YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
From the Library of
Irving G. Vann
1863

DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE
Being and Attributes of G O D9
THE
Obligations of Natural Religion ',
AND THE
Truth and Certainty

O F T H E

Chriftian Revelation.
In Anfwer to Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza, the Author of the Oracles
of Reafon, and other Deniers of Natural and Revealed
Religion.
Being Sixteen SERMONS, Preached in the Cathedral-
Church of St. Paul, in the Years 1704 and 1705, at
the Ledture Founded by the Honourable ROBERT
BOYLE, Efqj
By SAMUEL CLARKE, D.D.
Rector of St. James's, Wefiminfier.

The Tenth Edition, Correcled.
There is inferted, in this Edition,
A Discourse concerning the Connexion of the Prophecies
in the Old Tejtament, and the Application of them to Cbrijl.
There is al/b added,
An Answer, to a Seventh Letter, concerning
the Argument a priori.
L O N D O N:
Printed for H. Woodeall, J. Beecroft, W. Strahan,
L. Hawes, W. Clark, and R. Collins, R. Hors-
fiem>, W. Johnston, T. Longman, and T. Davies.
MDCCLXVI.

DEMO NSTR ATION
O F TH E
BEING and ATTRIBUTES O F
G O D:
More particularly in Anfwer to
Mr. Hobbs, Spinoza,
And their Followers.
Wherein the Notion of LIBERTY is Stated, and the
Poffibility and Certainty of it Proved, in Oppofition to
Neceffity and Fate.
Being the Subftance of Eight SERMONS, Preached
in the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul, in the Year 1704,
at the Ledure Founded by the Honourable ROBERT
B,0 YL E, Efqi
By SAMUEL' C LARKE, D.D,
Rector of St. James's, Weflminfier.
The Tenth Edition, Corretled.
Rom. i. 20. For the Invifible Things of Him from the Crea
tion of the World are dearly feen, being underftood by the
Things that are made-, even his Eternal Power and God
head ; So that they are without Excufe.
LONDON:
Printed for H. Woodfall, J. Beecroft, W. Strahan,
L. Hawes, W. Clark, and R. Collins, R. Hors-
field, W. Johnston, T. Longman, and T. Davies.
MDCCL&VI.

TO T H E
Moft Reverend Father in God
THOMAS
Lord Archbiihop of Canterbury ',
and Primate of all England ;
Sir HENRY ASHURST,
Baronet ; '
Sir JOHN ROTHERAM,
Knight^ Serjeant at Law ;
JOHN EVE LIN, Efquire;
TRUSTEES Appointed by the
,Hon. ROBERT BOYLE, Efytdre\
this DISCOURSE Is humbly Dedicated.

THE

PREFACE.

THERE being already publijhed many
and good Books, to prove the Being
and Attributes of God; I have chofen
to contract what was requifte for me to fay,
upon this Subject, into as narrow a Compafs,
and to exprefs what I had to offer, in as
few Words, as I could with Perfpicuity. For
which Redfon I have alfo confined myfelf to Que
only Method or continued 'Thread of Arguing j
which I have endeavoured fljould be as near
to Mathematical, as the Nature of fuch a
Difcourfe would allow : Omitting fome other
Arguments, which I could not difcern to be
fo evidently conclufive : Becaufe it Jeems not
to be at 'any "time for the' real Advantage of
fyutb to ufe Arguments in its Behalf founded
A 4 ,oruy

The PREFACE;
only on fuch Hypothefes, as the Adverfariek
Apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant,
Tet I have not made it my Bufinefs to oppofe
any of thofe Arguments, becaufe I think it is
not the bejl Way for . any one to recommend
his own Performance, by endeavouring to dif
<pover the Imperfections of Others who are
engaged in the fame Defign with himfelf
of Promoting the Interefi of true Religion
and Virtue. But every Man ought to ufe fuch
Arguments only, as appear to Him to be clear
and firong ; and the Readers muf judgq
whether they truly prove the Conclufon,

THE

THE
CONTENTS.
TH E Introduction, concerning the Caufes of
Atheifm. Page 1.
Prop, I. That Something has exifted from Eternity. 8
Of the Difficulty of conceiving Eternity. 9
That Difficulties arifing merely from the Nature
of Eternity are not to be regarded, becaufe
equal in ail Suppofitions. ibid.
Prop. II. That there has exifted from Eternity fome
one Immutable and Independent Being. 1 1
Pf the Abfolute Impoffibility of an Eternal Suc-
ceflion of Dependent Beings exifting without
any Original Independent Caufe at all. 12
Prop. III. That That Immutable and Independent Be
ing, which has exifted from Eternity without any exr
fernal Caufe of its Exiftence, mujl be SelfExljlent,
that is, ^ 'e-ceffarily ¦ Exifting. ¦ 1 4
Pf the true Idea of Self-Exiftnece ; that it is the
Idea of a Being, the Suppofition of whofe Nonr
Exiftence is an exprefs Contradiction. 16
That every Man may be more ce> tain of the Being
of a Supreme Independent Caufe, than he can
be of any Thing eife befldes his own Ex
iftence. 18
Of the Idea of God, including Self-Exiftence. 19
' Tnat the Material World cannot poffibly be the
Firft, Original, and Independent Being. 2 1
The Form of the Weld not Neceflary, 22
Nor its Motion. 23
Mi". Toland's pernicious Opinion, of Motion be
ing effential tq Matter, confuted. ibid. The

The CONTENT Si
The Matter of the World not Neceffarily Ex£
ifting. 24
A Confutation of Spinoza's Opinion concerning
one only JSuJbftancc. 25
Concerning the Eternity of the World ; And that
the Opinion of the beft ancient Philofophers
an that Matter did not at all favour the Senti
ments of Modern Atheifts. 28
Prop. IV. What the Subftance or Effence of that Bet
ing, which is^ Self-Exiftent or Neceffarily-Exifting,
is, we have no Idea, neither is it at all poffible for
us to comprehend it, 35
Of Infinite Space. 37
Of the Vanity of explaining Things by fuch
School-terms as have really no Signification
at all. 3S
Prop. V. That, though the Subftance or Effence of the
Self-Exiftent Being is itfelf abfolutely incomprehen-
Jible to us, yet many of the Effential Attributes of
his Nature areftritlly Demonftrable, as well as his
Exiftence. As in the firft Place, that fie muft of
Necefftty be Eternal. ibid.
Of the Manner of our conceiving the Eternity of
God, with refpect to Succeffion. 39, 40
Prop. VI. That the Self-Exiftent Being muft of Ne
cefftty be Infinite and Omniprefent. 41
Of the Simplicity, Unchangeablenefs, Incorrup
tibility, &c. of his Nature. 42
Of the Manner of our conceiving the Immenfity
of God, 43
Prop. VII. That the SelfrExiftent Being muft of Ne
cefftty be but One. 44
Of the. BlefTed Trinity. 45
Of the Abfolute Impoffibility of two different
Self-Exiftent Independent Principles, fuch as
God and Matter* ibid. Ths

The CONTENTS.
The Error of Spinoza concerning One Uniform
Subftance. ibid.
Prop. VIII. That the Self-Exiftent and Original Caufe
of all Things muft be an Intelligent Being. 47
This the main Queftion between us and the
Atheifts. ibid.
Not eafily proved a Priori. 48
But demonftrably proved a Pofteriori from the
Variety and Degrees of Perfection in Things,
.and the Order of Caufes and Effects, ibid.
From the Intelligence that Created Beings are
confeffedly endued with. . 49
That if Intelligence be a real diftinct Quality or
Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Compo
sition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion j
then Beings endued with Intelligence can never
poffibly have arifen purely out of that which
itfelf had no fuch Perfection. ¦• 50
That Intelligence is fuch a real diftinct Per-
L fection, and not poflible to be a mere Effect
or Compofition of Unintelligent Figure and
Motion. 52
Mr« Hobbs forced to recur to that prodigioufly
abfurd Opinion, that all Matter, as Matter, is
endued with Thought. 54
The Propofition demonftrated further from the
Beauty,Order, and Final Caufes of Things. ibid,
From the Original of Motion. 56
That the Material World cannot poffibly have
been Self-Exiftent. 58
Prop. IX. That the Self-exiftent and Original Caufe
of all Things is not a Neceffary Agent, but a Being
endued with Liberty and Choice. ibid.
This Propofition a neceffary Confequent of the
foregoing. ibid,
Proved further from the Arbitrary Difpofition
pf Things in the World j with a full Anfwer tp

The C 6 N T E N T S.
jto Spinoza's Arguments for the Neceffity of*
all Things. ~ 59
'Alfo from Final Caufes. 64
And from the Finitenefs of Created Beings. 65
And from the Irnpoflibility of an Infinite Suc-
ceffion of Caufes. 66
That Liberty is not in itfelf an jmpoffible and
contradictory Notion. 67
JProp. X. That the Self-Exiftent Being, the Supreme
Caufe of all fMngsa muft of Neceffity have Infinite
Power. 69
Of working Contradictions, and Natural, or
Moral Evil, 70
Qf tire Power pf Creating Matter. 7;
Of the Power of Creating immaterial Cogitative
Subftances, and thofe endued with Liberty of
Will or Choice. - 72
Pf the Immateriality of Human Souls. 75
That the Power of Perception is not confined to
Bodily Senfes. 76
Of the Poffibility of communicating to a Creature
the Power of Beginning Motion. . 77
Of the Poffibility of enduing a Creature with.
Freedom of Will. 80
- An Anfwer ' to Spinoza's and Mr. Hobbs's Argur
ments againft the Poffibility of Liberty. 82
That there muft be fomewhere a Beginning of
Operation. ibid.
That Thinking and Willing neither, are, nor can
poffibly be, Qualities or Affeftions of Mat
ter. - 85
That, fuppofing they were Affections of Matter,
yet even That molt abfurd Suppofition would
not all affect the Queftion qbput the Poffibi-
• lity of Liberty. , 90
A fhameful Fallacy in Mr.Hobbs and his Followers
argi n ;, who, when they would'prove the Sou}
to be m;reMatter,then they fuppofeMatter to be a

The CONTENT S.
a Subftance capable, , not only of Figure and
Motion, but alfo of other unknqwn Properties :
And whert they would prove. the Will and ali,
w other Operations of the Soul to be NeceflaryV
then they diveft Matter of all its unknown
Properties, and make it Mere Solidity endued
only with Figure and Motion again. 9 r
Of the Neceffity of the Will's being determined -
by the laft Judgment of the Uuderftanding. 93
¦¦' Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-Knowledge not
repugnant to the Liberty of Mens Actions. 9^
Of the Original of Evil. 99
Prop. XI. That the Supreme Caufe and Author of
all Things muft of , Neceffity be Infinitely Wife. 1O0
Proved a Priori. ioi
~ And a Pofteriori., from the WifdOm and Perfection
of th° W'vr:;s of God, evidenced more illuftri-
,-¦ -vd:y ia die late Difcoveries in Aftronomy and'
Nai,,i:a: Phiioibphy. ioi
I^.o,?. M-Ii, That the Supreme Caufe and Author of
aU -Things muft of Neceffity be a Being of Infinite
'Tao,:MCji, Juftice, and Truth, and all other Moral
Perfetiions, fuch as become the Supreme Governor
and Judge of the World. 106
Of Providence. 109
The Neceffity of God's Moral 'Attributes con-
fiftent with perfect Liberty. no
Of the Neceffity of God's doing always what i*
Beft and Fitteft in the Whole. 1 12
Of the Impoffibility of his doing Evil. iij
That Liberty is not in itfelf an Imperfection,'
but a Perfection. 114
/That the higheft Moral Perfection of Rational
Creatures does not exclude Natural Liberty. 115
That the Grounds of all Moral Obligations are
Eternal and Neceffary, and depend not on
any Laws. ibid.
The Conclusion, " '*i?
THE

<tt*

•t H El
CONTENTS Of tlie Second Volume.

TH E Introduction. pag. I
Of the feveral Sorts of Deifts. 1 1
The firft Sort of Deifts ; And of Providence. 1 2
Human Affairs not beneath the Regard of Pro
vidence. 1 6
The fecond Sort of Deifts. 1 7
Profane and debauched Deifts not capable of
being argtied with. 18
The third Sort of Deifts. 20
• The fourth Sort of Deifts. 22
That there is now no confident Scheme of Deifm
in the World. 25
Prop. I. That, from the Eternal and Neceffary Dif
ferences of Things, there naturally and neceffarily
'¦ arifc certain Moral Obligations, which are of the'm-
felves incumbent on all Rational Creatures, antece
dent to all pofitive Inftitution, and to all Expeclation
of Reward or Punifhment. 2 8
That there are eternal and neceilary Differences
of Things. "29
The Abfurdity of thofe who deny the eternal
and neceffary Differences of Things. 31
An.

The CONTENT .S.
An Anfwer to the Objection drawn from the*
Variety of the Opinions of learned Men, and the
Laws of different Nations, concerning Right
and Wrong. 36
That the Will of God always determines itfelf to
act according to the e:ei nal Reafon of Things. 38
That a\\ Rational Creatures are obliged to govern
themfelves, in all their Adtions, by the fame
eternal Rule of Reafon. 39
Proved from the Original Nature of Things. 40
And from the Senfe that all, even wickeu Men,
unavoidably have 01 their being under fuch
an Obligatinn. '42
'And from the Judgment of Mens Confidences upon
their Own paft Actions. 44
Of that natural Knowledge, which Plato thought
to be Reminifcence. ibidi
1 The moft profligate of Men not utterly infenfible
Of the Dirkrence of Good and Evil. 45
Mens natural Senfe of eternal Moral Obligations
.proved further from the Judgment they all pafs
upon the Actions of Others. 4.6
An Anfwer ";to the Objection drawn from the
total Ignorance of fome barbarous Nations in
Matters of Morality. 50
Of the principal .Moral Obligations in particu
lar, ibid.
Of Piety, or Mens Duty towards God. 51
Of Righteoufnefs, or the Duty of Men one to
wards another. 53
Of Juftice and Equity. ibid.
Of univerfal mutual Benevolence. 57
Of Sobriety, or Mens Duty towards themfelves :
And of the Unlawfulnefs of Self-Murder. 60
The Law of Nature, eternal, univerfal, and ab-
folutely unchangeable. 65
Eternal

The C 0 ft T E'ft T 1
Eternal Meral Obligations* Antecedent; in fom£
Refpect, even to this Confidefation of their
beiflg the Will of Command vf God hitfifelf. 6 8
The Law of Nature obligatory, Antecedent to all
Confidefation of particular Rewards and Pit-
nifhments-. 7 *
Tet it does not froth hence at all follow, either
that a good Man ought to have nb Refpect to
Rewards and Puniffiments, or that Rewards
and Puriifhments are not abfolutely neceffary
to maintain the Practice of Virtue in this pre-
fent World.. 73
The manifold Abfurdities of Mr. Hobbs's Doc
trines concerning the Original of Right ffiewn
in particular. y6
Prop. II. That the fame cternalMoral Obligations^
which arife neeeffarily from the natural Differences of
Things, are moreover the exprefs, Will, Command}
and Law of God to all rational Creatures. 90*
Proved from the Confideration of the Divine At
tributes. v 9 1
And from the Confidetation of the Nature of
God's Creation. ' 0.4.
And from the Tendency of the Practice of Mo
rality to the Good and Hapfinefs of the whole
World. 96
Prop. III. That the fame eternal Moral Obliga
tions, 'which are of themfelves incumbent indeed ott
all rational Creatures, antecedent to, any RefpeSi of
particular Reward or Punifhmeht, muft yet certainly
and neeeffarily be attended with Rewards and Pu-
inifhments. 99
Proved from the Attributes of GocU ibid.

The CONTENTS.
And from the Neceffity there is that there fhould
be fame Vindication of the Honour of God's Lazvs
and Government. j oo
Prop. IV. That, becaufe thefe Rewards and Punijh-
ments are not diftributed in the prefent State, there
fore there' muft of Neceffity be a future State. 102
'" That, according to the Original Gonftitution of
Things, Virtue and Vice are attended with na
tural Rewards and Punifhments. 103
But that now, in this prefent World, the natural
Order of Things is fo perverted, thatVice often
flourifhes in great Prosperity, and Virtue falls
under the greateft Calamities of Life. 105
That therefore there muft needs be a Future State
of Rewards and Punifhments. 1 06
Of the Stoical Opinion concerning the Self-Suf
ficiency of Virtue to its own Happinefis. 108
From whence the Certainty of a Future State is
again concluded. 110
Why the Wifdcm of God is not fo clearly. and plain
ly feen in his Government of the Moral as in
the Fabrick of the Natural World. 1 1 1
Of the Immortality- of the Soul, and the natural
Proofs we have of it. 113
The natural Credibility of the Soul's being im
mortal of great Ufe to the wifer Heathens. 1 1 7
The Argument for a Future State drawn from
Mens natural Defire of Immortality. / 120
Another drawn from Mens Confidence or Judg
ment of their own A&ions. ibid.
Another drawn from Man's being, by Nature,
an Accountable Creature. 121
Prop. V. That though the Neceffity and Indifpen-
fablenefs of all the great and moral Obligations of
Natural Religion, and alfio the Certainty of a Future
State of Rewards and Punifhments, be in general
b deducible

The ,C O N T E N T S.
. dcduciblc from right Redfion : Tet fuch is the prefent
- corrupt Efiate and Condition of Mankind in the
World, that very Few are able, in Reality and Ef-
feff, to difcover thefe Things clearly and plainly for
themfelves, but Men have great Need of Particular?
Teaching, and much Jnjlruition. 122
Men hindered from difcovering and understand
ing Religious Truths by Careleffinefs and Want
of Attention; 123
And by early Prejudices and Falfie Notions ; 124
And by Senfual Appetites, Paffions, and Worldly
Bufinefs ; s 125
And, above all, by vicious Habits and PraSiices. 127
Wherefore Men have great Need to be Taught
and InftruSied in Matters of Religion. 128
The great Ufe and Neceffity of an Order of
Preachers. 131
Pr o p. VI. That all the Teaching and Inftruffiion of
the beft Heathen Philofopbers was, for many Reajons,
utterly infufficient to reform Mankind. ibid,
That there have been, in the Heathen World, fome
excellent Teachers of Morality. 132
Who feem to have been defigned, by Providence,
to bear Witnefs againft the Wickednefs of the
Nations wherein they lived. 133
But yet none of thefe Men were ever able to reform
the World with any confiderable Succefs. , 1 34
Becaufe they have been but very Few that have
in earneft fet themfelves about that excellent
Work ; 136
And thefe Few were intirely ignorant of fome
Dofirines abfo:ute!y necellary to the bringing
about that great End. 138.
Particularly, they weie ignorant in what Manner
God will be acceptably worfhipped, 140
And in what Method God would be reconciled to
returning Sinners. 142
Arid

The CONTENTS.,
And other Doctrines, abfolutely neceffary to the
fame End, they were very doubtful and uncer
tain ahout. 143
And thofe Things, which they were certain of,
yet they were not able to prove and explain
clearly and diftinffly enough. 147
And thofe Things, which they were r.b'e to prove
and explain clearly and diftinclly enough, yet they
had not fufficient Authority to inforce in Prac
tice. 1 50
Prop. VII. That there was plainly wanting a Divinq
Revelation to recover Mankind out of their .univer-
fally degenerate Eftate : And that both the Neceffities
of Men, and their natural Notions of God, gate them
rea finable Ground to hope for fuch a Revelation. 153
A Divine Revelation very neceffary for the Recovery
of Mankind. ibid.
That it was agreeable to the Dictates of Nature
and right Redfon to expect or hope for fuch a
Divine Revelation. 1 56
The Unreafonablenefs of Modern Deifts in deny
ing the Want and Ufe of a Revelation., 159
The great Neceffity andTUfe of divine Revelation. \6i
Yet God was not abfolutely Obhged to afford Men
the Help of fuch a Revelation^ 1 64
Want of Univerfality no fufficient Objecti;;h,
againft the Truth of a Revelation 165
Prop. VIII. That there is no, other Religion now in
the World, but the Chriftian, that has cnyjuft Pre
tence or tolerable Appearance of Reafion to be efice:)?cd
fitch a Divine Revelation. 1 67
Of the Mahometan Religion. ibid.
Of the Jeuifh Religion. . ibid.
Prop. IX. That the Chriftian Religion has all the
Marks and Proofs of its bang cilually and truly a
Divine Revelation that <^;v Divine Revelation, fiiip-
b 2 • pofing

The CONTENTS.
pofing it was true, could reafonably be imagined or
defired to have. 168
The Marks of a Religion coming from God. ibid,
Prop. X. That the Praclical Duties, which the Chri
ftian Religion injoins, are all fuch as are moft agree
able to our natural Notions of God, and moft per- ¦
feSlive of the Nature, and conducive to the Happi-
nefis and Well-being of Men. • 169
Proved in the feveral Inftanr.es of Duty. , 1 70
This a great Evidence of a Religion coming
from God. 1 173
Prop. XI. That the Motives, by which the Chri
ftian Religion inforces the Practice of the Duties it
injoins, are fuch as are - moft fuitable to the excel
lent Wifdom of God, and moft anfwer able to the
natural Expeclations of Men. 176
Of the Acceptablenefs of true Repentance, as a Mo
tive to Obedience. ibid.
Of the Divine Affiftance, as another Motive to
Obedience. 177
Of the clear Dificovery of future Rewards and Punifh
ments, as another Motive to Obedience. 178
Prop. XII. That the peculiar Manner and Circum-
ftances with which the Chriftian Religion injoins the
Duties, and urges the Motives beforementioned, are
exactly confonant to the Dictates "of found Rcafo'n, or
the unprejudiced Light of Nature, and moft wifely
perfective of it. jgy
Proved by particular Inftav.ces, 18 f
An Anfwer to th: Objection drawn from the
Divifions among Chriftians. 182
Frop. XIII. Th'it all the Crcdcnda, or Doflrines,
which the Chriftian Religion requires our particular
sificnt to, are agreeable to unprejudiced Reafion,

The CONTENTS.
have every one of them a natural Tendency, and direti
Influence, to reform Mens Manners, and do Toge
ther make up the moft confiftent and rational Scheme
of Belief in the World. 183
Of the One Supreme God. 1 84
Of the Only- begotten Son of God. ibid.
Of the Holy Spirit. 186
Of the Creation of the Univerfie. ibid.
Of the Formation of the Earth. 187
Of the continual Government of Providence. 188
Of Paradife and the Lofs of it by Sin. 1 89
Of the Flood. 1 go
Of God's revealing himfelf to the Patriarchs, and
giving the Law to the Jews. igi
Of the other Particulars of Scripture-hiftory in
the Old Teftament, 192
Of God's fending his Son into the World for the
Redemption of Mankind. 193
That it is not unreafonable to fuppofe God ma
king a Revelation of his Will to Men. 194
That it is not unreafonable to believe that
God would appoint a Sacrifice or Expiation for
Sin. ibid.
That it is not unreafonable to believe that a
Mediator ffiould be appointed between God
and Man. 195
Of the Objection drawn, from the Dignity of the
Perfon whom we believe to. be our Mediator
and Redeemer. jg6
Of the Objection drawn from the Chriftian Re
velation not being in Fact Univerfal, 201
Of the other Particulars of Scripture-hiftory
contained in the New Teftament. 202
Of the Day of Judgment and Chrift the Judge. 204
Of the Refurrebiion of the Body. ibid.
Of the Refurrection of the fame Body. 206
Of the Eternal Happinefs of the Bleffed, and the
Et.rnal Punijhment of the Damned. 207 All

The CONTENTS,
All the Articles of our Belief agreeable to Right
Reafon. 210
- Every one of them has a dhe&Tendency and power
ful Influence to reform Mens Manners. 211
, And All of them' Together make up the moft
confiftent and rational Scheme of Belief in the
World. 215
Prop. XIV. That the Chriftian Revelation is pofi-
tively and direclly proved to be fent to us from God
by the Miracles which our Saviour worked, by the
Fulfilling of the Prophecies, and by the Tefiimony of
the Apoftles. 116
Of the Life and Character of our Saviour, as an'
Evidence of the Truth of the Chriftian Reve
lation. 217
Of the Miracles of Chrift, as the Evidence of his
Divine Commiffion. 218
Of Miracles in general. ibid.
That, in refpect of the Power of God, all Things
are alike eafy. 219
That therefore Miracles ought not to be defined
by any abfolute Difficulty in the Nature of the
Things themfelves to be done. ibid.
What Degrees of Power God may hav<* commu
nicated to Created Beings is not poffible for us
to determine. 22,0
That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to
be fuch an Effect as could not have been pro
duced by any lefs Power than the Divine Om
nipotence, ibid.
All Things that are done in the World are done
either immediately by God himfelf, or by created
Intelligent Beings, Matter being capable of no
Laws or Powers. And confequently there is,
properly fpeaking, no fuch Thing as the Courfie
or Power of Nature. 221
That therefore a Miracle is not rightly defined to
be that which is againft the Courfie .of Nature, or
above the natural Powers of Created Agents. 222
The

The CONTENTS.
The Unreafonablenefs of thofe who deny the Pof
fibility of Miracles in general. 223
Some Effects prove the confiant Providence of God,
and others prove the occafional Interpojiiion
either of God himfielf , or of fome Intelligent Be
ing fuperior to Men. 224
Whether fuch Interpofiition be the immediate Work
of God, or of fome Good or Evil Angel, can
hardly be difcovered merely by the Work it
felf. 225
That there is no Reafon to fuppofe all the Won
ders worked by Evil Spirits to be mere De-
lufiions. ibid.
Flow we are to diftinguilh Miracles, wrought by
God. for the Proof of any Doctrine, from the
Frauds of Evil Spirits. 226
The Difference between thofe who teach, thai the
immediate Power of God is, or is not, neeeffarily
requifite to the Working of a Miracle, is not
very great at Bottom. 228
The trpe Definition of a Miracle. 229
The Strength of the Evidence of our Saviour's
Miracles. ibid.
Concerning the Objection, that we prove in a
Circle the Miracles by the Dotlrine, and the
Dofirine by the Miracles. 230
Of the pretended Miracles of Apolknius and
Others. 231
Of the fulfilling the Prophecies, as an Evidence of
our Saviour's Divine Commiffion. 231
Of the Prophecies that went, before concerning
the Meffiah. 233
Of the Prophecies that Chrift himfielf delivered 'con
cerning Things that were to happen after. 234
An Anfwer to Objections againft applying the Pro
phecies in the OldTeftament to Chrift. 1 3 6, &c.
Of the Tefiimony of our Saviour's Difciples, as an
Evidence of the Truth of the Chriftian Reve
lation. 283
What

The CONTENT S.*
What Things are requifite to make the TeftiV
mony of our Saviour's Difciples a- complete
••» Evidence. „ 283
That the Apoftles could not be impofied upon them
felves., ibid.
That they could have no Defign of impofing upon
Others. . 284,
That the Apoftles Tefiimony has been truly con
veyed down to Us. 287
Of the Authority of the Booh of Holy Scripture, ibid.
Prop. XV. That they who will not, by the Argu
ments and Proofs befiorementioned, be convinced of the
Truth and Certainty of the Chriftian Religion, would
not be convinced by any other Evidence whatfioever -,
7ios not though one fihould rife on Purpofie from the
Dead to endeavour to convince them. 289
That the Evidence, which God has afforded us of
the Truth of our Religion, is abundantly Suffi
cient. ¦ ibid.
That the Caufe of Mens Unbelief is not Want of
better Evidence to prove the great Truths of
,Religion. 290
But that Wickednefs and ungovern Lufts are the
only Caufes of obftinate Infidelity. 292
And, fo long as Men are under the Dominion of
their Lufts, they would not be convinced,
though the Evidence of Religion was even
much ftronger than it is. ibid.
Nay, not even though one (hould rife on Purpofe
from the Dead to convince them. 294
That therefore 'tis abfolutely neceffary, in the
firft Place, that Men become impartially wil
ling to embrace all Truth, and to obey all rea-
fbnable Obligations. 295
That Men of fuch a Difpofition would be reli
gious, though the Evidences of Religion were
much lefs than they are. 296
That God may require us to take Notice of fome
Things at our Peril. 298 A

DEMONSTRATION

OF THE

Being and Attributes

O F

G O D.
More particularly in Answer
to Mr. Hobbs, Spino%a> and their
Followers.

LL thofe who either afe, or pretend to Tht Mm-
be Atheijls ; who either difbelieve the duakn.
Being of God, or would be thought
todofo; or, (Which is all one,) who
deny the Principal Attributes of the
Divine Nature, and fuppofe God to be an Un
intelligent Being, which acts merely by Neceffity ;
that is, which, in any tolerable Propriety of
Speech, acts not at all* but is only acted upon :
B All

norance .

2 A Demonflration of the
All Men that are Atheifts, I fay, in this Senfe, muft
be fo upon one or other of thefe three Accounts. ¦
Meifma- Either, Firft, Becaufe, being extremely ignorant
njh from and ftupid, they .have never duly confiidered any Thing
flupid lg- at a]j\ nor mac|e afly juft Ufe of their natural
Reafon, to difcover even the plaineft and moft ob
vious Truths ¦, but have fpent their Time in a Man
ner of Life very little Superior to. that of Beafts.
Or from Or, Secondly, Becaufe, being totally ^debauched
grafiCcr- and corrupted in their Praclice, they have, by a
r option of v;cjol1s antj degenerate Life, corrupted the Prin
ciples of their Nature, and defaced the Reafon of
their own Minds ; and, inftead of fairly and im
partially inquiring into the Rules and Obligations
of Nature, and the Reafon and Fitnefs of Things,
have accuftomed themfelves only to mock and feoff
at Religion ; and, being under the Power of Evil
Habits, and the Slavery of Unreafonable and In
dulged Lufts, are refolded riot to hearken td any
Reafoning which would oblige them to forfake
their beloved Vices.
Or from On, Thirdly, Becaufe in the way of Speculative
jaije Phi- Reafoning, and upon the Principles of Philofophy,
*ej-}y. ,-hey pretencj tnat tne Arguments ufed Againftthe
Being or Attributes of God, feem to them, after
the ftiiitcft and fulleft Inquiry, to be more ftrong
and conclufive, than thofe by which we endeavour
to prove thefe great Truths.
Thefe feem the only Caufes that can be imagined,
of any Man's disbelieving the Being or Attributes .
of God •,, and no Man can be fuppofed to be an
Atheift, but upon one or other of thefe 'three Ac
counts. Now to the two former of thefe three Sorts
of Men-, namely, to fuch as are wholly ignorant
and ftupid, or to fuch as through habitual De
bauchery have brought themfelves to a Cuftom of
mocking and fcoffing at all Religion, and will not
hearken ro any fair Reafoning ; it is not my prefent
Bufinefs

Being and Attributes of Got). *
¦Bufinefs to apply myfelf. The One of thefe wants
to be inftructed in the firft Principles of Reafon, as
well as of Religion ¦, The Other difbelieves only for
a prefent faife Intereft, and becaufe he is delirous
that the Thing (hould not be true. The One has
not yet arrived to the Ufe of his natural Faculties j
The Other has renounced them ; and declares he will
not be argued with, as a rational Creature. 'Tis
therefore the third Sort of Atheifts only, (namely,
thofe who in the way of Speculative Reafoning, and
,-vpon the Principles of Philofophy, pretend that the
Arguments brought Againft the Being or Attributes
of God, do, upon the ftricteft and fulleft Exami
nation, appear to them to be more ftrong and con-
clufive, than thofe by which thefe great Truths are5
attempted to be proved;) Thefe, I fay, are the only
Atheiftical Perfons, to whom my prefent DifcOurfe.
can be fuppofed to be directed, or indeed who are
capable of being reafoned with at alb
Now, before I enter upon the main Argument, I
ftiall premife feveral ConceffionSi which thefe Men*
upon their own Principles, are unavoidably obliged
to make* '
Andj Firft, They muft of Neceffity own; that, <r'k$eiȣ
fuppofing it cannot be proved to be true, yet at leaft "fGcdwrj
'tis a Thing very Defirable, and which any wife Man DfiraiIi"
would wifh to be true, for the, great Benefit and
Happinefs of Men ; that there was a God, an Intel
ligent and Wife, a Juft and Good Being, to Govern
the World; Whatever Plypothefis thefe Men can
poffibly framej whatever Argument they can invent,
by which they would exclude God and Providence
out of the World ; That very Argument or Hypo-
thefis, will of Neceffity lead them to this Conceffion.
If they argue, that our Notion of God arifes not
from Nature and Reafon, but from the Art and Con
trivance of Politicians ; That Argument itfelf forces
them to confofs, that 'tis manifeftly for the Intereft
B« of

4 A Demonfration of the
of Human Society, that it fhould be believed there
is a God. If they fuppofe that the World was made
by Chance, and is every Moment fubject to be de-
ftroyed by Chance again •, no Man can be fo abfurd
as to contend, that 'tis as comfortable and defirable
to live in fuch an uncertain State of Things, and
* fo continually liable to Ruin,
*Mariaac Terras Ccelumq;- without any Hope of Renovati-
Unadiesdabitexitio.multofq; on; as in a World that were un-
per annos der the Prefervation and Conduct
Suitentata: ruet moles & ma- of a powerfu] Wife and Good
china Mundi. _ , f , ' . „
 Diaisdabitipfafidem God. It they argue againft the
res Being of God, from the Faults
Forfitan, & graviter terrarum and jjefefts which they imagine
OmnU conquaffari in parvo they can find in the Frame anc*
tempore cernes. Conftitution of the Vifiible and
Lucret. Lib. 5. Material Wqrld ; this Suppofiti-
on obliges' them to acknowledge,
that it would have been better the World had been
made by an Intelligent and Wife Being, who might
have prevented all Faults and Imperfections. If
they argue againft Providence, from the Faultinefs
and Inequality which they think they difcover in
the Management of the Moral World ; this is a
plain Confeffion, that 'tis a Thing more fit and de
firable in itfelf, that the World fhould be governed
by a Juft and Good Being, than by mere Chance
or Unintelligent Neceffity. Laftly, if they fup
pofe the World to be Eternally and Neeeffarily Self-
Exiftent -, and'eonfequently that every Thing in it
is eftabliffied by a Blind and Eternal Fatality ; no
rational Man can at the fame Time; deny, but that
Liberty and Choice, or a Free Power of Acting,
is a more eligible State, than to be determined thus
in all our Actions, as a Stone is to move down
ward, by an abfolute and inevitable Fate. In a
Word, which Way foever they turn themfelves, and
whatever Hypothefis they make, concerning the
Original

Being and Attributes of God. 5
Original and Frame of Things ; Nothing is fo cer
tain and undeniable, as that Man, confidered with
out the Protection and Conduct of a Superior Being,
is in a far worfe Cafe; than upon Suppofition of
the Being and Government of God, and of Mens
being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection, and
Favour. Man, ofhimfelf, is infinitely infufficient
for his own Happinefs : * He is liable to many Evils * Arch-Bp.
and Mifitries, which he can neither, prevent nor redrefis : Tillotfon'j
He is full of Wants which he cannot fiupply, and job'xxviil
compaffed about with Infirmities which he cannot re- 2$.
move, and obnoxious to Dangers which he can never
fiuffciently provide againft : He is fiecure ofi Nothing that
he enjoys in this World, and uncertain ofi every Thing
that he hopes for : He is apt to grieve for what he
cannot help, and eagerly to defire what he is never
likely to obtain, &c. Under which evil Circum-
ftances, 'tis manifeft there can be no fufficient
Support, but in the Belief of a Wife and Good
God, and in the Hopes which true Religion affords.
Whether therefore the Being and Attributes of
God can be demonftrated, or not -, it muft at leaft
be confeffed by all rational and wife Men, to be
a Thing very Defirable, and which they would
heartily Wifij to be true, that there was a God,
an Intelligent and Wife, a Juft and Good Being,
to Govern the World.
Now the Ufe I defire to make of this Conceffion,
is only this : That fince the Men I am arguing
with, are unavoidably obliged to confefs, that 'tis
a Thing very Defirable at leaft, that there fhould be
a God ; they muft of Neceffity, upon their own
Principles, be very willing, nay, defirous above all
Things, to be convinced that their prefent Opinion
is an Error, and fincerely hope that the contrary
may be demonftrated to them to be true ; And con-
fequently they are bound with all Serioufnefs, At
tention, and Impartiality, to confider the Weight of
B 3 the*

6 A Demonftration of the
the Arguments, by which the Being and Attributes
of God may beproved to thern.
Scoffing at Secondly, All fuch Perfons as I am fpeaking of,
&%5<"?2S' who profefs thernfelves to be Atheifts, not upon any
fxcu/aik. prefent Intereft or Luft, but purely upon the Prin
ciples of Reafon and Philofophy ; are bound by
thefe Principles- to acknowledge, that all mocking
and ficoffing at Religion, all jefting and turning Ar
guments of Reafon into Drollery and Ridicule, is
the moft unmanly and unreafonable Thing in the
World. And cohfequently they are obliged to ex
clude put of their Number, as Irrational and Self-
condemned Perfons, and unworthy to be argued.
with, all fuch Scoffers at Religion, who deride at
all Adventures without hearing Reafon; and who
will not ufe the Means of being convinced and
fatisfied. Hearing the Reafon of the Cafe with
Patience and Unprejudicednefs, is an Equity which
Men owe to every Truth that can in any Manner
concern them ; arid which is neceffary to the Dif-
covery of every Rind of Error. How much more
in Things of the utmoft Importance !
Fhtueavd Thirdly, Since the Perfons I am difcourfing to,
goodMan- cannot but own, that the Suppofition of the Being
jers abjo- 0f Q0d, is in itfelf moft defirable, and for the Be-
'tlffirlT ne*h °f tne World, that it fhould be true ; They
muft of Neceffity grant further, that, fuppofing
the Being and Attributes of God to be Things not
indeed Demonftrable to be true, but only Poffible,
and fuch as cannot be -demonftrated to be falfe; as
moft certainly they cannot : And much more, fup
pofing them once made to appear Probable, and but
more likely to be true than the contrary Opinion :
Nothing is more evident, even upon thefe Suppo-:
jitions only, than that Men ought in ajl Reafon to,
.jive pioufiy and virtuoufiy in the World ; and that
Yjce and Immorality are, upon all Accounts, and.
unde(.

Being and Attribute's of God.
under all Hypothefes, the moft abfurd and inex-
cufable Things in Nature.
Thus much being premifed, which no Atheift
who pretends to be a rational and fair Inquirer into
Things, can poifibly avoid granting ; (and other
Atheifts, 1 have before fiid, are not to be difputed
with at ail ; as being Enemies to Reafon, no lefs
than to Religion, and therefore abfolutely Self-con
demned :) I proceed now to the main Thing I at
firft propofed -, namely, to endeavour to fhew, to
fuch confidering Perfons as I have already defcri-
bed, that the Being and Attributes of God aie not
only poffible or barely probable in themfelves, but
affo {briefly demonftrable to any unprejudiced Mind,
from the moft unconteftable Principles of Right
Reafon. And here, becaufe the Perfons I am at prefent
dealing with, muft be fuppoied not to believe any
Revelation, nor acknowledge any Authority which
they will fubmit to, but only the bare Force of
Reafoning: Ifhall not, at this Time, draw any
Tefiimony from Scripture, nor make ufe of any
Sort of Authority, nor lay any Strefs upon any
popular Arguments in the Matter before us ; but
confine myfelf to the Rules of ft rift and demon-
ftrative Argumentation.
Now Many Arguments there are, by which the
Being and Attributes of God have been undertaken
to be Demonftrated, And perhaps moft of thofe
' Arguments, if thoroughly underftood,. rightly
ftated, fully purfued, and duly feparated from the
falfe or uncertain Reafonings, which have fometimes
been intermixed with them ; would at length appear
to be fubftantial and conolufive. But becaufe I
would endeavour, as far- as poffible, to avoid all
Manner of Perplexity and Confufion ; therefore I
fhall not at this Time ufe any Variety of Arguments,
but endeavour, by One clear and plain Series of
B 4 Proportions,.'

8 A Demonflration of the
Propofitions, neeeffarily connected and following
one from another, to demonftrate the Certainty
of the Being of God, and to deduce in Order the
Neceffary Attributes of his Nature, fo far as, by
our Finite Reafon, we are enabled to difcover and
apprehend them. And becaufe it is not to-iny
prefent Purpofe to explain or illustrate Things to
Them that Believe, but only to convince Unbe-f
lievers, and fettle Them that Doubt, by ftrict and
undeniable Reafoning ; therefore I fhall not alledge
any Thing, which, however really true and ufeful,
may yet be liable to Contradiction or Difpute ; but
fhall endeavour to urge Such Propofitions only, as
cannot be denied without departing from that Rea
fon, which all Atheifts pretend to be the Foundation
of their Unbelief. Only it is abfolutely Neceffary,
before all Things, that they confent to lay afide
all Manner, of Prejudices ; and efpecially fuch, as
have been apt to arife from the too frequent Ufe
pf Terms of Art, which have no Ideas belonging
to them ; and from the common receiving certain
Maxims of Philofophy as true, which at the Bottom
feem to be only Propofitions without any Meaning or
Signification at all.
Something. I. Firft then, it is Abfolutely and Undeniably
Txiitd" fertain' that Something has Exifted from all Eternity,
f™mEti;r- r^'s is ^'Evident and Undeniable a Propofition,
j;tj/. that no Atheift in any Age has every prefumed to
affert the contrary ; and therefore there is littl$ Need
of being particular in the Proof of it. For, fince
Something now Is, 'tis manifeft that Something
always Was : Otherwife the Things that Now Are,
muft have been produced out of Nothing, abfolutely
^nd without Caufe : Which is a plain Contradiction
in Terms. For, to fay a Thing is produced, and
yet that there is no Caufe at all of that Production,
js to fay that Sornething is Effefled, when it i^
Effected

Being and Attributes of God. &
Effected by Nothing ; that is, at the fame Time
when it is not Effected at all. Whatever Exifts,
has a Caufe, a Reafon, a Ground of its Exiftence 9
(a Foundation on which its Exiftence relies •, a
Ground or Reafon why it doth Exift, rather than
not Exift ;) either in the Neceffity of its own Nature,
and then it muft have been of itfelf Eternal : Or
in the Will of fome Other Being •, and then That
Other Being muft, at leaft in the Order of Nature
and Caufality, have Exifted before it.
That Something therefore has really Exifted from OftbeDtf.
Eternity^ is one of the certaineft and moft evident/"^ °f
Truths in the World ; acknowledged by all Men, f™^**
and difputed by none. Yet as to the Manner how
it can be •, there is nothing in Nature more difficult
for the Mind of Man to conceive, than this very
firft Plain and Self-evident Truth, For, How any
Thing can have Exifted Eternally ; that is, How an
Eternal Duration can be now actually Paft ; is a
Thing utterly as impoffible for our narrow Under-
ftandings to comprehend, as any Thing that is not
an exprefs Contradiction can be imagined to be :
And yet to deny the Truth of the Propofition, that
an Eternal Duration is now aSually Paft ; would be
to affert fiomething fiill far more Unintelligible, even
a real and exprefs Contradiction.
The Ufe I would make of this Obfervation, is Difficulties
This. That fince in all Queftions concerning the ar'fiaS
Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning anyy^-^.
Thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is Nature of
joined ; tho' we can indeed Demonftrate certain- Eternity
Propofitions to be true, vet 'tis impoffible for us *" *\ '
r , , r ' 1 1 regarded,
to comprehend or frame any adequate or compleat becaufe
Ideas of the Manner how the Things fo demonftrated equal in all
can Be : Therefore when once any Propofition is SuPpofi'*-
clearly demonftrated to be < true ; it ought not to m
difturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing Diffi
culties on the other Side, which, merely for want o.f

jp A Demonjlration of the
of adequate Ideas of the Manner of the Exiftence of
the Things demonftrated, are not eafy to be cleared.
Indeed, were it poffible there fhould be any Propo
fition which could equally be Demonftrated on both
Sides of the Queftion, or which could on both Sides
be reduced to imply a Contradiction ; (as fome have-
very inconfiderately afferted;) This, it muft be
confefled, would alter the Cafe. Upon This abfurd
Suppofition, all Difference of True and Falfe, all
Thinking and Reafoning, and the Ufe of all our
Faculties, would be entirely at an End. But when
to Demonftration on the one Side, there are oppofed
on the other, only Difficulties raifed from, our want
of having adequate Ideas of the Things themfelves ;
this ought not to be efteemed an Objection of any
real Weight. 'Tis directly and clearly Demonftrable,
that Something has been from Eternity : All the Ob
jections therefore raifed againft the Eternity of any
Thing, grounded merely on our want of having
an adequate Idea of Eternity •, ought to be looked
upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like
Inftances ; 'Tis Demonftrable, for Example, that
Something muft be actually Infinite : All the Metaphy-,
fical Difficulties therefore, which arife ufually from
applying .the Meafures and Relations of Things
Finite, to what is Infinite ; and from fuppofing
. Finites to be [Aliquot] Parts of Infinite, when indeed
they are not properly fo, but only as Mathematical
Points to Quantity, which have no Proportion at all :
(and from imagining AH Infinites to be Equal, when
in Things difiparate they manifeftly are not fo ; an
infinite Line being not only not equal to, but infinitely
lefs than an infinite Surface, and an infinite Surface
than Space infinite in all Dimenfions :) All Metaphy-
fical Difficulties, I fay, arifing from falfe Suppo-
fitions of this Kind, ought to be efteemed vain
and of no Force. Again : 'Tis in like Manner.
Demonftrable^ that §>UMtity is infinitely Divifible:
AU

Being and Attributes of God. ft
All the Objections therefore raifed, by fuppofing
the Sums total of all Infinites to 'be Equal, when in
difiparate Parts they manifestly are not fo ; and by
comparing the imaginary Equality or Inequality of
the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities,
whofe Parts have really no Number at all, they all
having Parts without Number ; ought to be looked
upon as weak and altogether inconclufive : To afk
whether the Parts of Unequal Quantities be equal in
Number or not, when they have No Number at all;
being the fame Thing as to afk whether two Lines
drawn from differently diftant Points, and each of
them continued infinitely, be equal in Length or not,
that is, whether they End together, when neither of
them have any End at all.
II. There has Exifted from Eternity, * Some One There muft
Unchangeable and Independent Being. For fmceha'veExiJt
Something muft needs have been from Eternity >ete/^-Tone
as has been already proved, and is granted on all independent
Hands :" Either there has always Exifted Some Being.
One Unchangeable and Independent
Being, from which all other Be- * The Meaning of this Pre-
jngs that are or ever were in the t9fi*™> [and M.that. the ff'
T J3 . r . . _ . gument here requires,) is, that
Umverfe, have received their On- there muft needs have Always
ginal ; or elfe there has been an hen Some Independent Being,
infinite Succeffion of changeable s°me ?ne at Jeaft- ,/» >w
, , , „ . , ° , that there can be no More than
and dependent Beings produced one 0ne7 ., mt the Beflgn of this
from another in an endlefs Pro- Propofition, hut of the Seventh.
greffion, without any Original
Caufe at all. Now this latter Suppofition is fo
very abfurd, that tho' all Atheifm muft in its Ac
count of moft Things (as fhall be fhewn hereafter)
terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheifts ever
were fo weak as openly and directly to defend it.
For it is plainly impoffible, and contradictory to itfelf.
I fhall not argue againft it from the fuppofed Impof
fibility of Infinite Succeffion, barely and abfiblutely
considered

\Z. '-d Demonfilration of the
eonfidered in itfielfi; for a Reafon which Ihall be
Pientioned hereafter. But, if we confider fuch an
Infinite Progreffion, as One entire Endlefs Series of
Dependent Beings ; 'tis plain this whole Series ofi Beings
can have no Caufe from without, of its Exiftence ;
becaufe in it are fuppofed to be included all Things
that are or ever, were in the Univerfe : And 'tis plain
it can have no Reafon within itfelf, of its Exiftence ;
becaufe no one Being in this Infinite Succeffion is
fuppofed to be Self-Exiftent or Neceffary, (which is
the only Ground or Reafon of Exiftence of any
Thing, that can be imagined within the Thing itfelf
as will prefently more fully appear,) but every one
Dependent on the foregoing : And where no Part is
Neceffary, 'tis manifeft the Whole cannot be Necef
fary -, Abfolute Neceffity of Exiftence not being an
extrinfic, relative, and accidental Denomination ; but ,
an inward and effentidl Property of the Nature of
the Thing which fo Exifts. An Infinite Succeffion
therefore of merely Dependent Beings, without any
Original Independent Caufe ; is a Series of Beings,
that has neither Neceffity, nor Caufe, nor any Rea
fon or Ground at all of its Exiftence, either within
itfielfi ox from without ; That is, 'tis an exprefs Con
tradiction and Impoffibility •, 'tis a fuppofing Some
thing to be caufied, (becaufe 'tis granted in every one
of its Stages of Succeffion, not to be Neeeffarily and
df itfelf-,) and yet that, in the Whole, 'tis caufed
abfolutely by Nothing. Which every Man knows
is a Contradiction to imagine clone in Time ; and,
becaufe Duration in this Cafe makes no Difference,
'tis equally a Contradiction to fuppofe it done fir on}
Eternity, And confequently there muft, on the
contrary, of Neceffity have Exifted from Eternity,
Some One Immutable and Independent Being.
To fuppofe an Infinite Succeffion of changeable
and dependent Beings produced, one from another in
m endlefs Progreffion, without any Original Caufe at;

, Being and Attributes of Gob.
at all, * is only a driving back
from one Step to another, and
(as it were) removing out of
Sight, the Queftion concerning
the Ground or Reafon of the
Exiftence of Things. 'Tis in
Reality, and in point of Argu
ment, the very fame Suppofi
tion, as it would be to fuppofe
One continued Being, of beginning-
lefis and endlefs Duration, neither
Self-Exiftent and Neceffary in
itfelf, nor having its Exiftence
founded in Any Self-Exiftent
Caufe. Which is directly abfurd
and contradictory.
Otherwife, thus. Either there
has always Exifted Some One Un
changeable and Independent Being,
from which all other Beings have
received their Original ; or elfe
there has been an Infinite Succef
fion of changeable and dependent
Beings, produced one from ano
ther in an endlefs Progreffion,
without any Original Caufe at all.
According to this latter Suppo-
fitionj there is Nothing in the
Univerfe Self-Exiftent or Neeef
farily- Exifting. And if fo; then
it was originally equally poffible,
that from Eternity there fhould
never have Exifted any Thing
at all ; as that there fhould from
Eternity have Exifted a Succef
fion of changeable and dependent
Beings. Which being fuppofed ;
then, What is it that has from
Eternity

* This Matter has fince been
well illuftrated, by a late Able
Writer. " Suppofe a Ghaih
" hung down out of the, Heaven},
"from an Unknown Bright',
" and, though Every Link of it
" gravitated toward the Earth,
" and what it bung upon <wat
" not.vifible, yet it did not -dl-
''fcettd, hut kept its Situation:
" And, upon This, - a Queftion
" jhould arife, What fupported
" or kept up this Chain? Would
" it be a fufficient Anfwer, to
"fay, that the Firft or Loweft
" Link hung upon the Second,
" or That next above it ; the
" Second, or rather the Firft
" and Second together, upon
" the Third; and fo on in in-
" finitum f For, What holds
" up the Whole ? A Chain of
'' Ten Links would fall down ;
" unlefs Something, able to bear
" it, hindered. One 'of 'Twenty J
" if not flayed by Something of
" a yet Greater Strength, in
" Proportion to the Increafe of
" Weight. And therefore One
" of infinite Links, certainly ;
" if not fuftained by Something
" infinitely flrong, and capable
" to bear up an infinite Weight.
" And Thus it is in a Chain of
" Caufes and Effects ; tending,
" or (as it were) gravitating
" towards fome End. TheLafi,
" orLoweJl, depends, or (as one
" may fay) is fufpended upon
" the Caufe above it* 1 his
"• again, if it be not the Firft
" Caufe, is fufpended, as an
" Efifecl, upon Something above
" it, fcfr. And if they jhould be
" infinite ; unlefs (agreeably to
" what has been Jaid) there is
"fome Caufe, upon which All
" hang or depend; they -would "be

-14 ¦ A Demonfrdiion of the . ,
P be but an infinite Effeft, Eternity determined fuch a' Sut>
« without an Efficient. And ceff10n Qf Beings to Exift, rather
" to alurt there is any Juch , . r a T~ *u„„~
"Thitg, would be as great an than that from Eternity there
«« Abfurdity as to jay, that fhould never have Exifted any
" a finite, or little Weight Thin°" at all ? Neceffity it was not ;
<< wants Something to fuftain b f k was equally poffiblfi,
" it, but an Infinite one (or r A J ,r ,
"the Greateft) does not." *> this Suppofition, that they
Religion of Nature deli- fhould not have Exifted at all.
neated, pag. 67. Chance, is nothing but a mere
Word, without any Signification;
And Other Being 'tis fuppofed there was none, to
determine the Exiftence of thefe. Their Exiftence
therefore was determined by Nothing ; neither by
any Neceffity in the Nature of the Things them1-
felves, becaufe 'tis fuppofed that none of them are
Self-Exiftent ; nor by any other Being, becaufe no
other is fuppofed to. Exift. That is to fay; Of two
equally poffible Things, (viz. whether any Thing or
Nothing fhould from Eternity have Exifted,) the one
is determined, rather than the other, abfolutely by
Nothing : Which is an exprefs Contradiction. And
cortfequently, as before, there muft on the contrary,
of Neceffity have Exifted from Eternity, Some One
Immutable and Independent Being. Which, what k
is, remains in the next Place to be inquired.
The One M- That Unchangeable and Independent Being, which
Indepen- has Exifted from Eternity, without any External Caufe
dent Being, 0f jts Exiftence ; muft be Self-Exiftent, that is, Necefi-
flecefL.ilv far Hy- Exifting. For whatever Exifts, muft either
Exifting. have come into Being out of Nothing, abfolutely
without Caufe •, or it muft have been produced by
fome External Caufe ; or it muft be Self-Exiftent.
Now to arife out of Nothing, abfolutely without
any Caufe ; has been already fhewn to be a plain
Contradiction. To have been produced by fome
External Caufe, cannot poffibly be true of every
Thing ; but Something muft have Exifted Eternally and

Being and Attributes df Gov.
and Independently ; As has likewife been fheWn
already. It remains therefore, that That Being,
which has Exifted Independently- from Eternity,
mult of Neceffity be Self-Exiftent., Now to be
Self-Exiftent, is hot to be Produced' by itfielfi ;"¦ for
That is an exprefs Contradiction. But it is, (which
is the only Idea we can frame of Self- Exiftence ;
and, without which, the Word feems to have no
Signification at all:) It is, I fay, to Exift by an
Abfiolute Neceffity originally in the Nature ofi the Thing
itfielfi. And this Neceffity, muft be Antecedent; hot
indeed in Time, to the Exiftence of the Being itfelf ;
becaufe That is Eternal : But it muft be Antecedent,
in the Natural Order of our Ideas, to bur Suppofition
of its Being. That is ; This Neceffity muft not
barely be confiequent -upon our Suppofition of the
Exiftence of fuch a Being ; (For then it would not
be a JNeceffity Abfolutely fuch in itfelf, nor be the
,Ground or Foundation of the Exiftence of any
Thing ; being, on the contrary, only a Confequent
of it ;) But it muft antecedently force itfelf upon us,
whether we will or no, even when we are endea
vouring to fuppofe that no fuch Being Exifts. For
Example: When we are endeavouring to fuppofe,-
that there is no Being in the Univerfe that Exifts
Neeeffarily ; we always find in our Minds, (befides
the foregoing Demonftration of Something being
Self-Exiftent, from the Impoffibility ofi every Thing's page u,
being dependent ;)' W e always find in our Minds, ^f-
I fay, fome Ideas, as of Infinity and Eternity ; which
to remove, that is, to fuppofe that there is no Being,
no Subftance in the Univerfe, to which thefe Attri
butes or Modes of Exiftence are neeeffarily inherent,
is a Contradiction in the very Terms. For Modes
and Attributes exift only by the Exiftence of the
Subftance to which they belong. Now he that can
fuppofe Eternity and Immenfity (and confequently
the Subftance by whofe Exiftence thefe Modes or
Attributes

%6 A peMonflfation of the"
Attributes exift,) removed out of the Univerfe %
may, if he pleaie, as eafily remove the Relation of
Equality between twice Two and Four.
That to fuppofe lmmenjity removed out of the
Univerfe, or not Neeeffarily Eternal, is an exprefs
Contradiction ; is intuitively evident to evey one who
attends to his own Ideas, and confiders the Efiential
Nature of Things. To fuppofe
* Moveantur Partes Spatii * any Part of Space removed, is
de Locis fuis & movebuntur f fe j removed from and
(ut ita dicam) de Seipfis. f\ r ,r . r ¦> _ ,
Newton. Princip. Lib. I. Schol. out of Itfelf : And to fuppofe the
adDefinit. 8. Whole to be taken away, is fuppo
fing it to be taken away from itfelf \
that is, to be taken away while it ftill remains i Which
is a Contradiction in Terms. There is no Obfcurity in
This Argument, but what arifes to thofe who think
Immenfe Space to be abfolutely Nothing. Which
Notion, is itfielfi likewife an exprefis Contradiction.
For Nothings is That which has No Properties or
Modes whatfioever. That is to fay ; 'tis That of
which Nothing can truly be affirmed, and of which
Every Thing can truly be denied. Which is not the
Cafe of lmmenjity or Space.
From this Third Propofition it follows,
The true Jft- That the only true Idea of a Selfi-Exiftent or
Notion of Neeeffarily -Exifting Being, is the Idea of a Being, the
Self-Exifi- Suppofition of whofie Not-Exifting is an exprefs Contra
diction. For fince 'tis abfolutely impoffible but there
page 1 1 fcf muft be Somewhat Self-Exiftent ; that is, which Ex-
i4- ills by the Neceffity of its own Nature -, 'Tis plain
that That Neceffity cannot be a Neceffity confequeftt
upon any foregoing Suppofition, (becaufe Nothing
can be Antecedent to that which is Self-Exiftent 5
no, not its own Will, fo as to be the Caufe or Ground
of its own Exiftence,) but it muft be a Neceffity
_ abfolutely fuch in its own Nature. Now a Neceffity4
not relatively or confiequentially, but abfiolutely fiuch in
its own Nature; is nothing elfe, but its being a
plain

Being and Attributes of G o D. - \J
plain Impoffibility or Implying a Contradiction to
fuppofe the contrary. For.Inftahce: The Relation
of Equality between twice Two and Four is an
abfolute Neceffity ; only becaufe 'tis an immediate
Contradiction in Terms to fuppofe them unequal:
This is the only Idea we can frame of an abfolute
Neceffity ; and to ufe the Word in any other Senfe
feems to be ufing it without any Signification at all.
If any One now afks, What Sort of Idea the Idea
of that Being is, the Suppofition of whofe Not-
Exifting is thus an exprefs Contradiction ? I anfwer,
'Tis the Firft and Simpleft Idea we can poffibly
frame ; an Idea neeeffarily and effentially included or
prefuppofed, as zfine qua non, in every other Idea
whatsoever ; an Idea, which (unlefs we forbear
thinking at all) we -xannot poffib'y extirpate or
remove out of our Minds ; of a moft Jimple Beings
abfolutely Eternal and Infinite, Original and Independent.
For, that he who fuppofes there is no Original inde
pendent Being Li the Univerfe, fuppofes a Contra
diction, has been ftiewn already. And that he
who fuppofes there may poffibly be, no Eternal and
Infinite Being in the Univerfe, fuppofes likewife a
Contradiction, is evident from hence ; (befides that
thefe two Attributes do neeeffarily follow from Self-
originate Independent Exiftence, as fhall be fhewn
hereafter ;) that when he has done his utmoft, in
endeavouring to imagine that no fuch Being Exifts,
he cannct avoid imagining an Eternal and Infinite
Nothing ; that is, he will imagine Eternity and
Immenfity removed out pf the Univerfe, and yet
that at the fame Time they ftill continue there :
As has been above * diftinctly explained. * page 15.
This Argument the Cartefidns, who fuppofed the foe Error
Idea of Immenfity to be the Idea of Matter, have beenoftbeC&r-
greatly perplexed with. For (however in Words they te&*ns-
 have contradicted themfelves, yet in Reality) they
have more eafily been driven to that moft intolerable
C Abfurdity,

I*

* Puto implicare Contra-
diftionem, ut Mundus fit
Finitus : i. e. I. think it implies
a Contradiction, for the World
to be Finite. Cartef. Epilt.
69. Prima; Partis
And his Follower Mr. Regis,
Mais peut etre (faith he) que
je raifonne mal, &c. i.e. But
perhaps I argue Jll, when I
conclude that the Property my
Idea hath to reprefent Exterfion,
[that is, in the Senfe of the
Cartefians, Matter] comes from
Extenfion itfelf, as its Cauje.
For, What hinders me from
believing that, if this Property
comes not from myfelf, yet at
haft it may come from fome
Spirit [or Being] Superior to
me, which produces in me the
Idea of Extenfion ; though Ex
tenfion does not aSiually Exift ?
Yet when I confider the Thing
attentively, I find that t>:y
Conclufion is good ; and that

A Demonjlration of the
Abfurdity, of afferting Matter*
to be a Neceffary Being ; than
been able to remove out of their
Minds the Idea of Immenfity, as
Exifting Neeeffarily and infepa-
rably from Eternity'. Which
Abfurdity and inextricable Per
plexity of theirs, in refpect of
the Idea of Immenfity, fhews that
they found That indeed to be
Neceffary, and impoffible to be
removed ; But, in refpect of
Matter, 'twas only a perverfe
applying an Idea to an Object
whereto it no ways belongs.
For, that 'tis indeed abfolutely
impoffible and contradictory to
fuppofe Matter Neeeffarily- Exift
ing, fhall be demonftrated pre-
fently.

no Spirit, [or Being] how
excellent foever, can caufe the Idea which I have of Extenfion to reprefent to
me Extenfion rather than any Thing elfe, if Extenfion does not ailually Exift ;
Becaufe, if he Jhould do fo, the Idea which I fhould then have of Extenfion,
'would not be a Reprefent ation of Extenfion, but a Reprejentalion of Nothing.
Which is impoffible.
But it may be I ftill deceive myfelf, when I fay that the Idea I have of
Extenfiony fuppofes an Objecl ailually Exifting. For it Jeems that I have
Ideas, which do not fuppofe any Objecl : I have, for Example, the Idea
cf an Enchanted Caftle ; though no juch Thing really Exifts. Yet 'when I
confider the Difficulty ftill more attentively ; I find there is this Difference
between the Idea of Extenfion, and that of an Enchanted Cafile ; that the
firft being natural, that is, independint on my Will, fuppofes an Objecl
which is neeeffarily fuch as it reprefenls ; "whereas the other, being artificial,
fuppofes indeed an Objecl, but 'tis not neceffary that That Objecl he
abfolutely Juch as the Idea reprefents, becaufe my Will can add to that
Objecl, or diminifo from it, as it plecfes ; as I have before J aid, and as
/ball be proved hereafter, when I come to treat of the Origin of Ideas.
Regis. Metaphyf. Lib. I. Par. 1. Cap. 3.

idly. From

Beiiig and Attributes of Goo. I g>
idly. From hence it follows, that there is no Nothing fo
Man whatfioever, who makes any Uj'e of his Reafon, "f ' a"'\" s
but may eqfily become more certain of the Being of a efce ffjJf
Supreme Independent Caufe, than he can be of any Sni,rem*
Thing elfe be/ides his own Exiftence. For how much
Thought foever it may require to demonftrate the '
Other Attributes of fuch a Being, as it may do to
demonftrate the greateft Mathematical Certainties ;
(of which more hereafter :) Yet, as to its Exiftence;
that there Is fomewhat Eternal, Infinite, and Self-
Exifting, which muft be the Caufe and Original of
all other Things ; this is one of the Firft and moft
natural Conclufions, that any Man, who thinks at
all, can frame in his Mind : And no Man can any
more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether
twice Two be equal to Four. 'Tis poffible indeed
a Man may in fome Senfe be ignorant of this firft
and plain Truth, by being utterly ftupid, and not
thinking at all : (For, though it is abfolutely impof
fible for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may
poffibly neglect to conceive this : Tho' no Man
can poffibly Think that twice Two is not Four,
yet he may poffibly be ftupid, and never have
thought at all whether it be fo or not.) But this
I fay : There is no Man, who thinks or reafons at
all, but may eafily become more certain, that there
is Something Eternal, Infinite, and Self-Exifting ;
than he can be certain of any Thing elfe.
^dly. Hence we may obferve, that Our firft Cer- {
tainty of the Exiftence of God does not arife firom this, <
that in the Idea our Minds frame of him (or rather '
in the Definition that we make of the Word, God, '.
as fignifying a Being ofi all poffible Perfections ) we in- '
elude Self-Exiftence : But firom hence, that 'tis demon
ftrable both negatively, that neither can All Things
poffibly have arifien cut ofi Nothing, nor can they have
depended one on another in an endlefis Succeffion ; and
alfio pofitively, that there is Something in the Univerfe,
C 2 actually

£d A Demonjtration of the
actually Exifting without us, the Suppofition of ' whofie
Not- Exifting plainly implies a Contradiction. ~The
Argument which has by Some been drawn from
our including Self^Exiftence in the Idea of, God,
or our comprehending it in the Definition or Notion
we frame of him ; has This Obfcurity and Defect in
it ; that it feems to extend only to the Nominal Idea
or mere Definition of a Self-Exiftent Being, and does
not with a fufficiently evident Connexion refer and
apply That general Nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion
which we frame in our own Mind, to any Real par
ticular Being actually Exifting without us. For 'tis
not Satisfactory, that I have in my Mind an Idea
of the Propofition ; There Exifts a Being indued with
all poffible Perfections ; Or, There is a Self-Exiftent
Being. But I muft alfo have fome Idea of the
Thing; I muft have an Idea of Something actually
Exifting. without me. And I muft fee wherein
confifts the Abfolute Impoffibility of removing
that Idea, and confequently of fuppofing the Non-
Exiftence of the Thing ; before I can be fatif-
fied from that Idea, that the Thing actually Ex
ifts. The bare having an Idea of the Propofition,
There is a Self- Exiftenl Being, proves indeed the Thing
not to be impoffible ; (For of an impoffible Propo
fition there can be no Idea ;) But that it actually Is,
cannot be proved from the Idea ; unlefs the Certainty
of the Actual Exiftence of a Neceffarily-Exifting
Being follows from the Poffibility of the Exiftence
of fuch a Being : Which that it does in this particu
lar Cafe, many Learned Men have indeed thought ;
and their fubtle Arguings upon this Head are fuf
ficient to raife a Cloud not very eafy to be feen
through. But it is a much Clearer and more Convin
cing way of Arguing, to demonftrate that there does
actually Exift without us a Being, whofe Exiftence
is Neceffary and of itfelf, by fhewing the manifeft
Contradiction contained in the contrary Suppofition, (as

Being and Attributes of Go vT. 2 r-
(as I have before done,) and at the fame Time the page n,
abfolute Impoffibility of deftroying or removing &c*
fome Ideas, as of Eternity and Immenfity, which page 15.
therefore muft needs be Modes or Attributes of a
Neceffary Being actually Exifting. For if I have in
my Mind an Idea of a Thing, and cannot poffibly
in my Imagination take away the Idea of that Thing
as actually Exifting, any more than I can change or
take away the Idea of the Equality of twice Two
to Four, the Certainty of the Exiftence of that Thing
is the fame, and ftands on the fame Foundation, as
the Certainty of the other Relation. For the Rela
tion of Equality between twice Two and Four has
no other Certainty but this ; that I cannot, without
a Contradiction, change or take away the Idea of
that Relation. We are Certain therefore of the
Being of a Supreme Independent Caufe ; becaufe
'tis ftrictly demonftrable, that there is Something
in the Univerfe, actually Exifting1 without us, the
Suppofition of whofe Not-Exifting plainly implies
a Contradiction. (
Some Writers have contended, that 'tis prepofterous
to inquire in this Manner at all into the Ground or
Reafion of the Exiftence of the Firft Caufie : Becaufe
evidently the Firft Caufie can have nothing Prior to
it, and confequently mufts needs (they think) Exift
abfiolutely without Any Caufe at all. That the Firft
Caufie can have no Other BEING prior to it, to be
the Caufie ofi its- Exiftence •, is indeed Self-evident.
But if originally, abfiolutely, and antecedently to all
Suppofition of Exiftence, there be no neceffary Ground
or Reafion why the Firft Caufe does Exift, rather than
not Exift ; If the Firft Caufe can rightly and truly
be affirmed to Exift, abfolutely without Any Ground
or Reafion of Exiftence at all : It will unavoidably
follow, by the fame Argument, that it may as
well Ceafie likewife, to Exift, without any Ground or
Renfion of Ceafing to Exift. Which is abfurd. The'
C 3 Truth

22 A Denionjlration of the
Truth therefore plainly is : Whatever is the True...
Reafion, why the Firft Caufie can never poffibly Ceafie
to Exift ; the Same is, and originally and always
was, the True Reafion why it always did and cannot
but Exift : That is, 'tis the True Ground and Reafion ,
of its Exiftence.
¦ That the 4thly. From hence it follows, that The Material
Material World cannot poffibly be the Firft and Original Being,
Worldclfff Uncreated, Independent, and of itfielfi Eternal. For
be the Self- ^ince lt nath been already demonftrated, that What-
Exiftent ever Being hath Exifted from Eternity, Independent,
Being. and without any External Caufe of. its Exiftence,
page 14. muft be Self-Exiftent ; and that Whatever is Self-
Exiftent, muft Exift Neeeffarily by an Abfolute
Neceffity in the Nature of the Thing itfelf: It
follows, evidently, that unlefs the Material World
Exifts Neeeffarily, by an Abfolute Neceffity in its ..
own Nature, fo as that it muft be an exprefs Con
tradiction to fuppofe it not to Exift ; it cannot be
Independent and of itfelf Eternal. Now that the
Material World does not Exift thus Neeeffarily, is
very Evident. For Abfolute Neceffity of Exifting, '
and a Poffibility of Not-Exifting, being contra
dictory Ideas ; 'tis manifeft the Material World
cannot Exift Neeeffarily, if Without a Contradiction
we can Conceive it either Not to Be, or to be iD any ,
Refpect otherwifie than it Now is. Than which,
nothing is more eafy. For whether we confider
the Form of the World, with the Difipofition and
Motion of its Parts ; or whether we confider the
Matter of it, as fuch, without Refpect to its pre
fent Form ; Every Thing in it,"' both the Whole and
every one of its Parts, their Situation and Motion,
the Form and alfo the Matter, are the moft Arbi
trary and Dependent Things, and the fartheft remo
ved from Neceffity, that can poffibly be imagined!
A Neceffity indeed of Fitnefis, that is, a Neceffity
that Things fhould be as they are, in order to the
Vicll-bcing

Being and Attributes of God. 2$
Well-being of the Whole, there may be in all thefe
Things : But an Abfolute Neceffity of Nature in any
of them (which is what the Atheift muft maintain)
there is not the leaft Appearance of. If any Man
will fay in This Senfe, (as every Atheift muft do),
either that the Form of the World, or at leaft the
Matter and Motion of it, is Neceffary ; Nothing
can poffibly be invented more Abfurd.
If he fays, that the particular Form is Neceffary ; The Form
that is, that the World, and all Things that are of the
therein, Exift by Neceffity of Nature ; he muft ^"Ji™'
affirm it to be a Contradiction to fuppofe that any c"^ar^'
Part of the World can be in any Refpect; otherwife
than it now is. It muft be a Contradiction in
Terms to fuppofe more or fewer Stars, more or fewer
Planets, or to fuppofe their Size, Figure, or Motion,
Different from what it now is ; or to fuppofe more
or fewer Plants and Animals upon Earth, or the
prefent ones of different Shape and Bignefs from
what they now are. In all which Things there is
the greateft Arbitrarinefs in refpect of Power and ¦
Poffibility, that can be imagined ; however Necef-
fr.ry any of them may be, in refpect of Wifdom,
and Preservation of the Beauty and Order of the
Whole. "
If the Atheift will fay, that the Motion in General Nor its
of all Matter is Neceffary •, it follows that it muft Motion.
be a Contradiction in Terms to fuppofe any Matter
to be at Reft. Which is fo abfurd and ridiculous,
that I think hardly any Atheifts, either Antient or
Modern, have prefumed directly to fuppofe it.
One late * Author indeed has ventured to affert, *Mr. To-
and pretended to prove, that Motion (that is, the Iznd, Lett.
Conatus to Motion, the Tendency to move, the Power, 1I1'
or Force that produces actual Motion) is effential to
all Matter. But how Philofophically, may appear
from this One Confideration. The effential Tendency
to Motion, of every one, or of any an Particle of
C 4 Matter

£% A Demonflrdtion of the
Matter in this Author's imaginary Infinite Plenum,
muft be either a Tendency to move fome one deter
minate Way at once, or to move every Way at once.
A Tendency to move fome one determinate Way,
cannot be effential to any Particle of Matter, but
muft arife from fome External Caufe ; becaufe there
is nothing in the pretended neceffary Nature of any
Particle, to determine its Motion neeeffarily and
effentially one Way rather than another. , And a
Tendency or Conatus equally to move every Way at
once, is either an abfolute Contradiction, or at leaft
could produce nothing in Matter, but an Eternal
Reft of all and every one of its Parts.
If the Atheift will fuppofe Motion, neceffary and
effential to fiome Matter, but not to all : The fame
Abfurdity, as to the Determination of Motion, ftill
follows : And now he moreover fuppofes an Abfolute
Neceffity not Univerfal ; that is, that it fhall be a
Contradiction to fuppofe fome certain Matter at
Reft, tho' at the fame Time fome other Matter
actually be at Reft.
Nor the If he only affirms bare Matter to be Neceffary ; ¦
bare Mat- Then, befides the extreme Folly of attributing;
Motion and the Form of the World to Chance ;
(which fenfelefs Opinion J think All Atheifts have
now given up ; and therefore I fhall not think my
felf obliged to take any Notice of it in the Sequel
of this Difcourfe :) it may be demonftrated by many
Arguments drawn from the Nature and Affections
of the Thing itfelf, that Matter is not a Neceffary
Being. For Inftance, thus : If Matter be fuppofed to «
Exift Neeeffarily ; then in that Neceffary Exiftence
there is either included the Power of Gravitation^,
or not. If not ; then in a World merely Material,
and in which no Intelligent Being prefides, there
never could have been any Motion ; becaufe Motion,
f#ge 23. as has been already fhewn, and is now granted in
the Queftion, is not Neceffary of itfielfi. But if the
Power

Being and Attributes of Go a. £$
Power of Gravitation be included in the pretended
Neceffary Exiftence of Matter ; then, it following
neeeffarily that there muft be a Vacuum, (as the
incomparable Sir Ifiaae Newton * has abundantly *Principi'a
demonftrated that there muft, if Gravitation be an Ph'lofoph.
Univerfal Quality or Affection of Matter;) it fol- Edit' P""
lows likewife, that Matter is not a Neceffary Being. Edit, fa-'
For, if a Vacuum actually be, then 'tis plainly more cunda,/.
than poffible for Matter not to Be. If an Atheift 368»
will yet Affert, that Matter may be Neceffary, tho'
not neceffary to be every-where : I anfwer, this is
an exprefs Contradiction. For abfiolute Neceffity, is
abfolute Neceffity every-where alike. And, if it be
no Impoffibility for Matter to be abfent from one
Place, 'tis no Impoffibility (abfolutely in the Nature
of the Thing -, For no Relative or Confequential
Neceffity can have any Room in this Argument:)
'Tis no abfolute Impoffibility, I fay, in the Nature
of the Thing, that Matter fhould be abfent from
any other Place, or from every Place.
Spinoza, the moft celebrated Patron of Atheifm in Spinoza'*
our Time, who taught thatf there is no Difference °Pl"ion
of Subftances, but that the Whole and every Part "
of the Material World is a Necef-
farily-Exifting Being ; and that \ fUna fubftantianbn poteft
there is no other God, but the produci ab alia fubftantia.
Univerfe : That he might feem. ^^fuoftanS'e^necef-
jngly avoid the manifold Abfur- fario infinita. ibid. Prop. 8.
dities of that Opinion, endeavours, , Ad naturam fubftantia; per-
by an Ambiguity of Exqreffion tinet exiftere Ibid. Py-7-.
• , f-. r c \ • r\-r r t rraeter Deum nulla dan1
in the Progrefs of his Difcourfe, neJ. concipi poteft fubftantia.
to elude the Arguments by which ibid. Prop. 14.
he forefaw his Affertion would
"be confuted. For, having at firft
plainly afferted, that [] All Sub- \\ Ad naturam fubftantia;
fiance is Neceffarily-Exifting ; he pertinet exiftere. Prop, -.
would afterward feem to explain
it. away, by afferting, that the
Reafion

26 A Demonjlration of the
*Res nullo alio modo, neq; Reafion why every Thing * Exifts
alio ordine a Deo produci Neceflrarily and could not poffibly
potuerunt, quam products . , J. r-.rn.f-rr
fant. Prop. 33. have been in any Refpect different
Ex Neceflitate Divinas Na- from what it now is, is becaufe
turse, infinita infinitis modis every Thing flows from the Necefi-
fhoc eft, omnia qua; fub intel- r, r .1 f-r,- ¦ sr , ¦ r> u- l
leftum infinitum cadere Pof- fity ofi the Divine Nature. By which
funt) fequi debent. Prop. 16. if the unwary Reader underftands,
th*t he means Things are therefore
Neeeffarily fuch as they are, becaufe Infinite Wjfdom
and Goodnefs could not poffibly make Things but in
that Order which is Fitteft and Wifeft in the Whole;
he is -very much miftaken : For fuch a Neceffity is
not a Natural, but only a Moral and Confequential
Neceffity, and directly contrary to the Author's
true Intention. Further ; if the Reader hereby
underftands, that God was determined, not by a
Neceffity of Wifcom and Goodnefs, but. by a
mere Natural Neceffity, exclufive of Will and
Choice, to make all Things juft as they now are'';
neither is This the Whole of Spinoza1?, Meaning r
For This, as abfurd as it is, is ftill fuppofing God
as a Subftance diftinct from the Material World j
ilea's fu- Which f He exprefly denies. Nay further; if any
pra citatis. ont thinks his Meaning to be, that all Sulftances
in the World are only Modifications of the Divine
Effence ¦, neither is This All ; For thus God may
ftill be fuppofed as an Agent, acting upon himfielf at
leaft, and manifefting himfielf in different Manners,.
according to his own Will: Which J Spinoza
exprefly denies. But his true Meaning therefore,
however darkly and ambiguoufly
tDeum non operari ex he fometimes fpeaks, muft be
libertate voluntatis. Prop. ,i-  1 ¦ r , r ^, .
32. Corol. ,. & Scholium id thls* and, if he means any Thing
Prop. 17. at allconfiftent with himlelf, can
be no other than this : That, fince
|| Una fubftantia non poteft tis abfolutely || impoffible" for any
produci ab alia fubftantia. Thing to be created or produced
1 - by

Being and Attributes of God. 27
by another ; and * alfo abfolutely *Res nullo alio modo, neq;
impoffible for God to have caufed alio ordine a Deo F^uci
any Thing to be in any Refped STS*.*™ P
different from what it now is ;
every Thing that Exifts, muft
needs be fo a f Part of the Divine t Prater Deum nulla dari,
Subftance, not as a Modification £* ~ncipi poteft fubftantia-
caufed in it by any $ Will, or " Detm non operari ex
Good-Pleafure, or Wifdom, in the libertate voluntatis. Prop.
Whole, but as of Abfolute Necef- 32. Corel. 1.
fity in itfelf, with Refpect to the
|| Manner of the Exiftence of each c j. Nu"° alio mdo> mV
Part, no lefs than with Refpect to , ' '
the Self- Exiftence of the Whole. Thus the Opinion
of Spinoza, when expreffed plainly and confidently,
comes evidently to this : That the Material World,
and every Part of it, with the Order and Manner of
Being of each Part, is the only Self-Exiftent or Ne-
ceffarily-Exifting Being. And now confequently
he muft of Neceffity affirm all the Conclufions,
which I have before fhewn to follow demonftrably
from that Opinion. He cannot poffibly avoid
affirming, that 'tis a Contradiction (not to the
Perfections of God ; For that's mere fenfelefs Cant
and Amufement in Him who maintains that there
is but One Subftance in the Univerfe ; But he muft
affirm, that 'tis in itfelf and in Terms a Contra
diction) for any Thing to be, or to be imagined,
in any Refpect otherwife than it now is. He muft
fay 'tis a Contradiction to fuppofe the Number, or
Figure, or Order of the Principal Parts of the
World, could poffibly have been different from
what they now are. He muft fay, Motion is
Neeeffarily of itfelf; and confequently that 'tis a
Contradiction in Terms to fuppofe any Matter to
be at Reft : Or elfe he muft affirm, (which is rather
the more abfurd of the two ; as may appear from what

2$ A Demonjlratioh of the
what has been already faid in Proof of the Second
page xi. General Head of this Difcourfe: And yet he
has* chofen to affirm it;) that
* Corpus motum, vel quief- Motion, as a Dependent Being,
dlt^na~tl rr *a»been Eternally communicated
pore, .quod etiam ad motum from one Piece of Matter to ano-
vel quietem determinatum fuit t]ier ; without having at all any
¦ ab alio & illud itcrum ab Orioinal Caufe of its Being, either
a io, & fie in infinitum. . ,°. , nr r -^
pj. II. trot. 13. Lemma 3. within itfelf or from without.
Which, with the other like Con-
fequences touching the Neceffity of the Exiftence
of Things ; (the yery Mention of which is a fuffi
cient Confutation of any Opinion they follow from;)
do, as I have faid, unavoidably follow from the fore-
mentioned Opinion of Spinoza. And confequently
That Opinion, viz. That the Univerfe cr Whole
World is the Self-Exiftent or Neeeffarily -Exifting Being,
is demonftrated to be falfe.
I have, in this Attempt to fhew that The Material
World cannot poffibly be the Firft and Original Being,
Uncreated, Independent, and Self-Exiftent ; defignedly
omitted the Argument ufually drawn from thefiup-
pofied abfolute Impoffibility, in the Nature of the
Thing itfelf, of the World's being Eternal, or
having Exifted thro' an Infinite Succeffion of Time.
And this I have done for the two following Reafons,
Of the O- *ft- Becaufe the Queftion between us and the
pinion con- Atheifts is not, Whether the World can poffibly have
inning the fam j?ternal ? fat, Whether it can poffibly be the Ori-
theWorU &mU Independent, and Self- Exifting Being? Which
is a very different Queftion. For many,' who have
affirmed the One, have ftill utterly denied the Other.
And almoft all the Antierit Philofophers that held
the Eternity of the World, in whofe Authority and
Reafons our Modern Atheifts do fo greatly boaft
and triumph ; defended That their Opinion, by
fuch Arguments as fhew plainly that they did by
no Means thereby intend to affert, that the Material World

Being and Attributes of God. <2q
World was the Original, Independent, Self-Exifting
Being, in Oppofition to the Belief of the Exiftence
of a Supreme All-governing Mind, which is the
Notion of God. So that the Deniers of the Being
of God have no Manner of Advantage from that
Opinion of the Eternity of the World, even fuppo
fing it could not be difproved. Almoft all the old
Phflofophers, I fay, who held the Eternity of the
World, did not thereby mean (at leaft their Argu
ments do not tend to prove) that it was Independent
and Self-Exiftent ; but their Arguments are wholly
levelled, either to prove barely that Something muft
needs be Eternal, and that the Univerfe could not
poffibly arife out of Nothing abfolutely and without
Caufe ; which is all that Ocellus Lucanus's Argu
ments amount to : Or elfe that the World is an
Eternal and Neceffary EffeCt, flowing from the
Effential and Immutable Energy of the Divine Na
ture ; which feems to have been Arifiotle's Opinion :
Or elfe that the World is an Eternal Voluntary
Emanation from the All- wife and Supreme Caufe j
which was the Opinion of many of Plato's Followers.
None df which Opinions or Arguments will in the
leaft help out our Modern Atheifts ; who would
exclude Supreme Mind and Intelligence out of the
Univerfe. For however the Opinion of the Eternity
of the World is really inconfiftent with the Belief
of its being Created in Time r yet fo long as the
Defenders of that Opinion either did not think it
Inconfiftent with the Belief of the World's being
the EffeCt and Work of an Eternal, All-wife, and
All-powerful Mind ; or at leaft could defend that
Opinion by fuch Arguments only, as did not in the
leaft prove the Self-Exiftence or Independency of the
World, but moft of them rather quite the contrary ^
'tis with the greateft Injuftice and Unreafonablenefs
in the World, that Modern Atheifts (to whofe
JPiypofe' the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the World would

3©

A Denionflration of the"
would fignify nothing, unlefs at the fame Time the
Exiftence and Sovereignty of Eternal Intelligence
or Mind were likewife difproved) pretend either
the Authority or the Reafons of thefe Men to be
on their Side.
Ocelltts Lucanus, one of the ancienteft Aflerters of
the Eternity of the World ; (whofe Antiquity and
Authority * Mr. Blunt oppofes to
that of Mofies ;) in delivering his
Opinion, fpeaks indeed like one
that believed the Material World
to be Self-Exiftent ; afferting,
*f that it is utterly incapable either
of Generation or Corruption, ofi Be^
ginning or End ; that it is ofi itfielfi
Eternal and Perfect, and Permanent
for ever ; and that the Frame and
Parts of the World muft needs be
Eternal, as well as the Subftance and
Matter of the Whole. But when he
comes to produce his Arguments
or Reafons for his Opinion ; they are either fo very
abfurd and ridiculous, that even any Atheift in this
Age ought to be afhamed to repeat them ; -as when
he proves J that the World muft
needs be Eternal, without Beginning
or End, becaufe both its Figure and
Motion are a Circle, which has nei
ther Beginning nor End: Or elfe
they are fuch Arguments as prove
only, what no Man ever really de
nied ; viz. That Something muft
needs be Eternal, becaufe 'tis im
poffible for every Thing to arife
or to fall into
Nothing;

* Oracles of Reafon -y Letter
to Mr. Gildon, p. zi6.

•f- 'Aylrnirov to noLv xai dvu-
"Atapxpv Xcd cIt&ivtdIov.
K.o<7f*o; avrit; II- iavtoO d'iSi-
o; Iri xcu auroJEXJ;, xa.) Stct-
[uvuv rov nrdvla. aluva.
Aa Moj <rov xao-y.%, duay-
xatov xcct rec. [him &VT& crvvv-
fcifX*'"- Aiyu h% fticn, ovpa-
vov, yw, &c. Ocell. Lucan.
IIeji tj)5 tb iranlf tyvcnut;.

% To uvac%w xa.) aVeWnfloii
Ta crxripahs xa.) T>i{ xu/yaiu(,
sriraTai dio'U- dyinfas o xoVftoj
xdi dpBuplof Urt ydg rev crxri-
pdlos ilia; xv'xhof oi/po? ^£ wdv-
7octv tiro$ Xat op,Qioq, hiovjip
&>&fX°S *** dTfteiiTvloS. i) T£
T))S ximVswj, &C Ibid.
Thus tranflated : Nay, that
the Figure, Motion, &c. thereof,
are without Beginning and End;
therehy it plainly appears, that
the World admitteth neither Pro-

out of Nothing,

duclion nor Diffolution. For the
Figure is Spherical, and confe
quently on every Side equal, and therefore without Beginning or Ending. Alfo
the Motion is circular, &c. Oracles of Reafon, p. 215.

Being and Attributes of God.

3

i

Nothing ; As when he fays * that * 'AyinJlo, tl <ndi.—\% 0j
the World muft have been Eternal, Y*%ryh<>™> »V™ ?°S
becaufe 'tis a Contradiction for the ^I^yl^^t
lfniverfie to have had a Beginning ; yt SI dSv\dloV. — 'Ex]of yd? TS
fince, if it had a Beginning, it muft n«»io; tilth. Ocell. ibid.
have b.'.n caufied by Some other Thing, and then it is
not the Univerfie. To which One Argument, all
that he fays in his whole Book, is plainly reducible.
So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only
this ; that there muft needs be an Eternal Being in
the Univerfe : and not, that Matter is Self-Exiftent,
in Oppofition to Intelligence and Mind. For, all
that he afierts about the abfolute Neceffity of the
Order and Parts of the World, is confeffedly moft
ridiculous ; not at all proved by the Arguments he
alledges : And in fome Paffages of this very Book,
as well as in other Fragments, he himfelf fuppofes,.
and is forced exprefly to confefs, that, however
Eternal and Neceffary every Thing in the World be
imagined to be; yet even That Ne- , , , ¦
c^ffity muft flow from an ^Eternal ^JZf^Z ^o7l.
and Intelligent Mind, the neceffary Luc. de Leg. Fragm.
Perfections of whofe Nature are t Zv>ixci T°' Hfapo* */>/»»»'«.
the Caufe t of the Harmony and T**?f f 8':T'°! s ®lKJbid-
Beauty of the World, and particu- xai Tlit ififa ^0 @iS fj0^_
larly of Mens having || Faculties, »«; «»5p«'woK, uX iSo»i( in**,
Organs of Senfe, Appetites, &c. \^^ o-v^wv, dxhd, &c.
fitted even to Final Caufes. ' r
Ariftotle likewife was a great Afferter indeed of
the Eternity of the World : But not in Oppofition ¦
to the Belief of the Being, or of the Power, Wif
dom, or Goodnefs of God. On the contrary, He for
no other Reafon afferted the World to 'be Eternal,
but becaufe he fancied that fuch an Effect muft
needs Eternally proceed from fuch an Eternal Caufe.
And fo far was he from teaching, that Mater is
the Firft and Original Caufe of all Things ; that,
pn the contrary, he every-where exprefly defcribes God

2± A Detnonffation of the
* n8»«. God to be an * Intelligent Being-s
•f- ®th tttrtSpetln «Vpws, j. fncorporeal : J The Firft Mover
Diog.in Vita Ariftot. - 0f all 1 kings, Himfielf Immoveable ;
Ariftot. Metaph. and affirms, that || // there were
|| ej pii '&ou napd rd anxflnW nothing but Matter in the Worlds
"**?.>, ** i'r*' W *t ' T"' f.'V //for* «w«& &? »o Original Caufie,
.»«,r««Px«-p».. ^- but an Irifinite Progreffion of Caufies:
Which is abfurd.
¦ As to thofe Philofophers, who taught plainly and
exprefly, that Matter was not only Eternal, but alfo
Self-Exiftent and intirely Independent, Co-exifting
from Eternity with God, independently, as a Second
Principle : I have already fhewn the Impoffibility
of this Opinion, at the Entrance upon, the prefent
Head of Difcourfe, where I proved that Matter
page 24. could not poffibly be SelfiExiftent. And I fhall
further demonftrate it to be Falfe, when I come to
prove the Unity of this Self-Exiftent Being.
Plato, whatever his Opinion was about the ori
ginal Matter, very largely and fully declares his
Sentiments about the Formation of the World, viz.
, That it was compofed and framed by an Intelligent
and Wife God. And there is no one of all the
Antient Philofophers, who, in all ,his Writings,
fpeaks fo excellently and worthily
• *o «i,t,\ ««J «fts ™JS * as H concerning the Nature
Toy inotvioi;. . . .. c Jr
"o yS,, »>«*>, *ai e«ic, *>2 and Attributes of God. Yet, as
irdtla, td h tlfam xa.) rd h dSa to the Time of the World's begin-
K«2i;'«7oy«a"w«»l*lfW«ft£»o{. njng t0 be Formed, he feems to
e epu . 1 . 10. make it indefinite, when he fays,
•f The World muft needs be an Eternal Refiemblance ofi
the Eternal Idea. At leaft his Followers afterward fo
underftood and explained it, as if, by the Creation
of the World,' was not to be underftood a Creation in
\ Xldca, undyxy tokSe xoo-jaov, iIhwu rivet; s7»ai. Plato in Tirnxo.
Which Words, being very imperfeil in our Copies of the Original, are thus
rendered by Cicero : Si ergo generatus [eft mundus ;] ad id efteftus eft,
^quod ratione fapientiaq; comprehenditur, atq; immutabili anernitate con-
tinetur. Ex quo efficitur, ut fit necejfe hunc quern cernimus mundum, fwiulor
thrum alernum effe alicujus esterni. Cic. de Univerf.

Being and Attributes of
in Time * ; but only an Order of
Nature^ Caufality, and Dependence :
That is, that the Will of God, and
his Power of Acting, being necef- ,
farily as Eternal as his Effence ;
f the Effects of That Will and
Power might le fiuppofied coeval to
the Will and Power' themfelves j
in the fame Manner, as Light
would eternally proceed from the
Sun, or a Shadow from the inter*
pofied Body, , or an Imprejfion from
an impofied Seal, if the refpect ive
Caufes of thefe Effects were fup
pofed Eternal,
From all which^ it plainly ap
pears how little Reafon Modern
Atheifts have to boaft either of
the Authority or Reafons of thofe
Antient Philofophers who held
the Eternity of the World. For
fince thefe, Men neither proved,
nor attempted to prove, that the
Material World was Original to
itfelft Independent, or Self-Ex
ifting ; but only that it was an
Eternal Effect ' of an Eternal
Caufe, which is God : 'tis evident
that this their Opinion, even fup
pofing it could by no Means be
refuted, could afford no Manner
of Advantage to the Caufe • of
Atheifts in our Days* who, ex
cluding Supreme Mind and Intel
ligence out of the Univerfe, would
make mere Matter and Neceffity
the Original and Eternal Caufe
Of all Things.
D zdly. The

Gob.

33

* Not» irpo xid^S tltal, £•£
w? x^'"? ff^TEpoy dvli 'itla\ aXS'
on o xiajA.ii; irufd ve bj-i, (ptljel
^oT£po; ixutoq xa.) dlltof rarts.
Plot in is.
Qui aiitem a Deo quid.erfl
fadtum fatentur, non tameri
eura volant femjoris habere^
fed fuze Great ionit initium 5
ut, modo quodam vix 3n«
telligibili, Semper fit fadlus,
Auguftin. de Civil: Dm. LiB.
II. Cap. 4.
De murido; & dk his quos
in mundo Deos a Deo1 fa£k>S
fcribit Plato, apertiflime dicit
eos efle cofpifle, & habere ini-
tinrti.-j — ¦ — Verum id quo-
modo intelligant, inveneruni
[Platonici ;] non efle hoc Vide-*
licet TempoHs, fed Subflitwtio'
nis initium; Ibid: Lib. lot
Cup. 31.
Sed mtinduhi quiderh fuiflei
femper, Philofophia audtor eft 3
conditore quidem Deo, fed nori
ex tempore). Macrob. in Sown.
Scip. Lib. z. Cap. 10.
•f Ka» e> jSa^et, ira.fa.tS£iy(idti
cri tin T<yi» yvyfipui $Bvaywcre<S
irpot; to ^riTyjABvoii' tya&) ydg ot$
Ka.Sd'tzt^u.'l'riofrootSp.a. ri?; Ixd-"
5"tf crxtccq yUi\a.i' o^.op£povo$ cz Ttf ¦
catjidli w a-Xid, xa.) »x opcyrtftat'
yrw Syi xat 00& 0 xoa[>Loi; icocfcc-
x'o^a^v^A if 1 Tis ®£tf amy oV7o£
UviiS Ta ili'cn, xcti &malidi<j$ ej-1
tu @itj; ax'm SI xa) ojAoTifAoCt
Zacharits Scholaft. Dijputat.
Sicut enim,' inqufiunt \Pld-.
tonici,] fi pes ex aeternitate
femper fuJfTet in puiverej fern--
per ei fubeffet veitigium ', qflod
taftien veftigium a calcante
fgfturri nemo dubitaret ; nee
alteram altera prius eflet ;
quamvis akenini ab sflte'fcr"
factum effet ; Sis inquiantf;& SuandiW

34 -^ Demonflration of the
mundus atq; in illb Dii creati, 2dly. The other Reafon why
& femper fuerunt, femper ,;n this Attempt to prove that
exiftente qui fecit ; & tamen K, _ _ . , r „- ,. „„ . *.„it.ul
fafli font. A«/K». 4 «A ^ M»fcrw/ JP*r/</ rtWWKrf />#/</)>
D«-. Ztf. 10. Cap. 31. fo //fo F>'r/? W Original Being,
Uncreated, Independent, and Self-
Exiftent) I have omitted the Argument ufually
drawn from the fiuppofied abfolute Impoffibihty of
the World's being Eternal, or having Exifted
through an Infinite Succeffion of Time ; is becaufe
That Argument can never be fo ftated, as to be of any
Ufe in Convincing or Affecting the Mind of an Atheift,
who muft not be fiuppofied to come prepared before-
' hand with any tranficendent Idea of the Eternity of
God. Fox fince an Atheift cannot be fuppofed to
believe the Nice and Subtle (and indeed unintek
ligible) Diftinctions of the Schools ; 'tis impoffible
by this Argument fo to difprove the Poffibility of
the Eternity of the World, but that an Atheift will
underftand it to prove equally againft rhe Poffibility
of Any Thing's being Eternal; and confequently
that it proves nothing at all, but is only a Difficulty
arifing from our not being able to comprehend ade
quately the Notion of Eternity. That the Material
World is not Self-Exiftent or Neceffarily-Exifting,
but the Product of fome diftinct fuperior Agent,
¦page 21. may (as I have already fhewn) be ftrictly demon
ftrated by bare Reafon, againft the moft obftinatc
Atheift in the World. But the Time when the
World was Created ; or whether its Creation was,
properly fpeaking, in lime ; is not fo eafy to de
monftrate ftrictly by bare Reafon, (as appears from
the Opinions of many of the Antient Philofophers'
concerning that Matter-,) but the Proof of it can
be taken only fronr Revelation. To endeavour to
prove, that there cannot poffibly be any fuch Thing
as infinite Time or Space, from the Impoffibilitv of
* Cud- an * Addition of Finite Parts ever compofing or
vvonh'j exhatifting an Infinite : Or from the imaginary In-
643. ' equality ofi the Number of Years, Days, and Flours, that

Being and Attributes of Gov. <?r
that would be contained in the one ; or of the
Miles, Yards, and Feet, that would be contained
in the other -, is fuppofing Infinites to be made up
of Numbers of Finites ; that is, 'tis fuppofing Finite
Quantities to be Aliquot or Conftituent Parts of In
finite ; when indeed they are not fo, but do all
Equally, whether Great or Small, whether Many or
Few, bear the very fame Proportion to an Infinite,
as Mathematical Points do to a Line, or Lines to a
Superficies* or as Moments do to Time ; that is,
none at all. So that to argue abfolutely againft the
Poffibility of Infinite Space or Time, merely from
the imaginary Inequality of the Numbers of their
Finite Parts ; which are not properly Conftituent
Parts, but mere Nothings in Proportion ; is the
Very fame, Thing as it would be to argue againft
the Poffibility of the Exiftence of any determinate
Finite Quantity, from the imaginary Equality or
Inequality of the Number of the Mathematical Lines,
and Points contained therein % when indeed neither
the one nor the other have (in Propriety of Speech)
any Number at all, but tbey are abfolutely without
Number : Neither can Any given Number or Quan
tity be any Aliquot or Conftituent Part of Infinite, or
be compared at all with it, or .bear any Kind of
Proportion to it ; or be the Foundation of any
Argument in any Queftion concerning it.
IV. What the Subftance or Effence ofi that Being, <rhe Ef-
<which is Self-Exiftent, or Neceffarily-Exifting, is \ feme of the
we have no Idea, neither is. it at all poffible for us to Self-Exift-
comprehend it-. That there is fuch a Being actually ¦'?' ^'*g'—
Exifting without us, we are fure (as I have already hinfib'L
fhewn) by ftrict and undeniable Demonftration... a%es %,t
Alfo what it is not ; that is* that the Material World ,4, js.
is not it, as Modern Atheifts would have it; has been '
already Demonftrated. But what it is, I mean as .
to its Subftance arid Effence ; this we are Infinitely r &
D 2 unable

36 A Demonftration of the
unable to comprehend. Yet this does not rn the
leaft diminifh the Certainty of the Demonftration
of its Exiftence. -For 'tis one Thing, to know cer
tainly that a Being Exifts ; and another, to know
what the Effence of that Being is. And the One
may be capable of the ftrictect Demonftration,
when the Other is abfolutely beyond the Reach of
all our Faculties to underftand. A Blind or Deaf
Man has infinitely more Reafon to deny the Being,
or the Poffibility of the Being, of Light or Sounds j
than any Atheift can have to deny, or doubt of,
the Exiftence of God. For the One can at the
utmoft have no other Proof, but credible Tefiimony,
of the Exiftence of certain Things, whereof 'tis
abfolutely impoffible that he himfelf fhould frame
any Manner of Idea, not only of their Effence, but
even of their Effects and Properties : But the Other
may, with the leaft Ufe of his Reafon, be affured
of the Exiftence of a Supreme Being, by undeniable
Demonftration ; and may alfo certainly know Abun
dance of its Attributes, (as fhall be made appear in
the following Propofitions) though its Subftance or
Effence be intirely incomprehenfible. Wherefore
nothing can be more Unreafonable and Weak,
than for an Atheift upon this Account to deny the
Being of God, merely becaufe his weak and finite
Underftanding cannot frame to itfelf any adequate
Notion of the Subftance or Effence of that Firft
and Supreme Caufe. We are utterly ignorant of
the Subftance or Effence of all other Things ; even
of thofe Things which we converfe moft familiarly
with, and think we underftand beft. There is not
fo mean and' contemptible a Plant or Animal, that
does not confound the moft inlarged Underftanding
upon Earth : Nay, even the fimpleft and plaineft
of all inanimate Beings have their Effence or Sub
ftance hidden from Us in the deepeft and moft im
penetrable Obfcurity. How weak then and foolifh is

Being and 'Attributes of 'God. 37
is it to raife Objections againft the Being of God,
from the Incomprehenfiblenefs of his Effence ! and
to reprefent it as a ftrange and incredible Thing,
that ther$ fhould Exift any incorporeal Subftance,
the Effence of which we are not able to Co upre;
hend ! As if it were not far more ftrange, that
there fhould Exift numberlefs Objects of our Senfes,
Things fubject to our daily Inquiry, Search, and
Examination ; and yet we not be able, no not in
any Meafure, to find out the real Effence of any one
even of the leaft of thefe Things.
Neverthelefs, 'tis very neceffary to obferve here
by the Way, that it does not at all from hence
follow, that there can poffibly be in the unknown
Subftance or Effence of God, any Thing contradictory
to our clear Idesis. For as a Blind Man, tho'hehas
no Idea of Light and Colours, yet knows certainly
and infallibly that there cannot poffibly be any Kind
of Light which is not Light, or any Sort of Colour
which is not a Colour : So, though we. have no Idea
of the Subftance of God, nor indeed of the Subftance'
of any Other Being ; yet we are as infallibly certain
that there cannot poffibly be, either in the One or
the Other, any contradictory Modes or Properties ;
as if we had the clear eft and moft, diftinCt Idea of them.
From what has been faid upon thjs Head, we
may obferve, ... .
\ft. The Weaknefis ofi fuch, as have prefiumed to Of Infinite,
imagine Infinite Space to be. a juft Reprefientation or Space.
adequate Idea of the Effence of the Supreme Caufie.
This is a weak Imagination, arifing from hence,
that Men ufing themfelves to judge of all Things
by. their Senfes only, fancy Spiritual or Immaterial
'Subfilances, 'becaufe they are not Objects of their
Corporeal Senfes, to be as it were mere Nothings;
Juft as^Children imagine. Air, becaufe they cannot
jee it, to be mere Emptinefs and Nothing. ' But the
papacy is too grofs, to deferve being Infifted upon.
D 3 There

38 A Demonftralim of the
There are perhaps Numberlefs Subftances in the
World, whofe Effences are as intirely unknown and.
impoffible to be reprefented to our Imaginations, as
Colours are to a Man th<it was born Blind, or Sounds
to One that has been always Deaf Nay, there is
no Subftance in the World, of which we know any
Thing further, than only a certain Number of its
Properties or Attributes ; of which we know fewer
jn fome Things, and in Others more. Infinite Space
is nothing elfe but an abftract Idea of Immenfity
pr Infinity 5 even as infinite Duration is of Eternity,
And it would be juft as proper to fay that Eternity
is the Effence of the Supreme Caufe ; as to fay, that;
Immenfity is fo, Indeed they feem Both to be but
Modes of an Effence or Subftance Incomprehenfible
to Us ; And, when we endeavour to reprefent the
real Subftance of Any" Being whatfoever in oup
Weak Imaginations, we fhall find ourfelves in like:
Manner deceived.
The Vanity idly, From hence appears the Vanity of the School
<f the men . who, as in other Matters, fo in their Difputes
<§ch.oobm. ^^ the geif_Exiftent Being, when they come at
what they are by no Means able to comprehend or
explain ; left they fhould feem ignorant of any
Thing, they give us Terms of Art, and Words of
- Amufement ; mere empty Sounds, which, under
Pretenfe of explaining the Matter before them, have
really no Manner of Idea or Signification at ail,
Tbus when they tell us concerning the Effence of
God, that Fie is Purus AClus, niera Forma, and the
|ike ; Either the Words have no Meaning, and figr
nify nothing ^ or elfe they exprefs only the Perfetr
tion of his Power, and other Attributes ; Which is
not what thefp N|en. intend to exprefs by then).
fiat the V. Though the Subftance or Effence of the Self-.
S'lf-Pfftr Exift ent Being is itfelf abfolutely Incomprehenfible ta
*wift'LS us '¦> ygt many °f the Effential Attributes of his Natim
item!- 0K ftriflly X>en\onftxable^ as well as his Exiftence.

Be'fng and Attributes of Govt. 30
Thus, in the firft Place, the Selfi-Exiftent Being muft
of Neceffity be Eternal. The Ideas of Eternity and
Self-Exiftence are fo clofely connected, that, be
caufe Something muft' of Neceffity be Eternal,
Independently, and without any outward Caufie ofi its
Being, thereto re it muft neeeffarily be Self-Exiftent ;
and, becaufe 'tis impoffible but Something muft be
Self-Exiftent, therefore 'tis neceffary that it muft
like wife be Eternal. To be Self-Exiftent, is (as
has been already fhewn) to Exift by an Abfolute pages 15,
Neceffity*in the Nature of the Thing itfelf. Now l6-
this Neceffity being Abfolute, and not depending
upon any Thing External, muft be always unalter
ably the fame ; Nothing being alterable, but what
is capable of being affected by fomewhat without
itfelf. That Being therefore, which has no other
Caufe of its Exiftence, but the abfolute Neceffity
of it's own Nature ; muft of Neceffity have Exifted
from Everlafting, without Beginning ; and muft
of Neceffity Exift to Everlafting, without End.
As to the Manner of this Eternal Exiftence ; 'tis Of the
manifeft, it herein infinitely tranfcends the Manner Manner of
of the Exiftence of all Created Beings, even of fuch D"fmilTtfie
as fhall Exift for ever ; that whereas 'tis not poffible Eternity of
for Their finite Minds to comprehend all that is God.
paft, or to underftand perfectly all Things that are
at prefent, much lefs to know all that is future, or
to have intirely in their Power any Thing that is to
come ; but their Thoughts, and Knowledge, and
Power, muft of Neceffity have Degrees and Periods,
and be fucceffive and tranfient as the Things Them
felves : The Eternal Supreme Caufe, on the con
trary, (fuppofing him to be an Intelligent Being,
which will hereafter be proved in the Sequel of this
Difcourfe) muft of Neceffity have fuch a perfect,
independent, and unchangeable Comprehenfion of
all Thing's, that there cap be no One Point or In
fant of bis Eternal Duration, wherein all Things
D 4 that

ZvccFjJlon.

49 A Demonftration of the
(that are paft, prefent, or to come, will not be as
jntirely known and feprefepted to him ip one finglg
Thought or View; and all Things prefent and
future, be equally intirejy in his Power and Dh
rection ; as if there was really no Succeffion at all,
but all Things were actually prefent at once.
Thus far we can fpeak Intelligibly concerning the
Eternal Duration of the Self-Exiftent- Being ; And
po Atheift can fay this is an Impoffible, Abfurd, or
Infufficient Account. It is, in the moft Proper and
Intelligible Senfe of the Words, to ail the Purpofes
of Excellency and Pei-i'p£i\on,.Interminabilis Vita tola
fimul & perfeCla Pojfeffio : The Intire and PerfeCi
Poffeffion of an endlefs Life.
}Vkh re* Others have fuppofed that the Difference between
fpest to_ tjie Manner of the Eternal Exiftence of the Supreme
Caufe, and that of the Exiftence of Created Beings,
js this : That, whereas tl)e latter is a continual
tranfient Succeffion or Duration ; the former is one
Point or Inftant comprehending Eternity, and where,.
in all Things are really Cq-Exiftent. But this
Piftinctiqn 1 fhall not now infift upon, as being qf
no Ufe in the prefent Difpute; becaufe 'tis impofr
fible to prove and explain it in fuch a Manner, a§
ever -tq convince an Athejft that there is any Thing
in it. And befides : As, on the one Hand, the
School-men have indeed generally chofen to defend it ;
• Cnieem injjenio figere, fo> Pn the other Hand, there*
»t rem capiat fugientem cap- are many Learned Men, of far
turn.— Tam fieri non poteft, better Underftanding and Judgment,
jit infians \T,mPoris] coexift- who h rejefted and oppofed it.
at rei jucceiiivse, quarn im- TT •> \tj crL.:
poflibile eft punftum coexift- *¦!¦• -the
fre [f«#/«».Vj].line«i^-Lufu5 inerus non intelI$c"torurn yerbprum. Qafind,
P by fie. Lib. I.
jf Jha\l not trouble you mxith the inconfiftent and unintelligible Notions of the
Schoolmen ; that it [the Eternity of God] is duratio tota fimul, in which
we are net to. conceive, any Succeffion, but to imagine it an Inftant. We may as
•tL-vell cqnceiiie the. Immenfity of God to be a Point, as his Eternity to be an
Inftant. — And hoiv That can be together, ivhich mujl neccf'arily be imagined
to be co-exiftent to Succeftions ; let thim that can, conceive. Archbiiliop Til-
ty?fy y?!'?* 5?W' '4; •' ">

Being and Attributes of G o Dt 4.1
VI. The Self-Exiftent Being muft of Neceffity be That the
Infinite and Omniprefient. The Idea of Infinity or Self-Ex'ft-
Immenfity, as well as of Eternity, is fo clofely effn %"jn_
connected with that of Self Exiftence, that becaufe finite and
tis impoffible but Something muft be Infinite, Omnipre-
Independently and ofi itfielfi, (for elfe it w.:uld be-^s/*
impoffible there fhould be any Infinite at all, unlefs
an Effect could be perfecter than its Caufe ; there
fore it muft of Neceffity be Self-Exiftent : And, be*
,caufe Something muft of Neceffity be Self-Exiftent,
therefore tis neceffary that it muft likewife be
Infinite. To be Self-Exiftent (as has been already
fliewn) is to Exift by an Abfolute Neceffity in the/^gwiS^
Nature of the Thing itfelf. Now this Neceffity l6"
being Abfolute in itfelf, and not depending on any
Outward Caufe ; 'tis evident it muft be every-where,
as well as always, unalterably the fame. For a
Neceffity which is not every-where the fame, is
plainly a Confequential Neceffity only, depending
iipon fome External Caufe, and not an Abfolute
one in its own Nature : For a Neceffity abfolutely
fuch in itfelf has no Relation to Time or Place,
or any Thing elfe. Whatever therefore Exifts by
an Abfolute Neceffity in its own Nature, muft
peeds be Infinite as well as Eternal. To fuppofe
a Finite Being to be Self-Exiftent ; is to fay that
tis a Contradiction for That Being not to Exift,
the Abfence of which may yet be conceived with
out a Contradiction. Which is the greateft Ab
furdity
Others fay, God fees and knows future Things, by the Prefentialily and Co-
Exiftence of all Things in Eternity ; For they fay, that future Things are
'ftStually Prefent and Exifting to God, though not in menfura propria, yet
' in menfura aliena. The Schoolmen have much mote of this Jargon and
(anting Language,. I envy no Man the underftanding thefe Phrafes ; But (a
yie they Jeem to figf'fy nothing, but to have been Words invented by idle and
conceited Men ; which a great many ever fince, left they Jhould feem to be igno-,
rant, would feem to underftand. But I wonder moft, that M<n, -when they
have amufed and puzzled themfelves and others wtth hard Words, Jhould call
ibis Explaining Things. Archbiihop Tillotfon, Vol. 6. Serm. 6,

43 ~A Demanftration of the
furdity .in the World. For, if a Being can without
a Contradiction be abfent from One Place, it may
without a Contradiction be abfent likewife from
another Place, and from all Places : And whatever
Neceffity it may have of Exifting, muft arife from
fome External Caufe, and not abfolutely from it
felf ; And confequently the Being cannot be Self-
Exiftent. From hence it follows,
ift. That the Infinity of the Self-Exiftent Being
muft be an Infinity of Fullnefis as well as of lmmenjity ; "
That is, it muft not only be without Limits, but
alfoy without Diverfity, Defied, or Interruption. For
Inftance : Could Matter be fuppofed Boundlefis, it
would not therefore follow that it was in this com
plete Senfe Infinite ; becaufe, though it had no
Limits, yet it might have within itfelf any affign-
able Vacuities. But Whatever is Seif-Exiftent,
muft of Neceffity Exift abfolutely in every Place
alike, and be equally prefent every-where ; and
confequently muft have a true and abfolute Infinity,
both of hmnenfity and Fullnefis.
.zdly. From hence it follows, that the Self-Exift
ent Being muft be a meft Simple, Unchangeable,
Incorruptible Being -, without Parts, Figure, Motion,
Divijibility, or any other fuch Properties as we find
in Matter. For all thefe Things do plainly and
neeeffarily imply Finitenefs in their very Notion,
and are utrerly inconfiftent with complete Infinity.
Divifibility is a Separation of Parts, real or mental :
Meaning by mental Separation, not barely a partial
Apprehending ; (for Space, for Inftance, which is
abfiolutely indivifible and infepara-
sOrdo partium fpatii eft bleeither really or * mentally, may
Immutabilis : Moveantur hs .,_,. i .,,„„,¦ 77,, „**.„„!„ „.,j„j •( u„*
de locis fuis, & movebuntur ?et be fatally apprehended ;) but
(ut ita dicam) de feipfis. a removing, disjoining, or fepa-
Newton. Princ-p. Schol. adDs- rating of Parts one from another,
$mU 8- even fo much as in the Imagination* And

Being and Attributes ofG o d. &\
And any fuch Separation or Removing of Parte
one from another, is really or mentally a fetting
of Bounds : Either of which deftroys Infinity.
Motion, for the fame Reafon, implies Finitenefs;
And to have Parts, properly fpeaking, fignifies
either Difference and Diverfity of Exiftence : which.
is inconfiftent with Neceffity ; or elfe it fignifies
Divifibility, real or mental as before, which is
inconfiftent with complete Infinity. Corruption^
Change, or any Alteration whatfioever, implies Mo^-
tjon, Separation'of Parts, and Finitenefs. And any
Manner of Compojition, in Oppofition to the moft
perfect Simplicity, fignifies Difference and Diverfity
in the Manner of Exiftence j Which is inconfiftent
with Neceffity.
'Tis evident therefore, that the Self-Exiftent Be- Of the
ing muft be Infinite in the ftriCieft and moft complete Manner if
Senfe. But as to the -particular Manner of his being: °ur- ¦ e"~r.
Tr.. , c . _, - . , & ceiving tat
Infinite or every-where prefent, in Oppofition to the Immenfity
Manner of Created Things being prefent in fuch °I God.
or fuch finite Places ; This is as impoffible for our
finite Understandings to comprehend or explain,
as if is for us to form an adequate Idea of Infinity.
Yet that the Thing is true, that he is actually
Omniprefient, we are as certain, as we are that there
muft Something be Infinite ; which no Man, who
has thought upon thefe Things at all, ever depjedf
The Schoolmen indeed have prefumed to affert, that
the Immenfity of God is a Point, as his Eternity
(they think) is an Inftant. But, this being altqge^
ther Unintelligible ; That which we can more fafely
affirm, and which no Atheift can fay is abfurd, and
which neverthelefs is fufficient to all wife and good
Purpofes, is this : That whereas all Finite and
Created Beings can be prefent but in. One definite
Place at Once ; and Corporeal Beings even in That
One Place very imperfectly and unequally, to any
Pujpqfe of Power or Activity , only by the Succeffive Motion

44 A Demonftration of the .
Motion of different Members and Organs ; The
Supreme Caufe, on the contrary, being an Infinite
and moft Simple Effence, ' and comprehending all
Things perfectly in himfelf, is at all Times equally
prefent, both in his Simple Effence, and by the
Immediate and Perfect Exercife of all his Attributes,
to every Point of the Boundlefs Immenfity, as if it
were really all but one Single Point.
That the VII. The Self-Exiftent Being muft ofi Neeeffity be
Self Exift- frut One. This evidently follows from his bein'g
Tan^Tbut Neceffarily-Exiftent. For Neceffity Abfolute in itfelf
One. is Simple, and Uniform, and Univerfial, without any
poffible Difference, Difformity, ox Variety whatfoever :
And all Variety or Difference of Exiftence muft needs
arifie from fome External Caufe, and be dependent,
upon it, and proportionable to the Efficiency of That
Caufe, whatfoever it be. Abfolute Neceffity, in which
there can be no Variation in any Kind or Degree, can
not be the Ground of Exiftence of a Number of
Beings, however fimilar- and agreeing : Becaufe,
without any Other Difference, even Number is itfielfi
a manifeft Difformity or Inequality (if I may fo fpeak)
of Efficiency or Caufiality.
Again : To fuppofe Two (or more) difiinCt Beings
Exifting ofi themfelves, neeeffarily, and independent^
-from each other ; implies this plain Contradiction \ '
that, each of them being independent from the other,
they may either of them be fuppofed to Exift alone, fo
that it will be no Contradiction to imagine die other
not to Exift ; and confequently
* See This farther explained, neither ofi them * will be Neceffat-
tthe ^Tfrtl *f Y'~ rily-Exifting. Whatfoever there-
ter, at the End of this Book. c J & .
tore Lxifts Neeeffarily, is the One
Simple Effence of the Self-Exiftent Being ; And
whatfoever differs from that, is not Neceffarily-
Exifting : Becaufe in abfolute Neceffity there can
be no Difference or Diverfity of Exiftence.. Othqr
Bein^-

Being and Attributes of Go d." ac
Beings there may be innumerable, befides the One
Infinite Self-Exiftent : But no Other Being can be
Self-Exiftent, becaufe fo it would be individually
the fame, at the fame Time that it is fuppofed to
be different.
From hence it follows,
ift. That the Unity of God is a true and reaU not Of the
figurative, Unity. With which Prime Foundation Trinity*
of Natural Religion, how the Scripture-DoCtrine of
the Trinity perfectly agrees, I have elfiewhere endea
voured to fhow particularly, in its proper Place.
. idly. From hence it follows, That 'tis impoffible Thelmpofi •
there fihould be Two different Self-Exiftent Independent fibility <f
Principles, as fome Philofophers have imagined ; fuch '^„°^t e~
as God and Matter. For fince Self-Exiftence is Principles.
Neceffary- Exiftence ; and fince 'tis an exprefs Con
tradiction (as has already been fhewn) that two dif- /<*£* 44*
ferent Beings fhould each be Neceffarily-Exifting ;
it evidently follows, that 'tis abfolutely impoffible
there fhould be Two Independent Self-Exiftent
Principles, fuch as God and Matter.
idly. From hence we may obferve the Vanity, The Error
Folly, and Weaknefs of Spinoza: Who, becaufe the e/apinoza.
Self-Exiftent Being muft neeeffarily be but One,
concludes from thence, that * the ' rT . , „ .
/ / tit- i j j rr-i ¦ Una fubftantia non poteft
whole World, and every Thing con- produci ab alia- mu_ /ar_ L
tained therein, is One Uniform Sub- prop. 6.
fiance; Elernal, Uncreated, and Acl naturam fubftantia; per-
Neceffary • Whereas juft on the *g^&J«& darf,
contrary he ought to have con- neq. concipi potelt fubftantia.
eluded, that, becaufe all Things in Prop. 14.
the World are very different one
from another, and have all Manner of Variety, and
all the Marks of Will, and Arbitrarinefs, and
Changeablenefs, (and none of Neceffity) in them •,
being plainly fitted with very different Powers, to
very different Ends ; and diftinguifhed one from
another by a. Diverfity, not only of Modes, but alfo of

4& A feemmftr-attin 6f the
of- effehtial Attributes, and confequently (fo far as tiS
poffible for us, by the Ufe of our prefent Faculties*
to attain any Knowledge at all of them) of their
SUbftanees themfelves alfo ; therefore none ofi thefe
Things are Neceffary or Self-Exiftent, but muft' needs
depend all upon fiome External Caufie, that is, on the
One Supreme, Unchangeable, Self- Exift ent Being. That
Which led Spinoza- into his foolifh and deitructive
Opinion, and- on which alone all his Argumentation
is- intirely built, is That abfiurd
* Per fubftantiam intelligo , Definition of Subftance ; * that it
id, quod in- fe eft, & per fe i$ Something, the Idea of which 'does
concipitur ; hoc eft, id cuius ; depmd m or pre-fuppofie, the
conceptus non mdiget concep- T, V j7 ,_,. / , . «
tu alterius rei, .a quo formari Idea of any other Thing, firom which
defeat! Dtfinitio 3. WMch, it might proceed ; but includes itt
prefently after, be thus explains: ¦ itfiif Neceffary-EXiiftence. Which
.Ad.nat«ram fubftantia; perti- -rLc „;„;„„:„ ^:,-Ua^ f*ir. ~~A r,„
net exiftere; hoc eft, ipfius ef- definition is eithev fialfie and fig-
fentia involvit liecefrarid exift- nifies nothing ; and then his w hole
emiam. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 7. Doctrine, built upon it, falls at
once to the Ground : Or, if it be
true, then neither Matter nor Spirit, nor any Finite
pages2q& Being whatfoever, (as has been before fhewn) is in
•41* That Senfe properly a Subftance, but (the b ui) the1
Self-Exiftent Being alone : And fo it will prov#
nothing- (notwithftanding all his Show and Form of
Demonftration) to his1 main Pbrpofe, which was to
make us believe that there is no fuch Thing as
Power- or Liberty in the Univerfe,
f Res nullo alio modo, neq; but that f every particular Thing1
alio ordme a Deo produci j h w ^ j . Abfolute
potuerunt, quam productas . > / . , .
font. Prop. 33. Neceffity juft what it is, and could
not poffibly have been in any Re^
fpedt otherwife. Suppofing, I fay, his Definition
of Subftance to be true ; yet even That would really
conclude nothing to his main Purpofe concerning
ihe.Neceffity of all Things. For fince, according to
That Definition, neither Matter nor Spirit, nor any
Finite Beings whatfoever, are Subftances, but only* :
Modes;

Being and Attributes of God. 47
Modes ; How will it follow, that, becaufe Subftance
is Self-Exiftent, therefore all thefe Modes are fo too?
Why, becaufe * from an Infinite
Caufe, Infinite Effects muft needs *ExNeceffitateBivins:Na-
follow. Very true ; fiuppofing That *"*• infinita. infinh;s umod|s
t r ¦ r ,/r -/i r< r (hoc eft, omnia qua; fub mtel-
Infinite Self-Exiftent Caufe, not \e&am innnitum- cadere pot
to be a Voluntary, but a mere funt) fequi debent. Prop. 16.
Neceffary Agent, that is, no Agent
at -all: Which. Suppofition (in the prefient Argument)
is the Queftion begged •, And what he afterwards
attempts to alledge in Proof of it, fhall afterwards
be eonfidered in its proper Place.
VIII. The Self-Exifilent and Original Caufie of all That the
Things muft be an Intelligent Being. In this Propo- Self-Exiffi.
fition lies the main Queftion between us and; the ent??nf ,
Atheifts. For, that Something muft be Self-Exift- ™iiigentT
eht ; and that That which is Self-Exiftent, muft
neeeffarily be Eternal and Infinite and the Original'
Caufe of all Things ; will not bear much Difpute.
But all Atheifts, whether they hold the World to
be of itfielfi Eternal both as to the Matter and Form,
or Whether they hold the Matter only to be Necef
fary and the Form Contingent, or whatever Hypo-
thefis they frame ; have always afferted, and muft
maintain, either directly or indirectly, that the
Self-Exiftent Being is not an Intelligent Being, but
either pure unactive Matter, or (which in other
Words is the very fame Thing) a mere neceffary Agent.
For a mere neceffary Agent muft of Neceffity either
be plainly and directly in the groffeft Senfe Unintel
ligent ; which was the antient Atheifts Notion of
the Self-Exiftent Being1 : Of elfe its Intelligence
(which is the Affertion of Spinoza and fome Moderns)
muft be wholly feparate from any Power of Will
and Choice ; which, in refpect of any Excellency
and Perfection, or indeed to any common Senfe, is
the very fame Thing as no Intelligence at a!).
Now

4§ A Demonftration of the
,,Now that the Self-Exiftent Being is not fuc'h §
Blind and Unintelligent Neceffity, but in the moft
proper Senfe an underftanding and purely aClive Being?
cannot indeed be demonftrated ftrictly and properly
a priori ; becaufe (through the Imperfection of our'
Faculties) we know not wherein Intelligence confiUs*
nor can fee the Immediate and Neceffary Connexion!
of it with Self-Exiftence,. as we can that of Eternity,
Infinity, Unity, &c. But, a pofteriori, almoft every
Thing in the World demonstrates to us this great
Truth ; and affords undeniable Arguments, to
prove that the World, and all Things therein, are,
the Effects of an Intelligent and Knowing Caufe.
Pfpvtd . And lft. Since in general there are manifeftly xn
from the Things various Kinds of Powers, and very different\
Degrees of Excellencies and Degrees of Perfection j it muft needs
inThinTs- k,e> t)iat» 'n ^ie Order of Caufes and Effects, the*
and the ' Caufe muft always be more Excellent than the
Order of Effect- : And confequently the Self-Exiftent Being,
(ffff"and whatever That be fuppofed to be, muft of Neceffity
(being the Original of all Things) contain in itfelf
tjie Sum and higheft Degree of all the Perfections-,
of all Things. Not becaufe That which is Selff
Exiftent, muft therefore have all poffible Perfections i
(ForThis* though moft certainly true in itfelf, yet
cannot be fo clearly demOnftrated a -priori :) But
becaufe tis impoffible that any Effect fhould have
any Perfection, which was not in the Caufe. For,-
if it had* then That Perfection would be caufed by
nothing,; which.is a plain Contradiction. Now are
Unintelligent Being, 'tis evident* cannot be endued
with all the. Perfections of all Things in the World - j >
becaufe Intelligence is one of thofe Perfections. All
Things therefore canfiot arife from an Unintelligent'
Original : And confequently the Self-Exiftent Being.
muft of Nectffity be Intelligent.

