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YALE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Qj

Otffii* WLtiitxn

IN DEFENCE

THE PEOPLE

MASSACHUSETTS.

BOSTON :
PUBLISHED BY SIMON GARDNER.

A. Sampson, Fi-inter.

1824.

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ABVEHTZSEMSSNT.

IN presenting to tbe public this collection of
Mr. Otis' Letters upon the Hartford Convention,
J we do bim no more than justice in declaring our
conviction that he has amply redeemed bis promi
ses. He has demonstrated not merely the moral,
but tbe physical impossibility of a secret combi
nation, so often charged on that assembly; and
though obliged to refer to facts and events which
transpired during tbe war, he has forborne reviving
topics of controversy, and has provided an armour
for tbe defence of tbe bonor of the State, which even
bis political opponents need not be backward to put
on. Expectation too may be entertained that the
brow beaten and calculating friends of the primitive
plan of the Convention, (if any such there be) who
have kept aloof and borne with exemplary fortitude
censures inflicted on their agents, will no longer be
ashamed or afraid to put in a word, though a com
mendable prudence may forbid their taking up a
Cudgel in behalf of tbeir old I'orlorn Hope.
Tbe censors of tbe Hartford Convention may be .
divided into three classes. First the "Enragees,"
or those who aflPect to be patriots '^par excellence."
They are like all pretenders to excessive virtue in
both sexes, much to be suspected — persons, to whom,
as Lord Bacon says, "tbe mixture of a lie doth ever
add pleasure;" and whose minds, "if there were

IV
"taken out, vain opinions, flattering hopes, false
"valuations, imaginations as one would, and tbe
"like, would be left poor, shrunken things." They
love fiction, which bis lordship calls "Vinum Dse-
monum." In the brewing of this adulterated " Vi
num," the Hartford plot is a principal ingredient,
and as the DjEMOnes cannot live without it, we
must let them continue brewing.
There is in the second place a much larger and
more respectable description of prejudiced persons,
whom the writer of the letters has apparently aimed
to disabuse — men who think ill of the Conventiouy
¦who are of fair minds and sound understandings,
but whose pride of opinion will not yield without a
struggle. Such persons are humbled in discovering
themselves to have been dupes to a mere fiction —
that what they have regarded as a "blue light"
was a mere ignis fatuus, and that the Pandemonium
of Hartford was harmless as a Quaker meeting. To
these persons it may be a consolation to know that
their case is not absolutely new; and though even
with the aid of Matthew Cai'ey's Vindicise, it is im
possible to refer them to the story of any false plot,
the belief in which, like that of tbe one in question,
was current upon no evidence whatever ; yet in
stances are not wanting to shew that tbe disease of
tbe imagination is sometimes epidemical, and that
good sense affords no protection against it, when tbe
predisposition to it is strong. Of this tbe history of
animal magnetism is a striking illustration. Accord
ing to the discoverer of the system, there is "a fluid
universally difl"used and filling all space, being the
medium of a reciprocal influence between the celes-

tial bodies, the earth and living beings." One great
conductor of this animal magnetism was sound. Vast
numbers of persons surrounding an iron chest in
circles, were magnetized by a tune upon a forte
piano — ^by hearing each others' voices, touching each
others' thumbs, holding the same string, and even in
different apartments, without any contact whatsover.
By this means they experienced various sorts of con
vulsions, w^ere cured, or thought themselves so, of
divers maladies, and were affected by almost every
variety of agitation, and of tbe beats and colds, which
are common in popular assemblies and governments,
and are produced in tbe same way, by tbe magnet
ism of sympathy. This imposture was gravely up
held by ingenious and scientific writers, (superior,
with respect be it spoken, to tbe Daemones) and
believed by thousands ; and such was the general
excitement even in Paris, that a commission was
instituted, of wbicb Doctor Franklin was one, which
was occupied many days, and in regular sittings, in
trying to detect and explode it. When, therefore,
we find sensible persons believing in the diffusion of
this animal magnetism, by the contact of thumbs,
ropes, and wires, and the percussion of sound upon
the atmosphere, it requires no great stretch of imagi
nation beyond this, to conceive that the Legislatures
of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and other States,
might have been magnetized with a plot-making
sympathy — and as the one was propagated by sound
from room to room, why might not the other have
found its way from State to State by the "still voice"
of newspapers or other invisible mediums, among
those who were pulling the same string!

VI
It is fair to console this well disposed class, by
reminding them of this and other instances, shewing
that a proneness to credulity being often constitu
tional, is not always a reproach to the head, though
a malignant perseverance in error, despite of evi
dence, is so to the heart. The great Johnson be
lieved in apparitions. The miracles of Prince Ho-
henloe, attested "by grave and reverend signiors,"
divide with intrigues for the Presidency the public
attention in tbe Metropolis of the Union. And it is
quite possible there may be in Boston, disciples of
GrALL, who, if they had a chance of lecturing upon
Mr. Otis' skull, would place their finger upon the
plot-making region with the moralizing solemnity of
the Grave Digger in Hamlet.
Apart from these classes — tbe violent and the cre
dulous, are great numbers of persons who have
thought unfavorably of the Convention from having
beard only one side of tbe story, and to whom cor
rect information will be acceptable. Included in
these, is the class who in the course of ten years,
have grown up from childhood and youth to man
hood. Since the conclusion of the war, the Feder
alists have withdrawn to their farms and their mer
chandize, and have talked about "good feelings,"
and conducted themselves as if it did not require as
many parties to lay aside a quarrel as it does to
make one. Meanwhile the efforts to keep alive the
excitement of the old controversy have been inces
sant on the part of the conductors of the democratic
papers, and tbe Governor incites the children to dis
honor their fathers for opinions wbicb have long
ceased to have any relation to the present state of

vu
affairs. By this great mass of ingenuous young men
it must be desirable to be furnished with tbe mate
rials contained in and referred to by these Letters ;
and it is due to that interesting portion of the com
munity to let them see that their Governor has no
better right in reason than he has by the Constitu
tion, to call upon them to blush for tbeir country.
With respect to Mr. Otis himself — he has refrain
ed from every thing like a personal vindication, and
given his reasons for that forbearance. We shall
not therefore connect with this pamphlet any such
vindication, as it might be presumed to receive his
assent, aud have an air of evasion. It cannot be
amiss however to say, that knowing perfectly well
the part he acted during tbe war, and his affinity to
the oldest whig and republican families in tbe coun
try, it would be incomparably more easy for us to
shew the injustice done him by imputing to him a
disposition to violent or high-handed or disorgani
zing measures at any period, than to account for tbe
peculiar and virulent persecution by wbicb it has
been attempted to father upon him, whatever mea
sures by misrepresentation and the course of events
are most liable to be regarded as at variance with
the republican and federal principles of our Union.

nm^ ^if f i^gs

LETTER I.
TO THE EDITOR OP THE CENTINEL.
Aliud est maledicere — aliud accusare — accusatio crimen desiderat reum
ut definiat, homiuem ut uotet — argumento probet, teste confirmet. Maledic-
tio autem nihil habet propositi praster contumeliam. Cic : pro M C(»lio.
SIR, Several months have elapsed since the speech of His Ex
cellency the Governor ¦was made to the Legislature upon his
accession to the chair. In that speech. His Excellency appears
in the novel character of public accuser of the State and people
over which he is called to preside, and requites them for the
honor of their suffrages by bearing record to the past infamy of
their political character and conduct. He imputes to them
perseverance in a course of odious and criminal violation of
their federal obligations, and desertion of the common cause in
a time of urgent peril, and charges them with advancing to
the very brink of treason. This "unhallowed" series of enor
mities, he says, was consummated by an "authorzed combi
nation,"- (that is, as he intends, an illegal confederacy, au
thorized hy law,) the mischievous consequences of which he
describes in the language of one flushed, if not intoxicated
with a new authority. This combination (whose alias dictus is
the Hartford Convention) consisted of persons deputed by the
Legislatures of several States, as Committees to meet together
and consult upon a pressing emergency and to Ireport their
proceedings. Of this number, twelve only were appointed by
Massachusetts ; so that (their names being matter of public re
cord) they may consider themselves denounced as individuals

2
before both branches of the Legislature, not less than if they
had been described with the technicality of an indictment. In
that assembly no voice was raised in their defence by their
friends, who were the minority, and who thought, perhaps
wisely, that silence was the most expressive reply, while the
majority substantially echoed the music of the speech, and
were soothed for the insult offered to the State by the flat
tering unction which His Excellency poured forth upon them
selves. Thus the members of that Convention, for going upon
a State-errand, und^rtakenjyith^^nowiij-elucto are accused
by their Governor, and in fact attainted by an act of the Gen
eral Court, of misdemeanors, which although they cannot by
the Constitution, work forfeiture or corruption of blood, ought
justly to be visited with forfeiture of character, and are by the
public accuser and his court intended to produce that effect.
In these circumstances — in a country whose Constitution pro
hibits the passing of bills of attainder, and secures to the hum
blest culprit the right of a hearing and defence and trial by
his peers ; it would not probably, be deemed in any view of
equity, a departure from the respect due to the Chief Magis
trate and his friends, for the parties thus criminated to appear
before the public in vindication of their characters ; though they
would still be in the predicament of those unfortunates, whoj
under the very ancient " regime" of a country from which I
trust His Excellency would not wish to take example, were
first scourged, and then heard in their defence. Perhaps al
lowance would be made by the liberal (of which I hope there
are many) among His Excellency's supporters, for a tone of in
dignation, in the aged patriots, statesmen, and warriors of the
revolution, (who from different States were members of that
Convention) in defending their civic and military wreaths from
the indecorous grasp of a Chief Magistrate with whom they
need not shrink to compare their claims in every department
of merit and duty to their country. And even the humble in
dividual who addresses you, after many years of service in
public life, might be excused for protesting with some vehe
mence against the injustice of being sent to his account as
a conspirator against the government of his country in conse
quence merely of having served upon a Committee of the Gen-

eral Court sitting in Hartford instead of Boston, and thus ^
undertaking a mission forced upon him by three-fourths of the h
Legislature against his most earnest remonstrance, and to the
great sacrifice of his convenience ; without any equivalent in
diplomatic perquisites and outfits by which the wreaths and
laurels of His Excellency have been gilded. But whatever
hope I might reasonably cherish of a fair indulgence from
every friend of justice in repelling this official libel; yet if the
solitary interest of my own good name were all that was en
dangered by it, I should suffer it to waste its venom " on the
desert air," and leave to posterity to award the praise or cen
sure that shall hereafter appear to be due to " combinations,"
authorized or unauthorized — civil or military ; whether at Hart
ford, the supposed scene of my machinations, or at Newburgh,
where history has laid a plot in which some of His Excellency's
intimate friends were thought to be implicated. (See ^ofe A.)
To this impartial tribunal I would refer my own cause rather
than appear before the public in any communication which may
wear the semblance of a labored vindication of my own politi
cal character. My disinclination to enter upon any such vin
dication has ever been invincible. In proof of its reality I can
adduce the restraint which I have invariably imposed upon
myself. In a long course of public vocations, (which I sin
cerely wish had been as beneficial to my country as they have
been laborious and unproductive to me,) no personal justifica
tion has ever been attempted by me in any recollected instance
against the pitiless censures and calumnies which have been
showered upon me.« It has been my fashion of thinking, that
if a man is sustained by public favor, he has no occasion to
engage in the difiicult task of speaking of himself. If on the
contrary, the people have grown tired, or dissatisfied with his
services, he becomes an object of pity if not of contempt, when
(destitute of the resource which in a retreat from public sta
tion, ministers not only to consolation, but delight— a retro
spection of the best motives, and of a constant communion of
sentiment with wise and honorable men,) he whines over the
*I do not consider ^ letter once written to Gen. Heath, nor a series of
numbers written by "One of the Convention," nor a late letter on the suh,
Ject of the Massachusetts Claim, as forming exceptions to this remprlf.

4
variableness of the popular fancy, and by becoming his own
trumpeter provokes the sneers of his enemies and loses the
esteem of his friends. In all such instances, the attempt to
write one's self into favor — to roll up hill a recoiling popular
ity, is like the labor of Sysiphus — torment without hope. To
such torment I would not willingly be thought capable of the
weakness and folly of dooming myself. Not that I ever held
myself above explanation to candid inquiry from the humblest
citizen of any party, or affected indifference to the popularity
"which follows." But having never, when youthful ardor
availed me, given chase to " that popularity which must be run
after," I would not at this day, with an impaired alacrity, phy
sical and moral, for all the pursuits of this world, expose myself
to the ridicule of hobbling after the butterfly on my crutch, and
throwing off my oldfashioned vesture in order to quicken my
speed. This forbearance to engage in a wordy war on my own
account, connected with the recollection that I am no longer
the competitor of His Excellency, and that I consider my pub
lic "occupation gone," will, I hope obtain credit for my assu
rance that the remarks I propose to make upon a part of the
speech, are prompted by a sense of duty to my native State,
and by no view to any personal gratification or object.
The part to which I allude is the " authorized combination."
This undignified fling was a poisoned shaft which could not harm
the Convention — a dead enemy; but which adheres to the bosom
of the Commonwealth. The very terms, though sufficiently inac
curate, establish this truth. A combination in the ill sense used
by His Excellency, is a league for a bad purpose, in which
those who authorize it are principals. Such a combination
among agents in behalf of their principals, affecting t\\e former
only with guilt, and leaving the latter innocent, is a solecism
and absurdity. It is then the good old State and people of
Massachusetts — ^that people who appointed, approved, and
cheered the Convention; whose honor is assailed by their
Governor. The Convention itself is the stalking horse. The
Commonwealth of 1823 is still the Commonwealth of 1814—
" Shorn of its beams" it is true— mutilated by political sur
geons and reduced to second rate dimensions by the intrigues
of low ambition—doomed for a long time, perhaps forever, to

exhaust its political strength and influence in wranglings grow
ing out of personal and contemptible antipathies and predilec
tions. But nevertheless, the same sober, moral, firm, and
patriotic community then and now. All this His Excellency
seems not to comprehend. He begins with censure and ends
with praise. The end of his Commonwealth, like Gonzalo's in
the Tempest, forgets the beginning— And he is not aware that
he dishonors the people who rocked the cradle of independ
ence, by charging upon them a " combination" to consign it
prematurely to a tomb. It thus (for reasons which shall be
explained) becomes a claim of justice which the State has a
right to prefer, that some member of that Convention, under
the pledge of his own name and character, should take issue
upon the guilt of the people of Massachusetts, in regard to that
particular. To those who know the relation in which I have
stood both to that Convention and to the. Governor, no apology
can be necessary for my taking up the gauntlet at this moment,
nor for my omitting to do it till now. What I propose to offer
will be merely in the nature of an historic memoir, presenting
the transaction, not entirely in a new light, which is impossi
ble; but in one, by which the friends to the honor of the State,
of whatever party, should be glad to view it, and accompanied
by such remarks only as are extorted by the speech. And
while I disclaim the intention of giving just cause of offence to
ingenuous and liberal men, of whatever political bias, I calcu
late upon ha'ving about my ears, an " irritable genus" of a dif
ferent description, which I am neither ambitious to propitiate,
nor fearful to offend. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER II.
SIR, In selecting from the catalogue of crimes for which His
Excellency has. arraigned his native State, the affair of the
Hartford Convention for the subject of my remarks, I do not
proceed merely under an impression that this is the most hein-

ous of the charges. Indeed to do justice to the whole speech
would require a dispassionate retrospect of all the measures
adopted by the State in the troublous times which succeeded
Mr. Jefferson's accession to power. For His Excellency covers
the whole ground of the " long-continued opposition," though
not intending to include (I presume) his own opposition to
Jay's treaty and to the measures and character of Washington,
the object of his later admiration. He accuses the State as
false and recreant to its federal obligations — as shrinking from
the danger of battles which other States were obliged to fight
in its defence, "paralyzing the means and agents" employed
to shield it from the assaults of a common enemy, and sacrifi
cing the " vital interests" of the country to an " unhallowed"
spirit of party. In short. His Excellency by throwing into one
dark group the deformities of the factious monster, has pre
sented to the world the picture of a degenerate State, resem
bling the decayed and rotten republics of which we read, in
the last periods of their decline. It is true, however, that with
the pretensions of a skilful painter, he aims to relieve the 06-
scuro by the claro, and exclaims (in substance) in a sort of
gubernatorial ecstacy,
"What though your crimes were many and were great,
"What though they shook the basis of the State !"
Yet now you have made me Governor, your sins which were of
scarlet, are made white as snow, and you are readmitted into
the "American family." "Jam nova progenies cmlo demitti-
tur alto."
But it certainly is not my peculiar province, nor my inten
tion to analyze this extraordinary specimen of an inauguration
speech— neither am I influenced by a wish that it should dft
His Excellency political harm, nor a belief that it will have
that effect. The zeal of those who delight in the aliment offer
ed to their unextinguishable resentments, and of those whose
hopes would be blasted by the return of a spirit of general con
cord, will always prevail over the passive disapprobation of
persons of better feelings, who, though supporters of His Ex
cellency, condemn his speech. It will therefore, probably add
to the number of his voters. But in that part of the speech

Xvhich adverts to the Hartford Convention, my associates and
myself are stigmatized by every designation short of the " appel
nominal." Circumstanced as I was in respect to His Excel
lency, his hearers could not but look about them to see if I
were present— to see him point his "slow" and "moving"
finger at me from the top of the ladder to which he had ascend
ed. I thus feel myself called upon to answer in behalf of my
old constituents. My friends will lament on my account, what
they will regard as a superfluous and thankless task. The sub
ject they will be ready to say is already comprehended by all
who have examined it with a wish for correct information —
that the superficial will not examine, and that the perverse will
never own their conviction. Above all that a subject now dry
and obsolete will find no readers, while the time is pregnant
with questions and events of more urgent and attractive inter
est. There is much of truth in these suggestions. The history
of the Convention and of all the material facts connected with
its institution and proceedings, have from the beginning been
in possession of all who have seen fit to consult public docu
ments. The story of a plot or secret combination, imputed to
that body, is regarded as impossible in the nature of things, by
those who reflect upon the publicity and nature of our modes
of legislation. And the declaimers and essayists who use it as
a Phantasmagoria on the approach of an election, cannot con
verse together upon the imposture, by themselves, without
laughing in each other's faces.
But while all this is undeniable, it is not less certain that the
history of human credulity affords no example of a more gener
al illusion than yet prevails in relation to the origin and objects
of that assembly. A deep rooted and undefinable prejudice is
found among thousands whose distempered imaginations resist
the prescriptions of truth and reason. They choose to believe
that it was organized at first for some bad purpose, or that it
spontaneously brooded over some atrocious conspiracy, heresy,
or schism. Nothing it is admitted was done, nothing publicly
suggested repugnant to the duty of good citizens. But this to
these jealous persons only proves that the plot was stifled in
embryo. Nobody, say they, can shew that the Convention did
not intend to dissolve the Union or make a separate peace. It

8
is vain to reply that it was equally within their power to have
turned the course of the Mississippi for the convenience of
General Pakenham; and that the same demand for negative
proof, would oblige them to stand mute to a charge of plotting
to blow up Congress with gunpowder, or the President with an
infernal machine. The "rising generation" it seems too, who
can hardly be expected to delve into the dry details of legisla
tive proceedings, must be taught to believe that the Convention
was a cabal menacing the integrity of the Union and disgrace
ful to the State— its parent. Many honest and zealous indi
viduals join in the outcry against this legitimate child of the
State, as if its crimes could disgrace only half of the family, or
as if their posterity could always carry abroad the parish re
gisters in their pockets, and escape the dishonor of a traitorous
pedigree by shewing that their fathers were not among the pub
licans and sinners.
While these idle misapprehensions could be ascribed only to
the ordinary sources of fiction, to that portion of our editors,
debaters, tub-orators, and attorneys without cases, who consti
tute the " cheap defence" of our nation, there was reason to
hope that they would expire in time with the embers of those
passions which gave rise to them ; and like the mania of witch
craft, (which in its day was current, with much more plausible
evidence,) serve merely to show that in a season of discontent,
the propensity to believe in the marvellous bears an exact pro
portion to the incredibility of the tale. But a new aspect is
now given to vulgar calumny by the Speech of a Governor.
The discredit of the Hartford Convention is no longer derived
from the flourishes of electioneering rhetoric or the "tales of
my landlord." It rests upon what ought to be the best and
most reluctant testimony— that of a Chief Magistrate bound by
a sense of his own dignity, and the ties of natural attachment
to construe in the most favorable sense the transactions of the
people of his own State. This Governor feels himself compel
led, to admit and proclaim that the "good name" of the State
had incurred a "reproach" by a long continued course of dis
loyalty, by which it was regarded as excommunicate from the
"American family." And this language he holds upon an oc
casion when grateful emotions naturally suggest that of pane-

gyric, when immemorial usage demands that of civility ; and
when, if ever, the people have a right to expect that the man of
their choice will cover with the mantle of office their political
errors. All these enormities he thinks were aggravated by the
Hartford Convention. Now, when these things, under these
circumstances, are solemnly said by a Governor, I appeal to
the candid of all parties, whether it can be proper to let them
pass "as old wives tales!" How will this affair stand with
posterity, and what must be the measure of humiliation and
permanent loss of credit and influence of this State, if those
members of that Convention who are upon the stage, acquiesce
in this description of their own times and characters ! We
see how easily the history of events passing under our own
eyes is distorted, and the difficulty of forming correct esti
mates of the characters and motives of men, and of the origin
and object of measures, from what is written with professed
impartiality. Hereafter it will be too late to efface the blot made by His
Excellency upon the historic page, by alleging that his speech
was intended merely to chime with the slang of the day. It
will be answered (plausibly though untruly) that the accused
party in the Legislature quailed under the pungent rebuke
from the chair, and that the members of the Convention con
tinued to be dumb as sheep before their shearer. Will then
future generations be consoled for the disgrace of the State, by
the compliment paid to the "rising generation" for having dis
avowed the deeds of their undutiful fathers ? Or will not the
rising generations of this State burn with shame and indignation
when it shall constantly be thrown in their teeth by the rising
generations of other States, that their base blood has crept to
them through ancestors who silently admitted themselves to be
stigmatized as outlaws from the "American family!" What
must be the feelings of the sons of Massachusetts when, on any
public occasion requiring a statement of her claims, the boast
of her former deeds shall be met with the reproach of her later
recreancy ? When the spirit which inspired the impulse and
suggested the emblem of "join or die," shall be contrasted with
the infatuation that would divide the States; and when the
glory of that Provincial Congress which shone forth upon the
2

10
nativity of the Union, shall be regarded, on the confession of a
Governor, as extinguished in the obscurity of an authorized
conclave, whose dark designs, in a time of war, disheartened
the friends of die country and encouraged its foes.
These anticipations open a field for observations pertinent to
the subject that would fill a volume. They are suggested as my
inducement and justification for appearing before the public,
but will be pursued no further than to repel the chaise and sug
gestions in that speech, and to shew that the character of the
Hartford Convention, whether for good or evil, rests upon the
broad shoulders of the community, and consequently that every
friend to the honor of the State, of whatever party, has a deeper
interest in rescuing both the State and Convention from the
disparagement of "disloyal motives" (be his opinion of the ex
pediency of past measures as it may) than he can have in the
issue of any electioneering tournament, or the downfall of any
political antagonist. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER III.
SIR, The first position which I mean to establish is this : That
the project of the Hartford Convention and its proceedings
were more in conformity with tlie public sentiment of Mas
sachusetts Proper, than any measure which had been adopted
by that State, since the acceptance of the Federal Constitution.
How stands the proof? In October, 1814, the Legislature con
vened in a special session, upon a call from the Governor, for
the express purpose of concerting measures for the defence of
the State from her own resources. The members apprized of
the object, and bringing with them the recent feelings and sen
timents of their constituents, raised a Committee of both Houses
to report such measures as the exigency required. Among those
was the resolution proposing a Convention. In favor of this,
after the usual course of proceedings and debate, the vote in

