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THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

SERIES XXIX NO. 2
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES
IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Under the Direction of the
Departments of History, PoUtical Economy, and
Political Science

THE DUTCH REPUBLIC
AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

BY

FRIEDRICH EDLER, M.DlPL., PH.D.

BALTIMORE
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
igii

Copyright 191 i by
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

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Press op
The new era printins cohpaiy
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CONTENTS. Page.
Preface  vii
I. The United Provinces at the Beginning of the
American Revolution  9
II. The Dutch as Neutrals  17
III. Enghsh Complaints  36
IV. Early Relations between the two Republics ... 70
V. Enghsh Aggressions and Dutch Defiance  95
VI. The United Provinces drawn into War with
England  138
VII. The United Provinces and Great Britain as
Enemies  174
VIII. The United States and the United Provinces
form closer Relations  205
IX. Peace  ,  233

PREFACE.
Nearly all phases of the American Revolution have been
carefully investigated. This is, to some extent, true also of
the influence which European powers exercised upon its de
velopment. Little attention, however, has been paid to the
important part which the United Provinces of the Nether
lands played in the contest. Their aid to the Americans,
though mostly clandestine, or indirect, and often based upon
selfish principles, was nevertheless remarkably effective.
Some Dutch historians, like Colenbrander and Blok, have at
some length dealt with the relation of the United Provinces
to the young American commonwealth. They did so, how
ever, when writing the history of their own country, and
consequently considered matters entirely from a Dutch point
of view. In America no complete account of the assistance
given by the Netherlands to the Revolution has been written.
It seemed, therefore, desirable to add this missing link.
While the subject is presented in this essay chiefly from a
diplomatic standpoint, matters of political economy, as the
commercial and financial relations between the two republics,
have not been neglected. Consideration is also given to
military and naval affairs. A discussion, however, in how
far the governmental system of the United States is derived
from Dutch sources was deemed beyond the scope of this
monograph and consequently omitted.^
The material needed for a thorough study of the subject
was found in the United States. The archives of Europe
have been — and are still being — searched by Americans for
' This question has been repeatedly treated. See : Douglas Camp
bell, The Puritan in England, Holland, and America; WiUiam
Elliot GrifRs, The Influence of the Netherlands in the Making of
the English Commonwealth and the American Republic, and other
writings of the same author on Holland; Henry William Elson,
History of the United States of America, Chapter " Colonization —
New York."

viii Preface.
everything connected with the history of their country.
Copies made abroad are easily accessible at public libraries
in the United States. The archives of the Netherlands,
England, France, and Prussia are thus literally brought to
the door of the student in America: Sparks' collection of
transcripts in the library of Harvard University, Bancroft's
similar coUection in the New York Public Library, Sparks'
Dutch Papers in the library of Cornell University, and
Stevens' Dutch Papers in the Library of Congress, together
with the published and unpublished manuscripts in the pos
session of the Department of State at Washington, fur
nished most of the information for this monograph.
In conclusion I wish to express my sincere thanks to Pro
fessor J. Franklin Jameson, Professor William Ray Mann
ing, and Dr. William Elliot Griffis for their valuable sug
gestions and kind assistance and to my wife who for many
months helped me in the tedious work of arranging notes
and preparing the manuscript.

THE DUTCH REPUBLIC AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION.

CHAPTER I.

The United Provinces at the Beginning of the
American Revolution.
" All Europe is for us," wrote the American commis
sioners at Paris in 1777.^ This had been true even in the
earlier stages of the struggle between England and her
American colonies, though perhaps less known. It was the
outcome of the British policy of the last two decades, which
had resulted in the isolation of England in Europe.^ France
had been compelled to accept most humiliating conditions
from England in the treaty of Paris of 1763, ceding thereby
Canada, the island of Cape Breton, and her African pos
sessions on the river Senegal. In India property and terri
tories were restored to their ancient limits, but the French
were to send thither no more troops and consequently lost all
influence. Naturally France was looking for an opportunity
to retrieve these losses, to wipe out the disgrace, and to pay
England back in her own coin. Her attitude was fully
understood in England. " A dismemberment of the British
empire," wrote a prominent Englishman of the time, " was
an idea that now offered itself to her [the French] councils,
in all the splendor of well-founded expectation. To deprive
^Benjamin FrankUn and Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, April 9, 1777 (Wharton, The Revolutionary Dip
lomatic Correspondence of the United States, H, 287).
^ " Every nation in Europe wishes to see Britain humbled, having
all in their turns been offended by her insolence, which in prosperity,
she is apt to discover on all occasions" (Benjamin Franklin and
Silas Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, March 12,
1777, in Wharton, H, 289). 9

IO Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [i88
an ancient enemy of his hereditary possessions, to strip a
victorious rival of his most valuable conquests, was too
brilliant a temptation for ambition and inveteracy to resist. ^
It cannot be surprising, then, that the efforts of the Thirteen
Colonies to gain independence from their mother country
had been watched with interest and sympathy by the French
government from the beginning.
Another European state which had been greatly offended
by the treaty of Paris in 1763 was Prussia, now at the height
of its prosperity and power. Frederick the Great concluded,
in 1756, the Convention of Westminster with England, and
the latter was his only ally during the greater part of the
Seven Years' War; but when Bute replaced Pitt in the
English cabinet, British policy changed. All the provisions
of the Convention were broken successively by England.
The subsidies to Frederick were discontinued, and a sepa
rate peace was concluded with France (that of Paris in
1763) without even guaranteeing the Prussian dominions as
had been stipulated by the Convention.^ The consequence
was that Frederick conceived a strong hatred for England
in general and Bute in particular, which he later transferred
to Lord North. Though the Prussian king, from political
reasons, abstained from taking part openly with the Ameri
cans against England, he strongly sympathized with them
and assisted them indirectly in many ways. In later
chapters will be shown his efforts to influence the Dutch
Republic against her old ally. Great Britain.
Still a third power was anxious, if not to avenge offences
committed by England, yet to recover former losses. Spain,
at the end of the Spanish succession war, had ceded to Eng
land the island of Minorca and her stronghold Gibraltar,
the key to the Mediterranean.^ Everything tending to
'John Andrews, Two additional Letters to His ExceUency the
Count Welderen, 1781, p. 37.
' France had occupied the Rhenish provinces of Cleve, Geldem,
and Moers. England, in 1763, left France at liberty to surrender
them to Austria or return them to Prussia (Petersdorff, Friedrich
der Grosse, 451).
'By the treaty of Utrecht in 1713.

189] United Provinces at Beginning of Revolution. 11
weaken England was afterwards welcome to Spain, since
Great Britain's embarrassment would open the prospect for
gaining back those two important possessions. Hence, she
joined the enemies of England during the Seven Years' War.
Her efforts to get back Gibraltar and Minorca failed ; and
in the Peace of Paris of 1763 she was compeUed to cede
Florida to Great Britain, although the latter power returned
to her Cuba and the Philippines, while France gave Louis
iana by way of compensation for Florida. Spanish hostility
to England continued.
The rest of Europe was more or less indifferent with
regard to the gigantic struggle just begun by the American
colonies against their mother country. There was only one
power which at this period was allied with England by com
mercial and political treaties. The attitude of the United
Provinces of the Netherlands at the beginning of the Ameri
can Revolution was an important problem. While France,
Prussia, and Spain were governed by the will of their kings
only, the United Provinces formed a republic in which party
spirit ruled.^ There were two large political classes, the
' The form of government in the United Provinces was very com
plicated, and in order to make the proceedings there during the
revolutionary period comprehensible, a short outline of their consti
tution is desirable.
The United Provinces consisted of the following seven provinces :
Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Guelderland, Overyssel, Groningen, and
Friesland. These states differed greatly in size, situation, and
general tendencies, some being maritime, others inland provinces ;
some Protestant, others Catholic; some democratic like Friesland,
others aristocratic like Holland (Griffis, Brave Little Holland, 3).
Having formed their confederation at Utrecht in 1579, they had been
united for almost two hundred years.
The president or stadtholder (since 1751 WilUam V of Orange)
stood nominally at the head of the government and held the offices
of captain-general and admiral-general, in which capacity he had
the supreme command over all the military and naval forces of the
Republic, but he could not declare war or conclude peace. As
grand-admiral he presided over the admiralties — councils which not
only had charge of the administration of the navy but also had the
direction of the custom-house. Only a few offices could be filled by
the states, the disposal of the rest belonging to the stadtholder.
This was a powerful means for putting the magistrates, especially
those of the cities, under obligations to him and for attaching to his
person such men as were looking for positions. The stadtholder
was the first member of the Council of State and was privileged to

12 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [19°
partisans of the stadtholder or English party and the anti-
stadtholder or Anti-Orange party, also called the French
party or Patriots.^ These two groups were contending with
be present at the sessions and take part in the deliberations of the
States General at his discretion, and also to make propositions to
them. In several provinces, as Holland, Guelderland, Utrecht, and
Zealand, he was president of the body of nobles. William V was,
by a resolution of the States General in 1749. made also governor-
general and supreme director of the companies of the East and West
Indies, and possessed as such considerable power, being represented
in their chambers and appointing their directors.
The main part of the sovereignty of the Dutch Republic was,
however, vested in a senate of sovereign states or States General,
in which each state or province, large or small, carried one vote
(Griffis, Brave Little Holland, 2). The States General declared war
and made peace, and their resolutions were decisive for the Republic.
They appointed ambassadors and ministers to foreign courts, also
instructing them and receiving their reports, which as a rule were
directed to the griffier, that is to say, secretary of the States Gen
eral. Diplomatic officials reported also to the stadtholder. All
treaties, alliances, and conventions were negotiated and ratified in
the name of the States General, after having been communicated to
and ratified by the assemblies of the several provinces, since the
deputies had to submit the subjects under consideration to their
provinces before voting on them in the States General. It was,
however, often not clear in what cases either a majority or absolute
unanimity was necessary. The foreign ambassadors and ministers
at the Hague were accredited to the States General. A few were
also accredited to the stadtholder. The presidency of the States
General changed weekly, the deputies of the provinces occupying
this office in rotation (Wharton, IV, 88 ff. ; Fitzmaurice, Life of
William, Earl of Shelburne, ii.-^). The assemblies of the separate
states or provinces were composed of the nobles and of the deputies
of the cities within the provincial boundaries.
The cities formed almost independent republics within the state.
At the head of each were placed as chief executives the burgo
masters, who belonged also to the great council consisting of the
burgomasters and the councilors. The regencies, composed of the
burgomasters, councilors, and schepens (judges), appointed the
deputies to the provincial assemblies, the large cities sending as
such two burgomasters, two schepens or two councilors, and one
pensionary. The minister, or secretary, of a city was called pen
sionary; he stood under the authority of the burgomasters (Whar
ton, V, 99).
The prime minister or secretary of the States of Holland, who
was practically also the foreign minister of the Republic, had the
official title of Grand Pensionary and was a very influential man,
as the province of Holland could be considered half the nation. In
fact, his power was greater than that of the stadtholder. The
resolutions of the assembly of Holland were more or less decisive
for the other provinces (Wharton, V, 686, 687; Fitzmaurice, Shel
burne, 113).
" Schlozer, Ludwig Ernst, Herzog zu BraunschweiE!- und Liine-
burg, 76-82.

191 j United Provinces at Beginning of Revolution. 13
each other bitterly, but being at this juncture about equally
divided, neither obtained absolute supremacy.
At the head of the Orange party was the stadtholder,
WiUiam V. Since his mother, Princess Anne of England,
had always remained more attached to her native country
than to the United Provinces, it was natural that her son too
should have a personal affection for that country. The
partisans of France in the Netherlands having strong re
publican tendencies, he saw in England the power which
alone could fortify his position, and his attachment to Great
Britain was therefore based rather on selfish motives than
on patriotic considerations. His wife was Wilhelmine, niece
of King Frederick II of Prussia, and she shared, to some
degree, her uncle's inclination toward France. Since Wil
liam V was irresolute'- and of a weak character, though good
natured, there is no doubt that Wilhelmine would have suc
ceeded in causing her husband to seek closer connections
with the court of France. Her influence was, however,
counterbalanced by that of Duke Louis Ernest of Bruns
wick, the prince's former tutor and constant adviser, who
was an ardent English partisan. The duke is said to have
been endowed with extraordinary inteUigence, with which,
however, he combined an ambitious and intriguing character.
He could never during his long residence in the United
Provinces accommodate himself to the spirit of the Dutch,-
and the consequence was that, forsaken by the Orange
party and violently attacked by the Patriots, he was finally
compelled to leave the Republic. In the period under con
sideration he had, however, stUl great influence upon the
affairs of the country. Subsequent research' has exonerated
him from the serious charges made against him, and it
seemed that he served as a kind of a scapegoat for the
political sins of both parties. He was principally accused
of having kept the young prince in ignorance of the affairs
' Wharton, I, 449.
' Davies, History of Holland and the Dutch Nation, III, 440.
'Schlozer, Braunschweig; Nijhoff, De Hertog van Brunswijk.
Both books were written for the purpose of defending the duke.

14 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [192
of the Republic, and of having arranged while his tutor
a secret agreement (Acte van Consulentschap) with Wil
liam, according to which the latter was bound to ask the
duke's advice in ah affairs of importance. The Prince of
Orange himself confessed once to Maillebois that his mili
tary instruction had been such as to make him a corporal,
and he might as well have added that in civil matters too he
was scarcely able to hold a subaltern's position,^ but, accord
ing to what has become known of the prince's capacities,
this does not speak against Duke Louis. As to the Acte van
Consulentschap, Brunswick, aware of the young stadt-
holder's lack of intelligence, firmness, and energy, thought
such a measure necessary for the welfare of the country.
His conduct can therefore not be attributed wholly to
ambitious aims.
Of the provinces, some like Zealand and Guelderland,
where the prince had large possessions, were almost wholly
for the English cause, while others, especially the province
of Holland, and the large towns (Amsterdam at their head)
inclined toward France and the American colonies. The
Patriots counted in their number the rich merchants and
craftsmen of the country, and also many of the laboring
classes, most of whom adhered to the Orangists. A re
ligious sect, the Mennonites, also belonged to this party.*
The aristocrats, who had much influence at the court, were
traditionally and as a consequence of their preference for
the French manner of living and thinking members of the
French party. While the English minister to the States
General, Sir Joseph Yorke, was tempestuous and overbear
ing, the French envoy, Due de la Vauguyon, won, by his
courtesy and tact, the social circles of the aristocrats.
French at that time was still the court language, and French
literature was much read among the more refined classes
of the people throughout Europe.'

'Colenbrander, De Patriottentijd, Hoofzakelijk naar buitenland-
sche bescheiden, I, 78.
° Schlozer, Braunschweig, 76-82.
'Wharton, I, 449.

193] United Proidnces at Beginning of Revolution. 15
At the outbreak of war between England and her colonies
the English partisans in the United Provinces sympathized,
of course, with Great Britain ; on the other hand, the French
party, like France herself, with the colonies, though not yet
openly. The Dutch population in general watched with
interest the exertions of the Americans for liberty, as they
saw in that struggle a certain analogy to their own defection
from Spain, which originated, like the American Revolu
tion, partly in the unwillingness of the dependent provinces
or colonies to be taxed by their mother country.
For the Dutch foreigiv policy there was, at the beginning
of the American Revolution, only one course, that of remain
ing neutral. The United Provinces were not in a state of
effective defence, either on land or on sea. They were far
less prepared for an offensive war, their navy not being
strong enough to give the slightest prospect of success in a
naval contest with England, nor their army sufficient in
numbers, compared with the military forces of the sur
rounding countries, to assist England on the continent, in
case the war should spread over Europe. There was
another reason why the Republic should keep out of the war.
The Dutch were the great carriers of the world, trans
mitting the products of Europe to all parts of the earth, and
vice versa, and would remain such so long as they were
neutrals ; but from the instant they should become involved
in the war, their ships would be liable to seizure by the
other belligerents, and their commerce and navigation must
decUne accordingly. The attitude of the masses of the
Dutch at the outbreak of the English-American war was,
consequently, in general friendly to the cause of the rebelling
colonies,^ while the interests of the country as understood
by those who were in any way connected with commerce
and navigation — and that was the great majority of the
population — did not allow armed assistance. Great Britain
was too formidable a naval adversary for the small republic
in her present defenceless condition to cope with, and the
' Davies, History of HoUand, III, 445.

1 6 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [i94
Dutch were fully aware of the fact that the destruction of
their navy meant the ruin of their country. " Strictest
neutrality" must therefore be their political motto. It
wUl be seen in the course of this essay how great a service
the Dutch rendered to the American cause by not taking an
active part in the war until it was weU nigh decided in favor
of the American arms. The following chapter will show
the first official efforts of the United Provinces to remain
neutral.

CHAPTER II.
The Dutch as Neutrals.
Though the government of the United Provinces, at the
beginning of the Anglo-American war, was neutral, with
a tendency on the part of the stadtholder to oblige England
whenever possible, it could not prevent agents of the
American colonies as well as of France from carrying on
secret negotiations on Dutch ground. Sir Joseph Yorke,
the English ambassador at the Hague, reported, in April,
1776, confidentially to Lord Suffolk that a friend had shown
him a letter of very suspicious contents, which had been
intercepted at the post-office.^ It was from Abbe Des-
noyers, the French charge d'affaires at the Hague, and
directed to Count de Vergennes, the foreign minister in
Paris, dated April 16. It revealed the fact that a certain
person calling himself an Englishman and living in the
United Provinces, but not at the Hague, was corresponding
with Dr. Benjamin Franklin, then chairman of the com
mittee of secret correspondence in Philadelphia. The com-
' Yorke to Suffolk, April 19, 1776 (Letters and extracts from the
correspondence of Sir Joseph Yorke, in the library of Harvard
University, Sparks MSS., LXXII).
The United Provinces followed the practice of other countries at
that time of having the letters of foreign ministers clandestinely
opened at the post-office and copied. A special official then deci
phered them. This was not so very difficult, since being appointed
for this particular purpose, he was apt to find the key to the ciphers.
In this way the reports of the French as well as of the Prussian
minister were copied at the Hague, and also those of the Prussian
envoy at the court of St. James, who sent his letters to Berlin by
way of the United Provinces. The reports of the English envoy
could not be intercepted as he had them safely delivered on board
the ships (at Hellevoetsluis) which carried them over to England.
The copies circulated among the Grand Pensidnary of the States of
Holland, the register or griffier of the States General, and the
Prince of Orange. Griffier Fagel, who was an ardent English par
tisan, communicated them to the English minister (Colenbrander,
Patriottentijd, I, 118-119).
2 17

1 8 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [196
mittee had transmitted full powers to that person, adding
instructions with data regarding the present state and dis
position of the colonies. The American agent had called
upon Desnoyers to propose, on behalf of the colonies, closer
connections between the two powers. France might become
the mediator of the quarrel, or open her ports to the colonies
and be received in theirs. The French charge submitted
the matter to the French court, stating that the American
agent was ready to confer with the French authorities.
In May, Sir Joseph Yorke was able to send a second
confidential report on this subject to Lord Suffolk, enclos
ing another extract from a letter to Count de Vergennes
from the Abbe Desnoyers, in which the latter gave an ac
count of an interview with the American correspondent.
Desnoyers had informed the agent that Louis XVI could
not accept the propositions of Congress, but that the vessels
of all nations, including those of England, were free to enter
the French ports, and that no difference would be made
between England and her colonies in that respect. Only
the carrying of contraband goods and the enlistment of
soldiers were prohibited. Sir Joseph expressed his surprise
at this attitude of the French court and added that it would
be a good lesson for His Majesty's deluded and rebeUious
subjects, but feared that it would only result in confirming
Dr. Franklin in his determination to continue the struggle
for independence.^
Later in the year Ambassador Yorke reported again to
Lord Suffolk regarding these negotiations between the
American colonies and France. The correspondent of the
American committee had repeated his propositions to Des
noyers, and the latter had informed his court of the inter
view. From the contents of the charge's letter it ap
peared that the attitude of the King of France had not
changed and that the agent had received no further in
structions from America.^ A few days later, Yorke wrote
'Yorke to Suffolk, May 24, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII; Colen
brander, Patriottentijd, I, 119).
'Yorke to Suffolk, August 2, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII)

197] The Dutch as Neutrals. 19
less cheerfully to Lord Suffolk concerning the conduct of
France and also that of the Dutch Republic. He had been
informed of an utterance of Desnoyers to the effect that the
latter wished the troubles between England and her colonies
to continue a little longer in order that Great Britain might
be reduced to a state as weak as that of France. The
United Provinces shared this hope, but from different mo
tives, commercial advantage being their main reason.^
In the course of the year 1776 France had become more
decided in her hostility toward England and in her sympathy
for the colonies. It was henceforth essential for her to
draw the Dutch Republic away from Great Britain, and to
attach it more closely to herself for reasons which were
partly of a commercial, but more of a strategical nature. In
case of a war with England, if the Dutch Republic should
be the latter's ally, France would have to close her ports to
the Dutch ships. This action would deprive her of the
very means of carrying on the hostilities effectively, since
the United Provinces were the chief sources of French naval
stores and provisions. At the same time she would have to
engage her army either to defend her northern boundaries
against the United Provinces or to invade the latter. Part
of her navy would be required to hold the Dutch forces in
check. It was thus of utmost importance for France to
have the United Provinces at least neutral neighbors. On
July 7, 1776, Count de Vergennes read a memorandum in
the French council on the new situation, laying out a plan
to be pursued by France in the controversy between England
and her colonies. He recommended an effective French
propaganda in the United Provinces to stir up the republican
party, which France had neglected. He would also profit
by the thirst for riches with which the Dutch were imbued
individually by letting them enjoy a neutrality which would
become a source of wealth for them.- To carry out this
policy a new French ambassador was appointed for the
'Yorke to Suffolk, August 13, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France a I'Etablisse-
ment des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, I, 528.

20 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [i9°
vacant post at the Hague, the Due de la Vauguyon.^ The
choice was a very lucky one from the French standpoint.
His talents for accomplishing the task set him were extra
ordinary. He succeeded in causing the authorities to foUow
his suggestions so that the Republic became, in the end,
utterly dependent on France. Following his instructions, he
aroused in commercial circles the greed for gain and among
the regents the love of power, at the same time somewhat
discrediting the stadtholder in order to isolate him and to
paralyze his influence ; but he took care to do this in an in
conspicuous manner. The main field of his activity in the
United Provinces was the province of Holland and especiaUy
the city of Amsterdam, with the regents of which he was
soon in close connection. However, in the beginning, he
avoided conferring with the leaders of the French party
as he thought it dangerous to show his cards too quickly.-
Even his personality was highly fitted for his mission, and
won him many friends in the Republic. He is said to have
differed much from the average Frenchman of his class at
that time, being neither frivolous nor skeptical and not
making any efforts to appear a witty man.' These qualities
counted greatly in the eyes of the stern and plain Dutch
natives. Furthermore his figure was more of the Dutch
than of the French type.*
The English colonies in America declared their inde
pendence on July 4, 1776. This bold step was received with
hearty applause in Europe. The news of the declaration
arrived in the United Provinces toward the end of August,
1776, and caused there much rejoicing. Only the partisans
of England were greatly depressed. Yorke declared that
'Paul Frangois de Quelen, Due de la Vauguyon, was appointed
minister to the States General in December, 1776, being then a little
over thirty years old. He was a favorite of Louis XVI, his father
having been the latter's tutor (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd I 120-
121). ' '
'Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 156.
' Colenbrander. Patriottentijd, I, 121.
*In a letter to Lord Eden, dated December 24, 1776, Sir Joseph
Yorke speaks of Vauguyon as being "of the right cut for this
Embassy, being as squab as anything in Holland" (Colenbrander
Patriottentijd, I, 121, note). '

199J The Dutch as Neutrals. 21
he could not help thinking such a step would be advanta
geous to the English govemment, for the hot heads amongst
the Americans, who had gone too far to hope for pardon,
had probably carried this point in the Congress by main
force, in the hope, by breaking down the bridge behind
them, of drawing the others along with them into the mire.
In this light, he said, it was looked upon by reasonable
people in the United Provinces.^
WhUe the English ambassador at the Hague and the
partisans of Great Britain thus faintly tried to console them
selves with the supposition that the Declaration of Inde
pendence had been forced upon the colonies by " hot heads,"
and was therefore not due to general conviction, the French
charge, Desnoyers,^ sent a report to his government which
is of special interest, since it dealt with public opinion in
the Netherlands regarding the independence of America and
the expectations which the Dutch connected with it. The
Dutch fiattered themselves that the independence of the
English colonies would open to them a new source of com
merce and wealth. The Dutch had always been very ob
servant of the American contest, having once themselves
possessed considerable portions of North America, where
a large number of their nation still subsisted, preserving the
customs and religion of the United Provinces. The Dutch
at home would willingly aid their American kindred, who
would as willingly reunite themselves with the mother
country. The act of independence, he continued, was going
to occupy greatly the minds of those among the Dutch who
thought it possible to assist the Americans in making their
revolution as successful as had been the Dutch revolution
against Spain. Jealous of the commerce of other countries,
the United Provinces, he thought, would not wish any
nation to be ahead of them in the friendship of a new
'Yorke to Eden, August 23, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' The Due de la Vauguyon arrived at the Hague in December,
1776. Desnoyers wrote to Vergennes on December 17, 1776, that he
expected Vauguyon's arrival daily, and that his duty as charge d'af
faires would then be ended (Sparks MSS., LXXXII).

22 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. \20O
nation of such vast economic possibilities, and one which
in the time of peace would multiply as the sand.^
The French were, however, still apprehensive that Eng
lish influence might predominate in the United Provinces
and that the neutrality of the Dutch would give way to an
armed assistance of England. The French ambassador was
suspicious as to the recent zeal of the Prince of Orange in
naval matters, noticing also that the stadtholder revealed his
sympathy for Great Britain more and more. He had heard,
besides, of a marriage project between the Prince of Wales
and the stadtholder's daughter. The prospect of such a
union was said to have been opened to William V by his
envoy at the court of St. James, Count van Welderen. The
latter, then on leave at the Hague, had just been in con
ference with Sir Joseph Yorke.^ At this conjuncture, the
French government took into consideration a renewal of the
treaty of Commerce of 1739 with the Dutch Republic, but
Count de Vergennes rejected this project because the treaty
would give advantages, as before, only to the Dutch. On
the other hand, it would not cause the ties existing between
England and the United Provinces to cease. Furthermore.
he did not deem such a treaty necessary for attaching the
United Provinces to France because it was well known to
the Dutch that France desired their neutrality ; and this was
so advantageous to the Republic' The ambassador, Vau
guyon, was, however, instructed by Count de Vergennes
to assure the friends of France in the United Provinces
that Louis XVI was taking a special interest in the pros
perity of the Republic and that the Patriots would always
find sufficient support in France to counterbalance the influ
ence and the aims of England.*
In the meantime the colonies in America had not remained
inactive regarding the appointment of representatives in
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, September 10, 1776 (Sparks MSS
LXXXIH). 'Vauguyon to Vergennes, August i, 1777 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXII). 'Vergennes to Vauguyon, August 3, 1777 (ibid.).
*Same to same, August 7, 1777 (ibid.).

20i] The Dutch as Neutrals. 23
Europe. Soon after the committee of secret correspon
dence had been formed in 1775, with Benjamin Franklin as
its chairman, a resolution was passed appointing C. W. F.
Dumas at the Hague^ its correspondent in the United Prov
inces. Silas Deane^ of Connecticut was elected by Congress
as American business agent in Paris and Franklin,' then in
his seventieth year, as commissioner to France. Arthur
Lee, Franklin's successor in England after the latter's de
parture in the spring of 1775, had in the same year been
appointed secret agent of the committee of secret corre
spondence in London, and was elected in October, 1776,
commissioner of Congress to the court of France as a sub
stitute for Mr. Jefferson, who had not accepted that office.*
Dumas owed his appointment to Dr. Franklin, with whom
he had become acquainted during a stay of the latter in the
United Provinces at the beginning of the American Revo
lution. Franklin, noticing Dumas' strong love of liberty
and his devotion to the American cause, did not hesitate
to propose him as secret correspondent to Congress. A
prominent Dutchman (van der Capellen) wrote to Living
ston in 1779 that Dumas was devoted with heart and soul
to the cause of the Thirteen States, to which he had ren
dered important services.'' Francis Wharton says of Dumas :
" It will be seen by M. Dumas' correspondence that his ser
vices were unremitting, assiduous, and important, and per
formed with a singular devotedness to the interests of the
United States, and with a warm and undeviating attach
ment to the rights and liberties for which they were con-
' " Charles William Frederick Dumas . . . was a native of
Switzerland, but he passed a large portion of his life in Holland,
chiefly employed as a man of letters. He was a man of deep learn
ing, versed in the ancient classics, and skilled in several modern
languages, a warm friend of liberty, and an early defender of the
American cause. About the year 1770, or a little later, he published
an edition of Vattel, with a long preface and notes, which were
marked with his liberal sentiments" (Wharton, I, 603).
'In February, 1776 (ibid., I, 559).
'On September 27, 1776 (ibid., I, 473).
* Ibid., L S17. .
" Beaufort, Brieven van en aan Joan Derek van der Capellen van
de Poll, 114.

24 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [202
tending."^ When Arthur Lee was elected secret agent in
London, FrankUn referred him (on December 12, I775) to
Dumas, to whom the committee of secret correspondence
had sent detailed information regarding the American affairs.
Dumas, Franklin wrote, would also transmit Lee's letters
to the committee via the Dutch island St. Eustatia, in case
Lee should not be able to send them more directly.^ When
Deane left America to enter upon his duties as the commer
cial agent of Congress in France, Franklin recommended
him also to Dumas, instructing Deane to inform the latter
of everything of interest that had happened in America.'
Soon after Deane's arrival at Paris a correspondence be
tween the two began, and Deane expressed to Dumas his
desire of visiting the United Provinces as a private gentle
man. In a letter, dated August 18, 1776, Deane gave this
interesting account of the American policy regarding the
United Provinces to Dumas : —
" It is the policy of the United Provinces of Holland to be neuter
to every attention. The United Colonies only wish them to keep
steady to their only true system of policy in the present case; and
give me leave to say that a reflection on their former struggles must
show them in what point of light the Americans are to be con
sidered. The United Colonies ask no aid or alliances. Let Britain
court every, even the most petty and mercenary, power in Europe,
the United Colonies only ask for what nature surely entitles all
men to, a free and uninterrupted commerce and exchange of the
superfluities of one country for those of another, and the first power
in Europe which takes advantage of the present favorable occasion
must exceed every other in commerce."*
Though Dumas used every means for keeping his activity
for the American Congress a secret, it was not long before
Sir Joseph Yorke discovered it. He informed Lord Suffolk
confidentially that one Macintosh was certainly in corre
spondence with America, but that Dumas must be regarded,
properly speaking, as the agent of Congress.^ Lord Suffolk,
however, seemed to have additional inteUigence of American
agitation in the United Provinces, for he wrote to Sir Joseph
'Wharton, I, 603.
' Wharton, II, 63 ; R. H. Lee, Life of Arthur Lee, I, 53.
'Wharton, II, 82.
* Wharton, II, 128.
¦Yorke to Suffolk, September 17, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

203] The Dutch as Neutrals. 25
soon afterwards that he had reason to believe Alexander
Foster from Philadelphia to be the American agent at Am
sterdam and WiUiam Hodge at Rotterdam.^ With all these
French and American influences in the United Provinces
known to the English ambassador it is surprising that he
could say in a letter to W. Eden that the rebels were losing
friends every day, which was the fate of those going down.^
When Yorke leamed of SUas Deane's intention to visit the
United Provinces, he warned the government at the Hague
that neither the treaties existing between England and the
Republic nor the friendly relations entertained by them
could allow such rebel visitors in the United Provinces.'
While the agents of three countries were thus busy in
the United Provinces trying to move the Dutch according
to the special interests of their respective governments, the
Republic pursued officially the policy of neutrality. In
February, 1775, Sir Joseph Yorke had presented a memo
randum to the States General, in which he announced that
the English colonies in America had risen in rebellion against
his master, who would find means to bring his subjects
back to their duty. For this purpose the king thought it
necessary that the rebels should not receive, under the pre
text of commerce, anything that might nourish the insur
rection. Yorke asked then in the name of George III that
the States General, without delay, take such measures as
they deemed proper for preventing the inhabitants of the
United Provinces from exporting arms and munitions of
war to the West Indies beyond what was bona fide necessary
for the use of the Dutch colonies. He observed that the
temporary inconveniences caused by this prohibition would
be small; it was, however, the only means for preserving
harmony between the two countries and for avoiding disa
greements, which must result from a different conduct.*
' Suffolk to Yorke, November 29, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Yorke to Eden, December 24, 1776 (ibid.).
'Yorke to Suffolk, July 15, 1777 (ibid.).
* Yorke's memorandum, February 27, 1775 (Sparks MSS., CIII;
Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).

26 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [204
The States General, thereupon, passed a resolution in March,
in which they expressed their desire of maintaining the lib
erty only of the bona fide commerce and navigation, and
of checking any abuses which might possibly be made of
that freedom to the disadvantage of the English crown.
They prohibited, for a period of six months, the export of
arms, gunpowder, and other munitions of war in English
vessels or ships carrying the Enghsh flag.^ Ships of other
nations, including those belonging to subjects of the States
General, were forbidden to export such goods during the
same period, unless with express permission of the com
petent admiralty. At the same time the admiralties were
to be instructed to permit such goods to be exported only
when the sender should declare under oath that he had no
knowledge, directly or indirectly, of the arms or ammunition
being sent to places situated in the dominions of Great
Britain in America. The Dutch colonies in the West Indies
were to receive the same orders concerning the export of
contraband from there. The States General declared that
this was the utmost that they could do without violating the
freedom of commerce and navigation; they trusted there
fore that this resolution would meet with the approbation
of the king.
The States General then issued detailed orders for the
Republic. All export of munitions of war, gunpowder,
cannon, guns and balls, in ships domiciled in the English
dominions was forbidden provisionally for a period of six
months under fine not only of the confiscation of the arms
and ammunition found in those vessels, but in addition of
one thousand guilders to be paid by the skipper, his vessel be
ing confiscated in case of non-payment. For the loading of
such goods in other vessels, including Dutch, permission by
the competent admiralty was prescribed. For contraven
tion of the latter regulation the same fine as before was
fixed. The admiralties were instructed according to the

' This was, of course, aimed chiefly at the Americans, who were
at this Deriod stiU considered EngUsh subjects. Not yet possessing
a flag of their own, they were using the same colors as the mother
country.

205] The Dutch as Neutrals. 27
resolution. The West Indies Company, the Society of
Surinam, and the Administration of the Berbice were
asked to issue the same orders for the colonies under their
management, the fine to be fixed according to the circum
stances of the colonies and the permission for Dutch ships
and those of other nationality to be given by the competent
governments or authorities of the colonies.^
George III, through his ambassador at the Hague, de
clared his satisfaction with the neutrality of the United
Provinces as expressed by the resolution of the States Gen
eral of March 20, 1775. As the term of the prohibition
of the export of contraband would expire in the month of
September, 1775, Yorke presented, in August, another mem
orandum to the States General asking for a prolongation
of the term,^ which was granted for one year by a resolu
tion of the States General of August 18.' Similar resolu
tions, each for one year, were passed by them, on October
10, 1776 — after Yorke had made strong representations
that the previous measures had been absolutely ineffective*
— and again on November 3, 1777.°
The French charge d'affaires. Abbe Desnoyers, reported
the.se declarations of neutrality to Count de Vergennes on
September 24, 1776. He had heard, he wrote, of a memo
rial of the English ambassador requesting the renewal of
the prohibition of the export of contraband to thejrevoltiijg^
colonies. After stating the previous decrees for that pur
pose he continued that the language held by the Dutch in
these resolutions seemed rather curious, when compared
with their subsequent leniency as to facts. It was almost
proved, he said, that they had contributed to raising the con
fidence of the colonies in declaring their independence, whUe
' Resolution of the States General, March 20, 1775 (Bancroft MSS. ;
Groot Placaatboek, IX, 107).
'Yorke's memoranda of April 7, 1775, and August 8, 1775 (Ban
croft MSS.; Sparks MSS., CIII).
'Resolution of the States General, August 18, 1775 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII). * Yorke, October i, 1776 (Bancroft MSS.; Sparks MSS., CIII).
Below, p. 41.
'Groot Placaatboek, IX, 107.

28 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [206
at the same time they had furnished the English ministry
with packets and store ships. The Republic had quickly
seized the opportunity for this double game at sea and found
it profitable, both financially and politically. But he thought
the United Provinces would sooner or later be compelled to
take some part in the controversy. If the court of Vienna
should then be inclined to encroach upon the Dutch bound
aries or commerce, the embarrassment of the United Prov
inces would become very great. The adjustment of Eng
land with her colonies, Desnoyers said, could consequently
not be very agreeable intelligence for the majority of the
Dutch. This adjustment, after the American Declaration
of Independence, appeared to many people impossible, but,
he said, might perhaps be the more easily effected on that
very account.^
It is not quite clear from this letter which way Desnoyers
wished the Dutch to turn. Apparently he was not aware
of the policy of the French government decided upon in
the course of the year 1776, according to which the neutral
ity of the United Provinces was greatly desired by France,
but at the same time a secret or indirect support of the
American colonies by the Dutch could only be agreeable
to her.
While these declarations of neutrality were in favor of
the English, another decision of the Dutch government in a
neutral direction was certainly very pleasing to the colo
nies, that is, the quasi refusal to send the Scotch brigade
to England.^
In November, 1775, WiUiam V informed the States Gen
eral of George Ill's desire transmitted to the stadtholder in
the preceding October of borrowing the brigade' during
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, September 24, 1776 (Sparks MSS,
LXXXIII). ' Pfister, Die amerikanische Revolution, I, 298.
' One of the main reasons why the Scotch regiments were left in
the United Provinces and why their recruiting in Scotland was form
erly not only permitted but facilitated was probably that they formed
a small army at the disposal of the English kings, especially the
Stuarts, for emergency use whenever Parliament would not grant
the raising of one (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 115).

207] The Dutch as Neutrals. 29
the rebelUon of the colonies in America. Since England
was making war against her own colonies and outside of
Europe, the treaty with the United Provinces of 1678 was
not available, and she could not ask for the six thousand
auxiliaries stipulated by that treaty.^ Neither could the
lending of the Scotch brigade be demanded on account of
the treaty but merely on the ground of the friendly rela
tions existing between the two governments. According to
tradition, it is true, the brigade was at England's disposal
whenever she wanted it, but since Great Britain had for
bidden the recruiting of the brigade in Scotland the obliga
tion of the United Provinces to adhere to the tradition on
her part had ceased. It seems that England foresaw the
difficulties created by her request and that, according to a
note in the diary of the Duke of Brunswick, the whole
transaction was only a political trick of Lord North, who
thought he might be enabled by a refusal of the Dutch to
persuade ParUament of the necessity of hiring foreign
troops.^ George III, in return for the loan of the brigade, offered
to replace the latter by an equal number of Hanoverian
troops, or to pay the expenses for levying the same number
of national Dutch troops. The States General were further
more to have the choice of either recalling the brigade or
leaving it to Great Britain at the conclusion of the war.
In the case of the recall of the brigade, George III would
again grant permission for recruiting in Scotland.' The
States General referred the proposition to the provinces,
four of which (Guelderland, Friesland, Overyssel and Gro
ningen) immediately gave their consent to the transfer of
' Nijhoff says (Brunswijk, 145) that William V was immediately
willing, " om die complaisance aan den koning van Engeland te
bewijzen, als of het afstaan van circa 6000 man troepen als een zaak
van beleefdheid kon worden aangemerkt." As only the lending of
the brigade, counting scarcely more than a thousand men, was and
could be in question, Nijhoff seems to be mistaken here. See also
Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 116, note i.
' Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 148, footnote.
'Ferguson, Papers iUustrating the History of the Scots Brigade
in the Service of the United Netherlands, II, 396.

30 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [208
the Scotch brigade. The attitude of Zealand and Utrecht
has not become known. Holland, though Yorke had asked
for an answer within a month,^ came to a resolution only in
February, 1776, accepting then England's offer, under con
ditions which made the acceptance equal to a refusal. She
required that permission to recruit in Scotland must be
restored after the brigade should return to the United Prov
inces; that England should bear all the expenses of trans
port from the Republic and back, as weU as the pay of the
brigade during its absence from the Netherlands and the
cost of replacing it by foreign troops; and finally that the
brigade should in no case be employed either wholly or
partly outside Great Britain's possessions in Europe.^
These conditions were accepted by the States General on
AprU 5, 1776.' The last condition especially was a great
disappointment to George III, since he wanted to employ
the brigade, according to a statement by Yorke, against the
American colonies.* A few days later, on April 8, the
Prince of Orange, who had corresponded privately and
directly with George III, made known that the King of
England had sent him an autograph letter thanking him for
his good offices and announcing that he would accept the
conditions which the prince had communicated to him as
the opinion of the States General, in case he should be in a
position to renew his request."*
Though the United Provinces had given in these transac
tions a strong proof of their neutrality, what was more im
portant was the fact, revealed in the course of the debates,
that the relations between England and the United Prov-
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd I, 116.
'Ferguson, Scots Brigade, II, 397; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd,
I, 116.
'Secret Resolution of the States General, 1776 (Sparks MSS.,
CHI). * Brunswick to WilUam V, September 24, 1775 (Nijhoff, Bruns
wijk, 144, footnote).
°Mrs. Fairchild states (Francis Adriaan van der Kemp, 38) that
when the brigade was at last lent to the king, it was upon the con
dition that it should not be used outside of Europe. This seems to
be a mistake, as the brigade, in fact, was never lent to George III.

209] The Dutch as Neutrals. 31
inces had become rather cool while the sympathy for the
American colonies had greatly increased. Amsterdam had
even considered the proposition of seUing the Scotch brigade
to England as if aiming at the severance of all relations
with Great Britain.^ The Duke of Brunswick was indig
nant at the English request and, though an English partisan
himself, was violently opposed to granting it. In his opin
ion, England, knowing the unwillingness of the States Gen
eral to increase the Dutch army, ought not to have asked
for a measure which would have diminished the number
and the strength of the Dutch military forces and therefore
weakened the resistance of the Republic to France. He
had no faith in either raising the number of Dutch national
troops or hiring foreigners. The former would not be
granted by the States General. On the other hand, it would
be difficult to subject all those foreign troops to the military
and civil laws of the Republic, and they would therefore
endanger the safety of the state. ^
Most remarkable were the proceedings in the States of
Overyssel, owing to the opposition of van der Capellen van
de Poll,' who was destined to become the great leader of
the Dutch Patriots and the man to whom the United States
' Ferguson, Scots Brigade, II, 397.
'Brunswick to Prince of Orange, January 30, 1776 (Nijhoff,
Brunswijk, 292).
'Joan Deric van der Capellen van de (or "tot den") Poll was
bom on November 2, 1741, as the eldest son of Frederich J. van der
Capellen, major of infantry. He was anxious to enter the Rid-
derschap and the Upper House of the States of Zutphen, province
of Guelderland, but was not admitted, failing to fulfill the require
ments. Van der Capellen then turned to the province of Overyssel.
His birth and his possession of a knightly estate, "that of Breden-
horst" (later exchanged for that of Poll), qualified him there, and
with the support of the stadtholder he was admitted as regent into
the Ridderschap of Overyssel on October 22, 1772. By the study of
English philosophy and statecraft he was imbued with liberal prin
ciples and ideas, which brought about his determination to establish
an open and declared opposition ; this he thought of the utmost
importance for the maintenance of a constitution in which, like the
Dutch, a great dose of monarchy entered. Carrying out this_ plan,
he drew upon him the hatred of the English faction and the indig
nation of the stadtholder, who recognized too late that he had
assisted an opponent in becoming a regent (Fairchild, van der
Kemp, 30-35 ; Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 87).

32 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [210
owe gratitude for his courageous support of the cause of
the Revolution at a time when no one dared to plead openly
in the United Provinces for American independence and
when the success of the rebellion was very problematic.^
On December 16, 1775, he violently opposed in a now
famous speech before the States of Overyssel the lending
of the Scotch brigade to Great Britain. He declared, what
ever might be the fate of the American colonies, he would
always regard it as a glory and an honor to have openly pro
tected, in his public character, their cause which he regarded
as that of all the human kind. It was absolutely necessary
for the Republic, he said, to keep strictest neutrality during
the controversy of Great Britain with her colonies, since it
was the duty of the United Provinces to restore their own
commerce and agriculture which had greatly declined.
Therefore if the Republic were going to give assistance to
England, the same must be given also to the Americans.
Besides the conduct of England was not such as to cause
the United Provinces to break with a peaceful neighbor,
France, who was the natural friend of the Republic. Hid
eous as this unnatural war between brothers was, in which,
according to the newspapers, even barbarians declined to
interfere, it would be more hideous if this should be done
by a people who once themselves had been slaves and had
borne the name of rebels, but most hideous of all must it be
regarded if assistance should be given against the Amer
icans, who, a brave nation, deserved the respect of all the
world, and who defended unfalteringly the rights which as
men they had received from (jod Almighty and not from
England.^ Van der Capellen was bold enough to have this speech
printed and distributed, causing thereby a great sensation.
The States of Overyssel, on March 14, 1777, removed his
"Avis " from their records, declaring that it was not con
ceived in decent terms, and soon afterwards arranged his
' Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 61, 63.
' Vaterlandsche Historie (Wagenaar's Vaterlandsche Historie,
continued), XXV, 55-57-

21 1] The Dutch as Neutrals. 33
dismissal as a regent. In America van der CapeUen won
many friends and admirers by his brave defence of the
American cause, as is proved by the letters which he re-
that of the President and members of Congress ;^ and from
Governor Trumbull of Connecticut in his own name and
that of the President and members of Congress;^ and from
Franklin and others. Van der CapeUen's courage did not
fail to impress the majority of the Dutch ; his attachment to
America and his conduct in the affair of the Scotch brigade
made him dear to his fellow-citizens.^
Another important act of neutrality of the Dutch was
the keeping open of their ports to American vessels. Ambas
sador Yorke had frequent conferences with the heads of
the Republic on the subject of closing the Dutch ports in
all parts of the world to vessels of the American colonies,
but the United Provinces declined.'
The passage of foreign troops in British pay through the
United Provinces for embarkation to America was, how
ever, not denied. Sir Joseph Yorke presented a memo
randum to the States General on February 23, 1776, in
which he stated that England had concluded a treaty with
the Prince of Hesse-Cassel by which the latter was obliged
to furnish a regiment of infantry for English service. This
regiment was to be sent down the rivers. Main and Rhine,
to the Dutch frontier, and permission was asked to let it
pass through the Dutch territory without molestation. The
regiment would observe the most exact discipline, and every
thing for its passage would be paid in cash. In a similar
English memorandum of February 17, 1777, free passage
was requested again for Hessian troops with their arms
and baggage from the Dutch frontier to Dort or Willem-
stadt, and for about thirteen hundred men of Anspach with
their field artillery.*
' Fairchild, van der Kemp, 36-39.
' Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 59.
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, October 11 and 22, 1776 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXII). ' Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England.
3

34 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [212
While the United Provinces indirectly assisted England
by aUowing this passage of troops, they, in a similar affair,
acted in favor of the Americans, restoring, thereby, their
neutrality. The Republic employed in her service two regi
ments of the Prince of Waldeck, which George III was
very anxious to obtain against the American colonies. Sir
Joseph Yorke, therefore, in concert with the griffier of the
States General, Fagel, and the chiefs of the English party,
had many interviews with principal members of the Repub
lic on this subject. The Prince of Waldeck, of course, as
owner of the regiments, was asked for this cession too,
but replied that he would first communicate the proposi
tion to the States General. He would accept it only if the
United Provinces should not increase the compensation for
the regiments.^ Yorke thought that the States General
would never grant such an increase, and that the regiments
would consequently pass over into the English service. He
was, however, mistaken. The States General voted in
favor of the retention of the regiments on the conditions
of the Prince of Waldeck.^
As an act of neutrality must also be considered the re
newal by the States General of the placaat of 1756. Ac
cording to this resolution pirates appearing in Dutch waters,
or privateers entering any of the Dutch ports without show
ing colors and not being able to produce legal commissions,
were liable to be seized and prosecuted. All the Dutch
admiralties were immediately informed accordingly and in
structed to put the law in force at once.' Though the
' " Augmenter la capitulation." It is uncertain whether this means
" increase the contract money," or " renew the contract " by which
the regiments had passed into the service of the United Provinces.
Probably the first, since Yorke — apparently in view of the Dutch
parsimony — did not expect the States General to grant it. The
renewal of the capitulation could scarcely have been considered
extraordinary by him.
'Vauguyon to Vergennes, July, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXXII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, May 6, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
The interesting episode of a man-of-war constructed by the
Dutch for the United States should be mentioned. The American
commissioners in Paris succeeded in having a frigate built for the
United States at Amsterdam in 1777. She was a very large vessel,

21 3j The Dutch as Neutrals. 35
Dutch government thus gave in many ways proof of its
earnest desire to be strictly neutral, the court of St. James
was by no means satisfied with the conduct of the Dutch,
as will be seen in the next chapter.
carrying thirty 24-pounders on one deck, and almost equalled a ship
of the line in appearance. Unfortunately difficulties arose about the
equipping and manning of the vessel in the neutral Dutch Republic.
The commissioners were also lacking funds. They resolved there
fore to sell the frigate to the King of France (Franklin, Deane, and
Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, November 30, 1777, in
Wharton, II, 433). Louis XVI, on his part, ceded the "Indian," as
the frigate was called, to the ChevaUer Luxembourg. In 1780
Alexander Gillon, a merchant from South Carolina, rented the ves
sel for his state and renamed her " South Carolina." He sailed
from Amsterdam in July, 1780, but did not arrive at Philadelphia
until May 28, 1782. The " South Carolina " was put to sea again in
December of the same year, but was chased and captured by an
English squadron soon after she had left the Capes of Delaware.
Luxembourg, as had been stipulated by contract, demanded 300,000
livres for this loss. His claim was settled only on December 21,
1814, when the state of South Carolina made a final payment of
$28,894 to the heirs of the Chevalier Luxembourg (C. O. PauUin,
The Navy of the American Revolution, 264, 304, 436-440).

CHAPTER III.
English Complaints.
Though George III, in 1775, had expressed his satis
faction with the Dutch proclamation prohibiting contraband
trade with North America,^ the sentiments of the English
authorities soon changed. Sir Joseph Yorke wrote to Lord
Suffolk in the following year that he was glad to receive
from Sir William Gordon an ordinance, in terms very
friendly to his Majesty, just published by the government
of Brussels prohibiting the exportation of arms and ammuni
tion, which he would take care to publish in the United
Provinces as worthy of imitation. " I stated," the ambas
sador said in another letter to his government, " the strong
proof of friendship lately given by the King of Portugal,
and proved more or less, that every Power in Europe had
gone further than the Republic."^ Still it was apparently
not so much the wording of the Dutch declaration that dis
pleased Great Britain as it was the failure to enforce it.'
According to the law of nations it was then, just as to-day,
considered a breach of neutrality, and formed a casus beUi,
for a state to furnish arms and other contraband goods to
belligerents. If, however, private citizens engaged in such
commerce, they did not involve their country in any breach
of neutrality but ran the risk of losing their goods.* In
the case of the subjects of the States General, it did not
make any difference that the latter had issued special regu-
' Above, p. 27.
'Yorke to Suffolk, April 30, 1776; same to same, August 6, 1776
(Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' The admiralties were apparently not very strict in the observance
of the regulations (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, US; Jameson,
" St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," American Historical
Review, July, 1903, p. 687).
* Wharton, I, 453. 36

2X5] English Complaints. 37
lations. Dutch citizens violating the contraband laws of
their country were subject to the punishment provided for
such transgressions, yet the status of the Dutch government
with reference to Great Britain was not changed thereby.
The English were, therefore, as far as the law of nations
was concerned, not justified in making the contraband trade
of Dutch merchants the subject of violent reproaches to
the Republic.
There were many ways in which the Dutch merchants
were able to evade the regulations of the States General.
As it was forbidden to export contraband to the American
colonies the Dutch carried their goods first to some French
port where the goods passed nominally into the possession
of the French. This manipulation was even sometimes
performed in mid ocean, American and Dutch vessels
exchanging their cargoes. In 1777 the Grand Pensionary
of HoUand, at the instigation of Sir Joseph Yorke, had
these manoeuvres on the high sea investigated. The am
bassador, reporting the result to his government, said that
the fact of illicit trade seemed clearly proved by this in
quiry, however with the difference that Frenchmen assisted
in the collusion to cover the Dutch, and that papers were
given to mask the transaction and prevent the law from
taking effect.^ A more frequent means of making the ordi
nances ineffective was to send the contraband goods to the
Dutch West Indies, especially the island of St. Eustatia,
whence American vessels carried them to the colonies. It
seems that in the beginning of the war only comparatively
few American merchant vessels ventured as far as the coast
of the Dutch Republic. They usually unloaded their car
goes at French or Spanish ports where Dutch vessels re
ceived the American goods in exchange for contraband
brought from the United Provinces. Sir Joseph Yorke
observed ironically that the Dutch merchants ought to
become anti- Amer ican, not out of good will to England,
'Yorke to Suffolk, November 25 and 28, 1777 (Sparks ' MSS.,
LXXII).

38 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [216
but from jealousy in seeing the American trade, owing to
the greater facility of the voyage, pour into French and
Spanish ports instead of theirs.'-
Another trade in which the Dutch merchants were en
gaged might have been considered unlawful, that is, the
commercial intermediacy between England and her revolt
ing colonies. To such violations, however, Great Britain
closed her eyes. The English ambassador wrote to Lord
Suffolk in 1776 that the English manufacturers conveyed
their goods to America through the United Provinces. He
added that he did not expect to see a stop put to it and that
he was not insisting upon the prohibition of any other
branch of contraband than warlike stores.^ No wonder
then that Dutch commerce and navigation reached a height
during the American Revolution which had never been at
tained before. England was losing accordingly. The
high marine insurance, sometimes as high as 35 per cent.,
for English goods destined for the West Indies was almost
prohibitive. Many of the Dutch who had never thought
of engaging in the commerce with distant countries now
took their share in the American trade. It was as if a gold
mine had been opened for Dutch commerce.' A regular
trade intercourse between America and the United Prov
inces, especially Amsterdam, had been established, according
to the French charge d'affaires. Abbe Desnoyers, as early
as 1776. He informed the foreign minister in France that
the " independents of the English colonies " seemed to have
a very regular intercourse with Amsterdam, that some
of them were actually there and purchased great quanti-
' Yorke to Suffolk, December 24, 1776, and Yorke to Eden, Decem
ber 27, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, December 3, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
The French, too, replaced English navigation to a great extent at
this period (Arthur Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Sep
tember 9, 1777, in Wharton, II, 391-392).
' On the flourishing of Dutch commerce and navigation see : Kam-
pen, Verkorte Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, II, 290; Dumas to the
American Commissioners, June 19, 23, 26, 1778 (Lee's MSS. in the
library of Harvard University, IV, No. 156) ; Vaterlandsche His
torie, XXV, 58.

217] English Complaints. 39
ties of goods for ready cash. A large quantity of ducats
recently coined at Dordrecht he supposed to be intended
also for the American agents.^
To what extent contraband trade was carried on between
the United Provinces and America may be judged from
reports of the English ambassador at the Hague to his
government. In April, 1776, he wrote that within two
days 850 barrels or 85,000 pounds of gunpowder had been
shipped from Amsterdam to France. He concluded that
those shipments must be for America since never before,
even in times of war, had so much gunpowder been shipped
from Amsterdam.^ Orders for powder continuing to arrive
from France, Yorke was confirmed in his opinion that since
all those consignments were certainly destined for the
American colonies, there must be means for eluding the
ordinances. " In short," he wrote to Suffolk, " this is the
first and almost sole market for the Rebels, tho' conducted
from hence thro' so many different channels to conceal it,
and to endeavour to have it appear that other countries are
equal sharers with them in this mischievous commerce."'
The reason why the Dutch engaged so much in this danger
ous trade was that they obtained very high prices in Amer
ica, an inducement which few merchants were able to
resist. As one of the most considerable Dutch traders to
North America Sir Joseph Yorke mentioned the house of
Crommelin. In his opinion all attempts to stop that illegal
trade would be without results since future attempts could
not be prevented when the profits were so great.* He said
that gunpowder brought a profit of more than 120 per
cent, at St. Eustatia.' According to a statement of one R.
Irvine in Rotterdam these profits were even larger. Gun
powder taken from the United Provinces to St. Eustatia
and sold there had yielded 230 Dutch florins (or guilders)
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, September 10, 1776 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII). 'Yorke to Suffolk, April 30, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Same to same, August 9, 1776 (ibid.).
'Same to same, March 22, 1776 (ibid.).
"Same to same, April 2, 1776 (ibid.).