Being and Attributes of GoB. aq
There is no Poffibility for an Atheift to avoid
the Force or this Argument any other Way, than
by afferting one of thefe two Things : Either that
there is no Intelligent Being at all in the Univerfe j
or that Intelligence is no difitinCt Perfection, but merely
a Compofition of Figure and Motion, as Colour
and Sounds are vulgarly fuppofed to be. Of the
Former of thefe AfiertiOns every Man's own Con-
ficioufnefis is an abundant Confutation. For they
who contend that Beafts are mere Machines, have
yet never prefumed to conjecture that Men are fo
too. And that, the Latter Affertion (in which the
main Strength of Atheifm lies) is moft abfurd and
impoffible ; fhall be fhewn prefently. . Though if
That Affertion could be fuppofed to be True, yet
even ftill 'twould unavoidably follow, that the Self-
Exifting Being muft needs be Intelligent ; as fhall be
proved in my ^th Argument upon this prefent Head.
In the mean Time ; that the Aflertion itfelf, viz.
that Intelligence is not any difiind- Perfection, properly
fpeaking, but merely a Compofition of Unintelli*
gent Figure and Motion •, that this Affertion, I fayt
*s moft abfurd and impoffible, will appear from
what fhall be faid in the enfuing Argument.
idly. Since in Men in particular there is undeniably From the
that Power which we call Thought, Intelligence, I"te,li-
Confciqufnefs,' Perception, or Knowledge ; there f"t"cn*_
muft of Neceffity either have been from Eternity, ted Beings*
without any Original Caufie at all, an infinite Succef
fion of Men, whereof no one has had a Neceffary >t
but every one a Dependent and Communicated Being ;
or elfe thefe Beings, indued with Perception and
Confcioufnefs, muft at fome Time of other have
arifen purely out of that which had no fuch Quality
as Senfe, Perception, of Confcioufnefs ; or /elfe they
muft have been produced by fome Intelligent Supe
rior Being. There never was nor can be any Atheift
whatfoever, that can deny but One of thefe Three
E Suppofitiong

$o A Demonftration of ih$
Suppdfitions muft be the Truth. If therefore1 the
two former can be proved to be falfe and impoffible,
the latter muft be owned to be demonftrably true.
Now that the Firft is impoffible, is evident frorrt
page n, what has been already faid in Proof of the Second
Ac. General Head of this Difcou rfe. And that the Second
is likefwife inipoffiblt, may be thus demonftrated :
If Perceptiofi or Intelligence be' a diftMB ^udliiy or
Perfection, and not a mere Effect or Compoutioft
of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings,
indued with Perception or 'Confcioufnefs, can never
have ariftrt purely out of that which had no fuch
Quality as Perception or Confcioufnefs ; becaufe
nothing can -ever give to another any Perfection
which it hath not either actually in itfelf, or at leaft
in a higher Degree. But Perception or Intelligence
is a diftincl Quality or Perfection, and not a mere
Effect or Compofition of Unintelligent Figure and
Motion. Firft, If Perception or Intelligence be any real diftinct
Quality or Perfection ; and not a mere Effiek or Compo
fition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion -, Ihen Being's,
indued with Perception or Confiekilfintfis^ can never pof-
fibly havi arifien purely dut ofi thai Which itfelf had nb
fuch Quality as Perception or Confitieufinefi ; beemtfie
nothing can-ever give to another' any Perfection which it
hath fioi eit'ber ti&Ually in itfelf, nr at leaft in a higher
Degree. This is Very evident j < becaufe, if any
Thing -could give to another any Perfection which
it has not itfelf, That'; Perfection -would be Caufed
asbfohitely by Nothing ; which is a plain CoAtra-'
diction. If any one here replies,
*Orades of Reafon, p. 186. (as Mr. <Mdon has done* in a
&tff£Hj££S Y*T t0Jf- B!T Ith?! °**%
Replies concerning the Natural bounds, Tajtes, and the like, aTlfe
Immortality if the Soul. from Figure and Motion, which
have no fuch Qualities in then>
felves j or that Figme^ BhifibiByi Mobility t

Being ana1 Attribiitei of G o i>. * I
Mobility, and other Qualities of Matter* are cOn^
feffed to be given from God* who yet cannot*
without extreme Blafpherhy, be faid to have any
fuch Qualities himfelf ; and that therefore^ in like!
Manner, Perception or * Intelligence
may arife out of that which has no * ff *""''* me V clcer0*'
Intelligence itfelf: The Anfwer is ^^le^Sw^iJ.
Very eafy : Firft, that ColdurSt bd-vei?nderfta»dwg,-becaufefome
Sounds, Taftes, and the like* are Portions ^fr^w* Intelligent ;-—
by no Means Effects arifing from T Ty "!?' *"**, the .ctbt
' y-,. . ' . . . ° , Speaker in Licero, that, t>y the
mere figure and Motion ; there- jamt Argument, the^Wholsmufi
being nothing in the Bodies them* be a Cmertier, a Mufician, a
felves, the Objects of the Senfes, D*nrh«*Mafter, or a phikfi-
that hasany Manner of Similitude fe«SfdftS
to any of thefe Qualities ; but they Motion effential to Matter.
are plainly Thoughts or Modifica
tions of the Mind itfelf, which is an Intelligent
Being j and are not properly Caufied, but only Oc
casioned, by the Impreflions of Figure and Motion.
Nor will it at all help an Atheift, {as to the prefent
Queftion) though we fhould here make for \\vfti
(that we may allow him the greateft poffible Ad
vantage) even that moft abfurd Suppofition, that
the Mind itfelf is nothing but mere Matter* an3 not
at all an Immaterial' Subftance. For, even fuppo<-
fing it to be mere Matter, yet he muft needs confeft
it to be fitch Matter, as is indued not only with
Figure and Motion, but alfo with the Quality of
Intelligence and Perception : And confequently, as
to the prefent Queftioh* it will ftill come to the
fame Thing j that Colours, Sounds, and the like,
which' are not Qualities of Unintelligent Bodies, but
Perceptions of Mind, can no more be caufed by, or
arrfe from, mere Unintelligent Figure and Motion,
than Colour can be a Triangle, orSound a Square,
ot Something be caufed by Nothing. Secondly,
as to the other Part of the Objection ; that Figure,
Dhifibilrtyi Mobility, and otherQualiEks of Matter,
E 2 are

1 8 A Demonftration of the
art! (as we ourfelves acknowledge) given it from
God, who yet cannot, without ektreme Blafphemy,
be faid to have any fuch QuaHties himfelf; and that
therefore, in like Manner, Perception or Intelligence
may arife out of that which has no Intelligence itlelfc
The Anfwer is ftill eafier : That Figure, Divifibility,
Mobility, and other fuch- like Qualities of Matter;
are not real, proper, diftinct, and Pqfitive Powers,
but only Negative Qualities-, Defiicencies, or Im
perfections. And, though no Caufe can communi
cate to its Effect any real Perfection which it has
not itfelf, yet. the Effect may eafily have many
Imperfections, Deficiencies, or Negative Qualities,
which are not in the Caufe. Though therefore
Figure, Divifibility, Mobility, and the like, (which
are rnere Negations, as all Limitations and all Defects
tf Powers are) may be in the Effect* and not in the
Caufe j yet Intelligence (which I now fuppofe, and
fhall prove immediately, to be a difiinCl Quality;
•and which no Man can fay is a mere Negation) can
not poffibly be fo.
Having therefore thus demonftrated, that ^Per
ception or Intelligence be fuppofed to be a diftinti
Quality or Perfection, (though even but of Matter
only, if the Atheift pleafes) and not a mere Effect
or Compofition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion;
then Beings indued with Perception or ConfcioufneJ§
can never have arifen purely out of that which had
no fuch Quality as Perception or Confcioufnefs;
becaufe nothing can ever give to another any Per^
feet ion which it has not itfelf; It will eafily appear,
Secondly, that Perception or Intelligence Is really fucb
a diftinCt Quality or Perfection, and not poffibly a mere
EffeCt or Compofition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion:
And That for this plain Reafon; becaufe Intelligence
is not Figure, and Confcioufnefs is not Motion. For
whatever can arife from, or be compounded of any
Things ; is ftill only thofe very Things, of which it

Being and Attributes of God. $$
h was compounded. And if infinite Compofitionsi
or Divifions be made eternally ; the Things will
ftill be but eternally the fame. And all their pof
fible Effects can never be any Thing but Repe*
titions of the fame. For Inftance : All poffible
Changes, Competitions, or Divifions of Figure, are
ftill nothing but Figure i And all poffible Compo-
fitions or Effects of Motion can eternally be nothing
but mere Motion. If therefore there ever was a
Time when there was nothing in the Univerfe but
Matter and Motion, there never could have been
any Thing elfe therein but Matter and Motion,
And it would have been as impoffible there fhould
ever have Exifted any fuch Thing as Intelligence
or Confcioufnefs ; or even any fuch Thing as Light,
or Heat, or Sound, or Colour, or any of thofe we
call Secondary Qualities of Matter ; as 'tis now
impoffible for Motion to be Blue or Red, or for a
Triangle to be transformed into a Sound. That
which has been apt to deceive Men in this Matter,
is This-, that they imagine Compounds to be
fomewhat really different from That of which they
are Compounded : Which is a very great Miftake.
For all the Things, of which Men fo judge, either,
if they be really different, are not Compounds nor
Effects of what Men judge them to be, but are
fomething totally diftinct ; as when the Vulgar
thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties inherent
in Bodies, when indeed they are purely Thoughts
of the Mind : Or elfe, if they be really Compounds
and Effects, then they are not different, but exactly
the fame that ever they were ; as, when two Tri
angles put together make a Square, That Square
is ftill nothing but two Triangles; or, when a
Square cut in Halves makes two Triangles, thofe
two Triangles are ftill only the two Halves of a
Square ; or, when the Mixture of Blue and Yellow
Powder makes a Green, That Green is ftill nothing
E 3. t«t

54' A Demonftration of the
but Blue and Yellow intermixed, as is plainly vifihlg
by the Help of Microfoopes. And, in fhort, every
Thing by Compofition^ Divifion, or. Mpdon, is
pothing elfe but the very fame it was before, taken
either in Whole or by Parts, or in different Place or
Order. Mr, Hobbs feems to have been aware of this ;
And therefore, though he is very fparing, and as
it were afharned to fpeak out j yet finding himfelf
preffed, in his own Mind, with the Difficulty arjfing
from the Impoffibihty of Senfe or Confcioufnefs
being merely the Effect of Figure and Motion ; and.
jt not ferving iftrPurpofe at all (were the Thing
never fo poffible) to fuppofe that God, by an irnr
mediate and voluntary Act of his Almighty Power%
indues certain Syftems of Matter with Confcioufnefs
»c t .. . %, n j and Thought, (*df which Opinion
* See my letter to Mr. Dod- T . „ ,, {¦=> X r .. ' r 1
*ell, -with the Four J)efences l ^all have Occafion -to fpeak
cf it. fomething more hereafter ;) he is
t Scio fuiffe PhiIofpPho$ forced f to have Recourfe to that
quofdam, eof4emq; <viw doc- prodigioufly . abfurd Suppofition,
fos, qui corpora omnia Senfu jhat All Matter, as Matter, is in-
pra;dita effe fuftinuerunt: Nee j j ,. i • 1 i— J j
video, f, natura fenfionis in re- d^ed nDt on]y Wlth Flgurt »nd a
aftione fol'a collocaretur, quo- Capacity qf Motion, but aUbwitfi
modo refutari puffin).. Sed etfi an actual Senfe or Perception t
»Lrum l°nl!^±t9T^ and wants only the Organs and
aliorum, pnantaima aliquod A/r c . ' . , & 7
nafceretiir; illud tamen, re- Memory of Animals, to exprefi
moto cbjeclo, ftatim fceflaret:. its Senfatkm.
Narn nifi a4 retinendup} MpT
ia™ imprefluin, etiam remoto ohje&o, apta habea,nt Organa, ut habent
, Animalia ; ita tantum fentient, ut nunquarn fenfiffe fe recordentur. — -
§enfioni ergo, qua? vufgo ita appellatur, neceflimo adhajret rnemoria ali-
gua, (3c. t&bbs Phyfic. Cap. 25. SeiJ. 5. See alfo No. z & 11 of the
Appendix to % Colkclion of Papers which paffed between Mr. Leibnitz and
PS: Pjari^
From the. §dly. That the Self-Exiftent and Original Caufe
Ord2\nd°^ ^ Things is an Intelligent Being; appears abun-
finJc'JZjes &™h from the excellent Variety, Order, Beauty,
¦'qf Things, and Wonderful Contrivance, and Fitnefs ofi all Things,
k $¦* fVarl4\ to, their proper and refpeCUve Ends.
'This

Being md ^tributes of Q o D. ,£c
This Argument has been fo Learnedly and Fully See Mr.
bandied both by Ancient and Modern Writers, £y/^f
that I do but juft mention it, without enlarging aty^; J%~
all upon it. I fhall only at this Time make this Mr". Ray,
One Obfervation; That, whereas Des Cartes 3Sid°fthtWfi-
Qthers have endeavoured to give a Poffible Account f„mth0{God
{PoJtWet did I fay? nay, indeed, a moft impoffible Creation;
gild ridiculous Account) how the World might he and Mr.
formed by the Nece-ffary Laws of Motion alone ; ®ff/\zm't
they have,- by fo feemingly vaft an Undertaking, <fhklogy. -
really meant no more, than, to explain philofophi-
cally how the inanimate Part, that is, infinitely the
leaft conftderable Part of the World, might poffibly
have been framed. For, as to Plants and Animals,
in which the Wifdom of the Creator principally
appears, they have never in any tolerable Manner,
Or With any the leaft Appearance of Succefs, pre
tended to give an Account how They were originally
Formed. In Thefe Things, Matter and the Laws
of Motion are able to do nothing at alj. And how
ridiculous the Epicurean Hypothefis is, of the Earth
producing them all at firft by Chance; (befides that,
1 think, it is now given up even by all Atheifts;)
appears from the late Difcovery made in Philofophy,
(fhat there is no fuch Thing as equivocal Generation
pf any the meaneft Animal or Plant ; the Sun, and
Earth, and Water, and all the Powers of Nature in
Conjunction, being able tojdo nothing at all towards
the producing anyThipg indued with fb much as even
a Vegetable Life, (prom which moft excellent Dif
covery, we may, by the Way, obferve the Ufefulnefs
of Natural and Experimental Philofophy, fometimes
even in Matters of Religion.) Since therefore Things,
are thus, it muft unavoidably be granted, (even by
the moft obftinate Atheift) either that, all Plants and
Animajs are originally the Work of an Intelligent
Being, and Created by him in Time ; .or that, having
feeeo from Eternity in the fame Order and Method
E 4 they

50 A Demonftration of the
they now are in, they are an Eternal Effect of an.
Eternal Intelligent Caufe continually exerting his in.
finite Power and Wifdom ; or elfe that, without any
Self-Exiftent Original at all, they have been derived
one from another in an Eternal Succeffion,' by an
Infinite Progrefs of Dependent Caufes. The firft
of thefe three Ways is the Conclufion we affert !
The fiecond (fo far as the Caufe of Atheifm is con?
* cerned) comes to the very fame Thing : And the
page n, third I have already fhewn (in my Proof of the
&'> Second General Head of this Difcourfe) to be abfo,
lutely Impoffible and a Contxadi&ion.
From the 4-thlj. Suppofing it was poffible that the Form
Originalof0f the World, and all the Vifible Things contained
#to», therein, with the Order, Beauty, and exquifite FiN
nefs of their Parts •, nay, fuppofing that even Intel
ligence itfelf, with Confcioufnefs and Thought, in
all the Beings we know, could poffibly be the Refult
or Effect of mere Unintelligent Matter, Figure,
and Motion ; (which is the moft unreafonable and
impoffible Suppofition in the World :) Yet even ftill
there would remain an undeniable Demonftration,
that the Self-Exiftent Being X whatever it be fup
pofed to be) muft be Intelligent. For even thefe
Principles themfelves (Unintelligent Figure and Motion)
could never have poffibly Exifted, without there had
been before them an Intelligent Caufe. I inftance in
Motion. 'Tis evident there is Now fuch a Thing as
Motion in the World : Which either began at fome
Time or other, or was Eternal. If it began at any
Time, then the Queftion is granted, that the Firft
Caufe is an Intelligent Being : For mere Unintelli
gent Matter, and that at Reft, tjs manifeft could
never of itfelf begin to move. On the contrary,
»f Motion was Eternal ; it was either Eternally-
eaufed by fome Eternal Intelligent Being ; or it
muft of itfelf be Neceffary and Self-Exiftent ; or
fife, without any Neceffity in its, own Nature, and
without

Being and Attributes of God. 5^
without any External Neceffary Caufe, it muft have
Exifted from Eternity by an Endlefs Succeffive
Communication. If Motion was Eternally caufed
by fome Eternal Intelligent Being ; this alfo is
granting the Queftion, as to the prefent Difpute,.
If it was of itfelf Neceffary and Self-Exiftent •, then
it follows, that it muft be a Contradiction in Terms
to fuppofe any Matter to be at Reft ^ And yet at
the fame Time, becaufe the * Determination of this * Page 23*
Self-Exiftent Motion muft be every Way at once,
the Effect of it could be nothing elfe but a perpe
tual Reft. Befides (as there is no End of Abfurdities
when they once begin) it muft alfo imply a Con
tradiction to fuppofe that there might poffibly have
been originally more or lefis Motion in the Univerfe <
than there actually was : Which is fo very abfurd a
Confequence, that Spinoza himfelf, though he ex
prefly afferts all Things to be Ne-
eeffary, yet feems afhamed here* p^S^JfcJ;
_to fpeak out his Opinion, or rather 11. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.
plainly contradicts himfelf in the
Queftion about the Original of Motion. But if it
be faid, lafUy, that Motion, without any Neceffity in
its own Nature, and without any External Neceflary
Caufe, has Exifted from Eternity, merely by an
Endlefs Succeffive Communica
tion ; as f Spinoza, inconfiftently + CorPus motum> ,veI <Pef-
' ' r ' ~ _, . ', cens, ad motum vel quietem
enough, feems to affert : This I determinaridebuitabaliocor-
have before fhewn (in my Proof pore, quod etiam ad motum
of the t Second General Propofi- vfl q^iem determinatum fuit
/. c .!.¦ V>-r  r«\ *~ k- „ 30 alio, & illud iterum ab
tlOn Of this Difcourfe) tO be a &<>, Ufv: in infinitum. Ethic,
plain Contradiction. It remains pari jr. prop. 13. Lemma ^
therefore, that Motion muft of
Neceffity be Originally Caufed by Something thattA*f« n,
is Intelligent •, or elfe there never could have been "f*
any fuch Thing as Motion in the World. And
confequently the Self-Exiftent Being, the Original
Caufe of all Things, (whatever it be fuppofed to be)
muft of Neceffity be an Intelligent Being.
From

|8 A Demonftration of the
From hence it follows again, that the Materia
World cannot poffibly be the Original Self-Exiftent
Being. For fince the Self-Exiftent Being is demon,
ftrated to be Intelligent ; and the Material World,
plainly is not fo ; it follows that the-Material World
cannot poffibly be Self-Exiftent, What Some have
fondly imagined concerning a Soul of the World $
if thereby they mean a Created Dependent Being ;
fignifies nothing in the prefent Argument. But if
they underftand thereby Something Neceffary and
Self-Exiftent ; then it is nothing eJfe but a falfe,
corrupt, and imperfect Notion of God.
That the IX- The Self-Exiftent and Original Caufe of all Things,
Self-Exift-. is not a neceffary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty
tnt Being m$ choice. The contrary to this Propofition, is the
Freejgent Foundation and the Sum of what Spinoza, and his
' Followers have afferted concerning the Nature of
God. What Reafons or Arguments they have
offered for their Opinion, I fhall have Occafion to
confider briefly in my Proof of the Propofition itfelf,
The Truth of which appears
This is a lft> Iri that it is a Neceffary Confequence of the
neceffary foregoing Propqfition. For Intelligence without Li-
Conje- frerty (as j jhere hinted) is, reajiy (in refpect of any
The* forf- P°wei% Excellence, or Perfection) no Intelligence at
going Pro- alb It is indeed a Conficieufinefis, but it is merely a
pofition. PaffiveOne; a Confcioufnefs, not of Acting, but
purely of being Acted upon. Without Liberty^
nothing can in any tolerable Propriety of Speech,
be faid to be an Agent or Caufe of any Thing. F°T
to Act neeeffarily is really and properly not to Aft
at all, but only to be Acted upon. What there
fore Spinoza and his Followers affert concerning the
Production of all Things * from
•ExNecefritateDiyinsNa- the Neceffity of the Divine Na
turae, iniinita ln-hnitis modis J r , „7 ,
fequi debent, Etbu. Par. L ture> 1S mere Jargon and Words
Prep. 16, without any Meaning at all,
Fos

Being and Attributes of God. eg
For if, by the Neceffity of the Divine Nature,
they underftand not the Perfection and Rectitude
of his Will, whereby God is unalterably determined
to do always what is beft in the Whole ; (as con-
feffedly they do not ; becaufe this is confiftent with
the moft perfect Liberty and Choice;) but, on the
contrary, mean an Abfolute and ftrictly Natural
Neceffity ; It follows evidently, that when they fay,
God, by the Neceffity of his Nature, is the Caufe
and Author of all Things ; they underftand him
to be a Caufe or Agent in no other Senfe, than as
if a Man fhould fay, that a Stone, by the Neceffity
of its Nature, is the Caufe of its own falling and
and ftriking the Ground : Which is really not to
be an Agent or Caufe at all : But their Opinion
amounts to this, that all Things are equally Selfi
Exiftent, and confequently that the Material World
is God : Which I have before proved to be a Con-
tradiction. , In like Manner, when they fpeak oF
the Intelligence and Knowledge of God ; they mean
to attribute thefe Powers to him in no other Senfer
than the ancient Hylozoics attributed them to all
Matter ; that is, that a Stone, when it falls, has a See a wry
Senfation and Confcioufnefs •, but That Confciouf- remarkam
fiefs is no Caufe at all, or Power, of Acting. pf$fe
Which Kind of Intelligence, in any tolerable Pro- Jf0bbs «'-
priety of Speech, is no Intelligence at all. And con- ted above,
fequently the Arguments, that proved the Supreme^* 5-4<
Caufe to be properly an Intelligent and Active Being ;
do alfo undeniably prove that he is likewife indued
With Liberty and Choice, which alone is the Power
of Acting.
idly. If the Supreme Caufe is not a Being indued Provej
with Liberty and Choice, but a mere Neceffary/*'-^''
Agent, whofe Actions are all as abfolutely and natu-^j^ '
fally Neceffary as his Exiftence: Then it will follow, Difpofitio*
that nothing which is not could poffibly have been ; of Things.
and that nothing which, is, could poffibly not have*^*
been? ""/¦

60 A Demonftration of the
•with an been ; and that no Mode or Circumftance of the
Anfwer to Exiftence of any Thing could poffibly have been in
Argents any Re*Pe& otherwife than it now actually is. All
for the Ne- which being evidently moft falfe and abfurd; it
cejjityofall follows, on the contrary, that the Supreme Caufe
Things, jg not a mere neceffary Agent, but a Being indued
with Liberty and Choice. The * Confiequence ; viz. That, if
the Supreme Caufe be a Neceffary
Agent, then nothing which is not
could poffibly have been ; and no
thing which is could poffibly either
not have been, or have been dif
ferent from what 'tis : This, I fay,
is exprefly owned by Spinoza to
be the unavoidable Confequence
of his own Opinion. And accord
ingly he endeavours to maintain,
that no Thing, or Mode of Exiftence
of any Thing, could poffibly have
been in any RefipeCi different from
what it now actually is. Flis Reafons
are •, ( i .) becaufe, -j- from an infi
nitely perfect Nature, infinite Things^
in infinite Manners, muft needs pro
ceed ; and ( 2 . ) J becaufe, if any Thing
could poffibly be otherwife than it is,
the Will and Nature of God muft
be fuppofed capable of Change ¦, and
(J-)
Si res alterius paturse potuiffent efle, vel alio modo ad operandum deter-r
minari, ut natura: ordo alius efTet : Ergo Dei etiam natura alia poflet cue
quam jam eft. Prop. 33. Demonflrat.
Quicquid concipimus in Dei poteftate efle, id neceflario eft. Prop. 35.
Dcum non operari ex libertate voluntatis. Coral ad Prop. 32.
Res nullo alio modo neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam
produclje funt. Prop. 33.
f Ex neccffitate divinx natura;, infinita infinitis modis fequi debent,
Prep. 16.
% Si res alterius natura potuiflent efle, vel alio modo ad operandum
determinari, ut naturae ordo alius eflct : Ergo Dei etiam natura alia poflet
eS/s quam jam eft. Prop. 3 3 . Demon/rat.

•Alii putant.Deum efle can-
fern liberam, propterea quod
poteft, ut putant, efHcere ut
ea quae -ex ejus natura fequi
diximus, hoc eft, quae in ejus
poteftate Junt, non fiant ; Sed
hpc idem tift ac fi dicerent
quod Deus poteft efficere, ut
ex natura trianguli non fequa-
tur, ejus tres angulos aequales
efle duobus reclis. — Ego me
fatis clare oftendifte puto, a
fummaDei potentia omnia ne
ceflario effluxifle, vel femper
eadem neceffi tate fequi ; eodem
modo ac ex natura trianguli ab
seterno & in sternum fequitur,
ejus tres angulos sequari duo-
bus reftis. Ethic. Par. I.
Scbol. ad Prop. 17.
Omnia ex neceflitate naturae
divinae determinata funt, non
tantum ad exiftendum, fed
etiam ad certo modo exiften
dum & operandum ; nullumq;
datur contingens. Demonftrat'.
Prop. 29.

Being and Attributes of G 0 D. 6 1
(3.) * becaufe if all poffible Things, * Immo adverfarii [qui ne-
in all poffible Manners, do not always 8ant ex neceflitate divine na-
.j /r •; r^ -/i ' 7 turs omnia neceflano flucrej
and neeeffarily Exift, they never can Dei omnipotent negate vi-
All Exift; but fiome Things, that do dentur. Coguntur enim fateri,
not Exift, will ftill always be poffible Deum infinita creaibilia intel-
only, and never can actually Exift ; ^ere' *ux. ""A" »™qua™
j r .j n 1,, ¦ rfi j creare potent. Nam alias, fi
and Jo the>aCtual Omnipotence of God fcilicet omnia, quz intelligit,
is taken aWay. The Firft of thefe crearet ; fuam, juxta iplbs,
Arguments is a plain Begging of exh.auriret omnipotentiam, &
+uJ^r~\ ,«.«.•¦ t? u. Z • c >e imperfe&um redderet. Ut
the Queftion. For, that an infi- igiturpDeum perfeaum ft,tu.
nitely perfect Nature is able indeed ant, eo rediguntur, ut fimul
to produce infinite Things, in in- ftatuere debeant, ipfum non
finite Manners, is certainly true : Poffe omni.a «fficere' f ?»»
B, . ,, a 7 c n j ejus potentia fe cxtendit. Ca-
ut that it Muft always actually do r«l. ad Prep. 17.
fo, by an abfolute Neceffity of Nature,
without any Power of Choice, either as to Time, or
Manner, or Circumftances ; does by no Means fol
low from the Perfection of its Nature, unlefs it be
fa ft. fuppofed to be a Neceffary Agent : Which is the
very Queftion begged, that was to be proved. The
Second Argument is (if poffible) ftill weaker : For
how does it follow, if God, according to his Eternal
unerring Purpofe and infinite Wifdom, produces
different Things, at different Times, and in different
Manners; that therefore the Will and Nature of God
is changeable ? It might exactly as well be argued,
that if God (according to Spinoza's Suppofition) does
Always neeeffarily produce all poffible.D^r*»f« and
Varieties of Things ; therefore his Will and Nature
is Always neeeffarily infinitely various, unequal, and
iiffimilar to itfielfi. And as to the Third Argument,
(which is mere Metaphyfical Trifling) it is juft fuch
Reafoning as if a Man fhould argue, that, if all
poffible [Eternal] Duration be not Always actually
Exhaufted, it never can be All Exhaufted ; and
that therefore fo the Eternity of God is taken away.
Which Sort of arguing, every one, at" firft Sight,
difcems the Weaknefs of. But

<>2 A Demonftration of the
But whatever the Arguments were, and if they.
were never fo much more plaufible than they really '
are -, Yet the Affertion itfelf, [viz.] That no Thingi
or Mode of Exiftente of any Thing, tould poffibly have
been made in any RefipeCt different from what it dCtually
is; is fo palpably abfurd and falfe, fo contradictory
to Experience and the Nature of Things, arid to
the moft obvious and common Reafon of Mankind}
that of itfelf It immediately, and upon the firft Hear
ing, fuffkiendy confutes any Principle of which it
is a Confequence. For all Things in the World
appear plainly to be the moft Arbitrary that can be
imagined •, and to be wholly the Effects, not of
Neceffity, but of Wifdom and Choice. A Neceffity
indeed of Fitnefs ; that is, that Things could not
have been Otherwife than they are, without diminhh'-'
ing the Beauty, Order, and Well-being of the
Whole ; thefe rnay be, and (as far as we can appre
hend) there certainly Is. But this is fo far from
ferVing our Adverfaries Purpofe, that, on the con
trary, 'tis a direct Demonftration that all Things
were made and ordered by a Free and a Wife Agent.
That therefore which I affirm, contradictory to
Spinoza's Affertion, is, that there is not the leaft
Appearance Of an Abfolute Neceffity of Nature, (fo as
that any Variation would imply a Contradiction) in
any of thefe Things. Motion itfelf, and all its Quan
tities and Directions, with the Laws of Gravitations
are intirely Arbitrary ; and might poffibly have been
altogether different from what they now are. The
Number and Motion of the Heavenly Bodies hWtvh
Manner of Neceffity in the Nature Of the Things
themfelves. The Number of the Planets might have
been greater or lefs. Their Motion Upon their owa
Axis might have been in any Proportion fwifter of
flower than it now is. And the Direction of aU
their progreffive Motions, both of the primary and
fecondary Planets, uniformly from Weft to Eaft",
{wheff

Being and Attributes of G od, 63
(when by * the Motion of Comets *Namdum<;ometaemoven-
it appears there was no Neceffity, gj '"^^ JjJJeUmSm
but that they might as eafily have h'^^c^^^&v
moved in all imaginable tranfverfe nullo modo fieri potuit, ut
Directions) is an evident Proof csco fato tribitendtim fit, quod
that thefe Things are folely the planetaa in orbibus concentri-
„„ „ _ -,-i-r-ri j y->i ¦ Cls motu cotuunili ferantu*
Effect Of Wifdom and Choice, eodem omnes.--.Tam miram
There is not the leaft Appearance uriiformitatem in planetarum,
Of Neceffity, but that all thefe fyftemate.riertnlirrofatendum
t>l.' „ Zi.. , sr-Ui uh..i u^^ eftihtelhgentia&'tfimfiliofuiffe
Things might poffibly have been t&asuas Nt.M optic. pags
infinitely varied from their prefent 34$.
COnftitution : And (as the late
Improvements in Aftronofny difcover) they are
actually liable to Very great Changes. Every Thing
upon Earth is ftill more evidently arbitrary ; and
plainly the Product, not of Neceffity, but of Will. -
What abfolute Neceffity for juft fuch a Number of
Species of Animals or Plants ? or who without blttfh-
ing dare affirm, that f neither the t Res nutto a];o to^0j m;
Form, not 'Of der., nor any the alio ordine a Deo produci pb«-
minuteftCirtUfrtftance or Mode of tuerum, quam produftas funt.
Exiftehce of any of thefe Things, *****. "'***«¦ '
.could poffibly have been in the leaft diverfified by the
Supreme Caufe ?
To give but One Inftance. In all- the greater
Species of Animals, Where wafc-the Neceffity for
that t Conformity We obferve in ^ ri ,. . ,_ ,
1 -Tt 1 1 r ji_, f r it t Idemqi dici poflit de unu-
the Number and Liktnefs of all /JUAqu/eftincorpo-
their Principal Members? and ribus animalium; <uix. Necef-
How would it have beeh a COn- fario fateiidum eft, intelligen-
wJ!ja:»- .4, r,-,„„~r<> „~„ ^* aU „¦( tia & confiko fuifle effedam-
traction to fuppofe any or all of ^^ Q 6_
thetn varied from what they now
are? To fuppofe indeed the Continuance of fuch
Monfters as Lucretius imagines to have periihed for
Want of their principal Organs of Life ; is really
a Contradiction. But how would it have been a
Contradiction for a whole Species of Horfies or
Oxen to have fubfifted with -Sin Legs,- or Four Eye's? But

64 A Demonftration of the
But 'tis 3 Shame to infift longer upon fo plain Sri
Argument. It might have been objected with much rhore
.Plaufiblenefs, that the Supreme Caufe cannot be
Free, becaufe he muft needs do always what is Beft
in the Whole. But this would not at all ferve
Spinoza's Purpofe. For this is a Neceffity, not of
Nature and Fate, but of Fitnefs and Wifdom ; a
Neceffity confiftent with the greateft Freedom and
moft perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of
this Neceffity is fuch an unalterable Rectitude, of
Will, and Perfection of Wifdom, as makes it impof:
fible for a Wife Being to refolve to Act foolifhlyj
Or for a Nature infinitely Good to chufe to do that
which is Evil. Of which I fhall have Occafion to
fpeak more hereafter, when I come to deduce the Moral
Attributes of God.
The fame j,dly. If there be any Final Caufe of any Thing
proved alfo m the Univerfe ; then the Supreme Caufe is not a
fcZfi!. * Neceffary, but a Free Agent. This Confequence
alfo <S^/»ffz<2 acknowledges to be unavoidable. And
therefore he has no other Way left, but wioh a
„.. , ,. r,. ftrange Confidence to * expofe alf
•Naturamnnem nullum nbi T,. . p _ _ * t*cJ t
pnfifixum habere; & omnes *,nal Caufes, as the Fictions of
caufas finales; nihil nifi huma- ignorant and fuperftitious Men:
na efle figmenta. Appendix ad And "to f laugh at thofe who are
'tOcubs ad videndum, den, f° f°°lifh ^d childifh as to fancy,
tes ad mafiicandum, herbas that Eye j were defigned and fitted
& animantia ad alimentum, to fiet with, Teeth to chew with,
folemadilluminandum.mare pood t0 be mm for ^ourifihmenti
ad alendum pifces, \3c. Ibid. . c . T . ¦. c. J T r *
Nullas unquam rationes cir- ther S»n t0 glve Ugfy, &C. I fup-
ca res naturales a fine, quem pofe it will not be thought, that,
Deus aut Natura in iis facien- when once a Man comes to this, he,
dis fibi pro^fuit.defumemus. js tobe djf ¦ j .± j ¦ ;
Cartes, Principe Par. I, §. 28. _„, K f r c -r
3 Whoever pleafes, may, for Satis
faction on this Head, confult Galen de Ufiu Partium%
Tully de Natura Deorum, Mr. Boyle ofi Final Caufes9
and Mr. Ray ofi the Wifidom of God in the Creation.^ 1 fhall

Being and Attributes of God, b$
I fhall only obferve this One Thing ; that the larger
the Improvements and Difcovenes are, which are
daily made in Aftronomy and Natural Fhilofophy ;
the more clearly is this Queftion continually deter
mined, to the Shame and Confufion of Atheifts.
afthly. If the Supreme Caufe be a mere Neceffary From the
Agent, 'tis impoffible Any EffeCt or Product of That Fimtenefs
Caufe fhould be Finite. For fince that which acts °fCreat<:<i
neeeffarily, cannot govern or'direct its own Action » etn&h
but muft neeeffarily produce whatever can be the
Effect or Product of its Nature : 'Tis plain every
Effect of fuch an Infinite Uniform Nature, acting
every-where neeeffarily alike, muft of Neceffity be
Immenfe, or Infinite in Extenfion; And fo no Crea-
Eure in the Univerfe could poffibly be Finite: Which
is infinitely abfurd and-rontrary to Experience,
Spinoza,, to fhuffie off this Abfurdity, expreffes the
Confequence of his Doctrine thus :
That * from the Neceffity of the Di- ' * Ex neceffitate Diyinse na-
»r . -x -j. n-i -. i  tarse, infinita infinitis modis
vine Nature, infinite Things, (mean- f . debent_ £//..f Par L
ing infinite in Number) in infinite prop. 16.
Manners, muft needs follow. But
whoever reads his Demonftration of this Propofi
tion, can hardly fail to obferve, (if he be at all uled
to fuch Speculations) that, if it proved any Thing
at all, it would equally prove, that, from the Neceffity
of the Divine Nature, only Infinite Things (meaning
Infinite in Extenfion) can poffibly arifie. Which
Demonftration alone is a fufficient Confutation of
the Opinion it was defigned to eftabliih.
$thly. If the Supreme Caufe be not a Free and And from
Voluntary Agent, then in every Effect (for Inftance, thelmpojjt-
in Motion) there muft have been a Progreffion of ffZf{e an
Caufes in infinitum; without any Original Caufe at all. Suaejfton
For if there be no Liberty any-where ¦, then there is ofCaujes.
no Agent ; no Caufie, Mover, Principle, or Beginning
of Motion any-where. Every Thing in the Univerfe
muft be Paffivc, and nothing AClive : Every Thing
Moved} and no Mover ; Every Thing EffeCt, and
F nothing

66 A Demonftration of the
nothing Caufie. Spinoza indeed (as has been already
obferved) refers all Things to the Neceffity of the
Divine Nature, as their real Caufe and Original :
But this is mere jargon, and Words wirhout any
Signification ; and will not at all help him over the
prefent Difficulty. For if, by Things Exifting
through the Neceffity ofi the Divine Nature, he means
Abfolutely a Neceffity ofi Exiftence -, fo as to make the
World, and every Thing in it, Self-Exiftent ; then
it follows, (as I have before fhewn) that it muft be
a Contradiction in Terms to fuppofe Motion, &c.
not to Exift : Which Spinoza himfelf is afhamed to
affert. But if therefore, by the Neceffity of the Divine
Nature, he means only the Neceffary Following ofi an
EffeCt firom its Caufie ; or, the Caufie Neeeffarily pro*-
ducing its EffeCt ; this Neceffity muft ftill always be
determined by fomething antecedent, and fo on in
finitely. And this Spinoza (though fometimes he
feems to mean the other and equally abfurd Senfe)
exprefly owns in fome Places to be his Meaning.
* n „„„ iv ^ * There can be no Volition, faith he,
* Unaquasq; volitio non po- , ' . '
tell exiftere, neq; ad operan- but from fiome Caufie, which Caufit
dum determinari ; nifi ab alia muft likewifie be caufied by fiome other
caufa determinetur, &hsc Caufie, and fo on infinitely. Again;
rurlus ab alia ; & fie porro in , frr-u j • , , , , ° .
infinitum. Prop.^. Demonfrr. T Will, faith lie, belongs to the
t Voluntas ad Dei naturam Nature ofi God, no otherwifie than
non magis pertinet, quam re- Motion and Reft do : So that God
IX™™?^ r^t ?fan! can n° more ProPerly be fiaid to ail
eodem modo fefe habet, ut , , _ .. r rr , r TrJ„ , ,
motus & quies. by the Liberty ofi his Will, than by
Deus non magis dici poteft the Liberty of Motion and Reft. And
ex libertate voluntatis agere, what the Original of Motion and
quam dici poteft ex libertate u a : u . 1 1 .. c tit j
inotus & quietis agere. Corol. j*eft ls' he tells us ln thefe Words:
ad Prop. 32. %Every Body in Motion, or at Reft,
X Corpus motum vel quief- muft have been determined to that
cens, ad motum vel quietem Mo(Jon Qr Refi b j- ^ M
cietermman debuitab alio cor- ,. , - ¦ r 1/ >-i -r , 1
pore, quod etiam ad motum vel which ™uft llM "keWlfie have been
quietem determinatum fuit ab determined by a third ; and fio on in
alio ; & illud iterum ab alio ; infinitum. And thus, fince Motion
& uc in infinitum. Ethic. Par. :0 nn+ ;„ „„„ „„„ r •_ c. ~C
11. Prop. 13, Lemma 5. W n0t ln ^ 0,le °f ltS StageS °f
Communication

Being and Attributes of Go d. 6?
Communication a Neceffary Self-Exiftent Being, (be
caufe the Body moved may always, without a Con
tradiction, have been imagined to be at Reft, and
is fuppofed not to have Motion from itfelf, but from
another) the Opinion of Spinoza plainly recurs to
an Infinite Succeffion of dependent Beings produced one
from another in an endlefs Progreffion, without any
Original Caufie at all. Which Notion I have already page i i*
(in the Proof of the fiecond General Head of this &c-
Difcourfe) demonftrated to imply a Contradiction.
And fince therefore there is no other poffible Way
to avoid this Abfurdity, but by granting that there
muft be fomewhere' a Principle of Motion and
Action, which is Liberty ; I fuppofe it by this Time
fufficiently proved, that the Supreme Caufe muft
be a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.
From what has been faid upon this Head, it fuf- That Li-
¦ficiently appears, that Liberty is not in itfelf, and forty is not
in the very Notion of the Thing, an abfolute Con- '.* 'fi^Xr"
to- -it __. .. . ° , r.< i r impoffible
tradiction and Impoffibihty -, as the Pleaders for anj con.
Neceffity and Fate contend that it is, and place the tradiaory
chief Strengh of their Argument in that Suppofition. Motion.
For that which actually is, is certainly not impof
fible. And it has already been proved, that Liberty
actually is -, nay, that 'tis impoffible for it not to
be, in the Firft and Supreme Caufe. The Principal
Argument ufed by the Maintainers of Fate againft
the Poffibility of Liberty is this : That, fince every
Thing muft have a Caufe, * every ... ... , ... ,
», ,. 9 r^ . . r , * Mens ad hoc vel illud vo-
Vohtion or Determination of the lendum dc[erminatur a caufa>
Will of an Intelligent Being, muft, qua: etiam ab alia determinata
as all other Things, arife from fome eft, &, h*c iterum ab alia, &
Caufe, and That Caufe from fome f™ ^ZT ft'^ ^
other Caufe, and fo on infinitely.
But now (befides that, in This Sort of Reafoning,
thefe Men always ignorantly confound Moral Motives
with Phyfical Efficients, between which Two Things
there is no Manner of Relation : Befides This, I fay)
F a this

68 A Demonftration of the
this very Argument really proves the direct contrary^
to what they intend. For fince every Thing mult'
indeed have a Caufe of its Being either from without,
or in the Neceffity of its own Nature; and 'tis a plain
page n, Contradiction (as has already been demonftrated)
^c- to fuppofe an infinite Series of dependent Effects;,,
none of which are Neceffary in Themfelves or Self-,
Exiftent -, therefore 'tis impoffible' but there muft
be in the Univerfe fome Being whole Exiftence is
founded in the Neceffity of its Own Nature ; and
which, being acted upon by Nothing beyond itfelf,
muft of Neceffity have in itfelf a Principle of Acting,, ,
or Power of beginning Motion, which is the Idea5
of Liberty. 'Tis true, this Argument proves only
the Liberty of the Firft and Supreme Caufe, and'
extends not indeed to any Created Being : But it
-evinces in general, (which is fufficient to my prefent ,
Purpofe) that Liberty is fo far from being impoffible
and contradictory in itfelf, that, on the contrary,
tis impoffible but that it muft really Be fomewhere:
And this being once eftablifhed, it will be eafy to
ihew hereafter, that it is a Power capable of being
communicated to Created Beings. Of which, in
its proper Place.
That the ¦ ¦ X. The Self-Exifient Being, the Supreme Caufie of
Self-Exift- all Things, muft of Neceffity have infinite Power. This
tnt nVnjfl Propofition is evident and undeniable. For fince
'poiuerful. n°thing (as has been already proved) can poffibly
page 4.4.. be Self-Exiftent befides himfelf ; and confequently
all Things in the Univerfe were made -by Him,
and are intirely dependent upon Him ; and all the
Powers of all Things are derived from Him, and
muft therefore be perfectly Subject and Subordinate
to Him : 'Tis manifeft that nothing can make any
Difficulty or Refiftance to the Execution of his
Will ; but he muft of Neceffity, have abfolute Power
to do every. Thing he pleafes, .with the perfected: Eafe,

Being and Attributes of Go D. #9
Eafe, and in the perfecteft Manner, at once and in
a Moment, whenever he Wills it. TheDefcriptions
the Scripture gives of this Power are fo lively and
emphatical, that I cannot. forbear mentioning one
or two Paffages. Thus Job ix. 4.. He is wife in Heart,
and mighty in Strength ; — which removeth the Moun
tains, and they know it not ; which cverturneth them in
his Anger. Which Jhaketb the Earth out of her Place,
and the Pillars thereof tremble. Which commandeth
the Sun, and it rifieth not ; and fiealeth up the Stars.
Which alone fipreadeth out the Heavens, and treadeth
upon the Waters ofi the Sea: Which doth great Things
paft finding out, yea and Wonders without Number.
Again ; Hell is naked before Him, and DefiruCiion hath
no Covering. He ftretcheth out the North over the
empty Place, and hangeth the Earth upon nothing.
He bindeth up the Waters in his thick Clouds, and the
Cloud is not rent under them. The Pillars ofi Heaven
tremble, and are aftonifhed at his Reproof. He divideth
the Sea with his Power, and by his Underftanding he
fimiteth through the Proud. Lo ! thefie. are Part of his
Ways, but how little a Portion is heard of him? But the
Thunder ofi his Power who can underftand? fob xxvi.6.
So likewife, Ifiaiah xl. 12. Who has meafiured the
Waters in the Hollow ofi his Hand, and meted out
Heaven with the Span ; and comprehended the Duft ofi
the Earth in a Meafiure ; and weighed the Mountains
in Scales, and the Hills in a Balance. Behold I the
Nations are as a Drop of the Bucket, and are counted
as the fimall Duft of the Balance ; behold I he taketh up
the Ifies as a very little Thing. All Nations before him
are as nothing, and they are counted to him lefis than
Nothing, and Vanity. To whom then will ye liken
God, or what Likenefis will ye compare ujito him? But
I do not urge Authority to the Perfons I am at pre
fent fpeaking to. 'Tis fufficiently evident from Rea
fion, that the Supreme Caufe muft of Neceffity be
Infinitely Powerful. The only Queftion is, What
F 3 the

ja A Demonftration of the
the true Meaning of what we call Infinite. Power Is,
and to what Things it muft be underftood to extend,
or not to extend ?
Now, in determining this Queftion, there are
fome Propofitions, about which there is no Difpute,
Which therefore I. fhall but juft mention : As,
Ofisjork- ifi. That Infinite Power reaches to all Poffible
ing Con- Things, but cannot be faid to extend to the"*work-
tradu- ¦ a Thing which implies a Contradiction : As,
that a Thing fhould be and not be at the fame Time ;
that the fame Thing fhould be made and not be made,
or have been and not have been ; that twice Two fhould
not make Four, or that That which is neeeffarily Falfe
fhould be True. The Reafon whereof is plain,:
Becaufe the Power of making a Thing to be at the
fame Time that it is not, is only a Power of doing
that which is Nothing, that is, no Power at all.
OrWatu- idly. Infinite Power cannot be faid to extend to
ral and thofe Things which imply Natural Imperfection in
Moral j^g Be}rig to whom fuch Power is afcribed : As, that
it fhould deftroy its own Being, weaken itfelf, or the
like. Thefe Things imply Natural Imperfection,
and are by all Men confeffed to be fuch as cannot,
poffibly belong to the Neceffary Self-Exiftent Being,
There are alfo other Things which imply Imper
fection in another Kind, viz. Moral Imperfection :
Concerning which, Atheifm takes away the Subject
of the Queftion, by denying wholly the Difference
of Moral Good and Evil ; and therefore I fhall omit
the Confideration of them, 'till I come to deduce
the Moral Attributes of God.
But fome other Inftances there are in the Quef
tion about the' Extent of Infinite Power, wherein
the Principal Difference between us and the Atheifts
(next to the Queftion, Whether the Supreme Caufe
be an Intelligent Being ox not ?) does in great Mea-
fyre confift. As, ift. Tha?

Evils.

- Being and Attributes of God. 71
17?. That Infinite Power includes a Power of Of the
Creating Matter. This has been conftantly denied p°™r. °f
by all Atheifts, both Ancient and Modern ; and as p^aft'e"f
conftantly affirmed by all who believe the Being,
and have juft Notions of the Attributes of God.
The only Reafon which the Atheifts have, or can
pretend to alledge for their Opinion, is, that the
Thing is in its own Nature abfolutely Impoffible.
But how does it appear to be impoffible ? Why,
only becaufe They are not able to comprehend How
it can be. For, to reduce it to a Contradiction,
{which is the ajone real Impoffibility) this they are
by no Means able to do. For to fay that fome-
thing which once was not, may fince have begun
to Exift, is neither directly, nor by any Confe
quence whatfoever, to affert that That which is not,
can be, while it is Not ; or that That which is, can
Not be,' while it is. 'Tis true, We, who have been
ufed to converfe only with .Generations and Cor
ruptions, and never faw any ThlngMade or Created,
but only Formed or Framed, are apt to endeavour to
conform ourJdea of Creation to that of Formation ;
and to imagine, that as in all Formations there is
fome Pre-Exifting Matter out of which a Thing is
Formed; fo in' Creation there muft be eonfidered a
Pre-Exifting Nothing out of which, as out of a real
Material Caufe, a Thing is Created: Which looks
indeed Very like a Contradiction. But this is only
a Confufion of Ideas, juft like Children's imagining
that Darknefis is fome real Thing, which in the Morn
ing is driven away by the Light, or Transformed
into it : Whereas the true Notion of Creation is not
a Forming Something out ofi Nothing, as out of a
Material Caufie ; but only a bringing Something into
Being, that before had no Being at all •, or a Cauf-
jng Something to Exift Now, that did not Exift
Before ; or which, without this Caufe, would not
have Exifted. Which no Man can ever reduce to
F 4 *•

jz A Dhnonftraiipn of the ¦
a Contradiction, any more than the Formation of .any
Thing into a Shape which it had not before, can be
reduced to a Contradiction.
.But further : The Creation of Matter is a Thing
no% only not impoffible in itfelf, but what moreover
even by bare Reafon is demonftrated to be True. For
page 24. 'tis a Contradiction (as I have fhewn above) to fup
pofe Matter Neceffarily-Exifting.
Of the 2.dly- -Tis poffible to Infinite Power to Create an
Power of 'Jmmaierial Cogitative Subftance indued with a Power
Immatefianf beginning Motion, and with a Liberty of Will or
Coeitati've Choice. This alfo has been always denied by all
Sulfiances. Atheifts. And, becaufe it is a Propofition of the
greateft Confequence to Religion and Morality,
therefore I fhall be particular in endeavouring the
Proof of the feveral Parts of it.
Firft, 'Tis poffible to Infinite Power to Create an
Immaterial Cogitative Subftance. . That there can
be fuch a Thing as a Cogitative Subftancej that is,
a Subftance indued with Confcioufnefs and Thought,
is granted by all ; becaufe every. Man's own Expe
rience' convinces him that-He himfelf is fuch a Subr
ftance. Further ; That if there be, or can be, any
fuch Thing as Immaterial Subftances ; then 'tis moft
reafonable to believe, that fuch SubftanceS as are
indued with Confcioufnefs and Thought [Properties
the fartheft diftant from the known Properties of
Matter, and the moft unlike them that can poffibly
be imagined] are thofe Immaterial Subftances; this
alfo will, 1 think, be granted by all Men. The
only Point therefore, that remains to be proved, is,
That Immaterial Subftances are not impoffible ; or,
that a Subftance Immaterial is not a contradictory'
Notion. Now, whoever afferts that it is contra
dictory, muft affirm, that whatever is not Matter,
is nothing; and that, to fay any Thing Exifts whicti
is not Matter, is faying that there Exifts fomething
whjch is nothing. Which in other Words is plainly this i

Being and Attributes of God. 73
this ; That whatever we have not an Idea of, is
nothing, and impoffible to Be. For there is no
other Way to reduce Immaterial Subftance to, a Con
tradiction, but by fuppofing Immaterial to fignify
the fame as Having no Exiftence : And there is no
poffible Way to prove That, but by faying we have
no Idea of it ; and therefore it neither has nor can
have any Exiftence. By which fame Argument,
Material Subftance will in like Manner be a Contra
diction : For of That alfo (viz. of the Subftance to
which Solidity belongs) we have No Idea. But fup
pofing it were true (as 'tis indeed moft falfe) that we
had a clearer Idea of the Subftance of Matter, than
we have of Immaterial Subftance ; ftill by the fame
Argument, wherewith an Atheift will prove Imma
terial Subftance to be impoffible, a Man born Blind
may -demonftrate irrefragably, that Light or Colour
is an Impoffible and Contradictory Notion, becaufe
it is not a Sound or a Smell. For the Power of feeing
Light or Colour is, to a Man born Blind, altogether
as incomprehenfible and abfolutely beyond the Reach
of all his Ideas, as either the Operations and Per
ceptions, or even the Simple Effence of a Pure Imr
material Subftance or Spirit, can be to any of Us.
If therefore the Blind Man's Want of Ideas be not
a fufficient Proof of the Impoffibility of Light or
Colour ; how comes bur bare Want of Ideas to be
a Demonftration of the Impoffibility of the Being
of Immaterial Subftances ? A Blind Man, they will
fay, has Tefiimony of the Exiftence of Light : Very
true ; So alfo have We of the Exiftence of Imma
terial" Subftances. But there' is this further Advan
tage on Our Side in the Comparifen ; that a Blind
Man, excepting the Tefiimony of Others, finds not,
by Any Reafoning within himfelf, the leaft Like
lihood or Probability, no not in the loweft poffible
Degree, that there can be any fuch Thing as Light
pr Colour ; But We, befides Tefiimony, have great and

74 A Demonftration of tfre
and ftrong Arguments both from Experience and
Reafon, that there are fuch Things as Immaterial
Subftances, though we have no Knowledge of their
Simple Effence : As indeed of the Subftance even
of Matter itfelf (its Simple Subftance, eonfidered as
abftract from, and as the Foundation of, That
Effential Property of Solidity) we have no Idea:
(For to fay that ,Extenfion is the Subftance of
Matter is the fame Way of thinking, as to fay
that Exiftence, or that Duration, is the Subftance of
Matter.) We have, I fay, great and ftrong Argu
ments both from Experience and Reafon, that there
are fuch Thingsl as Immaterial Subftances, though
we have no Idea of their Simple Effence. Even the
very firft and moft univerfal Principle of Gravitation
itfelf in All Matter, fince it is ever Proportional,
not at all to the Surfaces of Bodies, or of their Par
ticles in any poffible Suppofition, but exactly to the
Solid Content of Bodies, 'tis evident it cannot be
caufed by Matter acting upon the Surfaces of Mat
ter, which is all // can do ; but muft (either imme
diately or mediately) be caufed by fomething which
continually penetrates its Solid Subftance. But in
Animals, which have a Power of Self- Motion ; and
, in the perfecier Sorts of them, which have ftill
higher Faculties ; the Thing is yet more evident.
For we fee, and feel, and obferve daily in ourfelves
and others, fuch Powers, and Operations, and Per-
' ceptions, as undeniably evince themfelves either to
be the Properties of Immaterial Subftances : Or elfe
it will follow, that Matter is fomething, of whofe
Effential Powers (as well as of its Subftance itfelf)
we have altogether as little Idea, as we have of
Immaterial Beings : And then how are Immaterial
Subftances more impoffible than Material? But, of
this, more hereafter. From

Being and Attributes of God. 75
From what has been faid on this Head, it will Of the Its-
be eafy to anfwer all the Objections that have been materiality
brought by any Atheifts againft the Notion of fg£f"ma"
Human Souls being Immaterial Subftances diftinct
from Body. For fince 'tis poffible there may be See a Lei-
fuch Things as Immaterial Subftances ; and fince, t?r f° Mr,,
if any fuch Subftance Can Be, there is all the Rea- ^f^fy
fon iq the World to believe that Confcious and Four De-
Thinking Subftance Is fuch ; thefe Properties being fenceso/%,
the moft remote from the known Properties of
Matter that are poffible to be conceived : The
Foundation of all the Objections againft the Imma
teriality of the Soul is intirely taken away. I fhall
not here tarry to. confider the Objections in par
ticular which have been often and fully anfwered
by learned Pens, but fhall only mention One on.
which all the reft depend, and to which they may
all be reduced. , And it is This :
* That, feeing the only Means we
have of Perception, are the tive
Senfes, and thefe all plainly, de
pend upon the Organs of the
Body, therefore the Soul, with
out the Body, can have no Per
ception, and confequently is No
thing. Now (befides that thefe
very Senfes or Perceptions, how
ever they may be obftructed by
bodily Indifpofition, arid To do
indeed depend upon the Organs
of the. Body as to their prefent
Exercifie ; yet, in their -Nature^
are really intirely diftinct Powers,
and cannot poffibly, as has been
¦ * before

*  Si immortalis natura
animai eft,
Et fentire poteft fecreta a
corpore noftro ;
$>uinqi (ut opinor) earn fa-
ciundum eft Senjtbus au&am :
Nee ratione alja nofmet pro-
' ponere nobis
Pofl'umus infernas animas
Acherunte vagare.
Piftores itaq; & fcriptorum
fecla priora
Sic animas introduxerunt
fenfibus auftas,
At neq; feorfum oculi,
&c— —
Nee fenfus ipfi feorfum
confiftere poffunt
1 Naribua atq; manu, atq;
oculis, atq; auribus, atq;
Lingua ; nee per fe pof
funt fentire, nee effe. Lucret.
lib. j.

*Ofl-!i» yu% I5-H1
ifiweflot vvsa,i%£it' oiov |2*^t£sn' £rsv mtiuv, Arififqt,

y6 A Demonftration of the
* page 52. * before fhewnj be abfolutely founded in, or arife
from, any of the known Properties or Qualities of
Matter : Befides this, I fay) of Him that thus'
argues, I would only afk this one Queftion : Are
our Five Senfes, by an Abfolute Neceffity in the
Nature of the Thing, All and the only Poffible Ways
of Perception ? And is it impoffible and contra
dictory, that there fhould be any Being in the
Univerfe indued with Ways of Perception different '¦
from thefe that are the Refult of Our prefent Com-,
pofition ? Or, are thefe Things, on the contrary,
purely Arbitrary ; and the fame Power that gave Us
thefe, may have given others to Other Beings, and .
might (if he had pleafed) have given to Us others
in this prefent State, and may yet have made us
capable of different ones in Another State ? If they,
. ^ be purely Arbitrary ; then the Want of thefe does'
by no Means infer a total Want of Perception :
But the fame Soul, which in the prefent State has
the-Powers of Reflexion, Reafion, and Judgment ± which. ¦
are Faculties intirely different from Senfe ; may as
eafily in another State have different Ways even of
Perception alfo. But if any one will fay, that thefe
Senfes of ours are Neeeffarily the only Ways of Per-.,
ception ; how does that appear ? And is it not
infinitely more reafonable to fup-
t Has tamen imagines [mor- p0fe, that this is a f mere Pre-
firlteSlttn;ecTne judice, arifing from Cuftom, and .
palate, nee line faucium, la- an attending to bare Senfe in Op'
terum, pulmonum vi & figura pofition to Reafon ? For, fuppo^.
poteft. Nihil enim Jnimo, f,n„ Men iiaa; been created only
(Jpeaking of Juch as attributed -it-. c r j 1 j
I. Spirits thejame Powers and W«h Four Senfefi, and had never
Senjes only as they Jaw Men in- known the Ufe of Sight; WOllld
4ued with in this prejent State) they not then have had the very
videre poterant : Ad Oculos fame Reafon tQ conclude therQ
omnia referebant. Masm au- 17^ m 1 nr r
tern ingenii-eft re'vocare men- were but Four poffible Ways of
tem a fenftbus, & cogita'io- Perception, as they have Now to
nemaconfuetudineabducexe. fancy, that there are but Five I
Cicero Tufcul. S>n>*Ji. 1. - A nrl

Being/ and Attributes of God. 77
And would they not then have thought Sight to
have been an Irripoffible, Chimerical, and merely
Imaginary Power, with abfolutely the fame Reafion,
as they now prefume the Faculties of Immaterial
Beings to be fo ? that is, with no Reafion at all.
One would think Men fhould be alhamed therefore
to be fo Vain, as merely from their own Negative
Ignorance, without any Appearance or Pretence of
any Pofitive Argument, to difpute againft the Pofi-
fibiBty of the Being of Things, which (excepting
only that they cannot frame to themfelves an Image
orNotion of them) there is a Concurrence of all the
Reafons in the World to perfuade them that fuch
Things Really are. And then, as to the Difficulty
of Conceiving the Nature and Manner of the Union
between Soul and Body,. We know altogether as
much of That, as we do of the Nature of the
Union or Cohefion of the infinitely divifible Parts
of Body : Which yet no Man doubts of. And
therefore our Ignorance can be no more an Argu
ment againft the Truth of the One, than it is a Bar
to our Belief of the Other.
Secondly, 'Tis poffible to Infinite Power to indue Of induing
a Creature with the Power of beginning Motion. This Creatures
is conftantly denied by all Atheifts; becaufe the™^'
Confequence of it is a Liberty of Will, of which I i,^„„ing
fhall have Occafion to fpeak prefently. But that Motion.
the Propofition is true I thus prove : If the Power
of beginning Motion be in itfelf a Poffible Thing,
and alfo Poffible to be communicated ; Then a Creature
' may be indued with That Power. Now that the
Power of beginning Motion is in itfelf a Poffible
Thing I have already proved, by fhewing that there
1 inuft Neeeffarily be fomewhere a Power of beginning
Motion ; becaufe otherwife Motion muft have been
from Eternity, without any External Caufe of its
Being ; and yet it is a Thing that has no Neceffity
of Exiftence in its own Nature. So that, if. there be

78 A Demonftration of the
be notfiomewhere a Principle or Power of beginning
Motion, Motion muft Exift without any Caufe ot
Reafon at all of its Exiftence, either within itfelf,
page 11, or from without : Which, as I have before fhewn,
&c. js an exprefs Contradiction. Wherefore a Principle
or Power of beginning Motion there muft of Ne*
ceffity Be fomewhere or other : And confequently
it is not in itfelf an Impoffible Thing. I add :
As a Power of beginning Motion is not in itfielfi 'an
impoffible Thing, becaufe it muft of Neceffity Be
in the Supreme Caufe : So neither is it impoffible
to be Communicated to Created Beings. The Reafon
is plain : Becaufe no Powers are Impoffible to be
Communicated, but only thofe which imply Self-
Exiftence and abfolute Independency. That a Sub
ordinate Being fhould be Self-Exiftent or abfolutely
Independent is indeed a Contradiction ; but 'tis no
Contradiction to fuppofe it indued with any Other
Power whatfoever feparate from thefe. I know the
Maintainers of Fate are very confident, that a Power
of beginning Motion is nothing lefs than being really
Independent, or being able toAct Independently from
any Superior Caufe. But this is only a childifh Tri
fling with Words. For a Power of Acting Indepen
dently in This Senfie, communicated at the Pleafure of
the Supreme Caufe, aTid continued only during the
fame good Pleafure, is no more a real and abfoluteltf
dependency, than the Power of ii^/Kg', (which I fup
pofe the Defenders of Fate are not fo fond to make
a continual Creation, as they are to make the Power
of Self-Motion a continual External Impulfe ;) or
than the Power of being Conficious, or any other P01M
whatfoever, can be faid to imply Independency.
In Reality, 'tis altogether as hard to conceive how
Conficioufinefis, or the Power of Perception, fhould
be communicated to a Created Being, as how the
Power of Self-Motion fhould be fo. Unlefs Percep
tion be Nothing elfe but a mere Paffive Reception of

. Being and Attributes of God. jg
of Impulfe •, which I fuppofe is as clear that it is
not, as that a Triangle is not a Sound, or that a
Globe is not a Colour. Yet no Man doubts, but
that He himfelf, and all Others, have truly a Power
of Perception. And therefore, in like Manner,
(however hard it may be to Conceive, as to the
Manner of it •, yet fince, as has been now proved,
it can never be fhewn to be impoffible and exprefly
contradictory, that a Power of Self Motion fhould
be communicated) I fuppofe no confidering Man
can doubt, but that he actually has alfo a Power of
. Self-Motion. For the Arguments drawn from con
tinual Experience and Obfervation, to prove that
we have fuch a Power, are fo ftrong, that nothing
lefs than a ftrict Demonftration that the Thing is
abfolutely impoffible, and that it implies an exprefs
Contradiction, can make us in the leaft doubt that
. we have it not. We have all the fame Experience,
the fame Marks and Evidence exactly, of our hav
ing really a Power of Self- Motion, as the moft rigid
Fatalift could poffibly contrive to require, if he was
to make a Suppofition of a Man's being indued with
that Power. There is no one Thing that fuch a Man
can imagine ought to follow from the Suppofition
of Self-Motion, which every Man does not now as
much feel and actually experience in Himfelf, as it
can poffibly be imagined any Man would do, fup
pofing the Thing were true. Wherefore to affirm,
uotwithftanding all this, that the Spirits, by which
a Man moves the Members of his Body, and ranges
the Thoughts of his Mind, are Themfelves moved
wholly by Air or Subtler Matter infpired into the
Body ; and That again by other External Matter,
and fo on ¦, as the Wheels of a Clock are moved
by the Weights, and thofe Weights by Gravitation,
and fo on ; without a Man's having the leaft Power,
by any Principle within himfelf, to think any one
Thought, or impel his own Spirits, in order to
move

8o A Demonftration of the1
move any Member of his Body : All this is fo con
trary to Experience and the Reafon of Things, that,
unlefs the Idea of Self- Motion were in itfelf as evi
dently and clearly a Contradiction, as that Two and.
Two fhould make Five, a Man ought to be afhamed
to talk at that Rate. Nay, a Man of any consider
able Degree of Modefty, would even in That Cafe'
be almoft tempted rather to doubt the Truth of his
Faculties •, than take upon him to affert one fuch
intolerable Abfurdity, merely for the Avoiding of
another. There are Some indeed, who, denying
•Men the Power of beginning Motion, would yet. feem
in fome 'Manner to account for their Actions, by
allowing them a Power of determining Motion. But
this alfo is a mere ludicrous Trifling with Words.
For, if That Power of determining Motion, be no
other in a Man, than that which is in a Stone to
reflect a Ball one certain Way ; this is juft nothing
at all. But if he has a Power of determining the
Motion of his Spirits any Way, as he himfelf pleafes ;
this is, in all Refpect s, the very fame as the Power
of beginning Motion.
Of the ' Thirdly, 'Tis poffible to Infinite Power to indue
PoJJibHity a Creature with Freedom or Liberty ofi Will. It might
of induing fuf£ce that this is at once proved bv the fame Argu-
with Free- nients, and in the fame Method, as I juft now
dom or Li- proved Self-Motion, or a Power of beginning Motion^
berty of t0 j-^ poffible : viz. Becaufe Liberty muft of Necef
fity Be in the Supreme Caufe ; (as is at large proved
page 58. in the Ninth General Head of this Difcourfe) and
therefore cannot be impoffible and contradictory in
the Nature of the Thing itfelf: And becaufe it im
plies no Contradiction to fuppofe it communicated,
as being no harder to conceive, than the foremen-
' tioned Power of beginning Motion : And becaufe the
Arguments, drawn from Experience and Obferva
tion, are ftronger on the one Side of the Queftion,
than thofe, arifing merely from the Difficulty of
our

Being and Attributes of Go a. $i
Our apprehending the Thing, can be on the other.
But, forafmuch as This is the Queftion of the
greateft Concern of all, in Matters both of Re
ligion and Human Life ; and both Spinoza, and
Mr. Hobbs, and their Followers, have with great
Noife and Confidence denied it : I -fhall therefore
(not contenting myfelf with this) endeavour to
fhew, moreover, in particular, the Weaknefs of the
Principal Arguments by which thefe Men have
pretended to demonftrate, that there cannot poffibly
be any fuch Power in Man as a Liberty of Wilt.
As to the Propriety of the Terms, whether the
Will be properly the Seat of Liberty or not, is not
now to the Purpofe.to inquire : The Queftion being
not Where the Seat of Liberty is ? but Whether
there be at all in Man any fuch Power as a Liberty
of Choice, and of Determining his own Actions I
or, on the contrary, his Actions be all as Neceffary
as the Motions of a Clock. The Arguments by
which Spinpza and Mr. Hobbs have attempted to
maintain this latter Side of the Queftion are all
plainly reducible to thefe Two :
lft. That, fince every Effect muft needs be pro
duced by fome Caufe ; therefore, as every Motion
tin a Body muft have been caufed by the Impulfe of
lome other Body, and the Motion of That by the
Impulfe of a Third • fo every Volition or Deter
mination of the Will of Man muft needs be pro
duced by fome External Caufe. and That in like
Manner be the Effect of fome Third. And con
fequently that there cannot poffibly be any fuch
Thing in Nature as Liberty or Freedom of Will.
idly. That Thinking and all its Modes, as Willing
and the like, are Qualities or Affections of Matter.
And confequently, fince 'tis manifeft that Matter has
not in itfelf a Power of beginning Motion, or giving
itfelf any Manner of Determination whatfoever ;
G therefore

$2 A Demonftration of the-
therefore tis evident" likewife, that 'tis impoffibjje
there fhould be any fuch Thing as Freedom of Will.
AnAnfwtr Now to thefe Arguments I oppofe, and fhall
to Mr. endeavour briefly to demonftrate, the Three fol-
?°inoza'f lowinS Propofitions.
Arguments ift. That Every Effect cannot poffibly be the
againji the Product of External Caufes ; but there muft of
Poffibility Necefflty be Somewhere a Beginning of Operation,
ofLi erty. Qr a power 0f Acting without being antecedently
acted upon. And that this Power may be, and is,
in Man.
idly. That Thinking and Willing neither are,
nor can be, Qualities and Affections of Matter-,
and confequently are not concluded under the Laws
thereof. %dly. That even fuppofing the Soul not to be a
diftinct Subftance from Body, but that Thinking
and Willing could be, and were indeed, only Qua
lities or Affections of Matter ; yet even This would
not at all affect the prefent Queftion, nor prove
Freedom of Will to be impoffible. :
That there ift. Every Effect cannot poffibly ^e the Prd-
muft be dudt of External Caufes; but there muft of Ne-
aBerin-6 "ffity De Somewhere a Beginning of Operation,
ning of or a Power of Adting without being antecedently
Operation, acted upon : And this Power may be, and is, m
Man. The feveral Parts of this Propofition have
pages 11, been already proved in the Second and Ninth Gent*
58> & 77- ral Heads of this Difcourfe ; and in that Part of
this Tenth Head which is concerning the Poffi
bility of the Power1 of Self-Motion being commu
nicated to Created Beings. I fhall not therefore
here repeat the Proofs, but only apply them to
Spinoza's and Mr. Hobbs 's Arguments, fo far as is
neceffary to fhew the Weaknefs of what they have
faid upon this Head in Oppofition to the Poffi-
bi'iry of Liberty or Freedom of Will. Now the.
Manner

*3

feeing and Attributes df Gob.
Manner of their Arguing upon this Head, is this :
That every EffeCt muft needs be owing to fome Caufe ;
and That Caufe muft produce the Efi-
fieCt * neeeffarily -, becaufe, if it be
a fufficient Caufie, the EffeCt cannot
but follow ; and, if it be not a fuf
ficient Caufie, it will not be at all a
Caufie ofi that Thing. Thus, for In
ftance, \ whatever Body is moved,
muft be moved by fiome other Body,
which itfielfi likewife muft be moved
by fiome Third, and fio on without
End. That the %Will, in like Man
ner, ofi any voluntary AgeHt, muft of
Neceffity be [| determined by fome Ex
ternal Caufe, and not by any Power
of determining itfelf, inherent in it
felf: And That External Caufe muft
be determined neeeffarily by fiomefother
Caufe External to It; and fio on with
out End. From all which it evi
dently appears, that All that thefe
Men urge againft the Poffibility
of Freedom^ extends equally to
all other Beings (not excepting the
Supreme) as well as to Men : And
* Spinoza in exprefs Words con-
feffes it. Wherefore confequently,
whatever Noife they make of the
Strength and Demonftrative Force
of their Arguments ; all that they
fay amounts at laft to no more but
this One moft abfurd Conclufion ;
G 2 that
In mente nulla eft ab&luta five libera voluntas ; fed mens ad hoc Vel
illud volendum determinatur a caufa, qusS etiam ab alia determinata eft,
& hsec iterum at alia, & fie in infinitum. Spinoza, Ethic. Par, II. Prop. 48.
|| See above, page 68.
* Hinc fequitur, Deum non operari ex libertate volunt&Us. Ethic. Par. k.
Qorol, ad Prop ^3*.

* Quicunq; unquam EfFec-
tus produdlus fit, produftus eft
a caufa neceffiiria. Nam quod
produftum eft, caufam habuit
integram, hoc eft, omnia ea
quibus fuppofitis Effeftum
non fequi intelligi non pofiit :
ea vero caufa neceffaria eft.
Hobbs P hilojophia prima, cap. 9.
f Corpus motum, vel quief-
cens, ad motum vel quietem
determinari debuit ab alio cor-
po're, quod etiam ad motum
vel quietem determinatum fuit
ab alio, & illud iterum ab
alio, & fie in infinitum. Spi
noza, Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13'.
Lemma 3.
% Unaqujeq; volitio non po
teft exiftere, neq; ad operan
dum determinari, niii ab alia1
caufa deterrhinetur, & hsec
rurfus ab alia; & fie porro in
infinitum. Id. Ethic. Par. I;
Prop. 32. Dsmonjirat.
I concti've nothing taketh Be
ginning from itfelf , but, from the
Ailion of fome immediate Agent
without itfelf And that there
fore, when firft a Man had an
Appetite or Will to Jomething,
to •which, immediately before*
he had no Appetite or Will, the
Caufe of his Will is not the Will
itfelf, but fomething elfe not in
his own dij'pofing. Hobbs'j
Debate with Bp, Bramhall,
page 289.

84. A Demonftration , of the
that there neither is any-where, nor can poffibly be,
any Principle of Motion or Beginning of Operation at
all ; but every Thing is caufed neeeffarily by an eternal
Chain ofi Dependent Caufies and Effects, without arty
Independent Original. Ail their Arguments therefore
pages n, on this Head are already anfwered in the Second and
\z, &$%¦ Ninth General Pleads of this Difcourfe; (where \
proved that there muft of Neceffity be an Original,
Independent, and Free Principle of Motion or
Action ; and that, to fuppofe an endlefs Succef
fion of Dependent Caufes and Effects, without any
Original or Firft and Self- actuating Principle, is
fuppofing a Series of Dependent Things to be firom
Eternity produced by Nothing ; which is the very
fame Abfurdity and Contradiction, as to fuppofe
Things produced by Nothing at any definite Time;
the Ability of Nothing to produce any Thing, being
plainly the fame in Time or in Eternity.) And I have
moreover proved ex abundanti, in the foregoing Part
page 77. of this Tenth Head ; that the Power of beginning
Motion is not only poffible and certain in itfelf, but
alfo poffible to be communicated to Finite Beings ; and
that it actually Is in Man.
That idly. Thinking and Willing neither are, nor can
Thinking be, Qualities or Affections of Matter ; and confe-
and if-il- qUentiy are not concluded under the Laws thereof.
Irf," nor That 'tis poffible there * may be Immaterial Sub-
can be; fiances, the Notion not implying a Contradiction
Affeatons jn itfelf; hath already been fhewn under the prefent
•pjffff General Propofition. Further, that Thinking and
Willing are Powers intirely different from Solidity,
Figure and Motion ; and, if they be different, that
then they cannot poffibly arife from them, or be
compounded of them ; hath likewife been already
page .jo. proved under the Eighth General Head of this Dif-
p"g< Sz- courfe. It follows therefore, that Thinking and
Willing may poffibly be, nay, that they certainly and
nxeffarily are, Faculties or Powers of Immaterial
Subftances ;

Being and Attributes of God. 85
Subftances ; feeing they cannot poffibly be Qualities
or Affections of Matter ; unlefs we will confound
(as fome have done) the Ideas of Things ; and
mean by Matter, not what That Word in all other
Cafes fignifies, a fiolid Subftance capable of Divifion,
Figure, and Motion,- and of whatever Properties
can arife from the Modifications of thefe ; but Sub-
fiance in general, capable of unknown Powers or
Properties intirely different from thefe, and from
whatever can poffibly refult from thefe. In which
confufed Senfe of the Word, could Matter be fup
pofed' never fo capable of Thinking and Willing ;
yet in That Senfe, (as I fhall fhew prefently) it
would fignify nothing at all to the Purpofe or
Advantage of our Adverfaries. In the mean Time,
how great an Abfurdity it is to fuppofe Thinking
and Willing to be Qualities or Affections of Matter,
in the Proper and Ufual Senfe of the Word ; may
fufficiently appear, without any foreign Argument,
from the Senlelefsnefs of Mr. Hcbbs's Own Expli
cation of the Nature and Original of Senfation and
Confcioufnefs. The immediate Caufie
ofi Senfiation, * faith he, is this : * Ex quo intelligitur, Sen-
The Object, or Something flowing firom f°™ im ™f s^nfo/ a-
it, preffeth the outermoft Part of the ^primum ^"tangit & p«-
Organ, and That Preffure is com- mit. Si enim organi pars ex-
municated to the innermoft Parts ofi tinia prematur ; ilia cedente.
tbeOrgan ; Where, by the Refiftance KJS ?XS
or Reaction, ofi the Organ, caufing & ita propagabitur preffio, fn ?
a Preffure outwards contrary to the Motus ille, per panes Organi
Preffure of the ObjeCt inwards, there °mne*> u{1> ad int™am -— -
. -" , J _/ r T Quomam autem motui ab Ob-
is made up a Phantafim or Image : j^0 per media ad 0rg.,ni
» G 3 Which partem intimam propagator
fit aliqua totius Organi reiif-
tentia five reattio', per motum ipfius Organi internum natural em ; fit prop-
terea conatui ab Objefto, conatus ab Organo contrarius. Ut, cum conatus
ille ad intima, ultrmus ailus fit eorum qui fiunt in aftu Seniionis ; turn
demum ex ea reaclione aliquaiidiu durante; ipfum exiftat Phamajma ; qiu.d
propter conatum verfus externa, femper videtur tanquam aliquid iitu:i>
extra Organum, Hobbs de Serfione y Matu Animali.

06 A Demonftration of the ¦
* Phantafma eft fentiendi Which Phantafim, * faith he, is
M^uAnSaU ^ SenJi"ne ^ thS Senfatim *tffV' ASain ' ^
1 fCaufrSenfioniseftExter- Caufie ofi Senfiation, f faith he, is
-hum Corpus' five Objeaum an ObjeCt preffmg We Organ ; which
quod premit Organum pro- Preffure is by Means of the Nerves
prium ; & prtmendo, (medi- , h ^ ^ W j-Q mh
antibus Nervis & Membramsj J - , _ /„
continuum efficit Motum in- Heart ; Where, by the Refinance or
trorfum ad Cerebrum & inde CounUr-prefftire ofi the Heart OUtr
ad Cor ; unde nafcitur Cordis warjs js moJe an fmage or Phath
renftentia & contra-preflio feu , r . . , . c r ?¦ ivr„
«VWi«, five Conatus Cordis tafim, which is Senfation. Now
liberantis fea preffione per what is there in all this that does
motum tendentemextrorfum; in any the leaft Meafure tend to
qui motus propterea apparet gx . • Qr makfi intelligible the
tanquam aliquid externum : r o
4tque Apparitio hxc, five real and inward Nature pf Senje
Phantafma, eft id quod vo- or Conficioufinefs ? The Objerft, by
camus Senfanem. Leviathan, communicating a Preffure through,
^' l'- the Organ to the Senfory, does
indeed raife a Phantafim or Image, that is, make a
certain Impreffion on the Brain : But Wherein confifts
the Power of Perceiving this Impreffion, and of
being Senfible of it ? Or What Similitude hath this
Impreffion to the Senfe itfielf, that is, to the Thought
excited in the Mind ? Why, exactly the very fame
that a Square has to Bluenefis, or a Triangle to Sound,
or a Needle to the Senfe of Pain, or the Reflecting
ofi a Tennis-Bail to the Reafion and Underftanding ofi a
Man. So that Mr. Hobbs's Definition of Senfation,
that it is itfelf, the inmoft and formal Nature of it,
nothing but the Phantafm or Image made in the
Brain by the Preffure communicated from the
Object, is, in other Words, defining Bluenefis to
be the Image of a Square, or Sound the Picture of
a Triangle, or Pain the Similitude of a Sharp-pointed
Needle. I do not here mifreprefent him in the leaft.
For He himfelf exprefly confeffes,
t Qua mnlitates wnnes nq- j h u 5 ^ Qualities, fiuch as
mman folentfenfibiles, &funt . T •'¦¦ *>~ ri
in jpfo Obje&o nihil aliud LolOUX,
pncter materia motnm, quo Obje&um in Organa Senfuum diverfimode
opcir.tur. Neq; in Nobis aliud funt, quam diverfl motus. Motus enim nihil
S;snerat p raster motum. Leviathan, cap. \.

Being and- Attributes of 'God. 87
Colour, Sound, and the like, are in the Qbjecls them
felves nothing but Motion ; And, becaufe Motion can
produce * nothing but Motion, (as'likewife 'tis evident * See Foul-
that Figure and all its poffible Compofitions c™ Dfft"'rfn
produce nothing but Figure) ; therefore in Us alfo^/Do£
the Perceptions of thefe fienfible Qualities are nothing wcn.
but different Motions. If then the Phantafm, that
is, the Image of the Object made in the Brain by
Figure and Motion, be (as he fays) the Senfation
itfelf, Is not Senfation bare Figure and Motion ?
And are not all the forementioned Abfurdities un
avoidable Confequences of his Opinion ?
Mr. Hobbs (as I have elfewhere obferved) feems
indeed not to have been altogether unaware of this
infuperable Difficulty ; but he induftrioufly endea
vours to conceal it from his Readers, and to impofe
upon them by the Ambiguity of the Word Phantafim.
Yet, for a Referve, in Cafe he
fhould be too hard preffed, -f-
he gives us a Hint, that poffibly
Senfiation may be fiomething more,
viz. a Power of Perception or Con
fcioufnefs naturally and efifentially
inherent in all Matter, only that it
wants the Organs and Memory of
Animals to exprefs its Senfation :
And J that, as a Man, if he were
fiuppofied to have no other Senfie but
Seeing, and That fio ordered as that
his Eyes were always? immoveably
fixed upon one and the fiame ObjeCt,
and That1 alfo unchangeable and
without any the leaft Variety ; finch
a Man could not properly be fiaid to
See, but only to be under an unintel
ligible Kind ofi Amazement : So all
unorganized Bodies may poffibly have
Senfiation or Perception.; but becaufe
fffr Want- of Organs there is no
G 4 Variety

f Scio fuifle Philofophos
quofdam, eofdemq; wins dec-
lot, qui corpora omnia Senju
prtedtia effe fuftinuerunt : i\'rc
video, ft natura fenfionis in re-
aftione fola collocaretur, qu;-
modo refutari pofp.nt. Sed etfi
ex reaftione etiam corporum.
aliorum, phantafma aliquod
nafceretur ; illud tamen, re
moto objefto, ftatim cellaret.
Nam nifi ad retinendum Mo
tum impreflum, etiam remoto
Objedlo, apta habeant Orga-
na, ut habent Animalia ; ita
tantum fentient, ut nunquam
fenfifl'e fe recordentur.  ¦
Senfioni ergo, ,qu<e vulgo ita
appellator, neceffario adh<eret
memoria aliqua, &c. Hobbs
Phffic. Cap. 25. Sea. 5.
See alfo No. 2 & I 1 of the
Appendix to a Colleclion of
Papers which pajfed betnveen
Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke.
% Itaq; & Senfioni adhxret
proprie dicta? , ut ei riilqua in-
fit,

83 , A Demonftration of the
fita fit perpetife phantafma- Variety in it, neither any Memory
turn yarietas ; ita ut aliud ab of. M&&m of eiCpnjfmg that Senfiation,
*muf ^ ho^eV therefore to Us it fieems asij [they had
pculis quidem Claris, cajterifq; nofiuch Thing at all. This Opinion,
Vklendi Organis redte fe ha* J fay^ ]y[r# JJobfa mentions as pot
bentibus compofitum, nullo .fiW %ut fa does it wirf| fuch
autem alio fenfu praedimm, r, ,. ^.-rt-j jo
eumq; ad eandem rem eodem Hefitancy, Diffidence, and Spa^
femper colore & fpecie fine ringnefs, as fhews plainly that, he
ulla vel minima varietaie ap- meant it only as a laft Subterfuge
^rqTqbuiSm?lilmnon to recur to when he fhould be
Videre videretur.  Attoni- preffed with the fore- mentioned
turn effe, & fortaffe Afpec>re Abfurdities unavoidably confe-
eum, fed ftupentem dicerem, ^ Q ^ Suppofition of
videre nr3n dicerem. Adeo ~J r • i • t f" j
Sentire femper idem, & Non Senfation being only Figure and
Sentire, ad idem recidunt, Motion. And indeed well might
U- ihid. he be fparing, and, as it were,
afhamed of this Subterfuge. For it is a Thing
altogether as abfurd, as even the other Opinion
itfelf of Thought being mere Motion. For,
What can be more ridiculous, than to imagine that
Matter is as effentially Confcious as it is extended ?
Will it not follow from that Suppofition, that
every Piece of Matter, being made up of endlefly
fieparable Parts, (that is, of Parts which are as really
diftinct Beings, notwithftanding their Contiguity,
as if they had been at never fo great a Diftance
one from another) is made up alfo of innumerable
Confcioufneffes and Infinite Confufion ? But 'tis a
Shame to trouble the Reader with fo much as the
Mention of any of the Numberlefs Abfurdities fol
lowing from that Monftrous Suppofition. Others
therefore, who would make Thinking to be an
Affection of Matter, and yet are afhamed to ufe
Either of the forementioned Ways ; contend that
Cod, by his Almighty and Supreme Power, indues
¦ ertain Syftems of Matter with a Faculty of Think
ing, according to his own good Pleafure. But
this alfo amounts to Nothing. For (befides the
Abfurdity

Being and Attributes of God. 89
Abfurdity of fuppofing God to make an innumerable
Company of diftinct Beings, fuch as the Particles
of every Syftem of Matter neeeffarily are, to be at"
the fame Time One Individual Confcious Being :
Befides this, 1 fay) either our Idea of Matter is a
true and diftinct Idea, or it is not. If it be a true
and diftinct Idea ; that is, if our Idea (not of the
Subftance of Matter ; for of fimple Subftante we have
no Idea ; but if our Idea of the Properties which
effentially diftinguifih and denominate the Subftance)
be a right Idea, viz. that Matter is Nothing but a
Solid Subftance, capable only of Divifion, Figure,
and Motion, with all the poffible Effects of their ,
feveral Compofitions ; as to Us it appears to be,'
upon the Beft Examination we are able to make of
k ; and the greateft Part of our Adverfaries them
felves readily allow : Then 'tis abfolutely Impoffible
for Thinking to belong to Matter ; becaufe Think
ing, as has been before fhewn, cannot poffibly arife pages ;2,
from any Modification or Compofition of any or all of'86' &&7-
thefe Qualities. But if any Man will fay, that our
Idea of Matter is wrong ; and that by Matter he
will not here mean, as in all other Cafes, a Solid
Subftance, capable only of Divifion, Figure, and
Motion, with all the poffible Effects of their feve
ral Compofitions ; but that he means Subftance in
general, capable of Thinking and of numberlefs
unknown Properties befides : Then he trifles only,
in putting an ambiguous Signification upon the
Word Matter, where he ought to ufe the Word
Subftance, And, in That Senfie, to fuppofe Thinking
or any other Active Property poffible to be in
Matter, as fignifying only Subftance in general, of
whofe Powers and Capacities we have no certain
Idea ; would make nothing at all to the Prefent
Purpofe, in our Adverfaries Advantage-, and is
gt leaft Not a clearer and more Intelligible 'Way of
Talking,

§o A Demonftration of the
Talking, than to attribute the fame Properties to ah
Immaterial Subftance, and keep the Idea of Matter
and its Properties clear and diftinct. For I affirm,,
That, if sdly, That even fuppofing (in thefe Mens con-
Thj^ fured Way) that the Soul was really not a diftift<a
"hngZere Subftance from Body, but that Thinking and Wil-
Qualities ling could be and were-indeed only Qualities or
of Matter; Affections of Matter; yet even This would not at
y'hl7T a^ a^e(^ ^e Pre^cnt Queftion about Liberty, nor
berty might prove Freedom of Will to be an impoffible Thing,
be poffible. For, .fince it has been * already demonftrated, that
*pagesco, Thinking and Willing cannot poffibly be Effects
y'87 01 Compofitions of Figure and Motion ; Whofoever
will make Thinking and Willing to be Qualities or
Affections of Matter, muft fuppofe Matter capable;
of certain Properties intirely different from Figure
and Motion. And, if it be capable of Properties'
intirely different from Figure and Motion, then it
can never be proved from the Effects of Figure
ajid Motion being all Neceffary, that the Effects'
of other and totally, diftinct Properties muft like-*
wife- be Neceffary.
AJhamtful ^ Mr. Hobbs, therefore, and his "Followers, are
Kftfif^. guilty. of a. moft. fhameful Fallacy in that very
Mr.Hobbs °. J , • , , , . ' j 1 • j;
and his Argument, wherein they place their main and chief
Followers. Strength. For, fuppbfing. Matter to be capable of
Thinking and Willing, they contend that the Soul
is mere Matter \ and, knowing that the Effects of
Figure and. Motion muft needs be all Neceffary,
they conclude that the. Operations of the Mind
muft All therefore be Neceffary : That is, When
they Would prove the Soul to be mere Matter ; then
they Tuppofe Matter capable not only of Figure
and Motion, but alfo of other unknown Properties :
And when they would prove the Will, and all other
Operations of the Soul, to be Neceffary ; then they
ctiveft Matter again of all its unknown Properties, and

Being and Attributes of God. o.j;
and make it mere Solidity, indued only with Figure
and Motion again. Wherefore, diftjnguifhing their
ambiguous and confufed Ufe of the Word Matter ;
they are unavoidably reduced, to one of thefe Two
Conceffions : If by Matter they mean a Solid Sub
ftance indued only with Figure and Motion, and all
the poffible Effects of the Variations and Compo
fitions of thefe Qualities ; then the Soul cannot be
mere Matter ; becaufe (as Mn Hobbs himfelf * con- *Motusnl-
feffes) Figure and Motion can never produce any hil gene-
Thing but Figure and Motion; and confequently, r^t prater
(as hath been -f before demonftrated) they can never LeviaTli
produce fo much as any Secondary Quality, [Sound, cap. I.
Colour, and the like], much lefs Thinking and Rea- i pages 5?,
foning : From whence it follows, that, the Soul be- 86' ^ 87-
iflg unavoidably a Subftance Immaterial, they have
no Argument left to prove that it cannot have a
Power of Beginning Motion ; which is a plain Inftanc*
of 'Liberty. But if, on the other Hand, they will by
Matter mean Subftance in general, capable of unknown
Properties, totally different from Figure and Mo
tion -, then they muft no longer argue againft the
Poffibility of Liberty, from the Effects of Figure and
Motion being all unavoidably Neceffary ; becaufe
liberty will not confift in the Effects of Figure and
Motion, but in thofe Other Unknown Properties
of Matter, which thefe Men can no more explain
pr argue about, than about Immaterial Subftances.
The Truth therefore is ; They muft needs fuppofe
Thinking to be merely an Effect or Compofition of
Figure and Motion, if they will give any Strength
to their Arguments againft Liberty : And then the
Queftion will be, not Whether God can make Mat
ter think or no ? (for in That Queftion they only
trifle with a Word, abufing the Word Matter to
fignify Subftance in general) but the Queftion will be,
Whether Figure and Motion, in any Compofition or
Divifion, can poffibly Be Perception and Thought ?
Which

92 A Demonftration of the
Which (as has been before faid) is juft fuch a Quef
tion, as if a Man fhould afk, Whether it be poffible
that a Triangle fhould be a Sound, or a Globe a Colour?
The Sum is this : If the Soul be an Immaterial Sub
ftance, (as it muft needs be, if we have any true
Idea of the Nature and Properties of Matter) then
Mr. Hobbs's Arguments againft the Poffibility of
Liberty, drawn all' from the Properties of Matter,
are vain and nothing to the Purpofe. But if our
Adverfaries will be fo abfurd as to contend, that
the Soul is nothing but mere Matter ; Then either
by Matter they muft underftand Subftance in gene
ral, Subftance indued with unknown Powers, with
AClive as well as Paffive Properties ; which is con
founding and taking away our Idea of Matter, and
at the fame Time deftroying all their own Argu
ments againft Liberty, which they have founded
wholly on the known Properties of Matter : Or elfe
they muft fpeak out, (as they really mean) that
Thinking and Willing are nothing but Effects and
pages 50, Compofitions of Figure and Motion ; which I have
52, 86, already fhewn to be a Contradiction in Terms.
^ 87- There are fome other Arguments againft the
Poffibility of Liberty, which Men, by attempting
to anfwer, have made to appear confiderable ; when
in Reality they are altogether befide the Queftion.
As, for Inftance, thofe drawn from the Neceffity of
the Will's being determined by the laft Judgment ofi the
Underftanding; And from the Certainty ofi the Divine
Preficieuce.
Of the As to the former, viz. The Neceffity of the Will's
Will's being determined by the laft Judgment ofi the Underftand-
bemgNe- jng . -p]-,js js oniy a Neceffity upon Suppofition ;
urmined'' t^at is t0 fay, a Neceffity that a Man fhould Will
by the lafl a Thing when 'tis fiuppofied that he does Will it :
Judgment Juft as if one fhould affirm, that every Thing
"d'a* Ud"' w^cn Is> 's therefore Neceffary to Be, becaufe,
ing. a" when it Is, it cannot but Be. For the laft Judgment 4

Being and Attributes of Got). 93
of the Underftanding is nothing elfe but a Man's
final Determining (after more or lefs Confideration)
either to Chufe or not to Chufe a Thing ; that is,
'tis the very fame with the ACt ofi Volition. Or elfe,
if the ACt ofi Volition be diftinguifhed from the laft
Judgment of the Underftanding ; then the ACt of Vo
lition, or rather the Beginning of AClion, confequent
upon the laft Judgment ofi the Underftanding, is not
determined or caufied by that laft Judgment, as by
the Phyfical Efficient, but only as the Moral Motive.
For the true, proper,' immediate, Phyfical Efficient
Caufie of Action, is the Power ofi Self- Motion in Men,
which exerts itfelf freely in Confequence of the laft
Judgment ofi the Underftanding. But the laft Judg
ment ofi the Underftanding is not itfelf a Phyfical Ef
ficient, but merely a Moral Motive, upon which the
Phyfical Efficient, or Motive Power begins to Act.
The Neceffity therefore, by which the Power of
ACting follows the Judgment of the Underftanding,
is only a Moral Neceffity ; that is, no Neceffity at all
in the Senfe wherein the Oppofers of Liberty un
derftand Neceffity. For Moral Neceffity is evidently
confiftent with the moft perfect Natural Liberty.
For Inftance, A Man, intirely free from all Pain of
Body and Diforder of Mind, judges it unreafonable
for him to Hurt or Deftroy himfelf: And, being
under no Temptation or External Violence, he
cannot poffibly act contrary to this Judgment ; not
becaufe he wants a Natural or Phyfical Power fo
to do, but becaufe 'tis abfurd and mifchievous,
and morally impoffible, for him to Chufe to do it.
Which alfo is the very faro»e Reafon why the moft
perfect rational Creatures, fuperior to Men, cannot
do Evil : Not becaufe they want a Natural Power
to perform the Material Action ; but becaufe tis
morally impoffible, that, with a perfect Knowledge of
what is Beft, and without any Temptation to Evil, their

94. A Demonftration of the
their Will fhould determine itfelf to Chufe to Act
Foolifhly and Unreafonably. Here therefore feems
at laft really to lie the Fundamental Error, both
of thofe who argue againft the Liberty of the Will,
and of thofe who but too confufedly defend it:
They do not make a clear Diftinction between
Moral Motives and Caufes Phyfically Efficient ; Which
Two Things have no Similitude at all. Laftly,
If the Maintainers of Fate fhall alledge, that, after
all, they think a Man, free from all Pain of Body
and Diforder of Mind, is under not only a MoraV-
but alfo a Natural Impoffibility of hurting or de
ftroying himfelf; becaufe neither his Judgment nor
his Will, without fome Impulfe External to both,
can any more poffibly be determined to any Action,
than one Body can begin to move without being
impelled by another : I anfwer, This is forfaking
the Argument drawn from the Neceffity of the
Will's following the Underftanding, and recurs to
the former Argument of the Abfolute Impoffibility
of there being any-where a firft Principle of Mo- '
tion at all : Which has been abundantly anfwered
P«ge77. a!ready- .
The Cer- The Other Argument, which I faid has alfo
tainty of frequently been urged againft the Poffibility of
Divine Liberty, is the Certainty of the Divine Prefcience.
Knew- ^Ut tais a^° *s intirety befide the Queftion.
ledge not For if there be no Other Arguments, by which
inconfiftent it can be proved antecedently, that all Actions
imtb the are pfecejfary . \[& certain it can never be made
Mens Mi- t0 aPPear to follow from Prefcience alone that they
vr.s. muft be fo. That is, .If upon Other Accounts there
be no Impoffibility but that the Actions of Men
may be free ; the bare Certainty of the Divine Fore- ,
Knowledge can never be proved to deftroy That
Freedom, or make Any Alteration in the Nature
of Mens Actions : And confequently the Certainty of

Being and Attributes of God. rvr
of Prefcience, feparated from Other Arguments, is
altogether befide the Queftion concerning Liberty.
As to the Other Arguments, ufually intermingled
with this Queftion ; they have all, I think, been
anfwered already. And now, that the bare Cer
tainty of the Divine Fore-Knowledge (if upon Other
Accounts there be no Impoffibility for the Actions
of Men to be free) can never be proved to deftroy
that Freedom, is very Evident. For bare Fore-
Knowledge has no Influence at all in any Refpecf, nor
affects, in any Meafure, the Manner of the Exift
ence of any Thing. All that the greateft Oppofers
of Liberty have ever urged, or can urge, upon this
Head, amounts only to This •, that Fore-Knowledge
implies Certainty, and Certainty implies Neceffity.
But neither is it true that Certainty implies Neceffity ;
neither does Fore-Knowledge imply any other Cer
tainty, than fuch a Certainty only as would be
equally in Things, though there was no Fort> -
Knowledge. . For (ift.) The Certainty of Fore-Knowledge does
not caufe the Certainty of Things, but is itfelf
founded on the Reality of their Exiftence, What
ever now Is, 'tis certain that it Is ; and it was Yef-
terday and from Eternity as certainly true, that
the Thing would be To-day, as 'tis now certain that
it Is. And This Certainty of Event is equally the
fame whether it be fuppofed that the Thing could
be Fore-known or not. For whatever at any
Time Is, 'twas certainly true from Eternity, as to
the Event, that That Thing would be : And this
certain Truth of every future Event would not at
all have been the lefs, though there had been no
fuch Thing as Fore-Knowledge. Bare Prefcience
therefore, has no Influence at all upon any Thiug ;
nor contributes in the leaft towards the making
it Neceffary. We may illuftrate this in fome Mea
fure by the Comparifon of our own Knowledge.
We

o6 A Demonftration of the
We know certainly that fome Things Are ; and*
when we know that they are, they cannot but Be :
Yet 'tis manifeft our Knowledge does not at all
affect the Things to make them more Neceffary
or more Certain. Now Fore- Knowledge in God
is the very fame as Knowledge. All Things are
to him as if they were equally prefent to all the
Purpofes of Knowledge and Power. He knows
perfectly every Thing that Is : And he Fore-knows
whatever fhall be, in the fame Manner as he knows
what Is. As therefore Knowledge has no Influence
on Things that are ; fo neither has Fore-Knowledge
on Things that fhall be. 'Tis true ; The Manner
how God can forefee Future Things, / without a
Chain of Neceffary Caufes ; is impoffible for us to
, explain difiinClly. ThoJ fome Sort of general Notion
we may conceive of it. For as a Man, who has no
Influence over another Perfon's Actions, can yet
often perceive before-hand what That Other will
do ; and a Wifier and more experienced Man wiil
ftill with greater Probability forefee what Another,
whofe Difpofition he is perfectly acquainted with,
will in certain Circumftances do ; And an Angel,
with ftill much Lefis Degrees ofi Error, may have a
further Profpect into Mens future Actions : So 'tis
very reafonable to apprehend, that God, without
influencing Mens Wills by his Power, yet by his
Forefight cannot but have as much Certainer a
Knowledge of future free Events, than either Men
or Angels can poffibly have ; as the Perfection of
His Nature is greater than that of Theirs. The
Difiind Manner how he forefees thefe Things is
indeed impoffible for Us to explain. But fo alfo are
Numberlefs other Things which yet no Man doubts
the Truth of. And, if «>here were any Strength
in This Argument ; it would prove, not againft
Liberty, but againft Prefcience itfelf. For if thefe
Two

Being and Attributes of God* r.
Two Things were really inconfiftent, and one of
them muft be deftroyed ; the introducing an ab
folute and univerfal Fatality, which evidently de-
ftroys all Religion and Morality, would tend more
of the Two to the Difhonour of God, than the
denying him a Fore-Knowledge, which upon this
Suppofition would be impoffible and imply a Con
tradiction to conceive him to have ; and the deny
ing of which, would in fuch Cafe be no more a
Diminution of his Omnificience, than theNdenying
him the Power of working Contradictions, is
taking away his Omnipotence. But th; Cafe is not
thus. For though we cannot indeed clearly and
diftinctly explain the Manner of God's forefeeing
the Actions of Free- Agents ; jet thus much we
know, that the bare Fore-Knowledge of any
Action, tb.at would upon all other Accounts be
piee, cannot alter or diminifh That Freedom; it
being evident that Fore-Knowledge adds no other
Certainty to any Thing, than what it would equally
have though there was no Fore-Knowledge. Unlefs
therefore we be antecedently certain that nothing
can poffibly be Free ; and that Liberty is in itfelf
abfolutely an Inconfiftent and Contradictory No
tion ; (as I have above fhewn that it is not) bare /«£* 67;
Fore-Knowledge, which makes no Alteration at
all in any Thing, will not be any Way Inconfiftent
with Liberty ; how great Difficulty foever there
may be in , comprehending the Manner of fuch
Fore-Knowledge. For if Liberty be in itfelf pof
fible ; The bare F'orefight of a Free Action, before
it be done, is nothing different (to any Purpofe in
the prefent Queftion) from a fimple Knowledge of ,
it when it is done : Both thefe Kinds of Knowledge
implying plainly a Certainty tnly of the Event,
(which would be the feme though there was no
fuch Knowledge) and not at all any Neceffity of
the Thing.
H tor

98 A Demonftration of the
For {idly,) As Fore-Knowledge implies not any
other Certainty than fuch as would be equally in
Things though there was no Fore-Knowledge : ' So
neither does this Certainty of Event in' any Sort
imply Neceffity. For let a Fatalift fuppofe (what
he does not yet grant) that there was in Man
(as we affert) a Power of beginning Motion, that
is, of acting freely ; and let him fuppofe further,
if he pleafe, that thofe Actions could' not pofi-
fibly be Fore-known : Will there not yet, ndt-
withftanding this Suppofition, be in the Nature
of Things the fame Certainty of Event in every
one of the Man's Actions as if they were never
fo Fatal and Neceffary ? For Inftance ; Suppofe
the ^Man, by an internal Principle of Motion-,
and an abfolute Freedorn of Will, without any
External Caufe or Impulfe at all, does fome par
ticular Action To-day ; and fuppofe it was not
poffible that this Action fhould have been fore-
feen Tefterday ; was there not neverthelefs the fame
Certainty of Event as if it had been fore-feen ?
That is, Would it not, notwithftanding the fiup
pofied Freedom, have been as certain a Truth Yef-
terday and from Eternity that this Action was
in Event to be performed To-day, (though fuppofed
never fo impoffible to have been Pore-known)
as 'tis now a Certain and Infallible Truth that it
Is performed ? Mere Certainty of Event therefore
does not in any Meafure imply Neceffity. And
confequently Fore-Knowledge, however difficult to
be explained, as to the Manner of it, yet (fince
'tis evident it implies no other Certainty but Only
That Certainty of Event which the Thing would
equally have without being Fore-known) 'tis eViV
dent that It alfo implies no Neceffity.

And

Being and Attributes of G o D. 99
And now, having, as I hope, fufficiently pro- Of the
Ved both the Poffibility and the real Exiftence ofOriginal
Liberty ; I fhall, from what has been faid on th\s0fEwi'
Head, draw only this one Inference, that hereby
we are enabled to anfwer that Ancient and Great
Queftion, [IIo'Sev to KOHovf] What is the Caufe and
Original of Evil ? For Liberty implying a Natural
Power of doing Evil as well as Good ; and the
imperfect Nature of Finite Beings making it pof
fible for them to abufe This their Liberty to an
actual Com million of Evil ; and it being Necef
fary to the Order and Beauty of the Whole,, and
for difplaying the Infinite Wifdom of the Creator,
that there fhould be different and various Degrees
of Creatures, whereof confequently fome muft be
left Perfect than others -, Hence there neeeffarily
arifes a Poffibility of Evil, notwithftanding that
the Creator is infinitely Good. In fhort, thus,'
All that we call Evil is either an Evil of Imper
fection, as the Want ofi certain Faculties and Excel
lencies which other Creatures have ; or Natural Evil±
as Pain, Death, and the like ; or Moral Evil, as
all Kinds of Vice. The Firft of thefe is not pro
perly an Evil. For every Power, Faculty, or Per
fection, which any Creature enjoys, being the Free
Gift of God, which he was no more obliged to'
beftow than he was to confer Being or Exiftence
itfelf; 'tis plain the Want of any certain Faculty
Or Perfection, in any Kind of Creatures, which.
never belonged to their Nature, is no more an
Evil to Them, than their never having been Cre
ated or 'brought into Being at all could properly
have been called an Evil. The Second Kind of
Evil, which we call Natural Evil± is either a Ne
ceffary Confequence of the Former ; as Death to a
Creature on whofe Nature Immortality was never
Conferred 5 and then 'tis no more properly an Evil
H 2 than

loo A Demonftration of the
than the Former : Or elfe 'tis counterpoifed in
the Whole with as great or greater Good, as the
Afflictions and Sufferings of Good Men; and then •
alfo it is not properly an Evil: Or elfe laftly,
'tis a Punifihment ; and then 'tis a Neceffary Con
fequence of the Third and laft Sort of Evil, viz.
Moral Evil. And This arifes wholly from fiae
Abufe of Liberty, which God gave to his Crea
tures for other Purpofes, and which 'twas reafo-
nable and fit to give them for the Perfection and
Order of the whole Creation : Only They, con
trary to God's Intention and Command, have abu-
fed what was Neceffary for the Perfection of the
Whole, to the Corruption and Depravation of
themfelves. And thus all Sorts of Evils have
entered into the World, without any Diminution
to the Infinite Goodnefs of the Creator and Go
vernor thereof.
That the -^I- ^-be Supreme Caufie and Author of all Things
Supreme muft ofi Neceffity be Infinitely Wife. This Propofi-
Cauje and tion is evidently Confequent upon thofe that have
itlThifas already been proved : And thofe being eftablifhed*
muftofNe-Tn'is, as admitting no further Difpute, needs not
ctjfttfbe to be largely infifted upon. For nothing is more -
I>fn,tely evjdent, than that an Infinite, 'Omniprcfient, Intelli
gent Being muft know perfectly all Things that are;
And that He who alone is Self-Exiftent and Eternal,
the fiole Caufie and Author ofi all Things, firom whom
alone all the Powers ofi all Things are derived, and
on whom they continually depend ; muft alfo know
perfectly all the Confequences of thole Powers,
that is, all Pcffibilities of Things to come, and what
in every Refpect is Beft and Wife ft to be done':
And that, having Infinite Power, he can never be
controuled or prevented from doing what he fo
knows to be Fitteft. From all which it manifeftly follows,

Being and Attributes of God: i o i
follows, that every Effed of the Supreme Caufe
muft be the Product of Infinite Wifdom. More
particularly : The Supreme Being, becaufe he is
Infinite, muft be. every-where prefent : And, be
caufe he is an Infinite Mind or Intelligence, there
fore wherever he Is his Knowledge Is, which is
infeparabie from his Being, and muft therefore
be Infinite likewife : And wherever his Infinite
Knowledge is, it muft neeeffarily have a full and
perfect Profpect of ail Things, and nothing can be
concealed from its Inflection : He includes and
furrounds every Thing with his boundlefs Pre-
fence ; and penetrates every Part of their Sub
ftance with his All-feeing Eye : So that the inmoft
Nature and Effence of all Things are Perfectly
Naked and Open to his View ; and even the
deepeft Thoughts of Intelligent Beings themfelves
manifeft in his Sight. Further, All Things being
not only prefent to him, but alfo intirely Depend
ing upon him, and having received both their Be
ing itfelf, and all their Powers and Faulties from
Him ; tis manifeft that, as he knows all Things
that are, fo he muft likewife know all Poffibilities
of Things, that is, all Effects that Can be. For,
being himfelf Alone Self-Exiftent, and having
Alone given to all Things all the Powers and Fa
culties they are indued with ; 'tis evident He muft
of Neceffity know perfectly what All and Each
of thofe Powers and Faculties, which are derived
wholly from himfelf, can poffibly Produce : And
feeing at one boundlefs View all the poffible Com
pofitions and Divifions, Variations and Changes,
Circumftances and Dependencies of Things ; all
their poffible Relations one to another, and their
Difpofitions or Fitneffes to certain and refpective
Ends-, he muft, without Poffibility of Error, know
¦ exactly what is Beft and Propercft in every one of
H % the

102 A Demdnftration of the
the Infinite Poffible Cafes or Methods of Difpofing
Things ; and underftand perfectly how to order
and direct the respective Means to bring about
what he fo knows to be, in its Kind, or in the
Whole, the Beft and Fitteft in the End. This- is
what we mean by Infinite Wifidom. And having be-
t*gc 6cs. fore fhewn (which indeed is alfo evident of itfelf)
that the Supreme Caufe is moreover All- Powerful ;
fo that He can no more be prevented by Force or
Oppofition, than he can be hindered by Error or
Miftake, from Effecting always what is abfolutely
Fitteft and Wifeft to be done ; It follows undeni
ably that he is actually and effectually, in the higheft
and moft complete Senfe, Infinitely Wife -, and that
the World, and all Things therein, muft be and
are Effects of Infinite Wifdom. This is Demon
ftration a priori. The Proof a pofteriqri of the
Infinite Wifdom of God, from the Confederation,
pf the Exquifite Perfection and Confummate Ex
cellency of his Works, is no lefs ftrong and unT
deniable. But I fhall not inlarge upon This Argu
ment, becaufe it has often already been accurately
and ftrongly urged, to the everlafting Shame and
Confufion of Atheifts, by the ableftand learnedeft
* Writers both of Ancient and
* Srr Galen de Ufiu Par- Modern Times. I fhall here ob-
tium.TvWv de Natura Deorum, r l ..!• i~\ ti ¦ TU-..
t> 1 f «¦'• / r i- m ferve only this One Thine ; I hat
Boyle of Final Laujes, Mr. J 5 '
Ray of the Wifdom if God in the older the World grows, and the
//•.' Creation, Mr. Derham'j deeper Men inquire into Things,
Pb.fico-Theology, &c. and the more Accurate Obferva-
. _ . . ^ tions they make, and the more
+ Opmionum .Lommenta , > t-^-,- ¦ 1 f i
dekt dies, batL-fas judkia and greater tDifcovenes they find
eqnfirmat. Cueto. out-, the ftronger this Argument
continually grows : Which is a
certain Evidence of its being founded in Truth.
If Galen, fo many Ages fince, could find in the
Conftruction and Cqnftitution of the Parts of a
Human

Being and Attributes of G o D. 103
Human Body fuch undeniable Marks of Contri
vance and Defign as forced him Then to acknow
ledge and admire the Wifdom of its Author ;
What would he have faid if he had known the
Late Difcoveries in Anatomy and Phyfic, the Cir
culation of the Blood, the exact Structure of the
Heart and Brain, the Ufes of Numberlefs Glands
and Valves for the Secretion and Motion of the
Juices in the Body ; befides feveral Veins and other
Veffels and Receptacles not at all known, or fo
much as imagined to have any Exiftence, in His
Days ; but which Now are difcovered to ferve the
wifeft and moft exquifite Ends imaginable ? If
the Arguments againft the Belief of the Being of
an All-wife Creator and Governor of the World,
which Epicurus and his Follower Lucretius drew
from the Faults which they imagined they could
find in the Frame and Conftitution of the Earth,
were fo Poor and Inconfiderable, that, even in that
Infancy of Natural Philofophy, the Generality of
Men contemned and defpifed them as of no Force ;
How would they have been afhamed if they had
lived in Thefe Days -, when thofe very Things,
which they thought to be Faults and Blunders in
the Conftitution of Nature, are difcovered to be
very ufeful and of exceeding Benefit to the Prefer-
vation and Well-being of the Whole ? And, to
mention no more, If Tully, from the partial and
very Imperfect Knowledge in Aftronomy which His
Times afforded, could be fo confident of the Hea
venly Bodies being Difpofed and Moved by a Wife
and Underftanding Mind, as to declare, that, in
His Opinion, whoever afferted the * Cceleftem ergo admirabilem
contrary was himfelf * void of all ordinemincredibilemquecon-
Underftanding ; What would He ftantiam, ex qua confervatio
have faid if "he had known the & filus onmium omnis oritur,
_, , _.- . n 3 qui vacare mente putat; 13
Modern Difcoveries in Aftronomy ? ipfe mentig expers habcndB$
H 4 The eft. DiNatura'Deorum,Lib.3.*

104 A Demonftration of the
The Immenfie Greatnefis of the World, (I mean of
that Part of it which falls under our Obfervation)
which is now known to be as much greater than
what in His Time they imagined jt to be, as the
World itfelf,' according to their Syftem, was greater
than Archimedes's Sphere ? The Exquifite Regularity
of all the Planets Motions, without Epicycles,
Stations, Retrogradations, or any other Deviation
or Confufion whatfoever ? The inexpreffible Nicety
of the Adjuftment of the Primary Velocity and
Original Direction of the Annual Motion of the
Planets, with their Diftance from the Central Body,
and their Force of Gravitation towards it? The
wonderful Proportion of the Diurnal Motion of the
Earth and other Planets about their own Centers,
for the Diftinction of Light and Darknefs ; without
that rnonftrouffy difproportionate Whirling of the
whole Heavens, which the Ancient' Aftronomers
were forced to fuppofe ? The exaCi Accomodating of
the * Devfities of the Planets to
* Planetarum denfitates fere thdr Diftances from the Sun an(J
funt, ut radices diametrorjm r ' , , „ ' . r
apparentiumapplicatsaddia- confequently to the Proportion of
metros veras, hoc eft, reci- Heat which each of them is to
proce ut djftantis Planetarum bear reflectively ; fo that neither
a fole, dufts in radices dia- «.u„/u ...u: i „ n. ~ .u c
metrorum apparentium. Col- tnofe which are neareft to the Sun
locavit igitur Deus Planetas are dehroyed by the Heat ; nor
in diverfis diftantiis a Sole, thofe which are fartheft off by
MtquiUbet pro gradude, f talis, the £0]d but each Qn£ •
calore oolis ma/ore vel winore ,_, r . , J '
fruatur. Newton. Princip. a temperature fuited to its pro-
fiib,. 3. Prop. 8. per Ufes, as the Earth is to ours?-
The Admirable Order, Number, and
Ufiefukefis pf the feveral Moons, (as I may very pro
perly call them) never dreamed of by Antiquity,
but now by the Help of Telefcopes clearly and difi-
linfrly fieen to move- about their refpective Planets ;
and whofe Motions are fo exactly known, that their
very Eclipfes are as certainly calculated and foretold as

Being and Attributes of God. 105
as thofe of our own Moon ? The ftrange Adjuftment
pf our Moon's Motion about its ow'n Center once in
a Month, with its Motion about the Earth in the
fame Period of Time, to fuch a Degree of Exact-
nefs, that by that Means the fame Face is always
obverted to the Earth without any fenfible Vari
ation ? The wonderful Motions of the Comets,
which are Now known to be as exact, regular,
and periodical, as the Motions of other Planets ?
Laftly, the Prefervation of the fieveral Syftems, and
of the fieveral Planets and Comets in the fiame Syftem,
from falling upon each other ; which in infinite paft
Time (had there been no Intelligent Governor of the
Whole) could not but have been the Effect of the
fmalleft poffible Refijlance made by the fineft AEther,
and even by the Rays of Light themfelves to the
Motions (fuppofing it poffible there ever could have
been any Motions) of Thofe Bodies ? What, I fay,
would Tully, that great Matter of Reafon, have
thought and faid it thefe and other newly difco
vered Inftances of the inexpreffible Accuracy and
Wifdom of the Works of God had been found out
and known in His Time? Certainly A theifm, which
Then was altogether unable to withftand the Argu
ments drawn from This Topic ; muft now, upon
the additional 'Strength of thefe later Obferyations,
(which are every one an unanfwerable Proof of the
incomprehenfible Wifdom of the Creator) be utterly
afhamed to fbow its Head. We Now fee with how
great Reafon the Author of the Book of Ecclefiafti-
cus, after he had defcribed the Beauty of the Sun
and Stars, and all the then vifible Works of God
in Heaven and Earth, concluded, ch. xlui. v. 32,
(as We, after all the Difcoveries of later Ages, may
ho Doubt ftill truly fay). There are yet hid greater
Things than thefie, and we have fieen but a few of his
Works.
"' XH. Laftly,

1 06 A Demonflratton of the
TheSu- ' XII. Laftly, The Supreme Caufe and Author of dll
trfmiAu- Things muft of Neceffity be a Being of Infinite Goodnep% '
Things J'iftice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections.;
muft be fuch as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of the
Infinitely World. That there are Different Relations of Things
Gculfjvft, Qne towards another is as certain as that there are
Different Things in the World. That, from thefe Dif
ferent Relations of Different Things, there neeeffarily
arifes an Agreement or Difagreement of fome Things
to others, or a Fitnefis or Unfitnefs of the Application
of Different Things or Different Relations one to
another, is likewife as certain as that there is any
Difference in the Nature of Things, or that Diffe
rent Things do Exift. Further, that there is a
Fitnefis or Suitablenefs of certain Circumftances to cer
tain Perfons, and an Unfiuitablenefis of Others, founded
in the Nature of Things and in the Qualifications of
Perfians, antecedent to Will and to All Arbitrary or
Pofitive Appointment whatfoever, muft unavoidably
be acknowledged by every one who will not affirm
that 'tis equally Fit and Suitable, in the Nature and
Reafion ofi Things, that an Innocent Being fhould be
extremely and eternally Miferable, as that it fhould be
Free from fuch Mifery. There is therefore fuch a
Thing as Fitnefs and Unfitnefis, eternally, neeeffarily,
and unchangeably, in the Nature and Reafon of
Things. Now What thefe Relations of Things abfof
lutely and neeeffarily Are in Themfelves, "That alfo
they Appear to be, to the Underftanding of all In
telligent Beings, except Thofe only who underftand
Things to be what they are not, that is, whofe
Underftandings are either very imperfect or very
much depraved- And, by this Underftanding or
Knowledge of the Natural and Neceffary Relations
of Things, the Actions likewife of all Intelligent
Beings are conftantly directed, (which by the Way
is the true Ground and Foundation of all Morality) unleft

Being and Attributes of God. i 07
pnlefs their Will be corrupted by particular Intereft •
or Affection, or fwayed by fome unreafonable and
prevailing Luft. The Supreme Caufe, therefore,
and Author of all Things, fince (as has already pages io«
been proved) he muft of Neceffity have Infinite ^ 101*
Knowledge, and the Perfection of Wifidom ; fo that
tis abfolutely impoffible he fhould Err, or be in
any Refpect Ignorant of the True Relations and
Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of Things, or be by any Means
Deceived or impofed upon herein : And fince he is
likewife Self- Exiftent, abfolutely Independent, and All-
Powerful, fo that, having no Want of any Thing,
tis impoffible his Will fhould be influenced by any
wrong Affection; and, having no Dependence, 'tis
impoffible his Power fhould be limited by any Su
perior Strength : 'Tis evident He muft of Neceffity
(meaning not a Neceffity of Fate, but fuch a Moral
Neceffity as I before faid was confiftent with the pages 9$
rnoft perfect Liberty) Do always what he Knows to ^94-
be Fitteft to he done ; That is, He muft act always
according to the ftricteft Rules of Infinite Goodnefs,
Juftice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections.
In Particular, The Supreme Caufe muft in the firft
Place be infinitely Good ; that is, he muft have an
unalterable Difpofition to Do and to Communicate
Good or Happinefs : Becaufe, being himfelf neeef
farily Happy in the Eternal Enjoyment of his own
Infinite Perfections, he cannot poffibly have any
other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but
pnly that he may communicate to Them his Own
Perfections, according to their different Capacities,
arifing from that Variety of Natures, which it was
fit for Infinite Wifidom to produce ; andaccording to
their different Improvements, arifing from that Liberty
. which is effentially Neceffary to the Conftitution of
intelligent and Active Beings. That he muft be in-.
finitely Good appears likewife further from, hence, that.

