YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.

THE

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

ADMINISTRATIONS

WASHINGTON AND ADAMS

1789-1801.

WILLIAM HENRY TRESCOT.

BOSTON:
LITTLE, BEOWN AND COMPANY.
1857.

Entered according to Aot of Congress in the year 1857, by
WILLIAM HENEY TEESCOT,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the District of South Carolina,

C AMBEID G.E:
ALLEN AND FARNHAM, PKINTEES.

TO

HON. EDWARD EVERETT.

Dear Sir, —
Since the time -when Massachusetts and South Carolina, Virginia
and New York, gave to the public service of a common country
such men as Washington and Adams, Jay and Pinckney, that
country has travelled fast and far. Its territory has expanded, its
influence extended, its character matured, and its place in the world
has become proudly assured.
But the spirit which informed their counsels has departed, and
the language of their unselfish patriotism would be profaned in the
party controversies of the day. What is to be the issue of this mis
erable dissension, God only knows. But whether this great empire
is to outlive its angry disputes, and again move onwards in the unity
of the spirit and the bond of peace, or whether the grand fabric is to
be resolved into separate republics, each carrying out God's purpose
in its special civilization, it cannot be amiss, in this day of hard
thoughts and bitter words, to go back to our old days and to our
ancient rulers for that sober wisdom, which, united or separate, can
alone secure our prosperity.
It ought not to surprise you, and I am sure it will surprise nobody
else, that, fresh from the contemplation ofthe temperance, judgment,
and patriotism of those great rulers, I should find a natural associa
tion between your character and that of the wise and virtuous men
who created and adorned our early history.
A*

VI DEDICATION.
It has been, sir, your good fortune to have filled the same high
office which has been illustrated by the names of Jay and Jefferson,
Marshall and Madison, Clay and Webster and Calhoun. It was the
good fortune of your country, that, during your official life, you were
called upon to justify the history of her past growth, and vindicate
the strength and justice of her position towards the world. You
did both in language which has become history. You linked the
eager present with the venerable past, and developed the policy of
to-day from the principles and practice of our earliest statesmanship.
To whom, then, could I dedicate these pages with more propriety
than to him who has so thoroughly represented the traditionary
policy of our wisest and greatest statesmen ? And I venture to hope
that it will not diminish the slight value of this honest tribute to your
public character, that, justified by circumstances which I at least
can never forget, I can subscribe myself, in a spirit of sincere and
and respectful aflfection, Your friend,
WM. HENRY TEESCOT.
Barnwell Island, S. C, )
Nov. 10, 1857. }

PREFACE,

This volume is the sequel to one which I ventured to
publish in 1852, under the title of " The Diplomacy of
the Revolution," and I hope soon to complete the
series by a similar one, in reference to the remaining
periods of our diplomatic history, in accordance with
the division suggested in the first chapter of this book.
An attempt to appreciate the progress of interna
tional law, as illustrated in the diplomatic history of
the world from the peace of Westphalia, undertaken
with no view to publication, required the study of the
special diplomatic history of each of the great Euro
pean powers, and of the United States. The diplo
matic history of almost every European state has been
written, whether well or ill, by some one of that great
body of historical students in the Old World to whom
the materials have been accessible ; and outside of their
labors, and in illustration of them, there exists an

viii • PREFACE.
immense mass of memoirs, state papers, and negotia
tions, bearing on the same subject. But there was no
corresponding summary of our own diplomatic history.
The only work of the kind, " The Diplomacy of the
United States," by Theodore Lyman, Boston, 1828,
although an accurate, laborious, and useful book, is not
written from the point of view which I wished to
occupy ; and I therefore found it necessary to study the
diplomatic history of the United States for myself, as
thoroughly as the materials would permit. Finding the
study one of great interest to myself, I have thought its
results might not be without interest for others.
I have published this volume separately, because the
twelve years which it includes have a character of their
own, and the accession of Mr. Jefferson, reversing that
policy, makes the commencement of his administration
a proper starting-point for the next period of our
history. The materials which I have used are the official col
lections of state papers relating to our diplomatic his
tory, in Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence, from the
Declaration of Independence to the Treaty of Peace;
The Diplomatic Correspondence, from 1783 to 1789,
published by Congress, in 7 vols. 8vo. ; The Secret Jour
nals of Congress, Foreign Affairs, from the Meeting

PREFACE. ix
thereof to the Dissolution of the Confederation by the
Adoption of the Constitution ; The American State
Papers, Foreign Affairs, 4 vols, folio, from the Adop
tion of the Constitution to the Treaty of Ghent ; and
the Lives and Letters " of ¦ such of the distinguished
actors in our political history as have been published.
Among these I feel bound to refer specially to the large
and valuable publication of the Letters and Works of
John Adams, prefaced by a biography of great inter
est and value, and, considering the relation of the
author and the subject, of singular and honorable im
partiality. Besides these, I have had the MSS. col
lections of General Thomas Pinckney and General
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the one minister to Eng
land and Spain, and the other minister to France.
As there were no discoveries to make in our diplo
matic history, I have made none, and whatever value
these pages may have must attach to the connected
and impartial narrative which I have endeavored to
construct. Whenever I have quoted a public state paper with
out a special reference, it wiU. be found under its proper
date in one of the above published collections ; and
for the facts of our general history, a knowledge of
which I have assumed in the reader, the authority will

X PREFACE,
be found in any of the general histories of the United
States. I cannot conclude this preface without acknowledg
ing my sense of grateful obligation to Professor Bowen,
of Harvard University, for the kindness with which he
undertook, and the care with which he has accom
plished, the troublesome task of correcting the proofs of
this volume as they came from the press.
In the body of this work, by inadvertence, a reference
to the Life of Gouverneur Morris, by Dr. Sparks, as
authority for certain facts in Mr. Morris's ambassa
dorial career, was omitted. The reference belongs to
the chapter on the French negotiations.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
* PAGE
INTRODUCTION. FROM 1783 TO 1789 . . . . 1

CHAPTER II.
NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH ENGLAND . . .63
CHAPTER III.
NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH FRANCE . . . .129
CHAPTER IV.
NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH SPAIN AND ALGIERS . 225
CHAPTER V.
CONCLUSION  275

ERRATA.
Page 112, 3d line from bottom, for included read excluded.
Page 127, line 17, for a contemporary statesman, read contemporary statesmen.
Page 171, 3d line of note, for creditable to Mr. Pinckney^ read creditable to Jl^.
Pichering.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.
FROM THE TREATY OF PEACE, 1783, TO THE ADOPTION OF THB
CONSTITUTION, 1788.
The Diplomatic History of the United States may be
divided into three periods, — from Washington to Jeffer
son, from Jefferson to the Declaration of Mr. Monroe,
and from that Declaration to the present day.* This
division is, of course, to some extent arbitrary, but still
correct enough for the purposes of a continuous and
general narrative; and each of these periods may be
fairly considered as the illustration of a special condi
tion of public necessities, and as the natural manifesta
tion of an independent principle of our foreign policy.
* The character and circumstances of this famous Declaration will
be discussed in its proper place in the history of the period to which
it belongs. I use the term here simply as a convenient description
of that period, when the consequences of our foreign policy, from the
accession of Mr. Jefierson to the Treaty of Ghent, were, to borrow a
compact and comprehensive French phrase, resume, in the official
acts of the govemment. 1

2 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.
The condition of the country at the inauguration of
General Washington's administration was, in many
respects, anomalous. It was a transition leading to a
great change, and required an activity of diplomatic life
that has not since been either necessary or possible.
In the first place, the independence of the colonies
had not abruptly cut all connection with Europe ; and
as the colonial policy of the great maritime states had
always been considered questions of European concern,
the powers of the old world did not at first recognize
the extent of that independence. They still fancied
themselves directly interested in the politics of the
United States. And it is safe to say, that the admis
sion of an American minister into an European con
gress would have appeared a more natural diplomatic
proceeding in 1788 than at any later period of our
history. Again : there existed at that time, in Europe, an ex
aggerated idea of the immediate importance of Amer
ican commerce. It was a time when great interests
were about to take the place of great men, but while
they were still felt through the action of governments,
rather than in their own strength. Governments, there
fore, everywhere strove by treaties to secure commercial
advantages ; and the correspondence of Franklin, Adams,
and Jefferson, who represented the country abroad from
the peace of 1783 to the adoption of the constitution,
bears testimony to the anxiety of many maritime
powers to conciliate and secure these supposed advan-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 3
tages. The indissoluble commercial connection be
tween England and the United States had not then
established itself; and the general idea was, that the
independence of the colonies had broken up an old and
rich commerce, the fragments of which were to be
obtained by early and liberal conventions.
In the third place, the treaty with France was one of
mutual guarantees, and many of its clauses were open
to interpretations involving the United States in the
stormy and changeful politics of that unhappy empire.
The circumstances of France soon, indeed, compelled
her to insist upon that construction of the treaty most
favorable to her belligerent rights, and the government
was plunged into an harassing controversy both with
England and France. The task of the administration
was, in negotiating such treaties as were absolutely
necessary for the interests of the country, to avoid all
political engagements ; and, in carrying out faithfully
such treaties as had already been negotiated, to shun
all action that might compromise the neutrality of the
country. In other words, its object was to establish
by diplomacy what had already been achieved by arms,
— the perfect independence of the United States ; not
their isolation from the great affairs of the world, but
the right to determine for themselves how far their
interests were implicated in European politics, and how
far they would permit themselves to be made parties to
any European agitation. Situated as were the Euro
pean states, they were not always arbiters of their own

4 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
interests ; and there existed on their part a strong dis
position to apply the rule of their own conduct to the
new republic, and compel a participation in a conimon
fate. To resist this pretension, and thus perfect the
work of the Revolution, was neither an easy nor a safe
achievement ; and it was accomplished only after many
disheartening trials, and through the long, patient, and
painful negotiations which gave character to this period
by the treaties with England, Spain, and France.
With the accession of Mr. Jefferson, opened a new
state of affairs. The commerce of the country, in its
gradual increase, had demonstrated that its natural
channels, could neither be created nor changed by treaty
stipulations, and the idea of the importance of treaty
connections with America had lost much of its original
force. The progress, too, of the great revolution which
convulsed the old world until 1815, was fast absorbing
the attention of the European powers. And during
this period of unequalled importance and excitement,
it became very clear that the interests of the new
republic were, and for some time must be, entirely dis
connected from the ruling interests of the European
confederacy. The Revolution having given us an inde
pendent national existence, and the administrations of
Washington and Adams having vindicated our perfect
independence of national action, it remained for Mr.
Jefferson and his successors to complete this work.
So long as the United States were bounded by terri
tories belonging to European powers, they were at any

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 5
time subject to foreign and extrinsic influences, and
liable to be drawn into the consequences of political
action not always proceeding from their own interests ;
and the full independence of no maritime country could
be considered established in face of the belligerent pre
tensions of the European nations, during this period
most extravagantly pressed, and, so far as force went,
most powerfully supported. The two leading ideas,
therefore, of this second stage of our foreign policy
were : first, the necessary territoried extension of the
United States, which would leave their independence
of action uninfluenced by the neighborhood of Euro
pean colonies ; and next, the recognition of their equal
right to the great maritime prerogatives ofan independ
ent and coramercial people. As far as circumstances
permitted, the first was carried out in the purchase of
Louisiana and Florida ; and the second developed in
the long controversy terminating in the war of 1812.
And, though this war did not effect a technical solution
of the vexed question of neutral rights, yet it was a
declaration that no infringement upon our full equality
of maritime privileges could be ventured without
instant war with a nation, who, by a brilliant series of
naval achievements, had manifested at least its ability
to hold its own.
With this period, the minority of the United States
terminated. The necessary conditions of an active and
healthy Hfe were fulfilled, and the United States stood
before the world with their territories compact, their

6 DIPLOMATIC HISTOKT.
national interests clearly defined, and their political
intelligence alert, practised, and ready for the exigency
of any future question.
With this period, also, the founders of the republic
withdrew from participation in the daily life of the
nation. They had labored fearlessly and faithfully
through the dangers of the war, — through the darkness
and despondency of the Confederation, — through the
perplexed and hazardous discussions of the Convention.
With rare courage and temper and wisdom, they had
laid broad the foundations of a great country ; and, with
singular good fortune, had been permitted to perfect
the government which they had initiated. For more
than a quarter of a century, the men who framed the
constitution were allowed to administer it ; and, having
thus formed it in infancy and moulded its youth, they
retired, one after another, frpm the scenes of their great
achievements, leaving to a new generation the respon
sibility of its mature manhood. But, as if to conse
crate with the grace of their final benediction its fore
most step, it was granted to Mr. Monroe, fhe last of
the venerable company, to inaugurate, by his famous
Declaration, the vigorous commencement of our national
life. From the date of this Declaration, our foreign
policy, if it has not taken a higher tone, has at least
expressed itself in a more systematic development. To
this period belong the settlement of the French claims,
so ably conducted by Mr. Rives ; the Treaty of Wash
ington, so admirably negotiated by Mr. Webster ; the

DIPLOMATIC HI STOET. 7
Oregon Question, adjusted by Mr. McLane ; the An
nexation of Texas, in great measure due to the active
resolution of Mr. Calhoun ; and those masterly discus
sions of national interests and international law which
have made the state papers of Mr. Everett and Mr.
Marcy proud and perpetual records in our national his
tory. I propose, in the present volume, to write the history
of the first of these three periods.* It was a time of
trial and trouble, but it was illustrated by great names
and honorable labors ; and th'e whole superstructure of
our after history rests upon the foundation of its calm
' and patient sagacity, its simple and unfaltering truth
fulness. To comprehend fully, however, the position of the
country at the inauguration of General Washington, it
wUl be necessary briefly to review the condition of our
foreign relations during the five years which elapsed
between the treaty of peace of 1783 and the adoption
of the constitution in 1788.
It would be almost as easy for a man in the vigorous
and varied activity of his matured life to realize faith
fully to himself the uncertainty and weakness of his
infancy, as for a citizen of the United States at the
present day to reproduce the condition of his country
* For that period, which, commencing with the Declaration of In
dependence, terminated at the treaty of peace, 1783, I may be
permitted to refer to " The Diplomacy of the Revolution," by the
author of this volume. Appleton, 1852.

8 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
at the date of that treaty which secured its independ
ence. In every element which contributes to the glory
and strength of national existence, — an efficient govern
ment, compact territory, flourishing finances, a pros
perous commerce, dense population, and an effective
military and naval force^ — the United States of America
were, in 1783, singularly deficient. They had, indeed,
unparalleled resources ; a soil whose prodigal bounty
was fed by the inexhaustible mines and lavish valleys
and fruitful hills of an untouched continent ; majestic
rivers whose currents rolled in proud anticipation of a
priceless commerce, and broad bays whose arms spread
wide to welcome the freighted argosies of the world.
The spirit of their people was free, bold, and venture
some ; shrewd in enterprise, quick in resolution, and
possessing unbounded faith in themselves and their fu
ture. Above all, they had, and honored in their coun
cils, not a few of those " kingly spirits of history," who,
when they receive full and obedient recognition from
the people, are the highest manifestation of national
life, and the surest guarantee of national character.
But this rich soil, with its treasures of corn and coal
and cotton and gold and lead, was to be won and
worked. Forests were to be felled and cities to be
builded, harbors to be created and rivers to be rendered
navigable. The spirit of the people was to be devel
oped by labor, and even the great men who had by
seven years of suffering achieved independence, were to
be perfected by a wider and more difficult experience.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 9
For it must not be supposed that the treaty of peace
secured the national life. Indeed, it would be more
correct to say, that the most critical period of the coun
try's history embraced the time between the peace of
1783 and the adoption of the constitution in 1788.
It is now almost impossible to understand how the
Articles of the Confederation, which constituted the rev
olutionary government, lasted through the struggles of
that difficult time.* The central power was clumsy in
its construction, uncertain in its action, and very feeble
in its execution. It certainly did not either lead popu
lar sentiment, or develop a consistent scheme of na
tional policy. The indomitable spirit of the people
* For the history of the Confederation, the only authority with
which I am acquainted is " The History of the Formation and Adop
tion of the Constitution of the United States," by Mr. George T.
Curtis, of Boston. The first volume of this work only has been pub
lished, including the period of the Confederation. As the great
party divisions of our political history have taken their rise in differ
ent constructions of the constitution, and as every one brings to the
study of that instrument a mind more or less biased by early, and, of
necessity, prejudiced convictions, it is of course impossible to pro
nounce an opinion on this work until it is completed. Inferring
some of Mr. Curtis's opinions from his argument in the Dred Scott
case, I can anticipate a wide difference on many important points.
I can say, however, with truth and great pleasure, that so far the
work is a credit to the graver literature of the country. It is con
ceived in a spirit of candid, philosophical inquiry, and executed
in a manner honorable to the taste, learning, and honesty of its
accomplished author.

10 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
conquered by endurance the chief obstacles to success,
while the necessary unanimity of action and opinion
was preserved by the individual influence of the great
men who appeared together in the diflerent colonies,
and commanded, each in his sphere, the confidence of
his immediate section. The subordination of the gov
ernment to the individual ability of its instruments was
most striking in the foreign relations of the country, and
the diplomacy of the Revolution was the result rather of
the wisdom of Franklin, Adams, and Jay, than of the
prolonged and perplexed deliberation of the Conti
nental Congress. Efficient and sufficient, however, as
might be the articles of the confederation for the pur
pose of giving validity to the diplomatic transactions
which resulted in the treaty of peace, the provisions of
those articles rendered the government absolutely im
potent for the continued administration of the foreign
affairs of the new commonwealth. And the inquiry
made by the Duke of Dorset, in reply to the advances
of the American commissioners towards the negotia
tion of a commercial treaty with Great Britain, sug
gested insuperable difficulties.
"Having communicated," says his Grace, in a letter
dated March 26, 1785, " to my court the readiness you
expressed in ypur letter to me of the 9th December, to
remove to London for the purpose of treating upon
such points as may materially concern the interests,
both political and commercial, of Great Britain and
America, and having at fhe same time represented that

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 11
you declared yourselves to be fuUy authorized and em
powered to negotiate ; I have been, in answer thereto,
instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the
real nature of the powers with which you are invested,
whether you are merely commissioned by Congress, or
whether you have received separate powers from the
respective States  The apparent determination of
the respective States to regulate their own separate
interests, renders it absolutely necessary, towards form
ing a permanent systera of coraraerce, that ray court
should be inforraed how far the commissioners can be
duly authorized to enter into any engagements with
Great Britain which it may not be in the power of any
one of the States to render totally useless and ineffi
cient." *
Now the Articles of Confederation, after providing in
Art. 2, that " each State retains its sovereignty, free
dom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled,"
provided in Art. 9, that " the United States, in Congress
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and
power of deterraining on peace and war, .... of send
ing and receiving arabassadors, entering into treaties
and Eilliances ; provided, that no treaty of commerce
shall be made whereby the legislative power of the
respective States shall be restrained from imposing
* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. IL, p. 297.

12 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own peo
ple are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation
or importation of any species of goods or comraodities
whatsoever." And it also provided, in the sarae article,
that the consent of nine States sbould be necessary to
the exercise of even this liraited power. Such a pro
vision, in tbe presence of thirteen States, differing
widely in the character of their production and the
interests of their coraraerce, was an absolute negative
upon any perraanent or concerted action.
In addition to this, there was no efficiently con-
sti'ucted Departraent of State. Congress itself was
gradually subsiding into a political inanity ; the States
were absorbed in their local affairs ; their most distin
guished men were employed at home; a quorura of
members was tardily and with great difficulty convened
at the seat of government ; the federal and state
finances were in a condition of almost hopeless embar- ¦
rassment ; the mihtary force of the country nearly dis
banded; and the executive government itself, at the
very tirae it was offering to negotiate with the raost
powerful nation of the world, was driven from the capi
tal by a military insurrection which lacked principle to
be called a rebellion, and had scarcely strength enough
to be termed a riot. The questions, too, which were
of first importance to the United States, were precisely
those commercial and territorial questions which needed
prompt action, a vigorous governraent, and corapetent
military force: such questions, for example, as the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 13
boundaries between Spain and theraselves ; the restora
tion of the frontier posts by the English ; the coraraerce
with the West Indies, and the navigation of the Mis
sissippi. And yet, unfortunately, these were just the
questions most calculated to excite sectional feeling, to
develop mischievously local differences, and consequent
ly, under the limitation of the Confederation, the most
unlikely to be settled. All therefore which could be
expected at this period of our history was, that the gov
ernraent should give up nothing, and, if it pressed no
claims, that at least it should abandon none. And this
is just what the government did. It held every thing in
statu quo between the treaty of independence and the
adoption of the constitution ; and therefore it is that
frora the transactions of these five years can best be
learned the position of the United States upon the open
ing of General Washington's administration.
In 1781, the Continental Congress, which had in the
first years of the war neglected the organization of any
departraent of foreign affairs, was compelled, by the
growing necessities of its diplomatic relations, to estab
lish some orderly arrangeraent in this branch of admin
istration. They resolved, " That tbe extent and the rising im
portance of these United States entitle them to a place
among the great potentates of Europe, while our polit
ical and commercial interests point out the propriety of
' cultivating with them a friendly correspondence and
connection. 2

14 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" That to render such an intercourse advantageous,
the necessity of a competent knowledge of the interests,
views, relations, and systems of those potentates, is
obvious. " That a knowledge, in its nature so comprehensive,
is only to be acquired by a constant attention to the
state of Europe, and an unremitted apphcation to the
means of acquiring wellgrounded inforraation. . . .
" That to answer these essential purposes, the com
mittee are of opinion that a fixed and permanent office
for the department of foreign affairs ought forthwith
to be established, as a remedy against the fluctuation,
the delay, and indecision to which the present mode
of managing our foreign affairs must be exposed."
Under this new and better arrangement, Robert R.
Livingston, of New York, was elected " Secretary of
Foreign Affairs." After filling this responsible post with
erainent abiUty from the 20th of October, 1781, until
June, 1783, Mr. Livingston resigned. Congress post
poned the election of his successor until they had deter
mined upon a place of permanent session ; and, in the
raean time, conducted the correspondence with their
foreign ministers through the successive presidents of
their own body, Boudinot, Mifflin, and Lee. On the 7th
of May, 1784, Mr. Jay was elected to the vacant post.
A happier selection could not have been made. Mr.
Jay, after filfing high and responsible oflice at home, had
been Minister to Spain, and one of the plenipotentiaries
in Paris who negotiated the treaty of peace. The

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 15
grave' truthfulness of his character, the sobriety of his
judgment, and his inflexible resolution, all abundantly
illustrated in long public service, secured him the con
fidence of the country, while his diplomatic experience
gave him precisely that knowledge of national and
European interests and influences raost needed in those
questions which the varied poficies of England, France,
and Spain were anxious to settle, each to its own
special advantage. Of aU men in the country, Mr. Jay
was thus the best fitted to coraprehend the position of
our ministers abroad, to appreciate their despatches, and,
at the sarae time, to guide the dehberations of Congress
in harmony with the pohcy of the department. Be
tween Mr. Livingston's resignation and Mr. Jay's entry
into office, Congress received and replied to several
diploraatic coraraunications, which, possessing perhaps
no pohtical value, were yet interesting as reflections and
indications of European opinion. In March, 1783, the
Burgoraasters and Senate of the Free City of Ham
burg addressed, through John Abraham de Boor, to
Congress, whom they style "right noble, high, mighty,
most honorable Lords," a "raost obsequious missive,"
in which, referring to the treaty of peace with England,
they say : " We, impressed with the raost lively sensa
tions on the illustrious event, the wonder of this and
the raost remote future ages, and desirous fuUy to tes
tify the part we take therein, do hereby offer your High
Mightinesses our service and attachment to the cause ; "
and then; stating the advantages of a reciprocal trade,

16 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
proceed, " intercessionaUy and most obsequiously to
request your High Mightinesses to favor and counte
nance the trade of our merchants, and to suffer thera
to enjoy all such rights and liberties as you allow to
merchants of nations in amity, which, in gratitude and
with zeal, we wiU in our place endeavor to retribute, etc.,
etc." To all which. Congress replied briefly but prop
erly, and, as was fitting in return for so much friend
ship, prayed " God Almighty to keep the Honorable
Burgoraasters and Senate of the Imperial Free City
of Hamburg in his holy protection." *
In July, 1783, the ApostoUcal Nuncio in Paris sent
to Franklin, to be transmitted to Congress, a note, in
which he stated : " Before the Revolution, which has
just been corapleted in North America, the CathoUcs
and Missionaries of those provinces depended, as to
their spiritual concerns, on the Apostolical Vicar resi
dent in London. It is weU known that this arrange
ment can no longer exist; but as it is essential that
the Catholic subjects of the United States should have
an ecclesiastic to govern them in their reUgious con
cerns, the Congregation de Propaganda Fide existing
at Rome for the establishment and conservation of Mis
sions has come to the determination of proposing to
Congress to estabUsh, in sorae city of the United States
of North America, one of their CathoUc subjects, with
the powers of ApostoUcal Vicar, and in the character of
* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. p. 62 and 67.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 17
Bishop, or siraply in quality of Apostolical Prefect. . . .
And as it might soraetiraes happen that among the
subjects of the United States, there might be no per
son in a situation to be charged with the spiritual
government, either as Bishop or Apostolical Prefect, it
would -be necessary, in such circumstances, that Con
gress should consent to choose him from among the
subjects of a foreign nation the most friendly with the
United States." *
It is unnecessary to examine the scope and conse
quence of this proposition, which was not, it raust be re
marked, the opening of diplomatic intercourse between
the Pope as a prince and the United States as a nation,
but a scheme by which Congress, exercising the right to
choose the ApostoUcal Prefect, would, by the act of
choice, recognize and strengthen his position as an offi
cial of the national government. For on the llth of
May, 1784, Congress resolved : " That Dr. FrankUn be
desu-ed to notify to the Apostolical Nuncio at VersaiUes,
that Congress will be pleased to testify then- respect
to his sovereign and state ; but that, the subject of his
application to Dr. FrankUn being purely spiritual, it is
without the jurisdiction and powers of Congress, who
have no authority to permit or refuse it, these powers
beihg reserved to the several States individuaUy." f
On the 17th of May, 1784, the same day on which
Mr. Jay was elected Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and
* Sparks's Dip. Corres. Vol. IV. 156.
t Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. 117.
2'

18 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Mr. Jefferson appointed to supply his place in the cora
raission at Paris, Congress passed a series of resolu
tions, intended for the instruction of their foreign min
isters, and tracing a general outUne of what they con
sidered a complete system of foreign poUcy. The field
in which they proposed to negotiate was certainly wide
enough ; for their first resolution declared, that it would
be advantageous for the United States to conclude trea
ties of araity and coraraerce with Russia, Austria, Prus
sia, Denmark, Saxony, Hamburg, Great Britain, Spain,
Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany, Rorae, Naples, Venice, Sar
dinia, and the Ottoman Porte ; and they then proceeded
to declare the principles on which such treaties should
be negotiated. These principles, considered simply as
political sentiments, were highly honorable to those who
announced them ; but it must always be impossible to
establish, by a system of treaties, a theory of abstract
right. Treaties are, in fact, siraply the expression of im
mediate interests, and depend in their negotiation so
much upon circumstances of adventitious strength and
the constantly changing contingencies of national neces
sity, that it is difficult to say in advance how far they
are or can be raade the expression of general principles.
Besides which, the United States were scarcely in posi
tion to introduce either new principles of national
action, or even to enforce the application of raany
recognized poUtical truths. These instructions, how
ever, evidenced no presumptuous desire to alter the old
and well-estabUshed relations of national community,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 19
nor clairaed any special raission for the diploraacy of
the new Republic. They declared, that, in all treaties,
three points should be carefuUy stipulated : —
" 1. That each party shall have the right to carry
their own produce, manufactures, and merchandise, in
their own bottoms, to the ports of the other, and thence
the produce and merchandise of the other, paying in
both . cases such duties only as are paid by the raost
favored nations, freely where it is granted to such na
tion, or paying the corapensation when such nation
does the sarae.
" 2. That with the nations holding territorial posses
sions in America, a direct and similar intercourse be
adraitted between the United States and such posses
sions ; or, if this cannot be obtained, then a direct and
sirailar intercourse between the United States and cer
tain free ports within such possessions ; that if this,
neither, can be obtained, perraission be stipulated to
bring frora such possessions, in their own bottoms, the
produce thereof to their States directly, and for these
States to carry, in their own bottoms, the produce and
merchandise to such possessions directly.
"3. That these United States be considered, in aU
such treaties and in every case arising under them, as
one nation, upon the principles of the Federal Consti
tution." If the first and second of these points could have
been estabUshed' in the treaties of the United States,
there would have been achieved, doubtless, a great and

20 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
wholesome reform in the comraercial system of the age.
But they were just the points which it was hopeless to
ask ; for they were in direct contravention of the essen
tial principles of both British and Spanish trade. And
even France, in the character of our nearest ally, only
admitted them in a modified and exceptional fashion.
The close of the last century was emphatically an age
of coramercial alliances, but alliances negotiated on the
principles of the strictest monopoly, and based entirely
upon an exchange of mutual privileges.
As to the third point, the independence of each State
in the matter of import and export, expressly guaran
teed by the Federal Constitution, would seem to have
rendered it an impossible condition in the most impor
tant, that is, the commercial, negotiations of the cora
raonwealth. Indeed, Congress had, shortly before the
adoption of these very resolutions, declared that, " unless
the United States, in Congress assembled, shaU be
vested with powers competent to the protection of
commerce, they never can comraand reciprocal advan
tages in trade ; and without these, our foreign comraerce
must decUne, and eventuaUy be annihilated. Hence
it is necessary that the States be expUcit, and fix on
some effectual mode by which foreign commerce not
founded on principles of equality may be restrained." *
And they resolved to ask from the States a power
for fifteen years, which should control State action
* Dip. Corres. 1783-1789, Vol. I. p. 106.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 21
both as to imports and exports. Without this power,
which they never obtained, it is impossible to see how
the United States could have negotiated a treaty of
comraerce " as one nation, upon the principles of the
Federal Constitution."
The instructions further required the foreign min
isters to negotiate, if possible, the principles of "free
ships, free goods," the aboUtion of any confiscation for
contraband, the repeal of the old system bf raarque
and reprisal, and the exemption in war from armed
interference of " all fisherraen, all cultivators of the
earth, and aU artisans or manufacturers, unarmed or
inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or places, and
aU raerchants and traders exchanging the produce of
different places, and thereby rendering the necessaries,
conveniences, and comforts of human Ufe more easy
to obtain and more general."
This anomalous system of peaceful war, it raay safely
be said, can never be realized. For those not actually
engaged in the field, it might deprive war of some
of its discorafort, but would relieve none of its real
horrors ; less money might be lost, but less blood
would scarcely be spUt. And its false phUosophy
ought rather to have sprung from the selfishness of
an absolute monarchy supported by a hired and un
sympathizing array, than frora the rulers of a people
whose every citizen was a soldier, and whose character
and safety depended upon the * identity, in honor,
strength, and interest, of every class of its community.