40 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [218
per cwt., that is, 46 Dutch stivers or 4s. 2d. sterling a pound,
while the price in the United Provinces was only from 40 to
42 guilders per cwt. or about gd. sterling a pound. These
exorbitant profits, together with the facility of obtaining
permission for the export of powder in their own bottoms,
he said, would induce the Dutch merchants to run all risks.
They could afford to lose two cargoes out of three and stiU
make considerable profits. Powder was therefore exported
in every possible disguise, in tea chests, rice barrels, etc.,
so that, in case of search, the powder would not be found
by a superficial inspection of the cargo. Irvine stated
further that not fewer than eighteen Dutch vessels, laden
with powder and ammunition for the American market,
had sailed from Amsterdam for St. Eustatia, between the
first of January and the middle of May, 1776.^
Under these circumstances the anger of the English at
the conditions existing in the United Provinces and Yorke's
despair are comprehensible. In August, 1776, Sir Joseph
wrote to Lord Suffolk that should the unhappy situation in
America be by any accident prolonged, it appeared to him
that the surest, indeed the only, way to act with the Repub
lic was to determine what Great Britain had the right
to require of a nation styling itself friend and ally, to com
municate it previously in friendship to the stadtholder and
the ministers, and to make a formal demand to the States
General, requiring a speedy answer; letting it be known at
the same time, that, in case of a refusal. His Majesty would
be under the necessity of taking measures for his own
security. He expressed his hope that such a step would not
dissatisfy the reasonable and well intentioned; from others
England could expect nothing voluntarily which would run
counter to their private interest. The ambassador proposed
then that Great Britain should request of the States General

'Irvine to Suffolk, May 14, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
How profitable European trade with the American colonies was
and how it could be carried on with comparatively small risk we
learn also from the letter of Arthur Lee to von der Schulenburg of
June 7, 1777 (Wharton, II, 330).

219] English Complaints. 41
that the term of the Dutch proclamation expiring in Sep
tember of the same year might be prolonged. He suggested
also that an " amplification " should be demanded, having ex
perienced the inefficiency of prohibitions, dependent on the
oaths of brokers who were only proxies for merchants.^
Yorke's suggestion feU on fertile soil in England. About
a month later he received instructions from his government
directing him to submit a memorial to the Dutch authori
ties, in which not only the renewal of the prohibitory edict,
expiring on the 20th of September, was requested but more
efficient measures demanded for suppressing the smug
gling to the American colonies.^
Yorke's memorial, delivered on September 17, in exe
cution of this direction, was received rather coolly by the
States General. They replied that they could not extend
the prohibitions beyond what had been done already. Every
individual was at liberty to hazard his fortune in commerce.
Besides, making their prescriptions more severe might re
sult in keeping their own colonies from receiving the neces
sary supplies, and Great Britain could not expect the United
Provinces to prepare the ruin of their own colonies.' The
English, not satisfied with this answer, were at a loss what
to do to check the Dutch contraband trade to America. Sir
Joseph Yorke thought that means might be found to re
strain that trade. As an effective measure he proposed to
inform the United Provinces that, in case they should con
tinue their present attitude, orders would be sent to Bengal
not to let them bring home any saltpeter, since they made
such bad use of their gunpowder.* Lord Suffolk suggested
that all doubt and embarrassment could be avoided if the
States General would not allow the exportation of larger
military stores to the Dutch West Indies than had been
'Yorke to Suffolk, August 6, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Suffolk to Yorke, September 13, 1776 (ibid.).
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, October 7, 1776 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII). The proclamation of the United Provinces was renewed by the
resolution of October 10, 1776.
* Yorke to Eden, October 25, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

42 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [220
sent annuaUy upon an average of some years preceding the
American Revolution.^ Sir Joseph Yorke approved of such
a measure, and hinted that if it should be rejected, the
necessity might be urged of confiscating all the powder
found in Dutch vessels sailing for the settlements of the
United Provinces, unless its use for the Dutch possessions
could be proved.^ In fact, the ambassador warned the
Prince of Orange as head of the West India Company to
prevent all extraordinary exportations of miUtary stores to
the Dutch territories both in Africa and the West Indies.
Ever since the beginning of the Revolutionary War the
chief intercourse between the United Provinces (as well as
other European countries) and the American colonies had
been effected by way of St. Eustatia.' This Dutch island
therefore soon attracted the attention of the British govem
ment. According to Yorke's observations it was the rendez
vous of everything and everybody that was meant to be
conveyed clandestinely to the continent of America.* Be-
' Suffolk to Yorke, October 22, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 29, 1776 (ibid.).
' The following discussion of St. Eustatia and the part the island
played in the American Revolution is almost wholly based upon
Dr. J. Franklin Jameson's most excellent and exhaustive monograph,
" St. Eustatius in the American Revolution," in the American His
torical Review, July, 1903, p. 683 ff. For the sake of conciseness
references are mostly given only where sources besides Dr. Jameson
were consulted or, in a few instances, where the details of this essay
exceed Dr. Jameson's data.
* Yorke to Eden, May 14, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
Besides St. Eustatia, of the Lesser Antilles the islands of Curagao,
Bonaire, Aruba, Saba and St. Martin belonged to the United Prov
inces. St. Eustatia — an island of an area less than seven square
miles — was_ little more than a mass of barren rocks and had almost
no production of its own (at the time of the American Revolution
it did not produce more than six hundred barrels of sugar a year).
The same was true of the other islands except perhaps St Martin.
The only Dutch colonies in America which had a production of any
importance were those in Guiana, called after the rivers on which
they were situated Surinam, Essequibo, Demerari, and Berbice
(Wild, Die Niederlande, II, 320; Gazette de Leyde, April 6, 1781,
p. 7) ; see also Hansard, The Parliamentary History of England,
XXII, 220, 221.
Geographical lexicons call this island " St. Eustatius," but since
all documents of this period name it Eustatia, that form is used in
this paper. Similarly, the contemporary spellings " Dogcrersbank,"
" Demerari," and " Trinconomale " are used.

22 1 j English Complaints. 43
ing a free port, it became during the American Revolution
the store house for goods of all nations. Here the English
bought the products of America, and the Americans the
manufactures of England; here, after France had joined the
war, the British merchants met the planters from the French
West Indian islands ; and here, finally, was the chief market
where the Americans obtained their military stores. After
the outbreak of war between France and England many
planters and merchants of the British West Indian islands,
especiaUy of St. Kitts — also called St. Christopher — stored
their goods at St. Eustatia to secure them from capture by
the French. The whole island was one vast store house,
equally useful to friend and foe.^ Still the English govern
ment, anxious to suppress the rebellion in North America,
regarded St. Eustatia in a different light. Report after
report arrived at London of the numerous and large pur
chases of arms and ammunition effected by the Americans
on that island. The principal agent in the business was said
to be Mr. Isaac van Dam, a Dutch resident of St. Eustatia.
It was learned that in one instance he had sent 40CO pounds
of gunpowder on board a Virginia vessel to North Carolina
in support of the rebellion ; then he was found to have sent
£2000 sterling to France for the purchase of powder to be
sent to St. Eustatia for transmission to the American colo
nies. Harrison sent 6000 pounds of powder from Martin
ique, and then 14,100 pounds more from St. Eustatia. Of
these 10,000 were shipped to Charleston; the rest, to Phila
delphia.^ Later a single vessel is said to have exported 49,-
000 pounds.' Sir Joseph Yorke was directed to express to
the States General the dissatisfaction of George III and to
give them to understand that they must not be surprised if
the English men-of-war in the vicinity of St. Eustatia
henceforth should show more vigilance and less reserve.*
' Hannay, Rodney, 151-152.
'Maryland Archives, XI, 494; XII, 171, 268, 332, 423; Force,
American Archives, fourth ser., VI, 612, 905; fifth ser., I, 1025; II,
965; III, 513; Jameson, St. Eustatius, 6^.
•August 2, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Suffolk to Yorke, April 12, 1776; Yorke to Suffolk, April 19,
1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

44 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [222
Thereupon the States General assured Sir Joseph of their
disapproval of such iUegal proceedings on the part of their
subjects. When Yorke reported this answer to London, he
could inform his superiors at the same time of the death of
van Dam, who had made a declaration before his death that
the consignments of contraband to North Carolina had been
effected on the account of French merchants.^ St. Eustatia
was now guarded by the English in such a way that it be
came almost impossible to enter even the necessary pro
visions for the inhabitants of the island. This caused great
indignation in the United Provinces, and some Anti-Oran-
gists even proposed to blockade, in return, the residence of
the British ambassador at the Hague.^
The governor of St. Eustatia, Johannes de Graaf, had
been appointed in the middle of the year 1776, his prede
cessor being thought by Great Britain to have favored the
contraband trade. It was soon evident that the new gov
ernor did no better. " This day the Port of Statia is opened
without reserve to all American vessels, and I find that the
salutes of their armed vessels are returned at St. Croix as
well as at Statia," wrote Captain Colpoys to Vice-Admiral
Young from Basseterre, St. Christopher, on November 27,
1776.' Yorke had also intimated to the Dutch authorities
that de Graaf should be cautioned. This was done by the
direction of the Prince of Orange. StUl the exportation of
contraband was continued at Amsterdam with the same
zeal.* But, on October 22, Yorke could write to his govem
ment that the contraband trade to the West Indies was
suspended at present, occasioned, as he believed, by the
late " glad tidings " from Long Island.' In January of the
'Yorke to Suffolk, May 31, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Desnoyers to Vergennes, October 8, 1776 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXII). ' Sparks MSS., LXXII (following a letter of Yorke to W. Eden,
dated March 7, i777)-
'Yorke to Suffolk, September 10, 1776 (Sparks MSS.. LXXII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 22, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
The " glad tidings from Long Island " were the news of the
disaster of the Americans at Brooklyn Heights when SuUivan and
Lord Stirling (William Alexander) with some eleven hundred men
were taken prisoner by General Howe on August 27, 1776.

223] English Complaints. 45
following year, 1777, de Graaf complained to the directors
of the West India Company about the conduct of English
vessels. British men-of-war, he wrote, were cruising daUy
in the roads of St. Eustatia, seizing, even under the cannon
of the fortress, vessels intending to enter or leaving the
port. The island must therefore almost be considered
blockaded and its commerce would be ruined. He asked
to be instructed as to what course he should pursue since
he was anxious to avoid everything that could give to
Great Britain the slightest pretence for a complaint.
Though the Dutch, he said, were perfectly entitled to re
pulse the British aggressions by force, prudence must per
suade the island to suffer the hostilities, owing to want of
sufficient means. This would, however, be very hard and
disadvantageous for St. Eustatia.^ Yet the hardships thus
pictured by de Graaf were only the preliminaries of greater
troubles which the English had in store for the governor and
the inhabitants of the island.
In February, Sir Joseph Yorke received a letter from his
government, informing him of a " flagrant insult offered to
His Majesty's colours, in the public honour paid by the
principal Dutch fort [St. Eustatia] to a Rebel brigantine
carrying the flag of the Rebel Congress." This offence,
the missive stated, was not only proved by a letter of Presi
dent Greathead of St. Christopher, but was uncontradicted
by de Graaf's answer to it. The ambassador was then
directed to demand of the States General a formal disavowal
of the salute, and the immediate dismissal and recall of de
Graaf. The King of England would not allow the United
Provinces to amuse him with assurances, and he would,
therefore, instantly give orders for such measures as he
thought "due to the interests and dignity" of his crown.^
' Gouverneur de St. Eustache aux directeurs de la Compagnie des
Indes occidentales, January 28, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXXII).
'Suffolk to Yorke, February 14, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII;
Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 124).
The salute of the " Andrew Doria " by Fort Orange, on November
16, 1776, has been claimed to be the first salute to the American
flag abroad (Bancroft, History of the United States, IX, 293;

46 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [224
On the following day the Lords of Admiralty in London
were instructed to give
"immediate orders to the Commander in Chief of His Majesty's
ships and vessels at the Leeward Islands to station proper cruizers
off the harbour of St. Eustatia, and to direct their commanders to
search aU Dutch ships and vessels going into and coming out of the
said harbours, and to send such of them as shall be found to have
any arms, ammunition, clothing, or materials for clothing on board
into some of His Majesty's ports within the limits of the command
of the said Commander in Chief . . . , to be detained there until
further orders.'"
On February 21, Yorke delivered a memorandum to the
States General according to his instructions. He declared
that the complaints were based on authentic documents
(which he appended to his note), as Their High Mighti
nesses would admit after perusal. De Graaf, besides hav
ing allowed an unlimited commerce with the Americans, had
neglected his duty to such a degree as to allow an American
pirate to take an English vessel almost within reach
(presqu'a la portee) of the cannon of his island. To crown
his insult to the British nation and all the powers of Europe,
he had caused the fortress of St. Eustatia to answer the
salute of a ship carrying the rebel flag. Yorke continued
that all the friendly representations which the president of
the neighboring island of St. Christopher had made to de
Graaf had been answered by the latter in a most vague and
unsatisfactory manner. The Dutch governor had even re
fused to enter into a discussion with or give an explanation
to a member of the King's Council of St. Christopher, who
B. F. Prescott, The Stars and Stripes : The Flag of the United
States of America; When, Where and by Whom was it first Saluted?
[Concord, 1876] ; Dr. W. E. Griffis, " Where our Flag was first
saluted," New England Magazine, n. s., VIII, 576). StiU, in a letter
dated October 27, 1776, and sent from the Danish island of St.
Croix to Vice-Admiral Young, it is said of an American schooner,
which had departed two days before with a small cargo of powder:
" But my astonishment was great to find such a Commerce coun
tenanced by the Government here. The vessel went out under
American Colours, saluted the Fort and had the compliment re
turned the same as if she had been an English or Danish ship "
(Letter of October 27, 1776, in Bancroft MSS.; Jameson, St. Eusta
tius, 691).
'Suffolk to the Lords of Admiralty, February 15, 1777 (Sparks
MSS., LXXII).

22 s] English Complaints. 47
had been sent by President Greathead to St. Eustatia for
that express purpose. The ambassador then stated the de
mands of his king and concluded, citing verbally from his
instructions, that satisfaction must be given. ^
The first enclosure with the memorandum was a letter of
President Greathead to Governor de Graaf, dated December
17, 1776. Greathead wrote that although the rebel colonies
had been said for some time to be receiving protection at
St. Eustatia, he had not previously complained about this.
He could, however, not remain silent longer, because au
thentic reports had verified these rumors. Not only had
provisions and military stores been furnished the Americans
daily and openly by inhabitants of the island, but even
armed vessels had sailed from St. Eustatia with the avowed
intention of making prizes of ships and property of peace
ful and loyal English subjects. He referred in particular
to the sloop " Baltimore Hero," which, carrying the flag of
the Continental Congress, had on November 21 attacked
and seized under the cannon of St. Eustatia a brigantine
and her cargo. The brigantine, belonging to one McCon-
nell, an English subject living on the island of Dominica, had
been on her way from St. Christopher to St. Eustatia. The
American sloop returned afterwards to the roads of St.
Eustatia, enjoying there apparently every protection. Great-
head stated further that the American armed vessel, " An
drew Doria" (Captain Robinson), flying the rebel flag, had
entered the roads of St. Eustatia about the middle of No
vember and saluted Fort Orange by 13 guns, which were
answered by the fort in the solemn way that was due to
the flags of independent and sovereign states. The " Andrew
Doria" had thereupon been suffered to take on board gun
powder and other articles of war as well as provisions for
the use of the American army. The Americans having
usurped their power, their armed ships were to be con-
' Yorke's memorandum, February 21, 1777 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland and England; Sparks MSS., LXXXII; Vater
landsche Historie, XXV, iii; Sparks Dutch Papers; Stevens
Papers in the Library of Congress).

48 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [226
sidered pirate vessels. To the disgrace of all public faith
and national honor it had been left for a Dutch colony
avowedly to assist the Americans in their treason, and to
become the protectors of their buccaneering. It was a
fortress of Their High Mightinesses which first recognized
the American colors, until now unknown in the catalogue
of national flags. Greathead, in conclusion, demanded fuU
satisfaction for the insult offered by Fort Orange to His
Britannic Majesty's flag, also effective means to prevent a
repetition of such incidents, and an indemnity for the pirate
act of the "Baltimore Hero" together with an exemplary
punishment of the culprits. The president of St. Chris
topher sent Mr. Stanley, member of the King's Council and
Solicitor General, to present the complaint to Governor de
Graaf and to wait for an answer.
De Graaf asked in his reply of December 23 (forming
the second appendix to Yorke's memorial) for authentic
proofs and witnesses of the alleged daily and open furnish
ing of contraband to the Americans, since he was prohibited
by his commission as well as the laws of his country to
prosecute persons without plaintiff and witnesses, or to
condemn them without evidence. The governor rejected
the accusation of having protected and furthered piracy, and
he denied therefore his obligation to give indemnity in the
case of the " Baltimore Hero." He said that he knew him
self to be free of partiality and that he must not be ex
pected to disturb the commerce and navigation of St.
Eustatia and of the Dutch nation. He flattered himself
that he was able to justify his attitude toward the American
vessel " Andrew Doria." No one on earth, he declared, but
his superiors was entitled to caU him to account for acts
of administration effected by him.
Greathead, on December 26 (Yorke's appendix No.
three), expressed his disapproval of de Graaf's conduct as
not in conformity with the treaties existing between Great
Britain and the United Provinces, and informed the gover
nor of his intention to lay the matter before his royal master.

227] English Complaints.

49

Appendix four, dated December i6, 1776, contained an
affidavit of a certain James Fraser and others before John
Stanley, member of the King's CouncU of St. Christopher
and Solicitor General of the British Leeward islands in
America. The "Andrew Doria" had according to this
affidavit been saluted by Fort Orange on or about November
16, 1776. The American vessel was said to have fired
eleven guns and the fort nine. The witnesses stated that
they had learned that the commandant of the fort had
hesitated to answer the salute, but that the governor had
ordered him to do so.
In appendix five, dated December 9, 1776, was presented
the affidavit of one Matthew Murray, who had deposed
that he sailed from St. Christopher to St. Eustatia about
December i, 1776. When their boat arrived in the waters
of St. Eustatia by the side of a sloop, a fellow passenger
of Murray's (whose name, however, no one on board had
heard before), exclaimed: "You may all know now, who I
am. I am "constapel" (gunner?) of the sloop called the
" Baltimore Hero," an American privateer, the same which,
some days ago, captured the Irish brig off St. Eustatia!"
To the memorandum was also appended the affidavit of one
John Trottman, a saUor who had deserted from the "An
drew Doria." He declared that the American vessel had
sailed for St. Eustatia with the intention of buying there
clothes and other necessities for the American army.^
Yorke, evidently self-complacent, reported that he had
executed the orders of His Majesty the King. He stated
that he had informed the Prince of Orange and the Duke
of Brunswick of what had happened, and that both had
been highly surprised, since they had received no news of
such transactions. They disavowed the proceedings of the
governor of St. Eustatia, and Yorke said he had no doubt
that the States General would do the same and give every
satisfaction possible.^ The Prince of Orange and the Duke
SdrtIcs IDutch Psocrs
'Yorke to Suffolk, February 21, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
4

50 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [228
of Brunswick were certainly surprised at what they heard
concerning de Graaf, but they were more indignant at
Yorke's language and that of his government. Brunswick
wrote to the stadtholder that Yorke's note to the States
General was certainly the most arrogant missive ever trans
mitted to a sovereign. The threat expressed by the King of
England in the conclusion of the memorandum was an
insult as well as an injustice to the Republic. The latter
could not comply wtih the king's demands as long as she
desired to be considered a sovereign and independent state.
What made the matter worse, the duke said, was the verbal
declaration of the English ambassador to the States General
that he would be recalled in case satisfaction could not be
given within three weeks. England's contempt for the
Republic was evident.^ The duke was far from defending
the conduct of the governor of St. Eustatia; on the con
trary, he was of opinion that de Graaf should be caUed upon
to justify his conduct, and that, in case the accusations
were found to be true, England ought to be given satisfac
tion. The honor and dignity of the Republic required, how
ever, that such satisfaction should be denied until the
accused had been heard. It was the duty of the Republic
to be firm on this occasion, and to take measures for the
protection of her commerce and her ports. The duke hinted
that the court of St. James had taken this step only in order
to justify her searching and seizing of Dutch vessels.^
'Yorke, who had represented Great Britain in the Netherlands
since 1751, was apparently not the right representative of his country
there under the circumstances. He was always inclined to carry
matters to extremes, and offended continually the national feelings
of the Dutch by the imperious manner in which he carried out his
instructions. As early as 1769 the Duke of Brunswick wrote to the
stadtholder that the way in which Yorke treated things was always
very disagreeable, and that so long as he (Yorke) was at the Hague
England would never be of any service to the United Provinces.
It would therefore be desirable in the interest of the stadtholder and
the whole country that Yorke should be removed. According to the
Dutch envoy at the court of St. James, Count van Welderen,
Yorke was the greatest enemy of the RepubUc (Nijhoff, Brunswijk,
142). In the present case Yorke seems to have been less guilty of
arrogance, since he used in the memorial apparently the terms of his
instructions. 'Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 149-152.

229] English Complaints. 51
Yorke was unconcerned about the indignation which his
memorandum roused throughout the United Provinces.
" Had any other Ck) vernor of any other Power done the
same," he wrote to W. Eden, " we should have done wrong
not to have exacted the same satisfaction." Sir Joseph
Yorke thought it would become public more easily in the
United Provinces than anywhere else and would be a good
lesson for other powers. He informed Lord Suffolk con
fidentially that the memorial had raised a violent fermenta
tion through the country, that the exchange was alarmed
and the people in general frightened. Since his note was a
categorical demand and did not imply a negotiation, he
expected that it would be complied with.^
Before an answer was given to the ambassador's memo
rial, the States General received, through the West India
Company, a letter from de Graaf, written at St. Eustatia
on January 28, 1777, in which he reported that the English
brigantine " May," skipper William Taylor, had been cap
tured by the armed American bark " Baltimore Hero," com
manded by Thomas Waters, between St. Christopher and
St. Eustatia on November 21, 1776, and sent to Maryland.
The owners of the " May," merchants of the island of Do
minica, complained about it to Thomas Shirley, the governor
of Dominica, and to James Young, the Vice-Admiral of the
English squadron at Antigua, stating that the " Baltimore
Hero " was fitted out at St. Eustatia and partly belonged to
residents of that island. They applied for indemnity to
de Graaf. The " Baltimore Hero," the governor, stated
further, had stayed at St. Eustatia from November 11 to
20, 1776, neither importing nor exporting anything, except
taking with her some necessary provisions and water. On
December 2 the bark returned to St. Eustatia. Though no
complaints had been received then, de Graaf questioned
Waters why he had taken the " May," whether his vessel
was fitted out at St. Eustatia, and whether she belonged
wholly or in part to merchants there. Waters thereupon
'Yorke to Eden, March 7, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

52 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [230
showed his commission from Maryland, issued by the Coun
cil of Safety, John Hancock, President, declaring under
oath that his ship had not been fitted out at St. Eustatia
and was not owned by residents of that island. De Graaf
concluded by stating that at St. Eustatia no American war
vessel had been received and saluted, but only merchant
vessels.^ Yorke, having learned of de Graaf's report, informed his
government of it. Sir Joseph said that the governor endeav
ored to justify himself by stating that it was a merchant
vessel which had been saluted, and not a war vessel; but
all impartial people condemned him. The ambassador also
announced that the Dutch minister at the court of St. James
was to deliver a resolution regarding St. Eustatia to the
British government.-^ This was true. The States General,
indignant at the English ambassador's offensive language,
resolved to have their answer to his memorial delivered to
the British government not through him, but through Count
Welderen. The latter accordingly conveyed to George III
the complaints of the States General at the reproaches ex
pressed in Yorke's memorial and at the threatening tone of
the latter, which were unacceptable to a sovereign and inde
pendent state, but above all inadmissible between neighbors
united by the ties of good harmony and of mutual friend
ship. De Graaf, Welderen continued, had been instructed
to come home in order to answer the charges pending against
him. The governor was also to give an account of all that
had come to his cognizance concerning the American colo
nies and their ships ever since he had taken over the com
mand of the island. The States General would not hesitate
to disavow acts of their officials which might in the least be
construed to be a recognition of the sovereignty and inde
pendence of the American colonies. The Dutch governor
and commanders in the West Indian colonies had again re-
' Missive van Representant en Bewindhebberen der Westindische
Compagnie, March 22, 1777 (Sparks Dutch Papers; Stevens Papers
in the Library of Congress).
'Yorke to Suffolk, March 25, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

23 1 J English Complaints. 53
ceived instructions from the States General to observe
strictly the orders and regulations against the exportation of
military stores to the American colonies.^
Three days after van Welderen had handed this memorial
to Lord Suffolk for transmission to the English king, the
orders of February 15 to the Lords of the Admiralty were
revoked, and the latter instructed to return to the govern
ment of St. Eustatia such Dutch vessels as were seized and
detained merely in consequence of those orders.^ On April
10, Lord Suffolk handed to Count van Welderen the king's
answer. ¦ It was a declaration that George III could not
consider the English memorandum of February 21 contrary
to the respect which sovereign and independent states owed
to each other. His Majesty was pleased that the States
General had complied with his request in recalling their gov
ernor and renewing to the Dutch governors and commanders
in the West Indies the orders concerning contraband trade.'
The British answer was not well received in the United
Provinces. Burgomaster Temminck of Amsterdam was
said to have been very much vexed that Count Welderen
accepted Lord Suffolk's note without criticizing it. Gov
ernor de Graaf was not to be recalled definitely, as stated
by the English note, but he was only to return in order to
explain his conduct. Temminck did not doubt that de
Graaf would be able to justify his actions and in that case
it would be impossible not to send him back to his island.
Yorke too does not seem to have been convinced, at this
time, of the reliability and adequacy of the material which
he had transmitted to the States General as evidence of de
Graaf's offences. He asked his government now for addi
tional proofs, especiaUy for particulars from the accounts —
sent from St. Christopher. — of smuggling at St. Eustatia.
(jovernor de Graaf became apparently henceforth more
' Count van Welderen's memorial, March 26, 1777 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland, and England; Sparks MSS., CIII; Stevens
Papers in the Library of Congress).
'Above, p. 46. Suffolk to the Lords of the Admiralty, March 29,
1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Suffolk to Welderen, April 10, 1777 (Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England; Sparks MSS., CIII).

54 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [232
severe in the supervision of the commercial transactions at
St. Eustatia. Some residents of the island, according to
Yorke, submitted a petition to the directors of the West
India Company, complaining of de Graaf's severity in visit
ing their vessels. They said they were not able to export
the smallest quantity of powder or other military stores for
their own use, and they requested therefore that the gover
nor be removed. The States General, however, did not give
credit to their complaints,^ and it is possible that this petition
was recognized as a political manoeuvre in connection with
de Graaf's temporary recaU. Another cause of the ruin of
the trade of St. Eustatia was, as Yorke informed his gov
ernment, the long credit granted to the North American col
onies by St. Eustatia merchants. He added that de Graaf
continued to salute the Americans that stole into the port,
but according to his regulation of honors, with two guns less
than the king's ships. The latter, Yorke concluded, no
longer saluted the port.^
The St. Eustatia incident formed a good object lesson for
the United Provinces. They saw what they had to expect
from Great Britain, and awakened to the fact of their own
weakness, and the danger threatening their commerce and
navigation. The result was a new impulse to increase the
Dutch navy. The province of Holland especially asked for
the fitting out of a squadron to be sent as convoy to the
West Indies, and urged contributions by the other provinces
for the building of twenty-four new ships of the line. In
May, 1778, the last province gave her consent to this
measure.' 'Yorke to Eden, April 25, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII) ; Resolu
tion of the States General, April 24, 1777 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
Yorke wrote, however, to Lord Suffolk, May 2, 1777, that the peti
tion was not the work of inhabitants of St. Eustatia, but was drawn
and signed by a number of masters of vessels navigating to the
Dutch West Indies (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Yorke to Eden, July 4, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 126.
According to Franklin and Deane, the States General immediately
ordered twenty-six men-of-war to be put upon the stocks (FrankUn
and Deane to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, March 12,
1777, in Wharton, II, 289). The commissioners were apparently
mistaken regarding the exact number of ships to be built.

233] English Complaints. 55
In August, 1777, the directors of the West India Com
pany again presented to the States General a letter from
de Graaf (dated June 30, 1777). This time he requested
to be excused from coming over to Europe. By such a pre
cipitate departure from St. Eustatia, his family affairs and
private business would greatly suffer. He thought further
more that the voyage was too dangerous now, since the hur
ricane season had begun. His body being stUl weak from
a recent illness, he feared too that his health would be in
jured by a stay in Europe during the winter. In addition
to his former report he mentioned some details of the inci
dents which had caused such violent accusations against
him. Fort Orange, he declared, answered the salute of the
"Andrew Doria," as a merchant vessel, according to a long
established custom of the island, with two guns less than
she had fired. The return of the salute of such ships was
merely an act of courtesy, in which no attention was paid
to their nationality. The answering of the salute of the
"Andrew Doria" did not therefore imply the recognition of
the independence of North America. Relative to the com
merce with North America effected by American vessels, de
Graaf explained that St. Eustatia had to rely upon that
country for her necessary provisions, as flour, bread, Indian
com, rice, salted fish, etc. ; as well as timber for houses,
barrels, etc. Ever since he had taken over the command of
the island he considered it his duty not to disturb this com
merce. Besides, he had never received any orders from
his superiors to do so. That this trade had increased, as
Great Britain pretended, was contrary to facts. The dan
ger attending American navigation since the beginning of
the Revolution was too great to allow extensive trade on
their part. As to the exportation of contraband to North
America, he said, he was conscious of having complied as
strictly with the regulations issued by the States General as
was in his power. In cases where the least suspicion of an
illegal exportation existed, the cargo of the vessels in ques
tion was examined. He had now even appointed a sworn

56 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [234
examiner to visit all American vessels at their arrival as well
as their departure, in order not only to prevent the exporta
tion of contraband but also the manning and equipping of
the vessels. Of course, there were always men who would
violate the laws, or find ways and means to evade them.
Since this had happened at all times and places, no reproach
could be cast upon him for such transgressions. With ref
erence to the taking of an English vessel near the fortress
of St. Eustatia, the governor declared that this was not
done within the range of the cannon of the island. It had
therefore not been more in his power to prevent the cap
ture than if the latter had taken place off the coast of
Africa.^ In October the States General resolved finaUy not
to comply with de Graaf's request to be excused from
coming to the United Provinces.^
The governor of St. Eustatia addressed a serious com
plaint to the Dutch West India Company on June 28, 1777,
which was laid before the States General. The English
man-of-war " Seaford " had seized and taken to the island
of Antigua two Dutch vessels, which had set sail at St.
Eustatia for Zealand on the day before. James Young, the
commander of the English squadron in the West Indies, had
tried to justify the capture by stating that the " Watergeus,"
one of the Dutch vessels, had on board products of the
British American colonies in rebellion, previously imported
into St. Eustatia. This was contrary to a recent act of Par
liament, forbidding all commerce and intercourse with the
North American colonies. The other ship, the "Hoop,"
was accused of having had on board gunpowder and ammu
nition. Young had also complained about the conduct of
one van Bibber at St. Eustatia, said to be an agent of the
' Missive van Bewindhebberen der Westindische Compagnie, Au
gust 27, 1777 (Sparks Dutch Papers; Stevens Papers in the
Library of Congress).
'Resolution of the States General, October 6, 1777 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII). Yorke caUed de Graaf the "dirty governor of that nest of
smugglers " (Yorke to Suffolk, private, September 24, 1777, in
Sparks MSS., LXXII).

235] EngUsh Complaints. 57
American Congress.^ Van Bibber was consequently ar
rested by the governor, but when de Graaf asked for evi
dence against him Young replied that the only proof he had
was the deposition before the court of the Vice-Admiralty
at Antigua of one George RaU. The latter was the com
mander of a small American privateer caUed " Jenny " which
had been taken by Captain Colpoys. Rail had declared that
van Bibber, the American agent, had sent several men on
board the "Jenny" from other American vessels, then at
St. Eustatia. Bibber had subsequently ordered him to
pursue a sloop, domiciled at Antigua, which had shortly
before left St. Eustatia, laden with cotton, cloth, etc. These
proceedings. Rail stated also, had been public and were in
no way prevented by the government of the island. Abraham
van Bibber, interrogated upon these charges before the
assembly of St. Eustatia, asserted that he had not furnished
people to the " Jenny," nor given orders to Rail, except that
he should bring up his prizes at Martinique. Although
Young could not furnish sufficient evidence or witnesses,
van Bibber was continued in custody. He seized, however,
an opportunity to escape from St. Eustatia. De Graaf in
formed Vice-Admiral Young that the " Watergeus " had
sailed from St. Eustatia for the port of Middleburg, prov
ince of Zealand, with products of America and the West
Indies, and that the " Hoop " was returning to Flushing
with 1750 barrels of gunpowder and three barrels of flint
which could not be sold at St. Eustatia. He demanded the
' Abraham van Bibber was the agent of the state of Maryland at
St. Eustatia as early as March, 1776, taking care of cargoes sent
or underwritten by that state. Later in the year van Bibber of
St. Eustatia and Richard Harrison of Maryland formed a co
partnership. They solicited from the Virginia Committee a por
tion of their custom (Maryland Archives, XI, 266, 442, 443, 494,
501, 555; Force, American Archives, fourth series, VI, 905; manu
script letters of March 11, 23, 28, June 14, July 25, August 15, 1776,
in the Virginia Archives; Jameson, St. Eustatius, 685). Van Bibber
claimed to be on the best of terras with Governor de Graaf, and
urged the Maryland Council to send all their vessels to St. Eustatia
rather than to any other island (Force, American Archives, fifth
series, II, 180; III, 513, 759; Jameson, St. Eustatius, 690, 691;
Maryland Archives, XII, 423, 456).

58 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [236
immediate release of the two ships and their cargoes and
an indemnity for costs and damages, caused by the seizure
and detention of the vessels. De Graaf asked if the admiral
could think that the United Provinces would permit com
merce and navigation from one Dutch possession to the
other to be disturbed in such a way as long as the Republic
formed an independent and sovereign state.^
The proposition of the province of Holland to send a
squadron as convoy to the West Indies was now at last
approved by the States General. Originally it was intended
to despatch about twenty vessels, but it was not found pos
sible to man more than eight. They set sail in December,
under the command of Vice-Admiral Count van Bylandt,
under strict orders to protect only the legal trade.^ In
April of the following year (1778) Count van Bylandt sent
home a confidential report on the condition of St. Eustatia.
It showed to what degree the United Provinces had neglected
the defence of their West Indian possessions. Bylandt in
formed the States General also of hostilities committed by
English privateers on the river Demerari, and of his inten
tion to despatch a man-of-war there. British privateers
even anchored at St. Eustatia, under the pretext of being
compelled to do so for want of provisions. They did not
stay long in the harbor but cruised afterwards in the neigh
borhood of the island. Bylandt emphasized the necessity
of putting St. Eustatia in a position of defence which would
enable her to maintain herself against an enemy for some
time and to protect her flourishing trade. Many complaints
were presented to him by inhabitants of the island about the
governor. According to these people the latter acted arbi
trarily in the administration of St. Eustatia. The assembly
of the island, consisting of one chairman (Capitein der
' Missive van Bewindhebberen der Westindische Compagnie, Au
gust 26, 1777 (Sparks Dutch Papers ; Stevens Papers in the Library
of Congress).
'According to Yorke, however, most of the ships had sailed with
out convoy (Yorke to Suffolk, December 23, 1777, in Sparks MSS.,
LXXII). The squadron remained at or near St. Eustatia until the
year 1779 (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 125).

237] English Complaints. 59
Burgerije) and four councillors, was wholly in the hands of
de Graaf. The governor was rich, being owner of a number
of farms and holding mortgages on many others. This re
sulted in making many people dependent on him, so much
the more as he had given several important administrative
offices to relatives of his.^ That Count Bylandt was not
only a good sea-captain, but also a diplomat, may be con
cluded from the fact that the English were satisfied with
his conduct.^ The British as well as the French ambassador
at the Hague had predicted trouble when the sending of a
convoy to the West Indies was considered by the Provinces.'
His position was difficult, but during his whole stay at St.
Eustatia no conflict of any significance occurred.
In accordance with the resolutions of the States General
of March 21 and October 6, 1777, de Graaf saUed for the
United Provinces in order to answer the charges brought
against him by Yorke. Two directors of the West India
Company had been instructed by the States General to ex
amine de Graaf. After his arrival in July, 1778, he was
directed to answer in writing the following three charges :
Did he admit the equipping of American vessels at St.
'Secret Resolution of the States General, June 4, 1778 (Sparks
MSS., CIII; Sparks Dutch Papers; Stevens Papers in the Library
of Congress).
'Yorke to Suffolk, August 25 and 28, 1778 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXII). Lord Macartney, governor of Grenada, thought, however,
that " to see a man of Count Byland's Birth and Quality receive
aboard his Flag Ship the Masters of Rebel Privateers with all the
attention and civility due to their equals in regular service excites
one's pity and contempt" (Jameson, St. Eustatius, 694).
' " A party at Amsterdam are endeavouring to push the States
to give convoy to the West-Indian trade, which will be plunging
into all the inconveniences and squabbles of the last War, and
therefore I hope this Government will be too prudent to give into,
for I make no scruples to tell them as my private opinion, that
England can never suffer such a trade to be so cover'd, when the
proofs of the iU use made of our indulgence are so notorious "
(Yorke, September 24, 1777). " H n'est pas douteux que malgre
la protection des vaisseaux de guerre, les Anglois voudront con-
tinuer de visiter les navires marchands. On m'assure meme que
M. Yorke I'a positivement declare, et il me paroit alors impos
sible d'eviter de part et d' autre des actes violents " (Vauguyon,
October 31, 1777, in Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 125, 126, foot
note).

6o Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [238
Eustatia? Did he allow, almost under the cannon of the
island, the capture of an English vessel by an American
pirate? Did he permit his fortress to return the salute of
a vessel carrying the American flag?
In addition de Graaf was to state everything that had
come to his knowledge, during his stay at St. Eustatia, con
cerning the American colonies and their vessels.^ The gov
ernor answered with a very interesting report covering,
appendixes included, about 340 printed folio pages. He
said in general, only much more in detail, what he had
stated already in his previous reports. His defence was
exceedingly clever and convincing. The West India Com
pany submitted his missive to the States General, inform
ing them that, after careful examination, they had nothing
to add to his report, except that in their opinion the United
Provinces had more cause to complain about the conduct
of Great Britain than the latter about that of the Republic.
The two directors of the West India Company finally recom
mended de Graaf to the protection of the States General,
expressing their hope that the latter would also find the
governor innocent. De Graaf's report was then examined
by the several provinces. Holland made a lengthy resolu
tion in favor of the governor, instructing their deputies to
the States General accordingly.^ A petition of de Graaf
to be allowed to return to his post' was finally complied
with by the States General and he went back to St. Eu
statia.* ' Bicker and Warrin (directors of the West India Company) to
the States General, March 23, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers; Stevens
Papers in the Library of Congress ; " blue book " in possession of
Dr. W. E. Griffis, Ithaca, N. Y.; Jameson, St. Eustatius, 692,
note i).
'Extract, Resolution of States of HoUand and Westfriesland,
August 6, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
'De Graaf to the States General, June 18, 1779 (Sparks Dutch
Papers). ' " De Graaf went out again as governor, and conducted himself
so acceptably to the Americans that two of their privateers were
named after him and his lady; and his portrait, presented sixty
years afterward by an American citizen grateful for the 'first
salute,' hangs in the New Hampshire state-house [it was copied in

239] English Complaints. 6r
In concluding this discussion of the St. Eustatia contro
versy it may be mentioned that the commerce between the
United States and the United Provinces was carried on
more and more directly now. Thulemeier, Frederick the
Great's envoy at the Hague, reported to his master in the
beginning of the year 1778 that the commerce of the United
States with St. Eustatia had almost ceased. The proximity
of the English fleets was too great a danger for the Amer
icans. The Dutch established their offices at Bordeaux and
other French ports. In July of the foUowing year, he in
formed the king that the commerce of the Republic with
North America became larger every day. No less than ten
vessels, equipped by Congress, were lying in the harbor of
Amsterdam. An American agent by the name of "la
Serre " resided there, without, however, being recognized
by the regents. Still the contraband trade with the United
States was decreasing because the establishment of factories
by the Americans had made considerable progress. They
were therefore less dependent on Europe for their gun
powder, ammunition, and other warlike articles.^ Sir
Joseph Yorke from time to time also sent reports to his
home government, to the effect that commerce with St. "
Eustatia was reduced. From other sources, however, we
may conclude that there was rather a continuous increase.
John Adams, after his return from his first mission to
Europe, wrote in a letter to the President of Congress,
" From the success of several enterprises by the way of
St. Eustatia it seems that the trade between the two coun
tries [United States and United Provinces] is likely to
Surinam from a painting owned there by de Graaf's grandson].
Of his defense no more need now be said than that an observance
of neutrality which gave to the one belligerent such absolute con
tentment and to the other such unqualified dissatisfaction can
hardly have been perfect" (Jameson, St. Eustatius, 695).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 16, 1778, July 23 and
September 28, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland). Thule
meier apparently misspelled the name of the American agent and,
no doubt, meant Stephen Sayre, who, according to Ambassador
Yorke, was in Amsterdam in 1779. Sayre was a disreputable
character (Wharton, Introduction, sec. 146, 150, 192 ff.).

62 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [240
increase, and possibly Congress may think it expedient to
send a minister there [to the United Provinces]."^ Vice-
Admiral Bylandt stated in the journal which he kept during
his command at St. Eustatia in 1778-1779 that 3182 vessels
sailed from the island during the thirteen months of his
stay there.^ It was said that in 1779 more than 12,000
hogsheads of tobacco and 1,500,000 ounces of indigo were
shipped to St. Eustatia from North America, in exchange
for naval supplies and other goods from Europe.'
Besides the Dutch contraband trade and the conduct
of the governor of St. Eustatia, another incident aroused
the anger of the English against the United Provinces,
furnishing a pretext for serious reproaches on the part of
Great Britain later. This was the admission of the Amer
ican sea-captain John Paul Jones with English prizes to the
Dutch waters.
On October 4, 1779, Jones appeared at the Texel and
anchored there with the English vessels " Serapis " and
" Comtesse de Scarborough " which he had taken in the
North Sea. His ships were flying the American flag. As
soon as Sir Joseph Yorke learned of this, he called upon
the Prince of Orange. The latter told him that he had given
immediate orders to take no notice of the American flag.
He hoped, besides, that the Dutch authorities might be able
to oblige Jones to leave immediately with his prizes. Yorke
replied that the treaties between England and the United
Provinces would require more than that. The prince was,
however, of the opinion that American ships coming in
with prizes would all have French commissions and colors,*
and that it would therefore be difficult to act against those
vessels. The president of the States General, to whom
'John Adams to the President of Congress, August 4, 1779 (C.
F. Adams, The Works of John Adams, III, 282).
'Jameson, St. Eustatius, 686; De Jonge, Geschiedenis van het
Nederlandsche Zeewezen, IV, 384.
'Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaerboeken, 1781, p. 794 (Jameson, St.
Eustatius, 686).
*In the previous year (1778) France had joined the war against
England.

241] English Complaints. 63
Yorke also applied, answered at first evasively that the
States General had no official information of the incident
yet, and were therefore at present unable to take any steps
in the matter. A few days later the president informed the
ambassador, however, that the affair had been brought to
the knowledge of the States General, but that it was com
plicated in so far as the American captain would probably
produce a French commission. While Yorke's previous
appeals had been informal, he submitted an official memo
rial to 'the States General on October 8, after some confer
ences with Duke Louis. Sir Joseph claimed that Jones was
a rebel and pirate, because the revolting colonies had no
power to issue legal commissions. Yorke therefore de
manded the restoration to Great Britain of the two vessels
with their officers and crews. He even tried to have Jones
arrested. The High Bailiff, Mr. Dedel, declared, however,
that he was not authorized to effect the arrest, unless evi
dence and affidavits of robberies or demands of money were
presented to him against Jones. Since the ambassador was
not able to comply with these requirements, his attempt
failed.^ After a request by Jones and repeated appeals by
Yorke, the States General authorized the admiralty at Am
sterdam to have sick and wounded on board of Jones' ships
taken on shore and cared for.-^
Otherwise the Dutch government was still inactive.
Yorke wrote home that the Dutch were puzzled to the high
est degree, and, foreseeing dangers and difficulties on all
sides, they did nothing at all. The ambassador said he
looked upon the Jones incident as a lucky circumstance.
The captain had come to Amsterdam and was insulted when
he appeared in the coffee houses. Yorke thought therefore
'Yorke to Weymouth, October 8 and 12, 1779; Yorke's memorial
of the same date (Sparks MSS., LXXII; Bancroft MSS., America,
HoUand and England).
'Extract, Resolution of the States General, October 15, 1779
(Sparks Dutch Papers). Yorke reported to his government that
the wounded in Jones' fleet had been cared for, and paid this
tribute to the American : " Jones has so far acted humanely "
(Yorke to Weymouth, October 22, 1779, in Sparks MSS., LXXII).

64 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [242
that the " intrigue of the Court of VersaiUes," as he termed
it, would advance the English cause in the United Prov
inces.^ The British ambassador does not seem to have been
well informed in this case, because, according to other rec
ords, Jones was received enthusiastically by the Dutch peo
ple. In the city theater at Amsterdam a public ovation was
given him and songs in his praise were sung in the streets.^
That the French had their hands in the affair was soon
obvious when two French cutters entered the Texel and
anchored near Jones' ships.' Even a fortnight after Yorke
submitted his memorial, the States General had not yet
passed a resolution upon the matter. The province of Hol
land declared that the United Provinces had for more than
a century followed the principle, laid down in several regu
lations, of not deciding whether those who had taken vessels
at sea were entitled to do so or not. Such an action must
be left to the proper judges. Still the Republic would not
give shelter to captors, other than Dutch, and their prizes,
except in cases of emergency, as during bad weather, etc.
Jones and his vessels must therefore leave Dutch waters as
soon as they were able to sail. No ammunition or ship
materials were to be delivered to him, except what he
needed for reaching the open sea and the next foreign
harbor.* This decision was, in general, adopted by the States Gen
eral, but did not meet with the approval of Sir Joseph
Yorke. He addressed a still more urgent note to the States
General. The ambassador based his demand for the resti
tution of the " Serapis " and " Scarborough " and the re
lease of their crews on the treaty of Breda in 1667, con
firmed by that of 1716 and also by those concluded later.
According to the regulations the captains of foreign war
'Yorke to Weymouth, October 15, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 165; Griffis, Brave Little Hol
land, 231.
'Yorke to Weymouth, October 19, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
* Extract, Resolutions, HoUand and Westfriesland, October 21,
1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers).

243] English Complaints. 65
vessels, when entering Dutch waters, had to show their
commissions. If these were found illegal — that is, if they
were not issued by a sovereign power — the captains were to
be regarded as pirates.^ To his government Yorke reported
the following: —
" As well to the Prince as to the Ministers of the Republic, I
proved the very great moderation and forbearance on the part of
His Majesty who had given more than time sufficient to force this
little squadron to sea, or to the Court of Versailles to produce a
legal authority on the part of His Most Christian Majesty for their
acts of hostility against Great Britain ; that as neither of these
events had come into our aid, it was not possible with honor, or
with regard to other friendly powers, to abstain any longer from
demanding what we were entitled to by the Law of Nations and
by Treaty."
The ambassador added that he was displeased with the
evasive answer of the States General to his previous me
morial, and that he had therefore delivered a new note to
the president of the States General, after showing it to the
Grand Pensionary.^ The resolution of the States General
concerning Yorke's new memorial resulted in a refusal to
restore the vessels. The United Provinces, they declared,
would adhere to their old principle not to decide whether
the prizes were taken legally or not, but Jones would be told
that he must leave Dutch waters.' The latter measure was
contradicted by Amsterdam. Her deputies to the Assembly
of the States of HoUand and Westfriesland asserted that
Jones could not be compelled to saU, since such a step would
'Extract, Resolutions of States General, October 29, 1779 (Sparks
Dutch Papers; Bancroft MSS., America, HoUand, and England).
'Yorke to Weymouth, October 29, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Resolution of the States General, November 19, 1779 (Bancroft
MSS., America, HoUand, and England; Sparks MSS., CIII).
At this time ugly attacks — ^probably instigated by the English
party — were made against Jones in Dutch newspapers. He was de
scribed as a " rough, unpolished sailor " and a " man of little under
standing and no morals or sensibility." Friends of the American
cause (de Neuf ville, Dumas, van der CapeUen) intended to defend
Jones by publishing certain papers of the latter concerning the
restoring of the Selkirk plate (Wharton, II, 599) in which his noble
character was revealed, but the captain refused his permission
(NeufvOle to van der Capellen, November 9, 1779; van der Capellen
to Jones, without date; Jones to van der Capellen, November 29,
1779, in Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 150-153).
5

66 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [244
be contrary to the resolution of the States General of No
vember 3, 1756, which provided that " Commissie vaarders"
— vessels possessing proper commissions — would be admit
ted to Dutch waters.^ The English ambassador reported
indignantly to his government that his memorial was not
complied with. The States General, he said, passed over
treaties and had recourse to interior regulations, no matter
when taken and under what circumstances.^
The matter took now a sudden turn in another direction,
foreseen, however, by many. The States General received
a letter from the Prince of Orange, stating that he had, in
conformity with their resolution of November 19, given
orders to Vice-Admiral Reynst to urge Jones pohtely, but
firmly, to depart from the Texel. Reynst had sent Captain
van Overmeer on board the " Serapis " to execute the order.
Overmeer found, however, that the " Serapis " was not
commanded by Jones any longer, but by a French captain,
Cotineau de Corgelin, who held possession of it in the name
of the King of France. The same was the case with the
other English vessel, and Reynst had therefore found him
self unable to carry out his order, since the vessels were
not commanded by Jones.' The French ambassador at the
Hague subsequently pretended that Jones had a French com
mission.* Yorke was quite pleased with this development
of the Jones incident, considering it a victory over the
French party in the United Provinces. He wrote to the
Foreign Office in London: —
" I cannot help observing upon the turn this affair has taken, that
it has not ended so disagreeably for us as it appeared Ukely to do at
first. The arrival of the squadron under an American flag was
meant to procure some kind of avowal of American Independence,
whereas the Court of Versailles has at least been obliged to cover it
' Extract, Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, November
13 and 17, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers; Nieuwe Nederlandsche
Jaerboeken, 1779, p. 1365).
'Yorke to Stormont, November 23, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
° Extract, Resolution of States General, November 26, 1779
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Yorke to Stormont, December 14, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

245 ] English Complaints. 67
with a French mask.' The change in its appearance will probably
too, enable me to effectuate an exchange of prisoners, which was
impracticable in its former shape; and, lastly, the best part of the
nation is at the bottom highly offended at the contempt it is treated
with, when it was so easy to have prevented it at the beginning."''
An interesting light is thrown upon the affair by a con
versation between Captain Cotineau and Reynst which was
submitted in writing to the States General by the stadt
holder. Cotineau had said that he was to be regarded as a
French officer though Jones had chosen to show an Amer
ican flag. The ships had been armed in France and Louis
XVI had sent on board one lieutenant-colonel with 150 men.
The " Comtesse de Scarborough " had been taken by Coti
neau himself, and he had declared to the prisoners from the
beginning that they were French prisoners of war. When
Reynst showed surprise that the vessels had been flying two
flags, using sometimes one and sometimes the other, Coti
neau answered that Dr. Franklin in Paris had given per
mission to use the North American flag. The French flag
had been shown only from December 7. Reynst had tried
in vain to obtain a copy of the French commission to John
Paul Jones, and it was suspected that it had not yet ar
rived.' In fact, however, Jones refused emphatically to
'Yorke was right. Jones had no French commission. He wrote
to van der Capellen, " I never bore nor acted under any other com
mission than that I have received from the Congress of the United
States of America" (November 29, 1779, in Beaufort, Brieven van
der CapeUen, 153).
'Yorke to Stormont, December 14, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Extract, Resolution of States General, December 22, 1779 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
In conformity with an advice from the Due de la Vauguyon,
Jones had told the Dutch commandant at the Texel that his French
commission had not been found among his papers since the loss
of the "Bon Homme Richard," and he feared that it had gone to
the bottom in that ship; but, if it was really lost, it would be an
easy matter to procure a dupHcate of it from France (Jones to
Vauguyon, November 4, 1779, in Wharton, III, 398).
Of the different stages of the Jones incident the Prussian envoy
at the Hague, Thulemeier, sent detailed accounts to Frederick the
Great (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand, under dates 1779,
October 8, 12, 15, 19, 26, 29; November 2, 16, 19, 23, 30; December
14, 17, 28, 31).

68 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [246
accept the French commission. The French naval agent at
Amsterdam, de Livoncourt, wrote to him : —
"Meanwhile I can make no more entreaty, if you persist in not
using the commission which I was charged to send you. Reflect
that all the French here in the service of the king have strongly at
heart to maintain the republic in sentiments favorable to the allies
of his majesty. It is in conformity with these views, and for the
good of the common cause, and only for this transient object, that
the commission, for the origin of which you imagine a thousand ill-
natured motives and which finally you refuse to accept, has been
addressed to you.
" You know all that I have had the honor to say to you on this
subject has been as well for your personal quiet as for the honor
and satisfaction of the common allies.'"
Jones, flying only the American colors, and not showing
the French flag on the "Alliance," which he now com
manded, nor producing any French commission, was re
quested by Vice-Admiral Reynst to inform him whether
the " AUiance " was to be considered a French or an Amer
ican vessel. In the first case Jones would be expected to
show the French commission, to hoist the French flag and
pendant, and to confirm it with a salute from his guns. In
the second case Jones was asked not to neglect any oppor
tunity to depart according to the orders of the States Gen
eral.^ The American answered that he had no orders to
hoist the flag of France. He could not display any other
than the American colors, unless he received orders for that
purpose from Dr. Franklin. Besides, he was' ready to saU
whenever the pilot was ready to conduct the "Alliance" to
sea.' On December 27 Jones put to sea,* having stayed at
the Texel almost three months. This long delay, in spite
of the many entreaties of the Dutch government to depart,
was necessitated partly by indispensable repairs of the ves
sels under his command, and partly by the vigilance of
a superior number of English war vessels at the exits of
the roads at the Texel. For Great Britain the stay of John
'December 17, 1779 (Wharton, III, 431).
'Reynst to Jones, December 17, 1779 (ibid.. Ill, 430).
'Jones to Reynst, same date (ibid., Ill, 430).
'Jones to Dumas, December 27, 1779 (ibid.. Ill, 450).

247] English Complaints. 69
Paul Jones in Dutch waters furnished subsequently a wel
come pretext for the reproach to the United Provinces that
they protected American pirates in their ports.^
' This discussion is somewhat ahead of the chronological order.
Chapter III is devoted to the British accusations that the Dutch,
directly or indirectly, supported the cause of America. Since the
Jones episode formed one of the chief complaints of England in
this respect, it seemed best to mention it here. Below, p. 129.