11
the House stood — ayes 260, nays 90. In Senate, 22 to 12.
The vote of the Representatives of Massachusetts Proper was
Q26 to 67. In the winter session of the same Legislature, three
months after the last, (the members having had another oppor
tunity of consulting their constituents) the proceedings of the
Convention were reported, and referred to a Committee of both
Houses. The report of this Committee is conceived in terms
of the most cordial and unqualified approbation. The expedi
ency of the call of the Convention is reiterated and justified.
A sense of the " wisdom and ability with which they have dis
charged their arduous trust," is expressed. Resolutions "highly
approving" their proceedings, and recommending provisions for
giving them effect, were reported, and this most full and lauda
tory report was accepted in the same popular branch by a vote
of the members of Massachusetts Proper, 159 to 48. In the
interval between the adjournment of the autumnal and the
commencement of the winter session, all the harsh and viru
lent invective which had been lavished upon the Convention by
its leading opponents in the General Court, (and which indeed
was the source of all the prejudice and misconception that have
since prevailed) was circulated far and near. Nothing was
omitted to inflame the resentment, awaken the jealousy, alarm
the fears, and extend the sphere of an enraged opposition, and
conjure up against the framers and members of the Convention,
a blast of popular fury. But the people were firm, and the
clamor was unheeded. This is not all. The delegates, who
were the inliabitants of Massachusetts Proper, as well as the
persons deputed to Washington with these proceedings, con
tinued, from the epoch of the Convention to that of the last
political year, to receive as ample testimonials of public confi
dence as were ever conferred upon the same number of persons
in the same period. With the exception of two, (Mr. Cabot
and Mr. Dane, who had long since retired from political em
ployment, universally esteemed and honored,) they were con
stantly appointed or chosen to distinguished public stations in
the Commonwealth, (those who have died, having been in office
to the time of their death.) Throughout the entire period, there
was no occurrence to justify the belief in any change of the
popular sentiment in Massachusetts respecting that Conven-

12
tion, but on the contrary, every public indication of an ad
herence to the same opinions was manifested in the political
complexion of the government, and in the whole progress of
affairs. From this compendious state of facts, which it would be easy
to extend, the result is inevitable that the people, government,
and Convention of Massachusetts were identified, in relation
to that measure at the time of its adoption, and that as well
after as before that period, there reigned among the majority
of the people and their representatives, and the individuals
who served in the Convention, a more perfect union of politi
cal sentiment, than is usually realized for such a length of
time in popular governments, between the people and their
public servants. To impute these measures to a faction, is to
set truth and reason at defiance. The feelings which gave rise
to tliem pervaded a majority of all classes in town and country,
including a very ample portion of those most distinguished in
every profession and calling, by virtue, talents, wealth, and all
the qualities which merit and command influence among an in
telligent people. This is not at all the history or character of
faction. The powers of a republic may indeed be usurped by
individuals, and the rights and the will of the people may be
come a prey to the tyranny of three, ten, thirty, or five hundred
tyrants, without involving them in the culpability of misgovern-
ment. An oligarchy, or if you please, a junto of ambitious and
unprincipled men, may obtain a temporary ascendency in the
most perfect Commonwealth, by the consent of the people ; but
unless they retain by force, what.they have gained by deception
or surprize, the people are in fkult. But this is not a case of
usurpation, or of short lived faction, nor of surprize or fraud.
If the Convention was a measure of political profligacy, the
people of Massachusetts are either an intelligent people and
guilty with premeditation — or they are an ignorant people, and
the dupes were hoodwinked and led by the knaves.
This latter hypothesis nobody will seriously maintain  Upon
the former, (which is the hypothesis of the speech,) not only is
the character of the State dishonored, but the confidence and
hopes of the votaries of our Republican system are built upon
the sand. The experiment of a Republican Government can

13
never bfe made with more advantage than it has been with the
sons of the Pilgrims. They founded the "American family"
upon a republican rock at Plymouth. They were republicans at
heart before their emigration — the manners, habits, prejudices,
and education of their descendants ; their intelligence, state of
property, and sense of interest, growing out of actual prosper
ity, all conspired to render the scene and the circumstances of
the experiment eligible beyond any which mankind had witness
ed. They had realized the mutual protection and advantages
of a Confederation, forty years together, a century and a half
ago. If then, the imputations of those who would hunt down
the Hartford Convention are correct, there must be in republi
can government, among the most intelligent and virtuous peo
ple, and under the most favorable circumstances, an inherent
and irreversible tendency to degenerate ; against which, we in
this western world, shall have in vain provided the checks and
balances of paper Constitutions. If, for example, the majority
of a great people of that description in one or more States, with
ample means of information, and intimate acquaintance with
public characters, instigated by an 'unhallowed spirit of party,
could persevere through many consecutive years, in confiding
the administration of affairs, to men who, belying characters
free from former stain or reproach, had become so dead to
shame, and gangrened at heart, by party-hate, as to "combine"
to favor the views of a public enemy, by discouraging the
defence of the country in a war to whose scourge they and their
children and fortunes were indiscriminately exposed — If, I say,
the citizens of well balanced republican governments, exerci
sing the faculty of annual elections, knowing their men, and
forewarned of their policy, continued to "heart on" and cheer
with encouragement, those who (in the spirit of the tenants of
a penitentiary) would delight in undermining the very founda
tions of the Constitution — well might the friends of monarchy
exclaim, of what value is the parchment citadel ! naturally
might they consider the cause of republics desperate, and that
such a state of affairs implied the want, and must be followed
by the possession on somebody's head, of that "thing which is
hung up in the tower and shewn to strangers for sixpence," to
save the people from their own enemies — ^themselves.

14
It is no answer to these suggestions, that the body of the na
tion was sound and that the disease was local. It was in a
vital part— it was in New England— a part not predisposed to
such an infection. Besides, symptoms of at least equal malig
nity, with less of exciting cause, have been manifested in those
regions of our body politic which, during the war, were regard
ed as the most healthful. When the measures of government
or any of its departments bear hard upon the predilections of
the States, most eminently patriotic, (if we take their word for
it,) we hear a warmer tone of expostulation ; and a louder note
of preparation for resistance than was ever sounded by the Yan
kee bugle. A Missouri question— a contested claim of juris
diction by the Supreme Court — the establishment of a bank, the
sale of a lottery ticket, or a proposition to modify the tariff,
produce speeches, resolutions, and remonstrances, in such "bold
words," as shew a determined spirit of resistance, and would,
if followed by "deeds as bold," soon break up the "family"
establishment, and bring down the house itself upon our heads.
I put it then with confidence to those friends of Republican
Government, who are not eaten up with prejudices — and to
such of the "rising generation" as have no disposition to sully
the grey hairs of their fathers, (in order to obtain an admission
into the "American family" by His Excellency's back stairs,)
whether it be not their duty, and ought not to be their pleasure
to furnish themselves with the means of repelling a scandal
which leads to these sinister conclusions. To examine impar
tially the history of the period reviewed in the speech — to judge
from documents which cannot deceive, and from undeniable
facts, whether there were not two sides to the great questions,
and especially to that of the war; concerning which, honest
minds might innocently differ — to determine in a spirit of can
dor, whether the then great federal party might not have sin
cerely felt similar apprehensions of danger to the liberties of
Europe, and of America also, from the avowed principles and
ambitious strides of the Emperor of France; to those which
ai-e now inspired by the demonstrations of the Holy Alliance.
Whether that danger would be at this moment too remote and
visionary to justify common precaution, if the despotism of Na
poleon, by events (admitted in the speech of Mr. Madison to

15
have been out of ordinary calculation) had not been annihilated;
and whether opposition to the war did not grow out of a sense
of that danger; and anxiety for peace (after that had subsided)
out of the fear of national bankruptcy (suspended by a hair) and
of an exhausting conflict without indemnity or redress. Let
such persons, now that jealousy and pride ought to be laid
asleep, inquire whether, under this aspect, the opposition was
not perfectly natural, and whether under the adverse events of
a protracted war, (had it continued) it might not have appeared
that more of reason was on its side. Let them also consider
how far its objects hare been obtained and the predictions of
its opponents accomplished.
To those who are not afraid to commence and pursue such in
quiries, with a view to truth alone, a momentous question is pre
sented. On what ground do the interest and honor of the State
(which by the supposition that the Republican party has the as
cendency, is their interest and honor) require them to place the
late opposition? must it be on that of "unhallowed" party feel
ings, on insensibility to the honor and danger of the country — on
disaffection to the Union and traitorous combinations ? or is it not
sufficient for all the fair and honorable objects of party to ar
raign the wisdom, policy, and expediency of the system pursued
by those who had influence with the people under former ad
ministrations, and for those reasons only to transfer, if they see
fit, their confidence to those who with them were opposed to
the old order of things. This may be done without discredit to
a State, and no man is entitled to expostulate or complain.
The people may change men whenever a revolution happens in
public opinion respecting men or measures. Let the change
happen, if you please, through a real persuasion of its fitness,
through a fondness for rotation in office, through the charm of
new talents or new faces, nay, even through caprice, or any of
the causes which operate upon the man or the million. All this
is unobjectionable, because it is in the natural course of things,
but when it shall become the settled habit of our Governments
for those who come into power by the suffrage of the people, to
launch forth in revilings of those who go out, we shall exhibit a
miserable spectacle of hostile factions, like those which brought
the republics of ancient and modern times to ruin. Men of

16
principle and talent will not devote their lives to the study of
the "Commonwealth's affairs," with a certain anticipation that
upon every change of public opinion they are not only to lose
place, (which they ought to expect and be reconciled to,) but
character also. The powers of government will then fall suc
cessively into the hands of those who will deserve all the ill
they can say of each other, and who will indemnify themselves
for the loss of the little reputation they have at stake by turning
through their sterile grounds, the streams which flow from the
public treasury. Every man will have a price for himself and
his relations — every place its perquisites, to the profits of which
the prices in the statute book will afford no clue. While the
high minded and disinterested will seek in disgust the shade of
private life, and leave the republic to its fate.
H. G. OTIS.

LETTER IV.
SIR,
In this " era of good feelings," the propensity to forget being
entirely on one side, it may be necessary to refresh the memory
of the once " disloyal," but now penitent majority of Massachu
setts, by quoting the specimen of the sublime and virulent,
wherewith it has pleased His Excellency to chastise them for
their former offences. These are his words :
"The long continued opposition to the federal government, but more
especially the measures pursued in this State during the eventful and critical
period of the late war — the withholding from the general govemment the
constitutional means of defence— the paralyzing influence exercised over the
means and agents of that government, which occasioned double sacrifices
of life and treasure ; while the citizens of other States were exerting their
utmost energies against a common enemy ; when a gallant army and navy
were covering themselves with glory, and retrieving and establishing, on an
imperishable basis, the national character, on the ocean and on the land; at
this portentous crisis, when our liberties and independence were at hazard
an unhallowed spirit of party was permitted to prevail over the vital interests
of the country— an authorized combination was formed, and meetings held
in a neighboring State, which, whatever may have been its professed object,

ir
had the certain effect of encouraging the enemy, of discouraging and impairing
the means and resources of the country, and of alienating the minds of the
citizens from that "unity of government,! which, in the emphatic language
of Washington, "constitutes us one people, — is the meiin pillar in the edifice
of our real independence, the support of our tranquillity at home, our peace
abroad, of our safety, of our prosperity, of that very liberty which we so
highly prize." These measures and this course had cast a reproach on the
good name of the State, which is now disavowed and removed. Massachusetts
is at length restored to the American family. Her character is redeemed in
the estimation of the patriots of our own country and of every statesman
in Europe. The rising generation, who could have had no agency in this
disloyal course, appear to have taken an honorable autid an earnest interest
in its disavowal."
The cruelty of this bitter invective is aggravated by those
characteristics which distinguish calumny from legal accusa
tion. By an absence of all specification of time, place, and
circumstance, and by the indiscriminate phraseology of the pub- ¦
lie tribunal, which condemned to the guillotine "those suspect
ed of being suspicious."
It is an advantage enjoyed in the military and naval service,
that those who are charged by the voice even of i-umor, with
deviation from duty, can cause to be instituted such inquiry
into their conduct as will compel their accusers to specify or
to abandon their charges. But for those who serve the State
in the civil department, no such recourse is provided. They
are at the mercy of every popinjay ¦who can throw a squib or
discharge an air gun from a garret window — of editors who
pander for the bad passions of party — and for rivals who hum
ble themselves to imitate the starlings and "halloo Mortimer,"
instead of gi^ving an elevated tone to the public sentiment, in
which all men of high minds, even of their own party, would
be glad to harmonize.
Although in the foregoing quotation, the Governor has embo
died the substance of all the insinuations of hostility to the
Government, on the part of Massachusetts and the Convention,
which have been wire-drawn through endless speeches, essays,
and volumes, he has not alleged a single fact susceptible of a
direct issue. His nearest approach to precision is in the impu
tation of certain effects which he avers to have been the result of
the Convention. These effects are : — First, encouragement to
the enemy. Second, discouragement of the country, and im-

18
pairing its means and resources. Third, alienating the miftds
of the citizens from the unity of government, &c. Now admit,
for a moment, (what shall be disproved) that these "effects"
had followed the institution or the proceedings of the Hartford
Convention, they would not, unless in connexion with its avow
ed intentions and actual misdeeds, furnish any just ground for
questioning its patriotism and integrity. On the contrary, its
pretensions to these attributes are demonstrable beyond all pos
sible doubt, by those rules of evidence which are founded in
the principles of eternal justice, and by which alone we can
fairly estimate the motives of men and the objects of associa
tions. Nobody will deny that consequences often enable us to
form a judgment of intellectual endowments, of the wisdom of
schemes, and of the sagacity and foresight of their projectors.
But the only standard of intentions is words and actions taken
together. It would be then, a simple and conclusive answer to every
calumnious aspersion of the Convention, that it was, correctly
speaking, a war measure, rather than a peace measure — It was
one of a series of propositions for raising men and money for
public defence. And if its proceedings were confirmatory of
that profession, it is not responsible with its character, for any
sinister consequences which incidentally followed.
Apart from this doctrine, neither individuals, or societies, or
governments can find protection from calumniators in and out
of office. He who makes a profession of religion, and whose-
whole life is devoted to the observance of its ordinances and the
practice of its duties, may be branded as a hypocrite. He whose
example is a mirror of all the moral virtues before men, may be
charged with retiring from their busy haunts with a purpose of
solitary intemperance. Societies for propagating the Gospel,
may be charged with the secret design of disseminating the Age
of Reason. Bible societies may be accused of an intent to bring
the Scriptures into disrepute — and the society for Foreign Mis
sions, of aiming to establish the influence and empire of this
world, like their predecessors, the Jesuits. Just as the early
Christians were actuaUy denounced by the Governor of Bythin-
ia, (whose politeness, if he had held his office from their choice,
would probably have spared them the outrage,) for holding Con-

19
ventions of the most dangerous tendency, though the only pro
fessions made by them, were of the sublimest morality to which
their lives were conformable, and their only overt acts of trea
son consisted in singing hymns and doing homage to the Sa-riour.
It seems strange that a fundamental rule, by wliich our con
duct in all the ordinary transactions of life is governed, should
require illustration; that in the affair of the Convention, their
own words and acts, which are the only test of character, should
be disregarded, and that they should be charged with promo
ting tendencies to disunion which it was their avowed inten
tion to counteract, and against which, their proceedings are a
formal protest.
As a disregard of this plain rule is the cause of all the misap
prehension; let us try it by another case. It was predicted of
Mr. Jefferson's administration, and conscientiously believed,
that it would prove fatal to the funding system, and detrimental
to our religious institutions ; that it would endanger the Consti
tution and sacrifice the public peace to foreign partialities. But
upon his accession to power he promulgated principles favorable
to the support of public credit and of the Constitution, and
avowed the strongest attachment to a system of neutrality.
Tlie measures of his administration were ostensibly adapted,
and by him and his friends avowed to be intended to conform
to this exposition of his creed. His opponents however thought,
and probably still think, that the tendency of his system was to
an opposite end. Public credit was however cherished — no di
rect violation of the Constitution (the repeal of the Judiciary
act, concerning which, there are two opinions, excepted,) was
encouraged, and the peace of the country, though often endan
gered, was preserved during his time. Is it not then regarded
fey the friends of that administration as flagrant injustice, as
well as indecency, to return to the old charge ? to insist that
what he said and did while he was at the helm, shall be ac
counted for nothing ? that he nevertheless harbored a secret un
friendliness to the Constitution, and panted for a British war ?
And in affirmance of these allegations to adduce the incautious
speeches, and intemperate essays, of anonymous writers of his
party, and the violent, indecorous, and extravagant language of
the public news-papers that were enlisted in his support, and the

20
editors of which were said to be under his special patronage ?
This is a course pursued by no fair adversary at this day. A
conviction of the impolicy of that administration is still deeply
rooted in the minds of many, but base and unconstitutional views
are imputed to it by none. It stands upon the foundation of its
own history. Not so the Hartford Convention. In their case
the appeal is made in vain to profession and practice, to wit
nesses and records of their own transactions. The feast which
malignity and credulity are invited to make at their expense is
composed of scraps from newspapers, and Olive Branches, and
stump orations — a gallimaufrey, which, after feeding multitudes,
is simmered down by His Excellency into a portable sauce pi-
quante, for the Senators and Representatives to take home to their
"American family" dinners. Proceeding still on the supposi
tion (for the sake of argument) that these "effects" on the friends
and foes of the country were realized ; it follows conclusively,
that if nothing to authorize: them was countenanced by the Con
vention, they must have been the fruit of impressions made by
misrepresentation. It is then, an abomination in the Directors
of the Party Mint, to stamp the name of the Convention upon
their base coin, instead of their own image and superscription.
Beside these considerations, it would be quite pertinent to
insist, that in a time of war, those who are dissatisfied with a
continuance of hostilities, and who desire a return to a pacific
policy, are not to be gagged, lest the disclosure of their senti
ments should encourage the enemy. At least, this was the
creed of Chatham, when he thanked "God that America had
resisted." Of this persuasion was the republican party, during
our short war with France. Of the Whigs in England, before
the peace of Ryswic, and of the Tories, when they compelled
the peace of Utrecht. There is, first or last, a peace party in
all free governments, and they will speak fearlessly. This
party was formidable, and respectable and audible from the be
ginning of the war between England and France until the peace
of Amiens, in the British Parliment. It was a Peace Party
whose opposition to the invasion of Spain, found favor in this
country, and the late Mr. Dexter, eloquently observed, that
the friends of peace have sometimes no alternative but to speak
loud, at the risk of being overheard by the enemy. It is inevi-

21
table in all wars that an enemy should place some hope in the
known disposition of the party desirous of peace. But it has
little or no effect upon his plans of operation ; and if through a
reluctance to encourage this hope, all should forbear to recom
mend a pacific policy, wars would be eternal, as was the case in
the Grecian Republics, where exile or death frequently await
ed those who dared to oppose their predominant frenzy for the
tented field.
These remarks would be strictly in point, if in consequence
of the Hartford Convention, (though a war measure in itself)
being a measure of the Peace Party, the result had been, through
a misapprehension of its views, to encourage the enemy and dis
courage the friend. But it so happens, that they are not all es
sential to the vindication of the Convention, from a responsi-
bleness for the "certain effect," by His Excellency, referred to
that source. Because His Excellency is mistaken, and no such
certain effect ever took place. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER V.
SIR, The Hartford Convention, though irreconcilably opposed to
the origin and conduct of the war, and most anxious for peace,
was nevertheless, as I have asserted, professedly and truly a
Council of War; created to make a more effectual provision
for the public defence. It is inconceivable by what force of
imagination it could have been, in any possible event, said to
produce the "certain effect" of discouraging friends, or encour
aging the enemy. Still, had it been true in fact, that these ef
fects had been produced by any cause whatever, there would
have been the same difficulty in disproving His Excellency's as
sertion, which is always incident to what is termed in logic,
proving a negative. We must have rested on the natural in
credibility of the fact — on the impossibility of any connexion
between such a cause and such an effect — on the tendency of the

22
cause to produce an opposite effect, and in a word, upon the total
destitution of proof on his part. But the true and conclusive
reply to this direct assertion of the speech (already given) is,
that between the time of the institution of the Hartford Con
vention and the end of the war, no such "certain effects" as are
mentioned, took place. No such events happened — no instance
can be adduced demonstrative of increased confidence in the
enemy, or of depression in the defenders of the country. The
very reverse of all this may be established by the history of that
period. The appalling occurrences of the war, aU happened
prior to the era of the Convention. Before that time the ene
my had hovered over and threatened the coast from Maine to
Georgia. They had made descents in many places, ravaging
them with fire and sword. They had marched almost without
molestation to the metropolis of the Union, and destroyed with
Vandal hands the public buildings. Never was the aspect of
our affairs more perilous, the attitude of the enemy so menacing,
his pretensions so lofty, and the discontent with the measures
of government so feverish among the people of Massachusetts,
(though always loyal and alert for measures of defence,) as in
the season immediately preceding the organization of the Con
vention. It was this posture of affairs which induced the Ex
ecutive of Massachusetts to convene the Legislature, and which
suggested to that body, the expediency of a Convention, among
other resolutions providing defensive measures. The Legislature
was summoned in September, 1814. The act instituting the Con
vention, passed in October following. The Convention was in ses
sion from the 15th of December in that year, to the 5th day of the
next January. Throughout this entire period, and thencefor-
ivard to the termination of the war, not a new project was form
ed, nor entei-prize commenced, nor new pretension advanced, nor
advantage of any moment gained by the enemy. On the other
hand, to this same period, (dating from the act establishing the
Convention) may be referred, a more united disposition in the
people to prepare the means of protracted resistance, not indeed
from acquiescence in the hostile policy which occasioned the
war, but from a persuasion of its being the only mean of safety.
And it may be truly affirmed that no period of the war was dis
tinguished by so much of military vigor and brilliant success.

