YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

In Memory of
RUSSELL LORD
Yale 1910S
from the fund established in 1928
by his mother
MRS. JOHN BRACKETT LORD

MODERN
RUSSIAN HISTORY

This work, has been translated
from the original Russian by
ALEXANDER S. KAUN
who is also the author of the
last chapters dealing with the
reign of Nicolas II.

MODERN
RUSSIAN HISTORY
Being an authoritative and detailed history of Russia
fiom the Age of Catherine the Great to the Present
By ALEXANDER KORNILOV
Professor at the
Politechntcum of Peter the Great in Petrograd
Volume Two

The Borzoi
ALFRED A. KNOPF
New York MCMXVII

COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY
ALFRED A. KNOPF

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PREFACE
(To the Third Part)
In my preface to the first part of my " History of Russia in
the Nineteenth Century " I announced that the third part would
contain the internal history of Russia for the last thirty years.
But the abundance of material which I have come upon in the
course of my taking up that period has forced me to change my
mind. The decisive turn in the national outlook that has taken
place after the famine of 1891-92, and also a series of new
factors and circumstances in the economic and social life of
the country which had been crystallised at that time and had in
their turn conditioned new tendencies and aspirations in our
national policy and in the governmental activity (e.g., the con
struction of the Siberian railroad and the Far-Eastern policy), —
these facts form a sufficient basis for the treatment of the last
eight years of the nineteenth century together with the first
years of the twentieth century as a separate period serving as a
direct prelude to the great events that were displayed before
our very eyes in 1904-1906.
Whether this period will form the contents of a fourth part
of my work, I cannot state definitely at present. But, at any
rate, the construction of such a fourth part appears to me as a
logical possibility.
This third part of the history expounds the reactionary
period of our internal modern history, which began in 1866 and
continued till the famine of 1891-92, with a brief, bright inter
mission in 1880-81. No systematic investigations of that epoch
have been made thus far, and for this reason the composition
of this part has been for me a far more difficult and responsible
task than that of the first two parts.
Petrograd, 19 14. A. Kornilov.

CONTENTS PART II

Chapter XX  i
The Crimean campaign and its significance. — Character
istics of Alexander II. — His education, political views and
tastes. — The influence of the Crimean campaign on the Tzar.
His first steps. — The attitude of society towards Alexander
in 1855-56. — The conclusion of peace and the manifesto of
March 19, 1856. — The address to the nobles in Moscow. — -
Preparations for the peasant-reform. — The activity of Lans-
koy and Levshin. — The relationship of the nobles. — Circulat
ing monographs. — The formation of the Secret Committee. —
Rostovtzev. — The course of activities in the Secret Commit
tee during 1857. — The petition of the Lithuanian nobles and
the Imperial Rescript to Adjutant-General Nazimov, No
vember 20, 1857. — The programme of the government. — The
publication of the November Rescript.
Chapter XXI  20
The nobility and the reform-programme of the government.
— The differing interests of landowners in the agricultural
and industrial provinces. — The attitude of the Intelligentzia;
the articles of Chernyshevsky and Herzen; the Moscow Ban
quet. — The address of the nobility of Nizhni-Novgorod. — The
hesitation in Moscow. — Addresses of other provinces. —
Provincial committees. — The point of view of Unkovsky and
of the Tver committee. — The sanctioned programme of activ
ities. — The attitude of the press. — The evolution of Rostovt-
zev's views.— The opening of the Zemstvo department. —
Miliutin. — The examination of the governmental programme
by the Main Committee and the opening of the Editing Com
missions. — The composition of the commissions. — Rostovt-
zev's programme. — The first assembly of the delegates of the
provincial committees. — The addresses of the nobles. — The
death of Rostovtzev. — Panin. — The second assembly of the
delegates. — The inner struggle in the Editing Commissions.
— The summary of their work.

CONTENTS

Chapter XXII  42
The Course of work in the Main Committee and in the State-
Council, the discussions of the projects of the Editing Com
missions. — Their conflicts. — The manifesto of February 19,
^-- . 1861. — Its analysis. — Its legal, administrative, and economic
significance for the peasants, for the nobles, and for the
country.
Chapter XXIII  55
The influence of the peasant-reform on society and the
press. — The conditions of the press in 1855. — The excep
tional position of Herzen, his prophecy in 1853, and his pro
gramme in 1855-1858. — The attitude of the liberals towards
Herzen. — The role of the Bell in the work of reform
and in the development of public opinion in Russia. — The
differentiation of tendencies in society and press after 1858.
— The position of various press-organs. — The radicalisation
of the Contemporary, and its relation to Herzen in 1859-60. —
The Russian Messenger and other liberal organs. — The posi
tion and role of the Slavophiles. — Social demands crystallized
during 1859-61. — Their comparison with the government's
views of that moment.
Chapter XXIV  65
The attitude of the peasants towards the reform of Febru
ary 19, 1861. — Disturbances and uprisings accompanying the
introduction of the new order of things. — The Besdna
catastrophe. — The impression of these facts on society. —
Reaction in governmental circles in 1861. — Valuiev's policy. —
The relationship of the public and the government. — First
appearances of Nihilism in 1861. — The Russian Word. — The
oppositional tendencies of the nobility. — Its two wings. — The
Tver incident of 1862. — The constitutional movement and the
differing opinions in nobility circles. — The attitude of the
industrial-commercial spheres. — The evolution of this class
after the Crimean campaign and the reasons of its opposi
tional tendencies.
Chapter XXV  80
The development of a general opposition and the first
manifestations of a revolutionary spirit. — The proclamations
of 1861-62. — "Young Russia" and the conflagrations of 1862.
— Arrests and exiles of radical writers. — The impressions
of these facts on the public. — The schism between the liber
als and radicals. — Herzen on the latter side. — The impres
sion in Western Europe. — The circular of Gorchakov. 

CONTENTS
The Polish movement. — The policy of Marquis Velepolsky,
its failure. — The uprising of 1863. — Its impression on the
Russian public. — The significance of the intervention of
foreign powers. — Its resultant outburst of patriotism in Rus
sia.— The fall of the Bell.— The triumph of Katkov and
the general reaction. — ' Continuation of reforms. — Tatari- '
nov's financial reform. — The excise reform. — The university-
movement and the decree of 1863. — Other reforms in the min
istry of education. — Secondary schools, education of women,
primary schools. — The statute of 1864.

Chapter XXVI  96
The Zemstvo-reform. — Its connection with the peasant-
reform. — Its analysis. — The attitude of the public and press
towards the zemstvo-reform. — Conditions under which the
zemstvo-institutions had to function. — The judicial reform.
— Its significance and content. — The first steps of the new
courts. — Press legislation. — The vacillation of the govern
ment in this sphere. — Two commissions of Prince Obolensky.
— The policy of Golovnin and Valuiev. — The temporary laws
of 1865. — The mood of the nobles in 1865. The address of
the Moscow nobles. — The position of the radical press and
circles. — The attentate of Karakosov. — The end of the re
form-epoch and general conclusions about it.

PART III
Chapter XXVII  in
The attentate of Karakosov. The subsequent reaction. —
The internal development of Russia in spite of the reaction. —
Continuation of certain reforms. — The completion of the peas
ant reform. — The general picture of land-ownership among
various groups of the population after the reforms o£ 1861, 63,
66. — The amount of soil-property among the liberated peas
ants.
Chapter XXVIII  123
The immediate results of the peasant-reform. — The
growth of population before and after the reform. — The dis
tribution of population before and after the reform. — The
growth of the urban population before and after the reform.
— The industrial crisis and its causes.

CONTENTS

Chapter XXIX  136
The financial conditions during the reform-epoch and in
the next years. — The financial policy and activity of Re
itern. — The effort to raise the productive capacity of the
country, and particularly the export commerce. — The ques
tion of railroad-building. — Its course up to the middle of the
70-ies. — Organisation of commercial credit. — Opening _ of
private banks. — Deficits in the state budget. — The question
of continuing internal reforms and the report of Reitern in
1866.

Chapter XXX  151
The new municipal statute. — Former legal and actual
status of cities. — The measures of the 40-ies. — The statute
of 1870. Its substance and criticism thereof. — The question
of military reorganisation. — The reforms of Miliutin. — The
abrogation of recruitments and the law of universal service,
1874. — The general educational significance of Miliutin's
military reforms.
Chapter XXXI  163
The activity of the Ministry of Education after 1866. —
Count Dimitry Tolstoy and Miliutin as representatives of
two antagonistic camps in the reign of Alexander II. — The
views of Tolstoy. — Tolstoy and Katkov. — The question of
the reform of the secondary school. — The struggle for the
introduction of classicism. — The importance of the reform
of 1871. — Tolstoy's plans and measures in regard to the uni
versities. — The development of woman educaton in the period
of 1866-78. — Primary education. — The statutes of 1864 and
1874. — The struggle of the ministry of education with the
zemstvo. — History of the zemstvo-schools from 1866-1880.

Chapter XXXII  176
The development of zemstvo-institutions from 1866 to
1878. — The region of their activity. — Their aims and means.
— Their budgets. — Their effort to tax commerce and indus
try, and conflict with the government on the question. — The
zemstvo expenses and their growth. — Class interests within
the zemstvo. — The question and natural taxation and its dis
tribution. — The struggle of the government with the zemstvo
and the limitation of the latter's activity.

CONTENTS

Chapter XXXIII  181
The establishment of new courts and their first steps. —
Valuiev's fight against them. — The reactionary activity of
Count Pahlen. — The beginning of the work of the new stat
utes. — The position and tendency of the procuratorship. —
Special order of deciding cases of crimes against the state. —
Changes in the institution of jurists, and exemption of certain
cases from the jurisdiction of juries. — The position of the
press in the post-reform period. — Leading organs and liter
ary tendencies after 1866. — The public mood.
Chapter XXXIV  196
The conditions of the masses and of the rural communi
ties in the 6o-ies and 70-ies. — The course of the redemption-
process. — Poor portions. — " Cut-offs." — Rent in the south
ern and northern provinces. — Growth of rent. — Indebtedness
of landowners. — Intensive cultivation of the soil owing to the
increasing export and prices of grain. — Landownership in
the north and in the south. — Sale of land. — The buyers.
— The condition of peasant-estates. — Insufficient property. —
Burden of taxes and payments. — Lack of equity in taxation.
— The famine of 1868. — Investigations by the zemstvo. —
— Tax-arrears. — The condition of the peasant-estates in the
black-soil region. — The famine in Samara in 1872-73. — Pro
vision-loans. — The conclusions of Yanson and Prince Vas-
silchikov about the status of the peasants in the 70-ies.
Chapter XXXV  207
The attitude of the government and of the public towards
the position of the masses. — Popular tendencies in literature.
•^ — Student-disorders in 1869. — Niechaiev and Niechaievism.
— The circle of Chaikovsky in Petrograd; their ideas and
plans. — Bakunin and Lavrov abroad. — Lavrists and Baku- (
nists. — Forward. — The beginnings of the movement "Into the
People." — Arrests. — The report of Pahlen. — The society
"Land and Freedom."
Chapter XXXVI  224
The government's policy in the borderlands.— Oppressions
in Little Russia and Poland.— Foreign policy.— The Eastern
question. — Rivalry between Russian and British interests in
Asia. — The conquest of the Caucasus and of Central Asiatic
Khanates.— Disorders in Turkey.— Balkan Slavs.— The
Servian war and the Bulgarian Atrocities.— The conven-

CONTENTS
tions of the Powers. — The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.
— Its course and outcome. — The congress in Berlin. — Eco
nomic and financial results of the war. — The resignation of
Reitern. — The impression of the war and the Congress on
the Russian public. — Slavophiles. — The zemstvo movement. **
— The revolutionary movement. — The appeal of the govern
ment to the public. — The declarations of the zemstvos. —
The formation of the party "The Will of the People."
Chapter XXXVII  239
Series of revolutionary attempts to assassinate Alexander
II. — Confusion and vacillation in the upper spheres. — The
explosion in the Winter Palace and the establishment of the
Supreme Commission under the leadership of Loris-Melikov.
— Loris-Melikov's programme and its realisation. — Relations
.of liberals and revolutionists towards him. — The resignation
ftrf Tolstoy. — The reforms of L^rJ£_-MeHkov. — Senatorial re
visions and the peasant question. — The constitutional move
ment — Loris-Melikov's report about the appointment of a
special preparatory commission. — The catastrophe of March
1, 1881.
Chapter XXXVIII  249
Alexander III. His education. — Public attitude towards
him before his accession. — His views. — His first steps. —
The conflict of two tendencies in the upper spheres. — The
council of March 8, 1881. — Vacillation. — Katkov and
•#. Aksakov. — The agitation of Pobiedonostzev. The manifesto
of April 29, 1881. — The resignation of Loris-Melikov and
other ministers. — The ministry of Ignatiev. — His programme.
— Measures for the improvement of the economic condi
tions of the people. Compulsory redemption. — Agitation of
the nobles. — Lowering of redemption-payments. — The pol
icy of Bunge.. — The abolition of poll-tax. — The introduction
of tax-inspectors.
Chapter XXXIX  256
Early measures of Alexander III for the solution of the
land-dearth problem among the peasants. — The peasant-
bank and its first steps under Bunge. — The facilitation of
renting state land. — Organisation of peasant-migrations. —
The rules of 1881.— The law of July 13, 1889. — The intro
duction of factory inspectors and the law for the protection
of minors and women in factories. — Taxes on inheritance
and bonds. — The question of administrative peasant-re-

CONTENTS
form. — The commission of Kokhanov. — Its participators and
the liquidation of their work. — The collapse of Ignatiev's
regime.
Chapter XL  260
The decisive turn towards reaction. — The role of Pobie-H
donostzev. — Count D. Tolstoy. — Reaction in the Ministry of
Education. — Reactionary policy of the nobility in internal
affairs. — The jubilee of the granting of the nobility-charter
in 1885. — Pazukhin's programme. — The liquidation of the
question of reorganising the peasant-institutions after the
dismissal of Kokhanov's commission. — 'The law of July 12,
1889, about the Zemsky Chiefs. — The zemstvo-statute of
June 12, 1890. — Judicial restrictions. — The new press-law of
1882. — Persecution of non-Orthodox Christians. — The Jewish
question. — New orders in the army.
Chapter XLI  267
The financial policy in the second half of Alexander's
reign. Vishnegradsky and his system. — Extreme protection
ism in custom policies and in railroad-tariff legislation. — The
results of this system. — Foreign policy of Alexander III.
— Conquest of Turcomania. — Russo-British relations in
Central Asia. — The Balkan affairs. — Bulgarian troubles. —
The Franco-Russian alliance and its significance.
RUSSIA UNDER NICOLAS II, 1894-1916.
I The Reaction Under Nicolas II . . 275
II War and Revolution  293
III The " Constitutional " Regime . .317
IV Russia in Arms  337
Bibliography  353
Index  357

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY

CHAPTER XX
THE military failures experienced- by Russia in the
Crimean Campaign, which revealed to all the in
adequacy of Nicolas' policy, had been foretold by
Nicolas Turgeniev back in 1847, a prediction that required
considerable perspicacity and a profound understanding of the
general course of affairs in Russia and in Europe. Until the
Crimean Campaign the might of the Russian Government ap
peared colossal, and the strength of Nicolas' system seemed un-
disputable not only in his own eyes, but in the eyes of all his
entourage, including the Heir. After the quick suppression
of the Hungarian uprising by Paskevich's superior forces, the
military power of Russia was deemed enormous even in West-i
ern Europe, and it is astonishing how rapidly that power van
ished at the first collision with regular troops of civilised
countries, though those forces were not very considerable.
Moreover, Russia's unpreparedness had begun to appear even
in her war with Turkey, and that unpreparedness was made
still more apparent when Turkey was joined by England,
France, and later by Sardinia.
Properly speaking, despite the apparent formidableness of
the Coalition, the Allies did not disembark a very big army;
in view of the sea-transport facilities of that time they were not
able to bring ashore more than seventy thousand men. Yet
although Nicolas possessed an army of a million men he proved
unequal to those seventy thousand — partly because of the
1

2 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
i chaotic conditions of the military equipment and to the back
wardness of Russian ammunition, partly because of the lack of
convenient roads of communication, partly because of the aston
ishing absence of military leaders and generals accustomed to
independent action. The provision of the Sebastopol army was
'carried on by the same means and methods as in 1812; the
amount of the requisitioned carts, of transporting accommoda
tions, of oxen and horses, was enormous and out of proportion
to the amount of supplies delivered. The southern provinces
groaned under the burden of that obligation and were ruined,
while the army suffered want in every respect. The disorder
was augmented by the terrible theft and all sorts of abuses which
greatly increased the expenses of the State.
Medical and sanitary affairs were equally unsatisfactory, and
the struggle with the diseases that spread in the South was very
inadequately carried on. The strategic plans were below criti-
! cism. The most powerful man in the upper spheres at that
; time was Paskevich, and he brought great harm by delaying the
sending of reinforcements to Crimea, as he feared an invasion
by Austria who, in gratitude for Nicolas' aid in 1849, had
mobilised her army and held it in readiness to join the Allies.
Prince V. I. Vassilchikov, the former Chief of Staff at Se
bastopol, definitely stated that had Paskevich sent the rein
forcements without delay, Sebastopol could have been saved.
The actions of other land-commanders also proved to be be
low criticism; they showed no initiative, no independence.
The troops alone appeared above reproach in regard to en
durance and bravery, and some naval commanders, educated
in the school of Admiral Lazarev, demonstrated sufficient
heroism and enterprise. The aggravation of the defeats was
emphasised the more when with such an excellent spirit in the
army, and with comparatively small forces of the enemy, the
Russians could not defend their own territory. The glory
of Russian arms, renowned since the days of Catherine, was

ALEXANDER II 3
dimmed with unusual rapidity. Nicolas I who used to like
to end his manifestoes with self-confident exclamations, as, for
instance, in 1848: " God is with us! Take heed, O nations,
for God is with us ! " was forced to see the inadequacy of that
system which he had considered absolutely faultless, to which
he had devoted all his powers, and by virtue of which he was
wont to deem himself a great historical personality. Nicolas
felt that he was bequeathing his son a deranged heritage; his
last words to him on his death-bed were : " I am not handing
over the command to you in good order." We may say that
Nicolas died at the right time, for had he had to reign after
the Sebastopol Campaign he would have been bound first of
all to relinquish his thirty years' system, and to renounce his
system would have meant to renounce himself.
But the Heir, Alexander II, was also completely unprepared
for the reformatory activity that, awaited him. In this respect
there are a great many false legends and conceptions in Rus
sian historical literature.
Generally the personality of Alexander II, the Tzar-Libera
tor, appears in the writings of panegyrical historians and naive
contemporary memoirists as that of an ideal reformer, hu
manistically inclined, who wished, so to speak, by virtue of
his inner impulses and motives, to promulgate those reforms
which he carried out. This is entirely untrue, and to dispose
of these false notions appears to me in this case particularly,
important. True, Alexander's tutor, Zhukovsky, was a hu-i
manist, and he wished to imbue his pupil with humanistic
ideas; but it is a mistake to consider Zhukovsky a liberal. He
was an honest, good-hearted man, and hoped to make out of
Alexander a good monarch, of the type of Henry IV, as he
pictured him.1 Zhukovsky acted quite courageously in his
1VassiIi Zhukovsky was the father of the short-lived German
pseudo-Romanticism in Russian literature. In spite of his sentimental
leanings toward Western liberal minds, he remained all his life a

4 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
sphere: he straightforwardly declared to his parents that if
they intended to make out of Alexander not a military com
mander but an enlightened Monarch who would see in his
fatherland not a barrack but a nation, he must be set free from
the " military parade " atmosphere which prevailed at the Court.
Alexander's mother sympathised with Zhukovsky's views, and
even Nicolas allowed him to express them freely, but in the
end Nicolas' views prevailed: he wanted the future Emperor
to be first of all a military man, in the real sense of the word.
However, the " parade "-ideals triumphed in Alexander's edu
cation. From an early age he had a liking for display; he was
greatly flattered at being able when ten years old to caracole
splendidly, to command well, to ride past his grandfather, the
king of Prussia, in a ceremonial march at Berlin. Those in
clinations and feelings had become deeply rooted in his nature.
It may be that he had received from Zhukovsky a general
predilection for the good, but on the whole he emulated his
father, and when he was admitted in the forties to state-
affairs, he felt deep respect for Nicolas' system, and never
attempted to criticise it. The more power Nicolas allowed
him in managing various state-matters, the more strictly he
adhered to the former's ideas. The reaction that took hold
of the Government after 1848 was shared by Alexander not
less than by his father. A great part of the reactionary meas
ures of that time were carried through with the participation
and even at times upon the initiative of Alexander. Thus,
for instance, the famous Buturlin-Committee was founded with
his direct co-operation. In the peasant-question Alexander was
even more conservative than Nicolas, and in all the committee-
staunch Conservative and upholder of Autocracy. In a letter to Push
kin he reproached the Poet for having had connections with " the de
spicable scoundrels and villains"— the Decembrists. At the end of
his life he plunged into pietistic Mysticism, and was one of the few
who sided with Gogol's obscurantist views. — Tr.

HIS TASTES AND PREJUDICES 5
meetings concerning peasant-matters he invariably upheld the
rights and interests of the landowners.
When he ascended the throne, persons who stood close to
court circles thought that a real " gentry-era " had come to
stay. The antagonists of serfdom regretted that now all hope
for progress in the peasant-problems was gone (as may be
seen from the correspondence between Miliutin and Kavelin) ;
on the other hand, the proserfdom nobles were ready to cele
brate their triumph: they knew that Alexander was opposed
to the " Inventories " introduced in the southwestern region ;
they knew that he was responsible for the exemption of the
Lithuanian provinces in 1853 from Bibikov's " Inventory Reg
ulations," in spite of the fact that Bibikov was then Minister
of Interior, and that those regulations had been confirmed for
Lithuania by Nicolas on December 22, 1852. This incident
aroused a disagreement between Alexander and Bibikov, and
at the former's accession the latter was the first minister to
go. The victim had been an adherent of Nicolas' system and
a very contumacious person, but in the eyes of the public he
had lost his post not as such, but as one who sided with the
peasants against the views of the new Tzar.
Thus we see that Alexander's personal tastes and prejudices
had shown little promise of his carrying through reforms, par- i
ticularly the main reform — the abolition of serfdom. It !
seems to me important to emphasise this circumstance, for it
illustrates the power, inevitableness and unaypidableness of the
course events were taking; it is very important to make clear ,
that the reforms took place not because of the Tzar's inclina- ;
tion for them, but rather in spite of his convictions; he had to
yield to the developing socio-political process, since he saw that| j
if he should struggle against that process, as his father did,;
Russia might be brought to disruption. Those reforms, then.U
began not by virtue of the humanistic ideas implanted in him ,
by Zhukovsky; he did not side with the reforms because he

6 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
sympathised with the Men of the Forties who had announced
their Hannibal-oaths against serfdom,2 but by reason of the
conviction that had grown up within him during the Crimean
War, that the Russian State, if it was to be preserved and
strengthened, had need of fundamental reforms. Of course
this does not in the least diminish Alexander's merits, but makes
them more significant and valuable inasmuch as he succeeded
in carrying through the great work staunchly, bravely, and
honestly, disregarding all difficulties, and not considering his
personal inclinations and sympathies, but retaining exclusively
the point of view of the exigency of the State.
But the first problem that confronted Alexander on his
accession, February 19, 1855, was the Crimean War; all the
thoughts of the Government and society were directed to
wards its ending and the conclusion of peace, which were
finally made possible by some Russian successes on the Cau
casus, and particularly by the perseverance of the army in
Sebastopol. The Allies also were tired, and after the capture
of Kars by the Russians, peace was concluded in March, .1856,
not quite as humiliating for Russia as one might have ex
pected from her defeats.
During the war Alexander was able to take only a few steps
on the road of internal reforms. These were such as did not
require particular efforts and yet demonstrated to all his new
progressive tendencies. To them belonged the dismissal of
the Buturlin-Committee, the permission to issue passports for
going abroad, and the abolition of the university restrictions
2 The author refers to Turgeniev who, in his own -words, "took a
Hannibal oath not to rest until serfdom would disappear from Russia."
The Men of the Forties is a name applied to the idealistic, altruistic
intelligentzia brought up on the teachings of Bielinsky and other cham
pions of freedom during the iron regime of Nicolas I. In Russian
literature the Man of the Forties, or the Superfluous Type, is most
characteristically presented in Turgeniev's Rudin and in Herzen's
Who Is To Be Blamed f — Tr.

HIS FIRST STEPS 7
introduced after 1848. The public regarded these first rays
of a liberal policy with the same enthusiasm as it did the
first steps of Alexander I. An optimistic, unusally rosy mood
reigned. For thirty years society had experienced terrible re
pression, and having been weakened at the very beginning
through the annihilation of its best representatives — the De
cembrists, it was naturally humble and incapable of express
ing its thoughts. The dominating feeling was that of libera
tion from the heavy Nicolaievian regime, and an expectation
of a more liberal policy, supported by Alexander's first meas
ures. Alexander at once achieved the repi'tatinn nf hping 1 nnren-
friend of liberal _reojganisadonsJL  Every hesitation or change
in the activity of the Government was ascribed not to the
young Monarch, but to the intrigues and hostility of his func
tionaries. At first the people manifested very little inclina
tion for self-action and initiative; having become accustomed
to expect everything from above, they now as well awaited
everything from the progressive Government, and did not in
the least try to secure for themselves some rights to participate
in national affairs. It is curious that all the programmes that
emanated at that time from the public were quite unanimous,
whether they were composed by moderate liberals of the type
of Granovsky (who died in October, 1855), or by subsequent
radicals like Chernyshevsky, or by such free and experienced
European revolutionists as Herzen who lived in London, out
side of the pressure of Russian conditions. All those pro
grammes, as formulatgd_by. Chernyshevsky- in_.i85.6,, aspired for
the following desiderata: the spread of education, the increase
of the number of students and teachers, the improvement of
censorship conditions (about the complete abolition of censor
ship nobody dared even dream), the building of railroads, as
an important means for the development of industry, and
finally, a " rational distribution of the economic forces," by

8 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
which was understood the abolition of serfdom — the question
was not allowed as yet to be openly discussed.
In written memoranda the matter was argued more di
rectly; it was indicated that one of the immediate needs was
the abolition of bondage, but the idea was expressed rather
moderately; namely it was recommended to do away with the
institution gradually, without " shocking the country," as
Granovsky expressed himself in a Memorandum published in
1856 by Herzen in Voices from Russia. Herzen himself
spoke considerably more openly and vigorously, in the inspired
tone which he had been accustomed to employ, being free from
the oppression of the censorship in London. But even his
programme was quite moderate; it was expressed, in Jlis famous
letter to_ Alexander II, published in the first number of the
\Polar Star, in 1855. Herzen considered as the most urgent
J needs of Russia: the liberation of the peasants, from, jhejand-
[• owners, the liberation of the tax-paying classes from corporal
I punishment, and the liberation of the press from , censorship.
!' Further Herzen did not go; he only desired the mitigation of
ithe oppression,- and for the time being did not even demand
constitutional guarantees.
Such was the mood of the Russian public at the beginning
of Alexander's reign, during 1855-56. As a matter of fact,
the Tzar himself had at that moment no definite programme
of reforms, and the final words in his peace-Manifesto, which
' had attracted general attention, was his only declaration of
any programme at all.
As the Treaty of Paris was concluded after an unfortunate
campaign for Russia, which had revealed her internal disorder,
one could have expected considerable concessions on the part
of the defeated party, but after all they were not so very
big. The Russian diplomats succeeded in obtaining quite hon
ourable terms, utilising the disagreements and misunderstand
ings that had arisen between Napoleon III and England.

1WJS TKEATY OF PARIS 9
Napoleon, who had started the war with the idea of weaken
ing Russia, considered that the Campaign should have a defi
nite, practical purpose, and as such he placed the liberation of
Poland, or at least her return to a semi-independent constitu
tional order. He based his argument on the Congress of Vienna
and on the Constitution of 1815, and had logically figured that if
Poland would be restored by the will of the European Powers,
dictated to Russia, it would serve as an important political prec
edent for the intervention of European Powers in the internal
affairs and relations of Russia, which circumstance would
signify the political decline of Russia. But when Napoleon
noticed that England was not disposed to intervene energeti
cally in favour of Poland, he quickly moderated his bellicose
spirit, and began to seek round-about ways for inducing Russia
to start peace negotiations. Prince Gorchakov, at that time
Ambassador at Vienna, wittily characterised the state of his
Government's mind, remarking that although Russia was by
necessity dumb, she would not remain deaf, meaning that while
Russia, as the defeated party, would feel awkward about open
ing peace conversations, she would by no means decline to
take part in them. The negotiations progressed quite favour
ably, in view of Napoleon's attitude, but here Austria again f
interfered, and continuing to ignore the services rendered her
by Nicolas in 1849, she lowered Russia's international chances.
At any rate the Congress of Paris, assembled in 1856, treated
Russia comparatively mildly, and of the two chief demands of
the Russian diplomats — that there should be no war-con- f
tribution and no decrease of territory — the first was granted;
as for the second, Russia had to yield the estuary of the
Danube to Roumania.
Declaring the terms of the Treaty, Alexander remarked in
his Manifesto that the concessions were not important in com
parison with the burdens of war and with the advantages of
peace, and ended the Manifesto with the following significant

10 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
words : " With the aid of the Divine Providence, forever
gracious to Russia, may her internal welfare be established and
perfected; may truth and kindness reign in her courts; may
the aspiration for enlightenment and for all useful activities de
velop all over with new force, and may every one peacefully
enjoy the results of honest labour under the shelter of laws
equally just for all, equally protecting all. . . ."
The programme of internal reforms hinted in those words
perfectly corresponded with the hopes and aspirations of the
public, that had been awakened with the advent of the new
reign. The last words of the sentence quoted clearly implied
the equalisation of all classes, and could naturally be inter
preted as hinting at the liberation of the serfs. The adherents
of bondage became greatly alarmed. One of them, Count
Zakrevsky, Governor-General of Moscow, asked Alexander
during his stay at Moscow to reassure the nobles in regard
to the disquieting rumours. Alexander consented, but his
speech to the nobles was of a nature quite unexpected either
by them or by Zakrevsky. He said that he did not intend to
abolish serfdom at once, with one stroke of the pen, but that
he considered it impossible to continue the existing conditions,
so that " it would be better to abolish serfdom from above than
wait till it will begin to liberate itself from below," and he
ended his speech with a request that the gentry should " delib
erate on the way by which this can be accomplished."
That speech was such a general surprise that even the Min
ister of Interior, Lanskoy, did not at first believe it, until
Alexander himself assured him that he had not only actually
delivered it but that he had no regrets for what he had said.
Then a hurried preparation began in the Ministry of Interior
for the elaboration of the peasant-reform, since Lanskoy was
convinced that the Government had given out a watch-word,
from which it was impossible to retreat.
. Lanskoy began his Ministerial career in 1855 with a strange

ItlE, r-UASAJNT yuESTION 11
circular on the name of the Marshals of Nobility, in which
he had spoken in the name of the Tzar about the sacred
rights of the nobles, granted to them by the crowned pred
ecessors of the reigning Monarch; the nobles naturally inter
preted the Circular as a promise that the institution of serfdom
would not be touched. But Lanskoy himself was not an up
holder of serfdom ; on the contrary, in his youth he belonged to
the liberal movement of the Tenths and Twenties, and was
probably a member of the Union of Welfare. He undoubtedly
sympathised with the idea of liberating the serfs, and was glad
to direct the activity of the Ministry of Interior in the prep
aration of the reform; but he had no definite views, and he
warned Alexander that it was a question of such a nature
that once started it could not be stopped, and he therefore
recommended the working out in the first place of a definite
programme which should be followed to the end. He invited
as an assistant A. I. Levshin, who was considered well pre
pared through his work in the Ministry of State Domains;
but Levshin also had no definite views, and was furthermore
very undecisive and timid in matters of such national impor
tance. For this reason all the work under his direction was
reduced to gathering materials about the peasant-rprojects pre
sented during the preceding reigns, and about the opinions
and memoranda that were then circulating in public. We
should remember that until 1857 the censorship had not allowed
the slightest mention of the bondage-problem, and when Con
stantine Aksakov hinted in the newspaper Molva at the ad
vantages of free over forced labour, in reference to American
slavery, he was reprimanded in a friendly way by the Deputy-
Minister of Education, Prince P. A. Viazemsky, himself a
writer who had been known some time before as a great liberal.
Yet unofficial memoranda continued to circulate freely, es
pecially in regard to the peasant-question, and under the in
fluence of those memoranda the Ministry of Interior came to

12 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the conclusion that there were three ways in which to solve the
problem. One was to abolish serfdom in one general ukase, without
alloting any land to the peasants.
Or serfdom might be abolished with. .the retention by the
peasants of their portions, through redeeming them by some
financial operation, as it appeared clear that the peasants were
not in a position to pay at once to their landowners the price
of the allotments, and the landowners would not be willing
to postpone the payments for many years. Theoretically this
way was feasible.
The Ministry of Interior, however, considered both those
ways hardly realisable, and at any rate combined with great
difficulties and dangers for the State. It argued that the
landless liberation of the peasants would gravely threaten the
peace of the country; on the other hand, any financial measure
for the redemption of the peasants' allotments with the aid of
the Treasury would, in view of the deplorable state of the
finances at that moment, threaten the country with bankruptcy.
The Government could pay out at once to the landowners the
redemption price, which was about one billion rubles, and
collect it from the peasants in the form of delayed payments,
only by making a special loan. But after the Crimean Cam
paign, because of the enormous issues of paper-money, Russian
funds were extremely low, and such a big loan appeared almost
impossible. Thus there remained only a third way out — a series of
preparatory measures which would convert the peasants into
Obligatory Peasants for a definite or indefinite term (similar
to the Ostsee Statute of 1804, or according to the system in
troduced by Kiselev in Moldavia and Wallachia, or like Bibi-
kov's Inventory Regulations in the western provinces). The
Ministry favoured the last system most of all, as it led to a

LANSKOY AND LEVSHIN 13
liquidation of serfdom without any expenditures on the part
of the^ Government.
The Ministry had to consider, however, what would be the
results of the reforms in different provinces. Levshin, who
possessed estates in various provinces, could dimly prevision
that if the peasants were freed and became Obligatory, those
landowners who had been getting the larger part of their in
come not from agriculture but from the side-earnings of their
serfs, would fall into a difficult position, as the obligation of
the peasants to perform some barshchina or to pay certain
obrok for their lands would by no means compensate the land
owners for the exploitation of the side-earnings of their bond
men. Levshin sought means for the elimination or at least
mitigation of such difficulties which were bound to arise in the
industrial, not black-soil provinces. The Ministry of Interior
and Alexander himself considered that the redemption of the
personal freedom of the peasants was out of question, that
the person of the peasant should be freed without any com
pensation. For this reason Levshin proposed a " covert " compensation
for the landowners of the industrial provinces, in the form of
obliging the peasants of those provinces to redeem their abode
on the estates on the basis of a special estimation of the industrial
advantages connected with their place. Under such a pretext
it was possible to include in the redemption a compensation for
the loss of the landowners' right to exploit the person of the
peasant. Such were the original propositions of the Ministry
of Interior.
But Alexander II did not want to consider those proposi
tions before first hearing from the nobles, whose initiative he
preferred to that of the Government. He had been aware of
the movement among the nobles in the black-soil provinces, who
even during the preceding reign had pointed out the disad-

14 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
vantages of serfdom in densely populated regions. On the other
hand he could see from the circulating unofficial memoranda
that among the gentry elements ready to show an initiative
in the matter existed. Negotiations with the nobles began,
which were referred to the time of the Coronation, when the
Marshals of Nobility assembled at Moscow.
In his first negotiations Lanskoy suffered a complete fiasco.
Not one official representative of the nobility was willing to
demonstrate any initiative; they said that they did not know
the intentions of the Government, and had no plans of their
own to suggest, — as a matter of fact they feared that the
Government would make use of their initiative for promul
gating the measure to their disadvantage, not to mention the
fact that to the mass of the nobility the limitation of the bond
age-right appeared as an extremely dangerous measure in every
respect. This, however, did not prevent individual progressive repre
sentatives of the nobility from expressing their views in private
memoranda, as I have already mentioned. Most conspicuous
among these was the memorandum of Kayelin,_ a well known
professor, and at the same time a landowner in the province
of Samara, a historian and a jurist, who knew well the eco
nomic condition of the country, and was inclined to a quite
radical handling of the peasant-question. He advocated the
second way, the redemption course. His idea was that the
landowners should be compensated for the losses they would
suffer through the liquidation of serfdom, whether those losses
would result from the transfer of land to the peasants, or
from the discontinuation of the exploiting of the serfs' earnings.
In order to equalise the chances of agricultural and industrial
estates, Kavelin proposed to base the redemption not on the
estimation of the land value, but on the estimation of the selling
value of the estates.
One of the memoranda was presented by Yuriy Samarin,

MEMORANDUM OF YELENA PAULOVNA 15
the famous Slavophile, a man who undoubtedly stood for the
peasants' interests. Sharing the apprehensions of Levshin in
regard to the financial side of the question, Samarin advocated
the third way. He desired first of all the limitation of the
power of the landowner over the peasant, especially over the
person of the peasant; he insisted on retaining of his land by
the peasant and on the compensation of the landowner either
through regulated barshchina-work, or through definite obroks,
according to local conditions. Of the same nature was the
memorandum of another Slavophile, Prince Cherkassky.- -A
memorandum presented by a landowner from the province of
Poltava, a certain Posen, enjoyed serious consideration among
governmental circles. He manipulated skilfully with liberal
phrases, and even mentioned redemption, but his whole plan
was actually reduced to voluntary agreements between land
owners and peasants. Posen personally presented his mem
orandum to Alexander, and was supported by General Ros
tovtzev who was impressed with his financial and economic
erudition. The memorandum of Grand Duchess Yelena Paulovna, his
aunt, and a very enlightened woman, made a strong impression
on Alexander. She upheld the liberation of the peasants. Her
memorandum was worked out with the aid of N. A. Miliutin
and with the co-operation of Kavelin; it was, properly speak
ing, a project for the liberation and establishment of the peas
ants on her big estate, Karlovka, in the province of Poltava.
Grand Duchess Yelena Paulovna asked the Government for
definite instructions as to how she should carry out her idea,
and requested permission for organising councils with the land
owners of adjacent provinces. Alexander answered that he
awaited the initiative of the nobles, and while giving her no
instructions expressed his approval of her intention to organise
regular consultations among the landowners of the neighbour
ing provinces. At the same time a special secret committee

16 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
was formed in January, 1857, for the examination of the
projects presented; the members consisted largely of ministers
and dignitaries of the preceding reign. ' n
Among the members of the Committee Minister Lanskoy^
was unconditionally in favour. of the reform. Of the same
standing was General Rostovtzev} chief of the military schools,
personally devoted to Alexander; he was quite inexperienced
in the peasant-question, and when he was appointed with two
other members, Baron M. A. Korf and Prince P. P. Gagarin,
to examine the memoranda and projects which circulated
among the public, he even tried to elude the appointment. On
the other hand Rostovtzev was not an attractive figure in the
eyes of the public: on his name lay a spot — a rumour existed
that he had informed upon and betrayed the Decembrists.
The truth of the matter was distorted. In 1825 Rostovtzev
was a twenty-two years old officer, very friendly with the in
fluential leaders of the Conspiracy of December 14 — Ryleiev,
and particularly Prince Obolensky, with whom he shared rooms.
During the interregnum in 1825 Rostovtzev not only was able
to hear accidental phrases from the conspirators about their
intentions, but he was evidently directly solicited by Ryleiev
and Obolensky to join them. Rostovtzev, however, was ab
solutely loyal in his views and did not sympathise with the
plans of the Decembrists or with any secret political societies.
He categorically refused to take part in the conspiracy, even
tried to dissuade Ryleiev and Obolensky from their intentions,
and finally warned them that if they would not give up their
plans he would consider it his duty to inform the Government
of the threatening danger. Seeing that the plot was proceeding,
Rostovtzev fulfilled his threat, came to Nicolas and told him
that there was an opposition to his accession, that something
was brewing, and pleaded with Nicolas either to abdicate him
self or to persuade Constantine to come to Petrograd and
publicly abdicate. Rostovtzev mentioned no names, and after

THE WORK OF THE SECRET COMMITTEE 17
his meeting with Nicolas (on December 10) he immediately
informed Ryleiev and Obolensky, neither of whom had changed
their attitude of respect for him, about it; on his return from
exile Obolensky at once renewed his friendship with him. But
at that time the details were not generally known; Rostovtzev
was suspected, and Herzen systematically pursued him to his
very death, in his Bell.
Rostovtzev's real role in the peasant-question began later;
his participation in the works of the Secret Committee was
neither decisive, nor important. The other members of the
Committee were either indifferent or hostile towards the re
form, although they dared not openly oppose Alexander's state
ment that the time had ripened for the limitation of the land
owners' rights. The work progressed very slowly; only the
Ministry of Interior made active progress, owing to its chief,
Lanskoy, and to its possession of collected materials.
In the summer of 1857 Levshin presented a definite plan
for the reform, which consisted in declaring the peasants per
sonally free, but bound to the soil, under a temporary or in
definite obligation to perform their duties for their allotments,
the latter to be eventually bought by the peasants into personal
property; the landowners of not black-soil provinces were al
lowed to add " industrial advantages " to the value of their
lands. Dissatisfied with the slow work of the Committee whose
chairman, Prince Orlov, was opposed to the reform, Alexander \
introduced his brother, Constantine, well known for his liberal \
views, into the Committee. Indeed, he enlivened the spirit of '
the Committee, but in view of his inexperience he was inclined
too readily for compromises in order to accelerate the business.
Among other measures he suggested publicity, claiming that
the declaration of the Government's views would reassure the
peasants and would give the public a chance to co-operate in
the working out of the details of the reform. The Committee

18 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
decisively rejected the idea of giving publicity to the Govern
ment's views, and resolved to carry on the work gradually and
deliberately, dividing it into periods, the first period to be
devoted to the collecting of materials, and so forth. Com
petent persons, Levshin for example, asserted that the Com
mittee intended to prolong the matter indefinitely, in the hope
that it would finally be tabled.
But soon after this decision of the Secret Committee the
Government found at last that initiative on the part of the
; nobility for which it had sought so long. It came from the
i j Lithuanian nobles who had been under the sword of Damocles
1 1 every since the Inventory Regulations were postponed in 1853;
, that question rose again in the Ministry of Interior, and the
Lithuanian landowners in a declaration to the Governor-Gen
eral of Vilna, Nazimov, declared that they would be glad to
raise the question of the complete abolition of serfdom on condi
tion that for the landowners be preserved the ownership of the
soil. Nazimov presented the opinion to the Secret Committee
where the discussions were prolonged for three weeks. Alexan
der lost his patience, and ordered Lanskoy in three days to pre
pare an answer to the Lithuanian nobles in co-operation with
Muraviov, Minister of State Domains, who did not sympathise
with the reform but dared not contradict the Tzar. On No
vember 29, 1857, Alexander signed the rescript in the name of
Nazimov, which had made a great impression and had played an
important role in the development of the work. The Gov
ernment proposed to form provincial committees in the three
Lithuanian provinces from delegates of the nobles, one delegate
from each district, under the chairmanship of Marshals of the
Nobility, for the discussion of methods for the emancipation
of the serfs. The Government indicated, however, the funda
mental principles on which the reform could be carried out,
and those principles did not agree with the views of the Lith
uanian nobles.

THE WORK OF THE SECRET COMMITTEE 19
It was indicated to the nobles that although the land would
be considered the property of the landowners, the peasants
should be given the right to purchase their allotments during
a certain term of time, and should in addition be given suffi
cient appendaged land by the landowners to secure their sub
sistence and the payment of their taxes, for which they would
have to pay in barshchina or obrok, in definite amounts. Dur
ing the transitory stage the landowners were to preserve the
right of estate-policing. The peasants were to be divided into
village- or wo/ojf-communities. The provincial committees
were to take care of the regular payment of taxes to the Gov
ernment.

CHAPTER XXI
IN the preceding chapter I expounded the basic principles
on which the reform was proposed to be carried out.
Not only the principles themselves, which at any rate
rejected a landless liberation of the peasants, but also in par
ticular the fact that the Rescript was sent out a few days
after its sanctioning to all Governors and Marshals of No
bility, with the request that the nobles of other provinces ex
press their views in regard to an analogous solution of the
peasant-question, had a great significance for the further course
of the reform. Later the Government decided to publish the
Rescript for general information, in spite of the opposition of
the members of the Secret Committee, especially of its chair
man, Prince Orlov, who were against the sending of it even
to the Governors.
The publication of the Rescript was a very important event;
the Government could not turn back the course even had it
wanted to, without running the risk of arousing great dis
turbances. On the other hand, since the peasants had become
informed about the Government's proposal to the nobles, it
was only a question of time before all provinces would par
ticipate in the work, for the landowners understood the neces
sity of hastening the presentation of their addresses concerning
the desirability of establishing provincial committees, lest the
delay provoke disturbances among the peasants.
Some delay in the presentation of those addresses was caused
by the almost general dissatisfaction of the landowners with
the principles proposed by the Government. In this case ap
peared first of all the economical difference between various
20

THE LANDOWNERS AND THE REFORM 21
provinces, of which the Government had been aware (Levshin,
to wit), but had not appreciated sufficiently. Lanskoy received
reports from local representatives of the administration con
cerning the reception of the Rescript by the nobles, and it
appeared that it had aroused general criticism. All admitted
the timeliness and inevitableness of the reform, but in not a
single province did the nobles completely agree with the Govern
ment's programme. In the black-soil provinces the landowners j
derived their wealth exclusively from agriculture; the land was
divided in two almost equal parts, one allotted to the peasants,
and one cultivated by the landowner with the aid of the serfs'
barshchina. In most of those provinces there existed no side
earnings of a non-agricultural nature. In the most densely pop
ulated provinces, as in Tula, Kursk, Riazan, there was a sur
plus of hands, as we have seen, and in many places unpopulated
lands were sold at higher prices than peopled estates, which
showed what a burden the bondmen presented in comparison
with the value of the soil. It is natural therefore that in such
regions the landowners considered the liberation of the peasants
with land very disadvantageous, and they preferred to free the
peasants without compensation provided the masters retained
the most valuable asset of the estates — the land.
In the Northern, not black-soil provinces, on the contrary,
the conditions were quite different. There the landowners
seldom lived on their estates, and the peasants themselves culti
vated the soil very little, but payed their masters obrok from
their various earnings — in commerce and industry. We see
also at present that of the one million inhabitants of Petrograd
in 1897 one hundred thousand were ascribed to the province
of Yaroslavl, about the same number to Tver, and so forth,
which shows how the population of those provinces are occupied
with various city-industries, commercial and artisan. Even
during the bondage-state numerous peasants were developing
profitable occupations in Petrograd and Moscow; many kept

22 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
inns and post-stations at high-ways and river-harbours, which
was very profitable in the absence of railroads. For the land
owners of those provinces it appeared desirable to liberate the
peasants with considerable land-allotments, but on condition
that the redemption sum should cover the loss of the masters'
[income from the high obroks.
In view of this difference in the conditions of the various
provinces there appeared two distinct theories among the gentry
of that time; the most conscious and progressive elements in
the Northern provinces desired a quick and complete liquida
tion of serfdom, but on the basis of high compensation for their
estimated losses; the most conscious and progressive elements
in the black-soil provinces, on the other hand, were willing to
admit even a gratuitous liberation of the peasants, but on
condition that they retained ownership of the land. The point
vof view of the first appeared very dangerous even in the eyes
of such friends of the reform as Lanskoy and Levshin, since,
in their opinion, it was apt to shake the financial position of
the country.
At the time the advanced intelligentzia regarded the publi
cation of the Rescript very enthusiastically. The permission
of the Government to discuss the matter in the press brought
forth congratulatory articles addressed to Alexander by all the
progressive organs, even by the representative of the subsequent
radical movement, the Contemporary, and by the free London
publication of Herzen, the Bell. Chernyshevsky lauded the
Tzar above Peter the Great, while Herzen dedicated to him
an article with the epigraph : " Thou hast conquered, 0
Galilean!" The representatives of the universities, of liter
ature, and of the highest intelligentzia of both Capitals gave
a public banquet in Moscow, an unusual event in those days;
sympathetic speeches were delivered concerning Alexander, and
a warm ovation took place in front of his portrait. That loyal

HESITATION IN MOSCOW 23
banquet naturally displeased the Governor-General of Moscow,
Zakrevsky, and other proserfdom fanatics, but they were not
in position to turn the course of the great movement once it
was started.
But in spite of public sympathy the programme of the rescript
of November 20 caused a delay in the formation of provincial
committees. The Government hastened to open a provincial
committee in Petrograd, under the pretext that the nobles
there had long ago brought up the question of reorganising
the condition of the peasants. Indeed, they had raised that
question under Nicolas, and later at the accession of Alex
ander; with no intention, however, of abolishing serfdom, but
with a desire to reorganise it on feudal-emphyteutic principles
(i.e., the peasants should be ascribed to the landowners' estates
with the right of perpetual-hereditary use of allotted lands) ;
but the rescript of December 5, 1857, m the name of the
Governor-General of Petrograd, Ignatiev, arranged the open
ing of a provincial committee on the same basis as those of the
Lithuanian provinces.
The first gentry to present an address concerning the opening
of a committee, was that of Nizhni-Novgorod; its governor,
A. N. Muraviov, the founder of the Union of Salvation in
1817, succeeded in inspiring the nobles of Nizhni-Novgorod
— with which patriotic traditions have been connected since
the Troubled Time and the days of Kozma Minin-Sukhoruky 1
— to be the first to join the emancipatory steps of the Govern
ment. During the assembly of the nobles Muraviov collected
a sufficient number of signatures, and sent a deputation to
Petrograd; but his opponents aroused an agitation, and soon
1 During the Interregnum, or Troubled Time, early in the seven
teenth century, a patriotic butcher, Kozma Minin, induced his fellow-
citizens at Nizhni-Novgorod to contribute men and money for the
organisation of a national militia to repulse the Poles who had in
vaded Russia and were besieging Moscow. Alexander I also re
ferred to Minin in his appeal to the people in 1812. — Tr.

24 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
after the departure of the first deputation they sent to Petro
grad a contra-deputation. The Government forged the iron
while it was hot, and on December 24, 1857, before the arrival
of the second deputation a rescript was issued in the name of
Muraviov in answer to the address of the nobles. In Moscow
the delay was due to the fact that the province of Moscow
was one of the industrial, not black-soil provinces; only after
a remark from above that the Government was expecting
prompt action on the part of the First Capital did the Moscow
nobles present an address about the opening of a committee.
It pointed out the desirability of changes in the programme
of activity in accordance with' special local needs. The Gov
ernment, however, insisted on its programme, and the committee
was opened on the general basis. After this other provinces
began to join, so that by the end of 1858 committees on the
peasant-question were opened in all provinces.
The nobles of each district elected two members to the
provincial committee, and for the defence of the interests of
the peasants the Government appointed to every committee
two members from among the local landowners, known to be
in sympathy with the abolition of serfdom. In the majority
of the committees there was marked from the very beginning
an attempt to introduce some changes into the programme pre
scribed by the rescripts. The committee of the province of
Tver expressed its opposition to the Government's programme
more sharply than any other committee; its chairman was the
Marshal of the Tver Nobility, A. M. Unkovsky, a man of
the younger generation, who combined emancipatory ideas with
the care for the interests of the local nobles. He considered
himself obliged to guard the interests of the nobles whom he
represented, so that they should not find themselves in worse
condition that nobles of other provinces at the moment of the
liberation of the peasants. At the same time he desired that

UNKOVSKY'S PROGRAMME 25
the period of the reorganisation of the whole Russian life
should not come to an end with the completion of the peasant-
reform. In a memorandum presented to the Minister of Interior even
before the opening of the committee, he argued from the point
of view of the progressive landowners of the industrial provinces
that the palliatives offered in the rescripts, particularly the
method of the gradual extinction of serfdom and the transitory
Obligatory stage, did not solve the question at all; that the
peasants would not be satisfied with a half-freedom and the
landowners would be ruined, and that, finally, no regular
collection of taxes could take place when the peasants were
without property and the landowners had no right to manage
their property. As the only true way to liberate the peasants
" not in words, but in deed, not gradually, but at once, simul
taneously and universally, without infringing any one's inter
ests, without arousing dissatisfaction on any side, and without
risking the future of Russia " — Unkovsky considered the
redemption of the bondage-right, i.e., of the person of the
peasant with a full land allotment. He demanded that this
operation be performed with the aid of the Government, that
the landowners receive at once the entire redemption-sum, at
least in the form of obligations bringing a certain income and
realisable on the money-market. He also insisted that the
price of the land only should be paid by the peasants, and in
installments, whereas that part of the compensation which
should correspond with the loss of the right to exploit the
working power of the peasants should be paid by the State,
with the co-operation of all classes, for the bondage-right had
been so instituted and it should be so abolished — in the name
of national needs and considerations. Unkovsky succeeded in
imbuing the landowners of Tver and of other provinces with
his views, and when the work of the Tver committee began,

26 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
his plan was accepted by a majority of votes, in contradiction
to the literal sense of the rescripts and of the appended instruc
tions of the Minister.
In the meantime the Government, which at first had intended
to allow the provincial committees complete freedom in the
internal organisation of their work within the frame of the
rescripts, had become alarmed by the information about the
dissensions and contradictions in the various interpretations of
the meaning of the rescripts, and it decided to give the
provincial committees a definite programme of action and a
fixed form for their projects. This mission fell into the hands
of a cunning man, a landowner in the fertile and densely
populated province of Poltava, M. P. Posen, who in the guise
of a Liberal enjoyed at that time the full confidence of Ros
tovtzev. Posen's programme was to place definitely the dots
on the i's and to govern the work of the provincial committees
by a uniform set of rules. With the interests of the landowners
of the fertile black-soil provinces in view, Posen suggested
the idea that the plan should provide for a transitory Obligatory
period during which the peasants should use their allotments,
but after that period (twelve years. Tr.) the allotments
would return to the landowners in absolute property, and the
peasants would receive personal freedom, without land.
Posen's programme met with the strenuous opposition of the
nonblack-soil regions. The Tver committee sent a deputation
under the leadership of Unkovsky to Lanskoy and Rostovtzev
with a decisive declaration that if the Government expected
the nobility of Tver to co-operate in the liquidation of the bond
age-right it must provide for the granting of land to the peas
ants, entire annihilation of all bondage-relations, and compen
sation to the landowners for their losses. Should this not be al
lowed, the committee would resign, and the Government might
entrust the work of its officials who " would write down what
ever they would be told to." This determined declaration of the

QUESTION OF REDEMPTION 27
Tver committee took place in October, 1858, when both Lan
skoy and Rostovtzev had been already considerably shaken in
their views on the necessity of a transitory Obligatory period
and on the impossibility of redemption.
We should _jnention_here^at_thfi_^prQY^.jQf_J^Jcedemp-
tion idea was shared not only by some other committees of the
non black-soil provinces, but by a considerable part of the
progressive press. As soon as permission was granted to dis
cuss the peasant-question, the Contemporary published an article
by Chernyshevsky, the second part of which included Kavelin's
project in extenso, and which on the whole advocated the view
of the Tver committee. The Russian Messenger of Katkov
declared redemption to be the only correct solution of the
question, since it was impossible to free the peasants, without
land and equally impossible to liberate them with land except
by means of redemption, for the peasants were not in position
to pay for the land at once, and the landowners wouldL not be
willing to sell on the basis of delayed installments, .The same
stand was taken by Herzen's Bell in which his closest friend,
Ogarev, published'lohg_aTficIei~oh the peasant-questiorT.
In the summer of 1858 Rostovtzev, during his vacation
abroad, carefully studied various projects for the emancipation
of the peasants, among them some projects worked out by
foreign bankers (Frenkel and Homberg). He gradually came
to the conviction that the " transitory Obligatory period "
would not prevent disturbances and misunderstandings, but
would make them inevitable, for the peasants having become
personally free and yet obliged to pay barshchina and obrok
to the landowners would not easily submit to their demands
and not appreciate the legitimacy of the measure. For this
reason he worked out with the aid of the Imperial Secretary,
Bludov, a plan for the introduction of extreme police-measures
for that transitory period, in the form of specially authorised
District-Chiefs and temporary Governor-Generals. But this

28 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
plan met with the strong opposition of the Ministry of Interior
and of many private persons, who argued that such an order
would be not a " transitory Obligatory," but a " state of siege,"
and life in the provinces would become unbearable. Rostovtzev
understood the justness of those arguments and withdrew his
plan despite the energetic support it had received from Alex
ander II who was much annoyed by sharp criticism of it in a
memorandum presented to him by Lanskoy on behalf of the
Ministry of Interior (the memorandum was drawn by the
Governor of Kaluga, Artzimovich, although it had been ascribed
for a long time to Miliutin).
The more deeply Rostovtzev went into the matter during
his vacation abroad the more clearly he saw the difficulties of
the original plan of the Government. He expressed his ideas
in personal letters to the Tzar from Wildbad and Dresden.
In his fourth (last) letter he pointed out that the shorter the
transitory Obligatory period was made the better it would be
for the peace of the country, and that in order to preserve
authority and calm in the provinces, the power should be con
centrated in the peasant- mir (village commune with mutual
guarantee and responsibility. Tr.) and its representatives,
leaving the landowner to deal not with individual peasants,
but with the mir. At the same time Rostovtzev had already
adopted the idea of redemption as a general financial measure;
but he would not agree to force the measure on both parties,
for he considered that the policy of redemption by aid of the
Government should be voluntary and by means of mutual
agreements. At the same time the possibility and feasibility of redemption
had been heartily endorsed in the ministry of Interior by
N. A. Miliutin and Y. A. Soloviov, who exercised a direct
influence on the course of the reform through the Zemsiy
(land-) Department formed in the Ministry of Interior on
March 4, 1858, under the chairmanship of Deputy-Minister

SOLOVIOV AND MILIUTIN 29
Levshin. The activity of Levshin had come to an end with
the publication of the Rescript; he did not sympathise with the
rapid and energetic measures in the matter of the reform, and
he considered the publication and dissemination of the rescripts
a dangerous salto mortale for the State. Feverish activity
began in the Zemsky Department and Levshin yielded his place
to the younger and more capable workers — Soloviov and
Miliutin; the latter soon supplanting him as Deputy-Minister.
Soloviov was an excellent worker in the preparation and
elaboration of the materials necessary for the reform. The
post of Miliutin was still more responsible and important.
Rostovtzev later said that Miliutin was the nymph Egeria
of the Editing Commissions. He performed the same role in
the Ministry of Interior. He entered that Ministry in 1835
as an inexperienced youth of seventeen, immediately after his
graduation from the Noble Pension at the Moscow University.
Perhaps he was noticed more than the ordinary petty clerks
owing to the fact that he was a nephew of the Minister of
State Domains, Count Kiselev, but it is beyond doubt that his
advancement was due mainly to his remarkable gifts which
had been manifested from the first years of his service. Under
Count Perovsky he occupied the position of director of the
Economy Department, and in spite of his age (he was only
thirty then) he was a distinguished figure in the Ministry.
During the Forties he undertook an investigation of the
economic conditions of the Russian cities; he attracted to this
work such men as Yuriy Samarin and Ivan Aksakov, and in
1846 he carried through the reform of the public management!
of the city of Petrograd, approximately on the same principles
on which the subsequent city-reform of 1870 was based.
During the years 1856-57 Miliutin, with the co-operation
of his old friend, Samarin, and his new friend, Kavelin, thor
oughly prepared himself for participation in the peasant-reform.
In 1857 he was able to advocate his views in his conversations

30 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
with Levshin, and at the same time he inspired Grand Duchess
Yelena and Grand Duke Constantine with the idea that a
basic and radical reform, in the form of an emancipation of
the peasants with sufficient land-allotments, was necessary. He
pointed out the way to make use of the nobles' initiative, but
at the same time not to allow the nobles too great a share in
the work, lest the aroused interests and appetites of the nobles
paralyse the beneficial significance of the measure for the
masses. His activity was soon noticed by the court-reaction
aries, who hastened to compromise him in the eyes of the Tzar,
accusing him of radical political views, and even of revolu
tionary aspirations. Their attack succeeded, and Miliutin
would have been dismissed in 1857, but for the energetic inter
cession of Lanskoy, Prince Gorchakov (Foreign Minister),
and Grand Duchess Yelena. In spite of all the intrigues of
his enemies, Miliutin was appointed early in 1859 t0 the post
of Deputy-Minister, in place of Levshin, and although he
bore the title of " temporary functionary," he retained the post
till the issue of the statutes of February 19, 1861.
Miliutin shared the views of Samarin on the peasant-reform.
Both admitted their preference for a radical solution of the
question by means of compulsory redemption under the condi
tion of granting the peasants those allotments which they had
been using under the bondage-system; but they were aware
of the difficulties and dangers connected with such a solution,
for the State Treasury which had been drained by the war
and was in the weak and incapable hands of such ministers
as Brock and (later) Kniazhevich. Miliutin and Samarin
considered as the most important part of the reform the libera
tion of the peasants with a sufficient land allotment, and they
regarded with mistrust the majority of the provincial com
mittees. Yet in the demands of the majority of the Tver
committee Miliutin could not help seeing a desire to find a
conscientious and radical solution of the question, with the

EDITING COMMISSIONS 31
preservation of the advantages and interests not only of the
landowners, but also of the peasants.
Eventually Lanskoy and Rostovtzev found it necessary to
allow the Tver committee to carry through their plan to its
end, and they were permitted to work out a special redemption-
project for an immediate and simultaneous liberation of the
peasants with land, as against the projects based on Posen's
programme, which considered the plan of a transitory Obli
gatory period. Soon a similar permission was granted to the
Kaluga committee, and to fifteen other committees which had
not finished their works by that time.
At the same time Rostovtzev, by the order of the Tzar,
brought for discussion before the Main Committee extracts
from his letters to Alexander written from abroad. The dis
cussion caused very important changes and additions to the
original programme of the Government. These influenced the
whole further course of the reform, especially the works of the
Editing Commissions, the institution established in March,
1859, in aid of the Main Committee for the examination of the
projects of the provincial committees and for the working out
of general statutes for the State and local units. The chair
man, or according to the Imperial decree — the " chief," of
the Editing Commissions was Rostovtzev. The Commissions
were composed of representatives of various departments con
nected with the peasant-affairs and with the codificatory works,
and also of " expert-members " — landowners who had at
tracted attention by their projects and work in the provincial
committees. The suggestion for " expert-members " was
offered by Miliutin to Alexander and to Rostovtzev, and
was approved by both. In spite of Miliutin's apprehensions,
good relations were at once established between Rostovtzev
and him, and Rostovtzev showed his complete confidence in
Miliutin, by asking his assistance in selecting members foT the
Editing Commissions. Miliutin made use of the invitation,

32 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
and introduced some members who had been most active in
the realisation of the reform. Among them were Y. F.
Samarin, Prince V. A. Cherkassky, V. V. Tarnovsky, G. P.
Galagan, not to mention Y. A. Soloviov, who was appointed
by the Ministry of Interior, upon the advice of Miliutin.
" With these friends of the reform, however, there came to
the Commissions members with whom Miliutin's circle had to
carry on a stubborn and bitter fight. They were: the Mar
shals of Nobility of Petrograd — Count P. P. Shuvalov, and
of Oriol — V. V. Apraksin, Adjutant-General Prince Paske
vich, the Poltava landowner, Posen, the editor of the lournal
of Landowners, A. D. Zheltukhin, and a representative
of the Ministry of State Domains, Bulygin, who obdurately
advocated the views of his principal, M. N. Muraviov.
Originally there were formed two Editing Commissions: one
for the working out of a general project, and one for that of
local projects; but Rostovtzev merged them into one, and then
subdivided it into departments — administrative, juridical, and
economical, to which was added later a financial department
for the compensation question. These departments served as
sub-commissions which worked out reports for the general
meeting of the Commissions. Over the two most important v
sub-commissions — the economical and financial — Miliutin/
presided. But his activities were not limited by this. Not in
vain did Rostovtzev name him the Egeria of the Editing Com
missions. He actually was the central person of the whole
work, the manager of the internal policy of the Commissions,
and the leader of its progressive members in the fight with the
hostile forces who acted within and without the Commissions.
He succeeded at the very beginning in bringing together a
united group of convinced, talented, and industrious advocates
of the reform, in the persons of Samarin, Cherkassky, and
Soloviov, who were joined in most cases by Tarnovsky, Gal
agan, Peter Semionov, and others. This group had gained the

THE PETROGRAD NOBILITY 33
complete confidence of Rostovtzev. Miliutin eliminated the
bad influence of Posen upon Rostovtzev, by revealing Posen's
masqued intentions and forcing him to admit at the sessions
of the Editing Commissions that he was in favour of a landless
emancipation of the peasants.
From the very first the Commissions had to combat the advo
cates of the feudal aspirations of the Petrograd nobility.
Count Shuvalov and Prince Paskevich, who based their argu
ments on the literal meaning of the Rescripts, and insisted on
the perpetual conservation of the property right to all lands
for the landowners, rejected all forms of redemption except
individual voluntary agreements, and particularly insisted on
the conservation by the landowners of the votchina (hereditary
estate) -power and votchina-]\irisd.iction on their lands as an
inviolable seignioral right. The fight began at the first ses
sions of the Editing Commissions in connection with those
changes in the Government's programme which had been
accepted upon the discussion of Rostovtzev's views expressed
in his letters from abroad to Alexander. The new Govern
mental programme presented to the Commissions at the very
opening of their sessions was later formulated by N. P.
Semionov (in his " History of the Liberation of the Peasants
during the Reign of Alexander II ") as follows:
1. To free the peasants with land.
2. The final outcome of the liberation to be the redemption
by the peasants of their allotments in property.
3. The Government to facilitate the process of redemption
through mediation, credit, guarantee, and financial operations.
4. To avoid if possible a transitory Obligatory period, and
if inevitable, to make the period short.
5. Barshchina must be abolished within three years by legis
lation, by transferring the peasants to an obrok basis, except
in cases where the peasants did not desire such a change.
6. The peasants to be given autonomy in their village-life.

34 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
This programme was received sympathetically by the mem
bers of the Editing Commissions, and was made the basis of
their work.
But having accepted that programme, the Commissions had
to take up a position contrary to the majority of the projects
of the provincial committees, which had been worked out on
the basis of the rescripts and of Posen's programme. The Edit
ing Commissions decided not to take into account the opinions
of the nobles expressed in the projects of the committees, but
to use them only as material for their own judgments. Three
thousand copies of the Commissions' reports were printed and
widely distributed throughout the country, by the order of
Rostovtzev. In the summer of 1858 the Tzar made a tour
through various provinces, spoke to marshals of the nobility
and to members of the committees, expressed his gratitude for
their initiative, and promised to invite delegates from every
committee to participate in the final discussion of the reform
in Petrograd. The nobles understood that they would be
admitted to the Main Committee for participation in the final
decision of the question. Miliutin appeared determinedly
opposed to such an interpretation of the Tzar's promise, and
persuaded Rostovtzev and Lanskoy that the admission of the
nobles to the Main Committee even with only an advisory
voice would overturn the whole work and distort the result of
the reform. It was finally decided to allow the delegates of
the provincial committees to criticise the projects of the Editing
Commission at its sessions, but not to vote on the questions.
The work of the Commissions was divided by Rostovtzev's
plan into several periods. During the first period the projects
of the first twenty-one provinces which had finished their work
earlier than the rest were examined, and delegates from those
provinces were invited to join in the discussions. After the
criticism and revision of these projects, delegates of other
provinces were called out, and after further criticism and

THE WORK OF THE COMMISSIONS 35
discussion, the final projects were worked out. The arrival
of the first group of delegates was awaited with some uneasiness
by the members of the Editing Commissions, as their opponents
considered the appearance of the delegates the most opportune
moment for a general battle which might distort the course of
the work.
The main objections of the nobles were directed, first,
against the rejection of all those provincial projects which
recommended the return of the land to the landowners after
the termination of the transitory Obligatory period of eight
to twelve years; next they objected to the lowering of the
estimation of the value of the estates, and finally to the elimina
tion in one form or another of the votchina-right of the land
owners to be the " chiefs " of the village-communities, proposed
by the programme of Posen.
Miliutin decided to counteract the attack of the hostile ele
ments by proving the selfish and greedy motives of the major
ity of the provincial committees, and to accomplish this he
wrote out a memorandum (presented to the Tzar through
Lanskoy) in which he tersely criticised the activity of the
provincial committees of the first summons, and expressed the
opinion of the Ministry of Interior that the delegates should
not be allowed to present any general decisions, but should
only be invited to present their opinions on the work of the
Editing Commissions at its special sessions. The Tzar ap
proved of this view, and corresponding instructions were given
to the delegates. The latter naturally grew indignant; at
first they intended to present an address to the Tzar, protest
ing against the actions of the hateful bureaucracy, but when
the address was not accepted, they petitioned Rostovtzev to
allow them to assemble and work out general decisions for pre
sentation to the " supreme Government." They were allowed
to have private gatherings, without the right to make decisions,
and they were promised in the name of the Tzar that their

36 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
considerations would reach him through the Main Committee.
The delegates proceeded then with their comments on the work
of the Commissions, and filled two thick volumes with sharp
and merciless criticism.
We should note that the majority of the delegates of the
first summons were liberally inclined, and with the exception
of a few persons were not proserfdom. Most of them be
longed to the committees of the non black-soil or semi-black-
soil provinces, and definitely stood not only for the liberation
of the peasants, but for land allotment. Yet all of them op
posed the granting of land to the peasants in perpetual posses
sion under once for all fixed obligations. They feared, not
without reason, that the performance of barshchina after the
abolition of the landowners' authority would actually be impos
sible, while they considered unjust, in view of the constant rise
in land values, the fixation of obroks with no right for rais
ing them. The majority demanded obligatory simultaneous re
demption with the aid of a special credit operation. Very few
preferred the system of perpetual possession with the right of
periodical revision of the obroks, and only a few persons fa
voured the retention of all the land by the landowners after the
expiration of the temporary Obligatory period.
With absolute unanimity the delegates attacked the project
of the administrative organisation of the peasants; they did not
directly defend the votchina-powei of the landowners, but
shaiply criticised the intention of the Commissions to subordi
nate the proposed organs of peasant-autonomy to the local
district-police, whereby the very principle of autonomy was
annulled. In this part of their objections the delegates stood
on liberal and even democratic principles, and their arguments
made a strong impression on many members of the Commis
sions and on all progressives in the country. The delegate
from Tver, Unkovsky, formulated these ideas best of all and
went further in his criticism, attacking the whole existing

ADDRESSES OF THE NOBLES 37
system of local district administration, against which he pro
posed his own project endorsed by the Tver committee.
Unkovsky demanded a fundamental reorganisation of the local
administration on the principles of decentralisation and auton
omy, of which the smallest unit was to be an all-class volost.
The delegates came to the conclusion, however, that their
comments could hardly be considered by the Tzar, if only
because of their voluminosity. For this reason they decided
before their departure to try once more to address the Tzar
with a petition to admit them to the Main Committee at the
time of the final discussion of the reform. But the idea of a
general address was not realised, and the delegates broke into
groups. Eighteen of them presented a very moderately com
posed address in which they petitioned that their comments
be admitted before the Main Committee. The delegate from
Simbirsk, Shidlovsky, presented a separate address with vague
demands in an oligarchic spirit. Finally five delegates headed
by Unkovsky appeared with a criticism of the bureaucratic
regime, a demand for an obligatory redemption, and a general
statement on the necessity of a reorganisation of the juridical
and administrative order of the State. Simultaneously with
those addresses a memorandum was presented to the Tzar by
a Petrograd landowner, M. A. Bezobrazov, an aristocrat (a
nephew of Prince Orlov) and Court Chamberlain, who was
not a member of the delegation. In his memorandum he
savagely criticised the actions of the Ministry of Interior and
of the Editing Commissions, and demanded that the bureau
cracy be " bridled," and elective representatives of the nobles
summoned, in whom only, in his opinion, the supreme authority
should seek support.
Alexander's ire, provoked by the sharp expressions of that
memorandum, was reflected in his attitude towards the ad
dresses of the delegates, although these were drawn in a loyal
and correct tone. The delegates who had signed the addresses

38 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
were reprimanded by their respective Governors,2 and their
comments in most cases passed unnoticed. In the end this
incident, which served as a beginning for the development of
an oppositional movement among the nobles and a certain part
of society, proved beneficial to the Editing Commissions and
to the outcome of their work, because it strengthened Alex
ander's sympathy with them and their activities.
After the departure of the delegates of the first summons,
the second period of the work of the Editing Commissions
began. They revised their projects so as to include some of
the suggestions of the first delegates and some of the projects
that had arrived from other provinces, although they did not
find it necessary to make any essential changes in their original
plans. But before the work came to an end, an event took
place which seemed to threaten the reform with disaster.
On February 6, i860, Rostovtzev died after a three, months'
illness caused by overwork and nervous strain. Count Panin,
the Minister of Justice, was appointed to the post of chairman
of the Editing Commissions. He was a rabid routinist-
bureaucrat and thorough conservative, and an outspoken op
ponent of the programme of action of the Editing Commissions.
This appointment aroused general astonishment anet indigna
tion. Herzen used a black border in printing in the Bell the
news of Panin's appointment, and declared despondently that
the tone of the reign Jhad changed. He invited the members
of the Commissions to resign, if there was a drop of citizen-
blood in them.3 Miliutin shared the same view, and only the
2 On February 20, i860, Unkovsky was banished to the province of
Viatka, for a sharp protest against the restriction of free discussion,
decreed by the Minister of Interior. — Tr.
8 A contemporary describes in the appearance of Panin at the sessions
of^ the Editing Commissions. In came " an enormous awkward being,
with arms as long as those of an orang-outang. This being fiercely
and seriously glared at every one over his spectacles, and listened to
the names of those whom he met, as they were read out to him by Bul
gakov. Some of the representatives were honoured by his snaking

PANIN 39
persistent persuasions of Grand Duchess Yelena prevented him
from carrying out his intention of resigning. Alexander II
explained his motive in reply to the amazed question of his
aunt Yelena : " You do not know Panin ; his only conviction
is the exact fulfilment of my orders." Alexander forbade
Panin to make any changes in the policy of the work established
by Rostovtzev. Yet his appointment revived the hopes of the
serf-holders and of the enemies of the Editing Commissions.
The delegates of the second summons, who belonged mostly
to the committees of the black-soil and the Western provinces
and who advocated a landless liberation of the peasants, arrived
at Petrograd with the intention of throwing over the projects
of the Commissions with the aid of Panin. They were dis
appointed: Panin endeavoured formally to keep his promise to
the Tzar, and did not assist the delegates. The delegates
criticised the projects of the Editing Commissions, especially
the ideas of allotting land to the peasants and of the formation
of peasant-communities and volosts independent of the land
owners; they did not scruple about arguments, and went to
any length to discredit the work of the Commissions from the
conservative point of view, ascribing the projects republican,
socialistic, and communistic principles. Thus the criticism of
those delegates differed in principle from that of the delegates of
the first summons. The Editing Commissions had no difficulty
in disproving those exaggerated accusations. But after the
hands with them, but the majority had to be satisfied with a slight
and even slighting nod."
James Mavor, in quoting the above statement in his An Economic
History of Russia, adds that Panin was proprietor of 21,000 serfs, his
income was 136,000 rubles, his interests were bound up with the main
tenance of peasant-bondage, his political views were those of a con
servative of conservatives.
At the first rumour of Panin's appointment, Herzen wrote in his
Bell: " What ? Panin, Victor Panin ! That lanky madman who has
destroyed the last vestige of justice in Russia by his formalism! Ha!
Ha! Ha! This is a mystification."— Tr.

