, and forerunners of submission.
Thus it has been with Russia on the one hand and England
and Prance on the other. If the two Powers had acted with
that energy, decision, and promptitude which the occasion
requfred ; if when Menschikoff began to threaten, the two squad
rons had been sent to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles,
and if the Russian Government had been plainly told that the
moment a Russian soldier set foot on Turkish territory, or as
soon as a Russian ship-of-war approached with hostile intentions
the Turkish coast, the combined squadrons would move up to the'
Bosphorus, and, if necessary, operate in the Black Sea, there
can be little doubt that the Russian Government would have
paused in its course, and things would not have come to th^
pass at which they have now arrived. But the Russian
Government has been led on step by step by the apparent
timidity of the Government of England, and reports artfully
propagated that the British Cabinet had declared that it would
have la paix d, tout prix have not been sufficiently contradicted
by any overt acts. The result has now been that the Cabinet
of St. Petersburg, not content with bullying Turkey, threatens
and insults England and Prance, and arrogantly pretends to
forbid the ships-of-war of those Powers from frequenting the
waters of another Power over whose waters Russia has no
authority whatever, and who has invited those ships into those
waters specifically to protect it against Russian aggression.
It is the robber who declares that he -will not leave the
house until the policeman shall have first retired from the-
courtyard. The position of England and France was already sufficiently
humiliating, but this insolent pretension, published to all Europe
even before it was communicated to us, seems to me to make
that position no longer tenable consistently with a due regard
to the honour and character of this country.
I would there^re beg to submit, and to place my opmion
thus on record, that orders should forth-with be sent to the two
squadrons to go up to the Bosphorus, and that the Russian
Government should be informed that, although we had not

AGEEES TO MILDEE MEASUEES. 279
intended that this move should have taken place without some
fresh incident, or some more urgent request from the Porte, yet
after the inadmissible pretension put forward in Count Nessel
rode's note, to dictate to us as to the movements of our fieet
we had no alternative left but to station that fieet at the heart
of that empire whose integrity and independence have been
unwarrantably threatened by a Russian mvasion of its terri
tory. Palmeeston.
Lord Aberdeen, on the other hand, hoping and be
lieving that the form of Convention between Eussia and
Turkey, which had been prepared by France and England,
would be accepted, and that peace would thus be main
tained, considered that Count Nesselrode's Circular
should only be met by a grave expostulation. ' When,
he added, ' the four Powers simultaneously advised the
Porte not to regard the entrance of the Eussian troops
into the Principalities as a casus lelli, it was not that
they attached any weight to the declaration of the
Emperor that he did not intend to make war upon
Turkey, or that they entertained any doubt of an act of
real hostility having been committed, but they wished
to accept his declaration so far as to preserve in their
own hands the means of negotiating with greater hopes
of success than if the utmost extremity of war had been
proclaimed.' Lord Clarendon also shared Lord Aber
deen's views.
Lord Palmerston acquiesced, with reservations, in
the Premier's decision. He said : —
I do not think that we advised the Porte not to consider
the invasion of the Principahties a casus belU. A casus belli, if
I understand the term, means a ease which would justify war.
Now we have told the Porte that the invasion of the Princi
pahties would justify war on the part of Turkey against Russia,
but we advised the Sultan, on grounds of prudence and as a
question of strategy, not to exercise his right and to send an
army to fight at a disadvantage beyond the Danube. It seems
to me, therefore, that we have told the Sultan that the mvasion
of his territory is a casus belli, but that he would do best by

280 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
standing on the defensive. As to the fleet, I acquiesce in your
reasoning, and, on consideration, I admit that, as we have
launched proposals for a peaceful arrangement, it would be
better not to endanger the negotiation by throwing into it any
fresh element of difficulty; and I am, therefore, prepared to
share the responsibihty of submitting even to msult rather than
afford to the quibbhng and pettifogging Government with
which we have to deal any pretext arising out of our course
for refusing terms of accommodation unobjectionable in them-
, 1

Parliament was prorogued, with an expression of
hope, in the Speech from the Throne, that the dispute
would yet be arranged without recourse to arms. Lord
Palmerston, as soon as he was released from the House
of Commons, went down to Derbyshire to open the
Melbourne Athenseum, on which occasion he gave an
address on the educational facilities provided by such
institutions. This was very proper for a Home Sec
retary, although, in his character of ex-Foreign Secre
tary, it was abroad that his eyes were fixed, while he
was in close correspondence with his colleagues, stimu
lating each in turn to adopt a bold tone as to the events
then taking place. To Mr. Sidney Herbert, Secretary
at War, he writes, in September, from Balmoral,
whither he had gone in attendance on the Queen : —
, Balmoral : September 21, 1853.
The question between Russia and Turkey seems, as you say,
to be in an unsatisfactory and unpromising state, and yet it hes
in a nutshell, and its solution depends upon honest intentions
and plain dealing on the part of Russia. What is it the
Emperor wants 1 Why -will he not plainly tell us what it is t
Does he want merely what all of us want — namely, that the
Christians in the Turkish empire shall be safe from oppression,
vexation, and injury? If that is what he wants, let him begin
by himself setting the example, and let him, by evacuating the
Principalities, relieve the Christian mhabitants of that part of
the Turkish empire from the comphcated and various miseries
which the occupation of their country by a Russian army inflicts
upon them. Beyond that, let him be satisfied, as we all are,
' To Lord Aberdeen, July 15, 1853.

I HIS OPINION OF THE SITUATION. 281
wi^h the progressively hberal system of Turkey, and let him
k'.iep his remonstrances till some case and occasion arises which
c?)Jls for them. At present he has not been able even to allege
fy oppression of the Christians, except that which he himself
a-ctises in the Principahties. I believe the real fact at the
btom of all these unintelligible pretences is that what he really
mts is that the Sultan should not, by hberal measures and
( progressive improvement, interfere with the arbitrary and
tyrannical powers which the Greek clergy now too often
exercise, whether by right or by assumption, to the cruel
oppression of the Greek communities. But if the Emperor
wants no more than what I have said, he ought to be satisfied
with the declarations which the Sultan is ready to make. If,
on the other hand, the Emperor wants to become acknowledged
protector of the Greek subjects of the Sultan, and to be allowed
to interfere between the Sultan and the Sultan's subjects, why
then I say let him manfuUy avow this pretension, and let us
manfully assist Turkey in manfully resisting it, and let the
fortune of war decide between the Emperor's wrong and the
Sultan's rightful cause. In my opmion Russia ought to be
required to give a categorical answer, and to be driven from
the discreditable subterfuges behind which she has so long
sheltered her aggressive intentions. I believe that what I have
last stated is what the Emperor really means and wants, and
therefore I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that war
between him and Turkey is becoming ine-vitable. If such war
shall happen, upon his head be the responsibihty of the conse
quences. I by no means think with you that he wUl have an easy
-victory over the Turks. On the contrary, if the betting is not
even, I would lay the odds on the Tm-ks. All that the Turkish
army wants are directory officers, and it would be strange
indeed if England, France, Poland, and Hungary could not
amply supply that deficiency. I do not believe in the dis
affection of the Turkish pro-vinces ; this is an oft-repeated tale
got up by the Russians. The best refutation is, that for many
months past the Russian agents have been iryiagperfas et nefas
to provoke insurrection in Turkey, and have faUed. The fact
is, that the Christian subjects in Turkey know too well what
Russian regime is not to be aware that it is of aU thmgs the
most to be dreaded, and the oftener Russian troops enter Turkish
territory the stronger this conviction is impressed upon the
people. Russia ought not to forget that she has weak points —
Poland, Cfrcassia, Georgia. My wish is that England should

282 , LIFE. OF LOED PALMEESTON.
be on friendly terms with Russia; it is desirable that t'L,
should be, for the sake of: both countries and for the sake L
Europe. Neither country would gain anything, by war wiu
the other ; and Russia, if her Government understood properB
her position, has important and useful fimctions to perform ii
the system of Europe. The Emperor has, since IB^iS, and til
this last affafr, performed those functions to the admiration of
aU thinking men. He seems latterly to have lost his reasoning
faculties. Brunnow has often said to me that, however different the
internal organisation of England and Russia, and however
opposite their respective -views as to the theory of , government,
they have, nevertheless, so many great interests in common,
that there is nothing to prevent them from working well
together so long as no difference arises between them in regard to
the affairs of Turkey or of Persia. Brunnow is a wise man, but
matters seem to have been lately managed at Petersburg by men
who are otherwise. *
All I can say is that, as far as I am concerned, I am desirous
that England should be well with Russia as long as the Emperor
allows us to be so ; but if he is determined to break a lance
with us, why, then, have at him, say I, and perhaps he may
have enough of it before we have done -with him.
On October 4, he wrote to Lord Aberdeen, suggest
ing that it would be advantageous in all communica
tions with Baron Brunnow, the Eussian ambassador, to
maintain a mysterious indefiniteness and uncertainty as
to the degree and the manner of assistance which Eng
land would give to Turkey against Eussia, and point
ing out that the Eussian Government must greatly
dread an open rupture with England and France. He
knew that private and verbal communications, given in
all honesty, but tinctured by the personal bias of the
Prime Minister, were doing irreparable mischief, and
that the Eussian Minister was determined not to take
them at their true value, but persisted in giving them
the interpretation which he desired for them, namely^
an insuperable dislike on the part of the English
Government to any active measures against his country.
Lord Aberdeen replied, with a view to reassure Lord
Palmerston : —

THE FLEETS OEDEEED TO CONSTANTINOPLE. 285
It is very true that I may formerly have regarded the possi
bihty of war between England and Russia with the utmost
incredulity ; but for some time past I have seen the desfre for
war increase so much as to lead me to think that it is but too
probable. At present, therefore, vous prechez le converti. As
for Brunnow, he is already frightened out of his wits at the
prospect, and most assuredly he hears nothing from me to
diminish his alarm.
The crisis was now rapidly culminating. On Octo
ber 5 the Porte issued a declaration making the further
continuation of peace depend upon the evacuation of
the Principalities within fifteen days ; and on October
14 the English and French fieets passed up to Constan
tinople, at the request of the Sultan. Lord Palmerston
wanted something even more decisive on our part.
C. G. : October 7, 1853.
My dear Aberdeen, — The state of Russo-Tiirkish affairs;
seems to require some statement on the part of England and
Prance, assuming, of course, that war has been declared by
Turkey, and that hostihties between Russia and Turkey are
about to commence. I should, therefore, wish to propose to the
Cabinet to-day —
'Pfrst, that instructions should be sent to Constantinople
that, m the event of war having been declared, the two squad
rons should enter the Black Sea, and should send word to the
Russian admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of
things, any Russian ship-of-war found cruising in the Black Sea-
woidd be detamed, and be given over to the Turkish Govern
ment. ' Secondly, that England and Prance should propose to the
Sultan to conclude a convention to the effect that, whereas war
has, unfortunately, broken out between Russia and Turkey, in,
consequence of differences created by unjust demands made upon
Turkey by Russia, and by an unwarrantable invasion of the
Turkish territory by a Russian army ; and whereas it is deemed
by England and IVance to be an object of general European
interest, , and of special importance to them that the pohtical
independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire
should be _ maintained in-violate against Russian aggression, the
two Powers engage to furnish to the Sultan such naval assist
ance as may be necessary in existing cfrcumstances for the

284 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
defence of his empire ; and they moreover engage to permit any
of theh respective subjects who may be willing to do so to enter
the mihtary or naval service of the Sultan. In return, the
Sultan to engage that he will consult with England and Prance
as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to
determine, on the conclusion of hostUities, the future relations
of Russia and Turkey.'
Such a convention would unquestionably have a great and
useful effect on the course to be pursued by the three Eastern
Powers. Lord Aberdeen, in reply, said : ' I cannot say that
I think the present state of -the Eusso-Turkish question
would authorise such a proceeding on our part as that
,which you intend to propose.' Indeed, as the rupture
of peace appeared more and more likely, more and
more hesitalion was developed in high quarters. Eepre-
sentations were made that the fanatical party at Con
stantinople had become so clamorous for war, for their
own purposes, that the Turk was thwarting instead of
assisting English efforts to come to a satisfactory un
derstanding with Eussia. It began to be feared that
England was about to be dragged behind the Otto
man chariot in a campaign the real object of which
was to obtain more power for two millions of Mussul
men to rule oppressively twelve miUions of Chris
tians. Suggestions were thrown out that if, setting
aside all Turkish considerations, it was thought that
Hngland and Europe had such a strong interest
in keeping Turkish territory out of the hands of
Eussia as to be justified in going to war for that pur
pose, such a war ought to be carried on unshackled by
¦any obligations to the Porte, and ought to lead to
such a peace as would provide other and better arrange
ments for the future than the * recomposition of the
Ignorant, barbarian, and despotic rule of the Mussul
man over the most favoured and fertile portion of
Europe.' Lord Aberdeen had forwarded to Lord Palmerston
A Memorandum which he had received drawn up in this

HESITATION IN HIGH aUAETEES. 285
sense.' Lord Palmerston returned it with the follow
ing remarks : — Broadlands: November ], 1863.
I return the Memorandum, which states very clearly the
course of past events, but which, towards its conclusion, points
to future objects not consistent with the policy laid down in its
beginning, and not easy to be carried into execution.
Accordmg to my view of the matters in question, the case
is simple and our course is clear. The five great Powers have,
in a formal document, recorded their opinion that it is for the
general interest of Europe that the integrity and independence
of the Ottoman empire should be maintained ; and it would be
easy to show that strong reasons, pohtical and commercial, make
it especiaUy the interest of England that this integrity and inde
pendence should be maintained. But Russia has attacked the
independence and has -violated the integrity of the Ottoman
empfre ; and Russia must, by fair means or foul, be brought to
give up her pretensions and withdraw her aggression. England
and Prance, urged by common interests to defend Turkey
against Russia, have given Turkey physical assistance and
political and diplomatic support. They undertook to obtain for
Turkey, by negotiation, a satisfactory and honourable settlement
of her differences with Russia, and, faUing that, to support
Turkey in her defensive war.
Hitherto our efforts at negotiation have failed, because the
arrangement which we proposed was declared, both by Turkey
and by Russia, to be such as Turkey could not honourably nor
safely adopt. The Turkish Government, seeing no apparent
prospect of better results from negotiation, and aware that
lapse of time was running to the disadvantage of Turkey, at
length, after having for some considerable time yielded to our
ad-vice to remain passive, came to a determination not unnatural,
and not unwise, and issued that declaration of war which we
had officially and pubhcly said that the Sultan would have been
justified in issuing the moment the Russians invaded his
erritory. This declaration of war makes no change in the position of
England and France in relation to Turkey. We may stUl try
to persuade Russia to do what she ought to do, but we are stUl
bound, by a regard for our own interests, to defend Turkey.
Peace is an excellent thing, and war is a great misfortune ; but
there are many things more valuable than peace, and many
thmgs much worse than war.
' From the Prince Consort.

386 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
We passed the Rubicon when we first -took part -with Turkey
and sent our squadrons to support her ; and when England and
Prance have once taken a third Power by the hand, that third
Power wiMsi be carried in safety through the difficulties in
which it may be involved. England and Prance cannot afford
to be baffled, and whatever measures may be necessary on their
part to baffle their opponent, those measures must be adopted ;
and the Governments of the two most powerful countries on
the face of the earth must not be frightened, either by words or
things, either by the name or by the reahty of war.
No doubt when we put forth our whole strength in defence
of Turkey we shall be entitled to direct in a great measure the
course and character of the war, and to exercise a deciding.
influence on the negotiations which may afterwards lead to
peace. And it was -with that -view that, some time ago, I
proposed to the Cabinet that, negotiation faihng, England and
Prance should conclude a convention with Turkey, by which,
on tlfe one hand, the two Powers should engage to afford
Turkey naval assistance, and to permit their respective subjects
to enter the Sultan's service, naval and mihtary ; and by which
the Sultan, on the other hand, should engage to consult -with
the two Powers as to the terms and conditions of peace. But
the only grounds on which we can claim infiuence in these
matters is our determination to give hearty and effectual
support. We support Turkey for our own sake and for our
own interests, and to withdraw our support, or to cripple it, so
as to render it ineffectual, merely because the Turkish Govern
ment did not show as much deference to our ad-vice as our
ad-vice' deserved, would be to place our national interests at the
mercy of other persons. If Lord Liverpool's Government had
so acted in regard to the Provisional Government of Spain, we
never should have driven the Prench out of the Peninsula.
But, it is said, the Turks seem to wish for war, whUe we
wish for peace. I apprehend that both parties wish for one
and the same thmg, namely, the relinquishment by Russia of
inadmissible pretensions and her retirement from the Turkish
territory; both parties would rather gain these ends by the
pen than by the sword : we only differ in our belief as to the
¦efficacy of these two methods. It is indeed possible that the
Turks may think that a successful conflict would enable them
to make a treaty of peace which should free them from the
thraldom of some of their old engagements ; and if this were
possible, it would certainly place future peace on a firmer
foundation.

HIS OPINION ON TUEKEY AT THE TIME. 287
The concludmg part of the Memorandum points to the
expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the establishment of
a Greek empire in European Turkey. But such a scheme
would be diameteicaUy opposed to the principles of the pohcy
•on which we have hitherto acted. To carry such a system into
execution, we ought to join the Russians against the Turks,
instead of helping the 'Turks against the Russians; for how
could such a reconstruction of Turkey become the result of a
successful contest by England and Prance in defence of Turkey ?
I have no partiahty for the Turks as Mahometans, and should
he very glad if they could be turned into Christians; but as to
the character of the Turkish Government in regard to its
treatment of Christians, I am well convinced that there are a
vast number of Christians under the Governments of Rus.sia,
Austria, Rome, and Naples who would be rejoiced to be as well
treated, and to enjoy as much security for person and property
as the Christian subjects of the Sultan.*
To expel from Europe the Sultan and his two miUions of
Mussulman subjects, including the army and the bulk of the
landowners, might not be an easy task ; still, the five Powers
might effect it, and play the Pohsh drama over again. But
they would find the buUding up still more difficult than the
pulUng down. There are no sufficient Christian elements as
yet for a Christian state in European Turkey capable of per
forming its functions as a component part of the European
system. The Greeks are a small minority, and could not be
the governing race. The Sclavonians, who are the majority,
do not possess the conditions necessary for becoming the bones
and sinews of a new state. A reconstruction of Turkey means
neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia, direct or
mdirect, immediate or for a time delayed.
It seems to me, then, that our course is plain, simple, and
straight : that we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by
negotiation, if possible ; and that if negotiation fails, we must,
by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers.
Lord Palmerston was not confining his suggestions
to proposals for mere acts of force. He enters, in the
next letter, on a discussion as to the best way of pre
senting a form of arrangement to the two contending
parties so as to secure its favourable consideration. He
' The Italians, wben this was written, had not achieved the liberty
and good government which they now enjoy. I

288 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
agreed with Lord John Eussell in thinking it unadvis-
able to present the note to the Turks without leaving
them any discretion as to alterations which they might
desire. Broadlands : October 24, 1853,
My dear John RusseU, — If we wish to prevaU on the Porte
to sign a note for presentation to the Emperor, we must leave
the Turkish Government the power of proposing alterations in
the draft we send them. We may hope that our draft may be
accepted by them -without alteration ; but they may have good
reasons which have not occurred to us for desiring some
changes, or they may have even bad reasons which, if the
changes they propose would not increase our difficulties at
Petersburg, might, in spite of thefr badness, be allowed to pre
vaU. If we send them a draft which they must either take as
it is or reject, we may have a rejection, and we may lose by
our pertinacity an invaluable chance of a peaceful arrangement.
But further, if we are prepared to impose our form of
words on Turkey, we should thereby incur an honourable
engagement to impose them equally on Russia ; and are we, or
are the Prench, or is Austria, or is Prussia prepared to declare
war agamst Russia, not for the defence of the Turkish empire
and the preservation of the balance of power in Europe, but
in order to compel the Emperor of Russia to accept a particular
form of words put together in Downmg Street. This would
surely be carrying the parental affection of authorship beyond
reasonable extent. Then as to the way in which the draft of
note should be sent to Constantinople. I agree with you that
it would be inexpedient to re-vive the Vienna conference for
such a purpose, or, indeed, for any other. That conference is
dead — ^peace to its remains. No good can come out of a confer
ence at Vienna on these matters, and at the present time. A
Vienna conference means Buol, and Buol means Meyendorf,
and Meyendor/ means Nicholas ; and the Turks know this, and
so does all Europe.
Moreover, the very atmosphere of Vienna is unhealthy.'
I doubt whether even you or I should not find ourselves para
lysed by the political miasma of the place. If the maclunery
of a conference is to be set up again, and it may be very useful
' 'Vienna is a sad place for humbug, and X. suffered from the
atmosphere as does the liveliest and sturdiest dog in the Grotto del
Cane.' — Lord Pahnergton to Lord Clarendon.

TUEKISH FLEET DESTEOYED AT SINOPE. 289
to reorganise it, we ought to make a sine qud non of its bein^
held in London. '^
It is, indeed, doubtful whether the gold and silver ace of-
notes has not gone by, and whether, when the Fury gets to
Constantinople, she will not find the age of brass and iron
aheady begun ; but we are quite right to make the attempt.
Indeed it was so. The two armies were already in
conflict ; and, on November 30, the navies also met in
deadly fight, when the Turkish fleet was destroyed at
Sinope. The feeling now roused in England was very
strong ; and Lord Palmerston, on December 10, wrote
to Lord Aberdeen : —
WiU you allow me to take this opportunity of repeating in
writing what I have more than once said verbally, on the state
of things between Russia and Turkey t It appears to me that
we have two objects in -view : the one to put an end to the
present war between these two Powers ; the other to prevent,
as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so, a recurrence of
similar differences, and, through those differences, renewed
dangers to the peace of Europe.
Now, it seems to me that, unless Turkey shall be laid pros
trate at the feet of Russia by disasters and war, an event which
England and Prance could not without dishonour permit, no
peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless
the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon
his demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipula
tions of former treaties upon which he has founded" the preten
sions which have been the cause of existing difficulties.
To bring the Emperor to agree to this, it is necessary to
exert a considerable pressure upon him; and the quarter in
which that pressure can at present be most easUy brought to
bear is the Black Sea and the countries bordering upon it. In
the Black Sea, the combined Enghsh, Prench, and Turkish
squadrons are indisputably superior to the Russian fleet, and are
able to give the law to that fleet. What I would strongly
recommend, therefore, is that which I proposed some months
ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian Government and
the Russian admiral at Sebastopol should be informed that so
long as Russian troops occupy the Principahties, or hold a
position in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian
ships-of-war can be aUowed to show themselves out of port in
the Black Sea.
VOL. II. U

290 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
You wUl say that this would be an act of hostihty towards
Russia ; but so is the declaration already made, that no Russian
ships shall be permitted to make any landing or attack on any
part of the Turkish territory. The only difference between the
two declarations is, that the one already made is incomplete
and insufficient for its purpose, and that the one which I pro
pose would be complete and sufficient. If the Russian fleet
were shut up in Sebastopol, it is probable that the Turks would
be able to make in Asia an impression that would tend to
facUitate the conclusion of peace.
With regard to the conditions of peace, it seems to me that
the only arrangement which could afford to Europe a fafr
security against future dangers arising out of the encroachments
of Russia on Turkey, and the attempts of the Russian Govern
ment to interfere m the internal affahs of the Turkish empire,
would be that arrangement which I have often suggested,
namely, that the treaty to be concluded between Russia and
Turkey should be an ordinaiy treaty of peace and friendship, of
boundaries, commerce, and mutual protection of the subjects of
one party withm the territories of the other ; and that all the
stipulations which might be requfred for the privileges of the
Principahties and of Servia, and for the protection of the
christian rehgion and its churches in the Ottoman dominions
by the Sultan should be contained in a treaty between the
Sultan and the flve Powers. By such a treaty Russia would
be prevented from deahng single-handed -with Turkey in regard
to those matters on which she has, from time to time, -endeavoured
to fasten a quarrel on the Sultan.
Lord Aberdeen replied on the 13th : ' I confess I am
not prepared to adopt the mode which you think most
likely to restore peace.' He went on to say that he
shoiid prefer an open declaration of war to the ' pres
sure' which Lord Palmerston proposed; but as the
union of the four Powers had just been effected, with a
declaration that the integrity of the Turkish Empfre
was an object of general interest, it was to be presumed
that they would take measures to secure it. Eecourse,
therefore, to direct hostUity would be out of place,
although it might eventually come.
- Lord Palmerston resigned on the 15th. We have

ULTIMATUM TO EUSSIA. 291
seen in the last chapter what was the immediate reason
which he assigned; but the fact is that, as Mr. King-
lake says, he was gifted with the instinct which enables
a man to read the heart of a nation, and he felt that
the English people would never forgive the Ministry if
nothing decisive was done after the disaster at Sinope.
During his short absence of about ten days, the Cabinet
resolved to send the fleet into the Black Sea, with in
structions to the admiral to prevent any Eussian vessels
of war from leaving port. Lord Aberdeen, in acknow
ledging the withdrawal of Lord Palmerston's resignation.

I am glad to find that you approve of a recent decision of
the Cabinet -with respect to the British and French fieets adopted
in your absence. I feel sure you will have learnt with pleasure
that, whether you are absent or present, the Government are
duly careful to preserve from all mjiiry the interests and dignity
of the country.
The session of 1854 began on January 31. On Feb
ruary 7, the Eussian ambassador was recalled, and
shortly after the British Government sent a final ulti
matum to the Eussian Emperor, caUing upon him to
evacuate the Principalities by April 30. Meanwhile
troops were despatched to the East, and active prepara
tions were carried on at home. On March 7 Lord
Palmerston presided over a banquet given at the Eeform
Club to Sir Charles Napier, previous to his departure
with the fleet for the Baltic. I give an extract from
Lord Palmerston's speech on this occasion, both as
iUustrating the temper of the time, and as a specimen
of the spirited ease and humour with which he could
stir up an after-dinner audience. His enjoyment was
contagious, and the company laughed sympathetically
even before they heard the joke.
After the formal toasts had been duly drunk, Lord
Palmerston rose and said : —
There was a very remarkable entertainer of dinner company,
¦called Sir R. Preston, who lived in the City, and who, when he
U 2

292 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
gave dinners at Greenwich, after gorging his guests -with turtle,.
used to turn round to the waiters and say, ' Now bring dinner.''
Gentlemen, we have had the toasts which correspond -with the
turtle, and now let's go to dinner. Now let us drink the toast
which belongs to the real occasion of our assembling here. I
give you ' The health of my gallant friend Sfr Charles Napier,''
who sits beside me. If, gentlemen, I were addressmg a Hamp
shire audience, consisting of country gentlemen residing in that
county, to which my gallant friend and myself belong, I should
introduce him to your notice as an eminent agriculturist. It
has been my good fortune, when enjoying his hospitahty at
Merchistoun Hall, to receive most valuable mstructions froin
him while walking over bis farm about staU-feeding, gro-wing
turnips, wire fencing, under-draining, and the like. My gallant
friend is a match for everything, and whatever he turns his hand
to he generally succeeds in it. However, gentlemen, he now, hke
Cincmnatus, leaves his plough, puts on his armour, and is pre
pared to do that good service to his country which he -will
always perform whenever an opportunity is afforded to him. I
pass over those earlier exploits of his younger days, which are
weU known to the members of his profession ; but, perhaps, one
of the most remarkable exploits of his life is that which he
performed in the same cause of hberty and justice in which he
is now about to be engaged. In the year 1833, when gallantly
volunteering to serve the cause of the Queen of Portugal
against the encroachments and the usurpations of Don Miguel
— to defend constitutional rights and hberties against arbitrary
power — he took the command of a modest fleet of frigates and
corvettes, and, at the head of that little squadron, he captured
a squadron far superior in force, including two line-of-battle
ships, one of which my gallant friend was the flrst to board.
But on that occasion my gallant friend exhibited a characteristic
trait. When he had scrambled upon the deck of this great
¦hne-of-battle ship, and was clearing the deck of those who had
possession of it, a Portuguese officer ran at him full dart with
his drawn sword to run him through. My gaUant friend quietly
parried the thrust, and, not giving himself the trouble to deal
in any other way with his Portuguese assailant, merely gave
him a hearty kick, and sent him do-wn the hatchway. WeU,
gentlemen, that -victory was a great event — I don't mean the
victory over the officer who went down, but the victory over
the fieet, which my' gaUant friend took into port ; for that -vic
tory decided a great cause then pending. It decided the hber-

EULOGY OF SIE CHAELES NAPIEE. 293
•ties of Portugal ; it decided the question between constitutional
•and arbitrary power — a contest which began in Portugal, and
which went on afterwards in Spain, when my gallant friend Sir
De Lacy Evans lent his powerful aid m the same cause, and with
the same success. My gallant friend Sir Charles Napier, how
ever, got the first turn of fortune, and it was mainly owing to
that victory of his that the Queen of Portugal afterwards occu
pied the throne to which she was rightfully entitled, and the
Portuguese nation obtained that Constitution which they have
ever since enjoyed. A noble friend of mine, now no more,
whose loss I greatly lament, for he was equaUy distinguished as
a man, as a soldier, and as a diplomatist, the late Lord Wilham
Russell — an honour to his country, as to his family — told me
that one day he heard that my gaUant friend Sir Charles Napier
was in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Valenza, a Portu
gese fortress some considerable distance from the squadron
which he commanded. Lord W. Russell and Colonel Hare
went to see my gallant friend, and Lord W. RusseU told me
that they met a man dressed in a very easy way, followed by a
fellow -with two muskets on his shoulders. They took him at
first for Robinson Crusoe ; but who should these men prove to
be but the gallant admiral on my right and a marine behind
him. ' WeU, Napier,' said Lord W. RusseU, ' what are you
¦doing here 1 ' ' Why,' said my gaUant friend, ' I am waiting to
take Valenza.' ' But,' said Lord Wilham, ' Valenza is a forti
fied to-wn, and you must know that we soldiers understand how
fortified towns are taken. You must open trenches ; you must
make approaches; you must establish a battery in breach ; and
all this takes a good deal of time, and must be done according
to rule.' ' Oh,' said my gaUant friend, ' I have no time for all
that. I have got some of my blue-jackets up here and a few of
my ship's guns, and I mean to take the town with a letter.'
And so he did. He sent the governor a letter to tell him he
had much better surrender at discretion. The govemor was a
very sensible man ; and so surrender he did. So the trenches,
and the approaches, the battery, breach, and aU that, were saved,
and the town of Valenza was handed over to the Queen of
Portugal. WeU, the next great occasion in which my gallant
friend took a prominent and distinguished part — a part for
which I can assure you that I personally, in my official capacity,
and the Government to which I had the honour to belong, felt
deeply indebted and obhged to him — was the occasion of the
war in Syria. There my gallant friend distinguished himself,

294 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
as usual, at sea and on shore. AU was one to him, where-
ever an enemy was to be found : and I feel sure that when the
enemy was found, the enemy -wished to Heaven he had not
been found. WeU, my gaUant friend landed with his marines,
headed a Turkish detachment, defeated the Egyptian troops,
gained a very important -victory, stormed the town of Sidon,,
captured three or four thousand Egyptian prisoners, and after
wards took a prominent pai-t in the attack and capture of the
important fortress of Acre. I am bound to say that the Go
vernment to which I belonged, in sending those instructions-
which led to the attack upon Acre, were very much guided by
the opinions which we had received of the practicabUity of that-
achievement in letters from my gaUant friend.
Mr. Bright, a few days later in the House of Com
mons, took Lord Palmerston to task for the tone of
this speech. Such apparent levity and gaite de cceur in
a Minister of the Crown must have grated on the sen
timent of one who abhorred the war, and thought it
unnecessary. But surely when the conflict was inevit
able and imminent, it was the common-sense view of
patriotism to neglect no means, however -trifling, of
keeping up the heart and spirit of the nation. Lord
Palmerston, however, was so stung by the manner of
the attack, that he replied with a bitterness and severity
quite unusual for him, and which, perhaps, was exces
sive — ^the House for the moment showing by the excla
mations of some of its members that this was the
impression made upon it. At the same time it must
be aUowed that it was very galling to a man of Lord
Palmerston's character to be held up to public repro
bation as one who was inciting people to fight as if they
were cocks in a pit.
The war had now fairly begun, and as early as June
Lord Palmerston proposed to the Cabinet a descent on
the Crimea. He urged that the siege of Sebastopol
was the object on which the allied armies should be
directed. The occupation of the Principalities by the
Eussian forces he regarded as a pledge for the neutrality
of Austria, her active aUiance with the enemy beingf

MEMOEANDUM ON NECESSAEY MEASUEES. 295
quite possible should all fear be removed of Eussia's
permanent hold upon the Danube. He was, therefore,
a strong advocate for leaving the Eussians in undis
turbed enjoyment of the pestilent air of the Dobrudscha,
and for crossing over from Varna to the great Eussian
arsenal on the Black Sea.
The Cabinet unanimously acknowledged the force of
his arguments, though there were some few who wished
for a postponement of such an expedition untU the
second year of the campaign. The difiiculty was the
unprepared state of the French army, which was stiU
deficient both in men and material. The French officers,
indeed, generaUy disliked this selection of the Crimea as
their battle-field.
The following Memorandum on the measures to be
adopted against Eussia was sent round to the Cabinet : —
C. G. . June 15, 1854.
Some conversation having passed on Wednesday evenmg
at Sfr Charles Wood's between some members of the Cabinet,
about the objects to which our operations ought to be dfrected in
the war against Russia, I wish to submit the foUowmg observa
tions to the Cabinet.
England and France have entered into war with a great
Power, have made great exertions, at a great expense, and for a
great purpose. They would lose caste in the worid if they con
cluded the war with only a small result. The particular overt
act by which Russia broke the peace was the invasion of the
Danube Principahties, but the purpose for which we took up
arms would be very imperfectly accomphshed if the only result of
the war was to be the evacuation of those provinces by the
Russian army, even if that evacuation were accompanied by a
waiver on the part of Russia of the demands she has made upon
Turkey. Such a result would be a triumph rather than a defeat
for Russia. She would say that she had defied and withstood the naval
and military strength of two of the greatest Powers of the
world, that these Powers had been unable to hurt her, and that
she had substantially gained aU that she had set out by demand
ing, inasmuch as the Sultan had done by his own act for his
Christian subjects that which she had required. We should
then have no security for the future, and whenever a more

296 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
favourable opportunity might present itself, whenever England
and France were disunited, she would again make her sprmg
upon Turkey, and with a better chance of success.
It seems absolutely necessary that some hea-vy blow should
be struck at the naval power and territorial dimensions of Russia,
and unless this be done in the present year, the accomphshment
of it wUl become more difficult, and the reputation of England
and Prance will materially suffer.
The points where such blows could best be struck are
evidently the Russian possessions in Georgia and Cfrcassia and
the Crimea.
The expulsion of the Russians from Georgia and Circassia
must probably be left to the Turks and the Circassians, and no
effort should be left untried to reorganise the Turkish army in
Asia, by placing it under European officers, so sis to put it mto
ft, condition to drive the Russians out of Georgia before thfl
season for military operations is over, and to co-operate with the
Cfrcassians. The British and Prench troops are now, to a certain degree,
pledged to co-operate with Omar Pasha in raising the siege of
Silistria. If that can be accomplished early enough to leave time for
operations afterwards m the Crimea, weU and good; and of
course the British and Prench troops would be ordered in no
case to cross the Danube and entangle themselves in the un
healthy plains of Wallachia.
But I confess that it seems to me, that if the combined army
had been ready to undertake the reduction of the Crimea and
Sebastopol, that object is so infinitely more important than the
temporary defence of the Danube fortresses, that I would have
preferred that SUistria and the line of the Danube should have
been abandoned, and that Omar Pasha should have fallen back
upon Schumla, and Varna, and Adrianople, and that the alhed
army should have gone at once to the Crimea.
The Russians could not retain peimanently the Danube
fortresses, and if they moved on to the southward they must
have left garrisons in them. The further they advanced south
ward the greater would be thefr difficulties of all kinds, and the
more the effective strength of their army would dwindle away,
and the more easily, therefore, they would afterwards be de
feated. But the further south the point at which they might be
defeated, the more fatal a defeat would be.
The occupation of the Danube fortresses by Russia would

EECOMMENDS ATTACK ON CEIMEA. 297
be only a temporary and precarious advantage for her. The
capture of Sebastopol and of the Russian Black Sea fleet would
be a lasting and important advantage to us. Such a success
would act with great weight upon the fortunes of the war, and
would teU essentiaUy upon the negotiations for peace. We
should be able materially and at once to reduce our naval ex
penditure if the Russian Black Sea fleet were destroyed or in
our possession; and, holding the Crimea and Sebastopol, we
could dictate the conditions of peace in regard to the naval
position of Russia in the Black Sea.
There does not seem good reason to beheve that the Rus
sians have at present more than ¦40,000 men in the Crimea, if
they have so many ; and if 25,000 English and 35,000 Prench
could be landed somewhere in the large bay to the north of
Sebastopol, there can be little doubt that they would be able to
take the fort on the hill on the north side of the harbour of
Sebastopol, and they would then command the harbour, fleet,
and to-wn.
This enterprise need not prevent the capture of Anapa and
Poti this year, but even if it did there can surely be no com
parison between the value of the capture of Sebastopol and the
•taking of the forts on the coast of Circassia. The capture of
.Sebastopol and the capture or destruction of the Russian fleet
would of course imply the surrender of the Russian troops
which form the garrison of the place, or thefr evacuation of the
Crimea by capitulation, and either of these results would be a
brUhant feat of arms for the aUied forces. Anapa and Poti
might be taken at leisure afterwards, and -with greater ease if
Sebastopol had been mastered.
But if the attack on the Crimea is put off tiU next year the
Russian Government will have time to strengthen the defences
of the place, and to mcrease the garrison to any amount which
the peninsula can hold, and we may find the undertaking far
more difficult then than it would have been this year.
The Emperor will, during the autumn, winter, and spring,
raise and train recruits enough to make good his losses during
this campaign, and next year we should have to deal -with a
reinforced and reorganised army, instead of with one worn
down and dispirited by the unsuccessful operations of this
summer. On the other hand, the alhed troops are now fresh,
eager, and ready for enterprise. If they are to remain inactive
till next spring, thefr health may give way, their spirits may
flag, thefr mutual cordiahty and good understanding may be

298 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
cooled do-wn by mtrigues, jealousies, and disputes, and pubhc
opinion, which in England and Prance now stands by the two
Govemments, and bears up the people of the two countries to
make the sacrifices necessary for the war, may take another
turn, and people may grow tired of burthens which have pro
duced no sufficient and satisfactory result.
It seems to me, then, that the Prench Grovernment ought
to be urged to press forward the complete formation of their
co-operating army in Turkey, and that we ought to endeavour
to make arrangements with them for an attack on Sebastopol
as soon as the combined army is in a state to undertake it.
We do not seem hkely to accomphsh anything of much
importance in the Baltic, and on that account it is the more
desirable that we should gain some real and signal advantage in
the Black Sea. Palmerston.

And to the Minister of War he writes on the same
subject. Brocket : June 16, 1854.
You said yesterday at the Cabinet that you wished to talk
over what was to be written to Raglan by the maU which would
go before our next Cabinet, and as I was obliged to leave the
Cabinet early to save my raUway train to this place, I send you
my vote in writing.
It seems to me that to keep the allied army in Bulgaria,
and to carry on operations on the banks of the Danube, would
be to throw away time, money, men, official and national re
putation. Nothing that we could do there would have any decisive
effect on the war, nor could it help us one step towards the
attainment of that future security which our convention -with
Prance specifies as one of the main conditions of peace. Even
if we were to drive the Russians across the Pruth, it would be
what the Prench call a coup d'epSe dans I'eau — a temporary
advantage which would cease the moment we -withdrew. I
shotdd, indeed, doubt the -wisdom of an advance of the Turks
to the north of the Danube, nor ought they to attach too much
importance to the hne of the Danube. Omar Pasha was quite
right tp defend the Danube and SUistria as long as he could,
but I should not have thought less well of ultimate results if
he had retfred at length to Schumla and Varna, or even ta

BATTLE OF THE ALMA. 299'
Adrianople. The Russian difficulties would increase with every
day's march to the southward, and the dangers of thefr position
would become more and more serious.
Our only chance of bringing Russia to terms is by offensive
and not by defensive operations. We and the Prench ought to
go to the Crimea and take Sebastopol and the Russian fleet the
moment our two armies are in a condition to go thither. Sixty
thousand English and Prench troops, -with the fleets co-operating,
would accomphsh the object in six weeks after landing, and if
this blow were accompanied by successful operations m Georgia
and Circassia, we might have a meiry Christmas and a happy
New Year.
There is not the slightest danger of the Russians gettmg to
Constantinople. The Turks are able to prevent that ; but even
if they could not, the Austrians would be compeUed, by the
force of cfrcumstances, to do so. Austria has, as usual, been
playing a shabby game. When she thought the Russians likely
to get on, and while she fancied England and Fiance needed
hastening, she bragged of her determination to be active against
Russia. As soon as she found our troops at Varna, she changed
her tone, and, according to a despatch which Clarendon had in
his hand yesterday, she now says she shall not enter the Prm-
cipaUties, and the Russians must be driven out by the Turks
and the English and Prench. She can hardly think us simple
enough to do her work for her ; but the best way to force her
to act would be to send our troops off to the Crimea. This is
my vote. On the 29th of June the Duke of Newcastle sent
out instructions to Lord Eaglan to make an immediate
advance on Sebastopol. Few persons at that time fore
saw the delay and difficulties which would have to be
encountered before success crowned the enterprise. The
Secretary of State for War himself, writing to Lord
Palmerston in the beginning of September, said that he
was sanguine enough to give the allied forces only three
or four days after descending upon the Eussian coast
before they would be in possession of Sebastopol. On
the 14th of September the troops of France and England
landed in the Crimea, and a few days later they won the
battle of the Alma. On the Srd of October the news
of the fall of Sebastopol arrived. It was believed by

500 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.'
most people for nearly, twenty-four hours. Indeed, the
Emperor of the French himself announced it to his
troops at the camp of Helfaut.
These reported successes drew from no less an
authority than Mr. Gladstone a recognition of Lord
Palmerston's initiative in designating the Crimea as
the proper field for the allied armies. In a letter of
the 4th October, he says : —
My purpose is to offer yon a congratulation which I feel to
be especially due to you upon the great events which are taking
place in the Crimea. Much as we must all rejoice on pubhc
grounds at these signal successes, and thankful as the whole
nation may justly feel to a Higher Power, yet in looking back
upon the instruments through which such results have come
about, I for one cannot help repeating to you the thanks I
offered at an earlier period for the manner m which you urged —
when we were amidst many temptations to far more embarrass
ing and less effective proceedings — the duty of concentrating
¦our strokes upon the true heart and centre of the war at
Sebastopol. In the month of November, 1854, Lord Palmerston
went over to Paris with Lady Palmerston, mainly vdth
the view of having an interview with -the Emperor.
He writes to his brother : —
Yesterday EmUy and I dined at St. Cloud. The dinner was
very handsome, and our hosts very agreeable. The Empress
was full of hfe, animation, and talk, and the more one looks at
her the prettier one thinks her. I have found the Emperor and
Drouyn de Lhuys in very good opinions on the subject of the
war, and acting towai'ds us with perfect fafrness, openness, and
good faith.
Meanwhile in the Crimea all was not prospering,
and the disappointment of the public when they learnt
that Sebastopol had not been taken, as reported, in
creased their impatience. A sort of Nemesis hung over
Lord John Eussell, and compelled him to become the
spokesman of the general feeling, and to indicate Lord
Palmerston, his rejected lieutenant, as the man of the

EESIGNATION OF LOED JOHN EUSSELL. 301
hour. In a letter to the Prime Minister Lord John
urged the necessity of a change in the War Department,.
and pointed out the ' necessity of having in that office a
man who, from experience of military details, from in
herent vigour of mind, and from weight with the House
of Commons, can be expected to guide the great opera
tions of war with authority and success. There is only
one person,' he continued, ' belonging to the Govern
ment who combines these advantages. My conclusion
is, that before Parliament meets Lord Palmerston should
be entrusted with the seals of the War Department.'
Lord Aberdeen, however, declined to recommend the
change to the Queen, aUeging, with great fairness, that
although on the first constitution of the office such an
arrangement might have been best, yet that the Duke
of Newcastle had discharged his duties too ably and
honourably to afford any justification for his removal.
After a short winter session, in whi^h the Foreign
Enlistment Bill was passed. Parliament reassembled on
the 23rd of January, 1855. Mr. Eoebuck, on the first
night, gave notice that he intended to move for the ap
pointment of a select committee 'to inquire into the
condition of our army before Sebastopol, and into the
conduct of those departments of the Government whose
duty it has been to minister to the wants of that army.'
Lord John Eussell immediately resigned. Writing to
Lord Aberdeen, he said : ' I do not see how the motion
is to be resisted : but as it involves a censure upon the
War Department, with which some of my colleagues are
connected, my only course is to tender my resignation.'
Lord Palmerston's opinion on this event is contained in
the following letter : — Piccadilly : January- 24, 1855.
My dear John RusseU, — I received your letter of this morn
ing with much regret, and I feel bound in candour to say that
I think your decision Ul-timed. Everybody foresaw that on the
meeting of Parliament after Christmas some such motion as that
given notice of by Roebuck was likely to be made ; and if you
had determined not to face such a motion, your announcement

302 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
of such a decision a fortnight ago would have rendered it more
easy for your coUeagues to have taken whatever course such an
announcement might have led to, either to have met your views
by a new arrangement of offices, or to have given up the Govern
ment in a manner creditable to all parties concerned. As it is,
you -wiU have the appearance of having remained in office, aid
ing in carrying on a system of which you disapproved untU
driven out by Roebuck's announced notice, and the Govern
ment -wUl have the appearance of self-condemnation by flying
from a discussion which they dare not face ; while as regards
the country, the action of the executive will be paralysed for a
time in a critical moment of a ' great war, -with an impending
negotiation, and we shall exhibit to the world a me&,ncholy
spectacle of disorganisation among our political men at home
similar to that which has prevaUed among our military men
abroad. My opinion is that, if you had simply renewed -the
proposal which you made before Christmas, such an arrange
ment might have been made ; and there are constitutional and
practical grounds on which such a motion as Roebuck's might
have been resisted without -violence to any opinions which you
may entertain as to the past period.
The ministerial explanations which took place in the
House of Commons were immediately foUowed by the
Eoebuck motion for a select committee. Left in the
lurch by their recognised leader, the Aberdeen Cabinet
found thefr best defender in the man for whom many of
them had felt distrust. Lord Palmerston, coming gal
lantly forward to take upon himself the invidious duty
of supporting an Administration over which he had little
control, and which, before disaster came, had neglected
his advice, said that he fully concurred that the respon
sibility for the conduct of the war fell not on the Duke
of Newcastle alone, but on the whole Cabinet. He did
not deny that there had been something calamitous in
the condition of our army, but he traced it to the in
experience arising from a long peace. If the House
thought the Government not deserving of confidence,
the direct and manly course would have been to affirm
that proposition. The course about to be pursued would
be dangerous and inconvenient in its results abroad.

FALL OF ABEEDEEN COALITION MINISTEY. 303
He hoped that when the House had determined what
set of men should be entrusted with pubhc affairs, they
would give their support to that Government, and not
show to Europe that a nation could only meet a great
•crisis when it was deprived of representative institu
tions. When the House divided there appeared for
Mr. Eoebuck's motion, 305 ; against it, 148. Majority
against the Government, 157. This startling result
so amazed the House that they forgot to cheer, but
laughed derisively.
On the 1st of February Lord Palmerston formaUy
announced in the Commons the resignation of the
Ministry. Thus fell the Coalition Cabinet of 1862,
the victim of the war which it had itself declared.

304 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XL
BECOMES PEIMB MINISTEB — ATTENDS TO STATE OP THE AEMY^
NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA— BBFOEMS POE TUEKEY — CONFEEENCB
BEEAKS UP.
LoED Dekbt was sent for to form a Government, and
immediately sought the co-operation of Lord Palmer
ston, offering him the leadership of the House of
Commons, which Mr. Disraeli was willing to waive in
his favour. Offers were also made, through him, to
Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Sidney Herbert. Lord Palmer
ston, however, in the foUowing letter, declined the pro
posals, having also expressed his great unwillingness,
under existing circumstances, to belong to any Govern
ment in which the management of foreign affairs did
not remain in Lord Clarendon's hands : —
144 Piccadilly : January 31, 1855.
My dear Derby, — Ha-ving well reflected upon the proposition
which you made to me this morning, I have come to the con
clusion that if I were to join your Government, as proposed by
you, I should not give to that Government that strength which
you are good enough tq think would accrue to you from my
acceptance of office.
I shaU, however, deem it my duty, in the present critical
state of afiairs, to give, out of office, my support to any Govern
ment that shall carry on the war -with energy and vigour, and
will, in the management of our foreign relations, sustain the
dignity and interests of the country, and maintain unimpaired
the alliances which have been formed.
I have conveyed to Gladstone and Sidney Herbert the
communication which you wished me to make to them ; but it
seemed to me to be best that they should write to you
themselves.

SUMMONED TO FOEM A MINISTEY. 305
Loard Derby at once retired, and Lord John EusseU
was the next person sent for by the Queen, who signified
that it would give her particular satisfaction if Lord
Palmerston could join in the formation. He expressed
his wiUingness to do so ; but many of the Whigs posi
tively declined, and notably Lord Clarendon. Lord
John Eussell therefore resigned the commission which
the Queen had entrusted to him ; and in his letter an
nouncing this to Lord Palmerston he thanked him for
the readiness with which he had consented to aid the
formation of a Government, and promised his support
in the event of Lord Palmerston being charged by the
¦Queen with this difficult but honourable task.
Lord Palmerston rephed : — February 4, 1855."
Thank you for your letter, which I have just received.
I think the course which you have adopted was, under all cir
cumstances, the best. The events which led to the present
state of things were too recent to have aUowed personal feehngs
to subside sufficiently to have enabled you to succeed in the
task which the Queen had asked you to undertake; and to
have made an imperfect arrangement would not have been
advantageous either to yourseh or to the country.
I feel very thankful to you for what you say -with reference
to the possibility that the Queen might desire me to try to form
a Government ; and if this should be, I should, of course, lose
no time in communicating with you.
The ' possibility ' was what everyone, during these
' stage ' negotiations, foresaw to be a necessity. Lord
Palmerston was requested to take up the abandoned
task, and he successfully performed it. He thus writes
to his brother to announce the event : —
Downing Street : February 15, 1855,
 ' Quod nemo promittere Divum
Auderet volvenda dies en attulit ultro.'
A month ago if any man had asked me to say what was one
of the most improbable events, I should have said my being
Prime Minister. Aberdeen was there,- Derby was head of one
great party, John RusseU of the other, and yet, in about ten
VOL. II. X

306 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
days' time, they all gave way hke straws before the -wind, and
so here am I, writmg to you from Do-wning Street, as Pfrst
Lord of the Treasury.
The fact was that Aberdeen and Newcastle had become
discredited in pubhc estimation as statesmen equal to the
emergency. Derby felt conscious of the incapacity of the
grea-ter portion of his party, and their unfitness to govern the
country, and John Russell, by the way in which he suddenly
abandoned the Government, had so lost caste for the moment
that I was the only one of his pohtical friends who was willing
to serve under him. I could not refuse to do so, because he
told me that upon my answer depended his undertaking to^
form a Government, and if I had refused, and he had dechned
the task, and the Queen had then sent for me, people would
have ascribed my refusal to personal ambition. Besides, he
broke -with the late Government because the War Department
was not given to me, and it would have been ungrateful of me
to have refused to assist him. It is, however, curious that the
same man who summarily dismissed me three years ago, as
unfit to be Minister for Foreign Affairs, should now have
broken up a Government because I was not placed in what
he conceived to be the most important post in the present state-
of things. I think our Government -wiU do very well. I am backed
by the general opinion of the whole country, and I have no
reason to complain of the least want of cordiahty or confidence
on the part of the Court.
As Aberdeen has become an impossibihty, I am, for the-
moment I'in&vitable. We are sendmg John Russell to negotiate
at Vienna. This will serve as a proof to show that we are in
earnest in our wish for peace, and in our determination to have
sufficiently satisfactory terms. I have no great faith in the
sincerity of Russia, though it is said that the Emperor Nicholas
is much pressed by many around him to make peace as soon as
he can. But we must insist upon his ha-vmg a very smaU
number of sliips-of--war m the Black Sea, probably not more
than four, and it -will be a great gulp for him to swaUow such
a condition, especially seeing that we have not been able as
yet to take his fieet. We must also ask for the destruction of
the works at Sebastopol, although we should not make that a
sine qud non, unless we had taken the place and had destroyed
the works ourselves. However, a short time will show whether
we are to have peace or war, and, in the meanwhile, we are

EXPLANATION OF THE STATE OF PAETIES. 307
makmg our preparations for war as if peace was out of the
question. I expect to be tolerably strong in Parliament for some little
time to come, and I think that when the session is over it wiU
be advisable to dissolve.
We shall have many discontented men behind us, because the
body of the Whigs are angry that the Peelites joined me, and
have occupied places which the Whigs hoped to have them
selves ; but if the Peehtes had not joined me, we should have
had an equally numerous band of discontented, only with this
difference, that they would have consisted of more able men.
Aberdeen and Newcastle behaved in the most friendly and
honourable manner possible in persuadmg their friends to
remain in the Government, but I see that the Peehte section
still continues to endeavour to make itself a httle separate
section. When one of the leading Peelites hesitated to accept
the offer made to liim. Lord Palmerston, divining his
thoughts, wrote openly to him as follows : —
To speak plainly and frankly, you distrust my views and
intentions, and you think that I should be disposed to continue
the war without necessity, for the attainment of objects either
unreasonable in themselves or unattainable by the means at
our command, or not worth the efforts necessary for thefr
attainment. In this you misjudge me. If by a stroke of the
wand I could effect in the map of the world the changes which
I could wish, I am quite sure that I could inake arrangements
far more conducive than some of the present ones to the peace
of nations, to the progress of ci-vihsation, to the happiness and
welfare of mankind ; but I am not so destitute of common
sense as not to be able to compare ends with means, and to see
that the former must be given up when the latter are wanting;
and when the means to be brought to bear for the attainment
of any ends consist in the blood and treasure of a great nation,
those who are answerable to that nation for the expenditure of
that blood and treasure must well weigh the value of the
objects -which they pursue, and must remember that, if they
should forget the just proportion between ends and means, the
good sense of the people whose afiafrs they manage will soon
step in to correct their errors, and to caU them to a severe
account for the evils of which they would have been the cause.'
' February 6, 185S.
x2

308 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
No time was lost by the reorganised Cabinet in
remedying some of the most pressing evils which had
borne down our army in the Crimea. Lord Palmerston,
in announcing to the House of Commons the formation
of his Government, detailed also some of his new ad
ministrative measures. The office of Secretary at War,
was to be amalgamated with that of the Secretary of
State in the person of Lord Panmure; a BUI was
immediately to be introduced for the enlistment of
older men on short service ; the Admiralty was to es
tablish a special Board to superintend the transport
service ; lastly, a sanitary commission was to be sent to
the Crimea, and another, under Sfr John M'Neil, to
superintend the commissariat. I append Lord Pal
merston's letter to Lord Eaglan accompanying the
Sanitary Commission ; — Downing Street : February 22, 1855.
This wiU be given to you by Dr. Sutherland, Chief of the
Sanitary Commission, consisting of himself. Dr. Ga-vin, and Mr.
Rawhnson, whom we have sent out to put the hospitals, the
port, and ihe camp into a less unhealthy condition than has
hitherto existed, and I request that you wiU give them every
assistance and support in your power. They wiU, of course, be
opposed and thwarted by the medical officers, by the men who
have charge of the port arrangements, and by those who have
the cleaning of the camp. Their mission will be ridiculed, and
their recommendations and directions set aside, unless enforced
by the peremptory exercise of your authority.
But that authority I must request you to exert in the most
peremptory manner for the immediate and exact carrying into
execution whatever changes of arrangement they may recom
mend ; for these are matters on which depend the health and
lives of many hundreds of men, I may indeed say of thousands.
It is scarcely to be expected that officers, whether mihtary or
medical, whose time is wholly occupied by the pressing business
of each day, should be able to give thefr attention or their time
¦to the matters to which these commissioners have for many
years devoted their action and thefr though-ts.
But the interposition of men skUled in this way is urgently
required. The hospital at Scutari is become a hotbed of
pestilence, and if no proper precautions are taken before the

ENEEGETIC PEOSECUTION OF THE WAE. 309
sun's rays begin to be felt, your camp wUl become one vast seat
of the most virulent plague. I hope this commission wUl
arrive in time to prevent much evil, but I am very sure that
not one hour should be lost after thefr arrival in carrying into
effect the precautionary and remedial measures which they may
recommend. The patriotic impatience, however, of a certain
section of ambitious politicians was so great that they
could not wait. Before five days had elapsed Mr.
Layard again drew attention to the state of the army,
and, in a speech decidedly hostile to Lord Palmerston's
Administration, recommended that, in imitation of the
French revolutionary Convention, the House should
send out some of its own members to sit in judgment
on the guilty. In reply to this, Lord Palmerston,
amid general laughter, suggested that it might be satis
factory to the House to take the honourable member at
his word, and to add to the direction that he and his
colleagues should proceed instantly to the Crimea, the
further instruction that they should remain there during
the rest ofthe session.
As to Mr. Eoebuck's committee. Lord Palmerston
still retained his objection to it, as not in accordance
with the Constitution or efficient for its purpose. He
told the House that, as an English king once rode up
to an insurrection and offered to be its leader,' so the
Government offered to the House of Commons to be its
committee, and would do of itself all that it was
possible to do. As, however, Mr. Eoebuck still per
sisted, ' aiming,' as he said, to ' assist the noble Lord in
infusing new vigour into the Constitution ofthe country,'
Lord Palmerston yielded, giving as his reason for so
doing that the country asked for an inquiry, and that,
whatever inconvenience there might be in such a
course, there would be greater inconvenience and danger
if the government ofthe country were again to be in
abeyance. This concession, however, produced another
ministerial crisis, which was, however, of short dura-
' Eichard II. in Wat.Tyler's insurrection.

310 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
tion. Sir James Graham, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sid
ney Herbert retired because the renewed motion was
not to be resisted ; and Sir Charles Wood, Sir George
Lewis, and Lord John Eussell took the vacant places.
The death of the Emperor Nicholas and the active
alliance of Sardinia with the Western Powers were both
events which appeared likely to affect favourably for
peace the negotiations which had now been renewed at
Vienna. Lord John Eussell, who went to the Con
ference as English representative, was instructed thaf
the end to be held in view was the admission of Turkey
into the great European famUy, and that there were
certain points which must be insisted on as necessary
fully to attain this object. They lay under four princi
pal heads, namely, the Principalities, the free navigation
ofthe Danube, Eussian supremacy in the Black Sea, and
the independence of the Porte. Lord Palmerston writes
to Lord John Eussell private instructions : —
Piccadilly: March 28, 1855.
I fear from aU you have said to Clarendon, pubhc and
private, that there is no chance of the new Emperor of Russia
agreeing to the only conditions which would afford us security
for the future, and though some few people here would applaud
us for makmg peace on almost any conditions, yet the bulk of
the nation would soon see through the flimsy veil -with which
we should have endeavoured to disguise entfre faUure in attain
ing the objects for which we undertook the war, and we should
receive the general condemnation which we should rightly
deserve. The Austrians, the Prussians, and the Russian agents of
course trumpet forth the vast value of the concessions made by
Russia by her acceptance of the four pomts as a basis of negotia
tion ; but the whole value and practical effect of those points
must depend upon the manner in which they are worked out,
and, according to the schemes of Gortschakoff and Prokesh, the
vaunted concessions would be reduced to absolute nullity. The
two important points of the four are the first and the third ;
the Second lays down a principle not new, but always admitted
even by Russia herself, though m practice she contrived to
evade the carrying of it out. The fourth point Russia felt to be

LOED JOHN EUSSELL AT VIENNA. 311
¦only the relinquishment of a pretension which could not be
¦enforced by arms when England and Prance resolved to back
Turkey, and the admission involved in the Russian acceptance
of this fourth point does not take from her one particle of her
power of future aggression against Turkey, though it saves
Turkey from a source of great internal weakness. But the
pretension was one which Russia had yet to make good, and she
could not make it good against Turkey supported by England
and Prance.
The first point is very important, because the object the aUies
Jiad in -view to be attained by it is to emancipate the Princi
pahties from foreign interference and to tie them more closely
to the Sultan, while, at the same time, security should be given
them for the maintenance of local self-government, and for
those privUeges of religion, internal admmistration, and com
merce which are essential to their welfare and prosperity. For
these purposes it is plain that their Constitution should be im
proved and hberahsed, that their Prince should be appointed
by the Sultan, with the only condition that he should be one of
¦the Sultan's Christian subjects. That the Constitution, which
¦ought to include a representative system, should be granted
{octroy^) by the Sovereign, confirmed by him by the most
.solemn sanction, and communicated by him to the contracting
Powers. Such an arrangement would seem to be a sufficient
guarantee, considering that there has been no complaint by the
two provinces that the Sultan has endeavoured to infringe on
their privileges or to curtail their liberties. The only e-vil to
be guarded against is the recurrence of that intermeddling in
the internal afiairs, of the pro-vinces by a foreign Power, and
those military occupations of those two pro-vinces by foreign
.troops, which have led to the conflicts between the Powers of
Europe. Now, the scheme of Gortschakoff and PrOkesh, so far from
attaining the objects we have in view, would have the effect of
riveting the foreign shackles which Russia has sought to fasten
on the Principalities, adding to their tightness and thefr weight,
and fixing them down by the assistance and co-operation of
Austria, -with the formal sanction and approval of England and
France. The treacherous game of Austria and Russia is manifest
and palpable. They propose to England and Prance the most
objectionable arrangements on the first, second, and fourth
points. They tell England and France, or, at least, Austria

312 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
suggests to England and Prance, that it would be necessary for
those two Powers to agree to these objectionable conditions, in
order to secure the co-operation of Austria on the third pomt,
the most important to the Western Powers. And what would
be the result ? Why that which follows all such bargains vrith
his sable majesty : we should have paid the price vdthout ob
taining the thing we wanted to buy. Austria evidently means
to throw us over on the thfrd point ; and if that is to happen,
the sooner we are undeceived as to her intentions the better.
Her substitutes for a narrow limitation of the Russian
Black Sea fleet, are, as you say, futile. The opening of the
Straits would be a standing danger to the Sultan, with no
compensating advantage, but, on the contrary, -with probable
inconvenience to England and Prance. The maintenance by
us and the Prench of permanent fleets in the Black Sea to
counterbalance the fleet of Russia, is simply a mauvaise plai-
santerie. The stipulation that Russia should not have a larger
fieet than she now has, even assuming that the sunken sMps
are not to count, would stiU leave her with too powerful a
naval force ; and it must be remembered that it is easy to
build steamers which, though unarmed at first, may easily be
strengthened and turned into ships-of-war. The neutrahty
scheme of Drouyn might do, if confined to the Black Sea and
the Sea of Azoff, but it would probably be as distasteful to
Russia as our o-wn proposals. The truth is we are in the
middle of a battle, and our adversary seems determined to try
the fate of arms, though it is clearly for his interest not to do
so. Possibly this Czar might find more difficulty in yielding
than his father might have done. However, I presume a few
days wUl now give a turn to affafrs. Drouyn comes here to
morrow on his way to Vienna, whither he is going to stiffen
Bourqueney. We are getting on very fafrly in the House of Commons,
and people there are beha-ving very well towards the Govern
ment. I am taking charge of the current business of the Colonial
Office, in order to know a little about it, and because I thought
it began to press a little too much on Gteorge Grey's health. I
did not, however, state that latter reason to him, but put it
upon the first, my proposal to take charge.
Whilst there was a chance of peace issuing out of
the doings at Vienna, Lord Palmerston was consider-

SUMMAEISES TUEKISH EEFOEMS. 313
ing what were the reforms which would have to be
demanded from the Sultan. Letters have been already
quoted to show how constantly he urged upon the
Turks that complete equality between Christian and
Mahomedans was the only means whereby the Otto
man empire could be permanently strengthened ; and
in the following letter he summarises what he was pre
pared to press upon the Porte. He also advocated the
establishment of primary schools in which Christian
and Mussulman chUdren should receive elementary
instruction together : — May 14, 1855.
My dear Clarendon, — What remains to be done for the
nonconformists in Turkey would be, I apprehend, speaking
generally : —
a. Capacity for mUitary service by voluntary enlistment
and ehgibility to rise to any rank in the army.
b. Admission of non-Mussulman e-vidence in civil as well
as criminal cases.
c. Establishment of mixed courts of justice (with an equal
number of Christian and Mussulman judges) for all
cases in which Mahomedkns and non-Mahomedans are
parties.
d. Appointment of a Christian officer as assessor to every
govemor of a proAdnce when that governor is a Mus
sulman ; such assessor to be of suitable rank and to-
have full hberty to appeal to Constantinople against any
act of the governor unjust, oppressive, or corrupt.
e. Ehgibility of Christians to all places in the administra
tion, whether at Constantinople or in tbe pro-vinces,.
and a practical application of this rule by the appoint
ment of Christians at once to some places of frust,
ci-vU and military.
f. The total abolition of the present system by which offices
at Constantinople and in the provinces are bought and
sold and given to unfit and unworthy men for money
paid or promised. Such men become tyrants in thefr
offices, either from mcapacity or bad passions, or from
a desfre to repay themselves the money paid for their
appointments.
There ought not only to be complete toleration of non- Mus
sulman rehgion, but aU punishment on converts from Islam,
whether natives or foreigners, ought to be abohshed.