23
and so much of unity in the national feeling on the part of this
people ; and so palpable a lowering of tone on that of the enemy,
as that immediately following the sittings of the Convention.
The President of the United States at this time, appears to have
entertained no apprehensions from the disaffection of Massachu
setts, or of New England. In the same month of September,
in his Message, he expatiates upon the undaunted spirit which
pervaded the nation, upon the heroic and enlightened patriotism
of their constituents, and upon the promptness and alacrity
"every where" displayed in sustaining the public burdens. The
expedition against New Orleans (as was justly apprehended by
our Commissioners at Ghent, and foreseen by our Government)
was doubtless planned in the British Cabinet at the commence
ment of the campaign, and perhaps could not have been aban
doned by the commanding general. Yet if the tendency of
the Hartford Combination had been to encourage the enemy,
one would expect to see this "effect" realized in those States or
their neighborhood, which were the seat of disaffection. The
enemy were certainly bound to be in readiness to make some
demonstrations, in the way of co-operation vrith their Hartford
auxiliaries. But this encouraged enemy, though apprized by
public documents of the project of the Convention, transferred
altogether the prosecution of hostilities to the extreme South,
while our discouraged brethren in that quarter, with the same
information, continued to prepare ¦with vigor for the defence of
New Orleans ;) and Jackson obtained his splendid victory on
the day when he had every reason to conclude that the Conven
tion was in session. From the address of that general to his
victorious troops, recurring to the whole series of military ope
rations, from September to January, it is apparent that the "zeal
and alacrity" of the people and of the military of all that region
could not be surpassed. And his congratulations and encomi
ums upon the spirit and unanimity in which every symptom of
disaffection had been merged, were expressed in the most glow
ing and unqualified terms. In a word, all the operations of the
war, from the time of the first public mention of a Convention
to the termination of hostilities, were carried on in the South.
They were likewise of a most encouraging complexion.
To what other region shall we look, for the "certain effects,"

24
attributed to the combination ? Let us for a moment, take a
peep into the British Cabinet and observe there the effects upoij
its policy. If we find that administration, instead of presum
ing upon hopes inspired by the known existence of the Hart
ford Convention, and rising in their terms of peace, in antici
pation of its depressing influence upon this country ; actually
descending from their high ground, and conceding in negotia
tion, points of which they had formerly been tenacious, the
inference is irresistible that the "effects" of that formidable
association, were not such as to elate the hopes of the British
ministry. This then seems to have been the actual course of
events. The correspondence of our ministers at Ghent disclo
ses the fact, that in the same month of October, (when the pro
ject of the Convention then recently convened and agitated
could not have been known in Europe,) the tone of the British
negotiators was such as forbade the hope of terminating their
discussions by an amicable treaty. Their demands bore the
stamp of a most presumptuous confidence. While they requir
ed stipulations for dismantling the forts on our frontier and
discontinuing our naval armament on the lakes without any
corresponding concessions on their part, they also insisted (as
a sine qua non,) upon the actual dismemberment of our terri
tory, by a renunciation of jurisdiction over an immense region
in favor of their Indian friends, and upon an admission of the
latter as parties in adjusting the terms of peace. Such was the
forbidding aspect of the negotiation, and the arrogance of the
British pretensions, at a time when they could by no possibility
have heard of any such measure as the project of the Hartford
Convention. But in December they must have been well in
formed of the fact, that such a Convention would be held ; of
the time of its intended meeting, and of the views ascribed to
it by its opponents; — ^yet far from presuming upon, and waiting
only a few days for an issue favorable to their wishes — for the
work of disunion to be consummated — they at that moment ac
tually abandon their high and inadmissible pretensions, recede
from the sine qua non, and (although they undoubtedly calcu
lated that New Orleans had fallen) they concluded a treaty of
peace conformable to the instructions of our government. This
fact alone is conclusive in disaffirmance of the consequences im-

25
puted to the Convention by His Excellency — but independently
of all these remarks, it is sufficient that any just and candid
person by reverting to general considerations must perceive and
admit that no blame in this particular could attach to the Con
vention. The only incentives to an enemy, that could have
grown out of the Hartford Convention must be found either in
its avowed objects, its actual proceedings, or in the suggestions
of the fears, jealousies, or malice of its opponents. But its
avowed object, as described in the act of its creation, was "to
unite in the most vigorous measures for defending the State
and expelling the invader," "laying aside all party feelings
and political dissentions." Its proceedings speak for them
selves the language of patriotism and union, and contain the
distinct project of a vigorous system for defence, and for the
effect of timidity, jealousy, or malignity, they could not be re
sponsible. Had the Legislature called upon His Excellency
for documents to justify and support his allegations of "certain
effects," he must have found himself embarrassed under a total
destitution of that evidence, which alone, a Chief Magistrate,
consulting what is due to his own dignity, should make the
basis of his communications. If, indeed, the invasion of this
State and of Connecticut — the assaults upon Eastport and Cas-
tine, Belfast, Scituate, Wareham, in the former, and Petipauge
and Stonington in the latter, had been cotemporaneous with,
or immediately followed the project of the Convention, there
might have been some faint color, for the presumption, that
the enemy were encouraged to make these onsets in the belief
that the measure was indicative of a spirit of disaffection of
which advantage might be taken. But even then, the fault
would have been in the painters and not in the model. But
these hostile incursions preceded the Convention. They were
of a nature to excite alarm; to produce detestation and resist
ance ; to allay the flame of party, to awaken a sense of com
mon danger and a concert of common counsels among States
bordering on each other and exposed to similar hostile ¦risita-
tions. They had that "effect" and none other. It is impossi
ble that an enemy could have calculated upon any other, and
it will be with posterity, only an additional instance of the
blindness and uncharitableness of party feeling, that the reverse
4

26
of this effect should have been ascribed to that association.
Those of the rising generation, whose curiosity prompts them
to investigate the causes which damped the ardour of their
countrymen, and stimulated the enterprize of the enemy, must
look far behind the Hartford Convention. They must raise the
veil which those who rejoiced in the salvation of their country,
by a period put to the war, have been willing, its promoters
should drop over the egregious errors which marked its com
mencement. Many of these causes may then be discerned in
the declaration of war itself by one half of the country, in the
total improvidence of means and preparation for such an event,
and the absence of the commanding talents in the War Depart
ment which could in any measure, by the creation of resources,
counterbalance the evils of -this precipitancy — ^in contriving so
to manage matters, as to enable the enemy on the frontier to
get the first intelligence of the war and capture an important
post before its defenders were apprized of the event— in a plan
of operations, which is the standing jest and wonder pf all mil
itary men, adopted under His Excellency's auspices, by which
Canada was assailed in the point to which those entrusted with
its defence, whether French or English, had always endeavored
to transfer the seat of war — in marching our forces to the inter
minable wilderness to breathe a vein in the little finger of the
enemy instead of pushing directly for his heart. Thus expo
sing whole armies to be captured and scalped in this Ultima,
Thule of the civilized creation, where success would have been
of Uttle avail. In the deplorable waste of the "materiel" of
war and subsistence and its transportation, through places, over
which the "foul fiend" had been the only pioneer, at an ex
pense exceeding the intrinsic value of the lading. These and
the disasters of the two first campaigns, together ¦with a strong
impression of the hopelessness of the contest, had doubtless the
"certain effect" of depressing the spirit of the country. ¦ But
even these dangers were considered insignificant in comparison
with another. The despotism of Napoleon at the commence
ment of our war overshadowed Europe. And it was the sober
and deliberate persuasion of niany of the firmest and vrasest
patriots, in every part of New-England, that the extension of
its baleful influence to our counti-y would be promoted, by a

27
war with his enemy, leading to an alliance (at least de facto)
vrith the tyrant himself.
These considerations doubtless produced a deep sensation,
and strong desire in this people to abide by the armistice made
between Generals Dearborn and Provost soon after the com
mencement of hostilities, and afterwards to embrace the terms
of peace offered through Admiral Warren. When these terms
(which, as was anticipated, and as the event has proved, were
as favorable as there was a prospect of ever obtaining) were re
jected ; no doubt a bitter feeling of regret and resentment elec
trised the people of Massachusetts, who had just taken the gov
ernment from the hands bf the war party. They posted in all
directions to meetings of their primary assemblies, and the
voice of opposition to the policy of the war, like peals of inces
sant thunder, echoed from every point of the compass. It was
instinct, and not influence which produced the universal desire
to compel the administration to reconsider and accept at that
period, those terms which after two years and a half of hard
fighting, they boast as a merit of having obtained.
This hope however, was exceedingly enfeebled by subsequent
events. Although the gratifying sense of security to the liber
ties of the country, in the do^wnfall of Bonaparte, outweighed
the dread of danger from the continuance of the war, yet it
could not be disguised that this danger had become more seri
ous, from circumstances which increased the confidence of the
enemy ; and that, probably, the administration had suffered to
escape the favorable time for negotiating peace. It became
then, the duty of the people to prepare to meet a foe whose
means of annoyance were augmented on their own coasts, and
at their own home. On none but God and herself could New
England rely for succour — yet her principal States, simply for
entertaining a constitutional doubt, (in a new case) authorized
by the Judges of her highest tribunal, (whose ermine was as spot
less as their talents were great) were considered as outcasts
from the "American family;" and for concerting the means of
defending themselves from the catastrophies of Havre de Grace,
Alexandria, and Washington, by an array of their own sons,
they are charged with authorizing "combinations;" and the

28
portraits of Strong and Cabot, and Treadwell and Goodrich,
and West, are placed in his Excellency's collection, by the
sides of those of Cataline and Cethegus.
H. G. OTIS.

LETTER

n-

"I do not know the method of drawing \ip,f.n indictmeflt against a whole
people. I am not ripe to pass sentence on the gravest public bodies, en
trusted with magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged with
the safety of their fellow citizens upon the very same title that I am, I re
ally think that for wise men, this is not judicious : for sober men, not decent :
for minds tinctured with humanity, not mild or merciful."
Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America.
SIR, It has, I trust, been successfully demonstrated that the in
stitution and proceedings of the Hartford Convention, whatever
were its objects, were attended with no detriment to the nation.
Certainly none for which the State or Convention are responsi
ble. I will, in the course of this letter, attempt to arrange the
multitudinous charges included in the speech, under such gen
eral heads, as may enable me to refute them vrithout a particu
larity of detail, that would forbid the expectation of engaging
the attention to a subject, upon which more are ready to decide
than are patient to examine.
To those, however, who wish for a short answer, and to all
who are the professed advocates of State Rights, the suggestion
ought to be conclusive — that the charge of a "combination" as
preferred against a Free and Independent State, or its consti
tutional Government, or (which is the same thing) its approved
Agents, is in itself preposterous and not predicable of such a
State. There can be no limitation, but its own discretion, to the
right of each of these United States, to consult with any other

29
State, upon subjects of joint interest, and upon the nature and
extent and the mode of performing its duties to the Union, as
also upon the means of causing those due to itself to be respect
ed. It may be very inexpedient to exercise this right upon light
occasions — ^but of this the State must of necessity be exclusively
the judge ; and neither can it nor its agents be justly chargea
ble with any species of offence for holding such consultation,
the power to do it having never been relinquished, and conse
quently being reserved to the State.
If Mr. Burke had lived^n these times, he would have been
relieved from the diffi<rf|cy^hich he found in drawing up an
indictment against a wltjp people by the precedent now afford
ed. He would have also learnt, that a whole people, (not mere
ly subjects of a colony, but constituting an Independent State)
might be guilty of a "combination" — and what must have ap
peared to that great man, a more extraordinary novelty, would
have been the discovery that the passing of an act by a Legis
lative Body with open doors, the appointing of a Committee
for a constitutional inquiry into the state of public grievances,
and the sitting of such Committee with closed doors, were ipso
facto, withou any overt act or proof of evil intention, evidence
of such combination ; notwithstanding the result of such private
deliberation, should, when published to the world, be fi-ee from
all color of criminality. It is not believed that Mr. Burke,
from the exhaustless storehouse of his menjory and with his
unwearied patience of research, could have produced a narra
tive of any plot or combination, real or fabricated, which had
excited a public sensation and obtained credit, (and there is no
history of a war, foreign or domestic, without one) that was not
countenanced by evidence true or false of some fact, proving
either intention or overt act. In those periods of English his-
torj- when the scaffold has been drenched with blood shed in
punishment of constructive treasons, the imputed crime was al
ways fixed by evidence of some act deemed criminal in law,
upon the accused party. At one period, writing was consider-
. ed as an overt act — (scribere est agere :) but even then, the
public accuser was held to prove that the criminal matter was
in the hand writing of the culprit. Until this point was estab
lished, Sydney could not be sacrificed upon account of writings

30
found in his closet. The Popish Plot, the standing reproach
of the credulity and bigotry of a great nation in an enlightened
age, was attempted to be substantiated by perjured witnesses,
testifying to falsehoods in the form of facts. Had there been
no allegation of facts whatever, nothing but a mere outcry of
plot, popery, combination, without a pretext of fact to uphold
it, that imposture would not probably have run like wildfire
over England.
In the days of witchcraft and demonology, the victims to the
prevailing delusion were not hange^^ithout a charge of some
magical or infernal act done by ti|einB|iid proved by at least,
one witness — somebody was pincneJIptormented — ^the color
faded — the flesh rotted — the speeclrfailed, or the senses were
benumbed. The weird sisters or brothers were always proved
to the satisfaction of the jury, to have occasioned a "toil and
trouble" in some mode or other. It was not essential to have
a very clear conception of their metempsychosis, or mode of
travelling through the air, or process of incantation — but still
there was a formal accusation of witchcraft, and ¦witnesses to
prove it.
The Hartford case out-herods all these. The accusers are
agreed, neither in regard to the offenders, nor the crimes. His
Excellency includes in his indictment, first "the State" — ^next,
the Legislature who authorized the "combination," and of course
the combination itself. Others (writers from whom His Excel
lency catches his enthusiasm) affect to discriminate between the
whole body of Federalists in the Legislature, and the few who
were supposed to draw the "Leviathan with a hook." Some
regarded all the members of the Convention as in "pari delicto J'
Others pick out the speckled birds by their own sagacity. One
essayist of distinguished prolixity, who is thought by his parti-
zans to have exhausted the subject, acquits the members from
Connecticut, (as I am credibly informed, having never read his
numbers) because they were restrained by their instructions
from disloyal enterprizes against the Union; — but condemns
those of Massachusetts, whose instructions (doubtless not then
read by him) were of the same tenor.
In Essex, the established character of Mr. Dane for moderation
and probity being in their way, the Salem papers excepted him

31
from the general charge, and admit that he consented to serve
in the Convention, merely to control the evil propensities of
others. This attempt in Essex, to make converts of the "rising
generation" by excepting Mr. Dane from the conspirators, re
minds me of an anecdote in the memoirs of Madam de Main-
tenon ( I think) which I quote from memory. A young lady of
the Huguenot pursuasion, was compelled to become a Catholic,
and it was required of her, to admit by subscribing the accus
tomed formalities, that th©> Protestants were all doomed to eter
nal perdition — as this io^idenl most of her friends, she resisted,
but finally agreed to gi'i^^^er all but an excellent aunt to whom
she was devoted — and the Confessors were obliged to let her
give in her adhesion to the Romish Church, with an express
reservation that her aunt was not to be included among the
castaways. There is as little of consistency in the offences imputed, as
of agreement respecting the culprits. The sticklers for the free
dom of the press and the opposers of sedition acts go far beyond
the maxims of law, which our English ancestors in the days of
the third Edward found intolerable. They strain points, which
were not thought tenable by the legal assassins of Algernon
Sydney. They will have it, not only that speaking and wri
ting against the war-measures of an administration are misde
meanors and acts of moral treason, but that one man's writing
and speaking is evidence of treason in others who are of his
political party. They hold the Legislature and Convention
responsible not for what appears in their own records, but for
aU the ebullitions of zeal and resentment which burst forth
from all quarters of the State and of New England against the
war — for the noise and threatenings of the "drums ecclesiastic;"
for the animated remonstrances of the county and town meet
ings, expressive of the regret and indignation of an astounded
people ; — for the impassioned and frequently inconsiderate
essays in the public papers, in which individuals of all classes
proclaimed their fears of the "variety of wo," which impended
over the country. All these symptoms of discontent, in a nat
ural course of events agitating a people bitterly averse to, the
war policy, and finding vent through the usual and safest ave-

32
nues of public opinion, have been laid to the charge of the Con
vention by whose instrumentality, they were in truth not encour
aged but attempered. The opposition to these war measures
though confined to words is viewed as equivalent to overt acts
of aid to the public enemy; and the fashion has been that
whencesoever they proceeded, the Convention from i^hom they
did not proceed, must sustain the odium attached to them.
Thus while, agreeably to the fundamentals of our Constitution,
no man can be held to answer for even a petty larceny, till the
same be formally described ; the best citizens may be held up to
the execration of their country and tfte world upon the ram
bling suggestions of a Chief Magisflme and the echo of his
friends. It is this chaos of accusation which those who would reply to it
must reduce and mould into some manageable shape. Although
I know nothing of the calumnious writings against the Conven
tion which have appeared the last year, except from the occa
sional remarks in answer to them which have chanced to fall in
my way ; I am satisfied that the authors though equal in the
qualifications of malignity and arrogance to their predecessors,
are entirely deficient in pretensions to their talents for fabrica
tion and sophistry. Nor can they have added any new matter
to the idle and oft repeated medley of discordant slanders — or
done more than bedizen, the stories of other times, with the
trumpery of their own bad taste. I therefore proceed on the
presumption, that whatever has or can be urged against the
Hartford Convention, or its creators, must be included in some
one or more of the following propositions :
First. That the resolve of the Legislature instituting the
Convention, was upon the face of it, unconstitutional.
Second. That if not unconstitutional in terms, its makers
intended under cover of it, to attempt some object adverse to
the Constitution or laws of the Union.
Third. That admitting the Legislature to be innocent in
act and intention, the Convention were nevertheless guilty in
one or the other of these respects.
Fourth. That the whole procedure was in any event in
expedient. To those who feel a sufficient interest in the subject to pur-

33
sue the inquiry, I trust the following suggestions will appear
reasonable :
1st. That every reader desirous of correct information is
bound either to peruse the legislative proceedings which origi
nated and followed the Convention, as well as the report of the
Convention itself, or take upon credit the substantial accuracy
of the brief quotations and statements that shall be made of
their contents.
2d. That every reader will in like manner, either acquaint
himself with the contents of the Private Journal of the Conven
tion, of which, the original is in the office of the Secre^tary of
State of Massachusetts, alid copies of which, were published
last Spring in the Boston newspapers, by reading the same, or
give credit to the assertioni that it contains nothing repugnant
to the public report.
I also advance the following distinct facts as incontrovertible :
That the Legislature of Massachusetts, during the war, pas
sed no act or resolve whatsoever, authorizing obstruction to the
due execution of the laws of the United States.
That the language of opposition and disapprobation of the
national policy expressed by that Legislature in those proceed
ings which are regarded by their opponents as most objectiona
ble, is coupled with strong and uniform assurances of attach
ment to the Federal Union.
That the Executive Government of the State is equally un-
obnoxious to the charge of any act of opposition to the National
Govemment. That the omission on the part of that Executive Government
to comply with the requisition of the President of the United
States, was confined to one particular. It was a refusal to
place the militia at the control of a Prefect sent without an
accompanying force to take command from the hands of the
Governor. It was given upon the faith of the opinion of the
Judges of the Supreme Court, his sworn advisers, upon a con
stitutional question. The incompliance extended only to the
form and not to the substance of the requisition. The duty re
quired was performed, fully and faithfully.
I submit also, the following opinions as deducible from ac-
5

34
kuowledged principles and facts which command the assent d
impartial judgment :
That the Legislative and Executive Branches of the State
Government, and the Hartford Convention, are amenable for
their oivn acts alone— und not for sentiments expressed by
others, under any circumstances whatsoever, whether from the
pulpit or the press, whether in writing or speaking.-
That the property, real and personal, of the advocates and
Supporters of the measures of those States which patronized the
Convention, was held by them in a proportion, at least com
mensurate with their numerical majorities : That their inter
ests in the public funds, and the immense capital of banks and
other institutions connected with them, probably much exceed
ed that proportion : That their character as men, and citizens,
and friends to the Federal Union, from the beginning would
fairly compare with those of their opponents.
That a secession from the Union, would have been attended
probably with a civil war, certainly with a prostration of public
credit, with deplorable depreciation, if not annihilation of prop^
erty in the funds, with fearful changes and insecurity to prop
erty of all other description, and an aggravation of every public
calamity, which the most "fearful looking for" of judgments
could hardly exaggerate.
It is by no means essential, that all these facts and opinions
be established, in order to exculpate the Hartford Convention.
Yet the admission of their truth (and I perceive not that any of
them can be questioned,) must leave its merit or demerit, to
rest upon the footing of its reported and published transactions,
and be found irreconcilable with every imputation of illegal
combinations and disloyal designs.
H. G. OTIS.

LETTER VII.

SIR,
It has never, I believe, been seriously insisted that the re
solve of the Legislature of Massachusetts appointing the Hart-

35
ford Convention is upon its face repugnant to tlie Constitution
of the United States. It was in these words :
"Resolved, That twelve persons be appointed as Delegates from this Com
monwealth to meet and confer with Delegates from the other New England
States or any other, upon the subject of their public grievances and concerns,
and upon the best means of preserving our resQmxes, Jind of defence agamst
the enemy, and to devise and suggest for adoption by tliose respective States
sucli measures as they may deem expedient ; and also to take measures, if
they shall think it proper, for procuring a Convention of Delegates from all
the United States, in order to revise the Constitution thereof, and more effect
ually to secure the support and a^ttachment of all the people by placing all
upon the basis of fair representation;"
Coupled with this resolution it is also proper, though not
essential to the inquiry, to take into view the circular letter
written under an order of the General Court by the President
of the Senate, and Speaker of the House, to the Executives of
other States, from which is made the following extract :
"The general objects of the proposed Conference are, first, to deliberate
upon the dangers to which the eastern section of the Union is exposed by the
course of the war, and which there is too much reason to believe will thicken
round them in its progress, and to devise, if practicable, means of security
and defence which may be consistent with the preservation of their resources
from total ruin and adapted to their local situation, mutual relations and
habits, and NOT REPUGNANT TO THEIR OBLIGATIONS AS MEM
BERS OF THE UNION."
The constitutionality of the foregoing resolve must be deter
mined by a comparison of its tenor with the provisions of the
Constitution itself. It is presumed that the only clauses in
that instrument bearing on this point, are in the 10th section
of the first article. " No State shall enter into any treaty, al
liance, confederation," &c. This is peremptory and unquali
fied. Again, "No States shall, without the consent of Congress,
enter into any compact or agreement with another State," &c.
It is then beyond dispute that States with the consent of Con
gress, may enter with each other into compacts or agreements,
not being treaties, alliances, or confederations. They must
then have a right to meet and confer together previously to the
consent of Congress, so as to be able to discuss and adjust the
terms of a compact or agreement, to be submitted to Congress
for its subsequent consent. Otherwise in many cases the pow
er to make such compacts with the consent of Congress would

36 .
be nugatory — ^for such consent could not always be expected,
until the agreement on which it was to operate, should be di
gested into such form as would enable Congress to act with a
full understanding of its true character. The consent of Con
gress is then not requisite as preliminary to meeting and con
ference. If an agreement be made to which the sanction of
Congress is refused, it becomes void ab initio, and this is an all-
sufficing security. The practice of all the States having ques
tions of interest or controversies with each other is in unison
with this theory. Massachusetts and Maine have had repeated
Conventions, on the subject of their lands and other property.
That is to say, their respective Commissioners have met and
conferred with each other. And it would seem to be a rigid
construction of the Constitution which has never entered any
brain, that two States could not determine a question of bound
ary, or of a common road, or river navigation, or confer upon
the project of a canal through their respective territories, in the
first instance. A different usage has prevailed, it is believed,
universally. A deputation from the Legislature of Kentucky
was lately sent to that of Virginia — afterwards another was
sent from Virginia to Kentucky. If the respective Commis
sioners had met each other, instead of meeting the several Le
gislatures, this would have been a Convention ; or if they had
any way settled the matter in controversy between them, they
would have made an inchoate compact. Still more lately a
Convention from several States has been held at Washington,
for the purpose of making a canal, and it is expected that the
Legislatures of these States will _/lrst concur in the project, and
then apply to Congress for aid and consent. And it is pre
sumable, if the Legislatures of three or four States favorable to
the views of administration, had appointed Commissioners to
meet at Richmond or J^orfolk during the war, to concert meas
ures for aiding the National Government in fortifying or de
fending the Chesapeake, that, far from affixing to such meeting
the stigma of being unconstitutional, thousands of pens would
have "leaped" from their inkstands to vindicate the patriotic
procedure. In the case in question, it will be remembered, that the au
thority of the members of the Hartford Convention was merely