40 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
departure of the delegates, when the third, codificatory, period
had begun for the Commissions, the group of members led by
Miliutin had to live through a hard time.
Count Panin carefully but persistently endeavoured to pro
mulgate in the Commissions some of his views which seriously
threatened to cripple the work. Other members of the Com
missions, who secretly sympathised with the aspirations of the
delegates of the second summons, renewed the struggle with
the group of Miliutin, Cherkassky, Samarin, and Soloviov.
The conflict assumed a quite bitter character; at one session
Panin stated that Miliutin expressed mistrust in his, Panin's,
words, and with another member, Bulygin, Miliutin came on
the verge of fighting a duel. Panin's main purpose ^consisted
in striking out the expression " perpetual " in the clause grant
ing allotments to the peasants; he pretended to oppose that
expression from the juridical point of view, but he evidently
intended to create a basis for the realisation of the desires of
those provincial committees which had tried to prove, with the
aid of Posen, that by the sense of the Rescripts the allotments
were to belong to the peasants for the temporary Obligatory
period only. Panin failed in his attempt, in spite of all his
endeavours, which went so far as falsifying the journals of
the sessions, as Miliutin proved. Owing to the steadfast de
fence of that point by Miliutin and his friends, all that Panin
could attain was the substitution of the word " permanent "
for the word " perpetual," its equivalent in fact.
Although Panin's opposition was thus frustrated, Miliutin
and his friends had to yield several more or less substantial
points during the third period (and partly during the second)
of the work of the Commissions. Those compromises consisted
in some diminution of allotments in certain districts; in some
raise of the obrok norm in the black-soil provinces, where it
had been originally proposed to be one ruble lower than in the
non black-soil provinces, and finally in the permission of an

SUMMARY

41

o£ro£-revision after twenty years, i.e., of the transvaluation of
the obligations in accordance with the changed prices on grain in
those estates where the fields were given to the peasants in
perpetuity. Yielding to that last change, on which the Tzar
himself had insisted, Miliutin hoped that no Minister of In
terior would ever undertake the readjustment of the obroks
in the non-redeemed estates. Indeed, no revision of the obroks
took place in 1881, but instead obligatory redemption was
introduced in all those estates where there still remained
temporary Obligatory peasants.
On October 10, i860, the Editing Commissions were closed
after having worked without rest for about twenty months,
and having prepared projects of sixteen various acts with ex
planatory memoranda, indices, etc. The printed reports of the
departments, the journals of the sessions of the Commissions,
the summaries of the projects of the provincial committees, and
other works of the Editing Commissions filled eighteen enor
mous volumes, besides six volumes of statistical information
about all estates having more than one hundred serfs, and three
big volumes of comments by the delegates of the provincial
committees, also published by the Commissions,

CHAPTER XXII
FROM the day of the closing of the Editing Commissions
in October of i860, the work began in the Main Com
mittee. It lasted two months^ irreconcilable contra
dictions among the members appeared which placed Grand Duke
Constantine, who had been appointed chairman of the Com
mittee in place of Prince Orlov, in a very difficult position.
No majority could be formed on certain questions; there were
only ten members, and they broke into three or four groups,
and not one of them had an absolute majority.
The. main question concerned the methods and norms of
the land-allotments for the peasants. At the discussion of this
question an obstinate group was formed under the leadership of
M. N. Muraviov, Minister of State Domains, who was joined
in all questions by the Chief of Gendarmes, Prince V. A.
Dolgorukov, and in most cases by Minister of Finance, A. M.
Kniazhevich, and for some time also by the Court Minister,
Count V. F. Adlerberg, who later, however, withdrew from
the coalition. This group had endeavoured to establish the
norms of the allotments and their valuation as recommended
by the provincial committees, but seeing the impossibility of
carrying out that point of view they attempted to have those ques
tions transferred to the decisions of local authorities, permitting
the Main Committee to define only the general principles of the
reform. The project presented by them was prepared by the
new star of the aristocratic party, the hope of the serfholders
and feudalists — P. A. Valuiev, who had not long before ex
changed his post of Governor for a position in the Ministry of
42

THE STATE COUNCIL

43

State Domains, and who was appointed Minister of Interior
after the publication of the Act of February 19.
But that group was not able to get a majority in the Main
Committee; on the side of the projects accepted by the Editing
Commissions were four votes, but they had no absolute ma
jority either, as Prince Gagarin who desired a landless liber
ation of the peasants, and Count Panin who opposed many of
the Commissions' decisions, stuck stubbornly to their opinions.
After many efforts on the part of Grand Duke Constantine to
win over Panin, the latter joined the majority (five against
four), having succeeded in decreasing the norms of the allot
ments in numerous districts from one-quarter to one-half of
a desiatin. Thus the work of the Main Committee came to
an end after two months, and the decisions of the Editing Com
missions suffered no fundamental changes.
The Tzar was present at the last session of the Main Com
mittee, and by invitation, all members of the Council of
Ministers. The Tzar thanked the Editing Commissions for
their good work, and declared that in transferring the matter
to the State Council he would not tolerate any procrastination
in the final discussions, and then and there he appointed Feb
ruary 15 as the last day for the examination of the question,
so that the abolition of bondage might be enacted before the
beginning of field-works. " This," said Alexander, " I desire,
I demand, I command ! "
The members of the State Council were given ten days for
getting acquainted with the question, and on January 28, 1861,,
Alexander II opened the sessions with a long and vigorous!
speech in which he reviewed the whole course of the peasant-i
question during the preceding reigns and in his own time, and
repeating his demand for a rapid examination of the question
in the State Council, he said : " Different views on the work
presented before you may exist. I shall willingly listen to all
opinions, but I have the right to demand one thing: that put-

44 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ting aside your personal interests, you act not as landowners,
but as State dignitaries endowed with my confidence." At
that he reiterated his desire to have the matter accomplished
by the middle of February.
Indeed, the members of the State Council had finished the
examination of the whole matter by February 17. The Tzar
gave his resolution on each question, joining the opinion of the
majority at one time, and that of the minority, at another.
Not seldom he agreed with the opinion of eight against thirty-
five, in order to sustain the decision of the Editing Commissions
(which he succeeded on all points).
The project passed the State Council with only one new
amendment, made by Prince Gagarin^ who having been de
feated in all his attempts to carry through a landless liberation,
proposed that in cases of mutual agreement the landowner
might give the peasants one-fourth of the allotment determined
by the law, gratuitously, whereupon all their obligations to one
another would be cancelled. The State Council unanimously
approved of the amendment, and it was confirmed by the Tzar.
Thus originated the so-called " quartered," or in the expression
of the people, " beggarly," " charity " allotments. The peas
ants were frequently tempted with the possibility of receiving
a gratuitous allotment, no matter how small it might be; this
caused a spread of land-dearth among the peasants, particularly
in the Steppe-provinces, where there was so much land in 1861
that the peasants were not very eager to assert their proprietor
ship of it.
On February 19 the Tzar signed the Act and the solemn
manifesto which was written by the Metropolitan of Moscow,
Filaret. At first the writing of the manifesto was entrusted
to Y. Samarin, but his project was found unsuitable, and it
was turned over as material to Filaret, who performed the
work reluctantly, in view of his opposition to the way in which
the reform was carried out.

THE ACT OF FEBRUARY 19TH 45
Let us analyse the Act of the 19th of February. The new
legislation concerning the peasants was very cumbersome —
there were seventeen acts and special rules. First came
the " General act concerning the peasants freed from bond
age ',' ; besides general introductory articles the act defined the
legal position of the liberated peasants and their administrative
organisation which was to be alike everywhere. Of a similarly
general character was the act concerning redemption, i.e., the
methods and conditions under which the allotments were to be
redeemed,, The act about house-serfs also had a general sig
nificance. They were to be freed completely and gratuitously
two years after the publication of the Act, without getting any
thing from their masters. Equally general was the nature of
the act concerning local institutions for peasant-affairs, by the
aid of which the new legislation was to be put into practice,
namely: Peace-Mediators and their District-Conferences, and
Provincial Boards for Peasant Affairs. In regard to the eco
nomic side of the question several local acts were issued regu
lating the different conditions. One act was issued for
the peasants of Great Russia, White Russia, and New Russia,
where the communal — obshchina — system was in existence; >
a special Little Russian act was issued for the peasants of the
provinces Poltava, Chernigov, and part of Kharkov; a local act;
was also issued for the Southwestern provinces, and a local act;
for the Lithuanian provinces of Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, and
Minsk; in each case the acts were to fit the peculiar local agri
cultural conditions that had taken form in the historical process.
Special acts were issued also for 1) small serf-owners who
were permitted to sell their estates to the Government, in case
the conditions of the emancipation were disadvantageous for
them; for 2) peasants performing obligatory work in land
owners' factories; 3) peasants in mountain and salt-works;
4) peasants in the Region of the Don Army; 5) peasants
and house-serfs in the province of Stavropol (the only Cau-

46 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
casian province subjected to peasant-reform at that time) ;
6) peasants in the Bessarabian Region where personal bondage
had been abolished even before its annexation to Russia; finally
a special act was issued for 7) Western Siberia; in Eastern
Siberia there had been no bondage-right. Considering that
the number of articles in every act exceeded one hundred, we
may get an idea of the gigantic legislative and codificatory
work performed by the Editing Commissions.
The chief significance of the Great Reform has been its
legal aspect; in this respect the fall of bondage has been the
most important event in all the modern history of Russia.
Contemporaries and especially participators of the reform were
fond of saying that by the Act of February 19 the people were
for the first time brought on the historical arena in Russia.
At any rate we may say that the whole status of the people has
fundamentally changed with the introduction of the reform.
Whatever the material consequences of the reform have been,
one cannot deny the enormous importance of the fact that men
were no longer permitted to sell other men or to transfer them
from field work to house service, i.e., to a state of domestic
slavery. The peasants got rid of the unlimited interference in
their life, which the landowners had exercised even to the ex
tent of arranging marriages among them.
From the generally human point of view the legal sig
nificance of the reform has been colossal, but we must observe
here that the abolition of serfdom, having freed the peasants
from personal and legal subjection to the landowners, has not
equalised the peasants with the landowners in their civil rights :
the reform has transferred them from the class of bonded
1 peasants not into the class of fully able citizens, but into thf
class of the so-called tributary orders. This vestige of the
general binding of all orders, on which the Muscovite state
had been based, has continued to exist. The legal position
of the tributary orders consisted in their being taxed by the

ITS SIGNIFICANCE

47

Government per capita, not according to their income; the
tax had to be paid by the group as, ^ whole, by mutual guar
antee, which bound every one to the group in which he was
registered, by the aid of a special passport system. Every
tributary order was responsible for all its members, and for
this reason the Government was obliged to allow such groups
a certain authority over its members, the right to keep them
forcibly within the group. As long as the " mutual guarantee "
system and the per capita tax existed there could not be any
full rights of separate classes in Russia, or actual equality of
all citizens before the law; those under the burden of the
tributary system had no freedom of movement or of profession,
for in order to be transferred from one group into another
one had to obtain a verdict of dismissal. One limitation
logically resulted another, and the traces of that bondage are
still noticeable in Russia.
Another article in the General Act stated that during the
first nine years after the publication of the Act the temporary
Obligatory peasants could not refuse their allotment and had
to perform obligations for it; their personal freedom was thus
definitely limited. One should have in mind that the men
who worked out the peasant-reform of 1861 did not profess
the liberal views of the men of the end of the eighteenth or of
the beginning of the nineteenth century, whose starting point
were the rights of human personality, the ideology of the
Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen. The members of
the Editing Commissions desired primarily the security of the
welfare of the people and of the State. They undoubtedly were
well disposed towards the peasants and sincerely wished to
improve their life in a fundamental way, but since they acted
for welfare, and not for personal freedom in the proper sense
of the word, it is natural that at times questions of welfare
prevailed against questions of personal liberation. As a result
of that attitude came the beneficial part of the reform — the

48 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
liberation of the peasants with land, but the same circumstance
conditioned the element of guardianship which was considered
necessary to introduce for the time of the organisation of the
freed peasants.
The reasonable apprehension that the emancipated peasants
might again fall under the power and even bondage of the
landowners, resulted in the administrative organisation estab
lished for the peasants. The peasantry was organised in
autonomous social units, of which the smallest was a village
community. Economically the communities had considerable
independence ; in " communal " villages the taxation was de
termined by the peasants according to the size of individual
allotments, which in their turn were determined by the general
assembly of the village community. That general assembly
could tax the members with dues for various spiritual, mental,
or moral needs, and for social exigencies.
Originally it was intended that while the village-communities
should have complete management of the economic part, the
volost was to be another unit of the local administration, not
connected hierarchically with the economic unit; but in the
end the volost was placed above the village community in many
administrative matters. The elected village functionaries, the
Elders, had to submit in police questions to the volost-chitis
and the volost-boaxds, and together they were subordinate to
various police and administration authorities of the district,
whose orders they had to fulfil without dispute, under the
fear of disciplinary penalties which could be inflicted by the
Peace Mediator at his own initiative or upon complaints of
various officials. In the end the persons elected by the village-
autonomy became virtually petty agents of the district-police;
although chosen by the village communities and volosts they
were responsible not to their electors, but to the " authorities."
This circumstance undermined the principle of self-government
at its root.

ITS ECONOMIC ASPECT

49

We have seen that those defects in the administration were
decisively attacked by the delegates of the first summons. The
Editing Commissions, fearing the ferule of the landowners
over the peasants, objected to having the volost represented by
all classes and remaining independent from the district ad
ministration; but they fell into another extreme, and subjected
the village communities to bureaucratic arbitrariness.
In the economic respect the Editing Commissions consider
ably deviated from the recommendations of the provincial com
mittees, particularly in regard to the norms of the allotments,
the norms of the peasants' obligations for those allotments, and
the question of redemption and compensation. According to
the Act, the peasants were to retain approximately those allot
ments which they had been using in their bondage-state. But
the Commissions regarded the fact that in some places the land
owners gave their peasants larger allotments than were needed >
(because in the industrial, non black-soil provinces land was
of small value) ; while in other regions the landowners gave
their peasants such small allotments that the peasants could
neither subsist on them nor be able to eke out the assessed obrok.
In view of this the Editing Commissions worked out special
norms for the regulation of existing conditions. In every
region there was to be a maximal norm; if peasants on a certain
estate were in possession of more land than was limited by
that norm, the landowner had the right to let them use the'
whole land for additional obligations or he could demand the
cutting off of the surplus. On the other hand minimal norms 1
in the measure of one-third of the maximal norms were estab
lished. Where the peasants' allotments were below that
minimum, the landowner was obliged to add land for the com
pletion of the norm.
In respect to the maximal norms, the size of which naturally
determined the minimal norms, Russia was divided into three
regions: the non black-soil, the black-soil, and the steppes. In

50 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the non black-soil region there were seven possible grades of
norms, from three and a quarter to eight desiatins, so that
there could be maximal allotments of three and a quarter,
three and a half, four, five, six, seven, and eight desiatins. In
the black-soil region were five grades: three, three and a quar
ter, three and a half, four, and four and a half desiatins; in
the region of the steppes were four grades : six and a half, eight
and a half, ten and a half, and twelve desiatins. In establish
ing these norms the Editing Commissions increased about twice
the norms recommended by the provincial committees. In the
course of the Commissions' work they had to take into account
the considerations and protests of the delegates, and decrease
many norms by one-quarter, one-half, and even by whole
desiatins. Later the bargaining affair between Grand Duke
Constantine and Panin further reduced the size of the norms.
But after all the insufficiency of the peasants' allotment was due
not so much to the diminution of the original norms recom
mended by the Editing Commissions, as to the fact that in the
best cases the peasants received those allotments that had been
in their possession during the bondage state, and those allot
ments required only half of their labour, and could not there
fore yield enough for their subsistence and for the fulfilment
of the obligations.
-—In respect to the obligations of the peasants, the Editing
Commissions subdivided Russia into four regions: non black-
soil, industrial (i.e., of the obrok-system) ; non black-soil (of
the barshchina-system) ; black-soil (all of barshchina) ; and the
steppe region. The maximal, or full, obrok, which corre
sponded to the maximum norm of the allotment, was in the
non black-soil industrial region nine rubles per soul, and ten
rubles in the more advantageous places, as those in the vicinity
of the Capitals or in the province of Yaroslavl. In the other
regions the norm was originally estimated to be eight rubles
all over, but in view of the protests of the delegates and of some

PEASANT OBLIGATIONS 51
of the members of the Commissions, the obrok in the black-soil
region had to be raised to nine rubles.
The " full " obrok could be levied only on maximum allot
ments in a given region; smaller allotments were assessed with
lower obroks, but the diminution of the obroks was not made
proportional to the diminution of the size of the allotment. A
special gradational system was accepted for the estimation of
additional desiatins, so that if a peasant had seven desiatins in
a region of an eight desiatin-norm, his nine rubles obrok was di
minished not by one-eighth, but only by fifty-six and two-thirds
copecks. In regions where under the bondage-system the peas
ants had allotments below one-third of the maximal norm,
additional allotments required obroks almost twice above the
norm. For this reason the peasants preferred in such cases
" beggarly " gratuitous allotments to additional land, where
for one-third allotment they had to pay two-thirds obrok. There
were many disturbances in places where landowners refused to
yield to the peasants' demand for gratuitous " quarterly " allot
ments. From the aforesaid we can see what were the allotments re
ceived by the peasants after the liquidation of the bondage,
and what were their obligations. Their allotments were equal
approximately to one-half of the amount of their earning ca
pacity, for in the best cases they received only that land which
they possessed under bondage and which required only three
days' work in a week, the rest of the time being given to barsh-
china. In order to utilise their labour power, the peasants had
either to rent the other half of the land from the landowner,
or to hire themselves to the landowner, or to look for some
side work which would enable them to pay the taxes and the
obroks and to buy such necessaries as their own property could
not supply them with. With the growing density of the popula
tion the dearth of land was felt more and more, rent rose
higher and higher, and the peasant grew poorer and poorer;

52 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
for this reason in the most fertile part of Russia the misery
of the peasants is at the present time the greatest. The peasants
of the black-soil regions, particularly rich in soil, as in the
provinces of Tula or Tambov, live in worse poverty than the
peasants of the provinces of Tver or Yaroslavl, where the land
yields little, but where they earn from industrial occupations.
By the Act of February 19 the peasants received the land
in " perpetual," or as Panin insisted — in " permanent "
utilisation. By voluntary agreements with the landowners
they could eventually redeem their obligations, and receive the
land in personal possession. Not the land but the obligations
were redeemed. Compulsory redemption was rejected both by
Alexander and Rostovtzev who consented only to redemption
by mutual agreement. Yet, as one could have foreseen, the
majority of the landowners had to seek redemption. In the
non black-soil provinces they wished it themselves ; in the black-
soil provinces, especially in the barshchina-estates, the position
of the landowners grew unbearable, for with the abolition of
their authority over the peasants the latter performed their
barshckina very inadequately and evasively, so that those estates
deteriorated considerably. The landowners in the black-soil
regions began to hope for redemption as the only way to settle
with their bondmen. On the whole the redeeming operation
was realised more rapidly than one could have expected, and
it was delayed only in cases where the peasants were unwilling
to meet the offers of the landowners.
Such was the economic side of the reform of February 19
for the peasants and for the landowners. For the gentry
proper the results of the liquidation of bondage were not alike
in all regions. In the black-soil provinces, after the hard
barshchina-period, the landowners retained most of their land,
were able to get cheap labour in view of the dense population
and the absence of non-agricultural occupations. Besides, they
received a compensation which they could employ either for

SUMMARY OF RESULTS 53
the improvement of their estates or for the extinction of their
debts. If they were not inclined to manage their estates, they
could profitably rent their land, since the rentals were very
high on account of the insufficient allotments of the peasants.
But in the non black-soil industrial region the landowners,
having received their compensation, severed in most cases all
connections with their former possessions ; only a few remained
on their estates, and endeavoured to continue agricultural pur
suits. It was difficult to obtain labour hands from a popula
tion that catered to industrial occupations, and the majority of
the landowners sold out their estates, and employed their capital
for industrial purposes, if they did not waste it otherwise.
Thus with the abolition of serfdom industry received new
capital. In conclusion let us say that the chief significance of the
abolition of bondage has lain not only in the enormous economic .
consequences which it bore for the peasantry, gentry, and in
dustry of the country, but still more in the fundamental change
wrought by it in the legal conditions of the Empire. Only
after the abolition of serfdom did all those great reforms that
were promulgated during the Sixties become possible. Only
then could the road for the judiciary reform be cleared. Dur
ing the bondage-system the whole administrative structure was
based on class-principles, with the prevalence of the gentry;
the landowner was the caretaker of everything on his estate,
and the Central authority had confidence in the management
of the "gratuitous chief s-of -police " (Nicolas's expressed idea
of the role of the nobles. Tr.) Now had the bureaucratic
method been feasible, everything should have been rebuilt from
top to bottom; but the bureaucracy did not possess sufficient
power for such a grandiose transformation. Hence the aboli
tion of serfdorn__resulted— in -the introdiietion-fifr local self-
government, in one way or another. Moreover, the Govern
ment seemed -ta-pxefer-a- self-government with no class limita-

54 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
tion to that of the aristocratic gentry whose oligarchic pre
tensions at that moment were more disquieting than democratic
principles. Such were the results for the country of the fall of bondage.

CHAPTER XXIII
IN the preceding chapters I have expounded more or less
fully the entire course of the peasant-reform, and in the
last chapter I analysed the Act of February 19. Now
I shall endeavour to illustrate the influence of those labours
on the development of public thought in various circles, to trace
the differentiation of political views and tendencies that had
taken place in this connection in the press, and to clarify in
passing the influence of the press on the course of the peasant-
reform and the attitude of the Government towards the press.
Finally I intend to sketch the programme for the reorganisation
of various sides of the State life, that had been definitely formu
lated among governmental circles, and also those social demands
which were expressed in 1861 or about 1861 in the progressive
press and in declarations of various social institutions.
We have observed that the position of the press in 1855 was,
very difficult in respect to censorship-conditions. As a matter
of fact, all social and political questions were nearly unmen
tionable for the press; at the same time one should note that/
after the oppression which the Russian public had experienced
during the long reign of Nicolas, particularly during his last
seven years, the public's activity and thought were so stultified
that it was hardly ready for active participation in the great
work that stood before the country.
In spite of the unanimous consciousness of the need for funda
mental reforms, the public indicated very timidly and vaguely
the ways for the realisation of those reforms. The public was
as devoid of a definite plan for practical reorganisations, as
was the Government at the beginning of the reforms. We
55

56 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
have seen that the public regarded the new Tzar very opti-
mistically, and that optimism almost bordered on apathy; every
thing was expected from the higher spheres. This condition
was strengthened by the difficult position of the press in regard
to censorship, the absolute impossibility of expressing with some
freedom views and opinions on social and political questions,
even for those few persons who had such. Even in those
memoranda which had circulated widely and had been pre
sented to the Government, and which were not restricted by
censorship, the demands were expressed very moderately, as we
may see from their formulation in Chernyshevsky's programme
of 1856, which has already been mentioned.
The position of Herzen was quite exceptional not only in
view of his freedom from the censor's oppression, but because
by preparation and equipment he knew contemporary Russia
exceptionally well, so that in some matters he appeared almost
as a prophet. Thus as early as 1853, before the beginning of
the crisis of Nicolas' system, which had opened the eyes even
of ordinary persons, Herzen predicted that the fall of bondage
was " necessary, inevitable, unavoidable," and that it would
occur in the nearest future. Even then Herzen declared his
radical programme for the solution of the peasant-question,
and demanded not only the liberation of the peasants, but
their liberation with all the land which under the bondage-
regime they had been using. Upon the accession of Alexander
II, Herzen decided to found an organ for the expression of
immediate problems of Russian national and social life. In
1855 he began to publish his pamphlets Polar Star, and upon
the establishment of the Unofficial Committee on peasant
affairs, Herzen undertook the publication of a bi-weekly, soon
transformed into a weekly paper — the Bell. The Bell
acquired a great importance; Katkov told Herzen during his
visit to London that the Bell lay on Rostovtzev's desk as a
source of information on the peasant-question. It revealed

THE ATTITUDE OF THE MAGAZINES 57
with an unaccustomed straightforwardness all the sores of
Russian national and social life, pilloried abuses and unsavoury
actions of individual officials mercilessly, and appeared as a
constant menace to the higher functionaries, and as an institu
tion which pushed on the Government and the public, without
letting them stop. Herzen. was often reproached — especially
by Chicherin, in an article published in the Bell — for his nerv
ousness, passionateness, for the unevenness of his judgments, for
his frequent leaps from praising the Government to sharply
condemning its activity. Herzen replied that his platform was
immutable,- that he always stood on the side of the one who
liberated, and as long as he liberated. To a great extent the
leaps in the Bell's attitude towards the Government were due
to the vacillating policy of the latter which in all questions —
except that of peasant-reform — as in the question of the press
or the universities, hesitated and now moved ahead, now re
treated. At any rate, until 1858 Herzen 's Bell was the only
organ where the opinions of the Russian progressives could
be freely expressed, and in this respect he performed a great
service by his stimulating influence on the Government, and
by his activity for the formation of a public opinion in the
country. As to the periodicals published in Russia, their tendencies
and programmes began to differentiate from the year 1 8.58 ,-when
the press was permitted to discuss the peasant-question, and
when the provincial committees were opened; these, although
closed for the public, did not keep their activity in secret,
and gave food for discussion in the provinces and in the
Capitals. The Contemporary, directed by Chernyshevsky and Dobro-
liubov, was the first to move sharply to the left. The Con
temporary was published, as in the time of Nicolas, by Panaiev
and Niekrasov, but they were not the influential leaders of the
organ. After the death, in 1848, of its leading contributor,

58 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Bielinsky, in the period of suffocating reaction all the
best literary forces of that time, the so-called writers of the
Forties, who professed the views of Bielinsky in his last years,
were united in the magazine. But the writers who expressed
the aspirations of the best part of Russian society in the Forties
were liberals, not radicals. Alongside with them, however,
began to appear in the pages of the Contemporary representa
tives of the young generation, at first in the~~person of
Chernyshevsky, who being older than Dobroliubov, Pisarev,
and the other Men of the Sixties, had begun his career in the
Fifties; then in the person of young Dobroliubov who began
to write in 1857 at the age of twenty, and manifested at once
unusual gifts and an extraordinary independence of views.
In 1858 Chernyshevsky^ took over the department of economics
and peasant-problems, and gave Dobroliubov the position of
literary critic, which iiT the "-thick " magazines of that time
had a great importance, as it included all publicistic discussions
and much wider tasks than the title implied. The manager of
the critical department occupied a role similar to that of the
leader in a chorus, or that of the first violin in an orchestra,
and such was the role of young Dobroliubov who did not long
remain under the instructorship of Chernyshevsky, but soon
became his equal colleague and friend. By his views he was
an heir not only to Bielinsky and to the radical critics of the
Forties, but he proceeded further, and appeared as the first
herald of populistic (narodnichestvo) principles and ideals in
Russian critique.
The young leaders of the Contemporary soon collided with
the representatives of the older generation on the magazine:
Turgeniev, Grigorovich, Goncharov, and other novelists of the
Forties, who were joined by the recently discovered Tolstoy.
Dobroliubov soon began to feel dissatisfied with the develop
ment and tendency of Russian Progress, and with ardent
passion he expressed his impatience and discontent. He

DOBROLIUBOV AND CHERNYSHEOSKY 59
considered that timid and moderate Progress as treading on
one and the same place; he spoke with contempt of the evasive
and vague revealments of Russian sores and abuses in the press.
Both he and Chernyshevsky were bitterly disappointed in
the nobles whose class egoism was manifested in the activities
of the provincial committees; Chernyshevsky, who in February,
1858, praised Alexander, and in April wrote complimentary
notes about the liberal landowners, changed his tone by the
end of the year. About that time a pause came in the press-
discussion of the peasant-question. When in April, 1858,
Chernyshevsky published in the Contemporary a continuation
of his article " On New Conditions of Village Life," and
quoted at length Kavelin's project which in 1856 circulated
freely and was known to the Government, that article appeared
very dangerous in the eyes of the Government by its advocating
the transfer of the land to the peasants through redemption.
The Main Committee considered it an impertinence, and by
its request a circular was issued forbidding the discussion in
the press of the questions of redemption and votchina-authority.
The circular and the persecution of Kavelin made a depressing
impression on the Contemporary and on the other representa
tives of the progressive press. Katkov (then a liberal) demon
stratively discontinued the department on peasant-questions in
his Russian Messenger; the publishers of Village Well-Being,
a magazine started by the Slavophiles mainly with Koshelev's
money, were about to close it forever. This did not last long,
however. We know that the Government's views changed in 1
regard to the redemption question; in the fall of 1858 it per-!
mitted again a more or less free discussion of the peasant- \
problem. Then (at the end of 1858 and particularly early "
in 1859) Chernyshevsky began to write extremely virulent
articles against the selfishness of the landowners, their greedy
aspirations and extraordinary appetites, which he had been
shown by the works of the provincial committees. He recom-

60 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
mended such radical ways for the solution of the problem that
they appeared absolutely inacceptable to the Government and
as spelling utter ruin for the landowners.
At the same time Dobroliubov reached the apogee in his
attacks on the weakness and vagueness of the liberalism of the
nobles, and on the cowardice and mildness of Russian pro
gressives. Such were his articles on Shchedrin's Provincial
Sketches, and on Goncharov's Oblomov. When Herzen read
his famous "What is Oblomovism?" he thought the Con
temporary had gone too far, and that it required restraint.
During 1859-1860 articles appeared in the Bell that warned
the Contemporary, and defended the liberalism of the nobles
from the attacks of Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov. Thus
the Contemporary occupied in 1858-1859 a position more
radical than that -of Herzen 's paper.
The main representative of the liberal, or rather the liberal-
democratic current was Katkov's Russian Messenger which
sided with the views of Unkovsky and the Tver liberals.
Katkov was at that time perhaps the most consistent and firm
upholder of liberalism, and an opponent of any governmental
ferule. To a certain degree the same tendency was pursued
by Kraievsky's Annals of the Fatherland, but the editor,
/ Dudyshkin, was a weak publicist, and had no influence.
Druzhinin's " thick " monthly, Library for Reading, intended
to become an organ of English constitutional Toryism, so to
speak, i.e., it hoped to create an enlightened conservative party
which would endeavour to promulgate certain liberal reforms
and then instead of constantly moving forward, reduce its tasks
to the conservation of the positions won. That magazine
lacked talents, and was unable to play the role it had intended
to. The Slavophile views were expressed in a periodical Russian
Discourse which appeared irregularly. In 1857 the Slavophiles
issued a newspaper Rumour, but the censorship conditions

SLAVOPHILE PUBLICATIONS 61
were then very hard, and the paper was discontinued by the
end of the year. Ivan Aksakov, who was forbidden in 1852
to be editor or even to publish his writings, received a permis
sion in 1859 for a newspaper, Sails, but his tone was so sharp
that publication was stopped on the second number.
In general the Slavophiles occupied a quite peculiar position.
On one hand, they appeared as conservatives par excellence,
and even as reactionaries; in some respects they wished to turn
Russia back to pre-Petrine times. In their eyes Peter's reforms
which had drafted Western civilisation upon Russian life were
a distortion of Russia's natural peculiarities, and they demanded
a return to ancient times. The Slavophiles idealised the old
ages, when the Government did not interfere with social, com
munal, or private life, and advocated Orthodoxy and Autocracy
as necessary foundations of Russian life. They understood
under Orthodoxy a church free from external influence and
service to the state, and absolutely rejected the official Ortho
doxy of the present. In regard to Autocracy they stood on
the platform expressed by Constantine Aksakov in his letter
to Alexander II : The power of authority belongs to the Tzar,
but the power of opinion — to the people. In this respect their
views were quite radical; for instance, they demanded not an
alleviation of the position of the press, but complete, .freedom
of speech, and in religious questions they demanded unlimited
freedom of conscience and creed. They did not admit in
private or communal life any regulation or interference on the
part of the state. They expressed their ideas sharply and
radically, and for this reason were unable to promulgate them
through the press. Their only successful attempt was the
magazine Village Well-Being, published for one year at the
Library for Reading, with the co-operation of Koshelev,
Samarin, and Cherkassky. It printed articles exclusively on
peasant-problems, mostly written by progressive members of the
provincial committees. Chernyshevsky and Dobroliubov ad-

I

62 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
mitted that outside of the Contemporary the Village Well-
Being was the only honest publication, although they often
opposed its views. In Moscow another magazine appeared
devoted exclusively to the peasant-question, the Landowners'
Journal, edited by Zheltukhin ; most of its articles were written
by representatives of black-soil provinces, and therefore advo
cated landless liberation of the peasants. Professor Vernad-
sky's magazine, Economical Indicator, stood in principle- fo*. the
interests, of big landownership, and advocated pure Manchester-
ism. It was an academic publication, and the public knew
about it only from Chernyshevsky's sharp attacks upon its
articles. During that period, between 1859 and 1861, when the
process of the differentiation in the tendencies of the press took
place, the freedom of the press grew in spite of the unrelenting
censorship; newspapers and magazines became bolder and
widened the sphere of their interests, so that by 1861 the press
actually discussed all social and political questions of the day.
We must say that the very contingent of the questions had
expanded considerably. During the first five years of Alex
ander's reign the public consciousness made big strides, and
had gained initiative and definiteness of purpose. In connec
tion with the peasant reform there emerged concomitant ques
tions concerning local self-government, judicial reorganisation
and jury-trials, publicity and freedom of speech, and numerous
other questions regarding culture, education, and the satisfac
tion of the economic and industrial needs of the rejuvenated
country. Those questions were formulated in projects of
provincial committees, in speeches and addresses of delegates
to the provincial assemblies in i860, and were echoed in the
press. In Voices from Russia Herzen published parallel with the
Bell memoranda and projects which could not be published
in Russia; there we may see the growth and development of

THE PROGRESSIVES 63
the plans for reorganisation. In the end of i860 appeared the
ninth and last number of Voices from Russia, in which along
side with the " Political Will " written by Rostovtzev before
his death for Alexander, was published an unsigned memo
randum about the desirable course of the peasant-reform. The
publishers of the Bell asserted that had the Editing Commis
sions followed the direction of the author of that memorandum,
Russia would have had a true, not pseudo-liberation of the
peasants. The Bell's admonition came too late, for the Com
missions had been already closed. The Bell expressed, how
ever, its general satisfaction with the activity of the Commis
sions, and even said a good word about the deceased Rostovtzev
whom it had pursued for years.
The memorandum, which for some considerations I am in
clined to ascribe to N. A. Serno-Solovievich, had at the end a
programme which formulated the views of the most progressive
groups of that time.
" In conclusion," wrote the author, " let us indicate the main
demands of public opinion, demands not only perfectly legal,
but very moderate, for they are practised in all somewhat
enlightened states:
1. The liberation of the peasants with land.
2. Equality of all before the courts and the law.
3. Complete separation of the judiciary power from the ad
ministrative ; jury-courts.
4. Reorganisation of the police.
5. Responsibility of all administrative organs, beginning with
the ministers.
6. Right of verification of the collection and expenditure
of taxes.
7. Right of control over the issue of new laws.
8. Freedom of conscience and creed.
9. Freedom of the press.
10. The abolition of the Contract-Monopoly, and the re-

64 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
vision of the laws oppressing commerce, industry, and national
labour. n. Abolition of civil ranks.
12. Full amnesty for all sufferers for political convictions.
" The last eleven points are a natural consequence of the
first — the abolition of serfdom. In foreign words, it is a
constitution ; in Russian — it means a regulated order."
As a matter of fact, there was no constitution in the pro
gramme; neither a representative government, nor legal guar
antees are mentioned there, but it offers a broad liberal, and
in some features, radical reorganisation of the state. From
that plan we can see how far public opinion outgrew the
programmes of the Government.
Such were the desiderata of the progressive groups at the
moment of the fall of bondage. The fact that those demands
had outgrown the offers of the Government brought about
new relations between the public and the Government of Alex
ander II, relations quite different from those that existed at
his accession. Now there was no longer the older perfect and
unanimous confidence in the Government; on the contrary,
the governmental activity aroused scepticism and mistrust, in
spite of its progressive tendencies and desire to place the public
initiative before that of the Government. At the moment of
the emancipation of the peasants, the entente cordiale which
had existed between the public and the Government at the
beginning of the reform, vanished entirely. The declaration
of freedom in March, 1861, dissatisfied not only the radical
circles of society, but first of all — the peasants.

CHAPTER XXIV
WHILE the reform was in preparation the peasants
had patiently awaited for four years the decision
of their fate. Many times during that period
when the enemies of the reform tried to frighten Alexander
with probable peasant disturbances, the Tzar did not believe
them, pointing out their general calmness. Until the moment
of the publication of the Act there reigned an unusual calm
among the peasants. But as soon as the Act was solemnly
declared from church pulpits, and copies of it were given out
to every landowner and every village community, there began
that fermentation among the peasants which the enemies of
the reform had long before predicted.
In the majority of the_ districts- no-measures were taken for
the proper explanation of the Act to the, peasants. Only in
a very few places which had enlightened governors, such as
Artzimovich of Kaluga, care was taken to help the peasants
orient themselves in the sense of the Act. But even in such
places the publication of the Manifesto aroused misunderstand
ings on the part of the landowners and the peasants. The
peasants had patiently waited four years expecting that in the
end they would receive " full freedom," which meant in their
eyes the immediate fall of the landowners' power, and the grant
ing to the peasants without any compensation not only of the
lands which they had been using under the bondage-order, but
also of the land of the landowners to whom the Tzar would
pay "salary" for it. When the Act of February 19 was
issued, and the peasants saw that for an indefinite time the
65

66 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
obligations were retained — barshchina or obrok — , that in
some cases their land might be diminished, that they had to
be bound to their masters until the redemption was accom
plished, that redemption could be realised only upon mutual
agreement by both sides, — the peasants came to the conclusion
that it was not at all the freedom which they had been expect
ing; they decided that the Tzar could not have given them
such a freedom, that the landowners had concealed the " real
freedom " and published a " forged freedom." On this basis
a number of disturbances and riots arose. Foreseeing the pos
sibility of such events, the Government had commissioned to
all provinces prominent generals who were given the power
of governor-generals for extraordinary cases; at the slightest
sign of disturbances these special authorities had the right to
employ all means for the suppression of the unrest, including
the right to command military forces, and charge at the people.
Thus it came to pass that when the peasants, considering the
declared freedom as " forged," and at times trying to read
into the Act of February 19 what they had been hoping for,
refused to perform barshchina and pay obrok and other obli
gations to the landowners, the Generals displayed their power
in one way or another. Where the Generals happened to be
better disposed or more reasonable, or where the peasants were
more peacefully inclined, peace was restored by mere persuasion.
But in a number of places bloodshed took place. In the village
of Bezdna, province of Penza, the peasants, led by a fanatical
defender of the people's rights, their fellow-villager, Anton
Petrov, were greatly disturbed; in the end General Apraksin
ordered the troops to fire at them, which resulted, according
to the greatly underrated official figures, in fifty-five dead and
seventy wounded. The students of the Kazan university,
under the leadership of the young Professor Shchapov, had
a requiem served for the dead of Bezdna. Alexander person
ally dictated a resolution by which the monks who had

THE PEACE MEDIATORS 67
officiated at that mass were to be exiled to Solovki, and
Shchapov was to be brought to Petrograd. It was the first
instance of the manifestation of dissatisfaction on the part of
the democratic layers of the people, and of corresponding
repressions on the part of the Government.
At that time a significant change had taken place in the
upper spheres, in the very department which was to carry
through the reform. As a concession to the landowners who
were grieved by the peasant reform, Minister of Interior
Lanskoy and his closest assistant, Miliutin, were dismissed from
their posts, although in a gracious manner: Lanskoy was
granted the title of Count, and Miliutin was promoted to
the rank of Senator, with the right to go abroad. Valuiev,V
who had been known as an opponent to the reform and to the
character of the work of the Editing Commissions, was ap
pointed Minister. During the discussion of the question in the
Main Committee he assisted the enemies of the project of the
Editing Commissions, Minister of State Domains Muraviov,
and Chief of Gendarmes Dolgorukov, for whom he worked
out a special memorandum.
Now Valuiev declared that he considered his task " the
strict and exact realisation of the acts of February 19, but in
a conciliatory way." As a matter of fact he soon revealed his
purpose of working into the hands of the landowners, not
scrupling even about twisting and misinterpreting the law.
The carrying through of the reform was placed in the hands
of Peace Mediators, their District Conferences, and Provincial
Peasant Boards. Before his dismissal Lanskoy had sent out
an important circular to the Governors, instructing them about
the selection of adequate persons as Peace Mediators. He
pointed out that since the Governors were to appoint the Medi
ators from among nobles recommended by the nobles them
selves, they should be very cautious in the selection, admitting
to that post only persons known for their sense of justice and

68 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
friendliness towards the peasants, and who would be apt to
enjoy the confidence of the peasants. Indeed, the best inclined
Governors, whose numbers were considerably increased during
Lanskoy's administration, had made a successful selection of
Peace Mediators. In general one must say that the Peace
Mediators of the first summons had left an excellent memory
as just and devoted workers. In view of their quite inde
pendent position — they could be dismissed only after a trial
by the order of the Senate which confirmed their appointments
— they were not subordinate to the provincial or central
authorities, and were in a position to follow the law and decide
cases according to their conscience. In many places they came
into collision with the interests of big and influential land
owners ; the latter complained to Valuiev who came out in their
defence, but he suffered a decisive fiasco, owing to the ener
getic resistance of the Peace Mediators to the attempted pres
sure on the part of the Government. Irritated by his failure,
Valuiev launched a special campaign against the Mediators,
attempting to force their subordination through the Provincial
Boards. Failing in bringing them under his influence or dis
charging them, he tried to decrease their number through the
Provincial Boards, under the pretext of economy, naturally
leaving out of the staff the most stubborn of them. But the
Peace Mediators were willing to sacrifice their material inter
ests, and they declared that if it was a question of economy
they were ready to receive a half or a third of their salary,
provided their number remained intact, as otherwise they would
not be able to accomplish the work within the appointed two
years. Thus Valuiev failed even in his last stratagem. It
was much easier for him to press upon the Governors, for they
depended upon him to a great extent, and as a matter of fact
those Governors who had honestly followed the Act of Feb
ruary 19 were either dismissed or " promoted " against their
will to the Senate. After all, however, the Act of February

PISAREV AND NIHILISM 69
19 was carried out in most cases in its correct way, thanks to
the firmness of the Peace Mediators.
Yet in spite of this the changes in the spheres, which ap
peared to all as a sign of concessions to the reactionaries, the
substitution of Lanskoy by Valuiev, Valuiev's policy, and also
the bloody events and the suppression of the disturbances in
the spring of 1861 — all these contributed to the general indig
nation of the intelligentzia, reflected partly in the tendencies
of the press.
About that time the most radical organs were joined by
another magazine, the Russian Word, founded in 1859 by
Count Kushelev. During- its-Jurst two years it had no sig
nificance, but from 1861 Pisarev the twenty-year-old publicist
who appeared in the literary arena with as much brilliance and
force as Dobroliubov, set its tone. Dobroliubov died in No
vember, 1 86 1, at the age of twenty-five, having inscribed his
name indelibly in the history of Russian literature. While
the Contemporary was a political and social organ par ex
cellence, and represented in those questions the most radical
groups of the public, the Russian Word was the organ of the
Nihilists* using that term in the sense introduced about that
time by Turgeniev (in his novel, "Fathers and Children").
One of that generation, still living with us, Prince P. A. :
Kropotkin, characterises that movement as " the struggle for
I individuality " ; the foremost purpose was the liberation of the
I individual fronr-the- aged jconyentions and prejudices, from the
fchains of family, society, and religion. | Pisarev considered the
' spread of natural science and the dissemination of the conclu
sions of science one of the main means leading to that aim,
supposing not without reason that it would be the best weapon
in the struggle with the prejudices and superstitions that had
entangled the old order of Russian life. He attacked all au
thorities mercilessly, and for this reason, although he paid little
attention to political questions, considering that the liberation

70 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of personality should in itself be a panacea against all evils
in life, his destructive tendencies and passionate struggle with
all sorts of authorities appeared more dangerous in the eyes of
the Government than the socialistic tendencies of the Con
temporary. The propaganda of the Contemporary and of the
Russian Word began to arouse the apprehensions not only of
the Government, but also of the moderate progressives among
the social workers of that time.
As to the nobles, they were divided as before into two wings.
-One represented the oligarchic-pro-serfdom group, who now,
• after the abolition of serfdom, were mainly occupied with the
, question of the compensation which the gentry desired to receive
from the Government in order to maintain its prevalence in
the country. The representatives of that current saw such a
compensation in the expansion of the political rights of the
nobles only, without a corresponding expansion of the rights
of other classes, for which reason we may call that current
oligarchical. The other wing of the oppositional gentry rep
resented a liberal-democratic current, largely based on the
ideology of the progressive nobles who had manifested their
ideas in the declarations of the Tver provincial committee,
during the assemblies of the nobles in 1859, and through their
delegates in the Editing Commissions. Their ideas were at
that time popular largely among wide strata of the nobles-
landowners in the industrial non black-soil provinces. Later
N. K. Mikhailovsky gave them the characteristic name of
" repentant nobles."
The oligarchic current found considerable support in the
Ministry of Interior, whose head, Valuiev, was ready to extend
some compensation to the nobles. Acting in this direction, he
tried on one hand to change the projected zemstvo-seli-govem-
ment to accord with more aristocratic principles, and on the
other hand he declared himself in 1863 in favour of granting
the nobles some participation in the Government, if not of

THE TVER RESOLUTION 71
a legislative, at least of a consultative character. During the
Polish uprising Valuiev presented a report to the Tzar, in
which he asserted that in view of the loyal and patriotic senti
ments of the Russian nobility, they should be given an advan
tage over the Polish nobility who were soliciting the
restoration of the Constitution of 18 15.
The views of the liberal-democratic group soon found a
brilliant expression in the famous Tver incident which took
place early in 1862.
The oppositional current of the liberal-democratic character
was manifested in 1861, as it had been since the very beginning
of the peasant-reform, most acutely in the province of T-vex_
where the most conscious representatives of that movement were
found. After the emancipation of the peasants the Russian
nobles prepared to demand the organisation of land-credit for
the nobles. The nobility of Tver considered that question
inflated, properly speaking, conditioned by the fact that the
peasant-reform had not been solved by paying the landowners at
once the compensation sum which would be sufficient for the
hiring of labour and for reasonable improvements. But if me
liorative credit was to be considered necessary, it was necessary
not only for the nobles, but for all agriculturists, of all classes,
including the peasants. The Tver nobles regarded the discus
sion of that question possible only in conjunction with the other
needs of the moment, which originated in the questions aroused,
but not solved, by the peasant-reform. The Tver assembly '
found the following reforms necessary for the establishment of
a regulated and well organised private credit : 1 ) The reor
ganisation of the financial system of the State in the sense that
it should depend upon the people, not upon lawless wilfulness;
2) the establishment of independent and public courts; 3) the
introduction of full publicity in all branches of the administra
tion, without which there could be no confidence in the Gov
ernment, and consequently in the firmness of the existing order

72 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of the State; 4) the abolition of antagonism among classes.
Upon the realisation of these reforms, the question of credit, in
the opinion of the Tver nobles, would be solved by itself, with
out the interference of the State and without the aid of the State
treasury. The resolution of the Tver nobility further de
clared : " The nobles, being profoundly convinced of the neces
sity of doing away with inter-class antagonism, and desiring
to dismiss every possibility of being reproached for forming
an obstacle to the common good, declare before all Russia that
they abdicate from all their class-privileges . . . and do not
consider an infringement of their rights the obligatory allot
ment of the peasants with land in property, with the compen
sation of the landowners by the aid of the State."
The concluding point of that resolution was of particular
significance, for it corresponded perfectly with the ideas of the
most radical groups of the intelligentzia, as expressed by
Chernyshevsky in his " Letters with no address," written by
him a few weeks after the Tver assembly, but published only
in 1874 m the periodical Forward issued abroad by Lavrov.
" The realisation of these reforms," declared the resolution
of the Tver nobility, " is impossible by means of governmental
measures, as our social life has been managed until now. Even
supposing the full readiness of the Government for promulgat
ing the reforms, the nobles are deeply convinced that the Gov
ernment is not in a position to accomplish them. The free
institutions towards which these reforms lead must emanate
from fhe people, otherwise they will be only a dead letter, and
will place the public in a still more tense position. For this
reason the nobles are not appealing to the Government with
a request for carrying out these reforms, but, considering its
incompetency in this matter, they are merely indicating the
road which it should enter for the salvation of itself and of
the public. This road is an assembly of men elected by the
whole nation, without difference of class."

THE TVER ADDRESS 73
On such a radical platform the nobility now stood! In
accordance with those resolutions an address was dictated to
Alexander. It reiterated the need for an obligatory redemp
tion, and in regard to the question of the class privileges, the
nobles wrote: "By virtue of class privileges the nobles have
been exempt until now from the fulfilment of the most im
portant social duties. Sire, we consider it a deadly sin to live*
and make use of the benefits of the social order at the expense
of other classes. The order of things is unjust, under which
the poor man pays a ruble, while the rich man does not pay
a copeck. This could have been tolerated only under the
bondage-system, but now it puts us in the position of parasites,
utterly useless to our country. We do not wish to enjoy any
longer such a disgraceful privilege, and we do not accept the
responsibility for its further existence. We most loyally beg
your Imperial Majesty to allow us to take over part of the
State taxes and obligations according to our status.
" Besides property privileges we enjoy the exclusive right
of supplying men for the administration of the people; at pres
ent we consider the exclusiveness of this right lawless, and
we beg that it be extended to all classes."
Indicating further the lack of mutual understanding between
the Government and the public, the representatives of the latter
thus concluded their requests:
" The general disorder serves as the best proof that the
reforms demanded by the most urgent needs can not be realised
in a bureaucratic way. Even we do not pretend to speak for
the whole nation, in spite of the fact that we stand nearer to
it, and we firmly believe that good intentions are in themselves
insufficient not only for the satisfaction, but even for the indica
tion of the national needs; we are convinced that all reforms
remain unsuccessful because they are being undertaken without
the opinion and the knowledge of the people.
" The summons of men elected by all Russia is the only

74 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
means for a satisfactory solution of the problems aroused, but*
not solved, by the Act of February 19."
Compare these resolutions and their tone with the declara
tion of Unkovsky, or with the resolutions of the same Tver
nobility in 1859, and you will see how far during a year and
a half that nobility had shifted to the left, and how much more
aggressive its democratic tone had become. They emphasised
that the question did not so much concern the promulgation of
liberal reforms and the improvement of the existing order of
things, as the way in which those reforms should be carried
out, and to how great an extent the representatives — not of
society, but of the people proper, would participate in carrying
them out.
When the resolutions and the address were made public,
Valuiev, who had constantly upheld the privileges and rights
of the nobles, dared not even raise the question of the legality
of such resolutions. Formally the nobles were entitled to the
right of expressing their opinions about their needs, and
although the declaration concerned the fundamental reorgan
isation of the order of the state, still it could be construed as
emanating from the discussion of the position and needs of
the nobility. But Valuiev found a way for punishing, if not
the Tver nobles as a whole, at least those of their representa
tives of the most progressive elements, who had been elected
Peace Mediators by the nobles and confirmed by the Senate.
Those Peace Mediators were the initiators of the whole affair,
and after the transmission of the address to the Tzar they
came together at the regular Provincial Assembly of Peace
Mediators, and declared that since the nobles had formulated
their views, the assembled Mediators would in their further
activity be guided not by the orders of the Government, but by
the views of the public. In this case one could certainly find
infringement of the order and of the service-duty. Valuiev
utilised that circumstance, had the thirteen Peace Mediators

ECHOES OF THE ADDRESS 75
who signed the declaration arrested, brought to Petrograd, and
imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. After a con
finement of five months they were tried by the Senate and
sentenced to two years' imprisonment with the deprivation of
certain rights and privileges. The Governor-General of Petro
grad, Prince Suvorov, interceded, however, before the Tzar,
and the accused were set free; they were deprived of certain
service-rights, but these were restored to all who later petitioned
for them.
The Tver movement was echoed in other places. In general
the idea of the need of constitutional guarantees and a repre
sentative order spread widely among the nobility and the in
telligentzia. Herzen supported that idea in his Bell in special
articles, and through the project of a general address proposed
by Ogarev. One must say that Ogarev's address was consider
ably less democratic in its demands than that of the Tver
nobility, due to the fact that Ogarev had intended to unite for
signing the address different layers of the nobility, even the
section which was more oligarchically than democratically
inclined. Turgeniev, a close friend of the publishers of the
Bell, disapproved of Ogarev's project, indicating that the Bell
was wrong in attacking the Act of February 19, since the peas
antry had accepted the Act as a symbol of their freedom and
would consider its opponents their enemies. He objected both
to the_contents of the address and to the timeliness of the
moment for its .presentation. He recommended the working
out of an adequate address for the moment when the statutes
concerning the 2iewz.f^o-self-government would be published;
by that time it appeared certain that Valuiev would in a great
measure distort the projects of the Editing Commissions regard
ing local self-government.
Other persons of the liberal-democratic camp regarded the
address with similar hostility. Kavelin, for instance, pointed
out that the country had not as yet prepared the necessary ele-

76 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ments for the realisation of a constitutional order, that the
constitution would exist only on paper, or would become aristo
cratic, the more so since the matter was considered from the
point of view of recompensing the landowners for their losses
on account of the peasant-reform. Kavelin, as many others
among the intelligentzia and among governmental circles,
looked upon the zemstvo as a school for the preparation and
training of political workers ; he considered well organised local
self-government as the only way out for the moment.
Samarin occupied a nearly similar position. He protested
in a letter to Ivan Aksakov, the publisher of the newspaper
Day, against the movement of writing constitutional addresses.
Aksakov did not publish that letter for fear that Samarin would
make many unnecessary enemies among the public; besides,
Aksakov predicted that the addresses would have no success.
It is curious that Samarin did not come out from the customary
Slavophile opposition to any constitution, but, like Kavelin,
claimed that at that moment the people were not ripe for a
constitution, that "we cannot yet have a popular constitution,
while a non-popular constitution, i.e., a rule of the minority
acting without authority in the name of the majority, is a lie
and a fraud." He argued that under such a constitution
centralisation would develop, and Petrograd would stifle Russia.
In his opinion Russia needed at that moment various liberatory
reforms, the liberation of the public from the despotism of the
administration, an independent judiciary, absolute religious
toleration, freedom of the press, the reorganisation of the taxes
in a direction favourable for the people, the development of
education, the limiting of the unproductive expenditures of the
Treasury and the Court — all these measures Samarin con
sidered realisable under an autocratic regime.
We have seen what the tendencies of the peasants, of the
nobility, and of the intelligentzia were in 1861. I wish to
touch now upon the characterisation of the commercial-indus-

THE MERCHANTS AND MANUFACTURERS 77
trial milieu. The merchants and manufacturers of that period
presented that " dark kingdom " which Ostrovsky depicted so
strongly in his comedies (Dobroliubov wrote in this connection
his famous critical article, "Dark Tzardom"). But even in
that milieu there appeared many flashes of progressive ideas,
and aspirations to get out of the darkness.
Even during the Crimean Campaign an extraordinary en-
livenment took place in the commercial-industrial circles. The
war contracts, the new issues of assignations which artificially
inspired business-transactions, the liberal perspectives of the
new reign — all these combined to account for the appearance
of numerous undertakings, trade-companies, stock companies,
etc. The Government, in contrast to the oppressions of the
preceding reign, regarded them liberally, from the laissez-faire
point of view. The spread of the movement was caused by
the issue of large quantities of money by the Treasury, as I
have mentioned ; besides, by some strange financial combination,
the Government decided at that moment to decrease the inter
est paid on deposits in governmental credit-institutions;
naturally the deposits were withdrawn, and their owners tried
to boom new undertakings in order to invest their capital.
Still greater enlivenment was expected from the building of
new railroads and from the completion of those already begun.
Commercial and industrial activities had developed sud
denly with extraordinary force, out of proportion to the needs
and actual possibilities of the moment; the flourishing of com
merce and industry in a country which was utterly drained by
the war, and had been economically bleeding, was abnormal and
could not endure long: indeed, after about three years after
the war a number of failures took place. Many undertakings
which had attracted savings of long years began to collapse,
because their conception had not been in accord with the actual
needs of the country. Failures were enhanced by the universal
industrial crisis of 1857-1858, brought about by changes in the

78 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
means of production. Although the building of railroads began
at that time, the Government gave the work over to foreign
capitalists, so that Russian capitalists were forced to invest
their capital in more or less ephemeral undertakings.
Naturally the very fact of transferring such colossal under
takings as the building of railroads into the hands of foreigners
aroused dissatisfaction and opposition among industrial circles,
and their aggravation grew under the influence of the crisis
and the fall of the course of the paper-money. Hence we may
understand the alliance that was manifested in the years of the
crises between the oppositional merchants and the radical
intelligentzia, and the sympathy which the commercial-indus
trial circles began for the first time to show for various organs
of the progressive press.
The majority of the conscious representatives of the com
mercial-industrial circles sincerely welcomed the peasant-
reform both because they had always been antagonistic towards
the nobles, and also because capitalistic undertakings could not
exist without a sufficient amount of free labour, and the aboli
tion of serfdom undoubtedly promised a considerable amount
of such labour in the near future.
The abolition of bondage, combined with the building of
new roads of communication, created an advantageous con
juncture for Russian capitalism. Hence the conscious elements
among the industrialists were progressively inclined and sym
pathised with the early liberal measures of the Government;
but they soon grew disappointed in the activity of the Govern
ment, which in many cases was directed against their interests.
From the end of the Fifties individual representatives of the
commercial-industrial class began to appear, who astonished
their contemporaries with their unexpected independence and
enterprise not only in commercial but also in social affairs.
For instance, Kokorev, a famous contractor who had mani
fested great enterprise and thoughtfulness in the peasant-

THE PROGRESSIVE MERCHANTS 79
question, actively interfered with the redemption-question, and
was the first to point out those means which could be under
taken to aid the Government, in case it should decide to
choose the road of obligatory redemption. Kokorev was
closely connected with all the progressive and liberal repre
sentatives of the public and the press, and enjoyed a great
prestige in the Moscow liberal circles. Katkov and Pogodin,
and even Herzen in his Bell, praised him greatly. During
the time of the first censorship-repressions in 1858, when the
press was forbidden to discuss redemption and other problems,
and the liberal Moscow censor, N. F. Kruze, was discharged
the Moscow authors collected about fifty thousand rubles, not
without the aid of Kokorev, for Kruze. The progressive mer
chants even in the provinces willingly contributed money for
educational purposes, as for woman-gymnasia, and in other
ways manifested their sympathy with enlightenment and
progress.

CHAPTER XXV
THE Government watched with great alarm the de
velopment of the general opposition and radicalism;
it was particularly worried by the revolutionary
proclamations which appeared in 1861, some of which were
printed abroad, and some, in Russia. The revolutionary spirit
in those proclamations grew very rapidly; the first widely dis
tributed sheet, the Great Russian, in whose composition
Chernyshevsky, Serno-Solovievich, and other persons of the
Contemporary circle took part, still stood on a liberal-demo
cratic platform, and its contents were not as sharp as the reso
lution of the Tver nobility. But as early as the fall of 1861
there appeared a proclamation, " To the Young Generation,"
ascribed to the poet M. L. Mikhailov, which alongside with
extremely naive demands, such as the complete abolition of
any police, secret as well as open, definitely threatened the
Dynasty, declaring that if the Dynasty would not carry through
the reforms that were needed, the question of its deposition
would arise; it further asserted that Russia was in need not
of a monarch, but of an elected, salaried Elder, who would
serve the people — thus manifesting a republican spirit, al
though the establishment of a republic was not put forth as
a practical task of the near future.
In 1862 appeared a proclamation, ".Young-JJjissia," which
appealed directly for a bloody revolution, sociaL as. well as
political, and which was written in an unusually ferocious,
Marat-like tone. It divided all Russia into two parts: the
party of the people," and the party of ..the. Ernperor, and as all
those who did not sympathise with the revolution were con
sidered as belonging to the party of the Emperor, they were
80

"YOUNG RUSSIA" 1862 81
to be slaughtered and exterminated everywhere; the axe and
fire were advocated with enthusiasm. The author of that
proclamation was a young student, Zaichnevsky, who was soon
caught distributing the " Golden Charter " in the state of
his father (a general), and was exiled to Siberia. The proc
lamation produced a grave impression, although the matter
was not so serious, coming as it did from two young men
behind whom there was no party. The Government also at
tributed to it an exaggerated importance, the more so since
at that time numerous conflagrations occurred in Petrograd,
which threw the population into a panic. It undoubtedly was
the work of incendiaries who announced their purpose in
advance, and devastated whole quarters. Some ascribed the
conflagrations to students, some to Poles, but it is curious that
not one of the incendiaries was caught. That it was the
work of young revolutionists, is hard to believe; that Polish
emissaries did the work appeared more probable subsequently,
when in 1863 the cynic proclamation of General Mieroslavsky
was discovered which recommended similar extreme measures
for the increase of disturbances in Russia, since general unrest
was considered an important prop for the success of the Polish
insurrection. But no definite facts have ever been discovered
for the confirmation of such propositions. Prince Kropotkin
suggested in his memoirs that the conflagrations in many places
(the city of Simbirsk and other Volga towns were burned)
were the work of the reactionary party, as provocative acts. If
his suggestion is correct, one must admit that the work was
cleverly carried through, as the guilt for the conflagrations was
in the end laid at the doors of Russian or Polish revolutionists,
and this circumstance produced a natural rift in the progressive
ranks. It doubtless served as the first cause for the turning
away of a considerable part of Russian society from progressive
aspirations, owing to the terrorising influence of such revolu
tionary actions.

82 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The Government in its turn reacted upon those occurrences
very severely. In the first place it began to arrest all who
distributed the proclamations, and soon caught their alleged
authors. M. L. Mikhailov, the author of " To the Young
Generation," was arrested. The Government began to perse
cute those who had any relations with Herzen abroad, although
before it had regarded visits to Herzen quite liberally (among
those visitors had been persons of high standing in the Court
circles). In 1 861-1862 many such persons were arrested;
among them were representatives of the progressive press:
Chernyshevsky, Serno-Solovievich, and soon after, Pisarev (for
writing a ferocious article for an underground publication).
The Senate, before which they appeared for trial, sentenced
them severely, often disregarding the law, and being guided
exclusively by inner conviction. Chernyshevsky was sentenced
to fourteen years of hard labour for the alleged authorship of
a proclamation, " To the Landowners' Peasants " ; the accusa
tion was based on the testimony of a spy, and partly on the
basis of a comparison between the handwriting of a certain
note with Chernyshevsky's other manuscripts, although he
argued that at least one-half of the letters of that note did
not correspond with his characters. Serno-Solovievich was also
sentenced to hard labour, and Pisarev was sentenced to two and
a half years' imprisonment in the fortress; as a matter of fact
he spent there four and a half years, for his preliminary im
prisonment was not counted as a part of his penalty.
Not satisfied with these arrests, processes, and banishments,
the Government pounced upon those organs in which the revo
lutionary tendencies had been expressed, or whose personnel
had been compromised. The Contemporary and the Russian
Word were discontinued for eight months. At the same time
Aksakov's Day was discontinued, naturally only for its sharp
tone, because Aksakov took no part in the revolutionary move
ment, and was hostile towards the revolutionary, and par-

SPLIT OF INTELLIGENTZIA 83
ticularly the Nihilist, tendencies. After four months the Day
was restored under the responsible editorship of Samarin, and
then from the New Year Ivan Aksakov was again permitted to
edit it, without any changes in the personnel or in the tendency
of the paper. But the discontinuation of the Contemporary
and the Russian Word, and the elimination of their leaders,
had decisively influenced their further fate.
The main consequence of those events was the split in the
ranks of progressive society. The public mood was charac
teristically expressed during the Petrograd conflagrations in
the words of a liberal to Turgeniev : " Look what your Nihi
lists are doing: they are setting Petrograd on fire." The view
that the " Nihilists " had become a menace and a danger not
only to the Government, but to the very public, was shared by
many. A sharp argument arose between the liberal Russian
Messenger and the radical Contemporary and the Nihilistic
Russian Word. When Katkov (the editor of the Russian
Messenger) was criticised by Herzen for a virulent article,
"To which Party Do We Belong?" in which he derided all
existing parties, the Russian Messenger opened a ruthless cam
paign against the Bell and Herzen, ignoring his services in the
matter of the peasant-reform. The quarrel between them grew
particularly bitter in 1861, when Herzen, partly under the
influence of Ogarev and later of Bakunin, who fled from Si
beria and came to London, began to support the leaders of the
Polish movement. He carried on definite negotiations with
the Poles, and agreed under certain conditions to support their
struggle against the Russian Government ; in the eyes of Katkov
and his readers this appeared as national treason, the more so
since in the ardour of his campaign against the governmental
repressions in Poland, Herzen published articles encouraging
Russian officers and soldiers to desert their army and fight
against the Government for the Polish cause.
All these manifestations of unrest made a very strong im-

84 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
pression abroad, especially among circles connected with Rus
sian finances through holding Russian securities. The foreign
rumours about the approaching revolution in Russia, which
threatened the position of her finances abroad, alarmed the
Government; in a circular to all Russian ambassadors Prince
Gorchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, interpreted the in
ternal events in a way intended to calm the foreign bourses. In
his customary picturesque manner Gorchakov wrote: "The
expanse of the sea, as Racine says, cannot be calm. Such is
the condition here. But the equilibrium is getting restored.
When the billows rise, as they now have all over, it would be
naive to assert that the sea will immediately calm down. The
main task is to put up dams where danger threatens the public
peace and the interests and existence of the State. Toward
this are directed our cares, without deviating from the way
which our august Tzar has chosen from the very day of his
accession. Our motto is — neither weakness, nor reaction.
Russia begins to understand this motto. It requires time to
have it acclimatised also in Europe, but I hope that the most
prejudiced minds will be convinced of what is evident."
The Note was intended to quiet European circles interested
in Russian financial conjunctures, by persuading them that in
the first place there was no revolution as yet, and secondly
that no reaction would follow, but reforms would be carried
through for the peaceful continuation of Russia's social and
economic life.
In the meantime the Polish movement developed crescendo,
and in 1863 an armed uprising broke out in Warsaw.
The policy of Marquis Velepolsky had been carried on in
Poland. He was a very distinguished statesman, but did not,
however, win the sympathy of the dominating Polish parties.
He tried to realise the policy recommended in 1858 by an
other Polish statesman, State-Secretary Enoch, who, inspired
perhaps by Velepolsky, asserted that if Russia desired the

THE POLICY OF VELEPOLSKY 85
pacification of Poland she should seek support in the middle
class which was economically connected with Russian interests.
For the satisfaction of the political demands of that group of
the Polish population, Velepolsky proposed a series of more
or less liberal reforms inclined mainly towards the restoration
of national independence within the limits of the Kingdom,
and of such institutions as were composed of local men; as a
result of the re-establishment of Polish loyalty to the Tzar
it was proposed to reintroduce the Constitution of 1815.
The Russian Government approved of that policy, but it
did not satisfy either of the two predominating active revolu
tionary parties. One of them, the White, composed of the
nobility, aspired further politically than Velepolsky (for the
restoration of the Poland of 1772), while in the social respect
it did not sympathise with the bourgeois-democratic reforms
proposed by the latter. The other party, the Red, using demo-
gogic means, demanded more radical reforms than those recom
mended by Velepolsky, and also required the restoration of the
territory of 1772.
Velepolsky, in the capacity of Polish Minister of the Interior,
had a number of collisions with the Russian vice-rois who were
changed four times during two years (1 861-1862). Finally
Grand Duke Constantine was appointed to the post (at his
own request), and he promoted Velepolsky to the position of
Chief of the Civil Administration, which was equivalent to the
post of a prime-minister. But by that time Velepolsky, on
account of the struggle he had to carry on with both the aris
tocratic and the democratic parties, was greatly discredited in
the eyes of the population.
In his struggle with his internal enemies Velepolsky closed up
the " Agricultural Society " which was the centre of the active
organisations of the nobles, and, on the other hand, desiring to
moderate or somehow avert revolutionary actions on the part
of the revolutionary Democrats, he declared a recruitment in

86 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the cities only, hoping in this way to eliminate all the young
men of the lower urban classes, who formed the chief support
of disturbances and of revolutionary street-riots in the cities.
But his attempt to carry out that measure in Warsaw served
as a signal for an open revolt.
The first act of the revolt was the annihilation of the sleep
ing unarmed Russian soldiers in the barracks. That circum
stance aroused many in Russia against the Poles, including
Aksakov, and particularly Katkov, who up to that time advo
cated the satisfaction of Velepolsky's demands — the granting of
some independence to Poland within the limits of the " Congres-
suvka," i.e., the present ten Polish provinces (before 1915.
Tr.) Aksakov had considered it desirable for the sake of her
dignity for Russia to withdraw her troops from Poland and allow
the Poles to take care of themselves. But after the treacherous
slaughter of the Russian soldiers many Russian organs pub
lished indignant articles against Poland.
The irritation against Poland became still greater when
the European Powers attempted to interfere in the matter, and
even threatened armed intervention. The " skirmisher " in
that case appeared to be, as before the Crimean Campaign, Na
poleon III, who maintained active connections with the Polish
emigrants. The threats of foreign intervention aroused an
unexpected outburst of patriotism in Russia. A mass of pa
triotic addresses was sent by nobles, merchants, peasant- and
town-societies, and even by Schismatics. The address of the
last-named was composed by Katkov; it was he who inserted
the famous phrase: "In the novelties of thy reign our an
tiquity is felt. . . ."
Those addresses greatly encouraged the Government and
having produced a certain impression abroad helped it to re
pulse with dignity the attack of the foreign diplomatists. But
t at the same time the patriotic movement, merged with the
-, anti-Nihilistic current and with the opposition to the revolu-

AFTER THE POLISH REVOLT 87
tionary manifestations that took place in Petrograd in 1862,
not only deepened the schism in the ranks of the intelligentzia,
but produced a considerable shifting of all social elements to
the right, so that the radicals remained isolated and weakened.
Katkov, who had gone far to the right from the position he
occupied in 1861, was triumphant and the hero of the day.
The prestige of Alexander's government was restored, and
it was no longer afraid of the liberal and radical opposition
which had completely lost its influence. The change in the
public mood was expressed among other ways in the fall of the
Bell's circulation : from two and a half to three thousand it fell
to five hundred, and although it existed for five years, its cir
culation never rose above that number. Its existence became
hardly noticeable.
In view of the conditions that had solidified during 1862-
1863, a supposition might have risen that the triumphant reac
tion would discontinue the realisation of the proposed reforms.
This did not take place, however. The Government remained
as before directly interested in the promulgation of the re
forms. Without some of them it could not technically admin
ister the country, while others were necessary for the support
and development of the cultural and economical life of Russia.
In this respect the lesson taught by the Crimean Campaign still
preserved its significance. Besides, the Government had to
fulfil the programme announced by Gorchakov to the financial
circles of Western Europe. The Government was to show its
loyalty to the slogan: "Neither weakness nor reaction,"
and indeed, it undertook to continue the reforms even before
the suppression of the Polish uprising. But now the demo
cratic basis which appeared to unite in 1861 the Tver nobility
and the Contemporary and Aksakov's Day was to a great ex
tent eliminated from those reforms which were worked out
in a purely bureaucratic way: in the depths of governmental
chanceries, of special committees and commissions. True, the

88 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
projects were given wide publicity and were discussed by com
petent persons and in the press, but not in the mood in which
the peasant-reform was carried out.
Of the subsequent reforms the first was the financial, which
resembled Speransky's Plan of 1809. During the years 1^62-
1866 V. A. Tatarinov, one of Alexander's most honest and
able assistants, after a careful study abroad of various finan
cial systems, had undertaken important measures for the regu
lation of the financial administration. His measures were first
of all directed towards the eradication of the abuses which
flourished in all departments in regard to the squandering of
sums without any adequate accounting. Tatarinov had cen
tralised the state economy in the hands of the Ministry of
Finances which was to be responsible before the State Comp
troller for all income and expenditures, and was to prepare
a yearly budget-scheme for the approval of the State Council;
up to 1862 the budget had not had any publicity. At the same
time the so-called " single cash " system was established, by
which all individual treasuries at various departments were
abolished, and every copeck of income or expenditure had to
pass through the Ministry of Finance, which also directed the
assignations for single departments in accordance with the state
budget. Tatarinov was placed at the head of the State Con
trol, and that department was reorganised so that it might con
trol the carrying out of the budget and also the fiscal accounts
at the Capital and in the provinces. Local Controlling Cham
bers were formed, independent of the administration — of the
governors and of the chiefs of separate departments.
Alongside with these reforms for the improvement of the
financial apparatus another important measure was undertaken
— the establishment of the State Bank ; on one hand it sup
planted the old credit-institutions which proved quite clumsy
for the developing economic life, and on the other hand it was
to encourage and finance commercial-industrial undertakings.

