YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

THE IVORKS OF
JOSEPH BUTLER, LL.D.
LATE LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

TO -WHICH IS PREFIXED,
A LIFE OF THE AUTHOR,
BT DR EIPPIS ;
-WITH .A. PBEFA.OX!,
GIVING SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS CHAEACTEE AND WEITINGS,
BY SAMUEL HALIFAX, D. D.
LATE LOBD BISHOP OF GL0UCX9TXB.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. L

CAMBRIDGE, N. E.
PUBLISHED BY HILLIARD AND BROWN.
BOSTON,
HILLIARD, GRAT, LITTLE, AND fVILEINB.
1827.

BOSTOW,
Isaac K,. Butts & Co. Printsri,

TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
CHARLES, LORD TALBOT,
BARON OF HENSOL,
LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN,
THE FOLLOWiNG
TREATISE
IS, WITH ALL RESPECT, INSCRIBED
IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OP THE HIGHEST OBLIGATIONS
TO THE LATE
LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM, AND TO
HIMSELF
BY HIS lordship's MOST DUTIFUL,
MOST DEVOTED,
AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT,
JOSEPH BUTLER.

CONTENTS.

Page
Life op Dr Butler, by Dr Kippis, . . .9
Preface, by Bishop Halifax, . .16
Advertisement,  55
Introduction,  57

PART I. ,
OP NATUEAL EELIGION.
CHAP. I.
Of a Future Life,  67
CHAP. IL
Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pun
ishments ; and particularly of the latter, . 85
CHAP. III.
Of the Moral Govemment of God, . 97
CHAP. IV.
Of a State of Probation, as implying Trial, Diffi
culties, and danger, . . . . .211
1*

vi CONTENTS. CHAP. V.
Page.
Ofa State of Probation, as intended for Moral Dis
cipline and Improvement, ¦ ¦ *""
CHAP. VI,
Of the Opimon of Necessity, considered as influen
cing Practice, . . . . . .152
CHAP. VII.
Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme,
or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended, . 168
Conclusion,  179

PART II.
9
OF REVEALED EELIGION.
CHAP. I.
Of the Importance of Christianity, 185
CHAP. II.
Of the Supposed Presumption against a Revelation,
considered as Miraculous, .... 203
CHAP. III.
Of our Incapacity of Judging what were io be ex
pected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility, from
A nalogy, that it must contain Things appearing
liable to Objections, . . . .210

CONTENTS. vii
CHAP. IV. Page.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme, or Constitu
tion, imperfectly comprehended, . . 225
CHAP. V.
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Ap
pointment ofa Mediator, and the Redemption
of the world by him,  233
CHAP. VI.
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation ; and of
the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of if, 252
CHAP. VII.
Of the particular Evidence for Christianity, 271
CHAP. VIII.
Ofthe Objections which may be made against arguing
from the Analogy of Nature to Religion, . 307
Conclusion,  320

Two Dissertations on Personal Identity.
Dissert. 1  332
 II. , .  339

THE LIFE

or

DR BUTL.ER.

Dr Joseph Butler, a prelate of the most distin
guished character and abilities, was born at Wantage, in
Berkshire, in the year 1692. His father, Mr Thomas
Butler, who was a substantial and reputable shopkeeper
in that town, observing in his son Joseph* an excellent
genius and inclination for learning, deterrained to educate
him for the ministry, among the Protestant dissenters of
the presbyterian denomination. For this purpose, after
he had gone through a proper course of grammatical
literature, at the free grammar school of his native place,
under the care of the Rev. Mr Philip Barton, a clergy
man of the Church of England, he was sent to a dissent
ing academy, then kept at Gloucester, but which was
soon afterwards removed to Tewkesbury. The principal
tutor of this academy was Mr Jones, ',a man of uncom
mon abilities and knowledge, who had the honor of
training up several scholars, who became of great erai
nence, both in the established church and among the
dissenters. At Tewkesbury, Mr Butler made an extraor
dinary progress in the study of divinity ; of which he
gave a remarkable proof, in the letters addressed by hira
* He was the youngest of eight children.

X THE LIFE OF
while he resided at Tewkesbury, to Dr Samuel Clarke,
laying before him the doubts that had arisen in his mmd,
concerning the conclusiveness of some arguments in the
Doctor's demonstration of the being and attributes of
God. The first of these letters was dated the 4th No
vember, 1713; and the sagacity and depth of thought
displayed in it, immediately excited Dr Clarke's particu
lar notice. This condescension encouraged Mr Butler
to address the Doctor again upon the same subject,
which likewise was answered by him ; and the corres
pondence being carried on in three other letters, the
whole was ' annexed to the celebrated treatise before
mentioned, and the collection has been retained in all
the subsequent editions of that work. The management
of this correspondence was intrusted by Mr Butler to
his friend and fellow-pupil, Mr Seeker, who, in order to
conceal the affair, undertook to convey the letters to the
post-office at Gloucester, and to bring back Dr Clarke's
answers. When Mr Butler's name was discovered to
the Doctor, the candor, modesty, and good sense, with
which he had written, immediately procured bim the
friendship of that eminent and excellent man. Our
young student was not, however, during his continuance
at Tewkesbury, solely employed in metaphysical specu
lations and inquiries. Another subject of his serious
consideration was, the propriety of his becoming a dis
senting minister. Accordingly, he entered into an ex
amination of the^principles of non-conformity ; the result
of which was, such a dissatisfaction with them, as deter
mined him to conform to the established church. This
intention was, at first, disagreeable to his father, who
endeavored to divert him from his purpose ; and, with
that view, called in the assistance of some eminent pres
byterian divines ; but finding his son's resolution to be
fixed, he at length suffered him to be removed to Oxford,
where he was admitted a commoner of Oriel college, on
the 17th March, 1714. At what time he took orders
doth not appear, nor who the bishop was by whom he
was ordained ; but it is certain that he entered into the
church soon after his admission at Oxford, if it be true, as

DR BUTLER. xi
is asserted, that he sometimes assisted Mr Edward Tal"
bot in the divine service, at his living of Hendred, nea''
Wantage. With this gentleman, who was the second
son of Dr William Talbot, successively bishop of Oxford,
Salisbury, and Durham, Mr Butler formed an intimate
friendship at Oriel college ; which ^ friendship laid the
foundation of all his subsequent preferments, arid pro
cured for him a very honorable situation, when he was
only twenty six years of age. For it was in 1718 that,
at the recommendation of Mr Talbot, in conjunction with
that of Dr Clarke, he was appointed by Sir Joseph
Jekyll to be preacher at the Rolls. This was three years
before he had taken any degree at the University, where
he did not go out bachelor of law till the 10th June 1721,
which, however, was as soon as that degree could suita
bly be conferred upon him. Mr Buder continued at
the Rolls till 1726 ; in the beginning of which year he
published, in one volurae octavo, " Fifteen Sermons
preached at that Chapel." In the raeanwhile, by the
patronage of Dr Talbot, bishop of Durham, to whose
notice he had been recommended (together with Mr
Benson and Mr Seeker) by Mr Edv?ard Talbot, on his
death bed, our author had been presented first to the
rectory of Haughton, near Darlington, and afterwards to
that of Stanhope, in the same diocese. The benefice
of Haughton was given to him in 1722, and that of Stan
hope in 1725. At Haughton there was a necessity for
rebuilding a great part of the parsonage house, and Mr
Butler had neither money nor talents for that work. Mr
Seeker, therefore, who had always the interest of his
friends at heart, and acquired a very considerable influence
with Bishop Talbot, persuaded that prelate to give Mr
Butler, in exchange for Haughton, the rectory of Stan
hope, which was not only free from any such incum
brance, but was likewise of much superior value, being
indeed one ofthe richest parsonages in England. Whilst
our author continued preacher at the Rolls-Chapel, he
divided his time between his duty in town and country ;
but when he quitted the Rolls, he resided, during seven
years, wholly at ''tanhope, in the conscientious discharge

xii THE LIFE OF
of every obligation appertaining to a good parish priest.
This retirement, however, was too solitary for his dis
position, which had in it a natural cast of gloorainess.
And though his recluse hours were by no means lost,
either to private improvement or public utility, yet he
felt at tiraes, very painfully, the want of that select so
ciety of friends to which he had been accustomed, and
which could inspire him with the greatest cheerfulness.
Mr Seeker, therefore, who knew this, was extremely
anxious to draw hira out into a more active and conspicu
ous scene, and omitted no opportunity of expressing this
desire to such as he thought capable of promoting it.
Having hiraself been appointed king's chaplain, in 1732,
he took occasion, in a conversation which he had the
honor of holding with Queen Caroline, to raention to her
his friend Mr Butler. The queen said she thought he
had been dead. Mr Seeker assured her he was not.
Yet her Majesty afterwards asked Archbishop Blackburn
if he was not dead ; his answer was, " No, raadara ; but
he is buried." Mr Seeker continuing his purpose of
endeavoring to bring his friend out of his retirement,
found means, upon Mr Charles Talbot's being made lord
chancellor, to have Mr Butler recomraended to hira for
his chaplain. His lordship accepted, and sent for hira ;
and this proraotion calling him to town, he took Oxford
in his way, and was admitted there to the degree of doc
tor of law, on the Sth December, 1733. The lord chan
cellor, who gave him also a prebend in the church of
Rochester, had consented that he should reside at his
parish of Stanhope one half of the year.
Dr Butler being thus brought back into the world, his
merit and his to^ents soon introduced him to particular
notice, and p3ved the way for his rising to those high
dignities which he afterwards enjoyed. In 1736 he was
appointed clerk of the closet to queen Caroline ; and, in
the same year, he presented to her raajesty a copy of his
excellent treatise, entided, " The Analogy of Religion,
Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
Nature." His attendance upon his royal mistress, by
feer especial coramand, was from seven to nine in ih :

DR BUTLER. xiii
evening every day ; and though this particular relation to
that excellent and learned queen was soon determined
by her death in 1737, yet he had been so effectually
recomraended by her, as well as by the late Lord Chan
cellor Talbot, to his Majesty's favor, that in the next
year he was raised to the highest order of the Church,
by a nomination to the bishopric of Bristol ; to which see
he was consecrated on the third of December 173S.
King George II. not being satisfied with this proof of his
regard to Dr Butler, promoted him, in 1740, to the
deanery of St Paul's, London ; into which he was install
ed on the 24th May in that year. Finding the demands
of this dignity to be incorapatible with his parish duty at
Stanhope, he iraraediately resigned that rich benefice.
Besides our prelate's unreraitted attention to his peculiar
obligations, he was called upon to preach several dis
courses on public occasions, which were afterwards
separately printed, and have since been annexed to the
latter editions of the sermons at the Rolls-Chapel. In
1746, upon the death of Dr Egerton, bishop of Here
ford, Dr Butler was raade clerfc;of the closet to the king ;
and on the 16th October 1750, he received another
distinguished mark of his Majesty's favor, by being
translated to the see of Durham. This was on the 16th
of October in that year, upon the decease of Dr Edward
Chandler. Our prelate being thus appointed to preside
over a diocese with which he had long been connect
ed, delivered his first, and indeed his last charge to his
clergy, at his priraary visitation in 1751. The principal
object of itwas, "External Religion." The Bishop having
observed, with deep concern, the great and growing ne
glect of serious piety in the kingdom, insisted strongly on
the usefulness of outward forms and institutions, in fixing
and preserving a sense of devotion and duty in the minds
of men. In doing this, he was thought by several per
sons to speak too favorably of Pagan and Popish cererao
nies, and to countenance in a certain degree, the cause
of superstition. Under that apprehension, an able and
spirited writer, who was understood to be a clergyraan of
-ot 2

xiv THE LIFE OF
the Church of England, published in 1752, a pamphlet,
entitled, " A Serious Inquiry into the Use and Importance
of External Religion ; occasioned by some passages in the
Right Rev. the Lord Bishop of Durham's Charge to the
Clergy ofthat Diocese ; — Humbly addressed to his Lord
ship." Many persons, however, and webelieve the greater
part ofthe Clergy ofthe diocese, did not think our prelate's
Charge so exceptionable as it appeared to this author.
The Charge, being printed at Durham, and having never
been annexed to any of Dr Butler's other works, is now
become extremely scarce ; and it is observable, that it is
the only one of his publications which ever produced hira
a direct literary antagonist.*
By this proraotion, our" worthy bishop was furnished
with ample means of exerting the . virtue of charity ; a
virtue which eminently abounded in hira, and the exer
cise of which was his highest delight. But this gratifica
tion he did not long enjoy. He had been but a short firae
seated in his new bishopric, when his health began visi
bly to decline ; and having been corapliraented, during
his indisposition, upon afccount of his great resigna
tion to the Divine will, he is said to have expressed some
regret that he should be taken from the present world so
soon after he had been rendered capable of becoming
much raore useful in it. In his last illness he was carried
to Bristol, to try the waters of that place ; but these
proving ineffectual, he removed to Bath, where, being
past recovery, he died on the 16th of June 1752. His
corpse was conveyed to Bristol, and interred in the
cathedral there, where a monument, with an inscription,
is erected to his memory.
On the greatness of Bishop Butler's character we
need not enlarge ; for his profound knowledge, and the
prodigious strength of his mind, are araply displayed in
his incomparable writings. His piety was of the raost
serious and fervent, and, perhaps, soraewhat of the as
cetic kind. His benevolence was warra, generous, and
* This Charge, with all the rest of Bishop Butler's writings, is_ in
cluded in the present edition of his works.

DR BUTLER. xv
diffusive. Whilst he was bishop of Bristol he expended,
in repairing and improving the episcopal palace, four
thousand pounds, which is said to have been more than
the whole revenues of the bishopric amounted to, during
his continuance in that see. Besides his private bene
factions, he was a contributor to the infirmary at Bristol,
and a subscriber to three of the hospitals at London.
He was likewise a principal promoter, though not the
first founder of the infirraary at Newcasde, iri Northum
berland. In supporting the hospitality and dignity of the
rich and powerful diocese of Durhara, he was desirous
of imitating the spirit of his patron, Bishop Talbot. In
this spirit he set apart three days every week for the
reception and entertainment of the principal gentry of the
country. Nor were even the clergy who had the poorest
benefices neglected by him. He not only occasionally
invited them to dine with hira, but condescended to visit
them at their respective parishes. By his will he left five
hundred pounds to the Society for propagating the Gos
pel in Foreign Parts, and sorae legacies to his friends and
domestics. His executor and residuary legatee was his
chaplain, the Rev. Dr Nathaniel Forster, a divine of dis
tinguished literature. Bishop Butler was never married.
Soon after his decease, th^ following lines, by way of
epitaph, were written concerning him ; and were printed
first, if we recollect aright, in the London Magazine.
Beneath this marble, Butler lies entomb'd.
Who, with a soul enflamed by love divine,
His life in presence of his God consumed.
Like the bright lamps before the holy shrine.
His aspect pleasing, mind with learning fraught.
His eloquence was like a chain of gold.
That the wild passions of mankind controU'd ;
Merit, wherever to be found, he sought.
Desire of transient riches he had none ; ,
These he, with bounteous hand, did well dispense:
Bent to fulfil the ends of Providence ;
His heart still fix'd on an immortal crown ;
His heart a mirror was, of purest kind,
AVhere the bright image of his Maker shined ;
Reflecting faithful to the throne above,
The irradiant glories of the Mystic Dove.

PREFACE BY
THE EDITOR.

" When I consider how hght a matter very often subjects the best
" estabhshed characters to the suspicions of posterity, posterity
" often as mahgnant to virtue as the age that saw it was envious
" of its glory ; and how ready a remote age is to catch at a low
" revived slander, which the times that brought it forth saw de-
" spised and forgotten almost in its birth, I cannot but think it a
" matter that deserves attention." — Letter to the Editor of the
Letters on the spirit of Patriotism, Sfc. by Bishop Warbur
ton. See his works, vol. vii. p. 547.
The Charge to the Clergy of the Diocese of Durham
was printed and published in the year 1751, by the learn
ed prelate whose name it bears ; and, together with the
Serraons and Analogy of the sarae writer, both too well
known to need a more particular description, corapletes
the collection of his works. It has long been considered
as a matter of curiosity, on account of its scarceness ;
and it is equally curious on other accounts — its subject,
and the calumny to which it gave occasion, of represent
ing the Author as addicted to superstition, as indined to
popery, and as dying in the communion of the Church of
Rome. The improved edition of the Biographia Britan
nica, published under the care of Dr Kippis, having un
avoidably brought this calumny again into notice, it may
notbe unseasonable to offer a few reflections in this place,
by way of obviating any irapressions that may hence arise
to the disadvantage of so great a character as that of the
late Bishop Butler, referring those who desire a more

PREFACE BY THE EDITOR. Xvii
particular account of his life, to the third volume of the
same entertaining work, printed in 1784. Art. Butler,
(Joseph.)* I. The principal design of the Bishop in his Charge
is, to exhort his clergy to " do their part towards reviv
ing a practical sense of religion amongst the people com
mitted to their care ;" and, as one way of effecting this,
to " instruct them in the importance of external religion"
or the usefulness of outward observances in promoting
inward piety. Now, from the corapound nature of raan,
consisting of two parts, tiie body and the raind, together
with the influence which these are found to have on one
another, it follows, that the religious regards of such a
creature ought to be so framed, as to be in some way
properly accommodated to both. A religion which is
purely spiritual, stripped of every thing that may affect
the sense, and considered only as a divine philosophy of
the mind, if it do not mount up into enthusiasm, as has
frequently been the case, often sinks, after a few short
fervors, into indifference ; an abstracted invisible object,
like that which natural religion offers, ceases to raove or
interest the heart ; and something further is wanting to
bring it nearer, and render it more present to our view,
than merely an intellectual contemplation. On the other
hand, when, in order to remedy this inconvenience, re
course is had to instituted forras and ritual injunctions,
there is always danger lest men be tempted to rest en
tirely on these, and persuade themselves that a painful
attention to such observances will atone for the want of
genuine piety and virtue. Yet, surely, there is a way of
steering safely between these two extremes ; of so con-
sidting both the parts of our constitution, that the body
and the mind may concur in rendering our religious ser
vices acceptable to God, and at the sarae tirae useful to
ourselves. And what way can this be, but precisely that
which is recoramended in the Charge ; such a cultivation
* The account here alluded to, the reader will observe, is prefixed to
the present edition of Butler's works.
VOL. I. 2*

xviii PREFACE
of outward as well as inward religion, that from both
may result, what is the point chiefly to be labored, and
at all events to be secured, a correspondent temper and
behaviour ; or, in other words, such an application of the
forms of godliness, as may be subservient in promoting
the power and spirit of it ? No man, who believes the
Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and under
stands what he believes, but must know, that external
religion is as much enjoined, and constitutes as real a
part of revelation, as that which is internal. The raany
ceremonies in use among the Jews, in consequence of a
divine coraraand ; the baptism of water, as an emblem
of moral purity ; the eating and drinking of bread and
wine, as syrabols and representations of the body and
blood of Christ, required of Christians, are proofs of this.
On coraparing these two parts of religion together, one,
it is iraraediately seen, is of much greater iraportance
than the other ; and, whenever they happen to interfere,
is always to be preferred ; but does it follow from hence,
that therefore that other is of littie or no iraportance,
and, in cases where there is no corapetition, may entirely
be neglected ? Or rather, is not the legitimate conclusion
directly the reverse, that nothing is to be looked upon as
of littie importance, which is of any use at all in preserv
ing upon our minds a sense of the divine authority,
which recalls to our remerabrance the obligations we are
under, and helps to keep us, as the Scripture expresses
it, " in the fear of the Lord all the day long .'' "* If, to
adopt the instance mentioned in the Charge, the sight
of a Church should reraind a man of some sentiraent of
piety ; if, from the view of a material building dedicated
to the service of God, he should be led to regard himself,
his own body, as a living " temple of the Holy Ghost,"f
and therefore, no more than the other, to be profaned or
desecrated by any thing that defileth or is impure ; could
it be truly said of such a one that he was superstitious,
or mistook the means of religion for the end } If, to use
* Prov. xxiu. 17. t 1 Cor. vi. 19.

BY THE EDITOR. xix
another, and what has been thought a more obnoxious
instance, taken from the Bishop's practice, a cross, erect
ed in a place of public worship,* should cause us to
reflect on him who died on a cross for our salvation, and
on the necessity of our " own dying to sin,""!- and of
" crucifying the flesh with its affections and lusts ; " J
would any worse consequences follow from such senti
ments, so excited, than if the same sentiraents had been
excited by the view of a picture, of the crucifixion sup
pose, such as is commonly placed, and with this very
design, in foreign churches, and indeed in many of our
own ? Both the instances here adduced, it is very possi
ble, may be far from being approved, even by those who
are under the most sincere convictions of the importance
of true religion ; and it is easy to conceive how open to
scorn and censure they must be from others, who think
they have a talent for ridicule, and have accustoraed
theraselves to regard all pretensions to piety as hypocriti
cal or superstitious. But " Wisdom is justified of her
children." II Religion is what it is, " whether men will
hear, or whether they will forbear ;"§ and whatever in the
smallest degree promotes its interests, and assists us in
performing its comraands, whether that assistance be de
rived frora the medium of the body or the mind, ought
to be esteemed of great weight, and deserving of our
most serious attention.
However, be the danger of superstition what it may,
no one was more sensible of that danger, or more in
earnest in maintaining, that external acts of themselves
are nothing, and that moral holiness, as distinguished
frora bodily observances of every kind, is that which
constitutes the essence of religion, than Bishop Butier.
Not only the Charge itself, the whole intention of which
is plainly nothing more^than to enforce the necessity of
practical religion, the reality as well as forra, is a deraon
stration of this, but raany passages besides to the sarae
* See Note A, at' the end ofthis Preface.
t Rom, vi. 11. t Gal. v. 24. |1 Mat. xi. 19. § Ezek. ii. 5.

XX PREFACE
purpose, selected from his other writings. Take the
two following as specimens. In his Analogy he observes
thus: "Though mankind have, in all ages, been greatly
prone to place their religion in peculiar positive rites, by
way of equivalent for obedience to moral precepts ; yet,
without making any coraparison at all between them, the
nature of the thing abundantly shows all notions of tiiat
kind to be utterly subversive of true religion ; as they
are, moreover, . contrary to the whole general tenor of
Scripture, and likewise to the most express particular
declarations of it, that nothing can render us accepted of
God without moral virtue."* And to the sarae purpose
in his Serraon, preached before the Society for the Pro
pagation of the Gospel, in February 1738-9. " Indeed,
amongst creatures naturally formed for religion, yet so
much under the power of imagination as men are, super
stition is an evil which can never be out of sight. But
even against this, true religion is a great security, and the
only one. True religion takes up that place in the mind,
which superstition would usurp, and so leaves little room
for it ; and likewise lays us under the strongest obliga
tions to oppose it. On the contrary, the danger of su
perstition cannot but be increased by the prevalence of
irreligion ; and, by its general prevalence, the evil will be
unavoidable. For the coramon people, wanting a reli
gion, will, of course, take up with alraost any superstition
which is thrown in their way ; and, in process of tirae,
araidst the infinite vicissitudes of the political world, the
leaders of parties will certainly be able to serve them
selves of that superstition, whatever it be, which is get
ting ground ; and will not fail to carry it to the utmost
length their occasions require. The general nature of
the thing shows this ; and history and fact confirra it. It
is therefore wonderful, those people who seem to think
there is but one evil in life, that of superstition, should
not see that atheism and profaneness must be the intro
duction of it." f
* Analogy, Part ii. Chap. 1. t Serm. xvi.

BY THE EDITOR. X»i
He, who can think and write in such a manner, can
never be said to mistake the nature of real religion : And
he, who, after such proofs to the contrary, can persist in
asserting of so discreet and learned a person, that he was
addicted to superstition, must himself be much a stranger
both to truth and charity.
And here it may be worth our while to observe, that
the same excellent prelate, who by one set of men was
suspected of superstition, on account of his Charge, has
by another, been represented as leaning to the opposite
extreme of enthusiasm, on account of his two discourses
On the Love of God. But both opinions are equally
without foundation. He was neither superstitious, nor
an enthusiast ; his mind was much too strong, and his
habits of thinking and, reasoning much too strict and se
vere, to suffer him to descend to the weaknesses of either
character. His piety was at once fervent and rational.
When impressed with a generous concern for the declin
ing cause of religion, he labored to revive its dying
interests; nothing, he judged, would be more effectual
to that end, araong creatures so much engaged with
bodily things, and so apt to be affected with whatever
strongly solicits the senses, as men are, than a religion of
such a frame as should in its exercise require the joint
exertions of the body and the mind. On the other hand,
when penetrated with the dignity and iraportance of " the
first and great coraraandraent,"* love to God, he set
himself to inquire, what those moveraents of the heart
are, which are due to Hira, the Author and Cause of all
things ; he found, in the coolest way of consideration,
that God is the natural object of the same affections of
gratitude, reverence, fear, desire of approbation, trust,
and dependence, the sarae affections in kind, though
doubtless in a very disproportionate degree, which any
one would feel frora conteraplating a perfect character in
a creature, in which goodness, with wisdora and power,
are supposed to be the predominant qualities, with the
* Matt. xxii. 38.

xxii PREFACE
further circurastance, that this creature was also his gov
ernor and friend. The subject is manifestly a real one ;
there is nothing in it fanciful or unreasonable : This way
of being affected towards God is piety, in the strictest
sense. This is religion, considered as a habit of mind ;
a religion, suited to the nature and condition of man.*
II. From superstition to popery the transition is easy :
No wonder then, that in the progress of detraction, the
simple imputation of the former of these, with which
the attack on the character of our author was opened,
should be followed by the more aggravated imputation of
the latter. Nothing, I think, can fairly be gathered in
support of such a suggestion frora the Charge, in which
popery is barely mentioned, and occasionally only, and
in a sentence or two ; yet even there, it should be re
marked, the Bishop takes care to describe the peculiar
observances required by it, " sorae, as in theraselves
wrong and superstitious, and others of them as being
made subservient to the purposes of superstition." With
respect to his other writings, any one at all conversant
with them needs not to be told, that the matters treated
of, both in his Serraons and his Analogy, did, none of
them, directly lead him to consider, and much less to
combat, the opinions, whether relating to faith or worship,
which are peculiar to the church of Rorae. It might
therefore have happened, yet without any just conclusion
arising frora thence, of being himself inclined to favor
those opinions, that he had never mentioned, so much as
incidentally, the subject of popery at all. But fortu
nately for the reputation of the Bishop, and to the eternal
disgrace of his calumniators, even this poor resource is
wanting to support their malevolence. In his Sermon at
St Bride's before the Lord Mayor in 1740, after having
said that " Our laws, and whole constitution, go more
upon supposition of an equality amongst mankind, than
the constitution and laws of other countries;" he goes
on to observe, that " this plainly requires, that more par-
* See note B, at the end of this Preface,

BY THE EDITOR. xxiii
ticular regard should be had to the education of the
lower people here, than in places where they are born
slaves of power, and to be made slaves of supersti
tion ; " * raeaning evidentiy in this place, by the
general term superstition, the particular errors of the
Romanists. This is something ; but we have a still
plainer indication what his sentiments concerning popery
really were, from another of his additional Serraons, I
mean that before the House of Lords on June the Ilth,
1T47, the anniversary of his late Majesty's accession.
The passage alluded to is as follows ; and my readers
will not be displeased that I give it them at length : " The
value of our religious establishraent ought to be very
much heightened in our esteem, by considering what it
is a security from ; I raean that great corruption of Chris
tianity, popery, which is ever hard at work to bring us
again under its yoke. Whoever will consider the popish
claims, to the disposal of the whole earth as of divine
right, to dispense with the most sacred engagements, the
claims to suprerae absolute authority in religion ; in short,
the general claims which the Canonists express by the
words, plenitude of power — whoever, I say, will consider
popery as it is professed at Rorae, may see, that it is
raanifest open usurpation of all huraan and divine au
thority.^ But even in those Roman catholic countties
where these monstrous claims are not admitted, and the
civil power does, in many respects, restrain the papal ;
yet persecution is professed, as it is absolutely enjoined
by what is acknowledged to be their highest authority, a
general council, so called, with the Pope at the head of
it ; and is practised in all of them, I think, without ex
ception, where it can be done safely. Thus they go on
to substitute force instead of arguraent ; and external pro
fession raade by force, instead of reasonable conviction.
And thus corruptions of the grossest sort have been in
vogue, for many generations, in many parts of Christen
dom ; and are so still, even where popery obtains in its
' Serm. xvii.

xxiv PREFACE
least absurd form. And their antiquity and wide extent
are insisted upon as proof of their truth; a kind of proot,
which at best can only be presumptive, but which loses
all its litde weight, in proportion as the long and large
prevalence of such corruptions have been obtained by
force."* In another part of tiie same Sermon, where
he is again speaking of our ecclesiastical constitution, he
reminds his audience that it is to be valued, " not because
it leaves .us at liberty to have as little religion as we
please, without being accountable to human judicatories ;
but because it exhibits to our view, and enforces upon
our consciences, genuine Christianity, free from the su
perstitions with which it is defiled in other countries ; "
which superstitions, he observes, " naturally tend to abate
its force." The date of this Sermon should be here
attended to. It was preached in June 1747 ; that is,
four years before the delivery and publication of the
Charge, which was in the year 1751 ; and exactly five
years before the author died, which was in June 1752.
We have then, in the passages now laid before the reader,
a clear and unequivocal proof, brought down to within a
few years of Bishop Butier's death, that popery was held
by him in the utmost abhorrence, and that he regarded it
in no other light, than as the great corruption of Chris
tianity, and a manifest, open usurpation of all human and
divine authority. The argument is decisive ; nor will
any thing be of force to invalidate it, unless from some
after-act during the short remainder of the Bishop's life,
besides that of delivering and printing his Charge, (which,
after what I have said here, and in the Notes added to
this Preface and to the Charge, I must have leave to
consider as affording no evidences at all of his inclina
tion to papistical doctrines or ceremonies) the contrary
shall incontrovertibly appear.
III. One such after-act, however, has been alleged,
which would effectually demolish all that we have urged
in behalf of our Prelate, were it true, as is pretended,
* Serm. xx.

BY THE EDITOR. xxv
that he died in the communion of the Church of Rome.
Had a story of this sort been invented and propagated
by papists, the wonder might have been less.
Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Airidts.
But to the reproach of Protestantisra, the fabrication of
this calumny, for such we shall find it, originated from
among ourselves. It is pretty remarkable, that a circum
stance so extraordinary should never have been divulged
till the year 1767, fifteen years after the Bishop's de
cease. At that time Dr Thomas Seeker was Archbishop
of Canterbury ; who, of all others, was the most likely
to know the truth or falsehood of the fact asserted, hav
ing been educated with our Author in his early youth,
and having lived in a constant habit of intiraacy with
him to the very tirae of his death. The good Arch
bishop was not silent on this occasion : with a virtuous ,
indignation he stood forth to protect the posthumous
character of his friend ; and in a public newspaper, uri-
der the signature of Misopseudes, called upon his accuser
to support what he had advanced, by whatever proofs
he could. No proofs, however, nor any thing like a
proof, appeared in reply ; and every man of sense and
candor at that time was perfectly convinced the assertion
was entirely groundless.* As a further confirmation of
the rectitude of this judgment, it raay not be araiss to
mention, there is yet in existence a strong presumptive
arguraent at least in its favor, drawn frora the testiraony
of those who attended our Author in the sickness of
which he died. The last days of this excellent prelate
were passed at Bath ; Dr Nathaniel Forster, his chap
lain, being continually with hira ; and for one day, and
at the very end of his illness, Dr Martin Benson also,
the then Bishop of Gloucester, who shortened his own
life in his pious haste to visit his dying friend. Both
these persons constantly wrote letters to Dr Seeker, then
Bishop of Oxford, containing accounts of Bishop But-
• See note C, at the end of fhis Preface.
3

xxvi PREFACE
ler's declining health, and of the symptoms and progress
of his disorder, which, as was conjectured, soon termina
ted in his death. These letters, which are still preserved
in the Lambeth Library,* I have read ; and not the
slenderest argument can be collected from them, in justi
fication of the ridiculous slander we are here considering.
If at that awful season the Bishop was not known to
have expressed any opinion tending to show his dislike
to popery, neither was he known to have said any thing,
that could at all be construed in approbation oi it ; and
the natural presumption is, that whatever sentiraents he
had forraerly entertained concerning that corrupt system
of religion, he continued to entertam them to the last.
The truth is, neither tbe word nor the idea of popery
seems once to have occurred either to the Bishop hira
self, or to those who watched his parting raoraents :
Their thoughts wers otherwise engaged. His disorder
had reduced him to such debility, as to render him inca
pable of speaking much or long on any subject : the few
bright intervals that occurred were passed in a state of
the utmost tranquillity and composure ; and in that cora
posure he expired. " Mark the perfect man, and behold
the upright; for the end of that man is peace. "f " Let
me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end
be like his."t
Out of pure respect for the virtues of a man, whom I
had never the happiness of knowing, or even of seeing,
but from whose writings I have received the greatest bene
fit and illumination, and which I have reason to be thank
ful to Providence for having early thrown in ray way, I
have adventured, in what I have now offered to the public,
to step forth in his defence, and to vindicate his honest
fame from the attacks of those, who, with the vain hope
of bringing down superior characters to their own level,
are for ever at work in detracting from their just praise.
For the literary reputation of Bishop Buder, it stands too
* See note D at the end of this Preface.
t Psalm xxxvii. 37 J Numb, xxiii. 10.

BY THE EDITOR. XXvii
high in the opinion of the world, to incur the danger of
any dirainution : but this, in truth, is the least of his ex
cellencies. He was more than a good writer, he was a
good man ; and what is an addition even to this eulogy,
he was a sincere Christian. His whole study was direct
ed to the knowledge and practice of sound morality and
true religion ; these he adorned by his life, and has re
commended to future ages in his writings ; in which, if my
judgment be of any avail, he has done essential service
to both, as much, perhaps,-as any single person, since the
extraordinary gifts of " the word of wisdom and the word
of knowledge " * have been withdrawn.

In what follows I propose to give a short account ofthe
Bishop's moral and religious systems, as these are col
lected frora his works.
I. His way of treating the subject of morals is to be
gathered frora the volurae of his Serraons; and particu
larly from the three first, and frora the preface to that
volume. " There is," as our author with singular sagacity has
observed, " a rauch more exact correspondence between
the natural and moral world, than we are apt to take no
tice of."f The inward frarae of man answers to his out
ward condition ; the several propensities, passions, and
affections, iraplanted in our hearts by the Author of na
ture, are in a particular manner adapted to the circum
stances of life in which he hath placed us.. This general
observation, properly pursued, leads to several important
conclusions. The original internal constitution of man,
corapared with his external condition, enables us to dis
cern what course of action and behaviour that constitution
* 1 Cor. xii. 8. f Serm. vi.

xxviii PREFACE
leads to, what is our duty respecting that condition,
and furnishes us besides with the most powerful arguments
to the practice of it. . . .
What the inward frame and constitution of man is, is
a question of fact; to be deterrained, as other facts are,
from experience, from our internal feelings and external
senses, and frora the testimony of others. Whether hu
raan nature, and the circumstances in which it is placed,
might not have been ordered otherwise, is foreign to our
inquiry, and none of our concern. Our province is, taking
both of these as they are, and viewing the connexion be
tween thera, frora that connexion to discover, if we can,
what course of action is fitted to that nature and those
circurastances. From conteraplating the bodily senses,
and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we learn
that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with.
In like manner, from considering our inward perceptions
and the final causes of thera, we collect that the feeling
of sharae, for instance, was given to prevent the doing of
things sharaeful ; corapassion, to carry us to relieve others
in distress ; anger, to resist sudden violence offered to
ourselves. If, continuing our inquiries in this way, it
should at length appear, that the nature, the whole nature
of raan leads hira to, and is fitted , for, that particular
course of behaviour which we generally distinguish hy
the name of virtue, we are authorized to conclude, that
virtue is the law we are born under, that it was so intend
ed by the Author of our being ; and we are bound by the
Vnost intiraate of all obligations, a regard to our own high
^interest and happiness, to conforra to it in all situations
and events.
Huraan nature is not simple and uniforra, but raade up
of several parts ; and we can have no just idea of it as a
systera or constitution, unless we take into our view the re
spects and relations which these parts have to each other.
As the body is not one raember, but many ; so our in
ward structure consists of various instincts, appetites, and
propensions. Thus far there is no difference between hu
man creatures and brutes. But besides these common

BY THE EDITOR. xxix
passions and affections, there is another principle peculiar
to raankind, that of conscience, moral sense, reflection,
call it what you please, by which they are enabled to re
view their whole conduct, to approve of some actions in
themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this prin
ciple will of course have some influence qn our behaviour,
at least at times, will hardly be disputed ; but the particu
lar influence which it ought to have, the precise degree
of power in the regulating of our internal frame that
is assigned it by Him who placed it there, is a point of
the utraost consequence in itself, and on the determination
of which, the very hinge of our Author's Moral System
turns. If the faculty here spoken of be, indeed, what it
is asserted to be, in nature and kind, superior to every
other passion and affection ; if it be given, not merely that
it may exert its force occasionally, or as our present hu
mor or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all times
exercise an uncontrollable authority and governraent over
all the rest ; it will then follow, that, in order to cora
plete the idea of huraan nature as a sygfem, we must not
only take- in each particular bias, propension, instinct,
which are seen to belong to it, but we must add, besides,
the principle of conscience, together with the subjection
that is due to it from all the other appetites and passions :
just as the idea of a civil constitution is forraed, not barely
frora enuraerating the several members and ranks of which
it is coraposed, but from these considered as acting in va
rious degrees of subordination to each other, and all un
der the direction of the supreme authority, whether that
authority be vested in one person or more.
The view here given of the internal constitution of
raan, and of the supreraacy of conscience, agreeable to
the conceptions of Bishop Butier, enables us to compre
hend the force of that expression, common to hira and
the ancient moralists, that virtue consists ia following na
ture. The meaning cannot be, that it consists in acting
agreeably to that propensity of our nature which happens
to be the strongest ; or which propels us towards certain
objects without any regard to the methods by which they
3*

xxx PREFACE
are to be obtained : but the meaning must be, that virtue
consists in the due regulation and subjection of all the
other appetites and affections to the superior faculty of
conscience ; frora a conformity to which alone our actions
are properly natural, or correspondent to the nature, to
the whole nature, of such an agent as man. From hence
too it appears, that tiie Author of our frarae is by no
means indifferent to virtue and vice, or has left us at lib
erty to act at randora, as humor or appetite may prompt
us ; but that every man has the rule of right within him ;
a rule attended in the very notion of it with authority,
and such as has the force of a direction and a comraand
frora Hira who made us what we are, what course of be
haviour is suited to our nature, and which he expects
that we should follow. This moral faculty iraplies also a
presentiraent and apprehension, that the judgment which
it passes on our actions, considered as of good or ill de
sert, will hereafter be confirraed by the unerring judgraent
of God ; when virtue and happiness, vice and misery,
whose ideas are now so closely connected, shall be indis
solubly unhed, and the divine government be found to
correspond in the raost exact proportion to the nature he
has given us. Lastiy, this just prerogative or supreraacy
of conscience it is, which Mr Pope has described in his
Universal Prayer, though, perhaps, he raay have express
ed it rather too strongly where he says,
" What conscience dictates to be done,
Or warns me not to do.
This teach me more than hell to shun.
That, more than heaven pursue."
The reader will observe, that this way of treating the
subject of morals, by an appeal to facts, does not at all
interfere with that other way, adopted by Dr Sarauel
Clarke and others, which begins with inquiring into the
relations and fitness of things, but rather illustrates and
confirras it. That there are essential differences in the
qualities of huraan actions, established by nature, and

BY THE EDITOR. XXXi
that this natural difference of things, prior to and in
dependent of all will, creates a natural fitness in the
agent to act agreeably to it, seems as little to be denied,
as that there is the moral difference before explained,
from which we approve and feel a pleasure in what is
right, and conceive a distaste to what is wrong. Still,
however, when we are endeavoring to establish either
this raoral or that natural difference, it ought never to be
forgotten, or rather it will require to be distinctly shown,
that both of these, when traced up to their source, sup
pose an intelligent Author of nature, and raoral Ruler of
the world; who originally appointed these differences,
and by such an appointraent has signified his will that
we sliould conforra to them, as the only effectual method
of securing our happiness on the whole under his govern
ment.* And of this consideration our prelate himself
was not unmindful; as may be collected frora many ex
pressions in different parts of his writings, and particularly
from the following passages in his Xlth Serraon. " It
may be allowed, without any prejudice to the cause of
virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and rais
ery are, of all our ideas, the nearest and raost iraportant
to us ; that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought
to prevail over those of order, and beauty, and harraony,
and proportion, if there should ever be, as it is impossible
there ever should be, any inconsistence between them."
And again, " Though virtue or raoral rectitude does in
deed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right
and good, as such ; yet, when we sit down in a cool
hour, we can neitiier justify to ourselves this or any other
pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our hap
piness, or at least not contrary to it." f
Besides the general systera of raorality opened above,
our Author, in his volurae of Sermons, has stated with
accuracy the difference between self-love and benevo
lence ; in opposition to those who, on the one hand, rnake
* See note E, at the end of this Preface. -f- Serm. xi.

xxxii PREFACE
tbe whole of virtue to consist in benevolence,* and to
those who, on the other, assert that every particular aftec
tion and action is resolvable into self-love. In combat
ing these opinions, he has shown, I think unanswerably,
that there are the same kind of indications m huraan
nature, that we were raade to proraote the happiness of
others, as that we were made to proraote our own ; that
it is no just objection to this, that we have dispositions
to do evil to others as well as good ; for we have also dis
positions to do evil as well as good to ourselves, to our
own raost iraportant interests even in this life, for the
sake of gratifying a present passion : that the thing to be
laraented is, not that men have too great a regard to their
own real good, but that they have not enough ; thdl be
nevolence is not more at variance with, or unfriendly to,
self-love, than any other particular affection is ; and that
by consulting the happiness of others a man is so far from
lessening his own, that the very endeavor to do so, though
he should fail in the accomplishment, is a source of the
highest satisfaction and peace of raind. f He has also, in
passing, aniraadverted on the philosopher of Malrasbury,
who, in his book " Of Human Nature," has advanced, as
discoveries in raoral science, that benevolence is only the
love of power, and corapassion the fear of future calamity
to ourselves. And this our Author has done, not so much
with the design of exposing the false reasoning of Mr
Hobbes, but because on so perverse an accountof human
nature he has raised a system, subversive of all justice
and honesty. J
II. The religious systera of Bishop Butler is chiefly to
be collected from the treatise, entitled, " The Analogy
of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution
and Course cf Nature."
" All things are double one against another, and God
* See the 2d Dissertation " On the Nature of Virtue."
t See Serm. 1. and xi. and the Preiace to the Volume of Sermons.
X See the notes to Serm. i. and v.

BY THE EDITOR. xxxiii
hath made nothing imperfect."* On this single observa
tion of the Son of Sirach, the whole fabric of our prelate's
defence of religion, in his Analogy, is raised. Instead
of indulging in idle speculations, how the world might
possibly have been better than it is ; or, forgetful of the
difference between hypothesis and fact, attempting to ex
plain the divine econoray with respect to intelligent crea
tures, frora preconceived notions of his own ; he first in
quires what the constitution of nature, as made known to
us in the way of experiment, actually is ; and from this,
now seen and acknowledged, he endeavors to form a
judgment of that larger constitution, which religion dis
covers to us. If the dispensation of Providence we are
now under, considered as inhabitants of this world, and
having a teraporal interest to secure in it, be found, on
exaraination, to be analogous to, and of a piece with that
further dispensation, which relates to us as designed for
another world, in which we have an eternal interest, de
pending on our behaviour here ; if both raay be traced up
to the same general laws, and appear to be carried on
according to the same plan of administration ; the fair
presuraption is, that both proceed frora one and the same
Author. And if the principal parts objected to in this-
latter dispensation be sirailar to, and of the same kind
with what we certainly experience under the former ;
the objections, being clearly inconclusive in one cas^
because contradicted by plain fact, raust, in all reason, be
allowed to be inconclusive also in the other.
This way of arguing frora what is acknowledged to
what is disputed, frora things known to other things
that reserable thera, frora that part of the divine establish
ment which is exposed to our view to that more iraportant
one which lies beyond it,vis on all hands confessed to be
just. By this raethod Sir Isaac Newton has unfolded the
system of nature ; by the sarae method Bishop Butler
hfi explained the system of grace ; and thus, to use the
Words of a writer, whom I quote with pleasure, " has
• Eccles. xiii. 24.

xxxiv PREFACE
formed and concluded a happy aUiance between failh
and philosophy."*
And although the argument frora analogy be allowed
to be imperfect, and by uo raeans sufficient to solve all
difSculties respecting the government of God, and the
designs of his providence with regard to*mankind ; (a
degree of knowledge, vvhich we are not furnished with
faculties for attaining, at least in the present state ;) yet
surely it is of importance to learn from U, that the natural
and raoral world are intiraately connected, and parts of
one stupendous whole, or systera ; and that the chief ob
jections which are brought against religion, raay be urged
with equal force against the constitution and course of
nature, where they are certainly false in fact. And this
information we may derive from the work before us ; the
proper design of which, it may be of use to observe, is
not to prove the truth of religion, eitlier natural or re
vealed, but to confirra that proof, already known, by con
siderations frora analogy.
After this account of the method of reasoning em
ployed by our Author, let us now advert to his raanner of
applying it, first, to the subject of Natural Religion, and,
secondly, to that of Revealed.
1. The foundation of all our hopes and fears is a future
life ; and vvith this the treatise begins. Neither the reason
of the thing, nor the analogy of nature, according to
Bishop Butier, give ground for iraagining, that the un
known event, death, will be our destruction. The states
in which vve have forraerly existed, in the worab and in
infancy, are not more different frora each other than from
that of raature age in which we now exist : therefore,
that we shall continue to exist hereafter, in a state as dif
ferent frora the present as the present is from those through
which we have passed already, is a presumption favored
by the analogy of nature. All that we know frora reason
concerning death, is the effects it has upon aniraal bodies ;
and the frequent instances araong men, of the intellectual
* Mr Mainwaring's Dissertation, prefixed to his Volume of Sermons.

BY THE EDITOR. xxxv
powers continuing in high health and vigor, at the very
time vvhen a raortal disease is on the point of putting
an end to all the powers of sensation, induce us to hope
that it may have no effect at all on the huraan soul, not
even so much as to suspend the exercise of its facul
ties ; though, if it have, the suspension of a power by no
means implies its extinction, as sleep or * a swoon may
convince us.*
The probability of a future state once granted, an ira
portant question arises. How best to secure our interest
in that state ? We find from what passes daily before
us, tiiat the constitution of nature adraits of misery as
well as happiness ; that both of these are the conse
quences of our own actions ; and these consequences we
are enabled to foresee. Therefore that our happiness or
misery in a future world may depend on our own actions
also, and that rewards or punishraents hereafter may fol
low onr good or ill behaviour here, is but an appointment
of the same sort with what we experience under the
divine governraent, according to the regular course of
nature. f
This supposition is confirmed from another cirurastance,
that the natural governraent of God, under which we now
live, is also moral ; in which rewards and punishments
are the consequences of actions, considered as virtuous
and vicious. Not that every man is rewarded or punish
ed here in exact proportion to his desert ; for the essen
tial tendencies of virtue and vice, to produce happiness
and the contrary, are often hindered from taking effect
frora accidental causes. However, there are plainly the
rudiments and beginnings of a righteous administration
to be discerned in the constitution of naiure ; from whence
we are led to expect, that these accidental hindrances
will one day be removed, and the rule of distributive
justice obtain completely in a more perfect state. J
The moral government of God, thus established, im
plies in the notion of it some sort of trial, or a moral pos-
* Part i. chap. 1. f Chap. 2. X Chap. 3.

xxxvi PREFACE
sibility of acting wrong as well as right, in those who are
the subjects of it. And the doctrine of religion, that the
present life is in fact a state of probation for a future one,
is rendered credible, from its being analogous throughout
to the general conduct of Providence towards us with re
spect to this world ; in which prudence is necessary to
secure our temporal interest, just as we are taught tbat
virtue is necessary to secure our eternal interest ; and
both are trusted to ourselves.*
But the present life is not merely a state of probation,
iraplying in it difiiculties and danger, it is also a state of
discipline and iraproveraent ; and that, both in our tem
poral and religious capacity. Thus, childhood is a state
of discipline for youth ; youth for manhood ; and that for
old age. Strength of body, and maturity of understand
ing, are acquired by degrees; and neither of them with
out continual exercise and attention on our part, not only
in the beginning of life, but through the whole course of
it. So, again, with respect to our religious concerns, the
present world is fitted to be, and to good men is in event,
a state of discipline and improveraent for a future one.
The several passions and propensions iraplanted in our
hearts, incline us, in a multitude of instances, to forbidden
pleasures ; this inward infirmity is increased by various
snares and teraptations, perpetually occurring frora with
out : hence arises the necessity of recollection and self-
government, of withstanding the calls of appetite, and
forraing our rainds to habits of piety and virtue ; habits
of which we are capable, and which, to creatures in a state
of moral imperfection, and fallen from their original in
tegrity, raust be of the greatest use, as an additional se
curity, over and above the principle of conscience, frora
the dangers to which we are exposed. f
Nor is the credibility here given, by the analogy of na
ture, to the general doctrine of religion, destroyed or
weakened by any notions concerning necessity. Of itself
it is a mere word, the sign of an abstract idea ; and as
* Part i. Chap, 4, f Chap, 5.

BY THE EDITOR. Xxxvii
much requires an agent, that is, a necessary agent in or
der to effect any thing, as freedom requires a free agent.
Adraitting it to be speculatively true, if considered as in
fluencing practice, it is the same as false : for it is matter
of experience, that, with regard to our present interest,
and as inhabitants of this world, we are treated as if we
were free ; and therefore the analogy oT nature leads us
to conclude, that, with regard to our future interest, and
as designed for another world, we shall be treated as free
also. Nor does the opinion of necessity, supposing it
possible, at all affect either the general proof of reli
gion, or its external evidence.*
Still objections raay be raade against the wisdom and
goodness of the divine governraent, to which analogy,
which can only show the truth or credibility of facts, af
fords no answer. Yet even here analogy is of use, if it
suggest that the divine governraent is a scheme or systera,
and not a number of unconnected acts, and that this sys
tem is also above our comprehension. Now, the govern
ment of the natural world appears to be a system of this
kind ; with parts, related to each other, and together cora
posing a whole : in which systera, ends are brought about
by the use of raeans, raany of Which means, before expe
rience, would have been suspecte/1 to have had a quite
contrary tendency ; which is carried on by general laws,
similar causes uniformly producing sirailar effects ; the util
ity of which general laws, and the inconveniences which
would probably arise frora the occasional or even secret
suspension of thera, we are in sorae sort enabled to dis
cern ;j- but ofthe whole we are incompetent judges, be
cause of the small part which comes within our view.
Reasoning then from what we know, it is highly credible,
that the government of the moral world is a system also
carried on by general laws, and in which ends are accom
plished by the intervention of means ; and, that both con-
.* Part i. Chap. 6.
t See a Treatise on Divine Benevolence, bv Dr Thomas Baleur,
Part II. * '
4

xxxviii PREFACE
stitutions, the natural and the raoral, are so connected, as
to forra together but one scherae. But of this scheme,
as that of the natural world taken alone, we are not quah
fied to judge, on account of the mutual respect of the
several parts to each other and to the whole, and our
own incapacity to survey the whole, or, with accuracy,
any single part. All objections, therefore, to the wisdom
and goodness of the divine government may be founded
merely on our ignorance ;* and to such objections our
ignorance is the proper, and a satisfactory answer, f
2. The chief difiiculties concerning Natural Religion
being now reraoved, our Author proceeds, in the next
place, to that which is Revealed ; and as an introduction
to an inquiry into the Credibility of Christianity, begins
with the consideration of its Iraportance.
The importance of Christianity appears in two re
spects. First, In its being a republication of Natural Re
ligiou, in its native siraplicity, with authority, and with
circumstances of advantage ; ascertaining, in many in
stances of raoment, what before was only probable, and
particularly confirming the doctrine of a future state of
rewards and punishraents. f Secondly, As revealing a
new dispensation of Providence, originating from the
pure love and raercy of God, and conducted by the rae
diation of his Son, and the guidance of his Spirit, for the
recovery and salvation of mankind, represented in a state
of apostacy and ruin. This account of Christianity
being admitted to be just, and the distinct offices of these
three divine persons being once discovered to us, we are
as much obliged, in point of duty, to acknowledge the
relations we stand in to the Son and Holy Ghost, as our
Mediator and Sanctifier, as we are obliged in point of
duty to acknowledge the relation we sland in to God the
Father ; although the two former of these relations be
learnt from revelation only, and in the last we are in-
* See Note F at the end of this Preface.
t Part i. Chap. 7.
X See note G, at flie end of this Preface.

BY THE EDITOR. xxxix
Structed by the light of nature; the obligation in either
case, arising from the offices themselves, and not at all
depending on the manner in which they are raade known
to us.*
The presumptions against revelation in general are,
that it is not discoverable by reason, that it is unlike to
what is so discovered, and that it was introduced and
supported by miracles. But in a scherae so large as
that of the universe, unbounded in extent and everlasting
in duration, there must of necessity be numberless cir
cumstances which are beyond the reach of our faculties
to discern, and which can only be known by divine illu
mination. And both in the natural and moral govern
ment of the world, under which we live, we find many
things unlike one to another, and therefore ought not to
wonder if the same unlikeness obtain between things
visible and invisible ; although it be far frora true, that
revealed religion is entirely unlike the constitution of
nature, as analogy may teach us. Nor is there any
thing incredible in revelation, considered as miraculous;
whether miracles be supposed to have been performed at
the beginning of the world, or after a course of nature
has been established. Not at the beginning of the world ;
for then there was either no course of nature at all, or a
power must have been exerted totally different from what
that course is at present. All men and animals cannot
have been born, as they are now ; but a pair of each
sort raust have been produced at first, in a way alto
gether unlike to that in which they have been since pro
duced ; unless we affirm, that men and animals have
existed from eternity in an endless succession. One
miracle, therefore, at least,' there raust have been at the
beginning of the world, or at the time of man's creation.
Not after the settlement ofa course of nature, on account
of miracles being contrary to that course, or, in other
words, contrary to experience; for, in order to know
whether miracles, worked in attestation of a divine reli-
• Part ii. Chapter 5.

xl PREFACE
gion, be contrary to experience or not, we ought to be
acquainted with other cases, similar or parallel to those
in which miracles are alleged to have been wrought.
But where shall we find such similar or parallel cases ?
The world which we inhabit affords none. We know of
no extraordinary revelations from God to man, but those
recorded in the Old and New Testaraent ; all of which
were established by miracles. It cannot therefore be said,
that miracles are incredible, because contrary to expe
rience, when all the experience we have is in favor of
miracles, and on the side of religion.* Besides, in rea
soning concerning miracles, they ought not to be cora
pared vvith common natural events, but with uncommon
appearances, such as comets, magnetisra, electricity;
which, to one acquainted only with the usual phenoraena
of nature, and the common powers of raatter, raust be
fore proof of their actual existence, be thought incredi-
ble.f The presumptions against Revelation in general being
despatched, objections'againstthe Christian Revelation in
particular, against the scherae of it, as distinguished from>
objections against its evidence, are considered next.
Now,.'Supposing a revelation to be really given, itis highly
probable beforehand, that it must contain many things
appearing to us liable to objections. The acknowledged
dispensation of nature is very different frora what we
should have expected : reasoning then frora analogy, the
revealed dispensation, it is credible, would be also differ
ent. Nor are we in any sort judges at what tirae, cw in
what degree, or manner it is fit or expedient for God to
instruct us, in things confessedly ofthe greatest use,
either by natural reason, or by supernatural information.
Thus, arguing on speculation only, and wiihout expe
rience, it vvould seem very unlikely that so important a
remedy as that provided by Christianity, for the recovery
of mankind from a slate of ruin, should have been for so
* See note H, at the end of this Preface.
t Chap. 2.

BY THE EDITOR. xli
many ages withheld ; and, when at last vouchsafed, should
be iraparted to so few ; and, after it has been iraparted,
should be attended with obscurity and doubt. And just
so we might have argued, before experience, concerning
the remedies provided in nature for bodily diseases, to
which by nature we are exposed : for raany of these
were unknown to raankind for a number of ages ; are
known but to few now : some important ones probably
not discovered yet; and those which are, neitiier certain
in their application, nor universal in their use. And the
same mode of reasoning that would lead us to expect they
should have been so, would lead us to expect that the
necessity of thera should have been superseded, by there
being no diseases ; as the necessity of the Christian
scherae, it may be thought, might also have been super
seded, by preventing the fall of man, so that he should
not have stood in need of a Redeemer at all.*
As to the objections against the wisdom and goodness
of Christianity, the same answer may be applied to them
as was to the like objections against the constitution of
nature. For here also, Christianity is a scheme or econ
omy, composed of various parts, forming a whole, in which
scheme means are used for the accomplishing of ends ;
and which is conducted by general laws, of all of which
we know as little as we do of the constitution of nature.
And the seeming want of wisdom or goodness in this
system is to be ascribed to tiie same cause, as the like
appearances of defects in the natural systera ; our ina
bility to discern the whole scheme, and our ignorance of
the relation of those parts which are discernible to others
beyond our view.
The objections against Christianity, as a matter of fact,
and against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been
obvdated together, the chief of them are now to be con
sidered distinctly. One of these, which is levelled
against the entire system itself, is of this sort : The res
toration of mankind, represented in Scripture as the
* Chap. 3.
4*

xiii PREFACE
great design of the gospel, is described as requiring a
long series of means, and persons, and dispensations, be
fore it can be brought to its corapletion ; whereas the
whole ought to have been effected at once. Now every
thing we see in the course of nature, shows the folly of
this objection. For in the natural course of Providence,
ends are brought about by means, not operating imme
diately and at once, but deliberately and in a way of
progression ; one thing being subservient to another, this
to somewhat further. The change of seasons, the ripen
ing of fruits, the growth of vegetable and aniraal bodies,
are instances of this. And therefore, that the same
progressive raethod should be followed in the dispensation
of Christianity, as is observed inthe coraraon dispensation
of Providence, is a reasonable expectation justified by
the analogy of nature.*
Another circurastance, objected to in the Christian
scheme, is the appointraent ofa Mediator, and the saving
of the world through hira. But the visible governraent
of God being actually administered in this way, or by
the mediation and instrumentality of others, there can be
no general presuraption against an appointraent of this
kind, against his invisible government being exercised in
the same manner. We have seen already, that with re
gard to ourselves this visible governraent is carried on by
rewards and punishments ; for happiness and misery are
the consequences of our own actions, considered as virtu
ous and vicious ; and these consequences we are enabled
to foresee. It raight have been iraagined, before consult
ing experience, that after we had rendered ourselves lia
ble to misery by our own ill conduct, sorrow for what was
past, and behaving well for the future, would, alone, and
of tiiemselves, have exempted us from deserved punish
ment, and restored us to the divine favor. But the fact
is otherwise ; and real reformation is often found to be of
no avail, so as to secure the criminal from poverty, sick
ness, infamy, and death, the never failing attendants on
? Chap. 4.

BY THE EDITOR. xliii
vice and extravagance, exceeding a certain degree. By
the course of nature then it appears, God does not always •
pardon a sinner on his repentance. Yet there is provision
raade, even in nature, that the raiseries which raen bring
on themselves, by unlawful indulgences, raay in raany
cases be mitigated, and in some removed ; partly by ex
traordinary exertions of the offender himself, but more es
pecially and frequentiy by the intervention of others, who
voluntarily, and from raotives of compassion, subrait lo
labor and sorrow, such as produce long and lasting in
conveniences to themselves, as the raeans of rescuing an
other from the wretched effects of former imprudences.
Vicarious punishraent, therefore, or one person's sufferings
contributing to the relief of another, is a providential dis
position in the econoray of nature.* And it ought not to
be matter of surprise, if by a method analogous to this we
be redeeraed frora sin and raisery, in the economy pf grace.
That mankind at present are in a stale of degradation, dif
ferent from that in which they were originally created, is
the very ground of the Christian revelation, as contained
in the Scriptures. Whether we acquiesce in the account,
that our being placed in such a state is owing to the crirae
of our first parents, or choose to ascribe it to any other
cause, it raakes no difference as to our condition : the vice
and unhappiness of the world are still there, notwithstand
ing all our suppositions ; nor is it Christianity that hath put
us into this state. We learn alsp from the same Scrip
tures, what experience and the use of expiatory sacrifices
frora the raost early times might have taught us, that re
pentance alone is not sufficient to prevent the fatal conse
quences of past transgressions ! But that still there is room
for mercy, and that repentance shall be available, ihough
not of itself, yet through the mediation of a divine person,
the Messiah ; who, from the sublimest principles of com
passion, when we were dead in trespasses and sins, f suf
fered and died, the innocent for the guilty, the just forthe
unjust,f that we might have redemption through his blood,
* See pote I, at the end of this Preface. f Eph. ii. 1.
X 1 Pet. iu. 18.

xliv PREFACE
even the forgiveness of sins.* In what way the death of
Christ was of that efficacy it is said to be, in procuring the
reconciliation of sinners, the Scriptures have not explain
ed. It is enough that the doctrine is revealed ; that it is
not contrary to any truth which reason and experience
teach us ; and that it accords in perfect harraony with the
usual raethod of the divine conduct in the government of
the world, f
Again it hath been said, that if the Christian revelation
were true, it must have been universal, and could not
have been left upon doubtful evidence. But God, in his
natural providence, dispenses his gifts in great variety, not
only among creatures of the sarae species, but to the same
individuals also at different times. Had the Christian
revelation been universal at first, yet, from the diversity of
men's abilities, both of mind and body, their various
means of improvement, and other external advantages,
sorae persons raust soon have been in a situation, with
respect to religious knowledge, rauch superior to that of
' others, as much perhaps as they are at present. And all
men will be equitably dealt with at last; and to whom
little is given, of him littie willbe required. Then, as lo
the evidence of religion heing left doubtful, difficulties of
this sort, like difficulties in practice, afford scope and op
portunity for a virtuous exercise of the understanding, and
dispose the raind lo acquiesce arid rest satisfied with any
evidence that is real. In the daily commerce of life, raen
are obliged lo act upon greal uncertainties, with regard to
success in their temporal pursuits; and the case with re
gard to religion is parallel. However, ihough religion be
not intuitively true, the proofs of it which we have are
araply sufficient in reason to induce us lo embrace it; and
dissatisfaction with those proofs may possibly be men's
own fault."J
Nothing remains but to attend to the poshive evidence
there is for tiie truth of Christianity. Now, besides its
direct and fundamental proofs, which are miracles and
• Colos. 1. 14. t Chap. 5. f Chap 6.

BY THE EDITOR. xlv
prophecies; there are many collateral circumstances, which
may be united into one view, and altogether may be con
sidered as making up one argument. In thisway of treating
the subject, the revelation, whether real or otherwise, may
be supposed to be wholly historical : the general design of
which appears to be, to give an account of the coiidilion
of religion, and its professors, wilh a concise narration of
the political state of things, as far as religion is afi'ected
by it, during a great length of tirae, near six thousand
years of which are already past. More particularly, it
comprehends an account of God's entering inlo covenant
with one nation, the Jews, that he would be their God,
and that they should be his people ; of his often interpos
ing in their affairs ; giving them the promise, and after
wards the possession, of a flourishing country ; assuring
thera of the greatest national posterity in case of their
obedience, and threatening the severest national punish
ment in case they forsook hira, andijoined in the idolatry
of their pagan neighbors. It contains also a prediction of
a particular person to appear in the fulness of time, in
whom all the promises of God to the Jews were to be
fiilfilled. And it relates, tiiat, at the time expected, a
person did actually appear, assuming to be the Saviour
foretold ; that he worked various rairacles among thera,
in confirraation of his divine auihority ; and, as was fore
told also, was rejected and put to death hy the very peo
ple wTio had long desired and waited for his coming :
But that his religion, in spite of all opposition, was es
tablished in the world by his disciples, invested with su
pernatural powers for that purpose ; of the fale and for
tunes of which religion there is a prophetical description,
carried down to the end of time. Let any one now, after
reading the above history, and not knowing whether the
whole were nol a fiction, be supposed to ask. Whether all
that is here related be true? and instead of a direct
answer, let him be informed of the several acknowledged
facts, which'are found to correspond lo it in real life ; and
then, let hira corapare the history and facts together, and
observe the astonishing coincidence of both : Such a joint

xlvi PREFACE
review raust appear to him of very great weight, and to
araount to evidence soraewhat raore than human. And
unless the whole series, and every particular circumstance
contained in it, can be thought to have arisen from acci
dent, the truth of Chrislianity is proved.*
The view here given of the moral and religious sys
tems of Bishop Butier, it will imraediately be perceived,
is chiefly intended for younger students, especially for
students in divinity ; to whom it is hoped it raay be of
use, so as to encourage thera lo peruse, with proper dili
gence, the original works of the Author himself. For it
raay be necessary to observe, that neither of the volumes
of this excellent prelate are addressed to those who read
for amusement, or curiosity, or lo gel rid of lirae. All
subjects are not to be coraprehended wilh the sarae ease;
and raorality and religion, when treated as sciences, each
accorapanied with difficulties of its own, can neither of
thera be understood as they ought, wiihout a very peculiar
attention. But raorality and religion are not merely
to be studied as sciences, or as being speculatively true ;
they are to be regarded in another and higher light, as tbe
rule of life and manners, as containing authoritative di
rections by which to regulate our failh and practice. And
in this view, the infinite importance of them considered,
* Chapt. 7. To the Analogy are subjoined two Dissertations, both
originally inserted in the body of the work. One on Personal Iden
tity, in which are contained some strictures on Mr Locke, who as
serts that consciousness makes or constitutes personal identity ;
whereas, as our author observes, consciousness makes only person
ality, or is necessary to the idea of a person, i. e. a thinking intelligent
being, but presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal
identity ; just as knowledge presupposes truth, but does not con
stitute it. Consciousness of past actions does indeedj show us the
identity of ourselves, or gives us a certain assurance that we are the
same persons or living agents now, which we were at the time fo
which our remembrance cau look back ; but still we should be the
same persons as we were, though this consciousness of what is past
were wanting, though all that had been done hy us formerly were
forgotten ; unless it be true, that no person has existed a single mo
ment beyond what he can remember. The other dissertation is On
the JVature of Virtue, which properly belongs to the moral system
of our Author already explained.

BY THE EDITOR. xlvii
it can never be an indifferent matter whether they be re
ceived or rejected. For both claim to be the voice of
God ; and whether they be so or not, cannot be known,
till their claims be impartially exarained. If they in
deed come frora Hira, we are bound to conforra to them
at our peril : nor is it left lo our choice, whether we will
submit to the obligations they impose upon us or not ; for
submit to them we must, in such a sense, as to incur the
punishments denounced by both against wilful disobe
dience to their injunctions.

The following Epitaph, said lo be written by Dr Na
thaniel Forster, is inscribed on a flat marble stone, in
the cathedral church of Bristol, placed over the spot
where the reraains of Bishop Butiet are deposited;
and which, as it is now almost obliterated, it may be
worth while here to preserve.

H. S.
Reverendus admodum in Christo Pater
JOSEPHUS BUTLER, LL.D.
Hujusce primo Dioeceseos
Deinde Dunelmensis Episcopus.
Qualis quantusq; Fir erat
Sua libentissime agnovit <etas :
Et si quid Prcesuli aut Scriptori ad famam valent
Mens altissirrta,
Ingenii perspicacis et subacti Fis,
Animusq ; pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis,
Mortui haud facile evanescet memoria.
Obiit Bathoniee 16 Kalend. Julii,
A. D. 1752.
¦ Annos natus 60.

irOTES TO THE PREFACE,

THE EDITOR.