CHAPTER IV.
Early Relations Between the two Republics.
The attempts of American representatives to raise a loan
in the Netherlands formed part of the general financial
policy of the Americans. The latter expected to borrow
from Europe funds with which to meet the momentary
exigencies of their newly created commonwealth. Therefore
the Dutch loan must be considered in connection with other
foreign loans. The majority in Congress, led by Richard
Henry Lee and Samuel Adams, arranged a series of mis
sions to European courts for the purpose of borrowing
money, though those courts had given no intimation that
they would receive American envoys. In several cases it
was even more or less evident in advance that the reception
would be refused. Only in one instance was it known
beforehand that American representatives were welcome.
France, contemplating joining the war against England,
had intimated that envoys from North America would be
received, at least in a private capacity. First Silas Deane,
then Benjamin Franklin, and finally Arthur Lee was sent
to France,^ and all were well received by the French court.^
Fearing that premature complications with England
would result from assisting the American colonies openly,
France decided to do so clandestinely. The famous drama
tist and secret agent of the French court, Beaumarchais,
established a mercantile house in Paris under the fictitious
name of Roderique Hortalez and Company for the special
purpose of buying military stores and selling them to the
Americans. As headquarters of the firm the "Hotel de
Holland " was selected, a building erected under the reign
' Above, p. 123.
' Wharton, I, 291. 70

249] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 7 1
of Louis XIV by the Dutch Republic as the residence of its
minister at the French court, but vacant now for many
years.^ Both Deane and Arthur Lee negotiated successfully
with Beaumarchais, with whom they made an agreement
for furnishing munitions of war to the American colonies.
The French government supported Beaumarchais by pay
ing to him one million livres for the use of the Americans
and providing him secretly with ammunition from the royal
arsenals. France urged the court of Spain, with which she
was allied by the so-called family compact, also to assist
Beaumarchais with one mUlion livres for the same purpose.
This sum was paid to him through the Comte de Vergennes.
The Americans were to pay to Hortalez and Company
American produce in return, but the consignments of the
colonies to France consisting of tobacco, indigo, etc., soon
almost ceased, after such shipments had been repeatedly
intercepted by the English, and after the rumor had spread
in America that the whole transaction was a mere pretext
of France for the maintenance of nominal neutrality.^
Beaumarchais then received another million from the King
of France.' The subsidies, thus furnished by France to
the American colonies through Beaumarchais, became later
the subject of controversies between the latter and the
United States, the question being whether the Americans
ought to pay in full for the goods which they received from
him, or whether the money given to the French agent by
his government was intended as gratuitous assistance to
the United States.*
Already at this early stage of the Revolution Americans
contemplated a loan in the United Provinces. On Novem
ber 2, 1776, Carmichael wrote from Amsterdam^ to the com-
' Wharton, I, 370.
'Ibid., I, 374.
' Bayley, National Loans of the United States, 6.
' Wharton, I, 381 ff. ; Bayley, National Loans of the United States,
S ff. ; Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 47.
'William Carmichael of Maryland happened to be in Europe at
the beginning of the American Revolution. He was in Paris when
Silas Deane arrived there as commercial and political agent from

72 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [250
mittee of secret correspondence that he had endeavored to
induce Dutch merchants to invest in direct commerce with
America. He had also tried to find out the sentiments of
the people of the United Provinces in general respecting the
Americans, and to learn whether, in case of necessity, the
United States would be able to negotiate a loan, and, on the
other hand, whether England would be able to obtain further
credit. Arriving but two days after the accounts had
reached Amsterdam of the misfortune of Long Island, Wil
liam Carmichael found many even of the sanguine friends
of America dejected and the partisans of England almost in
a frenzy of joy. In this disposition, he said, it was easy
to see that no hopes could be entertained of engaging mer
chants in direct trade. He found that they had the greatest
incUnation to serve the Americans, and at the same time to
help themselves, for no people saw their interest clearer;
but their fears that America might be subdued, the con
fident assertions of the friends of England confirming these
apprehensions, the prodigious sums they had in the English
funds, with this unlucky business at New York, all con
spired to prevent direct speculations.^ An American loan
was, therefore, in Carmichael's opinion, not yet practicable
in the Provinces, but he was confident that, in case the
final success of the American colonies should become evi
dent, or either France or Spain should recognize American
independence, funds might be had from the Dutch. As
soon as the lenders should see that the first payments of
interest were made punctually, plenty of money would be
offered by Dutch houses. As security for such loans he pro
posed the issue of bonds similar to those current in the
the United States, and lived with him for some time, aiding him in
his official business. When the Prussian minister in Paris suggested
that Frederick the Great would like to be informed on American
commerce by a competent American citizen, Deane proposed to
Carmichael the undertaking of that mission. Carmichael accepted
and went to Berlin by way of Amsterdam (Wharton, I, 577). It was
then that he studied the political situation in the Netherlands and
tried to further the American cause there.
'Wharton, II, 185.

25 1] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 73
Netherlands, and suggested that they should be lodged in a
public bank in Europe.
Such sounding of Dutch financial circles could not long
remain unknown to the British ambassador at the Hague.
He reported to his government that, according to rumors,
his "bastard brother ambassador" Deane was at Amster
dam, endeavoring to borrow money for Congress, and that
the American commissioner even had proposals drawn up
for that purpose. Yorke added that he could not con
ceive of the Dutch lending a stiver to the Americans, be
cause the colonies were not in a position to give any
security. " This," he concluded, " is but a poor bait to
take in old sharpers."^
While there was no prospect yet of raising a loan in the
United Provinces, the American commissioners were more
successful in France. The French government, not yet
ready to join the war, when asked by the commissioners^
to provide the Americans with ships, men, and warlike
stores, declined, since such aid could not be rendered with
out becoming known to the English. A loan, however, was
less dangerous in this respect, there being little difficulty in
keeping monetary transactions a secret. In the beginning
of the year 1777 Louis XVI granted, therefore, two million
livres' to the Americans, demanding no promise of repay
ment but requiring absolute silence.* This made the com-
' Yorke to W. Eden, November 15, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' Bolles, Financial History of the United States, 227.
' Five French livres equal about one American dollar.
'According to Bayley (National Loans, 10, 11), this loan was not
obtained from the French government directly, but from the
Farmers General, to whom Franklin and Deane were referred, be
cause that private corporation, " engaged in the collection of the
national revenue of France, might loan public moneys, if encouraged
to do so by the government, without causing any diplomatic compli
cations." (The Farmers General leased the public revenues, paying
to the government a certain fixed sum.) The contract dated March
24, 1777, was signed by Franklin, Deane, and a representative of the
Farmers General. In contradiction to this, Bolles (Financial His
tory, 228) states that it was proposed to obtain money from the
Farmers General, but as it was difficult to settle all the terms, the
Crown granted the money. De Knight-Tillman, History of the
Currency of the Country and of the Loans of the United States, 17.

74 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [252
missioners hopeful of raising enough money for paying the
interest upon $20,000,000 of paper money issued by Con
gress. They advised Congress to draw on them for sums
equal to the interest of what they had borrowed, when such
interest should become due. Before the end of the year
the commissioners obtained another loan from France,
amounting this time to three million livres.^
Meanwhile the relations between the American agents in
Paris and the Netherlands were kept up. Dumas furnished
addresses of Dutch firms, with whom the Americans could
deal, and promised to send more in future,^ though there
was no better prospect yet for a loan. It is interesting to
observe that England's credit also was low at this period.
Thulemeier, the Prussian envoy at the Hague, who had in
structions to inform his master, Frederick the Great, about
everything noteworthy, reported in January, 1778, that the
credit of Great Britain was very precarious. This was
due partly to the enormous number of business failures
in London, but largely to the court of Versailles. The
French government, he said, aimed at the ruin of the
English credit by secretly buying British funds and selling
them at a considerable loss.'
In the United Provinces there was especially one friend
and admirer of the United States who made an ardent
attempt to obtain a loan in his country for the Americans.
This was Joan Derk van der CapeUen.* He explained to
the Dutch capitalists that the credit of America, based
upon a country rich in products, was supported by a
really republican government. This credit, he argued, was
infinitely more secure than that of England, which suffered
from an enormous national debt and depended only on a
commerce which had become very uncertain, while its sole
guarantee was a despotic and awkward government. Van
' Bolles, Financial History, 228-229.
'Dumas to A. Lee, September 23, 1777 (Lee MSS., Library of
Harvard University, III).
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 23, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
'Above, pp. 23, 31.

253] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 75
der Capellen was, however, not yet able to collect a sum
large enough to be offered to the Americans. He sug
gested, therefore, to Franklin a method by which the Dutch
might be induced to invest their money in American securi
ties. Congress, he said, should offer propositions which
would be advantageous enough to enable the Dutch to with
draw their money from England without loss in spite of the
low rates of the British funds. For this purpose he recom
mended a fundamental law, to be passed by Congress, to the
effect that the interest of the loan should not be reduced
unless a restitution of the capital was offered. The interest
must be high and be offered for a number of years. This,
the Dutch statesman thought, would be the most efficient and
most humane way of bringing the war to a speedy end in
favor of the Americans. It would, at the same time, serve
to separate his country gradually from Great Britain, and
to attach it more and more to the interests of the United
States.^ The American commissioners in Paris conceived
now the plan of opening a loan officially in the United
Provinces. In May they wrote, " We mean to apply for
the loan desired to the moneyed men of Holland."^ Still,
though the disposition in Holland seemed to be favorable to
the American cause, they apprehended that it was not yet
warm enough to produce any decided success. This would
only be possible when Great Britain appeared more en
feebled. Dumas published in the United Provinces an essay
by Arthur Lee, which he hoped would have some effect.'
It explained that the success of the American arms would
reestablish American commerce upon its ancient free foot
ing. Since the Netherlands were thus to profit by the
victory of the United States, the Americans looked chiefly
to the United Provinces for support. The memorial then
continued : —
' Van der Capellen to Franklin, April 28, 1778 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 64-65).
'A. Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, May 23, 1778
(Wharton, II, &D9).
' A. Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, June i, 1778 (ibid.,
H, 603).

76 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [254
" The extraordinary remittances which the people of America have
made to the merchants of Great Britain since the commencement of
this dispute is a proof of their honor and good faith ; so much more
safe and advantageous is it to trust money with a young, industrious,
thriving people, than with an old nation overwhelmed with debt,
abandoned to extravagance, and immersed in luxury. By maintain
ing the independence of America a new avenue will be opened for
the employment of money, where landed property, as yet untouched
by mortgage or other incumbrances, will answer for the principal,
and the industry of a young and uninvolved people would insure
the regular payment of interest. The money-holder would in that
case be relieved from the continual fears and apprehensions which
every agitation of the English stocks perpetually excites. He might
count his profits without anxiety, and plan his moneyed transactions
with certainty.'"
The commissioners shortly afterwards informed their
government that they were going to send to the United
Provinces the proposals for a loan as soon as Franklin, who
was entrusted with forming the plan, should have the pro
posed bills printed and the business prepared for execution.^
More than a month and a half later these preparations were
not yet finished. " We are signing the notes for the loan in
HoUand, which is a work of time," Arthur Lee wrote to his
superiors.' While the American commissioners were thus working
for a loan in the Netherlands, they continued to ask for
further assistance from France. Their application to the
French government for the privilege of borrowing two mil
lion sterling from private sources, in order to redeem so
many of the bills of credit in the United States as would be
sufficient to restore the remainder to their original value, was
not complied with.* A further request was made by Frank
lin to the court at Versailles for a quarterly payment of
three quarters of a miUion livres, whereupon the king con
sented to advance 750,000 livres more.^
The main reason why it was so difficult for the United
'A. Lee's Memorial for Holland (Wharton, II, 545).
'A. Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Jun« 9, 1778
(ibid., II, 609).
'A. Lee to the Committee of Correspondence, July 28, 1778
(ibid., II, 671).
' Bolles, Financial History, 230.
'Ibid., 234; Gerard to the President of Congress, February 9,
1779 (Wharton, III, 41).

2 55] Early Relations Between the two Republics. yj
States to obtain assistance in Europe was that their credit
was poor. Another was that the principal European nations
were arming for war, and all had to borrow money, some
offering rates of interest considerably higher than those pro
posed by the Americans. There remained, therefore, only
two motives for lending money to the United States : either
benevolence or the desire to humiliate Great Britain. Since
this condition of the European money-market continued for
rather a long period, there was not much hope left of ob
taining loans from individuals. It could only be expected
from governments.' The American commissioners in
France were almost in despair. " Our currency," wrote
John Adams in the fall of 1778, "can not engage our at
tention too much. And the more we think of it, the more
we shall be convinced that taxation, deep and broad taxation,
is the only sure and lasting remedy. Loans in Europe will
be very difficult to obtain. The powers at war, or at the
eve of war, have such vast demands, and offer terms so
much better than ours, that nothing but sheer benevolence to
our cause can induce any person to lend "us. Besides, a
large foreign debt would be a greater evil, for what I know,
than a paper currency."^ Arthur Lee expressed himself
similarly : —
" Congress must not trust to the success of a loan, which, for the
foUowing reasons, I apprehend will be found impracticable.
" The war in Germany supervening on that between us and Great
Britain, and the preparations for it by France and Spain, have raised
and multiplied the demand for money, so as to give the holders of it
their choice and their price. The empress queen has engrossed
every shilling in the Netherlands. England has drawn large sums
from the Hollanders, who can not easily quit their former market.
France is negotiating a loan of one hundred million livres, which
will exhaust Geneva and Switzerland. The money-holders regard
the lending their money at such a distance as Jacob did the sending
Benjamin into Egypt, and it is time only will make them endure the
thought of such a separation.
" These are the difficulties which the circumstances of things
oppose to our scheme of a loan, and render the aid of some other
operation necessary for sinking the superabundant paper.'"
'BoUes, Financial History, 231.
•Adams to R. H. Lee, August 5, 1778 (Wharton, II, 677).
- A. Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, August 21, 1778
(ibid., II, 691, 692).

78 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [256
The experience with their first loan in the United Prov
inces was not such as to make the commissioners hopeful.
In a joint letter they informed Congress in September, 1778,
that they had taken measures in Amsterdam for borrowing
money of the Dutch.^ These steps consisted in negotiating
American obligations signed by the commissioners in Paris,
their value being one thousand guilders each, bearing five
per cent, interest and to be redeemed ten years after issue.''
A certain number (about two hundred and eight) were
lodged in the French house of Horneca, Fizeaux, and Com
pany at Amsterdam.' These papers were not taken up at
all. Van der Capellen suggested that the negotiations would
be more successful if, instead of the obligations being signed
by Franklin, Lee, and Adams, Congress, represented by its
president and secretary, would do so under the official seal.
The Dutch were accustomed to similar contracts with their
states. Besides, Congress must promise expressly not to
reduce the interest during the terms of the bonds. In his
opinion ten years was too short a period, and he recom
mended extending it to twenty. Van der CapeUen con
sidered also very injurious to the American credit the false
reports which were spread in the Netherlands by the Eng
lish, and which could not be corrected by the friends of the
American cause since the latter were not kept informed of
the facts. He deemed it of the utmost importance that
measures should be taken to furnish reports to the Dutch
that were absolutely true, even in regard to the misfortunes
of the Americans. The Dutch statesman then offered his
services to make such news public. A description of the
existing condition of the United States, the form of govem
ment in the separate states, the facility with which foreigners
might settle there, the prices of the various qualities of land,
together with a concise history of the war, and the cruelties
committed by the English would, in his opinion, work
' Franklin, Lee, and Adams to the President of Congress, Sep
tember 17, 1778 (Wharton, II, 722).
'Thulemeier to Frederick the Great, November 24, 1778 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 16, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

257] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 79
wonders in a country where America was known only from
the gazettes. Van der Capellen stated also that he had in
vested 20,000 French livres with the firm of Horneca and
Fizeaux for American securities. He was convinced that
it would be more advantageous to the American cause to
procure one hundred thousand livres from fifty persons and
from different parts of the country than to receive even a
million from a single capitalist. He had interested a num
ber of compatriots in the Dutch loan, when letters from
London arrived, stating that the American people were dis
satisfied with Congress and there were grave dissensions
between the French and the Americans and also among the
Americans themselves. The consequence was a general dis
trust in the success of the Revolution. Van der Capellen
expressed his desire that Congress would find means to assure
the Dutch that, whatever turn the war might take and of
whatever nature the final peace with Great Britain might be,
the capital and interest of the debts contracted during the
struggle would be secure. Unless these apprehensions of
the Dutch should be relieved, support for the American
cause could not be expected in the United Provinces.^
At the beginning of 1779 there was yet no hope for a loan.
" The prospect of a loan in Europe," wrote John Adams to
Congress, " after every measure that has been or could be
taken, I think it my duty to say frankly to Congress, is very
unpromising. The causes of this are very obvious, and can
not be removed; the state of our country itself and the
course of exchange would be sufficient to discourage such a
loan if there were no other obstruction, but there are many
others. There are more borrowers in Europe than lenders ;
and the British loan itself wiU not be made this year at a
less interest than seven and a half per cent." He saw no
hope of relief but in taxation and economy. The people
of the United States, in his opinion, must be destitute of
sense as well as of virtue, if they would not be wiUing to
' Van der Capellen to Trumbull, December 7, 1778 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Caoellen, 89-93).

8o Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [258
pay the cost of their defence, since they had one powerful
ally (France) and could expect others, while England was
exhausted and had no ally at aU.^
The loan in the United Provinces was a faUure. Louis
XVI, in order to encourage it, had consented to guarantee
the interest of three million livres. Toward the end of May,
1779, however, the loan amounted scarcely to 80,000 florins.
The work of the commissioners was greatly hampered by
the efforts of the separate states of the Umted States to
obtain loans in Europe, especiaUy when their agents offered
higher rates of interest than the representatives of Congress
were able to propose.^ " Running all over Europe, asking
to borrow money," the states created such a beUef in the
distress and poverty of the country as to make it undesir
able for foreigners to enter into close relations with the
United States.'
In connection with the American attempts to effect a loan
in the Netherlands, Stephen Sayre* (Arthur Lee's secretary)
must be mentioned. According to Sir Joseph Yorke this
"noted American agent" arrived at Amsterdam, but was
received openly nowhere except at the house of Jean de
Neufville. The ambassador stated that the purpose of
Sayre's visit was " to find any enthusiasts dupes enough to
advance money upon the security of lands in America."^
These land schemes are of sufficient interest to be men
tioned, as Sayre discussed them whUe at Amsterdam. Hav
ing travelled through a great part of Germany and the
northern states of Europe, he was of opinion that many
persons were waiting impatiently for the moment of safety,
that is, the certainty of the independence of the United
States, to embark for America in order to settle there.
Others were anxious to make investments in America, like
' John Adams to Jay, President of Congress, February 27, 1779
(Wharton, III, 70).
' Franklin to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, May 26, 1779
(ibid.. Ill, 188-192).
' Bolles, Financial History, 236.
'Above, p. 61.
° Yorke to Lord Weymouth, May 21, 1779 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

259] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 81
de Gome, the minister of state of Frederick the Great. Con
gress should therefore appropriate a district of land near
some of the middle states in America, containing three or
more degrees of latitude and longitude, to be set apart as
security for the subscribers to American loans. This dis
trict should be divided into square lots of one hundred acres
each of cultivable land, numbered and registered in the public
offices of the states. Each subscriber, according to this
scheme, would be entitled to the first number unoccupied,
as he applied for location. The inhabitants of the district
were to enjoy the privileges constitutionally belonging to the
people of the other states. An interest of a certain per cent.
would be paid to the subscribers until they had located their
lands. The land certificates should be transferable, so that
those who did not settle in America might be able to sell
their shares. Sayre was of opinion that upon such a plan
the agents of Congress would have no difficulty in borrow
ing large sums of money in the United Provinces, and at
low interest, too, because America was offering such advan
tages as no other country could boast of, viz., that of giving
landed security and unembarrassed choice of immediate pos
session. Besides, he thought, America would secure the
sympathy and friendship of the United Provinces by such
a loan.'- Mr. Sayre's scheme seems to have been too fan
tastic ever to have been taken into serious consideration.
In July, 1779, van der Capellen noticed that the people of
the Netherlands were beginning to see the dangerous posi
tion of England and to think more favorably of the Amer
ican cause and the credit of the United States. He informed
his friends in America accordingly and suggested that some
thing should be done to profit by this change of public
opinion.^ He impressed on the Americans again that in
order to strengthen the credit of the United States it would
be necessary to make the Dutch better acquainted with
American affairs and for that purpose to have a system of
' Sayre to van der Capellen, June 23, 1779 (Beaufort, Brieven van
der CapeUen, 154-156).
'Van der CapeUen to Trumbull, July 6, 1779 (ibid., 109).
6

82 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [260
continuous and trustworthy intelligence established regard
ing the vicissitudes of the war. Van der CapeUen expressed
strong hopes that his efforts concerning the American loan
might succeed. In the Netherlands there were many Roman
Catholics and these were much in favor of the United States.
A great number of them were residing in his province, of
whom he knew many, and through them he expected to be
able to influence others of their faith. It was now the right
moment to act.^
These communications were received with much enthu
siasm in the United States, and probably formed the prin
cipal cause for the subsequent appointment of Laurens,
President of Congress, as special agent to the United Prov-
inces.2 The Dutch statesman worked indefatigably for the
American cause, even publishing extracts from his corre
spondence with, leading Americans (Trumbull and Living
ston), and inducing friends and relatives, like his cousin.
Baron van der Capellen tot de Marsch, to contribute to the
American loan.' But this experiment, also, was a failure.
For a moment, a brighter prospect was opened when Mr.
Neufville, a Dutch banker (not the same with whom John
Adams negotiated later), offered to Franklin in the spring
of 1779 large sums, provided the business should be taken
from the house then employed for placing the American
bonds with the United Provinces. Unfortunately he proved
to be an adventurer. At first he asked that " all the estates,
real and personal " in the thirteen United States should be
mortgaged to him, also that a fifth of the capital sum bor
rowed should every year for five years be laid out in com
modities and sent to Holland, consigned to him, to remain
in his hands as security for punctual payments, till the time
stipulated for final payment should be completed. As
another condition he proposed that all vessels of merchan
dise coming from America to Europe should be consigned
'Van der Capellen to Livingston, July 16, 1779 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 113-115).
'Livingston to van der Capellen, March 15, 1780 (ibid., 214).
'Van der CapeUen to Livingston (ibid., 112).

26 1] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 83
to him or his correspondents. Franklin rejected these con
ditions with indignation, and Neufville then came down to
the terms employed by the other house. No complaints
having been preferred against the latter, Franklin was not
in favor of a change, especially as he had commenced to
doubt Neufville's reliability. Franklin therefore answered
evasively that if the banker could procure a list of sub
scribers amounting to about the promised sum, Neufville's
proposition would be considered. NeufviUe, in contradic
tion to his pretensions, was not able to furnish such a list,
but, instead, sent Franklin a new set of extravagant propo
sitions. The American commissioner then dropped all cor
respondence with him. After this experience, Franklin
wrote in the fall of 1779: " The truth is, I have no expecta
tions from Holland while interest received there from other
nations is so high and our credit there so low; while par
ticular American States offer higher interest than the Con
gress, and even our offering to raise our interest tends to
sink our credit. My sole dependence is now upon this court
[France]."^ But the year 1779 was almost ended, and no
funds had been secured from France for more than a year.
No wonder that the American commissioners seemed to
have no hope at all in a foreign loan at this time. One of
them wrote: —
"I perceive by the journals that a committee is appointed for
framing a plan of a foreign loan. It is my duty to say that there
is not_ the least probability, in the present situation of things, of
obtaining any adequate loan in Europe, and to beseech Congress not
to let the vain expectation of that divert their attention from trying
every resource at home. It is necessary that the impressions to our
discredit which have arisen from the unsuccessful attempts that have
been already made should be allowed to wear off and some favorable
event occur, such as the enemy being obliged to draw off their
troops, before it will be possible to succeed in such a plan. In the
mean time the repetition of ineffectual attempts will only debase
your credit more, and especially if they are accompanied with the
offer of more than ordinary interest, which ever augments the
suspicion of the insecurity of the principal and that the borrowers
are themselves conscious of their insufficiency.'"
' Franklin to Jay, October 4, 1779 (Wharton, III, 361, 362) ; Bolles,
Financial History, 236-238.
'Arthur Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, November 6,
1779 (Wharton, III, 401-402) ; Bolles, Financial History, 239-240.

84 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [262
Another effort of the American commissioners to draw
the two republics nearer together should not be overlooked,
namely, the proposal of a treaty of amity and commerce.
Already in the spring of 1777 Vauguyon had informed his
government of a suggestion that had been made to Mr. van
Berkenrode, the Dutch envoy to the court of Versailles, by
Franklin and Deane. These gentlemen had solicited the
States General to favor the commerce of the United States,
which would give them great advantages. The commis
sioners, according to Vauguyon, had offered to go to the
Netherlands in order to negotiate, or, in case this should not
be considered convenient, they were wiUing to treat with a
deputy of the United Provinces in Paris. The French am
bassador had also learned that the Dutch, after many delib
erations, had decided to authorize Berkenrode to make an
answer which, without rejecting the offer of the Americans,
would not betray any eagerness to accept it.^ About a year
later, rumors were spread that Franklin was expected in
HoUand to negotiate a treaty of commerce. These reports.
Sir Joseph Yorke observed, made only little impression in
the Netherlands, but served to show the temper of the times.^
On February 6, 1778, France openly espoused the part of
the United States, in concluding a treaty with them. It was
stipulated that, in case Great Britain should declare war
upon France, neither of the contracting parties should make
peace separately, and that England must recognize the inde
pendence of her former American colonies before a general
peace might be thought of. The treaty was ostensibly com
mercial. On March 18, Beranger, the French charge
d'affaires at the Hague, informed the ministers of Holland
and the president of the States General, on behalf of his
government, of the conclusion of the convention, causing
thereby a great sensation.' The exact terms of the treaty,
however, were not yet made known to the Republic, no copy
'Vauguyon to Vergennes, May 30, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXXIII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, April 3, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 20, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).

263] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 85
of it being transmitted. Dumas, after a conference with
the Grand Pensionary of Holland, asked the American com
missioners in Paris to send one for the Grand Pensionary,
from whicii another might be drawn for the regency of Am
sterdam.^ Franklin thereupon sent a copy of the treaty to
the American agent, but Vauguyon was instructed by the
French minister of foreign affairs, who had conferred with
the American commissioners on the subject, to prevent a
formal communication until express orders were sent to that
effect. The ambassador was, however, authorized to allow
the Grand Pensionary of Holland and the regency of Am
sterdam to read the treaty, and to assure them, as he had
done before,^ that no exclusive commercial advantages had
been stipulated for France. Vauguyon was also charged to
inform the Dutch that no free ports had been accorded to
the Americans in France except for commodities of their
own growth, such as tobacco, which were not introduced
into France from the Netherlands. For everything else
the former English colonies would be subjected to the same
rules and rights as other privUeged nations, and these pro
visions could therefore in no way be offensive to the United
Provinces.' Sir Joseph Yorke, who appears not to have
known of the confidential proceedings just mentioned, was
at a loss to know why the treaty had not been communicated
to the Republic, and suspected the reason to be that the
French had granted favors to the Americans which they
withheld from the Dutch, especially regarding free ports.*
In the autumn of 1778, when the treaty between France and
America was no longer a secret, Vauguyon received two
copies of it from his government for communication to
whomever he thought proper, but he was forbidden even
then to deliver them to the Dutch ministers officially." On
October 22, a printed copy was handed to the Grand Pen-
' Dumas to the Commissioners in Paris, May 29, 1778 (Arthur
Lee MSS., Harvard University).
'Yorke to Suffolk, March 27, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, June 21, 1778 (ibid., LXXXIII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, July 20, 1778 (ibid., LXXII).
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, October 15, 1778 (ibid., LXXXIII).

86 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [264
sionary, who brought it to the knowledge of the States Gen
eral. The latter discussed the matter secretly, but no official
action was taken. ^
Vauguyon secretly sounded Dutch politicians to see if
they favored a convention between France, Spain and the
Republic for the mutual protection of their commerce. The
Netherlands were not yet ready to take such a step. The
Grand Pensionary, van Bleiswijck, was much pleased with
the proposition, but declared that he would not be able to
win the Prince of Orange for it. France did not insist, and
the Republic considered it now almost a favor to be left
undisturbed in the enjoyment of neutrality. In truth,
France had become aware of the fact that the United Prov
inces were more advantageous to her as a neutral power
than as an ally. The Dutch navy was too weak to be of any
real service, in case the Netherlands should join the war.
On the other hand, their large commercial fleet would be of
the greatest importance for France, as long as Dutch naviga
tion remained undisturbed by the belligerents.^ France
therefore now left it entirely to the Americans to further
their own cause in the United Provinces. On April 28,
Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Deane addressed to the Grand
Pensionary a letter, already known to and approved by the
city of Amsterdam, in which they expressed the desire of
Congress to enter into closer relations of friendship and
commerce with the United Provinces. The commissioners
requested that their letter be submitted to the States Gen
eral.' The Grand Pensionary, however, did not comply with
this wish. He knew that this proposition of the United
'Secret Resolution of the States General, October 28, 1778 (Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland and England).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 127-130.
' Franklin, Lee, and Adams to Dumas, April 10, 1778 (Wharton,
H, 546, 547).
Thulemeier reported to his royal master on May 26, 1778, that
Franklin's letter proposing to the Grand Pensionary in the name of
Congress " the conclusion of a treaty of commerce " had been accom
panied with menaces in case of a refusal to recognize American
independence. Three days later, however, he corrected this state
ment, asserting that no such menaces had been made (Bancroft
MSS., Prussia and Holland).

265] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 87
States would not be accepted by the Dutch sovereign body,
and, with the consent of the Prince of Orange, communi
cated it, confidentially, to the members of the States of
Holland only. Each city, which had a vote in that prov
ince, was secretly provided with a copy.^ It was thought
that in this way every offence to the English government
would be avoided.^ So many persons knowing of the letter,
it proved, however, impossible to conceal it long from the
English ambassador. Yorke said that the very fact of the
Dutch attempt to keep the communication of the American
commissioners a secret showed the prevailing sentiments.
Sir Joseph soon took occasion to confer with the Prince of
Orange. " I was really sorry," the ambassador wrote of
this conference, " for the Prince of Orange, who not being
prepared by the Pensionary before I saw him, shewed more
concern and embarrassment than I ever saw in him before,
and convinced me that he had been led into it without feel
ing the consequence, and overpersuaded by others. I flatter
myself not to have omitted anything which was proper to
be said to him, which he received very kindly, and with
strong assurances of attachment to the King, and personal
regard to me : I left him with a strong and friendly recom
mendation not to suffer himself to be so trapped again."'
Yorke had also a conversation on the subject with the Grand
Pensionary, who was rather embarrassed with the ambas
sador's manner of " opening the business," the latter affect
ing " not to give credit to it." Van Bleiswijck admitted the
fact of the American proposal and that he had communi
cated it to some members of HoUand, not thinking it proper
to keep such a letter entirely to himself. Yorke's question
why he had not seen fit to inform the English government
of this step, either through him or the Dutch envoy in Lon
don, was answered evasively. The Grand Pensionary said
that he had not looked upon it as a matter of sufficient im-
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 130; Blok, Geschiedenis van het
Nederlandsche Volk, VI, 326.
' Young, History of the Netherlands, 627.
'Yorke to Suffolk, private, May 29, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

88 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [266
portance, anci that, besides, he was not properly authorized
to communicate it officially to the English government.
However, he did not hesitate then to send a copy of the letter
to Yorke.^
While the government of the United Provinces was stiU
too much in awe of Great Britain to enter into closer rela
tions with the United States, the principal city, Amsterdam,
engaged in negotiations with the Americans, thereby finally
causing a breach with England and involving the Dutch
Republic in a disastrous war, as will be seen in a later chap-
ter.2 In July, 1778, van Berckel, pensionary of Amsterdam,
requested Dumas, the American agent, to express to the
plenipotentiaries of the United States at Paris the gratitude
and appreciation of the regency of Amsterdam for having
been furnished with a copy of the French-American treaty.
" May we hope that circumstances will permit us soon to
give evidence of the high esteem we have for the new repub
lic, clearly raised up by the help of Providence, whUe the
spirit of despotism is subdued; and let us desire to make
leagues of amity and commerce between the respective sub
jects which shall last even to the end of time. What troubles
me is that it is not in our power to make the other members
of the government do as we could wish; in which case the
republic would be at once disposed to another course."'
Dumas forwarded a copy of this letter to the commissioners
in Paris and another one to Congress. He informed van
Berckel soon afterwards of a letter which he had received
from William Lee, then in Frankfort. The latter wrote
that he was not disposed to make haste, especially in im
portant affairs, but he could not help saying that there might
be danger of the good people in HoUand losing some advan
tages in commerce with America by their too great caution.
He had reason to believe that the British ministry had
'Yorke to Suffolk, official. May 29, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII);
Thulemeier to Frederick II, July 7, 1778 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia
and Holland).
'Below, pp. 152 ff.
'Van Berckel to Dumas, July 31, 1778 (Wharton, II, 674).

267] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 89
already sent orders to their commissioners to yield the point
of independence, provided they should obtain some exclusive
benefit in America.^
Afraid that the British commissioners, in their negotia
tions with the United States, might arrange some measures
excluding the Dutch from American commerce, the burgo
masters of Amsterdam sent a "Declaration" to Dumas.
They expressed a desire to conclude a treaty of commerce
and amity with the republic, provided Congress should not
enter into engagements with the English which might prove
"hurtful or prejudicial" to Dutch commerce, "directly or
indirectly." Amsterdam not being able to negotiate a treaty
independently of the States General, her ministers could
think only of preparing such a convention. " It is plain,"
wrote van Berckel in his letter to Dumas on September 23,
1778, " that a treaty of commerce can not be concluded
unless the principal commercial -city of the republic gives
its consent thereto, and that it can not give its consent with
out having examined the terms. This examination may as
well precede as follow the acknowledgment of the inde
pendence of America by the English, in which case we
should gain much time."^ Already on the fourth of the
'Dumas to van Berckel, August 17, 1778 (Wharton, II, 687, 688).
'Wharton, II, 738, 739.
Since these negotiations of the city of Amsterdam with Congress
caused much heated controversy afterwards (below, pp. 152 ff.) the
wording of the " Declaration," which showed that the conclusion of
a draft treaty with Congress originated principally in self-defence,
will be of interest: — "Amsterdam, September 23, 1778.
" The undersigned pensionary of the city of Amsterdam, has the
honor to make known to those who are duly authorized by the Con
gress of the United States of America that he is empowered by the
burgomasters of the aforementioned city to declare in their names
that provided the said Congress do not enter into any engagement
with the English commissioners which may be hurtful or prejudicial
to the commerce of the republic of the United Provinces, directly or
indirectly, the aforesaid burgomasters on their side will be entirely
disposed, as far as depends on them, so to direct the course of
affairs, that whenever the independence of the said United States of
America shall be recognized by the English, a perpetual treaty of
amity shall be concluded between this republic and the aforesaid
United States, containing the most extensive reciprocal advantages
in relation to the commerce of the subjects of the two powers.

90 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [268
same month a prominent merchant of Amsterdam, Jean de
Neufville, who was much interested in American commerce
had with the authorization of van Berckel formulated with
William Lee at Aix-la-Chapelle a draft treaty which was
to be considered only after the recognition of American
independence by Great Britain.^
Lee, who had entered upon these negotiations without
special authority from Congress, reported them in detail.
After his arrival at Frankfort^ he found an opportunity of
negotiating a treaty of commerce with the province of Hol
land and West Friesland. He proceeded so far as to agree
on the draft of a treaty with Mr. de NeufviUe and feU sure
Congress would approve of it, as it contained all the sub
stantially advantageous articles of the commercial treaty
with France and some beneficial and agreeable additions.
The negotiations had been conducted on both sides with
great secrecy, which was absolutely necessary in order to
procure final success with the United Provinces ; for though
the city of Amsterdam and the States of Holland paid about
five sixths of the whole taxes for the support of the gov
ernment, which consequently gave them very powerful
weight and influence, yet they had no power by their con
stitution of entering into such a treaty without the concur
rence of the other provinces. In some of the latter the
Prince of Orange, who greatly favored England, had an
overdue influence. This, Lee said, rendered secrecy of the
" The undersigned has the honor further to declare, that it is the
will of said burgomasters that this declaration may be employed as
shall be thought expedient, with the necessary precaution that it
shall not come to the knowledge of those interested, to prevent, if
possible, or at least to obstruct, the execution of a plan which has no
other object than to prornote the mutual happiness and the true
interests of the two republics.
" E. T. Van Berckel."
' Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 326.
' William Lee was charged to work for the American cause in
Germany and Austria. It was while in the former country that he
negotiated with de Neufville, who had been commissioned there by
van Berckel. Probably the negotiation was held there in order
to avoid suspicion, which could not have been prevented if the meet
ing had taken place in the United Provinces.

269] Early Relations Between the two Republics. 9 1
last importance, until the Patriots in Holland had secured
success. Only then the business could be agitated in the
States General, where it must be passed to have full au
thority.^ To Lee it appeared to be of no inconsiderable importance
that he had obtained from the pensionary an engagement
by which the States General would be prevented from tak
ing any measures that might be injurious to the United
States, provided America should not take any measures
injurious to Holland. This engagement the pensionary
alone was capable of complying with, because his single
negative would be sufficient to prevent the States General
from entering into any such measures, and consequently the
states would be prevented from giving any aid to Great
Britain against France.^ The American commissioners in
Paris, informed of Lee's transactions at Aix-la-Chapelle,
did not approve of the provision that the treaty should be
considered only after the recognition of American inde
pendence by Great Britain. "We would only remark that
the mentioning it in the declaration as a thing necessary to
precede the conclusion of such a treaty 'that the American
independence should be acknowledged by the English' is
not understood by us, who conceive there is no more occa
sion for such an acknowledgment before a treaty with Hol
land than there was before our treaty with France. And
we apprehend that if that acknowledgment were really
necessary or waited for, England might endeavor to make
an advantage of it in the future treaty of pacification to
obtain for it some privileges in commerce perhaps exclusive
of Holland. We wish, therefore, that idea to be laid aside,
and that no further mention may be made to us of England
in this business."'
France was aware of the fact that the principal men of
'W. Lee to Committee of Foreign Affairs, September 12, 1778
(Wharton, II, 715. 7i6).
'Same to same, October 15, 1778 (ibid., II, 787, 788).
'Franklin, Lee, and Adams to Dumas, October 16, 1778 (ibid.,
IL 799).

92 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [270
Amsterdam desired closer relations with the Americans, but
she knew equally well that the States General would not
join in these efforts before aU fear of England's resent
ment had gone.^ Yorke also was suspicious of secret ne
gotiations between Amsterdam and the United States,
though he did not know their nature and had in particular
no knowledge of the draft treaty.^ The American com
missioners, however, did not overestimate the value of this
secret agreement with the city of Amsterdam, and when
Dumas hinted that some of the friends of the American
cause in the Netherlands wished the commissioners to pro
pose a treaty to the Dutch government, they answered that
it would really be a great pleasure to them to be instrumental
in cementing a union between the two republics of Holland
and the United States by a treaty of amity and commerce
similar to that lately concluded with France, or varying
when circumstances might require it. But, having received
no answer from the Grand Pensionary to a letter which
they had written to him some months before, expressing
their disposition toward such a good work, they appre
hended that any further action of that kind on their part
would not, at present, be agreeable ; though they still would
hold themselves ready to enter upon such a treaty when it
should seem good to the States General.'
At first, the efforts of the Americans to have the States
General accredit an American minister were also unsuccess
ful. As early as July 2 and 3, 1777, Congress, according
to the minutes in the Secret Journal of Congress, had de
liberated on the question of sending a representative to the
States General at the Hague.* Almost a year later (April
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, September 13, 1778 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII). 'Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 326.
Yorke was satisfied to report to Lord Suffolk about a year later
(July 10, 1779) that the States of Holland had taken no notice of
the letter from the American agents in Paris to the Grand Pen
sionary (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Franklin, Lee, and Adams to Dumas, September 27, 1778 (Whar
ton, II, 747, 748).
'Wharton, II, 362, 363.

27 1 J Early Relations Between the two Republics. 93
10, 1778), Franklin and Arthur Lee informed Dumas that
John Adams, having shortly before arrived at Paris as the
successor of Silas Deane, then recaUed to the United States,
had told them of the resolution of Congress to send a min
ister to the Netherlands. Though there was the best dispo
sition toward the United Provinces in America, the measure,
according to Adams' report, had been postponed for fear
that the reception of an American envoy might inconveni
ence the States General at present, on account of the still
existing connections with Great Britain.^ That the appre
hensions of Congress in this respect were well founded is
evident from a letter of van der Capellen toward the close
of the year in which he stated that the time seemed distant
when the States General would receive an American min
ister. Except in Amsterdam the English party was still
too strong in the United Provinces.^
It is interesting to note what John Adams said in this
connection of the United Provinces and their relations to
the United States. He held that the similitude of manners,
of religion, and in some respects of constitution ; the analogy
between the means by which the United Provinces and the
United States arrived at independence; but above all the
attractions of commercial interest would infallibly draw
them together. This connection would probably not show
itself in a public manner before peace or a near prospect of
peace, because too many motives of fear or interest placed
the Hollanders in a dependence on England. Nevertheless,
if the King of Prussia could be induced to take the Amer
icans by the hand, his great influence in the United Prov
inces might contribute greatly to conciliate the friendship
of the latter for the United States. Loans of money and
the operations of commercial agents or societies would be
the first threads of connection.
From the inquiries of the commissioners at Paris,
Adams said further, it appeared that some money might be
'Wharton, II, 545, 546.
'Van der CapeUen to Erkelens, December 7, 1778 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der CapeUen, 82).

94 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [272
borrowed in the United Provinces, and from the success
of several enterprises by way of St. Eustatia it seemed
that the trade between the two countries was likely to in
crease, and Congress might think it expedient to send a
minister to the Hague. If they should, it would be proper
to give him a discretionary power to produce his commis
sion, or not to show it, as he should find his mission likely
to succeed, and to give him full powers and clear instruc
tions concerning the borrowing of money. As to the man
himself, he should have consummate prudence with caution
and discretion that would be proof against every trial. ^
As late as February, 1780, Adams had to inform Con
gress that an American minister was much wished for in
the United Provinces but that he might not yet be received
publicly.'^ All efforts to bring about closer financial, com
mercial, or diplomatic relations between the two repubhcs
had up to this point completely failed.
'John Adams to the President of Congress, August 4, 1779 (Whar
ton, IIL 281, 282).
'Same to same, February 27, 1780 (ibid.. Ill, 526).

CHAPTER V.
English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance.
Since the last war between Great Britain and France^ the
United Provinces had gained a considerable part of that
trade with France which was formerly in the hands of Eng
land. An extended commercial intercourse had been going
on, ever since, between the Republic and French ports.
Dutch vessels carried to France, together with many other
goods, large cargoes of ship-building materials and naval
munitions, which were purchased by the Dutch mostly from
the northern countries. Corresponding quantities of mer
chandise were taken back in return, so that in fact this trade
had become one of the principal branches of Dutch com
merce.^ While the carrying trade of the United Provinces
had thus been steadily increasing, their naval strength as
a belligerent power had since the great wars of the seven
teenth century declined to the same degree.' How weak
their position in this respect was may be judged from the
number and state of their war vessels. In the sea battles
of the eighteenth century ships of sixty and more cannon
were considered most effective. Of such vessels England
had 122, France 63, and Spain 62. The United Provinces
possessed only 11, which, besides, were older than those of
the other nations mentioned.* It was evident that after
such neglect of her navy, the Republic in times of war would
be at the mercy of her seafaring neighbors.
By a treaty concluded between England and the United
Provinces in 1674 a novel principle had been introduced in
the naval intercourse of the two countries, namely, that in
' 1756-1763.
' Cerisier, Observations Impartiales d'un Vrai HoUandois, p. i.
'Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, 112.
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 153.
05

96 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [274
case of war free ships made free goods. According to this
stipulation either country was allowed to carry in its vessels
— with exception of contraband of war — ^goods of a nation
with which the other was at war. Naval provisions and
materials for the construction of ships were not to be con
sidered contraband by the contracting parties and were
therefore exempt from seizure. All effects, however, found
on an enemy's vessel, even if belonging to one of the two
contracting countries, might be confiscated.^
While this treaty had rendered large profits to Great
Britain whenever the Netherlands were at war, she was
opposed to its stipulations in her own wars and especiaUy
since the beginning of her troubles with the American colo
nies. " I took care," said Yorke after an interview with the
ministers of Holland in 1776, "to be very particular about
the inadmissibility of any claim to the abused stipulation of
free ships, free goods in the Treaty of 1674," and he added
with satisfaction that both the Grand Pensionary and the
griffier had admitted that the treaty could not with justice be
pleaded in cases of rebellion.^
These remarks regarding the commercial and naval rela
tions of the United Provinces with France on the one hand
and with England on the other will show the great influence
which the events described in this chapter had on the Amer
ican Revolution. France, after her alliance with the United
States, could give effective assistance to the latter only by
having at her disposal a powerful fleet of war vessels. A
ready and large supply of ship materials and naval munitions
was required to strengthen her naval power. It was only
natural that the United Provinces should continue to furnish
these supplies, since England, stUl bound by the treaty of
1674, was not expected to be able to object to it. Great
Britain, however, confident in her naval superiority, set aside
' Cerisier, Observations Impartiales, 33 ; Fitzmaurice, Shelburne,
112. 'Yorke to Suffolk, August 6, 1776 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
This report was made on the occasion of the restoration of the
Dutch ship "Judith Aletta" by a sentence of the English Court of
Admiralty.

275] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 97
her treaty obligations and used every means to intervene in
the commercial relations between France and the Nether
lands. Already in the beginning of the American Revolution fre
quent searches by the English of vessels coming from Dutch
ports aroused deep indignation and apprehension among the
merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In the spring of
1777, the rumor prevailed that the British authorities had
issued orders to search aU vessels leaving the ports of the
United Provinces.^ Later in the year the English began to
take Dutch vessels not only in Europe, but also in the West
Indies,^ which measure brought forth a clamor from the
merchants of Amsterdam for the protection of their com
merce and an official complaint from the Republic presented
by Count Welderen to the court of St. James.' A convoy
to the West Indies was granted by the States General in
November, much to the disappointment and dissatisfaction
of Yorke,* who must have seen in this step, proposed by the
States of Holland and sanctioned by the States General, an
alarming proof of the weakening of the English party in the
United Provinces. The citizens of Amsterdam had gained
a decided victory in this matter, and, anxious to increase
their influence still more, desired to be represented at the
court of St. James by a diplomat of their own choice.
Count Welderen, they said, did not show enough fervor in
supporting their interests, and they suggested to the States
General the sending of an ambassador chosen from among
the magistrates of Amsterdam. The petition, however, was
not considered, and Welderen remained in his official posi-
' Vauguyon to Vergennes, April 19, 1777 (Sparks MSS., LXXXII).
' Dumas to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, August 22, 1777
(Wharton, II, 378).
'Yorke to Suffolk, private, September 24, 1777 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXII) ; Dumas to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 14,
1777 (Wharton, II, 408).
'Resolutions of the States General, November 3, 1777 (Sparks
MSS., CIII) ; Yorke to Suffolk, November 7 and 19, 1777 (Sparks
MSS., LXXII).
The convoy sailed in December (above, p. 58).

98 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [276
tion in London.^ Dumas, in discussing the political situa
tion in the Republic, said he had been told by the pensionary
that the United Provinces owed the conservation of their
liberty to the noble resistance of the United States, be
cause the English were trying to establish despotism in the
Republic. Their faction, he proceeded, was defeated now
together with its principal supporter, Sir Joseph Yorke,
whose influence, he thought, was much reduced.^ It is not
surprising that under these circumstances the English party,
and especially the British ambassador, were constantly ap
prehending that the Dutch might not remain neutral.
Yorke pretended to have news from Paris to that effect.'
The Prussian envoy at the Hague also informed his king
that after the rupture between France and England, the
United Provinces, it was generally feared, would only
with difficulty be able to remain neutral.* England would
probably claim the help stipulated by treaties, but the party
of neutrality would be victorious, since the actions of Great
Britain had not been such as to make new friends in the
United Provinces or to strengthen their old ones there.^
When matters between Great Britain and France grew
more and more serious, the former began to look for aid
to the United Provinces. The state of the Dutch military
as well as naval forces was, however, so deplorably bad that
direct assistance could hardly be expected. Yorke did his
best to induce the Prince of Orange to have effective
measures taken for the augmentation of the Dutch army.
WiUiam V, a willing tool in the hands of the English, was
found, also on this occasion, sincerely attached to George
III and the cause of Great Britain. The prince's efforts,
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 23, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' Dumas to the American Commissioners, January 23, 1778 (Arthur
Lee MSS., Harvard University).
'Yorke to Suffolk, February 10, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 27, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Same to same, March 31, 1778 (ibid.).

277] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 99
however, threatened to be nullified by the stubborn resist
ance of Amsterdam.^
Yorke received stricter instructions for his conduct in this
case. The king, he was told, had seen with great concem
how little prospect there was for the adoption of the Prince
of Orange's proposals regarding the augmentation of the
Dutch forces. Since the independence of the Republic de
pended on such a measure, the ambassador would be sen
sible of the necessity of putting her forces on a respectable
footing at the present moment. He was asked to consider
that the propriety and utUity of enforcing every argument
possible to encourage the stadtholder and the Dutch min
isters for this object must be obvious. The States General
could not consider their own defenceless state as consistent
with those maxims of prudence and sound policy which
brought the Republic to the degree of prosperity and wealth
which it enjoyed. The letter then came more to the point,
suggesting that in the war between Great Britain and France,
Great Britain would have a right to call for those succors
to which she was entitled by treaty. In this case the Re
public would make " but an indifferent figure in the eyes of
Europe " if she should not only be incapable of fulfilling her
engagements, but even be unable to defend herself. The
instructions, in conclusion, said that Great Britain would
never permit the subjects of the RepubUc to become the
carriers for England's enemies, and that the old claim of
free ships, free goods would never be admitted.-
The ambassador, conscious of the weakness of his posi
tion, did not hesitate to call the attention of his superiors to
it. His antagonists in the United Provinces, he said, had a
great advantage over him, for while he recommended vigor
ous measures and showed the danger to which the Republic
was exposed, the French ambassador recommended quiet
and ease without expense except for the protection of com
merce. As soon as the Prince of Orange had recommended
'Yorke to Suffolk, March 31, April 3 and 7, 1778 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXII). •Suffolk to Yorke, April 14, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

lOO Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [278
the augmentation of troops, Vauguyon had told some prin
cipal members of the government that the United Prov
inces had nothing to fear from France, either in the Nether
lands or upon the lower Rhine, since His Most Christian
Majesty wished for peace, but that the dignity as well as the
interests of the Republic required a strong navy. On ac
count of these conditions, Yorke had to arm himself with
patience in the prosecution of the business, and he implored
his superiors to do likewise. He suggested that he might be
obliged to request orders for formaUy demanding military
aid, for if the Dutch violated one treaty, because they would
or could not give assistance, they had no right to claim the
privileges of 1674 which were so notoriously detrimental to
Great Britain because of free ships and free goods.^ The
military proposition of the stadtholder had been defeated,
principally by the resistance of Amsterdam, which city gave
as reason for her attitude that by the increase of the Dutch
army the jealousy of some neighboring power might be
excited while, on the other hand, no real protection was of
fered to the Republic. Thulemeier no doubt was right when
he suspected that France had had a hand in the game.^
To what degree the decline of England's reputation had
progressed at this period is shown in a confidential letter
written by Yorke. It had become a fashion, he said, to
look upon Great Britain as unable to maintain the contest
with her former colonies in America. He attributed this to
the many libels published in England. Some fortunate
event was absolutely necessary, either in America or at sea,
to restore in the political world the appearance which Great
Britain had " such a right to assume." Then her neighbors
would soon speak again " the language of respect and
friendship."' The ambassador, of course, judged chiefly
from the conduct of the Dutch and perhaps from the atti
tude of Vauguyon and his foUowers in the United Prov-
' Yorke to Suffolk, April 21, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, April 21, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Yorke to Suffolk, private, May 29, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

279] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. loi
inces. He was highly indignant at the French ambassador's
achievements and blamed him almost solely for the dis
content which was spreading more and more in the Re
public at the English aggressions at sea. France was tak
ing advantage of every trifling event, in order to incite the
Dutch merchants to complain.^ The smallest outrage of a
privateer at sea was swelled into an article for the Dutch
gazettes to represent England as bent upon ill treating the
trade and subjects of the Republic.^ Of course, the French
party used to the best possible advantage the weapons which
England herself furnished them so abundantly.
Sir Joseph was, at this time, almost in despair and highly
discontented with everything and everybody in the United
Provinces, but especially with the Prince of Orange. " His
Majesty's ambassador," he wrote, "is very singularly cir
cumstanced in such a Situation. His Instructions, the In
terest of his Country, his own Wishes, aU unite to bind him
to the Stadtholderian Party, and yet the little Union which
is permitted in that Party, and the total want of Concert,
leave him almost without assistance to counteract the Am
bassador of France. The great difficulty of all proceeds
from the want of firmness in the Prince of Orange, who
with the best Intentions, a thorough knowledge of his
Country's and his own Interest, and convinced of the exist
ence of the Intrigue and its cortsequences, takes no step
whatever to stem the Torrent, but contents himself with
thinking and saying, that tho' he has not the force to carry
what he wishes, he has however a Liberum Veto to reject
whatever may be improperly proposed by others."
To bring about a change and to rouse the Prince of
Orange " at least to a sense of his own Danger, and of his
Duty to himself, his Family and his Country," Yorke pro
posed a curious method which clearly shows his misconcep
tion of the political situation. He suggested that Frederick
the Great should be induced to influence the stadtholder,
'Yorke to Suffolk, July 28, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Same to same, private, August 28, 1778 (ibid.).