FINANCIAL REFORMS 89
Finally, in 1863, the wine-contracts were abolished. The
beverage income had constituted the lion share of the budget;
the Government had been wavering between two systems for ex
ploiting it, the direct fiscal monopoly of the manufacture and
sale of the beverages, or the system of contracts. The abuses
of the first system forced Kankrin to prefer the system of con
tracts which had been abolished by Guriev. But the system of
contracts demoralised the officials just as much, as the contrac
tors bribed the whole local administration, so that it was a
generally known fact that every local official received two sal
aries — one from the Government, and another, larger than the
first, from the contractors. The Government tolerated that
system, being aware of the insufficient salary it paid its func
tionaries. In 1863 the sale of wine was permitted to all;
every vessel of wine or vodka was taxed with a special excise,
and every wine-house with a special license-tax. The taxes
were collected by local excise institutions, whose personnel was
well remunerated and consisted of educated persons.
Parallel with these financial reforms some inprovements
were made in the personnel of the financial administration. In
place of incapable ministers, like Brock and Kniazhevich, the
young and capable M. K. Reitern, whose appointment aroused
great hopes among society, now stood at the head of the Min
istry. Those hopes were ultimately disappointed, but he did
introduce some improvement in the management of the finances.
The honest, gifted, and energetic administrator, K. K. Grote,
was at the head of the new Excise Department.
Next to financial reform came that of the universities, in
1863. During the first years of the new reign the oppressions
introduced in the reign of Nicolas were removed, and although
the old statute of 1835 remained intact, the students enjoyed
actual freedom and independence; the old Curators were sup
planted with humanistic and enlightened persons who permitted
them to have their organisations and meetings, and publish

90 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
their own periodicals free from censorship. Private persons,
unclassified students, and even women, were admitted into the
universities. The awakened society, not too rich in intellectual
forces, placed great hopes in the university youth, and the
position of the students was quite honourable. They were flat
tered by such an attitude, and became imbued with social aspira
tions; they took active part in establishing Sunday Schools,
popular libraries, and similar educational institutions.
In i860, Pisarev, a new prophet of the young generation,
appeared. He demanded that youth be allowed to speak in
public, to write and publish their thoughts, in order " to shake
up with their original scepticism those stale objects, that dilapi
dated junk " called " general authorities." " This is the final
word of our young camp," wrote Pisarev, — " what can be
broken, we should break: whatever will stand the blow — is
of use; whatever will be smashed to pieces — is rubbish; at
any rate, smash right and left; no harm may come out of
this." The spirit of criticism, self-will, and youthful pugnacious-
ness toward the professors was not slow in appearing. It be
came customary in the classes to applaud, to whistle, to hiss.
Various demands were presented to the professors. In 1861
one of the first revolutionary proclamations, the one composed
by Mikhailov, was directly addressed " To the Young Genera
tion." In Kazan, as I have mentioned, after the Bezdna catas
trophe the students led by the young Professor Shchapov had
a demonstrative mass served for the souls of the peasants killed
by the soldiers. At the convocation of the Petrograd univer
sity, February 8, 1861, the students created a scandal when
the address announced by Kostomarov about the recently de
ceased Constantine Aksakov was forbidden by the Minister.1
*To this day Russian revolutionary students are fond of a song
which has a refrain about the nagaika, i.e., the Cossack-whip:
"Ah, little nagaika, little nagaika, my little nagaika —
Thou danced on our backs on February the Eighth." — Tr.

STUDENT DISORDERS 91
In a word, the university showed, as a correct barometer, to
use Pirogov's expression, the stormy tendencies that had ac
cumulated by that time among society.
The Government, alarmed, attempted to check this movement
by strict measures. The weak, human Minister Kovalevsky was
dismissed, and his place was taken by an extreme obscurantist,
Admiral Putiatin, recommended by Count Stroganov, the same
Stroganov who was Curator in Moscow during the Forties, and
who now stood at the head of the reactionary government circle.
Under the chairmanship of Stroganov special temporary rules
were worked out for the universities and were sanctioned by
the Tzar on May 31, 1861. These rules forbade all embryos
of corporative life among the students, even the uniform dress ; 2
they forbade the issue of poverty-certificates, the exemption of
poor students from tuition fees and any gathering without the
permission of the authorities. Curator Delianov, who was then
a liberal and had attempted with the aid of Kavelin and other
popular professors to work out in co-operation with student-
delegates reasonable and feasible regulations, was discharged
immediately after Kovalevsky, to be supplanted by General
Philipson, formerly Attaman (chieftain) of the Cossack troops.
In the fall, when the new rules were to be put into practice,
grandiose student-riots took place, which resulted in mass-ex
pulsions from the University, in a procession of the students
through the city towards the home of Curator Philipson, in
a collision with the troops near the University buildings, and
in the imprisonment of three hundred students in the fortress.
-Simultaneously the Moscow students rioted and marched on
the streets. But there the police instigated the common peo
ple against them, by spreading a rumour that the nobles made
2 During the last two reigns, however, the wearing of a uniform has
been made obligatory for students, under the threat of penalty for be
ing discovered in civilian garb. The motive for this policy has been
the Government's desire to facilitate for its agents the task of recog
nising "suspicious" elements on the street and in public places. — Tr.

92 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
disturbances because they desired the re-establishment of serf
dom. The students were cruelly beaten up, many were ar
rested, and later expelled from the University. Alexander II
was at that time in Crimea with the Empress, who was ill.
He was greatly alarmed by these occurrences, hastened back to
Petrograd, and expressed his dissatisfaction both with the ac
tions of Count Putiatin and with those of the Petrograd Gov
ernor-General Ignatiev. The former gave way to A. V.
Golovnin, who was recommended by Grand Duke Constan
tine, and proved to be one of the most enlightened and well-
intentioned Ministers of Education in Russia; Ignatiev was
supplanted by the human and good-hearted Prince A. A. Su-
vorov, who treated the youth very sympathetically. Golovnin
at once began to work out a new statute. Professor Kavelin,
dismissed with four other professors a short time before for
having protested against the measures of Putiatin, was now
commissioned to go abroad for the study of university condi
tions in various countries. Prominent scholars, professors, and
administrators took part in the preparation of the new statute.
The project worked out in the Ministry was printed and
sent out to various competent persons in Russia and abroad.
The press took active part in the discussion of the question.
The opinion of Stroganov about the transformation of the uni
versities into exclusive aristocratic institutions was rejected
by all. The general views were divided between two systems.
One was represented by the historian Kostomarov and by
Baron Korf, and it advocated the view that universities were
to give the students only knowledge, while education proper
should be implanted at home and in the lower schools. The
other system was represented by the friends and disciples of
the late Granovsky — Chicherin, Kavelin, Katkov, and other
liberal professors, who insisted that the universities should have
a general educational mission for the young generation. Kave
lin brought from abroad the unanimous opinion of foreign au-

SECONDARY SCHOOLS FOR WOMEN 93
thorities in favour of a corporative constitution for the univer
sities. The project was presented to the State Council, after
a preliminary discussion by a special commission under the
chairmanship of Count Stroganov. The progressive principles
were considerably modified and curtailed in that commission,
and in such a form it passed the State Council and was sanc
tioned by Alexander II on June 18, 1863.
The new statute restored the university-autonomy within
the limits of the statute of 1804, although it preserved some
paragraphs of the statute of 1835, which concentrated a con
siderable discretionary power in the hands of the Curator.
The Statute greatly limited the entrance of outsiders. The
corporation of professors received autonomy in the form of a
self-governing council of the faculties, but the students were
allowed no legal opportunity for the organisation of their own
social and academic life. Yet as long as Golovnin remained
at the head of the Ministry, his liberal policy contributed to
the establishment of some order and peace in the universities.
The secondary schools were also reformed at that time. The
gymnasia were divided into classic and " real " ; in the first
Greek was added to the instruction* of Latin, and the prepara
tion was intended mainly for the universities ; the " real "-
gymnasia were to prepare their students chiefly for higher
technical schools. The Statute was sanctioned November 19,
1864, but its realisation was hampered by lack of funds and of
Greek instructors.
Here we should say a few words about the secondary schools
for women. Before the accession of Alexander no open schools
for women had existed; they were taught either at home or in
some closed Institutes which were organised according to an
antiquated system dating back to the days of Catherine.
When, on the basis of the emancipation-movement, the struggle
for individualism began, the woman-question became one of
the most burning problems. In the press, at provincial assem-

94 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
blies, in university circles — everywhere was discussed the
necessity of emancipating woman from her dependent and
secluded position. In 1859 schools began to open for women
in cities where the inhabitants were able to collect from volun
tary contributions a more or less sufficient sum. Those woman-
gymnasia, at first of four grades, and later of six, were placed
under the patronage of the Empress Maria Alexandrovna, and
their management was conducted not by the Ministry of Edu
cation, but by the Department of the Institutions of Empress
Maria (formed by Nicolas I after the death of his mother,
Maria Feodorovna, the widow of Paul I). The chief ad
ministrator of the woman-gymnasia was the enlightened and
distinguished pedagogue, N. A. Vyshnegradsky. The pro
gramme of those schools was slightly shorter than that of the
" real "-schools.
With the emancipation of the peasants arose the urgent need
for the organisation of primary education which up to that
time had existed only in a few estates of rich and philan-
thropically inclined landowners, and partly among the State-
peasants. In some places church-parish schools appeared to
exist, but in the prevailing majority of cases they existed only
on paper. The question about popular schools had been dis
cussed very actively among the intelligentzia from the end of
the Fifties. With the aid of Professor Pavlov numerous Sun
day Schools supported by students, progressive army-officers,
women of wealthy families, and so forth, were established in
Kiev in 1859 and then in many other cities. During the years
of stormy opposition, 1861-1862, in several places the Sunday
Schools became the arena for largely naive political propaganda,
which resulted in the Government's decree in 1862, closing all
Sunday Schools until the issue of special rules concerning them.
At the same time the idea persistently circulated among so
ciety about founding special societies for the spread of learning
among the people. One of the projects belonged to I. S.

SPREAD OF EDUCATION 95
Turgeniev. Special Committees of Learning were established
at the Free Economic Society in Petrograd and at the Agricul
tural Society in Moscow; those committees were of great use
in the work of popular education both through collecting money
for schools and through publishing and distributing popular
books. With the appointment of Golovnin as Minister of Educa
tion his Ministry began to work on a statute for primary
education. Two projects were presented before the State
Council, one of which proposed the management of the primary
schools by the Ministry of Education, and the other recom
mended the organisation of local committees in the provinces
and districts for the maintenance of those schools. The Chief
of the Second Department of H. M.'s Chancery, Baron Korf,
suggested to the State Council that it hand over the manage-;
ment of the projected schools to the proposed zemstvo-'mstitu-
tions. The State Council decided to organise special councils
in the provinces and districts, into which representatives of the
zemstvo were to be invited. The Statute was sanctioned June
14, 1864.

CHAPTER XXVI
THE abolition of serfdom, as I have already mentioned,
caused many changes in the existing system of local
administration which had been closely connected with
the bondage-right. The landowner had been the sole and
unlimited representative of the administrative power on his
estate, and most of the police and judiciary positions in the dis
trict and provincial administration had been filled by nobles.
Such a system could be tolerated only under bondage condi
tions, but when the Crimean Campaign had revealed the sores
in the old order of things, the Government saw the necessity
of reorganisation to improve the national and social life of the
country through the participation of all capable and living
forces of society. Such were the principles expressed by Miliu
tin, chairman of the commission for the reform of the local
administration, in a memorandum presented to and approved
by the Tzar at the very beginning of the reforms. Miliutin's
plan was: To give local self-government more confidence,
more independence, and more unity. Declarations of some of
the provincial committees, particularly of the non black-soil
industrial provinces, followed, emphasising and developing the
suggestions of the delegates of the first summons which had
indicated the necessity of establishing self-government on an
all-class basis, in accordance with the new civil order of the
country now liberated from bondage. On those foundations
Miliutin's commission prepared the first sketch of the zemstvo-
institutions. The same commission was to work out a general police-
reform and the organisation of new Peace-institutions for carry-
96

THE ZEMSTVOS 97
ing out the peasant-reform. Its work was far from completed,
when Lanskoy and Miliutin were dismissed, and the new
Minister, Valuiev, assumed the chairmanship of that com
mission. We know that Valuiev was opposed to the principle
of class-equality, and strove to support and strengthen the
prestige and power of the nobility, which had been shaken by
the abolition of serfdom. Yet he dared not set aside the
principle of class-equality altogether, but he tried to give the
nobles prevalence in the zemstvo-'msthutions, by lowering the
census for nobles in comparison with that of landowners of
other classes, and by increasing the number of delegates from
private estates over the number of delegates from peasant-
communities. But his amendments were rejected by the State
Council, owing to their criticism by Baron Korf who pointed
out that they would arouse dissatisfaction and irritation among
the public. Although the representation of the population was
finally based on a curial system, still it was more just and demo
cratic than the one suggested by Valuiev. Valuiev had in
tended to give electoral rights to nobles who possessed land
equal in size to fifty maximum-peasant-allotments of a given
region, while the census for landowners of other classes was to
be equal to one hundred such allotments. The State Council
instituted a uniform census for all categories — the equivalent
of one hundred allotments.
The electors of the zemstvo-delegates were divided into three
curiae: 1) the curia of private landowners, 2) the curia of
village-communities, and 3) the curia of townspeople whose
participation in the elections required the possession of real
estate in the town of a certain value (three thousand and six
thousand rubles), or membership in a merchant-guild, or the
possession of commercial-industrial establishments with a turn
over of not less than six thousand rubles yearly. For the num
ber of delegates to be sent by each curia to the district-zemstvo-
assembly Valuiev had intended to institute a preference in

98 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
favour of the private landowners, proposing that while the
village-communities should elect one delegate from every four
thousand allotments, the private landowners should be entitled
to one delegate from a tract of land equivalent to only two
thousand allotments. The State Council equalised all curiae
to a requirement of three thousand allotments for the election
of one delegate, and of an equivalent amount of property for
townspeople. It was further decided that the total number of
delegates elected by one curia could not exceed the total num
ber of delegates elected by the other two curia; combined.
The structure of the zemstvo-'mstitutions was proposed in
the following way. The zemstvo organs of the province as
well as of the district were divided into those of arrangement
and of execution. The first were instituted as zemstvo assem
blies of delegates elected by the curiae; the number of the dele
gates to the district-assembly varied according to the size of
the district, from fourteen to over a hundred; the provincial
assemblies were composed of provincial delegates elected by the
district assemblies. The presidents of the district-assemblies were
marshals of district nobility, and presidents of the provincial as
semblies — provincial marshals of nobility. The district assem
blies were to manage economic affairs of the district, the provin
cial — the economic matters that concerned the whole province.
The district-assemblies were made completely independent of
the provincial. The assemblies of both categories were to con
vene once every year for the determination of a general plan
of management, for the confirmation of the budget with the
right to tax real estate and the commercial-industrial establish
ments within their region, and finally for the election of execu
tive organs which managed the entire business, and for the
examination and approval of the yearly accounts presented by
those executive organs, called Zemstvo-Boards, provincial and
district, each composed of a chairman and several members.
The delegates were to be elected for three years, and the

THE ZEMSTVOS 99
Boards had to be elected for the same term by the assemblies.
As to the competency of the zewwtao-institutions, Miliutin,
not wishing to expand the circle of affairs under their juris
diction too much, insisted that in their sphere only they en
joyed full independence from the local administration-author
ities, and were subject only to the Senate, while the Governors
simply had the right of supervising the legality of their trans
actions. At first it was proposed to hand over to the zemstvo
all those matters that had been managed before the Emancipa
tion by the local administration, of which the most important
were : the construction and maintenance of roads of communica
tion, matters of public welfare, i.e., hospitals and asylums, and
alimentary affairs. Upon the suggestion of Baron Korf, the
power of the zemstvo was expanded to include caring for the
spread of local education, for the construction of churches and
of prisons, for the development and organisation of medical
and veterinary aid in the districts and provinces, and in general
for the benefits and needs of the local population, of the village-
interests, commerce and industry.
Such were the general features of the structure and powers
of the all-class local self-government organs created by the
act of January 1, 1864.
They were introduced at first only in thirty-three provinces,
and even there gradually, beginning in the year 1865. By the
first of January, 1866, they were introduced in nineteen
provinces, by January 1, 1867 — in nine more provinces, total
ing twenty-eight; during 1867, in two more, and after January
1, 1868, in four more; the Bessarabia Region was included in
the zemstvo-prov'mces.
The public and the press placed great hopes in the zemstvo-
self-government and many exaggerated its significance, although
the Act in itself aroused much criticism. Most pessimistic was
the opinion of I. Aksakov who refused to see in it any self-
government, but considered it as one of the forms of calling

ioo MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
elected zemstvo-mtn to the service of the State. He greeted
only the principle of class-equality put through in the zemstvo-
act. The most optimistic view was expressed by K. D. Kavelin
in a series of articles which appeared in Korsh's St.-Petersburg
News. He saw in the zemstvo-'mstitutions a necessary and
excellent school for the preparation of men of all classes for
participation in state-affairs under the future representative
order; he ardently appealed to all progressive and enlightened
persons to take part in the new institutions.
However, the z^wwtao-institutions had to begin their activity
under very unfavourable circumstances, for in 1866 reaction
was triumphant throughout Russia. They were regarded with
hostility by all governmental organs — local and central, and
were soon limited in their right of taxing commercial and in
dustrial establishments; then the publicity and accessibility of
zemstvo-assemblies was restricted, and the freedom of their
discussions limited, in view of which many precious and worthy
zemstvo-workers soon lost interest in the work, and withdrew
from the personnel of the zemstvo-boaids and assemblies.
Chronologically, the next capital reform of the Sixties was
brought about in the judiciary, through the issue of new stat
utes on November 20, 1864. To grasp the enormous import
ance of that reform, one must remember what the old courts
and court-proceedings had been in the pre-reform days.
" Black in the courts with black injustice," thus on the eve of
the Crimean Campaign the poet-patriot of the Slavophil camp
— A. S. Khomiakov, characterised Russia. " The old court ! "
I. S. Aksakov who had served personally on many pre-reform
judiciary institutions, wrote in the Eighties — " at the very
memory of it my hair stand up on end, a frost rasps my
skin! . . ."l
From the time of Catherine the judiciary remained un-
1 From his editorial in the news-paper Russ, February 15, 1884.

REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY 101
changed, although the need for its fundamental reorganisation
had been admitted by Alexander I and by Nicolas I, and during
those two reigns a number of memoranda, and projects were
prepared on the question by such men as Speransky, Nicolas
Turgeniev, Dashkov, Bludov, and others. They were unable
to shake the firmly established " justice," as long as the bondage
system existed, and the nobles prevailed in all grades of state-
service and in all state-institutions, central and local. Even
under Alexander II the measures undertaken for the improve
ment of the judiciary at the beginning of his reign enjoyed no
success until after the fall of bondage. The judiciary reform
progressed in a rapid tempo only after 1861, when it was decided
to have no historical connection with the previous structure,
but to begin anew, on the basis of new principles founded on
juridical science and on the experience of civilised countries.
The chief vices of the old order were the class-differentiation
of the cases, the multitude of court-instances, the complete de
pendence of the court on the administration, the archaic in
quisitorial process in criminal cases, the secrecy of the proceed
ings, the declaration of the verdict without arguments of the
parties or attorneys, the ignorance of the judges and their
meagre remuneration which was the cause of flagrant bribery
and abuses, and — in a word — the domination of force over
justice and truth. In truth it was an " abomination of desola
tion in the holy place " (Aksakov).
After the abolition of serfdom and the appointment of
Zamiatnin instead of Count Panin to the post of Minister
of Justice, the work of the fundamental reform was entrusted
to a special committee of enlightened and brilliant jurists. An
extremely perseverant and devoted person, State-Secretary of
the State Council, S. I. Zarudny, was the life of the work.
The main principles were worked out and confirmed by the
Tzar in 1862, and a hurried preparation of judiciary statutes
on the basis of juridical science was begun. Into the founda-

102 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
tion of the new structure were laid the principles of non-class
composition of the courts, equality, of all citiz.ens before the law,
absolute independence of the court from the administration,
for which purpose judges were appointed for life, received large
salaries, and were chosen from among enlightened and juri
dically-educated persons.
Trials were to be open and public, with the active participa
tion of both sides; accusations were to be formulated and sup
ported by the procurator, while the interests of the defendant
were to be upheld by a sworn attorney. The number of in
stances was considerably shortened: two for civil cases, and
one for common criminal cases. A jury court was established,
the jurymen to be chosen in turn from a list of full right
citizens who had reached a certain age. The jury system was
copied from the English courts. Only in case the jury court
acted against the established forms or order of proceedings,
or if the law was incorrectly applied by the judge, could the
parties appeal to the Senate which, if it found the complaint
just, might order a new trial of the case by the same or an
other court, but at any rate by a new jury. Unfortunately
from the very beginning cases of state-treason, of certain of
ficial misdemeanours, and also press-cases were eliminated from
the competency of the juries, and the general and political im
portance of the latter was thus diminished.
The independence of the judges was somewhat curbed by
the fact that although they could not be removed from office
by the authorities, there still remained the system of rewards
and presentation of ranks and orders, so that the administration
(the minister of justice) had some power over the more pliable
judges. Later, during the period of reaction, the Government
tried to shake the principle of the permanence of office of
judges, and to increase the number of cases eliminated from
the jurisdiction of juries (from 1866 on).
Alongside with this general judiciary reform which aspired

THE PRESS 103
indeed for a "fast, just, and merciful" court (the words of
Alexander II), there were introduced justices of peace for
petty cases, elected by the zemstvos and by municipal dumas.
One may say without hesitation that in spite of the restric
tion of some of the principles originally instituted, the judicial
reform was the most radical and in principle the most consistent
of all the great reforms of the Sixties.2
Unfortunately the new courts as well as the zemstvo-insti-
tutions began to operate in 1866 at the beginning of a period
of prolonged reaction, which mutilated and distorted the ju
dicial statutes of Alexander II, through the so-called "novelles,"
i.e., partial modifications and amendments which were subse
quently enacted as permanent laws.
The last of the great reforms of the Sixties was the new
legislation about the press, issued in 1865 in the form of
" Temporary Rules." Nowhere during the first ten years of
Alexander's reign did the Government and the Tzar show so
much vacillation as in the question of censorship regulation
and the position of the press. In any case, the liberation of
the press from censorship appeared to the Government as the
most dangerous of the reforms which it considered necessary
2Maxime Kovalevsky (recently deceased), the greatest authority on
Russian institutions, illuminates the impotence of the Russian juries in
his article on the "Reforms of Alexander II":
"Not every person is allowed to become a member of the jury; to
enjoy this privilege a man must be a land-proprietor possessing not
less than one hundred desiatins, or real property valued at five thousand
rubles. . . . No wonder that our jurymen show, as has been said, a
great severity in judging all offences against property. The require
ments of the law have been even increased during the reign of Alexan
der III, and the growing class of proletarians has been in this way
more and more deprived of any participation in the performance of
this civil duty. At the same time the Government has kept in its own
hands the power of eliminating from the lists any class of people it
considers untrustworthy. . . ." M. Kovalevsky, Russian Political In
stitutions. — Tr.

104 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
to introduce. As early as 1855 Valuiev, later one of the most
persistent and cunning oppressors of the press, asserted in his
famous memorandum, " A Russian's Meditation," that before
all other reforms it was necessary to grant some freedom to the
press. Indeed, at the very beginning of the reign the Buturlin-
Committee was abolished, and Baron Modest Korf, one of its
leaders and initiators, became one of the most consistent liberals
in the governmental circles. New magazines were permitted
to appear with widened programmes and with the right to
discuss political and social questions. Upon the rescript of
November 20, 1857, the press was permitted to discuss the
peasant-question and the abolition of bondage. Soon, as we
remember, there came a pause, a change in the Government's
mood, but it passed in a few months. In 1859 Alexander II
said to the censor, Academic Nikitenko, that he was opposed
to oppression of the press, but that he could not allow any
" evil tendencies. . . ."
Actually the freedom of the press grew and developed until
the year of 1861, when it, manifested in its radical organs an
outspoken revolutionary tendency. The progress made in the
development of the public thought in six years — from 1855
to 1 86 1 — was unbelievable. At that time the stupid ob
scurantist Putiatin was supplanted by the liberal Golovnin, who
began to work on a new censorship-statute, and at the same
time tried to influence diplomatically the editors of the maga
zines. But in the governmental spheres a reaction had already
begun, and Minister Valuiev obstructed Golovnin on every
step, and complained of his levity toward the press. The mat
ter of repressions and punitive measures against the press was
transferred to Valuiev, while Golovnin continued to manage
the general censorship and to work on the reform in the com
mission of Prince D. A. Obolensky. Then came the conflagra
tions of 1862, and new rules concerning "warnings" and
" discontinuations " of periodicals were issued for the restrain-

SOCIAL FERMENTATION 105
ing of the press. Those rules were at once applied to the
radical Petrograd magazines and to the non-radical, but
too sharp, Day of Aksakov. Upon the request of Golovnin
the whole censorship question was transferred to the Ministry
of Interior, where a new commission for its solution was formed
under the chairmanship of the same Obolensky. That com
mission regarded the issue of a new censorship statute untimely
and dangerous; instead it introduced in 1865 as an experiment
" temporary rules," which continued to exist without consider
able changes for forty years.
According to those rules preliminary censorship was abol
ished for books of a certain volume (not less than ten sheets
for original, and not less than twenty for translated books) ;
for periodicals the question of exemption from preliminary
censorship was left to the discretion of the Minister of Interior,
and for the first time it was decided to introduce that freedom
only in Petrograd and Moscow. The permit for publication
of new periodicals was also left to the discretion of the Min
ister of Interior; among the punitive measures those introduced
by the temporary rules of 1862 were retained.
Such was the extremely moderate freedom granted to the
press by the reform of 1865. Of all the reforms of the Sixties
this was undoubtedly the most parsimonious and cautious. Yet
on September 1, 1865, the progressive papers, appearing for the
first time without preliminary censorship, expressed their joy
in eloquent, grateful articles. Soon, however, they were bit
terly disappointed.
The low spirits, the prostration and the even reactionary
mood, into which certain circles of society had fallen after the
revolutionary outbreaks of 1862 and after the Polish revolt,
had gradually passed away under the influence of the renewed
progressive activity of the Government. In circles of the no
bility constitutional aspirations again appeared, though in a
more reserved tone, and far less democratic than the Tver

106 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
declarations of 1862. The assembly of nobles at Moscow in
the year 1865, mostly aristocratically-oligarchically inclined,
accepted an address to the Tzar, edited by Katkov. In that
address they begged the Tzar " to crown the edifice of his
reforms " with the summons of representatives of the Russian
land, by which they understood mainly the representatives of
the nobles. Alexander II regarded that address unfavourably,
and in a rescript to Valuiev he indicated that the right of
initiative in State reorganisations belonged to the Tzar alone,
and that such addresses on the part of the nobles might only
hinder him in carrying out the reforms he had decided on.
The radical part of the public was at that time, as we have
seen, completely deranged; yet partly under the influence of
the practical ideals pointed out in Chernyshevsky's novel,
" What is to be done?" various circles and associations began
to arise among the young generation which purported to fulfil
the ideals preached in that novel. One enterprising Moscow
circle, led by Ishutin, was preparing for a broad and definite
propaganda of communistic ideas, but before it had time to
start its activity, one of its members, a cousin of Ishutin,
Karakozov, an unbalanced and probably abnormal fellow, de
cided against the persuasions of his comrades to assassinate
Alexander II. Karakozoy j:ame to Petrograd, and fired a
pistol a,t. the^TzaTj when the latter was entering his carriage
after a stroll with his daughter in the Summer Garden. The
bullet missed its mark, because a commoner, Komissarov, who
happened to stand near by, pushed Karakozov's hand.3 That
event made an indelible impression on Alexander and on the
public, and the reactionaries and enemies of the democratic
reforms made skilful use of that impression. The period of
reforms came to an end before some of them had been carried
out; the municipal reform was accomplished in 1870, and that
s Komissarov was promoted to the rank of nobleman by the Tzar.
— Tr.

IMPORTANCE OF THE REFORMS 107
of universal military service, in 1874. A stubborn and last
ing reaction began in April, 1866, and lasted with a few short
pauses till 1905. The reforms which had been accomplished
suffered mutilation during that reaction; not only radicals, but
even the liberally inclined social groups underwent various
persecutions and restrictions. This circumstance did not, how
ever, destroy either the great historical significance of the pro
mulgated reforms, or the preparation and internal development
of that socio-political process which forms the contents of
Russian history in the nineteenth century, and has not as yet
been completed. The importance of the great reorganisations
of the period of reforms is such that the dividing line they have
placed between the pre-reform and post-reform Russia is im
passable and ineraseable ; no reaction in the Government's and
social circles could have returned Russia to her pre-reform
position. The reaction which started in 1866... brought njuch^
evil to the country: it disturbed the peaceful course of the
development of society and of the people; by driving all op
position into the " underground " it provoked an underground
revolutionary movement which acquired a more and more ir
reconcilable and terroristic character; but the reaction was
powerless to restore the old regime, for that regime was irre
vocably destroyed with the abolition of serfdom and with the
development of democratic ideas among the public,. The re
action could cripple and distort the new order, but^ it could not
.bring back the old.
The democratic principles of the new all-class order have
found a favourable soil in the Russian people. In a short time j
they became so deeply rooted that they proved strong enough
to stand a half century-long attack at the hands of the reaction
which came immediately after their declaration. The country
would perish, and the great State become disrupted because of
internal dissensions and a lasting, decomposing struggle, rather
than give up those principles; during fifty years, whenever the

io8 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
reaction weakened through internal or external causes, the
inner course of the socio-political process manifested its rights
at once and developed with a multiplied force along the road
indicated during the period of the great reforms of the Sixties.

PART THREE

CHAPTER XXVII
THE attentate of Karakozov, on April 4, 1866, pro
duced a shocking impression upon Alexander and
upon the public. They refused to believe that the
attempt was planned and carried out by an individual, and
they ascribed it to the work of some powerful and fiendish
organisation, of some unknown secret society. General M. N.
Muraviov, famous for the cruelty and ruthlessness with which
he had suppressed the recent Lithuanian uprising,1 was ap
pointed head of the committee for the investigation of the
affair; but in spite of his vigorous efforts to reveal the alleged
conspiracy, and in spite of his unscrupulous actions and orders
which terrorised the peaceful citizens, especially college-students
and authors, no conspiracy against the life of the Tzar was
discovered. The insignificant circle of Ishutin at Moscow had
nothing to do with regicide ideas; as a matter of fact the
members of that circle tried to dissuade Karakozov from his
intention, and considered him mad and abnormal. But the
Government made use of the existence of that circle, and of
the fact that Karakozov had belonged to it, to throw a shadow
of suspicion upon the tendencies of the young generation, upon
the state of affairs in the universities, and upon the direction
of the Ministry of Education which was then managed by
the enlightened and liberal A. V. Golovnin. The court circles
did not miss the opportunity to utilise the impressions of those
events upon Alexander, and they directed their reactionary
blows first of all at the Ministry of Education, even before
Muraviov's investigation had come to an end.
1 In the revolutionary parlance he has been known as the " Hang
man."— Tr. ill

112 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Karakozov's attentate took place on April 4, and on April
5, during the session of the Committee of Ministers, the Super-
Procurator of the Holy Synod, Count D. A. Tolstoy, attacked
as not sufficiently Russificatory the policy of Golovnin in the
Northwest; this partial criticism soon became a general attack,
and Golovnin, convinced that he had lost the Tzar's con
fidence, was forced to resign and leave his place to Count
Tolstoy. Tolstoy had by that time a thoroughly established reputation.
jln 1859 he made known his pro-serfdom ideas in a sharp criti
cism of the works of the Editing Commissions; Alexander said
'of that criticism, that its author either did not understand
anything about the peasant-question, or was a person of evil
intentions. This did not prevent Tolstoy from becoming
Super-Prqcurator of the Synod in 1864, and Minis^r^oi Edu
cation in 1866, with definite reactionary plans.
If Muraviov did not succeed in discovering a conspiracy
against the life of the Tzar, he and his friends from among
the court-reactionaries succeeded in connecting the unrest and
fermentation in the minds of the young generation with the
policy of the Ministry of Education and with the tendencies of
the radical press. The Contemporary and the Russian Word
were closed forever; the attitude of the Government towards
the young generation was characteristically expressed in the
Imperial rescript on the name of Prince P. P. Gagarin, Presi
dent of the Committee of Ministers, dated May 13, 1866.
" Providence has willed," the rescript read, " to reveal before
the eyes of Russia what consequences we may expect from
aspirations and ideas which arrogantly encroach upon every
thing sacred, upon religious beliefs, foundations of family life,
property right, obedience to the law, and upon respect for the
established authorities. My attention is now turned to the
education of the youth. I have given instructions to the end
that the education be directed in the spirit of religious truths,

REACTION: DMITRI TOLSTOY 113
of respect to right of property, and of keeping the fundamental
principles of public order, and that in all schools there should
be forbidden the open or secret teaching of those destructive
conceptions which are hostile to all conditions of moral and
material well-being of the people." The rescript invited the
parents to co-operate with the Government in its activity; it
further indicated the necessity for guarding the existing order
of things from all sorts of destructive attempts emanating from
certain pernicious organs of the press, and from private persons
(some of whom occupied State positions, the rescript declared).
" It is necessary," the paper concluded, " to put a stop to the
repeated attempts for arousing hostility among various classes,
particularly against the nobility and the landowners, in gen
eral, in whom the enemies of public order naturally see their
direct opponents." .
The reaction that began in' 1866 affected not only the Min
istry of Education; after the resignation of Golovnin other
resignations followed. Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, Chief of the
Gendarmes, resigned, among others. He could not be sus
pected of liberalism, but after the event of April 4, he admitted
that he was too old for his position. He was supplanted by
a young court-general, Count P. A. Shuyalov, who soon became
the soul of the reaction in governmental spheres; he was joined
in the Committee of Ministers by Valuiev and by Minister of
State Domains, General Zelenoy. They formed a very influ
ential triumvirate. Prince A. A. Suvorov, the human and
tactful governor-general of Petrograd, was also dismissed and
succeeded by General Trepov who was appointed Supreme
Chief of Police in the Capital; he had already manifested his
abilities as Supreme Chief of Police in the Kingdom of Poland.
Shuvalov, Valuiev, and Zelenoy presented a project to the
Tzar about the strengthening of gubernatorial powers ; although
that project' contradicted to the recently promulgated liberal
reforms, and in spite of the opposition of Minister of Justice

114 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Zamiatnin and Minister of Finance Reitern, Alexander ad
mitted the necessity of the measure, owing to the fact that
Shuvalov constantly disturbed him with reports about the un
rest in the provinces. Although it required legislative sanction,
the measure was passed in an administrative order, in the form
of an act of the Committee of Ministers, confirmed by the
Tzar. Persons of judiciary ranks, whose independence had
not long before been established by the new statutes, were
ordered in a special circular to present themselves before the
governor of their province whenever he demanded this, and to
regard the governor as the representative of the monarchical
authority. Thenceforth not one official could occupy his posi
tion without the consent of the governor; to this rule were
subject the Controlling Chambers which had just opened, and
even the zemstvo-'mstitutions, although the latter were recog
nised by the law as non-governmental, but " public " institu
tions. Such were the first symptoms of the reaction in 1866.
Here we should note that the event of April 4, 1866, and
the white terror perpetrated by M. N. Muraviov, which fol
lowed it, had a tremendous influence not only on governmental
circles, but also upon the public. Some journalists, like Katkov,
who now passed definitely to the side of the reaction, furiously
attacked the Nihilists and the seditious Poles. For these Kat
kov found even Muraviov 's measures not sufficiently severe.
Others, like Niekrasov, were so frightened that they were ready
to make the most undignified compromises with Muraviov.
This, however, did not save Niekrasov's magazine from being
discontinued. Still others, like Dostoievsky, were not only sin
cerely terrified by the event, but held society responsible for it.
On the whole an extreme mental confusion reigned, which
naturally was utilised by the Government. Under such un
favourable circumstances the new courts-and the zemstvo-'msti-
tutions had to begin their activity.
Yet, we have already observed, in spite of the new

CONTINUATION OF REFORMS 115
tendency of the Government the reaction was not in a position
to set Russia back to her pre-reform position. The reforms
accomplished could be distorted, but not recalled. Moreover,
during this reactionary period the Government was forced to
proceed with carrying out the reforms in various departments
of national life and administration which had been planned
in the preceding years. It had to complete the arrangement
of the peasant-affairs by expanding the Act of February 19
upon the State (formerly Fiscal) peasants, to introduce the
principles of self-government in municipalities, and finally to
accomplish the great reform in the matter of military service,
and a series of reforms within the army. Alongside with these
it had to pursue a progressive financial and economical policy
in order to help the development of the country, although such
a policy hardly harmonised with the new reactionary course in
the affairs of internal administration and education.
For these reasons Alexander II was obliged to retain such
advocates of progress as Dmitri Miliutin in the Ministry of
War, as Grand Duke Constantine at the head of the Navy and
of the State Council, as Tatarinov at the post of State Comp
troller, and as Reitern in the position of Minister of Finance,
while he saw Tolstoy succeed Golovnin, and the formation
within the Committee of Ministers of the reactionary trium
virate of Shuvalov, Valuiev, and Zelenoy. In a word, life in
Russia did not stop or regress during that heavy period of gov
ernmental and to some extent public reaction, but it continued,
as we shall see, to develop and progress, although under the yoke
of repressions and reaction that development had frequently
assumed morbid and mutilated forms. The foes of progress
could do nothing more, in the face of the uncontrollable process
of the internal growth and development of the national organ
ism, than put sticks into the wheels and hinder the process as
much as they could.
In 1866 the peasant-reform was completed by spreading the

116 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
fundamental principles of the Act of February 19 to the numer
ous categories of the State peasants. Still earlier — in 1863
— the reform was applied to the Udielny peasants. The name
udielny (appanage) was used in the Act of the Imperial Fam
ily, issued under Paul in 1797, for the peasants who were
ascribed to estates of members of the Imperial family. By the
time of the peasant-reform there were about eight hundred
and fifty thousand Udielny peasants of the male sex. Upon
Alexander's request the Ministry of the Court issued in 1858
a special ukase, equalising the Udielny peasants in their per
sonal rights and administrative management with the State
peasants; this measure at once abolished personal bondage in
the Imperial estates. As to the land-allotments of those peas
ants, a special commission in the Ministry of the Court dis
cussed their conditions for two years after the emancipation
act of 1 86 1, and as a result the position of the Udielny peasants
was made considerably better than that of the landowners'
peasants. In the pre-reform period the Udielny peasants pos
sessed larger " basic " portions than other categories, and be
sides they made use of various additional portions out of the
" reserved " lands of the Imperial estates. The application of
the Act of February 19 to those peasants would have put them
in a much worse condition than before. Count Adlerberg,
Minister of the Court, disagreed with the Main Committee,
which suggested that the Udielny peasants relinquish their ad
ditional, reserved portions, in view of the fact that their
" basic " allotments were quite satisfactory in comparison with
the allotments of the landowners' peasants; he worked out a
project which was approved by the Tzar and enacted as a law
on June 26, 1863, by which the peasants reserved all their
former allotments, while those whose allotments were below the
maximum portions of the landowners' peasants, received addi
tional land. Thus the maximal norms of the allotments of
the landowners' peasants were taken as minimal norms for those

STATE PEASANTS 117
of the Udielny peasants. At the same time the obligations
remained unaltered (they were comparatively light. Tr.), and
the o£ro£-payments at once began to be counted as redemption-
payments, to be completed in forty-nine years; the peasants
were directly acknowledged as proprietors of their allotments.
As to the numerous categories of the State peasants, it was
decided to apply the Act of February 19 to them also. Before
the formation of the Ministry of State Domains under Count
Kiselev, during the reign of Nicolas I, the possession of the
State lands had no order or regulation. In some places Fiscal
peasants were in possession of enormous tracts of land, which
they were actually unable to cultivate; while in other places
they owned not more than half a desiatin per soul, and were
obliged to rent land from neighbouring landowners or even
peasants. During the Forties Kiselev founded Cadastral com
missions which were to equalise the allotments of the Fiscal
peasants throughout the empire, and in cases where it was im
possible to allot the peasants sufficient land, they were to be
transplanted to other free State lands, and pay obrok. An
other task of the commissions was to work out a just system
of obroks, in accordance with the agricultural and industrial
conditions of different allotments. After almost twenty years
of work, those commissions succeeded in establishing more regu
lated conditions for the Fiscal peasants in the provinces of
European Russia ; in provinces where land was scarce the min
imum of the peasants' allotments was eight desiatins per soul
— a quite satisfactory amount in comparison with the allot
ments of the landowners' peasants, while in provinces where
land was abundant the peasants received as much as fifteen
desiatins per soul. Thus even under Kiselev (1837-1856) the
State peasants were considerably provided with land. As to
taxes, the Cadastral commissions estimated them not according
to the size of the allotment, but according to the income of
the peasants, since in many provinces the peasants were occupied

118 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
with industry more than with agriculture. In the end the
obroks of the State peasants were considerably smaller than
those of the landowners' peasants.
When the general peasant-reform began, Kiselev had already
left his post, and was succeeded at first by Sheremetiev, then
(from 1857) by M. N. Muraviov, the most vicious and clever
serfholder among Alexander's ministers. Fearing that the
prosperity of the State peasants would bring about the enact
ment of better laws for the landowners' peasants, Muraviov
decided to make the condition of the State peasants worse.
With this aim he undertook in 1859 a revaluation of the obrok-
assessments ; he claimed that the State land alloted to the peasants
belonged to the State, not to the peasants, and their obroks were
not taxes, but rental fees. The new obroks were increased on
the whole fifty per cent., in some places, eighty per cent.
When the ukase of March 5, 1861, was issued, ordering the
introduction of the emancipatory reform in the State domains,
Muraviov prepared a project which was very unfavourable for
the State peasants. Fortunately, however, some defenders of
their rights were found among the members of the Main Com
mittee and the question fell into the hands of N. A. Miliutin,
who succeeded in frustrating Muraviov's attempts, and in mak
ing the State peasants hereditary owners of those allotments
which were given to them by the Cadastral commissions. We
have seen that those allotments were larger than even those
of the Udielny peasants, let alone those of the landowners'.
As to the obligations, in spite of their considerable increase
owing to the efforts of Muraviov in 1859, they were still
smaller than the obroks instituted for the landowners' peasants.
In the legal and administrative respects the Udielny and
State peasants — the latter by the ukase of January 18, 1866
— were to enjoy the general system instituted for the land
owners' peasants. This equalised the entire Russian peasantly
legally and administratively. Yet the final settlement of the

LANDOWNERSHIP CONDITIONS 119
State peasants was delayed a few more years after 1866, owing
to the fact that the Cadastral commissions had not completed
all their work by that time, and in single provinces special
enactments had to be carried through between 1867 and 1872.
Thus the land question of the landowners' and of the Udielny
peasants was settled much earlier than that of the State peas
ants, and the allotments of the latter were not at once con
sidered their property; they had to redeem them later at con
siderably raised norms.
We get the following picture of Russian landownership in
the Seventies of the ninteenth century from the official data of
the Central Statistic Committee, issued in 1878 for forty-nine
provinces of European Russia, not including Finland, Poland,
and the Caucasus. The entire land in those forty-nine prov
inces was estimated as three hundred and ninety-one million
desiatins, in round figures; this included one hundred and fifty
million desiatins of fiscal lands, i.e., lands not allotted to the
peasants, but at that moment the property of the State, — which
formed thirty-eight and a half per cent, of the entire territory.
Lands of the Imperial family, after the allotment of the
Udielny peasants, occupied seven and four-tenths million desia
tins, or two and two-tenths per cent, of the whole territory;
in private property of landowners of all classes were ninety-
three million desiatins, i.e., twenty-three and seventy-eight
hundredths per cent. ; of the latter the land belonging to nobles
proper toward the end of the Seventies amounted to only
seventy-three million desiatins, while lands owned by non-
nobles, by commoners, among whom were also rich peasants
who bought property outside of their communities, amounted
to twenty-million desiatins. The amount of lands owned by
churches, cities, monasteries, and other institutions reached eight
and a half million desiatins. Finally the total amount of the
peasant-allotments was one hundred and thirty million desiatins,
i.e., thirty-three and four-tenths per cent, of the territory of

120 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the forty-nine provinces — considerably more than the amount
of land in private ownership.
Professor L. V. Khodsky published a book in the Eighties,
devoted to the study of the position of the peasants after the
Reform and of the material well-being of separate peasant-
classes. Before this, in 1876, Professor Yanson undertook the
same task, and endeavoured to estimate the allotments and
obligations of the peasants on the basis of quite unsatisfactory
figures. Later we shall have to deal with his calculations and
conclusions, but at present, for the general picture of land-
ownership in Russia, I shall quote Professor Khodsky's figures,
because they are based on the data of the Central Statistic Com
mittee, published in 1878. Khodsky had figured out that out
of ten million six hundred and seventy thousand State and
Udielny male peasants, five million four hundred thousand,
or fifty per cent., were given generous allotments ; three million
eight hundred thousand, or thirty-five per cent., were given suf
ficient allotments, and one million four hundred and fifty-five
thousand, or thirteen and seven-tenths per cent., were given
insufficient allotments. Professor Khodsky employed the terms
" generous," " sufficient," and " insufficient," conditionally.
He indicated that the maximal allotment of the landowners'
peasants was equal to one-half of the amount of land the
peasant was capable of cultivating, considering that he did not
receive that portion for which he had to work three days
barshchina in the pre-reform days. In regard to the State
peasants, Khodsky figured on the basis of the reports of the
Cadastral commissions, and in view of the absence of barshchina
among them, that the average allotment of the State peasants
was sufficient for a tolerable existence, and absorbed the whole
working capacity of the individual ; hence he regarded the allot
ments that were above that average norm as generous. Out of
these considerations Khodsky concluded that fifty per cent, of the
State and Udielny peasants were allotted generously, and thirty-

CLASSIFICATION OF ALLOTMENTS 12 1
five per cent. — sufficiently. By sufficiently Khodsky under
stood, not quite consistently, the allotments that were to be
classed between the maximal norm of landowners' allot
ments and the average norm of the State allotments. This
second class appeared far from uniform, because the
peasants whose allotment approached the maximal norm of
the landowners' allotment received, as we have seen, only
one-half of what they were capable of cultivating, while
those whose possessions were near the average norm of the
allotments of the State peasants, received indeed a more or less
sufficient portion. For this reason Khodsky considered in the
province of Samara, for instance, those who received more than
ten desiatins as generously endowed, while in the category of the
sufficiently endowed he included those who received from three
to ten desiatins — a quite variegated category. Finally, Khod
sky found that the allotments below that norm were absolutely
insufficient, and in this category he figured thirteen per cent.
from among the State and Udielny peasants.
As to the landowners' peasants, whose number was approxi
mately equal to the total number of the State and Udielny
peasants (there were about ten million State, and about eight
hundred and fifty thousand Udielny peasants — altogether
about ten million six hundred thousand souls, while the number
of landowners' peasants was also about ten million six hundred
thousand), — Khodsky found among them only thirteen per
cent, generously allotted, i.e., whose portions were above the
average norm of the State peasants. Then four million six
hundred thousand and twenty-five, or forty-three and a half
per cent., were allotted sufficiently, and finally forty-two per
cent. — four million four hundred and sixty thousand — re
ceived absolutely insufficient allotments. If we put all the
categories of the peasants together, we find that of the total
of twenty-one million two hundred and seventy-eight thousand
male souls there were six million nine hundred thousand gen-

122 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
erously alloted, mainly from among the State and Udielny
peasants; they formed thirty-two per cent., i.e., less than one-
third of the total mass. Eight million four hundred and thirty
thousand, or about forty per cent., were sufficiently allotted
with those limitations of that term which I have observed.
Finally five million nine hundred thousand, or about twenty-
eight per cent., i.e., more than one-fourth, were allotted in
sufficiently. On the whole this treatment of the peasants was quite liberal,
if we compare the general dimensions of peasant ownership
with those of private landownership of that day, and do not
take into account the enormous tracts of fiscal landownership
which consisted in the main of remote and unarable land, of
which only four million desiatins were utilised as obrok-pay'mg
assets, while the remaining one hundred and forty-six million
desiatins were situated chiefly in the northern provinces, and
consisted of forests, water, and marshes, which greatly increased
the total amount of fiscal landownership, but, in view of their
climatic and soil-conditions, did not form a part of the utilis-
able land-fund.
This is, in general features, the picture of the peasants'
landownership, as it appeared soon after the realisation of the
Reform. In another chapter we shall analyse the changes and
defects that had eventually been revealed in that system.

CHAPTER XXVIII
WE shall now examine the immediate economic and
social results of the peasant-reform, which have
directed the general current of Russian life until
recent times.
Historians who have studied this question — like Professor
Miliukov in his book, " Studies in the History of Russian
Culture," and those who have quite recently investigated the
data connected with this question — like M. Oganovsky in his
work, " Studies in the History of Agrarian Relations in
Russia," published in 191 1, — agree that the. first immediate^
and at the same time the most conspicuous, consequence of the
peasant-reform was the extraordinary rise of the growth of the
population. P. N. Miliukov arrives at this conclusion after
an examination of past centuries; he justly indicates that the
growth of the population had been checked for a long time,
and that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the
period of Peter's stormy activity, his wars and expensive re
forms and constructions, the population of Russia, especially of
her central regions, had absolutely decreased. We may fairly
presume the same to have been true during the Troubled Time,
at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth
century. Miliukov supposes therefore that beginning perhaps
with the sixteenth century down to the second quarter of the
eighteenth century, there had been no increase in the popula
tion, since the entire surplus was swallowed up by the enormous
sacrifices which the people had to make for the creation of the
Russian state and for territorial aggrandisement. Miliukov
gives the following figures for the central provinces, i.e., for
the Petrine province of Moscow which embraced the future
provinces of Kaluga, Tula, part of Riazan, part of Nizhni-
123

124 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Novgorod, Kostroma, Vladimir, and part of Tver: In 1678
there were thirty-nine persons per square verst, in 1724 —
somewhat less than twenty-nine persons, and only in 1858, on
the eve of the peasant-reform, did the density of the population
again reach that of the middle of the seventeenth century, i.e.,
thirty-nine and four-tenths per verst. At first glance there
appears indeed an enormous leap in the growth of the popula
tion during the last forty years of the nineteenth century. In
the Petrine province of Kiev Miliukov estimated in 1678
eleven and four-tenths per square verst, in 1 724 — eleven and
two-tenths, while in 1858 the density of population there
reached forty persons per square verst, and in 1897 — fifty-
seven, — a growth not only in the post-reform time, but even
before the Reform. P. N. Miliukov brings analogous figures
for other parts of European Russia, which seem to prove that
although the growth of the Russian population has progressed
quite rapidly since Peter, its most rapid progress was manifested
after the Reform. Most of the later investigators are inclined
to share this view, among them the above mentioned Oganov-
sky who cites Miliukov's figures and diagrams in support of
his opinion of the great significance of the increased growth
of the population after the Reform.1
If we should take into account, however, the data of all
the census that took place in Russia during the nineteenth cen
tury, we shall see that the growth of the population changed
somewhat differently from the way Mr. Oganovsky suggests.
Thus, if we trace the numbers from the fifth " revision "
(census), at the very end of the eighteenth century, to the cen-
1 It seems that the first investigator of the peasantry to have cate
gorically claimed the " extraordinary " growth of the population after
1861, was P. P. Semionov, in his introduction to the Census materials
issued in 1882. To a considerable extent his conclusion was shared by
P. B. Struve, in his famous early work, Critical Notes on the Question
of Russia's Economic Development, Petrograd, 1894. In his later
work, The Bondage Economy, published in 1913, Struve rejected his
former point of view.

GROWTH OF THE POPULATION 125
sus of 1897, i-e-> f°r °ne hundred years, we shall find that at
the beginning of that period the population of Russia was about
thirty-six million of both sexes, including (approximately) the
population of the conquered provinces, or twenty-nine million
without the latter. The next, sixth, " revision " took place
before the war, in 181 1, and showed that the population had
increased in fourteen years from thirty-six to forty-one million.
By the seventh " revision," taken immediately after the war
of 1 812, the general population of the Russian Empire had
increased to nearly forty-five million, but one must observe
that this number included the population of the annexed terri
tories — the Kingdom of Poland (about three million), the
Grand Duchy of Finland (over one million), the region of
Bessarabia (about three hundred thousand), and the dominion
of the Caucasus where it was impossible at that time to get any
figures as to the number of the people. Excluding these terri
tories, we see by the calculation of Academic Herman z that
without Poland, Finland, and Bessarabia, but including the
Caucasian portion and Siberia, Russia had in 181 1 a male
population of eighteen million eight hundred thousand in round
figures, which within four years diminished by nearly a million.
Considering that the annual increase of the population in the
preceding years exceeded one per cent., the increase during the
four years should have been approximately eight hundred thou
sand, whereas there was a loss of nearly one million, i.e., in
general the human loss caused by the Napoleonic wars was over
one and a half million male persons. After the wars the popula
tion began to grow again, in spite of the existence of bondage;
as in the case of other countries, slavery did not lead to the
diminution of the population. Indeed, during the Thirties and
the Forties the numbers increased greatly, and by the ninth
2 In accepting the data of Herman, I have corrected the important
errors included in his table published in Memoirs de V Academie des
Science de St. Petersbourg, 1820, page 456.

126 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
" revision " we see that in 1851 there were sixty-eight million
as against forty-five million in 1815, i.e., in thirty-six years the
population increased more than one time and a half, in spite
of the fact that there were no territorial acquisitions during
that time, and that those years included the cholera epidemic
of 1848, when owing to the ignorance of means for combating
the disease about one million people perished; besides, there
were a number of famines on account of failure of crops
(1820-1821, 1833, 1839-1840, 1843-1846, 1848). In the
short period of seven years, from the ninth " revision " to the
tenth, in 1858, the population again increased considerably,
reaching seventy-four million, in spite of years of misery, includ
ing the Crimean Campaign which cost at least half a million
lives. Thus we see that under bondage the general population grew
quite noticeably. True, the number of bonded peasants not
only did not increase, but diminished between the eighth and
ninth, and ninth and tenth " revisions," but this shows merely
that even during the bondage system there was a considerable
number of peasants who had changed their status — through
liberation of single villages (the number of which was quite
considerable after 1804), through redemption of persons or
families, through the purchase of estates from landowners by
the State, under Kiselev (about fifty-four thousand souls),
through flights and forced exiles to Siberia. But the most
considerable loss of bondmen was due to the recruitments which
took place every other year, and at times every year, requiring
from five to ten men out of every thousand. Between the
eighth and tenth " revisions " the recruitments diminished the
number of bondmen by not less than one and a half million.3
8 From 1834 the recruitments took place each year alternately in
one-half of the empire, taking five to ten men from every thousand.
During the war of 1853-1856 seventy men were recruited from every
thousand, which depleted the ten million bondmen by not less than
seven hundred thousand. One should also bear in mind that the re-

NUMBERS OF BONDMEN 127
Thus we may come to a well founded conclusion that the num
ber of the bonded peasantry diminished not because of the
decrease of the natural growth of the population, but merely
because a considerable part of the bondmen were then assigned
to different classes of the people.
I am bringing out these facts in order to limit the optimistic
conclusions which are apt to spring from the superficial com
parison of the numbers of the peasants before and after the
emancipation. If we take the whole first half of the nine
teenth century, it will indeed appear that the growth of the
population during that period was smaller than during the
second half of the century — on account of the Napoleonic
wars and epidemics; but after the Napoleonic wars, in spite
of two cholera epidemics and numerous crop failures, the rela
tive growth of the population was almost as large as after
the Emancipation. In my opinion the increase of the population
in the years following the Napoleonic wars was one of the
main causes which, alongside with a number of other econom
ical conditions that undermined the system of bondage-land-
ownership, prepared the fall of bondage.
A priori considerations lead the investigators of the post-
reform to another idea — that after such an event as the eman
cipation of the peasants from bondage there must have taken
place in a large degree the distribution of the population among
less populated fertile provinces, on the one hand, and its move
ment into cities — on the other. The latter especially, since
with the abolition of serfdom it appeared possible to bring
about those conditions which create in all countries a normal
development of capitalism (the increase of the labour supply
on the market, and the transition of natural wealth into money-
wealth on a large scale). Some historians have followed these
cruits were men between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five, i.e.,
the most fecund producers of children, which fact decreased the num
ber of births in the years following recruitments.

128 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
a priori considerations, and accordingly interpret the figures
given by the statistic data. But if we should follow the sta
tistic material furnished by the " revisions " and censuses, and
by the data collected at various times by the Central Statistic
Committee, we shall see that in this case also the a priori con
siderations are not justifiable.
A detailed study of the growth of population in single prov
inces will show us that in the regions where the peasants im
migrated before and after the Reform, i. e., in the provinces
where the population had particularly increased during the
nineteenth century, a considerable part of that increase, and in
some provinces the main part, took place in the pre-reform
time. A comparison between the growth of the population
from 1797 to 1897 m tne southeastern and southern provinces
with its growth in the central, particularly in the non black-
soil provinces, will show a colossal difference. Whereas in
the province of Yaroslavl the increase for the whole cen
tury was seventeen per cent., in those of Vladimir and Kaluga,
thirty per cent., in those of Kostroma, Tver, Smolensk, Pskov,
and even the black-soil Tver, fifty to sixty per cent., — in the
province of Astrakhan the increase was one thousand and seven
hundred and fifty per cent., in that of Ufa — one thousand
two hundred per cent., in that of Samara and in the Region
of the Don Army — one thousand per cent., in that of Kherson
— one thousand per cent., in Bessarabia — eight or nine hun
dred per cent, in that of Tavrida (Crimea) — four hundred
per cent., in that of Yekaterinoslav — three hundred and fifty
per cent., and so forth. These figures indicate a considerable
outflux of the population from the centre to the peripheries.
Among the central and northern non black-soil provinces only
those of Moscow and Petrograd show during that time an
increase of one hundred and fifty per cent, for that of Mos
cow, and five hundred per cent, for the province of Petrograd,
an increase explained wholly by the growth of the urban popu-

GROWTH OF THE POPULATION 129
lation in the capitals. From the table and cartograms at the
end of this chapter you can observe that the process of the
migration from the centre to the peripheries had taken place
in a considerable measure, and in some cases largely, in the pre-
reform period.
Approximately the same may be said concerning the growth
of the urban population in Russia. P. N. Miliukov, in his
work on the history of Russia culture, gives very interesting fig
ures about the growth of the urban population for the last
two and a half centuries. In the middle of the seventeenth
century, in 1630, the urban population numbered two hundred
and ninety-two thousand, or two and four-tenths per cent, of
the entire population. About one hundred years later their
number increased only to three hundred and twenty-eight thou
sand, or two and a half per cent, of the total population; we
must remember that this was in the time of Peter, when the
numbers of the people diminished greatly. By the fourth " re
vision," made in 1782, we had already eight hundred and two
thousand urbanites, or three and one-tenth per cent, of the
total population. The fifth "revision," in 1796, the starting
point for the study of the population movement in the nine
teenth century, shows one million three hundred and one thou
sand — four and one-tenth per cent, of the total population.
For the sixth " revision " Miliukov gives the figures of one
million six hundred thousand, or four and four-tenths per cent. ;
for the " revision " — three million and twenty-five thousand,
or five and eight-tenths per cent. ; for the ninth " revision," in
1 85 1, three million four hundred and eighty-two thousand —
five per cent.;* for 1858 — six million, or nine and two-tenths
per cent, of the total. Then Miliukov takes at once the census
of 1897, and shows the number of the urban population as six
teen million two hundred and eighty-nine thousand, almost
thirteen per cent, of the entire population.
4 Miliukov gives the wrong percentage — seven and eight-tenths.

130 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The general conclusion that one may draw from these fig
ures is that the urban population increased after the Reform
not only absolutely but even relatively, although Miliukov him
self finds the present proportion of the urban to the general
population very unfavourable, in comparison with other coun
tries of a higher culture. As a matter of fact, the figures used
by Miliukov require considerable corrections. Those he em
ploys for the pre-reform time (except the figures for 1858,
evidently) denote the numbers of the so-called city classes,
the merchants and commoners (mieshchanie) combined, whereas
the census of 1897 gives the number of all the city inhabitants,
not only of the merchants and commoners. From the data
of the Economy Department we can see that in 1847 the en
tire urban population of Russia equalled four million seven
hundred thousand persons, of whom there were two million
three hundred thousand commoners, or fifty per cent., about four
and a half per cent, were merchants, about five and a half per
cent, nobles and other privileged persons, about one-half per cent.
— clergy. All these categories formed sixty-one and a half per
cent, of the total number of city inhabitants, while the remain
ing thirty-eight and a half per cent, were marked in the category
of " others." Professor Ditiatin, who has made a special study
of the history of Russian cities in the nineteenth century, ex
plained that the " others " denoted " factory workers, labourers,
drivers, and other categories of workingmen almost all whom,
belonged by their origin and ascription to the peasant-class."
Indeed, we witness a similar phenomenon at present : in Mos
cow and Petrograd an enormous portion of the population is
ascribed to the peasants in spite of the fact that for years and
decades they have lived in the cities, engaged in commerce or
industry. By the end of the Forties nine per cent, of the Petro
grad population were commoners, and five per cent. — merchants,
while the remaining eighty-six per cent, belonged to non-urban
classes.

URBAN POPULATION 131
Hence it is evident that the city-classes and the city-inhab
itants are not synonymous; the figures given by Miliukov for
the city-classes of the pre-reform days can not be compared
with the figures of the city-population as a whole, given by
the census of 1897, which included nobles and peasants and
persons of various ranks who lived at that time in the cities.
If we should take for a basis of the city contingent of the
population the data of the Economy Department, taken in the
forties, quoted and illuminated by Professor Ditiatin, we shall
have to multiply the figures 5 quoted by Miliukov for the pre-
reform time at least one time and a half, if not more, and
then the picture will be quite different. It will appear that
the growth of the city population proceeded consistently, grad
ually, very slowly, and has increased little after the Reform.
One must note, however, that in regard to the population of
the capitals and of some big industrial centres, it grew con
siderably more rapidly after the Reform than before it.
Thus you can see that the a priori considerations about thej
effect of the peasant-reform on the growth of the population, oni
its distribution through the empire, on the growth of the cities
and, in general, on the preparation of the capitalistic order,,
are not quite correct, and should be regarded with great cau
tion. Upon a close study of the figures and relations, we see
that the transformation of the economic status after the Re
form has been accomplished more slowly and gradually than
one might have expected.
The reasons for this fact are quite simple. During the first
years after the Reform Russia was in a very depressed economic
state. On one side the peasants found themselves burdened
with almost intolerable payments; on the other side, the land
owners were unable to cope successfully with the new condi-
5 1 do not know where Miliukov has taken his figures for the popu
lation in 1858, but they evidently express the entire city population,
not only the city-classes.

132 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
tions produced by the revolution. The landowners lacked the
resources required for the new form of agricultural manage
ment which demanded not only hired labour, but also a com
plete new inventory — implements and cattle, for under the
bondage system the peasants had cultivated with their own im
plements and cattle the land of their masters. Not having
their own inventory, the landowners of the black-soil provinces
were not infrequently forced to rent the larger part of their
estates to the emancipated peasants.
In the non black-soil, industrial provinces, the conditions of
the landowners were in this respect still worse. With a few
exceptions they were unable to meet the new conditions, and
their estates were either ruined or sold out; since the peasants
did not have the money for the purchase of the much needed
land, the estates were sold to merchants or to single rich peas
ants who treated it like birds of prey, cut out forests and even
gardens, and then themselves sold the ravaged estates to peasants.
Such was the situation in the field of agriculture. Curiously
enough, in the years immediately following the Reform, we
find no improvement in the industrial field either. We know
that the merchants and factory owners had expected that the
emancipation of the peasants would increase the supply of
labour, from among the freed peasants, especially since their
allotments were not sufficient. But such was not the case in
the first years after the Reform. A great number of factories,
especially iron-foundries and cloth-factories, were still Posses-
sional, i.e., they depended on bonded labour. As soon as
their working men were liberated, they began to abandon the
factories in crowds, in their desire to get away from the hate
ful places of their long suffering and slavery. For this rea
son many factories were forced either to close up or to lessen
their production in the first years after the Reform.
Tugan-Baranovsky, in his book, Russian Factories, sets
forth curious figures about the Kuvshinsky works, for instance.

POST-REFORM DIFFICULTIES 133
In 1857 that foundry produced four hundred and seventy-
nine thousand puds of cast-iron, in 1 862 — three hundred and
thirteen thousand puds, and even in 1868, seven years after
the Reform, it produced only three hundred and fifty-three
thousand puds. Such was the general situation in the Urals.
All the Ural foundries gave in i860 fourteen million five hun
dred thousand puds, in 1861 — only fourteen million two hun
dred thousand puds, in 1862 — ten million four hundred thou
sand, in 1863 somewhat more — eleven million four hundred
thousand, in 1867 — twelve million four hundred thousand
puds, and only about 1870 did the total reach the first norm,
and soon thereafter began to exceed it. In the seventies the
iron-production was considerably larger than in the pre-reform
days; it took the iron manufacturers ten years to orient them
selves in the new circumstances. The cloth-factories also re
quired five to six years before they could adapt themselves to
the new conditions.
It is curious to observe that a similar situation existed for
the cotton-mills, although they had instituted hired labour long
before the Reform, and had therefore expected an improve
ment in the labour conditions. It happened that England was
going through a severe commercial-industrial crisis at that time,
which raised the prices of cotton-yarn (a considerable part of
the Russian cotton-mills still depended on English yarn). For
this reason their conditions had also somewhat deteriorated in
the first years after the Reform.
These circumstances which resulted from or coincided with
the peasant-reforms, affected the state of internal commerce
in Russia. A clear illustration is furnished by the figures of
the turnover of the Nizhni-Novgorod fair. Fairs had a greater
significance at that time than now when they are giving way
before the modern methods of wholesale trade. In i860 the
turnover of the Nizhni-Novgorod fair was one hundred and
five million rubles, in 1861 — ninety-eight million rubles, in

134

MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY

1862 — one hundred and three million rubles, and only in
1864 did it exceed the turnover of i860, reaching one hun
dred and eleven million rubles, after which it continued to in
crease. Such were the post-reform economic conditions in Russia.
The state of industry was far from flourishing, and the way
was still far to a developed capitalistic order.

.7.30

l»«

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND-OWNERSHIP BY CATEGORIES
IN 49 PROVINCES IN THE YEAR 1878.

DENSITY OF THE POPULATION IN VARIOUS PROVINCES

Provinces in order of
density of popula
tion in 1797

rsq.mile yrevision E 1797 iothsexes)

V.u
O B
^ ¦" «
rt.3M-<

rsq.mile. yrevision
of 358 and
data f 1863 both sexes)

.. ^ v

rsq.
mile ycensus f 1897 both sexes)

&¦-¦€

rcentile
in- rease
of ensity
for 00yrs.

S>"

fi.a»°~

5*°

Oi

E*°

£u-°"

1600

1

2048

3

2378

5

ab. 50%

1586

2

2672

1

4064

1

150

1400

3

2160

2

2776

3

100

1340

4

1647

8

1760

14

130

1234

5

1430

13

i486

19

17

1 1 76

6

1850

4

2220

7

100

1170

7

1775

5

23H

6

100

1062

8

1356

14

I604

17

30

1003

9

1674

7

2040

11

100

952

10

1306

16

1654

15

72

932

11

1760

6

2786

2

200

928

12

IIIO

18

1440

20

ab. 60

916

13

1340

15

l6l8

16

75

860

14

1644

9

2170

8

150

840

15

1580

11

208S

10

150

762

16

858

21

I3l6

21

60

752

17

1431

12

1926

12

150

624

18

709

25

884

28

50

582

19

8s6

22

940

25

60

504

20

1122

17

1566

18

200

480

21

1610

10

2768

4

500

396

22

1013

20

1820

13

350

356

23

806

23

1097

23

200

283

24

450

28

592

29

118

272

25

1070

19

2156

9

700

238

26

534

27

1272

22

400

149

27

368

29

476

3<>

200

82

28

209

31

360

31

340

82

29

572

26

933

26

< 1000

82

30

780

24

1090

24

1200

82

31

326

30

892

27

ab. 1000

81

32

129

32

177

33

118

72

33

105

34

127

34

70

14

34

130

33

256

32

1750

13

35

19

35

23

35

75

Notes

Tula 
Moscow 
Kursk 
Kaluga 
Yaroslavl 
Riazan 
Oriol 
Vladimir 
Penza 
Simbirsk 
Kharkov 
M Smolensk 
Oi Nizhni-Novgorod
^Tambov 
Voroniezh 
Pskov 
Kazan 
Kostroma 
Tver 
Saratov 
Petrograd 
Yekaterinoslav . .
Viatka 
Novgorod 
Kherson 
Tavrida (Crimea)
Perm 
Orenburg 
Samara 
Ufa 
Don Region 
Vologda 
Olonetzk 
Astrakhan 
Arkhangelsk

[ Owing to Mos-
I cow.

[ Partly owing to
I Kharkov.

j Owing to Petro-
t grad

(Partly owing to
i Odessa.

CHAPTER XXIX
COMBINED with the depressed economic state of the
country was a similar state of the national finances.
After the Crimean Campaign, during the whole re
form-period, and in the post-reform years, the Government was
in very difficult circumstances. One of the main causes was
the fall of the course of the paper-ruble. After the money-re
form of 1843 and until the Crimean Campaign the position of
the Russian finances was quite satisfactory. Owing to Kan-
krin's reform the amount of credit-money in circulation was
very moderate: in 1854 three hundred eleven million rubles,
and their course stood at par in view of the presence of a
metallic fund of one hundred and twenty-three million rubles,
which allowed a free exchange of the paper money. The war
required new issues of paper-money, the amount of which
reached in 1858 the sum of seven hundred and eighty million
rubles, while the metal-reserve had fallen to one hundred and
nineteen million rubles, i. e., below the one-sixth norm which
Kankrin considered necessary for the uninterrupted mainten
ance of free exchange; hence the Government was forced to
refuse redemption. Naturally the course of such unredeema
ble money fell continually during the years immediately fol
lowing the Crimean Campaign.
At the same time the Government was eager to see the de
velopment of private credit and of private capitalistic under
takings; with this view it lowered the interest paid for de
posits in fiscal credit-institutions — to direct the deposits to
private enterprises. The deposits began to flow out rapidly,
136

i'lJNAJNClAJL, uifnCuLTIES 137
descending in ten years to two hundred million from over one
billion rubles. In the pre-reform time the Government made
free use of that fund, and borrowed from it for its needs, so that
in the end the debt of the Government to the saving institu
tions exceeded five hundred million rubles. When the deposits
began to be withdrawn more rapidly than it had been expected,
the Government was forced to contract new loans on heavy
conditions, and yet it did not cover the entire debt; it still
owed the credit-institutions one hundred and sixty million
rubles. The course of the paper-money fell not only because of the
superabundant issue of such money and the diminution of the
metal-fund, but also because of Russia's extremely unfavoura
ble balance of trade at that time, in view of her insignificant
export and large import soon after the war. This unfavoura
ble trade balance was enhanced by the fact that after the aboli
tion of the rule forbidding Russians to go abroad, which was
introduced in the reign of Nicolas, the number of Russian
travellers abroad became very large, and they withdrew enor
mous quantities of money from their country.
The situation resembled that after the Treaty of Tilsit and
during the Continental System, early in the nineteenth cen
tury. Under such difficult conditions the Tzar appointed in
1862 the comparatively young M. K. Reitern as Minister of
Finance, after two absolutely incapable ministers — Brock and
Kniazhevich. Reitern's ability had been demonstrated through
his activity in the financial sub-commission of the Editing Com
mission, which worked out the plan of the redemption-opera
tion. Reitern's immediate task consisted in raising the course of
the paper-ruble, while his remote ideal was the transition to
a permanent metal standard. However we may regard such
a plan of political economy, which is reduced to one exclusive
problem, we must say that at his very start Reitern committed

138 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
a big blunder. In order to raise the course of the paper-
money he attempted to make it redeemable by contracting
a loan of fifteen million pounds sterling, i.e., about one hun
dred and fifty million rubles, which at once increased the metal-
fund, and allowed the Government to announce that it was
ready to redeem the credit-money. But at this Reitern made
a naive mistake: he declared that until a certain date the
paper-ruble would be exchanged at a certain rate, after a cer
tain time — at a higher rate, then at a still higher, and so
forth — calculating that the course of the ruble would con
stantly rise owing to the redemption. He did not take into
account the numerous speculators who hastened to buy out the
credit-bills while the rate of exchange was low, to present
them for redemption when the rate was promised to be the
highest. This mad speculation absolutely paralysed the possi
ble success of the measure; to this was added the Polish re
volt, and the expected intervention of foreign powers, the fear
of which forced the Government to spend a part of the re
serve fund for military preparations. Soon Reitern was not
in position to continue the redemption-operation, and the course
of the paper-ruble fell lower than before. Although the num
ber of credit-bills in circulation had decreased from seven hun
dred and eighty million to seven hundred million rubles, the
metal-fund had also shrunk from one hundred and nineteen
million to fifty-five million rubles, which formed only about
one-twelfth of the total amount of credit-money, and was thus
less than one-half of the moderate fund considered by Kankrin
as indispensable.
Reitern's first big error was masqued, however, by the Polish
revolt and by the military preparations, which absorbed large
sums of money; his reputation did not suffer, and he remained
at his post sixteen years. His next activity was directed to the
raising of the country's productive powers, after he saw his
" heroic " measures for the raise of the paper-course fail. He

FIRST RAILROADS 139
understood that in order to increase the export of the Russian
chief commodity — grain, it was necessary to build railroads;
toward this he directed all his efforts. Owing to the fact that
he enjoyed the confidence of Alexander II, Reitern was the
actual manager in this matter, in spite of his frequent conflicts
with the Minister of Communications.
The history of railroad building presents one of the most
cardinal parts of the history of the development of capitalism
in Russia, and its study is of great importance for the clear
understanding of the course of the transformation of Russian
social life after the abolition of serfdom. We have seen the
difficult conditions of the embryonic capitalism immediately
after the Emancipation; and we all know that the development
of a net of railroads is the most powerful nerve in the evolu
tion of capitalism in every country.
The first Russian railroad was the Tzarskoselsky (from
Petrograd to Tzarskoie-Selo. Tr.), twenty-five versts long,
built in 1837 by private means without any subsidies or guar
antees on the part of the Government; the railroad was to re
main the property of its builders for an indefinite time. The
construction lasted two years, and cost comparatively little —
forty-two thousand rubles per verst, including all the necessary
buildings. The exploitation of that railroad convinced the
Government of the practicability of railroads in Russia, and it
undertook the construction of the Petrograd-Moscow line, sub
sequently called, the Nicolaievsky. At the head of the fiscal
undertaking stood Minister of Communications Kleinmichel,
one of Arakcheiev's generals; although it is generally testified
that personally he was honest, the construction of the railroad
was connected with flagrant abuses. True, it was firmly built,
especially the depots, bridges, etc., but it cost one hundred and
sixty-five thousand rubles per verst, as against forty-two thou
sand rubles of the Tzarskoselsky railroad. The construction
of the Nicolaievsky railroad lasted nine years ; the bonded peas-

140 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ants were driven in hordes to the works, and the workers per
ished in large numbers.
These were the only railroads built during the reign of
Nicolas. True, in 1851, the Government decided to construct
the Warshavsky (Petrograd- Warsaw) Railroad, again by fiscal
means, in spite of the lesson it had learned, but until 1853 only
a small portion was constructed, at the expense of eighteen
million rubles, and the breaking out of the war caused the
work to cease for lack of funds. After the Crimean Cam
paign the Government of Alexander II, which had just ex
perienced the horrors of want of roads, when the ammunition
had to be transported to Sevastopol on horses, and the troops
had to march there on foot, determined to consider as one of
its first tasks the construction of roads. But in view of the
bitter lesson taught by the fiscal management of the building of
I the Nicolaievsky railroad, and in accordance with the principles
j of its new economic policy, the Government decided to hand
' the matter over to private companies, limiting its own role to
general initiative and to encouragement of private enterprisers.
Added to these considerations was the plan for attracting cap
ital and metal-money into Russia, for which reason foreigners
were allowed to head the undertaking. Although among the
founders was one Russian banker, Stiglitz, most of them were
foreigners; even the office of the Company was not in Petro
grad, but in Paris. A joint-stock company was formed, under
the title, Main Company of Russian Railroads; it issued stock,
with the Government's guarantee for five per cent, income on
that capital, besides other privileges, as, for instance, that the
company should retain ownership of the roads for ninety-nine
years. Yet the founders of the company did not furnish any
cash capital, but only underwrote it; special "obligations" had
to be issued for the construction of the roads. Owing to the
fact that the founders had squandered a considerable part of
the stock-capital, the building of the roads proceeded with great

TH£ MAiN COMPANY 141
difficulties and at high cost — about one hundred thousand
rubles per verst.
The Main Company was to complete, first of all, the War
shavsky line, then to construct the line Diinaburg-Riga, next
the Moscow-Nizhni-Novgorod line, and finally, the Moscow-
Sevastopol line. It had been planned in that way to connect
the fertile Volga provinces, part of New Russia, and the cen
tral black-soil provinces, with a Baltic port through Moscow,
while Moscow would in her turn be joined with the Black
Sea (Sevastopol). But the Main Company completed only
the Warshavsky road and the line to Nizhni-Novgorod, while
the Diinaburg-Riga was not finished by the stipulated time,
and the Moscow-Sevastopol railroad was not even begun. Only
part of the capital was subscribed abroad, but the larger por
tion of the stock and obligations the company sold and realised
in Russia, so that in the end the hopes of the Government for
the influx of foreign capital were not fulfilled; the reverse
came to pass, and the whole enterprise, conducted as it was
rapaciously in means and methods, proved unfortunate in all
respects. In view of this failure, particularly after it appeared that
owing to the high cost of the construction the profitableness of
the railroads was doubtful, the more so since the movement of
freight on the Warshavsky road was not large, the dividend
expectations of the stockholders were not realised, and the
Government had to pay out considerable sums on the basis of
its guarantee. Not only was the Russian public disappointed
in the results of the undertaking, but the Government itself
felt almost despondent, and in 1861 it cancelled its first agree
ment with the Main Company, insisted upon the transfer of
the main office from Paris to Petrograd, and that the manage
ment should include four members appointed by it; the com
pany was released from its obligation to construct the remain
ing two railroads.