¦314 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
This would have been a very complete programme
of civil and religious emancipation, could only the in
struments have been found to carry it out thoroughly
and honestly. But thorough and honest instruments
can never be found under such a blighting and corrupt
despotism as that of the Sultan of Turkey. The depths
of criminal recklessness and indifference to which it
habitually descends is illustrated by the foUovring
Memorandum of Lord Palmerston's, from which it
appears that the. very first loan the Turkish Govern
ment ever raised — a loan paid to them at the very
height of war, and for the purposes of thefr struggle for
national existence, was being deliberately squandered by
their sovereign on favourites and on personal luxuries,
while the fortress of Kars and its gaUant defenders were
being abandoned to their fate. We were pouring water
into a cracked vase : no wonder that it was aU use
lessly spilt : —
Should we not be justified in saymg to the Turkish Govern
ment that we wUl not advance any more of the loan which we
have guaranteed until these extravagant prodigahties have been
put an end to ? We shaU not be able to justify to Parhament
¦our having incurred pecuniary responsibihty to assist the
Turkish Government in carrying on the war if it turns out
that our guarantee has thus been made subser-vient to wasteful
expenditure for personal and private purposes. The Turkish
troops are in arrear of theh pay. We are told that Commissariat
-supplies are stopped for want of money. Kars and its- brave
army are lost because the Turkish Government has not supplied
pay, provisions, and munitions of war to them; and at this
crisis, when a proper sense of duty would have led the Sultan to
stint himself, in order to find money for the defence of his throne
and empfre, he launches into extravagance in repafring and
building palaces, and he nearly doubles the amount of money
apphed to his personal expenses and to the aUowances -to mem
bers of his family. This is scandalous. P. 16-12-55.
The second Vienna Conference broke up without any
.result being arrived at, Eussia declining to accede to
the fixed limitations sought to be imposed on her naval

HESITATION OF FEANCE. 315
forces in the Black Sea. Lord Palmerston had some
¦difficulty during these Conferences in keeping our ally
staunch. Napoleon's bugbear was a German Con
federacy against France, and this inclined him to back
up the proposals of Austria, with a view to remaining
ofr friendly terms with her, so as to secure her neutrality.
The war also had never been so popular in France
as it was in England, and the French appeared too
ready to accept terms which the English Government
thought insufficient. In the following letter the Em
peror of the French is urged not to aUow a subtle
diplomacy to rob him of the fruits of victory. The
English Ministry had just obtained a large majority in
the House of Commons on Mr. Disraeli's resolution
•expressing ' dissatisfaction with the ambiguous language
and uncertain conduct of Her Majesty's Government.'
Londres : Mai 28, 1855.
Sfre, — Votre Majesty a daignd me permettre de vous exprimer
ma pens6e de temps en temps dans des occasions importante^
J'ose done vous soumettre que la proposition que nous fait
I'Autriche de prononcer dans la Conference de Vienne le mot
' Limitation,' n'est qu'un pi^ge qu'on nous tend.
Le Principe de Limitation n'a aucune valeur pour nous, tout
depend du Cbiffre. La Russie pourrait bien accepter le principe
sans que nous fussions pour cela plus pr6s d'une paix sure et
honorable. Mais par une telle acceptation, la Russie nous
entrainerait dans un d^dale de negociations qui amoUfraient les
esprits en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, partout, et
m6me en Crim6e ; car ces negociations oisives et Ulusoires em-
plcheraient de conduire energiquement la guerre, et ne nous
aideraient pas k faire la paix. La position de la Prance et de
I'Ajagleterre n'est-eUe pas simple et claire? Nous avons fait
k la Russie des propositions qu'on ne peut critiquer qu'en les
pronongant trop liblrales envers notre ennemi ; ces propositions,
la Russie les a rejettes avec fiert6, on pourrait mSme le dfre,
avec insolence. Qu'avons-nous k faire done, excepts de nous
mettre k obtenfr des succfes par la guerre ; pourquoi nous humi-
lier en faisant de nouvelles propositions k la Russie, et en quit-
taut le terrain oii nous nous itions places ? Ce terrain n'est
pas le principe de Limitation, mais une Limitation definie et
Buffisante k nos yeux pour parer aux dangers de I'avenfr.

316 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Je sens bien que nous n'avons pas le droit de soumettre k
V. M. des considerations puisees dans notre situation interieure,.
mais peut-^tre V. M. me permettra de remarquer que le Gou
vernement anglais vient de remporter une grande victohe Par-
lementaire : nous avons eu k la Chambre des Communes,
vendredi sofr, une majorite de 100 voix, et contre quelle
attaque ? Contre une accusation que nous nous occupions d'une
negociation mutUe et peu honorable, tandis que nous devions
nous occuper uniquement de remporter des succfes dans la guerrre.
La Chambre a compris, d'aprfes les explications que nous lui
avons donnees, que les negociations etaient suspendues 'sine
die,' et que la guerre se poursuivait avec -vigueur. Si aprfes cela
nous nous trou-vions replonges dans le Labyrinthe de Vienne,
seulement et uniquement pour facUiter k TAutriche le moyen
de fafre une communication k Frankfort, j'en craindais les
suites chez nous. On nous dit chaque semaine, ' U ne faut pas
que I'Autriche nous echappe,' mais nous ne la tenons pas encore ;
et jamais nous ne la tiendrons, tant que nous ne nous soyons
montres les plus forts.
Victorieux en Crimee nous commanderons I'amitie, peut-^tre
m^me I'epee, de I'Autriche ; manquant de succfes en Crimea
nous n'aurons pas m^me sa plume. Voici le Poste important
de Jenikaie qui est tombe entre lios mains, YoUk Anapa qui va
sUivre la m^me destinee, en peu de semaines nous serons maltres
de Sevastopol et de la force flottante des Russes ; ne permettons
done pas k la Diplomatic de nous ravir les grands et importants
avantages que nous sommes sur le point de recueillir.
Napoleon's Court and Ministers were much mixed
up in speculations and affairs on the Bourse, and it was
by the Bourse-mongers at Paris that the cry for peace
at any price was stimulated. Count Persigny told
Lord Palmerston that as often as the Emperor received
the English answers differing from his pacific proposals,
he always smiled and said, ' After all, the English are
right.' The last formal sitting of the Conference had been
held on April 26. Lord John Eussell, who had favoured
the Austrian propositions of peace, returned to England
to find the Cabinet indisposed to accept them, on the
ground that they would legalize by treaty the state of
things which had been declared to be a menace to

LOED JOHN EUSSELL'S EESIGNATION. 317
Turkey. His first impulse was to resign, therein fol
lowing the example of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys, the
French Minister, who had also expressed his assent to
Count Buol's proposals. Yielding, however, to the
representations of his coUeagues, he remaii;ied a mem
ber of the Government tUl July, when Sir E. Lytton,
having given notice of a motion in the House of Com
mons directly aimed at him and his conduct at Vienna,
he relieved the Government of the embarrassmen-t
natural to such an attack by retfring from the Adminis
tration. Not only all the supporters of the Govern
ment, but nearly all its members out of the Cabinet,
had come to the opinion that this step was necessary.
During the whole of this session the Opposition and
the Eadicals poured an incessant fire on the Treasury
Bench, discharging their artUlery from very different
quarters though concentrating it in the same direction.
The Opposition wished the country to believe that the
Government were careless of the honour and prestige
of England, and were too ready to make peace at any
price ; while the Manchester school, on the other hand,
taking Lord John Eussell's attitude at Vienna as thefr
text, enlarged on the folly and wickedness of the war.
Lord Palmerston, although almost single-handed, met
these attacks with success. He had the confidence of
the country, who saw in his character that mixture
of moderation and firmness which the circumstances
required. He struck the keynote of the pubUc tone
when, in a debate on August 7, he referred to what had
been alleged as to the assent of the Turkish ambassador
to those proposals of the Vienna Conference which the
English and French Cabinets had subsequently rejected,
and asserted that the objects of the war were wider
than could depend upon the decision of the Turkish
Government. The protection of Turkey was a means
to an end; behind the protection of Turkey was the
greater question of repressing the grasping ambition of
Eussia, and preventing the extinction of political and
commercial liberty. The Governments of France and

318 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
England had as great, or even greater, interest than
Turkey in the conditions of the future peace of Europe.
Parliament was prorogued on August 14, the mes
sage from the Lords interrupting Lord Palmerston as
he was speaking in acquiescence with Sir De Lacy
Evans's exhortations for the vigorous prosecution of
military measures.
The Prime Minister was indeed indefatigable in his
attention to aU the detaUs of the campaign. The fol
lowing letter, only one among many, illustrates the care
and knowledge which he showed : —
Piccadilly : June 10, 1855.
My dear Panmure, — This is capital news from the Sea of
Azoff, and the extensive destruction of magazines and supphes
m the towns attached must greatly cripple the Russian army in
the Crimea. I am very sorry, however, to see so sad an account
of the health of the Sardinians, and I strongly recommend you
to urge Raglan, by telegraph to-day, to move the Sardinian
camp to some other and healthier situation.
Such prevalence of disease as the telegraphic message men
tions must be the effect of some local cause ; and I am as sure
as if I was on the spot that these Sardinians are put do-wn in
soine unhealthy place, from which they ought -without the loss
of a day to be removed. Our quartermaster-generals never
bestow a thought about healthiness of situations, and, indeed,
they are in general whoUy ignorant of the sanitary principles
upon which any given situation should be chosen or avoided ;
but if Raglan were to consult Dr. Sutherland on the subject, I
am confident he would get a good opinion. At aU events, these
men ought to be removed from where they are -without loss of
a day; and no excuse of mihtary arrangements ought to be^
accepted as a pretence for delay.
As the cholera seems to be mcreasing among the troops, I
should advise you to send for the doctor I mentioned, and who
would give you useful suggestions as to the treatment of the
disease, and as to the best way of administering sulphuric acid,
which seems now to be the most effectual remedy, and which,
if taken in time, seldom fails in stopping the attack.
We are 40,000 men short of the number voted by Parha
ment, and we shall be without the shadow of an excuse if we
do not resort to every possible means and every possible quarter

EESULTS OF HIS ENEEGETIC MEASUEES. 319'
-to complete our force to the number wliich Parliament has
authorised. Let us get as many Germans and Swiss as we can;
let us get men from Halifax ; let us enhst Itahans ; and let us
forthwith increase our bounty at home without raising the stan
dard. 'Do not let departmental, or official, or professional pre
judices and habits stand in our way. We must override all
such obstacles and difficulties. The only answer to give to
objectors on such grounds is, the thing must be done ; we mMst
have troops. War cannot be carried on without troops. We
have asked Parhament for a certain amount of force, and have
thereby pledged ourselves to the opinion that such a number is
necessary ; and we shaU disgrace ourselves if we do not make
every effort to raise that amount. We are now getting on in
the month of June, and no time is to be lost.
Do not forget to suggest to our commissariat people in the
Black Sea that large supplies of oxen to be eaten, and of horses
to be ridden or to draw, may be derived from the country on
the eastern shore of the Sea of Ajzoff, from whence these animals
might be brought down to the port of Taman, near the Straits
of Kertch, and be from thence carried coastwise to Balaclava ;
and it would be well also to point their attention to the pro
jecting neck of land or island called Ki-assnoi, in the Bay of
Perekop, which is said to abound m sheep and hay. It lies
north-west of the coast of the Crimea.
The good results of the new energy infused into the
military authorities were soon evident. In a speech at
Melbourne during the autumn. Lord Palmerston was
enabled to say that the hospitals in the Crimea were,
at length, 'in an admirable condition, and might, in
fact, almost be regarded as models for the hospitals of
London. The troops enjoyed every comfort compatible
with a military campaign, and were in as good a con
dition as if they were on a peace establishment at,
home.' Thus was England, as is her wont, profiting by
bitter experience, gradually strengthening through the
conflict itself, and slowly, but surely, outstripping her
allies in the development of her latent resources.
Among the minor results of the evidence of her
power and military resources was an offer made, about
this time, of a Spanish contingent of ten to twenty

320 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
thousand men. It is not unreasonable to suppose that
if they had been really wanted we should never have
had the chance given to us of declining with thanks
their proffered services.
Lord Palmerston now foresaw, with the daUy de
crease of the dangers which accompany war, the near
approach of dangers from diplomacy. He writes to his
brother : — Piccadilly : August 25, 1855.
I am kept m town for the present, but hope to go do-wn to
Broadlands in the first week of September, subject to weekly
attendances here in London on matters connected with the con
duct of the war. Thmgs in that matter are lookmg well. Our
bombardment of Sweabourg and our successes in repulsmg the
Russians in the Crimea wiU, I hope, be foUowed by the capture
of Sebastopol and the expulsion of the Russians from the
Crimea. Our danger wUl then begin — a danger of peace, and
not a danger of war. Austria wUl try to draw us again into
negotiations for an insufficient peace, and we shall not yet have
obtained those decisive successes which would entitle us to m-
sist on such terms as wiU effectuaUy curb the ambition of Russia
for the fiiture.
I must try to fight the battle of negotiation as well as the
battle of war, and, fortunately, the spfrit of the British nation
wUl support us. I wish I could reckon with equal confidence
on the steady determination of the French.
King Bomba's insult to England, through the British mis
sion at Naples, must be properly atoned for. Clarendon being
at Paris, nothing can be decided tUl he returns and the Cabinet
can be assembled ; but I have written to Clarendon to say that
my opinion is that we ought to insist upon the immediate dis
missal of Massa,! and upon a promise that he shall never again
be employed in any pubhc capacity. I would not make this
demand tUl our reserve squadron — now in attendance on the
Queen, but which wiU return with her on Tuesday, and which
consists of three hne-of-battle ships — shaU have anchored in the
Bay of Naples, opposite the King's palace, and shall have taken
on board the mission and the consul, and then I would have a
boat sent on shore with a demand that in two hours an answer
should be sent by the King saying that Massa was dismissed,
aUowing half an hour for the letter to go, half an hour for the
answer to come hack, and a whole hour for writing the answer.
' Minister of Police at Naples.

APOLOGY FEOM KING BOMBA. 321
If the time passed without a satisfactory reply, the place should
share the fate of Sweabourg ; e poi dopo, if that should not be
sufficient. However, we shall see what resolution may be come
to when the Cabinet meets on the question.
The King of Naples had acted a very unfriendly
part during our war with Eussia. He had forbidden,
within his territory, the sale of horses, mules, or other
supplies to English agents. He gave way in this
matter of the Minister of Police as soon as he heard
of our success at Sebastopol, which happened very
shortly afier the date of this letter.

VOL. II.

322 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XIL
BENBWAL OP NEGOTIATIONS — PEACE SIGNED — DECLAEATION OP
PAEIS — DISPUTES ABOUT EXECUTION OP TREATY — MISUNDBE-
STANDING WITH THE UNITED STATES — DEATH OP SIR WILLIAM
TEMPLE— EGYPT — PERSIAN APPAIES.
In September came the news of the fall of Sebastopol,
Austria, who had never relaxed her efforts to bring
about an accommodation, now renewed her endeavours,
and found in France a much more pliable subject to deal
with than England. The French Emperor was assailed
on all sides by a ' feu d'enfer ' of Eussian and Austrian
intrigue trying to shake his constancy and to drive him
to some act of weakness. One such act that he medi
tated at this moment, and that it required all the
weight of English persuasion to arrest, was the recall
of a considerable number of his troops home from the
Crimea. The Austrian and French Cabinets, however, very
much mistook the intention of this countrj-- if they
imagined that we were going to surrender ourselves
blindly into the hands of our allies without fully
exercising our own rights and judgment. On Novem
ber 21, Lord Palmerston thus writes to the Comte de
Persigny, French ambassador iu London : —
Piccadilly: 21 Novembre 1855.
Mon cher Comte, — D'aprfes notre Constitution et notre
Regime Parlementafre, le pouvoir executif ne doit jamais faire
une demarche aussi importante que celle dont il s'agit, sans
avoir des pieces officielles k produire au Parlement, afin d'etre a
mSme d'exphquer clahement ce qui a ete propose k I'Angleterre,
par quels motifs la proposition a ete appuyee, et quelles on ete
les raisons qui ont conseUie son adoption.

FALL OF SEBASTOPOL. 323
Mais, jusqu'.*. present, nous n'avons rien de tout cela. II y
a eu il Vienne une negociation k laquelle nous n'avons pas pris
part ; on a signe, du moins paraphe, un protocole pour nous,
mais sans nous ; on nous communique confidentiellement ce pro
tocole paraphe, k prendre ou k laisser, en nous disant qu'U faut
ou le rejeter ou I'accepter immediatement, bon ou maiivais, sans
en discuter la redaction et les details.
Cette maniere d'agfr dans une affaire tellement grave ne
nous convient pas. Nous souhaitons nous conformer aux desirs
de I'Empereur, mais il faut que nous soyons en regie vis-4.-vis
de notre Parlement ; et nous ne pouvons pas souscrire a une
proposition de paix k etre faite en notre nom, k la Russie, sans
que nous soyons entierement d'accord et sur la forme et sur la
substance d'une telle proposition. II est done indispensable que
nous ayons une proposition par ecrit, dont nous puissions
bien examiner la redaction, avant de pouvoir donner k I'Autriche
Paiitorisation qu'elle nous demande, de parler k la Russie en
notre nom.
Je dis parler en notre nom, parce que, malgre que I'Autriche
doit s'approprier la demarche qu'elle voudrait faire k Peters-
bourg, elle se propose de dire qu'elle salt d'avance que sa pro
position serait adoptee par la France et 1' Angleterre, si elle
venait k ^tre acceptee par la Russie.
La nation anglaise serait enchantee d'une bonne paix qui
assur^t les objets de la guerre ; mais plut6t que d'etre! entrainee
k signer une paix k des conditions insuffisantes, elle pi-efererait
contmuer la guerre sans d'autres alhes que la Turquie, et elle
se sent -tout-^-fait en etat d'en soutenfr le fardeau, et de se tirer
ainsi d'affaire. Soumettez, je vous prie, ces observations a
Walewsky. These observations were not unnecessary, because
Count Buol had already persuaded France to favour
his proposal that the Black Sea arrangements should
be contained in a separate treaty between Eussia and
Turkey. Four days after this letter. Count Persigny
came to urge, at Downing Street, acquiescence in this
arrangement, but he met with a distinct refusal.
'We ought to stand firm,' said Lord Palmerston, 'as to
ha-ving all the stipulations about the Black Sea made parts of
the Treaty between Russia and all the belhgerents. I can fancy
how I should* be hooted in the House of Commons if I were to
T 2

324 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
get up and gay that we had agreed to an imperfect and unsatis
factory arrangement about one of the most important parts of
the whole matter, as a personal favour to Count Buol, or to
save the amour-propre of Russia. I had better beforehand
take the Chiltem Hundreds.' '
Towards the end of the year, when winter had
caused hostilities to cease. Count Buol put forward, in
the name of Austria, four new points, which in sub
stance were nearly the same as the four old points.
The third, on which the former negotiations had broken
off, proposed that no fleet and no naval station of any
country should be permitted in the Black Sea. The
Czar, on January 16, 1856, accepted these proposals as
a basis for negotiating a treaty of peace ; although, of
course, there were other points, many and dif&cult, to
be settled by subsequent negotiation. Sir Hamilton
Seymour was now our ambassador at Vienna. He was
one of the ablest members of our diplomacy, and Lord
Palmerston felt that he could speak proudly to him in
reply to Austrian pressure without leading him into
imprudences. 94 Piccadilly ; January 24, 1856.
My dear Seymour, — Buol's statement to you the night be
fore last was what in plain Enghsh we should call impertinent.
We are happily not yet in such a condition that an Austrian
minister should bid us sign a treaty without hesitation or
conditions. The Cabinet of Vienna, forsooth, must insist upon
our doing so ! Why, really our friend Buol must have had his
head turned by his success at St. Petersburg, and quite forgot
whom he was addressing such language to. He should re
member that he is a self-constituted mediator, but that nobody
has made him umpire, arbiter, or dictator. He may depend
upon it we shall do no such thmg. We shall not sign without
knowing what it is that we are signing. We shall not sign un
less we are satisfied with that which we may be asked to put
our names to. Pray tell him so, and say to him privately from
me, with my best regards and compliments, that we feel very
sincerely obliged to him for his friendly and firm conduct in
these recent transactions, that we accepted, -with the addition
' To Lord Clarendon, November 26, 1855,

THE CONGEESS OF PAEIS. 325
of our own supplementary conditions, the arrangement which
he proposed to us, becalise we felt that it contained aU that,
in the present state of things, we were entitled to exact from
Russia, subject, of coiu-se, to any further demands which the
fifth article proA-ides for and authorises us to make.
But it is Russia rather than the allies who ought to feel
grateful to him for his good offices in these matters, because we
are confident that if the war goes on, the results of another
campaign will enable us this time twelvemonth to obtain from
Russia much better conditions than those which we are now
willing to accept.
We know the exhaustion, the internal pressure, difficulties,
and distress of Russia quite as well as Buol does ; but we know
better than he does our own resources and strength. He may
rest assured, however, that we have no wish to contmue the
war for the prospect of what we may accomphsh another year,
if we can now obtain peace upon the conditions wliich we
deem absolutely necessary and essential; but we are quite
prepared to go on if such conditions cannot be obtained. The
British nation is unanimous in this matter. I say unanimous,
for I cannot reckon Cobden, Bright, and Co. for anything ; and
even if the Government were not kept straight by a sense of
our pubhc duty, the strong feeling which prevaUs throughout
the coimtry would make it impossible for us to swerve. So
pray let Count Buol keep his threats for elsewhere, and not send
them over here.
On February 1 a protocol was signed at Vienna by
the representatives of the five Powers, and the congress
for the final settlement of the terms of peace was ap
pointed to meet in Paris.
To this Congress Lord Clarendon went as British
plenipotentiary, in concert with Lord Cowley. During
its sittings Lord Palmerston was in constant correspon
dence with him, aud entered, with indefatigable in
dustry, into the smallest details. They had, however,
a difficult task in the negotiations. The Eussians,
although beaten, were not inclined to yield one inch,
save to absolute necessity, and the French were too
eager for peace to be depended upon for much assist
ance. The Emperor himself was swayed by Count
Walewski's many Eussian affinities; he was horrified

326 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
by the daily accounts of the privations endured by his
army in the Crimea, and he was absorbed in a domestic
event which had given him an heir, whom he was anxious
to christen amid the rejoicings for peace. He was,
therefore, only thinking of how to ' faire le genereux '
towards the Czar, whom he would gladly have con-
cUiated now that his position in Europe was secured.
Amid all such secret motives and tortuous actions the
British Government had to hold on its way^ now and
then yielding on minor matters, but adhering firmly to
the principal conditions of peace. In this it succeeded ;
and on March 30 the Treaty of Paris was signed.
A few days later, the plenipotentiaries also sub
scribed a declaration about maritime war.
At the beginning of hostilities Great Britain had
tacitly abandoned her ancient doctrines respecting
neutrals, which she could only have attempted to en
force under pain of having all mankind against her.
It was evident that they could never be revived, and
that the concessions which she had once made to
neutral rights could never be withdrawn. When,
therefore, the President of the Congress, in the name
of his Government, suggested to the English plenipo
tentiary that it would be a ' benevolent ' act for the
Congress to proclaim as permanent the principles upon
which the war had been carried on, with the addition
that privateering should be abolished,' Lord Clarendon
• Original Draft of Mesolutimi handed to Lord Clarendon. — ' Le
congrfes de Westphalie a consacrg la liberty des cultes, le congrfes de
Vienne I'abolition de la traite des noirs et la liberty de la navigation
des fleuves ; il appartiendrait au cougrfes de Paris de consacrer I'aboli
tion de la course et la franchise du commerce des neutres, conform6-
ment aux principes appliques dans la guerre actuelle.
' Ces principes sont, d'apr&s les declarations 6manees de la France et
de I'Angleterre au debut de la guerre :
' Que le pa-rillon neutre couvrc la marchandise ennemie, excepts la
contrebande de guerre.
' Que la marchandise neutre, exoeptfi la contrebande de guerre, n'est
pas saisissable sous pavilion ennemi.
' Et que les blocus doivent etre effectifs, c'est-a-dire maintenus par
une force navale suflBsante.'
The Americans had previously, bj- a circular, asked the assent of the

NEW EULES OF NAVAL WAEFAEE. 327
referred the matter home, and, with the approval of the
Queen and of the entire Cabinet, conveyed the assent
of the British plenipotentiaries to the proposal, point
ing out at the same time, as a necessary proviso, ' that
the declaration should not be binding except between
those Powers who have acceded or shall accede to it.'
This clause was added, and certain other modifications
made in the declaration before it was finaUy settled.
Its policy is not a matter for discussion here ; but the
fact of its having been deliberately adopted by the
English Cabinet, for what they considered good and
sufficient reasons, is the point which it is desirable to
Tocord, as many absurd tales have been from time to
time current about it : as though the English plenipo
tentiary had agreed to it without any authority from
home or consultation with the rest of the Ministry.
On May 5, an animated and prolonged debate took
place in the House of Commons on the treaty of peace.
Lord Palmerston spoke on the second night of the
¦discussion from twelve o'clock till half-past two, and
exhaustively defended the acts of the Government. The
following day he moved a vote of thanks to the navy
and army.
Thus ended the Crimean war — a war which, how
ever some men may look back to it with regret, on
account of the incapacity since shown by the Turks for
profiting by the breathing-time afforded to them, was
¦certainly just, and possibly necessary. It cost England
some 25,000 men, and fifty milUons in money, but Eus
sian overbearance and greed of dominion received a
•wholesome, if only temporary, check, and, had the war
continued a little longer, would have been still more
severely punished. The plans proposed to the Allies for
the ensuing campaign embraced operations in Circassia
maritime Powers to the doctrine of 'free ships, free goods.' Most of
the Powers consulted England as to the answer they should give, and,
in accordance with our views, answered that they should not agree
unless the United States at the same time gave up the system of
privateers. This they declined to do ; but by the Declaration of Paris
they are left to stand alone in their anachronism.

328 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
and Finland ; the English to have chief command in
the South, and the French in the North. The Shah
of Persia had promised certain facilities on the Caspian
in view of a campaign in Georgia, and a Treaty with
Sweden had already been signed the previous December.
It is not impossible that the result might have been the
restoration of Finland to Sweden, of her lost provinces
to Persia, and the independence of Circassia.
Only twenty years, however, elapsed before Eussia
and Turkey again found themselves in hand-to-hand
conflict; but this time they fought alone. Neither
France nor England intervened, and the Turk had to
maintain the struggle without allies. There were plenty
of reasons, both foreign and domestic, why French
men in 1877 should be unwilling to fight anew for a
cause about which even in 1854 they were, as a nation,
wholly indifferent. But, at first sight, ib appeared to
many that Englishmen were, to say the least, incon
sistent when they successfully protested against being
a second time led to war with Eussia in behalf of
Turkey. This was a very superficial view of the case,
as the circumstances of the two periods were wholly
different. In 1877 the Eussian Czar came forward to
free a nationality. This, at any rate, was the osten
sible object as well as the inevitable result of his acts,
whatever secret aims and unavowed motives may have
also been at work. At the time of the Crimean war
not only was there no such justificatory pretext put
forward, but had there been it would have found no
echo in England, because the Bulgarian people were
not deemed to be in a condition to profit by any such
demands made in their behalf. But during the years
which elapsed between the Congress of Paris and the
Conference at Constantinople education, wealth, and
general civilization had, by various agencies, so spread
among the Slavs of Turkey, that Lord Palmerston's
dictum, as to there being among them no elements
capable of self-government, was rapidly becoming an
anachronism. He himself, had he been alive, would

EUSSIA AND TUEKEY IN 1854 AND 1877. 329
have been the first to recognize this ; nor, if we may
judge by his conduct at the time of the establishment
of the Greek Kingdom, would he have been among the
most laggard in action to endow them with whatever
measure of freedom they were capable of receiving.
Again, the antecedents of Czar Nicholas and of his son
were entirely different — in other words, the Eussia of
1854 presented to the world a totally different aspect
from the Eussia of 1877. The Emperor Nicholas in
his haughty arrogance and imperious conduct was but
the representative and embodiment of what had been
the aggressive policy of his empire for many years.
The duel between him and Lord Palmerston, as the
official representative of British honour and interests,
only culminated in the Crimean war. During earlier
years it had been fiercely maintained, while almost
dramatic in its personal incidents. Persia, India, Po
land, Hungary and the outlying parts of Turkey had in
turn been the ground of contest. That a check to the
continual encroachments of Eussia was required had
become a cardinal point in the creed of almost every
European statesman. The Emperor Alexander, on the
contrary, was not only credited with a distaste for
war, and with a conciliatory disposition, but also had
never shown himself a disturber of the peace. His
noblest triumph — namely, the emancipation of the serfs
— had been at home. When at last he did proceed to
carry his arms abroad he had patiently waited till the
unanimous voice of Europe at the Constantmople Con
ference pronounced that, in the actual controversy, he
was right and his adversary wrong. Lastly, the Govern
ment of the Turk stood before the eyes of the English
people in a very different light from that with which
hope had surrounded it in 1854. That Lord Palmer
ston and most of the statesmen of that period believed
in the probable reform and regeneration of Ottoman rule,
is not only an undoubted truth, but the only justifica
tion of the policy which they so long and so earnestly
maintained. But when Lord Eussell, in 1860, in a let-

330 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ter to Lord Palmerston, stated his fears that ' nothing,
but honesty and energy in a degree that are not to
be found at Constantinople can restore the Turkish
Empire,' he was only giving expression to convictions
which were beginning to dawn everywhere. It came to
pass, therefore, that when, after twenty years of profound
peace, and the command during tba-t -time of immense
sums of money which the capitalists of Europe had
poured into the lap of Turkey, her Government proved
worse and her corruption greater than before the English
people thought her case hopeless, and wisely preferred
to let her get though her troubles with Eussia unas
sisted and alone.
But to return to 1856. Difficulties shortly arose
respecting the execution of some of the articles of the
treaty of peace. A Turkish officer had been sent to
take possession of Serpent's Island, at the mouth of the
Danube, and the Turkish flag was hoisted. Soon after
wards a party of seven Eussian marines, with a lieu
tenant, landed and occupied the island. The Eussian
Government declined to remove them, on the ground that
the question of its occupation was to be settled by a
Conference at Paris. The English admiral then sta
tioned a vessel off the island, with orders to prevent, by
force if necessary, all attempts to increase the Eussian
force on the island. So matters remained till the end
of the year.
Another point in dispute was as to the identification
of a place marked Bolgrad on the map. The treaty
said that the new frontier was to run ' south of Bolgrad.'
When the commissioners met to mark it out, they dis
covered that the real Bolgrad was much more to the
south than the Bolgrad of the Conference maps. They
were unable, therefore, to agree, and the matter, to
gether with the question of Serpent's Island, was referred
to a new Conference.
Lord Palmerston, in the following memorandum,
recounts his first interview with the new Eussian am
bassador in London, and records what he said to him
about these two disputed points : —

MINOE DISPUTES WITH EUSSIA. 331
Piccadilly, August 12, 1856.
Count Chrepto-vitch came to me this morning at half-past
eleven by appointment. He began by ci-vil expressions of plea
sure at renewal of old acquaintance, to which I rephed in
simUar terms. After some preliminary talk of this kind, I
said I was sorry that, at our first inter-view on the renewal of
diplomatic relations between the two Governments, I should
have to enter upon a string of grievances. ' Well,' said he,
' let us hear them : what are they ¦? ' I said I was sorry to
have to say that, ever since the conclusion of the treaty of
peace, the Russiaji Government has been acting in a manner
inconsistent with its engagements, and has in some instances
broken them, in others tried to evade them. That the treaty
distinctly says that the fortress and district of Kars are to
be restored to Turkey ; in violation of which engagement the
fortress had been demolished, and the Russian occupying
force increased. The treaty says that a portion of Bessarabia
is to be restored to Turkey, and from the ratification of the
treaty that territory belonged of right to Turkey ; but in
disregard of this, the Russians have destroyed the fortifications
of Ismail and Reni. Here Count Chrepto-vitch interrupted me
with much impatience. He said these things were done, whether
right or wrong, and there was no use in going back to past
events, and that we must look only to the future. I said I
entirely diffijred from him ; I thought there was great use in
going back to past events, and that they had, as I would pre
sently explain, a great bearing on the future. That I must be
allowed to tell him fully and plainly all I think on these
matters ; that it was for the purpose of doing so that I had asked
him to call upon me ; and that if he did not choose to hsten to
me, he had better go back to Petersburg. I then resumed. I
said that these acts were not only at variance with the treaty, but
quite unworthy of a great Power like Russia. If Russia had
been able at the Congress of Paris to obtain stipulations that
there should be no defensive works at Kars, and no fortifica
tions at IsmaU and Reni, and that both those frontiers should
be left open to the future attacks of Russia — meditated attacks,
her conduct would lead us to think, though I did not ask him
to admit that — if such stipulations could have been obtained,
I could have understood the value which Russia would have
attached to them, and they would have been worth a struggle in
the negotiation ; but as no such stipulations were made, the only
efiect of demolishing Kars and Ismail and Reni would be to put

332 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the Turks to some expense and trouble in reconstructing
these works, and the probable result would be that they
would be rebuilt upon a better plan. This, therefore, was an
ebullition of ill-humour and revenge that might be called childish.
1 said, however, that we were glad to find that one part of this
grievance is about to cease, and that Kars and its district is to
be immediately evacuated by the Russians. The next point I
had to complain of was the attempt to take possession of Ser
pent's Island. When the east and west boundary between
Russia and Turkey in Europe ran south of this island, the
island naturally belonged to Russia ; , but now that the east and
west boundary hne will run a good way to the north of that
island, the island must naturally belong to Turkey. I said that
the island has no intrinsic value as territory; that its only
value is that it is, by means of its lighthouse, a guiding point to
ships making the mouths of the Danube, and on that account it
must belong to the Powers to which the mouths of the Danube
belong. Count Chrepto-vitch said that the island is also impor
tant for ships going to Odessa, because when they happen, as is
frequently the case, to be blown to the southward and out of
their course by adverse winds, the hght on this island teUs
them where they are. I said that the light kept for the Da
nube would do equally well for Odessa ; and that, being on this
point, I would observe, in passing, that we have been informed
that the Russian detachment which landed to take possession of
the island, finding a superior force of Turks there, endeavoured
to induce the Turks to -violate thefr duty, and either to go away
and give up the island to the Russians, or to desert over to the
Russian service. Count Chreptovitch seemed to admit the force
of the reasoning that the change of the boundary line in those
quarters must throw this island into the Turkish hmits.
I then went on to Bessarabia. I said that the Emperor of
Russia had formally accepted the Vienna proposal, which drew
the new boundary between Russia and Molda-via by a line
starting from a point north of the Pruth, and going southward
along a chain of hUls to Lake Salyick ; that at Paris, out of
pure deference to the wishes of the Emperor of Russia, and
from a desire to insist on nothing that had not a real pohtical
value, the allies had agreed to a great modification of this line
in favour of Russia; that the new hne was, however, very
plainly and clearly described by the treaty ; that it is to start
from a point on the sea-coast beyond Lake Bourna Sola, to run
up to the Ackerman Road, and to follow along that road to the

MEMOEANDUM ON EUSSIAN PEETENSIONS. 333
River Yalpouk, leaving the town of Bolgrad to the north of
the boundary ; that at the Congress a map had been produced,
on which a to-wn had been pointed out bearing the name of
Tabor, or of Bolgrad, and which was designated as the town to
the south of which the boundary line is to run, and between
that town and Lake Yalpouk there is space enough for the
hne to be drawn. But; I said, when the commissioners came
to the ground, the Russians started a new Bolgrad on the
alhes ; and this new Bolgrad is much to the south of the Bolgrad
of the Conference, and so close to Lakp Yalpouk that there is
no space for a boundary line between the town and the lake. I
said this was an unworthy deception which cannot be acquiesced
in, and that the old Bolgrad, which was the town meant by the
Congress, must be the Bolgrad to the south of which the
boundary is to run. Count Chreptovitch said that in fact the
new Bolgrad is the real to-wn, the old Bolgrad being only a
ruined and deserted -village;' but nevertheless he admitted that
the old Bolgrad, and not the new one, must be deemed the
Bolgrad of the treaty.
I said that we had to complain of another proceeding of the
Russian commissioners. That the commission had agreed to
make a general survey of the whole line in the first instance,
and then go over it regularly, putting up landmarks as they
went. That upon a great part of the line all are agreed ; and
our commissioners proposed that upon those parts the land
marks should be fixed, leaving the other parts, as to which
difierences had arisen, to be landmarked afterwards, when the
disputed points should have been settled. That to this the
Russians have obj ected, and want to delay the whole till the whole
is agreed upon. I said that in this way the season for opera
tions -will be lost ; winter wiU come on before the boundary is
laid down ; and what will be the consequence ? The Russians
-will not go out of the district to be ceded, because the boundary
Ime is not settled and drawn ; the Austrians will not go out of
the Principahties because the Russians are not out of ceded
Bessarabia ; and our fieet may probably not leave the Black
Sea because the treaty is not executed. All this state of things
wUl be contrary to the treaty; but the fault will be with
Russia, and with her also the responsibility ; and this we shall
have to say when Parliament meets. Count Chrepto-vitch said
that these delays were the fault of subordinate agents, and
not of the Russian Government, who are anxious for a final set
tlement. I said that might be ; but we cannot give orders to

334 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. ,
these subordmate Russian agents, and the Russian Govern
ment can ; and as that Government is despotic, it can make its
orders to be obeyed, and we must therefore hold the Govern
ment answerable for the conduct of its agents. However, the
Count assured me, in the most positive terms, that these mat
ters shall be speedUy and satisfactorily settled. I said I hoped
they would, and that thus all difficulties would be got over.
That the information that Kars is immediately to be restored
to the Turks, had reheved us from an embarrassment we had
felt as to whether Lord Granville should be aUowed to go on to
Moscow ; and if those other points were well settled, we should
resume with Russia our former habits of cordial friendship.
That we are plain and simple people, and look to things and
not to words ; and that the sort of small attentions and fiatteiy
which we understand they are la-vishing on the French —
though with what success may be doubted — would be altogether
thrown away upon us. That Prince Gortschakoff seems to
have expressed to Lord Gran-ville some surprise that England
should have taken singly, in the Black Sea, a step with refer
ence to a treaty to which England is only one of several con
tracting parties; but that Prince Gortschakoff' must not be
surprised if we continue to act in the same manner, whenever
any occasion for doing so should arise, inasmuch as we consider
that we have a right to do so, and we know that we have the
power to do so.
I said that Baron Brunnow had often said to me that Eng
land and Russia hold to different principles of government.
Russia is for despotic power ; England for constitutions ; but
nevertheless the two countries have great interests in com
mon, upon which abstract and theoretical differences of opfrion
have no direct bearing ; and that, as long as Russia and Eng
land do not come into coUision about the affairs of Turkey or
the affairs of Persia, there is no reason why they should not
act in concert on many important matters. I said I hoped
that Russia would stick to her engagements about Turkey, and
then there could be no differences on that subject. That as to
Persia, Russia had, during the war, done in Persia what she
had doiie in America, and what she had a perfect right to do,
that is to say, create for England as much embarrassment and
hostility as she could. That her instruments, however, had
become, or will become, her victims. That Russia had lost for
President Pierce all chance of re-election by the course she
urged him to take towards England ; and that as to Persia,

FEENCH LEANING TO EUSSIA. 335
though we have hitherto shown great forbearance, the time is
fast approaching when the Persian Government will see cause
to repent its conduct towards us, unless in the interval that
conduct shall be entirely changed, and fully atoned for. I
observed that Count Chreptovitch did not very much deny what
I said as to the action of Russia in America and in Persia. I
said — and he with great warmth of manner joined in the wish
— that our sincere desire is to forget the recent past, and to
remember only our former good relations. I said that, with regard
to himself personally, it is unfortunate that so long a delay has
taken place between his nomination and his arrival, because it
cannot be considered otherwise than as a mark of want of re
spect to the Queen — not perhaps on his part, but on the part of
his Government. That in general, when a foreign Minister
arrives while the Queen is at Osborne, such Minister is taken
down by the Seferetary of State for Foreign Affairs, to have as
early as possible his audience of Her Majesty at Osborne ; but
that in his case this practice will not be observed ; and that, as
he has shown so httle empressement to pay his respects to the
Queen, Her Majesty cannot be advised to show any empresse
ment to receive him ; and that he cannot have his audience till
the Queen shall return to London.
We parted -with much mutual cordiality, and tender in
quiries about mutual friends, Enghsh and Russian.
France did not show herself so ready to support
England at the council table as she had proved herself
in the field. Lord Palmerston spoke frankly to the
French ambassador. He pointed out that owing to
French assistance at the Congress, Eussia had obtained
many concessions to which she was not entitled : that,
all the same, a Treaty had been concluded which was
sufficient, if loyally carried out ; but that, on the con
trary, it was being evaded, and that the Eussians pre
tended that they were secretly backed by France. He
said that, as to these two points of Bolgrad and the Isle
of Serpents, it was absolutely impossible for England to
admit the pretensions of Eussia. That England had
resigned herself to accept somewhat unsatisfactory con
ditions of peace, sooner than be the cause of a continu
ance of the curse of war, but that she was quite resolved

336 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to insist on the full and entire execution of those
conditions, and that the only result of any failure of
French co-operation would be a weakening of the hon
ourable and advantageous alliance between France and
England. Count Walewski's answer was of a nature to draw
from Lord Palmerston a very decided hint that England
would take her own line, whether France went back or
forward, and his firmness eventually carried the day.
During the session a resolution was introduced in
the House of Commons alleging that ' the conduct of
Her Majesty's Government in the differences, with the
Hnited States on the question of enlistment has not
entitled them to the approbation of th^ House.' We
had been charged with violating the neutrality of the
United States, by enlisting recruits for the British ser
vice. No doubt the laws of the States had in some
respects been infringed, but not intentionally, nor by
any authorised English official.' However, Mr. Cramp-
ton, our minister at Washington, received his pass
ports from the President and left the country. Our
Government did not retaliate for this act of diplomatic
censure, but continued , to receive Mr. Dallas in Lon
don. Both their original offence and their subsequent
apologetic conduct formed the grounds of Parliamen
tary attack on the Government. Lord Palmerston,
when the resolution was discussed, successfully pointed
out the inconsistencies of its supporters. While with
one accord they joined in aspirations for peace and good
will between the two countries, they were doing all they
could to create illwill.
These gentlemen, so anxious for peace, tell you that England
has been insulted, treated -with contempt, contumely, and in
dignity. What is the effect likely to be produced 1 Why, to
excite a spirit of resentment towards our neighbours and kin-
' During the Crimean war we sent a remonstrance to Holland on
her violation of neutralityin supplying arms to Eussia, and then dis
covered that our own Ordnance Department had been ordering from
the Dutch large quantities of gunpowder.

DEATH OF HIS BEOTHEE. 337
dred in the United States. Others, again, tell the Americans
that their Go-verrtment has been deluded, and persuaded to
accept an apology they ought not to have accepted, and that
their laws have been intentionally -violated by a foreign Govern
ment. Is that the way to create good feeling 1 Is that the
way to persuade the American people to cultivate the most
friendly relations with England ?
Thus he met his critics.
Towards the end of the year Lord Palmerston visited
Manchester and Liverpool, and received, amid much
enthusiasm, addresses from the corporations and other
public bodies.
Any record of his life would be incomplete that did
not notice the 'death of his only brother. Sir WiUiam
Temple, which occurred in London, in August of this
year. Although Lord Palmerston was the older by not
more than two years, he always treated his younger
brother with the affectionate care which might rather
be expected from a father. Many of the most inter
esting of his letters are those to his brother, who, being
in the diplomatic service, lived much abroad, and
whom Lord Palmerston therefore endeavoured, in spite
of all his work, to keep informed as to what was going
on at home. A strong affection subsisted between them,
although their temperaments were very different ; and
during William Temple's last illness in London, Lord
Palmerston passed a considerable time with him every
day. The future of Egypt must, for a long time to come,
have a special interest for Englishmen. The foUowing
letter to Lord Clarendon sufficiently explains itself, and
is interesting as showing the head of the British Cabinet
declining proposals coming from an unexpected quarter,
which were to lead to the possession of Egypt by Eng
land. Lord Palmerston's opinions on this matter were
frequently repeated. He saw the paramount importance
of its being kept open for transit, but never encouraged
any idea of annexation. On one occasion, to Lord
Cowley, he used a homely but apt illustration : ' We do
VOL. II. Z

'338 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
not want Egypt,' he said, ' or wish it for ourselves any
more than any rational man with an estate in the north
of England and a residence in the south, would have
wished to possess the inns on the north road. All he
could want would have been that the inns should be
well kept, always accessible, and furnishing him, when
he came, with mutton chops and post-horses.' '
Piccadilly : March 1, 1857.
My dear Clarendon, — As to the Emperor's schemes about
Africa, the sooner ¦ Cowley sends in his grounds of objection the
better. It is very possible that many parts of the world would
be better governed by Prance, England, and Sardinia than
they are now ; and we need not go beyond Italy, Sicily, and
Spain for examples. But the alliance of England and France
has derived its strength not merely from the mihtary and naval
power of the two states, but from the force of the moral prin
ciple upon which that imion has been founded. Our union has
for its foundation resistance to imjust aggression, the defence
of the weak agamst the strong, and the maintenance of the
existing balance of power. How, then, could we combine to
become improvoked aggressors, to imitate, in Africa, the par
tition of Poland by the conquest of Morocco for France, of
Tunis and some other state for Sardinia, and of Egypt for
England? and, more especially, how could England and Prance,
who have guaranteed the integrity of the Tiu-kish Empire, turn
round and -wrest Egypt from the Sultan 1 A coalition for such
a purpose would revolt the moral feelings of mankmd, and
would certainly be fatal to any English Government that was
a party to it. Then, as to the balance of power to be main
tained by giving us Egypt. In the first place, we don't want
to have Egypt. What we wish about Egypt is that it should
continue attached to the Turkish empire, which is a security
against its belonging to any European Power. We want to
trade with Egypt, and to travel through Egypt, but we do not
want the burthen of governing Egypt, and its possession would
not, as a political, mihtary, and naval question, be considered,
in this country, as a set-off against the possession of Morocco
by Prance. Let us try to improve all these countries by the
general influence of oiu' commerce, but let us all abstain from
a crusade of conquest which would call upon us the condemna
tion of all the other civUised nations.
' To Lord Cowley, November 25, 1859.

THE DANUBIAN PEINCIPALITIES. 339
This conquest of Morocco was the secret aim of Louis Phi
hppe, and is one of the plans deposited for use, as occasion may
offer, in the archives of the Prench Government.
In August the Emperor of the French, with the
Empress, paid a visit to the Queen at Osborne. The
great question to be discussed was that of the Danubian
Principalities. Eussia, France, and Sardinia were in
favour of the union of Eoumania with Moldavia ; Prussia
was neutral ; England, Austria, and Turkey were op
posed to it. By the Treaty of Paris their future con
stitution had been left to be settled by the Treaty
Powers after a Divan had been convoked in each of the
two provinces to ascertain the wishes of the people
themselves. There was little doubt as to what they
were, but the elections in Moldavia resulted in the
return of members unfavourable to the union. The
Porte being accused of having obtained this result by un
fair means, a demand was made for the annulling of the
elections under a threat ofthe withdrawal of the French
and Eussian ambassadors from Constantinople. This
meant war and general confusion. Lord Palmerston's
attendance was requested at Osborne in order to confer
about these matters, and a memorandum of the arrange
ment agreed upon was drawn up by him. It was in
effect that the Moldavian elections should be annuUed ;
while the two Governments were to combine to secure
. the suzerainty of the Sultan over the Provinces. The
end of it all, however, was, as we know, their union
under one ruler, thereby affording another iUustration of
the fatility of attempting in these days to sever by arti
ficial means countries which affinity, fellow-feeling,
and geography combine to join. England gave herself
on this occasion much trouble and incurred some risk,
with the sole result of alienating from herself the sym
pathies of the populations whose fate was involved.
France had taken an opposite line, though, no doubt,
from other motives than pure affection for the Eou-
manians and Moldavians.
z2

340 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Lord Palmerston's character must have been quite a
puzzle to the French Emperor, who found that he could
neither intimidate nor cajole him, nor yet shake him off.
No wonder that he sometimes showed a little temper.
' I am rather surprised,' says Lord Palmerston,* ' that the
Emperor should have spoken with so much bitterness about
me, for nothing could be more personally friendly than his
manner at Osborne. But the fact, no doubt, is that he is
much annoyed at finding that we did not give in to his notions
about dri-ving the Mahomedans away from the southern shores
of the Mediterranean, and about gi-ving an extension to French
occupation in Africa. The fact is that, in our alhance with
Prance, we are riding a runaway horse, and must always be on
our guard ; but a runaway horse is best kept in by a hght
hand and an easy snaffle. It is fortunate for us that we are
thus mounted, mstead of bemg on foot, to be kicked at by this
same steed ; and as our ally finds the alhance useful to himself,
it will probably go on for a good time to come. The danger is,
and always has been, that Prance and Russia should unite to
carry into effect some great scheme of mutual ambition. Eng
land and Germany would then have to stand out against them ;
and Germany is too much broken up and disjointed to be an
efficient ally.
We had this year a little war with Persia, owing to
her occupation of Herat, contrary to the solemn engage
ments made with England in 1853. Although the
dispute did not attract much public attention, Lord
Palmerston was fully alive to the importance of the
issues involved. He foresaw that Khiva and Bokhara
would shortly be occupied by Eussia, and that Cabul
and Candahar might, before very long, be deemed the
advanced outposts of British India. Whether it would
be better that Herat should remain a weak, independent
Government, or that it should be in the hands of a ruler
able to defend it, like the ruler of Cabul, and who, by
geographical position, must attach himself to an English
alliance, might be a moot point ; but at any rate it was
clear that it must not be allowed to fall to Persia.
About the general question he says to Lord Clarendon: —
' To Lord Clarendon, September 29, 1857.

"WAE WITH PEESIA. 341
February 17, 1857.
It is quite true, as you say, that people in general are dis
posed to think lightly of our Persian war ; that is to say, not
enough to see the importance of the question at issue. Ellen-
borough is right : we are beginning to repel the first opening
of trenches against India by Russia ; ' and whatever difficulties
Ferokh ^ may make about Afghanistan, we may be sure that
Russia is his prompter and secret backer. But that makes it
the more essential that we should carry our point on that
subject. What, however, are our important points'? The
renunciation by Persia of all claim over Herat and of all
future design or attempt to mvade Herat. This is a sine qud
non, and, of course, includes an acknowledgment of the inde
pendence of Herat, and mcludes it so completely that a dis
tinct acknowledgment of that independence seems hardly
necessary. Any engagement on our part towards Persia about
our own relations with Affghanistan should be peremptorily
refused. As to our mediation, as there is in most men's minds a
confusion of ideas between mediation and arbitration, we might,
if driven to it, substitute for mediation, a condition that if any
difference should arise between Persia and any of the Affghan
states, includmg Herat, Persia would, in the first place, ask our
good offices to arrange the matter in dispute ; and we might
promise to use our good offices to obtain a settlement just and
honourable to both parties.
The treaty of peace between the Queen of England
and ' His Majesty whose standard is the sun ' was signed
at Paris on March 4. Persia renounced all claim or
dominion over Herat and Affghanistan, and engaged (in
such terms as were suggested in the above letter) to
refer any future differences she might have with the
Affghan states to the friendly offices of the British
Government. The opportunity of this war was also taken to obtain
the abolition of slave trade in the Persian Gulf — an
act consistent with the many former efforts of Lord
Palmerston to put an end to traffic in human beings.
' Lord EUenborough had just made a speech in the House of Lords^
in this sense.
' Ferokh Khan, ambassador from Persia.

342 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
I append a letter which, on the conclusion of peace,
he wrote to the Sadr Azim ' in reply to a flowery com
munication from that minister. It is a specimen both
of the skill with which he could read as well as write
between the lines and of candid irony in expressing his
sentiments. Behind the diplomatic effusion of the-
Persian minister he discerned the true character and
motives of his correspondent, who had secretly been a
bitter enemy of England. His courteous reply conveys-
very clearly that he knew it all, but that the ' least said,,
soonest mended ; only don't let it occur again ' : —
London : September 8, 1857.
Excellency, ^I have received with much pleasure the letter
dated June 5 last, which you were so good as to address to-
me ; and I have been much gratified by the friendly sentiments
which it contains. I rejoice, as your Excellency does, at the-
treaty of peace, which has happily put an end to the war
between England and Persia; and I hope that the peace which
has thus been estabhshed may long continue for the mutual
advantage of both countries. I can truly assure your Excel
lency that it is the wish of the English, Government and of the
Enghsh nation that Persia should be a happy, a prosperous, a
strong, and an independent state, and that the most perfect;
friendship and the fullest confidence should prevail between
the Governments of England and of Persia.
I am rejoiced to find, from your Excellency's letter, that it
is your desire and intention to cultivate in future the friend
ship of England. But I should not be deserving of your good
opinion if I were to disguise from you the truth of my thoughts,
and there are parts of your Excellency's letter which compel
me to speak frankly in reply.
Your Excellency says that, until now, out of various con
siderations, you have looked upon yourself as alone and with
out assistance in your endeavours to preserve the friendship of
the two Governments from injury. And you further say that,
you request me, and you entertain the firm hope that I shall
henceforward give my fuU attention to the observance of the
rules of friendship and miity between the two Governments.
Now upon this I feel myself obliged to say that the war
which took place between our two countries was not owing to
' The ' Prime Minister ' cf Persia.

LETTEE TO THE PEESIAN PEEMIEE. 343
any neglect on the part of the English Government of the
rules of friendship and equity, but was occasioned solely and
entirely by your Excellency's o-wn unfriendly conduct, and by
the -violent hostUity which your Excellency displayed towards
England, both in word and deed ; and, therefore, so far from
your Excellency ha-ving been alone in endeavours to preserve
friendship between the two Governments, your Excellency
was the main and principal cause of the cessation of that
friendship. I have no doubt that your Excellency, in seekhig a quarrel
with England, believed that you were promoting the interests
of Persia, and I am bound to suppose that your Excellency
considered yourself as performing on that occasion the part of
a true patriot ; and this belief on my part strengthens my con
fidence in the future maintenance of friendship between the
two Governments and comitries, because the events of the war,
and the decisive victories obtained by the British troops over
superior numbers of Persian troops, must have shown and have
proved to the sagacious mind and powerful understanding of
your ExceUency that the true interests of Persia are best pro
moted by peace and friendship with England, and that the sure
results to Persia of war -with England must be defeat and
disaster. With this conviction strongly impressed upon your
mind, your Excellency will, I am sure, like a good patriot,
clearly see in what direction the welfare of your country lies,
and you wUl direct your policy as minister of your Sovereign
so as to secure that welfare. 'Therefore it is that, kno-wing the
high statesmanlike qualities which so emmently distinguish
your ExceUency, I feel satisfied that the aUiance between our
two countries wUl rest henceforward upon the basis of national
interest, which is a ffi-mer foundation than the sentiments of
individual ministers, however friendly and sincere those senti
ments may be. With every wish for the health and happiness
of your Excellency, and -with a fervent hope that the reign of
your illustrious master and Sovereign the Shah of Persia may
be long and prosperous, I have the honour to remain.
Your Excellency's most obedient
and faithful Servant, Palmekston.
His Excellency The Sadk Azim, &c.

344 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XIII.
QUAEKEL WITH CHINA — EESOLUTION CARRIED BY MR. COBDEN
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT — DISSOLUTION — INDIAN MUTIN-T —
GOVERNMENT INDIA BILL — DEFEAT ON CONSPIRACY BILL —
RBSIGNATION.
' Hee Majesty commands us to inform you that acts of
violence, insults to the British flag, and infraction of
treaty rights committed by the local Chinese authori
ties at Canton, and a pertinacious refusal of redress,
have rendered it necessary for Her Majesty's officers in
China to have recourse to measures of force to obtain
satisfaction.' So ran the Speech from the Throne at
the opening of Parliament in February 1857.
This was the affair of the lorcha ' Arrow,' destined
to attain some celebrity. It happened thus. Under
treaties with China, British vessels were to be subject
to consular jurisdiction only. The ' Arrow,' having a
British register, was boarded by Chinese from a war
junk and the crew carried off, on a charge of piracy.
Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong-Kong, demanded
satisfaction from the Chinese Commissioner, Yeh, and,
failing to obtain it, proceeded to use force with the fleet
under Admiral Sir Michael Seymour. He also added
to his former demands one for the admission of foreign
ers to the port and city of Canton under treaty engage
ments which had never been carried out. Yeh retaliated
by proclamations offering rewards for the heads of the
barbarians. Such was the position of affairs when Mr. Cobden
brought forward in the House of Commons a resolution
to the effect that ' the papers laid on the table failed to
establish satisfactory grounds for tlie violent measures

DIFFICULTIES WITH CHINA. 345
resorted to.' In the House of Lords a similar motion,
brought forward by Lord Derby, had been rejected by a
majority of thirty-six. The discussion in the Commons
lasted four nights, and was marked by great ability.
Mr. Gladstone, Sir James Graham, Lord John Eussell,
Mr. Disraeli, and Mr. Eoebuck all joined Mr. Cobden
in his attack upon the Government. As the debate
proceeded it became evident that the fate of the Go
vernment was involved. Meetings were lield, on the
one hand by the Opposition, and on the other by the
friends of the Government, at which resolutions to put
forward all their respective strength were adopted. The
ministerial phalanx had been lately weakened, many
Liberals having grown apathetic, owing to the coldness
shown towards the cause of Eeform. The issue was up
to the last doubtful. Lord Palmerston spoke vigorously,
and concluded with some pointed strictures upon the
combination of parties confederated against him, warn
ing the House that it had in its keeping not only the
interests and lives of many of their fellow-countrymen,
but also the honour and reputation of the country. The
resolution was, however, carried against the Govern
ment by a majority of sixteen.
' Let the noble Lord,' Mr. Disraeli had said in his
speech, 'who complained that he was the victim of a
conspiracy, not only complain to the country, but let
him appeal to it.' Perhaps he little thought that he
would be taken at his word. Anyhow, the next day
but one, Lord Palmerston announced to the house that,
as soon as the necessary business could be completed.
Parliament would be dissolved. He was at once asked
whether meanwhile the war, which had been con
demned, was to be carried on, and whether the Go
vernor, who had been censured, was to be retained.
But Lord Palmerston was not a man to be awed by
logic into conclusions inconsistent with that policy
which he was about to ask the nation to ratify. His
answer to these challenges was that the policy of the
Government, so long as it continued a Government

346 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
would remain Avhat it had been. That policy was ' to
maintain the rights and defend the lives and properties
of British subjects ; to improve our relations -with China;
and in the selection and arrangement of the means for
the accomplishment of those objects to perforin the duty
Avhich they owed to the country.'
There never, perhaps, was a general election which
turned more completely than this one of 1857 on the
personal prestige of a minister and the national confi
dence in one man. Lord Palmerston^ — after declining
overtures from the City of London and other places —
put forth his address to the country through the electors
of Tiverton, the Devonshire borough to which he was
wedded, both by ties of gratitude and of inclination.
In it he distinctly challenged the verdict of the con
stituencies as one of confidence or no confidence in his
administration. But in a very short time there was no
doubt as to what the answer would be. Personally, he
was in the heyday of his popularity. The country
remembered that when others had shrunk from the
responsibility of conducting the war with Eussia, he
had come forward and caiTied it to a successful issue in
the face of great difficulties at home, in the field, and
at the congress table. It appreciated his talent and
versatility. It admired his good-humour and gallant
bearing in the face of opposition, and was proud of his
marvellous energy and boisterous fun in despite of
advancing years. , The news of a happy conclusion to
the Persian war came in time to aid his supporters.
' Palmerston ! ' became a rallying cry on every hustings.
The ' fortuitous concourse of atoms,' as he apologetically
termed his opponents when they denied having combined
against him, was scattered to the winds. Many of the
leading Peelites lost their seats. Mr. Bright and Mr.
Milner Gibson were displaced at Manchester, Mr.
Layard at Aylesbury, and Cobden himself was rejected
at Huddersfield. The Opposition was discomfited, and
a triumphant majority was returned to support Lord
Palmerston's Government.