22 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
No nation should be taught to believe war the worst of
evils; and when it does come, in stern justice or awful
retribution, the national heart should not sink at its
coming. Neither artisan, nor manufacturer, nor mer
chant, busy in rendering the comforts of Ufe more gen
eral, should be exempt from the nation's grief or the
nation's glory. If a country must peril her aU, let her
aU be freely perilled ; but let every citizen feel that he
is part and' parcel of his country's life, — that she can
not be struck and he not bleed, — and that, when she
calls her armies into battle, it is time for the reaping-
hook to be reconverted into the sword.
It is indeed singular, that men of such wonderful
practical sagacity as were the statesmen of our early
history, should have incorporated into an instrument of
so business-like a character the sentimentaUty of these
latter propositions. From these instructions, it is clear
that the pohcy of the United States was raeant to be
distinctly coraraercial, and that their aUiances were to
be controlled siraply by the advantages of trade that
could be negotiated. And this was even raore strongly
indicated by a resolution of the 19th of October, 1793,
to which these instructions were intended to be supple
raentary. " Resolved, The acquisition of support to the
Independence of the United States having been the
priraary object of the instructions to our ministers
respecting the convention of the neutral raaritirae pow
ers for maintaining 'the freedom of commerce, you wUl
observe that the necessity of such support is super-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 23
seded by the treaties lately entered into for restoring
peace. And, although Congress approve of the prin
ciples of that convention, as it was founded on the
liberal basis of the maintenance of the rights of neu
tral nations and of the privileges of comraerce, yet
they are unwiUing, at this juncture, to become a party to
a confederacy which may hereafter too far complicate
the interests of the United States with the politics of
Europe ; and, therefore, if such a progress is not already
raade in this business as raay render it dishonorable to
recede, it is the desire of Congress, and their instruction
to each of the ministers of the United States at the
respective courts in Europe, that no further measures
be taken at present towards the admission of the United
States into that confederacy."
Upon Mr. Jay's accession to office, the treaty relations
of the United States were confined to France, England,
HoUand, and Sweden ; * and, during his term of oflice,
treaties were negotiated with Prussia and Morocco;
but the only nations whose relation with and position
towards the United States it is important to determine
at this time were France, England, and Spain.
The relations of France with the United States
present, during this period, very little of general interest.
FrankUn, at that time Minister Plenipotentiary in Paris,
* Treaty with France, 6th February, 1778; with Holland, Sth
October, 1782 ; with England, peace, 30th November, 1782, and llth
April, 1783; with Sweden, 3d April, 1783; with Prussia, 1785;
with Morocco, 1786.

24 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
retired from active service, to wear, without further
responsibility, the accumulated honors of laborious
years, and his place was ably and araply fiUed by
Thoraas Jefferson. The chief object of Mr. Jefferson's
efforts was to obtain a broad and perraanent comraer
cial arrangeraent, by which the trade between the two
countries raight be as free as the interests of both
manifestly reqaired. The French governraent was ex
tremely dissatisfied with the slow growth of its Ameri
can coramerce. It had expected, that, upon the close
of the war, a natural feeUng of gratitude, and the bitter
animosity between the late beUigerents, would have
diverted trade from its old colonial channels, and had
made what, under its old system, raust be considered
very Uberal provisions for the encouragement of this
commercial connection. But in two very important
articles, tobacco and whale oUs, the French systera of
farraing the revenue, and its policy in view of the crea
tion of a powerful marine, did not aUow the adoption
of that perfect freedom of trade which could alone
counteract the old commercial influence of Great
Britain, and corapeusate for the liberal credits which
recoramended the British merchants, and were pecu
liariy needed by the trading coraraunity of the new
RepubUc at this time. Mr. Jefferson spared no labor
to convince the French court of the necessity for a
broader policy than had been adopted ; his views seem
to have attracted considerable attention in the highest
quarters, and he was seconded earnestiy and usefully

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 25
by Lafayette. But even before his mission terminated,
, the difficulties had become insuperable. The death of
Vergennes, the changes in the administration of the
finances, indeed the state of the French finances them
selves, rendered any radical change in their system of
imports and exports impossible. Besides, the treaty
lately negotiated between England and France, and
the weU khown ambition of Louis XVI. to extend his
colonial power and develop the raaritirae capabilities
of his empire, indicated a disposition to imitate the
English system of colonial raonopoly. But it is hardly
probable, that, even with raore liberal aUies, Mr. Jefferson
could have estabUshed a freer and perraanent system of
commerce. For his letters and despatches from home
abound in constant complaint of the lack of all unity
of opinion in the States, and the utter inefficiency of
Congress ; whUe France, on more than one occasion,
and especiaUy in relation to Massachusetts and New
Hampshire, made serious, and, as Mr. Jay admitted,
well founded reclamations against the commercial reg
ulations of the several States..
The political relations of the two countries remained,
during this period, undisturbed, although the treaty obU
gations between thern might, under certain circum
stances, have seriously embarrassed the United States.
For while, under the treaty, France guaranteed the boun
daries of the United States, they reciprocaUy guaran
teed the French possessions in America ; and had war
resulted in Europe, either from the disturbances in Hol-
3

26 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
land or the disputes as to the Bavarian succession, the
relations between the United States and France might
have gravely compromised the peace and safety of the
forraer. Fortunately, France was able to solve the dif
ficulties of both these questions without an appeal to
arras ; and, stiU raore fortunately, the question between
Great Britain and the United States as to the surren
der of the frontier posts was protracted in its settlement,
untu the impolicy of requiring France to substantiate
her part of the guarantee was evident to the nation.
In 1786, Mr. Jay instructed Mr. Jefferson to sound the
French government as to its readiness to intervene in
this matter ; and in reply, after referring to its possible
consequences, Mr. Jefferson says : " However, if this me
diation should be finaUy needed, I see no reason to
doubt our finally obtaining it, and stiU less to question
its omnipotent influence on the British court." Now,
difficult as it proved for the United States to maintain
their neutrality in the war which soon after broke out in
Europe, it is easy to see how much more difficult that
poUcy would have been^ if the country had been indebt
ed for its boundary to the diplomatic intervention of
France. And both the difficulty and wisdora of this
neutral poUcy were fuUy coraprehended by Mr. Jefferson
at this tirae ; for writing, in October, 1787, to Mr. Jay,
on the critical state of the difficulty between Prussia
and HoUand, which at one time threatened an Euro
pean war, he says : " Should this war take place, as is
quite probable, and should it be as general as it threat-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 27
ens to be, our neutrality must be attended with great
advantages ; whether of a nature to improve our raorals
or our happiness is another question. But is it sure
that Great Britain, by her searches, her seizures, and
other measures for harassing us, wiU preserve our neu
traUty ? " and then, stating his reasons for his opinion,
he adds, referring to the King of Great Britain : " When
I review this disposition, and review his conduct, I have
little hope of his permitting our neutraUty. He wiU
find subjects of provocation in various articles of our
treaty with France, which wiU now come in view in aU
their consequences, and in consequences very advanta
geous to the one and the other country."
A few questions occurred for the solution of the two
countries at this time, which are chiefly interesting as
showing with what manly independence the United
States then acted, even in the presence of an ally whose
past services they gratefuUy acknowledged, and whose
future friendship they anxiously sought. Just before
the departure of the ChevaUer de la Luzerne, the
French Minister, from PhUadelphia, Mons. de la Mar-
bois, the Secretary of Legation, was assaulted in the
streets of that city by a French resident, named Long-
charaps. Longchamps was prosecuted before the crim
inal courts of Pennsylvania, and sentenced to fine and
imprisonment. While undergoing his punishment, the
French government demanded that he should be deliv
ered up to it, as a French subject, guilty of a grave mis
demeanor against French law. The demand was

28' diplomaTichistort.
warmly pressed by Mons. de Marbois, who had become
Charge d' Affaires. Such an extradition involved some
of the raost difficult and delicate questions of interna
tional law, and the rights as weU as the pride of both
countries would be affected by the result. The outrage
was scandalous and indefensible ; and fhere was, on the
part of Congress, every desire to soothe the susceptibU-
ity of the raonarch to whom they were under the high
est obUgations of human gratitude. It was, too, one of
those questions on which the court of France had
always shown itself particularly sensitive ; and in the
French archives, there was more than one case not dis
similar, in which France had asserted and obtained the
amplest apology and fuUest redress from so.me of the
oldest and most powerful of the Em-opean states.
Congress referred the correspondence to Mr. Jay for his
opinion ; and his report is a most admirable specimen
of the firra, judicious, and just character of his diplo
raacy. " Your Secretary," said Mr. Jay, " considers the fol
lowing principles to be unquestionably true : naraely, —
" That every friendly foreigner, coming to any coun
try on lawful business, is entitled to the protection of
the laws of that country, on the one hand, and owes
obedience to them during his residence, on the other.
" That whenever such foreigner breaks the peace, or
otherwise violates the laws of the land, he is as amena
ble to them as any other person ; and that the sovereign
power of the State has undoubted right to punish him in

diplomatic HISTORT. 29
the manner and degree prescribed by the laws of the
State. " That where the said laws sentence such offending
foreigner to imprisonment for a Umited tirae, the State
has a clear right to hold and detain hira in prison ac
cordingly, and are not bound to release or deliver him
up to his prince for any purpose whatever, before he
shall have satisfied the laws of the land which he has
violated, by undergoing the punishment decreed thereby
for his offence.
" Your Secretary is therefore of opinion, that the
requisition is premature ; for, admitting Charles Julien
de Longchamps to be a Frenchman ; admitting that he
has offended his prince, either here or elsewhere ; admit
ting, further, that his prince has a right to demand him,
and that the United States were bound by treaty or
otherwise to deliver hira up ; yet it is not to be denied
that he has broken the peace and violated the laws of
this country ; and having been legally condemned to
imprisonment for the same, a comphance with the said
requisition at present cannot possibly be required by
the law of nations.
" How far it would be right and proper for the Uni
ted States afterwards to demand of the State of Penn
sylvania to deliver the said Charles Julien de Long
champs to be tried and judged in France for that part
of the aforesaid offence against the peace, governraent,
and dignity of that commonwealth, which consisted in
his having there violated the rights and privileges of His
3*

30 diplomatic HISTORT.
Most Christian Majesty's Legation, and how far such
demand would be warranted by the law of nations and
the federal compact between the States, are questions
so new, so deeply and intimately connected with the
nature of our constitutions and confederation, and so
extensive in then- consequences, as to require very ample
discussion, much reflection, and serious consideration.
Your Secretary is further of opinion, that the Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States at the court of
VersaiUes should be instructed to submit the above facts
and reasons to the candid consideration of his Most
Christian Majesty, to assure him that it would give
them great pain to have their conduct viewed by him in
an unfavorable point of view, and that they flatter
theraselves the reasons which render it irapossible for
them at present to comply with his requisition wiU ap
pear to him as conclusive as they do to Congress. That
they will maturely, candidly, and earnestly consider how
far a compliance with it, when the prisoner shaU be
legally released, may be free from objections, and wiU
endeavor, in the mean time, to make that very important
question the subject of mutual and friendly discussions ;
that as the man himself can be no object with the
States, and as neither their interests nor their inclina
tions can lead them to give cause of umbrage to their
first and best friend and aUy, they hope he will have
perfect confidence in their sincerity when they declare
that obstacles to fheir complying with his requests will
always give them as much concern and regret as oppor-

diplomatic HISTORT. 31
tunities of manifesting their respect, their regard, their
gratitude, and their attachment to him will always give
them pleasure and satisfaction."
Fortunately, some months after, and before the dis
cussion was renewed, Mons. de Marbois formaUy with
drew the demand on the part of his government.
Another case, involving questions of a very similar
character, occurred in 1788, soon after the arrival of the
Count de Moustier, who succeeded the ChevaUer de la
Luzerne. Ferrier, a native of Languedoc, commanding
the brig David, was despatched from the island of St.
Domingo for Nantz with a valuable cargo of coffee.
Under pretence of leaks in the vessel, he came to Nor
folk, Virginia. Satisfied, from depositions taken on
board, that Ferrier intended fraudulently to convert the
ship and cargo into his own possession, the French con
sul, with the consent of the mayor, arrested Ferrier, who,
upon the investigation, had deserted, and sent him pris
oner on board of the French ship Jason, then lying in
the same harbor. There the culprit underwent an ex
amination, and confessed his crime ; upon which the
consul caUed an assembly of the merchants belonging
to his nation, who resolved to send Ferrier to Nantz,
there to be tried by the officers of the French Admi
ralty. At the same tirae, the consul wrote to the Governor
of the State, declaring the facts of the case, and request
ing the consent of the Executive CouncU to send Ferrier
to France, in the vessel which he had commanded. To

32 diplomatic histort.
this letter no answer was received ; but shortly after, a
sheriff went on board the French ship and arrested
Ferrier, as a debtor in the sum of £50 to a French
resident of Norfolk. Ferrier was carried on shore, gave
the necessary bad, and vanished. Under these circum
stances, the French governraent demanded his de
livery. The consular convention which was afterwaids
adopted being then only under negotiation, Mr. Jay
held very properly, that " The foreign consuls here have
no authority than that which they may derive from the
law of nations and the acts of particular States;" and
the whole matter was referred to Virginia. Governor
Randolph, at that time executive officer of the State,
held, that as consular powers must be measured by the
legislative acts of the State, so mu^t his, and declared
that he could find no warrant to justify any such action
on his part, adding : " That if the act of the public officer
in withdrawing Ferrier from the Jason was unlawful,
it belonged to the judiciary, not the executive, to declare
it so ; that if it was lawful, the executive could not
wrest him from the hands of that officer, especially as
Mr. Oster (the consul) might have reclaimed him after
his discharge, and caused a mulct to be imposed on the
sheriff, if that discharge was improper." As the gov
ernment was just about passing from its old federal
condition into its present constitutional organization.
Count de Moustier did not press the reclaraation. But
in his last letter on the subject, he said : " If circura-

diplomatic histort. 33
st&nces did not promise a happy revolution in the actual
organization of the United States, and if the princi
ples that have been adopted in Virginia, with respect to
Captain Ferrier, should serve as a basis for the com
mercial policies of the other States, which have hitherto
foUowed very different raaxims, the consequences would
be, that no nation could safely navigate and trade in
their ports, and that foreign captains raight, under the
protection of the laws, dispose of cargoes which have
been intiusted to them, and might enjoy with impunity
the fruit of their crimes, in spite of the claim of their
owners, and notwithstanding the demands of the minis
ter plenipotentiary of a power closely connected with
the United States."
These cases not only exhibit the caution with which
the government acted wherever the national rights or
the national character were concerned, but they illus
trate strongly how absolutely necessary a more efficient
and simpler executive authority was, for the adminis
tration of the foreign affairs of the country. For in all
doubtful questions of right, this reference backwards
and forwards from the States to Congress was only too
weU calculated, by its delay, to provoke difficulty and
create unnecessary irritation. Not only, however, was
the government. stringent in the measure of its justice,
even to such an aUy, but it manifested a most sensitive
susceptibUity as to the style in which that aUy should
address it ; and of this, one of the last of Mr. Jefferson's

34 diplomatic histort.
despatches affords a very striking example. Writing to
Mr. Jay on the 4th of February, 1789, he said : —
" We had before understood, through different chan
nels, that the conduct of the Count de Moustier was
politicaUy and morally offensive. It was delicate for
me to speak on the subject to the Count de Montraorin.
The invaluable raediation of our friend the Marquis de
Lafayette was therefore resorted to, and the subject
explained, though not pressed. Later intelUgence show
ing the necessity of pressing it, it was yesterday resuraed,
and represented through the same medium to the
Count de Montmorin, that recent information proved to
us that his minister's conduct had rendered hira per
sonaUy odious in America, and might even influence
the dispositions of the two nations ; that his recall was
become a matter of rautual concern ; that we had un
derstood he was instructed to reraind the new govern
ment of their debt to this country, and that he was in
the purpose of doing it in very harsh terms ; that this
could not increase their desire of hastening payment,
and raight wound their affections ; that therefore it was
much to be desired that his discretion should not be
trusted to as to the form in which the deraand should
be raade, but that the letter should be written here and
he instructed to add nothing ; nor was his private con
duct oraitted. The Count de Montmorin was sensibly
impressed," etc., etc. And the result was, as Mr. Jeffer
son proceeds to state in detail, that the Count de Mous-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 35
tier was allowed to ask his conge, and his place sup
pUed by Monsieur de Ternant.
But that which indicated a radical difference of
opinion between the two governraents, as to their poUti
cal relations, was the consular convention, the negotia
tions for which, coraraencing in 1782, were not terrai
nated by ratification until 1789. As the treaty of
araity and -coraraerce raade between France and the
United States, in 1778, granted rautual Uberty for the
establishraent of consulates and vice- consulates. Con
gress in 1782, by a coraraittee consisting of Randolph,
Sherraan, and Clymer, reported the scheme of a con
sular convention. This convention was sent to Dr.
Franklin, with the following special and stringent in
structions : " That the said minister plenipotentiary use
his discretion as to the words or arrangement of the
convention, conforming himself to the matter thereof in
all respects, except as to so much of the sixth article as
relates to the erection of a chapel, taking care that
reciprocal provisions be made for the recognition of the
consuls and vice-consuls of the United States, and for
the admission of persons attached to the consulate to
the privileges stipulated in the fifth article in a raanner
most conducive to expedition and freest from difficulty."
In December, 1784, on motion of Mr. Jay, Congress
unanimously " Resolved, That His ExceUency the Presi
dent inform the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United
States at the Court of France, that it is the desire
of Congress, in case the convention proposed for reg-

36 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ulating and ascertaining the powers and privileges of
consuls should not already be signed, that he delay sign
ing it until he receive further instructions on the subject
frora Congress." To which Dr. FrankUn replied, that
he received the resolution too late, as the convention
had been signed in July. The convention as signed
came accordingly before Congress for ratification. The
original scheme proposed by Congress was injudicious
and extiavagant enough, and it is difficult to understand
how, in their usual cautious temper, they could ever
have consented to a system of consular jurisdiction a«
wide, dangerous, and unusual as their scheme com
prised. But objectionable as was the original scheme,
and evident as it was that Congress had changed their
opinion as to its policy, when the convention was sub
mitted for ratification, it was discovered that Dr. Frank
lin had disregarded his special instructions to conform
himself to the matter thereof in all respects, and had
aUowed Mons. de Rayneval, the French negotiator, to
make sundry and important changes in the scherae, —
aU of which tended rather to exaggerate than diminish
its original imperfections. The convention as signed
was referred to Mr. Jay for a report, and an analysis
of that report is the best statement of the faults of the
original scheme, and its objectionable modifications in
the hands of the American minister. Both conven
tions conferred upon consuls, their retinues, and houses,
almost ambassadorial privUeges, gave them such exten
sive judicial powers in relation to all disputes between

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 37
individuals of the respective nations as to create an
independent tribunal in many cases which good pohcy
required should be settied by the national courts, and
in fact organized a quasi diplomatic surveillance over
the whole country. They were also wanting in recip
rocity in one important particular, inasmuch as while
consuls were admitted into aU the ports of the United
States from France, provision was made for their
admission only into the French continental ports from
the United States.
Mr. Jay first stated his objections to an error in the
style of fhe preamble in reference to the United States.
The error was a singular one, and the objection not
insignificant. Instead of the United States of America,
the style applied to the RepubUc was, " The Thirteen
United States of North America." Mr. Jay's objection
was, " the style of the Confederacy being ' The United
States of America.' The scheme and the convention
are both erroneous, so far as they both add the word
' North.' But the title of the convention departs essen- r
tiaUy from that of the scherae, inasmuch as it Umits the
compact to thirteen United States of America, and con
sequently excludes from it aU such other States as
might, before the ratification of it, or in future, be cre
ated by, or become parties to, the Confederacy." It
would be interesting to know whether the alteration
was suggested by the French negotiator, and for what
reason Dr. FrankUn consented to the change. Placing
the variations of the scheme and the convention in long
4

38 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
and careful comparison, Mr. Jay summed up his objec
tions to their principle in the foUowing brief and forci
ble statement.
" The convention appears well calculated to answer
several purposes ; but the most important of them are
such as America has no interest in promoting. They
are three : —
" 1. To provide against infractions of the French and
American laws of trade.
" 2. To prevent the people of one countiy from emi
grating to the other.
" 3. To estabUsh in each other's countiy an influential
corps of officers, under one chief, to promote mercantUe
and political views.
" The first of these objects is clearly evinced by the
tenth article.
" The second of these objects, though less explicitly,
is stiU sufficiently, evinced from the fourteenth article.
" The third of these objects, as it respects raercantile
views, is apparent frora the general tenor of the con
vention ; and it appears plain to your Secretary, that a
minister near Congress, consuls so placed as to include
every part of the country in one consulate or the other,
vice-consuls in the principal cities and agents in the
less important ones, constitute a corps so coherent, so
capable of acting jointly and secretly, and so ready to
obey the orders of their chief, that it cannot fail of
being influential in two very important political re
spects : first, in acquiring and communicating intelU-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 39
gence; and secondly, in acquiring and impressing such
advices, sentiraents, and opinions of raen and measures
as it may be deemed expedient to diffuse and encour
age. These being the three great purposes which the
convention is calculated to answer, the next question
which naturaUy occurs is, whether the United States
have any such purposes to answer by estabUshing such
a corps in France. As to the first, we have no laws
for the regulation of our commerce with France or any
of her dominions ; and, consequently, we want no pro
visions or guards against the infraction of such laws.
As to the second, we have not the raost distant reason
to apprehend or fear that our people will leave us to
raigrate either to the kingdom of France or to any of
its territories ; and, consequently, every restriction or
guard against it must be superfluous and useless.- As
to the third, France being a countiy in whose govern
ment the people do not participate, where nothing can
be printed without previous license, or said without
being known, and, if disliked, foUowed with inconven
iencies, such a corps would there be very inefficient
for poUtical purposes. Where the people are perfectly
unimportant, every measure to influence their opinions
must be equaUy so. For poUtical purposes, therefore,
we do not want any such corps in France. As to
assisting our merchants, and such other matters as
properly belong to consuls, they would answer all those
purposes just as well without these extraordinary powers
as with them."

40 DIPLOMATIC HISTORTi
To comprehend the force of the second objection in
this report, it must be borne in mind, that both scheme
and convention conferred upon consuls the right to
arrest, not only deserters of the crew, but the captain,
officers, and passengers, of any ship of the one nation
arriving in the ports of the other. But the convention,
in one of its articles, added to the scheme the foUow
ing provision : " They who shaU prove they belong to
the body of their respective nations by the certificate
of the consuls or vice-consids of the district, mention
ing their names, surnames, and places of their settle
ment as inscribed on the registers of the consulate,
shall not lose, for any cause whatever, in the respective
States and doraains, the quality of subjects of the
country of which they originaUy were." Coraparing the
two clauses, and considering the plenary power of the
French crown as to its emigration laws, Mr. Jay cor
rectly argued, that the King had only to require every
French passenger in a French ship to register himself
on his arrival at the consulate, and he would then be
for ever incapacitated for naturalization, while the
power of arrest in the hands of the consul would be
the raeans of enforcing this regulation or punishing its
infraction, — a right, which, he contended, went far
beyond the provision of the treaty of 1778, on which
it was expressly based.
The report concluded with the following recommen
dation : " Although the true pohcy of America does
not require, but on the contrary militates against, such

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 41
conventions ; and although your Secretary is of opinion
that the convention as it now stands ought not to be
ratified, yet as Congress have proceeded so far in the
present instance, he thinks that instructions should be
sent to their minister at Versailles to state the objec
tions to the present form, and to assure the King of the
readiness of Congress to ratify a convention raade
agreeable to the scheme before mentioned, provided
an article be added to limit its duration to eight or ten
years, in order that practice and experience may enable
them to judge more accurately of its merits than can
ever be done of mere theoretical estabhshments, how
ever apparently expedient."
This advice was foUowed, and one of the last acts of
Mr. Jefferson's mission was to sign this convention with
the raodifications and hmitations required. It is much
to be regretted that Congress did not take advantage of
the variations between the scheme and the convention
as negotiated by Dr. FrankUn, to change the whole
basis of their consular arrangement with France. For
the scheme itself was Uttle better than the convention,
and they would have been exercising only a recognized
right in insisting upon a renewal of negotiation on an
altered basis. As it was, the practical working of the
convention during Washington's administration afford
ed ample proof of the wisdom and practical foresight
of Mr. Jay's objections.
This convention was in perfect keeping "wath the
spirit of the old French diplomacy, and serves as a fair
4

42 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Ulustration of the Ught in which France regarded the
American aUiance. Firm and generous in its support
of the United States, liberal in its commercial arrange
ments, and forbearing in its claims upon the treasury of
the young Republic, the government of France never
theless manifested a constant desire to exercise a pro
tectorate, as it were, over the country. The principle of
French diplomacy in Europe had been to maintain the
closest and kindest relations with the secondary powers,
asking and obtaining in return that degree of influence
which enabled her to corabine them against any rival
power. Influence with Sweden, Switzerland, and the
smaller German States, was thus a principle with
French statesmen, from Richelieu to Vergennes ; and
they proposed to place the United States in a similar
position, — to make them the means of French stiength
and influence in the colonial system, just as these States
were in the continental. It was a perfectly fair policy,
if the United States were indeed a second-rate power
in a subordinate poUtical system ; and it cannot cer
tainly be urged against the French statesmen of that
day as a want of political sagacity, that they did so con
sider the United States. But it is one of the highest
and worthiest of the countless claims of the early Amer
ican statesmen upon the reverence of their countrymen,
that they reaUzed from the beginning the noblest of
futures for their country, ajid laid the foundations of
their poUcy so deep and broad that the fortunes of a
continent rest secure upon its massive base.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 43
The relations between the United States and Spain,
during this period, were both uncertain and unpleasant.
In 1785, Doh Diego de Gardoqui arrived in the United
States, commissioned as Charg^ d' Affaires from the
Spanish court. The relations between the two coun-
tiies had never been cordial. They had, during the war,
occasionally acted together, and maintained throughout
its progress a continued diplomatic correspondence,
which came to nothing ; for both parties anticipated
the future consequences of independence of the Colo
nies, and were unwilUng to make concessions, to which
circumstances might give unforeseen importance ; be
sides which, there was open between them one question,
at least, — the navigation of the Mississippi, — upon
which they disagreed widely and hopelessly. Upon the
estabUshment of their independence, the United States,
as weU as Spain, were anxious to settle this question.
The increasing trade and emigration westwardly and
south-westwardly were fast multiplying the causes and
occasions of difficulty, and more than one serious mis
understanding between the western settlers and the
Spanish authorities proved the necessity not only of a
positive, but of a very prompt, settlement of aU disputed
points. Congress, therefore, in July, 1785, commis
sioned Mr. Jay to open negotiations with Gardoqui.
As minister in Spain, Mr. Jay had gone over aU this
ground with Gardoqui, then as now the representative
of Spain in the discussion ; and they, in fact, only re
suraed a former negotiation, the United States, in the

44 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
mean time, having gained both in strength and consist
ency, and thus coming upon the old ground with
greater advantages.
Spain, on her part, claimed, — 1. The reUnquishraent
by the United States of their claira to navigate the Mis
sissippi beyond their own boundary ; and 2. The accora
raodation of the boundaries between the two countries
to the claim of Spain on certain lands lying between
the boundaries of Florida and the eastern bank of the
Mississippi, which claim the United States had hitherto
refused to adrait. In exchange for these concessions,
she offered a coraraercial treaty of singular liberaUty,
and affording to the United States opportunities and
advantages offered by no other raaritirae and colonial
power ; and the Spanish Minister intiraated, that if the
first demand were compUed with, the second might be
easily modified to meet the territorial convenience of
the United States. In short, the language of Spain
was, " Give up the navigation of the Mississippi, and
we will be friends ; even the stringency of my commer
cial system shaU be relaxed in your favor, and none bet
ter than yourself know the value of ray offer. Refuse,
and we are eneraies." Mr. Jay felt the fuU force of this
reasoning. To refuse was, first, to forfeit the advan
tages of a commerce, the value of which could not be
exaggerated ; and, secondly, to incur the risk of a war,
and the certainty of the active poUtical hostility of a
power which could and would work the United States
serious damage. For if the United States brought on

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 45
a rupture with Spain, France was pledged to their ene
my. Already, and more than once, the French minis
ters to Congress had declared the position of the United
States untenable ; and the family aUiance was too close
to permit arbitration on behalf of the United States, or
neutrality in regard to Spain. Portugal, with whora
the United States had manifested an early and steady
desire to form an alliance, was under the influence of
Spain ; and the Barbary Powers, who had given the
young Republic great anxiety, and with whom they
were even then negotiating under the patronage of
Spain, would need but the slightest encourageraent
frora that power to break off all discussion, and renew
with fiercer vigor their war of depredation, while Eng
land would gladly aid in the destruction of our coramer
cial hopes, and purchase, even at a sacrifice, the transfer
of those commercial advantages that Spain so UberaUy
offered. Knowing all this, — believing that Spain was in
earnest in her anxiety to conclude a negotiation, the
progress of which only multiplied its difficulties, — think-
iag that it would be at least twenty years before the
navigation of the Mississippi would develop into an
absolute national necessity, and feeling the utter impo
tence of the country for war, Mr. Jay endeavored to
effect a compromise. He suggested, first, the rehnquish-
raent of the right for a limited period, about twenty-
five years : it was refused. Then he proposed to rehn
quish the exercise of the right explicitly, retaining the
right by imphcation. This too failed, after one or two

46 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
attempts at the construction of a clause sufficiently
subtie. Finally, Mr. Jay drafted a clause, in which aU
reference to the right was omitted, and the United
States, for certain reasons therein stated, consented not
to use the river below their own boundaries. This
clause would of course expire with the term of the
treaty, and as the reasons aUeged were temporary, the
rights of the United States would then revive in undi
minished force. No settleraent, however, would be ad
mitted by Spain short of an absolute reUnquishment.
But Mr. Jay had, when in- Spain, put on record his
opinion, that such an absolute reUnquishment was im
possible, and that any treaty wliich included it was a
declaration in advance of a future war ; and that opinion
he stiU held; and Congress itself neither could nor
would consent to such an abandonraent of the clearest
and most important national rights. In the raean tirae,
the collisions between the citizens and authorities of the
two nations were becoming more frequent and more
difficult of settlement. Congress, it is true, in good
faith condemned every instance of individual invasion
of Spanish rights, even where those rights were doubt
ful ; declaring, very justly, that as they were actually in
negotiation upon the whole matter, it was but proper
that the country should wait that decision, and abide it.
But their power was not always equal to their will ; and
in April, 1787, Mr. Jay reported the alternative before
the United States strongly and briefly.
" Your Secretary is convinced that the United States

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 47
have good right to navigate the river from its source to
and through its mouth ; and unless an accoraraodation
should take place, that the dignity of the United States,
and their duty to assert and raaintain their rights, wiU
render it proper for them to present a memorial and
remonstiance to his Catholic Majesty, insisting on their
right, coraplaining of its being violated, and demanding,
in a teraperate, inoffensive, but at the sarae time in a
firm Emd decided manner, that his Majesty do cease in
future to hinder their citizens frora freely navigating the
river through the part of its course in question. Your
Secretary is further of opinion, that, in case of refusal,
it wiU be proper for the United States then to declare
war against Spain. There being no respectable raiddle
way between peace and war, it will be expedient to
prepare without delay for the one or the other; for cu--
cumstances which call for decision seem daily to accu
mulate. " If Congress conceive that a treaty with Spain on
the terms proposed is eligible, the sooner such senti
ments are communicated to your Secretaiy, the better.
If an idea of obtaining better terms should be enter
tained, the sooner the question can be decided, the bet
ter ; and for that purpose, your Secretary thinks it would
be weU either to place some other negotiator in his stead,
or to associate one or more persons with him in the
business. Any manner of conducting it most advan
tageous and raost satisfactory to his country wUl always
be the raanner most pleasing and agreeable to him.