142 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
In spite of this failure, Reitern and the new Minister of
Communications, Melnikov, decided to continue the work; in
Reitern's opinion the construction of railroads was uncondi
tionally necessary for his basic task — the development of the
country's productive powers, in general, and the raise of
the course of the Russian money, in particular, by way of in
creasing the grain-export. Melnikov prepared a quite pur
poseful plan for the further development of the railroad net;
to construct the Moscow-Sevastopol line, the lines Odessa-Kiev
and Kiev-Moscow, to complete the Diinaburg-Riga road, to
continue it through Riga-Libava (Libau), and to connect that
road with Oriol, i.e., with a central point for export com
modities, particularly agriculture products; Oriol was to be
joined with Tambov and Saratov. On the other hand a line
was to be built from Kiev, or from some point on the Odessa-
Kiev line, towards the Austrian border, for strategic reasons,
and a line from.Yekaterinoslav to the Grushevsky coal-mines in
the Don Region, in order to provide the new roads with min
eral fuel, in case the forests along their course would not fur
nish them with sufficient fuel.
The plan was apparently well made, but it was very difficult
to begin its realisation. Reitern still preferred private capital
for the undertaking; he expected an influx of Russian and
foreign capital; besides he pointed out that since a considerable
part of the construction would have to be done by the aid of
loans, it was important that those loans be a private matter,
although with the Government's guarantee, lest the contracting
of new loans should harm the national credit. On the other
hand, Melnikov considered that since private construction had
been compromised, the work should be done by fiscal means;
he recommended the establishment of a strict supervision, to
eliminate thievery. Melnikov's view was defeated, and a hunt
for private concessionaires began. It appeared that the heads
and members of the Main Company, who had filled their

HUNT FOR CAPITAL 143
pockets with Russian money, had spread rumours abroad about
the extreme difficulty of constructing railroads in Russia, assert
ing in addition that the whole enterprise was unprofitable.
For this reason no capital could be attracted on the Continent.
The Government tried to find willing capitalists in England,
and offered them extraordinary privileges, such as ninety-nine
years of proprietorship, a guarantee of five per cent, profit
for the entire capital, gratis sites for depots at Sevastopol,
Moscow, and other places, and even its readiness to establish
porto-franco at Sevastopol, i.e., the Government was willing
to promulgate measures which would have undermined its own
financial policy.
Fortunately the English proved too slow, and let pass the
final date announced by the Government; owing to that delay
only the concession did not take place. Then Melnikov sug
gested that temporarily at least the construction of some of the
projected roads be commenced by fiscal means. The Kiev-
Balta railroad was built in this way, and it appeared that
thanks to Melnikov's personal honesty and strict watchfulness,
the cost was only a little over fifty thousand rubles per verst.
An important role in the history of Russian railroads was
played by the concession given to a Russian contractor, Derviz.
In 1866 he undertook to build the Riazan-Kozlov line which
connected through Riazan, Moscow, and through the latter —
Petrograd, with the most fertile region; the enterprise proved
very profitable, and yielded eight per cent, dividend the first
year. It completely changed the state of the Riazan-Moscow
line which began to pay twelve per cent, dividend. These
circumstances, discovered after 1866, aroused the appetites of
Russian capitalists, and improved the chances of Russian rail
roads abroad. Many high personages, or persons with high
connections, began to seek concessions; even many zemstvos.
Reitern's propositions were examined by a special committee
under the chairmanship of a member of the State Council,

144 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Chevkin, and with the participation of N. A. Miliutin; the
committee decided that the further construction of railroads
was a most vital question for Russia. Miliutin argued that
in the next ten years (i 865-1 875) at least five thousand versts
of railroads should be built. Although Miliutin's calculation
was considered optimistic in 1865, it was greatly exceeded, be
cause owing to the concession-fever which began after the suc
cess of the Riazan-Kozlov line, between 1865 and 1875 were
built not five thousand, but twelve thousand more versts, so
that by 1875 Russia was in possession of a net of seventeen
thousand versts, which connected the most productive regions
with ports and with the coal region of the Don, and allowed
a wide export of internal products abroad.
Thus we may say that the plans of railroad construction
were finally well realised; but as to the question of its cost
for the Treasury and the country, and as to whether the work
was done at all conscientiously, we must say that not only was
the cost of the construction excessively large, and enormous
capital fell into the pockets of the " griinders," but there were
numerous other unpardonable abuses, with which many high
personages were connected.1
Particularly strange appeared the episode of selling the
Nicolaievsky railroad to the Main Company. Reitern decided
to form a special railroad-fund for the encouragement of private
capitalists; the Nicolaievsky line was not very profitable (owing
to its high cost), he proposed to sell it, as well as other un
profitable State property, and to use the money for the railroad-
fund. We can understand these considerations, but the sub
sequent course of the affair is beyond comprehension. A solid
company of Moscow capitalists, headed by Koshelev, offered
to buy the line on very advantageous conditions, but it was
sold to the Main Company, which had begun its career with
1 Komilov generally uses the terra " high personages " for members
of the Imperial family. — Tr.

GRAFT 145
fraud, compelled the Government to pay out an enormous sum
as " guarantee," managed its affairs badly, and still owed a
large debt to the Government. Some explain that outside of
ordinary graft in the matter, the sale of the road to the Main
Company was motivated by the desire of the Government to
give it a chance for settling with its creditors, primarily with
the Treasury. A quite extraordinary consideration!
Thus was accomplished the construction of the railroads
which have been a powerful factor in the development of Rus
sian capitalism.
Outside of this activity Reitern worked hard for the
creation and popularisation of private credit. In the pre-
reform time, and shortly after the reform, until the opening
of the Imperial Bank in i860, Russia had no organised private
credit. Reitern was not satisfied with the exclusive activity of
the Imperial Bank, and decided to encourage the establish
ment of private banks. The question was vividly discussed
in the press and in financial circles. With the aid of the
Ministry of Finance a number of societies were formed from
among private capitalists for various forms of private credit.
Reitern was also interested in the question of general agrarian
credit, but in this respect he acted timidly, fearing that in view
of the instability of prices on land there might be great abuses.
His immediate task in the field of national finances, in the
narrow sense of the word, was his struggle with deficits in the
State-budget. The budget had grown less considerably than
one might have expected by the perspectives pictured during the
reform-period. At the beginning of Reitern's administration
it amounted to three hundred and fifty million rubles, and by
the end of his service, in 1878, i.e., after fifteen years, it in
creased only to six hundred million rubles (in paper-money).
We should add that in spite of such a moderate growth of the
budget, in spite of the constant economising in the expenditures
of various departments, even in the reorganisation of the army,

146 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
which was found indispensable after the Crimean ^Campaign,
every budget brought a deficit, and Reitern was continually
fighting with individual ministers for the diminution of ex
penditures. Only about the years 1 873-1 874 did he succeed in reducing
the deficit to zero, and in 1875 in having the income exceed
the expense. He then began to save up for a reserve fund
which he considered necessary for a transition to a metal-cur
rency. Just when his last dream seemed realisable to him, it
vanished — at the outbreak of the war in 1877.
The same considerations which forced the Government to
support capitalism, to prepare and encourage its development,
compelled it to carry through several other important reforms
during that reactionary period.
It is instructive to note in this respect that Reitern, a person
who did not share the liberal aspirations of his progressive con
temporaries, was forced, however, in 1866 to enter into a
stubborn battle with his most reactionary colleagues in the
Committee of Ministers, and first of all with the Chief of
Gendarmes, Count Shuvalov, in which battle he almost lost
his post. In one of his posthumous notes, issued by his heirs
in 1910 as supplements to Kulomzin's biography of him, we
read: "In 1866, after the attentate of Karakozov, the ap
pointment of Shuvalov, the resignation of Golovnin, — a regu
lar baiting began against me from different sides, instigated by
Shuvalov. He was joined by Valuiev, and together they
opened a pseudo-liberal campaign, i.e., they tried to produce
an impression of liberalism on the public, at the same time ad
hering relentlessly to absolutism. The enclosed memorandum
had put an end to their attacks against me. . . ."
We can hardly agree with calling the policy of Shuvalov-
Valuiev " pseudo-liberalism " — as a matter of fact it was un
doubtedly a reactionary policy which at times used very thin
liberal phrases as a subterfuge, but this is immaterial; what

REITERN'S MEMORANDUM 147
interests us is the memorandum presented by Reitern to the
Tzar on September 16, 1866, about which the author, says that
it had put an end to the attacks against him — so convincing
did its contents prove for Alexander II. That memorandum
is therefore of considerable significance for the characterisation
of the Government's mood at that moment, and for the under
standing of the circumstance that in spite of the reigning re
action certain reorganisations were carried through which had
not been accomplished during the reform-period. In that
memorandum Reitern wrote:
" Your Imperial Majesty has obliged me to report to you
about the present financial difficulties, and about the measures
which should be undertaken for the improvement of the finan
cial and economic conditions of the country.
" The financial and economic state of a country is complex ;
its roots abide not only in fiscal measures and in purely
economic conditions, but in phenomena of general national
development. If, on one side, it is doubtless that lack of
frugality, a bad administration, and ill-considered and op
pressive fiscal measures are bound to derange the finances, and
then the economic state of a country, — it is, on the other side,
also true that during certain epochs of national development
financial difficulties appear as an inevitable result of circum
stances, as a symptom of the process that is going on within the
social organism."
Reitern further analysed the situation in which Russia found
itself at the beginning of Alexander H's reign — which is again
quite characteristic for a memorandum written at that time
by a minister of finance.
" Russia came out from the Crimean Campaign tired of the
gigantic struggle, with drained finances and exhausted money-
funds, crippled by an issue of four hundred million credit-bills.
The moral authority of the Government was shaken; the war
revealed numerous defects of our administration, both military

148 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
and civil; it shook the dominating position which Russia had
occupied in Europe since the Vienna Congress; as a conse
quence of this came the fall of our authority abroad, and mis
trust for the power and ability of the Government — within
the Empire.
" Even if the Government," he further wrote, " had wished
after the Crimean Campaign to return to the traditions of the
last forty years, i.e., to a relentless opposition to all modern
aspirations, it would have met insurmountable obstacles, if not
in an open, at least in a passive resistance which might in time
have shaken even the loyalty of the people — the broad basis
of the monarchical principle in Russia. For the happiness of
Russia your Imperial Majesty has chosen a different road.
History of all nations proves that revolutions may be forestalled
only by timely reforms which give the people in a peaceful
way that which they seek in revolutions, i.e., the elimination
of the outgrown forms and of the inrooted abuses. The re
forms which will immortalise the reign of your Imperial
Majesty did not touch only the surface of the social order, as
most reforms undertaken voluntarily by governments do.
Courageously and consistently you approached the root of the
evil, and laid a correct foundation for the structure of civil
order. Millions of our people have been called to civilism,
without being divorced from the soil; the system of admin
istrative graft which had been officially tolerated and even en
couraged has fallen with the contracts (i.e., of the beverage),
and now there is a possibility for an honest administration; the
great principle of the separation of the judiciary from the
administration has been strictly carried through in the reorgan
ised courts — without it the sense of justice cannot develop
among the citizens. Finally, in the field of local zemstvo affairs
the principle of self-government has been laid.
" These and many other reforms have already deeply changed
Russia, and I venture to say, for the best, but they have not

REITERN'S MEMORANDUM 149
had time to become ripe, and have aroused in certain minds
extreme and deplorable tendencies." " In a word, the reforms
are so broad, they have so thoroughly affected the depth of our
state-structure and social life, that much time, much labour,
many sacrifices will be required before Russia will emerge
from her transitional state, and will be firmly established on
new, rational foundations. Only then will the economic
development find a stable basis, confidence and credit will be
restored, and there will be found a solid ground for finances,
which does not exist at present. . . ."
Such were the frank declarations of the Minister of Finance
who had directly connected the reforms which were accom
plished, and those that were to be promulgated in the future,
with the financial well-being of the State. Naturally those
were the most substantial arguments in favour of reforms, that
could at that moment produce an impression on Alexander.
At the very end of his lengthy memorandum, after the ex
position of his financial principles and plans, Reitern wrote:
" With such a course of action one may hope that in a few
years the economic forces of Russia will grow stronger; the
reforms which form the glory of your Majesty's reign will not
have to be stopped in their development on account of want
of means, but on the contrary they will yield abundant fruit,
and Russia will finally emerge from the transitional and rest
less period which naturally and inevitably follows revolutions
in the civil and economic order, stronger and richer than ever."
This memorandum, in spite of the reactionary mood of
Alexander, supported by Shuvalov and other retrogrades, was
accepted by him graciously, and had not only put an end to
attacks against Reitern, as the latter believed, but it enabled
him to develop the financial policy which was quite progressive
for that moment, and did not at all harmonise with the gen
eral reaction of the Government.
Out of similar considerations other reforms were carried

150 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
out: municipal, which were connected in the beginning with
certain reforms projected by the Ministry of Interior back
in the Forties, and then a whole series of important reorganisa
tions in the sphere of the military department, the urgent neces
sity of which was demonstrated by the unfortunate Crimean
Campaign, but the realisation of which was delayed mainly
because of the poor state of Russian finances at that time.

CHAPTER XXX
SO far I have not spoken about the municipal reforms
and the development of the cities, in general, because
there has been little to say on the subject. The status
of the cities remained almost without change throughout the
first half of the nineteenth century, indeed, till the end of the
Sixties, so that municipal self-government instituted by Cath
erine had not only not developed, but had come to a standstill
and was decaying. To give a clear picture of the cities and
the city-life in Russia during the earlier part of the nineteenth
century, I shall quote some statistics gathered from official
sources in an article by Professor Ditiatin, one of the best
scholars in the field of the pre- and post-reform municipal life.
Those statistics were taken three times during the nineteenth
century — in 1825, in 1852, and in 1867, and on each occasion
they showed the same picture of a stagnant, motionless city-life.
We see by the tables of 1825 that out of forty-two provincial
capitals — including such cities as Odessa, administratively
equivalent to provincial capitals — only in two, Odessa and
Vilno (both hardly Russian cities), did stone-buildings prevail
over wooden houses ; in Odessa, by the way, stone was cheaper
than wood. In Petrograd there were twice as many and in
Moscow two and a half times as many wood as stone-buildings.
In other provincial capitals the proportion was still worse:
one out of five, in one place, one out of seven, in two cities,
one out of eight, in three, one out of ten, in two, and finally,
in Samara, there was one stone-building for every seven hundred
and eighty-four wooden ones.
The same picture was presented by the figures of 1852 and
151

152 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of 1867. Such, in spite of the quite broad self-government that
was granted to them by Catherine in 1785, were the poverty
and backwardness of the cities. By that charter the population
of the cities was divided into six classes; all of them were
admitted to the election of a general duma, the delegates of
which elected from among themselves an executive of six mem
bers. Paul I abolished that Statute before it had time to
become fairly rooted; beside his tendency to undo all that his
mother had undertaken, he pointed out that the city-charter,
taking up the liberties and rights of the citizens, contradicted
the autocratic order which he intended to guard so jealously.
Alexander I restored the charter, but it continued to exist
merely on paper. From the investigations of the Ministry of
Interior we see that not only in small towns, but even in large
provincial cities, even in the Capitals, municipal institutions
were a myth. We find, for instance, that such an institution
as the Assembly of Delegates, which was to keep the registra
tion books of the voting citizens, did not exist even in Petrograd
and Moscow, so that the elections of the general dumas and
of the city-mayors were evidently performed by casual persons
whose voting rights nobody examined. Never more than one-
tenth, and more often only a twentieth of the voters made use
of their privilege. The percentage of the voters differed
according to classes; Professor Ditiatin shows that only one-
half to one-tenth per cent, of the commoners entitled to vote
took part in the elections of the city-mayor of Moscow in the
Forties. Moreover, the revision of the Ministry of Interior
during the Forties proved that the general dumas seldom existed
in reality ; such was the case in Moscow early in the nineteenth
century. It thus appears that the city-inhabitants had failed to make
use of the privileges granted them by the law. The revision
discovered that instead of the legal institutions there existed in
the towns various forms of peculiar chanceries, completely sub-

MILIUTIN'S ACTIVITY BEGINS 153
jected to the local police, which did not tax the population, but
begged the well-to-do to give contributions for the miserable
maintenance of the town-administration. Thus did reality
differ from the lofty phrases of Catherine's legislation.
I see one explanation of the fact in the general relationship
between the authorities and the subjects; the omnipotent
guardianship manifested on the part of the representatives of
the authority, i.e., the police, deprived all reasoning persons
from the desire to take part in pseudo-self-government. A
greater importance had the circumstance that according to
Catherine's legislation the self-government was given no power
for levying taxes; it was to seek means for the required ex
penditures, i.e., it was allowed to collect contributions for pav
ing the streets or putting up lanterns. Naturally no sensible
citizen had any taste for such self-government.
When some symptoms of economic development in Russia
appeared in the Forties the Government became somewhat
alarmed at the deplorable state of the cities. The Minister
of Interior, L. A. Perovsky, a quite enlightened man, instructed
the young and gifted N. A. Miliutin, who then occupied the
post of Chief of the Economy Department, to investigate the
matter. In co-operation with such intelligent men as Yuriy
Samarin, Ivan Aksakov, and others, Miliutin made a thorough
study of the conditions and needs of Russian cities, and pre
sented the material to the Minister of Interior for the prepara
tion of a new statute for municipal government. Owing to
Miliutin's energy a new statute was worked out for Petrograd,
which was sanctioned by Nicolas, in spite of the fact that the
Forties were the years of cruel reaction ; evidently the Govern
ment had no apprehensions of unrest on the part of the hapless,
harmless city duma.
By that statute the general municipal duma which had not
existed in reality was restored. Miliutin, well intentioned,
but inexperienced, ascribed the backwardness of municipal

154 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
affairs to lack of culture among those strata of the population,
which were expected to take care of them ; therefore he decided
to instill into municipal self-government the most cultured and
enlightened forces of the country — the nobles. The duma
was to be elected by six orders, of which the first was the order
of hereditary nobles who had some connection with the city;
next followed personal nobles and officials, merchants, com
moners, and the order of tzekh-artisans who belonged to the
class of commoners; every order could elect from one hundred
to one hundred and fifty representatives, so that the dimensions
of the duma were quite majestic — over five hundred members.
It is astonishing that Nicolas I acquiesced in the establishment
of such a representative body. The duma was to elect a
special, executive duma for the actual management of all affairs.
Properly speaking, the new statute differed little from that of
Catherine; it was rather a well-intentioned attempt to re-estab
lish or to call to life that which had been instituted by law.
The attempt did not succeed ; the nobles who lived in Petrograd
showed no interest in the municipal affairs, and besides, since
the duma had no right to levy taxes it was utterly impotent.
Yet with the appearance of progressive tendencies among
society the Government became uneasy about even this form
of self-government. At the end of the Fifties the Governor-
General of Petrograd, Ignatiev, expressed alarm at the di
mensions of the duma as instituted by Miliutin in 1846. The
Government was afraid of the repetition of the Western
European events of 1848 when in almost all big centres the
social movement emerged from the city-halls. The similarity
was of course only external, yet it alarmed the Government
to such an extent that the municipal statute was revised by the
State Council, the number of the duma-mtmbers was reduced
to two hundred fifty, and the very elections of the delegates
were made not direct, but through special assemblies of electors,
called by class-curiae.

MUNICIPAL REFORM 155
Such was the situation when other Russian cities, moved
by the general liberal spirit and manifestation of initiative after
the Crimean Campaign, began to petition in the end of the
Fifties and early in the Sixties for the expansion to them of
the Petrograd municipal statute. In 1863 the Government
introduced that system in Moscow and Odessa; at the same
time, trying to meet the general desire, the Tzar ordered on
July 20, 1862, the working out of a new municipal statute for
the Empire.
Valuiev, who was then Minister of Interior, sent out a cir
cular to the governors, in which he requested them to form
special commissions from among the representatives of the
public for the discussion and clarification of the question. Five
hundred and nine local commissions were formed; all of them
presented their considerations and desires which were not based
on any experience, but were imbued with liberal aspirations,
and justly connected the poor state of the cities with the exist
ing order of things; yet they did not go beyond generalities,
and did not even express a definite demand that first of all
municipal self-government should have the right of self-taxa
tion, without which nothing could be done.
On the basis of the presentations of the commissions the
Ministry of Interior worked out in 1864 a general project
which, with the conclusions of Baron Korf, the Chief of the
Codificatory Department, was presented to the State Council
on March 31, 1866. But a few days later Karakozov's atten
tate took place, which resulted in general confusion and re
action. The project remained motionless for two years, and
finally was returned to Timashov, the new Minister of Interior,
more reactionary than Valuiev. In 1869 Timashov presented
it to the State Council, without substantial changes. The j
State Council sent it back to the Ministry of Interior, demand
ing that representatives of the city-communities take part in
the discussion of the project. Six provincial mayors and two

156 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
from the Capitals were invited into a special commission for
such discussion. The commission proved very conservative and
opposed to the principle of all-class-representation in city gov
ernment; fearing that the democratic elements would numer
ically prevail against the more well-to-do classes, the commis
sion introduced the so-called Prussian Class-System, according
to which the tax-payers were divided into three separate curiae.
The first curia consisted of the highest tax-payers, who sub
scribed one-third of all taxes ; their number was of course very
small. Those who paid the second third of the taxes, formed
the second curia, and finally all the small tax-payers who filled
the last third, formed the third curia. Each curia had an
equal number of delegates, so that one-third of the cky-duma
represented a few wealthy people, one-third represented the
middle class, and only one-third — the multitude of small tax
payers. On June 18, 1870, the statute became a law. Its main de
fects were its distortion of the all-clasS'principle, and the
insufficient amount of independence it afforded the municipal
self-government. True, the city-dumas were made independent
of the local administration, and were made subject directly
to the Senate, while the governors were instructed only to watch
the legality of the enactments of the dumas. But actual inde
pendence is connected with the power of taxation, and in this
respect the rights of the dumas were very limited. They were
permitted to tax only certain incomes, and to a limited amount,
so that they received very meagre means for their expenditures ;
but at the same time they were charged with the fulfilment of
many obligations which were by their nature fiscal rather than
local, as, for instance, the up-keep of the police,1 or the partial
up-keep of the civil administration of the city. As a result,
the funds of the municipal self-government did not suffice for
the satisfaction of such cultural needs as popular education and
1 All Russian police are in national service. — Tr.

THE ARMY 157
medical care. The limitations and restrictions promulgated in
the municipal statute were more considerable than those intro
duced into the zemstvo-statute by the law of November 21,
1866. We shall see later how the municipal self-government
has developed in actual life.
Let us turn now to the important reforms in the Ministry
of War, which I have mentioned. The question of the re
organisation of the army, and the radical reformation of all
the defensive means of the country loomed up gravely after the
Crimean Campaign which had proved the general backward
ness of Russia in comparison with civilised countries, and the
inadequate conditions of her defence, in spite of her numerical
strength. But such reforms as the equipment of the army
with modern ammunition, or the laying out of good roads,
required immense sums of money and in view of the poor
financial conditions after the war, these reforms, obvious as
their need appeared, had to be postponed. The first two years
after the war were occupied by the release of a considerable part
of the army which amounted in 1856 to two million two hun
dred thousand; it was reduced to one and a half million. It
was intended to reduce the army further, but the international
complications of 1859, and later the Polish insurrection of
1 862-1 863, which threatened the intervention of foreign
Powers, forced the Government to carry through an additional
mobilisation, and to keep five military corps on the western
frontier. Another circumstance which blocked the work of reorganisa
tion was the presence at the head of the Ministry of an ordi
nary Nicolaievan general, Sukhozanet, a firm man, but one
utterly unfit for any reformatory activity. Not until 1861
was he supplanted by D. A. Miliutin, brother of N. A. Miliu
tin, in whom Alexander had finally found the right person to
carry through the reform. D. A. Miliutin had been a pro
fessor in the Academy of the General Staff, and later Chief

158 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of the Staff of the Caucasian army, and thus, in addition to
distinguished personal gifts, he combined a theoretic with a
practical preparation.
Miliutin began by mitigating the service for the soldiers.
Up to that time the term of service was twenty-five years of
what was generally considered equivalent to hard labour.
Even the bonded peasants looked upon military service as the
severest and most degrading punishment; the soldiers naturally
felt quite humble, and considered themselves no better than
criminals, a circumstance that had considerable bearing upon
the spirit of the army. Miliutin reduce.d, the_Jerrn. toja&gen
years ; abolished corporal punishment^ wh^ch had been widely
practised before; he further endeavoured to change the attitude
of the officers toward their subordinates — in general he tried
to elevate the soldier to the dignified position of the defender
of his country. He reorganised the management of the Min
istry of War along more reasonable and economical lines; he
proposed the abolition of separate army-staffs in time of peace
and of such big units as corps, so that the largest military unit
became a division (four regiments). The minister of war was
given greater authority, but on the other hand the military ad
ministration was somewhat decentralised, being divided into
Military Districts, the commanders of which appeared to be
quite independent authorities in time of peace, combining the
authority of corps-commanders with that of military governor-
generals in relation to the army. The next important reform
was the reorganisation of the military judiciary along more
humane principles, the same as were laid as the foundation of
the judiciary reforms of 1864; owing to the fact that Miliutin
stood at the head of the work, and to the absolute confidence
Alexander had had in him, the reform of the military judiciary
was spared the mutilations which the civil judiciary suffered
during the years of reaction. Alongside with this one should
consider the reform of the military schools which were re-

UNIVERSAL SERVICE 159
organised from exclusive caste-institutions into military gym
nasia, with a higher educational programme. Higher Junker-
schools were assigned for special military training and for the
preparation of military specialists; among these were the
Pavlovsky, Alexandrovsky, Constantinovsky, and Nicolaievsky
Schools. This reform contributed greatly to the higher edu
cational level of the military contingent, and to the mitigation
of martial customs, in general.
But the chief military reform carried out by Miliutin was
the radical change in the very system of the military obligation,
the complete abolition of the recruitments which lay heavily
on the people, and the introduction of a most democratising
principle into Russian life. Throughout Europe the intro
duction of universal military service was taking place at that
time ; that system was important not only by virtue of the con
ditions of equality which it established in accordance with the
new order of society instituted everywhere during the nine
teenth century, but it appeared considerably more adequate
also in the technical, military, and economic respects.
The military reorganisation which was carried through in
Prussia after the Treaty of Tilsit by the talented General
Scharnhorst served as the prototype of that system. In view
of Napoleon's prohibition of maintaining more than forty
thousand men in actual service, Scharnhorst hit upon the clever
idea of subjecting the whole nation to a military training, by
making the service-term very short, and registering every soldier
upon the completion of his actual service into the reserve.
Thus in case of war the forty thousand men could be rapidly
multiplied many times, through mobilising the reserves. On
this idea was based the acceptance of universal military service
by most of the European Powers during the first half of the
nineteenth century. But while the mobilisation of the reserves
was quite feasible for Prussia, in view of her small size, good
roads of communication, and the comparatively high culture of

160 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the population, — it was almost impossible in the Russia of the
first half of the nineteenth century. For this reason Alex
ander I was forced to turn to the unfortunate idea of Military
Colonies; for the same reason Russia kept under Nicolas I,
as at present, an army of one million, although the population
was three times smaller than now.
With the development of railroad-building in the Seventies
there arose a possibility for the reorganisation of the army
along general European lines. Miliutin presented his plan
for the reform to Alexander; it was approved, passed by the
State Council, and became a law on January i, 1874.
By the new statute recruitments were abolished, and uni
versal service equal for all classes took their place. While
before men had been recruited from the age of twenty to thirty-
four and were often fathers of families, the new law called
only for men of the age of twenty for a term of six years, after
which time they were registered as reserves for nine years, and
remained assigned to the militia till the age of forty. All
classes enjoyed equal privileges. Miliutin granted exemption
of the first degree to only sons of parents, or only grandsons
of grand-parents, or only brothers-supporters of orphan-minors.
The exemption of the second degree was granted to those who
had brothers younger than eighteen. Exemption of the third
degree was granted to those who followed immediately brothers
in active service, even if there were other brothers-supporters in
the family.
The non-exempted, if found healthy and capable of service,
were assigned as recruits, in the order of lot-numbers they
drew, until they filled the amount required every year from a
given district. If the number of the non-exempt was not suf
ficient for the completion of the required contingent, those of
the third-degree and, next, of the second-degree-exemption were
called upon, again in the order of the lots drawn. But the

EDUCATION AND THE ARMY 161
men of the first degree exemption could be called to service only
by a special Imperial summons.
Privileges were granted to persons of education. University
men had to serve half a year, instead of six years; those who
had a secondary education had to serve two years; graduates
of Municipal or District schools, or of four-grade-gymnasia —
three years. Finally, those who had a primary education served
four years. Men of a university or secondary education were
permitted, besides, to enter the army as volunteers, in which
case the term of their service was further reduced to one half.
Such were the fundamental features of Miliutin's reform
which has proved to be one of the most important factors in
the democratisation of Russtali society; at the same time it was
one of the most humane reforms of the reign of Alexander II,
having actually abolished military bondage.
In 1875 Miliutin introduced new rules for the training of
soldiers, which concerned not only military subjects, but began
with general reading. In regard to literacy, the contingent
of the army had improved by virtue of the fact that it was com
posed of men of higher classes after the promulgation of the
new statute; until the reform of 1874 the number of literate
in the army amounted to thirteen per cent., while in 1874 the
percentage rose at once to twenty. Owing to the rules of 1875,
almost every recruit went back home able to read and write,
so that in Miliutin's hands the army had become a considerable
surrogate of schools, the number of which was quite insufficient
in Russia.
Curiously enough, during the discussion of that reform in
the State Council, the educational privileges and other liberal
articles of the reform were opposed by those ministers who
should have upheld them. Minister of Education, Count Tol
stoy, denied the desirability of granting special privileges for
men of a university education, and Count Pahlen, Minister

162 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of Justice, opposed the subjection of cases about evading mili
tary service to juries; Miliutin, a military general and Min
ister of War, had to defend the liberal principles from the
attack of those who might have been expected to take a dif
ferent stand. Enjoying the full confidence of Alexander,
Miliutin was in a position not only to have his reform passed
through the State Council, but, unlike the other reform-min
isters of Alexander II, to see it carried out into life, since he was
not dismissed like Lanskoy or his brother, Nicolas, but remained
minister of war to the very end of Alexander's reign.

CHAPTER XXXI
OF a totally different character was the activity of the
Minister of Education, Count D. A. Tolstoy, out
spokenly reactionary and directed plausibly against
Nihilism, but in fact against any liberal and democratic ideas.
His policy was in complete accord with the reactionary mood
of the Government, which took form after Karakozov's attempt
on the Tzar.
In general we may say that Count Tolstoy and Miliutin
were two persons who brilliantly characterised the two con
tradictory sides, the two irreconcilable, almost mutually ex
clusive, tendencies of the reign of Alexander, II. It may
appear astonishing that for fifteen years after 1866 those two
great political actors remained among the co-workers of Alex
ander II, and that both had evidently enjoyed his full con
fidence. We may explain it by the fact that in Alexander
himself there was going on a constant conflict between two
opposed principles. On one side he was fully aware of the
necessity for promulgating progressive reforms which would
radically alter the former order, but on the other side he was
under constant repression and fear of the growing revolutionary
movement which he considered it necessary to combat rig
orously. We have seen that after the reactionary tendencies
of the Government had become quite definite, still the peculiar
conditions of the new life, the technical and economic needs of
the State, powerfully demanded the continuation of the reforms,
and such reforms as the municipal and the military were carried
out after 1866.
Count Tolstoy consistently and incessantly represented those
reactionary tendencies and demands, under the onslaught of
163

164 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
which Alexander found himself after 1866. As a matter of
fact, Tolstoy was not an enemy of education; he was neither
like the mystic clericalist Golitzin of the time of Alexander I,
nor like the savage obscurantist Shirinsky-Shikhmatov at the
end of the reign of Nicolas I. In his personal tastes and fond
ness of Classicism Tolstoy resembled externally rather Count
Uvarov, to whom Russia owes a considerable advance in educa
tion in spite of his boast that he would hold back her general
development for fifty years. But undoubtedly Tolstoy was
less clever and educated than Uvarov, and at the same time
more consistent and perseverant in the promulgation of his
ideas, for Uvarov was, properly speaking, first of all a man of
compromise, and ever calculating about his career. Yet, unlike
Uvarov, Tolstoy has left behind him the reputation of having
been unreservedly a foe and extinguisher of enlightenment.
As I said, Tolstoy was not an enemy of education proper,
but he was a constant, consequential, and vicious enemy of the
people, and as minister he obstinately and persistently trampled
the most sacred rights and interests of the people fox the sake
of the interests and prerogatives of that ruling class, to which
he belonged. For this reason he appeared to be one of the
most ardent advocates of that political and social order with
which those prerogatives were connected. Of all the min
isters of Alexander none equalled Tolstoy in his persevering
and uncompromising upholding of the reactionary principles.
We have seen that Reitern wrote that Shuvalov and Valuiev
carried on a pseudo-liberal policy, while actually it was reac
tionary. Nobody could have said this about Tolstoy; he was
an open and outspoken reactionary, and of all the ministers
of Alexander II he was the only one who openly declared
himself opposed to the reforms of the Sixties. He never com
promised with his views like Valuiev who appeared liberal
during the period of liberalism and reactionary during the
period of reaction. Tolstoy was a convinced reactionary; he

TOLSTOY CHARACTERISED 165.
sharply criticised the peasant-reform in a memorandum which
aroused the indignation of Alexander, and was appointed Min
ister of Education as an acknowledged reactionary, at the time
when the Tzar considered such a reactionary necessary for that
post. In his activity Tolstoy found support in the theoretic princi
ples with which he was furnished by the prominent publicists j
of the time — M. N. Katkov and P. M. Leontiev, the editors
and publishers of the Russian Messenger and the Moscow j
News. Katkov, as we know, had then become a most rabid :
opponent of the Nihilistic tendencies which developed at the
end of the Sixties; on the other hand, being opposed to the
separatistic tendencies which began to manifest themselves in
some of Russia's borderlands, particularly in the Western
provinces, he grew more and more reactionary after the Polish
insurrection, and especially after the attentate of Karakozov.
During the epoch of reforms he was known as a liberal of the
English calibre; he still preserved a portion of his Anglomania,
but it turned conservative and even reactionary. Tolstoy
shared Katkov's Anglomania, and intended to transplant the
English system of education, which appealed to him on account
of its aristocratic character. But while the English aristo
cratic system was in full accord with the established political
order (where the aristocracy was a constitutional factor,
although a conservative one) and has guarded the acquired
rights and liberties of the people from the absolutism of the
kings, the aristocracy which Katkov and Tolstoy aspired to
implant in Russia was to suppress the interests of the people
under the wing of the autocracy. This difference between
English and Russian aristocracy was well observed and indi
cated by Prince A. I. Vassilchikov in a memorandum published
in 1875 in Berlin, called a Letter to the Minister of Education,
Count Tolstoy, from Prince A. Vassilchikov. On the whole,
we must say that although Tolstoy's system undoubtedly had

166 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
certain aristocratic tendencies, in the most unattractive sense
of that word, yet his main and most essential idea consisted
in the struggle with Nihilism which had rapidly developed in
Russian society, and to which was ascribed an important
revolutionising influence. It was from that point of view that
Katkov also criticised the former system of popular education.
By Nihilism was then understood the spread of the ma
terialistic point of view, which in its turn was connected with
the popularisation of the latest conclusions of natural science
among broad circles of the intelligentzia and the college youth,
owing to the efforts of Pisarev and other publicists of the Rus
sian Word, the chief organ of the Nihilists. Tolstoy and
Katkov held accountable for the spread of such a Weltan
schauung among students the system of education which allowed
hours to the study of natural science, of history, of rhetoric,
and similar subjects which train the pupils in " senseless high-
browiness," in " water-grinding," in acquiring " premature,
hasty conclusions " ; in short they opposed such studies as helped
to develop independent thinking, demanding instead a system
which would train the young minds exclusively in the acquisi
tion of exact information, and prevent them from excessive
reasoning which led to Nihilistic ideas and materialistic teach
ings. They considered ancient languages, and next — mathe
matics, as the most important studies in secondary schools. Such
were the basic principles of Russian Classicism, theoretically
elaborated by Katkov, and put into practice by Tolstoy.
From the very first Tolstoy favoured that system, but he
found its realisation quite difficult; financial conditions did not
permit any considerable expenditures, there was a dearth in
instructors of Latin, and particularly of Greek, and besides
he was aware of the opposition his plan was bound to meet not
only on the part of the public, but even among the upper
bureaucratic circles, even among the members of the State
Council, where the discharged reform-ministers succeeded in

TOLSTOY'S CLASSICISM 167
creating a liberal atmosphere and sympathy with the ideas of
the former progressive Minister of Education, Golovnin.
Tolstoy had to move his plan slowly. At first he sent out
a circular to all District Curators, asking them to point out
the defects of the existing system of education. Next he
founded a new high institution, the Philological Institute, which
was to prepare instructors of ancient languages; later he reor
ganised along these lines the Lyceum founded by Bezborodko
in Niezhin. At the same time he engaged in active negoti
ations with foreign institutions, especially Austrian, where
there were many Slav philologists who might easily learn Rus
sian and become instructors of ancient languages in Russian
gymnasia. A considerable number of such instructors soon
flowed in from Galicia and Bohemia.
In 1 87 1, i.e., five years after his appointment, Tolstoy de
cided to bring his plan to the front. He presented a carefully
worked out memorandum to the Tzar, recommending classic
education as a means for combating Nihilistic tendencies among
the youth, the evil influence of which Alexander had pointed
out in his rescript to Prince Gagarin, in 1866. Alexander
regarded the general tendencies of Tolstoy's report favourably,
but since he himself had no classic education, he ordered a
commission of experts to discuss the matter. Among the mem
bers of the special commission were Valuiev, Troinitzky, Tol
stoy, some specialists from his ministry, and Count S. G.
Stroganov. Tolstoy found it necessary to prepare himself for
the occasion, and he took lessons in Greek from a director of
a gymnasium. The commission rapidly worked out a detailed plan for the
new statute, and presented it to a special committee of the State
Council, among whom were all ministers who had charge of
some schools, the former Ministers of Education — Kovalevsky
and Golovnin, former Minister of Justice, Count Panin, —
D. A. Miliutin, — fifteen members altogether. Of them nine

168 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
members sided with Tolstoy, while six vigorously opposed his
plan; those who pleaded most energetically against it were
D. A. Miliutin, then Admiral Count Lietke, the former tutor
of Grand Duke Constantine, former Minister Golovnin,
Academic J. K. Grot, and to the general surprise — Count
V. N. Panin. Miliutin and Golovnin pointed out that the
classic system was considered dead even in England and
Prussia, which countries Tolstoy used as models for his plan,
and that raz/-schools were being opened there on equal rights
with classic gymnasia, so that the parents might be free to
choose. Miliutin also denied the connection between a real
system of education and Materialism and Nihilism ; he indicated
that all the actors of the French revolution, the Materialists
at the end of the eighteenth century, were brought up on
Classicism. Tolstoy won in the special committee.
But at the general session of the State Council, where the
discussion was customarily purely formal, as the members ac
cepted the project prepared by some special department or com
mittee, something unusual occurred on this occasion. Moved
by one of the strongest human feelings — parental love, to use
the expression of Prince Vassilchikov, the State Council re
jected Tolstoy's project by twenty-nine votes against nineteen.
But Alexander joined the minority, and on May 15, 1871,
Tolstoy's project became law.
In the new Classic gymnasia forty-nine hours a week were
assigned for the study of Latin, and thirty-six hours for Greek.
The students were to gain a thorough knowledge of the gram
matical and syntactical peculiarities of the ancient languages,
and to be capable of rapidly translating under dictation difficult
passages from Russian into Latin or Greek. Then the amount
of mathematics taught was considerably enlarged, while the
hours of the instruction in Russian language and rhetoric were
greatly decreased; the instruction in Church-Slavic was intro
duced at the expense of Russian. Natural science was elim-

NEW SYSTEM 169
inated, the hours for history, geography, and modern languages
were contracted, and the study of modern languages was de
clared of secondary importance.
At the same time the whole educational system in the gym
nasia was changed. The pupils were to be trained in such a
way that they should appear ultra-disciplined and absolutely !
obedient; espionage was encouraged under the form of " special
confidence " and " frankness " on the part of the pupils towards !
their instructors. The Pedagogic Councils lost all authority,
and the entire power was concentrated in the hands of the direc- :
tors; the latter, as well as the inspectors, were appointed
largely (70-80 per cent.) from among instructors of ancient
languages. Alongside with this the rea/-gymnasia were abolished; in
their place were founded re«/-schools, with a six years' course
(the gymnasia had an eight years' course), intended to give
the students a special, technical or industrial, education, which
in the opinion of Katkov and Tolstoy would satisfy the educa
tional needs of the higher industrial classes. Subjects of gen
eral education and development were eliminated from the
reaZ-schools as well as from the classical gymnasia. In place
of ancient languages the real-schools required an enormous
amount of drawing — forty hours a week. A considerable
amount of mathematics was required, and a very moderate dose
of natural science which, according to instructions, was to be
taught not scientifically, but " technologically," whatever this
term might have meant. Thus the main object of the schools
was frankly considered not the elevation of the level of knowl
edge and enlightenment, but the substitution for matters of
general education of subjects designed to discipline the mind.
At the time of the discussion of the project it was vigorously
attacked by the progressive press, such as European Messenger,
Petrograd News, Voice (the radical organs, Contemporary,
and the Russian Word, had already been discontinued). But

170 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
when it was presented to the State Council, Tolstoy obtained
an Imperial order prohibiting the discussion of the plan by
the press.
Tolstoy had intended to reorganise in a corresponding spirit
the higher educational institutions, but in spite of his repeated
efforts in that direction, he never succeeded in radically chang
ing the university statute of 1863. He was forced to be satis
fied with issuing additional rules periodically, with the aim of
further restricting the liberties of the students and of the
professors. During his administration numerous disturbances
occurred among the students, particularly grave in the years
1869, 1874, and 1878. Tolstoy made use of those disturbances
for preparing the reform of the universities, and worked in
that direction upon the mood of Alexander. But in spite of
the co-operation of Katkov he failed to accomplish his aim.
The elements of the new statute he prepared were ultimately
put into practice by his successor, Delianov, in 1884, at a more
opportune conjuncture.
Tolstoy's interference with the gymnasia for women, which
belonged to a different department (the Institutions of Empress
Marie), was of such a nature, especially in regard to the limi
tation of the instruction of natural science, that the dis
tinguished pedagogue, Vishnegradsky, who was at the head of
those schools, was forced to resign. Tolstoy was opposed to
higher education for women. Before 1863 women had forced
themselves into the universities as " free-hearers," or unclassi
fied students; but the commission which discussed the statute
of 1863 rejected the clause about admitting women into uni
versities. Then a group of progressive women, under the
leadership of Mesdames Trubnikov, Stasov, and Philosophov,
began a series of intercessions for the organisation of higher
education for women. Tolstoy finally had to yield, and permit
public lectures for both sexes, to be read by university profes
sors; one weighty reason for his consent was the fact that

WOMAN EDUCATION 171
Russian women, deprived of higher education at home, filled
the universities of Switzerland, where they easily fell under
the influence of socialistic and anarchistic propaganda, to the
mortification of the Government. Thus the Alarchinsky
Courses were opened, the majority of whose students consisted
of women. Similar courses, especially for women, were opened
in 1870 in Moscow, under the name of Lubiansky; they
acquired the character of a school of natural sciences, par
excellence; one year later they were joined by a historico-
philological department. As to Petrograd, it was only in 1878
that Professor Bestuzhev-Riumin succeeded in opening private
courses for women, with a physico-mathematical and a historico-
philological department. A special society was organised for
the finding of means for the support of those courses, and
owing to the energy of that society and of the persons who stood
at the head of that institution, those courses have developed
into Higher Courses for Women, which are still in existence.
Tolstoy refused to allow women to study medicine, but D. A.
Miliutin, as Minister of War, opened in 1872 medical courses
for women at the Nicolaievsky Hospital. In 1881, Minister
of War Vannovsky found the existence of the courses at a mili
tary hospital out of place, and they were closed. Only in 1897
were they reopened in the form of the now existing Medical
Institute for Women.
Such was the fate of the secondary and higher schools under
Count Tolstoy. We should note that Miliutin's military
gymnasia were at that time the only schools of a general educa
tional character.
Tolstoy's attitude was as negative towards primary as
towards secondary and higher education. By the statute of
Golovnin, of 1864, the Ministry of Education left the found
ing of primary schools to the initiative of private persons,
societies, cities, zemstvos, and other institutions. The Min
istry obliged itself only to supervise the order of instruction in

172 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
those schools ; it was to spend for the support of primary schools,
one hundred thousand rubles the first year, two hundred
thousand the second year, and three hundred thousand rubles
during the third year. Actually only the first assignation took
place, in 1864; in the following years money for schools was
expended only for the western borderland, with the view of
fighting Polonism. The one hundred thousand rubles assigned
for the Russian provinces were to be distributed among the
thirty-four School Councils which existed in the zemstvo-
provinces, so that it would make three thousand rubles for each
province. But even that meagre sum was given a different
direction by Minister Tolstoy who either used it for organising
some Ministerial Schools, or for the foundation of Teachers'
Institutes, or of Seminaries for teachers of primary schools.
The zemstvos have played the main role in opening primary
schools, although by the statute of 1864 they were not obliged
to engage in that activity, except for the clause added through
the initiative of the zemstvos of Petrograd and Nizhni-Nov
gorod, and owing to the support of M. A. Korf. According
to this the zemstvos were allowed to care for the finding of
means for the spread of primary education in zemstvo-provinces
and districts. From the very start the zemstvos interpreted
that clause broadly, and considered it one of their chief obliga
tions to care for the dissemination of popular education in
Russia. In view of the meagre means in their possession, they
were at the beginning rather unsuccessful in their attempts to
encourage the opening of schools by village-communities.
According to the statute of 1864 there were Provincial and
District School Councils. The Provincial Councils were
poorly constructed. Golovnin had to combat the aspirations of
the Ecclesiastical Department for the management of popular
education; he was forced to compromise and to decree that the
Provincial Council was to be presided over by a bishop, and
its membership to consist of the governor, two representatives

PRIMARY EDUCATION 173
of the Ministry of Education, and two members of the
zemstvo. Since the bishop and the governor were absorbed in
their own affairs, the Provincial Councils were clumsy, dead
institutions. The District Councils consisted of one repre
sentative of the Ministry of Education (usually the principal
of the local District-school), one representative of the Min
istry of Interior (who was preferably to be elected from among
the local gentry), and two members from the zemstvo. They
were permitted to elect their own president, and he was gen
erally one of the zrem.rr»o-members. The District Councils
were inclined to work hand in hand with the zemstvo, and
this greatly strengthened the position of the latter in its edu
cational policy.
When Tolstoy was appointed Minister of Education in
1866, he sharply criticised the existing state of affairs, and im
mediately prepared a project for the installation in every
province of a special ministerial inspector who would guard the
school-business from falling into " ill-intentioned " hands. In
1869 the inspectors were installed, and one year later Tolstoy
had the audacity to claim in his report to the Tzar that the
activity of the School Councils and of the zemstvo was " good
for nothing," and that only the inspectors were performing
their duties properly. Even a superficial glance at the situation
was sufficient to prove that one inspector for a whole province
was actually unable to get acquainted with the state of affairs,
and was in fact impotent in regard to the supervision of the
schools. Striving to take the management of primary education out
the hands of the School Councils, Tolstoy obtained in 1871 a
new Imperial decree, instructing the inspectors to interfere with
the appointment of teachers by the Councils. This was in
violation of the statute of 1864, which placed the zemstvo-
institutions outside of the jurisdiction of the administration;
complaints against the Provincial Councils could be brought

174 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
only before the Senate. The conflict between the zemstvo and
the Ministry of Education was sharp and relentless. Tolstoy
saw the necessity of changing the statute, in order that he
might usurp the management of the primary schools. In 1873
he presented a plan for a new statute, by which directors of
People's Schools were to be appointed at the head of the
Provincial Councils, and at the head of the District Councils
— inspectors of those Schools, which posts (of directors and
inspectors) were to be established in every province and dis
trict. The reformed Councils were to be subordinate to Dis
trict Curators.
Although this reform was approved by the Emperor, it was
strongly opposed by the State Council. Tolstoy unexpectedly
came into collision with a strong wing of the nobility who were
indignant at his attempts to place popular education in the
hands of the bureaucracy. That sentiment found access to
Alexander, and on December 25, 1873, Tolstoy received an
Imperial rescript, in which his attention was called to the fact
that the supervision of the schools was to be intrusted in the
provinces to the first order — the nobility. Accordingly Tol
stoy had to alter his plan, and place at the head of the Pro
vincial Council the provincial Marshal of Nobility, and at the
head of the District Council — the District Marshal of No
bility. In many places the Marshals were on the side of the
zemstvo, it should be noted. The number of inspectors was
increased to two for every province, instead of one; Tolstoy
could not install more inspectors on account of financial diffi
culties. The conflict between the Ministry of Education and the
zemstvo was continued in the Eighties, under Minister Delianov.
During Tolstoy's administration the struggle assumed bitter
forms. The representatives of the zemstvo had to defend the
popular schools from the bureaucratic encroachments of the in
spectors who tried to restrict and curtail the education of the

TOLSTOY VS. ZEMSTVO 175
peasants' children. After the issue of the law concerning uni
versal military service, the zem^»o-members of the School
Council had to perform the function of examiners for those
who sought the educational privilege of the fourth degree, i. e.,
of primary education. This role enabled the zemstvo-mem-
bers to manifest more vigorously their opposition to the policy
of the Ministry of Education.
The friction between the zemstvo and the agents of the
Ministry of Education finally grew so keen that in certain
provinces, where the representatives of the Ministry were par
ticularly aggressive in their endeavour to limit the participa
tion of the zemstvo-members in the school management, the
zemstvo refused to vote money for the schools. In 1879 the
Tver zemstvo resolved to discontinue all money appropriations
for popular education. It is not known what the end would
have been had not the epoch of the " heart dictatorship " come,
and had not Loris-Melivov obtained the dismissal of Count
Tolstoy in 1880. Only then were the zemstvos enabled to
breathe more freely, under the more liberal ministers, A. A.
Saburov and Baron Nicolayi (both of them did not keep their
positions for a long time: Saburov from the end of 1880 till
the spring of 1881, and Baron Nicolayi from May, 1881, to
May, 1882).

CHAPTER XXXII
WE shall now examine the sphere of activity of the
zemstvo-'mstitutions and their means and powers.
The organs of the zewz.y/z'o-self-government were
instituted for the management of local affairs, in districts and
provinces, and for the satisfaction of local needs by the aid of
the means that were given them and of the certain administra
tive authority which was granted them by the law. The en
tire field of their activity was indicated in the second article
of the statute of 1864. It comprised first of all various so
called zemstvo-obligations : to maintain in good order the roads,
to lay out new roads when necessary, to manage the so-called
zemsky-post, i.e., the post-horses and stations for internal com
munication in the districts, to take charge of the alimentation
of the people, of " public welfare," in the broad sense of the
word, including care of cripples, poor, and of corresponding
philanthropic institutions; it also included care for the develop
ment of local commerce, industry, and particularly agricul
ture, and for the insurance of property; also care for public
health, i.e., local medical-sanitary activity, for popular educa
tion in the provinces and districts, for the erection of churches,
and for the up-keep of penitentiaries.
Most of these tasks were performed even in the pre-reform
time by various bureaucratic or class-institutions which used
for the purpose certain zemsky taxes and also " natural obliga
tions " borne by the people by the order of provincial and
district authorities. The law of 1851 divided the zemsky ob
ligations and taxes into State and provincial; the income from
those taxes amounted to four million four hundred and fifty
176

ZEMSTVO BUDGETS 177
thousand rubles in 18 14, and fifty years later — to twenty-
three million nine hundred thousand rubles; of the latter sum
nineteen million were classified as State-taxes, and only four
million eight hundred thousand — as provincial. At the in
stitution of the zemstvos the entire zemsky State taxes, which
formed, as we have seen, three-fourths of the pre-reform reve
nue, were retained for the central organs of the Government. ;
The zemstvos were permitted to obtain means through self-
taxation, i.e.7~by-revy1ng provincial and district taxes on real- !
estate and commercial-industrial institutions. They also re
ceived about nine million rubles which had been collected for
the maintenance of various philanthropic institutions; in the
thirty-three provinces, where zemstvos had been instituted at
that time, there were in all seven hundred and eighty-five such
asylums, for which the population paid yearly a little over four
hundred thousand rubles, an average of twelve to thirteen
thousand rubles per province. The zemstvos received also nine
million rubles which had accumulated as alimentary capital.
The pre-reform revenues proved insufficient for the needs
of the zemstvos. In 1865, when nineteen zemstvos were in
stalled in provinces, their budget reached five million six hun
dred thousand rubles; in 1867, when there were twenty-eight
zemstvo-pxov'mczs, the budget rose to ten million three hun
dred and nine thousand, in 1868 to fourteen million and a
half, in 1871 to twenty-one and a half million, in 1876 to
thirty and a half million, and towards-the eighties, in spite of
the drainage of the Russo-Turkish war, the zemstvo-budget
reached thirty-six million rubles. Thus in 1880, sixteen years
after the publication of the zemstvo-statute, the zemsky-taxes
increased more than sixteen times over those of the pre-reform
period ; yet compared with the growing needs of the people,
the collected revenue was far from sufficient.
From the very beginning the zemstvos encountered very un
favourable conditions; besides the reaction in governmental

17& MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
circles, which impeded their activities, they were greatly em
barrassed by the general economic and financial conditions.
The situation of both the landowners and the emancipated
peasants immediately after the Reform was such that it was
practically impossible to assess land. Prince A. I. Vassilchikov
wrote at that time:
" The Russian land is poor, for it, the land — literally the
soil, is paying above its capacity, above its productivity . . .
because for centuries agriculture has been burdened more than
any other branch of national labour with high taxes ... be
cause the land squeezes out of the poorest tax-payers most of
the taxes for the satisfaction of those State needs which least
concern the poor tax-payers. . . ."
Unable to tax the over-burdened land any more, the zemstvos
tried to meet their requirements by assessing heavily industry
and commerce. But Minister of Finance Reitern saw in this
policy a danger to his plans of protecting big industry, and
owing to his initiative a new law was issued on November 21,
1868, making it possible for the zemstvo to assess only the
immovable property of factories and foundries, and commer
cial patents and license — not more than ten to twenty-five
per cent, of their fiscal assessments. This at once put the
zemstvos in a difficult financial position, and caused the first
friction between them and the Government, which has con
tinued to grow keen, assuming at times such extreme forms
as the temporary closing of the zemstvo institutions (in the
province of Petrograd).
The enormous needs of popular education, of public health,
etc., required immense sums of money, and the zemstvos had
to solve the grave problem of how to obtain the necessary sums
without taxing the population beyond endurance. Prince Vas
silchikov furnished curious figures about the zemsky taxes be
fore the Reform; of the total sum of thirty-five million five
hundred and ninety-eight thousand rubles, thirty-five million

DIFFICULTIES OF THE ZEMSTVOS 179
were collected from one hundred and nine million desiatins
of peasants' land, five hundred thousand rubles from seventy
million desiatins of landowners' land, and thirty-six thousand
rubles from one hundred and thirteen million desiatins of fiscal
land. Thus fiscal land paid zemsky taxes one thousand times
less, and the landowners' land seventy times less per desiatin
than the peasants' land. The zemstvos had to regulate the
payment of the taxes, and we see from the budget of 1868 what
a radical change they wrought in that field: Of the nine
million seven hundred thousand rubles of land-assessments, four
million eight hundred thousand rubles were levied on land
owners', and Imperial lands — seventy-five million desiatins
altogether, while an almost equal sum was collected from the
seventy million desiatins of peasants' land.
Another difficulty of the zemstvos consisted, and still con
sists, in the regulation according to which they must first of
all cover the so-called obligatory expenses — pre-reform items;
these do not include such needs as public health, education,
agricultural or industrial improvements. From the budget of
1868 we see that eighty-two and eight-tenths per cent, were
spent on the obligatory items plus maintenance of zemstvo-
boards; only eight per cent, could be spent on public health,
and five per cent, for popular education. ;
We must note that on the whole the early ze»«/»o-workers •
manifested high idealism and disinterestedness ; they stood ';
above class-interests, and honestly strove for the betterment1,
of the peasants' conditions in every respect. If the results of i
their ardent work were not brilliant, we should not overlook!
the most obvious causes : lack of funds, and the opposition of !
the Government.
After Karakozov's attempt on the Tzar's life, the relation
between the Government and the zemstvo grew rapidly worse.
A series of new rules was issued in quick succession, limiting
the rights and publicity of the zemstvo-mstituthns, and subor-

180 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
dinating them to the local administration, to wit the gov
ernors. The growing restrictions, and the systematic ignoring
of zemstvo-pleas and declarations by the Ministry of Interior,
affected the attractiveness of the zemstvo-activity, and drove
away many disappointed devoted workers. In their place came
new types of members who demonstrated not only narrow
class-interests, but often base selfish aspirations. During the
railroad-delirium, the Griinder-spirit found expression even
among zew^iwo-institutions, and the altruistic service of the
early workers gave place to seeking for a portion of the " pub
lic pie." During the dark period not many idealists were
capable of retaining their fighting posts in an atmosphere of
depression; only exceptional personalities could continue the
hard struggle against the reaction, and devote themselves to
modest, but productive culture work against heavy odds. Under
such circumstances progressive tendencies could be preserved,
naturally, only in a few provincial and district zemstvos.

CHAPTER XXXIII
LET us cast a glance at the new courts, and at the press
freed from preliminary censorship at the end of the
sixties and during the first half of the seventies.
Properly speaking, the new judiciary statutes were enacted
as early as November 20, 1864. But the question of their
installation was subjected to a lengthy discussion, at first by
the Committee of Ministers, then by a special committee, and
lastly by the State Council, after which a decree was issued
concerning the introduction of the statutes into practice. The
Government's hesitation was due to two serious reasons: lack
of funds (nine million rubles were assigned for the reform),
and lack of adequately prepared -men for the occupation of
the new judicial posts which were to be held for life. Fortu
nately the Government rejected the proposed compromise —
to withdraw the life-tenure principle, which measure, instituted
at the very introduction of the new statutes, would have dealt
them a death-blow. As to the financial difficulties, two sug-i
gestions were made; Prince Gagarin, President of the Com- "1
mittee of Ministers, proposed introducing the new courts sim- I
ultaneously throughout the Empire, but in view of lack of
means, limiting their personnel. This would have taxed the
energy of the new institutions, and would have affected the
speed of the court decisions; yet it had been solemnly promised
that the new courts would be " speedy, just, and merciful." j
The other plan was offered by Minister of Justice Zamiatnin, '
and called for the installation of the new courts for the time
being in only two districts, that of Petrograd and that of Mos
cow. The Tzar ordered a special commission to examine both
181

182 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
opinions; the majority accepted Zamiatnin's plan, against a
minority of the most ardent friends of the reform, who, headed
by Senator Zarudny, insisted that it would be better to post
pone the installation of the new courts altogether, if it was
impossible to carry out the reform simultaneously throughout
the Empire. We may rejoice now that the opinion of the
minority did not triumph, for who knows what would have
become of the new statutes during the reactionary period, had
they not been promulgated in 1866?
The State Council approved the opinion of the majority,
and decreed that the new institutions be opened on April 17,
1866, in both Capital districts. Karakozov's attempt on the
Tzar on April the 4th, encouraged the reactionaries to sug
gest the postponement of the opening of the new courts, but
Alexander remained firm in his decision. The courts were
opened on the date set.
In spite of all apprehensions the personnel of the new courts
was extraordinarily successful. Minister Zamiatnin had spent
much of his time in seeking out distinguished and honest work
ers among the old courts, and he filled the four hundred new
positions in the districts, which ranked from coroners to sena
tors of the cassational departments, with brilliant men. From
the very start the trials in the new courts, in spite of the
novelty of the proceedings, passed smoothly and successfully.
The public interest might be compared perhaps only with the
interest shown in the sessions of the first State Duma; the
gallery was always filled with eager crowds who could not
control their enthusiasm, and cheered in spite of the admoni
tions of the presiding judge.
The press also warmly greeted the new courts. Here is
what Katkov wrote at that time:
" With this reform an entirely new principle is entering
into our life, which will place a conspicuous border-line be
tween the past and the future, and which will be reflected in

REFORMED COURTS 183
everything. ... Its influence will not be limited to the judiciary
institutions proper, but like a keen element it will invade every
thing, and will lend to all a new significance, a new power.
Justice, performed publicly and with the participation of jury
men, will become a living social force. An independent court,
not subject to administrative control, will elevate and ennoble
the social milieu, for through it the character of independence
will be imparted to all manifestations of public life. . . ."
In 1867, after the courts had demonstrated their adequacy,
Katkov wrote:
" In truth, one can hardly believe that such an important
matter, so dissimilar to our former order, has been so firmly
and successfully implanted from the basic idea to the minutest
details in a short time. History will not forget a single one
of the names of those connected with this great work of the
civic rejuvenation of Russia."
Now we can hardly believe that those words belonged to
Katkov, who eventually became one of the most vicious enemies
of the new courts, and accused them of taking part in the
general sedition. But then it was the " honey-moon " of the
reform, to use the expression of J. V. Hessen; as a member of
the new courts, the now famous A. F. Koni, expressed himself
then, all the workers put into their activity their first love.
The idyl of the honey-moon could not last very long, consider
ing the reactionary conditions.
First of all the keen dissatisfaction of the Government, es
pecially of Valuiev, was aroused by the verdicts of the courts
concerning cases of violating censorship regulations. Such cases
began to appear in 1866. The first, in which A. S. Suvorin,
then a liberal, was tried for his book, " All Sorts," passed com
paratively safely for the new courts : the author was sentenced to
a light penalty, and the book was withdrawn from circulation.
But in the very next case, against Pypin, editor of the Con
temporary, and Y. G. Zhukovsky, author of the article " The

184 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Cause of the New Generation," the Crown court (not a jury)
found no guilt, and acquitted them. Valuiev was utterly en
raged, declared the verdict impossible, and requested the dis
missal of Motovilov, the president of the court, in defiance of
the principle of life-tenure. Alexander remained, however,
within the limits of the law, perhaps because the verdict was
decided while Motovilov was on a furlough. The case ended
with the procurator appealing to the higher cassation, and the
Judicial Chamber sentencing Pypin and Zhukovsky to one
week's arrest; as to the magazine itself, the Contemporary had
been in the meantime stopped forever by an Imperial decree.
Another celebrated case was that of Protopopov, a petty
clerk who was accused of having insulted one of his superiors,
a vice-director of the department. To Valuiev's horror, the
jury found Protopopov irresponsible, on the basis of a diagnosis
by experts, and acquitted him as having acted in a moment of
mental derangement. The reactionary press, especially the
Tiding, began to attack the revolutionism of the courts.
Early in 1867, when the Petrograd zemstvo held public
discussions concerning the new law which limited the power
of taxation by the zemstvo, one of its members, M. N. Liubo-
shchinsky, Senator of the Cassational department of the Senate,
delivered an indignant address; upon Valuiev's report, Alex
ander in a moment of rage decided to discharge the Senator.
But Minister Zamiatnin tried to convince him that such a
step would be a direct infringement of the law, and to his
great displeasure Alexander, perhaps for the first time in his
life, came to see that even his power might have some limit.
The Senator retained his post, but Minister Zamiatnin and his
Deputy, Stoianovsky, were dismissed as suddenly as had been
Lanskoy and Miliutin in 1861, upon the publication of the
peasant-reform. In the selection of a successor the Tzar fol
lowed the suggestion of Chief of Gendarmes Count Shuvalov,
who recommended a person who was foreign to justice and

COUNT PAHLEN 185
had had his experience in a different sphere, — Count K. I.
Pahlen, at that time Governor of Pskov, and before vice-
director of the Police Department; so utterly unprepared was
he in the work of his new department, that the management
of the Ministry of Justice had to be temporarily intrusted to
Prince Urusov, Chief of His Majesty's Second Chancery, while
Pahlen underwent preparatory instruction. Soon, however,
Pahlen came out with self-confident criticism of the statutes^
the guardianship of which he had just assumed. ^^-- '
Even before he entered upon his duties Pahlen held a con
sultation with the Moscow members of the procurature, trying
to find support among them for the reactionary measures he
was about to introduce. By way of experiment he expressed
his opinion concerning the dangerousness of granting life-tenure
to young men appointed as coroners, since there remained no
way for correcting errors in such appointments. Pahlen found
no sympathy among the members of the Moscow procuracy, who
testified unanimously to the excellent personnel of the coroners.
Yet he insisted on his notion, and as it was still considered
premature to abolish one of the cardinal principles of the new
statutes — that of life-tenure, the Minister used a roundabout
way, and received the Imperial permission to appoint not cor
oners, but officials to " act in their place " ; the latter, of course,
might be discharged. This roundabout way has become firmly
established in the Ministry of Justice; to this day there are
persons who have been " acting " coroners for twenty years
and more.
By the Statutes the Procurator is the representative of the
Government's authority, and is directly subordinate to the
Minister of Justice (who has the title of Procurator-General) ;
he does not enjoy the life-tenure privilege. But as the pro
curators were also general guards of the law and defenders
of the citizens from illegal encroachments of the administra
tion, it is evident that for the worthy fulfilment of their func-

186 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
tion they had to be conscious of their independence from local
administration; this consciousness could be the easier cultivated
since the young procurators were to be selected from the minor
judiciary personnel, the coroners, who had the life-tenure
privilege. Hence one may understand how the actual depriva
tion of coroners of that prerogative might affect the personnel
of the procurators. Bear in mind that the judiciary statutes
were a sort of Habeas corpus act for Russia; for the first time
they asserted that no one could be punished without due court-
proceedings. Yet at the same time it was stated that the
administrative authorities were to take legal measures for pre
vention of crimes. When the Statutes were discussed by the
commission, Unkovsky, the former Marshal of the Tver No
bility, published an article in which he pointed out the danger
of administrative measures for prevention of crime, since
officials were not responsible for their actions; he insisted that
in order to maintain the significance of the civil guaranties it
was necessary to establish responsibility of officials for their
actions against private persons. His idea was not accepted.
For this reason the guarding of private rights was left to
the procurators ; one can readily see the importance of the selec
tion of their personnel, and of the establishment among them
of a tradition of independence from the administration. But
Pahlen throughout his administration endeavoured to bring up
the procurators in the bureaucratic spirit, and to make them
follow hints from higher up. They were instructed not to
counteract the local administration, but on the contrary, to
work in accord with the governors. This naturally was re
flected in the local application of the Statutes. As the activity
of the new courts grew there appeared considerable punitive
activity on the part of administrative authorities and institu
tions, particularly severe and frequent in regard to the peasants ;
these were classed as " measures for prevention of crime." It
was up to the procurators to struggle against such abuses of

THE PROCURATORS 187
the police and administration. During Pahlen's administra
tion the personnel of the procurators, and consequently the
judiciary personnel as a whole, fell very low, since the further
career of the procurators consisted in being promoted to the
Judicial Chamber and the Senate.
During the same time a long series of so-called novelles was
issued — additions and modifications of the laws, which actually
distorted their principles. As early as 1866, after the process
of Pypin and Zhukovsky, Valuiev insisted upon the exemption
of press-cases from District-Courts, and their direct trial by
Judicial Chambers. In 1871, when the first symptoms of the
spread of the underground revolutionary movement had become
manifest, after the Nechaiev-process, Pahlen and Shuvalov
carried through a radical reformation of the order and pro
ceedings of cases concerning State crimes; namely, all such cases
were to be investigated in their first stage not by coroners, but
by officers of the gendarmerie with the participation of pro
curators. The investigations were to be submitted through the
procurator of the Judicial Chamber and the minister of justice
to the Tzar who might direct the case in one of these three
ways: either order regular court-proceedings (such a direction
had almost never occurred, except in cases when the inevitability
of a severe verdict appeared certain), or the Tzar might order
to drop the case, or the third, most frequent, way — that of
solving the case administratively, i.e., by exile into more or less
remote provinces. That administrative method was motivated
by a most hypocritical consideration — the desire to mitigate
the punishment for young political criminals; the hypocrisy of
that motive was soon shown when the administration demanded
not the mitigation, but the hardening of punishments for be
longing to revolutionary societies, which demand was satisfied
by a special law issued in 1874. (
The very order of the proceedings in political cases had been
changed time and again. At first they were subject to Judicial

188 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Chambers, then to special sessions of the Senate, and by the
novelle of 1878, they were again entrusted to Judicial Cham
bers, owing to the fact that by that time the Government had
prepared an obedient contingent of judges among the members
of the Judicial Chambers. In the same year those cases were
transferred to Military Courts, under the provision that they
should apply Article 279 of the Military Code, which gave
a death sentence for nearly all cases; by a special circular, in
1887, the military courts were directly forbidden to employ
measures of punishment other than death, and if they found
special reasons for the mitigation of the verdict they were to
petition about the commutation of the sentence at its con
firmation. The fact that the Government decided to make use of the
military courts at quite a late date, in spite of the growing
reaction and revolutionary movement, was due to the reorgan
isation of those courts by Miliutin; as long as he remained at
the head of the Ministry of War, the Government feared the
courts of his department more than the civil courts manipulated
by Pahlen.
Among other reactionary changes in judiciary circles was
the limitation of the rights of attorneys in matters of internal
organisation; by the law of 1874 their order was declared sub
ject to District Courts and Judicial Chambers. Finally, clouds
began to gather over the most important side of the new insti
tutions — the juries. The Ministry of Justice had collected
material alleged to prove the immense number of acquittal-
verdicts declared by juries in cases of doubtless guilt. A per
sistent campaign was launched not only to exempt a series of
cases from the jurisdiction of juries — this had been already
done to a considerable measure before — but to abolish jury-
courts altogether. Count Pahlen's opposition to the juries was
moderated, however, after he had read the memorandum written
on that question in 1878 by A. F. Koni, who had been presid-

RESTRICTING JUSTICE 189
ing judge of the Petrograd District Court for many years,
had gathered large material of statistic data and personal
observations, and convincingly proved the wrongness of the
prevailing opinion concerning the jury courts. The campaign
against the juries was postponed till the Eighties.
Turning now to the position of the press, we observe that
all the publications which appeared on September i-st, 1865,
abounded in praise for the Government's measure which had
abolished preliminary censorship, althbugh they were aware of
the difficulties which the new statute promised for them. Ivan
Aksakov wrote in his Day:
" At last to-day's issue appears without preliminary censor
ship. To-day, starting to write an editorial, we know that we
shall read it in print just as we wrote it down ; to-day we are
not obliged to comply with the taste, valour, and Weltan
schauung of the ' gentlemen having command of the barriers
and turnpikes.' . . . To-day the nightmare, in the form of the
censor, will not disturb our work, will not oppress our spirit,
stifle our mind, and hold back our pen, and we are granted an
unprecedented, an unheard of right: not to lie, not to quibble,
to speak not in a falsetto, but in our own, natural voice.''
The joy was of short duration. The press soon came to see
that the power of the administration was not curbed by the new
law. By the "temporary rules" of 1865 a monthly magazine
appearing without " preliminary censorship " still had to be
presented two days before its publication to the censor who
might delay its release or cut out certain articles or pages.
The provincial magazines and newspapers remained for a long
time under censorship, except the Kiev paper, the Kievite.
Soon the Government had press-cases exempted from regular
court-proceedings, and made broad use of the administrative
penalties permitted by the Statute. In the first place there were
the "warnings"; after 1865, a newspaper or magazine having
received two warnings and deserving a third one, was to be

190 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
stopped for a period of from two to eight months; the counting
of the warnings did not begin every year, but might hang, like
the sword of Damocles, for years over a publication. The
censor had another means for affecting the material conditions
of the press: he could forbid the printing of private advertise
ments, besides imposing heavy money-penalties.
: When in 1868 Valuiev was displaced by Timashov, the
position of the press became still more difficult during the ten
years of the latter's administration. A number of novelles
were issued regarding the press rules. On June 14, 1868, a
rule was illegally carried — through the Committee of Min
isters instead of the State Council — by which a publication
could be forbidden, on account of pernicious tendencies, to sell
its issues to non-subscribers. In 1871 magazines were ordered
to be presented to the censor not two, but four days ahead of
publication ; also books that were published without preliminary
censorship were to be presented to the censor one week before
their publication. In 1873 the minister of interior was given
the right to forbid the discussion of certain internal or foreign
questions in the press; it was then that the reform of the sec
ondary schools, which had been the burning problem of the day,
was not allowed to be touched in print. A publication which
disobeyed that rule could be stopped without warning for a
period not over three months. For forty years those " tem
porary rules " raged over the Russian press, swollen by addi
tional restrictions issued by Timashov, and later (in the
Eighties) by Tolstoy.
A few words about the conditions and the tendencies of the
press during that time. The Slavophiles, in spite of their loyal
convictions, in spite of their profession of the three basic
principles of the Russian order — Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and
Nationality — still suffered restrictions in the spread of their
ideas and opinions. Yuriy Samarin was forced to publish
Khomiakov's writings abroad, in 1867, and there he began to

TENDENCIES OF THE PRESS 191
publish his Russia's Borderlands. Upon the appearance of the
first issue of that publication, Samarin received an Imperial
reprimand. The fate of Ivan Aksakov was no better. After
many adventures he brought his paper, the Day, to a natural
death, in 1866; when he attempted in 1867 to publish a new
magazine, Moscow, a shower of various and frequent penalties
fell upon him. During one year the magazine was stopped
three times, after a series of warnings, and finally upon the
presentation of Timashov, the Committee of Ministers resolved
to stop its publication forever. True, the Senate permitted
Aksakov to contest the ministerial decision, and he even won
the case before the Senate, but since the senatorial decision was
not unanimous, the case was transferred into the State Council,
where it was finally resolved to discontinue the Moscow.
Without awaiting the outcome of his contest, Aksakov began
to publish a daily, the Muscovite, but it met with such a num
ber of penalties that he had to stop it by the end of the year.
Thus from 1868 the Slavophiles actually had no organ of their
own. True, in 1872. Koshelev founded the magazine Dis
course, but its pages were open to writers of different ten
dencies ; after the confiscation and burning of two issues of that
magazine, it also was discontinued at the end of the first year.
Strakhov's Dawn was also partly inclined toward Slavophilism.
It was published from 1870 to 1871, and actually expressed
the views of the " Men of the Soil." l
As to the radical press, we have seen that in 1866 the Con
temporary and the Russian Word were stopped forever by an
Imperial order, and for a year and a half nobody dared renew
their traditions. Only by the end of 1867 Blagosvietlov at
tempted to continue the work of the Russian Word, and
founded a magazine Action, in which Pisarev, Shelgunov,
Zaitzev, and other contributors to the Russian Word, took part.
1 Dostoievsky was one of the " Men of the Soil " ; their ideas may
be defined as reactionary Narodnichestvo, — Tr.