Dr Butler, when Bishop of Bristol, put up a cross, a plain piece
of marble inlaid, in the chapel of his episcopal house. This, which
was intended by the blameless prelate merely as a sign or memorial,
that true Christians are to bear their cross, and not to be ashamed of
following a crucified Master, was considered as aifording a presump
tion, that he was secretly inclined to Popish forms and ceremonies,
and had no great dislike to Popery itself. And, on account of the
offence it occasioned, both at the time and since, it were to be
wished, in prudence, it had not been done.
Page xxii. B.
Many of the sentiments, in these two Discourses of Bishop Butler,
concerning the sovereign good of man ; the impossibility of procuring
it in the present life ; the unsatisfactoriness of earthly enjoyment ;
together with the somewhat beyond and above them all, which onee
attained, there will rest nothing further to be wished or hoped ; and
which is then only to be expected, when we shall have put off this
mortal body, and our union with God shall be complete ; occur in
Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I. sec. xi.
Page xxv. C.
When the first edition of this Preface was published, I had in vain
endeavored to procure a sight of the papers, in which Bishop Butler
was accused of having died a Papist, and Archbishop Seeker's replies
to them ; though I well remembered to have read both, when they
first appeared in the public prints. But a learned professor in the
University of Oxford has furnished me with the whole controversy in
its original form ; a brief history of which it may not be unacceptable
to offer here to the curious reader.
The attack was opened in the year 1767, in an anonymous pam
phlet entitled, " The Root of Protestant Errors Examined ; " in which
5

1 NOTES TO THE PREFACE
the author asserted, that, "by an anecdote lately given Wm," that
"same Prelate," (who at the bottom of the page is called «— P of
D— m) " is said to have died in the communion of a Churcn, tnat
makes much use of saints, saints' days, and all the trumpery ot saint
worship." When this remarkable fact, now first divulged, canie to
be generally known, it occafioned, as might be expected, "« "ttie
alarm ; and intelligence of it was no sooner conveyed to Archbishop
Seeker, than, in a short letter, signed Misopseudes, and prmted
in the " St James's Chronicle of May 9," fie called upon the writer
to produce his authoriiy for publishing " so gross and scandalous
a falsehood." To this challenge an immediate answer was returned
by the author of the pamphlet, who, now assuming the name of
Phileleutheros, informed J^isopseudes, through the channel of the
same paper, that " such anecdote had been given him ; and that
he was yet of opinion that there was nothing improbable in it, when
it is considered that the same prelate put up the Popish insignia of
the cross in his chapel, when at Bristol ; and in his last Episcopal
Charge, has squinted very much towards that superstition." Herei
we find the accusation not only repeated, but supported by reasons,
such as they are, of which it seemed necessary that some notice
should be taken ; nor did the Archbishop conceive it unbecoming his
own dignity to stand up on this occasion, as the vindicator of in
nocence against the calumniator of the helpless dead. Accordingly,
in a second letter in the same newspaper of May 23, and subscribed
Misopseudes as before ; after reciting from Bishop Butler's Sermon
- before the Lords, the very passage liere printed in the Preface, and
observing, that " there are in the same sermon, declarations as strong
as can be made, against temporal punishment for heresy, schism, or
even for idolatry ; " his Grace expresses himself thus ; " Now he
(Bishop Butler) was universally esteemed, throughout his life, a man
of strict piety and honesty, as well as uncommon abilities. He gave
all the proofs, public and private, which his station led him to give,
and they were decisive and daily, of his continuing to the last a
sincere member ofthe Church of England, Nor had ever any of his
acquaintance, or most intimate friends, nor have they to this day, the
least doubt of it." As to putting up a cross in his chapel, the Arch
bishop frankly owns, that for himself he wishes he had not ; and
thinks that in so doing the Bishop did amiss. But then he asks,
" can that be opposed, as any proof of Popery, to all the evidence on
the other side, or even to the single evidence ofthe above mentioned
sermon ? Most of our churches have crosses upon them ; are they
therefore Popish churches ? The Lutherans have more than crosses
in theirs ; are the Lutherans therefore Papists ? " And as to the
Pharge, no Papist, his Grace remarks, would have spoken as Bishop
Butler there does, of the observances peculiar to Eoman Catholics,
some of which he expressly censures as wrong and superstitious, and
others, as made subservient to the purposes of superstition, and,
on these accounts, abolished at the Reformation, After the publica
tion ofthis letter, Phileleutheros replied ina short defence of his owu
conduct, but without producing any thing new in confirmation of
what he had advanced. And here the controversy, so far as the two
principals were concerned, seems to have ended.

BY THE EDITOR. li
But the dispute was not sufTered to die away quite so soon. For
in the same year, and in the same newspaper of July 21, another let
ter appeared ; in which the author not only contended that the cross
m the Episcopal Chapel at Bristol, and the Charge to the Clergy of
Durham in 1751, amount to full proof of a strong attachment to the
idolatrous communion of the Church bf Rome, but, with the reader's
leave, he would fain account for the Bishop's " tendency this way."
And this he attempted to do, " from the natural melancholy and
gloominess of Dr Butler's disposition ; from his great fondness for the
Uves of Romish saints, and their books of mystic piety ; from his
drawing the notions of teaching men religion, not from the New
Testament, but from philosophical and political opinions of his own ;
and above all, from his transition from a strict dissenter amongst the
presbyterians to a rigid churchman, and his sudden and unexpected
elevation to great wealth and dignity in the Church." The attack,
thus renewed, excited the Archbishop's attention a second time,
and drew from him a fresh answer, subscribed also Misopseudes, in
the " St James's Chronicle of August 4." In this letter, our excellent
Metropolitan, first of all obliquely hinting at the unfairness of sitting
iu judgment on the character of a man who had been dead fifteen
years ; and then reminding his correspondent, that " full proof had
been already published, that Bishop Butler abhorred Popery as a vile
corruption of Christianity, and that it might he proved, if needful,
that he held the Pope fo be the antichrist ; " (to which decisive tes
timonies of undoubted aversion from the Romish Church, another is
also added in the Postscript, his taking, when promoted to the see of
Durham, for his domestic chaplain, Dr Nath. Forster, who had pub
Ushed, not four years before, a Sermon, entitled. Popery Destructive
of the Evidence of Christianity ;) proceeds to observe, " That the
natural melancholy of the Bishop's temper would rather have fixed
him amongst his first friends, than prompted him to the change he
made : That he read books of all sorts, as well as books of mystic
piety, and knew how to pitk the good that was in them out of the
bad : That his opinions were exposed without reserve in his Analogy
and his Sermons ; and if the doctrine of either be Popish or unscriptu
ral, the learned world hath mistaken strangely in admiring both : That,
instead of being a strict dissenter, he never was a communicant in
any dissenting assembly ; on the contrary, that he went occasionally,
from his early years, to the established worship, and became a con
stant conformist to it when he was barely of age, and entered him
self, in 1714, of Oriel College : That his elevation to great dignity in
the Church, far from being sudden and unexpected, was a gradual
and natural rise, through a variety of preferments, and a period of
thirty-two years: That, as Bishop of Durham, he had very little au
thority beyond his brethren, and, in ecclesiastical matters, had none
beyond them ; a larger income tban most of them he had ; but this
he employed, not; as was insinuated, in augmenting the pomp of wor
ship in his cathedral, where, indeed, it is no greater than in others,
but for the purpose of charity, and in the repairing of his houses."
After these remarks, the letter closes with the following words :
" Upon the whole, few accusations so entirely groundless, have been
so pertinaciously, I am unwilling to say maliciously, carried on, as
the present ; and surely it is high time for the authors and abettors of

lii NOTES TO THE PREFACE
•t, in mere common prudence, to show some regard, if not to truth,
at least to shame." , , , , . ,
It only remains to be mentioned, that the above letter of Archbishop
Seeker, had such an effect on a writer, who signed himself in the " St
James's Chronicle of August 25," A Dissenting Minister, that he
declared it as his opinion, that " the author of the pamphlet called the
Root of Protestant Errors Examined, and his friends, were obliged in
candor, in justice, and in honor, to retract their charge, unless they
could establish it on much better grounds than had hitherto appeared ; "
and he expressed his " hopes, that it would be understood that the
dissenters in general had no hand in the accusation, and that it had
only been the act of two or three mistaken men." Another person
also, " a foreigner by birth," as he says of himself, who had been
long an admirer of Bishop Butler, and had perused with great atten
tion all that had been written on both sides in the present contro
versy, confesses he had been " wonderfully pleased with observing,
with what candor and temper, as well as clearness and solidity, he
was vindicated from the aspersions laid againsthim." All the adver- ,
saries of our prelate, however, had not the virtue or sense to be thus
convinced ; some of whom still continued, under the signatures of
Old Martin, Latimer, An Impartial Protestant, Paulinus, Misono-
this, to repeat their confuted falsehoods in the public prints : as if
the curse of calumniators had fallen upon them, and their memory,
by being long a traitor to truth, had taken at last a severe revenge,
and compelled them to credit their own lie. The first of these gen
tlemen. Old Martin, who dates from Newcastle, May 29, from the
rancor and malignity with which his letter abounds, and from the
particular virulence he discovers towards the characters of Bishop
Butler and his defender, I conjecture to be no other than the very
person who had already figured in this dispute, so early as the year
1752 ; of whose work, entitled, " A Serious Inquiry into the Use
and Importance of External Religion," the reader will find some ac
count in the notes subjoined to the Bishop's Charge, in the second
volume. Page xxvi. D.
The letters, with a sight of which I was indulged by the favor of
our present most worthy Metropolitan, are all, as I remember, wrap
ped together under one cover ; on the back of which is written, in
Archbishop Seeker's own hand, the following words, or words to
this effect, " Presumptive Arguments that Bishop Butler did not die
a Papist." Page xxxi. E.
" Far be it from me," says the excellent Dr T. Balguy,* " to dis
pute the reaUty of a moral principle in the human heart. I feel its
existence : I clearly discern its use and importance. But in no re
spect is it niore important, than as it suggests the idea of a moral
governor. Let this idea be once effaced, and the principle of con-
* Discourse is.

BY THE EDITOR. liii
science will soon be found weak and inefTectual. Its influence on
Bien's conduct has, indeed, beea too much undei-valued by some phi
losophical inquiries. But be that influence, while it last, more or less,
it is not a steady aad permanent principle of action. Unhappily we
always have it in our power to lay it asleep. — JVeglect alone will
suppress and stifle it, and bring it almost into a state of stupefaction.
Nor can any thing, less than the terrors oi religion, awaken our
minds from this dangerous and deadly sleep. It can never be a mat
ter of indifference to a thinkmg man, whether he is to be happy or
misentble beyond the grave." Page xxxviu. F.
The ignorance of man is a favorite doctrine with Bishop Butler.
It occurs in the second Part of the Analogy ; .it makes the subject of
his Fifteenth Sermon ; and we meet wiA it again in his Charge.
Whether, sometimes, it be not carrieii to a length which is excessive,
may admit of doubt. Page xxxviu. G.
Admirable to this purpose are the words of Dr T. Balguy, in the
9th of his Discourses, already referred to, p. Ixii. " The doctrine of
a if^e to come, some persons will say, is a doctrine of natural reli
gion ; and can never, therefore, be properly alleged to show the im
portance of revelation. They judge, perhaps, from the frame of the
world, that tbe present system is imperfect ; they see designs in it,
not yet completed ; and they think they have grounds for expecting
another stale, in vtjiich these designs shall be farther carried on, and
brought to a conclusion, worthy of infinite wisdom. I am not con
cemed to dispute the justness of this reasoning ; nor do I wish to
dispute it. But how far will it reach ? Will it lead us to the Christian
doctrine of a judgment to come ? Will it give us the prospect of an
eternity of happiness ? Nothing of all this. It shows us only, that
death is not tlie end of our being ; that we are likely to pass hereaf
ter into other systems, more favorable than the present to the great
ends of God's providence, the virtue and the happiness of his intelU
gent creatures. But into what systems we are to be removed ; what
new scenes are to bo presented to us, either of pleasure or pain;
what new parts we shall have to act, and to what tiials and tempta
tions we may yet be exposed ; on all these subjects we know just
nothing. That our happiness /or ever depends on our conduct here,
is a most important proposition, which we learn only from reve
lation." Page xl. H.
In the common affairs of life, common experience is sufficient to
direct us. But will common experience serve to guide our judgment
concerning the fall and rejdemptitin of mankind ? from what we see
every day, can we explain commencement, or foretel the dissolution
•f the world .' To judge of events like these, we should be conver
sant in the history of other planets ; should be distinctly informed of
5*

liv NOTES TO THE PREFACE, &c.
God's various dispensations to aU the different orders of rational be
ings. Instead, then, of grounding our reUgious opinions on what we
caU experience, let us apply to a more certain guide, let us hearken
to the testimony of God himself. The credibUity of human testi
mony, and tbe conduct of human agents, are subjects perfectly
within the reach of our natural faculties; and we ought to desureno
firmer foundation for our belief of reUgion, than for the judgmentswe'
form in the common affairs of life ; where we see a Uttle plain tesli-
mony easily outweighs the most specious conjectures, and not seldom
even strong probabilities." Dr Balguy's 4th Charge. See also an
exceUent pamphlet, entitled, " Remarks on Mr Hume's Essay on the
Natural History of ReUgion," Sect. 5 ; and the 6th of Dr Powell's
Discourses. Page xliii. I.
Dr Arthur^shley Sykes, from whose writingfl some good may he
collected out of a multitude of things of a contrary tendency, in
what he is pleased to call " The Scripture doctrine of Redemption,'!*,,
opposes what is here advanced by Bishop Butler ; quoting his word^
but without mentioning his name. If what is said above be not '^
thought a sufiicient answer to the objections of this author, the
reader may do well to consult a Charge " On the Use and Abuse of
PhUosophy in the Study of Religion," by the late Dr PoweU; who
seems to me to have had the observations of Dr Sykes in his view,
where he is confuting the reasonings of certain philosophizing divines
Against the doctrine of the atonement. PoweU's Discourses, Charge
IIL p. 342—348.
* See fhe observations on the texts cited in his first chapter, and
also in chapters the fifth and sixth.

ADVERTISEMEITT.

If the reader should raeet here with any thing which he
had not before attended to, it will not be in the observations
upon the constitution and course of nature, these being all
obvious ; but in the application of thera : in which, ihough
there is nothing but what appears to me of sorae real
weight, and therefore, of great iraportance ; yet he will
observe several things which will appear to hira of very
little, if he can think things to be of litde iraportance, which
are of any real weight at all, upon such a subject as re
ligion. However, the proper force of the following trea
tise lies in the whole general analogy considered together.
It is corae, I know not how, lo be taken for granted, by
many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject
of inquiry ; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be
fictitious. And accordingly they treat it, as if, in the
present age, this were an agreed point araong all people
of discernment ; and nothing reraained, but to set it up
as a principal subject of rairth and ridicule, as it were by
way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the
pleasures of the world. On the contrary, thus rauch, at
least, will be here found, not taken for granted, but proved,
that any reasonable raan, who will thoroughly consider

Ivi ADVERTISEMENT.
the matter, may be as much assured, as he is of his own
being, that it is not, however, so clear a case, that there
is nothing in it. There is, I think, strong evidence of its
truth ; but it is certain no one can, upon principles of
reason, be satisfied of the contrary. And the practical
consequence to be drawn from this, is not attended lo, by
every one who is concerned in it.

May, 1736.

INTRODUCTION.

Probable evidence is essentially dislinguished from
demonstrative by this, that it adraits of degrees, and of
all variety of thera, from the highest moral certainly, to
the very lowest presuraption. We cannot, indeed, say a
thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption
for it J because^ as there may be probabilities on both
sides of a question, there may be sorne against it : and
though there be not, yet a slight presuraption does not
beget that degree of conviction, which is iraplied in say
ing a thing is probably true. But that the slightest possi
ble presuraption is of the nature of a probability, appears
frora hence, that such low presumption, often repealed,
will amount even to raoral certainty. Thus, a man's
having observed the ebb and flow of the lide to-day, afibrds
some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable,
that it raay happen again lo-raorrow ; but the observation
of this event for so raany days, and months, and ages
together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a
full assurance that it will.
That which chiefly constitutes probability, is expressed
in the word likely ; i. e. like some truth,* or true event ;
like it, in itself, in its evidence, in some more or fewer of
its circurastances. For when we determine a thing to be
probably true, suppose that an event has or will corae to
pass, 't is from the raind's reraarking in it a likeness to
some other event, which we have observed iias corae to
* Verisimile.

58 INTRODUCTION.
pass. And this observation forms, in nuraberless daily
instances, a presuraption, opinion, or full conviction, that
such event has or will come to pass ; according as the
observation is, that the like event has sometiraes, most
commonly, or always, so far as our observation reaches,
come lo pass at like distances of tirae, or place, or upon
like occasions. Hence arises the belief, that a child, ifit
lives twenty years, will grow up to the stature and strengtii
of a man ; that food will contribute to the preservation of
its hfe, and the want of il for such a number of days be
its certain destruction. So, likewise, the rule and measure
of our hopes and fears concerning the success of our
pursuits ; our expectations that others will act so and
so in such circurnstances ; and our judgraent that such
actions proceed frora such principles ; — all these rely upon
our having observed the like to what we hope, fear, ex
pect, judge ; I say upon our having observed the like,
either with respect lo olhers or ourselves. And thus,
whereas the prince,f who had always lived in a warm
climate, naturally concluded, in the way of analogy, that
there was no such thing as water's becoming hard, because
he had always observed it to be fluid and yielding ; we, on
the contrary, frora analogy, conclude, that there is no
presumption at all against this ; that it is supposable there
may be frost in England any given day in January next;
probable, that there will on some day ofthe monlh ; and tbat
there is a raoral certainly, i. e. ground for an expectation,
without any doubt of it, in sorae part or other of the winter.
Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an
iraperfect kind of information, and is lo be considered as
relative only to beings of limited capacities. For nothing
which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past,
present, or future, can be probable to an infinite intelli
gence ? since il cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is
in itself, certainly true, or certainly false. But to us, pro
bability is the very guide of life.
From these things it follows, that in questions of diffi-
t The story is told by Mr Locke, in the chapter of Probability.

INTRODUCTION. 59
cully, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory
evidence cannot be had, or is not seen, if the result of
exaraination be, that there appears, upon the whole, any
the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other,
oragreater presuraption on one side, though in the lowest
degree greater, this deterraines the question, even in mat
ters of speculation ; and, in matiers of practice, will lay
us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of
prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption, .
or low probability, ihough it be so low as lo leave the
raind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely
a raan is as really bound in prudence lo do what upon the
whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to
be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows lo be so.
Nay, further, in questionsof great consequence, a reason
able man will think it concerns him to remark lower pro
babilities and presumptions than these ; such as amount
to no more than showing one side of a question to be as
supposable and credible as the other ; nay, such as but
amount to much less even than this. For numberless
instances might be raentioned respecting the common
pursuits of life, where a man would be thought, in a lite
ral sense, distracted, who would nol act, and with great
application loo', not only upon an even chance, but upon
rauch less, aod where the probability or chance was great
ly against his succeeding.*
It is not my design to inquire further into the nature,
the foundation, and measure of probability ; or whence it
proceeds, that Ukeness should beget that presuraption,
opinion, and full conviction, which the human raind is
formed to receive from it, and vvhich it does necessarily
produce in every one ; or to guard against the errors to
which reasoning frora analogy is liable. This belongs to
the subject of logic, and is a part of that subject which has
not yet been thoroughly considered. Indeed I shall not
take upon me to say, how far the extent, compass, and
force, of analogical reasoning can be reduced lo general
• See Chap. vi. Part 3.

60 INTRODUCTION.
heads and rules, and the whole be forraed into a system.
But though so little in this way has been atterapted by
those who have treated of our intellectual powers, and
the exercise of them, this does not hinder but that we
may be, as we unquestionably are, assured, that_ analogy
is of weight, in various degrees, towards determining our
judgraent, and our practice. Nor does it in any wise
cease lo be of weight in those cases, because persons,
either given to dispute, or who require things lo be slated
wilh greater exactness than our faculties appear lo adinit
of in practical matiers, may find olher cases, in which it
is not easy to say, whether it he, or be nol, of any weight;
or instances of seeraing analogies, which are really of
none. It is enough lo the present purpose to observe,
that this general way of arguing is evidently natural, just,
and conclusive. For there is no man can raake a question
but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it
is seen al all, in the figure of a circle, and nol in that of
a square. Hence, namely frora analogical reasoning, Origen* has
vvith singular sagacity observed, that " he who believes
the Scripture to have proceeded frora hira who is the
Author of naiure, may well expect to find the same
Sort of difiiculties in it, as are found in the constitution
of nature." And, in a like way of reflection, it raay be
added, that he who denies the Scripture to have been
frora God", upon account of these difficulties, raay for
the very same reason, deny the world tohave been form
ed by hira. On the olher hand, if there be an analogy,
or likeness, between that system of things and dispensa
tion of Providence which revelation informs us of, and
that system of things and dispensation of Providence
which experience, together with reason, informs us of,
i. e. the known course of naiure ; this is a presumption,
that they have both the sarae author and cause ; at least
so far as to answer objections against the forraer being,
* Xfft jiiv roi ye riv airaf TrapoJtla/ievov t« /triVavToj tJv Kdnfiov chat
rairas ris ypaipas mjrcinBat, Sri oaa mpl T?j Krlacus iiravTf rots ^vrSm rit
TTtpl oirSs Xdyov, raura /cai irefl tuv ypa^Sr. Philocal. p. 23. Ed. Cant.

INTRODUOTION. 61
frora God, drawn from any thing which is analogical or
similar to what is in the latter, which is acknowledged
to be from hira ; for an Author of naiure is here sup
posed. Forming our notions of the constitution and govern
ment of the world upon reasoning, without foundation for
the principles which we assume, whether from the attri
butes of God, or any thing else, is building a world upon
hypothesis, like Des Cartes. Forming our notions upon
reasoning from principles which are certain, but applied
to cases to which we have no ground to apply them, (like
those who explain the structure of the hiunan hody, and
the nature of diseases and raedicines, frora nit^re raathe
matics, without sufficient data) is an error rauch akin to
the former : since vvhat is assumed, in order to make
the reasoning applicable, is hypothesis. But it mu^^ be
allowed just, to join abstract reasonings with the observa
tion of facts, and argue from such facts as are known, to
others that are like tbem ; from that part of the Divine
governraent over intelligent creatures, which coraes under
our view, to that larger and more general governraent
over thera which is beyond it ; and, from what is present,
to collect vvhat is likely, credible, or not incredible, will
be hereafter.
This method, then, of concluding and determining, be
ing practical, and what, if vve vvill act at all, we cannot but
act upon in the common pursuits of hfe ; being evidently
conclusive, in various degrees, proportionable lo the de
gree and exactness of the whole analogy or likeness ; and
having so great authority for its introduction into the sub
ject of religion, even revealed religion, my design is to
apply it to that subject in general, both natural and re
vealed ; taking for proved, that there is an intelligent Au
thor of Nature, and natural Governor ofthe world. For
as there is no presuraption against this prior to the proof
of it, so it has been often proved with accumulated evi
dence; frora this arguraent of analogy and final causes;
from abstract re^omings; frora the raost ancient tradhion
und testiraony ¦ and from thp ('"neral con#nt of mankind.

62 INTRODUCTION.
Nor does it appear, so far as T can find, to be denied by
the generality of those who profess theraselves dissatisfied
with the evidence of religion.
As there are sorae, who, instead of thus attending lo
what is in fact the constitution of Nature, form their no
tions of God's government upon hypothesis ; so there
are others who indulge themselves in vain and idle specu
lations, how the world raight possibly have beeti framed
otherwise than it is : and upon supposition that things
might, in iraagining that they should, have been disposed
and carried on after a better model, than, what appears in
the present disposition and conduct of thera. Suppose,
now, a person of such a turn of raind to go on with his
reveries, till he had at length fixed upon some particular
plan of Nature, as appearing to hira the best, — one shall
scarce be thought guilty of detraction against human un
derstanding, if one should say, even beforehand, that the
plan which this speculative person would fix upon, ihough
he were the wisest of the sons of men, probably would
not be the very best, even according lo his own notion of
best ; whether he thought that lo be so which afiorded
occasions and motives for the exercise ofthe greatest vir-'
tue,- or which was productive of the greatest happiness,
or that these two were necessarily connected, and run up
into one and the same plan. However, it may not he
amiss, once for all, to see what would be the amount of
these emendations and iraaginary improvements upon the
systera of Naiure, or how far they would raislead us.
And it seeras there could be no stopping, till we came
to some such conclusions as these : — That all creatures
should at first be made as perfect and as happy, as they
were capable of ever being : that nothing, to be sure, of
hazard or danger should be put upon thera lo do ; sorae
indolent persons would perhaps think, nothing at all : or
certainly, tbat eff'ectual care should be taken, that they
should, whether necessarily, or not, yet eventually and in
fact, always do what was right and raost conducive to
happiness, which would be thought easy for infinite power
to effect ; eithgp: by nol giving thera any principles whjch

INTRODUCTION. 63
would endanger their going wrong, or by laying the right
moUve of action, in eveiy instance, before their minds
continually, in so strong a raanner, as would never fail of
inducing thera to act conformably toil : and that the whole
method of governraent by punishments should be reject
ed, as absurd ; as an awkward round-about method of
carrying things on ; nay, as contrary to a principal purpose,
for which it would be supposed creatures were made,
naraely happiness.
Now, without considering what is lo be said in particu
lar to the several parts of this train of folly and extrava
gance, vvhat has Been above intiraated is a full, direct,
general answer to il, naraely, that we raay see beforehand
that we have not faculties for this kind of speculation.
For though it be adraitted, that, frora the first principles
of our nature, we unavoidably judge or deterraine sorae
ends to be absolutely in themselves preferable lo others,
and that the ends now raentioned, or ifthey run up inlo
one, that this one is absolutely the best, and consequent
ly, tbat we raust conclude the ultiraate end designed
in the constitution of Nature and conduct of Providence,
is the most virtue and happiness possible ; yet we a,re
far frora being able to judge what particular disposition
of things would be most friendly and assistant to virtue,
or what means might be absolutely necessary to produce
the most happiness in a systera of such extent as our
own world raay be, taking in all that is past and lo come,
though we should suppose it detached from the whole of
things. Indeed, we are so far from being able to judge
of this, that vve are not judges what may be the necessary
means of raising and conducting one person lo the high
est perfection and happiness of his naiure. Nay, even
in the little affairs of the present life, we find raen of dif
ferent education and ranks are not corapetent judges of
the conduct of each other. Our whole nature leads
us to ascribe all raoral perfection to God, and to deny
all iraperfection in hira. And this will for ever be a
practical proof of his moral character, to such as wil
consider what a practical proof is, because it is the voice

64 INTRODUCTION.
of God speaking in us. And frora hence we conclude,
that virtue raust be the happiness, and vice the raisery,
of every creature ; and that regularity, and order, and
right, cannot but prevail, finally, in a universe under his
governraent. But we are in no sort judges what are the
necessary means of accomplishing this end.
Let us, then, instead of that idle and not very innocent
employment of forming imaginary models of a world,
and scheraes of governing it, turn our thoughts to what
we experience to be the conduct of Naiure wilh respect
to intelligent creatures ; which raay be resolved inlo gen
eral laws or rules of administration, in>the sarae way as
raany ofthe laws of Nature, respecting inaniraate matter,
may be collected from experiraents. And let us compare
the known constitution and course of things with what is
said to be the moral system of Nature, the acknowledged-
dispensations of Providence, or that government which-
we find ourselves under, wilh what religion teaches us to
believe and expect, and see whether they are not analo
gous, and of a piece. And upon such a coraparison it
will, I think, be found, that they are very much so ; that
both raay be traced up lo the same general laws, and re
solved inlo the sarae principles of Divine conduct.
The analogy here proposed to be considered, is of
pretty large extent, and consists of several parts ; in some
raore, in others less, exact. In some few instances, per
haps, it raay amount to a real practical proof, in others
not so ; jet in these it is a confirmation of what is proved
otherwise. It will undeniably show, what too many want
to have shown thera, that the systera of religion, both
natural and revealed, considered only as a systera, and
prior to the proof of it, is not a subject of ridicule, unless
that of naiure be so too. And it will afford an answer to
alraost all objections against the systera both of natural
and of revealed religion, though not perhaps an answer in
so great a degree, yet in a very considerable degree an
answer, to the objections against the evidence of it ; for,
objecUons against a proof, and objections against what is
said to be proved, the reader will observe, are different
things.

INTRODUCTION. 65
Now, the divine government of the world, iraplied in
the notion of religion in general, and of Christianity, con
tains in it,— That raankind is appointed to live in a future
state ;* that there every one shall be rewarded or pun
ished ;f rewarded or punished respectively for all that
behaviour here which vve comprehend under the words,
virtuous or vicious, morally good or evil 4 that our pre
sent life is a probation, a state oflrial,§ andof discipline, ||
for that future one ; notwithstanding the objections vvhich
meu may fancy they have, frora notions of necessity,
agaiust there being any such moral plan as this at all ;fl
and whatever objections raay appear to lie against the
wisdom and goodness of il, as it stands so imperfectly
made known to us at present :** that this world being in
a state of apostacy and wickedness, and consequently of
ruin, and the sense both of their conditfbn and duty being
greatly corrupted araongst men, this gave occasion for an
additional dispensaUon of Providence, of the utraost im-
portance,tt proved by miracles,J:^ but containing in it
many things appearing to us strange, and not lo have been
expected ; §§ a dispensation of Providence, which is a
scherae or systera of things|||| carried on by the raediation
of a Divine person, the Messiah, in order to the recovery
of the world :^U yet not revealed lo all raen, nor proved
with the strongest possible evidence to all those lo whora
it is revealed ; but only to such a part of mankind, and
with such particular evidence, as the wisdom of God
thought fit.*** The design, then, ofthe following Treatise
will be lo show, that the several parts principally objected
agabstin this raoral and Christian dispensation, including
its scheme, its publication, and the proof which God has
affbrded us of its truth ; that the particular parts princi
pally objected against in this whole dispensation, are analo
gous to what is experienced in the constitution and course
of Nature, or ProvidenSe ; that the chief objections iheni-
* Ch. i. t Ch. U. X Ch. iu.
§ Ch. iv. II Ch. V. IT Ch. vi.
•* Ch. vu. ft Part II. ch. i. Xt Ch. ii.
§§ Ch. m. IIII Ch. iv. irir Ch. v. *•* Ch. vi. vu.
6*

66 INTRODUCTION.
selves, which are alleged against the former, are no other
than what may be alleged with like justness against the
latter, where they are found in fact to be inconclusive;
and that this arguraent, from analogy, is in general unan
swerable, and undoubtedly of weight on the side of reli
gion,* notwithstanding the objections which may seem lo
lie against it, and the real ground which there raaybe for
difference of opinion, as to the particular degree of weight
which is to be laid upon it. This is a general account of
what raay be looked for in the following Treatise. And
I shall begin it wilh that which is the foiindation of all our
hopes, and of all our fears — all our hopQS and fears, which
are of any consideration — I raean, a Future Life.

* Ch. vui.

THE
ANALOGY OF
RELIGION TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PART I.
OF NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAP. I.
Of a Future Life.
Strange difficulties have been raised by sorae con
cerning personal identity, or the saraeness of living
agents, iraplied in the notion of our existing now and
hereafter, or in any two successive raoments ; which
whoever thinks it worth while, may see considered in
the first Dissertation at the end of this Treatise. But,
without regard to any of them here, let us consider what
the analogy of Nature, and the several changes which
we have undergone, and those which we know we may
undergo without being destroyed, suggest, as to the ef
fect which death may, or may not, have upon us ; and
whether it be not from thence probable, that we may

68 Of a Future Ufe. [Part 1.
survive this change, and exist in a future stale of life and
perception. I. Frora our being born inlo the present vvorld in the
helpless iraperfect slate of infancy, and having arrived
frora thence to raature age, we find it to be a general,
law of nature in our own species, that the sarae creatures,
the same individuals, shoidd exist in degrees of life antl
perception, with capacities of action, of enjoyment, and
suffering, in one period of their being, greatly different
from those appointed them in anoiher period of it. And
in other creatures the same law holds. For the differ
ence of their capacities and states of life at their birlh
(to go no higher) and in maturity; the change of worras
into flies, and the vast enlargeraent of their locoraotive
powers by such change ; and birds and insects bursting'
the shell, their habitation, and by this raeans entering into
a new world, furnished with new accoraraodations for
them ; and finding a new sphere of action assigned thera;
— these are instances of this general law of nature.
Thus, all the various and wonderful transformations of
aniraals are to be taken into consideration here. But
the states of life in which we ourselves existed forraerly,
in the worab and in our infancy, are alraost as different
frora our presenl, in raature age, as il is possible to con
ceive any two states or degrees of hfe can be. Therefore,
that we are lo exist hereafter in a state as different (sup
pose) from our present, as this is from our former, is but
according to the analogy of naiure ; according to a natu
ral order or appointraent, of the very sarae kind with
what we have already experienced.
II. We know we are endued with capacities of ac
tion, of happiness, and raisery ; for we are conscious
of acting, of enjoying pleasure, and suffering pain.
Now, that we have these powers and capacities before
death, is a presumption that we shall retain thera ihrough
and afler death ; indeed, a probabihty of it abundantly
sufficient lo act upon, unless there be sorae positive rea
son to think that death is the destruction of those living

Chap. 1.] Of a Future Ufe. 69
powers ; because there is in every case a probability,
that all things vvill continue as.we experience they are, ia
all respects, except those in which we have some reason
to think they will be altered. This is that kind* of
presuraption, or probability, frora analogy, expressed in
the very word continuance, which seeras our only natural
reason for believing the course ot the world will con
tinue to-morrow, as it has done so far as our experience
or knowledge of history can carry ns back. Nay, it
seems our only reason for believing, that any one sub
stance, now existing, will continue to exist a~ moment
longer; the self-existent substance only excepted. Thus,
if men were assured tiiat the unknown event, death, was
not the destruction of our faculties of perception and of
action, there would be no apprehension that any other
power or event, unconnected vvith this of death, would
destroy these faculties just at the instant of each crea
ture's death ; and therefore no doubt but that they would
reraain afler it : which shows tbe high probability that our
living powers will continue after death, unless there be sorae
ground lo think that death is their destruction. f For, if
it would be in a manner certain that we should survive
death, provided it were certain that death would not be
our destruction, it must be highly probable we shall sur
vive it, if there be no ground to think death vvill be' our
destruction. * I say kind of presumption or probability ; for I do not mean
to affirm, that there is the same degree of conviction that our living
powers will continue after death, as there is, that our substances will.
XDestmction of living powers, is a manner of expression unavoida
bly ambiguous ; and may signify either the destruction of a living be
ing, so as that the same living being shall be incapable of ever per
ceiving or acting again at all ; or the destruction of those means
and instruments by which it is capable of its present life, of its
present state of perception and of action. It is here used in the
former sense. When it is used in the latter, the epithet present is
added. The loss of a man's eye is a destruction of Uving power»
in the latter sense. But we have no reason to think the destruction
of Uving powers, in the former sense, to he possible. We have no
more reason to think a being, endued with living powers, ever loses
them during its whole existence, than to beUeve that a stone ever
acquires them.

70 Of a Future Ufe. , [Part 1.
Now, though I think it raust be acknowledged, that
prior to the natural and raoral proofs of a future life
comraonly insisted upon, there would arise a general
confused suspicion, that, in the great shock and- alteration
which we shall undergo by death, we, i. e. our living
powers, might be wholly destroyed ; yet even prior to
those proofs, there is really no particular distinct ground,
or reason, for this apprehension at all, so far as I can
find. If there be, it must arise either from the reason
ofthe ihing, or from the analogy of JVature.
But we cannot argue from ihe reason of the ihing,
that death is the destruction of living agents, because we
know not at all what death is in itself; but only some of
its effects, such as the dissolution of flesh, skin, and
bones : and these effects do in no wise appear lo imply
the destruction of a living agent. And, besides, as we
are greatly in the dark upon what the exercise of our living"
powers depends, so we are wholly ignorant what the
powers themselves depend upon ; the powers themselves,
as distinguished, not only frora their actual exercise, but
also from the present capacity of exercising thera ; and
opposed lo their destruction ; for sleep, or, however,
a swoon, shows us, not only that these powers exist when
they are not exercised, as the passive power of raotion
does in inaniraate raatter ; but shows also that they exist,
when there is no present capacity of exercising them ;
or that the capacities of exercising thera for the presenl,
as well as the actual exercise of them, may be suspend
ed, and yet the powers iheraselves reraain undestroyed.
Since, then, vve know not at all upon what the existence
of our living powers depends, this shows further, there
can no probability be collected from the reason of the
thing, that death vvill be their destruction : because their
existence may depend upon soraewhat in no degree af
fected by deatii ; upon somewhat quite out of the reach
of this king of terrors. So that there is nothing more
certain, than that the reason of the thing shows us no
connexion between death and the destruction of living

Chap. 1 .J Of a Future Life. 71
agents. Nor can we find any thing throughout the
whole analogy of JVature, to aflbrd us even the slightest
presumption, that animals ever lase their living powers ;
much less, if it were possible, that they lose them by
death ; for vve have no faculties wherewith to trace any
beyond or through it, so as to see what becoraes of thera.
This event reraoves thera from our view. It destroys
the sensible proof, vvhich we had before tiieir death, of
their being possessed of living powers, but does not ap
pear to afford the least reason to believe, that they are
then, or by that event, deprived of thera.
And our knowing, that they were possessed of these
powers, up to the very period lo vvhich we have faculties
capable of tracing thera, is itself a probability of their
retaining thera beyond il. And this is confirraed, and a
sensible credibility is given lo it, by observing the very
great and astonishing changes which we have experi
enced ; so greal, that our existence in another stale of
Ufe, of perception and of action, will be but according to
a raethod of providential conduct, the like to vvhich has
been already exercised, even wilh regard to ourselves ;
according lo a course of naiure, the like to which we
have already gone through.
However, as bne cannot but be greatly sensible, how
difficult it is to silence iraagination enough to raake the
voice of reason even distinctly heard in this case ; as we
are accustoraed, frora our youth up, to indulge that for
ward delusive faculty, ever obtruding beyond its sphere ;
of sorae assistance, indeed, to apprehension, bul the au
thor of all error : as we plainly lose ourselves in gross
and crude conceptions of things, taking for granted that
we are acquainted with what indeed we are wholly ig
norant of ; it may be proper lo consider the imaginary
presumptions, that death will be our destruction, arising
frora these kinds of early and lasting prejudices ; and to
show how littie they can really araount lo, even though
we cannot wholly divest ourselves of thera. And,
I. All presumption of death's being the destruction of

72 Of a Future Life. [Part I.
living beings, must go upon supposition that they are
compounded, and so discerptible. Bul, since conscious
ness is a single and indivisible power, it should seera that
the subject in which il resides, must be so too. For,
were the raotion of any particle of matter absolutely one
and indivisible, so as that h should iraply a contradiction
to suppose part of this raotion to exist, and part not to
exist, i. e. part of this matter lo move, and part lo he at
rest ; then its power of motion would be indivisible ; and
so also would the subject in which the power inheres,
naraely, the particle of raatter : for, if this could be di
vided into two, one part might be moved and the other at
rest, which is contrary lo the supposition. In like man
ner, il has been argued,* and, for any thing appearing to
the contrary, justiy, that since the perception, or con
sciousness, which we have of our own existence is indi
visible, so as that it is a contradiction lo suppose one
part of it should be here and the other there ; the per
ceptive power, or the- power of consciousness, is indivisi
ble loo ; and, consequently, the subject in which it re
sides, i. e. the conscious being. Novv, upon supposition
hat hving agent each man calls hiraself, is thus a single
being, which there is at least no raore difficulty in con
ceiving than in conceiving it to be a compound, and of
which there is the proof now raentioned ; it follows, that
our organized bodies are no raore ourselves, or part of
ourselves, than any other raatter around us. And it is
as easy to conceive how raatter, which is no part of our
selves, raay be appropriated to us in the raanner which
our present bodies are, as hovv we can receive im
pressions frora, and have power over any raatter. It is
as easy lo conceive, that we may exist out of bodies, as
in thera ; that we raight have animated bodies of any
other organs and senses wholly different from these now
given us, and that we raay hereafter animate these same
or new bodies variously modified and organized, as to
• See Dr Clarke's Letter to Mr Dodwell, and the Defences of it.

Chap. I.J Ofa Future Life. 73
conceive how we can animate such bodies as our present.
And, lastly, the dissolution of all these several organized
bodies, supposing ourselves to have successively aniraated
them, would have no more conceivable tendency to de
stroy the living beings, ourselves, or deprive us of living
faculties, the facukies of perception and of action, than
the dissolution of any foreign raatter, which we are ca
pable of receiving impressions from, and making use of
for the comraon occasions of life.
II. The siraplicity and absolute oneness of a hving
agent cannot, indeed, frora the nature of the thing, be
properly proved by experiraental observations. But as
these faU in with the' supposition of its unity, so they
plainly lead us to corudude certainly, that our gross
organized bodies, with which we perceive the objects of
sense, and wilh which we act, are no part of ourselves,
and therefore show us, that we have no reason to believe
their destruction to be ours; even without determining
whether our living substances be material or immaterial.
For we see by experience, that men may lose their
lirabs, their organs of sense, and even the greatest part
of these bodies, and yet reraain the sarae living agents :
And persons can trace up the existence of iheraselves to
a time when the bulk of their bodies was extremely
small, in coraparison of what it is in raature age ; and we
cannot but think, that they might then have lost a con
siderable part of that sraall body, and yet have remained
the sarae living agents, as they may now lose great part
of their present body, and reraain so. And it iscertain,
that the bodies of all aniraals are in a constant flux, from
that never ceasing attrition which there is in every part of
thera. Now, things of this kind unavoidably teach us to
distinguish between these living agents, ourselves, and
large quantities of matter, in which we are very nearly
i'.aterested : since these may be alienated, and actually
are in a daily course of succession, and Changing their
owners; whilst we are assured, that each living agent re-
7

74 Of a Future Life. [Part I.
mairis one and the sarae perraanent being.* And this
general observation leads us on to the following ones.
First, That we have no way of determining by ex
perience, what is the certain bulk of the living being each
man calls himself; and yet, till it be deterrained that it is
larger in bulk than the sohd eleraentary particles of
matier, which there is no ground to think any natural
power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to think
death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even
though il should not be absolutely indiscerptible.
Secondly, Frora our being so nearly related to, and
interested in certain systems of raatter, suppose our flesh
and boues, and afterwards ceasing lo be at all related to
thera, the hving agents, ourselves, reraaining all this while
undestroyed, notwithstanding such ahenations : and conj
sequently these systems of raatter not being ourselves; it
follows further, that we have no ground lo conclude any
olher, suppose internal systems of raatter, lo be the living
agents ourselves ; because we can have no ground lo con
clude this, but frorn our relation to, and interest in such
other systems of matter : and, therefore, we can have no
reason to conclude, what befalls those systeras of raatter
at death, lo be the destruction of the Uving agents. We
have already, several liraes over, lost a great part, or per
haps the whole of our body, according to certain coramon
established laws of naiure ; yet we remain the same
living agents : vvhen we shall lose as great a part, or the
whole, by anoiher coramon established law of naiure,
death, why raay we not also reraain the sarae ? Thai the
alienation has been gradual in one case, and in the other
win be raore at once, does not prove any thing to the
contrary. We have passed undestroyed through those
many and great revolutions of matier, so pecuUarly ap
propriated tons, ourselves ; why should we imagine death
would be so fatal to us ? Nor can it be objected, that
what is thus aUenated, or lost, is no part of our original
* See Dissertation I.

Chap. I.J Of a Future Ufe. 75
solid hody, but only adventitious matter; because we
may lose entire lirabs, which raust have contained many
soUd parts and Vessels of the original body : or if this be
nol admitted, we have no proof that any of these solid
parts are dissolved or alienated by death ; though, by the
way, vve are very hearly related to that extraneous
or adventitious matter, whilst it continues united to
and distending the several parts of our soUd body. Bul,
after all, the relation a person bears lo those parts of
his body to which he is the most nearly related, what
does it appear to amount to but tbis, that the living
agent and those parts of the body mutually affect each
other.' And the sarae thing, the sarae thing in kind,
though nol in degree, raay be said of all foreign raatter,
which gives us ideas, and which we have any power
over. Frora these observations the whole ground of the
iraagination is reraoved, that tbb dissolution of any raatter
is the destruction of a living agent, from the inierest
he once had in such matter.
Thirdly, If we consider our body soraewhat raore
distinctly, as made up of organs and instruments of
perception and of motion, it will bring us to the same
conclusion. Thus, the comraon optical experiraents
show, and even the observation how sight is assisted by
glasses shows, that we see wilh our eyes in the same
sense as we see with glasses. Nor is there any reason
to believe, that we see with thera in any other sense ;
any olher, I raean, which vvould lead us lo think the eye
itself a percipient. The like is to be said of hearing :
and our feeling distant soUd matier by raeans of sorae
what in our hand, seeras an instance of the like kind, as
to the subject we are considering. AU these are instances
of foreign raatter, or such as is no part of our body, being
instruraental in preparing objects for, and conveying them
to the perceiving power, in a raanner similar, or like to the
raanner in which our organs of sense prepare and convey
thera. Both are, in a like way, instruraents of our re
ceiving such ideas from external objects, as the Author of

76 Of a Future Life. [Part 1.
nature appointed those external objects to be the occa
sions of exciting in us. However, glasses are evidently
instances of this ; namely, of raatter, which is no part of
our body, preparing objects for, and conveying them
towards the perceiving power, in like manner as our
bodily organs do. And if we see wilh our eyes only in
the same raanner as we do with glasses, the like may
justly be concluded frora analogy, of all our olher senses.
It is not intended, by any thing here said, to affirra, that
the whole apparatus of vision, or of perception by any
other of our senses, can be traced, through all its steps,
quite up lo the Uving power of seeing, or perceiving ; but
that, so far as it can be traced by experiraental observa
tions, so far it appears, that our organs of sense prepare
and convey on objects, in order to their being perceived,
in Uke raanner as foreign raatter does, without affording
any shadow of appearance, thatthey themselves perceivei^:
And that we have no reason lo think our organs of sense
percipients, is confirraed by instances of persons losing
sorae of them, the living beings themselves, their former
occupiers, remaining unimpaired. Il is confirraed also
by the experience of drearas ; by which we find we are
at present possessed of a latent, and what vvould other
wise be an uniraagined unknown power of perceiving
sensible objects, in as strong and lively a manner without
our external organs of sense, as wilh them.
So also with regard to our power, of raoving, or direct
ing raotion by vvill and choice : upon the destruction of a
Umb, this active power remains, as il evidently seeras,
unlessened ; so as that the living being, who has suffered
this loss, would be capable of moving as before, if it had
anoiher Umb lo move with. It can walk by the help of
an artificial leg, just as il can make use of a pole or a
lever, lo reach towards itself and to move things beyond
the length and the power of its natural arm : and this last
it does in the same raanner as il reaches and raoves, wilh
its natural arm, things nearer and of less weight. Nor is
there so much as any appearance of our Umbs being en'

Chap. I.J Of a Future Life. 77
dued vvith a power of raoving or directing themselves ;
though they are adapted, like the several parts of a ma
chine, to be the instruments of raotion lo each olher; and
sorae parts ofthe sarae lirab, to be instruraents of motion
to olher parts of it.
Thus, a man determines that he will loot at such an
object through a microscope; or, being larae suppose,
that he wiU walk to such a place vvith a staff a week
hence. His eyes and his feet no raore deterraine in
these cases, than the raicroscope and the staff. Nor is
there any ground to think they any raore put the deter
mination in practice, or tiiat his eyes are the seers, or his
feet the raovers, in any other sense than as the raicroscope
and the staff are. Upon the whole, then, our organs of
sense and our limbs are certainly instruraents, which the
living persons, ourselves, raake use of to perceive and
move vvith. There is not any probability, that they are
any. more ; nor, consequentiy, that we have any other
kind of relation to them, than what we raay have to any
other foreign raatter forraed into instruraents of perception
and motion, suppose into a raicroscope or a staff (I say,
any other kind of relation, for I am nol speaking of the
degree of it ;) nor, consequently, is there any probability,
that the alienation or dissolution of these instruments is the
destruction ofthe perceiving and raoving agent.
And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter in
which Uving beings were most nearly interested, is not their
dissolution ; and that the destruction of several of the
organs and instruraents of perception and of raotion belong
ing to them, is not their destruction ; shows, demonstra
tively, that there is no ground to think, that the dissolution
of any other raatter, or destruction of any other organs
and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of
living agents, frora the like kind of relation. And we
have no reason to think we stand in any other kind of re
lation to any thing which vve find dissolved by death.
But it is said, these observations are equally applicable
to brutes ; and it is thought an insuperable difficulty, that

78 Of a Future Ufe. [Part 1,
they should be imraortal, and, by consequence, capable
of everlasting happiness. Now, this mannerof expression
is both invidious and weak : but the thing intended by it,
is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural
or moral consideration. For, 1st, Suppose the invidious
thing, designed in such a manner of expression, were
really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural im
mortality of brutes ; namely, that they must arrive at
great attainments, and become rational and moral agents;
even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what
latent powers and capacities they raay be endued with.
There was once, prior to experience, as greal persuraption
against huraan creatures, as there is against the brute
creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which
we have in raature age ; for we can trace up our own
existence to the sarae original with theirs. And we find
it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued witii
capacities of virtue and religion, should be placed in a
condition of being, in which they are altogether wiihout
the use of thern for a considerable length of their duration,
as in infancy and childhood. And greal part of the hu
man species go oul of the present world, before they come
to the exercise of these capacities in any degree al all.
Bul then, 2dly, The natural iraraortality of brutes does
nol in the least imply, that they are endued with any latent
capacities ofa rational or moral nature. And th^ econo
my of the universe raight require, that there should be
Uving creatures without any capacities ofthis kind. And
all difficulties, as to the raanner hovv they are lo be dis
posed of, are so apparently and wholly founded on our
ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted
upon by any, bul such as are weak enough to think they
are acquainted with the whole system of things. There
is, then, absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is
so rhetorically urged against the greatest part of the natu
ral proofs or presumptions of the immortaUty of human
minds : I say the greatest part ; for it is less applicable to
the following observation, which is more peculiar lo man
kind : —

Chap. I.J Of a Future Ufe. 79
III. That as it is evident om present powers and capaci
ties of reason, raeraory, and affection, do not depend upon
our gross body, in the raanner in which perception by our
organs of sense does ; so they do not appear to depend
upon it al all in any such raanner, as to give ground to
think, that the dissolution of this body wiU be the destruc
tion of these our present powers of reflection, as il will of
our powers of sensation ; or to give ground to conclude,
even that it will be so much as a suspension ofthe former.
Huraan creatures exist at present in two slates of life
and perception, greatly different from each olher ; each
of which has its own peculiar laws, and its own peculiar
enjoyraents and sufferings. When any of our senses are
affected, or appethes gratified with the objects of them,
we may be said lo exist, or live, in a state of sensation.
When none of our senses are affected, or appetites grati
fied, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act, we may
be said to exist, or live, in a slate of reflection. Now it
is by no raeans certain, that any thing which is dissolved
by death is any way necessary to the living being, in
this its slate of reflection, after ideas are gained. For
though, frora our present constitution and condition of
being, our external organs of sense are necessary for
conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages,
and levers, and' scaffolds are in architecture; yet, when
these ideas are brought in, we are capable of reflecting
in the raost intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest
pleasure, and feeUng the greatest pain,'by raeans of that
reflection, without any assistance from our senses ; and
vdthout any at all, which we know of, frora that body,
which wiU be dissolved by death. It does not appear,
then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting
being, is in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to our intel
lectual enjoyraents or sufferings : nor, consequently, that
the dissolution, or alienation of the forraer by death, will
be the destruction of those present powers, which render
us capable of this stale of reflection. Further, there are
instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect

80 Ofa Future Ufe. [Part 1.
our present intellectual powers ; and this affords a pre
sumption, that those diseases will not destroy these pre
sent powers. Indeed, frora the observations made above,*
it appears, that there is no presumption, frora their mu
tually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the
body is tiie destruction of the Uving agent. And by the
same reasoning it must appear, too, that there is no pre
suraption, frora their mutually affecting each other, that
the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our pres
enl reflecting powers ; bul instances of their not affect
ing each other, afford a presumption of the contrary.
Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present
reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from
imagining such diseases to be the destruction of thera. \
Several things, indeed, greatly affect all our living powers,
and at length, suspend the exercise of them ; as, for in
stance, drowsiness, increasing tiU it ends in .sound sleep:
and from hence we might have imagined it would de
stroy them, till we found, by experience, the weakness
of this way of judging. Bul, in the diseases now men
tioned, there is not so much as the shadow of probability,
to lead us lo any such conclusion, as to the reflecting
powers which vve have at present ; for, in those diseases,
persons the moraent before death appear to be in the
highest vigor of life. They discover apprehensioUj
memory, reason, all entire ; with the utmost force of af
fection ; sense of a character, of shame and honor ; and
the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even lo the
last gasp : and these surely prove even greater vigor of
life than bodily strength does. Now, what pretence is
there for thinking, that a progressive disease, when ar
rived to such a degree, I mean that degree which is
mortal, vvill destroy those powers, which vvere nol im
paired, vvhich were not affected by it, during its whole
progress, quite up to that degree? And if death, by dis
eases of this kind, is not the destruction of our present
•Pages 74, 75,76.

Chap. I.J Of a Future Ufe. 81
reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by
any other means is.
It is obvious that this general observation may be
carried on furtiier : and there appears so lillie connexion
between our bodily powers of sensation, and our present
powers of reflection, that there is no reason to conclude
that death, which destroys the former, does»so rauch as
suspend the exercise of the latter, or interrupt our con
tinuing to exist in the Uke slate of reflection which we
do now. For, suspension of reason, raemory, and the
affections which they excite, is no part of the idea of
deatb, nor is irapUed in our notion of it. And our daily
experiencing these powers to be exercised, without any
assistance, that we know of, frora those bodies which will
be dissolved by death ; and our finding often, that the
exercise of them is so lively to tiie last ; — these things
afford a sensible apprehension, that death may not per-
. haps be so much as a discontinuance of the exercise of
these powers, nor of the enjoyments and sufferings which
it implies;* so that our posthuraous Ufe, whatever there
may be in it additional lo our presenl, yet may not be
entirely beginning anew, but going on. Death may, in
sorae sort, and in some respects, answer to our birth,
which is not a suspension of the faculties which we had
before it, or a total change of the state of life in which
we existed when in the womb, but a continuation of both,
wilh such and such great alterations.
Nay, for ought we know of ourselves, of our present
life, and of death, death may iramediately, in the natural
course of things, put us into a higher and raore enlarged •
* "There are three distinct questions, relating to a future Ufe, here
considered : Whether death be the destruction of living agents ? If
not. Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflec
tion, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sen
sation .' And if not. Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance
of the exercise, of these present reflectmg powers ? Now, if there
be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible,
less for the next, and Jass stiU for the first.

82 Of a Future Ufe. [Parti.
stale of Ufe, as our birth does;* a state in which our
capacities and sphere of perception, and of action, may
be rnuch greater than at present. For, as our relation
to our external organs of sense renders us capable of
existing in our present stale 'of sensation, so it may
be the only natural hindrance to our existing, imraedi
ately and of course, in a higher stale of reflection. The
truth is, reason does not at all show us in vvhat stale death
naturally leaves us. But were we sure that it would sus
pend all our perceptive and active powers, yet the suspen
sion of a povver, and the destruction of il, are effects so
totally different in kind, as we experience from sleep anda
swoon, that we cannot in any wise argue frora one lo the
other ; or conclude, even lo the lowest degree of pro
bability, that the same kind of force which is sufficient to
suspend our faculties, though it be increased ever so
much, will be sufficient to destroy thera.
These observations together raay be sufficient to show,
how littie presumption there is that death is the destruc
tion of human creatures. However, there is the shadow
of an analogy, which raay lead us lo iraagine it is ; the
supposed likeness which is observed between the decay
of vegetables and of living creatures. And this likeness
is indeed sufficietit to afford the poets very apt allusions
to the flowers of the field, in their pictures of the frailly
of our present life. But, in reason, the analogy is so far
frora holding, that there appears no ground even for the
coraparison, as lo the present question ; because one of
the two subjects compared is wholly void of that, which
is the principle and chief thing in the other, the power of
perception and of action ; and which is the only thing we
are inquiring about the continuance of. So that the de-
* This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brahroans:
vofit^Eiv [lEv ycip Sfi rbv ^£V ivOdSc Plov, bte <*v &Knj)v Kvofiivoiv elvat' rivil
ddvarcv, yivEatv els rbv Svrtas ^tov, Kal Hv ciiSai/xova vols (j)i\o(roiJitiaaBt.,
Lib.. XV. p. 1039. Ed. Amst. 1707. To which opinion perhapl
Antoninus may allude in these words, &s vvv TtEpinivcis, h6te eiiSpvaf
h rijs yaoTphs Trjs yvvaiKSs try i^iXdj], yrois USi^eadaL t^v lipav Iv jj t3 i/^^d-
piov fftf TS i'Mrpy tStu hireactTat. Lib. IX. c. 3.

Chap. I.J Ofa Future Life. 83
struction of a vegetable is an event not sirailar, or analo
gous, to the destruction of a living agent.
But if, as was above intiraated, leaving off the delusive
custora of substituting iraagination in the roora of experi
ence, we would confine ourselves lo vvhat vve do know and
understand ; . if we vvould argue only frora that, and from
that forra our expectations, it would appear, at first sight,
that as no probability of living beings ever ceasing to be
so, cau be concluded frora the reason of the thing ; so
none cau be collected frora the analogy of naiure ; he-
cause we cannot trace any Uving beings beyond death.
But as we are conscious that we are endued whh capaci
ties of perception and of action, and are living persons,
what we are to go upon is, that we shall continue so till '
we foresee sorae accident, or event, which will endanger
those capacities, or be likely to destroy us ; which death
does in no wise appear to be.
And thus, when we go out of this world, we may pass
into new scenes, and a new slate of Ufe and action, just
as naturally as we carae inlo the present. And this new
stale may naturally be a social one. And the advantages
of it, advantages of every kind, raay naturally be bestow
ed, according to some fij^ed general laws of wisdom, upon
every one in proportion to the degrees of his virtue. And
though the advantages of that future natural stale should
not be bestowed, as these of the present in some raeasure
are, by the will of the society, bul entirely by his raore
iraraediate action, upon whora the whole frarae of nature
depends, yet this distribution raay be just as natural, as
their being distributed here by the instruraentality of
men. And, indeed, though one vvere lo allow any con
fused undetermined sense, which people please to put
upon the word natural, it would be a shortness of thought
scarce credible to imagine, that no system or course of
things can be so, but only what we see at present ;*
especially whilst the probability of a future life, or the
• See Part u. ch. 2. and Partii. ch. S.

84 Of a Future Ufe. [Part 1.
natural iramortality of the soul, is admitted upon the evi
dence of reason ; because this is really both admitting and
denying at once, a state of being different from the pres
ent to be natural. Bfil the only distinct meaning of that
word is, stated, fixed, or settled ; since what is natural as
much requires, and presupposes an inteUigent agent to
render it so, i. e. to effect it continually, or at stated times,
as what is supernatural or miraculous does lo effect it for
once. And from hence it must follow, that persons' no>
tion of what is natural vvill be enlarged, in proportion to
their greater knowledge of the works of God and the
dispensations of his Providence. Nor is there any ab
surdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the
universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views,
may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispen
sation may to them appear natural, i. e. analogous or con
formable to God's dealings with other parts of his crea
tion, as natural as the visible known course of things
appears to us. For there seems scarce any other possi
ble sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which
il is here used ; sirailar, stated, or uniform.
This credibihty of a future life, which has been here
insisted upon, how littie soever it may satisfy our curiosity,
seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like man
ner as a demonstrative proof vvould. Indeed, a proof,
even a demonstrative one, of a future Ufe, would not be a
proof of religion. For, that we are lo live hereafter, is
just as reconcileable with the scherae of atheisrn, and as
weU to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive
is; and therefore nothing can be raore absurd than to
argue frora that scheme, that there can be no future state.
But as religion implies a future state, any presumption
against such a state is a presumption against religion.
And the foregoing observations reraove all presumptions
of that sort, and prove, to a very considerable degree of
probability, one fundamental doctrine cf religion ; which,
if believed, would greatly open and dispose the raind
seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whble.

85

CHAP. II.
Of the Government of God hy Rewards and Punish
ments; and particularly ofthe latter.
That which raakes the question concerning a future
life to be of so great importance lo us, is our capacity of
happiness and misery. And that which raakes the con
sideration of it to be of so great importance to us, is the
supposition of our happiness and raisery hereafter, de
pending upon our actions here. Without this, indeed,
curiosity could not but soraetiraes bring a subject, in
which we raay be so highly interested, lo our thoughts ;
especially upon the mortality of others, or the near pros
pect of our own. But reasonable men would not take
any farther thought about hereafter, than what should
happen ttrus occasionally to rise in their rainds, if it were
certain that our future interest no way depend upon our
present behaviour ; whereas, on the contrary, if there be
ground, eilher frora analogy or any thing else, to think it
does, then there is reason also for the most active thought
and solicitude to secure that interest ; to behave so
as that we raay escape that raisery, and obtain that
happiness in another life, which we not only suppose
ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put
in our own power. And whether there be ground for
tbis lasl apprehension, certainly would deserve lo be raost
seriously considered, were there no otber proof of a
future, life and interest, than that presuraptive one
which the foregoing observations araount to.
8

86 Of the Government of God [Part 1.
Now in the present stale, all which we enjoy, and
a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power.
For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our
actions ; and we are endued by the Author of our naiure
with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We
find, by experience, he does not so much as preserve our
lives exclusively of our own care aud attention to provide
ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance,
by which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved,
and without which he has appointed they shall not be
preserved at all. And in general we foresee, that
the external things, which are the objects of our various
passions, can neither be obtained nor enjoyed, without
exerting ourselves in such and such raanners ; but by
thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy, these
objects, in which our natural good consists, or by this
means God gives us the possession and enjoyraent of
thera. I know not that we have any one kind or degree
of enjoyment, bul by the means of our own actions.
And by prudence and care, we may, for the most part,
pass our days iu tolerable ease and quiet : or, on the
contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion,
wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as
miserable as ever we please. And many do please to
make themselves extremely miserable, *» e. lo do what
they know beforehand will render thera so. They follow
those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction,
exaraple, experience, wiU be disgrace, and poverty, and
sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes
to be the general course of things ; though it is to
be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all
our sufferings are owing to our own folUes.
Why the Author of Nature does not give his creatures
promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard
to their behaviour ; why he does not raake them happy
without the instrumentality of their own actions, and pre
vent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is
another matter. Perhaps there may be sorae ira;30S-

Chap. 2.J By Rewards and Punishments. 87
sibiUlies in the nature of things, which vve are unacquaint
ed with :* Or less happiness, it raay be, would, upon
the whole, be produced by such a raethod of conduct,
than is by the present : Or, perhaps, divine goodness,
with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our
speculations, raay not be a bare single disposition to
produce happiness ; but a disposition to raake the good,
the faithful, the honest man, happy. Perhaps an in
finitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his
creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has
given thera ; lo the relations vvhich he has placed them
in to each olher ; and lo that which they stand in to
hiraself; that relation to hiraself, which, during their
existence, is even necessary, and which is the most
iraportant one of aU. Perhaps, I say, an infinitely
perfect Mind may be pleased wilh this moral piety of
raoral agents, in and for itself, as weU as upon account of
•Is being essentially conducive to the happiness of his
creation. Or the whole end, for vvhich God raade, and
thus governs tbe world, raay be utterly beyond the reach
of our faculties : There may be somewhat in il as im
possible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind
raan to have a conception of colors. But however
this be, it is certain matter of universal experience,
that the general method of divine administration is,
forewarning us, or giving us capacities lo foresee, with
more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, vve shall
have such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings ; and
giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those suf
ferings, in consequence of our actions.
" Bul all this is to be ascribed to the general course of
naiure." True. This is the very thing which I ara
observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of
naiure; i. e. not surely To-the words, or ideas. Course
of nature, but to hira vvho appointed il, and put things
into il ; or lo a course of operation, from its uniformity
* Part i. chap. 7.

88 Of the Government of God [Part 1.
or constancy, called natural,* and which necessarily
iraplies an operating agent. For when men find them
selves necessitated to confess an Author of Naiure, or
that God is the natural governor of the vvorld, they must
not deny this again, because his governmeut is uniform;
they must not deny that he does all things at all, because
he does them constantly ; because the effects of his acting
are permanent, whether his acting be so or not ; though
there is no reason to think it is not. In short, every
man, in every thing he does, naturally acts upon the
forethought and apprehension of avoiding evil, or ob
taining good : and if the natural course of things be the
appointment of God, and onr natural faculties of know
ledge and experience are given us by him, then the good
and bad consequences which follow our actions are his
appointment, and our foresight of those consequences is
a warning given us by him, how we are lo act.
"Is the pleasure, then, naturally accompanying every
particular gratification of passion, intended lo put us upon
gratifying ourselves in every such particular instance, and
as a reward to us for so doing.'"' No, certainly. Nor
is it lo be said, that our eyes were naturally intended to
give us the sight of each particular object lo which they
do or can extend ; objects which are destructive of them,
or which, for any other reason, it may beeome us to turn
our -eyes from. Yet there is no doubt, but that our eyes
were intended for us lo see with. So neither is there
any doubt, bul that the foreseen pleasures and pains,
belonging to the passions, were intended, in general, lo
induce mankind to act in such and such raanners.
Now, from this general observation, obvious to every
one, that God has given us lo understand he has appoint
ed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our
acting in one raanner, and pain and uneasiness of our
acting in another, and of our not acting al all; and that
we find the consequences, which we were beforehand in-
» Pages 83, 84.

Chap. 2.J By Rewards and Punishments. 89
forraed of, uniforraly to follow ; we raay learn, that we
are at present actually under his governraent, in the
strictest and raost proper sense ; in such a sense, as that
he rewards and punishes us for our actions. An Author
of Nature being supposed, it is not so rauch a deduction
of reason as a raatter of experience, that we are thus
under his government: under his governraent, in the
sarae sense as we are under the governraent of civil raa
gistrates. Because the annexing pleasure lo sorae ac
tions, and pain to others, in our power lo do or forbear,
and giving notice ofthis appointraent beforehand lo those
whora it concerns, is the proper forraal notion of govern
ment. Whether the pleasure or pain which thus foUows
upon our behaviour, be owing to the Author of Nature's
acting upon us every raoraent which we feel il, or lo his
having at once contrived and executed his own part in
the plan of the world, makes no alteration as lo the raat
ter before us. For, if civil raagistrates could raake the
sanctions of their laws lake place, without interposing at
all, after they had passed them ; without a trial, and the
formaUties of an execution : if they were able lo make
their laws execute theraselves, or every offender to exe
cute them upon himself, we should be just in the same
sense under their governraent then, as we are now ; but
in a rauch higher degree, and more perfect manner.
Vain is the ridicule with vvhich one foresees sorne per
sons will divert themselves, upon finding lesser pains
considered as instances of divine punishment. There is
no possibiUty of answering or evading the general thing
here intended, without denying all final causes. For,
final causes being adraitted, the pleasures and pains
now mentioned must be admitted too, as instances of
them. And if they are ; if God annexes deUght to some
actions and uneasiness to others, with an apparent de-
¦ sign lo induce us to act so arid so, then he not only, dis
penses happiness and raisery, bul also rewards and pun
ishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel
upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies,
8*

90 Of the Government of God [Part I.
suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon
wounding ourselves, be appointed by the Author of Na
ture to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruc
tion ; this is altogether as much an instance of his pun
ishing our actions, and consequently of our being under
his governraent, as declaring, by a voice frora heaven,
that if we acted so, he would inflict such pain upon us,
and inflicting il whether it be greater or less.
Thus we find, that the true notion or conception ofthe
Author of Nature, is that of a raaster or governor, prior
to the consideration of his raoral attributes. The fact
of our case, which we fiud by experience, is, that he ac
tually exercises dorainion or government over us at pres
ent, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as
strict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the
sarae sense as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded
and punished by those who govern them.
And thus the whole analogy of nature, the whole pre
sent course of things, raost fully shows, that tiiere is
nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion,
that God wiU reward and punish raen for their actions
hereafter ; nothing incredible, I raean, arising out of the
notion of rewarding and punishing, for the whole course
of nature is a present instance of his exercising that
government over us, which impUes in il rewarding and
punishing.