'TEIUMPHANT APPEAL TO THE COtTNTEY. 347
The new Parliament met on the 30th of April ; and
almost immediately after the commencement of business
Lord Palmerston moved the Army Estimates, Sir John
Eamsden, the Under-Secretary for War, not having had
time to make himself, acquainted with the details of
his office. This short session was snaturaUy not very
productive of legislation. The silence of the Queen's
Speech on the subject of Parliamentary Eeform had
been strongly commented upon in the discussion on the
Address. T^ murmurers had been quieted by Lord
Palmerston's assurance that before next year it would
be the duty of the Government to take the subject into
their fullest consideration, but that they felt no useful
purpose could be served by calling upon the House
during so brief a session to enter iipon so large and
sweeping a question. One of the principal measures
carried was the Divorce Court Bill, which encountered
pertinacious opposition. Lord' Palmerston met the
charge of hurrying the Bill through Parliament by a
laughing rejoinder that, on the contrary, he vvas quite
ready to sit through September if it was desired. to
have a full discussion of all the detail^,, and* added,
amid laughter and cheers, ' One prominent opponent of
the Bill said to me on one occasion, " You never shall
pass the BiU." I replied, " Won't we ? " ' The qi^es-
tion had indeed occupied the attention of the Legislature
for so many years, that it seemed likely to do so for
many years longer. It was only the firmness and de
termination of the Premier that carried it to a settle
ment. Lord Palmerston varied his labours during the
session by a visit to Manchester, for the opening of the
Fine Art Exhibition, and by interviews at Osborne with
the Emperor of the French and the Grand Duke Con- <
stantine, who both visited England this summer. He
availed himself of his conversation with the latter to
tell him that the English Government could not con-i
sent to the proposal which had been made to them
by the Eussian Government,* namely, to limit British

f '* $4 ' ¦
348 • LIFf OF LOED PALMEESTON.
consuls to the southern districts of Persia, and to leave
jtJje Eussian consuls in undisturbed possession of the
northern. About the middle of June the news of the Indian
mutiny burst .upon the Government. Troops were at
'once ordered to ptepare for embarkation. The next
mail brapght tidings of the death of General Anson, the
Commander-in-Chief. The news arrived on a, Satur
day. That same night Lord Palmerston had an inter
view vfith gir Colin ^ Campbell^ who #sta^ted on the
Sunday, to take .the command in India.
Vigorous as were the efforts of the Government to
meet^the crisis, they did not completely" satisfy the very
? natural anxiety of their Sovereign. The Queen had
expressed her vie-tys to this effect in a letter to Lord
PalmeEston, which drew from him the following charac-
-teristic answer: — ¦'
» Piccadilly : 18th July, 1857.
Viscount Palinerston<? presents his humble ^, duty to your
Majesty, and has had the honour to receive your Majesty's coin-
munication of yesterday, stating what your Majesty would have
said if your Majesty had been in the House of Commons.
Viscount Pafftaerston may perhaps be permitted to take the
liberty oflfeaying that it is fortunate for those from whose
opinions your Majesty difiers that your' Majesty is not in the
Hoipe ofiCommons, for they would have had to encouitter a
formidable antagonist in argument; although, on the other
hand, those whose opinions your Majesty approves would have
ha^ the support of a powerful ally in debate.
But with regard to the arrangements in connection with ihe
state of affairs m India, Viscount Palmerston can assure your
Majesty that the Go-^emment are taking, and wiU not fail to
continue to take, every measure which may appear weU adapted
to the emergency ; but measures are sometimes best calculated
to succ^d which follow each^other step by step.
This drew another and a more detailed communica
tion from, the Queen, in which the military measures to
be adopted were urged at greater length. The Cabinet
were not backward in seconding the wishes of the
Crown, and, 'step by step,' but without any loss of

THE INDIAN MUTINY AND ITS HEEOES. 349
time, a succouring and avenging army was dispatched
across the sea. The first vessel had sailed from our shores
with troops on the 1st of July, and she was followed by
others in continuous succession, so that by the end of
September about eighty ships had left for India, with
upwards of 30,000. troops on board. This rapidity and
vigour was but^the fitting counterpart to the heroic
efforts of our fellow-countrymen in the East, who pre
served for us our empire in Hindosta,n. Lord Palmer
ston, at the Lord ^Payor's banquet oii"^ the 9th of
November, paid a tribute to the national spirit.
It is impossible for any Englishman to allude to that which
has been achieved in India — not by soldiers only, but by
ci-vilians, by individuals, and by knots of men scattered over the
whole surface of a great empire — without^ feelmg prouder than
ever of the nation to which we have the happiness to,belong.
There never was an instance in the history of the world of such
splendid examples of bravery, of ii|trepidity, of resource, and
seh-reliance accomplishing such results as those which we
nave lately witfaessed. 'The Government at home, on the other
hand, may justly pride themselves on not ha-ving been unequal
to the magnitude of the occasion. We took the earliest oppor
tunity of despatching to India a great army — an army which
had not yet arrived when those great victories w^re accom
phshed, but which, when it shall arrive, -will render that which
remains to be done comparatively easy of accopaplishment, ,and
will, I cannot en-tfertain the 'slightest doubt, re-establish the
power and authority of England upon an unshakable basis
throughout the whole of our Indian empire. My noble friend
Lord Panmure has alluded to the spirit which has been dis
played in this country, and I am proud to say, that although
we have despatched from these shores the largest army that I
believe ever at one time left them, we have now under arms
in the United Kingdom as many fighting men as we had before
the news of the mutiny reached us; and, therefore, if any
foreign nation ever dreamed in its visions that the exertions
which we had been compelled to niake in India had lessened
our strength at home, and that the time had arrived when a
different bearing might be exhibited towards us from that
which was safe in the moment of our strength, the manner in
which the spirit of the coimtry has burst forth, the manner in
which our ranks have been filled, the maimer in which our

350 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
whole force has been replenished, will teach the world that it
would not be a safe game to play to attempt to take advantage
of that which was erroneously imagined to be the moment of
our weakness. It has been the fashion among the people of
the Contment to say that the English nation is not a military
nation. In one sense, indeed — in thefr sense — that assertion
may be said to be true. An Englishman is not so fond as the
people of some other countries are of uniforms, of steel scabbards,
and of iron heels ; but no nation can excel the Enghsh, either
as officers or soldiers, in a knowledge) of the duties of the mih
tary profession, and in the zeal and ^bihty -with which those
duties are performed ; and wherever desperate deeds are to be
accomphshed — wherever superior numbers are to be boldly
encountered and triumphantly overcome — wherever privations
are to be encountered — wherever that which a soldier has to
confront is individuaUy or collectively to be faced, there, I wiU
venture to say, there 'is no nation on the face of, the globe which
can surpass — I might, -without too much national vanity, say, I
believe that there is no nation which can equal — the people of
the British islands. Buf, my Lord Mayor and gentlemen,
while we all admire the bravery, thotconstancy, and the intre
pidity of our countrymen in India, we must not forget to do
justice also to our countrywomen. In the ordinary course of
hfe the functions of woman are to cheer the days of adversity,
to soothe the hours of suffering, and to give additional brUliancy
to the simlhine of prosperity; but our countrywomen in India
have had occasion to show qualities of a higher and nobler kind,
and when they have had either to sustain the perils of the siege,
to endure the privations of a diflficult escape, to forget their own
sufferings in endeavouring to minister to the wants of others,
the women of the United Kingdom have, wherever they have
been found in India, displayed quahties of the noblest kind,
such as never have been surpassed in the history of the world.
Henceforth the bravest soldier may think it no disparagement
to be told that his courage and his power of endurance are equal
to those of an Englishwoman. •
In Lord Palmerston's pocket-book I find a note
about this speech : ' Gave much offence at Compiegne —
can't be helped — il n'y a que la verity qui blesse.' The
allusion to the ' foreign nation which might dream that
we had lessened our strength at home ' had been ap
propriated by the French Court, which was just then

EFFUSES OFFEES OF FOEEIGN HELP. 351
showing, in concert with certain noisy bodies in France,
considerable umbrage at the protection England afforded
to foreign refugees, although Lord Palmerston, writing
to Lord Clarendon, says, ' My speech was pointed, not
at France particularly, but at the whole Continent,
where, for the last six months, we have been talked of,
and written of, and printed of as a second-rate power.
I hear that at Paris, since the fall of Delhi, no French
man in the clubs ever mentions India.' '
The fact was, that^ not only our Indian empire, but
our place among nations was at stake during this crisis.
• So sensible of this was Lord Palmerston that he steadily
declined pressing offers of foreign assistance which
were made to the British Government, feeling that,
from the tone adopted abroad, it became necessary that
England should triumph entirely ' off her own bat,' as
he jauntily expressed it. Not only did Prussian officers
individually volunteer their services, but an offer was
made of two Belgian regiments to be taken bodily into
our pay. The object in either case was, no doubt, the
experience to be gained by active operations in the
field on a large scale, rather than any quixotic devotion
to the English cause. But, whatever the motives. Lord
Palmerston steadily set his face against the proposals,
although some in places of authority appeared inclined
to favour the idea of a Belgian contingent. ' The more
I think of it,' he wrote to Lord Clarendon on Sep
tember 29, 'the more I feel it is necessary for our
standing and reputation in the world that we should
put down this mutiny and restore order by our own
means, and I am perfectly certain that we can do it
and that we shall do it.'
Parliament was called together for the next session
on December 4, to pass a Bill of Indemnity for the
Government for having suspended the Bank Charter
Act during the financial panic of the autumn. Lord
Palmerston has a pithy note about the debate : ' Geo.
> To Lord Clarendon, November 16, 1857. ,

352 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Lewis and J. Eussell made good speeches. The others,
not having a, ^ clear iflea, conveyed none.' The two
Houses adjourned for Christmas, and met again at the
usual time in February. On the first evening the Pre
mier moved an address of congratulation to the Queen
on the marriage of the Princess Eoyal and the Crown
Prince of Prussia, stating that there had been no event
since the marriage of her Majesty herself which had
so much enlisted the feelings and so much excited the
interest of the whole British nation. With his usual
instinct as to what would be most pleasing to the people
of England, he put into the foreground that this was
not a marriage of mere political convenience, but one
of mutual affection. The illustrious parties chiefly
concerned, he added, ' have been more fortunate than
many royal personages. They, indeed, have belonged
to that class whom it is said —
 " Gentle stars unite, and in one fate
Their hearts, their fortunes, and their feelings blend." '
A few days later he introduced the Government Bill
which was to transfer the rule over India from the old
Company to the Crown, it having been shown by the
events of the past year that, to use his own words to
the Queen, the inconvenience and difficulty of adminis
tering the government of a vast country on the other
side of the globe by means of two Cabinets, the one
responsible to the Crown and Parliament, the other
only responsible to the holders of India Stock, meeting,
for a few hours, three or four times a year, was no
longer tolerable. Many vested interests were involved,
and, under a plea of delay, a strong opposition was
offered ; but on a division the Ministry, contrary to
general expectation, obtained the large majority of
145.' Walking home with Lord Palmerston after this
' The majority was even greater than had been expected, and proves
how little credit is to be given to reports which circulate in clubs and
drawing-rooms as to the probable result of Parliamentary proceedings.
(Lord Paljperston to the Queen, Feb. 18, ]858.)

THE OESINI CONSPIEACY. 353
victorious result. Sir Eichard Bethell, then Attorney-
General, remarked to him that he ought, like the
Eoman consuls in a triumph, to have somebody to re
mind him that he was, as a minister, mortal.
That day week showed that no such reminder was
needed. But we must go back to recall the circum
stances which had prepared the ground for the cata
strophe which was now imminent.
On January 14 a most determined attempt had been
made to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon as he was
being driven with the Empress to the Opera. Bombs
had been thrown under his carriage, shattering the
framework when they exploded and killing some twenty
bystanders. Fortunately, the Imperial party escaped
with only trifling injuries. The gang who had perpe
trated this outrage, of whom the leader was one Orsini,
had come from London, where they had made their
preparations for this atrocious attempt. Much indig
nation was felt by the French that men should be able
to contrive such a diabolical deed under the protection
of English hospitality. It was felt to be unjust that
shelter should be afforded by a Government — and stUl
more by a friendly Government — to the assassins of a
friendly Sovereign. This very natural feeling found
expression in a despatch from the Minister of Foreign
Affairs at Paris to Count Persigny, the French ambas
sador iu London. Count Walewski, after deprecating
any intention to find fault with the right of asylum
which England extended to political refugees, pointed
out that men such as Pianori and Orsini were not mere
fugitives, but were assassins : —
Ought the English legislation, he proceeded, to contribute
to their designs and continue to shelter persons who place
themselves beyond the pale of common right and under the ban
of humanity 1 Her Britannic Majesty's Government can assist
us in avertmg a repetition of such guilty enterprises by affbrdmg
us a guarantee of security which no state can refuse to a neigh
bouring state, and which we are authorised to expect from an
ally. PuUy relying, moreover, on the high sense of th^ English
VOL. II. A A

354 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Cabinet, we refrain from indicating in any way the measures
which it may see fit to take in order to comply with this wish.
We rest entfrely upon it for estimating the decisions which it
shall deem best calculated to attain the object.
There was little in this document to arouse the sus
ceptibilities of the nation; and the Cabinet, sensible of
the justice of some of the observations contained in ity
determined, without answering it officially, to introduce
a measure the effect of which would be to make the
crime of conspiracy to murder — which had hitherto
been treated as a misdemeanour — a felony, punishable
with penal servitude. Lord Palmerston's first idea was
a measure to give power to the Secretary of State to
send away any foreigner whom the Government might
have good reason to suspect was plotting a scheme
against the life of a foreign sovereign, the Government
being bound to state the grounds upon which the per
son in question had been sent away, either to a secret
committee of Parliament or to a committee composed
of the three chiefs of the courts of law. This notion,
however, was abandoned for the simpler form of Bill
which would, it was believed, attain the object in -view.
The BUI, although strongly opposed, was read a first
time by a majority of no less than 200. Meantime,
however, events were occurring which rapidly altered
the public tone. Addresses had been presented to the
Emperor from members of the French army, which,
while congratulating him on his escape, contained ex
pressions and menaces but too well calculated to wound
the pride and inflame the temper of the English people.
Some of these ' French colonels ' — as they were popu
larly designated — spoke of the English as 'protectors
of assassins,' and uttered threats to the effect that ' the
infamous haunt in which such infernal machinations
were planned should be destroyed for ever.'
These ridiculous effusions would have passed un
noticed, unless with contempt, had not some of them,
unfortunately, been inserted in the ' Moniteur,' the
official organ of the French Government. In vain did

THE FEENCH COLONELS. 355
the ambassador, by order of his Government, express
regret at their insertion and explain that it happened
through inadvertence, owing to the number of addresses
which, according to the usual custom, required such
official notification ; . in vain did Lord Palmerston urge
in the House that it would be unworthy of the nation
to be turned from a course, otherwise proper, by the
idle vapourings of irresponsible swashbucklers, and
' upon any paltry feelings of offended dignity or of irri
tation at the expressions of three or four colonels of
French regiments, to act the childish part of refusing
an important measure on grounds so insignificant and
trumpery.' The nation's back was up. The House re
pented of its former vote, and the leader of the Opposi
tion, who had spoken for the Bill on its first reading,
joined with the other malcontents in giving it its death
blow, by supporting Mr. MUner Gibson's amendment to
the question that it should be read a second time. This
amendment was : ' That this House cannot but regret
that Her Majesty's Government, previously to inviting
the House to amend the law of conspiracy at the pre
sent time, have not felt it to be their duty to reply to
the important despatch received from the French Govern
ment, dated January 20.'
Verbal answers, fitting both in substance and in
tone, had been given to the French ambassador in Lon
don and, through Lord Cowley, to the French Cabinet
at Paris ; but an official despatch, in reply, had been
deliberately postponed, under the con-viction that in the
actual temper of men's minds, no advantage, but only
exasperation, would be the result of any answer which
the English Foreign Office could consistently give.
Eeport said that Lord Derby, sitting under the gal
lery ofthe House of Commons and watching the progress
of the debate, saw the turn of the tide with the quick
eye of an old parliamentary tactician, and sent hasty
word to his lieutenants that they should take it at the
flood which led to office. Anyhow, Mr. Disraeli plunged
into the stream, and, declaring that while, on the first
A A 2

356 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
reading, the question was between England and France,
on this the second reading, by some strange metamor
phosis, it had become one between the House of Com
mons and the English minister, he announced that he
sided with the House. Mr. Gladstone also threw in his
lot with the Opposition in a powerful speech; Lord
John Eussell joined the Eadicals ; and when a division
was called. Lord Palmerston's Government found itself
in a minority of nineteen.
This defeat was a complete surprise. Ministers,
when they went down to the House of Commons on the
afternoon of this February 19, did not even anticipate a
narrow division, much less a crisis. There were unseen
causes, however, which had been graduaUy sapping
Lord Palmerston's ascendency over the House of Com
mons. Some injudicious appointments had alienated
not a few of his supporters, and his manner lately had
certainly, for some reason or other, become more brusque
and dictatorial than was altogether pleasing to -the
members. Many, however, of those who voted in the
majority did not wish to overthrow his Government,
and had he thought fit to appeal to the House of Com
mons for a vote ot confidence, it would probably have
accorded it, and have remained satisfied with the reply
already given by the public to the denunciations of the
French army. But Lord Palmerston never showed any
undue tenacity in the retention of office. He at once
tendered his resignation to the Queen, and persisted,
although Her Majesty at first declined to accept it.
Thus Lord Palmerston, after weathering many a
turbulent storm, was overthrown by a gust, and Lord
Derby, being sent for, reigned in his stead. The new
Premier, with a candour which was very characteristic
of him, soon acknowledged the hasty and needless
character of the vote which had proved fatal to his
opponents, and to which he had so greatly contributed.
In the House of Lords, on March 1, Lord Clarendon,
who had been the Foreign Secretary of the late Govern
ment, fully vindicated thefr conduct ; and Lord Derby,

EESIGNS OFFICE, 357
in reporting to the Queen the proceedings of the evening,
saidi, ' Lord Clarendon made an admirable speech in ex
planation of the course which the late Government
pursued, and which, had it been delivered in the House
of Commons on the subject of the amendment, would
probably have deprived Lord Derby of the honour of
addressing your Majesty on the present occasion.' '
' Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv. p. 190.

358 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XIV.
OUT OF OFFICE — GOBS TO CDMPIBGNB — DERBY GOVERNMENT DE
FEATED ON REFORM BILL, 1859 — DISSOLUTION — OUTBREAK OF
FRANCO-AUSTRIAN WAR — VOTE OF WANT OF CONFIDENCE IN
MINISTERS — SECOND PREMIERSHIP — ITALIAN AFFAIRS — SPAIN AND
MOROCCO — FORTIFICATIONS.
Just before his resignation, Lord Palmerston had the
satisfaction of being able to announce the capture of
Canton and the successful issue of his China policy.
He was thus quite content to retire for awhUe from the
cares of office, convinced that the conduct of his Go
vernment in the matter of the attempt upon the French
Emperor's life, though it involved him personaUy in a
temporary banishment from power, had contributed to
the pre'servation of that French alliance which it was
one of his chief aims to maintain. Indeed, even after
he had ceased to be responsible for the course of
events, he still exerted his undoubted influence to
smooth the path of his successors and to save them
and the country from the consequences of a rupture
with France. He writes, on March 1, to Lord Claren
don: —
I am told that Persigny says that if the Derby Government
drop the Murder Bill he wiU be immediately recaUed. It would
be most unfortunate that the diplomatic relations of the two
countries should be broken off on such a ground. Such a rup
ture would justly incense the British nation. Would make any
measure in the matter impossible, and would leave hardly any
way for a reconciliation.
It would be very desirable that you should convey, if you
can, these considerations to Cowley, in order that he might, in
case of need, press them upon the Emperor, and urge upon him
strongly that his own personal interest as well as that of both

VISIT TO NAPOLEON. 359
countries would be very seriously injured by such a step as the
recaU of his ambassador.
We find him availing himself of his comparative
leisure to serve on a committee about the poUution of
the Thames, to preside at the Eoyal Literary Fund
dinner, to see Earey, the horse-tamer, perform on a
mare caUed Surplice at the Duke of Wellington's
Eiding-school, and to make notes afterwards about his
system of breaking and the pedigree of the animal.
Such variety of employment must have been to him
both new and refreshing.
In November he went over to Compiegne on a visit
to the Emperor Napoleon, and with both horse and
gun joined in the sports of the French Court, though,
on the hunting days, a stag, and not a fox, was the
quarry. He wrote to his brother-in-law : ' They are
aU very civil and courteous, and the -visits of the
English to the Emperor serve as links to maintain and
strengthen English aUiance.' I find a scrap of con
versation recorded which is amusing, as iUustrating an
odd bent of the French mind. While the dancing was
going on. Lord Palmerston and the Emperor walked
up and down an inner room, and the Imperial philo
sopher propounded his idea of an improvement upon
the existing system of universal sufirage, namely, to
limit the right of voting to married men. He said
that unmarried men do not feel the same sentiments
about thefr country as those who have a famUy stake
in it, and that such a voting qualiflcation would shut
out both priests and soldiers — classes which he would
wish to see excluded. Lord Palmerston could only
answer that property of some sort ought, in his opinion,
to be the real basis for the suffrage, and that whUe
many bachelors might own property, many a man
with both. -wife and chUd might have none.'
' During this conversation the Emperor also said that the Emperor
of Eussia had told Mm that he would spend his last rouble, and
sacrifice his last man, to prevent the establisbment of a Greek empire
at Constantinople.

360 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Lord Derby's ministry meanwhUe was conducting'
affairs in the face of a majority which did not show
much inclination to tolerate them for long. After ful
filling the object of their call to power, namely, writing
an answer of some sort to Count Walewski's despatch
about the refugees, they had proceeded to bring in
and immediately to withdraw their India Bill, and
then to pass a different Bill, founded upon resolutions
of the House. They managed, however, to struggle
through the session by the aid of the self-sacrifice of
one of their coUeagues ' and of the gladiatorial genius
of thefr ChanceUor of the Exchequer.
At the beginning of the session of 1859 a Eeform
BUI was introduced by the Government, one new
feature of which was a franchise founded upon per
sonal property. On the second reading. Lord John
Eussell moved an amendment condemnatory of its
pro-visions, and Lord Palmerston spoke in support of
Lord John's resolution ; he chaffed the Ministry by
assuring them that he did not want them to resign,
but said to them, ' As Voltafre said of some minister
who had incurred his displeasure, " I won't punish
him ; I won't send him to prison ; I condemn him to
keep his place." ' On a division in the House of 621
members, the Government were left in a minority of
39, and a few days later they announced thefr inten
tion of dissolving Parliament.
Lord Palmerston was re-elected for Tiverton without
opposition. Of course he had his usual tournament
with the Eadical butcher after he had finished his
speech. In vain did Eowcliffe, from the middle of the
crowd in front of the hustings, insist on a plain,
straightforward answer to the questions he was about
to put. He got what he asked for, but was left as
much in the dark as ever. Yet it was all done so good-
humouredly and with such an evident enjoyment of the
' Lord EUenborough resigned in consequence of an attack on the
Government about the publication of his despatch censuring the
Governor-General of India, Lord Canning.

EEPLY- TO THE TIVEETON BUTCHEE. 361
fun of the thing, that the most exacting elector could
not take it amiss.
Mr. Eowcliffe said that as Lord Palmerston had talked a
great deal about Lord Derby's Eeform BUI, he hoped his lord
ship would favour the electors and non-electors with his -views
on Eeform. He would ask his lordship whether he would vote
for the ballot, and whether he was in favour of manhood
suffrage, or 6^. franchise, or rating franchise. He was once a
member of the noble lord's committee, but finding his opinions
in advance of his lordship's, he refused to remain a member any
longer. The noble lord also said a great deal about the Con-
sphacy BUI, but it was well known he was a pet of the Emperor
of the Prench. (Laughter.) He believed that the noble lord
was a do-wnright Tory, and the best representative the Conserva
tives could possibly have. He hoped his lordship would answer
his questions in a straightforward and honest manner.
Lord Palmerston said he was delighted to find that his old
friend, however far advanced in years, retained that youthful
-vigour which he possessed when first he knew him, and with
his vigour he had retained also his prejudices and opinions.
(Laughter, and a cry of ' No chaff.') His friend asked for a
straightforward answer, and he would give him one. He totally
disagreed with him in almost all his opinions. He (the noble
lord) thought the day would never come when he and his friend
would agree in pohtical faith. His friend asked him what he
thought on many points. In the first place he would say he
was opposed to the ballot. He was against manhood su&age.
(EowcliflTe : ' How far wUl you go -with the franchise 1 ') He
would give a straightforward answer to that. He would not
tell him. (Laughter.) He held it was his duty, after the con
fidence they had reposed in him, to act accordmg to his judg
ment in any measure relatmg to Eeform. He hoped that the
pohtical difference of Mr. Eowcliffe and himself would not alter
thefr private friendship. He was sorry to disagree with his
friend, but no man could agi'ee with everybody. The man who
did agree with everybody was not worth having anybody to
agree with him. (Cheers and laughter.)
The elections were much influenced by the aspect
of foreign affairs. On New Year's Day the French
Emperor had electrified Europe by addressing the
Austrian ambassador, at the usual reception of the

•362 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
•diplomatic corps, in a manner which betokened an un
pleasant feeling between the two countries. Whether
in so doing he was imitating his uncle, whose abrupt
remark to the English minister at Paris in 1803 im
mediately preceded the rupture of the peace of Amiens,
was a matter for curious speculation ; but the parallel
¦did not fail to excite general uneasiness. The relations
between Austria and Sardinia were known to be
strained, owing to the impatience of the Italians at
the continuance of Austrian predominance in the
peninsula. Did these few words spoken at the
TuUeries import that France would join in the fray
should hostilities break out ? This proved to be their
meaning, and, after a few months of suspense, Austria
fired the mine by a summons to Sardinia to disarm.
On her refusal war was declared, and French troops
^jegan to pour into North Italy, as allies of Victor
Emmanuel. This was the moment of the general
election in England. Lord Derby's Government were,
rightly or wrongly, suspected of leanings towards
Austria, while public feeling was strongly in favour of
Italian independence. This sufficed to turn the scale
wherever parties were evenly balanced, and so the
dissolution faUed to give the Conservative party a
majority. A renewed attempt was made to induce Lord Pal
merston to join the Government with the leadership
of the House of Commons, but the Liberal party had
meanwhile been engaged in preparing for the future
by healing their dissensions and reconciling thefr
leaders. Lord Palmerston and Lord John EusseU had
come to an agreement that whichever of the two was
charged with the formation of a Government should
receive the co-operation of the other. And at a
meeting in WiUis's Eooms, at which some of the
Peelites were present, it was arranged that an im
mediate vote of want of confidence in ministers should
be moved by Lord Hartington in the House of Com
mons. Accordingly, on June 10, in a House of no less

LOED GEANVILLE 'SENT POE.' 363
than 637 members, such a vote was carried by a ma
jority of 13, in spite of Mr. Disraeli's amusing protest
against the scene of Almack's, where dowagers and
beauties formerly held sway, having been turned into
an arena for the issuing of vouchers by political patrons.
Lord GranviUe, to the astonishment of everybody,
was charged with the construction of a Ministry, the
Queen feeling that ' to make so marked a distinction
as is implied in the choice of one or other as Prime
Minister of two statesmen so fuU of years and honours
as Lord Palmerston and Lord John Eussell, would
be a very invidious and unwelcome task.' Lord Gran-
vUle's failure to make a Government under the cir
cumstances is worth noting, as an illustration of the
working of our form of government, and of the
fact that the House of Commons is the ultimate de
positary of the power that makes, as weU as unmakes,
ministers. Lord Palmerston consented to serve under Lord
G^ranville for the reasons and under the limitations
stated in the foUowing paper : — 91 Piccadilly: June 11, 1859.
Viscount Pahnerston presents his humble duty to Your
Majesty, and has the honom- of assuring Your Majesty that he
will deem it his duty to afford Lord GranvUle his assistance
and co-operation in forming an administration in obedience to
Your Majesty's commands. Viscount Palmerston considered
himself to be promoting the pubhc interest by taking an active
part in the late proceedings in the House of Commons tending
to the removal of Lord Derby's administration; but he feels
that it would have been inexcusable in him to have encouraged
and organised those proceedmgs with a -view to any personal
objects or interests of his own. Those who unite to turn out
an existing Government ought to be prepared to unite to form
a stronger Government than that which is to be overthrown ;
and it was in this spfrit, and with a deep sense of what is due
by pubhc men to Your Majesty and to the country, that Viscount
Palmerston and Lord Johii Eussell, before they called the meet
ing .at WUlis's Eooms, came to an agreement -to co-op^ate with
¦each other in the formation of a new administration, whichever

364 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
of the two might be caUed upon by Your Majesty to reconstruct
Your Majesty's Government. That agreement did not extend
to the case of any thfrd person; but Viscount Palmerston
conceives that the same sense of public duty which had led him
to enter into that engagement with Lord John Eussell, should
also lead him to give assistance to Lord Granville towards the
execution of Your Majesty's commands. Viscount Palmerston's
promise to Lord Granville has, however, been conditional. He
thinks that it would be a great disappointment and an evU for
the country if, on the overthrow of one administration by a
deliberate vote of want of confidence by a recently elected House
of Commons, the overthro-wing majority should be so paralysed
as not to be able to offer to Your Majesty a stronger adminis
tration than that which they have overthrown. But, on the
other hand, it would be injurious to the interest of the Crown
and of the nation, that on such an occasion an administration
should be formed which, by the weakness of its personal ele
ments, should be destitute of the inherent strength necessary to
enable it to face and overcome the difficulties with which it
must have to contend ; and Viscount Palmerston deems himself
bound by his duty to Your Majesty, and by a proper regard to
what he owes to himself, to say that to an administration so
composed he would feel it impossible to belong. The promise,
therefore, which he has given to Lord GranvUle has been made
conditional on Lord Granville's success in organising a Govern
ment so composed as to be calculated officially to carry on the
pubhc service, and to command the confidence of Parhament
and of the country.
This success did not attend Lord Granville's efforts.
He found Lord John Eussell reluctant to accept his
leadership, with Lord Palmerston leading the House of
Commons ; and as he met with insuperable difficulties
in the task which he had unwilUngly undertaken, he
resigned his commission. Lord Palmerston having
then been sent for, constructed a Ministry, with Lord
John Eussell at the Foreign Office, and Mr. Gladstone
at the Exchequer. He also offered the Board of Trade
to Mr. Cobden, who declined it. The Administration
was looked upon as the strongest that was ever formed
so far as the individual talents of its members were
concerned. Men of some political mark were appoiuted.

PALMEESTON .AGAIN PEEMIEE. 365
down to the most subordinate offices. Thus Lord Pal
merston, in his seventy-fifth year, again became Prime
Minister and leader of the House of Commons. The
remainder of his course was to be comparatively smooth.
For six years he was accepted by the country as the
minister of the nation, and almost occupied a position
removed from the chances of party strife. Whatever
difficulties he had to contend with did not consist either
in wars abroad or in parliamentary defeats at home.
Such as they may have been, they were of a more hidden
character. The events of this period are too recent to
warrant either great detail in their history, or absence
of reserve on the part of the historian.
The war in North Italy was sharp and short. The
victories of Magenta and Solferino drove the Austrians
within their famous Quadrilateral, and the last week in
July found the French and Sardinians pausing in view
of these formidable defences. The Emperor Napoleon
had previously learnt that Prussia was preparing to
take the field and to march on Paris. He had lost
many men, and was anxious to make peace ; and so it
happened that, within a fortnight after accession to
office. Lord Palmerston had to consider a proposal made
to the British Cabinet that they should intervene be
tween the belligerents, and propose an armistice upon
terms which were laid before them by the French am
bassador. These included the surrender of Lombardy
andthe Duchies to Sardinia, and the erection of Ve
netia into an independent state under an Archduke,,
but made no provision for the Papal States. In the
foUowing letter he gives his reasons for declining to
place England in such a false position :¦ — ¦
PiccadiUy : July 6, 1859.
My dear John Eussell, — The more I think of Persigny's
proposal the less I like it, and the more I inchne to' the opinion
that we ought to be very careful not to mvolve ourselves, and
not to commit ourselves by hastily adopting it. Those -who
propose to two beUigerents on the point of fightmg that they
should agree -to an armistice, in order to negotiate a peace,

366 LIFE OF LOBD PALMEESTON.
ought to have settled in thefr own minds the outhne of such an
arrangement as might be proposed to the belligerents with a
chance of success ; but we have no plan of our own, and we are
asked to adopt as our own one sketched out by one of the belli
gerent parties out of three. It would be useless to propose an
armistice to the Austrians, unless we gave them an idea of the
terms to be the subject of negotiation ; but if we confine our
selves simply to the first condition, that Italy should be entfrely
given up to the Italians, Austria would, of course, peremptorily
refuse. If we were to go farther, and communicate the details.
of the Persigny scheme, we should identify ourselves with it,.
and be committed to an approval of it ; but that I should be
unvriUmg to do, though if such an arrangement were to be
worked out as the result of the war, we should, of course, ac
quiesce in it, and say that matters might have turned out worse.
It is to be observed that we are not told that this scheme has
the assent of the Sardinians nor of the Itahans generaUy. It
would obviously fall far short of the wishes and expectations of
Italy; and if we made it, we should be accused of ha-ving mter-
posed and stopped the alhed armies in thefr career of -victory,
and of ha-ving either endeavoured or of ha-ving succeeded to rivet
on Italy a remnant of Austrian shackles, and of having be
trayed and disappointed the Itahans at the very moment when
thefr prospects were the brightest.
The scheme proposes to give Venetia and Modena to an
Austrian archduke, as an independent Sovereign, by way of
interposing some neufral state between Piedmont and Austria.
But what would be the result ? The same Austrian mfluences
and interference which have been the bane of Tuscany would
soon afflict this new state. It would not be constitutional, and'
there would be worse neighbourhood between it and constitu
tional Piedmont than there would be between Venetia as part
of Piedmont and Austria, because Venetia and Piedmont would*
be separated only by an imaginary Une; whereas the Tyrol
would be a buffer between Venetia and Austria. The freedom.
of Piedmont would excite the aspirations of the Venetians.
Discontent and disturbance would arise. Austria would inter
vene, she could not see an archduke in trouble and not come
and help him. She would again be brought into active inter
ference in Itahan affairs ; and if Modena were added to Venetia,
Austria would again take her place in Cenfral Italy. Fresh
quarrels would arise because the old grievances would spring
up anew, and fresh wars would inevitably follow. If the-

CHECKS FEENCH DESIGNS ON ITALY. 367
scheme is the Emperor's own, it is suggested by jealousy of
Sardmia and tenderness for the Pope; but we feel neither of
these mental affections, and are not bound to adopt them. The
scheme, moreover, throws whoUy out of question the -wishes of
the Itahans themselves, and we are asked to propose to the
belligerents a parcelling out of the nations of Italy, as if we-
had any authority to dispose of them. I cannot be a party to
Persigny's scheme.
If the Prench Emperor is tfred of his war, and finds the
job tougher than he expected, let him make what proposals he
pleases, and to whomsoever he pleases ; but let them be made-
as from himself formally and officially, and let him not ask us
to father his suggestions, and make ourselves answerable for
them. The French Emperor must have anticipated the
refusal of England to become his cat's-paw. Anyhow,
on July 5, he acted for himself. On that day he sen-t
General Fleury to the headquarters of the Emperor of
Austria -with a letter proposing an armistice. General
Fleury arrived at a late hour, and the night was spent
by the Emperor Francis Joseph in council with Count
Eechberg, Prince Mettemich, and Count Mensdorff.
Next morning Napoleon received a reply accepting the
armistice. An interview took place on the 8th between
the two Emperors, and on the 11th, at ViUafranca, a
provisional treaty of peace was signed, containing as
bases the creation of an Italian Confederation, under
the presidency of the Pope, the cession of Lombardy
to Sardinia, and the return of the Grand Dukes of
Tuscany and Modena to thefr states. The Emperor
Napoleon, however, obtained from the Austrian Em
peror a verbal assurance that no force should be
employed -to restore the Grand Dukes. The definitive
treaty was to be settled in a Conference at Zurich.
Cavour withdrew from the Sardinian Ministry on the
announcement of this peace, although the spfrit, which
he had raised and left behind him, was not destined to
be quelled until, in defiance of the imperial compro
mises at VUlafranca, it had worked out his project of a
Northern Italian Kingdom. Lord Palmerston also lost

368 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
no time in expressing his disappointment at the terms
of the treaty : — 94 Piccadilly : juillet 13, 1859.
Mon cher Persigny, — Si je comprends ce qui va ^tre arr&t6
pour ritahe, il est question d'une Confederation itahenne oii
I'Autriche prendrait place en vertu de la V^nitie; un tel
arrangement serait funeste, et mettrait I'ltahe au d^sespofr.
La plus grande partie des maux de I'ltalie, et I'esprit r6-
volutionnafre qui s'y est montr6, prennent leur source dans
I'ing^rence de I'Autriche dans les affafres des Etats au-deli du
P6. Jusq'^ present cette ing^rence n'a eu aucune base legitime,
et un des buts que I'Empereur des Frangais se proposait d'at-
teindre 6tait d'affranchir I'ltalie de cette ing^rence aiitrichienne
«n des pays ne faisant pas partie des possessions de I'Autriche.
Mais une fois que I'Autriche de-vient membre d'une Con
federation Itahenne, toute I'ltahe est livree pieds et mams
hes k I'Autriche. Jamais I'Angleterre ne pourra s'associer
S, un si mauvais arrangement. Au contraire, nous pourrions
¦croire de notre devoir de protester hautement et en face de
I'Europe contre un pareil asservissement des peiiples de I'ltahe.
L'Autriche devrait au contrafre Stre strictement exclue de toute
ingerence politique ou militaire en dehors de ses frontieres. Et
si cela n'est pas fait, rien n'est fait, et tout sera k recommencer
«n fort peu de temps.
Confederation politique des Etats itahens, oui ou non, c'est
line question qui merite examen. II y a du pour et du contre.
Le Pape, Naples, Toscane, Modena seraient toujours pour
TAbsolutisme. Le Piemont seul pour un systfeme hberal ;
comment on parviendrait a s'entendre reste k savofr.
Union douaniere de toute I'ltalie avec un tarife modere et
liberal encourageant le commerce, quant k cela U n'y aurait que
du ' pour ' parmi les hommes intelligents. Mais mSme avec
cette union, les relations de I'Autriche ne de-vraient 6tre que
¦celles d'un pays etranger faisant un pacte avec un corps dont il
n'est pas membre.
Soyez bien sur que si I'Autriche n'est pas soigneusement
exclue de toute ingerence, de toute espfece, dans les affafres de
I'ltalie, le sang frangais a ete verse en vain, et la gloire de
I'Empereur ne sera que de oourte duree.
This scheme of an Italian Confederation was not
proposed by Austria, but by Louis Napoleon. It had
been floating in his mind for many years as a means

SYMPATHY AT COUET WITH AUSTEIA. 369
of substituting Italian support of the Pope for the
support of French and Austrian troops. The English
Cabinet stated without delay, in a despatch to Paris,
thefr objections to it, which they felt sure the French
Government would, on consideration, recognise.
It further appeared likely that, in contravention
of the verbal engagement given at VUlafranca, and
looking merely to the text of the provisional treaty,
Austria might attempt to employ her troops in re
storing the archdukes. An official remonstrance was
therefore sent, in the month of August, by our Govern
ment to Vienna, which declared that ' a provision for
the employment of French or Austrian forces to put
down the clearly expressed -wiU of the people of
Central Italy would, in the opinion of Her Majesty's
Government^ not be justiflable. Great Britain would
feel it her duty to protest against a supplement to the
treaty of VUlafranca of that nature, if such were even
contemplated.' The Emperor Napoleon also was urged
to remain firm on this point.
No doubt the French Emperor was in a dilemma,
and looked to England to extricate him from it. The
war was over, but not the conflict. Neither Eomagna
nor the Duchies would agree to a confederation of
which Austria would be the most powerful member,
and in which the ecclesiastical domination of the
Vatican was secured by the Presidency of the Pope.
But Napoleon had bound himself not to move forward
in the only direction which would satisfy the national
aspirations of the people whose cause he had espoused.
He therefore turned to England with the hope that
she would propose a Congress, which should take the
burden off his shoulders. Mr. Theodore Martin, in his
'Life of the Prince Consort,' says that there was
much cause for anxiety lest the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Secretary would, at this time, ' be carried into
some imprudence by their enthusiasm for the Italian
cause.' If enthusiasm is the proper word to apply to
their feelings in the matter, it was at any rate cer-
VOL. II. B B

370 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
tainly not the ill-regulated and unreflecting enthusiasm
of youth, which often leads men to be imprudent, but
it was the firm sympathy of experienced statesmen who
recognised in the Italian cause not only a just cause,
but one destined by the very nature of things to win in
the end, and involving meanwhile the peace and pros
perity of Europe. But there was no fear at any time
of England being led on where she would not wish to
go, and the Cabinet declined even taking the French
proposals into consideration until the preliminaries of
peace had been reduced into the form of a treaty. If
Austria then expressed no objection to a Conference,
the British Government signified that they would not
by any act of theirs be the means of preventing Euro
pean concert.
In the work already referred to the author also
implies that the Foreign Office at this juncture was
unnecessarily eager to communicate its views to the
parties concerned, and that it was no business of Eng
land to intermeddle in the bad peace which the French
Emperor had made, but that the proper course for her
to maintain was perfect silence. Lord John EusseU,
in a letter to Lord Palmerston, dated Abergeldie, Sep
tember 11, 1859, stated in the following words how he
met this criticism : —
I maintained that so far as regarded the Emperors, and the
transfer of the pro-vince of Lombardy from one to the other, we
had never said a word. But the state of Italy was another
question. It had occupied our Government for years, and had
during these years been a source of anxiety. To say that be
cause two Emperors had treated the question at VUlafranca we
should suddenly become silent, and not try to prevent the re
newal of troubles, would be in my opinion to desert our duty.
That the policy of the Cabinet was contained in two despatches,
for each of which there was a cause. The cause of the first was
an invitation on the part of Prance to join in a Congress, to
which we had replied by objeetmg to certain provisions of the
peace, and supposed intentions of the Powers. The cause of the
second was the apprehension that Austria might use force to
restore the Archdukes. Against such a course we protested.

DENIES HOSTILITY TO AUSTEIA. 371
I was wUling to keep within the line of these despatches. But
¦conversations with foreign ministers abroad raised fresh ques
tions, to which it was necessary to reply by fresh explanations.
NaturaUy aU this caused Lord Palmerston to be
represented as very hostile to Austria, just as was the
case in the former revolutionary years. He denies it.
94 Piccadilly : August 22, 1859.
My dear Cowley, — I know that aU the partisans of arbitrary
government in Europe represent me as the bitter enemy of
Austria, and I wish whenever you hear this to deny its truth.
I am an enemy to bad government, to oppression and tyranny;
and, unfortunately, the Austrian rule in Italy, as elsewhere,
has been marked by those evils. I am an enemy, therefore, to
the bad system of Austrian government, and heartUy wish all
Itahans to be freed from the Austrian yoke. It would be
better for Austria that this should be. It has been decided
that Venetia shall stUl be a victim, but care ought to be taken
that Austria be prevented, either as member of a Confederation,
or in any other way, from interfering in the afiairs of Italy
beyond her own frontier. The Austrian Government is un
fortunately hated in many Austrian provinces north of the
Alps, and especially in Hungary and Galicia. I wish with all my
heart she would change her system, and concihate the good-will
of her subjects; for I hold a great and powerful Austrian
¦empire north of the Alps to be of the utmost importance for
the general interests of Europe.
Much is said at Paris of what are caUed the intrigues of
Cavour — unjustly, I think. If it is jneant that he has laboured
for the enlargement of Piedmont and the freedom of Italy from
foreign yoke and from Austrian rule, he will in history be
¦caUed a patriot ; but the means he has employed may be good
or bad. I know not what they have been ; but the end in view
is, I am sure, the good of Italy. The people of the Duchies
have as good a right to change thefr rulers as the people of
England, Prance, Belgium, and Sweden ; and the annexation of
the Duchies to Piedmont would be an unmixed good for Italy,
and for Prance, and for Europe. I hope Walewski wiU not
sway the mind of the Emperor to make the ensla-ving of Italy
the end of a drama, which opened with the declaration, * Italy
free from the Alps to the Adriatic,' and ' I'ltahe rendue k elle-
mlme.'
B B 2

372 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
If the Italians are left to themselves all wiU go well ; and
when it is said that if the French garrison were drawn away
from Eome, aU the priests would be killed, the example of
Bologna may be quoted, where the priests remain unmolested,
and perfect order has been maintained.
When the French showed an evident leaning to
Austria during the negotiations at Zurich, Lord Pal
merston pithily said that this famous declaration,
' I'ltalie rendue a elle-meme ' was being turned into
'¦ I'ltalie vendue a I'Autriche.'
These negotiations proceeded very slowly, and were
not finished till the autumn. The Duchies had abso
lutely refused to take back their sovereigns, and in
September Tuscany and Eomagna had formally tendered
thefr annexation to Sardinia. How, then, without the
employment of force, was the proposed Treaty of Zurich
to be reconciled with the stipulations of VUlafranca?
Towards the end of October, therefore, France became
more than ever urgent for a Congress. Mr. Martin, in
his ' Life of the Prince Consort,' ' says that Lord John
Eussell stated that Lord Palmerston and himself would
advise the Cabinet to accede to the French Emperor's
proposal, and implies that, superior counsels prevaUing,
their intentions were fortunately overruled. It is diffi
cult to reconcile this alleged statement of Lord John
EusseU's with the foUowing note from him to Lord
Palmerston and Lord Palmerston's endorsement, made
the same day : — Pembroke Lodge : October 21, 1859.
My dear Palmerston, — On reading the articles of the Treaty
of Zuiich and refiecting upon the figure we should make in a
Congress, I can see no reason sufficient to induce us to go to
one. We cannot object to the transfer of Lombardy, but the
clause about the Duchies and the article about the Pope are
especially objectionable. I cannot but think that by going into
a Congress we should give some sanction to the Austrian doc
trine of the divine right of kings. The notion of a confedera
tion we have always scouted as a way of leading Sardinia back
to the house of bondage. • Vol. iv. p. 504.

ULTIMATE CONCESSIONS. 373
I should therefore be inclined to say m answer to Walewski's
dispatch that our objections on the score of Venetia being part of
the Italian Confederation are by no means removed — that the
Pope's assurance that he will grant reforms when his authority
is restored is of no value in our eyes, as we do not see how the
authority of the Pope is to be re-established without the em
ployment of foreign force — that to such employment of foreign
force, either to re-estabUsh the authority of the Pope or to
restore the Archdukes in Tuscany and Modena, we have in
superable objections. The rights reserved to the Archdukes and
to the Duchess of Parma by the Treaty of Zurich appear to us
in the same light as the rights of the Count de Chambord and
Prince Wasa — rights to respect and observance, but not to
obedience and subjection on the part of Prance and Sweden.
That if the mdependence of Italy mentioned in the Treaty of
Zurich, is not to be Ulusory, the rights of the Itahan people
ought to be respected and observed. Yet if the Congress should
decide to use force, what would be the position of Great
Britain? She would only have to protest and withdraw.
France would be in a simUar position, but Prance has bound
herself by engagements to which Great Britain is not a party.
For these reasons, etc. Yom-s truly, J. Eussell.
Lord Palmerston's endorsement on this note is as
follows : ' I entirely agree with John Eussell, and had
afready come to the same conclusions.' — P. 21, 10-59.
It is true that a few days later these views were
modified, but it is acknowledged how ' evenly balanced
the arguments were on both sides.' The ground finaUy
taken by the Foreign Secretary was that, as we already
had differences with France about China, Morocco, the
Suez Canal, &c., a blank refusal of her proposed Con
gress would be the prelude to a total divergence of
views between the two countries. The decision, there
fore, finally arrived at by the Cabinet was not to decline
the Congress, if it were clearly understood beforehand
that the declaration made against the employment of
foreign force would be maintained and acted upon, and
pro-vided there was nothing in the invitation contrary
to the already declared policy of England. This deci-

374 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
sion was made known to the French Government, whicfr
was to issue the invitations to the other Powers.
There was a dispute this year between Spain and
Morocco, which, as affecting English interests, at
tracted Lord Palmerston's attention. Spain demanded
a ra-yon of territory round her fortress of Ceuta on the
African coast. This was agreed to by the Moors, but
they could not come to a settlement as to what
should be the boundary lines of the territory to be
ceded. Broadlands : October 11, 1859.
My dear John Russell, — It is plain that Pi-ance aims,
through Spam, at getting fortified points on each side of the-
Gut of Gibraltar, which, in the event of war between Spain and
France on the one hand, and England on the other, would, by a
cross fire, render that strait very difficult and dangerous to pass,,
and thus vfr tually to shut us out of the Mediterranean. The
distance between part of the African coast and the Spanish
coast is only eight mUes. With a fortified port on each side,
and guns that would carry three mUes or more, a fleet of mer
chantmen or of transports would have some difficulty in keeping
out of fire, especially if on each side there were a flotUla of gun
boats, protected by the guns of the fortresses, fc-hig from a
certain distance out from these fortresses, and presenting but a
small mark to any ships-of-war convoying the merchantmen or
transports. As things now stand such vessels would be safe by
keepmg well over to the African coast, but they would no longer
be so if that coast belonged to France or Spain.
The French Minister of War or of Marine said the other
day that Algeria never would be safe tUl France possessed at
port on the Atlantic coast of Africa. Against whom would such
a port make Algeria safe? Evidently only against England;
and how could such a port help France against England?
Only by tending to shut us out of the Mediterranean.
I still think that the Spanish Government are determined
to pick a quarrel with Morocco, and that thefr first act wUl be
to take Tangier, and thefr last to evacuate it ; and that the best
way of preventmg a serious difference between us and Spain
would be to ask the Emperor of Morocco to request us to
occupy Tangier in trust for him during hostUities with Spain,
if war with Spain should break out. " •

PEOPOSES DOCKYAED FOETIFICATIONS. 375
War was declared a few days after this. Ib was
intimated to the Spaniards that if Tangier were occu
pied by their troops, we could not permit the occupa
tion to be prolonged after the close of the war. The
Spanish Foreign Minister promised that Spain ' would
not take possession of any point on the Straits the
position of which would give her a superiority threaten
ing the navigation.' On this assurance being given,
and the undertaking being observed. Great Britain
remained neutral.
The next letter refers to the fortifications which
were afterwards constructed. It was a subject much
canvassed at the time, and on which Lord Palmerston
was excessively anxious.
There could be no question which so thoroughly
tested the patriotism of a British statesman, because the
more it was successful the less likely it was to be popu
lar. The fact that we were placed in a state of ade
quate defence was precisely the fact that rendered any
attack upon us unlikely; and if we were never attacked,
it was sure to be said that our defences were uncalled
for. But we must remember that though the boy who
cried ' wolf did so often when the wolf did not appear,
he was right in the main, for the wolf did come at last,
and the flock was eaten because the cry had been dis
believed. We might as well have no locks on our doors
and no bars to our windows, because thieves do not
attempt to break into our houses every night.
94 Piccadilly : December 15, 1859.
My dear Gladstone, — Sidney Herbert has asked me to sum
mon a Cabinet for to-morrow, that we may come to a decision
on a fortification question, and I am most anxious that the
arrangement which he has proposed should be adopted.
The main question is whether our naval arsenals and some
other important points should be defended by fortifications or
not ; and I can hardly imagine two opmions on that question.
It is quite clear that if, by a sudden attack by an army landed
in sfrength, our dockyards were to be destroyed, our maritime
power would for more than half a century be paralysed, and our

376 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
colonies, our commerce, and the subsistence of a large part of
our population would be at the mercy of our enemy, who would
be sure to show us no mercy. We should be reduced to the
rank of a thfrd-rate power, if no worse happened to us.
That such a landing is, in the present state of things, pos
sible, must be manifest. No naval force of ours can effectually
prevent it. Blockades of a hostUe port are no longer possible,
as of yore. The blockading squadron must be under sail, be
cause there would be no means of supplying it with coals
enough to be always steaming, while the outrushing fleet would
come steaming on with great advantage, and might choose its
moment when an on-shore wind had compelled the blockaders
to hkul off". One night is enough for the passage to our coast,
and twenty thousand men might be landed at any point before
our fieet knew that the enemy was out of harbour. There
could be no security against the shnultaneous landing of twenty
thousand for Portsmouth, twenty thousand for Plymouth, and
twenty thousand for Ireland. Our troops would necessarily be
scattered about the United Kmgdom; and with Portsmouth
and Plymouth as they now are, those two dockyards and all
they contain would be entered and burnt before twenty thou
sand men could be brought together to defend either of them.
Then, again, suppose the manoeu-vre of the first Napoleon
repeated, and a large Prench fleet, -with troops on board, to start
for the West Indies, what should we do 1 Would the nation be
satisfied to see our fleet remain at anchor at Torbay or Portland,
lea-ving our colonies to thefr fate? And if we pursued tbe
French, they might be found to have doubled back, to have
returned to the Channel, and for ten days or a fortnight to have
the command of the narrow seas. Now the use of fortifications
is to establish for a certain number of days (twenty-one to
thirty) an equation between a smaller inside and a larger force
outside, and thus to give time for a relie-ving force to arrive.
This in our case would just make the difference between safety
and destruction. But if these defensive works are necessary, it
is manifest that they ought to be made with the least possible
delay ; to spread thefr completion over twenty or thirty years
would be folly, unless we cpuld come to an agreement -with a
chivahous antagonist not to molest us tUl we could inform him
we were quite ready to repel his attack. We are told that these
works might, if money were forthcoming, be finished possibly
in three, or latest four years — long enough this to be kept in a
state of imperfect defencej,^

ARGUMENTS FOE FOETIFICATIONS. 377
But how is the money, estimated in round numbers at ten
or eleven millions, to be got ? There are two ways : annual
taxation, to raise for this purpose over and above all other ex
penses a third or a fourth of this sum, or the raising a loan for
the whole amount, payable in three or four annual instalments,
with interest, in twenty or thirty years. The first method
would e-vidently be the best in prmciple, and the cheapest, but
the burthen would be hea-vy, and the danger would be that after
the first year the desire for financial relief might prevaU over a
provident sense of danger, and the annual grants would dwindle
down to their present insufficiency ; and the works would thus
remain indefinitely unfinished. The second course has the
advantage of being financially as light, or nearly so, as the pre
sent system, because the annual repayment of principal and
interest would be but little heavier than the present annual
votes, while we should gain the same advantage of early com
pletion of works which would be secured by the greater financial
burthen of the first plan.
Arrangements of this kind have been deemed, by the de
hberate judgment and action of Parhament, wise and proper
for private persons. Why should they not be so for a nation,
in regard to outlays of the same nature as those for which
private persons have been by law enabled to charge their
estates ? The objection to borrowmg for expenditure is stronger
for individuals than for a nation.
The indi-vidual, if he went on borrowing for annual expenses,
would end by havmg no income left to hve upon or to assign
to a fresh lender. A nation would, perhaps, in the end come to
the same standstill, but its power of increasing its mcome is
greater than that of an individual ; but still Parliament has
encouraged and enabled private persons to borrow money for
permanent improvement of thefr estates, the money so borrowed
to be repaid in a limited number of years.
If we do not ourselves propose such a measure to Parlia
ment, it will infallibly be proposed by somebody else, and wUl
be carried, not mdeed against us, because I for one should vote
with the proposer, whoever he might be, but with great dis
credit to the Government for allowing a measure of this kmd,
involving, one may say, the fate of the empire, to be taken out
of thefr hands. People would say, and justly too, that we and
the proposer ought to change places, and that he and his friends
had shown themselves fitter than we were to assume the re
sponsibihty of taking care 'ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.'

378 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
In accordance with these views he moved a resolu
tion in the foUowing session providing nine millions^
for the purpose of fortifying our dockyards and arsenals.
His proposals were founded on the report of a Eoyal
Commission which had enquired, during the pre
ceding autumn, into our means of defence. The reso
lution was adopted by the House by a large majority,,
and the results of his action are seen in our existing
forts and lines round Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham,,
and Cork.