192 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Pisarev, however, soon had a disagreement with Blagosvietlov,
was drowned, in 1868, and with him disappeared the chief
force of the movement; Zaitzev soon emigrated abroad. Shel-
gunov, who was far from being an adequate exponent of the
Nihilistic views, remained the only representative of Pisarev 's
ideas. The traditions of the Contemporary were restored in 1868
in the Annals of the Fatherland, which Niekrasov rented from
Kraievsky, and edited together with Yeliseiev and Saltykov.
Of the former members of the Contemporary, Pypin, Zhukov
sky, and Antonovich did not join the new publication. The
new Annals of the Fatherland began to demonstrate populistic
(Narodnichestvo) views, which became so one-sided during the
Seventies that the magazine rejected all political ideals for the
near future, and labelled the Constitutional idea " a fad of the
nobility" (for which it did not pay to break lances), asserting
that the only question of the moment was the improvement
of the conditions of the masses. In 1866 a weekly, the Week,
appeared under the editorship of Dr. Conradi and his gifted
wife; although officially the publication had no party allegiance,
it undoubtedly promulgated ideas of Narodnichestvo, and one
of its main contributors was P. L. Lavrov, the founder of that
doctrine, about whom we shall speak again.
Katkov's Russian Messenger, and Moscow News, the daily
which he edited together with Leontiev, inclined more and
more to the right. Katkov mercilessly attacked the Nihilists,
Separatists, and all non-Russians, especially the Poles. But
he was still somewhat liberal in respect to judicial independence
and to local self-government, and even in his chauvinistic and
Russificatory ideas he was still not the typical rabid reactionary
of the Eighties. The newspaper Tiding, organ of the selfdom-
advocates and of the oligarchic-constitutional nobles, had to
discontinue publication in 1869 for lack of subscribers and in
view of governmental persecutions. A few years later Prince

TENDENCIES OF THE PRESS 193
Meshchersky, editor of the Citizen, resolved to revive the views
of the Tiding, and to this day 2 he appears as the representative
of the aristocratic aspirants, and as a relentless enemy of the
democratic order which came as a result of the reforms of the
Sixties. Of the daily papers the Moscow News, as long as it did not
become completely reactionary, was the most influential and
widely read during the Sixties and Seventies. But its prestige
began to be rivalled by that of the Petrograd liberal paper,
Voice, especially after its powerful articles against Tolstoy.
The influence of the Voice became still greater when in 1871
the historian Bilbasov became its editor; its liberal tendencies
were tinted occasionally with Slavophile hues, as in the articles
of A. D. Gradovsky and of Prince A. I. Vassilchikov.
Until the middle of the Seventies the Petrograd News, pub
lished by the Academy of Science, but rented and edited by
V. F. Korsh, occupied an important place. Owing to its at
tacks against Tolstoy the paper suffered persecution, and in
1875 the Academy of Science was requested to withdraw it
from Korsh, and lend it to more yielding hands. The forces
which had been grouped around Korsh were distributed be
tween two publications, the Bourse Gazette of Poletika, which
existed till the end of the Seventies, and the New Time
(Novoie Vremia), founded in 1876 by Suvorin, then an ex
treme liberal. Suvorin did not preserve his liberalism, how
ever, and soon began to turn to the right and to vacillate.3
In the latter half of the Seventies the Russian News (Russkiya
Viedomosti) began to gain influence as an organ of the mod
erately liberal democrats; it has been inspired by young pro
fessor-economists, headed by A. I. Chuprov and A. S. Posnikov.
2 Meshchersky died in 1914. — Tr.
3 To this day the Novoie Vremia is the weathercock of the official
policies. It still preserves the epithet given it by the satirist Saltykov-
Shchedrin — " the ' What is your request ? ' paper." — Tr.

194 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The public was in a quite depressed mood after 1866. Only
once, in 1870, did symptoms of life appear among society, — in
connection with the announcement of important military and
zemstvo-reiorms, and with the victory of Russian diplomacy in
abrogating the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Paris, in
1856, upon Russian navigation in the Black Sea. The general
mood was well illustrated in the address to the Tzar presented
by the duma of Moscow; it was edited by the Slavophiles,
greeted the Government's return to reformatory activity, and
expressed hope for further liberal steps in respect to freedom
of press, of conscience, and of the Church. After the assur
ances of loyal rejoicing on the occasion of the diplomatic vic
tory, the address went on :
" Whatever trials may threaten us now, they will — we are
certain — not find Russia unprepared, but will find her closely
concentrated around Your throne.
" With greater faith than in the past does Russia now look
at her future, aware of a constant spiritual revival. Every
one of Your great reforms which have been accomplished, or
are being accomplished, or are eagerly awaited, has served as
a source of new power for the country as well as for Your
Majesty. No one is so entitled to the gratitude of the people,
as You, Sire, and to none has the nation shown such gratitude.
. . . From you alone the nation expects the fulfilment of your
beneficent promises, and first of all — freedom of opinion and
the printed word, without which the national spirit withers,
and thefe is no room for sincerity and truth in the relations to
the Government; freedom of the Church, without which the
preached sermon is impotent; finally, freedom of religious con
science — the most precious treasure for man's soul.
" Sire ! Internal and foreign affairs are mutually connected.
The pledge of our success in the foreign region lies in the
power of national self-consciousness and self-respect. . . .
Confidence on the part of the Tzar in his people, reasonable

MOODS OF THE PUBLIC 195
self-restrain in freedom and honesty in loyalty on the part of
the people, a mutual, unseverable bond between the Tzar and
the people based on the accord of aspirations and beliefs —
herein is our power, our historical mission. Yes, Si: e, we shall
conclude with the words of our ancestors in their reply to your
first crowned forebear, in 1642: " Your will we are ready to
serve with our wealth and with our blood, but our thought is
what it is."
The address was edited by Ivan Aksakov, Prince Cherkassky,
and Yuriy Samarin. But the Slavophiles were once more con
vinced that the Government desired not honest loyalty, but
slavish obedience. The Minister of Interior found that the
address abounded in such impossible expressions that it could
not be presented to the Tzar. . . .
After this the last signs of social life were extinguished, and
the public, tired by its struggle and disappointed in its attempts,
began to stagnate in a prostration which lasted till the second
half of the Seventies.

CHAPTER XXXIV
IN one of the previous chapters I outlined the external
process of the distribution of landownership, as it took
form after the expansion of the peasant-reform in 1866
upon the State-peasants. Now I intend to examine the con
tents of the internal process, the outcome of which depended
upon many material and non-material factors.
By the Act of February 19, the redemption of peasant-allot
ments was based, under normal conditions, upon mutual agree
ment between the landowners and the peasants. The land
owners were allowed to demand redemption against even the
desire of the peasants, but in such cases they received not full
compensations, but only eighty or seventy-five per cent, of the
full amount. Moreover, by the Act of February 19, only
obrok-estates might be redeemed, while barshchina-estates had
first to pass to the obrok system, after which the landowners
might demand redemption which was estimated by the capi
talisation of the obrok.
We have already observed that on the barshchina-estates the
productivity of the peasants after the Reform had considerably
fallen, since the emancipated peasants had become aware of
the fact that the landowners no longer exercised their former
authority ; in many places the peasants refused to be transferred
from barshchina to obrok. In 1862 a number of declarations by
the gentry concerning the necessity of introducing obligatory
redemption appeared. Outside of the sharp declarations of the
Tver nobility, which had a political character, there had been
petitions of a purely business character, as for instance, the
petition of the nobles of the province of Kazan, where the
196

LAND TENURE 197
majority of the peasants were on barshchina, and where the
landowners felt helpless and were being rapidly convinced of
the necessity of bringing their peasants to redemption.
In 1863 the Government issued an additional law by which'
barshchina-estates might be directly redeemed upon the request
of the landowners who were to receive from the Redeeming
Institution only eighty and seventy-five per cent, of the com
pensation sum. In the meantime peasants of many places, par
ticularly in the southeastern and in the southern New Russia
provinces, actually fled from redemption, in spite of the fact
that they did not have to make any additional payments and
that their debt by the compensation arrangement equalled only
three-fourths or four-fifths of the capitalised obrok. The
peasants refused redemption in view of the absence of side earn
ings in those regions.
Then the Government was forced to make use of the addi
tional clause introduced by Prince Gagarin, concerning the
so-called " quarterly " or " beggarly " allotments. Wherever
the peasants were unwilling or unable to pay for the land they
were allowed to demand free "quarterly" allotments. The^
entire southeast of Russia and part of the eastern provinces,
as Ufa, the southern part of Perm, part of Voronezh, all of
Tambov, Samara, and part of Saratov, appeared to be the
region of the greatest expansion of those " beggarly " allot
ments. In view of the fact that during the first years after the
Reform most of the redemption cases were accomplished upon
the demand of the landowners (more than sixty-five per cent.),
and since because of this the latter received incomplete com
pensation, they in their turn made broad use of their right to,
" cut off " the allotments of the peasants within the limits of
the established maximal norm. Those " cut-offs " had in many
places a great importance in that they not only diminished the
property of the peasants in size but in that they greatly dete-

198 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
riorated it qualitatively, and often placed the peasants in com
plete economic dependence upon the landowner because the
latter intentionally cut off such necessary parts of the land as
the meadow or the pasture land. In non-black-soil provinces
where the land requires manuring the peasants could not exist
without raising cattle, and they could not keep cattle without
having the meadows and pastures, so that they were compelled
to rent those " cut-offs " at such prices as the landowners were
pleased to name.
These conditions affected the general state of agriculture
very unfavourably in the first years after the Reform. On one
side the peasants owing to the " cut-offs " fell in many places
into complete economic bondage to the landowners. On the
other side the landowners also depended to a great extent upon
the peasants, being forced to conduct their estates by free hired
labour; although owing to the greater freedom of movement
after the Reform outside labourers appeared, still the land
owners preferred to deal with their former serfs. In the non-
black-soil provinces industry was well developed, and the land
owners had great difficulty in finding labourers for their
estates. They were forced to sell out their property.
A different economic conjuncture was in the black-soil
provinces. There the peasants received very small allotments
and at the same time in most of those places they could find no
side-earnings. They were forced either to hire themselves as
labourers to the landowners or to rent land from the latter.
We should note that at that moment the black-soil provinces
were splendidly situated in respect to raising grain. Since
the end of the Forties after the abolition of the Corn laws in
England and under the influence of the growing concentration
of the population of Western Europe in cities, the demand for
Russian grain increased, and agriculture had come to be very
profitable; after the Reform to this was added the building of

AGRARIAN CONDITIONS 199
railroads which was so planned as to facilitate the export of
grain from the most fertile provinces to sea-ports.1
Under this influence the cultivation of the soil in the fertile
provinces grew very rapidly after the Reform. During the
Sixties the area of cultivated land in European Russia equalled
eighty-eight million eight hundred thousand desiatins; twenty
years later one hundred and six million eight hundred thousand
desiatins were under cultivation, and in 1887 one hundred
seventeen million desiatins. We must not forget that in the
non-black soil provinces the landowners abandoned their estates,
so that the amount of land under cultivation did not increase
throughout the Empire. In the black-soil provinces the culti
vated area increased unequally; in the central black soil
provinces it increased only by five per cent. ; in the middle Volga
provinces during the twenty years following the Reform the
area increased by thirty-five per cent. ; in the Little Russian
provinces — by thirteen per cent., while in New Russia it in
creased by ninety-eight per cent., and in the Southern Trans-
Volga region by three hundred and sixty-five per cent.
These figures do not show an increase in the landowners'
estates at all. In spite of the increase of prices on grain, which
rose during those twenty years by fifty to eighty per cent.; in
spite of the fact that the landowners had received an enormous
capital in the form of compensation sums, and that during the
Eighties a number of Agrarian banks were opened — the land
owners did not invest those funds in agricultural improvements,
but spent them in various ways, and preferred to rent their
1 The export of grain from Russia which was very unsteady in the
first half of the nineteenth century, but had not reached even thirty
million puds before 1845, rose to fifty-one million puds between 1846-
1850; in the next five years, 1850-1885, it fell to forty-five million,
on account of the war; between 1856-1860 it rose to sixty-nine mil
lion, between 1861-1865, to seventy-six million, between 1876-1880, to
two hundred and fifty-seven million puds per year, and so forth.

2©® MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
land to the peasants, making use of the growth of rental prices.
So that on the whole landowners' estates decreased.
This is explained by the fact that at the moment of the
liberation of the serfs the landowners did not have their own
inventory, and that their estates were deep in debt. Of the
five hundred and eighty-eight million rubles which the land
owners were to receive as compensation during the first ten
years after the Reform about two hundred and sixty-two mil
lion rubles was retained for the extinction of their debts to
the Treasury, and the remaining three hundred and twenty-six
million rubles were paid in bonds, the course of which was
quite low, so that the actual sum equalled only two hundred
and thirty million rubles. The indebtedness of the landowners'
estates continued to grow; by the end of the Sixties the new
debt was equal to two hundred and thirty million rubles, by
the beginning of the Eighties it reached four hundred million
rubles and by the end of the Eighties it exceeded six hundred
million rubles. A general view of the first twenty years after
the Reform will show the following process:
In the North landowners' estates deteriorated; they were
either sold or transformed into industrial units. In the
Southern provinces landowners retained their possessions, but
they rented a considerable part of their land to peasants.
During the Eighties in European Russia, excepting Poland,
Finland, and the Caucasus, there were sixty-eight million
desiatins under cultivation, of which forty-seven million and
three hundred thousand desiatins belonged to peasant-allot
ments, about twelve million desiatins were rented by the peas
ants from the landowners, and only eight million seven hundred
thousand desiatins belonged to private landowners. Thus we
see that eighty-seven per cent, belonged to the peasants, and
only twelve and eight-tenths to private landowners.
In respect to the black-soil provinces we must come to the
conclusion that although the landowners retained the land they

PEASANT LANDOWNERSHIP 201
did not improve or expand the cultivation of their estates, and
in the meantime their indebtedness continued to grow, so that
during the Nineties a wholesale liquidation of landowners'
estates took place with the aid of Peasant and Gentry banks.
The statistic data about the sale of landowners' estates show
that the average sale of their land between 1859-1875 equalled
five hundred seventeen thousand desiatins yearly; between
1875-1879 seven hundred and forty-one thousand desiatins
yearly; at the beginning of the Nineties — seven hundred and
eighty-five thousand desiatins yearly. The yearly average of
the sales has continued to grow, and reached one million
desiatins by the beginning of the twentieth century, while in
1906 (when special conditions existed) seven and one-half
million desiatins of landowners' property was offered for sale.
The distribution of the land by classes during that time had
changed in the following way; in 1877 the nobles possessed
77.8 per cent, of the entire area of private landownership, the
merchants — 12.2 per cent., commoners — two per cent., peas
ants — seven per cent., and all "other" private owners — one
per cent. In 1887, ten years later, we get the following
figures: nobles 68 per cent., merchants — 13 per cent., com
moners — 2.9 per cent., peasants — 12 per cent., and "others"
— 2.3 per cent.
While the merchants have been buying the land from the
nobles not for agricultural, but for industrial or speculative
purposes, the peasants bought land mainly for direct cultivation.
Most of their purchases during that period were accomplished
not by communities or societies, as it was in the next period,
but by individuals. During the Sixties the peasant purchases
equalled ninety-one thousand desiatins annually, during the
Seventies — two hundred and three thousand desiatins, during
the Eighties — four hundred and thirty-eight thousand desia
tins. In many cases peasant-buyers were land speculators like
the merchants.

202 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
It thus appears that the peasants triumphed all along the
line; their possessions expanded, they bought land, increased the
size of rented land. We must not forget, however, that they
aspired for an increase of property because, owing to the limited
allotments which were given them by the Act of February 19,
they had no other way out. The dearth of land in the black-
soil region was felt by the peasants particularly during the first
years after the Reform. While the prices of grain doubled,
the rental prices increased by three hundred and even by four
hundred per cent., which was due not only to the rise of grain
prices on the international market, but also to the extension
of railroads to such places as Kozlov, Morshansk, Saratov,
Penza, Kursk, Oriol, Kharkov, New Russia, and so forth.
The sale of grain became very lively near the new railroad
centres, and the peasants were tempted to produce more of it.
But in view of the enormous rental prices most of the peasants
were in the long run ruined, and furthermore, the excessive
cultivation of the soil caused the exhaustion of the black soil.
The economic conditions of the peasants on their own allot
ments were no better, because they were greatly burdened with
all sorts of payments. In 1872 Minister of State Domains
Valuiev, collected interesting material about their condition in
various parts of Russia. Putting aside the official conclusions
we may derive valuable information from the work of such inde
pendent investigators as Professor Yanson, or as Prince
Vassilchikov. From such data we learn that the sum of all
direct taxes and payments which lay on the rural population in
1872 was two hundred and eight million rubles, of which only
thirteen million rubles fell upon private landowners; the rest,
about two hundred million rubles, fell upon peasants' land.
Among those taxes were the State zemsky tax, local zemsky
taxes, redemption payments, and in some places — obrok pay
ments. In all, the peasants paid ninety-five million rubles of
land assessments.

HEAVY TAXES 203
Then followed the per capita tax of forty-two million rubles,
which was paid exclusively by peasants — altogether ninety
million rubles of various non-land payments. These did not
include the natural obligations which were performed only by
peasants, and which we may roughly estimate as equivalent
to several tens of millions rubles. Thus, not counting the
natural obligations, the -ninety- and ~one4iaif million peasants
paid about two hundred million rubles of taxes, i.e., an average
family paid thirty rubles. Such payments were doubtless un
bearable for the ordinary peasant.
We should add that these taxes were unequally distributed
among the peasants themselves. The landowners' peasants had
to pay fifty-four million rubles for their allotments of thirty-
three and one-half million desiatins, while the State-peasants
had to pay only thirty-seven million rubles for their seventy-five
million desiatins. The general picture of the heavy and un
proportional taxation to which the peasantry was subjected ap
peared early after the Reform. As early as 1867 there was a
grave failure of crops in the province of Smolensk, which was
followed by a famine; Valuiev, then Minister of the Interior,
at first denied the existence of the famine and asserted that
there were sufficient alimentary reserves for the satisfaction
of the peasants' needs, but investigators who were appointed
discovered that the reserves were not sufficient, and that the
peasants not only had to eat various substitutes for bread, like
bark, lime, etc., but that they actually died from starvation.
The Government became alarmed and appointed a special com
mission under the chairmanship of the Heir (the future Em
peror Alexander III) for the relief of the starving peasants.
Three years later another failure of crops occurred; it af
fected mainly the southeastern provinces which had been con
sidered the granary of all Russia and even of Europe; in the
province of Samara it lasted three years and resulted in a
famine of enormous dimensions. It became clear to the Gov-

204 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ernment that it was necessary to lighten the burden of the
over-taxed peasants on one side, and on the other to bring an
end to their landlessness in the black-soil provinces. Yet the
Government continued to act very slowly, and allowed the
conditions of the peasants to grow worse. During the Seven
ties some local administrators attempted to explain away the
misery of the peasants by their own bad morals. For instance,
Klimov, the Governor of Samara, expressed it as his opinion
before the Committee of Ministers in 1873 that the peasants
spent all their income on drink and hence starved when the
crops failed. The State Comptroller, A. A. Abaza, pointed
out that Klimov's information about his own province was
incorrect; Abaza indicated that the province of Samara paid
more than three per cent, of the general sum of taxes collected
in Russia, while its excise payments equalled only one and
one-half per cent, of the total excise revenue, thus definitely
proving to the Governor of Samara that his province was one
of the most sober in Russia. The exhaustion of the black-soil
belt of Russia in the Nineties was certain beyond a doubt.
During the famine years of 1 892-1 893 I had to gather statistic
data about starving peasants, and I personally saw a large
number of impoverished villages in the central black-soil
provinces; for instance in the province of Tula seventy-five per
cent, of the peasants' houses had their stoves built without chim
neys, for the sake of economy in fuel which consisted of wood
or straw; the ceilings in those houses were absolutely black
with soot, and in damp weather they dripped black mud. A
large number of houses in such villages were uncovered; only
the rafters remained on the roof, since the straw was removed
and given to the cattle. According to the data I collected
it appeared that by the beginning of the Nineties in some vil
lages about fifty per cent, of the peasants had no horses, while
of the remaining fifty per cent, about forty-five per cent, owned

YANSON'S DIAGNOSIS 205
one horse, and only five to six per cent, possessed two or more
horses. If the Government was slow in undertaking serious measures
for the improvement of the unbearable position of the peasants,
the public saw even during the Seventies that the status of the
peasantry was doomed to slide downward. Among the writers
who made use of the statistic data gathered by the Govern
ment commissions were two distinguished investigators whom
I have already mentioned — Y. E. Yanson and Prince A. I.
Vassilchikov. Professor Yanson had definitely expressed the
conclusions which he drew from his investigations in his book,
A Statistic Investigation of the Peasant- Allotments and
Assessments. He set forth the economic insecurity of the
peasant, his poor nourishment, bad physical and moral condi
tions of living, large number of sickness and high death rate;
he named as the causes of such conditions poor soil, insufficient
allotments, and finally the heaviness of taxation. He recom
mended the lowering of land taxes, the transplanting of peas
ants into unoccupied provinces, the facilitation of land acquisi
tion by the migrating peasants, and finally the revision of the
system of taxation. Most of his recommendations were put
into practice early in the Eighties.
Prince A. I. Vassilchikov differed from Yanson in that he
considered the main cause of the miserable conditions of the
peasants not the insufficiency of their allotments, but the ter
rible taxation system which paralysed the beneficial results of
the reform of February 19. Quoting the epigraph of Taine,
in his characterisation of the position of the peasants in France
before the Revolution of 1789 — quand I' homme est miserable,
il s'aigrit; mais quand il est a la fois proprietaire et miserable,
il s'aigrit encore d'avantage — Prince Vassilchikov found the
condition of the French peasants of that time quite analogous
to the position of his contemporary Russian peasants, and he

206 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
warned the Government that the tax system was bound to
bring the small landowners to desperation and to such out
bursts of popular indignation as were manifested during the
French Revolution.
The opinions of Prince Vassilchikov and Professor Yanson
were in a large measure shared by most of the writers of that
time; this attitude was expressed back at the end of the Fifties
and early in the Sixties by Chernyshevsky, and later by Serno-
Solovievich and others. During the Sixties a quite definite
and persistent opinion about the defects of the economic order
that was established by the peasant Reform was formed among
the progressive Russian intelligentzia; the spread of that
opinion gave rise to the movement of Narodnichestvo in liter
ature and in life.

CHAPTER XXXV
THE pessimistic conclusions of Yanson and Vassilchikov
did not surprise the representatives of the intelli
gentzia who were familiar with the critical views of
Herzen, Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, and other publicists of
the Contemporary or the Bell. Radical public opinion regarded
the Governmental activity with mistrust and suspicion. From
the very beginning of the Sixties the formation began of the
so-called Narodnichestvo ^school in Russian literature. Al
ready in 1 860-1 86 1 the first productions appeared of such
writers as Nicholas Uspensky, Naumov, Levitov, Rieshetnikov,
and a number of others who brilliantly described the difficult
position in which the people found themselves at the moment of
emerging from the bondage system. The above-mentioned
writers could do it the easier since by their origin they were
close to the people; they were the commoner-writers who were
then entering Russian literature which until that time had been
created chiefly by nobles. In an article " Is It Not the Be
ginning of a Change ? " dedicated to Nicholas Uspensky,
Chernyshevsky indicated that phenomenon.
Those Narodniki-writers had tasted in their personal life of
the misery which oppressed the people. In their description of
the real state of the masses they worked largely upon the public
conscience, upon the conscience of the most susceptible minds,
particularly of the young generation. There loomed up the
question of the duty of the intelligentzia before the people, for it
1 Narod — means : people. The derivatives are numerous. Narod
nichestvo — the doctrine of going " to the people." Narodnichesky —
the adjective. Narodnik — an adherent of the doctrine. — Tr.
207

208 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
appeared clear to those idealists that every intellectual body is
enabled to enjoy the benefits of culture only at the expense of
the people; this brought about the problem of paying back to
the people the debt which lay upon the shoulders of the
intelligentzia. Such was the sentiment not only of the com
moners who came from the ranks of the people, but of numer
ous representatives of the nobility — those whom a few years
later N. K. Mikhailovsky named " Repentant Nobles."
When in 1861 student disturbances took place in connection
with some questions regarding the liberation of the peasants,
when Putiatin and Ignatiev exaggerated the event and tact
lessly ravaged the University of Petrograd, and hundreds of
young men were expelled and thrown into fortresses and bar
racks, Herzen wrote in his Bell, addressing those expelled
students :
" Where shall you go, youths, from whom knowledge has
been shut off? Shall I tell you, Where? Give ear, for even
darkness does not prevent you from listening, — from all
corners of our enormous land, from the Don and the Ural,
from the Volga and the Dnieper, a moan is growing, a grum
bling is rising, — this is the first roar of the sea-billow, which
begins to rage, pregnant with storm, after a long and tiresome
calm. V narod! To the people ! — that is your place, O
exiles of knowledge. Prove to those Bistroms z that out of you
will emerge not clerks, but soldiers, not mercenaries, but sol
diers of the Russian people! "
That slogan: V narod! To the people!, which was used
by Herzen on a particular occasion, was caught up by the
narodnichestvo-literature, and was powerfully reflected in the
minds of the young.
2Bistrom was the General who commanded the soldiers during the
quelling of the student disturbances in 1861 ; he told his soldiers that
the disturbers were "clerks" dissatisfied with the liberation of the
peasants.

REPENTANT NOBLES 209
True, in the following years, under the influence of the
collapse of the progressive intelligentzia, which took place in
1862 after the Petrograd conflagrations, under the influence of
the Polish insurrection which aroused reactionary mood, but
mostly under the influence of that current which under the
leadership of Pisarev received the name of Nihilism, and put
forth more selfish questions — of the struggle for individuality
(i.e., for the liberation of one's intellectual personality from
all religious, social and other chains and prejudices) under the
influence of those circumstances the Russian intelligentzia had
somewhat deviated from the Narodnichestvo aspirations and
from the tendencies which began to develop in literature after
the peasant Reform.
But during the second half of the Sixties the Narodnichestvo
movement again came to the front, enhanced by the new rules
issued by Minister Tolstoy in 1867, which severely restricted
University life; the young generation felt oppressed, insulted,
and removed from the honourable place to which it was ele
vated by Dobroliubov, Pisarev, and other literary leaders of
the radicals. In place of problems of internal struggle for
individuality and for the liberation of one's personality there
inevitably rose before them the question of the necessity of
acquiring first of all more tolerable external conditions. That
thought necessarily pointed towards social problems.
At the same time we have seen that in 1868, in connection
with the famine in the province of Smolensk, the question about
the misery of the peasants rose before the public for the first
time. The young generation were deeply affected by the pic
tures of the sufferings of the people, and a strong fermentation
was going on among the University students during 1868—
1869. Grave disturbances took place, in which the students
protested against the Government, and in the result masses of
them were excluded from the University and from the Medical
Academy, and were transported to their homes. The surging

210 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
young mass was thus scattered throughout Russia, where it
came in contact with society, and at once began to propagate
the very ideas which they had been punished for holding. The
year 1869 and those immediately following saw the beginnings
of new, revolutionary and radical-Narodnichesky currents
among Russian youth.
As if to meet the new currents an article written by P. L.
Lavrov in the magazine Week appeared, which was a success
ful formulation of the tasks which were placed before society
by the new circumstances. Lavrov, who was quite moderate
during the Sixties and had been opposed by the radical organs,
especially by Pisarev, had moved considerably to the left. In
spite of his maturity — he was then a retired Colonel of forty
— Lavrov was inclined to evolution, and constantly moved
forward, trying to preserve his bond with the younger genera
tion and with their problems. In 1868 in his articles written
from exile under the transparent pseudonym of Mirtov,3 he
formulated those general problems which in his opinion were
then before the Russian intelligentzia. He wrote :
" The development of the individual physically, mentally and
morally, the embodiment of truth and justice in social forms,
this short formula embraces everything that may be considered
Progress." On the basis of that formula Mirtov wrote a series of arti
cles under the title of " Historical Letters," in which he indi
cated the conditions for the achievement of the purpose. He
put forth the obligations of every " critically thinking indi
vidual," whose role he saw in paying the price of Progress.
" A civilised minority," he wrote, " who do not strive to
be civilising in the broadest sense of the word, bear responsibil
ity for all the sufferings of their contemporaries, which they
could have removed, had they not limited their role to that of
8 Lavr — means: laurel. Mirt — myrtle.

LAVROV 211
representing and conserving civilisation, but had taken upon
themselves also the role of moving it ahead."
" The embodiment of truth and justice in social forms," as
the aim of human activity, and the obligation of striving for
the achievement of that aim, gave the young generation a basis
for its conduct which it needed gravely at that moment, and
which Pisarev could not furnish.
Later the sociological teachings of Mikhailovsky gave a
brighter and stronger expression to the task outlined by Lavrov,
but the latter was undoubtedly the first Russian thinker to place
that task before the public. So much did his formula suit
the moment that even Shelgunov, the leader of the Action and
promulgator of Pisarev 's ideas, greeted the appearance of
Lavrov's articles in book form, and although he disagreed with
some of the latter's views, he warmly recommended the book
to the public as " an extraordinary phenomenon in Russian
literature." The formula of Lavrov was so broad that it was taken up
by representatives of various platforms. Since " the embodi
ment of truth and justice in social forms " might be achieved
in various ways, the formula was accepted by revolutionaries
as well as by peacefully inclined Narodniki who limited their
activity to cultural development of the country, particularly of
the village.
A formula, politically more definite, although in substance
analogous to that of Lavrov, was announced abroad at that
time by the most distinguished representative of the Russian
emigration, M. A. Bakunin. In 1868 a Russian magazine was
founded in Geneva, the Cause of the People, under the editor
ship of N. I. Zhukovsky; in the first issue Bakunin placed be
fore the progressive Russian youth a number of tasks required,
in his opinion, by the moment. The first point of his pro
gramme completely corresponded with the formula of Lavrov,
with the only difference that Bakunin was more definite.

212 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
First of all was placed the task of liberating one's personality
from any bonds, but it was definitely indicated that only the
individual who had thrown off all religious beliefs and had
become atheistic, might be considered free, so that Atheism_was
put forth as the cornerstone of personal evolution. The second
point of the programme called for the " embodiment of truth
and justice in social forms," but it pointed out definitely that by
truth and justice was meant a certain social order in which was
to be attained not only the social and economic liberation of
the people through the abolition of all hereditary property,
transferring the land to agricultural communes, and the fac
tories, capital and means of production — to labour-associations,
granting equal rights to women, abolishing marriage and fam
ily, and submitting all children to a public education: all these
Bakunin considered realisable only in case the work began from
the complete annihilation of the State. Anarchism was the
typical feature of Bakunin's programme. According to him,
as long as mankind will live and develop under forms of state,
economic and social freedom will be impossible, for whatever
the form of government — whether a constitutional monarchy
or a democratic republic — any state organism is based on com
pulsion and hence inevitably leads to inequality and domination
of one social group or class over others.
The sharp and irreconcilable formulation of the question by
Bakunin appealed to the aroused youth more than the vague
and abstract formula of Lavrov. During the winter of 1868-
1869 Bakunin's programme was the subject of lively discussion
among students. The question rose whether it was worth
while to study. According to Bakunin all study, all knowl
edge, were at that time waste of the people's sources; the trans
fer of knowledge and culture to the people was impossible as
long as the people were not free, in Bakunin's sense of the
word; hence until that moment it was not worth while to
study. Bakunin recommended leaving the universities, going

BAKUNIN. NIECHAIEV 213
to the people, and raising them — not in the sense of imparting
knowledge and ideas to them, but in the direct sense of rebel
ling against the existing order of things, since until that order
were overthrown and annihilated no proper social development
was possible.
Soon a new herald of revolutionary ideas appeared among
the young generation, who went further than Bakunin. It was
the twenty-three-year-old Niechaiev, a teacher in a primary
school, and an unclassified student at the University. He had
a magnetic influence not only upon the young people, but upon
all who came in contact with him. Among his followers was
the forty-year-old writer, Pryzhov, who admitted that he had
never met such a winning personality. Niechaiev soon fled
abroad, and there he produced such an impression on Bakunin
that the latter was ready to submit to him, and even tried to
win Herzen to his side, but the latter brusquely turned away.
Bakunin succeeded, however, in converting Ogarev and for
a time, Herzen's children, whom he persuaded after the death
of their father (January, 1870) to hand over to Niechaiev
the public money which had been in their trust.
Upon the young generation Niechaiev had a hypnotising
effect. In his extreme ambition he intended personally to man
age the whole movement; he did not scruple about spreading
mystifying rumours and using dishonest means for the achieve
ment of his purpose. Bakunin finally became utterly disap
pointed in him. Niecljaiey put into the foundation of his
political system the principle of extreme Jesuitism. In his opin
ion a revolutionist was justified in ignoring all moral principles,
in deceiving, killing, and robbing; for thesake oijiolding the
organisation in a firm grip, Niechaiev allowed himself to com
promise his coworkers, to steal their letters or documents, and
to terrorise them in other ways.
This harmonised with the structure of his organisation which
was borrowed from Babeuf and his followers. It consisted

214 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of a hierarchy of "fives"; each group of five knew only one
superior from the next " five," and at the very top was the
mysterious " committee," which was itself a myth, since
Niechaiev was the actual head of all the " fives." In one of
the Moscow " fives " which consisted of Uspensky, Pryzhov,
Nicolaiev, Kuznietzov, and Ivanov, Niechaiev observed that
Ivanov began to regard him critically. He ordered the other
members of the " five " to kill Ivanov, as a spy, calculating
that the crime, once committed, would throw those who had
taken part in it into slavish subjection to him. He succeeded
in his plan; the student Ivanov was murdered. But the affair
was disclosed, and served as the basis for the Process of the
Niechaievians, in which eighty-seven persons were tried, thirty-
three sentenced to various penalties, while many of the acquitted
were later exiled in the administrative order.
When Bakunin gained a clear view of the personality of
Niechaiev and his system, he did his best to disavow any con
nection with him and to denounce him publicly. But the evil
had been done: Niechaiev's organisation, "The Tribunal of
the People," had produced a deep impression upon the con
temporary public, and that episode had greatly harmed the
reputation and development of the revolutionary movement.
In 1872, one year after the trial of the Niechaievians, Dos
toievsky, himself a former revolutionist, wrote a novel " De
mons " ("The Possessed"), with the Niechaiev affair as
its basis. But Dostoievsky generalised that monstrous phenom
enon, and applied it to the whole movement, which naturally
aroused great indignation in radical circles; it was adequately
expressed in an article of a young writer in the Annals of the
Fatherland, N. K. Mikhailovsky, who, without attempting to
defend Niechaiev and his system, protested at the same time
against Dostoievsky's general slander of the revolutionary
movement. About the same time, in the early Seventies, the circle of the

CHAIKOVTZY 215
Chaikovtzy, who were grouped around a young university
graduate, N. V. Chaikovsky, a new movement, in contrast to
that of Niechaiev, arose among the young generation. In his
Memoirs of a Revolutionist Prince Kropotkin describes the
origin of that circle and of similar circles.
" In all cities, in all the ends of Petrograd, appeared circles
of ' self -development.' There the works of philosophers,
economists, and of the young school of Russian historians were
carefully studied. The reading was accompanied with endless
discussions. The aim of all those readings and discussions was
to solve the great problem which stood before the young men
and women: In what way could they be most useful for the
people? Gradually they came to the conclusion that there ex
isted only one way: One must go to the people and live their
lives. Young men began to depart for villages as physicians,
assistant-surgeons (feldshers), school-teachers, volost-clerks.
In order to be still closer to the people, many became hard
day-labourers, blacksmiths, woodchoppers. Girls began to
undergo examinations as school-teachers, midwifes, nurses, and
flocked by the hundreds to villages where they devoted them
selves unreservedly to the service of the poorest part of the
population. None of them had as yet any thought of revolu
tion, of any revolutionary reorganisation of society after some
definite plan. They merely wanted to teach the people how
to read and write, to enlighten them, to help them in some
way to get out of darkness and misery, and at the same time
to learn from the people themselves, their ideal of a better
social life."
These memoirs were written several decades after that
epoch, and many of them have become, so to speak, chrono
logically merged; there might have been perhaps some chron
ological aberration. We may therefore take Kropotkin with
some reservations. We may point out that many members
of the circles were revolutionists from the very beginning; an-

216 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
other prominent Chaikovetz, L. E. Shishko, tells us in his
memoirs that when still a junker he professed revolutionary
ideas. Many others entered the circles with definite revolu
tionary ideas. But at any rate even the political processes at
the end of the Seventies assure us that numerous Narodniki
who " went to the people " in the middle of the Seventies were
imbued with most peaceful intentions. Here is the testimony
of S. I. Bardin, a woman defendant in the Process of Fifty,
tried in 1876:
" I belong, gentlemen, to the category of those who are
known among the young people as peaceful propagandists.
Their task is to instil into the consciousness of the people ideals
of a most perfect and most just social order, or to clarify for
them ideals which are unconsciously inrooted in them ; to point
out to them the defects of the present order, in order that the
errors might be avoided in the future; but when that future
will come, we do not state, and we cannot state, since its ulti
mate realisation does not depend upon us. I think that it is
quite a distance from such propaganda to instigation for riots.
. . . We are accused of being political revolutionists ; but if we
aspired for a political coup d'etat we should have acted dif
ferently; we should not have gone to the people whom it is
necessary to prepare and develop, but we should have sought
to bring together the dissatisfied elements among the educated
classes. . . . But the truth of the matter is that we have in
no way aspired for a coup d'etat. . . ."
It is certain that in the early Seventies the aims of the
Chaikovtzy were not revolutionary, but peaceful, cultural. In
their desire to come in contact with the people they put on
peasant garments, tried to appear " common," and at the same
time endeavoure^ to disseminate among the masses and the
intelligentzia general knowledge and their own social views.
Among them were men of various political views, and many
who were not at all interested in political questions. Among

KROPOTKIN 217
the books which they spread were : Marx' " Capital," the first
volume of which had been translated into Russian (1872),
articles by Chernyshevsky, Dobroliubov, Mirtov's " Historical
Letters," Flerovsky's " The Position of the Labouring Class,"
and his " ABC of Social Sciences." The Censorship Commit
tee forbade those books, and even burned some of them. Then
the Chaikovtzy were forced to deviate from the legal path of
action, and they began to print in an underground way small,
thin brochures. For this purpose they established a printing
place, with the aid of Ippolit Myshkin, a governmental ste
nographer in Moscow.
The propagation of Socialistic, or to be exact, Anarchistic
ideas among Petrograd workingmen occupied a considerable
place in the early activity of the Chaikovtzy. Foremost in this
respect was Prince P. A. Kropotkin, a former Imperial Page,
a well educated military officer who served not in the Guard,
but in Siberia, whither he was attracted by his desire to in
vestigate that little known region. In 1871 he lived abroad,
and frequented German workingmen-circles. It was the mo
ment of the split in the International, owing to the difference
of opinion between Marx and Bakunin. The two men were
mutually exclusive both in questions of programme and of tac
tics. While Marx aspired for the establishment in the re
mote future of an ideal social order through socialising the
means of production and the realisation of Socialism by the
aid of a state, and placed before the proletariat a definite task
of capturing the authority of the State, and even, if necessary,
instituting a dictatorship — Bakunin first of all denied the
State, and considered that every person or group of persons who
wished to improve the condition of the masses economically
and socially, would have to fight the State as their main enemy.
The conflict between the two leaders ended in the expulsion
of Bakunin from the International, but his cause was upheld
by many sections, especially in Latin countries, and the Inter-

218 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
national perished in the internecine strife. Kropotkin, who
happened to find himself in the thick of those dissensions, de
cisively took the side of Bakunin; he also thought that the
liberation of the working masses was possible only upon the
abolition of the State and the establishment in its stead of
federative unions, starting with the smallest socialistic or com
munistic units.
Then Kropotkin joined the circle of the Chaikovtzy, and be
gan to propagate these ideas actively in this and also in other
circles of revolutionary youth, which began to form at that
time. Those students who had been expelled from higher insti
tutions, especially in 1869, prepared revolutionary cadres in the
provinces among senior gymnasia students, among their younger
brothers and sisters, seminarists, etc.; so that parallel with the
circle of the Chaikovtzy there appeared a number of other,
revolutionary, organisations. The revolutionary mood affected
even men of mature age. Thus Kovalik, President of the Con
ference of Peace Mediators in Mglinsk, gave up his position,
and devoted all his time to the organisation of revolutionary
circles; in a short time he went through several provinces, and
established mort than ten revolutionary organisations. He
soon made close connections with another known organiser, a
Penza landowner, Voinaralsky, who contributed all his for
tune — about forty thousand rubles, to the cause, and actively
organised circles. I have already mentioned Ippolit Myshkin,
who made use of his position as governmental stenographer for
maintaining an illegal printing machine at his Moscow home
for the publications of the Chaikovtzy.
At the same time considerable revolutionary cadres were be
ing prepared abroad. Part of the expelled students went there.
Especially large was the number of girl students who went
abroad, on account of the difficulties of procuring higher edu
cation at home; from the early Seventies Zurich swarmed with
Russian girls, and even married women — often fictitiously

LAVRISTS — BAKUNISTS 2 1 9
married. Girls frequently at that time contracted fictitious
marriages with persons whom they might never meet again,
in order to free themselves from parental guardianship. In
the Zurich " Colony" there were some wealthy members; the
Colony purchased a home for eighty thousand francs, where
they had meals and daily lectures, addresses, readings, and so
forth. Lavrov was a permanent lecturer at the Colony, and
became the editor of the revolutionary publication, Forward.
He had by that time accepted in a certain sense Bakunin's
programme, except that he considered the federative-anarchic
order an ideal of the remote future and hence recommended a
long road of propaganda and peaceful preparation of the masses
for the future uprising and revolution. Bakunin, as an ardent,
irreconcilable revolutionary Anarchist, naturally rejected Lav-
rov's way, and advocated immediate action, organisation of
revolts, considering even a small revolt as the best propaganda.
He proclaimed therefore propagande par le fait, and his nu
merous followers were called Bakunists-parlefaitists.
The intensive activity of the Lavrists and of the Bakunists
alarmed the Russian Government. It demanded that by Janu
ary 1, 1874, the students come back to Russia, threatening
those who might come after that date with many difficulties;
on the other hand it indicated its intention of organising higher
education for women. Indeed, we may believe that owing to
the threatening dimensions of the Zurich Colony the Govern
ment did not oppose the opening of courses for women at
Petrograd and Moscow. The students resolved to take the
Government's notice as a signal for going " to the people " ;
they went back, but not with the intention of studying; they
marched " to the people."
Together with the revolutionary cadres that had been formed
at home, the Narodniki from abroad were scattered among the
people. Most of them decided to act peacefully, in the begin
ning at least, and to limit their activity to propaganda of so-

220 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
cial ideas. They acted very clumsily, having had no experience
or preparation, taking no precautions against the police, and
failing to conceal their identity under the transparent peasant-
guise. Two or three months after the beginning of that move
ment, the Government started an investigation of the propa
gandists; Count Pahlen prepared an extensive memorandum
concerning the matter. In the month of May many of the
young idealists were imprisoned. Some of them were soon re
leased, but many were kept two and three and four years ; those
arrests gave the basis for the big Process of 193, which took
place in 1877.
From the memorandum of Count Pahlen we may judge ap
proximately the dimensions of the movement: during two or
three months seven hundred and seventy persons were arrested
in thirty-seven provinces — six hundred and twelve men and
one hundred and fifty-eight women. Two hundred and fif
teen persons were imprisoned, and the rest were set free.
Many propagandists were not caught, and one must assume
higher figures than the official ones for those who went " to
the people." Among those apprehended were Kovalik, Voi-
naralsky, a number of girls from noble famihes, like Sofia
Perovsky, V. N. Batiushkov, N. A. Armfeld, Sofia Leshern
von Herzfeld ; there were daughters of merchants, like the three
sisters Kornilov, and persons of all ranks and classes, from
Prince Kropotkin to common workingmen.
Pahlen stated with horror that society not only did not re
sist the movement, but even assisted it financially and other
wise. He could not understand that the public did not sym
pathise with the Government's reactionary policy, and therefore
welcomed any expression of opposition.
For the Narodniki the movement " to the peoples-proved a
failure; not only because they were soon arrested, but be
cause they did not come into contact jyith the people. The
peasants shunned them, and in some places betrayed them to

LAND AND FREEDOM 221
the police. The Narodniki who were not imprisoned began to
think of a firmer organisation. Two attempts were made in
1876 to organise the revolutionary forces. In Moscow a group
of peaceful AWo</wz£z-propagandists was formed, who figured
in the Process of Fifty, in 1877. Among them were L. N.
Figner, V. I. Alexandrov-Nathanson, Dzhabarti, and several
workingmen, one of whom, Peter Alexeiev, delivered at the trial
an ardent speech which made a profound impression. Of a
greater importance was the attempt to bring together the
Petrograd revolutionary Narodniki in the society which subse
quently became known under its historical name " Land and
Freedom" (Zemlia y Volia). At the head of that society
were Mark Nathanson, his wife Olga, Alexander Mikhailov,
and the remnant of the Chaikovtzy and those Narodniki who
had not yet been arrested.
The basic principle of the programme of " Land and Free
dom " was the assumption that only an economic revolution
from the bottom might bring about a final and complete change
from the existing order to a juster social organisation harmon
ising with the ideals of the people. Therefore they based their
operations on the people proper, and divided their activity into
the following branches : ( 1 ) organising activity — the crea
tion of a fighting squad among the people, which would con
centrate all the material and spiritual forces of the revolution,
and could start a general uprising at the right moment. But
since even Bakunin acknowledged before his death (1876) that
it was necessary to engage in preparatory work, the party pro
posed (2) agitational activity — passive (sending petitions,
strikes, refusal to pay taxes, etc.), and active (riots and upris
ings), which was employed only in one place with the aid of
forged manifestoes — in Chigirin (the case of Stefanovich and
Deich) ; (3) establishment of regular connections with the ex
isting organisations among the people ( Schismatists and Sec-
tants) ; (4) propagation of revolutionary Narodnichestvo

222 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
among society, young people, and city workingmen. According
to Aptekman, these four points exhausted the tactics-programme
of " Land and Freedom."
Alongside with this programme a definite constitution was
worked out, by which the original Petrograd group was to be
the nucleus of the organisation, and the members of which
could recommend outside elements. From the nucleus the
" administration " of the society was formed ; it had a " heav
enly chancery" — for the fabrication of false passports; there
were separate groups for propaganda among students and work
ingmen, and a special, disorganising, group for the application
of armed force against the Government and traitors. Finally
for direct propaganda and organisation of the people there ex
isted the most important and numerous group of the " rustics "
(derevenshchiki). The "disorganising" group gradually in
creased, by force of circumstances, and formed a basis for the
terroristic party, " Will of the People," about which we shall
have to speak later.
The first manifestation of the " Land and Freedom " society
was expressed in a demonstration in front of the Kazan Ca
thedral in Petrograd, on December 6, 1876, in which thou
sands of workingmen were to take part; the speaker was a
young man, G. V. Plekhanov, now leader of the Russian So
cial-Democrats. Only two or three hundred persons gath
ered, however, and were easily scattered by janitors and petty
merchants, organised for the occasion by the police. Twenty
men were arrested, tried a month and a half later, and se
verely punished; some were sentenced to hard labour for five
or ten years, while the minimum penalty was exile.
The most numerous group of that society, the " rustics,"
made persistent efforts to establish firm connections with the
peasants. Taught by the bitter experience of 1874, they were
more cautious and tactful, and no longer appeared an easy prey
of the police and of the ignorant, treacherous peasants. But in

LAND AND FREEDOM 223
the end they were forced to the conclusion that the people were
hopelessly unprepared for the acceptance of their ideas, and that
no success of their work was even thinkable until the people
were more developed. They could only, therefore, either aban
don all revolutionary plans and turn into peaceful Kulturtrdger
for life, or — abandon the village, and begin the work " from
the other end." The difficulties which they had to go through,
the rude persecutions on the part of the Government, the grow
ing indignation against the despotism of the administration —
were bound to direct the minds of the Narodniki toward the
second alternative. It appeared necessary to acquire first of all
elementary conditions of social life which would allow free
intercourse with the people. Circumstances developed in such
a way that the number of " rustics " began to decrease, while
the " disorganising " group grew and became at the end of the
Seventies the famous " Executive Committee," which originated
among Kiev revolutionists, but soon attracted all the active
revolutionary forces, and made the terroristic struggle with the
Government the main issue, pushing the Narodnichestvo-dreams
and ideals to the background.

CHAPTER XXXVI
ALONGSIDE with the growth of revolutionary tend
encies among the young generation, with the accretion
of dissatisfaction on the part of liberal zemstvo-
circles, elements of discontent and exasperation had accumu
lated during that post-reform period of Russian history in va
rious parts of the vast Empire, provoked by insulted and
persecuted national feelings. Under the influence of the Rus
sificatory policy carried on in the crudest forms in the border
lands there arose and developed morbidly sharpened national
interests and feelings.
The Ukrainophile movement appeared in Little Russia, and
grew and strengthened, thanks to the persecution of the Little
Russian language which had been inaugurated by Nicolas
and renewed during the Sixties and Seventies in connection with
the chauvinistic tendencies that prevailed in the ruling spheres
and among a part of the public and the press after the suppres
sion of the Polish uprising. Katkov turned patriot and chauvin
ist, and attacked all non-Russian nationalities for the aspirations
of cultural self-expression and alleged political separatism. His
persecution of the Ukrainophiles caused the Government to ap
point a special commission, of Minister of Education Tolstoy,
Minister of Interior Timashov, Chief of Gendarmes Potapov,
and a renowned Kiev chauvinist, Yusephovich. The commis
sion investigated, among other things, the activity of the South
western branch of the Geographical Society, found its work
in the field of Little Russian poetry connected ' with Ukrain-
ophilism, and had it closed in 1875. At the same time per
secutions of the Little Russian language began: all publica-
224

BORDERLANDS 225
tions and stage productions in that language were forbidden. ^/
Professors Dragomanov (historical philologist) and Zieber
(economist) of the University of Kiev were dismissed (after
they refused to resign) by the " Third point," which deprived
them forever of the right to occupy an official position. The
ethnographer Chubinsky was banished from Kiev, while Drago
manov and Zieber preferred to migrate abroad.1
The Polish question at that time was no less acute. Be
fore the uprising the governmental policy was based at first
on the principles suggested by Marquis Velepolsky, and later
on the views of N. A. Miliutin and Y. F. Samarin, who dis
tinguished between the question of Russian domination in
Poland proper, and that of Russian prevalence in the North
west and Southwest, where the task was to combat the in
fluence of Polonism upon those Russian or Lithuanian regions.
The Kingdom of Poland was to be absolutely free to employ
the Polish language and develop its own culture. But that
policy changed rapidly after the removal of Miliutin, who was
stricken with apoplexy in 1866, and the management of Rus
sian affairs in Poland fell into the hands of Prince V. A.
Cherkassky, whose heavy character and brusqueness made the
relations with Polish society acute; from that time the Russian
policy in the Kingdom of Poland began to be governed by the
same principles that had been applied to the Western region.
Compulsory instruction of Russian was demanded at first in
secondary, and later also in primary schools; elementary edu
cation became very difficult, since the Poles naturally were
unwilling to give money for Russian schools and send their chil
dren there as long as they were not allowed to be taught in
their native tongue. During the Seventies and Eighties (un
der Curator Apukhtin) the restrictions had reached such an
1 There exists an opinion that Dragomanov did so upon the advice
of Prince Dundukov-Korsakov, Governor-General of Kiev, who was
friendly disposed toward him.

226 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
extent that even religious instruction was not permitted in Pol
ish, owing to which in the majority of schools such instruction
was entirely discontinued during that time. All trade-signs
had to be either in Russian or in both languages.
In the Seventies the question concerning the Kholm re
gion, which was solved in recent years by the Third Duma,
came to the front. A large portion of that population were
not Poles, but Ruthenians, i.e., Little Russians, who had
formerly belonged to the Orthodox creed; under Polish domin
ion their faith was modified, in that while they preserved Or
thodox traditions they also acknowledged the supremacy of the
Pope. During the Seventies the question arose about the recon
version of those Uniates to the Orthodox church, as had been
done under Nicolas I in the Northwest. But the adminis
tration acted in that case rudely, hastily, and violently; a num
ber of atrocities, riots, and repressions took place; hussars and
cossacks were sent to aid the " voluntary " conversion to the
Orthodox faith, and the reunion of the Uniates acquired the
character of a real scandal. It is obvious that such a policy
could not have aroused any good feelings towards the Govern
ment on the part of the oppressed nationalities; it enhanced
the general opposition which existed under the influence of eco
nomic factors and of the growing reaction.
The general discontent caused by this stubborn reaction and
by senseless repressions was complicated during the Seventies
by difficulties in foreign affairs. By that time the old Eastern
question had ripened.
For twenty years after the Crimean Campaign the Russian
military authorities, especially on the frontiers, had been trying
to restore the prestige which the Russian army had lost in
Crimea, if not in Europe — at least in Asia. Two years after
that war Russian territory began to increase steadily all along
the Eastern Asiatic frontier. In 1858 Governor-General Mura
viov of Eastern Siberia annexed to Russia the entire left bank

CONQUESTS 227
of the river Amur, together with the vast region Ussuriysk,
to the south of the mouth of Amur down to Vladivostok;
the Chinese government had no power to resist, and Muraviov
accomplished the great conquest with the aid of a few hun
dred soldiers. In i860 the annexation was officially confirmed
in Pekin.
Simultaneously the conquest of the Caucasus was completed,
in the form of the " pacification " of the stubborn mountain
eers. The decisive blow was delivered in 1859, by the capture
of the village Gunib and the surrender of Shamil, the spiritual
head and military leader of the mountain tribes. By 1865 the
entire Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia, to the Turco-Persian fron
tiers, were parts of the Russian Empire.
Alongside with this there went on throughout the Sixties a
constant pushing forward of the Russian border into the depth
of Central Asia, at the expense of the Khanates. Russia had
from old carried on commercial relations with those Khanates,
but their subjects, who consisted of wild steppe raiders, had con
tinually harassed the Russian borderland, robbing and carrying
away not only cattle, but often men, women, and children,
whom they sold into slavery. The numerous attempts of the
Government to check the raiders had failed mainly because of
the topographic difficulties. Under Peter the Great a military
expedition under the command of Prince Cherkassky-Betovich
moved far into those lands, but perished after a temporary suc
cess. In 1839 during Nicolas' reign Governor-General Pe-
rovsky of Orenburg undertook a winter expedition against
Khiva; the snow-storms of the winter proved not less disas
trous than the heat of the summer in those regions. In 1853
Perovsky succeeded in pushing the Russian military posts to
the shores of Syr-Daria, and built there a considerable fort, later
named after him.
At the same time the frontiers to the south of Siberia and
the Steppe Region continued to be moved southward. In 1854

228 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the border line extended along the river Chu from the city
Vierny to Fort Perovsky, enforced by a series of military posts.
Wild hordes from Bokhara and Kokland tried to break through
that line, and those raids gave the Russian commanders a pre
text for pushing the raiders farther inland. In 1864 Colonel
Cherniaiev captured Tashkent, in Kokand. The Government
approved of his action, annexed the region of Tashkent, and
two years later formed there the Turkestan Governor-General
ship. This led to further collisions with Bokhara and Kokand,
again without any official order from above. England looked
with alarm upon the aggressive movements of the Russians to
wards South Asia; remembering since the days of Napoleon
the fantastic Russian plans of penetrating India through Asiatic
mountains and steppes, the British Government asked the Rus
sian Chancellor where his Government intended to stop.
Gorchakov replied that the Emperor did not have in mind the
aggrandisement of Russian territory, but the strengthening and
improvement of the frontier.
In the end a formal war broke out with Bokhara and
Kokand, in which both of them were discomfited, and in 1868
the Russians took the city of Samarkand, the burial place of
Tamerlan, — a sacred place with which there is connected a be
lief that whoever possesses it will possess all Central Asia.
Governor-General Kaufman of Turkestan impressed the half-
savage Eastern tribes with his cruel conduct, and firmly estab
lished the Russian prestige. Making use of an uprising in
Kokand, he sent an army there under the command of Skobelev,
who conquered the Khanate and had it annexed to Russia un
der the name of Fergan Region. General Kaufman's next step
was to undertake a campaign against Khiva, in 1873; the Khan
was forced to give up more than half of his possessions, to
free all his slaves, and to become a dependent vassal of Russia,
as his neighbour, the Emir of Bokhara, had become before.
Thus was the conquest of all Central Asia accomplished, to

BOSNIA — HERZEGOVINA 229
the great indignation and natural apprehension of the English
who saw that between the Russians and India lay only the
lands of the Turcomen and Afghanistan, and that the Rus
sian invasion of India was no longer as fantastic a dream as it
had appeared at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
While the British apprehensions were reaching their apogee
in regard to the " Russian peril " in Asia, the state of affairs
in the Near East had grown very acute. In 1874 the insur
rection in Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, chiefly because
of the unbearable taxation system of the Turkish government.
Other nationalities on the Peninsula were restless, and the sit
uation grew alarming. The uprising in Herzegovina made
Austria uneasy, as she feared that Bosnia and Herzegovina
she coveted would unite with Serbia, and avoid her grip; her
Foreign Minister Andrashi urged a collective intervention on
the part of the European Powers, and in January, 1876, the
Sultan had to yield to the demand of six Powers to conclude
an immediate armistice with the insurrectionists, and to under
take a series of radical reforms in the general administration
and taxaton of the provinces which had revolted. But the
Herzegovinians declared that they would not lay down their
arms until the European Powers gave them sufficient guaran
tees that the Sultan would keep his promise. Turkey refused
to satisfy the demands of the insurgents; a religious movement
against Christians arose among the Mohammedans; the Sultan
was accused of submitting too much to foreign influence. He
was forced to send hordes of savage Bashi-Bazouks for the sup
pression of the restless Christians, and those irregulars com
mitted bloody massacres in Bulgaria, in which, according to
the investigation of a British diplomat, twelve thousand Bul-
gars of both sexes were slaughtered. At the same time the
French and German consuls in Saloniki were murdered. The
indignation against Turkey became general in Europe.
The semi-independent states of Serbia and Montenegro de-

230 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
clared war against her, and masses of Russian volunteers filled
their armies. Although the commander of the Serbs was Gen
eral Cherniaiev, the conqueror of Tashkent, they proved poorly
prepared and equipped, and the Turks delivered them a num
ber of crushing defeats. Seeing that Serbia was on the verge
of the abyss, and that she was threatened by massacres similar
to the Bulgarian atrocities, Russia demanded of Turkey the im
mediate cessation of war activities and the conclusion of an
armistice. That demand was supported by other European
Powers, although Austria, in her desire to see Serbia decisively
beaten by the Turks, hesitated for some time.
In 1876 a memorandum was issued in Berlin, in which the
Powers demanded of the Sultan the immediate introduction of
the promised reforms in the Christian dependencies of Turkey,
the enlargement of the territory of Serbia and Montenegro,
and the appointment of Christian governors in Bulgaria, Bosnia,
and Herzegovina. England, however, refused to join the other
Powers; encouraged by this circumstance, Turkey declined the
demands of the Berlin memorandum. When the European
Powers sent their fleet for a demonstration at Saloniki, the Brit
ish fleet was sent plausibly to assist Turkey.
In the meantime by a court revolution Sultan Abdul-Aziz
was deposed and strangled; his successor, Murad V, proved
half-witted, and was supplanted by Abdul-Hamid, who re
mained on the throne till the revolution of 1908. A confer
ence was called in London for the peaceful solution of the
acute situation; Turkey consented to a six weeks' armistice
with Serbia and Montenegro. Confident in the support of
England, the Turkish plenipotentiaries at the conference al
lowed themselves, we may say, to mock at the European Pow
ers: They declared that the Sultan had resolved to grant his
people a constitution, hence no changes in the internal or for
eign affairs could be made without the consent of their parlia
ment. This reference to a constitution which had not existed

WAR DECLARED 231
exasperated all the diplomats, even those of England. Russia
sent an ultimatum to Turkey threatening war unless the Turk
ish Government accepted immediately the project prepared by
the European Powers. Turkey declined, and in April, 1877,
Emperor Alexander declared war.
Alexander II did not take this step with an easy heart; he
was well aware of its importance, of the financial difficulties
connected with the war; he saw clearly that it might easily
become an all-European conflagration, and the still more dan
gerous possibility of Russia being forced to fight against Aus
tria, England, and Turkey, with the other Powers neutral.
The head of the Russian diplomats, Prince Gorchakov, had
become somewhat senile by that time — he was about eighty
years old — and his policy was extremely wavering. Alexander
himself wavered considerably; he was compelled to wage war
against his desire, by the bellicose mood in the Court-circles
and by the public opinion created by the Slavophiles. The pro-
Slav sentiment at home and abroad was so general that the
Emperor could not remain behind his people in the eyes of the
world, and had to take decisive measures in defence of the
Slavs. In vain Reitern tried to dissuade Alexander from plung
ing the country into war. In 1875 he had succeeded in at
taining a budget without deficit, and even in saving up a metal
reserve of one hundred and sixty million rubles; but even be
fore the war unfavourable circumstances had begun to threaten
the course. A considerable failure of crops in 1875 bad been
complicated by a drought which hampered the navigation in
some of the water-ways that were of great importance for
the transportation of grain to ports. The seventeen thousand
versts of railroads were still not generally profitable, and the
Government had to pay guaranteed income. The course of
the ruble began to fall under the influence of the unfavourable
balance of trade (owing to the decrease in exported grain), of

232 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the forced payments of railroad-guaranties, of the outflow of
foreign capital in view of the alarming international affairs,
and of a panic on the Moscow bourse, caused by the bankruptcy
of a large bank. Reitern's plans began to quaver, and the war
threatened them with complete ruin. For a partial mobilisa
tion in 1876, intended as a demonstration against Turkey, the
Government had to contract a loan of one hundred million,
and Reitern sharply remarked to the Tzar that in case of war
Russia might go bankrupt.
When the war broke out, it appeared that beside the fact
that it was necessary to issue masses of paper-money, which
destroyed all Reitern's efforts to restore the course of the paper-
ruble, Russia was unprepared in every other respect. Mi
liutin's reforms in the army were only two years old, the new
order had not as yet been working well, and it took six months
to draw even moderate forces towards the Turkish frontier.
Ambassador Ignatiev gave assurances that Turkey was de
caying, and that very small forces would be required for its
defeat. It was criminal optimism. The Russian army was
not only insufficient, but inefficient. The staff was extremely
bad. Grand Duke Nicolas, the Tzar's brother, was made
commander-in-chief, although he lacked elementary strategic
ability; he appointed as Chief of the Staff General Niepokoi-
chitzky, who was senile and had no plan for the campaign.
After their brilliant crossing of the Danube, the Russian armies
were scattered; individual commanders accomplished heroic
feats, but in view of the lack of concerted action, the army was
threatened more than once with disaster. Had Suleiman-
Pasha obeyed orders and joined forces with the brave Osman-
Pasha, the Turks would have succeeded in cutting off the
advance-forces of Gurko's army.
With all the blunders of the Turks and miraculous escapades
of isolated Russian troops, the war lasted throughout 1877 and
part of 1878. After the capture of Plevna (with the aid of

SAN STEFANO AND BERLIN 233
the Roumanian army, under the command of Prince, later
King, Carol) the Russians crossed the Balkans, occupied
Adrianople, and appeared before Constantinople in January,
1878. It was then that Alexander received a telegram from
Queen Victoria, asking him to stop, and conclude an armistice.
Although Alexander had promised England even before the war
that he would not occupy Constantinople, Lord Beaconsfield
had the parliament vote six million pounds for military ex
penses; war seemed inevitable. But Turkey was exhausted
and forced to ask for peace; in the middle of January, 1878,
the Adrianople armistice was signed, and soon after diplomatic
negotiations began in San Stefano, where Ignatiev successfully
represented Russia. In March -the peace was signed, in which
all Russian demands were satisfied; Serbia and Montenegro
were enlarged"/ and Bulgaria- became a semi-independent princi
pality, with a territory reaching to the /Egean Sea. In Asia
Russia was to receive the conquered Kars and Batum, with their
environs. Part of Bessarabia which went to Roumania in
1856 was restored to Russia, and Roumania was compensated
with Dobrudja.
Lord Beaconsfield immediately protested against any terri
torial changes being made in Turkey without the participation
of the Great Powers who had signed the Treaty of Paris, in
1856. Under the threat of war with England and Austria,
Alexander was forced to consent to a congress of European
representatives in Berlin, presided over by Bismarck. At that
Congress the conditions of the peace were substantially changed :
the possessions of Serbia, Montenegro, and especially Bulgaria,
were diminished ; part of Bulgaria, to the south of the Balkans,
was separated as a Turkish province under a Christian gov
ernor. Beaconsfield protested also against Russia's territorial
acquisitions, but he succeeded only in changing. Batum from a
military port into an open port for all nations.
The humiliation at Berlin, coupled with the inadequate

234 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
management of the campaign, and with the theft and graft
which were discovered in the matter of provisioning the army
— aroused the indignation and opposition of wide circles in
Russia, not only of radical and revolutionary layers, but of
the most loyal society, as the Slavophiles. When rumours
concerning the concessions wrested from Russia at the Berlin
Congress had reached Moscow, Ivan Aksakov delivered a
thundering speech at the public session of the " Slav Society,"
in which he said:
" Shall we admit even a particle of truth in all those letters
and telegrams which are circulating every day, every hour in
all tongues, to all corners of the world, disgraceful news about
our concessions? Not once denied by the Government, this
news, spreading among the people, scorches them with shame,
stings their conscience, oppresses them with bewilderment.''
He went on describing in strong terms the humiliating con
duct of the Russian diplomats, the significance of the con
cessions for the independence of Bulgaria and of other Slav
nationalities on the Balkan peninsula, for the political pre
ponderance of treacherous Austria, and for the fall of Russian
prestige among the Slav nations. Aksakov repeated several
times that he refused to believe that those actions of the diplo
mats were approved by the " supreme authority," and he fin
ished his remarkable speech with the following words :
" The people are raging, grumbling, indignant, disturbed
with the daily news from Berlin, and await, like a blessed
tiding, the resolution of the Throne. Russia awaits and hopes.
Its hope shall not be belied, for the Tzar's words : ' The
sacred cause will be brought to its end,' shall not be broken.
Loyal duty commands us all to hope and trust, but loyal duty
commands us also not to keep silent in these days of lawless
ness and untruth which are building up a wall between the
Tzar and the land, between the thought of the Tzar and the
thought of the people. Is it indeed possible that in answer

DISCONTENT 235
there will sound from above a grave word : ' Hold your peace,
O honest lips! Speak but you, O flattery and falsehood! ' "
When Alexander heard about that speech, he was so enraged
that in spite of Aksakov's position in society, and his age, he
ordered him banished from Moscow.
Still greater was the excitement among the liberal zemstvo-
mtn and among the revolutionary circles, especially in the
South, where the people were nearer to the war zone, and had
been able to see better the abuses and disorders in the com
missariat, and where the Ukrainophile movement had been quite
widely spread. The conviction of the necessity of a constitu
tional order in Russia became particularly widespread among
Kiev society. That conviction was strengthened by the fact
that in Bulgaria, which from an oppressed, wild, and unciv
ilised country was transformed into an independent Principal
ity, a constitutional order was immediately established; this
could not have taken place without the consent of Alexander;
hence the hopes of the Russian patriots and liberals were en
couraged. From the South the constitutional movement spread
throughout Russia.
The revolutionary movement had by that time taken on
sharp forms. The non-political aspirations of the Narodniki
underwent a change under the repressive measures of the Gov
ernment which prevented them from carrying on their peaceful,
cultural work among the people; after the attempt of Viera
Zasulich to shoot Chief of Police Trepov for flogging a political
prisoner,2 the revolutionary movement became a keen political
2 The Government was so confident that the process of Zasulich
would lower the reputation of the revolutionists in the eyes of the
public, that it allowed her to be tried by a jury. To its horror the
jury declared Viera Zasulich not guilty, in spite of the fact that she
did not deny her actual shooting at Trepov with the intention of kill
ing him. Upon leaving the court, Zasulich was almost arrested by
gendarmes who had intended to deal with her " in the administrative
order," but the crowd protected her, and soon after she fled abroad.
She is still active in the revolutionary propaganda. — Tr.