48 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" With respect to prescribing a line of conduct to our
citizens on the banks of the river, your Secretary is
embarrassed. K war is in expectation, then their ardor
should not be discouraged nor their indignation dimin
ished; but if a treaty is wished and contemplated, then
those people should be so advised and so restrained as
that their sentiments and conduct may, as much as pos
sible, be made to quadrate with the terras of articles of
it. Your Secretary cannot forbear to express his solicir
tude that this very important and consequential business
may not be left in its present situation. The objects
involved in it are of great magnitude, and effects must
and wUl result from it, by which the prosperity of Amer
ica wiU be either greatly advanced or greatly retarded.
He also takes the liberty of observing, that a tieaty dis
agreeable to one half of the nation had better not be
raade, for it would be violated ; and that a war, disliked ,
by the other half, would proraise but little success, espe
cially under a governraent so greatly affected by popular
opinion." Under these circurastances, the negotiations having
been prolonged without approaching any satisfactory
conclusion, public opinion began to be disturbed by
rumors of intended cessions. Congress, therefore, took
occasion, on motion of the delegates from North Caro
lina, stating the uneasiness produced by a report
" that Congress are disposed to treat with Spain for the
surrender of their claim to the navigation of the river
Mississippi," to refer the matter to a committee, upon

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 49
whose recoraraendation the following resolutions were
adopted : —
"Resolved, That the said report not being founded in
fact, the delegates be at liberty to coraraunicate all such
circumstances as may be necessary to contradict the
same, and to remove misconceptions.
"Resolved, That the free navigation of the river Mis
sissippi is a clear and essential right of the United
States, and that the sarae ought to be considered and
supported as such.
"Resolved, That no further progress be raade in the
negotiations with Spain by the Secretary for Foreign
Affairs ; but that the subject to which they relate be
referred to the federal government, which is to assemble
in March next."
There were some minor subjects of disagreement be
tween the two countries ; complaint by citizens of the
United States of cruel and unjust treatment in Havana ;
and, on the part of Spain, of irregular invasion of her
territory by adventurous individuals from the United
States ; but they were subordinated to the general inter
ests of the main negotiation. On one subject, however.
Congress took decided action, and, upon a report from
¦Mr. Jay submitting the facts of the coraplaint, on the
26th of August, 1788, thus —
"Resolved, That the Secretary for the Department of
Foreign Affairs be directed to transmit copies of the
papers referred to in his said report, to the Charg^ d' Af
faires of the United States at Madrid, and to instruct
5

50 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
him to represent to his Catholic Majesty the inconven
iences which the States bordering on his dominions
experience from the asylum afforded to fugitive negroes
belonging to the citizens of the said States ; and that
Congress have full confidence that orders will be given
to his Governors to permit and facilitate their being
apprehended and delivered to persons authorized to
receive them, assuring his Majesty that the said States
will observe the like conduct respecting aU such negroes
belonging to his subjects as may be found therein.
"Resolved, That the said Secretary be also directed
to communicate the said papers to the Encargado de
Negocios of Spain, and to signify to him that his inter
position to obtain proper regulations to be made on the
subject would be very agreeable to Congress."
It is but justice, however, to Spain tb state, that the
Governor of East Florida had permitted the fugitives
to be apprehended and put in keeping of persons named
by their raasters, but decUned to deliver them up, on
the ground that Georgia, while under the British gov
ernment, had refused to observe a reciprocal conduct as
to their capture and delivery. This subject, along with
the others, passed into the hands of the new government.
The treaty of 1783, with England, went no further
than the recognition of the independence of the United
States. The numerous and important questions which
their altered relations forced upon both governments
were postponed to a more convenient season, and, as in
most postponements, national interests were daily more

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 51
entangled, and national sentiment more irritated. The
commercial questions which sprang naturaUy frora the
recognition of American Independence were of the first
importance to the people of the United States. As
subjects of the Crown, they had, under the British sys
tem, enjoyed certain privUeges and immunities, which
had given the character and cm-rent to their commerce.
As aUens, the navigation laws of England unsparingly
cut them off from old iraraunities, closed the West
Indies, and imposed heavy and, to them, unwonted
duties on their productions. The American statesmen
werc anxious that the comraercial arrangeraents between
the two countries should be adjusted on the freest basis.
They wished the relation between the new Republic
and their ancient sovereign to be sui generis, and
thought that their independence need not make them
aUens. They argued, with great force, that the natural
tendency of their comraerce was towards England ; that
the British West? Indian Colonies depended upon them
for cheap and prompt supplies ; that trade between the
two countries, on equal and liberal terms, would soon
efface the angry recollections of a seven years' war, and
that the prosperity resulting from such a comraerce
would enable American debtors, in the pleasantest and
speediest manner, to pay their Enghsh creditors, and
thus remove a source of perpetual and bitter contro
versy. The English poUticians, on the other hand,
maintained, with equal force, that such a relation was
impossible ; that the United States became, as the nat-

52 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ural consequence of their own act, a foreign power;
that, even admitting the wisdom and expediency of
such a liberal policy as was suggested, there was this
insuperable difficulty in the way : England was bound
by her commercia] tieaties with other nations to aUow
them any privileges granted to the most favored nations ;
that these nations would insist upon a participation in
any advantages afforded to what they would justly de
clare was the foreign nation of the United States ; and
thus, any relaxation towards their ancient colonies
would involve a complete revolution of their whole
commercial system. Some of the leading EngUsh
statesmen went further, and opposed the poUcy of any
such misplaced liberality. Lord Sheffield may be con
sidered the head of this party ; and he argued, with great
selfishness it raay be, but certainly with great shrewd
ness : " Our irapatience to pre-occupy the Araerican raar
ket should perhaps be rather checked than encouraged.
The same eagerness has been indulged by our rival
nations. They have vied with each pther in pouring
their manufactures into America, and the country is
already stocked, most probably overstocked, with Euro
pean commodities. It is experience alone that can
demonstrate to the French or Dutch trader the fallacy
of his eager hopes, and that experience will operate
every day in favor of the British merchant. He alone
is able and wiUing to grant that liberal credit which
raust be extorted frora his competitors by the rashness
of their early ventures. They wiU soon discover that

II
DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 53
Araerica has neither raoney nor sufficient produce to
send in return, and cannot have for sorae time ; and not
intending or being able to give credit, their funds wUl
be exhausted, their agents wiU never return, and the ruin
of the first creditors will serve as a lasting warning to
their countrymen. The sohd power of supplying the
wants of America, of receiving her produce, and of
waiting her convenience, belongs almost exclusively to
our own merchants. If we can abstain frora raischiev
ous precipitation, we shall learn, to our great satisfac
tion, that the industry of Britain will encounter httle
corapetition in the Araerican raarket. We shall observe
with pleasure, that, araong the raaritirae States, France,
after all her efforts, wiU derive the sraaUest benefits from
the commercial independence of America. She raay
exult in the dismemberment of the British Empire ; but
if we are ttue to ourselves and to the wisdom of our
ancestors, there is still life and vigor left to disappoint
her hopes, and to control her ambition."
Immediately after the negotiation of the preliminary
Articles of Peace, there seems to have been some anxi
ety on the part of England,, as to the retention of the
commerce of the United States. The administration
of Lord Shelburne did in fact introduce an American
Intercourse BiU, which was ably argued by Mr. Pitt in
the House of Commons, and certainly exhibited in its
provisions a wise and generous liberality. It was, how
ever, warmly opposed, especiaUy by Mr. Eden, who was
the negotiator of the Commercial Treaty with France ;
5*

54 DIPLOMATIC HISTOBT.
and although supported by Mr. Burke, it was opposed by
Mr. Fox. Lord Shelburne's administration was over
turned by the vote of censure passed by the Housfe of
Commons on his treaty of peace with the United States ;
and he was succeeded by the Duke of Portland, as the
head of the famous coaUtion ministry of Lord North
and Mr. Fox. One of Mr. Fox's earUest proceedings
was to move the postponement of this bill ; and he soon
after substituted another, simply repeaUng certain corn-
mercial forms which were attached to the old colonial
navigation, and which were useless and improper in re
lation to the commerce of an independent nation. In
doing so, Mr. Fox declared his intention of making the
comraercial relations between the two countiies a sub
ject of large and liberal negotiation ; but that negotia
tion never came to any result, and after a useless delay,
the preliminary articles were converted into the defi
nitive treaty of peace with the United States. Circum
stances unfortunately proved the correctness of Lord
Sheffield's prophecy. It became the general opinion in
England, that a treaty with the Araerican States was
unnecessary and impoUtic ; that the English merchants
would have as much of the American tiade as they
ought to wish for; that no sacrifices of navigation or
commercial regulations could avail to secure any greater
advantage than they would otherwise have ; and that
the dependence of the British West Indies, as repre
sented by American and West Indian advocates, was
faUacious. In addition to this subject of difference,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 55
large and perplexed enough to tax the highest ability of
any negotiator, England, in direct violation of the pro
visions of the treaty, held on to the north-western posts,
a wrong to which the United States could not subrait
with dignity, and yet which they had not the force to
resist with success. It was in the raidst of this very
troubled state of affairs, that Mr. Adams arrived in
London as Minister Plenipotentiary from the United
States. His instructions were brief and simple. " You wUl,
in a respectful but firm manner, insist that the United
States be put, without further delay, in possession of all
the posts and territories within their limits, which are
now held by British garrisons, and you will take the
earliest opportunity of transmitting the answer you may
receive to this requisition.
" You will remonstrate against the infraction of the
treaty of peace by the exportation of negroes and other
Araerican property, contrary to the stipulations on that
subject in the seventh article of it. Upon this head,
you wiU be supphed with various authentic papers and
docuraents, particularly the correspondence between
Gen. Washington and others on the one part, and Sir
Guy Carleton on the other. You wiU represent to the
British rainistry the strong and necessary tendency of
their restrictions on our trade to incapacitate our raer
chants, in a certain degree, to make remittances to
theirs. " You will represent in stiong terras the losses which

56 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
many of our and also of their merchants will sustainj
if the former be unreasonably and immediately pressed
for the payment of debts contracted before the war. On
this subject, you wiU be furnished with papers in which
it is amply discussed."
On the 1st of June, 1785, Mr. Adams had his first
audience of the King. And surrounded as his duty was
with difficulties, surely as he must have anticipated the
failure of all negotiation on the subjects which he was
commissioned to discuss, yet to no man has the retribu
tive justice of history offered an hour of prouder life
than that in which, as the recognized representative of
the United States of America, he placed in the hands of
his ancient sovereign the credentials of his honorable
trust. In his person, no unworthy example of the vig
orous and refined manhood which at that day charac
terized the statesmen of America, — in his farne, iden
tified with every great event of his country's progress,
from the Congress which declared, to the treaty which
recognized, independence, — well might he be, as he de
scribes himself, the focus of all eyes as he stood in the
royal antechamber, full of ministers of state and bish
ops and arabassadors.
When Mr. Adams was intioduced into the King's
closet, he thus addressed His Majesty : —
" Sir : The United States of Araerica have appointed
me their Minister Plenipotentiary to your Majesty, and
have directed me to deUver to your Majesty this letter,
which contains the evidence of it. It is in obedience

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 57
to their express commands that I have the honor to as
sure your Majesty of their unanimous disposition and
desire to cultivate the most friendly and Uberal inter
course betweeh your Majesty's subjects and their citi
zens, and of their best wishes for your Majesty's health
and happiness, and that of your royal family. The ap
pointment of a minister from the United States to your
Majesty's court wiU form an epoch in the history of
England and of America. I think rayself more fortu
nate than aU ray feUow-citizens, in having the distin
guished honor to be the first to stand in your Majesty's
royal presence in a diplomatic character ; and I shall es
teem myself the happiest of raen, if I can be instru
raental in recoraraending ray country raore and more to
your Majesty's royal benevolence, and of restoring an
entire esteem, confidence, and affection, or, in better
words, the old good-nature and the old good-humor
between people, who, though separated by an ocean and
under different governments, have the sarae language, a
similar religion, and kindred blood.
" I beg your Majesty's permission to add, that although
I have some time before been intrusted by my country,
it was never in my life in a manner so agreeable to
myself." " The King," says Mr. Adams, " listened to every word
I said, with dignity, but with an apparent emotion.
Whether it was the nature of the interview, or whether
it was my visible agitation, — for I felt more than I did
or could express, — that touched him, I cannot say ; but

58 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
he was much affected, and answered me with more tre
mor than I had spoken with, and said : —
" ' Sir : The circumstances of this audience are so
extraordinary, the language you have now held is so
extremely proper, and the feeUngs you have discovered
so justly adapted to the occasion, that I must say that
I not only receive with pleasure the assurance of the
friendly dispositions of the United States, but that I
am very glad the choice has faUen upon you to be their
minister. I wish you, sir, to believe, and that it may be
understood in America, that I have done nothing in the
late contest but what I thought myself indispensably
bound to do, .by the duty which I owed to my people. I
will be very frank with you. I was the last to consent
to the separation ; but the separation having been made,
and having become inevitable, I have always said, as I
say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship
of the United States as an independent power. The
moment I see such sentiments and language as yours
prevail, and a disposition to give this country the pref
erence, that moment I shaU say, let the circumstances
of language, religion, and blood have their natural and
fuU effect.' "
Notwithstanding this happy inauguration of his mis
sion, Mx. Adams soon discovered the utter hopelessness
of carrying his purposes. His despatches were but con
stant complaint and sorrowful acknowledgment that cir
curastances were too strong for him. It is clear, from
the correspondence between Mr. Jay and himself, —

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 59
1. That between the tieaty of 1783 and his arrival
in 1785, Lord Sheffield's views had becorae almost uni
versal. The Marquis of Lansdowne, in whom alone
Mr. Adaras saw any hope, was out of power, and not
likely to return ; while neither among the people, nor the
various poUtical parties, was there manifest the slightest
desire to liberalize their national poUcy.
2. The comraerce of the United States had literally
fulfiUed the prophecy of its enemies, and had run towards
England with a current too strong to be turned by home
legislation, and regardless of British restriction. And
thus England was already in fuU enjoyment of almost
all which she could have obtained by the raost concil
iatory policy.
3. The right of each State to govern and regulate its
own coraraerce, and the rivahy of their various inter
ests, rendered it irapossible to resort to any uniform and
consistent system of retaliation, by which alone Eng
land could he brought to negotiation. The result of
Mr. Adams's labors might be summed up in a few des
ultory and inconsequential conversations with the Brit
ish minister ; for the question of the posts was as hope
less as a more Uberal arrangement of their comraercial
regulations. In the first place, England had the power,
and in the next, she pretended a right. The British
minister declared that the United States had broken Jhe
treaty, by putting obstacles in the way of the recovery
of English debts ; and they found, in the independent
legislation of so many States, sorae laws which afforded

60 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
a plausible ground for argument. They therefore dis
tinctly signified their intention to hold on to the posts,
until the legislation of which they complained was re
pealed. There was, of course, but one alternative, if the'
issue was directly made, to resist or to submit. The
first was impossible ; for Mr. Jay's language, applied to
the state of affairs between Spain and the United States,
was stiU more painfuUy true in reference to Great
Britain. " Unblessed with an efficient government, des
titute of funds, and without public credit either at home
or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in patience for
better days, or plunge into an unpopular and dangerous
war, with very little prospect of terminating it by a
peace either advantageous or glorious." To subrait was
equally impossible ; and Mr. Adams was therefore in
structed by Congress to protiact the discussions, and
thus avoid a categorical answer, which would have
forced upon the United States a profitless issue. Hav
ing demonstrated the uselessness of his mission, Mr.
Adaras was recaUed at his own request. The British
government had never reciprocated the courtesy of the
United States in sending an ambassador, but had con
tented itself with appointing Mr. Temple consul-gen
eral at New York, an appointment which Congress
sanctioned in a spirit of very ill-judged liberality. The
negotiations between the two countries were therefore
ended, and as the Federal Constitution was about to go
into operation. Congress suffered the foreign affairs of
the country to wait in patience for those better days.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 61
Mr. Adams concluded his mission early in 1788, and
with it he closed his diplomatic life. As a diplomatist,
he was second to none. He possessed neither the facil
ity of Franklin, nor the singular impartiality of Jay ;
but he was wider and bolder in his views than either.
His appreciation of political events took in a broader
scope, and was sustained by a profounder and ampler
study of political history. His temper was not Concih-
ating, for his inteUect was too active and impetuous to
wait upon other men's doubts. From the outset of the
Revolution, he realized, more vividly than perhaps any
other public man, the fuU force and value of that great
event. If he erred, it was because he insisted too stren
uously upon the iminediate recognition by others of that
consequence which he foresaw raust attach to the polit
ical position of the United States. In his despatches
wiU be found more than one anticipation of political
consequences which his country is only now developing
in the fulness of its strength and prosperity; and the
American historian "would be unfit for his task who
could censure, with unsympathizing criticism, the impa
tience of an enthusiasm so patiiotic in its zeal, and so
far-seeing m its hopes. The treaty with, Holland, which
was his own pecuUar work, and of critical importance
at the time of its signature, could have been negotiated
only by one who knew how to inspu-e others with his
own confidence in his country's future. His thorough
knowledge of the rights and interests of the colonies
gave bis services incalculable importance in the peace

62 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
negotiations with Great Britain; and his mission to
England was aU that under the circumstances it could
be, — a strong and dignified protest against the wilful
ness of a short-sighted and selfish policy. Since the
day on which, in St. James's Palace, he was presented to
the King', a long line of worthy successors, in that same
palace, surrounded by the same royal pomp and circum
stance, have from time to time renewed and raaintained
the bonds of national intercourse, and each new rainis
ter has represented a vaster, richer, greater nation. But
with aU our increase, we have added to the national
possession no nobler spirit, no tiuer patiiot, no higher
gentleman, than he who purchased his honors neither by
popular Up service nor party jugglery, but who, UteraUy,
by journeyings often, in perUs in the city, in perils in
the sea, in perUs among false brethren, in weariness and
painfulness, earned the proud privilege of being naraed,
by a grateful senate, the first Minister of the United
States to the court of England.
This necessarUy brief review of the diplomatic trans
actions of the years intervening between the treaty of
peace of 1783 and the institution of the constitutional
government in 1789, shows the difficulties which the
new government had to encounter at the outset of its
adrainistration of the foreign affairs of the countiy.
The object of the foUowing pages wiU be to trace the
policy of that government in dealing with the troubles
it inherited, and to foUow the progress of its negotia
tions to their successful conclusion.

CHAPTER II.
NEGOTIATIONS AND TREATY WITH ENGLAND.
On the 30th of AprU, 1789, George Washington was
solemnly inaugurated as first President of the United
States of America. After taking the oath of office, he
addressed the two houses of Congress in the senate
chamber. And with an " aspect grave almost to sad
ness, his modesty actually shaking, his voice deep, a Ut
tle tiemulous, and so low as to caU for close attention,"
he declared j in language which finds its fuUest and fit
test appUcation in the history of his own administration,
that '.' there is no truth more thoroughly estabUshed, than
that there exists, in the economy and course of nature,
an indispensable union between virtue and happiness,
between duty and advantage, between the genuine max
iras of an honest and magnaniraous pohcy and the
soUd rewards of public prosperity and felicity." *
In the construction of the cabinet, which iraraediately
foUowed the inauguration, the secretaryship for Foreign
Affairs was conferred upon Thomas Jefferson, of Vir-
* Life and Works of Fisher Ames, Vol. I. p. 34.

64 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ginia. Mr. Jefferson had been Governor of Vnginia, a
distinguished and useful meraber of the Continental
Congress, and had achieved in that body a lasting and
historical reputation by the authorship of the faraous
Declaration of Independence. He had taken no part in
the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention ; and
although at that tirae not properly to be ranked among
either the advocates or the opponents of the constitu
tion, he looked upon that instrument rather as an experi
ment than an achievement. At the tirae of his appoint
raent, he was Minister Plenipotentiary of the United
States at Paris, but on leave of absence from his mission.
When Mr. Jefferson left Paris, in September, 1789,
the French Revolution had commenced. He had heard
the cannon proclaim the fall of the BastUe, and seen
the ferocious crowd which tore Foulon from the pro
tecting arras of Lafayette, and butchered Savigny under
the windows of the Hotel de VUle. He had seen the
fleur-de-Us, which had floated in brave and noble com
panionship with his national flag over the historic fields
of the Revolution, sink, stained with the blood of its
faithful guardians, before the tricolor, and had heard
Lafayette predict that it would raake the tour of the
world. The King of France, towards the power and
glory of whose crown he had looked earnestly in the
darkest hours of his country's fate, longing to see its
splendor rise sunlike over the broad Atlantic, bringing
heaUng on its wings, — that royal friend he had seen
broken and humUiated, surrounded, to use his own de-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 65
scription, with a fierce crowd of sixty thousand citizens,
of all forms and colors, arraed with the rauskets of the
Bastille and the InvaUdes, as far as they would go, the
rest with pistols, swords, pUces, pruning-hooks, scythes,
etc., ahd while , the turaultuous shout of " Vive la Na
tion " hailed the States-General who accorapanied hira,
" not a single ' Vive le Roi ' was heard." He had seen
Baily attach the ti'icolor cockade to the King's hat,
and thus witnessed, in his own words, the conclusion of
" such an amende honorable as no sovereign ever made,
and no people ever received."
IMr. Jefferson looked upon these disturbances, however
unfortunate, as natural, but temporary. He had great
confidence in the character and abUity of the popular
leaders of the States- General. With raany of thera he
was in the habit of confidential consultation, and by all
of them he was treated with great respect, whUe his
views and theories, both of the American Revolution
and of governraent, found araong them general accept
ance and sympathy. ]\Ir. Jefferson, therefore, left
France, deeply and favorably interested in the Revolu
tion, which, just before his departure, had been, as it
were, constitutionally inaugurated by, the vote whicli
declared the permanence of the Assembly. It was nat
ural that it should be so. As a speculative politician,
Mr. Jefferson belonged, raore nearly than any other of
the great American statesmen, to that school in which
the best of the French reforraers were devoted disciples.
He was, hke them, not so much a revolutionary states-
6*

66 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
man as a social reforraer. Born and bred in Virginia,
where social distinctions were wider and stronger than
in any other of the colonies, where the great colonial
proprietors formed, in fact, a landed aristocracy, and
where the institution of slavery gave even an intenser
character to their aristocratic privileges, Mr. Jefferson
had, early in Ufe, placed himself in direct opposition to
the social system into which he was born. The primo
geniture law, the established church, the institution of
slavery, he attacked early and continuously. When he
entered Congress, he gave, by the Declaration of Inde
pendence, a very much broader and more radical char
acter to the grounds of difference between the mother
country and the colonies than had yet been avowed.
For with regard to the leaders of the American Revolu
tion, it has been said with great force and truth : " What
we find in their speeches, what we read in the vtTritings
of those days, has much about birthright and inheri
tance, charters and the privileges of English born sub
jects, and very Uttle about the rights of man. . . . They
had gone but a short way into those philosophical ideas
which characterized the subsequent and real revolution
in France. The great State papers of Araerican liberty
are all predicated on the abuse of chartered, not abso
lute, rights."* These opinions Mr. Jefferson carried with
* Gibbs, Administration of Washington and Adams, Vol. I. p. 2,
3. In quoting this work, while I cheerfully admit the great value of
its original matter for the purposes of historical illustration, while I
sympathize with much of its enthusiastic regard for the leaders of

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 67
hira into the Departraent of State. In the unexpected
contingencies of national politics, it happened that these
the old federal parties, and admire the spirit and ability displayed in
its composition, I cannot too strongly deplore and condemn its whole
tone and temper. It is written, not in the calm and conscientious
spirit of history, but with all the violent animosity of perverted party
feehng. The small, personal jealousies, the idle and malignant gossip,
the discredited and discreditable scandal, which are always rife in
times of great party excitement, are not only reproduced, — that
might be justified, as necessary for the illustration of the sentiment
and opinions of the day, — but made ground for grave historical ref
erence and induction. Now, to say the least, it is very unphilosophi
cal to assume, that, at any period of political strife, all the wisdom and
the worth belong to one party. Imperfect as is human nature, and
complicated as are the motives of human action, not every difference
of opinion, even where we feel assured that our own judgment is
right, not every weakness or inconsistency, or even selfishness of pub
lic conduct, although repugnant to our moral sense, is ground suffi
cient for harsh condemnation. But if ever there was a time when
men might have differed, not only honestly, but hotly, when every
allowance ought to be made for misconceptions of each other's mo
tives, an-d misunderstandings of each other's characters, it was during
the early years of our national life. A new government, a vast
country, unsettled interests, wide spread privation and unreasonable
hopes, ambition in high places, restlessness everywhere, and great
political difficulties both at home and abroad, — surely, all these ele
ments must have combined in a public life, which requires for its
proper appreciation, not only wise and stern judgment, but that gen
tler and better teacher, the charity which believeth no evil, and
which hopeth aU things. That the meu of the day misjudged them
selves and their contemporaries, and that they spoke bitterly one of
another, is natural enough, for they were mortal. But if that great

68 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
opinions, and the personal syrapathies perhaps conse
quent upon them, did not permit him cordiaUy to ap
prove the policy of the cabinet in which he was chief,
and did finaUy induce his resignation. But he certainly
never coraproraised his character as Secretary of State
bj' their expression, and the views of the governraent,
in their fuU integrity, were announced, enforced, and
supported by him with a sti-engih of logic, an elevation
of sentiment, and an elegance of style, which have
made his State papers memorable iUustrations of the
national mind.
The questions which demanded the attention of his
department have already been indicated ; but sorae tirae
necessarUy elapsed before the new government was
ready for active negotiation ; and it was not, in fact,
untu 1791, that the diplomatic systera of the country
was organized by the appointment of Thoraas Pinck
ney, of South Carolina, to London, Gouverneur Morris,
of New York, to Paris, and Wilham Short, of Mary
land, to the Hague, Colonel David Huraphreys, of Con
necticut, having been previously norainated Minister Res-
band of worthies has been reunited iu a higher sphere, looking back,
perhaps with joy, perhaps with sorrow, but certainly with profound
humility, upon their best achievements, how little would they desire
that we should, in a spirit of unwise and exaggerated partisanship,
expose their weaknesses, repeat their misunderstandings, and coun
teract, as niuch as in us Ues, the sacred work of time. What they
did, they did all together; the humblest of them doing much
that we should imitate, the highest of them much that we sliould
avoid.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 69
ident at Lisbon, and Mr. Carraichael reraaining, under
his old coraraission, Charg^ d' Affaires at Madrid. When
Ms. Jefferson entered upon his official duties, the inter
ests of the country required iraraediate negotiation with
Spain and England. But while the negotiations with
Spain pursued their distinct course to their consumma
tion by treaty, in 1795, the relations between the United
States and England became so compUcated with the
relations of both to France, as to render the negotiations
with these courts to a great degree dependent on each
other. This complication found its solution in Mr. Jay's
tieaty of 1794 ; but to comprehend thoroughly the bear
ing of this treaty, it will be necessary to follow sepa
rately the paraUel lines of the French and English nego
tiations, until they converge into this central and critical
transaction of our diplomatic history.
By the treaty of 1783, between Great Britain and
the United States, it had been agreed, that creditors on
either side should meet with no lawful irapediraent to
the recovery of the full value, in sterUng raoney, of all
bond fide debts heretofore contiacted ; that Congress
should earnestly recommend to the legislatures of the
respective States restitution of all confiscated estates,
and the adoption of such conciliatory legislation as
would effectually carry out the prior provision of the
treaty ; and that his Britannic Majesty should, with all
convenient speed, and without causing any destruction,
or carrying away any negroes or other property of the
American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garri-

70 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
sons, and fleets frora the United States, and from any
port,- place, and harbor within the same. These pro
visions, it was rautually aUeged, had not been executed
on either side. When Mr. Adams, after faiUng in his
effort to settie these difficulties, had returned frora his
raission, the British governraent, as has been stated,
conteraptuously neglected the courtesy of reciprocating
a diploraatic representation, and the coraplaints of the
two countries were thus aggravated by the irapossibil
ity of all explanation. The retention of the posts by
the British, wounded the national honor, while their
coraraercial restrictions sensibly affected the national
interests. Feeling the urgent necessity for sorae action,
and prevented by the discourtesy of Great Britain frora
any direct approach, the government resolved to open
an inforraal coraraunication with the British court.
For this purpose, Washington authorized Gouverneur
Morris, at that time in London bn private business, to
ascertain, if possible, the intentions of Great Britain.
In view ofthe final treaty, the instructions of Washing
ton are specially iraportant, as indicating what were, at
the outset, the objects of any negotiation on the part of
the United States. Mr. Jefferson not having yet as
sumed his functions, General Washington himself
addressed Mr. Morris: —
" Your inquiries will coraraence by observing, that as
the present constitution of governraent, and the courts
established in pursuance of it, reraove the objections
hitherto made to putting the United States in posses-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 71
sion of their frontier posts, it is natural to expect, from
the assurances of his Majesty, and the national good
faith, that no unnecessary delays will take place. Pro
ceed, then, to press a speedy performance of the treaty
respecting that object.
" Remind them of the article by which it was agi-eed,
that negroes belonging to our citizens should not be
carried away; and of the reasonableness of making
compensation for thera. Learn, with precision, if pos
sible, what they raean to do on this head.
" The comraerce between the two countries you well
understand. You are apprised of the sentiraents and
feehngs of the United States on the present state of it ;
and you doubtless have heard, that, in the late session of
Congress, a very respectable nuraber of both houses
were incUned to a discriraination of duties unfavorable
to Britain, and that it would have taken place but for
concUiatory considerations, and the probabUity that the
late change in our governraent and circurastances would
lead to raore satisfactory arrangeraents.
" Request to be inforraed, therefore, whether they
conteraplate a treaty of coraraerce with the United
States, and on what principles or terras in general. In
treating this subject, let it be strongly irapressed on your
mind, that the privilege of carrying our productions in
our vessels to their islands, and bringing in return the
productions of those islands into our own ports and mar
kets, is regarded here of the highest importance, and
you wUl be careful not to countenance any idea of our

72 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
dispensing with it in a treaty. Ascertain, if possible,
their views on this point, for it would not be expedient
to commence negotiations without previously having
good reasons to expect a satisfactory terraination of
thera. " It raay also be weU for you to take a proper occa
sion for reraarking, that their omitting to send a rainister
here, when the United States sent one to London, did
not raake an agreeable irapression, and request to
know what would be their future conduct on sirailar
occasions." In virtue of this authority, Mr. Morris had several
interviews with the Duke of Leeds and Mr. Pitt. They
resulted in nothing. " I have," said he, in writing to
General Washington, " some reason to believe that the
present administration intend to keep the posts, and
withhold payment for the negroes. If so, they wiU
color their breach of faith by the best pretexts in their
power. I incline to think, also, that they consider a
treaty of commerce with America as being absolutely
unnecessary, and that they are persuaded they shaU
derive aU the benefit from our trade without the treaty.
It is true, we might lay them under restriction in our
ports ; but they believe that an atterapt of that sort would
be considered by one part of Araerica as calculated by
the other for private emolument, and not for the general
good. The merchants here look on it as alraost impos
sible for us to do without thera ; and it must be
acknowledged, that past experience and the present situ-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 73
ation of neighboring countries go far to justify that
opinion. Whether the ministers shall act according to
their own ideas, or consult raercantile people, they will
equally, I think, repel advances from us, and therefore it
seems raore prudent to lay the foundations of future
advantage, than atterapt to grasp at present benefit."
And the whole negotiation was thoroughly and briefly
suraraed up by the President in the raessage which ac
companied the despatches sent to the Senate.
" The sum is, that they declare without scruple they
do not mean to fulfil what reraains of the Treaty of
Peace to be fulfilled on their part, (by which we are to
understand the delivery of the posts and payraent for
property carried off,) till perforraance on our part, and
corapensation where the delay has rendered the perforra
ance now irapracticable ; that on the subject of a treaty
of coraraerce, they avoided direct answers, so as to sat
isfy Mr. Morris they did not raean to enter into one,
unless it could be extended to a ti'caty of alUance offen
sive and defensive, or unless in the event of a rupture
with Spain. As to sending a minister here, they raade
excuses at the first conferences, seeraed disposed to it in
the second, and in the last, express an intention of so
doing." Nothing could be clearer, and nothing more embar
rassing. Conscious of weakness, and irritated at the
injustice which it could not resist, is it wonderful that
the public opinion of the country should have become
extiavagant in its antagonism to England, or that the
7

74 DIPLOMATICHISTORT.
system of restriction on English coramerce should have
found a stronger and more vehement support than its
intrinsic merits justified ? Before, however, the govern
ment had determined upon a line of poUcy to meet the
requirements of the position. Great Britain had so far
opened the door for an arrangement, as to send an ac
credited minister to Philadelphia. And, in 1791, IVtr.
Hammond, who had been secretary to Mr. Hartley's
mission at Paris in 1783, and was, at the tirae of his
appointment. Secretary of Legation at Madrid, arrived
in this country as Minister Plenipotentiary. But before
the opening of any discussion between the two govern
ments, the presence of the British rainister raised two
preUminary questions, which it was expedient to have
answered. The first was, did he come authorized to
conclude a treaty ; and the second, whether the British
government were in good faith prepared to give up the
posts, upon the fulfilraent of what they clairaed to be
treaty obUgations ; or were these difficulties raade simply
to supply a diplomatic excuse for the permanent reten- .
tion of these iraportant railitary positions ? Mi: Jeffer
son therefore forraaUy asked of Mr. Haramond the ex
tent of his powers ; and a short correspondence made it
apparent that the British rainister had not, to use his
own language, any "special coraraission empowering
him to conclude any definite arrangements upon the
subject of the commercial intercourse between Great
Britain and the United States," but that, under his gen
eral plenipotentiary powers, he felt fully " corapetent to

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 75
enter into a negotiation with this governraent for that
purpose, in the discussion of principles which may serve
as a basis, and constitute the stipulations, of any such
definite arrangements." Feehng very justly that a raere
procrastinating discussion of abstract coramercial prin
ciples would be idle ; satisfied that the American minis
ter at London could learn more directly and certainly
the inclination of the British government on that head ;
and indisposed, raoreover, to mix up the clear questions
of treaty obligations with the doubtful issues of com
raercial expediency, IMr. Jefferson wisely determined to
limit his discussion with the British minister "to the
measures which reason and practicability may dictate
for giving effect to the stipulations of our treaties yet
reraaining to be executed."
On the 15th of Deceraber, 1791, he addressed a letter
to Mr. Hararaond, containing a full, clear, and expUcit
stateraent of the clairas of the United States govern
raent. " I have the honor to propose," said the letter, " that
we shall begin by specifying, on each side, the particular
acts which each considers to have been done by the
other in contravention of the tieaty. I shaU set the
example. '
" The provisional and definitive treaties in their seventh
article stipulated, that ' His Britannic Majesty should
with aU convenient speed, and without causing any de
struction or carrying away any negroes or other property
of the American inhabitants, withdraw aU his armies.