BtJT, as divine punishraent is what raen chiefly object
against, and are raost unwilling to allow, it raay be proper
to raention some circurastances in the natural course of
punishraents at present, which are analogous to what re
ligion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment;
indeed so analogous, that as they add a farther credibili
ty to it, so they cannot but raise a raost serious apprehen
sion of it in those who vvill attend to them.

Chap. 2.J By Putiishments. 91
It has been now observed, that such and such raiseries
naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and
wilfulness, as vvell as actions more comraonly and raore
distinctly considered as vicious ; and that tbese conse
quences, when they raay be foreseen, are properly natu
ral puni.shraents annexecK to such actions. For the gen
eral thing here insisted upon is, not that we see a great
deal of raisery in the world, but a great deal which raen
bring upon themselves by their own behaviour, which
they raight have foreseen and avoided. Now, the cir
curastances op these natural punishraents, particularly
deserving our attention, are such as these : That often
tiraes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of ac
tions which procure raany present advantages, and are
accompanied with rauch present pleasure ; for instance,
sickness and untimely death is the consequence of intera
perance, though accorapanied with the highest mirth and
joUity : That these puoishnients are often rauch greater
than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions,
of which they are the punishraents or consequences :
That though we raay imagine a consthution of nature, ui
which these natural punishraents, which are in fact to
follow, vvould follow iramediately upon such actions be
ing done, or very soon after ; vve find, on tbe contrary,
in our world, that they are often delayed a great while,
soraetiraes even tiU long after the actions occasioning
thera are forgot ; so that the constitution of nature is
sucb, that delay of punishraent is no sort nor degree of
presuraption of final impunity : That, after such delay,
tbese natural punishments or raiseries often corae, nol by
degrees, but suddenly, vvith violence, and at once ; how
ever, the chief misery often does : That, as certainty of
such distant misery following such actions is never afford
ed persons, so, perhaps, during the actions, they have
seldora a distinct fuU expectation of its following:* and
many times the case is only thus, tiiat they see in general,
• See Part li. chap. 6.

92 Of the Government of God [Part 1.
or raay see, the credibility, that interaperance, suppose,
will bring after its diseases ; civil crimes, civil punish
ments ; when yet the real probability often is, that they
shall escape; but things notwithstanding take their destined
course, and the misery inevitably follows al its appointed
tirae, in very raany of these cases. Thus, also, though
youth raay be aUeged as an excuse for rashness and folly,
as being naturally thoughtiess, and not clearly foreseeing
ah the consequences of being untractable and profligate;
this does not hinder but that these consequences follow, and
are greviously felt throughout the whole course of mature
Ufe. Habits contracted, even in that age, are often utter
ruin ; and raen's success in the world, nol only in the
coraraon sense of worldly success, bul their real happi
ness and raisery depends, in a great degree, and in va
rious ways, upon the rnanner in which they pass their
youth ; which consequences they, for the most part, ne
glect to consider, and perhaps seldora can properly be
said to believe beforehand. Il requires also lo be men
tioned, that, in nuraberless cases, the natural course of
things affords us opporlunities for procuring advantages
to ourselves at certain tiraes, which vve cannot procure
when we will; nor , ever recall the opportunities, if we
have neglected thera. Indeed, the general course of
nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity
of youth, persons are indocile and self-willed, they inev
itably suffer in their future life, for want of tiiose ac
quirements which they neglected the natural season of
attaining. If the husbandraan lets his seed-time pass with
out sowing, the whole year is lost to hira beyond recovery.
In like raanner, though after .men have been guilty of
folly and extravagance, up io a certain degree, it is often
in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, lo
recover their health and character, at least in good mea
sure ; yet real reformation is, in raany cases, of no avail
at all towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sickness,
infamy, naturally annexed lo folly and extravagance, ex
ceeding that degree. There is a certain bound to im-

Chap. 2. J By Punishments. 93
prudence and raisbehaviour, which being transgressed,
there remains no place for repentance in the natural
course of things. It is, further, very rauch to be re
marked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of
attention,* not looking about us lo see what we have to
do, are often attended vvith consequences altogether as
dreadful as any active misbehaviour, frora the' most ex
travagant passion. , And, lastly, civil government being
natural, the punishments of it are so too ; and sorae of
these punishments are capital, as the effects of a disso
lute course of pleasure are often inortal. So that raany
natural punishments are finalf to hira who incurs thetn, if
considered only in his temporal capacity ; and seem in
flicted by natural appointraent, either to reraove the
offender out of the vvay of being further raischievous, or
as an example, though frequently a disregarded one, to
those who are left behind.
These things are nol vvhat we call accidental, or to be
met wilh only now and then ; but they are things of
* Partii. Chap. 6.- -
f The general consideration of a future state of punishment most
evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of
these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this
doctrine, as taught in scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that
Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punish
ment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a
like manner of expression and of description as the Scripture does.
So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere
revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great
distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at
the end of this world ; that each shall then receive according to his
deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude, that it should^ finally
and upon the whole, be well with the righteous and ill with the wick
ed ; but it could not be determined, upon any principles of reason,
whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass
through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice
should finally and eifectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that
the next slate of things, after the present, is appointed for the execu
tion of this justice ; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but the mys- ¦
tery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to
prevail, shall then be finished ; and he will talce to him his great
power, and vnll reign, by rendering to every one according lo his
works.

94 Of the Government of God [Part 1.'
every day's experience ; they proceed frora general
laws, very general ones, by which God governs tbe world,
inthe natural course of his providence. And theyare
so analogous lo what religion teaches us concerning the
future punishraent of the wicked, so much of a piece
with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the
very same words and manner of description. In the
book of Proverbs,* for instance. Wisdom is introduced
as frequenting the most public places of resort, and as
rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed
guide of human life. " How long," speaking to those
who are passing through it, " bow long, ye simple ones,
will ye love folly, and the scorners delight in their
scorning, and fools hate knowledge .' Turn ye at my re
proof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, 1
wiU make known my words unto you." But upon being
neglected, " Because 1 have caUed, and ye refused, I
have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded; but
ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of
my reproof: I also vvill laugh at your calamity, I wifl
mock when your fear coraeth ; when your fear cometh
as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirl
wind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you.
Then shall they caU upon me, but I will not answer ; they
shaU seek me early, but they shall nol find me." This
passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of
it are highly figurative ; but their raeaning is obvious.
And the thing intended is expressed raore Uterally in the
following words : " For that they haled knowledge, and
did not choose the fear of the Lord ; therefore shall they
eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their
own devices. For the security of the siraple shall slay
thera, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy thera."
And the whole passage is so equally applicable lo vrhat
we experience in the present world, concerning the con
sequences of raen's actions, and to what religion leaches
» Chap. I.

Chap. 2.J By Punislments. 96
us is to be expected in another, that it may be ques
tioned which of the tvvo was principally intended.
Indeed, vvhen one has been recollecting the proper
proofs of a future slate of rewards and punishments,
nothing, methinks, can give one so sensible an apprehen'-
sion of the latter, or representation of il to the mind, as ob
serving, that after the many disregarded checks, adraoni
tions, and warnings, which people meet with in the ways
of vice, and folly, and extravagance ; warnings from
their very nature ; from the exaraples of others ; from
the lesser inconveniences vvhich they bring upon them
selves ; frora the instructions of wise and virtuous men :
after these have been long despised, scorned, ridiculed ;
after the chief bad consequences, teraporal consequences,
of their follies, have been delayed for a great while ; at
length they break in irresistibly, like an arraed force ; re
pentance is loo late to reUeve, and can serve only to ag
gravate their distress : the case is become desperate ; and
poverty and sickness, reraorse and anguish, infaray and
death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them,
beyond possibility bf reraedy or escape. This is an ac
count of what is in fact the general constitution of
nature. It is not in any sort meant, that according to what ap
pears at present of the natural course of things, men are
always uniformly punished in proportion to their raisbe
haviour ; but tiiat there are very many instances of rais
behaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned,
and very dreadful instances loo, sufficient to show what
the laws of the universe may admit ; and, if thoroughly
considered, sufficieut fully to answer all objections
against the credibility of a future stale of punishments,
from any imaginations, that the frailly of our nature and
external teraptations almost annihilate the guilt of human
vices ; as well as objections of anoiher sort ; frora neces
sity ; from suppositions that the will of an infinite Being
cannot be contradicted ; or that he must be incapable of
offence and provocation.* • See Chap. 4 and 6.

96 Of the Government of God, S^c. [Part 1.
Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors
to serious persons, the raost free from enthusiasm, and
of the greatest strength of mind ; but it is fit things be
stated and considered as tbey really are. And there is,
in the present age, a certain fearlessness with regard to
what may be hereafter under the government of God,
which nothing but an universally acknowledged demott-
stration on the side of atheisra can justify, and which
makes it quite necessary that raen be reminded, and, if
possible, made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for
being thus presumptuous, even upon the raost sceptical
principles. For, raay il not be said of any person, upon
his being born into the vvorld, he raay behave so as to be
of no service lo it, but by being raade an example ofthe
woful effects of vice and folly : That he raay, as any
one may, if he wiU, incur an infamous execution from
the bands of civU justice ; or in some otiier course of
extravagance shorten his days ; or bring upoh hiraself
infaray and diseases worse than death .' So that it had
been better for hira, even vvith regard lo the present
world, that he had never been born. And is there any
pretence of reason for people to think themselves se
cure, and talk as if they had certain proof, that, let them
act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing
analogous to this, with regard lo a future and raore general
interest, under the providence and government of the
sarae God ?

97

CHAP. III.
^ Of ihe Moral Govemment of God.
As the raanifold appearances of design and of final
causes, in the constitution of the world, prove it to be
the work of an InteUigent Mind, so the particular final
causes of pleasure and pain, distributed araongst his
creatures, prove that they are under his governraent ;
what raay be caUed his natural governraent of crea
tures, endued wilh sense and reason. This, however,
irapUes soraewhat raore than seeras usually attended
to, vvhen we speak of God's natural governraent of the
world. It iraplies governraent of the very sarae kind
with that which a raaster exercises over his servants, or a
civil raagistrate over bis subjects. These latter instances
of final causes as really prove an intelUgent Governor oi
the world, in the sense now raentioned, and before* dis
tinctiy treated of, as any other instances of final causes
prove an intelUgent Maker oi it.
But this alone does not appear, at first sight, to deter
mine any thing certainly, concerning the raoral character
of the Author of nature, considered in this relation of
governor ; does not ascertain his governraent to be raoral,
or prove that he is tbe righteous Judge of the world.
Moral governraent consists, not barely in revvarding and
punishicg raen for their actions, which the raost tyranni
cal person raay do ; bul in rewarding the righteous and
•Chap. 2.
9

98 Of the Moral [Part 1.
punishing the wicked ; in rendering to raen according to
their actions, considered as good or evil. AnB the per
fection of moral governraent consists in doing this, with
regard to all intelligent creatures, in an exact proportion
to their personal merits or demerits.
Sorae raen seem to think the only character of the
Author of nature to be that of simple absolute benevo
lence. This, considered as a principle of action, and
infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest
possible happiness, without regard to persons' behaviour,
otherwise than as such regard would produce higher
degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only charac
ter of God, veracity and justice in hira would be nothing
but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now, surely
this ought not to be asserted, unless il can be proved ; for
we should speak with cautious reverence upon such a
subject. And vvhether it can be proved or no, is not the
thing here to be inquired into ; but whether, in the con
stitution and conduct of the world, a righteous govern
ment be not discernibly planned out ; which necessarily
implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be
in the creation beings, to whom the Author of nature
manifests hiraself under this raost araiable of all char
acters, this of infinite absolute benevolence ; for it is
the raost amiable, supposing it nol, as perhaps il is
nol, incorapatible wilh justice : but he manifests him
self lo us under the character of a righteous gover
nor. He may, consistently with this, be simply and
absolutely benevolent, in the sense now explained ; hut
he ha^for be has given us a proof in the constitution
and conduct of the world that he is, a governor over
servants, as he rewards and punishes us for our actions.
And in the constitution and conduct of il, he may also
have given, besides the reason of the thing, and the natu
ral presages of conscience, clear and distinct intimations,
that his government is righteous or raoral : clear It) such
as think the nature of it deserving their attention ; and

Chap.' S.J Govemment of God. 99
yet not lo every careless person who casts a transient re
flection upon the subject.*
But it is particularly to be observed, that the divine
governraent, which we experience ourselves under in the
present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the per
fection of raoral governraent. And yet this by no raeans
hmders, but that there raay be somewhat, be it raore or
less, truly raoral in it. A righteous governraent raay
plainly appear to be carried on lo sorae degree ; enough
to give us the apprehension that il shall be completed,
or carried on lo that degree of perfection which religion
teaches us it shaU ; but which cannot appear, liU rauch
more of the divine adrainistration be seen, than can in the
present life. And the design of thischapter is lo inquire
how far this is the case ; how far, over and above the
moral naluref which God has given us, and our natural
notion of bira, as righteous governor of those his creatures
to whora he has given this nature ; J I say how far, be
sides this, the principles and beginnings of a moral gov
ernraent over the world raay be discemed, notwithstand
ing and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it.
Now one might mention here, what has been often
urged with great force, that, in general, less uneasiness,
and raore satisfaction, are the natural consequences|| ofa
virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the present
state, as an instance of raoral governraent established in
nature ; an instance of it collected frora experience and
present raatter of fact. But it raust be owned a thing of
* The objections against religion, fi-om the evidence of it not being
universal, noT so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged
against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore
the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this Treatise, as
well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against
revealed religion, I chose to consider them in the second Part. And
the answer to them there. Chap. 6, as urged against Christianity, be
ing almost equally applicable to them as urged against the Religion of
Nature, to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.
t Dissertation 2. JChap. 6.
j) See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry conceming Virtue, Part 2.

100 Of the Moral [Pan 1.
difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses,
each araongst theraselves, and also against each other, so
as to raake an estiraate with any exactness, of the overplus
of happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impos
sible, that, araidst the infinhe disorders of the worid, there
may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue, even vvith
regard to those persons whose course of life, from their
youth up, has been blameless ; and raore with regard to
those, who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice,
and have afterwards reformed. For suppose an instance
of the latter case ; a person wilh his passions inflamed,
his natural faculty of self-government irapaired by habits
of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so
raany harpies, craving for their accustomed gratification:
who can say how long it might be before such a person
would find raore satisfaction in the reasonableness and
present good consequences of virtue, than difficulties and
self-denial in the restraints of it .'' Experience also shows,
that men can, to a great degree, get over their sense of
shame, so as that, by professing iheraselves to be without
principle, and avowing even direct villany, they can sup
port theraselves against the infamy of il. But as the ill
actions of any one will probably be more talked of, and
oftener thrown in his vvay, upon his reformation ; so the
infamy of them will be rauch raore felt, afler the natural
sense of virtue and of honor is recovered. Uneasinesses
ofthis kind ought indeed to be put to the account of for
mer vices ; yet it will be said, they are in part the conse
quences of reformation. Still I ara far frora allowing it
doubtful, whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than
vice in the presenl vvorld ; but if it were, yet the begin
nings of a righteous administration raay, beyond aU ques
tion, be found in nature, if we will attentively inquire after
thera. And,
I. In whatever raanner the notion of God's raoral gov
ernraent over the worid raight be trealed, if it did not
appear whether he were, in a proper sense, our governor
at aU ; yet when it is certain matter of experience, that

Chap. S.J Government of God. 101
he does raanifest himself to us under the character of a
governor, in the sense explained,* it raust deserve lo be
considered, whether there be not reason to apprehend,
that he may be a righteous or moral governor. Since it
appears to be fact, that God does govern mankind by the
method of rewards and punishments, according lo some
setded rules of distribution, it is surely a question to be
asked, What presumption is there against his finally re
warding and punishing them according to this particular
rule, namely, as they act reasonably or unreasonably, vir
tuously or viciously ? since rendering raan happy or rais
erable by this rule, certainly faUs in, rauch raore falls in,
with our naiural apprehensions and sense of things, than
doing so by any other rule whatever ; since rewarding
and punishing actions by any other rule, would appear
much harder to be accounted for by rainds forraed as he
has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion, then, more
or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us, tiiat the
righteous shall upon the whole, be bappy, and the wicked
miserable, cannot, however, possibly be considered as
absurd or chiraepical ; because it is no raore than an expec
tation, that a method of governraent, already begun, shall
be carried on, the raethod of rewarding and punishing
actions ; and shall be carried on by a particular rule,
which unavoidably appears to us, at first sight, raore nat
ural than any other, the rule which we call distributive
justice. Nor,
II. Ought it to be entirely passed over, that tranquillily,
satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural
consequences of prudent management of ourselves aud
our affairs ; and rashness, profligate negligence, and wilful
foUy, bringing after thera raany iuconveniences and suffer
ings ; these affijrd instances of a right constitution of na
ture : as the correction of children, for their own sakes
and by way of exaraple, when they run into danger or
hurt theraselves, is a part of right education. And thus,
• Chap. 2.
9*

102 Of the Moral [Part 1.
that God governs the worid by general fixed laws ; that
he has endued us with capachies of reflecting upon this
constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and bad
consequences of our behaviour, plainly iraplies some sort
of raoral government : since from such a con^tUution of
things it cannot but follow, that prudence and imprudence,
which are of the nature of virtue and vice,* raust be, as
they are, respectively rewarded and punished.
III. Frora the natural course of things, vicious actions
are, to a great degree, actually punished as raischievous
to society ; and besides punishraent actually inflicted upon
this account, there is also the fear and apprehension of it
in those persons whose criraes have rendered them ob
noxious lo it in case of a discovery ; this stale of fear beuig
itself often a very considerable punishraent. The natural
fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such
crhnes, is a declaration of naiure against them. It is ne
cessary to the very being of society, tbat vices destructive
of il should be punished as being so ; the vices of false
hood, injustice, cruelty : which punishment, therefore, is
as natural as society, and so is an instance of a kind of
moral government, naturally established, and actually
taking place. And, since the certain natural couree of
things is the conduct of Providence or the government of
God, though carried on by the instrumentality of men, the
observation bere made amounts to this, that mankind find
themselves placed by hira in such circurastances, as that
they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and
are often punished, and soraetimes rewarded, under his
government, in the view of their being mischievous or
eminently beneficial to society.
If il be objected that good actions, and such as are
beneficial to society, are often punished, as in the case of
persecution, and in other cases, and that iU and mischie
vous actions are often rewarded ; it raay be answered
distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary, and con-
• See Dissertation 2.

Chap. S.J Govemment of God. 103
sequently not natural in the sense in which it is neces
sary, and therefore natural, that iU or raischievous actions
should be punished ; and, in the next place, that good ac
tions are never punished, considered as beneficial to socie
ty, nor iU actions rewarded, under the view of their being
hurtful to it. So thatit stands good, without any thing on
the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of
nature has as truly directed that vicious actions, considered
as mischievous to society, should be punished, and put
mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them, ashe has
directed and necessitated us lo preserve our lives by food.
IV. In the natural course of things, virtue, as such, is
actually rewarded, and vice, as such, punished ; which
seems to afford an instance, or example, not only of gov
ernraent, but of moral government begun and establish
ed ; moral in the strictest sense, though not in that per
fection of degree which reUgion teaches us to expect.
In order to see this raore clearly, we raust distinguish be
tween actions themselves, and that quality ascribed to
thera, vvhich vve call virtuous or vicious. The gratifica
tion itself of every natural passion must be attended witfi
deUght ; and acquisuions of fortune, however made, are
acquisitions of the raeans or materials of enjoyraent. An
action, then, by which any natural passion is gratified, or
fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, abstract
ed from all consideration of the raorality of such action.
Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case is
gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the virtu
ousness or vnciousness of it, though it be, perhaps, virtuous
or vicious. Thus, to say such an action, or course of be
haviour, procured such pleasure or advantage, or brought
on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different thing
frora saying, that such good or bad effect was owing to
the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In one
case, an action, abstracted from aU raoral consideration,
produced its effect ; in the olher case, for il will appear
that there are such cases, the morality of the action, the
action under a moral consideration, i. e. the virtuousness or

104 Of the Moral [Part 1.
viciousness of h, produced the effect. Now I say, vir
tue, as such, naturally procures considerable advantages
to the virtuous, and vice, as such, naturally occasions great
inconvenience, and even misery, to tiie vicious, in very
many instances. The immediate efiects of virtue and
vice upon the mind and temper are lo be raentioned as
instances of it. Vice, as such, is naturally attended with
sorae sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly vvith great
disturbance and apprehension. That inward feeling
which, respecting lesser raatters and in familiar speech,
we call being vexed with one's self, and in raaltei's of
iraportance, and in raore serious language, reraorse, is an
uneasiness naturally' arising Irom an action of a man's own,
reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faully,
». e. vicious in greater or less degrees ; and tiiis raanifest
ly is a different feeling from that uneasiness vvhich arises
from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more
coramon than to hear a man lamenting an accident oi
event, and adding, — But, however, he has the satisfaction
that he cannot blame hiraself for it ; or, on the contrary,
that he has the uneasiness of being sensible il was his
own doing ? Thus also, the disturbance and fear which
often follow upon a man's having done an injuiy, arise
frora a sense of his being blame-worthy ; olheruise there
vvould, in raany cases, be no ground of disturbance nor
any reason to fear resentment or sharae. On the other
hand, inward security and peace, and a raind open to the
several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants of
innocence and virtue ; to which must be added, the
complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart, which
accompany the exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude,
friendship, benevolence.
And here, I think, ought lo be mentioned, the fears of
future punishraent, and peaceful hopes of a better life, in
those who fully believe or have any serious apprehension
of religion ; because these hopes and fears are present
uneasiness and satisfaction lo the raind, and cannot begot
rid of by great part of the world, even by men who

Chap. S.J Goveniment of God. 105
have thought most thoroughly upon that subject of religion.
And no one can say how considerable this uneasiness and
satisfaction may be, or what, upon the whole, it raay
araount lo.
In the next place comes in the consideration, that all
honest and good raen are disposed to befriend honest good
men, as such, and to discountenance the vicious, as such,
and do so in sorae degree, indeed in a considerable degree ;
fi-ora which favor and discouragement cannot bul arise
considerable advantage and inconvenience. And though
the generality of the world have little regard to the mo
rality of their own actions, and may be supposed to have
less to that of others, when they themselves are not con
cerned ; yet, let any one be known to be a raan of virtue,
soraehow or other he will be favored, and good offices
will be done him frora regard to his character, without
rerflote views, occasionaUy, and in some low degree, I
think, by the generaUty of the world, as it happens to
corae in their way. PubUc honors, too, and advantages,
are the natural consequences, are soraetunes at least the
consequences in fact, of virtuous actions, of erainent jus
tice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in
the view of being virtuous. And soraetimes even death
itself, often infaray and external inconveniences, are the
public consequences of vice, as vice. For instance, the
sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, oppres
sion, additional lo the mere feeling or fear of misery, has
doubtiess been instrumental in bringing about revolutions,
which make a figure even in the history of the world.
For it is plain, men resent injuries as implying faultiness,
and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having re
ceived harra, bul of having received wrong ; and they
have this resentraent in behalf of others, as well as of
themselves. So, likewise, even the generaUty are, in
some degree, grateful and disposed to return good offices,
not merely because such a one has been the occasion of
good to them, but under the view that such good offices
implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. To

106 Of the Moral [Parti,
aU this raay be added two or three particular things, which
many persons wiU think frivolous ; but to me nothing ap
pears so, which at aU comes in towards determining a
question of such importance, as whether there be or be
not a moral institution of government, in the strictest
sense moral, visibly established and begun in nature,
The particular things are these : That in doraestic gov
ernment, which is doubtiess natural, children, sind others
also, are very generally punished for falsehood, and injus
tice, and ill-behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the
contrary ; which are instances where veracity, and jus
tice, and right behaviour, as such, are naturally enforced
by rewards and punishments, whether more or less con
siderable in degree : that though civil government be
supposed lo lake cognizance of actions in no other view
than as prejudicial to society, without respect lo the mo
rality of them, yet as such actions are iraraoral, so*the
sense which men have of the immorality of them very
greatly contributes, in different ways, to bring offenders
to justice ; and that entire absence of aU crirae and guilt,
in the raoral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost
of course procure, and circurastances of aggravated guih
prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil
criraes, in raany cases, though by no raeans in all.
Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad ef
fects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the
course of the world does, in some measure, turn upon
the approbation and disapprobation of thera, as such, in
others. The sense of weU and iU doing, the presages of
conscience, the love of good characters and dislike of
bad ones, honor, sharae, resentraent, gratitude ; all these,
considered in theraselves, and in their effects, do afford
manifest real instances of virtue, as such, naturally fa
vored, and of vice, as such, discountenanced, more or
less, in the 'daily course of human Ufe; in every age, in
every relation, in every general circurastance of it. That
God has given us a raoral nature,* may raost justly be
* See Dissertation 2,

Chap. S.J Govemment of God. 107
urged as a proof of our being under his moral govern
ment ; bul that he has placed us in a condition, which
gives this nature, as one raay speak, scope to operate,
and in which it does unavoidaby operate, i. e. influence
raankind lo act, so as thus lo favor and reward virtue,
and discountenance and punish vice ; this is not the same,
but a further additional proof of his moral governraent ;
for it is an instance of il. The first is a proof that he
will finaUy favor and support virtue effectually ; the sec
ond is an exaraple of his favoring and supporting it at
presenl, in sorae degree.
If a raore distinct inquiry be raade, whence it arises,
that virtue, as such, is often rewarded, and vice, as such,
is punished, and this rule never ir^erted ; it wiU be founil
to proceed, in parL imraediately frora the raoral nature
itself which God Iras given us ; and also, in part, from
his having given us, together with this nature, so great a
power over each other's happiness and raisery. For,
fi,rst, it is certain, that peace and delight, in sorae degree
and upon sorae occasions, is the necessary and present
effect of virtuous practice ; an effect arising iraraediately
frora that constitution of our nature. We are so made,
that well-doing, as sucb, gives us satisfaction, al least in
sorae instances; ill-doing, as such, in none. And, sec-
.ondly, from our raoral nature, joined with God's having
¦put our happiness and raisery, in raany respects, in each
other's power, it cannot but be that vice, as such, sorae
.kinds and instances of it al least, will be infaraous, and
:raen wiU be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable ;
^' and the villain will by no raeans be able always to avoid
feehng that infaray, any raore than he will be able to
¦escape this further punishment which raankind will be
disposed lo inflict upon hira, under the notion of his de-
•^ serving it. jBut there can be nothing on the side of vice
•to answer this; because there is nothing in the huraan
mind contradictory, as the logicians speak, to virtue.
:For virtue consists in a regard to what is right and rea
sonable, as being so; in a regard to veracity, justice

108 Of the Moral [Parti.
charity, in themselves : and there is surely no such thing
as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty.
If it be thought, that there are instances of an approba
tion of vice, as such, in itself, and for hs own sake,
(though il does not appear to rae that there is any such
thing at all; bul, Apposing there be,) it is evidently
monstrous ; as rauch so as the most acknowledged per
version of any passion whatever. Such instances of
perversion, then, being left out as merely iraaginary, or,
however, unnatural ; it raust follow, from the frame of
our nature, and frora our condition, in the respects now
described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot
but be, favored, as such, by others, upon sorae occasions;
and happy in itself, in sdrae degree. For what is here
insisted upon, is nol in the degree in which virtue and
vice are thus distinguished, but only me thing itself, that
they are so in sorae degree ; though the whole good and
bad effect of virtue and vice, as such, is not inconsidera
ble in degree. But that they raust be thus distinguished,
in sorae degree, is in a manner necessary ; it is matter of
fact, of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion
of human affairs.
It is nol pretended but that, in the natural course of
things, happiness and raisery appear to be distributed by
other rules, than only the personal merit and demerit of
characters. They may sometiraes be distributed by way
of raere discipline. There raay be the wisest and best rea
sons why the vvorld should be governed by general laws,
from whence such proraiscuous distribution perhaps must
follow ; and also why our happiness and raisery should be
put in each other's power, in the degree which they are.
And these things, as in general they contribute to the re
warding virtue and punishing vice, as such ; so they often
contribute also, not to the inversion of this, which is im
possible, but lo the rendering persons prosperous though
wicked, afflicted though righteous ; and, which is worse,
to the rewarding some actions, though vicious, and pun
ishing other actions, though virtuous. But all this cannot

Cliap. S.J Government of God. 109
drown the voice of nature in the conduct of Providence
plainly declaring itself for virtue, by way of distinction
from vice, and preference to it. For, our being so con
stituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favored
and discountenanced, rewarded and punished respectively
as such, is an intuitive proof of tlie intent of nature that
it should be so ; otherwise the constitution of our raind,
frora which it thus immediately and directly proceeds,
would be absurd. But it cannot be said, because virtu
ous actions are soraetimes punished, and vicious actions
rewarded, that naiure intended it. For, though this
great disorder is brought about, as all actions are done,
by means of sorae natural passion, yet this may he, as it
undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such
passion, iraplanted in us for other, and those very good
purposes. And indeed these other and good purposes,
even of every passion, raay be clearly seen.
We have then a declaration, in sorae degree of present
effect, frora hira who is suprerae in naiure, which side he
is of or what part he lakes; a declaration for virtue, and
against vice. So far, therefore, as a raan is true to virtue,
to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the
right ofthe case, in whatever he is concerned, so far he
is on the side of the divine adrainistration, and cooperates
with it ; and frora hence, to such a raan, arises naturally
a secret satisfaction and sense of security, and iraplicit
hope of somewhat further. And,
V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies
of virtue, which, tbough not of present effect, yet are at
present discernible in naiure ; and so afford an instance
of somewhat raoral in the essential constitution of it.
There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and
yice to produce the good and bad effects now raentioned,
in a greater degree tban they do in fact produce them.
For instance, good and bad raen vvould be rauch more
rewarded and punished as such, were it not that justice
is often artificially eluded, that characters are not known
and many who would thus favor virtue and discourage

110 Of the Moral [Part. 1.
vice, are hindered frora doing so by accidental causes.
These tendencies of virtue and vice are obvious with
regard to individuals. But it may require more particu
larly to be considered, that power in a society, by being
under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and
has a necessary tendency lo prevail over opposite power,
not under the direction of it ; in like manner as power,
by being under the direction of reason, increases, and
has a tendency lo prevail over brute force. There are
several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior
strength, to that of raen ; and possibly the sura of the
whole strength of brules raay be greater than that of
mankind : but reason gives us the advantage and su
periority over thera, and thus man is the acknowledged
governing aniraal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority
considered by any as accidental ; bul as what reason has
a tendency, in the nature of the thing, lo obtain. And
yet, perhaps, difficulties raay be raised about the raean
ing, as well as the truth of the assertion, that virtue has
the like tendency.
To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly
how the case stands with regard to reason, which is so
readily acknowledged lo have this advantageous ten
dency. Suppose, then, two or three men, of the best and
most iraproved understanding, in a desolate open plain,
attacked by ten liraes the raumber of beasts of prey;
would their reason secure thera the victory in this
unequal corabat ? Power, tben, though joined witii reason,
and under its direction, cannot be expected to pre
vail over opposite power, ihough merely brutal, unless
the one bears some proportion to the olher. Again, put
the iraaginary case, that rational and irrational creatures
were of like external shape and manner ; it is certain,
before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish
each other, lo separate frora their adversaries, and to form
a union araong theraselves, they might be upon a level,
or, in several respects, upon great disadvantage, ihough,
united, they miglit be vastly superior; since union is of

Chap. S.J Govemment of God. 1 1 1
such efficacy, tbat ten men, united, raight be able
to accomplish what ten thousand of the sarae natural
strenglh and understanding, wholly ununited, could not.
In this case, then, brute force raight raore than maintain its
ground against reason, for want of union among the
rational creatures. Or suppose a number of raen to
land upon an island inhabited only by .wild beasts ;
a nuraber of men, who, by the regulations of civil
governraent, the inventions of art, and the experience of
some years, could they be preserved so long, would
be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to
preserve theraselves in security from them ; yet a con
juncture of accidents might give such advantage lo the
irrational animals, as that they raight at once overpower,
and even extirpate, the whole species of rational ones.
Length of tirae, then, proper scope and opporlunities for
reason to exert itself, raay be absolutely necessary to its
prevailing over brute force. Further stiU; there are
many instances of brutes succeeding in atterapts vvhich
they could not have undertaken, had not their irrational
nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger
of such atterapts, or tbe fury of passion hindered their
attending to it ; and there are instances of reason, and
real prudence preventing raen's undertaking what, it hath
appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by
a lucky rashness. And in certain conjunctures, igno
rance and folly, weakness an3 discord, raay have their
advantages. So that rational aniraals have not necessarily
the superiority over irrational ones ; but, bow iraprobable
soever it may be, it is evidently possible, that, in sorae
globes, the latter raay be superior. And vvere the
f^mer wholly at variance and disunited, by false self-
interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and con
sequent rage and raaiice against each other, whilst
tbe latter were firraly united araong theraselves by in
stinct, this might greatly contribute to tbe introducing
such an inverted order of things. For every one
would consider it as inverted; since reason has, in

112 Of the Moral [Parti.
the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force,
notwithstanding the possibility it raay not prevail, and the
necessity which thereis of raany concurring circumstances
to render it prevalent.
- Now, I say, virtue in a society bas a like tendency to
procure superiority and additional power, whether this
power be considered as the means of security from op-
poshe power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it
has this tendency, by rendering public good an object
and end to every raeraber of the society ; by putting
every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection
and self-governraent, both in order to see what is the
raost effectual rnethod, and also in order fo perform
their proper part, for obtaining and preserving il; by
uniting a society within itself, and so increasing its
strength, and, which is particularly to be raentioned,
uniting it by raeans of veracity and justice. For as
these last are principal bonds of union, so benevolence,
or pubhc spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is— •
nobody knows what.
And suppose the invisible world, and the invisible dis
pensations of Providence, to be in any sort analogous to
what appears ; or, that both together raake up one uru-
forra scheme, the two parts of which, the part which
we see, and that which is beyond our observation, are
analogous to each other; then, there raust be a like natural
tendency in the derived pdwer, throughout the universe,
under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over that
which is not under its direction ; as ihere is in reason,
derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force.
But then, in order to the prevalence of virtue, or tha^p
raay actually produce what it has a tendency to prg»
duce, the like concurrences are necessary as are to the
prevalence of reason. There raust be sorae proportion
between the natural power or force which is, and that
which is not, under the direction of virtue : There raust
be sufficient length of time ; for the coraplete success of
virtue, as of reason, cannot, frora the nature of the
thing, be otherwise than gradual : there raust be, as one

Chap. S.J Government of God. 113
may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and exten
sive enough, proper occasions and opportunities for the
virtuous lo join together, to exert themselves against
lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their united labors.
Now indeed it is to be hoped, that the disproportion be
tween the good and the bad, even here on earth, is not
so great, bul that the former have natural^ power suffi
cient lo their prevailing to a considerable degree, if cir
cumstances would perrait this power to be united. For,
rauch less, very rauch less power, under the direction
of virtue, vvould prevail over much greater, not under
the direction of it. However, good raen over the face
of the earth cannot unite ; as for other reasons, so be
cause they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each
other's characters. And the known course of huraan
things, the scene we are novv passing through, particu
larly the shortness of life, denies lo virtue its full scope
in several other respects. The natural tendency which
we have been considering, ihough real, is hindered frora
being carried inlo effect in the present state, but these
hinderances raay be removed in a future one. Virtue,
to borrow tbe Christian allusion, is railitant here, and va
rious untoward accidents contribute to its being often
overborne ; but it raay corabat withi greater advantage
hereafter, and prevail corapletely, and enjoy its conse
quent rewards, in sorae future stales. Neglected as it is,
perhaps unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here,
there raay be scenes in eternity, lasting enough, and in
every other way adapted, to afford it a sufficient sphere
of action, and a sufficient sphere for the natural conse
quences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally
iraraortal, and this state be a progress towards a fu
ture one, as childhood is towards raature age, good men
rnay naturally unite, not only amongst theraselves, but
also vvith other orders of virtuous creatures, in that fu
ture state. For virtue, frora the very nature of it; is a
principle and bond of union, in sorae degree, araongst
aU who are endued with it, and known lo each other ;
10*

114 Of the Moral [Parti.
so as that by it a good raan cannot but recoraraend him
self to the favor and protection of aU virtuous beings,
throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted
whh his character, and can any vvay interpose in his be
half in any part of his duration. And one raight add,
that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue to
becorae effect amongst one or raore orders of creatures,
in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any
orders of vicious creatures, throughout the universal
kingdom of God ; this happy effect of virtue would
have a tendency, by way of exaraple, and possibly in
other ways, to araend those of them who are capable of
araendment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue..
If our notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged,
in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have
enlarged our views with respect lo the material world,
representations of this kind wonld not appear absurd or
extravagant. However, they are not to be taken as in
tended for a literal delineation of what is in fact the
particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be
known without revelation ; for suppositions are not lo be
looked on as true, because nol incredible, but they are
mentioned to show, that our finding virtue to be hindered
frora procuring to itself such superiority and advantages,
is no objection against its having in the essential nature
of the thing, a tendency to procure thera. And the sup
positions now raentioned do plainly show this; forthey
show, tbat these hinderances are so far from being ne
cessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive how they
may be reraoved in future states, and full scope be
granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies
of it are lo be considered as declarations of God in its
favor. This, however, is taking a pretty large compass ;
though it is certain, that as the raaterial world appears
to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there must
be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it.
But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and we
shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an

Chap. S.J Govemment of God. 115
instance not so vast and remote ; by supposing a kingdom,
or society of men, upon it, perfectly virtuous, for a suc
cession of many ages ; to which, if you please, raay be
given a situation advantageous for universal raonarchy.
In such a stale there would be no such thing as faction, but
raen of the greatest capacity would, of course, aU along,
have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to
thera, and they would share it among theraselves without
envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him
to which his genius was pecuUarly adapted ; and olhers,
who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and
think theraselves very happy, by being under the pro
tection and guidance of those who had. Public deter
minations would really be the result of the united wisdom
of the coraraunity, and they would faithfully be executed
by the united sirength of it. Some would in a higher
way contribute, but all would in some way contribute to
the public prosperity, and in it each vvould enjoy the
fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by
fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so
they would be sufficiently secured frora it in their neigh
bors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies
in injustice, ever slight and accorapanied with faction and
intestine treachery ; these, on one hand, would be found
mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition
against wisdora, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity
on the other, aUowing both a sufficient length of years to
try their force. Add the general influence which such a
kingdora would have over the face of the earth, by way
of exaraple particularly, and the reverence which would
be paid it. Il would plainly be superior to all olhers,
and the world raust gradually corae under its erapire ;
not by raeans of lawless violence, but partly by what
must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other
kingdoras subraitting theraselves voluntarily to it through
out a course of ages, and claiming its protection, one
after another, in successive exigencies. The head of it
would be a universal raonarch, in another sense than

116 Of the Moral [Parti.
any mortal has yet been, and tiie eastern style would be
literally applicable to hira, that all pe'ople, nations, and
languages, should serve him. And though indeed our
knowledge of huraan naiure, and the whole hislory of
raankind, show the irapossiblity, without sorae miracu
lous interposition, that a nuraber of men here on earth
shall unite in one society or government, , in the fear of
God and universal practice of virtue, and that such a
government should continue so united for a succession of
ages ; yet, admitting or supposing this, the effect vvould
be as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the won
derful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish na
tion in the Scripture, vvould be, in a great measure, the
consequence of what is predicted of thera ; that the
" people should be all righteous, and inherit the land for
ever ; "* were we to understand the latter phrase of a
long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to
work. The predictions of this kind, for there are many
of thera, cannot corae lo pass in the present known
course of nature ; but suppose thera corae to pass, and
then the dorainion and pre-eminence proraised raust natu
rally follow, lo a very considerable degree.
Consider, now, uie general systera of religion : that
the governraent of the world is uniforra, and one, and
moral ; that virtue and right shall finally have the advan
tage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the
deceits as wefl as the violence of wickedness, under the
conduct of one suprerae Governor ; and frora the observa-
-tions above made it wiU appear, that God has, by our rea
son, given us lo see a peculiar connexion in the several
parts of this scherae, and a tendency towards the comple
tion of it, arising out of the very nature of virtue; which
tendency is to be considered as soraewhat raoral in the
essential constitution of things. If any one should think
all this to be of little importance, I desire hira to con
sider what he would think, if vice had, essentially and in
*Isa. lx. 21.

Chap. S.J Government of God. 117
its nature, these advantageous tendencies, or if virtue had
essentially the direct contrary ones. *-
But it may be objected, that notwithstanding all these
natural effects, and these natural tendencies of virtue,
yet things raay be now going on throughout the universe,
and mEty go on hereafter, in the sarae mixed way as
here at present upon earth ; virtue sometimes prosperous,
sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, some
times successful. The answer to whicii is, that it is not
the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly
to prove God's perfect moral government over the world,
or the truth of reUgion, but to observe what there is in the
constitution and course of nature to confirra the proper
proof of it, supposed to be known, and that the weight
of the foregoing observations to this purpose raay be thus
distinctly proved. Pleasure and pain are indeed, to a
certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed
araongst us, without any apparent regard to the raerit or
demerit of characters. And were there nothing else,
concerning this raatter, discernible in the constitution and
course of nature, there would be no ground, from the
constitution and course of nature, to hope or lo fear, that
men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according
to their deserts ; which, however, it is to be reraarked,
implies, that even then there would be no ground, from
appearances, to think that vice, upon the whole, would
have the advantage, rather than tbat virtue would. And
thus the proof of a future slate of retribution would rest
upon the usual known arguments for it ; which are, I
think, plainly unanswerable, and vvould be so, though there
were no additional confirraation of thera from the things
above insisted on. But these things are are a very
strong confirmation of thera : For,
First, They show that the Author of nature ife not in
different to virtue and vice. They amount to a declara
tion from hira, deterrainate, and notto be evaded, in favor
of one, and against the other : such a declaration as
there is nothing to be set over against, or answer, on the

118 Of the Moral [Part 1.
part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the
proper proof M religion, to deterraine frora the course
of nature only, whether il were most probable that the
righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a
future life, there can be no doubt but that he would de
termine the probability to be, that the former would.
The course of nature, then, in the view of it now given,
furnishes us with a real practical proof of the obligations
of religion.
Secondly, When, conforraably lo what religion teaches
us, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice, as sucb,
so as that every one shaU, upon the whole, have his de
serts, this distributive justice wiU not be a thing different
in kind, but only in degree, irom what we experience in
his present government. It will be that in effect, toward
which we now see a tendency. It will be no more than
the completion of that moral government, the prindplei
and beginning of which have been shown, beyond all dis
pute, discernible in the presenl constitution and course
of naiure. And from hence it follows.
Thirdly, That as, under the natural government of
God, our experience of those kinds and degrees of hap
piness and raisery, which we do experience at present,
gives just ground to hope for and to fear higher degrees
and other kinds of both in a -future slate, supposing a
future state admitted ; so, under his raoral government,
our experience that virtue and vice are, in the raanners
above-raentioned, actually rewarded and punished at pres
ent, in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and lo
fear that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher
degree hereafter. It is acknowledged, indeed, that this
alone is not sufficient ground to think, that they actucMy
mil be rewarded and punished in a higher degree, rather
than in a lower : But then.
Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from
the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For
these tendencies are essential, and founded in the naiure
of things ; whereas the hinderances to their becoraing

Chap. S.J Govemm£nt of God. 119
effect are, in nuraberless cases, not necessary, but artifi
cial only. Novv, it may be rauch raore strongly urged,
that these tendencies, as weU as the actual rewards and
punishraents of virtue and vice, whicii arise directly out
of the naiure of things, vviU reraain hereafter, than that
the accidental hinderances of thera will. And if these
hinderances do nol reraain, those rewards and punishraents
cannot but be carried on rauch further towards the perfec
tion of moral governraent, i. e. the tendencies of virtue and
vice wiU becorae effect ; but vvhen, or where, or in what
particular vvay, cannot be known at aU but by revelation.
Upon the whole, there is a kind of raoral governraent
implied in God's natural governraent ;* virtue and vice
are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and
mischievous lo society,f and rewarded and punished di
rectly as virtue and vice.f The notion, then, of a raoral
scheme of government, is not fictitious, but natural ; for
it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and
course of nature, and the execution of this scheme is
actually begun, in the instances here raentioned. And
these things are lo be considered as a declaration of the
Author of naiure, for virtue, and against vice ; they give
a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded
and punished hereafter, and also ground lo hope and to
fear, that they raay be rewarded and punished in higher
degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirraed,
so the arguraent for religion, from the constitution and
course of nature, is carried on farther, by observing, that
there are natural tendencies, and, in innuraerable cases,
only artificial hinderances, to this raoral scherae being
carried on much farther towards perfection than it is at
present.^ The notion, then, of a raoral scheme of gov
emment, much more perfect than what is seen, is not
a fictitious, but a natural notion, for il is suggested to our
ihoughts^ by the essential tendencies of virtue and vice.
• Page 101. t Page 102. t Page 103, &c.
§ Page 109, &c.

120 Of the Moral Government of God. [Part 1.
And these tendencies are to be considered as intimations,
ss implicit proraises and threatenings, frora the Author of
lature, of rauch greater rewards and punishments to fol
low virtue and vice, than do at present. And, indeed,
every natural tendency, which is lo continue, but which
is hindered from becoming effect by only accidentoZ causes,
affords a presumption, that such tendency wiU, some lime
or other, become effect : a presumption in degree propor
tionable to the length of the duration through which such
tendency wiU continue. And frora these things together
arises a real presuraption, that the moral scheme of gav-
ernment established in nature, shall be carried on mnch
farther towards perfection hereafter, and, I think, a pre
suraption that it wiU be absolutely completed. But from
these things, joined with the moral nature which God has
given us, considered as given us by him, arises a practical
proof* that it will be corapleted ; a proof frora fact, and
therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from
the eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfit
ness of actions. * See this proof drawn out briefly, chap. 6.

121

CHAP. IV.
Ofa State of Probation, as implying Trial, Difficulties,
and Danger.
•
The general doctrine of religion, that our present Ufe is
a slate of probation for a future one, comprehends under
it several particular things, distinct from each olher. But
the first and most common raeaning of it seems to be, that
our fiiture interest is now depending, and depending upon
ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunhies here for
that good and bad behaviour, which God will reward and
punish hereafter ; together with temptations to one, as well
as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in
great measure, the same with saying, that we are under the
moral government of God, and to give an account of our
actions lo him. For the notion of a future account, and
general righteous judgment, iraplies sorae sort of teinpta- -
tions to what is wrong, otherwise there would be no moral
possibility of doing wrong, nor ground for judgrnerit or
discrimination. But there is this difference, that the word
probation is raore distinctly and particularly expressive of
aUurements lo wrong, or difficulties in adhering uniformly
to what is right, and of the danger of miscarrying by such
temptations, than the words moral government. A state
of probation, then, as thus particulariy iraplying in it trial,
difficulties, and danger, raay require to be considered dis
tinctly by itself.
And as the raoral government of God, vvhich religion
teaches us, iraplies, that we are in a state of trial with re
gard to a future world ; so also his natural government
over us impUes, that we are in a stale of trial, in a like
11

122 Of a State of Trial. [Part 1.
sense, with regard lo the present worid. Natural govern
ment, by rewards and punishments, as much iraplies nat
ural trial, as moral governraent does raoral trial. The
natural governraent of God here raeant,* consists in his
annexing pleasure to sorae actions, and pain to others,
which are in our power to do or forbear, and in giving us
notice of such appointraent beforehand. This necessarily
implies, that he has raade our happiness and raisery, or
our interest, to depend in part upon ourselves. Andso.
far as raen have lemptationsto any course of action, which
wiU probably occasion thern greater temporal iii(»nve-
nience and uneasiness than satisfaction, so far their tempo
ral interest is in danger from themselves, or ihry are in a
stale of trial with respect to it. Now, people often blame
others, and even thernselves, for their misconduct in their
teraporal concerns. And vve find raany are greatly want*
ing to theraselves, and raiss of that natural happiness which
they raight have obtained in the present life; perhaps
every one does in sorae degree. But many run thera
selves into great inconvenience, and into extrerae distress
and raisery, nol through incapacity of knowing better, and
doing better for themselves, vvhich would be nothing lo
the present purpose, but through their own fault. And
these things necessarily imply temptation, and danger of
miscarrying, in a greater or less degree, vvith respect to
our worldly inierest or happiness. Every one, loo, with
out having religion in his thoughts, speaks of the hazards
which young prople run upon their setting out in the
world ; hazards frora other causes, than raerely their ig
norance, and unavoidable accidents. And sorae courses
of vice, at least, being contrary to men's worldly inierest
or good, temptations to these must at the same time be
temptations to forego our present and our future interest.
Thus, in our natural or temporal capacity, vve are in a
state of trial, i. e. of difficulty and danger, analogous or
like to our moral and religious trial.
• Chap. 2.

Chap. 4.J Cf a State of Trid. 123
This will more distinctly appear to any one, vyho thinks
it worth while, raore distinctly, lo consider what it is which
constitutes our trial in both capacities, and to observe how
mankind belTave under it.
And that which constitutes this our trial, in both these
capacities, raust be somewhat eilher in our external cir
cumstances, or in our nature. For, on thg one hand,
persons raay be betrayed into wrong behaviour upon sur
prise, or overcorae upon any other very singular and ex
traordinary external occasions, who would, otherwise, have
preserved their character of prudence and of virtue : in
which cases, every one, in speaking of the wrong beha
viour of these persons, would irapute it lo such particular
external circurastances. And, on the olher hand, raen
who have contracted habits of vice and folly of any kind,
or have sorae particular passions in excess, will seek op
porlunities, and, as it were, go out of their way, to gratify
themselves in these respects, at the expense of their wis
dom and their virtue ; led to it, as every one would say,
not by external temptations, but by such habits and pas
sions. And the account ofthis last case is, ihatparticu-
lar passions are no raore coincident with prudence, or that
reasonable self-love, tbe end of which is our worldly
interest, than they are with the principle of virtue and re
Ugion, but often draw contrary ways to one as well as to
the olher ; and so such particular passions are as much
temptations to act iraprudentiy with regard to our worldly
interest, as lo act viciously.* However, as when we say,
men are raisled by external circurastances of temptation,
it cannot but be understood, that there is somewhat
within themselves to render those circurastances terapta
tions, or to render thera susceptible of impressions from
them ; so, when we say, they are misled by passions, it
is always supposed, that there are occasions, circum
stances, and objects, exciting these passions, and affording
* See Sermons preached at the Eolls, 1726, 2d Ed. 205, &c. Pref.
p. 25,&.c. Serm. p. 21, &c.

124 Ofa State of Trial. [Part 1.
means for gratifying them. And, therefore, temptations
from within, and from without, coincide, and mutually
iraply each other. Now, the several external objects of
tbe appetites, passions, and affections, being present lothe
senses, or offering themselves to the raind, and so ex
citing emotions suitable to their nature, not only in cases
where they can be gratified consistently with innocence
and prudence, but also in cases where they cannot, and
yet can be gratified imprudently and viciously; this
as really puts them in danger of voluntarily foregoing
their present interest or good, as their future, and
as really renders self-denial necessary to secure one as
the other ; i. e. we are in a Uke state of trial with respect
to both, by the very same passions, excited by the very
sarae raeans. Thus, raankind having a temporal in
terest depending upon themselves, and a prudent course
of behaviour being necessary to secure it, passions in
ordinately excited, vvhether by raeans of example or by
any other external circurastance, towards such objects,
at such times, or in such degrees, as that they can
not be gratified consistently with worldly prudence, are
teraptations dangerous, and too often successful tempta
tions, to forego a greater teraporal good for a less ; i. e.
to forego what is, upon the whole, our temporal- interest,
for the sake of a presenl gratification. This is a des
cription of our state of trial in our teraporal capacity.
Substitute now the word future ior temporal, and virtue
ior prudence, and it will be just as proper a description of
our state of trial in our reUgious capacity ; so analogous
are they to each other.
If, frora consideration of this our like stale of trial in
both capachies, we go on'lo observe farther, how man
kind behave under it, vve shall find there are some who
haye so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond
the passing day ; they are so taken up with present grati
fications, ns lo have, in a manner, no feeling of conse
quences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this
Ufe, any raore than to their happiness in another. Some

Chap. 4.J Of a State of Trial. 125
appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion
in their worldly concerns, as rauch as in religion. Oth
ers are, not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried
away by the like passions, against their better judgraent, and
feeble resolutions, too, of acting better. And there are
men, and truly they are not a few, who shamelessly avow,
not their interests, but their mere will and pleasure, to be
their law of life ; and vvho, in open defiance of every
thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious
extravagance, foreseeing, vvith no remorse and little fear,
that it will be their temporal ruin ; and sorae of them,
under the apprehension of the consequences of wicked
ness in another slate : and, lo speak in the raost raode
rate way, huraan creatures are not only continually liable
to go wrong voluntarily, bul we see likewise that they
often actually do so-, wilh respect to their teraporal inter
ests, as weU as wilh repect lo religion.
Thus, our difficulties and dangers, or our trials in our
temporal and our religious capacity, as tiiey proceed from
the same causes, and have the sarae effect upon men's
behaviour, are evidently analogous, and of the same
kind. It may be added, that as the difficulties and dangers
of miscarrying in our religious state of trial are greatly
increased, and, one is ready to think, in a raanner wholly
made, by the ill behaviour of others ; by a wrong educa
tion, wrong in a raoral sense, sometiraes positively vicious;
by general bad exaraple ; by the dishonest artifices which
are got into business of all kinds ; and, in very many
parts of the world, by religion being corrupted into su
perstitions which indulge men in their vices; so, in like
manner, the difficulties of conducting ourselves prudent
ly in respect to our present interests, and our danger of
being led aside frora pursuing it, are greatly increased by
a foolish education, and, after we come lo raature age,
by the extravagance and carelessness of olhers, whom
we have intercourse vvith ; and by mistaken notions, very
11*

126 Of a State of Trial. [Part 1.
generally prevalent, and taken up frora coraraon opinion,
concerning temporal happiness, and wherein it consists.
And persons, by their own negligence and folly in their
teraporal affiiirs, no less than by a course of vice, bring
themselves into new difficulties, and, by habits of indul
gence, becorae less qualified lo go through thern ; and
one irregularity after another embarrasses things to such
a degree, that they know not whereabout they are, and
often makes the path of conduct so intricate and perplex
ed, that il is difficult to trace it out ; diificult even to de
termine vvhat is the prudent or the raoral part. Thus,
for instance, wrong behaviour in one slage of life, youtb;
wrong, I raean, considering ourselves only in our terapo
ral capacity, without taking in religion ; this, in several
ways, increases the difficulties of riglit behaviour in ma
ture age ; i. e. puts us into a raore disadvantageous stats
of trial in our teraporal capacity.
We are an inferior part of the creation of God. There
are natural appearances of our being in a state of degra
dation ;* and we certainly are in a condition which does
not seem, by any means, the most advantageous we could
imagine or desire, either in our natural or moral capaci
ty, for securing either our present or future interest.
However, this condition, low, and careful, and uncertain
as it is, does.not afford any just ground of complaintt'
For, as raen may raanage their teraporal affairs witb
prudence, and so pass their days here on earth in tolera
ble ease and satisfaction, by a moderate degree of care;
so, likewise, with regard to religion, there is no more re
quired than what they are well able to do, and what they
must be greatiy wanting to themselves if they neglect.
And for persons to have that put upon them vvhich they
are well able lo go through, and no raore, we naturally
consider as an equitable thing, supposing il done by pror
per authority. Nor have we any raore reason to com-
phiin of it, witii regard to the Author of nature, than of
his not having given us other advantages, belonging to
olher orders of creatures. • Part 2, Chap. 5.

Chap. 4.J ' Of a State of Trial. 127
But the thing here insisted upon is, that the state of '
trial which religion teaches us we are in, is rendered
credible, by its being throughout uniforra and of a piece
with tiie general conduct of Providence towards us, in
all other respects within the compass of our knowledge.
Indeed, if raankind, considered in their natural capacity
as inhabitants of this world only, found themselves, from
their birth lo their death, in a settled stale of security and
happiness, without any solicitude or thought of their own;
or, if they were in no danger of being brought inlo in
conveniences and distress by carelessness, or the folly
of passion, ihrough bad example, the treachery of others,
or the deceitful appearances of things ; vvere tbis our
natural condition, then it might seem strange, and be
some presuraption against the trulh of religion, that it
represents our future and more general interest, as not
secure of course, but as depending upon our behaviour,
and requiring reeoUection and self-government to obtain
it. For it might be alleged, " What you say is our con
dition in one respect, is not in any wise of a sort with
what vve fiud, by experience, our condition is in another.
Our whole present interest is secured to our hands, with
out any solicitude of ours, and why should not our'future
interest, if vve have any such, be so loo.'"' But since,
on the contrary, thought and consideration, the voluntary
denying ourselves many things which we desire, and a
course of behaviour far from being always agreeable to
us, are absolutely necessary to our acting even a common
decent, and coraraon prudent part, so as to pass with any
satisfaction through the present world, and be received
upon any tolerable good terms in it ; since this is the case,^
aU .presumption against self-denial and attention being
necessary to secure our higher interest, is reraoved.
Had we nol experience, it raight, perhaps, speciously be
urged, that it is improbable any thing of hazard and dan
ger shonid be put upon us by an infinite Being, when
every thing which is hazard and danger in our manner
of conception, and will eud in error, confusion, and mis-

128 Of a State of Trial. [Part I.
ery, is now already certain in his foreknowledge. And,
indeed, why any thing of hazard and danger should be
put upon such fraU creatures as we are, may vveU be
thought a difficulty in speculation ; and cannot but be so,
tiU we know the whole, or, however, rauch more of the
case. But still the constitution of nature is as it is. Our
happiness and misery are trusted to our conduct, and
made lo depend upon it. Soraewhat, and, in raany cir
curastances, a great deal too, is put upon us, either to do,
or to suffer, as we choose. And all the various miseries
of Ufe, which people bring upon themselves by negUgence
and folly, and might have avoided by proper care, are in
stances of this ; which raiseries are, beforehand, just as
contingent and undeterraraed as their conduct, and left
to be deterrained by il.
These observations are an answer lo the objections* •
against the credibility of a state of trial, as implying
temptations, and real danger of miscarrying with regard
to our general interest, under the moral government of
God ; and they show, that, if we are at all to be considered
in such a capacity, and as having such an interest, tbe
general analogy of Providence raust lead us to apprehend
ourselves in danger of raiscarrying, in different degrees,
as to this interest, by our neglecting to act the proper
part belonging to us in that capacity. For we have a
present interest, under the government of God which we
experience here upon earth. And this inierest, as it is
not forced upon us, so neither is it offered to our accept
ance, but to our acquisition ; in such sort, as that vve are
in danger of missing it, by means of temptations to ne
glect or act contrary to it ; and without attention and self-
denial, must and do miss of it. It is then perfectly
credible, that this raay be our case with respect to that
chief and final good which religion proposes to us.

129

CHAP. V.
Of a Siate of Probation, as intended for Moral
Discipline and Improvement.
From the consideration of our being in a probation-
slate, of so much difficulty and hazard, naturally arises
the question, how we came to be placed in it.'' But such
a general inquiry as this vvould be found involved in in
superable difficulties. For, though some of these diffi
culties would be lessened by observing, that all wicked
ness is voluntary, as is implied in its very notion, and
that raany of tiie raiseries of life have apparent good ef
fects, yet vvhen we consider other circurastances belong
ing to both, and what raust be the consequence of the
former in a life lo corae, it cannot but be acknowledged
plain folly and presuraption, lo pretend lo give an ac
count of the whole reasons of tbis raatter ; the whole
reasons of our being allotted a condition, out of which
so much wickedness and raisery, so circurastanced,
would in fact arise. Whether it be nol beyond our fac
ulties, not only to find out, but even to understand, the
whole account of this ; or, though we should be supposed
capable of understanding it, yet, whether il vvould be of
service or prejudice to us to be inforraed of it, is impos
sible to say. But as our present condition can in no
wise be shown inconsistent witii tbe perfect moral gov
ernment of God ; so religion teaches us we are placed
in it, tiiat vve might qualify ourselves, by the practice of
virtue, for another slate, which is to follow it. And this,
Ihough but a partial answer, a very partial one indeed, to
the inquiry now mentioned, yet is a raore satisfactory

130 Of a State of [Parti.
answer to anoiher, which is of real, and of the utmost
iraportance to us to have answered — the inquiry. What
is our business here .'' The known end, then, why we are
placed in a state of so much affliction, hazard, and diffi
culty, is, our improvement in virtue and piety, asthe
requisite qualification for a future state of security and
happiness. Now, the beginning of life, considered as an education
for mature age in the present worid, appears plainly, at
first sight, analogous to this our trial for a future one; the
former being, in our temporal capacity, what the latter is
in our religious capacity. Bul some observations com
mon to both of thera, and 'a raore distinct consideration
of each, will raore distinctly show the extent and fore?
of the analogy between thera ; and the credibility, wbiclj
arises from hence, as well as frora the naiure of the tliingf:
that the present life was intended to be a state of dispis
pUne for a future one.
I. Every species of creatures is, we see, designed for
a particular way of life,, to which the nature, the capar
cities, temper, and qualifications of each species, are as
necessary as their external circurastances. Both corae
into the notion of such state, or particular way of life,
and are constituent parts of it. Change a man's car
pacities or character to the degree in which it is' con
ceivable they raay be changed, and he vvould be alto
gether incapable of a human course of Ufe and human
happiness ; as incapable, as if, his nature continuing un
changed, he were placed in a vvorld where he had no
sphere of action, nor any objects to answer his appetites,
passions, and affections of any sort. One thing is set
over against another, as an ancient writer expresses i(>
Our nature corresponds lo our external condition. With
out this correspondence, there vvould be no possibility of
any such thing as human Ufe and huraan happiness;
which life and happiness are, therefore, a result from our
nature and condition jointly; raeaning by buman hfe, not
living in the Uteral seuse, but the whole complex notion

Chap. 5. J Moral Discipline. 131
commonly understood by those words. So that, without
determining what wiU be the employment and happiness,
the particular life of good raen hereafter, there raust be
some deterrainate capacities, sorae necessary character
and quaUfications, without which persons cannot but be
Utterly incapable of it ; in Uke manner as there must be
some, without which men would be incapable, of their
present stale of life. Novv,
II. The constitution of human creatures, and indeed
of aU creatures vvhich come under our notice, is such, as
that they are capable of naturally becoraing qualified for
stales of life, for which theywere once wholly unquaUfied.
In imagination vve raay indeed conceive of creatures, as in
capable of having any of their faculties naturally enlarged,
or as being unable naturally to acquire any new qualifica
tions; but the faculties of every species known to us are
made for enlargeraent, for acquireraents of experience
and habits. We find ourselves, in particular, endued with
capacities, not only of perceiving ideas, and of knowledge
or perceiving truth, but also of storing up our ideas and
k[>owledge by memory. We are capable, not only of
acting, and of having different momentary irapressions
made upon us, bul of getting a new facility in any kind
of action, and of settied alterations in our temper or char
acter. The povver of the two last is the power of habits.
But neither the perception of ideas, nor knowledge of
any sort, are habits, ihough absolutely necessary to the
forming of thera. However, apprehension, reason, raem
ory, which are the capacities of acquiring knowledge,
are greatly improved by exercise. Whether the word
habit is applicable to all these iraprovements, and, in par
ticular, how far the powers of meraory and of habits raay
be powers of the same naiure, I shall not inquire. But
that perceptions come into our minds readily and of
course, by means of their h^-ing been there before,
seems a thing of the sarae sort, as readine.ss in any par
ticular kind of action, proceeding frora being accustoraed
to it. And aptness lo recollect practical observations of

132 Of a State of [Part 1.
service in our conduct, is plainly habit in raany cases.
There are habhs of perception, and habits of action. An
instance of the fofraer, is our constant and even involun
tary readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight
concerning raagnitudes and distances, so as to substitute
judgment in the roora of sensation, imperceptibly to our
selves. And it seeras as if all olher associations of ideas,
not naturally connected, might be called passive habits,
as properly as our readiness in understanding languages
upon sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in
speaking and writing thera is an instance of the latter, of
active habits. For distinctness, we may consider habits
as belonging lo the body, or the mind, and the latter will
be. explained by the former. Under the former are com
prehended all bodily activities or raotions, whether grace
ful or unbecoming, which are owing to use ; under the
laiter, general habits of life and conduct, such as those
of obedience and submission lo authority, or to any par
ticular person; those of veracity, justice, and charity;
those of attention, industry, self-government, envy, re
venge. And habits of this latter kind seera produced by
repeated acts, as well as the forraer. And in like rnan
ner, as habits belonging to the body are produced by
external acts, so habits of tiie raind are produced bythe
exertion of inward practical principles ; i. e. by carrying
them into act, or acting uponnhem, the principles of obe
dience, of veracity, justice, and charity. Nor can those
habitsbe formed by any external course of action, other
wise than as it proceeds from these principles; because
it is only these inward principles exerted, which are strict
ly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of cha
rily. So, likewise, habits of attention, industry, self-gov
ernment, are, in the sarae manner, acquired by exercise;
and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether
in outward act or in thought and intention, i. e. inward
act; for snch intention is an act. Resolutions to dowell
are properly acts : and endeavoring to enforce upon our
own rainds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in oth-

Chap. 5.J Moral Discipline. 133
ers that practical sense of it which a raan really has hira
self, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, raay and will
contribute towards forming good habits. But, going over
the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking vvell, and
drawing fine pictures of il, this is-so far from necessarily
or certainly conducing to form a habit of it in hira who
thus employs hiraself, that it may harden the raind in a
contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible,
i. e. form a habit of insensibility lo all raoral considera
tions. For, frora our very faculty of habits, passive ira
pressions, by being repeated, grow weaker. Thoughts,
by often passing through the mind, are fell less sensibly ;
being accustoraed lo danger, begets intrepidity, i. e. les
sens fear ; to distress, lessens the passion of pity ; lo in
stances of others' raortality, lessens the sensible apprehen
sion of our own. And from these tvvo observations
together, that practical habits are forraed and strengthen
ed by repealed acts, and that passive impressions grow
weaker by being repeated upon us, it raust follow, that
active habits raay be gradually forming and strengthening,
by a course of acting upon such and such raotives an^
exciteraents, whilst these motives and excitements them
selves are, by proportionable degrees, growing less sen
sible ; i. e. are continually less and less sensibly fell,
even as the active habits strengthen. And experience
confirms this ; for active principles, at the very lime
that they are less lively in perception than they were, are
found to be sorae how wrought more thoroughly into the
temper and character, and become more effectual in in
fluencing our practice. The three things just mentioned
may afford instances of it. Perception of danger is a
natural excitement of passive fear and active caution ;
and, by being inured to danger, habits of tiie laiter are
gradually wrought, at the same time that the former gra
dually lessens. Pdfcepiion of distress in others is a natu
ral exciteraent, passively to pity, and actively lo relieve
it ; but let a man sel himself to attend to, inquire out,
and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot bul grow less
12

134 Of a State of [Part 1.
and less sensibly affected with the various raiseries of
life, wilh which he must become acquainted ; when yet,
at the same tirae, benevolence, considered not as a pas
sion, bul as a practical principle of action, will strength
en ; and, whilst he passively corapassionates the distressed
less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist
and befriend thera. So also at the sarae tirae that the
daily instances of raen's dying around us give us daily a
less sensiMe passive feeling or apprehension of our own
mortality, such instances greatly contribute lo the strength
ening a practical regard to it in serious raen ; i. e. lo form
ing a habit of acting with a constant view to it. And
this seems again further lo show, that passive impressions
made upon our rainds by admonition, experience, exam
ple, ihough they may have a reraote efficacy, and a very
great one, towards forming active habits, yet can have this
efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course
of action ; and that it is, not being affected so and so,
but acting, which forras those habits ; only it must be al
ways remerabered, that real endeavors to enforce good
irapressions upon ourselves, are a species of virtuous ac
tion. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the naiure
of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once
equivalent to habits, i. e. what is wrought by use and ex
ercise. However, the thing insisted upon is, not what
raay be possible, but what is in fact the appointment bf
nature, which is, that active habits are to be forraed by
exercise. Their progress raay be so gradual as to be
imperceptible of its steps ; it may be hard to explain the
faculty by which we are capable of habits, throughout its
several parts, and to trace it up^to its original, so as lo
distinguish it from aU others in our mind ; and it seems
as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the
thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield, in
sorae such raanner as this, to use and exercise, is raatter
of certain experience.
Thus, by accustoming ourselves lo any course of action,
we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often

Chap. 5.J Moral Discipline. 135
pleasure in it. The incUnations which rendered us
averse lo il grow weaker ; the difficulties in it, not only
the imaginary, but the real ones, lessen ; the reasons for
it offer thernselves of course to our thoughts upon all
occasions ; and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to
make us go on in a course of action to vvhich vve have been
accustomed. And practical principles appear to grow
stronger absolutely in themselves, by exercise, as well as
relatively, vvith regard to contrary principles ; vvhich, by
being accustoraed to submit, do so habitually, and of
course. And thus a new character, in several respects,
may be forraed ; and many habitudes of life, not given
by nature, but which nature directs us to acquire.
III. Indeed we raay be assured, that we should never
have had these capacities of improving by experience,
acquired knowledge and habits, had they not heen ne-
¦cessary, and intended to be made use of. And, accord
ingly, we find thera so necessary, and so rauch intended,
that without thera we should be utterly incapable of that
which vvas the end for which we were raade, considered
in our temporal capacity only ; the eraployraents and
satisfactions of our mature slate qf Ufe.
Nature does in no wise qualify us wholly, much less
at once, for this mature stale of life. Even maturity of
understanding and bodily strength are not only arrived to
gradually, but are also very rnuch owing to the continued
exercise of our powers of body and raind frora infancy.
But if we suppose a person brought into the worid with
both these in raaturity, as far as this is conceivable, he
would plainly at first be as unquaUfied for the human Ufe
,of mature age, as an idiot. He would be in a raanner
distracted with astonishraent, and apprehension, and curi
osity, and suspense ; hor can one guess bow long it would
be_ before he would be familiarized to himself, and the
objects about him; enough even lo set himself to any
ihing. It may be questioned loo, whether the natural
information of his sight and hearing would be of any
inanner of use at all to'hira in acting, before experience.