I02 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [280
basing this odd recommendation on the supposition that the
King of Prussia owed gratitude to England, because George
III had, in Frederick's existing contest with Austria over
the Bavarian succession, "openly and generously espoused
the Prussian Cause." This proposal, however, was not acted
upon by the English government.^
The hostilities between England and France began in
June, 1778,^ and with them serious troubles for the United
Provinces. The aggressions of the English became more
and more open and also more frequent. In July they began
to stop Dutch vessels in the English Channel. In the pre
carious position of the English this action was surprising.
In the midst of the dangers, Thulemeier wrote, which
menaced Great Britain from all sides, the English con
tinued to heap impositions on the Dutch. Recently five
large merchant vessels of the latter had been taken as
prizes.' Nothing could be more welcome to France than
these actions of the enemy. Her consuls and agents at
foreign ports were charged to make public Great Britain's
treatment of the United Provinces and to announce that it
was very unsafe for Dutch ships to sail without convoy.
Amsterdam urged that the Dutch navy be increased in order
to free the Republic from this tyranny. Yorke remarked
thereupon, " This country is running headlong into a de
pendence on the Court of Versailles."* On September 14,
' Yorke to Suffolk, August 25, 1778, most private (Colenbrander,
Patriottentijd, I, 134, 374-376).
The answer which Yorke received left no doubt concerning the
relations between the courts of St. James and Berlin : " His Prus
sian Majesty confines his Expressions of Cordiality to H. M. in
his quality of Elector only; all his Communications in the Dispute
with the Court of Vienna have been limited to H. M.'s Electoral
Minister; the Servants of the Crown have been strictly excluded,
and His Language with regard to this Country is very little changed.
Many things therefore must happen (to speak openly to Your Ex
cellency) before He can be enough considered as a Friend to be
applied to in the Manner you suggest" (Suffolk to Yorke, Sep
tember I, 1778, most private, in Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I,
134, 376).
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 129.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, September I, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
'Yorke to Suffolk, September 8, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

28 1] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 103
the States General received a lengthy petition from the
merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, asking for pro
tection against the excesses of English war vessels and
privateers.^ The seizing of Dutch vessels by the English,
however, continued. Before the end of September twenty-
nine had been taken. ^
In consequence of a complaint transmitted to the court of
St. James by Count Welderen, some Dutch vessels had been
released and Yorke reported from the Hague that this
measure had a good effect in the United Provinces for the
moment.' He was, however, very much mistaken, since
Welderen, by direction of the States General, handed
another memorandum in much stronger terms to the English
cabinet transmitting the grievances of the Dutch merchants.
The States General, he wrote, had seen with satisfaction that
the vessels "Martina'' and "Hendrik en Alida" (taken when
sailing from Curagao and St. Eustatia directly toward the
Republic), the "Debora en Maria,'' "de Hoop," and
"Adriana" (when bound from the United Provinces to
France) had been released, since it removed the fear that
England intended to ruin the commerce of the United
Provinces. On the other hand. Great Britain, so far, had
not offered any indemnity for the cost and damages occa
sioned by the seizure, and the captors, it seemed, had not
received any mark of displeasure from His Majesty the
King. The States General had learned with the greatest
surprise that English vessels possessing commissions from
the king had repeatedly violated Dutch territory in America
and especially had almost blockaded the rivers of Essequibo
and Demerari. There were also other complaints of the
capture and other molestations of Dutch vessels by British
men-of-war and privateers, in violation of the treaty of
1674. The United Provinces had no other resources than
' Sparks Dutch Papers ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, September 18,
1778 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, September 25, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Yorke to Suffolk, September 15, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

104 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [282
commerce and navigation, and the welfare of the Republic
therefore depended wholly upon the freedom of her ships.
The Dutch trusted that His Majesty would disapprove of
the action of his subjects, contrary to the express provisions
of the treaties, and that all Dutch vessels seized would be
released and an appropriate indemnity paid which should
cover the real cost and damages caused by their capture and
delay. In conclusion Welderen said that the States General
were confident His Majesty would find means for rendering
impossible the recurrence of such violations of Dutch terri
tory and Dutch navigation.^
The Dutch feared that by the intermption of their navi
gation their credit, the basis of every commercial country,
might be undermined. Freight and commission trade, the
most important contributors to the revenues of the United
Provinces, were suffering most, and the merchants of the
United Provinces became alarmed lest those branches of
their commerce might wholly pass to rival countries which
were able to defend their interests effectively against Eng
land. It was dangerous to suffer the molestation of com
merce for another reason. There was a possibility, or rather
a probability, that France might take countermeasures.^ In
fact, the French ambassador was working in this direction.
Louis XVI, he declared to the Dutch ministers, was pleased
with the recent action of the United Provinces regarding
the defence of their navigation and promised the assistance
of France. Vauguyon, however, stated that the regulations
which France had published regarding the navigation of
neutral powers would be revoked if England did not adopt
similar measures within six months. The Dutch flag could
not be respected by France if this was not done by Great
Britain.' The English, realizing that they were rapidly losing groimd
in the United Provinces, released some Dutch ships, and
'Welderen's memorial of September 27/28, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland, and England).
' Cerisier, Observations Impartiales, 39 ff.
'Yorke to Suffolk, September 25, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

283] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 105
orders were given for the dismissal of the rest except those
which had naval or warlike stores on board. The British
government contemplated also the issue of positive direc
tions which would effectually prevent the taking of the Dutch
vessels destined for French ports or the United States, but
not carrying contraband. Naval munitions of every descrip
tion were still to be « seized, together with the vessels on
which they were found. Whatever might be the conse
quences, every means would be exerted to prevent His Ma
jesty's enemies from being supplied with such stores. Yorke
was directed to call the attention of the Dutch government
to the treaty of alliance with the States General of the year
1668. According to its stipulations any hostile act against
the King of Great Britain and his subjects would form a
casus foederis, entitling England to call upon the United
Provinces for assistance. Yorke was to explain to the
Dutch that this treaty was not less binding for them than
the commercial treaty of 1674 for the English. The infer
ence from this could be easily drawn. The United Prov
inces, upon requisition, would not be in a position to render
the stipulated assistance, and Great Britain, consequently,
would not be obliged to keep the treaty of 1674. The am
bassador was directed to express these views of the English
cabinet very cautiously and without taking any public step,
in order to avoid altercation or disagreeable discussions.^
In the meantime, the complaints of Dutch merchants to
the States General regarding English outrages at sea con
tinued. Yorke reported that during the two days preced
ing the date of his letter no less than thirteen such com
plaints had been presented. He asserted that the French
were intriguing in Amsterdam with the object of exciting
public opinion to a point where the magistrates would have
to yield. The latter would thus be compelled to ask the
States General for protection against England and satisfac
tion for the losses sustained. The French were not scru-
' Suffolk to Yorke, September 29, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII,
CIII).

io6 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [284
pulous in their means for attaining this end, declaring that
Great Britain had no other view than to annihilate Dutch
trade and navigation, and representing acts of violence com
mitted by English adventurers as acts of the British govern
ment.^ That the complaints of the United Provinces, however,
were not wholly unjustified, as Yorke tried to represent
them, is seen from the fact that in October forty-two vessels
had been taken by the English.^ Moreover, the States Gen
eral were rather reluctant in voicing the public opinion in
this matter. When the merchants of Friesland sent up a
petition similar to those of the citizens of the province of
Holland and demanded by their deputies new instructions
to Count Welderen, the States General refused, on the
ground that this request contained no other matter than
what had already been brought to the knowledge of the
English government.'
France now took a step further in her policy regarding
the United Provinces. Vauguyon, according to instructions
from Paris, called upon the Prince of Orange and the Dutch
ministers, representing to them the necessity " of supporting
their trade to the Baltic and insisting upon the stipulations
of the Treaty of 1674, respecting naval stores." That those
articles should be safe under the flagof the Republic, he said,
was of the greatest importance, and if England pursued her
present course, France would certainly alter her conduct and
visit Dutch vessels with the same vigor. He inquired
whether or not the Dutch would protect, by convoys, their
vessels carrying naval stores, adding that France would
efficiently support such defensive measures. The ambassa
dor was answered that representations had already been
made to Great Britain.*
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 2, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
Regarding the Dutch grievances see also Thulemeier's report of
the same date to Frederick II (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Hol
land) ; Cerisier, Observations Impartiales, 39 ff.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 6, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 133.
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 10, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Yorke to Suffolk, October 16, 1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

285] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 107
The official English answer to the Dutch representations
arrived at the Hague, but brought no change in the existing
conditions. Count Welderen had been informed by Lord
Suffolk that the English admiralty was directed to allow
free transit to all Dutch merchant vessels, except those car
rying contraband goods, and especially ship-building timber.
It cannot be surprising that this answer did not satisfy the
Dutch. It was rumored, according to an announcement of
the admiralty at Amsterdam, after the beginning of Novem
ber, that vessels bound for France or England would be
granted such convoys as they required.'^ Great Britain was
now ready to buy at an appraised value the naval munitions
seized on Dutch vessels and brought to her ports. Besides
she would pay the freight on the cargoes and compensate the
proprietors for all expenses and losses occasioned by the
detention of their vessels. Investigation regarding the ac
tions of British captains in the territories of the United
Provinces in America, especially on the rivers of Essequibo
and Demerari, was also promised, and any culpables would
be punished.-^
The public mind in the United Provinces, however, was
aroused too much to be appeased by Great Britain's weak
attempts at reconciliation. Amsterdam continued her clam
oring for protection,' and anonymous pamphlets were
widely circulated, irritating the people still more. The rea
son, said an anonymous author, why England persecuted
the Dutch was innate hatred and her jealousy of Dutch
commerce and navigation. Even some of his countrymen
tried to justify the hostile attitude of the EngUsh. The
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 16, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Suffolk to Welderen, October 19, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland, and England) ; see also Davies, History of Hol
land, III, 445-446, concerning England's attitude with regard to
the Dutch timber trade.
The promise regarding Essequibo and Demerari was repeated in
December, 1778 (Suffolk to Welderen, December 11, 1778, in Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 20, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).

io8 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [286
pretext was often heard that the Dutch ships seized by the
English had been carrying forbidden goods, but this could
not be maintained as long as it was not shown that all of
them had contraband on board. England, of course, did
not like to have the United Provinces provide France with
material for ship building. Had it not been equally hard for
the Dutch to see Great Britain furnish the same materials
to France from the treaty of 1674 to the peace of Nymwe-
gen ? The question was not what was liked, but what was
permitted by the treaties.
It was furthermore said, continued this writer, that Dutch
navigation from harbor to harbor in France strengthened
England's foe, but he did not see how a reproach could be
constructed from this, since the Republic was living in peace
with France, and an order from the Dutch authorities for
bidding this trade would be a breach of neutrality. He
would also not let pass the argument pronounced by friends
of England in the United Provinces that a number of French
ports were blockaded by British vessels and therefore Dutch
vessels must not enter them, especially when loaded with
ship timber, because in this case proof would be required
that the ports were really and efficiently blockaded. It
was further said that England's attitude was justified by
the failure of the United Provinces to furnish assistance in
the war of 1756 to 1763. This was contrary to facts, for
the Dutch had assisted Great Britain both by troops and
ships during the last war. In return the English had seized
so many Dutch ships that the United Provinces suffered
more from England than from France, then their enemy.
In conclusion he recommended as means for bringing about
a change: frequent use of convoys; joining other nations,
especially the United States of America, in the protection
of commerce; pleading freedom of navigation, within the
spirit of the treaties; and finally the strengthening of the
forces of the Republic by all means.^
'Onderzoek van Groot-Brittanjes Gedrag, 140-147.

287] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 109
Such clever work on the part of the Patriots^ did not re
main without results. The appeals to the Dutch authorities
for protection against England became more and more ur
gent. On October 23, 1778, the merchants of Amsterdam,
Dordrecht, and Rotterdam addressed another petition to the
States General expressing their dissatisfaction with the an
swer of the English ministry, and, pointing out once more
the immense damage done to the United Provinces by Great
Britain's proceedings regarding the timber trade with
France, demanded redress of their grievances.^
In order to come to a friendly understanding with the
United Provinces, if possible, Yorke was charged by the
Foreign Office in London to negotiate with the Dutch.' In
execution of this instruction he handed, on November 2,
1778, a memorial to the States General. Though, he said,
the French threatened to invade Great Britain and her ter
ritories, the king, his master, still refrained from calling
upon the United Provinces for the assistance stipulated by
the most solemn treaties, and especially that of 1678, and
the separate article of the treaty of 1716. All that was
requested at present was a conference for discussing various
articles in question in the treaties. It was not at all the
intention of the king to disturb the customary commerce of
the United Provinces with France, except in military and
naval munitions. It was to be hoped that the sense of jus
tice of the United Provinces and their friendship for Great
Britain would prevent them from having naval munitions
carried into France under the cover of convoys.*
The American agent at the Hague, learning of Yorke's
' In this connection van der Kemp, one of the foremost Patriots
in tlie United Provinces, must be mentioned. Concerning the ques
tion of unlimited convoys he published anonymously a Collection of
State Papers, with a preface by "Junius Brutus Secundus Frisco."
Of him van der Capellen wrote on May 12, 1780, " The unlimited
convoy and the whole Patriot party owe more than is known to this
clergyman" (Fairchild, van der Kemp, 45).
'Sparks Dutch Papers, I, 88.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 27, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
' Secret Resolution of the States General, November 2, 1778 (Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland, and England; Sparks MSS., CIII).

IIO Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [288
step, predicted that the latter would find in Amsterdam for
midable adversaries who were firmly resolved on an abso
lute refusal of the English requests. Dumas found also
that the irritaition against England was even growing, espe
cially among the nobility.^ The States General did not
hasten their reply to Yorke. The Grand Pensionary, how
ever, told him that convoys might perhaps be refused, but
that the value of a conference must be regarded as very
doubtful, since the stipulations of the treaty of 1674 were
distinct, and as to the other treaties, the Republic was not at
all obliged to furnish assistance.^
This friction between Great Britain and her ally naturally
tended to further the cause of the United States. "In
short," wrote the American commissioners at this time, " we
see no probability of England's forming any alliance against
America in all Europe, or, indeed, against France ; whereas,
on the other side, from the astonishing preparations of Spain,
the family compact, and other circumstances, and from the
insolent tyranny of the EngUsh over the Dutch and their
consequent resentment, which has shown itself in formidable
remonstrances as well as advances towards a treaty with us,
there is reason to believe that if Great Britain perseveres in
the war, both of these powers wUl at length be involved
in it."'
Correct as this view proved to be in the end, there was no
prospect yet of the United Provinces joining the war. Eng
land knew the feebleness of the Republic too well to be
afraid of this. As to a treaty with the United States, even
France was convinced that the Dutch would take such a step
' Dumas to the Commissioners in Paris, November 4, 1778 (Whar
ton, II, 829).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 135, 136.
Colenbrander remarks to this : " We see how small the board was
on which the government was stepping now, and how no balustrade
was there to hold on. A nice conduct, to insist upon a treaty which
guaranteed very extended and advantageous privileges to the mer-
chants, and then to refuse all protection . The denial of convoy
would have had reason only if England had demanded it as a tem
porary measure pending the negotiations regarding the treaty . . . ."
' Franklin, Lee, and Adams to the President of Congress, Passy,
November 7, 1778 (Wharton, II, 831, 832).

289] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 11 1
only if they could do it without running any risk.^ Yorke's
memorial of November 2 had been referred to the com
mittee of naval affairs for examination and report. This
committee was now of the opinion that the conference asked
for by the British ambassador concerning the meaning of the
treaties relative to naval stores should be refused, but that
the admiralty should not grant convoys for the protection of
these materials. It was thought by many that Amsterdam
might be able to thwart these plans by insisting upon the
strict observance of the treaties. " Otherwise," the Amer
ican agent at the Hague remarked, "the servile submission
of the nation to the lash of the English will expose it to
that of the French also, who will deprive it of the privileges
it has heretofore enjoyed in their country, and will seize its
vessels, after the example of the English. "-
Both parties in the United Provinces now worked in every
way possible to have the decision of the States General favor
able to their respective views. Amsterdam, without doubt,
was most deeply interested in the question of convoys.
Large speculations had been made there in the business of
furnishing naval stores to France, and during the preceding
summer such large quantities of munitions had been pur
chased by the merchants that money became scarce in that
city. One of the means by which the French party at Am
sterdam expected to influence the government of the United
Provinces was by causing the insurance firms henceforth not
to insure Dutch vessels destined for France or the French
colonies. This trick, which was expected to create a general
cry for convoys, failed because of a counterstroke of the
British party. The rich banker Hope, an English partisan,
temporarily established himself as insurer, which brought
the regular insurance firms quickly back to their business.
The partisans of Great Britain on their part did not disdain
to put into circulation anonymous incendiary pamphlets. In
'French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Vauguyon, November 9,
1778 (Sparks MSS., LXXXIII).
'Dumas to the Commissioners at Paris, November 10, 1778
(Wharton, II, 834, 835).

112 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [290
one of them it was said that Dutch merchants could lose
three vessels out of four destined to carry naval munitions
to France, and still make a profit.^
The merchants of Amsterdam began to call upon the
stadtholder, making him personally responsible for the con
sequences of a refusal to grant unlimited convoy. Jean de
Neufville, their speaker, requested efficient measures for
the protection of the commercial interests of the country,
referring to the prince as the admiral-general of the United
Provinces and emphasizing the fact that a number of war
vessels were already lying in the harbors, ready for action.
The Prince of Orange answered evasively, that, for the year
1779, the construction and fitting out of thirty-two vessels
had already been requested, and that every attention would
be paid to the protection of commerce and navigation.^ The
States of Holland, deliberating on Yorke's memorial of
November 2, did not at first reach a conclusion, but decided
to determine by the majority of voices whether or not con
voys should be granted for naval stores. A protest against
such a measure was filed by the members from Amsterdam,
led by Pensionary van Berckel, on the ground that the con
stitution required unanimity in this case, but they were
overruled. At the same time Vauguyon informed the prin
cipal officers of the government, and through them the pen
sionaries of the cities, that Louis XVI expected the Repub
lic to cause her flag to be respected by protecting her com
merce according to the English-Dutch treaty of 1674. Other-
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 136.
In footnote 3, ibid., Colenbrander says, " Thulemeier deelt het
pamfletje mee bij zijn depeche van 24 November 1778." Undoubt
edly this pamphlet is identical with the one which G. Bancroft found
with Thulemeier's report of November 10, 1778. In Bancroft's
MSS., Prussia and HoUand, these remarks appear at the end of that
letter : " Accompanying this dispatch is an interesting paper ' Examen
des plaintes des negocians d'Amsterdam au sujet de la saisie des
vaisseaux HoUandais charges de bois de construction pour la
France.' ... It has no date and no signature, but from its contents
one would conclude it was written by Yorke. . . It is an argu
ment in favor of Great Britain upon the construction of the treaty
of 1674."
'Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 327.

291] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 113
wise, the ambassador declared, " the king is immovably
fixed in his determination to deprive the [Dutch] nation of
those advantages which his majesty, out of pure kindness,
and without any obligation by treaty, has hitherto permitted
it to enjoy in the ports of France."^ The fear of England,
however, was still too great; the assembly of the province
of Holland refused the employment of convoys by merely
a majority of voices.^ Amsterdam protested, declaring the
resolution void, since, according to the constitution, it could
be passed only by a unanimous vote.
The English party triumphed, and Sir Joseph Yorke
hastened to send a special messenger to London to transmit
the news. Dumas expected that the English government
would boast of this victory in Parliament and in the press,
while the protest of the city of Amsterdam would probably
not be mentioned. He gives an interesting description of
the sentiment prevailing among the deputies after this curi
ous session. " I will only add," he said, " that to-morrow
morning the members from the great city [Amsterdam] will
depart, and with them all the glory of Belgium [sic]. The
others are ashamed of their own work, dare not boast of it,
and hang down their heads. It has even been attempted to
circulate the report that the famous resolution was adopted
unanimously and in conformity with the wishes of the
great city."'
Deputations were again sent to the States General, the
Prince of Orange, and the ministers of the Republic,* but
not from Amsterdam only. The States of Zealand entered
officially with the States General a request for convoys to
France.^ Still the resolution which excluded from convoys
' Dumas to the Commissioners at Paris, November 13, 1778
(Wharton, n, 837).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 13, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
° Dumas to the Commissioners at Paris, November 20, 1778 (Whar
ton, II, 843).
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 20, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
° Secret Resolution of the States General, November 13, 1778
(Sparks MSS., CIII).
8

114 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [292
only masts and ship timber, but no other naval munitions,
was passed by the States General.^ Serious consequences
were feared. The Patriots like van der Capellen were
shocked and indignant. Amsterdam protested^ and was
expected to refuse payment of her contributions to the ex
penses of the Republic, amounting to about one quarter of
the whole, and even to ask assistance of France, which
would certainly be granted. The latter power was likely to
execute her threats of seizing, in her turn, EngUsh property
on board Dutch ships, and of depriving them of the privil
eges they enjoyed in French ports.' These considerations
probably caused the Dutch government to withdraw every
thing that looked like submission to the English de
mands. Count Welderen, therefore, had to hand to the
British government a declaration which contained only the
refusal of the conference asked for. The resolution con
cerning convoys was not mentioned at all.*
The old question, whether the army or navy was to be
increased, was soon taken up again in the United Provinces.
"The friends to themselves and to us," wrote Arthur Lee
from Paris, "are for augmenting their marine; the pur
chased advocates of England and the dependents of the
Stadtholder are for increasing their army." The French
party, of course, was eager to strengthen the Dutch navy
in order to be able to fight England at sea. The English
party, on the other hand, was anxious to increase the army
of the United Provinces so as to meet any attack from
France on land. The latter seemed to be determined to
carry out her threats regarding the seizure of English goods
on board neutral vessels,^ but, in reality, she was much more
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 137; Doniol, Histoire, III, 718.
'Van der Capellen to Erkelens; same to Govemor TrumbuU, De
cember 7, 1778 (Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 82 ff.).
' Dumas to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 3, 1778
(Wharton, II, 847).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 137.
'Arthur Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, December S,
1778 (Wharton, II, 850).
The provinces of HoUand and Friesland, which depended chiefly
on commerce and ship-building, urged the increase of the navy;
Utrecht, Overyssel, Guelderland, and Zealand, under the influence

293] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 1 15
anxious to have the sending of Dutch cargoes of naval
munitions to her ports continued.
Vauguyon obtained from his government the approval of
a plan, conceived in connection with Amsterdam, for thwart
ing the consequences of the resolution. The preparations
for carrying out the scheme were completed when the
ambassador visited the city on December 2.^ Five days
later he presented a memorial to the States General in which
a clear and precise explanation was requested whether or
not the United Provinces were determined to maintain a
perfect neutrality. The King of France would decide' ac
cording to the answer of Their High Mightinesses whether
to maintain or to annul the orders already given. Partiality
would be manifested by the States General if they did not
make the most strenuous exertions to procure for the Dutch
flag all the freedom belonging to an independent state, and
for their commerce all the respect which the law of nations
and treaties secured to it. In the case of such a breach of
neutrality His Majesty would be compeUed to suspend not
only the advantages which the United Provinces enjoyed
as neutrals, but also the material and gratuitous favor which
their commerce enjoyed in French ports.^
of the stadtholder, that of the army. A proposition brought forth
by the Prince of Orange as a compromise, naraely, to increase army
and navy simultaneously, the former by fifty or sixty thousand raen,
the latter by fifty or sixty sails, was rejected by the States of Hol
land (Davies, History of HoUand, III, 450; Resolutions of Hol
land and Westfriesland, March 10, 1779, in Sparks Dutch Papers;
David Hartley, March 12, 1779, in Hansard, Parliamentary History,
XX, 277).
Finally, the demand regarding the land forces was entirely re
fused, while the building of only thirty-two vessels was granted;
but this number was soon augraented to fifty-two (Kampen, Ver
korte Geschiedenis, II, 293).
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 137.
'Wharton, II, 854, 855; Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and
England; Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaerboeken, 1779, p. 164; Sparks
Dutch Papers ; Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 329 ; Colenbrander, Patriot
tentijd, I, 137; Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 292 ff.
On July 26, 1778, France had issued liberal regulations regarding
the shipping of all those countries which, within six months, would
give proofs of their neutraUty (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 137,
note). The United Provinces, of course, enjoyed the advantages
from these regulations besides the special privileges that had been
conceded to them.

il6 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [294
Besides taking this official step, Vauguyon accentuated in
private conversations the determination of his royal master
to take away from the Dutch trade all the privileges granted,
in case the answer of the States General should not be satis
factory. He told the stadtholder very plainly that the
latter's personal welfare, together with that of his family,
might depend on the resolution of the States General and
endeavored to get the Princess of Orange to influence her
husband in favor of the French cause. He reached Princess
Wilhelmine through her lady-in-waiting, Fraulein von
Danckelmann, but was unsuccessful, since Wilheknine
answered that she did not intend to interfere in matters of
state. ^ The prospect of the compliance of the States Gen
eral with the French king's demand was not bright. The
committee which was appointed to deliberate on the answer
to Vauguyon's memorial decided that no change should be
made in the resolution concerning convoys. When the am
bassador learned this he immediately sent a note to the
Grand Pensionary demanding a precise answer, yes or no.^
The English party, however, was again victorious. In the
assembly of the province of Holland on December 19, an
evasive answer had already been formulated, which merely
expressed the desire of the United Provinces to maintain
strict neutraUty. The deputies of the city of Amsterdam
protested' as on November 18; nevertheless the resolution
'Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 171, 308; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I,
137, 138.
' Secret Resolution of the States General, December 29, 1778
(Sparks MSS., CIII).
' The deputies of Amsterdam contended that even if the refusal of
convoys for vessels carrying ship timber could be supported on any
principle of law or justice, England would not be benefited by it,
because those goods could be supplied to France equally well by
Sweden, Denmark, and the other nations of the North. "The meas
ure would result only in a transfer of this valuable trade from the
United Provinces to other nations.
The merchants of Friesland urged that they had hitherto em
ployed above two thousand ships, chiefly in the timber trade which
was now virtually annihilated (Davies, History of Holland, III,
449)- Cerisier in a pamphlet dated December 6, 1778, and entitled
" Observations d'un Vrai HoUandois " defended the American cause,
but at the same time admonished the Dutch to reraain neutral.

295] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 117
was adopted by the States General. On December 30, the
agent of the latter handed it to Vauguyon, who refused to
accept it, " as not being such as the king demanded." It
was then resolved to send the answer to Berkenrode, the
Dutch envoy at Paris, with instructions to hand it to
Louis XVI.^
The Prince of Orange, exasperated, now sought protec
tion from Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. It appears
that Vauguyon's intimation that the safety of the stadt
holder and his family was in danger had greatly alarmed
William. He described to the king the critical situation in
which the United Provinces were placed, and tried to con
vince him that the resolution regarding convoys was not
the outcome of partiality for England. Frederick was en
treated to protect the stadtholder and his family, for fear
that France would cause a revolution in the United Prov
inces in order to upset the present government and consti
tution, and to do away with the stadtholder's office. Wil
liam requested also Prussia's assistance in case France
should invade the Republic.^
Frederick, who was still involved in the Bavarian suc
cession controversy, showed no inclination to become entan
gled in the contest between England and France. He
answered evasively that William knew best the real inter
ests of the Republic, which alone should be decisive in her
present delicate position. He recommended that the stadt
holder should consult the constitution of the United Prov
inces for guidance in this dilemma. The Princess of
' Dumas to the Commissioners at Paris, December 18, 1778
(Wharton, II, 860, 861) ; same to the Committee of Foreign Af
fairs, January i, 1779 (ibid., II, 872-875) ; Vaterlandsche Historie,
XXV, 264; Thulemeier to Frederick II, December 22, 1778 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Secret Resolution of the States
General, December 30, 1778 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland,
and England) ; ibid., December 31, 1778 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
' Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 172, 312.
This correspondence was begun with the approval of the Duke of
Brunswick. It was thought necessary to inforra Frederick differ
ently from Thulemeier, who was suspected to have " sterke liaisons "
with Vauguyon (Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 172).

ii8 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [296
Orange, notwithstanding her assertion to the French am
bassador that she would never interfere in affairs of state,
began at this juncture a lively poUtical correspondence with
her uncle, and the latter abandoned his reserve in communi
cating his opinion to her. "You have done too much for
the English," he wrote to her on January 13, 1779, "you
permit them to pillage your vessels at their pleasure. The
French thought they might make use of the same imperious
tone as the English, and you feel now the inconvenience."
As a remedy he recommended that they should think more
of the Republic than of her neighbors, and show preference
for neither the British nor the French. The Republic must
not become the slave of either, but remain the friend of
both, and by means of her navy make herself respected
at sea.
Frederick modified this advice in a letter of March 7,
1779, in which he stated why, in his opinion, the United
Provinces ought to keep both powers in good humor. His
reasons were, that the Republic had neither a formidable
fleet, nor an army large enough to withstand a great power,
and, furthermore, that she had no allies and consequently
could not expect assistance from other powers. He did
not consider the present troubles of the Dutch serious, but
hoped, as he wrote to the princess on March 14, that they
might prove small clouds which would soon pass. A few
days later, on March 22, Frederick recommended closer
relations with France. The question, he said, at present
was to secure by convoys the merchant marine of the Re
public against the English, in order to prevent the latter
from enslaving her. If the French, he added, intended to
attack the United Provinces, it would be too late to aug
ment the army, since all the world was at war, and especially
a great number of Germans were serving in America. In
a letter, dated April 14, he became even more explicit re
garding the course to be taken. The large Dutch cities, he
said, did not want to lose their commerce, and since their
vessels carried more goods to French than to English ports.

297] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 119
they did not like their stadtholder to be ruled by the arro
gant haughtiness of the British ambassador at the Hague,
but he continued to recommend the utmost caution in order
not to make matters worse. On May 31, he suggested
ample supplies for the island of St. Eustatia, a measure
which would reconcile the French, since they would need
those provisions in America. In short, the best course
would be to bring about closer connections with France.
Whatever might be the outcome of the present war, it
would leave England utterly exhausted for many years
and unable to mix in the affairs of the continent of Europe.
Thus, whatever services the United Provinces might render,
Great Britain would be unable to repay them, and would
always remain the rival of the Dutch in commerce and
navigation. On the other hand by pleasing France the
United Provinces would retain their important trade with
that country and, above all, preserve the Republic in her
present state. The French had no reason to undermine the
prerogatives of the stadtholder, which the English would
be unable to restore if they should be lost through French
attacks or intrigues.^
It is thus clearly shown that Frederick the Great sought
to influence the United Provinces against England, and
there is no doubt that, to some extent at least, he was re
sponsible for their final attitude toward their former ally,
especially concerning the question of convoys. The Prus
sian king, therefore, indirectly, sided with the Americans
in this case as he did in others.^
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 142-145, 380-384; Blok, Geschie
denis, VI, 329, 330.
'Regarding Frederick the Great's attitude toward the United
States and the assistance which he rendered them, see of more
recent authors, pro and contra : Pfister, Amerikanische Revolution,
II, 160-168; H. Schoenfeld, Die deutschen, insbesonders preussischen
Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Staaten vor und wahrend des
Revolutionskrieges (Belletristisches Journal, Jahrgang 40, no. 25,
17. Juni, 1891, pp. lo-ii ; no. 26, 24. Juni, 1891, pp. 3-4) ; H. Schoenfeld.
Anfange deutschen Lebens und deutscher Politik in Amerika (All
gemeine Zeitung, Miinchen, Beilagen nos. 168 & 169, 30. & 31. Juli,
1897) ; Paul Leland Haworth, " Frederick the Great and the Ameri
can Revolution " (American Historical Review, April, 1904) .

I20 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [298
On January 5, 1779, Berkenrode, the Dutch envoy in
Paris, reported to the States General that Vergennes also
had refused to accept their answer to Vauguyon's memorial.
The French minister had requested him to withdraw the
reply in friendship, otherwise the king would issue edicts
which would be very disadvantageous for the United Prov
inces. Vergennes added the advice that the States General
should thereafter negotiate with Vauguyon.^ The subse
quent proceedings in the Netherlands, however, proved
again the supremacy of the English party.^ On January 16,
while the States General were still deliberating on the ques
tion, the French ambassador again presented a memorial.
It contained the projected edict of Louis XVI excluding the
United Provinces from the favors which France granted
to neutrals on the sea and in her ports. An exception was
made concerning the city of Amsterdam only, which was
allowed to enjoy all former privileges. This step of the
French government caused great emotion in the United
Provinces. Vauguyon was told that it was against the
Dutch constitution to treat with one city only, but he re
plied that this was neither a treaty nor a convention between
France and Amsterdam, but that the city merely continued
to enjoy what she had enjoyed before. The Republic ought
to be well satisfied that, by means of Amsterdam, she would
not lose all trade with France. The ambassador notified the
Grand Pensionary that his royal master had fixed January
26 for publishing the new order, in case he should, in the
meantime, not have received the answer which he demanded.
A few days before that date, a decision not having been
reached, a courier was dispatched from the United Prov
inces to Paris in order to obtain, if possible, a further de
lay of a week. In the beginning of February, however, the
States General had not yet informed Vauguyon of their
answer.' ' Sparks MSS., CIII, Ingekoraen Brieven, IV.
' Arthur Lee to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, January 5,
1779 (Wharton, III, 13).
' Dumas to the Comraissioners at Paris, January 12 to February

299J English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 121
The French edict of December 25, 1778, not taking im
mediate effect, the United Provinces adopted expedients for
carrying on their usual trade with France in a way which
should not aggravate the situation. At the Texel were fif
teen vessels ready to sail with naval munitions destined for
France, and along with them about three hundred others
with ordinary cargoes, also bound for France or her colo
nies. Nine war vessels were detailed to accompany this
latter mercantUe fleet to its destination, but it was sus
pected that the fifteen vessels for which no convoy was
permitted had mingled among them. All passed the Eng
lish Channel without accident. Thulemeier and Frederick
the Great thought that this might be a good way to satisfy
France, and, at the same time, not irritate Great Britain
too much.^
Count Welderen, on the other hand, was again directed
to make representations to the English court regarding the
capture of Dutch vessels, emphasizing the fact that, ac
cording to the treaty of 1674, naval supplies were not con
sidered contraband of war. He was to insist that all Dutch
ships stUl held in British ports should be released imme
diately and direct orders given that the navigation from and
to the colonies, from and to France, and from one French
port to the other — contraband always excluded — was not
to be disturbed in future.^ The delay which the States
General had requested regarding the execution of the
French edict was granted by Louis XVI, and Vauguyon
consequently was directed to notify them that, on Febru
ary 8, the new rules would be published and executed, un-
16, 1779 (Wharton, III, 18-22) ; Secret Resolution of the States
General, January 18, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., Holland, Araerica, and
England) ; sarae of February 5, 1779 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; Thule
meier to Frederick II, January 22, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
Holland). 'Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 12, 1779 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 138, 139.
' Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, January 21, 1779
(Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Secret Resolution of the States General,
January 26, 1779 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; W. Lee to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1779 (Wharton, III, 65, 66).

122 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [300
less convoy should be granted to all Dutch vessels carrying
naval munitions and especially timber.^
Amsterdam did not remain isolated in her opposition to
the resolution of the States General of November 19, 1778.
She was soon joined by the city of Haarlem, whose regents
were Anti-Orangists. From this city there was a consid
erable export of fine linen to France, and the merchants who
were interested in this trade feared harm if the edict should
be executed. Moreover, the pensionary of the city, Zeeberg,
shared van Berckel's views, and from now on the two cUies
cooperated regarding this question. Zealand promised Wil
liam V full support in his attitude concerning convoys.
Friesland, on the other hand, was less wUling to follow the
stadtholder's policy, owing to the fact that her regents were
rather aristocrats than Orangists. The other provinces were
less interested in the matter and would follow the least
expensive policy, namely, that which rendered costly arma
ments at sea unnecessary. The English party, therefore,
still prevailed, and when on February 18, 1779, the States
General reached a resolution in answer to the French am
bassador's note of January 16, there was no change of front.
Vauguyon was requested to procure a revocation of the ordi
nance of December 25, 1778. He again refused to accept
the resolution, since he was permitted to transmit to his
royal master only the clear and precise answer that Dutch
vessels carrying naval munitions would be protected. Every
other reply, he said, was to be regarded as negative, and the
French edict would immediately become valid.^
The ordinance was now published, but its execution was
suspended by the French king until March i.' All the
privileges which Dutch vessels had enjoyed in French ports
'Secret Resolution of the States General, February i, 1779
(Sparks MSS., CIII) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 5,
1779 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 145, 146; Blok, Geschiedenis,
VI, 330; Secret Resolution of the States General, February ig, 1779
(Sparks MSS., CIII) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 5, 1779
(Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 5, 1779 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Vaterlandsche Historie, XXVI, 28.

30i] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 123
were revoked; orders were given to all French war vessels
and privateers to search Dutch vessels destined for or coming
from English ports in order to seize English goods; and,
in addition, the import duty of fifty sous a ton, which was
imposed in 1774 on Dutch ships trading to France, was re
newed. Amsterdam and Haarlem, however, were not in
cluded in the provisions, on account of their animated appeals
for unlimited convoys.^ This was a clever stroke of French
diplomacy calculated to defeat the English party in the United
Provinces, because jealousy and financial losses must grad
ually draw the rest of Holland and the other provinces to
Amsterdam and the French. At the same time France
would continue to be supplied by the most powerful Dutch
city, whose trade she could not afford to lose in this trying
time of war. A few days later merchants of Rotterdam,
and soon afterwards also of Dordrecht, sent strong petitions
to the assembly of the province of Holland and the States
General. It was requested that efficient means might be
found to prevent the execution of the French edict, which
must have the most disastrous consequences for their com
merce.'^ England by recklessly pursuing her policy made it easy
for many of the Dutch to abandon the British party and to
turn to the French. On March 26 the Prince of Orange,
having finaUy fallen under the influence of the Grand Pen
sionary, van Bleiswijck, who inclined rather to France than
to Great Britain, presented a note to Yorke, asking for an
assurance that England would at least respect such convoys
as did not protect vessels laden with ship timber. He re
ceived the answer that the king saw no reason for revoking
the orders which had been given to the English admiralty
in August, 1778, regarding the seizing of Dutch vessels car
rying naval munitions. The resolution of the States General
of November 19, 1778, which excluded ship timber but not
'Davies, History of Holland, III, 449; Kampen, Verkorte Ge
schiedenis, II, 292.
"Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, February 26 and
March 5, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers).

124 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [302
other naval munitions from convoys had, therefore, not sat
isfied England and had not brought any change in the situa
tion. In consequence of this reply partisans of Great Britain
in the United Provinces were completely discouraged,^ so
much the more as France now put her threat into execution
by seizing a vessel from the city of Middleburg, andcoUect-
ing a duty on freight and tonnage from Dutch vessels in
French ports.''
Frederick the Great strongly condemned the attitude of
Great Britain toward the Republic. He thought their vigor
ous measures out of place and especially so the menaces of
the English ambassador at the Hague, which did not pro
duce the least effect, but tended only to agitate the minds of
the people.' The events showed that he was right. Toward
the end of March the assembly of the province of Holland
passed a resolution that all ships except those carrying con
traband of war should be protected by convoys. No differ
ence was to be made whether the vessels were transporting
goods on their own account or for English, French, or neu
tral houses; nor was it to matter whence they came or
whether they were destined for France, Great Britain, or
neutral countries.* The States General were asked to ap
prove of this measure. Merchants of the city of Rotterdam
also repeated their former request for convoy. They pleaded
that their ships not only lay abandoned in their harbors, but
for the few goods which were still allowed to be shipped
foreign vessels had to be chartered in order to avoid the ton
nage tax. Their commerce with England, Scotland and Ire
land was also ruined as a consequence of the French edict.
Worst of all, the new French tariff would deal the death
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 150, 151 ; Thulemeier to Frederick
II, March 19, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 16, 1779 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, March 24, 1779 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, March 30, 1779 (Sparks
Dutch Papers) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, April 6, 1779 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd,
L 151-

303] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 125
stroke to the Dutch commerce. By this tariff, which had
been in effect since May i, a duty of fifteen per cent, had
to be paid in France for all imports, besides the duties that
had already been collected on the same goods. Some arti
cles, as pitch, tar, masts, ship timber, ropes, etc., were left
free, but these were dangerous to export because the EngUsh
might seize the ships and cargoes.^
Since the beginning of April the aggressions of the British
had even increased. Yorke in a memorial to the States Gen
eral greatly resented the discrimination of the French re
garding Amsterdam and Haarlem, which, he said, was only
calculated to embroil the United Provinces in war with
England.^ Welderen reported about the same time that new
orders had been sent to the commanders of English ships
to arrest and bring to port all vessels, even if sailing under
convoy, which were carrying naval munitions destined for
France.' The States General resolved to ask Louis XVI
not to discriminate among the provinces of the Republic,*
but France continued the policy of strengthening the opposi
tion in the United Provinces against the stadtholder and the
English party. When, on March 30, the province of Hol
land had declared for unlimited convoy, the whole territory
expected to be exempted from the oppressive French meas
ure, and was greatly disappointed when this privilege re
mained confined to Amsterdam and Haarlem.
'Van der Capellen to Livingston, July, 1779 (Beaufort, Brieven van
der CapeUen, 116) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 160; Resolutions
of Holland and Westfriesland, May 11, 1779, and of the States
General, May 19, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
Regarding the secret resolution of the States General of April 26
to equip thirty-two vessels of war for the service of the year 1779
see Dumas' letter to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, May 15,
1779 (Wharton, III, 166-168).
' Yorke's Memorial, April 9, 1779, and Resolution of the States
General of the same day (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and
England; Sparks Dutch Papers; Vaterlandsche Historie, XXVI, 49).
Anonymous pamphlets supported Yorke, for example, " Avis a
I'Auteur de la Lettre d'un Bon Patriote, sur le Memoire, presente
aux Etats Generaux le 9 Avril, 1779, par M. I'Ambassadeur
d'Angleterre." ' Secret Resolution of the States General, April 12 and 22, 1779
(Sparks MSS., CIII).
'Secret Resolution of the States General, AprU 18, 1779 (Sparks
MSS., CIII).

126 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [304
The French government, aware that after Holland was
satisfied the opposition in the rest of the provinces would
lose its support and decrease, insisted upon the granting of
unlimited convoy by the States General.^ The assembly of
the province of Holland was therefore repeatedly occupied
with this question. In a resolution passed on June 11, it
was said that speedy action had been expected from the
States General on such an important matter, but two months
had passed since March 30, when the resolution of the States
of HoUand and Westfriesland concerning unlimited convoy
had been transmitted, and no answer had been received.
The deputies of the province to the States General were then
instructed to insist on the measure.^
When, toward the end of June, the States General had not
yet passed a resolution, the province of Holland sent an
ultimatum demanding a decision within four weeks. They
resolved, furthermore, that in case unlimited convoys were
not granted within that time, the States of Holland were to
take matters up with the admiralties within the province.
Since about nine tenths of the whole Dutch navy was under
the administration of the admiralties, the province of Hol
land declared by her resolution that eventually she would
alone decide the question of protection. At the same time
circular letters were sent by Holland to the other provinces
requesting them also to urge the measure of unlimited con
voys.' In recognition of this step France immediately sus
pended both edict and tariff for the province of Holland, but
only for the four weeks which had been allowed the States
General.* The resolutions of the different provinces on the
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 152.
'Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, June 4 and 11, 1779
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, June 24, 1779 (Sparks
Dutch Papers) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 161 ; Van der Capel
len to Dr. Richard Price, July i, 1779, and to Livingston, July, 1779
(Beaufort, Brieven van der CapeUen, 105, 106, 117) ; Blok, Geschie
denis, VI, 331 ; Doniol, Histoire, III, 782.
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 161 ; Thulemeier to Frederick II,
July 6, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Resolution of
the States General, July 6, 1779 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; Berkenrode's
report, July 8, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Vaterlandsche Historie,
XXVI, 84; Nieuwe Nederlandsche Jaerboeken, 1779, p. 169.

305] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 127
pending question were not favorable, most of them declaring
that the forces of the country were not in a state to success
fully carry out the measure of unlimited convoys. The
province of Guelderland answered that she would vote for
unlimited convoy if the province of HoUand, in return, would
vote for the augmentation of the Dutch army.^
This result was due to the activity of the stadtholder and
the English party. The Prince of Orange had summoned
the lieutenant-stadtholders of the provinces one by one to
his court and given them instructions for their attitude in
this contest.^ Yorke proposed to his government as a last
resort to demand military aid from the United Provinces,
a step which would at least embarrass the enemies of Great
Britain. As an outward motive for such a measure, he
said, the fact might serve that France and Spain in June,
1779, had simultaneously declared war on England. This
had, in fact, happened one year after hostilities had begun.'
In accordance with this suggestion the ambassador was di
rected to deliver a memorial to the States General, in which
he asserted that France was threatening to invade Great
Britain, and his royal master was therefore obliged to claim
from the United Provinces without loss of time the succor
which was stipulated in the treaties of 1678 and after. It
'Resolutions of HoUand and Westfriesland, July 21, 1779 (Guel
derland) ; July 22, 1779 (Stad en Land) ; July 23, 1779 (Overyssel) ;
August 4, 1779 (Utrecht) ; September i, 1779 (Friesland), in Sparks
Dutch Papers.
Amsterdam had pleaded for augmentation of the navy only, while
Guelderland wanted the army increased. There had been an alter
cation in the States General on this question, especially between the
Grand Pensionary and the pensionary of Amsterdam (Yorke to
Suffolk, July 10, 1779, in Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' " The lieutenant-stadtholders were the persons by whom the
Prince governed the smaller provinces; except in Zealand it was an
official position for which one or the other prominent or influential
person with extended relations in his district was chosen " (Yorke,
July 9, 1779, in Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 161, note 3).
The English party made strenuous efforts to convince the Dutch
that it would be more prudent and profitable for them to follow
England than France. An eloquent proof of these attempts forms
an anonymous pamphlet published in May, 1779, and entitled " De
fense de Sir Joseph Yorke, Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, s'il en a
besoin." ' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 162.

128 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [3°^
was clear that a casus foederis existed according to the sepa
rate article of 1715.^
As the United Provinces were neither in a condition to
furnish this aid, nor on account of the strength of the French
party able even to grant it, the only course was to delay the
reply. (Consequently Yorke's memorial was taken over by
the provinces for consideration, which meant that the matter
would rest for any length of time. This delay, of course,
would in itself have been an insult to Great Britain, if the
measure had been put forward seriously. It had been in
tended to strengthen the English party and to embarrass the
French partisans, but entirely missed its aim. Vauguyon
remarked that the neglect of such an essential memorial in
such grave circumstances meant a humiliating contempt of
England. He thought it a good symptom for Great Britain's
enemies, since it recaUed the fable of the dying lion receiv
ing a kick from the ass.-^
The States General at the end of the stipulated four weeks
had not reached a decision regarding convoys. The nego
tiations of the States of Holland with their provincial admi
ralty had also been unsuccessful. The latter, being controlled
by the States General, showed no disposition to assist in so
revolutionary a measure. In the meantime no convoys were
granted at all, not even for vessels which were not carrying
contraband or naval munitions. This inflicted an enormous
loss upon Dutch commerce and navigation, but petitions to
the States General were of no avaU. This condition was
due to a new proposal of the provinces to increase the Dutch
army by 14,000 men, to which measure the cities of Amster
dam, Dort, Haarlem, Rotterdam, and Schiedam were op
posed.' Yorke wrote that the probable outcome of it all

Yorkes Memorial of July 22, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England; Sparks Dutch Papers; Blok, Geschiedenis,
VI, 332).
Vauguyon, August 24, 1779 (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 162,
note 3) ; Franklin to Jay, October 4, 1779 (Wharton, III, 363).
Resolutions of the States General, September 9, 1779; October
21, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I,
163; Dumas to Franklin, September 14, 1779 (Wharton, IH, 314,
315).

307] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 129
would be that a mercantile fleet would be sent out under
convoy, pretending to protect only ships with non-forbidden
cargoes, but that, as in the beginning of the year, a number
of vessels laden with naval munitions would hide among the
rest. The English government, therefore, warned the Dutch
authorities that, this time, the vessels would not be permitted
to pass without being searched.^ The John Paul Jones
incident, which occurred about this time, tended to strain
the relations between England and the United Provinces still
further.^ Toward the end of November Yorke addressed a new
memorial to the States General. The king, he said, was sur
prised not to have received aid in answer to his request of
four months before, and referred again to the separate
article of 1716, which stipulated the casus foederis. French
aggressions were to be seen in the declaration of war, the
attack on the isle of Jersey, and the siege of Gibraltar. The
combined forces of the House of Bourbon menaced the
United Kingdom. A descent upon the British coast and a
formidable invasion of England under the protection of all
their naval forces was stUl their aim. The king therefore
requested a speedy and precise answer to this important
question. This memorandum was referred to the provinces
also for deliberation' but the British demands did not im
press the Dutch very deeply. Indifference was also shown
by the French ambassador in the matter.*
On November 8, the Dutch provinces agreed that two
merchant fleets, not carrying contraband of war or naval
stores, should sail under the protection of several men of
war. One was destined for the West Indies ; the other, for
France and Spain. With the vessels of the latter fleet were
'Yorke, September 7, 1779 (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 164,
165). 'Above, p. 62.
' Yorke's Memorial, November 26, 1779 (Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland and England) ; Resolutions of the States General, Novem
ber 26, 1779 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Trescot, Diplomacy of the
Revolution, 84.
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 30, 1779 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
9

130 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [308
intermixed about 25 or 30 laden with hemp, iron, tar, pitch,
etc., materials which by the resolution of the States General
of November 19, 1778, were not excluded from convoy,
and, at their own risk, also 18 or 20 ships whose cargoes
consisted of ship timber.^ The combined fleet left the
Texel under the command of Vice-Admiral Bylandt, on De
cember 27. On December 31 Count Welderen reported
from London that, two days before, 30 to 40 merchant
vessels under the convoy of some war vessels had been
sighted in the Channel, and that, thereupon. Captain Field
ing with six ships of the line and six frigates sailed from
England.^ The Dutch and English vessels met off the Isle of Wight
on December 31. Fielding asked permission of Bylandt to
search the ships under the latter's convoy. The Dutch
admiral declined, but showed papers signed by the skippers
of all the vessels under his convoy stating that their ships
were not carrying contraband of war. He added that no
vessels with ship timber had been granted the privilege of
convoy. Fielding, however, demanded also a declaration
that the vessels had nothing on board of which ship material
and especially cordage could be manufactured. Such a
statement could not be made, since, as has been mentioned,
some vessels laden with iron, hemp, etc., had been admitted
to the convoy. The English commander declared that he
would be compelled to use force for searching the ships.
An encounter followed in which Bylandt, commanding only
three ships of the line and three frigates, had to yield to the
superior force of the English. Several vessels whose cargo
consisted of ship material were taken by Fielding. A
salute to the British flag was demanded and given. Bylandt
was aUowed to continue with the rest of his ships on his
voyage, but refused to proceed and foUowed the captured
ships to Spithead on the English coast.' When the news of
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 166.
'Resolutions of the States General, January 4, 1780 (Sparks MSS.,
' Davies, History of Holland, III, 451 ; Kampen, Verkorte Ge
schiedenis, H, 293; Welderen's report on the Bylandt-Fielding inci-

309] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 131
the incident became known at Amsterdam (on January 8), a
great commotion occurred, especially on the stock exchange.
It was thought impossible that England, still the friend and
ally of the United Provinces, should have taken such a step.^
The States General very soon instructed Welderen to make
strong representations to the court of St. James concerning
the capture and holding of the merchant vessels and to de
mand satisfaction for the insult done to the Dutch flag. At
the same time Bylandt was ordered to sail back to the
Texel with the war vessels under his command.^
The Bylandt-Fielding episode created a sensation all over
Europe. Even in far-away St. Petersburg there was much
talk about it, and the Dutch minister accredited to the Rus
sian court reported that the English boasted greatly of this
petty success.' When Count van Welderen handed an ener
getic memorial to Lord Stormont, the latter received it with
indifference, remarking that an answer could be given only
after the memorandum had been laid before the king; but
that since the demand for aid had not been deliberated upon
by the States General, England did not know whether to
regard the United Provinces as friends and allies or only
as friends and neutrals.* Great indignation was created at
dent, dated January 4, 1780, with enclosures; Missive van de Admi-
raliteit to Amsterdam (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Vaterlandsche His
torie, XXVI, 170 ff.
' Davies, History of HoUand, III, 452 ; Nieuwe Nederlandsche
Jaerboeken, February, 1780, p. 130; Thulemeier to Frederick II,
January 14, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
Thulemeier sent with this report a detailed description, dated Jan
uary 4, 1780, of the encounter. Its ^uthor was a former Prussian
officer, von Schoning, now " Lieutenant de marine a bord du vaisseau
amiral du Comte de Biland." The title of the essay is " Relation
des am 31. December 1779 der Flagge der Vereinigten Provintzen
Zugefiigten affronts durch eine Konigliche Englische Escadre unter
Commando des Commodore Charles Fielding."
'Resolution of the States General, February 17, 1780 (Sparks
MSS., CIII; Sparks Dutch Papers); Thulemeier to Frederick II,
January 21, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'J. J. de Swart to the States General, February i and 4, 1780
(Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England) ; J. Adams to the
President of Congress, April 7, 1780 (Wharton, III, 600).
'Welderen to Fagel, March 7, 1780, with enclosures; Welderen's
Memorial to Stormont, March 6, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England) ; Resolution of the States General, March
13, 1780 (Sparks MSS., CIII).

132 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [310
Amsterdam by the decisions of the Court of Admiralty in
London of March 4 and 6, declaring those ships of Bylandt's
convoy confiscated which carried hemp, etc., whUe vessels
laden with ship timber and excluded from Bylandt's pro
tection were released after their cargo had been purchased.^
About the middle of March the English government
answered Welderen's memorial by saying that Bylandt had
been the aggressor and that Fielding had acted in conformity
with his instructions, and that the search of suspicious mer
chant vessels was not only necessary but just.^ This point
of view was rejected by the States General, who charged
Welderen to present another memorial to the English gov
ernment insisting that Fielding was the aggressor,' because
he sent an armed sloop to search the merchant vessels under
Bylandt's command and consequently the latter's firing upon
the sloop was to be regarded as an act of self-defence. Wel
deren was to ask again for satisfaction and indemnification.*
The Dutch envoy in handing this memorandum to Lord
Stormont added verbally that the United Provinces had
never admitted the visitation of ships sailing under the con
voy of Dutch war vessels, and that consequently, without the
least of doubt. Fielding had been the aggressor. Stormont
Stormont had already threatened in January that the Dutch would
be regarded as neutrals and the existing treaties annuUed if they
did not furnish succors (Welderen to the States General, January
28, 1780, received February 7, 1780, in Sparks Dutch Papers).
'J. Texier and Company to the States of HoUand and West
Friesland, March 16, 1780, and to the States General, March 17,
1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
' Welderen, on March 17, 1780, transmitted to the States General,
without comment, Stormont's answer of March 16 (Sparks Dutch
Papers; Bancroft MSS,, America, HoUand, and England).
'At the instigation of the Prince of Orange Count Bylandt was
placed before a Dutch court martial, but was acquitted on April 7,
1780 (Resolution of the States General, January 18, 1780, in Sparks
MSS., CIII) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 25 and February
4, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Prince of Orange
to the States General, April 14, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; De
Jonge, Geschiedenis, IV, 426.
'Resolution of the States of Holland and Westfriesland, April 8
and 18, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Resolution of the States
General, April 25, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., America, HoUand, and
England) ; John Adams to the President of Congress, May 2, 1780
(Wharton, III, 646, 647).

3ii] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 133
answered that he would lay the memorial before the king,
but that the latter was satisfied that the English commander
had acted according to the treaties and to his instructions.
Besides, it would not be in the power of the king to change
the sentence of the Court of Admiralty.^
The United Provinces after the seizure of the ships under
Bylandt's convoy naturaUy experienced great public excite
ment, but they were apparently not yet ready to side openly
with the Americans. "The Dutch," wrote William Lee
from Brussels in March, " are in a very disturbed state. As
yet there does not seem to be a probability of their taking a
decided and open part with us in the war. The influence
and power of the Prince of Orange are unfortunately too
great to permit them to adopt those measures which their
honor and interest direct, and which I believe a great ma
jority of the people wish. The prince is retained against us
by the flattering prospect of marrying his daughter to the
Prince of Wales. "^ In February, 1778, Thulemeier had
predicted that in case of a search by the English of Dutch
vessels sailing under convoy, and a subsequent hostile en
counter, Amsterdam would be exasperated and would bring
to pass an understanding between France and the United
Provinces.' Grave were then the doubts which even the
most ardent friends of England entertained in the United
Provinces regarding the correctness of Great Britain's step.
The Duke of Brunswick did not hesitate to tell Yorke that
England's attitude seemed to be poor policy, since it only
facilitated the growth of France's influence in the Republic,
and sacrificed old friendship to the delusion that it would be
possible to cut off from France the supply of naval muni-
' Welderen to the States General, May 2, 1780, with enclosure;
Memorial to Stormont, April 25, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England) ; Resolution of the States General, May 8,
1780 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; John Adams to the President of Con
gress, May 19, 1780 (Wharton, III, 689).
' W. Lee to John Adams, March 17, 1780 (Wharton, III, 556).
Regarding the project of a marriage between the Prince of Wales
and the stadtholder's daughter, see above, p. 22.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 6, 1778 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).

134 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [312
tions. The consequence would be that the whole Republic
would be thrown into the arms of France.^ The subsequent
events show that he was justified in this prophecy.
The deliberations of the provinces on Yorke's memorials
of July 22 and November 26, 1779, relative to the furnish
ing of aid had been continued without coming to any final
conclusion.^ The English ambassador, therefore, presented
a third communication to the States General in March, de
manding a satisfactory answer to his previous memorials
within three weeks, or else Great Britain henceforth would
regard the Dutch as neutrals and not as a "privileged"
nation.' The States General instructed Welderen a few
days afterwards to represent to the English government that
the delay in answering Yorke's memorials regarding assist
ance was not a violation of the aUiance between the two
powers, since it was caused by the peculiar constitution of
the United Provinces.* The Dutch envoy in carrying out
these orders told Stormont that it would be impossible to
receive the resolutions of all the provinces within three
weeks and that the United Provinces therefore asked for a
prolongation of the term. The English statesman answered
that the time would not be extended, since Yorke in his last
memorial had only repeated what had already been com
municated to the States General on January 28.° Yorke
' Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 182, 183.
'Resolutions of the States of Holland and Westfriesland, Febru
ary 2 and March 15, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Resolutions of
the States General, March 14, 1780 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
' Yorke's Memorial to the States General, March 21, 1780 (Sparks
Dutch Papers; Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England);
Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 170; Davies, History of HoUand,
III, 452, 453.
John Adams seemed. to be mistaken when he wrote to the Presi
dent of Congress on March 29 that the treaties would be revoked by
England after three months in case the answer of the States General
to Yorke's memorial should be a refusal of the succors (Wharton,
HI, 579). See also John Adams' letter to the President of Con
gress of April 3, 1780 (ibid.. Ill, 592).
'Resolution of the States General, March 24, 1780 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII) ; John Adams to the President of Congress, April 3, 1780
(Wharton, III, 592).
'Welderen to the States General, March 31, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, HoUand, and England) ; John Adams to the President of
Congress, AprU 14, 1780 (Wharton, HI, 614).

313] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 135
was authorized to announce a delay only in case there should
be a prospect that the States General would grant assistance.
Even the Prince of Orange gave up aU hopes of changing
the public sentiment of the Dutch, which was now becoming
more and more anti-English. The resistance of the British
party was broken, and most of the provinces (HoUand,
Groningen, Friesland, and Overyssel) voted against furnish
ing assistance to England, basing their refusal principaUy
upon the non-existence of the case of invasion of British
territory, which alone, they claimed, could have obliged them
to comply with the demand of the English king.^ When,
after the expiration of the three weeks allowed for the
answer of the States General, the latter had not passed a
resolution on the subject, England carried out her menace.
On April 17, Lord Stormont informed Count Welderen
that the term had- expired and transmitted an order of the
king, which the latter had given in his council of the same
day. It stated that the States General had deserted the alli
ance that so long subsisted between the crown of Great
Britain and the Republic and had placed themselves in the
condition of a neutral power, bound to England by no treaty.
Therefore the Dutch would from this time be considered to
be upon the same footing with all the other neutral states not
privileged by treaty, and all particular stipulations respecting
the freedom of navigation and commerce in time of war
contained in the treaties between the two powers, especially
in the marine treaty of 1674, were revoked.^ At the same
time the commanders of the English war vessels and
privateers were ordered " to seize and detain all ships and
'John Adams to the President of Congress, April 10 and 14, 1780
(Wharton, III, 605, 613) ; Dumas to the President of Congress
(ibid.. Ill, 612) ; Vreede, Laurens Pieter van der Spiegel, II, 7.
'Welderen to the States General, April 18, 1780, with enclosures
of April 17, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England) ;
Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 334; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 170;
J. Adams to the President of Congress, April 28 and May 8, 1780
(Wharton, III, 635, 636, 664) ; Vaterlandsche Historie, XXVI, 303;
Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 293; Davies, History of Hol
land, III, 453, 454- . .
John Andrews tried to justify the English step (Two Additional
Letters, 106-109).