1 o5 A Demonftration of the
that, being neeeffarily All- Sufficient, he muft con
fequently be .infinitely removed from all Malice
and Envy, and from all other poffible Caufes or
Temptations of doing Evil ; which, 'tis evident,;
can only be Effects of Want and Weaknefis, of Im
perfection or Depravation. Again, The Supreme
Caufe and Author of all Things muft in like Man
ner be infinicely Juft : Becaufe, the Rule ofi Equity
being nothing elfe but the Very Nature of .Things,
and their neceffary Relations one to Another; And
the Execution ofi Juftice being nothing elfe but a
fuiting the Circumftances ofi Things to the Qualifi
cations ofi Perfiqns, according to the Original Fit
nefis and Agreeablenefis, which I have before fhewn
to be Neeeffarily in Nature, antecedent to Will and
to all pofiitive Appointment ; 'Tis evident that He
who knows perfectly this Rule of Equity, and neeef
farily judges of Things as they are; who has complete
Power to Execute Juftice according to that Know
ledge, and No pnfifible Temptation to deviate in the
leaft therefrom ; who can neither be impofed upon
by any Deceit, nor fiwayed by any Byafis, nor awed
by any Power ; muft of Neceffity do always that
which is Right; without Iniquity, and without Par
tiality; without Prejudice, and without Refpect of
Perfons. Laftly, That the Supreme Caufe and
Author of all Things muft be True and Faithful
in all his Declarations and all his Promifes, is moft
evident. For the only Poffible Reafon of Faifi-
fying is either Rafihnefis or Forge tfiulnefis, Inconftancy
or Impotency, Fear ofi Evil, or Hope
* Ovk ;Vi» S m-.xa. <£> ©so; 0f Gain : From * all which an
i.^._ k^JS £(a t.Q.0, fnfiniteiy Wire All- Sufficient, and
utiyu." KolU'te avrk ^s,*- Good Being muft of Neceffity
ij\ai kte c?,?.as lixTuici, are be infinitely removed : And con-
^(p^l^-.af, tTE*da>o7«, fequently, as 'tis impoffible for
Swii" W PUo de Repub. ^xm t0 he deceived hmfielfi, fo nej-
l:b. 1. jul ' Fiism. ther is it poffible for him in any
v.ife-

Being and Attributes of God. 109
wife to deceive Others. In a Word : All Evil and
all Imperfections whatfoever arife plainly either
from fihortnefis ofi Underftanding, Defied ofi Pozver,
or Faultinefis of Will; And this laft evidently from
fome Impotency, Corruption, or Depravation ; being
nothing elfe but a direct Chufing to Act contrary
to the known Reafon and Nature of Things.
From all which, it being manifeft that the Su
preme Caufe and Author of all Things cannot but
be infinitely removed, it follows undeniably, that
he muft of Neceffity be a Being of Infinite Goodnefis,
Juftice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections.
To this Argumentation a priori there can be
oppofed but one Objection that I know of, drawn
on the contrary a pofteriori, from Experience and
Obfervation of the Unequal Diftributions of Pro
vidence in the World. But (befides the juft Vin
dication of the Wifdom and Goodnefs of Provi
dence in its Difpenfations, even with Refpect to
this Prefient World only, which Plutarch and other
Heathen Writers have'judicioufly made) the Ob
jection itfelf is intirely wide of the Queftion. For,
concerning the Juftice and Goodnefs of Godv (as of
any Governor whatfoever) no Judgment is to ba
made from a partial View of a few final I Portion
pf his Difpenfations, but from an i'ntire Conficiera-
tion of the Whole; And confequently not only the
fhort Duration of this prefenr State, but moreove1"
all that is paft, and that is ftill to come, muft be
taken into the Account : And Then every Thing
will clearly appear Juft and Right. ,
From this Account of the Moral Attributes of
God, it follows,
,ift, That though All the Actions of God are The Necef-
intirely Free, and confequently the Exercife of h\% fi'Jf0fGo'ri
Moral Attributes cannot be faid to be Neceffary, fff^ff
in the fame Senfe pf Neceffity as h's Exiftence and consent
Eternity are Neceffary ; yet thefe. Moral Attributes with per-
are feci Liberty

no A DentbnftraUbn of the
* "pages 93 are really and truly' Neceffary by fueh a Neceffity'
^ 94- as, though it be * not at all inconfiftent with Li-
' berty, yet is equally Certain, Infallible, and to be
depended upon, as even the Exiftence itfelf, of
the Eternity of God. For though nothing is more
page 58. Certain (as has been already proved in the Ninth
Propofition of this Difcourfe) than that God acts,-
not neeeffarily, but voluntarily, with particular In
tention and Defign, knowing that he does Goodj
and intending to do fo, freely and out of Choice*
and when he has no other Conftraint upon hint
but this, that his Goodnefs inclines his Will to
communicate himfelf, and to do Good ; fo that
the Divine Nature is under no Neceffity but fuch
as is confiftent with the moft perfect Liberty and
free'ft Choice : (Which is the Ground of all our
Prayers and Thankfgivings ; the Reafon why we
fray to him to be good to us and gracious, and thank
him for being juft and merciful ; whereas no Mail
frays to him to be Onmiprefient, or thanks him for
being Omnipotent, or for knowing all Things :)
Though nothing, I fay, is more certain than that
God acts, not neeeffarily, but voluntarily ; yet 'tis
neverthelefs as truly and abfiolutely impoffible for God
not to do (or to do any Thing contrary to) what
his Moral Attributes require him to do, as if he
was really, not a Free, but a Neceffary Agent:
And the Reafon hereof is plain : Becaufe infinite'
Knowledge, Power, and Goodnefs, in Conjunction,*
may, notwithftanding the moft perfect Freedom
and Choice, act with altogether as much Certainty
and Unalterable Steadinefis, as even the Neceffity of
Fate can be fuppofed to do. Nay, thefe Perfec
tions cannot poffibly but fo act, becaufe Free'
Choice, in a Being of Infinite Knowledge, Power,
and Goodnefs, can no more chufe to act contrary
to thefe Perfections, than Knowledge can be Ignorance^. P&9Hft

Being and Attributes of God. kit
Power be Weaknefis, or Goodnefis Malice: So that
Free Choice, in Such a Being, may be as Certain
and Steady a Principle of Action as the Neceffity
of Fate. We may therefore as certainly and in
fallibly rely upon the Moral, as upon the Natural
Attributes of God : It being as absolutely impof
fible for Him to act contrary to the One, as to
Diveft himfelf of the Other; And as much a Con
tradiction to fuppofe him Chufing to Do any Thing
inconfiftent with his Juftice, Goodnefs, and Truth,
as to fuppofe him divefted of Infinity, Power, or
Exiftence. The One is contrary to the Immediate
and Abfolute Neceffity ofi his Nature ; The Other to
the Unalterable Rectitude ofi his Will. The One is
in itfelf an Immediate Contradiction in the Terms i;
The Other is an exprefis Contradiction to the Neceffary
Perfections of the Divine Nature. To fuppofe the
JOne is faying abfolutely that Something is at the
fame Time that it is not : To fuppofe the Other is
to fay that Infinite Knowledge can Act Ignorantly,
Infinite Power Weakly, or that Infinite Wifdom and
Goodnefs can do Things Not Good or Wife to be done.
All which are equally great and equally manifieft
Abfurdities. This, I conceive, is a very Intel
ligible Account of the Moral Attributes of God ;
fatisfactory to the Mind, and without Perplexity
and Confufion of Ideas. I might have faid it at
once, (as the Truth moft certainly is) that Juftice,
Goodnefs, and all the other Moral Attributes of
God, are as Effential to the Divine Nature, as the
Natural Attributes of Eternity, Infinity, and the
like. But becaufe all Atheiftical Perfons, after
they are fully convinced that there muft needs be
in the Univerfe fome one Eternal, Neceffary, In
finite, and All-powerful Being, will ftill with un
reafonable Obftinacy contend, that they can by no
Means fee any neceffary Connexion of Goodnefis, Juftice,

H2 A Demonftration of the"
Juftice, or any other Moral Attribute, with theflf
Natural Perfections : Therefore I chofe to endea
vour to demonftrate the Moral Attributes, by a
particular Deduction, in the Manner I have now
done.
GftheNe- 2dly, From hence it follows, that, though God
Qjff- 's a moft perfectly free Agent, yet he cannot but
always do always what is Beft and Wifeft in the Whole.-
•what is The Reafon is evident : Becaufe Perfect Wifdom
Beft and ^nd Goodnefs are as Steady and Certain Principles;
theWhote °^ Action as Neceffity itfelf. And an Infinitely
Wife and Good Being, indued with the moft per
fect Liberty, can no more chufe to act in Contra
diction to Wifdom and Goodnefs, than a Necef
fary Agent can act contrary to the Neceffity by
which it is acted : It being as great an Abfurdity,
and Impoffibility in Choice, for Infinite Wifdom to. •
chufe to act Unwifely, or Infinite Goodnefs to
chufe what is not Good, as it would be in Nature
for abfolute Neceffity to fail of producing its necef
fary Effect. There was indeed no Neceffity in Na
ture that God fhould at firft create fuch Beings as,
he has created, or indeed any Beings at all ; be
caufe He is in Himfelf Infinitely Flappy and All-
fufficient. There was alfo no Neceffity- in -Nature.'
y that he fhould preferve and continue Things in
Being after they were created ; becaufe he would
be as Self-fufficient without their Continuance as
he was before their Creation. But it was Fit, and
Wife, and Good, that Infinite Wifdom fhould ma
nifeft, and Infinite Goodnefs communicate itfelf.-
And therefore it was Neceffary (in the Senfe of Ne-.
ceflity I am now fpeaking of) that Things fhould be
made at fuch Time, and continued fo long, arid-
indued with various Perfections, in fuch Degrees-.
as Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs faw it Wifeft and.
Beft that they fhould. And when and whilft Things. are

iBeing and Attributes of Gobi ii%
are in Being, the fame Moral Perfections make it
Neceffary that they fhould be difpofed and go
verned according to the exacteft and moft un
changeable Laws of Eternal Juftice, Goodnefs,
and Truth ; Becaufe, while Things and thz'xr fieve
ral Relations ate, they cannot but be what they are ;
and an Infinitely Wife Being cannot but know therri
to be what they are, and judge always rightly con
cerning the feveral Fitneffes or Unfitneffes of them j
and an Infinitely Good Being cannot but chufe to
uCl always according to this Knowledge of the rer
fpective Fitnefs of Things : It being as truly im
poffible , for fuch a Free AgeHt, who is abfolutely
incapable of being Deceived or Depraved, to chufe,
by acting- contrary to thefe Laws, to deftroy its
Own Perfections, as for Neceffary Exiftence to be able'
to deftroy its own Being.
^dly, From hence it follows, that though God bftbeftt*
is both Perfectly Free-, and alfo Infinitely Powerful, poffibility
yet he cannot Poffibly do any Thing that is Evil. %^"'ni
The Reafon of this alfo is Evident : Becaufe, as 'tis
manifeft Infinite Power cannot extend to Natural
Contradictions, which imply a Deftruction of that
very Power by which they muft be fuppofed to be
effected ; fo "neither can it extend to Moral Contra
dictions^' which imply a Deftruction of fome other
Attributes, as neeeffarily belonging to the Divine
Nature as Power. I have already fhewn that Juf
tice, Goodnefs, and Truth, are neeeffarily in God,
even as neeeffarily as Power, and Underftanding,
and Knowledge of the Nature of Things. 'Tis
therefore as Impoffible and Contradictory to fup
pofe his Will fhould chufie to do any Thing contrary
to Juftice^ Goodnefs, or Truth, as that his Power
fhould be able to do any thing inconfiftent with
Power. 'Tis no Diminution of Power not to be
able to do Things which are no Object, of Powers
And

H4" A Demonftration' of the „
And 'tis in like Manner no Diminution either- of
Power or Liberty to have fuch a Perfect and Un
alterable Rectitude of Will, as never Poffibly to
chufe to do any Thing inconfiftent with that
Rectitude.
That Li- i^thly, From hence it follows, that Liberty, pro-
hertyis not perjy fpeaking, is not in itfelf an Imperfection, but
in nfelf an perfe(aion> por k is in tne higheft and com-
on,, but a pleteft Degree in God htmficlfi; Every Aft wherein-
Perfeaion. He exerciles any Moral Attribute, as Goodnefs,
Juftice, -or Truth, proceeding from the moft Per
fect Liberty and Free'ft 'Choice ; without which,.
Goddnefs would not be Goodnefs, nor Juftice and
Truth any Excellencies -,- thefe Things, in the very
Idea and formal Notion of them, utterly excluding
all Neceffity. It h«s indeed been fometimes taught
that Liberty is a grer.t hnpifcCiicn, becaufe it is ,
the Occafion of all Sin and Miiery. But, if we will
fpeak properly, 'tis not Liberty that expofes us to-
Mifery, but only the Abufe of Liberty. 'Tis true,.
Liberty makes Men capable of Sin, and confe
quently liable to. Mifery ; neither of which they.
could poffibly be without Liberty. But he that
will fay every Thing is an Imperfection, by the
Abufe whereof a Creature may become more un
happy than if God had never given it that Power-
at all, muft fay that a Stone is a more Excellent
and Perfect Creature than Man, becaufe it is not,
capable of making itfelf miferabie, as Man is.
And, by the fame Argument, Reafon and Know
ledge, and every other Perfection, nay, even Ex
igence itfelf, will be proved to be an Imperfection;
becaufe 'tis That without which a Creature could
not be miferabie. The Truth therefore is, The
Abufe of Liberty, that is, the Corruption and De
pravation of That without which no Creatures
could be happy, is the alone Caufe of their Mifery r
But, as for Liberty itfelf, it is a great Perfection :
And

Being and Attributes of Go D.~ ' 1 1 i
And the more Perfect any Creature is, the more
Perfect is its Liberty : And the perfecteft Liberty
of all is fuch Liberty as can never, by any Igno
rance, Deceit, or Corruption, be biaffed or divei ted
from Chufing, what is the Proper Object of Free
Choice, the greateft Good;
Sthly, From hence it follows, that, though pro- That tbt
bably no RationalCreature can be, in a ftriet Phi- higheji
¦ lofophical Senfe, Impeccable, yet we may eafily con- Jf0fflPerf
ceive how God can place fuch Creatures, as he Rafinal
judges worthy of fo excellent a Gift, in fuch a Creatures
State of Knowledge and near Communion with do not
himfelf, where Goodnefs and Holinefs fhall appear effJJai
fo amiable, and where they fhall be exempt from Liberty.
'all Means of Temptation and Corruption, that it
fliall never be poffible for them, notwithftanding
the Natural Liberty of their Will, to be feduced
from their unchangeable Happinefs in the Ever
lafting Choice and Enjoyment of their greateft
Good. Which is the State of Good Angels, and
of the Saints in Fleaven.
Lafily, From what has been faid upon this Head, that tk
-it follows, that the true Ground and Foundation G>oundsof
of all Eternal Moral Obligations is This, that the Qbf^[
fame Reafons, (viz. the forementioned'* Neceffary ons are
and Eternal different Relations which different Things Eternal
bear to. one another, and the confequent Fitnefs or}"f*ecffi
Unfit nefis of the Application of different Things, or fffJ"fot
different Relations, one to another, unavoidably ari- on any
fing from that Difference of the Things themfelves) ^a--ws.
thefe very fame Reafons, I fay, which always and ?a£el°6*
neeeffarily do determine the Will of -God, as hath
been before fhewn, ought alfo conftantly to deter
mine the Will of all. Subordinate Intelligent Beings.
And, when they do not, then fuch Beings, letting
tip their own unreafonable Self- Will in Oppofition
to the Nature and Reafon of Things, endeavour
(as much as in them lies; to make Things be -what
h > they

ji6 A Demonftration of the -
they arc nor and cannot be : Which is the higher
Prelum ption and greateft Infolence imaginable: 'Tis
acting contrary to their own Reafon and Knowledge:
'Tis an attempting to deftroy that Order by which
the Univerfe fubfifts : And 'tis alfo, by Confequence,
offering the higheft Affront imaginable to the Cre
ator of all Things, who himfelf governs all his
Actions by thefe Rules, and cannot but require the
feme of all his reafonable Creatures. They who
found aU Moral Obligations ultimately in the Will
ef God muft recur at Length to the fame Thing.;
only with this Difference, that they do not clearly
explain how the Nature and Will of God himfielf muft
be neeeffarily Good and Juft, as 1 have. endeavoured
to do. They who fuu;id ail Moral. Obligations
only upon fairs imde for rhe Good of Societies,
hold an Opinion which (befides that 'tis fully con
futed by what has been? already faid concerning the
Eternal and. Neceffary Difference of Things) is
moreover fo directly and manifeftly contradictory
and inconfiftent with itfelf,. that it teems ftrange it
fhould not have been more commonly taken Notice
of. For, if there be no Difference between Good
and Evil, antecedent to all Laws,,, there can be na
Reafon given why any Laws fhould be made at all,
when all Things are naturally, indifferent.. To fay
that Laws are neceffary to be made for the Good of
Mankind, is confeffing that certain Things tend to
the Good of Mankind •, that is, to the preferving
and perfecting of their Nature ; which Wife Merv
therefore think neceffary to be eltablifhed by Laws.
And if the Reafon why certain Things are eftablifhed
by wife and good Laws, is becaufe thofe Things tend
to. the Good of Mankind, 'tis manifeft they were
good,, antecedent to their being confirmed by Laws.
Otherwife, if they were not good, antecedent to all
Laws, 'tis evident there could be no Reafon why,
fuch Laws fhould be made rather than the contrary..
Which is the greateft Abfurdity in the World.
AND-

Being and Attributes of God. 117
AND npw, from what has been faid upon this 77* Con-
Argument, I hope 'tis in the Whole fuffici-/^"-
cntiy clear that the Being and Attributes of God
are, to attentive and confidering Minds, abundantly
capable of juft Proof and Demonftration -, and that
the Adverfaries of God and Religion have not Rea
fion on their Side, (to which they would pretend to
be ftrict Adherers) but merely vain Confidence, and
-great Blindnefs and Prejudice, when they defire it
fhould be thought, that, in the Fabric of the World,
God has left himfelf wholly without Witnefs, and
that all the Arguments of Nature are on the Side
of Atheifm and Irreligion. Some Men, I know,
there are, who, having never turned their Thoughts
to Matters of this Nature, think that thefe Things
are all abfolutely above our Comprehenfion ; and
that we talk about we know not what when we dif-
pute about thefe Queftions. But, fince the moft
confiderable Atheifts, that ever appeared in the
World, and the Pleaders for Univerfal Fatality,
have Ail thought fit to argue in this Way, in their
Attempts to remove the Firft Foundations of Re
ligion, 'tis Reafonable and Neceffary that they
fhould be oppofed in their own Way ; It be:ng
moft certain that no Aigumention, of what Kind '
foever, can poffibly be made Ufe of on rhe Side of
Error, but may alio be ufed wich much greater
Advantage on the Behalf of Truth.
2. From what has been faid upon this Argument,
we may fee how it comes to pals, that, though
nothing is fo certain and undeniable as the Need-
fary Exiftence or God, and rhe confequent Deduc
tion of all his Attributes, yet Men, who have never
attended to the Evidence of Reafon, and the Notices
that God hath given us of Himfelf, may eafily be in
a great Meafure ignorant of Both. That the three
Angles of a Tnaag.-e are l^quai to Two righr Ones
I x is

1 1-8 A Demonftration of the
is fo certain and evident, . that whoever affirms the
contrary, affirms what may very eafily be reduced
to an .exprefs Contradiftion : Yet whoever turns
not his Mind to confider it at all, may eafily he
ignorant of This and numberlefs other the like
Mathematical and moft infallible Truths.
3. Yet the Notices that God has been pleafed to
give us of, himfelf are fo many and fo obvious,
in the Conftitution, Order, Beauty, and Harmony,
of the feveral Parts of the' World ; in the Frame
and Structure of our own Bodies, and the wonder?
ful Powers and Faculties of our Soujs y in the un
avoidable Apprehenfions of our own Minds, and
the common Confent of all other Men ; in every
Thing within us, and every TTfihg without us ;
that no Man, of the meaneft Capacity and, greateft
Diladvantages whatfoever, with the flighteft and
rnoft fuperncial Obfervation of the Works of God,
and the loweft and moft obvious Attendance to the
Reafon of Things, can be ignorant of Him ; but
he muft be utterly Without Excufe, Poffibly he
may not indeed be able to underftand, or be af
fected by, nice and Metaphyfical Demonftrations
pf the Being and Attributes of God : But then,
for the fame Reafon, he is obliged alfo not to fuf-
fer himfelf to be fhaken and unfettled by the fubtle
Sophiftries df Sceptical and Atheiftical Men ; which
he cannot perhaps anfwer, becaufe he cannot under
ftand. Bqt he is bound to adhere to thofe Things,
which he. knows, and thofe Reafonings he is ca
pable to judge of; which are abundantly fufficient
to determine and to guide the Practice of fober
and confidering Men.
4 But this is not all. God has moreover finally,
by ' a clear and exprefs Revelation of Himfelf,
brnuoh: down from Fleaven by his own Son, our
Bailed Lord and Redeemer, and fuited to every
(V,.w:uv and Underftaridipg, ,put to Silence ?he

Being and Attributes of God.
the Ignorance of Foolifh, and the Vanity of Scep
tical and Piofane Men. And, by declaring to
us Himfelf his own Nature and Attributes, he
has effectually prevented all Miftakes which the
Weaknefs of our Reafon, the Negligence of our
Application, the Corruption of our Nature, or the
falfe Philofophy of Wicked and Profane Men,
might have Jed us into ; And fo has infallibly fur-
nifhed us with fufficient Knowledge to inable us
to perform our Duty in this Life, and to obtain
our Happinefs in that which is to come. But this
exceeds the Bounds of my prefent Subject, and
delerves to be handled in a particular Difcourfe.

JI9

FINIS,

A
DISCOURSE Concerning the
Unchangeable Obligations
O F
Natural Religion,
AND THE
Truth and Certainty
-OF THE
Chriftian Revelation:
.Being Eight Sermons, Preached at the Cathedral
Church of St. Paul, in the Year 1705, at the
Lecture Founded by the Honourable ROBERT
BOTLE, Efqj
By SAMUEL CLARKE, D. D.
Late Re,ctor of St. James's, Weftminfter.
The Tenth Edition, Corrected.

Ifa. v. 20. Woe unto tbem that call Evil Good, and Good Evil; that
put Daritiefis fior Light, and Light, for Darknefe ; that put Bitter for
Sweet, and Sweet fior Bitter.
3Rom. i. 22. Profcffing themfelves to he Wife, they became Fools,
1 (ppr, ii. 10. But God hath revealed tbem unto w by lAy Spirit.

TO THI
Moft Reverend Father in God
THOMAS
Lord Archbiihop of Canterbury ',
and Primate of all England :
Sir HENRY ASHURST,
Baronet ;
Sir J OH N ROTHERAM,
Knight , Serjeant at Law ;
JOHN EVELIN, Ef quire ;
TRUSTEES Appointed by the
Hon. PvOBERT BOYLE, Efquire\
#bis DISCOURSE Is humbly Dedicated.

~-gfj£

THE

P R E F A C

j,^ Should not have prefiumed to puhlifik
thefie Papers, in Vindication ofi Na7
tural and Revealed Religion, after
fio many excellent Dificcurfies already
written upon that Subject, had I not
thought myfelf obliged to. it, in order
to purfiue more fully the Defign of the Honourable
Founder of this Leclure, and to anfiv.er the Expectation ¦
of the Moft Reverend and the Honourable Truftees ap
pointed by him. The Honourable Robert Boyle, Elqj
was a, Perfion no lefis zealoufiy fiollicitous fior the Propa
gation of true Religion and the Practice of Piety and
Virtue, than diligent and fuccefisful in improving Ex
perimental Philofiophy, and enlarging our Knowledge of
Nature. And it was his fettled Opinion, that the
Advancement and Irureafie ofi Natural Knowledge would
always be of Service to the Caufe and Intereft of true
Religion, in Oppofition to Atheifts and, Unbelievers of
all' Sorts. Accordingly he, in his Life- time, made ex-
eellent Ufe of his own Obfiervations to this Purpofie, in-
all his Writings ; and made Provifion, after his Death,,
for carrying on the fame Defign perpetually. In Pur-
fuance of which End I endeavoured, in my former.
Difcourfief

The PREFACE,
Dificouffie, to firengthen and confirm the Arguments
which prove to us the Being and Attributes of God,
partly by Metaphyfiical Reafoning, and partly from the*
JJificoverics (principally ihofie that have been lately
made) in Natural Philofiophy. And, in the prefent
Tteatifie, I have- attempted, in a plainer and eafier
'Method, to efiabliflj the Unalterable Obligations of
Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of
the Chriftian Revelation. If what I have faid may
in any Meafure promote the Intereft ofi true Religion, in
this ficeptical and proficne Age, and anfiwer the Defign
fior which this Lefiture wds founded, I. have my End.
It may perhaps be expefled that I fhould take fiome
Notice ofi certain Remarks which have been'pnblifihed
upon my former Sermons. Had the Author of thofie
Remarks entered into the Merits of the Caufie, or of
fered any confiderable Reafons in Oppofition to what 1
had laid down, 1 fiiould have thought myfielfi obliged t6
give him a particular Anfiwer. But fince his ¦ Book is
made up chicfiy ofi Railing, and grofis Mificonftrutlions ;
and All that' he pretends to fiay, by Way ofi Argument,
depends intirely upon Suppofition ofi the Truth ofi the
Cartefian Hypothefis, which the beft Mathematicians
in the Wcrtd have demonftrated to be ficdje, T prefiunti
it may be fiujfiiient to fhew here the lnfincerily of thai
Author, and the Weaknefis Sfi his Recfionirtg, by a fieiti
irief Gbfiervations.
The only Argument he alledges againft me in his
whole Book is This : That, * if we know net diftincllf
what the * EfTence ofi God, and
' Note, That, in this whole what the EfTence of Matter is, we
Queftion, the Word .Effence is cannot poffddy demonftrate them, at
Bot m ,bVarke,i '? rhe FT all, ^ be Two different Efifiences.
per Metaphyseal Senfe ol the ' •"
Word, as Signifying That by which a Thing is ivhat it is : For, in That
Senfe, the Attributes of God do conftitute his Effence ; and Solidity or Im
penetrability is the Effence of Matter. Bat FJjcnce is all along to be under-
fvood as fignifying here the feine with Sucjia/ice.
ft

*

The PREFACE,
To which I anfiwer ; 'Tis plain we know not the '
Effences of Things by Intuition •, hut can only reafion
about them from what we know of their different
Properties or Attributes. New, from the demon* -
ftrable Attributes ofi God, and firom the known Pro
perties of Matter, we have as unanfiwerable Reafons'
to convince' and fiatisfiy us that their Effences are
jntirely different, though we know not diflinRly what
thofie Efifiences arc, as our Facuhies can afford us, hf
judging of any the certaineft things whatjoever. For
Inftance, The demonftrable Attributes of God, are,
that He is Stlf-Exiftent, Independent, Eternal,.
Infinite, Unchangeable, Incorruptible, Intelligent,.
Free, All-Powerful, Wife, Juft, and Good : The
known Properties of Matter, are, that it is not-
Neceffary or Self-Exiftent, but Dependent, Finite,
(nay, that it fills but a few very fmall and incon
siderable Portions of Space) that it is Divifible, Paf--
five, Unintelligent, and confequently incapable of any
Active Powers. Now nothing can be more certain
and evident, than that the Subftances to which the fit
incompatible Attributes or Properties belong, or the
Effences firom which they flow, are intirely different'
one firom the other; though we do not difiinbJly know
what the inmofl Subftances or Effences Themfielves are*
If any Man will think a mere Hypothecs (the Car-
fefian or any other) concerning the inmoft Nature of
Subftances to be a more fiatisfaclory Dificovery ofi tie
different Effences of Things, than we can attain by
reafoning thus from their demonftrable Properties, and-
will chufe rather to draw fond Confieqjiences- firom fiuch
Hypothefes and Fictions, ficividcd upon no Pnofi at
ell, than to make Ufie of finch Philofiophy as -is grounded
only upon clear Reafon or good Experiments, I know
no Help for it, but he muft be permitted to enjoy his
Opinion quietly'. The

the PREFACE.
the reft ofi the Book is All .either an indecent and
iinreafionable Reviling of the learned Mr. Locke ; from
whom I neither cited any one Paffage, nor' (that I know (
of) borrowed any Argument from him ; And therefore
is altogether Impertinent. Or elfe it confifts cfi grofis
Mifireprefientations ofi my Senfie, and very unfair Con-
fit -unions and fialfie Citations ' ofi my Words ; Ofi which
Ifijall prefiently give fiome Inftances.
.The firft 8 and the 35th and 3.6th Pages ofi the
Remarks are fipent in ¦< attempting to prove, that, ifiwi
do not firft know what the hffence o/~God, and what
the Effence ofi Matter is. (that is, if the Cartefian
Hypsthefis or Fiction concerning the Effences of Spi
ritual and Material Subftance be not granted to be true)
there is no. Way left by which it can be proved, at allt
that the Effence ofi God and Matter is not one and the
fiame. To which I have already given an Anfwer,
viz. That, firom the demonftrable Attributes ofi God,
and firom the known Properties ofi Matter, (being in
compatible with each other) we have as abfiolute Cer
tainty ofi their Effences and Subftances being different,
though we do not diftinflly know what thofie Effences are^
as our Faculties inable' us to attain in qny Metaphyficat
Queftion. For incompatible Properties can no more pof
fibly le in any unknown, than in any known Subject.
Page 12. The Author of the Remarks riffer'tSi thai
Des-Cartes and his Followers have Mathematically
proved, that the Effence ofi Matter confifts in Lengthy
Breadth, anft Depth. And, upon this confident Af
fertion, his whole Book depends in every Part. To
this therefore I anfiwer, that That Hypothefis is
really fio far from being Mathematically proved
to be Tiue, that, on the contrary, He cannot but
know (if he knows any Thing of thefe Matters)
that the greateft Mathematicians in the prefent Age,
MM

The PREFACE.
Men confeffedly greater in that Science, than any
that ever lived before them, have clearly, proved [as
I before fiaid) that it is f abfiolutely Falfe. And not f Sa
to take the leaft Notice of This throughout his whole Sir Ifaac
Book, argues either great Ihfistcerity* or sreat lo-- Newton's
horance. PH*cip«, pages 383
I had affirmed, that to Imagine ah Eternal and
Infinite Nothing was being reduced to the Neccff.ly
of Imagining a Contradiction or Impoffibility. For
this, he argues againft ine, (Remark, page 14.) as if '
1 had aff'eried, that it was poffible to imagine an
Eternal and Infinite Nothing ; whereas I afferted,
that it was impoffible and an exprefs Contradiction fib
to do. This is, great Infincefity.
I had charged the Ca'rtefians with being unavoid
ably reduced to the Abfurdity ofi making Matter d
Neceffarily-Exifting Being. In citing this Paffage,
(Remark, pages 14 and ig) he ridiculoufily reprejenis
me as fiayingi that this Abfiurdity confifted in making
Extenfion Neceffary j though he knew, that in That Very
Paffage, I fuppofed 'Matter and Extenfion to be intirely
different Things, This likewife is great Infincerityi
/ had faid, that the Idea of Immenfity was an Ided
thai no way belonged to Matter. Inftead of this,
he cites me afferting fienfielefisly, (Remark, page 15).
that Extenfion no way belongs to Matter. As if
that which is not Immenfe or Infinite, is therefiote not
extended at all. This is the griateft Difingenuity in
the World.
Remark, page i£. He fays % I am fure this
AtJthof cannot produce One, no not One Cartefian,
that ever made Matter a Neceffarily-Exifting Being 3
that ever contradicted himfelf in Words, upon this
Subject 5 that, ever fras mightily, or not mightily,
K, or

The PREFACE.
or at all perplexed with what Mr. Clarke calls his Ar
gument ; nay, that ever heard of that Thing he calls
his Argument. Why are they thus mifreprefented
and impbfed upon ? To this I anfwer : It-had^ been
fufficient to make good my Charge, to have fhewn-, that
jrom the Cartefian Hypothefis it followed by unavoid
able Confequence, that Matter muft be a Neceffarily-
Exifting Being ; though the Cartefians themfelves haft
not fieen that Confequence. Tet I cited moreover a
Paffage out of Regis -, wherein, 'tis plain, He perceived
and owned that Confiequence. But becaufe the Re-
marker feems not fiatisfied with this, and pretends to
triumph here with great Pleafure and Affurance ; I
will fior once comply with his Challenge, and produce
him Another, and That an unexceptionable Cartefian,
namely, Des-Cartes himfielf, who Was greatly per
plexed with the Argument I mentioned, and was un
avoidably reduced to make Matter a Neceffarily-Ex
ifting Being, and at the fame Time did contradict
himfelf. in Words upon this Subject. // was Ob
jected to Des-Cartes by fome very learned Men, that,
* if Extenfion and Matter were
* Qoiero an a Deo fieri po- the fame Thing, it feemed to them
tuiffet, ut mundus ,effet fini- to fo'low, that God could neither
tus. Epijl. ad Cartefium 68, poffibly make the World finite,
Parth prim*. annihilate any Part of Matter,
Nondum illud pofium con- J . '
coquere, earn efle inter res without creating at the fameTime
corporeas connexionem, ut juft as much more to fupply its
nee mundum Deus creare po- p[acc# cf0 ffa He.anfwers:
tuent nifi infinitum, nee ul- , , ,. , . ,t?i
lnm corpus in nihilum redi- t that, _ according to his Hypo-
gere, quin eo ipfo teneatur tliefis, it does indeed imply a Con-
aliud paris quantitatis itratim tradiclion to fuppofe the . World
creare. £,,;/?. 5. Parti, Jecunda. tQ bg j.^.^ Q. to fapp0fe God
t Puto imtlicare Contradic- annihilating any Part of Matter ;
tlonem v.t f\ 'un.lus fit fimtus. but yet he will not fay God can-
Cancf. Epijt. vg. Partis pri- not do it, of that God cannot cauie
^tlihiautemnonvidetu-de tha[ Tw° and Three fhall not
•ilia enquam re effe ciceu- make Five, or any other Contra diction

The PREFACE.
diction whatfoever. Is not this dum, ipfam a P?o fieri non
making Matter a Neeeffarily- Ex- Po/re- B1"1 enim °"mu Ra-
;/i- „ u : t ./-.»*¦ Ho f en & Bont ab ems Omni-
ifting Being, /* «ew, /&*/ //j 0 /e„„/lVl dependeat .J ne ;.
Contradiction to fiuppofie God an- dem dicere aiifim, Deum fa-
nihilating it, or jetting Bounds to cere non Pofl"e ut M°ns fit
»V .? i> nst ibis contradicting him- £fe Val3% vel ut ^n]um &
r ,r r ^ ~ .or , ^ Duo non lint tna ; fed tan-
ieJt,/(T a ilto; to affirm, (as Carte-, tum dico, talia implant con-
does in all his Writings) that the tradisiioncm in mco conceptu.
World was Created by God, and Qi™1 j.dem, etlam de sPatie>
-r\ ^ j 7 • j ., quod fit plane vacuum, &c.
Depends upon him, and yet at the \piJi, 6> fart!s/eaind(Ef
fame Time to decLire, that it implies
as plain a Contradiction to fiuppofie any Part ofi Matter
annihilable by the Poiver ofi God, as to fiuppofie that
Two and Three fihould not make Five ? Is not this really
a Ridiculing ofi the^Power ofi God ? And was not Des-
Cartes therefore greatly perplexed with the Argu
ment I mentioned ? And is not an Hypothefiu, from
which fuch Confiequences unavoidably and confeffeily
follow, , a fine Land- Mark of Diftinction between
Spiritual and Material Subftances ? And whatever op-
pofies this Hypoihefis, a * depriving us of the Means * Rmnri,
of proving the Exiftence of the one only true God. tase 2S-
The Remarker humbly defires his Reader (page
16) to be perfuaded, that he is of no particular
Sect in Matters of Philofophy, but only of the
Party of Truth where-ever he meets with it.
The fiame Man had declared before, (page 12) that
he believed Des-Cartes had Mathematically proved'
his Hypoihefis ; and takes not the leaft Notice ofi its
having fince been fully confuted by Mathematicians
confeffedly far more eminent in that Science, than Des-
Cartes was. This is a very fingular Mark ofi Im
partiality, and ofi being addicled to no Party in Matters
ofi Philofophy.
Speaking ofi the Cartefian Argument drawn firom
the Idea ofi God, I had ufied thefie Words : Our firft
K 2 Ccr-

The PREFACE.
Certainty of the Exiftence of God arifes not front
this j that, in the Idea we frame of him in our own
Minds, or rather in the Definition that we make of
the Word [Gbd,~] as fignifying a Being of all pof
fible Perfections, we include Self- Exiftence: But,
&c. Meaning, that, according to That Argument^
Self- Exiftence was rather made only a Part ofi the De
finition of the Word, than proved to be a real Attri
bute of the Being itfelf. Inftead of this, the Re-
marker, (pages 17 and 19) by a childifih Mifiunder-
ftanding of the tyntax of the Sentence, and referring
the Particle [or] to a wrong Member of the Period,
cites my Words in a quite different Manner-, as if I had
faid, In the Idea we frame of God in our owu Minds,
or rather in the Idea we frame of Him in the Definition
that we make of the Word, &c. And he is very
facetious (pages 17 and 19) in ridiculing this Framing
of an Idea in a Definition ; which he calls, as it truly
is, a Real Piece of Nonfienfie. But when, upon the
Review, he finds himfelf the true and only Author of it,
for Want of underftanding Grammar ; I fiuppofie it will
make him more modefi and careful.
He accufies me (Remark, pages 18, no, lie.) ofi
not underftanding the Cartefian Argument drawn from
the Idea of God. I confefis myfielf very ready to fiubmit
to this Charge ; and T can fihew him much more learned
¦fSeeCai- Writers than either ofi Us, who have likewifie -j- not
¦worth'.i underftood. that Argument. If He does underftand
p/ge L2j- it, he will do the World a very acceptable Piece of
£fr. Service to make' it out.
What he fays in his 2^1 ft, 2 2d, 23d, and 24th
Pages, is fuch a Heap of Mificonfiruilions, and fio in
tirely void ofi Senfie, that I confefis I cannot at all tell
• what he means. Frdm

The PREFACE.
From my ufiing the Word Mere Matter, he concludes
(page 29) that I imagine there is another Sort of
Matter, which is not a mere, bare, pure incogi-
tative Matter ; -and that Thefe Terms neeeffarily
impo.rf this Senfe. Whereas, in every one ofi the Places
he cites, 'tis as exprefis and evident as Words can make
it, that by Mere Matter / underftand the Matter of
which the World confifts, not as oppofied to Another
Sort of Matter •, but either as oppofied to Motion and
to the Form of the V/orld, or as eonfidered by itfelf
find without the Government and Direction of a
Supreme Intelligent Mind. This therefore is the
higheft Degree of Infincerity.
He charges me (pages 4, and 29, and 30,) with
ptaking a Tranflation quite different from Spinoza's
Senfe and Words. How I could miftranflate what
I did not tranfiate_ at all, I underftand not : But whe
ther I have mifrepreiented SpinozaV Senfie, or no,
(as I think I have not,) This I can only leave to the
learned World to judge.
1 reduced SpinozaV Opinion to this ; That the
Material World, and every Part of it, with the
Order and Manner of Being of each Part, is the
only Self-Exifting or NeceffarilyTExifting Being.
And this I think is as clearly con- . ?^ter Deum nuJ,a dari
tained in the * Words I cited from neq; coneipi poteft fubftantia.
him, as any Thing can be. Here Spinoz. Ethic. Par. 1. Prop. 14,
the Remarker afferts (page 30) Vnafubfentianonpotefflpro,
, ^ . ¦" *? i- duci ab aha fubftantia. Prop. 6.
that Spinoza, never taught this Res nu!lo alio modo neq.
Dotlrine, nay, that he taught the alio ordine a Deo produci po^
^quite contrary. To prove which, tuerunt, quam products: funt.
he cites a Pa/Tage, where Spinoza • ro{\^\ /• . ,, ...
V, JJ & \ ¦ * M Ad naturam fubftantia; per-
affirms, that f All who have in tinet exiftere. P,op.y.
any Degree eonfidered the Divine f Qrones qui naturam di-,
Nature, deny that God is Cor- vjnam aliquo modo contem-
, ' ,r J , . ,r ¦ , plati iunt, Deum eiie Corto-
poreal, Now this alfio is extremely *reum negant E(/^ pJ^
£. 3 Infincere, Prof. 15. Scfal,

The PREFACE.
Irfincere. For had this Author cited here the whole
Sentence of Spinoza, as he had cited it before in his
2 bth Page ; it would have appeared evidently, thai
Spinoza, by denying God to be Corporeal, meant only
fallacioufily to deny his being any particular Piece of
- „ _ ••,,•• Matter, any * Finite Body and of
n i er tortus lnteiJipimus . <-,. ',,,-, J , , T.
quamcunqne quantitatem, a certain Figure. For, that He
longam, Intam, & profundam, bdicved Infinite Corporeal Subftance,
ccrta ahqun.fivura terminatam ; that is, the whole Material Uni
que nihil abiurdius de Deo, f , God rhefides the Places
ente fcihcet ablolute infinite, ) . . c , • , 7 .
dici poteft. 'ibid. I haq cited from him,) he in j ex-
f Subftantiam Corpoream, prefis Words acknowledges, in a Pafi-
qus non nifi infimta concipi fa„e whjch this very Author cites in
poteft, nulla rationi natura di- J., .in £ 1 • r> ' J * 1
\>ina i^gnum cfc dici poteft. *he *th PaSe °f hts Remarks : And
He maintains it at large through the
% Schol. ad Whole of that very J Scholium, front whence the
rrop. 15, pian.:ri:er foas ^ith the greateft Infmcerity taken the
prejent Objection. But befides : SuppoJ'e Spinoza had
not explained himfielf in this Place, and had in this
fingle Paffage contradicted what he had plainly taught
throughout the reft ofi his Book ; . would this have
been any juft Reafion tofiay, that Spinoza never taught
the Doctrine I iii.puted to hjm ? nay, that he ta
the quite contrary ? 1
He (barges me (page 32) with arguing only againft ¦
the Acceffories of Atheifim, and leaving tie Effential
Hypothefis in its full Force ; nay, with confirming
and eltablifhing (page 11) Spinoza's Atheijln. xli
feems, in the Opinion of this Author, that proving the
Material World to be, not a Neceffary but a Depen
dent Being, madei prefierved and governed, by a Selfi-
F.xiftent, Independent, ' Eternal, Infinite Mind, of per
fect Knowledge, Wifdom, Power, Juftice, Goodnefis and
Truth -, is arguing only againft the Acceffories pf
Atheifim ; And that the Efiehtial Hypothefis of Athe
ifim is left untouched, nay confirmed and eftablfihed,
by all who will not prefiume to define the Effence of
that

The PREFACE.
thai Supreme Mind according to the Unintelligible Lan
guage of the Schools, and the groundlefis Imagination
of Des-Cartes concerning the Subftance or Effence
of Matter and Spirit. I confefis it appears to me,
on the contrary, that the Effence of Atheifm lies
in making God tuber an Unintelligent Being \_fiuch
as is the Material World f\ or at leaf a Neceffary
Agent \_fiucb as Spinoza makes his One Subftance to
bef\ void ofi all Freedom, Wifdom, Power and
Goodnefs •, and that Other Metaphyfical Difiputes
are only about the Acceffories : And that there is
much more Ground, on the other Side, to fiufpect That
very Hypothefis, ofi which this Writer is fo fond, to
be favourable to the Atheifts main Purpofie. For if,
firom Des-Cartes'.? Notion ofi the Effence ofi Matter, it
follows (as he himfielfi, in the Places now cited, con-
feffes in exprefis Words) that it implies a Contra
diction to fiuppofie the Material World Finite, or to
fuppofe any Part of Matter can be annihilated by
the Power of God ; I appeal to this Author, whether
This does not naturally tend to make Men think Matter
a Neceffary and Self-Exjftent Being.
He charges me (page 33) with fialfly accufmg Spi
noza ofi making God a mere Neceffary Agent •, and
cites a Paffage or two out of Spinoza, wherein that
Author feems to affert the contrary. The Words which
I cited firom Spinoza, do as clearly exprefis what I
charged him with, as 'tis poffible for any Thing to be
fxpreffed. For he afferts plainly, * A fumma Del potenda
that * from the Power of God Omnia necejfario enluxiffe.
All Things proceed Neeeffarily; Omnia c.-.- Neceffitau D.:--vin^
that All Things are determined 'AW-etermmatafunt, &c.
1 1 t^t 5 r 1 t-. • Quicquid conc;p;mus in
by- ¦ the Neceffity of the Divine Dei poteftate e.Te, id muft
Nature ; that whatever is in the J'ario eft.
Power of God, muft Neeeffarily „Res nfUo aIi° ™od°< ^V
t-> -n. ,1 , tm ¦ u „„.. alio ordine, a Deo produca
Exift; that Things could not po£ueruntj „uam p£,dua»
Jia,ve been produced by God in any {mu
K 4 other

the PREFAG E.
D^um n*n operari ex libertate 0ther Manner ™0rf*r? A™ -'?
wlun'taiis, •¦¦"•¦¦¦¦ Now are ; and that God does ndt
Adt by a Liberty of Will. All
this the Remarker very injincerely paffies ever, without
the leaft Notice. And the Words 'which he cites out
ofi Spinoza, do not at all prove the contrary to what
I after ted. For when Spinoza fays.
* Sequitur, folum Deum that * God alone is a Free Cdufe ;
pfe caufam iferam. md thaf Qod ^ by fa Law*
Deus ex Jolis iuas naturae r. . vt ' • ' ¦ i ' i ¦ '
Jegitms, & a nemine 'coaclus of his pwn Nature, without being
iigit. "' forced by Any : 'Tis evident, be
does not there mean a Freedom of
Will; but only fiallacioufiy fignifies, that the Neceffity
}y which all Things Exift in the Manner they do, is
an inward Neceffity in the Nature of the Things
themfelves, in Oppofition to any Force put upon
them from without -.'Which External Force, 'tis
plain indeed that [the-™ w] the whole Univerfe (the
"God of Spinoza) cannot be fiubjeB to ; becaufe it is
fiuppofied to contain All Things, within itfielfi. But
befides : Suppofing (as I fiaid before) that Spinoza had
directly contradicted himfielf in this one Paffage ; how
would That have proved my Charge againji him to
have been fialfie f
He fays (page 3 4) that I am guilty myfielfi ofi what
j? groundlejly imputed to Spinoza ; viz. of making God
a mere Neceffary Agent : Namely, by affirming that
there 'is a Neceffary Difference betwixt Good and
EviJ, and that there is fuch a Thing as Fitnefs
and Unfitnefs^ Eternally, " Neeeffarily, and Un
changeably, in the Nature and Reafon of Things,
antecedently to Will and to all Pofitive pr Arbi
trary Appointment whatfoever". " This, he fays, is'a
groundlefis and pofitive Affertion ; and plainly imports
the Eternal Neceffary Co-Exiftence ofi all Things, as
'much qs Spinoza 's Hypothefis does. Is not this an
Admirable Confequence ? Becaufe I affirm the Proper' tions

1*he PREFACE.
tions of Things, and the Differences of Good and Evily
to be Eternal and Neceffary ; that therefiore I affirm
the Exiftence ofi the Things themfelves to be alfo
Eternal and Neceffary ? Becaufe I affirm the Propor
tion, fiuppofie between a Sphere and a Cylinder to be
Eternal 'and Neceffary; that therefore I affirm the
Exiftence of Material Spheres and ¦Cylinders to be
likewifie Eternal and Neceffary f Becaufe I affirm the
Difference between Virtue and Vice to be Eternal and
Neceffary ; that therefore I affirm Men, who practifie
Yirtue or Vice, to have Exifted Eternally? This Acr
cufiation fihews both extreme Ignorance, and great Ma
lice, in the Author of the Remarks,
I had ufied thefie Words, (Demonftrat, page 9)
How an Eternal Duration can now be actually Paft,
is a Thing utterly as impoffible for our narrow
Underftandings to comprehend, as any Thing, that
fs not an exprefs Contradiction, can be imagined
jo be ; And yet to deny the Truth ofi the Propofition^
that an Eternal Duration is now actually paft), is to
affert fomething ftill far more unintelligible, even
a teal and "exprefs Contradiction. Inftead of this, the
Remarker (page 39) citing my Words, with extreme
Difingenuity leaves put one half of the Sentence, and
makes me to fay abfolutely, that fomething is ftill
far more unintelligible than that which is utterly
impoffible to be underftood. Such grofis Mifireprefien-
iations as thefe, in leaving out one Part ofi a Sentence^
to make the reft Nonfienfie ; can very hardly proceed, but
from Want of Honefiiy.
Laftly, (page 41) he fiays that in my Sermons there
is not one Argument offered, to prove againft Spi-
fieza, that God is a Spirit. / perfiuaded myfelf, that
the proving God to be a Being abfolutely diftinct firom
'iU Material World, Self-Exiftent, Intelligent^ Free,
¦ '"' '""" " ' ' Alfi

The PREFACE.
^ill-powerful,: Wifie<, and Good j had been proving, him
to be a Spirit.. But itfieems, no Proof is of any Force
with ¦ this Author, if it be not agreeable to the Car-r
tefian Philofiophy, in which alone he Jeans to have
•any Knowledge.. To this therefiore, I earn not obliged,
to .trouble either myfelf or the Reader, with giving any
further Anfwer. '

A DISCOURSE

DISCOURSE Concerning the
Unalterable Obligations
O F
Natural Religion,
AND THE
Truth and Certainty
OF THE
Chriftian Revelation,

\M AVI NG in a former Difcourfe endea- The Intra*
i -jltsl) voured to lay firmly the firft Foun- ^''se
dations of Religion, in the Certainty
gjlg) of the Exiftence and of the Attributes
pf God ; by proving feverally and diftinctly :
That Something muft needs have Exifted firom Eter
nity : And how great foever the Difficulties aret
which perplex the Conceptions and Apprehenfioris
WP attempt to frame of an Eternal Duration ¦, yet
they

¦>t - *Jfbe Ev i d e nc e of Natural
they ;neither ought nor can raife in any Man's
Minjl any Doubt or Scruple concerning the Trufch
of the Affertion Itfelf, that Something has really been
Eternal. That there muft have Exifted from Eternity Some
One Unchangeable and Independent Being ; becaufe
to fuppofe an eternal Succeffion of merely depen
dent Beings, proceeding one from another in an
endlefs Progreffion without any original Indepen
dent Caufe at all, is fuppofing Things that have
in their own Nature no Neceffity of Exifting, to
be from Eternity caufed or produced by nothing ;
which fi$ £J)e very fame Abfurdity and exprefs Con
tradiction, as to fuppofe them produced by Nothing
3t any determinate Time.
That That Unchangeable and Independent Being,
which has Exifted from Eternity, without any Ex
ternal Caufe of its Exiftence ; muft be Self-Exiftent,
that is, Neeeffarily -Exifting.
That it muft of Neceffity be Infinite or every*
where prefent ; a Being moft Simple, Uniform, In
variable,- Indivifible, Incorruptible, and ipfinitely re
moved from "all fuch Imperfections, as are the
known Qualities and infepatable Properties of the
Material World.
That it muft of Neceffity be but One •, becaufe
to fuppofe Two, pr more, different Self-Exiftent
independent Principles, may be reduced to a djrect
Contradiction. That it muft Neeeffarily be an Intelligent Being.,
That it muft be a Free and Voluntary, not a jyV
ceffary Agent.
That this Being muft of Neceffity have Infinite
Power ; and that in this Attribute is included,
particularly, a Poffibility of creating or producing
Things, and alfo a Poffibility of communicating
to Creaturcs the Power ofi Beginning Motion, and a
Poflibiljty of enduing them with Liberty or Freedovp

and Revealed FvELiGiotf.
of Will; which Freedom of Will is not inconfiftent
with any of the Divine Attributes.
That He muft of Neceffity be infinitely Wifie.
And laftly, That He muft Neeeffarily be a Being
of infinite Goodnefis, Juftice, and Truth, and all other
moral Perfections ; fuch as become the Supreme
Governor and Judge of the World.
It remains now, in order to complete my Defign
of proving and eftablifhing the Truth and Excel
lency of the whole Superftructure of our moft.
Holy Religion ; that I proceed, upon this Founda
tion of the Certainty of the Being and Attributes of
God, to demonftrate in the next Place the Unalter
able Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Cer
tainty of Divine .Revelation; in Oppofition to the
vain Arguings of certain vicious and profane Men,
who, merely upon Account of their Incredulity,
would be thought to be ftrict Adherers to Reafon,
and fincere and diligent Inquirers into Truth ; when
indeed on the contrary there is but too much Caufe
to fear, that they are not at all fincerely and really
defirous to be fatisfied in the true State of Things,
but only feek, under the Pretence and Cover of
Infidelity, to excufe their Vices and Debaucheries ;
which they are fo ftrongly inftaved to, that they
cannot prevail with themfelves upon any Account
to forfake tbem : And yet a rational Submitting to
fuch Truths, as juft Evidence and unanfwerable
Reafon would induce them to believe, muft neeef
farily make them uneafy under thofe Vices, and
Self-condemned in the Practice ' of them. It re
mains therefore (I fay) in order to finifh the Defign
I propofed to myfelf, of eftablifhing the Truth and
Excellency of our Holy Religion, in Oppofition to
all fuch vain Pretenders to Reafon as thefe ; that I
proceed at this Time, by a Continuation of the
fame Method of Arguing* by which I before de-,
monftrated

2

|. 7&? Evidence of Natural
montlr-ated the Being and Attributes of. Godj to
prove diftinctly the following Propofitions.
I. That the fame Neceffary and Eternal different
Relations, that different Things bear one to ano
ther ; and the fame confequent Fitnefs or Unfitnefis
pf the Application of different Things or different
Relations one to another, with regard to which the
"Will of God always and Neeeffarily does determine
Itfelf to chufe to act only what is agreeable to
Juftice, Equity, Goodnefs and Truth, in order to
' the Welfare of the whole Univerfe ; ought likewife
conftantly to determine the Wills of all fubordinate
rational Beings, to govern all their Actions by the
fame Rules, for the Good of the Public in their
refpective Stations. That is ; thefe Eternal and
Neceffary Differences of Things make it fit and
reafionable for Creatures fo to act •, they caufe it to
be their Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, fo to
do ; even feparate from the Confideration of thefe
Rules being the pofitive Will or Command ofi God ;
and alfo antecedent to any Refpect or Regard, Ex
pectation or Apprehenfion, of any particular, private
and perfional Advantage or Difiadvantage, Reward or
Punifihment, either prefent or future, annexed either
by natural Confequence, or by pofitive Appoint
ments, to the practifing or neglecting thofe Rules.
II. That though thefe eternal moral Obligations
are indeed of themfelves incumbent on all rational
Beings, even antecedent to the Confideration of
their being the pofitive Will and Command of
God ; yet That which moft ftrongly confirms,
and in Practice moft effectually and indifpenfably
. inforces them upon us, is this •, that both from the
Nature of Things, and. the Perfections of God,
- and from fevera] other collateral Confiderations, it
appears, that, as God is himfelf Neeeffarily Juft and
Good in the Exercife of his Infinite Power in the
Government of the whole World, fohe cannot but
likewife

aftd Revealed Religion.
likewife pofidvely Require that all his rational Crea
tures fhould in their Proportion be fo too, . in the
Exercife of each of their Powers in their refpective
Spheres. That is ; As thefe eternal moral Obli
gations are really in perpetual Force merely from
their own Nature and the abftract Reafon of Things;
fo alfo they are moreover the exprefs and unalter
able Will, Command, and Law ofi God to his Crea
tures, which he cannot but expect fhould in Obe
dience to his Supreme Authority, as well as in
Compliance with the Natural Reafon of Things,
be regularly and conftantly obferved through the
whole Creation.
III. That therefore, though thefe eternal moral
"Obligations are alfo incumbent indeed on all rati
onal Creatures, antecedent to any Refpect of Parti
cular Reward or Punifhment ; yet they muft cer
tainly and neeeffarily be attended with Rewards and
Punifihments. Becaufe the fame Reafons, which
prove God himfelf to be Neeeffarily Juft and Good;
and the Rules of Juftice, Equity and Goodnefs, to
be his unalterable Will, Law and Command, to all
Created Beings ; prove alfo that he cannot but be
pleafied with and approve fuch Creatures as imitate
and obey him by obferving thofe Rules, and be
difipleafied with fuch as act contrary thereto ; and
confequently that he cannot but fome Way or other
make a fuitable Difference in his Dealings with them ;
and manifeft his Supreme Power and abfolute Au
thority, in finally fupporting, maintaining, and
vindicating effectually the Honour of thefe his Di
vine Laws ; as becomes the Juft and Righteous
Governor and Difpofer of all Things.
IV. That confequently, though in order to efta-
blifh this fuitable Difference between the Fruits or
Effects of Virtue and Vice, fo reafonable in itfelf,
and fo abfolutely neceffary for the Vindication of
the Honour of God •, the Nature of things, and the

6 *the Evidence^ Natural
the Conftitution and Order of God's Creation^
was originally fuch,' that the Obfervance of the
,. eternal Rules of Juftice* Equity and Goodnefs, does'
indeed of itfelf tend by direct and natural Confe
quence to make all Creatures Happy ; and the con
trary Practice, to make them miferabie : Yet fince
through fome great and general Corruption and De
pravation, (whencefoever That may have'arifen ; the
. particular Original whereof could hardly have been
known Now without Revelation ;) fince, I fay, the
Condition of Men in this prefent State is fuch, that
the natural Order of Things in this World is in
event manifeftly perverted, and Virtue and Good
nefs are vifibly prevented in great Meafure from
obtaining their proper and due Effects in eftablifh
ing Mens Happinefs proportionable to their Beha
viour and Practice j therefore 'tis abfolutely im
poffible, that the whole View and Intention, the'
original and the final Defign, of God's creating fuch
rational Beings as Men are, and placing them in
this Globe of Earth, as the Chief and Principal, or
indeed (may we not fay) the only Inhabitants* for
whofe Sake alone This Part at leaft of the Creation
is manifeftly fitted up and accommodated ; 'tis ab
folutely impoffible (I fay) that the Whole of God's
Defign in all this fhould be nothing more, than
to keep up Eternally a Succeffion of fuch fhort-
lived Generations of Men as at prefent Are ; and
thofe in fuch a corrupt, confufed, and diforderly
State of Things, as we fee the World is now in ;
. without any due Obfervation of the Eternal Rules
of Good and Evil, without any clear and remark
able Effect of the great and moft neceffary Diffe
rences of Things, and without any final Vindica
tion of the Honour and Laws of God in the prs^
portionable Reward of the beft, or Punifhment of*
the worft of Men. And confequently 'tis certain
and neceffary, (even as certain as the moral Attri butes

find Repealed Religion.
¦ btftes of God before demonftrated) that, inftead of
continuing an eternal Succeffion of new Generations
in the prefent Form and State of Things, there muft
at fome Time or other be fuch a Revolution and Re
novation of Things* fuch & future State of Exiftence
of the fame Perfons, as that, by an. exact Diftributi-
on of Rewards and Punifhments therein, all the pre
fent Diforders and Inequalities may be fet right 5 and
that the whole Scheme of Providence, which to us,
who judge of it by only one fmall Portion of it,
feems now fo inexplicable and much confuted ; may
appear, at its Confummation, to be a Defign worthy
of Infinite Wifdom, Juftice, and Goodnefs;
V. That, though the indifpenfable Neceffity of
all the great and moral Obligations of Natural Re
ligion, and alfo the Certainty of a future State of
Rewards and PunifhmentSj be thus in general de-
ducible even demonftrably, by a Chain of clear and
undeniable Reafoning : Yet (in the prefent State of
the World,, by what Means foever it came original-
. .ly to. be: f° corrupted, of which more hereafter)
fuch is the Carelefnefis, InconJideratenefis, and Want of
Attention of thegreater Part of Mankind j fo many
the Prejudices and fialfie Notions imbibed by evil
Education-, fo ftrong and violent the unreafonable'
. .Lufts, -Appetites and Defires of Senfe •, and fo great
the Blfndnefis, introduced by fiuperftitious Opinions*
vicious Cuftoms, and debauched Practices through the
World ; that very Few are able, in Reality and Effect j
to difcover thefe Thjngs clearly and plainly for them
felves ;. butMen have great need of particular Teaching
¦ ¦ and much InftrufiionjXo convince them of the Truth,
and Certainty, and Importance of thefe Things.-, to give
them a due Senfie, and clear and j uft Apprehfnjions Con -
cerhing theiri ; and to bring them effectually to th<?
Practice pf the plaineft and moft neceffary Duties.
¦VI. That, thpugh in almoft every ,Age there
have indeed been in the Heathen World' fome
i" vviig

The Evidence of Natural
wife and brave and good Men, who have made it
their Bufinefs to ftudy and practife thefe Things
themfelves, and to teach and exhort others to do
the like ; who feem therefore to have been raifed up
by Providence, as lnftruments to reprove, in fome
Meafure, and put fome Kind of Check to the extreme
Superftition and Wickednefs of the Nations where
in they lived : Yet none of thefe have ever been
able to reform the World with any confiderably
great and univerfal Succefs ; Becaufe they have been
but very few that have in earneft fet themfelves
about this excellent Work ; and they, that have in
deed fincerely done it, have themfelves been intirely
ignorant of fome Doctrines, and very doubtful and
uncertain of others, abfolutely neceffary for the
bringing about that great End ; and thofe Things,
which they have been certain of, and in good Mea
fure underftood, they have not been able to prove
and explain clearly enough ; and thofe that they
have been able both to prove and explain by fuffici
ently clear Reafoning, they have not yet nad Au
thority enough to inforce and inculcate upon Men's
Minds with fo ftrong an Impreffion, as to in
fluence and govern the general Practice of the
World. VII. That therefore there was plainly wanting a
Divine Revelation, to recover Mankind out of their
univerfally degenerate Eftate, into a State fuitable
to the original Excellency of their Nature :
Which Divine Revelation, both the Neceffities of
Men, and their natural Notions of God, gave them
reafonable Ground to expect and hope for ; As ap
pears from the Acknowledgements which the beft
and wifeft of the Heathen Philofophers themfelves
have made, of their Senfe of the Neceffity and Want
of fuch a Revelation ; and from their Expreffions of
the Hopes they had entertained, that God would
fome Time or other vouchfafe it unto them. VIII. That

and Revealed Religion. 9
. VIII. That there is no other Religion now in the
World but the Chriftian, that has any juft Pretence,
or tolerable Appearance of Reafon, to be efteemed
fuch a Divine Revelation : And therefore, if Chri-
ftianity be not true, there is no Revelation of the
Will of God at all made to Mankind.
IX. That the Chriftian Religion, eonfidered in
its primitive Simplicity, and as taught in the Holy
Scriptures, has all the Marks and Proofs of its being
actually and truly a Divine Revelation, that Any
Divine Revelation, fuppofing it was true, could
reafonably be imagined or defired to have.
X. That the Practical Duties, which the Chri
ftian Religion enjoins, are all fuch, as are moft agree
able to otir natural Notions of God, and moft per
fective of the Nature, and conducive to the Hap
pinefs and Well-being of Men : That is ; Chrifti-
anity, even in this fingie Refpect, as containing alone,
and in one confiftent Syftem, All the Wife and good
Precepts, (and thofe improved, augmented, and ex
alted to the higheft Degree of Perfection) that ever
were taught fingly and fcatteredly, and many Times
but very corruptly by the feveral Schools of the
Philofophers ; and this without any Mixture of the
fund, abfurd, and fuperftitious Practices of any of
thofe Philofophers ; ought to be embraced and
practifed by all rational and confidering Deifts, who
will act confiftently, and fteddily purfue the Con-
fequences of their own Principles ; as at leaft the
beft Scheme and Sect of Philofophy that ever was
kt up in the World ; and highly probable, even
though it had no external Evidence to be of Divine
Original. XI. That the Motives, by which the Chriftian
Religion inforces the Practice of thefe Duties, are
fuch as are moft fuitable to the excellent Wifdom
of God, and moft anfwerable to the natural Ex
pectations of Men. L a XII. That

lo The Evidence of Natural
XII. That the peculiar Manner and Circumftaneej
with which it injoins thefe Duties, and urges thefe
Motives, are exactly confonant to the Dictates of
found Reafon, or the unprejudiced Light of Na
ture ; and moft wifely perfective of it.
XIII. That all the [Credenda, or] Doctrines, which
the true, fifnple, and uncorrupted Chriftian Reli
gion teaches -, (that is, not only thofe plain Doc
trines, which it requires to be believed as Funda
mental and of Neceffity. to eternal Salvation, but
even All the Doctrines which it teaches as Matters
of Truth ;) are, though indeed many of them not
difcoverable by bare Reafon unaffifted with Reve
lation, yet, when difcovered by Revelation, appa
rently moft agreeable to found unprejudiced Reafion-,
have every one of them a natural Tendency, and a
tlirect and powerful Influence, to reform Men's Lives
.and correlt their Manners ; and do together make
up an infinitely more confiftent and rational Scheme
of Belief, than any that the wifeft of the- antient
Philofophers ever did, or the cunningeft of modern
Unbelievers can invent or contrive.
XIV. That as this Revelation, to the Judgment
of Right and Sober Reafori, appears even of itfelf
highly credible and probable •, and abundantly re
commends itfelf in its native Simplicity, merely by
its own intrinfick Goodnefs and Excellency, to the
Practice Of the moft rational and confidering Men,
who are defirous in all their Actions to have /Satis
faction and Comfort and good Hope within them
felves, from the Confcience of what they do : So it
is moreover .pofitively and directly proved to be
actually and immediately fent to us from God, by
the many infallible Signs and Miracles, which, the
Author of it worked publickly as the Evidence of
his Divine Commiffion ; by the exact Completion
- both of the Prophecies that went before concerning
him, and of thofe that He himfelf delivered con
cerning

and Revealed Re li g i on. jj
Cerning Things that were to happen after ; and by.
the Tefiimony of his Followers : Which in all its,
Circumftances was the moft credible, certain, and
convincing Evidence that was ever given to any
Matter of Fact in the World.
XV. And Laftly •, That they who will not, by
fuch Arguments and Proofs, as thefe, be convinced
of the Truth and Certainty of the Chriftian Re
ligion, and be perfuaded to make it the Rule and
Guide of all their Actions ; would not be convinced,
(fo far as to influence their Hearts, and reform
their Lives) by any other Evidence whatfoever ;
no, not though one fhould rife on purpofe from
the Dead, to endeavour to convince them.
I might here, before I enter upon the particular of the fe-
Proof of thefe feveral Propofitions, juftly be allow-, veralSom
ed to premife, that having Now to deal with another °fiDe'P-
Sort of Men, than thofe againft whom my former
Difcourfe was directed ; and being confequently in
fome Parts [of this Treatife to make Ufe of fome
other Kinds of Arguments than thofe which the
Nature of that Difcourfe permitted and required ;
the fame demonflrative Force of reafoning, and even
. MathematicaLCenainty, which in the main Argu
ment was there eafy to be obtained, ought not
here to be expected ; but that fuch moral Evidence,
qr mixt Proofs from Circumftances and Teftimony,
as moft Matters of Fact are only capable of, and
wife and honeft Men are always fatisfied with,
ought to be accounted fufficient in the prefent Cafe,
Becaufe all the Principles indeed upon whichfiltbeifts
attempt to build their Schemes, are fuch as may
by plain Force of Reafon, and undeniably demon-
ftrative Argumentations, be reduced to exprefs and
direct Contradictions. But the Deifts pretend to
own all the Principles of Reafon, and would be
though,! to deny nothing but what depends entirely
i. . L 3 on

12 The Evidence of Natural
on Teftimony and Evidence of Matter of Fact,
which they think they can eafily evade.
But, if we examine Things to the Bottom, we
fhall find that the Matter does not in reality lie
here. For I believe there are in the World, at
leaft in any Part of the World where the Chriftian
Religion is in any tolerable Purity profeffed, very
Few, if Any, fuch Deifts as will truly ftand to all
the Principles of unprejudiced Reafon, and fin-
Cerely both in Profeffion and Practice own all the
Obligations of Natural Religion, and yet oppofe
Chriftianity merely upon Account of their not being
fatisfied with the Strength of the Evidence of Mat
ter ofi Fact. A conftant and fincere Obfervance of
all the Laws of Reafon, and Obligations of Na
tural Religion, will unavoidably lead a Man to
Chriftianity ; if he has due Opportunities of exa
mining Things, and will fteddily purfue the Con-
fequences of his own Principles. And all Others,
who pretend to be Deifts without coming up to
this, can have no fixed and fettled Principles at' all,
upon which they can either argue or act confift-
ently ; but muft of Neceffity fink into downwright
Atheifim, (and confequently fall under the Force of
the former Arguments ;) as may appear by confi-
dering the fieveral Sorts of them.
Ofthejirjt i. Some Men would be thought to be Deifts,
^jf "fj*, becaufe they pretend to believe the Exiftence of an
cfProiii- Eternal, Infinite, Independent, Intelligent Being ;
deuce. and, to avoid the Name of Epicurean Atheifts, teach
alfo that this Supreme Being made the World :
Though at the fame Time they agree with the Epi
cureans in this, that they fancy *
* Omnis enim per fe Divfim God does not at all concern him-
natura neceffe eft fcIf • fa Government of the
Immortah svo iumma cum XTT , , . , ,
pace fruatur, World, nor has any regard, to, or
Semota a noftris rebus, fe- care of, what is done therein. But, '
junaaq; longe. if we examine Things duly, this
Opinion

and Revealed Religion. 13
Opinion muft unavoidably ter- Nam privata dolore omni,
minate in abfolute Atheifim. For T Pn/ata pencils,
11 1 . . , -\ ,-. j lpia iuis pollens opibus, nihil
although to imagine that God at ^indiga noftri,
the Creation of the World, Or at Nee bene promeritis capitur,
the Formation of any particular nec tangitur ira.
Part of it, could (if he had pleaf- Tj ^ ^ L™[etj *£.£
ed) by his infinite Wifdom, Fore- «-Tl \£Tl^y™?* "&.?&.'
fight, and unerring Defign, have <&*« «T«fs^«- *r« $™ i%yxTs,
originally fo ordered, difpofed, and ?™ «"'««" _ sWjjikt. Laert.
adapted all the Springs and Series m %£ ff^Dodrtne of thofe
of future neceffary and unintelligent Modem Philofophers much
Caufes, that, vtthout the imme- different ; -who afcrihe every
' diate Irtterpofition of his Almigh- ThiH t0 ^"er, and M<><"»>
r, ¦ 1 exclujive of Final Caufes : and
ty Power upon every particular fpeai of God as *n Intehigen-
Occafion, they fhould regularly, tia Supramundana : Which it
by Virtue of that original Difpo- the w7 Can- e^Epicurus and
fition, have produced Effects wor- Lucretlus-
thy to proceed from the Direction
and Government of infinite Wifdom : Though
this, I fay, may poffibly by very nice and abftract
Reafoning be reconcileable with a firm Belief both
of the Being and Attributes of God, and alfo with
a confiftent Notion even of Providence itfelf ; yet to-
fancy that God originally created a certain Quantity
of Matter and Motion, and left them to frame a
World at Adventures, without any determinate and
particular View, Defign, or Direction ; this can no
Way be defended confiftently, but muft of Neceffity
recur to downright Atheifim ; As I fhall fhew pre-
fently •, after I have made only this One Obferva
tion, that as That Opinion is impious in itfelf, fo
the late Improvements in Mathematicks and natural
Philofophy have difcovered, that, as Things Now
are, That Scheme is plainly falfe and impoffible in
Fact. For, not to fay, that, feeing Matter is ut
terly uncapable of obeying any Laws, the very ori- l
sinal Laws of Motion themfelves cannot continue
to take Place, but by fomething Superior to Mat-
L 4 tcr,

14- The Evidence of Natural
ter, continually exerting on it a certain Force or
Power according to fuch certain and determinate
Laws ; tis now evident beyond Queftion, that the
Bodies of all Plants and Animals, much the moft
confiderable Parts of the World, could not poffibly
have been formed by mere Matter according to any
general Laws of Motion, And not only ib ; but
That moft univerfal Principle of Gravitation itfelf,
the Spring Of almoft all the great and regular inani
mate Motions in the World, anfwering (as I hinted
in my former Difcourfe) not at all to the Surfaces.
of Bodies, (by which alone they can ^ct one upon
another) but entirely to their Solid-Content ; cannot.
poffibly be theRefult of any Motion originally im-
prefled on Matcer5 but muft of Neceffity be caufed
(either immediately or mediately) by fomething which
penetrates the very Solid Subftance of all Bodies,
and continually puts forth in them a Force or Power
entirely different from that by which Matter acts
On Mattet. Which is, by the Way, an evident
Demonftration, not only of the World's being made
(iriginally by a Supreme Intelligent Caufe ; but
moreover that it depends every Moment on fome
Superior Being, for the Prefervation of its Frame ;
and that all the great Motions in it are. caufed by
fome Immaterial Power, not having originally .impref-s
fed a certain Quantity of Motion upon Matter, but;
perpetually and actually exerting itfelf every Mo
ment in every Part of the World. WThich Prefier-
wing and Governing Power, whether it be immedi
ately the Power and Action of the fame Supreme
Caufe that created the World, of Him without
whom not a Sparrow falls to the Ground, and with
whom the very Hairs ofi our Head are all numbered ;
pr whether it be the Action of fome fubordinate
Inftruments appointed by Him to direct and prefide
reflectively over certain Parts thereof; does either
( Way equally give Us a very nobje Idea of 'Providence, ,

and Revealed Religion. jr
Thofe Men indeed, who, merely through a certain
Vanity of Philofophizing, have been tempted to
embrace that other Opinion, of alt Things being
produced and continued only by a certain Quantity
of Motion, originally impreffed on Matter without
any determinate Defign or Direction, and left to
itfelf to form a World at Adventures ; Thofe Men,
I fay, who, merely through a Vanity of Philofo-
phizing,, have been tempted to embrace that Opi
nion, without attending whither it would lead them ;
ought not, indeed, to be directly charged with
all the Confiequences of it. But 'tis certain, that
Many, under that Cover, have really been Atheifts;
and the Opinion itfielfi (as I before faid) leads, neeef
farily and by unavoidable Confequence, to plain
Atheifim. For if God be an All-powerful, Omni-
prefent* Intelligent, Wife and Free Being, (as it hath
been before demonftrated that he neeeffarily Is;)
he cannot poffibly but know, at all Times and in all
Places, every Thing that is; and foreknow what at
all Times and in all Places 'tis fitteft and wifeft
fhould be ; and have perfect Power, without the leaft
Labour, Difficulty or Oppofition, to order and bring
to pafis what he fo judges fit to be accomplifhed :
And confequently 'tis impoffible
but * he muft actually direct and * Qe° confeflb,, confiten-
appoint every particular Thing ^ni eft Eorum confiliomun-
1 --.• n r i • • i dum admuuftran. Cic.de Nat.
and Lircumltance that is in the ^W. Lib. 2.
World, or ever fhall be, excepting
only what by his own PJeafure he puts under the
Power and Choice of fubordinate Free Agents. If
therefore God does not concern himfelf in the Go
vernment of the World, nor has any Regard to
what is done therein ; it will follow that he is not an
Qmniprefent, All-powerful, Intelligent, and Wife
Being ; and confequently, that he Is not at all.
Wherefore the Opinion of this Sort of Deifts ftands
rjQt upon any certain confiftent Principles, but leads t
unavoidably ;

The Evidence cf Natural
unavoidably to downright Atheifim;
And, * however in Words they
may confefs a God, yet in Reality
and in Truth they deny him.
If, to avoid this, they will own God's Govern
ment and Providence over the greater and mere
conftderable Parts of the World, but deny his In-
** "J ii jiff ' J
deme. fpedtion and Regard to human Affairs here upon
Earth, as being -f too minute and
fimall for the Supreme Governor
of allThings to concern himfelf in ;
This ftill amounts to the fame.
For if God be Omniprefent, All-
knowing, and All-powerful ; he
cannot but equally know, and with
equal Eafe be able to direct and go
vern, J all Things as any, and the
|| minuteft "Things as the greateft.
So that if he has no Regard nor
Concern for thefe Things; his At
tributes muft, as before, be deni
ed -, and confequently his Being.
But befides : Human Affairs are, by
no means the minuteft and moft
inconfiderable Part of the Creation.
For, (not to confider, Now, That
Excellency of Human Nature,
which Chriftianity difcovers to us;)
let a Deift fuppofe the Univerfe
as large as the wideft Hypothefis
of Aftronomy will give him leave
to imagine ; or let him fuppofe it
as immenfe as he himfelf pleafes,
and filled with as great Numbers .
of rational Creatures as his own
Fancy can fuggeft ; Yet the Syftem wherein we are
placed, will, at leaft for aught he can reafonably
fuppofe, be as conftderable as any other fingle
Syftem ;

16

* Epicurum verbis reli-
quifle Deos, re fuftulifle. Cic.
de Nat. Dear. Lib. 2.
Human
Affairs not
beneath the
Regard of
Prcvi, •f- 'sluri yaJf Tit£{ of »ofti'£y<rii»
3Wl TO §lta,, Xa) T0KX.VTO. OiCC-
wcp 0 7wya$ ait a. i$etpr,tit, a-
ya&ct, xa) iirtaftif e'%ovtos t>ju
aLxpjrtavrit, xai yvvtrtt Tn> te-
>E^oTC8T^)|l• rat piiloi avSqamUuv
xetiapjfmut, «s f*ix£«v xa) It/lc^w*
ctrut, xa) o\ta%iUt T»){ lav-rut
impttetaf. Simplic. in Epiclet.
% Deorum providentia mun
dus adminiftratur ; iidemque
confulunt rebus humanis ; ne-
que foliim univerfis, verum
etiam Singulis. Cic. de Divinat.
Lib. 1.
|| 'AM? sSit fayl as 1<rus s'm
XpTwaht bj£i|«!7-9ai TaVayi, a?
iirifitt^Ti CfM*§u» eiVi Ssoi, UK
»t1o» H rat fisy/Sei Statyegoilut.
Plato de Leg. Lib. 10.
'E( is tfl« iS Hoo-pa 0 Seo;
iit%u.s>.urai , dtdyx.11 xa) rut pt-
tut avm tspotont , ucssip xa.
eel t'zyyai isomer. Kai yap.
««T§o; top oAb c-flftalos EirifMAij-
Sijuasi «rgo9£'f*E»05, ex «"« api-
XijtreiE rat (ASgaSV J*as rfalnyo?,
uS SixovofAo;, f, OTo?uli*o{ anjg'
tat yttg (ae^sjv apitefitvuit, a-
vdyxvi xjcipottiis to c-XoV oialiSeo--
Sai. Simplic. in Epiclet.

and Revealed Religion. 17
Syftem ; And the Earth whereon we dwell, %
confiderable as moft of the other Planets in this
Syftem -, And Mankind manifeftly the only con
fiderable Inhabitants on this Globe *of Earth.
Man therefore has manifeftly a better Claim to the
particular Regard and Concern of Providence, than
any Thing elfe hi this Globe of ours ; And this our
Globe of Earth, as juft a Pretence to it, as moft
other Planets in the Syftem ; And this Syftem, as
juft an one, as far as we can judge, as any Syftem
in the Univerfe. If therefore there be any Pro
vidence at all, and God has any Concern for any
Part of the World ; Mankind, even feparate from
the Confideration of that Excellency of Human
Nature which the Chriftian Doctrine difcovers to
us, may as reafonably be fuppofed to be under its
particular Care and Government, as any other Part
of the Univerfe.
2. Some others there are, that call themfelves Of the fir
Deifts, becaufe they believe, not only the Being, C6nd Sort
but alfo the Providence of God ; that is, that every 0fiDeifi''
natural 'Thing that is done in the World, is produc'd
by the Power, appointed by the Wifdom, and di-
' retted by the Government of God ; Though, not
allowing any Difference between moral Good and
Evil, they fuppofe that God takes no Notice of the
morally good or evil Actions of Men; thefe Things
depending, as they imagine, merely on the arbi
trary Conftitution of Human Laws. But how
handfomly foever Thefe Men may feem to fpeak, of
the natural Attributes of God, of his Knowledge,
Wifdom, and Power ; yet neither can This Opinion
be fettled on any certain Principles, nor defended
by any confiftent Reafoning ; nor can the natural
Attributes of God be fo feparated from the moral,
but that He who denies the latter, may be reduced
to a Neceffity of denying the former likewife. For
fince (as I have formerly proved) there cannot but be

i § The Evidence of Natural
bw eternal and neceffary Differences of differeng
Things one from another ; and from thefe neceffary
Differences of Things there Cahnot but arife a Fit
nefs or Unfitnefs of the Application of different
Things or different Relations one to another ; and
infinite Knowledge can no more fail to Know, or
infinite Wifdom to Choofe, or infinite Power to
Act according to thefe eternal Reafons and Propbr- .
tions of Things, than Knowledge can be Ignorance*
Wifdom be Folly, or Power Weaknefs ; and confe
quently the Juftice and Goodnefs of God are as
certain and neceffary, as his Wifdom and Power : It
follows unavoidably, that he who denies the Juftice
or Goodnefs of God, or, which is all one, denies his
Exercife of thefe Attributes in infpecting and re
garding the moral Actions of Men ; muft alfo deny,
either his Wifdom, or his Power, or both -, and con
fequently muft needs be driven into abfolute Atheifim,
For though, in fiome moral Matters, Men are not
indeed to be judged of by the Confiequences of their
Opinions, but by their Profeffion and Practice >
# . , . , yet in the prefent Cafe it * mat-
ilk Slrtneget • Ilkdqui ters not at a11 what Men affirm, or
to, quid ei confentaneum ft how honourably they may feem
dicere, qui, &c. Cic. de Finib. to fpeak of fome particular Attri-
L'b- ~2' butes of God ; but what, notwith
ftanding fuch Profeffion, muft needs in all Reafon
be fuppofed to be their true Opinion ; and their
PraElice generally appears anfwerable to it.
Profane For, concerning thefie two Sorts of Deifts, tis ob-
anddebau- fervable, that as their Opinions can terminate con-
toea ue- f,n-ent]y jn nothing but downright Atheifim ; io their
pableofbe- Practice and Behaviour is generally agreeable to that
ing argued of the moft openly ^ro^tStA. Atheifts. They not only
'w'ih- oppofe the Revelation of Chriftianity, and reject all
the moral Obligations of Natural Religion, as fuch ;
but generally they defpife alfo the Wifdom of a\\ Hu
man Ccnftitutions made for the Order and Benefit of
Mankind |

and Revealed Religion. lo
Mankind, and are as much Contemners of co'mmtin
Decency as they are of Religion. They endeavour
to ridicule and banter all Human as well as Divine
Accomplifhments ; all Virtue and Government of a
Man's felf, all Learning and Knowledge, all Wif
dom and Honour, and every Thing for which a. Man
can juftly be commended or be efteemed mqre ex
cellent than a Beaft. They pretend commonly, in
their Difcourfe and Writings, to expofe the Abufes
and Corruptions of Religion ; but (as is too ma
nifeft in fome of their modern Books, as well as in
their Talk,) they aim really againft all Virtue in
general, and all good Manners, and againft what
foever is truly valuable and commendable in Men.
They pretend to ridicule certain Vices and Follies
of ignorant or fuperftitious Men ; But the many
very profane and very lewd Images, with which
they induftrioufly affect to drefs up their Difcourfe,
fhew plainly that they really do not fo much intend
to expofe and deride any Vice or Folly, as oh the
contrary to foment and pleafe the debauched and
vicious Inclinations of Others as void of Shame as
Themfelves. They difcover clearly, that they have
no Senfe at all of the Dignity of Humane Nature,
nor of the Superiority and Excellency of their Rea
fon above even the meaneft of the Brutes. They
will fometimes in Words feem to magnify the Wif
dom, and other natural Attributes of God ; but in
•rqality, by ridiculing whatever bears any Refem-
blance to it in Men, they fhew undeniably that they
do not indeed believe there is any real Difference in
.Things, or any true Excellency in one Thing more
than in another. By turning every Thing alike, and
without Exception, into Ridicule and Mockery ;
they declare plainly, that they don't believe any
Thing to be wife, any Thing decent, any Thing
comely or praife-worthy at all. They feem not to
have any Efteem or Value, for thofe diftinguifhing
Powers and Facuhies ; by induing them wherewith, God

20 ^Evidence of Natural
Job xxxv. God has taught them more than theBeafts ofi the Field,
"• and made them wifier than the Fowls ofi Heaven. In
a Word : Whatfioever Things are true, whatfioever
Things are honeft, whatfioever Things are juft, what
foever Things are pure, whatfoever Things are lovely,
whatfoever Things are of good Report, if there be any
Virtue, if there be any Praifie; thefe Things they
make the conftant Subject of their Mockery and
Abufe, Ridicule and Raillery. On the contrary -,
whatfoever Things are profane, impure, filthy,
difhonourable and abfurd ; thefe Things they make
it their Bufinefs to reprefent as harmlefs and indif
ferent, and to laugh Men out of their natural
Shame and Abhorrence of them ; nay, even to
recommend them with their utmoft Wit. Such
Men as thefe art not to be argued With, till they
can be perfuaded to ufe Arguments inftead of Drol
lery. For Banter is not capable of being anfwered
by Reafion : Not becaufe it has any Strength in it ;
but becaufe it runs out of all the Bounds of Rea
fon and good Senfe, by extravagantly joining toge
ther fuch Images, as have not in themfelves any
Manner of Similitude or Connexion ; by which
Means all Things are alike eafy to be rendered ri
diculous, by being reprefented only in an abfurd
Drefs. Thefe Men therefore are firft to be con
vinced of the true Principles of Reafion, before they
can be difputed with ; and then they muft of Ne
ceffity either retreat into downright Atheifim, or be
led by undeniable Reafoning to acknowledge and
fubmit to the Obligations of Morality, and heartily
repent of their profane Abufe of God and Religion.
0/ the 3. Another Sort of Deifts there are, who having
^Jn^ff1 "Snt Apprehenfions concerning the naturalAttributes
£f "ft- 0f Qo^ and his All- governing Providence ; feem
alfo to have fome Notion of his moral Perfections
alfo. That is ; as they believe him to be a Being ir>
finitely Knowing, Powerful, and Wife -, fo they be
lieve him to be alfo in fome Senfe a Being of infinite
Juftice*-

and Revealed Religion. m
Juftice, Goodnefs, and Truth •, and that he governs
the Univerfe by thefe Perfections, and expects fuit
able Obedience from all his rational Creatures. But
then, having a Prejudice againft the Notion of the
Immortality of Human Souls, they believe that Men
perifli intirely at Death, and that one Generation fhall
perpetually fucceed another, without any Thing
remaining of Men after their Departure out of this
Life, and without any future Reftoration or Reno
vation of Things. And imagining that Juftice and
Goodnefs in God are not the fame as in the Ideas
we frame of thefe Perfections when we confider them
in Men, or when we reafon about them abftractly
in themfelves ; but that in the Supreme Governor
of the World they are fomething Tranficendent, and
of which we cannot make any true Judgment, nor
argue with any Certainty about them : They fancy,
though there does not indeed feem to Us to be any
Equity or Proportion in the Diftribution of Re
wards and Punifhments in this prefent Life, yet,
that We are not fufficient Judges concerning the
Attributes of God, to argue from thence with any
Affurance for the Certainty of a future State. But
neither does This Opinion ftand on any confiftent
Principles. For if Juftice and
Goodnefs be not * the fame in God, * Km& dV*« v*V * a"j$
as in our Ideas ; then we mean no- "V™ iri T^ %f***«e«« ?*';
thing, when we fay that God is ne- .^Jfc' ' o£
ceffarily Juft and Good : And for cantr. Celfi Lib. 4.
the fame Reafon it may as well be
faid, that we know not what we mean, when we
affirm that he is an Intelligent and Wife Being ;
And there will be no Foundation at all left, on
which we can fix any Thing. Thus the moral At
tributes of God, however they be acknowledged in
Words, yet in Reality they are by thefe Men in
tirely taken away ; and, upon the iame Grounds,
tjhe natural Attributes may alfo be denied. And fo,
upon

2.2 The Evidence of Natural
upon the Whole, This Opinion likewife, if we argfjg
upon it confiftently, muft finally recur to abfolute
. Atheifm.
Of the 4- The laft Sort of Deifts are thofe* who,_ if they
fourth Sort did indeed believe what they pretend, have juft and
of Deifts. right Notions of God* and of all the Divine Attri
butes in every Refpect : W7ho declare they believe*
that there is One, Eternal, Infinite* Intelligent, All-
powerfuli and Wife Being ; the Creator, Preferver,
and Governor of all Things : That this Supreme
Caufe is a Being of infinite Juftice, Goodnefs, and
Truth, and all other moral as well as natural Per
fections : That he made the World for the Manifef-
tation of his Power and Wifdom, and to commu
nicate his Goodnefs and Happinefs to his Crea
tures : That he preferves it by his continual All-
wife Providence, and governs it according to the
Eternal Rules of infinite Juftice, Equity, Goodnefs,
Mercy, and Truth : That all created rational Be-
. ings, depending continually upon him* are bound
to adore, worfhip, and obey him ; to praife him
for all Things they enjoy, and to pray to him for
every Thing they want: That they are All obliged to
promote, in their Proportion, and according to the
Extent of their feveral Powers and Abilities, the ge
neral Good and Welfare of thofe Parts of the World
wherein they are placed; in like Manner as the Divine
Goodnefs is continually promoting the univerfal Be
nefit of the Whole :. That Men in particular are every
one obliged to make it their Bufinefs, by an univerfal
Benevolence, to promote the Happinefs of all others*
That, in order to this, every Man is bound always
to behave himfelf fo towards Others, as in Reafon he
would defire they fhould, in like Circumftances, deal
with Him : That therefore he is obliged to obey and
fubmit. to his Superiors in all juft and right; Thing?
for the Prefervation of Society, and the Peace and
Benefit of the Publick j to be juft and hpneft, equi^ table

and Revealed Religion. #3
table and fincere, in all his Dealings with his Equals*
for the keeping inviolable the everlafting Rule of
Righteoufnefsj and maintaining an umve:fal Truft
and Confidence, Friendfhip and Affection amongft
Men ; andj towards his Inferiors* to be gentle and
kind, eafy and affable* charitable and willing to affift
as many as ftand in need of his Help, for the Pre^>
fervation of univerfal Love and Benevolence amongft
Mankind, and in Imitation of the Goodnefs of God*
who preferves and does Good to all Creatures,
which depend intirely upon Him for their very Be
ing, and all that they enjoy : That, in Refpect of
Himfelf, every Man is bound to preferve, as much
as in him lies, his own Being, and the right Ufe of
all his Faculties, fo long as it fhall pleafe God, who
appointed him his Station in this World, to con
tinue him therein : That therefore he is bound to
have an exact Government of his Paffions, and care
fully to abftain from all Debaucheries and Abufes
of himfelf, which tend either to the Deftruction of
his own Being, or to the Difordering of his Faculties*
and difabling him from performing his Duty, or
hurrying him into the Pradtice of unreafonable and
unjuft Things : Laftly, That, accordingly as Men
regard or neglect thefe Obligations, fo they are pro-
portionably acceptable or difpleafing unto God ;
who, being Supreme Governor of the World* can
not but teftify his Favour or Difpleafure at fome
Time or other ; and, confequently, fince this is not
done in the prefent State, therefore there muft be a
future State of Rewards and Punifhments in a Life
to come. But All this, the Men we are now fpeak
ing of, pretend to believe only fo far as 'tis difcover-
ajble by the Light of Nature alone, without be- -
lieving any Divine Revelation. Thefe, I fay* are
the only True Deifts -, and, indeed, the only Perfons
who ought in Reafon to be argued with, in order to
convince them of the Reafonablenefs, Truth, and
M Certainty

$4 The Evidence of 'Natural
Certainty of the Chriftian Revelation. But alas-!
* fg. it. there is, as I * before faid, too much Reafon to be
lieve, that there are very few or nomfiucb Deifts as
thefe among modern Deniers of Revelation, For
fuch Men as I have now defcribed, if they would at
all attend to the Confequences of their own Prin
ciples, could not fail of being quickly perfuaded to
embrace Chriftianity. For, being fully convinced
' of the Obligations ofi Natural Religion, and the Cer
tainty of a future State of Rewards or Putiifihments ;
and yet obferving, at the fame Time, how little Ufe
Men generally are able to make of the Light of Rea
fon to difcover the one, or to convince themfelves
effectually of the Certainty and Importance of the
other ; 'tis impoffible but they muft be fenfible of
the Want of a Revelation •, 'tis impoifible but they
muft earneftly defire God would be pleafed, by fome
direct Difcovery of his Will, to make thefe Things
more clear and plain, more eafy and obvious, more
certain and evident, to all Capacities ; 'tis impoffible
but they muft wifh God would be pleafed particu
larly to fignify exprefsly the Acceptablenefs of Re
pentance, and his Willingnefs to fottgive returning
Sinners ; tis impoffible but they muft be very folli-
citous to have fome more particular and certain In
formation concerning the N ature of that future State*
which Reafon teaches diem in general to expeft.
The Confequence of this is, that they muft needs
be poffefied before-hand with a ftrong Hope, that the
Chriftian Revelation may, upon due Examination,
appear to be true. They muft be infinitely far from
ridiculing and defpifing any Thing that claims to be
a Divine Revelation, before they have fincerely and
thoroughly examined it to the Bottom. They muft
needs be before-hand very much difpofed in its Fa
vour ; and be very willing to be convinced, that,
what tends to the Advancing and Perie&ing theOb-'
ligations of Natural Religion, to the Securing their
great

and Revealed Religion* 2|
great Hopes, and Afcertaining the Truth of a future
State of Rewards and Punifhments ; and can any
Way be made appear to be worthy of God, and con
fiftent with his Attributes * and has Any reafonable
Proof of the Matters of Fact it depends upon ; is
really and truly, what it pretends to be, a Divine Re
velation. And now, is it poffible that any Man, with
thefe Opinions and thefe Difpofitions, fhould con
tinue to reject Chriftianity, when propofed to him
in its original and genuine Simplicity, without the
Mixture of any Corruptions or Inventions of Men ?
Let him read the Sermons and Exhortations of our
Saviour, as delivered in the Gofipels ; and the Dif-
courfes of the Apoftles, preferved in their Abts and
their Epiftles ; and try if he can withftand the Evi
dence of fuch a Doctrine, and reject the Hopes of
fuch a glorious Imorlortality fo difcovered to hitru
The Heathen Philofiophers, thofe few of them, who Thai there
taught and lived up to the Obligations of Natural " ""•"' n»
Religion, had indeed a confiftent Scheme of Deifm $J*^/"
fo far as it went -, and they were very Brave and Wife peijm i„
Men, if any of thena could keep fteddy and firm to it. the Worldt
But the Cafe is not fo Now. The fame Scheme of
Deifin is not any longer confiftent with its own
Principles, it k does not now lead Men to embrace
and believe Revelation, as it Then taught them to hope
for k. Deifts^ in Our Days* who obftinately reject
Revelation when offered to them, are not fuch Men
as Socrates and Tally were ; but, under Pretence of
Deifm, it is plain, they are generally Ridiculers of
aU that is truly excellent even in Natural Religion
itfelf. Could we fee a Deift* whofe Mind was
heartily poffeffed with worthy and juft Apprehenfions
of all the Attributes of God, and a deep Senfe' of
his Duty towards that Supreme Author and Bre-
ferver of his Being : Could we fee a Deift, who li
ved, in anvexact Performance of all the Duties of
Natural Religion j and by the Practice of Righteouf-
M a fiefs*

26 ' The E v i d e n c e of Natural
nefs, Juftice, Equity, Sobriety, and Temperance*
expreffed, in his Actions as well as Words, a firm
Belief and Expectation of a future State of Rewards
and Punifhments. In a Word, could we fee a Deift,
Who, with Reverence and Modefty, with Sincerity
and Impartiality, with a true and hearty Defire of
finding out and fubmitting to Reafon and Truth,
would inquire into the Foundations of our Belief,
and examine thoroughly the Pretentions which pure
and uncorrupt Chriftianity has to be received as a
Divine Revelation ; I think we could not doubt re
affirm of fuch a Perfon, as our Saviour did of the
young Man in the'Gofpel, that he was not far from
the Kingdom of God ; and that, being willing to do his
Will, hefihouldknow of the Doilrine, whether it was of
God. But, as I have faid, there is great Reafon to
doubt, there are are no fuch Deifts as thefe among
the Infidels of Our Days. This, indeed, is what
they fometimes pretend, and feem to defire fhould
bethought to be their Cafe. But alas! their trivial
and vain Cavils ; their Mocking and Ridiculing
without and before Examination * their directing
the whole Strefs of their Objections againft parti
cular Cuftoms, or particular and perhaps uncertain
Opinions, or Explications of Opinions, without at
all confidering the main Body of Religion * their
loofe, vain, and frothy Difcourfes ; and, above all,
their vicious and immoral Lives ; fhew plainly and
Undeniably, that they are not really Deifts, but
mere Atheifts ; and confequently not capable to
judge of the Truth of Chriftianity. If they were
truly and in earneft fuch Deifts as they pretend and
would fometimes be thought to be, thofe Principles
(as has been already fhewn in Part, and will more
fully appear in -the following Difcourfe) would un
avoidably lead them to Chriftianity. But, being
fuch as they really are, they cannot poffibly avoid
recurring to downright Atheifim. The

and Revealed Religion. ij
The Sum is this. There is «, T,„ «„ '» . ...
now * no fuch Thing, as a con- rum Summa, quam fuperius
fiftent Scheme of Deifm. That comprehendimus.aberraveris;
which alone was once fuch, name- omms ratio .intereat, & ad
ly, the Scheme of the beft Heathen jj££ ™ <eve"antur-
Philofiophers, ceafes now to be fo,
after the Appearance of Revelation : Becaufe (as I
have already fhewn, and fhall more largely prove
in the Sequel of this Difcourfe) it directly conducts
Men to the Belief of Chriftianity. All other Pre
tences to Deifim may, by unavoidable Confequence,
be forced to terminate in abfolute Atheifim. He that
cannot prevail with himfelf to obey the Chrifiian
Doctrine, and embrace thofe Hopes of Life and Im
mortality, which our Saviour has brought to Light
through the Gofpel ; cannot Now be imagined to
maintain, with any Firmnefs, Steddinefs, and Cer
tainty, the Belief of the Immortality ofi the Soul, and a
future State of Rewards and Punifhments after Death ;
Becaufe all the main Difficulties and Objections lie
equally againft Both. For the fame Reafon, he who
difbelieves the Immortality of the Soul, and a future
State of Rewards and Punifhments ; cannot defend,
to any effectual Purpofe, or inforce with any fuffi
cient Strength, the Obligations of Morality and Natu
ral Religion ; notwithftanding that they are indeed
incumbent upon Men, from the very Nature and
Reafon of the Things themfelves. Then ; he who
gives up the Obligations of Morality and Natural
Religion, cannot poffibly have any juft and worthy
Notion of the moral Attributes of God, or any true
Senfe of the Nature and neceffary Differences of Things.
And he that once goes thus far, has no Foundation
left, upon which he can be fure of the natural Attri^
butes, or even of the Exiftence of God : Becaufe to
deny what unavoidably follows from the Suppofi
tion of his Exiftence and natural Attributes, is in
Reality denying thofe natural Attributes, and that
M 3 Exiftence

g8 The E v i d e n c e of Natural
Exiftence itfelf. On the contrary : He who be*
lieves the Being and natural Attributes of God, muft
of Neceffity (aB has been fhewn in my former Dif
courfe) confefs his moral Attributes alfo. Next ; he
who owns and has juft Notions of the moral Attri*
butes of God, cannot avoid acknowledging the
Obligations of Morality and Natural Religion. In like
Manner ; he, who owns the Obligations of Mora
lity and Natural Religion, muft needs, to fupport
thofe Obligations, and make them effectual in Prac
tice, believe a future State of Rewards and Punifth
tnents. And finally ; he who believes both the
Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Certainty
of a future State of Rewards and Punifhments ;
has no Mariner of Reafon left, why he fhould
reject the Chrifiian Revelation, when propofed to
him in its original and genuine Simplicity, Where*
fore fince thofe Arguments which demonftrate to
Us the Being and Attributes of God, are fo clofely
connected with thofe which prove the Reafonable-
nefs and Certainty of the Chriftian Revelation, that
there is Now no cpnfiftent Scheme of Deifm left;
all modern Deifts being forced to fhift from one
Cavil to another, and having no fixed and certain
Set of Principles to adhere to : I thought I could
no Way better prevent their ill Defigns, and obviate
all their different Shifts and Objections, than, by
endeavouring, in the fame Method of Reafoning
by which I before demonftrated the Being and Attri
butes of God, to prove in like Manner, by one direct
and continued Thread of Arguing, the Reafonable-
nefs and Certainty of the Chriftian Revelation alfo.
To procee"d therefore to the Proof of the Propo*
fttions themfelves,
I. The fame neceffary and eternal different Relations,
that different Things bear one to another * and the fame
-cmfeau^ent, Fitnefs or Unntnefs vf the Application of
different

and Revealed Religion. 2£
different Things ' or different Relations one to another ;
with Regard to which, the Will of God always and
neeeffarily does determine itfielfi, to chufie to ail only
what is agreeable to Juftice, Equity, Goodnefis and
Truth, in Order to the Welfare of the whole Univerfe ;
ought likewife conftantly to determine the Wills of all
fubordinate rational Beings, to govern all Their Actions
by the fame Rules, for the Good of the Publick, in
their refpetlive Stations. That is ; thefie eternal and
neceffary Differences of Things make it fit and reafon-
able for Creatures fo to alii; they caufe it to be their
Duty, or lay an Obligation upon them, fio to do ;
even fieparate firom the Confideration of thefe Rules
being the pofitive Will or Command of God ; and
alfio antecedent to any RefipeEl or Regard, Expectation
or Apprehenjion, ofi any particular private and per-
fonal Advantage or Difad vantage, Reward or Pu-
nifhment, either prcfient or future ; annexed either by
natural Confequence, or by pofitive Appointment, to the
Praclifing or Neglecting of thofie Rules.
The feveral Parts of this Propofition may be
proved diftinctly, in the following Manner.
i. That there' are Differences of Things; and That there
different Relations, RefpeCis or Proportions, of fome areeternal
things towards others ; is as evident and undeniable, aJ "p)*tfe.
as that one Magnitude or Number is greater, equal rentes of
to, or fmaller than another. That, from thefe dif- Things.
ferent Relations of different Things, there neeeffarily
arifes an Agreement or Difagreement of fome Things
with others, or a Fitnefis or Unfitnefis of the Applica
tion of different Things or different Relations one
to another ; is likewife as plain, as that there is any
fuch Thing as Proportion or Difiproportion in Geometry
and Arithmetick, ox Uniformity or Difformity in com
paring together the refpective Figures of Bodies.
Further, that there is a Fitnefs or Suitablenefs of
certain Circumftances to certain Perfions, and an Un-
fiuitableuefis of others; founded in the Nature of
M 4 Things

g<5 " ^Evidence of Natural
Things and the Qualifications of Perfons, antecedent
to all pofitive Appointment whatfoever : Alfo that,
from the different Relations of different Perfons one to.
another, there neeeffarily arifes a Fitnefs or Unfitnefs
pf certain Manners of Behaviour of fome Perfons to
wards others : Is as manifeft, as that the Properties
which flow from the Effences of different mathema-r
tical Figures, have different Congruities or Incongruities
between themfelves ; or that, in Mechanics, certain.
Weights or Poivers have very different Forces, and
different Effects one upon Another, according to
their different Diftances, or different Pofitions and&'-
tuations in refpect of each other. Fox Inftance: That
God is infinitely fuperior to Men ; is as clear, as that
Infinity is larger than a Point, or Eternity longer than
a Moment. And 'tis as certainly Fit, that Men fhould
honour and worfhip, obey and imitate God, rather.
than on the contrary in all their Actions endeavour
to djfhonour and difobey him ; as 'tis certainly True,
that they have an intire Dependence on Him, and
He on the contrary can in no Refpect receive any
Advantage from Them ; and not only fo, but alfq
that his Will is as certainly and unalterably juft and
equitable in giving his Commands, as his Power is
irrefiftible in requiring Submiffion to it. Again;
tis a Thing abfolutely and neeeffarily Fitter in itfelf,
that the Supreme Author and Creator of the Uni
verfe fhould govern, order, and direct all Things
to certain conftant and regular Ends ; than that every
Thing fhould be permitted to go on at Adventures,
and produce uncertain Effects merely by Chance, and
in the utmoft Confufion, without any determinate
View or Defign at all, 'Its a Thing manifeftly
Fitter in itfelf, that the All-powerful Governor of
the World ftiould do always what is Beft in the
Whole, and what tends moft to the univerfal Good
of the whole Creation ; than that he fhould make
the Whole continually miferabie ; or that, to fatisfy the

and Revealed Religion. 31
the unreafonable Defires of any particular depraved
Natures, he fhould at any Time fuffer the Order
of the Whole to be altered and perverted. Laftly,
'tis a Thing evidently and infinitely more FzV, that
any one particular innocent and good Being fhould, by
the Supreme Ruler and Difpofer of all Things, be
placed and preferved in an eafiy and happy Eftate 5
than that, without any Fault or Demerit of its own,
it fhould be made extremely, remedilefisly, and endlefisly
miferabie. In like Manner ; in Men's Dealing and
Converting one with another ; 'tis undeniably more
Fit, abfolutely and in the Nature of the Thing it
felf, that all Men fhould endeavour to promote the
univerfal Good and Welfare of All ; than that all Men
fhould be continually contriving the Ruin and De-
ftruCtion of All. 'Tis evidently more Fit, even be
fore all pofitive Bargains and Compacts, that Men
fhould deal one with another according to the
known Rules of Juftice and Equity ; than that every
Man, for his own prefent Advantage, fhould with
out Scruple difappoint the moft reafionable and equi
table Expectations of his Neighbours, and cheat and
defraud^ or fipoil by Violence, all others without Re-
ftraint. Laftly, 'tis without Difpute more Fit and
Reafonable in itfelf, that I fhould prefierve the Life of
an innocent Man, that happens at any Time to be in
my Power ; or deliver him from any imminent Dan
ger, tho' I have never made any Promife fo to do ;
than that I fhould fuffer him to perifh, or take away
his Life, without any Reafon or Provocation at all.
Thefe Things are fo notorioufly plain and felf- The alfir-
evident, that nothing but the extremeft Stupidity of dity of thofe
Mind, Corruption of Manners, or Perverfenefs of^fj^
Spirit, can poffibly make any Man entertain the leaft and Mcef-
Doubt concerning them, For a Man endued with>o> Diffe-
Reafion, to deny the Truth of thefe Things ; is the ™£fj f
very fame Thing, as if a Man that has ..the Ufe of tngs'
his Sight, fhould at the fame Time that he beholds
the Sun, deny that there is any fuch Thing as Light in

32 The Evidence of Natural
in the World -, or as if a Man that underftands Geo
metry or Arithmethick, fhould deny the moft obvious
and known Proportions of Lines or Numbers, and per-
verfely contend that the Whole is not equal to, all its
Parts, or that a Square is not double to a Triangle of
equal Bafe and Height. Any Man of ordinary
Capacity, and unbyaffed Judgment, Plainnefs and
Simplicity ; who had never read, and had never
been told, that there were Men and Philofophers,.
who had in earneft afferted and attempted to prove,
that there is no natural and unalterable Difference
between Good and Evil ; would at the firft Hearing
be as hardlyperfuaded to believe* that it could ever
feally enter into, the Heart of any Intelligent Man*
to deny all natural Difference between Right and
Wrong ; as he would be to believe, that ever there
could be any Geometer who would ferioufly and in
good Earneft lay it down as a firft Principle, that a
crooked Line is as Straight as a Right one. So that in
deed it might juftly feem altogether a needlefs Un
dertaking, to attempt to prove and eftablifh the
eternal Difference of Good and Evil -, had there not
appeared certain Men, as Mr. Hobbs, and fome few
Others, who have prefumed, contrary to the plaineft
and moft obvious Reafon of Mankind, to affert, and
not without fome Subtlety endeavoured to prove,
that there is no fuch real Difference originally, neeef
farily, and abfiolutely in the Nature of Things ; but
that all Obligation of Duty to God arifes merely from
his abfolutely irrefiftible Power ; and all Duty towards
Men, merely from pofitive Compact: And have found
ed their whole Scheme of Politicks upon that Opi
nion. Wherein as they have contradicted the Judg
ment of all the wifeft and fobereft Part of Mankind,
fo they have not been able to avoid contradicting
themfelves alfo. For (not to mention now, that
they have no Way to fhew how Compacts themfelves
come to be Obligatory, but by inconfiftently owning
an eternal original Fitnefis in the Thing itfelf, which
I fhall

and Revealed Religion. 33
I fhall have Occafion to obferve hereafter S Befides
This, I fay,) if thefe be naturally and abfiolutely, in
Things themfelves, no Difference between Good and
fivil, Juft and Unjuft ; then in the State of Nature,
before any Compact be made, 'tis equally as good,
juft, and reafonable, for one Man to deftroy the
Life of another, not only when 'tis neceffary for
his own Prefervation, but alfo arbitrarily and with
out any * Provocation at all, or any Appearance of *SteHobh
Advantage to himfelf; as to preferve or fave ano- deC've.«,
ther Man's Life, when he may do it without any 3' ** *'
Hazard of his own. The Confequence of which
is, that not only the firft and moft obvious Way
for every particular Man to fecure himfelf effec~tu-
ally, would be (as Mr. Hobbs teaches) to endeavour
to prevent and cut off all others ; but alfo that Men
might deftroy one another upon every foolifh and
peevifh or arbitrary Humour, even when they did
not think any fuch Thing neceffary for their own
Prefervation. And the Effect of this Practice muft
needs be, that it would terminate in the Deftruction
of all Mankind. Which being undeniably a great
and unfufferable Evil, Mr. Hobbs himfelf confefies
it reafonable, that, to prevent this Evil, Men fhould
enter into certain Compacts to preferve one another.
Now if the Deftruction of Mankind by each other's
Hands be fuch an Evil, that, to prevent it, it was
fit and reafonable that Men fhould enter into Com
pacts to preferve each other ; then, before any fuch
Compacts, it was manifeftly a Thing unfit and un-
reafionable in itfelf, that Mankind fhould all deftroy
one another. And, if fo, then for the fame Reafon,
|t was alfo unfit and unreafonable, antecedent to all
Compacts, that any one Man fhould deftroy another
arbitrarily and without any Provocation, or at any
Time when it was not abfiolutely and immediately ne
ceffary for the Prefervation of himfelf. Which is
directly contradictory to Mr- #?^'s firft Suppofi- tiori,

g ^ 7&? E v t d e N c e £/" Natural
* Ex his fequitur injuriam tion, of * there being no natural
nemini fieri pofle, nifi ei quo- and abfolute Difference between
cum initur paftum. De Cive Good and Evil, Juft and Unjuft,
% 3> §* fcJSJJT fU mm " antecedent to pofitive Compact.
the fame Pufpoje. , . £ ... f
And in like Manner All others,
who upon any Pretence whatfoever, teach that Good
and Evil depend originally on the Conftitution of
pofitive Laws, whether Divine or Human ; muft una
voidably run into the fame Abfurdity. For if there
be no fuch Thing as Good and Evil in the Nature
of Things, antecedent to all Laws -, then neither
can any one Law be better than another ; nor any
one Thing whatever be more juftly eftablifhed,<
and inforced by Laws, than the contrary ; nor can
-f- any Reafon be given, why any
f Manifeftum eft rationem Laws fl^^ £ver fa made M ^ ,
nullam efle Lege prohibenti „ ,. T ,, ... , .
noxas tales, nifiagnofcuntta- But a11 Laws, equally, Will be
les Aftus, etiam antecedenter either J arbitrary and tyrannical,
ad ullam Legem, mala efle. or frivolous and needlefs ; becaufe
Cumberl.de Leg Nat. pag. i9±. th contrary might with equal
t Nam ftohdnas invemn ' & fi
qua; inanior poteft, quam ma- Reafon have been eftabhfhed, if,
la effe nulla contendere, & before the Making of the Laws',"
tanquam malos perdem & con- a]i Things had been alike indiffe-
demnare peccantes t Arms. P • »7 rr,
adverfi Gentes. lib. z. rent in their own Nature. There
is no poffible Way to avoid this
Abfurdity, but by faying, that, out of Things in
their, own Nature abfolutely indifferent, thofe are
chofen by wife Governors to be made obligatory.
by Law, the Practice of which they judge will tend
to the public Benefit of the Community. But this
is in exprefs Contradiction in the very Terms. For
if the Practice of certain Things tends to the public
Benefit of the World, and the contrary would tend
to the public Difadvantage ; then thofe Things are
not in their own Nature indifferent, but were good
and reafonable to be practifed before any Law was
made, and can only for that very Reafon be wifely
inforced by the Authority of Laws. Only here it
is

and Revealed Religion. 35
is to be obferved, that by the pub- ' "
lie Benefit muft * not be under- * <*P autuem Cifum ?th~
n ¦ j 1 , r n_ c nem dicunt habendam, Exter-
ftood the Intereft of any one par- norum negant. dirimunt hJ
ticular Nation, to the plain Injury communemgenerishumanifo-
or Prejudice of the reft of Man- cietatem; quafublata,jultitia
kind ; any more than the Intereft ^dlWs tollitur- Ci" de °#c-
of one City or Family, in Oppofi
tion to their Neighbours of the fame Country : But
thofe Things only are truly good in their own Na
ture, which either tend to the univerfal Benefit and
Welfare of all Men, or at leaft are not deftructive
of it. The true State therefore of this Cafe is plainly
this. Some Things are in their own nature Good and
Reafionable and.fi/ to be done; fuch as keeping Faith,
and performing equitable Compacts, and the like ; And
thefe receive not their obligatory Power, frorn any
Law or Authority ; but are only declared, confirm
ed, and inforced by Penalties, upon fuch as would
not perhaps be governed by right Reafon only.
Other Things are in their own Nature abfolutely
Evil , fuch as breaking Faith, refufing to perform equi
table Compacts, cruelly deftroying thofie who have neither
¦direClly nor indirectly given any Occafion fior any fuch
Treatment, and the like; And thefe cannot, by any
Law or Authority whatfoever, be made fit and
reafonable,- or excufable to be practifed. Laftly,
other Things are in their own Nature Indifferent}
that is, (not abfiolutely and firidly fo ? as fuch trivial
Actions, which have no Way any Tendency at all
either to the public Welfare or Damage ; For,
concerning fuch Things, it would be childifh and
trifling to fuppoie-any Laws to be made at all ; But
they are) fuch Things, whofe Tendency to the pub
lic Benefit or Difadvantage is either fo fimall or fo
remote, or fo obfieure and involved, that the Genera
lity of People are not able' of themfelves to difcern
on which Side they ought to act : And thefe Things
are made Obligatory by the Authority of Laws :
Though

26 The E vt d e n c e of Natural
AnAnfiwtt Though perhaps everyone cannot diftinctly per-
lotbeobjec- ceive the Reafon- and Fitnefs- of their being en-
$^7* joined : Of which Sort are many particular penal
Variety of Laws, in feveral Countries and Nations. But to
the Opini- proceed.
"ed'tleT*' The principal Thing that can, with any Colour
'and The of Reafon, feem to countenance the Opinion of
Law of thofe who deny the natural and eternal. Difference
different Qf qOQ(j an(j ^V1\ . (for Mr. Hobbs's falfe Reafon-
eotcTnL i"gs l M hereafter confider by themfelves •,) is
right and the Difficulty there may fometimes be to define
wrong, exactly the Bounds of Right and Wrong; the
Variety * of Opinions, that have
* t« l\ xota tat V« 3f*»i«, obtained even among underftand-
«te|J m v *r<*.W o-Koinnai,™- -m„ an<j Earned Men concerning
~4» fe. fec^e* *m «*•„., ^ j Queftions of Juft and Un-
aire eoxenvi>i*u eimu,<l>vo-iidt fun. *^~ ^~ J . -
Ariftot. Ethic, lib. \. cap. i. juft, efpecially in political Mat
ters ; and the many contrary Law
that have been made in divers Ages and in diS©.
rent Countries, concerning thefe Matters. But as,
in Painting, two very different Colours, by diluting
each other vefy flowly and gradually, may from
the higheft Intenfenefs in either Extreme, terminate
in the Midft infenfibly, and fo run one into Jshe
other* that it fhall not be poffible even for a fkilful
Eye to determine exactly where the one ends, and
the other begins ; and yet the Colours may really
differ as much as can be, not in Degree only, but
entirely in Kind, as Red and Blue, or White and
Black : So, though it may perhaps be very difficult
in fome nice and perplexed Cafes (which yet are very
far from occurring frequently) co define exactly me
Bounds of Right and Wrong, Juft and Ujyrcfli;
and there may be fome Latitude in the Judgr
ment of different Men, and the Laws of divers
Nations ; yet Right and Wrong are neverthelefs, in
themfelves totally and eflentially different ; even
altogether as much, as White and Black, Light mi
Larknefis,

and Revealed Religion. 37
toarknefis. The Spartan Law per
haps, which * permitted their * K*tVW »t»^uro *M iKtv-
Youth to Steal ; may, as abfurd *f" 5 '"f*?* s; T* TK 5TT0''
1 , JL. r , Plutarch. Ap.opbthesmata Lacs-
as it was, bear much Difpute, whe- WM. ^ *
ther it was abfolutely Unjufi or no ;
becaufe, every Man having an abfolute Right in his
own Goods, it may feem that the Members of any
Society may agree to transfer or alter their own Pro
perties upon what Conditions they fhall think fit.
But if it could be fuppofed, that a Law had been
made at Sparta ; or at Rome, or in India, or in any
other Part of the World ; whereby it had been
commanded or allowed, that every Man might Rob
by Violence, and Murther whomfoever he met with ;
or that no Faith fhould be kept with any Man* nor
any equitable Compacts performed ; no Man, with any
tolerable Ufe of his Reafon, whatever Diverfity of
Judgment might be among them in other Matters,
would have thought that fuch a Law could have
authorifed or excufed, much lefs have juftified fuch
Actions, and have made them become good : Be
caufe 'tis plainly not in Men's Power to make Falfe-
Mod be. Truth, though they may alter the Property ef
their Goods as theypleafe. Now if* m flagrant Cafest
the natural and effential Difference between Good
and Evil, Right and Wrong, cannot but be con-
fefled to be plainly and undeniably evident; the
Difference between them muft be alfo effential and
unalterable in all, even the fmalleft and niceft and
' moft intricate, Cafes, though it be not fo eafy to
be difcerned and accurately diftinguifhed. For if,
from the Difficulty of determining exactly the
Bounds of Right and Wrong in many perplexeddfts,
it could truly be concluded, that Juft and Unjufi:
were not effentially different by Nature, but only
by pofitive Conftitution and Cuftom ; it would fol
low equally, that they were not really, effentially,
and unalterably different, even in the msft flagrant Cafes

3& The Evidence of Natura!
Cafes that can be foppofed. Which is an Affertidn
fo very abfurd, that Mr. Hobbs himfelf could hardly
vent itwithout blufhing, and difcovering plainly* by
hisfhiftingExpteffions,his fecret Self-condemnation.
There Are therefore certain neceffary and eternal Dif
ferences of Things -, and certain confequent Fitnejfes
or Unfitneffes of the Application of different Things
or different Relations one to another; not depending
on any pofitive Conftitutions, but founded unchanged
ably in the Nature and Reafon of Things* and
unavoidably arifing from the Differences of the
Things themfelves. Which is the firft Branch of
the general Propofition I propofed to prove.
That the 2- Now what thefe eternal and unalterable Rela*
mil of God tions, Refipeds, or Proportions of Things, with their
always de- confequent Agreements or Difiagreements, Fitnejfes' or
%7t7aci Unfitneffes, abfolutely and neeeffarily Are in them-
accerding felves ; That alfo they appear to be, to the Under-
to the eter-ftandings of all Intelligent Beings ; exceptthofe only,
na}fre^f'"t who underftand Things to be what they are not,
"J ">is- tha£ jS) wnpfe Underftandings are either very imper
fect, or very much depraved. And by this Under
ftanding or Knowledge of the natural and neceffary
Relations, Fitnefles, and Proportions of Things, the
Wills likewife of all Intelligent Beings are conftantly
directed, and muft needs be determined to act ac
cordingly -, excepting thofe only, who Will Things
to be what they are not and cannot be; that is, whofe
Wills are corrupted by particular Intereft or Affec
tion, or fwayed by fome unreafonable and prevailing
Paffion. Wherefore fince the natural Attributes of
God, his infinite Knowledge, Wifdom, and Power*
fet Him infinitely above all Poffibility of being de'.
ceived by any Error, or of being influenced by any.
wrong Affection ; 'tis manifeft His Diviae WiU can
not but always and neeeffarily determine itfelf to
chufe to Do what in the Whole is- abfolutely Beft
and Fitteft to be done *\ that is* to act conftantly ac
cording

and Revealed Religion. 33
cording to the eternal Rules of infinite Goodnefs,
juftice and Truth. As I have endeavoured to
fhew diftinctly in my former Difcourfe in deducing,
feverally the Moral Attributes of God.
3. And now, that the fame Reafion of Things, •That all
with Regard to which the Will of God always and rational
neeeffarily Does determine itfelf to act in conftant Creatures
Conformity to the eternal Rules of Juftice, Equity > "'^,
Goodnefs and Truth, ought alfo conftantly to deter- themfel-ves
mine the Wills of all Subordinate Rational Beings in all their
to govern all Their Actions by the- fame Rules, is -^'msf>
very evident. For, as 'tis abfolutely imptffible in Na- fir^,!iRule
ture, that God fhould be deceived by any Error, or ofRcfon.
influenced by any wrong Affedion : So 'tis very un
reafonable and Blameworthy in Practice, that any
Intelligent Creatures, whom God has made fo far like
unto himfelf, as to indue them with thofe excellent
Paculties of Reafion and Will, whereby they are en
abled to diftinguifh Good from Evil, and to chufe the ,
one, and refufe the other; fhould either negligently
fuffer themfelves to be impofed upon and deceived in
Matters of Good and Evil, Right and Wrong ; or
wiffiully and perverfely allow themfelves to be over
ruled, by abfurd Pafifions and corrupt or partial Affcc*
tions, to act contrary to what they know is Fit 10 be
done. Which two Things, viz. negligent Mif under
ftanding, or wilful Pafifions and Lufts, are, as I faid*
the only Caufes which can make a reafonable Crea-.
ture act contrary to Reafon, that is, contrary to the
eternal Rules of Juftice, Equity* Righteoufnefs and
Truth. For, was it not for thefe inexcufable Cor
ruptions and Depravations, 'tis impoffible. but the
fame Pioportions and Fitneffes of Things, which
have fo much Weight and fo much Excellency and
Beauty in them, that the Ail-powerful Creator
and Governor of the Univerfe (who has the abfolute
and uncontroulable Dominion of all Things in his
own Hands, and is accountable to none for what
N he

40 The Evidence/ Natural
he does, yet) thinks it no Diminution of his Power
to make this Reafon ofi Things the unalterable Rule
and Law of all- his own Actions in the1 Government
of the World, and does nothing by mere'Will and
Arbitrarinefs ; 'tis impoffible, '(I fay) if it was not
for inexcufable Corruption and Depravation, but the
fame eternal Reafion ofi Things muft much more have
Weight enough to determine conftantly the Wills
and Actions of all Subordinate, Finite, Dependent
Proiied a°d Accountable Beings. For originally1 and in
from the Reality, 'tis as natural and (morally fpeaking). ne-
origmal ceffary, that the Will fhould be determined in every
ThiZs. Action by the Reafion of the Thing, and the Right ofi
the Cafe ; as 'tis natural and (abfolutely fpeaking)
neceffary, that the Underftanding fhould fubmit to a
demonftrated Truth. And 'tis as abfurd and Blame
worthy to miftake negligently plain Right and Wrong,
that is, to underftand the Proportions of Things in
Morality to be what they are not ; or wilfully to ail
contrary to known Juftice and Equity, that is* to
will Things to be what they are not and cannot be;
as it would be abfurd and ridiculous for a Man, in
Arithmetical Matters, ignorantly to believe, that
Twice Two is not equal to Four ; or wilfully and ob-
ftinately to contend, againft his own clear Know
ledge, that the Whole is not equal to all its Parts.
The only Difference is, that Afifient to a plain fpe-
culative Truth is not in a Man's Power to with
hold ; but to ACt according to the plain Right and
Reafion of Things, this he may, by the natural Li
berty of his Will forbear. But the One he ought to
do ; and 'tis as much his plain and indifpenfable
Duty ; as the other he cannot but do, and 'tis the Ne
ceffity of his Nature to do it. He that wilfully refufes
to Honour and Obey God, from whom he received his
Being, and to whom he continually owes his Pre
fervation, is really guilty of an equal Abfurdity
and Inconfiftency in Practice, as he that in Specula tion

and Revealed Religion* 'fix
tion denies the EffeCt to owe any Thing to its Caufe, or
the Whole to be bigger than its Part. He that refufes
to deal with all Men equitably, and with every Man
as he defires they fhould deal with him, is guilty of
the very fame Unreafonablenefs and Contradiction
in one Cafe, as he that, in another Cafe, fhould affirm
one, Number or Quantity to be equal to another, and
yet That other, at the fame Time, not to be equal to the
- firft. Laftly, he that acknowledges himfelf obliged
to the Practice of certain Duties both towards God
and towards Men, and yet takes no Care either to
preferve his own Being, or at leaft not to preferve
himfelf in fuch a State and Temper of Mind, and
Body, as may beft enable him to perform thofe Du
ties, is altogether as inexcufable and ridiculous as he
that, in any other Matter, fhould affirm one Thing at
the fame Time that he denies another, without which
the former could not poffibly be true *, or undertake
one Thing, at the fame Time that he obftinately omits
another, without which the former is by no Means
practicable. Wherefore all rational Creatures, whofe
Wills are not conftantly and regularly determined,
and their Actions governed, by right Reafon and
the neceffary Differences of Good and Evil, accord
ing to the eternal and invariable Rules of Juftice*
Equity, Goodnefs and Truth •, but fuffer themfelves
to be fwayed by unaccountable arbitrary Humours,
and rafh Paffions, by Lufts* Vanity and Pride •, by
private Intereft, or prefent fenfual Pleafures : Thefe,
fetting up their dwn unreafonable Self-will in Oppor
fition to the Nature and Reafon of Things, endea
vour (as much as in them lies) to make Things be
•what they are not, and cannot be. Which-is the
higheft Prefumption and greateft Infolence, as well
asthe greateft Abfurdity, imaginable. 'Tis acting
contrary to that Underftanding, Reafon and Judg
ment, which God has implanted in their Natures
on Purpofe to enable them to difcern the Difference
between Good and Evil. 'Tis attempting to deftroy
N 2 thao

4,2 The E v i d enge. of Natural
' ' that Order,' by which the Univerfe fubfifts. 'Tis
offering the higheft Affront imaginable to the Crea
tor of all Things, who made Things to be what they
are, and governs every Thing himfelf according to
the Laws of their feveral Natures. In a Word ; All
wilful Wickednefs and Perverfion of Right is the
very fame Infolence and Abfurdity in Moral Mat
ters ; as it would be in Natural Things for a Man to
pretend to alter the certain Proportions of Num
bers, to take away the Demonftrable Relations and
Properties of Mathematical Figures ; to make Light
Darknefs, and Da-rknefs Light ; or to call Sweet
Bitter, and Bitter Sweet.
And from Further ; As it appears thus from the abftraCl and
the Senfe, abfiolute Reafon and N ature of Things, that all ratio-
that all, naj Creatures Ought, that is, are obliged to take Care
IT Men ' tnat che'r Wills and Actions be conftantly deter-
unavoid- mined and governed by the eternal Rule of Right
ably have, ani\ Equity : So the Certainty and Univerfality of
of their be- ^^ Q,\faat{on js plainly confirmed, and the Force
tn9 UHuCV © 1. / *
fuch an of it particularly difcovered and applied to every
ObUga- Man, by This ; that in like Manner as no one,
uon. wj10 js instructed in Mathematics, can forbear
giving his Aflent to every Geometrical Demon
ftration, of which he underftands the Terms,
eirher by his own Study, or by having had them
explained to him by Others ; fo no Man, who
either has Patience or Opportunities to examine
and confider Things himfelf, or has the Means
of being taught and inftructed in any tolerable
Manner by Others, concerning the neceffary Re
lations and Dependencies of Things, can avoid
giving his Affient to the Fitnefs and Reafonable-
n.-fs or his governing all his Actions by the Law or
Rule before- mentioned, even though his Practice,
tumuli! the Prevalence of brutifh Lufts, be moft
suiiuruiy contradictory to that Affient. That is to
lay ; by the Reafon of his Mind, he cannot but be
compelled to own and acknowledge, that there is
really

and Revealed Religion. ^
really fuch an Obligation indifpenfably incumbent
upon him ; even at the fame Time that in the Actions
of his Life he is endeavouring to throw it off and
defpife it. For the Judgment and Confcience of a
Man's own Mind, concerning the Reafonablenefs
and Fitnefs of the Thing, that his Actions fhould
be conformed to fuch or fuch a Rule or Law ; is the
trueft and formalleft Obligation ; even more properly
and ftrictly fo, than any Opinion whatfoever of the
Authority of the Giver of a Law, or any Regard he
may have to its Sanction by Rewards and Punifh
ments. For whoever acts contrary to this Senfe and
Confcience of his own Mind, is neeeffarily felf-con-
demned ; and the greateft and ftrongeft of all Obli
gations is that which a Man cannot break through
without condemning himfelf. The Dread of fupe-
rior Power and Authority, and the Sanction of Re
wards and Punifhments ; however indeed abfolutely
neceffary to the Government of frail and fallible
Creatures, and truly the moft effectual Means of
keeping Them in their Duty ; is yet rsally in itfelf
only a fiecondary' and additional Obligation, or In-
fiorcement of the firft. The original Obligation of all
(the ambiguous Ufe of which Word, as zTerm ofi
Art, has caufed fome Perplexity and Confufion in
this Matter) is the eternal Reafion of Things -, That
Reafion, which God himfelf, who has no Superior to
direct him, and to whole Happinefs nothing can be
added, nor any Thing dimimfhed from it, yet con
ftantly obliges himfielf to govern the World by : And
the more excellent and per left any Creatures are,
the more chearfully and fteddily are their Wids
always determined by this Supreme Obligation, in
Conformity to the Nature, and in Imitation of the
moft perfect Will of God. So far therefore as
Men are confeious of what is right and wrong,' fo
far they Are under an Obligation to ad accordingly ;
And confequently That eternal Ruie of Right,
N 3 ' which.

A>:d from
the Judg
ment of
Mens Con
Jciences up
on their
pnun paft
AtSions,

The Evidence of Natural
which I have been hitherto defcribing, 'tis evident
Ought'as indifpenfably to govern Mens Actions, as
it Cannot but neeeffarily determine their Affent.
Now that the Cafe is truly thus ; that the eternal
Differences of Good and Evil, the unalterable Rule
of Right and Equity, do neeeffarily and unavoidr
ably determine the Judgment, and force the Affent
of all Men that ufe any Confideration ; is ubdeniar
bly manifeft from the univerfal Experience ofManr
kind. For no Man willingly and deliberately tranf
greffes this Rule, in any great and conftderable \n-.
ftance ; but he acts contrary to the Judgment and
Reafon of his own Mind, and fecretly Reproaches.
himfelf for fo doing. And no Man obferves and
obeys it fteddily, efpecially in Cafes of Difficulty and
Temptation, when it interferes with any prefent Inte^
reft, Pleafure or Paffion ; but his own Mind com
mends and applauds him for his Refolution in exe
cuting what his Confcience could not forbear giving
its Affent to, as Juft and Right. And this is what
St. Paul means, when he fays, {Rom. ii. 14, 15.) that
when the Gentiles which have not the Law, do by Na
ture the Things contained in the Law, thefe, having not
the Law, are a Law unto themfielves ; which fihew the
Work ofi the Law written in their Hearts, their Conr
fcience alfo bearing Witnefis, and their Thoughts the
mean While accufin

&'

or elfe excufing one another.