136 Of a State of [Parti.
And it seems that men would be strangely headstrong and
self-willed, and disposed to exert themselves wilh an im
petuosity which would render society insupportable, and
the living in it impracticable, were il not for some ac
quired moderation and self-government, sorae apthude
and readiness in restraining themselves, and concealing
their sense of tilings. Want of every thing of this kind
which is learned, would render a man as incapable of
society as want of language vvould ; or as his natural ig
norance of any of the particular eraployraents of life,
vvould render him incapable of providing himself wilh the
common conveniences, or supplying the necessary wants
of it. In these respects, and probably in many more, of
wdiich vve have no particular notion, raankind is left by
nature an unformed, unfinished creature, utterly deficient
and unqualified, before the acquireraeni of knowledge,
experience, and habils, for that raature state of life,
which was the end of his creation, considering hira as
related only to this world.
But then, as naiure has endued us with a power of sup
plying those deficiencies, by acquired knowledge, experi
ence, and habits ; so, likewise, vve are placed in a condition,
in infancy, childhood, and youlh, fitted for it; fitted for our
acquiring those qualifications of all sorts, vvhich we stand
in need of in raature age. Hence children, from their
very birth, are daily growing acquainted vvith the objects
about thera, vvith the scene in which they are placed, and
tohave a future part; and learning soraewhat or other,
necessary to the performance of it. The subordinations,
to which they are accustoraed in doraestic life, teach
thera self-governraent in coraraon behaviour abroad, andj
prepare thera for subjection and obedience lo civil au
thority. What passes before their eyes, and daily hap
pens to them, gives thera experience, caution against
treachery and deceit, together whh nuraberless littie rules
of action and conduct, which we could not live whhout,
and which are learned so insensibly and so perfectly, as to
be raistaken perhaps for instinct ; ihough they are the

Chap. 5.J Moral Discipline. 137
effect of long experience and exercise ; as much so as
language, or knowledge in particular business, or the
quaUfications and behaviour belonging to the several ranks
and professions. Thus, the beginning of our days is
adapted to be, and is, a slate of education in ihe-theory
and practice of raature life. We are much assisted in it
by exaraple, instruction, and the care of others; but a
great deal is left to ourselves to do. And of this, as part
is done easily and of course, so part requires diligence
and care, the voluntary foregoing raany things which we
desire, and setting ourselves to vvhat we should have no
inclination lo, but for the necessity or expedience of it.
For that labor and industry which the station of so raany
absolutely requires, they would be greatly unqualified for
in rnalurity, as those in olher stations would be for any
other sorts of application, if both were not accustoraed
to thera in their youlh. And according as persons be
have theraselves, in the general education which aU go
through, and in the particular ones adapted to particular
eniployments, their character is formed, and made ap
pear; diey recommend theraselves more or less; and
are capable of, and placed in, different stations in the so
ciety of raankind.
"The former part of life, then, is to be considered as
an iraportant opportunity, which nature puts into our
hands, and which, when lost, is not to be recovered.
And our being placed in a state of discipline throughout
this Ufe, for another world, is a providential disposition of
things, exactly of the same kind as our being plaped in a
stale of discipline during childhood, for mature age. Our
condition in both respects is uniforra and of a piece, and
coraprehended under one and the sarae general law of
nature. And if we are not able at all to discern, how or in
what way the present Ufe could be our preparation for an
other, this would be no objection against the credibility of
its being so. For we do not discern how food and sleep
contribute lo the growth of the body, nor could have any
12*

138 Ofa State of [Part 1,
thought that they would, before we had experience. Nor
do children al all think, on the one hand, thatthe sports and
exercises, to which they are so much addicted, contribute
to their health and growth ; nor, on the olher, of the
necessity vvhich there is for their being restrained in them;
nor are they capable of understanding the use of many
parts of discipline, which nevertheless they raust be made
to go ihrough, in order lo qualify thera for the business
of mature age. Were we not able, then, lo discover in
what respects the present Ufe could forra us for a fu
ture one, yet nothing would be raore supposable than
that il might, in sorae respects or other, from the general
analogy of Providence. And this, for aught I see, might
reasonablj' be said, even though we should not take in the
consideration of God's moral governraent over the world.
Bul, IV. Take in this consideration, and consequently, that
the character of virtue -and piely is a necessary qualifica
tion for the future stale, and then we raay distinctly see
how, and in what respects, the present life may be a
preparation for it ; since we want, and are capable of
improvement in fhat character, by moral and reUgious
habits ; and the present life is fit to be a state of discipline
for such improvement ; in like raanner, as we have al
ready observed, how, and in what respects, infancy,
childhood, and youth, are a necessary preparation, and a
natural state of discipline, for raature age.
Nothing which vve at presenl see would lead us lo the
thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter; but, if we
judge at all frora the analogy of naiure, we raust sup
pose, according lo the Scripture account of it, that it
will be a community. And there is no shadow of any
thing unreasonable in conceiving, though there be no
analogy for it, tbat this community wiU be, as the Scrip
ture represents il, under the more imraediate, or, if such
an expression raay be used, the raore sensible govern
ment of God. Nor is our ignorance, vvhat will be the
eraployraents of this happy comraunity, nor our conse-

Chap. S.J Moral DiscipUne. 139
quent ignorance, what particular scope or occasion there
wiU be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity,
amongst the merabers of it with regard to each other,
any proof that there vvill be no sphere of exercise for
those virtues. Sluch less, if that vvere possible, is our
ignorance any proof that there wiU be no occasion for
that frarae of raind, or character, vvhich is formed by the
daily practice of those particidar virtues here, and which
is a result from it. This al least must be owned in
general, that as the governraent established in the uni
verse is moral, the character of virtue and piety must,
in sorae vvay or other, be the condition of our happiness,
or the qualification for it.
Now, frora what is above observed concerning our
natural povver of habits, it is easy lo see, that we are
capable oi raoral improveraent by discipline. And how
greatly vve want il, need not be proved to any one who
is acquainted vvith the great wickedness of raankind, or
even with those iraperfections which the best are con
scious of. But il is not perhaps distinctly attended to by
every one, that the occasion which huraan creatures
have for discipline, to iraprove in thera this character of
virtue and piety, is to be traced up higher than to excess
in the passions, by indulgence and habits of vice. Man
kind, and perhaps all finite creatures, frora the very consti
tution of their nature, before habits of virtue, are deficient,
and in danger of deviating frora what is right, and there
fore stand in need of virtuous habits for a security against
this danger. For, together wilh the general principle of
moral understanding, we have in our inward frame va
rious affections towards particular external objects. These
affections are naturally, and of right, subject to the gov
ernment of the moral principle, as lo the occasions upon
which they may be gratified, as lo the times, degrees,
and raanner, in which the objects of thera raay be pur
sued ; but then the principle of virtue can neither excite
thera, nor prevent their being excited. On the contrary,
they are naturally felt, when the objects of them are

140 Of a State of [Part 1.
present to the raind, not only before all consideration
whether they can be obtained by lawful raeans, but after
it is found they cannot. For the natural objects of af
fection continue so ; the necessaries, conveniences, and
pleasures of life, remain naturally desirable, ihough they
cannot be obtained innocently ; nay, though they cannot
possibly be obtained at aU. And vvhen the objects of
any affection vvhalevqir cannot be obtained without un
lawful raeans, bul may be obtained by thera, such af
fection, ihough its being excited, and its continuing some
tirae in the raind, be as innocent as it is natural and
necessary, yet cannot but be conceived to have a ten
dency to incline persons to venture upon such unlawful
means, and therefore raust be conceived as putting thera
in sorae danger of it. Novv, what is the general secu
rity against this danger, against tlieir actually deviating
from right? asthe danger is, so also must the security
be, from within, from the practical principle of virtue.*
And the strengthening or improving this principle, con
sidered as practical, or as a principle of action, will
lessen the danger or increase the security against it.
And this raoral principle is capable of iraprovement, by
proper discipline and exercise ; by recollecting the prac-
* It may be thought that a sense of interest vpould as effectually
restrain creatures from doing wrong. But if by a sense of interest
is meant, a speculative conviction or belief that such and snch in
dulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole,
than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say, that this
sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them frora thus indulging
themselves. And if by a sense of interest is meant, a practical re
gard to what is upon the whole our happiness, this is not only coin
cident with the principle of virtue or moral rectitude, but is a part of
the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to
be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. For we daily
see it overmatched, not only by the more boisterous passions, but by
curiosity, shame, love of imitation, by any thing, even indolence:
especially if the interest, the temporal interest, suppose, which is the
end of such self-love, be at a distance. So greatly are profligate
men mistaken, when they affii-m they are wholly governed by inter
estedness and self-love : And so little cause is there for moralists to
disclaim this principle. See p. 123, 124.

Chap. 5.J Moral Discipline. 141
tical irapressions which exaraple and experience have
raade upon us ; and, instead of foUowing huraor and
raere inclination, by continually attending to the equity
and right of the case, in whatever we are engaged, be it
in greater or less raatters, and accustoming ourselves al
ways to act upon it, as being itself the just md natural
motive of action ; and as this moral course of behaviour
raust necessarily, under divine government, be our final
interest. Thus ihe principle of virtue, improved into
a habit, of which improvement we are thus capable,
will plainly be, in proportion to the strength of it, a
security against the danger which finite creatures are in,
from the very nature of propension, or particidar affec
tions. This way of putting the matter supposes particu
lar affections to reraain in a future slate, which it is
scarce possible to avoid supposing. And if they do, we
clearly see, that acquired habits of virtue and self-gov
ernment may be necessary for the regulation of thera.
However, though we vvere not distinctly lo take in this
supposition, but to speak only in general, the thing really
comes to the sarae. For habits of virtue, thus acquired
by discipUne, are iraprovement in virtue ; and iraprove
ment in virtue must be advancement in happiness, if the
government of the universe be moral.
Frorn tbese things we may observe, and it will farther
show this our natural and original need of being im
proved by discipline, how it coraes to pass, that creatures,
made upright, fall ; and tbat those who preserve their
uprightness, by so doing, raise theraselves to a more se
cure state of virtus. To say that the forraer is accounted
for by the nature of liberty, is to say no more than that
an event's actuaUy happening is accounted for by a raere
possibility of its happening. But it seeras distinctly con
ceivable from the very nature of particular affections or
propensions. For, suppose creatures intended for such a
particular state of life, for which such propensions were
necessary ; suppose them endued with such propensions,
together with moral understanding, as well including a prac
tical sense of virtue as a speculative perception of it ; and

142 Ofa State of [Parti.
that all these several principles, both natural and moral,
forming an inward constitution of mind, were in the
most exact proportion possible, i. e. in a proportion the
most exactly adapted to their intended stale of life ; such
creatures would be raade upright, or finitely peifect.
Novv, pailicular propensions, frora their very nature, raust
be felt, the objects of thera being present, ihough they
cannot be gratified>at all, -Or not with the allowance ofthe
moral principle. But if they can be gratified without its
aUowance, or by contradicting il, then they must be con
ceived to have sorae tendency, in how low a degree so
ever, yet sorae tendency, to induce persons to such for
bidden gratification. This tendency, in sorae one partic
ular propension, may be increased, by the greater fre
quency of occasions naturally exciting il, than of occa
sions exciting others. The least voluntary indulgence in
forbidden circurastances, though but in thought, will-in
crease this wrong tendency, and rnay increase it further,
till, pecuUar conjunctures perhaps conspiring, it becomes
effect ; and danger of deviating from right, ends in actual
deviation from it-; a danger necessarily arising from the
very nature of propension, and which, therefore, could
not have been prevented, though it might have been
escape^, or got innocentiy through. The case would
be, as if we were lo suppose a straight path marked^but
for a person, in which such a degree of attention would
keep hira steady ; but if he would not attend in this de
gree, any one of a thousand objects catching his eye,
might lead hira out of it. Now, it is impossible to say,
hovv much even the first full overt act of irregularity might
disorder the inward constitution, unsettie the adjustments)'-.
and aker the proportions which formed il, and in which
the uprightness of its make consisied. Bul repetition of
irregularities would produce habhs : and thus the con
stitution would be spoiled, and creatures, raade upright,
become corrupt and depraved in tbeir settied character,
proportionably to their repeated irregularities in occasional
acts. But, on the contrary, these creatures might have

Chap. S.J for al Discipline. 143
improved and raised theraselves to a higher and more
secure state of virtue, by the contrary behaviour, by
steadily following the moral principle, supposed lo be one
part of their nature, and thus withstanding that unavoid
able danger of defection, vvhich necessarily arose from
propension, the olher part of il. For, by thus preserving
their integrity for some tirae, their danger would lessen,
since propensions, by being inured to'subniit, would do it
more easily andof course ; and their tecurity against this
lessening danger would increase, since the raoral princi
ple would gain additional strenglh by exercise; both vvhich
things are iraplied in the notion of virtuous habils. Thus,
then, vicious indulgence is not only criminal in itself, but
also depraves the inward constitution and character. And
virtuous self-governraent is not only right in itself, but
also improves the inward consthution or character; and
may improve il lo such a degree, that tbough we should
suppose it irapossible for particular affections lo be abso
lulely coincident vvith the raoral principle, and consequent
ly should alfow, that such creatures as have been above
supposed would for ever remain defectible ; yet their
danger of actually deviating frora right raay be alraost in
finitely lessened, and they fully fortified against what re
mains of it; if that raay be called danger, against vvhich
there is an adequate effectual security. But still, this
their higher perfection raay continue to consist in habits of
virtue forraed in a stale of discipline, and this their more
complete security reraain to proceed from them. And
thus it is plainly conceivable, that creatures wiihout blem
ish, as tiiey came out of the hands of God, raay be in
, danger of going wrong, and so may stand in need ofthe
security of virtuous habils, additional to the moral princi
ple wrought into their natures by hira. ' That which is the
ground of their danger, or their want of security, raay
be considered as a deficiency in thera, to which virtuous
habits are the natural supply. And as they are naturally
Capable of being raised and iraproved by discipline, it
may be a thing fit and requisite, that they should be placed

144 Of a State of [Part 1.
in circumstances with an eye to it; in circumstances pe
culiarly fitted to be, lo thein, a state of discipline for their
improveraent in virtue.
But how rauch raore strongly raust this hold vvith re
spect to those vvho have corrupted their natures, are
fallen from their original rectitude, and whose passions
are become excessive by repealed violations of their in
ward constitution ?>• Upright creatures may want tobe
iraproved ; depraved creatures want lo be renewed.
Education and discipline, which may be in all degrees
and sorts of gentleness and of severity, is expedient for
those ; but raust be absolutely necessary for these. For
these, discipline, ofthe severer sort too, and in the higher
degrees of it, must be necessaiy, in order lo wear out
vicious habhs ; to recover their primitive strength of self-
government, which indulgence must have weakened; to
repair, as well as raise into a habit, the moral pnnciple,
in order to their arriving at a secure state of virtuous
happiness. - Now, whoever wiU consider the thing may clearly see,
that the present world is peculiarly fit to be a stale of
discipline for this purpose, to such as vvill sel themselves
to mend and improve. For, the various temptations
wilh which we are surrounded ; our experience of the
deceits of wickedness ; having been in many instan
ces led wrong ourselves ; the great viciousness of the
world; the infinite disorders consequent upon it; our
being raade acquainted with pain and sorrow, either from
our own feeUng of it, or frora the sight of il in others;
these things, though sorae of them raay indeed produce
wrong effects upon our minds, yet, when duly reflected
upon, have all of them a direct tendency to bring us to a
settied raoderation and reasonableness of temper; the
contrary both to thoughtless levity, and also lo that un
restrained self-will, and violent bent to follow present incli
nation, vvhich raay be observed in undisciplined minds.
Such experience, as the present stale affords, of tiie frailty
of our nature, of the boundless extravagance of ungovern*

Chap. 5.J Moral DistipKne. 145
ed passion, ofthe power which an infinite Being has over
us, by the various capacities of misery whicii he has
given us; in short, that kind and degree of experience
which the present state affords us, that the constitution
of nature is such as to admit the possibility, the danger,
and the actual event, of creatures losing their innocence
and happiness, and becoming vicious and wretched ; halh
a tendency to give us a practical sense of things very dif
ferent frora a mere speculative knowledge, that we are
Uable to vice, and capable of misery. And vvho knows,
whether the security of creatures in the highest and raost
settled slate of perfection, may not, in part, arise frora
their having bad snch a sense of things as this, formed,
and habiuially fixed within them, in some state of pro
bation ? And passing through the present worid with that
moral attention vvhich is necessary to the acting a right
part in it, raay leave everlasting impressions of this sort
upon our minds. Bul to be a Utile more distinct : al
lurements to what is wpong ; difficulties in the discharge
of our duty ; our not being able to act a uniform right
part without sorae thought and care ; and the opporluni
ties which vve have, or imagine we have, of avoiding
what vve dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful
means, when we either cannot do it al all, or at least not
so easily, by lawfiil ones ; these things, i. e. the snares
and teraptations of vice, are what render the present
Worid peculiarly fit lo be a state of discipline to those vvho
will preserve their integrity ; because they render being
upon our guard, resolution, and the denial of our pas
sions, necessary in order to that end. And the exercise
of such particular recollection, intention of raind, and
Self-governtnent, in the practice of virtue, has, frora the
make of onr nature, a pecuUar tendency to forra liabits
of virtue, as implying not only a real, bul also a more
continued, and a raore intense exercise of the virtuous
principle ; or a raore constant and a stronger effort of
virtue exerted inlo act. Thus, suppose a person to
know himself lo be in particular danger, for some tirae,
13

146 Of a State of [Part 1,
of doing any thing wrong, vvliiclr yet he luUy resolves
not lo do, continued reeoUection, and keeping upon his
guard, in order to make good his resolution, is a contin
ued exerting of that act of virtue in a high degree, which
need have been, and perhaps vvould have been, only in
stantaneous and weak, had the templation been so. It
is indeed ridiculous lo assert, thnt sell-denial is essential
to virtue and piety ; but it vvould have been nearer die
truth, tbough nol strictly the truth itself, to have said, tiiat
it is essential to discipline and improvement. For, though
actions materially virtuous, vvhich have no sort of difficul
ty, but are periectiy agreeable to our particular inclina
tions, may possibly be done only frora these particular in
cUnations, and so may not be any exercise of the pri^iciple
of virtue, i. e. not be virtuous actions at aU ; yet, on the
contrary, they may be an exercise of that principle, and,
when they are, they ha\'e a tendency lo form and fix the
habit of virtue, Bul when tbe exercise of the virtuous
principle is raore continued, oftener repeated, and more
intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger, temp
tation, and difficulty, of any kind and in any degree, this
tendency is increased proportionably, and a raore con
firmed habit is the consequence.
This undoubtedly holds lo a certain length, but how
far it raay hold, I know not. Neither our intellectual
poweis, nor our bodily strengtii, can be improved beyond
such a degree ; and both may be over-wrought. Pos
sibly there may be somewhat analogous lo this, witii re
spect to the moral character ; vvhich is scarce worth con
sidering. And I raention il only, lest it should come
inlo some persons' thoughts, not as an exception to the
foregoing observations, which perhaps it is, but as a con
futation of them, which it is not. And there raay be
several olher exceptions. Observations of this kind can
not be supposed to hold rainutely, and in every case. It
is enough that they hold in general. And these plainly
hold so far, as that from thera raay be seen distinctiy,
which is all that is intended by thera, that the present

Chap. 5.J Moral Discipline. 147
world is peculiarly fit to be a state of discipline for our
improvement in virtue and piety ; in the sarae sense as
sorae sciences, by requiring and engaging the attention,
not to be sure of such persons as vvill not, but of such as
will, sel iheraselves to thera, are fit to forra the raind to
habits of attention.
Indeed, the present state is so far frora proving, in
event, a discipUne of virtue to the generaUty of men, that,
on the contrary, they seem lo make it a discipUne of vice.
And the viciousness of the world is, in different ways,
the great temptation, which renders it a stale of virtuous
discipline, in the degree it is, lo good men. The whole
end, and the whole occasion of raankind being placed in
such a state as the present, is not pretended to be ac
counted for. That which appears araidst the general
corruption is, that there are sorae persons, who, having
within tbem the principle of amendraent and recovery,
attend to and follow the notices of virtue and religion, be
they raore clear or raore obscure, which are afforded
them ; and that the present world is, not only an exer
cise of virtue in these persons, bul an exercise of il in
ways and degrees peculiarly apt to iraprove il ; apt to
improve it, in sorae respects, even beyond what would be
by the exercise of it required in a perfectly virtuous socie
ty, or in a society of equally imperfect virtue with them
selves. But that the present world does not actually be
come a slate of moral discipline lo raany, even lo the
generality, i. e. that tiiey do not improve or grow better
in it, cannot be urged as a proof that it was not intended
for moral discipUne, by any who at all observe the anal
ogy of nature. For of the numerous seeds of vegetables
and bodies of aniraals, which are adapted and put in the
way, to iraprove to such a point or slate of natural raatu
rity and perfection, we do not see perhaps that one in a
million actually does. Far the greatest part of thera de
cay before they are iraproved to it, and appear to be ab
solutely destroyed. Yet no one, who does nol deny all
final causes, wiU deny, that those seeds and bodies which

148 0/a State of [Parti.
do attain lo that point of maturity and perfection, answer
the end for which they vvere really designed by nature;
and therefore that nature designed them for such perfec
tion. And ] cannot forbear adding, though it is not to the
present purpose, that the appearance of such an amazing
waste in naiure, with respect lo these seeds and bodies,
by foreign causes, is to us as unaccountable, as, what is
much raore terrible, the present and future ruin of so many
raoral agents by themselves, i. e. by vice.
Against this whole notion of moral discipline it may be
objected, in anoiher way, that so far as a course of beha
viour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear,
so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-lovei
But doing what God commands, because he commands
it, is obedience, though it proceeds frora hope or fear.
and a course of such obedience will forra habits of it:
and a constant regard lo veracity, justice, and chanty,
may form distinct habits of these particular virtues, and
will certainly form habits of self-government, and of deny
ing our inclinations, whenever veracity, justice, or charity
requires h. Nor is there any foundation for this great
nicety, whh which sorne affect lo distinguish in tiiis case,
in order to depreciate all religion proceeding frora hope
or fear. For veracity, justice, and charity, regard to
God's authority, and to onr own chief interest, are not
only all three coincident, but each of thern is, in itself, a
just and natural raotive or principle of action. And he
who begins a good life frora any one of thera, and per
severes in it, as he has already in sorae degree, fo he
cannot fail of becoming raore and raore of that charac
ter, which is correspondent to the constitution of nature
as raoral, and to the relation which God stands in lo us
as raoral governor of it ; nor, consequently, can he fail of
obtaining that happiness, which this constitution and rela
tion necessarily supposes connected whh that character.
These several observations, concerning the active prin
ciple of virtue and obedience to God's coraraands, are
applicable to passive subraission or resignation to his will ;

Chap. 5. J Moral Discipline. 149
which is another essential part of a right character, con
necled vvith the former, and very much m our power to
forra ourselves to. It may be imagined, that nothing
but afflictions can give occasion for or require this virtue ;
that it can bave no respect to, nor be any way necessary
to qualify for a state of perfect happiness ; but it is not
experience which can make us think thus : Prosperity
itself, whilst any thing supposed desirable is not ours, be
gets extravagant and unbounded thoughts. Imagination is
altogether as much a source of discontent as any thing in
our external condition. It is indeed true, that there can
be no scope for patience, when sorrow shall be no more ;
but tiiere raay be need of a teraper of mind, which shall
have been formed by patience. For, tiiough self-love,
considered merely as an active principle leading us to
pursue our chief interest, cannot but be uniformly coinci
dent with the principle of obedience to God's commands,
our interest beiug rightiy understood ; because this obe
dience, and the pui-suit of our own chief interest, must
be, in every case, one and the sarae thing ; yet it may be
questioned, whether self-love, considered merely as the
desire of our own interest or happiness, can, frora its na
ture, be thus absolute and uniformly coincident with the
wiU of God, any more than particular affecrions can ;*
coincident in such sort, as not to be Uable to be excited
upon occasions, and in degrees, irapossible to be gratified
consistentiy with the constitution of things, or the divine
appointmeats. So that habits of resignation may, upon
this account, be requisite for aU creatures : habits, I say,
which signily what is formed by use. However, iu gen-
CTal, it is obvious, tbat both self-love and particular af
fections in human creatures, considered only as passive
feelings, distort and rend the mind, and therefore stand in
need of discipUne. Now, denial of those particular auc
tions, in a course of active virtue and obedience to GJod's
will, has a tendency to moderate them, and seems also to
bave a tendency to habituate the mind to be easy and
• Page 127.
13*

150 Of a State of [Parti.
satisfied wilh that degree of happiness which is allotted lo
us, i. e. lo moderate self-love. But the proper discipline
for resignation is affiietion. For a right behaviour under
that irial, recollecting ourselves so as lo consider it in the
view in which religion teaches us to consider h, as from
the band of God ; receiving it as what he appoints, or
thinks proper to permit, in his world and under his gov
ernraent, this will habituate the mind to a dutiful submis
sion ; and such submission, together with the active prin
ciple of obedience, raake up the teraper and character in
us which answers lo his sovereignty, and which absolutely
belongs lo the condition of our being, as dependent crea
tures. Nor can it be said, that this is only breaking the
mind lo a submission to mere power, for mere power
may be accidental, and precarious, and usurped ; but it
is forming wilhin ourselves the temper of resignation to
his rightful authority, who is, by nature, supreme over all.
Upon the whole, such a character, and such qualifica
tions, are necessary for a mature state of life in the present
world, as nature alone does in no wise bestow, but has put
it upon us in great part lo acquire, in our progress ,from
one stage of life to another, from childhood lo mature
age ; put il upon us lo acquire them, by giving us capa
cities of doing it, and by placing us, in the beginning of
Ufe, in a condition fit for it. And this is a general analogy
to our condition in the present world, as in a slate of moral
discipline for another. It is in vain, then, to object against
tbe credibility of the present Ufe being intended for this
purpose, that all the trouble and the danger unavoidably
accorapanying such discipline raight have been saved us,
by our being made al once the creatures and the charac
ters which we were to be. For we experience, that what
we were to be, was to be the effect of what we would do ;
and that the general conduct of nature is, not lo .save us
trouble or danger, but to raake us capable of going ihrough
them, and lo put it upon us to do so. Acquirements of
our own experience and habits, are the natural supply
to our deficiencies, and security against our dangers ;

Chap. S.J Moral Discipline. 151
since h is as plainly natural to set ourselves to acquire the
qualifications as the External things which vve stand in
need of. In particular, it is as plainly a general law of
nature, that we should, with regard lo our leraporal inte
rest, form and cultivate practical principles within us,
by attention, use, and discipline, as anything whatever is
a natural law ; chiefly in the beginning of lile, but also
throughout the whole course of it. And the ahernalive
is left lo our choice, either to improve ourselves and bet
ter our condition, or, in default of such iraproveraent, to
reraain deficient and wretched. It is therefore perfectly
credible, frora the analogy of nature, that the sarae raay
be our case, vvith respect to the happiness of a future
state, and the qualifications necessary for il.
There is a third thing, which raay seera implied in the
present world being a state of probation, that it is a theatre
of action for the manifestation of persons' characters, with
respect to a future one ; not, to be sure, to an all-knowing
Being, but to his creation, or part of it. This may, per
haps, be only a consequence of our beiiigin a slate of
probation in the other senses. Howev'er, it is not impos
sible that men's showing and raaking manifest what is in
their heart, what their real character is, may have respect
to a future life, in ways and manners which we are not
acquainted with ; particulariy it may be a means, for the
Author of nature does not appear to do any thing with
out raeans, of their being disposed of suitably to their cha
racters, and of its being known to the creation, by way of
example, that tliey are thus disposed of, Bul not lo enter
upon any conjectural account ofthis, one may just men
tion, that the manifestation of persons' cjiaraciers contri
butes very much, in various ways, to the carrying on a
great part of that general course of nature respecting man
kind, which comes under our observation at present. I
shaU only add, that probation, in both these senses, as well
as in that treated of in the foregoing chapter, is iraplied
in raoral governinent ; since by persons' behaviour under
it, their characters cannot bul be manifested, and if ihey
behave well, iraproved.

152 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Part 1.

CHAP VI.
Of the Opinion of JVecessity, considered as influencing
Practice.
Throughout the foregoing Treatise il appears, that
the condition of mankind, considered as inhabitants of
this world only, and under the governraent of God which
we experience, is greatly analogous to our condition, as
designed for another world, or under that farther govern
ment which religion teaches us. If, therefore, any assert,
as a fatalist raust, that the opinion of universal necessity
is reconcileable with the forraer, there iramediately arises
a question in the way of analogy ; whether be raust not
also own it to be reconcileable with the latter, i. e. with
the systera of religion itself, and the proof of it. The
reader, then, will observe, that the question now before
us, is nol absolute, whether the opinion of fate be recon
cileable wilh reUgion ; but hypothetical, whether, upon
supposition of its being reconcileable with the constitu
tion of nature, it be not reconcileable wilh religion also.''
or, what pretence a fatalist, — not other persons, bul a
fataUst — has lo conclude, from his opinion, that there can
be no such thing as reUgion ? And as the puzzle and
obscurity, vvhich raust unavoidably arise frora arguing
upon so absurd a supposition as that of universal neces
sity, will, I fear, easily be seen, it will, I hope, as easily
be excused.
Bul since it has been all along taken for granted, as a
thing proved, that there is an inteUigent Author of nature,
or natural Governor of the world ; and since an objec-

Chap. 6.J As Influencing Practice. 153
tion may be raade against the proof of this, from the
opinion of universal necessity, as it raay be supposed
tbat such necessity will itself account for the origin and
preservation of all things, it is requisite that this objection
be distinctly answered ; or that it be shown, that a fatal
ity, supposed consistent with what we certainly expe
rience, does not destroy tbe proof of an intelligent Au
thor and Governor of nature, before we proceed lo con
sider, vvhether h destroys tbe proof of a raoral Governor
of it, or of our being in a state of religion.
Now, when it is said by a fatalist, that the whole consti
tution of nature, and the actionsofnien,that everything and
every raode and circumstance of every thing, is necessary,
and could not possibly have been otiierwise, it is to be ob
served, that this necessity does not exclude deliberation,
choice, preference, and acting frora certain principles,
and to certain ends ; because aU this is matter of un
doubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what
every man may, every moraent, be conscious of. And
from hence it follows, that necessity, alone and of itself,
is in no sort an account of the constitution of nature, and
how things came to be and to continue as they are ; but
only an account of tiiis circumstance relating lo their ori
gin and continuance, that they could nol have been other
wise than they are and have been. The assertion, tbat
every thing is by necessity of nature, is not an answer
to the question. Whether the world came into being as
it is by an intelligent Agent forming it thus, or not ; but
lo quite another question. Whether it carae into being as
it is, in that way and raanner which we call necessarily,
or in that vvay and raanner which we cM freely. For,sup-
pose farther, that one, who was a fatalist, and one, who kept
lo his natural sense of things, and beUeved himself a free
agent, were disputing together, and vindicating their re
spective opinions, and they should happen to instance in
a house, they would agree that it was built by an archi
tect. Their difference concerning necessity and freedom,
would occasion no difference of judgment concerning

154 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Part 1.
this, but only concerning another raatter, whether the archi
tect buih it necessarily or freely. Suppose, then, they
should proceed lo inquire, concerning the constitution
of nature ; in a lax way of speaking, one of thera might
say, it was by necessity, and the other by freedom ; but,
if they had any meaning to their words, as the latter
must mean a free agent, so the former must at length
be reduced to mean an agent, whether he vvould say
one or more, acting by necessity ; for abstract notions
can do nothing. Indeed, vve ascribe to God a necessary
existence, uncaused by any agent. For vve find within
ourselves the idea of infinity, i. e. iramensity and eternity,
impossible, even in imagination, lo be removed out of
being. We seera to discern intuitively, that there must,
and cannot but be, soraewhat, external lo ourselves, an
swering this idea, or the archetype of it. And from
hence (for this abstract, as much as any other, irapUes a
concrete) we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be,
an infinite and iraraense eternal Being existing, prior to
all design contributing lo his existence, and exclusive of
it. And, frora the scantiness of language, a manner of
speaking has been introduced, that necessity is the foun
dation, the reason, the account of the existence of God.
But it is not alleged, nor can il be at all intended, that
every thing exists as its does by this kind of necessity,
a necessity antecedent in nature lo design ; it cannot, I
say, be meant, that every thing exists as it does, by this
kind of necessity, upon several accounts ; and particu
larly, because it is admitted, that design, in the actions
of men, contributes to raany alterations in nature. For,
if any deny this, I shaU not pretend to reason with them.
From these things it ioWows, first, That when a fatalist
asserts that every thing is by necessity, he raust mean, by
an agent acting necessarily ; he raust, I say, raean this;
for I am very sensible he would not choose to mean it.
And, secondly. That the necessity, by which such an
agent is supposed lo act, does not exclude intelligence
and design. So that, were the system of fatality admit-

Chap. 6,J As influencing Practice. 155
led, it would just as much account for the formation of the
world, as for the structure of a house, and no more.
Necessity as rauch requires and supposes a necessary
agent, as freedom requires and supposes a free agent to
be the forraer of the world. And the appearance of
design and of final causes in the constitution of naiure,
as really prove this acting agent to be an inteUigent de
signer, or to act from choice, upon the scheme of neces
sity, supposed possible, as upon that of freedom.
It appearing thus, that the notion of necessity does not
destroy the proof, that there is an intelligent Author of
nature and natural Governor of the world, the present
question, which the analogy before mentioned* suggests,
and which, 1 thinkj it wiU answer, is this : whether the
opinion of necessity, suppose consistent with possibility,
with the constitution of the world, and the natural gov
ernment which we experience exercised over it, destroys
all-reasonable ground of belief, that we are in a slate of
reUgion ; or whether that opinion be reconcileable whh
religion, with the system and the proof of it.
Suppose, tben, a falaUst lo educate any one, from his
youth up, in his own principles ; that the child should
reason upon them, and conclude, that since he cannot
possibly behave otherwise than he does, he is not a sub
ject of blame or coraraendation, nor can deserve to be
rewarded or punished : iraagine hira to eradicate the very
perceptions of blarae and coraraendation oul of his mind,
by means of this system ; to forra his temper, and cha
racter, and behaviour to it ; and frora it to judge of the
treatment he was to expect, say, frora reasonable raen,
upon his coraing abroad into the world ; as the fatalist
judges frora this systera, what he is lo expect frora the
Author of nature, and with regard to a future state : I
cannot forbear stopping here to ask, whether any one of
coramon sense would think fil, that a child should be put
upon these speculations, and be left to apply thera to
• Page 152.

166 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Part 1.
practice i* and a raan has little pretence to reason, who
is not sensible that vve are all children in speculations of
tbis kind. However, the child would doubtless be highly
delighted lo find himself freed from the restraints of fear
and sharae, withwhich bis play-fellows were fettered and
erabarrassed ; and bighly conceited in his superior know
ledge, so far beyond his years. But conceit and vanity
would be the least bad part of the influence which these
principles must have, when thus reasoned and acted upon,
during the course of his education. He raust either be
aUowed to goon, and be the plague of all about him, and
hiraself loo, even lo his own destruction, or else cor
rection raust be continually made use of, to supply the
want of those natural perceptions of blame and commen
dation, which we have supposed to be removed, and to
give hira a practical impression of what he had rea
soned himself out of tiie belief of, thai he was, in fact,
an accountable child, and to be punished for doing what
he was forbid. It is therefore in reality impossible, bul
that the correction vvhich he raust meet with, in the course
of his education, raust convince him, that if the scheme
he was instructed in vvere nol false, yet that he reasoned
inconclusively upon it, and, soraehow or other, misapplied
itto practice and common life; as what the fatalist expe
riences of the conduct of Providence at present, ought,
in aU reason, to convince him, that this scheme is misap
plied, when applied to the subject of religion.* But, sup
posing the child's teraper could remain still formed to the
systera, and his expectation ofthe treatment he vvas to have
in the world be regulated by it, so as lo expect that no
reasonable raan would blame or punish him for anything
which he should do, because he could not help doing it;
upon this supposition, it is manifest he would, upon his
coming abroad into tlie world, be insupportable to society,
and the treatraent which hc would receive from h, would
render it .so to hira ; and he could nol fail of dohig some-
• Page 166.

Chap, 6,J As influencing Practice. 1 57
what very soon, for which he would be delivered over
inlo the hands of civil justice : and thus, in the end, he
would be convinced of the obligations he vvas under to
his wise instructer. Or suppose this scheme of fatality,
in any other way, applied to practice, such practical appU
cation of it wUl be found equally absurd, equally fallacious
in a practical sense. For instance, that if a raan be des
tined to Uve such a tirae, he shall Uve fo il, though he take
no care of his own preservation ; or if he be destined lo
die before that tirae, no care can prevent il ; therefore, aU
care about preserving one's life is to be neglected : which
is the fallacy instanced in by the ancients. But now, on
the contrary, none of these practical absurdities can be
drawn, frora reasoning upon the supposition, that we
are free ; but all such reasoning, with regard to the com
mon affairs of Ufe, is justified by experience. And, there
fore, though it were adraitted that this opinion of neces
sity were speculatively true, yet, vvith regard to practice, it
is as if it were false, so far as our experience reaches ;
that is, to the whole of our present life. For, the con
stitution of the present world, and the condition in whicii
we are actually placed, is as if vve were free. And it
raay perhaps justly be concluded, thaf since the whole
process of action, through every step of it, suspense, de
Uberation, inclining one way, deterraining, and at last doing
as we deterraine, is as if we were free, therefore we are
so. Butthe thing here insisted upon is, that under the
present natural governraent of the world, we find we are
treated and dealt wilh. as if we were free, prior lo all
consideration whether vve are or not. Were this opinion
therefore, of necessity, adraitted to be ever so true, yet
sucb is in fact our condition and the natural course of things,
that, whenever we apply h to Ufe and practice, this ap
plication of it always misleads us, and cannot bul raislead
us, in a raost dreadful raanner, with regard to our present
interest. And how can people think theraselves so very
secure then, that the sarae application ofthe sarae opinion
may not raislead thera also in sorae analogous raanner,
14

158 Of ihe Opinion of JVecessity, [Parti.
with respect lo a future, a raore general, and raore im
portant interest i For, religion being a practical subject,
and the analogy of nature showing us, that we have not
faculties lo apply this opinion, were it a true one, to prac
tical subjects ; whenever we do apply it to the subject of
religion, and thence conclude, that we are free from its
obUgations, it is plain this conclusion cannot be depend
ed upon. There wih stiU remain just reason lo think,
whatever appearances are, that we deceive ourselves ; in
somewhat of a Uke raanner as when people fancy they
can draw contradictory conclusions from the idea of in
finity. Frora these things together, the attentive reader will
see, h follows, that if, upon supposition of freedom, the
evidence of religion be conclusive, it reraains so, upon
supposition of necessity ; because the notion of necessity
is not applicable to practical subjects ; i. e. with respect
to thera, is as if it were not true. Nor does this contain any
reflection upon reason, bul only upon what is unreasonable.
For, to pretend to act upon reason, in opposition to prac
tical principles which the Author of our nature gave us
to act upon, and to pretend lo apply our reason to subjects
with regard lo which our own short views, and even our
experience, will show us it cannot be depended upon, —
and such, at best, the subject of necessity raust be, — this
is vanity, conceit, and unreasonableness.
But this is not all. For we find wilhin ourselves a will,
and are conscious of a character. Now, if this, in us,
be reconcileable vvith fale, il is reconcileable with it in the
Author of nature. And, besides, natural government
and final causes imply a character and a will in the Gov
ernor and Designer ;* a vvill concerning the creatures
whom he governs. The Author of nature, then, being
certainly of sorae character or other, notwithstanding ne-
* By vnll and character is meant that, which, in speaking of men,
we should express, not only by these words, but also by the words
temper, taste, dispositions, practical principles ; that whole frame
(^ mind, from whence we act in one manner rather than another.

Chap. 6, J As influencing Practice. 159
cessity, it is evident this necessity is as reconcileable with
the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and
justice, in him, which attributes are the foundation of re
ligion, as wilh any other character ; since we find this ne
cessity no more hinders men from being fcenevolent than
cruel ; true, than faithless ; just, than unjust, or, if the
fataUsl pleases, what we caU unjust. For it is said. in
deed, that what, upon supposition of freedora, would be
just punishment, upon supposition of necessity, becomes
manifestly unjust; because it is punishraent inflicted for
doing that which persons could not avoid doing. As if
the necessity, vvhich is supposed lo destroy the injustice
of raurder, for instance, would not also destroy the in
justice of punishing it. However, as littie to the purpose
as this objection is in itself, it is very rauch lo the purpose
lo observe frora it, how the notions of justice and injustice
remain, even whilst we endeavour to suppose them re
moved ; hovv they force theraselves upon the raind, even
whilst we are raaking suppositions destructive of thera :
for there is nol, perbaps, a raan in the world, but would
be ready to raake this objection at first thought.
But though it is. raost evident, that universal necessity,
if it be reconcileable with any thing, is reconcileable with
that character in the Author of nature, which is the foun
dation of religion ; " yet, does it not plainly destroy the
proof, that he is of that character, and consequently the
proof of religion ? " By no means. For we find, that
happiness and raisery are not our fate, in any such sense
as nol to be the consequences of our behaviour, but that
they are the consequences of it,* We find God exer
cises tbe sarae kind of governraent over us, with that
which a father exercises over his children, and a civil
magistrale over his subjects. Now, whatever becoraes
of abstract questions concerning Uberty and necessity, it
evidently appears to us, that veracity and justice must be
the natural rule and raeasure of exercising this authority,
* Chap. 2.

160 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Parti.
or governmeni, to a Being, who can have no competi
tions, or interfering of interests, wilh his creatures and his
subjects. But as the doctrine of liberty, ihough we experience its
truth, may be ^lerplexed with difficulties which run up
into the mosl abstruse of all speculations, and as the
opinion of necessity seems to be the very basis upon
which infideUty grounds itself, it raay be of some use to
offer a more particularproof of the obligations of religion,
which raay distinctly be shown not to be destroyed by
this opinion.
The proof, from final causes, of an inteUigent Author
of nature, is not affected by the opinion of necessity;
supposing necessity a thing possible in itself, and recon
cileable vvith the constitution of things.* And it is a
raatter of fact, independent on this or any other specu
lation, that he governs the world by the raethod of re
wards and punishraents ;-|- and also that he hath given
us a moral faculty, by which we distinguish between ac
tions, and approve sorae as virtuous and of good desert,
and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert.|
Now, this moral discemraent implies, in the notion of it,
a rule of action, and a rule of a very peculiar kind ; for
it carries in il authority and a right of direction ; author
ity iu such a sense, as that we cannot depart from it
without being self-conderaned,§ And that the dictates
of this raoral faculty, which are by nature a rule to us,
are raoreover the laws of God, laws in a sense including
sanctions, may be thus proved. Consciousness of a
rule or guide of action, in creatures who are capable of
considering it as given thera by their Maker, nol only
raises iraraediately a senile of duty, but also a sense of
security in following it, and of danger in deviating frora
it. A direction of the Author of nature, given to crea
tures capable of looking upon it as such, is plainly a
* Page 153, &c. t Chap. 2.
X Dissertation 2. § Sermon 2d at the Rolls,

Chap. 6.J As influencing Practice. 161
coraraand from hira ; and a comraand from hun neces
sarily includes in il, at least, an iraplicit proraise in case
of obedience, or threatening, in case of disobedience.
But then the sense of perception of good and ill desert,*
which is contained in the raoral discemraent, renders the
sanction explicit, and raakes it appear, as one may say,
expressed. For, since his method of government is to
reward and punish actions, his having annexed lo some
actions an inseparable sense of good desert, and lo others
of in, this surely amounts lo declaring upon whom his
punishments shaU be inflicted, and his rewards be be
stowed. For he raust have given us this discemraent
and sense of things, as a presentiraent of what is lo be
hereafter ; that is, by way of inforraation before hand,
what we are finally to expect in his world. There is,
then, raost evident ground to think, that the government
of God, upon the whole, will be found lo correspond to
the naiure which he has given us ; and that, in the
upshot and issue of things, happiness and raisery shah,
in fact and event, be raade to follow virtue and vice re
spectively ; as he has already, in so peculiar a raanner,
associated the ideas of them in our rainds. And frora
hence might easily be deduced tiie obligations of re
ligious worship, were it only to be considered as a raeans
of preserving upon our minds a sense of this moral
government of God, and securing our obedience to it ;
which yet is an extreraely iraperfect view of that raost
important duty.
Now, 1 say, no objection from necessity can lie against
this general proof of religion : none against the proposition
reasoned upon, that we have such a raoral faculty and
discemraent ; because this is a mere matier of fact, a
thing of experience, that human kind is thus constituted :
none against the conclusion ; because it is iramediate,
and wholly frora this fact. For tbe conclusion, that God
wiU finally reward the righteous and punish the wicked,
* Dissertation 2.
14*

162 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Part 1.
is not here drawn, from its appearing to us fit* that he
should, bul from its appearing, that he has told us he will.
And this he hath certainly lold us, in the proraise and
threatening, which, it hath been observed, the notion of
a coramand irapUes, and the sense of good and iU de
sert, vvhich he has given us, raore distinctly expresses.
And this reasoning from fact is confirraed, and, in some
degree, even verified, by other facts ; by the natural ten
dencies of virtue and of vice ;-|- and by this, that God,
in the natural course of his providence, punishes vicious
actions, as mischievous to society ; and also vicious ac
tions, as such, in the strictest sense. J So that the gen
eral proof of religion is unanswerably real, even upon
the wild supposition which we are arguing upon.
Il raust likewise be observed farther, that natural re
ligion hath, besides this, an external evidence, which the
doctrine of necessity, if it could be true, vvould nol af
fect. For, suppose a person, bythe observations and
reasoning above, or by any other, convinced of the truth
of religion ; that there is a God, who made the world,
who is the moral Governor and Judge of raankind, and
will, upon the whole, deal with every one according to
his works ; I say, suppose a person convinced of this by
* However, I am far from intending to deny, that the will of God
is determined by what is fit, by the right and reason of the case ;
though one chooses to decline matters of such abstract speculation,
and to speak with caution when one does speak of them. But if it
be intelligible to say, that it is fit and reasonable for every one to
consult his own happiness, then fitness of action, or the right and
reason of the case, is an intelligible manner of speaking. And it
seems as inconceivable, to suppose God to approve one course of
action, or one end, preferably to another, which yet his acting at all
from design Implies that he does, without supposing somewhat prior
in that eTid, to be the ground of the preference ; as to suppose him
to discern an abstract proposition to be true, without supposing sorae
what prior in it to be the ground of the discernment. It doth not,
therefore, appear, that raoral right is any more relative to perception
than abstract truth is ; or that it is any more improper to speak ofthe
fitness and rightness of actions and ends, as founded in the nature of
things, than to speak of abstract truth, as thus founded.
t Page 109. X Page 102, &c.

Chap. 6.J As influencing Practice. 163
reason, but to know nothing at all of antiquity, or the
present stale of raankind, it would be natural for such
a one to be inquisitive, vvhat was the hislory of this
systera of doctrine ; al what tirae, and in what raanner,
it carae first into the vvorld ; and whether it were be
Ueved by any considerable part of it. And were he
upon inquiry to find, that a particular petson, in a late
age, first of all proposed it as a deduction of reason, and
that mankind were before ¦ whoUy ignorant of it ; then
though its evidence frora reason would reraain, there
would be no additional probability of its truth, frora the
account of its discovery. But instead of this being the
fact of the case, on the contrary, he vvould find what
could not but afford hira a very strong confirraation of
its truth : First, That soraewhat of this systera, wilh
more or fewer additions and alterations, halh been pro
fessed in all ages and countries of which we have any
certain inforraation relating lo this raatter. Secondly,
Thatit is certain hisforigal fact, so far as we can trace
thmgs up, that this whole'systera of belief, that there is
one God, the Creator and moral Governor of the world,
and that mankind is in a state of religion, was received
in the first ages. And, thirdly, That as there is no hint or
intiraation in history, that this system was first reasoned
oul ; so there is express historical or traditional eviderice,
as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.
Now, these things must be allowed to be of great weight.
The first, of them, general consent, shows this system to
be conformable to the coraraon sense of raankind. The
second, naraely, that religion was believed in the first
ages of the world, especially as it does not appear that
there vvere then any superstitious or false additions to it,
cannot but be a farther confirraation of its truth. For it
is a proof of this ahernalive ; ehher that it came into the
world by relation, or that it is natural, obvious, and
forces itself upon the raind. The former of these is the
conclusion of learned raen. And whoever wih consider,
how unapt for speculation rude and uncultivated minds

164 Of the Opinion of JVecessity, [Part I.
are, will, perhaps from hence alone, be strongly incUned
to believe it the truth. And as it is shown in the second
part* of this Treatise, that there is nothing of such pe
culiar presuraption against a revelation in the beginning
of the worid, as there is supposed to be against subse
quent ones; a sceptic could nol, I think, give any ac
count, which vvould appear more probable even to hira
self, of the early pretences to revelation, than by sup
posing some real original one, frora whence they were
copied. And the third thing above mentioned, that there
is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient
as hislory, of the system of religion being taught raan
kind by revelation ; this must be admitted as sorae de
gree of real proof, that it was so taught. For why
should nol the raost ancient tradition be admitted as
some additional proof of a fact, against which there is
no presumption ? And this proof is mentioned here,
because it has its weight to show, that religion carae inlo
the world by revelation, prior to aU consideration qf the
proper auihority of any book supposed lo contain it;
and even pri-or to all consideration, whether the revela
tion itself be uncorruptiy handed down and related, or
mixed and darkened with fables. Thus the historical
account which we have, of the origin of religion, taking
.in all circumstances, is a real confirmation of its trulh,
no way affected by the opinion of necessity. And the
external evidence, even of natural religion, is by no
means inconsiderable.
But it is carefully to be observed, and ought to be re
collected after all proofs of virtue and religion, which are
only general, that as speculative reason may be neglected,
prejudiced, and deceived, so also may our moral under
standing be impaired and perverted, and the dictates of
it not impartially attended lo. This, indeed, proves
nothing against the reality of our speculative or practical
faculties of perception ; against their being intended by
* Chap. 2.

Chap. 6.J As influencing Practice. 166
nature to inform us in the theory of things, and instruct
us how we are to behave, and what we are lo expect,
in consequence of our behaviour. Yet our liableness, in
the degree vve are liable, to prejudice and perversion, is
a most serious adraonition lo us to be upon our guard,
with respect to what is of such consequence, as our de
terminations concerning virtue and religion ; and particu
larly, not to take custora, and fashion, and slight notions
of honor, (Jr iraaginations of present ease, use, and con
venience to raankind, for the only moral rule.*
Tbe foregoing observations, drawn frora the naiure of
the thing, and the hislory of religion, araount, when taken
together, to a real practical proof of it, not lo be confu
ted; such a proof as, considering the infinhe iraportance
of the thing, I apprehend, would be adraitted fully suffi
cient, in reason, lo influence "the actions of raen, who
act upon thought and reflection ; if it were adraitted that
there is no proof of the contrary. But it raay be said ;
"There are many probabilities, which cannot indeed be
confuled, i. e. shown lo be no probabiUties, and yet may
be overbalanced by greater probabilities on the olher
side; much more by demonstration. And there is no
occasion to object against particular arguments alleged for
an opinion, when tiie opinion itself may be clearly shown
tobe. false, without meddling whh such arguraents at aU,
but leaving them just as they dre.f Now, the raethod of
governraent by rewards and punishments, and especially
rewarding and punishing good and ill desert, as such, re
spectively, must go upon supposition, that we are free,
and not necessary agents. And il is incredible, that the
Author of naiure should govern us upon a supposition as
true, which he knows to be false ; and therefore absurd
to think, he will reward or punish us for our actions here
after; especially that he wiU do it under the notion, that
they are of good or ill desert." Here, then, the matter
is brought to a point. And the answer to all this is full,
• Dissertation 2. fPage 56,64.

166 . Of the Opinion of Necessity, [Part I.
and not be evaded ; that the whole consthution and
course of things, the whole analogy of providence shows,
beyond possibility of doubt, that the conclusion frora tiiis
reasoning is false, wherever the fallacy Ues. The doc
trine of freedom, indeed, clearly shows where ; in sup
posing ourselves necessary, when in truth we are free,
agents. But, upon the supposition of necessity, the fal
lacy lies in taking for granted that it is incredible neces
sary agents should be rewarded and punished,* But that,
somehow or other, the conclusion now mentioned is false,
is most certain. For it is fact, tbat God does govern
even brute creatures by the method of rewards and pun
ishments, in the natural course of things. And raen are
rewarded and punished for their actions, punished for
actions mischievous lo society as being so, punished for
vicious actions as such, by the natural instrumentaUty of
each other, under the present conduct of Providence.
Nay, even the affection of gratitude, and the passion of
resentment, and the rewards and punishments following
frora them, which in general are to be considered as
natural, i. e. from the Author of nature ; these rewards
and punishments, being naturally* annexed to actioiis-
considered as implying good intention and good desert,
ill intention and ill desert; these natural rewards and,
punishments, I say, are as much a contradiction lo the
conclusion above, and show its falsehood, as a more,
exact and complete rewarding and punishing of good
and ill desert, as such. So that, ifit be incredible that
necessary agents should be thus rewarded and punished,
then raen are not necessary, but free ; since it is matter
of fact that they are thus rewarded and punished. But
if, on the contrary, which is the supposition we have been
arguing upon, it be insisted, tbat men are necessary
agents, then there is nothing incredible in the farther sup
position of necessary agents being thus rewarded and
punished ; since we ourselves are thus deaU with,
* Sermon Sth, at the Rolls.

Chap, 6,J As influencing Practice. 167
Frora the whole, therefore it must follow, that a neces
sity supposed possible, and reconcileable with the consti
tution of things, does in no sort prove, that the Author
of nature will nol, nor destroy the proof that he will,
finally, and upon the whole, in his eternal governraent,
render his creatures happy or miserable, by some means
or olher, as they behave well or.iU. Or, lo express this
conclusion In words conformable to the titie of the chap
ter, the analogy of naiure shows us, that the opinion of
necessity, considered as practical, is false. And if ne
cessity, upon the supposition above mentioned, doth not
destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes
no alteration in the proof of revealed.
From these tilings, Ukewise, we may learn in what
sense to understand that general assertion, that the opin
ion of necessity is essentially destructive of aU religion.
First, In a practical sense ; that by this notion atheisti
cal men pretend to satisfy and encourage themselves in
vice, and justify to others their disregard to all religion.
And, secondly, In the strictest sense ; that it is a contra
diction to the whole constitution of nature, and to what
we may every raoraent experience in ourselves, and so
overturns every thing. But by no means is this assertion
to be understood, as if necessity, supposing it could pos
sibly be reconciled wilh the constitution of things, and
with what we experience, were not also reconcileable
with reUgion ; for upon this supposition it demonstrably
is so.

168 The Government of God, [Part 1.

CHAP. VII.
Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme,
or Constitution, imperfectly comprehended.
Though it be, as it cannot but be, acknowledged, that
the analogy of nature gives a strong credibility to the
general doctrine of reUgion, and to the several particular
things contained in il, considered as so many raatters of
fact ; and likewise, that it shows this credibility not to
be destroyed by any notions of necessity ; yet stiU, ob-
¦cictions raay be insisted upon against the wisdora, equity,
and goodness of the divine governraent, iraplied in the
notion of reUgion, and against the method by which this
government is conducted, to which objections analogf
can be no direct answer. For the credibility, or the
certain trulh, of a matter of fact, does not iraraediately
prove any thing concerning the wisdora or goodness of it;
and analogy can do no more, immediately or directly,
than show such and such things to be true or credible,
considered only as matters of fact. But stiU, if, upon
supposition of a moral constitution of nature and a raoral
governraent over il, analogy suggests and raakes it credi
ble, that this government must be a scherae, system, or
consthution of governraent, as distinguished frora a num
ber of single unconnected acts of distributive justice and
goodness ; and likewise, that it must be a scheme, so
imperfectly coraprehended, and of such a sort in other
respects, as to afford a direct general answer to all ob
jections against the justice and goodness of it; then
analogy is, remotely, of great service in answering those
objections, both by suggesting the answer, a'nd showing it
to be a credible one.

Chap. 7 J A Scheme Incomprehensible. 169
Now, this, upon inquiry, will be found lo be the case.
For, first, Upon supposition that God exercises a raoral
government over the worid, the analogy of his natural
government suggests, and makes it credible, that his
moral governraent raust be a scherae quite beyond our
coraprehension ; and this affords a general answer to all
objections l|ainst the justice and goodness of h. And,
ySecondly, A more distinct observation of some particular
things contained iu God's scherae of natural government,
the like things being supposed, by analogy, lo be contain
ed in his raoral governraent, will farther show how littie
weight is to be laid upon these objections,
1, Upon supposition that God exercises a raoral gov
ernraent over the world, the analogy of ||^ natural gov
ernraent suggests and raakes it credible, tnat his moral
govemraent raust be a scherae quite beyond our compre
hension : and this affords a general answer lo all objections
against the justice and goodness of it. It is most obvious,
analogy renders it highly credible, that upon supposition
of a raoral governraent, it must be a scheme, — for the
world, and the whole natural governraent of it, appears
to be so — lo be a scheme, system, or constitution, whose
parts correspond lo each other, and lo a whole, as really
as any work of art, or as any particular raodel of a civil
constitution, and government. In this great scherae of
the natural world, individuals have various pecuUar rela
tions to other individuals of their own species. And
whole species are, we find, variously related to olher spe
cies, upon this earth. Nor do we know how much far
ther these kinds of relations may extend. And, as there
is not any action, or natural event, which we are acquaint
ed with, so single and unconnected as not to have a re
spect to some other actions and events, so, possibly, each
of them, when it has not an immediate, may yet have a
remote, natural relation lo other actions and events, rauch
beyond the corapass of this present world. There seems,
indeed, nothing from whence vve can so much as raake a
conjecture, whethef all creatures, actions, and events
15

170 The Government of God, [Parti,
throughout the whole of nature, have relations to each
other. But, as rt is obvious that all events have future
unknown consequences, so, if we trace any, as far as we
can go, into what is connecled with it, we shall find, that
if such event were not connected with soraewhat far
ther in nature unknown to us, somewhat both past and
present, such event could not possibly havetbeen at all.
Nor can we give the whole account of any one thing what
ever ; of all its causes, ends, and necessary adjuncts ; those
adjuncts, I raean, without which it could not have been,
By this most astonishing connexion, these reciprocal cor
respondences and mutual relations, everything which we
see in the course of naiure, is actually brought about.
And things, seemingly the most insignificant iraaginable,
are perpetual^ observed to be necessary conditions to
other things of the greatest importance ; so that any one
thing whatever may, for aught we know to the contrary,
be a necessary condition to any other. The natural
vvorld, then, and natural governraent of it, being such an
incomprehensible scherae ; so incomprehensible, that a
man must really, in the literal sense, know nothing at all,
who is not sensible of his ignorance in it : this immediately
suggests, and strongly shows the credibility, that the
moral world and governinent of it may be so too. In
deed, the natural and moral constitution and government
of the world are so connected, as to make up together
but one scherae ; and it is highly probable, that the first
is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the
. latter, as the vegetable world is for the aniraal, and or
ganized bodies for minds. But the thing intended here
is, without inquiring how far the administration of the
natural world is subordinate to that of the raoral, only to
observe the credibility, that one should be analogous or
similar lo the other : that, therefore, every act of divine
justice and goodness may be supposed lo look much
beyond itself and its immediate object ; may have some
reference to other parts of God's moral adrainistration,
and to a general moral plan ; and that every circumstance

Chap, 7,J A Scheme Incomprehensible. 171
of this his raoral governraent raay be adjusted before
hand with a view lo the whole of it. Thus, for example :
the deterrained length of time, and the degrees and ways
¦ in which virtue is to reraain in a state of warfare and
discipUne, and in which wickedness is perraitted lo have
its progress ; the times appointed for tho, execution of
justice ; the appointed instruraents of h ; the kinds of
rewards and punishraents, and the raanners of their dis
tribution ; aU particular instances of divine justice and
goodness, and every circurastance of thera, may have
such respects to each olher, as to raake up aU together a
whole, connected and related in aU its parts ; a scheme,
or system, vvhich is as properly one as the natural world
is, and of the like kind. And supposing this to be the
case, it is most evident that vve are not competent judges
of this scherae, frora the sraall parts of it vvhich corae
within our view in the present life ; and therefore no ob
jections against any of these parts can be insisted upon
by reasonable raen.
This our ignorance, and the consequence bere drawn
from it, are universally acknowledged upon other occa
sions ; and, though scarce denied, yet are universally
forgot, vvhen persons corae to argue against religion.
And it is^ not perhaps easy, even for the raost reasonable
men, always lo bear in raind the degree of our ignorance,
and make due allowances for u. Upon these accounts,
it may not be useless to go on a little farther, in order to
, show raore distinctly, how just an answer our ignorance
is, to objections against tbe scheme of Providence, Sup
pose, then, a person boldly to assert, that the things com
plained of, the origin and continuance of evil, might easily
have been prevented by repealed interpositions ;* inter
positions so guarded and circumstanced, as vvould preclude
aU raischief arising frora thera : or, if this were im
practicable, that a scheme of governraent is itself an ira
perfection ; since raore good raight have been produced
*Page, 174,175,176.

172 The Govemment qf God, [Part 1.
without any scherae, system, or constitution at aU, by con
tinued single unrelated acts of distributive justice and
goodness, because these would have occasioned no irreg
ularities : and farther than this, it is presumed, the ob
jections will not be Carried, Yet the answer is obvious;
that, were these assertions true, stiUlhe observations above,
concerning our ignorance in the scherae of divine govern-
men,t, and tbe consequence drawn from it, would' hold in
great measure, enough to vindicate religion against aU ob
jections from the disorders of the presenl state. Were
these assertions true, yet the government of the world
might be just and good notwithstanding ; for, at the most,
they vvould infer nothing more than that it might have
been belter. But, indeed, they are raere arbitrary as
sertions ; no raan being sufficiently acquainted wilh the
possibilities of things, lo bring any proof of thera to the
lowest degree of probability. For, however possible
what is asserted may seem, yet many instances raay be
alleged, in tilings much less out of our reach, of supposi
tions absolutely irapossible, and reducible lo the most
p;i!pable self-contradictions, which nol every one by any
means would perceive to be such, nor perhaps any one
at first sight suspect. From these things it is easy to see
distinctly, hovv our ignorance, as it is „lhe common, is
really a satisfactory answer to all objections against the
justice and goodness of Providence, If a raan, con
teraplating any one providential dispensation, which had
no relation to any others, should object, that he discerned'
in it a disregard to justice, or a deficiency of goodness, '
nothing would be less an answer lo such objection, thari
our ignorance in other parts of Providence, or in the
possibiUties of things, no way related lo what he was
contemplating. But when vve know not but the parts
objected against may be relative to other parts unknown
to us, and when we are unacquainted with what is, in the
nature of the thing, practicable in the case before us,
then our ignorance is a satisfactory answer; because
some unknown relation, or sorae unknown irapossibility,

Chap, 7.J A Scheme Incomprehensible. 173
may render what is objected against just and good ; nay,
good in the highest practicable degree,
II, And how Utile weight is to be laid upon such ob
jections wiU farther appear, by a raore distinct observation
of sorae particular things contained in the natural govern
raent of God, the Uke to which raay be supposed, from
analogy, lo be contained in his raoral governraent, v.
First, As, in the scheme of the natural vvorld, no end^
appear to be accompUshed whhout raeans ; so vve find
that raeans very undesirable often conduce lo bring
about ends in such a raeasure desirable, as greatiy to
over-balance the disagreeableness of the means. And in
cases where such means are conducive lo such ends, it
is not reason, but experience, which shows us that they
are thus conducive. Experience also shows raany raeans
lo be conducive and necessary to accoraplish ends, which
means, before experience, vve should have thought would
have had even a contrary tendency. Now, frora these
observations relating to the natural scheme of the vvorld,
the moral being supposed analogous lo it, arises a greal
credibility, that the putting our raisery in each other's
power to the degree it is, and making men liable to vice
to tiie degree we are ; and, in general, that those things
which are objected against the moral scherae of Provi
dence raay be, upon the whole, friendly and assistant to
virtue, and productive of an over-balance of happiness ;
i. e. the things objected against may be means by which
an over-balance of goodwill, in the end, be found produ
ced. And, from the sarae observations, it appears to be
no presuraption against tbis, that we do nol, if indeed we
do not, see those raeans to bave any such tendency, or
that they seera to us lo have a contrary one. Thus, those
things which we caU irregularities, raay not be so at aU ;
because they may be means of accompUshing wise and
good ends more considerable. And it may be added, as
above, that they raay also be the only raeans by which
these wise and good ends are capable of being accora
pUshed. 15*

l'"/4 The Government of God, [Part I.
After these observations it raay be proper to add, in
order to obviate an absurd and wicked conclusion frora
any of tbem, that though the constitution of our nature,
from whence vve are capable of vice and misery, may, as
it undoubtedly does, contribute to tbe perfection and hap-
. piness of the world ; and though the actual perraission of
evil may be beneficial to it, {i. e. it would have been more
raischievous, not that a wicked person bad hiraself abstain
ed from his own wickedness, but that any one had forci
bly prevented it, than that it was perraitted) ;" yet, not
withstanding, it might have been much better for the
world if this very evil had never been done. Nay, it is
raost clearly conceivable, that the very coramission of
wickedness raay be beneficial to the world, and yet that
it would be infinitely more beneficfal for men to refrain
from it. For thus, in the wise and good constitution of
the natural world, there are disorders which bring their
own cures ; diseases which are themselves remedies.
Many a man would have died, had il not been for the
gout or a fever ; yet it would be thought raadness to as
sert, that sickness is a better or more perfect stale than
health ; though the like, vvith regard to the raoral world,
has been asserted. But,
Secondly, Thenatural governraent ofthe world is car
ried on by general laws. For this there raay be wise and
gpod reasons ; the wisest and best, for aught we knowto
the contrary. And that there are such reasons, is sug
gested lo our thoughts by the analogy of nature ; by our
being made to experience good ends to be accomplished,
as indeed all the good which vve enjoy is accomplished,
by this means, that the laws, by which the worid is gov
erned, are general. For we have scarce any kind of
enjoyments, but what we are, in sorae way or olher, in
strumental in procuring ourselves, by acting in a manner
which vve foresee likely lo procure thern : now this fore
sight could not be at all, were not the governraent of tbe
* Page 173.