379

CHAPTEE XV.
FKANCB AND THE ITALIAN DUCHIES — SYKIA — BMPBEOR NAPOLEON'S
SCHEMES — NEUTEALITY OP SAVOY — ATTITUDE OP PRANCE— THE
' DEBBY ' OF 1860— CONFLICT BETWEEN LORDS AND COMMONS ON
PAPER DUTIES— DISCUSSION ABOUT THE 'PRESS.'
Whatever may have been the previous differences which
arose between Lord Palmerston and Lord EusseU in the
course of their long career, these two statesmen were,
during the years which covered the second Palmerston
administration, thoroughly united, both in their general
views of policy and also as to the best manner of giving
them effect.
In the year 1860, Italian affairs absorbed almost the
whole interest of foreign events, and both ministers had
for their one aim the speedy realisation of an independent
and united Italy. In the following memorandum, drawn
up by Lord Palmerston and circulated among his col
leagues, we find sketched out the policy which, in
agreement with the Foreign Secretary, he wished to
pursue. We must, however, in order to appreciate it,.
recaU the position of matters at the opening of the
year. The Congress which, by the Treaty of Zurich, France
and Austria had engaged themselves to summon had
been postponed. The British Government had then
come forward and proposed that France, and Austria
should agree not to interfere for the future by force in
the internal affafrs of Italy, that the French Emperor
should concert with the Pope for the evacuation of
Eome, and that Sardinia should not send troops into
Central Italy until its several states had voted as to
thefr future destiny, she being at liberty to do so as soon

380 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
as a vote for annexation to her was passed. To these
proposals France had instantly assented. Meanwhile
the Duchies had preserved internal order, and had given
unmistakable signs of their intention to declare for
annexation to Sardinia if left to themselves. France
had demanded and was about to receive the cession of
Savoy from Sardinia as an equivalent for the increase
of territory which the latter was on the point of ac-
qufring. Lord Palmerston had foreseen this result,
but, though deploring it, had considered that the unity
of Northern Italy was cheaply purchased at the price.
Lord Palmerston's memorandum was as follows : —
Broadlands : January 5, 1860.
The affairs of Italy are coming to a crisis, and it is indis
pensably necessary that the Enghsh Government should come
without further delay to a decision as to the course which Eng
land is to pursue. But, in truth, that course has been already
marked out. The Enghsh Government might have determined
that, in regard to Italian affairs, England should abdicate its
position as one of the great Powers of Europe. We might have
said that we live in an island, and care not what may be done
on the Continent ; that we think only of making money, and
of defending our own shores ; and that we leave to others the
task of setthng as they like the affairs of the contment of
Europe. But such has not been the policy of the wisest and
greatest statesmen who have taken part in the government of
this country. We might have deemed the present an excep
tional case; we might have said the Emperor Napoleon has
got into a scrape about Itahan affairs ; let bim get out of it as
he can : it is not our business to help him. But we rightly
considered that what is at issue is not the interests of the Em
peror Napoleon, but the interests of the people of Italy, and,
through them, the welfare and peace of Europe. Therefore
when a proposal was made that a Congress should meet to con
sider how best the independence and welfare of Italy could be
secured, and when England was invited to be a party to that
Congress, we accepted the in-vitation.
But it would have been unworthy of the Government of a
great Power like England to have accepted such an in-vitation
without having decided upon the pohcy which we were to pur
sue when in the Congress. We had a policy, and we lost nb

MEMOEANDUM ON ITALIAN POLICY. 381
time in making that policy known to the principal Powers in
vited to the Congress. That pohcy is in accordance with those
principles which English statesmen in our times have professed
and acted upon, and which are the foundation of public opinion
in England. We declared that in going into Congress we should
take our stand upon the principle that no force should be em
ployed for the purpose of imposing upon the people of Italy any
form of government or constitution, that is to say, that the
people of Italy, and especially of Central Italy, should be left
free to determine their o-wn condition of pohtical existence. We
shall therefore go into Congress, if Congress there is to be, not
as jurymen go into their box, discarding preconceived opinions
and bound to be determined by what we hear in Congress, but
hke statesmen with a weU-matured and dehberately formed
pohcy, and with the intention of endeavouring to make that
pohcy prevaU. What is the best way of accomplishing this
purpose ? Why, ob-viously to persuade those Powers to agree
with us, who are most able to sway the course of events in Italy
and to bring them -to the result we wish for.
What are those Powers ? Obviously Prance and Sardinia.
Austria, the Pope, and the King of Naples have views directly
opposite to ours ; and the other states to be represented in Con
gress are too far off' to have the same infiuence as Prance and
Sardinia on Itahan aifairs.
It is demonstrable, therefore, that we ought to endeavour to
come to an understanding with Prance and Sardinia, for the
purpose of common and united action -with them in regard to
the matters to be treated of in Congress. We need take httle
trouble about Sardinia, because we know that her views tally
-with our o-wn ; we can have little doubt as to the mchnation of
the Emperor Napoleon, because he has declared over and over
again in manifestoes, in speeches, in letters and other communi
cations that his object is to free Italy from foreign domination,
to make Italy free from the Alps to the Adriatic, and to
' rendre I'ltalie k eUe-m&me.' There can be no reasonable doubt,
therefore, that both France and Sardinia would unite with Eng
land in maintaining the principle that the Itahans should be
secured against foreign compulsion, and should be left free to
determine, according to their own wUl, what shall be their
future political condition. But what is the best time for en
deavouring to establish this understanding ? Shall we take
steps now, or shaU we wait till the Congress is assembled, and
tUl some proposal is made by Austria or by the Pope, or by some

382 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
other Power, which would be at variance -with our -views?
Common sense seems to point out that if such an understanding
is to be aimed at, we ought to endeavour to estabhsh it without
delay, and not to aUow Prance and Sardinia to go into Congress
ignorant whether England would or would not support effici-
eiently the principles which she has theoretically declared. To
put off endeavouring to establish an understandmg with France
and Sardinia till after the Congress had met and had begun its
discussions, would be the most unbusinesshke proceeding that
•could well be imagined, and would, in all probabUity, expose us
to deserved disappointment. Austria does not trust thus to the
chapter of accidents, but has been actively employed in canvass
ing for support to her views.
But what is the imderstanding or agi'cement which we
¦ought to estabhsh -with France and Sardinia ? Clearly a joint
determination -to prevent any forcible interference by any foreign
Power in the affairs of Italy. This, it is said, would be a league
against Austria. No doubt it would be, as far as regards the
interference of Austria by force of arms in the affiifrs of Italy ;
and such a triple league would better deserve the title of holy
alliance than the league which bore that name.
But such an engagement might lead us into war. War -with
whom ? War with Austria. WeU, suppose it did, would that
war be one of great effort and expense 1 Clearly not. Prance,
¦Sardinia, and Central Italy would furnish troops more than
enough to repel any attempt which Austria could make to co-
-erce Sardinia or Central Italy. Our share in such a war would
be chiefly, if not whoUy, naval ; and our squadron in the Adri
atic would probably be the utmost of om- contribution, unless
we were asked to lend a couple of regiments to garrison some
point on the Adriatic, which, however, we should probably not
be asked to do, and if asked, we might not consent to do. We
ought not to be frightened by words; we ought to examine
things. But is such a war likely ? On the contrary, it is in
the highest degree probable that such an engagement between
England, France, and Sardinia would be the most effectual
means of preventing a renewal of war in Italy. As long as
England keeps aloof, Austria may speculate upon om* joining her
in a war between her on the one hand, and France and Sardinia
on the other. It is so natural that we should side with France
.and Italy, that our holding back from doing so would be looked
upon by Austria as a proof that there was some strong under
current which prevented us from doing so; and the Austrian

MEMOEANDUM ON ITALIAN POLICY. 383
•Government would not unnaturaUy reckon that when the war
had broken out, that undercurrent would drive us to side with
Austria against France ; and this speculation would be a great
encouragement to Austria to take a course leading to war. If,
¦on the contrary, we make it publicly known that we engaged
ourselves heartily on the side of France and Italy, it might be
affirmed, as confidently as anything can be affirmed as to a future
¦event, that there would be and could be no renewal of war in
Italy, and the triple aUiance, while it would be honourable to
England (I might say, the only course that would be honourable
to England), would secure the contmuance of peace in Italy, and
thereby avert one danger to the general peace of Europe.
But it is said we cannot trust the Emperor Napoleon, and
when we had entered into this triple alhance, he would throw
us over and make some arrangement of his o-wn without con
sulting us. It is no doubt true that such was the course pur
sued by Austria during the war which ended in 1815. Austria
took our subsidies, bound herself by treaty not to make peace
without our concmTcnce, sustained signal defeat in battle, and
precipitately made peace without our concurrence. But on
what occasion has the Emperor Napoleon so acted ? On none.
He differed with us about certain conditions and the interpre
tation of certain conditions of the treaty of peace -with Eussia,
but the points in dispute were settled substantially in confor
mity with our -views. There is no ground for imputing to him
bad faith in his conduct towards us as allies. But it is said that
he has no steadiness of purpose, and the agreement of VUlafranca
is a proof of this. That agreement was certainly much short of
the declarations of intention with which he began the war, but
he had great difScidties of many kinds to contend -with in further
carrying on the war ; and though we, as lookers on, may think,
and perhaps rightly, that if he had persevered those difficulties
would have faded away, yet there can be no doubt that he
thought them at the time real ; and he is not the only instance
of a sovereign or a general who has at the end of a war or a
campaign accepted conditions of peace less full and complete
than what he expected or demanded when hostihties began.
But there is no ground for imputmg to Napoleon unsteadi
ness of purpose in regard to his -views about Italy. I have,
durmg the last four or five years, had at different times oppor
tunities of conversation -with him upon many subjects, and,
among others, upon the affafrs of Italy, and I always found him
sfrongly entertaining the same views and opinions which have

384 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
filled his mind since January of last year, in regard to forcing
Italy from Austrian domination, and curtailing the temporal
sovereignty of the Pope. There seems, therefore, no reason to
apprehend that if we came to an understanding with Prance and
Sardinia, for the purpose of maintaining the prmciple that no
force should be employed to coerce the free wUl of the Italians,
the Emperor Napoleon should turn round and leave us in the
lurch. There is every reason, on the contrary, to be confident
that by such an agreement -with France and Sardinia, we should
without war complete a settlement of Italy highly honourable
to the Powers who brought it about, and full of advantage, not
to Italy alone, but to Europe in general.
I have argued thus far on the supposition that the Congress
will meetj and I think it' most probable that^ it wiU meet.
Austria and the Pope look to the Congress (mistakenly, I trust
and beheve, and mistakenly if the proposed concert with Prance
and Sardinia is established) as the means by which the Arch
dukes are to be restored and Eomagna brought back -to obedi
ence. These two Powers wUl not hghtly let the Congress shp
through thefr fingers. The Emperor Napoleon also wishes the
Congress to meet, in order to relieve him from responsibihty as
to the settlement of Italy. The probabUity, therefore, is that
the difficulty arising out of the pamphlet ' -will be got over, and
that the Congress wiU meet. But if that difficulty should prove
insurmountable, and the Congress should be given up, every
thing which I have said in this memorandum would equally
apply; or rather, I should say, the necessity of coining to an
agreement with Prance and Sardinia would be stronger stUl.
In that case matters would have to be settled by diplomatic nego
tiation or by force of arms ; and in either way an agreement
between England, France, and Sardinia would carry into effect
the objects which such an agreement might have in view.
It is said, however, that although the course now recom
mended might in itself be right and proper, it would not be
approved by the country nor by Parhament.
My dehberate opinion is that it would be highly approved
by the country, upon the double ground of its own merits, and
' Le Pape et le Congrh, by M. de la Gueronnifere. Supposed to have
been dictated by the Emperor himself. It advocated depriving the
Pope of his temporal power except over the city of Eome. , This
pamphlet was the indirect cause of the failure of the Congress. Austria
required from the French Government an undertaking not to support
the measures advocated in it. France hesitating, Austria declined to
appear at the Congress.

EXPEDITION TO SYEIA. 385
¦of its tendency to avert a rupture with Prance, and to secure
the contmuance of peace with our neighbour. I am equally of
opinion that it would be approved by Parliament ; but if, by
a,ny combination of parties, an adverse decision were come to, it
would, in "my opinion, be the duty of the Government to appeal
from Parliament to the country. My belief is that such an
appeal would be eminently successful ; but if it were not, I
would far rather give up office for maintaining the principle on
which the course which I recommend would be founded, than
retain office by givmg that principle up. Palmerston.
There was no need, however, of any formal league
like this 'triple alliance.' The influence of the two
Western Powers suflSced to restrain any forcible inter
vention, if such had been contemplated. In the
month of March, Tuscany and Emilia declared by an
immense majority in favour of annexation to Sardinia,
and King Victor Emmianuel formally received them
into the Piedmontese monarchy. Italy was already
half-way on her road to unity.
The massacre of the Maronites by the Druses with
the connivance of the local authorities in the neigh
bourhood of Beyrout and Damascus led this year to
the despatch of English ships and French troops to
Syria, under the provisions of a convention between the
five Powers and Turkey, after we had declined a pro
posal made by France to in-vite the Viceroy of Egypt
to Syria Lord Palmerston consented, but unwillingly,
to the expedition, fearing lest there would be much
trouble in getting the French out again. This was,
indeed, the case ; for, although all danger of renewed
violence had passed away by the time they arrived on
the coast, it was not until the latter end of 1861 that
they retired ; and during this interval continuous re
presentations to urge their departure were deemed
necessary by the British Government. Before they left,
however, the coercive influence of their presence had
secured the due punishment of the guilty, and had
enabled the British and French Commissioners to-
VOL. II. C C

-38t) LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
establish a system of administration which brought
about in the Lebanon a durable state of peace and good
order. Lord Palmerston had, no doubt, a personal partiality
for Napoleon IIL, and fully acknowledged that his
conduct had in many instances been that of an honour
able ally, but he was not blinded to the tendency which
this active-minded Prince, whose youth had been passed
in schemes of personal ambition, had to the forming
and nurturing of national projects which might be
more or less inconvenient to his neighbours ; and the
English Government under Lord Palmerston, though
very desirous to be friendly, would not in any emer
gency have been subservient to that of France. A
short note to our ambassador at Paris may serve as an
illustration : — '
John Eussell has shown me his private letter to you. I
concur in all he says. We must not take the language of
Thouvenel or the Emperor as ordinances from the book of fate.
It is an old-estabhshed manoeuvre to represent as settled and
inevitable that which one desfres to accomplish, and thus'
beforehand to deaden resistance by making people imagme it
hopeless. The Emperor's mind seems as fuU of schemes as a warren
is full of rabbits, and, like rabbits, his scheines go to ground
for the moment to avoid notice or antagonism.
We had no ground for war, and no sujficient reasons for
war about Nice and Savoy, nor could we by any ob-vious means
have prevented their annexation ; . but other questions may
arise in regard to which England could not be thus passive.
The illustration was very apt that compared the
French Emperor's mind to a rabbit warren, for he was
constantly working underground, but at no great depth.
In 1863, for instance, conversing with Nigra, the Ita
lian minister at Paris, he told him that if the Italians
wanted to get Eome they ought never to talk of it as
their capital, just as he himself, desiring to have
Brussels, never professed it openly, but proposed the
' To Lord Cowley, April 1860.

FEANCE AND SWITZEELAND. 387
exact contrary, and that, in that way, he was more likely
to get it than if he raised opposition by talking of it !
Lord Palmerston in the note quoted above pointed
to questions in regard to which England could not re
main passive. One was the question of Genoa. When,
later on, it was suspected that France was to be repaid
for her acquiescence in Garibaldi's conquest of SicUy
and Naples by the cession of Genoa or the Island of
Sardinia, he let it be understood that the fleet of
England would not be a passive witness of the trans
action. If any such intention existed — of which there
is some evidence — his outspoken remonstrances acted
as an effectual check to it.
He was not so successful in his efforts on behalf of
Switzerland, whose position was greatly affected by
the annexation of Savoy to France. The two districts
of Chablais and Faucigny, bordering on the Lake of
Geneva, had been declared by the treaties of 1815 to
participate in the neutrahty of Switzerland. It was at
first hoped that the Emperor would consent to hand
over these two northern districts of Savoy to the Swiss
Confederation. When this expectation vanished, it
was at any rate believed that France might be induced
to cede a strip of territory, so as to leave the lake
whoUy to the Swiss, and to provide them with a strate
gic line on the frontier of the Valais. Lord Palmerston
writes in this sense to the French Ambassador, and
appeals with great tact to those considerations of
generosity which, on paper at any rate, have so much
apparent influence with Frenchmen. 94 Piccadilly : avril 17, I860.
Mon cher Persigny, — Soyez bien convaincu que nous sou
haitons shicferement de nous entendre avec la France sur cette
question Savoyardo-Suisse, mais dans cette discussion la Prance
et I'Angleterre ne partent pas du mime point de depart ; chez .
nous, ici, I'habitude est de considerer les questions politiques
d'apres ce que nous croyons leur r6sultat pratique, et chez vous,
en Prance, c'est trop I'habitude de traiter toutes les questions
pohtiques, non pas sur le terrain du r6sultat pratique, mais sur
CC2

388 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
le terrain de I'amour-propre national, et, si vous me permettez
de vous le dire, c'est surtout, lorsque les arguments vous man-
quent, qu'on se place k Paris le plus fortement sur le terrain de
I'amour-propre. Cependant ce n'est pas Ik la bonne maniere
d'envisager les questions de haute politique; mais le vrai
amour-propre national ne doit-il pas conseUler k fafre ce qui est
juste et g6n6reux et honorable ? et n'est-ce pas que la justice, la
g6n6rosit6 et I'honneur conseilleraient k la France de satisfaire
aux reclamations legitimes de la Suisse ? La France a demand^
k la Sardaigne une frontifere strat^gique pour la surety militafre
de la France. Est-ce juste que la Prance 6te k la Suisse la
frontifere strat^gique que I'Europe, la Prance elle-mlme incluse, '
avait doim6e k la Suisse pour la surety du territofre de la Con
federation? Tous les arguments dont la France s'est servie
pour justifier sa demande, soutiennent plus encore la demande
. de la Suisse. Mais une grande Puissance et un grand Souverain,
en traitant avec un voism faible, de-vraient se montrer non-
seulement justes, mais g6n6reux ; il n'est pas une faiblesse que
d'agfr ainsi, c'est une preuve de la conscience de sa force ; mais
avec I'Empereur des Frangais ce n'est pas seulement une ques
tion de g6n6rosit6 ; la reconnaissance y entre pour sa part.
C'est en Suisse que I'Empereur a fait ses premieres etudes, et
qu'il a commence k d^velopper ce caractere qui lui a valu,
depuis, des succfes si ^clatants ; c'est en Suisse plus tard, et dans
des temps moins heureux que les dernieres dix ann6es, que I'Em
pereur a eu ^ se louer des proc6d6s de la Suisse k son igard : U
est impossible que I'Empereur ne sente pas de la bienveUlance
envers la Suisse. On croit en Europe que I'Empereur a donn6
k esp6rer aux Suisses, qu'apr^s que la Savoie lui aurait 6t6
eidie par la Sardaigne, il donnerait k la Suisse les parties neu-
trahs6es ; ne serait-ce pas inconsequent de leur refuser mSme
la fronti4re strategique dont ils seraient contents ? Les bords
du Lac de Genfeve et la ligne strategique, qui couvre le Valais,
paraissent essentiels pour la Suisse. Quant aux bords du Lac,
il est k remarquer que de toutes les raisons strategiques mises
en avant par la France pour appuyer la demande de la cession
de la^ Savoie, il n'y en a pas une qui s'applique aux bords du
Lac de Genfeve, tandis que toutes ces raisons s'apphquent k la
demande que fait la Suisse de ne pas avofr sur le Lac un voisin
aussi puissant que la Prance. Les stipulations dont on parle,
par lesquelles la France s'engagerait k n'avoir aucun batiment
arme sur le Lac, et de ne construire aucune forteresse sur les
hords, ne pourraient guhre Itre prises au serieux : il y a des in-

FEENCH TEBEITOEIAL DESIGNS. 389
vasions morales, tout comme des invasions militaires, et il est
essentiel k I'interlt commun de I'Europe que la Suisse continue
k rester Suisse ; il ne s'agit pas dans cette affafre d'une question
entre la France et I'Angleterre : c'est un interit europeen, et
non pas un interit anglais, dont U s'agit, et c'est k I'Europe et
non pas k I'Angleterre que la France doit des egards k ce sujet.
Pourquoi la Prance ne prendrait-elle pas I'initiative dans cette
affaire ? pourquoi ne se ferait-elle pas un merite de contenter
spontanement les justes desirs de ses voisins en Suisse? ne
serait-ce pas agfr en grand Seigneur, et cela sans rien sacrifier
qui soit essentiel aux vrais interlts de la France ?
Soyez bien sur que, dans les temps oii nous -vivons, la bonne
opinion de I'Europe vaut tout autant qu'un petit bout de
territoire. All that was obtained, however, was an article in
the Treaty of Cession declaring that the King of
Sardinia could only transfer the neutralised parts of
Savoy on the conditions upon which he himself pos
sessed them.
There is no doubt that Lord Palmerston by this
time had become really distrustful of the intentions of
the Emperor Napoleon. His attitude about Savoy was
coupled with the open avowals of some French ofScers
that it was the intention of, and a necessity for, France
to annex Geneva. Pamphlets supposed to be published
by the Emperor's permission were appearing and advo
cating territorial changes. Ortega, the; martyr of the
last Carlist rising, was reported to have declared that
he had been encouraged in his enterprise by the
Emperor; while the Portuguese minister in London
stated it to be generally believed in the Peninsula that
the Emperor of the French had agreed with Count
Montemolin that if the Carlist attempt succeeded, the
price of the acknowledgment and support of France
was to have been the advance of the French frontier
from the Pyrenees to the Ebro, or else the cession of
the Balearic Islands, and that Spain was to have been
assisted by France in conquering and annexing Portugal.
Eeports of the Emperor's conversation, derived from
unimpeachable sources, contained expressions of opinion

390 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
that it was necessary for France to obtain the Palatinate^
and to acquire Saarbruck and Saarlouis, places which,
indeed, became in 1870 the first point of his attack on
Prussia. The general concurrence of many other such
indications, some, no doubt, false, and each by itself
perhaps trivial, gave strength to the distrust which
Lord Palmerston had already felt at the end of the
previous year, when he wrote to Lord John Eussell.
Broadlands : November i, 1859.
, My dear John Eussell, — TUl lately I had strong confidence
in the fafr intentions of Napoleon towards England, but of late
I have begun to feel great distrust and to suspect that his
formerly declared intention of avenging Waterloo has only lain
dormant, and has not died away. He seems to have thought
that he ought to lay his foundation by beating, with our aid, or
with our concurrence, or our neutrality, first Eussia and then
Austria, and, by deahng with them generously, to make them
his friends in any subsequent quarrel with us. In this, how
ever, he would, probably, find himseff mistaken ; because with
nations and governments resentments for former antagonism or
gratitude for former benefits mvariably give way to considerer
tions of present and prospective interests; and Eussia probably,
and Austria certairily, would see no advantage in any great
lowering of England for the augmentation of the preponderance
of France. But this reasoning of mine may be wrong, and
Russia, at least, might join France against us.
Next, he has been assiduously labouring to increase his
naval means, evidently for offensive as weU as for defensive
purposes ; and latterly great pains have been taken to raise
throughout France, and especially among the army and na-vy,
hatred of England, and a disparaging feehng of our mihtaiy
and naval means. AU this may be explained away, and may
be accounted for by other causes than a dehberate purpose of
hostUity to England ; but it would be unwise in any Enghsh
Government to shut its eyes to all these symptoms, and not to
make all due preparations for the gale which the political baro
meter thus indicates, though it may possibly pass away. Of
course we should take as ' argent comptant ' all thefr professions
of 'alhance intime et durable,' as Walewski termed it in his
China despatch ; and the only expression we ought to give of
anything hke suspicion should be in the activity and the scale

HIS FIEST DISTEUST OF NAPOLEON. 391
¦of our defensive arrangements. In regard to them, however,
we must not be overruled by financial economy.
The incessant exertions which the French were
making to place their navy upon the most complete
¦and efficient footing did not tend to diminish the
•causes for anxiety. It was under these circumstances
that Lord Palmerston urged forward our defensive
preparations and the construction of fortifications,
and encouraged the development of the Volunteer
Eifle Movement. This was no mere ' invasion panic'
He felt that the salutary and restraining action of a
great Power like England is not confined to the
¦employment of physical force. If such a Power is
known to be strong within itself, and capable of
exertion when required, its diplomatic action will
¦command attention, will often strongly influence the
¦course of events, and, by dealing timely with beginnings,
may prevent proceedings which, if unchecked, would
lead to great and disastrous international convulsions.
Lord Palmerston, however, also feared direct action
against England if we remained unprepared. He says
in a letter to the Duke of Somerset :
. I have watched the French Emperor narrowly, and have
studied his character and conduct. You may rely upon it that
¦at the bottom of his heart there rankles a deep and inextin
guishable desfre to humble and punish England, and to avenge,
if he can, the many humiliations, pohtical, naval, and military,
-which, since the beginiung of this century, England has, by
herself and her allies, inflicted upon Prance. He has sufficiently
¦organised his military means ; he is now stealthily but steadUy
organising his naval means ; and, when aU is ready, the over
ture wiU be played, the curtain wUl draw up, and we shall have
¦a very disagreeable melodrama.
The following conversation with Count Flahault
and the letter to Count Persigny are very character
istic. Lord Palmerston had an enviable power of
telling hard truths under a sense of duty, while he
¦avoided giving offence, owing to the frankness and
geniality of his manner : —

392 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

Memorandwm of, a Conversation mith Cowni Flahault on Tuesday,
Ma/roh 27, 1860.
Count Flahault came to me at a quarter after four, just as
I was going down to the House of Commons. He said he was.
going to Paris next moming, and he wished to know what he
should say from me to the Emperor. I said I could not wait a
minute, as I had to be in the House to answer a question, but
that if he would go down with me in my brougham we might
talk as we went along. To this he agreed. I then referred to-
what Lord John had said. He objected to that reference,
saying that what had fallen from Lord John was personaUy
offensive to the Emperor. I asked what part. He said not the-
latter part, which related to concert with other Powers ; that
was pohtical, and could not be objected to ; but Lord John had
expressed distrust of the Emperor. I said distrust inight be
founded on either of two grounds : either upon the supposition
of intentional deceit, or upon such a frequent change of purpose
and of conduct as to show that no rehance could be placed upon
the continuance of tbe intentions or pohcy of the moment, and
Count Flahault must admit that, without imputing the first,
there is ample ground for a feeling founded on the second con
sideration. Count Flahault said his great object was to prevent
war between the two countries. I said that I feared the
Emperor and Thouvenel had schemes and -views which tended
to bring about that result, and might array Europe against
Prance. Count Flahault did not fear that, but was appre
hensive that hritation on both sides might bring on war between
England and France. I said that I was most anxious to prevent-
such a war ; but if it was forced upon England, England would
fearlessly accept it, whether in conjunction with a confederated
aUiance, or singly and by herself ; that the nation would risa
and rally as one man ; although, speaking to a Frenchman, I
ought perhaps not to say so, yet I could not refrain from
observing that the examples of history led me to conclude that
the result of a conflict between English and French, upon any- '
thing like equal terms, would not be unsatisfactory to the former.
Count Flahault said that he had been at the battle of
Waterloo, and knew what Enghsh troops are, but that the-
Prench army now is far superior to that which fought on that-
day. I said no doubt it is, and so is the present English army;
but with regard to the excellence of the French army, I would
remind Count Flahault of what passed between Marshal Tallard,

PLAIN EXPLANATIONS THEEEUPON. 39S
and the Duke of Marlborough, when the former was taken.
prisoner at the battle of Blenheim : ' Vous venez, milord,''
.said the Marshal, ' de battre les meUleures troupes de I'Europe.'
' Exceptez toujours,' rephed Marlborough, ' celles qui les ont
battues.' 'But,' said Count Flahault, 'what I fear is an in
vasion of this country, for which steam affords such facihties,
and which would be disastrous to England.' I replied that
steam tells both ways, for defence as well as for attack ; and
that as for mvasion, though it would no doubt be a temporary
evil, we are under no apprehension as to its results. That a
war between England and Pi'auce would doubtless be disastrous
to both countries, but it is by no means certain which of the
two would suffer the most.
Arrived at the House of Commons, we took leave of each
other. Count Flahault said he should not say an3rthing to the^
Emperor calculated to increase the irritation which he expected
to find, but would endeavour to calm. I said that of course
Count Flahault would judge for himself what he should say,
but he must have observed what is the state of pubhc feehng-
and opinion in this country. The conversation was carried on
in the most friendly manner, as between two private friends-
who had known each other for a long course of years.
Broadlands : octobre 18, 1860.
Mon cher Persigny, — Borth-svick s'est rendu ici il y a
quelques jours, d'aprfes votre desfr, pour me donner communica-'
tion de la conversation que vous avez eue avec lui.
La substance de ce qu'U m'a raconte comme le resume de ce
que vous lui avez dit est k peu prte que I'Empereur souhaite,
aujourd'hui comme toujours, paix avec tous et aUiance avec
nous ; mais que le maintien de cette aUiance depend beaucoup-
de nous. Vous avez dit que dans les masses en France il y a
mauvais vouloir envers I'Angleterre; que I'Empereur peut^
reprimer et contraindre ce sentiment, tant qu'il est aide par
une politique amicale de la part du Gouvernement anglais, et^
que ce'qu'U faudrait de notre part, ce serait d'exprimer confiance
en I'Empereur, et de nous abstenir de toute tentative d'organiser
une coalition europeerme contre la France. Que si nous devious
poursuivre un autre et different systfeme, U y aurait danger de
guerre entre les deux pays, chose que vous considereriez comme-
deplorable pour les deux. Mais vous avez ajoute que dans.
I'etat des preparatifs et des moyens guerriers sur terre et sur
mer des deux pays, le resultat d'une telle guerre ne serait peut-

394 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
¦etre pas favorable pour nous ; qu'avec vos b^timents blind6s
vous pourriez detrufre nos chantiers, et que le resultat d'une
teUe lutte serait peut-^tre de mettre la France k la t^te d'une
coalition europeerme dfrigee contre I'Angleterre, isoiee par sa
pohtique autant que par la geographic, et finalement vous avez
suggere I'idee que, lorsque je vais k Leeds vers la fin du mois
prochain, je pourrais utUement pour les deux pays profiter de
I'occasion pour exprimer dans un discours notre confiance en les
intentions pacifiques et desmteressees de I'Empereur.
Eh bien ! je suis toujours bien aise d'apprendre, soit par les
¦discours de I'Empereur, soit parce qu'on nous rapporte de ses
-conversations, que la politique exterieure de la France est
pacifique et desinteressee ; et quant k la question de paix ou de
guerre entre nos deux pays, vous pouvez ^tre sur qu'il n'y a
personne en Angleterre qui voudrait la guerre, et qiu ne desfre
pas la paix.
Mais pour ce qui regarde la guerre, I'histoire du passe nous
rassure quant aux chances de I'avenir. II n'y a certainement
pas de nation qui puisse se vanter d'etre plus brave que la
nation frangaise, mais je crois que nos hommes ont quelques
dix minutes de tenacite de plus que les v6tres ; et lorsque le
¦courage est egal des deux c6tes, c'est la tenacite qui decide du
sort du combat. Pour ce qui regarde I'apphcation de la science
et des arts mecaniques k la guerre, je crois qu'il n'y a pas grande
-difference entre les deux pays, soit pour les operations sur terre,
soit pour celles sur mer ; mais nous avons plus de fer et de
¦charbon que vous, et notre mdustrie en ces mati^res est plus
>developp6e que la v6tre.
La grande difference entre les deux pays consiste en ceci,
que tous nos preparatifs, soit mUitafres, soit navals, sont essen-
tiellement defensifs, tandis que les v6tres ont du moins I'ap-
parence d'etre destines pour des operations offensives.
Si par consequent les autres gouvemements de I'Europe
•commencent, non pas a se coahser pour attaquer la France,
¦chose k laquelle la demence seule pourrait. penser, mais pour
s'entr'aider dans le cas o-Q. la Prance devenait agressive, ce sont
les actes recents de la France et son attitude presente qui seuls
en sont les causes. Mais ceci ne donne 'k la France aucun juste
sujet de plainte. II n'y a pas un homme en Angleterre qui
=songerait k organiser une coalition pour attaquer la France
tranquille et paisible ; mais il n'y a pas un homme qui ne ferait
;Son possible pour organiser une coalition, pour restreindre la
Prance ambitieuse et envahissante.

LETTEE TO LOED COWLEY. 395
, ¦ II resulte de tout ceci, que I'Empereur a entre ses mains
les decisions de paix ou de guerre pour I'Europe. J'espfere
¦qu'il choisira la paix, et si cela est, nous I'aiderons de tout
notre coeur a la maintenir.
Nous Savons tres-bien que, parmi les masses en France, il y
a mauvais vouloir envers I'Angleterre. II n'est pas surprenant
•que les passions haineuses des nos guerres aient survecu plus
longtemps en France que chez nous. Dans notre pays toute la
population est si activement occupee de la -vie pohtique du
present, qu'elle oubhe bien -vite le passe, et ne porte ses regards
¦qu'A, une petite distance dans I'avenir.
Chez vous en Prance, les masses ne prennent que peu de
part k la -vie pohtique du present, et par consequent elles re-
tiennent beaucoup plus longtemps les souvenirs du passe, et
¦elles toument leurs regards plus activement vers I'avenir. Mais
pour vous dire franchement la verite, il nous re-vient de plusieurs
personnes que les agents du Gouvernement frangais ne se
montrent pas faches de voir ce mauvais vouloir se propager,
s'accroitre et se perpetuer.
; Quant k Leeds, j'y vais pour rencontrer des oii-vriers, et pour
leur parler menage et education, et non pas pour faire un dis-
¦cours pohtique. MiUe amities, Palmerston.
At the same time he acquaints the English Am
bassador at Paris with the correspondence that had
taken place. Broadlands : November 2, 1860.
My dear Cowley, — As you say that Persigny has only sent
•fextracts from my letter, I think it right to send you a full copy
•of it, which I wish you to show to Thouvenel, because the first
part of the letter accounts for my having written at all, and for
that which I did -write.
' I could not consider Persigny's message, coming as he did
¦straight from Paris, in any other light than as a sort of semi
-official communication, and it was necessary for me to answer
it ci-vUly but firmly. I beheve that I was not wrong in con-
¦sidering the communication as coming from superior authority
at Paris, though possibly Persigny, in his zeal, may have added
something of his own. He wrote me an answer, in which he
¦pretty weU admitted that Borthwick had faithfuUy rendered
•ihe substance of what had been said to him. I purposely

396 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
omitted to allude to one thing which Persigny had said, which
was that if I did not adopt a friendly course towards France, I
should be turned out at the beginning of next session by a
coalition of Tories and Eadicals upon the cry of peace against
what they would represent a pohcy calculated to bring about a
war with France. Other things which I have heard satisfy
me that Persigny spoke by order and according to orders, and,
therefore, the Emperor and his ministers ought not to be hurt
or offended at the answer which it was impossible for me not to.
give. If Persigny had been able to come down here, the dia^
logue would have been by word of mouth instead of by letter,
and it would, therefore, have been less formal. But pray assure
the Emperor that my great wish and that of aU my coUeagues.
is to maintain the closest relations of friendship and alliance
-with France, and that it wUl certainly not be our fault if things
should take a different course. But they must know that con
fidence depends upon facts, and not upon words and thing*
which have happened, and language which has been held for-
some time past could not faU to inspire distrust as to the future J
but that distrust has not been accompanied by the shghtest^
feehng of hostihty to Prance, and is purely and entirely a feel
ing of a defensive character.
The Emperor and those about him fancy we are making a
coahtion to attack Prance. We should be insane to do so.
What would be the object of such an attack, and what possible
hopes would anyone have of success ?
France is an essential element in the balance of power irt
Europe, and, I may say, in the world. AU that we want is,
that Prance should be content with what she is, and should
not take up the schemes and pohcy of the first Napoleon, which
many things of late lead us to think she has an inchnation to
do. Of course if that system were again to be acted upon,
it would be resisted now as it was before, but with earlier
success. The seizure of Savoy and Nice and the breach of
promise towards Switzerland about the cession to the Swiss
of the neutrahsed district are matters which cannot be got over
easily. At Leeds he did no-fc make a political speech, but
was there in October to open a mechanics' institute
and to converse familiarly, as he so well could, about
the everyday life of his hearers. When one of the
speakers, in a laboured oration, was enlarging on every

FAILS TO WIN 'THE DEEBY.' 397
man having his own sphere, and that while the mechanic
-would be out of place as Prime Minister, the Premier
would fail as a weaver. Lord Palmerston quickly re-
.plied, amid general laughter, ' Oh, my business is not
to weave, but to unravel ! '
There was one confederacy of a totaUy different
kind from any that came across the path of his official
¦duties which baffled his ' unravelling ' powers this
year. When the much-coveted ' blue riband ' of the
turf seemed just within his grasp, his horse Mainstone —
third in the betting — unaccountably broke down, with
strong suspicion of foul play. The entries in his list
of interviews on the moming of Monday, May 21, are
striking by their variety : —
John Day and Professor Spooner about Mainstone : settled
he should run on Wednesday. — Shaftesbury about Church ap
pointments. — Powell, to ask about Mainstone. — Sir Robert
Peel, ditto. — Bemstorff to read me a despatch. — Sidney Herbert
about his evidence to be given to-morrow before committee on
army organisation. — Deputation from Manchester against in
tention of the House of Lords to throw out the repeal of the
excise duty on paper.
The Derby Day being the next but one, we may be
sure that on this morning the trainer and the veterinary
were received with even more interest than the Prus
sian ambassador and the deputation. In spite of
a bad report from the stable. Lord Palmerston rode
¦down to Epsom on Wednesday to see Thormanby
win and his own horse only come in somewhere about
tenth. It was a great disappointment to him. He
had never been so near taking the great prize of the
turf, and he was convinced that if his horse had been
fairly dealt with, it would at any rate have made a good
ishow to the front. Lord Palmerston's connection with
the turf extended over a long period, commencing in
1815, with a fiUy called Mignonette, at Winchester,
und only ending with his death. He seldom betted,
but raced from innate love of sport and horses. He

398 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
usually bred his animals himself, and named thein
after his farms. A visit to his three paddocks at
Broadlands made his favourite Sunday afternoon walk.
The interest he took in Turf matters, and the assist
ance which he gave to those responsible for them,
were signally recognised when the Jockey Club in 1845
passed an unanimous resolution that their thanks should
be offered to him for his invaluable services in re-vising
the laws of the Turf, and that he should be requested
to become an honorary member of the club, having
been elected unanimously by a suspension of the rules.
Changing his trainer after this Mainstone affair, and
feeling very much disgusted at the state of the Turf,
revealed, as he considered, by the treatment of his
horse, he had no animal of any merit afterwards except
Baldwin,' which he disposed of shortly before his death
in the manner shown by the following letter : —
94 Piccadilly : July 31, 1865.
My dear Lord Naas, — I have been obhged to throw my
horse Baldwin out of training, in order to prevent his becomhig
regularly lame.
I mean to devote the rest of his days to the production of
good horses, and, if you hke to accept him as a staUion for the
Pahnerstown breeding stud, I wiU gladly make him a present
to that estabhshment, on the single condition that if at any
time you found that he did not suit, he should be returned to
me. If you take him, you should send some trusty person to
Broadlands to give him over to Ireland, and the sooner the
better. The session of 1860 offered many occasions on
which the tact and good humour of the leader of the
House of Commons were required. Conspicuous among
these was the dispute about the paper duties, which
threatened to disturb the mutual relations of Lords
• Baldwin was named by Lord Palmerston after Admiral Sir
Baldwin Walker. The Admiralty had despatched a fast . steamer to
fetch Sir Baldwin back after he had sailed from Plymouth, but it
eould not catch him.

THE LOEDS AND THE PAPEE DUTIES. 399"
and Commons. The Upper House had thrown out, by
a large majority, the Bill for the repeal of the excise
duty on paper, and, by so doing, they undoubtedly
usurped a power which, by the spirit of the Constitution,
whatever might be its letter, rested solely with the
Lower House. Lord Palmerston was not inclined to
allow the misunderstanding to grow into a quarrel.
He moved for a committee to enquire into precedents,
and, on its report, proposed three resolutions which
affirmed that the right of granting aids and supplies is
in the Commons alone, and that although the Lords
had exercised on some occasions the power of rejecting
Bills relating to taxation by negativing the whole, the
House viewed such acts with peculiar jealousy, and
reserved in their own hands the power so to frame Bills
of Supply as to maintain their rights inviolate. He
urged these resolutions on the acceptance of the House
with great dexterity and, as it proved, with entfre suc
cess. His position was difficult. There was indeed no
case for a resolution at all ; but while he wished to
build a bridge for the retreat of the Lords, he had two
colleagues in his Cabinet who were committed far too^
deeply by their expressions of wrath at what they
termed an outrageous invasion of the liberties of the
people to permit of their passing the matter over in
silence. So he had, as a wise and moderate counsellor,
to vindicate in his speech the rights of the Commons
whUe sparing the susceptibilities of the Lords. The
resolutions were adopted, the question rested for the
remainder of this session, and the Bill passed the Upper
House in the next.
Another matter of smaller moment served to illus
trate his happy art of putting things. Mr. Horsman
had raised a discussion which involved allusions to the
connection between the Government and the press, and
insinuated that the social influences of Cambridge
House helped to sway the political leanings of one of
the chief organs of public opinion. Lord Palmerston
9,nswered him as follows : —

•400 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
My right honourable friend has stated that he did not know
what the influence was which drew one of the editors or mana
gers of the ' Times ' to me ; and if by that statement he means
i;o imply a wish on my part to exercise any mfluence over the
hne of conduct which is pursued in the case of that journal, I
•can only say in answer to that charge, in the words of Mrs.
Malaprop, that I should be but too glad to plead guilty to the
rsoft impeachment, and to know that the msinuation which it
involves was really founded on fact. If there are influences
which, as the right honourable gentleman says, have fortunately
led Mr. Delano to me, they are none other than the influences
¦of society. My right honourable friend has observed, in that
glowing address which he has just delivered, that the contribu
tors to the press are the favourites and the ornaments of the
;social circles into which they enter. In that opinion he is, it
seems -to me, perfectly correct. The gentlemen to whom he
Tcfers are, generally speaking, persons of great attainments and
mformation. It is, then, but natural that thefr society should
be agreeable. My acquaintance -with Mr. Delane is exactly of
that character. I have had the pleasure of meeting him
frequently in society, and he has occasionaUy done me the
honour to join in society under my roof; that society was, I
may add, composed of persons of all shades of pohtics and of
various pursuits. I need hardly say I feel proud when persons
so honour me without undertaking any other engagement than
that which Mr. Delane always makes good — of making them
selves agreeable during the time of their stay.
A tribute paid by the Lord Chancellor to Lord
Palmerston's conduct of public affairs during this
session is so forcible and compendious that I here
insert it. Lord Westbury writes to him in the month
of August :
I cannot close this note without expressing to you, with the
most unfeigned sincerity, my admiration of your masterly
leadership during this most difficult session. Great knowledge,
great judgment, great temper and forbearance, infinite skill
and tact, matchless courtesy, and great oratorical talent, rising
-with each important occasion, have in a most eminent degree
marked your conduct of the Government and your leadership
•of the House of Commons. Those who know the secrets of the
•Cabinet must feel that none but you could have kept it together.

TRIBUTE TO HIS LEADEESHIP. 401
But what I esteem most is that happy quahty you possess by
which, whilst you receive the admiration, you at the same time
win the affection of aU around you.
We must remember that during aU these years the
Liberal party had only a smaU nominal majority of
twenty in the House of Commons, and that the Cabinet,
containing statesmen of marked individual importance,
contained also strong elements of divergence, whether
on matters of finance, of reforqi, or of foreign affafrs.
Lord Westbury was right in thinking that none but
a minister possessing peculiar talent for reconciling,
cementing, and commanding diverse idiosyncrasies
could have overcome such obvious difficulties.

VOL. II.

DD

402 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XVI.
STATE OF PARTIES — LOED WABDBNSHIP OF THE CINQUE POSTS —
CIVIL WAE IN AMERICA— COTTON SUPPLY — TUEKISH FINANCES
— VISIT TO HARROW — FATHER DALY — DEATH OF PRINCE CON
SORT — ' TRENT ' AFFAIR — NATIONAL BXPENDITUEE — CHURCH
PATRONAGE.
Political parties were in a singular jumble at the
period which we have now reached. The Conserva
tives, alarmed at the ' advanced ' tendencies of the
ChanceUor of the Exchequer, promised to refrain from
all attempts to turn out the Liberal Premier, if only he
would resist ' democratic ' budgets, and keep his hands
from any violent action against Austria. Needless to
say that Lord Palmerston was too loyal to enter into
any such secret understanding. The Hadicals, on the
other hand, hopeless of any effective pressure on their
part, and impatient of the laggard steps of the Whig
Cabinet, offered to help the Tories to turn out the
existing Government, and to give the administration
which would succeed a two years' lease of power.
They anticipated that by that time the country would
be ready for such a Government and such a Eeform
BUI as they would themselves desire. Needless to say
that the Conserva.tives were not so shortsighted as to
accept such an alliance. The upshot was that Lord
Palmerston, although with a small nominal majority,
continued to hold an unassailable position both in the
House and the country.
The very ancient and dignified office of Lord War
den of the Cinque Ports becoming vacant by the death
of Lord Halhousie in the spring of 1861, the dignity

INSTALLATION? AS LOED WAEDEN. 403
was conferred by Her Majesty upon Lord Palmerston.
It was at first intended that the post should not be
ffUed up ; but, on representations being made of the
liistorical traditions which attached to it, and of the
long line of illustrious men who had filled it, including
•during this century both Pitt and WeUington, the
Premier rightly considered that, unless for some good
Teason, a link with the past so interesting in its charac
ter should not be lightly broken. The ancient residence
of Walmer Castle still remained to the Lord Warden,
although his emoluments, save a few droits of Ad
miralty, had disappeared. Lord Palmerston's installa
tion took place at Dover with pomp and circumstance.
Under the antiquarian care of the town- clerk all the
old traditions had been unearthed and rusty ceremonies
refm'bished, and the new Lord Warden was conducted
to the Bredenstone with due solemnity to take the
oaths of office at a grand Court of Shepway. Lord
Palmerston entered into the thing with proper spirit,
,and made an appropriate speech at the inaugural ban
quet, in which reminiscences of the past mingled with
exhortations to the practice of modern patriotism.
But another penalty attached to the acceptance of
the Lord Wardenship. It was a ' place of profit '
{though of smaU profit) ' under the Crown.' So during
the Easter recess he had to vacate his seat in Parlia-
jment, and -was compelled to enjoy what the newspapers
of the day caUed his ' favourite relaxation, when he had
nothing else particular to do ' — namely, the being re
turned for Tiverton. Of course the redoubtable Eow
cliffe was on the watch, and from an open window near
the hustings upbraided the Premier for his lukewarm
ness about reform. ' You come to Tiverton to gull the
people, but you don't gull me. I have given the Whigs
a long trial, but now I throw them over. Go back to
Downing Street, and bring in an honest Eeform Bill,
¦and let us have no more double shuffle.' At the sound
of the weU-known accents Lord Palmerston came up
«mUing to the front, and, amid the cheers and laughter
DD 2

404 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
of the crowd, turned his tormentor inside out, and
then went down, shook hands with him, and gave him a
receipt for the gout. This Tiverton butcher was a vul
gar specimen, eager for notoriety ; yet the spectacle of
a Prime Minister, at the height of his power and popu
larity, giving himself as much pains to answer these
taunts as if they had come from the Leader of the
Opposition had its moral. In some countries the man
would have been ejected, or at least hustled; but in
England his rights as an elector were recognised both
by the mob and the minister.
The great event of this year was, undoubtedly, the
outbreak of the civil war in America. The English
Government, though it recognised the Southerners as
belligerents, proclaimed its neutrality and maintained
it in spite of many temptations and frequent solicita
tions to take a different course. Not only were motions
to that effect pressed upon them in both Houses of
Parliament, but similar proposals were made to them
by the Prench Government ; but they early recognised
that, if the war was to cease in any other way than by
the complete success of the North, it was far better
that it should so cease owing to a conviction on both
sides that they could never live again happily as one
community, than that the termination of hostilities
should be brought about by the mediation or inter
ference of any European Power. The sentiments which
inspired the Cabinet may be gathered from tbe tone of
the following short note, which I insert as contradicting
the generally received impression of Lord Palmerston's
hostility to the American Eepublic. It is quite true
that he entertained a feeling of contempt, and even of
dislike, for many of the men who from -time to time
occupied public positions in connection with the United
States Government, He thought them deficient in
honesty and offensive in tone — in short, not ' gentlemen,'
in the sense which is independent of bfrth and depends
solely upon character; but for the American people,
apart from its politicians, he had that admiration and

THE CIVIL WAE IN AMEEICA. 405
regard which his truly English nature would necessarily
feel for a free and kindred nation. To his correspondent
who had been urging proposals for our mediation he
writes : — 94 Piccadilly : May 5, 1861.
; My dear EUice,' — The day on which we could succeed in
putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections
of our North American cousms would be one of the happiest
-of our lives, and all that is wanting to induce us to take steps
for that purpose is a behef that any such steps would lead
towards the accomphshment of that purpose, and would not do
more harm than good. The danger is that, in the excited state
jjf men's minds in America, the offer of anyone to interpose
to arrest thefr action, and disappomt them of their expected
triumph, might be resented by both sides ; and that jealousy of
¦European, especially of English, interference in their internal
afiairs might make them still more prone to reject our offer as
impertinent. There would, moreover, be great difficulty in suggesting any
hasis of arrangement to which both parties could agree, and
¦which it would not be repugnant to English feehngs and prin-
•ciples to propose. We could not well mis ourselves up with the
acknowledgment of slavery and the principle that a slave escap
ing to a free soU State should be followed, claimed, and recovered,
hke a horse or an ox. We might possibly propose that the
North and South should separate amicably ; that they should
make some boundary line, to be agreed upon, the line of separa
tion between them ; and that each confederation should be free
¦to make for its own internal affairs and concerns such laws as it
might think fit — ^the two confederations entering, however, into
oertain mutual arrangements as to trade and commerce with
each other.
Do you think the time is come for any arrangement of such
a kind % or is it not in the nature of things and in human
/nature that the -wiry edge must be taken off this craving appe
tite for confiict in arms before any real and widespread desire
ior peace by mutual concession can be looked for ?
For those who looked ahead the civil war threatened
.an early blow to English interests in the shape of the
ioss of our cotton supply. Lord Palmerston writes to
' Eight Hon. Edward EUice, M.P.

,406 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the President of the Board of Trade, to see if he could
provide in any manner for the expected deficiency : —
94 Piccadilly: June 7, 1861.
My dear Milner Gibson, — It is -wise when the weather is;
fine to put one's house in wind and water-tight condition against
the time when foul weather may come on. The reports from
bur manufacturing districts are at present good ; the mills are
1 all working, and the people are in fuU employment. But we
must expect a change towards the end of next autumn, and du
ring the winter and the spring of next year. The ci-vil war hi
America must infaUibly diminish to a great degree our supply
of cotton, unless, indeed, England and Prance should, as sug
gested by M. Mercier, the French Master at Washmgton,
compel the Northern States to let the cotton come to Europe from^
the South ; but this would almost be tantamount to a war with
the North, although not perhaps a very formidable thing for
England and Prance combined. But even then this year's crop
must be less plentiful than that of last year. Well, then, has
the Board of Trade, or has any other department of the Govern
ment, any means of procuring or of helping to procure anywhera
in the wide world a subsidiary supply of cotton 1 As to our
manufacturers themselves, they will do nothing unless directed
and pushed on. They are some of the most helpless and short
sighted of men. They are hke the people who held out thefr'
dishes and prayed that it might rain plum-puddings. They
thmk it is enough to open their miU-gates, and that cotton will
come of its own accord. They say they have for years been
looking to India as a source of supply ; but their looks seem to^
have had only the first effect of the eyes of the rattlesnake, -viz.,
to paralyse the objects looked at, and as yet it has shown no
signs of faUing into their jaws. The western coast of Africa,
the eastern coast of Africa, India, Australia, the Fiji Islands,
Syria, and Egypt, all grow great quantities of cotton, not to
mention China, and probably Japan. If active measures were
taken in time to draw from these places such quantities of
cotton as might be procured, some portion at least of the pro
bable faUing off of this next year might be made good, and our
demand this year would make a better supply spring up for-
future years. I do not know whether you can do anything in
this matter ; but it is an important one, and deserves early
attention.

UEGES EEFOEMS ON THE SULTAN. 407
With his care for the preservation of the rights of
the Ottoman Porte,, Lord Palmerston had, of course,
never ceased to keep a watchful eye on the proceedings
of the Prench in Syria. He now writes to the British
Ambassador at Constantinople, and bases on the success
of his endeavours in that quarter an exhortation to the
new Sultan to abandon the architects and buUders of
Abdul Mejid for nobler agents and objects more worthy
¦ of an enlightened ruler. The years which have since
elapsed have sufficiently shown how vain were the hopes
of any such change ; but it cannot be too clearly re
membered that the keynote of Lord Palmerston's
Eastern policy at the time of the Crimean War and for
some time after was a sincere belief in the possibility,
if not the probability, of the complete regeneration of
Turkey, if the opportunity were offered to her. He
died before the experiment could be finally pronounced
a failure. 94 Piccadilly : June 26, 1861.
My dear Bulwer, — I am heartUy glad we have got the
French out of Syria, and a hard job it was to do so. The
arrangement made for the future government of the Lebanon
wUl, I dare say, work sufficiently weU to prevent the Prench
from ha-ving any pretext for returning thither. But the death
of the late Sultan and the accession of the present one are the
great and important events of the day, as bearing upon Eastern
affairs. Abdul Mejid was a good-hearted and weak-headed
man who was running two horses to the goal of perdition — ^his
own life, and that of his empfre. Luckily for the empire, his
o-wn life won the race. If the accounts we have heard of the
new Sultan are true, we may hope that he wiU restore Turkey
to its proper position among the Powers of Europe. If he will
continue the system of Liberal toleration and progressive m-
teraal improvement established by his predecessor on paper, and
in some cases and places carried into execution, and if he -wUl
apply to his empfre the weU-regulated economy with which he
is said to have managed his o-wn private affairs, he may be able
to rescue his country from the do-wnfall with which it has lately
seemed to be threatened.
You wiU, of course, encourage him to follow such a course,
and the present Grand Vizier -will be a useful instrument for

408 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
such a pohcy. But the Sultan must begin by clearing out the
Harem, dismissing his architects and buUders, and turning off
his robber ministers. The natural resources of the empfre, in
teUectual, physical, and material, are great; and, if properly
brought out and turned to account, would render Turkey a
powerful and important state.
Lord Palmerston always entertained a great affec
tion for Harrow, the place of his early education.
Many a time did he ride down in the course of his life
to revisit the old scenes, and this year he was present
at an interesting ceremony, for he undertook to lay
the foundation stone of the School Library, erected in
honour of Dr. Vaughan, who had recently retired from
the head-mastership. In spite of the pouring rain
he went down on horseback, and was received by the
assembled boys with great enthusiasm. He reminded
them, in his speech, that the strength of a nation con
sists not so much in the number of the people as in the
character of the men; and then, turning the rain to
account, went on : —
We ought to pay due respect to those who form the character
of the rising generation ; who instruct them that self-control is
better than indulgence ; who tell them that labour is to be pre
ferred to pleasure; and that whereas mere amusements may
be compared to the southern breezes, which, though pleasant to
be enjoyed, yet pass away and leave no trace behind them,
honourable exertion, on the contrary, may be compared to the
fertilizing shower which, though it may, as you aU know at the
present moment, not be agreeable to those who are exposed to it
(laughter), yet nevertheless leaves, by enriching and improving
the soil on which it faUs, solid marks behind it by the ample
and abundant harvest which it helps to create. I must, as a
Harrow man, be permitted to say that Harrow has held its place
in public estimation and pubhc service by furnishing men dis
tinguished the most in all the careers which they may have
chosen for their future hfe. We have named the most dis
tinguished in arms. We are proud of one name — a poet. Lord
B3T:'on — who here imbibed the first elements of that classical
attainment which afterwards led to his high fame. We may
boast — I speak now as a Harrow boy — ^that in the present

MENACE OF THE lEISH LIBEEALS. 409
century four Harrow boys ' have attained the post which I now
have the honour to hold, and I trust that there are many other
four Harrow boys who are destined to become distinguished
men hke those to whom I allude.
After this he rode back in the rain to pass the rest
of the day and night on the Treasury Bench ; being at
the time close upon seventy-seven years of age.
The manner in which from his place on that bench
he, this session, countermined the workings of an un
scrupulous intriguer deserves notice as illustrative of
his readiness of resource and knowledge of human
nature. The Government had announced the with
drawal of a grant given by the Derby administration
towards the maintenance of a mail-packet service be
tween the port of Galway and the United States.
Great indignation was excited by this withdrawal in
those parts of Ireland which had expected to profit by
the scheme; and a certain Father Daly, armed with
¦credentials from influential quarters, came over to
England, with the avowed design, by means of the
Irish vote, to put the Government in a minority should
it refuse to give way. He had an interview with Lord
Palmerston, and threatened him with this party defec
tion on the forthcoming Budget. Lord Palmerston
merely replied, that he should go straight down to the
House of Commons and relate exactly what had just
passed between them. He did so in a manner both
frank and amusing, and with such effect, that the Irish
Liberals, even had they secretly nursed any thoughts
¦of playing traitor to thefr party for the sake of local
emoluments, became ashamed to appear as dancing to
the wire-pulling of an Irish priest, and the Budget was
saved. Some of Lord Palmerston's views about contem
porary Italian and American affairs are given in the
following letter : —
' Perceval, Goderich, Peel, Aberdeen.

410 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Broadlands : October 18, 1861. '
My dear EusseU, — ^First, as to Eome, I believe you are right
in not instructing Cowley to make, at present at least, any sug
gestion to the Emperor as to a final arrangement of the ques
tion about the Pope. We could not suggest any arrangement
which was not founded on the basis that Rome and its -whole
territory should be evacuated by the French ; that the Pope
should have no temporal dominion over any part of the people
of Italy, and that the city of Eome should be the capital of the
Italian kingdom. But the first of these conditions would at
once stop the discussion of the other two. Notwithstand
ing the affected regret of the Emperor at having been
led to occupy Rome, it is, I think, pretty clear that he clings
to the occupation of that central part of Italy, as affordmg
him great military and political advantages wliich he is fully
determined not at present to give up. He is ready there
-with his army of twenty-five thousand men, capable of
being increased to any amount, either to take advantage
of any successful disturbance in the Neapolitan territory,
or to turn the flank of the Austrians in Venetia, or to
pass over to Dalmatia, whenever it may suit him to quarrel
-with Austria — and he may very possibly do so next spring.
But at all events his occupation of Eome, and the protection
which he thus affords to AntoneUi, the Pope, and King Francis
in thefr intrigues, retards the consohdation of the unity of Italy
and holds out to him a still ghmmerhig ray of hope that he may
succeed in his own scheme of an Italian confederation instead of
an united kingdom. The course of events -svill settle the Papal
question. Peter's pence wUl at last begin to fail ; and if the
Pope wUl only put forth a few more allocutions, even good
Cathohcs wUl become reconcUed to the cessation of his temporal
power. I think you are right in believing that the Emperor
wiU turn Austria out of Venetia before he turns himself out of
Eome ; and there can be little doubt that he remains in Eome
for the purpose of being more easUy able to turn Austria out of
Venetia. The arrangement you suggest by which Turkey would sell
Herzegovina to Italy, and Italy would give it to Austria in ex
change for Venetia, would be a very good one, but it would be
hard to accomplish. Turkey would not easily be persuaded to
sell Herzego-vina, and Austria would not be more disposed
to take that provmce in exchange for Venetia, to which she
foolishly attaches great military importance. I suspect that

'THE "TEENT" AFFAIE.' 411
Austria will not give up Venetia till compeUed to do so for
nothing by defeat in war. It might be worth considering
whether parties concerned might be sounded about some such
plan — Turkey first, because the first cession would be made by
her. As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be
to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the con
flict between North and South. It is true, as you say, that
there have been cases in Europe in which allied Powers have
said to fighting parties, hke the man in the ' Critic,' ' In the
Queen's name I bid you to drop your swords ; * but those cases
are rare and peculiar. The love of quarrelhng and fighting is
inherent in man, and to prevent its indulgence is to impose
restraints on natural liberty. A state may so shackle its own
subjects ; but it is an infringement on national independence to.
restrain other nations. The only excuse would be the danger
to the mterfering parties if the confiict went on ; but in the
American case this cannot be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.
I quite agree -with you that the want of cotton would not
justify such a proceeding, unless, mdeed, the distress created by,
that want was far more serious than it is likely to be. The
probabUity is that some cotton wUl find its way to us from
America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from
other quarters.
The only thmg to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to
give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while,
on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our
fellow-countrymen. Towards the end of the year 1861 two events, very
different in their nature, but alike sudden and startling,
highly excited the public mind. I refer to the illness
and death of the Prince Consort and the seizure of the
Confederate envoys on board the British mail-steamer
' Trent,' which brought us tO the verge of a war with
the United States. During the simultaneous interval
of suspense. Lord Palmerston was laid up with au
attack of gout, the worst in his whole life. No doubt
his symptoms were aggravated by the anxieties of the
moment ; and I remember that both his hands and both
his feet were completely crippled, and that he was unable
foi- a fortnight even to open a letter for himself. Yet

¦412 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
¦he never abandoned his post. DaUy communications
with the physicians in attendance at Windsor, urging,
perhaps with unnecessary precaution, the summoning
•of additional advice, daily communications and inter
views with those charged with the duties of negotiation
¦or of preparation for war, showed that the spirit was
not daunted by the pain and prostration of the body.
He felt the death of the Prince Consort most acutely,
and looked upon it as an irreparable loss. As to the
-dispute with America, he regarded the despatch of the
Guards and other troops to Canada before the arrival
-of a reply to our demand for a surrender of the captives
as the best means of averting war, and so it proved.
Although by certain organs of the peace party it was
denounced as an irritating measure, it was no such
thing, but the one way of showing, without offence to
the United States Cabinet, that England was in earnest.
It was only by extraordinary exertions that the troop
ships were enabled to reach the St. Lawrence before the
river navigation was closed by ice.
During these years there was constant friction at
work between the two wings of the Liberal party about
the national expenditure ; both parties apparently
-agreeing as to the ends to be attained, but differing as
to the necessary means. In 1862 Mr. Stansfeld, as
spokesman of the one section, moved a resolution in the
House that the national expenditure was capable of re
duction without compromising the safety or the legiti
mate influence of the country. Lord Palmerston met
this by a counter-resolution, by which the House,
^acknowledging the obligations of economy, declined to
bind themselves to any declaration beyond a trust that
such further reductions might be made as the future
estate of things might warrant. The two following
letters refer to this question of outlay on the army
:and navy, and to his disinclination to rest upon shifts
and chances when the position of England was con-
•cemed : —

INSISTS ON NATIONAL DEFENCES. 413
94 Piccadilly : January 8, 1862.
My dear Mr. Cobden, — I have many apologies to make to you-
for not ha-ving sooner acknowledged the memorandum which you
sent me some time ago suggesting an understanding and agree
ment between the Governments of England and Prance about
the number of ships of war which each of the two countries
should maintain. It would be very dehghtful if your Utopia
could be realised, and if the nations of the earth would think
of nothing but peace and commerce, and would give up quarrel
hng and fighting altogether. But unfortunately man is a fight
ing and quarrelling animal ; and that this is human nature is,
proved by the fact that repubhcs, where the masses govern,
are far more quarrelsome, and more addicted to fighting, than
monarchies, which are governed by comparatively few persons.
But so long as other nations are animated by these human pas
sions, a country hke England, wealthy and exposed to attack,
must by necessity be pro-vided with the means of defence, and
however expensive these means may be, they are infinitely
cheaper than the war which they tend to keep off.
94 Piccadilly : April 29, 1862.'
My dear Gladstone, — I read with much interest, as I came
up yesterday by the railway, your able and eloquent speeches at
Manchester ; but I wish to submit to you some observations-
upon the financial part of the second speech. You seem in that
speech to make it a reproach to the nation at large that it has
forced, as you say it has, on the Parhament and the Govern
ment the high amount of expenditure which we have at present
to pro-vide for. Now I do not quite agree with you as to the
fact ; but admitting it to be as you state, it seems to me to be
rather a proof of the superior sagacity of the nation than a
subject for reproach.
The main sources of increased expenditure have been army,
navy, and education. As to education, the increase has arisen
from the working of a self-acting system. We may not have
had the full value of our money, but we have derived great
advantage from the outlay.
Now as to the augmentation of our mihtary and naval
means of defence, I cannot give to the nation, contradistinguished
from Parhament and Government, the exclusive merit of bav
in" demanded them. It appears to me that the merit, as I call
it,''is equally to be shared by the nation, Parhament, and Go
vernment. Successive Governments have taken the lead by pre-

414 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
posing to Parhaments such estimates as, acting upon their
responsibihty, they thought needful for the pubhc ser-vice;
successive Parliaments have sanctioned those estimates, and the
nation has ratified those acts by their approval. It is, there
fore, a mistake to say that this scale of expenditure has been
forced upon Parliament or upon the Government ; and it is a
still greater mistake to accuse the nation, as Cobden does, of
ha-ving rushed headlong into extravagance under the impulse
of panic. Panic there has been none on the part of anybody.
There was for a long time an apathetic bhndness on the part of
the governed and the governors as to the defensive means of
the coimtry compared with the offensive means acquired and
acquiring by other Powers. The country at last awoke from
its lethargy, not indeed to rush into extravagance and uncaUed-
for exertions, but to make up graduaUy for former omissions,
and so far, no doubt, to throw upon a shorter period of tiipe
expenses which earher foresight might have spread over a greater
length of time. The Government, the Parhament, and the
nation acted in harmonious concert ; and if any proof were
wanting that the nation has been inspired by a dehberate and
sagacious appreciation of its position with respect to other
Powers, that proof has been afforded by the long-continued and
well-sustained sacrifices of time and money which have been
made by the 160,000 Volunteers, and by those who have con
tributed to supply them -with requisite funds.
But have the Government, or rather have both Liberal and
Conservative Governments, have the Parliament and the nation
been -wrong, and have Bright and Cobden been right ? I ven
ture to think that the Government, the Parhament, and the
nation have taken the juster -view of what the state of things
required. We have on the other side of the Channel a people who, say
what they may, hate us as a nation from the bottom of their
hearts, and would make any sacrifice to inflict a deep humilia
tion upon England.
It is natural that this should be. They are eminently vain,
and their passion is glory in war. They cannot forget or forgive
Aboukir, Trafalgar, the Peninsula, Waterloo, and St.Helena.
Increased commercial intercourse may add to the hnks of
mutual interest between us and them ; but commercial interest
is a link that snaps under the pressure of national passions.
Witness the bitter enmity to England lately freely vented, and
ijow with difficulty suppressed, by those Northern States of

WATCHFUL GUAED OF CANADA. 415
America with whom we have had a most extensive commercial
intercourse. WeU, then, at the head of this neighbouring
nation, who would like nothing so well as a retaliatory blow
upon England, we see an able, active, wary, counsel-keeping,
but ever-planning sovereign ; and we see this sovereign organis
ing an army which, including his reserve, is more than six times
greater in amount than the whole of our regular forces in our
two islands, and at the same time labouring hard to create a
na-vy equal to, if not superior to ours. Give him a cause of
¦quarrel, which any foreign Power may at any time invent or
create, if so minded ; give him the command of the Channel, which
permanent or accidental naval superiority might afford him, and
then calculate if you can— for it would pass my reckoning power
to do so — ^the disastrous consequences to the British nation
which a landing of an army of from one to two hundred thou
sand men would bring -with it. Surely even a large yearly
expenditure for army and na-vy is an economical insurance
against such a catastrophe.
To the argument that, ample financial means being
necessary for national defence, we should devote our
principal attention during peace to the husbanding of
¦our resources, he used to reply, that if a war should
suddenly come, as it might have come, with Prance
about Tahiti, or with America about the ' Trent,' the
want of ships, troops, guns, and dockyard defences
would be iU made up for by the fact that some hundreds
of merchants and manufacturers had made large for
tunes; for that this 'would only be offering to the
butcher a well-fatted calf instead of a well-armed buU's
head.' When it was urged that our measures of prepa
ration made the Prench angry, he answered that it was
so only because these preparations rendered us secure
against the effects of Prench anger. ' The anger of a
Power no stronger than ourselves may be borne, with
regret no doubt, but without alarm. The anger of a
Power greatly and decidedly stronger must cause ap
prehension, and is likely to lead to humiliation or
disaster.' He was also very watchful at this time for the se
curity of our Canadian frontier, in presence of the strife

416 LIFE OF LOED PAIMEESTON.
in the United States, and insisted on an increase to our
regular force in Canada, in order, by so doing, to '¦ keep
the United States Government in check, to give spirit
and confidence to our own people in the provinces, and
to take the best chance for the continuance of peace.'
Towards the end of the session Mr. Cobden made a
vigorous attack upon Lord Palmerston and his conduct
of affairs. The Prime Minister was accused of playing
false to the professions of Eeform which had, it was
aUeged, been freely made, if not by himself at ^ny rate
by many of his followers, when Eadical support was
wanted to oust the Tories. He was charged with owing
his retention of power to the support of his political
adversaries, who had more confidence in him than in
their own leader. Mr. Cobden asserted that, what with
fortifications, ironclads, wars in China, and reinforce
ments sent in haste in every direction, whether to
Canada, during the 'Trent' affair, or elsewhere. Lord
Palmerston had cost the country one hundred millions,
which, he maintained, was too heavy a price even for
such a bargain. Lord Palmerston replied with quiet
confidence and imperturbable good humour. He left
the charge of lukewarmness about Eeform as one for
which the country, and not he, was responsible; but,
acknowledging the other points, he sarcastically thanked
Mr. Cobden most warmly for having drawn attention
to the successful efforts which the Government had
made for the preservation of the honour, the safety,
and the interests of the empire. The very acts which
Mr. Cobden urged as caUing for censure he claimed as
those which deserved the chief approbation of the
House, which, nothing loath, testified their accord in
this view. Both sides of the British House of Com
mons are always ready to support a Minister whose ex
travagance, even if it deserve that name, is in their
belief honestly intended for the maintenance of the
national interests, and not merely for the promotion of
the interests of a class or a party.
' To Duke of Newcastle : September 1, 1861.