Of iiat It was a very wife Obfervation of Plato, which
natural he received from Socrates ¦, that if you take a young
Knowledge Man, impartial and unprejudiced, one that never
Plato* had any Learning, nor any Experience in theWorld ;
thought and examine him about the natural Relations and
10 he Reml- Proportions of Things, [or the moral Differences of
p'fience. q00(i an(i _gw7,] yQU may, only by afking him
Queftions, without teaching him any Thing at all
directly, caufe him to exprefs in his Anfwers juft and
adequate Notions of Geometrical Truths, [and true
and exact Determinations concerning Matters of
Rigkt

and Revealed Religion. 45
Right and Wrong."] From whence He thought it
was to be concluded, that all Knowledge and Learn
ing is nothing but Memory, or only a Recollecting
upon every new Occafion, what had been before
known in a State of Prre-exiftence. And fome
Others, both Ancient and Modern, have concluded
that the Ideas of all firft and fimple Truths, either
Natural or Moral, are Innate arid originally imprefi-
.fed or ftamped upon the Mind. In their Inference
from _the Obfervation, the Authors of Both thefe
Opinions feem to be miftaken. But thus much it
proves unavoidably, That the Differences, Relati
ons, and Proportions of Things both Natural and
Moral, in which all unprejudiced Minds thus natu
rally agree, are certain, unalterable, and real in the
Things themfelves, and do not at all depend on the
variable Opinions, Fancies, or Imaginations of Men
prejudiced by Education, Laws, Cuftoms or evil
Practices : And alfo that the Mind of Man naturally
and unavoidably gives its Affent, as to natural and
geometrical Truth, fo alfo to the moral Differences
of Things, and to the Fitnefs and Reafonablenefs
of the Obligation of the everlafting Law of Righ-
teoufnefs, whenever fairly and plainly propofed.
Some Men indeed, who,- by Means of a very evil The moft
arid vicious Education, or through a long Habit of profligate
Wickednefs and Debauchery, have extremely cov-^ff"^"0*
rupted the Principles of their Nature, and have long"^-//^-
accuftomed themfelves to bear down their own Rea- the Dffi-
fon, by the Force of Prejudice, Luft and Paffion ;rcnce °f
that they may not be forced to confefs themfelves E^f
felf-condemned, will confidently and abfolutely con
tend that they do not really fee any natural and ne
ceffary Difference between what we call Right and
Wrong, Juft and Unjufi ; that the Reafon and Judg
ment of their own Mind does not tell them they
„ are under any fuch indifpenfable Obligations, as we
would endeavour to perfuade- them * and that they
N 4 are

46 ' 7&? Evidence of Natural
•are not fenfible they ought to be goyerned by any
other Rule, than their own Will and Pleafure. But
even thefe Men, the moft Profligate of all Mankind;
however induftrioufly they endeavour to conceal and
deny their Self-condemnation -, yet cannot avoid
making a Difcovery of it fometimes when they- are
not aware of it, For Example : 1 here is no-Man
fo vjle and defperate, who commits at any Time a
Murder and Robbery, with the moft unrelenting
Mind ; but * would chufe, if fuch
* Quis eft enim, aut quis a Thing could be propofed to
nnquam fuit, aut avaritia tarn hJ tQ obtaj a]j the fame profic
ardenti, aut tarn eimenatis . • , - . ,
cupiditatibus, ut eandem il- °r Advantage, whatfoever it be
lam rem, quam adipifci fee- that he aims at, without commit-
kre quovis vdit, non multfe ting the Crime, rather than with
l2-Ui:;Ll %eoZ " » — ^ough he was fure to go
fine facinore, quam illo modo unpumfhed for committing the
pervenire? CzV.de Finib. lib, 3. Crime. Nay I believe, there is
no Man, even in Mr. Hobbs,s State,
of Nature, and of Mi"- Hobbs's own Principles ; but
if he was equally affured of fecuring his main End,
his Self-preferv'ation, by either Way -, would chufe
to preferve himfelf rather without deftroying all his
Fellow-Creatures, than with it ; even fuppofing all
Impunity, and all other future Conveniencies of
Life, equal in either Cafe. Mr. Hobbs- s own Scheme,
of Mens agreeing by Compact to preferve one ano
ther, can hardly be Suppofed without this, And
^ this plainly evinces, that the Mind of Man unavoid-r-
raTsen/e" ~ ^bly acknowledges a natural and neceffary Difre-i
le eternal rence between Good and Evil, antecedent to all
vmralOblu arbitrary and pofitive Conftitution whatfoever.
iiyy/oT Biit the Trwti1 °f this' that the Mind °f Man
the Ju7'- naturally and neeeffarily Affents to the eternal Law
mem they of Righteoufnefs, may ftill better and more clearly
all pajs and more univerfaHy appear, ; from the Judgment
VAaiomof ^at ^m Pals uPQn eac'1 Others A£t\ons, than from
Qtk'a what we candifcern concerning their Confcioufnefs of

end Revealed Religion. 47
of their Own. For Men may diffemble and conceal
from the World the Judgment of their own Con
fcience ; nay, by a ftrange Partiality, they may even
impofe upon and deceive Themfelves ; (For who is
there that does not fometimes allow himfelf, nay,
and evenjuftify hirhfelf in that, wherein he condems
Another?) But Mens Judgments concerning the
Actions of Others, efpecially where they have no
Relation to Themfelves, or Repugnance to their In
tereft, are commonly impartial : And from this we
may judge what Senfe Men naturally have of the
unalterable Difference of Right and Wrong. Now
the Obfervation which every one cannot but make
in this Matter, is This ; that Virtue and true Good
nefis, .Righteoufnefs and Equity, are Things fo truly
noble and excellent, fo lovely and venerable in them
felves, and do fo neeeffarily approve themfelves to
the Reafon and Confciences of Men, that even thofe
very Perfons, who, by the prevailing Power of
fome Intereft or Luft, are themfelves drawn afide out
of the Paths of Virtue, *f can yet
hardly ever forbear to give it its t Placet fuapte natura,
true Character and Commendation ?d?°* S^rVTM?L?
. _. r . infitum etiam lit Malis pro-
m Others. And this Obfervation bare meliores. Sense, de Be
holds true, - not only in the Gene- nef. I. 4.
rality of Vicious Men, but very
frequently even in the worft Sort of them, viz.
thofe who perfecute others for being better than
themfelves. Thus the Officers, who were fent by
the Pharifees to apprehend our Saviour, could not
forbear declaring that he fipake as never Man fipake. John vii.
And the Roman Governor, when he gave Sentence 46.
that he fhould be Crucified, could not at the fame
Inftant forbear openly declaring, that he found no Johnxviii.
Fault in him. Even in This Cafe, Men cannot chufe 38-
but think well of thofe Perfons, whom the Domi-.
nion of their Lufts will not fuffer them to imitate, or
whom their prefent Intereft, and the Neceffity of their
Worldly

4$ The Evidence of Natural ,
Worldly Affairs cOmpel them to difcourage. They
cannot but defire, that they themfelves were the
Men they are not ; and wifh with Balaam, that
though they imitate not the Life, yet, at leaft* they
might die the Death of the Righteous, and that their
laft End might be "like theirs. And hence it is that
Plato judicioufly obferves, * that
* oJ yij a™ ,.'«rf« •>« even the worft of Men feldom or
cWpaVEW fvyxpiwo-H, <,: never make fo wrong Judgment
croMo! Too-ovtov ical rcii k^hi* concerning Perfons, as they do con-
rit^a^ongoiHmiJxev- cerning cfhings . there being j0
*«} «&• «M«ft, fa w^ Virtue an unaccountable, and, as it
a<>( *« tw» «$ejga K*x«v, £J were, divine Force, which, wliat-
toT, ao'yon *« &£f« i»««?oM«, ever Confufion Men endeavour to
Wj »V Plato de Leg. lib. introduce in Things by their vicious
iz. Difcourfes and debauched Prac
tices, yet almoft always compels
them to diftinguifh Right concerning Perfons, and
makes them admire and praife Juft and Equitable
and Honeft Men. On the contrary, Vice and In-
juftice, Profianenefis and Debauchery, are Things fo ab
folutely odious in their own Nature, that, however
they infinuate themfelves into the Practice, yet they
can never gain over to themfelves the Judgment of
Mankind. They who Do Evil, yet See and Approve
what is Good ; and condemn, in others, what they
blindly allow in themfelves ; nay, and very frequently
condemn even themfelves alfo, not without great Dis
order and Uneafinefs of Mind, in thofe very Things
wherein they allow themfelves. At leaft, there is
hardly any wicked Man but, when his own Cafe is
represented to him under the Perfon of another,
will freely enough pafs Sentence againft the Wick-
ednefs he himfelf is guilty of ; and, with- fufficient
Severity, exclaim againft all Iniquity. This fhews
abundantly, that all Variation from the eternal Rule
of Right is, abfiolutely and in the Nature of the Thing
itfielfi, to be abhorred and detefted ; and that the un
prejudiced

and Revealed Religion. 4.9
prejudiced Mind of Man, as naturally difiapproves
Injuftice in moral Matters, as in natural Things it
cannot but diffent from Falfiehood, or difiike Incongru
ities. Even in reading the Hjftories of paft and far
diftant Ages, where, 'tis manifeft, we can have no
Concern for the Events of Things, nor Prejudices
concerning the Characters of Perfons ; Who is. there,
that does not praife and admire, nay, highly efteem,
and, in his Imagination, love (as it were) the Equi
ty, Juftice,, Truth and Fidelity of fome Perfons j
and, with the greateft Indignation and Hatred,
deteft the Barbarity, Injuftice, and Treachery of
others ? Nay, further ; When the Prejudices of cor
rupt Minds lie all on the Side of Injuftice ; as
when we have obtained fome very great Profit or
Advantage through Another Man's Treachery or
Breach of Faith ; yet, * who is
there, that, upon That very Oc- * Quis Pullum Numlto-
cafion, does not (evert to a Pro- rem' Fregellanum proditorem,
verb) diffike the Perfon and the ^^^^
Action, how much foever he may Finib. lib. 5.
rejoice at the Event ? But when
we come ourfelves to fuffer by Iniquity, 2l><?»,Where
are all the Arguments and Sophiftries, by which
Unjuft Men, while they are oppreffing Others,
would perfuade themfelves, that they are not fen-
. ,-fible of any natural Difference between Good' and
Evil ? When it comes to be thefe Mens own Cafe,
to be oppreffed by Violence, or over-reached by
Fraud ; where Then are all their Pleas againft the
eternal Diftinction of Right and Wrong ? How, on
the contrary, do they Then cry out for Equity, and
exclaim againft Injuftice ! How do they Then chal
lenge and object againft Providence, and think nei
ther God nor Man fevere enough in punifhing the
Vfelaters of Right and Truth ! Whereas, if there
was no natural and eternal Difference between Juft
and Unjuft, no Man could have any Reafon to
QQrnplaio of Injury, any other than what Laws and
Compacts

jjo The Evidence of Natural
Compacts made fo ; which, in innumerable Cafes,
will be always to be evaded.
AnAnfwer There is but one Thing, that I am fenfible of,
to the Ob- which can here, with any Colour, be objected againft
drawn what has been hitherto faid concerning the NeceffitJ'
from the of the Mind's giving its Affent to the eternal Law
total Igno- 0f Righteoufnefs •* and that is Hive total Ignorance,
'fame bar- which fome whole Nations are reported to lie under,
barousNa- of the Nature and Force of thefe moral Obligations.
tions in The Matter of Fact is not very -true: But if it
Matters o/waSj ,»tjs certain there are more Nations and People
ora >y' totally ignorant of the plaineft MathematiealTruthsj
as, of the Proportion, for Example, of a Square
to a Triangle of the fame Bafe and Heighth : And
yet thefe Truths are fuch, to which the Mind can- ¦
not but give its Affent neeeffarily and unavoidably^
as foon as they are diftinctly propofed to it. AM
that this Objection proves therefore, fuppofing the
Matter of it to be true, is only this ; Not, that the
Mind of Man can ever diffent from the Rule of
Right; muchtefs, that there is no neceffary Dif
ference in Nature between moral Good and Evil ;
anymore than it proves, that there is no certain
and neceffary Proportion of Numbers, Lines, or
Figures : But this it proves only, that Men have
great Need to be taught and inftructed in fome very
plain and eafy, as well as certain Truths ; and, if
they be important Truths, that then Men have
Need alfo to have them frequently inculcated, and
ftrongly inforced upon them. Which is very true ;
and is (as fhall hereafter be particularly made to
appear) one good Argument for the Reafonablenefs
of expecting a Revelation.
Of the 4. Thus it appears in general, that the Mind of
PMoralOb- ^an cannot avo^ Siving ics 4!fent to tne eternal
ligations in Law of Righteoufnefs ; that is, cannot but acknow-
fartkular. ledge the Reafonablenefs and Fitnefs of Mens go
verning all their Actions by the Rule of Right or
Equity ;¦

and Revealed Religion. 51
Equity : And alfo, that this Affent is a formal Obli
gation upon every Man actually and conftantly to
conform himfelf to that Rule. I might now from
hence deduce, in particular, all the feveral Duties of
Morality or Natural Religion. But becaufe this
would take up too large a Portion of my intended
DifcOurfe, and may eafily be fupplied abundantly out
of feveral late excellent Writers, I fhall only mention
the three great and principal Branches from which
all the other and fmaller Inftances of Duty do natu
rally flow, or may without Difficulty be derived.
Firft then, in refpect of God, the Rule of Right- Of Piety,
eoufnefs is, that we keep up conftantly, in our Minds, or Me"s
the higheft poffible Honour, Efteem, and Veneration ^"J/"'
for him ; which muft exprefis itfielfi in proper and re- God.
fpeCtive Influences upon all our Pafifions, and in the
fuitable Direction of all our Actions : That we worfiiip
and adore Him, and Him alone, as the only Supreme
Author, Prefierver, and Governor ofi all Things :
That we employ our whole Beings, and all our Powers
and Faculties, in his Service, and fior his Glory ; that
is, in encouraging the Practice ofi univerfial Righteouf
nefs, and promoting the Defigns ofi his Divine Goodnefis
amongft Men, in Juch Way and Manner as fihall at any
Time appear to be his Will we fhould do it : And,
finally, that, to enable us to do this continually, we
pray unto him conftantly fior whatever inieftand in need
ofi, and return him continual and hearty Thanks fior
whatever good Things we at any Time receive. There
is no Congruity or Proportion in the uniform Dif-
pofition and correfpondent Order of any Bodies or
Magnitudes ; no Fitnefs or Agreement in the Ap
plication of fimilar and equal Geometrical Figures
one to another, or in the Comparing them one
with another -, fo vifible and confpicuous, as is
the Beauty and Harmony of the Exercife of God's
feveral Attributes, meeting with fuitable Returns
of Duty and Honour from all his rational Creatures
throughout the Univerfe. The Confideration of
his

5 2 The E v i d e n c e of Natural
his Eternity and Infinity, his Knowledge and his' 8P3^
<&*»*' neeeffarily commands our higheft Admiration?
The Senfe of his Omniprefience forces a perpetual
awful Regard towards him. His Supreme Autho
rity, as being the Creator, Preferver, and abfolute
Governor of all Things, obliges us to pay him all
poffible Honour and Veneration, Adoration and Wof*
fhip : And his Unity requires, that it be paid to"
Him alone. His Power and Juftice demand our'
Fear. His Mercy and Placablenefis encourage out
v Hope. His Goodnefs neeeffarily excites our Low,
His Veracity and Unchangeablenefs fecure our Truft
in him. The Senfe of our having received our Be
ing and all our Powers from him, makes it infinitely
reafonable that we fhould employ sur whole Beings?
and all our Faculties, in his Service. The Confer
oufnefs of our continual Dependance upon him,
both, for our Prefervation and the Supply of every
Thing we want, obliges us to conftant Prayer. And ' '
every good Thing we enjoy, the Air w© breathe, and
the Food we eat, the Rain from Heaven, and the
fruitful Seafons, all the Bleffings and Comforts of
the prefent Time, and the Hopes and Expectations
we have of what is to come, do
* all demand our heartieft Gra''
n a- ^IZ^- , A m *tudt and Thankfgiving to him.
Ordines, quern dierum noc- __, . J° f
tiumq; viciffitudines, quem The Suitablenefs and Propor-
menfium ternperatio; quemq; tion, the Correfpondency and
ea qua; gignuntur nobis at Connexion of each of thefe
iruendum, non Gratum elfe /-tm ¦ r n.- i • i"- .
cogant ; hunc Hominem om- Thin§s refpectively, is as plain
nind numerare qui decet r Cic. and confpicuous as the Shining
de Legib. lib-. 2. of the Sun at Noon-day. And
vljafivoS, fix^, jinn, ,tis the greateft Abfurdity and
sj.>,«%>«ri &««,*.;'!»?,- Peryerfenefs in the World, for
(**;», xaii^nx^^^x^^- Creatures indued with Reafion,
1a\i fi* ®"- f^.T*"^""^ to attempt to break through and
xat agounia; xai So-Siovlaj atom »j„..„r  r_ .1 ¦ it r\ J ..
s « 5 v . v v „,. . tramgreis this- neceffary Order
Toy VjMoti Ton eij tfEW. Mtyas a » r , if
SeJf, in »V» wageVx" °ey*v* anct Dependency of Things. All
Inanimate and' all Irrational Be
ings,

and^ Revealed Religion: 53
ings, by the Neceffity of their Na- ; t«S1» X S> w ?£» ??y«o-o>s-
ture, conftantly obey the Laws of ^" 5 ^-^ ° ^ "' x«e<«
_i r* . ' j , , Siiuiut, Use. Arrian. lib. i.
their Creation ; and tend regu- ca. ^
rarfy to the Ends for which they
were appointed. How monftrous then is' it, that
Reafionable Creatures, merely becaufe they are not
Neceffitated1, fhould abufe that glorious Privilege
of Liberty, by which they are exalted in Dignity
above the reft of God's Creation, to make them
felves the alone Unreafonable and Diforderly Part of
the Univerfe ! That a Tree planted in a fruitful
Soil,' and watered continually with the Dew of
Heaven, and cherifhed conftantly with the kindly
Warmth and benign Influence of the Sun-beams,
fhould yet never bring forth either Leaves or Fruit,
is in no Degree fo irregular and contrary to Nature,
as that a Rational, Being, created after the Image of
God, and confeious of God's doing every Thing
for him .that becomes the Relation of an infinitely
good and bountiful Creator to his Creatures, fhould
yet never on His Part make any Return of thofe
Duties which arife neeeffarily from the Relation af
a Creature to his Creator.
Secondly. In Refpect of our Fellow-creatures, the OfRighte-
Rule of Righteoufnefs is; that in particular we fir oufnefi, or
deal with every Man as in like Circumftances we could '^fDnty °f
reafionably expeCt he fihould deal with Us ;. and. that in. towards
general we endeavour, by an univerfal Benevolence, to another.
promote the Welfare and Happinefs of all Men. The
former Branch of this Rule is Equity ; the latter
is Love. As to the former, viz. Equity : The Reafon Of Juftice.
which obliges every Man in Practice, fo to deal al- ^dEamty.
ways with another, as he would reafopably expect1
that .Others fhould in like Circumftances deal with
Him ; is the very fame, as That which forces him
in Speculation to affirm, that if one Line or Number
be equal to another, That other is reciprocally equal to

'54 The Evidence of Natural
to It. Iniquity is the very fame in ACtion, as Falfuy
or Contradiction inTheory, and the fame Caufe which
makes the one Abfurd, makes, the other Unreafonable.
Whatever Relation or Proportion one Man in. any
Cafe bears to another ; the fame That Other, when
put in like Circumftances, bears to Him. Whatever
I judge reafonable or unreafonable, for Another to
do for Me; That, by the fame judgment, I declare
reafonable or unreafonable, that 1 in the like Cafe
fhould do for Him. And to deny this, either in
Word or Action, is as if a Man fhould contend, that,
tho' two and three are equal to five, yet five are not
equal to two and three. Wherefore
• Nihil eft unum uni tam * were not Men ftrangely and moft
flimle, tam' par, quam Om- ., , i 'r
nes inter npfmetipfos fumus, unnaturally corrupted, by perverfie
Quod fi depra^atio confuetu- and unaccount ably fialfie Opinions, and
dinum, fi opinknum vanitas, m0nftrous evil Cuftoms and Habits.
^^T%S?£ prevailing.againft the cleareft and
cunq; coepiffet; fui nemo ipfe plaineft Reafon in the World :, It
tam fimilis effet, quam omnes would be impoffible that univerfal
font omnium ;- fccolerctur Equity fhould not be practifcd
Jus aeque ab omnibus. Cic. , •*,,«««¦ 1 i <• ¦ ..
de Leg. lib. \. by all Mankind ; and efpecially
among Equals, where the Propor
tion of Equity is fimple and obvious, and every
Man's own Cafe is already the fame with all others*
without any nice Comparing orTranfpofing of Cir-
.:....„ cumftances. It would be as im-
rl^JTlflw^l P°ffible' «hat J a Man, contrary to
humana ; cui parere qui velit, the eternal Reaion of Things,
nunquam committet ut ali- fhould defire to gain fome fmall
enum appetat, & id, quod al- profit tQ Himfelf, by doing Vio-
teri detraxerit, fibi affumat. i , -r^ i • ^ •• , -
Cic. de Offic. lib.3. lence and Damage to his Neigh
bour ; as that he fhould be wihV,
ing to be deprived of Neceffaries himfelf, to fatisfy
the unreafonable Covetoufnefs or Ambition of ano
ther. In a Word ; it would be impoffible for Men
not to be as much afhamed of Doing Iniquity, as they
are of Believing Contradictions. In confidering indeed ' the

and Revealed R e l i g i 6 N; §§
the Duties of Superiors and Inferiors in various Rela
tions, the Proportion of Equity is fomewhat more
complex -, But ftill it may always be deduced from
the fame Rule of doing as we would be done by, if
careful Regard be had at the fame Time to the Dif
ference of Relation : That is, if in confidering what is
fit for you to do to another, you always take into
the Account, not only every Circumftance of the
ACiion, but alfo every Circumftance wherein the
Perfon differs from you ; And in judging what you
would defire that Another, if your Circumftances
were tranfpofed, fhould do to you ; you always con
fider, not what any unreafonable Paffion or private
Intereft would prompt you, but what impartial Rea
fon would dictate to you to defire. For Example :
A Magiftrate, in order to deal equitably with aCri-
minal, is not to confider what Fear or Self-love would
caufe Him, in the Criminal's Cafe, to defire ; but
what Reafion and the public Good would oblige him
to acknowledge was fit and juft for him to expeCt. And
the fame Proportion is to be obferved, in deducing
the Duties of Parents and Children, of Mafters and
Servants, of Governors and Subjects, of Citizens and
Foreigners; in what Manner every Perfon is obliged,
by the Rule of Equity, to behave himfelf in each of
thefe and all other Relations. In the regular and
uniform Practice of all which Duties among all
Mankind, in their feveral and refpective Relations,
through the whole Earth, confifts That Univerfial
Juftice, which is the Top and Perfection of all Vir
tues : Which if, as * Plato fays* it
could be repreiented vifibly to 'AsiA^aW^sffii.
morta Eyes, would raife in us an „s\ ' , „ M a.fi7-!
' ' ttdiihm itxpe^ih, KSc. rlat. in
inexpreffible Love and Admiration phsdr.
of it: Which would introduce into Quae ft oculis cerneretur,
the World fuch a glorious and niirabiles amores, ut aitP/^,
, „ i ¦ i-j excitaret lui. Cic. de Ofht.
happy State, as the ancient Poets ^ 1 M
have attempted to defcribe in their Oculorum eft in nobis fen-
O Fiction

56 The Evidence of Natural
fus acerrimus, quibus fapien- Fiction of a golden Age : Which,
tiarn non cernimus ; Quam jn jtfelf is fo truly beautiful and
Sfi^SJKiSlK ^vely, that, as * Ariftotle elegantly
* "Av-xn ,tw Jv M^waio^wi, expreffes it, the Motions of the
ojet») f*e» in Tf^sJa- x«i b9" heavenly Bodies are not fo admira-
"IrSS'2^/"^^^" bly reBular and harmonious, nor
•5-ffl/-3- ^ grightnefg Gf the Sun. and
Stars fo ornamental to the vifible Fabrick of the
World, as the univerfal Practice of this illuftrious
Virtue would be conducive to the Glory and Ad
vantage of the rational Part of this lower Creation :
Which, laftly, is fo truly noble and excellent in its
own Nature, that the wifeft and moft confidering
Men have always declared, thatf
t Non enim mihi eft -vita neither Life itfelf, nor J all other
mea utilior, quam animi talis poffible Enjoyments in the World,
afteftio, neminem ut viplem put together, are of any Value or
O^/S^61^13' Efteem, in Companfon of, or in
I k«! to mapdvalv £?», fU- Competition with, that rightTem-
y^m ph «axir toi> lipituna. per and Difpofition of Mind, from
z?A.,«Sa>«To.««»,«-Jf«^- which flows trie Practice of this
!^.U«f«ri«>I.Vti univerfal Juftice and Equity. On
airdaiK. Plato de Leg. lib. 2. the contrary : Injuftice and Iniquity,
Violence, Fraud, and Oppreffion ;
the univerfal Confufion of Right and Wrong, and
the general Neglect and Contempt Of all the; Duties,
1 arifing from Mens feveral Relations one to another';
.'is the greateft and moft unnatural Corruption of
"God's Creation, that 'tis poffible for depraved and
rebellious Creatures to introduce: As they them
felves, who practife Iniquity moft, and are moft
defirous to defend it, yet, whenever it comes to be
their own Turn to fuffer by it, are not very back
ward to acknowledge. To comprife this Matter
therefore in one Word : What the Sun's forfaking
that equal Courfe, which now, by diffufing gentle
Warmth and Light, cherifhes and invigorates every
Thing in a due Proportion through the whole
Syftem ;

and Revealed Religion. 57
Syftem ; and, on the contrary, his burning up, by
an irregular and diforderly Motion, fome or the
Orbs with infupportable Heat, and leaving others
to perifh in extreme Cold and Darknefs : What
this, I fay, would be to the natural World ; That
very fame Thing, Injuftice and Tyranny, Iniquity
and all Wickednefs, is to the moral and rational Part
of the Creation. The only Difference is this :
That the one is an obflinate and wilful Corruption,
and moft perverfie Depravation of Creatures made
after .the Image of God ; and a violating the eter
nal and unalterable Law or Reafon of Things, which
is of the utmoft Importance : Whereas the other
would be only a Revolution or Change of the arbi
trary! and temporary Frame of Nature.
The Second Branch of the Rule of Righteouf- Ofunlwr-
nefs with Refpect to our Fellow-creatures, I fa\d,M ""'fat
was univerfial.Love or Benev.olence, that is, not only Jen^v0~
the ,doing barely what is Juft and Right in our
Dealings with every Man, but alfo a conftant
Endeavouring to promote in general, to the utmoft
.of our Power, the Welfare and Happinefs of all
Men. The Obligation to which Duty alfo may
eafily be deduced from what has been already laid
down. For if (as has been before proved) there
be -a natural and. neceffary Difference between Good
:and,Evil, and that which is Good is Fit and Rea
fonable, and that which is Evil is Unreafonable to
•be done ; and that which is the. greateft Good, is
always the moft Fi.t and Reafonable to be chofen i
Then, as the Goodnefs of God extends itfelf uni-
'Verfally over all ids Works through the whole
Creation, by doing always what is abfolutely beft
in the Whole ; fo every rational Creature ought in
its Sphere and Station, according to its refpective
Powers and Faculties, to do all the Good it can
to all its Fellow-creatures. To which End, uni-
verfslLeve and Malevolence is as .plainly the moft
O 2 direct,

58 The Evidence of Natural
UniveHaliter autem ve- direct, certain and effectual Means,
as "* in Mathematics the Flowing
of a Point is to produce a Line ;
or, in Arithmetic, the Addition of
Numbers to produce a Sum ; or, in
Phyfics, certain Kinds of Motions to
preferve certain Bodies, which other
Kinds of Motions tend to cor
rupt. Of all which the Mind of
Man is fo naturally fenfible, that,
except in fuch Men whofe Affec
tions are prodigioufly corrupted
by moft unnatural and habitual
vicious Practices* there is no Du
ty whatfoever, the Performance
whereof affords a Man fo f am
ple Pleafure and Satisfaction, and
fills his Mind with fo comfort
able a Senfe of his having done
the greateft Good he was capable
to do, of his having beft anfwer-
ed the Ends of his Creation, and
nearlieft imitated the Perfections
of his Creator, and confequently
of his having fully complied with
the higheft and principal Obli
gations of his Nature, as the
Performarice of this one Duty, of
univerl[s pove and Benevolence na-
turally\jrfords. But further; The
Obligation to this great Duty may alfo other-
wife be deduced from the A at ure tf Man, in the
following Manner : Next to that natural Self-love^
or Care of his own Prefervation, which every one
neeeffarily has in the firft Place for himfielfi, there is
in all Men a certain natural Affection for their
Children end Pcfterity, who have a Dependence
upon them ; and for their Relations and Friends, who

rum elt, quod non certius
ftuxus puncli Lineam producit,
aut additio numerorum Sum-
mam, quam quod Bencvolentia
cfFe&um prxftatbonum. Cum-
berland.de Leg. Natura1, pag. 10.
Pari fane ratione [ac in
Ariihmeticis operationibus~\ doc-
trina: Moralis Veritas fundatur
in immutabili cohasrentia in
ter ' Felicitatem Summam quam
hominum vires affequi valent,
& Actus benevolent! ce uni-vet-
Jalis. Id. ibid. pag. 23.
Eadem eft menfura Boni
Malique, qua? menfura eft iieri
falfiq; in propofitionibus pro-
nmniantibus de efEcacia Mo-
tuum ad rerum aliarum con-
fer-vationem & ccrruptionem fa
ciendum. Id. pag. 30.
f Angufta admodum #eft
circa noflra tantummodo com-
moda, Lastitis materia; fed
eadem erit ampliffima, fi ali-
crum omnium Felicitas cordi
nobis fit. Quippe hac ad
illam, eandem habebit pro-
portionem, quam habet im-
menfa Beatitudo Dei, totiufq;
humani generis, ad curtam
illam fids felicitatis fupel-
leftilem, quam uni homini,
eiq; invido & malevolo, for
tune bona poffint fuppeditare.
Id. ibid. pag. 214.

and Revealed Religion.
-who have an Intimacy with them. And becaufe
the Nature of Man is fuch, that they cannot live
Comfortably in independent Families, without ftill
further Society and Commerce with each other ;
therefore they naturally defire to increafe their De
pendencies by multiplying Affinities •, and to en
large their Friendfhips by mutual good Offices ;
and to eftablifh Societies by a Communication of
Arts and Labour : Till * by De
grees the Affection of Jingle Per-
fions becomes a Friendfhip of Fa
milies, and this enlarges itfelf to
a Society of Towns and Cities and
Nations, and terminates in the
agreeing Community ofi all Mankind.
The Foundation, Prefervation,
1 and Perfection of which univerfal
Friendfhip or Society is mutual
Love and Benevolence. And no
thing hinders the World from
being actually put into fo happy a State, but per-
verfe Iniquity and unreafonable Want of mutual
Charity. Wherefore fince Men are plainly fo con-
ftituted by Nature, that they ftand in Need of
each other's Affiftance to make themfelves eafy
in the World •, and are fitted to live in Com
munities ; and Society is abfolutely neceffary for
them •* and mutual Love and Benevolence is the
only poffible Means to eftablifh this Society in
any tolerable and durable Manner ; and in This
Refpect t All Men ftand upon
the fame Level, and have the
jmie natural Wants and Defires,
and are in the fame Need of each
Other's Help, and are equally
capable of enjoying the. Benefit
and Advantage of Society : 'Tis
evident every Man is bound by
O 3 the

59

* In omni honefto, nihil
eft tam illuftre, nee quod la-
tius pateat, quam conjundtio
inter homines hominum, &
quafi qusedam focietas & com-
municatio utilitatum, & ipfa
Charitas generis humani ; quas
rata a primo fatu, quo a pro-
creatoribus nati diliguntur,
— ferpit fenfim foras, cogna-
tionibus primum,  deinde
tptius complexu gentis humanar.
Cic. de Finib. lib, 5,

¦f- Nihil eft unum uni tam
fimile, tam par, quam om-
nes inter notmetjpfbs fumus.
Quo.1 nifi depravatio, 13c. fui
nemo ipfe tam fimilis effet,
quam omnes funt omnium?
Cic, de Legib. lib. 1.

^'Evidence of Natural
th6 Law of his Nature, as he is
alfo prompted by the * Inclina^
tion of his uncorrupted Affecti
ons, to f look upon himfelf as a
Part and Member of that one
univerfal Body or Community,
which is made up of all Man
kind ; to think himfelf % born to
promote the public Good and
Welfare of all his Fellow-crea
tures ; and confequently obliged,
as the neceffary and only effec*
tual Means to that End, to || em
brace them All with univerfal
Love and Benevolence : So that
he * cannot, without acting con
trary to the Reafon of his own
Mind, and tranfgreffing the plain
and known Law of his Being, do
willingly any Hurt and Mifchief
to any Man ; no, -f- not even to
thofe who have firft injured him ;
but ought, for the publick Bene
fit, to endeavour to appeafe with
Gentlenefs, rather than exafperate
with Retaliations ; and finally, to
comprehend all in one Word,
(which is the Top and complete
Perfection of . this great Duty)
ought to J Love all others as him
fielf. This is the Argumentation of that great
Matter, Cicero : Whole Knowledge and Under
ftanding of the true'State of Things, and of the
ety,orMens original Obligations of human Nature, was as
wards "^ much greater than Mr. Hobbs's, as his Helps and
thtmfelws, Advantages to attain that Knowledge were lefs.
and of the Thirdly, with Refpect to Ourfelves, the Rule of
^eToffet' " Righteoufnefs is, that every Man pre fierve his own
murder. Being, as long as he is able, and takeGare to keep him^ ¦
M

60

* Impellimur autem Na
tura, ut prodefle velimus
quamplurimis. Cic. de Finib.
lib. 3.
f Hominem effe quafi par
tem quandam civitatis & uni-
verfi generis humani, eumq; ef-
fe conjunfturn cum hominibus
Humana quadam Spcietate.
Cic. Shtrejl. Academ. lib. I .
% Homines hominum caufa
funt generati, ut ipfi inter
fe alii aliis prodefje poffint.
Cic. de Offc. lib. 1.
Ad tuendos confervandofq;
homines, hominem natura effe;
Cic, de Finib. lib. 3.
|| Omnes inter fe natural!
quadam indulgentia & bene-
volentia contineri, Cic. de
Legib. lib. I.
* Ex quo efficjtur, homi
nem natura obedientem, ho-
mini nccere non. poffe. Cic.
de Offic. lib. 3.
f Ovtb a^a. aVTa.8\Ki~v oe~, are
Hu.xws woi£i» ato'vrz a.r§p,uirm,
sT at otibv 1i:a.O"&i\ via avTtlv.
Plato in Critone.
X Turn illud efEci, quod
quibufdam incredibile videa-
tur, fit autem neceffarium, ut
nihilo- Jeje plus quam alterum
d'dtgat. Cic. de Legib. lib. 1 .

OfSobri •,or uty

and Revealed Religion. 6i
felf at all Times in fuch Temper and Difpofition both of
Body and Mind, as >may beft fit and enable him to per
form his Duty in all other Infiances : That is ; he ought
to bridle his Appetites with Temperance ; to govern
his Pafifions with Moderation ; and to apply himfielf to
the Bufinefs of his prefient Station in the World, what
foever it be, with Attention and Contentment. 'That
every Man ought to preferve his own Being, as long
as he is able, is evident ; becaufe what he is not him
felf the Author and Giver of, he can never, of him
felf, have j uft Power or Authority to take away. He
that fent us into the World, and alone knows for
how long Time he appointed us our Station here,
and when we have finifhed all the Bufinefs he in
tended we fhould do, can alone judge when 'tis fit
for us to be taken hence, and has alone Authority
to difmifs and difcharge us. This' Reafoning has
been admirably applied by Plato, Cicero, and others
of the beft Philofophers. So that, though the
Stoicks of old, and the Deifts of late, have in their ~
ranting Difcourfes, and fome few of them in their
rafh Practice, contradicted it, yet they have never
been able, with any Colour of Reafon, to anfwer
or evade the Force of the Argument : Which, in
deed, to fpeak the Truth, has been urged by the
forementioned Philofophers with fuch fingular Beauty
as well as invincible Strength, that if feems not
capable of having any Thing added, to it. Where
fore I fhall give it you only in .
fome of their own Words. We *"E» Tm <??»'?* to-fist -olJi-
Men, (fays * Plato -in the Per- ?f"™' *?, " ** '* tf™
fon of Socrates), are all, by the «SIS.^@£B'5 £J,a< „><:, T»\ im-
Appointment of God, in ' a cer- /»sXaf*E'n;;- ««! %^a% ra; dfyv-
tain Prifion or Cuftody, which we ^ " Is' ^op*'™ toi? S^
1 , 7 7 ". r J HVCLi. — Ovxev xcu o-v at, 7UV
ought not to break out of, and run „„~ „«, > , * . v .
away. We are as Servants, or, as <*WW<>i, p* o-npyvat™.; era
Cattle, in the Hand of God. And "' £«'*" *0™ rAmw, Xau-
would not any of Us, faith he, if Tm< d' «W. ««'. >J ™»
one of our Servants Jhould, contrary piato in Phted.
O 4. to

6g

The Evidence of Natural
to our Direction, and to eficape cut ofi our Service, kill him
fielf, 'think that we had juft Reafion to be very angry, and,
if it was in our Power, punifih him for it? So likewife
Cicero. God, fays * he, the Su
preme Governor of all Things,, for
bids us to depart hence without his
Order : And though, when the Di
vine Providence does itfelf offer us a
juft Occafion of leaving this World,
as when a Man choofes to fuffer
Death rather than commit Wick-
ednefs) a wife Man will then indeed
depart joyfully, as out of a Place of
Sorrow and Darknefis into Light ;
yet he will not be in Juch Hafte as to
break his Prifion contrary to Law ;
but will go when God calls him, as a Prifioner when
dijmiffed by the Magiftrate or lawful Power. Again j
That fihort Remainder ofi Life, faith
f he, which old Men have a Profit
peCl ofi, they ought neither too eager
ly to defire, nor yet, on the contrary,
unreafonably and dificontentedly de
prive themfelves of it : For, as Py
thagoras teaches, 'tis as unlawful
for a Man, without the Command
of God, to remove himfielf out of the World, as for a
Soldier to have his Pofit without his Generals Order.
And in another Place : Unlefis That
God, faith J he, whofie Temple and
Palace this whole World is, difi-
charges you himfielf out of the Prifion.
ef the Body, you can never be re
ceived to his Favour. Wherefore
you, and all pious Men, ought to
have Patience to continue in the Body
as long as God fhall pleafie, who fent.
Us hither ; and not force ycurfielves cut

* Vetat enim dominans ille
!n nobis Deus, injuflu hinc
nos fuo demigrare. .Cum ve
rb caufam juftam Deus ipfe
dederit, nae ille medius fidius
vir fapiens, lastus ex Lis tene-
bris in lucem illam exceffe-
rit : Nee tamen ilia vincula
carceris ruperit ; leges enim
vetant ; fed tanquam a ma-
giftratu, aut ab aliqua potef-
tate legitima, fie a Deo evoca-
tus, atq; emiffus, exierit. Cic,
Tujc.guafi. lib. I.

f Illud breve vitae reliquum
nee avide appetendum feni-
bus, nee (ine caufa deferen-
dum eft ; Vetatq; Pythagoras,
injuflu Imperatoris, id eft, Dei,
de prsfidio & ftatione Dei, de
przefidio & ftatione vitae dece-
flere. Cic. de Seneff.

L-

X Nil! enim Deus is, cujus
hoc Templum eft pmne quod
confpicis, litis te corporis
cuftodiis libu-averit ; hue tibi
aditus patere non poteft. 
Quare & tibi & piis omnibus
re"tinendi)s eft animus in cuf-
todia corporis ; nee injuflu
ejus, a quo ille eft nobis datus,
px hominum vita migrandum
, gft j ng mynus humanum

and Revealed Religion. 63
out ofi the World, before he calls for affignatum a Deo defugifle vi-
you ; left you be fiound Defierters ofi deamini- Sic. Somn. Scipion.
the Station appointed you ofi God. And, to mention
no more : 1 hat excellent Author, Arrian : Wait,
faith * he, the good Pleafure ofi God :
When Hi fignifies it to be his Will, * 'e*&|*<7& ™ &<>»¦ &•«»
that you fhould be dificharged from T".®' """''!• ~al . u>°*r?
this Service, then depart willingly : f^ „w„ws6 *,& «»t.V i«2
But, in the mean Time, have Pati- SI tS mae&n®. aW^o-St ««-
ence, and tarry in the Piece where he *»»T£« t««'t»i» t%» yfie,™, J< A
has appointed you : Wait, and do not Uf"X T"< ?T"*"c\ M''"T'
. rr . / -ir 7 M a^°7'S"WS efmtKiirTe. Ar-
hurry your pelves away wilfully and rian. m,. i.
unreafionably. The Objections,
which the Author of the Defence of Self-murder pre
fixed to the Oracles of Reafon, has attempted to ad
vance againft this Argument, are fo very weak
and chiidifh, that, 'tis evident, he could not, at
the Time he wrote them, believe in earneft that there
was any Force in them : As when he fays, that the
Reafon why 'tis not lawful for a Centinel to leave his
Station without his Commander's Order is, becaufe
he entered into the Service by his own Confient ; as
if God had not a juft Power to lay any Commands
Upon his Creatures without their own Confient : Or,
when he fays, that there are many lawful Ways to
feek Death in ; as if, becaufe a Man may lawfully
venture his Lifie in many publick Services, there
fore it was lawful for him directly to throw it away
upon any fooliffi Difcontent, But the Author of
that Difcourfe has fince been fo juft, as to confefs
his Folly, and retract it publickly himfelf. Where
fore, to proceed. For the fame Reafon that a
Man is obliged to preferve his own Being at all,
he is bound likewife to preferve himfelf, as far as
he is able, in the right Ufe of all his Faculties ;
that is, to keep himfelf conftantly in fuch Temper
both of Body and Mind, by regulating his Ap
petites and Paffions, as may beft fit and enable
pjm to perform his Duty in all other Inftances. For,

64 The<E.v idence of Natural
For, as it matters not whether a Soldier deferts
his Poft, or, by Drunkennefs, renders himfelf in
capable of performing his Duty in it : So for a Man
to difable himfelf by any Intemperance or Paffion, ,
from performing the neceffary Duties of Life, is,
at leaft for that Time, the fame Thing as depriving
himfelf of Life. And neither is'This all : For
great Intemperance and ungoverned Paffions not
only incapacitate a Man to perform his'Duty, but
alfo expofe him to run headlong into the Commiflion
of the greateft Enormities : There being no Violence
or Injuftice whatfoever, which a Man, who has de
prived himfelf of his Reafon byTntemperance or
Paffion, is not capable of being tempted to cpmrnit.
So that all the additional Obligations, -which a Man
is any Way under to forbear committing the moft
flagrant Crimes, lie equally upon him to govern
his Paffions, and reftrain his Appetites : Without
doing which, he can never fecure himfelf effectu
ally from being betrayed into the Commiflion of
all Iniquity. This is, indeed, the great Difficulty
of Life, to fobdue and conquer our unreafonable
Appetites and Paffions. But 'tis abfolutely neceffary
to be done : And * 'tis moreover
* o\ fCa apci. i/ixd? inxa. «>'- the braveft and moft glorious
kk xa.) Spoimv xeu tm roiaim, Conqueft in the World. Laftly :
iroy*™ vzjx^—oi »i F the f R f h t Man
xccfn?u,, w<,m> *«wuW e»£x« is obliged not to depart wilfully
nixus. Plato de Leg. lib. 8. , out of this Life, which is the
general Station that God has ap
pointed him, he is obliged likewife to attend the
Duties of that particular Station or Condition of
Life, whatfoever it be,©wherein Providence has,
at prefient, placed him, with Diligence and Content
ment : Without being either uneafy and difcon-
tented, that Others are placed by Providence in
different and fuperior Stations in the World ; or fo
extremely and unreafonably follicitous to change his

and Revealed Religion. 65
his State for the Future, as thereby to neglect his
prefent Duty.
From thefe three great and general Branches, all
the fmaller and more particular Inftances of Moral ^ ¦Caw
Obligations may (as 1 faid) eafily be deduced. $£"""
5. And now this, (This eternal Rule of Equity, univerfal,
which I have been hitherto defcribing) is That right «»« \abfi-
Reafion, which makes the principal Diftinction be- lufely ""'
tween Men and Beafts. This is the Law ofi Nature, abuf'
which (as Cicero excellently ex- * Eft quidem vera lex,
refta ratio naturae congruens,
diffufa in omnes, conftans,
fempiterna, qua; voeet ad
officium jubendo; vetando, a
fraude -de-terreat. ¦
Huic legi nee abrogari fas
eft, neq; derogari ex hac ali-
quid licet, neq; tota abrogari
poteft. Nee vero aut per Se-
natum, aut per populum folvi
hac lege pofTumus. Cic de Re-
pub, lib. 3. Fragment.
f Lex qua; feculis omnibus
ante nata eft, quam fcripta
lex ulla, aut quam omnino
civitas conftituta. Cic. de Lee.
lib. 1. *
J Legem neq; hominum
ingeniis excogitatam, neque
fcitum aliquod efle populo-
rum, fed aeternum quiddam;
quod univerfum mundum re-
gat. Cic. de, Legib: lib. z.
|| Nee fi, regnante Tarqui-
nio, nulla erat Roma fcripra
lex de ftupris, idcirco non
contra illam legem fempiter-
nam Sexlus Tarquinius vim
Lucretiis attulit. Erat enim
ratio profefta a rerum natura,
& ad refte faciendum impel-
lens, & ad delifto avocans ;
quae non tum denique incipit lex efle, cum fcripta eft, fed turn cum orta
eft'; orta autem fimul eft cum mente divina. Cic, de Legib. lib. z.
Lucretia,

preffes it) * is ofi univerfal Extent,
and everlafting Duration ; which can
neither be wholly abrogated, nor
repealed in any Part of it, nor have
any Law made contrary to it, nor
be difipenfied with by any Authority :
Which -f was in Force before ever
any Law was written, or the Foun
dation of any City or Commonwealth
was laid : Which £ was not invent
ed by the Wit of Man, nor efiablijh-
ed by the Authority of any People ;
but its Obligation ^as from Eternity,
and the Force of it reaches through-
cut the Univerfe : \\ Which, being
founded in the Nature and Reafon
of Things, did not then begin to be a
Law, when it was fir fi written and
enaded by Men ; but is ofi the fiame
Original with the eternal Reafions or
Proportions of Things, and the Per
fections or Attributes of God himfelf :
So that if there was no Law at
Rome againft Rapes, at that Time
when Tarquin offered Violence to

•66 The Evidence of Natural
Lucretia, it does not therefore follow that he was at
all the more Excufiable, or that his Sin againft the
eternal Rule of Equity was the lefis Heinous. This is
that Law ofi Nature, * to which
* In judicio de bonitate the Reafion ofi all Men every-where
hanim rerun., sque omnes naturauy and neeeffarily affents,
ubiq; convennant, ac omnia J r ¦ ¦ i ,-> ,r
Animalia in motu Cordis & as aU Animals confipire in the Pulfie
Arteriarum pulfu, aut omnes and Motion ofi their Heart and Ar-
homines in opinione de nivis teries or as all Men agree in their
candore & fplendore Sons. cv j . w Tin ¦< r
Cumberland, de Leg. Natura, Judgment concerning the Whitenefis
pag. 167. of Snow, or the Brightnefs of the
Sun. For though, in fome nice
Cafes, the Bounds of Right and Wrong may indeed
pag. 36. (as Was before obferved) be fome what difficult to
determine ; and, in fome few even plainer Cafes,
the Laws and Ciiftoms of certain barbarous Nati
ons may be contrary one to another, (which Some
have been fo weak as to think a juft Objection
againft there being any natural Difference between
Good and Evil at all ;) yet, in
f Hoc tamen non magis reality, this -f no more difproves
tollit confenfum hominum de {he mturd jjrent gr ^ rf _
generali Natura Bom, ejufq; . ,. , „¦" - J , „ . ,
partibus vel fpeciebus praeci: prejudiced Reafon to the Rule of
puis, quam levis vultuum di- Right and Equity, than the Diffe-
yerfitas tollit convenientiam rmce 0f moa Mens Countenances in
inter homines in con muni / ./j, r> /• •* sr r
hominum definition, aut fi- £eneral> or the Deformity of fiome
militudinem inter eos in par- few Monfters in particular, proves
tium principalium conforma- that there is no general Likenefis or
tione&ufu. Nulla gens eft, Uniformity in the Bodies of Men.
quae non fentiat ait us Deum j j j
diligendi, &c. Nulla gens non fentit gratitudinem erga parentes i£ bene*
failores, toti humano generi falutarem efle. Nulla temperamentorum
diverfitas facit ut quifquam non bonum efle fentiat univerlis, ut fingu-
lorum innocentium 'vita:, membra, & libertas conjerventur. Cumberland.
de Legib. Natura?, pag. 166.
Neq; enim an honoriftce de Deo Jentiendum fit, neq; an fit amandus,
timendus, colencus, dubitari poteft. Sunt enim haec Religionum, per
omnes gentes communia.  Deum eo ipfo, quod homines fecerit ratio
nales, hoc illis praecepiffe, & cordibus omnium infculpfifle, ne quijquam
cuiquam faceret, quod alium fibi Jacere iniquum duceret. Hobbs, de Ho-
mine, cap. 14. [Inconfiftent ly enough ivi/h his own Principles.] For,

and Revealed Religion.
For, whatever Difference there may be in fiome parti
cular Laws, 'tis certain, as to the main and principal
Branches of Morality, there never was any Nation upon
Earth, but owned, that to Love and Honour God, to
be grateful to Benefactors, to perform Equitable Com
pacts, to preferve the Lives of innocent and harmlefis
Men, and the like, were Things fitter and better to be
praCtified than the contrary. In fine : This is that
Lav; ofi Nature, which, being founded in the eter
nal Reafon of Things, is as abfolutely unalterable,
as natural Good and Evil, as * Ma
thematical or Arithmetical Truths,
as Light and Darknefis, as Sweet
and Bitter. The f Obfervance of
which, though no Man fikould com
mend it, would yet be truly commend
able in itfielfi. Which to fiuppofie
depending on the Opinions of Men,
and the Cuftoms of Nations ; that, is,
to fuppofe that What fihall be ac
counted the Virtue of a Man de
pends merely on Imagination or Cufi-
tom to determine, is J as abfiurd as
it would be to affirm, that the
Fruitful nets of a Tree, or the
Strength- of a Horfe, depends mere
ly on the Imagination of thofe who
judge of it. In a Word, 'Tis That
Law, which if it had its Original
from the Authority of Men, and
could be changed by it, then || all
the Commands of the cruelleft and
moft barbarous Tyrants in the World
would be as juft and equitable as
the wifeft Laws that ever were

by

* Nam ut vera & falfa, ut
confequentia & contraria, fua
fponte, non aliena, judican-
tur : fie conftans & perpetua
ratio vitae, quae eft •virtus ;
itemq; inconftantia, quod eft
•vitium ; Jua natura probatur.
Cic. de Legib, lib. I.
f Quod vere dicimus', e-
tiamfi a nullo laudetur, lau-
dabile efle natura. Cic. de
Offic. lib. i.
J Hax autem in opinione
exiftimare, non in natura po-
nere, dementis eft. Nam nee
Arboris nee Equi virtus, qua?
dicitur, in opinione fita eft,
fed in natura. Cic. de Legib.
lib. I.

|| Jam vero ftultiffimum
illud; exiftimare omnia jufta
efle, quae fcita lint in popu-
lorum inftitutis aut legibus.
Etiamne fiquae funt tyranno-
rum leges, fi triginta iWiAtbe-
nis leges imponere voiuiflent,
aut fi omnes Athenienfes de-

leftarentur tyrannicis legibus,. num idcirco hs leges jufta; haberentur ?
Cic. de Legib. lib. I. made ;

68

The Evidence of Natural
made ; and * to murder Men mth*
out DifiinCiion, to confound the
Rights of nil Families by the groffieft
Forgeries, to rob with unteftraimd
Violence, to break Faith continually,
and Defraud and Cheat without
Reluctance, might by the Decreet
and Ordinances of a mad Affembly.be
made lawful and honefi. In which
Matters if any Man thinks that
the Votes and Suffrages of Fools have
fuch Power, as to be able to change
the Nature of Things ; why do they
not likewife Decree (as Cicero ad
mirably expreffes himfelf,) that
poifionous Things may become whoU
fiome ; and that any other Thing,
1 which is now Deftrudive of Man
kind, may become Prefiervative of it.
¦f 6. Further yet : As this Law
of Nature, is infinitely fuperior te
all Authority of Men, and inde
pendent upon it ; fo its Obligar
tion, primarily and originally, is .
£ antecedent alfo even to this Con
fideration, of its being the pofi
tive Will or Command of God
himfelf. ' .For, || as the Addition of
certain Numbers neeeffarily produces
a certain Sum ; and certain Geometri
cal or Mechanical Operations give a

* Quod fi populorum juf-
fis, fi principum decretis, fi
fententiis judicum, jura con-
ftituerentur ; jus effet latroc'i-
tiari, jus adulter are, jus tefta-
menta falja Jupponere, fi_ haec
fuffragiis aut fcitis multitudi-
nis probarentur. Que fi tanta
potentia eft ftultorum fenten
tiis atq;juflis, ut eorum fuf
fragiis rerum natura vertatur ;
cur non fanciunt, ut quaewa/a
perniciojaque funt, habeantur
pro bonis ac Jalutaribus ; aut
cur, cum jus ex injuria lex
facere poffit, bonum eadem
facere non poffit ex mala ? Id.
ibid. •j- Eternal Moral Obligations,
antecedent, in fomeRefpecl, even
to this Confideration, of their
being the Will and Command
of God himfelf.
X Virtutis & Vitiorum, fine
ulla Divina ratione, grave ip-
fius confeientias pondus eft.
Cic. de Nat. Dear. lib. 3.
|| Deniq; nequis obligati-
onem Legum naturalium ar-
bitrariam l£ mutabilem a nobis
fingj fufpicetur, hoc adjicien-
dum cenfui ; Virtutum . exerr
citium habere rationem me-
<dii neceflarii ad finem, (fepo-
iita confideratione Imperii Di-
•vini) manente rerum natura
tali qualis nunc eft. Hoc autem ita intelligo, uti agnofeunt pleriq; omnes,
Additionem duarum unitatum, duabus prius pofitis, neceflario conftituere
-numerum quaternarium ; aut, uti praxes geometrical y mechanics, pro-
blemata propofita folvunt immutabiliter ; adeo ut nee fapientia nee volun
tas Di-vina cogitari poffit quicquam in contrarium, conftituere pofle.
Cumberland de Legib. Natura, pag. 231. conftant

and Revealed Religion. 6g
conftant and uncdterable Solution ofi certain Problems or
Propofitions : So, in moral Matters, there are certain
neceffiary and unalterable Refipeds or Relations of Things
which have not their Original from arbitrary and pofi
tive Conftitution, but are of eternal Neceffity in their •
own ISature. For Example : *
As, in Matters of Senfe, the Reafon * To l^ptnv, oJ },Si, ipj-
why a Thing is vifible, is not be- Pimf£ w, im tbIo &par*ir
caufie 'tis Seen; but 'tis therefiore f^'r?*- S£' ft?"™'
_ J , r \ ¦ -m n ¦ «i* Ttflo o{«ftsiior. [Note, thefe
Seen, becaufie tis vifible : So m Words are by Ficinus ridi-
¦ Matters of natural Reafon and Mo- culoufly tranflated videtur and
rality, that which is Holy and Good ^m.ff) !°uxS" *a} r° °™''
(as Creatures depending upon and T ~/ £& J£ £%™u

(T«l,

worfhipping God, and practifing &«' tSIo JWv iri. piato
Juftice and Equity in their Deal- Euthyphr.
ings with each other, and the
dike,) is not therefore Holy and Good, becaufe 'tis
-commanded to be done ; but is therefore commanded by
God, becaufe 'tis Holy and Good. The Exiftence in
deed . of the Things themfelves, whofe Proportions
and Relations we confider, depend entirely on the
mere arbitrary Will and good Pleafure of God,
who can create Things when he pleafes, and de-
ftrOy them again whenever 'he thinks fit. But
when Things are created, and fo long as it pleafes
God to continue them in Being ; their Proportions,
-which are abftradly of eternal Neceffity, are alfo
in the Things themfelves abfolutely unalterable.
Hence God himfelf, though he has no Superior, from
Whofe Will to receive any Law of his Actions, yet
difdains not to obferve the Rule . _ ., . ~ , . , ',
of Equity and Goodnefs, as f the ^ in rs,-fmx^ «.W
Law of all his Actions in the Go- «rs *«! »' dm* uprH i^uma
vernment of the World, and con- **' ©s|\ Origen. adverf. Cel-
defcends to appeal even to Men Jum' ' ' 4"
for the Equity and Righteoufnefs of his Judgments. Ezei.xviii.
To this Law, the infinite Perfections of his Divine
Nature make it neceffary for him (as has been be-/*?-38»39
fore

7o

* DiQamina Divini Intel
lects fanciuntur inLeges apud
ipfum valituras, per immuta-
bilitatem fuarum perfeftio-
num. Cumberland de Leg.
Natures, pag. 343.
Solebam ipfe quidem, cum
aliis plurimis, antequam do-
miniijurifq; omnis originem
univerfaliter & diftindle con-
fiderafTem ; dominium Dei, in
Creationem velut integram ejus
originem, refolvere. Verum
quoniam, &c.  in hanc
tandem conceffi fententiam,
dominium Dei efle jus vel po-
teftatem ei a fua Sapientia &
Bonitate, velut a Lege, datam
ad regimen eorum omnium
quas ab ipfo unquam creata
fuerint vel creabuntur. 
Nee poterit quifquam merito
conqueri, dominium Dei intra
nimis anguftos' limiles hac ex-
plicatione coerceri ; qua hoc
unum dicitur, illius nullam
partem confiftere in poteftate
quicquam faciendi contra fi
nem optimum, Bonum com
mune. Idem pag. 345, 346.
Contra autem, Hobbiana
refolutio dominii Divini in po
tent! am ejus irrefiftibilem adeo
apertei ducit ad, &c.  ut
mihi dubium non fit, illud
ab eo fiftum fuifle, Deoque
attributum, in eum tantum
finem, ut juri fuo omnium in
omnia patrocinaretur. Id. pag.
344- Nos e contrario, fontem
ind'eavimus, e quo demon-

The Evidence of Natural
fore proved) to have conftant Re->
gard : And (as a learned Prelate of
our own * has excellently fhewn,
not barely his infinite Power, but
the Rules of this eternal Law, are
the true Foundation and the IVJea-
fure of his Dominion over his
Creatures. Now for the fame Rea
fon that God who hath no Superior
to determine him, yet conftantly
directs all his own Actions by the
eternal Rule of Juftice and Good
nefs, 'tis evident all Intelligent
Creatures in their feveral Spheres
and Proportions, ought to obey
the fame Rule according to the
Law of their Nature, even though
it could be fuppofed feparate
from that additional Obligation,
of its being the pofitive Will
and Command of God. And
doubtlefs there have been many
Men in all Ages in many Parts
of the heathen W7orld, who
not having Philofophy enough
to collect from mere Nature any
tolerably juft and explicit Appre
henfions concerning the Attributes
of God, much lefs having been
able to deduce from thence any
clear and certain Knowledge of
his Will, have yet had a very
great Senfe of Right and Truth,
and been fully perfuaded in their

ftrari poteft, Juftitiam univer-
fajem, omnemq; adeo Virtutem moralem, quae in Reflore requiritur,
in Deo pras caateris refulgere, eadem plane methodo, qua homines ad eas
excolendas obligari ofteudemus. Id. pag. 547,
own

and Revealed Religion.' yt
own Minds, of many unalterable Obligations of
Morality. But this Speculation, though neceffary
to be taken Notice of in the diftinct Order and
Method of Difcourfe, is in itfelf too dry, and not
of great Ufe to Us, who are abundantly affured
that all moral Obligations are moreover the plain
and declared Will of God ; As fhall be fhewn par
ticularly in its proper Place.
7. Laftly, This Law of Nature has its full obli- The Law
gatory Power, antecedent to all Confideration of of Nature
any particular private and perfonal Reward or Pu- ° Jf^f/
nifhment, annexed either by natural Confequence, t0 Ml Con
or by pofitive Appointment, to the Obfervance or fideration.'-
Neglect of it. This alfo is very evident : Becaufe, °fi Par£-
if Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, Fitnefs and Z-ardsand,
Unfitnefs of being practifed, be (as has been fhewn) Punijk- *
Originally, eternally, and neeeffarily, in the Nature mentl-
of the Things themfelves, 'tis plain that the View
of particular Rewards or Punifhments, which is only
an After- con fideration, . and does not at all alter
the: Nature of Things, cannot be the original Caufe
of the Obligation of the Law, but is only an addi
tional Weight to enforce the Practice of what Men
were before obliged to by right Reafon. There is
no Man, who has any juft Senfe of the Difference
between Good, and Evil, but muft needs acknow
ledge,, that Virtue and Goodnefs
* are truly amiable, and to be * Dignae itaq; funt, qua
chofen for their own Sakes and Pr£Pter '"^cam fibi per-
7 . ' , „7 , , . tit fecbonem appetantur, etiam.
intrinfick Worth, . though a Man t\ nuna effet naturae Lex, quas
had no Profpect : of gaining any illas imperaret. Cumberland,
particular Advantage to himfelf, de Leg. Nat.pag.-2.t1.
by the Practice of them : And
that, on the contrary, Cruelty, Violence and Op-
preffion, Fraud, Injuftice, and all Manner of
Wickednefs* are of themfelves hateful* and by all
F Means

72 The Evidence of Natural
* A^5ixiio? irlv, t*x° f*if Means to be avoided, even * tno'
a Man fud abfolute Affurance,
that he fhould bring no Manner
of Inconvenience upon Himfelf
by the Commiflion of any or
all of thefe Crimes. This like-
wife is excellently and admirably
expreffed by Cicero : Virtue, faith
•j- he, is that, which, though no
Profit or Advantage whatfioever, was
to be expected to a Man's fielfi firom
the Practice of it, yet muft without
all Controverfiy be acknowledged to
be truly defirable for its own Sake
alone. And accordingly J all good
Men love Right and Equity, and do
many Things without any ProfipeCi
ofi Advantage at all, merely becaufie
they are Juft and Right, and fit te
be done. On the contrary, Vice is
fio odious in its own Nature, and
fio fit to be avoided, even though no
Punifihment was to enfiue, that || no
Man, who has made any tolera
ble Proficiency in Moral Philofophy,
can in the leaft Doubt, but, if he
was fure the Thing could be for ever
concealed intirely both from God
and Men, fio that there fihould not be
the leaft Sufipuion of its being ever
dificovered, yet he ought not to d»
^u'a decet, quia reftum, quia honeftum eft; etfi nullum confecuturum
emolumentum vident. Id. de Finib. lib. z.
|| Satis enim nobis (ft modo aliquid in philofophia profecimus) per*
fuafum efle debet, fi omnes deos hominefq; celare poffimus, nihil tamen
avare, nihil injufte, nihil libidinofe, nihil incontinenter efle faciendum.
Id. de Offic. Ub. 3.
Si nemo fciturus, nemo ne fufpicaturus quidem fit, quum aliquid divi-
tiar'um, potentlae," dominationis, libidinis caufa feceris ; fi id diis homi-.
nibufq; i'uturum fit femper ignotum, fifne fadlurus ? Id. ibid, any

diixm, 'AM' ofi? olStxtTt $vvxim>&.
pi jSj&ETai.'
'Ovo' os rd ftixjas \a.fA,@diiit
witio"xj\o. *AM' o( rd peydt&i x%xre%e~
"E^ei» ivrBfiiv®' xcu xagrtlii
„ 'Ovd of ye ravra. itdmt, &«-
•tiitfi 'ftovon,
'AM' »ri{ aSo^op yvYie'tctt
thai iiKft®; It oti Soke(»>
Philemonis Fragmenta.
f Honeftum id intelligi-
mus, quod tale eft, ut de-
tra£ta brnni utilitate, fine ullis
praerhiis fruftibufque, per ftip-
fum poffit jure , laudaii. . Cic.
de Finib. 2.
Atque haec omnia propter
fe folum, ut nihil adjungatur
emolument!, petenda funt. Id.
de Inventione lib. 2 .
Nihil eft de quo minus du-
bitari poffit, quam & honefta
expetenda per fe, & eodem
modo turpia per fe effe fugi-
cnda. Id. de Finib. lib. 3.
X Jus & omne honeftum,
fua fponte eft expetendum.
Etenim omnes viri boni ip-
fam aequitatem & jus ipfum
amant. Id. de Legib. lib 1 .
\ Optimi quiq; permulta ob
earn unam caufam faciunt,

dm Revealed Religion. ^3
any Thing unjuftly^ covetsufly, wilfully, paffiondtely, ti-
tentioufiy, or any Way "wickedly.
Nay, * if a good Man had it in * Itaq; fi vir bonus habeal
his Power to gain all his Neighbour's j^jj™ ; u\ -fi.^*j Jj£
Wealth by the leaft Motion of his tuT7eftame°nta nomer, ejus
Finger, and was fure it would never irrepere ; hac vi non utatur*'
be at all fufipcCted either by God fe il fxploratum quidem ha*
or Man , unqueftisnably he would bf tjd,°,mnln° ceminem"ni
... , ?. . , j -. a j qdarn fufpi.atilrum.  Hoc
think, he ought not to do it. And qui admiradr, is ft, quis fit
whoever wonders at this± has no vir bonus< nefdre fatetur*
Notion what it is to be really a good Idem dt °Jfic- **• 3'
Man. N ot f that any fuchThing f fc& Ej ^ hik% i% -aJS-
is poffible in Nature, that any T* a«&9a'Ki» ««i ^- ndi Meti-
Wickednefs can be indeed- con- «8i' T."5 H'°' *"""' 1" ****
,_ _l j r  /-^j t>. 1 trout. iia ait]» hxaiicrvtti 'Bsepi
cealed from God 5 But only, upon d^iat .^ ^,, ^/^
fuch a Suppofition* the natural RipubL lib. \q.
and neceffary Difference between
Juftice and Injuftice is made to appear more
clearly and undeniably.
Thus far is clear; But now from hence it does tet it dm
hot at all follow, either that a good Man ought to not from
have no Refpect to Rewards and Punifhments* or thf,ncJ \f
that Rewards and Punifhments are not abfolutely aeitjfer ^J*
neceffary to maintain the Practice of Virtue and agoodMaii
Righteoufneis in this prefent World. 'Tis certain* Bpght t0
indeed* that Virtue and Vice are eternally and ^"^l
neeeffarily different; and that the one truly de- guards and
ferves to be chofen for its own Sake* and the Punijh-
6ther ought by all Means to be avoided* though ^f"1*^ 6I"
a Man was fure* for his own Particular, neither ^.^ ^
to gain nor lofe any Thing by the Practice of Pmijh-
either. And* if this was truly the-State of Things ments art
in the World* certainly That Man muft have a J" **>¦
very corrupt Mind indeed, who could in the leaft ^fj"%
doubt, or fo much as once deliberate with himfelf, fnaintuin
Vvhich he would chufe. But the Cafe does not tbeprastia
ftand thus. The Queftion Now in the general f^'S
Practice of the World* fuppofing all Expectation oftVwld.
Rewards and Punifhments fet afide, will not be, whe-
P 2 ther

fif The Evidenced/' Natural
ther a^Man would chufe Virtue for its own Sake,
and avoid Vice : But the Practice of Vice is- accom
panied with great Temptations and Allurements of
Pleafure and Profit ; and the Practice of Virtue is
often threatened with great Calamities, Loffes, and
fometimes even with Death itfelf. And this alters
the Queftion, and deftroys the Practice of that
which appears fo reafonable in the whole Specula*
tion, and introduces a Neceffity of Rewards and
Punifhments. For though Virtue is unqueftion-
ably worthy 'to "be chofien fior its own Sake, even with
out any Expectation of Reward ; yet, it does not
follow that it is therefore intirely Selfi-fiufficient, and'
able to fupport a Man under all Kinds of Suffer
ings, and even Death itfelf, for its Sake, without
any Profpect of future Recompence. Here there
fore began the Error of the Stoicks, who taught,
that the bare Practice of Virtue was itfelf the chief
Good, and able of itfelf to make a Man happy un
der all the Calamities in the World. Their De
fence, indeed, of the Caufe of Virtue was very
brave : They faw well, that its Excellency was in
trinfick, and founded in the Nature of the Things '
themfelves, and could not be altered by any outward
Circumftances : That therefore Virtue muft needs
be defirable for its own Sake, and not merely for the
Advantage it might bring afong with it : And if fo,
then confequently neither could any external Dis
advantage, which it might happen to be attended
with, change the intrinfick Worth of the Thing it
felf, or ever make it ceafe to be truly defirable.'
Wherefore, in the Cafe of Sufferings artd'Death for
the Sake of Virtue, not having any certain Know
ledge of a future State of Reward (though the
wifeft of them did, indeed, hope for it, and think it
highly probable) they were forced, that they might
be confiftent- with their own Principles, to fuppofe-
the Practice of Virtue a fufficient Reward- to itfelf
in -all ^Cafesy and a- full CompenfationTor -all the
Sufferings

and Revealed Religion.
Sufferings in the World. And accordingly they
very bravely, indeed, taught, that the Practice of
Virtue was not only * infinitely to
be preferred before all the finful
Pleafures in the World, but alfo
¦f that a Man ought without
Scruple to chufe, if the Cafe was
propofed to him, rather to under
go all poffible Sufferings with Vir
tue* than to obtain all poffible
worldly Happinefs by Sin. And
the fuitable Practice of fome few
of them, as of Regulus for Inftance,
who chofe to die the crueleft
Death that could be invented, ra
ther than break his Faith with
an Enemy, is, indeed, very won
derful, and to be admir-ed. But
yet, after all this, 'tis plain, that
the general Practice of Virtue in
the World can never be fupported;
upon this Foot.. The Difcourfe is
admirable, but it feldom goes fur
ther than mere Words : And the
Practice of thofe few, who have
_ acted accordingly, has not been
imitated by the reft of the World.
Men never will generally, and,
indeed, 'tis not very reafonably
to be expected they- fhould, part
with all the Comforts of Life, and
even Life itfelf, without Expecta
tion of any future Recompence.
So that, if we fuppofe no future
State of Rewards, it will follow, that God has in
dued Men with fuch Faculties, as put therh under
a Neceffity of approving and chufing Virtue in the
Judgment of their own Minds,- -and yet has not
given bhem wherewith to fupport themfelves in the
P 3 fuitable

75

* Eft aut,em unus dies bene
& ex praeceptis ' tuis adlus,
peccanti immortalitati ante-
ponendus. Cic. Tufc. Qua-f.
I. 5. f Quasro fi duo fint, quo
rum alter optimus vir, as-
quiffimus, fiimma juftitia, fin-
.giulp-ri fide ; alter infigni fce-
lere & audacia : Et fi in eo
fit errore civitas, ut bony«i
ilium virum, fceleratum, fa-
cinorofum, nefarium putet ;
contra autem qui fit impro^
biffjmus, exiftimet efle fum-
ma probitate ac fide : proq^;
hac opinione omnium civi-
ufn, bonus- ille vir vexetur,
rapiatur, manus ei denique
auferantur, efFodiantur oculi,
damnetur, vinciatur, uratur,
extermineturj egeat ; poftre^
mo, jure e.tianj optimo omniis
bus. miferrimus . effe videatur ;
contra autem ille improbus
laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus
diligatur, omnes ad eum ho-
nores, omnia impgria, omnes
opes, omnes deniq;copiae con-
ferantur, vir deniq; optimus
omnium • ssftimatiqne, & dig-
niffimus omni fortlina jusice-
tur : Quis tandem erit tam de-
mens, qui dubitet utrum fe
efle maiit?- Idem' de Republ,
lib. 3. fragment. >

7$ The Evidence ef Natural
foitable and conftant* Practice of it. The Cqnfir
deration of which inexplicable pifficulty ought tq
have led the Philofophers to a firm Belief and Ex?
pecftatipn of a futyre State of Rewards and PunifiV
pient's, without which their whole Scheme of Morar
jfty cannpt be fupported. And, beGaufe a Thing of
fuch Neceffity and Importance to Mankind was not
rrpre clearly, and directly, and univerfal ly made
known, it might naturally have led them to fomg
farther Confequences alfo, which I fhall have Ocr
cafion particularly to deduce hereafter.
fhe tpati\- And now* from what has been faid upon this,
JfadiSs ffc**'" 'tis eafy tQ^ee the F*lfity and Weaknefs of
'3'Mr. Mr. Hobbsh Doctrines ; That there is no fiuch Thing
"HobbsV as Juft andUnjuft, Right and Wrong, originally in the
Do3rinesA JSfature ofi Things ; That Men in their natural State,
tfe^brifi- aniecedeni to all Compacts, are not obliged to univerfal
pal if' Benevolence, nor to any moral Duty whatfioever ; but
#igbt, are in a State of War, and have every one a Right to
ftpwv m j0 whatever he has Rower to do ; And that, in Civil
»"'¦*" ' Societies, it depends wholly upon pofitive Laws, or tht
Will of Governors, to define what fhall be Juft or-
Unjuft. The Contrary to all which having been
already fully demonftrated, there is no Need of be?
Jng large, in further difprovfog and confuting parr
ijcularly thefe Affertions themfelves. I fhall there
fore only mention a few Obfervations, from which
jfome of the greateft and moft obvious Abfurdities,
pf the chief "Principles upon which Mr. Hobbs
builds Ins, whole Doctrine in this Matter, may moft
eafily appear.
j. Firft then •, The Ground ajid Foundation
pf Mr. Hobbs'% Scheme is this •,
* Ab jb quatyafq Naturae t_bat , * All Men, being equal by
flriffl? rWm\ f», 1"f, «p>t, Naiwe ' frf mturally defiring the
acquirendi Spes. ' Leviath. y ' r ', "¦ , -J • J ¦ *
;', jS.  • Jaf%f ThmgSf have j (very one a.
' \ .ffafijrg dgdit umcujo; Right to every Thing * are every ont

77
jus in omnia. . Hoc eft, in
ftatu mere naturaii, five ante-
quam homines ullis paftis
kfe invicem obftrinxiflfent,
unicuiq; licebat facere quae-
cunq; & in quofcunq; libebat;
& poflidere, uti, frui omnibus,
qure volebat & poterac. De
Cive, c. i. § 10.

and Revealed R e l i g i o n.
iefirous to have abfolute Dominion
over all others, and may every- One
juftly do whatever at any Time is in
his Power, by inolcntly taking firom
Others either their Poffeftions or
Lives, to gain to himfielf that abfio-
lute Dominion. Now this is exact
ly the fame Thing, as if a Man
fhould affirm, that a Part is equal to the Whole, or
that one Body can be prefent in a Thoufiand Places at
once. For to fay that one Man bas a full Right to
the fame individual Things, whkh another Man at
the fame Time has afiull Rght to, is faying that
two Rights may be * contradictory
to each other, thae is, that a Thing
may be Right, at the fame Time
that 'tis confeffetl to be ffirong.
For Example, If every Man has
a Right to preferve his own Life,
then -j- 'tis manifeft I can have
no Right to take any Man's Life
away from him, unlets he has firft
forfeited his ; own Right,, by at
tempting to deprive me of mine.
For, otherwife, it might be Right
for me to do That, which at the
fame Time, becaufe it could not
be done but in Breach of another Man's Right, it
could not be Right for me to do : Wich is the
greateft Abfurdity in the World. The true State
of this Cafe therefore is plainly this : In Mr- Hobbs\
State of Nature and Equality, every Man having
an equal Right to preferve his own Life, tis evident
every Man has a Right to an equal Proportion of all
thofe Things which are either neceffary or ufefu] ta
Life. And confequently fo far is it from being
true, that any One has an original Right to poffefs
M, that, on the contrary, whoever firft Attempts,
P 4 without

* Si impoflibile fit fingulis,
omnes & omnia fibimet fubjh
fcere ; ratio qua hunc finem
proponit fingulis, qui runi tan
tum contingere poteft, faspiuV
quam millies proponeret im>
poffibile, & femel tantum pof
fibile. Cumberl. de Leg Nat.
pag. 217. . ,- -J
f Nee poteft cujufquam'
jus feu libertas ab ulla lege
reliita, eo extendere, ut li-
ceat oppugnare ea, quae aliis
eadem Lege imperantur faci*
enda. Id. pag. 219,

The E v-i den c e of Natural
without the Confient of his Fellows, and except it he
for fome pffblik Benefit, to take to. himfelf more
than his Proportion, is the Beginner of Iniquity*
and the Author of all fucceeding Mifchief.
2. To avoid this Abfurdity therefore, Mr. Hobbs
is forced to affert in the next Place, that fince every
Man has confeffedly a Right to >preferve his own
Life, and confequently to do every Thing that is
neceffary to preferve it ; and fince, in the State of
Nature, Men will neeeffarily have
* Omnium adverfus omnes * perpetual Jealaufiies and Sufipidom
perpetuae Sufpiciones,-  ff* mci) other>s jnaoaching ; ' there,
Eellum omnium in Omnes. i . „ n . . °
De Cive, c. i. § 12. for^ Jtfl Precaution gives every one.
f Spes unicu'iq; fecuritatis a Right to f endeavour, for his
Confervationifque fuse in eo own security, tet prevent, opprefis,
fin eft, ut viribus artibufque d dft R b ^ , f
proprus proximum fuum vel V ./ \7- ? J ¦
palam vel ex infidijs prae- eret Artifice or open Violence, as it
dccupare poflit. Ibid. c. 5. fihall happen at any Time to be in
§ l- ... ,. his Power, as being the II only cer-,
' H Secuntatis viam meho- .'.',. ' £ % ir ^ r *•
rem habet nemo Anticipa- tam Means of Self-prefervation,
tione. Lerv><*ih- <• '3* But tms *s even * plainer Abfur„
dity, if poffible, than the former.
For (befides that, according to Mr. Ifiobbsh Prin
ciples, Men, before pofitive Compacts, may juftly
do what Mifchief they pleafe, even without the Pre-;
tence of - Self -prefiervation) what can be more Ridi
culous than to imagine a War of All Men againft All
the directeft and certaineft' Means of the Prefiervation
of all ? Yes, fiays he, becaufe it leads Men to aNe-5
ceffity of entering into CompaCi for each other's Sgr
curity. But then, to make thefe Compacts Obliga-?
tory, he is forced (as I fliall prefently obferve more
* SeeDe particularly) to reciir to an * antecedent Law of.
&ve, c. 3. Nature : And this deftroys all that he had before
§ '• faid. For the fame Law ofi Nature which obliges
Men to Fidelity, after having made a Compact, will
unavoidably, upon all the fame Accounts, he found
Co oblige them,- before all Compacts, to Contentmini and

and ^wealed R e l i g i op. jy
and mutual Benevolence, as the readieft and cer
taineft Means to the Prefervation and FJappinefe-
of them All. 'Tis true* Men, by entering into
Co-mpaSs and making Laws, agree to compel one
another, to do what perhaps the mere Senfe of Duty,
however really Obligatory in the higheft Degree,
would not, without fuch Compacts, have Force
enough of itfelf to hold them to in Practice : And
fo Compacts muft be acknowledged to be in Fad
a great Addition and Strengthening of Mens Secu
rity. But this Compulfion makes no Alteration in
the Obligation itfielfi, and only fhews, that That
intirely lawlefis State, which Mr. Hobbs calls, the
State of Nature, is by no Means- truly Natural, or
in any Senfe fuitable to. the. Nature, and Faculties
of Man ; btit, on the contrary, is a State of extreme
ly Unnatural and Intolerable Conniption .• As I foal!
prefently prove more fully from fome other Confe
derations. 3. Another notorious Abfurdity and Inconfift-
ency in Mr. Hobbsh Scheme is this.: That he. all
along fuppofes Some particular Branches of th§
Law of Nature (which he thinks neceffary for the
Foundation of fome Parts of his pwn Doctrine)
to be originally Obligatory from the bare Reafon
pf Things ; at the fame Time that he denies and
takes away innumerable others, which have plainly
in the Nature and Reafon of Things the fame
Foundation of being Obligatory as the former,
and. without winch the Obligation of the former
can never befolidly made out and defended. Thus,
tie fuppofes that in the State of
. Nature, before any Compact be- * Unicuique Ikelat facer?
made, every * Man's own Will, is- q«*cunq«e lib'l«*- De Ow. ¦
his only Law ; that + nothing a, £' \' Lnftquens eft, ut JW,
Man can do, is Unjuft- ; and that hil djcendum fit Injuftum.
Nomina Jufti & Injufti locum
Ly hag coi}dition.e nori hjiberit, i!/<w«/£. cap. 13. f whatever

80 The Evidence of Natural
* whatever Mifichief one Man does
to anofher, is no Injury nor Injuftice\
neither has the Perfon, to whom the
Mffchiefi is done, how great fioever
it be, any juft Reafion to complain
of Wrong; (I think it may here1
reafonably be prefumed, that if
Mr. Hobbs had lived in fuch a
State of Nature, and had hap
pened to be himfelf the Suffering
Party, he would in this Cafe havf
been of another Opinion :) And
yet at the fame Time he fuppofes^
that, in the fame State of Nature,
Men are by all Means obliged -j-
to fieek Peace, and J to enter into
Compacts to remedy the fore- men
tioned Mifchiefs. Now if Men
are obliged by the original Rea
fon and Nature of Things to fieek Terms of Peace,
and to get out of the pretended natural State of
War, as foon as they can, how come they not to
be obliged originally, by the fame Reafon and
Nature of Things, to live from the Beginning in
univerfal Benevolence, and avoid entering into the State
of War at all? He muft needs confefs they would
be obliged to do fo, did not Selfprefiervation ne~
ceffitate them every Man to War upon others :
But this cannot be true of the firft Aggreffor, whom
yet Mr. Hobbs, in the H Place
H Ex his/equitur, Injuriam now cited> vindicates from being
guilty of any Injuftice : And
therefore herein he unavoidably contradicts him
felf. Thus again, in moft Inftances of Morality,
he fuppofes Right and Wrong, Juft and Unjuft to
have no Foundation in the Nature of Things,
but to depend intirely on pofitive Laws * that
* tit

* Ex his fequitur, Tnju-
riam nemini fieri pofle, nifi ei
quocum initur pa&um. — —
Siquis alicui noceat, quocum
nihil pactus eft ; damnum ei
jnfert, non Injur^am. — — Ete-:.
nim fi is qui damnum recipit,
injuriam exppftularet ; is qui
fecit fic diceret, quid tu mihi ?
quare facerem ego tuo potius,
quam meo libitu? &c. In qua
ratione, ubi nulla intercefle-
runt padla, non video quid fit
quod poflitn'reprehendK De
Cive, c, 3. §.4.
f Prima & fundamental
Lex .Naturae eft, quaerendam.
efte pacem, ubi haberi poteft,
&c. De Cive, c. 2. § z.
% See De Cive, cap. z.&y

nemini fieri pofle, &c.

and Revealed Religion.
* the Rules or DiftinClicns ofi Good
md Evil, Honeft and Difihoneft,
fire mere civil Confiitutions ; and
whatever the Chief Magiftr ate Com-r
fnands, is to be accounted Good ;
mhatever he Forbids, Evil : that f
'tis the Law of the Land only,
which makes Robbery to be Robbery,
fir Adultery to be Adultery : that
the Commandments, to Honour
\ur Parents, to do no Murder, not
fo commit Adultery, and all the
pther Laws of God and Nature,
are no further obligatory, than the
Civil Power fhall think fit to make
them fio; nay, that || where the
Supreme Authority commands Men to
fworfihip God by an Image or Idol, in.
Heathen Countries, (for in this In*-
ftance he cautioufly excepts Chrj-
ftian ones ('tis lawfiul and their
Duty to do it ; and (agreeably, as a
natural Confequence to all This,)
that § 'tis Mens pofitive Duty to obey
the Commands of the Civil Power in
dllThings, even in Things clearly and

81

* Regulas boni & mall, juft
& injufti, honefli & inhenefti},
efle -leges civiles.; ideoque'
quod legiflator pracceperit, 14
pro bono ; quod vetiierrt, ii
pro malo habendum eflp, L\
Cive, c. 12. § i.
Quod Aftio jufta vel injufta
fit, a jure imperantis provenit.
Reges legitimi qua: imperanL
jufta faciunt imperando ; quae
vetant, vetando taciunt injufta.
De Cive.t. 12. § i. [In which,
Seftion 'tis worth obfervingy
how he ridiculoufly Inter
prets thofe Words of Solomon,
(Dabjs fervo (uo cor docile, ut
pojjit Difcernere intir bonum 1$
malum,') to fignify, not hisCfo.
derftanding or Difccrning, but
his Decreeing what fhall be
good, and what evil.]
f Si tamen Lex civjlis ju-»
beat invadere aliquid, non eft
illud Furtum, Adulterium, &c»
De Cive, c. 14. § 10.
X Sequitur ergo, Iegibuj
illis, non Occides, non M<scha-
bere, non Furabere, Parentis
honorabis, nihil aliud praece-
pifle Chrjftum, quam ut cives
& fubditi fuis Principibus &',

fummislmperatoribus in qua;f-
tionibus omnibus circa meum, tuum, fuum, alienum, abfolute obedirent,
De Cive, c. 17, § io.
|| Si quaeratur an obediendum civitati fit, fl imperetur Deum colert?
fub Imagine, coram iis qui id fieri honorificum efle putant; certe facien
dum eft. De Cive, c. 15, §. }8. .
§ rjniverfaljter & in omnibus obedjre obligamur. De Cive, e. 14.
§• IO-
' DocTrina alia, quae Obediential civili repugnat, eft, qn\cquid faci
al Civis quicunque contra Confcicntiam fuam, peccatum eft. Leviath.

f- zg.

quicunque

Opinio eorum qui docent, peccdre fubditos, quoties mandata Principum
fior urn, qws fibi Injufta videntur fie, exfequuntur ; & erronea eft, & inter
fas njmeranda ejus; qbedieflu!* qyil| a^verfantur. De Cive, c. 1 2. § z.

directly

82 The E v ide nce«/ Natural
diredly againft their Confidence ; (that is, that tfs
their pofitive Duty to do That, which at the fame
Time they know plainly 'tis their Duty not to
do :) * Keeping up indeed always
in their own Minds an inward Der
fire to obfierve. the Laws of Nature
and Confcience, but not being bound
to obferve them in their outward
Actions, except when 'tis fiafie fio to
do : He might as well have faid,
that Human Laws and Conftitu*
tions have f Power to make Light
be Darknefis, and Darknefis light;
to make Sweet be Bitter, and Bit
ter Sweet:.- And indeed, as one
Abfurdity will naturally lead a
Man into another, he does fay
fomething very like it ; namely,
XDeCive, that J the Civil Authority is to judge of all Opinions and
Dodrines whatfoever ; to * determine ^ueftions Phi-
lofibphical, Mathematical; and, becaufe indeed the
Signification of Words is Arbitrary, even f Arith
metical ones alfio ; as, whether a Man fihall prefiume to
affirm that Two and. Three make Five or not : And
yet at the fame Time, Some particular Things, which
it would either have been too flagrantly fcandalous
for him to have made depending upon human
Laws ; as that J God is to be Lo
ved, Honoured', and Adored ; that
|1 a Man ought not to Murder his
Parents \ and the like : Or elfe,
which were of Neceffity to be
fuppofed for the Foundation of

. * Concludejxdunj eft, Le
gem Natura; femper & ubiqj
obligare in Foro interno, five
confcipntia, ; non femper in Foro
externo ; fed tum foluramodo,
cum fecure id fieri polliit. De
Cive, c. 3.

<f Quae fi tanta potentia eft
ftultorum fententiis atque juf-
lis, ut eorum fuffragiis rerum
natura vertatur ; cur non fen-
cipnt, u.t quae mala pcrnfiiofaq;
funt, habeantur pro bonis ac
falutaribui? Cicero, de Legib.
lib. 1.

c. 6. § i I
* Ibid. c.
I/- § 12
f Ibid. 1,
18. §4.

. J Neque enim an hpnorifice
<Je Deo fentiendum fit, neq.ue
an fit amandus, timendus, co-
lenduf, dubitari potefls. Sunt
enim haec Religion um per om
nes gentes communia. De Ho

mme, cap. 14,
|| Si is qui fummum habet imperium, feipfum, imperantem dico*
interficere alicui imperet ; non tenetur, Neque Parentem, &c. cum filius
mori quam vivere infarnis, atque exofus malit. Et ' alii cafus funt, cuav
mandata faftu inhpnefta funt, &c. D.tLCjvtxt. 6.. §..13. • ,\
his

and Repealed R e

ligion.

* Lex naturalis eft PatJis
Jlandum ejfe, five Fidem ob-
fervandam efle. j De Cive, c. 3.
§. 1.
f Lex naturalis omnes leget
civiles jubet obfervari. Ibid.
c. 14. §. 10.
\ Legem Civilem, quae
non fit lata in contumeliam
Dei (cujus refpeclu ipfte Civi-
tates non funt fui juris, nee
dicuntur leges ferre, &c.) De
Cive, c. 14. ,§. 10.
Pacli violatio, &c. See De
Cive, c. 3. §.3.

his own Scheme-, as that *¦ Com
pacts ought to be faithfully perform
ed, and Obedience -f to be duly paid
tv Civil Powers : The Obligation
of Thefe Things he is forced to
deduce intirely from the internal
Reafon and Fitnefs of the Things
themfelves, £ antecedent to, inde
pendent upon, and unalterable by all
Human Conftitutions whatfoever.
In which Matter, he is guilty of
the grofieft Abfurdity and In-
confiftency that can be. For if
thofe greateft and ftrongeft of all our Obligations;
to Love and Honour God, for Inftance ; or, to per
form Compacts faithfully ; depend not at all on any
Human Conftitution, but muft of Neceffity (to
avoid making Obligations reciprocally depend on
each other in a Circle) be confeffed to arife origi
nally from, and be founded in, the eternal Reafon
and unalterable Nature and Relations of Things
, themfelves, and the Nature and Force of thefe Obli
gations be fufficiently clear and evident, fo that he
who || Difhonours God, or § wil
fully breaks his Faith, is (according
to Mr. Hobbsh own Reafoning)
guilty of as great an Abfurdity
in Practice, and of as plainly con
tradicting the right Reafon of his
own Mind, as he who in a Difipute
is reduced to a Neceffity of affert-
ing fomething inconfiftent With
itsfelf ; And the original Obliga
tion to thefe Duties can from

«3

|| See De Give, c. 14. §. 10.
§ Eft Similitude quaedam
inter id, quod in vita com-
muni vocatur Injuria, & id,
quod in Scholis folet appel-
lari AbJ'urdum. Quemadmo-
dum enim is, qui; argumen
ts cogitur ad negationem af-
fertionis quam prius*affertierat,
dicitur redigi ad Abfurdum :
eodem modo is, qui prae
animi impotentia facit vel
omittit id quod fe non fac-
turum vel non omiffurum
pafto fuo ante promifcrat, Infuriam Tacit : neq; minus tn contradiftionem.
incidit, quam qui jn Scholis reducitur ad Ablurdum.  Eft itaq; Injuria
Apjiirdi t as quasdam in converfatione ; ficut Abfurditas Injuria gusedam eft
in difputatione. De. Cive, c. 3. §. 3-; hence

2$ *fbe E v n> e n Ce of Natural
hence only be diftirtctly deduced : Then, for thV
fame Reafon, all the Other Duties likewife of natCf-
ral Religion, fuch as univerfal Benevolence, juftice^
Equity, and the like (which I have before proved. to
receive in like Manner their Power ofi obliging^ from
the eternal Reafon and Relations of Things) muft
heeds be obligatory* ante€edent to any Confidera-;
tion Of pofitive Compact, and unalterably and inde
pendently On all Human Conftitutions whatfoever :
And. confequently Mr. Hobbs'?, whole Scheme, (both
of a State of Nature at firft* wherein there was no
. fuch Thing as Right or Wrong, Juft or Unjuft, at
all j and of thefe Things depending afterwards* by
virtue of Compact, wholly and abfolutely on the
pofitive and arbitrary Determination of the Civil
Power;) falls this Way intirely to the Ground, by
his having been forced to fuppofe fiome particuUf
Things obligatory, originally, and in their own Na
ture. On the contrary, If the Rules of Right and
Wrong* juft and Unjuft, have none ofi them any obli
gatory Force in the State of Nature, antecedent to poj
fitive Compact, Then, for the fame Reafon, neither
will they be of any Force after the Compact, fo as to
afford Men any certain and real Security, (excepting
only what may arife from the Compulfion of Laws, and
Fear of Punifihment, which therefore, it may well be
fuppofed, is all that Mr. Hobbs really Means at the
Bottom.) For, if there be no Obligation of Juft and
Right antecedent to the CompaCt, then Whence arifes
the Obligation of the CompaCt itfielfi, on which hg
fuppofes all other Obligations to be founded ? If*
lefiore any Compact was made, it was no Injuftice.
for a Man to take away the Life of his Neighbour*
not for his own Prefervation, bufi
* Ex his fequitur, injuriam merely to fatisfy an * arbitrary
nemini fieri pofle, nifi ei quo Humour or Pleafure, and without'
cum initur paftum. DeCive,
'¦ 3 • § 4- [^'hich vjhole Seilion highly deferves to be read and well eonfidered,
tis ctntaining the Secret of Mr. Hobbs'-i whole Scheme.} any

and Revealed Religion,
any Reafon or Provocation at all ; How comes it
to be an Injuftice, after he has made a Compact*
to break and neglect it ? Or What is it that makes
breaking one's Word to be a greater and more un
natural Crime, than killing a Man merely for no other
Reafion^ but becaufie no pofitive CompaCt has been made
to the contrary? So that, * this Way
alfo, Mr. Hobbs's whole Scheme is
intirely deftroyed.
4. That State, which Mr. Hobbs
calls the State ofi Nature, is not in
any Senfe a Natural State, but a
State of the greateft, moft unna
tural, and moft intolerable Corrup
tion, that can be imagined. For
Reafion, which is the proper Na
ture of Man, can never (as has
been before fhewn) lead Men to
any Thing elfe than univerfal Love
and Benevolence : And Wars, Ha
tred, and Violence, can never arife
but from extreme Corruption. A
Man may fometimes, tis true, in
his own Defence be neceffitated, in
Compliance with the Laws of N a -
ture and Reafon, to make War
upon . his Fellows : But the firft
Aggreffors, who upon Mr. Hobbs's
Principles, (that all Men f have a
natural Will to hurt each other,
and that every one in the State of
Nature has a J Right to do what
ever he has a Will to :) The firft Aggreffors, I fay,
who upon thefe Principles affault and violently
fpoil as many as they are fuperior to in Strength,
without any Regard to Equity or Proportion •*
thefe can never, by any Colour whatfoever, be
excufed

85

* Itaq; patet quod, fi Hob.
biana ratiocinatio eflet valida*
omnis fimal Legum Civilium
obligatio collaberetur ; nee
aliter fieri pot.eft quin earum
vis labefadletur ab omnibus
principiis, quae Legum natu-
ralium vim tollunt aut minu-
unt ; quoniam in his funda
tur & regimfnis civilis au&o-
ritas ac fecuritas, & legum
a civitatibus latarum vigor.
Cumberland, de Leg. Nat. pag.
Etiam extra regimen civile,
a malis omnigenis fimul con-
fideratis tutiorerit, quiaclibus
externis Leges Naturae con-
ftantiflime obfervabit ; quam
qui, juxta dottrinam Hobbi-
anam, vi aut infidiis alios
omnes conando praeoccupare,
fecuritatem fibi qusefiverit. Id.
pag. 304.
f Voluntas t&dendi omni
bus ineft in ftatu Naturas. De
Cive, c.\. § 4.
I In ftatu naturali, unicuiq;
licebat facere quaecunque &
in quofcunque libebat. Ibid.
§10.

$6 The E v i d £ n c e of Natural
*Si nihil exiftimiit contra excufed from having * utterly di-
vefted themfelves rf- Hainan Nature,
and having -f* introduced into the1
World, contrary to all the Laws
of Nature and Reafoh, thtgfeat-1
eft Calamities, and moft uiinatu-^
ral Gonfufiofi* that Mankind* by
the higheft Abufe of their natural
Powers and Faculties, are capable
Of falling under. Mr. Hobbs pre
tends indeed, that one of the firff
and moft natural Principles of
human Life is £ a Defire neceffa-
rily arifing in every Man's Mind,
of having Power and Dominion'
over Others ; and that this natu
rally impels Men to ufe Force and
Violence to obtain it. But nei
ther is it true, that Men, follow
ing the Dictates of Reafon and
uncorrupted Nature, defire difproportionate Power
and Dominion over others ; neither, if it was natu
ral to defire fuch Power, would it at all follow,
that it was agreeable to Nature to ufe violent and1
hurtful Means to obtain it. For fince the only
natural and good Reafon to defire Power and Do
minion (more than what is neceflary for every
Man's Self-prefervation) is, that the Poffeffor of
foch Power may have a larger.Compafs, and greater1
^Abilities and Opportunities of doing Good, (as is
evident' from God's Exercife of perfectly Abfolute
Power ;) 'tis plain that no Man, obeying the un
corrupted Dictates of Nature and Reafon, can de
fire to increafe his Power by fuch deftructivt and
pernicious Methods, the Prevention of which is
the only good Reafon that makes the Power itfelf
truly defirable. Ail Violence therefore, ¦ and- Wary
*• are

naturam fieri, hominibus vio
Iandis ; quid cum eo difle-
ias, qui omhi'nb h'o'rri'inefh ex
iomine tollafrr Cic. de Offic:
at- 3- # v , . , .
¦f- T«d£ df olxaia ota" i\vM
fova^dicat puo-si'— — yiytopita,
wi rm !§£on'-  • Wct&ltovTuii
tivai to Sixaio]dlof, o, Ti Ti; aV
mid pko.^i'yttv®'' o&ti daiZuci'
te xal rUo-tif——<>ol)y ha@w
"is ndi t^ior; ofcoif. Plato de
leg. lib. IO.
% Hbrnines Libertatis &
Dominii per naturam amatores.
Leviath. c. 17.
Nemini dubium efle debet,
quin avidius ferrentur homi
nes natura fua^ fi metus abef-
fet, ad Dominationem quam ad
Sdcietatem. De Cive, cap. 1 .
fz.

and Revealed tLvtibion: 87
are plainly the Effects, not of natural Defires, but
of unnatural and extreme Corruption. And this
Mr. Hobbs himfelf unwarily proves againft himfelf,
by thofe very Arguments, 'whereby he endeavours
to prove, that War and Contention is more natural
to Men, than to Bees or Ants, For his Arguments
on this Head are all drawn from Mens ufing them
felves (as the Animals he is fpeak
ing of, cannot do) to * Strive
about Honours and Dignities, 'till
the Contention grows up into Ha
tred, Seditions, and Wars -, to f fie-
parate each one his private Intereft
from the Public, and value him
fielf highly above others, upon get
ting and engroffing to himfelf more
than his Proportion of the Things
of Life ; J to find Fault with each
other's Management, and, thro' Selfi-
ccnceit, bring in continual Innova
tion and DiftraCiions ; to || impofie
one upon another, by Lies, Falfify-
ing, and Deceit, calling Good Evil,
and Evil Good ; to ** grow envious
at the Profperity ofi others, or proud
and domineering, when themfelves
are in Eafie^and Plenty ; and to
+t keep, up tolerable Peace and
Agreement among themfelves merely
by artificial Compacts, and the Com-
pulfion ofi Laws. All whichThings
are fo far from being truly the Na
tural Effects and Refult of Mens
Reafion and other Faculties * .that
** Animalia bruta, quamdiu bene flbt eft, casteris non invident : Homo
autem tum maxime moleftus eft, quando otio opibufq; maxims abuu-
dat. Ibid.
ft Confenfio creaturarum illarum hrtitarum, naturalis* eft ; hominum
paclitia tantum, id eft, srtif.ciofa. De Cive, c. 5. § 5.
Q_ on

* Homines inter fe de Ho-"
noribus & Dignitatibus per-
petuo contendunt ; fed Ani
malia ilia [Apes 3c Formicse]
non item. Itaq; inter Ho
mines Invidia, Odium* Bel-'
lunij &c. Leviath. c. 17.
•}- Inter Animalia ilia.* Bo-
num publicum ' & privatum
idem eft. — — Homini autem
in bonis propriis nihil tam ju-
cundum eft, quam quod ali=-
enis funt majora.. Ibidi
I Animantia quas rationem
non habent, nullum defec
tum vident, vel videre fe pU-
tant, in adminiftratione fua^
rum rerum publicarum. Sed
in multitudine Hominum,
plurimi funt qui prae caeteris
fapere exiftiinantes, conantur
res novare ; Et diverfi no-
vatores innovant diverfis mo-
dis ; id quod eft diftraftio &
bellum civile, De Cive, c. 5.
|| Animantia ilia verborum
arfe ilia carent, qua homines
alii aliis videri faciunt Bo-
num Malum, & Malum Bo-
r+um ; Magnum Parvum, &
Parvum Magnum. Leviath.
c. 1 7-.

88 The E vide n ce of Natural
on the contrary, they are evidently fome of the
groffelt Abuies' and molt unnatural Corruptions
thereof, that any one, who was arguing on the 6p-
pofite Side of the Queftion, could eafily have chofen
to have inftanced in.
5. Laftly : That chief and principal Argument,
which is one of the main Foundations of Mr. Hobbs's
and his Followers Syftem ; name
ly, that * God's irrtfiftible Pov/er
is the only Foundation of his Domi
nion, and the only Meafiure ofi his
Right over his Creatures ; and,
confequently, -f that every Other
Being has juft fo much Right as
it has natural Power ; that is, that
'tis naturally Right for every
Thing to do whatever it has Power
to do : This Argument, I fay, is
of all his others the moft noto-
rioufly falfe and abfurd : As may
fufficiently appear, (befides what
has been j already faid, of God's
Other Perfections being || as much
the Meafure of his Right, as his
Power is) from this fingle Con
fideration : Suppofe the Devil,
(for when Men run into extreme
impious Affertions, they muft be
aniwered with fuitable Suppofi-
tions ;) Suppofe, I fay, fuch a
Being as we conceive the Devil to be ; of extreme
Malice, Cruelty, and Iniquity ; was indued with
ftipreme abfolute Power, and made Ufe of it only
to render the World as miferabie as was poffible, in
the moft cruel, arbitrary, and unequal Manner that
cm be imagined ; Would it not follow undeniably,
upon Mr. Hobbs's Scheme ; fince Dominion is found
ed in Power, and Power is the Meafure of Right,

* Regni Divini naturalis
. Jus derivatur ab eo, quod Di-
viuee potentiee rcfjh.re impof-
fibik eft. Leviath c. 3 1 .
In regno naturali, regnan-
di & puniendi eos qui leges
fuas violant, jus Deo eft afola
potentia irreftftibili. De Cive,
c. 15. §5..
lis quorum Potentiae re-
fifti non poteft, & per confe-
quens Deo omnipotenti, jus
Dominandi ab ipfa potentia
derivatur. Ibid.
fNam quoniam Deus jus
ad omnia habet; & jus Dei
nihil aliud eft quam ipfa
Dei potentia ; hinc fequitur,
unamquamq; rem naturalem
tantum juris ex natura ha
bere; quantum potentiee habet.
Spincx. de Monarch, cap. 2.
[See alfo TraBat. Theolog. po
litic, cap. 16.]
I Page 69, 70.
|| See Cumberland, de Leg.
Nature, locis fupra citatis.

;-:n*.

:riic:

Iv Abfolute Pi\

rives Abfiolute Right •

and Revealed R e l i d I d Nf . 89
Right ; that fuch a Government as this would not
only 'be as much of Neceffity indeed to be fubmitted
to, but alfo* that it would be as Juft and Right, and
* with as little Reafion to be complained ofi, as is the * See
prefent Government of the World in the Hands of Hoiis de
the Ever-bleffed and infinitely Good God, whofe Love, 9'™' c"3'
and Goodnefs, and tender Mercy appear every
where over a<y his Works.
Here Mr. Hobbs, as an unanfiwerable Argument in
Defence of his Affertion, urges,
that -f the only Reafon why Men
are bound to obey God, is plainly
nothing but Weaknefis or Want of
Power ; becaufe, if they them
felves were All-powerful, 'tis ma
nifeft they could not be under any
Obligation to obey •, and confe
quently Power would give them
an undoubted Right to do what
they pleafed : That is to fay, If
. Men were not created and depen
dent Beings, 'tis true they could
not indeed be obliged to the pro
per Relative Duty of created and
dependent Beings, viz. to obey the
Will and Command of Another
. in Things Pofitive. But from their Obligation to
the Practice of Moral Virtues, of Juftice, Righte
oufnefs, Equity, Holinefs, Purito, Goodnefs, Bene
ficence, Faithful nefs, and Truth, from which Mr.
Hobbs fellacioufly in this Argument, and moft im-
pioufly in his whole Scheme, en
deavours J to difcharge them ;
from this they could not be dif-
charged by any Addition of Power
whatfoever : Becaufe the Obliga
tion to thefe Things is not as the
Glligatiori to- obey in Things of
O % arbitrary

t Quod fi jus regnandi
habeat Deus ab Omnipqten-
tia fua, manifeflum eft Obli-
gationem ad prasftandum ipli
obedientiam, incumbere ho-
minibus piopler imbecilhtatem.
[To explain which, he adds
in his Note;] Si cui durum
hoc videbitur, ilium rogo ut
tacita ccgitatione confiderare
velit, fi effent duo Omnipo
tences, uto utri obedire ob-
lig.iretur. Confitcbitur, cre
do,, neutxum neutri obligari. -
Hoc fi verum eft, verutn quo-
que eft quod pofui, homines
idea Deo Jubjetlos effe, quia om-
nipotentes nonjunt. De Cive*
c. 15. §7.

X Ut enim omittam vim &
naturam Deorum 5 ne homi
nes quidem cenfetis, nifi im-
becilli efi'tnt, futures befseft--
cos & benigrios. fuiffe. Cic.
de Nat. Dear. lib. I.

7Z>£ Evidence of Natural
arbitrary and pofitive Conftitution, founded only in
the Weaknefs, Subjection, and Dependency of the
Perfons obliged ; but alfo and chiefly in the eternal
and unchangeable Nature and Reafon of the Things
themfelves. For thefe Things are the Law of
God himfielf, not only to his Creatures, but alfo to
Himfielfi, as being the Rule of all his own Actions
in the Government of the World. #
I have been the longer upon this Head, becaufe
Moral Virtue is the Foundation and the Sum, the
Effence and the Life of all true Religion : For the
Security whereof, all pofitive Inftitution was prin
cipally defigned : For the Reftoration whereof, all
revealed Religion was ultimately intended : AneJ
inconfiftent wherewith, or in Oppofition to which*
all Doctrines whatfoever, fupported by what Pre.r
tence of Reafon or Authority foever, are as certainly
and neeeffarily falfe, as God is true.
II. Though thefie eternal moral Obligations are in
deed of themfelves incumbent on all rational Beings,
even antecedent to the Confideration of their being the
pofitive Will and Command of God ; yet, that which moft
firongly confirms, and in Practice moft effectually aid
indijpenfiably infiorces them upon us, is this, that both
firom the Perfections of God, and the Nature ofThingSi
and from fieveral other collateral Confederations, it ap
pears, that, as God is himfelf neeeffarily Juft and Good
in the Exercife of bis infinite Power in the Government ,
ofi the whole World, fio he cannot but likewifie pofitively
Require, that all his rational Creatures fhould in their
Proportion be fio too, in the Exercife of each of their
Powers in their feveral and refipeCiive Spheres. That
is, As thefe eternal moral Obligations are really in per
petual Force, merely from their own Nature, and the
abftraCl Reafon of Things ; fo alfio they are moreover.the
cxpu-fs and unalterable Will, Command, and Law of
God

and Revealed Religion. 91
God to his Creatures, which he cannot but exped Jhould,
in Obedience to his Supreme Authority, as well as in
Compliance with the natural Reafion ofi Things, be regu
larly and conftantly obfierved thro' the whole Creation.
This Propofition is very evident, and has little
Need of being particularly proved.
For \ft. The fame Reafons which prove to us That mo.
that God muft of Neceffity be himfelf infinitely ral Duties
Hply, and Juft, and Good, manifeftly prove, that it ar-' ihe
muft alfo be his Will, that all his Creatures fhould wnTlnd
be fo likewife, according to the Proportions and Command
Capacities of their feveral Natures. That there are "f God>
eternal and neceffary Differences of Things, Agree- K°f tj
ments and Difagreements, Proportions and TUforo- Conftdera-
portions, Fitneffes and Unfitneffes of Things* abfo- tion of the
lutely in their own Nature, has been before largely D'^r'-f ¦'1' '-
demonftrated., That, with Regard to thefe fixed and ' "'
certain Proportions ancrFitneffes of Things, the Will
of God, which can neither be influenced by any
external Power, nor impofed upon by any Error or
Deceit, conftantly and neeeffarily Determines itfelf
to chufe always what in the whole is Beft and Fit
teft to be done, according to the unalterable Rules
of Juftice, Equity, Goodnefs, and Truth, has' like-
wife been already proved. That the fame Consider
ations Ought alfo regularly to determine the Wills
of all Subordinate Rational Beings to act in conftant
Conformity to the fame eternal Rules, has in like
¦Manner" been fliewn before. It remains therefore
only to prove, that thefe very fame moral Rules,
which are thus of th/mf elves really obligatory, as be
ing the neceffary Refult of the unalterable Reafon
and Nature of Things, are moreover the pofitive
Will and Command of God to all rational Creatures :
And confequently, that the wilful Tranfgrelfion or
Neglect of them is as truly an infolent Contempt of
¦the Authority of God, as 'tis an abfurd Confounding
of the natural Reafons and Proportions of Things.
Now this alio plainly follows from what has been
Q_3 already

92 The Evidence of Natural
already laid' down. For the fame abfioluie PerfeCiiun
of the Divine Nature, which (as has been before
fhewn) makes us certain that God muft Himfielf he
of Neceffity infinitely Holy, Juft, and Good, makes
it equally certain, that he cannot poffibly approve
Iniquity in Others. And the fame Beauty, the fame
Excellency, the fame Weight and Importance of the
Rules of everlafting Righteoufnefs, with Regard ta
which God is always pleafed to make thofe Rules
the Meafure of aU his Own Actions, prove it impof
fible but he muft likewife will and -defire, that all
rational Creatures mould proportionably make them
the Meafure of Theirs. Even among Men, there is
no earthly Father, but, in thofe Things which he
efteems his own Excellencies, defires and expects,'
to be imitated by his Children. „ How much more
is it neceffary that God, who is infinitely far from
being fobject to fuch Paffions and Variablenefs as
frail Men are, and who has an infinitely tenderer
and heartier Concern for the Happinefs of his Crea
tures, than mortal Men can have for the Welfare
of their Pofterity, muft defire to be imitated by his
Creatures in thofe Perfections, which are the Foun
dation of his own unchangeable Happinefs ? In the
Exercife of his Supreme Power, we cannot imitate
him : In the Extent of his unerring Knowledge, we
cannot attain to any Similitude with him. We
cannot at all Thunder with a Voice like Him, nor are
we able to fearch out and comprehend the leaft Part
of the Depth of his unfathomable Wifdom, But his
Job xl. 9. Holinejs and Goodnefs, his Juftice, Righteoufnefs, and,
Truth ; thefe Things we. can underftand ; in thefe
Things we (an imitate him i nay, we cannot ap
prove ourfelves to him as obedient Children, if we
do not imitate him therein. If God be himfelf
effentially of infinite Hclinefs and Purity, (as, from
the Light of Nature, 'tis of all Things moft mani
feft that he is)' it follows, that 'tis impoffible but
he muft likewife be of purer Eyes, than to behold with
, Approbation

and Revealed Religion. 93
Approbation any Manner of Impurity in his Crea- Hab.i.13.
tures ; and confequently it muft needs be his Will,
that they fhould All (according to the Meafure of
their frail and finite Nature) be Hoiv as he is Holy.
If God is himfelf a Being of infinite Juftice, Righte-
oufinefis, and Truth, it muft needs be his Will, that
all rational Creatures, whom he has created after
his own Image, to whom he has communicated
fome Refemblance of his Divine Perfections, and
whom he has indued with excellent Powers and
Faculties to inable them to diftinguifh between
Good and Evil, fhould imitate him in the Exercife
of thofe glorious Attributes, by conforming all
their Actions to the eternal and unalterable Law
of Righteoufnefs. If God is himfelf a Being of
infinite Goodnefis, making his Sun to rifie on the Evil Mat. v.
and on ike Good, and fiending Rain en the Juft and on 45"
the Unjuft ; ¦ having never left himfielf wholly without Afts xiv.
Witnefis, but always doing Good, giving Men Rain firom l7-
Heaven and firuitfiul Seafions, and filling, their Hearts
with Food and Gladnefs : It cannot but be his
Will, that all reafonable Creatures fhould, by
mutual Love and Benevolence, permit and affift
each other to enjoy in particular, the feveral Effects
and Bleffirigs of the Divine univerfal Goodnefs.
Laftly, if God is himfelf a Being of infinite
Mercy and Compaffioh, as 'tis plain he bears long
with Men before he punifhes them for their Wiok-
ednet>, and often freeiy forgives them his ten thou- Mat.xviii.
fiand Talents ; it muft need be his Will, that they 24> z8-.
fhould forgive one another their hundred Pence ; " V1'
being mercifiul one to another, as he is merciful to jvjat. xi.
them all, and having Compoffion each on his Fellow- 23.
Servants, as God has Pity onTheni. Thus, from the
• Attributes of God, natural Reafon leads Men to the
Knowledge of his Will: All the fame Reafons and
Arguments, which difcover to Men the natural Fit-
nefifes or Unfitneffes of Things, and the neceffary Per
fections Or Attributes of God, proving equally at
Q, 4 the

The Evidence of Natural
the fame Time, that * That which
is truly the Law ofi Nature, or the
Reafion ofi Things, is in like Manner
the Will ofi God. And from hence
the Sobereft and moft Intelligent
Perfons among the Heathens, in
all Ages, very rightly and wifely
concluded, that the beft and cer
taineft Part of Natural Religion,
which was of the greateft Impor
tance, and. wherein was the leaft
Danger of their being miftaken,
was -f- to imitate the moral Attri
butes of God, by a Life of Ho.
linefs, Righteoufnefs- and Charity: ,
Whereas, in the External Part of
their Worfhip, there was nothing
but Uncertainty and Doubtful-
nefs ; it being abfolutely impof
fible^ without exprefs Revelation,
to difcover what, in that Particu
lar, they might be fecure would,
be truly acceptable to God.
This Method of deducing the
Will of God, from his Attributes,
is of all others the beff and \
cleareft, the certaineft and moft\
univerfal, that the Light of Na
ture affords. Yet there are alfo
(as I faid) fome other collateral Confiderations,
which help to prove and confirm the fame Thing,
namely, that all moral Obligations, arifing from
the Nature and Reafon of Things, are likewife the
pofitive Will and Command of God. As
2. This appears in fome Meafure from the Con-
derainn of fideration of God's Creation. For God, by Creating
'Things, manifefts it to be his Will, that Things
And as Providence worn
cferfully

94

*lta prlncipem Legem illam
& Ijltimam, mentem efle omnia
ratione aut cogentis aut ve-
tantis Dei. Cic. de Legib.
lib. 2.
Quae vis non modo fenior
eft quam aeras populorum &
ciyitatum, fed atqilalis illius
ccelum atque terras tuentis &
regentis Dei, Neque enim
effe Mens Divina fine ratione
poteft, nee ratio divina non
hanc vim in reStis pravifque
fanciendis habere. Ibid.
f Vis Deos propitiare ?
Bonus efto. Satis' illos coluit,
qui imitatus eft. Senec. Epift.
96. Km yug otmv at tun, a ir(a{
Ta tluqa. xu) Ta? Svo-fas «7ro-
@tiitBo-tv ifiut 01 §eo), dhhn py
iri>ot; tjjv ^v^r]v, av Ti? offt®*
xa) IWai®' av Tvy^dvn' rjoWi^
ye p.aM.011 ofai, vl in^lf raf
irat.VTtteTq Tayrat; tdopsrtds T£
xal Bvcriaq. Plato in Alc-ibi-
ode, 2.
Colitur autem, non tauro-
rum opimis corporibus con-
trucidatis, nee auro argenteo,
fufpenfo, nee in thefauros
ftipe infufa ; fed pia cif reila
•polqntate. Senec. Epift. 116.

And from,
the Conji-

of God's
Creation, fhould be what they Are,

and Revealed Religion.' a e
derfully preferves Things in their prefent State, and '•
all neceffary Agents, by conftantly and regularly
obeying the Laws of their Nature, neeeffarily em
ploy all their Natural Powers in promoting the
fame End ; fo 'tis evident it can
not but *" be the Will of God± that * Mens humana non 'poteft
all rational Creatures, whom he - *?nfiad™™, effe longe ere-
has indued with thofe fingular t^Xlt^Tlo-
Powers and Faculties,, of Under- ¦ minibus datum "eft efle, pari-
ftanding, Liberty and Free-choice, ter mallet ipfos porro effe,
wjiereby they are exalted in Dig- tvfye.'t thocf^' conf™
; J ' - r & & felicitate frui, quam lllct
nity above the reft of the World, deturbari de ftatu, in quo'
fhould likewife employ thofe their ipfos collocavit — Sic fcilket
extraordinary Faculties in prefer- e V*»<«*. creandi, cognofci-
ving the Order and Harmony of the ^^ST^S
Creation, and hot, in introducing' innotefcit obligatio, qua.teoe-
Difiorder and Confiufion therein, i»ur ad inferviendum eidem
The Nature indeed and Relations, v°luntati not*. Cumberl. de.
1 n • i r^-<- • Leg. Nat. pag. 227.
the Proportions and.Diiproporti- '
ons, the Fitneffes and Unfitneffes of Things, are
eternal, and in themfelves abfolutely unalterable;
But this is only upon Suppofition that the Things
E-xift, and that they Exift in fuch Manner as they
at prefent do. Now that Things Exift in fuch Man
ner as they do, or that they Exift at all, dependsin-
tirely on the Arbitrary Will and good Pleafure, of
God. At the fame Time therefore, and by the fame
Means, that God manifefts it to be his Will" that
Things fhould Exift, and that they fhould Exift in-
fuch Manner as they do (as by Creating them he at
firft did, and by Prefierving them he ftill conti
nually does, declare it to be his Will they fhould)
he. at the fame Time manifeftly declares, that aU
fuch moral Obligations, as are the Refiult of the
neceffary Proportions and Relations ef Things, are like-
wife His pofitive Will and Command. And confe
quently whoever acts contrary to the, foremen-
tioned Reafons and Proportions of Things, by dipho-
noptring God, by introducing unjuft and unequal Deal ings

96 The Evidence cf Natural
ings among Equals, by deftroying his own Bang, or
by any way corrupting, abufing, and mifc.pplying the
Faculties wherewith God has indued him, vas has
been above more largely explained) is unavoid
ably guilty of Tranfgreffing at the fame Time the
pofitive Will and Command of God, which in this
And from Manner alfo is fufficiently difcovered and made
the Ten- known to him.
deny of the 3, The fame Thing may likewife further appear
Praa,ce °f from the following Confideration : Whatever tends
to theJ directly and certainly to promote the Good and
Good and Happinefs of (he Whole, and (as far as is con-
Happineft fiftent with that chief End) to promote alfo the
Good and Welfare of every particular Part of
the Creation, muft needs be * agreeable to the Wilt
of God, who, being infinitely Self-
fufficient to his own Happinefs,
could have no other Motive to
create Things at all, but only
that he might communicate to
them his Goodnefs and Happi-
,nefs, and who, confequently, can
not but expect and require, that
all his Creatures fhould, accord
ing to their feveral Powers and
faculties, endeavour to promote
...the fame End. Now that the
exa<5t Obfervance of all thofe
moral Obligations, which have
before been proved to arife ne
eeffarily from the Nature and
Relation of Things, (that is to
fay, Living agreeably to the un
alterable Rules of Juftice, Righ
teoufnefs, Equity, and Truth) is
the certaineft and directeft Means
to promote the Welfare and Hap
pinefs, as well of Every Man in

of the
•wholeWorld.