Chap. 7. J A Scheme Incomprehensible. 175
world carried on by general laws. And ihough, for aught
we know to the contrary, every single case raay be, at
length, found to have been provided for even by these,
yet lo prevent all irregularities, or remedy them as they
arise, by the wisest and best general laws, may be im
possible in the nature of things, as we see h is absolutely
impossible in civil governraent. Bul tben we are ready
to think, that the constitution of naiure reraaining as it is,
and the course of things being permitted to go on, in other
respects' as it does, there raight be interpositions lo prevent
irregularities, though they could not have been prevented
or remedied by any general laws. And there would indeed
be reason to wish — which, by the way, is very different
frora a right to claim — that aU irregularities were prevented
or remedied by presenl interpositions, if these interpositions
would have no other effect than tiiis. But it is plain they
would have sorae visible and imraediate bad effects ; for
instance, they vvould encourage idleness and negligence,
and they would render doubtful the natural rule of life,
which is ascertained by this very thing, that the course
ofthe world is carried on by general laws. And farther,
it is certain tbey would have distant effects, and very
great ones too, by raeans of the wonderful connexions
before raentioned.* So that we cannot so much as guess,
what would be the whole result of the interpositions de
sired. It may be said, any bad result might be prevented
by farther interpositions, whenever there was occasion for
them ; but tbis again is talking quite at randora, and in
the dark.f Upon the whole, then, we see wise reasons
why the course of the world should be carried on by gen
eral laws, and good ends accoraplished by this raeans,
and, for aught we know, there raay be tbe wisest reasons
for it, and the best ends accoraplished by it. We have
no ground lo beUeve, that all irregularities could be reme
died as they arise, or could have been precluded by gen
eral laws. We find that interpositions would produce
* Page 169. f Pages 171, 172, 173.

176 The Government of God. [Part 1.
evil, and prevent good ; and, for aught we know, they
would produce greater evil than they would prevent, and
prevent greater good than they would produce. And if
this be the case, then, the not interposing is so far from
being a ground of complaint, that it is an instance of good
ness. This is intelligible and sufficient ; and going farther
seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.
But it may be said, that " after aU, tiiese supposed im
possibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted
with ; and we must judge of reUgion, as of other things,
by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing :
or, however, that tbe answers here given to what is
objected against religion, may equally be made use of to
invalidate the proof of it, since their stress lies so very
much upon our ignorance. " But,
First, Though total ignorance in any matter does
indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof con
cerning it, and objections against il, yet partial ignorance
does nol. For we may in any degree be convinced, that
a person is of such a character, and consequently will
pursue such ends, though we are greatly ignorant what is
the proper way of acting, in order the most effectually to
obtain those ends ; and in this case, objections against
his .manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to
obtain thera, might be answered by our ignorance,
though the proof that such ends were intended, raight not
at all be invaUdaled by it. Thus, the proof of religion is
a proof of the raoral character of God, and, consequently,
that is governmeni is moral, and that every one, upon the
whole, shall receive according to his deserts ; a proof
that this is the designed end of his governraent. But we
are nol competent judges what is the proper way of
acting, in order the most effectually lo accoraplish this
end,* Therefore our ignorance is an answer lo objec
tions against the conduct of Providence, in perraitting
irregularities, as seeraing contradictory lo this end. Now,
* Page 63, 64.

Chap. 7,J A Scheme Incomprehensiile. 177
since it is so obvious that our ignorance raay be a satis
factory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not
affect the proof of it ; till it can be shown, it is frivolous
to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of
religion, as it does the objections against it.
Secondly, Suppose unknown irapossibiUti«s, and un
known relations, might justly be urged to invalidate
the proof of reUgion, as well as to answer objections
against it, and that, in consequence of this, the proof of
it were doubtful ; yet still, let the assertion be despisecJ,
or l^t it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that raoral
obligations would remain certain, though it were not
certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences
of observing or violating thera. For these obligations
arise immediately and necessarily from tbe judgment of
our own raind, unless perverted, which vve cannot violate
without being self-condemned. And they would be
certain, ido, frora considerations of interest. For, though
it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of
virtue and vice, yet it is however credible, that they raay
have those consequences which religion teaches us they
wiU ; and this credibility is a certain* obligation in point
of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to live
in the conscientious practice of aU that is good. But,
Thirdly, Tbe answers above given to the objections
against religion, cannot equally be raade use of lo iu validate
the proof of it. For', upon supposition that God exercises
a moral governinent over the vvorld, analogy does raost
strongly lead us lo conclude, that this raoral governraent
raust be a scherae, or constitution, beyond our com-
, prehension. And a thousand particular analogies show
us, that parts of such a scherae, frora their relation to
other parts, raay conduce to accorapUsh ends, which we
should have thought they had no tendency at all to
accoraplish ; nay, ends, which, before experience, vve
should have thought such parts were contradictory to,
* Page 59, and Part ii. chap. 6,

178 The Govemment of God, «^c, [Part 1,
and had a tendency lo prevent. And, therefore, all
these analogies show, that the way of arguing made use
of in objecting against religion, is delusive ; because they
show h is not al aU incredible, that, could we coraprehend
the whole, we should find the perraission of the disorders
objected against, to be consistent wilh justice and good
ness, and even to be instances of thera. Now this is not ,
applicable lo the proof of reUgion, as it is to the objections
against it ;* and therefore cannot invaUdate that proof, as
il does these objections.
Lastly, Frora the observations now raade, it is easy to
see, that the answers above given to the objections
against Providence, ihough, in a general way of speaking,
they raay be said to be taken frora our ignorance, yet
are by no means taken raerely frora that, but from some
what which analogy shows us concerning it. For analogy
shows us positively, that our ignorance in the possi
bilities of things, and the various relations in nature,
renders us incorapetent judges, and leads us to fiilse
conclusions, in cases sirailar to this, in which we pretend
to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted
upon, are not mere suppositions of unknown impos
sibilities and relations; but they are suggested to our
thoughts, and even forced upon the observations of serious
men, and rendered credible, too, by the analogy of na
ture. And, therefore, to take these things into the ac
count, is to judge by experience, and what we do know;
and it is not judging so, to take no notice of thera.
• Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312, 2d Edition,

179

CONCLUSIOJV.

The observations of the last chapter lead us to con
sider this little scene of huraan life, in which vve are so
busily engaged, as having reference, of sorae sort or
other, to a rauch larger plan of things. Whether we
are any way related lo the raore distant parts of the
boundless universe into which we are brought, is alto
gether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of
things which coraes within our view, is connected wilh
somewhat past, present, and future beyond it.* So that
we are placed, as one raay speak, in the middle of a
scheme, not a fixed, but a progressive one, every way in
comprehensible ; incoraprehensible, in a raanner, equally
with respect lo what has been, what now is, and vvhat shall
he hereafter. And this scherae cannot but contain in it
soraewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought
and conception, f as any thing in that of religion. For,
wiU any raan in his senses say, thatit is less difficult to
conceive how the world carae to be, and continue as it is,
wiihout, than wilh, an intelligent Autiior and Governor of
iti' adraitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is
sorae other rule of government raore natural, and of easier
conception, than that which we call raoral? Indeed, wilh-
¦out an intelligent Author and Governor of nature, no
account at all can be given, how this universe, or the
part of it particularly in which we are concerned, carae
to be, and the course of it to be carried on, as it is ; nor
any of its general end and design, without a raoral Gov-
' Page 169, &c. t See Part ii. chap. 2.

180 Conclusion. [Part I.
ernor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of nature,
and natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone
upon in the foregoing treatise, as proved, and generally
known and confessed to be proved. And the very no
tion of an intelligent Author of nature, proved by partic
ular final causes, implies a vvill and a character,* Now,
as our whole nature, the naiure vvhich he has given us,
leads us to conclude his will and character lo be moral,
just, and good ; so vve can scarce in imagination conceive,
what it can be otherwise. However, in consequence of
this his wiU and character, whatever it be, he formed the
universe as it is, and carries on the conrse of it as be
does, rather than in any other manner ; and has assigned
to us, and to all living creatures, a part and a lot in it.
Irrational creatures act this their part, and enjoy and un
dergo the pleasures and tiie pains allotted them, withonl
any reflection. But one vvould think il impossible, that
creatures endued with reason could avoid reflecting some
times upon aU this.; reflecting, if not from whence we
carae, yet, al least, whiiher we are going, and what the
mysterious scheme in the midst of which we find our
selves, will at length corae oul and produce ; a scherae
in which il is certain vve are highly interested, and in
which we raay be interested even beyond conception.
For raany things prove it palpably absurd to conclude,
that we shall cease to be at death. Particular analogies
do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to be
thought strange in our being lo exist in another state of
Ufe. And that we are now Uving beings, affords a strong
probability that we shah continue so ; unless there be
sorae positive ground, and there is none frora reason or
analogy, to think death will destroy us. Were a persua
sion of this kind ever so weU grounded, there would,
surely, be littie reason to take pleasure in it. But, in
deed, it can have no other ground than some such iraa
gination, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves;
which is contrary to experience. Experience, too, most
•Page 158.

Part I.J Conclusion. 181
clearly shows us the folly of concluding, from the body
and the living agent affecting each other mutually, that
the dissolution of the forraer is the destruction of the
laiter. And there are reraarkable instances of tiieir not
affecting each olher, vvhich lead us to a contrary conclu
sion. The supposition, then, vvhich in all reason vve are
to go upon, is, that our living naiure vvill continue after
death. And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an insti
tution of Ufe, or to act upon any olher supposition.
Now, aU expectation of immortality, whether more or
less certain, opens an unbounded prospect to our hopes
and our fears ; since we see the constitution of nature is
such as to adrait of misery, as vvell as to be productive of
happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both
in some degree ; and since we cannot but know vvhat
higher degrees of both we are capable of. And there is
no presumption against beUeving farther, that our future
inierest depends upon our present behaviour ; for we see
our present inierest doth ; and that the happiness and
raisery, which are naturally annexed to our actions, very
frequently do not follow tiU long after the actions are
done to which they are respectively annexed. So that,
were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether il vvere
^ely that tbe Author of nature, in giving happiness and
misery to his creatures, halh regard to their actions or
nol; yet, since we find by experience that he hath such
regard, the whole sense of things vvhich he has given us,
plainly leads us, at once, and without any elaborate in
quiries, to think, that it may, indeed raust, be to good
actions chiefly that he halh annexed happiness, and lo
bad actions misery ; or that he will, upon the whole, re
ward those who do weU, and punish those who do evil.
To confirra tbis from the constitution of the world, it has
been observed, that sorae sort of raoral government is
necessarily irapUed in that natural governraent of God
which vve experience ourselves under ; that good and
bad actions, at present, are naturally rewarded and pun
ished, not only as beneficial and mischievous to society,
16

182 Conclusion. [Parti.
but also as virtuous and vicious ; and that there is, in the
very naiure of the thing, a tendency to their being re
warded and punished in a much higher degree than they
are at present. And though this higher degree of dis
tributive justice, which nature thus points out and leads
towards, is prevented for a time from taking place, il is
by obstacles which the state of this world unhappily
thVows in hs way, and which, therefore, are in their na
ture temporary. ' Now, as these things, in the natural
conduct of Providence, are observable on the side of
virtue, so there is nothing lo be set against them on the
side of vice. A moral scheme of governraent, then, is
visibly established, and, in sorae degree, carried into ex
ecution ; and this, together with the essential tendencies
of virtue and vice duly considered, naturally raise in us
an apprehension, that it will be carried on farther towards
perfection in a future state, and that every one shall there
receive according to his deserts. And if this be so, then
our future and general interest, under the raoral govern
ment of God, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour,
notwithstanding the difficulty which this raay occasion of
securing it, and the danger of losing it; just in the sarae
manner as our temporal interest, under his natural gov
ernment, is appointed lo depend upon our behaviour,
notwithstanding the like difficulty and danger. For,
from our original constitution, and that of the world
which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves,
with our own conduct and our own interest. And from
the same constitution of nature, especially joined with
that course'of things which is owing to raen, we have
teraptations to be unfaithful in this trust, to forfeit this in
terest, to neglect it, and run ourselves into raisery and
ruin. From these temptations arise, the difficulties of
behaving so as to secure our temporal interest, and the
hazard of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There is,
therefore, nothing incredible in supposing, there raay be
the like difficulty and hazard wilh regard to that chief
and final good vvhich religion lays before us. Indeed,
the whole account, how it carae to pass that we were

Part l.j Conclusion. 183
placed in such a condition as this, raust be beyond our
comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by vvhat
reUgion teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety
must be a necessary quaUfication for a future state of se
curity and happiness, under the moral government of
God ; in Uke manner, as some certain qualifications or
other are necessary for every particular condition of life,
under his natural governraent; and that the presenl state
was intended to be a school of discipUne, for iraproving
in ourselves that character. Now, this intention of na
ture is rendered highly credible by observing, that we
are plainly raade for iraprovement of all kinds ; that it
is a general appointment of Providence, that we cuhivate
practical principles, and forra within ourselves habits of
action, in order to becorae fit for vvhat we vvere wholly
unfit for before; that, in particular, childhood and youth
is naturally appointed to be a stale of discipline for ma
ture age ; and that the present world is peculiarly fitted
for a state of raoral discipline. And, whereas objections
are urged against the whole notion of moral government
and a probation state, frora the opinion of necessity, it
has been shown, that God has given us the evidence, as
il were, of experience, that aU objections against reUgion
on this head are vain and delusive. He has also, in his
natural governraent, suggested an answer to all our short
sighted objections against the equity and goodness of his
moral governraent ; and, in general, he has exerapUfied
to us the laiter by the former.
These things, which, it is to be remerabered, are mat
ters of fact, ought, in all coraraon sense, lo awaken man
kind, to induce them to consider, in earnest, their condi
tion, and what they have to do. Il is absurd, — absurd
to the degree of being ridiculous, if the subject were not
of so serious a kind, for raen to think themselves secure in
a vicious Ufe, or even in that imraoral thoughtiessness
which far the greatest part of them are fallen into. And
tiie credibility of reUgion, arising frora experience and
facts here considered, is fully sufficient, in reason, to en
gage them to Uve in the general practice of aU virtue and

184 Conclusion. [Part 1,
piely ; under the serious apprehension, ihough it should
be mixed whh sorae doubt,* of a righteous adrainistration
established in nature, and a future judgraent in conse
quence -'of it; especially vvhen we consider, how very
questionable it is whether any thing at all can be gained
by vice •,-f how unquestionably little, as well as precarious,
the pleasures and profits of it are at the best, and how
soon they must be parted with at the longest. For, in
the deliberations of reason, concerning vvhat we are to
pursue and vvhat to avoid, as teraptations lo any thing
from mere passion are supposed out of the case ; so in
ducements to vice from cool expectations of pleasure and
interest, so small, and uncertain, and short, are really so
insignificant, as in the view of reason, to be almost nothing
in themselves, and, in coraparison vvith the iraportance
of religion, they quite disappear and are lost. Mere pas
sion, indeed, may be alleged, though not as a reason, yet
as an excuse for a vicious course of Ufe. And how
sorry an excuse it is vvill be raanifest by observing, that
we are placed in a condition in which we are unavoida
bly inured to govern our passions, by being necessitated
to govern them ; and lo lay ourselves under the same
kind of restraints, and as great ones too, frora temporal
regards, as virtue and piety, in the ordinary course of
things, require. The plea of ungovernable passion, then,
on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things ; for it is
no reason, and but a poor excuse, Bul the proper mo
tives to religion, are the proper proofs of it, frora our
moral naiure, from the presages of conscience, and our
natural apprehension of God, under the character of a
righteous Governor and Judge ; a nature, and conscience,
and apprehension given us by hira ; and frora the con
firmation of ihe dictates of reason, by life and immor
tality brought to light by the gospel ; and ihe wrath of
God revealed from heaven, against all ungodliness and
unrighteousness of men.
* Part ii. chap. 6. f Page 99.

THE
ANALOGY OF
RELIGION TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

PART II,
OF REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAP, I.
Of the Importance of Christianity.
Some persons, upon pretence of the sufficiency of
the light of nature, avowedly reject aU revelation, as, in
its very notion, incredible, and what must be fictitious.
And, indeed, it is certain no revelation would have been
given, had the light of nature been sufficient in such a
sense, as lo render one not wanting and useless. But
no man, in seriousness and simplicity of mind, can possi
bly think it so, who considers the slate of religion in the
heathen world before revelation, and its present slate in
those places which have borrowed no light from it;
particularly, the doubtfulness of sorae of the greatest
16*

186 Of ihe Importance [Part 2,
men concerning things of the utmost importance, as weU
as the natural inattention and ignorance of mankind in
general. It is irapossible to say who would have been
able to have reasoned out that whole systera, which we
caU natural religion, in its genuine siraplicity, clear of
superstition ; but there is certainly no ground to affirm
tbat the generality could : if they could, there is no sort
of probability that they would, Adraitting there were,
they would highly want a standing adraonition, lo remind
them of it, and inculcate it upon them. And farther
still, were they as much disposed to attend lo religion as
the bBlter sort of roen are, yet, even upon this supposi
tion, there vvould be various occasions for supernatural
instruction and assistance, and the greatest advantages
might be afforded by tiiem. So that lo say, revelation
is a thing superfluous, what there was no need of, and
what can be of no service, is, 1 think, to talk quite wildly
and at random. Nor would it be more extravagant to
affirm, that mankind is so entirely at ease in the present
state, and life so completely happy, that it is a contradic
tion to suppose our condition capable of being in any
respect better.
There are other persons, not lo be ranked with these,
vvho seem lo be getting into a way of neglecting, and, as
it vvere, overlooking revelation, as of sraall importance,
provided natural religion be kept to. With little regard,
either to the evidence of the former, or to the objections
against it, and even upon supposition of its truth, "The
only design of it," say they, " must be to establish a
belief of the moral system of nature, and to enforce the
practice of natural piety and virtue. The belief and
practice of these things were, perhaps, much proraoted
by the first publication of Christianity ; but vvhether they
are believed and practised, upon the evidence and mo
tives of nature or of revelation,- is no great matter,"*
* Invenis multos  propterea nolle fieri Christianos, quia quasi
sufficiunt sibi de bona vita sua. Bene vivere opus est, ait. Quid
mihi prsecepturus est Christus ? Ut bene vivam ? Jam bene vivo.

Chap. I.J Of Christianity. 187
This way of considering revelation, though it is not the
same with the former, yet borders nearly upon it, and
very much, at length, runs up into it, and requires lo be
particularly considered, with regard to the persons who
seem to be getting into this way. The consideration of
it wiU, likewise, farther show the extravagance of the
former opinion, and the truth of the observations in
answer lo it, just raentioned. And an inquiry inlo the
Importance of Christianity, cannot be an improper intro
duction lo a treatise concerning the credibility of it.
Now, if God has given a revelation to mankind, and
commanded those things vvhich are commanded in
Christianity, it is evident, at first sight, that it cannot in
any wise be an indifferent matter, whether we obey or
disobey those coraraands, unless we are certainly assured,
diat we know aU the reasons for them, and that all those
reasons are now ceased, with regard to raankind in
general, or to ourselves in particular. And it is abso
lutely irapossible vve can be assured of this; for our
ignorance of these reasons proves nothing in the case,
since the whole analogy of nature shows, vvhat is indeed
in itself evident, that there may be infinite reasons for
things, with which we are not acquainted.
But the iraportance of Christianity will more distinctly
appear, by considering it raore distinctly : First, "As a
republication, and extemal institution, of natural or essen
tial religion, adapted lo the present circurastances of
mankind, and intended to proraote natural piety and
virtue ; and, secondly, As containing an account of a
dispensation of things, not discoverable by reason, in
consequence of vvhich several distinct precepts are en
joined us. For, though natural religion is the founda
tion and principal part of Christianity, it is not in any
sense the whole of it.
Quid mihi necessarius est Christus? Nullum homicidium, nullum
fiirtura, nullam rapinam facio, res alienas non concupisco, nullo
adulterio contamlnor. Nam inveniatur in vita mea aliquid quod
reprehend a tur, et qui reprehenderit faciat Christianum. — Aug. in
Psal. xxxi.

188 Of the Importance [Part 2.
I. Christianity is a republication of natural religion,
Il instructs mankind in the moral systera of the world:
that it is the work of an infinitely perfect Being, and
under his governraent ; that virtue is his lavv ; and that
he will finally judge raankind in righteousness, and ren
der to all according to their works, in a future state.
And, which is very material, it teaches natural religion in
its genuine siraplicity, free frora those superstitions with
which it was totally corrupted, and under which it was
in a rnanner lost.
Revelation is, farther, an authoritative pubUcation of
natural religion, and so affords tbe evidence of testimony
for the truth of it. Indeed the miracles and prophecies
recorded 'in Scripture, were intended to prove a par
ticular dispensation of Providence — the redemption of the
world by the Messiah; bul this does not hinder but that
they may also prove God's general providence over the
world, as our Moral Governor and Judge. And they
..evidently do prove it ; because this character of the
Author of nature is necessarily connected with, and im
pUed in that particular revealed dispensation of things; it
is likewise continually taught expressly, and insisted upon*,
by those persons who wrought the miracles and delivered
the prophecies. So that, indeed, natural religion seems
as much proved by tbe Scripture revelation, as il would
have been, had the design of revelation been nothing else
than lo prove it.
But it may possibly be disputed, how far rairacles can
prove natural religion ; and notable objections raay be
urged against this proof of it, considered as a raatter of
speculation ; but, considered as a practical thing, there
can be none. For, suppose a person to teach natural
reUgion lo a nation, who had lived in total ignorance or
forgetfulness of it, and to declare he vvas coraraissioned
by God so lo do ; suppose him, in proof of his commis
sion, lo foretell things future, which no huraan foresight
could have guessed at ; to divide the sea with a word ;
feed greal multitudes with bread from heaven ; cure aU

Chap. I.J Of Christianity. 189
manner of diseases ; nnd raise the dead, even hiraself,
to llie : would not tiiis give additional credibility to his
teaching, a credibility beyond what that of a coraraon man
vvould have, and be an authoritative publication of the
law of nature, (, c. a new proof of it.'' It vvould be a prac
tical one, of the stronj^est l^ind, perhaps, vvhich human
creatures are capable of having given them. The law of
Moses, then, and the gospel of Christ, are authoritative
publications ofthe religion of nature : they afford a proof
of God's general providence, as moral Governor of the
world, as well as of his particular dispensations of provi
dence towards sinful creatures, revealed in the law ofthe
gospel. As they are the only evidence of the latter, so
they are an additional evidence ofthe former.
To show this further, let us suppose a raan of the
greatest and raost improved capacity, who had never
heard of revelation, convinced upon the whole, notwith
standing the disorders of the vvorld, that it was under the
direction and moral governraent of an infinhely perfect
Being, but ready to question, vvhether he were not
got beyond the reach of his faculties ; suppose hira
brought, by this suspicion, into great danger of being
carried away by the universal bad exaraple . of almost
every one around him, who appeared lo have no sense, no
practical sense at least, of these things ; and this, perhaps,
would be as advantageous a situation, vvith regard to re
ligion, as nature alone ever placed any man in. What a
confirmation novv raust it be lo such a person, all at once
to find, that this raoral system of things was revealed
to mankind, in the name of that infinite Being whom he
bad, frora principles of reason, believed in ; and tiiat the
pubhshers of the revelation proved thejr coramission from
him, by making il appear that he had intrusted them wilh
a power of suspending and changing the general laws of
nature ?
Nor must it, by any raeans, be onfiitted, for it is a
thing of the utraost importance, that life and imraortality
are eminently brought to light by the gospel. The great

190 Of the Importance [Part 2,
doctrines of a future slate, the danger of a course of
wickedness, and the efficacy of repentance, are not only
confirmed in the gospel, bul are taught, especially the
last is, with a degree of light, to which that of nature is
but darkness,
Fartiier : As Christianity served these ends and pur
poses, when it was first pubUshed, by the rairaculous
publication itself; so il was intended to serve the same
purposes, in future ages, by raeans of tfie settlement of a
visible church ; of a society, distinguished frora common
ones, and frora the rest of the world, by peculiar religious
institutions ; by an instituted raethod of instruction, and
an instituted forra of external religion. Miraculous pow
ers were given to the first preachers of Christianity, in
order lo their introducing it into the world : a visible
church was estabUshed, in order to continue it, and carry
il on successively throughout aU ages. Had Moses and
the Prophets, Clirist and his Apostles, only laught, and
by miracles proved, religion to their contemporaries, the
benefits of their instructions would have reached but to a
small part of mankind, Christianity raust have been, in
a great degree, sunk and forgot in a very few ages. To
prevent this, appears to have been one reason why a visi
ble church was instituted ; to be, Uke a city upon a hill, a
standing raeraorial to the world of the duly which we owe
our Maker ; lo caU men continually, both by example and
instruction, to attend to h, and, by the form of religion evet
before their eyes, remind them of the reality ; to be the
repository of the oracles of God ; to hold up the light of
revelation in aid lo that of nature, and propagate it
throughout all generations to the end of the world — the
Ught of revelation, considered here in no olher view, than
as designed to enfo'rce natural reUgion. And, in propor
tion as Christianity is professed and taught in the worid,
religion, natural or essential religion, is thus distinctly and
advantageously laid before mankind, and brought again
and again to their thoughts, as a matier of infinite impor
tance, A visible church has also a farther tendency lo

Chap, 1, J Of Christianity. lOl
promote natural religion, as being an instituted method
of education, originally intended lo be of raore peculiar
advantage to those vvho vvould conforra to il. For one
end ofthe institution was, that, by adraonition and reproof,
as well as instruction ; by a general regular discipline,
and public exercises of religion, the body of Christ, as
the Scripture speaks, should be edified ; i. e. trained up
m piety and virtue, for a higher and belter state. This
settleraent, then, appearing thus beneficial ; lending, in
the nature of the thing, to answer, and, in sorae degree,
actually answering, those ends ; it is to be remembered,
that the very notion of it implies positive institutions ; for
the visibility ofthe church consists in thera. Take away
every thing of this kind, and you lose the very notion
itself. So that, if the things novv raentioned are advan
tages, the reason and importance of positive institutions
in general is raost obvious ; since without thera, these ad
vantages could not be secured to the world. And it is
mere idle wantonness, lo insist upon knowing the reasons
why such particular ones vvere fixed upon rather than
others,' The benefit arising from this supernatural assistance,
which Christianity affords lo natural religion, is what some
persons are very slow in apprehending ; and yet it is a
thing distinct in itself, and a very plain obvious one. For
will any, in good earnest, really say, that the bulk of man
kind in the heathen world were in as advantageous a sit-
'uation, with regard to natural religion, as they are now
amongst us ? that it was laid before them, and enforced
upon thera, in a manner as distinct, and as rauch tending
lo influence their practice ?
The objections against aU this, frora the perversion of
Chrisrianhy, and frora the supposition of its having had
but Utile good influence, however innocently they raay be
proposed, yet cannot be insisted upon as conclusive, upon
any principles but such as lead lo downright atheisra ;
because the raanifestation of the law of nature by reason,
which, upon aU principles of theisra, raust have been frora

192 Of the Importance [Part 2.
God, has been perverted and rendered ineffectual in the
sarae manner. It may indeed, I think, truly be said, thatthe
good effects of Chrislianity have not been small ; nor its sup
posed ill effects, any effects at all of il, properly speaking.
Perhaps, loo, thethings theraselves done have been aggra
vated : and if not, Chrislianity, hath been often only a
pretence ; and the same evils, in the main, would have
been done upon sorae other pretence. However, great
and shocking as the corruptions and abuses of it have
reaUy been, they cannot be insisted upon as arguments
against it, upon principles of theism. For one cannot
proceed one step in reasoning upon natural religion, any
more than upon Christianity, without laying il down as a
first principle, that the dispensations of Providence are
not to be judged of by their perversions, but by their
genuine tendencies ; not by what they do actually seem
lo effect, but by what they would effect if raankind did
their part; that ^ part vvhich is justly put and left upon
them. It is altogetiier as much the language of one, as
of the olher : He ihat 'is unjust, lei him be unjust still;
and he that is holy, let him. be holy siill.* The light of
reason does nol, any more than that of revelation, force
men to submit to its authority : both admonish thera of
what they ought lo do and avoid, together with the con
sequences of each ; and, afler this, leave thera at full
liberty to act just as they please, till the appointed time
of judgment. Every moment's experience shows, that
this is God's general rule of government.
To return, then : Christianity being a proraulgation of
the law of nature ; being, moreover, an authoritative
promulgation of it, with new light, and olher circum
stances of peculiar advantage, adapted to the wants of
mankind ; these things fully show its importance. And
it is to be observed farther, tbat as the nature of thecase
requires, so all Christians are coraraanded to contribute,
by their profession of Christianity, to preserve it in the
* Rev. xxii. 11.

Chap. I.J Of Christianity. 193
world, and render it such a promulgation and enforce
ment of religion. For il is the very scherae ofthe gos
pel, that each Christian shonid, in his degree, contribute
towards continuing and carrying it on ; aU by uniting in
the public profession, and external practice of Chris
tianity; some by instructing, by having the oversight,
and taking care of this religious comraunity, ihe Cburch
of God, Novv this fartiier shows the importance of
Christianity, and, vvhich is what 1 chiefly intend, its im
portance in a practical sense, or the high obligations we
are under, to take it into our raost serious consideration ;
and the danger there raust necessarily be, not only in
treating it despitefuUy, vvhich I ara not now speaking of,
but in disregarding and neglecting it. For this is ne
glecting to do what is expressly enjoined us, for con
tinuing those benefits tothe world, and transraitting them
down to ftiture times. And all this holds, even though
die only thing lo be considered in Christianity were, its
subserviency lo natural religion. But,
II, Christianity is to be considered in a further view,
as containing an account of a dispensation of things, not
at all discoverable by reason, in consequence of which
iSeveral distinct precepts are enjoined us. Christianity is
not only an external insthntion of natural religion, and a
new promulgation of God's general providence, as righ
teous Governor and Judge of the world ; but it contains
also a revelation of a particular dispensation of Provi
dence, carrying on by bis Son and Spirit, for the recovery
and salvation of raankind, who are represented, in Scrip
ture, to be in a state of ruin. And, in consequence of this
revelation being raade, we are cornmanded io be baptized,
not only in ihe name of the Father, but also of ihe Son,
and of the Holy Ghost ; and other obligations of duty,
unknown before, to the Son and the Holy Ghost, are re
vealed. Now, the importance of these duties may be
judged of, by observing ihat ihey arise, not from positive
command merely, but also frora the offices whicii ap
pear, from Scripture, to belong to those divine persons
17 ^

194 Of the Importance [Part 2.
in the gospel dispensation, or from the relations which,
we are there inforraed, they sland in to us. By reason
is revealed the relation which God the Father stands in
to us. Hence arises the obligation of duty vvhich vve are
under to hira. In Scripture are revealed the relations
which the Son and Holy Spirit stand in to us. Hence
arise the obligations of duty which we are under lo thera.
The trulh of the case, as one raay speak, in each of
these three respects, being admitted, that God is the
Governor of the World, upon the evidence of reason ;
that Christ is the Mediator between God and raan, and
the Holy Ghost our Guide and Sanctifier, upon the evi
dence of revelation : the trulh of the case, 1 say, in
each of these respects, being admitted, it is no more a
question, why it should be commanded ihat we be bap
tized in the narae of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,
than that we be baptized in the name of the Father.
This matter seeras to require to be ragre fully staled,*
Let it be remerabered, then, that reUgion coraes un
der the twofold consideration of internal and external ;
for the latter is as real a part of religion, of true religion,
as the forraer. Now, when religion is considered under
the first notion, as an inward principle, to be exerted in
such and snch inward acts of the mind and heart, the
essence of natural reUgion may be said to consist in re
Ugious regards to God, ihe Father Almighty; and the
essence of revealed religion, as distinguished frora natu
ra], to consist in religious regards lo the Son, and to ihe
Holy Ghost. And the obligation vve are under, of
paying the.se religious regards to each of these divine
persons respectively, arises frora the respective relations
which they each stand in to us. How these relations
are raade known, whether by reason or revelation, makes
no alteration in the case ; because the duties arise out of
the relations themselves, not out of the manner in vvhich
* See The Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy, of the Christian Sa
craments, &c. and Coluber on Revealed ReUgion, as there quoted.

Chap. I.J Of Christianity. 195
we are informed of them. The Son and Spirit have
each his proper office in that great dispensation of Provi
dence, the rederaption of the worid : the one our Medi
ator, the other our Sanctifier. Does not, then, the duly
of religious regards to both these divine persons, as im
mediately arise, lo the view of reason, out of the very
nature of these offices and relations, as the inward good
will and kind intention, which we owe lo our fellow-crea
tures, arises out of the common relations between us and
them? But ft will be asked, "What are the inward reli
gious regards, appearing thus obviously due to the Son
and Holy Spirit, as arising, nol merely from coraraand
in Scripture, but frora the very nature of the revealed
relations which they stand in to us.-"' I answer, the
religious regards of reverence, honor, love, trust, grati
tude, fear, hope. In vvhat external manner this inward
worship is to be expressed, is a matier of pure revealed
command ; as perhaps, the external raanner in which
God the Father is to be worshipped, raay be raore so
than we are ready to think ; but the worship, the internal
worship itself, to the Son and Holy Ghost, is no farther
matter of pure revealed coraraand, than as the relations
they stand in to us, are raatter of pure revelation ; for
the relations being known, the obligations lo such internal
worship are obligations of reason, arising out of those
relations themselves. In short, the history of the Gos
pel as immediately shows us the reason of these obliga
tions, as it shows us the meaning of the words. Son and
Holy Ghost.
If this account of the Christian religion be just, those
persons who can speak Ughtly of it, as of Uttie conse
quence, provided natural religion be kept lo, plainly for
get, that Christianity, even what is peculiariy so caUed,
as distinguished frora natural religion, has yet soraewhat
very important, even of a raoral nature. For the office
of our Lord being raade known, and the relation he
stands in to us, tiie obligation of religious regards to him
is plainly raoral, as rauch as charity to raankind is ; since

196 Ofthe Importance [Part 2,
this obligation arises, before external coraraand, iramedi
ately out of that bis office and relation itself. Those
persons appear lo forget, that revelation is lo be consid
ered as informing us of soraewhat new in the state of
mankind, and in the government of the world ; as ac
quainting us wilh some relations we sland in, which could
not othervvise have been known. And these relations
being real, (though before revelation we could be under
no obUgalions from thera, yet upon their being revealed,)
there is no reason to think, but that neglect of behaving
suitably to them wiU be attended wilh the sarae kind of
consequences under God's governraent, as neglecting to
behave suitably to any other relations raade known to us
by reason. And ignorance, whether unavoidable or vol
untary, so far as we can possibly see, wiU, just as much,
and just as littie, excuse in one case as in the olher : the
ignorance being supposed equally unavoidable, or equally
voluntary, in both cases.
If, therefore, Christ be indeed the Mediator between
God and raan, i. e. if Christianity be true ; if he be in
deed our Lord, our Saviour, and our God, no one can
say what raay follow, not only the obstinate, but tbe care
less, disregard to hira in those high relations. Nay, no
one can say what raay follow such disregard, even in the
way of natural consequence,* For, as the natural con
sequence of vice in this life are doubtless to be considered
as judicial punishraents inflicted by God, so likewise, for
aught we know, the judicial punishraents of the future
Ufe may be, in a Uke way, or a like sense, the natural
consequence of vice ;f of men's violating or disregard
ing the relations which God has placed thera in here, and
made known lo thera.
Again, If mankind are corrupted and depraved in
their raoral character, and so are unfit for that stale
which Christ is gone lo prepare for his disciples ; and if
the assistance of God's Spirit be necessary to renew their
* Pages 83, 84. f Chap. 5,

Chap.].] Of Christianity. 197
nature, in the degree requisite to tbeir being qualified for
tbat state ; all which is iraplied in the express, though
figurative, declaration. Except a man be born of the
Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God:* sup
posing this, is it possible any serious person can think it
a slight matter, whether or no he makes use of the raeans,
expressly coraraanded by God, for obtaining tbis divine
assistance.'' especially since the whole analogy of nature
shows, that vve are uot lo expect any benefits, without
making use of tbe appointed raeans for obtaining or en
joying thera, Novv, reason shows us nothing of the par
ticular immediate raeans of obtaining either temporal or
spiritual benefits. This, therefore, we must learn, either
from experience or revelation. And experience the
presenl case does not adrait of.
The conclusion frora all this evidentiy is, that Christian
ity being supposed either true or credible, it is unspeakable
iflreverence, and really the raost presumptuous rashness,
lo treat it as a light matier. It can never justly be es
teeraed of little consequence, tiU it be positively supposed
false. Nor do I know a higher and more important obli
gation which we are under, than that of exaraining most
seriously into the evidence of it, supposing its credibility ;
and of erabracing it, upon supposition of its truth.
The two following deductions raay be proper to be
added, in order lo illustrate the foregoing observations,
and to prevent their being raistaken.
First, Hence we raay clearly see, where Ues the dis
tinction between what is positive and what is moral in re
ligion. Moral precepts are precepts, the reasons of which
we see ; positive precepts are precepts, the reasons of
vvhich we do not see,f Moral duties arise out of the
* John iii. 5.
t This is the distinction between moral and positive precepts, cop-
sldered respectively as such. But yet, since the latter have some
what of a moral nature, we may see the reason of them considered in
this view. Moral and positive precepts are in sorae respects alike, in
17*

198 Of the Importance [Part 2.
nature of the case itself, prior to external coraraand.
Positive duties do nol arise out of the nature of the case,
but from external coraraand ; nor would tbey be duties
al all, were it not for such coramand received from him,
whose creatures and subjects we are, Bnt the raanner
in which the nature of the case, or the fact of the rela
tion, is raade known, this doth not denorainate any duty,
eilher positive or raoral. That we be baptized in the
narae of the Father, is as rauch a positive duty as that we
be baptized in the narae of the Son ; because both arise
equally from revealed command : though the relation
which we stand in to God the Father, is made known lo
usliy reason ; tbe relation we stand in to Christ, by rev
elation only. On the other hand, the dispensation ofthe
gospel admitted, gratitude as immediately becoraes due
to Christ, frora his being the voluntary minister of this
dispensation, as it is due to God the Father, from his be
ing the fountain of aU good ; though the first is made
known to us by revelation only, the second by reason.
Hence also vve raay see, and, for distinctness sake, it may
be worth meritioning, that positive institutions corae under
a twofold consideration. They are either institutions
founded on natural religion, as baptisra in the name of
the Father ; though this has also a particular refer
ence to the gospel dispensation, for it is in the narae of
God, as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ ; or they
are external institutions founded on revealed religion, as
baptism in the narae of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.
Secondly, From the distinction between what is mo
ral and what is positive in religion, appears tbe ground
of that pecuUar preference, which the Scripture teaches
us to be due fo the former.
The reason of positive institutions in general is very
obvious, though vve should not see the reason why such
particular ones are pitched upon, rather than others.
other respects different. So far as they are alike, we discern the rea
sons of both ; so far as they are different, we discern the reasons of
the former, but not of the latter. See p. 139, &c. and p. 198.

Chap. I.J Of Cliristianity. 199
Whoever, therefore, instead of cavilling at words, will
attend lo the thing itself, may clearly see, tbat posi
tive institutions in general, as distinguished frora this
or that particular one, have the naiure of moral com
mands ; since the reasons of them appear. Thus, for
instance, the external worship of God is a raoral duly,
though no particular mode of it be so. Care then is to
be taken, when a coraparison is made between positive
and moral duties, that' they be corapared no farther than
as they are different ; no farther than as the forraer are
positive, or arise out of mere external coramand, the
reasons of vvhich vve are not acquainted with ; and as the
latter are moral, or arise out of tbe apparent reason of
the case, without such external command. Unless this
caution be observed, we shaU run into endless confusion.
Now, this being premised, suppose two standing pre
cepts enjoined by the same authoriiy ; that, in certain
conjunctures, it is impossible to obey both ; thatthe for
mer is raoral, i. e. a precept of which we see the rea
sons, and that they hold in the particular case before us ;
but that the latter is positive, i. e. a precept of which vve
do not see tbe reasons : it is indisputable that our obliga-
"tions are to obey the forraer, because there is an apparent
reason for this preference, and none against it. Farther,
positive institutions, I suppose all those which Christianity
enjoins, are raeans to a raoral end ; and the end raust be
acknowledged raore exceUent than the means. Nor is
observance of these institutions any religious obedience
at all, or of any value, otherwise than as it proceeds from
a moral principle. Tbis seems to be tbe strict logical
way of stating and determining tbis matter ; bul will, per
haps, be found less appUcable to practice, than may be
thought at first sight.
And therefore, in a raore practical, though more lax
way of consideration, and taking the words, moral law
snd positive institutions, in the popular sense ; I add, that
the whole raoral law is as rauch raatter of revealed cora
mand, as positive institutions are ; for the scripture en-

200 Of the Importance [Part 2#
joins every moral virtue. In this respect, then, they are
both upon a level. But the moral law is, raoreover, writ"
ten upon our hearts ; interwoven into our very naturei
And this is a plain intimation of the Author of it, which
is lo be preferred, when they interfere.
But there is not altogether so much necessity for the
determination of this question as some persons seem to
think. Nor are we lefl lo reason alone to determine it.
For, first. Though raankind have, in all ages been greatly
prone to place their religion in peculiar poshive rites, by
way of equivalent for obedience to raoral precepts ; yet,
without making any coraparison at all between them, and
consequently wiihout deterraining which is to have the
preference, the nature of the thing abundantiy shows all
notions of that kind to be utterly subversive of true re
Ugion ; as they are, moreover, contrary to the whole gen
eral tenor of Scripture, and likewise lo the most express
particular declarations of it, that nothing can render us
accepted of God, without moral v^irtue. Secondly^ Upon
the occasion of mentioning together positive and moral
duties, the Scripture always puts the stress of religioti
upon the latter, and never upon the former ; which,
though no sort of allowance to neglect the former, when
tbey do not interfere vvith the laiter, yet is a plain intiraa
tion, that vvhen they do, the latter are lo be preferred.
And, farther, as raankind are for placing the stress of their
religion any where, rather than upon virtue, lest both the
reason of the thing, and the general spirit of Christianity,
appearing in the intiraation now mentioned, should be in
effectual against this prevalent folly ; our Lord himself,
from whose command alone tiie obligation of positive in
stitutions arises, has taken occasion to make the compar
ison between thera and moral precepts, when the Phari
sees censured him for eating with publicans and sinners ;
and also when they censured his disciples ior plucking
the eai-s of corn on the Sabbath day. Upon this com
parison he has determined expre.ssly, and in fortn, vvhich
shall have the preference vvhen they interfere. And by

Chap. I.J Of Christianity. 201
delivering his authoritative determination in a proverbial
manner of expression, he bas made it general : / will have
mercy, and not sacrifice.*^ The propriety of the word
proverbial is not the thing insisted upon, ihough, I think,
the manner of speaking is lo be called so. But that die
manner of speaking very reraarkably renders the deter
mination general, is surely indisputable. For, had it, in
the latter case, been said only, that God preferred raercy
to the rigid observance of the Sabbath, even then, by
parity of reason, most justly might we have argued, that
he preferred raercy, Ukewise, to the observance pf other
ritiial institutions, and, in general, raoral duties to positive
ones. Andi^us the deterraination would have been gen
eral, ihough its being so were inferred," and not express
ed. But as the passage reaUy stands in the gospel, il is
much stronger ; lor the sense, and the very literal words
of our Lord's answer, are as appUcable to any other in
stance of a coraparison, between poshive and moral duties,
as to this upon which they were spoken. And if, in case
of competition, mercy is lo be preferred to positive insti
tutions, h wiU scarce be thouglit, that justice is to give
place lo thera. It is reraarkable, loo, that, as the words
are a quotation frora the Old Testament, they are intro
duced, on both of the foreraentioned occasions, with a
declaration, that the Pharisees did not understand the
meaning of them. This, I say, is very reraarkable ; for,
since it is scarce possible for the raost ignorant person not
to understand the Uteral sense of the passage in the Pro-
phel,f and since understanding the literal sense would not
have prevented their condemning the guiltless,^ it can
hardly be doubted, that the thing which our Lord really
intended in that declaration was, that the Pharisees had
not learnt from it, as they raight, wherein the general spirit
of religion consists ; that it consists in raoral piely and
virtue, as distinguished frora forras and ritual observances.
• Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7. -f Hos. vj.
X See Matt. xu. 7.

202 Of the Importance of Christianity. [Part 2.
However, it is certain we may learn this from his divine
application of the passage, in the gospel.
But, as it is one of the pecuUar weaknesses of human
nature, when, upon a coraparison of two things, one is
found lo be of greater importance than the other, lo con
sider this olher as of scarce anyimportance at aU; it is
highly necessary that we reraind ourselves, how great pre
suraption it is to make light of any institutions of divine
appointraent ; that our obligations to obey all God's com
mands whatever, are absolute and indispensable ; and that
comraands raerely positive, adraitted to be frora him, lay
us under a moral obligation to obey tbem ; an obligation
moral in the strictest and most proper sense.
To these things I cannot forbear adding, that the ac
count now given of Christianity most strongly shows and
enforces upon us the obligation of searching the Scrip
tures, in order lo see what the scheme of revelation really
is, instead of deterraining beforehand, frora reason, what
the scheme of it must be.* Indeed, if in revelation
there be found any passages, the seeming raeaning of
which is contrary lo natural religion, we raay raost cer
tainly conclude sucb seeraing meaning nol to be the real
one. But it is not any degree of presumption against an
interpretation of Scripture, that such interpretation con
tains a doctrine, which the light of nature cannot dis-
cover,f or a precept, which the law of nature does not
oblige lo. * See Chap. 3. f Pages 204, 205.

203

CHAP. II.
Ofthe Supposed Presumption against a Revelation, con
sidered as Miraculous.
Having shown the importance of the Christian rev
elation, and the obligations which we are under seriously
to atlend to il, upon supposition of its truth or its credi
bility ; the next thing in order is, to consider the supposed
presumptions against revelation in general, which shall be
the subject of this chapter ; "and the objections against
the Christian in particular, which shall be the subject of
some following ones.* For il seems the most natural
method lo reraove these prejudices against Christianity,
before we proceed lo the consideration of the positive
evidence for it, and the objections against that evidence.f
' It'is, I think, comraonly supposed, that there is some
peculiar presumption, from the analogy of naiure, against
the Christian scherae of things, at least against miracles ;
so as that stronger evidence is necessary to prove the
truth and reality of thera, than would be sufficient to con
vince! US of otber events or matters of fact. Indeed,
the consideration of this supposed presumption cannot
but be thought very insignificant by many persons ; yet,
as it belongs lo the subject of this treatise, so it rnay tend
to open the mind, and remove some prejudices ; how
ever needless the consideration of it be, upon its own
account, * Chap. 3, 4, 5, 6. j Chap. 7.

204 Of the supposed Presumption Part 2.J
I. I find no appearance of a presuraption, from the
analogy of nature, against the general scheme of Chris
tianity, that God created and invisibly governs the world
by Jesus Christ, and by hira also will hereafter judge it
in righteousness, i. e. render to every one according to
his works ; and that good raen are under the secret
influence of his Spirit, Whether these things are, or are
not, to be caUed rairaculous, is, perbaps, only a question
about words ; or, however, is of no raoraent in the case.
If tiie analogy of naiure raises any presumption against
this general scheme of Christianity, it must be, either be
cause it is not discoverable by reason or experience, or
else because it is unUke that course of nature, which is.
But analogy raises no presumption agaiust the truth of
this scherae, upon either of these accounts.
First, There is no presuraption, frora analogy, against
the truth of it, upon account of its not being discoverable
by reason or experience. For, suppose one who never
heard of revelation, ofthe raost improved understanding,
and acquainted with our whole system of natural philos
ophy and natural religion ; such a one could not but
be sensible, tiiat it was bul a very smaU part of the
natural and moral system of the universe, which he
was acquainted with. He could not but be sensible,
that there must be innumerable tilings, in the dispen
sations of Providence past, in the invisible govern
ment over the vvorld al present carrying on, and in
what is lo come, of which he was wholly ignorant,*
and which could not be discovered wiihout revelation.
Whether the scherae of naiure be, in tbe strictest sense,
infinite or not, it is evidently vast, even beyond all possi
ble imagination. And, doubtiess, that part of it which is
opened to our view, is but as a point, in comparison of
the whole plan of Providence, reaching throughout eter
nity, past and future ; in comparison of what is even now
going on in the reraote parts of the boundless universe ;
* Page 170.

Chap. 2,J Against Miracles. 205
nay, in comparison of the whole scheme of this world.
And, therefore, that things lie beyond the natural, reach
of our faculties, is no ^ort of presuraption against the
truth and reality of thera ; because it is certain, there
are innuraerable things in the constitution and governraent
of the universe, vvhich are thus beyond the natural reach
of our faculties. Secondly, Analogy raises no presurap
tion against any of the things contained in this general
doctrine of Scripture now raentioned, upon account of
tiiehr being unlike the known course of nature. For
there is no presuraption at all, from analogy, that the
whole course of things, or divine governmeni, naturally
unknown lo us, and every thing in it, is Uke to any thing
in that which is known ; and therefore no peculiar pre
sumption against any thing in the forraer, upon account
of its being unlike to any ihing in the latter. And in the
constitution and natural governraent ofthe worid, as weU
as in the raoral government of it, vve see things, in a
great degree, unlike one another ; and therefore ought
not to wonder at such unlikeness between things visible
and invisible. However, the. scheme of Christianity is
by no raeans entirely unhke the scheme of nature ; as
wiU appear in the following part of this treatise.
The notion of a miracle, considered as a proof of a
divine raission, has been stated witb great exactness by
divines ; and is, I think, sufficiently understood by every
one. There are also invisible miracles; the incarnation
of Christ, for instance, which, being secret, cannot be
alleged as a proof of such a mission ; but require them
selves to be proved by visible rairacles. Revelation,
itself, loo, is miraculous, and rairacles are tbe proof of
it; and the supposed presuraption against these shall
presently be considered. AU which I have been ob
serving here is, that, whether we choose lo call every
iMng in the dispensations of Providence, not discover-
-^e wuhout revelation, nor like the known course of
tilings, rairaculous ; and whether the general Christian
dispensation now mentioned, is to be called so, or not ;
18

206 Of the supposed Presumption [Part 2,
the foregoing observations seera certainly lo show, that
there is no presumption against it, from the analogy of
nature, II. There is no presumption, frora analogy, against
sorae operations, which vve should now call rairaculous ;
particularly, none against a revelation, al the beginning
of the world ; nothing of such presumption against it, as
is supposed to be implied or expressed in the word
miraculous. For a miracle, in its very notion, is relative
to a course of nature ; and implies somewhat different
frora it, considered as being so. Now, either there was
no course of nature al the ti.rae which we are speaking
of; or if there were, we are not acquainted what the
course of nature is upon the first peopling of worlds.
And therefore the question, whether mankind had a
revelation made to thera at that time, is to be considered,
not as a question concerning a miracle, but as a coramon
question of fact. And we have the like reason, be it
more or less, to admit the report of tradition concerning
^ this question, and concerning common mailers of fact of
the same antiquity ; for instance, what part of the earth
was first peopled.
Or thus : When mankind was first placed in this stale,
there vvas a power exerted, totally different from the
present course of nature. Now, whether tiiis power,
thus wholly different from the presenl course of nature;
for we cannot properly apply to il the word miraculous ;
whether this power stopped iraraediately after it had
made man, or went on, and exerted itself farther in
giving bim a revelation, is a question of the same kind,
as vvhether an ordinary power exerted itself in such a
particular degree and manner, or not.
Or suppose the power exerted in the formation of the
world be considered as miraculous, or rather, be caUed
by that name, the case will not be different; since it
must be acknowledged, that such a power was exertedT
For, supposing it acknowledged that our Saviour spent
sorae years in a course working miracles ; there is no

Chap. 2.J Against JiHracles. 207
more presumption, worth mentioning, against his having
exerted this miraculous power, in a certain degree great
er, than in a certain degree less; in one or two more
instances, than in one or two fewer; in this, than in
another manner.
It is evident, then, that there can be no peculiar pre
sumption, from the analogy of naiure, against supposing
a revelation, when raan vvas first placed upon the earth.
Add, that there does not appear the least intiraation in
history or tradition, tiial religion was first reasoned out;
but the whole of history and tradition raakes for the
other side, that il carae into the world by revelation.
Indeed, the stale of religion in the first ages, of which we
have any account, seeras to suppose and iraply, that this
was the original of it araongst raankind. And these
reflections together, wuhout taking in the peculiar author
ity of Scripture, araount to real and a very raaterial
degree of evidence, that there was a revelation at the
beginning ofthe world. Now tbis, as it is a confirraation
of natural religion, and therefore raentioned in the forraer
part of this treatise ;* so, likewise, it has a tendency to
remove any prejudices against a subsequent revelation,
111, But stiU it raay be objected, that there is sorae
peculiar presuraption, frora analogy, against miracles ;
particularly against revelation, after the settiement and
during the continuance of a course of nature.
Now, vvith regard to this supposed presuraption, it is
to be observed in general, that before we can have ground
- for raising what can, wilh any propriety, be called an
argument frora analogy, for or against revelation consid
ered as soraewhat rairaculous, we raust be acquainted
wilh a similar or paraUel case. But the hislory of sorae
olher worid, seeraingly in like circumstances vvith our
own, is no raore than a parallel case ; and therefore
nothing short of this can be so. Yet, could vve corae at
a presumptive proof, for or against a revelation, frora
• Page 163, &c.

208 Of the supposed Presumption [Part 2.
being inforraed whether such world had one, or not;
such a proof, being drawn from one single instance only,
raust be infinitely precarious. More particularly : First
of all, There is a very strong presuraption against cora
raon speculative truths, and against the mosl ordinary
facts, before the prOof of thera ; which yet is overcome
by almost any proof. There is a presumption of miUions
to one, against the story of Ccesar, or of any other raan.
For suppose a number of common facts so and so cir
curastanced, of vvhich one had no kind of proof, should
happen to come inlo one's thoughts; every one would,
without any possible doubt, conclude thera to be false.
And the Uke raay be said of a single common fact. And
from hence it appears, that the question of importance,
as to the matter before us, is, concerning the degree of
the peculiar presuraption supposed against miracles ; not
vvhether there be any peculiar presumption at aU against
them. For, if there be tbe presuraption of raillions to
one, against the raost comraon facts, what can a smaU
presumption, additional to this, araount lo, though h be
peculiar .'' It cannot be estiraated, and is as nothing.
The only raaterial question is, whether there be any such
presumption against rairacles, as to render thera in any
sort incredible? Secondly, If vve leave out the consid
eration of religion, we -are in such total darkness, upon
what causes, occasions, reasons, or circurastances, the
present course of nature depends, that there does not
appear any iinprobability for or against supposing, that
five or six thousand years may have given scope for
causes, occasions, reasons, or circurastances, frora whence
miraculous interpositions may have arisen. And from
this, joined with the foregoing observation, it wiU follow,
thatthere raust be a presuraption, beyond all coraparison,
greater, against the particular coraraon facts just now
instanced in, than against miracles in general; before
any evidence of either. But, thirdly, Take in the con
sideration of religion, or the raoral systera of the world,
and then we see distinct particular reasons for rairacles ;

Chap. 2.J Against Miracles. 209
to afford raankind instruction additional lo that of nature,
and lo attest the trulh of it. And this gives a real cred
ibihty to the supposition, that it raight be part of the
original plan of things, that there should be rairaculous
interpositions. Then, lastly. Miracles must not be com
pared to comraon natural events ; or to events which,
though uncoraraon, are similar to vvhat we daily expe
rience ; but to the extraordinary phenomena of naiure.
And then the coraparison vvill be, between the presurap
tion against miracles, and the presumption against such
uncommon appearances, suppose, as coraets, and against
there being any such powers in nature as magnetism and
electricity, so contrary to the properties of other bodies
not endued with these powers. And before any one can
determine, whether there be any peculiar presumption
against rairacles, raore than against olher extraordinary
things, he must consider, vvhat, upon first hearing, would
be the presumption against the last mentioned appear
ances and powers, to a person acquainted only with the
daily, raonthly, and annual course of nature respecting
this earth, and with those coraraon powers of raatter
which we every day see.
Upon aU this I conclude, That there certainly is no
such presuraption against rairacles, as to render thera, in
any wise incredible ; that, on the contrary, our being able
to discern reasons for thera, gives a positive credibility
to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold ;
and that il is by no means certain, that there is any pecu
liar presuraption at aU, frora analogy, even in the lowest
degree, against rairacles, as dislinguished frora other ex
traordinary phenoraena ; though it is not worth while to
perplex the reader whh inquiries inlo the abstract nature
of evidence, in order to deterraine a question, which, with
out such inquiries we see* is of no iraportance,
* Page 208.
¦ 18*

210 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2.

CHAP. Ill,
Of our Incapacity of Judging, what were to be eocpected
in a Revelation ; and ihe Credibility from Analogy,
that it must contain Things appearing liable to Ob
jections.
Besides the objections against tbe evidence for Chris
tianity, many are aUeged against the scherae of it ; against
the whole raanner in which it is put and left with the
vvorld ; as well as against several particular relations in
Scripture : objections drawn frora the deficiencies of reve
lation : frora things in it appearing to rnen foolishness ;*
irom its containing matters of offence, which have led, and
it must have been foreseen, would lead, into strange en
thusiasm and superstition, and be made to serve the pur
poses of tyranny and wickedness ; from its not being uni
versal; and, which is a thing ofthe same kind, from its
evidence not being so convincing and satisfactory as it
might have been ; for this last is sometimes turned into a
positive argument against Us truth. f It vvould be tedious,
indeed impossible, to enumerate the several particulars
coraprehended under the objections here referred to, they
being so various, according lo the different fancies of men.
There are persons, who think it a strong objection against
the authoriiy of Scripture, that it is not composed by rules
of art, agreed upon by critics, for polite and correct writ
ing. And the scorn is inexpressible, vvith which sorae
of the prophetic parts of Scripture are treated ; partly
ihrough the rashness of interpreters, but very much also
• 1 Cor. i. 18, t See Chap. 6,

Chap, 3,J Uable to Objections. 211
on account of the hieroglyphical and figurative language
in which they are left us. Some of the principal things
ofthis sort shall be particularly considered in the following
chapters. But my design at present is to observe, in
general, with respect to this whole way of arguing, that,
upon supposition of a revelation, it is highly credible be
forehand, vve should be incorapetent judges of it, lo a
great degree ; and that it vvould contain many things ap
pearing to us liable to great objections, in case vve judge
of it olhe'rwise than by the analogy of nature. And,
therefore, though objections, against the evidence of
Christianity are more seriously to be Considered, yet ob
jections against Christianity itself are, in a great measure,
frivolous ; alraost aU objertions against it, excepting those
which are aUeged against tiie particular proofs of its coming
from God, 1 express rayself vvith caution, lest I should
be raistaken to vilify reason, which is indeed the only
faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning any
thing, even revelation itself; or be misunderstood lo assert,
that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false from
internal characters. For, it raay contain clear immoraU-
ties or contradictions ; and either of these would prove it
false. Nor wiU I take upon rae to affirra, that nothing
else can possibly render any supposed revelation incred
ible. Yet StiU the observation above is, I think, true be
yond doubt, that objections against Christianity, as distin
guished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous.
To make out this, is the general design of the present
chapter. And, wilh regard to the whole of it, I cannot
but particularly wish, that the proofs raight be attended
lo, rather than the assertions cavilled at, upon account of
any unacceptable consequences, whether real or supposed,
which raay be drawn from thera. For after all, that
which is true, raust be admitted ; though it should show
us the shortness of our facukies, and that vve are in no
wise judges of many things of which vve are apt lo think
ourselves very corapetent ones. Nor wiU this be any
objection with reasonable men ; at least, upon second

212 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2,
thought, it will not be any objection wilh such, against the
justness of the foUowing observations.
As God governs the worid, and instructs his creatures,
according lo certain laws or rules, in the known course
of naiure, known by reason together whh experience; so
the Scripture informs us of a scherae of divine Provi
dence, additional to this, Il relates, that God has, by
revelation, instructed men in things concerning his govern
ment, which they could not otherwise have known, and
rerainded them of tilings which they might otherwise
know ; and attested the trulh of the whole by rairacles.
Now, if thenatural and the revealed dispensation of things
are both frora God, if they coincide vvith each other, aud
together make up one scheme of Providence, our being
incompetent judges of one, raust render it credible that
we raay be incompetent judges also of theother. Since,
upon experience, the acknowledged constitution and
course of nature is found to be greatly different frora
what, before experience, would have been expected ; and
such as, men fancy, there lie great objections against:
This renders it beforehand highly credible, that they may
find the revealed dispensation Ukewise, if they judge of
it as they do of the constitution of nature, very different
froin expectations formed beforehand ; and liable, in
appearance, lo great objections : objections against the
scheme itself, and against the degrees and raanners ofthe
rairaculous interpositions, by which it was attested and
carried on. Thus, suppose a prince lo govern his do
rainions in the wisest raanner possible, by comraon known
laws ; and that upon sorae exigencies he shonid suspend
these laws, and govern, in several instances, in a different
manner : if one of his subjects were not a competent
judge beforehand, by what common rules the governmeut
should or would be carried on, it could not be expected
thatthe sarae person vvould be a corapetent judge, in what
exigencies, or in vvhat manner, or to vvhat degree, those
laws commonly observed would be suspended or deviated
frora. If he were not a judge of the wisdora of the ordi-

Chap. 3.J Liable to Objections. 213
nary administration, there is no reason lo think he would
be a judge of the wisdom of the extraordinary. If he
thought he had objections against the forraer, doubtless,
it is highly supposable, be raight think also, that be had
objections against the latter. And thus, as vve fall into
infinite folUes and raistakes, whenever we pretend, other
wise than from experience and analogy, lo judge of the
constitution and course of nature, it is evident!/ supposa
ble beforehand, that vve should faU into as greal, in pre
tending lo judge, in like manner, concerning revelation.
Nor is there any raore ground to expect that tiiis latter
should appear to us clear of objections, than that the for
mer should.
These observations, relating to the whole of Christian
ity, are appUcable to inspiration in particular. . As we
are in no sort judges beforehand, by vvhat laws or rules,
in what degree, or by what raeans, it were lo bave been
expected that God would naturally instruct us ; so, upon
supposition of his affording us light and instruction by rev
elation, additional to what he has afforded us by reason
and experience, vve are in no sort judges, by what me
thods, and in what proportion, it were to be expected
that this supernatural light and instruction would be af
forded us. We knovv not beforehand, what degree or
kind of natural information it were to be expected God
would afford raen, each by his own reason and experience ;
nor how far he would enable, and effectually dispose them
to communicate it, whatever it should be, lo each other ;
nor whether the evidence of it would be certain, bighly
probable, or doubtful ; nor whether it would be given wilh
equal clearness and conviction at all. Nor could we guess,
upon any good ground I mean, whether natural know
ledge, or even the faculty itself by which vve are capable
of attaining it, reason, would be given us at once, or grad
ually. In like manner, we are wholly ignorant what de-
Igree of new knowledge, it were to be expected, God
vv^ould give raankind by revelation, upon supposition of
his affording one ; or how far, or in what way, he would

214 Tlie Credibility of Revelation [Part 2.
interpose miraculously, lo qualify them, to whom he should
originaUy raake the revelation, for coraraunicating he
knowledge given by it ; and to secure their doing it tothe
age in vvhich they should live, and to secure its being
transmitted lo posterity. We are equally ignorant, whe
ther the evidence of it would be certain, or highly probable,
or doubtful ;* or whether aU who should have any degree
of instruction from it, and any degree of evidence of its
truth, vvould have the sarae ; or whether the scherae
would be revealed alonce, or unfolded gradually. Nay,
we are not in any sort able to judge, whether it were to
have been expected, that the revelation should have been
committed to writing ; or left to be handed down, and
consequently corrupted, by verbal tradition, and at length
sunk under it, if raankind so pleased, and during such
tirae as they are perraitted, in the degree they evidently
are, to act as they will.
But it raay be said, " that a revelation in sorae of the
above-raentioned circurastances ; one, for instance, which
was not coraraitted to writing, and thus secured against
danger of corruption, would not have answered its pur
pose." I ask, what purpose ? It would not have an
swered aU the purposes whicii it has now answered, and
in the sarae degree ; but it would have answered olhers,
or the sarae in different degrees. And which of these
were the purposes of God, and best fell in with his
general governinent, we could not at all have determined
beforehand. Now since it has been shown, that we have no prin
ciples of reason upon which lo judge beforehand, how it
were to be expected revelation should have been left, or
what was raost suitable lo tbe divine plan of governraent,
in any of tbe foreraentioned respects ; il must be quite
frivolous lo object afterwards as to any of thera, against
its being left in one way, rather than another; for this
would be to object against things, upon account of iheij
• See Chap. 6.

Chap. S.J Liable io Objections. 215
being different frora expectations, which have been
shown to be without reason. And thus we see, that the
only question concerning the truth of Christianity is,
whether it be a real revelation ; not vvhether it be attend
ed whh every circumstance which we should have looked
for: and concerning the authoriiy of Scripture, whether
it be what it clairas lo be ; not whether it be a book of
such sort, and so proraulged, as weak raen are apt to
fancy a book containing a divine revelation should. And
therefore neither obscurity, nor seeraing inaccuracy of
style, nor various readings, nor early disputes about the
authors of particular parts, nor any other things of the like
kind, though they had been much more considerable in
degree than they are, could overthrow the authority of
the Scripture ; unless the Prophets, Apostles, or our
Lord, had proraised, that the book, containing the divine
revelation, should be secure from those things. Nor
indeed can any objections overthrow such a kind of
revelation as the Christian claims to be, since there are
no objections against the morality of U,* but such as can
show, that there is no proof of miracles wrought originally
in attestation of it ; no appearance of any thing rairacu
lous in its obtaining in the world ; nor any of prophe
cy, that is, of events foretold, whicii huraan sagacity
could not foresee. If it can be shown, that the proof
alleged for alt these is absolutely none atftU, then is reve
lation overturned. But were it allowed, that the proof of
any one, or all of them, is lower than is allowed ; yet
whilst any proof of them remains, revelation wiU stand
upon much the sarae foot il does at present, as lo all the
purposes of life and practice, and ought to have the like
influence upon our behaviour,
Frora the foregoing observations, too, it wiU follow,
and those who will thoroughly exaraine into revelation
will find it worth remarking, that there are several ways
of arguing, which, though just with regard to other wri-
• Page 222.