37
"to meet and confer" — to "devise and suggest for adoption by
the States," measures, &c. This was the pith of their commis
sion. They could make no compact or agreement. They could
merely recommend " means of security and defence not repug
nant to their obligations as members of the Union." Thus it
seems to be a self evident proposition, that in this nation,
(where the right of the people by themselves or their delegates
peaceably to assemble at their own will and pleasure is univer
sally recognised) an authority ^ven by one body of men to
another, to meet and confer and suggest measures not repug
nant to a constitution, must be a constitutional authority, who
ever may be the constituents, and whoever the delegates.
As then the institution of the Convention was consonant to
the letter of the Constitution, it was equally so with its spirit.
To disprove this position it is not sufficient to shew that the
object of it was to effect a lawful end by a mode different from
that expressly provided by the Constitution; but it must also
be made to appear that the proposed means were not only dif
ferent, but at variance with the Constitution.
If the States of Pennsylvania and Delaware, or New York
and New Jersey in time of war should, by Commissioners
meeting for the purpose, devise a plan for impeding the pas
sage of a fleet up the Delaware or Hudson, by booms, and
chains, and hulks, (admitting it to be practicable,) and should
offer Congress, to place and maintain the same, upon stipula
ted conditions, it is not perceived wherein this procedure
would militate with the spirit of the Constitution. This was
the utmost extent of the principle involved in the Massachu
setts resolve. Its aim was to devise means of "security and
defence" adapted to their "local situation," &c. The report
pursued the instructions. It suggested a plan and recommend
ed an application to Congress for its sanction. And the most
important consideration of all is, that this sanction was given
by Congress.
After the adjournment of the Cenvention, an act passed and
is now found in the statute book, permitting the States indi
vidually to do that, which it was the principal object of the
States represented in the Convention to obtain permission to
do. To receive into the pay and service of the United States,

38
"troops raised, organized and officered under the authority of
any of the States." It was approved by the President, on the
very day of the passing of the resolve in Massachusetts requir
ing the Governor to appoint Commissioners to proceed to Wash
ington. Had this act been promulgated and its provisions
understood in Massachusetts at that time, it would h^ve super
seded the necessity of the application to the National Govern
ment. And had it been in existence prior to the institution of
the Convention, it would in all probability have foreclosed that
project. Thus the reasonableness, and constitutionality of the
main object of the Hartford Convention are in fact ratified by
a solemn act of the United States. The title of this act is, "an
act to authorize the President of the United States to accept the
services of State troops and volunteers." Add in imagination,
the words "and to ratify the proposal of the Hartford Conven
tion," and thereupon read the act and compare it with tlie re
port of the Convention, and you will find nothing incongruous
in the amended title. Compare also the instructions to the
¦Commissioners, with the phraseology of the act. By the for
mer, they are instructed,
"To make earnest and respectful application to the Government of the
United States, requesting their consent to some arrangement whereby the
State of Massachusetts separately or in concert with the neighboring States,
may be enabled to assume the defence of their territories against the enemy,
and that to this end a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within said
States, may be paid into the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated
to the payment of the balance due to the said .States and to the future de
fence of the same."
Now what says the act ? That the President of the United
States be
"Authorized and required to receive into the service of the United States
any corps of troops which may have been, or may be raised, organised, and
officered under the authority of any of the States, whose term of service shall
not be less than twelve months, which corps when received into the service
of the United States, shall be subject to the rules and articles of war, and
employed in the Slate raising the same or in an adjoining State, and not
elsewhere, except with the consent of the Executive of the State raising the
same." Here then, (with the exception of the reimbursement of the
debt already a.ccvued and the mode proposed for defraying

39
future expense,) was a full and ample concession of all that
Massachusetts had asked from the beginning. Here was an
end put to the whole subject of controversy between the Presi
dent and the State Governors, and an anticipation of the object
of the Commissioners which would have left them nothing to
do even if peace had not been announced immediately after
their arrival at Washington. For with regard to the fund for
the payment of the State troops proposed by the instructions
to be paid into the State treasuries ; it was a consideration al
together secondary — a mere suggestion of a convenient mode
of making the provision. The State could not be otherwise
than indifferent as to the choice of the channel through which
the money should be applied to the object — And as to thfr
balance then due, (that which constitutes the Massachusetts
claim,) a bill had passed the Senate and lay on the table of the
House for the adjustment of this and similar claims, when
tidings of the treaty were received. Had the war continued,
you can judge with what consistency Government could, (or
indeed can now) reject the claim, after having virtually rati
fied, as already suggested, the principle on which it was found
ed. Apart therefore, from the proposal of amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, found in the report of the
Convention, (which at worst were harmless or inexpedient;
though originating in, and designed to obviate the same un
equal operation of the existing system, which was felt by all
the opponents of the Missouri question,) it may be truly af
firmed that Government had become proselytes to the belief
that reliance for the most efficient defence, in the event of
protracted hostilities, must be placed on State troops, under
their own officers. And it is true without rhetorical exagger
ation—notwithstanding the prejudices of the credulous, the
pride of the opinionative, and the fury of the violent — ^though
language has been moulded into every shape of obloquy and ri
baldry by citizens of Massachusetts to bring shame upon the
Convention. It is yet true, that the very system recommend
ed by that Convention, BECAME BY ACT OF CONGRESS
THE LAW OF THE LAND. So far then as the proceed
ings of tliat assembly, involved measures to which the consent
of Congress is necessary, to give them a constitutional stamp;

40
they had that consent. Forthwith upon the adjournment of the
Convention without day their report was published. In nine
teen days after that adjournment the act of Congress in ques
tion was passed. The report and the views of the Convention
were accordingly before those who made the act. What influ
ence resulted from it is unknown. It is enough to know that
the justness of those views is virtually admitted — Congress
AND THE Convention were agreed in opinion, respecting
THE most expedient SYSTEM OF DEFENCE FOR THE FUTURE.
By this consent expressed in the act, the error of the Hartford
procedure (if error there was) became ratified, and the impress
of the highest national authority was stamped upon its inno
cence and constitutionality, and upon the expediency of its
policy. The power of holding the State troops requisite for
defence, in the hands of their own officers was confirmed. The
claim of the State "for the past," was recognized by the Sen-
.ate, and security "for the future" would have resulted from
the act both of Senate and House, had peace been delayed.
But from this judgment in their own favor, the persecutors of
the Convention appeal to the chancery of public opinion, and
urge their suit on those occasions when it comes to the turn of
passion to preside. The decree, if they prevail, will be in His
Excellency's words, that " measures had cast a reproach on the
good name of the State," and that she is dishonored— and the
costs of suit, besides disgrace, will be the amount of the Mas
sachusetts claim, which it seems is no longer sought as the
reward of services but of Repentance. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER VIII.
SIR, The proposition now to be considered is this : That ad
mitting the Resolve instituting the Convention to be constitu
tional IN terms, it was the intention of its framers under cover
(or pretext) of it, to attempt some object adverse to the Con
stitution or laws of the Union.

41
From a charge entirely gratuitous and so broad as to defy -
mensuration by any scale or compass of methodical argument,
it is plain that there is no appeal but to common sense and ex
perience on the internal evidence of its folly and falsehood.
This evidence in the present instance resulting from indispu
table facts, and from the organization and modes of procedure
of the legislative assemblies in the United States, must appear
not only satisfactory, but overwhelming. It is implied in the
words of the proposition, and is universally agreed, that the
plan of opposition, whatever were its outlines, was to receive
its form and pressure in the Convention. The combination
which originated the authority was the Legislature; but the
"authorized combination" was the assembly at Hartford. Nei
ther one nor the other was possessed of the means of doing
any thing — of any physical force applicable to purposes of
opposition to Government. Every act of the Legislature for
that end would have exposed its abettors to the penalties of
treason. And the Convention had not only no power to com
mand even the services of a constable, but were indebted to
the courtesy of Connecticut, for house room, fire, and can
dles. Whether the plot therefore is supposed to have been
invented in the Legislature of Massachusetts for the sanction
of the Convention, or in the Convention for ratification by the
States, it is clear that nothing more could be expected, than a
recommendation of measures by the Convention, which being
adopted by the Legislatures, should by them have been recom
mended to the people. I pause not to consider whether the
charge of " combination" in an odious sense, as applied to any
project which must be submitted to the people, (in whom reside
the right to change their government) be not destructive of it
self; because I wish never to anticipate in imagination circum
stances that would justify men of principle in counselling their
fellow citizens to shake off or even weaken the bonds of our
Union, and because further, I would disdain to take shelter in
the dark mazes of that theory. On the contrary,' I admit that
if the framers of the Convention or its members, permitted
themselves in the hour of their country's extreme peril, even to
brood over schemes of disunion, whether to be executed by
6

42
themselves or others, their impotency of uieans would furnish
no palliation for the political depravity of their hearts.
Still it is material, in forming our estimate of clahdestine in
tentions, to bear in mind, that all which the Legislatures and
Convention together could do, must have terminated in recom
mendations and reports : — For in judging of a man's dispositibn
to commit a crime, which he had the power to do, but from
which he may have been deterred by circumstances, it iS often
sufficient to be acquainted with his character. But in formings
an opinion of the likelihood of his intentions to give bad and
desperate councils to others, we look not merely to his charac
ter, but to that of the party for whom the advice is supposfed to
have been intended. No sower will be presumed to destine his
Seed for a- soil in which he knows it cannot vegetate— and the
waste of bad advice is for that reason probably less than that of
good. When, therefore, the federal members of the Legisla
ture of Massachusetts, or such of them as were behind the cur
tain, intended in the first instance to convey (by no matter
what occult act) to the Convention (a case almost too absiird to
be stated as a possibility) their project of disorganization, what
was the chance of a favorable hearing ? When the members of the
Convention or any of them in their turn entertained the design
of recommending " treasons, stratagems, or plots" for adoption
by the several Legislatures, and finally by the people, what was
their prospect of success ? These questions must have-occurred,
and were not very difficult to be resolved. The people had
spoken loudly, and their Representatives were perfectly appriz
ed, how far they would go in opposition. They were either ripe
for proceeding to extremes, or they were not. If they were not
thus ready, their Representatives knew it ; and unless qualififed
for the Insane Hospital, they could never intend, under cover of
any authority, to propose measures which must ultimately come
before the people, and which being rejected, would redound td
the confusion and disgrace of their authors. If on the other hand,
the people were thus prepared — the Convention, who instead of
taking advantage of the excitement, aimed by their report to
soothe their irritation aiid stimulate their patriotism ; to recon
cile them to a more enduring patience, and cheer them with a
more enlivening hope ; as also the Legislatures of the different

43
states who accepted that report — deserved well, not ill, of their
country. But to proceed tp facts. The number of federalists (or of
persons coniposing the majority, for there were among them a
few of the ''flying squad,") in both Houses, in the session of
1814, when the Convention was formed, may be taken at an
average of three hundred — varying but not materially from time
to time. The members of the Convention were elected from
the people at large from the different sections of the country in
Massachusetts and Maine, two only being Members of the Le
gislature. At the time of passing the resolve and appointing the mem
bers of the Convention, it was uncertain and impossible to be
known whether any other State would concur in the measure.
Application was publicly made to each of the New England
States, after the passing of tlie resolve, and not before, through
the same organ — its Executive. Those of New Hampshire and
Vermont did not convene their respective Legislatures in sea
son to come into the plan of a Convention. Now the readiest
mode of ascertaining whether it was practicable for the major
ity of a legislative body, (organized and doing business witli
open doors, according to the forms of our State Constitution)
to enact a combination, of the kind, and for the purposes imagi
ned, and under the circumstances just hinted, will be for any
person acquainted with legislative proceedings, to bring his own
mind to a clear and satisfactory conception of any mode of
effecting it. It must I think baffle the attempt of the most
vigorous fancy however versed in the beau ideal of plot making.
He will first determine whether the entire majority shall be
presumed privy to the project, or only the few leading and know
ing ones. To begin witli the first. A secret, (for secrecy is im
plied in the proposition, and was indispensable) must have been
imparted to three hundred persons, " more or less," and by the by
must have been kept by them to this hour. And what was the na
ture of the secret? Why, only that t)iis confidential party should
by a solemn act, confer an authority upon certain agents in ex
press words: with a secret understanding that the authority
should be vi,olated, and that their commission should be execu
ted in a manner diametrically opposite to the terms of the pre-

44
scribed power. These legislators must have understood and in
tended that instructions to devise means for the defence of the
country should be perverted to inventions for betraying it ; —
that instead of taking counsel together for the preservation of
the Union according to the letter of the resolve, they should
convene with a latent purpose of laboring for its dissolution.
Thus their Commissioners appointed for the ostensible object
of united defence, would become Commissioners of a separate
peace "in disguise," — and their faithfulness to their employers
would be manifested only by their perfidy to their country. It
would seem to require a drill, of unprecedented industry and
severity to bring this "host" under the discipline of a corps of
Illuminati, in the very few days which elapsed between the
beginning of the session and the day on which the Convention
project was adopted. To reconcile this body of substantial
Christian Yeomanry to hold their oaths of office in contempt :— -
To habituate them all to keep their tongues as with a bridle,
except only when they spoke to deny the truth and to repel
suspicion ; — To listen without horror to the unblushing denials,
and to witness the affected vehemence and indignation of others
in spurning the imputations of their opponents ; — Much address
would also be requisite to initiate the new comers from the
country, and to prevent those who had leave of absence from
telling tales. And there would seem to be need not only of
address but of necromancy, to be sure that the choice of agents
by ballot from all quarters, would fall upon persons who should
be prepared to disobey their instructions and to execute the
unknown and incommunicable intention of their employers.
All these difficulties would be multiplied and reiterated in
the legislative bodies of such other States as should agree to
send deputies to the Convention. The Governors of those
States could not collect from the circular letter of our Gover
nor, the real intent of the Convention. Is it then credible that
Governor Strong would have ventured to hold with the other
Governors, one language "official, and another confidential," by
letter, without knowing his men. Or, are they also to be con
sidered as conspirators, ab initio ? If yea, when, where, and by
what means was the understanding among them originated. If
nay, how were they qualified to give to their several Legisla-

45
tures, the proper impulses ? Recollect that to make sure work,
all these preliminaries must have been adjusted vrithin a very
few days; all before the appointment of the delegates from
Massachusetts and Maine. The electors in the Legislature of
Massachusetts must also have either known their men, or have
been willing to commit themselves and their machinations to
the discretion of strangers. There must have been an intelli
gence between them, otherwise the delegates could not discern
by the resolve or their credentials, what was expected of them.
And this mysterious intelligence between the electors and the
elected — between the different Governors — between those Gov
ernors and their Legislatures — and between those Legislatures
severally and their delegates; must (for any thing that has
hitherto appeared, or which can be conceived possible ;) have
been carried on by the " Prince of the power of the Air," and
he must have made good speed with his despatches.
But these are not the only obstacles which must have existed
in the way of "the combination." The legislative faction unless
besotted would look to the issue. Whatever it was intended the
Convention should do, could have been only recommendatory,
and in the form of a report. Suppose matters brought to this
point ; the Convention agreed ; and all the glowing ingredients
of faction thrown into that caldron, to be melted and cast into a
brazen image of sedition, and brought home and placed before
our General Court. In what mode was it to be disposed of?
How were they to set about the work of a disruption of the
States, or a separate peace, or a Northern Confederacy?^
The report would be made to the whole Legislature, foes as
well as friends. Now then, if not before, the plot must be dis
covered, previous to consummation and nothing gained by con
cealment thus far. The Legislature would be near the ordinary
termination of its Winter session, and not far from the end of
its political existence. To adjust any proposed substitute for
the National Government would require some little time even
for the wisest statesman. The Union could not be dissolved
by " Presto begone !" nor a northern constellation created by
" let there be light." It would have been madness indeed to
scuttle the ship and quit the wreck, without getting ready a
boat or a raft.

46
After a report of the Convention in favor of a revolution, the
opposition could not advance an inch, without Legislative aid —
and every act of legislation in furtherance of it would be a pub
lic act of usurpation. It is therefore inevitable that the makers
of the Convention — the sober, solid, cautious, and unaspiring
yeomanry of Massachusetts must have prepared to convert
themselves into a "Rump Parliament," and to arrange a new
order of things without any constitutional power, after the plan
of disunion should be promulgated, upon the faith that the Le
gislatures of other States, not then in session, or the people of
those States, would uphold their project. Otherwise they must
have gone home to their constituents, leaving behind the abortion
and taking with them the disgrace.
To those gross outrages upon probability and reason insepa
rable from the affirmative of the proposition at the head of this
letter, I add another. Every plan of opposition to the Consti
tution or laws must have consisted of many particulars. It was
to embrace States, and to expose persons. That the plan ivith
its necessary details and ramifications was digested by the Le
gislature into form, to be presented to the Convention, is a
notion too extravagant to have been yet hinted by the most
prejudiced enthusiast. It was then to be fasliioned in the Con
vention. A case is thus presented of intelligent men giving
authority to others, to make a plot in their behalf. A plot per
haps pregnant with tremendous consequences to their country
and themselves. Nor was it possible to ascertain beforehand
to whom this trust of confidence, of fortune, life and character
was to be confided. The Conventiclers were to be elected by
ballot— some from other States. And in the election of these
last Massachusetts could have no agency. In reference there
fore to Massachusetts, the plot was to be made not even by
immediate proxy — but by agents, strangers themselves and
chosen by persons also strangers. Be it then agreed, that
great and wise, and even good men, have sometimes conspired
to effect revolutions. They nevertheless manufacture their own
plots, or know their accomplices and what is intended to be
done. They do not put out treason and conspiracy to be made
for them by the job. But such was the predisposition of a ma
jority of both branches of our Legislature to sedition, that they

47
must have been reckless of what form it might assume, or of
the hands that were to mould it. The power of ratification was
indeed reserved to the Legislature; but individuals, after giv
ing the power, must have incurred the risk of such ratification
in spite of their own opposition — "ce n^est que le premier pas
qui coute." I ask with confidence if the history of man can
produce a parallelism to such a case ? Did ever a set of men
give a "carte blanche" to involve themselves in the entangle
ment of the pains and penalties, and casualties of a criminal
conspiracy, without knowing to whom such authority would be
filled out and executed ! ! !
There is indeed something so unnatural and revolting to com
mon sense, antecedently to all reasoning upon the subject, in
the idea of comprehending the majority of the Legislature in
any secret conspiracy, that the most prejudiced persons pressed
by these suggestions are compelled to abandon it, and fasten
the imputation upon the "knowing ones," "the leaders," the
"Boston stamp," &c. But this will rather aggravate than
lighten the mass of the objections. For although it would be
easier in the first instance for a few to agree upon a scheme,
and to keep their own counsels, than for many — yet the objec
tion arising from the danger of discovery applies in a great de
gree to every supposable number of confederates in a plan of
this nature ; and all the other objections apply in the same degree
to the supposition now assumed, with the addition of one that
would seem to be insuperable. This cabal of leading men must
have taken upon themselves not only to deceive their antago
nists in the Legislature, but the bulk of their own party. They
could have calculated upon no certain support even from friends
after the mask should be lifted, but must have incurred the haz
ard that when the report of the Convention should be made,
and their party thus, for the first time, apprized of tlieir trea
sonable intrigue, (besides encountering all the other impedi
ments) they would be disavowed and deserted, and left in " a
hole by themselves."
But there is no end to the tissue of idle conjectures which
can be woven by ardent imaginatiorxS. And yet one sentence
should suffice to dissipate them all — JVo act of disunion is fea
sible by a State Legislature without a previous: authorization

48
by the people. Suppose, (though the extravagance of the very
hypothesis is nauseating) that the Legislature of one or more
States had passed such acts — they would have been merely
void. The next Legislatures, unless the State Constitutions
were also annihilated, might have repealed them. Who would
have dared to execute such acts? Whence could have been
procured the men and money indispensable for this new atti
tude ? What provision could be made for the public debt prin
cipally held by the agitators or their friends; and by what
means could a separate peace be effected ? Yet for all these
contingencies the "combination" must have been prepared — as
if the fabric of the National Constitution could be dissolved and
replaced by another, with more ease than "Hamilton's bawn
could be turned into a barrack or a malt house." In a word,
the history of the Convention is " a plain unvarnished tale,"
similar to that of other associations created by law. For its
objects you must look to its charter—for its proceedings, to
its private books. When these stand fair you have all the evi
dence required in cases affecting incorporated societies, to de
fend their rights. And while that is unimpeached, there is the
same unreasonableness and injustice in presuming that it was
instituted for an object foreign to its commission, as for imagin
ing that the State Bank was intended to be organized for the
purposes of counterfeiting and forgery. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER IX.
SIR, I PASS now to the inquiry, whether admitting the Legisla
ture of Massachusetts, (and of course the Legislatures of the
other States) to be innocent of every purpose of opposition to
the Constitution and laws, the Convention were guilty either in
fact or intention of any such design.
This proposition is founded upon the supposal that the Con
vention either actually violated, or was disposed to violate the

49
authority and instructions of its constituents, and will be exa
mined on the presumption that the legality of these is fairly
established. If downright and incontestible facts had not ren
dered the course of the Convention as plain as the path of the
sun, it might be worth while to expatiate upon some general
principles and analogies connected with the subject, on which a
few words only shall be said. In judging of the probability
of enterprizes which it may have entered into the views of
the Convention either to suggest or even to intend ; the ex
tent of its means for the accomplishment of its ends, whether
physical or moral or both, is material to be considered. The
efforts of men, as hinted in a former letter, are generally limit
ed by the consciousness of their potentiality. No man attempts
to break a massive chain by mere manual strength — or swim
over an ocean. The Convention could not, by any act of theirs,
separate the Union, nor see their way to dry land beyond the
red sea. They had not the power of the thirty tyrants, nor of
the forty thieves, nor any other power of execution. They
could at most recommend measures, to be by others recommend
ed to the people, and they would hardly counsel what they
knew must be rejected. Suppose, however, (for the indulgence
of imagination) that the disunion of the States had been a topic
of discussion (no matter how ushered in) before the Convention.
If the people were ready to receive, but the Convention not
willing to give counsel to that end — so much more for the honor
of the latter. If the people were not ready, but the Convention
were so — will men calling themselves republicans invade the
recesses of private judgment and suspend us in perpetual effigy,
because we prudently sacrificed our genuine sentiments to pub
lic opinion — to their opinion ! Will they overwhelm us with
obloquy for concealing or renouncing those errors which they
held in abhorrence themselves, and for making a report, which
if they are correct in their bad opinion of our dispositions, is an
abjuration of our doctrines, and in degree at least a proof of
-proselytism to theirs ?
Yet this is the measure meted to the Conventionists by the
friends of liberal opinions — by the advocates of the unlimited
right of the people to change and modify government at plea
sure. We were traitors say they for entertaining certain opin-
7

50
ions, and cowards for not expressing and acting up to them.
We are, as they will have it, responsible for all the abominable
heresies inculcating opposition and disunion that were afloat
previous to the Convention — and for collecting, combating, and
exploding them in that assembly, and replacing them by a di
gest of sound, constitutional, federal doctrine, we are not only
responsible but despicable. So goefe the world.
But a truce with suppositions. The fact is, the people ofJVew
England never wavered for a moment in their fidelity to the
Union. In no official document or state paper of any of its con
stituted authorities that has met my eye, was the separation of
the States alluded to but as a visitation to be deprecated. A
warning voice was sometimes heard from these authorities
announcing fears that a prostrate commerce, a needless war,
and entangling alliances might put the Union in jeopardy.
It was a voice often expressive of deep emotion, sometimes of
anger, frequently of amazement, never of despair, in which,
however, the yearning of fraternal hearts, and the predomina
ting attachment to the Union were always discernible. It spoke
the language which Franklin held to Burke, at the time to
which the latter refers when he avers his conviction of the sin
cere desire cherished by the former for the reconciliation of
America with the parent country ; — a language of expostulation
and regret, but to the full as kind, as tender, and affectionate
as that which proceeded from other warning and threatening
voices, in all the States south of Delaware pending the Missouri
question. Common it has certainly been — much too common
in all quarters of our nation, in different periods of excitement,
to hint at "shuffling off" the "coil " of the Union. But this is
the language of the passions. " Vox et prmterea nihil." All
allusions to it should be dropped on all sides by common con-
gent, as serving only to perpetuate the recollections of family
broils, in which all have something to answer for.
Such being the state of the public mind in New England, it
must have been known to the Convention. Their advice, there
fore, to dissolve the Union, would have been a torch applied to
k mountain of ice, the flame of which would have been driven
back upon their own faces. The Convention needed no super
natural information to be aware of this. How monstrous then

51
the idea that the members of that body or any of them, could
harbor a thought, not only without authorization, but in the
very teeth of their principals, the Legislatures, to recommend
measures conflicting with the National Government, and to en
counter the surprize, disgust, resistance, and odium which could
not fail to be consequent upon the broaching of so unprecedent
ed an infringement of duty and outrage on decorum ! It im
plies that the Convention was made up of fools or maniacs.
Let any man figure to his mind, the scene to be anticipated
in the Legislatures of the different States on the presentation
of a report recommending a temporary or perpetual suspension
of our relation to the Union, (and an authorized opposition to
constitutional laws under any imaginable form would have been
equivalent to this) by a committee distinctly inhibited from
treading on that sacred and dangerous ground. And let him,
if he can, settle down in the belief that any person of sound
and sober intellect would have felt any conceivable inducement
to provoke, and meet the consequences of such an insult. Where
then can the incurably jealous look for evidence of the imputed
machinations of the Convention, which could never have been
encouraged by a prospect pf success ? All they are known to
have done wears a very different complexion. In their publish
ed report is embodied the result of all their proceedings. *Their
private journal (since published also) is a faithful diary of all
that was moved in that assembly. The fact has been so certi
fied by the lamented President. What more can be offered, or
is ever required, than the natural, intrinsic, irrefragable evi
dence arising from the original, genuine records and papers of
*Moretha;u four years ago, an eminent Judge of the Supreme Court, from
a Southern State, in a conversation at which several of his brethren and
other distinguished persons were present — inquired of me why the Conven
tion did not publish their private journal? Adding his opinion, that if that
were done, and it appeared free from anti-federal proceedings, all reasons
for jealousy would be removed. This gentleman had been always of the re-
publicain party and a cfensor of the Convention. It was in consequence of
this hint, that the journal was published. That it produced a most entire
conviction in the minds of many high-minded individuals of the republican
party, in the South, with whom I have been in habits of intimacy, I have
the happiness to knoiv. That it had that effect generally, I have reason to
believe.