* Dubitari non poteft,
quin Deus, qui ita naturalem
rerum omnium ordinem con-
ftituit, ut talia fint aftionum
humanarum confequentia er-
ga ipfos au&ores, t'ecitque ut
ordinaria hasc confequentia ab
ipfis prafciri pofTint, aut fum-
ma cum probabilitate expec-
tari ; voluerit haec ab iis con-
fiderari, antequam ad agen
dum fe accingerent ; atque
eos his provifis velut argu-
mentis in Legum fanc^ione.
contentis determinari. Cum;-
berl. de Leg. Nat. pag. 2?8.
Reclor, feu Caufa prima
ratiorralis, cujus^voluntate res
ita difponuntur, ut honiini-
bus fatis evidenter indicetur,
Actus quofdam illorum efle
media neceflaria ad finem ip
fis neceflarium ;Jrult homines
rid hos Aftus obligari, vel
hos Aftus Impfat. Id. pag.
zS5.

and Revealed Religion. 97
in particular, both in Body and Mind, ,as. of All
Men in general eonfidered with refpect to ' Society,
is fo very manifeft, that even the greateft Ene
mies of all Religion, who fuppofe it to be nothing
more than a worldly or State-policy, do, yet, by that
very Suppofition, confefs thus much- concerning it.
And indeed This 'tis not poffible for any one to
deny. For the Practice of moral
Virtue does * as plainly and urn * Pa» *"ane ratione {ac
deniably tend to the Natural Good '" i"thmefids .?Peratj°nibfO
' c , ,i. . , m r 1 rr Doctrinae Morahs Veritas fun-
of the World, as any Phyfical Ef- datur in immutabili cohx-
fieCt or Mathematical Truth is na- rentia inter, Felicitatem fum-
turally confequent to the Princi- mam quam Hominum vi-
1 1 • v • j j j res aflequi valent, & A&us
pies on which it depends, _ and Benevolenti* universalis. Id.
from which it is regularly derived, pag. 23.
And without fuch Practice, in
_ fome Degree, the World can . never be happy in
any tolerable Meafure : As is fufficiently evident
from Mr. Hobbs'% own Defcrjption of the extreme
miferabie Condition that Men would be in through
the Total Defect of the Practice of all moral Virtue,
if they were to live in That State which He ftiles
(falfely and contrary to all Reafon, as has been before
fully proved) the. State ofi Nature ; but which really
is a State of the groffeft Abufe, and moft unnatural
Corruption and Mifapplication of Mens natural
Faculties, that can be imagined. For fince God has
plainly fo conftituted the Nature of Man, that they
ftand continually in Need of each other's Help and
Affiftance, and can never live comfortably without ,
Society and mutual Friendfhip •, and are indued
with the Faculties of Reafon and Speech, and with '
other natural Powers, evidently fitted to inable
them to affift each other in all Matters of Life,
and mutually to promote univerfal Love and Hap
pinefs, 'tis manifeftly, agreeable to Nature, and to
the Will ofi God who gave them thefe Faculties, that
they foould employ them wholly to this regular and

The Evidence of Natural
and good End. And confequently 'tis on the con
trary evident likewife, that all Abufe and Mifap-
plication of thefe Faculties, to hurt and deftroy, to
cheat and defraud, to opprefs, infult, and domi-^
neer oyer each other, is directly contrary both to
the Dictates of Nature and to the Will of God; Who,
neeeffarily doing always what is Beft and Fitteft,
and moft for the Benefit of the' whole Creation,
'tis manifeft ^cannot Will the Corruption and De
ftruction of any of his Creatures, any otherwife
than as his preferving theirnatural Faculties, (which
in themfelves are good1 and excellent, but cannot
but he capable of being, abufed- andmifappliedj'
neeeffarily implies a confequential Permiffion of:
fuch Corruption.
And This now is the great Aggravation of the
Sin and Folly of all Immorality, that it is an obfti-
nate fetting-up the Self-will of frail, finite, and
fallible Creatures ; as in Oppofition to the eternal
Reafon of Things, the unprejudiced Jttdgment of
their own Minds, and the general Good and Welfare
both of Themfelves and their Fellow- creatures ;
fo alfo in Oppofition to, the Will 'of the Supreme
Atttbbr and Creator of all Things* who gave them
their Beings, and all the Powers and Faculties they
are indued with : In Oppofition to the Will of the
All-wife Preferver arid Governor of the Univerfe, .
on whofe gracious Protection they depend every
Moment for the Prefervation and Continuance of
their Beings : And in Oppofition to the Will of
ttreir greateft Benefactor, to whofe Bounty they
wholly owe whatever they enjoy at prefent, and all
the Hopes of what they expect hereafter. This
is" the higheft of all Aggravations: The utmoft
Unreafionablenefis, joined with obftinate Difobediemev
and with the greateft Ingratitude, III. Though

and Revealed Religion. go
III. Though the fore-mentioned eternal Moral Obli
gations are incumbent, indeed, on all rational Creatures,
antecedent to any RefpeCl ofi particular Reward or Pu-
nifihment ; yet they muft certainly and neeeffarily be at
tended with Rev/ards and Punifhments. Becaufie the
fame Reaficns, which prove God himfielf to be neeeffarily
Juft and Good, and the Rules ofi Juftice, Equity,
and Goodnefis, to be his unalterable Will, Law, and
Command, to all created Beings, prove alfio, that he .
fannot but be pleafed with and aporovej'uch Creatures
as imitate and obey him by obfierving thofie Rules, and
be difpleafed with fuch as aCl contrary thereto ; and
confiequently, that he cannot but fiome Way or other make
a fuitable Difference in his Dealings with them, and
manifeft his Supreme Power and abfolute Authority in
finally fiuppor ting, maintaining, and vindicating effectu
ally the Honour of thefie his Divine Laws, as becomes
the Juft and Righteous Governor and Difipofier of all
Things. This Propofition alfo is in a Manner Self-evident.
. For i ft, if God is himfelf neeeffarily a Being (as That the
has been before fhewn) of infinite Goodnefs, Juftice, Praaice of
and Holinefs : And if the fame Reafons, which y£"Jfl
prove the Neceffity of thefe Attributes in God him- be attend-
felf, prove moreover (as has likewife been fhewn ^ with
already) that the fame Moral Obligations muft^J'^
needs be his pofitive Will, Law, and Command, toa„%,me^
all rational Creatures ; It alfo follows neeeffarily* by proved
the fame Argument, that He cannot but be Pleafiedfrom_ tbe
with and Approve fuch Creatures as imitate and^T^'"
obey him by obferving thofe Rules, and be Dif-
pleafed with fuch as act contrary thereto. And if
fo, then, in the Nature of the Thing itfelf, tis evi
dent, that, having abfolute Power and uncontroul-
able Authority, as being Supreme Governor and
Difpofer of all Things, He cannot but Signify, by
fome Means or other, his Approbation of the one,
and . his Difpleafure againft the other. And this can

ioo The Evidence of Natural
can no Way be done to any effectual Purpofe, but
by the Annexing of refpective Rewards and Punifih-
ments. Wherefore, if Virtue goes finally unreward
ed, and Wickednefs unpnnifihed; then God never
Signifies his Approbation of the one, nor his Dif-
pieafure againft the other '¦-, and if fo, then there
remains no fufficient Proof, that he is really at all
Pleafed or Dijpleafed with either : And the Confe
quence of That will be, that there is no Reafon to
think the one to . be his Will and Command, or that
the other is Forbidden by him : Which being once
fuppofed, there will no longer remain any certain
Evidence of his own Moral Attributes, contrary
to what has been already demonftrated.
And from 2. The Certainty of Rewards and Punifhments in
the Necej- general may alfo fomewhat otherwife be deduced
is, that from their being neceffary to fupport (he Honour of
there God, and of his Laws and Government^ in the follow*
Jhould be jng Manner : 'Tis manifeft we are obliged, in the
J°dka2nof higheft TieS of Dut7 and Gratitude, to pay all pof
the Honour fible Honoitr to God,' from whom we receive our
of God's Being, and all our Powers and Faculties, and what-
La-ws and ever e]fewe enjoy. Now 'tis plain likewife, that we
mem " nave no other Way to Honour God, (whofe Happi
nefs is capable of no Addition from any Thing that
any of his Creatures are capable of doing) than by
Honouring, that is, by Obeying, his Laws. The Ho
nour therefore, that ii thus done to his Laws, God
is pleafed to accept as done immediately to himfelf.
And though we were indeed abfolutely obliged in
Duty to honour him in this Manner, notwithftand
ing that there had been no Reward to be expedted
thereupon ; yet 'tis neceffary, in the Government of
the Wforld, and well-becoming an infinitely wife and
1 Sam. ii. good Governor* that thofe who Honour Him he
3°- fhould Honour ; that is, fhould diftinguifh them with
luitable Marks of his Favour. On the contrary,
Though nothing that weak and finite Creatures are
able

and , Revealed Religion.
able to do, can in the leaft diminifh from the abfo
lute Giory and Happinefs of God ; yet, as to Us,
the Difhonouring, that is, theDifobeying his Laws,
is a Difhonouring of Flimfelf; that is, 'tis, as
much as in Us lies, a defpifing his Supreme Au
thority, and bringing' his Government into Con
tempt. Now the fame Reafon that there is, '.why
Honour fhould be paid to the Laws of God at all *
the fame Reafon there is, that That Honour foould
be vindicated, after it has been diminished and in
fringed by Sin. For no Law-giver, who has Au
thority to require Obedience to his Laws, can or
ought to fee his Laws defpifed or difhonoured,
without taking fome Meafures to vindicate the Ho
nour of them, for the Support and Dignity of his
own Authority and Government. And the only
Way, by which the Honour of a Lav/, or of its
Author, can be vindicated, after it has been infrin
ged, by wilful Sin, is either by the Repentance and
Reformation of the Tranfgreffor, or by his Punifih-
ment and DeftruCiion. So that God is neeeffarily
obliged, in Vindication of the Flonour of his Laws
and Government, to punifh thofe who prefump-
tuoufly and impenitently difobey his. Command
ments. Wherefore, if there be no Diftinction made
by fuitable Rewards and Punifihments, between thofe
who obey the Laws of God, and thofe who obey
them not ; then God fuffers the Authority of his
Laws to be finally trampled upon and defpifed,
without ever making any Vindication of it. Which
being impoffible, it will follow, that thefe Things
are not really the Laws of God, and that he has no
fuch Regard to them, as we imagine. And the Con
fequence of this muft needs be the Denial of his
Moral Attributes, contrary, as before, to what has
been already proved. And confequently the Cer
tainty of Rewards and Punifihments in general is ne-
.teffarily eftabliflied. IV. Though,

The Evidence of Natural
IV. ^Though in order to eftablifh this fuitable Dif
ference between the Fruits or EffeCts of Virtue and Vice, ,
fo reafonable in itfelf, and fo abfiolutely neceffary for the
Vindication of the Honour [of God, the Nature of
Things, and the Conftitution and Order of God's Crea
tion, was originally fuch, that the Obfervance ofi the
eternal Rules of Juftice, Equity, and Goodnefs, daes '
indeed of itfielfi tend, by direCl and natural Confequenie,
to make all Creatures happy, and the contrary Practice
to make them miferabie : Tet fince, through fiome gredt
and general Corruption and Depravation, (whekco-
fioever That may have arifien) the Condition ofi Men in
this prefient State is Juch, thai the natural Order ofi
Things in this World is in Event manifeftly perverted,
and Virtue and Goodnefis are vifiibly prevented in great
Meafure from obtaining their proper and due EffeCts in
eftablifhing Mens Happinefs proportionable to their Be
haviour and Practice : Therefore 'tis abfolutely impof
fible, that the whole View and Intention, the - original
and the final Defign, of God's creating fuch rational
Beings as Men are, and placing them on this Globe of
Earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (to fpeak
more properly) the only Inhabitants, for whofie Sake alone
this Part at leaft of the Creation is manifeftly fitted up
and accommodated; 'Tis abfiolutely impoffible, (I fay)
that the Whole of God's Defign in all this fhould be
nothing more, than to keep up eternally a Succeffion of
fuch fhort-lived Generations of Men, as we at prefent
ere;, and thofe in fuch a Corrupt, confufed, and difior-
derly State ofi Things, as wefiee the World is now in ;
without any due Obfervation of the eternal Rules of Good
and- Evil; without any clear and remarkable EffeCt
of the great and moft neceffary Difference of Things ;
and without any final Vindication of the Honour and
Laws of Ged, in the proportionable Reward of the beft,
or Puniftoment of the wcrft of Men. And confequently
'tis certain and neceffary, (even as certain as the moral
Attributes

and Revealed Religion. laj
¦Attributes of God before demonftrated) that, inftead of
the continuing an eternal Succeffion of new Generations
in the prefent Form and State of Things, there muft, at
fiome Time or other, be Juch a Revolution and Renova
tion ofi Things, fiuch a Future State of Exiftence. of the
fame Perfons, as that, by an exatl Diftribution of Re
wards and Punifhments therein, all the prefent Diforders
and Inequalities may be Jet right, and that the whole
Scheme ofi Providence^ which to Us, who judge ofi it by
only one fimall Portion ofi it, fieenis now fo inexplicable
and confiufied, may appear, at its Cbnfiummationi to be a
Defign worthy ofi infinite Wifidom, Juftice and Goodnefis;
1. In order to eftablifh a juft and fuitable Diffe- Thai, ac-
rence between the refpective Fruits or Effects of cofding. '"
Virtue and Vice, the Nature of Things, and the ^/CW»-
Conftitution and Order of God's Creation, was ori- tutlon of
ginally fuch, that the Obfervance of the eternal Rules Things,,
Of Piety, Juftice, Equity, Goodnefs, and Tempe- ^f/f'jf
rance,does of itfelf plainly tend, by dired and natural attended
Confequence, to make all Creatures happy ; and the with Na-
contrary Practice, to make them miferabie. This is tural Re-
evident in general, becaufe the Practice of univerfal p^f^Lf7"*
Virtue is {in Imitation of the Divine Goodnefs) the'msntu
Practice of That which is Beft in the Whole ; and
That which tends to the Benefit of the Whole, muft
of neceffary Confequence, originally, and in its own
Nature, tend alfo to the Benefit of every individual
Part of the Creation. More particularly, a fire*
quent and habitual Contemplating the infinitely excel
lent Perfections of the All-mighty Creator, and All-
wife Governor of the World, and our moft bounti
ful Benefactor ; fo as to excite in our Minds a fuit
able Adoration, Love, and Imitation of thofe Per
fections : A regular employing all our Powers and Fa
culties, in fuch Defigns, and to fuch Purpofes only*
as they were originally fitted and intended for by
Nature : And .a due fiubjeCting all our Appetites and
Paffions, to the Government ©f fobe.r and modeft
R Reafouj

( The Evidence of Natural
Reafon, are evidently the directeft Means to ob
tain fuch fiet tied Peace, and f olid Satisfaction of Mind,
as is the firft Foundation, and the principal and
moft neceffary Ingredient of all true Happinefs.
The temperate and moderate Enjoyment of all the" good
Things of this prefent World, and of the Pleafures ¦
of Life, according to the Mea'fures of right Reafon
and fimple Nature, is plainly and confeffedly the
certaineft^ and moft direct Method to preferve the
Health and Strength of the Body : And the Practice
of univerfal Juftice, Equity, and Benevolence, is ma
nifeftly (as has been before obferved) as direct and
adequate a Means to promote the general Welfare
and Happinefs ofi , Men in Society, as any Phyfical
Motion, or Geometrical Operation, is to produce
its natural Effect. So that if All Men were truly
Virtuous, and practifed thefe Rules in fuch Man
ner, that the Miferies and Calamities, arifing ufually
from the numberlefs Follies and Vices of Men, were
prevented; undoubtedly this great Truth would evi
dence itfelf vifibly in Fact, and appear experimen
tally in the happy State and Condition of the World.
On the contrary, NegleCl ofi God and Infenfiblenefs
of our Relation and Duty towards him ; Abufe and
unnatural Mifiapplicdtion of the Powers and Faculties
of our Minds •, Inordinate Appetites and unbridled
and furious Paffions; neeeffarily fill the Mind with
Confiufion, Trouble* crJ. Vexation. And Intemperance
naturally brings IV'cahiefis, Pains, and Sicknsffes, into
the Body. And mutual Irjuftice and Iniquity ; Fraud,
Violence^ and Oppreffiov ; Wars and Defiolations ; Mur
ders, Rapine, and ell Kinds ofi Cruelty; are fufficiently
plain Caufes of the AJfiries ami Calamities ofi Men in
Society. So that the original Conftitution, Order,
and Tendency of Things, is evidently enough fitted
and defigned to eftablifh. naturally a juft and fuitable
Difference in general between Virtue and Vice, by
their refpective Fruits or Effects. 2. But

and Revealed Religion. 105
2. But though originally the Conftitution and But that,
Order- of God's Creation was indeed fuch, that Vir- "ocu-''nth's
tue arid Vice are, by the regular Tendency of Things, ffffty (/ie
followed with natural Rewards and Punifhments : natural
Yet, in Event, through fome great and general Cor- Order of ^
ruption and Depravation, (whencefoever That may ihl»Zs"Jf
have arifen, ofi which more hereafter;) the Condition ^j, y-ff
of Men, in the prefent State, is plainly fuch, that often fiou-
. this natural Order of Things in the World is ma- r'fi"s in
nifeftly perverted ; Virtue and Goodnefs are vifibly gfeat.t r0~,
j ¦ '» it r r 1 • • 1 ¦ Jp^'ty^nd
prevented, in great Meafure, from obtaining their rirtuefalls
proper and due Effect, in eftablifhing Mens Happi- under the
nets proportionable to their Behaviour and Practice; %feafefi. .
and Wickednefs and Vice very frequently efcape the Jpjk' J
Punifhment, which the general Nature and Difpo
fition of Things tends to annex unto it. Wicked
Men, by Stupidity, Inconfideratenefs, and fenfual
Pleafure, often makeshift to filence the Reproaches
of Confcience, and feel very little of that Confu-
fion and Remorfe of Mind, which ought naturally
to be confequent upon their vicious Practices. By
accidental Strength andRobuftnefs of Conftitution,
they frequently efcape the natural ill Confequences
of Intemperance and Debauchery, and enjoy the
fame Proportion of Health and Vigour, as thofe
who live up to the Rules of ftrict and unblameable
Sobriety. And Injuftice and Iniquity, Fraud, Vio
lence, and Cruelty, though they are always attend
ed indeed with fufficiently calamitous Confequences
¦in the general, yet the moft of thofe ill Confequences
•fall not always upon fuch Perfons in particular, as
have the greateft Share in the Guilt of the Crimes,
but very commonly on thofe that have the leaft.
On the contrary, Virtue and Piety, Temperance
and Sobriety, Faithfulnefs, Honefty, and Charity,
though they have indeed both in themfelves the
true Springs of Happinefs, and alfo the greateft
Probabilities of outward Caufes to concur in pro-
R 2 moting-

io6 7^^ Evidence of Natural
moting their temporal Profperity, though they can
not indeed be prevented from affording a Man the
higheft Peace and Satisfaction of Spirit, and many
other Advantages both of Body and Mind in Re
fpect of his own particular Perfon ; yet in Refpect
of .thofe Advantages which the mutual Practice of
focial Virtues ought to produce in common, 'tis-
in Experience found true, that the Vices of a great
Part of Mankind do fo far prevail againft Nature
and Reafon, as frequently to opprefs the Virtue 6f
the Beft, and not only hinder them from enjoying
. thofe public Benefits, which would naturally and
regularly be the Confequences of their Virtue, but
oft-times bring upon them the greateft temporal
Calamities, even for the Sake of that very Virtue.
For 'tis but too well known, that Good Men are
very often afflicted and impoverifhed, and made a
Prey to the Covetoufoefs and Ambition of the
Wicked ; and fometimes moft cruelly and mali-
cioufly perfecuted, even upon Account of theif
Goodnefs itfelf. In all which Affairs, the Provi
dence of God feems not very evidently to interpofe
for the Protection of the Righteous. And not
only fo, but even in Judgments alfo,. which feem
more immediately to be inflicted by the Hand of
Heaven, it frequently fuffers the Righteous to be
involved in the fame Calamities with the Wicked,
as they are mixed together in Bufinefs and the
Affairs of the World.
Thatthere- 3' Which Things being fo, (viz. that there is
fore there plainly in Event no foffieient Diftinction made be-
muji needs tween Virtue and Vice ; no proportionable and cer-
^ aFutufe tain Reward annexed to the one, nor Punifhment to
'Rewards tne otnero in this prefient World ;) and yet it being
and Pu- no lefs undeniably certain in the general, as has
v foments, been before fliewn, that if there be a God, (and
That God be himfelf a Being of infinite Juftice and-
Goodnefs, and it be his Will, that all rational.
Creatures

and Revealed Religion. 107
Creatures fhould imitate his moral
Perfections, and he * cannot but * E' ^ p* ^«»S««rt» rQt
fee and take Notice how every S,£sV,', *.t*". **""?' s-!°f»*fc
reature behaves itfelf ; and can- T?~ « $l0^r, o*« 7,m 9..
not but be accordingly pleated with <?* yiy«T«j, iri™ yiy>eT«i ««
fuch as obey his Will and imitate °'°m "S""01' ~ "°"™« «f« i'"-
his Nature, and be dilpleafed with -"- "T ™ *'""' s a/^'.
- , ' r let* T (» wehos yiy»Erai, sat T
luch as act contrary thereto-,) it !».»»¦,«, # rm «tou T£» W»-
being certain, . I fay, that, z/" thefe Tw ****«> *'? t«™ T«uTa Eif
Things be fo, God muft needs,' "V^.y*^^K,^
17- )• .• r 1 Tt r onrevatoth. Os yap ey viro ye
in Vindication of the Honour ot &«,*.„' a>^r4, 8t £.„£.
his Laws andG~veniment,./g77//y, Su/wio-Sai e9s%) J/xai®. y;y.
at fiome Time or other, this his Ap- "£^«>> *<*' iimvheuv d^rjt
probation or Difpieaiure, by ma- ?<«*"$ *WB™ f^% ^T,
f. c ,, rr . , '.,T,/ aertfai %• Plato de Repub/.
King finally a fuitable Diherence //£. jo.
between thofe who obey him, and
thofe who obey him not: It follows unavoidably,
either that all thefe Notions which we frame con
cerning God, a-e fialfie, and that there is no Provi- ¦
dence, and God fees not, or at leaft has no Re
gard to what is done by his Creatures, and confe
quently the Ground of all his own moral Attri
butes is taken away, and even his Being itfelf; or
elfie that there muft neeeffarily be a Future State of
Rewards and Punifhments after this Life, wherein all
the prefent Difficulties of Providence fhall be clear
ed up, by an exact and impartial Adminiftration
of Juftice. But now, that thefe Notions are True,
that there is a God, and a Providence, and that
God is himfelf a Being indued with all moral Per
fections, and expects and commands that all his
rational Creatures fhould govern all their Actions
by the fame Rules, has been particularly and di-
ftirjctly proved already, 'Tis therefore directly
demonftrated, that there muft be a Future State of
Rewards and Punifhments. Let not thine Heart envy
Sinners, but be thou in the Fear of the Lord all the Day
R 3 %i

1 08 * The Evidence 5/ Natural
long ; For fiurely there is a Reward, and thine ExpeCta-
ticnjhall not be cut off, Prov. xxiii. 17 & 18.
0/ the 4- This Argument ' is indeed a common one j
Stoical but tis neverthclefs ftrongly conclufive and un-
Opimon anfwerabJe. So that whoever denies a Future
luself State of Rewards and Punifhments, muft of Ne-
' fufficiency ceffity, by a Chain of unavoidable Confequences,
of Virtue be forced to recur to downright Atheifm. The
^Hmhufs 0n'y middle Opinion that can be invented, is That
*' ' ' Affertion of the Stoics, that Virtue is Self-fiufficient
to its own Happinefs, and a full Reward to itfelf
in all Cafes, even under the greateft Sufferings
that can befal a Man for its Sakev Men who
were not Certain of a Future State (though Moft
of them did indeed believe it highly probable)
and yet would not give up the Caufe of Virtue,
had no other Way left to defend it, than by after t-
kig,that it was -in all Cafes, and under all Circum
ftances, abfolutely Self-fiufficient to its own Happi
nefs ; whereas on the contrary, becaufe it is ma
nifeftly not Self-fiufficient, and yet undoubtedly the
Caufe of 'Virtue is, not to be given up, therefore
they ought from thence to have concluded the
Certainty of a Future State. That Virtue is truly
worthy to be chofen, even merely for its own Sake,
without any Refpect to any Recompence or Re
ward, muft indeed neeeffarily be acknowledged.
But it does not from hence follow, that He who
Dies for the Sake of Virtue, is really any more
Happy, than he that dies for any fond Opinion, or
any unreafonable Flumour or Obftinacy whatfo
ever, if he has no other" Happinefs than the bare
Satisfaction arifing from the Senfe of his Refolu te
nets in perfifting to preferve his Virtue, and in
adhering immoveably to what he judges to be
right, and there be no Future State wherein he
may reap any Benefit of that his refolute Perfeve- rance, ¦

and Rc-vialed Religion.
ran re.- On the contrary, it will only follow, that
God has made Virtue neeeffarily amiable, and fuch
as Mens Judgment and Confcience can never but
chufe * and yet that he has not annexed to it any
fufficient Encouragement to fupport A4en effectu
ally in that Choice. Brave indeed, and admirable,
were the Things which fome of the Philofophers
have laid upon this Subject, and which fome very
few extraordinary Men (of which Regulus is a re
markable Inftance) feem to have made good in
their Practice, even beyond the common Abilities
of human Nature ; but 'tis very plain (as I before
intimated) that the general Practice of Virtue in the.
World ' can never be fupported upon this Foot, it
being indeed neither poffible, nor truly reafonable*
that Men, by adhering to Virtue,
fhould Part with their Lives, if* * oJ* <>!&» iVa? ftaxapia?
thereby they eternally deprived «-'*¦<*«#<<' t^j^S/h dwtevo-ar-
themfelves of all Poffibility ot ^\ . s. ,, - n- r
receiving any Advantage from Haikam.
that Adherence. Virtue, 'tis true,
in its proper Seat, and with all its full Effects and
Confequences unhindered, muft be confeffed to be
the chief Good, as being truly the Enjoyment, as
well as thelmitationofGod. But,
as the.-f Practice of it is circum- \ Porro ipfa Virtus-, cum
ftantiated in this prefent World, fibi bonorum culmen vendi-
and in the prefent State of Things, cefc humanorutn, quid hie a-
, : . r . • r ir 1 u- I" Su ni'1 perpetua Delia cum
tis plain it is not itfelf the cruet vi.iis . ncc exterioribus, fed
Good, but Only the Means to interioribus ; nee alienis, fed
it ; as Running in a Race is not plane -noftris & propriis ? — •
irfplf rhf. Pri-7P hnl- rhp Wav to , Abfit ergo.utquamdiu inhoc
ltlell the j. nze, but thev\ay to bello inteftino furauS;jam nos
Obtain It. , beatitudinem, ad quam vin-
cendo volumus pervenire, adeptos efle credamus. Augufiin. de Ciwtate
J)ei, lib. 19. c. 4.
Non enim virtus ipfa eft Summum Bonum, fed efFeftrix & mater eft
fummi boni ; quoniam perveniri ad illud fine virtute non poteft. Laclant.
lib. 3.
R 4 5- 'Tis

no The Evidence of Natural
From 5. 'Tis therefore abfolutely impoffible, that the
whence whole View and Intention, the Original, and the
*ia]„tfoP final Defign of God's creating fuch rational Beings
a Future as Men are, indued with fuch noble Faculties, and
'State is . fo neeeffarily confcious pf the eternal and unchange-
f>g"jy™- able Differences of Good and Evil : 'Tis abfolutely
f-.ff,'fi-' impoffible (I fay) that the whole Defign of an infi
nitely. Wife, and Juft, sand Good God, in all this,
fhould be nothing more than to keep up ' eternally
a Succeffion of new Generations of Men, and thofe
in fuch a corrupt, confufed, and diforderly State of
Things, as .we fee the prefent World is in, without
any due and regular Obfervation of the eternal Rules
.of Good and Evil? without any clear and remark
able Effect of the great and moft neceffary Differ
rences of Things, without any fufficient Difcrimi-
nation of Virtue and Vice by their proper and re
fpective Fruits, and without any final Vindication
pf the Honour and Laws of God, in the proportion
able Reward of the Beft, or Punifhment of the Worft
pf Men. And confequently 'tis certain and necef
fary, (even as certain as the moral Attributes of
God before demonftrated) that, inftead of the con
tinuing an eternal Succeffion of new Generations in
the prefent Form and State of Things, there muft
at fome Time or other be fuch a Revolution and Re
novation of Things, fuch a Future State of Exiftence
pf the fame Perfons, as that, by an exact Diftri-
bution of Rewards and Punifhments therein, all
the prefent Difo'ders and Inequalities may be fet
right, and that the whole Scheme of Providence,
which to Us who judge of it by only one fmall Por
tion of it, feems now fo inexplicable and much con
fufed, may appear at itsConfummation, to be a De
fign worthy of infinite Wifdom, Juftice and Good
nefs. Wjthput this. All * comes to Nothing. If.
? Ita fit, ut fi ab ilia rerum Summa, quam' fuperiiis compre-
Jjendimus, aberraveris ; omnis ratio intereat, & ad nihilum
ismnfa revertantur. Ladani. lib. 7, this

And Revealed Religion, in
jr.his Scheme be once broken, there is no Juftice, no
Goodnefs, no Order, no Reafon, nor any Thing
upon which any Argument in moral Matters can
be founded, left in the World. Nay, even though
we fhould fet afide all Confideration of the Moral
Attributes of God, and confider only his Natural
Perfections, his infinite Knowledge and Wifdom, as
Framer and Builder of the World, it would, even in
That View only, appear infinitely improbable, that
God fhould have created fuch Beings as Men are,
and indued them with fuch excellent Faculties, and
placed them on this Globe of Earth, as the only
Inhabitants for whofe Sake this Part at leaft of the
Creation is manifeftly fitted up and accommodated;
and all this without any further Defign, than
*only for the Maintaining a per
petual Succeffion of fuch fhort-
lived Generations of Mortals as * Non enim temere, nee
we at prefent are ; to live in the f°rtuitd_ fari & creati fumusj
utmoft Confufion and Diforder t^tfri ctXetTumt
for a very few Years, and then no ; nee id gigneret aut aleret,
Perifh eternally into Nothing, quod cum exantlayiifet omnes
What f can be imagined more Ifbores, tum incideret in mor-
. ¦ , , , ° , tis malum fempiternum. Cic.
vain and empty r what more ab- Tujc.£)ua>ji.lib. i.
ford? what more void of all f Si fine caufa gignimur ;
Marks of Wifdom, than the Fa- fl in h°mim°us Focreandii
brie of the World, and the Cre- *Z ^bitS^/""? *
. r • . ,? . . _ cam notmmetipiis ac volup-
^tion Of Mankind Upon this Sup- tatis noftra: gratia nafcimur|
pofition ? But, then, take in alfo fi nihil poft mortem fumus :
the Confideration of the Moral 9uid Poteft .effe tam fi»t*r*>*.
a-- -l r/— 1 j- .. cifum, tam mane, tam •vanum.
Attributes of God, and it amounts quam humana res eft> quanJ
(as I have faid) to a complete mundus ipfe ! Laaant. lib. f,
Demonftration, that there muft
be a Future State.
6. It may here at ffirft Sight feem to be a very Why the
ftrange Thing, that through the whole Syftem, of 'f'fff07" °f
Vr • i ¦ ? • i ¦ ¦ ¦ . ¦ U ¦ Cod is not
.Nature in the material, in the inanimate, in tne ir-j0 ciearu
rational Part of the Creation, every Jingle Thing and plainly
'"" "¦ ' ' " ¦" foould

World.

1 1 2 The Evidence of Natural
fen in £« foould have in itfelf fo many and fo obvious, fo
G°'~verf~ h evident and undeniable Marks of the. infinitely ac-
Moral, as" cni'&ie Skill and Wifdom of their Almighty Crea.'
in the Fa-to-c, that from the brighteft Star in the firmament
brie of the 0f Heaven, to the meaneft Pebble upon the Face
ivUf1 °f tne Earth, there is no one Piece of Matter, which
does not afford fuch Inftances of admirable Artifice
and exact Proportion and Contrivance, as exceeds
all the Wit of Man (I do not fay to imitate, but
even) ever to be able fully to fearch but and com
prehend : And yet, that in the Management of the
rational and moral World, for the Sake of which all
the reft was created, and is preferved only to be
fubfervient to it, there fhould not, in many Ages,
be plain Evidences enough, either of the Wifdom,
or of the Juftice and Goodnefs of God, or of fo
much as the Interpofition of his divine Providence
at'all, to convince Mankind clearly and generally
of the World's being under his immediate Cafe, In-,
i'pection, and Government. This, 1 fay, may indeed
at firft Sight feem very wonderful : But if we con
fider the Matter more clofely and attentively, it will
appear not to be fo ftrange and aftonifoing as we are
apt to imagine. For as in a great Machine, con
trived by the Skill of a confummate Artificer, fitted
up and adj ufted with all conceivable Accuracy for
fome very difficult and deep -projected Defign, and
po'ifhed and fine-wrought in every Part of it with
admirable Nicenefs and Dexterity ; any Man* who
law and examined one or two Wheels thereof, could
not fail to obferve, in thofe fingle Parts of it, the.
admirable Art and exact Skill of the Work-man ;
and yet the Excellency of the End or Ufe for which
the Whole was contrived he would not at all be
able, even though he was himfelf alfo a fkilful Ar
tificer, to difcover and comprehend, without feeing
the Whole fitted up and put together : So though
in every Part of the natural World, eonfidered even
fingle and unconnected, the Wifdom of the great
Creator,

and Revealed Religion. jij
Creator fufficiently appears ; yet his Wifdom, and
Juftice and Goodnefs, in the Difpofition and Go
vernment of the moral World, which neeeffarily
depends on the Connexion and Iffue of the whole
Scheme, cannot perhaps be diftinctly and fully com
prehended by any Finite and Created Beings, much
lets by frail and weak and fhort-lived Mortals, be
fore the Period and Accompliftiment of certain
great Revolutions. But 'tis exceedingly reafonable
to believe, that as the Great Difcoveries, which, by
the Diligence and Sagacity of later Ages, have been
made in Aftronomy and Natural Philofophy, have
opened furprifing Scenes of the Power and Wifdom ' '
. of the Creator, beyond what Men could poffibly
have conceived or imagined in Former Times : So,
at the Unfolding of the whole Scheme of Provi
dence in the Conclufion of this prefent State, Men
will be forprifed with the amazing Manifeftations
' of Juftice and Goodnefs, which will then appear to
have run through the whole Series of God's Go»
vernment of the Moral World,
This is the chief and greateft Argument, on which
the natural Proof of a Future State of Rewards and
Punifihments muft principally be founded. ' Yet there
are alfo feveral other collateral Evidences, which
jointly confpire to render the fame Thing extreme
ly credible to mere natural Reafon. As,
jft, There is very great Reafon, even from the Ofthelm-
bare Nature of the Thing' itfelf, to believe the Soulmortfufy
to be Immortal : Separate from all moral Arguments °'Jj 'tfff '
drawn from the Attributes of God, and without natural
any Confideration of the general Syftem of the Pr°°fe ™s
World, or of the Univerfal Order and Conftitution, ba/ot °flU
Connexion, and Dependencies of Things, The Im
mortality of the Soul has been
commonly believed in * all Ages * Et primum quidem omni
and in all Places, by the unlearn- &ffiu\ ^ Cic' Tu/c'
fd Part of all civilized People, and -•'•*• by

j 14 The Ev id en ce of Natural
by the almoft general Content of all the moft bar?
harous Nations under Heaven ; from a Tradition fo
ancient and fo univerfal, as cannot be conceived to
owe its Original either to Chance or to vain Imagi
nation, or to any other Caufe than to the Author of
Nature Himfelf. And the moft learned and think
ing Part of Mankind, at all Times and in all Coun
tries where the Study of Philofophy has been in any
Meafure cultivated, have almoft generally agreed,
that 'tis capable of a juft- Proof from the abftract
Confideration of the Nature andOperations of the Soul
itfelf. That none of the known Qualities of Mat
ter can, in any poffible Variation, Divifion, or Com
pofition, produce Senfe, and Thought, and Reafon; is
abundantly "evident, as has been demonftrated in
* Demon- the * former Difcourfe. That Matter confifts of in-
firat'°n, °f numerable, divifible, feparable, and, for the moft
and Jttri- Part> actually disjoined Parts, is acknowledged by
butes of all Philofophers. That, the Powers and FacuU
God. See ties 0f fye goul being the moft remote and diftant
tef to Mr" ^rom a^ ^e ^nown Properties of Matter that can
Dodwel, ' be imagined, 'tis, at leaft, a putting great Violence
<with the upon our Reafon to imagine them fuperadded by
feveral An- Omnipotence to one and the fame Subftance, can-
Retlie"" not ea-^Y be denied. That 'tis highly unreafonable
and abfurd to fuppofe the Soul made up of innumer
able Confcioufneffes, as Matter is neeeffarily made
up of innumerable Parts ; and, on the contrary,
that 'tis highly reafonable to believe the Seat of
Thought to 'be a fimple Subftanoe, fuch as cannot
naturally be divided and crumbled into Pieces, as all
Matter is manifeftly fubject to be, muft of Neceffity
be confeffed. Confequently the Soul will not be
liable to be diffolved at the Diffolution of the Body :
And therefore it will naturally be Immortal. All
this feems to follow, at leaft with the higheft Degree
of Probability, from the fingle Conffderation of the.
Soul's being endued with Senfie, Thought, or Confcioufi-> nefs.

oS %

oi nywyi, u laulSt^,
si's tuto ra-w'-s-oTE sWio-Sjjv, u%
D* 4-t-pgjj, eat av h Shrflai crupdlv
•n, £>T OTav SI 7-aVs dtsuWayy,
rtSmxw. OvSl yc wax; d^uv
£r«i i) -i/vx* EtrtiSdv rov d(pga-
»0£ o-wpdloi; ll-xp. yimla.1, &\
tst° wcVtio-fiai. 'ATA' oTaj
St), to]e xai <5£onjK.«T«7t>v swo^
avit,) iltta. Cyrus apud Xen.

and Revealed R £ l i g i q n«
#/?/}. / cannot imagine, faith * Oyntf,
(in that Speech which Xenophon
relates he made to his Children a
little before his Death) that the
Soul, while it is in this Mortal
Body, lives ; and that when it is fie -
para ted from it, then it fijould die.
I cannot perfuade myfielfi, that the
Soul, by being fieparated firom this
Body, which is devoid of Senfie, Jhould
thereupon become itfielfi likewifie de
void ofi Senfie. On the contrary, it fieems to me more
reafionable to believe, that when the Mind is fieparated
firom the Body, it fihould Then become moft of all fenjible
and intelligent : Thus He. But then further : If
we take alfo into the Confideration all the higher
and nobler Faculties, Capacities, and Improvements of
the Soul, the Argument will ftill become much
ftronger. I am perfuaded, faith
f Cicero, when I confider with what
Swiftnefs of Thought the Soul is in
dued, with what a wonderful Me
mory of Things paft, and Fore-caft
ofi Things to come ; how many Arts,
bow many Sciences, how many won
derful Inventions it has found out ;
that That Nature, which is Pofi-
fiefifior of fuch Faculties, cannot be
Mortal. Again, The Memory,
faith % he, which the Soul has of
Things that have been, and its
Forefight of Things that will be, -and
its large Comprehenfion of Things
that ' at prefent are, are plainly di
vine Powers : Nor can the Wit of
Man ever invent any Way, by which
thefe Faculties could pcjfibly come to le in Men, but by
immediate Communication firom God. Again, Though we

i>5

f Quid multa? Sic mihi
perfuali, fic fentio ; quum
tanta celeritas animorum fit,-
tanta memoria prjeteritorum,
futurorum providentia, tot
artes, tanta; fcientise, tot in-
venta; non pofTe earn natu--
ram, qua? res eas contineat,
effe mortalem. Cic. de Se-
neSlute. % Quod & prseterita te-
neat, & fut'ura provideat, &¦
compledli poffit prasfentia ;
hac divina funt. Nee inve-
niet-ur unquam, uride ad ho
minem venire poffint, nifi-
a Deo. Idem. Tufc. Q/aJl.-
lib. i.

n6

* Mentem hominis, q'uam-
vis earn non videas, ut De
um non vides ; tamen, ut
Deum agnofcis ex operibus
ejus, fic ex memoria rerum
& inventione & celeritate
Motus, omnique pulchri-
tudine virtutis, vim divi-
nam Mentis agnofcito. Id.
ibid.

The Evidence of Natural
we fiee not, faith * he, the Soul of
Man, as indeed , neither are we able
to fiee God : Tet6 as firom the Works
ofi God we are certain of his Being,
fo from the Faculties of the Soul, its
Memory, its Invention, its Swift-.
nefis of Thought, its noble Exercife
of all Virtues, we cannot but be
convinced of its divine Original and
Nature. And, fpeaking of the
Strength and Beauty of that Argument, which,.
from the wonderful Faculties and Capacities of the
Soul, concludes it to be of an Immaterial and Im
mortal Nature ; Though all the
vulgar and little Philofophers in the
World, faith -f he, (for fio I cannot
but call all fuch as diffent firom ¦
Plato and Socrates and thofie fiu-
perior Genius's) Jhould put their
Heads together, they will not only
never, wloile they live, be able to
explain any Thing fio neatly and ele
gantly ; but even This Argument it
fielfi they will never have Underftanding enough fully
to perceive and comprehend, how neat and beautiful
and ftrong it is. The chief Prejudice againft the
Belief of the Soul's exifting thus, and living afters
the Death of the Body ; and the Sum of all the
Objections brought againft this Doctrine by the
Epicurean Philofophers of old, who denied the Im
mortality of the Soul ; and by certain Atheiftical
Perfons of late, who differ very little from them
in their Manner of Reafoning;
is This : That they $ cannot
apprehend how the Soul can
have any Senfie or Perception,
without the Body, wherein evi
dently are all the Organs ofi Se.fte. But

f Licet concurrant plebeii
' omnes philofophi, (fic enim
ii qui a Plat one & Socrate &
ab ilia familia diffident, ap-
pellandi videntur :) non mo
do nihil unquam tam elegan-
ter explicabunt, fed ne hoc
quidem ipfum quam fubtili-
ter conclufum fit intelligent.
Id. Ibid.

% — — Si immortalis na
tura animai eft,
Et fentire poteft fecreta a
corpore noftro ;
Quinq; (ut opinor) earn

and Revealed Religion.

i 17

But neither * can they any better
apprehend or explain how the '
Soul in the Body, (that is, the
Body itfelf, according to their
Opinion) is capable of Senfie or
Perception by Means of the Or
gans of Senfie. And, befides, This
Argument, that the Soul can have
no Perception, when all the Ways
of Perception, that we have at
prefent Ideas of, are removed, is
exactly the very fame Argument,
and no other than what a Man
born blind might make Ufe of
with the very fame Force, to prove
that none of Us can poffibly have,
in our prefent Bodies, any Per
ception of Light or Colours, as I
have explained more particularly
in the -j- former Difcourfe.

faciendum eft Jcnfibus auclam :
 rAt neq; feorfum oculi,
&C. Lucret. lib. 3.
Quod autem corpus animas
per fe ? qu:e materia ? ubi co-
gkatio illi ? quomodo vifus ?
auditus ? aut qui tangit ? qui
ufus ejus ? aut quod line his
bonum ? Plin. lib. 7.
Neq; aliud eft quidqur.ni
cur incredibilis his animoruin
videatur jsternitas-, nil! quod
nequeunt qualis fit animus iia-
cans corpore inteliigere, & co-
gitatione comprehendere,. Cic.
Tujc. Qutejl. lib. 1 .
* Qnafi vero intelligent
qualis fit in ipfo corpore.  '
Mihi quidem naturam animr
intuenti, multo difficilior oc-
currit cogitatio, multoq; ob-
fcurior, qualis animus in cor
pore fit, quam qualis cum ex-
ierit. Id. ibid.
\ Dcmonjlration of the Being
and Attributes of God, p. 76,7 7.
This Confideration, of the Soul's appearing in all The natu-^
Reafon to be naturally immortal, afforded great r, ,. fi~
Pleafure and Satisfaction to the wifeft and fobereft the^oid's
Men in the Heathen World ; was a great Support being Im-
under Calamities and Sufferings, efpecially under mortal oj
fuch as Men brought upon themfelves by being fe%e fui,
virtuous ; filled them with great Flopes and com-/n- pjea-
fortable Expectations of what was to come here- ihens.
after •, and was a mighty Encouragement to the
Practice of all moral Virtue, and particularly to
take Pains in fubduing the Body, and keeping it
in Subjection to the Reafon of the Mind. Firft,
It afforded great Pleafure and Satisfaction to the
wifeft and fobereft Men in the
Heathen World, from the bare X Sed Me nemo de immor-
Contemplation of theThing itfelf. f^fffff^" Ck' TuJC'
Bo body, faith £ Cicero, fihall ever """ ~J ' ' *' drive

II

*

* Quad fi in hoc erro, quod
animos hominum immortales
effe credam, libenter erro ;
nee mihi hunc errorem, quo
dele&or; dum vivo, extorqueri
tolo. Idem de Seneclute.

The Evidence of Natural
drive Me from the Hope of Immof*
tality : .And, * If this my Opinion^
concerning the Immortality of the'
Soul, fihould at laft prove an Error ;
yetj 'tis a very delighifiul Error ;
And I will never fuffer myfelf to
be undeceived info pleafing ait Opi
nion, as long as I live. Secondly, It was a great-
Support to them under Calamities and Suffer
ings, efpecially under fuch as Men brought upon
themfelves by being Virtuous : Thefe and the like
Contemplations, faith f Cicero, had
fuch an EffeCt upon Socrates, that,
when he was tried for his Lifie^
be neither defired any Advocate
to plead his Caufie, nor made any
Supplication to his Judges for Mer
cy ; and, on the very laft Day of his
Life, made many excellent Difi-
courfes upon this Subject ; and a few.
Days before, when he had an Oppor
tunity offered him to have eficaped
out ofi Prifion, he would not lay hold
ofi it. For thus he believed, and
thus he taught, that, when the Souls of Men depart
cut of their Bodies^ they go two different Ways ; the
Virtuous to a Place of Happinefs, the Wicked and the
Senfiual to Mifiery. Thirdly, It filled them with great
Hopes and comfortable Expectations of what was
to come hereafter : O happy Day,:
faith J the good old Man inCicero,-
when I fihall go to that bleffed Aft
fiembly of Spit its, and depart out of,
this wicked and mifierably confittfied
World. Laftly, It was a -mighty.
Encouragement to the Practice of
all moral Virtue, and particularly to take Pains in
fubduing the Body, and keeping it in Subjection to
the'

•f His & talibus aslduftus
Socrates, nee patronum quae-
fivit ad judicium capitis, nee
judicibus fupplex fuit ; & fu-
premo vitse die, de hoc ipfo
multa difieruit ; & panels ante
diebus, cum facile poffit educi
e cuftodia, noluit.  Ita enim
cenfebat, itaq ; difieruit, duas
effe vias, duplicefq; curfus
animorum* e corpore exce-
dentium, &c. Id. Tufc. ^uisjl.
lib. l.

% O prsecfarum diem,
cfuum in illud animorum con
cilium coetumq; proficifcar,
& quuift ex hac turba & col-
luvione difcedam ! Idem de
Sencd.

and Revealed Religion.
the' Reafon of the Mind : We ought
to fipare no Pains, faith * Plato,
to obtain the Habit of Virtue and
Wifdom in this Life j for the Prize
is noble, and the Hope, is very great.
Again, having reckoned up the
temporal Advantages of Virtue in
the prefent World, he adds : -f- But
we have not yet mentioned the great
eft and chief eft Rewards which are
propofed to Virtue ; For, What can
be truly great, in fio fimall a Propor
tion ofi Time ? the ishole Age of the
longeft Liver, in this our prefent
World, being inconfiiderable and no
thing in 'Comparijon of Eternity.
And again, Thefe Things, faith J
he, are nothings either in Number
or Greatnefs, in Comparifion with
thofie Rewards of Virtue, and Pw-
niftimmts ofi Vice, which attend Men
after Death. And, to mention
no more Places : They, faith || he,
¦who in the Games hope to obtain a
VW'ory in fuch poor Matters, as
flfreftling, Running, and the like,
think not much to prepare themfelves fior the Contejl
by great Temperance and Abftinence : And fihall Our
Scholars in the Study ofi Virtue not have Courage and
Qefolution etiough to perfevere with Patience, for a
far nobler Prize ? Words very like thofe of Sti
Paul, i Cor. ix. 24. Know ye not, that they which
run in a Race, run all ; And every Man that ftri-
velh for the Mafiery, is Temperate in all Things ?
Now they do it to obtain a corruptible Crown, but we
tin- Incorruptible* S 2. Another

I19

*Xp»j matrix tisoiuv, o'rs dgt-
Ifl^ xut tp^ovtjo-tciis It Ttf Qi'f (M-
taay^ftM' xahov ya.% to dfyhovi
xa.) jj Etorij ptydhsn. Plato in
Phardone. f- Kott pei to. yi fiiyira
S#l%Stfa dglTlis XOU 'BSfOKtif/Lttd
dSXa a oWflXi/SaiMii.  T»
0 av tv ys oXtytfi x%ovcr f*£"
y& yenoilo 5 %ds ydi> sto? ys
0 sx taaiSif 1 j*£J£§< tn^e^vra
jrjgoi'o; Wgoj Ttdrrct 0X17©* vra'
T15 d* sftj. Plato de Repubh
lib. 10.
% TaSra ro'tivv sSh In n7\rj-
$£» uos i*sylBu wgo; - tMsSa d-
'rtTmrrio-u.na Ixdn^ot n-EgifM-
»h. Idem, ibid.
Oi (kit u%a »ixo; tvixx <ird-
tois xat $c6p,uii xa) ran Tota-
tiiv, EToJytJifl-av dmi'xfo-ha.i.— -
OX It qfifaegot wa.t$e$ dlvmrij-
o-a<rt xctpTtgwi irohu za)$ior®i
hexa flxji*;. Plato de Legib'
lib. 8. *

120 72><? Evidence of Natural
The Argu- 2. Another Argument which may be ufed in
meat for proof 0f a putUre State, fo far as to amount to a
'state"" vet7 great Probability, is That neceffary Defire of
dranxm Immortality, which feems to be naturally implanted
from Mens in all Men, with an unavoidable Concern for what
natural js to come hereafter. If there be no Exiftence after
Immorta- t^s Life, it will feem that the irrational Creatures,
lity. who always enjoy the prefent Good without any Care
or Sollicitude for what may happen afterwards,
are better provided for by Nature than Men, whofe
Reafon and Forefight, and all other thofe very Fa
culties, by which they are made more excellent than
Beafts, ferve them, upon this Suppofition, fcarcely
for any other Purpofe, than to render them uneafiy,
and uncertain, and fearful, and fiollicitous, about
Things which are not. And 'tis not at all pro
bable, that God fhould have given Men Appetites,
which were never to be fiatisfied; Defires, which had
no Objects to anfwer them ; and unavoidable Appre
henfions of what was nevsr really come to pafis.
Another 3- Another Argument, which may be brought
drawn to prove a Future State, is That Conficien.ee which all
from Mens jy[en fave of their own Actions, or That inward
crJu'dT- Judgment which they neeeffarily pafs upon them in
ment of their own Minds ; whereby they that have not any
their own Law, are a Law unto themfelves, their Confidence
Miions.^ },earing Witnefis, and their Thoughts accufiing, or fife
r^, i'c. ' excufiing one another. There is no Man, who at any
Time does good, and brave, and generous Things*
but the Reafon of his own Mind applauds him for,
fo doing ; and no Man at any Time does Things
bafe and viie, difhonourable and wicked, but at
•the fame Time he condemns himfelf in what he
does. The one is neeeffarily accompanied with
good Hope and Expectation of Reward ; the
other, with continual Torment and Fear of Pu-
nifhment. And hence, as before, it is not proba
ble, that God fhould have fo framed and confti- tuted

and, Revealed Religion. I2i
tuted the Mind of Man, as neeeffarily to pafs upon
itfelf a Judgment which fhall never be verified, and
ftand perpetually and unavoidably convicted by a
Sentence which fhall never be confirmed.
4. Laftly, Another Argument, which may be Another
drawn from right Reafon in Proof of a Future State drawn
is this, that Man is plainly in his Nature an Account- ffomMan t
Me Creature, and capable of being Judged. Thofe pjlfurey an
Creatures indeed, whofe Actions are all determined accountable-
by fomething without themfelves, or by what we Creature.
call mere Inftinct, as they are not capable of having
a Rule given them, fo tis evident that neither can
they be accountable for their Actions. But Man,
who has intirely within himfelf a free Principle or
Povver of determining his own Actions upon moral
Motives, and has a Ruie given him to act by, which
is Right Reafon, can be, nay, cannot but be, ac
countable for all his Actions, how far they have been
agreeable or difagreeable to that Rule. Every Man,
becaufe of the natural Liberty of his Will, can and
ought to govern all his Actions by fome certain
Rule, and give a Reafon for every Thing he does.
Every moral Action he performs, being Free and
without any Compulfion or natural Neceffity, pro
ceeds either from fome Good Motive or fome Evil
one, is either conformable to right Reafon or contrary
to it, is worthy either of Praifie or Difipraifie, and
capable either of Excufe or Aggravation. Confe
quently 'tis highly reafonable to be fuppofed, that
fince theie is a Superior Being, from whom we re
ceived all our Faculties and Powers ; and fince in
the right Ufie, or in the Abufie of thofe Faculties, in
the governing them by the Rule of right Reafon,
or in the neglecting that Rule, confifts all the mo
ral Difference of our Actions ; there will at fome
Time or other be an Examination or Inquiry made
into the Grounds, and Motives, and Circumftances
of our feveral Actions, how agreeable, or difagree-
S 2 able

1 22 The E v i d e n c e of Natural
able they have been to the Rule that was given us,
and a fuitabkjudgment be paffed upon them. Upon
thefe Confiderations, the Wifeft of the Ancient Hea
thens believed and taught, that the Actions of every
particular Perfon fhould all be ftrictly tried arid ex
amined after his Death, and he have accordingly a
juft and impartial Sentence paffed upon him. Which
Doctrine though the Poets indeed wrapt up in Fa
bles and obfcure Riddles, yet the wifeft of the Phi^
lofophers had a better Notion of it, and more agree-
* ,- < ~ v " T able to Reafon. From this Judg-
fO,VolE, oiTE e! «*?>©. arexus meflti laith "«'<?> let no Man hope-
yit6[Mv@* iinv^nron <uspymo$*i to be able to eficape : For though you
&«» — o« -/«« ifuxM^ irof couU forcend int0 the very p^th 0f
w «»T1!' ovvovia o-imxpoi; mi, , „ J . „ .. .. , ¦* . /
««, *ot^ ri«, t£j&9»- the Earth, or fly on high tor the
tii'i\iitit yttipet®., »? totm- Extremities of the Heavens; yet
g«»« mawTfof ito-tit H «.utZv fihould you never eficape the juft Judg-
wof^Siis,, e?Se *«i Tcdrw »'; «//«" D*tf». An Expreffion very
«Vt«'"f o» ?ti Siasjtofci^Eis Toaron. agreeable to that of the Pfalmift,
Plato de Legib. lib. to. f^fa cxxxix. g, 9.
Thefe, I fay, are very good and ftrong Argu
ments for the great Probability of a Future State :
But That drawn, as above, from the Confideration
of the Moral Attributes, of God, feems to amount
even to a Demonftration.
V. Though the Neceffity and fydifpenfiablenefis of all
the great and moral Obligations of Natural Religion,
and alfo the Certainty of a Future State of Rewards
and Punifhments, be thus in general deducible, even
demonftrably, by a Chain ofi clear and undeniable Rea-
fioning : Tet (in the prefient State ofi the World, by what
Means fioever it fame originally to be fio corrupted, the
particular Circumftances whereof could not Plow be
certainly known but by Revelation) fuch is the Care-
leffnefs, Inconfideratenefs, and Want of Attention
of the. greater Part of Mankind ; fo many the Pre
judices

and Revealed Religion. . 123
judices and falfe Notions taken up by evil Education ;
fio ftrong and violent the unreafonable Lufts, Appetites,
and Defires of Senfe ; and fio great the Blindnefs, in
troduced by fuperftitious Opinions, vicious Cuftoms,
and debauched Practices through the World; that very
Few are able, ' in Reality and EffeCt, to dificover thefie
Things clearly and plainly for themfelves : But Men have
great Need of particular Teaching, and much Inftruc-
tion, to convince them of the Truth, and Certainty,
and Importance of thefe Things ; to give them a due
Senfe and clear and juft Apprehenfions concerning
them ; and to bring them effectually to the Practice of
the plaineft and moft neceffary Duties.
1. There is naturally, in the greater Part of Man- Men kin-
kind, fuch a prodigious Careleffinefs, Inconfideratenefs, dered from
and Want ofi Attention, as not only hinders them *iftff>«r'm
from making Ufe of their Reafon, in fuch Manner 1*^ er~
as to difcover -thefe Things clearly and effectually for Religious
themfelves ; but is the Caufe of the grofteft and moft Truths by
ftupid Ignorance imaginable. Some feem to have Cafe'eff-
little or hardly any Notion of God at all ; and More want 0y
take little or no Care to frame juft and worthy Ap- Attention.
prehenfiions concerning him, concerning the Divine
Attributes and Perfections of his Nature ; and ftill
many More are intirely negligent and heedlefs, to
confider-and difcover what may be his Will. Few
make a due Ufe of their Natural Faculties, to di-
ftinguifo rightly the effential and unchangeable
Difference between Good and Evil; Fewer yet fo
attend to the natural Notices which God has given
them, as by their own Underftanding to, collect,
that What is Good is the exprefs Will and Command
of God, and What is Evil is Forbidden by him :
And ftill Fewer confider with themfelves the
Weight and Importance of thefe Things, the natu
ral Rewards or Punifhments that are frequently an
nexed in this Life to the Practice of Virtue or Vice,
and the much greater and certainer Difference that
fhall be made between them in a Life to come. Hence
S3 it

12± The Evidence of Natural
it is, that (as Travellers affure us) even fome whole
Nations feem to have very little Notion of God, or,
at leaft, very poor and unworthy Apprehenfions L
concerning him ; and a very fmall Senfe of the Ob
ligations of Morality ; and very mean and obfcure
Expectations of a Future State. Not that God has
any where left himfielf wholly without Wpnefis ; or
that the Difference of Good and Evil is to any ra
tional Being undifcerriible ; or that Men, at any
Time or in any Nation, could ever be firmly and
generally perfuaded in their own Minds, that they
perifhed abfolutely at Death : But, through Supine
Negligence and Want of Attention, they let their
Reafon (as it were) deep, and * are
* Multis fignis natura de- deaf to the Dictates of Common
clarat quid velit:—- obfur- TJnderftandinf? •, and, like brute
oeicimus tamen neicio quo t> n • i- i it,,.
modo, neeaudimus. Qic.de Beafts, minding only the Things ¦
Amkit. that are before their Eyes, never
confider any Thing that is abftract
from Senfe, or beyond their prefent private Tem
poral Intereft. And it were well, if, even in civilized
Nations, this was not, very nearly, the Cafe of too
many Men, when left intirely to themfelves, and
void of particular Inftruction.
And by 2. The greater Part of Mankind are not only
early Pre- JJnattenlive, and barely Ignorant ; but commonly
j'fiedftesfind they have alfo, through a carelefs and Evil Educa-
falfe Pto- . J , , S . ,. . . ,
tions. tl0n5 taken up early Prejudices, and many vain ana
fooliffi Notions, which pervert their natural Under
ftanding, and hinder them from ufing their Reafon
in moral Matters to any effectual Purpofe. This
cannot be better defcribed than in the Words of
Cicero : If we had come into the
t Si tales nos natura ge- World, faith f he, in fuch Cir-
nuiflet, ut earn ipfam intueri cumfiances, as that we could clear-
& peifpicere, eaque optima jy and diftinCih have dijcerned Na-
dnce curium vita: conficere t i nc i 1 i u
poifcmus ; haud effet fane ture herfelf> «*d have been able,
^wcd quiiciuam rationem & in the Courfe of our Lives, to follow

12$
do&rinam requireret. Nunc
verb, &c. Cic. Tujc. 2>ua:Ji.

and Revealed Religion
low her true and uncmrupted Di
rections : This alone might have
been fufficient, and there would
have been little Need of Teaching
and Infiruclion . But Now ' Nature
has given us only fome fimall Sparks
ofi right Reafion, which we fio quick
ly 'exlinguifih with corrupt Opinions
and evil Practices, that the true
Light of Nature no where appears.
As fioon as we are brought into the
World, immediately we dwell in the
Midft of all Wickednefs, and are
fiurrounded with a Number ofi moft
perverfie and foolifih Opinions ; fio
that we feem to fuck in Error
even with our Nurfies Milk. Af
terwards, when we return to our
Parents, and are committed to Tu
tors ; then we are further flocked
with fuch Variety of Errors, that
Truth becomes perfectly overwhelmed
with Falfhood ; and the moft natural
Sentiments of our Minds are in
tirely ftifled with confirmed Follies. But when, afiter
all this, we enter upon Bufinefs in the World, and make
the Multitude, confipiring every-where in Wickednefis,
our great Guide and Example ; then our very Nature
itfielfi is wholly transformed, as it were, into corrupt
Opinions. A livelier Defcription of the prefent
corrupt Eftate of Human Nature is not eafiiy to
be met with.
3. In the Generality of Men, the Appetites and Andbyfen-
Defires of Senfie are fo violent and importunate ; the-^afl/ ^'~
Bufinefs and the Pleafures of the World take up fo L"s't fff
much of their Time -, and their Paffions are fo very worldly
ftrong and unreafonable, that, of Themfelves, they Bujlnefi.
are very backward and unapt to employ their
Reafon, and fix their Attention upon moral Matters •,
S 4 and

lib. 3.
Nunc parvulos nobis dedit
igniculos, quos celeriter malis
moribus opinionibufq; depra-
vatis fic reftinguimus, ut nuf-
quam Natune lumen appareat,
 Simul atque editi in
Lucem & fufcepti fumus, in
omni continuo pravitate, &
in fumma opinionum per-
verfitate verfamur ; ut pene
cum ladle nutricis, errorem
fuxiffe videamur. Cum vero
parentibus redditi, deinde
magillris traditi fumus, turn
ita variis imbuimur erroribus,
ut vanitati Veritas, & opini-
oni confirmatae natura ipfa
cedat.  . Cum vero accedit
eodem, quali maximus qui
dem magifter, populus atque
omnis undique ad vitia con-
fentiens multitudo ;, tum plane
inficimur opinionum pravi
tate, a naturaque ipfa defcif-
cimus. Ibid.

J*6

*"Eti H tX «J-S7i» W45K Sf«V
c-ftTESjaWTai [i)Soi/i)'] 010 xa.i
yplwBTov dmorgi-^ad'Sui tsto to
ioTa'So;, ^X!^gwo-fXiE»o|i to giw.
Ariflol. Ethic, lib. 2. f. 2.

$fe Evidence of Natural
and ftill more backward to apply themfelves to the
Pr-aCiice of , them. The Love of Pleafure is (as
Ariftotle elegantly * expreffes it) fo
nourifihed up with us from our very
Childhood, and fo incorporated (as
it were) into the whole Courfe
of our Lives, that 'tis very diffi
cult for Men to withdraw their
Thoughts from Senfual Objects,
and fatten them upon Things remote from Senfe.
And if, perhaps, they do attend a little, and begin
to fee the Reafonablenefs of governing themfelves
by a higher Principle than mere Senfe and Appe
tite ; yet with fuch -f- Variety ofi
Temptations are they perpetually
encompaffed and continually fol*
licited, and the Strength of Paf
fions and Appetites makes fo great
Oppofition to the Motions of
Reafon, that commonly they
yield and fubmit to practife thofe,
Things, which, at the fameTime,
the Reafon of their own Mind J
condemns ; and what they allow
not, That they Do. Which Gbferr
vation is fo true of too great a
Part of Mankind, that Plato upon
this Ground declares || All Arts
and Sciences to have, in his Opinion,
left of Difficulty in tbem, than that
of making Men Good : Infomuch
that, it § is well, faith he, if
'Men can come to attain a right
Senfie, and juft and true Notions of
Things, even by that Time they ar
rive at old Age.

f Vitia de mercede folli--
citant : Avaritia pecuniam
promittit : Luxuria multas ac
Varias voluptates : Ambitio
purpuram & plaufum ; & ex
hoc potentiam, & quicquid
potentia ponit. Senec. Epift. 59.
ToJs il IVfAtii, oti lavTft rd
muSt) iv ii\dCi oJo» viuqa ri p.r,on-
Joi Iive? hso-a.i, atnuo-t mt vip.d<;,
ncri aWm'to? dv^iTueno-tt, Uav\'ut.\
tjo-aei, its' ivailiaids^oi^iiq. Plato
de Legib. lib. 1 .
j  Video meliora pro-
boque, Peteripra fequor.
|| "eSo£e Si), xa) vyv hi ioxcT,
rd fistf «wv» \ia.i-nii\ijtu.ia mdp-
id, ov crtpoi^a, ^a^sTOo: iltar
to it 1lta1^irovlxf^ "Ayv^^\
yjtjra; ^»9g»'irB«, •xa.yxaUinoy.
Plato in Epinomide.
$j Qfmwrw « *«' aXvi^iTi
io£a<; #i£<*iB». tirvyfi "91 xa.)
wgo; to yii^s vsapyittlQ. Id.
de legib. lib. 2.

and. Revealed Religion. 127
- 4. But that which, above all pther Things, moft And above
depraves Mens natural Underftanding, and hinders alb fyf''
them from difcerning and judging rightly of Moral "^"s and'
Truths, is this ; That as ftupid and carelefs Igno- Praaices,
ranee leads them, into fond and fuperftitious Opi- *
nions, and the Appetites of Senfe overcome and
tempt them into Practices contrary to their Con
fcience and Judgment ; fo, on the Reverfe, the
Multitude of fiuperftitiotts Opinions, vicious Habits,.
and debauched Practices, which prevail in all Ages
through the greater Part of the World, do recipro
cally increafe Mens grofs Ignorance, Careleffnefs,
and Stupidity, Falfe and unworthy Notions of
God, or fuperftitious Apprehenfions concerning
him, which Men carelefsly and inconfiderately hap*
pen to take up at firft, do (as it were) blind the
Eyes of their Reafon for the Future, and hinder
them from difcerning what of itfelf originally was
eafy enough to be difcovered. That which may be
known of God, has been manifeft enough unto Men Rom. i.
in all Ages ; for God hath fihewed it unto them : For. 19> &c-
the invifiible Things ofi Him from the Creation of the
World are clearly fieen, being underftood by the Things
that are made, even his eternal Power and Godhead:
So that they, who are ignorant of him, cannot but
be without Excufie. But, notwithftanding all the.
Heathen World had fo certain Means of knowing
God, yet generally tbey glorified him not as God ; nei
ther were thankful, but became vain in their Imagina
tions, and their foolifih Heart was darkened : And they
changed the Glory ofi the incorruptible God into Images
of the meaneft and moft contemptible Creatures ;
and worfihipped and fierved the Creature more than the
Creator, who is b.kffed for ever. The natural Con
fequence of which abfurd Idolatry, and alfo the
juft Judgment of God upon them for it, was, That
they were given up to n reprobate Mind, to Uncleqnnefs,
and to all vile Affections, to fuch a Degree, that not
Only their common Practices, but even their moft
Sacred

128 The Evidence of Natural
Sacred Rights' and Religious Performances, became
themfelves the extremeft Abominations. And
when Mens Morals are thus corrupted, and they
run with Greedinefs into all Excefs of Riot and De
bauchery ; then, on the other Hand, by the fame
natural Confequence, and by the fame juft Judg
ment of God, both their Vicious Cuftoms and ACtions,
Eph. iv. as well as Superftitious Opinions, reciprocally in-
18, 19. creafe the Blindnefis ofi their Hearts, darken the Judg
ment of their Underftandings, ftu-
. T „ „¦ c A„ pify and fear their Confidences fo
* Juftos natura effe factos ; r 1 J
 tantam autem effe cor- as to become paft feeling, and, by
ruptelam malte conjuetudinis, ut , Degrees, * extinguifo wholly that
ab ea tanquam igniculi extin- jj^ 0f pjature jn their Own
cuantur a natura dati ; exon- - ,9 , J , . , . ,
fnturq; & confirmentur vitia Minds, which was given them
contraria. Cicde Legib. lib. 1. originally to inable them to dif-
cern between Good and Evil.
Wherefore By thefe Means it comes to pafs, that though the
Men have great obligations and the principal Motives of Mo-
rft i,e rality are indeed certainly difcoverable and demon-
taught and ftrable by right Reafon ; and all confiderare Men,
inftruBed wnen thofe Motives and Obligations are fairly pro-
%MiTonS Pofed to tnem' muft °f Neceffity (as has been fully
proved in the foiegoing Heads) yield their Affent
to them as certain and undeniable Truths ; yet,
under the Difadvantages now mentioned, (as 'tis the
Cafe of moft Men to fall under fome or other of
them) very Few are ofi Themfelves able, in Reality
and Effect, to difcover thofe Truths clearly and
plainly for themfelves : But moft Men have great
Need, of particular Teaching and much InftruCtion,
not without fome Weight of Authority as well as
Reafon and Perfuafion :
17?, To raife and ftir up their Attention ; to move
them to foake off their habitual Careleffnefs, Stu
pidity, and Inconfideratenefs ; to perfuade them to
make Ufe of their natural Reafon and Underftand
ing, and to apply their Minds to apprehend and ftudy the

and Revealed Religion.
the Truth and Certainty of thefe Things. For, as
Men, notwithftanding all the rational Faculties they
are by Nature indued with, may yet, through
mere Neglect and Incogitancy, be grofsly and
totally ignorant of the plaineit and moft obvious
Mathematical Truths •, fo Men may alfo, for Want
of Confideration, be very ignorant of fome of the
plaineft Moral Obligations, which, as foon as di-
ftinctly propofed to them, they cannot poffibly
avoid giving their Affent unto.
2. To give them a due benfie and right and juft
Apprehenfions concerning thefe Things ; to convince
them of the great Concern and vaft Importance of
them ; to correct the falfe Notions, vain Prejudices,
and foolifh Opinions, which deprave their Judg
ment ; and to remove that Levity and Heedlelf-
nets of Spirit, which makes Men frequently to be
in their Practice very little influenced by what in
abftract Opinion they may feem firmly to believe.
For there are many Men, who will think them
felves highly injured, if any one foould make any
Doubt of their Believing the indifpenfable Obliga
tions of Morality, and the Certainty of a Future
State of Rewards and Punifhments, who yet, in
their Lives and Actions, feem to have upon their
Minds but a very, final 1 Senfe of the Weight and
infinite Importance of thefe great Truths.
3. To Inculcate thefe Things frequently upon
Them, and prefs them effectually to the Practice of
the plaineft and moft neceffary Duties ; to perfuade
them to moderate thofe Paffions, to fubdue thofe
Lufts, to conquer thofe Appetites, to defpife thofe
Pleafures of Senfe, and (which is the greateft Diffi
culty of all) to reform and correct thofe vicious
Cuftoms and evil Habits, which tempt and hurry
them too often into the Commiffion of fuch Things,
as they are convinced, at the fame Time, in the
Reafon of their own Minds, ought not to be prac- tifed.

igo • The Evidence of Natural
tifed. For 'tis very poffible Men may both clearly
underftand their Duty, and alfo be fully convinced
of the Reafonablenefs of practifing it ; and yet, at
Rom.vii, the fame Time, find a Law in their Members war-
23- ring and prevailing againft the Law ofi their Mind,
and bringing them into Captivity to
* Quidam ad magnificas the Law of 'Sin and Death. Men
voces excitantur, & tranfeunt * may be pleafed with the Beauty
in affeftum dicentium, ala- and Excellency of Virtue, and
cres. vultu & ammo. Kapit . e r . J T ,. . '
alios inftigatque rerum pul-. have fome faint Inclinations and
chritudo.  Juvat protinus even Refolutions to pradtife it,
quae audias, facere. Affici- an(J yet at the Return of their
bentu^ %£*£?%£ .Temptations, conftantly foil back
permaneat, fi non.impetum into their accuftomed Vices, if
infignem protinus populus ho- the great Motives of their Duty
neftidiffuaforexcipiat. Pauci be not very frequently and very
mam quam conceperant men- „ i - 1 i 7 ., ¦
tern, domum' perferre pome- ftrongly inculcated upon them,
runt. Senec. Epift. 109. fo as to make very deep and laft-
inglmpreffions upOn their Minds;
and they have not fome greater and higher AfJift-
ance afforded them, than the bare Conviction of
their own fpeculative Reafon.
For thefe Reafons ( I fay ) 'tis abfolutely necef
fary, that, notwithftanding the natural Demonftra-
blehefs both of the -Obligations and Motives of
Morality, yet, confidering the manifeft Corruptnefs
of the prefent Eftate which hum^n Nature is in,
the Generality of Men muft not by any Means be
left wholly to the Workings of their own Minds, ,
to the Ufe of their natural Faculties, and to the
bare Convictions of their own Reafon, but muft
be particularly Taught and lnftruded in their Duty,
muft have the Motives of it frequently and ftrong'
ly preffed and inculcated upon them with great
Weight and Authority, and muft have many ex
traordinary Affiftances afforded them, to keep them
effectually in the Practice of the great and plaineft
Duties of Religion. " And

and Revealed Religion.

131

And hence we may, by the Way, juftly obferve The great
the exceeding great Ufe and Neceffity there is of Ufe and
eftablifhing an Order or Succeffion of Men, whofe Nece^'y°fi
peculiar Office and continual Employment it may ofPrea'ch-
be to Teach and Inftruct People in their Duty, to en.
prefs and exhort them perpetually to the Practice
of it, and to be Inftruments of conveying to them
extraordinary Affiftances for that Purpofe. To
which excellent Inftitution, the Right and worthy
Notion of God and his Divine Perfections, the juft
Senfe and Underftanding of the great Duties of
Religion, and the univerfal Belief and due Appre-
henfion of a Future State of Rewards and Punifh
ments, which the Generality even • of the meaner
and more ignorant Sort of People among us are
now poffeffed of, is manifeftly and undeniably al
moft wholly owing ; as I fhall have Occafion here
after more particularly to obferve.
VI. Though in almoft every Age , there have indeed
been in the Heathen World fiome wife, and brave, and
good Men, who have made it their Bufinefis to ftudy
and pradifie the Duties of natural Religion Themfelves,
and to teach and exhort Others to do the like ; who
feem therefore to have been raified up by Providence as
Inftruments to reprove, in fiome Meafiure, and put fiome
Kind ofi Check to the extreme Super Jtition and Wickedr
nefis of the Nations wherein they lived ; yet none of thefie
have ever been able to reform the World, with any con-
fiderably great and univerfal Succefis ; becaufie they have
been but very Few that have in Earneft fiet them-
fielves about this excellent Work ; and they that have
indeed Jincerely done it, have themfielves been intirely,
ignorant of fome DoClrines, and very doubtful and
uncertain ofi others, abfiolutely neceffary for the bring
ing about that great End ; and thofe Things which they
have been certain of and in good Meafiure underftood, they

132 The Evidence of Natural
they have not been able to prove and explain clearly
enough ; and thofie that they have been able both to
prove and explain by fiufficiently clear Reafioning, they
have not yet had Authority enough to inforce and in
culcate upon Mens Minds with fio ftrong an Impreffion
as to influence and govern the general Practice ofi the
World. 1 . There have indeed in almoft every Age been,
in the Heathen World, fome Wife, and Brave, and
Good Men, who have made it their Bufinefs to
ftudy and practife the Duties of natural Religion
Themfelves, and to teach and exhort O/^rj1 to' do the
like. An eminent Inftance whereof, in the Eaftern
Nations, the Scripture itfelf affords us in the Hif-
tory of Job ; concerning whom it does not certainly
appear, that he knew any pofitive revealed Inftitu-
tion of Religion, or that, before his Sufferings, any
immediate Revelation was made to him, as there
was to Abraham, and the reft of the Patriarchs.
Among the Greeks, Socrates feems to be an extra
ordinary Example of this Kind. Concerning whom
, Plato tells us, in his Apology, that
* oJS> y«V *>&° ir^dtrm * he did nothing elfe, but go con-
W m^i&w**, *;™S"» »- tinually about, perfoading both
SBft^'ncW|»«wi»i(«x.5*&«, Old and Young, not to be fo
f"iTE x?*P!*ru' ^^h<»< pi™ much follicitous to gratify the
«M8 Ti»i« tlra o-tpiipa,, u; rUt Appetites of the Body, or to heap
^ ™f> «t «,« w *.- weald, or to raife themfelves
yaw, eTf ix ex jcpuftaTaw 11 «£E- r '
Wy{KT», a'wc- e|«|et?? X(*- to Honour, or gain any outward
ficcTa x«i t' «Ma t iy«&d toT; Advantage whatfoever, as to im-
,Y9{»W «W», ««J tti* prove the Mind by the continual
xai Smoo-h?. Plato in Apol. L -r c \\It j ^ 1 '
Socrat. Exercife of all Virtue and Good
nefs : Teaching them, that a Man's
true Value did not arife from his Riches, or from
any outward Circumftances of Life ; but that True
Riches., and every real Good, whether public or
private, proceeded wholly from Virtue. After
him, Plato and Ariftotle, and Others, followed his
Example,

and Revealed Religion. 133
Example, in teaching Morality. And among the
Romans, Cicero ; and in later limes, hpiCietus and
Antoninus, and feveral Others, gave the World
admirable Syftems of Ethics, and noble moral ,
Inftructions and Exhortations, of excellent Ufe
and Benefit to the Generations wherein they lived,
and defervedly of great Value and Efteem even
unto this Day.
2. So that, I think, it may very juftly be fup- who feem
pofed, that thefe Men were raifed up and defigned *° t>a<ve
by Providence, (the abundant Goodnefs of God bften je~
having never left itfelf wholly without Witnefs, not- providence
withftanding the greateft Corruptions and Provo- to bear
cations of Mankind) as Inftruments to reprove in Wimejs
fome Meafure, and put fome Kind of Check to the "ftfffftfjh
extreme Superftition and Wickednefs of the Nati- Bf the '
ons wherein they lived, pr at leaft to bear Witnefs Nations
againft and condemn it. Concerning Job, the Cafe '^trfn .
is evident and confeffed. And for the fame Reafon, ey IV
fome of the Ancienteft Writers of the Church have
not fcrupled to * call even Socrates
alfo, and fome others of the Beft * Ka" " f"T* *h™ &«™»-
of the Heathen Moralifts, by the T!5' &vt*i T' L*f ^V iT
JName of Chrifihans, and to affirm, x?a,'rv( xdi 'Hf***..?©., *«} »r
that -f as the Law was as it were fy*°><>» a-i-r^- " /3a§/3a?on SI
a Schoolmafter to bring the Jews 'A^«*V»^- 7«ftin.ApoIog.z.
unto Chrift, fo true moral Philofio- f rdx«. ii xcd ^ys^W
phy was to the Gentiles a Prepara- roT^-E^no-ir i26$v j <piMo-o<pia
tive to receive the Gofipel. This T°?' ™fy * T'" *T" *a*E'f<"
perhaps was carrying the Matter y^% xa) „„•„¦ T; •EWww,^, je
fomewhat too far ; but to be fure, 0 m>»s Ta5'ECpais; e^ ;#»{-»•
thus much we mav fafely affert, v^aesurxevd^a toW u"<p.xo-
that t whatever any of thefe Men °"0(pi -' •«••*¦«•"« ™ »*»
+ .til X?""B TeAstafMnw. Llem. Alex-
¦ were at any Time inabled to deh- «w. S/reai. 1. '
ver Wifiely and Profitably, and Agree- , . , v
«*& ^ £«»« ?>*/*, was <w a t.oSE^p^™,™,
Lifw fihining in a dark Place, de- fiw„. Orig. adwrf. Celf. lib. 6.
rived to them by a Ray of that infinite

134 "The Evidence df Natural
infinite overflowing Goodnefs, which does Good t(s
all, even both Juft and Unjufi ; from God the fole
Author of all Truth- and Wifdom ; and This, for
fome Advantage and Benefit to the reft of the
, World, even in its blindeft and moft corrupt Eftate.
But yet 3. But then, notwithftanding the moft that can
none of be made cf this Suppofition, 'tis certain the EffeS
thefe Men f n the Teaching and Inftru&ion even of the beft
Me to re- of the Philofophers in the Heathen World was in
form the Comparifon very fmall and inconfiderable. They
World never were able to reform the World with any great
To'nfiderl- an(^ univerfal Succefs, nor to keep together any con*
bleSuccefs. fiderable Number of Men in the. Knowledge and
Practice of true Virtue. With Refpect to the Wor-
foip of God, Idolatry prevailed univerfally in all Na
tions ; and, notwithftanding Men did indeed know
Rom. i. God, fo as to be without Excufie, yet they did not like to
xi & 28. ygtain him in their Knowledge, but became vain in their
Imaginations, and their fioolifih Heart was darkened, and
they changed the Glory of the uncorruptible God into
Images of the vileft Creatures ; and no Philofophers
pver turned any great Number of Men from; this ab
furd Idolatry to the Acknowledgment and Worfhip*
of the only true God. In Refpect of Mens Dealings
one with another, Honour, and Intereft, and Friend
fhip, and Laws, and the Neceflities of Society, did
indeed caufe Juftice to be practifed in many Heathen
Nations to a great Degree ; but very Few Men among
them were Juft and Equitable upon right and true
Principles, a due Senfe of Virtue, and a conftant
Fear and Love of God. With refpect to Themfelves,
Intemperance, and Luxury, and unnatural Unclemnejs,
were commonly practifed, even in the moft civilized
Countries ; and This not fo much in Oppofiflor* to
the Doctrine of the Philofophers, as by the Confent in
deed and Encouragement;of too great a Part of them*
I fhall not enlarge upon this ungrateful and melan-
cholly Subject : There are Accounts enough Extant, of

* Egregium fan&umq; virum
fi cerno, .bimembri puero,

a nd Revealed R e l i g i o n.
of the univerfal Corruption and Debauchery of the
Heathen World. St. Paul's Defcription of it, in
the whole firft Chapter of his Epiftle to the Romans,
is alone fufficient ; and * the Com
plaints of their own Writers abun
dantly confirm it. The Difciples
of the beft Moralifts, at leaft the
Practifers of theif Doctrine, were,
in their own Life7time, very -f-
pew ; as too plainly appears from
the evil Treatment, which that
great Man Socrates met withal at
¦Athens* And at their Deaths, their
Doctrine in great Meafure died
with them ; not having any fuffi-
cieht Evidence or Authority to
fupport it. And their Followers
quickly fell back into the com
mon Idolatry, Superftition, Un-
cleannefs, and Debauchery. Of
which, the Character the Roman
Writers give of thofe that called
themfelves the Difciples of Socra
tes is a particular and remarkable
Inftance. Thefe Confiderations
(fo very early did they appear to
be true) affected in fuch a Man
ner that great Admirer of Socrates,,
'Plato ; that he fometimes feems to
give over all Hopes of working
any Reformation in Men by Phi
lofophy ; and fays, that J a good

*3$

vel

Hoc monftrum
miranti fub aratro
Pifcibus inventis, & fcetae
comparo muls.
Jwvenal. Sat. 13.
See aljo the Places cited a
little below.
f Sint licet perhonefti;
¦ ' fed audire depofcimus
quot fint aut fuerint numero.
— — Vnus, Duo, Tres. — —
At genus humanum non ex
bonis pauculis, fed ex cxteris
omnibus a?ftimari convenit.
Arnob. ad-verJ.Gentes, lib. 2.
Da mihi virum qui fit ira-
cundus, maledicus, effrsena-
tus ; pauciffimis Dei verbis
tam-placidum, quam ovem,
reddam. Da libidinofum, &c.
— — Numquis haec Philofopho-
rum aut . unquam prasftitit,
aut praftare, fi velit, poteft ?
Lafiattt. lib. 3.
Il<z£« ftevlo?; EXXua-iB Ei; T»{
Qx'iSav, y.xi ix oiim- ei ¦5eu'te£©j,
&c. Origen. adverf. Celf. lib. I .

\ Tavra t.oyitrp.a X«6b» y?v
yjav exw' **' T<* o\v\h m9«\-
r\m-i, olo> h Xhja,uh xonogla xai
)Man, when he confider s thefieThlngs, C"^ "T ^^ f i°r™>
¦ j. -- i r r ¦ 1 vw° 1oivio» wssos-a.;, ^u* Taj
"would even chufie to Jit quiet, and ^Ma? ^w^t^s; «V>-
[diet;, ayaiza. ei' w/) ccvtoi; xa>-
Sa§o; diixias te xd) aWiwv igytn, Toflt IvSdis @i°v @idai\a.i, xdi rm <w«W»-
yii xvtS ftsld xa.},n<; 'ika'iio^ "feus, 7e »«< tu^mi »waWw>£«1»». Plato de Re-
'fubl. lib. 6. T

136 The Ev id en ce of Natural
'fhifit for himfielf; like a Man that, in a violent Hurri
cane, creeps under a Wall for his Defence ; and, fee
ing the whole World round about him filled with all
Manner of Wickednefis, be content if, prefierving his
fingle Self from Iniquity, and every evil Work, he can
pafs away the , prefient Life in Peace, and at laft Die
with Tranquillity and good Hope. And indeed, for '
many Reafons, it was altogether impoffible, that the
Teaching of the Philofophers foould ever be able
to reform Mankind, and recover them out of their
very degenerate and corrupt Eftate, with any con-
fiderably great and univerfal Succefs. .
'Becmfie r. ln the firft Place, Becaufe the Number of
iefn *buT m°fe> who have* in Earneft fet themfelves about this
"'very Few excellent Work, have been exceeding Few. Philo-
'that have fophers indeed, that called themfelves fo, there were
tn Earneft enough in, every Place, and in every Age. But thofe,
GlleTa- wno truly made it their Bufinefs to improve their
bout that Reafon to the Height ; to free themfelves from the
'excellent Superftition, which overwhelmed the whole World ;
•Work. t0 fearch out the Obligations of Morality, and the
Will of God their Creator ; to obey it fincerely
themfelves, as far as they could difcover it by the
Light of Nature ; and to encourage and exhort
others to do the like ; were but a very few Names. •
The Doctrine of far the greateft Part of the Philo
fophers confifted plainly in nothing but Words,
and Subtlety, and Strife, and empty Contention j
and did not at all amend even their own Manners ;
much lefs was fitted to reform the World. Their
Scholars, as Ariftotle * excellently
^ * 'am; o. wow™ teevra ftEf defcribes them, thought themfelves.
a wytfluw syi l\ ri,xSyo,xoi- greatly improved in Philofophy, and
r^rV ..«1« v^o-oQu,, tbat th h valiant Men,
.ojbwsf ti ¦mofuiiii toi; Kdpmviru, lfi they did but hear, and underftand^
.01 run ldle,wt CCXVOVO-i (K.E1T STTl-
fAEXa;, «yo*«r» i' oip'Sb, toi vprcuro-opittn. Same Sv «JJ' lKim, J t&vtrt <A
•rupx, oiru $i?aanvipau- oui', oi'roi rf,t ^vxi; wr'u piteroipoSrrtt. AriSot.
Ethic, lib. z.cap.i. T J and

and Revealed R e l i g' i o n; iof
hid learn to difipute about Morality ; though it had
ho EffeCt at all, nor Influence upon their Mahnehi
Juft as if a' Jick Man Jhould eXpeCl to be healed by
hearing a Phyjician difcourfe ¦,- though he never 'fol
lowed any of his Directions. Undoubtedly^ faid he;
the Mind of the one was exactly as much improved, by
fuch Pfrilojopby, as the Health ofi the other's Body •
by fuch Phyfic. And no Wonder the Generality
6f the common Flearers judged of their own Im
provement in Philofophy by fuch falfe Meafores,
when the enormous Vieioufnefs of the Lives of thd
Philofophers, themfelves' made it plainly appear,'
that * their Art was not fo much
intended and fitted for the Re- . * Inclufos [f hilofop&os j ¦
formation of Mens Manners, as h Angulis, facienda praeci-,
£o be an Exercife of Wit and Sub- ?Sre' ^* rfe iPfi 9oM«* fe-
., ¦¦•'. .¦..," . - ¦ZnJ-. ,-¦ , .. . aunt qui loquuntur ; & duo>
piety, and an Infirument of Vain- ^m fe a veris aaibus remo-
Glory. Excepting perhaps' Sb- verun't, a'pparet eos exercehdeS
crates and Plato, and fome others lihsuf dau%' fe} advbcdndi •
l r^u i„ r> i .1 • a ' s i.'- i ¦¦¦ gratia,* artem ipfam Philofo-
6fthat Rank,, this Account is too *hijB reperiff/ ^^
plainly true of the greateft Part of ui. 3;
the Philofophers. The Argument .
fs too Unpfeafant to" inftance in Particulars. Who
mever pleafes may, in Diogenes Lairtius arid' other
Writers,- find .Accounts enough of the LewMnefsf
imd unnatural Vices' of moft of the Philofophers1.
'Tis a Shame, fior Us fo much as to fipeak of thofe
Things which were done of them, hot only in fiecretj
but evert in tne moft' public Manner. I fhall here
l6nly add the Judgment of Cicero, a Man alable to'
,jbafs a rign't Judgment in this Matter as ever lived;
Do you think, fays -f tie, that thefie , ....
.Things [meaning the Precepts of .. t "Sed h.<ec eadem nnar
Morality] had any Influence -itpon £%«^ j%£.
thofie Men, (excepting only a very a-quiBus invsnta, djfputaV'ay
few of them) who taught, and confcripta funt ? Quote e-
writ, and difputed about them? ?im .quifa.ue, Ph^lofophorurH
Art F7/i • i - * 'u i ¦ rii .7 r- invemtur, cjui fir ita mora-
Nb ; Who is there of all the Phdofa-
i X i' > fherSv

! 3 g fhe E v i d e nc e of Natural
phers, whofe Mind and Life and
tus, ita animo ac vita confti- Manners were conformable to right
tutus ut ratio poftulat ; qui R , ? whg gver madg hh m_
difciplinam fuam non often- J , . .,
tationem fcientis, fed legem lofiophy to be the Law and Rule of
vita putet ; qui obtem'peret his Life, and not a mere Bi/aft and
ipfe fibi, & decretis fuis pa- Sh(JW Qr fe Wit anJ paris ? jffa
reat ? Videre licet multos, ,Jr J , ,. ram-.' j
libidinum fervos, &c Cic. obfitrved his own Inftruilions, and
fujculan. S>uaJiion. lib. z. lived in Obedience to his own Pre
cepts ? On the Contrary, many ofi
them were Slaves to filthy Lufts, many to Pride, many
to Covetoufinefis, (sfc.
And thofe 2. Thofe few extraordinary Men of the Philo-
fe™ °f 'fte fophers, who did indeed in good Meafure fincerely
"It ' z. Obey the Laws of natural Religion Themfelves, and
fbers,"Wbo J . , o . i . •
-did indeed made it their chief Bufinefs to lnftructand exhott
fincerely Others to do the fame, were yet Themfielves intirely
endeavour jgmrani Qf fome Doctrines abfolutely neceffary to
*Manihd, tne bringing about this great End, of the Reforma
ts* _>*? tion and Recovery of Mankind.
themfelves jn general : ' Having no Knowledge of the whole
intinly '£- Scheme, Order, and State of Things, the Method
HOY £fflt Of ¦ O *
fome Doc- of God's governing the World, his Defign in Cre-
trines ab- ting Mankind, the original Dignity of Human
jolutely ««-]sTature3 the Ground and Circumftances of Mens
"hd-in?- Prefent corrupt Condition, the Manner of the Di-
ing about vine Interpofiition neceffary to their Recovery, and
that great the Glorious End to which God intended finally
Endm to conduct them : Haying no Knowledge (I fay)
o*f all This ; their whole Attempt to difcover the
Truth of Things, and to in-
ftruct Others therein, was ' * like
* Errant ergo velut in mari Wandering in thc wide Sea with-
magno, nee quo ferantur in- , P . . , .
telbgunt ; quia nee viam cer- °ut knowing whither they were
nunt, nee ducem fequuntur. to go, or which Way they were to
Ladant. lib. 6. take, or having any Guide to
conduct them. And according-
t Ex ceteris Philofophis, , j. the Wifeft Qf them were M.
jionne optimus & graviiumus J ' , , , r - , .
quifque confitetur, multa fe ver backward to confefs theirown
ignorare; & multa fibi etiam Ignorance

Cic. Tufc.Quaft.i,.
* 'Ev jSJSai aTiu'Ssios.
f Tui ergo te, Cicero, li-
bri arguunt, quam nihil a
philofophia difci poffit ad vi-
tam. Hsec tua verba funt :
Mihi autem non modo adfapi- ,
entiam ca?ci 'videmur ; fed ad
ea ipfa, qua aliqua ex parti
cerni videantur, hebetes & ob-
tufi. Lactam, lib. 3.
\ "Sltrireg ydg xen la iui vvx-
li^iSm Qjt.fA.d\a 'ospif To Qiyyos
E^Ei to u-sS r,[/.t^cty, aru xa.i ine
d'^eI/jos; ^"/C^f * ""5 vceps ™
Tt] tpiiaa tpxti^urdla irdilm.
Arijl. MetaphyJ Aib. z.c. I .

and Revealed Religion. 139
Ignorance and great Blindnefs : aique. et'an» eire d'fcenda r
That Truth * was hid from them,
as it were in an Unfathomable
Depth : That f they were much
in the Dark, and very dull and
ftupid, not only as to the pro-
founder Things of Wifdom, but
as to fuch Things alfo, which
feemed very capable of being in
.great Part difcovered : Nay, That
even J thofe Things, which in
themfelves were of all others the
moft Manifeft, (that is, which,
'whenever Made knotvn, would
appear moft obvious and evident)
their natural Underftanding -wis
of itfelf as unqualified to find out and apprehend,
as the Eyes of Bats to behold the Light of the
Sun : That the very firft and moft neceffary Thing
of all, || the Nature and Attri
butes of God himfelf, were, not
withftanding all the general Helps
of Reafon, very difficult to them
to find out in particular, and
ftill more difficult to explain ;
it being much f more eafy to
fay what God was not,- than what
he was : And finally, that the
Method of ihftructing Men ef
fectually, and making them truly
Wife and Good, was a Thing §
very obfeure and dark, and diffi
cult to be found out. In a
Word ; Socrates himfelf , always
openly profeffed, that he pre
tended to be wifer than other Men, only in this
one Thing, that he was duly fenfible of his own
T 3 Ignorance^

|| Tm> jam ut insoinrrjv xdi •ma-
Tiga. Taos Ta nnounoq, tvpsTv ts
Bpyov, xaci evpovla heyiiv e(£ TOojVtag 5
diuvdlov. Plato in Timao.
Profefto eos ipfos, qui fe
aliquid certi habere arbitran-
tur, addubitare coget doftif-
fimorumjiominum de maxima.
re tanta difienfio. Cic. de Na
tura Deor. lib. I.
f\ Utinam tam facile vera
invenire poffem, quam\ falfa
convincere. Id. Ibid.
$ Ecra eu|«'^e»®' pre lj»o».
¦ K«i (Aoi 8va{3dl6s yi t\%
tott©* QaUelxt xou e-zD-tc-jti®-"
if ii/ i}v axoleiuoq xa.) oWdiE^fu'vJj*
1®.. Plato de Republ. lib. 4.

14© ' The '-.Evidence of Nat ural
'SeePlato Ignorance, and * believed, that it was merely For
^ta^So ra' c ver^' Rsafon, that the Oracle pronounced him
, More particularly ; The Manner in which God
tarf"\ ipighjC- be acceptably worfhipped, thefe Men were in7
W> ?% tirely' and unavoidably ignorant of. That God
ignorant in ought to be worfhipped is, in the general, as evident
'whatman- and plain from the Light, of Nature, as any Thing
,*T ^ can be - Btit in what particular Manner, and with
Zcfeptabk w^at K*n^ °f Service he will be worfhipped, canr
'nvorjhip- not be certainly difcovered by bare Reafon. Ober
£4. ' dience to the Obligations of Nature, and Imitation
of the Moral Attributes of God, the wifeft Philo,-
fophers .eafily knew, was undoubtedly the moft ac7.
ceptable Service to God. But fome external AdoT
ration feemed alfo to be neceffary ; and., how this
was to be performed, they could not with any Cer
tainty difcover. Accordingly, even the very beft
of therri complied therefore generally with the outr
ward'Religfon of their Country, and advifed Others
to dp the fame ; and fo? notwithftanding all their i
wife Difcpurfes, they fell lamentably into the Prac
tice of the moft foolifh Idolatry. LaCtantiifs ob:
ferves, that Socrates himfelf, fat
t e"*™. o W Ti^vTium the Cop.clufion of one of the bra-
Ifihfiflo. *&-K.$rw\Z'Ad- veft Difoourfes that ever was
SL2?T^ «^rj6T made by any Philofopher, "fuper-
c-ijjf." "Plato in Ph^done. ftitioufly ordered a Sacrifice to
'"Illud vero nonne fummse ' be offered for him to Aificula-
yanitstis; quod ante nlortem ff.us_ But herein LaCiantius was
jamihares fuos rogavu, ut t . . ¦ , ¦ • ¦ .
'jEfulapio gallum, \wm vd- certainly miftaken : For Socratej
yei-at,' pro fe facrarent. Lac- undoubtedly fpake this in Mock-
#*':/'/•': 3: ery of Alficulapius \ looking ¦ upon'
Death as his trueft Deliverance^.
PhtQ, after having delivered very noble and air
moft Divine Truths concerning the Nature and
Attributes pf the Supreme "God,
J n?«V.„ ft.,, <pa^. Tfft«? f weakly advifes Men to worfhip
T"? 1J7 "hvp-v'^i ii xai T»; T .  fl,

moiq ct» tic; Scot's **§Tt« kcu Ssvleg'a.
xoct agtrs^tx v£{A,uvt ogQttlale* fa
Tyg Iva-EQeiocq trxoTre Tvy%acv<n.—
Met* ^&ac $1 raV^je, X.9.I ro*«
ai, 

o-y" tiptygan, 6f>yid,*oi

. $nd Revealed Religion. 14^
likewife' Inferior Gods, Daemons, *¦•?» t»ai» "%*vt#; $«*, to»v ^9o-
and Spirits ; and dared not to con
demn the W^prfhipping even of
Statues alfo and Images, dedicated
according to the Laws of their
Country ; as if the * Honour they
paid to lifelefs Idols could pro
cure the Favour and Good-will
of Superior Intelligences. And
fo -j- he* corrupted and fpoiled the
beft Philofophy in the World, by
adding Idolatry to' that Worfhip,
which he had wifely and bravely
before proved to be due to the
Creator of all Things. After
him, Cicero, the greateft and beft
Philofopher that Rome, or per
haps any other Nation, -ever pro
duced, allowed £ Men to continue
the Idolatry of their Anceftors ;
advifed them || to conform them
felves to the fuperftitious Reli
gion of their Country, in offering
foch. Sacrifices to different Gods,
as were by .Law eftablifhed •,
and § difapproves and finds Fault
with the Perfian Magi, for burn
ing the Temples of the Grecian ,
Gods, and aliening, that the
whole Univerfe was God'sTemple.
In all which, he fondly contra
dicts himfelf, by % inexcufably
complying with the Practices of
thofe Men, whom in many of his ¦ .gerent pietatem in,Deos, eaf-
dem illos, quas nos, urbes incclere voluerunt. Id. ibid.
§ Video te, Ciceje, terr,ena-& manufadlavenerari. Vana effe intelli-
gis, & tamen eadem facis, qua; faciunt ipfi, quos ipfe ftultiffimos confi-
teris.  Si libenter errant etiam ii, qui errare fe fentiunt, qiianto magis
v»lgus indo&um ? Lailant. lib. z.
T 4 Writings

EttuxoTmSiT y avro~<;
iSfV(MXTtt 'Ilia. TrweQUm StSv xa-
T« noftov opyiafoftEnen. Plata de
Legib. lib. 4.
* Taj ph yap ran Sew* leut-
TetO-CCtpwS, TlfjLUfAEV1 T«V St E(«o-
veif a.ya.'kp.a.'roL tSfvcrci.j/.ii6i, ss
tlfih OLyoiXhao-i, -xouttip, a\]/iip£a£
ovTaj, cxtim; iysftzSa. T8f ijw-
4,"^«f Sebj vroXhyv Sid TasuT*
evvoiuv xa,) xdpt e%£i». Plaid
de Legib. lib. 1 1.
"f" To. Tlftdruti tsx dic&dvtd^
ft£» ilpnptva., ov fujii xa.) St&elld
Tot tytKoeotpot 'di-luf xdt. avra
uva.rqoLty'wa.i :v to 7tqo$ tov iroi-
rnw ruv &7\wv lvo-s@zlat sju e^p^is
fA.il VqSsVEIV, f/,y}d£ [AldyEH/ Tr, £i-
SutoKxT^ia.. Orig. ad-xierf.
Celf. lib. 6. :
% A Patribus acceptos De-
os placet coli. Cic. de Legib.
lib. 2.
|| Item illud ex infHtutis
Pontificum & Arufpicum non
mutandum eft, quibus hoftiis
immolandum cuiq; Deo. Id.
ibid. f Nec fequor Magos Per-
farunv, quibus auftoribus
Xerxes, inflammafle templa
Grascis dicitur, quod parie-
tibus includerent deos, quo
rum hie mundus omnis tem
pi um effet ,& domus. Melius
Grseci atq; noftri, qui, ut au-

142 Tfc E v i de nceo/ Natural
Writings he largely and excellently proves to be
extremely Foofifo upon account of thofe very Prac-
. tices. And to metition no more, (for indeed thofe
of a lower Rank, the Minuter Philofophers, as
T'ully calls them, are not worth the mentioning)
That admirable Moralift Epictetus, who, for a true
Senfe of Virtue* feems to have had no Superior in
the Heathen World; even He
v n , alfo * advifes' Men to offer LiT
.-. * *™t" n *?' Tl\ *** bations and Sacrifices to the Gods,
tticdevitrSeu *«t* to; w#Tgi» '
iidrrwtotiKu. Epiciet. cap. every one according to tne Re,
38.' ligion and.Cuftom of his Coun«
try.
And in But fiill more particularly : That ^vhich, of all
'"bftJod' °Aer ^ nin§s> thefe beft and wifeft of the •Pnil°"
^ould'be fopl-ets were moft abfolutely and unavoidably igno?
reconciled rant of ; and yet which, of all other Things, was of
to return- the greateft Importance for Sinful Men to know,
ingSmners. wa^ cj-fo jy[ethod by which fiuch, as have erred firom
the right Way, and have offended God, may yet again
reftore, themfielves to the Favour of God, and to the
Hopes ofi Happinefis. From the Confideration of the
Goodnefs and Mercifulnefs of God, the Philofo
phers did indeed very reafionably hope, that God would
fhew himfelf placable to Sinners, and might b§
fome Way reconciled : But when we come to inquire
more particularly, what Propitiation he will accept,
and in what Manner this Reconciliation muft be
made : Here Nature flops, and expects with Impa
tience the Aid of fome particular Revelation. That
God will receive returning Sinners, and accept of
Repentance inftead of perfect Obedience, They can
not certainly know, to whom he has not declared
that he will do fo. For, though this be the moft pro
bable and only Means of Reconciliation that Nature
fuggefts ; yet, whether this will be alone fufficient,
or whether God will not require fomething further,
for the Vindication of his Juftice, and of the Ho-r
nour

and Revealed Religion. J43
nour and Dignity of his Laws and Government, and
for the expreffing. more effectually his Indignation
againft Sin, before he will reftore Men to the Privi
leges they have forfeited, they cannot be fatisfacto-
rily aflufed. For it cannot pofitively be proved
from any of God's Attributes, that he is abfiolutely
obliged to pardon all Creatures all their Sins at all
'Times, barely and immediately upon their Repent
ing. There arifes therefore from Nature no Suffi
cient Comfort to Sinners, but anxious and endlefs
Sollicitude about the Means of appealing the Deity,
Hence thofe divers Ways of Sacrificing, and num
berlefs Superftitions, which over-foread the Face of
the Heathen World, but were fo little fatisfactory
to the wifer Part of Mankind, even in thofe Time3
of Darknefs, that the more confidering Philofo
phers could not forbear frequently declaring, that * * See
they thought thofe Rights could availlittle or no- Pfi^s Al
thing towards appeafing the Wrath of a provoked *£, *sz»
God, or making their Prayers acceptable in his 0UtT£ '
Sight •, but that fomething ftill feemed to them to
be wanting, though they knew not what. ^ntl otl,er
3. Some other Doctrines abfolutely neceffary aL-Ja""
Jikewife to the bringing about this great End of neceffary in
the Reformation of Mankind ; though* there was* <"¦*'"" '<"¦/>-
indeed fo much Proof and Evidence of the Truth ff™fM?!*f
of them to be drawn from Reafon, as that the beft beftphilo-
Philofophers could not by any Means be intirely fophers
ignorant of them ; yet fo much Doubtfiulnefis, Uncer- ™ere """J
tainty, and Unfteddinejs, was there in the. Thoughts a^if„"er.
and Affertions of thefe Philofophers concerning tain about.
them, as could not but + very
much diminifh their proper Effect
and Influence upon the Hearts and + PrJBter", ™hiJ. *Pru<? eos
T. rn/r T-n. • 1 certl e"» nin" quod a fcientia
Lives of Men. I inftance in the veniat.  & nemo paret,
Immortality of the Soul, the Cer- quia nemo vult ad incertum
tainty of a Future State, and the laborare. LaBant. lib. 3.
Rewards and Punifihments to be - diftribuled

7&? Evidence of Natural
diftributed in a Life to come. The Arguments-,
which may be drawn from Reafon, and from the
Nature of Things, for. the Proof of thefe great
Truths, feem really (as I have before fhewn) to
come very little fhort of ftrict Demonftration : And
accordingly the wifeft Philofophers ( as has like-
wife been fhewn before) did indeed fometimes feem
to have reafoned themfelves into a firm Belief of
them, and to have been fully convinced of their.
Certainty and Reality, even fo far as to apply them
to excellent Purpofes and Ufes of Life. But then,
on the other Hand, a Man cannot without fome
Pity and Concern of Mind obferve, how ftrangely
at other Times the Weight of the fame Arguments
feems to have flipped (as it were) out of their Minds,
and with what wonderful Diffidence, Wavering, and
Unfteddinefts, they Difcourfe about the fame Things.
I do not here think it of any very great Moment,
that there were indeed fome whole Sects of Philofo
phers, who abfolutely denied the Immortality of the
Soul, and peremptorily rejected all Kind of Expecta
tion of a Life to come ; (though, to be fure, this
could not but in fome Meafure fhock the common
People, and make them entertain fome Sufpiciort
about the Strength of the Arguments ufed on the
other Side of the Queftion by wifer Men •, yet, I fay)
it cannot be thought of any very great Moment,
that fome whole Sects of Philofophers did indeed
abfolutely deny the Immortality of the Soul ; becaufe
thefe Men were weak Reafoners in other Matters
alfo, and plainly low and contemptible Philofo
phers, in Comparifon of thofe greater Genius's we are
now fpeaking of. But that which I now obferve,
and which I'fay cannot be obferved without fome
Pity and Concern of Mind, is this, that even thofe
Great Philofophers themfelves, the very, Beft and
Wifeft, and moft Confiderate of them that ever
Jived, notwithftanding the undeniable Strength of
, the

HS

* 'Efto* ftlv dirdSavVfttm,
v[mv fiiuo-otLhtts' oiroTepoi SI -ii-
/*?' '^ffC'Tai *m ff"1"0" ?r?PYpt^t
aSthot ica.n) isfdit r, tu Sea.
Plato in Apolog. Socr.
f Quod prater Deos ne-
gat fcire quen,quam, fcit ipfe,
utrum melius fit ; nam dixit
ante. Sed fnum illud, nihil
ut ajprmet, tenet ad extre-
mum.. , Cic. Tujc. Quiejl. lib. l.

and Revealed Religion.
the Arguments which fometimes convinced them
,of the Certainty of a Future State, did yet at other
Times exprefs themfelves with fo much Hefitancy
and Unfteddinefs concerning it, as, without Doubt,
could not but extremely hinder the proper Effect
and Influence which that moft important Con
fideration ought to have upon the Hearts and
Lives of Men. I am now, faid *
Socrates, a little before his Death,
about to leave this World; and ye
are ftill to continue in it. ; which of
US havp the better Paft allotted
us, God only knows: -f Seeming
to exprefs' fome Doubtfulnefs,
whether he fhould have any Ex-
jftence after Death, or not. And
again? at the End of his moft
admirable Difcourfe concerning
the Immortality of the Soul, I
would have you to know, faid J he
to. his Friends who came to pay
him their laft Vifit, that I have
great Hopes I am now going into
the Company of Good Men ; yet I
would not be' too peremptory and
confident concerning it. But || if
Death be only as ' it were a Tran
smigration firom hence into another
Place ; and thofie Things, which are
told us, be indeed true, that thofie
who are dead to Us, do all Live
there : Then, &cf So likewife Cir
cero, fpeaking of the fame Sub
ject : / will endeavour, faith § he,
to explain what youdefiire; yet I ^on habe0# Cic. fufc. %u*ft.
would not have you depend upon jib, i.
what I fihall Jay, as certain and
jnfallible ; but I may guefis, as other-
Men

-£ Nvv at ev ire 0T1 ita.£ a.9-
S^at te ijwri'fu osCM^EcrSai aya-
3a?, xa.) tmto ft.iv dx, at tram
6iio-)(j\iPiaa\\/.rli. Plato in Phau.
|| Ei J a.v oiot #VoJ?)f«jcr«s
Irit o §dtdl&> IvBstOB e»s aA-
¦\o» roirot, xa) a*\»)9>) Ef i rd Si-
yopita,, as dpa. ixtl i\ffi tudv-
te? oi teShewte;, &c. Plato in
Apolog. Sqcrat.
§ Ea, que vis, ut potero,
explicabo ; nee tamen quafi
Pythius Apollo, certa ut fint
& fixa qua; dixero; fed ut
homunculus unus e multis,
probabilia conjedtura fequens.
Ultra enim quo progrediar,
quam ut verifimilia videam,

146 ' The Evidence^/* Natural
Men do, at what fhall feem moft probable : And fur
ther than this I cannot pretend to go. Again:
Which, of thofe two Opinions, 'faith
* Harum fententiarum qua? * he, [that the Soul is mortal,
T^'iiS^ °r th« it is immortal] be True,
nt ; qua? vermmillima, magna - , . . J . f
Qusftio eft. Id. Ibid. God only knows ; which of tbem ts
moft Probable, is a very Great Que
ftion. And again, in the fame Difcourfe, having
brought all thofe excellent Arguments before-men
tioned in Proof of the Immortality of the Soul :
Tet we 'ought not, faith "f he, to
f Etfi nihil nimis oportet be over -confident of it ; for it ofiten
Fonndere. Movemur enim happens that we are ftrongly affeCi-
fa:pe ahquo acute conclufo : i + r a ¦*? * f ¦
fabamus mutamufque fenten- ed at firft with an acute Argument,
tiam clarioribus etiarrf; in!re- and yet, a little while ajter, ftagger
bus ; in his eft enim' aliqua in our Judgment, and alter our Opi-
pbfeuritas. Id. Ibid. ^ nio^ evenin clearer Matters than
thefe ; for thefe Things muft be con-
fefifed to have fiome Obficurity in them. And again:
I know not how, faith % he, when I read the Argu
ments in Proof of the Soul's Im-
t Nefcio quomodo dum mortality, methinks, I am fully con-
lego, affent.or; cum pofui ¦ j d after I have laid
hbrum, & mecum ipfe de 1m- rj 1 n i.' j r- l
mortalitate animorum ccepi afide the Book, and' come to think
'cogitare, affenfio omnis ilia and confider of the Matter alone by
elabitur. U. Ibid. my fielfi, prefiently I find my fielfi fallen
again infienfiibly into my old Doubts.
From all which it appears, that, notwithftanding all
the bright Arguments and acute Conclufions, and
brave Sayings of the beft Philofophers, yet Life
and Immortality were || not fully
1. r> j t. r -^ • ¦ and fatisfactorily brought to Light
Credebam facile opinio- , , 1 t> r -i a ?
nibus magriomm virorum, by bare natural Reafon • but Men
rem gratiffimam [anima- im-
mortalitateni] promittentium magis quam probantium. Senec. Epift. 103,
Adeo omnis ilia tunc fapientia Socratis, de induftria venerat con-
fultse aequanimitatis, non de fiducia compertse, veritatis. TertuUian. d«
Anima. m

and Revealed Religion. 347
ftill plainly flood in Need of fome farther and
more complete Difcovery.
_ 4. Thofe Thirigs which the Philofophers were And thofe
indeed the moft fully certain of, and did in good Things
Meafure underftand -, fuch as the Obligations of 'Fir- Z^t?
tue, and the Will of God in Matters ofi Morality ; yet deed cer-
ttiey were never able to prove and explain clearly and tain of, yet
diftinClly enough, to Perfons of all Capacities, in or- they ™ere
der to their complete Conviction and Reformation. np°^e eJ*d
Firft, becaufe moft of their Difcourfes upon thefe explain
Subjects have been rather fpeculative and learned, clearly and
nice and fubtle Difputes, than practical and uni-.^/?'"f^
verfally ufeful Inftructions. They proved, by ftrict "
and nice Argumentation, that the Practice of Virtue"
is ivifie and reafibnable, and fit to be chofien ; rather
than that 'tis of plain, neceffary, and indifipenfiable Obli~
gation ; and were able to deduce the Will of Gody
drily by fuch abftract and fubtle Reafonings, as the
Generality of Men had by no Means either Abili
ties or Opportunities to underftand or be duly
affected by. Their very Profeffion, and Manner
Of Life, led them to make their Philofophy ra
ther * an Entertainment of leifure
Time, a Trial of Wit and Parts, * Profefto omnis iftorum
an Exercife of Eloquence, and of difputatio, quanquam uberri-
the Art and Skill of good Speak- ?os fonJes vi"utis & f<*en- .
, „ , & r tias contmeat, tamen collata '
ing, than an Endeavour to re- cum horum [qui rempubli-
form 'the Manners of Men, by cam gubernant] aftis perfec-
'fhewins them their plain and ne- tif1ue re.b,us> vereor ne non
m r. .. a j j- 1 tantum videatur attuliffe ne-
ceffary Duty And accordmgly gotiis homjftum ^^
the Study Of It was, as Cicero -f quantum ObleBationem quan-
himfelfobferves, unavoidably con- dam Ota. Cic. de Repub.
fined to a Few, and by no Means !"£:„. . . '
f. , r 1 n 11 j T Lit, inquit Cicero, philo-.
fitted for the Bulk and common r?phia pauc]s content/judi:
cibus, multitudinem confulto
ipfa fugiens.. — —Maximum itaque argumentum eft, philofophiam neque
-ad fapientiam tendere, neque ipfam effe fapientiam ; quod myfterium
ejus, barba tantum celebratur & pallio. Lattant. lib. 3. Sort

uhe Evidence of Natural
Sort of Mankind i who, as -they cannot judge or
the true Strength of nice and abftract Arguments,'
fo they will always be fufpicipus of fome Fallacy hi.
them: None *' but Men. of Parts'
and Learning, of Study and libe
ral Education, have been able to',
profit by the fublime Doctrine of
Plato, or by the fubrj'e Difouv
tations of other Philofophers •}
whereas the Doctrine of Morality,'
which is the Rule of Life and
Manners, ought to be plain, eafy
and familiar, and foited fully to'
the Capacities of all Men. ..Se
condly, Another Reafon why the'
¦Philofophers were never able t#
prove and explain, clearly and di-
fiinCtly enough, even thofe Things'
of which they were the moft Certain,
toPerfonsof all Capacities, in order
to complete their Conviction and
Reformation, was becaufe they never were able to
frame to themfelves any complete, regular, and
confiftent Syftem or Scheme of Things ; but the
Truths which they taught, were
¦f- fingle and fcattered, accidental as;
it were, and hit upon by Chance,-
rather than by any Knowledge of
the whole true State of Things/
and confequently lefs - Univerfally
eonvictive. Nothing could be
more Certain, (as they all Well
.knew) than that Virtue was un-
queftionably to be chofen^ and xbe
Practice of it to be recommend
ed neeeffarily above all Things;;-
and yet they could never clearly and fiatisfiaCtoriiy
1 make out, upon what Principles originally, and for

* 'Cfriyat /xctr Urno-ui i irtp-\
*a?Jv/j{ xa) iirtreTvi'tvp.itii H*m-
tut®' Ae|i! irhelotaq as il Tuif
tvTehtregot «(*« xa) ir^ayfian-
xus xat troxao-fAEtats rat vfo7\Kvr
SiSa^dtrui xa) yga-^dtrvf in
^yiv Hut, roi (lit Ti-Kavma ii
Jtfefii rot Soxnirut citat ^lAoAo-
•fut pmut. Orig. adverf. Celfi.
lib. .6.
'¦Ay^oixoTe^ey tiiriit I Ino-ov(,
T« S&oifo rot' XfrStd ire >.a-
{Siiiv, dtpis ttdt to XpAnot, @i&-
^E?iEs-Ef ov xtx'ituxt To» Titfyo? xat
vrupi'rnett Sraq tivdt, i an; it
la YLpiTun rXhMTUt, a fwJ' <**a-
Ei» VSiurat Sbtanai, aKMi. ftoyij
ei rot lyxtlxhia irphf tjis o-ejahis
*EM.Y,tw (pi'Aoo-otpius ptpo&nKa-
«j. Id. lib. 7. .

f 'Otix ot( dMrpta SV'i tos
tDucTmos lildypara tov Xji-
rov- ate! ori ax eW irdnri 0-
ftoia, uaitiQ &$i rd rut «Wiw.—
fxar©" y«f r)i, *wo p.tgu; rtt
trite pf*«Tixoe $Eia 7v>yx to ai>\-
yettS igat, xu\u<; ip§iy%aT6.
Oi Si r'aiatr'ta airoTq it xvgiv-
¦ lifoiq memorise oiti. licim/tilt
-rr,t diroirlot xai ytuffit rv)t dts-
- teyTot QaitotTat \o-jfrxiiai. fiu-
Jlin. Apolog. 1 .

H9

* Nee, quid defendere de-
beant, fcientes ; nee quid re-
futare. Incurfantque paffim
fine deleclu omnia quae afie-
runt, quicunque difientiunt.
Laclant. lib. 7.

and Revealed Re ligion*
'what End ultimately, this Choice was to be made,
and upon what Grounds it was univerfally to be.
fupported. Hence they perpetu?
ally * disagreed, oppofed, and con
tradicted one another in all their
Difputations to fuch a Degree,
that St. Auftin, fomewhere out of
Varro, reckons up no lefs than
280 Opinions concerning that one
Queftion, What was the Chief Good or Final Hap
pinefs of Man. The Effect of all which Differences
could not, without doubt, but be a mighty Hin
drance to that Conviction, and general Infiuencei
which That greatTruth,in the Certainty whereof they
All clearly agreed, (namely, that the Practice of Vir
tue-was neceffary and indifpenfable) ought to have had
upon the Minds and Lives of Men. This whole
Matter is excellently fet forth by LaCtantius : The
Philofophers, faith f he, take them
All together, did indeed difcover all
the particular DoCtrines of true Re
ligion ; but, becaufe each one endea
voured to confute what the others
afferted, and no One's fingle Scheme
was in all its Parts confiftent and
agreeable to Reafion and Truth, and
none ofi them were able to collect into
One whole and intirC Scheme the
feveral Truths difiperfied among them All, therefiore they
'were not able to maintain and defend what they had
•difcovered. And again, having fet down a brief
'Summary of the whole Doctrine and Defign of
true Religion, from the Original to the Confom-

f Totam igitur veritatem,
& omne divinas religionis ar
canum Philofophi attigerunt.
Sed aliis refellentibus, defer*-,
dere id, quod invenerant, ne-
quiverunt ; quia fingulis ratio
non quadravi.tr; nee ea, quae
vera fenferant, in fummam
redigere potuerunt. Laclant:

mation of all Things : This In-
tire Scheme, fays J he, becaufie the
Philofophers were ignorant of, there
fore they were not able to compre-

t Quam fummam, quia
Philofophi" non cOmprehen-
derunt ; nee veritatem com
prehended potuerunt; quaint

bend.

¦fj>6 $%e £ v i D e n C e bf Natur4
vis ea fere, cjuibus fumma hend the Truth ; notwithftanding
^kaver?' *&?? f "*" %that th^ faW mA ^covered, fln&h
drilla omnia prot'ule- almoA al1 the Particulars ofi which
runt, non anne&entes nee the whole Scheme confifts* But this
caufas rerum, ^ec.confequen* was done by different Men, and
tias, nee ratioi.es ; ut W at different Times, and in different
mam illam, qua? contmet uni- ^r M , . , . «,.¦"
verfaj & compingerent&com- Manners ; (with various Mixtures
plerent. Laclant. lib. 7. _ of different Errors, in what, every
Quod fi extitifTet aliquis one difcovered of Truth finely)
ffgSpW^diK «nd without finding the Connexion
fam, colligeret in unum, ac tf the Caufes, and Confequences and
redigeret in corpus ;' is pro- Reafons of Things ; from the mu-
fefto non diffentiret, a nobis, tual Dependencies of which,, the
Sed hoc nemo facere, mil .-, , * r 'j -n s a- r ,7 *
veri peritus ac fciens, poteft Completenefis and -Perfection of the
t Verum autem non nifi ejus whole Scheme arifies. Whereas, had
fcire eft, qui fit doftus a Deo. there been any Man, who could have
idem, ibid. collected and put together in Order
all the feveral Truths, which were
taught fiingly and ficatteredly by Philofipphers of all the
different Seels, and have made up out of them One
Intire confiftent Scheme ; truly he would not have
a j.i r differed much from Us Chriftians : But This it was
And thole ern r ** 1 • j 7 ¦ *
Things noi poffible for any Man to do, without having the
•which they True Syftem of Things firft Revealed to him.
•were able ^ Laftly, Even thofe Things, which, the Phl-
and'ex- fofophers were not only Themfelves certain of, but
plain clear- which they have alfo been able to prove and ex*
ly and di- plain to Others, with fufficient Clearnefis and Plain*
fi™ab nefis ; fuch as are the moft obvious and neceffary
'thefhld Duties of Life; they have not yet had Authority
notjuffid- enough to inforce and inculcate upon Mens Minds
tnt Autbtr- with fo ftrong an Impreffion, as to Influence and
TfoVe"in~ g°vern tne. general Practice of the World. The
Practice. Truths which they proved by fpeculative Reafon,
, , * wanted' ftill fome more fenfible
quamvif S^TuK Authority to back them, and
vconferant, tamen parum ha- x make them of moie Force and
Efficacy

and Revealed Re li
Efficacy in Practice-, And the
* Precepts which they laid down,
however evidently reafonifole and
fit to be obeyed, feemed ftill to
want Weight, and to be but the
Precepts ot Men. Hence -f- none
of the Philofophers, even of thofe
who taught the clearer, and cer
taineft Truths, and offered the
beft and wifeft lnftruclions, and
inforced them with the ftrongeft
Motives that could hi, were yet
ever able to work any remark
able Change in the Minds and
Lives of any confiderable Part
of Mankind, as the Preaching
of Chrift and his Apoftles' unde
niably did. Nor does it appear
/in Hiftory that J any A 'ufnber of
Socrates's or Plato's Followers were
convinced of the Excellency of
true Virtue, or the Certainty of
its final Rewardj in fuch a Man
ner as to be willing to lay down
their Lives for its Sake, as In-
. numerable of the Difciples of
Chrift are known to have done.
In Speculation indeed it may per
haps feem poffible, that, notwith
ftanding it muft be confeffed Phi
lofophy cannot difcover any com
plete and fatisfactory Remedy for
paft Mifcarriages', yet the Piecepts
and Motives offered by the belt
Philofophers might at leaft be
foffieient to amend and reform
Mens Manners for the future.
V Bur

gion. I j; r
bent Firmitatls ad probandatn
et impleudam veritatem. Lac
tam '. lib. 7.
* Quid ergo ? nihilne illi
[Philofophi] fimile pra:cipi-
unt ? Inio permulta, et ad
verum frequenter accedunt.
Sed nihil ponderis habent'illa
pnecepta, quia funt humana ;
et aniloritate majori, id eft,
divina ilia, carent. Nemo
igitur credit ; quia tam fe ho
minem putat efle qui audit,
quam eft ille qui praecipit.
Laftant. lib. 3.
*f Ei7ro(|U,» d at dXwBiVEtt Ttf 1
avtri&itTas Sia^Eivai tb$ dxpoa.- x
Taj rut "KiyopAtm aru (3iovt1at;,
uq TisTwt stoi; \%itTut. Atari-
SexIcji 'luSaToi xa) veinanoi ire pi
TH «7T KDTO» Xaf.Hfl.EtB fAEAAofl©-
alas®.. — Aeiksu'tu at xa) Ki\-
0-&< Yi 0 hti?>'J(Aet&., TitEq O^ETE-
Vfi&at 'tsipi odw'ibit xobao-eut, ,
M1S0 Tut TlhiTblt xtxi [Aurayai'ftijt.
Ori gen. adverj. CelJ. lib. 8.
Ila^a fjLlt Toiq'S.'hhrHJit eij ti(
Qaidut, xa) ax oida Ei Sevted^..
Hat Bit Ut.XEjji.ut, fAETafiahovlEi
duo dcruTtj xat ^.oy^ri^olam &i&
ztpiXouoipwo-at- wapa oe tu> \vioS,
b [AOtot tote gi 0ft7d£*a. aAV aU)
xa) ircTeha-ahao-'itis oi'ritE's yEto-
fj.noi autypoiut %QPot;. Idem. lib.'Jy.
Da mihi virum qui fit ira-
cundus, &c\ ' Numquis haec
Philojopborum, &c. ' Laft ant.
lib. 3. See this Paffage cited
abo-ue, page 13;.
\ JetuKcaTEi [AEt yap yd"t;£
E7nrs'jSl VKEg ThTS Ta Siypdl&.
a'&'j§rf,oKE:t Xcifhi oe tw xal
0.170 TwKgdrtst; airo p.icx<; yvw.8it]i
& (pi7\jo-]$a til (piXoAoyot [iwtot
Eiri-.oSrtaat aAA», xa) <7iut]E?.wf
IdiVTui xai ob^Yi^ xa) $q(2m xal
Suiara Eala^onVotWej. fujtin.
AODIO". i .

i. 52 The Evidence of Natural
But in Experience and Practice it hath o,n the corf-
trary appeared to be' altogether impoffible for
Philofophy and bare Reafon to reform Mankind
effectually, without the Afiiftance of fome higher
, Principle. For, though the bare natural Poffi-
>• bility of the Thing cannot indeed eafily be denied,
yet, in this Cafe, (as Cicero excel- -
* Nam fi, confenfu omni- fently expreffes * it) in like Man-
um Philofophorum, fapienti- ngr as ^ pbyfic, fa matters nothing
SaSS™^^ ^ethjr a Difeafe be fiuch as that
bus vos optime confultum no Man does, or no Man can re-
a Diis immortalibus dicitis. cover from it ; fio neither does it
Nam ut nihil intereft utrum fmkg « Differences whelher by
nemo valeal, an nemo pojjit <va- „,.,,,¦' •" . j •/
lere; fic non intelligo quid Philofiophy no Man is, or no Man
interfit,-utrum nemo fit fapiens, can be made wife and good. So
an nemo effe poffit. Cic de that, without fome greater Help
Natura Deor. lib. 3. and Amftance5 Mankind is plainly
left in a very bad State. Indeed,* in the original
uncorrupted State of Human Nature, before the
Mind of Man was depraved with prejudicate
Opinions, corrupt Affections, and vicious Inclina
tions, Cuftoms, and Habits, right Reafon may
juftly be fuppofed to have been a fufficient Guide*
and a Principle powerful enough to preferve Meh
in the conftant Practice of their Duty. But, in
the prefent Circumftances and Condition of Man
kind, the wifeft and moft fenfible of the Philo
fophers themfelves have not been backward to
complain that they found the Underftandings of
Men fo dart and cloudy, their Wills fo biaffed and
inclined to Evil, their Paffions fo outrageous and
rebelling againft Reafion, that they looked upon the
Rules and Laws of right Reafon as very hardly
practicable, and which they had very little Hopes
of ever being able to perfuade the World to fob- -
mit to. In a Word, they confeffed that Human
Nature was ftrangely corrupted ; and they acknow ledged

and Revealed Religion* .153
ledged this Corruption to be a Difeafe whereof they
knew not the true Caufie, and could not find out a
fufficient Remedy. So that the great Duties of
Religion were laid down by them as Matters of
Speculation and Difipute, rather than as the Rules of
Action ; and not fo much urged upon the Hearts and
Lives of Men-, as propofied to the Admiration of thofe
who thought them hardly poffible to be effectually
-.practifed by the Generality of Men. To remedy
all .thefe Diforders,, and conquer all thefe Corrup
tions, there was plainly wanting fome extraordinary
and fupernatural AJftftance ; which, was above the
Reach of bare Reafon and Philofophy to procure,
.and yet without which the Philo
fophers themfelves were fenfible * Nem° unquam vir mag-
there* could never be any truly ™scJn<i' Di™° J$atu iwU
Great Men.
VII. per thefie Reafions there was plainly wanting
a Divine Revelation to recover Mankind out ofi their
univerfially degenerate State, into a State fiuitable to the
original Excellency ofi their Nature. Which Divine
Revelation both the Neceffities of Men, and their na
tural Notions of God, gave them reafionable Ground to
expeCt arid hope fior : As appears firom the Acknowledg
ments \which the beft and wifeft of the Heathen Philo -
lofiophers themfelves have made of their Senfe of the
fiecejfity and Want ofi fuch a Revelation ; and from
their Expreffions ofi the Hopes they had entertained
that God would fiome Time or other vouchfiafie it Unto
them. '
1. There was plainly wanting a Divine Revelation A Divine
to recover Mankind out of their univerfal Corrup-,-^'^",8*
tion and Degeneracy ; And, without fuch a Reve- aJ°ejfffff'
lation, it was riot poffible that the World Should for'tie Re-
ever be effectually reformed. For If (as has been cover j of
¦before particularly fhewn) the grofs and ftupid I[i("'k!>"^-
U 2 Ignorance,'

The E vi d e N' c e of Natural
Ignorance, the innumerable Prejudices and vain
Opinions, the ftrong Paffions and Appetites of
Senfe, and the many vicious Cuftoms and Habits,
Which the Generality of Mankind continually la
bour under, make it undeniably too difficult a
Work for Men of all Capacities to difcover, every
One for himfelf, by .the bare Light of Nature, all
the particular' Branches of their Duty-, but moft
Men, in the prefent State of Things, have mani
feftly Need pf* much Teaching and particular In-
ftruction : If thofe who were beft able to difcover
the Truth and inftruct others therein, namely, the
Wtfeft and Beft of the Philofophers, were Them
felves unavoidably altogether ignorant of fome
Doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of
others,, abfolutely neceffary to- the bringing about
that great End, the Reformation of- Mankind:
If thofe Truths, which they were themfelves very
certain of, they were not yet able to prove and
explain clearly enough to vulgar Underftandings : .
If even thofe Things, which they proved fuf
ficiently, and explained with all Clearnefs, they
had not yet Authority enough to inforce and in
culcate upon Mens Minds with fo ftrong an Im
preffion as to influence and govern the general
Practice of the World -, nor pretended to afford
Men any fupernatural Affiftance which yet was
very neceffary to fo great a Work : And Ifi, after
all, in the Difcovery of fuch Matters as are the
great Motives of Religion, Men are apt to be
more eafily worked upon, and more ftrongly af
fected by good Tefiimony than by the ftricteft
abftract Arguments ; So that, upon the Whole, 'tis
plain the Philofophers were- never by any Means
well qualified to 'reform Mankind with any confi-
derable Succefs : Ihen there was evidently wanting
fome particular Revelation which might fupply all
thefe.Defects : There was plainly a Neceffity of fonte
particular

and Revealed R e l,i g i o n.
particular Revelation; to difcover *
in what Manner, and with what
Kind ofi external Service, God might
acceptably be worfhipped: There
was a Neceffity of fome particular
Revelation, to difcover what Ex
piation God would accept fior Sin ;
by which the Authority, Honour,
and Dignity of his Laws might
be effectually vindicated : There
was a Neceffity of fome particular
Revelation, to f give Men full
Affurance of the Truth of thofe
great Motives of Religion, the
Rewards and Punifihments ofi a
Jutwe State, which, notwithftand
ing the ftrongeft Arguments of
Reafon, Men could not yet forbear
doubting of : In fine, there was
a Neceffity. of fome particular
Divine Revelation, to J make the
whole Doctrine of Religion clear
and obvious to all Capacities, to add
Weight ,and Authority to the plain
eft Precepts, and to furnifh Men
with extraordinary sijfijlences to enable them to
overcome the Corruptions of their Nature. And,
Without, the Aififtance of. fuch a Revelation, tis
manifeft it was not poffible that the World could
ever be effectually reformed. Ye may even give over,
faith || Socrates, all Hopes of amend
ing Mens Manners for the future,
unlefs God be pleafed to fiend' you
fiome Other Perfon to inftruct you.
And Plato, Whatever, faith § he,
is fet , right and as it fioould be, in
the prefient Evil State of the World,
can be fio only . by the particular
Interpofiition of God.
U 3

* Nou.oSe't»)? qV'5 tSt xsxlrilan
hitoIe fti) To\p.ycrv) xaito\o[f,lilt ew* .
Sso<3-£j3.-iai/, ij'tij pi? o-atplf ixfi
*n, TPEtyai iso>At zavTH.———
MrydEv TOTiagairat e\ou<;, ualffEQ
tio ut ovtdlct , EiOEtai TV) •tfl'ttli},
(pVasl Tut TOidTUlt TTEpi. Plata
in Epinomide.
Tas ya£ J« Toiat/Tas £5e3»
§EtaTCeia{\ «T iitirdp.E§a ji/aek, '
o\x\Zjitrci<i T,e TroAu u$it)- aWf
WEiaofiE^a tat tSt e^ojvoev, aii
X,c^o-ofA,EBa E^rtyriTvi, aAX' y ru
vtdlptu Qeu. Plata de Re-
publ. 4.-,

SiiXvpi^Ed-Sai ravTa sr«( t-
Xgi"i woWtov afi<pit?@7iTdtTw,
©ea In. Plato de Legib.
hi. l. .

J Tyro 2sj t;i" to pe»^ (papcv
Cu&a x.vgtdJTctlciii, xa,t ovvcClov av
oiov te jK.r4A.ra tu ctgiroe, {Aa^i'v,
£. OkdUfTXOk tVI CCAA HO <XV dt-
dj;|f(£v, si fAri SiOq vpr/yotro.
Plato in Efinomide.