236 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
struggle. It had become evident that under the existing polit
ical conditions it was impossible to carry on any social
propaganda; moreover, the masses were not at all sympathetic
with such a propaganda; the Narodniki began to seek means
for the improvement of political conditions. After an armed
uprising in Odessa and the execution of Kovalsky, Stepniak-
Kravchinsky murdered Chief of Gendarmes Mezentzev in
daylight on the streets of Petrograd, and was not caught.
The Government appealed to the public for co-operation in
its struggle against the " sedition." At that time zemstvo
workers of several southern provinces had united, and held
some conferences in Kiev and Kharkov which were attended
by liberal elements of the public. They attempted to make a
temporary agreement with the revolutionists, and persuade
them to discontinue their terroristic activity in order to enable
the liberals to try peaceful means of persuasion with the Gov
ernment. Their attempt failed. Yet the zemstvo men decided
to call the attention of the Government to the fact that in its
struggle with the revolution it had been employing measures
which infringed upon the interests and rights of society as a
whole, and that as long as the Government ignored the just
demands of the public and did not respect the inviolability and
elementary rights of peaceful citizens, the representatives of
society were unable to give it any assistance. Similar resolu
tions were planned by many zemstvo assemblies, in response
to the invitation of the Government for co-operation. At the
provincial assembly of the Chernigov zemstvo, I. I. Petrun-
kevich delivered a characteristic speech in which he pointed
out all the abuses of the autocracy, the bigoted measures of
Tolstoy, the absence of freedom of press and of speech, and
ended with the resolution that under such conditions society
was unable to come to the assistance of the Government.
The Government hastened to forbid the discussion of such
questions at zemstvo assemblies, so that only a few of them had

RADICAL ZEMSTVOS 237
time to publish their declarations. The resolution of the Tver
assembly was as follows:
" The Emperor, in his care for the Bulgars, liberated from
the Turkish yoke, has found it necessary to grant them true
self-government, inviolability of personal rights, independence
of the judiciary, and freedom of press. The zemstvo of the
province of Tver ventures to hope that the Russian people
who have borne all the burdens of the war with such readi
ness, with such unreserved love for their Tzar-Liberator, will
be granted the same benefits, which alone will enable them
to enter, in the words of the Tzar, on the way of gradual,
peaceful, and legitimate development."
The Marshals of Nobility were notified through a circular
that they would be held responsible by the Minister, if they
let such resolutions pass. Yet the movement in the zemstvo
circles did not calm down, but continued to grow. In 1879
and 1880 there were many secret zemstvo assemblies, the most
imposing of which took place in Moscow. The Government
began to punish the active members of the movement.
Petrunkevich was arrested and banished to the province of
Kostroma.3 At the same time, as we have seen, the activity of the revolu
tionary Socialists grew more extreme and drastic. From 1878
a series of terroristic acts took place, with the view of wresting
elemental political freedom from the Government. In 1879
the party " Land and Freedom " had a conference at Voronezh,
for the discussion of new ideas and the revision of their pro
gramme. A preliminary conference was held at Lipetzk by
the extreme wing of the party, the leader of which was a prom
inent revolutionist from Odessa, Zheliabov; it decided to form
3 I. I. Petrunkevich is at present a prominent leader of the Constitu
tional Democrats, and an untiring zemstvo worker. He was elected to
the First Duma, and at the first session demanded amnesty for all
political prisoners. — Tr.

238 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
a special " Executive Committee " for terroristic actions against
the Government. The majority of the Voronezh conference
approved of the Lipetzk resolution ; a small group of Narodniki,
led by Plekhanov, separated from the majority, declaring them
selves in favour of the former programme and tactics which
placed social propaganda before political struggle. The party
of "Land and Freedom" split in two: the larger organisation
of the " Will of the People " (Narodnaia Volia. Narodovo-
letz, Narodovoltzy — members of the party), which concen
trated its chief forces on a systematic terroristic struggle with
the Government, though retaining some Narodnichestvo ideals
in their programme; and the smaller and less influential group,
the party of the " Black Partition " which continued to advocate
the old Narodnichestvo views in full. The field of action
remained in the hands of the " Will of the People," which
during the next two years performed a number of terroristic
acts that shook the governmental organisation.

CHAPTER XXXVII
THE economic and financial difficulties were very acute
after the war; Minister of Finance Reitern, who had
been opposed to the war, resigned upon its conclusion,
not wishing to cope with the complicated situation. At the
same time the gulf between the Government and the people
grew deeper and wider, signified by the development of the
zemstvo oppositional movement, and by the conversion of the
revolutionary Narodniki to active terroristic activity.
The terroristic attempts of the " Will of the People " were
directed chiefly against the life of the Tzar; he was systemat
ically besieged by a small, but energetic group who organised
nets of mines, exploded bridges, trains, and buildings, risking
their own as well as many other lives. The revolutionists
strongly believed that the murder of the Tzar would serve as
a signal for a general uprising of the people. The bewildered
Government, finding no support in the people whose needs and
rights it did not consider, undertook convulsive repressive
measures which made the conflict more acute and resolute,
and rendered the life of peaceful citizens as unbearable as
under the conditions of a siege.
After the attentate of Soloviov in 1879 and a number of
other attempts on the life of the Tzar, it appeared clear to all
that the Government was unable by repressive measures alone
to eradicate the revolution and establish peace in the country.
Some of the higher administrators and members of the Court
began to look for other means. Governor-General Loris-
Melikov of Kharkov, appointed after the attentate of Soloviov,
experimented with a new policy in his region; continuing to
239

240 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
suppress the revolutionists, he at the same time endeavoured
to win the sympathies and respect of the population by a human
and decent management of public affairs. Parallel with this,
Count Valuiev, President of the Committee of Ministers at
that time, began to inspire the Emperor with the idea of trying
to regain the confidence and co-operation of society, by allow
ing its representatives to participate in affairs of the State;
for this purpose he dug out the project he had prepared back
in 1863. Grand Duke Constantine, then President of the
State Council, also presented his plan for a representative
order, drawn up by his request in 1866 by Prince Urusov.
While those projects had been discussed in court circles,
throughout the country administrative despotism reigned
arousing general discontent and exasperation. The revolu
tionists organised a daring explosion in the Winter Palace, on
February 4, 1880. The explosion took place just at the mo
ment when the entire Imperial family were to take their seats
at the dining table, to entertain the Prince of Bulgaria, Alex-
1 ander Battenberg. The carefully planned slaughter of the
whole family failed only because the train of the Bulgarian
Prince was late, and the dinner took place half an hour behind
the scheduled time.
This event proved to all, and first of all to Alexander him
self, the danger of the situation, in which the revolutionists
were better informed and more efficient than the costly, enor
mous police organisation. New views concerning the internal
policy began to dominate among the higher circles. A week
before the explosion the Emperor called a conference for the
discussion of Valuiev's plan. The Heir, Tzesarevich Alex
ander, who took part in the discussions, expressed himself
definitely against the constitutional plans suggested by Valuiev
and Grand Duke Constantine, thus demonstrating early the
political beliefs which he later professed throughout his reign.
At the conference called by the Tzar after the explosion the

THE WINTER PALACE EXPOSITION 241
Tzesarevich suggested the establishment of a supreme investi
gating commission, with large authority, similar to the com
missions instituted in 1862 after the Petrograd conflagrations,
and in 1866 after the attentate of Karakozov. The Tzar at
first regarded his son's plan negatively, but at the conference
which took place on the next day, with the participation of
several governors-general who happened to be in the Capital,
Alexander II declared that he intended to make use of the
Heir's plan for the formation of a dictatorial institution, under
the name of the Supreme Commanding Commission, which
should have extraordinary power for the suppression of sedi
tion, and should at the same time seek a way out of the untol-
erable position of the moment. At the head of the commission
Alexander placed Loris-Melikov, the only governor-general
who had shown energy not only in suppressing the revolution,
but also in winning the sympathy of the population. By a
special ukase all administrative authorities, including the min
isters, were subjected to the commission under the command
of Adjutant-General Loris-Melikov.
To the public at large Loris-Melikov was known as a prom
inent Caucasian general who won glory in the War of 1877-
1878 by the capture of Kars, and later during the spread of
the black-plague in the province of Astrakhan, as an energetic
administrator. In the South he was known as Governor-Gen
eral of Kharkov. Immediately upon his appointment, Febru
ary 14, 1880, Loris-Melikov issued a proclamation to the
inhabitants of Petrograd, in which he declared that while
firmly endeavouring to eradicate the criminals who attempted
to shake the existing order, he at the same time desired to re
assure the peaceful and well-intentioned elements of the public.
" Upon the support of the public," he wrote, " I look as upon
the main power which may assist the Government in the restor
ation of a normal course of national life, from the disturbances
of which the interests of the public suffer mostly."

242 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Most of those who knew Loris-Melikov personally, testify
to his straightforwardness, honesty, sincerity, true liberalism,
readiness to meet loyal public demands even to the extent of
"allowing society some participation in the affairs of the State.
It is a mistake, however, to consider him a constitutionalist
who intended to introduce any Western form of government.
vHe openly opposed the establishment of any representative insti
tution, considering the moment inopportune; he advised that
affairs be regulated by a series of administrative and legislative
measures, to restore the institutions created by the reforms of
the Sixties and destroyed during the reaction, and in that work
of improving the conditions caused by the reaction he intended
to admit in one form or another the representatives of the
people to participate.
The fundamental task of Loris-Melikov was to suppress the
revolution. He decided to centralise the repressive authority,
and with this view abolished the Third Department of His
Majesty's Chancery, instituted with the aid of Benckendorff
by Nicolas I, and had all police affairs concentrated in the
hands of the Minister of Interior. At the head of the Police
Department he placed the former procurator of the Petrograd
Judicial Chamber, V. K. Plehve,1 who was instructed to bring
the procurature in close connection with the activity of the
police, thus furthering the work of Pahlen — of rendering the
procurators dependent upon the administration. The new
Dictator, as he was called, expanded his repressive measures
upon not only revolutionists, but all persons opposed to the
Government. At the very beginning of his " dictatorship of
the heart," he exiled N. F. Annensky, the famous writer and
statistician, to Siberia. He rejected the petition of the Borozna
zemstvo to allow Petrunkevich to return to the province of
1 Minister of Interior during the present reign ; perpetrator of the
Kishinev massacre of 1903, and of other atrocities; assassinated in
1904. — Tr.

LORIS-MELIKOV 243
Chernigov; Petrunkevich was permitted, however, to change
his abode from the province of Kostroma to that of Smolensk.
At the same time Loris-Melikov consistently carried through
his ideas concerning guarding the rights of the peaceful citizens.
It was his intention to restore in full measure the zemstvo and
judicial statutes of 1864, and to abolish all restrictions and
distortions which had followed them. He then insisted on
the dismissal of Minister of Education, Count Tolstoy, and
supplanted him with the liberal A. A. Saburov, who endeav
oured during the short term of his administration to return to
the principles of Golovnin. His next step was to discharge
Minister of Finance General Greig, who was both incapable
and reactionary; in his place was appointed A. A. Abaza, a
friend of N. A. Miliutin and one of the circle of Grand
Duchess Yelena Paulovna. Abaza's first measure was to abol
ish the heavy salt-tax; he undertook a number of measures for
the promulgation of liberal financial reforms, which were partly
carried out during the following reign.
Loris-Melikov had considerably improved the conditions of
the press. A number of new organs began to appear during
his dictatorship: The Country, edited by L. A. Polonsky, the
Order, edited by M. M. Stasiulevich, Russian Thought, edited
by Yuriev, a friend of Koshelev. For the twelfth time Ivan
Aksakov was permitted to raise his voice — in the Slavophile
publication, Russ, which existed for several years. The
zemstvo workers were finally allowed to have their own organ,
established in Moscow by the means of Koshelev, under the
title Zemstvo; it appeared for two years under the editorship
of Scalon, and manifested a very liberal, if not radical, tend
ency. Allowing the press to discuss political questions and to
criticise governmental measures, Loris-Melikov insisted upon
one restriction: the press was not permitted to mention or dis
cuss constitutional problems, in order that it might not arouse
false hopes. Such restrictions were announced not in the form

244 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of circulars, but were indicated to the editors in personal con
versations with the Dictator.
The Supreme Commanding Commission was closed six
months after its institution, upon the report of Loris-Melikov
who found no further need of extraordinary authority for the
struggle with the sedition. He was appointed Minister of
Interior, and at that post he continued his activity in the former
spirit. Enjoying the full confidence of the Tzar, he at the
same time kept up direct connections with progressive and
democratic circles of the public, particularly of the zemstvo,
and eagerly tried to realise many of the desiderata expressed by
public men in private memoranda and conversations.
After a study of the peasant-question through various
zemstvo presentations, he came to the conclusion that funda
mental reforms, which would be a direct continuation of the
Reform, were required for the satisfaction of the crying needs
of the peasants. He considered among other urgent needs the
revision of the taxation system, and the reorganisation of the
legal and administrative status of the peasants. The latter
question Loris-Melikov decided to hand over for a preliminary
discussion to the zemstvos, and by a circular to the governors,
December 22, 1880, he directed them to permit the discussion
of the question at provincial and district zemstvo assemblies.
This policy of establishing a certain harmony between the
Government and the representatives of the people was tre
mendously successful, and even such radical zemstvos as that
of Tver regarded Loris-Melikov's activity with full approval.
In an address to him, written in 1880, the Tver zemstvo said:
" In a short time you have been able to justify the confidence
of the Tzar, and many hopes of the public. You have intro
duced straightforwardness and good-will into the relations of
the Government and the people. You have wisely recognised
the lawful needs and desires of the public."
In the end the Tver zemstvo expressed its belief that " the

ZEMSTVO CO-OPERATES 245
deplorable past would not return, and a happy future was
opening for our dear country." Since the establishment of the
zemstvos no other high functionary has been honoured with
such a sincere public approval, neither before nor after Loris-
Melikov. On the part of the revolutionists, however, the activity of
Loris-Melikov not only did not meet with approval, but
aroused irritation and alarm. The revolutionary circles were
in a state of temporary disorganisation, owing to the arrest of
a prominent member of the " Executive Committee," Golden-
berg, the slayer of Governor Prince Kropotkin of Kharkov in
1879; the clever tactics of the gendarmes brought Goldenberg
not only to complete repentance, but made him betray the names
of most of his comrades. For a time the organisation was
forced to discontinue its activity, for fear of falling an easy prey
to the well informed police. Loris-Melikov mistakenly inter
preted the temporary lull in the terroristic acts as the decision
of the " Will of the People " to give up that activity. In
their underground publications the revolutionists sharply con
demned his policy as that of " the fox's tail " ; they logically
feared that the " dictatorship of the heart " would isolate them
from the fascinated public.
Loris-Melikov understood that in order to maintain the
good-will of the public he had to allow some outlet for the
desires progressive circles manifested to take part in State
affairs. In his report to Alexander II, presented on January
28, 1 88 1, he reiterated his opinion about the untimeliness and
impossibility of granting the people constitutional institutions;
yet he insisted on the necessity of satisfying the desire of the
advanced representatives of the people for State activity. He
suggested following the practice of the Editing Commissions
in inviting public men to co-operate in working out national
reforms; alongside with capable officials he wished to invite
zemstvo workers, professors, publicists, and other competent

246 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
persons. For the first time he proposed appointing two pre
liminary commissions in Petrograd; an administrative one, for
the general reorganisation of the administration, and a financial
commission, for questions of taxation, etc. The plans for those
commissions were to be brought before the General commis
sion, which was to consist of the members of the preliminary
commissions, and also of local experts invited for the purpose,
who were to be elected by zemstvos, or by municipal self-gov
ernments. Finally the plans were to pass from the General
commission to the State Council, into which were to be invited
ten to fifteen elective persons, as representatives of public
opinion. You can readily see that it is erroneous to call Loris-
Melikov's plan constitutional, as it has been widely known.
! Yet his moderate plan might have been a step forward in the
formation of an understanding and co-operation between the
public and the Government; its realisation might have brought
about a constitution in a peaceful way, while the present con
stitution had to be wrested through a revolution, and the people
were not organically prepared for it.
On the whole we may say that the policy of Loris-Melikov
was not unsuccessful; but the fact that he regarded somewhat
optimistically the results of his system in regard to the sup
pression of the revolutionary organisations, played a tragic
role. The revolutionists had concentrated all their forces to
deliver the Government a telling blow; they disregarded Loris-
Melikov as a nonentity, but renewed their attempts to kill
Alexander II. Petrograd, one may say, was undermined; in
many places, where the passage of the Imperial carriage might
be expected, the street or bridge was mined. After numerous
attempts the revolutionists resolved that mines did not bring
any results, in view of the difficulty of establishing the exact
moment of the Emperor's passing by; they decided to make
use of hand-bombs. One week before March 1, Zheliabov

ASSASSINATION OF ALEXANDER II 247
" sounded a call," as they expressed it in the parlance of the
" Will of the People," i.e., he asked for volunteers to appear
on the streets with bombs in their hands. The bombs were
prepared by the talented chemist, Kibalchich. In the end of
February Zheliabov and Trigoni were arrested; Sophia Perov-
sky, who was still unarrested, decided not only not to drop the
matter, but to hasten its accomplishment. On March 1, Alex
ander II, disregarding the warnings of Loris-Melikov, who
had succeeded twice in keeping the Tzar from Sunday rides,
rode out to inspect the troops, then to the Mikhailovsky Palace
(now Museum of Alexander III), the residence of Grand
Duchess Yelena, whence he was to return to the Winter Palace.
The revolutionists, led by Sophia Perovsky, manoeuvred on the
streets, shifting positions, and making sure not to miss their
victim. The circumstances of the catastrophe are too well
known to be retold here.2
2 When the Imperial carriage turned on the Catherinian Canal, Sophia
Perovsky waved her handkerchief, as a signal to her comrades who
were scattered at various corners of the adjacent streets. One of them,
Rysakov, flung a bomb wrapped in cotton at the cortege ; the bottom
of the carriage was smashed, a number of the escorting Cossacks were
wounded and thrown from their saddles, but the Tzar was not in
jured. The coachman suggested to drive on to the Palace, but Alex
ander approached the wounded Cossacks and the imprisoned, half
dead Rysakov. " Thank God, I am untouched," he said in answer to
anxious inquiries of his entourage. " It's too soon to thank God,"
shouted another terrorist, Grinevitzky, who came close to the Tzar,
and threw a bomb at his feet. The explosion was heard throughout
the city. A number of persons were wounded, among them Grinevit
zky. The Emperor suffered severe wounds; one leg was shattered
to the top of the thigh, the other severed to the knee; the abdomen
was torn open; the face was terribly disfigured; the right hand was
lacerated, pieces of the Tzar's wedding-ring having been driven into
his flesh. He could barely whisper to Grand Duke Mikhail: "Quick
home, to Palace, there die." At the Palace his legs were amputated;
he died about an hour and a half later, without regaining conscious
ness. On the 16th of April the death sentence was executed upon the par
ticipators of the assassination — A. J. Zheliabov, Sophia Perovsky, TJ,

248 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Thus was brought to a sudden end the system of measures
planned by Loris-Melikov. Alexander III, as you might have
concluded from his stand at the conference before the explosion
in the Winter Palace, showed no promise of becoming a liberal
monarch. Kibalchich, T. Mikhailov, and N. Rysakov. Grinevitzky had died of
his wounds before the trial, and the execution of Jessie Hanfman was
postponed because of her pregnancy. — Tr.

CHAPTER XXXVIII
EMPEROR ALEXANDER III was the second son of
Alexander II; his elder brother, Tzesarevich Nicolas,
died from tuberculosis in 1865. Until that year Alex
ander was brought up as an ordinary Grand Duke, whose career
was to be mainly military; after the death of his brother care
was taken to broaden his education. A number of prominent
professors were invited to him, among them the historian S. M.
Soloviov, and K. P. Pobiedonostzev, who was destined to play
such an important role in the future. At that time Pobie
donostzev was not reactionary; on the contrary, he had taken
part in the preparation of the judicial reform, and was one of
the most brilliant of Russian jurists. Other more or less pro
gressive professors were employed, but the young Tzesarevich
did not form any liberal ideas and principles as a result of
his education. In his personal and family life he presented an
original exception in the Court circles. He early married the
bride of his late brother, the Danish Princess Dagmar, and
after his marriage led a private life, occupied himself with
music and Russian history; it was he who founded the " Im
perial Russian Historical Society," of which he was the first
president. Partly because of his mode of life, and still more perhaps
because society had little information about him, a legend grew
up that Alexander was a liberal. We have seen that he had
manifested his conservatism some months before his accession,
and promised no sympathy for liberal reforms.
On March 2, 1881, at the reception of the members of the
State Council and other high dignitaries, who took the oath,
249

250 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Alexander III declared that he hoped to follow the policy of
his father; this was apparently a promise of a human and
liberal reign. Then in a circular note of March 4, sent to
Russian representatives abroad, it was announced that the new
Emperor, ascending the throne at such a difficult moment,
desired to preserve peace with all Powers, and concentrate all
his attention on internal affairs. The note too made a favour
able impression on the public.
In the meantime a question arose concerning the project of
Loris-Melikov, which had been approved by Alexander II on
the morning of his assassination; the late Tzar had ordered a
conference for March 4 at the Winter Palace, for the discussion
of the method of the opening of the projected commissions.
Alexander III at first considered that project as a legacy from
his father, which would give the finishing touch to his reign.
He called a special meeting of the Committee of Ministers,
to which was invited Count S. G. Stroganov, leader of the
Court conservatives, to decide whether the opening of the com
missions should be announced to the public or not. The con
ference took place on March 8, and two conflicting, mutually
excluding tendencies appeared — a progressive, to which be
longed Loris-Melikov, Minister of Finance Abaza, Minister of
War D. A. Miliutin, and Grand Duke Constantine, head of
the Navy Department and President of the State Council, and
a reactionary group which was represented first of all by K. P.
Pobiedonostzev, not long since a member of Loris-Melikov's
Supreme Commanding Commission. In 1880 Pobiedonostzev
was appointed, upon the presentation of Loris-Melikov, Super-
Procurator of the Holy Synod, in place of Count D. A. Tol
stoy; he was tutor to Alexander and his elder brother, and en
joyed the confidence of the Tzar. At the conference he was
supported by Count Stroganov who had been invited at his
suggestion, and by former Minister of Interior, Makov. An
intermediary position was maintained by Grand Dukes Vlad-

DIFFERING CURRENTS 251
imir and Mikhail; of the ministers, Minister of Justice Na
bokov was inclined liberally, but supported Loris-Melikov
hesitatingly, while Count Valuiev, President of the Committee
of Ministers, who had appeared in 1880 with quasi-constitu-
tional projects, showed little support of Loris-Melikov's project
at the conference, because of his hatred for the former Dic
tator and for Grand Duke Constantine. »*?
At the conference it appeared that Alexander III sympa
thised with the reactionaries, and was impatient with the
liberal members; he was impressed by the passionate speech
of Pobiedonostzev which opened with the phrase : " Finis
Russae," and predicted disasters and revolutions in case of the
acceptance of Loris-Melikov's project. Alexander remarked
that Emperor Wilhelm I had definitely advised his late father
of the danger of a constitutional regime for Russia, and urged
him, in view of the rumours about the Tzar's intention of
granting a constitution, to withdraw it, if it was not too late,
and if it was — to curtail it as much as possible ; Alexander
referred also to the Danish ministers who regarded the influence
of the constitutional institutions pernicious for Denmark.
No decision was immediately arrived at. Alexander con
tinued to hesitate for some time. He was loath to disobey the
last will of his father, the more so since some of the Court
liberals informed him of the grave mood of the country, and
counselled a liberal course as the only means for restoring calm
in the land. On the other hand, Pobiedonostzev tried to per
suade the Tzar of the absence of constitutional aspirations
among the wide circles of society, and drew to his support
Katkov and Ivan Aksakov. Katkov represented at that time
the extreme reactionaries, and openly hinted in his Moscow
News that the revolutionary movement emanated not from
the country, but that it " had built a nest on the threshold of
the supreme power," referring to Loris-Melikov and other
liberals at the court. Aksakov was deeply shocked by the event

252 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of March i. He came soon after to Petrograd, and delivered
a passionate speech at the Slav Society, in which he attacked
not only the revolutionists, but all the tendencies of Western
liberalism. Pobiedonostzev succeeded in persuading Alexander
that Katkov and Aksakov represented the public opinion of the
country, and he was secretly commissioned to draw up a mani
festo. On April 29, 1881, to the complete surprise of Loris-
Melikov and the other ministers the significant manifesto
appeared, which was intended to put an end to further
vacillations. In one place it read:
" In the midst of our great grief God's voice commands us
to stand courageously at the helm of the government, relying
upon Divine Providence, with faith in the power and truth of
the Autocracy which, for the benefit of the people, we are
called upon to strengthen and guard from any encroachments."
Those words were naturally interpreted as a clear indication
from above that the principle of autocracy was to be the corner
stone of the governmental policy, and that no constitutional ex
pectations would not be realised. Immediately upon the publi
cation of the manifesto Loris-Melikov, Abaza, and Miliutin
resigned. Yet, in spite of the defeat of the progressive ele
ments, the programme of the new reign was still not quite
reactionary, as it may be seen from the personnel of ministers
selected by the Tzar. As Minister of Interior N. P. Ignatiev,
a Slavophile, was appointed. He expected, together with
Aksakov, to be able to bring about the summoning of a Zemsky
Sobor (assembly of men of the land), of a consultative char
acter. N. C. Bunge, a man of conservative views, but a sin
cere friend of the reforms of the Sixties, a convinced democrat
who strove to alleviate the lot of the people, took the place of
Abaza as Minister of Finance. In place of Saburov, who had
resigned some time before, Alexander appointed Baron Nico
layi, who immediately began to carry out Golovnin 's policy,
and actively opposed Pobiedonostzev.

COUNT IGNATIEV 253
The manifesto of April 29 promised to strengthen and con
tinue the great reforms of the preceding reign. This motive
was emphasised in the circular of the new Minister of Interior,
Ignatiev, sent out on the very day of his appointment, May
6, 1 88 1. He indicated that the Government would take
measures for the establishment of close relations with the
people, and for the participation of local men in the affairs of
the State. The circular further stated that the rights of
zemstvos and the municipal institutions would remain intact,
on the basis of the Act of 1864. The peasants were warned
against false rumours, and were promised that not only would
their rights and liberties be guaranteed, but that measures would
be taken for the lightening of their burdens (mainly the taxes),
for the satisfaction of their needs (particularly of land), and
for the improvement of the rural administration and structure.
Thus we see that the regime was as yet far from reactionary.
Ignatiev's circular resembled the programme of Loris-Melikov;
one month after its issue Count Ignatiev began to carry out
his promise about allowing local men to take part in State
affairs. In June, 1881, the first session of "informed men"
was summoned by the Government for the discussion of such
important questions as the lowering of redemption payments, the
regulation of peasant migration, the beverage question — which
involved both the problem of combating drunkenness and of reg
ulating the revenue. ••' •
At the same time the Government raised the question of
redemption; there still remained one-seventh of the estates,
or one million four hundred thousand peasants who paid
obroks, as " temporary-Obligatory." Loris-Melikov had
pushed the question ahead, and in January, 1881, the State
Council determined to introduce obligatory redemption of the
obroks in those estates where a voluntary redemption had not
been started. At that time reactionary agitation began to
appear on the part of the nobles who considered compulsory

254 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
redemption an infringement of the sacred rights of property.
In the State Council that view was voiced by former Minister
of Interior Timashov, and later it was expressed in resolutions
of many assemblies of the nobles (of Tambov, Moscow, and
others), which impressed Alexander III in spite of the argu
ments of Ignatiev. The agitation of the nobles brought no
fruit, however, and the reform was carried out safely.
Then a series of new enactments began, which were known
as the reforms of Bunge, although a considerable part of them
had been prepared in the period of the " dictatorship of the
heart." The first problem was to ameliorate the conditions of
the freed peasants by lowering the redemption payments. The
session of the " informed men " who assembled in June of 1881
worked out, together with representatives of the Government,
a law by which all allotments received a reduction of one ruble
from every payment, and five million rubles, to be distributed
by the zemstvos, were assigned for lowering the payments in
especially burdened provinces; the total sum of reductions
amounted to twelve million rubles. It is worth noting that
in some provinces, very few indeed, reactionary voices against
the lowering of the payments rose from the nobility, although
that reform was carried on at the expense of the Treasury.
The next reform promulgated by Bunge was the abolition
of the per capita tax. Bunge in his financial policy was a fol
lower of Reitern, and had also striven primarily for the raising
of the course of the ruble and for the establishment of a firm
balance of the budget. Hence his protectionism, and economy
in expenditures. Yet he determined to do away with the detri
mental per capita tax, which necessitated " mutual guarantee,"
and thus limited freedom of movement and of occupations
among the peasants. But the abolition of that tax meant a
loss of forty million rubles in yearly revenue; Bunge had to
fill that gap in some way, for Russian finances were still in a
deplorable state since the war with Turkey. Part of the loss

BUNGE'S REFORMS 255
was retrieved through an increase of the liquor tax, which
affected mainly the drinking portion of the population, and the
rest of it Bunge had to recover by taxing the better situated
and less burdened peasants. The land-taxes of the State
peasants were raised by forty-five per cent. The abolition of
the per capita tax was accomplished in two terms: In 1883
and 1884 it was removed from the most burdened peasants,
and in 1886 — from the rest.
Bunge also made a serious attempt to regulate the collection
of taxes, which the police had accomplished in the crudest
and most cruel ways, compelling the peasants at times to sell
their crops in advance in order to pay the taxes. Bunge ap
pointed tax-inspectors who were to collect taxes, and also to
gather information concerning the paying capacity of the popu
lation, with a view to further regulating the tax-system.

CHAPTER XXXIX
AMONG the measures directed against the dearth of
land we should mention three: The establishment
of a Peasant-bank, to aid the peasants with credit for
buying land; the facilitation of renting fiscal lands; and the
regulation of migration. All those tasks had been definitely
outlined during the " dictatorship of the heart."
The Government assigned five million rubles a year for the
Peasant-bank; in spite of the meagre sum, its activity during
the first three years, while Bunge remained Minister and while
the first personnel of the bank administration, selected by
Bunge, was in power, was regulated by considerations of com
parative needs of the peasants to whom loans were made. But
later the activity of the bank changed ; the Government became
alarmed at the number of tax-delinquents, and began to sell
with zeal the lands of peasants who were in arrears ; as a result
the activity of the bank was reduced by the end of the Eighties
to insignificant transactions and occasional irrational land-
purchases by well-to-do peasants. After ten years of its ex
istence it had assisted the increase of peasant landownership by
one and a half per cent, i.e., by scarcely twelve hundredths per
cent, annually, whereas the previous assistance of private credit-
institutions had increased the peasant landownership by three-
tenths per cent, annually.
The growing rent rates had become the burning question in
the progressive press, in governmental circles, in the second
session of the " informed men." The general desire was for
the regulation of the fiscal and private renting prices and con
ditions of rent. But the State Council had expressed on sev-
256

LAND QUESTIONS 257
eral occasions its fear of arousing false hopes among the peas
ants by agrarian reforms from above; in this case it allowed
the regulation of rents only on fiscal domains, which amounted
to several million desiatins. In 1881, when Loris-Melikov was
still in power, Ignatiev, then Minister of State Domains, car
ried through a law, by which fiscal lands were to be rented
primarily to peasants of respective districts; this measure at
once raised the amount of fiscal land rented to peasants from
twenty-three to sixty-six per cent. In 1884 the law of 1881
was somewhat restricted; the term of rent was shortened from
twenty-four to twelve years, and land could be freely rented
only by peasants who lived within twelve versts of it.
The migration question was an old one. During the serf
dom-system peasants were either transported by their masters
to new estates, or fled from their owners into free lands, where
they settled with the actual, although unofficial, knowledge of
the Government. The migration of Fiscal peasants went on
more regularly since the days of Kiselev; they were often
helped by the Government in various ways. Between 1831
and 1866 the migration of Fiscal peasants averaged nine thou
sand persons annually, while in certain years the number
reached twenty-eight thousand.
By the Act of 1861 peasants were not allowed to leave their
allotments during the first nine years without the consent of
the landowner. Nevertheless they migrated in enormous
masses to less remote parts of Siberia or to the borderlands of
European Russia ; few made use of the privileges offered in the
regions of Amur and Ussuriysk. By the end of the Seventies
official estimates of such " wilful " migrators totalled forty
thousand per year. Special rules were issued on June 10, 1881,
restricting the migration, and requiring the permission of the
Ministers of Interior and of State domains in every case. The
rules were not put into practice, and the illegal migration con
tinued. The second session of " informed men," called by

258 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Ignatiev in September, 1881, criticised the restrictive rules,
and recommended that the Government assist the migrators
in every way. Their recommendation was not heeded until
July, 1889, when in spite of the reigning reaction under D. A.
Tolstoy as Minister of Interior, the State Council passed a
law by which migration was facilitated and aided.
Under Bunge protective laws concerning workingmen were
issued for the first time. By the law of 1882 the working
time of women and children was limited, the conditions of their
work were placed under the official supervision of Factory In
spectors. The latter institution was further developed in sub
sequent laws, issued in 1884, 1885, 1886.
Bunge made the first attempt to shift the burden of taxes
upon the shoulders of the wealthy. In 1882 a law was issued
about an inheritance-tax, and in 1885 — a tax on bonds was
instituted. Such were the not unimportant, although purely palliative
measures of the Government early in the Eighties for the im
provement of the economic conditions of the masses.
The question of the reorganisation of the rural administra
tion was handed over to the zemstvos for discussion, by the
circular of Loris-Melikov of December 22, 1880. The
zemstvos did not arrive at an unanimous opinion, however,
and it was left for the Government to institute in the fall of
1 88 1 a special commission under the chairmanship of State
Secretary Kokhanov, Deputy-Minister under Loris-Melikov.
Into the commission entered those Senators who had been com
missioned by Loris-Melikov to inspect certain provinces and
report the results of their revisions, some of those who par
ticipated in the original preparation of the reform of local
administration, and, as expert-members, various zemstvo work
ers. The commission appointed from its midst a sub-com
mission, headed by Kokhanov, which was to work out the
reform. After two and a half years the sub-commission pre-

POBIEDONOSTZEV 259
sented a plan for important reforms in the entire local admin
istration, on the basis of the principle of classlessness. But the
completion of the work of Kokhanov's sub-commission (the end
of 1884) coincided with the absolute triumph of the reaction
in governmental spheres, when Tolstoy had become Minister of
Interior. Tolstoy decided to liquidate the work of Kokhanov's
commission, and in order to do it in " good form," he invited
into the commission such " informed men " as would undoubt
edly reject its conclusions; without Kokhanov's knowledge
several governors and a number of reactionary nobles were
appointed as members, who naturally disagreed with the views
of the sub-commission.
The collapse of Ignatiev's regime took place, properly speak
ing, in May of 1882, one year after his appointment as Min
ister. His fall was caused by the same Pobiedonostzev who
a year before had brought about the fall of Loris-Melikov.
Pobiedonostzev made use of Ignatiev's suggestion that a
Zemsky Sobor be summoned during the coronation in Moscow;
that Sobor was to consist of nearly three thousand persons, and
presented a quaint assembly, similar to neither the legislative
nor consultative institutions of any civilised country. The
project was prepared by some Moscow Slavophiles, presented
to the Tzar, and had gained his approval, when Pobiedonostzev
appeared on the stage. He succeeded in persuading Alexander
III to discard once and for all the system of concessions to
public opinion. Ignatiev was informed that his project could
not be accepted, and resigned. His place was taken by the
same Count D. A. Tolstoy, who in 1880, at the request of
Loris-Melikov and to the joy of all thinking Russia, had been
dismissed. Only from that moment did the course which Alex
ander III followed to the end of his days, begin to appear dis
tinctly.

CHAPTER XL
IN the two preceding chapters I have characterised the first
two brief but significant periods of the reign of Alex
ander III, which had a preludial, transitory, hence hesi
tating character. With the collapse of Ignatiev's ministry and
the appointment of Tolstoy began the reign of reaction, the
true epoch of Alexander III. Simultaneously with the dis
missal of the Slavophile ministry of Ignatiev were discarded
the secret societies which had existed at the Court, the " Holy
Squad," and the " Voluntary Guard," in whose midst were
discovered constitutional tendencies and circles organised by
the young Count Shuvalov, with the aid of Court Minister
Count Vorontzov-Dashkov.
After the coronation, safely celebrated in Moscow in May,
1883, the Government, with the aid of the traitor Degaiev,
and owing to the internal decay of the revolutionary organisa
tion, succeeded in capturing the remnants of the "Will of
the People." Tolstoy was given full authority thereafter.
But even Tolstoy had to spend many efforts and considerable
time on the final liquidation of the heritage of the "heart
dictatorship " ; for three more years Bunge remained at his
post; the Kokhanov-Commission continued its work for two
more years, and its activity had to be annulled by a special effort
on the part of the Government, described in the last chapter.
First of all Tolstoy restored the reactionary tendency in his
old department — the Ministry of Education, which he had
managed for sixteen years under Alexander II ; Baron Nicolayi
was supplanted in May, 1882, by Delianov, formerly a liberal,
but now obsequiously obedient to Pobiedonostzev and Tolstoy.
260

CURBING EDUCATION 261
In 1884 a new University Statute was worked out according to
the ideas of Katkov, Leontiev, and Liubimov, concerning which
Katkov announced his famous triumphant outcry : " Rise,
Gentlemen: the Government is coming, the Government is
returning." By the new Statute the University Councils were
deprived of ail vestiges of autonomy, and the Ministry was
enabled to introduce its own programme in the departments
of law and philology; it resembled the regime of Shirinsky-
Shikhmatov. The students were to be handled with " porcu
pine gloves," to use a Russian expression; no corporative
organisations of students were to be tolerated, and at the first
attempt to protest they were to be reduced to soldiers.
The secondary schools were to preserve all the features of
Tolstoy's Classical system, and at the same time regain the
class-character which they bore during the reign of Nicolas.
Delianov sent out a circular in which he urged the elimination
of children of lower ranks from secondary schools.
Pobiedonostzev insisted upon handing over primary educa
tion into the hands of the Ecclesiastic department; this did not
take place because the nobles, although reactionary, were un
willing to relinquish their control of popular education, and
because of lack of funds. In an enormous majority of cases
the zemstvos refused to transfer their schools to the Ecclesiastic
department, and the Government could not afford to take them
by force and maintain them at its own expenses. But the low
est type of the schools, the so-called Reading and Writing
Schools, which were established by the peasants themselves,
were given over to the Ecclesiastic department, by the law of
June 13, 1884, carried through by Pobiedonostzev with the aid
of Delianov.
The reactionary tendencies of the nobles received support
and encouragement from Tolstoy, and they were reflected
chiefly in the fate of the peasant-question and in the reform
of the zemstvo administration. Whenever the interests of the

262 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
nobles were threatened, the reactionaries began to spread
rumours about unrest and sedition among the peasants, in the
form of expectation of a " black " partition of the land. Those
rumours, undoubtedly inflated, produced a strong impression
upon the Tzar, and in his Coronation speech to the volost-
chiefs he sounded a warning to the peasants — not to listen
to " sedition " talk, but to obey " their " Marshals of No
bility.1 On the occasion of the centenary jubilee of the Nobility
Charter, in 1885, a special Bank of the Nobility was opened,
with the view of supporting landowners by means of loans.
In the manifesto issued in connection with that event a wish
was expressed that " the Russian nobles preserve a dominant
place in military leadership, in affairs of local administration
and courts, in spreading exemplary rules of faith and loyalty
and sound principles of popular education."
In their address of thanks the nobles, especially the re-
actionally circles, such as the nobility of the province of Sim
birsk, voiced by Pazukhin, indicated that they put their hopes
in the firm hand of the Government, the force of which would
allow them to live peacefully in the villages. The Govern
ment replied that it would direct its legislation in that spirit.
Thus the liberal ideas of Bunge and Ignatiev came to an end.
Pazukhin symbolised the new regime; he it was who received
the authority to liquidate all the work and the projects of the
Kokhanov-Commission. He published an article in 1885, in
which he voiced the sentiments of the most reactionary elements
of the nobility. He considered the reforms of the Sixties,
particularly those of the zemstvo and of the courts, the source
of all evils in the country, since they destroyed the principle of
class-differences. 1 That speech was reprinted during the present reign, and widely
distributed through the Empire, especially in rural public places. — Tr.

" RESTORATION " 263
" If," he wrote, " in the reforms of the former reign we see
a great evil in the destruction of the class-organisation, it is
the task of the present reign to restore what has been
destroyed." No wonder that in view of such tendencies among the no
bility, rumours began to circulate in the villages of the ap
proaching restoration of the bondage-system.
Count Tolstoy was greatly pleased with the views of
Pazukhin; he appointed him Chief of his Chancery, and com
missioned him to work out a project of the " restoration." As
a result of that work appeared the statute of July 12, 1889,
concerning Zemsky Chiefs, and the statute of June 12, 1890,
concerning zemstvo institutions. The principle of both stat
utes was to create a " firm local authority," concentrated in
the hands of the nobles. The Zemsky Chiefs, appointed from
among the nobles, were to enjoy enormous power over the
peasants and their organs of self-government. By the Statute
of 1890 the zemstvo institutions were completely deprived of
that portion of independence from the Government, which was
granted to them by the Statute of 1864. Tolstoy reduced the
zemstvo boards to organs of the Ministry of Interior, subject
at every step to the governor; the presidents of the boards
were to be appointed by the Government. Pazukhin's ideas
concerning the necessity of reviving class-spirit found expres
sion in the revision of the electoral system for the zemstvos.
The modified rules gave the nobles a complete predominance.
The number of peasant-delegates was greatly reduced; the
volosts could elect only candidates for delegates, and the gov
ernor appointed delegates from among them. The zemstvo-
assemblies were actually, by the Statute of 1890, transformed
into assemblies of the nobles. We must say, however, that
Tolstoy died before he carried through his entire plan; his
successor, I. N. Durnovo, possessed neither Tolstoy's talent,

264 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
nor his character and influence, and the State Council passed
his original project with certain changes, which retained some
semblance of self-government for the zemstvos.
During that period the mutilation of the judiciary statutes
went on crescendo. The jury institution suffered most of all.
Besides, by the law of July 12, 1889, one of the fundamental
principles of the statutes — that of separation of administra
tive and judiciary authorities — was destroyed: The Zemsky
Chiefs were to perform both administrative and judiciary func
tions; Justices of Peace were discarded.
Naturally the press was further restricted during that time.
Tolstoy issued in 1882 "temporary rules," in addition to the
rules of 1865 and the "additions" of Timashov. By those
rules organs which had been temporarily stopped after three
warnings, might reappear only on condition of their being
presented to the censor on the eve of publication, not later than
at eleven p. m. This caused the discontinuation of liberal
dailies which could not of course exist under such conditions.
Another rule established a special Areopagus of four Minis
ters — of Education, Interior, Justice, and the Super-Procura
tor of the Synod, who might stop any publication for pernicious
tendencies, and even forbid the editor of such a publication
to edit at any time in the future. Heavy penalties were show
ered upon the press, prohibition of private advertisements, of
retail sale, etc.
During the last two or three years of Tolstoy's regime the
number of those penalties had diminished, and it might appear
that the Government had. loosened the reins; but as K. K.
Arseniev remarks, the diminution of the number of penalties
was due to the fact that liberal organs had either disappeared
or had been placed in such a position that they could not say
anything offensive. Only a very few liberal organs, such as
the European Messenger, Russian Thought, Russian News,

RACE PERSECUTIONS 265
lived through the difficult period, with the sword of Damocles
constantly hanging over them.
Particularly difficult during that gloomy period was the
position of non-Russian nationalities. In spite of the law of
May 3, 1883, which promised toleration for Schismatists and
Sectants, Pobiedonostzev persecuted the dissenters severely,
even furiously. Even such pure, moral sects as Tolstoyans,
Dukhobory, Stundists, were persecuted, and at times deprived
of their children. In 1894 the Stundists were forbidden to
assemble in their houses of prayer.
In harmony with this were the measures against the Uniates
in the West and in Poland, and in some cases against Lutherans
in the Baltic provinces. Jingo Nationalism had reached its
apogee. Jews and Poles were persecuted most of all; La-
maites, K'almycks, and Buriats also suffered persecution and
were not allowed to build temples and perform worship.
Jews in particular suffered from restrictions. By the " tem
porary rules " of May 3, 1882, they were forbidden to live
even within the Pale of Settlement — outside of cities and
small-towns (miestechki) ; they were forbidden to buy real
estate in villages. In 1887 Rostov-on-the-Don and Taganrog
with its district were exempted from the Pale; thus the Pale
of Settlement was reduced. In 1891 Jewish artisans who had
the right to settle outside the Pale, were driven out from Mos
cow; about seventeen thousand of them were rudely exiled.
In 1887 a percentage for Jewish children entering schools was
introduced. In 1889 an end came to granting Jews the rank
of Sworn Attorney; they had to remain Assistant- Attorneys to
the end of their days.
.The Poles were restricted in their rights of occupying gov
ernmental positions in Poland and in the Western provinces,
but in other parts of the Empire they suffered no special op
pressions.

266 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The reactionary spirit was reflected also in the army. The
humanistic principles implanted by Miliutin had gradually dis
appeared. The Government tried to bring up the officers in
the spirit of caste distinction. Thus the penalty for duels was
reserved only for civilians ; military officers were exempt from it.
The military schools, reorganised into gymnasia by Miliutin,
were once more turned into Cadet Corps, and Minister of War
Vannovsky endeavoured to revive the spirit of exclusive in
stitutions of the time of Nicolas I.

CHAPTER XLI
THE only breach in the reactionary wall of Alexander
Ill's government was Bunge's handling of the finan
cial policy. He remained at his post until January
I, 1887, in spite of the intrigues and insinuations that persued
him in the Court circles and in the reactionary press. He re
signed, under the pretext of old age, and was supplanted by
I. A. Vyshnegradsky, a learned technologist and practical finan
cier, who had had experience as professor in the Technological
Institute and in the Mikhailovsky Academy of Artillery, and
also as a speculator on the bourse. In his financial-economic
policy he did not demonstrate any broad views or foresight;
like most of the Russian ministers of finance in the nineteenth
century, he considered raising the course of the paper-ruble
the paramount aim. The main and immediate task of the
Ministry under Vyshnegradsky had become the accumulation
of large money reserves in the Treasury, and the broad par
ticipation in foreign stock-exchange operations with the aid
of those reserves, with the view of effecting a pressure upon the
foreign money market, and thus raising the course of the ruble.
Alongside with this, the protectionist tariff policy had reached
its apogee in 1891.
Big industry had become the pet child of the Ministry of
Finance. Upon the complaints of large manufacturers, Bunge's
workingmen-laws were revised in favour of the capitalists; the
factory-inspectors were restricted in their activity, so that in
dependent and conscientious inspectors soon resigned, and that
institution began to deteriorate. The Ministry protected the
home industry in every way by a special customs tariff and
267

268 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
by special railroad-rates; artificial favourable conditions were
created for manufacturers, at the expense of the interests of
other classes of the people, particularly the rural population,
who felt the effect of the tariff of 1891 in the rise of prices on
such important commodities as iron and agricultural imple
ments. As I have described in a previous chapter, the peasantry grew
impoverished and ruined, and was naturally losing its buying
capacity. This affected the internal market, for such com
modities as, for instance, cotton fabrics. The manufacturing
industry sought compensation in the markets of Central Asia,
but those were not sufficient; by the end of the reign of Alex
ander III a new idea originated — to push the market to the Far
East. In this connection appeared the idea of building the
Siberian railroad, the question of an outlet to the Pacific Ocean,
of the acquisition of an ice-free port in the Far East, and all
that policy which brought to the development of the Russian
Far East undertakings that culminated in the Russo-Japanese
war. A few words concerning the railroads: By the end of the
reign of Alexander II the net of railroads amounted to twenty-
two and a half thousand versts, and for the thirteen years of
Alexander Ill's reign it grew to thirty-six thousand six hun
dred and sixty-two versts. The old policy of Reitern was fol
lowed in building the roads so that they would aid the hauling
of raw materials to ports, in order to increase the exports and
thus improve the money course; on the other hand, the Min
istry granted special low rates for manufacturers of the in
dustrial Central provinces. For the latter purpose a special
department was instituted at the Ministry of Finance — the
Tariff Department, at the head of which was placed a young
man, S. Y. Witte, destined subsequently to play an important
role in the history of Russia. Another feature of the new
railroad policy, in contrast to that of Reitern, was the increase

FINANCIAL POLICY 269
of fiscal ownership of railroads. During the reign of Alexander
III the verstageof fiscal railroads increased by twenty-two thou
sand versts, while that of private roads diminished by seven
thousand six hundred versts, in spite of the building of new
private railroads: \ the Government continually redeemed old
roads. Such were the features of the financial policy which pre
pared and deepened the acute state of Russian socio-economic
conditions at the beginning of the twentieth century. Those
conditions developed alongside with the crisis lived through
by the people after the famine of 1 891-1892, when failure of
crops caused misery and starvation in twenty provinces, mostly
in the black soil region. That crisis formed, we may say,
the finishing touch to the general picture of Russia as seen at
the end of the reign of Alexander III, and appeared at the
same time as a powerful factor for bringing about the grave
changes of the subsequent years. =.
In his foreign policy Alexander III was undoubtedly original
and independent, and bent his own line. In 1882 the senile
head of Russian diplomats, the class-mate of Pushkin, Prince
Gorchakov, died; his place was taken not by another distin
guished statesman, but by a modest official, State-Secretary
Giers, who was in fact not so much a minister as a private
secretary of Alexander in the sphere of foreign policy.
During the first half of his reign foreign conjunctures did
not develop favourably for Russia; she was constantly threat
ened by war, on the part of Austria or England, and there
appeared various international complications, partly in connec
tion with Eastern affairs. The conquest of Central Asia, be
gun in the Seventies, was continued and completed, to the grow
ing alarm of England.
By the plan of General Skobelev, to a considerable extent
realised by himself, the last stronghold of the Turcomen, Geok-
Tepe, was to be destroyed, in order to bring the Russian fron-

270 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
tier to Afghanistan, and in one point even to the northern
border of British India. After energetic efforts and stubborn
conflicts, Skobelev finally succeeded in capturing Geok-Tepe,
subduing the savage tribes, and approaching Afghanistan and
British territory; after some bloody battles with the Afghans,
the last point of that portion of Central Asia — Merv — was
captured by the Russians. Alexander III was able to furnish
adequate answers to the interpellations of the British diplomats,
and to avert war with England.
Another danger threatened from Austria; Bismarck did his
best to involve Russia in a war with Austria, so that he might
have a free hand to deal with France; he also tried to embroil
Russia in the Balkans, where Serbia and Roumania ascribed
their failures at the Congress of Berlin to Russia, and where
Bulgaria was going through internal dissensions. Alexander
III, who personally disliked Germans, yet held up the tra
ditional friendship of his dynasty with the HohenzoUern House,
and disregarded the machinations of Bismarck. The exasperat
ing affairs in Bulgaria, the Principality which was created by
Russia and maintained by her, brought Russia to the verge of in
tervention and probable war with Austria; but in that case
also Alexander III disappointed Bismarck, withdrew his army-
officers from Bulgaria, and left the Bulgars to themselves.
Alexander III, aware of his isolated position in Europe, as
serted that Russia was not in need of any alliances; on one
occasion he demonstratively raised a toast to his only friend in
Europe — the Prince of Montenegro.
In the second half of Alexander's reign a possibility was
opened for Russia to establish better international relations.
In 1887 Bismarck nearly succeeded in instigating war between
Germany and France; a personal letter from the Tzar to Em
peror Wilhelm I restrained the latter from declaring such a
war. This served as the beginning of the rapprochement be
tween Russia and France; in 1889 a union was signed between

ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE 271
them, and made public after the solemn declaration by Wilhelm
II of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy.
The Russo-French alliance served as an important factor in
the international policy of the end of the nineteenth century;
it certainly brought an end to Bismarck's aspirations to crush
France. Alexander III, even during his life-time, was justly
called the Tzar-Peacemaker by many historians and publicists.

RUSSIA UNDER NICOLAS II, 1894-1916
BY ALEXANDER S. KAUN

Professor A. Kornilov wrote to me last August:
" I am highly complimented by the fact that you have ap
preciated my work, and I shall greatly rejoice at its appear
ance in the English language."
I deem it my duty before the esteemed author and before
the public, to state that my supplementary chapters do not pre
tend to be a direct continuation of Mr. Kornilov's work.
I fully agree with the opinion of Professor James Mavor,
expressed in a letter to me :
" Kornilov's book has a certain artistic unity, and it was a
very good idea on his part to close his History with 1890.
The history of the last twenty-five years cannot be written
from the same point of view or with the same perspective as
the history of the previous seventy-five years."
Precisely so. The events of the reign of Nicolas II have
not yet crystallised into a subject-matter for the impartial his
torian. I do not pretend to have treated that period sine ira
et studio.
In the four following chapters the reader will find a sub;
jective interpretation of the most salient events during the
present reign, as reflected in the mind of the Russian intelli
gentzia, of which I claim to be a member.
A. S. K.
November, igi6.

THE REACTION UNDER NICOLAS II
(I894-I905)
FOR a quarter of a century, from March, 1881, to Oc
tober, 1905, Russia was ruled by one consistent, re
lentless, inflexible personality — that of Constantine
Pobiedonostzev, tutor in the Imperial family during the reign
of Alexander II, intimate counsellor and confessor of Alex
ander III and Nicolas II, and Super-Procurator of the Holy
Synod. If in the Court-circles Pobiedonostzev had been looked
upon as the saviour of the Dynasty, he was famous throughout
the land as the " evil genius of Russia." In his hands Uvarov's
trinity- formula — Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality — had
developed to its apogee, to the absurd; the Government, the
entire State-apparatus, became a yielding instrument for the
realisation of the Procurator's aspirations which, in the main,
spelled the strangulation of any initiative and free will on
the part of the people and the ruthless persecution of all non-
Orthodox creeds and of all nationalities that did not belong
to the Great Russian tribe. Such, in a nutshell, was the policy
of Alexander III and of Nicolas II, until 1905; but, to re
peat, it was the personality of Pobiedonostzev that had stamped
all the important acts of the State during that long period. A
student of the Russian language will unmistakably recognise
the soulless, brutally-unctious style of the Grand Inquisitor
in most of the manifestoes, ukases, and rescripts, issued during
that time, all of them breathing the same spirit of obscuran
tism, intolerance, and cruelty, all of them striving to extin-
275

276 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
guish light and mind, to grind to dust the peasant and the
workingman, the intellectual and the zemst'wist, the Finn,
the Jew, the Pole, the Armenian, the Sectarian — ad majorem
autocratic gloriam.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the people who had ex
pected a change of policy at the accession of young Nicolas II
were utterly disappointed. As a matter of fact those rosy
expectations were based rather on self-suggestion than on sub
stantial precedents. As Heir to the throne Nicolas had not
demonstrated any independent views or opinions, any brilliance
of mind or intensity of purpose; he was brought up as an
ordinary Grand Duke, under the guidance of the pedantic
General Danilovich, and in the unhealthful atmosphere created
by Pobiedonostzev. Yet the people, having chafed for thir
teen years under the intolerable regime of Alexander III,
wished to hope that the young monarch would return to the
policy of his grandfather, so tragically interrupted on March
I, 1881.
Among the deputations that came to congratulate the new
Tzar were zemstvo delegates, of whom many presented frank
addresses voicing the sentiments and desires of the country.
As usual, the Tver zemstvo appeared to be the most radical
and outspoken; the author of the address, Rodichev, was not
allowed by the Minister of Interior to be present at the Court
reception, and was forbidden to live in Petrograd; other per
secutions followed the members of the zemstvos of Tver and
of other provinces which presented similar addresses. How far
from revolutionary those petitions were, can be seen from the
text of the Tver address:
"Your Majesty:
" In these festal days, which see the beginning of your serv
ices in the cause of the welfare of the Russian nation, the
zemstvo of the province of Tver greets you with feelings of
fervent loyalty. . . .

THE TVER ADDRESS 277
" The Russian nation has listened with gratitude to the
solemn expressions uttered by Your Imperial Majesty upon your
accession to the throne of all the Russias. We are filled with
gratitude for your resolve to devote yourself to the further
ance of the happiness of your people, and we hope for the suc
cess of the great task which has been bestowed upon you. We
allow ourselves to indulge in the hope that on the height of
the Throne the voice of the people and the expression of its
desires will be heard and listened to. We are firmly convinced
that the welfare of Russia will improve and fortify itself under
your rule, and that the law will henceforward be respected and
obeyed, not only by the nation alone, but also by the representa
tives of the authority that rules it; because the law, which in
Russia is an expression of the will of the Monarch, should
stand above the changing views of the individual instruments
of this sublime power.
" We earnestly hope that during your reign the rights of
individuals, as well as those of already existing representative
bodies, will be protected permanently and energetically.
" We expect, Gracious Sovereign, that these representative
bodies will be allowed to voice their opinions in matters in which
they are concerned, in order that the expressions of the needs
and thoughts, not only of the representatives of the administra
tion, but of the whole Russian nation, may reach the Throne.
We expect, Sire, that under your rule Russia will advance on
the path of civilisation and progress, as well as on the road of a
peaceful development of her resources and needs. We firmly
believe that in the close union of all the elements and classes
of the Russian people who are in the same measure devoted to
the Throne and to their country, the power which Your Majesty
wields will find new sources of strength and better chances of
success towards the fulfilment of the high aims Your Imperial
Majesty has in view."
This loyal advance of the zemstvo was roughly rebuked by

278 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
the young monarch in a short speech which he delivered at the
reception of the deputations. As a political programme of the
new reign, that speech was to smash all hopes for progressive
changes in the Government, and to hurl the moderate liberals
into the ranks of the aggressive opposition. The memorable
speech was as follows:
" I am glad to see here the representatives of all the different
classes of the country, assembled to express to me their submis
sive and loyal feelings. I believe in the sincerity of those feelings
which are inherent in every Russian heart. But it has been
brought to My knowledge that during the last months there
have been heard in some zemstvos the voices of those who have
indulged in the senseless dreams with respect to the participation
of the zemstvos in the general direction of the internal affairs
of the State. Let it be known by all that I shall devote my
whole power to the best service of the people, but that the
principle of autocracy will be maintained by me as firmly and
unswervingly as by my lamented father."
This blunt declaration was echoed with general indignation;
the country was given notice that the regime of Pobiedonostzev
was to continue unaltered and unmitigated. Thenceforward
the alignment of the national forces -appeared simple and dis
tinct; roughly speaking, it was — the Government versus the
' People, the Bureaucracy against everything free and liberal in
the country. The consequences of the new alignment were
foreseen by all, except those engaged in sawing the branch on
which they were seated. The famous Russian emigrant,
Stepniak-Kravchinsky, wrote on that occasion:
" Looked at politically, the speech of December 20 indicated
a turning point in the history of our progressive movement.
Hitherto the Government had declared that it was only from
the ranks of persons outside the law, revolutionary firebrands,
socialists, and other ignoble persons, that demands for reforms
in our political system had emanated. Nicolas II was the first

NICOLAS WARNED 279
openly to recognise that the country had asked from him through
its empowered representatives a constitutional reform, which,
however, he refused to grant, and had decided stoutly to re
sist it as long as he should be able."
The revolutionists, utterly crushed during the reign of Alex
ander III, now saw an opportunity for the resurrection of the
movement through the unification of all oppositional forces.
They were frank enough to express their hopes and expecta
tions in a lengthy address to the Tzar, printed abroad, but
dated " St. Petersburg, January 19, 1895." It is a remarkable
document, one may say — prophetic in many respects. Below
are some parts of it, quoted from a recent book written by a
Russian courtier under the pseudonym of Count Vassili : 1
" You have spoken, and your words are at present known
everywhere in Russia; ay, in the whole of the civilised world.
Until now you were unknown, but since yesterday you have
become a definite factor in the situation of your country, about
whom there is no room left for senseless dreams. We do not
know whether you understand or realise the position which
you have yourself created with your ' firm words ' . . .
" First of all, you are badly informed about the tendencies
against which you decided to raise your voice in your speech.
There has not been heard in one single assembly of any
zemstvo one single word against that autocracy which is so
dear to your heart. . . . The most advanced thinkers among
them have only insisted upon — or, rather, humbly begged —
that a closer union might be inaugurated between the Mon
arch and his people; for the permission for the zemstvos to
have free access to the Throne without any one standing be
tween it and them; for the right of public debate, and for
the assurance that the law should always be observed and stand
above the caprices of the Administration.
" In one word, the only thing that was in question was the
1 Behind the Veil at the Russian Court, by Count Paul Vassili.

280 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
desire to see fall and crumble to the ground that wall of
bureaucracy and courtierdom that has always parted the Sover
eign from the Russian people.
" This was the desire of the people which you, who have
just stepped on the throne, inexperienced and ignorant of the
national needs, have seen fit to call ' senseless dreams.'
" It is clear to all intelligent elements of the Russian peo
ple, who has advised you to take this imprudent step. You
»are being deceived; you are being frightened by this very gang
of bureaucrats and courtiers to whose actual autocracy not one
single Russian man or woman has ever been reconciled. . . .
" Do believe that even for the mildest of men such a declara
tion, ill-timed as it was, could only produce a crushing feeling
of betrayal. That day has done away with that halo with
which so many Russians had crowned your young, inexperienced
head. You have laid your own head on your popularity, and
have destroyed it. . . .
" After your sharp reply to the most humble and lawful
demands that have been addressed to you, by what and through
what means will Russian society be able to keep in quiet sub
mission to your will those of its members who wish to proceed,
further and further, on that road which leads to the amelioration
of the nation's fate? . . .
" It (your speech) has strengthened in others the determina
tion to fight to the bitter end against a hateful order of things,
and to fight it with all the means they may have at their disposal
and in their power. You have been first to begin the struggle,
and it will not be long before you find yourself entangled by
it." Thus began the new reign ; the despotic regime was not only
not mitigated, but on the contrary it~grew~~more intense and
ruthless, since Pobiedonostzev had. become~the omnipotent ruler
of Russia. During the former reign the Procurator still had
to encounter a sovereign with a character and a will, who had

AJtLivi&i vua 281
some scruples and respect for the memory of his father's ac
tivity; no such obstacles were in his way now, and he wielded
his grip over Russia uncontested and unrivalled.
No changes of import were promulgated during the first
period of Nicolas' reign, either in the personnel or in the policy
of the Government. The selection of functionaries was prac
tically in the hands of Pobiedonostzev who was quite con
sistent and consequential in his programme, and favoured per
sons with political views at least as conservative as those of
Count Dmitri Tolstoy, whose unlamented death in 1889 has
deprived the bureaucracy of one of its ablest and cleverest
upholders. Minister of Interior Durnovo, Minister of Edu
cation Delianov, Minister of Finance Vishnegradsky, Minister
of Agriculture Krivoshein, adhered strictly to the ferule of
the Super-Procurator, and so did their successors; the only
changes consisted in the degree to which the reactionary policy
was carried out.
The Minister of Interior continued the policy of Dmitri
Tolstoy in every respect. The zemstvo was further curbed
in its field of activity, and became more and more dependent
upon the good will of the local administration. Since politics
were absolutely forbidden, the zemstvo activity was limited
to economics. During the famine of 1891 their work proved
of unprecedented efficiency, considering Russian conditions. In
the field of local activity the zemstvo of the province of Mos
cow led the rest; under the presidency of Dmitri Shipov, and
with the co-operation of such spirited men as Muromtzev,
Golovnin, Kokoshkin, Chelnokov, it succeeded in introducing
radical improvements in the provincial life, such as establishing
a school within two miles and a hospital within five miles of
every inhabitant, equipping small medical outposts, supplying
the peasants with clover for the improvement of the cattle,
introducing veterinary doctors and inspectors of imported cat
tle, compelling factories to live up to sanitary requirements,

282 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
and so forth. The example of Moscow was followed by other
zemstvos, notably by those of Samara, Tver, Tambov, Chernigov,
Viatka, and by many city-dumas. Needless to say, the Ad-'
ministration did everything possible to hinder the work of these
public institutions, thus forcing the peaceful workers to join
the opposition. Most of the subsequent leaders of the Con
stitutional-Democratic party (Cadets) received their political
instruction as members of the zemstvo or city-dumas. From
1894 to 1903 there took place sporadic congresses of zemstvo-
presidents of a semi-official character, for the discussion of
provincial needs. In spite of the guarded policy of the leaderl
Shipov, political questions were raised and discussed at the
congresses, for it was impossible for public workers to over
look such phenomena as inequality of civil rights, gagged press,
obstructed popular education, limitations imposed upon the
zemstvo, irrational financial policy, and similar flagrant evils.
In 1902 Minister of Finance Witte set up a commission for
the " investigation of the causes of the exhaustion of the central
provinces " ; the commission appointed local sub-committees,
^.with the co-operation of the zemstvos. Witte's intention was to ¦
discredit his rival in the Committee of Ministers, Minister of;
Interior Plehve; hence his flirtation with the liberal elements.'
Pobiedonostzev and Plehve were sharply opposed to those com
mittees, and the latter minister sent out circulars forbidding
the discussion of many vital questions at their assemblies. The
uncomplete results of the sessions showed one hundred and eight
een committees advocating moderation, one hundred and eighty-
one standing for enlightened conservatism, and four hundred
and eighteen outspokenly oppositional to the regime. Witte
failed to achieve his purpose — of compromising Plehve; on the;
contrary, he lost his position as Minister of Finance, and was
appointed President of the Committee of Ministers, an un
important post at that time. Plehve renewed his persecution j
of the zemstvos with fresh vigour, cancelled elections (he an-

OSVOBOZHDENTZY 283
nulled the re-election of Shipov as President of the Moscow
zemstvo; in his place was elected the considerably more liberal
Golovnin), banished radical members, closed up assemblies,
and did everything in his power to strangle their activity.
His assassination in 1904 cleared the air.
At the end of the Nineties a new movement began among
liberal zemstvoists and other progressives, for the founding of
a Liberal party. The idea was finally realised in the establish
ment of an organ, Liberation, in Stuttgart, under the editor
ship of Peter Struve, an ex-Marxian. Among the " Libera
tors " ( Osvobozhdentzy, from the word svoboda — freedom ;
osvobozhdenie — liberation) were such idealists as Princes
Peter and Paul Dolgorukov, Prince Shakhovskoy, such prom
inent zemstvoists as Petrunkevich and Rodichev, radical writ
ers, professors, lawyers, as Korolenko, Miliukov, Nabokov,
Kokoshkin. The Liberators had local branches throughout
Russia, and carried on an energetic propaganda of constittp
tional ideas. The group of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists
and the Union of Liberators were formed before the outbreak
of the war with Japan, and were destined to play an important
part in the events of 1904-1905.
The persecution bf non-Orthodox creeds and sects went on
crescendo. Pure, harmless sects, as those of the Stundists, Molo- !
kane, Dukhobortzi, were ruthlessly oppressed, exiled, compelled
to serve the army, forbidden to perform their worship. The
only voice that dared rise against the bigoted policy of Pobie
donostzev, was that of Lev Tolstoy; on several occasions he
made vigorous appeals to the civilised world on behalf of the
Molokane, Dukhobortzi, and other oppressed sects and creeds.
It was largely due to his efforts that the Dukhobortzi were
enabled to migrate in large numbers to Canada where they
have been living according to their convictions. In 1897 an
ecclesiastical congress was held at Kazan, under the auspices

284 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
of the Holy Synod; among its bigoted resolutions, which were
approved by Pobiedonostzev, was one petitioning the Govern
ment to declare the Tolstoyans, i.e., the followers of Lev Tol
stoy, a sect " particularly dangerous for the Church and the
State," who should be dealt with as drastically as the most
" pernicious " sects. In 1900 the Holy Synod, obedient tool
of the Russian Torquemado, anathematised the greatest Russian,
the " conscience of Russia," — Lev Tolstoy ; the Orthodox
church was forbidden to afford him burial-rites.
The political and educational restrictions upon the Poles,
the Little Russians, the Baltic provinces, and other " border
lands," were continued with the former zeal, and adhesion to
Uvarov's trinity-formula. The Jews suffered most of all.
The "temporary laws" of 1882 have existed to this day, with
various modifications and additions, in most cases in the nature
of further restriction. The Pale of Settlement continued to
be narrowed and curtailed; Jews were not allowed to occupy
state or public positions, were greatly restricted _in_ attending
schools (five to ten per cent, in secondary schools, and two
to five per cent, in higher educational institutions), were for
bidden to buy real-estate outside of towns, in a word — " it
was as if all the Jews of Russia were to be violently crowded
in and piled on top of each other, like grasshoppers in a ditch.
Here they were to be miserably crushed together until the
fruitless struggle for life should have done its work." 2
Pobiedonostzev is credited with having predicted as a result
of his policy against the Jews that " a third of them would be
converted, a third would emigrate, while the rest would die
of hunger." In spite of those unbelievable persecutions, or
perhaps because of them, the Russian Jews have distinguished
themselves in all fields of national life — in commerce, at 'the
bar, in science, in art, in the press and — naturally — in all lib
eral and revolutionary movements. Plehve was said to have in-
2 Alexander III of Russia, by Charles Lowe.

NON-RUSSIANS 285
tended " to drown the Revolution in Jewish blood " ; the massa
cre in Kishinev, in 1903, was perpetrated with the knowledge
of the Minister of Interior (Plehve), as it has been established
beyond doubt.
Pobiedonostzev's short-sighted chauvinism, which resulted in
the alienation of loyal subjects of the Empire, was demonstrated
most palpably in the Government's policy with regard to Fin
land. Since 1809 the Grand Duchy enjoyed internal autonomy,
granted by Alexander I, and solemnly confirmed by all suc
cessive Tzars. Nicolas II had sworn allegiance to the Fin
nish constitution, but instigated by the Super-Procurator of ;
the Holy Synod he broke his oath, and in the year of 1899 V:
the independence of Finland came to an end ; the Grand Duchy ; ;';
was to become a Russian province, ruled by the Imperial min-, j
isters. The indignation of the little nation was shared by
the entire civilised world; the Finns resisted the new order
passively, but the senseless oppressions of Plehve as Minister
for Finland, and of Governor-General Bobrikov exasperated
even that stoical race, and in 1904 Bobrikov was assassinated
by Eugene Schaumann. The Government was responsible for
the rapid spread of Social Democracy and of revolutionary
ideas in the formerly peaceful and loyal Grand Duchy.
In a similar way the Armenians and the Georgians in the
Caucasus were driven by the Governmental despotism to revo
lutionary terrorism. Prince Golitzin, Governor-General of the
Caucasus, obtained the consent of Plehve and Pobiedonostzev
for the confiscation of the Armenian church-lands and charity-
funds which amounted to nearly sixty million dollars. The
attempted Russification of the theretofore loyal Armenians re
sulted in the creation of a new revolutionary contingent, more
sanguine and aggressive than the long-suffering native Russians.
The pacification of the Caucasus in subsequent years required
more efforts on the part of the Government than any other part
of the Empire.

286 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
The ablest minister during the present reign had been Sergey
Witte who succeeded Vishnegradsky in 1894 as Minister of
Finance. Like his predecessor, Witte pursued the policy of
increasing the reserve-fund of the State through economy and
with the aid of heavy taxation. In 1886 the reserve amounted
to fifty-six million rubles, in 1893 to two hundred thirty-six
million, and in 1901 the gold reserve was six hundred and forty-
eight million against a note issue of six hundred and thirty mil
lion rubles; at the same time Witte introduced a golden stand
ard (1897). These measures were achieved, naturally, at
heavy sacrifices for the people; besides the enormous foreign
loans the country was burdened also with a complicated system
of indirect taxation.
Witte endeavoured to monopolise the railroads, of which in
1900 the State owned sixty per cent. Yet the Government
had to meet growing deficits year after year, partly on account
of the construction of purely strategic lines, like the Siberian,
or the Eastern Chinese railway. The monopolisation of the
sale of liquor was also a measure carried through by Witte;
it greatly increased the revenue of the State, but at the expense
of the masses: drunkenness spread like a plague through the
country, whole villages suffered from the vodka-evil, and the
demoralisation of the illiterate, tax-burdened, half-starving peas
antry received an encouraging stimulus from the State wine
shop. Witte continued the protectionist policy of his predecessors,
on an enlarged scale. He employed strenuous efforts for fos
tering capitalism in Russia, and encouraged the development
of home industry at the expense of the fundamental national
asset — agriculture. The peasants, impoverished by heavy
taxes, were unable to pay the enormous import duties on agri
cultural implements and other necessities. Mr. Pares figured
out that " the Russian peasant pays, as compared with the Ger
man, two and a half times as much for cotton and sugar, four

WITTE'S ACTIVITY 287
and a half times as much for iron, six times as much for coal,"
and he adds : " The apparent wealth accruing to the State
from these various sources (from the spirit-monopoly and the
protective tariff A. S. K.) was unscrupulously exaggerated, and
systematic efforts were made to produce a deceptive appearance
of prosperity." 3 Witte himself was forced to acknowledge
the growing misery of the country, especially of the Central
provinces, where agriculture had greatly declined, and the peas
antry were utterly impoverished. We have seen that he es
tablished a special commission for the investigation of the causes
of the misery; the results were so unpleasant for the bureau
cratic regime that Witte lost his post, and Plehve was given
further license to oppress the grumbling people.
Capitalism, fostered and fondled by the Government since
the Seventies, brought about its logical concomitant — a city
proletariat. We have seen how the emancipated peasants/,
unable to subsist on the miniature allotments granted them, j
and still less able to meet the heavy taxes imposed upon them, 1
were forced to seek other earnings. Part of the peasants set- j
tied permanently in cities as factory-workers, drivers, etc.;.
while a large part of them went to the city for temporary work, ;
gravitating back to the soil, and returning to their village as;1
soon as they were in a position to maintain their land. The'
latter category has served as a link between the city working-
men and the village masses; the propaganda carried on in the
city was thus disseminated in remote nooks among the peasants,
always wishful for changes, always expecting good tidings
" concerning soil."
The Socialist propaganda among workers began in the middle
of the Eighties, when Plekhanov and other members of the
" Black Partition " formed a party under the name of " Libera
tion of Labour." Marxian Social Democracy spread in the
* The Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII.