TEEATMENT OF CHUECH PATEONAGE. 417
The Church patronage which Lord Palmerston ad
ministered during his two premierships was so large,
that the principle on which he declared himself to act,
and on which, indeed, he consistently did act, is worth
reading in his own words. I can certainly of my own
knowledge assert, that the one way in which a clergy
man could make it certain that he would not get pre
ferment was to commence his letter of application by a
statement of his political opinions, thus making them
a ground of claim. Lord Palmerston writes to Lord
Carlisle, then Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland : — '
I have never considered ecclesiastical appointments as
patronage to be given away for grace and favour, and for per
sonal or political objects. The choice to be made of persons to
fiU dignities in the Church must have a great infiuence on many
important matters ; and I have always endeavoured, in making
such appointments, to choose the best man I could find, without
any regard to the wishes of those who may have recommended
candidates for choice.
I conclude this chapter with a short but suggestive
note about Slavery and the Board of Admiralty : —
August 13, 1862.
¦ My dear Eussell, — No First Lord and no Board of Admi
ralty have ever felt any interest in the suppression of the slave
trade, or taken of their own free -wUl any steps towards its
accomphshment, and whatever they have done in compliance
with the -wishes of others they have done grudgingly and
imperfectly. If there was a particularly old slow-going tub in
the navy, she was sure to be sent to the coast of Africa to try
to cateh the fast-sailing American clippers ; and if there was
an ofiicer notoriously addicted to drinking, he was sent to a
station where rum is a deadly poison.
Things go on better now ; but still there is at the Admiralty
an in-vincible aversion to the measures necessary for putting
down the slave trade. These prejudices are so strong with the
naval officers of the Board, that the First Lord can hardly ha
expected not to be swayed by them.
' Walmer Castle : August 17, 1862.
VOL. II. E E

418 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Por nothing wiU Lord Palmerston be more honour
ably remembered than for his long and successful efforts
for the suppression of the slave trade and the dis
couragement of slavery. Prom the moment that he was
called to the Poreign Office in 1830, he entered warmly
into the subject, and with his whole heart laboured for
their extinction. He sought to engage all maritime
states in one great network of treaties for the combined
annihilation of this nefarious traffic in human beings,
and to a large extent he succeeded. Some of the Spanish
and other diplomatists used to be quite surprised at
what they thought his craze, and were fain to humour
him on, what they considered, so insignificant a matter.
When action succeeded to negotiation — as, for instance,
in the decisive blow dealt in 1840 at the Portuguese
slave-dealers by the destruction of their barracoons on
the West Coast of Africa — he never allowed any con
sideration for the susceptibilities or anger of foreign
Governments to induce him to halt in his course. On
the contrary, when the country, sick Avith deferred hopes
and aghast at the expense of the necessary squadrons,
seemed at one moment disposed to flinch, his earnest
language, conveying lofty aspirations, maintained its
spirit and strengthened it for renewed efforts.

419

CHAPTEE XVII.
RUSSIA AND POLAND — VISIT TO SCOTLAND — PEOPOSBD CONGRESS —
DBNMAEK AND SLESWIG-HOLSTEIN — LONDON CONFBKBNCB —
DANISH DEBATE — VISIT TO NOETHAMPTONSHIEE — CRIMINAL
LUNACY — CUBAN SLAVERY — lEISH CATHOLICS — CONVOCATION —
LAST ILLNESS AND DEATH.
As Premier, Lord Palmerston kept a watchful eye over
the proceedings of all the departments of his Govern
ment, and was an unwearied attendant on the sittings
of the House of Commons, ready at any moment to
smooth a difficulty or avert a storm. But he was very
chary of speech ; and when there was nothing particu
lar to say he did not attempt to say it. The session
of 1863 was entirely deficient of any subject of debate,
domestic or foreign, which could call for any lengthened
interposition on his part, with the exception of the
question of Poland ; and while this was being discussed
he was kept away by an attack of his old enemy the
gout. The immediate cause of the Polish outbreak was a
seizure by the Eussian Government of all the young
men in the cities whom they had reason to believe were
disaffected, and their enrolment in the ranks of the
army under the name of a conscription, or ' partial re
cruiting.' In fact, to use the words of our ambassador
at Petersburg, it was ' a simple plan, by a clean sweep
of the revolutionary youth of Poland, to kidnap the op
position and to carry it off to Siberia or the Caucasus.'
No wonder that this produced resistance. Those who
escaped took to the woods and organized themselves in
armed bands. E E 2

420 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Lord Palmerston writes to ' condole ' with the Eus
sian ambassador : — 4 fgvrier 1863.
Mon cher Brunnow, — Je regrette beaucoup les insurrec
tions qui ont 6clat6 en Pologne et en plusieurs des provinces de
la Eussie, parce que ces mouvements produfront de grands mal-
heurs dans le pays, et parce que beaucoup d'hommes qui de-
-vraient se rendre utiles k leur patrie payeront de leur sang, ou
par I'exil, la revolte dont ils ont et6 coupables.
Mais, quant au Gouvernement russe, je considere ces insur
rections comme une juste punition du Ciel, pour les menses,
dont ce Gouvernement a 6te coupable, pour preparer pour le
printemps des revoltes et des insurrections dans Moldo-WaUa-
chie, en Servie et en Bosnie, contre le Sultan.
 Non lex est justior uUa,
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua.
II est vrai que ces insurrections, ou 6clat6es, ou pr6par6es,
ne menacent de mort ni I'Empire russe ni I'Empire ottoman ;
la Eussie saura mettre ordre dans les provinces et la Porte
saura apprendre k Couza, au Prince de Servie et aux Bosniacs,
qu'il est mieiix de rester fidMe k son Souverain que d'6couter les
conseils subversifs d'un voisin ambitieux.
Mais, pour le moment, la Eussie souffre dans son int^rieur le
mal qu'eUe a I'intention d'infiiger k un voisin moffensif. Vous
concevez bien que je parle maintenant des cent mUle et plus de
fusils que le Gouvernement russe a envoy^s en Servie et en
Bosnie par des chemins d6tourn6s, et avec toutes les precautions
pour cacher, autant que possible, ce que I'on faisait, etjefais
allusion aussi k cette nu^e d'agents provocateurs qui, venant de
la Eussie, abondent et travaiUent dans les pro-vinces Euro-
p6ennes de la Turquie. Si le Prince Gortschakoff 6tait ami
autant k moi comme vous I'^tes, je me serais adress6 k lui au
lieu de vous 6crire, mais j'aimerais beaucoup qu'il sut I'impres-
sion que sa politique a faite sur nous. MUle amities,
Palmerston.
General disgust had been excited throughout Europe
by the Prussian Government having entered into a con
vention with Eussia whereby the troops of either -were
authorised to cross the frontier, and pursue the Polish
insurgents into the territory of the other. The following
extract from a letter to the King of the Belgians shows

DECLINES JOINT-NOTE WITH FEANCE. 421
that, however much Lord Palmerston disapproved of
this active assistance being given by Prussia to one of
the two contending parties, he was not going in conse
quence to allow England to become the cat's-paw of an
ambitious neighbour : — ^
Your Majesty wiU have learnt that we declined to faU into
the trap which the Emperor of the French laid for us by his
¦scheme for a -violent identical note to be presented to the
Government of Prussia.
It was evidently intended that the demands of such a note
bemg refused, or evaded, a pretence would thereby have been
afforded to Prance for an occupation of the Prussian Ehenish
provinces, and the French Government bave sho-wn much ill-
humour at the faUure of that scheme. But the danger to
Prussia and to other States is not over. If the Pohsh Eevolu
tion goes on, and Prussia is led to take an active part in any
way against the Poles, the Emperor of the French is sure,
«ooner or later, and upon some pretext or other, to enter the
Ehenish provinces as a means of coercing Prussia to be neutral.
Your Majesty would render an essential service to Prussia and
to Europe if you could exert your influence with the King of
Prussia to abstain from any action of any kind whatever beyond
the frontiers of his own territory.
During the ensuing months the British and Eussian
Governments were engaged in a long correspondence.
Lord Eussell proposed a suspension of arms, and a con
ference of the eight Powers to settle the affairs of
Poland, on the basis of national representation, liberty
of conscience, establishment of a legal system of re
cruiting, and Polish administration of the country. The
communications which were exchanged were couched
in friendly, though very frank terms, but' they yielded
no visible fruit, Eussia declining to accede to the Eng
lish proposals. At one moment England, Prance, and
Austria contemplated combining together in order to
create a semi-detached state in Poland, but as Austria
soon drew back the project fell to the ground. The
feeling, however, which the reports of Eussian misdeeds
in Poland, whether exaggerated or not, had excited in
' To the King of the Belgians : March 13, 1863.

422 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the public mind, compeUed the organ of the British
Government to put on record such observations as he
considered himself entitled to make, England having
been a party to the Treaty of Vienna whereby Poland
was secured to Eussia.
In the spring of this year Lord Palmerston went to
Scotland to deliver an address on being instaUed as
Lord Eector of the University of Glasgow. He also
visited Edinburgh, where he received the freedom of
the city and an honorary degree at the University. He
was received everywhere with marked enthusiasm. As he
went do-wn the Clyde in a smaU steamer to Greenock,
both banks of the river were lined with thousands of
workmen, who had left thefr work to catch a glimpse
of the Premier on the paddlebox, and to cheer him as
he passed. The captain of the guard-ship, anxious to
do honour to the occasion, was hindered by the fact
that a Prime Minister was not recognised in the code of
naval salutes ; but he found an escape from his dilem
ma in the discovery that Lord Palmerston was not only
Pirst Lord of the Treasury, but also Lord Warden of the
Cinque Ports, for Which great officer a salute of nineteen
guns was prescribed — an apt instance of the minor
anomalies of the Constitution under which we live.
Before the end of the Glasgow visit an incident oc
curred which illustrates the fun and simplicity that
characterised Lord Palmerston to the end of his life.
A number of gentlemen had confederated themselves
together under the title of the ' Gaiter ' Club, with
power to add to their number. This club had no local
habitation, but only a name. Its objects, beyond a
mild pedestrianism, were left undefined, but embraced
all that could be comprised under the mysterious, yet
far-reaching head of ' gaiterdom.' This body was about
to entertain at a breakfast one of thefr number on his
return from China, namely, that distinguished officer
Admiral Sir James Hope, and they determined to profit
by the opportunity to invite Lord Palmerston to become
a 'Gaiter.' He entered with becoming zest into the

INSTALLED AS A ' GAITEE : ' AN AMUSING SCENE. 423
Scotch humour of the thing, and in acknowledging the
honour conferred upon him spoke without rising (every
Gaiter being bound to speak sitting), and with appro
priate brevity, 'that whether the gaiters which the
members wore were long or short, of which he was
ignorant, of this he was quite sure, that his memory of
that day would be as long as they could possibly desire.'
It had devolved upon Dr. Norman M'Leod, one of the
Queen's chaplains, and also chaplain to the club, to
propose that the new member should be received. Those
who remember his rich vein of humour, and the solemn
fun which he kept ready for appropriate occasions, can
picture for themselves the manner in which he spoke as
foUows : That he had been lately staying at Balmoral ;
that he had taken the opportunity of informing Her
Majesty that it was contemplated by the gentlemen he
now had the honour of addressing to make Lord Pal
merston a ' Gaiter ; ' and that it was only due to Her
Majesty that, before so grave a step was taken, she
should be asked for Her gracious permission. That
Her Majesty had, after much consideration, replied, that
although, no doubt, it was a dangerous thing for any
subject to be both Prime Minister and a ' Gaiter,' still,
considering Lord Palmerston's great services, and, above
aU, his age and experience, which would preserve him
from any abuse of the power conferred upon him, she
would, in his favour, waive her objections. The party
had broken up laughing, when it was discovered that a
' Times ' reporter had been present the whole time, and
it was feared that he might, perhaps, be a Scotchman
who had neither undergone operation by a surgeon, nor
mUder treatment by a ' Gaiter,' in order to admit the
joke. Dr. M'Leod had really just come from Balmoral,
and in panic terror lest all he had said might appear in
the next day's ' Times,' he rushed from the room, called
a cab, and hurried to the railway in time to catch the
reporter before his parcel left. No doubt the precaution
was unnecessary, but the witty chaplain's agony of mind
was none the less diverting.

424 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
At Edinburgh Lord Palmerston climbed to the top
of Arthur's Seat, and wrote to his brother-in-law that
he really felt very little more difficulty in so doing than
when he used to mount it daUy sixty years before. The
past was also recaUed to him by a visit which he paid
to an old woman named Peggie Porbes, who had been
^^'^ servant at Dugald Stewart's when he was studying
' there in 1801. She produced an old box of tools, which
she had preserved all these years because it had been
the property of ' young Maister Henry.'
I'he Prench Emperor now sent letters to the different
sovereigns of Europe, proposing the assembling of a
Congress, and suggesting Paris as the place of meet
ing. 'It is on the Treaty of Vienna,' he said, 'that now
reposes the political edifice of Europe, and yet it is
crumbling away on all sides.' The British Government
declined the invitation. Some of Lord Palmerston's
remarks upon it are contained in the following letter : — '
94 Piccadilly : November 15, 1863.
Sire, — The subject to which Your Majesty's letter relates is
one of very great importance and deserving of mature conside
ration. Our answer to the Emperor's proposal has been, in
substance, that we do not admit that the Treaties of Vienna
have ceased to be in force, inasmuch as, on the contrary, they
are still the basis of the existing arrangements of Europe;
that, with regard to the proposed Congress, before we can come
to any decision about it, we should hke to know what subjects
it is to discuss, and what power it is to possess to give effect to
its decisions.
/iMy own impression is that the Congress wiU never meet,
and that the Emperor has no expectation that it should meet.
The truth is that the assembling of a Congress is not a
measure apphcable to the present state of Europe.
In 1815 a Congress was a necessity. France had overrun
all Europe, had overthro-wn almost all the former territorial
arrangements, and had established a new order of things. Then
came the returning tide of the Alhed Armies overturning
everything which Prance had created, and establishing, for the
moment, mUitary occupation of the greater part of Europe. It
' To the King of the Belgians,

NAPOLEON'S PEOPOSED CONGEESS. 425
was absolutely necessary to determine to whom, and in what
portions, and on what conditions, the vast regions reconquered
from France should be thenceforward possessed. J The Powers
whose armies had made this reconquest were the natural and
indeed the only arbiters ; and they had, by their armies, the
meajis of carrying their decisions into effect.
(Nothing of the kind exists in the present state of Europe/)
There are no doubts as to who is the owner of any piece of
territory, and there are not even any boundary questions in
¦dispute. The functions of a Congress, if now to be assembled, might
be twofold, and would bear either on the past or on the future,
or on both. Drouyn says that the Congress might take up the
treaties of 1815, go through them article by article, strike out
whatever has been repealed or set aside, and re-enact the
remainder as the Treaty of 1863-64, the name of which would
be less disagreeable to Prance than that of the Treaty of 1815,
which brings to mind Waterloo and St. Helena. This may be
¦a, natural feeling for France ; but it/is no good reason why aU
the rest of Europe should meet round a table to please the
Prench nation'Hand those who hold their estates under a good
title, now nearly half a century old, might not be particularly
desirous of having it brought under discussion with all the alte
rations which good-natured neighbours might wish to suggest
in their boundaries.
CNo doubt there have been some not unimportant changes
made in the territorial arrangements of Europe established by
the Treaty of 1815 ; but some of these were made regularly by
treaty at the time, and the others, not so made, some of the
parties to the Congress might not hke to sanction by treaty
acknowledgment. Chief among the first class is the separation of Belgium
from Holland; but that was solemnly sanctioned by negotia
tions the length of which I cannot easily forget, and by a treaty
between the five Powers and Holland and the German Diet.
That transaction requires no confirmation. Chief among the
second class was the absorption of Cracow by Austria without
¦any treaty sanction; and to that transaction the British
Government, which protested against it at the time, would not
he greatly desfrous of giving retrospective sanction by treaty
now.^ Then come the cession of Lombardy to Italy, and of
Savoy and Nice to Prance. These were legally made by the
rightful owners of the ceded territory, and no confirmation can

426 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
be required. There was indeed, in .the case of Savoy, ari
omission to attach to the territory as conveyed to Prance the
condition of neutrahty as to Chablais and Faucigny, subject to
which the King of Sardinia held Savoy ; but it may be doubted
whether Prance would consent to undertake that condition;,
and its real value, either for Switzerland or Italy, might, after
aU, be trifling. Then comes the absorption into the kingdom
of Italy of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Emiha, Naples, and
Sicily. These were all -violations of the Treaty of Vienna,
done -without treaty sanction ; but they were the -wUl of the
people of those countries. Those transactions have been
-virtually sanctioned by aU tbe Powers who ha-ve acknowledged
the King of Italy ; and if Victor Emmanuel is wise, he would
be content with leaving' those matters as they are, the more
especiaUy because if a new European treaty were to describe
the kingdom of Italy as it now is, that treaty would be a -virtual
renunciation by the King of Italy to any claim to Venetia and
Eome. On the other hand, Austria and the Pope would hardly
be prepared to give their formal sanction to the acquisitions,
made by the Italian kingdom.
As to the past, therefore, the functions of the Congress
would either be unnecessary or barred by insurmountable
difficulties. But then as to the future ? Would the Congress have to
range over the -wide and almost endless extent of proposed and
possible changes, or would it have to confine itself to questions
now practically pending ? There are but two such questions :
the one relating to Poland, the other to the difference between
the German Confederation and Denmark about Holstein and
Lauenburg and about Sleswig. As to Poland, would Eussia be
more likely to yield in a Congress than she has shown herself
to be in a negotiation? I much doubt it. £And as to the
question between Germany and Denmark, a smaUer machinery
than a European Congress might surely be sufficient to solve
that question.]]]
j_But if the Congress were to enter upon the -wide field of
proposed and possible chMiges of territory, what squabbles and
animosities would ensue fj Eussia would ask to get back aU she
lost by the Treaty of Paris ; Italy would ask for Venetia and
Eome ; fPrance would plead geography for the frontier of the
Ehine y Austria would show how advantageous it would be to
Turkey to transfer to Austria Bosnia or Moldo- Wallachia ;.
Greece would have a word to say about Thessaly and Epirus ;

PALMEESTON'S OBJECTIONS. 427
Spain would wonder how England could think of retaining
Gibraltar ;[ Denmark would say that Sleswig is geographicaUy
part of Jutland, and that, as Jutland is an integral part of
Denmark, so ought Sleswig to be so too "^Sweden would claim
Finland ; and some of the greater German states would strongly
urge the expediency of mediatizing a score of the smaller
Princes. If the members of the Congress should be unanimous in
agreeing to any of these proposals, of course there would be no
d&S,culty in carrying a unanimous decision into effect ; but if a
majority were one way, and a minority, however small, the
other way, that minority mcluding the party by which a con
cession was to be made, is it intended that force should be used,
or is the Congress to remain powerless to execute its own
decrees ?
fin the face of aU these difficulties, my humble opinion is
that no Congress will meet ; and I shall be glad to think that
the Emperor wUl have mended his position at home by making
the proposal, while its failure will have saved Europe from
some danger and much embarrassment.^]
Lady Palmerston desires me to tender to your Majesty her
sincere thanks for your condescending message; and we both
are greatly delighted at the prospect which your Majesty's,
letter holds out to us of the possibUity of ha-ving, in the course
of the -winter, the honour of receiving your Majesty at Broad
lands. And a fortnight later he writes to Lord Eussell : — ^
The state of Europe in 1815 was wholly different from
what it is now. At that time the success of French arms had
swept away most of the territorial boundaries and separate-
sovereignties which existed before 1792. The tide of conquest
which at first ran from west to east, then returned back from east
to west, and swept away almost all that Prance had estabhshed.
Europe was a political waste, and required the action of a
body of inclosure commissioners to allot the lands, and to give
holding titles. This was done at Vienna in 1814 and 1815.
But nothing of the kind exists in 1863, and nobody wants an
improved title to any possession except those who ought not to
get it; as, for instance, Eussia to the kingdom of Poland,
Austria to Cracow, France to Savoy without neutrahty, and
the Pope to what he holds and as much as he could get back.
' ' December 2, 1863.

428 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
It is quite certain that the deliberations of a Congress would
-consist of demands and pretensions put forward by some and
resolutely resisted by others, and that, there being no supreme
authority m such an assembly to enforce the opinions or
¦decisions of the majority, the Congress would separate leaving
many of the members on worse terms with each other than
when they met.
I think it seems pretty clear that, among other schemes
which the Emperor had for the Congress, there was a proposal
that there should be given to the Pope a European guarantee
,for his unmolested possession of the territory now held for him
by the French troops, which then might have been withdrawn.
France and all the Catholic Powers would wiUingly have joined
in such an arrangement, and Eussia might have done so out of
complaisance to Prance. Italy would have been embarrassed,
but inight have been overruled. We should have been placed
in a disagreeable dilemma, having either to refuse and to take
¦openly a position hostile to the Pope and distasteful to our
¦Catholic fellow-subjects, or to give our formal sanction and
guarantee to the permanence of the temporal power of the Pope,
against which we have not hesitated to declare our opinion.
This, however, was probably only one of the traps laid by Na-
¦poleon for the siUy birds be was trying to lure into his decoy.
Several of the other great Powers also declining the
Congress, the project fell through.
An account of the intricate proceedings connected
with the Sleswig-Holstein question cannot come within
¦either the scope or the space of this book ; but the part
which Lord Palmerston's Government took in the matter
must be briefly narrated.
The real dispute between Denmark and Germany
¦dated from the year 1848, when an insurrectionary
p)arty in the former declared their grievances and
appealed to Germany for aid in establishing the union
•of Holstein and Sleswig with a constitutional exist
ence separate from the rest of the monarchy. Ger
many assisted the insurrection, and at the Peace of
Berlin in 1850, although nothing was stipulated, it
was understood that the Danish Monarchy was to be
reconstructed with a view to satisfying the wishes of

PEUSSLA AND SLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. 429"
the Sleswig-Holsteiners. Negotiations followed, which,,
as far as Sleswig was concerned, were of an interna
tional character, and not merely between Denmark
and the Germanic Diet. It was on the interpretation
and fulfilment of the engagements contracted by Den
mark as the result of these negotiations that the dis
pute with Germany turned, which, while at its height,
assumed a new and more complicated aspect by the
sudden death of the King of Denmark. In conformity
-with the Treaty of London, 1852, Prince Christian as
cended the Danish throne, including that of the Duchies,
as King Christian IX. ; but the Duke of Augustenburg,
although his father had renounced for himseK and his
family, insisted on being recognised as Duke of Sleswig-
Holstein. Some of the smaller German states, in spite
of the treaty to which many of them had acceded, were
disposed to go with him on the ground that the treaty
of 1852 was not binding unless the other engagements
aUeged to have been entered into by the Crown of Den
mark at an antecedent time and upon another subject
were also fulfilled. To state such a proposition was ta
refute it; and the British Government had common
sense and common justice on their side when they urged
that every consideration of honour and good faith de
manded the acknowledgment of King Christian as King
Duke of all the territories which were under the sway
of his predecessor, and that there would then be a,
responsible sovereign from whom might be claimed the
fulfilment of any and every engagement taken by the
late King and not made good. The German Diet, how
ever, decreed a federal execution in Holstein — that is to
say, an administration of the Government by commis
sioners — and, though this was nominally done only in
the interests of the Holsteiners, it was undisguised
intervention in behalf of the Duke of Augustenburg,
who made his appearance at Kiel, and was greeted as
the rightful Duke. The close of the year saw the
Danish and German troops confronting one another on
the opposite banks of the Eider.

430 . LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
Austria and Prussia were at first inclined firmly to~'
abide by the Treaty of London ; but the pressure of the
Diet acting upon their mutual jealousies, and the fear
of each lest it should jeopardise its position in Germany,
¦combined to drive them along the path of aggression.
The first to suffer was the Diet itself; for the matter
was taken out of their control, and a combined Austrian
and Prussian force advanced through Holstein into
Sleswig. On Pebruary 2 the Danes evacuated the
Dannewerke, on which so much reliance had been
placed, and fell back upon Diippel. MeanwhUe, as
might have been expected, there had sprung up in
England a strong feeling of indignation at the violence
¦offered to little Denmark by the two great military
powers. It was suggested that Prance and Great Britain
should offer their mediation on the basis of the integrity
¦ of theDanish monarchy andthe engagements of 1851-52 ;
and that, if such mediation were refused by Austria and
Prussia, England should despatch a squadron to Copen
hagen, and Prance a corps d'armee to the Ehenish
frontier of Prussia. The following letter shows what
Lord Palmerston said about this proposal : —
94 Piccadilly : February 13, 1864.
My dear Eussell, — I share fully your indignation. The
conduct of Austria and Prussia is discreditably bad, and one or
both of them -wiU suffer for it before these matters are settled.
I rather doubt, however, the expediency of taking at the present
moment the steps proposed. The French Government would
probably decline it, unless tempted by the suggestion that they
should place an armed force on the Ehenish frontier in the
event of a refusal by Austria and Prussia — which refusal we
ought to reckon upon as nearly certain.
The objections which might be urged against the measures
suggested as the consequences of the refusal of Austria and
Prussia may be stated to be : Pfrst, that we could not for many
weeks to come send a squadron to the Baltic ; and that such a
step would not have much effect upon the Germans unless it
were understood to be a first step towards something more;
and I doubt whether the Cabinet or the country are as yet
prepared for active interference. The truth is, that to enter

ON THE EESULTS OF INTEEFEEENCE. 43]
into a military confiict with all Germany on continental ground
would be a serious imdertakmg. If Sweden and Denmark were
actively co-operating with us, our 20,000 men might do a good
deal; but Austria and Prussia could brmg 200,000 or 300,000
into the field, and would be joined by the smaller German
States. Secondly, though it is very useful to remind the Austrians
and the Prussians privately of the danger they are running at
home— Austria in Italy, Hungary and Gahcia ; Prussia in her
Ehenish pro-vinces — ^yet it might not be ad-vLsable nor for our
own mterest to suggest to France an attack upon the Prussian
Ehenish territory. It would serve Prussia right if such an
attack were made ; and if Prussia remains in the wrong we
could not take part with her against France. But the conquest
¦of that territory by Prance would be an evil for us, and would
seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium. On the
whole, I should say that it would be best for us to wait awhile
before taking any strong step in these matters.
The English Government was, in fact, not only
hampered, but fettered by the refusal of Eussia and
Prance to join heartily with her. Eussia acted, it may
be supposed, from the same motives which have hitherto
always kept her from breaking with Prussia ; Prance
partly, no doubt, from pique at our refusal the previous
year to agree to her Congress. It might, of course,
have been very different could England have consented
to Prench conquest on the Ehine as the price to be paid
for Prench assistance.
Lord Palmerston, however, was anxious to do all
he could for Denmark within the bounds of what was
statesmanlike and possible. He wrote to the Pirst
Lord of the Admiralty : — '
I own I quite agree -with EusseU, that our squadron ought
to go to Copenhagen as soon as the season will permit, and that
it ought to have orders to prevent any mvasion of, or attack
upon Zealand and Copenhagen. It is not unhkely that Austria
and Prussia, reckoning upon our passive attitude, contemplate
the occupation of Copenhagen, and think to imitate what the
first Napoleon did at Vienna and Berhn, and mean to dictate
• To the Duke of Somerset : Pebruary 20, 1864.

432 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
at the Danish capital their own terms of peace. We should be
laughed at if we stood by and allowed this to be done.
The Prussians took Diippel in April, and soon after
a solitary gleam of sunshine for the Danes broke the
monotonous gloom of their reverses, and they gained ar
naval success against the Austrians off Heligoland. The
two following letters tell Lord Palmerston's intended
action in case of the Austrian Government proposing-
to reinforce their fleet in the Baltic : —
94 Piccadilly : May 1, 1864.
My dear EusseU, — I felt so little satisfied -with the decision
of the Cabinet on Saturday, that I determined to make a notch
off my own bat, and accordingly I wrote this morning to
Apponyi, asking him to come here and give me half an hour's
conversation. He came accordingly. I said I wished to have
some friendly and unreserved conversation with him, not as
between an English minister and the Austrian ambassador, but
as between Pahnerston and Apponyi ; that what I was gomg
to say related to serious matters ; but I begged that nothing I
might say should be looked upon as a threat, but only as a frank
explanation between friends on matters which might lead to
disagreements, and with regard to which, unless timely explana
tion were given as to possible consequences of certain things,
a reproach might afterwards be made that timely explanation
might have averted disagreeable results. I said that we have
from the beginning taken a deep interest in favour of Denmark
— not from family ties, which have little infiuence on Enghsh
policy, and sometimes act unfavourably — ^but, first, that we
have thought from the beginning that Denmark has been
harshly and unjustly treated; and, secondly, we deem the
integrity and independence of the State which commands the
entrance to the Baltic objects of interest to England. That we
abstained from taking the field in defence of Denmark for many
reasons — from the season of the year; from the smallness of
our army, and the great risk of failure in a struggle with all
Germany by land. That with regard to operations by sea, the
positions would be reversed : we are strong, Germany is weak ;
and the German ports in the Baltic, North Sea, and Adriatic
would be greatly at our command. Speakmg for myself per
sonally, and for nobody else, I must frankly teU him that, if an
Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and poris, and

THEEATENS NAVAL ACTION IN THE BALTIC. 433
go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations
against Denmark, I should look upon it as an affront and insult
to England. That I could not, and would not stand such a
thing ; and that, unless in such case a superior British squadron
were to follow, with such orders for acting as the case might
require, I would not continue to hold my present position ; and
such a case would probably lead to coUision — that is, war ; and
in my opinion Germany, and especially Austria, would be the
,sufferer in such a war. I should deeply regret such a result,
because it is the wish of England to be well with Austria ; but
I am confident that I should be borne out by public opinion. I
again begged that he would not consider this communication as
a threat, but simply as a friendly reminder of consequences
which might follow a possible course of action.
Apponyi, ha-ving listened with great attention to what I
said, rephed that the considerations which I had pointed out
were not new to his mind ; that they had been forcibly dwelt
wpon, among other persons; by the King of the Belgians.
That he was quite aware that, if the Austrian ships entered
the Baltic, an Enghsh squadron would .follow them ; that in all
probabihty one of two things would happen — either that the
Austrian squadron would be destroyed, or that it would be
compelled by orders from the Enghsh admiral to leave the
Ealtic. Thus they would run the risk of a catastrophe or a
humiliation, and they did not wish for either. That, therefore,
whatever may have been said by Eechberg in his note, we
might be sure that the Austrian squadron wiU not enter the
Baltic. This is satisfactory, as far as Apponyi may be con
sidered the organ of the Austrian Government; but I think
we ought to have somethmg more positive in writing than we
have got.
I shall state to the Cabinet to-morrow the substance of my
conversation with Apponyi.
At the same time he wrote to the Pirst Lord of the
Admiralty : — May 4, 1864.
My dear Somerset, — It seems to me that we ought to msist
that no Austrian ships of war shall at any time, or under any
chcumstances during the war, enter the Baltic. We have never
¦declared ourselves neutral in this war : we have declined, for
reasons of our own, to take a part in it ; but we have done our
best to help the Danes by diplomatic interference.
VOL. II. P F

434 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
The reasons which opposed mihtary interference on our
part do not apply to naval aid ; and, so far as f orbiddmg the
Austrians to enter the Baltic at any time during the war, we
are rendering valuable aid to the Danes, without any great
effort to ourselves.
I should be much disposed to aUow the Danes to have their
ronclad. I am satisfied that a manifestation of good--wiU on
our part towards the Danes must contribute much to make the
Germans more reasonable in negotiation. They have been
encouraged hitherto by a belief that nothing would induce us
to interfere ; and this behef has been much strengthened, un
fortunately, by letters and language received in England.
In the meantime the British Government were
making active exertions, by a conference of the Great
Powers, to put a stop to the further prosecution of the
war ; and after much trouble they persuaded the belli- ,
gerents to come into such a conference to be held in
London. It met on April 25, and, after proclaimings
an armistice, proceeded to business. But no agreement
could be arrived at as to the ftiture frontier between
Denmark and the Duchies. The victorious Germans
were exacting ; the desperate Danes were obstinate ;,
and after sitting for two months the conference broke
up without any result of their labours. ^ On June 24
an informal application was made by our Government
to the Prench Emperor, again seeking for his active
alliance to defend Denmark. Louis Napoleon unhesi
tatingly declined giving any such assistance. He was
not inclined to incur the cost and risk of a war with
Austria and Germany, without the prospect of compen
sation on the banks of the Rhine. He showed at the
same time the strongest desire that England should
undertake the task, promising any amount of ' moral '
support. It is clear that he had hopes that, should
such a war spread, and naval operations begin in the
Adriatic, it would turn to his advantage in his cherished
object of procuring the freedom of Venetia. He urged
upon the British Government that, England having no
frontiers to be concerned about, it was for her to stand
forward as the champion of the Danes. But with no

FINAL SUEEENDEE OF THE DUCHIES. 435
aUy save Sweden the Cabinet did not think this country
bound to enter the lists, when the independent existence
of the Danish monarchy was not at stake, but only its
rights and dominion over the provinces in dispute.
The peremptory refusal of Prance caused the abandon
ment of the plans which England had conceived, and
no renewed proposal for active assistance was made to
Eussia. Had Great Britain, in alliance with Prance
and Eussia, succeeded in arresting the proceedings of
the German Powers, there can be but little doubt that
she would have made radical reforms by Denmark in
her administration of the subject provinces a sine qua
non. H, however, she had single-handed defended
Denmark by arms she would have been looked upon as
the upholder of "Danish policy towards the Duchies in
its entirety — a policy which was at total variance with
the principles by which she had been hitherto guided ;
for though the accounts of Danish oppression might
have been exaggerated, there was no doubt that the
Duchies had good cause for complaint. Hostilities
were quickly renewed, and Denmark was compeUed to
sign a peace at Vienna, by which she finally surren
dered to Germany the Duchies of Sleswig, Holstein, and
Lauenburg. Parliament now intervened to call Ministers to ac
count for their conduct of these affairs. During the
whole of the session there had been frequent interpel
lations and fragmentary debates upon this Dano-German
question ; but in the beginning of July a simultaneous
attack was made in both Houses upon the policy of -the
Government. In the House of Lords the resolution
moved by Lord Malmesbury was carried by a majority
of nine, and in the House of Commons Mr. Disraeli
proposed a simUar resolution. He asked the House to
join with him in expressing the opinion that the course
pursued by Her Majesty's Government had 'lowered
the just influence of this country in the councils of
Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace.'
This was a distinct vote of censure, and was accepted
p p 2

436 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
as such. The debate, which lasted for four nights,
aroused much public interest, because the strength of
parties was pretty nearly equal, and on the result of the
vote depended the continuance or retirement of Lord
Palmerston's administration. Each afternoon, as Lord
Palmerston went down to the House, he was cheered by
the crowd assembled in Palace Tard. He spoke on the
last night. As the successful winding up of a great
party debate, involving the fate of a Ministry, his speech
on this occasion was his last triumph, and showed that
though he spoke at the end of a night of long and
weary sitting, his old vigour and cunning of fence had
not deserted him. He had, in truth, a difficult task.
There had been a conspicuous failure; of that much
there could be no doubt. AUies, coUeagues, and cir
cumstances had proved adverse ; yet the excuses for
failure could not publicly be laid on any of them. So,
with the exception of a dexterous aUusion to the words
of the resolution as ' a gratuitous libel upon the country
by a great party who hoped to rule it,' he did not detain
the House long oh the points immediately at issue, but,
dropping the Danish matter altogether, went straigh-t
into a history of the financial triumphs of his Govern
ment. What has this to do with the question ? asked
impatient Tories. But it had all to do with the party
question, for it decided the votes of doubting men, who,
caring little about Sleswig-Holstein, cared a great deal
about English finance. Anyhow it commanded success,
for the Government got a majority of eighteen, and thus
renewed their lease of power. Both inside the House
of Commons and outside in Westminster HaU the ex
citement and cheering about the result was immense.
To the King of the Belgians Lord Palmerston shortly
afterwards opens his mind : — 94 Piccadilly : August 28, 1864.
Sire, — I have many apologies to make to your Majesty for
not ha-ving sooner thanked you for your letter of the 15th June.
We were at that time in the midst of an engrossing session of
Parliament, and the unequal contest between Denmark and

LETTEE TO LEOPOLD ON THE SITUATION. 437
Germany was stUl undecided, though with httle hope that
right could prevail over might. The Danish Government,
both under the late and under the present King, undoubtedly
committed many mistakes, both of commission and omission,
and they showed throughout these affairs, from beginning to
end, that inaptitude to deal with great concerns which might,
perhaps, have been expected from a nation shut up in a remote
corner of Europe, and not mixed up or practised with the
general politics of the world. It was, however, an unworthy
abuse of power by Austria and Prussia to take advantage of
thefr superior enlightenment and strength to crush an antagonist
utterly incapable of successful resistence; and the events of
this Danish war do not form a page in German history which
any honourable or generous German hereafter will look back
upon -srithout a blush. I -wish that Prance and Eussia had
consented to join with us in giving a different direction to those
affiiirs ; and I am con-vinced that words from three such Powers
would have been sufficient -without a recourse to blows. One
consequence is clear and certain, namely, that if our good friend
and neighbour at Paris were to teke it into his head to deprive
Prussia of her Ehenish provinces, not a finger in England would
be stirred, nor a voice raised, nor a man nor a shilhng voted to
resist such retribution upon the Prussian monarch ; and when
France and Itely shaU be prepared to dehver Venetia from the
Austrian yoke, the joy -srath which the success of such an under
taking wiU be haUed throughout England will be doubled by
the recollection of Holstein, Lauenburg, Sleswig, and Jutland.
He went to the North after the session, visiting
Bradford, where he had a very cordial reception, and
afterwards proceeding to Hereford, to uncover the statue
erected in memory of Sir George Lewis. The enthu
siasm with which he was received drew the, foUowing
from Lord Eussell : — '
Let me congratulate you on the reception you have niet
everywhere since the prorogation. It is clear your popularity
is a plant of hardy growth and deep roots, as the real embar
rassments of the Danish question have not shaken it. I stiU
believe that with a less timid cabinet we inight have been able
to deter Austria from the Danish war, and shown that it was
in our power ' pacis imponere morem.' But the risk wassome-
> Sept. 8, 1864.

438 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
thing, and the course pursued justifiable, though not so justi
fiable, though not so splendid as one could have -wished.
In reply to this note of congratulation from the
Poreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston -writes as fol
lows : — '
Many thanks for what you say about my August peregrina
tions ; they were not sought for by me, but they were successful,
not simply as regards myseK, but as relates to the Government;
and I may safely affirm that our general conduct has been
approved by the country, and especiaUy the management of our
foreign affairs, not-withstandmg the run made against us on that
point in Parliament. You say that with less timidity around
us we might probably have kept Austria quiet in the Danish
affair. Perhaps we might ; but then we had no equal puU upon
Prussia, and she would have ralhed aU the smaUer German
Powers round her, and we should equaUy have failed in sa-ving
Denmark. As to Cabmets, if we had colleagues like those who sat in
Pitt's Cabinet, such as Westmoreland and others, or such men
as those who were with Peel, like Goulburne and Hardinge,
you and I might have our o-wn way on most things ; but when,
as is now the case, able men fill every department, such men
wiU have opinions, and hold to them ; but unfortunately they
are often too busy with their own department to foUow up
foreign questions so as to be fuUy masters of them, and thefr
conclusions are generaUy on the timid side of what might be
the best.Before going to Bradford he went with Lady Palmer
ston to visit her estates in Northamptonshfre, and to
assist her at Towcester to cut the first sod of a raUway
from Northampton to Stratford-on-Avon. Of course he
was weU received; and the county member,'' in his
speech at the banquet, very happily hit off the popular
sentiment about the Premier, Ulustrating as foEows
the way in which his personal influence buoyed up the
Ministry, and the exceptional position which he held
¦with aU parties in the state : —
The noble lord and bis Ministry seem to be always engaged
in the game of chuck-farthing, and it is invariably -with ' He^ds
' To Lord Eussell : September 11, 1864.
' Mr., now Sir Eainald, Knightley.

"WAEMLY EECEIVED IN THE PEOVINCES. 439
I win, taUs you lose.' (Cheers and laughter.) Whenever it
comes up ' head,' the noble Viscount very properly has all the
credit ; when it comes up ' tail,' the rest of the ministers get
the blame. I do not mean to say that the noble Viscount is
guilty of unfair play, but the people, it is e-vident, are deter
mined to give him all the haffpence, and the rest of the Ministry
aU the kicks. (Great laughter.)
His own speech on this occasion is an instance of
how geniaUy he could touch the veriest commonplace.
It was after dinner, and his topic was the advantages
of raUways. Instead of giving a laboured dissertation
on steam and ci-vUisation, he brought home to the
country squires, in the following words, what they
would gain by a new raifroad : —
In former times a gentleman asked his friend in London to
come do-wn to him in the coimtry, and the friend came -with
thmgs to last him a fortnight or three weeks, and he took, per
haps, a week on the journey. Now, if a friend meets another
in St. James's Street and says, ' I shaU have some good shooting
next week ; -will you come do-wn to me and spend a few days ? '
the friend says, ' Oh, by aU means ; I shall be charmed. What
is the nearest stetion to your house 1 ' ' Well,' the friend says,
' I am not very weU off at present -with regard to railway com
munication; the nearest stetion is sixteen miles from my house;
but it is a good road : you will get a nice fly, and you -will come
very weU.' Upon which the in-vited guest says, ' Did you say
it was Tuesday you asked me for ? ' ' Yes,' says the country
man; 'and I think you told me that you were free on that day.'
Upon which the other replies, 'I have a very bad memory.
Upon my word, I am very sorry,, but I have a particular
engagement on that day. Some other time I shall be happy
to come down to you.' Then he offers himself as a visitor to
some other friend, who has a stetion within one or two miles of
•his house. (Laughter.)
This autumn Lord Palmerston became eighty years
.old. Traits of physical vigour at such an advanced
period of life are always interesting and generaUy in
structive, as teaching us how best to preserve and enjoy
those bodUy faculties which we receive at our birth.
Lord Palmerston was endowed with an excellent con-

440 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
stitution, and was very temperate both in eating and
drinking ; but he maintained his freshness, both of mind
and body, to a great degree by the exercise of his wiU.
He never gave anything up on the score of age. At any
rate, he never owned to that as a reason. He used to go^
out partridge-shooting long after his eyesight was too
dim to take a correct aim, and persevered in his other
outdoor pursuits. Twice during this year, starting at
nine o'clock and not getting back tUl two, he rode over
from Broadlands to the training stables at Littleton, to
see his horses take a gaUop on Winchester racecourse.
He rode down in June to Harrow speeches, and timed
himself to trot the distance from Piccadilly to the head
master's door, nearly twelve miles, within the hour, and
accomplished it. On his eightieth birthday, in October,
he started at half-past eight from Broadlands, taking
his horses by train to Pareham, was met by Engineer
officers, and rode along the Portsdown and Hilsea lines
of forts, getting off his horse and inspecting some of
them, crossing over to Anglesey forts and Gosport, and
not reaching home tiU six in the evening — an instance
of such combined energy both of mind and body as
cannot in the nature of things be very common at
fourscore. The opening of the session of 1865 found Lord
Palmerston still maintaining his ground in the confi
dence of the nation. Party spirit was not extinct, but
it was certainly dormant, and there was a general ac
quiescence in the opinion that the veteran might safely
be trusted with the honour and interests of England,
and that he should be left undisturbed during the short
remainder of his career. The Parliament, too, was old»
Everybody thus was looking to the future rather than to
the present, and the session — the last which the minis
ter was destined to see — was, therefore, uneventful.
Among the minor topics which Lord Palmerston joined
in' discussing was that of the condition of Ireland. He
repeated on this occasion his favourite saying, that
' tenant's right is landlord's wrong ; ' but by this he

ON lEISH • TENANT-EIGHT ' DEMANDS. , 44 1
only meant the extreme demands of the Irish agrarian
party, who claimed for the tenants the right of deal
ing with the landlord's property, not only without but
against his sanction, coupled with the condition that
at some future period they might compel the landlord
to pay for alterations to the making of which he had.
objected when being made. Lord Palmerston, however,,
spoke with great warmth of feeling and affection for the
Irish people, lamenting the want of capital in Ireland,
the influx of which was prevented, as he maintained,
by the sense that there was not the same security for
property as elsewhere, and by the alarm and distrust
which had been engendered by political and religious-
feuds. Lunacy, when pleaded as an excuse for crime, has
been frequently handled as a subject for discussion.
Lord Palmerston had at any rate distinct notions as to-
how he should meet it, as is seen in the following ex
tract of a letter to the Home Secretary. The occasion
that elicited this letter was the reprieve of Victor Town-
ley, who had murdered Miss Goodwin because she had
broken off her engagement with him. Neither the-
presiding judge nor the Commissioners of Lunacy re
ported to the Home Office in terms sufficient to justify
an exercise of the prerogative of the Crown, but three
justices and two medical men obtaining access to the
condemned man, sent in a certificate to the effect that.
he was insane. This certificate had been prepared in
conformity with an Act of Parliament, which, when thus
put in force. Sir George Grey conceived he had no
alternative but to comply with. The convict was ac
cordingly respited. Lord Palmerston, after saying that
the statute could never have been intended to act in
this way, and that it ought to be altered, went on : — ^
For my part I never have had but one opinion upon the
manner of deahng with murderers said to be insane. It seems
to me that if a man is sufficiently in possession of his reasoning-
' To Sir George Grey.

442 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
faculties to be able to take care of himself, and not to maim or
attempt to kill himself, he is, and ought to be, made to answer
for takmg away the hfe of another person.
The object of punishment is not vengeance on the criminal,
but deterring example to others. Madmen are proverbiaUy
cunning, and are perfectly able to calculate consequences,
and can be swayed hke other people by the fear of e-vil to
themselves resulting from violence committed upon others. The
doctrine set up in the Townley case seems to me most dangerous
to the general interests of society. Here is a man who, after
much deliberation, commits a barbarous murder, ha-ving gone
about and mixed in society -without being reputed insane, and
he is rescued from the hands of justice, and from the sentence
of the law, because four gentlemen choose to say that he has
imperfect notions of the distinction between right and wrong,
and because he chose to maintain that he had a right to put his
-victim to death. Why what murderer would not, after con
demnation, and in order to save his own life, make a similar
declaration ? And what an encouragement it Is to murder to
let it be kno-wn that by such means a man may escape the
penalty of the law. Again, the doctrine of these benevolence
mongers is that the more atrocious the deed, the more should
be the impunity to the doer ; because, the greater the enormity
of the crime, the more certein it must be that the criminal was
-out of his mind, for no man in his right senses would be guilty
of such a crime.
What is caUed in such cases mercy to the guilty is, in fact,
cruelty to the nation at large, by taking away some of the
restraints which the laws impose on the bad and -violent passions
of mankind. The true test, as it appears to me, is not whether
the culprit, after condemnation, chooses to say that he does not
admit the difference between right and -wrong, but whether, at
the time of committmg the crime, he knew that by the law
punishment would foUow.
The sympathy which the Government had shown
for Italian unity — the realisation of which was most
hateful to the Papacy — had deprived it to a great ex
tent of the Liberal Irish vote. Lord Palmerston speaks
-of this in the following letter : — '
> To Mr. Chichester Fortesoue,

TEEATMENT OF CATHOLIC PEETENSIONS. 443
September 10, 1864.
I should of com-se be very glad to have the support of the
Cathohc body in Ireland ; but as their pohtical action is regu
lated by the orders they receive from time to time from Eome,
and as the Papal Government is pleased to deem us its enemy,
because we are of opinion that Italian unity would be a good
thing, nothing that we could do with propriety in Ireland would
have the shghtest influence upon the Irish Catholics. If they
were in any degree capable of political gratitude they would
have supported the Whig Government; but two Monsignores
from Eome, and a ' Grandis Epistola ' from the Vatican, array
in hostUity to us men in the House of Commons who call them
selves Liberals, but who are ready to vote as Tories in obedience
to foreign injunctions. This, it is true, was foretold by the
•opponents of the Cathohc Emancipation, and we who supported
that measure derided the prBdiction. By though I am sorry to
have been in this respect a false prophet, I do not the less rejoice
at that act of sound policy and strict justicB.
And two days later he says to the same : —
We have invariably endeavoured to deal with equal impar-
tiahty between Protestant and Cathohc, but there is no shutting
our eyes to the fact that in Ireland, as elsewhere, the Cathohc
priesthood — and through them a portion of the laity — while
professing a desire for rehgious equality, aim at nothmg less
than political domination, and strive to transfer the source and
directing centre of that domination to a foreign authority.
Closely connected with this subject was that of
Catholic CoUeges — a matter which has already caused
much debate, and may cause much more. His view of
the matter is thus conveyed to the Lord- Lieutenant of
Ireland : — July 28, 1865.
My dear Wodehouse, — The new arrangement to be made
about the Cathohc CoUege wiU require much circumspection.
Whsit is required is that young men brought up m that esteb-
hshment should have the means of being examined for a Degree.
What the Irish Cathohcs want to accomplish under cover of
this reasonable purpose, is to substitute thefr Secterian CoUege
entfrely for the Queen's CoUeges, which are founded on the
principle of mixed education. This is an aim which we must
.not aUow them to accomplish. Thefr scheme of affihation,

444 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
plausibly recommended, tends to that end. My opinion, on the
contrary, is that the aggregate University body of the Queen's
CoUeges shoidd examme for Degrees all comers, wheresoever
educated. It is said that this would not give any security for
moral character, but that might be requfred from the instructors
of each candidate ; and it may safely be inferred that a young
man, who by study and apphcation has quahfied himself for a
Degree, must be possessed of sufficient self-control to prove him
to be a well-conducted young man. What the Cathohc priest
hood want is that this Catholic College should be the only place
of education for the young Irish Cathohcs, and that it should
be, like Maynooth, a place where young, men should be brought
up to be bigoted in religion, to feel for Protestents theological
hatred, and to feel political hatred for England. It is proposed
to put a number of lay Cathohcs mto the councU of the aggre
gate University. This would be quite right, but would be httle
check upon the priests and bishops. How could such men as
O'Hagan and MonseU be expected to stend up against CuUen
and others upon any importent religious matter 1 They might
make a good fight about Euchd and algebra, or chemistry or
astronomy, but upon all questions involving the real objects of
the Cathohc priesthood they would give way. The conclusion!
I come to is, that we ought to give the students of the Catholic
CoUege the means of obtaining Degrees, if they are sufficiently
instructed to pass examination ; but that we ought not to give
to the Catholic College a University condition of existence.
Therefore, if it should be necessary to give that College a charter
of incorporation, such charter should be limited to the usual
capacities of suing and being sued, and should not convey the
power of holdmg lands, either by purchase, grant, or bequest,
and of course should not give power to confer Degrees.
Clerical rule he regarded as very objectionable, in
whatever communion it might be found ; and he writes
to the Home Secretary about Convocation : —
May 24, 1866.
I see that Convocation have been very active, and are pro
posing to draw up a Eeform BUI for themselves. My opmion
is that, unless kept very tight and within the narrowest hounds,
Convocation would become a nuisance, and I should not be
disposed to consent to any alterations which would tend to give
them a more real and practical experience. Might not some
hint be given them to check thefr exuberant activity 1 I re-

STATE AND PUBLIC FEELING IN FEANCE. 445
member that Aberdeen, who was not addicted to unnecessary
vigour of action, sent them about their business one time when
they were begmning to be meddlesome.
His last two letters about foreign affairs will, I think,
be found interesting : — September 3, 1866.
My dear Cowley, — The Duke of Somerset writes me word
that the French were surprised, during the recent meeting at
Portsmouth, to find how real the cordiahty was with which
they were received. If this should happen to be mentioned or
observed upon to you by any of the French ministers, it might
not be amiss that you should explain to them that we English
men see two distinct entities in France, the nation and the
Government. Towards the French nation we aU feel that
¦cordial friendship which was expressed by words and deeds
during the late meetings ; aU old sentiments of rivalship and
antegonism as between Englishmen and Frenchmen are, on our
part, extinguished. But with regard to the French Govern
ment, we see, from time to time, measures taken and schemes
put forward which, whether framed or not in hostility to Eng
land, are, in our opinion, calculated to be injurious to our
national interests. Such schemes, therefore, we do our best to
oppose and to defeat ; not, as some French agents endeavour to
make out, from hatred to France and to everythmg French, but
solely from that watchful care of the interests of our coimtry
which it is the duty of every Government to exert. The result
is that, on the one hand, the French nation ought not to see in
our occasional opposition to the schemes of their Government
anythmg inconsistent -with the friendly feelings manifested m
the late meetings of the two na-sdes ; and, on the other hand, the
French Government should not infer, from the friendliness of
our reception of thefr fieet, that we shaU be more likely to give
way upon any matter in which the interests of England are
•concerned. ' a * v iq lacK
September 13, 1865.
My dear EusseU, — It was dishonest and unjust to deprive
Denmark of Sles-wig and Holstem. It is another question how
those two Duchies, when separated from Denmark, can be dis
posed of best for the mterests of Europe. I should say that,
with that view, it is better that they should go to increase the
power of Prussia than that they should form another httle state
to be added to the cluster of smaU bodies politic which encum-

446 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
ber Germany, and render it of less force than it ought to be in
the general balance of power in the world. Prussia is too weak
as she now is ever to be honest or mdependent in her action ;
and, with a view to the future, it is desirable that Germany, in
the aggregate, should be strong, in order to control those two
ambitious and aggressive powers, France and Eussia, that press-
upon her west and east. As to Prance, we know how restless
and aggressive she is, and how ready to break loose for Belgium,
for the Ehine, for anything she would be likely to get without
too great an exertion. As to Eussia, she will, in due time,
become a power ahnost as great as the old Eoman Empfre.
She can become mistress of aU Asia, except British India,
whenever she chooses to teke it ; and when enhghtened' ar
rangements shall have made her revenue proportioned to her
territory, and railways shaU have abridged distances, her com
mand of men will become enormous, her pecuniary means
gigantic, and her power of transporting armies over great
distances most formidable. Germany ought to be strong in
order to resist Eussian aggression, and a strong Prussia is
essential to German strength. Therefore, though I heartUy
condemn the whole of the proceedmgs of Austria and Prussia
about the Duchies, I o-wn that I should rather see them incor
porated with Prussia than converted into an additional asteroid
in the system of Europe;
As the foregoing pages do not profess to give a
' history of the times,' but only those events and inci
dents in which Lord Palmerston individuaUy took a
marked share, a very rapid retrospect of a more general
character over the period dealt with in this volume may
not be out of place.
The years of his last administration of the Poreign
Office have this peculiar feature about them, that they
form the last period of active intervention by England
in the affairs of other countries. We appear to be re
moved from that epoch by a vast interval. It seems
difficult for us now to imagine the despatch of a British
legion to assist a sovereign against a portion of his
subjects, to realise a Quadruple Alliance in which Eng
land should join to secure the succession to a continental
throne, or even to believe in the advance of a British
fleet to protect a weak neighbour from wrong. In the

EEVIEW OF HIS LATEE CAEEEE. 447
first place, such a foreign policy requires a man like
Lord Palmerston to carry it out successfully, and such
men are rare. His was not a flash policy, sacrificing
essentials to appearance, constructed merely to suit
party purposes, and casting aside while stiU incomplete
enterprises and undertakings, as soon as they had
served thefr turn. On the contrary, he worked quietly
but perseveringly, keeping always in view ' British
interests,' but not ostentatiously thrusting them into
the foreground on every occasion, and thus defeating
his object. So much was this the case, that during his
early career he incurred temporary unpopularity for
acts which, if they had been puffed and heralded, or, to
borrow a word from the Stock Exchange, properly
'floated,' in the more modern fashion, would have
secured immediate and general applause.
Another element of his success lay in such cfrcum
stances of comparative freedom to act without check
or interference as can hardly be the lot of any minister,,
however able, now-a-days, when foreign matters are
made as famUiar to the peasant, if he can only read, as
aforetime to the prince. The doctrine of 'non-inter
vention ' and the penny press have rapidly' and simul
taneously grown into favour with the British public ;
and the activity which characterised the Poreign Office
under the Palmerstonian regime is a thing of the past.
Yet the fruits which Lord Palmerston was able to
show as the results of his energy and determination
were well worth some risk and trouble in the cultiva
tion. Peace between nations was preserved right
through an era of revolutions ; constitutional govern
ment was planted in a great part of Europe; and,
meanwhile, England was known, respected, and dreaded
wherever the name of Palmerston had penetrated ; and
that was — everywhere.
Of course the enemies of such a policy became
countless. Disturbers of the peace must dislike the
constable ; neither despots nor their friends relish con
stitutions ; bullies, whether high or low, hate those who

448 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
keep them in order; and the selfish or apathetic at
home grow weary of being constantly caUed upon for
•exertions on behalf of objects which, however just, do
not affect their immediate interests. These combined
antipathies, foiled in 1850, made a renewed attack the
following year, and, as they hoped and believed, suc-
¦ceeded in crushing Lord Palmerston. Had he been a
mere partisan, relying for his position solely on his
•connection with a great party, the blow might perhaps
have proved as fatal as it was intended to be ; but his
strength lay, as he weU knew, in the country itself,
which saw in him a statesman, not indeed -without
blemish, but who maintained the honour of England,
extricated her from innumerable difficulties without
drawing the sword, and extended abroad those prin
ciples of civil and political liberty which are dear to
Englishmen. During the greater part of Lord Palmerston's next
term of office questions relating to Turkey and the
Crimean war fiUed up the foreground of politics. We
have seen that, from the first, he foresaw that Eussia
was so bent on an aggressive movement, that ordinary
diplomatic remonstrances would not suffice to check
her, and that nothing would stop her in time except a
con-viction that she would have to face an active Anglo-
Prench alliance. The success with which, when called
to the head of affairs, he finished the war and settled
the terms of peace greatly consolidated his power.
The short interval which separated his first from his
•second Premiership sufficed to enable him to renew and
cement his political association with those whom diplo
matic and parliamentary disasters consequent on the
war had temporarily removed from his side ; and he
was thus, in 1859, in a position to form a very strong
administration. The relations between England and Prance were at
this moment somewhat strained. Lord Derby's cabinet
having shown but scant sympathy towards the French
Hmperor's action for the liberation of Italy. Lord

EEVIEW OF HIS LATEE CAEEEE. 449
Palmerston's Government not only quickly established
a good feeling with Prance, but, by its influence, greatly
aided the Italian people to become a nation ; and, in
•SO doing, they were undoubtedly acting in harmony
with the general feeling of the English people.
Although Louis Napoleon ha.d taken the Prench
army to fight for Italy, he was in no way desirous of
,seeing Italian unity such as it exists to-day. He wished
for a Northern and Southern Italy, with a Papal sove
reignty between them ; and this was the secret of his
persistent retention of Prench troops at Eome. He
kept a large force there, in order to hold for the Pope
what remained to him, and in the hope also of being
able to set up some nominee of his own as King of
Naples if Ferdinand became impossible. Italy would
thus have been divided into three portions, each too
weak to resist his influence. But the march of events
was too strong for him ; and although the frank and
urgent representations which Lord Palmerston used to
make against the continued occupation of Eome failed
of effect, his Government was of signal service to the
Italian cause, both when there was a question of re
storing the Grand Dukes after the Peace of VUlafranca,
¦and later on when Garibaldi was helping to crown the
¦edifice. So sensible were the Italians of this that, after
the annexation of Naples, addresses of thanks poured
in to Lord Palmerston from all parts of Italy.
One of the earliest and most beneficial results of the
accession to power of a Liberal Ministry was the con
clusion of a commercial treaty with France, which was
ratified at home in spite of strong resistance from the
Conservative Opposition. The treaty was signed in
January 1860 ; and to Mr. Cobden, its distinguished
negotiator, Lord Palmerston offered, as an acknowledg
ment, in the name of the Queen, the choice of a
baronetcy or a seat at the Privy CouncU; but Mr.
Cobden declined to receive any titular distinction.
The general financial achievements of Lord Palmer
ston's Government, with Mr. Gladstone as Chancellor
VOL. II. Gr G

450 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
of the Exchequer, cannot be forgotten, embracing as;
they did extensive relief to trade, industry, and labour-
by the remission of taxation, simplification of the tariff,
and reduction of debt. Notwithstanding the cotton
famine and the war in America, the nation, during this
period, made great progress in wealth and prosperity.
In the early part of 1860, the Imperial Court of
China having shown its determination stUl to evade its
treaty engagements, a second Chinese war was under
taken in conjunction with the French. Lord Elgin was
sent out from England to co-operate with Baron Gros ;,
and, finally, the success of the aUied forces enabled
us at last to obtain regular diplomatic intercourse with
the Court of Pekin.
Overtures were soon after made to this country by
France, the object of which was to persuade us to assist
them in obtaining some compensation, if possible, for the
losses sustained by the holders of Mexican bonds, and to
restore peace to Mexico, long distracted by chronic revo
lution. The Palmerston Ministry, though consenting
to aid in operations at Vera Cruz, where the proceeds
of the customs were seized, wisely declined to join in
any further intervention, even though our allies kindly
intimated that they would be satisfied if our contingent
consisted merely of black troops. The French under
took the hopeless task of establishing order in the
country and placing an Austrian Emperor on the throne;
but the Spaniards and men of Spanish descent loved
disorder, and hated both French and Austrians, while
the remainder were weak and helpless, and of the
Mexican leaders each was for himself and jealous of
the others. The only class, therefore, whom the French
could find to back them was the Priest party. They
were thus obliged either to join in suppressing religious
liberty and restoring intolerance and persecution, or to
quarrel with their own supporters. Inevitable was the
failure which ensued. The discomfiture of the French
and the sad fate of the Archduke Maximilian, who had
accepted the imperial crown of Mexico, showed how

EE.VIEW OF HIS LATEE CAEEEE. 451
fuUy justified the British Government were in their
refusal to share in Napoleon's scheme, which, hatched
at Eome, was but a bad imitation of his uncle's earlier
attempt, to force on the Spaniards of old Spain a king of
his and not of their choice.
Greece, through the bad government of King Otho,
became the scene of revolution, and was for some time
in a state of anarchy. At last our Government and
that of Prance determined on a friendly intervention,
and had in 1862 to find a new king for the Greeks, who
wanted an English prince. Any member of the English,
French, or Eussian royal famUies was, however, excluded
by a mutual agreement to that effect ; and finally, after
much fruitless search for a fit man. Prince George of
Denmark accepted the crown, and the Ionian Islands
were handed over by England to the reconstituted
kingdom. This cession evoked a considerable amount
of opposition at the time ; but as these Islands formed
no part of the dominions of the British Crown, and as
the protectorate which we exercised had long been to
us a source of annoyance, this gift to the Greeks was
a politic measure. It was hoped that not only would
their kingdom thus be strengthened, but that such a
proof of our goodwUl would tend to rivet their attach
ment to England. But this was not all : Lord Pal
merston's Government at the same time strenuously
urged Turkey to give Thessaly and Epirus over to the
Greeks, but, as the map of Europe still indicates, with
out success.
We have seen how the Polish rising began, and also
the attack on Denmark by Germany. In both these
cases Lord Palmerston could easily have stirred up a
cry for war. English feeling was much excited on either
question ; but it was felt that neither the English in
terests involved, nor our avaUable means of offence, were
sufficient to justify an appeal to the national sentiment.
In July 1865, Parliament having nearly reached its
fuU term of existence, had been dissolved. There was
a contest at Tiverton, and Lord Palmerston went down
gg2

452 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON,
there for the last time, and was re-elected, although his
Liberal colleague lost his seat. The general result of
the elections was very favourable to the Ministry.
During the latter part of the preceding session Lord
Palmerston had suffered continuously from gout and
disturbed sleep. He never abandoned his duties as
leader of the House ; but without doubt they were, under
the circumstances, a matter of much physical difficulty
for him, and greatly aggravated his disorder. Imme
diately after the Tiverton election he retired to Brocket,
in Hertfordshire — the place Lady Palmerston had in
herited from her brother. Lord Melbourne — selecting
this in preference to Broadlands, as being more within
reach of medical advice. The gout had fiown to the
bladder, owing to his having ridden on horseback before
he was sufficiently recovered; and, although all his
bodily organs were sound, and there was no reason why,
with proper care, he should not have lived for several
years longer, those around him could not fail to feel
anxiety about his evident state of weakness, not only
for the moment, but at the prospect of his again meet
ing Parliament as Prime Minister. That he himself
felt the same anxiety for the future was clear ; and one
morning, about a fortnight before he died, I witnessed
an incident which was both evidence of this and also
very characteristic of the man. There were some high
railings immediately opposite the front door, and Lord
Palmerston, coming out of the house without his hat,
went straight up to them, after ca.sting a look all
round to see that no one was looking. He then climbed
deliberately over the top rail down to the ground on
the other side, turned round, climbed back again, and
then went indoors. It was clear that he had come out
to test his strength, and to find out for himself in a
practical way how far he was gaining or losing ground.
Not that he had any excessive dread of death, for, as
he put it one day, in homely fashion, to his doctor,
when pressing for a frank opinion as to his state, ' When
a: man's time is up there is no use in repining.' The

HIS LAST ILLNESS AND DEATH. 453
most touching and characteristic feature of his bearing
at this time was his solicitude to avoid adding to Lady
Palmerston's anxiety, and the cheerfulness which he
assumed in her presence. Indeed, consideration for
others was, as in life so in death, one of his finest
qualities. I remember that, only a few days before his
end, when, so far as the aspect of his face could be
token illness, he appeared as ill as a man could be when
about and at work. Lady Palmerston, at breakfast, al
luded to the cattle plague, which was then making great
havoc in England. He at once remarked that all the
symptoms of the disorder were described by Virgil, and
repeated to me some eight lines out of the Georgics
descriptive of the disease. He then told us a story of a
scrape he got into at Harrow, for throwing stones; and
the excess of laughter, which he was unable to restrain,
with which he recalled the incident, was the only token
that could have betrayed to Lady Palmerston how weak
he was. A chill caught while out driving brought on inflam
mation ofthe kidneys, and on October 18, 1865, within
two days of completing his eighty-first year, he closed
his earthly career. The half-opened cabinet-box on his
table, and the unfinished letter on his desk, testified
that he was at his post to the last.
I here quote a letter written very shortly before his
death, as it shows him, instead of being engrossed in
his own state of health, solicitous and active about the
health of a subordinate. On Sir Arthur Helps, as Clerk
of the Council, had come a great influx of business,
owing to the outbreak of rinderpest, and Lord Palmer
ston had already volunteered to help him by undertaking
some of the work : — Brocket : October 3, 1865.
My dear Gladstone, — I have this morning received the en
closed from an eminent physician of Southampton. The report
he makes of the health of Helps and of the state of the Council
Office Establishment seems to me to require immediate and
effective action. I have, therefore, written to Helps positively
to forbid his going to Balmoral ; and, as it seems that his second

454 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
in command, Harrison, is also knocked do-wn by excessive work,
and as the limited esteblishment of the Council Office is afready
too small and weak for the daUy work pouring in upon it by
reason of these cattle, sheep, and pig diseases, together with a
threatening of extension to horses, I have -written to Waddington
to request him to send some Home Office clerk to Balmoral to
officiate at the Council.
I have also told Helps that, as head of the Government, I
authorise him to take, without any delay, such steps as may be
necessary to procure additional assistance for his office which
this great influx of daUy business continues to press upon it. I
have told him that I -will -write to you to ask you to give the
necessary directions for an official sanction to the arrangement ;
but I have said that he ought not to delay taking the necessary
steps for obteiniag relief by adchtional assistence.
That, in spite of the depressing influence of his
illness, he was also fully alive to any new emergencies
which might arise, is shown by the next letter, of the
same date, to the Home Secretary, about the Fenian
movement in Ireland : — Brocket : October 3, 1865.
I am clearly for sending to Ireland a regiment of cavafry
to take the place of the one which it seems was lately brought
away from Ireland, and whether Eose ' is for such a reinforce
ment or against it. If the question was reversed, and we were
considering whether a regiment could be spared from Ireland,
we could not properly decide to diminish the Irish force without
the full assent of the general commanding ; but the question
being whether we could add to the existmg force, though it is
highly satisfactory to find that Sir Hugh Eose does not con
sider any addition necessary, we ought nevertheless to send it.
Sir Hugh Eose has been accustomed to walk over everything
and everybody opposed to him ; but in this case final success is
not the only thing to be pro-vided for. If there is any out
break it will begin by partial risings in scattered places, and in
smaU numbers, but yet numbers sufficient, if there should be
no protecting force, to murder, burn, and lay waste particular
-villages and landlord residences. A small regular force, capable
of rapid movement, would do what would be necessary in such
cases, and oavahy would be well fitted for the purpose. The
' Commander-in-Chief in Ireland.