)[ ElT« TQV AO17T0V X1°V0V K0C~
§iV($OvlEq $ I Otis AoTrs ttV, Ei jU.5)
Tivct aT^Aov v$mv b ©ec? e'Ets'D-eu,-
i^ei,": tcrjda^v^ vy.uJv. PtatO
in Apoicg. Socnatis.
§ Eu ya^ ^C'>) eitffyrtt, 0, t;
We£ ct'y (7W-&J) te x^ ysvifiai oiov
OiT, EC TOtaVTJJ X<&lGtrCtQ~ll TTOAi-
TElkdV, Oct* [AoTpctv <X.\JTQ ciccui*
Plato de Repmbl. lib. 6.
2. Since

f$& The Evidence of Natural
That -it 2. Since therefore there was plainly and confef-%''
^^^fedly .wanting a Divine Revelation to relieve the
#^JwefNeceffities of Men in their Natural State; And'-
Nature fince no Man can prefume to fay, that tis incon-
, and right fiftent with any of the Attributes of God, or unbe-
expialr cominS the Wifdom of the Creator of all Things,.
hope for to fupply that Want ; to reveal to his Creatures
ficcbraOi- more fully the Way tp Happinefs ; to make more
wine Re- particular Difcoveries of his Will to them ; to fet
•„:.,,, ion. before them in a clearer Light the Rewards and
, r Punifhments of a future State ; to explain in what
Manner he will be, pleafed to be worfhipped ; and-
* to declare what Satisfaction he will accept for Sin, .
and upon what Conditions he will receive returning
Sinners : Nay, fince, on the contrary, it feems ¦
more fuitable to our natural Notions of the Good
nefs and Mercy of God, to fuppofe that he fhould
do alf this than not, it follows undeniably, that it -
was moft reafonable, and agreeable to the Dictates
of Nature, to expeCi or hope for fuch a Divine Re
velation. The Generality of the Heathen World,
who were far/more equal and lets prejudiced Judges
in this Matter than modern. Deifts, were fo fully- '
perfuaded that the great Rules for the Conduct of
Human Life muft receive their Authority from
Heaven, that their chief Law- givers thought it
not a fufficient Recommendation of their Laws
that they were agreeable to the Light of Nature,
unlefs they pretended alfo that they received thern
from God. But I have no Need in this Argu- •
ment to make Ufe of the Examples of Idolatrous
Law-givers. The Philofophers themfelves, the
Beft and Wifeft, and the leaft Superftitious of
them, that ever lived, were not afhamed to confefs
openly their Senfe of the Want of a Divjne Reve
lation ; and to declare their Judgment that it was -
moft natural and truly agreeable to right and found
Reafon, to hope for fomething of that Nature. Ther<S .

and Revealed R -e l j g i o n.
There is, befides the feveral Places before cited,
a moft excellent Paffage in Plato .to this Purpofe,
one of the moft remarkable Paffages indeed in his
whole Works, though not quoted by any that I
have met with ; which therefore I think highly
worthy to be tranfcribed at large, as a juft and
unanfwerable Reproach to all thofe -who deny.
that there is any Want or Need of a Revelation.
It feems beft to me, faith * Socrates
to one of his Difciples, that we
expect quietly ; nay, Jtis abfiolutely
neceffary fihat we wait with Pati
ence 'till Juch Time as we can Learn
certainly how we ought to behave
ourfelves both towards God and to
wards Men. When will that Time
come, replies the Difciple ; and
who is it that will teach us this?
For metbinks I earneftly defire to fee
and know Who the' Perfon is that
will do it. It is one, anfwers
Socrates, who has now a Concern
for you. But, in like Manner as
Homer' 'relates that Minerva took
away the Mi ft firom before >Dio-
medesV Eyes, that he ..might be
able to diftinguijh one Perfon firom
another, fio 'tis neceffary that the
Mifil which is now before your
Mind be firft taken away, that
afterwards yc-u^ may learn to dif-

l57

tinguifh

nvc-liy

between Good and

Evil; fior as yd you ere not able
to do it. Lk the Perfion you men
tioned, replies the Difciple, take
away this Mift, or whatever elfie
it be, as fioon as he pleafies : For
U A I

* XfiK. 'Eftot jam av Soke?
KpaTtfOf Etfai, v}&v)(ia,v e^ei/v.—*
txvtxyxccfov 6v gr* iregtfAEiiEW, 'lax;
olv Tiq fAat$?) coq oeX 7T%o<; ©e«\ u£
Ttfc; a,y§f>u'&&q 5*a*EJcr0a( . AAK,
rioTE ^u waplrcti o yfeov<&* tiroq,
(0 Soxgolbg; xj riq o *ira.ilm<7Q)]i ;
tioira, yd% av jxoi 5o«<w" ISeTv Ttf-
TOD TO? CCV-Jgtd'&OV T15 er*. 2fiK.
Qi)TQq EriVj » [JLEAE WSOi CTQV-,
Aaao, aox^T fAOi, ujcrizz-p tw Aio-
jbttj'rfel (pv)<A T'/iV 'A$y\V0lV "OfJfypOf
ocwo Tftjy oty§a,AjAti)v oI^earTv t*j\
a-xfAva, otpg ev yiyy^a-jcoi y,lcIv
©eoy' ^dE jtj ajrjpa, yra kJ <j£
SiTv ai'UJo nrr,q -\>V)(w,q frpcjrw au(pE~
Amct, Ti)v c_^?C!Jy, r) wv 'jruc^tyot.
Tvy%flt,vett TolfjvixauV v}$yj vrgctr-
(pi^SlV ri( UV ^EAAciq yVGJtTEO-QcCi
r,ph X.CCX.OV YiOE kcci eVSa-op vuv U.EV
ydp ovk a.v fAoi. aozyq oWY}Br}yait,
AAK. 'AtptttftiTa), dreQeiAfioci,
'tw a,%7\vj, eWe «J\?i3 Ti uq syc)
vrupec-xsvuo'fAeH pulh. uv (psvyEitf
iwi vzr Ixe'>vh . irfo<rcccrcTou.£yu,vi
bftq 7T&T Iriv 0 awpwwoc, ily%
^.iT^AoijAi $Et\\\m yEVcffvtzi. SflK.
ocrm ingt as TrfoBvfAi'av sVn.
AAK. Etc; ToT= tolvvv xJ t^V
Svcriav a,ya.$a,AAE<j§cci xcccrirov
Eii/ai /j.ot Sox.!?. SfiK Ka* op-
vwq ye era ooxzt ec.c?&uAe$-Epo9
yap ern", # irugeNcwdvv-vziv roais-
TGV XwaVVOV. AAK. To?c; §EO?q
SI kJ ntpoii/vq Kj' TCC?.AX TCCLVrCL

nevcrthelefs very lively repre.
fehts the great Senfe/ which
the moft confiderate Heathens
had of their Want of fome
Extraordinary Inftru&ion.]

158 v The Evidence of Natural
ra. tofu^its. tote Suo-opEt, 'nat j ffffi willing to do any Thing he
,W,„, Tf ^ipatf-K^aat »„¦ naU £ ^ whofioever this Perfion
Tl;. Plato in Alcibiade 2. be ;¦ fio that I may but become a
[If it be fuppofed that Socrates good Man. Nay, anfwers'Socrates,
in this Paffage means Himfelf, That Perfon has a wonderful Rea-
^ili^-SS^ dmefis and WiUingnefs to do all this
fior you. It will be beft then, re
plies the Difciple, to fiorbear offer*
in% any more Sacrifices 'till the Time
that this Perfion appears.- You judge
very well, anfwers Socrates -, it will be much fiafer
fio to do, than to' run fo great a Hazard of offering
Sacrifices, which you knozv not whether they are ac
ceptable to God or no. Well then, replies the Dif
ciple, we will Then make our Offerings to the Gods
when That Day comes ; And I hope, God willing, it
may net be far off. And, in another Place, the
fame Author having given a l^rge Account of that,
moft excellent Difcourfe which Socrates made a lit
tle before his Death concerning the great Doctrines
of Religion, the Immortality of the Soul, and the
Certainty of a Life to come, he introduces one of
his Difciples replying in the following Manner :
/ an, faith * he, ofi the fame Opi
nion with you, O Socrates, concern
ing thefe Things, that to dificover the
certain Truth ofi them, in this prefient
Lifie, is either abfolutely imfcffble for
us, or at leaft exceeding difficult. Tet ,
not to inquire is, itk our utmcfiDiligence
into what can be fiaid about them,
or to give over our Inquiry before
we hiivc carried our Search as far
as pcjf.ble, is the Sign ofi a mean
and low Spirit. On the contrary,
we ought therefiore, by all Means%
to do one of thefe two Things ;
either^

w Ef&o»,ya£ 8oxu w £u)X%ct,>iq,
VTECi TCJV rOthldiV iCTfc'C OlO-'ZiJEg X01.1
col' to [asv o-afyiq iltitvctv iv tw
yvv $.0) 7t aavvxlov eivai, tj vrxy-
yeftAvmov t*'* to ft* $oi dvla [-l^g.
Taj AsyofAsva ws^i otvluv /x'-s w^t
VtUHTl TfQVTty l.AEy%UV KC/A VTfQ-
a;p!f«i?-tW wph a.v m ouQ.a.yjt axo-
*mm a-ure'vsry) Ttc» tro^vv [AO.)\QclxQ
eJvou dvcifoq. I Mote, that Fid-
?ius, in his '^'rai ilaiion of this
F^fiiige, as if the Word ?y\
was to be repeated «<Vo t^
,^i."y with vr^oaSlc-xo-Qal, WlitCS
abfurdly non dtfijlne inftead of
..'d/j/Z/Ti?.] Aeis yap wepl auT«

and Revealea Religlon. kq
either, by hearkening to InftruClicn, # ?¦<*§"> '*>&* ?-xi'> ,« tvoiTv, *?•
and fiy our1 own diligent Study, to " ^«»i» «^»1", ri» y«» #*-
find out f he Truth ; or, if that be ^ZTa)X!ZyZiaZ] M
abfioluley impoffible, then to fix our tovth oypvp.tt<» , wWe^eWi o-%e-
Foot upon that which to human ^'as' •"^""how* SiarzkiSo-at
Reafion, after the utmoft Search, *"*""' il r .niJtiv!a^ df:
in ' 1 n 111 (paMrEftlt XUI ^aXitdvtOTEBOV, E5TJ
appears beft and moft probable ; /sie*,^ 5Z"f*1®'. « *°y«
and, trufting to That, venture upon ©«'e t««, ^arooj6u9^a!(. />/«/<>
/£<stf #o«o»? /c <#r<?# /£<? Courfie of' in ph«dme-
our Lives accordingly, Unlefs a Man could have ftilf
fiome more filer e and certain Conduct to carry him
through this Lifie, finch as a Divine Difcovery ofi ihe
Truth would be. I fhall mention but one Inftance
more, and that is of Porphyry.; who, though he
lived after our Saviour's Time, and had a moft
inveterate Hatred to the Chriftian Revelation .in
particular,' yet * confeffes in e;ene-
ral that he was fenfibie there was * ^m au«m> dicit /V-
r • r 7 ¦» * 7 i r pbyrius, in primo de Retreffu
wanting fome umverfial Methd of jmma;. libro> nondum T%cfp_
delivering Mens Souls, which no tum in unam quandam feclam
Sect of Philofophy had yet found qux univerfalem Viam ani-
A ¦ ' mE.contmeat hberandas, non-
¦u dumq; in fuam notitiam ean-
dem viam hiftorial'i cognitione perlatam ; procul dubio confitetur, effe
aliquam ; fed nondtim in fuam veniffe notitiam. Ita ei non fufheiebat
quicquid de anima liberanda ftudiofiffime didiceiaij, fibique, vel potius
aliis, noffe ac tenere videbatur. Sentiebat enim adhuc fibi deeffe' aliquam
praeitantiffimam aucforitatem, quam de re tanta fequi oporterct. Augufiin,
de Ci-vitate Dei, lib. lo. c. 32.
3. This Senfe of the Ancient and Wifeft Philo- The U»-
fophers is much departed from by Modern Deifts, rff™$ff
who contend that there was no Want, no Need of fernDeipt
a Revelation -, that Philofophy and right Reafon in denying
was of itfelf fufficiently able to inftruct and pre- tbe Want
ferve Men in the Practice of their Duty -, and that "f^fjf
nothing was to be expected from Revelation. But, ^wz<
befides what has been already intimated concerning
the extreme Barbarity of the prefent Plea then World, and

1 60 The Evidence of Natural
and what the Philofophers both Greeks and Latins
have confeffed concerning the State of the more
civilized Nations wherein they lived, I think we
may lately appeal even to our Adverfaries them
felves, whether the Tefiimony of Chrift, (without
confidering at prefent what Truth and Evidence it
has) concerning the Immortality of the Soul, and
the Rewards and Punifhments of a Future State,
have not had (notwithftanding all the Corruptions'
of Chriftians) vifibly in Experi-
* oi«. My,*;, "b««f xa) ence anc} -Effect , a * greater and'
' E?^T' , ^ fT r*™l' more powerful Influence upon the
fiE^f. ^atarn aytmifo-Xai orosp r r
XpriovurpoZ It' ai>Th p} i|o- Lives and Actions of Men, than
uoo-utlai- 'imtt ah); vmlf «»s the Reafonings of all the Phi-
*d$frfC$7ti°f' 0r'Se"' lofoPhers 'that ever WCre in the
World: Whether credible Tefti-:
mony, and the Belief and Authority of Revelationj
be not in itfelf as it were a Li^ht held to the- Con-
fciences of ftupid and carelefs Men ; and the moft'
natural and proper Means, that can be imagined,
to awaken and rouze up many of thofe who would
be little affected with all the ftrict Arguments and'
abftract Rdafonings in the World : And, to bring'
this Matter to a fhort Iffue, whether, in Chriftian'
Countries, (at leaft where Chriftianity is profeffed
in any tolerable Degree of Pu-
f *sirE puzETi *aTa r» tea- rity ) the Generality even -f- of
taiotfyaxfwasxa) a^S ^ ^^^ and moft vu]gar and
AvjtoIb;, 0(S«{ kepi @EU (psput . ¦ nil .-1-.
i6ta?Jto£p»fi.**ihGagd- .ignorant People have, not Truer
P*)». Eufeb. Demonjlrat. E-van- and Worthier Notions of God,
gd' i'i'-3-: e' ?' ~ no more J11^ 3nd rigllt: Apprehen-
q~. . -, f ¦ r* ?> fions concerning his Attributes
Uticrat txntoo-iai, avtEt,ETaCp- O . ¦ ,
f/.ttaiTa'Tsatiraf.oixSo-ttiiiiAatix- and Jreriections, a deeper benle
iTwriuu;. «,"? <5wr»?£'? ^'ant it xoo- 0f the Difference of Gobd and
&. TU yd? oCx at b^oyio-a,, £vil a „reater Regard to moral
xai tus *eiph? Tut aiva Tn? ex- , . ,. . <-> , D. . . ,
^w.V^V*fs«i ™.e«XM- Obligations and to the plain and
tut sXaVIs?, ttoMw x^fflss Tv[%d- molt
VEit Ttit Et TOT? OrifAOlS EXXfao-iUt.
[Note, this Paffage is both corruptly printed 7roMiw» inftead of .groAty?;
and alfo the Senfe of it hurt by an iiriperfeit Tranllation. Orig. adverJK
Celf lib. 3. Edit. Cantab. pag.tzZ.]

¦tion.

and Revealed* Religion. j6i
moft neceffary Duties of Life, and a more firm and
> univerfal Expectation of a Future State of Rewards
and Punifhments, than, in any Heathen Country,
any considerable Number of Men were ever found
to have had.
, It may here perhaps be pretended, by Modern The great
Deifts, that the great Ignorance and undeniable '.^cejjity
Corruptnefs of the whole Heathen World has al- a"dUfe/
i • i r i t r rr ¦ DllJtneRe-
ways been owing, not to any abfolute Infufficiency w/a/;-(
of the Light of Nature itfelf, but merely to the
Fault of the feveral particular Perfons, in not fuf
ficiently improving that Light ; and that Deifts,
Now, in Places where Learning and right Reafon
are cultivated, are well able to difcover and explain
all the Obligations and Motives of Morality with
out believing any Thing of Revelation. But this,
even though it were true, (as, in the Senfe they
intend, it by no Means is ; becaufe, as has been
before fhewn, there are feveral very neceffary Truths
not poffible to be difcovered with any Certainty by
the bare Light of Nature -, But) fuppofing it, I fay,
to be true, that all the Obligations and Motives of
Morality could poffibly be difcovered and explained
clearly by the mere Light of Nature alone, yet
even This would not at all prove that there is no
Need of Revelation. For, whatever the bare Na
tural Poffibility was, 'tis certain, in Fad, the Wifeft
Philofophers of Old* never were able to do it to any * See ,
effectual Purpofe, but always willingly acknow- excellent
Jedged that they ftill wanted fome higher Affiftance. PJ-^e
And, as to the great Pretences of Modern Deifts, fotfcfp£r,
'tis to be obferved, that the Clearnefs of Moral poft, died
Reafonings was much improved, and the Regard above,
to a Future State very much increafed, even in Hea= paSe 1$2'
thenWriters, after the Coming of Chrift. And almoft
all the Things that are faid Wifely and truly by
Modern Deifts are plainly borrowed from That
Revelation

an

The E v i d e n c e of Natural
Revelation which they refute to embrace; and,
without, which, they could never have been able
to have- faid the fame Things. Now indeed* when
our whole Duty, with its true Motives, is clearly
revealed to us, its- Precepts appear plainly agree
able to Reafon -, and Confcience readily approves
what is Good, as it condemns what is Evil : Nay,
after our Duty is thus made, known to us, 'tis eafy
not only to fee its Agreement with Reafon, but
alfo to begin and deduce its Obligation from Rea^
fon.' But, had we been utterly deftitute of all
revealediLight, then, to have difcovered our Duty'
in, all Points, with the true Motives of it, merely
by the Help of Natural Reafon, would have been
a'Work of Nicety, Pains, and Labour, like gro
ping for an unknown Way in the obfcure Twilight.
, What Ground have any Modern Deifts to imagine,
that, if they themfelves had lived without the Light
of the Gofpel. they fhould have been wifer than
bocralcs, and Plato, and Cicero? How are they cer
tain they fhould have made fuch a right Ule of
their Reafon as to have difcovered the Truth ex
actly, without being any Way led afide by Pre
judice or Neglect? If- their Lot had; been among'
the Vulgar, how are they fure they fhould have
been fo happy, or fo confiderate, as not to have
been involved in that Idolatry and Superftition
which overfpread- the whole World ? If they had
joined themfelves to the Philofophers, which Sect
Would they have'ehofen to have followed? And:-
what Book would they have refolved upon to be
the adequate Rule of their Lives and Converfations ?
Or, if they fhould have fet up for Themfelves, how
are they certain they foould have been, fkilful and
unprejudiced enough to have deduced the feveral
Branches of their Duty, and applied them to the
feveral Cafes of Life by Argumentation and Dint
of Reafon ? 'Tis one Thing to fee that thofe Rules ' of

and Revealed Religion. '163
of Life, which are beforehand plainly and particu
larly laid before us, are perfectly agreeable to Rea
fon : And another Thing to find out, thofe Rules
merely by the Light of Reafon, without their
having firft been any otherwife made known. We
fee that even many of thofe who profefs to govern
'their Lives by the plain written Rule of an injiituted
and revealed Religion are yet moft miferably ignorant
of their Duty : And how can any Man be fore he
fhould have made fo good Improvement of his
Reafon as to have underftood it perfectly, in all its
Parts, without any fuch Help ? We fee that many
of thofe who protefs to believe firmly that great
and everlafting Happinefs which Chrift has promifed
to Obedience, and that great and eternal Mifery
which Chrift has threatened to Difobedier.ee, are
yet hurried away, by their Lufts and Paffions, to
trahfgrefs the Conditions of that Covenant to which
thefe Promifes and thefe Threatenings are annexed :
And how can any Man be fure he fhould be able to
overcome thole great Temptations, if thefe mighty
Motives were lefts diftinClly known, or lefs powerfully
inforced? But fuppofe he could, and that by Strength
of Reafon he could demonftrate to himfelf thefe
Things with all Clearnefs and DiftinCtnefis, yet could
All Men do fo ? Alfu redly all Men are not equally
capable of being Philofiophers, though all Men are
equally obliged to be Religious. At leaft thus much
is certain, that the Rewards and Punifhments of
another World, the great Motives of Religion,
cannot -be fo powerfully inforced, to the influencing
the Lives and Practice of all Sorts of Men, by one
who fhall undertake to demonftrate the Reality of
them by abftract Reafons and Arguments, as by
one who, foewing fufficient Credentials of his hav
ing been himfelf in that other State, fhall affur.i
them of the Truth and Certainty of thefe Things.
But, after all, the Queftion does not really lie here.
' The

164 The Evidence of Natural
The Truth, at the Bottom, is plainly This : AH
the great Things that Modern Deifts affect to fay
of right Reafon, as to its Sufficiency in difcovering
the Obligations and Motives of Morality, is only a
Pretence to be made Ufe of when they are oppofing
Chriftianity. At other Times, and in Reality, they
have no hearty Regard for Morality, nor for the
natural Evidences of the Certainty of a Future
State They are willing enough to believe that
Men perifh abfolutely at Death -, And fo they have
no Concern to fupport effectually the Caufe of Vir
tue, nor care to make out any .confiftent Scheme
of Things -, but unavoidably recur, in Truth, to
downright Atheifm. At leaft, in the Manners of
moft of them, 'tis too plain and apparent that
abfolute Libertinifm is the Thing they really aim
at : And, however their Creed may pretend to be
the Creed of Deifts, yet almoft always their Practice
is the Practice of very Atheifts.
-Yet God 4- To return therefore to the Argument. From
'was not what has been faid upon this Head, it appears
abfolutely plainly, that 'tis agreeable to the natural Hopes
ItffwdMen and Expectations of Men, that is, of Right Reafon
the Help duly improved, to fuppofe God making fome par-
offuch a ticular Revelation of his Will to Mankind, which
Re-vela- may fUppiy the undeniable Defects of the Light of
Nature. And, at the fame Time, 'tis evident that
fuch a Thing is by no Means unworthy of the
Divine Wifdom, or inconfiftent with any of the
Attributes of God ; but rather, on the contrary,
moft fuitable to them. Confequently, confidering
the manifold W7ants and Neceffities of Men, and
the abundant Goodnefs and Mercy of God, there
is great Ground, from Right Reafon and the Light
of Nature, to believe that God would not always
leave Men wholly deftitute of fo needful an Affift-
ance, but would at fome Time or other actually
afford it them. Yet it does hot from hence 3t all
follow, (m fome have imagined) that God is Obliged to

and RevCaled- Religion. 165
to make fuch a Revelation. For then it muft needs
have- been given in all Ages, and to all Nations ;
and might have been claimed and demanded as of
Juftice, rather than wifhed for and defired as of
¦Mercy-and condefcending Goodnefs. But the fore-
mentioned Confiderations are fuch as might afford
Men reafonable Ground to Hope fior fome Favour
of this Kind, to be conferred at fuch Time, and
in fuch Manner, and upon fuch Perfons, as fhould
feem beft to Supreme Infinite Wifdom : At leaft,
they might well difpofe and prepare Men before
hand, whenever any Doctrine fhould come accom-v
panied with juft and good Evidence of its being
fuch a Revelation, to believe and embrace it with
all Readinefs.
It has been made Ufe of, by a * modern Author, IVantof
as his principal and ftrongeft Argument againft the Umveffa-
_ Reafonablenefs of believing any Revelation at all, ll$™ffffjft_
that 'tis confeffed there has been no Revelation jeakna-
univerfially owned and embraced, as fuch,. either in gainfl the
all Ages, or by all Nations* in any Age. He 'rr"th "f
pretends to acknowledge, that, if the Doctrine ofalioifve
Chriftianity was univerfially entertained, he would *Oracl«
not doubt of its being truly a Revelation of the ofReafon,
Will of God to Mankind: But fince, in Fact, ^^197, ,
there is no inftituted Religion univerfially received^*
as a Divine Revelation ; and there are feveral Na
tions to whom the Chriftian Doctrine in particular
was never fo much as preached, nor ever came to
their Knowledge at all -, he concludes, that, what is
not univerfal and equally made known to All Men,
cannot be needful for Any -, and confequently that
there never was any real Want of a Revelation at
all, nor any Ground to think any further Affiftance
neceffary to enable Men to anfwer all the Ends of
their Creation, than the bare -Light of Nature.
This is the Sum and Strength of this Author's
Reafoning; and herein all the Deniers of Revelation
agree with him. Now, (not to take Notice here,

The Evidence of Natural
that 'tis by no Means impoffible but all Men may,
be capable of receiving fome Benefit from a Reve
lation which yet a great Part Of them may have
never heard or :) If thefe Mens Reafoning was true,
it would follow, by the fame Argument, that nei
ther was Natural Religion neceffary to enable Men;
to anfwer the Ends of their Creation. For, though
all the Truths of Natural Religion are indeed cer
tainly difcoverable by the due Ufe of Right Reafon
alone, yet 'tis evident All Men are not indued with
-the fame Faculties and Capacities, nor have they
All equally afforded to them the fame Means of.
making that Difcovery -, as thefe Gentlemen them
felves, upon fome Occafiohs, are willing enough to
own, when they are defcribing the barbarous Igno
rance of fome poor Indian Nations : And confe
quently the Knowledge of Natural Religion being,
in Fact, by no Means univerfal, it will follow that
there is no great Neceffity even of That ; but that
Men may do very well without it in performing the
Functions of the Animal Life, and directing them
felves wholly by the Inclinations of Senfe: And thus
thefe Gentlemen muft at laft be forced to let go all
moral Obligations, and fo recur unavoidably to ab
folute Atheifm. The Truth is : As God was not
obliged to make all his Creatures equal ; to make
Men Angels, or to indue All Men with the fame
Faculties and Capacities as Any -, So neither is he
bound to make All Men capable of the fiame Degree
or the fiame Kind of Happinefs, or to afford All Men
the very fame Means and Opportunities of obtaining
it. There is Ground enough, from the Confidera
tion of the manifeft Corruption of Human Nature,
to be fo far fenfible of the Want of a Divine Re-'
velation, as that Right Reafon and the Light of
Nature, itfelf will lead a wife and confiderate Man
to think it very probable that the infinitely merci
ful and good God may actually vouchfafe to afford
Men fome fuch fupernatural Affiftance : And confe
quently

and Repealed Religion. ^ % 6f
quently fuch a Perfon will be very willing, ready *
and prepared to entertain a Doctrine which fhall at
any tirne come attended with juft and good Evidence
of its being truly a Revelation of the Will of God.
But it does not at all from hence follow, either that
God is abfolutely bound to make fuch a Revelation*
or that, if he makes it, it muft equally, be made, to
All Men -, or that, fince in Fact it is not made to All,
therefore there is no reafon to believe that there is any
Need or any Probability of its 'being made' to Any.
VIII. There is no other Religion now in the
"World, but the Chrifiian, that has any juft Pretence or
toiler able 4ppearance of Reafon to be efteemed fuch a
' Divine Revelation : And therefiore, if Chriftianity be
not true, there is no Revelation of the Will of God at
all made to Mankind.
This Propofition will eafily be granted by all
Modern Unbelievers ; and therefore I need not be
particular in the Proof of it.
' The Mahometan Religion was founded by a vi-.o/ the
cious Perfon, propofes ridiculous and trifling Doc- Mahome-
trines to be believed, was propagated merely ty '£",£'"
Violence and Force of Arms, was confirmed by- '
no public and unconteftable Miracles, promifes
vain and fenfual Rewards to its Profeffors, and is
every Way incompaffed with numberlefs fuch Ab
furdities and Inconfiftencies, (as thofe who have
given us Accpunts of the Life of Mahomet, and
' the Nature of his Religion, have abundantly made
out, and is fufficiently evident even from the Alcoran
itfelf) that there is no great Danger of Its impofing
iipon rational and confiderate Men.
The Jewifih Religion was founded wholly upon of the
the Expectation of a Meffiah to come -, and the Je^Jh
!lime of his Appearance was limited by fuch plain Re"^D"-
and determinate Prophecies, that what Difficulties
foever there may be in computing the very nice and
X -. exact

X 68 The Evidence of Natural
exact Time of their Completion ; or what different
Periods foever may be fixed, from whence to begin
feveral Computations ; yet the Time of their being
fulfilled is now, in all poffible Ways of computing,
fo very far elapfed, that, if the Chrifiian Doctrine
be falfe, there is no Suppofition left, upon which
the Jewifih Religion can, with any Colour of Rea
fon, be believed to be true.
It being evident therefore, that either the Chri
ftian Revelation is true, or elfe (how great Want
foever there may be of it) there is no fuch Thing
as Revelation at all : It remains that I proceed to
confider what pofitive and direCl Evidence there is
to prove the actual Truth of this Divine Revela
tion. IX. The Chriftian Religion, eonfidered in its pri
mitive Simplicity, and as taught in the Holy Scriptures,
has all the Marks and Proofs of being actually and,
truly a Divine Revelation, that any Divine Revela
tion, fiuppofing it was true, could reafionably be ima
gined or defired to have.
TheMarh The neceffary Marks and Proofs of a Religion
. of a p.eli- coming from God are thefe : Firft, That the Du-
gioncomlnS ties it, injoins, be all fuch as are agreeable to our
fromGod. namrai Noti0ns 0f God, and perfective of the Na
ture, and conducive to the Happinefs andWell-being
of Men : And that the DoCtrines it teaches be all
fuch, as, though not indeed difcoverable by the
bare Light of Nature, yet, when difcovered by Re
velation, may be confiftent with, and agreeable to,
found and unprejudiced Reafon. For, otherwife,
no Evidence whatfoever can be of fo great Force to
prove that any Doctrine is True, as its being either
contradictory in itfelf, or wicked in its Tendency,
is to prove that it muft neeeffarily be Falfe. Se
condly, For the fame Reafon, the Motives likewife,
by which it is . recommended to Mens Belief and
Practice,

and Revealed Religion*
Practice, and all the peculiar Circumftances with
which it is attended, muft be fuch as are fuitable
to the excellent Wifdom of God, and fitted to
amend the Manners, and perfect the Minds of Men.
Laftly, It muft moreover be pofitively and direCtly
proved to come from God, by fuch certain Signs
and Matters of Fad, as may be undeniable Evi
dences of its Author's having actually a Divine
Commiflion. For otherwife, as no Evidence can
prove a Doctrine to -come from God, if it be either
Impoffible or Wicked in itfelf ; fo, on the other
Hand, neither can any Degree of Goodnefs or Ex
cellency in the Doctrine itfelf make it certain, but
only highly probable, to have come from God,
unlefs it has moreover fome pofitive and direct Evi
dence of its being actually Revealed.
The intire Proof therefore of this Propofition,
muft be made by an Induction of Particulars, as
follows :
X. Firft, The Practical Duties which the Chriftian
Religion' injoins, are all fuch, as are moft agreeable to
our natural Notions of God, and mojt perfieCtive of
the Nature, and conducive to the Happinefs and Well-
being of Men : That is', Chriftianity even in this fingle
RefipeCl, as containing alone, and in one confiftent Syftem,
all the wifie and good Precepts, (and thofe improved,
augmented, and exalted to the higheft Degree of Per
fection) that ever were taught fingly and ficattered-
ly, and many Times but very corruptly, by the fie-
.veral Schools ofi the Philofiophers ¦, and this with-
¦' out any Mixture of the fond, abfurd, and fuperfti
tious Practices of any of thofe Philofophers ; ought
to be embraced and praClifed by all rational and con
fidering Deifts, who will ad confiftently, and fteddily
purftue the Confequences of their own Principles, as at
leaft the beft Scheme and SeCl of -Philofophy, that ever
was Jet up in the World -, , and highly probable, even
X 2 thov.zb

170 The Evidence of Natural
though it had no external Evidence, to be ofi Divine
Qrgindl.
ThePropo- This Propofition is fo very "evident, that the
Jitionpro- greateft Adverfaries of the Chriftian Inftitution have
<ued,inthe never been able to deny' it any otherwife,, than by
JaZes of' confounding 'the Inventions of Men, the foperfti-
Duty. tious Practices, of particular Perfons, or the corrupt
Additions of certain particular Churches or Socier
ties of Chriftians,, with the pure and Ample Pre
cepts of the Gofpel of Chrift. In all thofe Inftances.
of Duty, which pure and uncorrupt Chriftianity
injoins, the Propofition is manifeft and altogether
undeniable. The Duties of Love, Fear, and Ado
ration, which the Chriftian Religion Obliges us to
render unto God, are fo plainly incumbent upon us
from the Confideration ef the excellent Attributes
of the" Divine Nature, and our Relation to him as
our Creator and Prefefver," that no Man who con-
fiders, can think himfelf free from the Obligations
which our Religion lays upon him to practife thefe
Duties, without denying the very Being of God,
and acting contrary to the Reafon, and all the natural
Notions of his own Mind. Its placing the true and
acceptable Worfhip of God, not fo much - in any
pofitive and ritual Obfervances, as in approaching
him with pure Hearts' and undefiled Bodies., with
unfeigned Repentance for all paft Mifcarriages, and
fincere Refolutions of conftant Obedience for the
future ; in praying to him for whatever We want,
^nd returning him our moft hearty Thanks for
whatever good Things we receive, with fuch De
pendence and Humility, fuch Submiffion, Truft
and Reliance, as are the proper Affections of dutiful
Children ; all this is plainly moft agreeable to our
Natural Notions and Apprehenfions of God. And
that the Prayers of finful and depraved Creatures,
fincerely repenting, foould be offered up to God,
and become prevalent with him,, through and by
th£

and Revealed Religion. 17 1
die Interceffioh of a Mediator, is -very confonant to
right and unprejudiced Reafon, as I fhall have Oc-
cafion to fhew more particularly hereafter, when I
come to confider the Articles of our Belief. Again,
The Duties of Juftice, Equity, Charity, and Truth,
which the Chriftian Religion obliges us to exercife
towards Men, are fo apparently reafonable in them
felves, and fo directly conducive to the Happinefs
of Mankind, that their unalterable Obligation is
not only in great Meafure deducible from the bare
Light of Nature and right Reafon, but even Thofe
Men alfo, who have broken through all the Bonds
of natural Religion itfelf, and the original Obliga
tions of Virtue, have yet thought it neceffary, for
the Prefervation of Society, and the Well-being of
Mankind,, that the Obfervation of thefe Duties, to
fome Degree, fhould be inforced by the Penalties of
human Laws, And the additional Improvements,
which our Saviour has made to thefe Duties, by
•commanding his Difciples to be as it were Lights Matt. v.
in the World, and Examples of good Works to all *6» &c«
Men -, to be fo far from injuring others, that on the
contrary they foould not indulge themfelves in any
Degree of Anger or Paffion -, to feek Reconciliation
immediately upon any Difference or Offence that
may arife ; to bear Injuries patiently, rather than re
turn Evil for Evil -, to be always willing to forgive
one another Their Trefpaffes, as they all expect For-
givenefs at the Hands of God -, to be Kind and Cha
ritable to all Men ; to affift readily, and be willing
to do all good Offices, not only to their Friends,
but even to their bittereft Enemies alfo; in a Word,
to raife their Virtue and Goodnefs far above the com
mon Practice of Men, extending their Charity uni-
verfally in Imitation of the Goodnefs of God him
felf, who maketh the Sun to rife on the Evil and on
the Good, and fendeth Rain on the Juft and on the >
Unjuft: Thefe Precepts, I fay, are fuch, as no un-
X 3 prejudiced

1 72 The Evidence of Natural
prejudiced Philofopher would have been unwilling:.
to confefs were the utmoft Improvements of Mora
lity, and to the higheft degree Perfective of human ¦
Nature. In like Manner, The Duties of Sobriety,
Temperance, Patience, -and Contentment, which our
Religion injoins us to practife in Ourfelves, ate fo
undeniably agreeable to the inward Conftitution of
human Natuie, and fo perfective of it, that the
principal Defign of all true Philofophy has ever
been to recommend and fet off thefe Duties to the
beft Advantage -, though, as the Philofophers them
felves have always confeffed, no Philofophy was ever
able to govern Mens Practice effectually in thefe Re-
fpects. But the' additional Precepts, and the new
Weight and Authority, which our Saviour has( ad-
Matt. v. ded to his Inftructions of this Kind ; teaching his
^r; . Difciples to govern their very Thoughts, Defires,
\q,za,&x. and Inclinations •, to contemn and get above all the
Defires of this prefent World, and to fet their Af
fections principally upon that which is to come ;
Thefe are the Things, which, when the Chriftian
Religion was in its primitive and pureft State, work
ed Men up actually to fuch a Pitch of chearful and
generous Obedience to the Laws of God, and taught
them to ' obtain fuch a complete Victory over the
World, and over all the Defires and Appetites of
Senfe, as the beft Philofophers have acknowledged
their Inftructions were never able to do. Laftly,
Even thofe pofitive and external Obfervances (the Two
Sacraments) which are inftituted in the Chriftian
Religion, as Means and Afliftances to keep Men
ftedfaft in the Practice of thofe great and moral Du
ties which a're the weightier Matters of the Law%
even thofe pofitive Inftitutions (I fay) are fo free
from all Appearance of Superftition and Vanity, and
fo wifely fitted to the End for which they were de
figned, that no Adverfaries of Chriftianity have ever.
been able to object any Thing at all againft the
Things.

and Revealed Religion. 173
Things themfelves, but only againft certain Corrup
tions and Superftitions, which fome, who call them- ¦
felves Chriftians, have, directly in Oppofition to the
true Defign of Chriftianity, introduced and annexed
to them. For what reafonable Man can pretend to
fay, that 'tis any Way unreafonable or Superftitious
for every Member of the Society to be folemnly ad
mitted into his Profeffion, by a plain and fig'nificant
Rite, intitling him to all the Privileges, and char
ging him with all the Obligations, which belong to
the Members of that Society as fuch ? which is the
Defign of One of the Sacraments : Or, that 'tis un
reafonable and Superftitious for Men frequently to
commemorate with all Thankfulnefs the Love of
their greateft Benefactor, and humbly and folemnly
to renew their Obligations and Promifes of Obe
dience to him ? which is the Defign of the Other.
Let now any impartial Perfon judge, whether this This a
be not a wife and excellent Inftitution of practical Sreat £**'-
Religion, highly conducive; to the Happinefs of R'*£?£a
Mankind, and worthy to be eftablifoed by a Reve- coming
lation from God, when Men had confeffedly cor- from God.
rupted themfelves to fuch a Degree, that not only-
the Light of Nature and right Reafon was alto
gether infufficient to reftore true Piety, but .even
That Light itfelf (as Cicero * ex-
prefsly acknowledges) no where *  ut Nature Lumen
appeared. Let any impartial Per- ^UlT^^X
fon judge, whether a Religion that cited before at LrgSj Page I2S>
tends thus manifeftly to the Reco
very of the rational Part of God's Creation, to re
ftore Men to the Imitation and Likenefs, of God,
and to the Dignify and higheft Improvement of
their Nature, has not within itfelf an intrinfic and
very powerful Evidence of its being truly Divine.
Let any one read the fifth, fixth and fieventh Chapters
ofi St. Matthew's Gofipel, and judge if they do not,
as it were, Jet before his Eyes fuch a lovely Image
X 4 and

174 T&EviD'ENCEdf Natural
* Formam ipfam, ' & tan- and Repirefentation of true Vir-
qazmFacieia honefii ; quae fi we as piat0 * fojrj cou]d not but
™/utir;CScSraet charm Men with the higheft De-
Sui, . Ck.de Offic. lib. j. gree of Love and Admiration
imaginable. In a Word, let any
Man .of an honeft and fincere Mind confider, whe
ther That practical Doctrine has not even in itfelf
the greateft Marks of a Divine Original, wherein'
whatfoever Things are true, whatfoever Things art*,
Phil. iv. 8. honeft, whatfoever Things arejuft, whatfoever Things
are pure, whatfoever Things are lovely, whatfoevelr
Things are of good Report, if there be any Virtue, if
there be any Thing praifie-worthy ; all thefe, and
thefe only, are the Things that are earneftly re
commended to Mens Practice. What wife Pretfcp't
was evfer delivered by any Philofopher of any Sect,
which is not more plainly laid'down by our Savi
our and his Apoftles ? And not only fo, but inforced
moreover witfi greaterEfficacy and Strength? found
ed upon nobler and more confiftent Principles ?
urged with greater Weight and Authority ? and
preffed with more powerful and affecting Argu
ments ? Nay, neither is This all the Difference!,
even in Refpect barely of the 'Excellency of the
Doctrine itfelf. For the Philofophers taught indeed;
many excellent moral Truths ; but fome upon one
Occafibn, and upon oneSetof Principles, fome upon
another ; and everyone of them were miftaken in
fome Inftances of Duty, and mingled particular'
Superftitions and falfe Notions with their good In
ftructions, and built their Dodrine upon no fure
Foundation of confiftent Principles ; and All of
them (as has been before fhewn) were very imper
fect and deficient, and far from beings able to make
" up an intire and complete Scheme of the whole Du-
. „, „ , , , , ty of Man in all Cafes. But now,
,1- rWr«.f Sfyrjurfd. «« t ^.'put together.all the wife and
Xjir""' uxtf S'ti oV'x i'ri **«'»1? good Precepts that ever were de*
livered

dn4 Revealed Religion. iye
Iivered by any wife Men of any «/*<»«• wWsp <>v$lj$.?rZt iW
Sect, and in any Age ; to improve  ^W?©- y«VT'V>, «*» >»'-
and exalt every one of them, to f/„ TJ ^''^L^0" *?-•
the higheft poffible Degree of Ex^ ty$iy$do-—Ztr»w wa^ »£«
cellency and Perfection ; to fepa- *»*»? «?/»)l«», d'^Jv tJ» xs1"*-
rate and lay afide all theSuperfti- "'J"', ?^'*: ff0^-,.1-
,~» • • j n <tl- i Quod fi extitlffet aliquis,
tlOUS Opinions and Practices that qui veritatem fparfarh per
had been mixed by all or any of fmgulos, per Se&afque diffu-
the different Sects of Philofophers, fam> colligeret in unum ac
or Teachers of Religion in any ?*f ret ^TV " Pu?~
_ T . • i i • r n • } te"° non dilfentiret a nobis.
Nation, with their refpective mo- Sed hoc nemo facere, nifi
ral Inftructions ; and to fupply all veri peritus ac fciens, poteft.
thofe Doctrines, wherein both mo- y.erum„ aut?m n°n ,wfi eJ^
ral Philofophy, and the additional faint'. 11 f. **" * ^
Inftitutions of all Religions in the
World, bad in the Whole been
hitherto altogether deficient ; and all this, in one
plain, intire, and regular Syftem, upon the Foun
dation of certain and confiftent Principles ; This is
the peculiar Character of the Chriftian Inftitution •,
and all this cannot, with any Colour of Reafon, be
imagined to have ever been done by any Man, hut
one fent immediately from God. Upon this Con
fideration alone, all fincere Deifts (if any fuch there
be) who really are what they pretend to Be, who
believe the Being and Attributes of God, and are
firmly convinced of the Obligations of Virtue and
natural Religion, and the Certainty of a Future
State of Rewards and Punifhments, muft needs by
their own Principles be ftrongly inclined to embrace
the Chriftian Religion ; to believe, at leaft to hope
confidently, that a Doctrine fo plainly fittect to re
cover Men out of their univerfally corrupt Eftate,
and reftore them to the Knowledge and Favour of
God, is truly Divine ; and to entertain it with all
Chearfulnefs, as what in itfelf has thofe -manifold
Maries of Goodnefs and Perfection, which are.them-
fglves "fufficient to fatisfy a good Man, that it can not

176 The Evidence of Natural
* Sed fi yel cafu id effice- not be any Thing elfe than a Rer
ret,' certiffime philofophare- veIation from God, even * though
tur ; & quamvis non poffet . . , , ,, , r °,
divinis teftimoniis ilia defen- " had wanted all thofe outward
dere, tamen feipfam Veritas Proofs, and divine and miraculous
illuftraret fuo lumine. LaBant. Teftimonies, which, fhail hereafter
'**' 7' be mentioned in their propeiPjace.
XI. Secondly, The Motives by which the Chriftian.
Religion infiorces the Practice ofi the Duties it injoins,
are juch as are moft fiuitable to the excellent Wifidom ofi
i God, and moft anfiwer able to the natural Expectations
' of Men.
¦ Of the 1 . The Accept ablenefs ofi true Repentance, in the
acceptable- signt of God, and the certain Affurance of Pardon
True Re- uPon fucn Repentance, which the Chriftian Re-
pentance. ligion affords us, is a moft powerful and neceffary
as a Mo- Motive to frail and finful Creatures to encourage
'iZe- t0 °" and fupport them effectually in the Practice of their
Duty. 'Tis indeed in general evidently moft agree
able to right Reafon, and to Mens natural Notions
of God, to believe him placable, and merciful, and
willing to forgive. But fince at the fame Time it
cannot be proved by any Arguments from Reafon,
that God is abfolutely obliged to forgive ; and 'tis
confeffedly evident, that it becomes the Supreme
Governor of the Univerfe to vindicate the Honour
and. Authority of his Laws and Government, to
/ give fome Evidences of his Hatred and Indignatioh
againft Sin, and fometimes by Inftances of Severity
to prevent Sinners from abufing his Mercy and
Patience -, no lefs than that 'tis agreeable to his in
finite Wifdom and Goodnefs to fuffer his Anger
to be by fome Means appeafed : No Motive in this
Cafe can be imagined more expedient and powerful
to encourage Sinners to return to the Practice of their
Duty, and to perfuade them to continue therein
immoveable for the future ; nothing can be ima
gined more feafonable and fatisfactory to the Mind of

and Revealed Religion. 177
of Man, and more agreeable to the excellent Wif
dom of God, and worthy of the fupreme and infi
nitely merciful Governor of all Things, than fuch
a pofitive Declaration pf the Acceptablenefis ef fincere
Repentance, and fuch an authentic Affurance of
Pardon and Forgivenefis thereupon, as under the
Chriftian Difpenfation the Divine Goodnefs and
Mercy has found Means to afford unto us, in fuch
Manner as is at the fame Time abundantly con
fiftent with the Honour and Dignity of the Laws
of God, and with his irreconcileable Hatred againft
all Unrighteoufnefs and Sin.
2. That divine and fiupernatural Affiftance, which, Of the di-
under the Chriftian Difpenfation, they who fincere- wineAJpJl-
ly endeavour to obey the Will of God, have En- ance' at
couragement to hope for, upon all neceffary Oc- "Motive to
cafions, is another powerful Motive to fupport Men Obedience.
effectually in the Practice of their Duty. The
wifeft of the Philofophers were fo far fenfible of
the great Corruption and Depravity of Human
Nature in its prefent State ; they were fenfible that
fuch was the Careleflhefs, Stupidity, and Want of
Attention, of the greater Part of Mankind ; lb
many the early Prejudices and falfe Notions taken
in, by evil Education -, fo ftrong and violent the
unreafonable Lufts, Appetites and Defires of Senfe-,
and fo great the Blindnefs, introduced by fuper
ftitious Opinions, vicious Cuftoms, and debauched
Practices through the World ; that (as has been
before fhewn) they themfelves openly confeffed, -
,they had very little Hope pf ever being able to re
form Mankind with any confiderable great and
Univerfal Succefs, by the bare Force of Philofophy
and right Reafon -, but that, to produce fo great a
Change, and inable Men effectally to conquer all
their corrupt Affections, there was Need of fome
fupernatural and divine Affiftance, or the imme diate

ij$ , ' 75k Evidence of Natural
diate Interpofiition of God himfelf. N ow This divine
Affiftance is vouchfafed to Men under the Chriftian
Difpenfation in fuch a Manner, as (from what has
been already faid concerning the Judgment of the
Wifeft of the Ancient Philofophers in this Matter)
appears to be .undeniably agreeable to the natural^
Expectations of right Reafon, and fuitable to the
beft' and worth ieft Notions that Men have ever by
the Light of Nature been able to frame to them
felves concerning the Attributes and Perfections of
Luke xi. God. If ye, fays our Saviour, being. Evil, know how
J3- to give Good Gifts unto your Children ; how much more -
fhall your heavenly Father give the holy Spirit to them
, that afk him ? The Effect of this divine Affiftance
evidenced itfelf in a very vifible and remarkable
Maimer in the primitive Times,
* Da mihi virum, qui fit by * the fudden, wonderful, and
ixacundus, maledicus, effhe- totaj Reformation 0f far greater
natus ; pauciffimis Dei verbis XT , r . , , ,K ° ,
tam placidum, quam ovem, Numbers of wicked Men, than
reddam. Da librdinofum, &c. ever were brought to Repentance
Latiant. lib. 3. by the Teaching and Exhortati-
JrfnapX-VTor5"E^r£V',r °ns of all the Philofophers in the
&c. Origen. adverf. Celf. r
lib. 1.' See this Paffage cited World. And even at this Day,
above, page 151. notwithftanding all the Corrupti
ons introduced among Chriftians,
I think it can hardly be denied by any Unbelievers
of Revelation, but that there are among us many
more Perfons of all Conditions, who worfhip God
in Sincerity, and Simplicity of Heart, and live in
the conftant Practice of all Righteoufnefs, Holinefs,
Of the and true Virtue, than ever were found in any of
dear Dif- the moft civilized Nations, and moft improved by
fZre Re- Philofophy in the heathen World.
•wards and 3- The Rewards and Punifhments which the
Punijh- Chriftian Religion propofes, to Obedience or Dif-
ments, as obedience, are a Motive, perfectly agreeable to
"Motive to Mens natural Hopes and Fears, and worthy of God
Qbedknce. to make known by pofitive and exprefs Revelation. For

and Revealed Religion.
For fince 'tis confeffedly fuitable, to the divine Wif
dom to make Variety of Creatures, indued with
very different Powers and Faculties, and capable of
very different Kinds and Degrees of Improvement ;
•and fince all rational Creatures, by Reafon of that
natural Liberty of Will which is effentially necef
fary to their being fuch, cannot but be* capable of
exalting and improving their Nature by the Prac
tice of Virtue and the Imitatipn of God, and on
the contrary of depraving and debafing their Na
ture by the Practice of Vice and Alienation of
¦themfelves from God; It follows undeniably (as
has been before fhewn by a more particular De
duction) that 'tis highly agreeable to the Light of
Nature and to right Reafon to fuppofe, that God,
the Supreme Governor and Difpoferof all Things,
will finally make a juft and fuitable Diftinction be
tween his Creatures, by the Diftribution of propor
tionable Rewards and Punifhments. Neverthclefs,
both the Truth itfelf of thefe final Rewards,, and
Punifhments was fo far called in Queftion, and
rendered doubtful and uncertain, by the Difputa-
¦tions even of the Wifeft Philofophers that ever
lived ; and thofe who did in general believe the
Truth and Certainty of them, had yet fo very blind
fand obfcure Notions of What Nature and Kind
they were to be, having their Imaginations ftrange-
ly prejudiced with poetical Fictions and fabulous
Stories, that ' the fetting this Matter clear and
right, and the fupplying this fingle Defect in the
Light of Nature, was a Thing highly worthy of
Divine Revelation : It being plainly a very different
Thing, and of very different Force as- to the intlu-'
fencing Mens Actions, for Men to be able to argue
¦themfelves into a reafonable Expectation of future
Rewards and Punifhments, and to be certainly afi-
fured of the Reality of them by exprefs Teftimony
of Divine Revelation, And accordingly, by Divine
Revelation

[79

The E v i d e n c e of Natural
Revelation in J the Gofpel, this Defect of the Light
of Nature Is now actually fupplied in fuch a Man^
ner ; Life and Immortality are fo brought to Light;
and the Wrath of God is fo revealed from Heaven
'againft all Ungodlinefs and Urtrighteoufoefs of
Men -, that this very Thing, the clear and diftinct
and confiftent Account which the Gofpel gives us
of thefe final Rewards and Punifoments, (which,
though indeed in themfelves fo abfolutely neceffary,
that without them no tolerable Vindication could
be made of the Attributes of God, yet neither by
the Light of Nature, nor by any pofitive Inftitution
of Religion, excepting only the Chriftian, were they
ever fo clearly and plainly reprefented to Mankind,
as to have their full and proper Effect upon the
Hearts and Lives of Men -,) This very Thing
(I. fay) the clear, diftinct, and confiftent Account;
which the' Gofpel gives us of thefe final Rewards
and Punifhments, is itfelf no contemptible Argu»-
ment of the Truth and Divine Authority of the
Chriftian Revelation. By the certain Knowledge
of thefe Rewards and Punifhments it is, that the
Practice of Virtue is now eftablifhed upon a fure
Foundation. Men have now abundantly fofficierit
Encouragement, to fupport them in their Choice
of Virtue, and in their conftant Adherence to. it, in
all Cafes, and under all Circumftances that can be
fuppofed. There is now fufficient Weight on tlie
Side of Virtue, to inable Men to conquer all the
Temptations of the Devil, the Flefh, and the
World ; and to defpife the fevereft Threatening^,
even Death itfelf. This is the Victory that overcometb
the World, even our Faith. The only Difficulty in
this Matter, arifing from the Duration of the final
Punifoment of the Wicked, fhall be eonfidered when
I come to difcourfe of the Articles of our Belief.
XII. Thirdly, The peculiar Manner and Circum ftances, ;

and Revealed Religion. 181
ftances, with which the Chriftian Religion injoins the
Duties, and urges the Motives before-mentioned, are
exdclly confonant to the Dictates ofi fiound Reafion, or
¦the unprejudiced Light of Nature, and moft wiftely
perfedive of it.
For what can be more agreeable to the Light of<rhfProPc-
Nature, and more evidently perfective of it, than-^^™";
¦ to have thofe Duties which Nature hints at only in ticular In-
general, explained fully and largely, and urged inftances.
particular, and inculcated upon the meaneft Capa
cities with great Weight and Authority, and exempli
fied in the Lives of holy Perfons propofed as Pat
terns for, our Imitation ? What can be more per
fective of the Light of Nature, than to have thofe
great Motives of Religion, the Rewards and Pu
nifhments of a Future State which Nature only ob-
ficurely points at, defcribed to us moft plainly, affec
tionately, and lively ? What can be more perfective
of the Light of Nature, than to have the Means ofi
atoning for Sin, which Nature . difcovers ' only the
Want of, plainly declared and exhibited to us ? What
can be more perfective of the Light of Nature, than
fuch a Difcovery of the Heinoufnefis of Sin and the
Neceffity of Holinefis, as the Death of Chrift and the
Purity of -the Gofpel do make unto us? In fine,
-What can more effectually perfect the Religion of
Nature, than the gathering together the Worjhippers
ofi ' the True God into One Body ? the eaujing them to
enter into fiolemn Obligations to live fiuitably to their
Holy Profeffion ? the giving them gracious Affurances
that true Repentance fihall be accepted for what is paft,
and- fincere renewed Obedience for the future ? the
uniting them by a few pofitive Rites in one Religious as
well as Civil Communion, for mutual Affiftance and
Improvement ? and the eftablifhing a certain Order or
perpetual Succeffion of Men, whofe conftant Bufinefs it
may be to explain the great Duties of Religion to Per
fons of meaner Capacities ; to urge and infer ce the
¦ Practice

182 fhe ;Ev iden ce. of Naturdl
Practice of them ; to fet before. Men the Reafons of
> their Duty, and the Neceffity of it ; to fhew them deafly
and impartially the Danger of neglecting it, and the
great Advantage 'ofi performing it fincerely ; in a Wordi
to inftrucl the Ignorant, and to admonifh the Wicked,;
to reduce thofie that err, to comfort -the Doubting, to
reprove the Obftinate ; and to be Inftruments' of con'-
- veying to Men all paper Affifiancfs, to inable them to
perform their whole Duty effectually ?
If thefe Things be the Ordinances of One, who
came to contradict the Dictates of right Reafon,
and nqt to perfect the Law of Nature, but to de
ftroy it -, then let all wife Men for ever forfake thg
Affemblies of Chriftians, and profefs themfelves
again Difciples of the Philofophers. But if thefe
Things be perfectly agreeable to Nature and right
Reafon, and tend exceedingly to the fopplying
the Deficiencies thereof ; then let none, under Pre
tence of maintaining Natural Religion, revile and,
blafpheme the Chrifiian, left they be found Liar$
unto God.
AnAnfwer The many Contentions indeed, about Opinions of
to the Ob- great Uncertainty and little importance, which, to
Jdfa'™n tne very Sreat Scandal of Chriftianity, have, in fe-
from the veral Ages of the Church, been with unreafonable
Divifions Z.eal kept up, inftead of promoting the univerfal
afp°ns Intereft of true practical Religion and Virtue, have,
,rijia,is. jt 'mufl. ke confer]^ given fome Occafion to the
Enemies of our moft holy Religion to blafpheme
arid revile both It, . and the Teachers of it. But,
though fuch Things as thefe have indeed afforded
them too plaufible an Occafion, yet they have not
given them any juft Reafon fo to do. For the ac
knowledged Corruption of aDoctrine or Inftitution,
in any particular Part or Refpect, is by no Means a
weighty or real Objection againft the Truth of the
Whole. And there has always been Extant a fof
fieient Rule, to inable fincere Perfons, in the midft of

and ''Revealed Religion. . 183
of the greateft Difputes and Contentions, to diftin-
guifh the Dodrine which is of God from the Opinions-
cfi Men ; the Doctrine of Chrift having been plainly
and fully delivered in our Saviour's own Difcourfes,
and in the Writings of his immediate Followers
the Apoftles, who cannot with any Reafon be ima
gined either to have mifreprefented it, or to have
reprefented it imperfectly. But, befides, I think
it can hardly be denied even by our Adverfa
ries themfelves, but that in all Times and Places,
Wherein Chriftianity has been profeffed in any tole
rable Degree of Purity ; whatever Contentions and
Difputes may have arifen about particular and
perhaps unneceffary Doctrines ; yet the gieat, the
moft 'neceffary, and fundamental Doctrines of Reli
gion ; .concerning God and Providence ; concern
ing the gracious .Method of God's Reconciliation
With penitent Sinners ; concerning the Neceffity of
true Piety, Righteoufnefs, and Sobriety ; concern
ing a Judgment to come, and the final Reward of
the Righteous, and the Punifhment of wicked Men,
in fuch a Manner as will effectually vindicate both
the Juftice and Goodnefs, the Wifdom and Honour
of God; thefe Things (I fay) have, notwithftand
ing all Differences concerning fmaller Matters, been
neverthelefs at the fame Time univerfally and con
ftantly taught, preffed and inculcated upon Perfons
of all Capacities, by the earneft and continual
Preaching of all the Minifters of the Gofpel, with
an Effect infinitely more confiderable and vifible,
both in Extent and Duration, than by the Teach
ing of any Heathen Philofophers that ever lived.
Which fhews undeniably the Excellency at leaft,
if not the Div-ine Authority of the Chriftian Infti
tution, in this particular Refpect.
XIII. Fourthly, All the [Credenda, or] Doctrines,
which the true, fimple, and uncorrupted Chriftian Reli-
Y gien

184 The Evidence of Natural
gion teaches-, (that is, not only thofe plain DoClrines-
which it requires to be believed as Fundamental and of
Neceffity to £ternal Salvation, but even All the Doc
trines which it^ teaches as Matters of Truth -. are, tho'
indeed many of them not dificoverable by bare Reafion
unafiftfted with Revelation, yet, when difcovered -by Re
velation, apparently moft agreeable to fiound unpreju
diced Reafon, have every one ,of them a natural 'fen- '
dency, and a direCl and powerful Influence, to reform
Mens Minds, and correct their Manners ; and do toge
ther" makeup an infinitely more confiftent and rational
Scheme of Beliefi, than any that the. Wifeft of the an
cient Philofiophers ever did, or the cunning eft of modtm
Unbelievers can invent or contrive.
OftheOne 1. That there is One only living and true God;
Supreme exifting of himfelf, by the Neceffity of his own
Nature; abfolutely Independent, Eternal, Omni-
prefent, Unchangeable, Incorruptible ; without
Body, Parts or Paffions ; of infinite Power, Know
ledge, and Wifdom -, of perfect Liberty and Free
dom of Will ; of infinite Goodnefs, Juftice, and
Truth, and all other poffible Perfections ; fo as to
be abfolutely Self-fufficient to his own infinite and
unalterable Happinefs : This is not only the firft
and principal Article of the Chriftian Faith, but ^
alfo the fiift and moft evident Truth that the Light ¦*
of Nature itfelf teaches us, being clearly demon- ,
Arable, upon certain and undeniable Principles of
right Reafon. , ;
Cf the- 2. That this Supreme Self-Exiftent Caufe. and
Cul- be- Father . of all Things did, before all Ages, in an
g-ttenSon }ncomprehenfible Manner, by his Almighty Power
VJ and Will, beget or produce a Divine Perfon ; ftyled ¦
the Logos, 'the Word, or Wifidom,
* e^h l* e«», in Contra- QT s q{ Qod * ^ q{ q^
diflinclion to AuToihos. . , , .. , - ^ J,
J in whom dwells the Fulnefs of
Divine' Perfections, (excepting abfolute Supremacy,
Independency, or Self- Origination) being the Image of

¦and Revealed Religion. 185
jf the Inyifiible. God ; the Brightnefis of his Father's Col.i. ij.
Glory, and the exprefis Image of his Perfon, having ,Heb-,i- 3-
been in the Beginning with God, Partaker with him \°%'%~
"of his1 Glory before the World was; the Upholder of folks'
all Things by the Word of his Power ; and himfelf J°!ln J- 2.
'over all (by Communication of his Father's Glory S^' s-'
and Dominion) Goi bleffed for ever : This Doctrine Rom' LI'.
(Ifay) though not indeed difcoverable by bare W John i."
Reafon,' yet, when made known by Revelation, K
appears plainly very confiftent with right Reafon,
and ('tis manifeft) contains nothing that implies
any Manner of Abfurdity or Contradiction, in it.
Indeed if ariy Men, pretending to be wife above
and beyond what is written,have at any Time given
fuch Explications of the Manner how .the Son pf
God derived his Being from the Father, or have
offered fuch Accounts of his Nature and Attributes as
can by any juft and neceffary Confequence be redu
ced to imply or involve any Contradiction (which
perhaps many of the * Schoolmen
,have but too juftly been accufed * It is not td be denied
of doing) fuch Explications are b"t that *e Schoolmen, who
without all Controverfy falfe, and Jn°,"\ " ^k and Leifure'
¦v. ... .. , r. i- • t> though very few among- them
veryjnjunoustoReligion.^ But as had either exaft Skill in the
this Doctrine is delivered in Scrip- Holy- Scriptures, or in Eccle-
Ttiire, I think, there is nothing in ifk.al A™1™y, and the
v ¦ r-i • 1 Writings of the ancient Fa.
it m any Degree contrary to right thers 6fthe chrifiian Chirchl
Reafon, as I have elfewhere endea- Ifay, it cannot be denied
voured to fhew in a par ticular Difi- but tnac *efe fpeculative ,
¦courfie, to which I refer the Reader. and V"J acut6,Men, who
,¦./.- ... . wrought a great Part of their
Divinity out of their own Brains, as Spiders do Cobwebs out of their own
Bowels, have ftarted a thou'fand Sub'tilties about this Myftery, ¦ fuch as no
Chriftian is bound to trouble his Head withal ; much lefs is it neceffary
for him to underftand thofe Niceties, which' we may reafohably prefume
that they who talk of them did themfelves never thoroughly underftand ;
and,. leaft of all, is it neceffary to believe them. - Archbijhop Tillotfon'/
" Sermon concerning the Unity of the Divine Nature.
«' It \yere to be wifhed, that fome Religionifts did not here fymbolize too
much with the Atheifts, in affecting to reprefent the Myftery of the Chriftian
Trinity, as a Thing dire&ly contradictory to all human Reafon and Under-
Handing. Cudvjorth's Syftem, Page 560.
Y 2 Now

1^6 The Evidence of Natural
Of the Now the fame that is faid of the Son may, in
Holy Spi- j;jce Manner, with little Variation, be, very agree
ably to right Reafon, underftood Concerning the
Original Proceffwn or Manner ofi Derivation of the
-Holy Spirit likewife from the Father.
Of the 3. That the Univerfe, theHeavens and the Earth;,
Creation ancj a]j Things that are therein, were Created arid
Univerfe Made by God ; and this through the Operation of
his Son, That Divine Word, or Wifidom of the Fa-
Heb.i 2. ther; 'by whom, ,the Scripture fays that God made
Eph.m.9. tfa 11/0^ . that iy him God created all Things;
1 ' ' that by him were all Things /ereated, that are in Hea-
von, and that are in Earth, Vifible and Invifible, whe
ther they be Thrones or Dominions, ' or Principalities or
Powers. ; all Things were created by him and for him,
and he is before all Things, and by him all 'Things con-
Johni. 3. fiift ; that all Things were made by him, and without
him was not any Thing made that was made : All this
likewife is very agreeable to found and unprejudi
ced Reafon. For that neitherthe Whole, nor any
Part of the World -, neither the Form, nor Motion,
nor Matter of the World ; cpuld exift ofi itfielfi, by
any Neceffity in its own Nature, is abundantly de
monftrable from undeniable Principles of Reafon,
as has been fhewn in my former Difcourfe. Con
fequently, both the whole World, and all the Va
riety of Things that now exift therein, muft of Ne
ceffity have received both their Being itfelf, and
alfo their Form and Manner . of being, from God
the alone Supreme and Self-exiftent Caufe, and
muft needs depend upon his Good-pleafore every
"Moment, for the Continuance and Prefervation of
that Being. Accordingly, if we fet afide the Epi
cureans, (whofe abfurd Hypothefis has long fince
been given up even by all Atheifts themfelves) and
fome very few others,' who with no lefs Abfurdity
(as I have alfo at large fliewn) contended that the
World was in its prefent Form Self-exiftent and
Neceffary;

and Revealed Religion. 187
Neceffary ; All the Philofophers of all Ages (even
* not excepting thofe who held the Eternity of the * See for-
World) have unanimoufly agreed in this great mer v°-
Truth, that the World evidently owes both its Be- lnme'2P-
ing and Prefervation to God the Supreme Caufe and
Author of all Things. And then, that God made
the World by the Operation of his Son ; though this
could not indeed be known certainly without ex
prefs Revelation, yet is it by no Means incredible, or
contrary to right Reafon. Fo", to the Judgment. of^
Reafon, 'tis one and the fame Thing, whether God
made the World immediately by himfelf, or medi
ately by the Miniftration of a Second Principle.
And what Plato and his Followers have faid con
cerning that Eternal Noyf or Mind, whom they fre
quently ftyle Aniuouoyo; the Minifter brWorkman by
whomGod framed allThings, proves undeniably thus
much at leaft, that the Doctrines delivered in Scrip
ture concerning this Matter, cannot be rejected as
inconfiftent and irreconcileable with right Reafon.
4. That, about the Space of 6c. 00 Years fince, the OftheFor-
Earth was without Form and Void, that is. a contufed >"^>P" °f
Chaos, out of which God formed this beautiful and 'Jf n '"fi"'
ufeful Fabric we now inhabit, and flocked it with
the Seeds of all Kinds of Plants, and formed upon
it Man, and all the other Species of Animals it is
now furnifhed with, is alfo very agreeable to right
Reafon. For though the precife lime indeed,
when all this wis done, could not now have been
known exactly, without Revelation, yet, even at
this Day, there are remaining many cenfiderable
and very ftrong rational Prools, which male- it ex
ceedingly probable, . feparate from the Authority of
Revelation) that this prefent Frame and Conftitu
tion of the Earth cannot have b^r. of a very rruch
lon°er Date. The univeiiai iradition delivered
•down from all the moft ancient Nations of the
World, both learned and barbarous; the conftant
Y 3 and

i88 The Evidence of Natural
and agreeing DoClrine of all ancient Philofopherg
and Pqets? concerning the Earth's being formed,
within fufch a Period of 1 jme, out of Water or a
Chaos -, the manifold Abfiurdities and Contradictions
pf thofe few Accounts, which pretend to a much
greater Antiquity ; the Number ofi Men, with which
the Earth is at prefent inhabited ; the late Original
pf Learning, and all ufefiul Arts and Sciences ; the
Impoffibility, that univerfal Deluges, .or other Acci
dents, fhould at certain long Periods have oft-times.
deftroyed far the greateft Part of Mankind, with
the Memory of all former Actions and Inventions,
and yet never have happened to deftroy them All ;
the Changes that muft neeeffarily fall put naturally
'in the Earth, in vaft Length of Time, by the Sink
ing and W7afoing down of Mountains, the Con-
fumption of Water by Plants, and innumerable
pthef fuch-like Accidents ; thefe, (I fay) and many
more Arguments, drawn from Nature, Reafon, and
Obferyatipn, make That Account of the Time of
the Earth's Formation exceedingly probable in it
felf, which from the Revelation delivered in Scrip-
ture-Hiftory we believe to be cehain.
Pfi *fie 5. That the fame God who created all Things
''Govern- ty ^ Word of his Power, and upholds and pre-
puat of -ferves them by his continual Concourfe, does alfo,
Pro^i- by hjs All-wife Providence perpetually govern and
efence. direct the Iffues and Events of Things ; takes Care
of this lower World,, and of all, even the fmalleft
Things, that are therein ; difpofes Things in a re
gular Order and Succeffion in every Age, from the
Beginning of the World to its final Period ; and
infpects, with a more particular and efpecial Re
gard, the moral Actions of Men : This, as it is far
jriore exprefsly, clearly, and conftantly taught in
Scripture, than in any of the Writings pf the Phi
lofophers, fo it is alfo highly agreeable "to right and
£uie Reafon. For th^t an Omniprefient and infinite-

and Revealed Religion. , 189
ly Wife Being cannot but know every Thing that
is done in every Part of the Univerfe, and with equal
Eafe take Notice of the minuteft Things as of the,
greateft ; that an infinitely powerfiul Being muft
needs govern and direct every Thing in fuch Man
ner, and to fuch Ends, as he knows to be beft and
fitteft in the Whole, fo far as is confiftent with that
Liberty of Will, which he has made Effential to all
rational Creatures ; and that an infinitely Juft and
Good Governor cannot but take more particular and
exact Notice of the moral Actions of all his rational
Creatures, and how far they are conformable or not
conformable to the Rules he has fet them -, all this
'(I fay) is moft evidently agreeable to right Reafon,
and, as has been before fhewn, deducible from it.
6. That God, after the Formation of the Earth, Of Para-
created Man at firft upright and innocent, and placed &/*> and
him in a happy and paradijaical State, where he in- tfe^ !f}f
joyed Plenty and Abundance of all Things without
Labour or Sorrow ; and that 67#' was the original &„. ;;;.
Caufe, that now on the contrary the very Ground is 17,18,^
cur Jed and barren for cur Sake, and in Sorrow we eat '9'
of it all the Days of our Life ; that Thorns alfo and
Thiftles are brought forth to us, and in the Sweat of
our Face we eat Bread, till we return unto the Ground ;
this likewife is very reafonable and credible in itfelf,
as appears, not only from the abftract Confideration
of the Nature of the Thing, but alfo from the ge
neral Opinion that the ancient. learnedeft Heathens
entertained, upon very obfcure and uncertain Tra
dition, that the original State of Man was inno
cent and fimple, and the Earth,
whereon 'they dwelt, * fruitful * T° ^aW* «7«V & ixpU
of itfelf, and abundant with all V *"\ a*'T' m^\ *"s"'-
VJ " Juyi ^ , <cjep JtoLi vvv xovEwq teat Xf.,vzi
,-Plenty ; but that God, for the _ j- -?<EOf) K« ^ ^..^ ya.
Sin of Men, changed: this Happy *uxl®. 2' <i'wuer x»i fA^n
Conftitution ofi Th.ngs, and made «V» f*&l*. «£ *' «'««»«-
y 4 ' Labour

ioo ' The Evidence of Natural
th $' ixai'ou- viri wXno-fmw J' Labour neceffary for the Support of
o; i'»%™ va; Tfwp^, eU v- our Lives.
Qftt l^iirio-ov Zeu; at (bio-ho-as -»,»*/-¦/
TD» takrwii, ij^MO-E •jra'»)<*J ««» <W arciou Ton Cjiov »V«J«|e. Calanus Inaui ¦
-apud Strabon. 'Lib. 15.
O/ <£« 7. g^«/ in Procefs of Time, after the firft En»
?lood- tfance of Sin into the World, Men by Degrees cor
rupted themfelves more and more, till at length
God, for the * Punifhment of,
* 'Ere l\ -l tS Seou tut /*<>?- their Sin and Incorrigiblenefs,
^ sI^'tjix®. lyiymo h auWj, brought upon them a general Flood,
^™ M**™} *>***« which deftroyed them all, ex,
S»{ E«^ra, Wti Ow; 5 cept a few Perfons, prelerved for
©£av zsuc. *T6 . 5t«r«'(*Mo; ««- the Reftoration of human Race,
SoP*, t^ To.^xof, iwowVaf y*- is a xruth delivered down to us,
a»W«0r.rs .\:,&.r„» 6*«Mf, not only by Authority of Scnp-
&c. iVa/a in Critia five At- ture, but alfo by the concurrent
/««'«?• Teftimony of almoft all Heathen
Philofophers and Poets : And the
Hiftories of all Nations backwards terminate in it :
And, (which is the moft remarkable Thing of all,
becaufe it is a demonftr'ative and ocular Proof of
the Univerfality of -fiome Juch Kind of Diffolutipn)
, the prefent vifible Frame and Conftitution of the
Earth thvoughout -, the Difpofition and Situation
of the feveral itrata of different Kinds of Matter,
whereof it is compofed ; the numberlefs Shells of
Fifties, BOnes of other Animals, and Parts of all
Kinds of Plants, which in every Country, and in
almoft every Place, are, at great Variety of Depths,
found inclofed in Earth, in Clay, in Stones; and
in all Sorts of Matter ; are fuch appannt Demon-
ftrations > f the faith's having been in Some Former
Times (the whole Surfiace of it at leaft) in a State of
Fluidity, that who foever has ken the Collections
of this Kind made by the very ingenious Dr. Wood"
ward, and others, muft, in a Manner, abandon all
'Ufe,

and Revealed Religion. 191
Ufe both of his Senfes and Reafon, if he can in
the leaft Doubt of this Truth. '
8. That God, after the Flood, made particular 0/ God$
Revelations of himfelf and of his Will to the Pa- revealing
priarchs, is a Thing very credible in itfelf, for the h'f"-lfft' '?
"feme Reafons that 1 have before fhewn in general, ^A/fw
that the Expectation of fome Revelation from God giving the
was a reafonable and probable Expectation, And La™ to
that, after this, God fhould vouchfafe by Exprefs the> 7ew'
Revelation to give a Law to the whole Nation of
the Jews, confifting very much in Sacrifices, and
in external Rites and ceremonious Obfervances,
. cannot with any juft Reafon be rejected as an in
credible Fact, if we confider, 'that fuch a Kind of
Inftitution was neceffary, in thofe Times and Cir
cumftances, to preferve that Nation from' the Ido
latry and Worfhip of falfe Gods, wherewith the
Countries around them were overfpread ; that thofe
Rites and Ceremonies were typical of, and prepa
rative to, a higher and more excellent Difpenfation ;
that the Jews were continually told by their Pro
phets, that their Obfervance of thofe Rites and Ce
remonies was by no Means fo highly acceptable to
God, nor fo abfolutely and indifpenfably infifted
upon by him, as Obedience to the Moral Law ; and
that the whole Matter oV'Fact, relating to that Re
velation, is- delivered down to us in a Hiftory, on
which the Polity of a whole Nation was founded.
at a Time when no Body could be ignorant of the
Truth of the principal Facts, and concerning which
we can now have no more Reafon to doubt, than of
any Hiftory of any ancient Matter of Fact in the
World. The moft confiderable and real Difficulty,
viz. why this Favour was gra'nted to that fingle
Nation only, and not to all the reft of the Wo. id
" likewife, is to be accounted for by the fame Reafons,
which prove (as has been before fhewn) that Geo page 165.
was not obliged to make known the Revelation of
the Gofpel to all Men alike,
q. That

192 The Evidence of Natural
Of the q. That all the other Particulars pf Scripture*
ether Par- ipjjiofy^ contained in the Old Teftament, are true Re-
ScrifZre- lations of Matter of Fact, (not to infift now on
Hiftory in the many Arguments which prove in general the
the Old Antiquity, Genuinenefs, and Authority of the
eftament. g00jis themfelves) will to a rational Inquirer ap^
appear very credible from hence, that very many
of the particular Hiftories, and fome even of the
miputer Circumftances alfo of thofe Hiflories, are
¦> confirmed by concurrent Teftimonies of profane and
unqueftionably unprejudiced Authors. Of which
* Lib. i. Grotius, in his excellent Book of * the Truth of the
e. 1 6. and Chriftian Religion, has given us, a large Collection.
iV. where As particularly, that the Manner ofi the Formation'
fee the pf the Earth out of a Chaos is mentioned by the
Citations ancienteft Phoenician, AEgypt'ian, Indian, and Greek
9X large. .Hiftorians ; the very Names of Adam and Eve,
by Sanchuniathon and others ; the Longevity of the
Antediluvians, by Berofius, and Manethos, and others ;
the Ark of Noah, by Berofius ; many Particulars
of the Flood, by Ovid and others ; the Family of
Noah, and two of every Kind of Animals entering
into the Ark with him, mentioned by Lucian him
felf, as a Tradition of the Ancient Grecians ; the
Dove which Noah fent out of the Ark, by Abydenus
and -f Autarch ; the Building of
f AEvxutiwi <?«<" mprtptit y Babel, by Abydenus ; the Burning
i» Tit ?-T«*0< «^-J*.' of ^ b Djodorus Sjcuks and
««*«. ulvepiw*, t J3J*<r y «w. oVra^, and Tacitus, and others ;
W«». phaarch: utrum Ter- feveral Particulars of the Hiftory
reftria an Aqvatica animantia 0f Abraham and the reft of the
this habeant Johrti.-e. -p. ¦ L , r> r j i
Patriarchs,, by Berofius and others ;
J ol 3, [m««Vj W.|->»- nian/ Particulars of Mofies's Ufe,
„l:v{«f .fti, ri.as » toj"? «r by feveral ancient Writers -, the
.oi? SisfisiKt StKaioir^xyooiiEf;, eminent Piety of the moft ancient
£ &«r.C* «{ «K«dv« fe- JexVs b -j- 5/ra^ and jnin dj_
vers Actions of David and 5o/o- '
#?e», in the Phoenician Annals ^
fome

and Revealed Religion. 193
feme of the Actions of Elijah, by Menander, and
confeffed by Julian himfelf ; the Hiftory of Jonah,
under the Name of Hercules, by Lycophron and * SeeStil-
JEneas Gazceus ; and the Hiftories of the following Ungfteet's
•Times, by many more Authors. Befides that 0r,g™fifa-
j{ as * learned Men have upon exceeding probable ^J'r.And
Grounds fupnofed) many of the moft ancient Scrip- Bochani
tnre-Hiftories are acknowledged and afferted in the Phaleg, &
Writings of the Poets, both Greeks and Latins ; \fffffx ^e
the true Hiftori.es being couched under fictitious tJi3.
Names and fabulous Reprefentations.
10. That God, in the Fulnefs of Time, that is', Of God's
at that Time' which his infinite Wifdom ( had fore- finding his
appointed, which all the Ancient Prophecies had s°n ffft0,,
,rr • 1 j 1 ¦ 1 r- tbe World
.determined, and which many concurrent ^^c^^ei- fcrtheRe-.
'ftances in the State of the Jewifh Religion, and in demptha
the Difpofition of the Roman Empire, had made a of Man*,
fit Seafon for the Reception and Propagation of a ¦'
new Inftitution of Religion -, that God (I fay) at
That Time, fh.o\$\d fiend his Only-begotten Son, That
Word or Wifidom of the- Father, That Divine Perfon
by whom (as ha,s been before 'fhewn) he created the
World, and by whom he made all former particular
¦Manifeftations of himfelf unto Men ; that he foould
fend him to take upon him our human Nature, and
¦therein to make a full and particular Revelation of
the Will of God to Mankind, (who by Sin had
corrupted themfelves, and forfeited the Favour of
God, fo that by the bare Light of Nature they
could not difcover any certain Means by which they
could be fatisfactorily and abfolutely fecure of re- '
gaihing that Favour;) To preach unto Men Repen-
tahce'and Remiffion of Sin, and, by giving himfelf
"a Sacrifice and Expiation for Sin, to declare the Ac-
- ceptablenefs of Repentance, arid the Certainty of
Pardon thereupon, in a Method evidently confiftent
with all neceffary Vindication of the Honour and
Authority of the Divine Laws, and with God's.
irreconcileable.

jo^. The Evidence of Natural
irreconcileable Hatred againft Sin ; To be a Me-.
diator and Interceffor between God and Man ; To
procure the particular Affiftance of God's Holy
Spirit, which might be in Men a new and effectual
Principle of a Heavenly and Divine Life ; in a
Word, To be the Saviour and Judge of Mankind,
and finally to bring them to Eternal Life : All this,
when clearly and exprefly revealed, and by good
Teftimony proved- to be fo revealed, is apparently
agreeable and very credible to right and true Rea
fon. As (becaufe it is the main arid fundamental
Article of the Chriftian Faith) I fhall endeavour to
make out more largely and diftinctly, by fhewing
in particular, that none of the feveral Objections,
upon which Speculative Unbelievers reject this Doc
trine, do at aU prove any Inconfiftency, in the Be
lief of ir, with found and unprejudiced Reafon.
fiat 'tit For,. Firft, It cannot be thought unreafonable to
not unrea- be believed in the general, that God foould make
ffuab!feG0cd a Revelation °f his WW to Mankind, fince on the
making a contrary (as has been before proved at large) it is
Revelation very agreeable to the Moral Attributes of God, and
ef hh mil to the Notions and Expectations of the wifeft and
to Men. mofl. ratjonai ]y[en that r^veci in the Heathen World.
That ,tis Secondly, It cannot be thought unreafonable to be
not unrea- believed, that in fuch a Revelation, wherein God
finable to freely proclaims Remiffion of Sin, and the Accept-
that'ded ablenefs of Repentance, he foould neverthelefs have
•would ap- appointed fuch a Sacrifice or Expiation for Sin, as
point aSa- might at the fame Time be a fufficient Teftimony
Extia °r °^ k*s irreconcileable Hatred againft it. For tho',
/ir sin." by the Light of Nature, it was indeed exceeding
probable and to be hoped for, that God would for
give Sin upon true Repentance, yet -it could not be
proved, that he was abfolutely obliged to do fo, or
that he would certainly do fo. On the contrary,
there was Reafon to fuppofe, that, in Vindication
of the Honour and Dignity of his Laws, he would .
require '

and Revealed Religion. - 1 95
.require fome further Satisfaction and Expiation.
And accordingly we .find the Cuftom of Sacrificing
to have prevailed univerfally over the Heathen
World in all Ages : Which, how unreafonable fo
ever an Expectation it was to think that the Blood
of Beafts could truly expiate Sin, yet thus much it
plainly and undeniably thews,, that it has been the
common Apprehenfion of Mankind in all Ages,
that God would not be appeafed nor pardon Sin
without fome Punifhment and Satisfaction ; and yet
at the fame Time they had good Hopes, that, upon
the Repentance of Sinners, God would accept fome
other Satisfaction inftead of the Deftruction of the
Offenders. 'Tis therefore plainly agreeable to right ,
Reafon to believe that God, in Vindication of the
Honour of his Laws, and for a Teftimony of his
Hatred againft Sin, foould appoint fome Sacrifice
or Expiation for Sin, at the fame Time that he for
gives the Sinner upon his true Repentance.
Thirdly, It cannot be thought unreafonable to That it a
be believed, that a Mediator or Interceffor fhould mt umea-
be appointed between God and Man, through and-^Jf^ ^
by whom the Prayers of Sinners may be offered upthataMe-
fo as to be acceptable in the Sight of God. 'Tis diator
well known, the Generality, of the wifeft Heathens ft",u,'f he
thought it agreeable to Reafon to make Ufe of/^"^
Subordinate Intelligences, Daemons or Heroes, by God and.
whom they put up their Prayers to the Superior Man.
Gods, hoping that, by the Mediation of thofe In-
:terceffors, the Unworthinefs of their own Perfons,
and the Defects of thefe Prayers might be fopplied,
and they might obtain fuch merciful and gracious
Anfwers to their Prayers, as they could not prefome
to hope for upon their own Account. Wherein
though thofe Pagans laboured indeed under very
great Uncertainty, in doing a Thing for which they
had no fufficient Warrant, and in ufing Mediators
whom they neither knew diftinctly to have any
. Being,

196 The Evidence of Natural
Being, nor could they however have any good Sc£
curity that fuch Mediation would be acceptable tof
the Supreme God -, yet, at the fame Time, this un
deniably proves, that 'tis by no Means inconfiftent
with right Reafon to believe that a Mediator may
by Divine Authority be appointed between God and
finful Men, to be their Ipterceffor and Advocate
with a juftly offended God.
*> . , Fourthly, The greateft real Difficulty in this Mat-
Gbjeaion ter' to tne Judgment of right Reafon, feems to1
drawn arife from the Confideration of the Dignity ofi the
fh>m the perfioni whom we believe to have given himfelf a
tte'pfffon Sacrifice and Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind,1.
•whom ive viz. how 'tis poffible, that .the Only-begotten Son cfi
believe to God foould be IncarmJe and become Man ; how
ie ourMe-^ls ce)nceivaDie that God fhould condeficend fo far as
Redeemer. *& fiend, and the Son ofi God condefcend willingly to
be fienti, and do fuch great Things for his Creatures ;
and, above all, how 'tis confiftent with Reafon to
fuppofe God condefcending to do fo much for fuch
frail and weak Creatures as Men, who, in all Ap
pearance, feem to be but a very fmall, low, and
inconfiderable Part of the Creation. And here
indeed it muft readily be acknowledged, that human
Reafon could never have difcovered fuch a Method
as this for the Reconciliation of Sinners to an offend
ed God, without exprefs Revelation. But then nei
ther on the other Side, when once this Method is'
made known, is there any fuch Difficulty or Incon-
ceivablenefs' in it, as can reafonably make a wife
and confiderare Man call in Queftion the Truth of a
well-attefted Revelation* merely upon that Account:
Which, indeed, any plain Abfurdity or Contradic
tion in the Matter of a Doctrine pretended to be re
vealed would, it muft be confeffed, unavoidably do.
, For, as to the Poffibility of the Incarnation of the, Son
ef God, whatever Myfterioufoefs there confeffedly
was jn the Manner of it, yet, as to the Thing itfelf, there

and Revealed Religion. 1 97
thefe is evidently no more Unreafonablenefs in be
lieving the Poffibility of it, than in believing the
Union of the Soul and Body, or any other certain
Truth which we plainly fee implies no Contradic
tion in the Thing itfelf, at the fame Time that we
are fenfible we cannot difcover the'Manner how it
is effected. Again, As to the Incredibility of the
Doclrine, that God fhould make fo great a Conde*
ficenfion to his Creatures ; and that a Perfon of fuch
Dignity as the Only-begotten Son of God fhould
vouchfafe to give himfelf a Sacrifice for the Sins of
Men : He that duly confiders, how 'tis no Diminu- '
tion to the Glory and Greatnefs of the Creator of all
Things to infpect, govern, and direct every Thing
by his All-wife Providence through the whole Crea
tion ; to take Care even of the Meaneft of his Crea
tures, fo that not a Sparrow falls to the Ground, or a
Hair of our Head perifhes without his Knowledge j
and to obferve exactly every Particle even of inani
mate Matter in the Univerfe : He (I fay) who duly
confiders This, cannot with Reafon think it any
reabDifparagement to the Son of God, (though it
was indeed a moft wonderful and amazing Inftance
of Humility and Condefcenfion) that he fhould
concern himfelf fo far for finful Men, as to appear
in their Nature to reveal the Will of God more
clearly to them, to give himfelf a Sacrifice and Ex
piation for their Sins, and to bring them to Repent
ance and Eternal Life. The greateft Enemies and
Deriders of Chriftianity have afferted Things far
more incredible to have been done upon far lefs
Occafions : Witnefs what Julian l
the Apoftate * thought fit to be- , *'°«Z!=! <l ^jf *»*
,. r . o-t 1 _ ¦ i AaKXtiitim tyEwoaEfEts oe Tnt .
heve concevmng^fculapms s com- 7~v ^ T-? -Ah yw!^ ^ fci.
ing down from Heaven, and con- tp^a- 0JV0; im y^ i| ou'?»W
verfing upon Earth in a vifible ^oinaa^of n^ov, inEituc
Form, only to teach Men the Art &rf ™ 'Z'>*»»s<* *<?«>*•
of healing Difeafes. And Modern Unbelievers,

The E v ld e n c e o/* Natural
Unbelievers, who feem willing in the contrary Etf*
treme, to deny God's having any Regard, or taking
any Care in any Refpect, for the Welfare and Hap*
pinefs of his Creatures, are forced, if they will
go about to give any Account or Explication of
Things, to invent much more incredible Hypo
thefes, difhonourable to God, and utterly incon*
fiftent with his Divine Attributes. Indeed, if we
will confider Things impartially, fo far is it from
being truly any Diminution of the Greatnefs and
Glory of God to fend his Son into the World for
the Redemption and Salvation of Mankind, that*
on the contrary, it is a Means of bringing the very -
greateft Honour to the Laws and Government of
God, that can be imagined. For What can be
imagined more Honourable, and worthy -of -the
Supreme Lord and Governor of all Things, than to
fhew forth his Mercy and Goodnefs, in forgiving
the Sins of frail and fallible Creatures, and fuffering
himfelf to be reconciled to them upon their true Re-; -
peritance, and yet at the fame Time to caufe fuch
an Expiation to be made for Sin, by the Sufferings
and Death of his own Son in their Nature, as might
be an abundant Evidence of his irreconcileable Ha
tred againft Sin, a juft Vindication of the Author-
rity and Dignity of his Laws, and a fufficient and
effectual Warning to deter Men from Sin, to create
in them the greateft Dread and Deteftation of it,
and for ever to terrify them from venturing upon
wilful Tranfgreffion and Difobedience ? 'Tis true,
no Man can take upon him certainly to fay, but
God by his abfolute Sovereignty and Authority
might, if he had fo pleafed, have pardoned Sin upon
Repentance, without any Sacrifice or Expiation at
all. But This Method of doing it by the Death
of Chrift is more wife and fit, and evidently more
proper and effectual to difcountenance and prevent'
Prefumption, to difcourage Men froai repeating their
Tranfgreffions,

and Revealed Religion. 199
Tranfgreffions, to give them a deep Senfe of the
heinous Nature of Sin, and to convince them of
the Excellency and Importance of the Laws' of
God, and the indifpenfable Neceffity of paying
Obedience to them ; forafmuch as it fliews us, that
at the fame Time that God was willing to fave the
Sinner, yet, left Encouragement fhould be given to
Sin by letting it go unpunifhed, he did not think
fit to forgive the Tranfgreffions of Men without
great Sufferings in our Nature, and to do away the
Guilt of our Sins but upon fuch difficult Terms as
the Death of his own Son. So that in this Difpen
fation, Juftice and Mercy and Truth are met together ¦,
Right eoufinefis and Peace have kiffed each other. And
by how much the greater the Dignity of the Perfon
was,, who gave himfelf thus a Sacrifice for the Sins
of Men, of fo ,much the greater Weight and Force
is this Argument to deter Men for the future from
Sin, and to convince them of the Neceffity of Obe
dience. Wherefore fo far is it from being true,
that the Confideration of the Dignity of the Perfon
fuffering is a real Objection againft the Credibility
of the Doctrine, that on the contrary, That very
Confideration contains the higheft Vindication ima
ginable of the Greatnefs, and Honour, and Autho
rity of the Laws of God, and at the fame Time,
the greateft poffible Inftance or Expreffion of his
Mercy and Compaffion towards Men, agreeable
to our natural Notions of his Divine Attributes.
And then, as to the laft Part of this Difficulty, viz.
how it can be confiftent with Reafon to fuppofe
God condefeending to do fo very great Things for
fuch mean and weak Creatures as Men axe, who in
all Appearance, feem to be but a very fimall, low,
and inconfiderable Part of the Creation ; forafmuch
as the whole Earth .itfelf is but a little Spot that
bears no Proportion at all t6 the Univerfe ; and,
in all Probability of Reafon, the large and num-
Z berlefs

*L%e Evidence of Natural
berlefs Orbs of Heaven cannot but be fuppofed fo
be rilled with Beings more capabfe, than we, to
fhew forth the Praile and Glory of their Almighty
Creator, and more worthy, to be the Objects of his
Care ahd Love : To this Part of the Difficulty, I
fay, the Anfwer is very eafy, That the Mercy and
Love of the infinitely good God, is extended equaly
Over aft, his Works ; That, let the Umverfe be
fuppofed as large, and the rational Creatures, with
which it is furnifhed, as many and excellent, as
any one can imagine, yet Mankind is plainly the
Chief, indeed the only Inhabitant, for whofe Sake
'tis evident this our Globe of Earth was formed.
into a habitable World ; and this our Earth is, as.
far as we have any Means of judging, as confider-
able and worthy of the Divine Care, as moft other
Parts of the Syftem ; and this our Syftem as con
siderable, as any other fingle. Syftem in the Uni
verfe ; and finally, that, in like Manner as ther
fame Divine Providence, which prefides over the
whole Creation, does particularly govern and di
rect every Thing in this our lower World, as well
as in every other particular Part of theUniveffe ;,
fo there is no real Difficulty to right Reafon, in
conceiving that the fame Divine Legos, the Word
Or Meffenger of the Father, who in various Difpen-
fations, according to the particular Needs and Exi
gencies of Mankind, has made various Manifefta-
tions of God, and Difcoveries of the Divine Will,
to Us here upon Earth, may alfo, for aught we
know, have to other Beings, in other Parts of the
Univerfe, according to their feveral Capacities or
Wants, made different Manifeftations of God and
Difcoveries of his Will, in Ways of which we can
know nothing, and, in which we have no Concern :
There being nothing in this at all contrary to the
Nature of God, or the Condition of 'Things. -
Fifthly

find Revealed ReligigNj 2 of
(. -Fifthly and laftly, If any one thinks it unreafon- Of /he
Able, to be believed, that God foould fend his Son Objeaioji
into the World for the Redemption of Mankind, t"™t6e
and yet that this Appearance of the Sort of God chrifiL
upon Earth foould not be till the latter Ages of the Revelation
World ; and after he has appeared, yet his Ap- mt bcin&
pearance not be made known equally to all Nations ; 'ynfferrai
Such a one * muft likewife for the fame Reafon * See
affirm, that tis unreafonable to believe the Necef- above,
fity and Obligations even of Natural 'Religion itfelf, Page 165.
(becaufe tis plain all Men are not furnifoed equally
with the fame Capacities and Opportunities of un
derftanding thofe Obligations ; And confequently
no Deift can, confiftently with his own Principles,
make This Objection againft the Truth of Chri
ftianity. He muft likewife for the fame Reafon
/affirm, that God is obliged in all other Refpects
alfo to make all his Creatures equal ; to rhake Men*
Angels ; to endue All Men with the fame Faculties. -. /
and Capacities, as Any -, at leaft, to make all Men.
Capable of the very fame Kind and the fame Degree
of Happinefs, and to afford to All of them all the
very fame Means or Opportunities of obtaining it ;.
In a Word, he muft- affert, that infinite Wifdom
cannot reafonabiy be fuppofed to have a Right of
making Variety of Creatures in very various Cir
cumftances : Which is an Affertion palpably moft
abfurd, in Experience falfe, and a very urijuttDimi-*
/uition of God's Sovereignty in the World.' But
¦befides, Though the Redemption purchafed by
the Son of Gbd is not indeed- actually made known
unto All Men, yet, as no .Man ever denied, but :
that the Benefit of the Death of Chrift extended
backwards to thofe who lived before his Appearance
in the World, fo no Man can prove, but that the
fame Benefit may likewife extend itfelf forwards to
thofe who never heard of his Appearance, though
they lived aft it it.
» '¦ Z a k ii- That

202

The 'Evidence of Natural

Of the 1 1 . That the Hiftory of 'the Life of Chrift, con-'
other Par- tained In the New Teftament, is a true Relation of
ticulars "f Mmers 0f Fa£l (not to jnfifl- here on the Teftimony
bcripture- . < .111-.11 1 • i n 11 i
hijhrycon- of his Difciples and Followers, which IhalJ be con-
taine'd in fidered hereafter in its proper Place) will to a rati
ne Ncvj ona| inqUirer appear very credible from herice,
ej anient. ^at ^^ many Particulars' of that Hiftory are con
firmed by concurrent Teftimonies of profane and
unqueftionably unprejudiced Authors. That be
fore the Coming of our Saviour, there was a general
Expectation fpread over all the Eaftern Nations,
that out offudaa foould arife a Perfon who fhould
be Governor of the World, is exprefly affirmed
by the Roman Hiftorians, * Sue
tonius and -f Tacitus. That there
Jived in Judaa, at the Time which
the Gofpel relates, fuch a Perfon
as Jefius of Nazareth, is acknow
ledged by all Authors, both Jew-
ifh and Pagan, who have written
fince that Time. The Star that
appeared at his Birth, and the
Journey of the Chaldaan Wife
Men, is mentioned by J Chalcidius
the Platonift. Herod's, caufing all
the Children in Bethlemen under
two Years old to be Slain, and a
Reflexion made upon him on
that Occafion by the Emperor
Auguftus, is related by || Macrdbius.
Many of the Miracles that Jefus
worked in his Life- time, are, as
to Matters of Fact, (particularly
his Jiealing the Lame and the
Blind, and calling out Devils)
remarkable and pertinent, that 'tis Jtrange how Gtotius could' omit to
mention it in the Place now cited.] exprefly

* Percrebuerat Oriente toto
veuis & conftans opinio, effe
in fatis, ut Judaea profefti re
rum potirentur, Sueton.
\ Pluribus perfuafio in-
erat, antiquis Sacerdotum li-
bris contineri, eo ipfo tem
pore fore, ut valefceret O-
riens, profe&ique Judsea re
rum potirentur. Tacit, lib.
21. % See the Place cited by
Grotius, de Veritate Chrifti-
ans Religionis, lib. 3. cap.
14. || Cum audiffet [Jugi/ftus,]
inter pueros quos in Syria
Herodes Re* Judaeorum intra
bimatum juflit interfici, filium
quoque ejus occifum ; ait,
Melius eft Herodis porcum effe
quam filium. Macrob. lib. z.
cap. 4. [A Tefiimony fo very

203
* See the Places cited by
Grotius, de Veritate Chrift. Ret.
lib. 2. cap. 5.

and Revealed Religion.
exprefsly owned by the moft im
placable Enemies of Chriftianity,
by * Celfius and Julian, and the
Authors of \hejewifih Talmud. And how the Power
of the Heathen Gods ceafed, after the Coming of
Chrift, is acknowledged by f Porphyry, who attri- f Ibid.
butes it to their being Angry at the Setting up
of. the Chriftian Religion, whiph heftyles impious
and profane. Many Particulars of the collateral
Hiftory, concerning John Baptifi, and Herod and
¦ Pilate, (not to mention the fan^ous Teftimony
concerning Jejus himfelf, becaufe it is by Some
fufpected not to be genuine, notwithftanding it
is found in all the ancient Copies) are largely
recorded by Jofiephus. The Cru
cifixion of Chrift under Pontius
Pilate is related by J Tacitus :
And diverfe of the moft remark
able Circumftances attending it,
filch as the Earthquake and mi
raculous Darknefis, were recorded
in the || public Roman Regifters,
commonly appealed to by the
firft Chriftian Writers as what
could not be denied by the Ad
verfaries themfelves ; and are in
a very particular Manner atteft-
ed by § Phlegon. Then, as to
the Refurrection and Afcenfion
of Chrift, thefe depend on the
general Proofs of the Credibility
of his Dificiples Teftimony, and
other following Evidences -, which
will be eonfidered hereafter in
their proper Place.

X Tiberio imperitante, per
procuratorem Pentium Pila-
tum, fupplicio affectus erat.
lib. 15.
|| Eum mundi cafiim rela-
tum in Arcanis veftris habecis.
TertuUian. Apol.
§ IIe^i l\ Tiis \m Ti/3E<na
Kai<r«£©- IxAeitJ/ew;, a @a.cn7\EV-
Ctl'&. Ky 0 lriO-Xq ,£OiKEV srecv-
gucrSuf t£ TTEgi Tut UEyahaiv
TOTE yEVOLlEtUt (SElO-f/jUV T»)$ yvtq,
awypnuJ/E xj 4>?Jym. Origen.
adverj. Ce/J. lib. 2,
TeIo^Iw 8' ETEi TVi Sixxoo-i-
ori; asvliga; ' Ot.v/ii/irictb'®' iyi-
*e\o s'k^eiiJ'I; t!7iit>. pEyltfin t£v
lyVUgiO-(J£tUt <lTf OTE^Of >c} ni| U^OL
e«/i) Tris nyS^ctq Eyitilo, are x^
arEfai; it i^am <pa.vnta.i- xj
o-Eio-puq, &c. Phlegon.

Z 3

12. That

fe 04 The Evidence of Natural
Of the pay 1 2. That God has appointed a Day, wherein he
°f Judg- mil judge the World in Right eoufinefis, by That Perfiolt
^f>V?/ whom; he has ordained, in order to reward every
Lhrtjt the ^ .... ' , , . -r-. n- ¦ I
judge, Man according to his Works, is a Doctrine per*
feftly agreeable to right Reafon, and to our natural
Notions of the Attributes of God ; As may appear
more particularly from what has been before faid
Concerning vthe Neceffity and Certainty of another
Life after this", and is evident from the Opinion of
all the wifer Heathens'concerning this Matter. Nor
"may it perhaps be altogether impertinent to obferve
here, that the Poet's, both Greek and Latin, have
unanimoufly agreed in this one particular Circum
ftance, that Men after Death fhould not have Judg
ment paffed upon them immediately by God him*
felf, but by juft Men appointed for that Purpofe.
®f fih 13.. That, in order to this final Judgment, not
fitofthe on]y the ^oul fha!1 furvive the Diffolution of the >
god): ' Body, but the Body, itfielfi alfo fhall be raified again %
This Doctrine, though not indeed difcoverable
with any Kind of Certainty by the bare Light of
Nature, becaufe the Belief of the Soul's Immortality
(for aught that appears to Reafon alone) -is fufficient
to anfwer all the Purpofes of a Future State, as fa?
as is difcoverable merely by the Light of Nature ;
yet this Doctrine (I fay) of The Refiurreclion of the
Body, when made known by Revelation, evidently
contains nothing in ic in the leaft contrary to right
Reafon. For what reafonable Man can deny, but
that 'tis plainly altogether as eafy for God to raife
the Body again after Death, as to create and form
'it at firft ? Some of the * Stoical
* hr.*,av uf eJ/v aSotctlm *} Philofophers feem to have thought
rf^>f«l*«r.^T,„, *•*»» it not only. p0ffib!e, but even
y?E°ioda.<t. Titfjy EitfVfMtut OT8, lit X J r
,f{ 5 ,St lo^t aW«W«wS«. probable : And many of the Jews,
*%*!**¦ Chryfppi,s citat. a who had no exprefs Revelation
nl- t'$- 7- concerning it, vjid yet believe it
yp<m

- ¦ and Revealed Religion. 2P 5
Upon an ancient Tradition, as appears from all
their Writings, and particularly from the Tranf-
Jation of the laft Verfe of the Book of Job, which
according to the Seventy runs thus : So Job died, be
ing old and fiull of Days; but * 'tis
written that he fihall rifie again with , * r-W1" * «"'«' '***>
tboje whom the Lord raifies up. Unrw. ' Job. xlil ult.
The only real Difficulty in this
Doctrine feems to arife upon putting the Suppofi
tion of One Body's being turned into the Nourifh-
ment, and becoming Part of the Subftance of ano
ther, fo as that the fame Parts may equally belong
to two Bodies, to both of which it fhall neverthe-
lets be abfolutely impoffible that the fame Parts
fhould be reftored. But this Objection, as great
and principal a Difficulty as it is, is really but a
great Trifle. For there does not "at all appear any
abfolute Neceffity, that, fo conftitute the fame
'•Body3 there muft be an exact Reftitution of all
and only the fame Parts. And if theie was any
fuch Neceffity, yet even ftill, without making that
hard Suppofition (which -f- Grotius and others have tDeVeri-
done) that God by a miraculous Providence always !?'e ^ef
/ .,- J in r 1 t. 1 Chr. lib. 2.
mterpoies to prevent, the Parts of one human Body cap% ,0>
from incorporating with and becoming the Nou-
rifhment of another, (for I cannot fee any fufficient '
Ground to deny, but that it may be poffible fo
Nature, for barbarous Cannibals, if any fuch there
be, to fubfift for fome Time, a id live wholly one
upon another, if deprived of all other Suftenanre ;)
"Without-any fuch hard Suppofitions as thefe. (Ifay) -. -
'tis eafy to imagine many Ways, by which the Re- .J t
forrection of the fame Body, properly fpeaking,
fliall neverthelefs be very poffible, and the whole
Foundation of this, and all other Difficulties of this
Kind, concerning the Parts, and Forms, and Mag
nitudes, and Proportions, of our future Bodies, be
intirely taken away.
Z 4 As,

206 The Evidence of Natural
OftheRe- As, Firft, No Man can fay 'tis improbable (and
iflhffame ^ wh° haVe bee" mpft and beft Verfed *" Microf-
Boa), copical Obferva tions, think it more than probable)
that the original Stamina, which contain all and
every one of the folid Parts and Veffels of the
Body, not excepting even the minuteft Nerves and
Fibres, are themfelves the intire Body, and that all
the extraneous Matter, which, coming in by Way
of Nourifoment, fills up and extends the minute
and infenfible Veffels, of which all the vifible and
fenfible Veffels are compofed, is not ftrictly and
properly Part of the Body. Confequently, while
all this extraneous Matter, which ferves only to
- fwell the Body to its juft Magnitude, is in continual
Flux, the original Stamina may continue unchanged,
and fo no Confufion of Bodies will be poffible in
Nature. There may be made many very confider-
able Obfervations concerning the determinate Figure
into which every refpective Body unfolds itfelf by
Growth, concerning the Impoffibility of the Body's
extending itfelf, by any Nourifoment whatfoever,
beyond that certain Magnitude, to which the ori
ginal Veffels are capable of being unfolded ; and
concerning the Impoffibility ofi reftoring by any Nou
rifoment any the fmalfeft Veffel or folid Part of the
Body, that has at any Time happened to be muti
lated by any Accident : All which Obfervations,
often and carefully made, will' feem very much to
favour fome fuch Speculation as This.
Secondly, It may alfo be fuppofed otherwife, not
without good Probability, that *
* 'H(Xi"{ fut at, S <pu(A.\t, ™ in like Manner as in every Grain
iuKpSa.flto-uiA.a- iWpx^S*. ofCorn there is contained a minute
* ?'J "f5 •'*"'' ~"5 w infenfible feminal Principle, which
rr,t ha<pSa.^vla. xoxxov ts (titsC ;-..,_ . ¦ r -ni i
tiyoiMt ydq *WsP ett, tS k6k- is ltlelt the intire future Blade
kov th cWov iytifs\a\ r«xns, and Ear, and, in due Seafon,when
ti/Tt! Koyi^. ti? eyKEpiai tu au-
p,a\i, «'<p' ov fti) (p&ieDftsvow tyetfETai to cwftat it eitpfyagc-'if, Qrigen, adverfi.
Cef. lib. 5. . ¦ all

and Revealed Religion. 207
all the reft of the Grain is corrupted, evolves and
unfolds itfelf vifibly into that Form ; fo our pre
fent mortal and corruptible Body may be but the
Exuvia, as it were, of fome hidden and at prefent
infenfible Principle, (poffibly the prefent Seat of the
Soul) which at. the Refurrection fhall difcover itfelf
in its proper Form. This Way alfo, there can be
no Confufion of Bodies, poffible in Nature. And
'tis not without fome Weight, that the ancientefl
Writers of the Church have always made Ufe of
this very Similitude ; that the Apoftle St. Paul
himfelf alledges the fame Comparifon ; and that
the Jewifh Writers feem to have had fome obfeurc
Glimpfe of this Notion, when they talked of a
certain incorruptible Part of the Body, though thefe
latter indeed explained themfelves very weakly and
unphilofophically. Many other Ways perhaps may be imagined,
by which the fame Thing may be explained intelli-
. gibly. But thefe Speculations are nice andfubtile,
and neither needful nor proper to be enlarged upon
in this Place, Only the bare Mention of therii,
foews the manifold Poffibility of the Doctrine of the
Refurrection, againft the Objections of thofe who
would have it feem contradictory.
14. Laftly, That after the Refurrection apd the Of the
general Judgment, wherein every Man fhall be judg- eternal
ed, according to his Works ; they that have done ^^T
well, fhall go into everlafiing Happinefs ; and they Bhffed, '
that have done Evil, into everlafting Punijhment ; is and the
a Doctrine in itfelf very credible, and reafonable to etfrnaJ,
be believed. Concerning the everlafting Happinefs J™; '^ tht
of the Righteous, there is no Difpute ; it being evi- Damned.
dent that God in his infinite Bounty may Reward
the fincere Obedience of his Creatures, as much
beyond the Merit of their own weak and imperfect
Works, as he himfelf pleafes. But the everlafting
Fmifhrnent, threatened to the Wicked, has feemed to
Many

The Evidence of Natural
Many a great Difficulty ; fince 'tis certain from, ouf
natural Notions of the. Attributes of God, that no
Man fhall be punifoed beyond the juft Demerit of
his Sins. Here therefore it is to be obferved, firft,
that no Man can fay 'tis unreafonable, that they who
by wilful *and ftubborn Difobedience to their Al
mighty Creator and moft merciful Benefactor, ^nd,
t>y the habitual Practice of unrepented Wickednefs,
have, during the State of Trial, made themfelves
unfit for the Enjoyment of thatHappinefs which
God has prepared for them that love and obey him,-
fhould be eternally rejected, and excluded, from it.
Thus much the wicked'eft of Men are willing
enough to believe : And if bare Deprivation ofi Hap-
finefis was all the Punifoment they had Reafon to
fear, they would be well content to fit ftHi in their
Wickednefs. But is it at all agreeable to Reafon to
believe, that the Punifoment, to be inflicted by the
final Wrath of a provoked God upon his pioft ob-
ftinate and incorrigible Enemies, "fhould be merely
fuch a Thing as is in its own Nature lefs dreadful
and terrible, than even thofe Afflictions which by
certain Experience we fee in this prefent Life fall. .
fometimes upon fuch Perfons with whom God is
hot angry at all ? Is it agreeable to.Reafon to be
lieve, that God, who (as is evidsnt by Experience)
fuffers the very beft of his own Servants, for the Pu-
riifoment of their Sins, or even only for the Trial
of their Virtue, to fall fometimes under all the Ca
lamities and Miferies, which tis poffible for the
'cruelieft and moft powerful Tyrants to invent and
execute, fhould punifh his moft obftinately rebelli-
. ous and finally impenitent Creatures, with nothing
more than the Negation of Happinefs ? There muft
therefore in the next Place be fome fenfible and pofitive
Punifihment, befides the mere negative Lofs of Happi
nefs. And whoever ferioufly confiders the dtead-
ful Effects of God's Anger in this prefent' World, in

¦and Revealed Religion^ zog,
in the Inftance of the general Deluge, the Overthrow
pf Sodom and Gomorrha, the amazing Calamities
which befell the whole Jewifih Nation at the De
ftruction of Jerufialem, and other fuch-like Exam
ples ; in fome of which Cafes, the Judgments have
fallen upon mixed Multitudes of good Men and
bad together ; (not to mention the Calamities which ¦-
fometimes befall even good Men by themfelves :)
"Whofoever, I fay, ferioufly confiders all this, can
not but frame to himfelf very terrible Apprehenfi-
1 ons of the Creatnefis of that Punifhment, which the
defpifed Patieince of God foall finally inflict on the
jmpenitently Wicked and Incorrigible, when tuey
foall be feparated and be by themfelves. And then,
as to the Duration of this Punifhment, no Man can
prefume in our prefent State of Ignorance and
Darknefs to be able truly to judge, ' barely by the
Strength of his own natural Reafon, what in this
Refipebl is or is not confiftent with the Wifdom, and
Juftice, and Goodnefs, of the Supreme Governor of
the World, fince we neither know the Place, .nor
Kind, nor Manner, nor Circumftances, nor Degrees^
nor All .the Ends and Ufies of the final Punifoment
, of the Wicked : Only this one Thing we are certain
of, that the Juftice of God will abundantly vindi
cate itfelf, and all Mouths fhall be flopped before
him, and be forced to acknowledge the exact Righr.-
teou'foefsof ail his Judgments, and to condemn their
own Folly and Wicked nefs -, forafmuch as the De-
grees or Jntenfienefis of the Punifhment which foall
-be inflicted on the Impenitent, foall be exactly pro
portionate to their Sins, as a Recompence of then?
Demerit, fo that no Man foall fuffer more than he
has deferved. This being once clearly eftablifhed,
the Difficulty about the Duration of the Punifhment
'will not appear fo infuperable to right Reafon. Fo*
nothing can be more evident, than that God may
iuftJy banifh. the Wicked eternally from- his King
dom

2i6 The Evidence of Natural
dom of Glory, and from that Happinefs which is
his free and undeferved Gift to the Righteous :
ReV'sf Vfl And the P°fltive Punifoment which foall be inflict-
le'torment- ed uPon tnem in that Sta£e of Eternal Rejection,
" ed vcith foall undoubtedly be fuch, and fo proportionated
Fire and to Mens Deferts, as the Righteous Judge will then
^ntfePrl ma^e aPPear> before Men and Angels, to be juft,
fince of the and wife, and neceffary, and fuch only as becomes
Holy An- the infinitely Wife and Good Lord and Governor
gels, and 0f tne Univerfe to inflict. The Wifeft of the Hea-
fince'onbc then, Philofophers, without the Help of Revelation,
Lamb. have taught, and did believe it agreeable to right
Reafon, that * the Punifhment of
* otfefi> SiZ«™J»*™<; the Incorrigible foould be [alwwi]
• VEiv iia. to. aiyisn rat au,a.p- ..-, ., ° , . ,
i ¦- .'.. ¦ «,*,^«'.7..^». without any determinate or known
turf* |W1« Et; rot Tafra^ot, End. And We cannot tell how
S$w a'wole ia^oiitovai. Plato in many wife Defigns God may ferve
Phf~' v . / ' > thereby. We know not but that,
»(»'{»(, Sra xj of ™„ hfS, as God has now difcovered to Us
imUat sfnytflai, teTluW -n xj in fome Meafure the Fall andPu-
fwrx-yayo). Celf. apud Origen. nifhment of evil Angels, to be a
' o?i» .-»«.. «-^r« •:»(..( Warning to Us -, fo he may here-
««koV{ o-wrtfoflai. Id. ibid. after ufe the Example of the Pu-
. nifhment of Wicked and Incorrigi
ble Men, to be a Means of preferving other Beings
in their Obedience. And many other Confidera-
tions there may poffibly be, very neceffary to ena
ble us to judge rightly Concerning this Matter ;
which, in this prefent State, we have no fufficient
Means of coming to the Knowledge of.
Thus all the Credenda, or DoClrincs, which the
Chriftian Religion teaches, (that is, not only thofe
plain Doctrines which it requires to be believed as
fundamental, and of Neceffity to eternal Salvation,
but even All the Doctrines which it teaches as Mat
ters of Truth) are in the Firft Place, though indeed
many of them not difcoverable by bare Reafon un-
affifted

and Revealed Religion. ait
afiifted with Revelation, yet, when * T«y T« *¦*«»! uV"»> ran
difcovered by Revelation, appa- *°?f? lwoAa'5 w'e^" ™"7?:
t) n * ,, / c j ?">oii». Ongen. adverf. Cell.
rently moft * agreeable to found /,£, 3> '
and unprejudiced Reafion.
In the »w/ Place, Every one of thefe Doctrines Every on,
has a natural Tendency, and a direct and powerful °f them
Influence, to refiorrh Mens Lives, and corretl their has a&-
Manners. This is. the Great End, and ultimate " e"fd
Defign, of all true Religion ; and 'tis a very great powerful
and fatal Miftake to think that any Doctrine, or M«w
any Belief whatfoever, can be any otherwife of any 'L"-^,"1
Benefit to Men, than as it is fitted to promote this „™m
main End. There was none of the Doctrines of our
Saviour, (as an -f excellent Prelate of our Church \ArchBp.
admirably expreffes this Matter) calculated fior the Sharp's
Gratification of Mens idle Curiofities, the bufying and wmoni.
amufing them with airy and ufielefis Speculations ; Much Queen on
lefis were they intended for an Exercife of our Credulity, Chriftmas
or a Trial -how fiar we could bring our Reafon to fiub- Day 1704.
mil to our Faith : But, as on the one Hand they were
plain and fimple, and Juch aS, by their Agreeablenefis
to the rational Faculties of Mankind, did highly • re
commend themfelves to our Belief ; fo on the other Hand
they had an immediate Relation to Practice, and were
the genuine Principles and Foundation upon which all
human and divine Virtues were naturally to be fiuper-
firuded. Particularly, What can be a more necef
fary and excellent Foundation of true Religion, than
That Doctrine which the Chriftian Religion clearly
and diftinctly teaches us concerning the Nature
and Attributes of the One only true God, without any
of that Ambiguity and Doubfiulnefs, thofe various
and inconfiftent Opinions and Conjectures, thofe
uncertain and oft-times falfe Reafonings concerning
the Nature of God, which, notwithftanding the
natural Poffibility of difcovering very many of the
Attributes of God by the Light of true Reafon, did

Si & , The Evidence^ Natural
did yet in Fact overfpread the greateft Part of the!
Heathen World with Pobytheifm or Atheifm ?
"What can be fo certain a Prefervative againftido-
latry, and the Worfhip of falfe Gods, -as the
Doctrmej that the Univerfe, the Heavens and the
Earth, and 'all Things contained therein, are the
Creatures and Workmanfhip of the One true God, and
have a continual Dependence upon Him for the Pre*
fervation of their Being ? What can be fo fure a
Ground pf true Piety and Reliance upon God, as
the clear Chriftian Doctrine concerning Providence,
concerning God's perpetually governing and di*
jecting the Iflues and Events of all Things, and
infoecting with a more efpecial Regard the moral
Actions of Men ? which Doctrine was perplexed'
by the Philofophers with encllefs Difputes. ' What
Can be fo juft a Vindication of the Goodnefs of
God, and confequently fo neceffary in order to our
maintaining in our Minds worthy and honourable
Notions- concerning him, as the Doctrine, that
God created Man at firft Upright, and that the. Ori
ginal of all Evil and Mifery is Sin ? the Want of a
clear Knowledge of which Truth extremely per
plexed the Heathen World, and made Many recur
to that moft abfurd Fiction of a Self-exiftent Evil
Principle. What can be a more proper Motive to
Piety, than the Doctrine that the Deluge, and other
remarkable Calamities which have befallen Man*
kind, were fent upon them by God's immediate
Direction, as Punifhments for their Wickednefs t
What can be a greater Encouragement to the Prac
tice of Holinefs, than the Doctrine, that God hat
at feveral Times vouchfiafed to make fieveral particular
Revelations ofi his Will to Men, to inftruct and fup
port them more effectually in that Practice ? But
above all, What Doctrine could ever have been-ima*
gined fo admirably fitted in all Refpects to promote
all the Ends of true Religion, as that of the hear- nation

and Revealed Religion. £t$
jiation of the Son of God? Which Way could Men
have been filled with fo deep a Senfe of, the Mercy
and Love of God towards them, and have been
inftructed in all divine Truths in a Method fo well
accommodated to their prefent Infirmitiesj as by
God's, fending his Only -begotten Son, to Jake upon him
eur Nature, and therein .to make a general Revelation of
the Will ofi God to Mankind? How could the Flonour
and Dignity, and Authority of the Laws of God
have been fo effectually vindicated, and at the fame
Time fo fatisfactory an Affu ranee of Pardon upon
true Repentance have been given unto Men, as by
this Method of the Son of God giving himfelf a Sacri
fice andExpiation for Sin? What could have been,
a more glorious Manifeftation of the Mercy and
Compaffion of God, and at the fame Time a more
powerful Means to difcountenance Mens Prefump-
tion, to difcourage them from repeating their Tranf
greffions, to give them a deep Senfe of theheinous,
Nature of Sin, and of God's extreme Hatred and
utter Irreconcileablenefs to it, and to convince
them of the Excellency and Importance of the Lawa
of God, and the indifpenfable Neceffity of paying.
Obedience to them, than this Expedient of fiaving:
Sinners by the Sufferings and Death of the Son of God,
and by eftablifhing with them a new and gracious;
Covenant upon the Merits oJ that Satisfaction ? How
could Men be better encouraged to begin z religi
ous Life, than by having fuch a Mediator, Advocate,
and Inlerceffor for them with God, to obtain Pardon
of ail their Frailties, and by being affured of the
Affiftance of the Spirit of God, to enable them to-
conqucr all tlieir corrupt Affections,, and to be in
them an effectual Principle of a heavenly and divine
Life? In fine, What ftronger and more powerful
Motives could' poffibly have been contrived to
peri'uade Men to live virtuoufly, and to deter them
from Vice, than the clear Di.fcovery made to us in
the

The Evidence of Natural
the Gofpel of God's having appointed a Day, tvherein
he will judge the World in Righteoufnefs ^ every Man
according to his Works ; and that they who have done
•well, fihall be adjudged to everlafting Happinefs; and
they that have done Evil, to endlefs Punijhment ; of
which the Light of Nature afforded Men but obfcure
Glimpfes ? And may we not here, upon the Whokv
appeal now even to our Adverfaries themfelves, whe
ther in all and every one of thefe Doctrines there be
not a more powerful, a more effectual Method laid
down, for the Reforming human Nature, and oblige
ing the whole World to forfake their Sins, and to
lead holy and virtuous Lives, than was ever taught
before ; nay, or than was poffible to have been con
trived by all the Wit of Mankind ? This is the
great and higheft Recommendation of the Chriftian
Doctrine : This is what, to a well-difpofed Mind,
would well-nigh fatisfactorily prove, even without
the Addition of any external Teftimony, that the
Revelation of Chriftianity could not poffibly but
Come from God -, Seeing that, not only all its prac
tical Precepts, but even al I its Articles of Belief alfo,
tend plainly to this one and the fame End, to make
Men univerfally amend and reform their Lives ; to
recover and reftore them to their original excellent
State, from the Corruption and Mifery which had
been introduced by Sin; and to eftablifh upon Earth
the Practice of everlafting Righteoufnefs, and intire
and hearty Obedience to the Will of God : Which
would have been the Religion bf Men (had they,
continued Innocent) in Paradife, and now is the Re
ligion of Angels, and for ever will be the Religion
of Saints in Heaven. Vain Men may value them
felves upon their fpeculative Knowledge, right Opi
nions, and true and Orthodox Belief, feparate,
from the Practice of Virtue and Righteoufnefs;
But, as fure as the Gofpel is true, no Belief what-1'
foever foall finally be of any Advantage to Men,apy. other-

and Revealed Religion. 215
otherwife than only fo far as it corrects their Prac
tice, hinders them from being Workers of Iniquity, Lake xiiL
and makes them like unto God. 7-
,'- ,. Laftly; All the Doctrines of the Chriftian Faith And all of
QoTogetber make up an infinitely more confiftent them.Toge-
and rational Scheme of Belief, than any that the Wifeft therfnakc
.-/-,. . . r„ ., J r i , ¦ 1,1 n si up the moft
Of the Ancient Philofophers ever did, or the Cun- fonfiflent
hingeft of Modern Unbelievers can invent or con- and ration
trive. This is evident from a fummary View of the ,ial^c.bef".
iorementloned Scheme of the Chriftian Doctrines, °-fhe 'jf^Jj;
wherein every Article has a juft Dependence on the
foregoing ones, and a cfofe Connexion with thofe
that follow ; and the whole Account of the Order
and Difpofition of Things, from tJheOriginal to the
Confummatio'n of all Things, is one intire, regular,'.
complete, confiftent,' and every Way a moft rational
Scheme : Whereas the Wifeft of the Ancient Phi
lofophers, that is, thofe of them who hit upon the
greateft Number, of fingle Truths, and taught the
feweft Abfurdities, were yet *
never able to make out any uni- . * Diveffi ac diverse omnia
verfal, intire, and coherent Syftem Pro£ulerf l> non annefteme.
. . _,. ' .. . ,01 r 1 nec cau!as rerum, ,nee con-
6f Doctrines,' and Scheme Of the fequentias, nefc rat/iones; ut
Whole State of Things, with arty - Suntmam illarri, qua- continet
Manner of Probability : And the aniverfi, & compingerent &
Cunningeft of Modern peifis (be- tomPlertet- ^aant.lib.f.
fides that they muft needs, in their ;-,-
own Way, believe fome particular Things ftranger
and in themfelves more incredible than any of the
fprementioned Chriftian Doctrines) cannot in the
whole, as has beeri before fhewn, frame to themfelves
any fixt and fettled Principles, upon which to argue
confiftently, but muft unavoidably either be per
plexed with inextricable Abfurdities, or eohfeffedly
recur to down-right Atheifm. There have indeed,
even among Chriftians themfelves,, been many Dif
ferences and Difputes about particular Doctrines :
A a* But

216 The Evidence of Natural
But (excepting fuch as have intolerably corrupted
the very fundamental Doctrines, and even the main
Defign itfelf of , the whole Chriftian Difpenfation,
of which there are too many Inftances in Writers
of the Romifh Church efpecially) thefe Difputes
among Chriftian, have not been, like thofe among
• the Philofophers, de rerum fiumma, concerning the
whole Scheme and Syftem of Things, but only con- '
cerning particular Explications of particular Doc-
. . trines ; which Kind of Difputes
* Sed perturbat nos opmi- , at all * affect rhe Terrain™ "
onum varietas, hominumque ao not ar aJ1 atTea trie certainty
diffenfio : Et quia non idem of the whole Religion itfelf, nor
contingit in fenfibus.-hos na- ought in Reafon to be any Man-
turacertosputamus ; ilia, quae nef of Hindrance to the + Effect
aliis fic, aliis lecus, nee nldem . . , . . . , . ,' . ,
femper uno modo videntur, which the plain and weightier and
fifta effe dicimus. Quod ell confeffedly more important fun-.
Icnge aliter. Cic. de Legib. damental Doctrines ought to have
^'t See above, Page i8z, "P0n the Pearts and Lives °f
185.

Men.