216 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2,
tings, are not applicable to Scripture ; at least not to tbe
prophetic parts of it. We cannot argue, for instance,
that this cannot be the sense or intent of such a passage
of Scripture, for if it had, it would have been expressed
more plainly, or have been represented under a more apt
figure or hieroglyphic ; yet we may justly argue thus,
with respect to common books, Aud the reason of this
difference is very evident ; that in Scripture we are^not
competent judges, as we are in common books, how
plainly^ it vvere to have been expected, what is the true
sense should have been expressed, or under how apt an
image figured. The only question is, what appearance
there is that this is the sense ? and scarce at all, how
much raore determinately or accurately it raight have
been expressed or figured ?
" But is it not self-evident, tbat internal iraprobabili-
lies of all mankinds, weaken external probable proof?"
Doubtless. But to what practical purpose can this be
alleged here, when it has been proved before,* that real
internal improbabilities, which rise even lo raoral cer
tainty, are overcome by the most ordinary testimony?
and vvhen it novv has been made appear, that we scarce
know what are improbabilities, as to the raatter we are
here considering ? as it wUl farther appear frora what
follows. For ihough, from the observations above' raade, it is
raanifest, that we are not in any sort competent judges,
what supernatural instruction were to have been expected ;
and ihough it is self-evident, that the objections of an in
corapetent judgraent must be frivolous ; yet it may be
proper lo go one step farther, and observe, that if raen
will be regardless of these things, and pretend to judge of
the Scripture by preconceived expectations, the analogy
of nature shows beforehand, not only that it is highly cre
dible they raay, but also probable that they vvUI, imagine
they have strong objections against it, however really un-
' Page 208.

Chap. S.J Ucd>le to Objections. 217
exceptionable : for so, prior to experience, they vvould
think they had, against the circurastances, and degrees,
and the whole raanner of that instruction, which is afford
ed by the ordinary course of nature. Were the instruc
tion vvhich God affords to brute creatures by instincts
'and mere propensions, and lo mankind by these together
witii reason, raatter of probable proof, and not of certain
observation, it vvould be rejected as incredible, in raany
instances of it, only upon account of the means by vvhich
this instruction is given, tiie seeming disproportions, the
limitations, necessary conditions, and circumstances of it.
For instance : Would it not have been thought highly ira
probable, that raen should have been so much more
capable of discovering, even lo ceriainty, the general
laws of matter, and the magnitudes, paths, and revolu
tions of the heavenly bodies ; than the occasions and
cures of distempers, and many olher things, in which
human life seems so much more nearly concerned, than
in astronomy ? Howi capricious and irregular a way
of inforraation, would it be said is that of invention,
by raeans of which nature instructs us in matters of
science, and in many things upon which the affairs of
the world greatly depend ; that a man should, by this
• faculty, be made acquainted with a thing in an inslant,
when, perhaps, he is thinking of somewhat else, vvhich he
he has in vain been searching after, it raay be, for years.
So likewise the iraperfections attending the only method
by which naiure enables and directs us to coramunicate
our thoughts lo each olher, are innumerable. Language
is, in its very nature, inadequate, ambiguous, liable to
infinite abuse, even from neghgence ; and so liable lo it
- from design, that every man can deceive and betray by
it. And, to mention bul one instance raore, tbat brutes,
without reason, should act, in many respects, with a sa
gacity and foresight vastiy greater than what men have
in those respects, would be thought impossible. Yet it
is certain they do act with such superior foresight ;
whether it be their own, indeed, is another question,
19

218 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2.
Frora these things it is bighly credible beforehand, that
upon supposition God should afford men some additional
instruction by revelation, it vvould be with circumstances,
in manners, degrees, and respects, which we should be
apl to fancy vve had great objections against the credi
bility of. Nor are the objections against the Scripture,
nor against Christianity in general, at all raore or greater
than the analogy of nature would beforehand, — not per
haps give ground to expect; for this analogy raay notbe
sufficient, in some cases, to ground an expectation upon ;
— but no raore iior greater, than analogy would show il,
beforehand, lo be supposable and credible, that there
raight seem to lie against revelation.
By applying these general observations to a particular
objection, it vvill be more distinctly seen, hovv they are
applicable to others of the like kind ; and indeed to al
raost all objections against Christianity, as dislinguished
from objections against its evidence. It appears from
Scripture, that as it was not unusual, in the apostolic
age, for persons, upon their conversion to Christianity, to
be endued with miraculous gifts; so, sorae of those per
sons exercised these gifts in a strangely irregular and
disorderly manner : and this is made an objection against
their being really miraculous. Now, the foregoing ob
servations quite remove this objection, how considerable
soever it raay appear at first sight. For, consider a per
son endued with any of tbese gifts, for instance, that of
tongues ; it is to be supposed, that he had the same power
over this miraculous gift, as he would have had over it,
had it been the effect of habit, of study, and use, as it
ordinarily is ; or the sarae power over it, as he had over
any other natural endowment. Consequently, he would
use it in the same manner he did any other ; either
regularly and upon proper occasions only, or irregularly
and upon improper ones ; according lo his sense of de
cency, and his character of prudence. Where, then,
is the objection ? Why, if this miraculous power was
indeed given to the world to propagate Christianity and

Chap. S,J Liable to Objections. 219
attest the truth of it, we might, it seems, have expected,
that other sort of persons should have been chosen to be
invested with it ; or that these should, at the sarae time,
have been endued vvith prudence ; or that they should
have been continually restrained and directed in the ex
ercise of h ; i. e. that God should have rairaculously
interposed, if at aU, in a different manner or higher de
gree. But, frora the observations raade above, it is un
deniably evident, that vve are not judges in vvhat degrees
and manners it were to have been expected he should
miraculously interpose ; upon supposition of his doing it
in some degree and raanner. Nor, in the natural course
of Providence, are superior gifts df meraory, eloquence,
knowledge, and other talents of great influence, conferred
only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as
are disposed lo raake the properest use of them. Nor
is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for
the conduct of Ufe, particularly in our education, com
monly given in a manner the most suited to recoraraend
il; but often with circurastances, apt to prejudice us against
such instruction.
One might go on lo add, that there is a great resem
blance between the light of nature and of revelation, m
several other respects. Practical Christianity, or th*
faith and behaviour which renders a man a Christian, is
a plain and obvious thmg ; Uke the comraon rules of
conduct, wilh respect to our ordinary temporal affairs.
The raore distinct and particular knowledge of those
things, the study of vvhich the Apostle calls, going on
nnto perfection,* and of the prophetic parts of revela-
"tion, like raany parts of natural and .even civil knowledge,
may require very exact thought and careful considera
tion. The hinderances too, of natural and of supernatural
light and knowledge, have been of the sarae kind. And
as it is owned the whole scherae of Scripture is nol yet
understood, so, if it ever coraes lo be understood, before
•Heb. vi. 1.

220 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2.
the restitution of all things,* and without rairaculous
interpositions, it raust be in the sarae way as natural
knowledge is corae at ; by the continuance and progress
of learning and of liberty, and by particular persons, at
tending to, comparing, and pursuing, intiraations scattered
up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded
by the generality of the world. For this is the way in
vvhich all iraprovements are made ; by thoughtful raen
tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature
accidentally, or which seera lo corae into our rainds by
chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which
has been so long in die possession of mankind, should
contain many truths as yet undiscovered. For, all the
sarae phenoraena, and the sarae faculties of investiga
tion, from which such great discoveries in natural know
ledge have been made in the present and last age, were
equally in the possession of mankind several thousand
years before. And possibly it might be intended, that
events, as they corae to pass, should open and ascertain
the raeaning of several parts of Scripture,
It may be objected, that this analogy fails in a raaterial
respect ; for that natural knowledge is of Uttie or no
consequence. But I have been speaking of the general
ijjstruction, which naiure does or does not afford us.
And besides, sorae parts of natural knowledge, in the
more coramon restrained sense of the words, are of the
greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of
life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fad
in this respect, yet it might be abundantly supplied from
the whole constitution and course of nature ; vvhich
shows, that God does not dispense his gifts according to
our notions of the advantage and consequence they"
would be of to us. And this in general, vvuh bis method
of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together
make out an analogy full to the point before us.
But it may be objected stlU farther, and more gene-
* Acts Hi. 21,

Chap. S.J Liable to Objections. 221
rally ; " The Scripture represents the worid as in a stale
of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient- to recover it,
to help in these respects where nature fails ; in particu
lar, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it
credible, then, that so raany ages should have been let
pass, be,fore a matter of such a sort, of so great and so
general importance, was made known to mankind ; and
then that it should be made known lo so smaU a part of
thera .'' Is it conceivable, that this supply should be so
very deficient, should have the Uke obscurity and doubt
fulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short, lie
open lo aU the Uke objections, as the light; of nature
itself.'' "* Without determining how far tbis in fact is so,
I answer, il is by no means incredible that it raight be
so, if the light of nature and of revelation be from the
same hand. Men are naturally Uable to diseases ; for
which God, in his good providence, has provided natural
remedies.f But remedies existing in naiure have been
unknown to raankind for many ages ; are known but
to few now ; probably raany valuable ones are not known
yet. Great has been, and is, the obscurity and difficulty,
in the nature and application of thera. Circumstances
seem often lo make them very iraproper, where they
are absolutely necessary. Il is after long labor and
study, and many unsuccessful endeavors, that they are
brought to be as useful as they are ; after high conterapt
and absolute rejection of the raost useful we have ; and
after disputes and doubts, which have seeraed to be
endless. The best remedies, too, when unskilfully,
much raore if dishonestly, appUed, may produce new
diseases; and, with the rightest application, the success
of them is often doubtful. In many cases, they are not
at aU effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly :
and the application of thera, and the necessary regiraen
accompanying it, is, not uncoranionly, so disagreeable,
that some will not subrait to thera ; and satisfy tliera,selves
? Chap 6. t See Cnap. 5.
19*

222 The Credibility of Revelation [Part 2.
vvith the excuse, that if they vvould, il is not certain
whether it vvould be successful. And many persons, who
labor under diseases, for which there are known natural
remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in
the vvay of thera. In a word, the reraedies which na
ture has provided for diseases, are neither cert,ain, per
fect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of
arguing, which vvould lead us to conclude that they must
be so, vvould lead us likewise to conclude, that there
could be no occasion for thera ; i. e. that \here could
be no diseases at aU. And, therefore, our experience
that there are diseases, shows, that it is credible before
hand, upon supposition nature has provided remedies for
them, that these remedies may be, as by experience vve
find they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal; be
cause it shows, that the principles upon vvhich we should
expect the contrary, are fallacious.
And now what is the just consequence frora aU these
things? Not that reason is no judge of what is offered to
us as being of divine revelation. For this vvould he to
infer, that we are unable lo judge of any thing, because
vve are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and
it ought lo judge, not only of the raeaning, but also of
the morality and the evidence, of revelation. First,
It is the province of reason to judge of the raoraUty of
the Scripture ; i. e. nol vvhether it contains things differ
ent from what we should have expected from a wise,
just, and good Being ; for objections from hence have
been now obviated ; but vvhether it contains things plainly
contradictory to wisdora, justice, or goodness ; to what
the light of nature leaches us of God. And I know
notiiing of this sort objected against Scripture, except- .
ing such objections as are formed upon suppositions,
vvhich would equally conclude, tiial the constitution of
naiure is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness ;
vvhich mosl certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some
particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular per
sons, requiring actions, which vvould be iraraoral and

Chap. S.J Uable to Objections. 223
vicious, were it not for such precepts. But il is easy lo
see, that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept
changes the whole nature of the case and of the action ;
and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or
imraoral, which, prior to the precept, must have appeared
and really have been so ; which may well be, since none
of these precepts are contrary to irarautable raorality.
If it were coraraanded, to cultivate the principles, and
act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelly ; the
comraand would not alter the nature of the case, or of the
action in any of these instances. But it is quite othervvise
in precepts, which require only the doing an external ac
tion ; for instance, taking away the properly or life of
any. For raen have no right lo eilher Ufe or property,
but what arises solely frora the grant of God. When this
grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at aU in
either; and when this revocation is made known, as
surely il is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust
to deprive thera of either. And tbough a course of ex
ternal acts, which without coraraand would be iraraoral,
must make an iraraoral habit, yet a few detached com
mands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper
to say thus rauch of the few Scripture precepts, which
require, not vicious actions, bul actions which would have
been vicious had it nol been for such precepts ; because
they are soraetiraes weakly urged as iraraoral, and great
weight is laid upon objections drawn frora them. But to
me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but
what arises from their being offences ; i. e. from their
.^eing liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by
wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes,
and perhaps, to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And
objections frora this head are not objections against reve
lation, but against the whole notion of religion, as a trial ;
'and against the general constitution of nature. Secondly,
Reason is able to judge, and raust, of the evidence
of revelation, and of the objections urged against that

224 The Credibility of Revelation, &1-C. [Part 2,
evidence ; which shaU be the subject of a following
chapter.* But the consequence of the foregoing observations is,
that the question upon which the truth of Christianity
depends, is scarce at aU, what objections there are against
its scherae, since there are none against the raorality of
it ; but what objections there are against its evidence :
or, what proof there remains of it, afler due allowances
made for ihe objections against that proof. Because it
has been shown, that the objections against Christianity,
as distinguished from objections against iis evidence, are
frivolous. For surely very little weight, if any at all, is
to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, vvhich,
when appUed to the general constitution of nature, expe
rience shows not to be conclusive : and such, I think, is
the whole vvay of objecting treated of throughout this
_ chapter. It is resolvable inlo principles, and goes upon
suppositions, which mislead us to think, that the Author
of nature would not act, as we experience he does ; or
would act, in such and such cases, as vve experience he
does not in Uke cases. But the unreasonableness of this
way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from
hence, that the chief things thus objected against, are
justified, as shall be farther shown, f by distinct, particu-;:
lar, and full analogies, in the constitution and course of
nature. But it is to be reraembered, that as frivolous as ob
jections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet,
when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself,
and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote''
virtue, than, all circumstances considered, could have
been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; this
is a presuraptive proof of its not proceeding frora them,
and so of its truth ; because we are corapetent judges,
what raight have been expected frora enthusiasm and po
litical views. • Chap. 7.
t Chap. 4, latter part ; and 5, 6.

CHAP. IV.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Constitution,
imperfectly comprehended.
It hath been novv shown,* that tbe analogy of nature
renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a
revelation to be made, it must contain many things very
different from what we should have expected, and such
as appear open to great objections ; and that this observa
tion, in good raeasure, takes off the force of those ob
jections, or rather precludes thera. Bul it may be al
leged, that this is a very partial answer lo such objections,
or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them : because it
doth not show at all, that the things objected against can
be wise, just, and good ; rauch less, that it is credible
they are so. Il will therefore be proper to show this
distincdy, by applying to these objections against the wis
dom, justice, and goodness of Chrislianity, the answer
abovef given to the like objections against the constitu
tion of nature ; before we consider the particular analo
gies in the latter, lo the particular things objected against
in the former. Novv, that which affords a sufficient an
swer lo objections against the wisdom, justice, and good-
aess of the constitution of nature, is its being a constilu-
ftion, a system, or scheme, iraperfectly coraprehended ; a
scheme, in which raeans are raade use of to accoraplish
ends ; and which is carried on by general laws. For,
from these things it has been proved, not only to be pos-
* In the foregoing Chapter.
tPart i. Chap. 7, to which this all along refers.

226 Christianity a Scheme [Part 2.
sible, but also lo be credible, that those things which are
objected against, raay be consistent with wisdom, justice,
and goodness ; nay, raay be instances of them : and even
that the constitution and government of nature may be
perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity,
then, be a scherae, and of the like kind, it is evident, tbe
like objections against it raust adrait of the like answer.
And, I. Christianity is a scherae, quite beyond our compre
hension. The raoral governraent of God is exercised,
by gradually conducting things so in the course of his
providence, that every one, at length, and upon the whole,
shall receive according to his deserts ; and neither fraud
nor violence, but trulh and right, shall finally prevail.
Christianity is a particular scherae under this general plan
of providence, and a part of it, conducive to its comple
tion, with regard to raankind; consisting itself also of
various parts, and a mysterious econoray, which has been
carrying on frora the tirae the vvorld carae into its present
wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery,
by a divine person, the Messiah ; " who is lo gather to
gether in one, the children of God that are scattered
abroad,"* and establish " an everlasting kingdora, where
in dwelleth righteousness. "¦)• And in order lo it, after
various raanifestations of things, relating to this greal and ¦
general scheme of Providence, through a succession of
raany ages ; — (" for the Spirit of Christ, which was in
tbe prophets, testified beforehand his sufferings, and the
glory that should foUow : unto whora it vvas revealed,
that not unto themselves, but unto us, they did minister
the things which are now reported unto us by them that
have preached the gospel ; which things the angels de
sire lo look into : "J) — after various dispensations, look
ing forward and preparatory to this final salvation, " III
the fulness of tirae," when infinite wisdora thought fit.
He, " being in the forra of God, raade hiraself of no
•John xi. 52. f 2 Pet. iii. 13. 1 1 Pet. i. 11, 'l2.

Chap, 4.J Imperfectly Comprehended. 227
reputation, and look upon hiraself the forra of a ser
vant, and was made in the Ukeness of men ; and being
found in fashion as a raan, he hurabled bimself, and be
came obedient to death, even the death of the cross :
wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given
him a name which is above every name ; that at the narae
of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and
things in the earth, and things under the earth ; and that
every tongue should confess, that Jesus Christ is Lord,
to-the glory of God the Father,"* Parts likewise of
tbis economy, are the rairaculous mission of the Holy
Ghost, and his ordinary assistances given lo good raen ;
the invisible governraent which Christ at presenl exer
cises over his Church ; that vvhich he himself refers lo
in these words,f " In ray father's house are many raan
sions — I ^0 to prepare a place for you ; " and his future
return to "judge the world in righteousness," and com
pletely re-estabUsh the kingdom of God, " For the Fa
tlier judgeth no raan ; but hath coraraitted all judgraent
unto the Son : that all raen should honor the Son, even as
they honor the Father, J All povver is given unto hira
in heaven and in earth,§ And he must reign, till he hath
put all enemies under his feet. Then coraeth the end,
when he shaU have deUvered up the kingdorn to God,
even the Father ; vvhen he shaU have put down aU rule,
and all authority and power. And when aU things shall
bejgubdued unto hira, then shall the Son also hiraself be
snbject unto hira, that put aU tilings under hira, that God
niay;be aU in all."|| Now littie, surely, need be said to
few, that this systera, or scherae of things, is but iraper
fectly |Gomprebended by us. The Scripture expressly
Asserts it to be so. And, indeed, one cannot read a pas-
Mge relating to this " great mystery of godhness,"** but
*hat,imraediately runs up into soraething which shows
us our ignorance in it; as everything in nature shows us
our ignorance in the constitution of naiure. And who-
•
* Phil. ii. X John xiv. 2. X ^°^^ v. 22, 23.
§ Matt, xxviii. 18. 11 1 Cor. xv. ** 1 Tim. iii. 16.

228 Christianity a Scheme [Part 2,
ever will seriously consider that part of the Christian
scheme which is revealed in Scripture, wiU find so much
raore unrevealed, as will convince hira, that, to all the
purposes of judging and objecting, we know as little of
il, as of the constitution of nature. Our ignorance,
therefore, is as much an answer to our objections against
the perfection of one, as against the perfection of the
other,* II, It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispensation,
as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are
made use of to accoraplish ends. And the observation
of this furnishes us wilh the same answers lo objec
tions against the perfection of Christianity, as to object
tions of the like kind against the constitution of nature.
It shows the credibility, that the things objected against,
howfoolish-f soever they appear to men, raay be the very
best means of accomplishing the very best ends. And
their appearing foolishness is no presuraption against this,
in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.f
III. The credibility, that the Christian dispensation
may have been, all along, carried on by general laws,||
no less than the course of nature, may require to be
more distinctly raade out. Consider, then, upon what
ground it is we say, that the whole common course of
naiure is carried on according to general fore-ordained
laws. We know, indeed, several of the general laws of
matter ; and a great part of the natural behaviour of liv
ing agents is reducible lo general laws, Bul we knoW,
in a manner, nothing, by what laws, storms, and terapests,"
earthquakes, famine, pestilence, becorae the instrtjments
of destruction to raankind. And the laws by which per
sons born into the world at such a tirae and place, are of
such capacities, geniuses, terapers ; the laws, by whicl
thoughts corae into our mind, in a multitude of cases
and by which innumerable things happen, ofthe greatest
* Page 164, &c. f 1 Cor. i. 18, &c. * f
X Page 168. || Pages 169, 170;

Chap. 4.J Imperfectly comprehended. ' 229
influence upon the affairs and state of the vvorld : these
laws are so wholly unknown to us, that we call the events,
which come to pass by thera, accidental ; though all rea
sonable men know certainly, that there cannot, in reality,
be any such thing as chance ; and conclude, that the
things which have this appearance are the result of gen
eral laws, and raay be reduced inlo them. It is then but
an exceeding littie way, and in but a very few respects,
that we can trace up the natural course of things before
us, to general laws. And it is only from analogy that we
conclude the whole of il lo be capable of being reduced
into them ; only from our seeing, that part is so. It is
frora our finding, that the course of naiure, in some re
spects and so far, goes on by general laws, 'that we con
clude this of the rest. And if that be a just ground for
such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to con
clude, yet lo apprehend, to render it supposable and
credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that
God's miraculous interpositions may have been, all along,
in lijfe manner, by general laws of wisdom. Thus, that
miraculous powers should be exerted at such tiraes, upon
such occasions, in snch degrees and raanners, and with
regard lo such persons, rather than olhers ; that the af
fau-s of the world, being perraitted to go on iu their natural
course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new
dnectlon -given thera by rairaculous interpositions; that
these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and
respects only ; aU this may have been by general laws,
plese laws are unknown, indeed, lo us ; but no raore
unknown, than the laws frora whence it is, that some
die as soon as they are born, and olhers Uve lo ex
trerae old age ; that one raan is so superior lo anoiher in
understanding ; with innuraerable more things, which, as
was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or
rules, at aU, though il is taken for granted, they are as
Inuch reducible to general ones as gravitation. Now,
if the revealed dispensations of Providence, and miracu
lous interpositions, be by general laws, as well as God's
20

230 Christianity a Scheme [Part 2,
ordinary government in tiie course of nature, raade known
by reason and experience ; there is no raore reason to ex
pect, that every exigence, as it arises, should be provided
for by these general laws of rairaculous interposhions, than
that every exigence in nature should, by the general laws
of nature : yet there might be wise and good reasons,
that rairaculous interpositions should be by general laws;
and that these laws should nol be broken in upon, or de
viated from, by other miracles.
Upon the whole, then, tiie appearance of deficiencies
and irregularities in nature, is owing to its being a scheme
but in part made known, and of such a certain particular
kind in other respects. Now we see no more reason,
wh}f the frame and course of nature should be such a
scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the for
mer is such a scheme, renders it credible, that the laiter,
upon supposition of its truth, may be so too; And as it
is manifest, that Christianity is a scherae revealed- but in
part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to
accomplish ends, like to that of nature ; so the credibili
ty, that it raay have been all along carried on by general
laws, no less than the course of nature, has been distinctly
proved. And frora aU this it is beforehand credible, that
there might, I think 'probable that there would, be the Uke
appearance of deficiencies and _ irregularities in Chris
tianity as in nature ; i. e. that Christianity would be Uable
to the like objections, as the frame of naiure, _ And these
objections are answered by these observations concerning
Christianity ; as the like objections against the frame of
nature, are answered by the Uke observations concerning
the frarae of nature.

The objections against Christianity, considered as a
matter of fact,* having; in general, been obviated in the
• Pages 229, 230.

Chap; 4,J Imperfectly comprehended. 231
preceding chapter ; and the sarae, considered as made
against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obvi
ated in this ; the next thing, according|to the metiiod
proposed, is lo show, that the principal objections in par-
ficijar, against Christianity, raay be answered by particu
lar anti full analogies in naiure. And as one of thera is
made against the whole scheme of it together, as just
now described, I choose to consider it here, rather than
in a-distinct chapter by itself. The thing objected against
this scherae of the gospel is, " That it seems to sup
pose God vvas reduced to the necessity of a long se
ries of intricate means, in order to accoraplish his ends,
the recovery and salvation of the world ; in like sort as
men, for want of understanding, or povver, not beiug able
to come al their ends directly^ are forced to go round
about ways, and make use of raany perplexed contri
vances lo arrive at thera." Now, every thing which vve
see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection
against the truth of Christianity. For, according lo our
manner of coneeption, God makes use of varieiy of
raeans, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural
course of providence, for the accomplishment of aU his
ends. Indeed, il is certain, there is somewhat in this
raatter quite beyond our comprehension ; but the mys
tery is as great in nature as in Christianity, We know
what we ourselves aim at, as final ends; and what courses
we take, merely as raeans conducing to those ends. But
we are greatly ignorant, how far things are considered
by the Author of nature, under the single notion of means
and ends ; so as that it raay be said, this is raerely an
end, and tbat raerely raeans, in his regard. And whether
there be not sorae pecuUar absurdity in our very manner
of conception concerning this matter, somewhat contradic
tory, arising from our extremely imperfect views of things,
it is impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest,
that the whole natural world and government of it is a
scheme, or system ; not a fixed, but a pcogressive one :
a scheme, in which the operation of various means takes

232 Christianity a Scheme, Sic. [Part 2,
up a great length of time, before the ends they tend to
can be attained. The change of seasons, the ripen
ing of the fruits ofthe earth, the very history of a flower,
is an instance ofthis : and so is human Ufe, Thus, vege
table bodies, and those of animals, ihough possibly form
ed at once, yet grow up by degrees lo a raature state.
And thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies,
are naturally directed lo forra, each his own raanners and
character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and ex
perience, and by a long course of action. Our exist
ence is not only successive, as it raust be of necessity,
but one state of our life and being is appointed by God
to be a preparation for another ; and that, lo be the
means of attaining lo another succeeding one : Infancy
to childhood ; childhood to youth ; youth lo mature age.
Men are irapatient, and for precipitating things : but the
Author of nature appears deliberate throughout his ope
rations ; accompUshing his natural ends by slow succes
sive steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid
out, vvhich, frora the nature of it, requires various sys
tems of means, as vvell as length of time, in order to the
carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in the
daily course of natural providence, God operates in the
very same manner as in the dispensation of Cliristianity :
making one thing subservient to another ; this, to some
what farther ; and so on, through a progressive series of
raeans, which extend, both backward and forward, be
yond our utmost view. Of this raanner of operation,
every thing vve see in the course of nature is as rauch an
instance, as any part of the Christian dispensation.

233

CHAP V.
Of the particular System of Christianity ; the Appoint
ment of a Mediator, and the Redemption of the
World by him.
There is not, I think, any thing relating to Christian
ity, which has been more objected against, than the me
diation of Christ, in sorae or olher of its parts. Yet,
upon thorough consideration, there seeras nothing less
justly liable to it. For,
I, The whole analogy of nature reraoves all iraagined
presumption against the general notion of " a Mediator
between God and raan,"* For we find, all living crea
tures are brought into the world, and their Ufe in infancy
is preserved, by the instruraentality of olhers ; and every
satisfaction of il, sorae way or other, is bestowed by the
like means. So that the visible governraent, which God
exercises over the world, is by the instruraentality and
mediation of others. And how far his invisible govern
ment be, or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by
reason. And the supposition, that part of it is so, appears,
to say the least, altogether as credible as the contrary.
There is then no sort of objection, frora the Ught of na
ture, against the general notion of a mediator between
God and man, considered as a doctrhie of Christianity,
or as an appointment in this dispensation ; since we find,
by experience, that God does appoint mediators, to be
* 1 Tim. ii. 5.
20*

234 The Appointment of [Part 2.
the instruments of good and evil lo us, the instruments of
his justice and his raercy. And the objection here re
ferred to is urged, not against mediation in that hi^h,
eminent, and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our rae
diator ; but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a
mediator at all,
n, As we must suppose, that the world is under the
proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion,
before we can enter into consideration of the revealed
doctrine concerning the rederaption of it by Christ ; so
that supposition is here to be distinctiy taken notice of.
Now, the divine raoral govei-nment which religion teaches
us, implies, that the consequence of vice shall be misery,
in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God,
That such consequent punishment shall take effect by
his appointment, is necessarily implied. But, as it is
not in any sort to be supposed, that we are made ac
quainted with all the ends or reasons for which it is fit
future punishments should be inflicted, or why God has
appointed such and such consequent raisery should fol
low vice ; and as we are altogether in the dark, how or
in what manner it shaU follow, by what immediate oc
casions, or by the instruraenlaUty of what means ; there
is no absurdity in supposing, it may follow in a way
analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and
such courses of action at present ; poverty, sickness,
infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands
of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing fu
ture punishment may follow wickedness of course, as
we speak, or in the way of natural consequence, from
God's original constitution of the world ; frora the na
ture he has given us, and from the condition in which he
places us : or, in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling
upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence,
falls down ; in the way of natural consequence, breaks
his limbs, suppose ; in the way of natural consequence
of this, without help, perishes.
Some good men raay, perhaps, be offended, with

Chap. 5.J A Mediator and Redeemer. 235
hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing, that the fu
ture punishments of wickedness may be in the vvay of
natural consequence ; as if this were taking the execu
tion of justice out of the hands of God, and giving it to
naiure. But they should remember that when things
corae lo pass according to the course of nature, this does
not hinder them frora being his doing, who is the God
of nature ; and that ihe Scripture ascribes those punish
ments to divine justice, vvhich are known to^be natural;
and which must be caUed so, vvhen distinguished from
such as are rairaculous. But, after aU, this supposition,
or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only
by way of iUustration of tiie subject before us. For,
since it must be admitted, that the future punishraent of
wickedness is not a matier of arbitrary appointraent, but
of reason, equity, and justice ; it cornes, for aught J see,
to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted
in a way analogous to that in vvhich the temporal punish
ments of vice and foUy are inflicted, or in any other
way. And tbough there were a difference, it is allow
able in the present case to make this supposition, plainly
not an incredible one. That fijture punishraent raay follow
wickedness, in the way of natural consequence, or ac
cording lo sorae general laws of government already es
tablished in the universe,
III, Upon this supposition, or even without it, we
may observe soraewhat, rauch lo the present purpose, in
the constitution of nature, or appointraents of Provi
dence : j;he provision which is made, that all the bad
natural consequences of men's actions should not always
actually follow ; or, that such bad consequences, as ac
cording to the setded course of things, would inevftably
have followed, if not prevented, should, in certain de
grees, be prevented. We are apt, presum.pluously, lo
imagine, that the world might have been so constituted,
as that there vvould not have been any such thing as
misery or evU. On the contrary, we find the Author of
nature perraits h. But then, he has provided reliefs.

236 The Appointment of [Part 2.
and, in raany cases, perfect remedies for it, after some
pains and difficuhies ; reUefs and remedies even for that
evU, which is the fruit of our own misconduct, andwhich,
in the course of naiure, would have continued, and ended
in our destruction, bul for sucb remedies. And this is
an instance both of severity and of indulgence, in the
constitution of nature. Thus, all the bad consequences,
now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice,
might be prevented. And, though all were not, yet some
of thera raight, by proper interposition, if not rejected ;
by another's coming to the rash raan's rehef, with his
own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case
required. Persons raay do a great deal themselves to
wards preventing the bad consequences of their folhes;
and more raay be done by themselves, together with the
assistance of others, their fellow-creatures ; which as
sistance nature requires and prorapts us lo. This is the
general constitution of the world. Now, suppose it had
been so constituted, that after such actions were done, as
were foreseen naturally lo draw after thera raisery lo the
doer, it should have been no raore in human power to
have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any
instance, than il is, in aU ; no one can say, whether such
a more severe constitution of things might not yet have
been really good. But that, on the contrary, provision
is raade by nature, that vve raay and do, lo so great de
gree, prevent the bad natural effects of our folUes; this
may be called raercy, or corapassion, in the original
constitution of the vvorld ; corapassion, as dislinguished
frora goodness in general. And, the whole known con
stitution and course of things affording us instances of
such compassion, it would be according to the analogy of
nature to hope, that, however ruinous the natural con
sequences of vice raight be, frora the general laws of
God's governraent over the universe, yet provision might
be made, possibly raight have been originally raade, for
preventing those ruinous consequences frora inevitably
following ; at least frora following universally, and in aU
cases.

}hap. 5,J A Mediator and Redeemer. 237
Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this raade
1 question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The
;enerality of raankind are so far from having that awful
ense of things, which the present slate of vice and mis
ry and darkness seeras to make but reasonable, that
hey have scarce any apprehension, or thought at all,
bout this matter, any vvay ; and sorae serious persons
nay have spoken unadvisedly concerning il. But let
IS observe, what we experience lo be, and vvhat, frora
he very constitution of naiure, cannot bul be, the con-
equences of irregular and disorderly behaviour ; even
f such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as vve scarce call-
icious. Now, it is natural to apprehend, that the bad
onsequences of irregularity vviU be greater, in propor-
ion as the irregularity is so. And there is no corapari-
on between these irregularities, and the greater in-
tances of vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all
eligion ; if there be any thing at all in religion. For,
onsider what it is for creatures, moral agents, presump-
abusly lo introduce that confusion and misery into the
ingdom of God, which mankind have, in fact, intro-
luced; to blaspheme the sovereign Lord of all; to
ontemn his authority ; lo be injurious lo the degree they
re, to their fellow-creatures, tbe creatures of God, Add,
bat the effects of vice, in the present world, are often
xlreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death : and,
pon putting all this together, h will appear, that as no
oe can say, in what degree fatal the unprevented con-
Squences of vice raay be, according to the general rule
f divine govemraent ; so it is by no raeans intuitively
ertain, how far these consequences could possibly, in
le, nature of the thing, be prevented, consistentiy with
le eternal rule of right, or with what is, in fafct, the
loral consthution of nature. However, there would be
irge ground lo hope, that the universal governraent was
ol so severely strict, but that there was roora for pardon,
r for having those penal consequences prevented. Yet,
IV, There seeras no probability, that any thing we

238 The. Appointment of [Part 2.
could do, would alone, and of itself, prevent them ; pre
vent their following, or being inflicted , But one would
think, at least, it were impossible that the contrary should
be thought certain. For we are not acquainted whh the
whole of the case, 'We are not informed of aU the rea
sons, vvhich render it fit that future punishments should
be inflicted ; and, therefore, cannot know, whether any
thing we could do would make such an alteration, as to
render it fit that they should be reraitted. We do not
know, what the whole natural, or appointed consequences
of vice are, nor in what way they would follow, if not pre
vented ; and, therefore, can in no sort say, whether we
could do any thing, which would be sufficient lo prevent
thera. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recol
lect the analogy of nature, or providence. For though
this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion
upon in this raatter, yet it is sufficient to answer a mere
arbitrary assertion, without any kind of evidence, urged
by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which
is nol reason, but revelation. Consider, then, people ruin
their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon
themselves by excess; they incur the penalties'of civil
laws, and surely civil government is natural : will sorrow
for these follies past, and behaving weU for the future,
alone and of itself, prevent the natural consequences of
them ? On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping
theraselves are often irapaired ; or, if not, yet they are
forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon sev
eral accounts, and in different ways : assistance which they
would have had no occasion for, had- it not been fortheir
raisconduct ; but vvhich, in the disadvantageous condition
they have reduced theraselves to, is absolutely necessary
to theif recovery, and retrieving their affairs. Now, since
this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabit
ants of this world, and as having a temporal interest here,
under the natural government of God, which, however,
has a great deal raoral in it; why is it not supposable, that
this raay be our case also in our more iraportant capacity,

Chap. 5,J A Mediator and Redeemer. 239
as under his perfect moral government, and having a
more general and future inierest depending ? If we have
misbehaved in this higher capacity, and rendered ourselves
obnoxious to the future punishment which God has an
nexed lo vice ; it is plainly credible, that behaving weU
for the time to come, may be — not useless, God forbid —
but wholly insufficient, alone and of Uself, to prevent that
punishment ; or to put us in the conduion which we
should have been in; had we preserved our innocence.
And, though we ought to reason with aU reverence,
whenever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet
it may be added, that U is clearly contrary lo aU our no-
lions of govemment, as well as to what is, in fact, the
general constitution of nature, to suppose ihat doing well
for the future, should, in aU cases, prevent aU the judicial
had consequences of having done evil, or all the punish
ment annexed to disobedience. And we bave manifestly
nothing from whence to deterraine, in what degree, and
in what cases, retbrraation would prevent tbis punishment,
even supposing that it would in some. And, though the
efficacy of repentance itself alone, to prevent vvhat man
kind had rendered theraselves obnoxious lo, and recover
what they had forfeited, is now insisted upon, in opposi
tion to Christianity ; yet, by the general prevalence of
propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion,
of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, ap
pears lo be contrary to the general sense of mankind.
Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the general laws
of God's government, been permitted to operate, whhout
any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for
aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to
think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding any
thing we could have done to prevent il. Now,
V, In this darkness, or this Ught of nature, call it which
you please, revelation coraes in ; confirms every doubting
fear, which could enter inlo the heart of raan, concerning
thefuture unprevented consequenceof wickedness; sup-
posestiie world to be in a state of ruin, (a supposition which

240 The Appointment of [Part 2,
seeras the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and
which, if not proveable by reason, yet it is in no wise con
trary to it ;) teaches us, too, that the rules of divine gov
ernment are such, as not to admit of pardon irhinediately
and directiy upon repentance, or by the sole efficacy of
it ; but then leaches, at the sarae tirae, what nature might
justly have hoped, that the moral governraent ofthe uni
verse was not so rigid, but that there was roora for an in
terposition to avert the fatal consequences of vice ; which
therefore, by this means, does admit of pardon. Reve
lation leaches us, that the unknown laws of God's raore
general governmeni, no less than the particular laws by
which we experience he governs us at present, are com
passionate,* as vvell as good, in the more general notion
of goodness ; and that he hath mercifully provided, that
there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction
of human kind whatever that destruction unprevented
would have beeini " God so loved the world, that he
gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth,"
not, to be sure, in a speculative, but in a practical sense,
" that whosoever believeth in him should not perish ;"f
gave his son in the same way of goodness lo the world,
as he affords particular persons the friendly assistauce of
their fellow-creatures, when, whhout it, their temporal
ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies ; in
the same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcend
ent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God
" loved us, and gave himself for us," wilh a love which
he himself compares to that of huraan friendship ; though,
in this case, all coraparisons raust fall infinhely shoW of
the thing intended to be illustrated by thera. He inter
posed in sucb a manner, as was necessary and effeclual
to prevent tbat execution of justice upon sinners, which
God had appointed should otherwise have been executed
upon them ; or in such a raanner, as to prevent that pun
ishment from actually following, which, according to the
• Page 235, &c . f John iii. 16.

Chap. 5,J A Mediator and Redeemer. 241
general laws of divine governmeni, must have foUowed
the sius ofthe world, had il not been for such interposi

tion," If any thing here said should appear, upon first thought,
inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, I am per
suaded, will entirely remove that appearance. For, vvere
we to suppose the constitution of things to be such, as
that the whole creation must bave perished, had il not
been for soraewhat, which God had appointed should be,
in order lo prevent that ruin ; even this supposition would
notbe inconsistent, in any degree, wilh the raost absolulely
perfect goodness. But stiU il may be thought, that this
whole manner of treating the subject before us, supposes
mankind to be naturally in a very strange state. And
truly so U does. But it is not Christianity which has put
us into this slate. Whoever wUl consider the raanifold
raiseries, and the extreme wickedness of the world ; that
the best have great wrongnesses wilhin themselves, vvhich
they complain of, and endeavor to amend ; but, that the
generaUty grow raore profligate and corrupt with age :
that heathen moralists thought the present state lo be a
state of punishment ; and, what raight be added, that
* It cannot, I suppose, he imagined, even hy the most cursory
reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed, or implied, in any thing said
in this chapter, that none can have the benefit of the general re
demption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquaint
ed with it in the present Ufe. But, it raay be needful to ; mention,
that several questions, which have been hrought into the subject
before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here ;
questions which have been, I fear, rashly determined, and, perhaps,
with equal rashness, contrary ways. For instance ; Whether God
could have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ,
consistently with the general laws of his government? And, had not
Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condi
tion of the better sort of men ; those just persons over the face of the
earth, for whom Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not
appointed ? The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly am
biguous ; and neither of them can properly be answered, without
going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole
ofthe case. And, perhaps, the very inquiry, what would have foh
lowed if God had not done as he has 1 may have in it some very
great impropriety ; and ought not to be carried ou any farther than is
necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things.
21

242 The Appointment of [Part 2.
the earth, our habitation, has the appearances of being a
ruin : whoever, I say, wiU consider aU these, and some
olher obvious things, wiU think he has Uttie reason to ob
ject against the Scripture account, that raankind is in a
state of degradation ; against this being tbe fact : how dif
ficult soever he may think it to account for, or even to
forrn a distinct conception of, tbe occasions and circum
stances of it. But that the crirae of our first parents
vvas the occasion of our being placed in a raore disad
vantageous condition, is a thing throughout, and particu
larly analogous lo what we see, in the daily course of
natural Providence ; as the recovery of the world, by
the interposition of Christ, has been shown to be so in
general. VI, The particular raanner in which Christ interposed
in the rederaption of the vvorld, or his office as Mediator,
in the largest sense, between God and man, is thus rep
resented to us in the Scripture : " He is the light of the
world;"* the revealer of the vviU of God inthe most
eminent sense : He is a propitiatory sacrifice ;f " the
Larab of God ; "J and as he voluntarily offered himself
up, he is styled our High-priest. § And, which seems of
peculiar weight, he is described beforehand in tbe Old
Testaraent, under the same characters of a priest, and
an expiatory victira. || And whereas it is objected, that
aU this is raerely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of
the IMosaic law, the apostle, on the contrary, affirras, that
the '¦ law was a shadow of good things to corae, and nol
the very image of the things ;V and that the priests that
offer gifts according to the law — serve unto tbe example
and shadow of heavenly things, as Moses was admon
ished of God, when he was about to make the tabema-
* John i. and viii. 12.
t Rom. iii. 2.5, and r. 11. 1 Cor. v. 7. Eph. v. 2. 1 John ii. 2.
Matt. xxvi. 2S.
t John i. 29, 36, and throughout the book of Revelation.
§ Throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews.
II Isa. liii. Dan. ix. 24. Psalm ex. 4. V Heb. x. 1.

Chap, 5,J A Mediator and Redeemer. 243
cle. " For see," saith he, " that thou make aU things
according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount : "*
j. e. the Levitical priesthood vvas a shadow of the priest
hood of Christ, in like raanner as the tabernacle raade
by Moses was according to that showed him in the
Mount, The priesthood of Christ and the tabernacle in
the Mount, were the originals : of the forraer of which,
the Levitical priesthood was a type ; and of the laiter,
the tabernacle raade by Moses vvas a copy. The doctrine
of this epistie, then, plainly is, tiiat the legal sacrifices
were allusions to the great and final atonement to be
raade by the blood of Christ; and not that this was an
allusion to those. Nor can any thing be more express
and determinate, than the following passage : " It is not
possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take
away sin. Wherefore, when he coraeth into the world,
he saith. Sacrifice and offering," i. e. of bulls and of
goats, " thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared
me — Lo, I corae to do thy will, O God. — By which wiU
we are sanctified, through the offering of the body of
Jesus Christ once for aU."f And to add one passage
more of the like kind : " Christ was once offered lo bear
the sms of many ; and unto them tbat look for hira shall
he appear the second tirae, wiihout sin ; " i. e. without
bearing sin, as he did al his first coraing, by being an
offermg for it; wiihout having our iniquities again laid
upon him, wiihout being any raore a sin-offering ; — " Un
to them that look for him shall he appear the second
time, wuhout sin, unto salvation, "J Nor do the inspired
writers at all confine themselves to this raanner of speak
ing concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an
etilcacy in what he did and suffered for us, addhional to,
and beyond raere instruction, exaraple, and government,
in great variety of expression : " That Jesus should die
for that nation," the Jews ; " and not for that nation only,
but that also," plainly by the efficacy of his death, " he
* Heb. viii. 4, 5. t Heb. x. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. J Heb. ix. 28.

244 The Appointment of [Part 2.
should gatiier together in one the children of God that
vvere scattered abroad;"* that "he suffered for sms,
the just for the unjust :"f that " he gave his life, him
self, a ransora : "J that " we are bought, bought with a
price : "§ that " he redeeraed us with' his blood ; re
deemed us frora the curse of the law, being raade a
curse for us: "II that he is our "advocate, intercessor,
and propitiation :"ir that "he was'made perfect (or con
summate) through sufferings; and being thus made per
fect, he became the author of salvation : "** that " God
was in Christ, reconciUng the world to himself,' by the
death of his Son by the cross ; not iraputing their tres
passes unto thera: "f-f- and, lastly, that "through death*'
he destroyed hira that had the povver of death. "JJ Christ,
then, having thus " humbled hiraself, and becorae obedi
ent to death, even the death of the cross, God also hath
highly exahed him, and given hira a name which is above "
every name; hath given aU things into his hands; hath
coraraitted alljudgraent unto him; that aU men should
honor the Son, even as they honor the Father."§§ For,'
" worthy is the Lamb tbat was slain, to receive power,
and riches, and wisdora, and strength, and honor, and
glory, and blessing I And every creature which is in
heaven, and on the earth, heard I, saying. Blessing, and
honor, and glory, and power, be unto hirn that sitteth
upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and
ever! "IIII
These passages of Scripture seem to coraprehend and
express the chief parts of Christ's office, as raediator
between God and raan, so far, I raean, as the naiure of
• John xi. 51, 52. 1 1 ?«*• "i- 18-
X Matt. XX. 28. Mark x. 45. 1 Tim. ii. 6.
§ 2 Pet. ii. 1. Rev. xiv. 4. 1 Cor. vi. 20.
II 1 Pet. i. 19. Rev. v. 9. Gal. iii. 13.
II Heb. vii. 25. 1 Johnii. 1,2. **Heb,|u. 10, and v. 9.
tt 2 Cor. V. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 16.
XX Heb. ii. 14. See also a remarkable passage in the book of Job,
xxxiii. 24. §§ Phil. ii. 8, 9. John iii. 35, and v. 22, 23.
IIII Rev. V. 12, 13.

Chap. 5.J A Mediator and Redeemer. 245
this his office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by
divines under three heads.
F\rst, He was, by way of erainence, the Prophet :
"that Prophet that should corae into the world,"* to de
clare the divine wiU. He published anew the law of na
ture, which men had corrupted ; and the very knowledge
of which, to sorae degree, was lost araong thera. He
taught mankind, taught us authoritatively, to " live sober
ly, righteously and godly in this present world," in
expectation of the future judgraent of God. He confirra
ed the truth of this raoral system of nature, and gave us
additional evidence of it ; the evidence of testimony. t
He distinctiy revealed the raanner in which God would
be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the re
wards and punishraents of a future life. Thus he vvas a
prophet in a sense in which no olher ever was. To
which is lo be added, that he set us a perfect " example,
that we should follow his steps."
Secondly, He has a " kingdom, which is not of this
world." He founded a chprch, to be lo mankind a stand
ing memorial of religion, and invitation to it ; which he
proraised lo be wilh always, even to the end. He exer
cises an invisible government over il, himself, and by his
Spirit ; over that path of -it which is militant here on
earth, a governraent of discipline, " for the perfecting of
the sainls, for the edifying his body ; till we all corae in
llie unity of the failh, and of the knowledge of the Son
of God, unto a perfect raan, unto the measure of the
stature of the fulness of Christ."J Of this church, all
persons scattered over the world, vvho live in obedience
to his laws, are members. For these he is " gone lo
prepare a place, and will come again to receive ihe/n
unto himself, that where he is, there they may be
also; apd reign with him for ever and ever :"|| and Uke-
* John vi. 14. f Page 188, &c. J Eph. iv. 12, 13.
II John xiv 2, 3. Rev. iii. 21, and xi. 15.
21*

246 The Appointment of [Part 2
wise " to take vengeance on thera that know not God,
and obey not his gospel."*
Against these parts of Christ's office, I find no objec
tions but what are fuUy obviated in the beginning of this
Chapter. Lastly, Christ offered hiraself a propuiatory sacrifice,
and made atonement for the sins of the world : which is
mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against
it. Sacrifices of expiation were coraraanded the Jews,
and obtained araongst most other nations, frora tradition,
whose original probably was revelation. And they were
continually repeated, both occasionally and at the returns
of stated tiraes ; and made up great part of the external
religion of raankind, " But now once in the end of the
world Christ appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of
himself,"-]- And this sacrifice was in the highest degree,
and vvith the raost extensive influence, of that efficacy
for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be
supposed to have thought their sacrifices to have been,
and which the Jewish sacrifices really were in some de
gree, and with regard to sorae persons,
Hovv, and in what particular way, it had this efficacy,
there are not wanting persons who have endeavored to
explain ; but I do not find tbat the Scripture has explain
ed it. We seem to be very much in the dark concerning
the manner in which the ancients understood atonement
to be raade, i. e. pardon to be obtained by sacrifices.
And if the Scripture has, as surely it has, left this raatter
of the satisfaction of Christ raysterious, left soraewhat in
it unrevealed, aU conjectures about it raust be, if not
evidentiy absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any
one reason to coraplain for want of farther information,
unless he can show his claim to it,
Sorae have endeavored to explain the efficacy of
vvhat Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what
tiie Scripture has authorized ; others, probably because
• 2 Thess. i. 8. t Heb. ix. 26.

Chap, S.J A Mediator and Redeemer. 247
they could not explain it, have been for taking il away,
and confining his office as Redeeraer of the world, lo his
instruction, exaraple, and governraent of the church;
whereas the doctrine of the gospel appears lo be, not
only that he taught the efficacy of repentance, but ren
dered it of the efficacy which it is, by what he did and
suffered for us : that he obtained for us the benefit of
having our repentance accepted unto eternal life : not
only that he revealed to sinners, that they were in a
capacity of salvation, and how they raight obtain it ; but,
raoreover, tbat he put thera into this capacity of salvation,
by what he did and suflered for thera ; put us inlo a
capacity of escaping future punishraent, and obtaining
future happiness. And it is our wisdora thankfully lo
accept the benefit, by perforraing the conditions upon
which it is offered, on our part, wiihout disputing how it
was procured on his. For,
VII, Since we neither know by what means punish
ment in a future slate vvould have foUowed wickedness in
this ; nor in what manner it would bave been inflicted,
had it nol been prevented; nor all the reasons why its
infiiction would have been needful; nor the particular
nature of tbat state of happiness which Christ is gone
to prepare for his disciples; and since 'we are ignorant
how far any thing which we could do, would, alone and
of itself, have been effectual lo prevent tbat punishment
lo which we are obnoxious, and recover that happiness
which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are not
judges, antecedently to revelation, whether a mediator
was or was not necessary lo obtain those ends ; to pre
vent that future punishraent, and bring mankind to the
final happiness of their naiure. And for the very same
reasons, upon supposition of the necessity of a mediator,
we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the
whole nature of his office, or the several parts of which it
consists ; of what was fit and requisite lo be assigned bira,
in order to accompUsh the ends of divine Providence in
the appointment. And frora hence il follows, that lo

24S The Appointment of [Part 2.
object against the expediency or usefulness of particular
things revealed lo have been done or suffered by him,
because we do not see how they were conducive to
those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is raore com
mon lo be raet with, than this absurdity. But if it be
acknowledged beforehand, that we are not judges in the
case, it is evident that no objection can, wilh any shadow
of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's
mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, tifl it can be
shown positively, not to be requisite, or conducive, lo the
ends proposed lo be accompUshed ; or that it is in itself
unreasonable. And there is one objection made against the satisfaction
of, Christ, which looks lo be of this positive kind; that
the doctrine of his being appointed to suffer for ihe sins
of the world, represents God as being indifferent vvhether
he punished the innocent or the guilty. Now, from the
foregoing observations, we may see tbe extrerae slighl-
ness of all such objections ; and (ihough it is raost cer
tain all who raake thern do not see the consequence) that
tbey conclude altogether as much against God's whole
original constitution of naiure, and the whole daily course
of divine Providence, in the government of the world, i. e.
against the whole scherae of theisra and the whole notion
of religion, against Christianity, For the world is a
constitution, or systera, whose parts have a rautual re
ference to each otber; and there is. a scheme of things
gradually carrying on, called the course of nature, lo the
carrying on of vvhich God has appointed us, in various
ways, lo contribute. And when, in the daily course of
natural providence, it is appointed that innocent people
should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is Uable to
the very same objection as the instance we are now con
sidering. The infinitely greater importance of that ap
pointraent of Chrislianity which is objected against, does
not hinder but it raay be, as it plainly is, an appointment
of the very sarae kind with what the world affords us
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at aU

Chap. 5,J A Mediator and Redeemer. 249
in the objection, il vvould be stronger, in one respect,
against natural providence, than against Christianity ; be-
¦cause, under the forraer, vve are in raany cases coraraand
ed, and even necessitated, whethei" vve will or no, to suf
fer for the faults of others ; whereas the sufferings of
Christ were voluntary. The world's being under the
righteous government of God, does indeed iraply, that
finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive ac
cording to his personal deserts ; and the general doctrine
ofthe whole Scripture is, that this shall be the corapletion
ofthe divine governraent. But, during the progress,
and, for aught we know, even in order to the corapletion
of this moral scheme, vicarious punishraents raay be fit,
and absolutely necessary. Men, by their folUes, run
themselves into extrerae .^i^ress; inlo difficulties vvhich
would be absolutely fatal to them, vvere it not for the in
terposition and assistance of others, God coraraands by
tlie law of nature, that we afford thera this assistance, in
many cases where vve cannot do it without very great
pains, and labor, and sufferings to ourselves. And we
see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings con
tribute lo the relief of anoiher; and how, or by what
particular raeans, this comes to pass, or follows, from the
constitution and laws of naiure, which come under our
notice ; and being farailiarized to it, men are not shocked
with it. So that the reason of their insisting upon ob
jections of the foregoing kind, against the satisfaction of
Clitist, is, eilher that they do not consider God's settled
and uniform appointment as his appointments at all, or else
they forget that vicarious punishmeni is a providential ap
pointment of every day's experience : and then, frora their
being unacquainted with tiie more general laws of nature,
or divine governraent over the world, and not seeing how
the sufferings of Christ could contribute lo the rederaption
of it, unless by arbhrary and tyrannical wiU, they conclude
his sufferings could not contribute to it any olher way.
And yet, what has been often alleged in justification of
this doctrine, even frora the apparent natural tendency

250 The Appointment of [Part 2.
of this raethod of our rederaption — its tendency lo vindi
cate the authority of God's laws, and deter his creatures
frora sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is, I
think, plainly unanswerable : though I am far frora think
ing it an account of the whole ofthe case. But wiihout
taking this into consideration, it abundantly appears, from
the observations above made, that this objection is, not
an objection against Christianity, but against the whole
general constitution of nature. And if it were to be
considered as an objection against Christianity, or, con
sidering it as it is, an objection against the consthution of
nature, it amounts to no more in conclusion than this,
that a divine appoiniraent cannot be necessary, or expe
dient, because the objector does nol discern it lo be so ;
ihough he must own that iheii nature of the case is such,
as renders bim incapable of judging whether it be so or
not; or of seeing it to be necessary, ihough it were so.
It is, indeed, a matter of great patience to reasonable
men, to find people arguing in this manner ; objecting
against the credibility of such particular things revealed
in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expe
diency of thera. For, though it is highly right, and the
most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire with
due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's dispen
sations ; yet, when those reasons are concealed, lo argue
frora our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be
frora God, is infinitely absurd. The presuraption ofthis
kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them.
And the folly of thera is yet greater, vvhen they are
urged, as usually they are, against things in Christianity
analogous, or like to those natural dispensations of Provi
dence, which are raatter of experience. Let reason be
kept to ; and, if any part of the Scripture account of
the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to
be really contrary to il, let the Scripture, in the name of
God, be given up : but let not such poor creatures as we,
go on objecting against an infinite scherae, that we do
not see the necessity or usefulness of all hs- parts, and
call this reasoning ; and, which still farther heightens the

Chap. S.J A Mediator and Redeemer. 251
absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not ac
tively concerned in. For, it raay be worth raentioning.
Lastly, Tbat nol only the reason of the thing, but the
whole analogy of nature, should teach us, nol to expect
to have the like information concerning the divine con
duct, as concerning our own duly. God instructs us by
experience, (for it is not reason, but experience, vvhich
instructs us) vvhat good or bad consequences wiU follow
from our acting in such and such manners ; and by tbis
he directs us how we are lo behave ourselves. But,
though vve are sufficiently instructed for the common
purposes of life, yet il is but an alraost infinitely small
part of natural providence vvhich vve are at all let into.
The case is the sarae vvith regard to revelation. ' The
doctrine of a Mediator between God and raan, againsl
which it is objected, that the expediency of sorae things
in it is not understood, relates only to what was done on
God's part in the appoiniraent, and on the Mediator's in
the execution of it. For what is required of us, in con
sequence of this gracious dispensation, is another subject,
inwhich none can coraplain for want of inforraation.
The constitution of the world, and God's natural govern
ment over it, is aU raystery, as rauch as the Christian dis
pensation. Yet under the first, he has given raen all
things pertaining to life ; and under the other, aH things
pertaining unto godliness. And, it may be added, that
there is nothing hard lo be accounted for in any of the
common precepts of Christianity ; though, if there were,
surely a divine coraraand is abundantly sufficient to lay
ns under the strongest obligations to obedience, Butthe
fact is, that the reasons of aU the Christian precepts are
evident. Positive institutions are raanifestly necessary
to keep up and propagate religion araongst raankind.
And our duty lo ChrijJ, the internal and external wor
ship of hira ; this part of the religion of the gospel raani
festly arises out of what he has done and suffered, his
authority and dorainion, and the relation vvhich he is re-
, vealed to stand in to us,*
* Pages 193 194, &c.

252 Religion not Universal : [Part 2,

CHAP. VI.
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation ; and of
the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it.
It has been thought by sorae persons, that if the evi
dence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into
a positive arguraent against it ; because it cannot be sup
posed, that, if it were true, it would be left to subsist
upon doubtftd evidence. And tiie objection against reve
lation, frora its not being universal, is often insisted upon
as of great weight.
Novv, the weakness of these opinions raay be shown,
by observing tbe suppositions on which they are founded,
which are really such as these ; — thatit cannotbe thought
God would have bestowed any favor at all upon us, un
less in the degree which, we think, he might, and which,
we iraagine, would be most to our particular advantage;
and also, that it cannot be thought he would bestow a
favor upon any, unless he bestowed the sarae upon all:
suppositions which we find contradicted, not by a few
instances in God's natural govemraent of the world, but
by the general analogy of nature together.
Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as
doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive
arguraent against it, should be put upon considering, what
that evidence indeed is, which tljpy act upon whh re
gard to their teraporal interests. For, it is not only ex
treraely difficult, but, in many cases, absolutely impossi
ble, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and un
easiness, so as to be able to say, on which side the over-

Chap, 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 253
plus is. There are the like difficulties and impossibiU
ties, in raaking the due allowances for a change of tem
per and taste, for satiety, disgusts, ill health ; any of
which render raen capable of enjoying, after they have
obtained, what they raost eagerly desired. Nuraberless,
too, are the accidents, besides that one of untiraely death,
which may even probably disappoint the best concerted
schemes ; and strong objections are often seen lo Ue
against thera, not to be reraoved or answered, bul which
seera overbalanced by reasons on the olher side ; so as
that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit
are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon ac
count of the appearing greater advantages in case of siic-
¦ cess, though there be but lillie probability of it. Lastly,
Every one observes our liableness, if vve be not upon
our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of raen, and
the false appearances of things ; and this danger raust
be greatly increased, if there be a strong bias wilhin,
suppose frora indulged passion, to favor the deceit.
Hence arises that great uncertainly and doubtfulness of
proof, wherein our teraporal interest really consists ; what
are the most probable means of attaining it ; and whether
those means will eventually be successful. And num
berless instances there are, in the daily course of Ufe, in
which all men think it reasonable lo engage in pursuits,
though the probability is greatly against succeeding ; and
to make such provision for themselves, as it is supposable
they may have occasion for, though the plain acknow
ledged probability is, that they never shall. Then those
who think tbe objection against revelation, frora its light
not being universal, to , be of weight, should observe,
tiial the Author of nature, in nuraberless instances, be
stows that upon sorae, which he does not upon others,
who seera equally lo sland in need of it. Indeed, he
appears to bestow all his gifts, wilh the most promiscuous
variety, among creatures ofthe sarae species : health and
strenglh, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means
of iraproveraent, riches, and all external advantages.
22

254 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2.
And as there are not any two raen found of exactly like
shape and features, so, it is probable, there are not any
two of an exactly like constitution, teraper, and situa
tion, with regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet,
notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties, God
does exercise a natural governraent over the world ;
and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent
insthulion of Ufe, vvith regard to our heahh and our af
fairs, under that his natural governraent.
As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have
been universal, and as they have been afforded to a
greater or less part of the world, at different times, so,
likewise, at different tiraes, both revelations have had
different degrees of evidence. The Jews who Uved
during the succession of prophets, that is, frora Moses till
after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of
their religion, than those had vvho lived in the interval
between the last raentioned period and the coming of
Christ, And the first Christians had higher evidence of
the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than
what we have now. They had also a strong presump
tive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater
force, in way of argument, than many may think, of
which we have very little remaining ; I raean, the pre
suraptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it
had upon the lives of the generality of its professors.
And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of
it, which tiiey could not have, from the conformity be
tween the prophetic history, and tbe state of the world,
and of Christianity. And farther : If we were to sup
pose the evidence, which some have of religion, lo
amount lo lillie raore than seeing that it raay be true,
but that they remain in great doubts and uncertainties
about both its evidence and its nature, and greal per
plexities concerning the rule of life ; others to have a
full conviction of the truth of religion, with a distinct
knowledge of their duty ; and others severally to have
aU the intermediate degrees of religious Ught and evi-

Chap. 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 255
dence, which lie between these two — If we put the case,
that for the present it was intended revelation should be
no more thaii a sraafl light, in the raidst of a world
greatiy overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance
and darkness ; that certain gliraraerings of this light
should extend, and be directed, to remote distances, in
such a manner as that those who really partook of it
should not discern frora whence it originally carae ; that
some, in a nearer situation to it, should have its light ob
scured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted ;
and that others should be placed within its clearer influ
ence, and be rauch raore enlivened, cheered, and di
rected by it ; but yet, that even lo these it should be no
more than " a light shining in a dark place :" all this
would be perfectly uniform and of a piece wilh the con
duct of Providence, in the distribution of its other bless
ings. If the fact of the case really were, that some have
received no light at all from the Scripture ; - as many ages
and countries in the heathen world : that others, though
they have, by means of it, had essential or natural re
ligion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never
had the genuine Scripture revelation, with its real evi
dence, proposed to their consideration ; and the ancient
Persians and modern Mahometans raay possibly be in
stances of people in a situation somewhat like lo this .:
that others, though they have had the Scriptiire laid be
fore tbem as of divine revelation, yet have had it with
the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated,
the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with
false miracles, as to leave the raind in the utraost doubt
fulness and uncertainly about the whole ; which may be
the state of sorae thoughtful raen in most of those na
tions who call themselves Christian : and, lastly, that
others have had Christianity offered lo thera in its genu
ine siraplicity, and with its proper evidence, as persons
in countries and churches of civU and of Christian Ub
erty ; but, however, that even these persons are lefl in
great ignorance in many respects, and have by no means

256 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2.
light afforded thera enough lo satisfy their curiosity, but
only to regulate their life, lo leach thera their duty, and
encourage thera in the careful discharge^of it : I say, if
we were to suppose this soraewhat of a general true ac
count of the degrees of moral and religious Ught and
evidence, which were intended to be afforded raankind,
and of what has actually been and is their situation, in
their moral and religious capacity, there vvould be nothing
in all this ignorance, doubtfulness, and uncertainty, in aU
these varieties and supposed disadvantages of some in
coraparison of others, respecting religion, but raay be
paralleled by raanifest analogies in the natural dispensa
tions, of Providence at present, and considering ourselves
raerely in our temporal capacity.
Nor is there any thing shocking in aU tbis, or which
would seera to bear hard upon the raoral adrainistration
in nature, if we would really keep in mind, that every
one shall be dealt equitably whh ; instead of forgetting
this, or explaining it away, after it is acknowledged in
words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed aU harsh ap
pearances, in this various econoray of Providence, would
be lost, if we would keep in mind, that every raerciful
allowance shall be raade, and no more be required of any
one, than what might have been equitably expected of
hira, frora the circumstances in which he was placed ; and
not what might have been expected, had he been placed
in other circumstances : i. e. in Scripture language, that
every raan shall be " accepted according to what he had,
nol according to what he had not."* This, however,
doth not by any raeans iraply, that aU persons' condition
here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity.
And Providence's designing lo place sorae in greater
darkness with respect to religious knowledge, is no raore
a reason why they should nol endeavor to gel oul of that
darkness, and others to bring thera out of ft, than why ig
norant and slow people, in raatters of other knowledge,
* 2 Cor. viii. 12.