136 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [314
vessels belonging to the subjects of the States-General
when they shall be found to have on board any effects be
longing to the enemies of his majesty, or effects which are
considered as contraband by the general law of nations."^
The question of assistance was thus settled before the
States General had reached a final conclusion, but in respect
to convoys the situation was different. The Bylandt-Field
ing incident discouraged the friends of Great Britain in
the United Provinces, while the partisans of France ob
tained supremacy in the assemblies of the several provinces.
The result was that, on April 24, the States General almost
unanimously- resolved to grant henceforth unlimited con
voys. A few days later also a resolution was taken by them
to fit out, for the protection of commerce and navigation,
fifty-two ships of the line and frigates.' Vauguyon there
upon handed a memorandum to the States General in which
he said that Louis XVI had applauded the efforts of the
States General to have their flag again respected. The king
had therefore ordered him to announce to the Dutch govem
ment that the recent French orders establishing a new tariff
and otherwise encroaching upon the commerce of the United
Provinces had been revoked. Furthermore the king would
not confine himself to reestablishing the subjects of the
States General in the enjoyment of former favors, but he
would give the Dutch a signal proof of his benevolence, in
' John Adams to the President of Congress, ;May 13, 1780 (Whar
ton, III, 675, 676).
'The deputies of the province of Zealand alone opposed the
measure (Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 334) ; Vaterlandsche Historie,
XXVI, 306.
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 170; Thulemeier to Frederick
II, April 28, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
Half a year later about two thirds of the fifty-two vessels were
ready, though cannon and crews were partly wanting in numbers
(Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 334). This part of the Dutch armament
was largely due to a number of petitions to the States General,
and so forth, requesting protection of the navigation (J. Adams to
the President of Congress, June 2, 4, 5, 10, and July 7, 1780, in
Wharton, III, 758, 759, 762, 768, 769, yjy, 839)-
On May 31, 1780, Franklin reported to the President of Congress
in regard to the vigorous arming of the Dutch (Wharton, III,
745)-

315] English Aggressions and Dutch Defiance. 137
retuming to them all the sums which had been received by
the French custom administration in virtue of the decree and
tariff.^ The English policy of aggression was thus a complete
failure. It did not result in the submission of the United
Provinces to the English demands as had been desired and
expected, but, on the contrary, in the refusal of all of them.
Military assistance was denied, unlimited convoys granted,
and the increase of the Dutch navy resolved upon. Great
Britain's object had been to draw the United Provinces away
from France, but instead, by what must be regarded as rather
awkward diplomacy, she had only caused the relations be
tween the two countries to become closer. The outlook for
the Netherlands, however, was very gloomy. It was to be
expected that English war vessels and privateers would try
to do great damage to Dutch commerce and navigation,
while the navy of the United Provinces was not in a state
to render sufficient protection. Great depression, especially
on the stock exchange at Amsterdam,^ was the consequence.'
There was, however, just at this period, a ray of hope that
protection might be tendered to Dutch navigation by the
powers of the North, a question which will be discussed in
the next chapter.
' Vauguyon's meraorial of April 26, 1780, with the decree of the
French king's council of state of April 22, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, HoUand, and England ; Sparks Dutch Papers) ; J. Adams
to the President of Congress, May 2, 1780 (Wharton, III, 644-646) ;
Vaterlandsche Historie, XXVI, 307; Davies, History of Holland,
HI, 454.
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 171.
'Regarding the question of convoys and succors see the speeches
of the Earl of Shelburne and Lord Stormont in Parliament on
June I, 1780 (Hansard, Parliamentary History, XXI, 633-^635, 637,
642-644) .

CHAPTER VI.
The United Provinces drawn into War with England.
The position of England was becoming extremely critical.
She had to depend entirely upon herself in her struggle not
only with her former American colonies, but also with
France and Spain, while the United Provinces were com
mercially supporting her enemies. In the desire to be
backed by one of the great European powers in the pur
suance of the war. Great Britain approached Russia.
Sir James Harris (later given the title of Lord Malmes
bury), a very clever diplomat, was sent to the Russian court
in order to arrange, if possible, an alliance. He found two
diverging poUtical influences at work in the Russian capital,
one emanating from Potemkin, who was rising in favor
with Empress Catherine II, the other from Panin, the sec
retary of the Russian Foreign Office and also a favorite,
but whose star was fading. Harris resolved to use the
former statesman for his purposes, neglecting and thereby
provoking against himself the other. The ambassador was
soon to see his mistake in undervaluing Panin's influence.
Potemkin was able to arrange for Harris two secret inter
views with the empress, during which she consented to an
alliance with England. Upon his report to the British gov
ernment, the ambassador received full powers to negotiate
the treaty. In the meantime Panin, from whom the pre
liminary proceedings had been concealed, became aware of
what was going on and succeeded in convincing his imperial
mistress of the impracticability of the proposed coaUtion.
Consequently negotiations were formaUy refused to Harris.
For a moment, however, it seemed that in spite of Panin's
counteractions he would be able to bring the two powers
nearer together, or, at least, to inflame the empress against
England's foes. 138

317] United Provinces in War with England. 139
Two Russian vessels carrying com were seized in the
Mediterranean by the Spaniards, who were desirous of
keeping all provisions from Gibraltar, which stronghold
they still hoped to recover from the English rule. Catherine
was very indignant when she heard of the fate of these
ships, and Harris with Potemkin's assistance cleverly took
advantage of the empress' ill humor in order to incite her
more against Spain. Satisfaction was to be imperatively
demanded while a fleet of war vessels was to sail from Cron-
stadt as quickly as it could be fitted out. Panin, however,
soon discovered this scheme, also, and thwarted it in a most
ingenious way. He told Catherine that the incident was
deplorable and condemnable, but that it was the outcome of
a false principle of public law rather than a proof of the
ill-will of the Spaniards. This, he declared, was the proper
moment to protest against such proceedings, and, since Eng
land agreed with Russia in the condemnation of the seizure,
she would likewise concur with Catherine in condemning
the system. The empress thereupon accepted his plan of
sending to the belligerents a declaration that in future
such violations of neutral rights would not be endured.
The northern and central powers were to be invited to join
in this action. Catherine was thus made to believe that her
step would not only conform to the desire of Harris, but
make her the head of a large confederation imited in the
pursuance of a noble aim.^
Her ultimate purpose was to establish the principle
(which, however, had already been pronounced in the
EngUsh-Dutch treaty of 1674) "that the navigation of
neutral powers should remain as free and unobstructed in
time of war, as in that of peace; and that provided their
ships were not laden with contraband goods, they should
enjoy the liberty of conveying, free of seizure and restraint,
all other articles whatever, though belonging to the sub
jects of the powers at war."^ What appealed to the empress
' Trescot, Diploraacy of the Revolution, 73-76.
'J. Andrews, History of the 'War with Araerica, France, Spain,
and Holland, IV, 4.

140 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [318
above all was the prospect which opened itself for enlarging
Russian commerce and navigation. American, British,
French, and Spanish merchant vessels were liable to capture
by the belligerents, and, consequently, appeared only in
reduced numbers on the seas. Russia now had an oppor
tunity to start an enormous carrying trade. She possessed
a sufficient number of ports and had at her disposal an
energetic and bold population which could be used to ad
vantage in the merchant service.^ Under present condi
tions, however, commerce and navigation were not secure
even for neutrals. " From every shore of Europe, from
almost every quarter of the globe, in fact," complaints re
sounded of English aggression and piracy. Russia herself
had experienced heavy losses. A large number of Dutch
vessels were employed by Russian merchants, and many of
those ships had been captured by the English. On the
other hand, no country owned a navy sufficiently large and
effective to cope with the English.^ The only way to
render the seas again free and secure seemed to be a com
bination of the naval forces of the various countries inter
ested. To create such a coalition was now planned by
Catherine. Her message to the different courts was writ
ten and sent secretly.
The declaration dated February 26, 1780, stipulated in
detail : —
I. That all neutral vessels should be able to navigate
freely from one port to another, even upon the coasts of
the powers at war.
2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the bel
ligerents should be free in neutral ships, excepting always
contraband goods.
3. That naval stores and provisions should not be con
sidered contraband unless belonging to the government of
a beUigerent.'
' Wharton, I, 447.
f Davies, History of Holland, III, 455.
"As was expressed in the treaty of 1734 between Russia and
England and in that of 1674 between the United Provinces and

319] United Provinces in War with England. 141
4. That a port should be considered blockaded only if
it was guarded so well that no attempt could be made to
enter into it without evident danger.
5. That these principles should serve as a rule when there
was a question regarding the legality of prizes.^
Ambassador Harris was absolutely ignorant of the nature
of the Russian missive sent abroad. The empress herself
told him that a communication would shortly be made to
the English court which would completely meet the wishes
expressed to her, and the EngUsh diplomat eagerly reported
this answer to his authorities. The disappointment and in
dignation foUowing the receipt of the Russian note by the
British cabinet were therefore great. Instead of being a
blow at England's enemies, the declaration presented a new
maritime law which was directly opposed to the whole mari
time policy of Great Britain and to a practice which she
could least afford to dispense with in her present critical
condition.^ Bitter were the criticisms of Russia's attitude made by
contemporaneous English writers. " It was," wrote one of
them, " a matter of peculiar astonishment that Russia
should be at the head of a combination so injurious to
Great Britain. The favors she had received from the Brit
ish ministry, in her late war with the Turks, and still more
the commercial benefits resulting from a connection with
this country, seemed to secure the good will of Russia, and
even its assistance, in case of necessity. Little, therefore,
was it expected that it should prove the first of all Euro
pean potentates in that inimical declaration, the intent of
which was to deprive Great Britain of the principal re
sources that enabled her to stand her ground in the midst of
so many difficulties."' Concerning the reception which the
England, only arms, ammunition, and military accoutrements should
be considered as contraband (Davies, History of Holland, III, 455,
456). 'John Adams to the President of Congress, April 10, 1780
(Wharton, III, 608) ; Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History,
1660-1783, p. 405.
' Trescot, Diplomacy of the Revolution, 76, 7'^.
' J. Andrews, History of the War, IV, 3, 4.

142 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [320
English government gave Catherine's declaration, the same
author said that Great Britain, contrary to her custom and
character, was compelled to " temporise " on this trying
occasion. "Her answer to this mortifying declaration,
though guardedly expressed, was not wanting in terms suf
ficiently clear to remind Russia how different a part Great
Britain had acted to her in the day of need."^ Even much
later, English critics expressed themselves scarcely less
severely, numbering Catherine among the concealed, if not
the open, enemies of Great Britain.^
The northern powers, Sweden and Denmark, considered
Russia's offer favorably, their main products, naval stores
and grain, being those of which England was chiefly inter
ested in depriving her enemies. The coalition to which
Catherine's plan finaUy led was called the Armed NeutraUty,
because the contracting parties, neutrals in the present war,
bound themselves, if need be, to defend their principles by
a combined armed fleet of a fixed minimum number.' It
formed an important factor in the American Revolution.
England had not only lost her last hope of a continental
alliance, but saw herself seriously hampered in her naval
actions even by inferior European sea powers. Moreover,
the Armed Neutrality added a new enemy to her foes, the
United Provinces of the Netherlands.
The belligerents, against whom Sir James Harris had
advised Catherine, cleverly seized the opportunity to turn
the affair to their own account. Spain made restitution and
recognized the new maritime code, thereby reconciling the
empress. France praised the wisdom of Catherine and con-
'J. Andrews, History of the War, IV, 4.
See the answer which the English court made to the declaration
of the Erapress of Russia in J. Adams' letter to the President of
Congress, May 8, 1780 (Wharton, III, 661, 662).
' See Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, III, 83.
'Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 405; Pfister, Amerikanische
Revolution, II, 181.
Portugal, influenced by England, did not accede to the treaty,
much to the disgust of France and Spain, who were indignant at
her partiality for Great Britain (Carmichael to the Committee of
Foreign Affairs, August 22, 1780, in Wharton, I'V, 39).

32 1] United Provinces in War with England. 143
sented to the principles of the Armed Neutrality, which the
former claimed had already been expressed, in general, by
her ordinance of 1778.^ For the protection of the com
mercial interests of Russia it seemed at least desirable, if not
necessary, that the United Provinces also should accede to the
Armed Neutrality. Catherine therefore instructed Prince
Gallitzin, her envoy extraordinary at the Hague, to negoti
ate with the States General to this effect.^
Already in March, 1780, John Adams had written from
Paris that there were rumors of the conclusion of a quin
tuple aUiance between Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia,
and the United Provinces for the maintenance of the honor
of the flags of these powers. Yet he thought that such a
combination would be more advantageous to France and
Spain than to Holland, because it would facilitate the pro
viding of their marine arsenals with ship timber, hemp, etc.
This would greatly embarrass Great Britain, since her
policy had always been to prevent the gro^yth of the navies
of her enemies by intercepting their supplies.' Adams' an
nouncement, however, was premature.
Prince Gallitzin entered upon his new duties about this
time. Couriers from St. Petersburg arrived with despatches
and he immediately conferred with the president of the
States General,* presenting also a memorial to that assembly.
' Trescot, Diplomacy of the Revolution, 7'/.
FrankUn advised Congress also to conform to the principle of
the Arraed Neutrality, that free ships made free goods, by givirig
orders to American cruisers not to raolest foreign ships (Franklin
to the President of Congress, August 9, 1780, in Wharton, IV, 24).
Congress, acting upon a motion of Mr. Adams, resolved : " That
the board of admiralty prepare and report instructions for the
commanders of armed vessels commanded by the United States con
formable to the principles contained in the declaration of the Em
press of all the Russias on the rights of neutral vessels.
" That the ministers plenipotentiary from the United States, if
invited thereto, be and hereby are respectively empowered to accede
to such regulations, conformable to the spirit of the said declara
tion, as may be agreed upon by the Congress expected to assemble
in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial majesty" (Wharton,
IV, 81).
'Davies, History of HoUand, III, 456.
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, March 18, 1780 (Whar
ton, III, ss8).
' Same to same, April 7, 1780 (ibid.. Ill, 599).

144 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [322
It contained a copy of the declaration of the empress to
the belligerent powers, and invited the United Provinces to
make common cause with her. Gallitzin, according to his
memorandum, did not doubt that the States General would
consider this invitation and make, without delay, a declara
tion to the powers actually at war, founded upon the same
principles as those of the empress. Negotiations with the
other neutral powers on this subject were suggested.^
The States General informed the several provinces of the
Russian proposal and asked for quick action.^ Delibera
tions were eagerly taken up by Holland and there was a
prospect that a decision would speedily be reached. The
American agent at the Hague felt sure that this resolution
would settle the matter " agreeably to the views of the em
press and to the general wishes of all good men." The other
provinces would soon follow suit, and their action must
accelerate the general pacification. "This intelligence," he
remarked, " is thought, not only by myself but by many
others, very important to the United States."'
England dreaded most the accession of the United Prov
inces to the Armed Neutrality. The Dutch navy, it is true,
was utterly ineffective, yet under the protection of that coali
tion, Dutch commerce and navigation would not only do
immeasurable damage to England's commercial interests,*
but by the undisturbed furnishing of naval munitions to
France and Spain considerably strengthen the position of the
foes of Great Britain. What sentiments prevailed in Eng
lish official circles regarding this question is shown by a
report of Thulemeier to the effect that, according to a com-
' Memorial of Dimitri Prince de Gallitzin to the States General,
April 3, 1780, with enclosure " Declaration aux cours de Londres,
VersaUles et Madrid" (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and
England; Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II,
AprU 4, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand) ; J. Adams to
the President of Congress, April 10, 1780 (Wharton, III, 606-608).
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, April 14, 1780 CWharton,
III, 613, 614).
'Dumas to the President of Congress, AprU 13, 1780 (ibid., Ill,
611, 612).
'Pfister, Amerikanische Revolution, II, 181.

323] United Provinces in War with England. 145
munication made to him by Gallitzin, Count Welderen had
secretly informed his superiors of imminent danger threat
ening from England. The Dutch envoy had learned that in
a council held at St. James, most of the English cabinet
officers had recommended a declaration of war against the
States General in case the latter should accept the invitation
extended to them by Russia. Prince Gallitzin observed to
the Prussian envoy that he deemed this a trick of the minis
try in London, because he could never believe that the British
government would use the invitation of the empress as a pre
text for a war with the United Provinces.^
On April 13 the province of Holland resolved to accept
Catherine's invitation to conferences. A copy of the reso
lution was to be transmitted to Prince Gallitzin, de Swart,
the Dutch resident at St. Petersburg, and the ministers of
the United Provinces at the courts of Copenhagen, Stock
holm, and Lisbon.^ Other provinces soon followed,' as had
been predicted by Dumas. The empress, through de Swart,*
expressed her gratitude to the Dutch that her proposition
had been received so favorably by the States General and the
provinces.^ Panin hoped that the United Provinces would

'Thulemeier to Frederick II, AprU 28, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, April 28, 1780 (Wharton,
III, 638, 639) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, April 18, 1780 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Guelderland and Zealand. J. Adams to the President of Con
gress, May 8, 1780 (Wharton, IH, 655).
'De Swart was apparently not a very capable diplomat. "The
Dutch Resident, Swart," said Harris of hira, " is a man neither of
birth nor character, totally improper for the post he fills. . . One
of the most despised and unnoticed of my colleagues" (Septeraber
20, 1779, and April 28, 1780, in Harris, Diaries and Correspondence
of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury, I, 225, 257). The
Grand Pensionary called him "un etre trop peu considerable pour
etre charge d'une comraission importante" (Vauguyon, June 23,
1780, in Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, L i79). Still Amsterdam
declared to the stadtholder that it wanted no other minister at St.
Petersburg than de Swart. Yorke concluded that the resident was
sold to Amsterdam and that he was the only one who served the
city well (Yorke to Stormont, June 20, 1780, in Sparks MSS.,
LXXH).
'J. J. de Swart to the States General, June 6, 1780 (Bancroft
MSS., America, Holland, and England).
10

146 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [324
endeavor to arm vessels and to take their share in the pro
tection of commerce and navigation. He thought it neces
sary, above all, that the States General should send a decla
ration like that of Russia to the beUigerent powers.^
The dread of England, however, still prevailed in the
Netherlands and it was feared that she might take revenge
by seizing the East and West Indian possessions of the
United Provinces. On June 29, 1780, the city of Amster
dam passed a resolution in which it was declared that the
accession to the league of the Armed Neutrality should be
based on the condition that Russia and the other neutral
powers guarantee to the United Provinces all the "posses
sions fixed and immovable " of the latter, both in and out of
Europe.^ This decision was inserted in the acts of the
provincial assembly of Holland, at the Hague, July i, 1780.
Here it was thought necessary that a defensive treaty of
alliance and also the guarantee of the Dutch possessions in
both Indies should form the basis of negotiations with Rus
sia. Many of the deputies disapproved of this proposition.
The Russian ambassador, on the other hand, was much dis
satisfied with the turn affairs had taken and attributed it to
the Prince of Orange and the English partisans.'
A few days later the American commissioners at Paris
' Secret Resolution of the States General, June 13, 1780 (Sparks
MSS., CIII).
'Wharton, III, 831.
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, July 7, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prus
sia and HoUand).
It seems that, in this question, the Duke of Brunswick rather than
the Prince of Orange was opposed to the accession of the United
Provinces to the Armed Neutrality. The duke repeatedly called the
stadtholder's attention to the danger which such a step would
involve, but in vain. Brunswick therefore supposed that the prince's
attitude was due to Frederick the Great's influence. On February
28, 1780, the latter had written that the Republic should try to render
her position at sea formidable and to conclude for the protection of
commerce a defensive aUiance with Sweden and Denmark. "This,
he thought, was the best means for bringing England back to a
reasonable behavior (Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 186).
Brunswick's reason for distrusting the Russian policy was that
after all Catherine (and her favorite Potemkin) inclined rather to
England, and that therefore the league of neutrals would do no
harm to that power.

325] United Provinces in War ivith England. 147
were advised from the Hague that " the talk had been of a
congress to be held in that residence." The Empress of
Russia was said to have expressed her desire of having aU
the conferences take place at St. Petersburg, and the Prince
of Orange, thereupon, had proposed and the States General
agreed to the sending of Baron van Wassenaer-Starrenberg
and Baron van Heeckeren van Brandsenburg as ministers
plenipotentiary to Russia in order to take part in conferences
to be held there for the protection of neutral commerce.^
In fact, however, the provinces were as indecisive on this
question as on all others, the negotiations with Russia drag
ging slowly.
The American agent at the Hague thought the English
party responsible for this procrastination, as they continued
to perplex, delay, and cross everything. In his opinion the
English intrigued in the United Provinces more than in all
Europe besides.^ They tried apparently every possible
means to keep the Netherlands from taking part in the
league of the Armed Neutrality. According to Prince Gal
litzin the English court informed Count Welderen that the
king would not hesitate to declare war upon the United
Provinces in case the latter should formally accede to the
maritime association. At the same time Ambassador Yorke
was said to have insinuated at the Hague that if the Nether
lands should abstain from entering into close relations with
the northern powers, the king would unofficially issue orders
by which the molestation of Dutch commerce would be dis
continued.' At the beginning of August Lord Stormont
asked the Dutch envoy if he had news from his government.
The English cabinet, he stated, had been informed that the
Republic intended to send a declaration to the British court,
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, July 14, 1780 (Wharton,
m, 857).
Adams speUed the names of the two plenipotentiaries Baron de
Waassenaar Starrenburg and Baron van Heckeren de Brantrenburg.
'Dumas to the President of Congress, July 15; 1780 (Wharton,
III, 861) ; Carmichael to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, Sep
tember 9, 1780 (ibid., IV, 53).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, August i, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).

148 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [326
similar to that of Russia. He had, therefore, instructed
Yorke to make known to the States General how offensive
such a step must be to England, because the Republic was
bound by engagements rather to assist Great Britain than
to oppose her. If she should follow Russia's example, this
would necessarily create the impression that she was inclined
to be unfriendly toward England. The latter, Stormont
concluded, earnestly wished to continue the old friendship
with the United Provinces.^
Regarding the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries,
Starrenberg and Brandsenburg, we learn from Thulemeier
that the two Dutch noblemen, after their arrival at St.
Petersburg, were to ask first for the guarantee, not as an
essential condition, but as a favor, and then to inform the
empress that the States General were very willing to make
the required declaration to the beUigerent powers. To
render this step more effective, the United Provinces, how
ever, wished to enter into closer relations with Russia. The
plenipotentiaries were also to announce that the States Gen
eral proposed to Catherine to unite the naval forces of the
neutral powers and to put them into service for the protec
tion of their subjects by forming several squadrons accord
ing to the pleasure of the empress.^
The Republic began now to put her navy on a better foot
ing by manning her war vessels. According to John
Adams, who had arrived at Amsterdam in a private capacity,
she had great success in this because large premiums were
paid for seamen, as much as sixty ducats a man. As an
outward sign of the friendly relations existing between the
United Provinces and Empress Catherine, Russian men-of-
war arrived in Dutch waters and anchored off the Texel,
their officers going ashore and visiting Amsterdam.' The
English ambassador at the Hague now became more in-
' Welderen to the States General, August 4, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Araerica, HoUand, and England).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, August 11, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
° J. Adams to the President of Congress, August 14, 1780 (Whar
ton, IV, 29).

327] United Provinces in War with England. 149
sistent. He continued to disapprove strongly of sending
plenipotentiaries to St. Petersburg, suggesting that the dif
ferences between Great Britain and the United Provinces
could easily be adjusted by nominating one or two pleni
potentiaries for direct negotiations with the EngUsh minis
try at London.
In the meantime the Dutch ambassadors had arrived at
the Russian capital and were received by the empress. They
thanked her on account of their masters and said that the
Republic was not only wiUing to accede to the concert pro
posed for the protection of navigation, but to leave entirely
to her discretion by what means it was to be effected. Dur
ing the first interview the guarantee regarding the Dutch
possessions in the East and West Indies was not mentioned.^
Soon despatches arrived at the Hague from the plenipoten
tiaries stating that a convention was being negotiated upon
the basis of that concluded by the northern courts with two
additional articles. One was concerning the restitution of
the ships which Great Britain had taken from the Republic,
the other provided that in case the United Provinces should
be attacked or molested because of their accession to the
Armed Neutrality, the other parties to it would be bound to
defend them. In a separate article it was to be stated that
the aim of the maritime league was to bring about peace
between the belligerents.
When John Adams heard of this, he said that he would
dread any interposition of the assembly at St. Petersburg,
since it was impossible for them to understand the subject,
and America was not represented. " If they should take
into consideration the affair of peace," he continued, " I
should be apprehensive of some recommendations to save
the pride, or what they would caU the dignity, of England,
which would be more dangerous and pernicious to America
than a continuance of the war."
The reports from St. Petersburg showed also that Eng-
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, September 26, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand) ; J. Adaras to the President of Congress,
September 28, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 72).

150 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [328
land was still very active in her efforts to prevent the acces
sion of the United Provinces to the northern league. The
ministers plenipotentiary learned from the Russian minister
that Ambassador Harris had taken steps in this direction.
He was said to have informed Catherine that his court
would respect the Armed Neutrality of the northern powers,
provided that the United Provinces should not be admitted
to it.^ In fact. Sir James had received instructions from
Lord Stormont, dated September 19, to use his influence
with the empress in order to prevent the accession of the
Dutch. Harris pointed out to Prince Potemkin that the
empress should see while it was yet time " the dangers to
which she exposed England, the difficulties in which she
would involve herself, and the ruin to which she devoted
Holland, if she joined with the Dutch in support of their
unjust claims and ungrateful conduct."^
The Dutch plenipotentiaries consequently advised their
government not to expect that, by delaying a final resolution
or by further representations, anything could be gained.
The only possibUity of admission to the Armed Neutrality,
they declared, lay in a quick decision.' No further men
tion was made of the guarantee. It had become known
toward the end of September that Catherine had not only
refused to grant it, but had demanded, as condition of the
admittance of the Dutch, that the Republic should first make
the declaration to the belligerents which Russia had pre
sented to them in March. This attitude of the empress
caused great disappointment and discouragement in the
United Provinces. Amsterdam, however, supported by
Vauguyon, adhered to the plan of becoming a member of
the northern alliance.*

'Dumas to Franklin, October 3, 1780, and J. Adams to Dumas,
October 4, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 76-78).
'Harris to Stormont, October 6/17, 1780 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 337).
'Secret Resolutions of the States of HoUand, October 13, 1780
(Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Carmichael to the Committee of Foreign
Affairs, October 15, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 99, 100).
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I. 181.

329] United Provinces in War with England. 151
It was most important for England to prevent the acces
sion of the Dutch to the Armed Neutrality, otherwise it
would be difficult to cut off the providing of France and
Spain with naval stores and ship timber, which were not
considered contraband by the neutral league. For this rea
son war had to be declared upon the Republic before she
presented to the British government the declaration de
manded by Russia. Now was the time for England to act,
because it became evident that having grown desperate the
Dutch would join the league without their East and West
Indian possessions being guaranteed to them by Russia and
the alliance. It would have been foolish for the English
to state the actual reason which led them to this step, be
cause Russia and the northern powers might have sided
with the Republic. Most welcome to them, therefore, was
an occurrence which furnished a pretext for hostilities.
This was the capture of the person and papers of Laurens,
the former president of the Congress of the United States.
Henry Laurens was appointed to "negotiate a foreign
loan " and at the same time as " a commissioner to negotiate
a treaty of amity and commerce with the United Provinces
of the Low Countries," his instructions being dated October
26, 1779.^ His commission was resolved upon November
I, 1779, but adverse conditions had kept him from saUing
until early in the fall of 1780.^ On September 3, while the
packet on which he was a passenger was off the coast of
Newfoundland, she was captured by the British boat " Ves
tal." Laurens threw the bag containing his papers over
board, but the weight affixed to it proved insufficient, and
bag and papers fell into the hands of the British.' Laurens
'Secret Journals of Congress, II, 283, 285, 290, 314, 320 (Whar
ton, III, 394).
'Laurens to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, January 24,
February 14 and 24 (Wharton, III, 468, 494, 516; ibid., IV, 56,
footnote). At what time and from what place Laurens sailed does not appear
from his correspondence.
' Laurens to the Committee of Foreign Affairs, September 14, 17S0
(Wharton, IV, 56) ; J. Adams to the President of Congress, Oc
tober 31, 1780 (ibid., IV, 109, no).

152 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [330
was taken to England in the sloop of war "Fairy" and
imprisoned in the Tower of London.^ Among the papers
were letters from J. D. van der Capellen and others, point
ing out the friends of the American cause in the United
Provinces, and above all the draft treaty arranged by Wil
liam Lee and Neufville in 1778.^ This draft treaty was
deemed sufficient to furnish a pretext for war, if need be,
and England determined to use it to the best advantage.
There was no reason to suppose that " the Northern Powers
would espouse a quarrel founded on an intrigue unknown
to them."'
The English government sent the papers to Yorke, who
said that he was not surprised at the facts they revealed,
since he always suspected intrigues between France, Am
sterdam, and the rebels in America. He consulted Griffier
Fagel, who agreed that the ambassador should communi
cate the documents to Prince Louis of Brunswick. With
the latter Yorke was especially satisfied, because Brunswick
promised to cooperate with him, not only in encouraging
the stadtholder, but also in drawing every advantage from
the discovery in the interest of England. Acting upon the
duke's advice, Yorke, on October 16, informed the Prince
of Orange of what had happened, finding him, however,
already prepared by Brunswick. The stadtholder was of
Yorke's opinion that, if the draft treaty had been an act
of the States General, it should be considered as an aggres
sion and a declaration of war. But even as it was, William
agreed that the discovery would justify every measure Eng
land might take against the United Provinces " without any
' Extract of letters from Louden to Duraas, October 6, 10, and 17,
1780 (Wharton, IV, 84, 85).
'Above, pp. 89 ff.
'Yorke to Stormont, October 17, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
Van der Capellen in a letter to John Adams, dated November 28,
1780, judged the conduct of the English rightly when he stated that
the object of the English was " de nous [the Dutch] entrainer en
guerre avant d'etre admis a la Neutralite armee, afin de donner
occasion aux Puissances confederees de pouvoir nous refuser comme
n'aiant pas la qualification requise, savoir d'etre une puissance
neutre" (Beaufort, Brieven van der CapeUen, 206).

33 1 ] United Provinces in War with England. 153
other neutral power being concerned in it." The prince did
not doubt that this " lucky " discovery would greatly assist
the cause of Great Britain. Yorke thought that the affair
could not fail "to occasion a wonderful alarm" in the
United Provinces, and that the enthusiasm existing there
for the aUiance of the Armed Neutrality would be greatly
reduced, which would in itself be a great point, " if nothing
else happens." It would, he said, also thoroughly open the
eyes of the stadtholder.^
Brunswick advised the Prince of Orange not only to com
municate the discovery to the burgomasters of Amsterdam,
but to make it as widely known as possible. A good way
to proceed would be to inform the burgomasters first only
of the draft treaty and a letter of Mr. de Neufville upon
the subject. The other papers should be kept in reserve in
order to frighten those concerned with the fear of addi
tional knowledge which the prince might have of their plot.
The stadtholder should then ask categorically whether the
city of Amsterdam, had authorized Pensionary van Berckel
to negotiate such a treaty with the English colonies in
America as an independent state, although they were not
recognized by the United Provinces nor by most of the other
nations. He could not believe, the prince was to declare,
that they would have done this without the knowledge of
the other members of the state and of the stadtholder. In
order to draw the most advantage from the discovery,
Brunswick told Prince William that other provinces ought
to be speedily informed of it, which would be easy since all
were assembled together. This might perhaps be the best
means of preventing the Dutch declaration regarding the
Armed Neutrality from being submitted to the belligerent
powers. The discovery might serve as an argument to save
the United Provinces from the embarrassing position in
which France had placed them. He did not doubt that
the English government had notified Ambassador Harris
at St. Petersburg, who would make good use of it with
'Yorke to Stormont, October 17, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

154 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [332
the empress. As a measure of precaution Duke Louis rec
ommended that the originals of the papers should not be
intrusted to Temminck or the other magistrates of Amster
dam, but that only copies be transmitted.'^
The stadtholder, acting upon this advice, summoned Tem
minck for an explanation of the matter. The burgomaster
replied that Berckel had only carried out the instractions
of the regency of Amsterdam.^ A direct trade with the
United States must be of the greatest advantage to the
United Provinces; besides, the negotiations had only been
casu quo. It was an obsolete transaction which was with
out effect. It had been occasioned by intelligence received
at Amsterdam that the English commissioners sent to
America had been directed to exclude the United Provinces
from trading with America in case a reconciliation should
be effected. Other countries would have been admitted to
such commerce.' WiUiam V told Temminck then that the
matter would be laid before the States of Holland on the
same day, and demanded that the pensionary should not be
present during that meeting of the provincial assembly.*
Before proceeding to the latter the stadtholder handed the
papers to the secret committee of the States General, where
they were taken ad referendum to be communicated to the
provinces.' The States of Holland declared that they had no knowl
edge of the matter and demanded an explanation from the
city of Amsterdam." On October 25 the answer from Am-
' Brunswick to the Prince of Orange, October 17, 1780 (Nijhoff,
Brunswijk, 320, 321).
'Above, p. 89.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 24, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Yorke to Stormont, October 24, 1780
(Sparks MSS., LXXII)._
Yorke, in concluding his report, remarked, " From this narrative,
which contains a full avowal and even a justification, it is evident
to what a pitch the tyranny of Amsterdam has risen, and what may
be expected from them if they continue to rule."
'Yorke to Stormont, October 20, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
° Secret Resolution of the States General, October 20, 1780 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
'Secret Resolutions of the States of HoUand and Westfriesland,
October 20, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers).

333] United Provinces in War with England. 155
sterdam, dated October 24, practically repeated the state
ment made by Burgomaster Temminck to the Prince of
Orange. The assembly of HoUand transmitted the report
to the States General, by whom it was referred to the prov
inces for deliberation.^ Yorke presumed that the States
General would finally disavow the conduct of the city of
Amsterdam, but in his opinion this would not be giving the
satisfaction to which England was entitled. He proposed,
therefore, that satisfaction should be formally demanded,
blaming only Amsterdam for this incident. In case of a
refusal, or if an answer should be withheld, Amsterdam
might be separated from the rest of the Republic in every
respect, just as should seem best to England. Ships be
longing to Amsterdam might be brought up and retained
until satisfaction was given, or the Texel and VUe, forming
the gates to the Zuider Zee and consequently to Amsterdam,
might be blockaded, while all the other ports of the United
Provinces should remain open. An immediate demand for
satisfaction, Yorke expected, would have a great influence
on the northern powers, since he thought that they would
not be inclined to quarrel with England for the sake of the
Dutch.2 In execution of this scheme, the ambassador on Novem
ber 10 presented a memorial to the States General, setting
forth that the alliance of Great Britain and the United Prov
inces contributed to the happiness of the two nations, but
the natural enemy of both wanted to destroy it and was
supported in this effort by a faction in the Republic. On
the other hand, the king's requisition of the stipulated as
sistance remained without effect, doubtless because of the
influence of a dominant cabal. The king, however, hoped
that the States General would return to the system which
was founded by the wisdom of their ancestors, and had
charged his ambassador to present the accompanying decla-
' Secret Resolutions of the States General, October 27, 1780 (Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland, and England; Sparks MSS., CIII;
Sparks Dutch Papers) ; J. Adams to the President of Congress,
October 27, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 106, 107).
*Yorke to Stormont, October 31, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

156 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [334
ration to Their High Mightinesses, the reply to which would
be regarded as the touchstone of their intentions and their
sentiments toward the English. The king asked of the
States General a formal disavowal of the conduct of Am
sterdam regarding the negotiations with America, and the
exemplary punishment of the Pensionary van Berckel and
his accomplices. In case the States General should refuse
to comply with this request or remain silent, the king would
be obliged to take such measures as the maintenance of his
dignity required. '-
John Adams, learning the contents of the English am
bassador's memorial, observed, " Whether Sir Joseph Yorke,
after 20 years residence in this Republic, is ignorant of its
constitution, or whether, knowing it, he treats it in this
manner on purpose the more palpably to insult it, I know
not." To Adams, who seems not yet to have been aware of
its purpose, this English measure must have been surprising.
The sovereignty of the United Provinces resided in the
States General, but Their High Mightinesses who assembled
at the Hague were only the deputies. The real States Gen
eral, in his opinion, were the regencies of the cities and the
bodies of nobles in the several provinces. The burgo
masters of the city of Amsterdam, called the regency, were
therefore an integral part of the sovereignty. What would be
said in England if the Dutch envoy at the court of London
had handed a note to the king, in which any integral part of
the sovereignty of Great Britain, as the whole House of
Lords, or the whole House of Commons, was charged with
conspiracy, factions, cabals, and sacrificing of general inter
ests to private views, and had demanded exemplary pun
ishment ?^
' Sparks Dutch Papers ; Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and
England. 'J. Adams to the President of Congress, November 16, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 153, 154).
On November 20, 1780, however, Adams wrote to van der Capellen
that the King of England would commence hostilities against the
United Provinces on pretense of an insult committed by the nego
tiation of Amsterdam with the United States (Wharton, IV, 157;
Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 201).

335] United Provinces in War with England. 157
The memorial, made public in the Dutch gazettes by
Yorke, was very much resented in the United Provinces,
causing there considerable alarm.^ Even the British parti
sans did not, in general, agree with it. The burgomasters
of .^\msterdam issued a detailed pamphlet in which they tried
to justify their action,- being successful at least as far as the
broad public was concerned. Yorke was not generally
thought to be the author of the memorial, but Lord Stor
mont. It was believed that the former had in vain made
representations in London predicting that such a step would
cause too great dissatisfaction in the United Provinces.
The fact was, however, that the ambassador, far from warn
ing against strong measures, was the motive power behind
the hostile attitude of the English govemment toward the
Dutch Republic. Grand Pensionarv' van Bleiswijck rightly
suspected that England was using this case as a means to.
prevent the accession of the L'nited Provinces to the Armed
Neutrality-.' Francis Dana, who, on a short visit to the United Prov
inces for the purpose of raising money, happened to be in
Amsterdam with John Adams,* shared the same opinion.
Holland and three other provinces had already declared for
unconditional adhesion to the pact, while two more pleaded
that the Dutch territories in both Indies should be previously
guaranteed, without, however, making this an absolute con
dition. The only province which was against the measure
was Zealand.® This Dana ascribed to the unlimited influ-
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 11, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand) ; Yorke to Stormont, November 14, 1780
(Sparks MSS., LXXII).
' Yorke to Stormont, November 3, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII) ;
Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 3, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Dana to Jonathan Jackson, November 11,
1780 (Wharton, IV, 151).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 14, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' ¦\\'Tiarton, I, 574.
'\Mien the wording of the declaration to the beUigerent powers
was deUberated upon by the States General, the deputies of Zealand
protested (Secret Resolution of the States General, November 20.
1780, in Sparks MSS., CIII; Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and
England) .

158 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [336
ence exercised there by the Prince of Orange, but possibly
the other six states might accede without Zealand. The
hesitation of the Republic was due to her not being prepared
for war, since only twenty-six of the fifty-two war vessels
voted for were ready for sea.^ At the beginning of Novem
ber the report of the burgomasters of Amsterdam regarding
the draft treaty had been examined by the states of the prov
ince of Holland in a secret session, and the action of Amster
dam disavowed, but a final resolution was postponed.^
In the meantime, the French party was not inactive, as
may be seen from a letter of Sir Joseph Yorke to his gov
ernment, in which, by the way, he accused Prussia of taking
part in the intrigues. " It is notorious," he said, " that the
Cabal, supported by France and Prussia, is as inveterate as
it is active, and that at the bottom all it does and all it
means, is to gain time to be better prepared, and if possible,
to draw the Northern League into the snare, by making their
particular aggression a common cause with the pretended
armed neutrality."' Utmost vigilance was recommended to
the ambassador by the authorities in London. It would be
essential, he was told, to watch John Adams as narrowly
as possible, because it was suspected that he had at least
some of the powers which were given to Mr. Laurens.* On
November 20, the States General resolved to accede to the
Armed Neutrality without the stipulation of a guarantee re
garding the East and West Indian possessions. This de
cision was reached by a majority of votes, namely, those of
Holland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overyssel, and Groningen
against Guelderland and Zealand, the latter still insisting
on the guarantee clause, though they agreed to the acces
sion in principle. °
'Dana to Jonathan Jackson, November 11, 1780 (Wharton, IV,
152). ' Secret Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, November 3,
1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Yorke to Stormont, November 21, 1780 f Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Stormont to Yorke, November 21, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Gazette de Leyde, XCIV, November 24, 1780; J. Adams to the
President of Congress, November 25, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 160).

337] United Provinces in War with England. 159
John Adams considered it a mistake for the Prince of
Orange to have produced Mr. Laurens' papers ; and particu
larly was the way in which he did it unfortunate, since it
was "justly offensive" to the United States. Yorke would
have been the proper authority to submit the papers, for the
prince in so doing appeared to be an instrument of the Eng
Ush ambassador, which did not at all recommend him to
the Dutch nation.' Adams' remarks were made shortly
after the States of Holland had passed a resolution which
disapproved and disavc P"^d the conduct of the magistrates of
Amsterdam.^ This resolution was passed by the States Gen
eral without change and communicated to the English am
bassador' by the Grand Pensionary in writing.*
Both resolutions failed to provide for the punishment of
van Berckel, which the English memorial had demanded.
Yorke answered, therefore, that the resolutions did not con
tain the satisfaction demanded, but that he imagined the king
would look upon this decision of the States General as a
first step toward a compliance with his demands. Regard
ing the accession of the Republic to the Armed Neutrality the
ambassador reported that the messenger who was carrying
the resolutions of the States General to St. Petersburg had
been recaUed by an express courier. Sir Joseph also learned
that a letter from the Grand Pensionary had been handed to
the messenger enclosing the resolution of the States of Hol
land upon the "American intrigue." The matter, he said,
was represented in such a way that it must appear as if all
the satisfaction necessary had been given to Great Britain.
The courier was ordered to stop at the village of Voor-
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, November 25, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 161).
'Resolution of Holland and Westfriesland, Noveraber 23, 1780
(Groot Placaatboek, IX, 30; Sparks Dutch Papers; Sparks MSS.,
CIII; Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England) ; Thulemeier
to Frederick II, November 24, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
Holland) ; Yorke to Stormont, November 24, 1780 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXII). ' Secret Resolution of the States General, November 27, 1780
(Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, Noveraber 28, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).

l6o Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [338
schooten and wait there, in order to receive the resolution of
the States General upon the same subject for transmission
to the Dutch plenipotentiaries at St. Petersburg.^
At the Rusian court the English intrigue was carried on
with increasing zeal, but apparently without success. Count
Panin, according to Sir James Harris, was " working every
engine" to have the Dutch admitted to the Armed Neu
trality. The British ambassador suspected that Panin was
concealing the truth from Catherine, but hoped that the
empress would not admit the Uni^vi Provinces, unless all
seven agreed in their opinion.^ That the decision of the
States General would not be unanimous Harris knew from
Yorke, who kept him informed of the proceedings at the
Hague. Sir James tried also to gain an ally in the Austrian
envoy at St. Petersburg. In a letter addressed to the Eng
lish ambassador at Vienna, Harris expressed his confidence
that England's effort would succeed in cutting up by the
roots the convention of the Armed Neutrality by taking
from the United Provinces their title of neutrals, for the
Dutch were an " ungrateful, dirty, senseless " people. He
asked his colleague to prevail upon the court of Vienna to
instruct Cobenzel, the Austrian representative at St. Peters
burg, to assist Harris in influencing Catherine against the
Netherlands.' It remained no secret that Harris was instructed from
London to declare to the empress that the Dutch by their
negotiations with America had departed from neutral
'Yorke to Stormont, November 28, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
John Adaras, who in this instance was not so well informed as
Yorke, thought that the recaUing of the courier was intended for
some change in the instructions sent to the Dutch plenipotentiaries
in Russia, but, he said, it was unknown what alteration was to be
made (J. Adams to the President of Congress, in Wharton, IV,
175). ' Harris to Stormont, November 18/28, 1780 (Malmesbury, Cor
respondence, I, 342).
"The view that Catherine would not admit the United Provinces on
the ground that the vote had not been unanimous was shared by
Yorke (Yorke to Stormont, December 3, 1789, in Sparks MSS.,
LXXII). ° Harris to Sir Robert M. Keith, November 29, 1780 (Malmes
bury, Correspondence, I, 345).

339] United Provinces in War with England. i6i
ground and should, therefore, not aspire to enjoy the same
prerogatives as Russia, Sweden, and Denmark.^ Yorke
warned his government that too much care and pains could
not be employed to keep the United Provinces from acceding
to the Armed Neutrality.^ All these efforts showed how
great the apprehension of Great Britain was that the Dutch
would escape her control.
At this time Sir Joseph Yorke presented a new memorial
to the States General in which he insisted upon a satis
factory answer to his previous memorial regarding the draft
treaty with the United States. The king, he said, put the
punishment of the culprits in the hands of the States Gen
eral, and only in the last extremity would charge himself
with it. It was, however, pointed out to the ambassador
that the States General had no jurisdiction over the indi
vidual provinces, and that they must leave the matter to the
province of Holland.'
John Adams remarked regarding Yorke's action that a
widening of the breach with the Republic by England did
not seem probable, but if a rupture should occur, it would de
no harm to the United States for Great Britain to have
more enemies to contend with.* Even Yorke himself ob
served that the Dutch, in general, thought a serious quarrel
with England impossible." The Prince of Orange was in
despair. At least so it seemed from a report of the English
ambassador in which he stated that William V acted as if he
had fallen into the hands of Great Britain's enemies.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, December i, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Yorke to Stormont, December 8, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
•Gazette de Leyde, CI, December 19, 1780; Yorke to Stormont,
December 12, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII; Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England) ; Resolution of the States General, December
12, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, De
cember 15, 1780 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; J. Adams
to the President of Congress, December 18, 1780 (Wharton, IV,
197)- 'J. Adams to Cushing, December 15, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 193)-
'Yorke to Stormont, December 3, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

1 62 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [340
Yorke, as usual, talked very frankly to him about his conduct
and that of the states toward England, avoiding, however,
mentioning the negotiations with Russia and with the other
powers of the Armed Neutrality.^
A few days after Sir Joseph had delivered his memorial,
he was informed by the States General that it had been
referred to the provinces and that a definite answer would
be given as quickly as the constitution of the government
would allow.-^ About the same time the British cabinet,
learning on December 16 of the Dutch resolution to join the
neutral league,' took final steps by directing Yorke to quit
the United Provinces without taking leave.* This meant the
severance of all diplomatic relations with the Republic, a
measure almost equalling a declaration of war, and the friend
ship which had existed between the two countries for 106
years would cease." However, the transmission of the
orders to Yorke met with some delay, owing to rough sea,
and in the meanwhile the Dutch envoy in London, informed
by Stormont, reported to the States General the resolution
taken by the English government, but his missive also was
late in reaching the Hague. Welderen added that he was
prepared to leave England as soon as he should receive
orders to that effect from the States General, and that he
would not go to court any more.'
This last English action was in keeping with the policy
which the British government had followed ever since the
American Revolution had begun. This was to render the
Dutch as far as possible unable to assist England's enemies.

Yorke to Stormont, December 12, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Resolution of the States General, December 15, 1780 (Bancroft
MSS., America, Holland, and England).
' Mahan, Influence of Sea Power, 406.
'Stormont to Yorke, December 16, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).
'Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 295; Doniol, Histoire, IV,
516; Davies, History of HoUand, III, 463.
'Welderen to the States General, December 17 and 19; both letters
were received at the Hague on December 25 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, HoUand, and England) ; Resolution of the States General,
December 25, 1780 (Sparks MSS., CIII).

341 J United Provinces in War with England. 163
Thus far England had been only partly successful, but now
that all friendly relations between the two countries had
ceased it would be easier to check the commerce and naviga
tion of the United Provinces, which had proved so harmful
to the English cause. There was, however, no time left
for Great Britain to take this measure, since the accession of
the Republic to the league of the Armed Neutrality was
near at hand.^
The last Dutch courier had brought full powers to the
commissioners of the United Provinces at St. Petersburg to
accede on behalf of the States General to the league as pro
posed by the Russian court. The Russian envoy learned that
as soon as everything was agreed upon the Dutch plenipo
tentiaries would produce credentials as ambassadors and
sign the Convention under that title. They were also in
structed to propose a treaty of commerce, on terms highly
advantageous to Russia. Both of the commissioners had
constantly been in conference with Panin, and, according to
Harris, had found in him more facility and zeal than they
could even have hoped for, since the Russian minister in
tended to urge the empress to lose no time in forming the
connection which he represented to her as most salutary to
her empire and most conducive to her glory.^ Catherine
agreed, and the plenipotentiaries signed on January 4, the ¦
acts then being dispatched to be ratified by the States Gen-
' E. Lusac, R. Vryaarts openhartige Brieven, I, 20.
For more than two years van der CapeUen had asserted that Eng
land, in pursuance of her interests, needed a war with the United
Provinces, and that she would have it (Van der Capellen to Vau
guyon, in Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 241).
'Harris to Stormont, December 8/19, 1780 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 347, 348).
Harris' report of a conversation which he had with the empress
is interesting. After he had explained to her why the Arraed
Neutrality was hurtful to England, Catherine asked him in return,
"You molest my commerce; you hold up my vessels; I attach to
that a particular interest; my commerce is my child, and you want
me not to be angry?" (Harris to Stormont, December 13/24, 1780,
in Malmesbury,- Correspondence, I, 355) . It was evident that Har
ris' mission had been a complete failure, at least as far as the
formal conclusion of the Armed Neutrality was concerned. It was
different regarding the execution of its principles.

164 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [342
eral.^ That Russia, however, would give the Dutch no
further support was the firm belief of Sir James Harris.^
On December 21, 1780, the States of HoUand resolved
that the provincial court of HoUand should decide whether
the papers taken from Laurens contained anything that,
according to the constitution of the United Provinces,
would justify criminal procedure against the burgomasters
of Amsterdam and their pensionary.' On the foUowing
day the States General passed this resolution without
change and Yorke was informed that only the States of
Holland were competent in this matter.* Sir Joseph refused
to accept this action, and suggested that the States General
should transmit it to his court through Count van Wel
deren." Yorke received his letter of recall on December 24 and
left the Hague on the following moming for Rotterdam and
Antwerp to proceed from there to England.' The States
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, February i, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 244-248) ; Dumas to the President of Congress, January 23,
1781 (ibid., IV, 200) ; Secret Resolution of the States General,
January 22, 1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
Harris reported to his government that he was not able to pre
vent the admission of the Dutch to the neutral league, since Potem
kin acted too late upon his advice (Harris to Stormont, December
29, 1780/January 9, 1781, in Malmesbury, Correspondence, I, 371).
' Harris to Stormont, December 13/24, 1780 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 349).
John Adams' opinion was directly opposite. He thought the con
federated powers would easily see that the real cause of offence
was not the Dutch-American draft treaty but the accession of the
Dutch to the Armed Neutrality, and that they would assist the
Netherlands (J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 25,
1780, in Wharton, IV, 210).
' Resolutions of HoUand and Westfriesland, December 21, 1780
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Resolutions of the States General, December 22, 1780 (Bancroft
MSS., America, Holland, and England; Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Yorke to the States General, December 22, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland, and England) ; Resolution of the States General,
December 23, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Dumas to the President
of Congress, December 19, 26, 27 (Wharton, IV, 199).
'Yorke to Stormont, December 29, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII) ;
J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 26, 1780 (Whar
ton, IV, 211) ; Gazette de Leyde, CIV, December 29, 1780, Supple
ment. Regarding a pension of £2,000, granted to Yorke, and Pitt's com-

343] United Provinces in War with England. 165
General, on their part, instructed Welderen to return to the
United Provinces, but to transmit, before his departure, to
the English government the declaration of the United Prov
inces regarding their accession to the Armed Neutrality.^
It could afford only small consolation to the Dutch that the
King of France assured them he would protect their legiti
mate and innocent commerce. He expected in return, he
said, that they would take the most efficient measures in
order to have their subjects fulfil scrupulously the condi
tions which guaranteed the liberty of their commerce.^
On December 20, George III issued a manifesto, which
was communicated to van Welderen on the following day.
It contained all the real and pretended grievances of Eng
land against the United Provinces and was intended to
veil the actual reason for England's attitude.' The king
attributed the conduct of the Republic to the prevalence in
the United Provinces of a faction which was devoted to
France and was following the dictates of that court. After
the commencement of the war with France his ambassador
had been instructed to offer friendly negotiations to the
States General in order to obviate everything that might
lead to disagreeable discussions, but no attention was paid
to Yorke's proposition of November 2, 1778. After Spain
joined the war, the States General were asked to carry out
their obligations in accordance with Article 5 of the per
petual defensive alliance between England and the United
Provinces of March 3, 1678, providing that the party of
pliment to his ability as an ambassador, see : William Pitt, Chancel
lor of the Exchequer, in debate of March 6, 1783 (Register, London,
1783, Vol. IX, p. 416).
' Thulemeier to Frederick II, December 25, 1780 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
The Dutch declaration was delivered to the French government
on December 19 (Berkenrode to the States General, December 21,
1780, in Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
The Prussian foreign ministers, Finckenstein and Hertzberg, were
informed of the declaration by the Dutch envoy at Berlin, Count
van Heiden, on December 20 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Appendix to a letter of Berkenrode to the States General, De
cember 28, 1780. The Appendix itself is dated December 23, 1780
(Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'Le Politique HoUandais, No. i, (Chapter II, 7.

1 66 / Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [344

the allies not attacked should break with the aggressor
within two months after the party attacked required it.
The Republic had within two years not furnished any as
sistance, nor even answered England's repeated demands.
On the other hand neutrality had been promised to Great
Britain's enemies and secret aid given to them by facilitating
the carriage of naval stores to France. Shelter had been
granted to John Paul Jones in the Texel, protection and
assistance had been rendered to the American rebels in St.
Eustatia, and finally the Dutch had drafted a treaty with
the American government. As no satisfaction had been
given, the king must get for. himself that justice which was
not otherwise to be obtained.^
When Franklin saw a copy of the document, he re
marked: "Surely there never was a more unjust war; it is
manifestly such from their own manifesto. The spirit of
rapine dictated it, and in my opinion every man in England
who fits out a privateer to take advantage of it has the same
spirit, and would rob on the highway in his own country
if he was not restrained by fear of the gallows."^
Count Welderen in execution of his instructions tried in
vain to hand the Dutch declaration to the British govem
ment. Lord Stormont refused to receive him on the ground
that, as a consequence of the manifesto of the king, the
Republic had to be regarded " as being in war with Eng
land."' Welderen was therefore compelled to leave Eng
land without fulfilling his instructions.*
'Gazette de Leyde, No. I, January 2, 1781, Supplement; J. Adams
to the President of Congress, January i, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 219-
221) ; De Vinck (Ostende) to States General, December 27, 1780
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
' Franklin to Duraas, January 18, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 240) .
' Welderen to the States General, December 21 and 29, 1780 (Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
The causes and motives of George Ill's conduct were laid before
the English ParUament in a message on January 25, 1781. In it, of
course, the Dutch were represented as the aggressors, making a
rupture with the United Provinces indispensable (Hansard, Parlia
mentary History, XXI, 960). A short account of the events preced
ing the rupture was sent by J. Adams to the President of Congress
on January 5 and 15, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 228, 229, 234).
'Resolution of the States General, January 15, 1781 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII).