76 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
garrisons, and fleets frora the said United States, and
from every port, place, and harbor within the same.'
" But the British garrisons were not withdrawn with
all convenient speed, nor have ever yet been withdrawn,
frora Michilimackinac, on Lake IMichigan ; Detioit, on
the straits of Lake Erie and Huron ; Fort Erie, on
Lake Erie ; Niagara ; Oswego, on Lake Ontario ;
Oswegatchie, on the River St. Lawrence ; Port-au-fer,
and Dutchman's Point, on Lake Champlain.
" 2. The British officers have undertaken to exercise
a jurisdiction over the country and inhabitants in the
vicinities of the forts.
" 3. They have excluded the citizens of the United
States from navigating even on our side of the raiddle
line of the rivers and lakes, established as a boun
dary between the two nations.
" By these proceedings, we have been intercepted
entirely frora the comraerce of furs with the Indian
nations to the northwards, a commerce which has ever
been of great importance to the United States, not Only
for its intrinsic value, but as it was the means of cher
ishing peace with those Indians, and of superseding the
necessity of that expensive warfare we have been
obliged to carry on with them during the time that
these posts have been in other hands.
" On withdrawing the troops frora New York, 1st, a
large erabarkation of negroes, the property of the inhab
itants of the United States, took place, before the cora
raissioners, on our part, for inspecting and superintend-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 77
ing embarkations had arrived there, and without any
account ever rendered thereof; 2nd, near three thou
sand others were publicly carried away by the avowed
order of the British commanding officer, and under the
view and against the remonstrances of our coramis
sioners ; 3d, a very great nuraber were carried off" in
private vessels, if not by the express perraission, yet
certainly without opposition, on the part of the com
raanding officer, who alone had the means of preventing
it, and without adraitting the inspection of the Araeri
can coramissioners ; and, 4th, of other species of prop
erty carried away, the comraanding officer perraitted
no exaraination at all. In support of these facts, I have
the honor to inclose you docuraents, a list of which
wiU be subjoined; and in addition to thera, I beg leave
to refer to a roU signed by the joint coraraissioners, and
delivered to your coraraanding officer for transmission
to his court, containing a description of the negroes
publicly carried away by his order, as before raentioned,
with a copy of which you have doubtless been furnished.
" A difference of opinion, too, having arisen as to the
river intended by the plenipotentiaries to be the boun
dary between us and the dorainions of Great Britain,
and by thera called the St. Croix, which narae it seeras
is given to two different rivers, the ascertaining of this
point becomes a matter of present urgency ; it has here
tofore been the subject of application from us to the
governraent of Great Britain.
" There are other sraaller raatters between the two
7*

78 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
nations, which remain to be adjusted ; but I think it
would be better to refer these, for settleraeni, through
the ordinary channels of our ministers, than to embarrass
the present important discussions with them. They
can never be obstacles to friendship and harraony.
" Permit me now, sir, to ask from you a specification
of the particular acts which, being considered by his
Britannic Majesty as a non-compliance on our part
with the engageraents contained in the 4th and 5th
articles of the treaty, induced hira to suspend the exe
cution of the 7th, and render a separate discussion of
them inadraissible."
On the 5th of March, 1792, about three raonths after
the rec'eipt of this letter, a lapse of tirae which certainly
indicated, on the part of the British rainister, no such
full and matured instruction as he would have neces
sarily possessed, had the complaints of his government
been simple and sincere, Mr. Hamraond addressed to
Mr. Jefferson his reply. In this reply, after stating that
its delay resulted from the. necessity of coUecting from
distant parts of the continent the requisite raaterials,
and of corabining and arranging thera, Mr. Hammond
distinctly avowed, that the action of the British govern
ment in suspending the 7th article was justifiable and
justified, on the ground of the irreparable injury which
raany classes of British subjects had sustained, and the
heavy expense to which the British nation had been
subjected, by the non-perforraance of their engagements
on the part of the United States. In support of his

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 79
position, he quoted the tieaty by which Congress bound
itself to recommend the necessary legislation to the
States ; the circular letters of Congress, urging such
legislation upon the various States ; and the language
of the old Congress, through their Secretary, Mr. Jay,
by which they declared, "they had deliberately and
dispassionately examined and considered the several
facts and matters urged by Great Britain as infractions
of the treaty of peace on the part of America ; and
regret, that, in sorae of the States, too little attention
appears to have been paid to the public faith, pledged
by treaty." He then recited the continued interposition
of Congress with the States, to induce thera to con
forra their legislation to their treaty engageraents, and
the continuous disregard of their obligations on the
part of the States, —
1. In not repeaUng laws that existed antecedently to
the pacification.
2. In enacting laws, subsequent to the peace, in con-
tiavention of the treaty, such as related to the estates
of the loyalists, such as respected their persons, and
such as obstructed the recovery of debts due to subjects
of the crown.
3. In the decisions of the State courts upon ques
tions affecting the rights of British subjects, especiaUy
those decisions which refused to aUow interest on debts
contracted before the Revolution.
And the reply was accorapanied by a -long list of the
acts of the States, and the decisions of the State courts.

80 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
in proof and iUustration of each head of the complaint.
Mr. Hamraond did not reply to the charge of the ab
straction of the negroes and other property, nor to the
aUeged irregularities attendant upon the evacuation of
the British arraies.
On May 29th, 1792, Mr. Jefferson furnished the British
rainister with his rejoinder, a voluminous and most
elaborate state paper. In this document, Mr. Jefferson
met not only the broad questions open between the gov
ernments, but went into an able and minute review of
the legislation and judicial decisions of every State, as
quoted by Mr. Hamraond. He proved that such acts
as were coraplained of had followed and been provoked
by the British infractions of the treaty, and that, consid
ered as acts of retaliation, which they were, they were
" aU of them so raoderate, of so short duration, the re
sult of such necessities, and so produced, that we raight
with confidence have referred them aiterius principis, quo
boni viri, arbitrio." " That induced at length, by assur
ances frora the British court that they would concur in
a fulfilraent of the treaty. Congress, in 1787, declared
to the States its wiU that even the appearance of obsta
cle, raised by their acts, should no longer continue, and
required a forraal repeal of every act of that nature ;
and, to avoid question, required it as well frora those
who had not, as those who had, passed such acts, — which
was complied with so fuUy that no such laws remained
in any State of the Union, except one ; and even that
one could not have forborne, if any symptora of com-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 81
pliance from the opposite party had rendered a reiterated
requisition from Congress important." He went on to
argue, that even this repeal was unnecessary, as treaties
were the supreme law of the land, overriding all incon
sistent legislation, and that the courts, both of the State
and general government, had so decided ; — that British
creditors had been for some time in the habit of having
recourse to these courts with perfect success ; — that no
external influence was brought to bear on either courts or
creditors, and that, in fact, the class of separate and un
settled debts contracted before the war formed but a
smaU portion of the original araount. He then exara
ined the question of the interest which had accuraulated
on the Araerican debt during the war, and reviewed the
decisions of the State courts, concluding " on the whole,
without undertaliing to say what the law is, which is
not the province of the Executive, we say that the rea
sons of those judges who deny interest during the war
appear Sufficiently cogent to account for then- opinion on
honest principles, to exerapt it frora the charge of pal
pable and flagrant wrong, and to take away all pretence
of withholding execution of the treaty by way of re
prisal for that cause." It is fortunately unnecessary to
foUow in detail this raasterly arguraent, which was char
acterized by an extent and accuracy of legal knowledge,
both international and local, worthy of a judicial decis
ion. For its great excellence consists in the strength,
clearness, and elegance with which it brought out the
two leading points of the American argument, and

82 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
which, once settled, swept away the crowd of sraaU and
special issues with which Mr. Hararaond had very in
geniously obscured the raain points of the controversy.
These were siraple enough. The governraent of the
United States, pointing to the seventh article of the
treaty, said to England, "in violation of that article,
you have not delivered up the posts, and you have car
ried away negroes." The British governraent answered,
" YeSj we have not executed that article, we have nOt
given up the posts, and we have carried away negroes,
because you have not carried out in good faith the
fourth and fifth articles of the treaty." To this, the con
clusive reply of the United States governraent was : —
" 1. We have done aU that we proraised to do. By
the explicit language of the treaty, the United States
siraply covenanted to recoraraend to the several States
the legislation which you claira. And that the charac
ter of this recommendation was understood in aU its»
possible and probable inefficiency, appears from the cor
respondence between the negotiators and the language
of your own statesraen in the discussion upon its mer
its. Now that Congress has recommended and labored
earnestly to secure the adoption by the States of those
recoraraendations, you yourself admit. What further,
then, can you claim ?
" 2. Granting that the United States, however, were
bound to procure tlie passage in each State of this con
ciliatory legislation, how does the case stand? You
covenant to deliver up the posts, — we agree to pass

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 83
certain laws. The deUvery of the posts is a matter sim
ple in its nature, requiring but little time and small
preparation. The legislation you desire requires the
action of thirteen independent States, scattered over a
continent, and demanding tirae, teraper, and tact in its
attainraent. You have never raade the first raoveraent
towards the perforraance of your part of the contract,
and your neglect has been the stiongest arguraent with
the States against our recoraraendation. With what
hope could \ve approach thera to ask such legislation as
would heal old wounds and restore kindness and confi
dence, while your troops are encamped on our territory
in direct and insulting violation of your own promises ?
If you had given up the posts, and we had then, in the
process of a reasonable time, neglected what we were
bound to perforra, then, but not until then, could you
fairly have coraplained of our failure, and then, in a thou
sand ways, you could have retaliated our want of faith."
With Mr. Jefferson's letter, the correspondence
ceased ; and when the Araerican Secretary, raore than
eighteen raonths after, " had it again in charge frora the
President of the United States to ask whether we can
now have an answer to the letter of May 29th," Mr.
Hararaond, the 22d of Nov., 1793, replied, " I have not
yetjreceived such definitive instructions relative to your
coraraunication of the 29th of May, 1792, as will enable
rae to renew the discussions upon the subject of it, which
have been for sorae tirae suspended." In a conversa-

84 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
tion between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Gouverneur Morris, as
far back as 1790, Mr. Pitt had hinted that it would be
better to make a new treaty than comply with the old ;
and in November, 1793, while this useless negotiation
was dragging its slow length along. Lord Grenville had
the following very significant conversation with the
American Minister in London: " With respect to the
posts, he observed, that the negotiation concerning them
was proceeding in another place, in which we were
both of opinion, for obvious reasons, that it was too
inconvenient to continue it ; that this negotiation was
not terminated ; and he assured rae that he continued to
receive pressing applications from the commercial sub
jects of his Majesty, on account of the non-execution of
the treaty on our part. He further said, that if the raeas
ure of relinquishing the posts were to take place, their
settlements would be exposed to the ravages, and them
selves to the expense and disadvantage, which I had
described to be at present the case with us. For these
reasons, he thought, administration would not be justi
fied in relinquishing the posts at this tirae, and ex
pressed his regret that Mr. Haramond had not been per
mitted by us to enter into a negotiation for some
arrangements relating particularly to the posts, and (as
I apprehended hira) Indian affairs, which he had no
doubt would have terrainated in our coraraon advan
tage and mutual satisfaction ; but that, when Mr. Ham
mond wished to open that business, he was given to

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 85
understand (though in the raost civil terras) that the less
that was said on that subject the better." *
It is clear frora this correspondence, especially when
taken in connection with these conversations, that the
English governraent had at that time no idea of negoti
ating. IMr. Hammond's mission was simply a dilatory
plea. His appointraent was delayed beyond any reason
able reciprocity of diploraatic intercourse. When he did
arrive, he was entirely unauthorized to conclude a treaty.
When the discussion was fairly opened, instead of sira-
plifying the arguraent, he started, by his course of
reasoning, a thousand smaU and subordinate issues,
which would have led in their full debate to an inex-
tiicable confusion of legal niceties. And, finally, when
Mr. Jefferson met him on his own ground, and under
took the discussion which he had himself introduced, he
allowed the whole matter to drop, without atterapting
even the obUgatory courtesy of an official reply. And
when, at the close of 1793, Mr. Jefferson resigned the
Secretaryship of State, tMs negotiation, wUfuUy and
perversely prolonged, still reraained to irritate national
sentiment and perplex the national pohcy.
In the mean time, in the beginning of August, 1792,
Mr. Pinckney arrived in London, as IMinister Plenipo
tentiary from the United States, and in a despatch, in
December of the sarae year, he described his situation
to the Secretary. * Pinckney MSS. See next note;
8

86 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" In ray first coramunication, I mentioned the civility
with which I was received at St. James's and at the
Office of Foreign Affairs. The only cUcumstance worth
raentioning in my conference with the King was, that
Lord North's rope of sand appeared not to have been
entirely effaced from his Majesty's memory, which I
infer frora his mentioning the differing circumstances
between the northern and southern parts of our coun
try, tending to produce disunion. I declined entering
on any discussion, observing only, that we agreed very
well at present, and hoped a continuance of the same
disposition. I have been constant in my attendance at
the King's levees, since the return of the court to St.
James's, and, placing myself in the circle of foreign min
isters, his Majesty never fails to have a few raoraents'
conversation with me on the weather, or other topics
equally important ; but, notwithstanding the great vari
ety of incident that has lately occurred in European
politics, he never touches that subject with me ; indeed,
not only the King, but raost of his courtiers, and (except
the Pole) aU the foreign rainisters, seera to consider the
Americans as united in principles with the French, and
as having, by exaraple, at least, assisted in exciting the
coraraotions with which great part of Europe is con
vulsed, and consequently are not very agreeable associ
ates. Some of the foreign ministers with whom I am
most intimate have told me that this idea prevaUs;
at the same time, they have been polite enough to
raake, themselves, a proper distinction between the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 87
raodes of conducting the revolutions in the two coun
tiies; although I consider this as an honorable testi
mony of the good conduct of ray country, it serves to
keep rae at a greater distance from those with whom
it is ray business to have most intercourse than would
otherwise be the case. The Queen received me with
affability at ray audience ; but at the drawing-rooras,
though she condescends to say a few words to me, yet
she gives a marked priority to any person near ; it is, in
short, very evident, that I am by no means in favor in
any of the apartments at St. Jaraes's.
" You may be assured that I avoid every thing that
may tend to widen the distance, by keeping as clear as
possible of aU European poUtics, by forbearing all men
tion of the cold civUity which I experience, and, in gen
eral, by airaing at a conciliatory conduct. Of the diplo
raatic corps, the Minister frora Poland converses freely
with rae, and we are on good terras ; the rest consider
me as one who, with respect to the present European
poUtics, neither rejoices in their joy, nor is afflicted with
their sorrow. They have all, however, paid me the com
phment of the first visit, except the Russian minister,
and with him I have no acquaintance." *
* This extract is copied from General Pinckney's Letter Book,
Vol. I. p. 74. For these volumes, together with a large collection of
private correspondence, I am indebted to his son, Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, Esq. ; and I am under further obligation to other members
of the family for the Letter Book and papers of General Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney, Minister to France. In using these manu-

88 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
The negotiation which had been opened between Mr.
Jefferson and Mr. Hammond was not transferred to
Mr. Pinckney, and his mission was therefore confined
to the discussion of such points of difference as might
arise in the current relations between the two countries ;
and these, unfortunately, were irritating enough. The
relations of the two countries were disturbed, not only
by the resteictive pohcy of the English coraraercial laws,
but by a suspicion on the part of the Araerican people,
alraost substantiated into certainty, that Lord Dorches
ter was using the frontier posts as centres, frora which
to stiraulate the savage hostility of the Indian tribes
against the United States ; and by the repeated impress-
raents of American seamen, — irapressraents incapable
of justification, and almost always conducted with the
rudest insolence. In vain did Mr. Pinckney urge upon
Lord GrenviUe the propriety of coraing to sorae araica
ble settlement of the question of impressraent, before it
had excited too rauch feeling, or had becorae complicated
with more difficult issues. Lord Grenville agreed that
it would be wise to do so, but the difficulties were im
raense, the cabinet busy ; and so the matter ended, as far
scripts, I have, of course, confined my extracts to such documents
only as have not been published in any collection of State papers.
The quotation from General Thomas Pinckney's papers is marked
T. P. MSS. ; those from General Cotesworth Pinckney, C. C. P. MSS.
It is a very small matter, but in reference to the despatch above, it
is proper to add, that a postscript states, " Since writing the above,
the Russian minister sent me his card."

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 89
as preventive action went. The length to which the
conteraptuous violation of American rights was carried
may be Ulustrated by the foUowing case, not perhaps
the raost extreme that might be selected. An Ameri
can vessel, bound from China to Ostend, was driven by
stress of weather into the port of Ramsgate. While
there, several seamen, who were under contract to per
form the whole voyage frora Boston to the East Indies,
thence to Ostend, and then back to Boston, deserted and
entered a British ship of war. The British coraraander
not only detained the raen, but insisted upon payraent
of their wages, although by their own contract they
had forfeited all right to compensation ; and threatened
to enforce his demand by the retention of the vessel.
Mr. Pinckney imraediately brought the whole subject
to Lord GrenvUle's attention, and briefly, but very ably,
pointed out the iUegality of the course of the British
commander. As to the taking and detaining American
searaen, which was becoraing too coraraon, he showed
the difficulty of distinguishing between the citizens of
the two countries ; the fact that the declaration of a de
serter could not be assuraed as proof of what he had so
rauch interest in proving; that the question of what
constituted citizenship raight be open to the govern
raents, but should not be left to the British naval cora-
manders ; that the captains, on both sides, were in every
case interested and prejudiced ; that in every case of
dispute, force must be appealed to for a decision ; a con
dition of things which placed the peace and commerce

90 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
of the countiy at perpetual hazard ; and that it was a
practice not exercised by any other nation of the world-
It was further suggested, that, granting these men to be
British citizens, they had voluntarily made a contiact
not forbidden by the laws of their own country, or of
that where the contract was raade ; that Great Britain
herself encouraged the engagement of foreign mariners
in her raerchant service ; and that such an interference
with a lawful contract was a great and deliberate out
rage.* Lord Grenville adraitted the force of the argu
raent as to the contract, but no redress was offered.
All Mr. Pinckney's representations were raet in the sarae
spirit, — answered courteously, but very slowly; dis
cussed vaguely and at tedious intervals, and allowed
finaUy to rest without result in the dusty obscurity of
the Foreign Office. But the raarch of events in Europe
was fast hurrying beyond the ordinary liraits of diplo
raatic discussion.
On the 30th of January, 1793, Mr. Pinckney, writing
to his governraent as to the probabiUty of war between
France and England, after referring to certain advan
tages which the coraraercial stipulations with some of
the belUgerents afforded, said, " I wish we had similar
articles in a treaty with this country ; for, although the
adrainistration of this country appear sensible of the
iraportance of our trade, and profess an inclination to
cultivate our friendship, yet they are adopting a raeasure
* T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. L p. 102-108.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 91
respecting the French, which, in its execution, may lead
to disagreeable consequences with respect to us. I
mean their plan of distressing thera, by preventing thera
frora receiving supphes of provisions. Now as we
shaU be the people who must principally supply them,
and have no treaty with Great Britain respecting our
intercourse with countries with whora she raay be at war,
and although our claira to a free intercourse is founded
in reason and our national right, yet, as we have no
arraed neutraUty the raerabers whereof this people have
to fear, they raay stop our vessels bpund to French ports
with provisions." * Circumstances soon justified Mr.
Pinckney's apprehensions. Early in 1793, war between
England and France was formally declared, and the
efforts of the United States to maintain a just neutral
ity complicated their relations with both. The relations
between the United States and France, springing out of
the French Revolution, wiU be detailed in the chapter
devoted to the history of the French negotiation. At
present, it is only necessary to state that an angry and
harassing controversy was engendered between the two
governraents ; that they were upon the brink of a most
disastious rupture ; and that the conduct of the French
minister was in such open violation of aU the decencies
of national intercourse, that his recall was finally de
manded of his government. On the 9th of May, 1793,
the National Convention of France passed a decree, by
* T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. I. p. 143, 144.

92 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
which, araong other things, ships of war and privateers
were " authorized to seize and carry into the ports of
the repubhc, merchant vessels which are wholly or in
part loaded with provisions, being neutral property,
bound to an enemy's port, or having on board merchan
dise belonging to an eneray." Merchandise belonging
to an eneray was declared lawful prize, seizable for the
profits of the captors ; but provisions, being neutral prop
erty, were to be paid for at the price they would have
sold for at the port to which they were bound. Against
this decree, Mr. Morris, United States minister in
France, protested iminediately, both on general grounds
and upon the special obligations of the treaties between
the two countries ; and in consequence, a few days after,
the Convention passed another decree, by which they
declared, that the vessels of the United States were not
included in their first decree of the 9th of May.
Scarcely, however, had the French government decreed
this exeraption of Araerican comraerce, than Great
Britain passed a hostile set of orders, based upon the
sarae principles, and adraitting of no exception. On
the Sth of June, 1793, by the additional instructions
issued by the British governraent, it was ordered : —
" 1. That it shall be lawful to stop and detain all ves
sels loaded wholly or in part with corn, flour, or meal,
bound to any port in France, or any port occupied by
the armies of France, and to send them to such ports as
shaU be most convenient, in order that such corn, meal,
or flour raay be purchased on behalf of his Majesty's

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 93
governraent, and the ships be released after such pur
chases, and after a due aUowance for freight ; or that
the raasters of such ships, on giving due security, to be
approved of by the Court of Adrairalty, be permitted
to proceed to dispose of their cargoes of corn, meal, or
flour in the ports of any country in araity with his
Majesty." The other instiuctions were the usual ones in relation
to blockaded ports, raaking a slight raodification in re
gard to ships of Sweden and Denraark.
Less fortunate than Mr. Morris, Mr. Pinckney re
raonstrated in vain. " If," said he, in language that act
uaUy represented the condition to which the country
was soon reduced, " If one nation had a right to shut
up to the produce of another all the ports of the earth
except her own and those of her friends, she raay shut
thera up also, whereby the neutral nation would be con
fined to her own ports ; or if, frora motives of policy,
she were to abstain from this last exclusion, yet the op
posite party would certainly have an equal right to pur
sue the sarae raeasure, whereby the sarae consequence
would ensue. But for a nation to have its peaceable
industry suspended, and its citizens reduced to idleness
and want by the act of another, is a restriction which
reason and justice do not authorize. . . . This act, too,
tends directly to draw the United States frora that state
of peace in which they wish to reraain ; for it is an es
sential character of neutrality to furnish no aids not
stipulated by previous treaties to one party, which are

94 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
not furnished with equal readiness to the other. If the
United States perrait corn to be sent to Great Britain
and her friends, they are equally bound to perrait it to
France ; to restrain it, would lead to war with France ;
and between restraining it themselves, and acquiescing
in the restraint by her enemies, is no difference. She
will consider this acquiescence as a pretext, and the
United States wiU see themselves plunged by this raeas
ure into a war with which they meddle not, and which
they wish to avoid, if justice to aU parties and fi-ora all
parties wiU enable thera to avoid it. In the case where
they found themselves obUged by treaty to withhold frora
the eneraies of France the right of coraing into their
ports, they thought themselves in justice bound to with
hold the same right frora France also, and they did it ;
were they to withhold supplies of provisions, they would,
by the sarae principle of irapartial neutraUty,, be bound
to withhold thera frora her eneraies also, and thus either
shut to theraselves all the ports of Europe where corn is
in deraand, or raake themselves parties in the war." *
But argument was useless. Great Britain was resolved
upon her course, and it was soon evident, frora the re
ciprocal treaty obligations of the aUies in this, the first,
coahtion against France, that the poUcy of England was
* 1. T. P. MSS. Letter Book, Vol. I. p. 479.
2. These orders are to be found under their various dates in the
1st vol., Am'erican State Papers : Foreign Relations. On page 183,
Vol. I, of his " Diplomacy of the United States," Mr. Lyman has
collected them together.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 95
the policy of Europe. A series of other raaritirae in
structions foUowed these, by which the property of ene
raies was seized in neutral ships ; the trade between
the United States and the French West Indian col
onies was forbidden under the rule of '56, by which
the principle was estabUshed, that neutrals could con
duct no trade in time of war with colonial possessions
of a belligerent, not allowed by the sarae belligerent in
tirae of peace ; a general systera of fictitious blockade
was established ; and provisions were declared contra
band of war. These proceedings on the one side pro
voked, of course, retaliation on the other ; and frora this
date the relations of the United States becarae raore
and raore erabarrassed. Their ships were confiscated,
then searaen irapressed, the sovereignty of their harbors
violated, their neutral rights, in every way and on aU
occasions, disregarded ; while the bureaux of their erabas
sies were piled with heaps of irapotent protests and un
heeded reclaraations. The exeraption permitted by
France was soon withdrawn ; for as soon as it was evi
dent that the United States had not the power to pre
vent the seizure of her vessels by England, France re
fused to aUow her enemies only to profit by the weakness
of a neutral ; and as soon as it was clear that the
United States did not intend to be forced into a war
by the exactions of England, France abandoned a pol
icy which was intended to win an ally, and not raerely
to protect a lukewarra friend. It would be idle now to
resume the diplomatic debates of that day, and to draw

96 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
out, in balanced arguraent, the international reasonings
and learned quotations with which aU the parties con
ducted their discussion of neutral rights. No jurist
would hesitate to adrait, that neutral rights were vio
lently abused and disregarded. No statesraan would
undertake to raeasure the actions of great nations, en
gaged in the fiercest contest that history has recorded,
by the technical rules of any code, however strong in
the logic of its morality, or wise in the consequences of
its peaceful justice. The war between Europe and
France was a war for existence. It was confined in its
scope to the settleraent of no coraraercial interests, the
vindication of no territorial aggrandizement, the adjust
raent of no narrow balance of national power. Its
terrible terapest shook the foundations of society ; and
the very heart of Christendora was hot with a passion,
to be cooled only when the Ufeblood of a fuU genera
tion of men had the whole globe ' incarnardined.' It
would have been folly to expect, that, in a conffict like
this, the interests of any one nation would be permitted
to stand between the destructive energies of the com
batants ; still less, those of a nation young, weak, un
considered, alld barely adraitted into that national soci
ety whose very Ufe was now in deadly peril. And it
raust in candor be acknowledged, that the weakness of
the United States was their salvation. Had their active
participation on either side been a positive advantage,
they would, like all the second-rate powers of Europe,
have been dragged into the struggle. Had they pos-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 97
sessed such a tolerable naval force as would have
terapted thera to maintain by arms their neutral rights,
they would have been comraitted to the conflict. For,
between the two eneraies, to act against one, on grounds
ever so special to the United States, would have been
alliance with the other ; and the interests of the country
would, with the certainty of incalculable daraage, have
been involved for ever in the coraplications of European
politics. And the great credit of Washington's adrain
istration was, that it realized the strength of the coun
try's weakness. To have tried the terapting diploraatic
game of playing off the supposed advantage of alliance
with one party against the other, would have led to com
plete defeat with both. While, by accepting the real
condition of the country as the basis of a frank nego
tiation with both England and France, Gen. Washing
ton was enabled to preserve the nation safe through a
storm which threatened to drag it frora its raoorings,
and sweep it defenceless and adrift upon the terapestu
ous sea of revolutionary politics. But, however ira
pressed with a sense of its own weakness, it was irapos
sible for the adrainisti'ation to keep the country in this
erabarrassing position. It was necessary to raake some
effort to better its relation to one or both of the contend
ing parties. In the country, at this tirae, putting out of
view those who, as is always the case in tiraes of ex
cited pohtical differences, held irapossible and extrerae
opinions, there were two clearly defined parties, each
led by able men, actuated by an earnest, patriotic spirit,
9

98 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
and sustained in its connections by stiong argument.
One party recognized the commercial dependence of the
United States on England, felt an honest sympathy
with the spirit, and great adrairation for the forms, of
the British cpnstitution, were at first disquieted, and
then horrified, at the progress of the French Revolution,
and resented with indignant vehemence the insolent
tone of the French government. They believed that
much of the wrong to which they were subjected could
not, in such stormy times, be hindered ; and that time
and the raanifest interests of the country would open
the eyes of the English statesmen, and graduaUy unite
more closely and affectionately the Araerican and Eng
lish people. They were anxious, therefore, to approach
as near to England as they could, consistently with
what was due to the character of the country ; to avoid
every possible relation with France, other than was ab
solutely necessary to the strictest and narrowest treaty
obligation ; and thus gain tirae to strengthen their own
forces. The other party syrapathized earnestly and naturaUy
with the efforts of the French republic. They regarded
the horrors of the revolution as the terrible but unavoid
able convulsions of a dying despotisra, and pitied and
paUiated what they could not justify. They regarded
the conduct of Great Britain in holding on to the posts,
restricting our West Indian coraraerce, and violating
our neutral privileges, as an insolent manifestation of
superior force, intended to mortify the national pride.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 99
and injure the national interests ; and they would have
rejoiced at any raeans which would possibly have sev
ered the commercial connection between England and
the United States, and transferred those relations to
France. But even this party did not wish war with
England. They would have interpreted the treaty
with France UberaUy, gone to the furthest edge of their
duties as neutrals, while at the same time they replied
to the comraercial restrictions of Great Britain by sirai
lar restiictions on the British tiade with the United
States. At the outset, the adrainistration took a course
between these two parties, but its tendencies were evi
dently towards the former ; and just when the conse
quences of its neutraUty were beginning to be most
erabarrassing, Mr. Jefferson resigned. He could scarcely
have done otherwise ; for aU his syrapathies and convic
tions were with that second party to whora reference
has just been made, and which was fast becoming an
organized opposition party. And iraraediately after his
resignation, the adrainistration resolved upon a proceed
ing, to which, as wUl be deraonstrated, he could never
consistently have consented. This was a soleran and
special raission to Great Britain, in the hope of finally
and proraptly settling the differences between the two
countries. It cannot be denied that this raission was a
step beyond the first position of the governraent, in
which direction the history of its action wiU show. It
raust be borne in raind, that, at the date of this raission,
the position of the United States between England and

100 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
France was not that of a neutial standing in equaUy
araicable relations to two hostile nations, but that of an
independent power, complaining with equal justice of
arbitrary and hostile conduct on the part of two gov
ernments waging internecine war against each other,
and so hampered by treaty obligations and old and
peculiar relations, that a change of relation to either
laid thera open to the reprisals of both. The fact that
the French rainister had been disraissed, that serious
differences existed between the two governraents, and
that, in face of their treaties and past connection, the
United States had proclairaed, and were observing, a
strict neutrality, permitted the English government to
hope a change in the policy of the United States- favor
able to British views ; while the retention of the posts,
the popular irritation arising frora England's comraer
cial UliberaUty, and her violation of the American neu
tral rights, allowed the French government to anticipate
a final rupture, before very long, between England and
the United States, which would further French inter
ests. A deviation, therefore, towards either, was closely
watched by each. But it must be aUowed, that Eng
land seemed rauch the least concerned of the two as to
the course of the United States. Secure in her cora
raercial connection, in possession of the frontier posts,
and wielding an imraense naval power, England looked
rather supercUiously upon the advances, and very indif
ferently upon the complaints, of the American govern
ment. A treaty with England, it was obvious, could

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 101
be negotiated only at great disadvantage ; but it was
unquestionably worth the trial. For one thing was cer
tain, — the United States could not stand stiU, and the
state of pubhc opinion was such, that, unless they could
approach nearer to Great Britain, unless sorae settle
ment of the many points in controversy could be ob
tained, the United States would drift into closer and
dangerous relations to France. And this is the just and
only ground of defence for the mission at that tirae.
The adrainistration beUeved that it could reconcile
sorae of its difficulties with England without compro
mising its neutrality with France ; but that it could not
draw nearer to France without putting itself in hostUe
relation to England, — a position which the interests of
the country imperatively forbade it to occupy. The
mission was therefore resolved on, in face of the violent
denunciation of aU those who sympathized with France,
and with rauch raisgiving on the part of raany, who,
without any undue French syrapathy, felt an honest and
natural indignation against the course of British policy.
The selection of the individual for the raission was not
a happy one. Mr. Jay, who received the appointraent,
was, in point of abUity and character, one of the fore
raost men of his day and generation, and General
Washington could have found for the public service no
purer, truer, nobler citizen. But Mr. Jay was Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States ;
and, however wiUing we raay be to admit, that, in the
infancy of a nation's political Ufe, it is impossible, per-
9*

102 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
haps unnecessary, to separate with stringent exclusive
ness the departraents of public service, yet it was not
seemly to permit the chief of the national judiciary to
be mixed up with questions which excited the most vio
lent party feeling ; nor did it become the head of the
Suprerae Court to raake a treaty, which, as the law of the
land, it was his duty to expound. There was, however,
another and more fatal objection. It wUl be recollected,
that one of the very first acts of General Washington,
after his inauguration, was to send his instructions to
Mr. Morris in reference to the points in controversy
between the two countries ; and that Mr. Jefferson, as
Secretary of State and authorized exponent of the gov
ernment, had, in his correspondence with the British
minister, distinctly stated the position of the United
States. Both General Washington and hiraself had
deraanded the iraraediate delivery of the posts, vindi
cated the good faith of the United States in their
efforts to carry out the treaty of peace, and insisted
upon the return of the negroes carried off, or upon rea
sonable compensation. Now it so happened that JMr.
Jay, during the time he held the office of Secretary of
Foreign Affairs under the Confederation, had gone over
this very ground of the difference between the two
countries, with that fearless candor which was his hon
orable characteristic under all circumstances ; he had
expressed opinions not in consonance with the present
official language of the administration. In reference to
the restoration of the negroes, and more especiaUy in

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 103
regard to such as, confiding in proclaraations and prora
ises of freedora and protection, fled from their masters,
and were received and protected within the British
caraps and lines, he had said : —
" Whenever the conduct of nations or of individuals
becoraes the subject of investigation, truth and candor
should direct the inquiry. The circurastances under
which these last-raentioned negroes were carried away,
raake a strong irapression on the raind of your Secre
tary, and place that transaction before him in a point of
view less unfavorable to Britain than it appears in to
his countrymen at large. He is aware he is about to
say unpopular things ; but higher motives than personal
considerations press him to proceed.
" If a war should take place between France and
Algiers, and, in the course of it, France should invite
the Araerican slaves there to run away frora their raas
ters, and actuaUy receive and protect thera in their
carap, what would Congress, and, indeed, the world,
think and say of France, if, on raaking peace with Al
giers, she should give up those Araerican slaves to their
forraer Algerine masters ? Is there any other difference
between the two cases than this, namely, that the Araer
ican slaves at Algiers are white people, whereas the
African slaves at New York were black people? It
raay be said that these remarks are made out of season ;
for, whether they be weU or ill-founded, the fact is that
Britain expressly agreed to give them up, and therefore
ought to have done it.