XIV. Fifthly, As this Revelation, to the Judg
ment of right and fiber Reafion, appears oJ itfelf
highly credible and probable\ and abundantly recom
mends itfielfi in its native Simplicity, merely by its own
intrinfiic Goodnefs and Excellency, to the Pradice of
the moft rational and confidering Men, who aredefi-
rous in all their ACiions to have Satisfaction and Com
fort, and .good Hope within themfelves, from the Con
fcience of what they do : So it is moreover pofitively
and direClly proved to be adually and immediately '
fent us from God, by the many infallible Signs and
Miracles, which 'the Author of it worked, publicly as
the Evidence of his divine Ccmmffion ; by the exact
Completion both of /^Prophecies that went before
concerning him, and of thofe that He himfielf delivered
concerning Things that were to " happen after -, and by
the Teftimony of his Followers ; which, in all its
Circumftances, was the moft credible, certain, and con
vincing

and Revealed Religion. 217
wincing Evidence, that was ever given to any Matter
of Fad in the World.
Firft, The Chriftian Revelation is pofitively and
directly proved to be actually and immediately
fent to us from God, by the many infallible Signs
and Miracles, which the Author of it worked pub- OfthcLift
licly as the Evidence of his Divine Commiffion. and Cha-
¦ Befides the great Excellency and Reafonablenefs rftut,e<ff ¦
of the . DoCirine eonfidered in itfelf, of which' I our, as a#
have already treated ; ' Pis here of no fmall Moment Evidence
to obferve, that the Author of it (feparate from all "ffitTrutk
external Proof of his Divine Commiffion) appeared "jja^^f,
in all his Behaviour, Words and Actions, to be lation.
neither an * Impoftor nor an Enthu-
fiaft. His Life was Innocent and \?™f,'M ? ""?, f TT
Spotlefs, fpent intirely in ferving e„Tai) ^ffirvt9{ «j !„„„,*,
the Ends of Holinefs and Cha- , <™^oe-u»»n te xa.) t«; aww
rity, in doing Good to the Souls «W« ^»™«*°e ™« »W»-
and Bodies of Men, in exhorting fZVeZ°nftlaZEvan%. lib,
them to Repentance, and inviting 3. r. 3.
them to ferve and glorify God*
When his bittereft Enemies accufed him, in order
to take away his Life, they could not charge him
with any Appearance of Vice or Immorality. And
fo far was he from being guilty of what they did
accufe him of, namely, of Vain-glory and attempt
ing to move Sedition, that once, when the admir
ing People would by Force have taken him and
made him their King, he chofe even to work a
Miracle to avoid that, which was the only Thing
that could be imagined to have been the Defign of
an Impoftor. In like Manner, whoever ferioufly
Confiders ' the Anfwers he gave to all Queftions
Whether moral or captious, his occafional Difeourfes
to his Difciples, and more efpecially the Wifdom
and Excellency of his Sermon upon the Mount,
which is as it were the Syftem and Summary of his
Doctrine, manifeftly furpaffing all the moral 'In
ftructions of the moft celebrated Philofophers that
A a a ' ever

218 ' The Evidenc e of Natural
ever lived, cannot, without the extremeft, Malice
and Obftinacy in the World, charge him with
Enthujiafim.' ' -'^-uT
Of the Thefe Confiderations cannot but add, great
Miracles Weight and Authority to his Doctrine, and make
of Chrift, hjs own Teftimony concerning himfelf exceedingly
^Jap-hit credible. But the pofitive and direCl Proof of his
Divine , Divine Commiffion are the Miracles which he
Commif- worked for that Purpofe :-, His healing the Sick.;.
fon- His giving Sight to the Blind : His calling out
Devils : His raifing the Dead : The Wonders that.
attended his Crucifixion : His own Refurrection
from the Dead : His Appearance afterwards to,
his Difciples : And his Afcenfion vifibly into
He.aven.. Thefe, and the reft of his -ftupendous Miracles,
were, to the Difciples that fiaw them, fenfible Dernon-
ftrations of our. Lord's Divine Commiffion.. And
to thofe who have lived fince that Age, they are as
certain Demonftration s of the fame. Truth, as the
Teftimony of thofe firft Difciples, who were Eye-
witneffes'ofthem, is certain and true.
To the Difciples that Jaw them, thefe Miracles-
were fenfible and complete Demonftrations of our.
Lord's Divine Commiffion ; becaufe they were fo .
great, and fo many, and fo public, and fo evident,
that it was abfolutely impoffible theyfoould' be
-the Effect of any Art of Man, of any Chance or
Fallacy : And the Doctrine they were brought to
confirm was of fo good and holy a Tendency,
that it was impoffible he fhould be inabled to work.:,
them by the Power and Affiftance of Evil Spirits :
So that, confequently,. they muft of Neceffity have .
been performed, either immediately or mediately, by
God himfelf.
OfMira- But here, becaufe there have been many QueftL-
desmge- 0ns raifed, and fome Perplexity introduced,, by the '
Difputes and different Opinions of learned Men, eon-

seral.

and Revealed Religion. 2 ft)
•concerning die Power of Working Miracles, and
concerning the Extent of the Evidence which Mira
cles give to the Truth of any Doctrine ; and be-
xaufe it hath been much controverted, whether true
Miracles can be worked by any lefs Power than
the immediate Power of God -, and whether, to
complete the. Evidence of a Miracle, the1 Nature
of the Doctrine, pretended to be proved thereby, is
.requifite to be taken into the Confideration, or no ;
It may not perhaps be improper, upon this Occa
fion, to endeavour to fet this whole Matter in its
true Light, as briefly and clearly as I can.
ift, then, In Refpect of the Power ofi God, and fh at v ?» .
in Refpect to the Nature ofi the Things themfelves, ^fftf "f
abfolutely fpsakin'g, all things that are poffible -0f'Q0lj aji
at all, that is, which imply not a direct Contra- Things are
diction, are equally and alike eafiy to be done. The "l'ie eafi-
Power of God extends equally to great Things,
as to fmall ; and to many, as to few : And the
one makes no more Difficulty at all, or Refiftance
to his Will, than the other.
Tis not therefore a right Diftinction to define Thatthere-
or diftihguifh a Miracle by any abjolute Difficulty/0" Mira-
in the Nature of the Thing itfelf to be done,- as if cfJ °ff he
the Things we call Natural were abfolutely and in defined by
their own Nature eafier to be effected, than thofe any abfo-
that we look upon as Miraculous. On the contrary, !ui' D'-fi'
. . ., \ i-iii j • 1 /i_ cutty m tot
'tis evident and undeniable, tnat „us at leaft as great Mature of
an Act of Power to caufe the Sun or a Planet to the Things
Move at all, as to caufe'it to ftand ftill at any Time, themfelves.
Yet this latter we call a, Miracle ; the former, not. " be dont%
Knd to reftore the Dead to Life, which is an Inftance
of an extraordinary Miracle, is in itfelf plainly
^together as eafy, as to difpoie Matter at firft into
fuch Ofder, as to fiorm, a human Body in that which
we commonly call a natural Way. So that, abfo
lutely fpeaking, in This ftriil and philofophi'cal Senfe,
A a g either

'220 _ Tfie E v i d e N£ e of Natural
either nothing is Miraculous, namely, if we have
Refpect to the Power of God ; or, if we regard
our own Power and Underftanding, then almoft
every Thing, as well what we cal! natural,, as what
we call ; fupernatural, is in this Senfe really Mifa-
¦ culous ; and 'tis only Ufualnefs ox tfnufiualnefs that
makes the Diftinctjon.
What De- 2. What Degrees of Power God may reafonably
grees of bg fuppofed to have communicated toCre#ted Beings,
GoTmay t0 fit^bordinate Intelligences, to good or evil Angels, is
have com- by no Means poffible for us to determine. Some
municated- Things abfolutely impoffible for Men- to effect, 'tis
%efneaUd eYident, may eafily be within the natural Powers of
tio't plffbk Angels ; and fome Things beyond the Power of
for us to inferior Angels may as eafily be fuppofed to be
determine, vvithirl , the natural Power of others that arefiupe-,
rior to Them ; and fo on. So that, excepting the
crginal Power of Creating, which we cannot indeed
conceive communicable toThings which were them-r
felves created, we can hardly affirm with any Cer
tainty, that any particular Effect, how great or
miraculous foever it may feem to us, is beyond the
Power of all Created Beings in the Univerfe tq
have produced.
f hat there- fTis not therefore a right Diftinction to define.
fore a Mi- a Miracle (as fome very learned and very pious Men
t^bii'd"' ^ave done) fo Qe fLlch aq Effect as could not have
fined is be Deen produced by any lefs Power than the Divine
fuch an Omnipotence. There is no Inftance of any Miracle
.Effca as jn Scripture, which to an ordinary Spectator would
bave been n?ceftfarity imply an immediate Creation of fomething
produced out pf nothing': And confequently fuch a Spectator
'by any Itfs could never be certain, that the miraculous Effect
fi"™ a waS iheyon^ tne P°wer of all created Beings in the
Pivinc Univerfe to produce. There Is, one Suppofition
Qmnipo,- indeed, upon which the Opinion of all Miracles
!(&?• hing neeeffarily the immediate EffeCts ofi the Divine
Omnipotence may be defended ^ And that is, if

and Revealed Religion. 221
God, together with the natural Powers wherewith
he hath indued all fubordinate Intelligent Beings,
has likewife given a Law or Reft rain t, whereby
they be hindered from ever interpofing in this
lower World, to produce any of thofe Effects
which we call miraculous or fupernatural : But
then, how certain foever it is, that all Created
Beings are under fome particular Laws and Re-
ftraints, yet it can never be proved, that they are
under fuch Reftraints univerfally, perpetually, and
without Exception : And without this, a Spectator
that fees a Miracle, can never be certain that it
was not done by fome Created Intelligence. Re
ducing the natural Power of Created Beings to as
low a Degree as any one can defire to fuppofe will
help nothing in this Matter; For, fuppofing (which
is very unreafonable to fuppofe) that the natural
Powers of the higheft Angels were no greater than
the natural Powers of Men, yet fince thereby an
Angel would be inabled to do all That inviiibly,
which a Man can do vifibly, he would even in this
Suppofition be naturally able to do numberlefs
Things,,'' which we foould efteem the greateft of
Miracles.
3. All Things that are Done in the World, are All Things
done either immediately by God himfelf,. or by that are
created Intelligent Beings, Matte? 'being evidently notdf"eftf the
.at all capable of any Laws or Powers whatfoever, done fither.
anymore than it is capable of Intelligence; except- immediate-
ing only this One Negative Power, that every TpatthbGod
of it will, of itfelf, always and neeeffarily continue f" ffjfd.
in that State, whether of Reft or Motion, wherein it intelligent
at prefent is. So that all thofe Things, which we Beings,
commonly fay are the Effects of the Natural Powers M*"erif-
1 J , T r 7i /, ¦ c r. ¦ . i- 2"eT capable
of Matter, and Laws of Motion, of Gravitation, cfna[awi
Attraction, or the like, are indeed (if we will fpeak ir Powers.
ftrictly and properly) the Effects of God's acting 4>>J confe-
upon Matter continually and every Moment, ^~fff'/h
A a 4 ther

222 7^ Evidence of Natural
properly ther immediately by himfelf, or mediately by fome.
fpeaking, created intelligent Beings ¦;- (Which Obfervation,
Tb/nr as DV tri.e Way, furnifoes us, as has been before noted*
the Courfe with an excellent natural Demonftration ol Provif
cr Power dence,) Confequently there is no fuch Thing as
of Nature. wj^t- jyjeri Cpmmon']y can 'tf,e Courfe ofi Nature, or
¦ S: ¦¦.'¦ the Pozver ofi Nature. The Courfe of Nature,
truly arid' properly fpeaking, is nothing elfe but the?
W'ill of God producing certain Effects in a continu
ed, regular, conftant and uniform Manner: Which
Courfe' or Manner of Acting, being in every Mo
ment perfectly Arbitrary, is as eafy to be altered at
any Time, as to be preferved. And if (as feems moft
probable)' this continual Acting upon Matter be
performed by the Subfervieiicy of created Intellf:
gences appointed to "that Piirpofe by the Supreme
Creator; then 'tis as eafy for any of Them, and as
much within their natura] Power (by thePermiffion
of God) to alter the Courfe of Nature at any Tirnei
or in anyRefpectj as to preferve or continue it.
fhatthere-' ?Tis'riot therefore a right Diftinction to define a
fore a Mi- Miracle to be That which is againft the Courfe oft
'ra.c!f ft "ft. Nature, meaning,' by the Courfie ofi Nature, the,
fined '"/ c i" Power of Nature, or the Natural Powers ofi Created
¦be That Agent s. ¦ For, in this Senfe, 'tis no more againft
which is tne Courfe of Nature for an Angel to keep a Man.
'figatnjl tie r finking in the V/ater, than for a Man to hold a
Court e of J ¦¦•> . &r,,.: ..,'.,-. . ¦ , ¦
Nature, or St one from falling in the Air, by over-powering the,
above the Law of Gravitation ; and yet the one is a Miracle,
"ft'ft"1 the other not fo. In like Manner, 'tis no more
Created above the natural Power of a created Intelligence
'Agents, to flop the Motion ofi the Sun or' of a Planet, than to
continue to carry it' en in its ufttal Courfie ; and yet the
former is a Miracle, the latter not fo. But if, by
the Courfie ofi Nature, be meant only (as it truly fig
nifies) the conftant and uniform Manner of God's
acting either immediately or mediately in preferving
'and continuing the Order of the World ; then,' in

and Revealed Re l i g-i on, 223
in That Senfe, indeed a Miracle may be rightly
defined to be an Effect produced contrary to the
ufuai Courfe or Order, of Nature, ,by the unufual
Interpofition of fome Intelligent .Being Superior to
)\ien .; as I foall have Occafion prefentiy to obferve
more particularly.
And from this Obfervation, we may eafily dif- Theunrea-
cover the Vanity and Unreafonablenefs pf that fonahleriefi
pbftinate Prejudice, which Modern Deifts have^/^
univerfally taken up, againft the Belief of "Miracles thePoJfibi-
i.n general. They fee? that Things generally go on Hty ofMJ-
in a conftant and regular Method ; that the Frame rac^s ft1.
and Order of the World is preferved by Things &""?"¦'
peing difpofed and managed in an uniform Manner j
that certain Caufes produce certain Effects in a con
tinued Succeffion, according to certain fixed Laws
or Rules ; and from hence they conclude, very
weakly and unphilofpphically, that there are in
Matter certain neceffary Laws or Powers, the Refult
pf which is That which they call the Courfe of Na
ture ; which they think is impoffible to be changed
or altered, and confequently that there can be no
fuch Thing as Miracles. Whereas on the contrary,
if they would confider Things duly, they could
hot hut fee, that dull and lifelefs Matter is utterly
incapable of obeying any Laws, or of being indued
with any Powers ; and that therefore That Order
and Difpofition of Things, which they vulgarly
call the Courfe of Nature, cannot poffibly be any
Thing elfe, ' but the Arbitrary Will and Pleafure of
God exerting itfelf and acting upon Matter con
tinually, either immediately by itfelf, or mediately
by fome fubordinate intelligent Agents, according
to certain Rules of Uniformity and Proportion,
fixed indeed and conftant, but which yet are made
iTuch merely by Arbitrary Conftitution, not by any
Sort of Neceffity in the Things themfelves ; as has
been abundantly proved in my former Difcourfe :.
"  ' ' ' And

2 24 The Evidence of Natural
And confequently it cannot be denied, but that 'tis
altogether as eafy to alter the Courfe of Nature, as
to preferve it ; that is, that Miracles, excepting
only that they are more unufual, are in themfelves,
and in the Nature and Reafon of the Thing, as cre
dible in all Refpects, and as eafy to be believed,
as any of thofe we call natural Effects.
Some Ef- 4- Thofe ( Effects which are produced in the
feas prove World regularly and conftantly, which we call the
the con- Works ofi Nature, prove to us in general, the Being,
Jiant Pro- h power ^ the other Attributes of God.
viaence of ' ,
God, and Thofe Effects, which, upon any rare and extraor'di-
Others nary Occafion, are produced in fuch Manner, that
prove the >tjsN marufefi; they could neither have been done by
"lnterpofiti- anv Power or Art ofi Man, nor by what we call
en cither of Chance, that is, by any Compofition or Refolt of
God him- thofe Laws, which are God's conftant and uniform
"w Tntfl Actings upon Matter ; thefe undeniably prove to
Ugent Be- us the immediate and occafional Interpofition either
ingSuperi- of God himfelf, or at leaft of fome intelligent
trtoMan. Agent Superior to Men, at That particular Time,
and on That particular Account. For Inftartce, The
regular and continual Effects of the Power ofi Gra
vitation, and of the Laws ofi Motion ; of the Me
chanic, and of the Animal Powers -, All thefe prove
to us in general, the Being, the Power, thePrefence,
and the conftant Operation, either immediate or
mediate, of God in the World. But if, upon any
particular Occafion, we foould fee a Stone fufipended
in the Air, or a Man walking upon the -Water, with- <
out any vifible Support; a chronical Difieafie cured
by a' Word fpeaking, or a dead and corrupted Body re-
fiored to Life in a Moment ; we could not then doubt,
but there was an extraordinary Interpofition either
of God himfelf, in order to fignify his Pleafure
upon that particular Occafion ; or at leaft of fome
Intelligent-

and Revealed Religion. 225
Intelligent Agent far fuperior to Man, in order to
bring about fome particular Defign,
5. Whether fuch an Extraordinary Interpofition whether
of fome Power Superior to Men be the immediate fuch Inter-
Interpofition of God himfelf, or of fome good Angel, P0fttion be
pr of fome evil Angel, can hardly be diftinguifhed 'JJ^f^
certainly, merely by the Work or Miracle itfielfi '; ef God, or
(except there be a plain Creation of fomething out "f Some
pf nothing, which, as I have faid, there does not G°od°rE-'
.certainly appear to be in any of the Miracles re- elan ffffjL
corded in Scripture:) Becaufe 'tis impoffible fox be difcove-.
Us to know with any Certainty, either that the red mereb
natural Power of good Angels, or of evil ones, ppr^itr
extends not beyond fuch or fuch a certain Limit ;fek.
or that God always reftrains them from exexcifing
their natural Powers in producing foch or fuch
particular Effects. Some fingular Miracles, fuch
as Raifiing the Dead, there is indeed all the Reafon'
in the World to believe are abfolutely beyond the
Power of evil Spirits to effect ; becaufe we have
foe greateft Reafon to believe, that the Souls of
Men are in the Hand of God, and cannot be re
moved by the natural Power of any inferior Be
ings. But there are not many other Inftances,
wherein we can certainly fay or determine, that this
or that particular Thing is abfolutely beyond the
natural Power of Good or Evil Spirits.
'Tis not therefore a right Diftinction, to fuppofe That then
the Wonders which the Scripture attributes to evil is ™reafi*
Spirits, to be mere Pr^eftigia?, Sleights, or Delufions. *gj(u%fe
For if the Devil has any natural Power of doing Wonders
any Thing at all, even but fo much as the meaneft vjorked
of Men ; and be not reftrained by God from exer- % ??il
fifing that natural Power ; 'tis' evident he will be yff^J*
"able, by Reafon of his Invifibility, to work true and Dehfihns.
rfal Miracles. Neither is it a right Diftinction to '
fuppofe the Miracles of Evil Spirits, not to be real
* ' EffeCts,

226 The Evidence of Natural
'EffeCts in the Things where they appear, but Impo-
fitions upon the Senfes of the Spectators : For to
irtipofe in this Manner upon the Senfes of Men
(not by Sleights and Delufibns, but by really fo
affecting the Organs of Senfe, as to make Things
appear what they are" not) is to all Jntents and
Iforpofes as true a Miracle, and as great an one,
as making real-Changes in the Things themfelves.
How me 6. When therefore upon any particular Occafion,
are to di- for Inftance, when at the Will of a Perfon who
ftfff'fi' teaches fome new Doctrine as coming from Gcd,
worked by and m Teftimony to the Truth of that Doctrine,
God for. there is plainly and manifeftly an Interpofition of
the Prtjof fome Superior Power, producing fuch miraculous
irfne from ^^^ as nave been before mentioned : The only
the Frauds poffible Ways, by which a Spectator may certainly
ef Evil and infallibly diftinguifo, whether thofe Miracles.
spnts. be indeed the Works either immediately of God '
himfelf, of (which is the very fame Thing) of
fome good Angel employed by him ; and .confe
quently the Doctrine witneffed by the MiracJes be
infallibly true and divinely attefted ; Or whether, on
the contrary, the Miracles be the Works of Evil
Spirits, and confequently the Doctrine a Fraud and-
Impofition upon Men : The only poffible Ways
(1 fay) of diftinguifoing this Matter certainly and
infallibly are thefe : Jf the Doctrine attefted by
Miracles be in itfelf impious, or manifeftly tending
to promote Vice, then without all Queftion the Mira-.'
cles, how great foever they may appear to Us, are
neither worked by God himfelf, nor by his Com
miffion -, becaufe our natural Knowledge of the
Attributes of God, and of the neceffary Difference*
between Good and Evil, is greatly of more Force
to prove any fuch Doctrine to be falfe, than any
Miracles in the World can be to prove it true. As,
forExampie, fuppofe a Man pretending- to be a Pro
phet,

and Revealed Religion. 227
•phet fhould work any Miracle, pr give any Sign or
Wonder whatfoever, in order to draw Men from
the Worfoip of the True God, and, , tempt them
to Idolatry, and. to the Practice : of fuch. Vices as
in all Heathen Nations have ufually,- attended the
Worfhip of Falfe God -, nothing can be more in-,
fallibly certain, than that fuch Miracles ought at Deut. xiii.
firft Sight to be rejected as Diabolical.. i/theDoc-.1' &c-
trine attefted by Miracles be in itfelf indifferent,:'
that is, fuch as cannot by the Light of Nature and*
right Reafon. alone be certainly .known whether it
be true or falfe ; and at the fame Time, in Oppofition?
to it, and in Proof of the direct contrary Doctrine,.
there be worked other Miracles, more and greater.
than the former, or at leaft attended with fuchCir--
cumftances as evidently fhew the Power by which'
thefe latter are worked to be Superior to the Power
that worked the former; then That Doctrine which
is attefted by the Superior Power, muft neeeffarily 1
be believed to be Divine1, This was the Cafe of;
Mofies and the ASgyptian Magicians. The Magicians-
"worked feveral Miracles to prove that Mofies was:
an Impoftor, and not fent of God ; Mofies, to prove ,
his Divine Commiffion, worked Miracles more and .
greater than theirs ; or elfe (which is the very fame 1
Thing) the Power by which He worked his Mira-:
cles, reftrained the Power by which They worked
theirssfrom being able at that Time to work all the
fame Miracles that He did ; and fo appeared evi
dently the Superior Power : Wherefore it was neeeffa
rily to be believed, that Mbfes*s Commiffion was
truly from God. If, in the laft Place, the Doctrine
attefted by Miracles be fuch as in its own Nature
' and Confequences tends to- promote the Honour and
Glory of God, and the Practice.of univerfal Righte
oufnefs amongft Men ; and yet neverthelefs be not ¦
in itfelf demonftrable, nor could without Revelation-
have been difcovered to be actually, true ; (or even

228 The Evidence df Natural
if it was but only indifferent in itfelf, and fuch a*
could not be proved to be any way contrary to, or
inconfiftent with thefe great Ends ;) and there be
no Pretence of more or greater Miracles on the
oppofite Side, to contradict it ; (Which is the Cafe:
of the DoClrine and Miracles of Chrift .-) Then the
Miracles are unqueftionably Divine, and the Doc--
trine muft without all Controverfy be acknowledg
ed as an immediate and infallible Revelation from
Matt. xii. God i Becaufe, (befides that it cannot be fuppofed
25. that Evil Spirits Would overthrow their own Power
and Kingdom) fhould God, in fuch Cafes as thefe,
permit Evil Spirits to work Miracles to impofe upon'
Men, the Error would be abfolutely invincible s,.
and That would in all Refpect s be the very fame
Thing, as if God worked the Miracles to deceive •
Men himfelf. No Man can doubt, but Evil Spirits,
if they have any natural Powers at all, have Power
to deftroy Mens Bodies and Lives, and to bring upon
Men innumerable other Calamities ; which yet in
Fact 'tis evident God reftrains them from doing,'.
by having fet them Laws and Bounds which they
cannot pafs. Now, for the very fame Reafon, 'tis
infinitely certain that God reftrains them likewife
from impofing upon Mens Minds and Underftandings,
in all fuch Cafes where Wife, and Honeft, and Vir
tuous Men would have no poffible Way left, by
which they could difcover the Impofition.
The Diffe- ^n<^ nere at ^ tne Difference between Thofe
rence be- who believe that all Miracles neeeffarily require the
tvieemhofe immediate Power of God himfelf to effect them,,
•who teach ancj th0fe who believe created Spirits able to work
immediate Miracles, is not very great. They who believe all
Povoer of Miracles to be effected only by the immediate Power
God is, or 0f Q0^ muft do it upon this Ground, that they
ts not, fie- fUpp0fe q0£ Dy a perpetual Law . reftrains all fob-,
ceffarilyre- rr . j r r _ /
quifite to ordinate intelligent Agents from interpofing at any
the vsork- Time to alter the regular Courfe of Things in this
'*i °fia lower

and Revealed Religion. 229
lower World ; (for to fay that created Spirits have Miracle -,
not otherwife a Natural Power, when unreftrained, is not """?
to do what we call Miracles, is faying that thofeff^/
invifible Agents have no Power naturally to do any
Thing at all.) And they who believe that fubor
dinate Beings have Power to work Miracles, muft
yet of Neceffity fuppofe that God reftrains them in
all fuch Cafes at leaft, where there would not be
fufficient Marks left, by which the Frauds of evil
Spirits could be clearly diftinguifhed from the Tef
timony and Commiffion of God.
And now from thefe few clear and undeniable
Propofitions it evidently follows,
ift, That the true Definition of a Miracle, in the The true
Theofogical Senfe of the Word, is this, that it is a Definition
Work effected in a Manner unufiual, or different from °faMire~
the common and regular Method of Providence,
by the Interpofition either of God himfelf, or of
feme intelligent Agent fuperior to Man, for the
Proof or Evidence of fome particular Doctrine, or
in Atteftation to the Authority of fome particular
Perfon. And if a Miracle fo worked, be not
oppofed by fome plainly fuperior Power ; nor be
brought to atteft a Doctrine either contradictory in
itfelf, or vicious in its Confequences ; (a Doctrine
of which Kind no Miracles in the World can be
foffieient to prove) then the Doctrine fo attefted
muft neeeffarily be looked upon as Divine, and the
Worker of the Miracle entertained as having infal
libly a Commiffion from God.
2. From hence it appears, that the complete De- The
mohftration of our Saviour's being a Teacher fent Strength
from God was, to the Difciples who fiaw his Mira- °/the£vi.
cles, plainly This: That the DoClrine he taught /ftfsaXi-
being in itfelf poffible, and in its Confequences o»r's /in
tending to promote the Honour of God and true racles-
Righteoufnefs among Men ; and the. Miracles he
worked being fuch, that there neither was nor
could

230 The E v i D 'e ; n c £ of Natural
could beainy Pretence of more or greater Miracle!
to be fet up in Oppofition to them, j it was ai
infallibly, certain that he had truly a Divine Com
miffion, as it was certain that God would not him
felf impofe upon Men a neceffary and invincible
Error.
Concerning 3- Frorri hence it appears how little Reafori there
the Objec- is to object, as fome have done, that we prove in a
tkn, that Circle the DoClrine by the.'Mif deles, and the Miraclei
j,e prove , ^, Dgf . ^ j-. h Mj.ade in this Waf
tn a Circle 1 , . ', . . '
the Mira- of reafoning, are not at all proved by the DoClrine ;'
ties by the but only the Poffibility and the good Tendency, or atf
Dof"?e> leaft the Indifferency of the Doctrine, are a neceffary
Dotfrine Condition or Circumftance, without which the Doc-
bfthe Mi- trine is not capable of being proved by any Miracles;
racks. 'Xis indeed the Miracles only, that : prove the
DoClrine ; and not the DoClrine, that proves the
Miracles : But then in order to this End, that the
Miracles may prove the DoClrine, 'tis always neeef
farily to be firft fuppofed that the DoClrine be fuch as'
is in its Nature capable of being proved by Miracles.
The DoClrine muft be in itfelf poffible and capable to '
be proved, and then Miracles will prove it to be
actually and certainly true. The DoClrine' is not'
ifirft known or fuppofed to be true, and then the
Miracles proved by it ; but the'DoClrine muft be'
fipft known to be fuch as is poffible to be true, and
then Miracles will prove that it actually is fo. Some*.
Doctrines are in their own Nature neeeffarily and'
dembnftrably true, fuch as are all thofe which con- ^
eern the Obligation of plain moral Precepts ; and'
thefe neither need nor can receive any ftroiiger Proof "[
from Miracles, than what they have already (though? M
not perhaps fo clearly indeed to all Capacities) frorri' ""
the Evidence of right Reafon. Other Doctrines'
are in their own Nature neeeffarily fialfie and impoffible "
to be true -, fuch as are all Abfurdities and Contra-
dictions?

find Revealed &E L 1 G i o N; 83 1
tiiftions, and all Doctrines that tend td prdrridte Vice ;
And thefe can never receive any Degree of Proof
from all the Miracles in the World. y Laftly^ Other
Doctrines are in their own Nature indifferent; or
poffible; Or perhaps probable to be true ; Arid thefe
tould not have been known to be positively true,
but by the Evidence of Miracles, which prove
them to be certain; To apply this to the DoClrine
and Miracles df Chrift • The rrioral Part of our Sa
viour's Doctrine would have appeared infallibly
true; whether he had ever worked any Miracles or
ho. The reft df his Doctrine was what evidently
Tended to promote the Honour of God, and the
Practice of Righteoufnefs among Men : Therefore!
That Part alfo of his Doctrine was poffible and
very probable to be true ; But yet it could not
.from thence be known to be certainly true, nor'
ought to have been received as a Revelation frorri
God, unlets it had been proved by undeniable Mira± ,
ties. And the Miracles he worked did indeed unde
niably prove it to be the Doctrine of God; Ne-
verthelefs, had his Doctrine in arty Part of it been
either abfurd and contradictory in itfelf; or vicious iri
its Tendency and Confequences^ no Miracles could
then poffibly have proved it to have been true. 'Tis
evident therefore; that the Nature of the Doctrine'
to be proved muft be takeri into the Confiderationi
as a neceffiry Circumftance ; and yetj that only the
Miracles are properly the Proof of the* DoClrine^
and not the DoClrine of the Miracles.
4. From hence it follows, that the : pf etended Of M
Miracles of Apbllonius TyaneUs, Arifteas Pro'connefi'us, P/ft"^
¦ i r ¦¦ - r- 1 1 tt'V- l- Miracles
and fome tew others among the Heathens* even ^- Apollcw
fuppdfirtg them to have been true Mirdiles, (which hius and
yet there is no Reafon at all to believe, becaufe «thfru
' they are very pOorly attefted* and are iri themfelves
very mean and trifling, as has been fully fhewn by
J&ufebw in his Book againft HierocUsi and by ma-*
j B d r#

2%z The Evidence of Natural
ny late Writers; but fuppofing them, . I fay, to
have been true Miracles) yet they will prove no
thing at all to the Difad vantage of Chriftianity;
Becaufe they were worked either without any Pre-,
tence of confirming any new Doctrine at ail ; or
elfe to prove abfurd and foolifh Things ; or to
eftablifh Idolatry and the Worfhip of Falfe Gods;
And, confequently, they could not be done by the
Divine Power and Authority, nor bear any Kind
of * Comparifon with the Mira-'
•Al-T._o^*«ip.e««i^- cjesoi;- Ci)nji that were worked
iv**!/*, J|rt«r.(«». ivo-T* C/« fo atteft a Doctrine which tended
*K; ts nSs? x*t rm iwau«Aou- in the higheft Degree to promote
Srfvr« -ruTs SvnapurSh ire t-U the Honour of God and the ge-
t^"" ™L tliU' 'o'r'iJL "' J" "eral Reformation of Mankind.
Zjwv <.<jroc«ooisuo-i)/. KJrigen. au- *
vt -J Celfi lib. 2.
M/<70» to'yivi crainov riffa? isi we§i t« Aprin yttop.ivuv , i£ ran irept T« 'iijjrs
«ai cvKajSziaii ritv moot ™ swi w«tri Si«, lr;» ilvtTr' oil irirEvriw ftsi/ u; ovx.
<WE01 yzvoyutvoit Tott ^EO* lr,<7CV irG^OVfteVClt, CUX* °B Tct$ 7rEC* T5JS H^OXOVl'TJffiflT;
'Acis-f&u. T' f^'J 7&P &w7\0fASvn rt 7T^ovota. Ta we£* tov 'Aptrsay 7ra.^a2o%a. iir%a.y-
fta.TivP.Ci xat *' wCf sAijcrai ta ran aA&Qwirm yimt fiovKopitn, Ta 7i,\i«.a.via (w%_
oiei) iisi$i\x>ino, , oix. £%ns ^y1"- ' Id. lib. 3.
To return therefore to the Argument : The Mi
racles (I fay) which our Saviour worked, were,
to thee Difciples that faw .them, fenfible Demonftra-
tions of his Divine]C'ommiffibn : And, to thofie who
have lived fince that Age, they are as -certain De-
monftrations of the fame Truth, as the Teftimony
of thofe firft Difciples who were Eye-wimeffes. of
them, is< certain and true : Which 1 fioah 'have Oc-'
cqjionto confider prefenlly.
OftUjul- Secondly, The Divine Authority of the Chriftian
p'%ae Revclationtis pofitively and directly proved-. by the
a?lfhvi- txaCt Completion both of all thofie Prophecies1 that
deuce of 'went before concerning' cur <Lord, and of thofie. that
cur Havi- fjc niwfidf , delivered concerning Things that were
"f'ff tv happen after.
vine Lorn- "" 1-te ¦ J ¦
mijjion. <\ ' , Coil-

ReveatedtL'Ei.iGioit. £33
Concerning the Meffiah it was foretold, (Gey. Of the
"4.9. 10.) that he Jhould come, before the Sceptre de- Prophecies
parted from Judcth : And accordingly Chrift ap .thatvjent
peared a little before the Time when the Jewifo /{ZlgThi
Government Was totally deftroyed by the Romans. MeJfi&Hi
It was foretold that he foould come before the De
ftruction; of the fecond Temple^ (Hagg. 2. 7.)
The Defire of all Nations -fihall come, .and I will fill
this Houfie with Glory, faith the Lord ofi Hofts -, the
Glory ofi this latter. Houfie fihall be greater than of the for
mer ;• And accordingly Chrift appeared fome Time
before the Dcftrifetion of the City and Temple.
It was foretold, : that he fhould come at the End ©f
490 Years after rhe Rebuilding of Jerufialem, which
had been laid, wafte during the Captivity, [Dan.
a. 24 ;) and that he fhould be. cut off; and that^
after That,... the.City and Sanctuary Jhould be deftroyed
and made defiolate: And accordingly, at what Time
foever the Beginning of the four hundred and
ninety Years can, according to. any Interpretation
of the Words, be fixed; the End of them will fall
about the Time of Chrift' s appearing ; and 'tis well
known how intirely the.City and Sanctuary were
deftroyed fome Years after, his being cut off. It was
foretold that he foould do many great and beneficial
Miracles-, that the Eyes ofi the Blind (Ifai. 35. 5.)
jhould be opened, and the Ears ofi the. Deaf tinjtopped ;
that . the lame Man fhould leap as an Hart, and tbi
Tongue of the Dumb fing : And this was literally ful
filled in the Miracles of Chrift; The Blind -reciBed
theit Sight, (Matt. ii. 5.) and the Lame walked ' %
the Deaf heard, &t. Lt was. foretold that he foould
die a. violent Death, (Ifai. 53: throughout), and That
mt for himfelf (..Dan. 9. 26.). but fior our Tranf-r
grefflons; (Ifai. 53. 5, b, & 12.) for the Iniquity of
us all, and' that he might, bear the Sin of many : All
which was exactly accomplished in the Sufferings
ef Chrift. It. .Was foretold.* (Gen. 49. 10.). that
B b 3 fi

£ 3 4 &ke Evidence bf Natural
to him fhould the Gathering of the People be, arid
(Pfial. 2. 8.) that God would give him the Heathen
for his Inheritance, and the utmoft Parts of the Earth
for his Pcffeffwn .- Which was punctually fulfilled by
the wonderful Succefs of the Gofpel, and its'uni-
verfai Spreading through the World. Laftly, Ma
ny minuter Cnxumftances were foretold of the
Meffiah ; that he fhould be of the Tribe of Judah,
and of the Seed of David ; that lie foould be borri
in the Town of Bethlehem (Mic. 5. 2 ;) that he
foould ride upon an Afis, in humble Triumph, into
the City of Jerufalera, (Zech. 9. 9 ;) that he fhould
he fold for thirty- Pieces of Silver, (Zech. 11. 12 ;)
that he foould be Scourged, Buffeted, and Spit upon,
(Ifai. 50. 6 ;) that his Hands and Feet foould be
pierced, (Pfal. 22. 16;) that he fhould be nunv
bered among Malefactors, (Ifai. 53. 12;) that he
foould have Gall and Vinegar offered him to drink,
(Pfial. 69. 21 ;) that they who faw him crucified
foould mock at him, and at Ins Trufiing in God to
deliver him, (Pfal. 22. 8;) that the Soldiers foould
caft Lots fior his Garments, (Pfal. 22. 18 ;) that he
foould piake his Grave with the Rich, (Hai. 53. 9 ;)
and that he foould rife again without fieeing Corrupt
tion, (Pfal. 16. 10.) All which Circumftances were
fulfilled, to the greateft poffible Exactnefs,' in the
Perfon of Chrift : Not to mention the numberlefs
typical Reprefentations, which had likewife evidently
their complete Accomplifoment in Him. And 'tis
no lefs evident, that none of thefe Prophecies can
poffibly be applied to any other Perfon that evefc
pretended to be the Meffiah.
Of the ' Further, The Prophecies or Predictioas which
Prophecies chrift delivered Himfelf, concerning Things that!
i^t?,/'f were to happen after, are no lefs ftrong Proofs of the
bimlelf de- . , ,r-L.. . . , . ,-' i • 53. n • i '
hvered Truth and Divine Authority at his Doctrine,, than
concerning the Prophecies were, which went befiore concerning
thm-.-s that jjjm; £je fad very particularly and at feveral time*
icere 'o ' r„,„

and Revealed Religion. 2 3 jf
foretell his own Death, and the Circumftances of it',
(Matt. 1 6. 21.) that the chiefi Priefts and Scribes
Jhould condemn him td Death, and deliver him to' the
Gentiles, that is; to Pilate and the Roman Soldiers,
to mock, and fcourge, and crucifiy him, (Matt. 2C*
18 & 19;) that he fhould be betrayed into their
Hands, (Matt. 20. 18 ;) that Judas fficdriot was the
Perfon who would betray him, (Matt. 26. 23;)
that afi his Difciples would forfake him and flee,
(Matt. 26. 21 ;) that Peter y particularly, would
thrice deny him in one Night, (Mar. 14. 30.) Hd
foretold further, that he would rife again the third
Day, (Matt. 16. 21 ;) that, after his Afcenfion, he
would fend down the Holy Ghoft upon his Apo- v
ftles, (Job. 15. 26;) which foould enable them to
work many Miracles, (Mar. 16. 17.) He foretold
alfo the DeftruCtion of Jerufialem with fuch very
particular Circumftances, in the whole 2 4/^ Chapter"
of St. Matthew, and the i^th of St. Mark^ and 21/
of St. Luke, that no Man who
reads * Jofiephus's, Hiftory of that > * Very remarkable alfo is
dreadful and unparallelled Cala- £e Hift£* reco)de.d bY a
. , r. , r. Heathen Writer, of what hap-
mity, can, without the greateft pened upon yftWs attemp^
Obftin'acy imaginable, doubt of ing to rebuild the Temple:
OUT Saviour's divine Fore-knOW- Imperii fid memoriam magni-
kdge. Laftly, Hefforetold like- tudine >P*™> &&*«'' m*--
o ' * . gare, ambitiojum quondam a-
tttfe many Particulars concerning puj, Hierojolpnam tcmplum,
the' future SllCCefs of the Gofpel, quod poft multa y inter iiedv*
and what foould happen to feve- "^^^^ I'^""9
ral of his Difciples •: He foretold ¦ PtZ%flZZTfZPZbTZ
what Oppofition and PerfecUtion gitabat immodicis; Negotiants;
they fhould meet withal in their- rnaluranduni Jlypid dederat An-
Preaching, (Matt. IO. I7;) He tiochenfi qui olirn Britannia,-
„ , , ° , • , Vr • j c curaverat pro treejeclis. Cum
foretold what particular Kind of iiaq. rei ,-^,-,^„( Alypius*
Death 5/. Peter foould die, (John juvaretque provincice reclor;,
metuendi globi flammarum prep*
fundamenta crebris affuhibus erumpentes fiecere locum exuflis aliquoties operan*
tibus inacceffum ; Hocque modo, ehmento defiinatius repellents, cefiavit inceptam.
Aromiiui. Marcellin. lib. 22. fui) initio;
Bb'j tt

$%e Evidence of Natural
%\. 1 8 ;) and hinted, that St. John ,foould five ti!J-
after the Deftruction of Jerufialem, (John 21. 22.;)
and foretold, that, notwithftanding, ail Oppofition
and Perfecutions, the Gofpel foould yet have fuch
Succefs, as to fpread itfelf over the World, (Matt.
j6. 18 ; 24. 14; 28. 19.) All and every one of
which Particulars were exactly accomplifoed, with?
put failing in any Refpect.
Some qf thefe Things are of permanent and vifi
ble Effects, even unto this Day.. Particularly the
Captivity and Difperfion of the Jews, through alf
Nations, for more than 1600 Years ; and yet their
continuing a diftinct People, in order to the ful
filling, the Prophecies of Things ftill future : This
(I fay) is particularly a permanent Proof of the
Truth of the Ancient Prophecies. But the greateft
part of the Inftances above-mentioned were fenfible
and ocular Demonfirations of the Truth of our Lord's,
Doctrine, only to thofe Perfons who lived at the
Time when they . happened : The Credibility of
' whofe Teftimony, therefore, foall be eonfidered pre-. .
fently in its proper Piace. ,
But, before I proceed to This, it may not be
improper in this Place to take Notice of Some 0b-4
jeCtions^ which have of late, been revived and urged
'againft this whole Notion both of the Prophecies them
felves, and of the Application of them to Chrift. The Su m
and Strength of which Objections is briefly This :
•That all the Promifes fuppofed to be made to the
Jews before Chrift's Time, ofaMeffias or Deliverer.-
iff ere underftood and meant of fome " Temporal De-
" liverer'*' only, who foould reftore to the ifiraelites
a mere worldly Kingdom, without the leaft Jma-;
f ginatioh cfi a Spiritual Deliverance " or, of any Such
Saviour as is preached in the New Teftament.
That, ¦ confequently, " All the Prophecies " in,
$he Old Teftament,, applied to Chrift by the Apo-
\ "' : ftles

and Revealed Religion. 237:
ftles in the New, are applied to him in a Senfe
merely *>' typical, myftical, allegorical, or enigmatical -ft
in a Senfe " different Jrom the obvious and literal
" Senfie -," by " new Interpretations put upon them,
" not agreeable to the obvious and literal Meaning of
" thofie Books" from whence they are cited. That
is to fay, That the Prophecies were all of them in
tended concerning Other Perfions, and Other Perfions
Only ; and therefore are falfely and groundlefsly-
applied either to Chrift in particular, or in general-
to the Expectation of Any fiucb Meffiah as foould
introduce a Spiritual and Eternal Kingdom.
That there are fevei al Palfages, cited by the Apo
ftles out of the Old Teftament, which are either not
found there at all, or elfe are very different, in the.
Text itfelf, from the Citations alledged ; and con-,
fequently are by the Apoftles either mifiunderftood or
mtfiapplied. That even Miracles themfelves " can never render
" a Foundation valid, which is in itfielfi invalid ; can
" never make a Falfe Inference 'true ; can never make-
" a Prophecy fulfilled, which is not fulfilled ; " can ne
ver make thofe Things to be fipoken concerning Chrift,
which were not ftpoken concerning Chrift. And con^-
fequently, that the Miracles faid to have been work
ed by Chrift, could not poffibly have been really
worked by him, but muft of Neceffity, together
with the Whole Syftem both of the Old and New
Teftament, have been wholly the EffeCt of Imagi
nation and Enthufiafim, if not of Impofture.
Now, in order to inable every careful and fincere
Reader to find a Satisfactory Anfiwer to Thefe and
all other Objections of the like Nature, I would lay
before him the following Confiderations :
1. I fuppofe it to have been already proved in
the foreo-oino-' Part of this Difcourfe, that there
00 B b 4 IS-

%<& ffhe Evidence of Natural
IS a GOD; and that the Nature and Circum
ftances of Men, and the neceffary Perfections of
God, do demonftrate the Obligations and the Me-
' fives of NATURAL RELIGION; that is,
that God is a MORAL as well as Natural Go
vernor of the World. Whoever denies Either of
thefe Affertions, is obliged to invalidate the Argu
ments alledged for Proof of them in the former
fart of This Book, before he has any Right to
intermix Atheiftical Arguments and Objections in
the prefient Queftion : It being evidently ridiculous,
in All who believe not that God is, and that he
is a Moral Judge as well as Natural Governor ?
to argue at all about a Revelation concerning Reli
gion, or to make any Inquiry whether it be from
God or 'no. '
f See a- 2. As God has in FaCi. made known even demon-'
£0ve'VTT Arable Truths, * Natural and Moral Truths, not tq\
&0/$-pdet- -^' Men' equally, but in different Degrees and Pro-
j6j>« portions, to fuch as have a Difpofition and Defire tq
'inquire after them : So 'tis agreeable to Reafon and
to the; Analogy of God's Proceedings, to believe,
that he may poffibly, by Revelation and Tradition,.
have given fome further Degrees of Light, to Such;
as are fincerely defirous to know and obey him,
fo that they who will Do his Will, may Know of
the Doctrine whether it be of God. «. As our Na~
t-ural Knowledge ofi Moral and Religious Truths in,
Fact is, fo Revelation poffibly may further be, as it
were a Light Shining in a dark Place.
3. It appears in Hiftory, that the Great Truths
and Obligations of Natural Religion have from
\he Beginning been Confirmed by a perpetual Tradi-'
fan in particular Families, who, though in the midft"
pf Idolatrous Nations, yet ftedfaltly adhered to the'
Worfihip of the God of Nature, the One God of the..
Univerfe-. And by the Nation of the Jews (notwith
standing all their Corruptions in Practice, yet in the.
Syfteny

find Revealed Religion, g 3 £
Syftem and Conftihktion of their Religion) has the' fame
Tradition been continually preferved. Whereby1 'i~.
they have been as it were a City upon a Hill, a fiand?
ing Teftimony againft an Idolatrous World.
4. Among the Writings of all, even the moft
ancient and learned Nations, there are None but ther
Books of the Jews, which (agreeably to the above
demonftrated Truths- concerning the God of Natur'e'
and the Foundations of Natural Religion) have,
exclufive of Chance and qf Neceffity, afcribed either
the Original of the Univerfie in general (an Univerfe
full of infinite Variety and Choice,) to the Wilf
and Operation of an Intelligent and Free Caufe, or
given any tolerable Account, in particular, of the
formation of this our Earth into its prefent habit
able State.
5. But inTbefe Books, there is, not only (in order
to prevent idolatry) a full Account (agreeable to
the Principles of natural Reafon) how the Heavens
and the Earth, and all Things therein contained,
are the Creatures ofi GOD ; but moreover, an uni
form Series pf Hiftory, from the Infancy of Man--
kind ; confiftent with itfielfi, and with the State of the:
Jewifih and Chriftian Church at this Day, and with
the Poffibilities of the predicted Series fior the future,. .
for feveral Thoufands of Years. Which Confiftency,
with the Poffibilities of Juch predicted future Events,
pould not "be by Chance (as I foall fhew prefently)
put is itfelf a great and ftanding Miracle.
6. In Thefie Books, agreeably to the Hopes and
Expectations naturally founded on the Divine Perfec
tions, God did from the Beginning make, and ha$
all along continued to his Church or True Worfihip- •
pers, a Promifie that Truth and Virtue foould finally
prevail, foould prevail over the Spirit of Error and
' Wickednefis, of Delufiion and Difiobedience. That the'
Seed ofi the Woman fhould (1) bruifie the Serpent' 'r^Gen^.
Head; That, among Her Pofierity, foould arife a 15.
• ' Deliverance

24.Q The EviDENCEg/" Natural
Deliverance from the Delufion and Power of Sin;
(2) Rom. by which Satan (2) foould be bruifed under, their
»6. 20. peefw That in particular from the Seed of Abraham,
and from the Family of Ifiaac, and from the Polte-;;
rity of Jacob, and from, the Houfe of David, fhould
arife the Accomplifioment of all God's Promifies to his
Church, and all the Bleffiffgs included in God's Cove
nant with his True Worfoippers. That, at length,
(3) If. 11. the Earth (3) fhould be full of the Knowledge ofi
9- the Lord, as the Waters cover the Sea : That (tsff-the,
11 1 T. Kingdoms of this World fhould become the Kingdoms.
pan. 7. of the Lord ; That, in the (5) laft Days, unto the-
27- Mountain of the Lords Houfe, the Seat of his True
(I) if. 6*' Worfhip, fhould all Nations flow. That God
j_ ' 5' would (6) create New Heavens, and a New Earth,
(7) 2 Pet, (7) wherein dwelleth Righteoufinefis : Wherein ( 8 ),
3- '3; the People foould be All righteous, and inherit the
{ffifLand for ever \ foould be All (9) Holy, even every
ii. 9; 1! 0Me that is (10) written among the Living. That'
26.. God would (11) Jet up a Kingdom, which foould
X9) K-4-3- never be deftroyed, but ftand fior ever : And that
writtZ' (12) the Saints °f t^ Mcft High foould take the
unto Life, Kingdom, and poffefs the Kingdom for ever, even fior
airiDn ever andteveri
^P^ 7. All the Great Promifes therefore, which God
12 ,an" has ever made to his CHURCH, to his PEOPLE,
Everfone to the FAMILIES or NATIONS of his True-
that fihall Worfihippers, are evidently to be all along fo under-
•Lriuen in ft°°di as th&tWicked and Unworthy Perfions, of what-
the Book, ever Family or Nation or Profeffion of Religion they be,
( 1 1) Dan. foall be excluded from the Benefit of thofe Promifes,
j1- +4* foall be cut off from God's People-, and Worthy Perfions
7.18, Tz, °f a'l Nations, firom the Eaft and firom the Weft, and
27. if. 60. Jrom the North and Jrom the South, foall be accepted
&*• in their Stead, That is to fay : In like Manner as the
Promife was made originally, not to All the Children of
Abraham, but to Ifiaac only ; and not to Both the Sons
of Ifiaac, butjo Jacob only ; And, among the Ppf-
. • : terity

and Revealed,. Religion. gi.1
ferity of Jacob, All were not Ifirael, which were Of
Ifrael; but, in Elijah's Days, feven Thoufandonly
were the True Ifrael ; and, in the Time of Ifiaiab,
though the Number of the Children of Ifirael was as If- 10,2*,
fhe dand ofi the Sea, yet a Remnant only was to. be^0™' 9-
fiaved; And in Hofiea God fays, I will call Tbem^fza.
my People, which were not my People, and Her.be-Rorn.gft
loved, which 'was not beloved : So 'tis all along evi- 2S-
dently to be underftood, that the Children of the
Promifie in the literal Senfie according to the Flefih,
the Vifible Church or Profeffed Worfihippers oJ the True R
God, are but the Type or Reprejent alive of the Real z. 28.°7r
invifible Church of God, the (ij true Children of 7 w 9. '
Abraham in thefipiritual and religious Senfie, the (2) 4- 12.
.&»»fr <?/ /£<? moft High, who fihall poffefis the Kingdom ^ D?an"
/or wer, even fior ever and ever, even (f) every one f^\i.
(bat is Written among the Living. 3.
8. It being evident, that God cannot be the God
ofi the Dead, but of the Living ; and that All Pro
p-foes . made to Such Worfihippers of the True God as
at any Tjme forfook All that thsy had, and even
Life' itfielfi, for the Sake of That. W 01 foip, could be
nothing but mere Mockery, if there was No Life to
came, and God had no Power to reftore them from
the Dead; This (I fay) being Self-evident, it follows (4) Dan, .
neeeffarily, that when the Time comes that The Pro- 1Z- ^3-
mificd Kingdom fhall take Place, the Dead muft be £ 6*°6'
raifed; and the Saints, which have died in the in- (6) Gen.
termediate Time, muft live again, and (4) ftand in '5- '•
their Lot at the End of the Days. " When God fly les yj ^en*
himfelf (5) THE God of Abraham, Ifiaac, and Jacob; (%) Gen.
and faid tp Abraham,. (6) I am T II T exceeding great 17. 8, 13.
Reward ; and (7) I will— be a God unto THEE, and '?• £J- -
to thy Seed after J bee; and (8) / will give the Land^l, 3\U'
unto THEE, and to thy Seed after thee -, and repeated (2) Gen.
the very fame Promifes to (1) Ifiaac and to (2) Ja-f8- 13-
cob perfonally, as well as to (3) their Pofterity after P8 '
fheni ; and yet (4) gave Abraham none Inheritance in, (^fit^,
the 7. 5. '

242" the E v i de n c e ' of Natural
the Land, though he promified that he would give it ttf
HIM and to his Seed after him ; but Abraham himfelf
(5) Heb. (5) fiojotirned only in the Land of Prarhifie, as in a
> i- 9* ftrange Cowntty, dwelling in Tabetndcles with Ifiaac and
Jacob, the Heif s with him ofi the fianie Prorfiife; who'
(6) Heb. all (6) confeffed that they were Strangers and Pilgrims
*»-*3- on the Earth; and Jacob particularly complained,
(7) Gen. that (7) the Days of the Years ofi his Pilgrimage had
47- 9- been Few and Evil : And, in bleffing Ifiaac and Ifih-
(8) Gen. fnael, God promifed to (?) ffcafo lfhmael fruitful, and
tj. ±0. to multiply him exceedingly, fo that he foould beget
01. 18. twelve Princes, and God would »w^ him a great Na-
(9) Gen. tion, and (9) multiply his Seed exceedingly, that it Jhould
j6. 10. ftot ie numbered for Multitude; and yet in the very-
fame Sentence, exprefsly by Way of Oppofition, and
of high. and eminent DifiinClion, declares that notwith-
(10) Gen. ftanding all this, yet (10) his COVENANT, his
17.19,21. EVEfRLAST ING Covenant, he would eftablifh
with Ifiaac: When all This (I fay) is eonfidered,
the Inference of the Apoftle to the Hebrews cannot
but appear unanfwerably juft, that thefe Patriarchs
(1) Heb. ( j ) looked fior a City fomewhat more than Temporal,
11. io._ tven a City which hath Foundations, whofie Builder and
{2) Heb. Maker is God; and that (2) they who fiaid .Such
11.14,16. Things declared plainly that they fiought a Country, a
better Country, that is, an heavenly ; dnd that for"
This Reafon God was not afihamed to be called
THEIR God, becaufe he had prepared for them a
City. And if this. Inference was neeeffarily True
(3) Heb. concerning foe Patriarchs, who (3J wfifiefifed that
11. 13- they were Strangers and Pilgrims on the Earth; much
(4) Heb. more, concerning thofe who (4) were tortured, not
11. 35. accepting Deliverance, muft it needs be true, that
the only poffible Reafon of this their Choice was,
that they might' obtain a better RefiurveClion.
Other Notices in the Old Teftament, that the*
fVorfibippcrs ofi the True God, in every Age of the;
World, foould at thp End have their Lot in the
Kittgdm

And Revealed Religion. 2S43
Kingdom promifed to the Saints of (5) Q,en. ;. 24. (6) Heb.
the moft Highv are die (5) Tranf- u- s- Wifd. 4. 10. Ecclus.
lation of Enoch, (6) that he Jhould 44- 16. 49. 14. (7) 2 Kings
notfteDeaih; and the (7) Taking \ ^%%l ^
up of £/ya£ ipto Heaven. ^?/«- (2) The Introduftion to
/cW to it at leaft, if perhaps not thefe Words is very fblemn ;
<6r«# Affertfons, are the Words °b that my w»r<l[™" »;*»
,- , , — , ' ' \ , , ,  graven <wlth an Iron
pf (l) Job: (2) i *»0W /Atf my Pen> and Le.ad.Jn the Rock
Redeemer livetb,. and that he fihall for ever ! And how they were
ftand at the latter Day upon the anciently underftood appears
l . ,1 ,1 j w 7 X ct ¦ ' from that Addition' to the End
Earth : And, though after my Skin of the Book of Job in the
/%ra.r deftroy this Body, yet in my LXX, yfy?cm1ai Si, au'w, *¦»'-
.Flfe/ifr /jc,// i y^fi GcJ. And thofe *•» «W»iow8«(», ^S'J* 0 *»-
of Zfflwi ; ( a j «y <fouf Men fihall <*- •"r*"'- _, *& ><* ^
7- .7 -.; J jd J being old, and full of Days ;
live ; together with my dead Body «. /„, V/, ^-,4 ^ ^^
/«// ^j cn/tf : Awake and Jing, " n> again --with Thoji <u,bo»i
ye that dwell in Duft ; fior thy Dew " 'be Lord raijh up."
is as the Dew of Herbs, and the & K z6' r9*
Earth fihall caft out the Dead. And (4) Tour Bones (4) If. 66,
Jhall fiourifh like an Herb. And that Paffage in Ho- '4-
fiea : (5) I will ranfiom them from the Power of the /, l'
Grave ; I will redeem them from Death. O Death, I
will be thy Plagues ; O Grave, I will be thy DeftruClion.
And That in Ezekiel : (6) Behold, — - — the Bones (6) Ezefc.
came together, Bone to his Bone ; And ••• the Si- 37 ; 7> **
news and the Flefih came up upon them, and the Skin '
covered them above ; — > — - and the Breath came into
them, and l&ey lived, and ftood up upon their Feet :
 Behold, O my People, I will open your Graves,
and caufie you to come up out of your Qraves, and
bring you, ifito the Land of Iftafil. Again, The
Words of Ifiaiah: (7) The Righteous perifheth, and(7)\c;^
<  . — is . taken away firom. the Evil to come ; ' » a»
He fihall enter into PEACE: What more na- >- '
tUral Signification have they, than that which
the Book of- Wifidom expreffes, ch. 3. 1, 3 ; The
Souls of the Righteous are in the Hand ofi God. ;*  •
' Tbtg

'&44- *$>£ Evidence of Natural
They are in Peace? And What,- but the Future?
(i) If. 65. State, can the (1) Conclufion of Ifiaiah' 5 Prophecy
17. 66. reafbnably be referred to? Behold'; I create new Hea-
22,23,24. vms arj a mw garifo ._^ — ^ tfo new fjeaveKS- and
the new Earth which 1 will make; fihall remain before
me, faith the Lord; fio fihall four Seed and your Name
remain. And  all Flefih fihdll come to worfihip be
fore me, fiaith the Lord. And they fihall go forth and
look upon the Carcafes of the Men that have tranfigreffed
againji me : For their Worm fihall -not die, neither- fhall
their Fire be quenched, andjhey fihall be an Abhotring
(2) Ezek. unto all Flefih. In like Manner, Whom does Gtod
44- JS' fpeak of by Ezekiel, when he fays, (2) The Sons
, j ,3 3 0/(3) Zadock, that kept the Charge of my Sanctuary-}
jsns, Zhe WHEN the Children of Ijrael went aftray from me •¦
-Sons of [which (4) went not aftray, when the Children of Ifrael
Righteouf- wmt ajiray-^ ^  ffoey y##// enter int0t my SanCluary ?
(4) Ezek. And to what do the following Words of the fame
48.11. Prophet moft naturally refer? (1) Every Thing
fihall live, whither the River co-
(1) Exek.^.'-g, 12. Com- # _  ^ - . fb ' Riv
pared with, Rev. 22. I, 2. He , . . J '
fhevoed me a pure River of IVa- upon the Bank thereof, on this bide
ter of Life :  ^ And on either and on that Side, fihall grow all
Side oJ lit -River yjas there the cpreesf0r Meat; whofie Leafi fihall
Manner If Fruits,, andjeljed mt f^ mithsr PaU tb< FrUH
her Fruit every Month, and the thereof be confiumtd : It fihall bring
Leaves of the Tree were for the forth iiew Fruit- according to his
tiealmg of the Nations. Months, becaufe their Waters they
iffiued out ofi the SanCtuaiy -, And the Fruit thereof
fihall ¦ be for. Meat, ' and' the Leaf thereof, for Medi
cine. Still more ftrong is that Allufidn in Daniel ?
£z) Dan. (z) I -beheld till the thrones werefcaft down, [till
7* 9, 10. the Thrones were placed] and the Ancient of Days
did fit :  A fiery Stream ififued and came forth
from before him : Thoufiand Thoufiands minifiered unto
him, and ten Thoufiand Times ten Thoufiand flood
before %im : The Judgment was fiet, and the Boefe
'were opened. But the following Wrods of the"
fame?

And Revealed Re Lid tort. V45
fame Prophet are direcl and exprefis ; (3) Many of (3) Dan.
^m that fileep in the Duft of. the Earth fhall awake, IZ- 2' 3.
/o?»c?. /o everlafting Life, [every one'\\) that fhall be ^j ver_ l¥
/oaW written in the Book] and fiome to Shame and
Everlafting Contempt. And they that be wifie fhall
fihine as~ the Brighlnefts ofi the Firmament; and they
that turn many to Righteoufinefis, as the Stars for ever
and ever.  But go thou thy Way, till the End be :
For thouftoalt reft, and fihalt ftand in thy Lot at the
End ofi the Days. Can any one, who confiders thefe
Texts, with any Truth or Reafon affirm, that All
the Promifes, fuppofed to be made to the Jews be
fore Chrift's Time, were meant of fome " Tempa-
ral "_ Deliverance only, " without the leaft Imagina-
" tion ofi. a Spiritual Deliverance ? "
( 9. There are in the Old Teftament many Inti
mations, and fome direCi Predictions, that all the
Great Promifes of God, made to his True Wor-
fhippers, foall receive their final Accompiifoment
by means of a Particular Perfion, anointed of God
for That Purpofe ; - who, after the Reduction of all
Adverfaries, foall fet up the Everlafting Kingdom.
The Seed of Abraham, in which All the Nations of
the Earth were to be B'leffed; (and in like Manner
the Seed of the Woman, which was to bruifie the Sef<>
pern's Head,) might originally, with equal Propriety,
and in as reafonable and natural a Senfe of the '
Words, be underftood to fignify (what St. Paul
afterwards (r)afferts it did figmfy) '' ' ¦
in the fingular Senfe, a Particular "¦ (1) Gal. 3. 16. He faith
Perfon; as, in the plural Senfe, »¦'> And to Seeds, as of Mam;
a Number -of Perfons. The (2) ft"?0?: J""''b ^d-
„,., , ... V '. lliat is tofay : In thePromile
Shiloh which was to come, and to to Abraham die Scripture, iifes''
whom the Gathering ofi the People the ambiguous Word, Seed,
was to be; (the -Premife laid up in not ''in the Plural Senfe, but
c, x . / , '-• »l-„ in the Singular .Senfe,
Otore, ra aiTOKCii»£vet aura, as the ' & ¦ ,* n
LX-X" render it 0 by \x» Oppofi- \.' -^Gen-49-^
. tion in the Text to the Terms Sceptre and Lawgiver,
;. , moft

^46 ST& Evidence of Nhfural
-moft naturally fignifies a Single Perfion wbbwdsfb
reign ; and, by the Gradation in the 'Words of the
Text, Somewhat, of Superior Dignity ' to that of a
• Sceptre and a Lawgiver. The Wrords of Balaam 1
(2) Num. (2) I fihall fiee him, but not now; I pall behold him;
24.17,19. but not nigh : There fhall come a Star out ofi Jacobs
find a Sceptre fihall rifie out of Ifrael :'*— — Out of Jacob
fhall come he that fhall have Dominion : are Wfords fo
put in his Mouth, as mofi properly and obvioufily to
defcribe a much Greater Perfion than perhaps He
thought of, a much Greater Perfion than one whd
mould fimite the Corners of Moab, and deftroy all tht
Children of Sheth. Again, That the Words of
ft) Deut. Mofies ; (3) The Lord thy God will raifie up unto thee
j8. 15* a Prophet from the Midft ofi thee, like unto Me, untd
Himfihallye hearken ; were not meant barely of Jojhua\
or of " a Succeffion ofi Prophets" but of One who
foould have as eminent a legifiative Authority as Mofies,
may reafonabjy be gathered from the Occafion of
their being fpoken, not merely by Mofies, upon a ge-
neralReliance andTruftthat God would provide hint
a Succeffor ; but by God himfielf, upon the People's
(4) Deut. (4) Defiring in Horeb,  fidying* Let me not hear
18. 16, again the Voice of the Lord my God, neither let me fee
*7»»8,i9. tfiis great Fire any more, that I die not,; Then the Lord
faid, They have well fpoken :  / will raifie them up
a Prophet firom among their Brethren, like unto Ibeq
and will put my Words in his Mouth, and be fihall fipeak,
unto them all that I fihall command him : And it fihalb
came to pafis, that whofioever will not hearken unto my
Words which he fihall fpeak in my Name, I will require
it of him. And that the Words, were Anciently, long
before the Application of them by the Writers of
the New Teftament, thus underftood, and not con
cerning Jofioua or a Succeffion of Prophets, appears"
from thofe additional Words j at the Conclufion of,
($ Deut. the Book of Deuteronomy : (5) J-olhua the- Sen of
$4, 91 10. Nm was fiull of the Spirit of Wifdom 5 for Mofiel had

and Revealed Religion. atf
had laid his Hands upon him.-.  But there arofie
hot a Prophet fince in Ifrael, like unto Mcfies, whbm
the Lord knew Face to Face. The Prediction of
Ifiaiah is ftill clearer: (i) Unto Us a Child is bom, (1) If. 9.
unto Us a Son is given, and the Government fioall 6-7-
be upon his Shoulders ; and his Name fihall be called
( 2 ) Wonder Jul, Counfielhr, the
mighty God, the everlafting Father, ( 2 ) 113J h* yyv n^d
the Prince ofi Pecce: Ofi the In- !?*££ ' ^Zt&Lfj^'Z'-
treafie of his Government and Peace \s MfL 3 .TT^M' "lal-
tbere fhall be no End, upon the S^w] the Mighty, the Potent
Throne of David and upon his "ne, the Father of the Jge to
Kingdom, to order it, and to efta- %f ^fZ^t
blifih it with Judgment and with
Juftice from henceforth, even FOR EVER: The
Zeal of the Lord of Hofts will perform this. Again :
(3) There Jhdll come forth a Rod out of the Stem of m jr. xu
Jefifie, — —He fihall not judge after the Sight of his \, 3,6,9.
Eyes, neither reproVe after the Hearing of his Ears :
But with Right eoufinefis fihall he judge the Poor, and
reprove with Equity for the Meek of the Earth -, -and
be fihall fimite the Earth with the Red of his Mouth,
And with the Breath ofi his Lips fihall he flay the Wicked.
-«  The Wolf alfo fihall dwell with the Lamb, &c. .
•——They fihall net hurt nor deftroy in all my Holy
Mountain ; For the Earth fihall be full of the Know
ledge of the Lord; as the Waters cover the Sea. And,
(4) Behold my Servant,-  mine EleCi, in whom (4) if. 4i.
toy' Soul delight eth : 1 have put my Spirit upon him : i> 3> 4-
 A bruifed Reed fhall he not break ;^—He fihall J*att- 13«
bring forth Judgment unto Truth :— — //// he have. ' '
fet Judgment in the Earth, and the Ifies Jhall wait
for his Law. The Prophet Jeremiah no lefs plainly :
(5) 1 will raife unto David a righteous Branch, and (c) Jen
a King fihall reign and profiper, and fihall execute Judg- 23- 5> 0.
fnent and Juftice' in the Earth :  And This is his 33- 'S.'6.
Name whereby he fhall be called, THE LORD
OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. And Ezekiel :
Cc (i)l

£ 4§ $he E v i de n C e bf Natural
(0 Ezek. (i) I will fiet'up one Shepherd over them, and he fhall
34- 2l>25- feed tbem, even my Servant David;  -And I will
37 22 23.
2^.,' 2 e'. CT^e wz'^ *^* fl Covenant of Peace, Sec.—* — 0»c?
Hof.3 . 5. King fhall be King to them All;  neither fihall they
defile themfelves any more with theirs Idols ; — —and
they all fhall have One Shepherd ; They fihall alfo%alk
in my Judgments,  — and my Servant David Jhall be
their Prince FOREVER. By Haggai is the
(2) Hagg. 2. 6, 7. Heb. ^ame predicted : (2) Tet once, it
12. 26. is a little While, and I will Jhake
(3) The Shiloh, unto whom fa Heavens and the Earth,—
VS^t"™* Jndthe (3} &&' ej allNatim
'(4) Zech. 9. 9, id. Matt, fio all come. And by Zecbary :
21. 5- (4) Behold, thy King comeih unto
thee : He is juft, and having Salvation ; lowly* and
riding upon an Ajs, and upon a Colt the Fole ofi an
Afis :— — He fihall fipeak Peace unto the Heathen ;
and his Dominion fihall be firom Sea even to Sea, and
from the River even to the Ends of the Earth. And
(S_)Mal. by Malachi: (5) The LORD whom ye fieek fihall
3- J • fiuddenly come to his Temple, even the Meffenger of the
Covenant. But moft exprefsly of all by Daniel :
(6) / fiaw in the Night-vifions,
<6) £?."¦ 7- y» H- and behold, one like (7) The Son of
(7) With Reference to This „. ' .. , y,/ , , rj ¦>
H is, that Chrift in the Gof- Man came ™lih the UoudS ofi Hea-
pel perpetually ftyles himfelf ven, and came to the Antient ofi
fHE Son of Man -, and once, Days, and they brought him near be-
Tthfchif uffp^ntc'; l /-^ Jnd there was given him
defcribed as coming in the Dominion, and Glory, and a King-
Clouds of J Heaven, John 3. dom ; that all People, Nations, and
13. And tells his Difciples Languages Jhould ferve him : His Dd-
that they Jhall Jee the Son ofi • • •¦ -n r a- r» • ¦ >
Man coiing in the Clouds If m™°» " f » Everlafting Dominion,
Heaven, Matt. 24. 30. And wbicb fhall not pafs away ; and bis
the High-Prieft, that Hereafter Kingdom that which fihall not be de*
ye Jhall fee the Son of Man fitting p^ An(j fa ^^^ 0f fa
en the right Hand of Foiver, Tt 1 .-. 1 • r» \ • 11 xo\
and coming in the Clouds of Holy One this Prophet calls (8)
Heaven, Matt. 26. 64., the Sealing up ofi the Vifion and Pro-
(8) Dan. 9. 24. phecy, and the Finifihing of Tranfi-
greffiort,

and Revealed Religion. £49
grejfioh, and the making an End of Sins, and ; the
making Reconciliation for Iniquity, and the bringing in
Everlafting Right eoufinefis. (Do all thefe Things de
note nothing but '¦'¦Temporal" Deliverance, '¦'¦without
" the leaft Imagination of a Spiritual Deliverance ?" ')
A^d, in the Words next following, he is ftyled
by Name, Meffiah : (1) Know therefore, fjnm (1) Dan.
Know Alfo] and underftand, that jrom the Going 9- 2S-
forth of the Commandment to reftore and to build Je- , L
rufialem, unto the Meffiah the Prince.; fihall be (2) (2) Seven
'Seven Weeks. . S^xaa,
nes (or
Weeks) of Years, (as the Word is ufed, Gen. 29. 27.) That is to fay;
Forty-nine Years, the Number of Years appointed until the Jubilee, Levit.
25. 8, 9, 10. Concerning the Other Numbers of Daniel in this Place;
1 fliall have Occafion to fpeak prefently.
io; Concerning this Meffiah, in the Setting up
bf whofe Kingdom All the Promifes of God ter
minate, 'tis clearly predicted in the Old Teftament;
that he foould arife particularly from the Tribe of
Judah; from the Family of D&vid, and in the
-Town of Bethlehem.-
The firft of thefe Particulars is expreffed in thofe
emphatical Words of Jacob : (3) Judah, thou art he , < «fe
*uohom thy Brethren fihall praifie,— — thy Father's Chil- \9, 8,- 10.
-dren fihall bow down before thee :  — The Scepter
.jhall not depart from Judah, nor a Lawgiver from
between his Feet; until Shiloh come, [LXX. eat A> h-
Sn ra omoxsi/Asva cwtS, till the Accomplifhmerit of the
Promifes which God has laid up in Store for him]
and unto him fhall the Gathering of the People be.
To which the Writer of the Chronicles feems to
refer, when he fays : (4) The Genealogy is not to be (4) 1 Chr.
reckoned after the Birth-right : For Judah prevailed 5- *> z-
above his Brethren, and of him came the chief Ruler,
[ HDD TSib and firom Him was it prophefied the
Ruler fhould arife.] And the Pfalmift : \5) Judah (5) Pf 60.
is mv Lawgiver1. '
Cc 2 The

2 $o fhe Evidence of Natural
The fiuond is expreffed in That Promife to "Dh-
(i) zSamif/W; (i) Thine Houfie and thy Kingdom fihall be efla-
7- l6- blifihed fior ever, before thee [LXX, ii/uwio'v pou, be
fore Me :] Thy Throne fhall be eftablifihed for ever.
Which Words might indeed, of themfelves, be
underftood concerning a Succeffion of Kings in 'the
Houfe of David. But that God had a further and
greater Meaning in them, he very clearly explains
(2) If. 11. by the following Prophets. By Ifaiah : (2) There
I, &c. fihall come forth a Rod out of the Stem ofi J effe, and
Compare a Branch fihall grow out ofi bis Roots ; And thenTol-
e^' 3j^* lowsj through the whole Chapter, a glorious De-
io". fcription of an everlafting Kingdom of Righteouf
nefis oyer both Jews and Gentiles. By Jeremiah :
(3) Jer« (3) I will raifie unto David a righteous Branch, and
23- 5- a King, fihall reign and profiper^ and Jhall execute Judg
ment and Juftice in the Earth : -  And this is his
Name, whereby he Jhall be called, THE LORD
OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS. By Ezekiel :
(4) Ezek. (4.) They fhall be my People, and I will be their God:
37- 23> And David my Servant Jhall be King over them, and
2.4,25,26. ffogy j}jaii 'ay ^ave Qm sfapferd . ... . . anc[ my ser.
vant David Jhall be their Prince FOR EVER:
Moreover I will make a Covenant of Peace with
them, it fhall be an Everlafting Covenant. And by
(5) H°f- Hofiea : (5) The Children of Ifrael fihall abide Many
3* 4- Days wsthout a King, and without a Prince, and
without a Sacrifice :  Afterward fihall the Children
of Ifrael return, and fieek the Lord their God, and
David their King ; and fhall fiear the Lord and bis
Goodnefis, in the LATT E R Days.
The third Particular is expreffed in thofe Words
(6) Micah of Micah : (6) But thou, Bethlehem Ephratab, though
5- 2- thou be little among the Thoufiands ofi Judah, yet out
att'2' 'of thee jhall He come forth unto me, that is to be
Ruler in Ifiratl: Whofie Goings forth have been from
Old, from Everlafting. After the Paffages now cir
ted out of the foregoing Ptophets, what can be,
more

and Revealed Religion. 251
more jejune, than to underftand thefe Words of
Micah" concerning Zorobabel; only as having been
of an Ancient Family ?
11. In the Books of the Old Teftament 'tis
exprefisly predicted, that the Kingdom of the Mef
fiah foould extend, not over the Jews only, but
alfo over the Gentiles. The (1) Promife made to (1) Gen.
Abraham, and fo often repeated to Him, and to 'jj-3- ,8-
Ifiaac and to Jacob, that in Their Seed fihould All\% fj^'
¦the Nations ofi the Earth be bleffed, is thus opened 28. 14.
and explained by the Prophets. (?,) There Jhall (2) If. u.
be a Root of J effe, which fhall ftand for an Enjign ,0'
ofi the People ; To it Jhall the Gentiles Jeek, and his'
Reft fhall . be glorious. ( 3 ) Behold -my Servant  ¦— (3) If. 42.
in whom my Soul delight eth ; • he pall bring '> 6-
forth Judgment to the Gentiles :  / will^f"' I2"
— — — — give thee for a Covenant of the People, for
a Light ofi the Gentiles. (4) It is a light Thing, (4)1^49.
that thou fihouldft be my Servant to -raifie up the Tribjs 6-
ofi Jacob, and to 'reftore the Prefierved, of Ifirael; I
will alfio give thee for a Light to the Gentiles, that
thou may eft be my Salvation unto the End of the Earth.
(5) Alfo the Sons of the Stranger that join tbemfielves (s)K 56.
to the Lord,  even Them will I bring to my Holy ^>7> 8-
Mountain, and  -mine Houfie fihall be called an Houfe \^
of Prayer for All People. The Lord God, which
gathereih the Out-cafts ofi Ifirael, fiaith, Tet will I
gather Others to him, befides thofe that are gathered
unto him. (6) The Strangers that fiojourn among (6) Ezek.
you^  fihall have 'an Inheritance with you among the 47. 22.
Tribes ofi Ifirael. (7) Frcm' the Rifiing of the Sun, (7) Mai.
even unto the Going down of the fame, my Name fhall '• Iu
be great among the Gentiles ; and in Every Place
Incenfie fihall be offered unto my Name, and a pure
Offering ; For my Name Jhall be great among th&
Heathen, fiaith the Lord ofi Hofils.
12. Concerning the Same Meffiah, of whom fo
great Things are fpoken, and whofe Kingdom is to
^ C c 3 be

252 *F&? Evidence of Natural
be an Everlafting Kingdom ; 'tis ftill exprefisty pre,
dieted by the Prophets, tnat he foould Suffer and
be Cut off. Concerning the very fiame Perfon, who
(with Refpect to his coming to Reign, and to in-
(1) Heb. troduce the everlafting Jubilee or (i) Reft to the
4.9. aa.$- People of God) is ftyled ('2) Meffiah The Prince;
/3«Wf*o5. Concerning the very fiame Perfon, I fay, 'tis in
i2 T2an'. the very fiame Sentence exprefisly predicted that he
(3) Dan. foould (3) be Cut off, but not fior himfielf, [ )b }>n
9- 26. and the People jhould not Then be His ; unto Him-
(4) Gen. Jhould not (4) Then the Gathering of the People be.~\
49- 10. por wbich Reafon, and alfo becaufie the Words can,"
with no tolerable Senfe, 'be applied to any Other-'
Perfio'n, .and becaufie moreover the Connexion of the
Whole Prophecy leads to the fame Interpretation,
the 53^ Chapter of Ifiaiah, likewife, is moft juftly
(5) If. 11. underftood to be fpoken of the Meffiah : (5) There
l- Jhall come forth a Rod out of the Stem of J effe ;-¦  .
(6) If. 11. ^ mth Rigbteoufnefi jbaU He judge the Poor : 
(7) If. 42. (7) Behold My Servant,— — -r-mine EleCl in whom'
I > 2, 3. my Soul delighteth ;-.  he fhall not cry, nor lift up,
nor caufe his Voice to be heard in the Street : A bruifed
Reed fliall he not break, and the fmoking Flax fihall he
not quench ; he fihall 'bring forth Judgment unto Truth \
(8) If. 52.  >(8J Behold, My 'Servant flail deal prudently ;
13. — ——(9) Surely He hath borne our Griefs ; — : — -— r
i & '^' he was wounded for, our Tranfgreffions, he was bruifed
for our Iniquities ;¦.. , . be is brought as a Lamb to ¦
the Slaughter, and as a Sheep before her Shearers is
dumb, fo he openeth not his Mouth : He was ' taken
from Prifion and from Judgment, and Who Jhall declare
his Generation?— — for the Tranfgreffion of my People
was hefiricken; And he made his Grave with the'
Wicked, and with the Rich in his Death :—  When
thou Jhalt make his Soul an Offering fior Sin ;  r— «
My righteous Servant 'fihall juftifiy Many, fior he Jhall
bear their Iniquities:-,  ¦ He was numbered with the

i and Revealed Religion. 2$%
the Tranfigreffors, and he bare the Sin . ofi^ Many, and
made Inter ceffion fior the Tranfigreffors.
13. All Prophecies of Bleffings to the Worfoip-
pers of the True God, expreffed either as being to
happen in the Latter Days,, or in Words which im
ply a Lafting Duration, are in Reafon to be under
ftood as having Reference to the Times of the pro-
mifed Kingdom of the Meffiah ; of whom 'tis ex-
prejsly faid, that he fliall (1) bring in Everlafting (1) Dan.
Right eoufnejs, and that (2) his Dominion is an Ever- 9-- 24-
lofting Dominion which fliall not pafs away, and his (2) an*'
Kingdom that which Jhall not be deftroyed. Some
Prophecies of this Kind are direCi and exprefis.
Others, beginning with Promifes of particular in
termediate Bleffings, and proceeding with general Ex
preffions more great and lofty than can naturally be
applied to the Temporal Blefifing immediately fpoken
of, are moft reafonably underftood to have a perpetu
al View and Regard to That Great and General Event,
in which all God's Promifes to his true Worfhippers
do center and terminate ; and of which All interme
diate Bleffings, promifed by God, are juftly looked
upon as. Beginnings, Types, Pledges, or Earnefts.
14. For fince, from the exprefis Prophecies before
cited. of the Meffiah'' 's everlafting Kingdom of Righte*
fufinefis, it appears that God had in FaCt a View to
That, as the Great and General End of all the Dif-.
penfations of Providence towards his true Worfhip
pers from the Beginning ; and. (3) no Prophecy of ^ 2pett
the Scripture is of any Private Interpretation, (that is, 1. 20.
the Meaning of Prophecies is not what perhaps the
prophet himfelf might imagine in his private Judg
ment of the State of Things then prefent) becaufe
the Prophecy in old Time- came not by the WIL L of
Man, but Holy Men fipake as they were moved by the
Holy Ghofi': There may therefore very poffibly and
very reafionably be fuppofed to be many Prophecies,
which, though they may have a prior and immedi-
C c 4 ate

2ji4 The Evidence of Natural
ate Reference to fome nearer Event, yet.by the Spi
rit of God (whom Thofe Prophecies, which are Ex
prefs, fhew to have had a further View) may .have
been directed to be uttered in fuch Words, as may
even more properly and more juftly be applied to the
Great Event which Providence had in View, than
to the intermediate Event which God defigned as only
a Pledge or Ear,neft of the Other. For Inftance:
(i) Dan. Suppofe thefe Words of Daniel, (i) I beheld till
7. 9, 10. the Thrones were cojl down, [till the 'thrones were
placed] and the Ancient ofi Days did fit-;  A fiery
Stream iffued and came forth jrem before him ; Thou
fiand Thcuficnds mniftred unto him, and Ten Thoufiand
'Times Ten Thoufiand flood before him ; the Judgment
was fet, and the Books were 'opened : Suppofe (I fay)
(?) ver. thefe Words were fpoken concerning the (2) Slaying
ii- ofi a wild Beaft, or the DeftruClion of a Temporal Em
pire ; yet what reafonable Man, who had ever elfe-
where met .with any Notices of a Judgment to come,
cculd doubt but the DeftruClion there ftoken of was
therefore expreffed in Thofie Words, that it might be
underftood to be the Introduction to the General
Judgment ? The exaCl and very particular Defcription
of a Refimri Ciicn in the %jth of Ezekiel ; fuppofing
it to be indeed fpoken of a Temporal Reftoration of
the Jews, yet Who can doubt but it- was So worded
with Defign, to allude to a real RefurreCiion of the
(3) Micah Dead? The Words of Micah, (3) Ihou, Bethlehem,
5. z- though thou be little among the Thoufiands ofi Judah,
§ yet out ofi Thee fihall He come forth unto me, that is to
be Rider in Ifrael ; whofe Goings forth have been from
of Old, firom Everlafting -, fuppofing it poffible they
could be fpoken of Zorclabel, yet, if afterwards
thefre fhould arife out of Bethlehem One in whom
were found all the Other prophetic Characters of
the promifed Meffiah, Who could doubt but the
(4) ]er. Words were intended either fiolely, or, at leaft, cbiefiyj
p>7<(>>5' of the Latter? The Words of Jeremy, (4) Baby
'¦' Ity

and Revealed Religion. 25?
fen bath been a golden Cup -, ¦  • the Nations have
drunken of her Wine, therefore the Napions are mad :
Flee out of the Midfi of Babylon,  be not cut off in
her Iniquity :•  My People, go ye out of the Midfl of
her, and deliver ye every Man his Soul from the fierce
Anger ofi the Lord: Who, that confiders the Nature
and Character of the Babylon in Jeremiah's Time,
and compares it with the Nature and Character of
the Babylon defcribed by St. John, can doubt but
the Spirit which influenced Jeremy, forefaw and in
tended to allude to That Babylon, which had (1) a(\) Rev.
golden Cup in her Hand, fiull cfi Abominations, (2) andl7- 4*
the Inhabit ers of the Earth have been made drunk withvi vfr" 2*
the Wine of her Fornication, (3) and the Kings of tbe{\. fi a.
Earth have committed Fornication with her :  .
Come out of her, my People, that ye be not Partakers
of her Sins, and that ye receive not of her Plagues ?
For the Words of Jeremy are more ftrictly applicable
to this latter Babylon, than to That in his own Time.
Again: The Words of Ifiaiah, (4) Behold, a*Virgin (4) It 7.
fhall conceive and bear a Son, and floall call his Name1^
Immanuel, that is to fay, God with us: Suppofing "' I"
Ifiaiah himfielfi could poffibly, at That Time, under
ftand them concerning a Son of his own, concerning
a -Son to be born of a young Woman afterwards, who
at the Time then prefient was a Virgin ; and that his
being ftyled Immanuel meant nothing more, than
that, before This Child was grown up, Judah
fhould be delivered from the then threatened Incur-
fions of Ifrael and Syria ; (all which, notwithftand
ing the fieeming Connexion of the Words in the
Place they ftand, is very difficult to fuppofe -,) yet if
afterwards any Perfon, comparing the Solemn Intro
duction wherewith the Words are brought in, (Hear
ye now, O Hcufie of David; Is it a fmall Thing for
you to weary Men, but will ye weary my God alfo?
therefore the Lord, himfelf fhall give you a Sign ; Be
hold a Virgin Jhall conceive, &c.) If any one, Ifay,.
comparing

2 36 The Evidence of Natural
comparing this Solemn Introduction with the Promifej
repeated to the Houfe of David, in Other Paffages of
the Prophets, that there foould be born unto them
(i) If. 9. a Son, who foould (1) fit upon the Throne of David,
7- Ezelc- and upon his Kingdom for ever, and of the Increafe of
37- 25> whofe Government and Peace there Jhould be no End j
and confidering moreover the Character of this pro-
(2) Dan. fnifed Son, that he foould (2) finijh Tranfgreffion,
.9. 24. and make an End of Sins, and make Reconciliation for
\ Iniquity, and bring in everlafting Righteoufnefs ; If a
Perfon, confidering and comparing thefe things, foould,
in his own Days, find a Son really born of a Virgin,
attefted to by numerous Miracles, and, by -God's.
Command, named Jefius, (which is fynonymoujs to
Immanuel, a Potent Saviour or God with us) becaufe
(3) Matt, he {3) Jhould fiave his People jrom their Sins, that is,
/\2jV foould (4) make Reconciliation for Iniquity,, and bring
o. 24. ' *n everlafting Righteouftnefts : Could fuch a Perfon
poffibly entertain the leaft Doubt, whether God,
who fent Iftaiah to repeat the fore- cited Words to
the Houfe of David, did not intend thereby to de-
fcr'ibe, if not whblely and fiolely, at leaft chiefly and
ultimately, this. Latter Saviour ? ; In like Manner ;
(5) 2Sam. Suppofe thofe great Promifes to David, (5) concern-,
7- '3> '4' ing the Efiablifihment of theTbrone of his Son fior ever,
were, by David and by the Prophet himfielf that de
livered them, underftood (rf ®l* eb-jmWi, as St. Pe->
ter fpeaks) concerning Solomon and a Succeffion: of
Kings in his Family ; yet, when following Prophecies,
dearly and exprefsly declared, that out -of the Roof
ef Jeffe foould arife a Meffiah who foould reign for
ever, no reafonable Man can doubt, but that the
former and lefs clear Prophecy was likewife intended
of God, and, therefore, rightly applied by the Apoftles
of Chrift to the fame Purpofe. To give but One
(6) Pf. Inftance more: Suppofe the Words, (6.) Thouwili
j6. 10. not leave my Soul in Hell, neither wilt thou fuffer thy
Holy One to fee Corruption were by David fpoken
concerning

and Revealed Religion/ 257
concerning Himfelf, (which however can no Way
be proved ;) yet Who, that (1) knew David him- (1) A&«.
fidf to be a Prophet ; and that had compared the 2- 3°-
Other Prophecies concerning the (2) Branch out of (2) If. n,
the Roots of J effe, the (3) One Shepherd of Ifrael,'1' &c-
even God's (4) Servant David, who foould be their ^ Ezek,
Prince for ever, and yet was to be (5) Cut off before fy Ver„
he foould reign for ever-, and that had himfelf feeri 25.
(as St. Peter "did) and actually converfed with Chrift (5) Daih,
rifien from the Dead ; Who (Ifay) in thefe Circurn- \f, Jot.
ftances, could poffibly doubt, but that (6) the Spi- (6) 2SanW
r# of the Lord which fipake by David, intended the z3- 2?
foremehtioned Words foould be underftood of, and
applied to Chrift ? And the like may be faid con
cerning fome Other Prophecies, which are vulgarly
fuppofed to be applied typically to Chrift.
15. 'Tis not 'agreeable to Reafon, or to the
Analogy of Scripture, to fuppofe that the Jews,
before our Saviour's Time, could have a Clear and
PiftinCl Underftanding of the Full Meaning even of
fhe Exprefis Prophecies, much lefs of thofe which
Were more obfimre and indirect, when Both were
intended to be only ( 1) as it were
a Light fihining in a dark Place: (0 See above, Page 238,
But thus much is evident, that andProP' VIL §i'+' P"*e ,6^
the Tews, both before and in Our l2)PercrebueratOHenteto-
o • , t=- 1 1 r n ,- t{> "vetus & con/tans Opinio, ells
SaviQiir.s Time, had, from fhele in Fatis> ut -judasi profeft.
Prophecies, ( 2 ) , a ge neral Expec- Rerum potirentur. Sueton.
tation of a' Meffiah, and that this Pluribus Perfuafio inerat,
A^Wwas. tobenot Wva «W ££' J^^fe
pW Deliverer, but TjP3N, P^- valefceret * O/W, ' profeftiq?
ter fiuttiri §eculi, the fftf^ Of the 7aaW Rerum potirentur. Ta-
future State, as well as of the "'• »„».,,, , „.
r. , »t7 1 ¦ 11 * Poffibly from that Text
prefent. Nor does it at all ap- ;» Zechary ¦ .'W iyj «v ri?
pear, tfyat our Lord's Difciples, • JouAw /»oo 'a»*to^'». LXX.
when they (3) thought he «e>0»/i
iraw Redeemed Ifrael, or when they (4) ^<?i if he (3) Lufee
^ould ^ 7'M Tfime reftore again the Kingdom to2*-^-
Ifrael; \*6m

258 " The Evidence of Natural
Ifrael ; I fay, it does not at all appear that they ex
pected MERELY a " Temporal" Kingdom ; but
their Error was in expecting a Prefent Kingdom ;
and therefore our Lord's Anfwer to them is not
concerning the Nature but the Time of the King
dom. And the modern Jews, at this Day, who
to be fure have entertained no Prejudicate Notions
from the New Teftament Writers Interpretation or
Application of Prophecies, have (I think) ftill an
univerfal Expectation, that the Meffiah foall be their
Prince in the future State as well as in the prefient.
(OJohn 16. When Jefius Chrift, by (1) the Works which
)°\ fV he did in his Father's Name, and (2) which bis Fa-
c. 36° " *^er &ave ^im t0 finift3-) nacl Proved himfelf to be
Sent of God; (which Truth the Apoftles likewife
confirmed by Their Teftimony, by their Works, and
by laying down their Lives, not for - their Opinions,
which poffibly Erroneous and Enthufiaftic Perfons
may fometimes fincerely do, but in Atteftation to
FaCts of their own Knowledge ;) and it appeared
moreover, that there was warning in Him no Cir
cumftance, no fine qua non, no Character, appropri
ated by any of the Ancient Prophets to the promified
Meffiah; He had then a clear Right to apply to him
felf All the Prophecies, which either diredly fpoke of
the Meffiah, or whichi through any intermediate,
Events, pointed at him, and were applicable to him.
17. The Application of this latter Sort of Pro
phecies to Chrift is not Allegorical. 'Tis not an
allegorical Application, .much lefs an allegorical Ar
gument or Reafoning : But they are applied to
Him as being really and intentionally, in the View of
Providence, the End and complete Accomplifihment of
that, whereof the intermediate Bleffing was a Pledge
or Beginning.18. The Application of this latter Sort of Pro
phecies to Chrift was never, by reafonable Men,
urged as being itfelf a Proof that Jefius was the true
Meffiah.

and Revealed Religion. 259
Meffiah. Nay, the Application of the moft direCi
and exprefis Prophecies whatfoever has not of, itfelf
the Nature of a direCi or pofitive Proof, but can only
be a fine qua non, an Application of certain Mar,ks .
or Characters, without which no Perfon could be the
riomifed Meffiah ft Many Men were of the Seed of
Abraham, and of the Tribe ofi Juda, and of the Fa
mily ofi David, and born in Bethlehem of Judea, and
Suffered, and were Cut off; and yet neither Any nor
All of thefe Characters could prove any Man to be
the promified Meffiah : But the Want of any one of
them would prove that any Man was not He. The
Proof 'of Jefius being the Chrift were (i) the Works /,) j0hn
which his Father gave him to finifih. .The Applica- 5. 36.
tion of direCi and exprefis Prophecies to him is no
thing biit fuch a Congruity of Marks or Characters,
as removes all Objections by which an Adverfary
would endeavour to prove^ that it was not He. Ought
not Chrift ( 2 ) t'o have fiuffered thefe Things, and to (z\ Luke
enter into his Glory ? is not Proving from his Suffer- 24- z6-
ings, that Jefus wtf.r the Chrift, but removing the
Objection, by which Some were apt to infer from
his Sufferings, that he could not poffibly be the Chrift.
The Application of indirect Prophecies to him, is
only a giving of further Light, from the Analogy
and Conformity of the Old Teftament to the New,
by Way of Jlluftration and Confirmation, to fuch as
have been before convinced by the direCi Proofs.
The Proof, therefore^ of the Truth of Chriftianity,
does not ftand upon the Application of Prophecies :
But the Works, by which Chrift proved himfelf to
hefient of God, gave him a Right to apply to himfelf
the Prophecies concerning the Meffiah ; And the
Marks or Characters of the promified Meffiah, given
by the Prophets, were fo many Tefts by which his
Claim was to be tried, " Miracles" indeed " can
" never render a Foundation valid, which is in itfelf
" invalid ; can never make a fialfie Inference true -, can
1 a mvir

£66 The Evidence of Natural
" never make a Prophecy fulfilled, which is not fuU
" filled; can never mark out a Meffias, or Jefius for'
" the Meffias, if Both are not marked out in the Old
" Teftament :" But Miracles can give a Man a juft
and undeniable Claim to be received as the prOmifed
Meffiah; if the prophetic Characters of the Meffiah
be applicable to him. And This it is by which
Jefius was proved to be The Chrift.
19. From what has been faid concerning the Ap
plication of indirect Prophecies, tis eafy to obferve
the Nature and Ufe of Types; and Figures^ and Alle
gorical Manners of Speaking : That Thefie were much
lefis intended to be ever alledged for Proofs of the
Truth of a Doctrine ; and yet, in their proper Places
may afford very great Light and Affiftance towards
the right Underftanding of it. An Inftance or two
will make this Matter obvious. There is a very re
markable Paffage in the Epiftle to the Galatians,
where the Apoftle himfelf ftyles the Thing he is
(1) Gal; fpeaking of an (1) Allegory; that is, he draws an
4. 24. Argument a fiimili. The Allegory or Similitude he"
makes Ufe of is not alledged by him as a " Proof"
of the Truth of the DoClrine he is afferting,- but as
a Proof of the Falfenefis and Groundlefsnefis of a parti
cular Objection urged by the Unbelieving Jews againft
it. The DoClrine the Apoftle afferts (both in the
Epiftle to the Romans and in This to the Galatians)
is, that Chriftians of the Gentiles, who imitate the
Faith and Obedience of Abraham, (being lircumcified
tsoith the Circumcifiion  ofi Chrift, Col. 2. ii.) are
equally capable of being admitted to the Benefit of
God's Promifes to his People, as the Jews of the li
teral Circuihcifion, who were lineally defcended from"
that Patriarch. , In Oppofition to this the Jews al-
(2) Rom. ledged, that fince to the JJraelites confeffedly (2)
9, 4. pertained the Adoption, and the Gloryi and the Cove
nants, and the Giving ofi the Law, and the Service of
God, and the Promifes -, fince Theirs confeffedly were the

dnd Revealed Religion. t6i
ihe ^Fathers or Patriarchs, to whom all the Promifes
'of God were originally made ; it could not poffibly
be true, nor confiftent with the Promifes of God
made to their Fathers, that thefe Ifraelites, who had
been all along the peculiar People or Church of God,
foould at laft be rejected for not receiving the Gof
pel -, and that Believers, from amongthe Gentiles of
all Nations, fhould be received in Their Stead.
¦Now, in Reply to this Objection, the Apoftle ar
gues with the greateft Juflnefis and Strength, from the
Analogy of a like Cafe acknowledged by Themfelves, in
'which the Reafon of the Thing was the fame 5 even
from the Analogy of God's Method and Manner of /
proceeding, in the Giving of Thofe very Original
Promifes to the Patriarchs, upon which This Preju
dice of the Jews was founded. (1) Tell me, fays he, („) q^
ye that defire to be under the Law, do ye not hear the 4. 2i,&c.
Law ? ¦ That is, Will ye not attend to the Analogy
of God's Method of proceeding in Thofe Very Pro-
'"mifies on which ye depend ? For it is written, that
Abraham had Two Sons, the one by a Bond-maid, the
other by a Free Woman : But He who was of the Bond'
woman, was born after the Flefih ; but he of the Free
'Woman was by Premife : Which Things are an Alle
gory, &c. That is to fay : Even originally, the Pro-
rmife was not made to All the Children of Abraham,
but to Ifiaac only : Which was, from the Beginning,
a very plain Declaration, that God did not princi
pally intend his Promife to take Place in (2) Abra- /2) rob,#
baik's Defcendents according to the Flefih, but in thofe 9. 8>
who, by a Faith or Fidelity like His, were, in a truer
and higher Serife, the Children and Followers of
that Great Father of the Faithful. In like Manner,
and for the fame Reafon, the Promife was not made
(3) to Both the Sons of Ifiaac, but to Jacob only : (3) Rom.
And, among the Pofterity of Jacob, All (4) were 9- '?•
'not Ifirael, which were Of Ifrael. What ye (5) ™6 m'
iyourftlves, therefore, faith St.' Paul, who are fo de- ^ Gal.
firous^. 21.

262 the Evidencec/ Natural
ftrous to be under the Mofaic Law, cannot but ait*
knowledge to have been originally and always true •>
(OGal.4. the fame is true (1) Now. What was true concern-
ver. 29. ing the two Sons of Abraham, and likewife con
cerning the two Sons of Ifiaac, who were the Pa
triarchs with whom God's Covenant was originally
made, is, by Continuance of the fame' Analogy, true
concerning the Covenant eftablifoed with the Fa
milies, and with the Nation of the Jews, deficeended
from thofe Patriarchs; 'tis true concerning the,
Church of God, through all fucceffive Ages ; 'tis
true concerning the (2) Jerufialem which now is, and
concerning That .which is to come. As (3) Abra
ham had Two Sons, the ofte by a Bond-ntaid, the other
by a free Woman : And as (4) the Son of the Bond
maid, though, according to the Flefih, no lefs truly
his Natural Defcendent than the Other, yet was
not to be Co-Heir with Him who, by theJPromife
of God, was appointed to inherit : So, fays the
Apoftle, the (5) Jerufialem which Now is, and is in
Bondage with her Children'; the vifible earthly Church,
which received the external ceremonial Law frorh
Mount Sinai, is not, by that outward general Deno
mination, intitled to the eternal Favour of God -t
But the Jerufialem which is above, which is the Mo
ther of us all, of All, who, by true Faith and fin
cere Obedience, are pleafing to God ; This heavenly
Jerufialem, this fipiritual-invifible Church or City of
the Living God ic is, to which all the Promifes of
God, made in All Ages to his Church, are, in
Reality, originally and finally appropriated.
From this remarkable Inftance, 'tis well worth
obferving by the Way, that, when the Apoftles arfc
fuppofed to argue with the Jews ad Hominem; the
Meaning is, that Arguments, alledged by the Apo
ftles to the Jews in particular, differ from Arguments
brought to the Gentiles, in This ; not that they were
at any Time Arguments drawn from Things acknow ledged

(2)

ver.

25-

(3)

ver.

22.

(4)

ver.

30.

(5)

ver.

*5>

26.

dnd Revealed RelicTOn^ &&« ut
ledged by the Jews, and in tbemfielves otherwife Ucon-
thfiive ; but that they were drawn, juftly andfirongly*
from Things well known among the Jews, though
what the Gentiles were Strangers to;
The Correfpondentes of Types and Antitypes;
|hoUgh they are not themfelves proper Proofs of the
Truth of a Doctrine, yet they may be very reafonable
Confirmations of the Foreknowledge of God ; of the
uniform View of Providence under different Difipen-
fiations ; of the Analogy, Harmony, and Agreement be
tween the Old Teftament and the New. The Words
of the Law; concerning one particular Kind of Death,
(i)'He that is hanged is accUrfied of God, can hard- (0 Dettf*
ly be conceived to have been put in upon any 2I' z3;
other Account than with a View and Forefight to
the Application made of it by (2) St. Paul. The (2) Gal.
Analogies between the (3) Pafchal Lamb and the,3", 'I* .
Lamb 'of God filain firom the Foundation of the World', 12.22*46.'
between the Egyptian Bondage and the Tyranny ofi 'Joh.i. 29.
Sin • between the (4) Baptifim of the Ifraelites in the 19- 36-
Sea and in the Cloud and the Baptifim ofi Chri- tX'^co'
fiians -, between the (5) Paffage through the Wil- \Q. 1, 2. "
dernefis and through the Prefent World ; between (5) Heb.
(6) Jefius [Jcfihua] bringing the People into the 3 • '5-9-
promified Land and Jefiits Chrift being the Captain tcou'il'.
ofi Salvation to Believers ; between the Sabbath ofi— n.
(7) Reft promifed to the People of God in the earth- (6) Heb.
ly Canaan and the Eternal Reft promifed in tne/"')8^b
Heavenly Canaan ; between the (8) Liberty granted 4. 5> ^f
from the Timd of the Death of the High Prieft, (8) Num!
to him that had fled into a City ofi Refuge, and the 35; 25'28"-
Redemption purchafed by the Death of Chrift; be- ^ eb-
tween the (9) High Prieft entering into the Holy <lo) Heb.
Place every 2'ear with Blood of Others and Ch rift's 9- 12,24,
(to) once entering with his own Blood into Heaven it- 2 \ c <
fielfi, to appear in the -Prefiente cfi God fior us : Thefe, ^"^
(I fay) and innumerable o.ther Analogies; between (!2) Heb.
the (n) Shadows cf Things to come, the (12) Shadows 10. 1.
of goad Things to, come, the ( 1 .5) &Wpwj ofi Heavenly^ «*.
E> d Things, i'

264 ^e Evidence of Natural
( 1 ) Heb. Things, the ( 1 ) Figures for the Time then prefient,
9 9- the. (2) Patterns of Things in the Heavens, and (3)
z« C ' ^e Heavenb Things Themfelves, cannot, without the
(3) Heb. Force of ftrong Prejudice, be conceived' to have
9- 23. happened by Mere Chance* without Any Forefight
or Defign. There are no Juch Analogies, much lefs
fuch Series of Analogies, found in the Books of
mere enthufiaftic Writers, much, lefs of enthufiafiic
Writers living in fuch remote Ages from each other.
'Tis much more credible and reafonable to fup-
(4) 1 Cor. pofe, (what St. Paul affirms) that (4) thefe Things'
10. 6. wgre Qur Examples ¦, and that, in the uniform Courfe
(5) ver. of God's Government of the World, (5) all thefie
11 ¦ Things happened unto Them of old fior Enfiamples, and
they are written fior Our Admonition, upon whom the
Ends ofitheWorld are come. And hente arifes that Apt-
wefis of Similitude in the Application of feveral Legal
Performances to the Morality of the Gofpel, that
it can very hardly be fuppofed not to have been
(6) 1 Cor. originaUy intended. As, (6) Know ye not that a
s' '7' ' little Leaven leaveneth the whole Lump ? Purge out
therefiore the Old Leaven, that ye may be a new Lump,
as ye are unleavened. For even Chrift our Paffovir
is facrificed for us. Therefore let us keep the Feaft,
not with old Leaven, neither with the Leaven ofi
Malice and Wickednefis, but with the unleavened
(7) Phil. Bread ofi Sincerity and Truth. Again; (7) WE are
3-3- THE Circumcifion, which worjhip God in the Spirit,
and rejoice in Chrift jefius, and have no Confidence in
(8) Col. 2. the Flefih. And ; (S) Toil being, dead in your Sins,
J3> "• and in the Circumcifion ofi your Flefih, hath God quick
ened together with Chrift -,  In whom alfo ye are
circimcified with the Circumcifion made without Hands,
in putting off the Body of the Sins of the Flefih, by [the
Chrifiian, the Spiritual Circumcifion] the Circumd-
(9) 1 Cot. fion of Chrift. And ; (9) Do ye not know that they,
9- lh M* which  fisai't at the Altar, 'are Partakers with the
8' °: 10- Altar ? Even fo hath the Lord ordained, that they,
1 iim. c , <J 1 ¦ f
,8 wmcb

eind Revealed Religion,; "a 6 j?
tfohich preach the Gafipel, fihould live ofi the Gofipeh
-.  Say I thefe Things as a Man ? or fiaith not the
Law the fiame alfio ? For it is written in the Law of
Mofies, Thoufhalt not muzzle the Mouth ofi the -Ox that
treadetb out the Corn. Doth God take Care for Oxen ?
or faith he it altogether for our Sakes ?¦
Some Applications of Texts out of the Old
Teftament are mere Allufions : That is, nothing
more is intended to be affirmed, than that the Words,
fpoken in the Old Teftament, are as Truly and as
Juftly applicable to the prefent Occafion, as they
were to That upon which they were originally fpo
ken. Of this Kind, 1 think, is That of St. Mat
thew : (i) Then was fulfilled that which was fipoken (i) MatfJ
by Jeremiah the Prophet, fiaying, In Rama Unas there z' l"1'
a Voice heard, Lamentation and Weeping, and great \'
Mourning, Rachel weeping fior her Children, and
would not be comforted, becaufe they are not: Thus
likewife St. Paul : (2) / mean not that other Men be (2) 2Cor'1
eafied, and you burthened ; but by an Equality -, A S 8" '3' '4J
it is written, He, that had gathered much, had no
thing over ; and he, that had gathered little, had no
Lack. Again ; What (3) Ifiaiah fays of the Jews, (3) If- &
(fuppofing. he did not fpeak there prophetically, T-
though the Solemnity ofi the Introduction makes it
inuch rriore reafonable to believe he did: But fup
pofing he fpake of the Jews in his own Time) Go
and tell this People, Hear ye indeed; but underftand
not 3 and fee ye indeed, but perceive -not : make the
Heart .of this People fat, and make their Ears heavy ',
and flout their Eyes : left they fiee with their Eyes,
and hear with their Ears, and underftand with their
Heart, afnd convert and be healed; was (4) fulfilled, (4) Matt.
was verified, was equally true, equally applicable to 13- "4-
the Jews, in our Saviour's Daysi Of the fame Kind
,feems to.be (5) St. Matthew's Explication of that (5) Mate
Paffage in (6) Ifiaiah, Surely he hath borne our Griefis; 8> l7-
and carried our Sorrows. The Senfe of the Words ^ If"53'
D d 2 in 4'

266- 1%e Evidence of Natural
in the Prophecy is what St. Peter expreffes t
(i) i Pet. (j) if/fan fa5 o-tunfielfi bare our Sins in his own Body
on the Tree : And the Apoftle to the Hebrews*
(2) Heb. (2) Chrift was once offered to bear the Sins of Many.
r^Matt ^C" Matthew fays, (3.) He healed all that were
S. 16, 1 j. Sick* That it might be fulfilled which was fpoken by
Efiaias the Prophet, fiaying, Himfielf took our Infir
mities, and bare our Sickneffies -, his Meaning is, Chrift
healed Difieafies in fuch a Manner, that even in
That Senfe alfo the Words of Ifiaiah were literally
(4) Matt, vetified. To give but One Inftance more-: (4) All
1 3- 34>35-- thefie Things (faith foe Evangelift) fipake Jefius unto?
the Multitude in Parables  that it might be
fulfilled which was fpoken by the Prophet, faying,
I will open my Mouth in Parables, I will utter
, Things which have been kept ficcret firom the Founda-
(y)Pf.7§. tion ofi the World: That is, the Words (5) of the
*• Pfalmift were as properly, as truly, and as juftlyv
applicable to the' Things which our Lord fpoke, as
to the Occafion upon which they were originally
fpoken by the Pfalmift.
To fuch as are accuftomed only to Modern
Languages, and underftand not the Nature of the
Hebrew and Syrias Speech, it may feem very flir
ty) Matt, prifing, that in the (6) Two laft-mentioned Paf-
b L7- 13- fages the Citations are introduced with thefeWords,.
35 ' That it might be fulfilled which was fpvken by the
Prophet, fiaying, 13c. But All, who underftand thofe
Languages, well know, that the Phrafes anfwer-
ing to thefe Expreffions, ha. AT^aS? that it might -be
fulfilled, mean nothing more than, Hereby was veri
fied, or, So that hereby was verified, or the like.
And they, who underftand not the Languages, may
yet eafily apprehend this, by confidering the Nature
andForce of fome Other Expreffions of the like Kind.
(7) Jtr- As, (7) They prophefiy a Lie in my Name, THAT* I
2f: Vf might drive you cut. (8) Behold, I fiend unto you
2,-3*>'"s" PrDfl>cls> —"  ~~ TH A T upon you may come rill
the

•and Revealed Religion, 267
the righteous Blood. With (1) Many other Paffages (') Exod.
of the fame Nature : Where the Words, " THAT11- 9- l7-
" fuch a Thing may be," do not at all fignify the Num 32.
Intention, " To /A/? £»i that it May be ;" but merely 14.
the Event, " So that it Will be." In the Cafe ofPf-S'- 4-
the moft DireCi and Exprefis Prophecies of all, the |f'7' l8*
Words, " This was done, THAT it might be fui- 3£ 3r]°'
" filled which was fpoken by the Prophet ft never do,
never poffibly Can fignify literally, that the Thing
was done For that End, that the Prophecy might
be fulfilled ; becaufe, on the Jieverfie, the Reafion
ivhy any Thing is predicted, always is, becaufe the
Thing was (before That Prediction) appointed to be
done. Much more therefore, in the Cafe of indirect
Prophecies, the Words, This was done, THAT it
might be fulfilled which was fpoken by the Prophet,
neeeffarily and evidently mean This only, that the
Thing was fo done, as that thereby or therein Was
verified what the Prophet had fpoken.
20. It cannot therefore, with any Sort of Rea
fon or Juftice, be inferred from fuch Citations out
of the Old Teftament as I have' now mentioned,
that the Apoftles either mifiunderftood or enlhufii-
aftically mifiapp'lied the Writings of the Prophets.
Nor can Any juft Argument be drawn againft the
Authority of the Books of the Old and New
Teftament from fuch Topics as Thefe, that the
Copies of the Law, in the Times of the idolatrous.
,K.ings of Judah and Ifrael, were well nigh loft ;
that fome Texts, cited out of the Old Teftament
by the Writers of the New, are not Now found
in the Old Teftament at all ; that other Texts are
read differently, in the Old Teftament itfelf, from
the Citations of the fame Texts recorded in the
New ; and the like. Which Things have, indeed,
given Occafion to Weak and Ridiculous Writers to
invent certain fienfielefis Rules or Regulations, ac
cording to which, Men may at any Time rightly
D d 3 make

£6$ fhe Evidence of Natural
make what Wrong Quotations they pleafe. But, in
Truth, the Things themfelves, I am here fpeaking
of, are nothing but what muft of Neceffity happen
in a long Succeffion of Ages.
(i)2Chr. When (i) Hilkiab the Prieft (in the Days of
34- J 4" Jofiiah) found in the Houfie of the Lord a Book of
the Law of the Lord given by Mofies, 'tis very
probable, indeed, from the Circumftances of the
Hiftory, that Copies of the Law were then- very
fcarce ; and that This found by Hilkiab was, to
his Surprifie, an authentic or original Copy. ; But
that the Whole foould have been, at that Time, a
Forgery of Hilkiab, is evidently impoffible ; be
caufe the very Being and' Polity of the Nation, ,as
well as their Religion, was founded upon the Ac
knowledgment of the Law of Mofies, how much
foever idolatrous Kings might, at certain Times,
have corrupted that Religion, and caufed the Study
of the Law to have been neglected. And in the
very fame Book, wherein the Account is given of
this particular Fad pf Hilkiab's finding a Copy [an
authentic Copy] of the Law, 'tis exprefsly and at
large recorded how, in aforegoing Reign, the King
(2) aChr. (2) fent to his Pfinces — : — to teach in the Cities
}7: 7? 8> of Judah ; and with tbem he fent Levites and Priefts;
t—. — — and they taught in Judah, and had the Book
of the Law of the Lord with them, and went about
throughput all the Ciiies of Judah, and taught tbg
People. That, in Length of Time, fome whole Books.
ftiould have been loft, is nothing Wonderful. There
are feveral Books exjirejsly cited in the Old Tefta
ment, of which we have now nothing remaining.
That, in the Books which remain, there foould
fometimes, for Want of (3) In-
(3). In fome ^ Places fallMUy in Tranfcribers, happen
- there is reafonable Ground for r\ -rr cr- r r • i ¦'
a worfe S» '..-Lf.'n. ' As, for OmtJJions, Tranjpofitions, and van-
jciknee, Pj. '22. 16. where ous Readings, is ftill lefs to be won?
dered

and Revealed Religion. 269
dered at. Nothing, but perpetual the Senfe moft evidently fhews
Miracle, could prevent it. They ^f j? be read, and the
ii pi i, • 1 LXXVerfion fhews it anciently
who have Skill to compare, in the ^ read, nto or lis, "they
Original, certain Paffages in the " Pierced my Hands and my
Books of Chronicles with the cor- " Feet: the Jewifli Mailers, in
refipondent Places in the Books of "J1 thejr «™^ Hebrew Ed.-
,ff . . _- . tions, have written it, niO
Az«£5 ; or the 18th .P/tf/az with « a, a Lion my Hands and
2 &M». ch. ?,2, which is a Tran- " my Feet." Which has no
fcript of the fame Pfalm ; or the tolerable Senfe at all.
14th JPfialm with the 53d, which are alfo one and the
fiame Pfalm tranfcribed ; and much more they, Who
can compare the Septuagint Tranflation with the Ori
ginal, will be able to find Inftances of thefe Things,
and very often alfo to fee plainly how and whence
they happened : (All which, far from diminifhing
the Authority of the Books, are ftrong Arguments of
their Antiquity, and againft their having been forged
by Efidras, or any other Hand.) What Wonder then
is it, that among the numerous Texts, cited in the
New' Teftament out of the Old, one or two foould
Now not be found in our prefent Copies of the
Old Teftament ? and that fiome others foould be read
differently, in the Old Teftament, from the Citati
ons of the fame Texts recorded in the New ? Or
how does this at all affect the Authority of Either,
when much the greateft Part of the Texts cited
agree perfectly either in Words, or, at leaft, in Senfie ;
and the Whole Series, Harmony, Analogy, Connexion,
and Uniformity of Both, compared with the Syftem
of Natural and Moral Truths, and with the Hiftory
ofi the World, and the State ofi Nations, through a
long Succeffion ofi Ages from the Days ofi Mofies to this
prefient Time, fhew, that the Books are not the
Refolt of random and enthufiaftic Imaginations, but
of long Forefight and Defign ? For the Spirit of
Enthufiafm is very hardly confiftent with itfielfi through
the Writings of one fingle Perfon. How then is it
poffible, that for 3000 Years together, and pretend-
Pdf fog

g«70 The Evidence of Natural
ing too (through all That Time) to an uniform
Series of Predictions, it foould HA P P EN never
to have fallen into Such a Tract of expected Events^
as the Nature and Truth of Things, and the Situation '
of the Kingdoms ofi the World, foould have rendered
abfolutely IMPOSSIBLE, and altogether
INCAPABLE of any farther, much lefs of
any final, Completion ?
21. I foall conclude This Head with pointing at
fome particular extraordinary Prophecies, which de-
ferve to be carefully eonfidered and compared with
the Events, whether they could poffibly have pro
ceeded from Chance or from Enthufiajm. Some of
them are of fuch a Nature, as that they can only
be judged of by Perfons learned in Hiftory-; and'
Thefe I foall but juft mention. Others are obvious
to the Confideration of the whole World ; and with,
. Thofie I foall' finifh what I think proper at thisTirne
to offer tjpon this Subject, Concerning Babylon, " it. was
(i) PriJeaux>s Connexion, « (i) particularly foretold, that it
(2 iit i7P'/i!z ^ " ^)fhouldbeJhutup,andbefieged
" by the Medes, Elamjtes, and
" Armenians : That the River (3) fhould be dried.
" up : That the City Jhould be taken in the Time
" (4) °f a Feaft, while her ..... ....¦ mighty Men were
'' drunken ; Which accordingly came to pafs" when
il Beljhdzzar and all his thoufiand Princes, who were
" drunk with him at the Feaft," were (5) " flain by
'« Cyrus's Soldiers, r . , Alfio it was particularly fiore-r
?t told, that God would make the Country of Babylon
" (.6) a Poffeffion for the Bittern, and Pools ofPVater :
" Which was accordingly fulfilled by the Overflowing
*' and Drowning of it, on the breaking down ef the
*' great Dam in order- to take the City" Could
the Correfpqndence of Thefe Events, with the Pre-a
diclions be the Refult of Chance ? But fuppofe
£Me Previous vrefe [orlei After the Event : Can tta

(3) >¦..
50- 3§-
S<- 36-'
(4) J'r.
5'- 39.
?7-

(5) Gyro,
p?edig,
lib, 7.