52
an organized assembly? What evidence can be so conclusive un
less it be supposed that these men, with GEORGE CABOT at
their head, agreed to drop a plot and hide their shame by forgery ?
In vain will the keenest adversary of the Convention sift
these documents in search of expressions implying a feeling of
hostility to the Union, or urging to active animosity against the
Government. The reverse of this is eminently true. The re
port breathes in every page a spirit of attachment to the Union,
and admits that "No parallel can be found in history of a
transition so rapid as that of the United States from the condi
tion of weak and disjointed Republics to that of a great and
prosperous nation." While it complains in a strain of severe
animadversion of the " prevalence of a weak and profligate po
licy," and enumerates evils and grievances inflicted by a mal
administration of affairs, it expressly reprobates "the attempt
upon every abuse of power to change the constitution," which
it says " would but perpetuate the evils of revolution." This
is followed by a train of reasoning, dissuasive of all measures
calculated to disunite the States, appealing to the good sense,
experience, and mutual interests of those States, whose policy
was most objectionable, and stating circumstances encouraging
the firmest confidence that time, patience, and events would
effect every desirable reform. Not a variation from this patri
otic, federal, and consoling tone can be detected throughout
the report. It is a manual of elementary principles; — a com-
mentairy on WASHINGTON'S Farewell Mdress—bj which,
(whatever may be its defects in other respects,) the most zeal
ous friend to the Union may be content to live or die.
So much for the theory of the report.
The measures it recommended were in substance but two : 
First — An application to Congress for their consent to an
¦ arrangement whereby the States, parties to the Convention,
"may separately, or in concert, assume the defence of their
territory at the national expense." r
Second — Certain amendments to the Constitution.
The utility of these amendments is a fair subject for an
honest difference of opinion. If the proposed mode of bring
ing them before the States for adoption may be regarded as
inexpedient, 1 care not (now) to contend that point. The

53
object of these amendments, however, was to diminish, what
the decision of the Missouri question is calculated to in
crease — the representation of Slaves. But this proposal may be
laid aside in this investigation. It has no bearing upon the
charge of disorganizing intentions, and has not to my knowl
edge, been a cause of serious complaint, except by those who
think it a needless departure from the mode of amending the
Constitution provided in the instrument. As to the other great
and principal object — The faculty of defending the States by
their own militia and at the expense of the United States, what
more need be added, than a repetition of the fact that Con
gress HAS since given AN EXPRESS SANCTION TO THE PRINCI
PLE. Had this been done at an early period of the war, the
main root of the bitterness that afterwards grew up would have
perished in the ground. Had it not been done at length, and
had the war continued, I am free to declare that I see no
mode in which the Eastern States could have been defended.
It was done however, but not in season for the Legislatures of
those States to take cognizance of it.
Here then I repeat is a subject of curious speculation for
posterity. The principal measure of an assembly intended (as is said)
to concentrate all the force of opposition to the constituted au
thorities of the nation ; was by the deliberate act of those au
thorities virtually adopted, and the egg that was laid in the
darkness of the Hartford Conclave, was hatched by daylight
under the wing and incubation of the National Eagle.
But independently of what the Convention is known to have
done, if all the proceedings of the prison house had remained
secret, the character of the men who composed it, afforded an
ample guarantee of the purity of their motives and conduct.
Take them for all in all, they were persons of exemplary mode
ration, and eminent, for wisdom, prudence, experience, love of
country, and all the virtues of the man and the citizen. Among
them were some, since gone from us with " all their coun
try's honors blest," who preserved through life the station of
"little lower than the angels," as nearly as it is given to the
best men to maintain it in this state of imperfection. In the
number were individuals who had been long, and often, and al-

54
most constantly employed in high offices. Legislative, Executive,
Judicial, and Military — in State and Nation. One at least of
the elder generation who had been honored with the confidence
and friendship of Washington : — Others who had been his
companions in arms : — And among the younger generation were
the sons of those who had fought the earliest battles for their
country's freedom — of the heroes of Bunker Hill and Lexing
ton, who had made good their claim to hereditary patriotism by
their own public services.
Some of these worthy persons had long since withdrawn from
the bustle and turmoil of the political arena, and become passive
though anxious spectators of the signs of the times. They had
now been brought together from distant locations, without means
or opportunity of previous intercommunication, and in the great
er number of instances without the slightest personal acquaint
ance, and of course without any common sympathy but what
arose from a reciprocal persuasion that each was influenced by
the same love of country and the same honorable vie-ws. Of
this merit I pretend not to claim any share. I am sensible that
among such men I was not " meet to be called an Apostle" —
But having nothing to retract, no favors to ask, no propitiatory
incense to offer upon new altars, I hope there will be seen
neither vanity nor condescension, in my declaring that I am
unconscious of any conduct that would justify the singling me
out as a political desperado who offered to the Convention pro
jects by which they were revolted. I challenge the production or
quotation of any speech or writing for which I am accountable,
without garbling or interpolation, conspicuous for unseemly vi
olence, intolerance, or even disrespect for my political adversa
ries ; much less pointing to a disunion of the States, which I
should dread as a national and perpetual earthquake. In the
ardor of debate I have repelled personalities by giving " mea
sure for measure :" — But if I am inimical to republican princi
ples and equal rights, I must have basely degenerated from my
parent stock — And though I claim no merit from "genus et
proavos;" yet that I should go into the Convention to instigate
others to pull down that " Temple," which for at least " forty
and six" years my ancestors with their countrymen had been
engaged in building from the first trench and corner stone, and

55
in which I had always professed to worship, weuld seem to be
an unnatural act at least, of which all just men will one day
require better proof than has been or can be furnished by the
unjust. To return however to my colleagues. I may add with
truth that they were persons in circumstances of ease — Some
of them in affluence — And all surrounded by those endearing
domestic relations in hazarding whose security even the bold
become cowards and the rash discreet. Who then ever heard
of a conspiracy made of such materials ? What could incline
such men to organize an active opposition to their government ?
To amass fuel for a fiery furnace through which they must pass —
To destroy the work of their own hands. To put in jeopardy
comfort, safety, property, wife, child, and brother. To vary
the dangers of foreign hostility by provoking the horrors of a
civil war, and to fly to anarchy for refuge from the remediable
evils of a bad policy ! It would be difficult to conceive which of
the malignant or restless demons, that influence human destiny,
could preside over such councils. Whether "Ate hot from Hell"
or simply the spirit of infuriate ambition. Ambition for what I
For a place to sit and mourn over the ruins of our country !
And was there not in those days, a " balm in Gilead" for dis
appointed ambition, to be found by turning from the old road
and taking the turnpike ? Besides what becomes of the ambition
of men, whose choice was seclusion — ^whose eyes were then full
fixed on Heaven. Did the tumult of ambition swell the veins
of such men as Cabot, Treadwell, West, and others ? Will
Brutus say they were ambitious !
For the rest — The principal evidence of the miracles wrought
by the founder of our holy religion rests upon " the labors, dan
gers, and sufferings voluntarily undergone" by the witnesses to
the accounts of them. And so far as the comparison can be
made with due reverence, it may be safely contended that the
same principles of human nature forbid the belief, that the mem
bers of the Hartford Convention would have voluntarily expo
sed themselves and their families and friends, in opposition to
government, to perils like those of martyrs — So that the pre
sumption in favor of the innocence of the Convention (keeping
always in view the disparities of importance in the subjects) is
analagous to that which forms the basis of the christian religion.
H. G. OTIS.

56
LETTER X.
SIR,
Mt last proposed point of inquiry is, whether the appoint
ment and 2n'ocedure of the Hartford Convention, allowing its
innocence, were in all events inexpedient? Here indeed is a
question very different from those hitherto considered ; a ques
tion fairly open to controversy, and respecting which alone,
ingenuous and well informed persons at this day can entertain
serious doubts. The proceeding propositions depend on facts
and inductions, many of which are self-evident, and all of which,
in connexion, amount to the fulness of demonstration. But it
is not pretended, that this inquiry is susceptible of the same
Unequivocal and satisfactory illucidation. Political expedi
ency is not like patriotism and the cardinal virtues, " steadfast
and unmoveable," admitting of neither shade or variation — But
it is an accommodating quality, which though honorably enga
ged in the service of patriotism, depends on the calculation of
chances and events, acts often in the dark or by a doubtful
light, and must be governed by time and circumstances. There
is but one genuine love of country. Though, as has been said
of other love, there are a thousand different copies of it. It is
seated in tlie heart: — But the domicil of expediency is the
head. Patriotism is a matronly virtue which never changes
the simplicity of her dress : — But expediency may, and indeed
must, conform to the fashion, and though she ought never to
wear a mask, she may occasionally, when she appears in a pub
lic assembly, "give her cheek a little red," without losing
either innocence or reputation. When patriotism is questioned
for her conduct, she calls upon truth and principles and honor
for her sponsors — But the vouchers of expediency are wisdom
and time. We may say of patriotism what it is very desirable
to affirm of the law of the land, "non erit lex alia Romce alia
Jlthenis, Sfc." It is always the same. But the rule of expedi
ency at Athens may not only be differently graduated from
that of Rome, but in each of those places it may, like the cli
mate, depend on the state of the atmosphere, on the tempests
and calms which, though they "balk not Heaven's design,"
baffle the prognosticks of the most careful observers.

57
Hence it is apparent that expediency and inexpediency are
not mere abstract generalities, but relative terms. And when
one says that the Convention or any other measure was inexpe
dient, it may import either that it was impolitic or superfluous —
or not adapted to the proposed end — or unreasonable, liable to
misapprehension and unpopularity — or so injudiciously concert
ed as to defeat its object. The inexpediency of a measure
may thus be exceedingly gross and palpable, betraying an ab
sence of political wisdom, forecast or experience, and justifying
a perpetual forfeiture of public confidence in skill and talents.
Or it may be extenuated by circumstances, and amount only to
such excusable error of judgment as sometimes befalls the most
wise and experienced. And though a correct estimate of a po
litical movement can seldom be formed until after the event —
Yet is not the event always the standard by which it should be
tried. Within the boundaries of this immense region of expediency,
one would imagine that citizens of the same country could find
space enough for tilt yards and race grounds without convert
ing the whole into a Bear Garden. That they might fairly
contend for the prize of ambition and the revrards of wisdom,
and be satisfied that those who are distanced should quit the
field and pocket their loss, without being hooted and insulted
by bullies and bravos, and stoned and pelted with rotten eggs.
I can discern no reason why one assemblage for political pur
poses rather than another ; whether Convention or Caucus ;
Vhether members of a State or National Legislature ; however
inexpedient may be their plans or proceedings ; availing them
selves only of the liberty of opinion and speech, should be dealt
¦with as a den of bandits. It savors indeed of impartiality that
a portion of the chief censors of the Convention, assail their old
colleagues and friends of the Caucus, with quite as much of viru
lence and reproach as have been showered on their ancient ad
versaries. But it savors more of the fierce intolerance which
bears with no difference of sentiment in respect to measures or
to men — ^which imputes as crime to others what it has done
itself, and what it stands ready to repeat under any allurement
of interest or change of tiines. Which, doing whatever seemeth
expedient in its own eyes, and reversing the operation of that.
8

58
laudable self-love that serves "the virtuous mind to wake,"
contracts the circle that ought to embrace all the good and great
of the country, by excluding first adversaries, then friends, till
it is confined to a little clan of which each member intends that
self shall be the centre. To the fair and ingenuous persons to
whom I have just alluded, I submit the intimation, that in judg
ing of the expediency of the Hartford Convention, they should
look to the state of things in the time of it. It may be admitted
that similar associations for political purposes would hereafter
be inexpedient, unwise, and impolitic ; vrithout surrendering
the point that the Hartford Convention should be thus charac
terized. Public opinion has now become consolidated in disap
probation of such Conventions for political objects. It is of no
consequence in this view, by what means — Future Conventions
must be accompanied by a general sensation of jealousy and
aversion, which would divest them of the faculty of doing good.
This is an all important consideration. It is the duty of every
independent citizen employed in the public councils, first, to
attempt fearlessly by his talents and influence to guide public
opinion ; and next, to conform to that public opinion, which he
fails to lead. No terrors of unpopularity should deter him in
the first case, and no pride of opinion make him inflexible in the
last. It is the part of a time-pleaser to hesitate in great emer
gencies until he knows the people are with him ; and of a head
strong bigot to persevere, when he finds they are fixed against
him. To decide, therefore, upon this question of expediency,
or indeed to form a judgment in what degree, if any, the mea
sure was inexpedient, and of consequence how far its promo
ters are culpable for deficiency of political wisdom and foresight,
it becomes indispensable to take a rapid view of the posture of
affairs, at the time when the measure was proposed.
It would only obscure this view, to connect with it any ex
amination of the merits of the policy by which affairs were
brought to their actual condition. Whether that was a perni
cious and erroneous course or otherwise is an inquiry foreign to
this subject. One which in its proper place I am willing to meet.
But the present question is whether a crisis had arrived in the
affairs of the State demanding recourse to be had to extraordi
nary means for its salvation, and whether it was expedient to

59
look for such means to a Convention — whether the sliip was
running on to the breakers, and proper means were taken to
keep her away, not whether there had been a deviation, or bad
reckoning kept in any former stage of the voyage. With re
spect to the existence of such a crisis there can be but one
opinion. Our prospects were shrouded in clouds and darkness.
We were exposed to the calamities which threaten a people
vulnerable by foreign hostility, unprotected by their Govern
ment, fettered by constitutional restraints from using their own
resources to protect themselves, and embittered against each
other by feelings of party rancor. The storm of war was gath
ering on the sea coast and frontier of the State. The territory
had been invaded, and part of it remained in the occupation of
the enemy ; — A hostile fleet hovered near our harbors, menacing
descent, and proclaiming the intention to pursue a system of
conflagration and plunder. The treasury had been declared
bankrupt "de/acfo;" — Stocks were at a discount of 20 per
cent. ; — No means were possessed by the National Government
(if inclination were not wanting,) of fortifying posts and har
bors, or of furnishing troops for their defence. To crown these
misfortunes, a misunderstanding had prevailed between the
President of the United States and the Governor of Massachu
setts respecting the concurrent authorities of the National and
State Governments over the militia. And although tlie Governor
in a spirit of accommodation had actually receded from his ob
jections so far as to place a detachment at the disposal of the
Presidential Prefect, yet such were the inconveniencies, jeal
ousies, and heart-burnings among the officers and men themselves,
without regard to party distinction, from this arrangement,
and so invincible their apprehension of being marched off to
Canada, leaving defenceless their own homes, that the Governor
was compelled to revert to the original plan of retaining them
under the command of their own officers. Thus arose a dis
tressing dilemma. To surmount the repugnance of the militia,
to be turned over to the Prefect was impossible ; — Unless this
could be done, the National Executive refused to assume the
payment of the troops ; — A million had already been disbursed
from the State Treasury in military expenditures; — All the
sources of revenue were occupied by the General Government—

60
and the requisitions for another campaign must have drained
the State Treasury of its last cent. No augury favorable to
peace appeared in any quarter, and no expectation was cherish
ed but of a protracted and arduous contest. Constitutional
difficulties and embarrassments from the same causes, in a
greater or less degree, were felt in all the New England States.
Without the aid of their own militia, they had nothing to save
their towns and villages (near the coast especially) from pro
miscuous ruin ; — And withput revenue they could not command
their services. Never was a more perilous emergency. The
Governor impressed vrith its importance convened the Legisla
ture, and communicated to them his sense of the wants and
dangers of the State.
The proceedings of that body and the origin of the Conven
tion shall be reserved for another letter. I shall therein attempt
to shew that this State was under an absolute necessity of ap
plying to Congress for its consent to some special arrangement
for its defence ; — That the other New England States were some
of them in fact, and others likely, to be subject to the same ne
cessity ; — Hence it will follow that the expediency of the Con
vention depends on the consideration of how far it was proper
for these States to unite in attempting to obtain for the accom
modation of all ; — ^what each would have been obliged (in the
progress of the war) to ask for itself. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER XI.
SIR, Among the causes which have contributed to diffuse an
impression to the disadvantage of the Hartford Convention,
none has had a greater effect, than a confused notion, generally
prevalent, of its being in itself an independent or isolated plan,
intended for the principal and original basis of some new scheme
of policy— "A castie in the air," from whose invisible towers
and parapets destruction was to be poured forth upon the Fed-

61
eral Union. But this is a great mistake— Jf was not a scheme
of any sort — ^but simply one of a chain of measures emanating
from one source, and at one time. The end and aim of the
Legislature which appointed it was the defence of the country.
The scheme was to organize a force and to provide a fund for
supporting it. The Convention was a measure subsidiary to
this scheme. It is in connexion with this only that it can be
fairly examined. It was designed as an instrument to effect
ends, to which it was from the beginning declared to be adapt
ed. , But its enemies will have it that it was secretly destined
for other ends, which we have seen it was not calculated to
promote. They refuse to the inventor the benefit of his specifi
cation. They deny the utility of the wheel and pully, not be
cause they were ill adapted to produce an effect intended, but
for the reason that they might be misapplied so as to cause some
other effect. This is not fair, in ordinary cases. Means in
trinsically bad, can never justify ends — But in judging of the
expediency of means, not liable to this reproach, what have we
to rest on without keeping sight of the end ?
Every member who came to the autumnal session of the Le
gislature of 1814, knew that he was summoned to aid in devising
means of defending the country. The Governor's Message was
confirmation enough of the fact, that the militia or State troops
was the only force to be relied on ; that the expense attending le
vies of these was not to be expected from the National Treasury;
that the resources of the State were inadequate to defray it, and
consequently that without some arrangement with the General
Government, the horrors of unresisted warfare, or unconditional
submission, presented the only and deplorable alternative. This
communication of the Governor was referred to a large Com
mittee of both Houses — And their report, of which it is neces
sary to give an epitome, comprehended a scheme of defensive
measures, already alluded to, and to which the Convention, as
it will appear, was contemplated as being merely instrumental.
The first resolution reported, was in these words :
Resolved, That the calamities of war being now brought home to the ter
ritories of this Commonwealth — a portion of it being in the occupation of
the enemy — our sea coast and rivers being invaded in several places and in
all exposed to immediate danger — ^the people of Massachusetts arc impelled

62
by the duty of self-defence, and by all the feelings which bind good citizens
to their country, to unite in the most vigorous measures for defending the
State and expelling the invader, and no party feelings or political dissen-
. sions can ever interfere with the discharge of this exalted duty."
This resolution, which one would think pledged all its sup
porters to some effective measures, passed unanimously.
Another resolution was that providing for the appointment of
the Convention, recited in a former letter.
Another, recommended provision to be made for raising a
corps of State troops, not exceeding ten thousand rank and
file, to be organized by the Governor, for the defence of the
State. Another, for accepting and organizing volunteers as a part
of that force, who should hold themselves in readiness to march
at a moment's warning, to any part of the Commonwealth, to
be entitled to full pay when in service, and to a compensation
short of full pay for the term of their enlistment.
Another, for authorizing a loan not exceeding a million of
dollars, pledging to provide funds, &c.
It cannot be too often repeated, that these resolutions apart
from that relative to the Convention, embraced a system of
State defence, the adoption of which was rendered imperative
by circumstances. But to secure to it a permanent efficiency,
the consent of Congress must be had to some mode of providing
or reimbursing the expense, the Executive Government having
declined defraying it. Without calling a Convention, the State
might have requested that consent on its own account. No ob
jection could be made to its doing so. To its petitioning Con
gress for what the State is now endeavoring to obtain^ — V^Y'
ment of its troops. Here then this question of expediency is
straitened down to a single point — Was it fit and proper to
request the co-operation of OTHER StATES IN APPLICATION
to Congress for a concession, which it was fit and pro
per for Massachusetts to request for herself; and in
the obtaining which, those States, being in similar cir
cumstances, had a similar interest ? If this be considered
doubtful, or decided in the negative, another arises; was it
manifestly and flagrantly unfit and improper — so much so, that
for attempting to unite more States than one in a request

63
which each one might very reasonably have preferred by itself,
those who favored such joinder in petition, should be regarded
as destitute of justification or apology for their indiscretion?
To assist the judgment in forming a satisfactory conclusion
upon either or both these questions, certain facts which have
been but little noticed, become extremely material. Before
Massachusetts made any overture to her sister States, and in
deed a fortnight prior to the sitting of the Legislature, the State
of Rhode Island made the first advance to the States of Mas
sachusetts and Connecticut. Governor Jones by letter of 21st
September, informs Governor Strong, that by an act of the Le
gislature of Rhode Island, he is authorized and requested in case
of invasion, to march to the assistance of any neighboring State,
and accordingly offers his aid, and requests the co-operation of
Massachusetts upon a like emergency. Governor Strong in re
ply, engages to lay his communication before the Legislature
when it should assemble ; and promises in the mean time to use
all the constitutional means at his disposal, to aid Rhode Island
in case of need. In Connecticut the same misunderstanding
between the General and State Governments, concerning the
authority over the militia, had arisen, and in consequence, the
former withdrew its assistance and supplies to the troops called
out to protect New London (actually blockaded) and other pla
ces. In Vermont, some time before this period, the Governor
had actually ordered back the militia which had been marched
out of the State, conceiving his own State to be in danger : —
And in New Hampshire, where Gov. Plumer had conformed to
the requisition of the President, he the next year lost his election.
To this state of things, so much alike, in all parts of New Eng
land — and to the communication first made from Rhode Island,
may be traced so far as I am acquainted with the subject, the
first germ of the Convention. In favor of the expediency of
the measure, it will be obvious, that a joint application from
several States would promise a more favorable result than a
solitary one. The New England States were notoriously under
the influence of similar opinions, and the embarrassment of the
same collisions with the National Executive respecting the mi
litia as I have just hinted. Their contiguous situation, military
system, general habits, exposure to the same dangers, facilities