104 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" How far an obligation to do wrong raay, consistent
with raorality, be so raodified in the execution as to
avoid doing injury, and yet do essential justice, raerits
consideration. By this agreeraent, Britain bound her
self to do great wrong to these slaves, and yet, by not
executing it, she would do great wrong to their raasters.
This was a painful dileraraa ; for, aw on the one hand
she had invited, terapted, and assisted these slaves to
escape frora their raasters, and, on escaping, had re
ceived and protected them, it would have been crueUy
perfidious to have afterwards delivered them up to their
former bondage, and to the severities to which such
slaves are usually subjected; so, on the other hand,
after contracting to leave these slaves to their masters,
then to refuse to execute that contract, and in the face
of it to carry them away, would have been highly in
consistent with justice and good faith. But one way
appears to your Secretary, in which Britain could extri
cate herself from these embarrassments : that was, to
keep faith with the slaves by carrying them away, and
to do substantial justice to their raasters by paying
them the value of those slaves. In this way, neither
could have just cause to coraplain ; for, although no
price can corapeusate a raan for bondage for life, yet
every raaster raay be corapensated for a runaway
slave." * And, further on in the sarae report, discussing

* Secret Journals of Congress, Foreign Afiairs, Vol. IV. p. "277,
278, 280.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 105
the question as upon whora the responsibility of the
first treaty violation rested, he said : " In whatever light,
therefore, deviations frora the treaty, prior to its final
conclusion and ratification, raay be viewed, it is certain
that deviations on our part preceded any on the part of
Britain, and therefore, instead of being justified by
thera, afford excuse to thera.
"As to the detention of our posts, your Secretary
thinks that Britain was not bound to surrender them
untu we had ratified the treaty. Congress ratified it on
the 14th of January, 1784, and Britain on the 9th of
AprU foUowing. From that time to this, the fourth and
fifth articles of the treaty have been constantly violated
on our part by legislative acts, then and still existing
and operating.
" Under such circurastances, it is not a raatter of sur
prise to your Secretary that the posts are detained ; nor,
in his opinion, would Britain be to blarae in continuing
to hold thera, until Araerica shaU cease to irapede her
?
enjoying every essential right secured to her and her
people and adherents by the treaty." This report was
a public and official document, of which it could not be
supposed that the English government was ignorant.
To send a rainister, holding such opinions, at such a
tirae, was unquestionably to withdraw frora the original
ground which the administration had occupied, and in
direct contradiction to the whole tenor of JMr. Jefferson's
despatches as Secretary of State.

106 dip'lomatic histort.
Mr. Jay arrived in England early in June, 1794.* His
instructions, furnished by Mr. Edmund Randolph, who
had succeeded Mr. Jefferson, covered four points. He
was instructed, —
First, to protest against, and demand compensation
* Mr. Jay's mission was not intended to supersede Mr. Pinckney,
and he was aocordingly instructed to confine himself to the special
objects of his negotiation, and to communicate fully and freely with
that gentleman. Mr. Pinckney could not, however, help feeling that
his own consideration was diminished, and the regular mission very
much sunk in importance by this special appointment. This feeling
he expressed with frankness to the Secretary of State, in announcing
Mr. Jay's arrival in London.
" With respect to this gentleman's mission, as it personally concerns
me, if I were to say I had no unpleasant feelings on the occasion, I
should not be sincere ; but the sincerity with which I make this dec
laration will, I trust, entitle me to credit, when I add that I am con
vinced of the expediency of adopting any honorable measures whieh
may tend to avert the calamities of war, or, by its failure, cement
our union at home ; that I consider Mr. Jay's appointment, from the
solemnity of the mission, supported by his^established reputation,
diplomatic experience, and general talents, as the most probable
method of effecting this purpose ; and that I am sensible of the deli
cacy, respecting myself, with which the measure has been carried
into execution. Under these impressions, it will be scarcely neces
sary for me to say further, that I will cheerfully embrace every op
portunity of promoting the objects of Mr. Jay's mission, and of ren
dering his residence here agreeable." He kept his word ; and in
the political excitement which followed the treaty, gave strono' and
generous testimony to Mr. Jay's services. — T. P. MSS. Letter Book,
Vol. IL p. 120.

diplomatic histort. 107
for, the vexations and spoliations to which the cora
raerce of the United States was subjected.
Second, and " subsequent in order," he was to draw
to a conclusion all points of difference between the
United States and Great Britain, concerning the treaty
of peace. And in reference to this portion of his rais
sion, his instructions contained a clause, singular to
say the least, and certainly iraplying extraordinary con
sideration for the person of the ambassador : " Except
in this negotiation,"' said Mr. Randolph, " you have
been personally conversant with the whole of the trans
actions connected with the treaty of peace. You were
a minister at its formation, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs when the sentiraents of the Congress, under the
Confederation, were announced through your office ;
and, as Chief Justice, you have been witness to what
has passed in our courts, and know the real state of
our laws with regard to British debts. It will be super
fluous, therefore, to add raore to you than to express a
wish that these debts and the interest claimed upon
thera, and aU things relating to thera, may be put aside in
a diplomatic discussion, as being certainly of a judicial
nature, to be decided by our courts ; and if this cannot
be accompUshed, that you support the doctrines of gov
ernment with arguments proper for the occasion, and
with that attention to your former public opinions which
self-respect will justify, without relaxing the pretensions
which have hitherto been maintained."
Thirdly. " In case that the two preceding points

108 diplomatic histort.
should be so accoraraodated as to proraise the continu
ance of tranquiUity between the United States and
Great Britain," it was referred to his discretion to pro
pose a coraraercial treaty between the two countries,
on certain bases included in the instructions. And,
fourthly, " You will have no difficulty in gaining access
to the rainisters of Russia, Denraark, and Sweden, at
the court of London. The principles of the armed
neutrality would abundantly coyer om- neutral rights.
If, therefore, the situation of things with respect to
Great Britain should dictate the necessity of taking the
precaution of foreign cooperation on this head, if no
prospect of accommodation should be thwarted by the
danger of such a raeasure being known to the British
court, and if an entire view of all our political relations
shall, in your judgraent, perrait the step, you will sound
those ministers upon the probability of an aUiance with
their nations to support those principles." And the
instructions concluded with this plenary power : —
" Such are the outUnes of the conduct which the
President wishes you to pursue. He is aware that at
this distance, and during the present instabiUty of pub
lic events, he cannot undertake to prescribe rules which
shaU be irrevocable. You wiU, therefore, consider the
ideas herein expressed as amounting to recoraraendations
only, which, in your discretion, you raay raodify as seeras
raost beneficial to the United States, except in the two
following cases, which are iramutable : 1st. That as the
British ministry wiU doubtless be soUcitous to detach us

diplomatic histort. 109
from France, and may probably raake sorae overture of
this kind, you will inforra thera that the governraent of
the United States will not derogate frora our tieaties
and engagements with France, and that experience has
shown that we can be honest in our duties to the Brit
ish nation without laying ourselves under any particu
lar restraints as to other nations. And, 2d. That no
treaty of comraerce be concluded or signed contrary to
the foregoing prohibition."
After a few inforraal conversations with Lord Gren
viUe, the negotiation proceeded rapidly to its conclu
sion ; and before the opinion of the United States gov
ernraent on its details could reach their rainister, the
tieaty was signed. It was evident, very early in the
progress of the discussion, that raost of the positions
taken by the United States would have to be aban
doned ; and sorae of thera the Araerican negotiator was
only too ready to abandon. Thus, in his letter to Mr.
Randolph, of the 13th of Septeraber, 1794, Mr. Jay
said : " A number of informal conversations on other
points then took place, and every difficulty which
attended thera carae into view, and was discussed with
great fairness and temper; the inquiry naturally led to
the fact which constituted the first violation of the
treaty of peace? The carrying away of the negroes
contrary to the 7th article of the treaty of peace was
insisted upon as the first aggression. To this it was
answered, in substance, that Great Britain understood
10

110 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the stipulation contained in that article in the obvious
sense of the words which expressed it ; naraely, as an
engageraent not to cause any destruction nor to carry
away any negroes or other property of the Araerican
inhabitants; or, in other words, that the evacuation
should be raade without depredation ; that no alteration
in the actual state of property was operated or intended
by that article ; that every slave, Uke every horse which
escaped or estrayed from within the Araerican Unes and
carae into the possession of the British army, became,
by the laws and rights of war, British property, and
therefore ceasing to be American property, the exporta
tion thereof was not inhibited by the stipulation in
question ; that to extend it to the negroes, who, under
the faith of proclamations, had corae into thera, and to
whora, according to proraise, hberty had been given,
was to give to the article a greater latitude than the
terras of it would warrant, and was also, unnecessarily,
to give it a construction, which, being odious, could not
be supported by the known and established rules for
construing treaties. To this was rephed the several
reraarks and considerations which are raentioned in a
report which I once raade to Congress on this subject,
and which, for that reason, it would be useless here to
repeat; on this point we could not agree. . . . Here,
again, the affair of the negroes eraerged, and was in
sisted upon, and was answered as before. I confess,
however, that this construction of that article has raade

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. Ill
an irapression upon ray raind, and induced rae to sus
pect that my former opinions on that head raay not be
weU founded." * That Mr. Jay should have been ira
pressed by the transparent sophistry of this reasoning,
can only be accounted for by the fact of his syrapathy
with its conclusion, as manifested in the opinions of his
report, when Secretary for Foreign Affairs. This con
struction of the treaty was thoroughly refuted by JMr.
Randolph, in his reply of the 15th of Deceraber, 1794.
" But reaUy, sir, the force of Lord GrenvUle's reason
ings appears to faU very far short of its objects.
" That a property is acquired in movables as soon- as
they come within the power of the enemy, is acknowl
edged. But it -will not be denied that rights, even in
movables, acquired by war, may, by the treaty of
peace, be renounced. In this instance, there was great
reason for such a renunciation. Negroes were not, hke
raovables in general, difficult to be distinguished. They
carried an infallible raark. British debts were stipu
lated to be paid, and the States in which the raass of
them lay, depended for their payment principaUy on the
* American State Papers, Foreign AflTairs, Vol. I. p. 485, 486. The
opinion to which Mr. Jay refers, is that expressed in his report as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, under the Confederation, and a portion
of which has been quoted above. " But however capable of pallia
tion the conduct of Britain respecting these negroes may be, it un
questionably was an infraction of the seventh article." — Secret
Journal, Vol. IV. p. 279. That Mr. Jay found it easy to change his
opinion will surprise no one who reads the report.

112 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
culture of their soU, and for the culture of their soU, on
this species of labor; As property, the British govern-.
raent could not have been tenacious of negroes ; and it
raay therefore be supposed, that, ih this view, they were
so indifferent as to be the raore easUy given up.
" If the stipulation as to the negroes did not raean an
alteration in the actual state of property, and iraported
only an engagement not to cause any destruction, or
carry away any negroes or other American property,
why was it made ? The cessation of war impUed the
cessation of further depredation ; the renewal of depre-
daJ;ion would have been the renewal of war. The
words of treaties, if they can be construed in an oper
ative sense, ought not to be turned to signify raerely
what would have existed without thera. It was a
thing of course that orders should be given by the Brit
ish governraent against plundering on the evacuation ;
or, if they should not be given by the governraent, it
becarae incurabent upon the coraraander, in behalf of
the_ British array in Araerica, to issue thera under his
own authority. The essence of Lord GrenviUe's argu
raent seems to consist in a refineraent of interpretation
which he gives to the words ' other property of the
Araerican inhabitants,' as if they confined the word
' negroes ' to those negroes who should thereafter be
captured frora the Araericans by the British arms, and
included such as were then denominated, by the rights
of war, British property. The use ofthe term 'negroes'
by itself, proves that the inquiry was simply to be,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 113
whether the persons who were not to be carried away
carae within the description of negroes, generaUy ; and
it is as fair to conclude fi-ora the words ' other property
of the Araerican inhabitants,' that the opinion of the
negotiators was, that negroes within the British power
were raade thereby Araerican property, as the reverse.
The fact too is, that the original proprietors of the ne
groes never lost entirely the hope of recovering thera,
stiU called them theirs, would have reclaimed them upon
the principles of postliminy, if they had been retaken
by the army of Araerica or its aUy, and thus even the
plenipotentiaries theraselves raight, without any irapro
priety, have taUsed of the negroes in British possession
as the negroes of Araerican inhabitants. These ideas
are supported by other parts of the seventh article.
Why is the ' carrying away ' only raentioned, if ne
groes which raight be thereafter seized were chiefly
conteraplated ? Is it not reasonable to believe, that,
with this irapression, it would have been said that ne
groes shaU not be captured and carried away? If a
critical exposition raust be resorted to, ' carrying away '
iraplies that the thing to be carried is aheady in posses
sion. Another part of the stipulation is, that the Amer
ican artUlery that may be in the fortifications shaU be
left therein. That is, not artillery made in America, but
artUlery the property of America, or, in other words, of
the United States. Now this artUlery was surely the
property of the British at the moraent of capture, and
10*

114 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
yet no pretence, as far as I can learn, was hatched up
to carry away our cannon.
" For the interpretation of treaties, as weU as in raoral
reasoning, general rules are prescribed; but your own
experience raust have satisfied you that these rules can
seldora be appUed with matheraatical precision. We
have an exaraple of this in Lord GrenviUe sheltering
hiraself frora the true construction of the article of the
treaty, by branding it with the epithet ' odious.' What
is raore custoraary than for nations to suiTender rights ?
What more comraon than for thera to surrender, on a
peace, rights a,cquired purely and solely through a war ?
The construction is not odious because the British gov
ernment hate slavery. No, sir ; they estabUshed it in
the United States while colonies ; they continued the
iraportation of slaves against the wiU of raost of the
States; it exists, by their authority, in many of thek
foreign dorainions. The odiura, then, of the business
raust be in depriving the slaves of the Uberty granted to
thera ; that is, in fact, giving and then taking away.
In answer to this, I observe, that the construction is not
so doubtful as to let in any reraarks upon odium, for
vague ideas of this Idnd are inadraissible, except in
truly doubtful cases. There raight, perhaps, have been
sorae countenance to this plea, if we should insist that
slaves originaUy belonging to the British, and afterwards
manumitted by them, were now deraanded by us to
return to their former condition. But those in question

DIPLOMATIC PISTORT. 115
belonged to our citizens ; — the war only presented the
chance of liberation. They were covered, in their flight
fi:ora their raasters, by the operation of war. They must
have been conscious (and such is the law of nations)
that if they had been regained by their forraer propri
etors in the course of the "war, they would have reverted
to the condition of slaves, and that what the war gave,
might, by a peace, be taken away.
" You must be too sensible of the anxiety of many
parts of the United States upon this subject, to pass it
over unnoticed. Permit me, therefore, to beg your at
tention to the foregoing ideas, since I have it gi-eatly at
heart that your negotiation may not be incumbered by
any objection which may be anticipated." *
This letter, unfortunately, did not reach London until
some time after the treaty had been concluded ; for,
with such disposition on the part of the American nego
tiator, discussion was rapidly exhausted, and, on the
19th of November, 1794, a tieaty was signed by Mr.
Jay and Lord GrenviUe. The consideration of the
treaty may be divided under four heads : 1. The ques
tions arising under the treaty of peace of 1783; 2. The
questions of neutral rights springing out of the iraraedi
ate circurastances of the day ; 3. The coramercial ques
tions ; and 4. Such miscellaneous provisions as the gen
eral interests of the countries required.
1. The questions under the old tieaty were those per-
* Am. State Papers, For. Aflf., Vol. L p. 510.

116 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
taining to the delivery of the posts, the abstraction of
the negroes, the coUection of the British debts, and the
north-eastern boundary line. As to the first, it was
agreed, by article 2, that the posts should be evacuated
by the 1st of June, 1796, about two years more being
thus allowed the British governraent to withdraw its
troops. As to the negroes, the subject was dropped,
and no raention, either of restoration or corapensation,
was raade in the treaty. As to the debts, by article 6,
a joint coraraission was appointed to decide upon all
cases where it was alleged that lawful irapediraents had
been placed in the way of their collection, and the
United States undertook the payraent of all clairas
awarded by the board. The settleraent of the north
eastern boundary line was also referred to a joint cora
raission. 2. The second class of cases included the difficulties
arising frora the right of irapressment clairaed by Great
Britain, accompanied by the exercise of the right of
search ; from the violation of the clear neutral rights of
the United States ; and frora the orders in council, by
which grain, on its way to France, was treated as con
traband. Of these, the question of irapressraent was
abandoned, as impossible of settleraent, between the
two countries. A coraraission was appointed by article
7 sirailar to that provided for the adjustraent of the
British debts, which was to decide upon aU clairas for
violation of neutral rights. And as it was found ira
possible to reconcile the opinions of the negotiators on

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 117
the question of raaking provisions contiaband, it was
agreed, in article 18, which was almost a transcript of
the obnoxious order, that, "whereas the difficulty of
agreeing on the precise cases in which, alone, provisions
and other articles not generally contraband raay be re
garded as such, renders it expedient to provide against
the inconveniences and raisupderstandings which raight
thence arise," such articles should not be confiscated,
but the owner should be by the captors speedily and
corapletely inderanified, " and the captors or, in their
default, the government under whose authority they act,
shall pay, to the masters or owners of such vessels, the
full value of such articles, with a reasonable profit
thereon, together with freight, and also the daraage
incident to such detention."
3. As to the comraercial interests of "the country, it
was provided by the llth, 12th, 13th, and 14th articles,
that there- should be a reciprocal and perfect liberty of
navigation between all the dorainions of Great Britain
in Europe and the territories of the United States ; that
the citizens of the United States may freely carry on a
trade between the British territories in the East Indies
and the United States, in all articles, the importation
and exportation of which should not be entirely forbid
den. And that, as regarded the British West Indian
possessions, the United States should be permitted to
carry and bring away, in their own vessels, all articles of
comraerce, the produce of the two countries, which
could bp carried or brought in British vessels : Provided

118 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the vessels of the United States were not above seventy
tons burden, and that the cargoes should be landed in
the United States only ; it being also agreed, that, dur
ing the continuance of the article in relation to the
West Indian trade, the United States should prohibit
and restrain the carrying any molasses, sugar, coffee, or
cotton, in Americam, vessels, either from his Majesty^
islands, or from the United States, to any part of the
world except the United States.
The other articles related to the Indian trade on the
borders, defined contraband according to the stiictness
of English pretension, established the right of sending
consuls, and contained the. usual stipulations as to pri
vateers and the right of bringing prizes into port, that
generally belong to friendly relations, stipulating, how
ever, that nothing in the treaty should operate or be
construed contrary to forraer and existing ti-eaties with
other sovereigns or States.
When the treaty was received in the United States,
it becarae the subject of long discussion in the cabinet,
and the raost violent agitation in public. The question
of its ratification becarae complicated with the re-issue
of the obnoxious orders of 1793, and by the unwilling
ness of the government to accept the 12th article, in
relation to the West India trade. But, after much de
liberation, the Senate advised the President to ratify the
treaty, subject to the suspension of the West Indian
provisos by a supplementary article. Accordingly, as
Mr. Jay had returned home, and Mr. Pinckney was

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 119
absent in Madrid on a special raission, the ratifications
were exchanged, on the 28th of October, 1795, between
Lord GrenviUe and WiUiara AUen Deas, Esq., the Sec
retary of the United States Legation, the British gov
ernraent raaking no objection to the suspension of the
12th article.* No act in our political history has, either
* Mr. Lyman, in his " Diplomacy of the United States," Vol. I. p.
204, says, referring to the ratification of this treaty, " This act was
performed by Mr. J. Q. Adams, minister resident at the Hague, de
spatched for that purpose to London, Mr. Pinckney being then in
Madrid." It is not a matter of much importance ; but as the volume
of treaties, published by the United States in their Statutes at Large,
does not contain the ratification, it may be as well to quote the au
thority for my statement. In the third volume of Mr. Pinckney's
Letter Book, containing the correspondence between Mr. Deas, act
ing as Chargd d' Affaires, and the Secretary of State, and also be
tween himself and Mr. Pinckney, will be found his letters, giving an
account of the ratification. Under date of 23d of October, 1795, he
writes to the Secretary of State : " Mr. Adams not having arrived in
London by the 20th fhstant, I opened, agreeably to your direction,
the despatches addressed to him, and on the same day acquainted
Lord Grenville, the minister ofthe foreign department, by note, that
I was authorized to exchange the ratifications, and transact what
remained to be accomplished respecting it, and requested a confer
ence on the subject He appointed this morning, when I waited
upon him. Upon stating that I was possessed of the President's rat
ification of the treaty, conformably to the advice of the Senate, and
oflTering to exchange the same for an equivalent ratification on the
part of this government, his Lordship observed, unofficially, that he
had no reason to think such an exchange would not take place, but
that it would be necessary to lay the business before the King for his
determination. He requested a copy of the President's ratification.

120 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
in its inception or execution, provoked a more violent oi'
prejudiced popular excitement, or a warmer discussion -
in Congress. At public meetings throughout the coun
ti-y, and in private" correspondence, in volurainous essays
and sharp paraphlets, the controversy raged, deaUng in -
extravagant denunciation or labored panegyric. In the
national legislature, it provoked the discussion of the
gravest constitutional issues, and, in some sections of
the country, excited the most discreditable riots. With
the details of this great party contest, these pages have
which I have since sent him, and appointed Wednesday next, the
28th, to conclude the business. . . .
" The letter of credence was absolutely necessary ; for, upon open
ing my business. Lord Gren"ville remarked, that, it being unusual for
the ratifications of a treaty to be exchanged by any other than the
persons who negotiated it, it was necessary that he should see my
powers. I handed to him a copy of your letter of 25th August, which,
after perusing, he observed was rather informal, and begged to know
if I was furnished with any other papers. I then produced the letter
of credence, with which he expressed himself perfectly satisfied."
— pp. 262-265.
On the 30th of October, writing to Mr. Pinckney, he says, " The
ratifications of the treaty were exchanged, on the 28th, without any
objections to the additional article, which is inserted immediately
after Mr. Jefferson's letter, and is in the words following.'' — p. 275.
Writing to the same, on the 13th of November, 1795, he says: "Mr.
Adams arrived from Holland the day before yesterday. As the rati
fications of the treaty had taken place, he of course waits until in
structions arrive relative to further negotiations, before he takes any
steps." — p. 304. Mr. Pinckney returned from Spain before the arrival
of any such instructions, and of course resumed his place as minister.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 121
properly no concern ; and the lapse of more than half a
century of national life, equivalent in its events and
wonderful developraents to centuries of older and
slower years, has carried us far beyond an active syra
pathy with the partisan struggles of that day. This
faraous treaty has become part of our ancient history ;
and we ought to be able to do impartial justice to the
exaggerations of honest patriotisra in either party, to
neutrahze disterapered invective by extravagant eulogi
ura, and to pronounce calmly upon the character of this
important transaction ; for, as in aU such cases, " the
debatable land " of party poUtics has long since passed
under the " erainent doraain " of history.*
* On the 7th of March, 1796, after the ratification of the treaty
with Great Britain, and before the motion was made in the House of
Representatives for the appropriation necessary to its execution, Mr.
Livingston, of New York, made in the House the following motion :
" Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested
to lay before this House a copy of the instructions to the Minister
of the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the King of
Great Britain, communicated by his message of the first of March,
with the correspondence and other documents relative to the said
treaty." Upon this resolution ensued one of the most interesting and im
portant debates in our political annals. After a long discussion, in
which the leaders of the House on both sides participated, the resolu
tion was adopted by a vote of 62 to 37. " Thus," says Mr. Benton,
in whose valuable abridgment of Congressional Debates this debate
will be found, " the House, by a majority of 25, passed the call upon
the President for the papers, and upon the declared ground of a
11

122 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
As a mere trial of diplomatic skiU, this tieaty is a
confessed failure; for, with a soUtary exception, the
right to judge the treaty, as it contained a regulation of commerce,
and also required an appropriation of money. President Washing
ton received the call in the sense in which it was made ; and although
he had no objection to furnishing the papers, and had laid them be
fore the Senate, (whence they became pubhc,) yet he deemed it his
duty to resist the claim of right asserted by the House, and therefore
to refuse the papers, which he did in a closely reasoned message, an
epitome of the arguments used in the House on that side." The
House, in reply, by a vote of 57 to 35, then passed the following
resolutions : —
" Resolved, That it being declared by the second section of the
second article of the Constitution, ' that the President shall have
power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties, pro
vided two thirds of the Senate present concur,' the House of Rep
resentatives do not claim any agency in making treaties ; but that,
when a treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted
by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend for its
execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by
Congress, and it is the constitutional right and duty of the House of
Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or
inexpediency of carrying such treaty into effect, and to determine
and act thereon as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the
public good.
" Resolved, That it is not necessary to the propriety of any appli
cation from this House to the executive, for information desired by
them, and which may relate to any constitutional functions of the
House, that the purpose for wluch such information may be wanted,
or to which the same may be apphed, should be stated in the appli
cation." The House of Representatives and the President were thus

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 123
tardy evacuation of the posts, its ratification abandoned
every position which the government had assuraed in
the prelirainary discussions, and its formal diplomatic
instiuctions. The condition of the country was too
weak to insist upon an equality of exchanges ; and Mr.
directiy at issue ; but upon the final vote to make the necessary
appropriation to carry the treaty into effect, after a protracted dis
cussion, the resolution to carry the treaty into effect was adopted by
a vote of 57 to 48.
" This vote ofthe House," says Mr. Benton, " to carry the treat)'
into effect, was no abandonment of the right it had asserted to judge
its merits, and to gi-ant or withhold the appropriation according to
its discretion."
This may be so. And it is possible to suppose extreme cases,
where a treaty may be so injurious that the patriotism of a House
would be sorely tried in executing its provisions. But the vote of
the House does not agree with what, I think, may now be fairly con
sidered the authoritative exposition of the Constitution. See Story
and Kent.
Where the Senate has acted with the President, within the hmits
of theil- constitutional prerogative, their action is final and binding.
To give the House any power of revision or check can only spring
from confounding the ideas oipotcer and right. That the House can,
without violating any express clause of the Constitution, refuse an
appropriation, is clear ; but that is far from proving the moral right of
such refusal. It is impossible to create a government with any free
dom of action at all, without affording an opportunity for the abuse
of that power ; and a capacity to do wrong does not surely imply a
right to do so. And, however plausible certain extreme cases may be
made to appear, it is certain, that, to adopt this theory would be to
introduce inconsistency in the principles, and confusion in the prac
tice, of the government.