(6) If, 14.

and Revealed Religion. 27 1
the following ones alfo have been written After the
Event ? or, with any Reafon, be afcribed to Chance ?
(1) The Wild Beafts of tbe'Defert  > Jhall dwell (1) jer.
There, the Owls fhall dwell therein : And it Jhall be 5°- 39-
NO MORE inhabited fior EVER, neither flj all
it be dwelt in from Generation to Generation : As , God
overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, &c. (2) They Jhall' z) jer.
not take of thee a Stone fior a Corner,  but 51- l6'
thou jhalt be defiolate For EVER, fiaith the Lord: 37- 64*
¦ Babylon fihall become Heaps, a Dwelling-place
for Dragons, an Aflonifihment and an Hiffing without
an Inhabitant : <  r— It Jhall Jink, and Jhall not rifie;
firom the Evil that I will bring upon her. (3) Bahy- (3) If. 13,
Ion, the Glory of Kingdoms, •  fihall be as when God i9>20>21'
overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah : Itfijall NEVE R
be inhabited, neither fihall it be dwelt in firom Genera
tion to Generation ; Neither fihall the Arabian pitch
Tent there, neither fhall the Shepherds make their Fold
there : But Wild Beafts ofi the Defiert Jhall lie there,
and their Houjes Jhall be full of doleful Creatures, and
Owls fihall dwell there.
Concerning Egypt, Was the following Prediction
forged after the Event ? Or can it, with any Reafon,
be afcribed to Chance ? (4) Egypt  ¦ fihall be (4) Ezek,
a BASE Kingdom : It fihall be the BASEST z9- H>^
pf Kingdoms ; neither fihall it exalt itfielfi ANT
MO R E above the Nations : For I will diminifih
them, that they fioall NQ MORE RULE over
the Nations.
Concerning Tyre, the Prediction is no lefs re
markable : (5) I will make thee like the Top of a .-. Ez6^
Rock: Thou Jhalt be a Place to Jpread Nets upon: 26.14,21!
Thou Jhalt be built NO MORE:  ;  Thou
Jhalt be NO MORE: (6) The- Merchants among ,^ Ezekf
the People Jhall hijs at thee ; thou Jhalt be a Terror, and Z1. 36.
NEVER Jhalt be any more. (7) All they, that (7) Ezek>
know thee among the People, Jhall be Aftonifhed at 2%. 19.
The

272 The Evidence of Natural
, The Deficription of the Extent of the Dominion
of That People, who were to poffefs Jud<ea in the
latter Days : Was it forged after the Event ? Or
(i}Dan. can it reafonably be afcribed to Chance? (1) He
11.4.0,41, JJ3all come . with Horjemen, and with many
42» 43- Ships, and  ¦ fihall overflow and pafis over : He
(2) Ver. flail enter alfio into the Glorious Land, [and (2) fihall
plant the Tabernacles of his Palace between the Seas
in the Glorious Holy Mountain -,J And many Countries
fhall be overthrown : But Thefe jhall Eficape out of his
Hand, even Edom and Moab, and the Chief ofi the
Children ofi Ammon. ' He fihall ftretch forth his Hand
alfo upon the Countries, and the Land of Egypt fhall
not eficape. But he fihall have Power over the Trea-
fiures ofi Gold and, ofi Silver, and over all the precious
Things ofi Egypt ; and the Libyans and Ethiopians
[o*tM] fhall be at his Steps.
When Daniel, in the (3) Vifion
(3) The Fame of which of Nebuchadnezzar's Image, fore-
was fo early fpread, that Ext- t0]d (4) four Great Succeffive Mo-
kiel, who was coiitem-porary , : XI, „, . . •" r
with Daniel, plainly ailudel mrchm : Was Thls written after
to it, when he fays of the the Event ? Or can the Congruity
Prince of Tyre,- ch. 28. 3. of his Defcription with the Things
thm art wfa than Daniel-, thmuves_ reafonably be afcribed
there is no Secret that they can J _, J » . . -»
bite from thee. *p mere CboHce ?
(4) Dan. 2. 38  44. When the Angel fays to Daniel,
(5) Dan. a. 24. fg) Seventy Weeks (6) are deter-,
•fSrtr^SS^: ntmd^upon thy People, and upon
27. Numb. 14. 34. E*ek. tby Holy City, to finifih the Tranfi-
4. 6, greffion, and to make an End of
Sins, and to make Reconciliation fior
Iniquity, £s?f. Was This written after, the Event ?
Or can it reafonably be afcribed to Chance, that .
(7) Ezra from (7) the Seventh Tear of Artaxerxes the King,
7- 6> 7'8- (when Ezra went up from Babylon  unto Jeru
fialem with a Commiffion to reftore the Govern^
ment of the Jews) to the Death of Chrift, [from 4\nK

and Revealed Religion. 7-J^
''ftnn, Nabonaff. 290 to Ann. Nabonaff. 780] fhould
be precifely 490 [70 Weeks ofi] Years ?
When the Angel tells Daniel, that (1) Three- (1) Dan.
ficore and two Weeks the Street [of Jerufalem] Jhall 9- 25'
be built again, and the Wall, even in troublous Times,
Lo>nyn pisoi, but This in Troublous Times, not like
thofe that foould be under Meffiah the Prince, when
he foould come to reign] Was This written ajter
the Event ? Or can it reafonably be afcribed to
Chance, that from the (2) Twenty -
Eighth of Artaxerxes, when the (2) Toft "iegoeW/sMis *%»-
Walls were finifoed, to the Birth "VA" t^x©-, £y&? *«*
of Chrift, [from ,f»». JV« WI 3 1 1 '^ ^ . s¥ov »Z*i? s:
to Ann. Nabonaff. 745] foould riiXs„ j^i„m', &c. Jofiifbiu
be precifely 434 [62 flP^&f fi/"] Antiauit. Judaic, lib. u. cap. $,
"Years ?
When Daniel further fays, (3) And he Jhall (3) Dan'
confirm [or, Never tbelefis he fhall confirm] the Cove- 9' ZJ'
nant with Many fior One Week : Was This written
after the Event ? Or can it reafonably be afcribed
to Chance, that from the Death of Chrift, (Anno
Dom. 33) 'to the Command given firft to St.
Peter to preach to Cornelius and the Gentiles, (Anno
Dom. 40) foould be exactly Seven [One Week of J
Years ?
When he ftill adds: (4) And in the Midft 0/(4) Dan.
the Week [ypirn '2fm, And in Half a Week] he fhall 9- z7- '
caufe the Sacrifice and the Oblation to ceafie, and
for the Overfipreading of Abominations he fhall make
if defiblate : Was 1 his written after the Event ? Or
can it with any Reafon be afcribed to Chance, that
from Vefipafiian's marching into Judtea in the Spring
Anno Dom. 67, to the taking of Jerufialem by
Titus in the Autumn Anno Dom. 70, fhould be
[ Half a Septenary of Years] Three Years and a
Half? When the fame Daniel foretells a Tyrannical
. Power, vyhfeh foould wear out the Saints of the
Moft

274 The Evidence of Natural
l 1 Dan Moft High, and they fihould be given into his Hand
7. zc. ' until (1) a Time and Times, and the Dividing of
Time: And (2) again, For(f)a
\z\ Ran' I-2' 7' j viF Time, Times, and a Half: (Which
(-1) Three Tears and a Half, ' .„ , ,. , J \ n7
or 1 260 Days, is, according to can noWay be applied to the Short
the Analogy of all the fore- PerfecUtion of Antiochus, becaufe
mentioned"^ Numbers, 1260 thefe Prophecies are exprefsly de-
Year5- clared to be (4) for many Days ;
(4) Dan. concerning (5) what fhall befall thy People in the
8- 2(i- Latter Days, fior yet the Vifion is for Many Days ;
10 1 14. concernmg (6) the Time of the End; (7) what
(6) c£. /&«// be in the Laft End ofi the Indignation ; con-
8. 17. cerning thofe who (8) fihall fiall by the Sword and
(7) ch- by Flame, by Captivity, and by Spoil, Many Days ;
($) ch. (9) to try them, even to the Time of the End, be-
1 r. 33. caufie it is yet for a Time appointed; concerning (10) a
{9) ck> Time of Trouble, fuch as never was fince there was
V"\\ * a Nation ; the Time (11) when God Jhall have ac-
12, 1 . ' eompliftoed to ficatter the Power ofi the Holy People ;
(u) ch. (\%) the Time ofi the End, till which the Words are
12 7- defied up and fiealed -, (13) to which the Prophet
\\ ''' is commanded to Jhut up his Words, and fieal the
([13) ch. Book, for many Jhall run to and fir 0, and Know-
12. 4. ledge fihall be increafied ; even (14) the End, till
i 1 4) c»- which Daniel was to reft, and then ftand in his Lot
3' at the End of the Days.) W7hen Daniel, I fay,
foretells fuch a Tyrannical Power to continue fuch
a determined Period of Time : And St. John pro-
(15) Rev. phefies, that the (15) Gentiles fihould tread the Holy
11. 2. City under foot Forty and Two Months ; which is
exactly the fame Period of Time with that of Da-
(16) Rev. niel. And again, that (16) Two Witnefifes, cloathed
M- 3- in Sackcloth, fihould prophefiy a Thoufiand two Hundred
and threeficore Days ; which is again exactly the
very fame -Period of Time. And again, that the
(17) Rev. (17) IVoman, which filed into the Wildemefis from Per-
\i. 6. fecution, fhould continue there a Thoufiand two
Hundred and threeficore Days. And again, that foe
fhould

cb. 7-

and Revealed Religion." 275
fhould (1) fly into the Wildernefis for a Time, and (0 Rev.
Times, and Half a Time ; which is ftill the very I2- H-
fame Period. And again, that a Wild Beafi, a Ty
rannical Power, (2) to whom it was given to make (2)
War with the Saints, and to overcome them, was r3-
(3) to -f- continue Forty and two
Months, (ftill the very fiame Pe
riod of Time) and to have
(4) Power over all Kindreds, and
Tongues, and Nations, fo that All
that dwell upon the Earth foould
Worfihip him : Is it credible, or
poffible, that ignorant and enthu-
fiaftical Writers foould, by mere
Chance, hit upon fuch Coincidencies
cfi [occult] Numbers ? efpecially
fince St. John could not poffibly
take the Numbers from Daniel,
if he underftood Daniel to mean
nothing more than the Short Per

fecUtion of Antiochus. And if
he did underftand Daniel to mean
a much Longer and Greater and
more Remote Tyranny, which
John himfielf prophefied of as in
His Time ftill future ; then the
Wonder is ftill infinitely Greater,
that in Thefie early Times, when
there was not the leaft Footftep
in the World of any Juch Power
as St. John diftinctly defcribes,
(but which Now is very Confipi-
cuous, as I fliall prefentl-y obferve
more particularly) it foould ever
enter into the Heart of Man to
conceive fo much as the Poffibility
of finch a Power fitting, not upon
the Pavilion of Heathen Perfecu- tors,

(3) ch- 13- 5-
(4) ch. 13.7, 8.
f There has prevailed among
Learned Men a aiery Impor
tant Error, as if the 1260
Days (or Years) here fpokerr
of, took their Beginning from
the Rife of the Tyranny here
defcribed. Whereas, on the
contrary, the Words of Daniel
are exprefs, that, not from
the Time of his Rife, but
after his having made War
with the Saints, and from;
the Time of their being given-
into his Hand, mould be a
Time and Times, and the Di
viding of Time, ch. 7. 24,
25. And St. John no lefs ex-
prefsly fays, that the Time,
not of the Two IFitnrffcs Pro-
phej'ying, (for in Part of 7'hat
Time they ha-d Great Power J
but of their Prophejyirtg in
Sackcloth, fhould be a tbou-
Jand two hundred and three-
Jcore Days, Rev. n. 3. And-
the perfecuted Woman, after
her Flight, was to be actu
ally in the Wildernejs, (and-
in her Place there, of Riches-
and Honour) a thoufand two-
hundred c?nd threejeore Days,
ch. 12. 6. Wherefore alfo
the foity and two Months,-
(die very fame I'eiiod) dur
ing which Time Pcz:-:r was-
gi-jen unto the Wild Bcajl to-
Continue, (in the Original it
is nuneu.!., to do what he
plealed>

276 The Evidence of Natural
jsleafed, Rev, 13. j.) evi- tors, but exprefisly (2 ThefT. 2. 4.7
dentiy eught not to be rec- in the cfmple an£J upon tJie Seat
koned from his Rue, or from rp 1,. rlf
the Time when the ten King, °f God himfelh
(ch. 17. 12.) received Power , But Thefie Prophecies, which
.With him-, but from the Time either relate to Particular Places^
of his having totally over- or depend upon the Computation
come the csaints, and or his r _ r . . ' ,, . ., c J;.
being Worfhipped by All that of Particular Periods ofi Time, are
dwell upon the Earth, ch. 13. (as I faid) of fuch a Nature, as
7> 8- that they cannot be judged of but
by Perfonsfkilled in Hiftory. There1
are fome Others more General, running through the'
Whole Scripture, and obvious to the Confideration
of the Whole World.
For Inftance : It was foretold by MofieSj that,-
when the Jews forfook the True God, they
(1) Deut. foould be (1) removed into all the Kingdoms ofi
*8- 25-. the Earth ; foould be (2.) ficattered among the Hea-
26 rT ' then, (3^ among the Nations, (4) amdng all People
(3) Deut. firom the one End ofi the Earth even unto the other 3
4- z7- foould There be (5) lefit Few in Number among the
3 6 £lU' Heathen, and (6) pine away in their Iniquity in their
(-) Deut. Enemies Lands; and foould (7) become an Aftonijh-
4. 27. ment, a Proverb, and a By-word, among all Nations :
(6) Levit. anc] tilat. (g) among thefie Nations they foould find
M Deut no Eafe-> neither fhould the Sole ofi their Foot have
28.37. Reft ;' but the Lord fihould give them a Trembling
(S) Deut. Heart, and Failing ofi Eyes, and Sorrow ofi Mind ;¦
%. ' p-. and (9) fiend a Faintnefis into their Hearts, in the
2;ji -g_ ' Lands ofi their Enemies ; fo that the Sound of a
Jhaken Leaf foould chace them. Had any Thing like
This, in Mofies' 5 Time, ever happened to Any Na
tion ? Or was there in Nature any Probability that
any foch Thing fihould ever happen to any People ?
That, when they were conquered by their Ene
mies, and led into Captivity, they foould neither
continue in the Place of their Captivity, nor be
fwal lowed up and loft among their Conquerors, but
be fcsttered among all the Nations of the World* and

and Revealed Religion. 277
and bated by all Nations for many Ages, and yet
continue a People ? Or could Any Defcription of
the Jews, written at this Day,' pofiibly be a more
exact and lively Picture of the State they have
Now been in for many Ages, than this Prophetic
Defcription given by Mofies more than 3000 Years
The very fame Thing is in like Manner continu
ally predicted through all the following Prophets,
that God would . ( 1 ) ficatter them among the He a- (i)jeT.g,
then-, that he would (2) caufie them to be removed 16. Ezelc
into all Kingdoms of the Earth; that he would (3) 4- J3-
flatter them into all the Winds, and (4) difperfie \2^ f'2,
them through the Countries of the Heathen ; that he 9. 29. 18.
would (5) Jifit them among all Nations, like as Corn 34- ,7-
isfifted in a Sieve'; that (6) in all the Kingdoms ^ ^'
of the Earth, whither they foould be driven, they V,\ Ezek."
foould be a Reproach and a Proverb, a Taunt and io. 23.
a Curfie, and an Aftonifihment, and an Hiffing; and22- '5-
that they foould (j) abide MANY DATS without (s) Amos
a King, and without a Prince, and without a Sacri- (6) jer.
fiee, and without an Image, and without an Ephod, 24. 9. 29.
and without Teraphim. And here, concerning the18-
Predictions of Ezekiel, 'tis remarkable in particular, ,' c
that, they being fpoken (8) in the very Time of (8) See
the Babylonian Captivity, 'tis therefore evident, fizek.1.1.
from the Time of his Prophefying, as well as from 3' II- ll'
the Nature and Defcription of (he Thing itfielfi, that
he muft needs be underftood of that Latter (9) ig\ Tobit
" Captivity into all Places," which was to happen 14. 5.
after the " Fulfilling the Time of That Age" wherein
God was firft to " bring them again" (out of the Ba
bylonian Captivity) " into the Land where they fhould
" build a Temple, *' but not like to that which after
wards (after their Final Return) foould " be built
" for ever with a Glorious Building." The fore-
cited Prophecies (I fay) muft of Neceffity be un
derftood of that Wide and Long Difperfion, which in

278 *£be Evidence of Natural
in the New Teftament alfo is exprefsly mentioned
(1) Luke by ( 1 ) Our Saviour and by (2) St. Paul.
21. 24. >'f is alfo, further, both largely and diftinblly pre-
\2i 2°m' diaed> as weH by Mofes himfeIf> as °y A11 the foU
lowing Prophets, that, notwithftanding this unex-
(3) Levit. ampled Difiperfiion of God's People, (3) yet, for all
26. 44. that, when they be in the Land of their Enemies,
(4) Deut. qq£ w-[i nQt faftroy them utterly 5 but, (4) when
3, a.' ' they Jhall call to Mind, among all the Nations, whi-
th'er God has driven them, and Jhall return unto
the Lord, he will turn their Captivity, and gather
them from all the Nations,  from the outmoft
(5) Deut. Parts of Heaven, —  (5) even in the LATTER
4: 3°- Days : That', (6) though he makes, a full End of all
if>) Jer- other Nations, yet will he not make a full End of
{7)H.io.Them; but (7) a Remnant of them Jhall be pre*
21. 22. 6. ferved, and return cut of all Countries whither God
*3- Jer- has driven them : That he (8) will fifit the Houfie'
Ezek3 6 "f Ifrael among all Nations, like as Corn is Jifited
i;, o. in a Sieve-; yet Jhall not the leaft Grain jail upon
(8) Amos the Earth : That (9) the Lord Jhall Jet his Hand
9 9- again the Jecond Time, to recover the Remnant ofi his
jj  Ljs People, < and Jhall Jet up an Enfiign for tte
27. 13. Nations, and jhall affcmble the Out-cafts of Ifrael,
and gather together the difiperjed of Judah from the
Four Corners of the Earth : for
(19) If. 43^ 5* 6. K 16. (lo) Iwiu bring tjy Seed from the
% tf, l'c. Ezek. 11. \]\ Eafl-> faith the Lord» and gather
"16,17. 20.41. 28.25.34, thee from jhe Weft : I will Jay to
it, 13. 36. 24. 37. zi. 39. the North, Give up-, and to the
27, 28, zg. South, Keep not back ; firing my Sons
firom far, and my Daughters firom the Enas of the
(n)Tf..ia Earth: (11) Behold, I will lift up my Hand to the
22. 00. s, (jeniiies, and fet up my Standard to the People ; and
'?o.S°' ' ^jpy foaM ^f,i fh Sons in their Arms, and thy
(i2)M". .-4.. Daughters flail be carried upon their Shoulders : (12)
-. an,! pcr a fmall Moment have I fiorfiaken thee, but with
'!¦;, "'Uc/"' Great Mercy will I gather thee : ln a little Wrath
Lhupter. S 6 ^ ^^

and Revealed Religion. 279
/ hid my Face from thee for a Moment ; but with
Everlafting Kindnefs will I have Mercy on thee. And
that thefe Prophecies might not be applied to the
Return from the 70 Years Captivity in Babylon,
(which, moreover, was not a Difpeffion into All
Nations) they are exprefis ly referred to the LAT
TER Days, not only by (j) Mofies, but by (2) (0 Deat.
Hofiea, who lived long after, (For the Children of '4- 3°:
Ifirael fihall abide MANY DAYS without a Kingft*/™;
and without a Prince, and without a Sacrifice ; AF
TERWARD they jhall return, and fieek the Lord
their God, and David their King, and fihall Fear the
Lord and his Goodnefis in the LATTE R bAYS-,) '
And by Ezekiel, who lived in the Captivity itfelf ;
(3) After MANY DAYS [fpeaking of Thofe (3) Ezek.
who fhould oppofe the Return of the Ifiraelites] thou 38- 8> I2-
fhalt vevifited; in the LATTER DAYS tbcu1^'1^
fihalt come into the Land ;  -upon the People thai
are gathered out of the Nations y  In that Day,
when my People of Ifrael dwelleth fiafiely,- ¦ -thou
fihalt come up againft them,  it fihall be in the
LATTER DAYS. Thefe Predidions, there
fore, neeeffarily belong to That Age, when (4) the (4) Luke
Times ofi the Gentiles foall be fulfilled, and (5) the 2I- J *4*
Fulnefis, of the Gentiles be come in. And that, through , t . 35°™,
all the Changes which have happened in the King
doms of the Earth from the Days of Mofies ,to the
prefient Time, which is more than 3000 Years, no
thing fhould have happened to prevent the P O S-
SIBILITY of the Accomplijhment of thefe Pro
phecies ; but, on the contrary, the State of the
Jewijh and Chriftian Nations, at this Day, foould
be fuch as renders them eafily capable, not only cf
a figurative, but even of a literal Completion, in
every Particular, if the Will of God be fo : This
(I fay) is a Miracle, which hath nothing parallel
to it' in the Phsenomena of Nature.
£ a Another

&8o 'The Evidence Df Natural
Another' Inftance; ho lefs extraordinary, is as
(i) Dan. follows : Daniel foretells -(i) a Kingdom 'upon the
7- z3- Earth, which fihall be divers firom All Kingdoms;
(2) ver. 7. (2) divers firom all that were before it,' (3) exceed*-
(3)ver-'9- ing dreadfiitf (4) and fihall devour the Whole Earth :
(4; ver. 23--'p|iat? among the Powers into which this Kingdom
X$)ver<24. foall be divided, there foall arife One Power (5)
(6) ver. 8, jivers firom the reft; who (6) fihall fubdue-. unto
26; 24> himfelf THREE of the Firft Powers, and he foall
(7) ver. 8, have (7) a Mouth fipeaking very great Things, and
z°- a Look more Stout than his Fellows.- Hefoall (8)
( )vtr-2l<~mafce jp/ar wjth the Saints, and prevail againft them.
(9) ver. 25. {9) And he fihall fipeak great Words againft the moft
High, and fihall wear out the Saints of the moft
High, and think to change Times and Laws ; and
they fhall be given into his Hand, for a long Seafon ;
(16) ver. 'even -til l-( 10) the Judgment fihall Jit, and— — -the
26,27.' ^Kingdom under the whole Heaven flail be given to
(i'i) Das; the People of the Saints of the moft High. ( 1 1_) He
11. 36, flail exalt himfielf and magnify himfelf above every
&c- God, and fihall fipeakr; marvellous Things againft the
God of Gods ; — --^ Neither fhall
' fit.) The- God of Gods, as he regard ( 1 2) the God of his Fa
ta, the foregoing Verfe; thers, -nor (13) the Defire of Wo-
t^ii;l°Tdi''St0 ^'^ mn" ndr r€gard my Gdd>forhe
Jhall magnify himfielf above all.
(14) GSds^ProtetJors, &s 'tU -And in :his Efiate floall he honour
in the Margin of the Bible; (14) the" God of Forces ; and (15)
or Saints-Proteaors.^ \ a Go^ ¦wjom fa fathers knew not,
Lawl ch. 7!^. fetting *up M> he honour-  ^US Jhall he
New Religions., ¦ do in the mofi flrong Holds -tiith a
Strange God, whom he jhall acknow
ledge and increaje with Glory ; and he -Jhall caufe tbem
to rule over many, and Jhall divide the Land for Gain.
. Suppofe now all this to be fpoken by Daniel of
nothing, more than the Short PerfecUtion under
Antiochus Epiphanes ; which, that it cannot be, I
(16) Page have fhewn (16) above : But, fuppofe it were, and
z74- '• ' * that

and Revealed Religion* g§f
that it was all forged after the Event ; Yet This
cannot be the Cafe of St. Paul and St; John, who
defame exactly a Like Power, and in like Words,
fpeaking of Things to come in the Latter Days, of
Things ftill Future in Their Time, and of which
there was Then no Footftep, no Appearance in
the World. The Day of Chrift, (faith (t) St. Paul, (0 2 Th*'
fihall not come, except there come a Falling away firft, 2" ?* &c*
and that Mian of Sin be revealed; the Son ofi Per*
dition ; Who oppofieth and exalteth himfielf above all
that is called God, or that is worfihipped ; fo that het
as God, fitteth (2) in the Temple
'ofi God, fihewing himfielf that he (2) ,'Tis therefore a £U*
\G°t T Wh°AC^ ^ f* SheTe^fpSgl **"*
the Working of Satan, with all
Power, and Signs, and Lying Wonders, ofid with
all Deceivablenefis of Unrighteoufnefis. Again .' (3) [3)iTini>
The Spirit fipeaketh exprefisly, that in the Latter Times 4- 3* &?*
Some fihall depart from the Faith, giving Heed t'&
feducing Spirits, and (4) DoclrineS ,
ofi Devils ; — - Forbidding to mar- n M Dunnes eohcerning
t- . ,. ,9 . r .. Demons, that is, Ghofls or ooi/lt
ry,, and commanding to abfitam firom Bf (good or bad) Mfn ^^
Meats,&c. St. John, in like Man-
her, prophefies of a Wild Beaft or Tyrannicdl Powef,
to whom was given (5) Great Authority, and a (?) Rev.
Mouth fipeaking Great Things, and Blafiphemies : And '3- z> 5*^
he opened, his Mouth in Blafiphemy againft God: fJ^ffff.
And it was given unto him to make War with the 17 j
Saints, and to overcome them ; and Power was given
him over all Kindreds and Tongues and Nations i
And all that Dwell upon the Earth Jhall wcrfihip
him.  >- And he that' exercifietb his Power before
him, — i — doth great Wonders, •  and D'eeeivetB
them that dwell on the Earth, by the Means of thofe
Miracles which he had Power to do.  And he
caufieth —- — that no Man might buy or fiell, fiaVe he.
that had the Mark or the Name of the Beaft. AncJ
the Kings of the Earth (6) have one Mind, and (Q RfeV*
jhall give their Power and Strength unto the Beaft -, l7ffl^)
: , E © 2 — — -even ' '

'282 The Evidence of Natural
 <- even Peoples, and Multitudes, and Nations and
Tongues.  For God bath put in their Hearts [in
the Hearts of the Kings] to fulfill his Will, and to
agree, and give their Kingdom - unto the Beaft, until
the Words of Qod fihall be fulfilled. The Name of
(i)Rev. the Perfon, in whofe Hands the (1) Reins or
'7- 3> 7- Principal Diretlion of the Exercife of this Power
(2) Rev. is lodged, is (2) Myftery, Babylon the Great, the
l7- 5- Mother of Harlots, and Abominations of the Earth :
(3) With whom the Kings of the
(3) «. 2. . Earth (4) have committed Fcrni-
ktrmis PraeiiceT ' ' '" °~ cation, and the Inhabitants of the
Earth have been made drunk with
the Wine ofi her Fornication : A nd She herfelf is
\<j) Rev. (cfi) drunken with the Blood ofi the. Saints, and with
l7- 6- the Blood of the Martyrs of Jefius : And (6) by her
(7) Sorceries are All Nations de-
(6) Rev. 1 s., 23,24. ceived : And in Her is found the
£7) A^fiMib ,[«<?«« ?«j.' Blood of Prophets, and of Saints,
fcaxo(;J Methods of making Men , j. J .„ ; f /» f * i7
Religions witbom 'Virtue? and °f M that are fialn UPm the
Earth. And This Perfon, [the
political Perfon] to whom thefe Titles and Cha-
(8) Rev. racters belong, is (8) That Great City, (ftanding(9)
*7" l8, upon Seven Mountains) which Reigneth over the Kings'
{9)wr-9- of the Earth.
If in the Days of St. Paul and St. John there
was any Footftep of fuch a Sort of Power as This
in the World ; Or, if there ever had been any
fuch Power in the World ; Or, if there was Then .
any Appearance of Probability, that could make it
enter into the Heart of Man to imagine that there
ever could be any fuch Kind of Power in the World,
(io)2Th. much lefs in (9) the Temple or Church of God:
z' 4* And, if there be not Now fuch a Power actually
and confpicuoufly exercifed in the World ; And if
any Picture of this Power, drawn after the Event,
'" can now defcribe it more plainly and exactly than
it was originally defcribed in the Words of the Pro-
phefy :

and Revealed Religion. 283
phefy : Then may it, with fome Degree of Plau-
flblenefs, be fuggefted, that the Prophecies are no
thing more than Enthufiaftick Imaginations. °J ''
. o Jhmony of
our Savi-
Thirdly ; The chief Evidence of the FaRs on ear's DiJ-
• which the Truth and Certainty of the Chriftian "tles> at
Revelation depends, to Us who live now at this f^fftftf
Diftance ofi Time, is the Teftimony of our Saviour's the -Truth
Followers : Which, in all its Circumftances, was °f the
the moft credible, certain, and convincing' Evi- Cfri/i'ait
l • » /r ,- 9, n • Re-vela-
dence that was ever given to any Matter ot Fact in tig„m
the World.
To make the Teftimony of our Saviour's Fol- What
-lowers a fufficient Evidence to Us in This Cafe, T&ing,are ^
there can be required but thefe three Things. ZmaL
1. That it be certain the Apoftles could not be the Tejli-
impofed upon Themfelves. 2. That it be certain mmy °f
they neither had, nor could have, any Defign to 0l"',sft'vf~
impofe upon Others. And, 3. That it be certain p^a'fm-
their Teftimony is truly conveyed dozen to us unto ptete Evi-
, this Day. All which Things are, indeed, abun- dence-
dandy certain, and clear enough to fatisfy any rea
fonable and unprejudiced Perfon.
For 1. That the Apoftles could not be impofed That the
.upon Themfelves is evident from what has been al- Al">fl*es
ready faid concerning the Nature, and Number, and "" jmtofed
Publicknefis of our Saviour's Miracles. They con- upon tbem-
, verfed frorri the beginning with our Saviour himfelf: felves.
They heard with their Ears, and faw with their
Eyes : They looked upon, and they handled with their
Hands of the Word of Life, as St. John expreffes it,
1 John 1.1. They faw all the Prophecies of the
Old Teftament precifely fulfilled in his Life and
Docfrine, his Sufferings and Death. They faw him
Confirm what he taught, with fuch mighty and-
evident Miracles, as his blttereft and moft- malicious
Enemies could not but confefs to be fupernatural,
even at the fame Time that they obftinately blaf-
E e 3 , phemed

'|&4 ?fhe E v i D E n c e of Natitfal
phemed the Holy. Spirit that worked them. They
faw him alive after bis Paffion, by many infallible
Proofs; he appearing not only to one or two, but-
to all the Eleven, feveral Times, and once to above
. five hundred together : And this not merely in a
tranfient Manner, but they converted with him fa
miliarly for no lefs than forty Days ; and, at laft,
they beheld him afcend vifibly into Heaven ; and
foon after they received the Spirit according to his.
Profpife. Thefe were fuch fenfible Demonftrations
of his being a Teacher fent from Heaven, and con- '
fequeptly, that his Doctrine was an immediate and
exprefs Revelation of the Will of God, that, if
the Apoftles, even though they had been Men of
the ¦weakeft Judgments and ftrongeft Imaginations
t.ha^ can be fuppofed, could be all and every one
of them deceived in all thefe feveral Inftances,
Men can have no Ufe of their Senfes, nor any
poffible Proof of any Fadts whatfoever, nor any
Means to diftinguifh the beft attefted Truths in.'
the World from Enthufiaftick Imaginations.
fhat the 2. 'Tis certain the Apoftles neither had nor
^°fJh ?¦ (:ou^d have any Defign of impofing upon Others:
poDejhn 7his is evident both from the Nature of the Things
cf impofing they did aqd fuffered, and from the Characters of
vpoq the Perfops themfelves. They confirmed what they
t tiers, taught by Signs and Miracles : They lived accord
ing to the Doctrine they preached, though mani
feftly contrary to ail the I nterefts and Pleafures of
this prefept World ; and, which Deceivers can ne
ver be fuppofed to do, they died with all imagine
pble Chearfulnefs and Joy of Mind, for theTeftimo?
ny of their Doctrine, and the Confirmation of their
Religion. This, I fay, is what Deceivers can ne
ver poffibly be fuppofed to do. For, 'tis very re-
Jnarjcable, the Apoftles did not lay down their Lives
for their Opinions, (which Enthufiiafts may poffibly
be fuppofed to dp) but in A^eftatipnto Fails of
their

and Revealed Religion. 385
their own Knowledge. They were innocent and
plain Men, Men that had no bad Ends to ferve,
nor Preferment to hope for in the World. Their
Religion itfelf taught them to expect, not Domi
nion and Glory, not the Praife of Men, not Riches
and Honour, not Power andEafe, not Pleafure nor
Profit; but Poverty and Want, Trouble and Vex
ation, Perfecution and Oppreffion, Imprifonments,
Banifoments, and Death. Thefe Things are not
the Marks and Tokens of Impoftors. Befides, The
Succefs and Event of their Undertaking ; that plain
and illiterate Men foould be able to preach their
Doctrine to many different Nations of different Lan
guages, and prevail alfo in eftablifhing the Belief of
it ; that they foould all agree exactly in their Tef
timony, and none of them be prevailed upon, either
by Hopes or Fears, to defert their Companions,
and difcover the Impofture, if there had been any :
Thefe Things plainly fhew, that their Doctrine was
more than Human, and not a Contrivance to im-
pole upon the World. This Argument is excel
lently urged by Eufiebius : Is it a Thing poffible to
be conceived, faith * he, that De
ceivers and unlearned Men, Men * k?«"Ro $\ vus « ^1* lx-
that underftood no other Language !f!|E*"' " "*-'^ *'V? *•*
but their Mother- tongue, Jhould ever ^u, ™? mfis <p«»i?s i*.^
think ofi attempting' fio extravagant a pmz, p* pint StavoitSimt ?&-
Tbing, as to travel over all Na- tf™ *¦?«*&?» i„) n» ™» i&-
tions? and not only fio, but that they ^^^ J^~aUi rl .„.
fihould be able alfio to accomplifih their *ilwp* -, ' ?.-A\«.\. l\, a-aom in,
Defign, and efiabliftj their Dobirine **« T° tW"* f*"JaMs &a'p«-
in all Parts of the World? Confi- -l*-'?"? ?•«} ™ **•'*¦»
der, moreover, how remarkable a TOT i^ynyfuim, 7r?«w«™v,
Thing it is, that they Jhould, in na « re to<; ««« d^u; h>tur*>-
Refpeft, difarree one from another ?'01?: *<*' "_Tar< *<:,ra'! drt'*'
tn the Account they gave ofi the xv%a~ rh ^iyvo^mr L£. ix_
•Actions of Chrift. For if, in all dv -o d^&ua. xau im iwthcru.-
^uefilians, ofi Fall, and in all Trials at «¦*'»> *$¦>*». f«» &™»- 'A^a,
E e -a. Law%

286
>.av, tWofiHi'xon'a
jtufiou Ti wXtj'Sows ruruv EKT05,
eLtrdnm Savoury* ovftSQtmen
iirihSityjihuv, xa) f/.a.^cv^o-eoi-
rw ys toT$ vvo rov \%o-ou irt-
it fiasdvui viro[twii<;, xa) icd-
crux aixla; xa) Satolm. Eufeb.
Demonjirat. Evang. lib. 3.
cap. 2.

'The Evidence of Natural
M«9»T«ii, Law, and in all ordinary Diffutes,
the Agreement of feveral Witneffes
is always accounted fufficient to de
termine fatisfablorily the Matter in
Queftion ; is it not an abundant
Evidence ofi the Truth in This Cafe,
that Twelve Apoftles, and Seventy
Dificiples, and innumerable other
Believers, have borne Witnefis to the
Aclions of Chrift, with the moft exaSt and perfect
Agreement among tbemfielves ; and not only fo, but
have endured alfio all Kinds ofi Torments, and even
Death itfielfi, to confirm their Teftimony ? Again ;
That illiterate Men, faith j he,
Jhould preach the Name of Chrift
in all Parts of the World ; fome
ofi them in Rome itfelf, the imperial
City ; others in Perfta ; others in
Armenia ; others in Parthia ; others
in Scytbia \ others in India and the
furtheft Parts ofi the World ; and
others, beyond the Sea, in the Bri-
tifh Ifles: This I cannot but think
to be a Thing far exceeding the
Power of Man ; much more, the
Power of ignorant and unlearned.
Men -, and, ftill much more, the
Power of Cheats and Deceivers.
And again : No one ' ofi them, faith
* he, being ever terrified at the
Torments aud Deaths of others, for-
fiook his Companions, or ever preach
ed contrary to them, and detected
the Forgery. Nay, on the contrary^
lhat One, who didforfiake bis Ma-
filer in his Life-Time, and betray
him to his Enemies, being Self-
condemned, defrayed himfelf with his own Hands.
And

cga? ek vravra; to rS 'lya-it ovo-
fX.a, Xal rbc, [/.ill UVTtoV TW P&l-
I ' 1 \ \ K
ybaiuv oc^viv kca ctvr-ov te -ty,v
(3acriAiKWT«Tji» wo?iu vEifiao-Sat"
Tyj ai rrv TIe^o-m, Ti)c oe tijV
'A^jav/wv, !t££b; SI to Tlaefyut
»3»@-, xa) du irdfas to XxuSwii,
Tina; tsi iSn xa) iir aural t^j
«.x«jKi»x? i^Biit id ax^a , Eff I n
rr,v 'liiSut pSacrai %ei%av, xal
!«£«? virig ro> Tlx.ia.n-i ita.^iK-
$£(> lit) rdf xatejj,;ta$ BjsiTosm-
xdi »j)(TS5' raula in tr 'iya ye
qySjAut xxid avS^umv tltat, ftij-
1j yt xdlct iviiJiUf xa) ihulaf,
w<.Wi« ht xald itbdnii; xa) yov-
t«;. Id. ibid. cap. 7.
* Gv6i\<i tj aulas irdirttrs la-
ervoi.(3dina ro7q irf>ouvv)pvj[Aivois rtl-
aa$, i%fr*) Ttjj Iratgiaf, uS" eui-
%xvi$vfy T0J5 aAXoi?, "? (?"?
ayayuv T« o-uvli^it[ABva' *A?&%
xat 0 £toilx lagootwai TOtycijVas
uvlhv, avloxftg'tci xu§' iaulou
•saqayefy^a Ttjv S'C\r,i iltiaizd-
<?a\<i. Id. ibid.

and Revealed Religion. 28 7
And much more, to tthe fame Purpofe, may be
¦ found excellently laid by the fame Author, in the
Seventh Chapter of the Third Book of his Demon-
firatio Evangelica.
3. 'Tis very certain that the Apoftles Tefti- That the
mony, concerning the Works and Doctrine of AP°flfis
Chrift, is truly and without Corruption conveyed down jft"'ft'fny
to Us, even unto this Day. For they left this truly con-
their Teftimony in their Writings : Which Wri- -veyed
tings have been delivered down to us by an unin- f,ft-'n i0
terrupted Succeffion through all intermediate Ages. s'
Their Books were all tranflated very early into
feveral Languages, and difperfed through all Parts
of the World ; and have moft of them been ac
knowledged to be the genuine Writings of thofe
whofe Names they bear, even by the bittereft Ene
mies of Chriftianity in all Ages. Paffages, con
taining the moft material Doctrines, have been cited
out of them by numberlefs Authors, who lived in
every Age from the very Days of the Apoftles unto
this Time : So that there is no Room or Poffibi
lity of any confiderable Corruption, fuch as might
in any wife diminifo our Certainty of the Truth of
the Whole. In Sum -, There is no Matter of Fact
in the World attefted, in any Hiftory, with fo many
Circumftances of Credibility, with fo many colla
teral Evidences, and in every Refpect attended with
fo many Marks of Truth, as This concerning the
Doctrine and Works of Chrift.
And here, by the Way, 'tis to be obferved, that OftheAu-
the peculiar Authority, which we attribute to the thorijf "f
Books of Holy Scripture contained in the New Tefta- tJj^f *
ment, is founded in this, that they were written or Scripture.
dictated by the Apoftles tbemfielves. The Apoftles
were endued with the miraculous Gifts of the
Holy Ghoft at Pentecoft : And This not only en
abled them to preach the Doctrine of Chrift with
Power, but alfo effectually fecured them from
'making

288

The Evidence gf Natural
making any Error, Miftake, or falfe Reprefentatiori
pf it. And the very fame Authority' that, by this
lingular Privilege, was added to their Preaching,
'tis manifeft ought, for the fame Reafons, to be.
equally attributed to their Writings alfo. Now all
the Books of the New Teftament were either writ
ten by the Apoftles, or, which is the very fame
Thing, approved and authorized by them. Moft
of the Books were uncontrovertedly written by the
Apoftles tbemfielves-, St. Paul having been made' one
of that Number by a Commiffion from Heaven,
no lefs vifible and fenfible than that which was
granted to the reft at Pentecoft. And thofe Books,
which were written by the Companions of the
Apoftles, were either dictated or at leaft approved
and authorifed by the Apoftles Themfelves. Thus
Eufiebius exprefsly tells us, that St. Peter reviewed
and approved the Gofpel of St. Mark, and that
* it was this Approbation that au
thorifed it to be received by the
Churches. And Iren<eus ; that -f
what St. Mark wrote was dila
ted by St. Peter ; ' and that J the
Gofpel ofi St. Luke was only- a
Tranficript ofi St.' Paul's Preaching.
And TertuUian in like Manner-,
that || St. Mark was only St. Peter's
Scribe, and St. Luke St. PauIV. And
Eufiebius -, that St. John § alfio re
viewed the Gofipels of St. Mark and
St. Luke, and confirmed the Truth
of them. And, to mention no
more, the fame Hiftorian jells us,
that (befides fome fmaller Reafons
drawn from fome miftaken Paf
fages in the Book itfelf) the chief
Reafon why the Authority of the
Epiftle to the Hebrews was que-
ftioned

1 * Ku^Saa'i te thii yiatyyt elf
IWaul-iv rati txxhyo-iais. Eufeb.
Hiflor. I. 2. c. 15.
f Marcus difcipulus & in-
terpres Petri, quas a Petro an-
nuntiata erant, edidit. Iren.
lib. 3. c. 1.
J Lucas feftator Pauli, quod
ab illo pradicabatur Evange-
lium in libro condidit. Id.
ibid. Vide & TertuUian. ndv.
Marcion. lib. 4.
|| Licet & Marcus quod
edidit, Petri adfirmetur, cujus
interpres Marcus : nam &
Lucx Digeftum, Paulo adfcri-
bere folent. Tertull. adv.
Marcion. lib. 4. -
§ "H$u Ss Ma§xov xa) Aovkx.
rut xal' aula? ivayyiTiiut ri«
sxdoo-iv irtTroiviiAsvwv, laiavvvjv uiro-
<jl%ao$ai pit CBacrii/, o^wSeiok
a'tiToK iiriiAa£7V£y>jaila. Eujeb.
Hi ft. I. I. c. 24,

and Revealed Religion. 289
ftioned by fome was, * becaufie * T„k ifrrtxoun rm ir^k
¦fhey thought it not to be written '%&?«>»*. ¦*& t>j« VupaLi in
fo St. Paul himfelf. x^ai.V ?< £" n"^ Saa* at
J J rvtv avaT^yiO-^ai (pr.p-avrsc;, let..
lib. 3. c. 3.
* XV. Laftly ; They who will not, by the Arguments
(md Proofs, befiarementioned, be convinced of the Truth
and Certainty of the Chrifiian Religion, and be per-
fiuaded to make it the Rule and Guide ofi all their Afli-
6ns, would not be convinced (fio far as to influence ffj-fenfee"
their Prablice, and reform their Lives) by any other which God
Evidence, whatfioever ; no, not though one flould rifie has afford-
on Purpofe firom the Dead to endeavour to convince eftus°fihe
them. Tn"h°f.
. . our Keligi-
From what has been faid upon the foregoing en is ahun-
Heads, 'tis abundantly evident, that Men are not dandy fuf-
called upon to believe the Chriftian Religion with--'5"""'
out very reafonable and fufficient Proof; much lefs
are they * required to' fet up Faith
in Oppofition to Reafon, or to be- , *"A^°i!,J;> aV" So'«f"«»«>-
lieve anyThing for that very Rea- Kgiintl, ^^3*, -0vSl *-
fon, becaufe it is incredible. On yof*e'» (to pird.yfil-K v-no tm
the contrary, God has given us all K-^"" ,»^^«o») m, nii-Ewwi,
the Proofs' of the Truth of our ?'. '"***?<»», ™ ™ £,,rai
' ., . uiov fcleoy, xat* tj 6soe[A£1i@>* an-
Religion, that the Nature of the vMa-ra,%xUo->-.*o^<&a\x°-r*.
Thing would bear, or that were  'Ovi\ tpafA-i, rauin xa)
reafonable either for God' to give, v-f^ff™™- Orig. adwf.
Zx r, « -i ° 1 /- Cell. lib. I.
or Men to expect. . And unlefs
God foould work upon Men by fuch Methods as
are wholly inconfiftent with the Defign of Religion,
and the Nature of Virtue and Vice ; which we are
fore he will never do : Nothing could have been
done more than has been already done, to con
vince Men of the Truth of Religion, and to per-
fuade them to embrace their own Happinefs. And,
indeed, no reafonable Man can fail of being per
fuaded by the Evidence we now have. For if,
jn other Cafes, we affent to thofe Things as certain
gpd dcmonfitatedi \yhjcb, if our Faculties of Judg- *u ¦

290 The Evidence of Natural
ing and Reafoning do not neeeffarily deceive us, do,
upon the moft impartial View, appear clearly and
plainly to be true ; there is the fame JReafon why,
in Moral and Religious Matters, we foould look upon
thofe Things likewife to be certain and demonftrated,'
which, upon the exacteft and moft deliberate Judg
ment we are capable of making, do appear to us to
be as clearly and certainly true, as 'tis certain that
our Faculties do not neeeffarily and unavoidably de
ceive us, in all our Judgments concerning the Na
ture of God, concerning the proper Happinefs of Man,
and concerning the Difference of Good and Evil. And
if, in other Cafes, we always act, without the leaft
Hefitation, upon the Credit of good and fufficient
Ifeftimony ; and look upon that Man as foolifh and
ridiculous, who fuftains great Lofles, or lets flip
great Opportunities and Advantages in Bufinefs,
only by diftrufting the moft credible and well-
attefted Things in the World •, 'tis plain there is the
fame Reafon, why we foould do fo alfo in Matters
of Religion. So that, unlefs our Actions be deter
mined by fome other Thing than by Reafon and
right Judgment, the Evidence, which we have of
the great Truths of Religion, ought to have the
fame Effect upon our Lives and Actions, as if
they were proved to us by any other Sort of Evi
dence that could be defired.
That the 'Tis" true, the Refurrection of Chrift, and his
Mens U other mighty Works, muft, after all, be confeffed
belief is not to be fuch ocular Demonftrations of the Truth
not Want of his Divine Commiffion to After-Generations, as
tfib^jtr they were to thofe Men who then lived, and fiaw
to'trwl b*m* anc^ eonverfied with him. But fince the Matters
the great of Fact are as clearly proved to Us, as 'tis poffible
Truths of for any Matter of Fact at that Diftance of Time to
Religion. ke . £nce tj-je Evidence of This is as great, and
greater than of moft of thofe Things on which Men
venture the Whole of their fecular Affairs, and on
which

and Revealed Religion. 291
which they are willing to fpend all their Time and
Pains : Since (I fay,) the Cafe is thus : He that will
rather venture all that he can poffibly enjoy, or fuf
fer ; he that will run the Hazard of lofing Eternal
Happinefs, and falling into Eternal Mifery, rather
than believe the moft credible and rational Thing in
the World, merely becaufe he does not fiee it with
bis Eyes ; 'tis plain that That Man does not disbe
lieve the Thing becaufe he thinks the Evidence of it
not fufficiently ftrong, but becaufe 'tis contrary to fome
.particular Vice of his, which makes it his Intereft
that it fhould not be true ; and, for that Reafon,
he might alfo have disbelieved it, 'tho he had feen
it himfelf. Men may invent what vain Pretences
they pleafe, to excufe their Infidelity and their
Wickednefs : But certainly That Man, who can
defpife the Authority both of Reafon and.Scripture
in Conjunction ; who can elude the plaineft Evi
dence of Matter of Fact ; who can be deaf to all
the Promifes and kind Admonitions of the Gofpel,
and to all the Threatenings and terrible Denuncia
tions of the Wrath of God, made known, in a good
Meafure, by the Light of Nature, and confirmed
by the Addition of exprefs Revelation -, Certainly
(I fay) That Man muft have fome other Reafion for
his Unbelief, than the pretended Want of fuffici
ent Evidence.-- Did Men follow the unprejudiced
Judgment of their own Minds, and the impartial
Dictates of natural Reafon, the leaft Poffibility of
obtaining eternal Happinefs, or the leaft Sufpicion
of falling into endlefs Mifery, would immediately
determine them to make it the great Study and Bu
finefs of their Lives, to obtain the One, and to '
avoid the Other. If then we fee Men act dir
rectly contrary to this natural Principle, and almoft
wholly neglect thefe Things, not only when there
is a fair Appearance and Probability of their being
true, which the Light of Nature itfelf affords-; but'

tgz 'The Evidence of Natural
but alfo when there is ail . reafonable Evidence
given of their being Certainly true, by exprefs Re
velation in the Goipel : Is it not very plain, that
fuch Men are" governed, not by Reafon and the
Force of Evidence, but by fome Other very diffe
rent Caufie of their Actions ?
But that What that Caufie is, is very apparent from the
Wickednefs Lives' and Actions of moft of thofe Perfons who
andungo- pretend Want of Evidence to be the Ground of their
Lulls are Infidelity. Their Lufts, their Appetites, their Affec-
the only tions, are interefted : They are Lovers of Vice and
Caufes of Debauchery, and Slaves to Evil Habits and Cuf-
jjff-e toms ;,and therefore they are not willing to difcern
the Evidence which would compel, them to believe
That, which yet they cannot believe with any Com
fort, fo Jong as they refolve not to part with their
beloved Vices. Their Hearts and Affections are
habitually fixed upon Things here below ; and
therefore they will not attend to the Force of any
Argument that would raife their Affections to Things
above i They are inflaved to the fenfual Pleafures
and finful Enjoyments of Earth, and therefore they
will not hearken to any reafonable Conviction which
would perfoade them to relinquifo thefe prefentGra-
tifications for the future and more' Spiritual Joys
of Heaven. The Love of this prefent World has
* blinded their Eyes, and there-.
1 Cor. 2. 14. fore they receive not the Things of
-*£,.., iwxwvf^'hv^ , the spirit ofi God; For they are
t*; to c?£ t» We.. -W*; loohfihnefis unto them ; Neither can
xa) av, J «V«i «x«i«uVo- they know them, becaufie they are fipi-
x'XvjAivov s tu's o^Sa^ts? td; j>v- ritually dijeerhed. In a Word : The
x« T u°7a' ^r true and only Reafon why1 Men
xairavirpa^mcrovruvirov^ai. J 1 ' .
Theophil Antioch. lib. 1. love Darknefis rather than Light \
is, becaufie their Deeds are Evil.
Andfohng And This Reafon affords a fufficient Account in*
as Men ^et^ why Men fhould be very unwilling to believe
7- ""mini the Dodrines of Chriftianity. If they are refolv- e4

and Revealed Religion. 293
ed not to reform their Lives, 'tis no Wonder they on of their
care not to difcern the Evidence of thofe Truths, Luft^jhey
which muft needs make them very uneafy in the ™e°ucon™n_
Midft of the Enjoymeat of all their finful Pleafures. cejthough-
In this Cafe, were the Proofs of the Truth of our *be Evi-
Religion much ftronger than they are, or than they denceofRl-
can be imagined or defired to be ; yet ftill thefe wenmucb
Men would be in the very fame Cafe, and ¦oeroe- ftronger
tually want ftronger and ftronger Evidence. 'Tis than if »•
true, many Men, who are now confcious and will
ing to acknowledge, that they act contrary to all
the reafonable Evidence and Convictions of Reli
gion, are neverthelefs very apt to imagine within
themfelves, that, if the great Truths of Religion
were proved to them by fome ftronger Evidences
they fihould, by that Means, be worked upon to
act otherwife than they do. But if the true Reafon
why thefe Men act thus foolifhly is not becaufe
the Doblrines ofi Religion are not fufficiently Evi
denced, but becaufe They tbemfielves are, without
allowing themfelves Time for Confideration, hurried
away, by fome unruly Paffions, to act directly con
trary to all Reafon and Evidence; tis plain (un
lefs God fhould irrefiftibly compel them) they might
well continue to act as they do, though the Evi
dence of thefe Things were really-greater than it is.
They are willing fondly to imagine, that if they had
lived in our Saviour's Time ; if they had heard his
^Preaching, and feen his Miracles ; if they had had -
the Advantage of beholding thofe mighty Works,
which he performed for the Proof of his Divine
Commiffion; as the Jews then had: they fhould
not, like them, have rejebled the Counfiel ofi God
againft tbemfielves, but with all Chearfulnefs have
believed his Doctrine, and embraced his Religion,
They fancy they foould immediately have become
Difciples of Chrift, and that the Truths which he
tauo-ht would have had a moft powerful Influence
- , . ° , llPon

294 The Evidence of Natural
upon the whole Courfe of their Lives. Andrif their
Hearts and Affections were not fet upon This World
more than upon the Next ; if they valued nPt the
prefient finful Enjoyments of Senfie above the Expectation
of the Gliry that fihall be revealed; moft certainly
they would do the fame now. But, if their Hearts
be let upon earthly Things, and their Paffions be
ftronger than all the Arguments of Reafon ; if they
^indeed fo love the Pleafures of Sin now, as that
they cannot perfuade themfelves, by all the Motives
of Religion, to live like Chriftians ; we need not
doubt to affirm, that they might very well have
been in the fame Cafe,, though they had lived' in
our Saviour's Time. The Jews are a notorious and
ftand'ing Inftance, how far Prejudice, Envy, Pride,
and Affection, are able to prevail over the ftrongeft
Convictions. When our Saviour began to preach,
that he was fent from God to inftruct them in their
Duty, they required a-Sign of him, and they would
believe him ; but, when he had worked fo many
Miracles, that even the World itfielfi could not con
tain the'flooks, if they flould all be written, they
perfifted ftill in their Infidelity. When they faw
him hanging upon the Crofe, and thought triem-
Matt. 27. ^e^ves fecure of him, they faid, Let him now come
42. down from the Crofs, and we will believe him:
But, when he arofe out of the Grave, wherein he
had. lain three Days, which was a much greater
and more convincing Miracle, they grew more
hardened' and obftinate in their Unbelief.
Nay, not Others there are, who imagine that if, thfeyr could
fuentho' but be convinced of the Truth of another World,
one Jhould by ,-jjg Appearance of one fent directly from that
pofefnm unknown State, they would immediately become
the Dead new Creatures. But, if God foould fatisfy their un--
to convince reafonable Demands by fending one on Purpofe from
* m' the Dead to convince them, there is little Room
to doubt, but, as they hearkened not to Mofies and the

and Revealed Religion. "29 j
the Prophets, to Chrift and his Apoftles ; fo neither
would they be perfiuaded by one rifiing on Purpofe from
the Dead. They might indeed be at firft furprized
and terrified at the Appearance of fo unufual and
unexpected a Meffenger : But, as wicked Men,
upon a Bed of Sicknefs, at the amazing Approach
of Death and Eternity, refolve, in the utmoft
Anguifh of Horror and Defpair, to amend their
Lives and forfake their Sins, but, as foon as the
Terror is < over, and the Danger of Death paft,
return to their old Habits of Sin and Folly: So
'tis more than probable it would be in the prefent
Cafe. Should God fend a Meffenger from the
Dead, to affure Men of the Certainty of a Future
State, and the Danger of their prefent Wicked-
nefs ; as foon as the Fright was over, and their
prefent terrible Apprehenfions ceafed, 'tis by no
Means impoffible or improbable that their old
vicious Habits and beloved Sins fhould again by
Degrees prevail over them. Some there are in
pur prefent Age who pretend to be convinced of
the Being of Spirits, by the powerful Demonftra
tion of their own Senfes ; and yet we do not ob
ferve that their Lives are more remarkably eminent
for exemplary Piety than other good Mens, who,
being convinced by the rational Evidence of the
Gofpel, go on in a fober, conftant, and regular
Exercife of Virtue and Righteoufnefs.
Tis not therefore for- Want of fufficient Evi- Thatthnr-
dence that Men difbelieve the great Truths of Re-/^^™™
lieiomfbut plainly for Want of Integrity, and ofMenJfd^
,&.. K. r I j • ¦ 11 ¦ • 1 1 rightly of
dealing ingenuoufly and impartially with them- t%e £vf
felves, that they fuffer not the Arguments of Re- dence of.
ligion to have that Weight and Influence upon Religion, it
them, which in the Judgment of Right .Reafon ^f'f.
they ought manifeftly to have. So long as Men ti,,fl,.Jf
permit their Paffions and Appetites to over-rule Places',:*,
F f their l:!j''K£rjl^

zq6 The Evidence of Natural
Prejudice, their Reafon, 'tis impoffible they foould have due'
Luft, and Apprehenfions in Matters of .Religion, or make
thefTe'come^y riSht ana- true Judgment concerning thefe
impartially Things. Men that are ftrongly biaffed and pre-
ivilUngto judiced even in worldly Affairs, 'tis well known
TrutTaandh0Vf h™d a"d difficult " is for them t0 Judge «>
tolbey all cording to Reafon, and to fuffer the Arguments
reafonable and Evidences of Truth to have their due Weight
ObUgati- wjm them. How much more in Matters of Reli-
"nfaii^af0- gion, which concern Things future and remote
any time from Senfe, muft it needs be, that Mens prefent
be made Interefts, Lufts, and Paffions, will pervert their
known to judgment, and blind their Understandings !
Wherefore, Men that pretend to be Followers
of Right Reafon, if they will judge truly of the
Reafonablenefs and Credibility of the Chriftian
Revelation, 'tis abfolutely neceffary, that, in the
firft Place, in order to that End, they become
impartially willing to embrace whatever fhall,
upon the Whole, appear to be agreeable to' Rea
fon and Truth, and grounded upon good Evi
dence, without interefting their Lufts and Appe*
tites in the Judgment ; and that, before all Things,
they refolve to be guided, in all their Actions, by
whatever Rule foall at any Time be well proved
to them to be the Will of God. And, when they
have put themfelves into this Temper and Frame
of Mind, then let them try if they can any longer
Job.1?; 17. reject the Evidence of the Gofpel. If any Man will
do his Will, be fhall know of the Doctrine whether it
Pfiz$. 8. be of God. For them that are meek God will guide
in judgment; and fuch as are gentle, them he will
learn his Way.
That Men Indeed, Men, that are of this good Difpofition,
tfftch a willing to be governed by Reafon, and net preju^
P'^jj*0" diced by Lufts and Vicious Appetites, could not but
thTnk it Slve tn?ir Affent to the Doctrines of Chriftianity,
their upon Account of the very intrinfic Excellency and
Reafonablenefs

and Revealed Religion. a 97
Reafonablenefs of the Things themfelves, even greateft
though the external Evidence of their Certainty Wrf0* "
had been much lefs than it at prefent is. Nay, /J^lt
were there hardly any other Evidence at all, than even thf'
barely the Excellency, and Reafonablenefs, and na- the Ev>-
tural Probability of the great Truths of Religion, 'fgjf'-f
together with the Confideration of the vaft Impor- ^erflmcb
tance of them ; yet even, in That Cafe, it would lefs than
be infinitely wifeft, and moft agreeable to Reafon, 'bey are.
for Men to live according to the Rules of the
Gofpel. And though their Faith extended no fur
ther than only to a Belief of the Poffibility of the
Truth of the Chriftian Revelation, yet even This
alone ought in all Reafon to have Weight enough
to determine reafonable Creatures to Jive fioberly,
righteoujly, and godly. For, is it not plainly moft rea
fonable, as an * ancient Writer
expreffes it, ifi each ofi the oppcjite
Opinions were equally doubtful and
uncertain, yet by all Means to em
brace and entertain That which
brings fome Hope along with it, ra
ther than that which brings none ?
For on one Side of the Queftion there
is no Danger at all ofi incurring any
Calamity, ifi that which we believe
and expebl ftjould at laft prove
falfe ; But, on the other Side, there
is the greateft Hazard in the World,
the Lofts of eternal Life, if the Opinion, which Un
believers rely upon, fhould^ at laft prove an Error.
And f again : What fay ye, Oye ,
ignorant Men, ye Men •»/ ' mifierdble + Q»!d dicf s» ? nefcff,.
b , /. 1 1 71 7-. 7; « £. etiam fletu & miferatione
and moft deplorabk lolly i Can ye digniffimi ? ita non tam ex-
forbear fearing within- yowfelves, timefcitis, ne forte h«c ve-
that at leafi thofe Things may pof- w fmt, quse fint defpeftui
"' /.,, J . J 11° „'„.; j. vo°is & prasbent materiam
fibly prove true, wkco- ye- now de- r-fus t ^ faheni ,vobifcom
F f z fpffi fub

* Non purior fatio eft, ex
duobus incertis & in ambi-
gua expe&atione pendentibiis,
id potius. credere, quod ali-
quas fpes ferat, quam quod
nullas? In, illo enim, peri-
culi nihil eft, fi, quod dicitur
imminere, cafium fiat & va
cuum ; in hoc, damnum eft
maximum (id eft, falutis a-
miffio) fi, cum tempus adve-
nerit, aperiatur hoc fuiffe men-
dacium. Armb. adv. Gentes,
lib. z.

Sq8

The Evidence pf Natural

volvitis, r.e, quod hoc die ere
dere obilinata renuitis perver-
fitate, redarguat ferum tem-
pus, & irrevocabilis poenite-n-
tia cailiget ? Id. ibid.

fub obfeuris cogitationibus fpjfie and mcck at? Have ye not
at leaft fiome Mifigivings ofi Mind,
left poffbly That, which ye now per-
vcrfely and obftinately refiufie to be
lieve, ye Jhould at laft be convinced
ofi by find Experience, when it will
be too late to repent ? Nor is this the Judgment
of Chriftian Writers only, but alfo of the wifeft
and moft confiderate Heathens. We ought to fipare
no Pains, faith * Plato, to obtain
the Habits ofi Virtue and Wifidom
in this prefient Life ; For the Prize
is noble, and the Hope is very great.
And -f Cicero : They have gained
a -great Prize indeed, who have
perfuaded themfelves to believe, that
when Death comes, they flail perifih,
utterly : What Comfort is there,
What is there to be boafted ofi, in
that Opinion ? And again : Ifi,
after Death, faith J he, as fome
little and contemptible Philofophers
think, I fihall be nothing ; yet there
is no Danger that, when we are all
dead, thofie Philofopher^ Jhould laugh
at me for my Error.
not ' Our Cafe. God has afforded
Us, as has been largely and particularly fhewn in
the foregoing Difcourfe, many and certain Proofs
of the Truth of our Religion ; even as certain as
any Matter of Fact is capable of having. And
we now exhort Men to believe, not what is barely
poffible,, and excellent, and probable, and of the ut
moft Importance in itfelf ; but what moreover they
have all the pofitive Evidence, and all the Reafion in
the World, to oblige them to believe.

* X^v) tsaira vtoiew, <us"£ «£s-
txs xa) Qfomc-iw; iv ru, (Sla yti-
roLO-^fiy' xa7,lv yag rq dvhov,
xa) ij sAttis puyafw. Plato in
Ph&d. f Praclarum nefcio quid
adepti funt, qui didicerunt fe,
cum tempus mortis venif-
fet, totos effe perituros. 
Quid habet ifta res aut lasta-
bile aut gloriofumi Cic. Tufc.
%. lib, I.-
X Sin mortuus, ut quidam
ipinuti Philofophi cenfent,
nihil fentiam; non ve^eor ne
hunc errorem meum mortui
philofophi irrideant. Cic. de
Seneit. But this is

To

and Revealed R e l i g i o n. 299
To conclude : No Man of Reafon can pretend That God
to fay, but God may require us to take Notice ofi ""7 re~
r Tl • "1. -i ... 1 1 Quire US tO
fome i rungs at our Peril, to inquire into them, and m/te Notice
" to confider them thoroughly. And Pretence of Want of certain
of greater Evidence will not excufe Carehfi.nefis or things-, and
unrcafionable Prejudices, when God has vouchsafed ff^thel
us all That Evidence, which was either Fit for and conft-
Him to grant, or Reafonable for Men to defire ; der them,
or, indeed, which the Nature of the Thing iiielf a'ouf
to be proved was capable of.

FINIS.

F f 3 ' 5 EVER A L

SEVERAL
LETTERS TO THE
Rev. Dr. CLARKE,
F R O M A
Gentleman in G!ocefterJhire>
Relating to the
FIRST VOLUME
OFTHE
Foregoing S E R M O N S :
W I T H THE
Dr's ANSWERS
THEREUNTO.
The Fourth Edition,

THE

Firft LETTER.
Reverend Sir,
I Suppofe you will wonder at the pefent
Trouble from one who is a perfect Stranger
to you, though you are not fo to him ; but
I hope the Occafion will excufe my Bold-
nefs. I have made it, Sir, my Bufinefs, ever
fince I thought myfelf capable of fuch Sort of
Reafoning, to prove to myfelf the Being and
Attributes of God: And, being fenfible that 'tis
a Matter of the laft Confequence, I endeavoured
after a demonftrative Proof, not only more fully
to fiatisfiy my own Mind, but alfo in order to
defend the great Truths of Natural Religion,
and thofe of . the Chriftian Revelation which
follow from them, againft allOppofiers : But muft
own with Concern, that hitherto I have been
unfuccefsful; and, tho' I have got very probable
Arguments, yet I can go but a very little Way
with Demonftration in the Proof of thofe Things.
When firft your Book on thofe Subjects (which
by all, whom I have difcourfed with, is fo
juftly efteemed) was recommended to me, I was
in great Hopes of having all my Inquiries an-
fwered : But, fince, in fome Places, either thro'
my not underftanding your Meaning, or what
elfe I know not, even That has failed me,
I almoft defpair of ever arriving to finch a Satifi-
faftion

4 The Firfil LetTER,
v * , " fablion as I aim at, unlefs by the Method I noyt
" ufe. You can't but know, Sir, that of two
*' different Expreffions of the fame Thing, though
u equally clear to fome Perfons, yet* toothers, one
" of them is fometimes very obfoure, though the
** other be perfectly intelligible. Perhaps this may
" be my Cafe here; And could I fee thofe of your
" Arguments, of which I doubt, differently pro-
" poled, poffibly. I might yield a ready Affent lo'
"them. This, Sir, I cannot but think a fuffi-
" cient Excufe for the prefent Trouble ; it being ,
" fueh an one as I hope may prevail for an An-
" fwer with one who feems to aim at nothing more
" than that good Work of inftructing others.
" Jn your Demqnftration of the Being and Attri-,
* Page 4;. " butes of God, .Prop. VI. * [Edit. 2d. p. 69 and 70]
Edit. 4*A. «« yOU pr0pofe to prove the Infinity, or Omniprefenei
Eat. Si. " of the Self-Exifeent Being. The former Part 6f
" the Proof feems highly probabje ; but the latter
" Part, which feems to aim at Demonftration, is
" not to me convincing. The latter Part of the
" Paragraph is, if I miftake not, an entire Argu*
" tnent of itfelf, which runs thus :" fo fuppofe a
finite Being to he Self-Exiftent is to fay, that 'tis a
Contradiction fior that Being not to exift, the Abfience of
which may yet be conceived without a Contradiction^
which is the greateft Abfurdity in the World. " The
" Senfe of thefe Words [the Abfience of which] feems
" plainly to be, determined by the following Sen-
" tence to mean its Abfence from any particular
" Place: Which Sentence is to prove it to be dri
" Abfurdity, and is this:" For, ifi a Being ean,
without a Contradibfion, be abjrent from one Place, it
may, without a Contradiction, be abfent from another
Place, and from all Places. "Now, fuppofing t.his
" to be a Confequence, all that it proves is that, if
" a Being can, without a Contradiction, be abfent
<; from one Place at one Time, it may, without. a
Contradiction,

The Firfl Letter. .£;
M Contradiction, be abfent from another Place, and
*' fo from all Places, at different Times ; (for I can-
" not fee, that, if a Being can be abfent from one
" Place at one Time, therefore it may, without a
" Contradiction, be abfent from all Places at the
" fame Time, i.e. may ceafie to exift.) Now, if it
" proves no more than this, I cannot fee that it
" reduces the Suppofition to any Abfurdity. Sup- t
*' pofe I could demonftrate, that any particular Man
" fhould live a Thoufand Years ; this Man might,
" without a Contradiction, be abfent from one, and
*' from all Places, at different Times; but it would
" not from thence follow, that he might be abfent
" from all Places at the fame Time, i. e. that he
"might ceafie to exift. No ; this would be a Con-
" tradiction, becaufe I am fuppofed to have de-
" monftrated that he foould live a Thoufand Years.
" It would be exactly the fame if, inftead of a
" Thoufiand Tears, I fhould fay for ever ; and the
" Proof feems the fame, whether it be applied to
"a Self-Exiftent or a Dependent Being.
" What elfe I have to offer is in relation to your
" Proof that the Self-Exiftent Being muft of Ne-
*' ceffity be but One. Which Proof is as follows,
*' in Prop. VII. * [Edit*. 2d. p. 74.]" To fuppofe two * Pagers.
cr more different Natures exifting of tbemfielves, ne- Eilit- ¥h-_
ceffarily and independent firom each other, implies this fffff 44^
plain Contradiction, that each ofi them being indepen
dent firom the other, they may either ofi them be fiup
pofied to exift Alone ; fio that it will be no Contradic
tion to imagine the other not to exift, and, confie-
quently, neither of them will be neeeffarily- exifting:
" The Suppofition indeed implies, that, fince each
~" of thefe Beings is Independent from the other, they
" may either of them exift Alone, i. e. without any
" Relation to or Dependence on the other : But
" 'Where is the third Idea^ to connect this Propo-
" fition and the following one, viz. fio that it, will
" be

$ . TBe Firft LetteK.
" be no Contradiction to imagine the other not to
" Exift ? Were this a Confequence of the former
" Propofition, I allow it would be Demonftration',
*Page 16, "by the firft Corollary of Prop. III. * [?,d Edit.,
I7;ff^\" -P- 2^-J But ^nce tnefe two Propofitions [they
** bt " may either of them be fiuppofied to exift alone] • and
" [fio that it will be no Contradiction to imagine' the
" other not to exift] are very widely different ; fince
, *' likewife 'tis no immediate Confequence, that be-
" caufe Either may be fuppofed to'exift independent
" from the other, therefore the other may be. fup-
" pofed not \o exift at all ; how is what wasprd-
" pofed proved ? That the Propofitions are diffe-
" rent, I think is plain ; and whether there be an
«' immediate Connexion, every body that reads your
*' Book, muft judge for themfelves. 1-muftfa'y,
" for my own Part, the Abfurdity does not appear
" at firft Sight, any more than the Abfurdity of
" faying that the Angles below the Bafe in an
" Ifofceles Triangle are unequal ; which though it
" is abfolutely falfe, yet I iuppofc no one will lay
" down the contrary for an Axiom; becaufe, H10*
'*' it is trtie, yet there is Need of a Proof to make
" it appear fo.
" Perhaps it may be anfwered, that I have not
" rightly explained the Words, to exift clone; And
*' that they do not mean only, to exift independent
• " firom the other; but that exifting Alone means
" that nothing exifts with it. Whether this or the
" other was meant I cannot determine : But which-
" ever it was, what 1 have faid will hold. For if
• " this left be the Senle of thofe Words, [Tbey
" either of them may be Juppofied to exift alone] ic
" indeed implies that it will be no ContiadicL'rin
*' to fuppofe the other not to exift : But then 1 afk,
" how come thefe two Propofitions to be c-cnvtc-*-
'• ed; that, to fuppofe two different Natures txift-
*' ing of themfelves neeeffarily and independent from
" each

The Firft Letter.
each other implies, -that each of them may be
fuppofed to" exift Alone in This Senfe ? Which is
exactly the fame as I faid before, only applied '
to different Sentences. So that if Exijting Alone
be underftood as I firft took it, I allow it is im
plied in the Suppofition, but cannot fee that the
Confequence is, that it will be no Contradiction to
fuppofe the other not to exift. But, if the Words
Exifting Alone are rneant in the latterSenfe, I
grant, that if either of them may be fiuppofied thus
to Exift Alone, it will be no Contradiction to
fiuppofie the other not to exift : But then I cannot
fee, that to fuppofe two different Natures exifting,
ofi tbemfielves, neeeffarily and 'independently firom each
other, implies that either of them may be fup
pofed to exift Alone in This Senfe of the Words ;
but only, that either of them may be fuppofed
to exift without having any Relation to the other,
and that there will .be no Need of the Exiftence of
the One in order to the Exiftence of the other. But
though upon this Account, were there no other
Principle of its Exiftence, it might ceafe to exift -,
yet, on the Account of the Neceffity of its own
Nature, which is quite diftinct from the other,
'tis an abfolute Abfurdity to fuppofe it not to exift.
" Thus, Sir, I have propofed my Doubts, with
the Reafons of them. In which if I have wrefted
your Words to another Senfe than you defigned
them, or in any Refpect argued unfairly, I affure
you it was without Defign. So I hope you will
impute it to Miftake. And, if it will not be
too great a Trouble, let me once more beg the
Favour of a Line from you, by which you will
lay me under a particular Obligation to be, what
with the reft of the World, I now am,
Reverend Sir,
Tour much Obliged Servant, &c."
'v.4.1713- THE

THE

ANSWER

T O T H E

Firft LETTER.

S I R,
DI D Men who publifh controverfial Papers
accuftom themfelves to write with that Can
dour and Ingenuity, with which you. propofe your
Difficulties, I am perfuaded almoft all Difputes
might be veiy amicably terminated, either by
Mens coming at laft to agree in Opinion, or at
leaft finding Reafon to fuffer each other friendly
to differ.
Your Two Objections are' very Ingenious, and
urged with great Strength and Acutenefs : Yet I
am not without Hopes of being able to- give you
Satisfaction in Both of them. To your Firft, there
fore, I anfwer : Whatever may, without a Contra
diction, be abfent from any one Place at any one
Time, may alfo, without a Contradiction, be abfent
from all Places at all Times. For whatever is abfio
lutely neceffaiy at all, is abfolutely neceffary in every
Part ofi Spacer and in every Point, of Duration.
Whatever can at any Time be conceived poffible to
be abfient from any One Part of Space, may for the
fame Reafon [viz. the implying no Contradiction in

The Answer to the Firjl Letter.
in the Nature of Things] be conceived poffible to be
abfent from every other Part of Space at the fame
Time, either by ceafing to be, or by fuppofing it
never to have begun to be. Your Inftance about de-
monftrating a Man to live iooo Years is] what (I
think), led you into the Miftake; and is a good In
ftance to lead you out of it again. You may Sup
pofe a Man Jhall live iooo Years, or God may re
veal andpromije he Jhall live iooo Years ; And upon
That Suppofition, it foall not be poffible for the Man
to be abfent from all Places in any Part of that
Time. Very true : But why foall it not be poffible ?
Only becaufe 'tis contrary to the Suppofition, or to
the Promife of God; but not contrary to the abfolute
Nature of Things ; which would be the Cafe if the
Man exifted neeeffarily, as every Part of Space does.
In Suppofing you could Demonftrate a Man foould
live iooo Tears, or one Year, you make an im
poffible and contradictory Suppofition. For, though
you may know certainly, (by Revelation fuppofe)
that he will live fo long, yet this is only the Cer
tainty of a Thing True in Fad, not in itfielfi necefi-
fiary : And Demonftration is applicable to nothing
but what is neceffary in itfielfi, neceffary in all Places
and at all Times equally.
To your fiecond Difficulty I anfwer : What exifts
' neeeffarily, not only muft fo exift Alone, as to be
¦ independent of any Thing elfe; but (being Self-
fiufficient) may alfo fo exift Alone, as that every Thing
eifc may poffibly (or without any Contradiction in the
Nature of Things) be fuppofed not to exift at all :
And, confequeiuly, (fince That which may poffi
bly be fuppofed not to exift at all, is not neeeffa
rily exiftent) No other Thing can be neeeffarily ^exiftent,
'Whatever is neceffarily-exijting, there is Need of
its Exifilence in order to the Suppofial ofi the Exiftence
tof any other Thing -, fo that nothing can poffibly be
fuppofed to exift) without prefiuppofimg and including
antecedently

20 The Answer to the Firft Letter.
antecedently the Exiftence of that which is neceffary.
For Inftance: The Suppofal of the ^Exiftence of
any Thing whatever includes neeeffarily a Prefiuppa-
fition of the Exiftence of Space and Time ; and if
any Thing could exift without Space or Time, it
would follow, that Space and Time were not necefi-
fiarily-exifting. Therefore, the Suppofing arty Thing
poffibly to exift Alone, fo as not neeeffarily to include
the Prefiuppofial ofi fiome other Thing, proves demon- •
flrably, that That other Thing is not neeeffarily- exift
ing ; becaufe whatever has Neceffity of Exiftence can
not poffibly, in any Conception whatfoever, be fup
pofed Away. There cannot poffibly be any Notion
of the Exiftence of any Thing, there cannot poffibly
be any Notion of Exiftence at all, but what fhall
neeeffarily preinclude the Notion of That which has
heceffary Exiftence. And, confequently, the Two
Propofitions, which you judged independent, are
really neeeffarily connected. Thefe Sorts of Things
are indeed very difficult to exprefis, and not eafy to
be conceived but by very Attentive Minds : But, to
fuch as can and will attend, nothing (I think) is
more demonftrably convictive.
If any Thing ftill flicks with you in This, or
any other Part of my Books, I foall be very will
ing to be informed of it, who am,
SIR, Tour affured Friend, •
Nov. 10,
17 1 3. and Servant, S. C.
P. S. Many Readers, I obferve, have mifunder-.
flood my Second General Propofition, as if the
Words [Some One unchangeable and independent Being]
meant [One Only  Being.] Whereas the true
Meaning, and all that the Argument there requires,
is [Some One at leaft.] That there can be but 0;ie
is the Thing proved afterwards .in the Seventh Pro
pofition. T fi £

%t

_2_

THE
Second LETTER.

Reverend Sir,
*' T Have often thought that the chief Occationd
•*'' _£ of Mens differing fo much in their Opinions,
*' were, either their not underftanding each other,
4' or elfe, that, inftead , of ingenuoufly fearching
" after Truth, they have made it their Bufinefs to
" find out Arguments for the Proof of what they
** have once afferted. However; 'tis certain there
*.' may be other Reafons for Perfons not agreeing
" in their Opinions : And; where it is fo, I can'c
" blit think with you, that they will find Reafori
" to fuffer each other to differ friendly, -every Man
" having a Way of Thinking; in fome RefpectS,
u peculiarly his own.
" I am forfy I muft tell you, your Anfwers to
" my Objections are not fatisfactory. The ReafionS
" why 1 think them not fo are as follow*
" You fay," whatever is abfiolutely neceffary at
dl, is abfolutely neceft'ary in every Part of Space, and
in every Point of Duration. " Were this evident,
" it would certainly prove what you bring it for,"
viz. that whatever may, without 'a Contradiction, be
abfient firom one Place at one Time, niay alfio be ab
fient firom" all Places at all Times. " But I do not
" conceive, that the Idea of Ubiquity is contained
" in the Idea of Self Exiftence, or dirtdly follows
u from it, any otherwife than as whatever exifts, '
" muft exift fomewhere. You add," Whatever-
G g can-

h£ The Second Letter.
can at any Time be conceived poffibly to be abfient fir cm
any one Pari of Space, may for the fiame Reajcn '[viz,
-the implyu-g no- Conn ariCiion ,in theN'aHire oj Ihiugsf
be conceived poffibly to be abfent from every other Part
of Space at the fame Tims, " Now I cannot fee,
that I can make thefe two Suppcfinions for the
fame Reafion, or upon the fiame Account. '¦ The
Reafon why L conceive this Being may be abfent
fiom cue Place is becaufe it doth not contradict
the former Proof [drawn from the Nature, of
Things] in which I proved only that it muit
neceH.irily ex ft. But the other Suppofition, viz.'
that I can conceive it poffible to be abfient from
Every Part of Space at one and the fiame Timef
directly contradicts the Proof that it-mltft exift
S O M ti WH h> R Li, and fo is an exprefs'Con-
triidiclion. Unittl it be laid, that as, when we
have proved the three Angles of a Triangle
equal to two right Ones, That Relation of the
; Equality of its Angles to two right Ones will
be wkere-ever a Triangle exifts ; fio, when we
have proved the neceffary Exiftence of a Being,
this Being muft exift every-vehcre'. But there is
a great Difference between thefe two Things :
The one being the Proof of a certain Relation,"
upon Si'.ppofilicn of fuch a Being's Exiftence with
foch particular 'Properties ; and confequently,
where ever this Being and thefe Properties exift,
this Relatioiv muft exift too : But, -from the
Proof -of the neceffary Exiftence of a Being, ''tis-
no evident Confequence that it exifts every-where.
My ufing the Word Dmonft.rv.tion, inftead of
Proof which leaves no room, for Doubt, Was through
Negligence, tor 1 never heard of ftrict Demon-
ftraifn of Matter of Fact.
-"¦In your Anfwer to my Second Difficulty, you
" fay," whatfoever is necfffarily-exifling, lleiC is
order to the Stippofial ofi the
Exiftence

Need of its Exiftence,

The Second Letter. 1 3
Exiftence ofi any other Thing.- " All the Confiequences
" you draw from this Propofition I fee proved
". demonftrably ; and confequently, that the two
" Propofitions I thought independent, are clofely
'.' connected. But how, or upon what Account,
u is there Need of. the Exiftence of whatever is
" neceffarily-exifting, in order to the Exiftence of
" any other Thing ? Is it as there is Need ofi Space
" and Duration, in order to the Exiftence of any
" Thing ; or is it needful only as the Caufie of the
" Exiftence of all other Things ? If the former be
" faid, as your Inftance feems to intimate : I an-
" fwer, Space and Duration are very abftrufie in
" their Natures; and, I think* can't properly be
" called Things, but are confider'd rather as Aff'ec-
" tions which belong, and in the Order of our Thoughts
" are anteccl ntly neceffary, to the Exiftence of all
"• Things. And I can no more conceive how a
" necefifarily-exiftent Being can, on the Jame Account,
*¦ or in the Jame Manner as Space and Duration arei,
" be needful in order to the Exiftence of any other
" Being; than I can conceive Extenfion attributed
" to a Thought : That Idea no more belonging to a
" Thiig exijting, than Extenfion belongs to Thought.
" But if the latter be faid^ that there is Need of
" the Exiftence of whatever is a neceffary Being,
u in order t'o the Exiftence of any other Thing,
" only as this Neceffary Being muft be the Caufe of
" the Exiftence /of , all other Things, : I think this is
" plainly begging the Queftion ;' For it fuppofes
" that there is no Other Being exifls$ but what is
" Cafual, and fo not neceffary: And on what Other
11 Account, or in what Other Manner than one of
«' thefe two; there can be Need of the Exiftence of
" a lfeceffary Being in order to the Exiftence of any
" Thing elfe, I cannot conceive.
" Thus, Sir, you feel entirely agree with yot*
" iri ail the Confiequences you have drawn from your
G g 2 " Suppf fit ions,

The Second Letter.
" Suppofitkns, but cannot fee the Truth oj the Sup*
" pqfi tions themfelves.
" I have aimed at nothing in my Style, but only
" to be intelligible -, being Ienfible that 'tis very
" difficult (as you obferve) to exprefs one's felf oh
" thfefe Sorts of Subjects, efpecially fo; one who is
" altogether unaccuftomed to write upon them.
" I have nothing at prefent more to add, but
" my fincereft Thanks for your Trouble in an-
" fwCring my Letter, and for your profeffed Rea'-*
" dineis to be acquainted with any other Difficulty
"that I may meet with in any of your Writings.
" I am willing to interpret this, as fomewhat like
" a Promife of an Anfwer to what 1 have now
" written, if there be any Thing in it which
" deferves one."

/ am;

Reverend SIR,
Tour moft obliged humble ServanU

.Nov. 23,
1713-

TH £.

*5

THE
ANSWER T O T H E
Second LETTER.

I

SIR,
T feems to Me, that the Reafon why you do
not apprehend Ubiquity to be neeeffarily. con
nected with Self Exiftence, is, becaufe, in the Order
pf your Ideas, you firft conceive a Being (a Finite
Being, fuppofe;) and then conceive Self- Exift enct
to be a Property of That Being, as the Angles are
Properties of a ' Triangle, when a Triangle exifts :
Whereas, on the contrary, Neceffity ofi Exiftence
not being a * Property Confiquent upon the Suppo- * $er the
fition of thg Thing's exifting, but Antecedently theConclufi-
Caufie or Ground of that Exiftence; 'tis evident ""^^
this Neceffity, being not limited to any Antecedent \\ft}e.fen,h
Subject, as Angles are to a Triangle; but being it- Letter.
felt Origincl, Abfiolute, and (in 'Order of Nature;
antecedent tQ.all Exiftence ; caqnpt but be every-where,
for the fame Reafon that it is any where. By
applying this Reafoning to the Inftance of Space,
you will find, that by Confequence it helongs
truly to 1'bat Subftance, whereof Space \s a. f Pro- i „,. ^.^e
perty, as Duration alfo is. What you fay about a 0i' La lit- ,
Neceffary Bang exifting Somewhere fuppofes it to be <^e.
.-•*'• Gg 3 i-ifl^i

The Answer to the Second Letter.
Finite ; and being Finite, fuppofes fome Caufe
which determined that fuch a certain Quantity of Thaf
Being fhould exift, neither more nor lefs : An<|
That Caufie muft either be a Voluntary Caufie, or elfe
fiuch a neceffary Caufe, the Quantity of whofe Power
muft be determined and limited by fome Other Caufie.
But in original abfolute Neceffity, antecedent (in Or
der of Nature) to the Exiftence of any Thing,
nothing of all This can have Place-, but the Ne
ceffity is neeeffarily every-zehere: alike.
Concerning the Second Difficulty, I anfwer,
That which exifts neeeffarily, is needful to the Exift
ence of any other Thing -, Not eonfidered now as a
Caufe, (for That indeed is begging the Queftion)
- but as a fine qua non, in the Senfe as Space is [ne
ceffary to every Thing, and nothing can poffibly -
be conceived to exift, without thereby prefuppofing
Space : -Which therefore I apprehend to be a Pro
perty or Mode of the Self-exiftent Subftance; and
that, by being evidently neceffary itfelf, it proves,
that the Subftance, of which it is a Property^ muft
alfo be neceffary ; Neceffary both in itfelf arid need
ful to the Exiftence of any Thing elfe whatfoever.
Extenfion indeed does not bielong to Thought, be
caufe Thought is not a Being ; But there is Need of
Extenfion to the Exiftence of every Being, to a
Being" which has or has not Thought, or any other.
Quality whatfoever. lam, Sir, Xour real Friend and Servant.

London, Nqv.
' .28, 1713. THE

u

V"v " > ' j'

THE
Third LETTER.
Reverend Sir,
I Don't very, well underftand your Meaning,
when you fay that you think, in 'the Order
of my Ideas I firft conceive a Being (finite fup
pofe) to exift, and then conceive Self- Exiftence to
be a Property of that Being- If you mean that
I firft fiuppofie a finite Being to exift I knew r.Qt
why, affirming Neceffity ofi Exiftence to be only'
a Confequent rof its Exiftence-, and that, whi?n
I have fuppofed it Finite, I very fafely conclude
it is not Infinite ; I am utterly at a Lois upon
what Expreffions in my Letter this Conjecture
can be founded. But if you mean, that I fi.ft
of all prove a Being to Exift from Eternity, and
then, from the Reafons of Things, prove that
fuch a Being muft be -eternally Neceffary, V
freely own it: Neither dp I conceive it to be
irregular or abfurd -, for there is a great Dif
ference between the 0'"dej- in which :L Lings e-xifil,
and the Order in which I prove to myfelf that
thy exift. Neither do I think my faying a ne
ceffary Being exifts Somexbrre fopro!es it to
he finite-, it only fuppofes that, this Being exifts
in Space, without determining whether here, or
.there, or every-where. .
" To my ficcond Objection you fay, fThat whh.h
« exifls necelfarily, is nrcdjul to, the Exiftence ,/fi any
G k 4 c '<¦¦"¦<:

V-

The Third Letter.
*' other Thing, as a fine qua non in the Senfe Space
" is neceffary to every Thing : Which is proved (you
*' fay) by Ibis Confideration, that Space is a Property
" of the Self-exijlent Subftance ; and, being both Ne-
?' ceffary in itfielfi, and needful to the Exiftence ofi
" evety Thing elfie, confiequ'ently the Subftance, ofi which
" it is a Property,, muft be fio too. Space, I own, is
" in one4 Senfie a Property of the Self-exiftent Sub-r
" flange; but, in. the fame Senfie, 'tis alfo a Property
f of all other Subftances. The only Difference is
" in Refpect to the Quantity. And, fince every
" Part of Space, as well as the Whole, is necefia-
" -ry,- every Subftance confequently muft be Self-
<f exiflent, becaufe it hath this Self-exiftent Pro-
" perty. Which fince you will not admit for true,
f if it directly follows from your Arguments, they,
" cannot be conclufive.
" What you fay under the firfl Head proves
%i (I think) to a very great Probability, though not
V , to Me with the Evidence of Demonftration .- But
*' your Arguments under the Second I am not able
*' to fee the Force of.
" I am fo far from being pleafed that I can form
*' Objections to your Arguments, that, befides
" the Satisfaction it- would have given me in my
?' own Mind, I foould, have thought it an Honour
" to have entered into your Reafonings, and feen
" the Force. of. them. I cannot defire to trefpafsj
" any more upon your better employed Time ; fo
{)¦ foall' only add my hearty Thanks for your
" 1 rouble on my Account, and that I am witli
If \he greateft Refpect,"'

Dee- the. 5:^
}7]'i:

'Reverend Sir,
Tour moft 'obliged humble Servant*.

The A N S W E R
TO THE
Third LETTER,
SIR,
T Hough, when I turn my ' Thoughts every
Way, I fully perfuade myfelf there is no
Defect in the Argument itfielfi; yet in my Manner of
Expreffcn I arh fatisfied there muft be fome Want
of Clearnefs, when there remains any Difficulty to
a Perfon of your Abilities and Sagacity. I did not
mean that your faying a neceffary Being exifts Some
where does neeeffarily fuppofe it to be finite ; but
that the Manner of Expreffion is apt to excite in the
Mind an Idea of a Finite Being, at the fame Time
that you are thinking of a Neceffary Being, without
accurately attending to the Natuie of lhat Neceffity
by which it exifts. " Neceffity abfolute, and antecedent
(in order of Nature) to the Exiftence of Any Sub
ject, has nothing to limit it ; but, if it operates at all,
(as it muft needs do,) it muft operate (if I may fo
fpeak) every-where and at all Times alike. Determi
nation of a particular Quantity, or particular Time or
Place pf Exiftence of any Thipg, cannot arife but
from fomewhat external to the Thing itfelf. For
Example : Why there fhould exift juft fuch a fmall
determinate Quantity of Matter, neither more nor
lefis, interfper'fed in the immenfe Vacuities of Space,
no Reafon can be given : Nor can there be any
Thing in Nature, which could have determined a
Thing fo indifferent in itfelf, as is the Meafure of
that Quantity, but only the Will of an intelligent and
free Agent. f o fuppofe Matter, or any Other Sub
ftance, Neceffarily-exifting in aFinite determinate Quan^
tiiy,, in an Inch- cube, for Inftance ; or in ^"cer tain

>9

.#>

The Answer to the Third Let t er,
tain Number of Cube-Inches, . and no more ; is ex-.
adtly the fame Abfurdity, as fuppofing it to exift
Neeeffarily, and yet for a Finite Duration only s
Which every one fees to be a plain Contradiction'.
The Argument is .likewife the fame* in the Queftir
on about the -Original -of Motion. Motion cannot
be neceffarily-exifting ; becaufe, it being evident that
All Determinations of Motion are equally fiojjible in
themfelves, the Original Determination of the: Mo
tion of any particular Body this Way, rather than the
•contrary W ay, could not be neeeffarily in itfielfi, but
was either caufed by the Will of an Intelligent and
Free Agent, 'or elfe was an EffeCt produced and de
termined without Any Caufe at all; which is an ex-
¦ prefs Contradiction : As I have fhewn fo my De*
monfiration ofi the Being and Attributes of God, Page
14, [Edit. 4th and 5th.] Page 1%, [Edit. 6th.]
To the Second Head of Argument I anfwer,
Space, is a Property [or Mode] of the Self-exiftent,
Subftance, but not of any other Subftances. All
other Subftances are IN Space, and are penetrated by
it ; but phe Self-exiftent Subftance is not IN Space,
nor penetrated by it, but is itfelf (if I may fo fpeak)
the Subfilratum of Space, the Ground of the Exiftence
of Space and Duration itfielfi. Which [Space and
Duration] being evidently neceffary, and yet Them
felves not Subftances, but Properties or Modes, fhew
evidently that the Subfiance> without which thefe
Properties could not fubfift, is itfelf much more (if
that were poffible) Neceffary. And as Space and
Duration *are needful (i. e.fiine qua; non,) to- the ExT
iftence of every Thing elfie ; fo confequently is the
Subftance, to which Thefie Properties belong in tbaf
peculiar Manner which I before mentioned.
I am, Sir,
Decern. 1 o, Tour affectionate Friend and Servant.
T HE

THE
Fourth LETTER,
Reverend Sir,
"' \y\/'^ate-ver 's tne Occafion of my not feeing
t* V V the Force of your Reafonings^ I cannot
?' impute it to (what you doj the Want of Clear-
fl nefis in your Expreffion.- J am too well acquaint-
" ed with myfelf, to think my not underftanding
" an Argument a fufficient Reafon to conclude
»' that it's either improperly expreffed, pr riot con-
*' clufive, unlefs I can clearly Jhew the Defied of
*l it. 'Tis with the greateft Satisfaction I muft
!" tell you, that, the more I reflect on your firft
" Argument, the more I am convinced of the
f- Truth pf it; and It now feems to me altogether
" unreafonable to fuppofe Abfolute Neceffity can
f ' have any Relation to one Part of Space more
*f than to Another ; and if fo, an Abfiolutely-neceffary
" Being muft exiif. every-where.
" Iwifo I was as well fatisfied in Refpect to the
?' other. You fay, all Subftances, except the Selfi-
'? .exiftent one, are In Space, and are. penetrated by
«' it. All Subftances doubtlefs, whether Body or
" Spirit, exift in Space .- But when I fay that a
f Spirit exifts in Space, were I put upon telling
" my Meaning, I know not how I could do it
?' any other- Way -than- by faying, fuch a particular
" Quantity pf Space terminates the Capacity ofi aCl-
f ing in finite Spirits -f/ one and the fiame Time; fo
^ that- they cannot act beyond that determined
" Quantity.- Not but that I think there is jome-
Yt what in the Manner of Exiftence of Spirits in
" Refpect

kit -The Fourth Letter.
" Refpect of Space, that more directly Anfwers to
" the Manner of the Exiftence of Body; but what
" That' is, or of the Manner of their Exiftence, I
*' cannot pOffibly form an Idea. And it feems (if
" poffible) much more difficult to determine what
" 'Relation the Self-exiftent' Being hath to Space", To
" fay he exifts In Space, after the Jame Manner that
" other Subftances do, ( fomewhat like which I
" too rafoly afferted in my laft) perhaps would be
" placing the Creator too much on a Level with
" the Creature, or, however, it is not plainly and
" evidently true : And to fay the Self exiftent Sub-
"' fiance is the Subjiratum of Space, in the common
" Senfie of the Word, is fqarce intelligible, or at
*•' leaft is not evident. Now, tho' there may be
" 'an hundred Relations diftinCi from either of thefe,
*' yet, how we fhould come by Ideas of them, I
" cannot conceive- We may indeed have Ideas to
" the Words, and not altogether depart from the
*' common 'Senfie of them, when we fay the Self-
" exiftent Subftance is the •Subfiratum of Space, Or
" the .Ground of its Exiftence : 'But I fee no Rea-
" fon to think it True, becaufe Space feems to me
*-' to be as abfiolutely Self exiftent, as 'tis poffible any
" Thing can be ; So that, make what other Sup-
" pofition you pleafe, yet we cannot help fup-
" pofing Immenfie Space ; becaufe there muft be
-" either an Infinity of Being, or (if you'll allow the
" Expreffion) an Infinite Vacuity of Being. Perhaps
" it may be objected to this, that, tho' Space is
*' really Neceffajy, yet the Pee fon of its being Ne-
" ceffary is its being a Property of the Self exiftent
" Subftance ; and that, It being fo evidently Ne-
" ceffary, and its Dependence on the Self-exiftent Sub-
" ft ance not fo evident, we a:e I'eady to conclude.
" it abfiolutely Sclfi-e^ijient, as well as neeffary ; and
" that this is the Reafon why the Idea of Space
" foices itfelf on our Miuds, antecedent- to, and
" exclufive

The Pourth Letter. #•$
c* exclufive of (as to the Ground of its Exiftence)
" all other Things. Now this, though it is really
-*c an bbjtClio'n, yet is no direct Anfwer to what I
" have faid ; becaufe it fiuppofies the only Thing to
" he proved, viz. that the Reafon why Space is ne-
" celtary is its being- a Property of a Self-exiftent
" Subftance. And fuppofing it not to be evident,
" that Space is abfolutely Self -exiftent; yet, while
" ft is doubtful, we cannot argue " as though the
" contrary were certain, and we were fure that
" Space was only a Property of the Self-exiftent
" Subftance. But now, if Space be not abfiolutely
" Independent, I don't fee what we tan conclude
" is fo : For 'tis manifeftly Neceffary Itfielfi, as well
" as antecedently needfiul to the Exiftence of- all
" other Things, not excepting (as I think) even '
" the Self-exiftent Subftance.
" All your Confequence?* I fee, follow demOn-
" ftrably from your Suppofition; and, wereTbat
" evident j I believe it would ferveto prove feveral
" other Things as weil as what you bring it for.
" Upon which Account, I foould be extremely
" pleafed to fee it proved by any one. For, as I
*: defign the Search after Truth as the Bufinefs of
" my Life, I fliall not be afhamed to learft from
" any Perfon ; though; at the fame Time, I can't ¦
" but be fenfible, that Inftrnclion from fome
" Men is like the Gift of a Prince, it reflects an
*' Honour on the Perfon on vvhom it lays an
" Obligation." / am; Reverend Sir;
Tour obliged Servant.1

Dec. 16, 1713.

THE

ft*

- -..'"¦" THE
A N S W E R
, TO THE
Fourth LETTER.
SIR}
MY being out of Town moft Part of th«!
Month of January,, and fome other acci
dental Avocations, hindered me from anfwering
your Letter fooner. The Sum of the Difficulties
it contains is (I think) this : That 'tis difficult to
determine what Relation the Self-exiftent Subftance has
to Space : That to fay It is. the Subftratum ofi Spa ce^
in the common Senfie of the Word,, is ficarce intelligible j
Or, at leafi, is not evident : That Space Jeems to be a$
Abfiolutely Selfi-exifient, as 'tis poffible any Thing can
be : And. that; its being a Property of the Self-exiftent
Subftance is Svppcfmg the Thing that was to be Proved.
This is entering indeed into the very Bottom of
the Matter, and I will endeavour to give you as
brief and clear an Anfwer as lean.
That the Self-Exiftent Subftance is the Subftra
tum of Space, or Space a Property of the Self-
Exiftent Subftance, are not perhaps very proper1
Expreffions, nor is it eafy to find fuch. But what
I mean is This : The Idea of Space (as aHb of
Time or Duration) is an AbftraCl or Partial Idea ;
An Idea of a certain Quality or Relation:, whicli Wfii

The. Answer to the Fourth LetteS. 2$
we evidently fee to be Neceffarily-exifting ; and yet
which, (not being itfelf a Subftance) at the fame
Time, neeeffarily prefuppofies a Subftance, without
which it could not exift; Which Subftance, conic-'
quently, muft be itfelf (mUch more, if poffible)
Neceffarily-exifting. I know not how to explain
this fo well as by the following Siniilitude : A
Blind Man, when be tries to frame to himfelf the
Idea of Body, his Idea is nothing but That of
Hardnefis. A Man that had Eyes, but no Power
of Motion, or Senfe of Feeling at all, when, he tried
to frame to himfelf the Idea of Body, his Idea would
be nothing but1 that of Colour. Now, as in thefe
Cafes, Hardnefis ii not Body, and Colour is not Body;
but yet, to the Underftanding of thefe Perfons,
thofe Properties neeeffarily infisr the Being of a
Subftance, of which Subftance itfielfi the Perfons have
no Idea : So Space to Us is not itfelf Subftance, but.
it neeeffarily infers the Being of a Subftance, which
' affects none of our -prefient Senfes-, And, bcinu it
fielfi Neceffary, it follows, thar the Subftance, which
' it infers, is (much more) Neceffary.
lam, Sir, Tour -affectionate Friend
Jan. 29. and Servant.

THE

£6

THE

Fifth LETTER.

Reverend Sir,
YOU have very corriprehenfively expreffed,-;
in fix or feven Lines, all the Difficulties of
my Letter; which I fhould have endeavoured
to have made foorter; had I not been afraid an
improper Expreffion might poffibly, occafion a
Miftake of my Meaning; lam very glad, the
Debate is come into fo narrow a Compafs ; For
I think now it intirely turns upon this, whether
our Ideas of Space arid Duration are partial, fo
as to prefiuppofie the Exiftence of fome other
Thing. Your Similitude of the Blind Man is
very apt, to explain your Meaning (which, I
think, 1 fully underftand ) but does not feem to
come intirely up to the Matter. For what is the
Reafon that the Blind Man concludes there muft
be Somewhat external; to give him that Idea of
Hardnefis ? 'Tis becaufe he fuppofes it impoffible
for him to be thus affected, unlefs there were
fome Caufe of it; which Caufe, fhould it be re
moved, the Effect would immediately ceafe'tooj
and he would no more have the Idea of Hardn'efisi,
but by Remembrance. Now to apply this to
the Inftance or Space and Duration : Since a Man;
from his having thefe Ideas, very juftly concludes
that there muft be fiomewhat External, which is
the Caufe of them -, confequently; foould This
Caufe (whatever it is) be taken away, his Ideas
" would

The Fifth LEtfUi '"
4i would be fo too : Therefore, if what is fiuppofied
" to be the Caufe be removed, and yet the -Idea re-
'' iriainSj That Suppofied Caufie cannot be the Real
" one. Now; granting the Self-Exiftent Subftance
" to be the Subftratum of thefe, Ideas, could we
*' make the Suppofition of its ceafing to be, yet Space
'.' and Duration would ftill remain unaltered: Which,
»:' feems to fhew, that the Self-Exiftent Subftance,
" is not "the Subftratum of Space and Duration.
« Nor would it be an Anfwer to the Difficulty
" to fay that every Property of the Self-Exifient
" Subftance is as neceffary as the Subftance itfielfi $.
"• fince That will only hold; While the Subftances
" itfielfi exifts : For there's implied, in the Idea of a^
" Property, an Impoffibility of' Subfifting without
«' its Subftratum. I grant the Suppofition is abfiurd't
>l But how otherwife can we know whether any.
" Thing be a Property of fuch a Subftance, but by
«' examining..- whether it would ceafie to be, if its
" fuppofed Subftance fhould do fo ? Notwithftand-
¦ " ing what I have now faid, I cannot fay that I
" believe your Argument not conclufive •; for I muft
«' PWn my Ignorance* that I am really at a Lofs
" about the Nature of Space and Duration. But,
" did it plainly appear that they were Properties of
" a Subftance, we fhould have an eafy Way with
" the Atheifts : For it would at once prove de-«
" monftrably an EternaU Neceffary, Self- exiftent
" Being ; that there is but Orte fuch ; and that he'
" is needful in order to the Exiftence of all other
" Things. Which .makes me think, that, tho' ic
" may be true, yet 'tis not ' obvious to every Capa-
" city : Otherwife it would have been generally
" ufed, as a fundamental Argument to prove the
" Being of God. #;
" I muft add one Thing more, that your Ar- .
u gument for the Omniprefience of God feemed
M always to me very probable. But, being very
H li " defkous

zB The Fifth Letter.
" defirous to have it appear demonftrably conclufive^
" I was fometimes forced to fay what was not alto-
" gether my Opinion : Not that I did this for the
" Sake of Difiputing, (for befides the particular Dif-
" agreeablenefs of this to my own Temper, I
" foould furely'have chofen another Perfon to
" have trifled with ;) but I did it to fet off the
" Objection to Advantage, that it might be more
" fully anfweied. I heartily wifo you as fair
" Treatment from your Opponents in Print, as I
" have had from you : Tho*, I muft own, I can-
" hot fee, in thofe that I have read, That unpre-
" judiced Search after Truth, which I would have
" hoped for."I am, Reverend Sir,
Tour moft humble Servant.
Feb. 3, 1713.

THE

n

THE

ANSWER T O t H E
Fifth LETTER,
s i R,
IN a Multitude of -Bufinefs, I miflaid your laft
Letter, and could not anfwer it till it came
again to my Hands by Chance. We feem to have
pufhed the Matter in Queftion between us as far
as it will go ; and, upon the Whole, I cannot but
take Notice I have very feldom met with Perfons
fo reafonable and unprejudiced as yourfelf in fuch
Debates as thefe.
I think all I need fay, in Anfwer to the Reafioning
in your Letter, is, that your granting the Abfiur
dity of the Suppofition you were endeavouring to
make, is, confequently, granting the neceffary Truth
of my Argument. If * Spate and
Duration neeeffarily remain, even
after they are fiuppojed to be taken
away, and be riot (as 'tis plain
the/ are not) Themfelves Sub
ftances ; then the f Subftance, on
whofe Exiftence they depend, will
neeeffarily remain likewife; even af
ter it is fiuppofied to be taken away':
Which fhews That Suppofition to
be impoffible and contradictory.

* Ut Partiom Temporit Or*
do eft Inihiutabilis, fic etiani
Ordo Partium Spatii. Mo-
veantur has de locis fuis, &
movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de
fetpftt. NEWTON. Princip.
MathemUt. Scbol. ad Drjinit. 8.
f Deus non eft JEternitas
Vel Infn'.tas, fed Mernus & in
finite ; non eft Duratlo vel
Spathmi, fed Durat & AJefi.-x
Durat femper, & Jd.Jl uni
que; & exijhndo , femper &
ubicjue, Durntionim k Spati*

3«
um, iEternitatem & Infinita-
tem, conjlituit. Cum unaqusq;
Spatii Particula fit Semper ;
& unumquodij; Durations in-
divifibile Momentum Ubique;
certe rerum omnium Fabri
cator ac Dominus- non erit
Jfunquam Nufquam. Omni-
p.rsefens eft, non per Vtriultm
folam, fed etiam per Subftkn

The Answer to the Fifth Letter-
As to your Obfervation at the
End of your Letter, that the Ar- -
gument I have infifted on, if it
were obvious to every Capacity,
foould have more frequently been
ufed as a Fundamental Argument
for a Proof pf the Being of God :
The True Caufie why it has been
tiara: nam Virtus line Subftan- ftldom Urged, is, I think,. This,
to fobfiftere non poteft. In .£§&.$& utoiverfal Prevalence of
ipfo continentur & tnomentur ^- ^ ,,., . , /.
XJm-verJa, &c. N E ff'T O N. $gfe#* S ^ford NotKHlS (teaching
Princip. Matbemat. &^J^WW^|^S/'ffr *s neicffarily' Infinite
meral. fub lincm. ' ^':^' ^if^^^effafjly "Eternal, and afcrib-
II Puto ^W C«/r,£- 1'ng^f;^^^4t4mere ^f^,v-
tionem, ut Mundus [meaning ¦ e> ¦, ->-;£jSffir&i&i»'.' 1 r ¦ "r j- t
Laws of $m$P|^c1,u&y^ pf /»«<
Caufes," and^l^g^^/f/S-
gmv? and- 0vi^'fW'm&de»ce from
the Government of tlie. ^b'f Id)- %ath incredibly
blinded the Eyes of Corn%ii£n ReafieHffarsd prevented
Men from difcerning Him in whom 'they live, and
move, and have their Being. The like has happened
in fome Other Inftances. How- univerfally have
Men for many Ages believed, that Eternity is no
Duration at all, and Infinity no Amplitude? Some
thing of the like Kind has happened in the Matter
of T'ranfiubftantiation, and (I think) in the Scholaftic
Notion of the Trinity, &c.

(he Material World] fit Finilus.-
Cartef. Epift. rJ9- Pmrtis print*.

lam, Sir, Tour affectionate Friend and Servant.

April 8,
1 713.

THE

3«

T* H E

ANSWER T.O A
Sixth LETTER;
Being Part of a
Letter writ to Another Gentleman,
who had propofed feveral of the
fame Objections with the for-egoing.

SIR

YO U will give me Leave, without any Pre
face or Apology, to propofe directly the beft
Anfiwer I can to the Objections your have offered.
There are but Two Ways„ by which the Being,
and All or Any of the Attributes of God, can. pof
fibly be proved : The one a priori, the other a
pofteriori. The Proof a pofteriori T is level to All Mens t Rsm -
Capacities : Becaufe there is an endlefs Gradation of 20. The
wife and ufiefiul Phenomena of Nature, from the invifMc
pioit obvious to the moft abftrufie ; which afford (at jftfiffu.
Hh 3 leaft ffs Llfi:.

32 The Answer to the Sixth Letter.
en of the leaft a moral and reafionable) Proof of the Befog of
dear? "" ^°^i to tnt feveral Capacities of All unprejudiced
feen, being Men, who have any Probity of Mind. And this
underftaed is what (I fuppofe) God expe&s (as a Moral
by the Governor) that Moral Agents foould be determin.
lr7wdfedbY-
e^en bis' The Proof a priori is (I fully believe) ftrictly
Eternal demonftrative- ; > but (like numberlefs Mathepatical
^finf[ral"i Demonftrdtions) capable of befog underftood by
only a few attentive Minds ; becaufe it is of Ufie,
only againft Learned and Metaphyfical Difficulties,
And therefore it muft never be expected, that;
this foould be made obvious to the Generality of
Men, any more than Aftronomy or Mathematicks
can be,
This being premifed in general, I proceed to
Particulars. Concerning the Notion of Self- Exiftence, I ex
plain myfelf thus i Of every Thing thatZr, there
is a Reafon which now does, or Once pr Always
did, determine the Exiftence rather than the Non-
exifience of that Thing. Qf That which derives
not its Being from Any Other Thing, this Reafon
or Ground qf Exiftence (whether- we can attain
to any Idea of it, or no)- muft be In the Thing
itfelf, For though the bare Proof by Ratiocination,
that there cannot but exift fiuch a Being, does not
indeed give us any diftinct Notion of Self- Exiftence,
but Only fhews the Certainty of the Thing : yet
when once a 1'hing is known, by reafoning d po
fteriori, to be Certain ; it unavoidably follows that
there Is in Nature a Reafon a priori (whether we
can difcover it or po) of the Exiftence of That
which we know cannot but exift. Since therefore,
jn that which derives not its. Being from any Other
Thmg, the Ground or Reafon why it exifts, rather
than not exifts, muft be in the Thing itfelf; and
}f js a plain Contradiction to fuppofe its own Will, by

. The Answer to the Sixth Letter. 33
by Way of efficient Caufe, to be the Reafon of its
Exiftence ; it remains that abfiolute Neceffity (the
fame Neceffity that is the Caufe of the unalterable
Proportion between 2 and 4J be, by Way of Formal
Caufe, the Ground of That Exiftence. And this
Neceffity is indeed antecedent, though not in Time,
yet in the Order of Nature, to the Exiftence of the
Being itfelf: Whereas, on the contrary, its own
fVill is, in the Order of Nature, fubfieauent to the
Suppofition of the Exiftence of the Being, and
therefore cannot be the formal Caufe of that Ex
iftence. Nothing can be more abfurd, than to fuppofe
that any Thing (or any Circumftance of any Thing)
is, and yet that there be abfolutely no Reafon Why
it Is, rather than not. 'Tis eafy to conceive, that
We may indeed be utterly ignorant of the Reaficns,
or Grounds, or Caufes of many Things. But thar
any Thing is ; and that there is a real Reafion in
Nature why it is, rather than is not ; thefe two are
as neeeffarily and effentially connected, as any two
Correlates whatever, as Height and Depth, &c.
The Scholaftic Way or proving the Exiftence
of the Self-exiftent Being, from the abfiohde Per
fection ofi his- Nature ', is u^pov tt^t^ov. For All or
Any Perfections prefiuppofie Exiftence -, Which is
Petitio Principii. But bare Neceffity ofi Exiftence does
not prefiuppofie, but infer Exiftence. That which
.exifts by abfolute Neceffity of Nature, will always
{whether you will or noj be fiuppofied or included
in any poffible Idea of Things, even where you
never fo exprefely endeavour to exclude it c Juft as
-the Proportion between 2 and 4 remains included^
in the very Term*, wherein any Man would en
deavour exprefsly to deny it,
To exift at all, and to exift every-where, are
one and the very fame Thing, where the Caufie or
H h 4 Ground

|Z 'The Answer to the Sixth Letter.
Ground of the Exiftence is not either confined to,
or operates only in, fome particular Place. For % .
and 4 to have <z* all a certain Proportion to each
other, and to have That fame Proportion every
where, is the very fame Thing. And the-^fee is
true, of every Thing that is neceffary in itfielfftf To
fuppofe (as you fuggeft) that the Self-exiftent may
be limit ted by its own Nature, is prefiuppofimg a Na-.
ture or limiting .Quality >: Whereas, in this Cafe;
fiere muftmothing be prefuppofed ; no Nature, no
Quality whatfoever, but what arifies (and confe
quently.;! every-where alike)' from a Neceffity abfiolute
in itfielfi, and antecedent (in the Order ot our Ideas)
to any Nature, Place, Quality, Time, or Thing what-
, foever, . When I fay, that Neceffity, abfiolutely fiuch in it
felf, has no Relation to Time or Place : My Meaning
i&, that it has no Relation to, or Dependence upon,
any particular Time or Place, or any Thing in any
particular Time or Place ; but that it is the Same
in All Tjme, and jn All Place. What you mean
by Time $nd Place being finite, I underftand not.
The Schoolmens Notion of Time's depending on
the Motions or Exiftence of the Material World
js as Senfielefis, as the fuppofing it to depend on the
Turning or not Turning of an-Hour-glafis, The fame
alfo is true of Place.
Infinite Space is infinite Extenfion ; and Eternity
\s infinite Duration. They are the Two firft and
pioft obvious and fimpfe Ideas, that every Man has
in his Mind. Time and Place are the fine qua, non
pf all other Things, and of all other Ideas. To
fuppofe Either of them' Finite is an exprefs Con-> '
tradidion in the Idea itfelf. No Man dofs or tan
poffibly imagine Either of them to be finite ; but
only, either by Non-attention, or by Choice, he at
tends perhaps to Part of his Idea, and forbears at
tending (o the Remainder, All the Difficulty tha* has.

The Answer to the Sixth Letter. 35
has ever arifen about this Matter, is nothing but
Duft thrown by Mens ufing -Words ( or rather
Sounds only) in their Philofophy, inftead of 'Ideas •<
And the Arguments drawn from the Jargon of the
Schoolmen will equally prove every Axiom in Eu
clid to be uncertain and unintelligible.
• They who remove the Idea of Infinity (or of a
Being whofe Attribute Infinity is) by fuppofing
Space to be nothing but a Relation between two Bo- .
dies, are guilty of the Abfiurdity of fuppofing That,
which is Nothing, to have real Qualities. For the
Space which is between two Bodies is always un
alterably juft what it was ; and has the very fame
"Dimenjions, Quantity, and Figure ; whether Thefie,
or any other Bodies, be there, or any-where elfie, or
pot at all : Juft as Time or Dura
tion is the * fame, whether you * Eadem eft Durath feu
turn yoUr Hour-Glafis or no, Or Perfeveranda Exiftentise Re-
whether the Sun moves, or ftands ™m> fi!.e fotUi „filU If1""'
„.,, , , , five tardt, five nulli. NEW'-
ftilk or whether there was or q on. Princip. Mathem.Scbd.
was not any Sun, or any Material ad Definit. 8.
World at all.
The Schoolmens Diftinctions about Spirits ex
ifting in Ubi, and not in Loco, are mere empty
Sounds, without >any Manner of Signification.
To fet Bounds to Space is to fuppofe it bounded
by fomething which itfelf takes up Space ; and
That's a Contradiction : Or elfe that 'tis bounded by
Nothing ; and then the Idea of That Nothing will
ftill be Space ; which is another Contradiction. Be
ings which exift in Time and in Space (as every
finite Thing muft needs do) prefiuppofie Time and
Space : But That Being,, whofe Exiftence makes
Duration and Space, muft be infinite and eternal,
becaufe Duration and Space can have no Bounds.
Not that Duration and Space are the Formal Caufe
Of That Exiftence ; but that necefiaty Attributes do

The Answer to the Sixth Letter.*
do neeeffarily and infeparably infer, or fihew to us, a
Neceffary Subftance ; of which Subftance itfielfi we
have no Image, becaufe "tis the ObjeCt of none of
cur Senfes: But we perceive its Exiftence by its
Effects, and the Neceffity of that Exiftence by the
Neceffity of certain Attributes, and by other Argur
nems of Reafon and Inference. To fuppofe Space
removed, deftroyed, or taken away, amounts to the
abfard Suppofition of removing a Thing away firom
itfielfi; that is, If in your Imagination you annihi
late the Whole cfi Infinite Space, the Whole Infinite
Space will ftill remain ; and, if you annihilate any
Part of it, That Part will fti'l neeeffarily remain,
as appears by the unmoved Situation ol the Reft.
And to fuppofe it divided or divifible amounts to
the fame Contradiction.
The- Objection, of Immenfity being inconfiftent
with Spirituality and Simplicity, arifes merely from
the jargon of the Schoolmen, who fin oider to
help out Tranfiubftantiatkn) have ufed themfelves to
• foeak of This, and of many o.her Things, in
Phrnfies which, had no Meaning or Ideas belonging
to them. By denying the real Immenfity and the
real Eternal Laration of God, they, in true Ccnfie-
quence, (though 'tis reafonable to iuppofe they Jaw
mt Th.it Confequence) denied hi.s Being. The ha-
menfity of Space (it being throughout abfiolutely uni
form ajid effentially indivifible) is no moie incon
fiftent with Simplicity, than the uniform fucceffive
Flowing of the Parts of Duration (as you moft
rightly obferve) are inconfiftent with Simplicity.
There is no Difficulty at all in this Point, but a
mere Prejudice, and Falfe Notion of Simplicity.
As to Spirituality : '1 he individual Confcioufnefs
of the One Immenfe Bring is at truly One, as
the prefent. Moment of Time is individually One,
in all Places at once. And the One can no moiei
properly

The Answer to the Sixth Letter. 37
properly be faid to be an Ell or a Mile of Con'
¦fcioufnefis (which is the Sum of your Objection)
than the other can be faid to be an Ell or Mile of
Time. This Suggeftion feems to defer ve particular
Confideration. To the Objection, that the fuppofing God to
be really and fiubftantially Omniprelent is luppofing
him to be- the Soul of the World, I anfwer, This
is a great Miftake : For the Word Soul fignifies a
Part of a Whole, whereof Body is the Other Part ;
And they, being united, mutually affefi each other,
as Parts of the fame Whole. But God is prefent
to every Part of the Univerfe, not as a Soul, but
as a Governor ; fo as to aCl upon every Thing in
what Manner he pleafes, himfelf being aCted upon
by Nothing.
What you foggeft about Space having no Parts,
becaufe 'tis Infinite, is a mere Quibble indeed, and
has nothing in it. The Meaning of Parts (in
Queftions of this Nature) is feparable, compound
ed, un-united Parts, fuch as are the Parts of Matter :
Which, for that Reafon, is always a compound, not
a fimple Subftance. No Matter is One Subftance,
but a Heap of Subftances. And That I take to be
the Reafon, why Matter is a Subject incapable of
Thought. Not becaufe 'tis . extended, but becaufe
its Parts are diftinCt Subftances, ununited, and in
dependent on each other : Which (I believe.) is not
the Cafe of Other Subftances. The Kinds of Sub
ftance may perhaps be Mere, and more different
from each other, than we (at prefient) for Want
of more Senfies, are aware of. Matter and Spirit is
no other Divifion than Matter and not -Matter : Juft
as if one fhould divide the Species of Animals into
Horfies and not- Horfies.
As to the Queftion, why Abfiolute Neceffity will
not admit of the Exiftence of Two diftinS Inde-
1 .pendent Beings, as well as of different Attiibutes and
'f - • " Properties

3 8 The Answer to the Sixth Letter .
Properties in One Independent Being; I anfwer*
Abfolute Neceffity, in which there is no where any
Variation, cannot be the Ground of Exiftence of a
Number of Finite Beings, however agreeing and
harmonious, becaufe That' (viz. Number, or Fi
nitenefs) is itfelf a* manifeft Difformity or Inequality ;
But it may be the Ground or Exiftence of One
Uniform infinite Being. The different Attributes of
*wbi£h One Uniform Being are not a-' Variety of
Parts, or an un Unifiormnefis (if I may fo fpeak) of,
the Neceffity by which it exifts ; but they are All
and each of them Attributes of the Whole, Attri- , „
butes of the One fimple infinite Being : Juft as the
Powers of Hearing and Seeing are not Inequalities
or Difformities in the Soul of Man, but each of
tbem Powers of the Whole Soul.
As to the Laft Argument you refer to,' my
Meaning therein' is this, that 'tis, a Contradiction
to fuppofe Two (or More) neceffarily-exiftent Beings ;
becaufe Each of them, by the Suppofition, being
independent, iand fiufficieni to itfelf, tho' the Other
were fuppofed not to exift, they thereby, Each of
them, mutually deftroy the fiuppofied Neceffity of the
Others Exiftence, and confequently Neither of theth
indeed will be neceffary or independent. For Inftance,
If Matter, or Spirit, or any Other Subftance, could
as poffibly be conceived to exift without That in which
they all exift, as That in which they all exift can be
conceived to exift without Them, then there would
be neceffary- Exiftence on Neither Part.
As to the Queftion concerning the poffible Plu
rality of Infinites: 'Tis certainly true that the In
finity of Space neither excludes finite Bodies nor
finite Spirits, nor infinite Body, nor infinite Spirit :
But it excludes every Thing of the fiame Kind, whe
ther finite or infinite; which is all that my Argu
ment requires. There can be but One Infinite Space,
and but One Infinite Time, and but One Infinite Spirit,

The Answer to the Sixth Letter. 39
Spirit, (taking Spirit to' mean a particular pofitive
diftinct Subftance, and not the mere negative non-
Matter, of which there may be innumerable Kinds ;)
And, if Matter could be infinite, there could like-
wife be but One infinite Body, and fo on : For One
Infinite in all Dimenfions exhaufts always the whole
Poffibility of That Kind, though it excludes not
Others. The Ubi of Spirits being their Perception only,
and the Omniprejence of God being his infinite Know
ledge only, are mere Words, without any Senfe ac
all. And, by the like Confufion, any Thing may
be faid to be any Things, and we have in us no
Principles of Knowledge at all, nor any Ufe either
of Words^tf Ideas.
lam, Sir, Tow affured Friend and Servant, &C1

THE

40

THE

ANSWER

T O A

Seventh LETTER,
Concerning the Argument a priori*

To the Reverend Dr.

* * *

<*- — "W* OUR Objection againft arguing at all
X. a priori, concerning the Exiftence and
Perfections of the Firft Cauje, is what many
Learned Men have indeed ftuck at : And, it being
evident that Nothing can be prior to the Firft
Caufie, they have therefore thought it fufficient to
fay, that the Firft Cauje exifts " abjolutely without
Caufie ;" and that therefore there can be no fuch
Thing as Reafoning or Arguing about it a priori
at all. But, if you attend carefully, you will
find This Way of Speaking to be by no Means
fatisfactory. For though 'tis indeed moft evident,
that no Thing, no Being, can be prior to That Being,
which is the Firft*Caufie and Original of all Things ;
yet there muft be in Nature a Ground or Reafion,
a permanent Ground or Reafion, of the Exiftence of
the Firft Caufie ; otherwife its Exiftence would be
owing to, and depend upon, mere Chance. And
all that could be faid upon This Head would
amount

The Answer to a Seventh Letter. 41
amount to This only, That it exifts, becaufie it ex
ifts ; that it therefiore does and always did exift, Ic-
ctiufie it does and always did exift. Which the
Followers of Spinoza wi;k with equal Strength of
Reafon, affirm concerning every Subftance that exifts
at all.
If the Idea of an Eternal and * * Nothing is That of whkb
Infinite Nothing Were a poffible Idea,/ ewrj Thing can truly be denied,
and not contradictory in itfelf, the fd n.° fhf'S ,ca" irTlly 'fie af~
zr ¦/? C ,u ir- an r U fi™"1- bo that the /«/,*, of
Exiftence of the Fir/? Gw/* would Nothing (if I may fo fpeak)
not be neceffary: {? or Neceffity of is abfolutely tbe Negation of M
being, and Poffibility of not being, Idcfs- The Idea, therefore,
j-cT n \ a J °c either of a Unite or Infinite
are contradictory Ideas.) And, if 1Noth]ng> is a Contradl^
the Exiftence of the /'/ry/ Gtf«/<? in Terms.
was not neceffary, it would be no
Contradiction to fuppofe it either 7*0/ /<? &zw exifted
in Time paft., cr to c?^ /o wy? at any Time to
come. The Exiftence, therefore, of the Firft Caufie,
is Neceffary : Neceffary abfolutely, and in itfielfi. And,
therefore, That Neceffity is, a priori, and in the
Order of Nature, the Ground or Reafion of its Ex
iftence. For that, which exifts Neeeffarily, or in
the Idea of which Exiftence and Neceffity are infe
parably and neeeffarily Connected, muft either /&«•?-
/i/Ttf be neceffary, becaufe it exifts ; or elfe, it muft
therefiore exift, becaufe its Exiftence is Neceffary. If
it was therefiore neceffary, becaufie it exifted, then,
for the feme Reafon, every Thing that exifts would
exift neeeffarily, and either every Thing, or Nothing,
would be the Firft Caufie. On the contrary, if the
Firft ,Co.ufie does therefiore exift, becaufie its Exiftence
is- Neceffary, then Neceffity is the Ground or Reafon
or Foundation of that Exiftence :• And the £#(/?-
<r#c<? docs not z';,;/b' (that is, a />ran, or in the
Order of Nature and Confequence, antecede) the
Neceffity of Exijting -, but 'the Neceffity of exifting
docs, on the contrary, /,'.'/> (that is, a priori, or
in the Order of Nature, antecede; the Suppofition of

4.2 The Answer to a Seventh LetteX
of the Exiftence. Which is what I propofed td
prdve. The Argument a pofteriori is indeed by far the
, , tnoft generally ufeful Argument, moft: eafy to be
underftood, and, in fome Degree, fuited to all Ca
pacities ; and therefore it ought always to be di
ftinctly infifted upon. But forafmuch as Atheiftical
Writers have fometimes oppofed the Being and At
tributes of God by fuch metaphyfical Reafonings
as can no otherwife be" obviated than by arguing.
a priori, therefore This Manner of Arguing, alfo,
is ufiefiul, and neceffary in its proper Place.
'1 he Eternity of God can no otherwife be proved,
than by confidering a priori the Nature of a Ne* ,
ceffary or Self-Exiftent Caufe The Temporary Phse^
nomena of Nature prove indeed demonftrably a
pofteriori, that there is, and has been from the Be
ginning ofi thofie Phenomena, a Being of Power and
Wifdom fufficient to produce and preferve thofe
Phenomena. , But that This Firft Caufie has exifted
firom Eternity, and fhall exift to Eternity, cannot be
proved from thofe Temporary Phenomena, but muft
be demonftrated from the intrinfic Nature of Ne*.
ceffary Exiftence. If the Firft Caufe exifts " abfio-
" lutely without any Ground or Reafon of Exiftence,"
it might as poffibly, in Times paft, without any Rea
fon, have not exifted, and may as poffibly, in Times
to come, without any Reafon, ceafe to exift. Can
it be proved a pofteriori, that the Firft Caufe of all ,
Things will exift Tomorrow ? Or can it be proved
any otherwife, than by foewing that Neceffity is a
certain Ground of Future as well as of Prefent Ex
iftence ? And, if fo, then the Ground or Reafion,
upon which the Firft Caufe new does, and hereafter
always will, and cannot but exift, is the very fame
Ground or Reajon upon which he always did exift :
And confequently it cannot with Tiuth be affirmed,
that the. Firft Caufe exifts '' abfolutely without Any
Ground

The Answer to a Seventh Letter. 43
*< Ground or Reafion ofi Exiftence." When Atheifti-
cal Writers affirm, that the material lfniverfie, aad
every exifting Subftance in particular, was Eternal
" abfiolutely without any Ground or Reafion of Exiftence -ft
can This Affertion be confuted by Him, who foall
himfielf affirm, that God was Eternal abfiolutely with
out Any Ground or Reafion ofi Exiftence ? Or can it be
any other Way confuted at all, than by foewing, that
Something muft be neceffarily-exiftent, (elfe nothing
would ever have exifted,) and" that That which is
. neceffarily-exiftent, cannot poffibly be either Finite or
Moveable, or at any Time capable of Any Alterations,
Limitations, Variations, Inequalities, or Diverfifications
whatfoever, either in. Whole, or in Part, or in dif
ferent Parts either of Space or Time ?
In like Manner, the Infinity, or Immenfity, or Om-
. niprefience of God can no otherwife be proved, than
by confidering a priori the Nature of a Neceffary or
Selfi-Exiftent Caufe.' The Finite Phenomena of Na
ture prove, indeed, demonftrably a pofteriori, that
there is a Being which has Extent of Power and
Wifidom fufficient to produce and preferve all thefe
Phsenomena. But that This Author of Nature is
Himfelf abfolutely Immenfie or Infinite cannot be
proved from thefe Finite Phenomena, but muft' be
demonftrated from the intrinfick Nature of Necef
fary Exiftence. If the Firft Caufe exift " abfiolutely
" without any Ground cr Reafion of Exiftence," it
may as poffibly be Finite as Infinite ; it may as pof
fibly be Limited, a*s be Immenfie. It may as poffibly
in Other Places, without any Reafion, not exift, as it
does, without any Reafion, exift in Thefie Places where
the Phenomena ofi Nature prove that it does exift.'
Can it be proved a pofteriori, that That Governing
Wifidom and Power, which the Phanomena^ cfi Na
ture in this material World demonftrate to be pre
fent Here, muft therefore be Immenfie, Infinite, or
Omniprefient .? muft be prefient likewife in thofe
I i boundlefs

The Answer to a Seventh Letter.
boundlefs Spaces where we know of no Phenomena
or liffecls to prove' its Exiftence ? Or can the Immen
fity and Omniprefience of the Firft Caufe be at all
proved any other Way than by foewing, that Ne
ceffity of Exiftence is capable of no Limitation, but
muft,' for the fame Reafon, be the Ground of Im
menfie or Onmipi efient Exiftence, as 'tis the Ground or
Foundation of any Exiftence at all ?
Again : The Unity ofi God, (which, I think, has
always been allowed to be a Principle of Natural
Religion; Otherwife St. Paul could not juftly have
blamed the Heathen as inexcufiable, in that they did
not like , to retain God in their Knowledge, and that,
when they kqew God, they glorified him not as God :
The Unity cfi God (I fay) can no otherwife be der
raonftrated, than by confidering a priori the Nature
of a Neceffary or Self-exiftent Caufe. The Pheno
mena of Nature, which come within the Reach of
Our Obfervation, prove, indeed, demonftrably, that
there is a Supreme Author and Director of- That Na
ture, or of Thofie Phenomena, whereof we have any
Knowledge. But that This Supreme Author- and
Governor of .THIS NATURE, or ofi. THESE
Phenomena, is likewife the Supreme Author and-Go-
verncr of UNIVERSAL Nature, cannot be
proved by Us from our partial and imperfieCl Know
ledge of a Few Phenomena in that fmall Part of the
Univerfe which comes within the Reach of Our
Senfes, but muft be demonftrated from the intrin
fick Nature of r.eccffary Exiftence. (If the Firft Caufie
exifts " abfiolutely 'without any Ground or Reafion cfi Ex-
" iftence" 'tis altogether as poffible, and as probable,
and as reafiunable to fuppofe, that there may, without
any Re.ifon, exift numberlefs Finite independent co-
exftent Firjl deifies [either1 of like Nature and Subftance
' to each other, or of different Nature and Subftance
from each other) in different Parts of the immenfe
Univerfe, as that there fhould, without any Reafon, exift:

The Answer to a Seventh Letter., 45
exift One only, Infinite, Immenfie, Omniprefient, Firft
Caufie, Author and Governor of the Whole.
' That there 'is, and cannot but be, One, and One
only, fuch Firft Caufie, Author and Governor of the
Univerfe-, is (I conceive) capable of ttrict Demon-
firation, including That Part of the Argument
which is deduced a priori. The Subject of the Que
ftion is no Trifle. If any fober-minded Man is per
fuaded he can find any Flaw in That Demonftra
tion, or cares not to examine it, left any of its
Confequences fhould prove inconfiftent with fome
other Notions he may perhaps through Prejudice
have imbibed, I foould be very Thankful to him
to fhew How the Unity of God (the Firft Principle of
Natural Religion) can at all be proved by Reafon a
pofteriori only. •
Some fuch Confiderations as thefe (I fuppofe)
they were, or others of the like Nature, Which mo
ved Mr. Limborch to write thus to Mr. Locke : * Ar- * Loch's-
gumentum defiderat Vir magnificus, quo prcbetur Ens, Familiar
cujus exiftentia eft neceffaria, tantum poffe effe Unum ; etterE'
fcf quidem ut id ar gumentum a neceffitate exift entie de-
fiumatur, £2? a priori (ut in Scholis hquuntur) non a
pofteriori concludat ; hoc eft, ex natura neceffaria ex
iftentia probetur, earn pluribus non poffe effe communem.
To which. Mr. Locke replies : j Les Theologiens, les t H'^
Philofiophes, & Defcartes luy-meme fuppoferit rUn'ileP-*22'
de Dieu fians la Prouver. After which, having fug- 4'3"
gefted -his Own Thoughts, he thus concludes : Cefil
la, fielon moy, une Preuve a priori, que I' Eire eternel
independent n'eft qu'Un.
To argue therefore a priori concerning the Ex
iftence and Attributes of the Firft Caufie is no A bfur-
dity. For, though No Thing, no Being, can indeed
be prior to the Firft Caufie, yet Arguments may,
and muft, be drawn from the Nature and Con
fequences of That Neceffity by which the Firft Caufie -
exifts. Mathematical Neceffary Truths are ufuaily .
I i 2 demonftrated

4^ The Answer to a Seventh Letter."
demonftrated a priori, and yet nothing is prior 10
Truths eternally neceffary. To confine therefore the
Ufie ofi the Term to Argumentations about fuchThihgs
only, as have Other Things prior to them in Time,
is only Quibbling about the Signification of Words.
To the Objection, that an Attribute cannot be
the Ground or Reafon of the Exiftence of the Sub
ftance itfielfi, which is always, on the contrary, the
Support of the Attributes ; I anfwer, that, in Strict-
nefs of Speech, Neceffity of Exiftence is not an At
tribute, in the Senje that Attributes are properly fo
ftyled ; but 'tis [Sui generis] the Ground or Foun
dation of Exiftence both of the Subftance and of All
the Attributes. Thus, in Other Inftances, Immen
fity is not an Attribute, in the Senfe that Wifdom,
Power, and the like, are ftrictly fo called; but 'tis
[Sui generis] a Mode of Exiftence both ofi the Sub- '
fiance and ofi All the Attributes. In like Manner,
Eternity is not an Attribute or Property, in the Senfie
that other Attributes, inhering in the Subftance, and
fupported by it, are properly fo called ; but 'tis
[Sui generis] the Duration ofi Exiftence both of the
Subftance, and of All the Attributes. Attributes or
Properties, ftrictly fo called, cannot be predicated one
of another. Wifidom cannot properly be faid to be
Powerful, or Power to be Wife. But Immenfity is
a MODE of Exiftence both of the Divine Subftance
and of all the Attributes. Eternity is the DURA
TION ofi Exiftence, both cfi the Divine Subftance.^
and of All the Attributes. And Neceffity is the
G ROUND, or Reafion, or Foundation cfi Exiftence
both cfi the Divine Sui ft ance, and cfi fill the At
tributes. I am, Sir,
Your very humble Servant, Ific.

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