ENEEGY OF HIS FEW LAST ACTS. 455
Fenians, moreover, may have arms for infantry, and may, by
possibihty, have guns, though that is unlikely, but cavalry they
cannot have ; and a Fenian put suddenly on horseback, even if
they could so fit out some of thefr men, would not be a cavafry
soldier. Then, upon the general principle, we should be in
spiring confidence in the loyal, and be gi-wng a useful warning
to the Fenians by showing that we could, if needed, add to the
regular force now in Ireland.
The same week he is writing to the Secretary of
¦State for War to inquire into the provision of arms and
ammunition in Canada, and to suggest heavier arma
ments for the works around Quebec. Three years pre
viously he had urged successfully that these fortifications
¦should be restored and enlarged, so as to provide some
place of strength for our small body of regular troops to
fall back upon, should a sudden invasion take place from
the United States. This did not then appear an unlikely
event. It was very widely anticipated, at the time, that
the civil war would end in the separation of South from
North, and that the North would want compensation and
some -triumph over somebody to wipe away the stain of
failure. The invasion of Canada, if it could be followed
by the conquest of the province, would have satisfied
both requirements, and, had we been unprepared, the
temptation might have been overpowering. Matters,
however, took a different turn, and the defeat of the
Southerners not improbably saved the Canadians from
attack. But during the summer of 1865 alarm had
been renewed by the threatening aspect of the Federal
¦Government, as manifested by a notice to the British
Government of the abrogation of the Treaty of 1817,
and by the establishment of a system of passports
between Canada and the United States. The Federals
were flushed with success; they had many men under
arms, and many grudges against the Canadians. Lord
Palmerston was fully alive to all this, and was anxious,
l)y assisting the colony in her fortifications, and by
maintaining an efficient flotilla on the lakes, to back
that spirit of self-reliance which alone, in the moment

456 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
of danger, could secure her independence, and to form
a centre round which some 200,000 loyal volunteer*
might rally if they wished to maintain their connection
with the British Crown.
Thus, indefatigable to the last in his care of the in
terests committed to his charge, did Lord Palmerston
complete his work, which had lasted through a longer-
term of public service than is easily paralleled in official
annals. In one life he summed up the political honours of
several generations, for he was a member of every
Government from 1807 to 1865, except those of Sir
Eobert Peel and Lord Derby. He sat in sixteen Par
liaments, and was elected to sit in the seventeenth.
During the later years of his life a detractor might
have been driven to say of him what the sarcastic-
Archbishop Sheldon said of his ancestor. Sir John
Temple, 'He has the curse of the Gospel, for all men
speak well of him.' He died full of years and honours,.
and free from fears or unmanly regrets. Over his grave
might well be written the words, ' Felix etiam opportu-
iiitate mortis,' for he suffered neither long nor painfully,
died at work, and quitted the scene with undimmed
reputation, before any failing on his part had made the
audience impatient. He bequeathed his Party to his;
successor, newly strengthened and consolidated by a
general election, fought and won under his name; while
to the Party itself he left as a noble legacy the example
of a long and honourable career, spent indeed within
their ranks, but devoted, even in the closing hours, to
the service of the whole country. The national voice-
decreed for his remains the tribute of a public funeral
and a grave in Westminster Abbey.
He had prepared for himself a last resting-place
in Eomsey Cemetery; but, as he had left no express.
directions as to his place of burial, it was considered
right to yield to the representations of those who urged
that the last testimony of respect which can be paid to-
frail mortality was in his case the concern of the nation.

WESTMINSTEE ABBEY. 457
His body was accordingly moved up to his town resi
dence in Piccadilly, and the funeral took place on the
27th of October. 'The whole distance to the Abbey was
lined by a dense crowd of interested and sympathetic
spectators, and the sacred building itself was filled
with all that was most distinguished and most repre
sentative. The Houses of Parliament, although their
session was over, were amply represented, and through
the dense crowd that surrounded the entrance into the
Abbey Church all his late colleagues of the Cabinet
marched as pallbearers. In the north transept, near
the grave of Pitt, were laid the mortal remains of
Palmerston.

458 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.

CHAPTEE XVIII.
CHAEACTBE— CHAEACTBEISTICS OF STYLE OF WRITING AND
SPEAKING.
Lord Palmerston's character has been so frequently
¦discussed — its many-sidedness offering to such various
dispositions some point or other of attraction — that it
may seem superfluous in me to attempt a repetition of
a similar kind. Tet, in closing this history, I cannot
resist the desire to put, however imperfectly, on record
the impressions made upon me by seven years of close
intercourse, both private and official. Biographers are
proverbially partial ; and it is, on the whole, to their
credit that they should be so. Eetrospect should rather
fasten on the good than the evil. But, on the other
hand, indiscriminate and extravagant praise is as un
real as it is unsatisfactory ; and whoever undertakes to
inform his fellow-countrymen is bound to bring his
judgment as well as his affection into play.
Lord Palmerston, then, was a great man chiefly in
the sense that he was so complete a man. His cha
racter deserves our attention more from its unusual
combination of good qualities than from the marked
presence of any one great quality or attribute. He had
a.bout him neither the glories nor the follies of a
genius; but he possessed, in rare harmony, charac
teristics which are generally in antagonism. He had
great pluck, combined with remarkable tact ; unfailing
good-temper, associated with firmness amounting almost
to obstinacy. He was a strict disciplinarian, and yet
ready above most men to make aUowance for the weak-

HIS CHAEACTEE: ITS COMPLETENESS. 459
ness and shortcomings of others. He loved hard work
¦in all its details, and yet took a keen delight in many
kinds of sport and amusement. He believed in England
as the best and greatest country in the world, while he
had not confined his observation to her affairs, but
knew and cared more about foreign nations than any
other public man. He had little or no vanity in his
composition^ and, as is seen in several of his letters to
his brother, he claimed but a modest value for his own
abilities ; yet no man had a better opinion of his own
judgment, or was more full of self-confidence. It was
amusing to notice the good-natured pity with which he
quite unconsciously regarded those who differed from
him in questions whereon he had made up his mind.
He never doubted for an instant in such a case that he
was right, and that they were wrong.
This gave him great tenacity of purpose, and helped
him through many difficulties, and even mistakes, which
would have swamped a weaker man. He seems almost
to be describing himself when, writing to Sir Stratford
Canning in December 1850 about the Turkish Minis
ters, he says : ' I believe weakness and irresolution are,
on the whole, the worst faults that statesmen can have.
A man of energy may make a wrong decision, but, like
a strong horse that carries you rashly into a quagmire,
he brings you by his sturdiness out on the other side.'
During the critical moment before the breaking out of
the Franco- Austrian war in 1859, M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
talking to Lord Clarendon, used the same simile : —
'I sigh,' he said, 'for one hour of Palmerston. No one
knows better than I do his faults. I have often suffered by
them, and so has England, and so has Europe. But his merits,
his sagacity, his courage, his trustworthiness, are invaluable
when you want
; " A daring pilot in extremity ; "
with whom one feels as ff one was mounted^ on a first-rate
hunter, who pulls, indeed, and rears and kicks, but never
swerves, never starts, and carries you over everything as long
as you give him his head,'

460 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
He liked office and the possession of power, but no
statesman showed more indifference to its trappings, or
so cordially detested the flatteries which it not unfre
quently attracts. Perhaps his strongest abhorrence was
affectation of any sort. He could not abide it in others,.
and never even dreamt of it for himself.
He was, for instance, always above the timid and
feeble tone of those who think it necessary to affect
coyness with respect to office, and who can talk of
nothing else but the sacrifice they made to duty on
the last occasion of accepting it. His language was
always frankly to the effect that office is the natural
and proper object of a public man's ambition, as the
sphere in which he can most freely use his powers
for the interest and advantage of his country. Lord
Palmerston never pretended to dislike it.
Who, again, at a social party, ever saw him retire
into a corner with a colleague or a diplomat, in order-
by mysterious looks and enigmatical gestures to rouse
an admiring curiosity among the bystanders ? Many
an ambassador of the old school must have felt chagrin
at his own discomfiture, but he was indeed a clever man
who could ' buttonhole ' Lord Palmerston at an evening
party, unless he 'really had something very pressing to
say. She also was a clever woman who could at dinner
draw him on to politics, with a view to impress the
other guests with the high range of the conversation at
the head of the table. The easy interchange of familiar
talk on social subjects being the appropriate coin for
the payment of what is due to society, Lord Palmerston
was too downright a gentleman to allow a fraud on
society for the sake of effect.
Men of one strong dominant idea are those that
usually come most rapidly to the front, whether they
succeed or not in afterwards retaining their foremost,
position. The tardiness with which Lord Palmerston
reached political prominence, though no doubt owing
to a variety of circumstances, may in part have had its
origin in this very conflict of qualities by which his

HIS CHAEACTEE: KNOWLEDGE OF MEN. 461
sympathies were held in suspense, and he himself mis
understood. His inanner, arising from an instinctive
horror of pomposity or affectation, created a belief in
his levity ; his good-humour and forbearance, a belief
in his indifference ; his reticence, a belief in his paucity
of ideas. A passage from ' Greville's Memoirs,' under
the date of August 7, 1836, shows however that, what
ever was the judgment of the public, his talents were
early recognised by competent judges : —
It is surprising to hear how Palmerston is spoken of by
those who knew him officially. Lady GranvUle a woman
expert in judging, thinks his capacity first-rate ; that it approaches
to greatness from bis enlarged views, disdain of trivialities,
resolution, decision, confidence, and above all, his contempt of
¦clamour and abuse. She told me that Madame de Flahault
had a letter -written by Talleyrand soon after his first arrival in
England, in which he talked -with great contempt of the Ministers
generally. Lord Grey included, and said there was but one
.stetesman among them, and that was Palmerston. His ordinary
conversation exhibits no such superiority ; but when he takes
his pen in his hand, his intellect seems to have full play, and
probably when engaged exclusively in business.
Perhaps the most valuable quality for a commander,
whether in the field or the Cabinet, is ' knowledge of
¦character.' To be able to choose fit instruments is often
a battle half won ; to be able to test reports that are
brought in is often a defeat half saved. For both these
purposes knowledge of character is indispensable —
knowledge gleaned not from laborious investigations,
for which there is seldom time, but from that instinc
tive judgment which is a gift in itself, and which only
requires for its exercise a few moments' conversation
with the person whose character is to be learned. This
gift Lord Palmerston had in a large degree. The con
sciousness of its possession led him, no doubt, on some
rare occasions, to be over-hasty in condemnation ; but
distrust of a new-comer is for a Minister a safe]- fault
than blind confidence.
At the time when the Greeks were being urgently

462 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
pressed to satisfy certain English claims, M. Eynard;
the banker, came to Lord Normanby and said that
Coletti had, Avithout any warning, drawn upon him for
600,000 francs in favour of the British Government,
the Greeks availing themselves of an outstanding offer
on his part; that it would cost him 80,000 francs to
provide the money at once, and that he wished to make
a request to the British Government to wait for a few
months, so as to spare him this loss. The English am-'
bassador, in a letter home, recapitulated the ingenuous
statements of the financier, and was evidently moved by
his appeal. Not so Lord Palmerston : —
C. G. : August 16, 184-7.
My dear Normanby, — I have received your letter giving an
account of your interview with Eynard. I rather thmk he
what Lowther used to call debuted in London many years ago
as an amateur actor ; and he seems, according to what you say,
not by any means to have trained off in his powers of perform
ance in that line. He did his part throughout the whole scene
admhably, and the only pity was that there were no spectators
to crown him with applause. But as the report of the best-
acted scene never can produce the same effect as the seeing and
hearing would, just as the best speech is tame without the ' os
habitumque hominis,' so I am concerned to say neither Mr.
Eynard's generosity, nor his impending loss of 80,000 francs,
nor his desertion by Guizot, nor his Eiu-opean reputetion, nor
his PhUheUenic enthusiasm, can light one spark of sympathy in
my cold and gloomy mind, and I feel as stone- hearted as Shylock
himself, even after readmg your letter to an end. I don't know
Eynard as well as you do, and therefore, perhaps, I know him
better. Eely upon it that in all these matters he is simply an
instrument of humbug in the hands of other persons. But we
are too old birds to be caught by such chaff. Pray, therefore,
tell Eynard, in such ci-vil terms as you think best, that we have
nothing to do with him in this matter, and can enter into no
communication with him on the subject. Our business is with
the Government of Greece, and not with the banker of that
Government. We mean to settle our affairs with Greece with
the Greek Government, and he wUl, of course, settle his affairs
with Greece with the Greek Government also ; but we cannot
settle our affafrs with Greece -with him, nor allow him to settle

PEOTECTION OF SUBOEDINATES. 463
his affahs with Greece with us. Depend upon it, the money
wiU not come from his pocket, but from the tUl of Louis
Phihppe, and Guizot and Co., and they sent him to you to
endeavour to bamboozle us. But, even ff this were not so, and
he was the good-natured, soft enthusiast he represents himself
to be, the only result would be that Greece would have to pay
him the 80,000 francs which he says he is going to lose, if that
assertion is true. All this is nothing to us, and we have nothing
whatever to do -with the matter. It is a question entirely be.
tween the Greek Government and Eynard.
He was the most steadfast and loyal of chiefs to
those who served under him. 'There is the devoted
friend who stands or faUs by one, like the noble Lord.'
So spoke, satirically, the leader of the Opposition, re
ferring to Lord Palmerston, in the debate of June 16,
1855. But the party sneer contained an acknowledged
truth whose universal acceptance did Lord Palmerston
both honour and good service during his long career.
He was served with zeal because the absent knew that
he would shirk no difficulties in their defence, and that
he would listen to no depreciatory tales against them,
unless accompanied by substantial proofs.
Lord Howden, British Minister at Madrid, begs him
not to attend to private and slanderous reports about
him. The reply is as follows : —
Broadlands : September 7, 1850.
My dear Howden,— -I have received your letter of the 25th
of last month, and beg you not to trouble yourself about the
matters to which it relates. If I had not full confidence in you
I should not have recommended you to the Queen for the post
you occupy ; and when I have confidence m a man, I do not
allow that confidence to be shaken by the tales of intriguers and
backbiters, even ff such should reach my ears, which in your
case they have not and probably wUl not. I say wiU not
because the commercial principle that supply follows demand
extends to other matters besides trade ; and when certain sup
plies are known to be discouraged and rejected, they are apt to
be withheld. In fact, the usual effect of underhand attempts to
injure a man is, with me, to make me more disposed to take his
part. I have some little experience in my own proper person of

464 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
the way in which falsehood is enlisted into the ser-vice of per
sonal pique or unfounded resentment. — Yours sincerely, Palmerston.
This is a letter which deserves to be remembered on
account of the truth which it contains. Tale-bearers
found no market for their goods in Lord Palmerston's
study, and so did not attempt to smuggle them in.
Nor was he more wiUing to yield to the open efforts
of those in high places who sought to persuade him to
sacrifice his agents abroad to their prejudices or dislikes.
' Pray make him clearly comprehend,' he writes to an
English Minister abroad, ' that I will never sacrifice any
British diplomatic officer, high or low, to the whims
and caprices of any foreign prince or potentate."
When the Greek Court used its personal influence
with our Court at home to bring pressure upon the
Foreign Office for the removal of Lord Lyons from
Athens, he writes to Lord John Eussell : —
Broadlands : August 20, 1847.
Otho's dislike to Lyons is not personal, but pohtical. It is
not that Lyons is disagreeable in himseff, but that the political
advice which he has been always instructed to give, and the
political principles and party which he has been insfructed to
support, are odious to Otho, and he hates Lyons upon the same
principle that a dog snaps at a stick. You would not alter the
feelmg by changmg the stick. It is the estabhshed formula of
proceeding in such matters to run dovm the man as an easier
method than combating his policy, or, rather, the pohcy of which
he is the organ. I think it is very un-wise to give way to an
intrigue ; to do so is a proof either of great blindness or of
weakness of character ; and when people once find out that by
brmging a certain amount of combined intrigue to bear against
a given individual, or upon a given object, they can carry their
point, either by imposing upon behef or by tiring out resistance,
their system of pohtical tactics is reduced to the same certainty
with which a general can tell you the precise number of days
which it will take him to capture a fortress.
' To Sir J. Milbanke, January 31, 1848, when the Bavarian Govern
ment asked for the removal of the English Secretary- of Legation at
Athens.

PEOTECTION OF HIS MINISTEES. 465
When a public servant is molested abroad he speaks
out plainly, and sends a direct message to the respon
sible authority : — Broadlands : October 29, 1849.
My dear Moncorvo,' — I am sorry to say that the last Lisbon
mail brings me another correspondence which has taken place
between Mr. Howard and Count Tojal upon the subject of
another act of petty vexation on the part of Dr. Moacho, the
Guarda Mor of the Health Department at Belem, towards Mr.
PhUipps, our Vice-Consul. I confess I am astonished that the
Portuguese Government should permit one of their inferior
officers to continue to carry on this system of mahcious annoy
ance ; but pray make Count Tojal clearly understand (which you
-will best do by sending him this note) that it is quite impossible
for me to permit a deserving servant of the British Cro-wn to be
the -victim of the low rancour and vulgar malignity of any
Guarda, whether he be ' Mor ' or not ; and I do intreat the
Portuguese Government not to aUow this ill-conditioned Doctor
to bring on a quarrel between England and Portugal. — Yours
sincerely, Palmeeston.
P. 0. : March 10, 1851.
Dear Gordon, ^ — I have received your letter about the attacks
made upon Sfr E. Lyons, and I request you will tell Baron
Stemgeld in plain terms that I will not stand a continuance or
renewal in Sweden of those base intrigues which were got up
against Sir E. Lyons at Athens. We have chosen for the
Queen's representative at Stockholm an able and distinguished
diplomatist, and a brave and honourable naval officer. We
expect and require that he shall be received at Stockholm with
aU the courtesy which is due to his personal merits, and to the
respect which is o-wing to the Government and country which
he represents; and ff the Swedish Government attaches any
value to the maintenance of its friendly relations with England,
it wiU take proper care that we shall have no just cause of
complaint on that score. Pray read this letter to Baron
Stemgeld. The staunch support, which he was thus wont to
give to all his fellow-workers, did not spring from a
mere generous impulse, but was based upon wide expe-
' Portuguese Minister in London.
¦^ British Minister at Stockholm.
VOL. II. H H

466 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
rience of the world and upon a practical knowledge of
its ways and difficulties. He well knew that none but
the men who are actually engaged in the conduct of
an affair can justly understand all the bearings of the
circumstances, and the full value of all the separate
incidents of which it consists ; and that the tendency
of the minds of one's best friends always is to think
that one has done too much rather than too little, when
difficulties arise which are connected with what has
been done ; and, on the contrary, to think that too little
has been attempted, when difficulties arise in conse
quence of what has been omitted. But men must be
taken as Nature made them, and it is well to make the
best of things as they are. His own words constantly
repeated this, and he added on one occasion that it was
'the duty of those who are charged with the conduct of
a branch of the service to support those who are acting
¦with them, and to hack them ¦up well through the difficulties
to which the'y may be exposed ; and you m,ay rely upon it
that I shall always do that, which I hold to be the sine qua
non condition upon which the co-operation of men of
honour can be expected.' '
Not that he omitted to convey privately to his agents
very plain expressions of his opinion if in any respect
lie considered that they had failed in judgment or
energy; but such rebukes created no ill-feeling when
the motive was not to shift blame but to discharge a
duty. In the case of minor errors he managed to in
timate his opinion without giving offence. 'But we
must suspend our judgment and decision,' he -writes
to Lord Normanby, ' till we know exactly what has
happened ; and if a friend of mine had done so in his
communications on these matters with the French
Government, he would not have found himself worse
placed thereby in subsequent discussions.' "
Nothing more annoyed him than that an agent should
show indifference to the ill-treatment of a British sub-
' To Lord .Normanby, March 6, 1847.
' Idem, May 10, 1850.

PEOTECTION OF ENGLISH ABEOAD. 467
ject; and he pushed this laudable feeling at times fur
ther perhaps than the general principles of international
law would strictly allow. An Englishman who goes to
reside in a foreign country must be held undoubtedly
subject to the laws of that country, and can strictly
only claim that such laws in his case should be fairly
carried out. But Lord Palmerston did not always
abide by that rule. ' As to the laws of Venezuela,' he
observes iu one instance, 'the people of Venezuela must
of course submit to them ; but the British Government
will not permit gross injustice to be done or gross op
pression to be exercised on British subjects under the
pretence of Venezuelan law.'
When a timid, hesitating Ministry is fearful of using
the power confided to it, there is always a reason found
for not doing so. Either the Government we have to
complain of is powerful — and it would be imprudent to
exact reparation from a State which might resent our
demands and defy our power; or the Government we
have to complain of is weak — and then it is beneath our
dignity to force a nation so inferior to our own to do
us justice. Lord Palmerston had none of these scruples.
Eight, in his eyes, was right ; and if he insisted upon
it when a formidable enemy might be provoked, he
treated with becoming scorn the argument that we
should deal more gently with an inferior delinquent.
' What ! ' he used to say ; ' we are to tax our people
for the purpose of giving them a strong Government,
and then we are not to maintain the rights of our
people because their Government is strong ? The weaker
a Governinent is, the more inexcusable becomes its in
solence or injustice.' This mode of reasoning is in
truth incontrovertible. Whenever it is asserted that
we are to put up with a wrong or an affront because it
comes to us from a contemptible antagonist, it is
generally easy to recognise an attempt to cover an act
of cowardice by an assumption of magnanimity.
Neither does it appear to signify much when once
reparation has been demanded whether the act which
H H 2

468 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
called for that reparation concerns a great interest or a
small one. The only question is, whether reparation
was justly demanded or not. Our honour is pledged to
obtain satisfaction when we once demand it with reason
and equity on our side. Our honour is tarnished when
we demand it without sach advocates in our behalf.
I have already alluded to his thoughtfulness about
others. With this was combined that attention to^
details which alone makes such thoughtfulness of any
practical utility. To the Commander-in-Chief he sug
gests that the Guards should be relieved of some of the
weight of their headgear : —
There is another subject which seems deser-ving of your
Eoyal Highness's attention. When your Eoyal Highness, or
any other sportsman, goes out shooting, whether in winter or
summer, carrymg no other load than a double-barreUed gun
weighing about eight pounds, and intending to walk leisurely
only a few hours, the lightest possible -wideawake is put upon
the head, and a loose jacket and trousers leave the hmbs as free
as possible ; but when a soldier of the Guards is ordered upon a
long and fatigumg march, or has to make all the bodily exertion
requfred on the field of battle, as ff his tight clothing and his
musket, knapsack, ammunition, and other thmgs, weighing
probably about sixty pounds, were not sufficient restraints upon
muscular exertion, he has to carry on his head a great bearskin
cap, weighing, it is said, about two pounds four ounces, whereas
a far hghter headgear, even ff made of bearskm, would answer-
every purpose, and reheve bis head and brain from the heat and
pressure of the present bead-dress. I would venture to submit
for yom- Eoyal Highness's consideration that a very hght cap,.
partly bearskin, ff that must be, but smaUer and lower than
ihe ArtiUery busby, would be a great rehef to the men of the
Guards ; and that after such an improved head-dress had come
into use everybody would wonder that the present high and
hea-vy cap had ever been worn.'
In another letter to Mr. S. Herbert when Secretary
of State for War, after asking whether he had thought of
preparing a little book of instructions for the Eifie Vo
lunteers, he adds, ' Have you been able to persuade the
• To Duke o£ Cambridge : November 12, 1861,

THOUGHTFULNESS FOE OTHEES. 469
Barrack Department to provide the sleeping rooms
of the soldiers with decent civilized arrangements of
utensils for night wants ? '
When the rage for competitive examination for
clerkships in our public offices first broke out he
watched with anxiety its detailed development; and,
wishing himself to revise the Papers of Questions on
which the examinations were conducted, he writes thus
to the Home Secretary : —
They (CivU Ser-vice Commissioners) continue to put the
most absurd questions, which tend to throw ridicule upon
the whole system, and answers to which are no more a test of
"the capacity of a young man to be a clerk than would be his
happening to know the exact dimensions of one of the great
craters in the moon.
This absurd pedantry is injurious to the interests of the
public service. Would it suit you to appoint them to meet us
in the Cabinet room in Downing Street on Wednesday at
three! If so, I wish you would appoint them, and request
them to bring with them their Papers of Questions for all the
public departments for which examinations take place.' '
When, for the purpose of preparing papers for Par
liament, or from any other cause of pressure, the hours
•bf work in some department ofthe Foreign Office were un
usually prolonged, he used to send for a list of the clerks
who had been so detained, and would convey to them
individuaUy his thanks and his appreciation of their
work. I find notes put away, docketed " Names of
Poreign Office Clerks who sat up " for such and such a
purpose. It is not every chief who, in the middle of
aU his engrossing employments, would trouble himself
about the share which each individual under him had
taken in the general work.
During a fit of the gout he hears that a coUeague is
also laid up. Straightway, thinking of his friend's
health, and not absorbed only in his own, he sends him
the following letter : —
' To Sir George Le-wis : Dec. 6, 1856.'

470 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON. Piccadilly : May 22, 1857.
My dear Clarendon, — Sympathy between colleagues is a,
good thing, but it may be carried too far, and I am sorry to-
hear that you have pushed it to the point of joining me in a
touch of gout.
Peel said that no man should give ad-vice till he is called in,.
and you have not called me in ; but I am caUed in by the
interest which we all take in your health. What, then, would
be your objection to the following suggestion ?
You want more afr and exercise. Much you cannot have,
a httle you might have, and every mickle makes a muckle, and
a little every day teUs in the course of the year. Why should
you not pro-vide yourself with a steady hack, with good action,,
who would give you no trouble when on him, and not prevent
you from thinking over the draft you are next going to write t
Why should not the aforesaid quadruped be at your door every
moming just as you finish your breakfast, and why should you
not ride him to the end of Hyde Park and back again, or down
to the Office, making a slight deviation by the way 1 It would
take you only half an hour, but you would soon find the advantage^
of that half-hour, if daily taken. — ^Yours sincerely, Palmeeston.
He himself practised what be preached. His groom
relates that often in his early days the horses were kept
waiting at the door of the Foreign Office up to ten or
eleven o'clock at night, so that, at any rate, Lord Pal
merston might ride home, and so observe his rule of
daily exercise on horseback. He was fond of saying
that ' Every other abstinence will not make up for ab
stinence from exercise.'
Although, perhaps, almost too hard in his language
during the combat, he was, after it was over, entirely
free from petty malice or lasting rancour. There was
always a desire to forgive and forget within the bounds-
of what was just. This won him at length the attach
ment even of his political foes. ' He was always a very
generous enemy,' said Cobden on his death-bed.
He had a wonderful faculty of dismissing from his
mind any matter, however anxious, when, for the time^
it was disposed of, and his disposition aUowed him to-

FEEEDOM FEOM EED-TAPEISM. 471
feel perfect confidence in his subordinates so long as
they had done nothing to forfeit it. These two qualities
were mighty aids to him in his work, as they not only
assisted his power of concentration, which was already
naturally strong, but freed him from that perpetual
head-worry which has worn out so many busy men. It
is almost needless to add that, in spite of his long
official habits, he never succumbed to that infirmity of
small minds which is well described and well understood
by the term ' red-tapeism.'
Fearless truthfulness was one of his distinctive
characteristics, which, while it made him some enemies,
in the long run won him more friends. In his inter
course with foreign Ministers, however, it sometimes
served a purpose which he at the time little anticipated.
I have heard him say that he occasionaUy found that
they had been deceived by the open manner in which
he told them the truth. When he had laid before them
the exact state of the case, and announced his own in
tentions, they went away convinced that so skilful and
experienced a diplomatist could not possibly be so frank
as he appeared, and imagining some deep design in his
words, acted on their own ideas of what he really meant,
and so misled their ownselves.
A distinguished author of an essay on the working
of the English Constitution lays down that a states
man who aspires to be a leader must also be an un
flinching partisan. This appears to be so far true that
it would, perhaps, be impossible to name any other
man than Lord Palmerston whose life has been an
iUustration of the contrary; but he never seemed to
take much interest in purely party politics, and party
spirit influenced few of his acts. It used to be said of
an eloquent Conservative leader that he led the Oppo
sition with the spirit and keenness of a jockey riding
a race ; every nerve was strained, and every legitimate
means resorted to, to 'dish' his opponents. Lord
Palmerston, oiithe contrary, once owned, in a letter to
his brother, t^^t he was not fit to be a leader of Opposi-

472 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
tion, because, as he said, ' I have not faction enough in
my composition.'
But if in public life he was genial, straightforward,
and considerate, in his private life these qualities were
equally marked. As an English country gentleman —
that type of landed proprietor which foreigners recog
nise as peculiar to this country, and by which so many
of our best qualities are fostered — he took a keen in
terest and a personal share in all rural pursuits and
business. Sports or meetings, farmers' dinners or
agricultural shows, village schools, where he sometimes
himself examined the children, or labourers' teas, when
he always had a cheery word ready, and friendly advice
mingled with fun — as on one occasion, when handing
to a man a prize of twenty-five shUlings, given for the
tidiest couple, he added : ' Scripture says that a vir
tuous woman is a crown to her husband ; but in your
case, you see, she is five crowns ' — into each and all he
threw himself with unaffected zest and enjoyment ; for
intercourse with his fellow-creatures, of whatever
degree, was a positive pleasure to him, and in this
Lady Palmerston resembled him. Her memory,
cherished by his private friends, should not be less
preserved in connection with his public career. Her
assemblies — neutral ground where distinguished per
sons of all parties, whether foreign or domestic, met
for social intercourse, forgetting for the moment thefr
political differences — were a powerful aid to him as
head of a Government. Shortly after her death, Mr.
Disraeli, in a speech at Glasgow, while alluding to the
happy circumstance of public life in England that we
do not as a rule permit our poUtical opinions to inter
fere with our social relations, recalled in the following
words one of his reminiscences : —
If you are on the Continent and wish to pay your respects
to a minister and go to his reception, you are invited by the
minister. The consequence is that you find no one there except
those that foUow him. It is not so in England. I remember
some years ago meeting, under the charming roof of one of the

INFLUENCE OF LADY PALMEESTON. 473
niost accomplished women of the time, the most celebrated
¦diplomatist of certeinly half a century, and he said to me,
' What a wonderful system of society you have in England ! I
have not been on speaking terms -with Lord Palmerston for
three weeks, and yet here I am ; but you see I am paying a
visit to Lady Pahnerston.'
The manner in which she performed what Lord
Palmerston, in reply to a complimentary letter from
the American Minister, once termed her ' portion of our
joint duties,' sufficiently proved that to the refinement
and kindliness of a ' grande dame ' she joined the genial
and sympathetic nature of her husband. Both host
and hostess succeeded in pleasing because they were
pleased themselves ; for age had not blunted their
delight in the society of their fellow-men, or their
pleasure in seeing others happy. By a natural law
these hospitable efforts strengthened their influence in
the political world, for the very reason that suoh was
not the sole object they had in view when they threw
open their doors not grudgingly or of necessity, but
because they liked it.
Let two instances suffice to illustrate Lord Palmer
ston's considerate kindness to those round him in the
country: — One day Lady Palmerston brought him
home word that during her drive she had heard of one
of his tenants having met with a serious accident.
Although it was late, and the hour for his daily work
in his library, he instantly ordered his horse, left his
despatches, and within half-an-hour was by the side of
what proved to be a dying man. Again, when, in
1859, he presented the parish clergyman, Mr. Moore of
Eomsey, to the living of Sutterton, knowing that Mrs.
Moore had indifferent health, and was anxious about
the quality of the water in her future home, he directed
specimens of it to be sent to, him out of Lincolnshire,
and himself forwarding them for analysis to the Eoyal
College of Chemistry, obtained a sa-tisfactory report,
which he handed to Mr. Moore.
Lord Palmerston was not a Democrat. He did not

474 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
think a democracy the best government for a people,
and he wished to maintain an aristocracy as a part of
ours. But all his feelings and sympathies were of a
broad popular kind. Instances appear through his
correspondence, when Secretary of War, of his interest
in the private soldier's comfort and moral improvement.
As a landlord he showed a constant attention to the
comfort, education, and improvement of the peasant.
But nowhere could be found a more complete exempli
fication of his feelings as to the happiness and enjoy
ment of the great masses of the population than in two-
letters to Sir Benjamin Hall, at that time First Com
missioner of Works, with respect to the management
of the parks. 94, Piccadilly : Oct. 31, 185T.
My dear Hall, — I cannot agree with you as to the principle
on which the grass in the park should be treated. You seem
to think it a thing to be looked at by people who are to be con
fined to the gravel walks. I regard it as a thing to be walked
upon freely and without restramt by the people, old and young,
for whose enjoyment the parks are maintained ; and your iron
hurdles would turn the parks into so many Smithfields, and
entirely prevent that enjoyment. As to people makmg paths
across the grass, what does that signify 1 If the parks were
to be deemed hayfields, it might be necessary to prevent people
from stoppmg the growth of the hay by walking over the
grass; but as the parks must be deemed places for pubhc
enjoyment, the purpose for which the parks are kept up is
marred and defeated when the use of them is confined to a
number of straight gravel walks.
When I see the grass worn by foot traffic, I look on it,
as a proof that the park has answered its purpose, and has
done its duty by the health, amusement, and enjoyment of the
people. In the college courts of Cambridge a man is fined haff-a
cro-wn who walks over the grass plots, but that is not a prece
dent to be followed. 94, Piccadilly : Nov. 12, 1857.
My dear Hall, — I have been much surprised this morning
at seeing a party of labourers employed in trenching a large
piece ofthe Green Park. As head ofthe Government, I have

HIS CAEE FOE THE MASSES. 475
a right to expect that essential alterations should not be made
in the spaces allotted for the enjoyment and recreation of the
public without my previous sanction and concurrence, and I
entirely disapprove of the restrictions which you are imposing-
upon the free enjoyment of the Green Park and Hyde Park by
the pubhc.
Your iron hurdles are an intolerable nuisance, and I trust
that you mean shortly to remove them. To cut up the Green
Park into enclosed shrubberies and plantations would be mate
rially to mterfere with the enjoyment and free recreation of the
public ; and I must positively forbid the prosecution of any
such scheme. As head of the Government, I should be held by
the public to have authorised these arrangements, and I do not
choose to be responsible for things which I disapprove.
There is earnestness and determination here. There
might have been a different way of looking at the sub
ject. It might have been contended that pleasure may
be derived from the eye — that the working man might
be gratified by seeing pretty patches of flowers, and
walking down nicely-gravelled walks ; and the popular
philosopher might have theorized on this subject with
much grace and plausibility. But what the simple glance
of Lord Palmerston saw was the labouring man, relieved
from his toil, strolling with his wife as he listed along
the broad common, sitting down under the trees, play
ing with his children, enjoying the free air and the
open space in careless independence ; and when he says
that he likes to see the grass worn because it is a proof
that the people have been enjoying themselves, we feel
how completely his heart beat, even on the most
ordinary questions, with the great public heart of the
country — how much in reaUty he was one of the many,
and concentrated in his own mind the feelings of the
many. It was this identity which he felt with the English
people that made him so proud of their strength and
so jealous of their honour.
It is singular how this feeling in a Minister — this
feeling which distinguishes the great Minister from the
ordinary one — raises his country, and elevates all those

476 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
in its service by a sort of magical influence that is felt
both at home and abroad. Chatham was in the soul of
Wolfe, and his son in that of Nelson. Mr. Canning's
hiigh bearing and splendid words gave to a few Guards
sent to Lisbon a force which may be said to have
paralysed the power of the great military monarchies of
Europe. Lord Palmerston had not the genius of these
men, but he had the spirit and the sentiment, and he
took care that no one who served under him should be
without them.
Lord Palmerston's correspondence, when read,
serves to account at the same time for his popularity
and his authority: the mixture of pleasantry with
satire — of good humour with censure — of friendliness
with command. The kindly tone of refusals, the full
¦and ample expression of thanks, combine in a singular
manner to exhibit the Minister who without exciting
¦our imagination as the ideal of a statesman, orator, or
hero, satisfied our mind with the reality of an able,
practical, good-tempered man who loved his country
¦and his countrymen, did his business with zeal and
pleasure, liked a joke, would not be trifled with, and
never showed a disposition either to cringe or to offend.
In short, there was a genuine desfre to produce an
agreeable impression as to themselves on others, which
took away that character of selfishness which so often
attaches to what a man when receiving or conferring
an obligation usually says, and that makes one feel that
the person who got the letter addressed to him must
have felt lighter and happier on the afternoon he re
ceived it.
It is said that M. de Talleyrand had a formula for
answering literary men who sent him their works. He
usually wrote that he received them with a satisfaction
which he felt sure would be increased on reading them.
But Lord Palmerston had no set formula. He put
himself in his correspondent's position, and gave him
self the trouble to realise the hopes and the feelings of
the person he was addressing. Two letters— one giving

CHAEACTEEISTICS OF HIS LETTBE-WEITING. 477
an appointment, the other expressing regret at not
doing so — are models of their kind. The gentleman
who got the appointment, and who might have thought
it came through a private friendship for his father, is
expressly told that he owes it to his own merits ; and
the gentleman who is not appointed would have shown
the refusal with as much pride to his mother or his wife
as if it had been the offer of a lucrative place.
94, Piccadilly ¦ Dec. 14, 1859.
My dear Sir, — Many thanks for your note of the 12th. I
can assure you that it gave me great pleasure to find myseff
able to do that which was agreeable to the son of a much
esteemed and highly valued friend ; but at the same time it is
due to you to say that I should not have been guided by my
personal feehngs in this respect, if I had not thought that you
were the fittest person I could choose for the office to which
you have been appointed. Piccadilly : June 24, 1859.
My dear Sir, — I return you the enclosed, and beg at the
same time to express my regret that it has not been possible
for me to avail myseff of your very valuable assistance in regard
to the arrangement which I have had to make, as I am weU
satisfied that any pubhc duties which you might have consented
to undertake would have been performed by you -with that
ability which you are kno-wn to possess. — Yours faithfully,
Palmerston.
He had a good-natured, gay way of giving reproofs
when he did not mean them to be severe, of which
everyone who had much correspondence with him will
recollect some example. ' Put a little more starch into
your neckcloth, my dear  ,' he said to a favourite
diplomatist who he thought did not hold up his head
hiwh enough at the court where the Minister repre
sented us.
It must often happen to a diplomatist who has any
inteUect to differ from some of the views which the
Minister of Foreign Affairs may have conceived, because
the Minister cannot know all the local circumstances to
which his views have to be applied so well as the man

¦478 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.,
on the spot. Such independence never drew down
Lord Palmerston's displeasure. At times he yielded
or modified his previous instructions ; at times he per
sisted in them ; but he never rebuked an agent, who had
anything to justify his sentiments, for expressing them.
But he hated anything like a subterfuge, and saw at
¦once through a device which some clever diplomatists
practise of putting their own opinions into somebody
else's mouth.
On one occasion a charge d'affa'i/res who was told to
carry out instructions he disapproved of related his
conversation with the Minister on whom he was told to
urge them, and gave the Minister's arguments in reply
with all the skill and force he could supply.
Lord Palmerston, after answering these arguments
with his usual abUity, closed his despatch by these quiet
observations : —
It may be, and no doubt is, the duty of a diplomatist, in
reporting a conversation with a member of the Government to
which he is accredited to report the nonsense, however great it
may be, that may be said to him, but it would be more to tbe
¦credit of his own sagacity if he took care in making his report
not to let it be supposed that he did not see the absurdity of
the things that had been said to him.
To one gentleman who was perpetually pressing on
him some claims of his father to a peerage, which claims
had been frequently put aside by him, after reminding
his correspondent courteously of this fact and of the
reasons for it, he writes, as if relieving himself from a
disagreeable thought : ' I confess I cannot see what
advantage or satisfaction can accrue to your father
from drawing from me at repeated intervals a repeti
tion of this statement.'
Lord Palmerston's style of writing Ulustrates his
character, and may be studied with advantage. Let it
be borne in mind that the letters which have been given
in these volumes were for the most part written hastily,
amid the press of business, and always without erasure

CHAEACTEEISTICS OF HIS LETTEB-WEITING. 479
or correction. Great simplicity, fun, and clearness
convey the true impression of a straightforward corres
pondent whose object in writing is not a display either
of wit or of erudition, but the communication of what
he has to impart in as short and as easy, but in as
effective a manner as possible. As a pompous and
reserved statesman too often gets, among the vulgar,
the credit of wisdom, so a dark and heavy writer is
supposed to be profound. If he is clear and light-
hearted, he is often regarded as shallow. No greater
mistake. Lord Palmerston's letters survive as a protest
against any such false judgment.
He wants a reform both in the manner and sub
stance of a young diplomatist's reports ; so he says to
Lord Normanby : — '
Your new man sends a long bavardage in an illegible hand.
Pray tell him that his reports are of no use ff they cannot be
read, and that imless he encloses a couple of spare haff-hours
with each report he had better keep them to himseff. The F. O.
is not a spelling school. He should write a larger hand, throw
over his reflections, and state his facts concisely like a table of
¦contents. He is tormented by the difficulty of reading the
faded colour of the Vienna despatches, so through Lord
Ponsonby he takes the mission to task : —
Your attaches put me out of all patience by the paleness of
the ink in which they write out your despatches. Pray give
them my compliments, and say I have put them all at the bot
tom of thefr respective lists, and tf they do not mend thefr ways
I shall be obliged to send you in their stead another set who
wUl pay more attention to writing that which can be read.^
His own language being simple and accurate, he was
apt to speak out when he came across sentences of a
¦different quality.
Lord Palmerston desires me [writes his secretery] ^ to hint
1 March 7, 1849.
2 To Lord Ponsonby, February 8, 1849.
' Sir G. Shee to Mr. Morier, April 22, 1834.

480 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
to you privately that he has great objection to the introduction
of any GalUcism into a despateh which may have to be laid
before Parliament. He observes, for mstance, that you use the
word adhesion, which he says is not an Enghsh word in the
sense in which you use it ; and he considers the same remark
apphcable to the phrase. It m,ay be permitted to doubt, which is
also employed. 1
To the Home Secretary he conveys a common-sense
view about the supposed claims of civic functionaries to-
marks of royal favour : — November 18, 1862.
My dear Grey, — It seems to me that there are strong objec
tions to gi-ving Baronetcies to Mayors and Lord Mayors. In
the first place, it would be opening a door without being able
to say how many would have to enter by it ; for ff once yoir
begin, it would be difficult to draw a line of distinction between
cases to be accepted and cases to be refused. But in fact it
would be handing over to municipal corporations the power of
disposing of dignities granted by the Crown ; and no wonder
that all the magistrates of Edinburgh express a -wish that they
may be allowed to make a Baronet.
Municipal corporations exercise their own prerogative in
conferring upon one of their members the dignity of Mayor j
and the Crown exercises its prerogative in conferring upon those
whom it deems worthy of it the dignity of Baronet.
But each party should keep -within its own bounds ; and
corporations should not try to make Baronets, any more than
the Cro-wn should try to make Mayors.
He declines to forward an oft-repeated recommenda
tion from the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, in a note
which is quite a model of brevity, because -though curt
' So, also, once in a speech in the House of Commons, he raised his
voice against a common error of expression: — 'We have heard the
term ally and allies rung in our ears by those who either must be
ignorant of the slipslop expression they were using, or who, through
what I must admit to have been its general acceptation, forgot that
they were using a totally mimeaning term. Why, what is an ally ?'
An ally is a Power allied by treaty engagements in carrying on some
active operation, political or otherwise. But to call a country au ally-
merely because it is iu a state of friendship with you, is to -use an
expression that has no meaning whatever, because it is applicable to
every other Power in the world with whom you may happen not to be
in a state of war.' — July 21, 1849.

CHAEACTEEISTICS OF HIS LETTEE- WEITING. 481
it is civil — a point in the letter being that the ' sar
castic critic ' whom he was ' remembering ' happened to
be Lord Carlisle himself to whom he was writing : —
Broadlands : April 24, 1862.
My dear Carhsle, — I have received your letter of the 19th.
I remember a sarcastic critic exclaiming, ' Here comes Dudley
Stuart -with his eternal Poles.' I shall parody the exclamation
by saying. Here comes Carlisle with his eternal X  ; but I
think the Poles better entitled to their freedom than X  is
to the Commandership, and so let us adjourn the debate.
He was often very happy in the phrases with which
he described a man's failings. Of a diplomatist who
would obstinately stick to his own idea in spite of in
structions from home, and for whom he was meditating
a rebuke, he says, ' S  is like a bad retriever, that
will not let go his game till he gets a rap on the nose.'
Of another, whose charity was not so large as his
egotism : —
I wish B  's letters were not so full of backbiting : how
ever, he makes up for his disparagement of others by his praises
of himseff. There is a whole type of diplomatists described in
the following sketch of a foreign ambassador : — •
CoUoredo is agreeable in private society, but diplomatically
he is a very unsatisfactory man to deal with. He seems always
in a fright lest he should say anything that would commit him ;
he is ever on the defensive, and there is no discussmg any mat
ter on equal terms with him. He ends a long conversation by
saying, ' Mais souvenez-vous que je ne vous ai rien dit,' and
while he is talking seems to fancy that there is a shorthand
-writer behind the screen taking do-wn what he says.' ,
' What energy,' he once said, speaking ofthe Turks,
'can be expected of a people with no heels to their
shoes ? ' And when a message was sent to him from a
foreign sovereign, asking that a baronetcy might be
conferred on an Englishman for whom that sovereign
professed an attachment, the only remark he made was
' To Lord Ponsonby, October 19, 1849.
VOL. II. I I

482 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
that while titles and honours were said to be the
cheap rewards bestowed by princes, they certainly "were
cheapest of all when borrowed from a neighbour.
Sir John Bligh, our Minister at Hanover, writes to
complain that the King wUl persist in giving balls on
Sunday, and asks for Lord Palmerston's approval if he
leaves the palace when the band strikes up. The Foreign
Secretary, in reply, sanctions the conduct ofthe English
Minister, but so words his communication as to check
any disposition that might exist to make too grave a
matter of the affafr: —
It is certainly somewhat singular that the King of Hanover,
who lays so much stress upon rehgion, should choose Sunday of"
aU days in the week for his baU-night, and in this respect he
seems to be the reverse of Lord Fitzhardinge, who said to some
body, that, to be sure, he had not much religion, but that what
little he had was of the best quahty. The Eling of Hanover-
professes to have a great deal ; but its quahty seems rather in
different, and I should think that his friends in England would
not be much edified by hearing of his Sunday-evening polkas.
However, I think you are quite right in making your bow at
these parties, and in then going away.'
His illustrations, often homely, generally went to
the root of the matter, as, for instance, when discussing
the policy of insisting on reciprocity from France before
throwing our markets open to her, he thus condemned
the notion : —
I look on the tariffs of the two countries as ff they were
two turnpikes, one on each side of a river dividing two counties,
both of which require payment from aU passing across. Who.
would not laugh at county A. ff it were to insist on continuing
tb pay the turnpike on its o-wn side, unless it were also relieved
from paying the turnpike on the B. side of the river? But
high customs duties are hke turnpike tolls, a charge making
passage more expensive for everything that comes in.
As a public speaker. Lord Palmerston's success was
very great, and surely results are good tests of merit in
the art of persuasion. He always contrived to serve up
' Foreign Office, October 26, 1847.

CHAEACTEEISTICS OF HIS OEATOEY. 483
food for every palate the best suited to his audience for
the moment, whether learned, municipal, political, or
artizan. He certainly never aspfred to the lofty rank
of a great orator, nor to the magic wand of a great
master of phrases; but in the power of conveying
abundant knowledge in an apt, logical, and convincing
form, he yielded the palm to none. I find traces of
careful preparation for the speeches of his earlier years ;
but during the latter half of his life he made little or
none. The great changes in the constitution of the
House of Commons which successive Eeform BiUs have
made must never be forgotten by those who would
compare the Parliamentary speakers ofthe present with
those of a former generation. The House of Commons
of the nineteenth century, for a variety of reasons, all
perhaps excellent, gives no encouragement to oratory.
A man may succeed in spite of it if he possesses know
ledge of details sufficient to redeem his defect ; but if
he cherishes the models studied by Pitt and Fox he
bears about him rather a burden than a source of
power. Shortly after Lord Palmerston's death there ap
peared a short criticism on his public speaking which
is so good, as far as it goes, that I here insert it. It
is taken from the columns of a newspaper ' which, as
a Eadical organ, had been very hostUe to him. The
tribute to his powers is all the more impartial: —
Lord Palmerston was successful chiefly because he always
made it his business to understand the temper of his audience,
and accommodate himseff to it. He was not an orator in any
critical sense of the word. He never made the slightest attempt
to rival such men as Pitt and Pox, as Gladstone and Bright, in
eloquence. But few men were ever more successful in effecting,
by means of pubhc speaking, the objects at which they aimed.
Lord Palmerston never indulged in any attempts at fine
language. He studied nothing of elocution except the art of
speaking out distinctly. His action was generally monotonous.
Although fluent, he had a fashion — perhaps an affectation — of
' The late Mormmg Star,
Ii2

484 . . LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
interjecting occasionally a sort of guttural sound between his
words, which must necessarily have been fatal to anything like
true oratorical effect, but which somehow seemed to enhance the
peculiar effectiveness of his unprepared, easy, colloquial style.
Certainly the occasional hesitation, real or affected, often did
much to increase the humour of some of the jocular hits in
which Lord Palmerston so commonly delighted. The joke
seemed to be so entirely unpremeditated ; the audience were
kept for a moment in such amusing suspense, while the speaker
was apparently turning over the best way to give the hit, that
when at last it came it was enjoyed with the keener rehsh. His
jokes were always suited to the present capacity of those whom
he happened to address.* If the House seemed in a humour
for mere nonsense, then Lord Palmerston reveUed in mere
nonsense. He had the happy art of making commonplaces
seem effective. He never rose above his aucSence; he never
vexed their intellect by difficult propositions or entangled argu
ments. Unless where he purposely chose to be vague or un-
inteUigible, he always went straight to the mark, and talked
m homely, -vigorous Saxon English. He never talked too long ;
he never by any chance wearied his audience. He always knew,
as ff instmctively, what style of argument would best at
any given moment tell upon the House. He brought to bear
upon every debate an unsurpassed tact, and a memory hardly
rivalled. He could reply with telling effect, and point by point,
to a lengthened attack from an enemy, -without the "use of a
note or memorandum of any Hnd. When argument faUed, he
employed broad, rough Enghsh satfre. He was never dull ; he
was never ineffective ; he was never uninteresting. One of his
rough and ready speeches helped to carry many a di-vision, when
Burke would have turned friends mto foes from sheer impa
tience, and when brilliant eloquence of any kind might have
been as dangerous to play with as lightning.''
' Having, on one occasion, to make an open-air speech to Ms con
stituents while suif ering from a bad cold, he left aside his ailment, to
be guessed by his hearers, and said, amid much laughter, ' I beg that
you will allow me to address you with my hat on, in order that I may
be your true representative, for I see that you all have your hats on '
'^ As a chance illustration of his after-dinner speeches, let me give
an extract from one of the last he made, namely, at the banquet of the
Fishmongers' Company in 1864. He followed another Minister who
descanted learnedly on the blessings of the British Constitution. Lord
Palmerston spoke more appropriately of the blessings of fish:  'I
believe that one of the functions of this ancient corporation is par-

HIS EEAL POWEE; HE WAS TEUSTED. 485
But whatever his merits as a speaker, it was to the
general confidence felt in his judgment, motives, and
character that Lord Palmerston owed'the great position
which he latterly occupied in the country. Public con
fidence is, for a statesman in a free community, one of
the first requisites for success ; and if this be wanting
no amount of briUiancy in speaking will long supply
such a capital defect. There have, no doubt, been tem
porary exceptions ; but leaders of party in England, and
above all, leaders of the Liberal party, must command
the moral trust as well as the inteUectual homage of
thinking men. It was felt that Lord Palmerston, with
aU his vigour of action and desire for personal dis
tinction, which alone can give the necessary stimulus
to exertion, was yet never moved by love of display,
whether personal or national ; that, having a full sense
of responsibUity, he despised no details ; and therefore,
whUe limiting the objects to be aimed at by a careful
consideration of the means at his disposal, he would
launch the country on no enterprise untU he saw clearly
how it should be carried through without being aban
doned half-way. His calm judgment made him inde
pendent of the forces which so often act- on our public
men, namely, the taunts and reproaches of foreign
statesmen and writers, whose interests are certainly
not British interests, and who generally give us their
warmest approval when we are playing thefr game and
not our own, or at any rate are satisfying their feehngs
of not unnatural jealousy. In short. Lord Palmerston's
ticularly connected with the position of the comitry to which it
belongs, because in an island comitry it is natmral that one of the first
fimctions of an efficient civic corporation should be to regulate the
immigration of the vast multitude of the inhabitants of the ocean that
come in contact with the population (laughter). That duty has been
from time to time most worthily performed by this corporation ; and I
am told that to this day the inhabitants of this great metropolis are
weekly and daily indebted to its guardian care ; for that there are
multitudes of immigrants that come here from the depths of -the
ocean unfitted to mix with the population of this island, and being
unable to obtain the necessary passport are refused an entrance through
the vigilance of this ancient corporation (laughter).'

486 LIFE OF LOED PALMEESTON.
character, free from bombast, though not deficient in
self-assertion, was typical ofthe English of his day, and
inspired the confidence which it deserved. I find among
his papers the following passage, copied out by himself
from some essay which he had been reading about De
Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland. It may serve as
an appropriate ending to this story of his career : —
The statesman who, in treading the slippery path of politics,
is sustained and guided only by the hope of fame or the desfre
of a lofty reputation, wUl not only find himseff beset with inces
sant temptations to turn aside from the line of strict integrity,
but the disappointment he is sure to meet with will probably
drive him to misanthropy, perhaps even frritate him to tarnish
by vindictive treachery a -virtue founded upon no sohd or
enduring principle. But the statesman who looks in the simple
performance of his duty for consolation and support amid all
the toils and sufferings which that duty may call him. to
encounter, who aims not at popularity, because he is conscious
that continued popularity rarely accompanies systematic and
unyielding integrity; who, as he is urged to no questionable
measures by the hope of fame, so he is deterred from none that
are just by the fear of censure, such a man may steer a steady
course through the shoals and breakers of the stormiest sea ;
and whether he meet with the hatred or gratitude of his
countrymen is to him a consideration of minor moment, for his
reward is other-wise sure. He has laboured with constancy for
great objects ; he has conferred signal benefits upon his feUow-
men ; nobler occupation man cannot aspfre to ; greater reward
it would be very difficult to obtain.
This extract bears date 1843. Did Lord Palmerston
make these maxims his own ? His public life, I ven
ture to think, proves that he did.