34S] United Provinces in War with England. {.i6'j J
Harris remained firm in his belief that no harm would be
done to England by Russia. Great Britain's enemies would
never so far mislead Catherine as to make her believe that
the support of the United Provinces was a casus foederis
of the convention of the Armed Neutrality. The King of
Prussia was moving heaven and earth to fix this idea in
her mind, and, besides, was offering troops to the Dutch
in any number, and money to the Danes in any amount,
provided only that they should employ their ships against
England.^ The fact seems to have been that the Empress
of Russia, at this time, was favorably disposed toward the
Republic, while she was indignant at the attitude of Great
Britain.-^ Harris tried every means to thwart the ratifica
tion by Russia of the convention with the United Provinces,
but without success. He informed his government that he
had been more lucky in preventing the immediate evils with
which the accession of the Dutch threatened England. He
had prevailed on Her Majesty to act only as a well-wisher
to both countries, and to show that determination by hold
ing out conditions "by no means dishonorable" to the
English.' ' Harris to Keith, January 10/21, 1781 (Malmesbury, Correspond
ence, I, 376).
Prussia acceded to the Armed Neutrality on May 8, 1781. Thule
meier transmitted a copy of the treaty to the States General in
August, 1781 (Thulemeier to Frederick II, August 21, 1781, in Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Thulemier to Frederick II, January 12, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; Dumas to the President of Congress, Janu
ary 23, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 200).
' Harris to Stormont, April 13/24, 1781 (Malraesbury, Correspond
ence, I, 403). ">,
A curious diplomatic blunder of the United States of America
should be mentioned here, namely, its request to be admitted to the
neutral league. In execution of the resolution of Congress of Octo
ber 5, 1780, John Adams on March 8, 1781, transmitted a memorial
to the States General in which he said that the American Revolu
tion had furnished the occasion of a reformation in the maritime
law of nations of vast importance to a free communication among
mankind by sea, and that he therefore hoped it might not be thought
improper that the United States should become parties to it. Copies
of this memorial were delivered by him to the representatives at the
Hague of France, Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, and also to the
pensionary of Amsterdam (Wharton, IV, 274, 275). Since the object
of the convention of the Armed Neutrality was to guard the rights

;i68 J) Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [346
The verdict which was pronounced by the provincial court
of Holland on the action of Amsterdam caused much em
barrassment. Van Berckel was acquitted, but the city of
Amsterdam was declared guilty and criminal.^ The French
ambassador warned his Dutch friends not to adopt that
declaration, because it would justify the hostilities of Eng
land, and the city of Amsterdam wrote to the Prince of
Orange asking him to oppose the publication of the verdict.^
Van Berckel sent an address to the States of HoUand and
Westfriesland in which he defended his honor and asked to
have his innocence declared.'
The whole Dutch people were in a state of utmost con
sternation, since they were not at all prepared for war,
although it had been threatening for a long time. On Janu
ary 12, 1781, the States General resolved to distribute let
ters of marque to privateers and orders to their men of war
to seize everything that they could belonging to the Eng
lish. But there were no privateers ready and comparatively
few war vessels,* while as early as the end of December,
1780, a great many English privateers had left Liverpool
to capture Dutch vessels." Here and there voices were
of neutrals against belligerents and the United States was a bel
ligerent power, the American proposition could not be complied
with. Vauguyon refused to second Adams without express order
from the French govemment (Vauguyon to Adams, March 14, 1781,
in Wharton, IV, 300).
The Gazette de Leyde registered with satisfaction the failure of
England to prevent the accession of the United Provinces to the
Armed Neutrality (XXVII, April 3, 1781).
'J. G. Tegelaar to van der Capellen, March 21, 1781 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 225).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 27 and 30, 1781 (Bancroft
MSS., Prussia and Holland).
'Resolutions of the States of HoUand and Westfriesland, May 4,
1781; Thulemeier to Frederick II, May 8, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' Dumas to the President of Congress, January 12, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 200) ; J. Adams to the President of Congress, January 14, 1781
(ibid., IV, 231).
The States General on January 26, 1781, issued orders forbidding
the Dutch to export contraband of war to England or goods for the
account of the English king and his subjects (Groot Placaatboek,
IX, 109, no).
'Tegelaar to van der Capellen, December 26, 1780 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 222).

347] United Provinces in War with England. 169
heard, including that of the government of Zealand, which
pleaded for reconciliation with England, but petitions to
this effect remained without consideration by the States
General.^ Others were hopeful that the United Provinces
would be victorious in the end, though they might be de
feated by Great Britain in the beginning and lose St.
Eustatia together with other West Indian possessions.^ It
was thought throughout the United Provinces that the Re
public would receive effective assistance from the neutral
league.' The Dutch press was a power of great influence in the
Netherlands during the period under consideration and
especially during the Dutch-English controversy.* Both
parties, the Orangists as well as the Patriots, made the most
intense use of it, in order to propagate their respective
views. Its importance in the political development of
the country equalled if not exceeded that of the poUtical
press of our own time. There were in existence two classes
of literature of this kind, newspapers and sporadically is
sued pamphlets. Up to 1780 the Dutch newspapers had
only registered the current events in a colorless way, but
from then on they served party purposes more or less, their
number at the same time increasing considerably. The ma
jority of them were organs of the Patriots." Many of the
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, January 15, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 232).
The Province of Zealand then declared her willingness to take part
in the hostiUties, but reserved to herself the right of demanding,
from the other provinces, compensation for all the cost, losses, and
damages which she might experience during the hostilities with
England (Van der Spiegel, II, 4-11).
'Tegelaar to van der Capellen, December 26, 1780 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 220-221).
' Gazette de Leyde, No. i, January 2, 1781, Supplement.
' John Adams frequently made use of the Dutch press for further
ing the American cause in the United Pro^'inces. This was possible
by the assistance of Cerisier, Dumas and others, without Adams'
becoming known as the author (J. Adams to Livingston, September
4, 1782, in Wharton, V, 690-691).
'Perhaps one of the oldest Dutch newspapers, still in vogue at
the outbreak of war between the United Provinces and England,
was the "Nederlandsche Mercurius" (1756-1806). In a French
spirit were pubUshed, from 1779, the " Lettres HoUandaises " (Dutch

170 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [348
pamphlets were edited anonymously and, consequently,
exhibited a more violent character than the party news
papers, since their authors could not easily be brought to
account. The distribution of these pamphlets in the United
Provinces was usually effected as secretly as their publi
cation, and they reached all classes of the population. At
this period they grew like mushrooms and formed not only
a potent factor in party controversies but tended to in
fluence considerably the foreign policy of the Netherlands.
No doubt, the most famous of these pamphlets was the
one entitled "Aan het Volk van Nederland" (To the
People of the Netherlands).^ Only recently has the author
Letters), a paper which originated in the French legation at the
Hague. One of its editors was A. M. Cerisier, a clever author,
entertaining close relations to the French ambassador. Its name was
later changed to " Nouvelles Lettres HoUandaises " (New Dutch
Letters), and from 1787 to "Le Politique HoUandais" (Dutch
Politics), when Cerisier took the editing into his own hands. The
most influential Patriot paper was probably " De Post van den
Neder-Rhijn" (1780-1787), edited by Pieter 't Hoen, and read in
thousands of copies. Van der Capellen and van der Kemp, regents
of Amsterdam, and other Patriots contributed to it. To counteract
it the Orangist van Goens, with the knowledge and support of the
stadtholder, issued the " Ouderwetse Nederlandsche Patriot" (1781-
1783). It was well written, but its edition did not exceed seven
hundred copies and it had therefore soon to be discontinued (Blok,
Geschiedenis, VI, 577; Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 258). One of
the most violent Patriot papers was the " Politieke Kruger," but
it was issued only from September, 1782 (Blok, Geschiedenis, VI,
398). A periodical of vast importance which became popular in
most European countries on account of its reliability was the
" Gazette de Leyde," edited by Etienne and Jean Luzac, who
inclined toward France and greatly aided the American cause.
The memory of Jean Luzac was honored by the Hblland Society
of Philadelphia when, in 1909, it sent as delegate a prominent mem
ber, the noted author of various books on HoUand, Dr. William
Elliot Griffis of Ithaca, New York, to Leyden in order to place there
on the house once occupied by Luzac a tablet, bearing this inscrip
tion : " In grateful remembrance to Jean Luzac, friend of Washing
ton, Adams, and Jefferson, champion of the truth and justice of the
cause of American independence in the Gazette de Leyde. Erected
by the Holland Society of Philadelphia, 1909 " (Washington Sunday
Star, October 24, 1909, Part 2).
' This pamphlet is not to be confounded with another one of almost
the same title : " Aan't Volk van Nederland " (" of Bewijzen en
Consideratien over de voordeelen der Negotie met de Noord Ame-
ricaanen"), which, though written in favor of the Americans, was
rather colorless. A great many of the pamphlets issued about this
time were addressed " aan't Volk van Nederland," as, for example.

349] United Provinces in War with England. lyi
been discovered to have been van der Capellen, the untiring
friend of the American cause.^ This pamphlet was chiefly
directed against the house of Orange, especially against
WiUiam V, and its services consisted in diminishing the
power of the English party, while it advanced the cause of
the United States in the Netherlands.^
The most important pamphlet coming from the other
side was van Goens' " Politick Vertoog over het waar Sys-
tema van Amsterdam" (Political Argumentation regarding
the true System of Amsterdam), dated March ii, 1781.
It denounced the policy of Amsterdam as selfish, tending
" Antwoord van Pieter Dwars-Doelen Scheepstimmerman op de
Werf Vrijheid en Eendracht . . . aan't Volk van Nederland in't
algemeen en aan de inwoonders der Stad Amsterdam in het bijzon-
der," a pamphlet written against the English.
'Up to 1908 neither the Congress of the United States nor the
American people in general had formally recognized the very valu
able services which van der Capellen rendered to the struggling
American colonies. It is owing to the Holland Society of New
York and especially to one of its presidents, Mr. John R. van
Wormer, chairman of the committee formed for the purpose, that
this debt of honor was paid on June 6, 1908, by placing a commemo
rative bronze tablet on the walls of the house No. 12 Bloemendal
Street, which van der Capellen and his wife occupied until shortly
before his death in 1784. The tablet, which was unveiled by Mr.
van Wormer on behalf of the HoUand Society of New York under
the auspices of the Dutch authorities, bears the following inscrip
tion : " Erected by the Holland Society of New York A. D. 1908 to
Joan Derek van der Capellen tot den Pol, Ridder in de Ridderschap
van Overyssel 1741-1784, in grateful recognition of the services
rendered by him during the war of the Revolution on behalf of the
United Colonies of North America, 177S-1783, which materiaUy
contributed toward the establishment of their independence as a
nation." Rev. Dr. William Elliot Griffis of Ithaca, New York, first sug
gested to the Holland Society the scheme as it was executed. A
detailed report on the history of the van der Capellen tablet was
published by the HoUand Society of New York in 1909.
' Its effect is said to have resembled that of an electric shock. On
September 25 and 26, 1781, it was spread through the principal
Dutch cities and also through the country by van der Kemp, van der
CapeUen's friend (Adrian van der Kemp came later to America
where he founded the town of Barneveldt, now Trenton, N. J., and
surveyed the route of the Erie Canal. Griffis, Young People's His
tory of Holland, 266). Although several individuals were employed
for this purpose and $2500 offered for the discovery of author and
publisher, the names of the author and his associates were not dis
closed (Fairchild, van der Kemp, 54-57; Groot Placaatboek, IX,
409).

172 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [350
to make the rest of the country serve the particular inter
ests of the great city. The pamphlet advocated severe
measures against Amsterdam, and was originally intended
only for a limited circle of readers, especially the regents
of Dutch cities, but soon became known to the public in
general, which received it in a very unfriendly manner.
Amsterdam was praised by the people as the champion of
progress, while the stadtholder was called the usurper of
the rights of the people.^ Van Goens became the object of
severe attacks and was referred to as the enemy of his
country. While his essay had been called forth by two
pamphlets by one Hendrik Calkoen, strongly taking sides
with Amsterdam,^ a number of counter publications ap
peared, the consequence of the " Politick Vertoog."'
Another pamphlet which cleverly represented the Eng
lish views was the " Rechtsgeleerde Memorie" (Judicial
Memorial).* The author tried to show that Yorke's accu
sations were weU founded and that the EngUsh crown was
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 258, 259.
' Q. N., Het Politick Systema van de Regeering van Amsterdam,
in een waar daglicht vorgesteld, en haar gedrag tegens de beschuldi-
ging van den Ridder Yorke, bescheidenlijk verdeedigd in een' Brief
aan een Heer van Regeering in Zeeland (The Political System of
the Administration of Amsterdam, represented in true daylight, and
her conduct modestly defended against the accusation of Sir Joseph
"V'orke in a letter to a gentleman of the Government in Zealand).
Q. N., Het Waare Dag-Licht van het Politick Systema der Re-
geeringe van Amsterdam, uit de Vaterlandsche Historien opge-
helderd (The true Daylight of the PoUtical System of the Admini
stration of Amsterdam, explained from the History of the Country).
' For instance : —
C. P., Le Voici of Pourtrait en Byzonderheeden, aangaande den
Politiek-Vertoog-Schrijver Hijklof Michael van Goens (Behold him,
or portrait and peculiarities concerning Rijklof Michael van Goens,
the writer of the Politick Vertoog). In this pamphlet van Goens
was called a traitor.
C. P., Supplement de Le Voici, etc. This was a continuation of
the foregoing pamphlet.
Brieven van Candidus, Betreffende den Schrijver en inhoud van
zeker Geschrift, getiteld: Politick Vertoog, etc. (Letters by Candi
dus, concerning writer and contents of a certain pamphlet entitled,
etc.). 'Rechtsgeleerde Memorie, waarin onzijdig onderzogt word de ge-
grondheit der Klagten, etc. (Judicial Memorial, in which is im
partially examined the justice of the complaints of the King of
Great Britain, etc.).

35 1] United Provinces in War with England. 173
justified in asking the punishment of the burgomasters and
pensionary of Amsterdam. Nicolaus Bondt repUed with a
vigorous pamphlet, including also remarks in refutation of
Goens' " Politick Vertoog," without however producing any
new ideas about the latter.^ Even in England pamphlets
appeared in defense of the course taken by Great Britain
against the Netherlands. "L'Esprit du Sisteme Politique
de la Regence d'Amsterdam, etc." (Spirit of the Political
System of the Administration of Amsterdam) is an ex-
emple. These pamphlets were translated into Dutch and
distributed over the United Provinces.^
' De Eer der Regeering van Amsterdam verdedigt, etc. (Defence of
the Honor of the Administration of Amsterdam).
'The title in Dutch was: De Geest van het Politick Systema van
de Regeering van Amsterdam, etc.
Only a few of the immense number of pamphlets which were
published on the occasion of the breach between the United Prov
inces and England have been mentioned here in order to show, from
the tone of the more important of them, their influence upon the
events under consideration. The PubUc Library in New York City
possesses a large and interesting collection of these pamphlets, the
examination of which would form a study in itself, for which the
author neither had the time, nor thought it expedient for the present
purposes. Many of them seem to be rather absurd, written by in
competent and irresponsible persons.
Regarding the Dutch newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets see
also Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 395-405.

CHAPTER VII.
The United Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies.
In Great Britain many voices were heard severely criti
cizing the government for breaking with the United Prov
inces. In the British Parliament the subject was taken up
by the opposition with enthusiasm.^ The States (General,
notwithstanding that the indignation of the Dutch at the
attitude of the English cabinet was strong and general, were
slow even in finding an answer to the complaints of Great
Britain, not to speak of active measures. About the middle
of Febraary, 1781, the pro-vincial States of Utrecht ex
pressed their surprise at such inactivity, bringing the matter
to a discussion in a secret session of the States (ieneral,^
but it was almost the middle of Alarch before a decision was
reached. A declaration of the general govemment was
then published and transmitted to every court.'
In this counter-manifesto the imputations of the English
king were repudiated in a detailed recapitulation of the rela
tions between the two countries since the beginning of the
American Revolution. It was vigoroush- asserted that the
United Provinces had remained neutral throughout the con
test. They had prohibited the exportation of military stores
to the English colonies in America and instructed all Dutch
governors and commanders to refrain from acts which might
be interpreted as involving an acknowledgment of Amer
ican independence. The governor of St. Eustatia was
called to account when accused of having violated these
'Debate in the House of Lords on the King's message relative to
the rupture with Holland, January 25. 1781 (Hansard. Parliamentary
History, XXI, 998-1103; Andrews, History of the War, IV, 119, 125;
Fitzmaurice, Shelburne, III, 109-119).
' Secret Resolutions of the States General, February 16, 1781
(Sparks MSS., CIII).
'Secret Resolutions of the States General, March 12. 1781 (Ban
croft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
174

353] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 175
orders. After the beginning of the Franco-English war,
the British ports were filled with Dutch ships, taken and
retained by England, although those vessels carried only
goods which the treaties declared free. All their remon
strances regarding this breach of treaty had been of no
avail. Even the Dutch flag had not been respected by Eng
land, as the Fielding-Bylandt incident showed. Neutral
territory of the United Provinces, both in Europe and in
America, had been repeatedly violated by Great Britain,
especially the island of St. Martin in the West Indies,^ for
which offence not the slightest satisfaction had been offered.
As Dutch commerce and navigation was thus in danger of
being annihilated, the United Provinces acceded to the
Armed Neutrality.
Explanations were also given in the counter-manifesto
as to why the Dutch had not furnished assistance to Eng
land, and why John Paul Jones had been tolerated in Dutch
waters. Subsidies were not given because the United Prov
inces did not find that their treaties with Great Britain com
pelled them to do so, and no hostile action had been taken
by the Dutch authorities against the American sea-captain
because existing regulations prevented the States General
' The governor of St. Eustatia reported, on August 12, 1780, the
following incident, brought to his knowledge by a letter which he
had received from the secretary of St. Martin, dated August 9,
1780 :—
On August 9, 1780, an English squadron belonging to Admiral
J. B. Rodney's fleet and consisting of one ship of the line and six
frigates under the command of Captain Robinson anchored at St.
Martin. Two of the officers visited the commander of that island,
informing him that the squadron was charged to seize all North
American vessels and their cargoes that might be found in the
waters of the island. The comraander's remonstrances against such
hostile procedure were without avail. The island being literally
defenceless, the English squadron found no further resistance in
carrying out its orders. No harm was done to the inhabitants of
St. Martin. Part of the squadron, on August 11, called also at St
Eustatia. The American vessels, however, which had happened to
be there had left as soon as the incident at St. Martin became
known, and the English vessels departed without hostilities.
Missive van Representant en Bewindhebberen der Westindische
Compagnie, etc., October 10, 1780 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Nieuwe
Nederlandsche Jaerboeken, 1780, p. 982: Resolution of the States
General, November 20, 1780 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; De Jonge, Ge
schiedenis, IV, 436.

176 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [354
from passing judgment upon his conduct before his arrival
at the Texel. Moreover, the interests of the Republic did
not make it desirable for her to meddle in a contest in which
she was not obliged to take part. As to the draft treaty,
found with Laurens, and the controversy to which it gave
rise, the States General had disavowed the act, agreeably
to the English desire, but they could not pronounce punish
ment upon the culprits because, according to the constitution
of the United Provinces, this was not within their jurisdic
tion, but belonged to the province of HoUand. FinaUy,
George III had tried every means to prevent the accession
of the United Provinces to the Armed Neutrality, and in
reality the admission of the Republic to the northern league
should be considered the cause of England's wrath.^
What made this counter-manifesto most remarkable was
its publication at a time when Catherine II of Russia had
just offered her services to the two countries for mediation
in the interest of a peaceable adjustment of their mutual
grievances.^ However, many people in the United Prov
inces did not regret the rupture with England, but regarded
war as a lesser evil than the continuance of the humUia
tions which the Republic had been suffering at the hands
of Great Britain. They hoped that a future peace would
' Counter-Manifesto of the States General. IMarch 12, 1781 (Sparks
Dutch Papers; Gazette de Leyde, Xo. XXIII, March 20, 1781;
Davies, History of Holland, III, 465).
'John Adams to the President of Congress, March 18, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 306-313).
It seems that John Adams misunderstood the situation when,
a few days previous, he wrote the following : " They [the Dutch]
are furious for peace. Multitudes are for peace with England at
any rate, even at the expense and risk of joining them in the war
against France, Spain, America, and all the rest. They are in a
torpor, a stupor such as I never saw any people in before, but they
cannot obtain peace with England on any other terms than join
ing her in the war, and this they will not, because they cannot
do. I sometimes think that their affections would lead them to do
it if they dared" (J. Adams to Dana, March 12, 1781, in Wharton,
IV, 285). The many aggressions of England had little by little
estranged most of her friends in the United Provinces, while the
followers of France had increased correspondingly. There can
not have existed much affection for England in the United Prov
inces at this time.

355] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 177
render their country free and independent of foreign in
fluences.^ The States General trusted that the northern powers
would come to the assistance of the United Provinces. The
Dutch plenipotentiaries at St. Petersburg and the envoys,
van Lijnden at Stockholm and Bosc de la Calmette at
Copenhagen, received instructions to present notes to
that effect to the courts to which they were accredited.
They were to express the confidence of the States Gen
eral in the power, magnanimity and fidelity of their allies.
The Dutch government had hesitated to join the alliance
but had been justified in so doing since England's con
duct toward the Republic had changed from the minute
the intention became known in Great Britain. It was evi
dent that the accession of the Republic to the Armed Neu
trality was the real cause of the rupture between the two
countries, and the States General hoped that their allies
would make common cause with them. This was necessary
because the Dutch navy was not in a condition to cope with
that of England. This was due to the employment of such
vast numbers of seamen in private bottoms that crews for
war vessels were wanting. Prompt and efficient help was
urged, especially by furnishing armed vessels to the United
Provinces in excess of the ships which the allies had destined
for the common defence.^
Frederick the Great felt so sure that Catherine would not
abandon the United Provinces, but support them efficiently,
that he thought he might safely guarantee such an attitude
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, January 12, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Resolution of the States General, January 12, 1781 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
Thulemeier reported that the States General had dispatched a
courier to Copenhagen, Stockholm, and St. Petersburg, since they
intended to demand the fulfilment of the obligations contracted in
articles 6, 7, and 8 of the maritime convention (Thulemeier to
Frederick II, January 16, 1781, in Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
HoUand). See also Dumas' letter to the President of Congress, January 23,
1781 (Wharton, IV, 200).
12

178 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [356
of the empress.^ Harris in St. Petersburg was of a dif
ferent opinion. He, too, thought that Catherine would fulfil
the obligations contracted by the convention of the Armed
Neutrality, but that the States General could not claim any
assistance from her, since the rupture between Great Britain
and the United Provinces had no reference to that act.^
From dispatches of Count Goertz, the Prussian envoy at St.
Petersburg, we learn that the Russian government was much
annoyed at the outbreak of war and greatly embarrassed
regarding the course to be taken. At the same time, a side
light is thrown uj)on the spirit in which Frederick received
the news of the rupture between the two countries. " Be
cause the English want war with all the world, they wUl
have it ! " he exclaimed, and showed the strongest marks of
anger and disappointment. Panin, the Russian minister,
also was shocked and confessed that he would never have
thought England capable of this act. When asked whether
Russia would be obliged to render assistance to her new
ally, he answered evasively and seemed to be greatly em
barrassed. A decision on this subject would be reached
when the sentiments of the courts of Denmark and Sweden
became known. It was understood, furthermore, that the
empress had written to Frederick the Great about the diffi
culty in which she was placed by Great Britain and had
asked him if Prussia would take sides with her, in case
Russia should be drawn into war when aiding her ally.'
Catherine seems to have soon made up her mind how to
proceed in the matter. The British minister at St. Peters
burg wrote at the beginning of March that the empress re
mained firm in her resolution to exclude the United Prov
inces from the protection which the maritime league would
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, February 5, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Harris to Stormont, February 2/13, 1781 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 38s).
'Elliot to Stormont, February, 1781 (Malmesbury, Correspond
ence, I, 383). The English minister told Lord Stormont that these
informations were confidentially given to him by a person who had
perused Count Goertz's last dispatches.

357] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 179
have afforded them, if they had remained neutral. Beyond
assisting the Republic with her good offices, the Dutch am
bassadors were to be told that she could do nothing in the
present situation.^ Harris even urged the Russian govern
ment to have examined the instructions which were issued
to the Russian sea commanders, "lest either wilfully or
inadvertently their orders for protection should be extended
to the Dutch ships." The Russian minister at the Hague
learned that in Catherine's opinion the Dutch demand for
assistance was premature.^ Panin answered the Dutch
plenipotentiaries that the United Provinces need not regret
having joined the maritime league, but that they must make
efforts themselves and not fall asleep. As the Republic was
mostly concerned she ought to put herself in a position to
effect her own defence, in order to repulse the enemy and to
pursue the war with success.'
The United Provinces, however, were hopelessly torn by
inner political and party strifes, and even now, in the hour
of danger, little or no exertion was made for the safety of
the Republic. The situation is vividly described by a letter
of John Adams which he wrote in March from Leyden: —
" The nation has indeed been in a violent fermentation and crisis.
It is divided in sentiments. There are stadtholderians and re
publicans; there are proprietors in English funds, and persons
immediately engaged in commerce; there are enthusiasts for peace
and alliance with England; and there are advocates for an al
liance with France, Spain, and America; and there are a third
sort, who are for adhering in all things to Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark. Some are for acknowledging Araerican independence,
and entering into treaties of commerce and aUiance with her;
others start at the idea with horror, as an everlasting impediment
to the return to the friendship and alliance with England ; some
will not augment the navy without increasing the army; others
will let the navy be neglected rather than augment the army.
" In this perfect chaos of sentiments and systems, principles and
interests, it is no wonder there is languor, a weakness, and irresolu
tion that is vastly dangerous in the present circumstances of affairs.
The danger lies not more in the hostile designs and exertions of the
English than from seditions and commotions araong the people,
'Harris to Stormont, February 26/March 9, 1781 (Malmesbury,
Correspondence, I, 391).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 9, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Same to same, March 13, 1781 (ibid.).

i8o Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [358
which are every day dreaded and expected. If it were not for a
standing army, and troops posted about in several cities, it is prob
able there would have been popular tumults before now; but every
body that I see appears to me to live in constant fear of mobs, and
in a great degree of uncertainty whether they will rise in favor of
war or against it ; in favor of England or against it ; in favor of the
prince or of the city of Amsterdam; in favor of America or
against it."'
Frederick the Great was very indignant at the inactivity of
the RepubUc, which he said should rather becaUed indolence.
It was unpardonable to reduce the naval armament to six
vessels when it should consist of twenty-one.^ The state of
the Dutch navy, in fact, was most deplorable, and what was
worse, there was no hope of having it rebuilt very soon.'
All Europe was surprised at the idleness of the Dutch, and
public opinion gradually turned against them. The Prus
sian king thought the English party and the Duke of Bruns
wick responsible for this pusiUanimity, which thwarted the
best intentions of the government.*
During all this time while the Dutch contented themselves
with quarreling as to whether the navy or army" should be
increased, or whether the Duke of Brunswick or the Prince
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, March 19, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 314).
Great dissatisfaction was reported from Zealand and Friesland.
They demanded peace with England on any condition, and even
threatened to withdraw from the union (Thulemeier to Frederick
II, May 8, 1781, in Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Reso
lution of the States General, January 22, 1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
On the situation see also Adams' letters of May 16 and 24,
1781 (Wharton, IV, 420, 431-433).
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, May 7 and 10, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, May 27, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 448-451).
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, June 18, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' It may be mentioned here that petty German sovereigns offered
their services to the United Provinces as they had done to Great
Britain. The Prussian envoy at the Hague reported that the
Duke of Wiirttemberg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, and
the Prince Bishop of Fulda had proposed to the States General
a subsidy treaty, by which they would be obliged to furnish a
certain number of troops to the United Provinces during the war
with England (Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 23, 1781, in
Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland).

359] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. i8i
of Orange himself was to blame for the pitiful position,^ the
English had been intensely active. They succeeded in mak
ing the North Sea and Baltic so unsafe for Dutch naviga
tion that, in 1781, only eleven of their ships sailed through
the Sound, whUe in 1780 about 2058 had passed there.^ StiU
they were not satisfied, and looked about for further
methods of hostility.
Before the beginning of the war the British government
had asked Yorke's advice as to the best means for striking
the Republic violently. They thought of destroying the
Dutch navy and arsenals at home, but the ambassador dis
suaded them from such a step because the shallowness of the
coast rendered the Texel, where most of the naval craft
of the United Provinces was stationed, and still more the
inland waters comparatively secure against an attack.
Furthermore it was to be feared that the English name
would be hated in the Republic for centuries if the war
should be carried into the heart of the country.' It would
be much more effective to blockade the ports, seize as many
as possible of the vessels of the Republic in the open sea
and attack her especially in the West Indies, where immedi
ate action should be taken because the West Indian posses
sions were her gold-mine for the moment, employing the
greatest number of Dutch citizens. Yorke recommended
the temporary capture of St. Eustatia, in order to cut off
the intercourse between Amsterdam and the American
rebels. According to rumor, ten or eleven men-of-war were
preparing to sail for the West Indies, three of which would
remain at St. Eustatia, while the rest were to be dispersed
among the other possessions. It would be wise to strike the
blow before those vessels should arrive.*
'Many thought that the Republic was approaching destruction,
and that it would be wise to sell all private property, because it
would in less than ten years lose more than half its value (Thues-
sink to van der Capellen, in Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen,
260). ' Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 300.
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 190.
'Yorke to Stormont, November 7, 1780 (Sparks MSS., LXXII).

1 82 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [360
The English cabinet seems to have agreed with Yorke,
since George III at the same time that he issued his mani
festo, had instructed Admiral Rodney to attack and seize
the Dutch possessions in the West Indies. St. Eustatia and
St. Martin were to be taken first, since it was thought that
large quantities of provisions and other stores were there or
upon their way thither. Major-General Vaughan was to
assist in the invasion of the islands.^ Rodney, who was in
American waters with his squadron, received this order on
January 27 and, assisted by General Vaughan, embarked the
English troops immediately, saUing from St. Lucia in the
Lesser Antilles on January 30. They arrived at St. Eu
statia on February 3, occupying the island and seizing the
Dutch man-of-war "Mars," commanded by Captain Bylandt,
together with more than 150 vessels of all descriptions, in
cluding five American armed ships. Rodney informed the
admiralty in London that all the magazines and storehouses
'George Ill's order to Rodney, December 20, 1780 (Rodney,
Letters from Sir George Brydges, now Lord Rodney, to His
Majesty's Ministers, s).
Rodney's conduct relative to the capture of St. Eustatia was
later severely criticized, and he had his correspondence published
in order to show " that his Views were invariably directed,
during the whole Period of his Command, to the Advanceraent
of the Public Service, and the Glory and Prosperity of his Country."
There were even officers in the English navy who were discon
tented with Rodney's conduct in the St. Eustatia affair from the be
ginning (Captain W. Young to Middleton, St. Eustatia, March 3,
1781, in Laughton, Letters and Papers of Charles, Lord Barham,
I, 95; Middleton's memorandum, ibid., 97 ff.).
In regard to the date of Rodney's orders there seems to be a-
discrepancy. Reports from St. Pierre, Martinique, dated Feb
ruary 15, 1781, stated that the frigate which brought the direc
tions to Admiral Rodney when at St. Lucia to commence hos
tilities against Holland had an extraordinarily short passage, his
letters being dated the 6th of January (Papers of the Continental
Congress, Letters of W. Bingham, J. Parsons, No. 90, Vol. I, 339,
in the archives of the Department of State, Washington).
Instructions, similar to those sent to Rodney relative to the
West Indies, were sent to the East Indies (Mahan, Influence of
Sea Power, 406). But it was the Dutch West Indian possessions
which England wanted to strike first, because of the assistance
they were giving to the United States of America and France.
Besides, there were only a few English men-of-war in the East
Indies, while Admiral Rodney with his fleet was already in West
Indian waters (Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 191).

361] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 183
at St. Eustatia were filled and even the beach had been found
covered with tobacco and sugar. All of this he would ship
to England on board the vessels taken in the bay. He re
ported also that the Dutch islands of St. Martin and Saba
had surrendered.^ There were, however, very few vessels
there.- Rodney then directed Sir Samuel Hood with a squadron
to attack Curagao; Rear-Admiral Drake, to seize Surinam;
while some frigates were to blockade the mouths of the
rivers Demerari and Essequibo.' A Dutch convoy of
twenty-six merchant vessels, which had sailed from St.
Eustatia the night before Rodney's arrival, was captured by
Captain Reynolds of Rodney's squadron and taken back to
St. Eustatia. The Dutch Vice-Admiral Crul was killed in
the action.* By not hauling down the Dutch flag at St.
Eustatia for some days, Rodney caught several more mer
chant vessels entering the road of the island in good faith."
Samuel Parsons at St. Pierre, Martinique, on learning of the
capture of St. Eustatia by the English, bought the fastest
vessel in the harbor to convey the news to the United States,
in order to prevent American vessels from going to St.
Eustatia.® More than 2000 American merchants and sea
men feU into Rodney's hands at St. Eustatia.' He was de-
' Rodney to Philip Stephens, Secretary of the Admiralty, St.
Eustatia, February 4, 1781 (Rodneys Letters, 7) ; Gazette de Leyde,
No. XXIV, March 23, 1781 ; De Jonge, Geschiedenis, IV, 462.
Captain Count Bylandt's report to the stadtholder regarding
the loss of the Dutch frigate " Mars," February 6, 1781 (Gazette
de Leyde, Supplement, ilarch 27, 1781).
'Captain W. Young to Middleton, St. Eustatia, February 3, 1781
(Laughton, Barbara's Letters, I, 91).
'Rodney to Stephens, February 6, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 11).
'Van Beverhoudt to van der Capellen, St. Thomas, Februarv
21, 1781 (Beaufort, Brieven van der CapeUen, 239). Tegelaar to
van der CapeUen, Amsterdam, March 21, 1781 (ibid., 226).
'Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 299; Major-General
Vaughan to Lord George Germain, St. Eustatia, February 7, 1781
(Remembrancer, or Impartial Repository of Public Events, Part I,
Vol. XL 261).
'Samuel Parsons to the Committee for Foreign Affairs, St.
Pierre, Martinique, February 15, 1781 (Papers of the Continental
Congress, Letters of Bingham and Parsons, No. 90, Vol. I, 339).
'Rodney to Stephens, February 10, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 13).

184 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [362
termined to remain at the island untU all the stores captured
should be embarked, and " till the Lower Town, that Nest
of Vipers, which preyed upon the Vitals of Great Britain be
destroyed."^ The Jews especiaUy were made to feel his wrath. They
were forced to give up all the cash and goods which they
possessed, and were driven from the island,^ but the persecu
tion was not confined to the Hebrew race. Rodney ordered
all Americans, without exception and distinction, to leave
St. Eustatia, which fate was subsequently shared by aU
Frenchmen and also by all citizens of Amsterdam residing
on the island. By a final proclamation the British admiral
informed all foreigners of every kind that they must depart,
aUowing only the settled inhabitants of St. Eustatia to re
main. Even English citizens engaged in commerce at the
island were not spared, their goods being confiscated, though
British merchants were allowed by special acts of Parlia
ment (the Grenada Act, the Tobacco Act and the Cotton
Act) to trade with St. Eustatia. Rodney gave as a reason
for his proceedings that those Englishmen were supplying
the enemies of their country.
All remonstrances, in which even the legislature of the
island of St. Christopher took part, against Rodney's be
havior were in vain. He shipped the stores which he had
seized, partly to the British islands in the West Indies,
partly to Great Britain, and the rest he sold at public auc
tion.' The reproach was soon made to him that he com
mitted the same crime for which he pretended to punish the
people of St. Eustatia, in that he also supplied the enemies
of Great Britain. The stores, sold at auction, were pur-
' Rodney to General Cunningham, Governor of Barbados, Feb
ruary 17, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 17).
' Van Beverhoudt to van der Capellen, St. Thomas, February 21,
1781 (Beaufort, Brieven van der CapeUen, 239).
Rodney's own almost boasting account of his treatment of the
inhabitants of St. Eustatia is to be found in a letter to Stephens,
dated St. Eustatia, March 6, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 29-31).
' " As for the other goods . . they were sold sub hasta. The
island ... becarne one of the greatest auctions that ever was
opened in the universe" (Hannay, Rodney, 155).

363] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 185
chased by the neighboring neutral islands, from which they
found their way to America and the French settlements.
At the auctions only about one fourth of the value of the
merchandise was realized, so that the enemies of Great
Britain were supplied by the English government at much
lower rates than by the Dutch.^
One Dutch man-of-war, the frigate " Eendragt," had
been detached by Rear-Admiral Count van Bylandt on
January 29, 1781, to sail for the West Indies. When on
March 18 it reached the river Berbice, Captain A. de Roock
sent Lieutenant Zeegers with an armed sloop to the governor
of the Dutch colony. The lieutenant found the fortress
burnt down and completely ruined. He then proceeded
further up the river, where he met the director of the planta
tion " Ithaca," G. Hobus, who told him that, on March 7
or 8, letters had arrived from Demerari and Essequibo
announcing the capture of those colonies by the English.^
On the following day, Hobus said, a British war vessel of
36 cannon took Berbice, the crew putting the ammunition of
the fortress on board and throwing everything else into the
river. They then set fire to the fortress and loaded four
ships, which they had taken in the river, with the products
of the farm. Captain Roock did not consider his forces
strong enough to retake and hold Berbice, so he sailed for
the French island Grenada, where (jovemor Count de Durat
informed him of the details of the seizure of St. Eustatia
by Rodney. While Roock was at Grenada, a French ship
arriving from Martinique brought the news that Rodney had
sailed with his fleet from St. Lucia leaving about 1000
troops at St. Eustatia.' The English admiral's task on the
'Debate in the British ParUament on Mr. Burke's motion re
lating to the seizure and confiscation of private property in the
island of St. Eustatia, May 14, 1781 (Hansard, Parliamentary His
tory, xxn, 219-257).
Burke's speech on this occasion is remarkable for its force and
beauty, though scarcely exaggerating the facts.
' It was also said that St. Eustatia and Curagao were occupied by
the English. Curagao, however, was successfully defended against
the British and remained Dutch (Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 383).
' Report of Captain A. de Roock of the frigate " Eendragt " to the

1 86 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [364
latter island had been completed. After its capture and
devastation he had continued using it as a trap for catching
Americans. On March 29, he wrote from St. Eustatia to
WiUiam Baird^ that fifty American vessels had been taken
and that their crews would be sent to England." The
island had then been in the possession of the English for
about two months, but it seemed that the fact was not yet
sufficiently known in the United States, for almost daUy
American vessels loaded with tobacco would approach St.
Eustatia and fall an easy prey to the British forces.'
When the capture of nearly all of their West Indian
possessions became known in the United Provinces it caused
much consternation. Amsterdam's losses at St. Eustatia
were enormous, and consequently the big city was deeply
affected by this severe blow so promptly dealt by England.
" The merchants of Amsterdam," wrote the American agent
at the Hague, " who have a great share in the effects seized
on at St. Eustatia, having resolved to send deputies to the
English ministry in order to have them restored to them,
and having invited the merchants of Rotterdam to join with
them in this deputation, the latter have answered that, with
men capable of acting so ruffianlike, they would rather let
them keep all that they had robbed than debase themselves
by courting the robbers. This noble answer would be stUl
more so if Rotterdam had lost as much at St. Eustatia as
Amsterdam ; there being as for that a very great difference."*
Prince of Orange, June 24, 1781, and report of Lieutenant J. B.
Zeegers to A. de Roock, March 18, 1781 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
The surrender to the English of the two Dutch colonies of
Demerari and Essequibo was reported by Rodney to Stephens on
March 17, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 37).
Davies (History of Holland, VIII, 469, 470) says that Demerari,
Berbice, and Essequibo were deliyered up to the English with a
pusillanimity which not even their insufficient state of defence could
excuse. ' Baird had belonged to the English Council of the Government of
New York.
'Rodney's Letters, 56; Gazette de Leyde, No. XXXIV, April 27,
1781. 'Rodney to General Cunningham, Governor of Barbados, March
31, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 57).
' Dumas to the President of Congress, AprU 2, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 323).

365] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 187
Of what immense importance St. Eustatia had been to the
American cause was recognized by the English to its fullest
extent after they occupied the island. Rodney himself de
clared that had it not been for the " infamous island of St.
Eustatia," the American rebellion could not possibly have
subsisted.'- The American agents and other people dealing
or connected with the Congress of the United States who
were taken prisoners at St. Eustatia were sent to England
and subjected to hard treatment there. FrankUn in Paris
received instructions to pay particular attention to the ex
change of these prisoners of war.^
Rodney and his country were to enjoy but little of the
spoils taken at St. Eustatia! The admiral had dispatched
thirty-four of the vessels, taken by him at that island and
laden with valuable goods seized there, under the convoy of
two English men-of-war to Great Britain. In the Channel
this fleet was met by a French squadron under Vice-Ad
miral de la Motte-Piquet. He captured twenty-two of the
Dutch merchant vessels and brought them into Brest.' The
'Rodney to Rear Admiral Sir Peter Parker, St. Eustatia, April
16, 1781 (Rodney's Letters, 69).
According to the English admiral, the business district of St.
Eustatia, or Lower Town, was a range of storehouses of about a
mile and a quarter in length. These stores were rented at the
enormous sum of twelve hundred thousand pounds sterling a year
(Rodney to Stephens, April 27, 1781, in Rodney's Letters, 75).
It is evident what an immense business must have been done at
St. Eustatia when during the last stages of the American Revolu
tion trading with the Americans and French allowed the paying of
such exorbitant rents.
'James LoveU (for the Committee of Foreign Affairs) to Frank
lin, May 9, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 405, 406).
The prisoners mentioned in this letter were Mr. Samuel Curson,
Mr. Isaac Gouverneur, Jr., and Dr. John Witherspoon, Jr.
Among the Dutch prisoners whom Rodney sent to England from
St. Eustatia was the governor of the island, de Graaf. The latter's
plantations were confiscated in the name of the king of England,
"pour se venger de la faveur que ce Gouverneur a accordee selon
les idees du Ministere Anglois au Commerce de VAmerique-Septen-
trionale" (Gazette de Leyde, No. XXXIV, AprU 27, 1781).
'Berkenrode to the States General, May 13, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
America, Holland, and England).
Captain W. Young had advised Rodney to direct the route of the
convoy and to inform Lord Sandwich where English cruisers might
meet them in European waters, since the immense riches carried by

1 88 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [366
remaining twelve, according to a letter from Franklin, were
soon afterwards taken by French and American privateers,
so that not one ship of the convoy arrived in England.^ St.
Eustatia also was soon lost to the EngUsh. Rodney's Ul
health compelled him to leave for England, sailing on Au
gust I, 1 781. He had ordered the island always to be pro
tected by several frigates and to have the large sum of
money, still at St. Eustatia, sent in Rear-Admiral Hood's
squadron to North America for the payment of the British
troops there. For some reason or other these orders were
not executed."
In the meantime a French fleet of about four hundred
saU, amongst which were said to be about thirty vessels of
the line,' arrived in West Indian waters under the command
of Count de Grasse. He was met by the general and com
mander of Martinique, Marquis de Bouille, with about 1200
troops on board of three frigates, one sloop, and one brig.
An expedition was then led by Bouille to St. Eustatia,
the fleet called for protection (Captain Young to Middleton, in
Laughton, Barbara's Letters, 94).
It seems that either Rodney did not follow Young's advice, or
that the cruisers which were to meet the fleet missed them.
De la Motte-Piquet's capture of the convoy under Hotham raised
the spirits of the Dutch " from that unmanly gloom and despond
ency into which they were thrown by the capture of St. Eustatia,
Demerara, and Essequibo " (J. Adams to the President of Congress,
May 16, 1781, in Wharton, IV, 419).
'Franklin to J. Adaras, May 19, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 423).
John Adams thought that the capture of St. Eustatia was the most
complete blunder the English had committed during the war because
the island was the channel through which British manufactures were
carried to North America, and it had furnished provisions and assis
tance to the English fleets and armies in the West Indies. As the
British merchants were permitted by an act of ParUament to trade
with St. Eustatia, all who had suffered by its capture were clamoring
against the British government and especially against Rodney and
Vaughan for illegally seizing their property. "These commanders
were threatened with as many law-suits as there were losers (J.
Adams to the President of Congress, May 29, 1781, in Wharton, IV,
460-461) ; Andrews, History of the War, IV, 126.
In fact, Rodney was subsequently compelled to pay back all he
had gained at St. Eustatia and died a poor man (Hannay, Rodney,
156). 'Rodney's Letters, 84.
' Samuel Parsons to Committee for Foreign Affairs, St. Pierre,
Martinique, March 18, 1781 (Papers of the Continental Congress,
Letters of W. Bingham, j. Parsons, No. 90, Vol. I, 343).

367] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 189
which place was reached in the night of November 26. The
island was garrisoned by 650 British troops, commanded by
Colonel Cockburn. Bouille was prevented from landing
more than 500 men, the sea running high. Of the events
which followed this realistic description is given: —
" They [the French] concealed themselves among the Canes, till
the Hour at which the Gates of the Fort were usually opened. In
the Instant that the Troops came out to perform their Exercise on
the Savanna, the Marquis caused the whole of his little army to
discharge their Musquets in the air and rush with their Bayonets on
the Enemy. It is impossible to conceive the confusion into which
this well concerted Stratagem threw the British tho' much superior
in Number and in actual position of Battle. Some called for
Quarter and others took to their Heels, endeavouring to regain the
Fort, which the French took possession of without opposition."'
Two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling in cash
feU into the hands of the French," so that no financial profit
at all was derived by the English from their conquest of St.
Eustatia. The island, however, had lost its importance.
It no longer proved the mere nourriciere, either for the
United States or for the French,' falling back into its former
insignificance, never to rise again up to the present day.
The trade which had been carried on by way of St. Eustatia
henceforth favored the Danish island of St. Thomas in the
Lesser AntUles.*
' Satnuel Parsons to Committee for Foreign Affairs, St. Pierre,
Martinique, December 31, 1781 (Papers of the Continental Congress,
Letters of W. Bingham, J. Parsons, No. 90, Vol. I, 331).
The writer dated his letter correctly, at the end, December 31,
1781 ; at its head it is marked, however, December 31, 1780. This
error seems not to have been detected when the letters were
arranged in volumes, and this manuscript is consequently inserted in
the wrong place.
France kept St. Eustatia as Dutch property for the Republic, not
as a French conquest (Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 300).
'Rodney's Letters, 84.
'Hunt to Middleton, March 17, 1782 (Laughton, Barbara's Let
ters, 149).
When Rodney returned to the West Indies in February, 1782, he
learned that the French had not only taken St. Eustatia, but also
the British islands of St. Christopher, Nevis, and Montserrat (Fitz
maurice, Shelburne, III, 125). Soon, however, the "tide of war"
became again favorable to England, and " her flag was triumphant
in every Part of the West Indies " until the conclusion of peace
(Rodney's Letters, 175; Wharton, IV, 323).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 191.

190 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [368
In the East Indies the English at Madras, when learn
ing of the rupture between Great Britain and the United
Provinces, fitted out an expedition against the principal
Dutch settlement on Coromandel coast, the town and harbor
of Negapatam. An Indian prince, Hyder-Ali, being hostUe
to the English, there was danger that he and the French,
with whom he was allied, would make common cause with
the Dutch and use Negapatam as a place of arms. The
command of the expedUion was entrusted to Sir Hector
Munro. The English garrisons were much reduced, their
main forces being in the field against Hyder-Ali, and
Munro's detachment, therefore, was comparatively small.
Negapatam, on the other hand, was strongly fortified,
and, besides, had been reinforced by Hyder-Ali, who
foresaw the English attack. Negapatam was thus de
fended by more than 8000 men, while the English num
bered about 5000; nevertheless after a siege of five
days the town surrendered. Everything belonging to the
Dutch government and the Dutch East India Company had
to be delivered to the British.^ With Negapatam the other
Dutch possessions fell into the hands of the EngUsh and
also the important harbor of Trinconomale on the island of
Ceylon. These events in the East Indies took place on
November 12, 1781, and January 15, 1782, respectively.
Another possession of the Dutch, the Cape of Good Hope,
was in danger of being taken by the British Captain John
stone and his ships. It was saved only by the active inter
vention of the French, Admiral Suffren covering the Cape
with a squadron." Trinconomale, on September i, 1782,
was retaken from the English by Suffren, but Negapatam
remained lost.'
' Andrews, History of the War, IV, 239, 240.
The English author concluded : " The reduction of Negapatam
completed the revolution that had begun to take place in the southern
provinces on the coast of Coromandel. It not only restored the
power and influence of the [English] East India Company in those
parts, but it raised the reputation and dread of the British arms
higher than ever."
' Davies, History of Holland, III, 470 ; Kampen, Verkorte Ge
schiedenis, II, 300; De Jonge, Geschiedenis, IV, 470.
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 195.

369] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 191
The Dutch at home were startled when they learned the
fate of their colonies. It was impossible to render assist
ance, for the United Provinces had only fifty war vessels
which could be considered serviceable, whUe the construc
tion of new ones made little or no progress. There were,
besides, not more than thirty-three vessels in the harbors
at home, while the rest were abroad, and of these only
eleven were ships of the line. With this small force, not
even a convoy to the Baltic was ventured.^ The aspect
became a little brighter when, during the summer, reports
arrived in the United Provinces that an encounter had oc
curred between the Dutch captains Melvill and Oorthuys
and the EngUsh off Gibraltar. Although Melvill had been
compelled to capitulate with his vessel, Oorthuys had not
only saved the man-of-war under his command, but forced
an English ship to haul down her flag.^
A convoy to the Baltic was now decided upon, although
a strong British squadron under Admiral Hyde Parker was
said to be near, and even to have orders to destroy the small
Dutch fleet in the Texel. On August i, 1781, the convoy,
consisting of eight men-of-war, seven frigates, and one
cutter under Rear-Admiral Zoutman, sailed from the Texel
with seventy-two merchantmen.' On Sunday, August 5,
between three and four o'clock in the morning, at the Dog-
gersbank in the North Sea, they met Parker with eleven
EngUsh war vessels and four cutters. The battle began at
eight o'clock, and lasted untU half past eleven. It was fierce
and bloody. Both parties fought as long as their ships
' Urgent requests were made to the States General by ship
owners, freighters, owners of plantations in the West Indies, mer
chants, etc., at Dordrecht, Haarlem, Amsterdam and Rotterdam for
the protection of those Dutch Indian possessions not yet captured by
the English. In case a convoy should not be possible, they asked to
be granted generous contributions for the arming of their own
vessels. This petition was received by the States General on June
7, 1781. It was approved by the Prince of Orange and resulted in a
circular letter of the States General, dated June 20, to all the
provinces recommending an appropriation of 1,200,000 guilders for
the purpose desired (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; J. Adams to the Presi
dent of Congress, June 12, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 495-498).
' Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 302-303.
' Davies, History of Holland, III, 470, 471.

192 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [370
were able to manoeuver. The English withdrew, and soon
afterwards the Dutch also left the scene of the battle to
repair their vessels as weU as they could in order to sail
back to the Texel, which they reached safely. Zoutman
reported that on all vessels officers and men had shown great
courage and had fought like lions.^ According to Parker's
account the Dutch were the first to retire, the British, how
ever, not being able to follow them."
When the news of the battle reached the United Prov
inces, the whole people were frantic for joy over its result.
Van der CapeUen wrote that the Dutch with an inferior
force had put the English admiral, who commanded nine
large vessels, to flight after a most bloody battle, which
lasted for four hours. The courage of the Dutch had been
so great that even those who had lost an arm or a foot
could not be persuaded to leave their posts but insisted on
remaining at the cannon.' After all the humUiations which
the United Provinces had suffered from the hands of Great
Britain this indecisive battle at the Doggersbank was ex
aggerated to a great national feat. John Adams, under the
influence of public enthusiasm at Amsterdam, called the en
counter a "glorious victory" of the Dutch.* The Prince
of Orange, in person, presented Zoutman with a memorial
coin on a golden chain, while King George III, considering
Parker the victor, visited him on board his flagship." There
were, however, a few voices heard in the United Provinces
judging the Doggersbank incident more soberly. They
maintained that the battle could be regarded as a victory
' Rapport van . . . Schout bij Nagt J. A. Zoutman an Zijne Door-
lugtige Hoogheid [Prince of Orange] van de Bataille met een
Engelsch Esquader, August 10, 1781 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, August 18, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 642).
'Van der Capellen to Livingston, August 18, 1781 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 257).
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, August 22, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 649).
' Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 301, 302.
William V of Orange publicly directed an address of thanks to
all who had taken part in the combat on board of the Dutch vessels
(J. Adams to the President of Congress, August 22, 1781, in Whar
ton, IV, 653, 654).

37 1 ] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 193
neither by the one nor by the other party, but that the Eng
lish had succeeded in compelling the Dutch convoy to dis
continue its voyage.^
In the meantime efforts to bring about peace were not
wanting. Ever since the beginning of the war between
Great Britain and the United Provinces attempts had been
made to effect a reconciliation between the two powers.
The Empress of Russia, Catherine II, made it her duty to
try her utmost for such a purpose. At first she considered
a joint mediation with Emperor Joseph II. She informed
France and Spain of her plan, declaring that the mediation
was to include all the belligerents." The prospect of a medi
ation may perhaps have been one of the causes for the inac
tivity displayed by the Dutch, as it seemed that the majority
of the people in the United Provinces did not think the war
would continue long.
Not until the beginning of February were letters of
'Le Politique HoUandais, No. XXX, September 3, 1781.
As a matter of fact, the owners of the mercantile ships which had
returned from the Doggersbank to the Texel later asked for an
indemnification because their vessels were compelled to stay in
harbor, which caused heavy expenses for equipping, wages, monthly
pay, subsistence of crew, etc. (J. Adams to the President of Con
gress, October 18, 1781, in Wharton, IV, 787, 788).
' Harris to Stormont, January 15/26, 1781 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 377).
Catherine's efforts to have Frederick the Great offer his mediation
to the United Provinces failed because the Prussian king, it was
said, did not want to take a share in the quarrel (Elliot to Harris,
February 10, 1781, in Malmesbury, Correspondence, I, 384).
As a fact, however, the king was willing to use his good offices
for the Republic, but he feared that his representations might, in
the beginning at least, be coolly received in England (Frederick II
to Thulemeier, February 12, 1781, in Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
Holland). The project of Frederick's mediation was discussed by
the Prince of Orange, the Grand Pensionary, and Griffier Fagel.
They demanded that Great Britain should not only recognize the
independence of the flag of Dutch merchant vessels, but also the
validity of the treaty of 1674 with the clause of free ships, free
goods (Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 23, 1781, in Bancroft
MSS., Prussia and Holland). The king answered now that the
Republic would obtain her ends more easily and promptly through
Russian mediation. The representations, in order to be effective,
should be made through a maritime power. He would therefore try
to engage Russia to use all her influence in the interests of the
United Provinces (Frederick II to Thulemeier, March I, 1781, in
Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland).
13

194 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [372
marque demanded by a privateer from Rotterdam, while
Amsterdam refused altogether to take them. Vauguyon, in
order to rouse the energy of the Dutch, even offered to fur
nish French letters of marque to their privateers, but he
found no candidates for such favors in the United Prov
inces.^ Nevertheless, strong as their desire for peace may
have been, owing to the consciousness of their utter feeble
ness, the States General unanimously rejected a formal
proposition of the province of Zealand to open direct nego
tiations with the court of St. James."
At the beginning of March Prince Gallitzin, the Russian
ambassador at the Hague, informed the States General con
fidentially that the empress, through Simolin, her minister
in London, had made urgent representations at the court of
St. James for conciliation.' This step was attributed to the
intervention of Frederick the Great at the Russian court.
No results, however, were expected since the principles
adopted by the United Provinces and Great Britain respect
ively regarding the maintenance of the maritime treaty of
1674 were too much opposed.* The court of Vienna, having
solicited the empress for cooperation in bringing about peace
between the belligerents, received the answer that Catherine
was wUling to accept Joseph's cooperation, but that, first, a
reconciliation must be effected between England and the
United Provinces." Frederick the Great thought that Cath
erine's desire to reconcile Great Britain with the United
Provinces was sincere. He had even received information
from St. Petersburg that, in case England should refuse an
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 6, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 9, 1781 (ibid.).
'Diraitri Prince de Gallitzin to the States General, March I,
1781 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Secret Resolution of the States Gen
eral, March i, 1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII; Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England) ; Dumas to the President of Congress,
March 5, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 273) ; J. Adams to the President of
Congress, March 18, 1781 (ibid., IV, 312-313),
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 2, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, March 15, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).

373] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 195
adjustment with the Republic on the basis of the empress'
suggestions, she would, together with her allies, openly take
sides with the United Provinces.^ The latter speedily ac
cepted the mediation offered by Russia, but the English court
hesitated and made difficulties." Lord Stormont, who fa
vored a general peace, was opposed to it.' The British gov
ernment, therefore, answered that a mediation between
England's old enemies, the French and Spaniards, would be
acceptable, but not with regard to the Dutch.* Catherine
was much annoyed at this reply," considering the refusal as
a want of confidence and respect, and attributing it to per
sonal aversion to her.' Her indignation was still noticeable
in the letter by which she informed the States General of
England's attitude and in which she stated that "her com
passionate heart had been affected with the difficulties formed
by the court of London."'
Another effort at mediation was made in July, 1781. This
time Catherine and Joseph agreed to try together to procure
a general pacification between the belligerent powers, and
the States General were sounded by them accordingly. The
United Provinces again were willing to accept. Even the
Patriots advised this course because they apprehended that
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, March 19 and 26, 1781 (Bancroft
MSS., Prussia and HoUand). Catherine was offered every induce
ment by England to draw her away from the United Provinces. A
convention between Great Britain and Russia was suggested and
Minorca set as prize, but the empress refused on the ground that she
would appear to be influenced as mediatrix by one of the belligerents,
if she accepted. Harris gave as a commentary on her answer that
she was longing to obtain Minorca, but that she had not the courage
to subscribe to the means by which it could be had (Harris to
Stormont,' March 13/24, 1781, in Malmesbury, Correspondence, I,
401, 402).
'Dumas to the President of Congress, March 22, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 322, 323) ; Secret Resolution of the States General, March 23,
1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, April 10, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
* Malmesbury, Correspondence, I, 410.
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, April 9, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Harris to Stormont, April 9/20, 1781 (Malmesbury, Correspond
ence, I, 410).
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, June 23, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 513).