288 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
early Nineties, particularly in the large cities and in industrial
districts. Sporadic strikes took place at various points, nearly
all of an economic nature. Witte experimented with a Fac
tory Law (1897), which limited the working hours to eleven
and a half; the shrewd Minister had intended to appease the
workingmen and to lure them into the arms of the patriarchal
government. In 1898 a congress of various Socialist groups
in Russia was held, which resulted in the formation of the
' Russian Social Democratic Workingmen 's Party; its original
aim was to eliminate all political problems from their propa
ganda, and to concentrate all the forces on the economic ,
struggle. The strike movement spread over the country, reach
ing Krasnoyarsk, in Siberia.
At that time the Government made another experiment with
the labour movement. Zubatov, Chief of Detectives in Mos
cow, obtained the consent of Grand Duke Sergey, Governor-
General of Moscow, of General Trepov, Chief of the Moscow
Police, and of Minister Plehve, for the organisation of a net
of labour-societies, under the supervision and protection of the
police. Zubatov's object was to assist the workingmen in their
economic struggle, in order to withdraw them from the influence
of political agitation and revolutionary propaganda. It was a
dangerous game; the employers protested against the strike-
propaganda of Zubatov's agents. One of the latter, Shaievich,
organised a large strike in Odessa (1903), with the support of
the local police; but the strike assumed such dimensions that
neither Zubatov nor the police were able to control it, and it
had to be put down with much bloodshed. The " Police
Socialism " was discredited.
The Zubatov-affair discredited also the purely economic
labour movement, showing as it did the possible results of
such a non-political activity. The new Morgan of the Social-
Democrats, the Spark, preached more vigorous class-propa-

REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM 289
ganda; at the congress of the party in 1903, a democratic
republic was declared their ultimate goal.
The Social-Democrats ignored the peasant-question ; in their
eyes the transformation of the peasantry into a property-less
proletariat was to be desired and worked for. The party that
appealed directly to the peasants was that of the Socialists-
Reyolationists, the heirs of the Narodovoltzy^oi^ the Will of
the People-traditions. Its organ, Revolutionary Russia, began
to appear in 1900; it tried to reconcile Western Socialism with
ancient Russian Communism; it advocated socialisation of the
land, and its distribution among those who actually till it. The
Socialists-Revolutionists made a successful propaganda among
the peasants and among the idealistic intelligentzia; they ap
pealed more to the Russian mind than the petrified Marxians.
As heirs of the Will of the People, they accepted terror as a
necessary means in the struggle with autocracy ; alongside with
the propaganda-group the party had a Fighting Organisation
which was to carry out the sentences pronounced by the Central
Committee. In 1902, twenty-one years old Balmashov, mem
ber of the Fighting Organisation, killed Minister of Interior
Sipiagin. During the thirty months of Sipiagin's administra
tion sixty thousand political arrests were made; Maxim Gorky
was banished from Nizhni-Novgorod, Peter Struve and Tugan-
Baranovsky — from Petrograd ; hundreds of university students
were exiled to remote provinces; the Telegraph Department
was forbidden to forward telegrams to Lev Tolstoy; the press
was enjoined from discussing 1,896 new subjects, in addition to
those prohibited before.*
In Revolutionary Russia for May, 1903, appeared the fol
lowing note :
"On 13th March, 1903, the Governor of Ufa, N. M.
Bogdanovich, ordered the troops at Zlatoust to fire upon a
* The Russian Revolutionary Movement, by Koni Zilliacus.

290 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
group of striking men. The crowd ran away, but the troops
continued to fire. Twenty-eight people were killed, and about
two hundred were wounded. Among the killed and wounded
were many women and children. . . . On the 6th of May,
by the order of the Fighting Organisation of the Party of
Socialists-Revolutionists, two of its members shot and killed
N. M. Bogdanovich, Governor of Ufa." 5
The terroristic activity of the Socialists-Revolutionists
achieved its greatest popularity in July, 1904, when Sazonov
assassinated the tyrannical dictator, von Plehve.
Throughout the reign of Nicolas II student-disturbances
have taken place. They began as early as 1896, when the
Petrograd students were forbidden to celebrate the annual uni
versity fete; the Moscow students resolved to express their
protest against the Government by marching to the Vagankovo
cemetery and having a memorial service performed for the
victims of the Khodynka massacre.6 The marchers were
5 Quoted by James Mavor, in the 2nd vol. of his Economic His
tory of Russia.
6 During the coronation of Nicolas II in Moscow, festivities were
arranged for the masses on the Khodynsky Field. Through criminal
mismanagement the people crowded in disorder, and when pushed
back by the mounted police, struggling, screaming men, women, and
children fell into deep ditches which had been dug around the field.
The number of victims was estimated at four thousand. Grand
Duke Sergey, Governor-General of Moscow, was naturally blamed
for the catastrophe. On the same evening the Tzar was present at
the ball given in honour of the French ambassador, and took part in
the dances. In this connection K. Zilliacus quotes Robert G. Inger-
soll's words written before the coronation:
" On reading the descriptions of the coronation of the Tzar, the
processions, the ceremonies and the festivities, the ostentation and pa
rade of the barbarian magnificence, the cloths of gold and the glit
tering of precious stones, I could not but think of the poor peasants,
of the trodden-down, overworked, and half-fed millions, of the gloomy
and ignorant masses who belonged body and soul to the Tzar. I
thought of the shoulders that had been torn open by the knout, of
the thousands of prisoners lingering in cells because they had dared
to whisper something about liberty, of the heaps of human beings

STUDENT-DISORDERS 291
driven by Cossacks back to the University; their names were
taken by the police, and thirty-six of them who seemed to be
leaders were arrested. On the next day the students gathered
at the University, and asked the Rector to obtain the release
of the prisoners; he refused and ordered them to disperse. As
they disobeyed, four hundred and three students were im
prisoned in the Provincial Gaol; one hundred and five of their
number were subsequently banished to Siberia, and twenty-six
were expelled from the University. Thus was inaugurated the
policy of the new reign towards the youth of the country.
In 1898 Minister of Education Delianov died; his place was
given to Bogoliepov, an obsequious nonentity, whose only aim
was to please Pobiedonostzev. In 1899 the Petrograd police
flogged a number of students with knouts; the chief of police
was rewarded by the Government. This atrocity was answered
with a strike of thirteen thousand students throughout the
Empire. The Tzar issued an ukase ordering the striking
students to be forcibly enlisted in the army. At the same time
numerous professors of liberal tendencies were dismissed from
the universities of Moscow, Petrograd, and other places. In
1900 serious disturbances took place at Kiev. One thousand
students held a meeting at which they discussed the demoralis
ing policy of the Ministry of Education. The Rector appealed
to the Authorities ; the University was surrounded by Cossacks
and police, under the command of General Novitzky of the
Gendarmerie. Five hundred students were arrested; one hun
dred and eighty-three of them were drafted as soldiers, and
the rest were expelled from the University. General Novitzky
and other military men objected to that form of punishment,
considering the army not a penitentiary, but the Rector, the
driven like cattle through the hopeless roads that lead to the hell of
Siberia. The cannon did not thunder loud enough, and neither the
pealing of bells nor the blare of the trumpets could drown the la
ments of the prisoners. . . . The coronation is a blemish on the nine
teenth century. Long live the Russian people ! "

292 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Curator, and Minister Bogoliepov upheld the measure. The
Kiev affair provoked further disturbances at Moscow, Kharkov,
and Petrograd; in every case the Cossacks attacked the pro
testing students, and flogged them mercilessly. It is charac
teristic that in Moscow and Kharkov workingmen took the
side of the students and joined their demonstration. In Petro
grad the students met in front of the Kazan Cathedral; Gen
eral Kleigels, the City Prefect, attacked them with a force of
Cossacks and police, who flogged them in front of the Cathe
dral and inside the church. Seven students (among them one
woman) were killed; the number of wounded could not be
established. One month later Bogoliepov was killed by an
ex-student, Karpovich. But the indignation of the public had
not calmed down with the removal of the obnoxious minister;
protests signed by mothers, by high officials, by authors, by
persons of all ranks and professions, were showered upon the
Government. At the same time street-demonstrations took
place in numerous towns, arranged in most cases by working-
men who marched and shouted " Doloy Samoderzhaviye! " —
" Down with absolutism! "
The atmosphere grew dense and suffocating. One felt the
oncoming of a storm, and one wanted it to come and relieve
the suspense.

II
WAR AND REVOLUTION
THE setback given to Russian diplomacy at the Congress
of Berlin had kept Russia in an isolated position for
a long time. Even the alliance with France seemed
to be rather a purely financial transaction than anything
else. The growth of Pangermanism, the increase of Ger
man influence at Constantinople and of Austrian influence
on the Balkan Peninsula, appeared to check the traditional
gravitation of Russian diplomacy toward the Near East. In
1898 the world was startled by the appeal of the Tzar to the
Great Powers for a Peace Congress; Russia evidently had no
aggressive intentions with regard to her western neighbours.
But the Russian expansion in Asia went on uninterruptedly.
Since the beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian
railroad, in 1891, the Government had its eyes turned east
ward. An attempt was made to create a Drang nach Osten
movement; Prince Ukhtomsky, editor of the Petrograd News,
and companion of Nicolas II during his travels in the East,
as Heir to the Throne, eloquently urged his compatriots to
look upon Asia as their natural home, endeavouring to prove
that the Russian people were geographically and morally
Asiatics. Russian diplomats got busy at Peking, negotiating
concessions in Manchuria and Korea. The defeat of China
by Japan, in 1895, and the occupation by the latter of Port
Arthur and Korea, threatened to thwart the ambitions of the
Government; but Russia was not in a position to resist, since
the Siberian railway had not yet been completed, and the
transportation of a sufficiently large army into Manchuria was
293

294 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
almost impossible. Russia succeeded, however, in inducing
France and Germany to demand jointly the withdrawal of
Japan from Port Arthur and from Korea. A number of im
portant concessions on the part of China to Russia followed
in rapid succession. In 1895 the Russo-Chinese Bank was
opened, and one year later that bank undertook the construc
tion of the Eastern Chinese Railway, which connected the Rus
sian railways with the province of Kirin. In 1898 Russia
leased the Liao-Tung peninsula, including Port Arthur, with
the right to connect Port Arthur through Kharbin with Muk
den, and Talien-Wan (later Dalny, renamed Dairen by Japan)
with Newchawng. During the Boxer uprising of 1900 Russia
occupied Manchuria, under the pretext of maintaining order,
promising to evacuate the region in 1902. At the same time
Russian capitalists (among them representatives of high circles)
greedily exploited the timber region of the river Yalu; the
independence of Korea was threatened by Russian encroach
ments. Such, in brief, was the history of the Russian advance in the
Far East. That this progress was thinly laid and artificial
was proved by the rapidity with which Russia was deprived of
her concessions, when she was encountered by a solidly organ
ised nation, for whom the contest was a question of life or death.
The war with Japan interests us only inasmuch as it reflected
the internal state of Russia, and by its consequences for the
revolutionary movement within the Empire; for this reason we
shall not describe its course in detail. As a matter of fact, for
the people at large that war was a purely external event which
did not concern them directly ; the masses were led to slaughter
for the imperialistic aspirations of the incapable Bureaucracy
and for the capitalistic interests of greedy speculators.1 The
1 The attitude of the best part of Russia towards the war was voiced
by Lev Tolstoy, the man who had been through his long life the
pillar of fire in the gloomy reality of his country. In a letter to the

THE FATAL WAR

295

unrelieved defeats of the army, the surrender of Port Arthur,
the disastrous collapse of the Baltic Fleet at Tsushima, the
disorderly flight of the demoralised troops at Mukden — were
calamities due not only to the lack of able commanders and'
strategists, to the lackadaisical management of such nonentities
as the bon vivant, Admiral Alexeiev, Commander of Port
Arthur, or as the " lazy Slav," General Kuropatkin ; not only
to the fact that the Russian soldiers fought, to paraphrase
Thiers' saying, like lions led by asses, forced at times to employ
the bayonet against their own officers who hid behind bushes;
not only to the unprecedented corruption in all branches of the
war-management, from the commissariat to the Red Cross de
partment: those were details. The war was an indictment of
the whole regime; it proved the utter rottenness of the bureau
cratic order; it has doomed the Autocracy. Under no other
form of government could have taken place such criminal over
looking of facts, such misrepresentation of the actual state of
affairs, such absolute ignorance, unpreparedness, and backward
ness, as under the Autocratic regime, where the fate of the
country lay in the hands of one person, hoodwinked by a gang
of corrupted, stupid bureaucrats. As an illustration I shall
London Times, published on June 27, 1904, Tolstoy denounced the
Russian Government for its imperialistic policy, and thus characterised
Nicolas II:
"The Russian Tzar, the same man who exhorted all the nations in
the cause of peace, publicly announces that, notwithstanding all his
efforts to maintain the peace so dear to his heart (efforts which ex
press themselves in the seizing of other people's lands and in the
strengthening of armies for the defence of those stolen lands), he,
owing to the attack of the Japanese, commands that the same should
be done to the Japanese as they had begun doing to the Russians —
namely, that they should be slaughtered; and in announcing this call
to murder he mentions God, asking the divine blessing on the most
dreadful crime in the world. This unfortunate and entangled young
man, recognised as the leader of 130,000,000 of people, continually
deceived and compelled to contradict himself, confidently thanks and
blesses the troops which he calls his own for murder in defence of
lands which he calls his own with still less right."

296 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
quote from a report presented to the Tzar shortly before the
war by Minister of War Kuropatkin upon his return from a
visit to Japan and a " thorough " examination of the Man-
churian situation:
" Japan at the present moment is reorganising her army and
navy, and proceeding very slowly with this task. Japanese
officers, though they have studied at our Academy and in Ger
man military schools, have not mastered the various workings
of European tactics. They are still savage and untrained, and
their army could not very well at present engage in any conflict
with us. It is true that they are ambitious, and that the
annexation of Korea is their earnest desire, but they have no
means of satisfying that ambition. If we want to strike at
their military or naval organisation, we could not select a more
favourable moment than the present one, when everything is
still in a state of chaos, and when Japan, having ceased to be
an Asiatic nation, is nevertheless far from resembling a Euro
pean one. As regards ourselves, we are perfectly ready, and
could in the space of thirteen days have four hundred thousand
men on the lapanese frontier, which is three times as many as
would be needed to repulse the army of our adversary. The
war would be a simple military promenade, and no necessity
could even arise of moving any of our troops from the German
or Austrian frontier, or of diminishing the garrisons in Po
land." The world knows now that every statement in the above
quotation proved to be utterly false. The " military prom
enade " cost Russia four hundred thousand men and nearly
five and a half billion rubles ; 2 by the treaty of Portsmouth |
Russia recognised the preponderating influence of Japan in I
Korea, agreed to the evacuation of Manchuria, and ceded to )
2 These figures are taken from Gregor Alexinsky's Modern Russia;
Major F. B. Maurice of the British General Staff estimates the cost
of the war to Russia as little less than one billion rubles, and two
hundred and twenty thousand men.

MEANING OF THE CONFLICT

297

Japan the Liao-Tung peninsula, including Dalny and Port'
Arthur, seven hundred and forty-five miles of the Chinese
railway, and the southern half of the island Saghalin. Thus
ended the grandiose adventure of Russian bureaucracy in the
Far East.
Mr. Bernard Pares, one of the keenest observers of Russia,
thus sums up the Russo-Japanese conflict:
" It is not every generation that has the privilege of witness
ing with its own eyes one of the most momentous changes in
the history of civilisation ; yet we stand at the crisis of a whole
era. The Russian Government had run away from Europe;
it had plunged itself into the heart of Asia, and its advocates
even maintained that Russia's mission in the East was justified
precisely by the fact that Russia was morally, as geographically,
a semi-Asiatic power. In this flight from the West she found
even her Asiatic outlet blocked; the ambitions which stood in
her way were those not merely of a Government, but of a whole
nation; and this was precisely the one Asiatic nation which
had taken its models of government from the West, and had
proved capable of producing as good results. The triumph
of Japan over Russia was not really a triumph of the yellow
race, but a triumph of the West; and in the struggle the
Russian Government, by the very formula of its reaction, was
deprived of the effective support of the Russian people itself.
Here, at this far corner of Asia, the Russian Government and
the Japanese people fought out the battle between reaction and
progress. The Russian Government was defeated by the West,
which again confronted it in the Far East. It was inevitable
that the triumph of the Japanese people should facilitate the
triumph of the Russian people too. . . ." 3
Synchronously with its crushing defeats on the fields of
Manchuria and in the waters of the Sea of Japan, the Bureau
cracy was being battered at home. Port Arthur, Liao-Yang,
3 Russia and Reform, by Bernard Pares.

298 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Mukden, Tsushima, Portsmouth — served as nails hammered
into the coffin of the anachronic despoty; each catastrophe on
the theatre of war was echoed with a fresh upheaval of the
nation within the Empire. The general indignation could not
be checked even by Plehve, although he continued to exercise his
tyrannical dictatorship, and opposed any form of public initiative,
even such an innocent activity as the zemstvo war-relief organ
isation. The bomb of Sazonov removed the powerful minister
in July, 1904; this was the first heavy blow at the autocracy
at home, and it was followed by more blows which were re
acted to by concessions on the part of the Throne. In Septem
ber, Prince Sviatopolk-Mirsky was appointed Minister of In
terior; he at once appealed to the public for "confidence"; it
was an attempted repetition of Loris-Melikov's " heart-dic
tatorship." The press greeted the new note with enthusiasm,
and by a hint from above the censorship suddenly ceased work
ing: the most radical articles were passed unmolested. New
publications appeared, frankly oppositional, and most of the
old organs assumed a bold tone. The zemstvoists held a con
gress in Petrograd, with the tacit consent of Sviatopolk-Mirsky;
its President, Shipov, endeavoured to restrain the Liberators
from excessive demands, and in the end he was authorised to
present to the Government eleven points of request, which
included civil equality for all races and classes, inviolability
of person and dwelling, freedom of speech, of press, of meetings
and associations, of conscience, of public instruction, amnesty
for political offenders, and finally — an assembly of represen
tatives. On the last point sixty members demanded an assembly
with legislative functions, while thirty-eight advocated a con
sultative body. The " eleven points " became the slogan of all
liberals; they were accepted by many zemstvos and dumas, and
embodied in addresses sent to the Minister of Interior. But
the well intentioned Prince met with the opposition of
Pobiedonostzev and the Grand Dukes, and his policy of " confi-

DEMANDS OF ZEMSTVOS 299
dence " had to come to a halt. Again the press was forbidden
to discuss "harmful" subjects; penalties were inflicted on the
radical publications. The tide of public opinion had risen too
high, however, to be checked by prohibitive ukases. A long
series of public banquets and meetings began; men of various
professions met under the' pretext of discussing their needs, and
adopted the " eleven points," or more radical resolutions. It
appeared obvious that all classes, all ranks and professions,
were of the unanimous opinion that the old order of things
had to go. Even the nobles declared themselves in favour of
reforms; Marshal of the Chernigov Nobility Mukhanov, who
was also President of the zemstvo, telegraphed to the Tzar
the resolution of the Assembly, which was equivalent to- the
" eleven points." The Tzar remarked, on the receipt of the
telegram: "Impertinent and tactless," yet shortly after he
issued an edict, promising vague reforms for the peasants,
zemstvos, workmen, press, courts, etc., to be carried out by the
Ministers, i.e., by the very bureaucrats whom the country had
unanimously condemned. The edict was followed by an official
communication in which the reform-seekers were rebuked, the
zemstvos and the press forbidden to discuss " irrelevant " ques
tions, public meetings declared unlawful. New restrictions
and oppressions were introduced.
On January 9, 1905, a new and formidable factor entered
the liberation movement — the proletariate. The intelligentzia
had been employing such moderate means as speeches and ad
dresses, but the simple workingmen decided to act in a more
direct manner: led by a governmental priest, Georgy Gapon,
the Petrograd workmen marched with ikons and religious songs
to the Winter Palace, with the intention of presenting a peti
tion to the Tzar. The petition was composed in naive terms;
here are some extracts from it:
" Sire, — We, workingmen and inhabitants of St. Peters- .
burg of various classes, our wives and our children and our

300 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
helpless old parents, come to Thee, Sire, to seek for truth and
defence. . . . We have been oppressed; we are not recognised
as human beings ; we are treated as slaves who must suffer their
bitter fate and who must keep silence. . . . We are choked by
despotism and irresponsibility, and we are breathless. . . . The
limit of patience has arrived. . . .
" Sire, here are many thousands of us, and all are human
beings only in appearance. In reality in us, as in all Russian
people, there is not recognised any human right, not even the
right of speaking, thinking, meeting, discussing our needs, tak
ing measures for the improvement of our condition. We have
been enslaved, and enslaved under the auspices of Thy officials,
with their assistance, and with their co-operation. . . . All the
people — workingmen as well as peasants — are handed over
to the discretion of the officials of the Government, who are
thieves of the property of the State, robbers who not only take
no care of the interests of the people, but who trample these
interests under their feet. The Government officials have
brought the country to complete destruction, have involved it in
a detestable war, and have further and further led it to ruin.
We workingmen have no voice in the expenditure of the enor
mous amounts raised from us in taxes. . . .
" Sire, is it in accordance with divine law, by grace of which
Thou reignest? Is it not better to die, better for all of us
toiling people of Russia, and let the capitalist exploiters of
the working class, officials, grafters, and robbers of the Russian
people to live? This is before us, Sire, and this has brought
us before the walls of Thy palace. We are seeking here the
last salvation. Do not refuse assistance to Thy people. . . .
Cast away from them the intolerable oppression of officials.
Destroy the wall between Thyself and Thy people, and let
them rule the country together with Thyself. Art Thou not
placed there for the happiness of Thy people?
". . . Russia is too great. Its necessities are too various

BLOODY SUNDAY 301
and numerous for officials alone to rule it. National repre
sentation is indispensable. . . ."
The petition put forth other " indispensable measures," akin
to the " eleven points," with emphasis on economical problems.
It ended thus:
" Here, Sire, are our principal necessities with which we
come to Thee! . . . Order and take an oath to comply with
these requests, and Thou wilt make Russia happy and famous
and Thou wilt impress Thy name in our hearts and in the
hearts of our posterity to all eternity. If Thou wilt not order
and wilt not answer our prayer — we shall die here on this
Square before Thy palace.
" We have nowhere farther to go and nothing for which to
go. We have only two ways — either towards liberty and
happiness or into the grave. . . . Let our life be a sacrifice for
Russia which has suffered to the extreme limit. We do not
regret this sacrifice. We willingly offer it." 4
The Tzar had left the Capital before the day set for the
demonstration; his uncle, Grand Duke Vladimir, it is generally -
believed, took charge of the city, and ordered the troops to fire
repeatedly at the unarmed workers who were peacefully march
ing towards their " Little Father." The number of dead and
wounded (among them women and children) is roughly esti
mated as one thousand five hundred. That memorable day is
known among the people as the Bloody Sunday, or as Vladi
mir's Day. At least in one respect the unsophisticated petition
was correct : " their lives served as a sacrifice for suffering
Russia." The Government had lost its head; like one who is drown
ing it undertook hazardous and contradictory measures, in the
hope of averting the inevitable — the fall of the autocratic
regime. General Trepov was transported from Moscow,
* From Sviatlovsk/s Rabocheie Dvizheniye <v Rossii. Quoted after
J. Mavor's An Economic History of Russia, pp. 469-473.

302 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
where he had distinguished himself as a ruthless police-master
under the governor-generalship of Grand Duke Sergey, and
appointed Governor-General of Petrograd and at the same
time Assistant to Minister of Interior Bulygin, with dictatorial
power over the Imperial police. Trepov had family traditions ;
it was his father who was shot at by Viera Zasulich in 1877
for having ordered political prisoners flogged. He lacked the
cleverness of Plehve, and acted bluntly, gendarme-like. In his
naive belief in force, he attempted to stop up the crater of the
volcano with knout and sabre; he introduced wholesale oppres
sions, particularly directed against workingmen and liberals.
The workmen replied with continuous strikes and disturb
ances throughout the country, especially in the industrial
regions; martial law was declared in Poland and in the Cau
casus, and over all railways; the universities closed their doors
voluntarily, and the Government resolved against coercing in
struction. On February 4 Kaliaiev assassinated Grand Duke
Sergey, by order of the Socialists-Revolutionists. As a result
of Kaliaiev's bomb came the Tzar's rescript on the name of
Bulygin, which included the following promise :
" I am resolved henceforth, with the help of God, to summon
the worthiest men elected by the people for participation in
the drafting and consideration of legislative measures."
The country, however, could not be pacified by empty
promises. Grave disturbances continued; in the industrial dis
tricts the Social-Democrats organised political strikes and
street-demonstrations. Still more effective and threatening
was the activity of the Socialists-Revolutionists among the
peasantry: whole villages (communes) rose in the provinces
of Kursk, Oriol, Chernigov, Vitebsk, Liublin, Bessarabia,
Podolia, Voronezh, Nizhni-Novgorod, in the Caucasus; in
places the peasants took the law in their own hands, and ap
propriated the landowners' estate; they sent petitions which
included political alongside with purely agrarian points.

DEPUTATION OF ZEMSTVOS 303
The more moderate elements proceeded, in the meantime,
to organise. The zemstvos, dumas, and various professional
unions held meetings and discussed national problems. Pro
fessor Miliukov was very active in organising professional
unions of all varieties — academicians, lawyers, physicians,
clerks, teachers, authors, railway employes, cabmen, janitors,
women, and even of officials and policemen. He finally suc
ceeded in merging them all in a Union of Unions, a powerful
body which might have played an important role in the subse
quent events, had Miliukov been able to control its differing
factions. In March the Russian army was routed at Mukden ; in May
the Baltic fleet was destroyed at Tsushima. The demands of
the public grew bolder. A zemstvo congress was held in Mos
cow, with the participation of Marshals of Nobility and duma
members; it sent a deputation with an address to the Tzar.
The deputation consisted of Prince Sergey Trubezkoy, F. I.
Rodichev, Prince D. I. Shakhovskoy, I. I. Petrunkevich, Count
P. A. Heyden, Prince G. E. Lvov, N. N. Lvov, F. A. Golovin,
Prince P. D. Dolgorukov, N. N. Kovalevsky, U. A. Novosilt-
sev, Baron P. L. Korf, A. N. Nikitin, and M. P. Fiodorov;
most of them had an established reputation as public workers
of liberal tendencies, and many of them could boast of having
suffered administrative penalties and Imperial reprimands for
their "senseless dreams." Prince Trubezkoy, as the spokes
man, described the situation of the country to the Tzar in
plain words; surely this was the first direct and truthful talk
that Nicolas II had heard. In the name of the zemstvo
Trubezkoy asked for the summons of representatives of the
people, equally elected by all classes, and for the abolition of
the bureaucratic wall between the Monarch and the people.
The address concluded with these words : " Do not delay, .
Sire. Great is your responsibility before God and Russia at
this terrible hour of the nation's trial." Similar desires were

304 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
expressed in the name of the cities by the member of the Petro
grad duma, M. F. Fiodorov. The reply of the Tzar is very
characteristic, considering his coarse rebuke of the zemstvoists
in 1896, and all his subsequent policy in regard to public
opinion :
" It has pleased me to hear your speeches. I do not doubt,
Gentlemen, that in your direct appeal to me you have been
guided by the feeling of ardent love for your country. To
gether with you and with all My people I have grieved pro
foundly over the disasters which the war has brought upon
Russia, and which we must further anticipate, and over our
internal disorders.
" Dismiss your doubts. My will — the will of the Tzar —
to summon representatives of the people — is unshakable. . . .
You may tell this to all your neighbours who live on the land
or in towns. I firmly believe that Russia will come out from
the grave trial rejuvenated.
" Let there be established, as of old, union between the Tzar
and all Russia, solidarity between Me and the men-of-the-land
{zemsky men), which shall form the foundation of an order
corresponding to the ancient Russian principles.
" I hope that you will assist me in this work."
- The effect of the Tzar's speech was enormous, but it was
immediately neutralised through the interference of the bureau
crats: the press was forbidden to discuss the matter freely, and
the papers that dared print frank comments were penalised.
"The general unrest continued. The Union of Unions was
getting more radical; it was joined by the Peasant Union
which was largely under the influence of the Socialists-Revolu
tionists. In the same month of June the country was stirred
by the mutiny of the battleship Potiomkin of the Black Sea
fleet; the crew killed all the officers, threw two shells at
Odessa, and sailed away to the shores of Roumania.
August the third a manifesto was issued announcing the es-

AUTOCRACY YIELDING 305
tablishment of a State Duma with consultative powers, of a;
very limited franchise. The tone of the manifesto was some
what ambiguous, except that it reasserted absolutism. Here
are some of its statements:
" The Empire of Russia is formed and strengthened by the
indestructible solidarity of the Tzar with the people and the
people with the Tzar. . . . Autocratic Tzars, Our ancestors,
constantly had that in view, and the time has come to follow
out their good intentions and to summon elected representatives.
. . . While preserving the fundamental law regarding auto
cratic power, We have deemed it well to form a State
Duma. . . ."
The manifesto was received with general dissatisfaction, but
the majority of the nation resolved not to boycott the Duma,
but to send representatives there with the view of founding a
Constituent Assembly. A zemstvo congress met in Moscow,
with the participation of various nationalities, and declared
itself for a programme which was soon after embodied in that
of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets).
The Government granted a semblance of autonomy to the;
universities which were to be managed by Rectors elected by
the professors; their buildings were thrown open for public
meetings. This measure illustrates the bewilderment of the
Government; its contradictory tactics of that moment are
astonishing. While the universities put into practice freedom
of meetings and of speech, the press was tightly gagged. The
country was throbbing in revolutionary convulsions; peasants
continued to appropriate land and to burn landowners' estates, ;
especially in the Baltic provinces where the masses wreaked
vengeance on their hated masters, the German Barons. October
was the month of big, significant strikes which culminated in!
the general strike, from the 7th to the 21st, approximately.!
The Moscow railways struck first; in ten days twenty-six
thousand miles with seven hundred and fifty thousand em-

306 MODERN KUSS1AJN Hits 1 OR Y
ployes of the railroads were involved. They were followed by
street-railways, and by most branches of trade and industry;
telegraph service was suspended, as well as postal. Soon the
Empire presented isolated towns where all activity had stopped,
where there was no light and a scarcity of food ; only the Strike
Committee was in possession of railway engines which they
used for distributing communications and information among
the strikers. It was an elemental passive revolution : the people
refused to perform their every-day functions under the existing
regime; the regime had to go. The Government faced bank
ruptcy and disintegration ; it understood that the nation wanted
definite concessions, and not vague half-measures. As a matter
of fact, the general strike was purely political; the demand
was for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, universal
freedom, and civil liberties. Nicolas II capitulated; he dis
missed the " evil genius " of Russia, Pobiedonostzev, appointed
Witte Premier, and issued the famous manifesto of October 17,
the substantial part of which was as follows:
..." We direct Our Government to carry out Our inflexi
ble will:
1. To grant the people the immutable foundations of civil
liberty, based on real inviolability of person, freedom of con
science, speech, meetings, and associations;
2. Without deferring the elections to the State Duma already
ordered, to call to the participation in the Duma (as far as it
is possible in view of the shortness of the time before assembling
of the Duma) those classes of the population now completely
deprived of electoral rights, leaving the ultimate development
of the principle of electoral right in general to the newly
established legislative order.
3. To establish as an immutable rule that no law can ever
come into force without the approval of the State Duma, and
that the elected of the people were secured a possibility for real

FREEDOM AND MASSACRES 307
participation in supervising the legality of the acts of authori
ties appointed by Us."
The manifesto was received with general rejoicing; although
the Strike Committee found it unsatisfactory, the people at
large recognised the document as a renouncement of autocracy
and the first actual step towards constitutionalism. The
bureaucracy, however, did its utmost to cool off the national
enthusiasm: it perpetrated massacres of Jews and intelligentzia
throughout the Empire on October 18, the day following the
issue of the manifesto. In Odessa alone the massacre continued
four days, leaving about one thousand dead and five thousand
wounded. The slaughter of the " enemies of the Tzar " was
organised by the society of " True Russians," whose loyalty to
the autocracy was fostered and bought by the higher bureau
crats; Trepov directed the massacres by telegrams. A clever
cartoon appeared shortly after in one of the Petrograd satirical
magazines, which excellently summed up the situation: Over
the facsimile of the Tzar's manifesto of October 17 was
stamped the impression of a bloody hand; the inscription ran:
" His Majesty's manifesto was sealed and signed by General
Trepov." During the great October events there was actually no Gov
ernment; the bureaucrats had lost their heads, and their only
activity was demonstrated in such convulsive outbursts as the
massacres. Premier Count 5 Witte had to dismiss Trepov who
made himself particularly odious in Petrograd by his circular
of October 14, in which he ordered the soldiers " not to spare
cartridges" and by the massacres of October 18; his successor,
Durnovo, as Minister of Interior, was hardly any better a
bureaucrat. The Liberals, led by Miliukov, met during the
strike in Moscow, and finally organised themselves into the
5 Sergey Witte, a parvenu, was made count after the disgraceful
Treaty of Portsmouth. The opposition-press called him Count Ports-
mouthsky, or Count Semi-Saghalinsky.

308 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Constitutional-Democratic Party; they were afraid of the revo
lution, and determined to support Witte, if he remained true
to his promises, but the very fact of Durnovo's appointment
eliminated all hopes for the constitutionalism of the Govern
ment. The actual power during the month of October lay in the
hands of the proletariate, particularly of the Petrograd Council/jj!
of Workmen's Deputies, under the able leadership of Khru-
staliov. The Council was composed of delegates from every
factory, elected by the workmen; from the beginning of the
general strike it assumed control of the situation, and by its
tactful management of the turbulent masses, by its dignified
treatment of the difficult tasks which arose in the days of prac
tical anarchy, the Council gained the unreserved loyalty and
confidence of the people, and inspired the bureaucracy with
respect and fear. Count Witte negotiated with Khrustaliov
as if with a dictator; appeals from various classes and organisa
tions, even from remote places, came before the Council; other
cities emulated Petrograd by founding local Councils of Work-
ingmen's Deputies ; there were formed also Councils of Peasants'
Deputies, and even Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. During the
strike the Council forbade the publication of any newspapers,
except the Bulletin of the Council of Petrograd Workingmen's
Deputies which was printed " by force " in various printing
offices. That the workingmen had little confidence in the manifesto
of October 17 is seen from the resolution of the Petrograd
Council, accepted on October 18:
" Pressed in the iron vise of the general political strike of
the Russian proletariate, the Russian autocratic government
has arrived at concessions. It has made an announcement
about liberties, about the legislative power of the future State
Duma, and about the intention to introduce into the Duma
representatives of the working men and of the intelligent layers

WORKMEN DISTRUSTFUL 309
of the people. But the fighting revolutionary proletariate can
not lay down its arms until the time when the political rights
of the Russian people will be established on solid foundations,
until there will be established a democratic republic, the best
means for the further struggle of the proletariate for Socialism."
The resolution further declared the demands of the working-
men, and ended thus: " In order to carry on the struggle for
these demands, the Council finds it necessary to continue the.
general strike until the moment when conditions will indicate
the necessity of a change in tactics." 6 That change came on
the 19th of October, when partial cessations of the strike in
several cities, notably in Moscow, forced the Petrograd Council
to declare the general strike at an end on October 21. In the
announcement about it the Council called for further struggle,
for the organisation of the working class armed " for a final
fight for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly"; "the
proletariate knows what it desires, and knows what it does not
want. It wants neither the police-hooligan Trepov, nor the
' liberal ' broker Witte — neither the jaws of a wolf nor the
tail of a fox. It does not want a nagaika (Cossack whip)
wrapped up in a constitution."
Witte sought in vain the support of the Liberals: he was
generally mistrusted ; it was felt that he was powerless against
the still omnipotent Court-camarilla, and that at best he could
introduce a patched up compromise between autocracy and a
constitution. In the meantime a mutiny broke out among the
sailors in Cronstadt; it had been poorly organised, resulted in
disorderly rioting, and in the arrest of the leaders who were
handed over to a court-martial. Martial law was soon de-
8 For information about the Petrograd Council I have used the
lstoria Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov g. S. Peterburga, a history of
the Council written by its initiators and leaders. In many of my
quotations I have followed, with very few changes, the excellent ver
sion of Professor James Mavor, in his An Economic History of
Russia.

310 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
clared in Poland, in response to the Poles' demand for auton
omy. The Council of Workingmen's Deputies declared a
general strike (November 2), with the demands: " Down with
death sentences 1 Down with field court-martials ! Down with
martial law in Poland ! " To what extent the Government was
terrorised by the proletariate may be seen from the proclamation
of Witte, issued upon the declaration of the second general
strike :
" Brothers-workmen ! Go back to work, cease from sedi
tion, have pity on your wives and children. Do not listen to
evil counsel. The Tzar has commanded us to devote special
attention to the labour question. . . . Give us time and every
thing possible will be done for you. Heed the advice of a man
who is disposed towards you and wishes you well."
Not less characteristic is the reaction of the workmen to
Witte's appeal. One factory upon the discussion of the procla
mation announced its laconic resolution : " Read it and —
struck." The answer of the Council ran as follows: ,
" The Council of Workingmen's Deputies, after listening to
the telegram of Count Witte to his ' brothers-workmen,' ex-
' presses first of all its extreme amazement at the impertinence
of the Tzar's favourite who takes the liberty of calling the
Petrograd workingmen his ' brothers.' The proletarians are
in no way related to Count Witte.
" The Council declares :
" 1. Count Witte calls upon us to pity our wives and chil
dren. The Council requests all workingmen to figure out how
many widows and orphans have been added to their ranks since
the day that Witte was placed at the head of the Government.
" 2. Count Witte is pointing out the benevolent attention
of the Tzar towards the working class. The Council is re
minding the Petrograd proletariate about the Bloody Sunday
of January 9.
" 3. Count Witte asks to be given ' time ' and promises to

FURTHER CONCESSIONS 311
do 'everything possible' for the workingmen. The Council
knows that Witte has already found time for delivering Poland
into the hands of martial executioners, and the Council does
not doubt that Witte will do ' everything possible ' for the
strangulation of the revolutionary proletariate.
" 4. Count Witte calls himself a man disposed towards us
and wishing us well. The Council declares that the working
class is in no need of good will on the part of the Tzar's favour
ites. It demands a popular government, based on universal,
equal, direct, and secret franchise."
The Government yielded more concessions. Finland was
restored in her former liberties, and her Diet was summoned,
for the first time since 1899. The redemption dues of the
peasants were reduced by one-half for 1906, to be entirely
abolished after January, 1907. A partial amnesty was granted
for political prisoners. The press disregarded the censor, and
published the most extremist articles. Agrarian disorders con
tinued in the Centre, in the South, and particularly in the
Baltic Provinces where the Letts rid themselves of the German
Barons and declared a republic. Frequent mutinies in the
army and navy occurred. The troops revolted in Siberia,"
notably at Vladivostok; Lieutenant Schmidt raised the revolu
tionary flag at Sevastopol, and engaged the fleet; military dis
turbances took place at Kiev, Bobruisk, Voronezh, Moscow,
Yekaterinodar, Novorossiysk. The employes of the Postal-
Telegraph Department were on strike, and the service was
crippled for two months.
Yet it was felt that the revolution was losing ground. There
was no longer the spontaneous union of all national elements,
the general solidarity which had reigned in October. At the
zemstvo congress held at Moscow in November a shifting to
the right was noticed; the more moderate element, disturbed
by the revolutionary excesses, particularly by the agrarian dis
orders, formed a separate party, under the name of Octobrists,

312 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
with the view of supporting the Government on the basis of
the manifesto of October 17. Even the Cadets began to lean
to moderation.
Among the proletariate itself there was no longer the former
solidarity of fighting spirit; the general strike as a weapon
became blunt. The November strike, declared by the Petro
grad Council, was a failure; it lacked the three factors indis-j
pensable for the success of such a gigantic undertaking: fresh
powers of the proletariate, unpreparedness of the Government,
and public sympathy (such was the post facto opinion of the
party leaders, e.g., of the Social-Democrat A. Lunacharsky) .
The Council was forced to call off the strike.
This disunion of the oppositional forces encouraged the Gov- ;
ernment to attempt a restoration of the fallen bureaucratic
prestige. It began cautiously, testing the degree of resistance
on the part of the revolutionaries. The arrest of Khrustaliov,
President of the Petrograd Council of Workingmen's Deputies,
was reacted merely by a resolution of protest and election of a
new presidium. The Government gained more courage. The.
committee of the Peasant Union was arrested in Moscow, j
Petrograd was declared under martial law. Draconic laws
were issued against strikers. Public meetings were forbidden.
The Council of Workingmen's Deputies, in conjunction with
the Committee of the Peasant Union, the Committee of the
Social Democratic Party, and the Committee of the Socialists-
Revolutionists, issued a manifesto to the people; here are some
extracts :
" The Government is on the verge of bankruptcy. . . . No
one is sure of the morrow. The Government has wasted all
the State revenues on the army and the fleet. There are no
schools, and the roads are neglected. Troops throughout the
country are disaffected, impoverished, and hungry. The Gov
ernment has robbed the State savings-banks. The capital of
small investors has been played with on the Bourse. The gold-

THIRD GENERAL STRIKE 313
reserve of the State Bank is insignificant compared with the
demands of the State loans and commercial transactions. . . .
" Only after the fall of the autocracy can a Constituent As
sembly put an end to this financial ruin. . . . There is but one
way out of this abyss — the overthrow of the Government, and
the removal of its last weapon. We must take from it the
last source of its existence — its financial revenue.
" The Government is issuing orders against the people as
though Russia were a conquered country. We have decided
not to allow the payment of debts contracted by the Tzar's
Government, since it has openly waged war against the whole
nation. "Therefore we decide:
" To refuse payment of redemption instalments and all other
fiscal payments.
" To demand in all payments of wages and salaries payments
in gold, and for amounts of less than five rubles full weight of
hard coin.
" To withdraw the deposits from the Savings-Banks and
from the State Bank, demanding payment of all amounts in
gold." 7
The revolutionary manifesto of December 2 was printed in
eight Petrograd newspapers; they were all suspended. One
hundred more papers reprinted the manifesto; the Government
refrained from persecution. Over a hundred million rubles
of deposits were withdrawn from the Savings Banks in answer
to the manifesto. On the next day the entire Council was
arrested and imprisoned. The Strike Committee declared a
general strike, the third in less than two months.
It was the final combat between the Revolution and the
Government; either side staked all on the card; neither side
knew the exact forces of the adversary. The trump, the " X,"
7 After Mavor's Econ. Hist, of Russia, and Nevinson's The Dawn
in Russia.

314 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
was — the army. The result of the struggle depended on the
side which the army would take. To the revolutionists and the
Government alike it appeared probable that the mass of the
soldiers, consisting as it did of peasants, workingmen, and op
pressed nationalities, would join their fighting fathers and
brothers; the numerous mutinies, the prevailing unrest, the
declarations of many military-revolutionary organisations, nat
urally strengthened the a priori judgments of the more opti
mistic elements among the proletariate. On the other side, the
Government, in the person of Minister of Interior Durnovo,
considered the moment opportune for risking a decisive battle;
the financial situation of Russia, especially its credit abroad,
required the restoration of order; since the wavering, "fox
tail " policy of Witte had failed in pacifying the country, it
remained to try the " wolf-jaws " method of Durnovo for
crushing the revolution.
The third general strike was a worse failure than the second
one. The working class was tired, exhausted — physically and
morally. Petrograd replied faintly; only a few large factories
struck. In a few places, in Saratov, in the South, in the
Caucasus, in the Baltic Provinces, the revolutionaries responded,
and attempted to overthrow the authorities. But the Govern
ment proved strong in its main citadel: the mass of the army!
proved inert, and by sheer inertia it obeyed the command of
the officers and blindly exterminated the fighters for freedom.
The last flash of the revolution, its grandiose finale where the
romantic and tragic gravely mingled, was the uprising in Mos
cow. The Council of Moscow Workingmen's Deputies de
cided to support the appeal of their Petrograd brothers, and the
men of the First Capital proved more loyal to the cause, or
perhaps more sentimental, than the sophisticated Petrograders.
For thirteen days the Moscow revolutionists engaged the in- :
fantry, cavalry and artillery of the Government, commanded
by Admiral Dubasov. Machine guns were hoisted on the tall

BLOODY REPRESSIONS 315
belfries of the numerous cathedrals to shell the clumsy barri
cades behind which were posted small bands of revolutionists
armed with Brownings or Mausers. Naturally machine guns
and magazine rifles proved the stronger; naturally the method
which was effective in 1789 — the barricades — was doomed
to be a romantic folly in the year 1905. The uprising was
crushed with unnecessary cruelty. Batches of prisoners were
executed without trial; houses and factories were bombarded
and destroyed; the terrorised population was treated like a
conquered enemy. Not satisfied with its military triumph,
the Government sent the Semionovsky Guards as a punitive
expedition into the Moscow region; the ill-famed Colonel
Riman invaded the towns and railway stations along the Mos
cow-Kazan railroad to " punish " all suspects. He had an
order from the higher authorities: "Have no prisoners; act
without mercy." The order was carried out to the letter. An
English observer who visited those unfortunate places shortly
after the passing of the expedition, remarks : " The Guards
distinguished themselves by their zeal and exultation in the
slaughter; but considerable allowance must be made for them,
because they had not been given a chance of slaughtering the
Japanese, and like all brave soldiers they naturally pined for
active service."
Durnovo had won the day. He was made independent of
Count Witte, and freely proceeded with his policy of exter
mination. The Government appeared to be determined not so
much on the restoration of the old regime, as on sheer revenge
for the months of uneasiness; the people were to be punished
for the few months of freedom which they had dared enjoy.
The country was thrown at the mercy of punitive expeditions.
The army, so miserably beaten in Manchuria, showed courage
in cannonading unresisting villages, fusillading unarmed peas
ants and workingmen, and instilling terror in the heart of the
population. The atrocities committed by the soldiers in the

316 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
provinces of Saratov, Tambov, Courland, Georgia, and many
others, remind one of the stories about the Turkish massacres
of Armenians; the tragic difference lies in the fact that the
Russian Bashi-Bazouks fired and flogged and outraged their
own brothers and sisters, their true defenders and friends.
Russia was pacified. A calm as of a graveyard reigned over
the terrorised towns and burned villages. Under such condi
tions the elections for the first Duma drew near.

Ill
THE "CONSTITUTIONAL" REGIME
IN the clamour of the Moscow uprising the country over
looked the issue of an important governmental act con
cerning the Duma elections. On the whole the decree of
December n, 1905, when compared with Bulygin's project
considerably enlarged the franchise. But it was obvious that
the " liberal broker " Witte schemed to assure a " desirable "
body of representatives for the first Russian parliament. The
elections were based on a system of classes or curiae. The Gov
ernment was confident of the loyalty of the peasants; with this
view of securing their good will, the redemption dues as we
have seen were reduced; besides, the belief was strong in the
traditional love of the peasantry for their Little Father-Tzar.
For this reason Witte endeavoured to create a strong peasant
influence in the Duma; the peasants who possessed purchased
land, and were therefore considered to be conservative, had
the privilege of voting both in the peasant-curia and with small
land-owners; peasants participated not only in the election of
their own deputies, but also in that of deputies from towns and
from landowners. The Government, as we shall see, was
severely disappointed in its expectations. The manifesto of
October 17 promised franchise rights for workingmen; but
Witte created a peculiar workingmen-curia, attested by I. I.
Petrunkevich as " the height of perfection from the point of
view of Machiavellism." The workers, unlike other curiae,
could elect not deputies, but electors who were distributed
among electors of towns and districts, and were thus drowned
3i7

318 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
in the majority of non-workers; there was practically no
chance for them to elect a delegate from their own midst.
The decree of December n enlarged the franchise of lodgers,
however, which enabled many workers to vote as lodgers.
The oppression of the press, the suppression of associations
and meetings, were conditions hardly favourable for normal
elections. But the Government of Witte-Durnovo continued
to " modify " the franchise in a definite direction. On Febru
ary 20, 1906, the summons of the State Duma with definite
regulations was issued. The State Council was reorganised
as an upper chamber, of equal rights with the Duma; half
of its members were appointed by the Tzar, and one-half elected
from universities, commercial committees, zemstvos, the clergy,
and the nobility. Thus against the Duma was put up a " cita
del in which the bureaucracy and the upper classes would find
sufficient support not only for a struggle with the national
representatives, but for the annulment of its importance in the
eyes of the people." * The Duma was not allowed to dis
cuss the fundamental laws of the State (including its own con
stitution). Other limitations followed in rapid succession.
Three days before the opening of the Duma a new decree was
issued, defining the fundamental laws in such a way that powers
of the House were rendered almost null. The Tzar was to re
tain the title of autocrat; he reserved the right of unlimited
action in questions of war and peace, of international rela
tions, of expenditures for the army and navy, of contracting
loans in certain cases, of issuing laws during recesses of the
Duma, of proroguing and summoning the Duma, etc. A
number of laws were promulgated on the eve of the opening
of the Duma, further limiting the freedom of the press, of
unions, meetings, imposing severe punishment on strikers and
" rioters," granting more power to the police, and so forth.
1 I. I. Petrunkevich in Pervaia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, a collec
tion of articles by prominent Cadets, members of the first Duma.

THE FIRST DUMA 31g
In spite of all the machinations and stratagems on the part
of the Government, the elections gave an overwhelming ma
jority to the opposition. One should bear in mind that the
Socialist^ and Radical parties boycotted the Duma, which fact
explains "the meagre number of Socialists in the first House.
The Cadets were the best organised party, they numbered the
strongest intellectual forces of the country, professional men —
notably lawyers, and they proved stronger and cleverer than
the bureaucracy, succeeding in carrying through their best
candidates, men of established fame, as Petrunkevich, Rodichev,
Lvov, Muromtzev, Vinaver, and other ex-Liberators. Miliu
kov was eliminated by the Government on the ground of his
being subject to trial for his activity in the Union of Unions;
but he remained the leader of the Constitutional Democratic
Party, and of its parliamentary group. Next to the Cadets in
number and influence was the Labourite Group which con
sisted mostly of peasants, radically inclined, especially in the
land question. The moderate elements were represented by
sixteen Octobrists, led by Count Heyden and Stakhovich —
both of them old fighters against the bureaucracy.
That the concessions of the autocracy were half-hearted was
made clear even to the most optimistic elements, when in place
of the dismissed ministry of Witte-Durnovo a new Cabinet
was appointed by the Tzar from among well-known reaction
aries. On April 24 the old bureaucrat Goremykin, predecessor
of Sipiagin as Minister of Interior, was declared Premier; the
most important portfolio — of the Ministry of Interior — was
entrusted to Piotr Stolypin, who had distinguished himself as an
uncompromising reactionary when governor of Saratov; as the
head of the Ministry of Agriculture, the department that was
to deal with the gravest problem — that of arranging the
agrarian affairs of the country — was appointed Stishinsky, a
large landowner whose hostility to the peasantry had been uni
versally known; the post of Minister of Justice was given to

320 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Shcheglovitov, a quondam Liberal who had sold himself to the
bureaucracy and had degraded Russian justice more than any
of his predecessors; the rest of the Cabinet were bureaucratic
nonentities. At last the historical day of the opening of the first Russian
parliament came, on April 27, 1906. The goal for which
Russia had struggled for a century, had sacrificed her best sons
and daughters, was apparently achieved. Yet there was no re
joicing on April 27 ; the country still presented the appearance
of a military camp ; the echoes of the cannonading had not died
away yet; the groans of the executed, flogged, and maltreated
were still filling the air. To complete the oppressed feeling
of the citizens, Petrograd resembled a besieged city on April
27 : detachments of Cossacks and Guards rode up and down the
streets, the bridges on the Neva adjoining the Winter Palace
were closed, and the square before that Palace swarmed with
troops. The Tzar received the members of the Duma with an
insignificant speech which indicated no policy or programme.
On the way from the Winter Palace to the Tavrichesky
Palace, which had been given over to the people's representa
tives, the members of the Duma had to pass by several prisons;
through the iron bars came shouts: "Amnesty!" The same
word greeted the deputies on their approach to the House;
throngs of people crowded the adjacent streets, and defying the
threatening military patrols, shouted laconically, reservedly,
but persistently : " Amnesty ! " The atmosphere was heavy ;
the sentiment of the crowd was shared by the deputies. After
the necessary formalities of opening the Duma and electing a
presidium, the battered zemstvoist Petrunkevich took the plat
form and voiced the general feelings, by demanding that the
House request amnesty for political prisoners, before under
taking anything else. Indeed, it was grim irony for the repre
sentatives of the people to occupy their comfortable seats, while
those who had fought for those seats and had forced the Gov-

DUMA VS. BUREAUCRACY 321
ernment to yield them to the people — were behind prison bars
and in Siberian tundras. At the moment of the opening of the
" parliament " there were seventy-five thousand political pris
oners !
The Duma worked out an Address to the Tzar, in which the
chief demands of the people were put forth in reserved but
forcible language; it demanded ministerial responsibility, as an
elementary requirement for a constitutional order; abolition
of the State Council; enlargement of the competence of the
Duma; full civil liberties for all classes and races; abolition of
capital punishment; expropriation of State and private land
for the peasants ; amnesty for those who had been imprisoned for
political or religious convictions, or for agrarian disturbances.
The President of the Duma, Professor Muromtzev, was to
present the Address to the Tzar; the deputies hoped that the
unanimity of their demands would produce an effect on the
Monarch. But the Tzar refused to receive the Address; the
President was informed through ordinary bureaucratic chan
nels that he might mail the Address to the Imperial Chancery.
The Address was answered by Premier Goremykin in a
haughty speech which was intended to teach the members of the
Duma manners. He denied the Duma's right to discuss such
questions as ministerial responsibility, the abolition of the
State Council, or the enlargement of the Duma's competence.
He declared the plan for land-appropriation " inadmissible,"
and insisted that the struggle with the disturbing elements was
more necessary than granting civil liberties. It was clear that
the Government was determined to deprive the Duma of any
significant power. As Mr. Pares somewhat cynically remarked,
the Emperor wanted a German parliament, while the Duma
intended to be an English one. The subsequent sessions of the
Duma were but a further development of the conflict between
the people and the bureaucracy. Convinced of their impotence
as far as legislative work was concerned, the deputies were

322 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
forced to limit their activity to criticism of the Government, in
order to open the eyes of the nation to the real state of affairs.
Some one defined that body of representatives as " the Duma of
national wrath." The long suppressed indignation of the suf
fering, robbed, deceived, and down-trodden people found an
outlet at last; for the first time the country and the whole
world were given an opportunity of listening to the tale of na
tional woe and degradation at the hands of an unscrupulous
bureaucracy. Interpellation followed interpellation, the abuses
of the administration were revealed day after day, while the
Ministers employed meaningless phrases in reply.
The first Duma existed seventy-two days. The only bill
-carried through by both Chambers and sanctioned by the Em
peror was the assignment of fifteen million rubles for the relief
of the starving peasants. The final, collision between the Gov
ernment and the Duma came at the gravesl^oirit — the agrarian
question. The Cadets and Labourites worked out anoint pro
ject for the appropriation of land for the peasants, and had in
tended to appeal to the people with an address recounting the
struggle between the representatives and the ministers. The
Court resolved to dissolve, or rather to disperse, the unpleasant
body. Stolypin was appointed Premier in place of the waver
ing Goremykin. On July 8 the Tavrichesky Palace was sur
rounded with troops ; the decree of the dissolution of the Duma
was posted in the streets.
About two hundred deputies immediately met at Viborg, in
Finland, and from there issued a manifesto to the people, signed
by the President and by all the Cadets and Labourites present.
" To the people from the representatives of the people.
" Citizens of all Russia !
" By the ukase of July 8, the State Duma has been dissolved.
" When you elected us as your representatives, you instructed
us to fight for land and freedom. In pursuance of your in-

ihe vlborg Manifesto 323
structions and our duty we drew up laws to secure freedom for
the people, we demanded the removal of irresponsible ministers
who, infringing the law with impunity, have been crushing
liberty. First of all, however, we wanted to construct a law
for the endowment of the toiling peasantry with land, by way
of appropriating for that purpose land belonging to the State,
the Imperial family, monasteries, churches, and to private land
owners. The Government held such a law inadmissible, and
when the Duma once more insistently confirmed its resolution
regarding compulsory appropriation, it was dissolved.
" In place of the present Duma the Government promises to
convene another one in seven months. For seven whole months
Russia must remain without popular representatives, at a time
when the nation is on the verge of ruin, and industry and com
merce are undermined, when the whole country is in the throes
of unrest, and when the Ministry has clearly proved its in
capacity for satisfying the people's needs. Seven whole months
the Government will act according to its own arbitrary will,
and will fight against the popular movement in order to secure
an obedient servile Duma; should it succeed in completely sup
pressing the popular movement, the Government will convene
no Duma at all.
" Citizens ! Stand up firmly for the trampled rights of popu
lar representation and for the State Duma. Not a single day
should Russia remain without popular representation. You
have the means for obtaining it: The Government has no
right, without the consent of the popular representatives, to
collect taxes from the people, or to summon the people for mili
tary service. Therefore, since the Government has dissolved
the State Duma, you have the right to refuse both recruits and
money. Should the Government contract loans in order to
procure funds, such loans, contracted without the assent of the
people's representatives, will not be valid, the Russian people

324 MODERN ttUSSlAiN JrilSlUttY
will never acknowledge them and will not pay them. Until
the convocation of the people's representatives do not give a
copeck for the Treasury, nor a soldier for the army.
" Be firm in your refusal, stand up for your right as one
man. No power can resist the united, inflexible will of the
people. Citizens, in this forced, but inevitable struggle your
representatives will be with you." 2
The deputies who signed the Viborg-manifesto were sentenced
to three months' imprisonment and deprived of electoral rights.
The Labourites and Socialists were not satisfied with the appeal
to passive resistance, and they issued two appeals — one to
peasants and workers, and another to the army and navy —
inviting the people to an armed uprising. With the exception
of a few strikes and a few military uprisings (in Poltava, Svea-
borg, Cronstadt, Revel) the country did not respond to the
call of its representatives.
We may say that with the Viborg-manifesto the first act of
the drama came to an end: the revolution was crushed, for a
time at least. The indifference of the masses on one hand, and
the inert loyalty of the army on the other, indefinitely postponed
the overthrow of the bureaucratic regime. After the dissolu
tion of the first Duma the autocracy resumed its former power,
although it preserved a semblance of parliamentarism in order
to throw dust into the eyes of foreign financiers; the fall of
Russian securities on the European exchanges immediately
after the dissolution of the Duma forced the Government to
allow the elections for the second Duma go on according to the
former electoral law. Stolypin rejected the demand of the
" United Nobility," of the " Union of Russian Men," and other
black organisations for a radical change in the electoral law,
in order to secure a right majority in the House; the Premier
still hoped to obtain desirable deputies through " administrative
tactics." The pliable Senate issued some " interpretations "
2 From Brianchaninov's Rospusk pervoy Dumy.

REACTION RAGING 325
and ' modifications " which disfranchised considerable classes
of the population ; the police were instructed to eliminate unde
sirable candidates, to assist the Right parties in every way and
to close up meetings, whenever the orator seemed to " wander
away from the subject"; the number of deported and exiled
candidates was enormous; the party of the Constitutional-
Democrats was refused legalisation by the Government, its
members prosecuted and forbidden to assemble. The Holy
Synod urged all priests to instruct their flocks in a reactionary
direction. At the same time Stolypin endeavoured to appease the peas
ants by various concessions; many class restrictions were abol
ished, State and communal land was offered for sale, freedom
of leaving the community was granted. The most important
agrarian law since the Emancipation Act was promulgated on"6
November 9, 1906, permitting, and practically encouraging,
any member of the village community to receive into private
property the land under his cultivation. This measure dealt
a death-blow to the ancient Russian institution — the obsh-
china, for years the pride and pet of the Government, of the
Slavophiles, and even of radical thinkers, as Herzen, for in
stance. Stolypin intended to create a contingent of small land
holders, on whose loyalty the Government might depend; be
sides, the experience of the revolutionary years had shown that
the communal system was responsible for the fact that whole
villages acted as one man in agrarian disturbances. The Di
vide et impera method was employed by Stolypin with regard to
all classes of the population.
The Government tried to outdo the Ministry of Witte-
Durnovo in its ruthless suppression of the opposition. Field
Courts-martial with closed doors were introduced for the trial
of offenders, political and ordinary ; executions became an every
day occurrence. Administrative arbitrariness reached its ut
most; death-penalties were inflicted without judicial proceed-

326 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
ings; in that year alone thirty-five thousand peasants were ban
ished by the Administration.
In spite of the Government's efforts to manipulate the elec
tions, the composition of the second Duma was more radical
than that of the first. Professor Miliukov gives comparative
figures of the party grouping in the first two Dumas:
Parties In First Duma In Second Duma
Extreme Right  ? 63
Moderate Right (Octobrists, etc.) 38 (8%) 34 (7%)
Cadets  184 (38%) 117(24%)
Polish "Kolo "3  32 39
Left (Labourites, etc.)  85 (18%) 97(20%)
Socialists  26 ( 5%) 83(17%)
Non-party  112 22 *
The people registered their increasing opposition to the Gov
ernment by electing twelve more Labourites and fifty-seven more
Socialists than in the first Duma; two hundred and thirteen
deputies had been prisoners or exiles or in some other way vic
tims of the Administration. The extreme Left entered the sec
ond Duma with the explicit purpose of using it as a national
platform for revolutionary propaganda. The Cadets, on the
other hand, had changed their tactics. " Not by storm, but by
regular siege. . . . Not hopeless ' demands,' but a systematic
effort to conquer the position occupied by the enemy. . . . No
need to hurry : the conflict will be serious and lasting." 5 To
this day the Cadets have followed that programme. " Spare
the Duma," has become their slogan. Recognising the limita
tions and legislative impotence of the Russian representative
3 The Polish kolo, or Circle, has presented a well-organised group
in the Dumas. Its interests were frankly limited to Polish problems,
in which it demonstrated considerable chauvinism and intolerance
toward other races. In Imperial questions the Kolo has been bar
gaining with the Cadets and Octobrists; in the last two Dumas the
Poles have definitely shifted to the Right.
4 From Vtoraia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, a collection of articles on
the 2nd Duma by Kaminka and Nabokov.
5 P. Miliukov, Vtoraia Duma — articles on the second Duma.

THE SECOND DUMA 327
system, the Cadets nevertheless find the Duma an excellent
medium for the political education of the people, and an impor
tant stage in the development of Constitutionalism in Russia.
They therefore tried to avoid useless conflicts with the Gov
ernment, and determined to do as much practical work as con
ditions would allow; but conditions were such that conflicts
were unavoidable, mainly because the Government desired them.
Stolypin entered the second Duma with the haughty mien of
a conqueror. In reply to the numerous interpellations of the
deputies, especially from the Left, in regard to the intolerable
governmental persecutions and wholesale executions, the
Premier calmly declared his programme : " First pacification,
then reforms." There was no doubt that the Duma was
doomed to dissolution, since it failed to form a yielding ad
junct of the Government. The fact that the Duma existed for
over three months was due largely to the diplomatic skill of the
Cadets who endeavoured to keep the House safe between the
Scylla of revolutionary outbursts on the part of the Left depu
ties, and the Charybdis of provocative onslaughts by the ex
treme Right, whose unscrupulous leaders were openly sup
ported and encouraged by the Government. On June the first,
Stolypin demanded of the Duma that it exclude all its Social- :
Democratic members and hand them over to the Government,
on the pretext that they had been organising a military plot.
The question was then referred to a committee for investiga
tion. Without waiting for the result of the committee's
work, a manifesto was issued on June 3, 1907, dissolving the
Duma, in view of the fact that " its composition was unsatis
factory." The manifesto was accompanied by a change of the
electoral law, which was justified by the following argument:
" Only that power which conceded the first electoral law, the
historic power of the Tzar, possesses the right to abrogate that
law and to replace it by a new law, and as it was God who be
stowed upon us Our power as Autocrat, it is before His altar

328 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
that We shall answer for the destinies of the Russian State."
The coup d'etat of June 3 reduced the number of repre
sentatives from five hundred and twenty-four to four hundred
and forty-two, at the expense of "non-Russian" regions; Po
land lost twenty-three seats out of thirty-seven; the Caucasus,
nineteen; Asiatic Russia, thirty-one; Turkestan was de
prived of representation altogether. Special seats were created
for Russians in places where their number was very small.
Many classes and races were actually disfranchised. The prin
ciple of curiae was further developed and so adapted as to in
sure the preponderance of large landowners as electors. Ac
cording to G. Alexinsky, they constitute more than one-half of
the total number of electors; "in other words," he says, "the
Government has transformed the Duma into the organ of the
landowners and the great capitalists." This crippled electoral
law was further clipped by being handed over to the Minister
of Interior and his subordinates, the governors, for " interpre
tation and elucidation."
The third and fourth Dumas were elected according to this
electoral law. At last the Government could boast of an obe
dient, servile majority among the representatives of the " peo
ple." At first that majority was found in the Octobrist
party, whose leader, Alexander Guchkov, endeavoured to sup
port Stolypin; but the growing reactionism of the Government
and its increasing departure from constitutionalism have alien
ated even the Octobrists, and the Ministry was forced to seek
support among the extreme Right — unadulterated obscurant
ists and chauvinists. How little respect Stolypin had for the
" constitution," even in its " modified " form is seen from the
following incident. The Government brought before the third
Duma a project about the introduction of zemstvos in six
Western provinces on the basis of the Statute of 1890, with im
portant changes, which insured a preponderance of Russian
landowners in those regions, where Russians are in minority.

STOLYPIN'S POLICY 329
The project was approved by the Duma, but rejected by the
State Council, on August 11, 191 1. According to Article III
of the Fundamental Laws, the project was to be considered
invalidated, and withdrawn; but the Government employed a
clever coup: it dissolved both Chambers for three days, and
during that interval promulgated the law. The reopened
Chambers faced an accomplished fact.
The " pacification " of the country continued with such
rigour that citizens recalled with regret the regime of Plehve.
Non-Russians were oppressed more ruthlessly than ever; the
Jews were treated as pariahs, restricted even in those miserable
rights which they had been enjoying before; their educational
and professional opportunities were further restricted, and the
Jew-Baiters in the Duma and in the press were encouraged by
the Authorities in arousing anti-Semitism in the population
by means of senseless accusations of the Jews in committing mur
ders of Christian children for ritual purposes. The celebrated"
Beilis case held the attention of the world for two years; the
process, which ended in the exoneration of Beilis, revealed the
unscrupulous efforts of the ruling spheres to misguide justice
and to popularise the belief in the blood-ritual of the Jews.
Finland was once more deprived of her autonomy ; Stolypin had
the Chambers pass an All-Imperial Law, which brought Fin
land under the common law of the Empire. Alongside with
increased centralisation grew the arbitrariness of local authori
ties, so that every province had an immense number of auto
crats, from the governor to the policeman. The enormous role
of espionage and provocateurs in political affairs was demon
strated in the revelation of the activity of Azev, who had been
for years in the service of the Department of Police, while re
maining an active member and leader of the Socialists-Revolu
tionists; he was responsible for the assassination of Plehve,
Grand Duke Sergey, and many other terroristic acts. Stoly
pin defended Azev before the Duma. On September 1, 191 1,

330 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Peter Stolypin, the Russian Bismarck, as his friends and even
some of his enemies called him, was assassinated by an agent
of the secret police, Bogrov, in the presence of the Imperial
family at a Kiev theatre.
The regime did not change under his successor, Kokovtzev,
who as Minister of Finance had made himself famous by his
declaration from the platform of the Duma: " Thank God,
we have no parliament." Stolypin 's formula: "First paci
fication, then reforms," was still in force as far as its first half
was concerned. In 1913 the fourth Duma passed a resolution,
stating that " the Ministry of Interior, retaining even after the
restoration of peace, the conditions of exceptional regulations,
arouses general dissatisfaction in the population and quite just
feelings of indignation at the uncalled for repressions. . . .
The Duma insists upon the earliest promulgation of broad re
forms." From 1906 to the end of 19 13 there took place three thou
sand two hundred and eighty-two executions by trial ; one should
bear in mind that the Russian civil code admits no capital
punishment, so that during the " constitutional " period military
courts were called upon to mete out justice for the conquered
people. Equally vigorous was the war of the Government
against the press. During the days of freedom preliminary
censorship was abolished, but the Administration retained the
right to penalise publications. It is impossible to calculate the
exact amount of money-penalties imposed on newspaper pub
lishers during the " constitutional " years; here are approximate,
considerably diminished, figures:

Years

Number of penalties

Amount in rubles

1906

16

15-525

1907

148

65.000

1908

120

82.200

1909

182
87-375
1910
243
60.150
1911
26S
73-450
UNIVERSITIES RAVAGED 331
Years Number of penalties Amount in rubles
!9J2 3'7 96.800
J9i3 340 129.000

Total 1,634 610.275 6
The condition of the universities was as deplorable as other
aspects of Russian life during the period of Restoration. The
school autonomy won in the fall of 1905 was nullified in a
series of "modifications." In 1910 Minister of Education
Schwarz brought a project before the Duma, by which he in
tended to restore the power of the Statute of 1884. His suc
cessor, Kasso, withdrew the project, but did not change the
policy which was actually a reintroduction of Dmitri Tolstoy's
system. The death of Lev Tolstoy in the fall of 1910 aroused
student disturbances throughout the country, owing to the Gov
ernment's prohibition of public demonstrations of mourning.
In January, 191 1, the Ministry of Education issued provoking
circulars, forbidding any assemblies of students within the uni
versities, and introducing severe punishments for disorders.
The events of the late Nineties were repeated: the students
struck. We should remember that, as Professor Vernadsky
remarked, there had been no normal academic life in Russia
since 1896. The University Councils tried to dissuade the
students from the demoralising step, but the police rudely in
tervened and pushed the Rectors and professors aside. The
prejsure of the police forced the Rector of the University of
Moscow, Manuylov, to resign; his action was followed by
more than a hundred professors and assistants, among them such
prominent lights as Prince Yevgeniy Trubetzkoy, Vernadsky,
Shershenevich, Vinogradov, Kizevetter, and others. The old
est Russian university was thus outraged. Similar events took
place in other places, notably in the Kiev Politechnicum. The
Government of Stolypin appointed " desirable " deans and pro-
6 Yezhegodnik gazety Riech, 1012-1014.. Yearbook issued by the
Petrograd daily Riech.

332 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
fessors, and public instruction was once more forced by the
boot of the policeman into " politically safe " ruts. The same
policy, needless to say, was carried on in secondary and primary
schools. The demoralisation of the public during Stolypin 's regime)
was shown in the increased neurasthenia among intellectuals, in
excessive sexuality and mysticism both in art and in life, and in ;
the rate of suicides. Between 1905 and 1909 there were more '
than forty-five thousand suicides in Russia. In Petrograd there
were 427 suicides in 1904, 354 in 1905 (which decrease shows
the mood of the people during the year of general upheaval) ;
in 1906 — 532; in 1907 — 716; in 1908 — 1,408; in 1909 —
1,438. In Odessa there were 256 suicides in 1905 and 642
in 1908; in Moscow — 74 in 1906 and 614 in 1908. Most
of the suicides were young; of one thousand cases in Moscow
during 1908 and 1909 there were —
45 of the age between 8 and 14
381 of the age between 15 and 20
179 of the age between 21 and 25
134 of the age between 26 and 30
117 of the age between 31 and 40
73 of the age between 41 and 50
A typical motive of suicide is found in a letter of a twenty-
year-old student in Odessa:
" To live as I would, is impossible now, and live as it is pos
sible I cannot. ... I cannot witness atrocities and suffering,
cannot bear the complaints and the sobs of the oppressed, and at
the same time feel my impotence to solace, however little, this
horror that is life. And I am going out of life, for there is
nothing to live for." 7
Despair and disparagement were natural consequences of
the drama that took place in the first decade of the twentieth
century. The national calamities, the national upheaval, the
7 Quoted by Alexinsky in his Modern Russia, from a report read at
the Congress of Russian Physicians early in 1910.

PROFANATION OF IDEAL 333
brief triumph of the people in the autumn of 1905, the bloody
bacchanale of the reaction under Durnovo and Stolypin, had
probably not so grave an effect on the minds as the profanation
of the ideal of popular representation. The blood that has
been shed for a Constitution since the Decembrists was re
warded with a distorted form of parliamentarism, with a servile
Duma which, instead of representing the will of the people,
formed a convenient tool in the hands of the bureaucracy. In
1906 I. I. Petrunkevich wrote: "Popular representation in
Russia can exist only when there will be a ministry responsible
before the Duma, for its present struggle with the ministry
cannot bring to any practical compromise. The ultimate re
sult of this struggle will be either a coup d'etat, the withdrawal
of the constitutional charter of October 17 and the abolition of
popular representation, or the complete victory of the latter
and the establishment of a responsible and parliamentary minis
try." 8 One year later the party of Mr. Petrunkevich, the
Cadets, put forth the slogan: " Spare the Duma"; its capable
leader, Paul Miliukov, advocated moderate, " siege "-tactics.
Five years later Mr. Miliukov, already an experienced member
of the Duma, wrote: " The five years of the third Duma have
sufficiently clarified the situation. In order to acquire one
single right — to exist, the Duma had to become one of the
wheels in the bureaucratic machine." 9
Let us turn to the few gratifying phenomena in Russian life
under the regime described. Among the useful measures un
dertaken by the Government in conjunction with the Duma
was the increased budget of the Ministry of Education. In
1913 it reached 142,738,000 rubles, of which twenty-seven
million rubles were assigned for secondary schools. The third
Duma assigned for primary education over eight million rubles
in addition to the budget-assignment of 1908, eight million in
8 Pervaia Gosudarstvennaia Duma, p. 104.
9 Yezhegodnik gazety Riech, 1912, p. 94-

334 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
addition to the budget of 1909, and ten million to that of 1910.
In spite of the Government's policy to suppress higher educa
tion, many private high-educational institutions sprang up;
Professor Vernadsky places the number of such institutions
at one hundred in 1913, not counting universities and Popular
Courses, and the number of students — at one hundred and
fifty thousand.
The 'Government has continued to put through the Dumas
agrarian legislation of the nature outlined by the late Stolypin.
The disruption of the "commune" has rapidly progressed;
the peasants have been eager to become independent land
holders, no matter how small their portion might be. An im
provement in the cultivation has been generally observed,
ascribed to the change of tenure. State lands were placed onj
sale, a systematic distribution of the peasants has been under-:
taken in order to avoid congestion in certain regions, impor
tant improvements have been introduced in peasant-migration.
Of the other measures carried through by the Dumas deserve
notice the reform of local courts, which withdrew the judicial
power from Zemsky chiefs," and restored it to courts of Peace,
and the increase of the army budget. The Octobrist leader
Alexander Guchkov fearlessly attacked the criminal negligence
of the bureaucracy in matters of national defence, and cited a
long list of Grand Dukes, nominal heads of military and navy
departments, who should be dismissed. Although the Govern
ment disregarded public opinion, it undertook the reorganisa
tion of the army and navy on a gigantic scale. The expecta
tion of the Duma that some of its members would be invited
to co-operate on the Committee of National Defence was not
fulfilled : the great reform, which was to restore the prestige so
disgracefully lost in Manchuria and at Tsushima, was entrusted
to the same bureaucracy that was guilty in the recent disasters.
On the whole the economic conditions of Russia had greatly
improved by the year 1914. In spite of the national calamities

CO-OPERATION MOVEMENT 335
and disruption of ordinary life, agriculture and industry showed
astonishing signs of progress. There appeared a considerable!
class of large manufacturers, conscious of their power, andj
therefore defiant in regard to the disappearing nobility and to;
the bureaucracy; in recent years they have expressed themselves
against the present order of government, which arrests the de
velopment of the country.
An interesting feature in the social life of the masses is the
growth of co-operative societies. From four thousand four
hundred and seventy-nine in 1905, their number has increased
to nineteen thousand two hundred and fifty- three in 191 1, to
nearly thirty thousand in 1913, and to thirty-seven thousand in
1916. "Co-operatives" are formed in villages and in towns,
fofmutual loans, for joint acquisition of agricultural implex
ments, cattle, etc., for production of oil, of dairy products, for
the maintenance of a common store selling to members all
necessaries at cost price, and for similar purposes. One can-j
not overestimate the importance of the co-operative movement :
it is the most powerful and effective organiser of the masses.1.
Every " Co-operative " becomes the centre of local life ; usually
it opens its own House, where the members gather for discus
sions, lectures, readings. " Co-operatives " of a district try
to form a union; this tendency to accumulate strength through
unification of single nuclei has met with the opposition of the
Government which, not without reason, sees in the Co-operative
movement a prototype of the Union of Unions. Still frequent
congresses of Co-operatives are held at various places. In 19 13
the second All-Russian Congress of Co-operatives took place,
and one thousand three hundred delegates attended.
The movement of trade-unions among workingmen has been
greatly hampered by the Government. Every form of labour
organisation has been looked on with suspicion ; the labour press
has suffered more than any other publications from admin
istrative arbitrariness. Under such conditions it is natural

336 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
that the proletariate continued to express its demands in the
form of strikes, economical and political. During 1913 and
the first half of 1914 the number of strikes increased menac
ingly. During the visit of President Poincare in Petrograd, in
July, 1 91 4, the workingmen were in the midst of a severe strike;
their demands were political as well as economic. The grave
situation was relieved by the declaration of war, when the
drummed up patriotism had drowned all individual and class-
motives.