INDEX.

ABEEDEEN, Earl of : estimate of, i.
168 (note), ii. 166 ; his action at the
Foreign Office,!. 450; Lord Palmers
ton's speech criticising his foreign
policy and contrasting his own,
471 ; foi-mation of his Coalition Min
istry, ii. 2^8, declaration of hia
policy, an indirect tribute to Pal
merston's foreign policy, 260j letters
to, 274, 279 ; reply to Palmerston's
mem. suggesting sending fleet to
Black Sea, 275 ; different vie-ws
as to action, 279 j effect of his bias
on negotiations, 282. Correspon
dence on the Eussian Question, 283-
291,hesitation to adopt Palmerston's
decisive measures, influence of the
Prince Consort, 284 ; disagrees -with
Palmerston's suggested ultimatum
to Eussia, 290 ; Crimean disasters ; ,
dedines Lord J. Russell's suggestion
to transfer Palmerston to War Office,
301, Eoebuck's motion for inquiry,
301, startling majority against the
Government, 303, end of the Coali
tion Ministry, ti.
Acre, St. Jean d'. Capture of, i. 394
Adelaide, Queen, health of, i. 326 ; in
fluence of, it.
Adrianople, Treaty of, i. 118
Afghanistan : defeat of Dost Ma-
hommed, i. 396 ; history of the Cabul
expedition, 398, British support of
Soqjah Shah, 399 ; occupation of
Cabul and subsequent disaster, 400
Alexander, Emperor, contrasted -with
his father, u. 329
Algeria: speech on French cruelties
in, i. 411 ; French occupation of,
472
¦• All the Talents,' Sudden collapse of
ministi'y of, i. 35

A.VC
Almack's, Lady Cowper at, i. 86
Althorp, Lord, breaks do-wn on the
Irish Coercion BiU, i. 303
Anglesey, Marquis of: difficulties as
Lord Lieutenant, i. 182 ; reserve
used towards him by WeUington,
ib. ; his reeaU, 185 ; activity of, 440
•Anstey, Mr., attacks Palmerston's
foreign policy, ii. 61
Anti-Catholics, Opposition of, i. 91
Anti-Corn Law League. See Free
Trade
Apponyi, Count, warned by Palmer
ston that our fleet would follow
that of Austria to the Baltic, ii.
432
Aquila, Count, Interview with, ii. 235
Arbitration, International, proposed
by Cobden, ii. 60; Pahueraton's
reservations, ib.
Army : force under arms in 1810, i.
63 ; in 1816, i. 73
Ascot, Emperor of Eussia at, i. 466
Ashburton, Lord: qualifications as a
special ambassador, i. 422 ; Lord
Ashbm-ton and Mr. Webster, ib.;
Palmerston's opinion of him, 452,
and of his treaty, ib.
Ashburton Treaty, The, i. 421; de
nounced by Palmerston, 423, 462
Ashley Lord : Mining Act for the pro
tection of women and children, i.
447, supported by Lord Palmer
ston, ib. ; his factory act, 460, sup
ported by Lord Palmerston, ib.,
Asiatics, Necessarj' pohcy towards,
defined, ii. 33
Attacks in the press upon him on
various occasions, ii. 249 ; and effi
cacy of legal proceedings, ib.
Auckland's, Lord, meeting with Eun-
jeet Singh, i. 400

488

INDEX.

AUS-
Austria (see also ' Metternich ') : in
efficiency of her army, i. 173, Lord
Cowley's opinion thereon, ib. ; sup
pression of insurrection in Papal
States, and Modena and Parma,
240 ; Austria and the ItaUan con
federation, 295, 299 ; Palmerston's
poUcy towards Austria and Italy,
299 ; death of the Emperor, 815 ;
state of the country in 1835, 316 ;
decUne of Metternich's influence,
324 ; Austria and France, 382 ;
caution to Metternich concerning
Switzerland, ii. 10 ; relation to
Italy in 1846, and British -views
thereon, 12 ; 'The Holy AUiance '
and Cracow, 31, violation of the
Treaty of Vienna, ib., British pro
test against, 32 ; occupation of
Ferrara, 42 ; action in Italy, 45 ;
retirement of Mettemich, 67 ; im
minent interference in Italy and
Palmerston's warning, 63 ; further
complications, 84, attitude of
Great Britain, ib. ; Baron Humma-
lauer as envoy, ib. ; evil influence
of Metternich s example, 84 ; ex
pected independence of Lombardy,
84 ; abdication of Ferdinand fore
seen hy Palmerston, 84 ; her pohcy
indicated, 86, necessity of a strong
sovereign shown, 87; complete
Austrian success and mediation of
England and France, 88; Palmer
ston on the Austrians in Italy, 88 ;
offensive attitude to Palmerston
personaUy, 91 ; failure of negotia
tions, 92 ; disaster of Novara, ib. ;
dependence on Russia, 94 ; leaning
of a section of the Enghsh towards,
99, 106. Civil war in Hungary, 103,
position of the Kaiser king, 104,
Palmerston on the position, 104,
his sympathy for oppressed Hun
gary, 105. Joint demand of Russia
and Austria for delivery of Kossuth
and the other fugitives by the Porte,
107, attitude of Tm-key suppoited
by Enrfand, 107, decisive action
of the British cabinet — the fleet to
the Dardanelles, 110, Palmerston's
negotiations, 113, and warning,
114, successful result of united
action of England and France, 114,
Palmerston's objection to confine
ment of the refugees, 121, their
ultimate release, 124. General

EEL
Haynau and Barclay's draymen.
169; rivalry of Prussia in" Ger
many, 170 ; her position, 172 ; non-
attendance at Wellington's funeral,
255. Abrupt menace of the French
emperor, 362, conclusion of the
Austro-French war, 365, Palmer
ston's objections to the French
peace proposals, 366, conference at
Zurich, 367, sympathy of th&
English court, 369, hostihty attri
buted to Palmerston, 371. His
efforts for ItaUan unity, 372 ; his
memor.indum on pohcy towards
Italy, 380 ; ultimate results of the
war, 385 ; raises difficulties in the
negotiations concerning the Polish
outbreak, 421. The Sleswig-Holstein
difficulty, outbreak of war, 430,
warning from Palmerston that
English fleet would foUow that of
Austria to the Baltic, 432 .
Azeglio, M. de, acknowledges Palmer
ston's aid to Italy, ii. 94

BALEARIC ISLANDS, Assembly
of French squadron with inten
tion to seize„the, i. 386
Ballot, the. His objection to, ii. 245
Belgium : growing importance of the
Belgian question, i. 212 ; discontent
in, 215 ; M. Van der Weyer's mis
sion to England, 216 ; constitution
of the Netherlands kingdom, 217 ;,
grievances of Belgium, 219 ; popu
lation of Belgium and HoUand
(jiote"), ib. ; English attitude to,,
223 ; difficulties of the Belgic ques
tion, 228 ; crown offered to Due de
Nemours, 229, British objections,
234, selection of Prince Leopold,
230 ; earliest French concessions,
233 ; Baron de Chokier appointed
regent, 239 ; the dismantling of
the fortresses, 246 ; French claims
to territory, 247, 248 ; Leopold's-
objection, 261 ; hesitation of the
Belgians, 252 ; their pretensions
rebuked, 253 ; new conditions of
separation, 257; English resolve
to recognise Leopold, 258 ; Leopold
becomes king, 260 ; advance of the
Dutch into, 261 ; entrance of the
French, 262 ; Palmerston's refusal .
to treat of the fortresses whilst
the French are in Belgium, 266 ^

INDEX.

489'

BEE
marked result of this firmness (note)
266, and French concessions, 268,
final success of the negotiations,
271, 275 ; Leopold's wish to retain
French troops, 272, Palmerston's
objection, 273 ; he points out dan
ger of conceding territory, 272,
Talleyrand's secret negotiation for
partition, 272 ; judicious action of
Leopold, 277; Palmerston's policy
tested by the position to-day, 280,
beneficial results of EngUsh poUcy,
321; high position of King Leopold,
322
Berryer, M., French oratory and,
i. 478
Beyrout surrendered to Admiral Stop-
ford, i. 382
Bloomfield, Lord : refused an au
dience by the Czar, 123
Blucher, Maa-shal : attempted escape
with Hohenlohe after Jena, i. 29 ;
tribute to, 30
Borough franchise, Transfer of, i. 129 ;
difficulties of, 149
Borough seats. Traffic in, i. 31
'Bottle-holder, The Judicious,' origin
of the term, ii. 125
Bowring, Sir John, sent to Naples,
i. 327 ; Palmerston's opinion of
him, ib.
Bribery at elections in 1841, i. 407
Bright, John, Right Hon. : accuses
Palmerston of levity in his speech
on Sir C. Napier, ii. 294, Palmer
ston's reply, ib., opinions upon it,
ib. ; isolated position towards the
Crimean war, 325 ; loses his seat,
346
Broadlands, Account ot^ i. 299
Brougham, Lord : Palmerston's reply
to, i. 73 ; Palmerston's opinion of,
112 ; iu France after the revolution
and desire to be naturalised, ii. 81 ;
motion on foreign affairs, 96, and
its defeat, 98
Brunnow, M. de: friendly action of
Russia through, i. 361 ; discussion
with, on the demand for the de
livery of the Hungarian refugees,
ii. 108 ; letter to, 420
Brunswick, Duke of : his death, i. 26 ;
contemptuous treatment of, by
Napoleon, ib. ; his courage, 28
Bunsen's, M., communication to Pal
merston on Swiss affairs, ii. 6
Butler's, General, proclamation at

CAV
New Orleans: Palmerston's sym
pathy with its victims, ii. 105
Byron's, Lord, sympathj' with Greece^
i. 114
CAMBRIDGE University : success
fully contests it with Copley, 92 f
again returned, 96, gratifying re
sult of re-election, 97, and its inci
dents, ib.
Canada : despatch of troops to, after the
' Trent affair,' ii. 412 ; Palmerston's
watchful guard of, 415, shown in
his last few days, 455
Canning, Mr. : becomes foreign secre
tary, 90; made premier, 104; embar
rassment in connection with his offer
•of the Exchequer to Palmerston, 107;
difficulties in formation of ministry,
108 ; death. 111 ; what was a Cau-
ningite ? 124 ; tribute to Canning
and his party, 125 ; compared with
Chateaubriand, 209 ; the Quadruple
AUiance, the completion of his poUcy,
301
Canton, Capture of, ii. 368
Capo d'Istria, Assassination of, i. 281
Carlos, Don : pretensions of, i. 283 ;
hopelessness of his cause, 330, 339
Casimir P^rier : becomes premier of
France, i. 230 ; appreciation of, 241,
253 ; encouraged, 259 ; agreement
¦with Sebastiani, 264, note ; assur
ance from, ib. and 265
Catholic Emancipation : limited relief
proposed by Lords GrenviUe and
Howick, i. 35,. George III.'s objec
tions, ib., Perceval's opposition,
38, Lord Palmerston's comments
thereon, 39 ; advocated by him, and
his reasons, 71 ; opposition of the
anti-Catholics, 91 ; Palmerston re
turned for Cambridge University
as its advocate, 91; Wellington's
change of attitude towards, 165 ;
speech on, 190 ; accepted by-
George IV., 193
Catholic University, Palmerston's ob
jection to a, ii. 444
Catholic vote. The, and Italy, ii. 443 ;
and the colleges, ib.
Catholics, Proposed State aid to, i.
464
Cavour, Count : retains Palnierston's
translation of Garter Oath as an ar
chive, ii. 235 ; conference at Zurich
and his resignation, 367

490

INDEX.

CHA
Character, His : general characteris
tics, i. i ; its completeness, ii. 458 ;
tenacity, 469 ; frankness and sim-
pUcity, 460 ; his knowledge of cha
racter, 461 ; loyalty to his subordi
nates, 463 ; protection of them, and
ministers abroad, 464, firm rule of
ministers abroad, 466, protection of
Englishmen abroad, 467 ; thought
fulness for and attention to others
468 ; absence of rancour, 470; abUity
to dismiss business from his mind,
ib, ; freedom from red-tapeism, 471;
fearless truthfulness, ib. ; not a
strong partisan, ib. ; deUght in
private Ufe, 472 ; influence of Lady
Palmerston's salon, ib. ; kindness
to his neighbours, 473 ; thought
fulness (for the masses, 474 ; his
identification of himself witii his
country, and resulting moral in
fiuence, 476
Charles X : Palmerston's account of
the critical state of his government
in 1829, i. 204
Chartists, the : ii. 80 ; special con
stables sworn in, ib. ; receive no
sjTupathy, ib. ; contemptuous hear
ing given to Smith O'Brien in the
House, 80
< ChUtern Hundreds, The,' refused to
Lord Chelsea by Mr. Goulburn ;
and Palmerston's protest, i. 448
China: Capture of Chusan,i.396; affairs
in China, 397 : opium-smuggling,
ib. ; reasons leading to the war with,
397 (note), 398 ; cession of Hong
Kong, 398 ; the ' opium war,' 406 ;
successes in, 457 ; threatened dis
turbance in, ii. 33 ; Palmerston's
views on, ib. ; outrages of Com
missioner Yeh, 344, Cobden's reso
lution on, 345 ; capture of Canton,
358 ; successful operations in second
war, 460
Chokier, Baron de, appointed Regent
of Belgium, i. 239
Cholera in England, in 1849, iii 101 ;
reappearance in 1863, 265 : Palmer
ston's celebrated despatch concern
ing ' a fast day,' ii., 266 '
Christina, Queen: Christina and Fer
dinand, i. 282 ; her tact as Queen-
Regent, 283 ; driven from Spain,
386
Church Patronage, His treatment of,
ii. 417

COM
Cinque ports. Installation as Warden
of, ii. 403
Clarence, Duke of : see WiUiam IV.
Clarendon, Lord (when Geo. VUliers') :
and M. de Torrens, i. 332 ; imfoun-
ded Spanish charge against, 384 ;
imprudent language to France on
Eastern affairs, 376 ; letters on Irish
affairs, ii. 47, 60 ; on Dr. McHale,
50 ; succeeds Lord RusseU at the
P.O., 266, Palmerston's approval of
the appointment, ib.; Palmerston's
tribute to, 273 ; disagreement -with
Palmerston's desire to act promptly
against Russia, 279 ; distinct refusal
to aid Lord RusaeU, 305; attends the
Congress of Paris, 325
Classic oratorv no longer demanded
in House of Commons, ii. 483
Clive, Lord, sent to Palmerston by
WeUington, i. 211
Clyde, Lord, Instant despatch of, to
the Indian Mutiny, ii. 348
Cobden, Mr. : on international arbi
tration, ii. 60 ; letter to, 413 ; pro
posed reduction of armaments, 187,
Palmerston thereon, 188 ; resolution
on the China outrages, 345, loses his
seat on the consequent dissolution,
346 ; decUnes Palmerston's offer of
the Board of Trade, 364 ; letter to, on
national defences, 413 ; successful
reply to, when attacked, 416 ; con
cludes treaty of commerce with
France, and refuses titular distinc
tion, 449
Cockburn, Sir Alexander: Palmer
ston's tribute to his speech on the
Greek debate, ii. 161
Codrington, Admiral : dissatisfaction
¦with, i. 145; his^upineness after
Navarino, 174
Coercion-biU : The, effect of, i. 303 ;
Lord Althorp and Mr. Stanley on
it, 303 ; Littleton's indiscreet com
munication to O'ConneU on it, 306
Coletti, M. (the Greek Premier), ii.
134 ; his character traced by Palmer
ston, ii.
Colonial Office, the, Palmerston under
takes supervision of, ii. 312
Colonial possessions. Value of our, i.
76 ; parallel cases, 76 ; Palmerston's
opinion of, 77
Commons, House of. Leadership of the:
Palmerston's distaste to, i. 113, 310 ;
Tiemey's claim to, 113

INDEX.

491

CON
Confidence of the people, in Palmer
ston, the reason of his success, ii.
486
¦' Conspiracy to Murder ' BUI : its intro
duction, ii. 354 ; threats of ' the
French Colonels,' and change of
feeling in the House, 355 ; Milner
Gibson's amendment, 355 ; Disraeli's
quick change of sides, and suspec
ted agency of Lord Derby, id.; op
position of RusseU and Gladstone,
356 ; defeat of, ib.. Lord Derby's
later acknowledgment of accidental
nature of this defeat, 357
Continental tour in 1844, i. 475
Continental troops, Criticism of, i. 86
Convocation, Restricts ambition of, ii.
444
Corfu, Palmerston's estimate of value
of, ii. 184
Cornelius, (the fresco-painter). Inter
view with, i. 480
Corn-laws. See Free Trade
Corn-resolutions, Difficult position of
WeUington cabinet in respect to, i.
133
Coronation, the. Influx of state per
sonages at, i. 345
Correspondence, His : examples of its
character and variety, i. 92 ; its
directness, ii. 476 ; absence of aU
offence, 477 ; power of conveying
good-natured reproof, ii. ; its toler
ance of just independence, 478 ; re
proof of subterfuge, ii. ; outspoken
ness, 479 ; characteristic lightness,
ib. ; clearness, and demand for the
same from others, i. .82, 413 ; ii.
479 ; its civil brevity, 480 ; hap
piness of phrase and description,
481 ; its nicety when requisite, 482 ;
its use of homely iUustrations, 482.
Costa-Cabral's, Senhor, influence dur
ing the civU war in ]?ortugal, ii. 17
County franchise: its extension de
feated, ii. 179
Coup d'etat. The. Sec France
Cowley, Lord : on the inefficiency of
lie Austrian armv, i. 173 ; letters
to, ii. 171, 371, 386, 395, 445 ; at
tends Congress of Paris with Cla
rendon, 326 ; Palmerston's letter to,
on his supposed hostility to Austria,
371 ; idem, giving reasons for dis
trust of, designs of Napoleon, 395
Cracow and ' The Holy AUiance,' ii. 81
Creptovich, Count: interview with.

DEF
ii. 331 ; reasons for delay in his pre
sentation, 335
Crimean -War, The : the Jerusalem
question the flrst inkling of it, ii.
188 ; Palmerston's proposed media
tion, 191 ; the crossing of the Pruth,
274 ; the fleet to Constantinople,
283 ; Palmerston urges descent on
Crimea, 294, unpreparedness of the
French, 295 ; expedition to the
Crimea, 29?; battle of the Alma,
ib. ; false report of fall of Sebastopol,
ib. ; Crimean disasters, 301, Mr.
Roebuck's motion for inquiry, ii.;
active measures of Palmerston as
premier, 308 ; his instructions to
Lord Raglan, ii. ; death of Emperor
Nicholas, 310 ; aUiance with Sar
dinia, ib. ; Conference of Vienna,
310, hesitation of the French, 315 ;
result of Palmerston's energy and
attention to details, 318; refusal of
foreign contingents, 319 ; faU of
Sebastopol, 322 ; imminent recall
of the French army, ii., decisive
refusal of the English cabinet, 323;
exhaustion of Russia, 325 ; end of
the war, 327, British plans for its
continuation if needful, ii. ; Palmer
ston's conduct of, 448
Croker, Mr. Wilson : acts as Welling
ton's intermediary with Palmerston,
i. 213 ; , graceful verbal encounter
between the two, 225
Cumberland, Duke of : interference in
politics, 162 ; Palmerston's opinion
of, ii. ; compared with the Duke of
Clarence, 163 ; the Duke of Sussex's
opinion of him, 164; ill-advised
interference of, 196 ;
Currency, Paper, Palmerston's opinion
of the evil of, i. 165

DALY, Father: Palmerston's open
treatment of his menace on -with
drawal of subsidy to Galway packets,
ii. 409
Danger of over-strength to a ministry,
i. 303
DardaneUes, the : the Straits closed,
i, 284 ; England accused of violat
ing treaty of, ii. 116, and Palmer
ston's defence, 120, defends stay of
fleet in, 118
Davis, Lieut., attempts his Ufe, i. 82
Defences.(see also Land Defences) : his

492

INDEX.

DEF
support ofthe militia ; ' England the
bulwark of freedom,' ii. 241 ; Letters
to Cobden and Gladstone on, 412
Defensive measures. His, approval of,
i.491
Delancey, Gen., Palmerston's obj ection
to Sir Da-vid Dundas's appointment
of, i. 57, and note, 58
Denman's, Lord, opinion of Daniel
O'ConneU's trial, i. 463
Derby, Earl of: (when Mr. Stanley)
on the Coercion bUl, i. 303 ; seces
sion from Lord Grey's ministry, 304 ;
position towards the Peel ministry,
315 ; (when Lord Stanley) attacked ,
by Lord Palmerston, 428 ; his
son (the present earl's) opinion of
him, ii. 140 ; leads adverse vote
against government on the Greek
question in the Lords, 150 ; failure
to form a ministry on resignation
of Lord John Russell, 179; letter
to, decUning to join his cabinet,
304 ; forms a ministry, ii. 230, Pal
merston refuses to join, ib. ; brings in
a MUitia bill supported by Palmer
ston, 231 ; weakness of his govern
ment, 236, 252 ; Palmerston's aid to
on Mr. Villiers' motion against
Protection, ii. 256 ; defeat of the
ministry on Disraeli's budget and
resignation, 257 ; attempt to form
a ministi'y on Aberdeen's resigna
tion, 804 ; offers leadership of Com
mons to Palmerston, ii.; other offers
to Gladstone and Sidney Herbei't,
ib.; suspected agency in defeat of
the ' Conspiracy to Murder ' bill,
356, succeeds to office on Palmer-
. ston's defeat thereon, 856, frank con
fession of accidental nature of it,
357; aided by Palmerston in settling
French affairs, 358 ; in a minority,
360 ; Reform-biU thrown out and
dissolution, ii., unfavourable result
of election, 362 ; renewed overtures
to Palmerston, ib.; resigns, ii.
Diplomacy : refusal of gifts by British
ministers, ii. 99 ; evils of the re
moval of ministers, ii. 129 ; diffi
culties of the diplomatist, 130 ;
'The Art of Diplomacy,' 149
' Diplomatic Relations with Rome '
BiU, passed, ii. 53 ; objections to
reception of Nuncio, ii.
Disraeli, Benj., Rt. Hon. : last effort for
Protection, ii. 96, support given to

EGY
the government by Sir R. Peel, ib. ;
remark on Palmerston's dismissal,
227 ; his budget more liked by the
opposition than supporters, 231 ;
only Disraeh and the premier, 236,
252 ; defeat of the government on
his budget and resignation, 267 ; at
tacks Palmerston on the China ques
tion, 345 ; rapid change of sides
on the ' Conspiracy to Murder BUI,'
and suspected influence of Lord
Derby, 365 ; tribute to the influence
of Lady Palmerston's salon, 473
Dissenters, The, and the Education
grant, ii. 34
Distress of the masses in 1842, i. 447 ;
affirmed by Palmerston, ib.; in the
manufacturing districts, 450
Divorce Court Bill, Passes the, ii. 347|
Dockyard fortifications : advocacy of,
ii. 375, letter to Gladstone there
on, 375 ; success of the resolution,
378 ; pushed on in distrust of
French designs, 391
'Don Pacifico ' affair, The, ii. 126 ; (see
also Greece)
Dost Mahommed : defeat of, i. 396 ;
British support given to Soojah
Shah, 399
Drouyn de Lhuys : letter to, ii. 138 ;
ordered back to Paris in consequence
of apprehended hostilities, 146, Wel-
Ungton's happy comment thereon,
ib.
Dudley, Lord : hesitation to leave the
Wellington Cabinet, i. 123; his
part in it, 127, 129 ; his ultimate
resignation and reasons for it, 160
Dundas, Sir David (Commander-in-
chief) : pretensions to supremacy
over Secretary at War repeUed by
Lord Palmerston, 66
Durham's, Lord, opimon of Lord Mel
bourne, i. 308, note

 and his intrigues. Account of,
i. 454
' Ecclesiastical Titles ' Bill and papal
aggression, ii. 172 ; Cardinal Wise
man's position towards it, 174
Egypt : treat}' for the evacuation of
me Morea, i. 173, its completion,
177; successes of Mehemet Ali, 283,
Palmerston's opinion of his designs,
284 ; powerful position of Mehemet
AU, 348, declares his independence,-

INDEX.

493

ILL
350, English cabinet decides to
give naval support to Turkey, 361 ;
French designs on Egypt, 368 ;
defeat of the Turks at Nezib, ii. ;
surrender of the Turkish fleet by
Achmet Pacha, 359 ; French pro
posal for a new boundary, 368;
Mehemet All's threats, 366, terms
offered by the Four Powers, 374;
blockade of Syrian coast, 882 ; Bey
rout surrenders to Admiral Stopford,
382, Sidon stormed by Sir C.Na
pier, 382, defeat on the Lebanon by
marines under Sir C. Napier, ii. ;
Louis PhiUppe's fear of Mehemet
All's power, 391, echoed in London,
ii., fallacy shown by easy defeat,
ii. ; capture of St. Jean d'Acre, 894 ;
final submission of Mehemet Ali,
401 ; Palmerston resists French de
signs on, ii. 388, insists on right
of transit, ii.
EUenborough, Lord : recall of, i. 465 ;
censure of Lord Caiming and resig
nation, ii. 360, note
EUice, Mr. Edward : high eulogy of
Palmerston's speech, i. 343 ; letter
to on the American civU war, ii. 405
Enlistment Act, Debate ou the Tory,
i.345
Enlistment question with the United
States : our minister receives his
passports, ii. 886, we do not reta-
Uate, ii.; debate in the House and
Palmerston's reply, ib.
Espartero, Marshal, made Regent of
Spain, i. 386
Esterhazy, Prince : conversation with
on foreign affairs, i. 293 ; agree
ment on Eastern affairs, 362
Europe : unsettled state of in 1830, i.
216; state of in 1832, 281 ; disturb
ances in, in 1847, ii. 2 ; state of
politics m 1860, 164; Contmental
exaltation on Palmerston's supposed
downfaU, 213 ; effect of his absence
from the Foreign Office on Conti
nental affairs, 272
Evans, General Sir de Lacy, Defeat of,
i. 342

FACTORY ACT, Lord Ashley's, i.
460 ; supported by Pahnerston, ti.;
curious incident in connexion with
it, 460
Famine iu Ireland, The, ii. 34

FBA
Father, His : letter to Dugald Stewart,
i. 9, death of, i. 11
Fenian disturbances, Palmerston's
energy concerning, in his last daj-s,
ii. 464
Ferdinand Emperor (of Austria) : his
abdication foreseen byPalmerston, u.
84
Fixed Duty and the Sliding Scale, i.
419 ; Palmerston's advocacy of the
former, 420
Flahault, Comte de : Palmerston's ar
guments to, i. 285 ; plain explana
tions to, showing his distrust of the
French Emperor, u. 392
Force under arms in 1810, i. 63 ; in
1816, 73.
Four Powers, Treaty of the, i. 369 ;
good results of, 398
Fox, Charles James : health of, i. 18 ;
his anxiety to conclude peace,
ii. ; death of, 22 ; Palmerston's
opinion of, 22
France: French army sent to the
Morea, i. 170 ; attitude towards
Greek slavery, 176 ; feeling in
France, in 1829, on European affairs,
186 ; prospei-ous state of, ii.; cu
rious state of Paris streets in 1829,
190 ; Palmerston's account of the
critical state of the government of
Charles X. in 1829, 204 ; reUgious
liberty the moving power iu, 210 ;
Casimir P&ier becomes premier,
230 ; aim to gain territory, 231, 239 ;
earliest concessions on the Belgic
question, 233 ; distinct language
used to, 236 ; attitude towards in
surrectionary movement in Modena
and Parma, 240 ; ovu satisfaction at
P^rier's appointment, 241 ; final
claim for territory, 246, concessions,
ib., revival of pretensions to ter
ritory, 248 ; Palmerston's denial of
her right to discuss fortress ques
tion, 249; appreciation of the friend
ship of, 253 ; reprisals in the Tagus,
255, British attitude thereupon,
256, 258 ; arrogant speech of Louis
PhUippe, 268, Talleyrand's expla
nation of it, ii.; entry of Frfench
army into Belgium, 262 ; agreement
of P^ricr and Sebastiani, 264, note ;
assurance from Perier, ii. and 265 ;
TaUeyrand's secret negotiations for
partition, 272; extreme language
of ' The Times ' towards, 272 ; oh a-

494

INDEX.

FEA f
racteristics of the nation, 275 ; dis
pute with the United States ; Bri
tish mediation, 328 ; Louis PhUippe's
inclination to aSpanish marriage,385;
gradual^ coolness towards EnglanS,
TaUeyrand's share in it, 331 ; effects
of her intrigues in Spain, Portugal,
and Greece, 336 ; Palmerston's com
plaints against her Government,
339 ; position of France and Russia,
362 ; her designs on Egypt, 358 ;
reservation under Soult's premier
ship in the agreement of the Powers
to support Abdul-Medjid, 359, Pal
mers ton'sopinion of her attitude, 360;
proposes a new boundary for Egypt,
363 ; danger to England of a Russo-
French alliance, 364; expected oppo
sition of Soult, 364 ; increase of her
navy, 365 ; her position, 866 ; admi
nistration of M.Thiers withM.Guizot,
367; suspicions of Louis PhUlppe,367,
exculpation of him, 368 (footnote);
French object in delay, 369 ; Thiers'
purpose fi-ustrated by execution of
the treaty of the Four Powers, ii.,
anger of Guizot and Thiers, 375,
imprudent language of Lords Hol
land and Clarendon, 375 ; indigna
tion in France, 376, threatening
language of Thiers and Guizot, 877,
Palmerston's opinion of her inten
tions, 378 ; protest against the lan
guage of the French ambassador at
Constantinople, 379 ; British naval
preparations, 380; France seeks
some concessions, 381. France and
Austria, 382; supposed plan to bum
the British fieet, and curious inci
dent, 383 ; possibihty of war with,
384, communication to Louis Phi
hppe thereon, 385 ; assembly of her
squadron with intention to seize
the Balearic Islands, 386, break up
of the Thiers' ministry, 388 ; Louis
PhiUppe's fear of Mehemet Ali, 391;
difficult position of Louis PhUippe,
892 ; Guizot succeeds Thiers, ii. ;
Guizot's better appreciation of the
position, ib. ; her participation in
thetreaty of the Four Powers refused
by Palmerston, 393 ; mediates be
tween England aud Naples, 403 ;
remains of Napoleon given up to her,
405 ; Palmerston's desire to con
clude Slave Trade Convention and
Guizot's jealousy, 411 ; difficulties

FEA
ofthe ministry, 414. French action in
Tahiti through Admiral deThouarS,
432, imprisonment of Mr. Prit
chard, 433, disavowed by Guizot,
434. Guizot's refusal to exercisfe-
the Slave Treaty, 444 ; suspected
concord between France and Ame
rica, 445 ; French occupation of
Algeria, '472 ; imminence of war
-with, 475 ; condition of in 1844,
478'; irritation in England to
ward, 479. The Spanish marriagesi^
and the Due de Montpensier, ii. 10,
Guizot's action in, and its' retribu
tive results, 12, causes leading to
downfaU of Louis Phihppe, ib. The
Quadruple Treaty and the civil war
in Portugal, 20 ; suggests union of
Spain and Portugal, and Palmer
ston's objections, 29 ; bribery of M.
Teste and attempted suicide, 40 ;
shortsighted policy of Guizot and:
Louis PhiUppe in the Sicihan revolt,
56 ; interference of the fleet in the
bombardment of Palermo, &c., 68.
The revolution in Paris (1848), 65,
causes leading to it, ii., vaciUation
and infatuation of Louis PhiUppe,,
66, Lord Nomianby's description, i.
67, undignified position of Guizot,.
,68,courageous conduct of theDuchess
d'Orleans, 70, effect of the news in
the House of Commons, ii., fears of
warUke action of the Provisional
Government, 72, attitude of England
towards, 73, Lamartine's circular, 75,
his reception ofthe Irish appeal and
Palmerston's remonstrance, 76, his
ultimate effective action, 77, atti
tude of England and Russia, 79,,
Foreign Office policy at this crisis,
ii. The French in Rome, 95 ; joint
action with England in the affair of
the Hungarian refugees and success-
fulresult, 114. Anti-British infiuence
in the ' Don Pacifico ' affair, 136,
desire of M, Thouvenel to despatch
fleet to Athens and better discretion
of the admiral, 138, ultimately offers
mediation, 140, limited acceptance
of the offers, 141, Baron Gros ap
pointed mediator, 140, his dilato
riness, 144, and resignation, 145,.
hostUe attitude to England and ap
prehensions of war, ii., confidence
of Palmerston, ii., Drouyn de
Lhuys ordered to return, 146-147.

INDEX.

495

FEA
Influence of the coup-detat, 191,
antagonistic position of the French
and Russian emperors, 192, criti
cal position of Napoleon, 198, his
position to the Assembly, 199, evi
dence of intended action of the latter
and the ex-royal famUy, 200, Napo
leon's marriage, ii. The Russians
cross the Pruth,alUed fleets atBesika
Bay, 274, and at Constantinople,285,
unpreparedness of tbe army in the
Criineau war, 295, expedition to
Crimea and battle ofthe Alma, 299,
French hesitation to proceed, Pal
merston's letter to the emperor, 315,
fall.of Sebastopol, influence of Aus
trian and Russian intrigue and im
minent recall of French troops, 322,
ffi-mness of British cabinet, 323,
Congress of Paris, 325, Walewski's
leaning to Russia, 325. Designs on
Egypt opposed by Palmerston, 338,
his insistance on right of transit, ii.;
the Orsini conspiracy, 353, threats
of ' the French colonels,' 354.
Abrupt menace to Austrian envoy,
362, conclusion of the Austro-
French war, 365, Palmerston's ob
jections to proposals of peace and
designs on Italy, 366, conference
at Zurich, 867, Palmerston's efforts
for Italian unity and ultimate
modifications, 370, his memoran
dums on our policy therein, 380,
demand for Savoy, 380, ultimate
results of the war, 385. The Le
banon massacres, successfiil Anglo-
French expedition, 385 ; French
territorial designs, 389 ; attitude to
Switzerland, 387; Palmerston's first
distrust, of the Emperor's designs,
explanations and preparations, 390 ;
his opinion of the French occupation
of Rome, 410 ; joint-note on the Po
lish outbreak declined by Palmer
ston, '421; his objections to propo-
'sal of a European Congress, 424 ;
obstacles thrown in the way of
interference in Sles-wig-Holstein,
430 ; Palmerston contrasts the friend
ship of the government and that
of the people, 445 ; his attitude to
France when premier, 449 ; conclu
sion of Commercial Treaty through
Cobden, ii. ; Palmerston decUnes
to join in interference in Mexico,
450.

GLA
Free trade: Palmerston's early advo
cacy of, i. 139; the 'Anti-Corn-
Law League, 419 ; the fixed duty
and the sliding scale, 419, Palmer
ston's speech in favour of the fixed
duty, 420 ; the Tory government
and free trade, 428; Palmerston's
speech on it, 443; Disraeli's last
attempt for Protection, ii. 96, atti
tude of Sir R. Peel, ii. ; Mr. Villiers'
final motion in condemnation of
Protection, ii. 266
FuUer, Mr. : disturbance in the House
of Commons, i. 60

GAETA, Surrender of, to the French.
i. 21
' Gaiter, a,' InstaUation as, at Glasgow,
ii. 423 ; amusing speech of Dr. Nor
man McLeod, ii.
George III.: his objections to CathoUc
reUef, i. 37
George IV. (os prince regent) : action
in the dispute between Sir David
Dundas and Lord Palmerston, i. 68 ;
(as hing) dislike to Lord Palmer
ston, 89, 106, preference for Herries,
ii. 106, 113 ; overrules Huskisson's
resignation, 136 ; at a drawing-
room, 1,41 ; share in Huskisson s
resignation, 154, refuses an audience
to Huskisson, 159 ; reception of
Donna Maria, 180 ; Peel's advice
to, in the Catholic question, 185 ;
accepts Catholic emancipation, 193
George, Prince, of Denmark, assisted
by Palmerston to the throne of
Greece, ii. 451
Germany : Palmerston's interest in
German affairs, i. 801 ; rivalry of
Austria and Prussia in, ii. 170.
Gibbs, Sir Vicary, i. 14 (footnote) ;
stands with Palmerston for Cam
bridge University, 14
Gladstone, W.E.: resigns from the Peel
cabinet, i. 488 ; allegations against
the Naples Government and counter
assertions, ii. 179, supported by
Palmerston, 181, effect in Naples,
182; tribute to Palmerston's fore
sight in selection of Crimea for seat
of operations, 800 ; asked to join
Lord Derby, 304 ; leaves Palmer
ston's ministry, 310 ; joins in attack
on Palmerston, 345 ; opposes ' Con
spiracy to Murder ' BiU, 356

496

INDEX.

GLA
¦Glasgow : -visit to, ii. 422
Goderich, Viscount : becomes premier,
i.' Ill ; the Goderich cabinet, 113 ;
difficulties with the King, 119 ;
Huskisson and Goderich, ii.
¦Gordon, Duchess of. Repartee of ; ' old
men and old women,' ii. 242
¦Graham, Sir James; secession from
Lord Grey's ministry, i. 304 ; his
position in 1847, ii. 35; leaves
Palmerston's ministry, 310
¦Grant, Mr. Charles (Vice-president
Board of Trade) : letter of resig
nation on the corn resolutions, i.
131 ; retires, 147
GranviUe, Lord : (the late) Palmer
ston's instructions to, on our rela
tions with France, 337; (the present),
succeeds Palmerston at Foreign
Office, ii. 213; caUed to form a
ministry, 363, limited assent of Pal
merston, ii., resigns the task, 364
•Great Britain : religious liberty the
moving power in, i. 210 ; prejudice
for the Dutch, 224; increasing favour
of reform in, 289 ; prosperity of, in
1888, 294 ; acts as mediator between
Prance and the United States, 323 ;
accession of Victoria, 340, creation
of peers, 344 ; effect on Bjitish sta
tus of Palmerston's foreign pohcy,
413 ; result ofthe elections of 1841,
416 ; the ten pound householder,
419 ; distress of the masses in 1842,
447, 450 ; imminence of war with
France, 475, popular iratation
against, 479 ; weakness of navy in
1844, 484; position of parties in
1845, 490 ; reviving prosperity of,
ii. 47 ; naval force in the Mediter
ranean in 1849, 113 ; accused of
violating Treaty of DardaneUes, 116,
Palmerston's defence, 116, 120 ; ex-
ceUent European effect of our action
in the Kossuth affair, 114 ; British
feeling in respect to Russian inter
ference in Greece, 143 ; state of par
ties in 1860, 164 ; necessity of land
defences appreciated by Palmerston,
176, Sir John Bmgoyne's opinion,
ii.; public sympathy on Palmerston's
supposed downfaU, 214, impression
of the completeness of it, 223, 227 ;
his support ofthe militia : ' England
the bulwark of freedom,' 241 ;
menacing attitude of France : de
fences pushed forward, 261 ; imani-

GBE
mity of the nation in the Crimean
War, 326 ; election of 1857 de
pendent on Palmerston's personal
prestige, 346 ; jumble of parties in
1860, 402 ; feeUng on the outbreak
of war between Prussia and Den
mark, 430, warlike feeling on this
occasion, and on the Polish out
break, restrained by Palmerston,
451
Great Exhibition of 1851, ii. 177;
apprehensions from influx of fo
reigners, 178 ; enthusiastic reception
of WeUington at, ii.
Greece : Palmerston's sympathy ¦with
Byron and the Greeks, i. 114 ;
battle of Navarino, 115 ; differences
in WelUngton cabinet on Greek
affairs, 126 ; Palmerston's advocacy
ot, 137, 139 ; adoption by the cabinet
of Palmerston's views, 170. Enslave
ment of Greeks after Navarino,
173, Palmerston's urgency for their
liberation, ii., indifference of the
English cabinet and its manoeuvres
in ttie House of Commons, 174, Pal
merston's appeal to Polignac, and
immaterial result, 176, halting po
licy of our Government towards,
177 (footnote). Discussion of Greek
affairs with Pozzo di Borgo, 188 ;
Palmerston's championship of, 201 ;
extension of territory, 281 ; ac
cession of King Otho, ii. ; evil
effects of French intrigue, 336.
British claims upon, ii. 101, the ' Don
Pacifico ' affair, 126, characteristics
of Greece, 126, ill-ad-vised conduct
of, 127, Capt. Lyons and King
Otho, 128, acknowledged financial
dishonesty, 130, Continental in
fluence at the com-t, 131, isolated
position of England, 132, support
of France and Russia, 136, ill-treat
ment of British subjects, ii., action
of Sir Thomas Wyse, 133, character
of M. Coletti, the premier, traced
by Palmerston, 134, intrigues
against Captain Lyons, 135, British
ultimatum, 136, Palmerston's de
fence of our attitude, 137, reprisals
made, 138, desire of M. Thouvenel
to send French fleet to Athens, 138,
ultimate offered mediation of the
French, and its limited acceptance,
140, firmness of Palmerston, 141 ;
covert hostihty of Russia, 142,

INDEX.

497

GEE
Baron Gros appointed mediator,
140, ' his dilatoriness, 144, and
resignation, 145, renevyal of em
bargo and ultimate success of Bri
tish claims, 146, adverse vote of
the Lords, led by tord Stanley,
150, debate in the Commons, 151,
Palmerston's defence of his policy,
151, triumph of the Government,
161. Prince George of Denmark
becomes King, assistance given by
Palmerston, 451
GrenviUe, Lord: opening speech in
Parhament, i. 34 ; proposes limited
relief to CathoUos, 36 ; the Gren
viUe clique, 89
Grey, Lord (as Lord Howick) : pro
poses hmited relief to Catholics, i.
37 ; (as Lord Grey), Wellington's
objections to, 211 ; becomes pre
mier, 213 ; his firmness, 265 ; Pal
merston's perfect accord with, 289 ;
strength of his ministry, 296, 300 ;
secession of Stanley aud Graham,
304 ; succeeded by Lord Melbourne,
306 ; Lord Palmerston's regret on
his retirement, 308
Guizot, M. : joins the government of
Thiers, i. 867 ; his anger at the
convention of the Four Powers,
375, threatening language of, 377 ;
succeeds Thiers, 392, his better
appreciation of the position, 392;
jesdous action to prevent conclusion
of Slave Trade Convention, 411;
disavowal of seizure of Mr. Pritch
ard, 434; refusal to expedite the
Slave Treaty, 444; his position
in 1845, 489 ; conduct in regard to
the Spanish marriages, and retribu
tive result in the revolution and his
downfall, ii. 10 ; undignified posi
tion, 'I'affaire Petit,' 68 ; reception
by Palmerston, 77; demonstration
of the natural results of his policy,
91

"prAMPSHIEE(South),Loses his seat
¦H for, i. 314
Hardinge, Viscount : opposition to an
nexation of the Punjaub, ii. 37;
Lord Palmerston's estimate of, 36 ;
on Russian intentions in Asia, 37
Hare, Francis : i.6 (footnote) ; boyish
correspondence ¦with, 4
Harrow School : education at, i- ^ ;
VOL. II. ^

HOE
visit to, and characteristic speech,
ii. 408
Haj-nau, General, thrashed by Bar
clay's draymen, ii. 169
Heathcote, Sir William, Attempted
coercion of, by Lord Temple, i. 33
Helps, Sir A., Palmerston's solicitude
for, when iU, ii. 464
Herbert, Sidney : Palmerston's good
opinion of, i. 488 ; letter to, on ' the
Vienna note ' and the situation, ii.
280 ; requested to join Lord Derby,
304 ; leaves Palmerston's ministry,
310
Herries, Mr., George IV.'s preference
for, as Chancellor of Exchequer, i.
106, 113
Heytesburg, Lord : mission to St.
Petersburg, i. 172 ; despatches to,
on Poland, 273 (footnote)
Hohenlohe's, Prince, attempted escape
with Blucher, after the battle of
Jena, i. 29
Holland : moderation of the Prince of
Orange, i. 216 ; constitution of the
Netherlands kingdom, 217 ; popula
tion of Holland and Belgium, 219
(footnote) ; British prejudice for,
224 ; new conditions of separation,
257; victorious advance into Bel-
gium,2gl ; improved position of, 276;
obstinacy of the king, 279 ; dubious
action of the Dutch, 286
HoUand, Lord : his interest in Palmer
ston's speech on Spanish affairs, i.
843 ; imprudent language to France
in favour of Mehemet Ali, 375 ;
death of, 387 ; his attitude to Pal
merston, ii. ; Palmerston's tribute
to, 888 ; letter from, u. 182
Home Office : Palmerston's selection
of, in the Aberdeen ministry, and
reasons, ii. 258 ; introduces ' Ticket
of Lciive,' prohibits intramural bu
rials, 262 ; extends Factory Act to
chUdren, ii. ; happy manner at ; in
stance 'the Rugeley deputation,'
263 ; duties of the office, 268 ; no
table despatch on application for
cholera fast-day, 266 ; refuses burial
under a church, 268
Hong Kong, Cession of, i. 898
Hood's, Sir Samuel, victory over the
French fieet off Rochefort, i. 23
Horrors of the Slave Trade, Descrip
tion of the, i. 467
Horsham, Unseated on petition for, i.13
K

498

INDEX.

HUM
Hume, Mr. Joseph, Palmerston's replv
to, i. 88
Hummelauer, Baron, comes as Aus
trian envoy, ii. 84
Hungary. See Austria
HusMsson, Mr.: Palmerston's opinion
of, i. 112 ; Goderich and Huskisson,
119 ; his independence in the Wel
Ungton cabinet, 128; Palmerston's
necessity to act as he did, 135 ;
George IV. overrules his resignation,
136 ; Palmerston's estimate of, 148 ;
Huskisson and Wellington, ib. ;
Wellington's determination to force
him to resign, and George IV.'s part
in it, 152 ; refused an audience,
169 ; resigns, 161

'TLIONE': success of this mare at
-'- Newmarket, i. 439 ; discussion as
to the name, 489
Income ta,x. Unpopularity of the, i.
446
India (see also Afghanistan) : designs
of Persia and Russia, i. 399 ; meet-
of Runjeet Singh and Lord Auck
land, 400 J victories in the Punjaub,
ii. 35, its annexation proposed, 37,
Viscount Hardinge's objections, ii.,
Palmerston thereon, and .on the
designs of Russia, 36, Wellington
and Hardinge on the designs of
Eussia and ' the Khyber Pass,' 37.
News of the mutiny, 348, instant
despatch of troops, ib., anxiety of
the Queen, ii., Palmerston's as
surances, ii., he declares must be
quelled by British forces alone, 351.
¦Transfer to the Crown, opposition in
Parliament, and unexpected over
whelming ministerial majority, 352
India, Viceroyship of, Palmerston de
clines, i. 89 ; and again, 107
Infanta, The, and the Spanish mar
riages, ii. 10
Ingilby's, Sir W., motion on the malt-
tax, i. 289 (footnote)
Intramural interments. He prohibits,
ii. 262
Ionian Islands, The : disaffection in, ii.
184 ; Palmerston's high estimate of
Corfu, 184, later modification of
his views concerning, 186
Ireland : Palmerston's management of
his estates in, 1. 47, 93, 99, 100,
117 ; his enthusiasm for, 198;

ITA
effect of the Coercion BiU, 303 ;
Lord John Russell ou Irish affairs,
ii. ; Irish measures in Lords and
Commons, 823 ; visit to, 438 ; trial
of O'ConneU, 462 ; proposed state
aid to Catlfolics, 464, the May
nooth Grant, 485 ; Palmerston ad
vocates liberality to, 487 ; the
railway mania in, 490 ; famine in,
ii. 34 ; priestly influence in, 46,
Pio Nono and the Queen's CoUeges,
46, his disapproval of proceedings of
the clergy, 63 ; Dr. McHale, 46, 60 ;
Lord Clarendon on Irish aifairs,
47, 50. Disturbances following the
French revolution, 76, appeal of
the revolutionists to Paris, ii., Pal
merston remonstrates with Lamar
tine, and effective action of the
latter, 77. Offer and refusal of Vice-
royalty, and reasons, 212 ; his opinion
ofthe demand for tenant-right^ 441 ;
the CathoUc vote and Italy and the
colleges, 443, Palmerston's objection
to a Catholic university ,444; Fenian
disturbances, 454
Ireland, secretaryship for, Palmerston
declines, i. 70
Isabella : proclaimed Queen of Spain,
i, 283 ; her attitude towards the
Spanish marriages, ii. 10
Italy. (See also Naples, Sardinia, Pio
Nono.) Encouragement given to
the King of Naples, i. 292, 295 ;
Austria and the Italian confedera
tion, 295, 299 ; Palmerston's policy
towards Austria and Italy, 295 ;
advice to, in 1847, ii. 3 ; position of,
12, 42, Austria's relation thereto,
and British views, 13 ; elements of
discord in, 14 ; Lord Minto's mis
sion to, 42; Sardinia and Charles
Albert, ib. ; Pio Nono, ii. ; Austrian
occupation of Ferrara, ii. ; influence
of Mazzini, ii. ; message to the
Grand Duke of Tuscany, 43 ; recep
tion of Lord Minto, 44 ; Austrian
action in, 45 ; revolution iu Sidly,
64 ; Palmerston's prophecy of a
united Italy, 57 ; imminent inter
ference of Austria, 63, Palmerston's
advice thereon, 64 ; effects of the
revolution in Paris, 78, appeals to
Great Britain, ii. Dispute -with
Austria and attitude of England,
84, expected independence of Lom
bardy, 84, complete Austrian sue-

INDEX.

499

JAM
¦cess and causes of disaster, . 87,
mediation of England and France,
¦88, Palmerston on the Austrians in
Italy and on natural barriers, 88,
weakness of, 92, failure of negoti
ations, ii., disaster of Novara, ii.,
French interests in the affair, and
our poUcy defined, 93, M. de
AzegUo's acknowledgment of Pal
merston's aid, 94 ; Palmerston's ef
forts for Italian unity at end of
Austro-French war, and ultimate
modifications, 370 ; memorandum on
policy to Italy in reference to France,
Austria, Sardinia, and the Pope, 380;
the Catholic vote and policy towards
Italy, 443 ; Palmerston's services to,
449
JAMAICA, Declines governorship of,
i. 107
Jena, Battle of, i. 24, 27 ; treachery at,
27 ; attempted escape of Hohenlohe
and Blucher after, 29
Jesuits, The, in Switzerland, u. 4, 8
Joubert's, M., incautious speech in
reference to French action towards
the Balearic Islands, i. 387
¦' Judicious Bottle-holder, The' : origin
of the title, ii. 125

KAFIR WAR, The, and Sir Harry
Smith, ii. 183
Khyber Pass, The : WeUington and
Hardinge on the annexation of the
Punjaub and Russian intentions,
36 ; its value, 39 ; Palmerston
thereon, 36
Kinglake, Mr., on Palmerston's in-
stmct for popular feeling, ii. 291
Kossuth : joint demand of Russia and
Austria for his delivery by the
Porte, ii. 107, attitude of Turkey
and support of England, 107, suc
cessful result of action of England
and France, 114 ; ultimate release
of, 124 ; reception in England, 183

LAMARTINE, M. : Palmerston's
confidence in, ii. 74 ; his circular,
75 ; remonstrance of Palmerston
concerning reception of the Irish
appeal, 76, his effective action, 77
Lamb, Sir F., Action of, as minister at
Lisbon, i. 130

LEW
Land defences : Palmerston's appre
ciation of necessity of, ii. 175, Sir
John Burgoyne thereon, 176 ; ad
vocates dockyard fortifications and
successfuUy passes resolution, 375
Landed interest : antagonism to that
of trade, i. 418 ; Sir R. Peel and the
landed interest, 452
Lansdowne; Lord (as Mr. Petty), de
feats Lord Palmerston for Cam
bridge University, i. 12 ; (as Lord
Lansdowne) Wellington's objec
tions to, 211 ; letters to, ii. 223, 253 ;
sympathetic letter to Palmerston
on his dismissal, 214, Palmerston's
reason for his reticence (loyalty),
given in letter to him, 223. Pal
merston's desire that he should be
premier, 250, general wish that it
should be so and his objections,
Palmerston's rejoinder, 251, new
Parhament meets, his conditional
assent, 255. Overcomes Palmer
ston's scruples to join the Aber
deen cabinet, 259
Lauderdale's, Lord, mission to Paris, i.
20 ; his return, 24
Layard's, Mr., motion on the Crimean
War, ii. 309
Lebanon, The : defeat of the Egyptians
in, by marines under Sir C. Napier,
i. 382 ; massacre of the Maron
ites ; Anglo-French expedition, ii.
386 ^
Leopold, King : selection of, as king of
Belgium, i. 280, his objections, 261,
our resolve to recognise him, 258,
becomes king, 260 ; his ¦wish to re
tain French troops, 272, Palmer
ston's objection, 278 ; judicious
action of, 277 ; letters from in ap
preciation of Palmerston's conductj
277 ; high position of, 322 ; his
cordial reception of Pahnerston,
475 ; testimony to Palmerston's ser
vices as foreign minister duringthe
French Revolution of 1848, ii. 74 ;
confidences between the king and
Palmerston : letter ofthe latter, 82;
letters to, 82, 421, 436; idem ou
Napoleon's proposal of a European
Congress, 424 ; idem on the Prusso-
Danish War, 487
Lewis, Sir George C. : eulogy of Pal
merston's speech in defence of his
Greek poUcy, ii. 162; joins Pal
merston's ministry, 810

ik2

500

INDEX.

LIB
Liberty, Popular, Palmerston's esti
mate of, i. 79
Lieven, M. and Madame de: depar
ture from England, i. 306 ; resent
ment of Madame Lieven on re
moval of hostUe feeling in France,
ii. 149
London, Treaty of, i. 182 ; successful
completion, 401
Louis PhiUppe : arrogant speech of,
i. 258; his interference in Spain,
aud earhest predilection for the
Spanish marriages, 325, 327 ; sus
picious conduct of, 367, excul-
paltion of, ."168 (footnote) ; commu
nication to, on threatened out
break of war, 385 ; his fear of
Mehemet AU, 391 ; difficult position
of, 392 ; the Spanish marriages and
causes leading to his downfaU, ii.
12 ¦; vacillation and infatuation of,
66-70
Lunacy as an excuse for murder,
Palmerston's objections to (Victor
Townley's case), ii. 441
Lyndhurst, Lord (as Mr. Copley) :
' contests Cambridge University
with Palmerston, i. 92 ; {^as Ijord
Lyndhurst)false charge against, 196

MC HALE, DR. Opposition of, ii.
46 ; Lord Clarendon on, 50
McLeod, iMr., Seizure of, by the
United States, i. 406 ; Palmerston's
firmness, 408
Mahmoud, Sultan : attempts to intro
duce civilisation, i. 346 ; his desire
to overthrow Mehemet Ali, 357,
his preparations, 358 ; his death, 359
Mahon's, Lord, attack on formation of
Spanish legion, i. 341
Maida, Victory of, i. 21
Maiden speech in Parliament, i. 44.
Malmesbury, Lord : correspondence
with, on Palmerston's refusal of the
Exchequer, i. 49-58 ; weakness of,
at the Foreign Office, ii. 236
Maria, Donna, at Windsor, i. 180 ;
reception by George IV. ib.
Maritime warfare declaration on, ii,
326 and footnote ; privileges of the
neutral flag, ii. ; privateering abo
lished, ii., refusal of agreement of
the United States, ii.
Marriage with Lady Cowper, i. 401

MIG
Mayjiooth grant. The, i. 485 ; Palmer
ston's letter on, ii.
Mehemet Ali : treaty with, for evacu
ation of the Morea, i. 173 ; successes
of, 283 ; Palmerston's opinion of his
design, 284; powerful position of,
348 ; declares his independence, 350 ;
Sultan Mahmoud's desire to over
throw him, 357 ; his threats, 366 ;
terms offered by the four Powers,,
374 ; Louis PhUippe's fear of, 391,
echoed in London, ii., fallacy shown
by easy defeat, ib. ; final submission
of, 401
Melbourne, Lord (as William Lamb) r
riots at his election, i. 87 ; position
in the WeUington cabinet, 136 ;
opinion of Wellington, 161 ; rea.sons
for leaving his cabinet, ii.; (as Ixird
Melbovrne), overtures from Wel
lington, 211 ; becomes premier, 308 ;
Lord Durh,-im's opioion of him, 308
(footnote) ; Palmerston's opinion of
the cabinet, 308 ; dismissed by Wil
liam rv., 309 ; becomes again pre
mier, 317; his opinion of Palmerston,
ii. ; Palmerston's difficulty ¦with a
section of the cabinet, 369, 381,,
leading to a letter tendering re
signation, with explanations, 370,
Melbourne requests its withdrawal,
asserting it would break up the
ministry, 373, the section yields,
374. Dissolution of Parliament, 409 ;
decline aud fall of the ministnv
409, 411 ; qualities of it, 416
MelvUle, Lord, Trial of, i. 17
Mendizabal, M. de, Rise and faU of, i.
334
Mettemich : Palmerston's opinion of
his policy in 1827, i. 117 ; his
change of front, 168 ; his duplicity,
172; Metternich and Switzerland,
806 ; Mettemich and ' his dear
Tories,' 309 ; decline of his infiuence,
324 ; cautioned concerning inter
ference in Swiss affairs, ii. 10 ; his
retirement, 57 ; iU-influence of his
example, 84 ; the result of his policy
demonstrated, 91
Mexico : the United States and, ii. 40 ;
Pahnerston objects to join France
in interference in, 450
Miguel, Don : attitude and duplicity
of, i. 130, 131 ; causes a panic in
Lisbon, 182 ; his foUy and con
trariety, 141 ; makes a coup d^Mat,

INDEX.

501

MIL
146 ; disastrous state of Portugal
under, 177, withdrawal of diplo
matic intercourse, ii. ; Miguelites
take Madeira, i79, repulsed at
Terceira, ii. ; decUning prospects
of, 292 ; surrender of, 306 ; threat-
esed return of, ii. 19
MiUtia BiU : Lord John RusseU's, ii.
229 ; Palmerston's objections, ii. ;
Lord Derby's, opposed by Lord J.
Russell, supported by Palmerston,
231
Minto, Lord : mission to Italy, ii. 66 ;
his reception ; his opinion of Pio
Nono, ii. ; instructions to, on the
SicUian revolt, 57
Modena and Pai'ma, Insurrection in,
i. 240 ; suppressed by Austria, ii. ;
attitude of France to, ii.
Morea, French expedition to, i. 172 ;
treaty with Mehemet Ali and its
ultimate evacuation, 173, 177
' Moming Chronicle, The,' Palmer
ston's connection with, i. 453, 456
Morpeth, • Lord : mission to the King
of Prussia, i. 26 ; inefficiency of, 27
Mother, his. Grief on death of, i. 11
(foot'note)
-Miulready's design for postal envelope,
i.406
Murray, Mr. Charles (consul-general
at Alexandria), letter to, ii. 99 ; on
Continental feeUng with respect to
Palmerston's downfall, 213
Mutiny in India : news of, ii. 348 ;
instant dispatch of Lord Clyde, ii. ;
rapid despatch of troops, ii. ; anxiety
of the Queen, and Palmerston's assu
rances, ii. ; his eulogy ofthe British,
not only soldiers, but civilians, and
especiaUy women, 349 ; declares ne
cessity to queU by British power
alone, 361

"VTAAS, LORD, letter to, about his
J- 1 horse ' Baldwin,' ii. 398
Napier, Sir Charles: Sidon stormed
by, i. 382 ; with his marines defeats
Egyptians in the Lebanon, ii. Ban
quet to, u. 291, Palmerston's speech
and tribute to, ii., Mr. Bright's
charge of levity and Palmerston's
bitter replj', 294, opinions upon it
Naples (see also SicUy) : encourage
ment given to the King, i. 292, 296 ;
relations with, in regard to chapels.

NAP
318 ; anticipated disturbances, 326 ;
mission of Sir John Bowring, 327 ;
Dispute with about the sulphur con
tract, 401, Palmerston's instructions
to Sir WiUiam Temple, 402, British
reprisals, 402, mediation of France,
403. Revolt in Sicily, ii. 64 ; British
claim upon, 101. Gladstone's aUe-
gations against, 179, supported by
Palmerston, 181; counter-assertions,
180, effect in Naples, 182. Affairs
in, ii. ; complaints concerning re
fugees in England, 264, Palmer
ston's opinion thereon, ii. ; he de
mands satisfaction for Bomba's
insults, 321
Naples, Prince of, proposed as King of
Belgium, i. 233
Napoleon I. : Lord Palmerston com
ments on his designs, i. 20 ; his idea
of ' peace,' 24 ; contemptuous treat
ment of the Duke of Brunswick, 26 ;
defeated at Pultusk, 34 ; letters to
TaUeyrand and Bernadotte, 46 ; de
livery of his remains to the Prench,
405
Napoleon III. : Palmerston's predUec-
tion for, 186. Influence of the coup
d'etat, 191, antagonistic position of
the Russian and French emperors,
192, critical position at this time,
198, popular and actual estimate o'f
his character at the time, ii,, his
position to the Assembly, 199, Pal
merston's opinion of it, ib., the coup
d^etat, 200, e-vidence of intended ac
tion of the Assembly and ex-Royal
family, 200. His marriage, 261,
Palmerston's approval of it, ii. ;
visit to, 800 ; appearance of the
Empress, ii. ; letter to, ii. 315 ; in
fluence of Russian and Austrian
intrigue on, 322. At Osborne, con
ference with Palmerston on the
Principalities, 339, result of policy
adopted, ii., mutual feelings of the
two men, 340. Takes umbrage at
Palmerston's eulogy of British in
India ; the intention not disavowed,
351 ; the Orsini conspiracy, 353 ;
visited by Palmerston, and conver
sation, 359 ; abrupt menace to Aus
tria at the New Year reception, 362 ;
Palmerston's estimate of, 386, his
first distrust of, reasons given to
Lord J. RusseU and Duke of Somer
set, to Persigny and Flahault, 390 ;

502

INDEX.