64
for recip^-pcal aid, and experience in past times, furnished all
"the inducements and promised all the advantages of the most
natural alliance.
Nothing even at this day justifies a doubt that the New Eng
land States would have defended themselves with more vigor
and economy, and of consequence, with more advantage to the
Union in the proposed mode. Congress, I say again, acquiesced
in that idea.
Was there then any thing unnatural or extravagant in the
conception that these States might by their delegates strike out
a plan for their mutual defence, by State troops under the au
thority of their own officers ; which would obviate all difficulties
and secure the assent of Congress ? Can it now be contended
to have been thus monstrous and inadmissible, inasmuch as it
has in fact the authority of Congress in its favor ? And having
determined to meet in Convention for that purpose, was it out
rageously amiss to embody, with one accord and in one instru
ment, the grievances which they felt and the remedies they
desired, by amendments to the Constitution divested of every
intimation of aiming at redress, through any but the most peace
able and legitimate medium ?
Protesting against conclusions drawn from the subsequent
unpopularity of the measure, I ask who could have foreseen this,
in its full extent ? What reason should have led men conscious
of honor and integrity, to presume that their opponents would
fasten upon this measure rather than any other as the spell by
which their motives were to be branded as suspicious and odious.
The minority in this State for many years, had done what seem
ed to be their utmost, to impress the world with a belief that
the Federal Party was disaffected to the Union. But it was
thought the only converts to their idle stories were Sir James
Craig, and John Henry. The cry of Union in danger, had been
raised for years against its old friends by its new ones, upon
occasions of every shew of discontent with the ever varying and
always hideous features of the restrictive system. That it would
now become a general yell, and rend the welkin, it was not pos
sible to foresee. It is true that an opposition of unparalleled
virulence and effrontery was made to the acceptance of the re
port of the Committee in both Houses. But to have yielded to

65
such a torrent would have seemed to justify the opening of the
flood gates, through which it issued. There seemed then to be
no good reason for desisting from a measure, felt by its advo
cates to be innocent and useful, especially as it would open a
natural avenue for a disavowal in behalf of the Eastern States
of the unworthy aspersions cast upon their character and mo
tives, and for conveying to the whole people, the sentiments of
persons thought worthy of their confidence, upon the obligations
imposed and the sacrifices required by the trying emergency ;
which while it should avoid revolting their feelings, by denying
their justness, might calm the irritation that tended in time, to
run into extremes. But further, the violence of the opposition
was directed against all the resolutions, except the first. Never
was there a display of more egregious inconsistency. They
agreed that the country was in danger, and that party discord
should cease, so that a cordial and vigorous union might be had
for its defence — But they voted against the resolution/or raising
men and money as well as against that for the Convention. They
outraged decorum and lost sight of self-respect in suggestions,
that the proposed force was to be organized as a corps of obser
vation on the National Government, and not for co-operation
with it in defending the country. No substitute was offered,
but that of placing the militia at the disposal of The Prefect.
An effort to effect this would have been the signal for general
insubordination. The abhorrence of the measure, coupled with
the apprehension of being converted into regulars, and marched
to Canada, while their homes were exposed to the incursions of
the enemy was insurmountable. Thus the majority were left
to act by the light of their own discretion, in circumstances al
together new, and painfully urgent, and were naturally inspired
with a disposition to fortify their own measures by a consulta
tion with those who were placed by the course of events in like
circumstances vrith themselves. As it was thus evidently the
design of the opposition to brand with the stigma of disaffection
to the Union, whatever was proposed by the advocates for the
resolutions ; the latter could not hope to avoid the effect of the
clamor by discarding the resolution for the Convention rather
than the others. Much less could they anticipate that any such
impression of the character of that i^easure, ^ould prevail in
9

66
an enlightened community, convinced as they were that deli
rious party rage and malice were the sole motives of those who
wished to create it.
There was then nothing to forbid the call of a Convention
on the score of expediency, but the objection of an abstract
principle. It may be said, that all meetings of delegates from
State Legislatures, to consult upon the great political subjects
which are confided to the province of the National Govern
ment, must be in their nature inexpedient. I am not inclined
to break a lance with the supporters of this principle, but
rather to admit its justice — But the situation of the Eastern
States was conceived to afford an exception to the principle.
A question of constitutional law had arisen between the Gene
ral and State Governments, respecting their several obligations
and authorities — It was a question of that nature and nothing
more. In no other light should it ever have been viewed. It
was one of the many questions which naturally arise in all
confederated governments — A " casus foederis" — Of the same
description with questions that were frequent before the Am-
phyctionic Councils in ancient times, and the Aulic Councils
in modern times — analagous to controversies which have arisen
in Germany, Holland and Switzerland — And not different in
reality from the dispute on the Missouri question, and twenty
other questions concerning the confiict of jurisdictions which
have been raised under our government, and one of which (the
steam boat question) has been lately adjudicated by the Supreme
Court. This controversy ought to have been conducted and
discussed with the same temper. Instead of which, such pains
had been taken to chafe the public mind, and indeed so unfa
vorable were the times to temperate investigation, that the
majority in Massachusetts could do nothing but endeavor to
defend the State by the best practicable means. There could
be no Umpire between the General Government and the State
Government. The latter therefore deviated from its regular
Sphere, under -the impulse of a necessity which is above the law
— At least such necessity was conceived to exist, and the de
parture was not intended to be drawn into precedent. A line
of sea coast extending continuously around four of those States,
through a range of six or seven hundred miles, indented by bays

67
and inlets, and communicating with the interior by navigable
rivers, for the most part unfortified, and altogether unprotected
by the National arm, was threatened by hostile fleets and armies
with all the horrors of fire and sword. What could be more
natural than for the Governments of the States thus circum
stanced, to obey the dictates of the law of nature, and endeavor
to consult and stand together in their own defence ! Such is
the fair view of the subject, so far as expediency is involved in
the inquiry. The Convention was not the plan or contrivance
of one man, or of a junto or cabal, but a simultaneous and in
stinctive conception of many — prompted by the nature, and
the imagined necessity of the case. If indeed the utility of
this measure were to be judged of by the effect produced by
the report in allaying the irritation of the public mind, it
would be every where crowned witli encomium. It operated
like a charm — like oil poured upon the billows : — And had the
war continued, (Government having assumed the 'payment of
the State t^-oops,) a train of desirable consequences would have
followed this report. But if the war had continued without
such provision, and an attempt had been made to enforce the
impending conscription, a case would have arisen pregnant
with trouble, and calling for measures not contemplated in the
Constitution. What would have been their character, God only
knows. The powers of the Convention, had ceased. If new
Conventions had been called, they would have proceeded di-
rectiy from the people. They alone, (and in extreme cases
only— cases not to be anticipated,) have a right to decide when
they are absolved from their Federal obligations. Whenever
such a case occurs, the People and not their Legislators
will cut the Gordian Knot. May no prophetic eye see far
enough to discern when that will happen! May tiie evil hour be
postponed until all the governijaents of this world, and the world
itself, shall be dissolved and "leave not a wreck behind!"
H. G. OTIS.

68
LETTER XII.
SIR, Your readers may probably be glad to hear that I have
finished the examination I proposed to make of that part of the
Governor's Speech which alluded to the Hartford Convention.
I will not increase the risk of being insupportably tedious" by a
recapitulation of the points which I have aimed to establish.
Some general considerations, however, are connected with it
which seem to require, at least, a bird's-eye view, but to which
justice could not be done, in less than the compass of a respect
able volume.
It seems to be generally admitted, that the influence of the
Eastern States in the councils of the Union, has been long in
the wane, and that the importance of Massachusetts has dwin
dled into absolute insignificance. Natural causes accounting
for a considerable diminution of her weight may be found, in
the varying ratio of her population, in the amputation that she
submitted to in the hope of saving her constitution and her life
in the multiplication of new States, and the growing dispropor
tion between that interest which in one part of the Union is
homogeneous, and those various interests in another, among
which there is no bond of sympathy. In these and some others
we must acquiesce, for they are inevitable and included in the
price we pay for our Union. But these causes are light and
slow of operation in forcing us into the back ground, in com
parison with the disparagement which too many among us have
for years been eager to bring upon their native State. One
sickens with chagrin in realizing what a gulf stream of calumny
has set in the same direction from Massachusetts towards the
South for years together, bearing on its dark and troubled bil
lows the shipwrecked characters of most of those who were
once dear, and loved, and honored among this people, and of
the people themselves. It is humiliating indeed, while one
sees the representatives of the South and West, always prompt
to catch and to resent a murmur uttered against the character
and pretensions of his State—Proud of the virtues and talents
of the good and great among his political opponents ; — blazon-

69
ing on all fit occasions the claims, services, sacrifices, and
qualities of his constituents — The Virginian especially, eulo
gizing his own State as the " hominum sator atque divorum" —
It is, I say, humiliating to see this, and at the same time to feel
that if a member from Massachusetts, though he were an "angel
trumpet tongued," should take up the same strain in favor of
his own State, or of her claims of whatever description ; though
decorum might dissemble the sneer and prevent the smart or
severe reply, it would be in the power of an unkind adversary
to bring up the Governor's " old song" and the recitative of the
Legislature, and to say — out of the mouth of thine own Govern
or, "will I condemn thee, thou wicked servant" — I will prove
by transcripts of your recorded infamy, under your great seal,
that for many long years there was no public virtue extant
among you — That your great men were in the interest of the
enemy ; and that your bands of patriots were nests of vipers.
In all this there is nothing of exaggeration. From the era
of the first embargo to the present hour, individuals have suc
ceeded each other in laboring not merely to counteract the
policyj but to disgrace the character of this State especially,
and of the other Eastem States in general, whenever their own
party was not in power. I truly thought that every gentleman
who had been in Congress of late years, without distinction of
party, and notwithstanding the personal civility and respect he
may have experienced, had been sensible of the shyness with
which any measure is regarded, that comes from Massachusetts.
There is much of urbanity, of respect to private feelings, of at
tention to expressed opinions, but nothing of weight or influ
ence. Civilities are exchanged, and kindness and friendships
between individuals formed and cultivated — But every Yankee,
as I have had reason to imagine, feels that he is not at home-
acts under restraint, expects no success in measures he origi
nates, and at most, faint praise in those he supports. It is not
because the former political dissentions, as between individ
uals, are kept in vivid remembrance — Nor because one is now
for Paul, and another for Apollos. No doubt, these consider
ations have some effect. But while the old party tracks are
becoming gradually effaced and confounded, by time and the

70
course of events, the monumental stones and finger posts
which indicate the by-road supposed to be taken by this State,
are preserved and pointed out perpetually by our own citizens.
The good sense and true interests of the republican party are
surrendered to the mercy and disposal of editorial popinjays
and other "ultras," who, in contempt of the example of the
wise and liberal of their own party, in other places, and of the
most respectable portion of it here, indulge an unnatural mania
for running down the character of poor Massachusetts. These
disinterested persons (apostates and others,) have become so
outrageously federal, that they affect to think the disgrace of
the State promotes the glory of the nation. By heightening
the aspect of the general depravity, they would make more
conspicuous the righteousness of the few, for whose sake the
city shall be saved. It seems to be with them an aphorism,
that he who humbleth his State shall be exalted. They are un
natural children who reverse the story of Saturn, and devour
their own mother. What weakness !^Not to perceive that the
character of a State is a common franchise, which like its at
mosphere, is incapable of division, and that whoever goes from
a district reputed to be infected, will be received with shyness
if he is not shunned, though he carries with him the Doctor's
certificate of his personal health! By reason of this infatuation,
which too nearly resembles that which kept the petty States of
Greece forever divided and dependent on Athens or Sparta; it
has happened that the good people of this State are in a fair
way to part with their self-respect. As with men, so with com
munities, when the consciousness of dignity of character is no
more, the merited loss of character itself soon follows. Al
ready it has come to pass that Massachusetts no longer in
deed the tall "anchoring bark" which bore the Admiral's flag,
but shamefully " razeed," yet still a sound and well manned
vessel, appears from the Capitol Hill diminished to "her buoy,
almost too small for sight." It is so universally taken for
granted, that during the war we not only " left undone what
we ought to have done," but committed the correlative sin,—
that in our opposition to the war, there was something of ma
lignity or treachery of a peculiar and distinctive character, not

71
belonging to opposition elsewhere— 4^hat it is now almost too
late to deny it, without appearing to incline to the affectation
of supporting paradoxes.
Nevertheless for one, at this or any other hazard, I pro
nounce the charge as it respects the Eastern States generally, or
Massachusetts alone, entirely destitute of foundation. But my
remarks will be principally confined to the latter — and they
must of necessity be of a general character.
In order to fix upon those States or either of them, a charge
of disaffection more virulent in its nature or dangerous in its
object tlian was common to the opposition to administration
elsewhere — ^it ought to appear either that the manifestation of it
was accompanied by a preparation to resist the laws, or by re
sistance in fact ; or else that the opposition in this quarter was
grounded on alleged pretences of discontent, in which the op
position in other States did not participate. If neither of these
assertions can be maintained ; — if no show of actual opposition
was made; — nor no pretence of grievance agitated among us,
but such as was regarded in the same light in other places, there
is manifest injustice in the condemnation of one and the acquit
tal of another, upon evidence equally applicable to all. How
then stands the evidence ? None has ever been suggested of
any actual opposition prepared or offered to the laws. None
of Massachusetts having done (I speak of deeds not words)
"what she ought not to have done." What omission of posi
tive duty can then be laid to her charge ? In her political ca
pacity as a member of the Union she had no duty to perfonn
but that of furnishing troops in obedience to requisitions ?
And can it be pretended that she did not furnish them ? Her
militia was held in constant readiness from the beginning to
the end of the war. They were always on the alert ; detach
ments were made to the full number at any time required ; —
detachments of soldiers, not mere human bipeds, as destitute of
equipments as of " feathers ;" but of horse, foot, dragoons, and
artillery, ready to be embattled. Nothing comparable to this
state of preparation could be found out of New England. It
was so perfect at "the head quarters" of the "Boston Stamp,"
as to extort the approbation of the National Executive Govern-

72
ment. The preparatives differed only in two particulars from
those of the South. First, in their completeness, and next in
their being furnished at our own expense — Money was supplied
as well as men. The taxes in all their odious and oppressive
variety were paid with exemplary promptness. It is certain
¦that the militia was not in most instances surrendered to the
National Prefect, and thereby hangs a constitutional question.
The merits of which I pause not now to examine. But is it
strange that it should be a question ?
When in a time of no peculiar excitement we see the Legis
lature of Virginia employing counsel to contest the right of
selling a paltry ticket in the ancient dominion, and that of Ken
tucky convulsed, by the assumption of jurisdiction by the Su
preme Court in cases involving the validity of a municipal law,
and her Governor speaking the language of absolute defiance.
When we attend to the flame kindled in Ohio, in South Caro
lina, and ready to burst forth in every State, South and West,
upon any construction of the Constitution which encounters
local convenience or habitual prejudice, can it be matter of
wonder or of censure, that in a cage of incotaparably greater
concernment, such a question should have arisen ? If the Presi
dent has the right, not only of deciding upon the presence of
the constitutional contingency which justifies his calling out
the militia, but also of appointing his Prefects to command them,
he possesses tlie power, at any moment, of converting the whole
militia of the nation into Pretorian Cohorts. I repeat that I stop
not to discuss this question. I only say it is a tremendous pow
er and an awfully pregnant question. A question compared with
which, the controversies about sedition acts and alien acts, and
national banks, and Cumberland roads, and lottery tickets, and
occupying claimants, and "id genus omne," are paltry squab
bles. It is a question about the power of the sword, which
settles all other questions. If you say it is clear the President
has it — ^be it so. But let me ask again ; — Was it then so clear
that doubtfulness must not be presumed ? So clear that hesita
tion became crime ? Was the retention of the command by tlie
State Executive, under the circumstances of that day, equiva
lent to an obstruction of the laws — a "paralyzing of the means
and agents of the Government?" It cannot be pretended. The

73
orders of the Government were carried into effect, though not
by the appointed organ.
Exclusive of this controversy, not an instance can be addu
ced of a topic of complaint or remonstrance from the earliest
hour of the new order of things under Mr. Jefferson, to the
close of the war, in which either New England or Massachu
setts stood alone. None in which they were not countenanced
and supported by the opposition in Congress from every State
iu the Union; — By the majorities of the Legislatures in other
States, when occasionally federal; — By the minority, when
otherwise ; — By meetings in cities, towns, counties, court
houses, and squares, in all the States on this side of the Poto
mac — sometimes beyond it; — And by the invariable tenor of
the federal newspapers in every State of the Union.
These are broad assertions, which it is in any one's power to
establish or refute, who will consult the newspapers, records
and documentary evidence of those times. To confirm them
by adducing the plenary proof of which they are susceptible,
would require compilations and references much too copious for
the limits prescribed to these letters. But enough may be com
prehended in a glance, to satisfy most readers, or to put them
in a. train to satisfy themselves.
To commence with the opposition antecedent to ¦the war.
The object of it is comprized in two words — The restrictive
system. In all its moods and tenses — through all its labyrinths
of embargo, nonimportation, and nonintercourse, with its acts
supplemental and explanatory, and all its reduplications of pains
and penalties, on land and water. It was to this system and
to this' alone, to which any idea of serious discontent or disaf
fection could be attached. This alone had a bearing upon our
foreign relations, and the peace of the country. In proof of
this it need only be mentioned that, upon the intelligence of
Mr. Erskine's arrangement, ¦with our Government, which it was
supposed had put an end to the "Terrapin" system, the most
unqualified commendation was bestowed on Mr. Madison by
his former opponents, and according to a writer devoted to his
interest, *"he was claimed as a f--ieralist and Washingtonian"
— and "the democrats began to grow jealous." Decisive testi-
* « Olive BrancV, by M. Carey."
10

74
menials of gratification in the arrangement were indubitably
manifested by the federalists.
The repugnance felt for these measures every where partook of
the same character, and grew out of similar views of their impol
icy. After pronouncing the system to be impolitic, oppressive
and unconstitutional, originating in fear or partiality to France,
leading to an alliance with her, destructive of commerce, which
it was a main purpose of the Union to protect ; censure would
seem to be exhausted. Those who held this language could carry
opposition by word no further. It expressed the all comprehen
sive articles of the opposition creed. Those who agreed in them
were of one faith. No reason for attempting to divide them
into various sects arises from the consideration that one repeat
ed the creed oftener, with greater zeal, or in a more varied
phraseology than another. Whatever of hostility to the Union,
was the import of this faith in one part of the country, just so
much and no more was implied in any other. This was un
doubtedly the faith of Massachusetts, of her Legislature, and
of her people. For this she is responsible, judging her always
by the record, not by fugitive or anonymous essays, or philippics
of any sort. This is the extent of her transgression before the
war. Was then this the faith, and this the language of other
States — of respectable popular meetings in other places; of the
opposition wheresoever existing ? Was it held by any one as
sembly or by any one respectable person, in whom it cannot be
presumed to have shewn a spirit of antipathy to the Union ? If
so, neither can such inference be admissible against Massachu
setts. I affirm then, as matter of notoriety, that these opinions
were held in extenso, and sounded by the trump of opposition
through all its regions and departments. For vouchers I appeal
to the public documents as before — And in a particular manner
to the resolutions of the Philadelphia meeting, Com. Truxton,
Chairman ; which as the writer above quoted admits, " embrac
ed the essence of all the objections raised against it throughout
the Union," I refer also to the resolutions at Staunton in Vir
ginia ; — To the debates in Congress, in which the "hand of
Napoleon" was declared to \?. visible in the whole system — to
the celebrated argument of Samuel Dexter, who contended
against the constitutionality of the act, and did more to fix that

75
impression in the minds of the people than any other man, and
finally again to Matthew Carey, (his worlc being the text book
of the revilers of this State) who admits that "no act of the
Federal Government since its first organization excited so much
outcry and clamour," and "incessant abuse in all the federal
papers from New Hampsliire to Georgia, and from Mississippi
to' the Atlantic." The same writer also truly states that the
nonintercourse acts were condemned by both parties. With
this evidence, which might be heaped like "Pelion upon Ossa,"
I inquire why is Massachusetts doomed by the Inquisition to
the duto dafe? Is it because she was more sensitive under the
previous torture ? because her agony was more exquisite ? her
groans louder and oftener repeated ? If the measure of her ab
erration is the same — ^if she said and wrote nothing more in
substance against the Pope and the Cardinals than her heretical
accomplices, why was she alone of the "American family" ex
cluded from the pale of the Church ? Let her citizen calumni
ators answer that question.
By principles analagous to those just considered, and by
evidence of the same kind, it may be demonstrated that the
opposition of the Eastern States, including Massachusetts, sub
sequent to the war, was nowise distinguished by any peculi
arity or hideousness of feature. But even the very general
observations which I intend to make on that subject, must,
contrary to my first intention, be reserved for another commu
nication. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER XIII.
SIR, In discussing the last question with which I propose io
trouble the public — the comparative demerit of the opposition
subsequent to the war, in Massachusetts and other places — I
regard an inquiry into the policy of the war itself as foreign to
my purpose. With the multitude in all countries, success is

76
the test of wisdom. And in this country our escape from the
impending calamities of protracted war, is considered by the
war-makers, as equivalent to success, though peace could not
be made until our Ministers were expressly instructed to aban
don the great object of contention — impressment ; and though
We were left with an hundred millions of additional debt, to
say nothing of loss from other sources.
But conceding for the sake of argument, (what is a very
ample concession,) that success is merit — that "finis coronat
opus," and as the war was wise, the opposition was of conse
quence impolitic and Unjustifiable; I come to the comparison
between the conduct of opposition in Massachusetts and in
other places, meaning to maintain, that the character or moral
quality of this opposition is not distinguishable from that which
prevailed elsewhere, and was supported by those, the purity
of whose motives and love of country is not questioned by
their political adversaries. This, however, seems to be enter
ing upon an immense field, and were it necessary to survey it in
its full extent, I should desist from the undertaking. To exe
cute it would be to write a history of the war — But I persuade
myself, that a few plain and undeniable postulates, and as
many examples, will enable me satisfactorily to establish the
position, or at least to put those who wish to go farther, in a
way to satisfy themselves.
It must be allowed me then, that the character of an opposi
tion to an administration, consists in the moral quality of the
principles on which it is founded.
When such opposition is confined to words, the language of
opposition, and that only, affords evidence of its principles.
When the principles of such an opposition, situated in differ
ent parts of a country, are expressed in language which imports
similar ideas, the character of that opposition in all those places,
must be considered as the same. The proclaiming of these prin
ciples, more or less frequently — ^with more or less of zeal or
indignation — by greater or smaller numbers, and with various
phraseolo^, so long as the ideas expressed are alike, does not
vary the character of the opposition, wheresoever situated.
It is moreover material to determine clearly, for what species
of opposition a State or people is fairly responsible. A Legie-