IV
RUSSIA IN ARMS
BY the summer of 1914 Russia was permeated with dis
content, somewhat akin to the state of minds in 1904.
The Government was hopelessly discredited in the
clumsily manipulated Beilis trial; its failure to gain the confi
dence of the people, and its continuation of the policy of re
pression irritated even the moderate elements. Various public
bodies expressed resolutions condemning the Government for
its narrow-sighted policy. Twenty-five leading Petrograd bar
risters were tried and sentenced to prison for a resolution pro
testing against the official accusation of Jews of cannibalism.
At a banquet arranged in honour of the convicted, Bobrishchev-
Pushkin, an Octobrist leader, voiced the public sentiment,
when he said :
"Again we are in 1904. I see once more together Cadets,
Octobrists, Social-Democrats. The Government has once
more succeeded in uniting the entire Russian public, and in
bringing back the mood of 1904. The moderates are the last
to join you in your fight. Blessed be, however, even those who
come at the eleventh hour — they too, deserve full reward. . . .
When the ship is careening, all passengers must be of one mind.
You must not reject the moderates, because the eleventh hour
has come. Soon there will strike the midnight of the last dark
day." We have already seen that representatives of big industries
openly opposed the archaic order of things. Among the mem
bers of the Duma gloomy pessimism prevailed. V. A. Makla-
337

338 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
kov, a moderate Cadet, said to an interviewer : " Should I be
asked, what my wishes for the Duma art, my answer would be:
To perish with honour . . . rather than drag on a fruitless ex
istence." Konovalov, vice-president of the Duma, stated that
there was " no hope for the improvement of the Government's
policy; the conflict will grow and deepen." Similar opinions
were expressed by prominent Octobrist members like Baron
Meiendorff, Shidlovsky, Count Kapnist.
A new phenomenon appeared in the year 1914 — a "Right
opposition." The conservative elements, the " United No
bility," for example, expressed great dissatisfaction with the
Government, with the crimes and blunders of the " petrified
bureaucracy." The nobility of Chernigov published a declara
tion about the " abnormalities of Russian life," the " reign of
arbitrariness in spite of the numerous ukases and manifestoes
promising the maintenance of lawfulness in the country."
As in 1904 and 1905, so in 19 14, while the liberal and mod-;
erate elements attacked the regime with verbal denunciations,!
the proletariate protested actively, sacrificing its blood, free
dom, and welfare. During the visit of President Poincare,
Petrograd saw barricades erected in various parts of the Capi
tal, the tramways and some railways inactive, great public
demonstrations and meetings held in the streets, collisions with
the Cossacks and police, which resulted in many killed and
wounded. Moscow, Riga, Nikolaiev, and other cities responded.
A revolution seemed " inevitable " (opinion of Alexander Guch
kov, former President of the Duma) .
Within a few days the situation was absolutely transformed.
The end of July saw the sudden deviation of Russian public
opinion from questions of internal policies to one grave prob
lem — the defence of the country from foreign aggressors. On
July 20 (August 2) the Tzar issued a manifesto declaring war,
which deserves reproduction as a tactful appeal to the national
sentiments :

WAR MANIFESTO 339
" We, Nicolas II, by grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of
all the Russias, Tzar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, etc.,
etc. " Declare to all Our loyal subjects :
" In pursuance of her historic traditions, Russia, sister in
blood and creed of the Slav nations, has never remained indif
ferent to their fate. The brotherly feelings of the Russian
people for the Slavs have reawakened with unanimous impulse
and peculiar force these last few days, when Austria-Hungary
presented to Serbia demands which were manifestly such as a
sovereign state could not accept.
" Disdainful of the conciliatory and pacific reply of the
Serbian Government and refusing the benevolent mediation of
Russia, Austria hastened to resort to an armed attack which she
opened by the bombardment of the defenceless city of Belgrad.
" Forced by these new conditions to take necessary measures
of precaution, we gave the order that the Army and Navy should
be placed on a war footing; yet, in Our care for the blood and
wealth of Our subjects, We strained all Our efforts to bring
about a peaceful solution of the negotiations then in process.
" In the midst of these friendly relations Austria's ally,
Germany, in spite of Our hopes that we should always remain
good neighbours, and shutting her ears to Our assurances that
the measures taken had no hostile intentions towards her — de
manded the revocation of those measures, and upon Our refusal,
suddenly declared war against Russia.
" It is now no longer a question of taking the part of a sister
nation unjustly wronged, but of defending the honour, dignity,
and integrity of Russia, and her position among the Great
Powers. We firmly believe that Our faithful subjects, inspired
with self-abnegation, will rise all as one man for the defence of
the Russian soil.
" In the dreadful hour of trial, let intestine dissensions be\
forgotten, in order that the union of the Tzar with His people !

340 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
may be yet more firmly consolidated, and that Russia, rising
as a single man, may repulse the insolent attack of the en
emy. " With a profound faith in the righteousness of Our cause
and humble confidence in Almighty Providence, We invoke in
Our prayers the Divine benediction upon Holy Russ and Our
valiant troops."
On the same day an ukase was issued for the convocation of
the State Council and the State Duma. " In the midst of the
heavy trials sent upon our country, we wish to be in perfect
union with our people," said the ukase. The country greeted
enthusiastically the unexpected constitutionalism of the Auto
crat. True, at the opening of the extraordinary session of the
Duma, Premier Goremykin (he had supplanted Kokovtzev not
long before) explained that one of the reasons for the convoca
tion of the Legislative Chambers was the desire of the Govern
ment to have measures for meeting war expenditures passed by
the Assemblies.
The Duma presented an unprecedented solidarity of thought
and action during the discussion of the situation. Only the
Labourites and the Social-Democrats dissented, true to their
party-traditions, and left the House when the declaration of the
Duma was put to vote. Deputy Kerensky made a statement in
the name of the Labour Group, in which patriotism was
mingled with opposition to the Government. " Remember," he
said, " that Russian citizens have no enemies among the work
ing classes of the belligerents! Protect your country to the
end against aggression by the states whose governments are
hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this
terrible war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom,
equality, and brotherhood been directing the activities of those
who control the destinies of Russia and other lands. . . . Peas
ants and workers, all who desire the happiness and well-being
of Russia in these days of trial, harden your spirit! Gather

ALL FOR WAR! 34i
all your strength, and, having defended your land, free it." x
In the name of the Constitutional-Democrats Paul Miliukov
declared that all other questions must be put aside before the
great task of defending Russia. " Our cause is a just cause.
We are struggling to liberate our country from a foreign in
vasion, to liberate Europe and the Slav world from the Ger
manic Hegemony, to liberate the entire world from the intoler
able yoke of armaments which never fail to increase, ruining
peaceful workers and perpetually provoking fresh armed con
flicts. In this struggle we are all one ... we throw into the
balance of conflict our firm will to vanquish the aggressor." 2
The Duma voted a resolution of confidence in the Govern
ment, " convinced that it had exhausted every means of main
taining peace compatible with the prestige of Russia as a Great
Power," and expressed its conviction that the people would rise
united to the appeal of the Sovereign for the defence of the
country. The nation responded with unprecedented unanimity ;
all parties, all classes, all races aligned themselves enthusiasti
cally under the banner: "All for the war." The Poles, the
Jews, the Little-Russians, the Armenians, the peasants, the
workingmen, the intelligentzia, put aside their grievances and
differences, and declared themselves ready to sacrifice their
blood and wealth for the defence of the country. With the
exception of a small number of irreconcilable revolutionists who
see in the defeat of Russia, the downfall of the autocracy, and in
her victory the triumph of despotism, the majority of Russian
Socialists have declared their support of the anti-German coali
tion. Such veterans of the revolutionary movement, as Prince
Piotr Kropotkin, Georg Plekhanov, Lev Deich, Axelrod, Alex-
insky, and others, have been urging their comrades to defer in
ternal issues till after the war. Plekhanov, father of Social-
1 From W. E. Walling's The Socialists and the War, pp. 192-193.
2 From G. Alexinsky's Russia and the Great War, pp. 148-149.

342 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
Democracy in Russia, says in one of his appeals : " Now the
Socialists of all countries must support every measure which
may somewhat check the success of German Imperialism, that
bestia triomfante, which presents a terrible menace to Inter
national Socialism."
There is an enormous difference between the attitude of the
Russian people towards the war with Japan and its attitude to
wards the present war. In the first case the masses had to be
driven like unwilling cattle, public opinion was opposed to the
campaign, the Government was utterly isolated. In 1914, the
declaration of war was greeted by the whole nation; not since
1 81 2, when the invasion of Napoleon united all classes in an
effort to repulse the enemy, has there been such a popular war
in Russia, as the present. What are the reasons of the sudden
transformation of the Russian sentiments?
The great problems that are being solved at present on the
blood-soaked battlefields of Europe have not yet crystallised
sufficiently to warrant impartial historical treatment. I shall
therefore not enter into a discussion of the causes of the war,
but shall merely indicate the prevailing attitude of the Russian
intelligentzia towards the great conflict, and this attitude may
be thus epitomised: "Germany is the bitterest enemy of
Russia." Germany has been held responsible for the fiasco of
Russian diplomacy at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878; the war
with Japan has been ascribed to the personal influence of Kaiser
Wilhelm who egged on the Tzar in his aggressive policy in the
Far East, in order that the Teutons might have a free hand in
the Near East; Germany made use of Russia's weakness after
the war with Japan to force upon her a commercial treaty, in
which Russian interests were so abused that the Government
forbade the subject to be discussed in the press, and one publicist
compared the treaty to a war indemnity; when in 1908 Austria
annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, in abrogation of the Treaty
of Berlin, and in violation of the historical interests of Serbia,

CLASH INEVITABLE 343
Wilhelm's threat to appear " in shining armour " in support of
his ally compelled the Russian Foreign Office to acquiesce in
the perpetration of the injustice ; finally, during the Balkan wars
Germany and Austria did their utmost to thwart Russia's en
deavours for a strong' alliance of the small states, by sowing dis
cord among the allies and by depriving Serbia of an outlet to
the Adriatic.
Since the conclusion of the war with Japan Russia had been
feverishly reorganising her army and navy, in response to
Germany's gigantic increase of military expenditures. The
third and fourth Dumas eagerly supported the Government's
efforts to improve the army and navy, although the representa
tives of the House were refused participation in the work of
reorganisation. The clash with Germany seemed inevitable,
and the only question was whether Germany would give
Russia and France time to get ready. Both Russia and
France heartily welcomed, in the meantime, the change in
England's traditional policy of " splendid isolation." Great
Britain and Russia came to an understanding concerning Persia,
Afghanistan, and Tibet ; the unofficial Triple Entente was grow
ing in pace with the increase of Teutonic influence in the Near
East, for the Pan-Germanistic dream about a straight diagonal
line — Berlin-Bagdad,3 threatened the welfare of all the three
nations concerned. For Russia in particular, a Germanised Con
stantinople would mean the end of her ambitions. Since Peter
the Great an outlet into an ice-free sea has been the historical
need of the Empire ; Arkhangelsk in the North is frozen most of
the year ; Vladivostok is ice-bound three months, and is too re
mote, especially since Russian interests in the Far East received
a serious check ; the Baltic Sea is closed half a year, and is, be
sides, at the mercy of Germany; the Black Sea is of unstable
use as long as the " key " is in the hands of Turkey, or, for
3 In the Eighties Bismarck spoke of the Balkan affairs as " not worth
the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier."

344 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
that matter, of any Power which may block the outlet into the
Mediterranean. Whenever Turkey was at war, Russian Southern trade suf
fered considerably. From the following data one may see the
importance of the Straits of Dardanelles for Russian exports;
the Turco-Italian and Balkan wars caused the fall in the ex
port of 1912. Value of the Value of the export
total export from that passed through the
Years Russia. Straits.
[in millions of rubles)
1903 1001 410
1904 1006 410
1905 1007 406
1906 1094 378
1907 1053 386
1908 998 345
1909 1427 565
1910 1449 565
1911 1591 568
1912 1518 433 4
From the above data it may be seen that in the last decade
an average of about thirty-seven per cent, of the total Russian
exports passed through the Straits ; but one should observe that
the Dardanelles has a special importance for the export of the
principal article of Russian foreign trade — cereals. More
than ninety per cent, of the total export of wheat passed
through the Straits, eighty-five per cent, of the barley export,
ninety-five per cent, of the total export of manganese ore,
eighty per cent, of the export of naphtha products, fifty-five
per cent, of the export of iron ore, forty-five per cent, of the
export of methylated spirits, etc.5
The grievances of the Russian people against Germany have
4 Data furnished by A. Raphalovich of the Ministry for Commerce
and Industry. Quoted by Professor J. Y. Simpson of Edinburgh in his
Self-Discovery of Russia.
B Ibidem, pp. 202-203.

HATRED FOR GERMANS 345
been not only of an economic and political nature. In the
minds of the intelligentzia and of the oppressed masses the
name of Germany, but particularly of Prussia, has been asso
ciated with the crimes of Russian bureaucracy. Since the mid
dle of the eighteenth century — in fact, since Peter the Great —
German influence has been preponderant in various fields of
Russian life: at the Court, in the army and navy, among the
higher bureaucrats, in commerce; German colonists have oc
cupied some of the best land in the West and in the South.
Any Russian schoolboy will give you a list of Russian tyrants
and oppressors with such names as Biihren, Pahlen, Bencken-
dorff, Berg, Plehve, Minn, Riman, Kaulbars, or of such dis
tinguished nonentities of the army and navy as Stakelberg,
Stark, Stossel, Rennenkampf, Grippenberg. The offer of
Wilhelm II to lend his troops for the suppression of the Revo
lution was a widely spread rumour in Russia in 1905 and
1906; the reactionaries have always praised Prussian ways,
and their organs have urged the Government to get closer
to Germany and to break away from Jacobine France and
treacherous England. A member of the Extreme Right in
the Duma, during the discussion of a liberal project introduced
by the Cadets, turned to the Left, and said threateningly:
" If you accept this project, Wilhelm will come and teach you
a lesson with his armed fist! " s
In a word, the war with Germany is in the eyes of the
6 As an upholder of the principle of " Divine rights " of kings, and
an enemy of revolutions, Wilhelm pleaded with Nicolas not to defend
Serbia. In his telegram to the Tzar, dated July 28, 10.45 P- m-» the
Kaiser said:
"Doubtless You will agree with me that both of us, You as well
as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that
all those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall suffer
their deserved punishment." The White Book, Exhibit 20.
The whole Serbian nation was to be held responsible and severely
punished for the murder of one prince, according to Wilhelm II.

346 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
majority of the people associated, rightly or wrongly, with
the struggle against everything pernicious in Russia, against
bureaucracy, militarism, and despotism. This explains the
wonderful unity of all ranks and classes, of the intelligentzia
and the masses, of the conservatives, liberals, and revolutionists,
of the landowners, manufacturers, peasants, and workingmen
— in the common purpose of defeating " Wilhelmism," to
use the expression of an old revolutionary. The alliance with
France and England is another encouraging asset for the lib
eral minded Russians. Says Leonid Andreiev, the foremost
contemporary Russian writer: " If the German be our enemy,
then this war is necessary; if the Englishman and the French
man be our friends and allies, then this war is good, and its
purpose is good."
As these lines are written the war is still raging, embroiling
more and more nations. It would be inadvisable to predict
results or consequences of the conflict, but it is possible to
venture an estimate of the effect which the war has already
had on the internal life of Russia. One may say without
exaggeration that it has had a salutary, rejuvenating, regener
ating effect on the Russian people; the terrible trial, which
the country is going through, has awakened, electrified, and
stirred up the entire nation, even its most phlegmatic ele
ments. The energy of the public, choked and suppressed for
years, has burst forth, and swept aside restrictions and bu
reaucratic barriers. The Government was forced to sanction
the wonderful activity of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos
and the All-Russian Union of Towns, in the care of sick and
wounded, in the charge of refugees, in the provision of sup
plies for the army, and in the production of munitions. The
' vigorous demand of the people inspired the Government to
carry out the greatest measure since the emancipation of the
serfs — the prohibition of vodka.
On July 17 and 18, 1914, the sale of liquor was forbidden,

VODKA PROHIBITION 347
in view of the mobilisation, as a temporary measure. But
the people made use of the occasion, and demanded the pro
hibition of the sale of alcohol for the whole duration of the
war, and if possible, forever. On August 22 an ukase for
bade the sale of liquor " till the end of the war," and six
days later the Tzar telegraphed to the president of a Tem
perance Union that he had decided to suppress the sale of
vodka by the State forever. The consequences of this measure
can hardly be estimated; with the loss of an enormous revenue
(six hundred and fifty million rubles annually), the State
has acquired millions of better humanity, stronger physically
and morally. Since the promulgation of the law sufficient
time has elapsed for obtaining eloquent figures showing the
results of the prohibition.. Without quoting tiresome statistics,
furnished by official and private investigators, by city mayors,
chiefs of police, factory owners, hospital heads, prison gov
ernors, and so forth, we may state on the basis of those figures
that the number of crimes has greatly diminished, the rate
of suicides has fallen, also the rate of fires, of railway acci
dents, of absences on the part of employes, of penalties in
factories. Among the positive effects of the temperance meas
ure we should note the considerable increase in the intensity
and productivity of labour, and the astonishing amount of de
posits in Savings Banks. The official figures show the pro
gressive increase of deposits in the State Savings Banks in
1 9 14 (in millions of rubles) : for August an increase of ten
and one-tenth, September twenty-five and eight-tenths, Octo
ber twenty-one and seven-tenths, November twenty-four and
eight-tenths, December thirty-five and two-tenths. The offi
cial report for September, 191 6, states the deposits for the
year 1915 as five hundred and ten millions, and those for the
first six months in 1916 as six hundred million two hundred
thousand rubles; before the war the average yearly deposits
/ / amounted to fifty-five million.

348 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
But if the people have shown signs of vigour and activity
since the war, the old bureaucracy has demonstrated its in
ability to learn anything or to change its corruptness and
Inefficiency, and its narrow chauvinism. The early promises
of concessions for the Poles, Armenians, and Jews, were fol
lowed by an ukase almost wholly abolishing the liberties of
Finland, by inhuman atrocities against the Jews, and by tact
less restrictions against the Ruthenians or Ukrainians in con
quered Galicia. The press was muzzled more effectively than
in the darkest days of Nicolas I. But the greatest crime of
the bureaucracy loomed up before the end of the first year of
war, when the victorious Russian army was forced to retreat
from Galicia, all the way from Cracow to Dvinsk, for the
simple reason that they had no munitions. It appeared that
Minister of War Sukhomlinov had misstated the degree of
the army's equipment, and had exaggerated the amount of
available munitions. Mikhail Stakhovich, member of the
State Council and President of the Zemstvo Union, gave a
horrifying description of the plight which the brave soldiers
had to suffer on account of the criminal falsifications of the
higher bureaucracy. He called the six hundred versts of re
treat a via dolorosa, a duel between cannon and bayonets.
The general indignation was the more intolerable since the
public had no outlet : the press was gagged, and the Duma had
not been convened for nearly a year. The Government finally
yielded to the popular demand, and convened the Duma for
July 19, 1915.
The first sessions of the Duma made one recall the "Duma
of National Wrath " ; again representatives of various parts
of the country, of various classes and nationalities, delivered
tales of woe and suffering, of incredible abuses and oppres
sions; again the ministerial policy was condemned for its lack
of confidence in the people, for its misrepresentations and un
preparedness. The Duma accepted the resolution offered by

PUBLIC DEMANDS 349
Count Bobrinsky, a member of the Right, which said in parts:
". . . Recognising that the surest way to victory is the will
ing assistance of the whole population for the creation of fresh
means of continuing the struggle, which demands the strength
of internal peace and the forgetting of old political quarrels,
as well as the benevolent attention of the authorities to the
interests of all loyal citizens of Russia, without distinction of
race, language or religion ; believing that rapid victory can only
be attained by the close union with the whole country of a
Government enjoying its entire confidence; expressing the un
shakable faith that the shortcomings which have hitherto ex
isted in the provision of munitions for the Army will be im
mediately removed with the assistance of the Legislative Cham
bers and the great force of public opinion, and that those
responsible for criminal omissions should pay the penalty, no
matter what their position, the Duma . . ." 7
The Government seemed for a time to give ear to public
demands. General Sukhomlinov was dismissed and subjected
to trial. His successor, General Polivanov, consented to the
suggestion of President of the Duma, Rodzianko, for the for
mation of a consultative committee of members of the Duma
and the State Council, to co-operate with the Ministry of
War. Prince Shcherbatov, a moderate Conservative, was ap
pointed Minister of Interior. Samarin, a Conservative, sup
planted the reactionary Sabler as Super-Procurator of the Holy
Synod. The whole country mobilised itself for the war; in
dustrial establishments were voluntarily transformed into mu
nition factories. With fresh vigour and confidence the public
offered itself for the national cause. But the Government
changed its course once more.
Never before have there occurred such frequent changes in
the Russian Cabinet as in the last year. One can hardly ex
plain the unusual vacillation in the Court spheres; perhaps the
7 From the London Times, Aug. 2, 1915.

350 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
most plausible reason for the constant shifting of ministers is
the lack of big men among the bureaucrats: with the death
of Stolypin, Witte, and Durnovo, there remained obedient
servants, but no leaders in the ranks of officials. At any rate,
such departments as the Interior, Justice, Agriculture, have
been changing their policy several times during the last year,
to the confusion and exasperation of the country.
On August 25, 19 1 5, an important political event took place:
a Progressive Bloc was formed of the following parliamentary
groups: Progressive Nationalists, Centre, Octobrists, Left Oc
tobrists, Progressists, and Cadets, of the Duma, and the Aca
demic and Centre Groups, of the State Council. The Bloc thus
represents all shades of public opinion except the extreme
Right and the extreme Left; it issued a declaration demanding
the formation of a Government which would enjoy the con
fidence of the country, the reconciliation of nationalities and
classes (specifying: Poles, Jews, Finns, peasants, workingmen),
abatement of press restrictions, amnesty for political and re
ligious prisoners, legislation drafted by both Chambers. One
can observe how moderate those demands are in comparison
with the demands of the first Duma; the declaration of the
Progressive Bloc has served the same role as the " eleven
points" of the Zemstvo Congress in the fall of 1904: various
public bodies have been reiterating the same demands in resolu
tions addressed to the Government. At present the Progres
sive Bloc is the strongest and most numerous political organisa
tion in Russia.
On September 3 the Duma was prorogued till November 1.
The workingmen called a strike as a protest. In Moscow a
congress of zemstvos and towns was held; it accepted a resolu
tion demanding the reassembling of the Chambers, and the
reconstruction of the Cabinet. About the same time a con
gress of Monarchists took place; it condemned the declaration
of the Progressive Bloc, stigmatising it as akin to the revolu-

THE YEAR 1916 351
tionary demands of the year 1905. The Tzar thanked the
congress for their loyal feelings. The convocation of the
Duma was indefinitely postponed.
The year 1916 opened with a fresh change in the composi
tion of the Cabinet. The old loyal servant of the autocracy,
Goremykin, gave place to Sturmer, also a reactionary of long
standing. The new Premier has succeeded in forming a nearly
harmonious Cabinet, all its members being reactionary. Yet
almost simultaneously with the appointment of the new Pre
mier, the Duma was reconvened, under unprecedented auspices.
The Autocrat of All Russia, Nicolas II, visited the House of
Representatives in person, and delivered a significant speech, in
which he emphasised the need of mutual confidence between the
people and the ministers.
Among the important measures of 1916 was the income
tax imposed most heavily upon large incomes. Thus, while
there is a tax of only three per cent, on incomes of 800 to 900
rubles, and one per cent, on incomes 1800 to 2000 rubles,
there is a tax of twelve per cent, on incomes of 390 to 400
thousand rubles, while on incomes over 400 thousand, there
is a tax of forty-eight thousand rubles plus 1.250 for every ten
thousand rubles.
Minister of Education Count Ignatiev is one of the few
ministers to preserve his post for more than a year. He has
carried through some radical reforms, such as opening of new
universities and other schools, and the general improvement of
technical instruction. He has been trying to facilitate the
entrance of Jews into educational institutions. The most im
portant change in the Cabinet took place on July 7, 19 16,
when Foreign Minister Sazonov was dismissed and supplanted
by Sturmer who is also the Premier. Sazonov's liberal views
in regard to the solution of the Polish question, judging from
the comments of the Left press and from the rejoicing of the
reactionary publications are supposed to be the reason of his

352 MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY
dismissal. One of Sazonov's last achievements was the for
mation of an Agreement between Russia and Japan, according
to which the two countries promised mutual support in the
affairs of the Far East against encroachment by other Powers.
The war is still on. Russia is being purged in a terrible
crucible. Public consciousness is continually growing. All
national forces — material and intellectual — are mobilised.
Everything is wide-awake, astir, in motion. How will all this
energy be directed after the war?
One need not be a prophet to foretell that the present order
of things will have to disappear. The only citadel of the
bureaucracy in 1905-1906 — the army, has learned in this
war an unforgettable lesson of the crimes of their rulers in
Petrograd. And one may hope that in the last conflict between
the people and the bureaucracy the army will prove to be the
people's army.

 1

Less than 100
persons a simile
From 100-200

From 200-500

From 500-1000

From-100- £000

Over 2 0(

RIOUS PARTS OF RUSSIA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Note.— Professor Kornilov appends an extremely helpful list of
references; unfortunately nearly all of them are in Russian. Those
who read that language will undoubtedly make use of the original
text. For the non-Russian readers I have compiled a list of books in
English, French, and German, which, although not claiming complete
ness, seems to me to contain the most important works on the subject.
Translator.)
GENERAL WORKS
Baring, M. The Russian People. 191 1.
Bruckner, Alexander. Geschichte Russlands bis zum ende 18
lahrhunderts. 1896.
Herzen, A. Du developpement des idees revolutionnaires en
Russie. 1853.
Kluchevsky. History of Russia, in three volumes. To the
seventeenth century.
Leroy-Beaulieu, A. U empire des Tsars. (Translated.)
Mavor, James. An Economic History of Russia. 1914.
Rambaud, A. Historie de la Russie. 1886. (Translated.)
Skrine, F. H. The Expansion of Russia. 1903.
Thun, A. Geschichte der Revolutionbewegung in Russland.
1883.
Wallace, Sir D. M. Russia. Revised edition. 1912.
CATHERINE II
Bruckner, A. Katharina die Zweite. 1883.
Hermann. Des progres de la population en Russie. In Series
V of Memoirs de l'academie des sciences.
Herzen, A. Memoirs de l'imperatrice Catherine II.
Masson, Charles F. P. Memoirs secretes sur la Russie pen
dant les reques de Catherine II et de Paul I. 1863.
(Translated into English 1895.)
353

354 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Storch, H. Historish-statistisches Gemdlde des Russischen
Reichs. 1797-99.
Terneux. Diderot et Catherine II. 1899.
Waliszewsky, K. Autour d'un trone.
Le roman d'une imperatrice. 1894. (Translated.)
ALEXANDER I
Bernhardi, F. Geschichte Russlands. 1875.
Czartoryski, Prince Adam. Memoirs du, et sa Correspond
ance avec Alexandre I-er. 1887.
Fife. Hiitory of Europe in the nineteenth century.
Golovnin, I. Histoire d' Alexandre I. 1859.
Le Maistre, Compte J.-M. Soirees de St.-Petersbourg. 1822.
Monnard, C. La Harpe. Notice biograpkique. 1838.
Schiemann, Th. Die Ermordung Paul's. . . . 1912.
Schnitzler, I. H. Histoire intime de la Russie. 1847.
Storch, H. Russland unter Alexander dem Ersten. 1803-
1805.
Tatischef, S. Napoleon et Alexandre. 1891.
Vandal, A. Napoleon et Alexandre. 1891-1893.
NICOLAS I
Custine, le Marquis de. La Russie en 1839.
Dolgorukov, P. La write sur la Russie. i860.
Hermann, C. T. Recherches statistiques sur la septieme re
vision, in series VII of Memoirs de I'academie imperiale
des sciences. 1820.
Koppen. Ueber die Vertheilung des Bewohner Russlands nach
Stiinden, ibidem, series 6. 1843.
Korff. Avenement au trone de I'empereur Nicolas I. 1857-
Lacroix, P. ("Bibliophile Jacob") Histoire de Nicolas I.
1864.
Lubomirski, Prince. Memoirs d'un Page de Nicolas I. 1890.
Rousset, C. H. La Guerre de Crimee. 1877.
Schiemann, Th. Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus
I. 1908.
Schiemann, Th. Die Thronbesteigung Nikolaus des I. 1902.
Tengoborski. Etudes sur les forces productives de Russie.
1851.
Tourguenief, N. La Russie et les Russes.
Tyrrell, H. The History of the War with Russia.

BlliLlOCiRAr'HY 355
ALEXANDER II
Avril, Baron A. d\ Le Congres de Berlin. 1889.
Dolgorukov, Prince P. Des reformes en Russie. 1862.
Favre, L. Histoire de la Guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie.
1879.
Golovnin, I. La Russie depuis Alexandre II. 1859.
Laferte, V. Alexandre II. 1882.
Leroy-Beaulieu, A. Un homme d'etat Russe (N. Miliutin).
1884.
Lisicki, H. Le Marquis Vielopolsky. 1880.
Melnick, I. ed. Russen iiber Russland, 1906.
Miliukov, P. Russia and its Crisis. 1907.
Rawlinson, Sir H. England and Russia in the East. 1875.
Trotha, von T. W. Der Kampf urn Plevna. 1896.
ALEXANDER III
Cordier. Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances.
1899.
Daudet, E. Histoire diplomatique de I'alliance franco-russe.
1894.
Flerowsky, N. Tri politicheskiya systemy.
Hansen. L' alliance franco-russe. 1897.
Leroy-Beaulieu, A. La France, la Russie, et I'Europe. 1895.
Lowe, Charles. Alexandre III.
Samson-Himmelstierna, H. Russland unter Alexander III.
1 89 1. (Translated.) NICOLAS II
Alexinsky, G. Modern Russia.
Alexinsky, G. Russia and the Great War.
Brianchaninov, A. I. Rospusk gosudarstvennoi dumy.
Brianchaninov, A. I. Mezhdodumie.
Ivanov-Razumnik. Istoria Russkoy obschchestvennoy mysli.
Kaminka, Nabokov. Vtoraig Gosudarstvennaia Duma.
Kovalevsky, V. La Russie a la fin du igme siecle. 1900.
Kulchitzky, L. Istoria russkavo revolutzionnavo dvizhenia.
Kuzmin-Karavaiev. Iz epokhi osvoboditelnavo dvizheniya. I,
II.
Lokot, Professor T. V. Politicheskiya partii i gruppy v Dumie.

356 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Miliukov, P. God borby.
Miliukov, P. Vtoraia duma.
Muraviov, Minister. Revolutzionnoie dvizhenie v Rossii.
Nevinson, H. W. The Dawn in Russia.
Pares, Bernard. Russia and Reform.
Pares, Bernard. Reaction and Revolution in Russia (in The
Cambridge Modern History, v., VII.)
Petrunkevich, Hessen, Muromtzev, et. al. Pervaia Gosudar-
stvennaia Duma. I, 2, 3.
Protzess Sovieta Rabochikh Deputatov.
-Simpson, Professor J. Y. Self-Discovered Russia.
Struve, P. Kriticheskia, zamietki ob eonomicheskom razvitii
Rossii.
Svatikov, S. G. Obshchestvennoie dvizhenie v Rossii.
Trotzky, Khrustaliov, et al. Istoria Sovieta Rabochikh Dep
utatov.
Tugan-Baranovsky. Russkaia fabrika v proshlom i nastoia-
shchem.
Ukhtomsky, Prince E. E. Puteshestvie na Vostok. 189C-1.
Urusov, Prince S. D. Zapiski gubernatora. (Translated:
Memoirs of a Governor.)
Vladimirov, V. Karatelnaia expeditzia.
Walling, W. E. Russia's Message. 1908.
Williams, H. W. Russia of the Russians.
Zilliacus, Koni. The Russian Revolutionary Movement.
Yezhegodnik gazety Riech. 1912— 1914.
" Internal Reviews " for the last twenty-five years in leading
liberal and radical magazines, notably — Viestnik Yev-
ropy, Russkaia Mysl: single years, Russkoie, Bogatstvo,
Mir Bozhiy, Sovremenny Mir, Russkiya Zapiski.

INDEX

Abaza, A. A., II: 204, 243, 250,
252
Abdul-Aziz, II: 230
Abdul-Hamid, II: 230
Act, of February 19, II: 43, 44,
45. 46, 52, 55> 65. 66, 68, 74
Action, II: 191, 211
Adrianople, II: 233
Afghanistan, II: 229, 270
Agricultural Society, II: 85
Aksakov, Constantine, I: 289, 292,
293, 306; II: 61
Aksakov, Ivan, I: 253, 295, 302,
3°3, 305, 306; II: 11, 29, 61,
76, 83, 86, 99, 153, 189, 191,
195, 234, 235, 251, 252
Alexander I, I: 52, 57, 62, 64-
220, 223, 224, 225, 229, 230, 231,
232. 237, 238, 245, 260, 269, 283,
285, 293; II: 152, 160, 164, 285
Alexander II, I: 231, 246, 263, 267,
293. 3°i. 310; H: 3-250, 260,
268, 275
Alexander III, II: 240, 241, 249-
271, 275, 279
Alexeiev, Admiral, II: 295
Alexinsky, Gregor, II: 296, 328,
34i
Amnesty, granted, II: 311; de
manded, 320, 321, 350
Amur, II: 227, 257
Annals of the Fatherland, I: 291,
301, 302; II: 192, 214
Anti-Semitism, II: 329
Andreiev, Leonid, 346
Arakcheiev, I: 155, 170, 175, 176, 357

177, 178, 179, 180, 186, 201, 211,
238, 242, 270; II: 139, 230
Areopagus, 264
Army, inertia of, II: 314
Arseniev, K. K, II : 264
Arzamas, 196, 239, 284
Asia, II: 226, 229, 233, 293
Asia, Central, I: 63, 171, 183, 220;
II: 227, 228, 268, 269, 270
Asia, East, II: 226
Asia, South, II: 228
Asiatic Russia (franchise), II: 328
Assignations, I: 59, 108, 109, 170;
II: 77
Assignational Bank, I: 47
Austria, I: 60, 61, 128, 138, 158,
159, 161, 163, 174, 253, 297, 300,
307; II: 233, 234, 269, 270, 271,
342, 343
Axelrod, II : 341
Azev, II: 329 B
Bagration, I: 151, 152, 154, 156
Bakunin, I: 289, 290, 303; II: 211,
212, 213, 214, 217, 219, 221
Balkans, II: 233, 234, 270, 293, 343
Balmashov, II: 289
Baltic Provinces, II: 284, 305, 311
Barclay de Tolly, I: 151, 152, 154,
155, 169, 170
Barricades, II: 315, 338
Barshchina, I: 27, 28, 53, 203, 254,
255, 262, 264; II: 13, 15, 19, 21,
36, 45, 50, 51, 52, 68, 197
Battenberg, Prince A., II: 240
Beccaria, I: 20, 23, 11 1

358

INDEX

Beilis, Case of, II: 329, 337
Bell, The, II: 22, 27, 38, 56, 60,
63, 65, 75, 79, 207, 208
Benckendorff, I: 196, 239, 245, 247,
248, 249, 297; II: 242
Berlin, Congress of, II: 233, 234,
293, 342
Bestuzhev-Riumin, I: 204, 205
Beverage reform, 1 : 274, 275
Bezpopovtzy, I: 296
Bibikov, I: 263; II: 5, 12
Biblical Society, I: 187, 189
Bielinsky, I: 289-293, 301-305
Black Partition, II: 238, 264, 287
Bloc, Progressive, II: 350
Bloody Sunday, II: 301
Bobrikov, Gov.-Gen., II: 285
Bobrinsky, Count V., II: 349
Bobrishchev-Pushkin, II: 337
Bobruisk (military disorders),
315
Bogoliepov, Minister, II: 291, 292
Bogoliubsky, Prince Andrey, I: 8
Bogrov, II: 330
Bondage-question, I: 13, 14, 21,
65, 94, 102, 254, 255, 257, 258,
301; II: 10-56, 62, 78, 96
Boyars, I: 13, 41
Boxer Uprising, II: 294
Bulgaria, II: 229, 230, 233, 234,
237, 240, 270
Bulletin of Petrograd Workmen's
Deputies, II: 308
Bulygin, Minister, II: 302, 317
Bunge, Minister, II: 252, 254, 255,
256, 258, 260, 261, 267
Buturlin Committee, II: 4, 6, 104
Byzantium, I: 34, 39

Cadets (Constitutionalist-Demo
crats), II: 282, 305; foundation
of party, 308, 312 ; in First

Duma, 319, 322; declared il
legal, 325 ; in Second Duma,
326, 327, 341
Cantonists, I: 176, 190
Carbonari, I: 197, 198
Carol, King, II: 232
Capitulation of autocracy, II: 306
Catherine II, I: 23-49, 51, 52, 54,
55, 58, 59, 67, 68, 69, 72, 80, 81,
86, 90, 95, 97, 101, 104, 105, in,
132, 143, 144, 179, 291, 199,
213, 214, 269, 283; II: 151, 152,
154
Caucasus, II: 158, 210, 227, 285,
302, 328
Cause of the People, II: 211
Censorship, Statutes, I: 160, 192;
II: 55, 60, 62, 103, 105
Chaadaiev, I: 285, 286, 287, 289,
292
Chaikovsky, N., II: 215-221
Chelnokov, II: 281
Cherkassky, Prince, II: 15, 32, 40,
61, 195, 217
Chernigov, zemstvo, II: 282;
agrarian disorders, 302; nobil
ity, 338
Chernyshevsky, II: 7, 22, 27, 57,
5s, 59, 72, 80, 82, 106, 207
China, I: 171, 267; II: 293, 294
Citizen, The, II: 193
Classicism, I: 281; II: 164, 166,
168
Clergy, I: 33, 54 _
Collectors of Russian Soil, I: 12
Collegia, I: 43, 52, 90, 91, 95
Colonisation, I: 24, 25, 104, 105,
108
Committee, Code, I: 44; of De
cember 6, I: 245, 246, 249, 258,
260, 280; Main, II: 34, 35, 37,
42, 43, 116, 118; of Ministers,
I: 104, 109, 179, 180, 181, 242;
II: 146; Secret, I: 259, 260; II:
17, 18; Scholastic, I: 189, 191;

INDEX

359

Unofficial, I: 83-95, i°9> "4,
246; II: 56
Committees, set up by Witte, II:
282
Compensation, see Redemption
Constantine, Grand Duke (brother
of Nicolas I), I: 23, 167, 205,
224-227, 231, 250; (brother of
Alexander II), II: 30, 42, 43,
50, 168, 240, 250, 251
Constantinople, 1 : 72 ; II : 293, 343
Constituent Assembly, demanded,
II: 305, 306, 313
Contemporary, The, I: 291, 301,
302, 303; II: 22, 27, 82, 83, 112,
169, 183, 184, 191, 192, 217
Continental System, I: 66, 123,
125, 126, 128, 137, 140, 144, 147,
148, 183, 215, 216, 220, 223, 266:;
II: 137
Co-operative movement, II: 335
Councils of workingmen, II: 308-
312
Coup d'etat, June 3, 1907, II: 328
Course of paper-money, I: 108,
109, 125, 137, 182, 271; II: 12,
71, 78, 136, 137, 138, 139, 231,
232
Court-camarilla, II: 309
Courts-martial, II : 309 ; field-c. m.,
II: 325
Crimean Campaign, I: 224, 252,
308, 310; II: i, 6, 9, 136, 140,
146, 147, 148, 150, 154, 157, 226
Cronstadt, mutinies, II: 309, 324
Czartoryski, Prince Adam, I: 70-
73, 83-91, in, 116-118, 127, 160

Day, The, II : 76, 82, 105
Decembrists, I: 198, 233, 235, 236,
239, 245, 260, 283, 289; II: 333
Degaiev, II: 260
Deich, II: 341
Delianov, Minister, II: 91, 170,
174, 260, 261, 281, 291
Depositki, I: 276, 277
Derzhavin, I: 86, 93, 94, 97, 99,
102, 106, 128
Diet, Polish, I: 165, 166, 193, 194,
202, 209, 211, 250
Dnieper Russ, I: 8, 10, 11, 18
Dobroliubov, II: 207, 211, 217
Dolgorukov, Prince A. M., II : 42,
59, 60, 67, 69
Dolgorukov, Prince Paul, II: 283
Dolgorukov, Prince Peter, II: 283,
303
Dolgorukov, Prince V. A., II: 113
Dostoievsky, I: 308; II: 114, 191,
214
Dubasov, Admiral, II: 314
Dukhobory, I: 106, 294, 296; II:
265, 283
Duma, State, II: 3°5> 3°6, 333
Duma, First; elections, II: 317,
318, 319; met, 320; address to
Tsar, 321 ; dissolved, 322, 323,
324
Duma, Second; elections, II: 326;
dissolved, 327, 330
Duma, Third, 332, 333, 335, 337,
338, 347
Duma, Fourth, II: 330, 334, 337,
338, 34°, 34i, 343, 348, 349, 35°,
351

Danilovich, General, II: 291
Dalny, port, II : 294, 297
Dardanelles, importance of, II:
344
Dawn, The, II: 191

East-Chinese Railway, II: 294, 297
Ecclesiastical Congress (Kazan),
II: 284
Economical Indicator, II: 62
Editing Commissions, II: 31, 33,

360

INDEX

34, 35, 38, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 49,
50, 112, 137
Education, II: 89-95, 113, 116,
164-175, 261, 334
Electoral law, II: 305, 306, 317,
318, 324, 325, 327, 328
Eleven Points, II: 298, 299, 301,
350
Elizabeth, Empress, I: 26, 37, 44,
47, 5i
England, I: 60, 61, 78, 85, 100,
107, 114, 116, 122, 123, 126, 137,
140, 146, 159, 161, 163, 170, 183,
219, 220, 231, 266, 307; II: 143,
227, 230, 233, 269, 270, 343, 345,
346
European Messenger, I: 98, 143,
285; II: 169, 264
Executions, figures, II: 330

Famine, of 1891, II: 281
Far East, II: 294, 297, 342
Fighting Organisation, II: 289,
290
Figner, Viera, II: 221
Finland, I: 23, 25, 123, 129, 136,
148, 151, 173, 206, 216, 219; II:
200, 285, 311, 329
Fletcher, Ambassador, I: 12
Forward! II: 72, 219
Fotiy, Archimandrite, I: 210, 242,
294
Forties, Men of, II: 6
France, I: 60, 113, 114, 128, 131,
134, 148, 149, 161, 216, 251, 252,
253, 299, 307; II: 293, 294, 295,
346
Free Agriculturists, I: 101, 102,
133
Free Economic Society, I: 187
Freemasonry, I: 163, 184, 196
French ideas, I: 37, 38, 39, 284,
289

Friend of Enlightenment, I: 99
Fundamental Laws, II: 318, 329

Gagarin, Prince P. P., II: 16, 43,
44, "2, 167
Gagarin, Prince A., II: 167, 181,
197
Galicia, retreat from, II: 348
Gapon, II: 299
Geok-Tepe, II: 269, 270
German Barons, II: 305, 311
German ideas, 1 : 39, 283, 284, 290,
291
German Imperialism, II: 341, 342
German preponderance, II: 345
Germany, I: 25, 104, 158, 159,
195; II: 270, 271, 294, 342, 363,
345
Giers, II: 269
Godunov, Boris, I: 16
Gogol, I: 302, 303
Golden Horde, 1:9, I0
Golitzyn, Prince A. N., I: 188, 189,
193, 210, 211, 225, 245, 246
Golitzyn, Gov.-Gen., II: 285
Golovin, II: 281, 283, 303
Golovnin, II: 92, 95, 104, m, 112,
167, 168, 171, 172, 243, 252
Goncharov, II: 58
Gorchakov, II: 9, 84, 228, 231, 269
Goremykin, II: 319, 321, 322, 340,
351
Gorky, II : 289
Grand Dukes, influence of, II:
306; attacked in Duma, II: 334
Great Russian, The, II : 80
Grinevitzky, II: 247, 248
Gruzia, I: 142, 169, 171, 181, 182,
211, 270, 271, 272, 274
Guchkov, Alexander, II: 328, 334,
338
Guriev, Minister, I: 142, 169, 171,
181, 182, 2ii, 270, 271, 272, 274

INDEX

361

H
Hanfman, Hessie, II: 248
Hegel, I: 286, 290, 291
Herzegovina, II: 229, 230
Herzen, I: 283, 289, 290, 291, 293,
296; II: 7, 8, 56, 75, 79, 82, 83,
207, 208, 213
Hetaeria;, I: 197
Heyden, Count P. A., II: 303, 319
HohenzoUern, II : 270
Holstein-Gotorp, I: 147
Holy Alliance, I: 163, 187, 209
Holy Synod, see Synod
Hungarian Uprising, II: 1
I
Ignatiev, Minister of Education,
II: 35i
Ignatiev, Minister of Interior, II:
154, 208, 232, 233, 252, 253, 254,
257, 259, 260, 261
Ikonobortzy, I: 296
Income-Tax, II: 351
India, II: 228, 229
Industry, I: 21, 27, 67, 128, 183,
184, 226, 267, 268, 269, 271, 273;
II: 77, 78, 133, 134, 268, 286
Ingersoll, Robert, II: 290
Intelligentzia, I: 5, 34, 36, 37, 48,
223, 279, 282, 285, 289, 302, 303,
309; II: 22, 69, 72, 75, 76, 166,
206, 207, 209, 210, 21 6, 289, 299,
307, 342, 345
Interregnum, I: 16; II: 23, 32, 123
Inventory Regulations, I: 259, 263,
264; II: 5, 18
Italy, I: 60; II: 271
Ivan Kalita, I: 9
Ivan III, I: 9, 10, 16
Ivan IV, I: 10, 16, 57

January 9, petition of, II: 299-
301

Japan, II: 293-297, 352
Jesuits, I: 163, 187
Jews, I: 104-107, 118, 120, 206;
II: 265, 284, 307, 329
Judiciary reform, II: 101, 102;
curbing of, II: 181-186, 187, 189

Kaliaiev, II: 302
Kankrin, I: 169, 186, 212, 214, 261,
269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276,
277, 278, 279, 309; II: 89, 136,
138
Karakozov, II: 106, m, 112, 146,
155, 163, 165, 179, 182
Karamzin, I: 57, 98, 99, 113, 128,
142, 143, 144, 156, 178, 191, 194,
2ii, 215, 219, 226, 236, 237, 238,
239, 241, 242, 243, 245, 253, 279,
308
Karpovich, II : 292
Kasso, Minister, II: 331
Katkov, I: 289, 290; II: 59, 60,
86, 87, 106, 114, 165, 166, 169,
170, 182, 183, 192, 224, 236, 251,
252, 261
Kaufman, General, II: 228
Kerensky, Deputy, II: 340
Kavelin, II: 27, 59, 75, 91, 92
Kharbin, II: 294
Khodsky, Professor, II: 120, 121
Khodynka, II: 290
Khomiakov, I: 284, 287, 292, 306,
307; II: 190
Khlysty, I: 296
Kholopy, I: 17
Khrustaliov, II: 308, 312
Kibalchich, II: 247, 248
Kievite, The, II: 190
Kireievsky, 1 : 284, 286, 287, 292
Kiselev, I: 173, 174, *79, 260, 261,
262, 263, 279, 301, 309; II: 117,
118, 257
Kishinev, II: 285

362

INDEX

Kizevetter, II: 331
Kleigels, General, II: 292
Kluchevsky, I: 7, 8, 12, 13
Kokhanov, II: 258, 259, 260, 261
Kochubey, I: 72, 78, 83, 85, 86, 88,
95, 103, 105, 136, 139, 173, 178,
243, 245, 246, 249
Kokoshkin, II: 277, 283
Kokovtzev, II: 330, 340
Kolo, Polish, II : 326
Komissarov, II: 106
Koni, A., II: 183, 189
Korea, II: 293, 294, 296
Korf, Baron M. A., I: 264, 304,
306
Korf, Baron P. L., II: 303
Korolenko, II: 283
Koshelev, I: 292, 306, 307; II:
61, 144, 197, 243
Kovalevsky, M., I: 13; II: 103
Kovalevsky, N., II: 303
Krivoshein, Minister, II: 281
Kropotkin, II: 69, 81, 215, 217,
218, 220, 341
Kriidener, Baroness, I: 162, 163,
187, 210
Kuropatkin, General, II: 295, 296
Kursk, II: 302
Kutuzov, I: 118, 149, 150, 154, 155,
156, 157, 158

Labourites, II: 319, 320, 322, 324,
326, 340
La Harpe, I: 42, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74,
75, 77, 82, 87, 91, "5, 163, 164,
229, 290
Lamennais, I: 302
Lancasterian Schools, 1 : 200
Land, distribution of, II: 42, 43,
44, 49, 5°
Land and Freedom, II: 221, 222,
237, 238
Landowners, see Nobles

Landowners' Journal, II: 62, 96,
97
Landownership, II: n 9-1 22
Lanskoy, II: 10, 14, 16, 22, 27, 67,
97, 162, 184
Lappo-Danilevsky, I: 31, 32
Lavrov, II: 192, 210, 211, 212, 219
Leibach, Congress, I: 202, 231, 285
Leontiev, II: 165, 192, 261
Letts, II: 311
Levshin, II: 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 22,
29
Liao-Tung, II: 294, 297
Liberation, II: 283
Liberation of Labour party, II:
287
Liberators, II: 283, 298
Lipetzk, Congress, II: 237, 238
Liquor, monopolisation of, II: 286;
prohibition of, II: 346
Lomonosov, I: 36, m
Loris-Melikov, II: 175, 239, 241-
259
Lovers of Nature, society, I: 196,
197
Lovers of Wisdom, society, I: 284,
292
Lunacharsky, A., II: 312
Lvov, Prince G., II: 303
Lvov, N. N., II: 303, 319
M
Magazine for Lovers, I: 99
Magazine of Russian Letters, I:
99
Magnitzky, I: 190, 192, 211, 237,
242
Maistee, de Joseph, I: 189, 190
Maklakov, V. A., II: 337, 338
Malta, Order of Knights, I: 55,
60, 61
Manchuria, II: 293, 294, 296
Manifesto, Revolutionary, II: 312
Manuylov, Rector, II: 331
Martial law, II: 309, 312

INDEX

363

Martinists, I: 38
Masons, I: 38, 172, 196
Mavor, James, I: 13; II: 272, 301,
3°9, 313
Merchants, I: 30, 31, 34, 182;
II: 77, 78, 79
Merezhkovsky, I: 42, 63
Meshchersky, Prince, II: 193
Metternich, I: 163, 164, 209, 217,
253
Mezentzev, II: 236
Mikhailovsky, N. K., II: 208, 211,
214, 267
Military Colonies, I: 175, 176, 178,
201, 210, 213, 217, 237, 242, 247;
II: 160
Military disturbances, II: 311
Miloradovich, I: 186, 201, 226,
227, 232
Miliukov, P. N., I: 7, 12, 16, 38,
40; II: 123, 124, 129, 130, 131,
283, 303, 307, 319, 326, 333
Miliutin, D. A., II: 1 57-1 71, 184,
189, 250, 252, 266
Miliutin, N. A., I: 301; II: 28-
40, 67, 97, 99, 118, 144, 153, 155,
157, 225, 243
Ministers, Committee of, see Com
mittee
Ministries, establishment of, I: 91,
94, 95
Mnemozina, I: 284
Molokane, I: 100, 294, 296; II:
283
Monarchists, Congress of, II: 350
Mongols, 1:8, 12
Montesquieu, I: 20, 38, 101, 106
Monthly Writings, I: 37
Mordvinov, Admiral, I: 87, 88,
89, 100, 128, 129, 140, 144, 181,
182, 187, 243, 244, 274
Moscow, I: 8, 9, 12, 41, 42, 96;
II: military disturbances, 311;
uprising, 314; University rav
aged, 331

Moscow Almanach, I: 293
Moscow Mercury, I: 99
Moscow Messenger, I: 284, 288
Moscow News, II: 165, 192, 193,
251
Moscow Observer, I: 99
Moscow Telegraph, I: 284, 285
Motley, I: 38
Mukden, II : 294, 298, 303
Mukhanov, II: 299
Munitions, lack of, II: 348; fac
tories of, II: 349
Muraviov, Alexander, I: 196, 197
Muraviov- Apostol, Matvey, I:
197, 205
Muraviov-Apostol, Sergey, I: 197,
202, 204, 228
Muraviov, Mikhail (Imperial tu
tor), I: 69, in
Muraviov, Mikhail (Decembrist),
I: 145, 199
Muraviov, Gov.-Gen. of Amur,
II: 226, 227
Muraviov, M. N., II: 18, 23, 24,
42, 67, m, 112, 118
Muraviov, Nikita, I: 197, 200, 205,
207, 208, 219, 233, 236
Muscovite, The, I: 288, 292, 293,
307; II: 191
Muromtzev, II: 281, 319; Presi
dent of Duma, 321
Mutual Guarantee, I: 9; II: 47,
254
Myshkin, Ippolit, II: 217, 218
N
Nabokov, II: 283
Napoleon I, I: 60, 61, 66, 114-171,
197, 215, 216, 217, 230
Napoleon III, II: 9, 86
Narodnichestvo, II: 191, 192, ao6,
207, 209, 221, 223, 238
Narodniki, II: 207, an, 216, 219,
220, 221, 223, 235, 236, 238, 239

364

INDEX

Narodovoltzy, I: 208; II: 238, 289
Nathanson, Mark and Olga, II:
221
Near East, II: 293, 342
Nevinson, H. W., II: 313
Nicolas I, I: 181, 192, 212, 223-
310; II: 1, 3, 4, 140, 153, 154,
160, 161, 162, 224, 226, 227, 242,
261, 266
Nicolas II, II: 272-352
Nicolayi, Baron, II: 192, 252, 260
Niechaiev, II: 213, 214, 216
Niekrasov, II: 114, 192
Nihilism, II: 69, 83, 114, 163, 165,
166, 167, 168, 192, 209
Nobles, I: 20, 21, 30, 33, 34, 54,
136, 141, 155, 184, 185, 186, 255,
256, 257, 258, 264; II: 13-21,
23-40, 7i, 73, 78, 97, 197-201,
208, 262, 267
Northern Messenger, I: 100
Northern Society, I: 205, 207, 208,
227, 243
Novikov, I: 38, 52, 196, 213
Novitzky, General, II: 291
Novoie Vremia (New Time), II:
193
Novorossiysk (military disorders),
11:3"
Novosiltzev, I: 73, 78, 83, 85, 88,
89, 90, in, 119, 127, 131, 160,
161

Obligatory redemption, II: 41, 79
Obligatory, transitory period, II:
25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 35
Obrok, I: 21, 28, 103, 262, 240;
II: 33, 35, 40, 41, 5i, 66, 117,
118, 196, 197, 202, 253
Obshchina, disruption of, II: 325,
334
October 17, Manifesto of, II: 306,
3i7

Octobrists, II: 311, 319, 326, 328,
338
Odessa, II: 288, 304, 307
Ogarev, II: 75, 210
Old Servers, I: 77, 78, 79, 87, 90,
94
Osterman-Tolstoy, I: 152, 153
Ostsee Statute, II: 12
Osvobozhdenie, see Liberation

Pahlen (regicide), I: 74, 78, 79
Pahlen, K. I., II: 161, 185, 187,
189, 220, 242
Pale of Settlement, I: 100; II: 284
Panin, Nikita, I: 33, 51, 75, 78, 79,
80
Panin, V. N., II: 38, 39, 40, 43,
50, 167, 168
Pares, Bernard, II: 286, 297, 321
Paris, Treaty of, II: 9, 233
Paskevich, I: 233, 245, 264, 299,
300; II: 2, 32
Paul I, I: 27, 38, 50-63, 69, 70,
75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 96,
97, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 114,
128, 177, 214, 220, 224, 228
Pavlov, Professor, I: 283, 289
Pazukhin, II: 262, 263
Peasants, I: 14, 17, 21, 26, 28, 33,
53, 54, 185, 186, 254, 258, 259,
260, 264; II: 10-54, 286-289;
disturbances of, II: 66, 305, 311;
Concessions to, present reign,
II: 311, 317, 325, 334; Union
of, II: 304, 312
Peasants, Economical, I: 28; Fis
cal, I: 28, 54, 102, 104, 211, 246,
260, 261, 262; Obligatory, I:
262, 263; II: 41, 46, 47, 253;
Possessional, 1 : 28 ; II : State, I :
28; II: 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,
257; Udielny, II: 116, 117, 118,
119

INDEX

3&5

Peace-Mediators, II: 67, 68, 69,
74
Peking, II: 293
Periodical Publications, I: 100
Permanent Council, I: 81, 85, 90,
94, "o
Perovsky, Sophia, II: 220, 247
Persia, I: 58, 62, 114, 123, 138,
140, 273
Pestel, I: 197-219, 234, 236, 260,
283
Peter, the Great, I: 11, 15, 16, 17,
19, 24, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42,
43, 45, 46, 94
Peter III, I: 32, 147
Petersburg, I: 16
Petrashevsky, I: 302, 304, 306
Petrograd News, II: 169, 193, 293
Petrunkevich, 1 : 1 ; II : 236, 237,
242, 243, 283, 303, 308, 317, 318,
320, 333
Pisarev, II: 166, 191, 192, 209,
210, 211
Plehve, II: 242, 282, 284, 285, 286,
287, 288, 290, 298, 302
Plekhanov, II: 222, 238, 287, 341
Pnin, 1 : 99, 100
Pobiedonostzev, II: 249, 250, 251,
252, 259, 260, 261, 265, 275, 276,
278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285,
291, 298, 306
Pogodin, I: 284, 288, 292, 293, 307
Poincare, President, II: 336, 338
Poland, I: 8, 10, 15, 16, 72, 75,
105, 116, 120, 124, 147, 159, 160,
161, 163, 165, 167, 172, 173, 193,
205, 206, 211, 216, 219, 250, 267,
268, 272, 273; II: 9, 81, 83, 84,
85, 86, 87, 200, 225, 265, 302,
310, 311, 328
Polevoy, I: 284, 285, 303
Police-Socialism, II: 288
Poll-Tax, I: 17; II: 255
Polonism, II: 172, 225
Polivanov, Minister, II: 349

Poltava (military disorders), II:
324
Popovtzy, 1 : 296
Population, growth of, II: 123-
131
Polar Star, The, II: 8
Port-Arthur, II: 293, 294, 295, 297
Portsmouth, Treaty of, II: 296,
298
Posen, M. P., II: 15, 26, 32, 33,
34, 40
Possessed, The, II: 114
Possessional Factories, I: 183, 184,
256, 267; II: 132
Potiomkin, Prince, 1 : 52 ; battle
ship, II: 304
Potocky, Count Severin, I: 93, 97,
in, 139
Press, conditions of, II: 55, 61, 62,
103, 104, 105, 186-194; penalties
of, 330, 33i
Princes, dissensions of, 1:8, 12
Proletariate, II: 287, 288, 289, 299,
301, 302, 306, 308, 309, 310, 311,
312, 314, 317, 318, 335, 336, 338
Prussia, I: 68, 115, 117, 118, 120,
121, 124, 126, 131, 148, 158, 159,
161, 174, 253, 300, 308; II: 159,
168, 345
Pugachov, I: 27
Pushchin, I: 201
Pushkin, I: 186, 239, 240, 284, 285 ;
II: 269
Pypin, II: 183, 184, 187, 192

Radicalism, II: 80, 81, 83, 106
Radishchev, I: 35, 52
Railroads, II: 78, 139-146, 268,
269, 286
Rastopchin, I: 128, 155, 157
Recruitments, I: 16
Redemption, II: 25, 27, 28, 32, 33,
41, 45, 59, 7i, 79

366

INDEX

Reform, results of, II: 123, 134
Reglament, Peter's, I: 92, 93, 94
Reitern, II: 114, 115, 137-178, 231-
239
Rescript, to Nazimov, II: 18, 20,
21
Revel (military disorders), II:
324
Revolutionary Russia, II: 289
Rhenish Confederation, I: 120
Riman, Colonel, II: 315
Rodichev, II: 276, 283, 303, 319
Rodzianko, II: 349
Romanovs, 1 : 41
Rosenkreizer, I: 38
Rostovtzev, I: 228; II: 15, 16, 27,
28, 31, 32-38
Roumania, II: 233, 270
Rousseau, I: 38
Runich, I: 101, 102, 190, 211, 237,
242
Russia, consolidation of, I: 9, 15,
18, 23
Russia's Borderlands, II: 191
Russian Discourse, II: 60
Russian Justice, I: 205
Russian Messenger, I: 192; II: 27,
60, 83, 165, 192
Russian News, II: 193, 264
Russian Thought, II: 243, 264
Russian Word, II: 69, 82, 83, 112,
166, 169, 191
Russo-Chinese Bank, II: 294
Ryleiev, I: 201, 208, 227, 234; II:
16
Rysakov, II: 247, 248

Sabler, Super-Procurator, II: 349
Saghalin, II: 297
Sails, II: 61
Saltykov, I: 67, 179
Saltykov-Shchedrin, I: 305; II:
192, 193

Samarin, Yuriy, I: 289, 292, 295,
305, 306; II: 14, 29, 30, 40, 44,
61, 75, 152, 190, 191, 195, 225
Samarin, Super-Procurator, II:
349
San-Stefano, II: 233
Sardinia, I: 307; II: 1
Savings, during war, II : 347
Sazonov, Minister, II: 351
Sazonov, murderer of Plehve, II:
290, 298
Schad, Professor, I: 185, 191
Scharnhorst, I: 174
Schauman, Eugene, II: 285
Schelling, I: 283, 284, 286, 290
Schilder, I: 51, 151, 178, 251
Schismatics, I: 40, 41, 55, 107, 294,
295, 297; II: 221, 265
Schmidt, Captain, II: 311
Schwarz (XVIII c), I: 38, 196,
213
Schwarz, Colonel, I: 202
Schwarz, Minister, II: 331
Scythian Plan, I: 150
Secret Expedition, I: 80
Sectants, I: 105, 107, 293, 294, 296,
297; II: 221, 265
Semionovsky Guards, regiment, I:
196, 197, 202, 209, 285; II: 315
Senate, I: 42-45, 81, 86, 90, 91, 92,
93, 94, 135, 166, 214; II: 82,
174, 184, 188, 190, 324
Serbia, II: 229, 230, 233, 270, 342
Sergey, Grand Duke, II : 288, 290,
302
Serving Class, I: 13, 16
Sevastopol (Mutiny), II: 311
Seven Years' War, I: 46, 47
Shaiovich, II: 288
Shakovskoy, Prince, II: 283, 303
Shamil, II: 227
Shcheglovitov, Minister, II: 319
Shcherbatov, Prince, I: 33
Shcherbatov, Minister, II: 349
Shelgunov, II: 191, 193

INDEX

3^7

Shershenevich, II: 321
Sherwood, I: 211
Shevchenko, I: 306
Shevyrev, 1 : 284, 288, 292
Shipov, Dmitri, II: 281-283, 298
Shishkov, I: 99, 128, 145, 155, 162,-
168, 172, 2ii, 242, 249, 279, 281
Shuvalov, P. A., II: 113-115, 146,
149, 164, 184, 187
Siberian Railroad, II: 293
Sipiagin, Minister, II : 289
Skoptzy, I: 296
Slavophiles, I: 284, 286, 287, 289,
292, 293, 302; II: 59, 60, 61, 76,
190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 231, 233,
252, 260
Slavs, settlement of, I: 7
Socialist movement, II: 287-289,
302, 304, 319, 324, 326, 327, 340,
341, 342
Son of the Fatherland, I: 192, 195
Southern Society, I: 196, 204, 205,
211, 228
Spain, I: 147, 160
Speransky, I: 109, no, 130-144,
148, 154, 165, 166, 172, 178, 181,
182, 190, 192, 195, 226, 237, 243,
245, 246, 247, 253, 260, 270
Spirit of Journals, I: 185, 192
Stakhovich, Mikhail, II: 319, 348
Stankevich, I: 289, 290
State Council, I: 136, 139, 141, 143,
166, 178, 180, 182, 187, 201, 225,
226, 232, 233, 260, 263; II: 43,
44, 88, 93, 95, 98, 143, 154, 155,
160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 170,
174, 181, 182, 186, 191, 240, 249,
250, 254, 258, 264, 318, 329, 340,
349, 35°
Stein, Baron, I: 161
Steingel, Baron, I: 236
Stepniak-Kravchinsky, II : 236, 278
Stishinsky, II: 319
Stolypin, II: 319, 322, 324, 325,
327, 328, 329, 330, 334

Storch, Academic, I: 25, 53, 97,
106, 185, 230
Strike Committee, II: 306, 307, 313
Strike, General ; First, II : 306,
309; second, II: 310, 311; third,
II: 313, 314
Strike, of Postal-Telegraph em
ployes, II: 311
Strikes, II: 288, 302, 305, 306, 336,
338, 350
Stroganev, I: 73, 82, 83, 85, 91,
103, 109, no, 127
Struve, P. B., II: 124, 283, 289
Student-disorders, II: 91, 92, 290,
291, 292, 331
Stundists, II: 283
Sturdza, I: 189, 190, 191
Sturmer, Boris, II: 351
Suicides, figures, II: 332
Sukhomlinov, Minister, II: 348,
349
Sumarokov, I: 37
Suvorin, A., II: 183, 193
Suvorov, General, I: 60, 61
Suvorov, Gov.-Gen., II: 75, 92,
113
Sveaborg (military disorders), II:
324
Sviatlovsky, II: 301
Sviatopolk-Mirsky, II: 298
Sweden, I: 8, 11, 13, 18, 123, 138,
146, 148, 149, 216
Synod, Holy, I: 48, 225, 234; II:
250, 260, 284, 325
Szlachta, I: 161

Tacitus, I: 101
Talleyrand, I: 131, 132, 159
Tariffs, I: 31, 59, 61, 107, 170, 182,
183, 215, 220, 268, 269, 270, 271 ;
II : 267, 268, 286, 287
Tashkent, II: 227, 230
Tatarinov, II: 88, 115

368

INDEX

Tatishchev, I: 36
Taxes, I: 15, 17, 108, 141, 271,
272; II: 73, 76, 156, 202, 203,
204, 205, 206, 254, 255, 258, 286,
287, 35i
Telescope, The, I: 284-287, 295
Tiding, The, II: 192, 193
Tilsit, Peace of, I: 126; Treaty
of, I: 126, 128, 129, 130, 137,
146, 159, 174, 215, 216, 218, 223
Tolstoy, Dmitri, II: 112, 115, 161-
175, 190-265, 281, 331 (
Tolstoy, Lev, II: 283, 284, 289,
294, 331
Tolstoyans, II: 284
Trade-Union movement, II: 335,
336
Trepov, Feodor, I: 113, 235; II:
288
Trepov, Dmitri, II: 288, 301, 302,
307, 308
Trepov, Alexander, Premier
Trigoni, II: 248
Triple Alliance, II: 271
Triple Entente, II: 343
Troshchinsky, I: 77, 80, 81, 109,
130
Troubled Time, see Interregnum
Trubetzkoy, S. P. (Decembrist),
1 : 201, 205
Trubetzkoy, S. (Zemstvoist), II:
303
Trubetzkoy, Y., II: 331
True Russians, II: 307
Tsushima, II: 295, 298, 303
Tugan-Baranovsky, I: 31, 184,
266; II: 133, 289
Tugendbund, I: 197, 199, 200
Turcomen, II: 229, 269
Turgeniev, Nicolas, I: 186, 196,
200, 201, 203, 205, 236; II: 101
Turgeniev, Ivan, 1 : 305 ; II : 58,
75
Turkestan, II: 227, 228, 328
Turkey, I: 15, 18, 23, 43, 47, 121,

123, 124, 129, 138, 140, 146, 148,
149, 210, 250, 251, 252, 260, 274,
307; II: 229, 230, 231, 232, 233,
234, 343, 344
Tver, I: 10, 12; Resolution of, II:
71-74, 276, 282
Tyaglo, I: 15 U
Ukhtomsky, Prince, II: 293
Ukrainophiles, II: 224, 235
Ulozhenie, 1 : 82, 254
Uniates, II: 226, 265
Union, All-Russian, of Towns, II:
346
Union, All-Russian, of Zemstvos,
II: 346
Union of Liberators, II: 283
Union, Peasant, II: 304, 312
Union of Russian Men, II: 324
Union of Salvation, I: 197, 198,
199, 201, 204
Union, Temperance, II: 347
Union of Unions, II: 303, 304, 319,
335
Union of Welfare, I: 199, 200, 201,
202, 203, 227
Unions, Professional, II: 303
United Nobility, II: 324, 338
United Slavs, society, I: 196, 205
Universal Service, II: 159
University, autonomy; granted,
II: 305; Withdrawn, II: 331
University Councils, I: 112, 187
University Statutes, I: 112, 187,
282; II: 93, 261, 331
Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 1 : 252
Unkovsky, II: 24, 25, 36, 37, 60,
74, 186
Uspensky, N., II : 207, 214
Ussuriysk, II: 227, 257
Uvarov, I: 185, 191, 195, 239, 249,
253, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 288,
304; his formula, II: 164, 275,
284

INDEX

369

Vagankovo Cemetery, demonstra
tion, II: 290
Valuiev, II: 42, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75,
97, 104, 106, 113, 115, H6, 155,
164, 167, 183-187, 202, 203, 240,
251
Vannovsky, Minister, II: 171, 266
Vassilchikov, I: 186, 196, 203, an,
214, 245, 251
Vassilkov, I: 204
Vassily III, I: 10
Vassily, Count, II: 279
Velepolsky, Marquis, II: 82, 83,
84, 85, 86, 225, 226
Vellansky, I: 283
Venevitinov, I: 284, 290
Vernadsky, Professor, II: 331, 334
Viatka, II: 282
Viazemsky, Prince, 1 : 284
Viazmitinov, I: 97, 192
Viborg, Manifesto, II: 322-324
Vienna, Congress, I: 159, 162, 253;
II: 9, 148
Village W ell-Being, II: 59, 61, 62
Vinaver, II: 319
Vinogradov, II: 331
Vishnegradsky, I. A., II: 267, 281,
286
Vishnegradsky, N. A., II: 94, 170
Vitebsk, II: 302
Vladimir, Grand Duke, II: 301
Vladivostok (mutiny), II: 311,
343
V Narod! II: 208
Vodka prohibition, II: 346, 347
Voice, II: 169, 193
Voices from Russia, II: 62
Voinaralsky, II: 218, 220
Volkonsky, S. G., I: 198, 204, 205,
243
Voltaire, I: 38
Voronezh (military disorders), II:
311

Vorontzov, A. A., I: 85, 86, 87,
116
Vorontzov, M. S., I: 186, 216
Vsevolod Big Nest, I: 8
W
Walling, W. E., II: 341
War, effects of, II : 346
Week, The, II: 192, 210
Western heresies, 1 : 40
Wilhelm I, II: 251, 270
Wilhelm II, II: 271, 342, 343, 345
Wilhelmism, II: 346
Will of the People, II: 222, 238,
239, 245, 247, 260
Winter Palace, I: 87, 94, 127; II:
240, 250, 299, 320
Witgenstein, I: 151, 152, 197, 198,
199
Witte, II: 268, 282, 286, 287, 288,
306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315,
3i7, 319

Yakushkin, I: 197, 198, 201
Yalu, concessions, II: 294
Yankovich de Mirievo, I: 37, in,
280
Yanson, Professor, II: 120, 202,
205, 206, 207
Yaroslav, I: 206
Yekaterinodar (military disor
ders), II: 311
Yelena, Grand Duchess, II: 15,
30, 38, 243, 247
Ypsilanti, I: 210
Yushnevsky, I: 303, 204

Zamiatnin, II: 101, 114, 181, 182
Zarudny, II: 101, 182
Zasulich, Viera, II: 235, 302

370

INDEX

Zavadovsky, I: 81, 82, no, 136
Zemsky Chiefs, introduced, II:
263 ; curbed, II: 334
Zemsky Sobor, I: 41
Zemstvo, II: 96-103, 143-148,
157, 171-180, 183, 194, 224, 235-
264, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282, 283,
298, 299, 303, 304, 311, 328
Zemstvo Congresses, II: 298, 303,
311, 350

Zemstvo-Constitutionalists, II : 283,
303
Zheliabov, II: 237, 246, 247
Zhukovsky, Vassily, I: 232, 242;
II: 3, 4
Zilliacus, Koni, II: 289, 290
Zlatoust, affair, II: 289
Zubatov, II: 288

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