196 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [374
otherwise the opposite party might continue to recommend
suing for peace directly with England.^ It was proposed
that an armistice of one year should be signed and that the
United States should be included in this arrangement.
Great Britain declined this plan of mediation also, empha
sizing the fact that she would not accept the intervention of
any power between herself and her colonies.^
In the meantime England tried to negotiate with the
United Provinces directly, mainly in order to satisfy the
opposition in Parliament. On behalf of the British govern
ment, Triquetti, the Sardinian consul at Amsterdam, who
was in English pay, made the following proposition to the
Dutch for an adjustment of the differences between the two
powers. The old treaties were to be renewed, with the ex
ception of that of 1674. The article dealing with naval
munitions was to be changed according to the EngUsh views.
Furthermore satisfaction was to be given for the negotia
tions of Amsterdam with the United States relative to a
commercial treaty. Triquetti's efforts failed. Lord North
then sent Paul Wentworth, proprietor of plantations at Suri
nam, and who had some relations with the United Prov
inces, to Amsterdam to negotiate with Rendorp, one of the
burgomasters of that city. Rendorp demanded indemnity
for all the Dutch ships captured by the English.
The Duke of Brunswick was for a separate peace with
England, but the Grand Pensionary van Bleiswijck, the
Princess of Orange, and also the envoys of France and
Prussia were opposed to the plan, so the negotiations re
mained futile.' England, now feeling sure that it would
not be possible to draw the Republic back to her former ally,
would not have made a third attempt for a separate peace
with the United Provinces, had it not been for two reasons.
The first was that the opposition in Parliament had to be
appeased, and the second that Catherine was once more pro-
' Dumas to the President of Congress, July 4, 1781 (Wharton, IV,
396). ' Malmesbury, Correspondence, I, 433.
° Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 209 ff.

375] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 197
posing a mediation between England and the Republic.^
Harris advised the English king to accept Catherine's pro
posal this time, because a refusal would be liable to operate
very powerfully on her irritable character, and however
potent and conclusive the reasonings might be, they would
carry no conviction to a mind like hers. He even hinted
that Catherine might join in the war against Great Britain."
On September 11, 1781, England accepted Russia's sepa
rate mediation in order to gain Catherine's friendship.'
The latter soon opened negotiations, this time at the Hague,
suggesting that all unnecessary formalities be omitted and
that both parties state their conditions of peace. The terms
would then be compared to see if there was any prospect for
a speedy arrangement.* The States General also accepted
Catherine's offer," although the large cities like Amsterdam
and Rotterdam seemed Uttle disposed toward a separate
peace with England." These proceedings did not please
France. The French ambassador, Vauguyon, asked the
Grand Pensionary that the Republic should not conclude a
separate peace with Great Britain, and said that the King
of France would like to be informed of any step taken by
the United Provinces in that direction. He was answered
that, although the States General knew of no obligation for
bidding them to conclude a separate peace with England,
since there was no alliance, not even a concert with France,
His Majesty the King would be promptly instructed of
everything pertaining to his interests. '^
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 213.
'Harris to Stormont, August 14/25, 1781 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 441).
'Stormont to Harris, September 7, 1781 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 446-447). Regarding the text of Stormont's note to
Simolin, accepting Russia's mediation, see J. Adams to the Presi
dent of Congress, December 13, 1781 (Wharton, V, 43, 44).
' Secret Resolution of the States General, November 26 and 27,
1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII).
'Secret Resolution of the States General, December 18, 1781
(Sparks MSS., CIII; Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, December 4, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' Same to same, December 25, 1781 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
Holland).

198 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [376
In January, 1782, the Empress of Russia dispatched Mar-
koff to the Hague to conduct the negotiations. Before his
departure from St. Petersburg the English envoy, Harris,
tried to influence him favorably toward England, warning
him especially against Vauguyon and the King of Prussia.
Markoff would see the latter while passing through BerUn
on his way to the United Provinces. Harris, according to
his own words, gave Markoff " such intelUgence on the char
acter and disposition of His Prussian Majesty [Frederick
the Great] , as might put him on his guard against His very
persuasive manner, and almost irresistible eloquence,"^
which shows how much the EngUsh apprehended Frederick's
influence in the United Provinces. The kings of Sweden
and Denmark also offered their good offices to Great Britain,
but their mediation was refused."
Dana, the American agent at St. Petersburg, foresaw that
Catherine's last efforts to bring about a separate peace be
tween England and the United Provinces would be as fruit
less as before. In his opinion, which finally proved to be
correct, there could be no peace in Europe separate from
that of the United States, since the latter affected the Euro
pean systems too sensibly to be overlooked.' In the United
Provinces the same view prevailed. "A separate peace with
England," wrote Livingston, "is now impossible without
degrading the character of the nation and exposing it to
greater evils than they are threatened with from England.
Besides, what advantages are to be derived from such a
peace ? Can Britain restore her conquests, now in the hands
of the French? Can she give back the plunder of St.
Eustatia, or the cargoes of the Indiamen divided among the
captors? Can she afford them a compensation for the loss
of last year's commerce? Or can she draw from her ex-
' Harris to Stormont, St. Petersburg, January 7/18, 1782 (Malmes
bury, Correspondence, I, 480-482).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 25, 1781, and
January 16, 1782 (Wharton, V, 70, 71, 114, 115) ; Dana to EUery,
January 17, 1782 (ibid., V, 116) ; Dana to Livingston, Alarch 5,
1782 (ibid., V, 223).
'Dana to EUery, January 17, 1782 (ibid., V, 116).

377] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 199
hausted purse sufficient sums to defend the barrier against
the troops of France, who would certainly avenge herself
for such ingratitude?"^
In March, 1782, the States General formally communi
cated their conditions for a separate peace with England to
the Russian government, which were that the rights of the
Armed Neutrality be saved to them. This meant free navi
gation." England, on the other hand, demanded that the
treaty of 1674 should not be renewed in its old form, thereby
denouncing the principle of free ships, free goods. Further
more, no indemnity for injuries done to Dutch property at
sea was mentioned. As to the Dutch colonies occupied by
the English, uti possidetis was to be the basis of the settle
ment. In addition to this, the United Provinces should be
obliged to expel the American agents from their territory
and to forbid all loans for the United States.'
For the purpose of quieting the opposition in Parliament,
the English government decided again to send Paul Went
worth secretly to the United Provinces in behalf of a sepa
rate peace.* His instructions directed him to find out also
whether, in case of such a peace being brought about, France
was to keep the Cape until a general peace would be con
cluded. England cared for a separate peace with the Re
public only if the French were to abandon the Cape, but
even then the obnoxious article regarding " free ships, free
goods '' would have to be removed from the treaty of 1674.
The Prince of Orange, acting upon Rendorp's advice, in
formed France of England's proposition, adding that the
'Livingston to J. Adams, March S, 1782 (Wharton, V, 220).
' Secret Resolution of the States General, March 4, 1782 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
The States of Holland passed the measure in February, 1782 (J.
Adams to Livingston, February 19, 1782, in Wharton, V, 188).
As early as about the middle of February, 1782, Harris had been
privately informed in St. Petersburg that the acknowledgment by
England of the principles of the Armed NeutraUty would mean
immediate peace with the United Provinces (Harris to Stormont,
February 4/15, 1782, in Malmesbury, Correspondence, I, 483, 484).
' Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 215.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 26, 1782 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).

200 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [378
United Provinces would not make any arrangements con
trary to the principles of the Armed NeutraUty. When
Wentworth arrived at the Hague pretending that his gov
emment had sent him for negotiations on the exchange of
prisoners of war, he was told that the United Provinces
demanded of England free navigation, return of the Dutch
possessions occupied by the British, and an indemnity for
the Dutch losses at sea. This was almost equal to a refusal
of the English offer, and, in fact, Wentworth had to return
to Great Britain without having achieved anything.^
On March 30, 1782, Lord North's cabinet fell. Rocking
ham became prime minister and Fox secretary for foreign
affairs. This meant a complete change in the foreign policy
of Great Britain. One of Fox's first official acts was to
write a letter to the Russian envoy in London in which peace
was offered to the United Provinces on the basis of the
treaty of 1674 and an immediate truce proposed." Harris
was now directed to persuade Catherine to a more active and
efficient negotiation.' Fox's letter to Simolin, dated ^^larch
29, 1782, was transmitted to the States General.* The ques
tion was now, whether the United Provinces would abandon
"France and America, and throw themselves alone upon
the Mercy of England."" In May, Fox renewed his propo
sition to the United Provinces,' but the latter, in the mean
time, had concluded a concert with France for combined
naval action, and were consequently not free to accept Eng
land's offer.'
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 218-220.
'Franklin to Livingston, April 12, 1782 (Wharton, V, 300).
'Fox to Harris, April 2, 1782 (Malmesbury, Correspondence, I,
493-495) ; Harris to Fox, April 19/30, 1782 (ibid., 498-500).
'Memorie, Exhibitum, April 3, 1782 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
°J. Adams to van der Capellen (Beaufort, Brieven van der Capel
len, 278).
'Duraas to Livingston, May 10, 1782 (Wharton. V, 4101 ; Extract,
Secret Resolution of the States of Holland, May 24, 1782 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
Fox's second letter was dated Mav 4, 1782 (Secret Resolution of
the States General, May 13, 1782, in Sparks MSS., CIII).
' Concept-Extensie rait kragt der Resolution commissorial van
15 en 24 Mey 1782. Exhibitum 31 Mey 1782 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
Secret Resolution of the States General, July 17, 1782 (Sparks

379] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 201
On AprU 12, 1782, Admiral Rodney won a tremendous
naval battle in the West Indies, which lasted almost twelve
hours without a moment's intermission. The commander
of the French fleet. Count de Grasse, was taken prisoner
and his flagship, with four other ships of the line, was
seized by the English.^ Adams said that this success made
England so giddy that she would give up the idea of peace
for some time." Soon alsp the attention of the Empress of
Russia was drawn to affairs at home, a Turkish war being
expected, which prevented her from prosecuting with vigor
her plans for mediation,' and this practically caused the dis
continuance of the negotiations.
Ever since the beginning of the war the United Provinces
had stood in reality alone. Their relations with France
were scarcely different from those before the war, except
that on May i, 1781, at Versailles a convention had been
signed by Vergennes and the Dutch envoy, Lestevenon van
Berkenrode, regarding reprisals.* Some people thought
that an alliance between France and the Republic would
occasion a general European war." Frederick the Great
warmly recommended an alliance with the French court,
but the Prince of Orange, who was still in favor of England,
expressed his apprehension that this would mean absolute
Dutch Papers), according to which the King of France expressed
his satisfaction at the refusal of the Dutch regarding a separate
peace. 'Rodney to the Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica. On board the
" Formidable," between Guadaloupe and Monserrat, April 14, 1782
(Journals of the Assembly of Jamaica, VII).
'J. Adams to Livingston, June 9, 1782 (Wharton, V, 483).
'Harris to Grantham, August 5/16, 1782 (Malmesbury, Corre
spondence, I, 527) ; same to Lord Mountstuart, October 14/25, 1782
(ibid., II, 4, s) ; same to Grantham, November 25/December 6,
1782 (ibid., IL 16).
'Van Berkenrode to the States General, May 3, 1781 (Bancroft
MSS., America, Holland, and England).
The convention was ratified at the Hague on May 16, 1781, and at
VersaUles on May 27, 1781 (Sparks Dutch Papers; Wharton, IV,
435). For text of the convention see also Wharton, IV, 435.
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, June 15, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 507).

202 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [380
dependence of the Republic upon her powerful neighbor.^
The king informed his envoy at the Hague that this answer
seemed to him to be not only superficial but weak. What,
he said, would be the result, if peace was concluded at a
moment when the United Provinces were without aUies?
No one would be interested in the fate of the Republic. On
the other hand, if she were an ally of France, that power
would be obliged to secure an honorable and suitable peace
for the Dutch."
In the provinces the idea of an offensive and defensive
alliance with France had many adherents. In November
even a whole province, that of Friesland, proposed it to the
States General.' The Patriots, of course, worked also for an
alliance with France. Van der CapeUen,* however, thought
that the views of France and the other great powers on
this subject should be known before definite steps were
taken. Vauguyon, whom he addressed accordingly, avoided
an answer, thereby arousing van der CapeUen's suspicion.
France, the latter wrote to a friend, must find means to
prevent other powers from interfering with the affairs of
the United Provinces. If she could not, or would not do
this, the Patriots would make no further attempts to bring
about an alliance with her. It was true that the Republic
was only a second-class power, not strong enough to defend
herself successfully even against one of the three great
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, July 20, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Frederick II to Thulemeier, July 26, 1781, and January 3, 1782
(Bancroft MSS., Prussia and HoUand).
'Resolution of the States General, November 16, 1781 (Sparks
MSS., CIII) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 23, 1781 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and Holland).
'Van der Capellen, the public sentiment being strongly in his
favor, was in the beginning of 1783 restored to his seat in the
provincial assembly of Overyssel, from which he had been expelled
after his famous speech against the lending of the Scotch Brigade
to Great Britain (above, p. 32). J. Adams, who as American peace
commissioner was temporarily in Paris, sent his congratulations to
van der Capellen by Dr. Wheelock, the president of Dartmouth
College in America, who happened to travel from Paris to the
United Provinces (J- Adams to van der Capellen, February 18,
1783, in Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 369).

381] Provinces and Great Britain as Enemies. 203
powers surrounding her. This would necessitate an aUiance
of the United Provinces with one or the other of these
countries, preferably with the strongest and the one which,
by her position, could either benefit or injure the Republic
most. This was France.^ For fear that the latter power
might altogether withdraw from the United Provinces and
keep the Dutch colonies in her possession the Patriot leader
continued to plead for an alliance."
The French court, on the other hand, was not pleased
with the various efforts made for a separate peace between
Great Britain and the United Provinces, and Vauguyon was
very active in his efforts to thwart them. He did not con
ceal the fact that the court at VersaiUes would take strong
countermeasures in case the Republic should accept condi
tions from Great Britain incompatible with her dignity and
contrary to the interests of the belligerents.' How utterly
without power and defence the Dutch really were is shown
by an incident which, under different circumstances, might
have provoked war. The United Provinces, in their contro
versies during the preceding century with Louis XIV, had
obtained the right of keeping garrisons in several barrier
fortresses of the Austrian Netherlands, as a protection
against French aggressions. Emperor Joseph II now took
advantage of the weakness of the Netherlands and forced
them to withdraw these garrisons in November, 1781.*
Although there was no prospect of a formal alliance
between France and the United Provinces, serious prepara
tions were made for a time in the Republic for a combined
naval action with France against England. In a secret
' Van der Capellen to Vauguyon, November 2, 1782 ; Vauguyon to
van der Capellen, November 5, 1782; van der CapeUen to Gijzelaar,
November 11, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 362 ff.,
374)- „ ,
'Van der CapeUen to Vauguyon, December 2, 1782 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 394, 395) ; same to Valck, December 15,
1782 (ibid., 419, 420).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, December 21, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'WUd, Die Niederlande, I, 267; Davies, History of Holland, III,
488, 489; Dumas to the President of Congress, January 30, 1782
(Wharton, V, 139).

204 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [382
session of the States General in the spring of 1782 it was
resolved to request the Prince of Orange to confer with the
court of France on such a concert.^ Though he did not
consider the Dutch fleet strong enough to furnish convoys,
defend the coast, and fight the enemy at the same time,"
William V carried out the resolution. France willingly
entered into the agreement, thereby binding the Dutch to
her interests, but answered evasively regarding all active
measures which might result therefrom. She had made a
secret arrangement with Spain to have the French fleet near
Gibraltar, and now kept the United Provinces waiting for
the promised combined naval action. This prevented them
from accepting Fox's peace offers,' which they undoubtedly
would have done if France had shown her cards openly.
The Dutch, in their ignorance of the real cause, con
demned the Prince of Orange for letting the Dutch war
vessels remain in the ports of the Republic instead of having
them join the French fleet. FinaUy a juncture of the fleets
at Brest was arranged between the two powers, but the ten
Dutch vessels which were designated for this purpose re
fused to sail and declared that they were not prepared for
such a step. This caused a storm of indignation in the
United Provinces and violent attacks on the Prince of
Orange.* An investigation regarding the condition of the
Dutch navy and the causes of its inefficiency was instituted,
lasting until 1787, but with no practical results."
' Secret Resolution of the States General, March 4, 1782 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 19, 1782 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Colenbrander, Patriottentijd, I, 231, 232.
*J. Adams to Livingston, September 23, 1782 (Wharton, V, 752);
Dumas to Livingston, September 27, 1782, and March 27, 1783 (ibid.,
V, 777; VI, 347); Davies, History of Holland, II, 447, 474-478;
Kampen, Verkorte Geschiedenis, II, 305 ff.
Very ugly accusations were made also against the Duke of Bruns
wick which finally caused his downfall (Kampen, Verkorte Geschie
denis, II, 305 ff.). When the popular indignation threatened to be
come an uprising against him, he left the Hague to take up his resi
dence in his own governraent, Bois-le-Duc (Davies, History of Hol
land, III, 478).
° Blok, Geschiedenis, VI, 391-

CHAPTER VIIL
The United States and the United Provinces form
Closer Relations.
Van der Capellen wrote in 1779 that the time had not
yet come for the public reception of an American envoy by
the United Provinces. He advised, however, that Congress
should send over a gentleman of distinction and ability, who
might, in the beginning, live in the Republic as a private
citizen, study the conditions of the country and learn its
language, until an occasion for showing his public character
should arrive.^ The United States had sufficient work for
such a representative in the United Provinces, since now all
correspondence between the two republics had to be directed
through the American ambassador, FrankUn, at Paris. It
seemed that the latter gentleman was already overburdened
with work, and that the affairs of America for that reason
must suffer, at least as far as the Netherlands were con
cerned." Probably acting upon van der CapeUen's advice, Con-
'Van der Capellen to Trumbull, July 6, 1779 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 108, 109).
' Van der Capellen to Livingston, July, 1779 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 115).
Steven Sayre asserted that he had been asked by Franklin whether
van der CapeUen had applied to Congress to be appointed United
States minister to the Netherlands. Sayre answered that if van der
Capellen had done this, his only motive could have been the wish to
serve America (Sayre to van der Capellen, October 24, 1779, in
Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 158). There are no suggestions
in van der CapeUen's correspondence that he ever desired to be
appointed American minister. Probably Dumas saw and misunder
stood van der CapeUen's letters to Trumbull and Livingston regard
ing the sending over of an American representative, and informed
Franklin erroneously that the Dutch statesman was anxious to
receive a commission.
Van der Capellen was indignant and thanked Sayre for defending
his character against the "calumny" (Van der Capellen to Sayre,
November 16, 1779, in Beaufort, Brieven van der CapeUen, 159).
205

2o6 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [384
gress in October, 1779, appointed its former president,
Henry Laurens, minister plenipotentiary of the United
States to the United Provinces.^ He also received instrac
tions to negotiate a loan of ten millions abroad. But
Laurens being delayed in departing for the United Prov
inces, John Adams, then residing at Paris, was authorized
by Congress on June 20, 1780, to enter upon that part of the
minister's duties in the Republic." On September 3, fol
lowing, the vessel " Mercury " in which Laurens had finally
saUed for Europe was taken by the English cruiser
"Vestal" and the minister himself was made prisoner, his
papers, as has been seen, furnishing Great Britain the pre
text of her rupture with the Netherlands.'
John Adams, arriving at Amsterdam in August, 1780,
previous to the receiving of his commission, found his posi
tion difficult from the beginning.* Not being vested with
any political authority, he did not communicate his business
to the States General and the Prince of Orange, or even to
the magistrates of Amsterdam." He was, however, of
opinion that he would be successful, if he had full powers
from Congress, in opening a considerable loan in the United
Provinces and extending the commerce between the two
countries.' The Dutch were highly ignorant of American
affairs, and it would be necessary to enlighten them before
they would risk anything for the United States.' While
'Van Dircks to van der Capellen, November 30, 1779 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 165).
'Wharton, I, 506; IV, 56, 61. Dana received the same commission,
in case Adaras should be unable to take Laurens' place (ibid., IV,
62, 63).
^Ibid., L 579-
¦ According to his own words, he entered the United Provinces
" a forlorn pilgrim without a letter of introduction." He received
his provisional commission for negotiating a loan only on September
19, 1780 (Fairchild, van der Kemp, 65).
°J. Adams to the President of Congress, September 24, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 66) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, October 13, 1780
(Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, August 14 and 23, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 29, 42) ; October 11, 1780 (ibid., IV, 95) ; October
14, 1780 (ibid., IV, 98)..
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, September 25, 1780 (ibid.,
IV, 67-69).

385] The United States and the United Provinces. 207
Franklin felt humiliated by "running about from court to
court begging for money and friendship,"^ Adams saw no
reason why they should be ashamed
" of asking to borrow money, after maintaining a war against Great
Britain and her allies for about six years without borrowing anj'-
thing abroad. When England has been all the time borrowing of
all the nations of Europe, even of individuals among our allies, it
can not be unnatural, surprising, or culpable, or dishonorable for us
to borrow money. When England borrows annuaUy a sum equal to
all her exports, we ought not to be laughed at for wishing to borrow
a sum annually equal to a twelfth part of our annual exports. We
may and we shall wade through if we can not obtain a loan ; but we
could certainly go forward with more ease, convenience and safety
bythe help of one. I think we have not meanly solicited for friend
ship anywhere. But to send ministers to every great court in
Europe, especially the maritime courts, to propose an acknowledg
ment of the independence of America and treaties of amity and
commerce, is no more than becomes us, and in my opinion is our
duty to do. It is perfectly consistent with the genuine system of
American policy, and a piece of respect due from new nations to
old ones.'"
Van der Capellen, who had so often before shown his
sincere desire of furthering the American cause, offered his
services to Adams and recommended a number of friends to
him, as Adriaan Valck at Rotterdam, Tegelaar, and the
Mennonite minister van der Kemp,' who might be employed
as correspondents or in any other capacity for promoting
Adams' object.
From another side also aid was proposed to Adams. The
King of Spain had expressed his willingness to guarantee
the payment of the interest and principal of a loan of 150,-
000 dollars for the use of the United States. The American
commissioners at Paris could not avail themselves of this
offer on account of the extensive loans which the French
minister of finance, Necker, was about to make. Franklin,
therefore, thought that probably the king's promise might
have weight in the United Provinces.* In this, however, he
'Franklin to Adams, October 2, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 74).
'J. Adams to Franklin, October 14, 1780 (Wharton, IV, 96).
'Van der Capellen to J. Adams, October 16, 1780 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 199, 200) .
Interesting is Adams', letter to van der Capellen of October 17,
1780, in which he informed the latter of the financial condition of
the United States (ibid., 195-199).
'Franklin to J. Adams, October 20, 1780 (Wharton, IV, loi).

2o8 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [386
was very much mistaken. The Dutch did not show any
inclination at all to loan money to the United States.^ The
latter, disappointed at not being successful in borrowing
money either in Spain or the Netherlands, appealed to Louis
XVI. A foreign loan of specie, they said, at least to the
amount of twenty-five miUion livres would be indispensably
necessary for a vigorous prosecution of the war. The King
of France was asked either to advance this sum from his
royal coffers or to help Congress to secure it from other
sources by acting as security for the payment of interest and
principal." Adams' efforts to raise a loan in the United Provinces
were much hampered by similar attempts of the separate
American states. Mr. A. GUlon, for example, was active
at Amsterdam in his efforts to borrow money for South
Carolina at five per cent, interest.' Adams attributed his
faUure to obtain money to the avarice of the Dutch and to
their fear that the United States might finally submit to Eng
land.* Van der CapeUen even was somewhat discouraged at
the fact that the credit of the United States was so low in
the United Provinces. He gave Adams advice as to how
the loan could be started, and recommended Tegelaar as a
negotiator, or, if he should not suit, J. de NeufviUe. He
mentioned in this connection also the house of Fizeaux, but
thought that the fact that its head was related to an English
general serving in America should be considered." Adams'
answer showed that he had lost almost all hope of ever suc
ceeding in his mission. He would not think it wise or
honest to deceive America with any hope of assistance in any
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, November 17, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 155) ; Yorke to Stormont, August 11, 1780 (Sparks
MSS., LXXII).
' Congress to the King of France, November 22, 1780 (Wharton,
IV, 159, 160).
'Gillon to van der CapeUen, November 25, 1780 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der CapeUen, 192-194).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, November 25, 1780
(Wharton, IV, 161).
'Van der Capellen to J. Adams, November 28, 1780 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 208).

387] The United States and the United Provinces. (209
way from the Republic. A dispute arose between Adams
and van der Capellen regarding the causes of the Dutch
attitude, the former attributing it to the fear of the English,
and remarking, " The less America has to do with such
people, the better it will be for her."^ Van der Capellen
refuted this view, asserting that the bad news from America,
the loss of Charleston, the defeat of General Gates, Arnold's
desertion, and above all the enormous depreciation of the
American paper money had caused the low credit of the
United States in the Republic. He assured Adams that
the great majority of the Dutch, certainly more than four
fifths of them, loved the Americans, and wished sincerely
that the United States might be victorious in the end."
In January, 1781, Congress decided to appoint John
Adams American minister plenipotentiary to the United
Provinces and provided him with credentials to the Prince
of Orange.' He was instructed not only to negotiate a
loan, but also to conclude, if possible, a treaty of commerce
and amity with the Republic. His reception by the States
General would, of course, involve the acknowledgment of
the independence of the United States. Many difficulties
were still existing in the United Provinces for such a step.
The Prince of Orange especially was hostile to closer rela
tions with the United States. As early as 1778 he had de
clared that he would retire from the office of stadtholder and
with his family leave the country, rather than accede to the
acknowledgment of the independence of the United States,
because in this case the Republic would be completely de
livered to France.* Adams seems to have been fully aware
of the fact that there was no prospect yet for his obtaining
'J. Adams to van der CapeUen, December 9, 1780 (Wharton,
IV, 190). Adams expressed himself similarly to the President of
Congress on December 14, 1780 (ibid., IV, 192).
'Van der Capellen to j'. Adams, Deceraber 24, 1780 (Beaufort,
Brieven van der Capellen, 209).
See Adams' reply of January 21, 1781 (J. A. Sillem's suppleraent
to Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 46-54).
' Huntington, President of Congress, to J. Adams, January i, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 224, 225).
' Nijhoff, Brunswijk, 154, 155.
14

2IO Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [388
any concessions in the United Provinces. His letters in
January and February show that he had not moved one step
forward regarding a loan, and that his hopes for being more
successful in the near future were very small.^
The plan of this loan was to issue one thousand obliga
tions at one thousand guilders each, bearing interest at the
rate of five per cent., payable in coupons of twenty-five
guilders every six months. This interest was thought more
than satisfactory, since it was one per cent, more than was
ordinarily paid for bank deposits. The whole amount
would be redeemed at the end of the tenth year. The
guarantee of all the states combined and of each singly
should serve as security for the whole, capital and interest.
Their tobacco trade alone, if necessary, would guarantee the
restitution of one mUlion guilders in ten years. One ob
jection made in the United Provinces against the loan was
that the money conld be used to greater advantage at home
for furthering Dutch industry. Many Dutch, however,
were of the opinion that by gaining free commerce and
navigation with the United States, considerable profits could
be obtained, since the sending of manufactures there and
the bringing back of raw products would not only employ
Dutch merchants and shippers, but also Dutch factories."
In the meantime Louis XVI had considered the request of
the United States for a loan of twenty-five million livres.
Franklin was now told by the French foreign minster that
the king was not able to favor the loan in his own dominion,
because it would interfere with his obtaining money to con
tinue the war, but that he would turn over to the United
States the sum of six millions as a gift exclusive of the
three millions which he had secured for Franklin before.'
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, January 4 and 15, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 227, 235) ; same to Franklin, February 15, 1781 (ibid.,
256)- 'Paraphlet, Drie Brieven etc. over het uitgekommen plan van een
negotiatie etc., February 25, 27, and 28, 1781; Carmichael to the
Committee of Foreign Affairs, March 11, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 280).
'Franklin to the President of Congress, March 12, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 281).
Part of this gift was to be employed for making purchases in

389] The United States and the United Provinces. 211
Adams, stiU unsuccessful in the Netherlands, did not re
ceive even enough money to discharge the bills of exchange
which Congress had drawn upon him and Laurens, but had
to depend upon Franklin for their payment. He had no
hope that these conditions would change until the indepen
dence of the United States should be acknowledged by the
Republic.^ He reported to Congress that people in the
United Provinces were as yet so much afraid of being
pointed out by the mob or the soldiery as favoring the loan
which he had opened that there was no prospect of success
for several months, if ever."
In the following month the French foreign minister in
formed Laurens, the special minister of Congress at Paris,
that Louis XVI was going to guarantee a loan of ten mil
lions, to be opened in the United Provinces, in addition to
the six miUions which he had granted as a gift.' France
thought that as soon as the Dutch withdrew their funds
from England and placed them with the Americans, the
resources of the English court would become exhausted.
This loan was not to have anything in common with Adams'
loan, and NeufviUe was, therefore, not to be connected with
it in any way. The houses of Fizeaux and Grand were
given the commission to negotiate it.* This loan, however,
France, while the rest was to be sent to the United States for estab
lishing the credit of the government there. Washington alone was
authorized to draw bills of exchange in America against this money
(Bolles, Financial History, 241).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, April 6, 1781 (Wharton,
IV, 352); same to Franklin, April 16, 1781 (ibid., IV, 363).
'Same to the President of Congress, March 19, 1781 (ibid., IV,
314). 'J. Laurens to the President of Congress, April 9, 1781 (ibid., IV,
355)- 'Vergennes to Vauguyon, April 13, 1781 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII). John Jay, before knowing that John Adams was authorized to
execute the business which had been committed to Henry Laurens,
also made attempts to raise a loan in the United Provinces. As soon
as he learned of Adams' commission, he referred the firm of
NeufvUle and Son, with whom he had negotiated, to him, since,
he said, " the impropriety of two loans at a time " was evident (Jay
to the President of Congress, April 25, 1781, in Wharton, IV, 385,
386). If Jay had not withdrawn, there would have been under con
sideration three loans for the United States in the Netherlands at
the same time, of which none had any prospect of success.

212 ) Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [390

was also a complete failure. The Dutch seemed to have no
inclination at all to risk their money in American funds,^
whereupon Louis XVI decided to supply the ten mUlions out
of his own treasury." The French ambassador at the
Hague now asked the States General to guarantee the ten
miUion loan for the United States in the Republic. The
Grand Pensionary, however, thought that this step would
not be successful, since the dismissal of Necker, which oc
curred at this time, had struck a mortal blow to the political
as well as financial credit of France.' The French proposi
tion was then modified. The money was to be loaned to the
King of France under the guarantee of the States General at
four per cent, interest.*
Franklin by this time had grown almost bitter toward the
United Provinces, expecting but little from them to the
advantage of the United States. Though the Dutch had
been in the same situation as the Americans and were then
glad to receive assistance from other nations, they did not
seem to feel for the United States, or to have the least incli
nation to help. In his opinion the Dutch lacked magna
nimity," but a few days later, Franklin almost apologized
for these remarks, saying that he had been out of humor
when he made them, because the United States could obtain
no loan in the Republic, while England borrowed freely
there.' Toward the end of August, the American correspondent
at the Hague was able to report that the French loan in the
United Provinces for the United States would probably suc-
'J. Laurens to the President of Congress, May 15, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 416, 417) ; J. Adaras to sarae. May 16, 1781 (ibid., IV, 420).
Van der Capellen assured Congress again that four fifths of his
countryraen were friends of the United States, and that their indif
ference regarding the Araerican loan was due to bad news from
America, etc. (Van der CapeUen to Livingston, May 25, 1781, in
Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 249-252).
'Vergennes to J. Laurens, May 16, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 418);
Doniol, Histoire, IV, 559; Bolles, Financial History, 252.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, July 31, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
' Sarae to same, August 31, 1781 (ibid.).
' FrankUn to Duraas, August 6, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 625).
"Franklin to Dumas, August 10, 1781 (ibid., IV, 627).

39i] The United States and the United Provinces. 213
ceed, since the States General were going to pass upon it.
The latter might open it themselves on their own credit,
guaranteeing the payment of the capital and the interest at
four per cent. It was still a secret that the loan was in
tended for the United States.^ The Prussian envoy at the
Hague also learned of the success of this loan, and thought
that it would be very helpful to the United States. Great
Britain would find in this occurrence a new motive for re
gretting the inconsiderate rupture with the Netherlands."
Franklin, at Paris, was still skeptical about the success of
the loan,' and in fact Dumas had to admit toward the middle
of October that so far as he knew only the provinces of
Holland and Friesland had consented to the loan proposed
by France.* In November Franklin reported that the affair
was said to be at last concluded, but it was not yet executed."
In reality, however, it had not made much progress, when
the news of CornwaUis' surrender reached the United
Provinces. A change in favor of the United States was now expected
to take place in the Republic, and, in fact, it began by the
depreciation of English securities, with which especiaUy
Amsterdam was fiUed. The consolidated funds, "the true
thermometer of the credit of England," feU to fifty per
cent., while they formerly had been quoted at one hundred
and fourteen.' The province of Zealand now also consented
to the French loan. Adams' loan, on the other hand, rested
as it was.'' He had received only a few thousand guilders
in all, and these he reserved for the relief of Americans
' Dumas to the President of Congress, August 23 and 30, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 655, 657).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, September 11, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Franklin to Morris, September 12, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 704).
'Dumas to the President of Congress, October 11, 1781 (ibid.,
IV, 771, 772).
'Franklin to the President of Congress, November 5, 1781 (ibid,
IV, 827).
Thulemeier to Frederick II, November 20, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, October 15, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 777).

214 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [392
escaping from English prisons.^ The Dutch firm of John
de Neufville and Son offered to the American commissioners
at Paris a loan of two miUion guilders, but their condUions
were such that they could not be accepted."
Adams found that there were four persons in the Republic
who had the whole affair of public loans in their hands and
that they refused to sanction a loan to the United States
untU peace was restored. These men, he suspected, were
receiving salaries for opposing American loans, or at least
were being supported by a combination consisting of the
British government, Dutch court, owners of English stocks,
and great mercantile houses, in the interest of the British
ministry.' Adams was therefore of opinion that the United
States would not obtain any loan in the United Provmces
until a treaty should be made.*
The French loan of five million guilders for the United
States was in the meantime completed in the Republic, but
only a comparatively small part of it remained available for
Congress, most of it being expended for advances made by
France." Van der Capellen thought that the credit of
America was growing considerably in the United Provinces.'
Franklin also was better satisfied, saying that there was
some prospect of another loan there ;' but Adams almost
despaired of success. " I can represent," he said, " my sit
uation in this affair of a loan by no other figure than that
of a man in the midst of the ocean negotiating for his Ufe
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 4, 1781 (Whar
ton, V, 37). He had ordered a hundred pounds for President Henry
Laurens, who was still imprisoned in the Tower of London. Adams,
solicited by Laurens' daughter for further supplies, referred her to
Franklin (ibid., V, 37).
'FrankUn to J. Adams, December 14, 1781 (ibid., V, 46-48).
'J. Adams to Franklin, January 25, 1782 (ibid., V, 131); Bolles,
Financial History, 253.
'J. Adams to Livingston, February 14 and 19, 1782 (Wharton,
V, 163, 187) ; Bolles, Financial History, 254.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, December 21, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and HoUand) ; Livingston to General Green, January ^l,
1782 (Wharton, V, 142).
'Van der CapeUen to J. Adams, May 2, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der CapeUen, 291).
'Franklin to Jay, April 24, 1782 (Wharton, V, 327).

393] The United States and the United Provinces. 215
among a school of sharks. I am sorry to use expressions
which must appear severe to you, but the truth demands
them."i In the next month, however, he was able to report upon
negotiations which he was conducting with three firms re
garding the opening of a loan.- These houses were Wilhem
and Jan Willinks, Nicholas and Jacob van Staphorst, and
De la Lande and Fynje. The loan was to bear five per cent.
interest, which, according to Adams, was a moderate rate,
since, as he said, France gave as much and other powers
much more. The whole amount of the loan was to be five
mUlion guilders, but Adams did not expect to obtain that
sum for a long time. By Christmas, he said, he might obtain
about one miUion and a half, but hardly more.' The con
tract was sent to Congress for ratification, and Adams hoped
to receive thirteen to fourteen hundred thousand guilders
upon the receipt of the ratification.* Congress approved the
contract of the loan and ratified it in September. Adams
was admonished to try his utmost to have the whole amount
raised, since the United States would need the money in any
event. In case the war should continue, it would be essen
tial for further exertions of the Americans, and if peace
should be brought about, it would be greatly needed for dis
charging the army." However, in July of the foUowing
year but three thousand of the obligations of the loan had
been sold, which, Adams said, was due to the scarcity of
money in the United Provinces. The loan was completed
only in 1786.'
' J. Adams to Livingston, May 16, 1782 (Wharton, V, 420) .
'Same to same, June 9, 1782 (ibid., V, 482).
'Same to same, July S, 1782 (ibid., V, 594, 595')-
'J. Adams to Livingston, August 18, 1782 (ibid., V, 665).
'Livingston to J. Adams, September 15, 1782 (ibid., V, 728, 729).
'J. Adams to Livingston, July 28, 1783 (ibid., VI, 608).
On August 7, 1783, van der Capellen wrote also that the Ameri
can loan of five million guilders was not yet filled (Beaufort, Brie
ven van der Capellen, 653). During the year 1784, 1,488,000 guilders
were received; in 1785, 134,000; and in 1786, 118,000 guUders; mak
ing it in aU five millions, as had been stipulated (Bayley, National
Loans, 17). This loan was not repaid until 1797-

2i6 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [394
A final French loan of six million livres was granted to
the United States by resolution of September 14, 1782, bear
ing five per cent, interest.^ In Spain also efforts were made
to borrow money for the United States, but only a small
sum was secured. The amount issued in 1781 was a trifle
more than $174,000." Although various other European
countries were invited to assist the Americans with loans,
no funds were received from the old world besides those
mentioned. John Adams had thus executed one part of his orders,
that is, the arranging of a Dutch loan. True, he had expe
rienced many faUures before he reached the goal, but the
money was now needed by the United States as much as
ever. He was not less successful in executing the rest of
his instructions. Early in 1781, the province of Friesland
had resolved to acknowledge the independence of the United
States. Adams thought it now opportune to disclose his
public character to the States General and open, if pos
sible, the negotiations between the two republics. In this
matter he approached the French ambassador at the Hague,
soliciting his assistance.' He addressed, on April 19, 1781,
a long memorial to the States General, in which he informed
them of his appointment as minister plenipotentiary of the
United States " to reside near " them and of his instructions
to negotiate a treaty of commerce and amity with the United
Provinces. At the same time he explained in detail why
such a treaty should be concluded as being in the interest
and to the advantage of both countries.* A shorter note
of the same tenor was directed to the Prince of Orange,
A number of loans were taken up in the United Provinces by the
United States after peace was restored; this continued until 1794.
Their discussion, however, would be beyond the scherae of this essay.
See De Knight-Tillraan, History of the Currency, 31 ff. ; Bayley,
National koans, 17 ff.
'De Knight-Tillman, History of the Currency, 31.
' De Knight-TiUman, History of the Currency, 30.
'J. Adams to de la Vauguyon, March i and April 16, 1781 (Whar
ton, IV, 270, 271, 364).
'Wharton, IV, 370-376; pamphlet, "Adams' Memorial;" A Col
lection of State Papers, pamphlet i ; Vaterlandsche Historie,
XXVIII, 33-

39S] The United States and the United Provinces. 217
expressing also the American minister's desire to be re
ceived by the stadtholder for the delivery of the credentials.^
Adams' memorial caused much discussion as to whether
closer relations with the United States would be advan
tageous to the United Provinces. For many reasons, one
anonymous author said, it was to the interest of the Dutch
to conclude a commercial treaty with the United States.
Many products of America, in his opinion, were suitable
for Europe, and this trade could be greatly increased after
the hostilities had ceased. Agriculture was very extensive
in the United States, the products of which could be ex
changed in Europe for manufactured articles. There was
a large importation of tobacco from Virginia, rice and indigo
from Carolina, grain from Pennsylvania, etc. In return
for these goods the Dutch could send to the United States
linen and cloth (lakens), the products of the United Prov
inces, and cotton and wool, imported from the Dutch colo
nies; while silk, which was much bought in America, could
be provided from Germany and France. The articles of
the East India Company, tea, china, etc., were also much
in demand with the Americans. The author concluded,
therefore, that the United Provinces in gaining the Amer
ican trade would not only further Dutch navigation, since
the carrying of the goods from and to the United States
would almost wholly be effected in Dutch bottoms, but
Dutch industry and commerce would be promoted as well.
There was danger, however, that American commerce might
seek other channels, and a treaty should now be concluded
with all possible speed, especially since the equality of both
republics, their freedom of politics and religion invited to
closer relations.^
Another Dutch writer tried to prove that a treaty with
the United States would be utterly disadvantageous to the
United Provinces. As the Americans, he declared, had no
'J. Adams' Memorial to the Prince of Orange, AprU 19, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 377).
' Pamphlet : Memorie wegens het commercieele belang etc. van
commercie met de Vereenigde Staaten van Nord-Amerika.

2i8 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [396
navy worth mentioning and only a few privateers, they
could not render any assistance to the Republic, either in
the West Indies or in Europe; otherwise they would have
defended St. Eustatia in their own interest. Besides,
Dutch commerce could not gain during the war ; on the con
trary it was cut off by the war and especially by the capture
of St. Eustatia. It would be folly to think of a direct trade
with the United States, because it would require continual
convoys and a large fleet on the American coast. Indirect
trade, however, was precluded as well, since St. Eustatia,
Berbice, Essequibo, and Demerari were taken. Of the two
remaining Dutch colonies, Surinam was not convenient as a
staple place and Curagao could be of no use at present.
How unsafe and unprofitable the American trade was, the
author stated, was fully shown by the fact that the French
mercantile vessels were almost all captured either on their
way to America or coming back. Of many hundreds of
vessels only twenty-five to thirty had reached France again.
He then set forth what the result of a treaty with the
United States would be after peace had been restored, men
tioning three possibilities: America would either be vic
torious, or defeated and subdued, or it might be divided up
between England, France, and Spain. If such a division
should occur, the United Provinces, by a treaty, would be
prevented from sharing in it. In case the Americans should
be subdued by England, they would not be able to fulfil
their treaty obligations toward the United Provinces. It
was improbable, he continued, that the United States would
be victorious, since England would never recognize the inde
pendence of her former American colonies. But even if
the Americans should gain independence and the United
States have the most advantageous treaty with them
(which, however, very Ukely France would have), the
American trade would prove injurious to the Dutch. The
exchange of Dutch products for money or goods was very
small. On the other hand their principal business, the
carrying trade, would not profit from the independence of

397] The United States and the United Provinces. 219
America, since the Americans, having no sound or channel
to pass through, would become formidable competitors.
They could sail with all winds and in all seasons. Further
more the United States would not buy through the United
Provinces what they could obtain directly from France,
Spain, or England. No treaty, he said, would induce Amer
ican merchants to do so. For trade with America remained
then only the few goods which were sent down the rivers
Rhine and Maas from Germany to the United Provinces,
but these might easily be fetched by the Americans in their
own vessels. From all these considerations this author
drew the conclusion that a treaty with America would do
the Dutch harm rather than good. The Americans would
preserve English institutions, especiaUy with regard to legal
matters and courts, since their language was the same; and
they would, therefore, also remain in closer commercial rela
tions with England than with any other nation.^
John Adams again suggested to Vauguyon that the United
Provinces should be invited to join the French- American
alliance," while the Prussian envoy at the Hague thought
that the French ambassador was taking up this project.
Thulemeier, however, doubted that a treaty between the two
republics could be brought about, since the Prince of Orange
had discussed the subject with him in a manner which
proved the strong opposition of the stadtholder to such a
measure.' The French ambassador thought it not even ad
visable yet for Adams to deliver his credentials. When the
latter disclosed to Vauguyon his intention of doing so, the
Frenchman said that he had no instructions from his gov
ernment to express an opinion about the matter, but that
privately he did not think the present moment favorable for
the step.*
'Pamphlet, Consideration op de Memoria etc., 19 April^ 1781
(August L. Schlozer, Briefwechsel meist historischen und politischen
Inhalts, 130-149).
'Wharton, IV, 397 ff.
'Thulemeier to Frederick H, April 20, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland) ; same to same, April 24, 1781 (ibid.).
'Vauguyon to Vergennes, AprU 21, 1781 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII).

220 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [398
Adams, however, did not heed Vauguyon's advice. At
the beginning of May he had a conference with the Grand
Pensionary, who told him that his recognition as American
minister might be difficult, since the United Provinces had
not yet acknowledged the independence of the United
States. Although Adams had thus received little encourage
ment, he tried, on the following days, to deliver his cre
dentials to the Dutch officials. All declined more or less
politely to receive them. The Grand Pensionary who was
to have a copy of the original said that it was not customary
to deliver the paper to him but that it would be better to
hand it to the griffier of the States General. The president
of the latter body, to whom Adams went next, refused to
accept the papers on the ground that such an act implied an
• acknowledgment, the responsibility for which he could not
take upon himself. The president, however, promised to
report the case to the States General. Thereupon Adams
tried to deliver his memorial to the Prince of Orange
through the latter's privy counsellor, but received the
envelope back unopened with " a polite excuse from the
prince that he could not receive it till after their high might
inesses should have resolved if, and when, he was to be ad
mitted in the character which he had set forth with them."
Adams now published his memorial in English, French,
and Dutch. All the public papers in the United Provinces
inserted it, and Dumas reported that it was generally known,
and that it both pleased and puzzled everybody. The
president of the States General kept his promise and
forwarded Adams' request. As a result the deputies of
aU seven provinces demanded and received copies of the
report, in order to transmit them to their regencies for de
liberation and decision. When the American minister told
Vauguyon of the steps which he had taken, the latter re
peated his former remark that he did not think the time
favorable for such a measure, but that, personally, he would

399] The United States and the United Provinces. 221
support it.^ The French government approved of the am
bassador's attitude. He was instructed not to take any
steps toward the admission of Adams' credentials, but
rather to try to convince him that the present circumstances
were not favorable to his measure. Vergennes added that
Vauguyon would probably not change Adams' intention, but
that the ambassador's words would at least serve to justify
the French proceedings if the American minister should
place France under the necessity of making them known to
Congress." Vauguyon was also directed not to hesitate to
tell the Dutch authorities that he did all in his power to
dissuade Adams from delivering his credentials. In case
the latter should again approach the French ambassador for
advice in the matter, Vauguyon was to persuade him to
withdraw his credentials quietly until circumstances should
permit the States General to accept them.'
When this letter was written, Vauguyon had already in
formed the Dutch ministers that Adams had acted without
the approbation of the court at Versailles. The ambassador
said he deemed this measure necessary in order to show
that his government did not mean to contribute to the em
barrassment of the States General.* Vergennes now com
missioned the French minister in the United States, de
Luzerne, to inform Congress of the attitude and conduct of
'Dumas to the President of Congress, May 2, 4, 11, and 16, 1781
(Wharton, IV, 393, 394) ; J. Adams to the President of Congress,
May 3, 7, and i6, 1781 (ibid., IV, 398, 401-403, 419) ; Resolution of
the States General, May 4, 1781 (Sparks MSS., CIII) ; Thulemeier
to Frederick II, May 15, 1781 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Hol
land). Thulemeier thought that Adams would not be admitted yet be
cause the Dutch government did not want to irritate England, and
also because neither the northern powers, nor the court of Vienna,
nor even Spain had recognized the independence of the United
States (Thulemeier to Frederick II, May 8, 1781, in Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
The Prussian envoy also reported that Adams had given the
Grand Pensionary to understand that a refusal of the Dutch gov
ernment might cause the United States later to decline comraercial
relations with the United Provinces (Thuleraeier to Frederick II,
May II, 1781, ibid.).
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, May 6, 1781 (Sparks MSS., LXXXIII).
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, May 11, 1781 (ibid.).
'Vauguyon to Vergennes, May 11, 1781 (ibid.).

222 Dpitch Republic and American Revolution. [400
France in this case. The French Foreign Secretary said
that he was convinced that Adams would be censured for
"his very awkward precipitation."^ The prospect of the
American cause in the United Provinces was thus not very
bright, and it was even said that the States General had
decided to refuse the admission of a minister from Con
gress.-" The Prince of Orange also was still opposed to
closer relations with the United States.'
The first opinion expressed openly in favor of a treaty
with America and pubUshed in the United Provinces was
that of Baron van der Capellen van de Marsch, who pleaded
for an alliance with both France and America. Baron de
Nagel, of Zutphen, also said that he would rather acknowl
edge the independence of the United States than form an
alliance with France.*
About this time Adams received instructions and a com
mission from Congress with full powers to " confer, treat,
agree, and conclude " a treaty of aUiance between France,
the United Provinces, and the United States." The Amer
ican minister communicated the news to Vauguyon, sug
gesting that they confer together on the subject. There
were three ways, he said, to propose the treaty to the United
Provinces. The French ambassador might open the nego
tiations in the name of his royal master, or both Adams and
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, May 17, 1781 (Sparks MSS., LXXXIII).
Adams was later asked " with friendly and patriotic anxiety " by
Livingston to report about the motive which had prompted him to
make the proposition of May 4, 1781, and to print the memorial.
He gave then a vivid and detailed account of his reasons (J. Adams
to Livingston, February 21, 1782, in Wharton, V, 193-199). The
subsequent events showed that Adams was a better judge of affairs
than Vauguyon.
See on this subject also Doniol, Histoire, IV, 562, 563 ; V, 48-57.
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, June 12, 1781 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, July 3, 1781 (Bancroft MSS., Prus
sia and Holland).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, November i. 1781
(Wharton, IV, 813, 814; A Collection of State papers, paraphlet 2).
Baron van der Capellen van de Marsch strongly supported also
Adams' deraand of an answer (Wharton, V, 246, 247 ; A Collec
tion of State Papers, pamphlet 5).
' Resolves of Congress, Comprising the Instructions to John
Adams, August 16, 1781 (Wharton, IV, 636-638).

40iJ The United States and the United Provinces. 223
Vauguyon might do so jointly, or, finally, Adams alone
might propose the treaty as a consequence of his former
suggestion of a similar treaty.^
Adams' instructions had been accompanied by a report of
CornwaUis' surrender, and he remarked to FrankUn how
easy a thing it would be to bring the war to a happy con
clusion, if only Spain and the United Provinces would co
operate with the United States and France with the sin
cerity of the latter power." The American minister appar
ently had great hopes for the conclusion of an alliance be
tween the United States, France, and the United Provinces
against England. He informed Jay, the American commis
sioner in Spain, that there would probably soon be a proposal
of such a triple alliance, and if Spain would join and make
it quadruple, it would be so much the better.' When, at the
beginning of December, Adams acknowledged the receipt of
the instructions to Congress, he was not so hopeful regard
ing the conclusion of a treaty with the United Provinces.
"The Dutch," he said, "are so indolent, so divided, so
animated with party spirit, and above all so entirely in
the power of their chief, that it is very certain that they
will take the proposition ad referendum immediately and
then deliberate upon it a lohg time." The news of Corn
waUis' defeat, however, he continued, had made a great im
pression upon the Dutch, so that his proposition, if made
immediately, would have a great effect. This he could not
do, because he was compelled to wait for the approval of the
French court.* So far, Vauguyon had only referred to the
American proposition as " very well considered.""
About the middle of December, Adams was able to write
to Congress that the first public body in the United Provinces
had proposed an alliance with the United States. It was the
quarter of Oostergoo. This, the minister said, was only a
'Adams to Vauguyon, November 25, 1781 (Wharton, V, 3, 4)-
'J. Adaras to Franklin, November 26, 1781 (ibid., V, 7, 8).
'J. Adams to Jay, November 28, 1781 (ibid., V, 32).
'J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 4, 1781
(ibid., V, 36, 37).
'Adams to Jay, November 26, 1781 (ibid., V, 10, 11).

224 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [402
part of one branch of the sovereignty, but the whole Re
public must follow. " It is necessitated to it by a mechanism
as certain as clock work ; but its operations are and wUl be
studiously and zealously slow. It will be a long time before
the measure can be completed."^
The French ambassador at the Hague grew more com
municative now. He caUed on Adams in Amsterdam and
suggested that the latter should go to the Hague and demand
an answer from the States General regarding his former
proposition. After that the American minister, according to
Vauguyon's advice, was to visit the cities of Holland, and
apply to their regencies." Adams went to the Hague on
January 8, and, on the foUowing day, called upon the presi
dent of the States General, demanding verbaUy a categorical
answer to his memorial regarding a treaty of commerce and
amity and the presentation of his credentials. The presi
dent, van der Sandheuvel, reported Adams' request to the
States General and the matter was again taken ad
referendum. Not a single province had so far answered the minister's
memorial. The Grand Pensionary, Bleiswijck, was Ul and
could not be seen by Adams. The latter then visited the
deputies to the States General from all the cities of the
province of HoUand, who without exception received him
very kindly, but were unable to make definite promises.'
Van der Capellen tot den Poll, who had just shown again
his love for the United States by offering twelve thousand
florins to Adams' loan in preference to that guaranteed by
' J. Adams to the President of Congress, December 14, 1781
(Wharton, V, 49, 50) ; A Collection of State Papers, paraphlet 3.
' J. Adaras to the President of Congress, December 18, 1781
(Wharton, V, 55)-
Count de Vergennes approved of this course to be taken by
Adams (Vauguyon to Adams, December 30, 1781, in Wharton, V,
79, 80).
'Adams to the President of Congress, January 14, 1782 (Wharton,
V, 97-99) ; A Collection of State Papers, pamphlet 4 ; Resolution of
the States General, January 9, 1782, and Resolution of Holland and
Westfriesland (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II,
January 11, 1782 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and Holland) ; Vater
landsche Historie, XXIX, 127.

403] The United States and the United Provinces. 225
France, was furious at the slow advance of the American
cause in the United Provinces, and even exclaimed that he
was ashamed to be Dutch. Van der Capellen, too, had sug
gested that Adams should demand a categorical answer from
the States General to his memorial, since many people in the
Republic desired an alliance with America.'- Adams him
self found his office more and more distasteful and wished
" every hour in the twenty- four " that he was back in the
United States again."
About a week after Adams had written in such despairing
terms the province of Friesland pubUcly acknowledged the
independence of the United States. Several cities of the
province of HoUand and the whole Republic were expected
soon to follow this example.' Adams now began to think
of transferring his residence from Amsterdam to the Hague,
in order to be in closer touch with the Dutch government.
For this reason he purchased a " large and elegant house in
a fine situation on a noble spot of ground " at the Hague for
about sixteen thousand guilders.* It caused surprise in the
'Van der Capellen to Adams, January 6, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 264, 265).
Regarding Adams' answer see Beaufort, Brieven van der Capel
len, 266, 267. He said that the time was approaching very fast when
the Republic must decide.
Van der Capellen tot den Poll to van der Capellen van de Marsch,
January 17, 1782 (ibid., 266).
'J. Adams to Franklin, February 20, 1782 (Wharton, V, 189).
'Vaterlandsche Historie, XXIX, 129.
'J. Adams to Livingston, February 27, 1782 (Wharton, V, 206,
207). This was the first legation building which the United States ever
owned. Adams took the title in his own name,_ since the United
States was not yet recognized by the United Provinces. As soon as
this should be done and Congress approve of the transaction, the
title was to be transferred to the United States. Adaras could not
pay the whole amount. He took for first payment the money of his
loan and some cash which he had brought from America, in all ten
thousand guilders. The rest was to be furnished by FrankUn or to
be borrowed from a friend. The American legation, or " Hotel des
Etats-Unis de I'Amerique," as it was officiaUy called, was situated
upon the Fleweele Burgwal, a canal street (J. Adams to Livingston,
May 16, 1782, in Wharton, V, 420).
Besides the United States, only France and Spain owned legation
buildings at the Hague, while all the other nations represented there
rented houses for their ministers (Dumas to Livingston, April 4,
1782, in Wharton, V, 293).
15

226 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [404
United Provinces that Adams should take this step with the
intention of establishing himself in his quality as American
minister to the United Provinces before the States General
had attributed this character to him.^ In the beginning of
March the deputies of Friesland proposed to the States Gen
eral the admission of Adams as " minister of the Congress
of North America."" As the Friesians were said to carry
through everything that they undertook, it was generally
thought that a treaty with the United States would soon be
perfected. Adams himself did not share in this opinion.'
Neither did the French court think the acknowledgment
of American independence by the Dutch in the near future
probable, because there was nothing which rendered such a
step necessary. The Foreign Secretary at Paris informed
the French ambassador to the United Provinces that it was
most important for France not even indirectly to promote
such a measure. She could not wish, he said, to guarantee
the consequences to the Republic which might result from
the recognition of the United States.* Strange to say,
Amsterdam was now opposed to closer relations with
America. Van der Capellen attributed this to intrigues.
He had also heard that Vauguyon was dissuading the Dutch
from recognizing the United States, but this rumor, he de
clared, was without foundation. He would regret extremely
if the United Provinces should neglect this opportunity
'Thulemeier to Frederick II, February 26, 1782 (Bancroft MSS.,
Prussia and Holland).
'Resolution of the States General, March 5, 1782 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII). Friesland played a prominent part for the American cause by its
enthusiasm for liberty. The students of the University of Franeker
held a grand festival, celebrating the future of the young republic.
Then the province was leading in the recognition of the independence
of the United States and the admission of Adams as American
minister. When finally the United States was recognized by the
States General, the " Society of Citizens " at Leeuwarden, on May
8, 1782, resolved to have a medal struck in commemoration of the
event (Griffis, Brave Little Holland, 231 ; Collection of State Papers,
pamphlet 24).
'J. Adams to Livingston, March 11, 1782 (Wharton, V, 234-236).
'Vergennes to Vauguyon, March 7, 1782 (Sparks MSS.,
LXXXIII).