Chap. 6.J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 257
should not endeavor to learn, or should not be in
structed. It is not unreasonable to suppose, that the same wise
and good principle, whatever it vvas, which disposed the
Author of nature lo make diflerent kinds and orders of
creatures, disposed hira also to place creatpres of like
kinds in different sUuations ; and that the sarae,principle
which disposed him to make creatures of different moral
capacities, disposed him also to place creatures of like
moral capacities in different religious situations ; and even
the same creatures, in different periods of their being.
And the account or reason of this, is also most probably
the account why the constitution of things is such, as that
creatures of raoral natures or capacities, for a considera
ble part of that duration in which they are living agents,
are nol at aU subjects of raorality and reUgion ; but grow
up to be so, and grow up to be so raore and more, grad
ually from childhood lo mature age.
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these
things, we must be greatiy in the dark, were it only that
we know so very Uitle even of our own case. Our pres
ent state raay possibly be the consequence of soraewhat
past, which we are wholly ignorant of; as it has a refer
ence to somewhat lo come, oi which we know scarce any
more than is necessary for practice. A system or con
stitution, in its notion, impUes variety ; and so complicated
a one as this world, very great variety. So that were
revelation universal, yet from men's different capacities
of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives,
their different educations and other external circumstances,
and from their difference of teraper and bodily constitu
tion ; their religious sftualions would be widely different,
and the disadvantage of sorae in comparison of olhers,
perhaps, altogether as much as at present. And the true
account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of
mankind, are placed in this condition of ignorance, must
be supposed also the true account of our farther igno
rance, in not knowing the reasons why, or whence it is,
22*

258 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2.
that they are placed in thjs condition. But the following
practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration
of those persons, who think the circumstances of raan
kind, or their own, inthe foreraentioned respects, a ground
of complaint.
First, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious,
may constitute one particular part of some raen's trial in
the religious sense ; as it gives scope for a virtuous exer
cise, or vicious neglect, of their understanding, in exara
ining or not examining into that evidence. There seems no
possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state of
moral probation, wilh regard lo the exercise of our under
standing upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard
to our behaviour in comraon affairs. The former is as much
a thing within our power and choice as the laiter. And I
suppose il is to be laid down for certain, that the same
character, the same inward principle, which, after a man
is convinced of the Irujh of religion, renders him obe
dient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus con
vinced, set hira about an examination of it, upon its sys
tem and evidence being offered to his thoughts; and that
in the laiter slate, his exaraination would be with an ira
partiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable lo
vvhat his obedience is in the forraer. And as inattention,
negligence, want of all serious concern, about a matter
of such a nature and such importance, when offered to
men's consideration, is, before a distinct conviction of its
truth, as real iraraoral depravity and dissoluteness, as
neglect of religious practice after such conviction; so,
active solicitude about it, and fair irapartial consideration
of its evidence before such conviction, is as really an ex
ercise of a morally right temper, as is religious practice
after. Thus, that reUgion is not intuftively true, bul a
matter of deduction and inference; that a conviction of
its truth is not forced upon every one, but left lo be, by
some, collected vvith heedful attention to preraises ; this
as rauch constitutes religious probation, as rauch affords
sphere, scope, opportunity, for right and wrong beha-

Chap, 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 259
viour, as any thing whatever does. And their manner of
treating this subject, when laid before thera, shows what
is in their heart, and is an exertion of il.
Secondly, It appears lo be a thing as evident, though
it is not so rauch attended lo, that if, upon consideration
of religion, the evidence of it should seera lo any persons
doubtful, in the highest supposable degree, even this doubt
ful evidence vviU, however, put thera inlo a general state
of probation, in the raoral and religious sense. For, sup
pose a raan to be really in doubt, whether such a person
had not done hira the greatest favor; or, whether his
whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person ;
no one who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence,
could possibly consider himself in the same situation,
witii regard to such person, as if he had no suqli doubt.
In truth, it is as just to say, that certainty and do jp are the
same, as to say, the situations now mentioned vvould leave
a man as entirely at liberty, in point of gratitude or pru
dence, as he would be, vvere he certain he had received
no favor from such person, or that he no vvay depended
upon him. And thus, though the evidence of religion
which is afforded to some raen, should be little raore than
that they are given to see the systera of Christianity, or
religion in general, to be supposable and credible, this
ought in all reason lo beget a serious practical apprehen
sion-thai it raay be true. And even this wifl afford raat
ter of exercise, for religious suspense and deliberation,
for raoral resolution and self-governraent ; because the
apprehension that religion may be true, does as really lay
men under obligations, as a full conviction that it is true.
Il gives occasion and raotives to consider farther the ira
portant subject ; to preserve attentively upon their rainds
a general iraplicit sense that they raay be under divine
moral governraent, an awful solicitude about reUgion,
whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought
to turn raen's eyes lo every degree of new light which
may be had, frora whatever side il coraes, and induce them
to refrain, in the mean time, from all immoralities, and

260 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2,
Uve in the conscientious practice of every coraraon virtue.
Especially are they bound to keep al the greatest distance
frora aU dissolute profaneness ; for this the very naiure
of the case forbids ; and to treat with highest reverence
a raatter upon which their own whole interest and being,
and the fate of nature depends. This behaviour, and an
active endeavor to raaintain within theraselves this tera
per, is the business, the duly, and the wisdora of those
persons, vvho coraplain of the doubtfulness of religion ; is
what they are under the raost proper obligations lo : and
such behaviour is an exertion of, and has a tendency lo
iraprove in thera, that character, which the practice of aU
the several duties of religion, frora a fuU conviction of
its truth, is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve
in others ; others, I say, to whora God has afforded such
convictidii. Nay, considering the infinite iraportance of
religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it rnay be said
in general, that whoever will weigh the matter thoroughly,
may see there is not near so much difference as is com
monly iraagined, between what ought in reason lo be the
rule of life, to those persons who are fully convinced of
its truth, and to those who have only a serious doubting
apprehension that it may be true. Their hopes, and fears,
and obligations, will be in various degrees ; bul, as the
subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the sarae, so
the subject-matter of their obligations, whaf they are
bound to do and to refrain frora, is not so very unUke,
It is to be observed farther, that, from a character of
understanding, or a situation of influence in the world,
sorae persons have it in their power lo do infinitely raore
harra or good, by setting an example of profaneness, and
avowed disregard to all religion, or, on the contrary,
of a serious, ihough perbaps doubting, apprehension of its
truth, and of a reverend regard to ft under ibis doubtful
ness, than they can do by acting weU or ill in all the com
mon intercourses amongst mankind; and consequently
they are raost highly accountable for a behaviour, which,
they raay easily foresee, is of such iraportance, and in

» Chap. 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 261
which there is most plainly a right and a wrong ; even
admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is
pretended. The ground of these observations, and that which ren
ders thera just and true, is, that doubting necessarily im
plies sorae degree of evidence for that of which we doubt.
For no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of
a number of facts so and so circumstanced, which should
accidentally corae into his thoughts, and of which he had
no evidence at aU. And thoiigh in the case of an even
chance, and where consequently we were in doubt, we
should in coraraon language say, that we had no evidence
at all for either side ; yet that sUuation of things which
renders it an even chance and no more, that such an event
wiU happen, renders this case equivalent to all others,
where there is such evidence on hoth sides of a question,*
as leaves the mind in doubt, concerning the truth. In
deed, in aU these cases, there is no raore evidence on the
one side than on the other ; but there is (what is equiva
lent to) much raore for either, than for the trulh of a num
ber of facts which corae into one's thoughts at random.
And thus, in aU these cases, doubt as much presupposes
evidence, lower degrees of evidence, as.belief presuppo
ses higher, and certainty higher stUl. Any one, who will
a little attend to the naiure of evidence, will easily carry
this observation on, and see, that between no evidence
al aU, and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt,
tiiere are as many intermediate degrees, as there are
between that degree which is the ground of doubt, and
deraonstration. And, tbough we have not faculties to
distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of
exactness, yet, in proportion as they are discerned, they
ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an im
perfection in the moral character, not to be influenced in
practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned,
as ft is in the understanding, not to discern it. And as, in
* Introduction.

262 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2.
aU subjects which men consider, they discern the lower
as well as higher degrees of evidence, proportionably to
their capacity of understanding ; so, in practical subjects,
they are influenced in practice by the lower as weU as
higher degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and
honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the under
standing, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence,
are in danger of overlooking evidence when itis nol glar
ing, and are easily imposed upon in such cases ; so, in
proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem ca
pable of satisfying themselves wilh having no regard in
practice to evidence acknowledged real, if it be not over
bearing. Frora these things it raust follow, that doubting
concerning reUgion implies such a degree of evidence for ,
it, as, joined wilh the consideration of its iraportance, un
questionably lays raen under the obligations before men
tioned, to have a dutiful regard to it in aU their beha
viour. Thirdly, The difficulties in which the evidence of re
ligion is involved, which sorae coraplain of, is no more
a just ground of coraplaint, than the external circum
stances of teraptation, which others are placed in ; or
than difficulties in the practice of it, after a full convic
tion of its truth. Temptations render our stale a more
iraproving state of discipline* than it would be otherwise;
as they give occasion for a raore attentive exercise of
the virtuous principle, which confirras and strengthens it
more than an easier or less attentive exercise of it
could. Now, speculative difficulties are, in this respect,
of the very sarae nature with these external teraptations.
For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is,
to sorae persons, a temptation to reject il, without any
consideration at aU ; and therefore requires such an at
tentive exercise of the virtuous principle, seriously to
consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for,
but for such temptation. And the supposed doubtful-
* Part i. chap. 5.

Chap. 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 263
ness of hs evidence, after it has been in some sort con
sidered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind, of ex-
pjaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, that
evidence vvhich it might see ; and also for raen's en
couraging iheraselves in vice, from hopes of impunity,
though they do clearly see thus rauch at least, that these
hopes are uncertain : in Uke manner as the comraon
temptation to raany instances of folly, which end in tem
poral infamy aud ruin, is the ground for hope of not
being delected, and of escaping vvith irapunity ; i. e. the
doubtfulness of the proof beforehand, that such foolish,
behaviour wiU thus end in infamy and ruin. On the
contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of re
ligion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of
the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding theraselves up to
the proper influence of any real evidence, though doubt-,
ful ; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though
under some uncertainty, whether the governraent in the
universe may not possibly be such, as that vice may es
cape witii irapunity. And, in general, temptation, mean
ing by this word the lesser allurements to wrong, and
difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the;
greater ones ; teraptation, I say, as such, and of every.
kind and degree, as il calls forth sorae virtuous efforts,
additional to what would otherwise have been wanting,
cannot but be an additional discipUne and improveraent
of virtue, as weU as probation of il, in tbe other senses
of that word,* So that the very sarae account is lo be
given, why the evidence of religion should be left in
such a raanner, as to require, in some, an attentive, soU
citous, perhaps painful, exercise of their understanding
aboutit; as why olhers should be placed in such cir
cumstances, as that the practice of its coraraon duties,
after a fuU conviction of the truth of it, should require
attention, solicitude, and pains : or, why appearing doubt
fulness should be permitted to afford matter of tempta-
* Part i. chap. 4, and page 151.

264 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2,
tion to sorae ; as why external difficulties and aUure
ments should be perraUled to afford raatter of temptation
to others. The same account also is lo be given, why
some should be exercised with temptations of both these
kinds, as why olhers should be exercised wilh the latter
in such very high degrees, as some have been, particular
ly as the priraitive Christians were.
Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing,
that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of
religion is involved, may make even the principal part of
sorae persons' trial. For, as the chief temptations of
the generality of tbe world, are, the ordinary motives to
injustice or unrestrained pleasure ; or to Uve in the
neglect of religion frora that frarae of raind, which ren
ders raany persons alraost wiihout feeling as to any thing
distant, or which is not the object of their senses ; so
there are other persons without this shallowness of tem
per, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and
future, who not only see, but have a general practical
feeling, that what is lo corae will be present, and that
things are not less real for their not being the objects of
sense ; and who, frora their natural constitution of body
and of teraper, and frora their external condition, may
have small temptations to behave iU, sraaU difficulty in
behaving weU, in the coramon course of life. Now,
when these latter persons have a distinct, full conviction
of the truth of religion, without any possible doubts or
difficuhies, the practice of it is lo them unavoidable,
unless they will do a constant violence to their own
minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline lo
thera, than it is lo creatures in a stale of perfection.
Yet these persons raay possibly sland in need of moral
discipline and exercise in a higher degree, than they
would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it
may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they
should give some further manifestation* what is their
* Page 151.

Chap. 6,J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 266
moral character, to the creation of God, than such a
practice of it would be. Thus, in the great varieiy of
religious situations in vvhich men are placed, what con
stitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes the pro
bation, in aU senses, of some persons, raay be the dif
ficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved ;
and their principal and distinguished trial may be, how
they wiU behave under and vvith respect lo these dif
ficulties. Circumstances in raen's situalion in their tem
poral capacity, analogous in good measure to this, re
specting reUgion, are to be observed. We find, sorae
persons are placed in such a situation in the world, as
that their chief difficulty, with regard to conduct, is not
the doing what is prudent when it is known; for this,
in numberiess cases, is as easy as the contrary : but to
some, the principal exercise is, recollection, and being
upon their guard against deceits, the deceits, suppose, of
those about them ; against false appearances of reason and
prudence. To persons in sorae situations, the princi
pal exercise, with respect to conduct, is attention, in order
to inforra theraselves what is proper, what is really the
reasonable and prudent part to act.
But as I have hitherlo gone upon supposition, that
men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion, is
not ov/ing to their neglects or prejudices; it must
be added, on the other hand, in aU common reason,
and as what the truth of the case plainly requires
should be added, that such dissatisfaction possibly may
be owing to those, possibly may be men's own fault.
For, If there are any persons, who never set theraselves
heartily, and in earnest, to be informed in religion ; if
there are any, who secretly wish it raay not prove true,
and are less allenlive to evidence than to difficulties, and
more to objections than to vvhat is said in answer to them ;
these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of
seeing the evidence.of religion, though it were raost cer-
23

266 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2,
tainly true, and capable of being ever so fully proved.
If any accustom themselves to consider this subject usu
ally in tiie way of mirth and sport ; if they attend to
forms and representations, and inadequate manners of
expression, iristead of the real things intended by thera,
(for signs often can be no more than inadequately ex
pressive of the things signified ;) or if they substitute hu
man errors in the roora of divine truth ; why may not
all, or any of these things, hinder sorae raen from seeing
that evidence which really is seen by otbers ; as a like
turn of mind, wilh respect to matters of coraraon specu
lation and practice, does, we find by experience, hinder
them frora attaining tiiat knowledge and right understand
ing, ih matters of coraraon speculation and practice,
which raore fair and attentive rainds attain to.' And the
effect wUl be the same, whether their neglect of seriously
considering the evidence of religion, and their indirect
behaviour with regard lo it, proceed frora raere careless
ness, or frora the grosser vices ; or whether it be owing
to this, tbat forms, and figurative raanners of expression,
as well as errors, administer occasions of ridicule, when
the things intended, and the trulh itself, would not. Men
may indulge a ludicrous turn so fa.r, as lo lose aU sense
of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even, as
it seems, to impair their faculty of reason. And in gen
eral, levity, carelessness, passion, and prejudice,' do hin
der us from being rightly inforraed, wilh respect to com
mon things ; and they may, in like raanner, and perhaps
in some farther providential manner, with respect to
raoral and religious subjects;, raay hinder evidence frora
being laid before us, and frora being seen when it is.
The Scripture* does declare, " that every one shaU nol
* Dan. xii. 10. See also Isa. xxix. 13, 14. Matt. vl. 23, and xi.
25, and xui. 11, 12. John iii. 9. John v. 44. 1 Cor. ii. 14, and 2
Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 13 ; and that affectionate, as vpell as authori
tative admonition, so very many times inculcated, " He that hath ears
to hear, let him hear." Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in
these and other passages of Scripture of the Uke sense, as to say, that

Chap, 6.J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 267
understand," And it makes no difference by what provi
dential conduct this comes to pass ; whetiier the evidence
of Christianity was, originally and with design, put and
left so, as that those who are desirous of evading moral
obUgations, should not see it, and that honest-minded
persons should ; or whether it comes to pass by any other
means. Farther : The general proot of natural religion and of
Christianity, does, I think, lie level to comrnon raen ;
even those, the greatest part of whose tirae, from child
hood to old age, is taken up with providing, for them
selves and their families, the comraon conveniences,
perhaps necessaries of life ; those, I raean, of this rank,
who ever think at aU of asking after proof, or attending
to il. Common men, were they as much in earnest
about reUgion as about their teraporal affairs, are capable
of being convinced upon real evidence, that there is a
God who governs the world ; and they feel theraselves
to be of a moral nature, and accountable creatures.
And as Christianity entirely faUs in with this their natural
sense of things ; so they are capable, not only of being
persuaded, but of being rnade to see, that there is evi
dence of rairacles wrought in attestation of it, and many
appearing completions of prophecy. But though this
proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections,
and may be run up into difficulties ; which, however,
persons • who are capable, not only of talking of, but of
reaUy seeing, are capable also of seeing through ; i. e.
not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy
their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not capa
ble wilh respect to any one thing in nature ; but capable
of seeing that the proof is not lost in these difficulties, or
destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough ex
amination into religion, with regard to these objections,
flie proof given us of Christianity was less than it might have been,
for this very purpose : Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis' esset
lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur. De Ver, R. C.
L. 2, towards the end.

268 Revelation not Universal : [Part 2,
which cannot be the business of every raan, is a raatter
of pretty large compass, and from the naiure of it, re
quires sorae knowledge, as well as time and attention, to
see how the evidence comes but, upon balancing one
thing wfth another, and what, upon the whole, is the
araount of it. Now, if persons who have picked up
these objections frora others, and lake for granted they
are of weight, upon the word of those frora whom they
received thera, or, by often retailing of thera, corae to
see, or fancy they see, thera to be of weight, will not
prepare theraselves for such an examination, with a com
petent degree of knowledge ; or will not give that time
and attention to the subject, which, frora the nature of it,
is necessary for attaining such information : in this case,
they must reraain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error;
in the sarae way as they must, with regard to coraraon
sciences, and matters of coramon life, if they neglect the
necessary means of being informed in thera.
But StiU, perhaps, it will be objected, that if a prince
or coraraon raaster were to send directions to a servant,
he would take care, that they should always bear the
certain raarks who they carae from, and that their sense
shonid be always plain ; so as tbat there should be no
possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the author
ity or meaning of thera. Now, the proper answer to aU
this kind of objections is, that, wherever the fallacy lies,
il is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to
Hira who is the governor of the world ; and particularly,
that he does not afford us such inforraation, wUh respect
to our temporal affairs and interests, as experience abun
dantly shows. However, there is a full answer to this
objection, from tbe very nature of religion. For, the
reason why a prince would give his directions in this
plain manner, is, that he absolutely desires sucb an ex
ternal action should be done, without concerning hiraself
with the motive or principle upon which it is done : i. e.
he regards only the external event, or the thing's being
done, and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it, or

Chap. 6.J Supposed Deficiency in its Proof. 269
rile action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion
consisting raerely in action itself, there is no sort of par
allel between the cases. But if the prince be supposed
to regard only the action ; i. e. only to desire to exercise,
or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyally of a
servant, he would not always give his orders in such a
plain manner. It may be proper to add, that tiie vvill of
God, respecting morality and religion, may be considered,
either as absolute, or as only conditional. If it be abso-
kite, it can only be thus, that we should act virtuously in
such given circurastances; not tbat vve should be brought
to act so, by bis changing of our circumstances. And if
God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the
lughest and^strictest sense, lo do or lo contradict his will ;
which is a most weighty consideration. Or his will may
be considered only as conditional, — that if we act so and
so, we shaU be rewarded ; if otherwise, punished : of
which conditional vvUl of the Author of nature, the whole
constitution of it affords most certain instances. ,
Upon the whole : That vve are in a state of religion
necessarily iraplies, that we are in a slate of probation :
And the credibility of our being, at aU in such a slate
being adraitted, there seeras no peculiar difficulty in sup
posing our probation to be, just as il is, in those respects
which are above objected against. There seeras no pre
tence from the reason of the thing, to say, that the trial
cannot equitably be any thing, but whether persons will
act suitably lo certain inforraation, or such as admits no
room for doubt; so as that there can be no danger of
miscarriage, but either frora their not attending to what
they certainly know, or frora overbearing passion hurry
ing them on to act contrary to il. For, since ignorance
and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses, as real
ly as intuitive conviction or certainty ; and since the two
former are lo be put to the sarae account as difficulties in
practice ; raen's raoral probation raay also be, whether
they wiU take due care to inforra iheraselves by irapar
tial consideration, and afterwards whether they wiU act
23*

270 Revelation not Universal, ^c. [Part 2.
as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have,
however doubtfiil. And this, we find by experience, is
frequently our probation,* in our teraporal capacity.
For the information which we want, with regard to our
woridly interests, is by no means always given us of course,
without any care of our own. And vve are greatly liable
to self-deceit frora inward secret prejudices, and also lo
the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge what
is the prudent part, often requires rauch and difficuk con
sideration. Then, after we have judged the very best
we can, the evidence upon which we raust act, if we
will Uve and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very
high degree. And the constitution and course of the
.world in fact is such, as that want of irapartial considera
tion what we have to do, and venturing upon extravagant
courses, because it is doubtful what will be the conse
quence,- are often naturally, i. e. providentially, altogether
as fatal, as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention
to what we certainly know, or disregarding it frora over
bearing passion.
Several of the observations bere made raay weUseem
strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good raen. But
if the persons for whose sake they are raade, think so ;
persons who object as above, and throw off all regard
to religion under pretence of want of evidence; I de
sire thera to consider again whether their thinking so, be
owing to any thing uninteUigible in these observations, or
to their own not having such a sense of religion and se
rious soUcitude about it, as even their slate of scepticism
does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon
the reflection of these persons that our naiure and condi
tion necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to
act upon evidence rauch lower than what is coramonly
called probable ; to guard, not only against what we ful
ly believe vvill, but also against vvhat vve think it supposa
ble may, happen; and to engage in pursuits when the
probability is greatly against success, if ft be credible
that possibly we may succeed in them,
* Pages 91, 262, 265, 266.

271

CHAP. VII.
Ofthe particular Evidence for Christianity,
The presumptions against revelation, and objections
against the general scheme of Christianity, and particular
things relating lo il, being reraoved, there reraains to be
considered, what positive evidence we have for the truth
of it : chiefly in order to see, what the analogy of nature
suggests with regard to that evidence, and the objections
against U ; or to see what is, and is aUowed to be, the
plain natural rule of judgment and of action, in our tem
poral concerns, in cases vvhere we havethe same kind of
evidence, and the sarae kind of objections against il, that
we have in the case before us.
Now, in the evidence of Christianity, there seera to be
several things of great weight, not reducible lo the head,
eilher of rairacles, or the corapletion of prophecy, in the
common acceptation of the words. But these two are fts
direct and fundaraental proofs ; and those other things,
however considerable they are, yet ought never to be
urged apart frora its direct proofs, but always lo be joined
¦with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity wiU be a
long series of things, reaching, as it seeras, from the
beginning of the world ter the present time, of great
variety and corapass, taking in both the direct, and also
the coUateral proofs, and making up, all of them to
gether, one argument ; the conviction arising from which
kind of proof raay be corapared to what they call the
effect in architecture or olher works of art ; a result from
a great nuraber of things so and so disposed, and taken

272 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
into one view. I shall therefore, _/irs<, make sorae obser
vations relating to rairacles, and the appearing comple
tions of prophecy ; and consider what analogy suggests,
in answer to the objections brought against this evidence.
And, secondly, I shall endeavor to give some account of
the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of
the direct and collateral evidence, considered as raaking
up one arguraent; this being the kind of proof, upon
which we deterraine raost questions of difficulty concern
ing coraraon facts, aUeged to have happened, or seeming
likely to happen ; especially questions relating to con
duct. First, I shall make sorae observations upon the direct
proof of Chrislianity frora miracles and prophecy, and
upon the objections alleged against il.
I. Now, the following observations, relating to the his
torical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of
Christianity, appear to be of great weight.
1, The Old Testament affords us the sarae historical
evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the prophets, as
of the coramon civil hislory of Moses and the kings of
Israel ; or, as of the affairs of the Jewish nation. And
the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical
evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, as of
the common matters related in thera. This, indeed,
could not have been affirmed by any reasonable raan,
if the authors of these books, like many other histo
rians, had appeared to 'make an entertaining raanner ol
writing their aira ; though they had interspersed rairacles
in their works, at proper distances, and upon proper
occasions. These raight have aniraated a duU relation,
araused the reader, and engaged his attention. And the
sarae account would naturally have been given of tbem,
as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors ; the
sarae account, in a manner, as is to be given, why the
poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts,
both rairaculous and natural, in Scripture, are related in
plain unadorned narratives; and both of thera appear,

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 273
in all respects, to stand upon the sarae foot of historical evi
dence. Farther : Sorae parts of Scripture, containing an
account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of
Christianity, are quoted as genuine, from the age in which
they are said to be written, down lo the present ; and
no other parts of thera, raaterial in the present question,
are oraitted to be quoted in such manner, as to afford
any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And, as
comraon history, when called in question in any instance,
may often be greatly confirraed by conteraporary or sub
sequent events raore known and acknowledged ; and as
the coraraon Scripture history, Uke many others, is thus
confirmed; so Ukewise is the miraculous history ofil, not
only in particular instances, bul in general. For, the es
tabUshraent of the Jewish and Christian religions, which
were events contemporary with the miracles related to be
wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them,
these events are just what we should have expected,
upon supposition such miracles were reaUy wrought to
attest the truth of those- reUgions. These miracles are a
satisfactory account of those events ; of which no othe?
satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all,
but what is iraaginary raerely and invented. It is lo be
added, that the most obvious, the mosl easy and direct
account of this history, how it carae to be written and to
be received in the world, as a true hislory, is, that it
really is so ; nor can any olher account of it be easy and
difecl. Now, though an account, not at aU obvious, but
very far-fetched and indirect, may indeed be, and often
is, the true account of a matter ; yet, it cannot be admitted
on the auihority of its being asserted. Mere guess, sup
position, and possibiUty, when opposed lo historical evi
dence prove nothing, but that historical evidence is not
demonstrative. Now, the just consequence from all this, I think, is,
that the Scripture history, in general, is to be adraitted
as an authentic genuine history, tiU soraewhat positive
be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no raan will
deny the consequence to be, that it cannot be rejected,

274 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to
be of none ; even ihough the evidence now raentioned
for its authoriiy were doubtful. This evidence raay be
confronted by historical evidence on the other side,
if there be any ; or general incredibility in the things re
lated, or inconsistence in the general turn of the history,
would prove it to be of no auihority. But since, upon
the face of the raatter, upon a first and general view, the
appearance is, tlrat it is an authentic history, ft cannot be
determined to be fictitious wiihout some proof that k is
so. And the following observations, in support of these
and coincident with them, will greatly confirm tiie his
torical evidence for the truth of Christianity,
2. The Epistles of St Paul, from the nature of episto
lary writing, and moreover, from several of them being
written, not lo particular persons, but to churches, carry
in thera evidences of their being genuine, beyond what
can be, in raere historical narrative, left to the worid at
large. This evidence, joined with that which they have
in coraraon wfth the rest of the New Testament, seems
not lo leave so much as any particular pretence for
denying their genuineness, considered as an ordinary
raatter of fact, or of criticisra : I say, particular pretence
for denying it ; because any single fact, of such a kind
and such antiquity,may have general doubts raised con;
cerning it, from the very nature of huraan affairs and
huraan testiraony. There is also lo be raentioned, a dis
tinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the
epistie chiefly referred to here, the flrst to the Corinthians ;
frora the raanner in which it is quoted by Clemens Roma
nus, in an epistie of his own to that church,* Now, these
epistles afford a proof of Christianity, detached from aU
others, which is, I think, a thing of weight ; and also a
proof of a nature and kind peculiar to itself. For,
In them the author declares, thaf he received the
gospel in general, and the institution of the communion
* Clem. Rom. Ep. I. c. 47.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 276
in particular, not from the rest of the Aposties, or jointly
together with thera, but alone from Christ hiraself; whom
he declares, likewise conforraably to the history in the
Acts, that he saw after his ascension,* So that the testi
mony of St Paul is lo be considered, as detached from
that of the rest of the Aposties, *
And he declares farther, that he was endued wilh
a povver of working miracles, as what was publicly
known to those very people ; speaks of frequent and
great variety of miraculous gifts, as then subsisting in those
very churches to which he was writing ; which he was
reproving for several irregularities ; and where he had
personal opposers : he mentions these gifts incidentally,
in the most easy manner, and without effort ; by way of
reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use of
them ; and by way of depreciating them, in coraparison
of moral virtues. In short, he speaks to these churches
of tbese rairaculous powers, in the manner anyone would
speak to another of a thing, which was as farailiar, and
as much known in coramon to them both, as any thing
in the world, -f- And this, as halh been observed by
several persons, is surely a very considerable thing,
3. It is an acknowledged historical fact, that Chris
tianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to he
received, upon the aUegation, -i. e. as unbelievers would
speak, upon the pretence of miracles, publicly wrought
lo attest the truth of it, in such an age ; and that it was
actually received by greal nurabers in that very age, and
upon the professed belief of the reality of these rairacles.
And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old
Testaraent, seeras distinguished by this frora all other re
ligions. I mean, that this does not appear to be the case
with regard to any other : for surely it wiU not be sup
posed to lie upon any person, to prove, by positive his-
* Gal. i. 1 Cor. xi. 23, &c. 1 Cor. xv. 8.
t Rom. XV. 19. 1 Cor. xii. 8, 9, 10—28, &c. and chap. xiii.
!> 2, 8, and the whole xivth chap. 2 Cor. xii. 12, 13. Gal. iii. 2, 5.

276 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
torical evidence, that ft was not. It does in no sort ap
pear that Mahoraetanism was first received in the worid
upon the foot of supposed rairacles,* i. e. public ones :
for, as revelation is itself rairaculous, all pretence to ft
must necessarily imply sorae pretence of rairacles. And
it is a known fact, that ft was iramediately, at the very
first, propagated by olher means. And as particular in
stitutions, whether in paganisra or popery, said to be con
firmed by rairacles after those institutions had obtained,
arenot to tbe purpose ; so, were there what raight be call
ed bistorical proof, that any of them were introduced by
a supposed divine coramand, believed to be attested by
miracles, tbese vvould not be in any wise parallel. For
single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for, after
parties are forraed, and have power in their hands ; and
the leaders of thera are in veneration vvith the raultitude;
and poUtical interests are blended wilh religious claims,
and reUgious distinctions. But before any thing of this
kind, for a few persons, and those of the lowest rank, all
at once to bring over such great nurabers to a new reli
gion, and get it to be received upon the particular evi
dence of rairacles ; this is quite anoiher thing. And I
think it will be allowed by any fair adversary, that the
fact novv raentioned, taking in all the circurastances of il,
is peculiar lo the Christian reUgion, However, the fact
itself is allowed, that Christianity obtained, i. e. was pro
fessed lo be received in the vvorld, upon the belief of
miracles, iramediately in the age in which ft is said those
miracles vvere wrought : or that this is what its first con
verts would have alleged, as the reason for their embrac
ing il. Now, certainly it is not to be supposed, that such
nurabers of raen, in the raost distant parts of the vvorld,
should forsake the reUgion of their countiy, in which they
had been educated; separate theraselves frora their friends,
particularly in their festival shows and solemnities, to
which the coramon people are so greatly addicted, and
* See the Koran, chap. xiii. and chap. xvii.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 277
which were of a nature to engage thera rauch raore than
any thing of that sort araongst us ; and embrace a reU
gion vvhich could not but expose them to raany incon
veniences, and indeed raost have been a giving up the
worid in a great degree, even frora the very first, and be
fore the erapire engaged in form against thetn : it cannot
be supposed, that such numbers should make so great,
and, lo say the least, so inconvenient a change in their
whole institution of life, unless they vvere really convinced
of the truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or
belief of which they professed to raake it. And it wiU,
I suppose, readily be acknowledged, that the generaUty
of the first converts to Chrislianity raust have believed
them ; that as, by becoming Christians, they declared to
the worid they vvere satisfied of the truth of those mira
cles, so this declaration was lo be credited. And tbis
their testimony is the sarae kind of evidence for those
miracles, as if they had put it in writing, and tliese writings
had corae down to us. And it is real evidence, because
it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity
to inform theraselves of, Il is also distinct from the di
rect or express historical evidence, though ft is of the
sarae kind ; and it would be allowed to be distinct in aU
cases. For, were a factiexpressly related by one or more
ancient historians, and disputed in after ages; tbat this
fact is acknowledged lo have been believed, by great
numbers of the age in which the historian says it was
done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact,
quite disihict from the express testimony of the historian.
The credulity of mankind is acknowledged, and the sus
picions of raankind ought lo be acknowledge^ loo ; and
their backwardness even lo believe, and greater stiU to
practise, what raakes against their interest. And it raust
particularly be remerabered, that education, and preju
dice, and authority, were against Christianity, in the age
I am speaking of. So that the iramediate conversion of
such numbers, is a real presumption of soraewhat raore
than huraan in this matter : I say presuraption, for ft is
24

278 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2,
aUeged as a proof, alone and by ftself. Nor need any
one of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered
as a proof by itself; and yet aU of thera together may be
one of the strongest, ,
Upon the whole : as there is large historical evidence,
both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in at
testation of Christianity, collected by those who have writ
upon the subject ; it lies upon unbelievers to show, why this
evidence is not to be credited. This vvay of speaking is,
I think, just, and what persons vvho write in defence of
religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such un
speakable importance, the proper question is, not whom
it Ues upon, according lo the rules of argument, to main
tain or confute objections ; but, vvhether there really are
any, against this evidence, sufficient, in reason, to de
stroy the credit of it ? However, unbehevers seera to
lake upon thera the part of showing that there are.
They allege, that numberiess enthusiastic people, in
different ages and counlries, expose themselves to the
sarae difficulties vvhich the primitive Christians did ; and
are ready to give up their lives, for the raost idle follies
iraaginable. But it is not very clear, to what purpose this
objection is brought. For every one, surely, in every case,
must distinguish between opinio^ and facts. And though
testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or any opin
ions at aU ; yet, ft is allowed, in all other cases, to be a proof
of facts. And a person's laying down his Ufe in attesta
tion of facts or of opinions, is the strongest proof of his
believing thera. And if the aposties and their contempo
raries did beUeve the facts, in attestation of which they
exposed tlgiraselves to sufferings and death, this their be
Uef, or rather knowledge, raust be a proof of those facts;
for they vvere such as came under the observation of their
senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet il is of
weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding
they were not eye-witnesses of those facts, as were tbe
apostles and their conteraporaries, had, however, fuU op
portunity to inform iheraselves, whether they were true or
nol, and give equal proof of their beUeving thera to be true.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 279
But enthusiasra, itis said, greatly weakens the evidence
of testimony even for facts, in raatters relating lo reli
gion ; some seera to think, it totally and absolutely de
stroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. And,
indeed, the pgwers of enthusiasm, and of diseases, too,
which operate in a like manner, are very wonderful, in
particular instances. But if great nurabers of raen, not
appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under, any
pecuUar suspicion of negligence, affirra that they saw
and heard such things plainly with their eyes and their
ears, and are adraitted to be in earnest ; such testiraony is
evidence of the strongest kind we can have, for any
matter of fact. Yet, possibly it raay be overcome, strong
as h is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by
contrary testimony. And in an instance where one
thought ft was so overcorae, il raight be just lo consider,
how far such evidence could be accounted for by enthu
siasm ; for ft seeras as if no other iraaginable account
were to be given of it. But liU such incredibility be
shown, or contrary testiraony produced, it cannot surely
be expected, that so far-fetched, so indirect and wonder
ful an account of such testiraony, as that of enthusiasm
raust be ; an account so strange, that the generality of
mankind can scarce be raade to understand what is raeant
by it; ft cannot, I say, be expected, that such account
will be adraitted of such evidence, when there is this
direct, easy, and obvious account of it, that people really
saw and heard a thing not incredible, vvhich they affirm
sincerely, and wilh full assurance, they did see and hear.
Granting, then, that enthusiasra is not (strictly speaking)
an absurd, but a possible account of such testimony, ft is
manifest that the very mention of it goes upon the pre
vious supposition, that the things so attested are incredible ;
and therefore, need not be considered, till they are shown
to be so. Much less need it be considered, afler the con
trary h^,been proved. And I think it has been proved,
to fuU saitasfaction, that there is no incredibility in a re-
¦ yelatiop, in general, or in such a one as the Christian

280 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
in particular. However, as religion is supposed pecu
liariy liable to enthusiasra, it raay just be observed, tbat
prejudices alraost without nuraber and without narae, ro
raance, affectation, huraor, a desire to engage attention or
to surprise, the party-spirit, custora, little, competitions,
unaccountable Ukings and dislikings ; these influence raen
strongly in coramon raatters. And as these prejudices
are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons
themselves vvho are influenced by tiiera, they are lo be
considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasra.
Yet human testimony in coraraon raatters is naturally and
justly believed notwithstanding.
It is intimated farther, in a raore refined way of obser
vation, that though it shonid be proved, that the apostles
and first Christians could not, in sorae respects, be de
ceived themselves, and, in other respects, cannot be
thought to have intended to impose upon the world, yet,
it will not follow, that their general testiraony is lo be be
Ueved, though truly handed down to us; because they
might still in part, i. e. in other respects, be deceived
themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon
others ; which, it is added, is a thing very credible, frora
that raixture of real enthusiasra, and. real knavery, to be
raet with in the same characters. And, I must confess,
I think the matter of fact contained in this observation
upon raankind, is not to be denied ; and that soinewhat
very much akin to it, is often supposed in Scripture as a
very comraon case, and most severely reproved. But ft
vvere to have been expected, that persons capable of ap
plying this observation as applied in the objection, might
also frequently have met wfth the like raixed character,
in instances where religion was quite oul of the case.
The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued
with reason, or a capacity ofdistinguisbing between truth ,
and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with
veracity, or a regard to truth in what they say : §ut frora
many occasions, they are liable to be prejudiced, and
biased, and deceived theraselves, and capable of intend-

Chap, 7.J For Christianity. 281
ing to deceive others, in every different degree ; inso
much that, as vve are all liable to be deceived by preju
dice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncoraraon thing,
for persons, who, from their regard to truth, would not
invent a Ue entirely wfthout any foundation at aU, to pro
pagate ft vvith heightening circumstances, after it is once
invented and set agoing. 'And olhers, ihough they
would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree
of falsehood, wiU let it pass wfthout contradiciion. But,
notwithstanding all tills, huraan testimony remains still
a natural ground of assent ; and this assent, a natural
principle of action.
It is objected farther, that however it has happened,
the fact is, that mankind have, in different ages, been
strangely deluded witb pretences to miracles and wonders.
But it is by no means lo be adraitted, that they have been
oftener, or are at aU raore Uable to be deceived by these
pretences, than by olhers.
It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of
historical evidence for rairacles, which are on all hands,
acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were
even ihe like historical evidence for these, to vvhat there
. is ibr those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is
in no wise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence
would noi be, that the evidence ofthe latter is not to be
admitted. Nor is there a raan in the world who, in com
mon cases, would conclude thus. For what would such
a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence, con
futed by contrary evidence, or any vvay overbalanced,
destroys the credibility of olher evidence, nefther confu
ted, nor overbalanced ? To argue, that because there is,
if there were, like evidence from testiraony, for rairacles
acknowledged false, as for those in attestation of Chris
tianity, therefore the evidence in the latter case is not to
be credited ; this is the same as to argue, that if two men
of equally good reputation had given evidence in different
cases no way connected, and one of tiiem had been con
victed of perjury, this confuted the testimony of theother,
^4*

282 ' Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
Upon the whole, then, the general observation that hu
raan creatures are so Uable lo be deceived, from enthusi
asm in reUgion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm
in comraon matters, and in both frora negligence ; and
that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavoring to
deceive olhers ; this does indeed weaken the evidence
of testitnony in aU cases, but does not destroy it in any.
And these things will appear, lo different raen, to weaken
the evidence of testiraony, in different degrees ; in de
grees proportionable lo the observations they have raade,
or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning
the weakness, and negUgence, and dishonesty of mankind ;
or conceming the powers of enthusiasra, and prejudices
equivalent to il. But it seeras to rae, that people do not
know what they say, who affirra these things to destroy
the evidence from testimony, which we have ofthe truth
of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of
testiraony in any case, but a proof or probability, that
persons are not corapetent judges of the facts to which
they give testimony ; or that they are actually under sorae
indirect influence in giving it, in such particular case.
Till this be raade out, the natural laws of huraan actions
require, that testimony be adraftted. It can never be suf
ficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently
to say, that there are so many principles, frora whence
men are liable to be deceived iheraselves and disposed
lo deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that
one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising per
sons can help reflecting, thit this very raanner of speak
ing supposes, they are nol satisfied that there is nothing
in the evidence, of which they speak thus ; or that they
can avoid observing, if they do raake this reflection, that
it is, on such a subject, a very raaterial one.*
Aud over against all these objections, is lo be set the
importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged
the attention of its first converts, so as to have render
ed them less liable to be deceived frora carelessness,
* See the foregoing chapter.

Chap. 7.J For Christianity. 283
tiian they would in comraon matters ; and likewise the
strong obligations to veracity, which their religion laid
them under : so that the first and raost obvious presurap
tion is, that they could not be deceived theraselves, nor
would deceive olhers. And this presuraption, in this de
gree, is pecuUar to the testiraony we have been consider
ing. In arguraent, assertions are nothing in themselves, and
have an air of posftiveness, which sometimes is not very
easy : yet they are necessary, and necessary lo be repeat-.
ed, in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly lo lay
before the view of the reader, what is proposed to be
proved, and what is left as proved. Now, the conclusion
from the foregoing observations is, I think, beyond all
doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to admit the
external evidence for Christianity, i. e. the proof of raira
cles wrought to attest il, lo be of real weight and very con
siderable ; though they cannot allow it to be sufficient, to
convince them of the reality of those miracles. And as
they must, in aU reason, adrait this, so it seeras to me,
tiiat upon consideration they vvould, in fact, admit it ; those
of thera, I raean, who know any thing al all of the matter :
in like raanner as persons, in raany cases, own, they see
strong evidence frora testimony, for the truth of things,
which yet they cannotbe convinced are true ; cases, sup
pose, where there is contrary testimony, or things which
they think, whether wfth or wuhout reason, to be incred
ible. But there is no testiraony contrary to that vvhich
we have been considering ; and it bas been fuUy proved,
that there is no incredibility in Chrislianity in general, or
inany part ofil,
II. As to the evidence for Christianity frora prophecy,
I shaU only make some few general observations, which
are suggested by the analogy of naiure ; i. e. by the ac-
''fenowledged natural rules of judging in coramon matters,
concerning evidence ofa Uke kind lo this frora prophecy,
I. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a
prophecy, does not, in any degree, invalidate the proof of

284- Of the particular Evidence [Part 2,
foresight, arising frora the appearing corapletion of those
other parts which are understood. For the case is evi
dently the sarae, as if those parts, which are not under
stood, were lost, or not written at all, or written in an un
known longue. Whether this observation be coramonly
attended to or not, it is so evident that one can scarce
bring one's self lo set down an instance in comraon raatters,
to exeraplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in
cypher, and partiy in plain words at length, and that, in
the part one understood, there appeared raention of sev
eral known facts ; it would never corae into any raan's
thoughts to iraagine, that if he understood the whole, per
baps he might find, that those facts vvere not, in reaUty,
known by the writer. Indeed, both in this example, and
the thing intended to be exemplified by ft, our not under
standing the whole (the whole, suppose, of a sentence or
a paragraph) raight soraetiraes occasion a doubt, whether
one understood the literal meaning of such a part ; but
this coraes under another consideration.
For the sarae reason, ihough a man should be incapa
ble, for want of learning, or opportunities of inquiry, or
from not having turned his studies this way, even so much
as to judge, vvhether particular prophecies have been
throughout corapletely fulfilled ; yet he raay see, in gen
eral, that they have been fulfilled, tq such a degree, as,
upon very good ground, to be convinced of .foresight
more than huraan in such prophecies, and of snch events
being intended by thera. For the same reason also,
though, by raeans of the deficiencies in civil history, and
the different accounts of historians, the raost learned
should not be able lo raake out to satisfaction, that such
parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and
throughout fulfilled ; yet a very strong proof of foresight
may arise, frora tiiat general corapletion of thera which
is raade out ; as rauch proof of foresight, perhaps, as the
Giver of prophecy intended should ever be afforded by
such parts of prophecy,
2, A long series of prophecy being applicable to such

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 285
and such events, is itself a proof, that it was intended
of tiiera ; as the rules, by which we naturally judge and
determine, in coraraon cases parallel to this, will show.
This observation I raake in answer lo the comraon ob
jection against the application of the prophecies, that con
sidering each of them distinctly by itself, ft does nol at
all appear, that they were intended of those particular
events to which tbey are applied by Christians; and,
therefore, it is lo be supposed, that, if they raeant any
thing, they were intended of olher events unknown to
us, and not of these at all.
Now, there are two kinds of writing, which bear a
great resemblance to prophecy, with respect lo the mat
ter before us ; the mythological and the satirical, where
the satire is, lo a certain degree, concealed. And a man
might be assured, that he understood what an author in
tended by a fable or parable, related wuhout any applica
tion or moral, raerely frora seeing it to be easily capable
of such application, and that such a moral might naturally
be deduced frora it. And he raight be fully assured, that
such persons and events were intended in a satirical
writing, merely frora its being applicable to them. And,
agreeably to the last observation, he might be in a good
raeasure satisfied of it, ihough he were not enough in
formed in affairs or in the story of such persons, to un
derstand half the satire. For, his salisfaclion, that he
understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these
writings, would be greater or less, in proportion as he
saw the general turn of them to be capable of such ap
plication, and in proportion to the nuraber of particular
filings capable of il. And thus, if a long series of pro-
piiecy is applicable to the present slate ofthe church, and
to the poUtical situations of the kingdoras of the world,
some thousand years after these prophecies were deliv
ered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before the
coming of Christ is applicable lo him ; these things are
in themselves a proof, that the prophetic history was in
tended of him, and of those events : in proportion as the

286 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2,
general turn of ft is capable of such application, and to
the nuraber and variety of particular prophecies capable
of it. And, though in all just vvay of consideration, the
appearing corapletion of prophecies is to be allowed lo
be thus explanatory of, and to determine tbeir meaning;
yet ft is to be reraerabered farther, that the ancient Jews
applied the prophecies to a Messiah before his coming,
in much the sarae manner as Christians do novv ; and
that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies re
specting the state of the church and of the worid in the
last ages, in the sense which the event seems lo confirra
and verify. And from these things it may be raade ap
pear, 3, That the showing, even to a high probability, if
that could be, that tbe prophets thought of some other
events, in such and such predictions, and not those at aU
which Christians aUege to be completions of those pre
dictions ; or that such and such prophecies are capable
of being appUed to other events than those lo which
Christians apply thera — that this would not confute or
destroy the force of the arguraent from prophecy, even
with regard to those very instances. For, observe how
this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be
the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured,
or satisfied lo any degree, that one knew the whole of
what he intended in il, one should be assured or satisfied
to such degree, that one knew the whole raeaning of
that book ; for the raeaning of a book is nothing but the
meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to
have compiled a book out of meraoirs, which he received
from anoiher, of vastly superior knowledge in the sub
ject of it, especially if il were a book full of great intrica
cies and difficulties, il would in no wise follow, that one
knew the whole raeaning of tbe book, frora knowing the
whole raeaning of the corapiler; for the original me
moirs, i. e. the author of thera, might have, and there
would be no degree of presuraption, in raany cases,
against supposing hira to have, sorae farther raeaning than

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 287
the compiler saw. To say, then, that the Scriptures and
the things contained in thera can have no other or farther
meaning, than those persons thought or had, vvho first re
cited or wrote them, is evidently saying, that those per
sons vvere the original, proper, and sole authors of those
books, i. e. that they are not inspired ; vvhich is absurd,
whilst the authoriiy of these books is under exaraination,
1, e, till you have deterrained they are of no divine au
thority al all. Till this be deterrained, it raust in all
reasou be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is
taking for granted that they are inspired, but that they
may have, some farther raeaning than what the compilers
saw or understood. And, upon this supposition, ft is
supposable also, that this farther meaning raay be fulfiUed,
Now, events corresponding lo prophecies, interpreted
in a different meaning from that which the prophets are
supposed lo have understood tbem ; this affords, in a
manner, the sarae proof that this different sense was
originally intended, as it vvould have afforded, if the
prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense
it is supposed they did ; because there is no presumption
of their sense of them being the whole sense of them.
And ft has been already shown, that the apparent com
pletions of prophecy must be aUowed to be explanatory
of its meaning. So that the question is, whether a se
ries of prophecy has been fulfilled, in a natural or proper,
i. e. in any real sense of the words of il. For such
completion is equally a proof of foresight raore than hu
man, whether the prophets are, or are not, supposed to
have understood it in a different sense, I say, supposed ;
for tbough I think ft clear, that the prophets did not un
derstand the full raeaning of their predictions, it is an
other question, how far they thought they did, and in
what sense they understood thera.
Hence raay be seen, to how littie purpose those
persons busy theraselves, who endeavor lo prove that
tile prophetic hislory is appUcable to events of the age
in which ft was written, or of ages before it. In-

288 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
deed, to have proved this before there vvas any ap
pearance of a farther corapletion of it, might have an
swered sorae purpose ; for it might have prevented the
expectation of any such farther completion. Thus,
could Porphyry have shown, that sorae principal parts
of the book of Daniel, for instance, tbe seventh verse
of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted
of the latter ages, was applicable to events whicii hap
pened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes ;
this might have prevented thera from expecting any far
ther corapletion of ft. And unless there vvas then, as I
"think there raust have been, external evidence concern
ing that book, raore than is come down to /us, such a
discovery might have been a stumbling block in the way
of Cliristianity itself; considering the authority which
our Saviour has given to the book of Daniel, and how
much the general scherae of Christianity presupposes
the truth of it. Bul even this discovery, bad there been
any such,* would be of very Uttle weight with reasona
ble men now; if this passage, thus applicable to events
before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable
also to events, vvhich succeeded the dissolution of the
Roraan erapire. I -raention this, not at all as intending
to insinuate, that the division ofthis erapire inlo ten parts,
for it plainly wa? divided into about that nuraber, were,
alone and by itself, of any raoraent in verifying the pro
phetic bistory ; but only as an example of the thing I
am speaking of. And thus, upon the whole, the matter
of inquiry evidently raust be, as above put. Whether the
prophecies are applicable to Christ, and to the present
state of the world and of the church ; applicable in such
a degree, as to imply foresight : not whether they are
• It appears, that Porphyi-y did nothmg worth mentioning In this
way. For Jerom on the i)lace says : Buas posteriores bestias—in
vno Macedonum regno ponit. And as to tbe ten lungs : Decent
reges enumerat, qui fuerunt stBvissimi : ipsosque reges non uni-
-us ponit regni, .verbi gratia, Macedoniae, Syriae, Asia, et Egypti ,'
sed de diversis regnis unum efficit regum ordinem. And intms way
of interpretation, any thing may be made of any thing.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 289
capable of any other application ; though I know no pre
tence for saying, the general turn of thera is capable of
any other.
These observations are, I think, just, and the evidence
referred lo in them, real ; though there may be people
who wiU not accept of such imperfect information from
Scripture, Some too have not integrity and regard
enough lo trulh, to attend lo evidence, which keeps the
mind in doubt, perhaps perplexity, and which is rauch of a
different sort frora what they expected. And it plainly
requires a degree of raodesty and fairness, beyond what
every one has, for a raan lo say, not to the vvorld, but to
himself, tbat there is a real appearance of soraewhat of
great weight in this matier, though he is not able tho
roughly to satisfy himself about it ; but it shaft have fts
influence upon him, in proportion to fts appearing realily
and weight. It is much more easy, and more falls in
vrith the negUgence, presumption, and wUfulness of the
generaUty, to deterraine at once, with a decisive air, there
is nothuig in ft. The prejudices arising from that abso
lute conterapt and scorn, with which this evidence is
treated in the world, I do not raention. For what in
deed can be said to persons, who are weak enough in
their understandings to think this any presumption against
il ; or, if tbey do not, are yet weak enough in their temper
to be influenced by such prejudices, upon sucb a subject ,''
I shall now, secondly, endeavor to give some account
of the general argument for the trulh of Christianity,
consisting both of the direct and circumstantial evidence,
considered as raaking up one arguraent. Indeed, to
state and examine this arguraent fully, would be a work
, much beyond the compass of tbis whole Treatise ; nor
is so rauch as a proper abridgraent of it to be expected
here. Yet the present subject requires lo have sorae
brief account of it given. For it is the kind of evidence
upon which most questions of difficulty, in coramon prac
tice, are determined ; evidence arising from various co
incidences, which support and confirm each olher, and
25

290 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
in this manner prove, wilh more or less ceriainty, the
point under consideration. And I choose lo do it also,
first, Because it seeras to be of the greatest iraportance,
and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of
revelation is, nol sorae direct and express things only,
but a great varieiy of circurastantial things also ; and that
though each of these direct and circurastantial things is
indeed to be considered separately, yet they are after
wards to be joined together ; for that the proper force
of the evidence consists in the result of tiiose several
things, considered in their respects to each other, and
united into one view ; and, in the next place. Because ft
seems lo me, that the matters of fact here set down,
which are acknowledged by unbelievers, must be ac
knowledged by thera also lo contain together a degree of
evidence of great weight, if tbey could be brought to lay
these several things before theraselves distinctly, and then
with attention consider thera together ; instead of that
cursory thought of thera, to which we are famiUarized.
For being faraiUarized lo the cursory thought of thmgs,
as really hinders the weight of theni frora being seen, as
frora having its due influence upon practice.
The thing asserted, and the trulh of which is to be
inquired into, is this : that over and above our reason
and affections, which God has given us for the informa
tion of our judgment and conduct of our lives, he has
also, by external revelation, given us an account of hira
self and his raoral governraent over the world, iraplying a
future state of rewards and punishraents; i. e. hath re
vealed the systera of natural religion : for natural reli
gion may be externally* revealed by God, as the igno
rant raay be taught it by raankind, their fellow creatures
— that God, I say, has given us the evidence of revela
tion, as weU as the evidence of reason, to ascertain this
moral system ; together with an account of a particular
dispensation of Providence, which reason could no way
• Page 187, fee.

Chap. 7.J For Christianity. 291
have discovered, and a particular institution of religion
founded on it, for the recovery of mankind out of their
present wretched condition, and raising them to the per
fection and final happiness of tbeir naiure.
This revelation, whether real or supposed, may^ be con
sidered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing
but the hislory of events before they corae to pass : doc
trines also are raatters of fact ; and precepts corae under
the same notion. And the general design of -Scripture,
which contains in it this revelation, thus considered as
bistorical, raay be said to be, lo give us an account of the
worid, in this one single view, as God's world ; by vvhich
it appears essentially distinguished from all olher books,
so far as I have found, except such as are copied from it.
It begins with an account of God's creation ofthe world,
in order lo ascertain and distinguish frora all others, who
is the object of our worship, by what he has done ; in
order to ascertain who he is, concerning whose provi
dence, comraands, proraises, and threatenings, this sacred
book all along treats ; the Maker and Proprietor of the
world, he whose creatures we are, the God of nature :
in order likewise to distinguish hira frora the idols of the
nations, which are either iraaginary beings, i. e. no beings
at aU ; or else part of that creation, the historical relation
of which is here given. And St John, not improbably
vrith an eye lo this Mosaic account of the creation, begins
his gospel with an account of our Saviour's pre-existence,
and that, " all things were made by hira, and wiihout him
was not any thing raade that was made ;"* agreeably to
tiie doctrine of St Paul, that " God created all things by
Jesus Christ."f This being premised, the Scripture, ta
ken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an
abridgment of the hislory of the world, in the view just
now mentioned ; that is, a general account of the condi
tion of reUgion and its professors, during the continuance
of that apostacy from God, and state of wickedness,
which it every where supposes the worid to lie in. And
?John i, 3. tEph. iii. 9.

292 Of the supposed Evidence [Part 2,
this account of the state of religion carries with it some
brief account of the poUtical state of things, as reUgion
is affected by it. Revelation indeed considers the com
raon affairs of this vvorld, and what is going on in it, as a
raere scene of distraction, and cannot be supposed to con
cern itself with foreteUing at what lirae Rorae, or Baby
lon, or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most
conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness, which
all places equally aspire lo be ; cannot, I say, be supposed
to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake.
But it seems to contain some very general account of the
chief governments of the vvorld, as the general stale of
reUgion has been, is, or shaft be, affected by thera, from
the first transgression, and during the whole interval ofthe
world's continuing in its present stale, to a certain future
period, spoken of both in the Old and New Testament,
very distinctly, and in great variety of expression : "The
times of the restftution of all things ;"* when " the mys
tery of God shaft be finished, as he hath declared to his
seryanls the prophets ;" f vvhen " the God of heaven
shall set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed;
and the kingdom shall not be left lo other people," \ as
it is represented to be during this apostacy, but "judg
ment shall be given to tbe saints,"§ and " they shaft
reign ;"|| " and the kingdora and dominion, and the
greatness of the kingdora under the whole heaven, shaU
be given to the people of the saints of the Most High,"ir'*
Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would re
mark how great a length of tirae the whole relation
takes up, near six thousand years of which are past :
and how great a variety of things ft treats of; the natu
ral and moral system or history of the world, including
the tirae vvhen it vvas forraed, aU contained in the very
first book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned
age ; and in subsequent books, the various coramon and
'Acts iii. 21. tKev. X. 7. JDan. ii. § Dan. vii. 22.
II Rev. xi. 17, 18. ch. xx. H Dan. vii.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 293
prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Christ
ianity. Now all this together gives the largest scope for
criticisra ; and for confutation of what is capable of be
ing confuted, either from reason, or from common histo
ry, or from any inconsistence in its several parts. And
itis a thing vvhich deserves, I think, lobe meptioned, that
whereas sorae iraagine, the supposed doubtfulness of the
evidence for revelation iraplies a positive argument that
il is not true ; it appears, on the contrary, to iraply a posi
tive argument that it is true. For, could any coraraon
relation, of such antiquity, extent, and varieiy, (for in
these thiugs the stress of what I ara novv observing lies)
be proposed to the exaraination of the world ; that it
could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confu
led, or shown to have nothing in il, lo the satisfaction of
reasonable raen ; this would be thought a strong presurap
tive proof of its trulh. And indeed it niust be a proof of
it just in proportion to the probabiUty ,; that if it were
false, it might be shown to be so ; and this, I think, is
scarce pretended to be shown but upon prinqiples and in
ways of arguing which have been clearly obviated.*
Nor does it at aU appear, that any sect of raen who be
Ueve natural religion, are ofthe opinion, that Christianity
bas been thus confuted. But to proceed ;
Together with the raoral systera of the worid, the Old
Testament contains a cbronological account ofthe begin
ning of it, and frora ihence, an unbroken genealogy of
mankind for many ages before common hislory begins ;
and carried on as rauch farther, as to make up a con
tinued thread of history of the length of between three
and four thousand years. It contains an account of
God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that
they should be his people, and he would be their God,
in a pecuUar sense ; of his often interposing miraculously
m their affairs ; giving them the promise, and, long after,
the possession, of a particular country ; assuring them of
• Chap. 2, 3, &c,
25*

294 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2,
the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would wor
ship hira, in opposition to the idols which the rest of
the world worshipped, and obey his coraraands ; and
threatening thera with unexampled punishments, if they
disobeyed hira, and fell into the general idolatry :
insorauch, that this one nation should continue to be the
observation and the wonder bf all the world. It declares
particularly, that " God would scatter them among aU
people, frora one end of the earth unto the other ;" but
" vvhen they should return unto the Lord their God, he
would have corapassion upon thera, and gather them,
frora aU the nations whither he had scattered ihem ; "
that " Israel should be saved in the Lord, with an ever
lasting salvation, and not be asharaed or confounded,
world without end," And as sorae of these promises
are conditional, others are as absolute as any thing can
be expressed, that the tirae should corae, when "the
people should be all righteous, and inherit the land for
ever : " that " though God would raake a fuU end of aU
nations whitiier he had scattered thera, yet would he not
make a full end of thera : " that " he would bring again
the captivity of his people Israel, and plant them upon
their land, and they should be no raore puUed up out of
their land :" that " the seed of Israel should not cease from
being a nation for ever,"* It foreteUs, that God vvould
raise them up a particular person, in whora aU his
proraises should finally be fulfilled ; the Messiah, who
should be, in a high and erainent sense, their anointed
Prince and Saviour, This was foretold in such a
manner, as raised a general expectation of such a person
in the nation, as appears frora the New Testaraent, and
is an acknowledged fact ; an expectation of his coraing
at such a particular time, before any one appeared,
clairaing to be that person, and where there was no
ground for such an expectation but from the prophecies ;
* Deut. xxviii. 64. Ch. xxx. 2, 3. Isa. xlv. 17. Ch. lx. 21. Jer.
xxx. 11. Ch. Ixvi. 28. Amos ix. 15. Jer. xxxi. 36.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 295
which expectation, therefore, must in all reason be pre
suraed to be explanatory lo those prophecies, if there
were any doubt about their meaning, Il seeras raore
over lo foreleU, that this person should be rejected by
that nation, to vvhora he had been so long promised, and
tiiough he was so much desired by them,* And ft
expressly foretells, that he should be the Saviour of the
Gentiles ; and even that the completion of the scheme,
contained in this book, and then begun, and in its pro
gress, should be soraewhat so greal, that, in coraparison
with it, the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of
sraaU account, " It is a light thing that thou shouldest be
my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and lo restore
the preserved of Israel : I will also give thee for a light
tothe Gentiles, that thou raayest be for salvation unto the
end of the earth." And, "In the last days, the moun
tain of the Lord's house shall be established in the lop of
the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills ; and
aU nations shall flow into il — for out of Zion shaft go
forth the law, and the word ofthe Lord from Jerusalem.
And he shall judge among the nations — and the Lord
alone shall be exafted in that day, and the idols he shall
utterly aboUsh, "-f- The Scripture farther contains an ac
count, that at the tirae the Messiah was expected, a
person rose up, in this nation, clairaing to be that
Messiah, to be the person whom all the prophecies
referred to, and in whora they should centre; that he
spent sorae years in a continued course of rairaculous
works,.and endued his iraraediate disciples and followers
with a power of doing tlie sarae, as a proof ofthe trulh of
that reUgion which he coraraissioned thera lo publish ;
that, invested wfth this auihority and power, they made
* Isa. viii. 14, 15. Ch. xlix. 5. Ch. liii. Mal. i. 10, 11. and
Ch. iii.
t Isa. xlix. 6. Ch. ii. Ch. xi. Ch. Ivi. 7. Mal. i. 11.— To
which must be added, the other prophecies of the like kind, several
in the New Testament, and very many in the Old, which describe
what shall be fhe completion of the revealed plan of Providenee.

296 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
numerous converts in the reraotest countries, and settied
and established his reUgion in the vvorld ; to the end of
which, the Scripture professes to give a prophetic ac
count of the state of this religion araongst raankind.
Let us now suppose a person utterly ignorant of history,
to have all this related lo him, out of the Scriptures.
Or, suppose such a one, having the Scriptures put inlo
his hands, lo remark these things in it, not knowing but
that the whole, even its civil history, as well as the other
parts ofil, might be, frora beginning lo end, an entire in
vention ; and to ask. What truth was in it, and whether
the revelation here related was real or a fiction.'' And,
instead of a direct answer, suppose hira, aU al once, lo be
told the following confessed facts ; and then to unite them
into one view.
Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profes
sion and establishraent of natural reUgion, the belief that
there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is his law,
and that raankind shaft be rewarded and punished hereaf
ter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in how very great
a degree, I say, the profession and establishraent of this
moral systera in the world, is owing to the revelatiop,
whether real or supposed, contained in this book ; the
establishment ofthis moral system, even in those countries
which do nol acknowledge the proper authoriiy of the
Scripture.* Let him be told also, vvhat number of nations
do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then lake in
consideration, of what importance reUgion is lo raankind.
And upon these things, he raight, I think, truly observe,
that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being receiv
ed in the world, with aU the circumstances and effects of
it, considered together as one event, is tbe most conspicu
ous and important event in the story of raankind : that a
book ofthis nature, and thus proraulged and recoraraend
ed to our consideration, deraands, as if by a voice frora
heaven, to have its clairas most seriously examined into ;
* Page 255,

Chap. 7,J For Christianity. 297
and that, before such exaraination, to treat it with any
kind of scofling and ridicule, is an offence against natural
piety. But ft is to be remerabered, that how much soever
the establishraent of natural religion in the vvorld is owing
to the Scripture revelation, this does not destroy the proof
of religion frorn reason, any more than the proof of JEm-
cH's Elements is destroyed, by a raan's knowing or think
ing, that he should never have seen the truth of the seve
ral proposUions contained in it, nor had those propositions
come into his thoughts, but for that raatheraaticlan.
Let such a person as we are speaking of, be, in the
next place, informed ofthe acknowledged antiquity of the
fii-stparts ofthis book ; and that its chronology, its account
of the time vvhen the eartii, and the several parts of ft,
were first peopled with huraan creatures, is no way con
tradicted, but is really confirraed, by the natural and civft
bistory of the world, collected from common historians,
from the state of the earth, and from the late invention of
arts and sciences. And, asthe Scripture contains an un
broken thread of coraraon aud civil history, from the cre
ation to the captivity, for between three and four thousand
years ; let the person we are speaking of be told, in the
next place, that this general history, as it is not contradict
ed, but is confirraed by profane history, as much as there
would be reason to expect, upon supposition of fts truth ;
so there is nothing in the whole hislory itself, lo give any
reiisonable ground of suspicion, of fts not being, in the
general, a faithful and Uterally true genealogy of men, and
series of things. I speak here only of the common Scrip
ture history, or ofthe course of ordinary events related in
it, as distinguished frora rairacles, and frora the prophetic
history. In all the Scripture narrations of this kind, fol
lowing events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all olher
histories. There appears nothing related as done in any
age, not conforraable to the raanners of that age ; nothing
in the account of a succeeding age, which, one would say,
could nol be true, or was iraprobable, frora the account
of things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the

298 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
¦characters, which would raise a thought of their being
feigned ; but aU the internal raarks iraaginable of their
being real. It is lo be added also, that raere genealogies,
bare narratives of the numberof years which persons call
ed by such and such naraes lived, do not carry the face
of fiction ; perhaps do carry [sorae presumption of vera
city ; and all unadorned narratives, which have nothing to
surprise, raay be thought lo carry soraewhat of the Uke
presuraption too. And the do.meslic and the political
hislory is plainly credible. There raay be incidents in
Scripture, which, taken alone in the naked way they are
told, raay appear strange, especially to persons of other
manners, temper, education ; but there are also incidents
of undoubted truth, in raany or raost persons' lives, which,
in the same circumstances, would appear lo the fuU as
strange. There may be mistakes of transcribers, there
may be other real or seeraing mistakes, not easy lo be
particularly accounted for ; but there are certainly no
more things of this kind in the Scripture, than what were
to have been expected in books of such antiquity ; and
nothing, in any wise, sufficient to discredit the general
narrative. Now, that a history, clairaing to commence
frora the creation, and extending in one continued series,
through so great a length of lime, and varieiy of events,
should have such appearances of reality and truth in its
whole contexture, is surely a very reraarkable circum
stance in its favor. And as all this is appUcable to the
coraraon history ofthe New Testament, so there is a far
ther credibUity, and a very high one, given to it by profane
authors ; many of these writing of the sarae tiraes, and
confirraing the truth of customs and events, which are in
cidentally, as well as more purposely mentioned in ft. And
this credibility of the comraon Scripture history, gives
sorae credibility to its miraculous history ; especially as
this is interwoven with the coraraon, so as that they imply
each other, and both together raake up one relation.
Let it then be more particularly observed to this person,
that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, which is indeed

Chap. 7,J For Christianity. 299
implied in the foregoing observation, that there vvas such
a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity, whose gov
ernment and general polity vvas founded on the law, here
related to be given thera by Moses as frora Heaven : that
natural religion, though with rites additional, yet no way
contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot
be said of the Gentile world ; and that their very being,
as a nation, depended upon tiieir acknowledgraent of one
God, the God of the universe. For suppose, in their cap
tivity in Babylon, they had gone over to the religion of
their conquerors, there would have reraained no bond of
union, to keep them a distinct people. And whftst they
were under tiieir own kings, in their own country, a total
apostacy from God would have been the dissolution of
their whole government. They in such a sense nation
ally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven
and earth, when the rest of tbe world were sunk in
idolatry, as rendered them, in fact, the peculiar people
of God, And this so remarkable an establishraent and
preservation of natural religion amongst them, seems to
add some peculiar credibiUty to the historical evidence
for the miracles of Moses and the prophets ; because
these miracles are a fuU satisfactory account of this event,
which plainly wants to be accounted for, and cannot
othervrise. Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history,
be acquainted farther, that one clairaing to be the Mes
siah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the tirae when this
nation, from the prophecies above mentioned, expected
the Messiah : that he was rejected, as it seemed lo have
been foretold he should, hy the body of the people,
under the direction of their rulers : that in the course of
a very few years he was beUeved on, and acknowledged
as the proraised Messiah, by great numbers among the
Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet
not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of mu:acles,* of
* Page 275, &c. :

300 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2,
which miracles we also have strong historical evidence ;
(by vvhich I mean here no more than must be acknow
ledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies be
adraftted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy, our
evidence of rairacles wrought in proof of Christianity :*)
that this religion approving itself to the reason of man
kind, and carrying its own evidence wilh it, so far as
reason is a judge of fts systera, and being no way con
trary to reason in those parts of it which require lo be be
lieved upon the raere authority of its Author ; that this
religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself, for
sorae hundred years, not only without any assistance from
temporal power, but under constant discouragements,
and often the bitterest persecutions from it, and then be
carae the reUgion of the world : that, in the mean tirae,
the Jewish nation and governraeijt vvere destroyed in a
very remarkable manner, and the people carried away
captive and dispersed ihrough the most distant countries ;
in which state of dispersion they have reraained fifteen
hundred years : and that they remain a numerous people,
united araongst theraselves, and dislinguished frora the
rest of the world, as they were in the days of Moses,
by the profession of his law, and every where looked
upon in a manner, which one scarce knows how distinctly
to express, but in the words of the prophetic account of
it, given so raany ages before it came lo pass : " Thou
shalt becorae an astonishment, a proverb, and a by
word, among aU nations whither the Lord shaU lead
lhee,"t The appearance of a standing miracle, in the Jews
reraaining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the
confirmation vvhich this event appears to give to the truth
of revelation, may be thought to be answered, by their
religion forbidding them intermarriages wilh those of any
other, and prescribing thera a great many peculiarities in
their food, by vvhich they are debarred from the means
* Page 282, &c. f Deut. xxviU. 37.