124 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Jay had little else to do than to accept or reject what
the British government chose to offer. Nor, in the
details of the tieaty, considered as a regulation of our
interests and a settlement of our difficulties, is there any
thing to excite our pride. The posts were deUvered up
only after an additional and unnecessary delay ; — the
question of the negroes, which involved a principle of
the deepest iraport to one half the country, was aban
doned; — irapressraent was not prevented; — the injuri
ous and presuraptuous interpolation into the law of
nations, contained in the British orders of 1793, was
acquiesced in ; — and the only concession offered to the
commerce of the country was so small, and its accom
panying conditions were so distasteful and injurious,
that, after raature deliberation, the United States re
fused to accept it.
But true as is aU this, and paradoxical as it raay seera,
it is equaUy true that the ratification of the treaty of
1794 was an immense benefit to the country. The con
dition of things was such, that some arrangeraent of
the open questions between Great Britain and the
United States, or war, was the impending alternative.
For the poUcy of which Mr. Jefferson was the represent
ative, and which he had the opportunity of carrying out
a few years after, was impracticable. That policy con
sisted in preserving neutraUty between the contending
parties, according to the strict letter of existing treaties ;
but to infuse a warmer and friendlier teraper into the
relations with France on the one hand, and at the same

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 125
time to oppose the commercial UliberaUty of Great
Britain by a system of reciprocal domestic restriction
at home. A little examination wiU show, that this pol
icy would have effectually injured our own comraerce,
excited strong sectional irritation, checked very consid
erably the spirit of commercial and maritime enterprise,
which, in spite of aU difficulties, was rapidly developing
itself, and failed entirely to remove any one of the causes
of iU feeUng between the two nations. Gen. Washing
ton thought differently. The tone of France was be
coming every day more insolent, and her deraands raore
exacting, while the progress of the Revolution was
dirainishing constantly the real raaterial interests which
connected her with the United States. But it was im
possible to reply to France with becoming temper, while
the presence of British troops on the soil of the United
States, and the unscrupulous disregard of neutial rights
by England, kept alive and stiengthened the bitter
popular aniraosity, which the events of the revolu
tionary Y^ar had excited. Some arrangeraent with
England was therefore indispensable ; such an arrange
raent as he desired 'he could not obtain, and he there
fore wisely deterojined to take what he could get. In
the first -place, the negotiation of any treaty was a
point gained. For in this, as in every difficulty be
tween England and the United States, grave as were
the issues, they were coraplicated by a conviction on
the mind of the American people, of a supercilious in
difference on the part of England as to their feelings,
11*

126 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
accorapanied by a shrewd and active desire to injure
their interests. The fact that questions of prirae im
portance to them had been wilfully left open by Great
Britain, that remonstrance after remonstiance had been
neglected, that discussion was provoldngly delayed, and
that the reciprocity of diplomatic representation had
been slowly conceded and barely sustained, were sources
of perpetual coraplaint. A treaty put an end to this
vague but powerful dissatisfaction. The discussion of
differences iraplied a certain respect and consideration
for the parties with whora they were conducted ; and
although there raight be stiong, perhaps insuperable,
difficulties, a frank commencement of explanation was
a great step to satisfactory settlement. Then the evac
uation of the posts reraoved one great offence ; the as
sumption of the British debts by the United States, sub
ject to the decision of a joint coraraission, however
doubtful in principle, put an end to a claraor on the part
of a large and influential class in England, which was
always provoking angry retorts frora the United States,
and thus keeping up the bad blood between the two
countries ; and the appointment of another commission
to decide upon the alleged violation of neutral rights
might fairly be represented as an approach towards
justice. Unpopular, too, as the treaty raight be, it had
this great advantage. As long as the popular feeling
was excited against Great Britain as the direct cause of
aU these evils, its expression tended to the encourage-
raent of actual hostiUties ; and in connection with the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 127
syrapathy for France, growing stronger every day, could
not have been long repressed. But as soon as the
treaty — an act of the United States government —
was interposed between England and the popular feel
ing, the excitement, though concentrated in its current,
was diverted in its channel ; and the same popular in
dignation, which, directed against England, was almost
too strong for control, when directed against the treaty,
encountered an opposition equaUy national in its char
acter and patriotic in its motive. And thus questions,
which at one time threatened to involve the country in
foreign war, passed passionately, but harmlessly, into
the safer arena of domestic politics. For it raust be
recoUected, that the basis upon, which the justification
of this tieaty rests is, that it was the alternative of
war, — a war in which the United States could, accord
ing to the confession of a conteraporary statesraan, have
barely raaintained their existence and their honor ; and
that, by accepting this treaty, while they avoided war
¦with England, they so strengthened their position that
they were enabled to avoid a war with France, and so
preserved the opportunity for that developraent which
enabled thera, in future years, to deal with both powers
on the footing of the raost perfect equality. The great
merit, therefore, of Gen. Washington's administration
is, that it was wise enough to recognize, and firm
enough to accept, a great national necessity. And this
is no slight praise. It is an easy and pleasant thing
for a statesraan to become the instruraent of national

128 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
strength, the mouth-piece of national pride ; but only
to a few chief spnits of history is it given to create
strength from their weakness, and to develop a noble
pride frora a wise humility. This high privUege was,
however, gi-anted to Washington and the great raen
who supported him in that momentous stiuggle. They
were forced to stand with folded arras in the presence
of wrongs which they resented ; to check national syra
pathies which they shared ; to confess national weakness
whicli . they deplored. But they looked beyond the
wounded pride of the present moment to the sober cer
tainty of a future recompense. They had faith enough
in their work to trust the future to posterity, and suffi
ciently and successfuUy has that posterity vindicated
their pohcy.
This view of the treaty, while it authorizes the pro-.
foundest admiration for those who negotiated and main
tained it, allows us at the same time to comprehend
thoroughly, and appreciate fairly, the earnest patriotisra
of that great party which opposed it. It is easy to un
derstand how repugnant to raany sincere convictions,
how odious to many honest iwejudices, how injurious
to many important interests, this treaty must have -ap
peared ; and v/e may vvell be grateful that the elements
of poUtical stiife were so tempered that rautual con
cession and ojiposition worked together upon the popu
lar mind, and tlie very progTess of the adojjtion of an
unsatisfactory and unpopular treaty tended to that
unitv and energy of national sentiment, which was sure,
in tirae, to render all such treaties unnecessary.

CHAPTER III.
NEGOTIATIONS AND CONVENTION WITH FKANCE.
When Mr. Jefferson was appointed Secretary of
State, it became necessary to nominate a successor for
the French mission ; and certainly, a more perfect con-
tiast to Mr. Jefferson than that successor it would
have been irapossible to find. Gouverneur Morris
sprang frora a faraily which had for generations pos
sessed large wealth and wielded great political influ
ence in New York. His grandfather had been Gov
ernor of New Jersey, and Chief Justice of New York.
His father had held high judicial office in New York,
with jurisdiction extending into the neighboring colo
nies. His uncle had held both judicial and executive
office of the highest rank in New Jersey and Pennsyl
vania. Of his three brothers, one was a signer of the
Declaration of Independence, another was Chief Jus
tice of New York, and the third had been for sorae
years an officer in the British array, and a raeraber of
Parliaraent. Mr. Morris hiraself had taken, an active
part in the politics of the United States. He was a
member of the Continental Congress, assistant finan-

130 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
cier to his eminent kinsman, Robert Morris, who was
the financial genius of the Revolution, and a member
of the convention which framed the Constitution., He
was one of Washington's most intimate friends, and
had been intrusted by him with the inforraal negotia
tions with England, the history of which has already
been narrated. .He was an accorapUshed scholar, a
thinker of some depth and gireat quickness, and as an
orator he had distinguished himself both in the Con
gress and in the convention, where his raanner was
erainently graceful, and his style both pointed and
fluent, in spite of an accident by which he had lost
a leg, he was a man of elegant address and courtly
manners, fond of the pleasant courtesies of society, and
an expert in that delicate social science which adds a
charm to the warrath of hospitality by the refineraent
of its display. In more regular times, his presence in
Paris would have been agreeable to the court of France,
and serviceable to his own governraent. As it was,
never was an ambassador raore raiserably raisplaced.
He received his appointment — an appointment very
reluctantly confirmed by the Senate — in 1792, in
Paris, where he had been residing, Avith short absences,
since 1789. In coraraunicating the appointment. Gen
eral Washington addressed him specially and privately,
and stated the ol^jections which had been made to his
nomination. " It was urged," said he, "that in France
you were considered as a favorer of the aristocracy, and
unfriendly to its Revolution (I suppose they meant the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 131
constitution) ; that under this impression, you could not
be an acceptable character, and, of consequence, you
would not be able, however wiUing, to promote the
interest of this country in an esaential degTee." Wbeth
er, at this time, anybody could have served the coun
try " in an essential degree," may well be doubted ; but
if there was one man who raust have been peculiarly
unacceptable to every adrainistration with which he had
to deal, from Duraourier, who was Minister of Foreign
Affairs when he was presented, to the bloodthirsty ruf
fians who were in power when he was recalled, Mr.
Morris was that raan. During the two or three years
previous to his appointraent, in which he had resided
in Paris, he had identified himself, as corapletely as it
was possible for a stranger, with the King's friends.
He expressed openly his conviction that the new consti
tution was a failure ; and, through those connected
with the court, had submitted to his Majesty the draft
of an address to be made when accepting the constitu
tion. The address coraraences thus : —
" Gentlemen : It is no longer your King who ad
dresses you. Louis XVI. is only a private individual.
You have just offered him the crown, and inforraed him
on what conditions he must accept it. I assure you,
gentlemen, that if I were a stranger in France, I would
not raount the slippery steps of the throne." It con
cludes : " I have been a Idng. Nothing reraains for rae
now either of authority or of influence. Yet I have a
last duty to fulfil. It is that of iraparting to you ray

132 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
reflections on your work. I pray you to hear them
with serious attention." And then follows a very long,
but not very profound poUtical essay, on the faults of
the constitution which he had just accepted. Accom
panying this strange paper was a stUl stranger meraoir,
given to Mons. Montmorin on the 31st of August,
1791. It appears not to have reached the King until
after his acceptance of the constitution, and was re
turned to Mi. Morris, with a request for a tianslation.
It would be useless to review this document, but one
paragraph deserves notice. Speaking of the King in
the third person, Mr. Morris says : " But it is important
for him to show that he has acted consistently. And
yet this should be accomplished in such a raanner as to
produce the effect, without appearing to intend it ; be
cause such appearance would place hira in the situation
of one who defends himself before his judges ; and a
king should never forget that he is accountable only to
God." That Mr. Morris was entitled to hold his own opin
ions, and, so long as he was a private person, to advise
any poUcy to which his Majesty thought fit to listen,
and to act with any party who had his syrapathies, and
whose confidence he had, nobody will dispute. But it
is equally as indisputable, that any one holding such
opinions, and so connected, could be of no possible ser
vice either to France or the United States, in a diplo
matic capacity, at that time. But Mr. Morris's inter
ference did not end when his public character began.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 133
As rainister of the United States, he contrived, and
very nearly accorapUshed, the escape of Louis XVI.
frora Paris. He becarae that raonarch's agent, by re
ceiving and disbursing a large amount of raoney ; and
the unexpended balance of that fund he preserved and
accounted for, after the terraination of his raission.
While it is irapossible to attach any moral blame to
this conduct, whUe it is irapossible not to syrapathize
with Mr. Morris's righteous indignation at the horrors
with which he was surrounded, while every instinct of
coraraon humanity would rejoice at the success of his
earnest endeavor, it is impossible to justify his conduct
as the diploraatic representative of the United States.
The rainister of any other power occupied a different
position. The representatives of the kindred Bourbon
dynasties, the ambassadors of allied raonarchs, would
have been justified in regarding Louis as France. Not
so with the rainister of the United States. They had
received from Louis himself notice of his acceptance
of the new constitution, and they had expressed their
joy at the prospect of a freer life to the French nation.
Any difference between the French raonarch and the
Assembly was a subject purely doraestic, and their rain
ister could not interfere with decency. If, after that
constitution had gone into operation, such disorganiza
tion was the result as dissolved all authority, the course
of Mr. Mon-is was clear ; either to diserabarrass hiraself
proraptly of his diploraatic character, or inform his gov
ernment of the state of things, and wait their decision.
12

134 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
His action, such as it was, was injudicious, inconsist
ent, and not mischievous only because it was useless.*
As may be supposed, his residence in Paris was far
from agreeable. The raajesty" which he reverenced and
would have served was hurailiated, persecuted, mur
dered. The graceful and generous society which he
loved was scattered by death, and into exUe. The gov
ernment to which he was accredited was adrainistered
by fierce fanatics or rude and ribald ruffians. His
house was thronged with pale and trerabling fugitives,
whose prosperity he had shared, and whose weakness
he protected with a courage worthy of his character and
his country. His differences with the governraent be
carae every day more serious, and his personal annoy
ances more irritating. Alraost his only diploraatic
duties were to protest, and to protest vainly, against
French decrees which violated neutral rights, and the
lawless depredation of French privateers. His diplo
matic coUeagues, one after another, had withdrawn
frora the disraal and bloody city ; and he, finaUy, with-
* While commenting thus freely upon the conduct of Mr. Morris
in permitting his honorable and natural sympathies to govern his
public course, it is but fair to add the following extract from a letter
of the Duke of Dorset, the Enghsh ambassador at Paris. Writing
to Mr. Pitt, July 9, 1789, he said: "Mr. Jefferson, the American
minister at this court, has been a great deal consulted by the prin
cipal leaders of the tiers etat ; and I have great reason to think it
was owing to his advice that order called itself L' AssembUe. Na
tionale." — Tomline's Life of Pitt, Vol. II. p. 266.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 135
out abandoning his diplomatic character, removed to
Sainport, about thiity mUes frora Paris, where he pur
chased a country residence, and remained until his
recaU. WhUe the presence of Mr. Morris in Paris was far
from beneficiEd to the relations of the two countries,
the extiaordinary conduct of the French minister at
PhUadelphia was forcing the governments to an ira
raediate issue. M. Genet had been sent from Paris in
1793, just after the declaration of war against England.
When he left France, the feeble virtues of the Giron
dists were fast yielding before the unscrupulous energy
of their opponents, and, as a party, they were sinking
from power to persecution ; while the Jacobin party,
under the lead of Robespierre, was gathering to itself
those eleraents of fierce and relentless strength with
which, soon after, it terrified and trampled over the
allied monarchies of Europe. M. Genet did not share
the ferocious fanaticism of the Jacobins ; but the smell
of blood was on his ambassadorial garments. As the
representative of the Convention, he spoke from the
scaffold of Louis, the true and tried friend of the peo
ple araong whom he had come. His conduct could not
be discreet nor his language moderate, as, unfortunately
for himself, whatever may been his private virtues, he
was the mouth-piece of a usurped and selfish despot
isra. Scarcely had he landed, therefore, before he ex
hibited in his words and deeds that reckless insolence
which is the constant accorapaniment of a false and

136 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
forced authority. He had come to the country to use
it, — as a coraraissioner of the Convention, to draft its
raen, convert its raoney, and constrain its laws, in sub
servience to the pohcy of France. He began where he
landed ; and, frora Charleston to New York, be organ
ized public opinion, enlisted raen, equipped vessels, and
coraraissioned privateers. In vain the government re
raonstrated with him, warned hira, checked hira. Every
reraonstrance provoked a raore extiavagant reply ; every
warning was foUowed by a renewed violation of law
and courtesy; and, finally, when a positive prohibition
stopped hira in his violent career, he denounced the
conduct of the governraent in language unparaUeled in
the diploraatic intercourse of the world. " In vain,"
was his insulting reply, " in vain the desire to preserve
peace leads you to sacrifice the interests of France to
this interest of the raoraent ; in vain the thirst for riches
preponderates against honor, in the poUtical balance of
Araerica; all this raanageraent, all these condescen
sions, aU this hurailiation, end in nothing. Our enemies
laugh at it ; and the French, too confident, are punished
for having beUeved that the American nation had a
flag ; that it had sorae respect for its laws, sorae convic
tion of its force, and that it had sorae sentiment of its
dignity. ... If our fellow-citizens have been deceived,
if you are not in a condition to maintain the sover
eignty of your people, speak. We have guaranteed it
when slaves : we know how to render it respectable hav
ing become free." This language forced the govern-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 137
raent to deraand his iraraediate recaU. The French
government compUed with the demand, but it accora
panied its acquiescence with a desire that Mr. Morris
should be lUcewise recalled frora Paris, a request which
was iraraediately granted. But the personal career of
these two rainisters, useless in one case, and raischiev
ous in the other, was only an incident araong greater
events, and a syraptora of the working of those princi
ples which shaped the policy of the country, and to the
course of which, diserabarrassed of their personal con
nection, attention raust now be directed.
However public sentiraent raay have been affected
towards the events and principles of the French Rev
olution, the declaration of war by the new republic
against England, in February, 1793, made the relation
of the United States to France a question of practical
poUtics. For, by the tieaty and convention negotiated
with the old French monarchy, the United States had
bound theraselves to perform certain duties, and had
assumed certain responsibihties. By the treaty of aUi
ance, they had guaranteed the French possessions in
Araerica, had pledged theraselves to put France cora-
merciaUy on the footing of the raost favored nation, had
undertaken a systera of rautual convoy and protection,
had entered into a special agreeraent as to contiaband,
had assured to France the right of bringing into Araeri
can ports all prizes without restraint or question, had
excluded aU prizes of her eneraies frora the sarae privi
lege, and, by the consular convention, had perraitted
12 *

138 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the organization of a consular jurisdiction, which raight
easily,- if not legitimately, be expanded into an exclusive
authority on the most important and deUcate neutial
questions. The declaration of war suraraoned the
United States distinctly to the discharge of these obU
gations, the faithful execution of which raust necessarUy
have involved thera in a war with England. But with
that nation they were at peace, and the coraraercial
interests of the country required that they should con
tinue so ; while the condition both of their raiUtary
strength and financial capacity raade the idea of war
irapossible. And yet, unfortunately, both England and
France deeraed it necessary, not indeed to corapel the
participation of the United States.in actual war, but to
disregard altogether the neutral position which it was
their gfeat pohcy to occupy. At the outset, therefore,
there were two courses open to the United States ; —
either to give way to the pressure of circurastances, and
join one or the other of the contending parties, or to de
clare the French treaties null and void, and, without
approaching England, hold theraselves free and neutral.
Neither their wishes nor their weakness perraitted the
first course. And although the execution of the treaties
in their spirit was scarcely reconcilable with a genuine
neutiality, the second course was opposed by a strong
public sentiment, which naturally syrapathized with
France ; by the unfriendly, if not hostUe relations with
England ; and by the fact that it was doubtful if France
would adrait any such right of abrogation, and would

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 139
not consider its exercise as a declaration of war. It is
true, that, when the tieaty of amity and alliance was
concluded, it was concluded with France occupying an
established position in the European system ; a position,
which, involving certain well-known relations with other
powers, afforded to both governments the raeans of a
reasonable calculation as to the nature, extent, and con
sequences of their obligations. Now the Revolution in
France had destroyed that position, altered those rela
tions, and forced consequences upon those obligations
such as the original parties could never have contera
plated. Besides which, the French governraent had, in
Condorcet's famous report on the declaration of war
against Austria, claimed the right, under her changed
circurastances, of deterraining for herself what treaties of
the old raonarchy she would accept, and what reject, —
a right which she could not, therefore, deny to any
other parties to her treaties. But such an abrogation
carried with it an irapUed conderanation of the French
Revolution, and an inferential denial of popular rights,
which were totaUy inconsistent with the historical posi
tion of the United States ; while, in case of a general
war, great benefits raight be drawn frora the faithful
execution, by France, of certain articles in the treaty.
After long and conscientious deliberation. General
Washington deterrained upon a course which was
neither one nor the other ; and which, notwithstanding
its fair and honest spirit, corabined, it raust be acknowl
edged, the difficulties of both. He resolved to main-

140 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
tain neutraUty and the French treaty together ; and, on
the 22d of AprU, 1793, published his proclaraation of
neutiality : —
" Whereas it appears that a state of war exists be
tween Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and
the United Netherlands on the one part, and France on
the other; and the duty and interest of the United
States require that they should, with sincerity and good
faith, adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and irapar
tial towards the beUigerent powers : —
" I have, therefore, thought fit, by these presents, to,
declare the disposition of the United States to observe
the conduct aforesaid towards those powers respectively,
and to exhort and warn the citizens of the United
States carefully to avoid all acts and proceedings what
soever, which raay in any raanner tend to contravene
such disposition.
" And I do hereby also make known, that whoso
ever of the citizens of the United States shaU render
hiraself liable to punishraent or forfeiture under the law
of nations, by corainitting, aiding, or abetting hostilities
against any one of the said powers, or by carrying to
any of them those articles which are deeraed contra
band by the modern usage of nations, wiU not receive
the protection of the United States against such pun
ishment or forfeiture ; and, further, that I have given
instructions to those officers to whom it belongs, to
cause prosecutions to be instituted against all persons
who shaU, within the- cognizance of the courts of the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 141
United States, violate the law of nations with respect
to the powers at war, or any of thera.
" George Washington.
" By the President, Thomas Jefeerson."
Scarcely had this proclamation been published, than
the difficulties of the course resolved on began to de
velop themselves. From one end of the country to the
other, pubUc opinion was in a ferraent. Public meet
ings, under the influence of passionate speeches, passed
resolutions of the raost extravagant syrapathy with
France. Turbulent spirits everywhere hastened to
the French rainister with offers of raaterial aid ; arras
were purchased, privateers fitted out, coraraissions
issued, and the French rainister superintended these
iUegal proceedings with all the insolent effrontery that
sprang frora the consciousness of a popular power
which he deeraed above the adrainistration. Every
day brought a new subject of coraplaint ; and the
Departraent of State was involved in perpetual and irri
tating controversy with M. Genet, who appealed, not
without a show of reason, to the covenanted friend
ship of the treaty of aUiance.
Besides coraplaints of so trivial a character that they
would have been siraply ridiculous, but for the studied
impertinence of tone in which they were couched,
M. Genet, under the 22d article of the treaty, which
provided that " it shall not be lawful for any foreign
privateers, not belonging to the subjects of the most
Christian King, nor citizens of the said United States

142 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
who have coraraissions from any prince or state in
amity with either nation, to fit their ships in the ports
of either the one or the other of the aforesaid parties,"
claimed the right of arming privateers in the ports, and
enlisting the citizens, of the United States. To this,
Mr. Jefferson repUed, that the right of arraing privateers,
not being a natural right, and depending upon express
treaty provision, could not be clairaed by inference ;
and that prohibition of this right to one nation, did not
necessarily imply permission to another; that it was
one thing to forbid any nation at war -with France to
arm in American ports, but another and a very differ
ent thing to permit French privateers to arm therein
against any other nation; that to give such negative
stipulations an affirmative effect would be to render
them inconsistent, and, in good faith, impossible.
France herself was, previous to the Avar with Eng
land, bound by treaty stipulation not to aUow the
arming of privateers in her ports of nations at war
with England. If, then, the United States had been
at war with England, and the 22d article of the treaty
with France was construed according to the French
interpretation, she would be bound by one treaty to
aUow Araerican privateers to arm in her ports, while by
another, equaUy positive, she was bound to forbid such
a proceeding. If, therefore, such a right was not the
strict and inevitable consequence of the treaty, to per
mit it in the present case would be so far distinctly to
abandon the neutrality between France and her ene-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 143
mies, upon which the government had formally re
solved. Several British vessels having been taken within the
waters of the United States by French privateers, the
government deraanded their restitution, stating ex-
pUcitiy, that, in case of refusal, it would itself raake the
necessary corapensation, and hold the French govern
raent responsible for repayment. In reply to this,
M. Genet claimed, that, under the treaty, and espe
ciaUy in view of the consular convention, the courts
of the United States could take no cognizance as to
AA'hether vessels held by the French as prizes were
lawful prizes or not ; that such jurisdiction belonged
exclusively to their consulates, which had recently, by
decree of the Asserably, been erected into coraplete
courts of adrairalty. In reply, Mr. Jefferson denied the
right ofthe French government to extend their consular
jurisdiction by investing their consuls with adrairalty
powers, unless with consent expressly given by the
United States. But without dwelUng upon this point,
which the unfortunate consular convention perhaps
rendered disputable, he declared that the United States
claimed no right to determine the question of prize as
to captures raade on the high seas, but that the United
States were bound, in virtue of their voluntarUy as
sumed neutrality, to protect their own waters, and to
raaintain the inviolabUity of every vessel within their
maritime liraits ; that they had, therefore, in every case,
a perfect right to deterraine whether a capture had been

144 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
¦made within their waters, and if it had, they were fur
ther bound to dissolve such iUegal seizure.
M. Genet further demanded that the United States,
having stipulated with France, that, as between them,
free ships should raake free goods, they were bound to
enforce that doctrine, as a principle of international law,
against all the beUigerents in the present war; — that
raerchant vessels, coraing into American ports with such
armaments as are usually carried for self-protection,
should be treated as privateers, or at least not allowed
to return to sea with such armament; — and that all
goods captured by French privateers should be sold in
the ports of the United States without the imposition
of the custoras duty usually charged on ordinary
raerchandise., In other words, M. Genet deraanded
that the United States should do every thing which
an ally could, without coraraltting an overt and direct
act of hostility to England. The United States, on the
other hand, had resolved to carry out a systera of cora
plete neutrality, and to allow it to be infringed only
Avhere the narrowest and strictest interpretation of the
treaties with France corapelled thera to deviate in the
discharge of treaty obhgations. The real condition of
the two nations was evidently inconsistent with their
treaty relations. The treaties had been formed at a
time when the interests and syrapathies of the two na
tions were identical, and they reflected correctly both
the pubhc sentiraent and the poUtical necessities of
their dates. But circurastances had greatly changed.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 145
and it was possible for neither party to discharge their
obligations with reciprocal advantage. The French
Republic demanded that the alliance raade with the old
monarchy should be earned out in the spirit of frank and
friendly reciprocity in which it was formed ; forgetting
that their revolution had literaUy obliterated one of the
contracting parties, and that they eould prove no suc
cession to its sentiments, interests, or rights. WhUe
the United States were corapelled to reply to these de
mands, exacting in tone and disastrous in consequence,
by that sort of special pleading which, however logical
and necessary, is scarcely ever in conformity with the
temper " of a true and sincere friendship."
While the French minister was raaking reclaraations
and clairaing the privileges of the treaty in one interest,
the British legation was clamorous in the other. Mr.
Hamraond watched the proceedings of the French
minister closely ; and whenever a complaint could be
supported or an arguraent raade, he appealed to the
principles of the proclaraation against M. Genet's
interpretation of the treaties. Between the two, the
course of the governraent was difficult and dangerous;
but having entered upon it in good faith, the adminis
tration advanced with firraness and ability. But the
contest in Europe Avas fast assuraing colossal propor
tions. The whole world was in arras, and in the ter
rible stiuggle for existence upon which the nations soon
entered, aU rules of right, all those sacred principles
which, in tiraes of ordinary strife, protect truth and
13

146 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
weakness, were swept before the storra. Whenever
neutral duties served the purpose of the combatants,
they were sternly exacted ; whenever neutial rights in
terfered with the violence of conquest, or stood in the
path of destruction, they were relentlessly stiicken
down; and again, in the history of the world, there
opened a sorrowful period, when might, red and ruth
less, put its foot in bloody triumph on the neck of shud
dering humanity.
, It was at this period of distress and danger that
General Washington, in pursuance of the poUcy which
has been described, undertook those negotiations with
England which terminated in the tieaty of 1794, and
the progress and results of which have been related in
the preceding chapter.
The first consequences of this treaty tended greatly
to increase the emban-assraent of the governraent. At
the sarae tirae that Mr. Jay had been sent to England,
Mr. Morris had been recalled frora Paris ; and it became
necessary to appoint a successor. The selection was a
matter of grave and pressing importance, not only as
indicating, by the character of the party fi-om whom the
selection was made, the tendencies of the administra
tion, but also on account of the delicacy of the negotia
tions coraraitted to the charge of the new minister ; for
it was his business, not merely to raaintain, but if pos
sible to improve, the relations between France and the
United States, and to reconcile France to the results of
the negotiation with England. In making the selec-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 147
tion. General Washington gave stiiking evidence of
that disregard of raere party connection, Avhich was one
of the special traits of his adrainistration. But it raust
be confessed that his choice only proved, by its conse
quences, how entirely irapracticable such a principle is,
in application to the necessities of political life. The
mission was tendered to, and accepted by, Jaraes Mon
roe of Virginia, who had served with credit during the
war of the Revolution, and was, at the tirae of his ap
pointraent. United States Senator from his native State.
The singular character of this appointment wiU best
appear frora Mr, Monroe's own description of his polit
ical position at that tirae : —
" I Avas at this tirae a raeraber of the Senate of the
United States, for the State of Virginia, which station
I had held for several years before. It had been, too,
my fortune to differ from the administration' upon
many of our raost iraportant public measures. It is not
necessary to specify here the several instances in which
this variance in political sentiment took place between
the adrainistration and rayself. I think proper, how
ever, to notice two examples of it, since they serve to
iUustrate the principles on which that variance was
founded, and the light in which I was known to the
adrainistiation and ray country, before the proposal
was made to me. The first took place when Mr. Mor
ris was norainated Minister Plenipotentiary to the
French RepubUc ; which noraination I opposed, because
I was persuaded, fiora Mr. Morris's known poUtical

148 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
character and principles, that his appointraent — espec
iaUy at a period when the French nation was in a
course of revolution frora an arbitrary to a free govern
raent — would tend to discountenance the repubUcan
cause there and at horae, and otherwise weaken, and
greatly to our prejudice, the connection subsisting be
tween the two countries. The second took place when
Mr. Jay was nominated to Great Britain ; Avhich nomi
nation, too, I opposed, because, under all the weU-
knoAvn circurastances o^ the moraent, I was of opinion
we could not adopt such a raeasure consistently either
with propriety or any reasonable prospect of adequate
success ; since, being a raeasure without tone, and one
which secured to that power time, which of aU things
it wished to secure, it seemed better calculated to
answer its purposes than ours ; moreover, because
I was of opinion, in the then state of European
affairs, it would be made by the enemies of the two
republics the means of embroiling us with France, the
other party to the European war ; and because I
thought it was unconstitutional to appoint a meraber
of the judiciary into an executive office ; and, lastly,
because I also thought, from a variety of considera
tions, that it would be difficult to find, Avdthin the
limits of the United States, a person Avho was more
likely to improve, to the greatest possible extent, the
raischief to which the measure naturaUy exposed us.
This last example took place only a few weeks before
my appointment, which Avas on the 28th of May,

DIPLOMATICHISTORT. 149
1794." * The effect of this appointraent was most
unfortunate ; for it forbade what was, at the moraent,
of prirae iraportance to the success of either raission, —
a coraplete understanding and syrapathy between the
adrainistration at home and their minister in Paris,
and that rautual confidence between the ministers to
England and France, which was absolutely necessary
if they were to work together harmoniously for a com
mon purpose.
Besides the general directions relative to such points
as required special negotiation, Mr. Monroe was re
minded by the Secretary of State, in his official instruc
tions, that —
" The President has been an early and decided friend
of the French Revolution, and whatever reason there
raay have been, under our ignorance of facts and policy,
to suspend an opinion upon some of its important
tiansactions, yet is he immutable in his wishes for its
accomphshraent, — incapable of assenting to the right
of any foreign prince to raeddle with its interior ar
rangeraents, and persuaded that success wiU attend
their efforts ; and particularly, that union araong them
selves is an irapregnable barrier against external as
saults. . . . We have, therefore, pursued neutiality with
faithfulness ; we have paid raore of our debt to France
than was absolutely due, as the Secretary of the Treas-
* Monroe's View of the Conduct of the Executive in Foreign
Affairs, etc. etc. Philadelphia, 1797. p. ill, iv.
13*

150 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ury asserts ; and we should have paid more, if the state
of our affairs did not require us to be prepared with
funds for the possible event of war. We mean to con
tinue the same Une of conduct in future; and, to
remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission
to London, you may say, that he is positively forbidden
to weaken the engagements between this country and
France. It is not iraprobable that you wiU be obliged
to encounter, on this head, suspicions of various kinds.
But you may declare the motives of that raission to be
to obtain iramediate compensation for our plundered
property, and restitution of the posts. You raay inti
mate, by Avay of argument, Avithout ascribing it to the
government,' that if war should be necessary, the affec
tions of the people of the United States towards it
would be better secured by a manifestation that every
step had been taken to avoid it; and that the British
nation would be divided when they found that Ave had
been forced into it. . . . To this matter you cannot be .
too attentive ; and you will be amply justified in repel
ling with firmness any imputation of the raost distant
intention to sacrifice our connection Avith France to
any connection with England. You may baclv your
assertions by a late determination of the President to
have it signified abroad, that he is averse to adrait into
his public roora, Avhich is free to aU the world beside,
any Frenchmen Avho are obnoxious to the French
Republic. ... To conclude ; you go, sir, to France to
strengthen our friendship with that country ; and you

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 151
are well acquainted Avith the line of freedora and ease
to which you raay advance Avithout betraying the dig
nity of the United States. You will show our confi
dence in the French RepubUc, without betraying the
most remote raark of undue complaisance. You will
let it be seen, that, in case of war with any nation on
earth, we shaU consider France as our first and natural
aUy. You raay dweU upon the sense which we enter
tain of past serAdces, and for the more recent interposi
tion, on our behalf, with the Dey of Algiers. Araong
the great events with which the world is teeraing, there
raay be an opening for France to becorae instruraental
in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi.
Spain raay perhaps negotiate a peace, separate from
Great Britain, with France. If she does, the Missis
sippi may be acquired through this channel, especially
if you contrive to have our mediation in any raanner
soUcited." Along with these instructions, Mr. Monroe received
the official reply of the House of Representatives to
the French Committee of PubUc Safety, which was
made through the Secretary of State. In making
this response, the Secretary said : " The President of
the United States has consigned this honorable and
grateful function to the Department of State. In no
manner can it be more properly discharged than by
seizing the occasion of declaring to the ally of the
United States, that the cause of Uberty, in the defence
of which so ranch Araerican blood and treasure have

152 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
been lavished, is cherished by our Republic with increas
ing enthusiasra ; that under the standard of liberty,
wheresoever it shall be displayed, the affections of the
United States wiU always rally ; and that the successes
of those who stand forth as her avengers, wiU be gloried
in by the United States, and will be felt as the suc
cesses of themselves and the other friends of huraanity."
With these instructions to guide hira, Mr. Monroe
arrived in Paris on the 2d of August, 1794, about two
months after the arrival of Mr. Jay in London. He
found the comraercial interests of the country suffering
under legislative enactraents, irapolitic in ' themselves,
and at variance with the explicit stipulations of exist
ing treaties ; general distrust of the sentiments and
intentions of the United States ; great dissatisfaction
with the course and sympathies of his predecessor; a
special jealousy of Mr. Jay's raission to London, and
an apparent conviction that his own erabassy Avas a
raere feint to withdraw the attention of the French
governraent, and to arause it with warra expressions
of friendship until the conclusion of the English nego
tiation should enable thera to drop the raask. The
objects of his raission were : — 1. To raise the embargo
which had been laid at Bourdeaux, as far as it affected
Araerican vessels, and to obtain corapensation for any
loss under its previous action. 2. To obtain corapensa
tion for the illegal captures which Araerican coramerce
had suffered at the hands of French privateers. 3. To
correct certain violations of the expUcit provisions of

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 153
the treaties between the tAvo countries. 4. To explain
the objects of Mr. Jay's mission, and to remove any
suspicion entertained by the French government as to
the character of its objects. And, 5. To obtain, if
possible, the cooperation of France in an effort to
secure frora Spain the free navigation of the Missis
sippi. The first and second points were easily and
proraptly put in tiain for friendly solution. The third
soraewhat erabarrassed him, for he was afraid to de
mand explicitly the fuUUment of the treaty stipulations,
lest the French government should reciprocate by a
demand for' the execution of the guarantee' of the
West Indian possessions by the United States. In
deed, when he approached the subject, he was raet by
the question, directly put, " Do you deraand the strict
execution of the treaties ? " And it was only by a
judicious evasion that he avoided the consequences of a
reply, and succeeded, after sorae negotiation, in obtain
ing the repeal of the decrees by which the treaty was
violated. As to the fifth object, he took the necessary
raeasures to secure its accoraplishraent, and was, to
some extent, favored by circurastances in advancing fhe
views of his government, when the negotiations with
Spain were transferred to Mr. Pinckney, and he was
relieved of further attention to thera. But the fourth
object of his mission was surrounded with difficulties,
and ndt only created perpetu-al erabarrassraent with
the French governraent, but involved hira in unpleasant
misunderstanding with the adrainistiation at home.