405] The United States and the United Provinces. 227
for furthering their commerce, navigation and industry.^
Many petitions from Dutch manufacturers and merchants,
and also from the municipalities of cities, such as Dort and
Leyden, were directed to the authorities of the separate
states and even to the States General, demanding closer com
mercial relations with the United States and the admission
of Adams." The growing popular sentiment in favor of
America was now soon to prompt a decision in the United
Provinces. The second province which urged the States General to
admit Adams as minister plenipotentiary of the United
States was Holland and Westfriesland. The provincial as
sembly passed a resolution to this effect on March 29, 1782,'
and communicated it immediately to the States General, at
the same time making it known to Adams through the Grand
Pensionary. Adams thanked that official very warmly and
expressed the hope that the other provinces would soon
follow the example given by Friesland and Holland.* In a
little more than three weeks this was accompUshed. Over
yssel followed on April 5," Zealand on April 8, Groningen
'Van der Capellen to Valck, March 13, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 272) ; same to A. M. Jansen, March 14, 1782 (ibid.,
275). ' J. Adams to Livingston, March 19, 1782 (Wharton, V, 248 ff. ;
A Collection of State Papers, pamphlets Nos. 6 ff.) ; Vauguyon to
Vergennes, March 15, 1782 (Sparks MSS., LXXXIII) ; Thulemeier
to Frederick II, March 22, 1782 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia and
HoUand). 'Wharton, V, 258; Sparks MSS., CIII; A Collection of State
Papers, pamphlet 17; Dumas to Livingston, March 29, 1782 (Whar
ton, V, 276) ; Thulemeier to Frederick II, March 29, 1782 (Ban
croft MSS., Prussia and Holland).
'J. Adams to van Bleiswijck, March 31, 1782 (Wharton, V, 289).
About this time extracts from van der CapeUen's correspondence
with the Araericans were published in the Courant and caused great
surprise and excitement in the United Provinces. The author was
proud that his efforts for the American cause had not been without
result. Still, he said, what could the friends of the United States
have done if Adams had not been in the United Provinces? "That
the latter had been appointed by Congress minister plenipotentiary
to the United Provinces, van der CapeUen attributed to his letters
to Trumbull and Livingston, in which he had recoraraended the
sending over of an American envoy (Van der Capellen to Valck, in
Beaufort, Brieven van der Capellen, 284).
'Van der CapeUen to J. Adams, AprU 6, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, Aanhangsel, 59).

228 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [406
on April 9, Utrecht on April 10, Guelderland on April 17,
and the States General finaUy resolved upon the admission
of John Adams on April 19.^ On April 22 the latter pre
sented his credentials to the Prince of Orange, on which
occasion nothing remarkable happened. Adams in his ad
dress to WUliam V emphasized the friendly feelings existing in
America for the United Provinces, and the prince answered
in such a low and indistinct way that the American minister
understood only the statement that the stadtholder had put
no difficulty in the way of the reception." A few days later
Adams presented a memorial to the president of the States
General, in which he formally proposed the conclusion of a
treaty of amity and commerce between the United States
and the United Provinces, and asked that a commission be
appointed with full powers to negotiate with him on the
subject.' The deputies for foreign affairs, thereupon, were
instructed by the States General to confer with the American
minister, which they did, receiving from him a draft of the
treaty. Copies were sent to all the provinces for delibera
tion, and, at the same time, the original draft was referred
to the deputies for naval matters for examination. After
this committee should have obtained the advice of the col-
' Collection of State Papers, pamphlets Nos. 18 ff. ; Sparks MSS.,
CIII, under dates of April 8 to 22, 1782; J. Adams to Livingston,
April 19, 1782 (Wharton, V, 315-319).
The resolution of the States General of April 19, 1782, was in the
following terms : " DeUberated by resumption upon the address and
the ulterior address made by Mr. Adams the 4th of May, 1781, and
the 9th of January of the current year to the president of the assem
bly of their high mightinesses, to present to their high mightinesses
his letters of credence, in the name of the United States of North
America, and by which ulterior address the said Mr. Adams has
demanded a categorical answer to the end to be able to acquaint his
constituents thereof; it has been thought fit and resolved that Mr.
Adams shall be admitted and acknowledged in quality of envoy of
the United States of North America to their high mightinesses as he
is admitted and acknowledged by the present" (Wharton, V, 319).
'J. Adams to Livingston, AprU 22, 1782 (Wharton, V, 319, 320);
Thulemeier to Frederick II, April 23, 1782 (Bancroft MSS., Prussia
and Holland).
°J. Adams to Livingston, April 23, 1782 (Wharton, V, 325);
Resolution of the States General, April 23, 1782 (Sparks MSS.,
CIII).

407] The United States and thc United Provinces. 229
leges of the admiralty, a full report was to be presented to
the States General for final decision.^
A perfect revolution had thus taken place in the inner
politics of the United Provinces, the EngUsh party having
lost ground completely, and the Prince of Orange being
compelled to yield to public sentiment, which had grown
decidedly anti-English. The Due de la Vauguyon said that
the Dutch nation had avenged itself " of all the political and
other evils which the English have done them since Crom
well." The Spanish envoy expressed himself similarly in
declaring that Adams " had struck the greatest blow which
had been given in Europe for a long time."^
Adams thought now that it was time to do something for
the men who had been especiaUy helpful to him in bringing
about the success of the American cause in the United Prov
inces and who hitherto had not received the reward they
deserved. He mentioned, above aU, Dumas, the American
correspondent, whom he recommended for an appointment
as secretary of legation and charge d'affaires at the Hague.
Then he called the attention of Congress to Mr. Thaxter, a
gentleman whose " indefatigable application to the affairs of
the United States, and whose faithful friendship" to Adams
recommended him to the favor of Congress. Next, Ed
mund Jennings of Brussels was lauded, having "honored"
the American minister " with his correspondence," and hav
ing been often serviceable to the United States. Finally
Adams praised M. A. M. Cerisier, " one of the greatest his
torians and political writers in Europe, author of the
' Tableaux de I'Histoire des Provinces Unies des Pays Bas,' "
and of the " Politique HoUandois." His pen, the minister
said, had erected a monument to the American cause more
glorious and more durable than brass or marble. " I have
had no money," Adams concluded, "but my salary, and
that has been never paid me without grudging. If I have
friends in Europe, they have not most certainly been made
' Secret Resolutions of the States General, AprU 26, 1782 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).
'Dumas to Livingston, May 10, 1782 (Wharton, V, 409).

230 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [408
by power, nor money, nor any species of corruption, nor
have they been made by making promises, or holding out
alluring hopes. I have made no promises, nor am I under
any obligation but that of private friendship and simple
civility to any man, having mentioned such as have been
my friends because they have been friends to the United
States, and I have no other, in Europe at least, and recom
mended them to the attention of Congress, as having ren
dered important services to our country, and able to render
still greater."^
In the meantime the deputies for naval matters had de
liberated upon the projected treaty with the United States,
and considered the advice of the colleges of the admiralty.
They proposed some slight changes in Adams' draft, which
had to be submitted to the latter for examination and ap
proval." Since all the provinces had to pass upon the treaty
bill, the American minister thought that it would be three
months before the treaty itself would be signed. An aUiance
between the two republics had not yet been proposed by him,
since he waited for the advice of the French ambassador,'
who apparently was not in a hurry to give it.* In a confer
ence with the Grand Pensionary Adams suggested that the
United Provinces should send an ambassador to Congress,
and consuls at least to Boston and Philadelphia. Mr. van
Bleiswijck answered that it was difficult to find a man who
was able to act as ambassador and at the same time wilUng
to undertake such a long voyage." Adams became now the
recipient of many attentions in the United Provinces. The
'J. Adams to Livingston, May 16, 1782 (Wharton, V, 420-423).
Dumas was not proposed to Congress as American charge d'af
faires, Livingston establishing the principle that a foreigner should
not act as regular representative of the United States abroad, and
that such positions must be filled by Americans (Livingston to the
President of Congress, September 12, 1782, in Wharton, V, 719).
'Resolution of the States General, May 21, 1782 (Sparks Dutch
Papers). 'J. Adams to Livingston, June 9, 1782 (Wharton, V, 482).
' The French court was against the alUance, preferring not to have
their hands bound (Adams to Livingston, September 6, 1782, in
Wharton, V, 706).
°J. Adams to Livingston, June 15, 1782 (Wharton, V, 495).

409] The United States and the United Provinces. 23 1
merchants of the city of Schiedam sent a deputation inviting
him to an entertainment in his honor and sending congratu
lations to Congress.^
At about the middle of August, the treaty of amity and
commerce was passed by the provinces, and the States Gen
eral proposed final conferences with the American minister."
At last, on October 8, 1^82, the treaty and a convention
concerning recaptures were signed by both parties at the
Hague and sent to America for the ratification of Con
gress.' Both documents were signed by Congress on Janu
ary 23, 1783,* and returned to the United Provinces, where
they arrived in May. In the absence of Adams, who had
been commissioned to Paris in order to take part in the
peace negotiations there, Dumas, acting for the American
minister, exchanged the ratifications with the States General
of June 23. On the same day van Berckel, burgomaster of
Rotterdam and brother of the pensionary of Amsterdam,"
having been appointed minister plenipotentiary of the States
General to Congress, set sail for the United States."
The conclusion of the treaty with the United Provinces
was a signal success for the United States. The Dutch Re-
'J. Adams to Livingston, July 5, 1782 (Wharton, V, 595-597).
'Dumas to Livingston, August 16, 1782 (ibid., V, 662).
'J. Adams to Livingston, October 8, 1782 (ibid., V, 803, 804);
Secret Resolution of Holland and Westfriesland, October 17, 1782
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
'They are printed under this date in the Journal of Congress
(Wharton, V, 805). The ratification by the States General is dated
December 27, 1782 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Davies, History of Holland, HI, 479.
'J. Adams to Livingston, May 30, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 457);
Dumas to the States General, June 5, 1783 (ibid., VI, 476, 477) ;
Dumas to Livingston, June 23, 1783 (ibid., VI, 502).
Regarding the appointment of a Dutch envoy to the United
States see also : Adams to Livingston, June 15, 1782 (Wharton,
V, 495) ; Resolution of Holland and Westfriesland, December 12,
1782 (Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Dumas to Livingston, December 12,
1782 (Wharton, VI, 130) ; same to same, January 11, 1783 (ibid.,
VI, 204) ; same to same, January 20, 1783 (ibid., VI, 221) ; same to
same, March 14, 1783 (ibid., VI, 271).
For the reception of van Berckel by Congress see: Secret Jour
nal of Foreign Affairs, October 25, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 714) and
van Berckel's reports of October 20 and November 4, 1783, both
received by the States General on December 22, 1783 (Sparks
Dutch Papers).

232 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [410
public was the first nation, after France, to enter into closer
relations with America. There was, however, a vast differ
ence between the two agreements. With France, the treaty
was in some degree an act of charity and had been felt as
such by the United States, but with the United Provinces the
parties had negotiated as equals. Furthermore the recogni
tion of American independence by the Dutch and the con
clusion of the treaty between the two republics established
the value of the United States in the eyes of the world,
thereby marking a step forward in the independent national
life of the new commonwealth.^
'Trescot, Diplomacy of the Revolution, 89-91.
The United Provinces were soon to discover that this treaty with
Araerica was not of raaterial advantage to them. The United
States proved to be rivals rather than customers of the Dutch
Republic. By 1786 they had taken away from the Dutch a con
siderable portion of the trade to China. American merchants also
established a flourishing though iUicit commerce with the Dutch
West Indian colonies, Surinam, and the Cape of Good Hope,
thereby greatly decreasing the trade between the United Provinces
and their colonies (Davies, History of Holland, III, 479, 480).

CHAPTER IX.
Peace.
Not having succeeded in concluding a separate peace with
the United Provinces, England tried to sever France from
the rest of her enemies by offering a separate peace to her.
In case this should not be feasible, England proposed a
general peace.^ The Due de Vergennes flatly declined to
enter upon negotiations regarding separate peace and de
clared that it would be the privilege of France and her
allies to make the propositions for peace which they con
sidered acceptable." The Dutch, hoping that France, while
negotiating for a general peace, would also defend their
interests, asked Louis XVI to make assurances in this re
spect. He answered evasively that he made it an unalterable
law to guard carefully the interests essential to the dignity
and prosperity of the United Provinces.' When it was
understood that Great Britain had authorized Mr. Oswald
and the EngUsh ambassador at Paris, Fitzherbert, to treat
with the four powers at war with her,* the States General
chose Mr. de Brantzen as special minister to support the
Dutch minister at Paris, Lestevenon de Berkenrode," in
negotiating for peace." The two plenipotentiaries of the
Republic were to negotiate with England on the basis, first
of all, that the Dutch, in conformity with the principles of
the Armed Neutrality, as a conditio sine qua non, were " in
'Secret Resolution of the States General, May 21, 1782 (Sparks
MSS., CIII).
'Berkenrode (Dutch envoy at Paris) to the States General, May
26, 1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'Berkenrode to the States General, July 14, 1728 (Bancroft
MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'J. Adams to H. Laurens, August 15, 1782 (Wharton, V, 662);
same to Dana, September 17, 1782 (ibid., V, 732).
°J. Adams to Livingston, August 18, 1782 (ibid., V, 665).
'J. Adams to Jay, August 17, 1782 (ibid., V, 664).
233

234 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [412
fuU possession and indisputable enjoyment of the rights of
the neutral flag and of free navigation ;" that naval stores
should henceforth be regarded as free merchandise and not
contraband; that all Dutch possessions taken by the Eng
lish were to be restored to the United Provinces ; and that
losses, "unjustly" caused by Great Britain, should be in
demnified by the latter.^ Of the other powers the Cbunt
d'Aranda was to represent Spain in the peace negotiations
at Paris ; Franklin and Jay, the United States.^ When Ber
kenrode and Brantzen, however, handed a copy of their
credentials to Fitzherbert, he declared that he did not yet
have sufficient instructions from his government,' and it
soon became evident that England would not be inclined to
restore all of her conquests of Dutch territory. Count de
Vergennes had sent a special ambassador, M. de Rayneval,
over to Great Britain, in order to sound the English ministry
regarding the sincerity of their desire for peace. This
diplomat reported that Lord Shelburne had declared that
England would keep the Dutch fort Trinconomale on the
coast of Ceylon because it suited her well.* Difficulties were
also encountered with another of the conditions of the
United Provinces. Vergennes told their plenipotentiaries
that a failure of the negotiations, or at least a long delay,
would be Ukely if the States General insisted on free navi
gation according to the principles of the Armed Neutrality
as a conditio sine qua non. England would most certainly
not grant it, since, in this form, it would involve a general
law. He proposed, therefore, that the Dutch should merely
mention free navigation as one of their conditions for peace,
without adding to it the obnoxious clause regarding the
treaty of the Armed Neutrality." In fact, Fitzherbert, a
'Wharton, V, 665, 666; Secret Resolution of the States General,
August 19, 1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'J. Adams to Livingston, Septeraber 23, 1782 (Wharton, V, 7Si).
° Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, September 19,
1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
' Conferences of M. de Rayneval with Lord Shelburne, October,
1782 (Wharton, V, 821).
° Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, November 7,
1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).

413] Peace. 235
few days later, received information from his government
that the Dutch conditio sine qua non would not be con
sidered.^ The English ambassador also hinted to the Dutch
plenipotentiaries that the conditions of the States General,
as they were now, would never be accepted by Great Brit
ain, and recommended their modification before they should
be formally presented to him." This advice, however, was
not heeded, and the conditions remained practically un
changed, even the article concerning free navigation, on the
g;round that full enjoyment of free navigation according to
the principles of the Armed Neutrality had been proposed
to the United Provinces in an official letter which the Eng
lish secretary of state. Fox, had addressed to Simolin, the
Russian ambassador at London, on May 4, 1782.'
In the meantime John Adams had joined Franklin and
Jay in Paris to take part in the peace negotiations. At the
beginning of December Adams verbally informed the Dutch
plenipotentiaries that the preliminaries, as far as the United
States and Great Britain were concerned, had already been
signed on November 30, 1782,* but that definitive peace
was only to be concluded in concurrence with the other bel
ligerent powers. In a confidential appendix to their report
regarding this conversation with Adams, Berkenrode and
Brantzen stated that Louis XVI had promised to restore to
the States General all Dutch territories which should be in
the possession of France at the conclusion of peace." The
fear of the Dutch that they might eventually lose one or the
other of their colonies which had been recaptured by the
French from Great Britain was thus removed, but the
' Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, November 18,
1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
' See statement dated November 29, 1782, in Sparks MSS., XL.
'Articles presented by Berkenrode and Brantzen to Fitzherbert
on December 6, 1782 (Sparks MSS., XL; Bancroft MSS., America,
Holland, and England).
*J. Adams' Journal, December 3, 1782 (Wharton, VI, 103-105).
'Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, December 3,
1782 (Bancroft MSS., America, HoUand, and England) ; van der
CapeUen to Valck, December 15, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven van der
Capellen, 418).

236 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [414
negotiations did not proceed as the States Ckneral wished.
In the first interview which Berkenrode and Brantzen had
with Fitzherbert after the presentation of the Dutch peace
conditions, the Englishman flatly rejected the indemnity
claims of the States General for losses at sea.^ He con
fined himself to a discussion of this article, but it was to be
expected that in the succeeding conferences he would deal
with the other articles in a similar way. In the United
Provinces the Dutch peace conditions were not generally
approved. Van der Capellen thought it a mistake to de
mand free navigation as a sine qua non, since Great Britain
had not even acknowledged to Russia the principles of the
Armed Neutrality, and could not be expected to act differ
ently toward the United Provinces. What then, he asked,
was the use of insisting on a condition which would never be
accepted?" France and England now reached an agreement
also; and there was only one point of difference left be
tween Spain and Great Britain,' so that little remained as
far as these powers were concerned except the settUng of
the forms. Even France feared that the negotiations be
tween the United Provinces and England might cause delay
and embarrassment.* John Adams actively assisted the
Dutch plenipotentiaries in Paris, whenever he could. He
supported especially their claims regarding free navigation,
as may be seen from his own words : —
" Unnecessary, however, as any exertions of mine have been, I
have not omitted any opportunity of throwing in any friendly sug
gestions in my power where there was a possibility of doing any
good to our good friends the Dutch. I have made such suggestions
to Mr. Fitzherbert. But with Mr. Oswald I have had several very
serious conversations upon the subject. So I have also with !Mr.
Vaughan and Mr. Whitefoord.
" "To Mr. Oswald I urged the necessity of Great Britain's agreeing
with the Dutch upon the unlimited freedom of navigation, from a
variety of topics, some of which I may explain to you more partic
ularly hereafter. Thus much I may say at present, that I told him
'December 6, 1782 (Sparks MSS., XL).
'Van der Capellen to Hooft, Deceraber 5, 1782 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 410-412).
'J. Adams' Journal, Deceraber 5, 1782 (Wharton, VI, 109).
'Vergennes to Luzerne, the French envoy to Congress, December
19, 1782 (Wharton, VI, 152).

41 S] Peace. 237
that it was impossible for Great Britain to avoid it ; it would prob
ably be insisted upon by all the other powers. France and Spain,
as well as Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, the Emperor, and
Portugal, as well as Holland, had already signed the armed neu
trality. The United States of America had declared themselves
ready to sign, and were ready. The combination being thus power
ful. Great Britain could not resist it. But if she should refuse to
agree to it with Holland, and the other powers should acquiesce,
and HoUand should make peace without it (which would never,
however, be the case), yet all would be ineffectual, for Holland
would forever be able to make use of other neutral bottoms, and
would thus enjoy the benefit of this Uberty and reality, though
denied it by treaty and in appearance. It would, therefore, be
more for the honor and interest of Great Britain to agree to it with
a good grace in the treaty with Holland. Nay, the wisest part she
could act would be to set on foot a negociation immediately for
signing herself the treaty of the armed neutrality, and then admit
ting it into the treaty with Holland would be a thing of course. At
one of these conversations Dr. Franklin was present, who sup
ported me with all his weight; at another, Mr. Jay seconded me
with aU his abilities and ingenuity. Mr. Oswald has several times
assured me that he had written these arguments and his own
opinion, in conformity with them, to the King's ministers in Lon
don, and I doubt not they wUl be adopted.'"
When Fitzherbert at last replied officially to the memo
randum of the Dutch plenipotentiaries of December 6, the
answer was such that it cast a gloom over the whole nation.
Free navigation in conformity with the articles of the
Armed Neutrality was rejected. It was admitted that Fox
had proposed free navigation, but the question at stake had
then been a separate peace between the two nations. The
proposition of Mr. Fox was now void, since the Dutch had
refused it. Great Britain, Fitzherbert stated, would return
to the United Provinces all Dutch possessions in the hands
of England at the conclusion of peace except Trinconomale
on the island of Ceylon. Losses at sea, he declared further,
could not be indemnified by Great Britain, because she had
been compelled to make war upon the Republic and had not
begun the hostilities deliberately." On January 20, 1783,
the preliminary articles of peace were signed by the repre
sentatives of England on the one hand, and France and
'J. Adams to Dumas, January i, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 191-192).
' Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, January 5, 1783
(Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England) ; Lord Grantham
to Fitzherbert, December 18, 1782 (Sparks MSS., XL).

238 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [416
Spain on the other. At the same time the cessation of hos
tilities was arranged by the ministers of these powers, to
which measure the United States, through Franklin and
Adams, also acceded.^ The United Provinces were not yet
ready to sign preliminaries," but were included in fhe
armistice.' That France had not delayed the signing of the
preliminary treaty until the negotiations between the United
Provinces and England were also concluded was bitterly
resented by the Dutch, who now considered themselves
abandoned by the French and delivered over to the hatred
or mercy of Great Britain.* Vergennes assured the Repub
lic again, that France would not conclude peace with Eng
land definitely, unless the United Provinces were included.
The preUminary treaty, he said, had been necessary, because
the United States were exhausted and had asked through
Franklin for twenty miUions to be able to carry the war
through another campaign. France, however, was not in
a position to grant this loan. Taxes, he further explained,
could not be increased in America, since this might cause
an insurrection and jeopardize everything. Spain was also
exhausted and absolutely demanded the conclusion of the
preliminary agreement.
The only important point which the Dutch, so far, had
gained during the negotiations was that England had re
nounced Trinconomale, but she demanded Negapatam in
stead. The States General, however, were decided not to
grant this, and still insisted upon free navigation." The
negotiations had thus arrived at a dead-lock. The States
' English Coraraissioners' Declaration of the Cessation of Hos
tilities, January 20, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 223, 224).
'FrankUn to Livingston, January 21, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 225).
'Vergennes to Luzerne, January 22, 1783 (Doniol, Histoire, V,
278) ; Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, January 23,
1783 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
George III proclaimed the cessation of hostilities on February
14, 1783, including the United States, France, Spain, and the United
Provinces (Wharton, VI, 251, 252) ; Groot Placaatboek, IX. 159.
'Van der Capellen to Jansen, January 29, 1783 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 496-499) ; same to Tegelaar, February 13, 1783
(ibid., 516, 517).
' Dumas to Adams, February 4, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 235, 236).

417] Peace. 239
General now thought of eliminating the question of free
navigation from the peace conferences by proposing to
France, Spain, and the United States a separate joint con
vention on the principles of the Armed Neutrality. Their
High Mightinesses tried to secure the cooperation of the
American ministers in Europe, who were wiUing to aid the
States General as much as their instructions allowed,^ but
the whole plan failed. Meanwhile the negotiations made
no progress, the United Provinces not yet being willing to
make concessions of importance. In February the States
of Holland and Westfriesland passed a resolution, accord
ing to which new instructions should be sent to Berkenrode
and Brantzen." The States General approved of it, though
the provinces of Friesland, Zealand, and Groningen had not
yet consented, which made the resolution unconstitutional.'
Conferences were now held not only between the Dutch and
English plenipotentiaries at Paris, but Brantzen sent his
secretary, Mr. For, to England in order to negotiate there
directly with the Foreign Secretary, Fox. StiU no agree
ment was brought about at either place.*
As an expedient England was said to have proposed to
France that the latter should cede to Great Britain the
French island of Tabago in the West Indies, in which case
England would restore Negapatam to the Dutch. It would
be left to the French, then, to obtain a suitable compensation
from the United Provinces, but Louis XVI, it was asserted,
declined to turn Tabago over to Great Britain. " France,"
' Dumas to J. Adams, January 24, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 229, 230) ;
same to same, January 28, 1783 (ibid., 232) ; J. Adams to Dumas,
January 29, 1783 (ibid., 232, 233) ; Dumas to J. Adams, January 30,
1783 (ibid., 233, 234) ; same to sarae, February 4, 1783 (ibid., 235) ;
J. Adams to Dumas, February 5, 1783 (ibid., 236) ; Dumas to Adams,
February 18, 1783 (ibid., 255, 256) ; same to same, March 6, 1783
(ibid., 273) ; Dumas to Livingston, April 18, 1783 (ibid., 384) ;
Livingston's Memorandum of June 3, 1783, etc. (ibid., 473, 474) ;
Report of a Committee of Congress, June 12, 1783 (ibid., 482,
483). 'Resolutions of Holland and Westfriesland, February 21, 1783
(Sparks Dutch Papers).
'Dumas to J. Adams, March 4, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 272).
'Dumas to Livingston, May 8, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 416).

240 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [418
said van der Capellen, " in rejecting this proposition, gives
evidence, that she does not consider the friendship of the
Republic worth a small and deserted island."^ The leader
of the Patriots also mentioned these rumors to the French
charge d'affaires at the Hague, who said he did not believe
in them. Berenger defended the attitude of his country
toward the Republic. France, he said, was by no means
indifferent toward the friendship of the United Provinces,
in whose prosperity and independence she took the most
sincere interest."
Toward the end of July, the situation relative to the
Dutch-English negotiations was not materially changed.
The following letter of the American minister at the Hague,
who had returned from Paris after the preliminaries were
signed and his business terminated there, describes excel
lently the state of affairs as far as the United Provinces
were concerned: —
" It is the general opinion here, both among the members of the
States and at the Hotel de France, that the delays of the definitive
pacification are contrived by the court of London in order to set all
their instruments at work in this Republic to induce it to renew its
ancient connexions with Great Britain, particularly their alliance,
offensive and defensive, by which each power was bound to furnish
the other, if attacked, a certain number of ships and troops. Against
this the patriotic party is decided, and they are now very well satis
fied with the grand pensionary, Bleiswick, because he openly and
roundly takes their side, and the court is said to be discontented with
him for the same reason. There is, no doubt, an intelligence and
correspondence between the two courts of London and the Hague to
bring about this point. The grand pensionary told me yesterday
that the court of London desired it, and there were persons here who
desired it, and he knew very well who they were; but that most
certainly they would not carry their point. Van Berckel, Visscher,
and Gyselaer all assured me of the same, and added that the fear
of this had determined them not to send a minister to London, but
to go through with the negociation at Paris, although they were all
highly dissatisfied with the conduct of France, and particularly with
that of the Count de Vergennes.
'Van der Capellen to Jansen, May 30, 1783 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 606).
' Berenger to van der Capellen, June 6, 1783 (Beaufort, Brieven
van der Capellen, 609).
Doniol (Histoire, V, 283 ff.) tries to show in detail that France
was very much occupied with the welfare of the United Provinces
and anxious to obtain as favorable a peace for them as was possible
under the circumstances.

419] Peace.

241

" They all say he has betrayed and deserted them, played them a
very bad trick (tour), and violated his repeated promises to them.
They do not in the least spare M. Berenger and M. Merchant, who
conduct the French affairs here in the absence of the Due de la
Vauguyon, but hold this language openly and freely to them. These
gentlemen have sometimes found it hard to bear, and have winced
and sometimes even threatened; but their answer has been more
mortifying still : ' Do as you please, drive the Republic into the arms
of England if you will. Suppress all the friends of France, if you
chose it.' And some of them have said. ' We will go to America.'
They all say that France had the power to have saved them; that the
acquisition of Tobago was no equivalent to France for the loss of the
Republic, etc., etc., etc. They are all highly pleased with the conduct
of their own ambassador, Brantzen, with his activity, inteUigence, and
fidelity. They all say that they would send a minister to London to
negociate there, if they were sure of being able to carry an election
for a man they could depend upon. But the court here would have
so much influence in the choice that they would run a risk of send
ing a man who would insensibly lead them into a revival of the old
ties with England, which they say is enslaving the Republic to that
kingdom. " I learn here from all quarters a confirmation of what I had
leamed before at Paris from M. Brantzen and the Due de la Vau
guyon, viz., that the Duke of Manchester had given them no answer,
nor said a word to them for six weeks, in answer to the propositions
they had made; among which was an offer of an equivalent for
Negapamam. "They offered some establishments in Sumatra and
Surat. Lately the Duke of Manchester has received a courier, and
has given an answer that a real equivalent might be accepted. No
answer is given to any other point, and this is vague ; so that another
courier must go to London and return. Parliament is now up, and
perhaps the ministers may now be more attentive and less timorous.'"
The belief, general in the Republic, that France had faUed
to put pressure upon Great Britain in favor of the Dutch
and would finally conclude a separate peace with England,
caused great apprehension to her adherents in the United
Provinces.^ It was evident that French influence was
rapidly decreasing and that the Orangist, that is, English,
party, was gaining correspondingly. The latter endeavored
to detach the Republic entirely from France and to restore,
by a revival of the alliance of 1674, the former friendly
relations with England. Adams thought that the apparent
change in the French policy was a blunder of Vergennes,
'J. Adams to Livingston, July 25, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 596, 597)-
' Same to same, August 3, 1783 (ibid., VI, 632, 633) ; van der
CapeUen to Racer, August 5, 1783 (Beaufort, Brieven van der
CapeUen, 648-650) ; van der Capellen to Baron de Breteuil, Septem
ber I, 1783 (ibid., «(55-66s).
16

242 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [420
who did not know how to negotiate with free nations. " He
can not enter into the motives," the minister said, "which
govern them; he never penetrates their real system, and
never appears to comprehend their constitution."^
With Vergennes' support the Dutch plenipotentiaries tried
again to save Negapatam for the United Provinces, but their
efforts were in vain. They offered to Great Britain the
Dutch establishments on the west coast of Sumatra. Eng
land, however, refused on the ground that those territories
would not be of the least use to her. She insisted on the
cession of Negapatam and, besides, demanded unlimited
free navigation in the East, that is to say, among the Dutch
East Indian possessions. Furthermore, an agreement was
to be made between the two nations relating to the com
merce on the African coast. Berkenrode and Brantzen then
offered an equivalent in money for Negapatam. For two
months they did not receive an answer, and when it arrived
it was a refusal. George III promised that Negapatam
should be returned to the Dutch later, if a suitable compen
sation would be found. Seeing that England was decided
not to make peace, unless Negapatam was ceded, the Dutch
plenipotentiaries yielded in this point. They asked, how
ever, that the conditions concerning free navigation in the
eastern seas should be dropped, as well as the article regard
ing the salute to the English flag, which had also been de
manded. The sea, the Dutch pleaded, was free and there
was therefore no reason why a particular dominion over the
sea should be recognized. The British negotiator still in
sisted on his conditions, although Vergennes now actively
supported the Dutch ministers. Since all the other treaties
were ready to be signed, the latter asked the States General
for speedy instructions.-"
Toward the end of August Vergennes informed Berken
rode and Brantzen that the court of Great Britain was urg
ing the powers concerned to designate a day for the signing
'J. Adams to Livingston, July 31, 1783 (Wharton, VI, 623, 624).
' Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, August 13, 1783
(Sparks Dutch Papers).

42 1 ] Peace. 243
of the definitive treaties. He said that he could not delay
the conclusion of the final agreement any longer. France
as well as Spain, he continued, was now compeUed to keep
a large quantity of troops in the field, which was a heavier
strain on the finances of both countries than they could
afford, while the uncertain political situation greatly
damaged French commerce. In his opinion, all these evUs
were due to the delay of the negotiations caused by the
indecision of the United Provinces. The Dutch plenipoten
tiaries protested, asserting that the delay had not been their
fault and that the States General should be given sufficient
time for deliberation. Thereupon the third of September
was fixed as the day for the signature.'^
The States General now instructed their plenipotentiaries
again to represent to the English peace commissioner the in
justice and unfairness of the British conditions, and to try
all means to obtain better terms. Berkenrode and Brantzen
were also to remind Vergennes of Louis XVI's promise not
to separate his cause from that of the Republic, and to
request his active cooperation for the sake of the United
Provinces. The plenipotentiaries were authorized only in
case all these efforts should fail, to comply with the English
conditions, namely, the cession of Negapatam, free naviga
tion in the eastern seas and the salute to the English flag on
the high seas, but to concede only as much as was absolutely
necessary in order to avoid an exclusion of the Dutch from
general peace."
After receiving these directions, Berkenrode and Brantzen
called upon Vergennes, who informed them that he had
already asked the British government to grant more
moderate conditions to the Dutch, but that his request had
not been complied with. He then called the attention of
the commissioners to the services which France had ren-
' Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, August 25, 1783
(Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
' Secret Resolution of Holland and Westfriesland, August 26, 1783
(Sparks Dutch Papers) ; Secret Resolution of the States General,
August 28, 1783 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).

244 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [422
dered to the United Provinces in the saving of the Cape of
Good Hope to the Dutch, in the recapture of their posses
sions in the East and West Indies, and other matters. The
United Provinces, he said, had not been fortunate in
their measures and the enemy, naturally, now took ad
vantage of it. In 1763 France had been in the same position
and had been compelled to accept the hard terms stipulated
by Great Britain. Vergennes declared that he tried to delay
the signing of the treaties, by informing England of the de
termination of Louis XVI not to make peace, unless the
United Provinces were included. Nevertheless, circum
stances made it necessary to come to a conclusion and to
fix the date for the signatures.
The Dutch plenipotentiaries then had a conference with
the Duke of Manchester, the special English peace commis
sioner at Paris. No understanding, however, could be
reached. In order to have the Dutch-English preliminaries
signed before the other powers concluded their definitive
treaties, Berkenrode and Brantzen, on September 2, sent
their treaty project to the Duke of Manchester.^ It was
immediately signed by the latter and by both Dutch plenipo
tentiaries." The definitive treaty of peace between Great
Britain and the United Provinces was concluded at Paris on
May 20, 1784, being subsequently ratified at St. James on
June 10, and at the Hague on June 15 of the same year.
The treaty contained eleven articles, of which the foUow
ing were of importance: Article two stipulated that the
vessels of the Republic should salute those of Great Britain
in the same manner as before the war. According to article
four the States General had to cede to England the city of

'Berkenrode and Brantzen to the States General, September 3,
1783 (Bancroft MSS., America, Holland, and England).
'Projet d' Articles PraeUminaires de Paix entre Sa Majeste le Roi
de la Grande Bretagne et Leurs Hautes Puissances les Etats Gene
raux des Provinces Unies des Pais-Bas. — A la Haye. Chez Isaac
Scheltus etc., 1783.
They were signed by the plenipotentiaries at Paris on September
2, 1783; by the respective governments at St. James on September
10, 1783, and at the Hague on September 26, 1783 (Sparks Dutch
Papers).

423] Peace.

245

Negapatam, but the latter was to be restored to the United
Provinces, in case an equivalent should be offered. Article
five provided for the restitution to the United Provinces of
all their possessions that Great Britain or the English East
India Company had conquered during the war. In article
six the States General promised not to hinder the navigation
of the subjects of England in the eastern seas. Article
seven arranged that commissioners should be named to settle
the difficulties between the English African Company and
the Dutch West India Company regarding navigation on the
coast of Africa.^
Concerning the United Provinces Great Britain had thus
absolutely made her own conditions, to which the former,
not being able to carry on the war alone, were compelled
to submit. It was different with the other powers. The
United States were recognized as an independent nation
whose boundaries should be the Mississippi River on the
west, Florida on the south, and the southern boundary of
Canada on the north. Furthermore the Americans should
have the right of fishing on the coast of Newfoundland and
in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, while the coasts of the United
States would not be open for fishing to English subjects.
France received back her possessions in the East Indies, as
well as Tabago in the West Indies and Senegal in Africa."
Spain regained Florida and the island of Minorca.
The United Provinces by accepting England's conditions
suffered permanent and very painful losses. Ceylon and
the Moluccas had, in fact, been wrenched from them by
Great Britain : the possession of Negapatam, together with
free navigation among the Molucca islands, enabled England
to establish there a flourishing smuggling trade in spices, thus
enjoying all the advantages of this commerce while in no
wise contributing to the expenses of keeping up the planta-
'Traite de Paix entre Sa Majeste le Roi de la Grande Bretagne et
Leurs Hautes Puissances les Etats Generaux des Pais-Bas. — A la
Haye. Chez Isaac Scheltus, etc., 1784 (Sparks Dutch Papers).
'France had paid dearly for this success, since the war cost her
1250 million livres (Pfister, Die amerikanische Revolution, II, 350).

246 Dutch Republic and American Revolution. [424
tions. The obligation of saluting the English flag was also
considered very humiliating by the Dutch.^
The United Provinces, which had proved themselves the
benefactors of the United States and France during the
gigantic struggle just terminated, must then be considered
the real and only victims of the American Revolution. Both
abroad and at home was this true, for party dissensions in
the United Provinces during the contest widened to such a
degree that reconciliation became hopeless, and a revolution
unavoidable. When this catastrophe a few years later reaUy
occurred, England with the aid of Prassia seized the oppor
tunity to subdue the Republic still further, and her depend
ence upon her British neighbor became complete.
'Van der Capellen to Baron de BreteuU, September I, 1783 (Beau
fort, Brieven van der Capellen, 658).

INDEX.

Adams, John, 77, 79-80, 93-94,
134 (note), 143, 148, 149, 156
(and note), 159, 160 (note),
161, 164 (note), 169 (note),
176 (note), 179-180, 187
(note), 192, 201, 202 (note),
206-211, 213-231, 235, 236-235
238, 240-242.
Adams, Samuel, 70.
"Adriana," 103.
"Alliance," 68.
American commissioners, 9 (and
note), 70-73, 91, 92. See also
Adams, John, etc.
Amsterdam, 14, 31, 38, 65, 88-
92, 97, 103, 107, III, 112, 113,
114, IIS, 116 (and note), 120,
123, 125, 127 (note), 128, 131,
132, 145 (note), 146, 150, 154-
155, i68, 171-172, 186, 191
(note), 194, 197, 226.
"Andrew Doria," 45 (note), 47-
49, 55-
Andrews, John (quoted), 9-10,
141, 190 (and note).
Armed Neutrality, 139-169.
Army of United Provinces, 15,
98-100, 114 (and note), 118,
127 (note), 128.
Aruba, island of, 42 (note).
Baird, WiUiam, 186 (and note).
" Baltimore Hero," 47, 48, 51-52.
Beaumarchais, P. A. C. de, 70-
71.
Beranger, 84, 240.
Berbice, 42 (note), 185, 186
(note).
Berkenrode, Lestevenon van, 84,
120, 201, 233, 234, 235, 242,
243-244.
Bonaire, island of, 42 (note).
Bondt, Nicolaus, 173.
Bosc de la Calmette, 177.
Bouille, Marquis de, 188-189.
Brandsenburg, Baron van Heeck
eren van, 147, 148, 149-150,
163, 177-

Brunswick, Duke Louis Ernest
of, 13-14, 31, 49-50, 117 (note),
133-134, 146 (note), 152, 153-
154, 196.
Bylandt, Count-van7""58-59, 62,
iSOjjWtgST 185.
Calkoen, Hendrik, 172.
Cape of Good Hope, 190, 199,
244.
Carmichael, WilUam, 71-73.
Catherine II, 138-142, 146
(note), 147, ISO, 160, 163 (and
note), 167, 178-179, 193, 194,
19s (and note), 196-198, 201.
Cerisier, A. M., 116 (note), 169
(note), 170 (note), 229.
Ceylon, 245.
Cobenzel, 160.
Cockburn, Colonel, 189.
Colenbrander, H. T. (quoted),
no (note), 112 (note).
Colpoys, Captain, 44, 57.
Commerce of United Provinces,
15, 25-28, 3&-45, 55, 58, 61-62,
95-137-
" Comtesse de Scarborough," 62,
64, 67.
Congress of the United States,
23, 70, 75, 78, 79, 92-93, 143
(note), 205-206, 209, 215, 222,
231.
Contraband trade of United Pro
vinces, 26, 36-45, 55-56, 58,
61-62.
Convoys, Dutch, 54, 58, 97, 107,
no. III, 113-114, 121, 124, I2S-
127, 128-130, 136-137, 191 (and
note).
Cotineau de Corgelin, Captain,
66, 67.
Crul, Vice-Admiral, 183.
Curagao, island of, 42 (note),
183, 185 (note).
Curson, Samuel, 187 (note).
Dana, Francis, 157, 198.
d'Aranda, Count, 234.

247

¦248

Index.

[426

De Brantzen, 233, 234, 235, 242,
243-244.
De la Lande and Fynje, 215.
De la Motte-Piquet, Vice-
Admiral, 187-188.
De Livoncourt, 68.
De Rayneval, 234.
Deane, Silas, 23, 24, 70, 71, 84,
86, 93-
"Debora en Maria," I03-
Demerari, 42 (note), 183, 185,
186 (note).
Denmark, 142, 198.
Desnoyers, Abbe, 17, 21, 27, 38-
39-
Doggersbank, battle off the, 42
(note), 191-193-
Doniol, H., quoted, 240 (note).
Dordrecht, 123, 191 (note).
Dort, 128, 227.
Drake, Rear-Admiral, 183.
Dumas, C. W. F., 23-24, 74, 85,
88, 98, no, 113, 144, 147, 169
(note), 186, 205 (note), 212
(note), 213, 229, 230 (note),
231.
Durat, Count de, 185.
East Indies, 190.
"Eendragt," 185.
Essequibo, 42 (note), 183, 185,
186 (note).
Fagel, Griffier, 17 (note), 152,
193 (note).
"Fairy," 152.
Fielding, Captain, 130, 132.
Fitzherbert, AUeyne, 233-238.
Fort Orange, 45 (note), 46-49,
55-
Foster, Alexander, 25.
Fox, Charles James, 200, 237.
France, attitude toward England,
9-10; toward America, 17-20;
toward United Provinces, 22;
financial relations with Amer
ica, 70-71, 73-74, 7^' ^°^' ^^°~
213, 214, 216; trade relations
with England and United Pro
vinces, 95-96, IOI, 102, 104,
106, 115-117; capture of St.
Eustatia by, 188-189; projected
aUiance with United Pro

vinces, 201-204; attitude con
cerning American minister to
United Provinces, 219-226 ;
conclusion of peace, 233-246.
Franklin, Benjamin, 17, 23, 24,
70, 82-«3, 84, 86, 93, 136
(note), 143, 166, 187, 205 (and
note), 207, 210, 211, 212, 213,
214, 234.
Frederick II, 10, 101-102, 117-
119, 121, 124, 146 (note), 167,
177-178, 180, 193 (note), 194,
201.
Free ships, free goods, 96, 100,
139-142, 199-
Friesland, 29, 106, 114 (note),
116 (note), 122, 13s, 158, 180
(note), 202, 213, 225, 226 (and
note), 239.
Fulda, Prince Bishop of, 180
(note).
Gallitzin, Prince Dimitri de, 143-
144, 145, 146, 147, 194-
George III, 27, 28, 29, 30, 53, 99,
123, 129, 133, 147, 155-156, 161,
165-166, 182, 192, 242.
Gillon, Alexander, 35 (note),
208.
Goertz, Count, 178.
Gouverneur, Isaac, Jr., 187
(note).
Graaf, Johannes de, 44-49, 52,
53-54, SS, 57-58, 59-60, 187
(note).
Grand Pensionary, office of, 12
(note). See also Van Bleis
wijck.
Grasse, Count de, 188-189, 201.
Great Britain, Dutch commerce
and, 25-27; Scotch brigade,
28-32; complaints of Dutch
non-neutrality, 36-69 ; inter
ference with Dutch commerce,
97-137; attempt to make alli
ance with Russia, 138-142, 160-
161 ; and the Armed Neutrality,
139-148, 151-169; at war with
United Provinces, 174-193;
attempts at pacification be
tween United Provinces and,
193-201 ; conclusion of peace,
233-246.
Greathead, President, 45, 47-^48.
Grenada, island of, 185.

427]

Index.

249

Griffis, William EUiot, 170
(note), 171 (note).
Groningen, 29, 135, 158, 227, 239.
Guelderland, 14, 29, 114 (note),
127 (and note), 145, 158, 228.
Gunpowder, trade in, 39-40.
Haarlem, 122, 123, 125, 128, 191
(note).
Harris, Sir James, 138-139, 141,
150, 160-161, 163-164, 167, 178-
179, 197, 198, 199 (note).
Harrison, Richard, 43, 57 (note).
" Hendrick en Alida," 103.
Hesse-Darmstadt, Landgrave of,
180 (note).
Hobus, G., 185.
Hodge, William, 25.
Holland, province of, 14, 30, 54,
112, 113, 114 (note), ns
(note), 124, 125-127, 128, 13s,
144, 145. 146, 154, 155, 157,
158, 159, 164, 199 (note), 213,
227, 239.
Holland Society, of Philadelphia,
170 (note), of New York, 171
(note).
Hood, Sir Samuel, 183.
"Hoop," 56, 57, 103-
Hope, J. W., III.
Horneca, Fizeaux, and Company,
78, 79-
Hyder-Ali, Prince, 190.
Jay, John, 211 (note), 223, 234.
Jefferson, Thomas, 23.
Jennings, Edmund, 229.
"Jenny," 57-
Johnstone, Captain, 190.
Jones, John Paul, 62-69.
Joseph II, 193, 194, 195, 203.
Laurens, Henry, 82, 151-152, 206,
211, 214 (note).
Lee, Arthur, 23, 24, 70, 71, 77, 83,
86, 93, 114-
Lee, Richard Henry, 70.
Lee, William, 88-89, 90-91, I33-
Legation building, American, at
the Hague, 225-226.
Leyden, 227.
Livingston, Robert R., 198-199,
222 (note), 230 (note).
Loans to America, by France,
70-71, 73-74, 76, 208, 210^213,

216; by Holland, 71-73, 74-76,
78-83, 206-208, 210, 211-215.
Louis XVI, 22, 73, 76, 80, 104,
112-113, 115, 120, 121, 122, 136-
137, 201 (note), 208, 212, 233,
235, 239.
Luxembourg, Chevalier, 35
(note).
Luzac, Jean, 170 (note).
Luzerne, A. C. de la, 221.
Manchester, Duke of, 244.
Markoff, 198.
"Mars," 182.
" Martina," 103.
" May," 51-
MelviU, Captain, 191.
" Mercury," 206.
Minorca, island of, 10, n, 195,
24s-
Molucca Islands, 245.
Montserrat, island of, 189.
Munro, Sir Hector, 190.
Navigation, freedom of, 140-141,
234-^44.
Navy of United Provinces, IS,
86, 95, 114 (and note), 118,
I2S (note), 126, 127 (note),
137, 144, 148, 158, 177, 180,
191, 204.
Negapatam, 190, 238, 242, 243,
^45-
Neuf ville, Jean de, 90, 112, 208,
211, 214.
Nevis, island of, 189 (note).
North, Lord, 29, 196, 200.
Oorthuys, Captain, 191.
Oostergoo, quarter of, 223.
Orange, Prince of, see WUliam
V.
Orangist party, 12, 111-112, 113,
116, 122, 124, 127, 147, 229, 241.
Oswald, Richard, 233.
Overyssel, 29, 31-33, "4 (note),
135, 158, 227.
Panin, Count, 138-139, 145-146,
160, 163, 178, 179.
Parker, Admiral Hyde, 191-193-
Parsons, Samuel, 183, 189.
Patriot party, 12, 109, in, 114,
158, 195, 202.
Portugal, 142 (note).

250

Index.

[428

Potemkin, Prince, 138-139, 146
(note).
Press, Dutch, 169-173.
Prussia, attitude during war, 10,
167 (and note). See also
Frederick II.
Rail, George, 57.
Rendorp, Burgomaster, 196, 199.
Reynolds, Captain, 183.
Reynst, Vice-Admiral, 66, 67.
Rockinghara, Marquis of, 200.
Roderique Hortalez and Com
pany, 70-71.
Rodney, Admiral J. B., 175
(note), 182-188, 189 (note),
201.
Roock, Captain A. de, 185.
Rotterdam, 103, 123, 124-125,
128, 186, 191 (note), 194, 197.
Russia, attempted aUiance with,
by Great Britain, 138-142, 160-
161, 167; and the Armed
Neutrality, 139-150, 167; at
tempt to make peace between
Great Britain and United Pro
vinces, 193, 194-201.
Saba, island of, 42 (note), 183.
St. Christopher, island of, 43,
184, 189 (note).
St. Eustatia, island of, 37, 42-62,
181-189.
St. Martin, island of, 42 (note),
182, 183.
St. Thomas, island of, 189.
Sayre, Stephen, 61 (and note),
80-81, 20s (note).
Schiedam, 128, 231.
Scotch brigade, 28-32.
"Seaford," 56.
" Serapis," 62, 64, 66.
Shelburne, Lord, 234.
Simolin, 194.
Spain, attitude during war, 10-
II, 142, 207-2C^.
Stadtholder (William V), see
WilUam V.
Stanley, John, 48.
Starrenberg, Baron van Wasse-
naer-, 147, 148, 149-150, 163,
177-
States General of United Pro
vinces, 12 (note), 26, 34, 44,
63, 64, 65, 86, 103-104, 106, no.

114, 116-117, 122, 128, 132, 134,
136, 147, 158, 159, 162, i6s, 168
(and note), 174, 177, 191
(note), 194, 197, 199, 204, 228,
239, 243-
Stormont, Lord, 131, 132 (and
note), 134, 13s, 147-148, 166,
195-
Suffolk, Lord, 24-25, 41^42.
Suffren, Admiral, 190.
Surinam, 42 (note), 183.
Swart, J. J. de, 131, 145 (and
note).
Sweden, 142, 198.
Tabago, island of, 239, 245.
Tegelaar, 207, 208.
Temminck, Burgomaster, 53,
154-
Thaxter, Mr., 229.
Thulemeier, 61, 74, 86, 98, 102,
117 (note), 121, 133, 144-14S,
219, 221 (note).
Treaty negotiations, between
France and America, 84-86;
between United Provinces and
America, 84-88, 223, 232; be
tween Amsterdam and Amer
ica, 88-92; between America,
France, and United Provinces,
222-223 ; between America,
France, Great Britain, Spain,
and United Provinces, 233-
246.
Trinconomale, 42 (note), 190,
234, 237.
Triquetti, consul, 196.
United Provinces of the Nether
lands, government of, 11
(note) ; political parties, 12-14;
reasons for neutrality, 15-16;
efforts to remain neutral, 17,
25-35; relations with France,
19-20, 22; attitude toward
American Declaration of Inde
pendence, 21-22 ; contraband
trade with America, 36-62;
John Paul Jones incident, 62-
69; financial relations with
America, 71-73, 74-76, 78-83,
205-215; treaty relations with
America, 84-88; refusal to ac
credit American minister, 92-
94; controversy over English

429]

Index.

251

interference with Dutch com
merce, 97-137 ; and the Armed
Neutrality, 144-169 ; drawn
into war with England, 151-
169, 174-193 ; attempts to make
peace between England and,
193-201 ; projected alUance
with France, 201—204; receives
American minister, 216-229 ;
treaty with United States, 229-
232; conclusion of peace, 233-
246.
United States of America, nego
tiations with France, 17-18;
representatives of, in Europe,
23-25; efforts to raise loans,
70-73, 74-76, 78-83; efforts to
make treaty of amity and com
merce -with United Provinces,
84-88 ; treaty negotiations with
Amsterdam, 88-92; attempt to
accredit American minister to
United Provinces, 92-94; and
the Armed Neutrality, 167
(note) ; negotiation of loans
in United Provinces and
France, 205-216; accredits
minister to United Provinces,
216-229; treaty with United
Provinces, 229-232 ; conclu
sion of peace, 233-246.
Utrecht, 30, 114 (note), 158,
174, 228.
Valck, Adriaan, 207.
Van Berckel, E. T., 88-92, 112,
168.
Van Berckel, P. J., 231.
Van Bibber, Abraham, 56.
Van Bleiswijck, Grand Pension
ary, 8s, 86-87, no, 123, 157,
193 (note), 196, 212, 220, 230.
Van Dam, Isaac, 43, 44.
Van der CapeUen, Joan Derk,
23, 31-33, 74-75, 78-79, 81-82,
93, 109 (note), 114, 152 (and
note), 163, 171 (and note),
192, 202, 205 (and note), 207,
208, 209, 212 (note), 214, 224-
225, 226-227, 236, 239.
Van der Capellen van de Marsch,
Baron, 222 (and note).
Van der Kemp, Adrian, 109
(note), 171 (note), 207.

Van der Sandheuvel, 224.
Van Goens, 170 (note), 171-172.
Van Lijnden, 177.
Van Staphorst, Nicholas and
Jacob, 215.
Vaughan, Major-General, 182.
Vauguyon, Duke de la, 14, 19-20,
84, 8s, 86, loo-ioi, 104, 106,
112-113, 11S-117, 120, 122, 136,
150, 194, 197, 202-203, 219, 220-
226, 229.
Vergennes, Count de, 17, 19,
120, 201, 221-222, 224 (note),
226, 233, 234, 238, 241-244.
"Vestal," 151.
Waldeck, Prince of, 34.
Washington, George, 211 (note).
"Watergeus," 56, 57.
Welderen, Count van, 22, 52, 97-
98, 103-104, 121, I2S, 130, 132,
14s, 162, 165-166.
Wentworth, Paul, 196, 199-200.
West India Company, 55, 56, 59,
60.
West Indies, 26, 27, 37, 181, 182
(note). See also St. Eustatia,
etc.
Wharton, Francis (quoted), 23.
Wheelock, Dr. Eleazar, 202
(note).
Wilhelmine, Princess of Orange,
13, 116, 117-118, ig6.
WiUiam V, 11 (note), 22, 30, 49-
50, 62, 66, 87, 98, IOI, 112, ns
(note), 117, 123, 127, 13s, 146
(note), 147, 152-154, 161, 191
(note), 192 (and note), 193
(note), 199-200, 201-202, 204,
209, 220, 222, 228, 229.
Willinks, Wilhelm and Jan, 215.
Witherspoon, Dr. John, Jr., 187
(note).
Wormer, John R. van, 171
(note).
Wiirttemberg, Duke of, 180
(note).
Yorke, Sir Joseph, 14, 17-19, 20-
21, 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39-
41, 43-44, 46, 49-51, 52, S3, 62-
67, 73, 80, 84, 8s, 87, 92 (and
note), 96, 98, 99-103, los, 109,
125, 127, 128-129, 145 (note).

252

Index.

[430

147, 148-149, 152-162, 164, 181.
Young, James, 51, 56-58.
Young, Captain W., 187 (note).
Zealand, 14, 30, 113, 114 (note),
122, 14s, 157 (and note), 158,

169 (and note), 180 (note),
194, 213, 227, 239.
Zeeberg, 122.
Zeegers, Lieutenant, 185.
Zoutman, Rear-Admiral, 191-
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