77
lature certainly is not accountable for the doctrines of the pul
pit or the press, farther than they are adopted by itself. The
people of a State are not so, farther than approbation of them ex
pressed in popidar meetings, or in their elections, amounts to an
indication of their general sense. Persons entirely destitute of
the confidence of their party, may push sound principles to an
indefensible extreme — Persons possessing that confidence in full
measure, frequently write or speak under impulses by which
they would not permit themselves to be governed, when called
to act. Neither State or people are to be tried and convicted
upon the impassioned apostrophizing of occasional sermons, es
says, or speeches. Let those, who, dissenting from this posi
tion, insist upon these things as good evidence, tell us in what
balance we shall weigh off against them, I will not say merely
the abominations and scurrilities against Washington and
Adams, but the inflammatory resolutions and denunciations of
the constituted authorities and their measures, for the first
twelve years after the adoption of the Constitution. Let them
shew us by what process, we may work equations between
given quantities of opposition language found in the grave dog
mas of Virginia and Kentucky, in Pennsylvania resolutions,
and Ohio resolutions, and Governor Adair's speech; and that
which abounded in the proceedings of Massachusetts and the
Eastern States, and the speeches of Governor Strong; so as to
find out how much the former were minus, and the latter pius,
the constitutional standard which is exactly one degree short
of moral treason. If this operation could be performed, and all
the menacing, disorganizing, anti-federal tenets pervading the
columns of the opposition papers of those days, could be con
trasted with those of later times, though it would be an odious
occupation to go through with it, this people need not fear the
result. Rejecting then all ebullitions of passion, and all ex
pressions by individuals of disloyalty to the Union, as incon
clusive and of no account, except with the limitation just now
mentioned; I affirm with confidence that the doctrines main
tained by the Legislature of Massachusetts, and by all such
popular meetings, as by their numbers or any other circum
stances, can be justly supposed to express a general sentiment;
may be demonstrated upon the principles above assumed, to be

78
the same in substance with such as were avowed in other States,
without subjecting them to any particular reproach.
The great objections to the war were, that it was unnecessa
ry — declared improvidently— -partial as it respected the selec
tion of an enemy— influenced by a fear of France — ^leading to an
alliance with her — involving the destruction of commerce —
threatening national bankruptcy — tending to the disunion of the
States — without any prospect of attaining its professed ends.
All these objections most certainly were urged at various
times against the war, in the public proceedings of Massachu
setts. They probably comprehend all the principal objections
that could be made to it. If the same objections were adopted
by other States, or popular meetings, or branches of opposition,
or individuals acting in public and official capacities, upon
whose views and motives no aspersions derogatory to their in
tegrity and patriotism have been cast, the comparison is justi
fied and the case proved. The first example in point might be
cited from the debates of the Congress which made the war, and
those of their successors until the close of it. Not a censure
upon the war is included in the enumeration just made, which
will not be found reiterated in every form of words, by mem
bers in opposition from different States, South of New England.
In the month of August following the declaration of war, a
meeting of citizens was convened in New York, whose proceed
ings, without any auxiliary evidence, are ample for my purpose.
"Never was such a meeting witnessed in New York for its re
spectability and numbers." The Chairman was Colonel Fish —
The Committee who framed the resolutions were John Jay,
Rufus King, Gouverneur Morris, Richard Harrison, E.
Benson, M. Clarkson, Richard Varick. After stating " the
war declared by a slender majority to be unwise" — " declared
under unfavorable circumstances, and that the consequences to
which it leads are alarming," and explaining the reasons for
this conclusion, the report adds :
"That we are irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that the American peo
ple will, under the name and form of an alliance, be submitted to the will
and power of the French Emperor." "That in this view of the subject, the
question of peace or war, involves all that is dear and valuable to man on
this side the grave." "We are therefore under the dire necessity of declar
ing that we have no confidence in the men who hav.e brought us to this

79
perilous condition." They further resolved^— " TAai Representatives be cha^
sen in the several counties — discreet men — friends of peace. These Repre
sentatives can correspond or confer with each other, and co-operate with
THE FKiEMDS OF PEACE in our sistcr States, in devising and pursuing such
constitutional measures as may secure our independence andpreserve our Union,
both of which are endangered by the present war."
These resolutions include the essence of all the invectives that
were ever uttered or that could be uttered against the policy
of the war, and its threatened consequences. They point also
to the formation of a Committee of correspondence, and to co
operation WITH other States ; to the very object intended
by instituting the Hartford Convention. In order to lend his
name to these proceedings, the venerated Jay left the retire
ment chosen for his "life's decline." Mr. King also gave
them the weight of his distinguished character. Indeed the
entire Committee is composed of men of the very highest emi
nence, for talents, virtue, and patriotism ; and the Chairman
was a distinguished officer of the revolution. They said and
recommended in effect all that was said or done by Massachu
setts. From New York, I pass on to Virginia, though ample
confirmation of my position, that the language of opposition was
every where uniform, may be found in every State between the
two, and no where more decided than in Maryland. In Sep
tember 1814, a Convention of delegates from eighteen Counties
of Virginia was held in Staunton — a very animated address was
adopted ; too long to be here inserted. I give only the fol
lowing extract : —
"As friends of Commerce we ask your co-operation in removing from office
an administration which has nearly accomphshed its total annihilation. As
friends of Peace we invite your solemn protest against the authors of our
impolitic and unnecessary war. As friends of Union we invoke you to ar
rest the progress of a system tendingjto its speedy and awful dissolution.'
In their circular letter they say,
"It is to show to our sister States that a powerful minority in Virginia Is
opposed to the fatal policy that has" consummated its career, in an unneces
sary, precipitate, and ruinous war."
It would be quite impossible to confine within the bounds of
as many letters as I have written, the quotations that might be
made of this same language held in all parts of the country.

80
They maybe found in overwhelming abundance in the files of the
Gazettes of the day, by whosoever will take the trouble of mak
ing the research. There was in fact but one opinion respecting
the policy of the war and the necessity of bringing it to a close
by a change of administration, among all its opponents. The
proportional numbers of the opposition in the Eastern States
undoubtedly exceeded that of other sections of the United States;
but the more it became general, the less did it deserve the char
acter of faction or to be deemed an object of suspicion. How
indeed is it possible to reconcile the conduct of men who pre
tend great deference fo» the voice of the people, and in the
same breath calumniate an opposition so extended and power
ful ! In the election which &tst ensued upon the declaration of
war, Mr. Madison had not a vote in New England, (Vermont
excepted,) none in New York, New Jersey, or Delaware. We
were a divided people in relation to that conflict, and the
grounds of the division were uniformly known and felt to be
the same. Against this statement there is absolutely nothing
to oppose but the threadworn tale of the withholding the militia
by Governor Strong, and the fact that the complaints of Massa
chusetts were more frequent and emphatical. With respect
to the Militia question, not only were the Governors of the
New England States agreed in their opinion, on the constitu
tional question, but the State of Maryland maintained the same
construction, though not being opposed and dishonored by her
own sons, she has received the payment of her claim. And as
to the repetition of grievances and the vehemence of the lan
guage of complaint, it was to be expected where most was suf
fered and most to be apprehended — in a country dependent for
its very existence on resources which were on the eve of anni
hilation. That an opposition from a portion of the country thus
circumstanced should . be more general and intense, and that
they should exclaim with emotion against measures which threat
ened to frustrate a main object of the Union, was naturally to
be expected ; and perhaps it was not out of the ordinary course
of paltry intrigue that individuals should be desirous of recom
mending themselves by magnifying the merit of their own trials
and efforts at the expense of the character even of the State
itself; and thus making good their claims to the loaves and

81
fishes which the persecution endured by prophets in their own
country, and among their ovm kin, would seem to deserve.
Hence the attrocious misrepresentations of persons, who, in the
time of our tribulation, were preparing themselves for the vo
cation of sycophants and toad-eaters to the National Govern
ment, may be accounted for; but that His Excellency should
take up and new vamp the tales of other times, seeing that he
has already had all the reward he can expect from the fountain
of honor, and consent to become Captain General and Com
mander in Chief of the legion of defamation instead of the Com
monwealth, must be an embarrassment to any true man who
shall have the charge of writing his epitaph. On the whole, it
will appear in the page of impartial history that the federal
party not merely in Massachusetts, but in all the States most
adverse to the war, conducted itself with a moderation and
dignity unexampled in the party struggles of great States.
When Erskine's arrangement promised peace, they prepared to
withdraw opposition. When peace was afterwards made, they
actually and with one accord did withdraw it. The Admin
istration and its friends affected to consider the delirium of the
public joy at our escape from the war as a homage to their
popularity. Because our brave citizens defended their House
hold Gods, in some instances, from invasion, and our army kept
its ground upon our own frontier, and our navy supported and
made glorious, the reputation of our flag, the Government Party
claimed for themselves, as much as if they had achieved the con
quests of Alexander, or destroyed the fleet of Xerxes, or the
Armada of Spain. They exulted as if the prowess of their
countrymen by land and water was a new discovery, of which
they were entitled to the benefit, and as if there had never ex
isted a Bunker Hill, or Saratoga, or Monmouth, or Stony Point,
or Cow^ens, or Yorktown ; and as if a naval establishment had
been their original and favorite measure.
They boasted of their peace as if they had not instructed
their Ministers to conclude a treaty omitting stipulations re
specting the principal cause of war, and left the great subject
of controversy precisely where it was. Still certain incidental
advantages had resulted from the war. A favorable impression
of the resources and spirit of the nation, was mad^ in Europe.
11

82
The popularity of the Navy was established, and what was more
important, visionary theories were supplanted by the practical
policy of the old federal party. While therefore, Govemment
boasted of its victory over the public enemy, the opposition had
gained a bloodless victory — a victory of principle — ^the only one
they aimed at, over their antagonists. With this, they were
content, and thus not only acquiesced in" the triumph of their
adversaries, without a symptom of spleen or repining, but ¦with
real good humor and unaffected joy.
Instead of attempting to organize and engraft upon the na
tion, an artificial and undying opposition for which materials
were not wanting, they shewed that their object was principles
not men, and magnanimously threw away their badges and uni
ted in electing to the first office, the man designated by their
opponents. They have also steadily supported his administra
tion, although throughout its seven years continuance, they have
been systematically excluded from office; as much so as the
Catholics in England, and the Jews in other countries ; nearly
as much so as Aliens and Outlaws are excluded every where,
and more so than it is generally thought politic by a conqueror
to exclude the citizens of the conquered country; and though
the " Union of the republican party" (which means the contin
ued interdiction of those who have ceased to act as a party) is
inculcated- as a vital principle. With this sacrifice to the spirit
of harmony, the democratic party in many of the States, appear
to be content. Seldom have we found them seeking or even
improving an occasion to tear open old wounds. The leading
men among them under the influence of the liberal feeling which
in generous natures accompanies success, disdain reverting to
injurious and offensive causes of animosity. But here it is far
otherwise. Here we are to learn even from our Governors that
it is not enough for our State to offer her hand without bending
the knee. That the Phoenix of our influence will not arise until
we put our hands on our mouths, and our mouths in the ashes
of that which has expired. That it is not sufficient to have
waved our constitutional rights, but that pardon must be asked,
for having made them a question. Influence indeed ! By sur
rendering to the National Government every questionable point,
we shall acquire the influence of a rivulet upon the opposing

83
tide when it swells its mass of waters and is lost in the sea.
But the only valuable influence among confederated States is
of a very different description. It results from the means pos
sessed, of bringing over to its measures the other members of a
confederacy and modifying the general policy by its peculiar
views of the national interest — This influence has its founda
tion in the respect which the State preserves for herself. In
the selection of able representatives and agents, and the in
terest she displays in the fame of the men of principle who
serve her with fidelity. No State can acquire or preserve in-
fliuence which has not self-respect, and this is not to be the
fruit of self-abasement. Confessions and repentance are the
conditions of forgiveness and happiness to the humbled sinner
in another world — But a State has no immortality. She must
take care of herself in this world and whenever she admits her
reputation to be tarnished it is gone. From the moment that
Massachusetts stands in a white sheet in the Hall of Congress,
though led in by her Governor, she will be held in contempt by
those of her Sisters, who claim for their own peccadillos the
merit of irirtueSi and who never make confessions. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER XIV.
SIR, Suggestions have reached me from a quarter entitled to
respect, that while the parallel I have attempted to draw be
tween the principles of opposition in the State of Massachusetts,
and out of it, is correct as far as it goes ; I have left unexamin
ed two themes of obloquy and complaint in which this State
alone is implicated. These are the alleged refusal of the Le
gislature to vote thanks to our victorious naval officers, and the
discouragement opposed to the public loans. I cheerfully yield
to the wish expressed for my view of these matters, though it
will be recollected that a fall retrospect of domestic transac
tions, is what I expressly disclaimfed the intention of under-

84
In the Senate of 1813, the follovring resolve passed that
body : —
"Resolved, As the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that in a war
like the present, waged without justifiable cause and prosecuted in a man
ner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not
becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of mili
tary or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence
of the sea coast and the soil."
Upon a division, the usual federal majority of members pre
sent voted in the affirmative. This resolve has been assailed in
every form of censure. A solemn invocation of defeat and dis
grace upon the navy and army could not be liable to greater re
viling. But though the House of Representatives of that year,
of which I was a member, unanimously -voted thanks to Perry
and others, thereby manifesting a different view of this pro
cedure from that entertained by the Senate, yet a dispassionate
consideration of this resolve and of the accompanying circum
stances, will shew it to be quite undeserving of the odium an
nexed to it, and far from justifying any inference of hostility to
the navy or indifference to its glory. Had the sentiment ex
pressed in that resolve appeared in a treatise on political moral
ity, or been found among the aphorisms of a Peace Society, no
exceptions would probably be made to it. In order to judge of
the correctness of this remark, let the converse of the proposi
tion be stated. For example — "It is becoming a moral and
religious people, to exult in the military and naval exploits of a
war waged without just cause, from motives of conquest and am
bition, not connected with the defence of the sea coast and the
soil." Would not many moral and religious persons of all
parties at this moment hesitate to subscribe to this as an axiom ?
If so, the objection to the resolve must be found not in the infer
ence, but in the assumed premises—In the character given of the
war; and not in the abstract claim of military and naval prow
ess to the approbation of the people. But this same character
of the war, I have already said, whether justly or not, had been
given to it a thousand times before this, and in that view the
resolve is left on the same ground with other censures upon that
measure. Justice however, to the majority of that day, requires
a more enlarged consideration of this matter. It has just been

85
noticed that the House of Representatives, in which the federal
members were more than two to one, and upon the motion of a
federalist passed unanimously votes of thanks for our naval
victories. Here then was a notorious difference of sentiment
in relation to this point between the two Houses.
The doctrine maintained in the Senate was — First, that it was
not the province of the State Legislatures to award this species
of homage to victorious officers, and that by assuming to do it,
they might graduate their praise by a rule different from that
which the National Government might deem proper to adopt.
But secondly, and principally, it was said there was manifest
inconsistency that a legislative body remonstrating with vehe
mence against the policy and necessity of the war, should in
the same breath encourage its authors to persevere, by enacting
plaudits upon their agents ; and that in the event of successful
operations in Canada, the precedent would create great em
barrassment for those who were opposed to the invasion of that
country; and who might be called upon to express gratitude for
what would be cause of regret. If the allegation of these rea
sons was insincere, and a mere veil for lukewarm feelings to
wards the navy ; there would still be no equity in selecting a
measure in which the Senate dissented from the House and the
people, and holding it out detached from innumerable demon
strations of very different feelings, as a genuine test of the pre
vailing sentiment. Judging, however, of the disposition of all
who voted in favor of the resolve, by what is known to be true
of many; their real friendliness to the navy and the indulgence
which they as private citizens permitted to their joy in its suc
cess, were displayed in too many and conspicuous modes to
leave a doubt respecting their sincerity. Among those Senators
were persons, who with their political associates were first and
foremost, to receive with open arms, upon his landing, the hero
who achieved the first naval victory : To set on foot and pro
mote the means of doing him and his gallant officers the highest
civic honors : — To renew the same cordial oblations of respect
and gratitude to him who succeeded to the command and the
glory of Old Ironsides — and to those who shared the honors of
his triumph. Persons, who assisted and officiated at public en
tertainments given to these officers — who, from that moment

86
cherished and cultivated an acquaintance with them and their
brethren of the sword as opportunity offered, and to this hour
have remained upon terms of strict intimacy and friendship with
many of their number.
Leaving then this inquiry as it relates to the branch of the
Legislature which passed the resolve, I refer you a moment to
other indications of the sense of the whole federal party on the
subject of our naval rictories. Those whose entire stock of cal
umny against that party is composed of gleanings from the Ga
zettes, must admit as proof of public opinion, the universal and
invariable attestation of those very newspapers, to whose occa
sional and limited overflowings of zeal, they resort, in order to
convict the people of disloyalty. It may be said with confi
dence, that from the first moment of the war to the last, the in
variable tenor of those newspapers showed an entire devoted-
ness to the interest and honor of the navy. Their columns
were promptly filled with glovring descriptions of naval suc
cess. No power of language can express more strongly the en
thusiasm felt in regard to every thing appertaining to the navy.
How could it be otherwise ? Every victory was a homage offered
to federal policy. Every brilliant achievement was the accom
plishment of federal prediction. How long and how often had
the enlightened foresight of the old federal party, calculating
upon the aptitude of our people for this species of defence,
pointed to the ocean which surrounds us, as the element on
which danger must be met, and protection sought ! The Con
gressional debates from the days of Washington to the epoch of
the war, are a continued record of exertions by one party in
favor, and of another in opposition to a naval establishment.
Every bulletin from the Ocean and the Lakes, was an encomi
um upon the policy recommended by Washington, strenuously
inculcated by Adams, rejected by Jefferson, and forced upon
Madison; as it was also a satire upon the "Chinese" system,
by which it was so long counteracted. The object which was
constantly and preeminently the favorite of the old federalists,
was the NAVY. They regarded the thirteen stripes as the
consecrated " Labarum." Their prophecy from the first, was,
"by this sign you shall conquer." Yet by the wayward fate
which attends human affairs, our naval heroes have fought their

87
adversaries into popularity, while their friends, the original
patrons of the navy, are put to act upon the defensive, and to
maintain by argument their friendliness to a darling object.
The "Lilliputian ties," have been broken, and the fleet has
been towed into the enemy's harbor. Against this constancy
of affection, this policy of the heart as well as of the head of
New England, evinced by day and by night, in season and out
of season, there is nothing to oppose, but the solitary vote above
mentioned. Yet this has been exaggerated and tortured into
every form of obloquy. The withholding of thanks has been
deemed equivalent to a denunciation of censure, and a refusal
to exult in success, regarded as the avowal of regret that it was
not defeat. In conclusion. From the proceedings of the Le
gislature of Massachusetts, taken together, no sentiment of dis
affection to the navy, or want of interest in the reputation of
its officers, can be inferred, but the reverse. The Senate (the
number of federal members being between twenty and thirty)
passed a resolve (more in the nature of an abstract position of
political morality than of a legislative enactment) importing
that the brilliance of the exploit is not a subject for thanks from
those who do not approve of the cause. In other words, that
the end and not the means, is always to be regarded. The
House of Representatives (the number of federal members be
ing between two and three hundred) voted thanks to the navy
on the ground that the officer cannot choose his service, and
that honor is always due to the brave who obeys orders. But
in the prosecution of the goodly work of dishonoring ourselves,
the vote of the Senate detached from its preamble, has served
as a watchword to rouse and cherish the popular prejudice,
while that of the House is constantly permitted to slumber in
silence. H. G. OTIS.

LETTER XV.
SIR, Those who are intent upon distorting every event which
occured in Massachusetts to the depreciation of her character.

88
were not satisfied with denying to the people the right of as
sembling and consulting upon their grievances, and to the Le
gislature that of public protestation against measures thought
to be detrimental to the Republic, but they present as a crying
enormity and peculiar to our citizens, their refusal to subscribe
to the War Loans. In order, however, to avoid the manifest
absurdity of applying this charge exclusively to this part of the
country, it has been roundly asserted, that " associations were
formed" to deter persons from subscribing by threats. This as
sertion is, I have reason to think, entirely unfounded. No
knowledge or even whisper of any such association ever reach
ed my ears, and I believe on my honor and conscience, that
none such was ever formed or thought of, though as usual my
name has been audaciously mentioned as a party concerned.
It is very certain, that when the war was declared, a general
and extreme disinclination prevailed among the monied men,
against taking a concern in the public loans — Nor was there
any very considerable abatement of that aversion, during the
continuance of the war. They regarded it as made by one ge
ographical division of the country,* without the consent of the
other, and by the procurement of other classes against the in
terest and wish of the monied class. They persuaded them
selves at first, that the conflict must speedily be terminated
unless money was supplied, that peace was within the control
of administration, and that they were not called upon to find
sinews for a war which they were anxious to have brought to an
end. Persons entertaining these opinions, would naturally
promulge them — They might commune with and influence each
other — To lend or not to lend, is a question on which monied
"VOTES IN CONGRESS ON THE WAR QUESTION.

For War.

IN SENATE. For Peace.

North of Delaware, -

5 South of Delaware,

- - 3

South of Delaware,

14 North of Delawai-e,

- 10

For War.

IN HOUSE. For Peace.

North of Delaware,

• • 17 North of Delaware,

- 36

South of Delaware,

62 South of Delaware,

- - 13

In the Autumn immediately following the declaration of war, the Peace
I:lECTORAL Ticket in Massachusetts succeeded by a MAJORITY of
[Cr24,023.