154 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Under the circurastances of his appointraent, and
resting upon the explicit language of his instructions,
Mr. Monroe felt authorized to assure the French gov
ernment, that the raission to England was intended
siraply to obtain the evacuation of the posts, and com
pensation for losses sustained by American comraerce
frora the English naval and privateering forces, and
that it contemplated no negotiation which could affect
the relations between France and the United States, or
weaken in any degree the sincere friendship which
existed between them ; and these opinions he undoubt
edly expressed in language of very highly colored en
thusiasra. The French governraent watched the prog
ress of the British treaty with suspicious jealousy ; and
Mr. Monroe soon found that he needed the raost ac
curate inforraation in reference to its probable character,
in order to raeet the constant and unfriendly references
raade to it. He accordingly applied to Mr. Jay. But
between Mr. Jay and Mr. Monroe there existed, very
naturally, no political confidence ; and as he was not
instructed to that effect, Mr. Jay declined furnishing
Mr. Monroe the inforraation he sought during the prog
ress of the negotiation. When the treaty was signed,
he offered to inforra him confidentially of its provisions,
stating generaUy, that it contained nothing in deroga
tion of the treaty Avith France. This information Mr.
Monroe declined to receive, as he considered that a
knowledge of the treaty, without the right of using
that knowledge in his conferences with the French

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 155
government, would only embarrass his position. That
governraent manifested a gro^ying uneasiness, which,
upon the publication of the treaty, becarae openly and
angrily avowed dissatisfaction. It suspended, how
ever, any definite action, until the Senate had advised
the President to ratify Mr. Jay's treaty. Upon the
receipt of this news, Mr. Monroe was unofficially in
formed that the French government considered the
treaties between France and the United States sus
pended, and that a special , minister would be sent to
PhUadelphia to protest against this violation of Ameri
can faith. Mr. Monroe iraraediately deraanded an inter
view Avith the Minister of Foreign Affairs. " I attended
hira," says Mr. Monroe, " again on the day following
(February 16, 1796), and remonstrated most earnestly
against the raeasure, urging every arguraent that I
could avail rayself of to divert the governraent frora it ;
offering to enter Avith hira, whenever he thought fit, into
a discussion ofhis objections to our treaty, or any other
aet of our governraent ; assuring hira that I should not
only be always ready to enter with him into such expla
nations, but, in the present instance, should do it with
pleasure, since, by being possessed of our view of the
subject, they would be better able to decide whether the
complaint was well or ill founded, and, of course, how
far it merited to be considered in that light. Upon this
occasion, as upon the preceding one, the minister de
clined stating any specific objections to the treaty or
any other act of our government, and, therefore, I could

156 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
make no specific defence."* On the 12th of March,
1796, M. De la Croix, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
furnished Mr. Monroe with " a summary exposition of
the complaints of the French Republic against the
United States of Araerica." The coraplaints were
divided under three heads : 1. The inexecution of the
treaties, which coraprised almost identically the sarae
subjects of dissatisfaction which had been discussed
between M.. Genet and Mr. Jefferson, and to which ref
erence has already been raade ; namely, — 1. the cogni
zance taken by the United States courts of prizes carried
by French vessels into Araerican ports, notwithstanding
the express clause in the treaty, which, the French gov
ernraent contend, forbade it; 2. the adraission of Eng
lish vessels of Avar into the ports of the United States
against the express stipulation of the 17th article of the
treaty ; 3. the unequal execution of the consular con
vention ; 4. the arrest of a captain of a French corvette
for acts done on the high seas. In reply to these, Mr.
Monroe reiterated the arguraent raade by Mr. Jeffer
son. The second head of coraplaint was the arrest, in
the waters of the United States, by an EngUsh ship of
war, of the vessel in which M. Fauchet, the French
minister, sailed for Europe, and the search of his tiunks
and papers. To this Mr. Monroe repUed, that the
United States had done all it could to punish the out
rage, had revoked the exequatur of the British consul at
* Monroe's View, p. xlix.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 157
the port where the violation had been coraraitted, or
dered aU suppUes to be withheld frora the offending ves
sel, and her iramediate departure from the waters of the
United States; and had instructed the United States
rainister in London to raake the conduct of his Majes
ty's officer a subject of forraal and special coraplaint,
and to deraand such immediate and ample satisfaction
as the nature of the case required.
The third cause of complaint was the treaty, with
England, inasmuch as by it the United States had " not
only departed frora the principles that were consecrated
by the arraed neutiality during the War of Independ
ence, but they had also given to England, to the injury
of their first alUes, a raark of the raost striking conde
scension without liraits, in abandoning the rule which
the rights of nations, their treaties A\dth all other pow
ers, and even the treaties of England with raost of the
raaritirae powers, had given to contraband," and had
" consented to extend the denoraination of contraband
even to provisions. Instead of restricting it, as all trea
ties had done, to the case of an effectual blockade of a
port, as proving the only exception to the coraplete free
dom of this article, they had tacitly acknowledged the
pretensions of England, the blockade to our (the French)
colonies, and even to France, by the force of a procla
mation alone." To which Mr. Morris- replied, "that
although the principles of the armed neutrality were very
dear to his government, yet it was not in their power
to force them upon England, and they could not be held
14

158 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
censurable for this incapacity ; and that, whatever they
raight desire, they stood in the same position as to con
traband. That with regard to alloA\dng provisions to
be made contraband, the treaty recognized no such
principle, but simply, acknowledging the irapossibUity
of settling the question, waived it, providing that, as it
was doubtful, compensation should be always made in
case of seizure." Here the discussion rested until July,
when. the news reached France that the House of Rep
resentatives, after long and violent discussion, had de
terrained that the treaty should be carried into effect.
The tone of the French government becarae iraraedi
ately raore imperative. M. Adet was recalled, and his
places the grade being reduced — was about to be
fiUed by a gentleman who, as consul in Charleston, had
made himself pecuUarly unacceptable to the United
States government; but this appointraent Mr. Monroe
had stUl influence enough to prevent. In the raean
tirae, great changes had taken place at horae. Mr. Ran
dolph had been corapeUed to resign, under circumstances
which excited great irritation, on the part of Gen. Wash
ington, against that party whose sympathies were
French ; and the policy of his cabinet, more harmonious
in opinion than it had ever yet been, raanifested the
change in his temper.* The pohtical struggle over the
* The circumstances of Mr. Randolph's resignation belong rather
to the personal and party history of the day, than to its diplomatic
history. For, although they tended directly to increase the bias of
Gen. Washington's prejudice in favor of one section of his cabinet, I

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 159
treaty, unsurpassed in bitterness of spirit and language,
had ended in victory for the adrainistration. The treaty
do not think they seriously affected the course of events. To review
them in detail would require a special chapter on the personal history
of the times, a subject to me alike unpleasant and unprofitable. The
misconstruction of Mr. Randolph's conduct, which, in the then distem
pered state of pubhc opinion, was both natural and unfair, has not
received historical sanction. The facts may be very briefly stated thus.
A despatch from M. Fauchet, the French minister at Philadelphia,
was intercepted by a British vessel, sent by the British government
to their minister, Mr. Hammond, and by him transmitted to the Pres
ident through the Secretary of the Treasury. This despatch pur
ported to be a full report of several conversations between Mr. Ran
dolph and the French minister, in which, according to the latter, Mr.
Randolph had given him a very distressing account of the factions
in the country, and the divisions in the cabinet, entered into a mi
nute and indiscreet detail of the President's private views, and sug
gested to the French minister certain ways of meeting a local com
bination against the government in some of the States, which he
construed into an implication of the venality of certain public char
acters. These conversations were vaguely reported, and accompa
nied by a running commentary of insolent and inflated sentiment,
that makes it almost impossible to say what is fact and what fancy.
This document was exhibited to Gen. Washington just at the time
when he was most troubled and annoyed by the opposition to Mr.
Jay's treaty, — that treaty being then under his consideration for rati
fication. He submitted the despatch to Mr. Randolph in a personal
interview, and demanded an explanation in a manner that Mr. Ran
dolph considered evidence of a foregone conclusion and of confidence
already forfeited. He accordingly resigned, and addressed his vin
dication to the public. In reference to the facts, I would only ob
serve, that no mere statement of the French ministers in the United

160 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
with Spain, which, at the outset of Mr. Monroe's rais
sion, was doubtful, had been negotiated without the aid
States, during the period of their Revolution, has any value as evi
dence. For without deliberately intending to misrepresent, they
took such strange and extravagant views of men and things, and
misunderstood so completely the relation of measures and parties,
that their opinions cannot be trusted ; and the whole of this very de
spatch is conceived in that spirit of ingenious, clever, but extravagant
misconception, which is the characteristic of the French Revolution
ary diplomacy ; a spirit whicli insisted upou treating the wildest po
litical dreams as the reahties of political life. It is impossible to
separate what the French minister calls Mr. Randolph's " precious
confessions " from his own general narrative of American politics ;
and the absurd inconsistency of this fancy sketch of our politics is
manifest to every student of our earlier history. But the charge of
corruption, I cannot believe, was ever really believed, even by those
small partisans who mistake malignity for honesty. Mr. Randolph
belonged to a class of men who had faults, and grave ones ; they
were passionate and prejudiced, but not treacherous ; they were
reckless and extravagant, but not corrupt ; and whatever were their
failings, it might be said of that great old Virginia stock, as FuUer
said of Woolsey, " Truly, nothing mean could enter this man's
mind." As to the indiscretion of suoh conferences with Fauchet, especially
after the experience of French ministers which the government had
suffered, that will depend upon the view taken of Mr. Randolph's
position in the cabinet, and the pohtical sympathies of the student.
He endeavored to hold middle ground between the two sections, and,
in consequence, and I think unavoidably, was sacrificed.
I would not have said this much, were it not that Mr. Gibbs, in
his Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, a
work to which I have specially referred elsewhere, has devoted many

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 161
of France. The treaty with England was secured, and
the governraent felt able to speak a higher and firraer
pages of mahcious ingenuity to the examination of Mr. Randolph's
conduct, and concludes his review with these sentences : " Mr. Ran
dolph, in his vindication, gave many reasons against the probability
of his guilt. There was produced, soon after his resignation, one in
favor of the supposition. The investigation of his accounts con
ferred upon him the distinguished honor of being the first cabinet
ofiicer who was a Defaulter." — Vol. I. p. 280.
The facts are these, as proved by the ofiicial records in the proper
Departments. Immediately upon his resignation, he surrendered
the key of his public office to the door-keeper, and refused to
cross its threshold again, thus leaving all his ofiicial papers to the
custody of his successor, Mr. Pickering. An account of his admin
istration was ordered and reported, covering the receipt and dis
bursement of over $1,000,000, which, according to the custom then,
but no longer existing, passed through his hands, on account of the
maintenance of foreign diplomatic agents and intercourse. This ac
count brought him in debt to the government. On his part, he im
mediately stated his account, making the government in debt to him,
asserting his perfect confidence in the correctness of his account, and
sustaining it by vouchers, so far as they were in his possession, and
calling for the production of other vouchers, which he positively al
leged were deposited by him in his own and other pubhc ofiices, and
remained in the custody of other public officers, but some of which
were never obtained. A suit was instituted by government to re
cover of him the balance reported against him ; but upon several tri
als, the juries were divided, and no verdict could be obtained. Mr.
Randolph then proposed to leave the decision to the Solicitor of the
Treasury, — a proposition which clearly vindicated his confidence in
his own integrity. That officer confirmed the precise balance re
ported against Mr. Randolph by the government account ; and accord-
14*

162 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
language; and early in Noveraber, IVEr. Monroe was re
called. This recaU was inevitable, but its manner was
ing to his agreement, judgment was entered up against him for that
amount. To satisfy this judgment, Mr. Randolph devoted every
cent he possessed, by conveying it to a trustee for that purpose ; and
it appears from the record of the Treasury Department, that not only
the entire balance, principal and interest, was discharged, but that,
in consequence of the government having become the purchaser of a
portion of the property conveyed in the deed of trust for its benefit,
it had actually received, by a resale of that property, some seven
thousand dollars more than the balance it claimed from Mr. Ran
dolph. In addition to this, the official records of this transaction
show, that, while every cent received by Mr. Randolph was charged
to him with interest, no credit was allowed him which was not sup
ported by the voucher of the receipt ofthe agent of the government,
to whose use it was ultimately applied ; and that, where bills of ex
change had been bought by Mr. Randolph, as Secretary of State, of
merchants or bankers in the country, drawn on foreign merchants
or bankers resident in the country to which the remittance to our
foreign agent had been sent, the receipt of the person of whom the
bill was bought was not allowed as a voucher, but that of the gov
ernment agent abroad was required as indispensable ; so that, if by
any casualty resulting from the dangers of the sea, the existence of
a general state of war in Europe, or the bankruptcy of foreign mer
chants or bankers, the foreign agent of our government failed to
receive the remittance purchased for him here, the Secretary of State
'had to bear the loss ; and instances of this to large amounts are dis
closed on the face of the accounts reported against Mr. Randolph,
and acknowledged in the documents accompanying them. In one of
these cases, the usual channel of remittance abroad, through Amster
dam, was cut off by the blockade of the coast of Holland ; and it
becoming necessary to remit to our minister at Madrid, throuo-h bills

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 163
not considerate, nor its alleged raotives just. The
grounds of his reraoval raay be gathered from the letter
of Mr. Pickering, Avho had succeeded Mr. Randolph,
under date of July 13, 1796.
"As early as October last, you predicted that if Mr.
Jay's tieaty should be ratified, it would excite great dis
content in France. Early in Noveraber, you raen
tioned the arrival of M. Fauchet, extreraely dissatisfied
with the treaty, adding that he was well received, and
would therefore be attended to. On the 6th of Decera
ber, you acknowledge the receipt of ray letter of Sep
teraber 12th, written subsequently to the ratification of
the tieaty, to repeat and further explain the principles
and views of the governraent concerning it. M. Adet's
on Madrid bankers purchased here, the bankruptcy of the parties to
the bill, occurring after the purchase of the bill, devolved upon Mr.
Randolph a heavy loss under the rule mentioned. Add to this the
principle universally adopted in government accounts, of charging
interest on all sums received from, and allowing no interest on sums
due from government, and it will be readily seen how easy it is to
make out an account against a public officer, receiving and disburs
ing over one milKon of dollars, and that at a time when the adminis
trative details of all the executive departments were more or less
imperfect. In concluding this note, I ought to say, that I was not able to con
duct the above interesting and, I think, conclusive investigation,
directly. I am indebted for it to one whose interest in Mr. Ran
dolph's fair fame guarantees the thoroughness, and whose character
assures the conscientious accuracy, of its details. To say that I am
responsible for the accuracy of its statements, may be proper, but it
can add nothing to its authority.

164 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
objections to the tieaty, and their refutation, accompa
nied my letter. And with such means in your hands, —
raeans araply sufficient to vindicate the conduct of the
United States, — not less regret than surprise is excited
that no atterapt was raade to apply them to the highly
important use for which they were sent. Although you
anticipated discontents ; although the syraptoras of dis
content appeared ; although these syraptoras, unattend
ed to and unallayed, raight increase to an. inflararaation,
and M. Fauchet's arrival, with all his dissatisfaction
and prejudices about hira, would assuredly add to the
irritation, yet you were silent and inactive, untU, on the
15th of February, you were alarmed by the project of
the Directory, accidentally coraraunicated to you by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, of sending to this countiy
an etjvoy extraordinary to represent to our governrnent
their decision concerning the tieaty with Great Britain,
" that they considered the treaty of alliance between us
as ceasing to exist frora the raoraent the treaty was rat
ified." Your letter of the 20th of the sarae raonth
describes your second interview with the rainister on
the project of sending an envoy extraordinary ; and the
reasons you urged to dissuade thera frora it were cer
tainly very cogent. Your letter of the 10th of March
inforras us that the project was laid aside; and your
letter of the 25th of March, that you had an audience
of the Directory on the subject, and that they had
agreed to suspend their proposed extraordinary raission
until the points in question should be discussed be-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 165
tween you and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The
result of this audience appears satisfactory ; and from
the good effect produced by the partial explanations
then given raay be calculated the happy consequences
of the full coraraunications which might have been
made, and Avhich for so long a time you had possessed
the means of raaking, in vindication of the raeasures
of the governraent you represent. That these were not
raade even so late as March 25th, is again to be ex-
tiemely regretted, because the justice, the honor, and
the faith of our country, were questioned, and conse
quently their raost iraportant interests were at stake."
The point of this censure was, that Mr. Monroe had
been for sorae time aware that dissatisfaction Avith the
tieaty existed, and that, having in his hands a fuU vindi
cation of that treaty, he had not used it ; the proof
being, that, when he did produce the defence of the
treaty, he obtained from the Directory a suspension of
hostile proceedings. Now this argument assuraes two
facts, neither of which the future confirraed : 1. That
the reply of the Secretary of State in Mr. Monroe's
possession was a satisfactory justification of the treaty ;
and, 2. that its production by Mr. Monroe did affect
the action of the Directory. And as to the proof on
which the argument rested, Mr. Monroe rejoined with
perfect success, if you admit that great dissatisfaction
against the treaty did exist, is it not a fair presumption
that to ray conduct is due the delay of the Directory in

166 DIPLOMA-TIC HISTORT.
openly expressing that discontent. The truth was, that
the French government did not care for any arguraent,
however able ; it was beyond the reach of the subtlest
diploraatic dialectic. The hope of the Directory — and
that alone caused delay — was, first, that the treaty
would not be ratified, and next, that the House of Rep
resentatives would interpose obstacles to its execution.
They believed that the countiy was divided into two
parties, the French and EngUsh. They expected that
popular strength would secure victory to the first, and
considering Mjc. Monroe as the representative of the
French party, they were wUUng, through hira, to concil
iate and strengthen his friends at horae. But when the
action of the Senate and the vote of the House con
firraed the triuraph of the adrainistration, they gave up
all hope, and deterrained to follow their original course.
Mr. Monroe's recall at such a raoraent was a great
relief to them ; for anxiety to maintain their influence
with the party to which he belonged, and his personal
sympathy with themselves, prevented them from visit
ing on hira the burden of their displeasure, while his
reraoval freed thera frora any such' erabarrassraent, and
allowed thera to represent the action of the United
States as the work of the opposite English faction.
And accordingly, in taking leave of him, they drew an
unwarrantable but politic distinction between him and
his governraent. "As for you," said the President of
the Directory, "As for you, Mr. Minister Plenipotentiary,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 167
you have corabated for principles ; you have known
the true interests of your country. Depart Avith our
regret. We restore in you a representative to Araerica,
and we preserve the remembrance of the citizen whose
personal qualities did honor to that title."
That Mr. Monroe's identification with the party in
the United States who syrapathized with France, and
opposed the English treaty, rendered hira an unfit ex
ponent of the adrainistration, cannot be denied ; but
then in justice it raust be recoUected, that he had ex
pressed that opposition in the senate chamber before
his appointraent ; that he had declared the raission to
England unwise, and the rainister raost objectionable ;
that his strong syrapathies with the French Revolution
were araong the aUeged raotives of his choice ; and that
during his raission he had acted in strict consistency
with his professions. And the adrainistration which
authorized Mr. Jay to conduct his negotiations " with
that attention to your (his) forraer pubhc opinions
which self-respect will justify," was surely bound to
raeasure Mr. Monroe by the same charitable standard.
Besides, Mr. Monroe had really done effectual service
during his mission. He conciliated the teraper of the
French governraent, carried out three of the four points
which were coraraitted to his care, and, without doubt,
delayed the expression of the French discontent for a
long tirae ; and this, too, when he knew that he had not
the confidence of his own governraent, and when the
want of frank intercourse between hiraself and the

168 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
rainister in London seriously erabarrassed his action.*
The governraent, however, found it absolutely neces-
* It is very much to be regretted that Mr. Monroe, upon his
return home, felt warranted in vindicating his conduct before the
people. It led to an undignified controversy between himself and
the Secretary of S^ate, which could only diminish the consideration
of both parties in the public eye.
A diplomatist, who necessarily assumes confidential relations to his
government, is not at liberty to dissolve that confidential connection
for his own vindication. One of the consequences of his position is,
that, without the consent of his government, his hps are closed, even
as to his own conduct. He runs the risk of being misunderstood,
misrepresented, and even sacrificed ; and, if the interests ' of the
country require it, he must be content with his martyrdom. Time
will surely do him justice ; and even if extraordinary circumstances
warrant his demand for justice, the Senate is the proper channel
through which to seek it. They are impartial eiiough to judge truly,
and powerful enough to act effectively, if his case requires their in
terference. I am no advocate of the mystification on foreign affairs which has
been the besetting sin of the cabinet pohcy of Europe ; and it is only
wholesome and right that the people should have clear notions and
proper information as to their foreign interests. But there is such a
thing as a wise reticence ; and if, whenever a foreign minister Is
superseded, he Is at liberty to publish despatches and attack the gov
ernment, the whole diplomatic system had better be abandoned.
For it was meant to guarantee moderation, prudence, and temper, in
the conduct of international relations. A foreign minister has noth
ing to do with the people. He is the instrument of the executive.
The executive is responsible to the nation, but he is responsible to
the executive. Our diplomatic history has furnished more than one
unfortunate illustration of the neglect of this truth; and it may

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 169
sary, in carrying out its policy, to have a rainister in
Paris who should sympathize with its sentiments, as
Avell as represent its opinions ; and Washington ten
dered the" French mission to General Charles Cotes
worth Pinckney, of South Carolina, the brother of
Thoraas Pinckney, at that tirae rainister to England.
A better selection it would have been irapossible to
* raake. Representing an old and honored narae, habitu
ated to the exercise of that acknowledged influence
which belongs to large fortune, established position, and
individual ability, — an eminent jurist, an active and ex
perienced soldier, a distinguished raeraber of the con
vention Avhich fraraed the Constitution, — General
Pinckney had worked faithfully and fruitfully in every
department of his country's service. To these claims
upon public consideration, he added the charm of a
character singularly frank, simple, and unselfish, and he
was one of that sraall band of Revolutionary worthies
who shared not only the confidence, but the warm per
sonal aflection, of their great chief. After the adoption
of the Constitution, he had withdrawn from the wider
field of federal politics, and devoted his stiU vigorous
safely be asserted, that in every case the ex-official vindication has
sprung rather from wounded pride than public spirit, and that the
interests of the country have suffered more from the exposure than
the character of the minister could possibly have done from his
silence. With a Senate constituted as is ours, the legal and natural
council of the President In foreign affairs. Injustice to a foreign min
ister can always be corrected. 15

170 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
energies to the interests of his faraily and State. Gen
eral Washington raade raore than one effort to draw
hira into the national service ; but he declined, on differ
ent occasions, the departments both of war and state,
and it was with great reluctance that he accepted the
almost hopeless mission that was now pressed upon
him. In a history Uke the present, it would be scarcely
possible or proper to dweU at any length on the general
character of the public raen to whora reference is raade,
as it is concerned with their career siraply in connec
tion with a special eraployraent. But it is difficidt to
resist the strong desire to Unger with affectionate regard
in sight of characters so high, so pure, so " tiue and
just in all their dealings," as the two Pinckneys. Culti
vated in their tastes and siraple in their raanners,
placed by fortune where the exercise of a graceful and
Uberal hospitality was the habit of their daily life, and
the assuraption of high duties the natural consequence
of their position, brave and gentle, free, AAdth aU the
genuine frankness of the southern nature, and yet grave
as becarae earnest raen in trying times, able, unselfish,
active, their success in life was free from all the feverish
excitement of political adventure. They sought nei
ther place nor power, but rose gradually frora duty to
duty, iUustrating, in the fulness of their lives and ser
vices, the virtues of the class to which they belonged,
and bearing, through a long and spotless career,
" Without abuse
The grand old name of gentleman."

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 171
At the date of his appointraent, General Pinckney rep
resented, as fairly as possible, the real sentiraent of the
large conservative party in the country. His experience
during the war, which, in South Carolina, assuraed a
peculiarly bitter and bloody character, guaranteed hira
against any extravagant British syrapathies; and, in
coramon with his native State, he felt a warm and
direct interest in the success of the French Revolution.
But he was eminently an American patriot; and his
correspondence, both public and private, is filled with
indignant protests against the spirit which would sub
ordinate the national policy to the interests or caprice
of any foreign power. The raotive and purpose of his
appointment were clearly and strongly set forth in his
instructions.* * These Instructions are quoted from the original, among General
Pinckney's MSS. I am surprised that they have never been pub
lished, for they are exceedingly creditable to Mr. Pinckney. As an
illustration of General Pinckney's character, I shall cite the following-
letter from the same MSS. collection. It was written to the Secre
tary of State, upon the rumor that Mr. Madison had arrived in Paris
to take his place, he having been superseded on account of his
failure. " All the Paris papers which were received here two nights ago
brought accounts that Mr. Madison had arrived in that city as Envoy
Extraordinary from the United States of America to the French
Republic. My letters from Paris, this morning, do not mention any
thing about it, and I^ therefore conclude it is without foundation. It
may, however, not be Improper to explain myself on this subject. It
may not be within your knowledge, sir, but the fact Is so, that it was
with very great reluctance I quitted private life to accept of public

172 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" Your own observation will furnish abundant proof
of the zeal, and even enthusiasm, with which the people
of the United States embraced the cause of the French
Revolution. Having recentiy closed a contest for the
maintenance and estabUshment of their own Uberties,
the atterapt of any nation to recover its long lost rights
could not fail to attract the good wishes of the people
of the United States. But such an atterapt by the peo
ple of France, who had rendered thera iraportant aid in
office. The inconvenience to my affairs was considerable. No con
sideration would have induced me to accept my appointment, but the
flattering one of being serviceable to my country. If, therefore, the
service I was sent to perform can be better executed by Mr. Madi
son, or any other gentleman, I earnestly entreat that no idea of deli
cacy with regard to me may prevent the nomination from immedi
ately taking place. Perhaps political circumstances might render
some other character a more acceptable agent than myself. It is
generally thought in France, and my heart swells proudly at the
idea, that I am the friend, and beloved by our illustrious Washington.
To men determined to see no neutrality but what is partial In their
favor, and to aUow of no independence but what is submission to
their Avill, the friend of Washington cannot be acceptable. Aet,
therefore. In the case, as the honor and interest of our country
require. At the same time, do not misunderstand me, and think that
when my country is embarrassed, I mean to shrink from public ser
vice. If It is thought necessary for me to remain on this side of the
Atlantic, I will cheerfully remain. If it is thought my country's in
terest would be probably promoted by my recaU, I will with pleasure
return. In a word, while my country Is In danger, the little abihties
I possess, whether in the cabinet or the field, when she calls for them,
are devoted to her." — C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 106.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 173
their own Revolution, was sure to excite the liveliest
sensibility; for every nerve was in unison, and the
slightest raotion there produced here a corresponding
vibration. You have felt, and you have witnessed, in
your fellow-citizens, a solicitude for the success of the
French Revolution scarcely surpassed, and hardly to be
distinguished frora that which was rhanifested in our
own struggle for independence. This strong syrapathy
deraanded aU the prudence and energy of our rulers to
restrain it within the liraits of that neutrality which our
duty and safety, and the interests of France herself,
reqmred us to raaintain. Unhappily, during the course
of the successive and violent revolutions of parties in
that country, atterapts were raade tending to produce
one in our own. You will perceive that I refer to the
extraordinary proceedings of M. Genet, during the
short period in which he was the accredited rainister of
the French Republic to the United States. Neverthe
less, to the anarchical proceedings of himself and his
agents, to their flagrant insults to the authority of the
laws, and to their endeavors to involve us in a foreign
war, was opposed only the exercise of the established
powers of government. Where the danger from these
acts was not irarainent, they were borne with from
sentiments of regard to his nation ; from a sense of
their friendship towards us, and from a conviction that
they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the
actions of a person who so Uttle represented our mutual
dispositions. To this forbearance, indeed, a reUance
15*

174 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
on the firraness of our citizens, in their principles of
peace and order, proportionally contributed.
" This man, agreeably to our request, was speedily
recalled; and in his successor we hoped to find that
candor and moderation which, superseding all suspi
cions, would perrait us to indulge in that pleasing
araity and those cordial good wishes which our orig
inal sentiraents inspired. But here, too, we Avere in no
sraall degree disappointed. Prorapt to coraplain, on
the slightest cause, and not seldora on mistaken
ground ; equally ready to charge, as violations of our
treaty, acts which, on a fair exposition of the articles,
were perfectly innocent, and founded on the neutral
ground we had taken ; an unpleasant altercation soon
began, and towards the close of his mission rose to a
degree of asperity, accompanied with a raarked aliena
tion frora the governraent, and a studied neglect of
those civilities which foreign rainisters were accus
tomed to render to the chief magistrate of the United
States. A siraple reraark raight seera to account for
this issue of M. Fauchet's raission. He received his
appointraent under the adrainistration of Robespierre.
The change of systera consequent on the death of that
scourge of France and opprobriura of huraan nature
was foUowed by a change in the representation of
France to the United States. In M. Adet we trusted
to experience aU that frankness and aU those evidences
of confidence which the sincerity of our governraent
and its real good-wUl to France raight justly chaUenge.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 175
He was inforraed by the President hiraself of the true
situation of the United States, and in the raost friendly
as weU as the most serious manner, cautioned to avoid
the rock on which the harmony that attended the com
raenceraent of his predecessor's raission had been
Avrecked. M. Adet received this inforraation and these
cautions with that propriety and apparent cordiality
which might be Ipoked for in a raan of sense and a well-
disposed rainister. But, although no interruption of
custoraary civilities has ever happened, although the
external appearance of harmony subsists, his conduct
has plainly indicated a distrust in the government, — a
distrust probably cherished, perhaps excited, by those of
our OAVn citizens, with whom he was chiefly associated.
Under such circumstances, the best interests of the two
nations raay be injured by rautual jealousies ; for dis-
tiust on one side begets suspicion on the other. Un
happily, as was natural, the distrusts and jealousies of
the rainisters have been comraunicated to their nation,
to the governraent of their nation, and while they con
sider the people of the United States as the warm and
invariable friends of France, they have been persuaded
to believe that the government is hostile to their inter
ests, and perhaps even to the principles of the Revolu
tion. Nothing can be more unfounded than this opin
ion concerning the governraent of the United States,
and nothing is .raore important to the interests of the
two countries than its eradication, — than the restora
tion of mutual confidence as the basis of rautual good-

176 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
will, and of the exercise of offices highly and recipro
cally beneficial.
" Faithfully to represent the disposition of the govern
raent and people of the United States (for their dis
position is one), to reraove jealousies and to obviate
complaints by showing that they are groundless, to
restore that rautual confidence which has been so un
fortunately and injuriously irapaired, and to explain
the relative interests of both countries, and the real
sentiment of your own, are the immediate objects of
your mission."
The French governraent, however, did not intend to
be conciliated. Trusting to the erroneous and exag
gerated representations of their ministers, ^ all of them
men of raost distempered political fancy, — they as
suraed that there was a broad gulf between the syrapa
thies of the Araerican people and the sentiraent of their,
government ; that the final triumph of the popular pas
sion was certain, and that they could, by the influence
of their agents, direct and control the national policy of
the United States. Considering Mr. Monroe's appoint
raent as a concession by the governraent to the popular
sentiment, they conciliated hira in order to strengthen
the party of which he was a distinguished raember,
relying upon that party to defeat the English treaty.
When these anticipations were disappointed, — when
the result of the discussion in both the House and the
Senate proved the strength of the governraent, and the
recall of Mr. Monroe its resolution to raaintain its

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 177
ground, dissatisfaction Avarmed into anger. The appoint
raent of General Pinckney, the brother of the minister
to England, the knowii personal friend of the President,
and one of the most erainent .raerabers of the Federal
party, put an end to all hesitation. For sorae time
before his recaU, the Directory had treated Mr. Monroe
with marked coolness ; * but iraraediately upon the news
of this change, their attentions Avere renewed, and until
his departure, he was the object of raost flattering
attention. General Pinckney arrived at Bourdeaux on the 15th
of November, 1796, and was received with all the
courtesy and distinction to which his official character
entitled him. He proceeded overland to Paris, where
the usual preUminary steps were taken, in order to his
formal presentation to the constituted authorities ;
when, without the slightest previous intiraation, M.
De la Croix addressed the foUowing note to Mr. Mon
roe, Deceraber 11, 1796 : —
" Citizen Minister : I hastened to lay before the
Executive Directory the copies of your letters of recall,
and of the letters of credence of Mr. Pinckney, whora
the President has appointed to succeed you in quality of
Minister Plenipotentiary frora the United States near
the French RepubUc. The Directory has charged rae
to notify you, ' that it will not acknowledge nor re
ceive another Minister Plenipotentiary from the United
* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 37.