,NAT
proposes European Congress, 424,
Palmerston's objections, ii.
Natural barriers, Palmerston on, ii,
89
Naturalised citizens, Palmerston's de
fence of the rights of, ii, 117
Naval force in the Mediterranean in
1849, ii, 113
Navarino, Battle of, i, 115
Navigation Laws, Repeal of the, ii. 59
Naw, 'The: Palmerston's reliance on,
i, 234, 288 (footnote) ; its weakness
in 1844, 484 ; supposed French plan
to burn our fleet and curious inci
dent, 383
Neaves', Lord, lines on Palmerston's
mare ' Ilione,' i, 489
Nemours, Due de: offered the crown
of Belgium, i, 229, Enghsh objec
tions to, 234 ; evidence of intended
action of the ex-Royal family before
the coup d^etat, ii, 200
Neutral fiag. The privUeges of the,
estabhshed, ii, 326
Newcastle, Duke of (as Lord Lincoln),
Palmerston's good opinion of, i. 488 ;
(as Duke of Newcastle) letter to, on
requirements of Crimean campaign,
u, 298
Newto-wn (Isle of Wight), Elected for,
i. 16
'New Whig Guide, The,' Contribu
tions to, i, 226 (footnote)
Nicholas, Emperor : health of, i. 344 ;
visit to England, 466, at Ascot, ii. ;
antagonistic position of the Empe
rors Nicholas and Napoleon, ii, 192 ;
death of, 810 ; contrasted with his
successor, 329
Normanby, Lord, his description of
the revolution in Paris, 67, Palmer-
i, ston's letter to him thereon, 71 ; a
hint to, 141, Instruction to, con
cerning the coup d'etat, 202, his hos
tihty to Napoleon, 203, his actions,
204, despatches to and from, -with
Palmerston's comments, 204, Wa
lewski's evidence in the affair, 203,
216, 224

O'BRIEN, SMITH, Contemptuous
reception of, by the House, ii. 80
Obstructive power of individual mem
bers of Parliament, i, 466
O'Connell, Daniel : elected for Clare,
i. 181 i vital effect of the election.

PAL
ii, ; peaceable behaviour of his sup
porters, 181 ; Littleton's indiscreet
communication to, on Coercion BiU,^
i, 306, Trial of, 462, Lord Denman's
opinion thereon, 468, imprisoned,,
466, released, 481,
O'Connor, Feargus, and the Chartists^
ii, 80
Old things, English liking for—' The
Old Hat ' Tavern, ii, 240
' Old women and old men,' repartee of
the Duchess of Gordon, ii, 242
' Opium war,' The Chinese, i, 406
Opposition, Palmerston's activity in^
i, 436
Orange, Prince of: moderation of, i.
216 ; Palmerston's predilection for,
230
Oratory, his : his style in debate, i.46 ;
examples of his powers in, 83 ; pre
paration of, in his early years, ii, 483,
abandoned in his later, ii, ; House
of Commons no longer demands
classic oratory, ii, ; able description
of Palmerston's oratory by ' Moming
Star,' 483
Orleans, Due de : impression of, i, 289 ;
his death, 451
Orleans, Duchesse de. Courageous con
duct of the, in the French revolution,
ii, 70
Orsini conspiracy. The : ii, 363 ; intro
duction of the ' Conspiracy to Mui"
der ' Bill, 364
Otho, King : accession of, i, 281

PALMELLA, MARQUIS OF, and
Wellington, i. 178
Palmerston, Lady (when Lady Cow
per), at Almack's, i. 86 ; marriage
with Lord Palmerston, 401 ; (when
Lady Palmerston) his portrait pre
sented to her by the House of
Commons, ii, 100, 162 ; her hus
band's tenderness for, in his last iU-
ness, 463 ; influence of her ' salon,*^
Disraeli's tribute to it, 472
Palmerston, Lord : dates at which he
took office, 3 ; parentage, 4 ; educa
tion, ii,; boyish correspondence with
Francis Hare, 4 ; his youthful man
liness at Harrow, 8 ; a pupil of Du
gald Stewart, 9 ; his father's death,
11 ; grief at the loss of his mother
(footnote) 11; defeated hy Petty for
Cambridge University, 12 ; takes

INDEX.

503

PAL
his degree, 13 ; unseated on petition
for Horsham, 18 ; again defeated
for the University, 14; appointed
junior lord of the -Admiralty, 14 ;
elected for Newto-wn, 16 ; Mr, Can
ning's wish to appoint him to the
Foreign office, 42 ; his maiden
speech in Parliament, 44, his opinion
of the speeches of others, ib., his
style in debate, 46 ; management of
his estates, 47, 93, 99, 100, 117;
made a Privy CounciUor, 49 ; offered
Chancellorship of the Exchequer,
49, accepts instead Secretaryship
at War, 50, reasons for declining
the Chancellorship and correspon-
lence with Lord Malmesbury, 51;
variety of his occupations, 59, 92 ;
his ¦ universality, 64 ; successful de
fence of the civil position of the
Secretary at War against the pre
tensions of Sir David Dundas, 66 ;
refuses Secret aiTship for Ireland,
70 ; advocates Catholic emancipa-
' tion, 71, 91, his reasons for so do
ing, 71 ; reply to Henry Brougham,
73 ; his opinion of "the value of
a vast empire, 77 ; visit to Paris
in 1815, descriptive letter, 81 ; at
tempt on his life by Lieutenant
Davis, 82 ; lucidity of his corres
pondence, ii., 413 ; examples of his
debating power, 83 ; reply to Joseph
Hume, 88 ; comparative isolation in
politics, 89, 318 ; decUnes Governor-
Generalship of India, 89 ; George
IV.'s dislike to him, ib., 106 ; re
turned for Cambridge University
as an advocate of Catholic eman
cipation, 91, second election, 96 ;
doings on the turf, 93, 99 ; charac
teristic and varied correspondence,
92 ; comparative silence in the
House, 102, 317 ; called to the
Cabinet, 105 ; offered ChanceUor-
ship of Exchequer by Canning, ii.,
intrigues against his appointment,
and Canning's embarrassment, 106,
offered Governorship of Jamaica,
107, second offer of Governor-
Generalship of India, ii. ; his dis
cernment in connection with his
distaste to lead in the Commons,
112 ; his opinion of Huskisson, ii.,
and of Brougham, ib. ; sympathy
with the Greeks, 114; opmion on
European policy in 1827, 116; ob-

PAL
jection to Turkish pohcy in 1829,
118 ; reasons for remaining with
the WeUington Cabinet, 122 ; neces
sity to act with Huskisson, i85 ;
his advocacy of Greece, 137, 139,
201 ; his early advocacy of Free
Trade, 139 ; leaves the 'W'-ellington
Cabinet, and speech in defence of
the action, 162 ; opinion of the
evil of paper currency, 165 ; in
clines the cabinet to his views on
Greece, 170 ; correctness of his view
of the Eastern question, 171, later
adoption of it, 172 ; his urgency for
the liberation of the Greek slaves,
174, appeal to Polignac thereon,
and immaterial result, 176 ; opinion
of the position of Turkey, 187 ;
second -visit to Paris, 186 ; speech
on CathoUc emancipation, 190 ;
speech on foreign affairs, 194 ; en
thusiasm for Ireland, 198 ; able
speech on Portugal, 199; his treat
ment of foreign affairs, 203 ; ex
ample of his foresight, 210; over
tures from Wellington through Lord
CUve, 211, interview -with Wel
lington, 213, Croker's endeavour to ¦
influence him, 213 ; succeeds Lord
Aberdeen at the Foreign Office, ii.,
characteristic letter, ii. ; personal
appearance in 1830, 223 ; his re
hance on the navy, 234, 288 (foot
note); distinct language used to the
French, 236 ; predilection for the
Prince of Orange, 230, 242 (foot
note) ; defines the correct poUcy of
France, 242, 250 ; insists on inviola
bility of treaties, 245 ; his charac
teristic firmness, 247; decisive denial
of French right to discuss fortress
question, 249 ; rebukes Belgian
pretensions, 268 ; appreciation of
friendship with France, and of
Casimir Perier, 258 ; urges re
tirement of the French from Bel
gium, 262 ; encourages parliamen
tary discussion, 264 (footnote) ;
straightforwardness cf his diplo
macy ,265; marked result of his firm
ness with France in the Belgic for
tress question,266and/ooteo«c, points
out danger of conceding territory,
272 ; sympathy with tbe Poles, 273 ;
final success of his Belgic policy,
275, his policy towards Belgium
tested by position to-day, 280 ; per-

504

INDEX.

PAL
fectaccordwith Lord Grey, 289; de
spatch of business, 299 ; the Quad-
rupleAlliance entirely his doing, 300;
regret at Lord Grey's retirement,
308 ; again demurs to lead in the
Commons, 810 ; loses his seat for
South Hants, 314 ; public estimate
of him in 1835, 317 ; succeeded at
Foreign Office by WeUington, 318 ;
returned for Tiverton and goes back
to Foreign Office, 318 ; initiates
formation of Spanish legion, 319 ;
justifies his interference in foreign
affairs, 319 ; his treatment of
Talleyrand, 331 ; his principle of
treating ' men as they are,' 336 ;
instructions to Lord GranviUe on
our relations with France, 337;
complaints against France, 339 ;
defends formation of Spanish legion
against Lord Mahon, 341, and his
foreign policy, 342, eulogy of his
speech by Edward EUice and Lord
HoUand, 343 ; protection of British
interests his guiding star, 346 ; sug
gests convention with l^rance on
Eastern affairs, 351 ; his opinion
of affairs in Europe in 1838, his
plan of concerted action, 352 ;
his constant endeavour to upset
the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 363 ;
his opinion of the attitude of
France, 360. His difficulties with
a section of the cabinet, 369, 381,
tenders resignation to Melbourne,
letter and explanations, 370, Mel
bourne requests its withdrawal,
stating it will break up the minis
try, 873, the sectinn yields, 374. Pal
merston's opinion of the attitude
of France, 378 ; declines to aUow
French participation in the treaty of
the Four Powers, 393 ; marriage
-with Lady Cowpei-j 401 ; goes out
of power with the MIelbourne minis
try, 411 ; his desire to conclude
Slave Trade Convention, and Gui
zot's jealous}', 411 ; effect of his
foreign policy on status of England,
413 ; foreign estimate of it, 416 ;
his poUcyemphaticaUy English, ii. ;
speech against the sliding scale,
420 ; denounces the Ashburton
Treaty ; 423 ; exposition of his
foreign policy, 424; able speech
against the Government, reviewing
past events, 426 ; attacks Lord

PAL
Stanley, 428 ; claims credit for past
treaties, 430 ; boldness of his atti
tude, 431 ; his position towards Lord
John RusseU, 432 ; his activity in
opposition, 435 ; his earnestness for,
abolition of slavery, 436 ; pubUc
estimate of him in 1841, 437 ; -visit
to Ireland and Wales, 438 ; speech
on the sliding scale and freedom of
trade, 443 ; affirms distress of the
masses in 1842, 447 ; supports Lord
Ashley's Mining Act, ii. ; objects
to Mr, Goulburn's refusal of the
Chiltern Hundreds to Lord Chelsea ;
449 ; his opinion of Lord Ashburton
and his treaty, 452 ; his independent
position, 453 ; Lord William Rus
sell's tribute to his foreign pohcy,
453 (footnote); connection with
' The Moming Chronicle,' 453, 456 ;
in reply to Mr, Roebuck, vindicates
his Afghan and foreign policy, 467 ;
supports Lord Ashley's Factory
Act, 460, curious incident in con
nection with it, ii. ; his detestation
of the slave trade, 467 ; speech
criticising Lord Aberdeen's foreign
poUcy, denouncing concessions, and
contrasting his pwn^ 471 ; Conti
nental tour ia 1844, 475, reception
by King Leopold, ii. ; predicts the
future of Prussia, 483 ; speech on
the Right of Search, 484 ; letter on
the Maynooth Grant, 486 ; advo
cates toleration in rpligion, 486, and
liberalitj' to Ireland, 487 ; approval
of defensive measures, 491 ; uneasi
ness at the railway mania, ii, ; at
the Foreign Office in 1846, ii. 1 ;
his policy of reform, 2 ; attitude to
S-witzerland and the Sonderburg,
6, advice to Switzerland, 9 ; action
in the civil war in Portugal, 15,
objections to French proposal for
union of Spain and Portugal, 29,
value set by him on possession of
the Tagus, 30 ; view of disturb
ances in China, 83 ; on the annexa
tion of the Punjaub and the designs
of Russia, 86 ; instructions to Lord
Minto on the Sicihan revolt, 66 ;
prophesies a United Italy, 57 ;
opinion on the repeal of the
Navigation Laws, 60 ; reserva
tions in respect to Cobden's pro
posed international arbitration, 61 ;
defends his foreign policy agMnst

INDEX.

505

PAL
Urquhart and Anstey, 62 ; advice
to Italy on Austrian interference,
¦65. Letter to Normanby on the
French Revolution (1848), 71, on
republics, 73, value of his services
at the Foreign Office at this crisis,
and testimony of King Leopold, 74,
confidence in Lamartine, ib., re
monstrates with bim on reception
¦of Irish appeal, 77. Letter tb King
Leopold on Continental affairs, 82 ;
foresees abdication of Emperor Fer
dinand (Austria), 84, shows the ne
cessity of a strong sovereign, 87 ; on
the Austrians in Italy, 89, on natu
ral barriers, 90 ; demonstrates the
result of such poUcy as Guizot's and
Metternich's, 91 ; Austrian offen-
siveness to him personally, 91 ; our
policy defined, 93 ; M. d'Azeglio's
acknowledgment of his aid to Italy,
94 ; on the position of the Pope, 97 ;
on presents to British ministers, 99 ;
his portrait presented by House of
Commons to Ladj' Palmerston, 100,
162. On the civil war in Hungary,
104, his sympathy with oppressed
Hungary, 105, the same sympathy
exhibited later in respect to General
Butler's proclamation at New Or
leans, 105, discussion with Brun
now, 108, negotiations and caution
to Austria, 112, defence of the
despatch of fleet to Dardanelles,
116, 118, 120. Defends the rights of
naturalised citizens, 117, objects to
confinement of the refiigees, 121,
* The judicious bottle-holder,' origin
of the term, 126, Defence of our
attitude on the ' Don Pacifico '
affair, 137, a hint to Lord Nor
manby, 141, his firmness, ii,,
defends British conduct to Greece
by reference to action of other
nations, 144, his confidence iu
respect to hostility of France and
apprehensions of war, 145, speech in
the House in defence of his policy,
161, and government triumph, 161,
Styled by Lord John Russell ' a
minister of England,' 163 ; his
¦estimate of Lord Aberdeen, 164;
appreciation of necessity of land
defences, 175 ; temporary resigna^
tion of the ministry, 179 ; supports
¦Gladstone's allegations against
Naples, 181 ; high estimate of Corfu,

PAL
184, later modification of his ¦views
concerning, 186 ; Uking for Louis
Napoleon, ii, ; on Cobden's pro
posal for reduction of armaments,
188 ; proposes British mediation
between Russia and Turkey in the
dispute leading to the Crimean
War, 191. Disagreement with Lord
John RusseU, 193, relations of the
two, ii., Palmerston ' not a Whig,'
194, his notions of the duties and
privileges of a foreign secretary,
ii., and in relation to the sove
reign, 195, royal influence in
foreign relations, the Prince Con
sort and Stockmar, ii,, and actual
interference, 196, necessity to re
pudiate this, 196, rarity of able
foreign secretaries, Palmerston's
experience and qualifications, 197,
the coup d'etat — critical position
of Napoleon, 198, interview with
Walewski, 200, evidence of the in
tended action of the Assembly, 200,
instructions to Lord Normanby and
special despatches, 204, evidence
of Walewski, 203, 216, 224, ex
planations to Lord John RusseU,
207 ; dismissed : ' The expelled
minister,' 211, refuses viceroyalty
of Ireland, and reasons, 212, evi
dence of royal wish, ii,, exulta
tion on the Continent, 213, sym
pathy at home, 214, letter from
Lansdowne, ii., his account to
his brother, 2,15, explanations in
the House, 218, Lord John's speech
and disclosure of the Queen's me
morandum of August 1850, 219,
227, his opinion of unfairness of
the step, 226, his reply, 220 ;
general sentiment of his complete
downfall, 223, 227, his explanation
of this (' loyalty ') explained in a
letter to Lansdowne, 223, and
Lord Dalling's testimony, 228, Op
poses Lord John Russell's Militia
Bill, and coUapse of the ministry,
229 ; declines to join Lord Derby's
cabinet, 230 ; supports Lord Derby's
Militia BiU, 23 : ; quick ending of
resentment to Russell, 232 ; his
knowledge of Italian : an iUustra
tion — his translation of Garter oath
for Victor Emmanuel, retained by
Cavour as an archive, 235 ; specu
lations as to change of ministry,

506

,INDEX.

PAL
237, his own position, ii, ; disso
lution of Parliament : characteristic
speech at Tiverton, 288, replies to
'the Tiverton buteher,' 243; on
necessities of defence ; 'England
the bulwark of freedom,' 241 ; ob
jection to the ballot, 245 ; speech
at Lewes, on necessity of use of
town sewage : his famous ' definition
of dirt,' 246 ; re-elected, ii. ; his
claims to be premier discussed, 248,
his own preference for Lansdoivne,
247, 250, objection to serve again
under, and opinion of. Lord John
RusseU, 247, 250, 252, 264, con
tinued friendliness with, 252 ; comes
to the rescue of Lord Derby's
ministry ou Mr, ViUiers's motion,
256 ; venomous press attacks on
different occasions, and efficacy of
legal proeeedingSj 249 ; tribute to
WeUington on his death, 250 ; re
joinder to Lansdowne's. objections
to the premiership, 261 ; his frank
ness, 252 ; turf victories with 'Buck-
thorne,' 250 ; selects the Home
Office in the Aberdeen coalition
ministry, 269, reserve in joining
it overcome by Lord Lansdowne,
ii. ; Aberdeen's declared policy a
tribute to his foreign policy, 260 ;
his vigour at the Home Office, 262,
illustrations of his acts there, ii, ;
approval of Clarendon at the
Foreign Office, 265 ; speech at
Romney on original sin, 267,
exceptions taken to it, ii., Pal
merston not irreverent, ii. ; re
signs on question of reform scheme,
270, 290, withdraws resignation,
ii., considered the backbone of the
ministry at home and abroad, 271 ;
effect of his absence from the
Foreign Office on Continental af
fairs, 272 ; his hatred of war, 273 ;
experience of the designs of Russia,
ii. ; the Russians cross the Pruth,
memorandum to send the fleet to
the Black Sea, and Aberdeen's
reply, 275 ; ' The Vienna note : '
Palmerston on the position, 276 ;
memorandum on Nesselrode's circu
lar, and on position of France and
England, advises prompt action
277, later acquiescence in differ
ent views, 279 ; letter to Sidney
Herbert on the position, 281 ;

PAL
further suggestions to Aberdeen,
284, the reply, and hesitation in
high quarters, ib. ; reply to the
Prince Consort's memorandum, and
opinion of position of Turkey, 285 ;
suggests ultimatum to Russia, 289,
Aberdeen's disagreement, ii. ;.
banquet to Sir C. Napier ; Palmer
ston's speech and tribute, 291,
charged with levity by Mr. Bright,
294, his bitter reply, ii., opinions
upon it, ib. ; urges descent on Cri
mea, 294, memorandum on mea
sures to be adopted, 295, tribute
from Gladstone to his foresight,
300 ; ¦visit to Napoleon, ii. ; Lord
Jolin Russell's wish he should take
War Office, and Aberdeen's refusal,
301 ; disapproves Lord John Rus
seU's retirement on Mr. Roebuck's
motion for inquiry, 302, defends
his absent coUeagues, ii., letter
to Lord Derby declining leader
ship of House "of Commons, 304;
promise of support from Lord
J. Russell on the latter's failure
to form a ministry, 305 ; called
to form a ministry, and becomes
premier, ii,, letter to his brother
describing the situation, ii, ; has
no desire to prolong the war, 307 ;
aetive measures of his cabinet :
Lord Panmure to the War Office,
808, sanitary measures, ii. ; im
patience of a section of the House,
309, reluctant assent to Roebuck
committee, ii., momentary minis
terial crisis and resignation, 310 ;
instructions to Lord John RusseU
for the Vienna Conference, ii. ;
supervises the Colonial Office, 312 ;
summarises Turkish reforms, 318 ;
hesitation of the French, letter
to Napoleon, 815 ; ministerial ¦vic
tory, 315 ; attacks of the Opposition
and Radicals, 317 ; attention to de
tails of campaign and favourable
result of his energy, 818 ; declines
foreign contingents, 319 ; foresees
difficulties of diplomacy, 320 ; de
mands satisfaction from Bomba,
321 ; fall of Sebastopol and immin
ent return of French troops, 322,
flrmness of the cabinet, ii., unan
imity of the nation in spite of
Bright and others, 326 ; Congress
of Paris, 325 ; declaration ou mari-

INDEX.

507

PAL
time warfare, 326 ; exhaustive de
fence of the treaty of peace, 327;
minor Russian disputes ; interview
¦with Count Creptovich and memo
randum thereon, 330 ; reply in
debate on enlistment question
with United States, 336 ; death of
Sir W, Temple, 337, relations of the
two brothers, ii, ; opposes French
designs on Egypt, 338, insists on
right of transit : apt iUustrations,
ii, ; at Osborne, to confer with Na
poleon on the Principalities, 339,
results of the poUcy adopted, 340,
feelings of the two to each other,
ii. ; successful war ¦with Persia,
ii., characteristic letter to the
Persian premier, 342. Quarrel with
China, outrages of Commissioner
Yeh, 344, Cobden's resolution, 845 ;
debate ; ' the fortuitous concourse of
atoms,' Gladstone, RusseU, Dis
raeli, ii., government majority, ii.
Dissolution, ii, ; election dependent
on his personal prestige, 346, re
turned for Tiverton, ib., triumph
of the Government, ib. ; passes
Divorce Court BiU, 347, Indian
mutiny : despatch of Lord Clyde
and assurances to the Queen, 348 ;
rapid despatch of troops, ii,, his
eulogy of the British in India : sol
diers, civihans, and especially
women, 349, declares nesessity to
queU it by EngUsh power alone,
351, Happy speech on the marriage
of the Princess Royal, 352 ; unex
pected ministerial majority in the
Commons on transfer of India
to the Cro-wn, ii. The Orsini con
spiracy : introduction of the ' Con
spiracy to Murder ' BiU, 358, Milner
Gibson's amendment, 355, unex
pected opposition and unexpected
defeat, 356, resigns the premier
ship, succeeded by Lord Derby,
ii,, the latter's acknowledgment
of accidental nature of his triumph,
357. Assists the government in
settling French affairs, 358 ; visits
Napoleon, 359, conversation with
him, ii.; re-elected for Tiverton;
'the butcher' again, 361 ; renewed
overtures from Lord Derby, 362 ;
agreement with Lord John RusseU,
ii. ; letter to theQueen,giving limited
assent to join Lord GranviUe, 363 ;

PAL
forms his second ministry on Gran-
viUe's failure, with RusseU at the
Foreign Office and Gladstone at the
Exchequer, 364, Board of Trade
offered to Cobden, ii. ; security of
his position, 366 ; objections to
French proposals of peace to
Austria, and designs on Italy, 866,
Austrian sympathy at Court, 369,
hostihty attributed to him by
Austria: his explanation to Lord
Cowley, 371 ; his efforts for Italian
unity and ultimate modification,
872 ; cautions Spain against occu
pation of Morocco, 874 ; advocates
fortification of dockyards, 375^
letter to Gladstone thereon, ii.,
success of the resolutions, 378 ; in
timate accord with Lord John
RusseU at this time (I860), 379;,
memorandum on policy to Italy in
reference to France, Austria, Sar
dinia, and the Pope, 380 ; massacres
in the Lebanon : Anglo-French
expedition, 385 ; his estimate of
Napoleon, 386 ; letter to Persigny
on French action towards Swiss
borders, 387; first distrust of the
French Emperor in letters to Lord J.
RusseU and Duke of Somerset, 390,
and plain explanations to Persigny
and Flahault, 393 ; pushes forward
fortifications and encourages the
volunteers, 391 ; letter on the sub
ject to Lord Cowley, 396; dis
appointed in 'The Derby' of. 1860,
397, his connection with the turf,.
898 ; the paper duty: coUision of
the Houses, 399 ; defends indepen
dence of the Times and the Press
against Mr. Horsman, 400 ; Lord
Westbury's tribute to his leader
ship, 401 ; made Lord Warden,
403 ; again elected for Tiverton,
ii. Outbreak of civil war in
America : his attitude to the bel^
hgerents explained, 404, 411, letter
to Mr. EUice thereon, 405, letter to
Milner Gibson on the cotton sup
ply, 406. Urges reforms on the
Sultan, 407 ; visit to Harrow School
and characteristic speech, 408 ;
open treatment of menace of Father
Daly, 409 ; opinion on French oc
cupation of Eome, 410 ; regret for
death of Prince Consort, 411 ; ' the
Trent affair ' : despatch of troops-

508

INDEX.

PAL
to Canada, ii., his remarkable
energy, though iU at the time, 412 ;
letters to Cobden and Gladstone on
national defences, 413 ; watchful
guard of Canada, 415 ; successfuUy
replies to Cobden's attack, 416 ; his
treatment of Church patronage, 417;
urges Admiralty to increased pre
vention of slavcrj- : his constancy
to this object, ii. ; chariness of
speech as premier, 419 ; letter to
Russian ambassador on the Polish
outbreak, 420, declines joint note
with France, and reasons, 421 ;
visit to Glasgow : instaUation as
a ' Gaiter,' 422 ; objections to
Napoleon's proposal of a European
Congress : letters to King Leopold
and Lord John Russell, 421. The
Sleswig-Holstein question : diffi
culties with France, letter to Lord
John Eussell, 430, advocates dis
patch of fleet to Baltic, 431, inde
pendently warns Apponyi that our
fleet would follow that of Austria
to the Baltic, 432, active mediae
tion, 434, unsuccessful result, and
final surrender of the Duchies, 435,
four nights' debate and ministerial
triumph, 436, letter to King Leo
pold on the situation, 437. En
thusiastic reception in the pro-
¦vinces, 437, characteristic speech at
Towcester, 489 ; reaches his eight
ieth year ; his habits and his
health, 440 ; on the Irish demand
for tenant right, 441 ; on lunacy as
au excuse for crime, ii. ; the
Catholic vote and Italy and the
coUeges, 443, objects to a Catholic
university, 444 ; restricts the am
bition of Convocation, 444 ; con
trasts the friendship of the French
as a people and as a Government,
445 ; his policy as to destiny of the
Duchies, 446. Review of the later
part of his official career, 446-451,
his foreign policy and reasons of
its success, 446, its enemies, 447,
his conduct of the Crimean War,
448, his attitude to France, 449,
his services to Italy, ii., commer
cial treaty 'with France through
Cobden, ii., financial successes
through Gladstone, 460, successful
operations in China, ii., objection
to join France in interference

PEE
with Mexico, ii., helps Prince
George to be King of Greece, 451,
restrains war feeling in the Polish
outbreak and in the Danish war,
ii. Eeturned for Tiverton in 1865
d,fter a contest, 452. Goes to
Brocket: commencement of his
last iUness, ii,, tenderness for his wife,
453, solicitude for others, 454, his
death, 463, Energy of his last few
days in the Fenian disturbance aud
for protection of Canada, 454 ; dura
tion of his career and felicity of his
death, 456 ; burial in Westminster
Abbey, 457, Reasons for his success :
the confidence of the pubhc, 485,
' De Witt on true statesmanship : '
extract found amongst his papers,
486. (For iUustrations of his cha
racter, see Character, Correspond
ence, and Oratory)
Panmure, Lord : becomes War Minis
ter and at the same time Secretary
of State, 308 ; letter to, ii. 318
Papal States, Insurrection iu, i. 240 ;
suppressed by the Austrians, ii. ;
attitude of France, ii. (see also Pio
Nono)
Paper currency. His opinion of the
evils, of, i. 165
Paper duty, the, Collision between
Lords and Commons on, ii. 399
Paris, Congress of, attended by Lords
Clarendon and Cowley, ii. 325
Paris : visit to, in 1815, i. 81 ; descrip
tive letter, ii. ; visit in 1829, 186,
curious state of its streets at the
time, 190
Parks, the : his care that they should
be kept open for the people, ii,
474
ParUamentary discussion encouraged
by Palmerston, i, 264 (footnote)
Partisan, Palmerston not a strong,
ii, 471
Patriotism, His : moral influence of
his absolute identification of himself
with his country, ii, 476
Patronage, Church, His treatment of,
a, 417
Peel, Sir Robert : his clearheadedness,
i. 132 ; his advice to George IV, on
the Catholic question, 185 ; forms a
ministry with WelUngton, 312 ; the
Peel ministry, 314; defeated on
Lord John Russell's Irish Appro
priation BiU, 316, resigns, 317 ;

INDEX.

509

PEE
the Queen's finnness ¦with him in
the matter of her household, 356 ;
difference with WeUington, 376;
growing favour of, 417 ; his bold
fiscal measures, ii., anticipations of
his fiscal measures, 442 ; proposes
the sliding scale, 443 ; his difficulties
in office, 446, 459 ; Peel and the
landed interest, 452 ; bad diplomatic
appointments, 454 ; changes in the
Cabinet, 488, resignation of Glad
stone, ii. ; his position in 1847, u.
35 ; neat reply to Feargus O'Connor,
81 ; supports Lord J. RusseU's Go
vernment against Disraeli's last
effort for Protection, 95 ; eulogy of
Palmerston's speech in defence of
his Greek policy, 160 ; his deatE,
162
Perceval, Mr. : opposes limited relief
to Catholics, i. 38 ; accession to the
premiership, 49 ; offers ChanceUor-
ship of Exchequer to Palmerston,
ii,; death of, 70
Persia : designs of, i, 899 ; war with,
occupation of Herat, ii, 340, her
claims abandoned, 341, abolition of
slavery in the Persian Gulf, ii,,
characteristic letter to the Persian
minister, 342
Persigny, Comte de : letters to, ii, 322,
868, 387, 898 ; letter to, on the Swiss
borders, 887 ; plain reasons given to,
for distrust of Napoleon's designs,
393
Personal appearance. His, in 1830, de
scribed by Sir Henry Bulwer, i. 223
Pio Nono : his position in 1847, ii, 42,
44, 56 ; Lord Minto's opinion of,
¦44 ; his attitude to the Irish col
leges, 45, 47, disapprobation of
the proceedings of the Irish clergy,
53 ; ' Diplomatic Relations with
Rome' BiU passed, ii.. Lord Eglin-
ton's objection to reception of a
nuncio, ii., and Lord Palmerston's
concurrence, 54 ; the French in
Eome, 95, position of the Pope, 96,
Palmerston on his position, 97 ;
Ecclesiastical Titles BiU and papal
aggression, 172, attitude of Cardinal
Wiseman, 174 ; Palmerston's opinion
of French occupation of Rome, 410 ;
the CathoUc vote and Italy, 443,
idem and the CoUeges, 443, Pal
merston's objections to a CathoUc
university, 444

POE
Plate, the River, Settlement of diffi
culties in the, ii. 28
Poland : Polish victory at Wawer,
1. 248 ; warning to Bulow against
interference, 251 ; Palmerston's sym
pathy with, 273 ; suppression of the
revolt, ii., despatches to Lord Hey-
tesbury thereon, ii. ; Polish out
break and cruel measures of Russia,
ii. 419, Palmei-ston's letter to the
Russian ambassador, 420, Prussian
assistance to Russia,, 421, Palmer
ston decUnes joint note -with
France, and reasons, ii. ; negotia
tions amongst the Powers, recal
citrancy of Austria, 421 ; English
war feeling restrained by Palmer
ston, 451
Polignac : immaterial result of Lord
Palmerston's appeal to him in be
half of the Greek slaves, i. 176 ;
Wellington and Polignac, 192 ; com
parison of the two, 2i0
Ponsonby, Lord, ambassador to the
Porte with Admiral Roussin, i. 350
Pope, The. See Pio Nona.
Portrait, His, presented to Lady Pal
merston by the House of Commons,
ii. 100, 162 ,
Portugal : affairs in, i. 131 ; attitude
and duplicity of Don Miguel, 130 ;
action of Sir F. Lamb as minister at
Lisbon, ii ; Don Miguel causes a
panic in Lisbon, 132 ; folly and con
trariety of Don Miguel, 141 ; abdi
cation of Don Pedro, 146 ; coup
dp etat of Don Miguel, ii. ; disastrous
state of, under Don Miguel, 177 ;
¦withdrawal of diplomatic intercourse
ii.; Oporto declares for Donna Ma
ria, 178 ; Pedroites landed at Ply- ,
mouth, ii. ; Marquis PalmeUa and
WeUington, 179 ; Miguehtes take
Madeira, ii. ; repulsed at Terceira,
ii,; inconsistent action of our cabinet,
180 ; Donna Maria at Windsor, ii,;
British interference at Terceira, ii.
(footnote) ; able speech upon, 199 ;
public opinion of Wellington's atti
tude to, 200 ; French reprisals in
the Tagus, 255, attitude of England
thereon, 256, 268 ; Don Pedro's ex
pedition to Oporto, 282 ; Admiral
Sartorius and Don Pedro, 287 ;
dubious prospects of Miguel, 292 ;
surrender of Miguel, 805 ; position
of Saldanha, 329 ; local difficulties.

510

INDEX,

POZ
ii.; evil effect of French intrigues,
336. CivU war in, h. 14, the Jun
ta, ii., Palmerston's action in, 16,
Colonel Wylde sent out aud sug
gested as chief of the staff, 16, 23 ;
British squadron in the Tagus, 16 ;
influence of Costa Cabral, 17 ; posi
tion of Saldanha, 18, 22, 26 ; threat
ened return of Don Miguel, 19 ;
baneful influence of Diez, ii.; Bri
tish proposals, ib.; the Quadruple
treaty, 20 ; amnesty demanded by
J^ngland and resistance of the Por
tuguese Court, 22, 25 ; expected
attack of Si de Bandeira, 26 ; final
settlement, 27 ; union with Spain
suggested by France, and Palmer
ston's objections, 29 ; his value of
the possession of the Tagus, 30
Pozzo di Borgo : conversation with, i.
181 ; discusses European affairs
with, 186 ; discusses Greece with,
188 ; ambassador in London, 316
Press, Independence of the, defended
by Palmerston when attacked by
Mr. Horsman, ii. 400
Prince Consort : position of, i. 374 ;
public liking for, 403 ; influence iu
foreign affairs of Baron Stockmar,
ii. 196; lettertoLordJohn EusseU in
evidence of desire for Palmerston's
removal, 212 ; hesitation in high
quarters in the Crimean War, 284,
Palmerston's reply to his memo
randum, 285 ; death of, 411, Pal
merston's regrets for, 412
Princess Royal, Marriage of the, ii.
852 ; Palmerston's happy speech on,
ii.
Pritchard, Mr, ; action of at Tahiti, i,
432; imprisonment of 1^ the French,
433, disavowed by Guizot, 434,
compensation made to, 435 ; Pal
merston's good opinion of him, 476
Privateering abohshed, ii, 326 ; dis
sent of the United States, ii.
Privy Councillor, Made a, i, 49
Property, His: management of his
English and Irish estates, i, 47, 93,
99, 100, 117
Prussia ; miUtary weakness of, in 1831,
i, 243 ; education in, in 1844, 481 ;
reception by the King of, 482 ; her
future predicted hy Palmerston, 483;
associated with Russia and Austria
in violation of Ti'eaty of Vienna,
ii, 31, British protest against, 32 ;

EOTJ
rivalry of Austria in Germany, 170 ;
the Sleswig-Holstein dispute with
Denmark, British mediation, 171 ;
assists Russia in the Polish outbreak,
421. Antecedents of the, Sleswig-
Holstein dispute, 428, outbreak of
war and the feeUng in England, 480,
Palmerston on difficulties of action
•with France, ii., success at Diip
pel, 432, active mediation but un
successful result, 434, final sur
render of the Duchies by Denmark,
436
Prussia, King of : visit of, i, 441 ; his
reception, 482 ; Palmerston's opinion
of, ii.
Pultusk, Victory of Benningsen at, i.
34
Punjaub, The : victoriesin, u. 36 ; Vis
count Hardinge's opposition to its
annexation, 37, Lord Palmerston's
opinion, 36
QUADRUPLE AUiance, The, i, 297;
completion of, 300 ; entirely due
to Palmerston, ii,; was the fulfil
ment of Canning's poUcy, 801 ; its
good effect, 306
Queen's CoUeges, The, and the Pope,
U. 45, 47

EACING, His connexion with. See
The Turf,
Raglan, Lord, letters to, on the ne
cessity of sanitary measures iu the
Crimea, ii, 308
Eailway mania. The: in Ireland, i, 488;
his uneasiness at, 491
Religious liberty the moving power in
France aud England, i, 210
Republics, Palmerston on, ii, 74
'Right of Search, The,' i, 422 ; Pal
merston's speech on, 484
Roebuck, Mr, : motion for inquiry into
elections, i, 448 ; Palmerston's reply
to, vindicating his Afghan and
foreign policy, 457 ; motion for in
quiry into Crimean war manage
ment, leading to the faU of the
Aberdeen ministry, ii, 301, Pal
merston's later reluctant assent to
the committee, 309
Rothschild, M, Anselm, Conversation
with, i, 350
Roussin, Admiral, French ambassador
to the Porte, i, 350

INDEX.

511

EOW
EowcUff (the Tiverton butcher) an
swered, u, 243, 361, 403
EusseU, Lord John : on Irish affairs, i,
303, 306 ; defeats Peel on the Irish
Appropriation BiU,316 ; his quaUties
as a parliamentary leader, 416 ;
Palmerston's position towards, 432 ;
strength of his Government, ii, 35 ;
dissolution of Parliament and tri
umph of Government, 41 ; styles
Palmerston 'A minister of England,'
163 ; extension of County Franchise
defeated, 179 ; defeat of the Govern
ment, ti,, resignation, ii,. Lord
Stanley sent for, ii,, return to power,
ii. Dispute with Palmerston, 198,
relations of the two, ii,, royal
influence, 195, 212, evidence of in
tended action ofthe French Assembly
200, e^vidence of Count Walewski,
203, 216, 224, Palmerston's expla
nation and correspondence, 207, dis
misses Palmerston, 211, Prince
Consort's letter to, 212, speech in
Parhament and disclosure of the
Queen's memorandum, 219, 227,
Palmerston's opinion of this action,
226, and reasons for his reticence
in reply, 223, proposes MUitia
BiU, 229, Palmerston's opposi
tion and collapse of the Ministry,
ii. Opposes Lord Derby's Militia
Bill, 231 ; his altered position to
the Whigs described, 232, 237,
247, 250 ; short duration of Pal
merston's resentment to, 232 ; Pal
merston's objection to serve un
der again, and opinion of, 247, 250,
252, 254, but continued friendUness,
252 ; at the Foreign Office, in the
Aberdeen Cabinet, 259, Palmer
ston's approval, ii.; wishes Palmer
ston at the War Office, and Aber
deen's refusal, 301 ; resigns on Mr.
Eoebuck's motion ; Palmerston's dis
approval of the step, 302 ; again
entrusted to form a ministry, dis
inclination of the Whigs and of
Clarendon, 305, promises support
to Palmerston, letter in reply, ii. ;
joins Palmerston's Ministry, 310;
goes to the Vienna Conference, ii.,
Sir E. Bulwer's motion against his
conduct at, and resignation, 317 ;
attacks Pahnerston on ' the fortui
tous concourse of atoms,' 345 ; op
poses ' Conspiracy to Murder ' Bill

EUF
356 ; agreement with Palmerston,
362 ; accepts Foreign Office under
Palmerston, 364; letter from, in
defence of Cabinet against Court
sympathy for Austria at conclu
sion of Austro-French war, 370 ;
idem on proposal for a congress,
372, intimate accord with Pal
merston at this time, 379 ; ex
planation from Palmerston of his
distrust of Napoleon, 390; letter
to, on Napoleon's proposal of a Eu
ropean Congress, 427 ; idem on diffi
culties with France on the Sleswig-
Holstein question, 480
Russell's, Lord William, tribute to
Palmerston's foreign policy, i. 453
(footnote)
Russia : ¦victoiy at Pultusk, i. 34 ; im
minence of war ¦with Turkey, 129 ;
declared views of, 130 ; the Treaty
of London and her promises, 132 ;
threatens war against Turkey, ii. ;
WeUington's dislike to, 138 ; de
claration on her part, 142 ; attitude
to Turkey and Greece, 143 ; makes
concessions, 169; correctness and
later adoption of Palmerston's view
of the Eastern Question, 171 ; Lord
Heytesbury's mission to, 172 ;
successfully opposed by Turkey,
180, severe losses in the campaign,
186 (footnote), equality in the
field with Turkey, 191 ; weakness
of, 202 ; the Sultan asks her aid,
283 ; the Dardanelles closed, 284 ;
British fleet sent to the DardaneUes,
293 ; the Black Sea difficulty, 294 ;
her doubtful attitude in 1834, 296,
297, 298 ; position towards England
in 1834, 306 ; in 1836, 316 ; depar
ture of the Lievens, 306 ; health of
the Emperor Nicholas, 344 ; posi
tion of France and Eussia in 1838,
352 ; Palmerston's constant endea
vour to upset Treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi, 353 ; her friendly advances
through M. de Brunnow, 361 ; dan
ger to England of a Eusso-French '
aUiance, 364 ; the advantages of an
English aUiance, 368 ; designs upon
InSa, 399 ; visit of the Emperor,
466 ; poUcy of, in 1844, 480 ; 'The
Holy AUiance' and Cracow, ii. 31,
violation of the Treaty of Vienna
ii., British protest against, 32;
Russian intentions in India, the

512

INDEX.

EUS
Punjaub and the Khyber Pass, 36 ;
attitude towards the Paris revolu
tion, 79 ; dependence of Austria on,
94. Joins Austria in demanding
Kossuth and other fugitives from
the Porte, 107, attitude of the
Porte and support of England, 107,
discussion with Baron Brunnow,
108, opposition in high quarters
against interference with Russia,
110, decisive action of the cabinet,
the fleet to fhe DardaneUes, 110,
successful result of action of France
and England, 114, irritation in
Russia, -117, demand to keep the
refugees in confinement, and Pal
merston's objections, 121, audience
refused to Lord Blomfleld, 123.
Influence against England at the
Greek court, 136, covert hostility
of, 142, complaints of the English
press, 143, resentment in England
ii. First inkhng of the Crimean
war : the Jerusalem difficulty and
Palmerston's proposed mediation iU
received, 188, antagonistic position
of the Emperors of Eussia and
France, 192, demand to protect the
Greek Church in Turkey, crosses
the Pruth, and occupies Principali
ties, 274, Palmerston's experience
of her designs, ii., French and
EngUsh fleets at Besika Bay, ii.,
Palmerston suggests fleet to Black
Sea, and Aberdeen's reply, 275, 'the
Vienna note,' 277, Count Nessel
rode's circular, ii., Palmerston's me
morandum ou this, and on position of
France and England,278, declaration
of the Porte, and fleets to Constan
tinople, 283, hostilities with Turkey,
289, destruction of Turkish fleet at
Sinope, ii., British ultimatum, 291,
despatch of British troops to the
East, 291, unpreparedness of , the
French, 295, expedition to the
Crimea, 299, battle of the Alma,
ii., death of the Emperor Nicholas,
310, fail of Sebastopol, 322, influ
ence of Eussian intrigue and im
minent recaU of French troops, 322,
firmness of the English cabinet, 323,
exhaustion of the country, 326,
Walewski's influence for her, ii..
Congress of Paris, 325, end of the
Crimean War, 327, British plans
for carrying it on, ii. The Eusao-

SEY
Turkish wars of 1854 and 1877 con
trasted, 328, Emperors Nicholas and
Alexander contrasted, 329. Minor
disputes about Serpents' Island and
Bolgrad, 330, Palmerston's memo
randum upon this, 331, interview
with Count Creptovich, and delay in
hi3presentation,38l,335. Cruel mea
sures on the PoUsh outbreak, 419,
Palmerston's letter to the ambassa
dor, 420, Prussian assistance, 421,
negotiations amongst the Powers,,
recalcitrancy of Austria, ii., Eng
lish warlike feeling restrained' by
Pahnerston, 451

SA DE BANDEIRA, Viscount,.
Threatened attack of, on Lisbou,
U. 26
St. Jean d'Acre, Capture of, i. 394
Saldanha, Duke of : difficult position
of, i. 329 ; his position during the
Portuguese civil war, ii. 18, 22, 26
Sardinia : Charles Albert and, ii. 42 ;
becomes our ally in the Crimea,
810 ; termination of the Austro-
French war, 366, conference at
Zurich and resignation of Cavour,^
367 ; Palmerston's efforts for Italian
unity, 870 ; his memorandum on
proper policy of Great Britain, 380 ;
¦ French demand for Savoy, ii. ^
ultimate results of the war, 386
Sebastiani, Marshal : meeting with,
189, 192 ; arrogance of his opinions,
189, ultimate surrender, 236 and
footnote ; distinct language used
to, 237 ; agreement with Casimir
Pfeer, 264 (footnote) ; conversation
-with, 338 ; negotiations with him
on Turkish aud Egyptian affairs,
862 ; Palmerston's better opinion of,
414
Sebastopol : false report of its fall, ii.
299 ; its faU, 322
Secretary at War : is made, i. 50 ; du
ties of the Secretary at War and
Secretary for War deflned, 65 ;
civil position of, successfully de
fended by Palmerston against pre
tensions of Sir David Dundas, 66
Self-interest, not friendship, the bond
between States, ii. 62
Seymour, Sir Hamilton : minister at
Lisbon duiimg the civil war, ii, 18 •
letters to, 18, 24, 26, 324

INDEX,

513

SIC
SicUy : revolution in, ii, 54 ; refusal of
Lord Napier to mediate, 55 ; in
structions to Lord Minto thereon,
ii, ; shortsighted pohcy of Guizot
find Louis Philippe, 56 ; negotiations
upset by news of French Revolution,
56 ; Palermo and Messina bom
barded, and interference of the Eng
lish and French fleets, 58; the
revolt finaUy subdued, ib.
Slate quarries. His, at Tan-y-Bwlch,
i,439
Slave Trade, the : its abolition carried,
i, 34, 290 ; Palmerston's earnestness
in its extinction, 436, ii, 418 ; his
detestation of it, i, 467 ; descriptive
account of its horrors, i, 467; his
insistance to the Admiralty on in
creased prevention of, ii, 417; his
unfaltering efforts against, 418
Slave Trade Convention : Palmerston's
anxiety to conclude, i, 411 ; Gui
zot's jealousy, ii., aud refusal to
ratify, 444
Sleswig Holstein : British mediation
in tbe Schleswig-Holstein question,
ii. 171 ; antecedents of the dispute
¦with Germany, 428 ; outbreak of
war-feeling in England, 430, re
strained by Palmerston, 451 ; Pal
merston's difficulties with France,
explained in letter to Lord John
Russell, 430 ; advocates despatch of
fleet to Baltic, 431 ; Prussian suc
cess at Diippel, 432 ; Palmerston
independently warns Apponyi that
our fleet would follow that of Austria
to the Baltic, 432 ; active mediation
but unsuccessful result, 434; final
surrender of the Duchies, 435 ; de
bate in the House, and ministerial
triumph, 436 ; Palmerston to Leo
pold on the situation, ii. ; his
policy with regard to the Duchies,
446
SUding Scale, The : and the Fixed
Duty,i. 419 ; Palmerston's advocacy
of a fixed duty, 420 ; proposed by
Sir R. Peel, 443
Somerset, Duke of: letter to, explain
ing Palmerston's reasons for dis
trusting the French Emperor, ii. 391
Soult, Marshal : reservation of France
in Eastern affairs under his premier
ship, i. 359 ; expected opposition of,
364
Spain :' Salic law, i. 282 ; the Spanish
VOL. II. !<

TAG
succession, ih. ; Ferdinand and
Christina, 282 ; Isabella proclaimed
Queen, 283 ; Christina's tact as
Queen Regent, ii. ; pretensions of
Don Carlos, ib. ; M. Zea Bermudez,
ii., Palmerston's opinion of him,
286 ; death of Ferdinand and crisis,
292 ; formation of the Spanish
Legion, 319 ; condition iu 1829 and
1879 compared, 320 ; Louis Phi
lippe's interference, with a ¦view to
Spanish marriages, 325, 827 ; the
Spanish constitution, 328 ; hopeless
ness of the Carlist cause, 330, 339 ;
Torreuo becomes premier, 332 ; rise
and faU of M. de Mendizabal, 334 ;
ill-effects of French intrigue, 336;
defeat of Sir de Lacy Evans, 342 ;
affairs in, 344 ; Christina driven
from, 386 ; Espartero made Regent,
386 ; Wellington's description of, ii.
10. The Spanish marriages : Queen
IsabeUa, the Infanta, the Due de
Montpensier, 10, British objections
to, 11, 29, Guizot's conduct in, 11 ,
and its retributive results, 12.
Union with Portugal suggested by
France, and Palmerston's obj ections,
29 ; cautioned against occupation
of Morocco, 874
Spanish Legion, the, Palmerston
initiates formation of, i. 319
Spanish marriages. The, and Louis
Philippe, i. 326, 327 ; fre.sh proposals
of, preceding his downfaU, ii. 12
Stockmar, Baron, Influence of, i, 228
( footnote) ; idem with the Prince
Consort on foreign affairs, ii. 195
Switzerland : Mettemich and Switzer
land, i. 306 ; troubles in ; the Son
derburg and the Jesuits, ii. 4, Pal
merston's attitude to, 5, Bunsen to
Palmerston thereon, 6 ; British
policy to, 6 ; mediation proposed,
8 ; capture of Freyburg, ii. ; Pal
merston's advice to, 9 ; caution to
Metternich, 10 ; French action in
reference to S-wiss borders, 387,
Palmerston to Persigny thereon, ii,
Syria: blockade of Syrian coasts, i,
882, See the Lebanon, Sidon, Bey
rout, St. Jean d'Acre

TAGUS, The river : French reprisals
in, i, 255, and action of England,

514

INDEX.

TAH
256, 258 ; value set by Palmerston
on its possession, ii, 30
Tahiti : Queen Pomar^, i, 432 ; Mr,
Pritchard's imprisonment, ii, ;
French action at, through Admiral
de Thenars, ii,
Talleyrand : meeting with, i. 189 ; his
anxiety for the English alliance,
227 and (footnote) 241; negotiations
with, 231, 246 ; his explanation of
Louis Philippe's speech, 258 ; his
proposal to Bulow, 263 ; negotia
tions with, 270 ; his secret negotia
tions for partition of territory, 272;
his influence on coolness between
France and England, 331 ; indif
ferent treatment of, at St. James's,
331, Palmerston's scant respect to,
ib.
Temple family, the, Lineage of,
i. 3 '
Temple, Sir William, i. 11 (footnote) ;
appointed ambassador at Naples,
284 ; commendation of his de
spatches, 345 ; instructions to, on
dispute -Nvith Naples, 402 ; his
death, ii. 337, relations of the two
brothers, ii. '
Tenant-right demands, Irish, Palmer
ston on, ii. 441
Thiers, M. : friendship for England,
i. 323 ; becomes premier with M.
Guizot, 367 ; his purpose in Eastern
affairs frustrated bj' signature of
treaty of the Four Powers, 369,
his anger thereat, 375, threatening
language of, 377 ; break-up of his
ministry, 388 ; succeeded by Guizot,
392
Ticket of leave, The, instituted by
Palmerston, ii. 262
' Times, The ' : its extreme language
against France, i, 272; its inde
pendence attacked by Mr, Horsman
and ably defended by Palmerston,
ii, 400
Tiverton : returned for, i. 318; charac
teristic speech at, 409 ; curious con
dition and reform of its electoral
body, ii, ; speech at, answers ' the
Tiverton butcher,' ii, 238; returned
again for, 346 ; re-elected for ; the
butcher again, 361 ; again returned,
403 ; last return for, after a contest,
452
Toryism : approaching demise of, i,
141 ; weakness of the party, 290 ;

THE
the Tory Government and free
trade, 428
Town sewage, Palmerston on the ad
vantage of its use, ii, 246
Trade and landed interests. Antago
nism of, i. 418
Traffic in borough seats, i. 31
Transfer of borough franchises, i. 129 ;
difficulties of, 149
Travelling in England in 1836, i. 330
Treaties : Palmerston insists on in
violability of, i. 245 ; Treaty of the
Four Powers, 369, its good effects,
393 ; Treaty of London successfully
completed, i. 401, (For other
treaties, see under different heads)
'Trent affair. The,' ii, 411 ; despatch
of troops to Canada, 412 ; P^mer-
ston's energj', though iU, ii.
Turf, Doings on the, i, 93, 99 ; success
of his mare ' Ilione,' 439 ; of ' Buck-
thorne,' ii, 250; disappointment with
' Mainstone ' in the Derby, 397 ; his
connexion with, 398
Turkey : alliance against and battle of
Navarino, i, 115 ; Palmerston's ob
jection to her policy in 1829, 118 ;
imminence of war with Russia, 129;
threatened by Russia, 132 ; Russia,
Turkey, and Greece, 148 ; correct
ness and later adoption of Palmer
ston's view of the Eastern Ques
tion, 171 ; successful resistance of
Russia, 180 ; severe Russian losses,
186 (footnote) ; Palmerston's view
of her position in 1829,187; equahty
in the field ¦with Russia, 191 ; the
Sultan asks Russian aid, 283 ; suc
cesses of Mehemet Ali, 284 ; treaty
of Unkiar Skelessi, ii, ; the Dar
daneUes closed, ii, ; difficult posi
tion of the Sultan, 287 ; our fieet
despatched to the Dardanelles, 293 ;
the Black Sea difficulty, 294 ; Sultan
Mahmoud's attempt to introduce
ci^viliaation, 846 ; Khosrew and
Reschid Pashas, 347 ; Palmerston's
opinion of Ottoman regeneration,
348 ; powerful position of Mehemet
Ali, ii, ; Admiral Roussin and
Lord Ponsonby ambassadors to the
Porte, 350 ; excitement in Constanti
nople, ii.; Mehemet Ali declares his
independence, ii.,our decision to give
naval support to the Sultan, 351 ;
opinion of the position of Turkey in
1838, 354 ; unciviUsed state of, 355;

INDEX.

515

TCE
the Sultan's desire to overthrow
Mehemet Ali, 357 ; position of the
Five Powers, 367 ; Mahmoud's pre
parations, 368 ; Turkish defeat at
Nezib, ib.; death of Mahmoud, 359;
surrender of the fleet by Achmet
Pasha, ii.; agreement of the Powers
to protect young Abdul Medjid, ii.,
reservation of the French, ii.; value
of peace to, 861 ; boundary of Egypt
proposed by France, 363. Joint de
mand of Russia and Austria for
delivery of Kossuth and Hungarian
fugitives, ii. 107, attitude of the
Porte and support of England, ii.,
decisive action of the cabinet ; the
fleet to the Dardanelles, 110, suc
cessful result of action of England
and France, 114, demand of Russia
for confinement of the refugees, 121,
Palmerston's objections, ii., ulti
mate release of, 124. Palmerston
urges reform, 168, warning to am
bassador, 166. First inkling of
Crimean war ; the Jerusalem ques
tion, and Palmerston's proposed
mediation, 188, Russia demands to
protect the Greek Church, 274,
crosses the Pruth, ii., French and
English fleets at Besika, ib., de
claration- of the Porte, and fleets to
Constantinople, 283, Palmerston to
the Prince Consort on her position
and prospects, 287, proposed draft
of note to Russia, 288, hostilities,
289, destruction of fleet at Sinope,
ii., ¦ despatch of British troops,
291, expedition to the Crimea, 299,
Palmerston summarises needful re
forms, 313, his indignation at the
squandering of the first Turkish
loan, 314, Congress of Paris, 325.
end of the Crimean war, 327, Eusso-
Turkish wars of 1854 and 1877 com
pared, 328 ; Palmerston urges
reforms on the Sultan, 407
Tuscany, Grand Duke of, British mes
sage to, ii, 48

UNITED STATES: mediation of
Great Britain between France and
the United States, i, 322 ; boundai-y
question with, 404, 421 ; seizure
of McLeod, 406, Palmerston's firm
ness, 408 ; Palmerston's letter to

VIC
Mr, Fox, minister at Washington,
408 ; the Ashburton treaty, 421,
Lord Ashburton's quahfications,
422 ; Lord Ashburton and Mr,
Webster, ii,; the right of search,
ii. ; suspected concord with France,
445 ; Palmerston's speech on the
right of search, 484 ; relation to
Mexico, ii. 40; General Butler's
proclamation at New Orleans ; Pal
merston's sympathy with the ¦vic
tims, 105 ; refuses agreement to
abolish privateering, 326. Difficul
ties of the enlistment question, 386,
our minister receives his passports,
ii., we do not retaliate, ii., de
bate, and Palmerston's reply, ii.
Outbreak of civil war, 404, Pal
merston's attitude to the belligerents,
ii., 411, his theory of the cotton
supply, 406, the 'Trent' affair, 411,
despatch of British troops to Canada,
412; Palmerston's energy though
ill, ii.
Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of, i. 284 ;
Palmerston's constant endeavour to
upset it, 853
Urquhart, Mr., attacks Palmerston's
foreign policy, ii. 6i

VAN DE WEYER, M. : flrst sent to
London, i. 216 ; his ability, 228 ;
his exceUent and courageous de
cision, 278
Victoria, Queen : accession of, i. 340 ;
her first council, ii. ; the corona
tion ; influx of State personages,
345 ; firmness with Sir Robert Peel,
in respect to the ladies of her house
hold, 856 ; letters to, ii. 348, 383.
Palmerston's view of relation of
Foreign Secretary to the Crown,
195, royal interference in foreign
relations and actual interference,
195, 197, evidence of desire for
Palmerston's removal, 212, the
Queen's requirements «nd the memo
randum of August 1850, 219, 227, use
made of it by Lord John Eussell, ii.,
reason of Palmerston's reticence in
reply, 228, his definition of loyalty,
226. Anxiety on news of Indian
mutiny, 348, reasFured by Pal
merston, ii. ; Palmerston's letter to,
giving limited assent to join Lord

516

INDEX.

: i- VIE
GranviUe, 363 ; court anxiety for
Austria on termination of Austro-
French war, 369, Lord J. RusseU's
deffence of ministerial action, 370
Vienna Conference, The : Lord John
Russell attends, ii. 310 ; Palmer
ston's instructions, ii. ; its futility,
314 ; Sir E, Buhver Lytton's mo
tion and Lord John RusseU's resig
nation, 317
' Vienna Note, The,' Palmerston upon,
ii, 276
Vienna, Treaty of. Violation of, by
Russia, Austria and Prussia, ii, 31 ;
England's protest, 32 ; discussion in
the House of Commons, ii.
A''olunteers, The : encouragement given
by him to the movement, ii. 391

w

ALES, Account of his visit to.

Walewski : interview with, in rela
tion to the coup d'etat, ii. 200, his
actions and evidence in favour of
Palmerston, 203, 216, 224 ; leaning
to Russia, 325, Palmerston's frank
ness to him upon it, 335 ; letter on
the Orsini conspiracy, 353
Ward, Sir Henry (Ionian High Com
missioner), letter to, ii. 184
Waterioo, Battle of, i. 72
Wellesley's, Marquis of, expectation
to be made premier, and reported
disappointment on the elevation of
his brother, i. 121
Wellington, Duke of, resignation as
commaiider-in-chief, i. 108 ; re
turn to office, 114, effect of his re
appointment, 120 ; becomes premier,
121, reported disappointment of the
Marquis of WeUesley, ii. ; dislike
to Russia, 138 ; Huskisson and
Wellington, 148 ; determination to
force Huskisson to resign, 152 ; Me^
bourne's opinion of him, 161 ;
change of attitude towards Catho
lics, 164 ; attitude to Marquis Pal
meUa, 178 ; reserve towards Lord
Anglesey, 182 ; Wellington and
Polignac, 192, comparison of the
two, 210 ; yielding policy of, 195 ;
public opinion of his action towards
Portugal, 200 ; overtures to Mel
bourne, 211, and to Palmerston,
ii., objection to Lords Grey and

Lansdowne, ii., interview with
Palmerston, ii., joins Peel's
ministry, 813, succeeds Lord Pal
merston at the Foreign Office, 314,
Palmerston's tribute to his conduct
of foreign affairs, 318 ; difference
with Peel, 876 ; declining health
of, 405 ; his description of Spain,
ii. 10 ; on Russian designs on India,
and 'The Khyber Pass,' 39, Pal
merston's value of this opinion, 36 ;
happy comment on withdrawal of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, 146 ; enthu
siastic reception at the Great Ex
hibition, 178 ; his death, 250 ; Pal
merston's tribute to, ii. ; absence of
Austria at his funeral, 265
Wellington cabinet : Palmerston's rea
sons for remaining with, i. 122 ;
causes of its feebleness, 123 ; Dud-
lej''s hesitation to leave it, 123 ; Pal
merston's opinion of it, 123 ; its dif
ferences on Greek affairs and gene
raUy, 126 ; Huskisson's indepen
dence in it, 128 ; Dudley's pari in
it, 129 ; difficult position in respect
to the corn resolutions, 133 ; dif
ferences on Eastern affairs, 137 ;
secession of Lamb and Dudley, and
their reasons, 160 ; forced resigna
tion of Huskisson, 161 ; resignation
of Palmerston and his speech there
on, 162 ; adoption of Palmerston's
views in favour of Greece, 170 ;
indifference to enslavement of the
Greeks and consequent manoeuvres
in the House of Commons, 174 ;
halting policy towards Greece, 177
footnote) ; inconsistent action to
wards the Miguelites and Pedroites,
179 ; weakness in debating power
in the Commons, 191, 194
Westbury's, Lord, tribute to Palmer
ston's party leadership, ii. 400
Whigs, the : Palmerston 'not a Whig,'
ii. 194 ; position of Lord John
Russell to the party described, 232,
237, 247, 250
William IV. (when Duke of Clarence)^
satisfaction at his appointment to
the navy, i. 108 ; compared with
Duke of "Cumberland, 163 ; his con
duct at the Admiralty, and resig
nation, 176 ; (when King) dismisses
Lord Melbourne, 309 ; -writes ap
proving Lord Palmerston's action
at Foreign Office, 312; his relations

INDEX,

517

WIN
with his ministers, 324; death of,
340
Winter, Severit3' of the, in 1844-5, i,
489,
Wiseman, Cardinal, Position of, to
wards Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, ii,
174

ZEA

YEH Mr. Commissioner, Outrages
of, ii, 344; Cobden's resolution
on, ii,
7EA-BEEMUDEZ, M, DE, i, 283;
Ai Palmerston's opinion of, 286

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