89
men in all countries consult together, and ascertain each others
general views. They form different connexions and associar
tions — accept or reject terms — enter into competitions for the
loan, or refuse it altogether as they please. The terms of a
loan also and the state of the public credit are fair subjects of
discussion. Every man may declare his opinion as of right —
And if he thinks ill of them, he may fairly apprize those who
rely on his judgment, of his sentiments. In these transactions,
men are governed by the dictates of interest and not of patri
otism. Exceptions to this rule are always objects of admira
tion. If, when Mr. Dallas unveiled the, secrets of the treasury
and bankruptcy stood confessed, it had pleased some of our
Republican Millionaires, to have descended like Jupiters in
showers of gold through the roof; they would have deserved
the honors of him who plunged into the Curtian gulf, and
as it happens, would have met a happier fate. But many
such examples were not to be expected; and I believe that
not one was found who loaned money at par. So that the
parallel of patriotism must be run between those institutions and
individuals, who disapproving the war, and distrusting the se
curity of the public resources, withheld their contributions and
proclaimed their opinions ; and those who thinking favorably of
both, assisted their injured country in the pursuit of redress,
by taking the loans, demanding a discount of only twelve per
cent, as a premium for their disinterested love of country. Un
fortunately for mankind, the days of patriotic oblation have
gone by; so far, I mean, as respects silver, and gold, and jew
els. Not of services — ^these I know may be had in profusion.
No country can vie with ours in numbers who are ready to de
vote their talents to the service of their country, in the humblest
as well as the highest departments. These talents, however,
are not golden or gratuitous. Whatever they possess of ster
ling worth of another description must be paid for, though not
always compensated. Those must attain to a great age indeed,
who live to see the thanks of the nation deserved by or given
to any man for taking up a loan. It is always an affair of cal
culation, though it may be prompted or accompanied by a real
desire to support the public credit, and is so far laudable. In
this view of the subject, it will be found that every proposal toy
12

90
a loan gives rise to some sort of association. When the Chan
cellor of the British Exchequer opened his budgets during the
late war there were always associations. And if one great
banker and his friends known to be in opposition to the Ad
ministration had for any reasons connected with his views of
the public credit or the terms of the loan, declined taking it and
made his reasons known at Lloyd's Coffee House ; and another
great banker with his friends had in consequence taken it with
a better bonus, would it not have seemed ridiculous to the En
glish nation that the latter should have crowed up his own well
paid patriotism, and decryed the conduct of the former as in
dicative of enmity to the Constitution and safety of the country !
To shew that obstructions to the loan were pushed to an ex
treme, and that threats were employed ; extracts as usual are
made from the newspapers. It is not incumbent, I repeat,
upon the old majority of the State to justify the sallies of zeal,
or satire, or sensibility which may have escaped from the pens
of individuals on this or any other topic. Yet what was the
Scope of the imputed theatenings ? Never that I have seen, of
pains or penalties, of injury to life, or limb, or property. Nei
ther of tar and feathers or effigies. Some half dozen essays,
more or less, may be found by those who go mousing among old
files and pigeon holes, wherein the writers, of their own mere
authority pronounce very strong censures upon those who being
opposed to the war -will nevei-theless contribute pecuniary aids.
But the sum total of the threats is that they ¦will be put in Co
ventry by their party. And what very dreadful sentence would
that have been to those who were restrained by that consideration
only, from lending their money, even if the writers of those
essays had possessed (which they did not) the means of giving
effect to their menaces ? Verily I say unto thee, they would
have had their reward.
But the most shameless argument, (if its malignity were not
neutralized by its folly,) to prove the existence of " a reign of
terror," was drawn from the advertisements of brokers who of
fered to receive proposals and effect subscriptions, without dis
closing names. The inference is, that this was intended as a
screen for those who were afraid to be known as subscribers.
Now the plain truth is, that it was understood at the Treasury

91
Department, that individuals whose proposals might be rejected,
would (from a disposition natural to most men to conceal nego
tiations which issue in no contract,) be desirous of keeping their
names out of sight, and the notices from the treasury encoura
ged the expectation that this should be done. As to those who
should take the loans, the concealment, in the nature of things,
could be but temporary. They would hardly permit the brokers
to be their permanent trustees. They would either hold or sell
their stock when subscribed for, and their names could not fail
to be known. Besides, the treasury documents were always
subject to the call of Congress. The brokers therefore issued
their proposals in conformity to those of the treasury, but no
man could have expected to be a subscriber and keep for any
length of time under the rose.
It is certainly not, a correct view of the social compact, to
assume, that in a time of public distress, the monied capital
ist is under any peculiar obligation to advance or risk his money
by lending it to the country. Such an obligation is equally
binding upon all who have any money to spare, whether the sum
be great or small ; and no reason can be perceived why those
who have property which may be converted into money, with
out material sacrifice, should be excused from such contribu
tion. Those, therefore, who had neither money, or property
to command money beyond their fair and ordinary expendi
tures, are alone entitled to complain against their fellow citi
zens, who, with themselves, decUned becoming public creditors.
He only who is "guiltless," is authorized to "cast the first
stone." I now sir, take my leave of you, and of those who have con
descended to read these letters. In writing them I have at
tempted to discharge a duty to my native State, and to defend
the people against the slanders of their Chief Magistrate. And
though, to judge from appearances, some are more ready to kiss
the rod, than to vindicate their own honor, the time will come
when the statements and principles of constitutional law con
tained in these letters; expounded by abler pens and under
more auspicious circumstances, will be approved by all, except
those who acquiesce in the disgrace of the State, so long as it
involves the disparagement of their adversaries. This virulent

92
feeling cannot, I trust, continue to be tiie ruling impulse of
great numbers of any party.
For myself, I am aware that my enlistment in this defence,
can be productive of no possible personal advantage. On the
contrary, this taking up of the gauntlet in behalf of my party,
may seem to imply the admission, that I am peculiarly respon
sible for the project of the Convention, and other measures ob
noxious to popular jealousy and censure, and thus to sanction
the odiousness which is attempted to be brought upon my polit
ical character. To all this, I content myself with opposing my
simple negation, and appealing to the well-informed of my co-
temporaries of both parties. My political sins are those of
Congresses, Senates, and Houses of Representatives — of a ma
jority of the people, first of the United States, then of my native
State and City. Of my full aliquot part of these I would no
thing extenuate, and more should not be set down to me in
malice. I have lived to see triumphant all the principles of
the great original federal party, of wliich Washington was the
head, and of which I was an individual member, though by the
perversity of the course of human affairs, I have survived the
downfall of the party itself. There is no prominent feature of
federal policy (unless the alien and sedition acts be so regard
ed by means of a factitious importance) which the ruling party
has not found itself compelled to adopt, and place in a bolder
relief. The funding system — bank, navy, army, loans, taxes,
embassies, in short, whatever appertaining to the civil and mil
itary establishments was formerly a theme of opposition, have
been patronized, not merely as appendages, but essentials to tiie
machinery of government. All the hydras and chimeras are
transformed into goodly shapes and proper agents. And not
a question has been decided, nor as far as I am informed, agi
tated upon old party principles, since the peace. With this
state of things as it affects myself, I am so perfectly content, as
to be inaccessible to any uneasiness or regret, except what ari
ses from an apprehension that these letters may be thought by
some to be dictated by spleen or other unworthy personal con
sideration. Against this, I can only once more oppose the
assurance of my word, and trust to time to become my compur
gator. And I assure those by whose strenuous opposition I

93
have become privileged to devote the few years of health and
vigor, which through Divine goodness may possibly be mine, to
retirement from public employment, that they have not only
done me a favor, but restored to me a tranquillity of mind
which is interrupted by no unkindly feeling towards them as a
party, nor even to their musquito auxiliaries, wliich, when
gorged with my blood, will fly off, and in due time fasten their
little stings in some new prey.
So far, however, as relates to the great party with whom it
will be always a subject of pride and pleasure to me, to have
acted, I confess that I regard the state of public affairs not
without emotions of apprehension and sorrow. Our party divi
sions no longer deriving nutriment from collisions of real in
terests and opinions of general policy, have become personal.
This, which has ever been the most dangerous division in all re
publics, inspiring implacable and hereditary animosities among
citizens, after the causes of their original schisms have ceased;
threatens, if I understand the tendency of things aright, more
of serious and permanent evil than has elsewhere proceeded
from the same prolific source. In other countries, where these
personal divisions (or if you please factions) have existed,
the representative principle was at best but imperfectly under
stood or adopted in practice. The contests and dissentions of
the old republics were carried on among the people in their
primary assemblies, and hence it was impossible, especially
where more than one State was concerned, to give such a di
rection to the suffrages of the people as should uniformly secure
a dominant party against the enterprize and occasional success
of its rival in obtaining a share in the administration of affairs —
but this is to be done, and is pretty nearly effected among us, by
a misapplication of the Principle of Representation. This great
principle, in its purity the noblest of all human discoveries — the
main regulator of the machinery of a free govemment, may be
so perverted and misapplied as to give an overwhelming force
to one of the parties in a State instead of preserving a just bal
ance among all. Through this medium, a tremendous organi
zation of the dominant party has already taken place throughout
the Union, for permanently securing to itself the powers of
Government without a participation by those who once were,

94
but have long ceased to be a party different in principle from
themselves. This great party is itself convulsed by feuds and
subdivisions, and cabals in behalf of different favorites — But all
these become subservient to the paramount antipathy entertain
ed against their ancient rivals. The only object in which they
are unanimous, is so to concert operations as to keep power in
the hands of the Republican family, when in truth there is no
difference between a member of the Republican family and the
persons they persecute, but what consists in this very ^irit of
intolerance and exclusion. On this principle they act openly and
universally — They have never departed from it a moment —
And no man from the President of the United States down to
the Tub Orators, affects to disguise it. It is of no conse
quence in this connexion that the leading men are not agreed
upon who shall be in office. They are perfectly of a mind as
to who shall be disqualified. No matter, in this view, which
candidate comes to be President ; it being understood that each
under the pains and forfeitures of treachery to his party is to
maintain them in their monopoly of honor and office. Here
ihen I venture to affirm is a personal division of parties, more
formidable than the world has ever seen, whether we regard
numbers, or the means possessed by one of strengthening itself
and oppressing others. When this state of affairs is consider
ed, and one reflects that the tyranny too often exercised in
republics by one popular faction over another, has been display
ed in every variety of violence and oppression that are imputa
ble to other species of despotism ; it is imposible to look down
the vale of futurity and to ruminate "On rising kingdoms and
on falling States," without sad misgivings. It is a new political
problem to be resolved ; what will be the fate of a republic,
where a vast number of citizens, in all respects qualified to take
part in public affairs, find themselves and their families degra
ded to a caste, which by the silent but irresistible effect of an
intelligence among equals of no better pretensions ; and for no
reason but a difference in name, (which may be applied with
arbitrary injustice to the third and fourth generation) is perma
nently shut out from the public confidence. They must indeed
be more or less than men, to remain without feelings of bitter
resentment, and dispositions to seize every occasion of escape

95
from this ignominious durance. They cannot but regard them
selves victims of a more galling dispensation than the Catholics
in England or the Greeks in Turkey, in proportion as there will
be less of pretence for any discrimination. First or last, they
will be driven to organize themselves in their turn. And new
indications of concerted movements intended on their part will
furnish pretexts for a more vigorous exclusion and a more intol
erable "dominatio plebis." But I have no inclination to trace
consequences further. Let those who incline to do so, resort
to history. If this system be pursued ; and through the re
deeming qualities of intelligence in the citizens— -their public
virtue, and any peculiar principle in our forms of Govemment,
these consequences stop short of those which, from causes sim
ilar in character, but never so fearfully combined, have befallen
other States, those who live after us ¦will have abundant cause
to claim the distinction of a chosen people.
H. G. OTIS.

96

NOTE TO LAST LETTER.

Having declared my opinion that Loans to Government
during the war were not a subject deserving of praise, nor the
refusal to loan, of censure; the following correspondence arro
gates no credit for opinions held by me during the war, in rela
tion to that subject. It leaves, however, all at liberty to judge
how far those opinions are consistent with dispositions to go all
lengths, which have been so kindly imputed to the members of
the Hartford Convention. Nothing was concluded, at the meet
ing referred to in these letters. All were left free to act for
themselves. I am bound in candor, however, to admit that un
til after the expectation of stopping the war had ceased by the
rejection of terms of accommodation, I cherished the hope, and
very probably expressed it in conversation, that the capitalists
here would not take the loans. I add, as my opinion merely,
that had it been premised in this quarter, that Government
would instruct Ministers to treat for peace, on the terms after
wards agreed to, they could have commanded much of the dis
posable capital in this part of the country.

BOSTON, JULY 2, 1819.
Dear Sir....You must doubtless remember that during the last war, a
gentlemem of high character, came hither from Philadelphia, bearing pro
posals from some opulent persons in that city to men of the same descrip
tion in this, to be concerned in taking one of the loans proposed by the
United States. That on this suggestion a meeting was had of some of our
principal and most opulent citizens, at which the expediency of subscribing
to this loan was submitted to their consideration. On that occasion I was
of the number of those who recommended the measure, and professed my
readiness to be concerned in it with my friends. I assumed that the reasons
which might have induced the opposers of the war to withhold their aid in
the iirst loan through a hope of stopping the progress of hostilities, bad
ceased : — That we were committed with the Government to the chances of
a confirmed state of open war : — That the money would be had, however
enormous the terms, aud that if the debt should be redeemed, those who did
not participate in the profit must still be Charged with the burden of the ex
cessive premium, and that if it should not be paid, the failure must be in
consequence of a prostration of public credit that would be detrimental to

97
property of every description, and which of course the rich should endeavor
to prevent. That an ultimate failure of the public credit was not likely to
happen in a country whose resources were increasing like ours, and that
the lenders of money might acquire some consideration with the Govern
ment of which a use favorable to a pacific policy might be made. I was
however overruled by the opinion of a majority, and nothing was done. It
would be gratifying to me to receive at your leisure ten lines expressive of
your recollection of these facts, or any of them, and of any otlier circum
stances explanatory of the part I then took in that discussion. I have no
view to any specific use to be made of your answer in humiliating vindica
tions of the course I pursued, or in idle pretensions to foresight and cor
rectness of opinion. But it is possible I may avail myself of it to satisfy the
curiosity of some who may take an interest in the humble but anxious part
which I bore in the afiairs of the times.
Respectfully, yours, H. G. OTIS.
HoK. G. Cabot.

BOSTON, JULY 3, 1819.
My Dear Sir.. ..By your note of yesterday, I am desired to state my
recollections of what passed, and especially of what part you took in a con
versation at an early period of the war, held in this town, on the expediency
of lending money to the Government of the United States. I remember that
at the request of a gentleman from Philadelphia, a meeting of some of our
wealthiest citizens was called at th& time, to which you refer, and that the
question proposed for their consideration was, whether the federalists here
ought to become subscribers to a loan solicited by the Government of the
United States. I well recollect that you was decidedly in favor of a sub
scription, and expressed your readiness to take a portion with your friends.
In support of this proposition you observed, that all hopes of preventing or
stopping hostilities had been long extinguished ; that we were now at open
war, and must all share in its consequences to our country ; that the tempo
rary failure of public credit would be a great calamity, and would load us
with a heavy debt, which would be contracted at a ruinous discount, but must
probably be discharged by a full payment of the nominal amount. You agreed
that the resources of the nation being amgle for its defence, must be consid
ered as pledged for the attainment of that object at all times, and that if we
did not choose to partake of the advantageous premiums On the loans, we
must, at any rate, bear our part of the burden.
These are my general impressions of the subject of your inquiry — doubt
less, there are many unimportant particulars, which, at this distance of time,
I am unable to retrace ; but as they cannot be of a difierent character, I shall
be happy if these give you satisfaction, — being very truly, and with great re
spect, your assured friend and servant,
GEO. CABOT.
13

98

[Several of the subscribers to this series of Letters upon the Hai'tford
Convention, have expressed their desire to the publisher to see Mr. Otis'
Letter upon the Massachusetts Claim, printed in the same volume; — this
was not contemplated in the prospectus, but he most readily and cheerfully
accedes to the suggestion of his patrons.]

MASSACHUSETTS CLAIM.

SIR, Being well informed that very significant inquiries are
occasionally made concerning the delay to bring before Con
gress the Massachusetts Claim, these last five years, I consider
it due to my colleagues of the Senate and House during that
period, as well as to myself, to otter you for publication a brief
statement of facts. Upon taking my seat in the Senate in the
winter of 1817-18, (after ascertaining that the Secretary of
War felt himself bound by the former decision of his predeces
sor,) I lost no time in consulting with Mr. Ashmun, my brother
Senator, and others friendly to the Claim, especially Mr. King,
upon the most advisable mode of introducing the subject before
Congress. They were all agreed upon the inexpediency of
taking the first step in the Senate. It was not usual to origi
nate applications of this nature in that body. The right of
propounding revenue bills in the House, by a sort of tacit con
sent, had been extended to other bills requiring considerable
new appropriations. The Claim would encounter much of pop
ular prejudice, which could be allayed only by a thorough exa
mination of its merits in the House. Success in the Senate
might not be auspicious to its fate in the House, while the loss
of the bill in the former branch could not fail to augment the
obstacles in the latter. These opinions were supported by sev
eral distinguished gentlemen of the majority, who, admitting
that their first impressions were adverse to the Claim, had the
magnanimity to wish that it might be presented under the most
propitious aspect, and receive the most dispassionate examina
tion. It was thereupon determined at a meeting of the whole

99
delegation of both Houses, to commence operations in the House
of Representatives, and for this purpose, the gentlemen most
friendly to the Claim, entered with me upon a laborious inves
tigation of the documentary evidence, and requested me to pre
pare a statement calculated to dissipate prejudice, and call the
attention of those whpse duty it would be to decide upon it, to
its true merits. Such a statement accordingly, in a pamphlet
form, (with references to the very able memorial of Messrs.
Lloyd and Sumner, formerly presented to the War Depart
ment, and other documents,) I digested with much labor, and
all possible diligence, and it being approved by Messrs. Mason,
Whitman, and by the greater part of my associates, was printed
and a copy placed in the hands of each member. The Speaker
evinced great liberality in the appointment of a committee upon
the memorial : And the minority of the committee, though at
first inclined against the Claim, (and perhaps not finally recon
ciled to it,) after an examination of the documents, magnani
mously agreed that the majoritv might make out in their report,
the most favorable case, ¦vfhich in their view, the eridence would
warrant, and that the same should be presented with an under
standing that they were not pledged to support it, unless upon
mature deliberation and debate they should see fit to do so. As
my attention had been much devoted to the subject in writing
the pamphlet, the committee did me the honor to engage me to
frame the report. It fortunately received their approbation,
and was made without any material variation. By the prin
ciples therein stated, the Claim must, I am persuaded, stand or
fall. They are the principles of substantial justice, applicable
to facts supported by the most conclusive evidence : And when
ever they shall be urged by the cordial and concurrent influence
of Massachusetts and Maine, before an impartial Congress, they
must prevail. The report was made to the House of Represen
tatives many weeks before the end of the session, but such was
the accumulation of business, that it could not take its place in
the orders of the day, before the end of the session.
Both the pamphlet and report assume a correct view of the
question, which, however repugnant to the received opinion, is
undeniably ^rue. The almost universal popular impression was,
and to a great extent among the friends and adversaries of the

100
Claim yet is, that the withholding of the militia from the command
of General Dearborn by Governor Stiong, was in consequence of
the difference of opinion between the NationaP-and State Exec
utives respecting the constitutional right to command. But this
opinion, so far as it relates to troops or services for which com
pensation is now claimed, (with the exception perhaps of some
inconsiderable particulars,) has no foundation in fact. In July,
1814, (prior to which the State claims little or nothing,) there
were no orders in existence from the President to the Governor.
The orders to which the Governor declined a, formal obedience,
were issued in 1812, and had expired in April, 1814, together
with the law from which they emanated. With the new re
quisition made in July, 1814, by General Dearborn, Governor
Strong literally complied. This put an end to the constitu
tional controversy. The Governor waved, if he did not aban
don it : And though he did not afterwards in all cases literally
(but only substantially) comply with other requisitions, the non
compliance was not attributable to the Governor's disposition
to revive that question ; but to other circumstances. In fact, to
a reluctance on the part of the militia to engage in service un
der a Military Prefect — to a fear of being drawn off to Canada,
and a determination not to go thither ; and to the derangement
of companies and officers under the last order. These pre
vailed without regard to poUtical parties, (as the documents
prove,) and these the Governor could not control, though he
made sincere efforts to get over the difficulties. It appeared to
the federal members of Massachusetts, that this was a most rad
ical and important distinction — that it placed the Claim on an
impregnable foundation, and taken in connexion with the actual
service, and the real concert (sufficient for all practical purpo
ses) which prevailed after July, 1814, between the officers of
the United States, including General Dearborn himself, and
the State Officers, put an end to all just objection to its allow
ance. We also thought this ground might be assumed with
perfect consistency, by those of our colleagues whose political
creed differed from ours — and that they ought to be glad, and
happy, and cordial, in aiding us to maintain it. But some of
them, including, I believe, all from Maine, could not view the
question in this light. They entirely declined pledging them-

101
selves to an active support of arguments founded on this basis.
It was accordingly the decided sentiment of every friend to the
Claim in the House of Representatives, that this disposition of
the members interested, would create a paralysis in one quar
ter, while a fever would be unavoidable in another, and that the
Claim could not struggle with such fearful odds.
In the next session the bill was committed to a Committee of
the whole House ; but for the reasons above stated, and which,
l)y Mr. Mellen and myself, were at the time communicated to
the Governor, and by him to the Legislature, (and for no other
reasons,) it was permitted by its friends to slumber on the files. >
In the session of 1822, Mr. Mills and myself received from
His Excellency the Governor new instructions to bring forward
the Claim — still leaving to our discretion the choice of means.
Mr. Gorham was our fellow lodger, and it was agreed between
us, to attempt once more to bring the members of the delega
tions of Massachusetts and Maine, into an agreement, to renew
an application to the President of the United States, for in
structions to the War Department to examine the accounts.
Since tiie exhibition and rejection of the memorial of Messrs.
Lloyd and Sumner, in 1817, the Claim of Maryland had been
allowed, and (as we conceived) other claims of a less merit
orious character than that of Massachusetts. The rejection of
the memorial of those gentlemen, happened during a vacancy
in the chief office of the War Department — ^before the ferment
of opinion growing out of the war had subsided ; and under a
firm conviction in the mind of Mr. Madison, that the constitu
tional controversy, and that alone, had occasioned the omission
to yield the militia upon every requisition. Several meetings
were had, at which it was proposed to make a respectful appli
cation to the President, recalling to his recollection these facts,
to the end of inducing him to review the decision on the above-
mentioned memorial, and authorize the examination of the
vouchers. Much delay took place, and several adjournments,
to afford opportunity to the Senators from Maine to receive in
structions. We prepared a memorial to the President, which
we endeavored to make unexceptionable to gentlemen of both
parties ; but I left Washington before the Senators from Maine
were ready to act upon it. The gentleman in whose hands 1

102
left it, informed me that it was not acceptable to some individ
uals, who -were averse to the admission of any fact which might
exculpate the Government of Massachusetts. Another was
therefore framed in very general terms, and presented too late
to be acted upon; but in consequence of which, at the next
session, as I have understood, the President had been pleased
to grant the desired order. It would have been quite impossi
ble for those of my colleagues in the Senate and House, with
whose views I had the honor to concur, or for myself, to have
exerted ourselves with more fidelity and industry, if the reward
for performing those duties had been the amount of the Claim.
Nothing could be done in the Senate, for the reasons above al
leged, more than to discuss the merits of our Claim in repeated
conversations, which we omitted no opportunity of doing. And
it must be obvious, that to agitate the question in the House,
Uvhile a portion of the Representatives from the interested States
'were indisposed to vindicate the justice of the Claim, and while
the doctrine was constantly maintained in public newspapers of
our own State, that equity afforded no ground for its support,
and that its success must be preceded by concessions of error,
and permitted by the mere bounty of Congress; would have
been an undertaking worse than hopeless. I rejoice that this
high concern is now deposited in abler hands than mine.
Whatever may be the fate of the Claim, I venture to predict
that any allowances made towards it, will never be the fruit of
disavowals or retractions, but the result of a con-riction founded
on evidence, and carried home to the understanding of Con
gress, or of the accounting officers, of the correctness of the
principles maintained by those who have heretofore been char
ged with the solicitation of the Claim. I am well satisfied that
there is such evidence, and that the principles are correct, and
that the Claim may be placed on a foot that would require no
departure from the political tenets of any party. If this can
not be done, the sooner it goes to profit and loss, the better.
For it is not competent to Congress, nor to the Executive Gov
ernment to make a grant to Massachusetts, of a million of dol
lars, more or less, as a bounty. If the State has a Claim in law
or equity upon the National Treasury, it ought to be paid — ^but
if otherwise, it is a nullity : and there is no power in the Con-

103
stitution enabling Congress to convert an unfounded demand
into a just Claim, on condition of disavowing political heresies,
or of any sort of truckling or humiliation— no power to give us
on our knees, what we are not entitled to receive in the erect
posture of an independent State. I hope this statement of facts
will not be considered obtrusive upon the public, or offensive to
any individuals. I mean to question no gentleman's motives,
nor even to censure the course of those, from whom I have the
misfortune to differ in opinion. While I cheerfully leave my
general political character to the disposal of the public, and rest
my private character upon the opinion of my neighbors, attempt
ing no vindication of either, I have felt it to be a duty to explain
the mode in which I have endeavored to discharge a special
trust, deeply interesting to my heart and feelings, and in re
gard to which I do not feel that the reproach of negligence or
indifference can justly be added to the charge of other failings.
H. G. OTIS.
JUNE 28, 1823.

NOTE A.
The writer of these letters, finding them called for by his friends, in the
form of a pamphlet, intended to illustrate certain of the subjects alluded to,
by notes and references — But upon experiment it was found difficult to com
press them within the limits of a common sized pamphlet, and the project i"
therefore abandoned.

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