Chap, 7,J For Chistianity. 301
of incorporating with the people in whose counlries they
live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that
which ft pretends to account for. But vvhat does it pre-
'tend to account for i The correspondence betvveen this
event and tbe prophecies ; or the coincidence of both
with a long dispensation of Providence, of a peculiar
nature, towards that people formerly ? No, It is only
the event ftself which is offered to be thus accounted
for ; which single event taken alone, abstracted frora all
such correspondence anticoincidence, perhaps vvould not
have appeared miraculous ; but that correspondence and
coincidence may be so, though the event itself be sup
posed not. Thus the concurrence. of our Saviour's being
born al Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of pro
phecy and other coincidences, is doubtiess miraculous,
the series of prophecy, and other coincidences, and the
event, being admitted ; though the event ftself, his birlh
at that place, appears to have been brought about in a
natural way ; of which, however, no one can be certain.
And as several of these events seem, in sorae degree
expressly, to have verified the prophetic history already ;
so Ukewise they raay be considered farther, as having a
peculiar aspect towards the fuU corapletion of ft ; as af
fording sorae presuraption that the whole of it shall, one
tirae or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have
been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide
dispersion ; which is indeed the direct fulfilling of sorae
prophecies, but is now raentioned only as looking forward
lo somewhat yet-' lo corae : that natural religion carae
forth frora Jndea, and spread in the degree ft bas done
over the world, before lost in idolatry ; which, together
with some olher things, have distinguished that very
place, in like raanner as the people of it are distinguish
ed : that this great change of religion over the earth, was
brought about under the profession and acknowledgraent,
that Jesus was the promised Messiah : things of this kind
naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the
full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the
26

302 Of ihe particular Evidence [Part 2.
final restoration of that people ; concerning the establish
raent of the everlasting kingdora araong thera, the king
dora of the Messiah ; and the future stale of the world,
under this sacred government. Such circumstances and
events corapared with these prophecies, though no com
pletions of them, yet would not, 1 think, be spoken of as
nothing in the argument, by a person upon his first being
inforraed of thera. They faU in with the prophetic
history of things still future, give it sorae additional cred
ibility, have the appearance of being somewhat in order
to the full completion of il.
Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge, and
great calmness and consideration, to be able to judge,
thoroughly, of the evidence for the truth of Christianity,
frora that part of the prophetic history which relates to
the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and lo the
slate of the church, frora the establishraent of Christian
ity to the present tirae. But it appears frora a general
view of it, to be very raaterial. And those persons who
have thoroughly examined il, and sorae of them were
raen of the coolest terapers, greatest capacities, and least
liable to iraputations of prejudice, insist upon it as deter-
rainalely conclusive.
Suppose novv a person quite ignorant of history, first
lo recollect the passages above raentioned out of Scrip
ture, without knowing but that the whole vvas a late fic
tion, then to be informed of the correspondent facts now
mentioned, and lo unite thera aU into one view: thatthe
profession and establishment of natural religion in the
world, is greatiy owing, in different ways, to tbis book,
and the supposed revelation which it contains ; that ft is
acknowledged lo be of the eariiest antiquity ; that its
chronology and common bistory are entirely credible;
that this ancient nation, the Jews, of whora it chiefly
treats, appear to have been, in fact, the people of God,
in a distinguished sense ; that as there vvas a national ex
pectation araongst them, raised from the prophecies, of
a Messiah to appear at such a tirae, so one at this time

Chap. 7,J For Christianity. 303
appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; that he was re
jected by this nation ; but received by the Gentiles, not
upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that
the religion he taught supported itself under the greatest
difficulties, gained ground, and al length became the reli
gion of the world ; that in the mean tirae the Jewish
polity was utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed
over the face of the earth ; that notwithstanding this,
they have reraained a distinct nuraerous people for so
raany centuries, even lo this day ; which nol only ap
pears to be the express completion pf several prophecies
concerning thera ; but also renders it, as one may speak,
a visible and easy possibiUty, that the prontises raade lo
thera as a nation, raay yet be fulfilled. And lo these ac-
kiowledged truths, let the person we have been suppos
ing add, as I think he ought, whether every one wiU
allow il or no, the obvious appearances which there are,
of the stale of the world, in other respects besides what
relates to the Jews, and of the Christian church, having
so long answered, and stftl answering to the prophetic
history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the
things before mentioned out of the Scripture, and serious
ly corapared with them ; tbe joint view of both together,
must, 1 think, appear of very great weight to a consid
erate reasonable person : of much greater indeed, upon
haying thera first laid before him, than is easy for us, who
are so faraUiarized to thera, lo conceive, without sorae
particular attention for that purpose.
AU these things, and the several particulars contained
under them, require lo be distinctly and most thoroughly ,
examined into ; that the weight of each raay be judged
of, upon such exaraination, and such conclusion drawn
as results from their united force. But this has not been
attempted bere. I have gone no farther than lo show,
that the general imperfect view of thera now given, the
^^confessed historical evidence for rairacles, and the raany
obvious appearing corapleiions of prophecy, together

304 Of the particular Evidence [Part 2.
wfth the coUateral things* here raentioned, and there are
several olhers of the like sort ; that aU this together,
which, being fact, must be acknowledged by unbelievers,
amounts to real evidence of soraewhat more than human
in this matter : evidence much more important, than
careless men, vvho have been accustomed only lo tran
sient and partial views of it, can imagine; and indeed
abundantly sufficient lo act upon. And these things, I
apprehend, must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For
though they raay say, that the historical evidence of mir
acles., wrought in attestation of Christianity, is not suffi
cient to convince thera that such miracles were really
wrought ; they cannot deny, that there is such historical
evidence, ft being a known matier of fact that there is.
They raay say, the conformity between the -prophecies
and events, is by accident ; but there are raany instances
in which such conformity ftself cannot be denied. They
may^ say, wilh regard to such kind of collateral things as
those above mentioned, that any odd accidental events,
wfthout meaning, will have a raeaning found in them by
fanciful people ; and that such as are fanciful in any one
certain vvay, will make ont a thousand coincidences,
wliich seem to favor their peculiar follies. Men, I say,
may talk thus; but no one who is serious, can possibly
think these things to be nothing, if he considers the im
portance of collateral things, and even of lesser circum
stances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished,
in nature, frora the evidence of deraonstration. In many
cases, indeed, it seems to require the truest judgraent, lo
determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial
evidence ; but it is very often altogether as convincing,
as that which is the most express and direct.
This general view of the evidence for Christianity,
considered as making one arguraent, raay also serve to
* All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible
to the head of certain miracles, or determinate completions of pro
phecy. See pages 271, 272.

Chap, 7,J For Christianity. 305
recommend to serious persons, to set down every thing
which they think raay be of any real weight at aU in
proof of il, and particularly the raany seeraing comple
tions of prophecy ; and they wiU find, that, judging by
the natural rules, by which we judge of probable evi
dence in coraraon raatters, they araount to a much higher
degree of proof, upon such a joint review, than-could be
supposed upon considering thera separately, at different
tiraes ; how strong soever the proof raight before appear
lo them, upon such separate views of it. For probables
proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence,
but raultiply ft. Nor should I dissuade any one frora
setting down, what he thought made for the contrary side.
But then ft is to be remembered, not in order lo influence
his judgment, but his practice, that a mistake on one side,
may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous, than
a mistake on the other. And what course is raost safe,
and what mosl dangerous, is a consideration thought very
material, when we deliberate, not concerning events, but
concerning conduct in our leraporal affairs. To be influ
enced by this consideration in our judgment, to beUeve
or disbeUeve upon it, is indeed as rauch prejudice, as any
thing whatever. And, like other prejudices, it operates
contrary ways in different raen. For some are incUned
to believe what they hope ; and otbers, what they fear.
And it is manifest unreasonableness, to apply to men's
passions in order to gain their assent. But in delibera
tions concerning conduct, there is notiiing whicii reason
more requires to be taken into the account, than the im
portance of ft. For, suppose it doubtful, what wonld be
the consequence of acting in this,, or in a contrary man
ner; still, that taking one side could be attended wilh Ut
ile or no bad consequence, and taking the olher raight be
attended wfth the greatest, must appear, lo unprejudiced
reason, of the highest raoraent towards deterraining how
we are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth
of common raatters, is to be judged of by all tbe evidence
taken together. And unless the whole series of things
26*

306 Of the particular Evidence, Sfc. [Part 2.
which raay be alleged in tbis argument, and every partic
ular thing in ft, can reasonably be supposed to have been
by accident, (for here the stress of the arguraent for
Christianity lies,) then is the truth of ft proved : in Uke
manner as if, in any common case, numerous events ac
knowledged, were lo be alleged in proof of any other
event disputed ; the trulh of the disputed event would be
proved, nol only if any one of the acknowledged ones
did of ftself clearly imply it, but, though no one of thera
singly did so, if the whole of the acknowledged events
taken together, could not in reason be supposed to have
happened, unless the disputed one were true.
It is obvious, how much advantage the nature of this
evidence gives to those persons vvho attack Chrislianity,
especially in conversation. For it is easy lo show, in a
short and lively raanner, that such and sucb things are
liable lo objection, that this and another thing is of little
weight in itself; but irapossible to show, in like manner,
the united force of the whole arguraent in one view.
However, lastly, as it has been raade appear, that there
is no presumption against a revelation as rairaculous;
that the general scherae of Christianity, and the princi
pal parts of it, are conforraable to the experienced con
stitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible; so
the account novv given of the positive evidence for it,
shows, that this evidence is such, as, frora the nature of
it, cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened.

307

CHAP. VIII.
Of the Objections which may be made against arguing
from the Analogy of JVature to ReUgion.
If every one would consider, with such attention as
they are bound, even in point of raoraUty, lo consider,
what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of
this chapter would be, in sorae good raeasure at least,
superseded. But since this is not to be expected ; for
sorae we find do not concern theraselves to understand
even what they write against : since this treatise, in com
raon wilh raost others, lies open lo objections, which may
appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight;
and, besides that, seeras pecuUarly liable to the objections
of such as can judge wiihout thinking, and of such as can
censure without judging; it may not be amiss to set
down the chief of these objections which occur to rae,
and consider thera to their hands. And they are such
as these : —
" That ft is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revela
tion, by saying, that there are the sarae in natural reli
gion ; when what is wanting is lo clear both of thera, of
these their coraraon, as well as other their respeclive,
difficuhies : but that it is a strange way indeed of con-
vincing-raen of the obUgalions of religion, to show thera,
that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits ;
and a strange way of vindicating the justice and good
ness of the Author of nature, and of reraoving the objec
tions against both, to vvhich the systera of religion Ues
open, to show, that the like objections lie against natural

308 Objections against the Analogy [Part 2.
providence ; a way of answering objections against reli
gion, without so much as pretending lo raake oul, that the
systera of it, or the particular things in it objected against,
are reasonable — especially, perhaps, sorae raay bejnat-
tentive enough to add, raust this be thought strange,
when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such
objections : that when this sort of reasoning is carried to
the utraost length it can be iraagined capable of, it wiU
yet leave the raind in a very unsatisfied state ; aud that
it raust be unaccountable ignorance of raankind, lo iraa
gine they wiU be prevaUed wfth to forego their present
interests and pleasures, frora regard to reUgion, upon
doubtful evidence,"
Now, as plausible as this way of talking raay appear,
that appearance wiU be found in a great raeasure owing
to half-views, which show but part of an object, yet show
that indistinctly ; and to undeterininate language. By
these raeans weak raen are often deceived by others,
and ludicrous raen, by theraselves. And even those
who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily
disentangle, and at once clearly see ihrough the perplex
ities, in which subjects iheraselves are involved ; and
which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse
of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following
reply to each part of this objection severally, raay be of
some assistance ; as it raay also tend a lillie lo slop and
silence others.
First, The thing wanted, i. e. what raen require, is to
have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for
any thing we know to the contrary, ft raay be, the same,
as requiring to coraprehend the divine nature, and the
whole plan of Providence frora everlasting. But il halh
always been allowed to argue, frora what is acknowledg
ed to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a
poor thing, to argue frora natural reUgion to revealed, in
the raanner found fauft with, than ft is to argue in num
berless other ways of probable deduction and inference,
in raatters of conduct, which we are continually reduced

Chap, 8,J Of JVature to Religion. 309
to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet ^oor raay
be appUed, I fear, as properly to great part, or the whole,
of huraan life, as it is to the things raentioned in tbe ob
jection. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to have
so littie knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the
most eminent have .'' To act upon conjecture and guess,
where the life of raan is concerned .'' Undoubtedly it is :
but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that
useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark.
Further : Since it is as unreasonable, as ft is coraraon,
to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal
weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if
they are not confuted themselves, deal unfairly with oth
ers, in making it seera that they are arguing oiily against
revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality
tbey are arguing against raoral providence ; it is a thing
of consequence to show, that such objections are as
much leveUed against natural religion, as against reveal
ed. And objections, which are equally applicable to
both, are, properly speaking, answered, by its being
show^ that they are so, provided the forraer be adraitted
tb be true. And without taking in the consideration how
distinctiy this is adraftted, it is plainly very raaterial to
observe, that as the things objected against in natural re
ligion, are of the sarae kind wfth what is certain matter
of experience in the course of providence, and in the in
formation which God affords us concerning our temporal
interest under his government ; so the objections against
the systera of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of
the very sarae kind with those which are made against
the systera and evidence of natural religion. However,
the reader upon review raay see, that raost of the analo
gies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise,
do not necessarily require to have raore taken for grant
ed than is in the forraer ; that there is an Author of na
ture, or natural Governor of the world ; and Christianity
is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but
chiefly, frora Us analogy to the experienced constitution
of nature.

310 Objection against the Analogy [Part 2.
*"*' Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in
such a determinate course of life ; as being what, there
is reason lo think, is commanded by the Author of na
ture, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under
his government. Now if raen can be convinced that
they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe,
that taking care of their temporal affairs wiU be to their
advantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument
to thera for the practice of religion. And if there be
really any reason for believing one of these, and en
deavoring lo preserve life, and secure ourselves the ne
cessaries and conveniences ofil ; then thereis reason also
for beUeving the other, and endeavoring to secure the
interest it proposes lo us. And if the interest which re
ligion proposes to us, be infinitely greater than our whole
teraporal interest ; then there must be proportionably
greater reason for endeavoring to secure one, than the
other : since, by the supposition, tbe probabiUty of our
securing one, is equal lo the probability of our securing
the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; and has
a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what
our condition really is, or upon what evidence we are
naturally appointed to act ; and who are disposed lo ac
quiesce in the terms upon vvhich we live, and attend to
and follow that practical instruction, whatever ft he,
which is afforded us.
But the chief and proper force of tbe argument re
ferred to in the objection, lies in another place. For ft
is said that the proof of religion is involved in such in
extricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful ; aod that
il cannot be supposed, that if it were true, it would be
left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above
tbe force of each particular difficulty or objection, these
difficulties and objections taken together, are turned into
a positive arguraent against the truth of religion : which
arguraent would stand thus. If religion were true, it
would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the
degree in which it is : therefore that it is thus left, not

Chap. S.J Of JVature to Religion. 311
only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force,
in proportion lo the weight of such objections ; but also
shows it to be false, or is a general presuraption of its
being so. Now the observation, that frora the natural
constitution and course of things, vve raust in our temporal
concerns, alraost continually, and in raatters of greal con
sequence, act upon evidence of a Uke kind and degree
tothe evidence of religion, is an answer lo this arguraent ;
because it shows, tbat il is according to tbe conduct and
character of tbe Author of nature to appoint vve should
act upon evidence like to that, which this arguraent pre
sumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we should act
upon: ft is an instance, a general one raade up of nu
merous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with
us, sirailar to what is said to be incredible. And as the
force of this answer lies raerely in the parallel which
there is between the evidence for religion and for our
temporal conduct ; the answer is equally just and con
clusive, whether the parallel be raade out, by showing
the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence
of the latter to be lower,
¦ Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not lo vindi
cate the character of God, but to show the obUgations
of men : ft is not to justify his providence, but lo show
what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and
ought not to be confounded. And though they raay at
length run up into each other, yet observations raay im
mediately tend to make out the latter, which do not ap
pear, by any immediate connexion, to tbe purpose of the
former; which is less our concern than raany seem to
think. For, 1st, It is not necessary we should justify
the dispensations of Providence against objections, any
farther than to show, tbat the tilings objected against
may, for aught we- know, be consistent wfth justice and
goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things in the
system of this worid, and plan of Providence relating lo
It, which taken alone would be unjust ; yet it has been
shown unanswerably, that if we could lake in the refer-

312 Objections against the Analogy [Part 2,
ence which these things raay have, to other things pres
ent, past, and to come ; to the whole scherae, which the
things objected against are parts of; these very things
might, for aught we knovv, be found to be, not only con
sistent wfth justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has
been shown, by the analogy of what we see, not only
possible that this raay be tbe case, but credible that it is.
And thus objections, drawn from such things, are an
swered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion
makes its vindication necessary. Hence it appears,
2dly, That objections against the divine justice and good
ness are not endeavored to be reraoved, by showing that
the like objections, allowed to be reaUy conclusive, Ue
against natural providence : but those objections being
supposed and shown not to be conclusive, the things ob
jected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther
shown to be credible, frora their conformity lo the con
stftution of nature ; for instance, that God wiU reward
and punish raen for their actions hereafter, from the ob
servation, that he does reward and punish thera for their
actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. And
I add, Sdly, It would be of weight, even though those ob
jections vvere nol answered. For, there being the proof
of religion above set down, and religion implying seve
ral facts ; for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that
God will reward and punish men for their actions here
after ; the observation that his present method of gov
ernment is by rewards and punishraents, shows that fu
ture fact not to be incredible ; whatever objections raen
may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful,
according to their notions of justice and mercy ; or as
iraprobable frora their belief of necessity, I say, as im
probable ; for it is 'evident no objection against it, as un
just, can be urged frora necessity ; since this notion as
much destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then, 4ihly,
Though objections against the reasonableness of the sys
tera of religion, cannot indeed be answered wiihout en
tering into consideration of its reasonableness, yet ob-

Chap, 8,J Of JVature to Religion. 313
jections against the credibUity or truth ofil raay, 'Because
tiie system of it is reducible into vvhat is properly matter of
fact; and the truth, the probable truth, of facts, may be
shown vvfthoul consideration af their reasonableness. Nor
is ft necessary, though, in sorae cases and respects, it is
highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a
proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us,
and of every particular dispensation of Providence, which
coraes into the systera of reUgion, Indeed the raore
thoroughly . a person of a right disposition is convinced
of the perfection of the divine naiure and conduct, the
farther he vvill advance towards that perfection of re
Ugion, which St John speaks of* But tbe general ob
ligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the
reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the
practice of religion is reasonable, raay be shown, ihough
no more could be proved, than that the system of it
may be so, for aught we know lo the contrary ; and
even wiihout entering into the distinct consideration of
this. And from hence, 5ihly, It is easy lo see, that
though the analogy of nature is nol an iraraediate an
swer to objections against the wisdora, the justice, or
goodness, of any doctrine or precept of religion ; yet
ft may be, as it is, an iraraediate and direct answer to
what is really intended by such objections ; which
is, lo show that the things objected against are in
credible. Fourthly, It is raost readily acknowledged, that the
foregoing Treatise is by no raeans satisfactory ; very far
indeed from it : but so would any natural inslftution of
life appear, if reduced into a systera, together wfth its
evidence. Leaving. reUgion oul of the case, raen are
divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures over
balance our pains ; and whether it be, or be not, eligible
to live in this world. And vvere aU such controversies
• 1 John iv. 18.
27

314 Objections against the Analogy [Part 2,
settied, which perhaps, in speculation, vvould be found
involved in great difficulties ; and vvere ft deterrained,
upon the evidence of reason, as nature has determined it
to our hands, that life is lo.be preserved ; yet still, ihe
rules which God has been pleased to afford us, for esca
ping the raiseries of it, and obtaining its satisfactions, the
rules, for instance, of preserving health and recovering
it vvhen lost, are nol only falUble, and precarious, but very
far from being exact. Nor are vve inforraed by nature,
in future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at
all certain, what is the best method of raanaging our af
fairs. What will be the success of our temporal pursuits,
in tbe common sense of the word success, is highly doubt
ful. And vvhat will be the success of them, in the pro
per sense of ihe word ; i. e. what happiness or enjoy
ment we shall obtain by thera, is doubtful in a much
higher degree. Indeed, tiie unsatisfactory nature of the
evidence, with which we are obliged lo take up, in the
daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men
do not throw away life, or disregard the interests of it,
upon account of ibis doubtfulness. The evidence of re
ligion then being adraitted real, those wbo object against
it, as not satisfactory, i. e. as not being vvhat they wish it,
plainly forget the very condition of our being ; for satis
faction, in this sense, does not belong to such a creature
as man, ,And, which is more material, they forget also
the very nature of religion. For, religion presupposes,
in all those who will embrace it, a certain degree of integ
rity and honesty ; which it was intended lo try whether
men have or not, and to exercise in such as have ft, in
order lo its imJDroveraent, Religion presupposes this as
rnuch, and in the sarae sense, as speaking 10 a man pre
supposes he understands the language in which you
speak ; or as warning a raan of any danger, presupposes
that he hath such a regard lo himself, as that he will en
deavor to avoid il. And therefore the question is not at
all, Wliether the evidence of religion be satisfactory ;
but. Whether it be, in reason, sufficient lo prove and dis-

Chap, 8,J Of JVature to Religion. 315
cipline that virtue which it presupposes .'' Now, the evi
dence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of
probation ; how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as
tothe purposes of curiosity, or any other : and indeed it
answers the purposes of the former in several respects,
which ft vvould not do, if ft were as overbearing as is re
quired. One might add farther, that whether the rao
tives, or the evidence for any course of action, be satis
factory, raeaning here by that word, vvhat satisfies a raan,
that such a course of action will in event be for his good;
this need never be, and I think, strictiy speaking, never
is, the practical question in common raatters. But the
practical question in all cases, is. Whether the evidence
for a course of action be such, as, taking in aU circura
stances, makes the faculty wfthin us, which is the guide
and judge of conduct,* determine that course of action to
be prudent .? Indeed, satisfaction that it will be for our in
terest or happiness, abundantly determines an action to be
prudent; but evidence, alraost infinitely lower than this,
determines actions to be so too, even in the conduct of
every day.
Fifthly, As to the objection concerning the influence
which this' arguraent, or any part of it, raay, or raay not,
be expected to have upon raen, I observe, as above, that
religion being intended for a trial and exercise of the
morality of every person's character, who is a subject of
ft ; and there being, as I have shown, such evidence for
It, as is sufficient, in reason, lo influence raen to erabrace
It; to object, that it is not to be imagined raankind wUl
be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose
of the foregoing Treatise, For the purpose of il is not
to inquire. What sort of creatures mankind are ; bul.
What the light and knowledge, which is afforded thera,
requires they should be ? lo show how, in reason, they
ought to behave ; not how, in fact, they will behave.
This depends upon theraselves, and is their own con-
* See Dissertation 2.

316 Objections against the Analogy [Part 2.
cern ; the personal concern of each man in particular.
And how littie regard the generality have to it, experi
ence, indeed, does too fully show. But religion, consid
ered as a probation, has had its end upon aU persons, to
whora ft has been proposed, vvith evidence sufficient in
reason to influence tbeir practice ; for by this means they
have been put into a stale of probation ; let thera behave as
they will in it. And thus, not only revelation, but reason
also, teaches us, that by the evidence of reUgion being
laid before raen, the designs of Providence are carrying on,
not only with regard lo those who will, but likewise with
regard to those who will not, be influenced by ft. How
ever, lastly, the objection here referred lo allows the
things insisted upon in this Treatise to be of some weight;
and if so, it may be hoped it will have some influence.
And if there be a probability that ft wiU have any at aU,
there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to
lay it before men, as there would be, ifit were likely to
have a greater influence.
And farther, I desire it may be considered, with re
spect to the whole of the foregoing objections, that in
this Treatise I have argued upon the principles of others,*
not my own ; and have omitted what I tiiink true, and of
the most importance, because by others thought unintelli
gible, or not true. Thus I have argued upon the princi
ples of tiie Fatalists, which I do not believe ; and have
oraitted a thing of the utraost importance which I do be
lieve, the moral fitness and unfitness of actions, prior to.
all will whatever ; which I apprehend as certainly to de
termine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and false
hood necessarily deterraine the divine judgment. Indeed
the principle of Uberty, and that of moral fitness, so force
iheraselves upon the mind, that moraUsts, the ancients as
"¦ By arguing upon the principles of others, the reader will ob
serve is meant, not proving any thing from those principles, but not
withstanding theni. Thus religion is proved, not, from the opinion
of necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding or even though
that opinion were admitted to be true.

Chap, 8,J Of JVature to Religion. 317
well as modems, have forraed their language upon it-
And probably it may appear in raine, though I have en
deavored lo avoid ft ; and in order lo avoid it, have sorae
times been obUged to express rayself in a raanner vvhich
will appear strange lo such as do not observe the reason
fork; but the general argument here pursued does not at
all suppose, or proceed upon, these principles. Now,
these two abstract principles of liberty and raoral fitness
being omitted, reUgion can be considered in no otber view
than merely as a question of fact ; and in this view it is
here considered. It is obvious, that Christianity, and the
proof of it, are both historical. And even natural religion
is, properly, a matter of fact. For, that there is a right
eous Governor of the world, is so ; and this proposition
contains the general system of natural religion. But then,
several abstract truths, and in particular those two princi
ples, are usually taken into consideration in the proof of
it; whereas ft is here treated of only as a raatter of fact.
To explain this : that the three angles of a triangle are
equal to two right ones, is an abstract truth ; bul thatthey
appear so to our raind, is only a raatter of fact. And this
last must have been admitted, if any thing was, by those
ancient sceptics, vvho vvould not have admitted the for
mer; bul pretended lo doubt, Whether there were any
such thing as trulh ; or. Whether we could certainly, de
pend upon our faculties of understanding for the know
ledge of it in any case. So likewise, that there is, in
the nature of things, an original standard of right and
wrong in actions, independent upon all vvill, but which
unalterably deterraines the will of God, to exercise that
moral governraent over the world which religion teaches,
i. e. finally and upon the whole lo reward and punish
men respectively as they act right or wrong ; this asser
tion contains an abstract trulh, as vvell as raatter of fact.
But suppose in the presenl slate, every man, without ex
ception, vvas rewarded and punished, in exact propor
tion as lie followed or transgressed tbat sense of right
and wrong, which God has implanted in the nature of
27*

318 Okjeciions agamst the Analogy [Part 2,
every man ; this would not be al all an abstract truth,
but only a matter of fact. And though this fact vvere
acknowledged by every one, yet the very sarae difficul
ties might be raised, as are now, concerning the abstract
questions of liberty and moral fitness : and we should
haye a proof, even the certain one of experience, that
the government of the vvorld was perfectly raoral, with
out taking in the consideration of those questions : and
this proof would remain, in vvhat vvay soever they were
determined. And thus, God having given raankind a
moral faculty, the object of which is actions, and which
naturally approves some actions as right and of good de
sert, and condemns others as wrong, and of Ul desert ;
that he will, finally and upon the whole, reward the former
and punish the latter, is not an assertion of an abstract
truth, but of what is as mere a fact, as his doing so at
present would be. This future fact I have not indeed
proved with the force with vvhich it might be proved,
from the principles of Uberty and moral fitness; but
without them have given a really conclusive practical
proof of it, which is greatly strengthened by the general
analogy of nature ; a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown
not to be demonstrative, for it is not offered as such ;
but impossible, I think, to be evaded or answered. And
thus the obligations of religion are made out, exclusively
of the questions concerning liberty and moral fitness;
which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse
reasonings, as every thing may.
Hence, therefore, raay be observed distinctly, what is
the force ofthis Treatise, It will be, to such as are con
vinced of religion, upon the proof arising oul of the two
last mentioned principles, an additional proof and a con
firmation of it ; to such as do not adrait those principles,
an original proof of it,* and a confirmation of that proof
Those who believe, vvill here find the scherae of Chris
tianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a
• Pages 159, 160, &c.

Chap. B.J Of JVature to Religion. 319
peculiar raanner strengthened : those who do not believe,
will al least be shown the absurdity of all atterapts lo
prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility
of il, and, I hope, a good deal raore.
And thus, ihough sorae perhaps may seriously think,
that analogy, as here urged, has too great stress laid upon
it ; and ridicttie, unanswerable ridicule, raay be appUed,
to show the argument frora il in a disadvantageous light ;
yet there can be no question, but that it is a real one.
For religion, both natural and revealed, iraplying in it
numerous facts ; analogy, being a confirraation of all
facts to which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of
mosl, cannot bul be adraitted by every one to be a raa
terial thing, and truly of weight on the side of religion,
both natural and revealed ; and it ought to be particularly
regarded by such as profess lo follow nature, and to be
less satisfied with abstract reasonings.

320

CONCLUSION.

Whatever account may be given, of the strange
inattention and disregard, in some ages and countries, to
a matter of such importance as religion, it would, before
experience, be incredible, that there should be the like
disregard in those, who have had the moral system of
the world laid before thera, as it is by Christianity, and
often inculcated upon thera ; because this moral system
carries in ft a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon
its being barely proposed to our thoughts. There is no
need of abstruse reasonings arid distinctions, to convince
an unprejudiced understanding, that there is a God who
made and governs the world, and will judge it in
righteousness ; ihough they raay be necessary to answer
abstruse difficuhies, when once such are raised ; when
the very raeaning of those words, which express raost in
teUigibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to
be uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itself is
obscured by the intricacies of speculation. But, to an
unprejudiced raind, ten thousand thousand instances of
design, cannot but prove a Designer, And it is intuitively
manifest, that creatures ought to live under a dutiftti sense
of their Maker ; and that justice and charity must be his
laws, to creatures whom he has raade social, and placed
in society. Indeed, the truth of revealed religion, pecu
liarly so called,' is not self-evident, but requires external
proof, in order to fts being received. Yet inattention,
araong us, to revealed religion, will be found to imply the
sarae dissolute immoral teraper of raind, as inattention to

Part 2, j Conclusion. 321
natural religion ; because, vvhen both are laid before us,
in tiie raanner they are in Christian countries of liberty,
our obligations lo inquire into botii, and to erabrace both
upon supposition of their truth, are obligations of the
same nature. For, revelation claims to be the voice of
God ; and our obUgation to atlend to his voice, is, surely,
moral in all cases. And as it is insisted, that its evidence
is conclusive, upon thorough consideration of it ;' so it
offers itself to us vvith manifest obvious appearances of
having something raore than huraan in it, and therefore
in aU reason requires, lo have its clairas most seriously
examined inlo. It is lo be added, that though light and
knowledge, in what raanner soever affc)rded us, is equally
from God ; yet a rairaculous revelation has a pecuUar
tendency, frora the first principles of our nature, to
awaken raankind, and inspire thera vvith reverence and
awe : and this is a pecuUar obligation, to attend lo what
claims to be so with such appearances of truth. It is
therefore most certain, that our obligations to inquire
seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and, upon
supposition of its truth, to erabrace it, are of the utmost
importance, and moral in the highest and most proper
sense. Let us then suppose, that the evidence of religion
in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously in
quired into by all reasonable men araong us. Yet we
find many professedly to reject both, upon speculative
principles of infideUty, And aU of thera do not content
themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying
their imaginary freedora from its restraints, Sorae go
much beyond this. They deride God's raoral govern
ment over the world : they renounce his protection, and
defy bis justice: they ridicule and vilify Christianity,
and blaspheme the Author of ft ; and lake all occasions
to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This
amounts to an active setting themselves against reUgion ;
to what raay be considered as a posftive principle of
irreligion ; which they cultivate within themselves, and,
whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as

322 Conclusion. [Part 2.
a good raan does the contrary principle. And others,
who are not chargeable wilh all this profligateness, yet
are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to
be groundless. Now admitting, vvhich is the supposition
we go upon, that these persons act upon vvhat they think
principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be
argued wfth ; it is really inconceivable, that tbey should
imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, con
sidered in itself, to be nothing at all ; nor do they pretend
tbis. They are far indeed from having a just notion of
fts evidence ; but they vvould not say its evidence vvas
nothing, if they thought the system of ft, wfth all its cir
cumstances, were credible, like other matters of science
or history. So that their manner of treating il must pro
ceed, either frora such kind of objections against all reU
gion, as have been answered or obviated in the former
part of this Treatise ; or else frora objections and diffi
culties, supposed more peculiar to Christianity, Thus,
they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a
revelation, and miraculous interpositions. They find
things io Scripture, whether in incidental passages or in
the general scherae of it, which appear lo thera un
reasonable. They take for granted, that if Christian
ity were true, the light pf ft raust have been raore gene
ral, and the evidence of it raore satisfactory, or rather
overbearing ; that it must and would have been, in sorae
way, othervvise put and left, than it is. Now, this is not
iraagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing, or
inconsiderable ; but quite another thing. It is being for
tified against tiie evidence, in sorae degree acknowledged,
by thinking they see the systera of Christianity, or sorae
what which appears to thera necessarily connecled wilh
it, lo be incredible or false ; fortified against that evidence,
which might, otherwise, make great impression upon
thera. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the
whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Chrislianity, their
behaviour seems owing to their taking for granted, through
strange inattention, that such doubting is, in a raanner, the
sarae thing as being certain against ft.

Part 2, J Conclusion. 323
To these persons, and to this stale of opinion concern
ing religion, the foregoing Treatise is adapted. For,
all the general objections against the raoral systera of
nature having been obviated, it is shown, that there is
not any peculiar presuraption at all against Christianity,
either considered as not discoverable by reason, or as
unlike to vvhat is so discovered ; nor any worth raention
ing, against it as rairaculous, if any al all : none certainly,
wliich can render it in the least incredible. It is shown,
that upon supposition of a divine revelation, the analogy
of nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think
probable, that many things in it must appear Uable
lo great objections ; and tiiat we must be incorapetent
judges of ft, lo a great degree. This observation is, I
think, unquestionably true, and ofthe very utraost impor
tance: bul ft is urged, as I hope it wiU be understood,
with great caution of not viUfying the faculty of reason,
which is " the candle of the Lord within us ; "* though
it can afford no Ught, where il does not shine : nor judge,
where ft has no principles to judge upon. The objec
tions here spoken of, being first answered in the view of
objections against Christianity as a raatter of fact, are in
the next place considered as urged, raore immediately,
against the wisdora, justice, and goodnessof the Christian
dispensation. And it is fully raade out, that they adrait
of exactly the Uke answer, in every respect, to vvhat the
like objections against the constitution of nature admit of:
that, as partial views give the Appearance of wrong to
things, which upon farther consideration and knowledge
of their relations to other things, are found just and good;
so ft is perfectiy credible, that tbe things objected against
tbe wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation,
may be rendered instances of wisdora and goodness by
their reference to- olher things beyond our view : because
Christianfty is a scheme as much above our comprehen
sion, as that of nature ; and, like that, a scherae in which
* Prov. XX. 27.

324 Conclusion. [Part 2,
means are made use of lo accomplish ends, and vvhich,
as is raost credible, raay be carried on by general laws.
And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer
taken merely or chiefly from our ignorance ; but frora
soraewhat positive, which our observation shows us. For,
to Uke objections,' the like answer is experienced lo be just,
in nuraberless parallel cases. The objections against the
Cbristian dispensation, and tbe raethod by which it is
carried on, having been thus obviated, in general and
together : the chief of them are considered distinctly,
and the particular things objected to are shown credible,
by their perfect analogy, each part, to the constitution of
nature. Thus, if man be fallen frora bis priraitive stale,
and 10 be restored, and infinite wisdora and power
engages in accomplishing our recovery : it vvere to have
been expected, it is said, that this should have been
effected at once, and not by such a long series of means,
and such a various economy of persons and things ; one
dispensation preparatory lo anoiher, tbis lo a farther one,
and so on through an indefinite nnmber of ages, before
the end of the scheme proposed can be completely
accoraplished ; a scherae conducted by infinite wisdora,
and executed by Almighty povver. But now, on the con
trary, our finding that every thing in the constitution and
course of naiure is thus carried on, shows such expec
tations-concerning revelation to be bighly unreasonable ;
and is a satisfactory answer lo thera, when urged as
objections against the credibility, that the great scherae
of Providence in the redemption of-the world, raay be of
this kind, and to be accoraplished in this raanner. As lo
the particular method of onr rederaption, the appoiniraent
of a Mediator betvveen God and raan; this has been
shown to be raost obviously analogous to the general con
duct of nature, i. e. the God of nature, in appointing
olhers to be the instruraents of his raercy, as we expe
rience in the daily course of Providence, The condftion
of this world, vvhich the doctrine of our redemption by
Christ presupposes, so much falls in vvith natural appear-

Part 2,J Conclusion. 325
ances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those
appearances ; inferred, that human nature was fallen from
its original rectftude, and, in consequence of this, degra
ded frora its priraitive happiness. Or, however this
opinion carae into the world, these appearances must have
kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of il.
And as it was the general opinion, under the Ught of
nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by
itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a
fuU remission of the penalties annexed lo il ; and as the
reason of the thing does not at aU lead to any conclusion ;
soevery day's experience shows us tbat reforraation is not,
in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages
and raiseries, which, in the natural course of things, God
has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there raay be
ground to think, that the punishments, which by the general
laws of divine government, are annexed to vice, may be
prevented ; that provision may have been, even originally,
made, that they should be prevented by some raeans or
olher, though they could not by reforraation alone. For
we have daily instances of such mercy, in the general
conduct of nature ; corapassion provided for misery,*
raedicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There
is provisions made, in ihe original constitution of the
world, that rauch of the natural bad consequences of our
folUes, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent,
may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance,
which nature enables, and disposes, and appoints them to
afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this,
when the world lay in vvickedness, and consequently in
ruin, "God so loved the world, that he gave bis only
begotten Son" to save it ; and " he being made perfect by
suffering, became the author of eternal salvation to aU
them that obey hira,"-]- Indeed, neither reason nor
analogy would lead us to think, in particular, that the in
terposition of Christ, in the manner in vvhich he did
* Sermon 6th, at the Rolls. f John "i- 16. Heb. v. 9.
28

326 Conclusion. [Part, 1.
interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the
world, which the Scripture leaches us it was : but neither
would reason nor analogy lead us to think, that olher
particular means would be of the efficacy, which ex
perience shows they are, in numberless instances. And
therefore, as the case before us does not admit of
experience, so that neither reason nor analogy can show,
how, or in what particular vvay, the interposition of
Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy which
it is there represented to be; this is no kind nor
degree of presumption against its being really of that
efficacy. Farther : the objections against Christianity,
frora the liglit ofil not being universal, nor its evidence so
strong as might possibly be given us, have been answered
by the general analogy of nature. That God has raade
such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer lo the
forraer; but that he dispenses his gifts in such variety,
botii of degrees and kinds, araongst creatures of the sarae
species, and even to the same individuals at different
times, is a raore obvious and full answer to it. And it is
so far frora being the raethod of Providence, in other
cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some
require in proof of Christianity, that, on the contrary, the
evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in
comraon raatters, throughout a very great part of life, is
doubtful in a high degree. And, adraitting the fact, that
God has afforded to sorae, no more than doubtful evidence
of religion, the same account may be given of it, as
of difficulties and temptations with regard to practice.
But as it is not impossible,* surely, that this aUeged
doubtfulness raay be men's own fauft, it deserves their
raost serious consideration, whether it be not so. How
ever, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evi
dence for that of which we doubt, and that this degree
of evidence as reaUy lays us under obligations, as demon
strative evidence, * Page 267, &c.

Part 2.J Conclusion. 327
The whole then of religion is throughout credible ;
nor is there, I think, any tiling relating to the revealed
dispensation of things more difterent frora the experienced
constitution and course of nature, than sorae parts of
the constitution of nature are from other parts of it. And
if so, the only question vvhich remains is. What positive
evidence can be aUeged for the truth of Christianity ?
This too, in general, has been considered, and the
objections against it estiraated. Deduct therefore what
is to be deducted from that evidence, upon account
of any weight which raay be thought to remain in these
objections, after what the analogy of naiure has suggest
ed in answer lo thera ; and then consider, vvhat are tiie
.practical consequences frora all this, upon the most scep
tical principles one can argue upon, (for I am writing to
persons vvho entertain these principles :) and, upon such
consideration, it wiU be obvious, that immorality, as little
excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated, in
persons wbo have been raade acquainted wfth Christian
ity, whether they believe it or not ; because the raoral
systera of nature, or natural reUgion, which Christianity
lays before us, approves itself, alraost intuitively, to a
reasonable raind, upon seeing il proposed. In the next
place, with regard to Christianity it vvill be observed,
that there is a raiddle, between a full satisfaction of the
truth of it, and a satisfaction of the contrary. The mid
dle state of raind between these two, consists in a serious
apprehension, that it raay be true, joined with doubt,
whether ft be so. And this, upon the best judgraent I
ara able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity,
as any sceptic can at all be supposed lo go, vvho has had
true Christianity, wilh the proper evidence of il, laid be
fore hira, and has in any tolerable raeasure considered
them, • For I would not be raistaken to coraprehend aU
who have ever heard of it ; because it seems evident,
that,-in raany counlries called Christian, neither Chris
tianity, nor Us evidence, are fairly laid before men. And
in places where both are, there appear lo be some who

328 Conclusion. [Part 2.
have very Uttie attended to eilher, and who reject Chris
tianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention ;
and yet are by no raeans without understanding in other
raatters. Now it has been shown, that a serious appre
hension that Chrislianity raay be true, lays persons under
the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it, through
out the whole of their life ; a regard not the sarae exact
ly, but in many respects nearly tbe sarae, with what a
full convicrion of its truth would lay thera under. Last
ly, it will appear, that blaspheray and profaneness, I
raean with regard lo Christianity, are absolutely wfthout
excuse. For there is no teraptation to it, but frora the
wantonness of vanity or mirth ; and these, considering the
infinite importance of the subject, are no such terapta
tions as lo afford any excuse for il. If this be a just ac
count of things, and yet men can go on to viUfy or disre
gard Christianity, which is lo talk and act as if they had
a deraonstration of fts falsehood ; there is no reason to
think they would aller their behaviour to any purpose,
though there were a deraonstration of fts truth.

TWO
DISSERTATIONS ON
PERSONAL IDENTITY.

28*

DISSERT. I.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the
most important question which can possibly be asked, so
ft is the raost intelligible one which can be expressed in
language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised
about the raeaning of that identity, or saraeness of per
son, which is implied in the notion of our living now and
hereafter, or in any two successive moments. And the
solution of these difficulties halh been stranger than the
dftficulties theraselves. For, personal identity bas been
explained so by sorae, as to render the inquiry concerning
a future Ufe of no consequence at all to us, the persons
who are raaking it. And ihough few men can be misled
by such subtleties, yet it may be proper a little lo con
sider thera.
Now, vvhen it is asked wherein personal identity con
sists, the answer should be the sarae as if ft were asked,
wherein consists siraiUtude or equality ; that all atterapts
to define, would bul perplex it. Yet there is no diffi
culty at aU in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two
triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises
to the raind the idea of sirailitude ; or upon twice two
and four, the idea of equality ; so likewise, upon corapar
ing the consciousness of one's self, or one's own exist
ence in any two raoraents, there as iraraediately arises lo
the raind the idea of personal identity. And as the

332 Of Personal Identity. [Diss. I.
two forraer coraparisons not only give us the ideas of si
militude and equaUty, but also show us, that tvvo triangles
are aUke, and twice two and four are equal ; so the lat
ter coraparison not only gives us the idea of personal
identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in
those two raoraents ; the presenl, suppose, and that ira
mediately past ; or the present, and that a month, a year,
or twenty years past. Or, in other words, by reflecting
upon that, vvhich is rayself now, and that, which was ray
self twenty years ago, I discern they are not tvvo, but
one and the same self.
But though consciousness of what is past does thus
ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet, to say
that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our be
ing the same persons, is to say, that a person has -not ex
isted a single moraent, nor done one action, but what he
can reraember; indeed none but what he reflects upon.
And one should really think ft self-evident, that conscious
ness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore can
not constitute, personal identity, any more than know
ledge, in any olher case, can constitute truth, which it
presupposes. This wonderful mistake raay possibly have arisen frora
hence, that to be indued wfth consciousness, is insepa
rable frora the idea of a person, or intelligent being.
For, this might be expressed inaccurately thus, — that con
sciousness makes personality ; and from hence it raight
be concluded to raake personal identity. But though
present consciousness of what we at present do and feel,
is necessary lo our being the persons we now are ; yet
present consciousness of past actions, or feelings, is not
necessary to our being the same persons who perforraed
those actions, or had those feelings.
The inquiry, what makes vegetables the same in the
comraon acceptation of the word, does not appear to have
any relation to this of personal identity ; because the word
same, when applied lo them and to person, is not only ap
pUed to different subjects, but it is also used in difterent

Diss. I.J Of Personal Identity. 333
senses. For when a man swears to the same tree, as having
stood fiftyyears in the same place, he raeans only the same
as to aU the purposes of properly and uses of common life,
and nol that the tree has been aft that time the same in
the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does
not know, whether any one particle of the present tree,
be the sarae with any one particle of the tree vvhich
stood in the sarae place fifty years ago. And if they
have nol one coramon particle of matter, they cannot be
the sarae tree in the proper philosophic sense of the
word same ; it being evidently a contradiction in terras,
to say they are, when no part of their substance, and no
one of tiieir properties, is the sarae ; no part of their
substance, by the supposition ; no one of their properties,
because it is allowed, tiiat the sarae properly cannot be
transferred frora one substance to another. And there
fore when we say the identity, or saraeness, of a plant
consists in a continuation of the same life, comraunicated
under the sarae organization, to a number of particles of
matter, whether the same or not, the word same, when
applied to life and lo organization, cannot possibly be un
derstood lo signify, what it signifies in this very sentence,
when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense
then, the Ufe, and the organization, and the plant, are
justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual
change of the parts. But in a strict and phUosophical
manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being,
nor any thing, can be the same with that, v.'ith which it
hath indeed nothing the same. Now, sameness is used
in this latter sense vvhen applied to persons. The iden
tity of these, therefore, cannot subsist wfth diversity of
substance. The thing here considered, and, demonstratively, as I
, think, determined, is proposed by Mr Locke in these
words. Whether it, i, e, tbe same self or person, be the
same identical substance'? And he has suggested what is
a rauch better answer to the question, than that which he
gives ft in form. For he defines person, a thinking inteh

334 Of Personal Identity. [Diss, 1,
ligent being, &sc, and personal identity, the sameness of
a rational being.* The question then is, whether the
sarae rational being is tbe same substance, vvhich needs
no answer, because being and substance, in this place,
stand for the sarae idea. The ground of the doubt,
whether tbe sarae person be the same substance, is said
to be this ; that the consciousness of our own existence,
in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive
raoraents, is not the same individual action,-\ i. e. not the
sarae consciousness, but different successive conscious
nesses. Now it is strange that this should bave occa
sioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable,
that a person raay have a capacity of knowing some ob
ject or other to be the same now, which it was when he
contemplated it forraerly; yet, in this case, u here, by
the supposition, the object is perceived lo be the sarae,
the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one
and the same perception. And thus, ihough the succes
sive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence
are not the same, yet are they consciousnesses of one
and tbe same thing or object; of the same person, self,
or living agent. The person, of whose existence the
consciousness is felt novv, and was felt an hour or a year
ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the
same person ; and therefore is one and the same.
Mr Locke's observations opon this subject^ appear
hasty ; and he seems to profess hiraself dissatisfied vvith
suppositions, vvhich he has raade relating to it. J But
sorae of those hasty observations have been carried lo
a strange length by others ; whose notion, when traced
and examined to the bottom, araounts, I think, to this :<5,
" Tbat personality is not a perraanent, but a transient
thing : that it lives and dies, begins and ends, continually:
that no one can any raore reraain one and the sarae per-
* Locke's Works, vol. i. p. 146. f Locke, p. 146, 147.
X Locke, p. 152.
§ See an answer to Dr Clarke's third defence of his letter to
Mr Dodwell, 2d edit. p. 44, 56, &c.

Diss. I.J Of Personal Identity. 335
son two moments together, than two successive moments
can be one and the same moraent : that our substance is
indeed continually changing ; but vvhether this be so or not,
is, if seeras, nothing to the purpose ; since il is not sub
stance, but consciousness alone, vvhich constftutes person
ality; which consciousness, being successive, cannotbe the
same in any two moments, nor consequently the person
aUty constftuted by it," And from hence it must follow,
that it is a fallacy upon ourselves, lo charge our present
selves with any thing we did, or to imagine our present
selves interested in any thing vvhich befell us yesterday,
or that our present self will be interested in what will be
faU us to-raorrow ; since our present self is not, in reality,
the sarae with the self of yesterday, but another like self
or person coming in its roora, and mistaken for it ; to
which another self wiU succeed to-raorrow. This, I say,
must follow : for if the self or person of to-day, and that
of to-raorrow, are not the sarae, but only like persons,
the person of to-day is really no more interested in what
wiU befall the person of to-morrow, than in what vvill be
faU any other person. It raay be thought, perhaps, that
this is nol a just represenlation of the opinion we are
speaking of; because those vvho maintain it allovv, that a
person is the sarae as far back as his reraerabrance
reaches. And, indeed, they do use the words, identity and
same person. Nor will language permit these words to
be laid aside : since if they were, there must be, I know
not what, ridiculous periphrasis substftuled in the room
of them. But they cannot, consistently with themselves,
mean, that the person is really the same. For ft is self-
evident, that the personality cannot be really the same,
if, as they expressly assert, that in which it consists is not
the same. And as, consistentiy wfth themselves, they
cannot, so, I think, appears they do nol, mean, that
the person is really the same, bul only that he is so in a
fictitious sense : in such a sense only as they assert ; for
this they do assert, that any number^ of persons what
ever raay be the same person. The bare unfolding this

336 Of Personal Identity. [Diss. 1,
notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the
best confutation of it. However, since great stress is
said to be put upon it, I add the foUowing things :
First, This notion is absolutely contradictory to that
certain conviction, which necessarily, and every mo
ment, rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon
ourselves ; when we reflect upon what is past, and look
forward upon what is to come, AU iraagination of a
daily change of that living agent which each raan caUs
hiraself, for another, or of any such change throughout
our whole presenl life, is entirely borne down by our
naiural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in
his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or
affairs, frora a suspicion, that thougli he should live to
morrow, he should not, however, be the sarae person he
is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act, wilh re
spect lo a future life, upon this notion, that personaUty is
transient ; it is reasonable to act upon it, wfth respect to
,,the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to
jreligion and lo our teraporal concerns ; and every one
sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in tbe lat
ter case. If, therefore, any can take up with it in the
forraer, this cannot proceed frora the reason of the thing, •
but raust be owing to an inward unfairness, and secret
co.'-rnption of heart.
Secondly, It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or quali
ty, but a being only which is capable of life and action, of
happiness and misery. Now aU beings confessedly con
tinue the sarae, during the whole tirae of their existence.
Consider then a living being now existing, and which has
existed for any lirae alive : this living being raust have
done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suf
fered and enjoyed forraerly, (this living being, I say, and
not another,) as really as it does and suffers and enjoys,
what it does and suffers and enjoys this instant. All
these successive actions, enjoyraents, and sufferings, are,
actions, enjoyments, and sufferings, of the same living be
ing. And they are so, prior to aU consideration of its

t

Diss. I.J Of Personal Identity. 337
reraerabering or forgetting ; since reraerabering or for
getting can make no alteration in the truth of past mat
ter of fact. And suppose this being endued vvith liraited
powers of knowledge and raeraory, there is no raore
difficulty in conceiving it to have a power of knowing
itself lo be the sarae living being which it vvas sorae lime
ago, of reraembering some of its actions, sufferings, and
enjoyraents, and forgetting olhers, than in conceiving it lo
know, or reraeraber, or forget any thing else.
Thirdly, Every person is conscious, that he is now
the sarae person or self he vvas, as far back as his re
membrance reaches : since, vvhen any one reflects upon
a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the per
son who did that action, naraely hiraself, the person who
now reflects upon it, as be is certain that the action was
at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance of an
action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured,
arises wholly from the consciousness that he himself did
it. And this he, person, or self, raust either be a sub
stance, or the properly of sorae substance. If he, if
person, be a substance ; then consciousness that he is the
sarae person, is consciousness that he is the sarae sub
stance. If the person, or he, be the property of a sub
stance ; StiU consciousness tbat he is the same property,
is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same,
as consciousness that he remains the same substance
would be ; since the sarae property cannot be transferred
frora one substance to anoiher.
But though vve are thus certain that we are the sarae
agents, living beings, or substances, now, which vve were
as far back as our remembrance reaches ; yet it is ask
ed, whether we may not possibly be deceived in it ? And
this question may be asked at the end of any deraonstra
tion whatever ; because it is a question concerning the
truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt,
whether perception by memory can in this case be de
pended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by-
deduction and reasoning, which also uiclude memory, or,
29

338 Of Personal Identity. [Diss, 1,
indeed, whether intuitive perception can. Here then we
can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt to
prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can
no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly
the same kind with them, and which there is just the
same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth
of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than
by the use or means of those very suspected facufties
themselves.

DISSERT. II.
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE,

That which renders beings capable of moral govern-
ment,.is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties
of preception and of action. Brute creatures are im
pressed and actuated by various instincts and propen
sions : so also are we, Bul, additional to this, we have
a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and
making'them an object to our thoughts ; and on doing
this, we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions,
under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of
good desert ; and disapprove others, as vicious and of iU
desert. That we have this moral approving and disap- ;
proving* faculty, is certain from our experiencing ft in *
ourselves, and recognising it in each other. It appears
frora our exercising it unavoidably, in the approbation

* This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus.t and is made use
of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the moral
faculty may he understood to have these two epithets, loKinaa-riKfi ¦
and taoioKijiatiTiKri, upon a douhle account ; because, upon a survey
of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them
to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the
guide of action and of Ufe, in contradistinction from all other faculties,
or natural principles of action : in the very same manner, as specula
tive reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and false
hood ; and, at the same time, is attended with a consciousness upon
reflection, that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it.
t Arr. Epict. lib. i. cap, 1,

340 Of the JVature of Firiue. [Diss, 2,
and disapprobation even of feigned characters ; frora the
words, right and wrong, odious and araiable, base and
worthy, with raany otbers of like signification in aft lan
guages, applied to actions and characters : from the
many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since
it cannot be iraagined, that all these authors, throughout
all these treatises, had absolulely no meaning at all to
their words, or a meaning raerely chiraerical : frora our
natural sense of gratitude, vvhich implies a distinction
between raerely being the instruraent of good, and in
tending it : frora the like distinction, every one makes,
between injury and mere harm, which Hobbes says, is
peculiar to mankind ; and between injury and just punish
ment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the considera
tion of huinan laws. It is manifest, great part of com
raon language, and of coraraon behaviour over the world,
is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty ;
whether caUed conscience, moral reason, raoral sense, or
divine reason ; whether considered as a sentiraent ofthe
understanding, or as a perception of the heart, or, which
seems tbe truth, as including both. Nor is it at all
doubtful in the general, vvhat course of action this facul
ty, or practical discerning power within us, approves, and
vvhat it disapproves. For, as much as it has been dis
puted wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for
doubt there may be about particulars, yet, in general,
there is in reahty a universally acknowledged standard
of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have
raade profession of in public ; it is that, which every raan
you meet, puts on the show of; ft is that, which the pri
mary and fundaraental laws of all civil constitutions, over
the face of the earth, raake it their business and endea
vor to enforce the practice of upon raankind ; namely,
justice, veracity, and regard to comraon good. It being
manifest tben, in general, that we have such a faculty or
discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some
things, raore distinctly, concerning it.
First, It ought lo be observed, that the object of this

Diss, 2,J , Of the JVature of Firtue. 341
faculty is actions,* comprehending under that name, ac
tive or practical principles ; those principles from which
men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave
thera power ; and which, when fixed and habitual in any
person, we call, his character. It does not appear, that
brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as dis
tinguished from events ; or that will and design, which
constitut© the very nature of actions as such, are at all
an object to their perception. But to ours they are;
and they are the object, and the only one, of the ap
proving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, be
haviour, abstracted from all regard to what is, in fact and
event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object
of the raoral discemraent, as speculative trulh and false
hood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and
such consequences, indeed, is always included ; for il is
part of the action itself : but though the intended good
or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the
same sense of the action as if they did. In Uke manner,
we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all
consideration of the good or the evil, which persons of
such characters have it actually in their power lo do.
We never, in the raoral way, applaud or blame either
ourselves or others, for what we enjoy or what we suffer,
or for having irapressions made upon us which we con
sider- as altogether out of our power ; but only for what
we do, or would have done, had ft been in our power ;
or for what we leave undone which we might have done,
or would have left undone though we could have done it.
Secondly, Our sense or discernment of actions, as
morally good or evil, iraplies in it a sense or discemraent
of thera as of good or ill desert. It raay be difficult lo
explain tbis perception, so as to answer all the questions
which raay be asked concerning it : but every one speaks
of such and such actions as deserving punishment ; and
* iv6e Tl apET}i Kai Kaxia — iv irtiuEi, iXXi ivEpyEtif. M. Auton. 1. 9. 16.
Virtutis laus omnis in actione consistit. Cic. Off. 1. 1. c. 6.
29*

342 Of the JVature of Firtue. [Diss, 2.
it is not, I suppose, pretended, that they have absolulely
no raeaning at all lo the expression. Now, the raeaning
plainly is not, that we conceive it for the good of society,
that the doer of such actions should be raade lo suffer.
For if unhappily it were resolved, that a raan who, by
sorae innocent action, was infected with the plague, should
be left to perish lest, by other people coraing near him,
the infection should spread ; no one would sajs, he de
served this treatraent. Innocence and iU desert are in
consistent ideas, IU desert always supposes guilt ; and
if one be not part of the otiier, yet they are evidently
and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of
a man in misery raises our" compassion towards him ;
and, if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our
indignation against the author of ft. But when we are
informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only
for his treachery or cruelty ; our corapassion exceedingly
lessens, and, in many instances, our indignation wholly
subsides. Now, what produces this effect, is the con- ,
ception of that in the sufferer, which we caU iU desert.
Upon considering tben, or viewing together, our notion of
vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of iU
desert. And thus there is in human creatures an asso
ciation of the two ideas, natural and raoral evil, wicked
ness and punishraent. If this association were raerely
artificial or accidental, it were nothing ; but being raost
unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to
it, instead of endeavoring to explain it away.
It may be observed farther, concerning our perception
of good and of ill desert, that the forraer is very weak with
respect lo coramon instances of virtue. One reason of
which may be, that it does nol appear to a spectator, how
far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous prin
ciple, or in what degree this principle is prevalent; since
a very weak regard lo virtue may be sufficient to make
raen act well in raany common instances. And on the
either hand, our perception of ill desert in vicious ac
tions lessens, in proportion to the temptations raen are

Diss. 2.J Of the JVature of Firtue. 343
thought lo have had to such vices. For, vice in human
creatures consisting chiefly in the absence or want of the
virtuous principle, though a man be overcome, suppose,
by tortures, il does not from thence appear, to what de
gree the virtuous principle was wanting, AU that ap
pears is, that he had it not in such a degree, as lo pre
vail over the temptation ; but possibly he had ft in a de
gree, which vvould have rendered him proof against com
mon temptations.
Thirdly, Our perception of vice and iU desert arises
frora, and is the result of, a coraparison of actions wilh
the nature and capacities of the agent. For, the raere
neglect of doing vvhat we ought to do, would, in many
cases, be determined by aU men to be in the highest de
gree vicious. And this determination must arise from
sucb comparison, and be the result of it ; because such
neglect would not be vicious in creatures of olher na
tures and capacities, as brutes. And it is the sarae also
witb respect lo positive vices, or such as consist in doing
what we ought not. For, every one has a different sense
of harra done by an idiot, raadraan, or child, and by one
of mature and comraon understanding ; ihough the ac
tion of both, including the intention, v/hich is part of the
action, be tbe sarae : as ft may be, since idiots and mad
men, as weU as children, are capable, not only of doing
raischief, but also of intending ft. Now, this difference
must arise frora soraewhat discerned in the nature or ca
pacities of one, which renders the action vicious j and
the want of which in the olher, renders the sarae action
innocent, or less vicious ; and this plainly supposes a
coraparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the
action and capacities of the agent, previous lo our deter
raining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a
proper application of the epithets, incongruous, unsufta-
ble, disproportionate, unfit, lo actions which our moral
faculty determines lo be vicious.
Fourthly, It deserves lo be considered, whether raen
are raore at liberty, in point of morals, to make themselves
raiserable wfthout reason, than to make olher people so ;

344 Of the JVature of Firtue. [Diss. 2.
or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good, for the
sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are lo ne
glect the good of otbers, whora naiure has coraraitted to
their care. It should seem, that a due concern about our
own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavor lo
secure and promote ft, which is, I think, very much the
meaning of the word prudence in our language ; it should
seem, that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faully
and blameable : since, in the calmest way of reflection,
we approve ofthe first, and conderan the other conduct,
both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disap
probation are altogether different frora raere desire of our
own, or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing
it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of per
ception, is satisfaction or uneasiness ; whereas the object
of the first is active behaviour. In one case, what our
thoughts fix upon is our condition ; in the olher, our con
duct. It is true, indeed, that nature has not given us so
sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly, either
in ourselves or others, as of falsehood, injustice, and cru
elty ; I suppose, because tbat constant habitual sense of
private interest and good, vvhich we always carry about
wfth us, renders such sensible disapprobation less neces
sary, less wanting, to keep us from iraprudentiy neglect
ing our own happiness, and foolishly injuring ourselves,
than it is necessary and wanting to keep us frora injuring
others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and con
stant a regard ; and also, because imprudence and folly,
appearing to bring its own punishment raore iramediately
and constantly than injurious behaviour, it less needs the
addition-dl punishment, which would be inflicted upon it
by others, had they the sarae sensible indignation against
it, as against injustice, and fraud, and cruelty. Besides,
unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compas
sion, the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves,
though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them;
and tbis, of course, lessens our displeasure against thera,
J3ut still it is matter of experience, that we are forraed so
as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of

Diss, 2,J Of the JVature of Virtue. 345
imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves
and others. In instances of this kind, raen often say of
theraselves wilh remorse, and of others with some indigna
tion, that they deserve to suffer such calaraities, because
they brought thera upon themselves, and vvould not lake
warning. Particularly when persons corae to poverty
and distress by a long course of extravagance, and after
frequent adraonitions, though without falsehood or injus
tice ; we plainly do not regard such people as aUke ob
jects of corapassion, vvith those vvho are brought inlo the
sarae condition by unavoidable accidents, Frora these
things ft appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and
folly of vice : meaning by folly, soinewhat quite different
frora raere incapacity ; a' thoughtless want of that re
gard and attention to our own happiness, vvhich we had
capacity for. And tbis the word properly includes, and,
as ft seeras, in its usual acceptation ; for vve scarce apply
ft lo brute creatures.
However, if any person be disposed lo dispute the mat
ter, I shall very wiUingly give him up the words virtue and
i-jce, as not applicable to prudence and folly; but raust
beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the
judge of actions, approves of prudent actions and disap
proves iraprudent ones; I say, prudent and imprudent
actions as such, and considered distinctly frora the hap
piness or misery which they occasion. And by the way,
this observation may help to determine, what justness,
there is in that objection against religion, that it leaches us
to be interested and selfish.
Fifthly, Without inquiring how far, and in what sense,
virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want
of it ; it raay be proper to observe, that benevolence, and
the want of ft, singly considered, are in no sort the whole
of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the re
view of one's own character, or that of others, our raoral
understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to
every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence pre
vailed, and the degrees in which ft was wanting. That
is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some

346 Of the JVature of Firtue. [Diss, 2,
persons rather than to olhers, nor disapprove injustice
and falsehood upon any other account, than merely as
an overbalance of happiness was foreseen Ukely lo be
produced by the first, and of raisery by the second. But
novv, on the contrary, suppose tvvo men competitors for
any thing whatever, which vvould be of equal advantage
to each of thera ; ihough nothing indeed would be more
irapertinent, than for a stranger to busy hiraself to get one
of thera preferred to the other ; yet such endeavor vvould
be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benafactor, abstracted
from aU consideration of distant consequences : as that
exaraples of gratitude, and the cultivation of friendship,
would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose
one raan should, by fraud or violence, take from another
the fruft of his labor, with intent to give it to a third, who,
he thought, would have as ranch pleasure from it, as would
balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have
had in the enjoyraent, and his vexation in the loss of ft ;
suppose also, that no bad consequences would follow ; yet
such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, farther,
'were treachery, violence, and injustice, no otherwise vi
cious, than as foreseen Ukely lo produce an overbalance
of raisery to society ; then, if in any case a man could
procure to hiraself as great advantage by an act of injus
tice, as the whole foreseen inconvenience, likely to be
brought upon others by it, would araount to, such a piece
of injustice would not be faully or vicious at aU ; because
it vvould be no more than, in any other case, for a man
to prefer his own satisfaction to another's in equal degrees.
The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so,
as to conderan falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice,
and to approve of benevolence to some preferably lo oth
ers, abstracted frora all consideration, which conduct is
Ukeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or mise
ry. And therefore, were the author of nature to propose
nothing to himself as an end but the production of happi
ness, were his raoral character merely that of benevo
lence ; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition, indeed,
the only reason of his giving us the above-mentioned ap-

Diss. 2, J Ofthe Nature of Virtue. 347
probation of benevolence to some persons rather than to
others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked vio
lence, and injustice, must be, that he foresaw this constitu
tion of our naiure would prodace more happiness, than
forming us with a teraper of raere general benevolence.
But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence,
injustice, must be vice in us, and benevolence to some,
preferably to others, virtue, abstracted from all considera
tion of the overbalance of evil or good which they may
appear likely to produce.
Now, if huraan creatures are indued with such a moral
naiure as we have been explaining, or with a moral
faculty, the natural object of which is actions ; moral
government must consist in rendering them happy and
unhappy, in rewarding and punishing them, as they follow,
neglect, or depart from, the moral rule of action inter
woven in their nature, or suggested and enforced by this
moral faculty ;* in rewarding and punishing them upon
account of their so doing.
I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation,
contradicted what any author designed to assert. But
some of great and distinguished merit have, I think,
expressed themselves in a raanner, which may occasion
some danger, to careless readers, of imagining the whole
of virtue to consist in singly aiming, according to the best
of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind
in the present stale ; and the whole of vice, in doing
what they foresee, or might foresee, is Ukely to produce
an overbalance of unhappiness in it: than which mis
takes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is
certahi, that sorae of the most shocking instances of
injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of perse
cution, may, in many supposable cases, not have the
appearance of being Ukely to produce an overbalance of
misery in the present state; perhaps soraetimes may
have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might
easily he carried on ; but I forebear.  The happiness
of the world is the concern of Him, who is the Lord and
" Part u. Chap. 6. p. 165.

348 Of the JVature of Virtue. [Diss. 2.
the Proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about,
when we endeavor to proraote the good of mankind in
any ways but those which he bas directed ; that is, indeed,
in all ways not contrary to veracity, and justice. I speak
thus upon supposition of persons really endeavoring, in
sorae sort, lo do good wfthout regard lo tbese. Bul the
truth seeras to be, that such supposed endeavors pro
ceed, alraost always, frora arabition, the spirit of party,
or sorae indirect principle, concealed perhaps in great
measure from persons themselves. And ihough it is our
business and our duty to endeavor, within the bounds of
veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, conveni
ence, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow-
creatures ; yet, from our short views, itis greatly uncertain
whether tbis endeavor will, in particular instances, pro
duce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole ;
since so raany and distant things must corae into the
account. And that which raakes il our duly, is, that
there is sorae appearance that it wiU, and no positive
appearance sufficient to balance this, on the contrary
side ; and also, that such benevolent endeavor is a cultiva
tion of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the
active principle of benevolence.
However, though veracity, -as weft as justice, is lo be
our rule of Ufe ; it raust be added, otherwise a snare wiU
be laid in the way of sorae plain men, that the use of
common forras of speech generally understood, cannot be
falsehood ; and, in general, that there can be no designed
falsehood wiihout designing to deceive. It raust likewise
be observed, that, in nuraberless cases, a man may be
under the strictest obligations to what he foresees wiU
deceive, without his intending it. For it is impossible
not to foresee, that the words and actions of men in
different ranks and eraployraents, and of different educa
tions, will perpetually be mistaken by each other ; and it
cannot but be so, whilst they will judge with the utraost
carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not,
perhaps, enough informed to be competent judges of even
though they considered it with great attention.

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