178 diplomatic histort.
States, until after the redress of the grievances de
manded of the American government, and which the
French Republic has a right to expect from it.'
" I pray you to be persuaded, citizen rainister, that this
determination having become necessary, allows to sub
sist between the French Republic and the American
people the affection founded upon forraer benefits and
reciprocal interests; an affection which you yourself
have taken a pleasure in cultivating by every raeans in
your power."
The personal treatment of General Pinckney, after
this letter, was marked by intentional and aggravated
discourtesy. Refusing to recognize hira as an accred
ited rainister, they refused also to furnish him with the
permit necessary to warrant his stay in Paris as a pri
vate stranger. In violation of his official character,
which was indisputable, he was subjected to the super
vision of the police, and finally enjoined to leave the
territory of the Republic. Accordingly, after two or ¦
three spirited attempts to vindicate his positioji and
maintain his diplomatic privilege, he reraoved, early in
1797, to Arasterdara, and, inforraing his government of
the recent occurrences, there waited further insti-uc-
tions. During this period. General Pinckney was not
idle. He kept up a constant correspondence with
Paris, and had, at one tirae, great reason to hope that
his mission would be re-opened with fairer chances of
success. On June 28, 1797, he Avrote to the depart
ment, from the Hague ; —

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. '179
" On the 20th, M. Pastoret, in the council of Five
Hundred, referred to the article of the constitution
which vests in the legislature the right of declaring war
on the requisition of the Directory : ' There exists,'
said he, ' a people to whora we are united by treaties,
and yet whose particular situation with regard to us
we are ignorant of. The Directory appears to treat the
Araericans as eneraies, and yet the legislature have
not declared war against thera. The arrets of the 12th
Ventose seeras to suppose, that, in violation of the
treaty of 1778, the Araericans had coraraitted hos
tilities against us. The commissioners of the Directory,
in the colonies, applaud themselves for having taken
measures by which French privateers have raade a great
nuraber pf Araerican prizes. But what right had they
to fit out privateers against this people ? What laAV
authorizes them to do so ?
" ' It is true, that the treaty of 1794, concluded with
England, our most inveterate eneray, excites well-
grounded suspicion with respect to the intentions of the
governraent of the United States ; but this cannot be a
sufficient reason for the Directory violating, Avith respect
to thera, both the constitution and the law ; besides, at
that time, we had no marine to assist us in protect
ing their commerce, and our miserable country was a
prey to the most dreadful anarchy.' ,
" He finished with moving, first, that the Directory be
required to give an account of the actual political rela
tions of France and the United States. Secondly, that

180 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the arrets of the 12th Ventose and the 17th Germinale,
concerning the treaties Avith the Araerican governraent,
should be referred to a coraraission to report on the
question, whether the legislature can annul the arraes
of the Directory. Both these propositions were referred
to a committee of five raembers, and the speech was
ordered to be printed. . . . The raeasure was recora
mended by the new Director. By raeans of  , at
Paris, I am informed that Barras will join Bartheleray
in our favor. Astonishing ; but though the authority
appears good, I can hardly credit it. Your letter to rae,
of the 16th of January, has been read, not only by the
merabers of the legislature in France, but also by most
of the officers of governraent. M. Segur, who writes
soraetiraes in our favor, wishes the case of .gratitude
had been treated raore moderately ; but it was abso
lutely necessary to ans-w^er the continual charges of
ingratitude and perfidy, nor do I conceive it could have
been done with greater mildness. To the thousand
copies I directed originaUy to be distiibuted, I have
added five hundred more, as many of our consuls in the
ports of France are writing for them, saying they have
had a wonderful effect upon the rainds of many per
sons, both in and out of office, who neither knew the
facts, nor were aware of the arguments used." *
From further despatches it appears, that, although the
majority of the commission were disposed to raake a
* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. U3-U5.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 181
favorable report, they felt consti-ained, in view of the
iraraediate circumstances of their domestic policy,
and the negotiations Avith England then pending at
Lisle, to postpone their action; and before General
Pinckney had an opportunity to test the sincerity of the
feeling, which seeraed evidently growing raore friendly,
a change in the character of his raission, as well as
great changes in the political relations of French par
ties, altered the character of the negotiation.
Owing to the iraraense tirae then necessary to the
tiansraission of coraraunications between Europe and
Araerica, General Pinckney's despatch, announcing his
rejection, did not reach Philadelphia until after the
Presidential election. General Washington's official
life had closed, and John Adams, the Vice-President
during his administration, had been chosen President.
Although party spirit still ran high, and the sympathies
of a large party in the country were unduly excited in
behalf of French politics, the news of General Pinck
ney's rejection provoked universal and patiiotic indig
nation. But the condition of the country was too per
Uous to be trusted to the council of passion, however
natural. While some difference of opinion existed, the
wisest and best raen of both parties desired reconcilia
tion. Alexander Harailton, the forraer Secretary of the
Treasury,' and leader of the Federal party, and who,
indeed, possessed a larger influence with that great
party than the President himself, was urgent for a
resumption of negotiations. In a letter, dated April 5,
16

182 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
1797, in reply to a raeraber of the Cabinet, with whom
he differed, he said : —
" The situation of our country, my dear sir, is singu
larly critical. . . . Either to be in rupture with France,
united with England alone, or singly, as is possible,
would be a raost unwelcome situation. Divided as we
are, who can say what Avould be hazarded by it ? In
such a situation, it appears to me we should rather err
on the side of condescension, than on the opposite side.
We ought .to do every thing to avoid a rupture, with
out unworthy sacrifices. No raeasure can tend more to
this than an extraordinary raission. And it is certain,
that, to fulfil the ends proposed, it ought to erabrace a
character in whora France and the opposition have fuU
credit. . . . Besides, there ought to be certain leading
instructions, frora which they raay not deviate. I agree
with you, that we have nothing to retract; that we
ought to risk every thing before we submit to any dis
honorable terms. But we raay remould our treaties;
we may agree to put France on the sarae footing as
Great Britain, by our treaty with her. We raay also
Uquidate, with a view to future wars, the iraport of the
mutual guaranty in the treaty of aUiance ; substituting
specific succors, and defining the casus fcederis. But
this last may or may not be done, though with me it is
a favorite object." *
When, therefore, the President, in his special mes-
* Gibbs's Administration, Vol. I. p. 489-490.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 183
sage to Congress, an extra session of which he had
iraraediately convened, declared, after giving a history
of the transaction : —
" It is ray desire, and in this I presurae I concur with
you and our constituents, to preserve peace and friend
ship with all nations; and believing that neither the
honor nor the interest of the United States absolutely
forbid the repetition of advances for securing these de
sirable objects with France, I shaU institute a fresh
atterapt at negotiation, and shall not faU to proraote
and accelerate an accommodation, on terms compat
ible with the rights, duties, interests, and honor of the
nation ; "
The Senate, in their address, responded : —
" We do, therefore, most sincerely approve of your
determination to proraote and accelerate an accorarao
dation of our existing differences with that republic, on
terras corapatible with the rights, duties, interests, and
honor of our nation, and you may rest assured of our
cordial coijperation, so far as it may becorae necessary
in this pursuit."
Andthe House of Representatives, replied: —
" Sensibly as we feel the wound which has been
infficted by the transactions disclosed in your com
raunications, yet we thmk with you, that neither the
honor nor the interest of the United States forbid the
repetition of advances for preserving peace. We, there
fore, receive with the utmost satisfaction your inforraa-

184 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
tion that a fresh atterapt at negotiation will be insti
tuted." The wisdora of this resolution can scarcely be dis
puted, but the raode of its execution was open to very
grave objections. Mr. Adams determined to appoint
two additional ministers, to assist General Pinckney in
resuming the negotiations.
Now, in the first place. General Pinckney's de
spatches, although in justice it must be said that they
did not arrive in tirae to influence the President's de
cision, indicated that there was a growing feeling in
favor of the American cause. A large raajority in the
Council of Five Hundred disapproved of the impolitic
and discourteous proceedings of the Minister for For
eign Affairs ; the committee to whora the whole matter
had been referred were prepared to report against the
conduct of their government, and only delayed the pre
sentation of their report from raotives of prudential
policy; public opinion had been reached by raeans of
the American state papers, which General Pinckney
had tianslated and circulated in France ; and Talley
rand hiraself, as late as July, 1797, had courteously
expressed the hope that he Avould soon have the pleas
ure of seeing General Pinckney again in Paris.* The
return and recognition of General • Pinckney would
have been altogether the fittest and fullest acknoAA'ledg-
* C. C. P. MSS. Letter Book, p. 173 etpassim.

JDIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 185
ment of the Avrong which had been done ; and in view
of his integrity, firmness, and ability, would have been
the best guarantee 'for the sincerity and success of the
negotiations. In the next place, the appointment of a coraraission,
including raen of opposite political opinions in refer
ence to the very subject of negotiation, was only sow
ing, in advance, the seeds of difference in the corarais
sion itself, and of discontent araong parties at horae.
For, it was certain, that, in a coraraission of three, one
party must be in a powerless rainority ; and the private
history of the tirae proves that it was irapossible to per
suade a firstrate raan of the opposition to accept, in
face of the experience of Mr. Monroe's mission, so dis
tasteful and responsible a position.
And, finally, the presence of the representatives of
differing opinions in the commission subjected it to
the Avily intrigues of the accomplished diplomatist then
at the head of foreign affairs in France, — kept alive
the behef in the French raind that there was a party in
the United States whom they could conciliate at the
expense of the government, and thus weakened the
stiength of the negotiators in a contest Avhere they
needed firraness, energy, and, above aU, unaniraity.
In pursuance of his plan, however, Mr. Adams nom
inated, to join General Pinckney, John Marshall of Vir
ginia, one of the raost distinguished Federalists of the
day, and, in after times, one of the most illustrious of all
the great raen of the country, and Elbridge Gerry of
16'

186 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Massachusetts, who A^as a very conspicuous raember
of the opposition, and who, coming frora the sarae
State as the President, shared his friendship, and pos
sessed raore of his confidence than any other public
raan of the sarae political party. The history of this
raission is painful and unprofitable, for it effected noth
ing, and ended in sore hurailiation to the countiy.
On the 4th of October, 1797, the three envoys
reached Paris, and on the Sth were forraally and courte
ously received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But
this first step was, their only one; for while all direct
conference with the rainister upon the business of their
mission was perseveringly postponed, they were ap
proached by inforraal agents, and through thera sounded
as to propositions alike dishonorable to hira from whom-
they carae, and unworthy of those before whora they
were laid. The details of this raiserable intrigue, and
the conduct and character of the agents who raanaged
it, do not deserve historical record. It corabined aU the
raeanness of cunning and the tenacious energy of
avarice ; but it was base in conception, clurasy in con
trivance, and fruitless in result.*
* The history of this intrigue, generally known as the X. Y. Z.
correspondence, can be found at length in the pubhshed despatches
of the ministers, and in the general histories of the United States.
Another, and very full account, will be found in the Life of Talley
rand, published in the continuation of the Biographie Universelle. In
this latter, Talleyrand's character is more unscrupulously attacked
than even by American histories. I cannot attach much Importance

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 187
It is sufficient to state, that through agents whora he
afterAvards, but in vain, disavowed, Talleyrand endeav
ored to coraproraise the Araerican envoys in prelirai
nary discussions. He raade three propositions, the ante
cedent conditions of any serious negotiation : — 1. An
apology for the language used by the President of the
United States in his raesriage to Congress in reference
to the conduct of the French governraent, both in their
fareweU of Mr. Monroe and their reception, or rather
rejection, of Mr. Pinckney. 2. A loan from the United
States government to the French Republic. And, 3. a
point which was urged with scandalous pertinacity, —
the gift of a large sura of raoney to the raerabers of the
Directory, with the exception of MerUn, who, the envoys
were frankly informed, derived, as Minister of Justice,
sufficient perquisites frora the prizes which he con
fiscated in violation of the soleran treaties between the
two governraents.
, The Araerican ministers listened with long suffering
patience to the discussion of these points, varied, as
they occasionally were, by reference to the real points at
issue between the two governments. But they were
decided, that any explanation of the language of the
President addressed to the national legislature France
had no right to demand, and no hope to obtain ; that
any negotiation touching a loan was clearly beyond
to the transaction, and have not therefore dwelt upon it In de
tail.

188 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
their powers, and must, be referred back for instructions ;
and that they could not even consider the proposition
bf personal remuneration to the Directory.
Having waited in vain for months, in hopes of direct
coraraunication with the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
they addressed to hira, January 27, 1798, a long and
very able letter, reviewing the various grounds of differ
ence between the two countries, and concluding with
the following language : —
" Perceiving no probabiUty of being alloAved to enter,
in the usual forms, on those discussions which might
tend to restore harraony between the two repubhcs,
they have deeraed it raost advisable, even under the cir
curastances of inforraality which attend the raeasure, to
address to your governraent, through you, this candid
review of the conduct, and this true representation of
the sentiraents and wishes, of the governraent of the
United States. They pray that it raay be received in
the teraper with which it is written, and considered as
an additional effort, growing out of a disposition cora
raon to the governraent and people of America, to cul
tivate and restore, if it be possible, harmony between
the two republics. If, citizen rainister, there reraains a
hope that these desirable objects can be effected by any
raeans which the United States have authorized, the
undersigned wiU stiU • soUcit, and wiU stUl respectfully
attend, the developraent of those means.
" If, on the contrary, no such hope remains, they have
only to pray that their return to their own country raay

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 189
be facilitated; and they will leave France with the
raost deep-felt regret, that neither the real and sincere
friendship which the governraent of the United States
has so uniforraly and unequivocaUy displayed for this
great republic, nor its continued efforts to deraonstrate
the purity of its conduct and intentions, can protect its
citizens, or preserve thera frora the calaraities which
they have sought, by a just and upright conduct, to
avert." Two very unsatisfactory interviews with Talleyrand
followed this coraraunication ; and on the 18th of
March, he replied at length to the despatch of the en
voys. The spirit of this reply would, in itself, have
precluded aU further discussion ; but it contained a
paragraph which effectuaUy closed aU coramunication.
" It is, therefore," said Talleyrand, " only in order to
sraooth the way of discussion that the undersigned has
entered into the preceding explanations. It is with the
sarae view that he declares to the coraraissioners and
euA'oys extraordinary, that, notwithstanding the kind
of prejudice that has been entertained with respeet
to thera, the Executive Directory is disposed to treat
with that one of the three, whose opinions, presumed
to be raore impartial, promise in the course of the ex
planation more of that reciprocal confidence which is
indispensable." Upon the receipt of this letter, Messrs. Pinckney and
Marshall terrainated their raission. That they fully
represented the sentiraent of their government, was

190 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
raanifested in a despatch, which did not, however, reach
thera, until after their withdrawal. That despatch,
dated March 23, 1798, conveyed the following explicit
instructions : —
" 1. That if you are in treaty with persons authorized
by the Directory, on the subjects of your raission, then
you are to remain and expedite the corapletion of the
treaty, if it should not be concluded. Before this letter
gets to your hand, you will have ascertained whether
the negotiation is or is not conducted with candor on
the part of the French government ; and if you shaU
have discovered a clear design to procrastinate, you are
to break off the negotiation, demand your passports,
and return home. For you will consider that suspense
is ruinous to the essential interests of your countiy.
" 2. That if, on the receipt of this letter, you shall not
have been received, or, whether received or not, if you
shall not be in tieaty with persons duly authorized by
the Directory, with fuU and equal poAvers, you are to
deraand your passports and return.
" 3. In no event is a treaty to be purchased with
raoney, by loan or otherwise. There can be no safety
in a treaty so obtained. A loan to the Republic would
violate our neutrality, and a douceur to the raen now in
power might, by their successors, be urged as a reason
for annulling the treaty, or as a precedent for further
and repeated demands."
Unfortunately, the history of this mission does not
close here. Mr. Gen-y became the dupe of the astute

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 191
but unprincipled rainister with whom he dealt. He
consented at the outset of the negotiations to receive
and discuss propositions which he was pledged to keep
secret from his colleagues ; he coraraitted hiraself in
private to opinions -which contradicted the record of the
despatches which bore his signature ; and when, having
exhausted all honorable expedients, his feUow rainisters
withdrew in patriotic indignation, he becarae a party to
their huraUiation, and remained in Paris to renew dis
cussions which were idle, upon propositions which were
dishonorable. It is tiue, that, in reply to a note from Talleyrand,
proposing " a day upon which to resurae our reciprocal
coraraunications upon the interests of the French Re
public and the United States of Araerica," he said, " I
can only, then, confer inforraally and unaccredited on
any subject respecting our raission, and coraraunicate
to the governraent of the United States the result of
such conferences ; being, in ray individual capacity, un
authorized to give thera an official starap." It is tiue,
that he said and believed that war would be the result
of his departure ; but his duty was clear, and the rebuke
adrainistered by the Secretary of State, in a despatch of
June 25th, most justly deserved.
" The respect due to yourselves and to your country
irresistibly required that you should turn your backs to
a governraent that treated both with conterapt, a con
terapt not diminished but aggravated by the flattering
but insidious distinction in your favor, in disparage-

192 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT
ment of men of such respectable talents, untainted
honor, and pure patriotisra, as Generals Pinckney and
Marshall, and in whom their government and country
reposed entire confidence ; and, especially, when the real
object ofthe distinction was to enable the French gov
ernment, trarapling on the authority and dignity of our
own, to designate an envoy with whora they would con
descend to negotiate. ... It is presuraed that you will
consider the instructions of the. 23d of March, before
raentioned,' as an effectual recall; lest, however, by any
possibility, those instructions should not have reached
you, and you should stiU be in France, I am directed by
the President to transmit you this letter, and to inforra
you that you are to consider it as a positive letter of re
call." The coraraunications between Mr. Gerry and Tal
leyrand, after the departure of his coUeagues, are of
no historical consequence. TaUeyrand's letters raani
fest but slender regard for so weak an instiuraent as
he soon found he had secured; andwhen the publica
tion of the despatches at horae gave to the world the
history of the sraaU and_ disgraceful intrigue which
TaUeyrand had conducted through his informal agents,
that minister with bold effrontery disavowed his sub
alterns, appealed to Mr. Gerry to vindicate his inno
cence, and involved him in a correspondence which
only added to the bitterness of the unfortunate envoy's
raortification. Whatever raay have been IMi-. Gerry's
private virtues, and virtues he undoubtedly had, 

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 193
whatever may have been his public services, and some
he had rendered, — of his conduct in this negotiation
impartial history can only record, that it was false to
himself, faithless to his coUeagues, and fatal to the
honor and interest of his country.*
The news of this second, and, in its accorapanying
circurastances, even raore aggravating failure, the suc
cessive arrival of the baffled plenipotentiaries, and the
publication of the despatches, excited in the country
universal indignation. Mr. Adaras called an extra
session of Congress, and, by his message, rallied to the
support of his administration the full and active syra
pathy of th-e Avhole nation. The national legislature
responded promptly to the popular feeling, and adopted
measures which indicated both their conviction of the
gravity of the crisis and their resolution to meet it.
The necessary legislation was passed to increase the
array and navy, and to provide for the requisite raeans
of defence. The coraraand-in-chief • was offered to and
* In the second volume of the Life of Gerry, by James T. Austin,
Boston, 1829, will be found an earnest and elaborate defence of Mr.
Gerry's conduct in this mission. I cannot think it satisfactory, but it
ought to be carefully read by any one who wishes to form an Impartial
opinion. I have, in the text of this volume, confined myself to con
clusions without the detail of the argument. To have reasoned out
every conclusion would have made this a book of episodes, or re
quired another volume of notes. Besides which, I know nothing
more unprofitable than a repetition of the personal controversies of
that' day, which were more numerous and more bitter than at any
other period of our history. 17

194 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
accepted by Washington. Merchant vessels were per
raitted to arra in their own protection, and the Presi
dent was authorized to instruct the public armed ves
sels, and issue coraraissions to private ones, to capture
French arraed vessels, wherever found. And an act
was passed; aUeging the repeated violation of the
treaties between the two countries, the just clairas of
the United States for reparation, and the coraplete faU
ure of all atterapts at honorable settleraent, and, for
these reasons, declaring the treaties with France void.
While urging upon Congress these and kindred
measures, Mr. Adams stiU expressed his readiness to
accept any araicable adjustraent of these national dif
ficulties consistent with the countiy's honor ; but in his
raessage of June, 1798, he expressly declared, " I Avill
never send another rainister to France without assur
ances that he will be received, respected, and honored
as the representative of a great, free, powerful, and
independent nation." Earnest and resolute to prepare
the country for the conflict that seeraed inevitable, Mr.
Adaras yet realized fully the perUous condition in
which a war with France would involve the nation,
and whUe these preparations were in progress, Avithout
abating one jot of zeal in their conduct, influenced by
what he considered a change of conditions in France,
he resolved once raore to atterapt negotiation.
The effect of this resolution upon politics at horae
was decisive, and, as far as the great Federal party was
concerned, destructive ; and these consequences have, in

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 195
a large raeasure, prevented an irapartial consideration
of its raerits as a raeasure of foreign policy. As such it
deserves the gravest attention. For the circurastances
under which he was compeUed to act, Mr. Adams was
in no way responsible. The policy of neutrality, a
pohcy erainently wise and honorable, had been initi
ated and persevered in by Washington's adrainistiation.
To avoid a war Avith England, negotiation had been
resorted to, which evidenced no foolish sensitiveness as
to national honor, and resulted in no extravagant advan
tage to the national interest. The very success of this
negotiation had coraplicated our relations with France ;
and the natural, the necessary, consequence of Jay's
treaty was, that the succeeding adrainistiation was
compelled to do in reference to France what that treaty
had done in reference to England, or else the whole
neutial pohcy of the country had to be abandoned. To
abandon this neutrality was to render useless the
laborious diplomacy of the last eight years ; and, in
fact, to pass the raost pointed condemnation upon Mr.
Jay's treaty, for that treaty would have been the osten
sible cause of the French dissatisfaction. Justice, there
fore, to the administration of Washington, as well as to
the great interests of the nation, required Mr. Adaras to
exhaust every honorable means of amicable adjustraent
before he resorted to the perilous venture of war. The
country was no better prepared for hostilities at this
tirae than at the signature of the treaty of London.
Public opinion, though for the raoment roused into

196 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
unaniraous indignation at the insolence of the Direc
tory, was stiU very rauch divided, both as to raen and to
raeasures; and the increased and onerous taxation
necessary to a war policy would have aggravated the
difference. Besides this, a Avar with France alraost
necessarily irapUed an aUiance with England ; and,
terrainate hoAV it raight, seemed to involve the unavoid
able sacrifice of national independence. For, scarcely
able to stand alone, with an amount of domestic legis
lation to perfect which required aU the temper, time,
and talent of its rulers, how was it possible, in such a
conflict, that the interest and honor of the country could
escape being crushed between the upper and nether
mUl-stone of the contending nations ? More than this,
a war with France was war with Spain ; and aheady,
at Lisle, where England and France were endeavoring
to adjust a peace, propositions had been suggested
looking to the cession of New Orleans to England.* It
involved probable difficulty with Portugal, with whora,
on account of its relations Avith the Barbary powers, the
United States were particularly anxious to be on arai
cable terras. For, although Portugal had been the
norainal ally of England, yet during the negotiations at
Lisle, in which England raade the interests of Portugal
a subject of indispensable settleraent, the Portuguese
* " Trinidad in our hands, PlevIUe said, would turn to great
account. So would New Orleans, and he Immediately saw its conse
quences as to the Americans." — Lord Malmesbury's Diary, July 8,
1797, VoL IIL, p. 370.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 197
rainister at Paris treacherously concluded a raost unex
pected peace with Talleyrand, a step which seriously
and most unfairly embarrassed the EngUsh negotiator.
It proraised trouble at the Hague, and, in fact, interfered
directly Avith all our European relations ; and, by mix
ing up the only independent power in America with
the contest in Europe, suggested and excused the dis
position of possessions in America as a raeans of terri
torial adjustraent in the final arrangeraent of an Euro
pean peace.
To avoid war, therefore, at almost any hazard, was
clearly the interest of the United States. All that Mr.
Adams was boUnd to consider on the other hand, Avas,
first, that the country should not be humiUated in - its
advances ; and secondly, that there should exist sorae
reasonable prospect of a fair settleraent.
It cannot be denied that the conduct of the Directory
had been insolent in the extrerae ; but this diploraatic
impertinence was not displayed for the sole or special
benefit of the United States. At the same time that
they refused to receive Mr. Pinckney, they dismissed
Lord Malmesbury frora Paris, with alraost conteraptu
ous rudeness.* The negotiations at Lisle, resuraed by
* " Burke was strongly opposed to pacific negotiations with
France, and taxed the government with meanness In proposing
them. Somebody observing that the badness of the roads had ren
dered Lord Malmesbury's journey a slow one, he replied, ' no won
der, as he went the whole way on his knees.' " — Diary and Corresp.
of Lord Malmesbury, Vol. IIL, p. 311, note.
17*

198 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the English governraent very rauch in the sarae man
ner as the United States rencAved their discussion
through Messrs. Pinckney, MarshaU, and Gerry, were
characterized by the same dishonoring and irritating
tiaits. These negotiations were terminated, unsuccess
fuUy, only a few days before the arrival in Paris of the
Araerican coraraissioners. And the diary of Lord
Malraesbury, the English rainister, and one of the raost
celebrated diploraatists of any age or country, and his
correspondence with Lord Grenville and Mr. Canning,
are full of constant coraplaint. The sarae deceitful delay,
the sarae vague discussion, the same secret intermedi
aries, the sarae suspicion, almost certainty, of diplomatic
manoeuvring on the part of the Directory for the base
purposes of stockjobbing and money raaking. Besides
this, it is clear th-at this dishonorable conduct was not
the action of the French people. As the extiact already
quoted frora Mr. Pinckney's despatches shows, and other
sources confirra, there were two parties in the country,
the one foUowing Barras, Rewbell, and Lar^veiUiere, the
other siding with Carnot and Bartheleray : the first, rude,
Jacobinical, aggressive, insolent; the other, disposed to
act in good faith, and with a view to broad and fair
national interests. The uncertainty of these paraUel
negotiations with England and the United States fur
nishes continual evidence of the fluctuating strength of
those parties in the Directory. And thus the United
States raight very well have resolved to retort the policy
of Genet, Fauchet, and Adet, and refuse to acknowl-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 199
edge the discourteous diploraacy of the Directory as an
expression of the French national feeling. But, fortu
nately for Mr. Adams, he was not forced to any such
palliating construction. Just before the arrival of the
Araerican commissioners, this contest in the Directory
had resulted in the triuraph of one party, and Barras
and his fr?ends were confirraed in power, while, at the
same tirae, the peace of Carapo Forraio crowned with
victory the pohcy of the French Republic. Frora this
period the diploraacy of France assuraed a raore regular,
if not a raore raoderate, character; and although the
Araerican rainisters derived no -immediate advantage
frora the change, although their negotiation seeraed
rather the expiring effort of the disgraceful systera which
had hitherto existed, yet they had scarcely returned
home before an improvement began to raanifest itself
in the conduct of French affairs. Talleyrand himself,
in a manner, — indirect, it is true, but recognized and
constantly repeated in diploraatic history, — made ad
vances to the government of the United States. The
negotiations had been closed, and the rainisters had re
turned horae early in 1798. In the August of the sarae
year, M. Pichon, the Secretary of the French Legation
at the Hague, acting evidently under instructions, had
an inforraal conversation Avith Mr. Vans Murray, the
newly appointed Araerican rainister to that place. In
the course of his conferences with the Araerican rain
ister, he showed him the correspondence between Tal
leyrand and himself, in which the forraer signified his

200 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
satisfaction at the step taken by M. Pichon, expressed
his own anxiety to see the negotiation resumed and
terrainated amicably, and declared the readiness of his
governraent to receive and treat with the fullest consid
eration any rainister frora the United States. These
letters were forwarded by Mr. Murray to the President ;
and in February, 1799, Mr. Adaras, basing his action
upon this correspondence, norainated Mr. Murray as
rainister to France. This noraination not giving satis
faction, he joined Avith Mr. Murray, Chief Justice EUs
worth, of Connecticut, and Governor Davie, of North
Carolina. But this coraraission — and it is to be re
gretted that it was a coraraission instead of a single
rainister — was not to enter Frence until distinct and
official assurance had been received of their certain and
honorable reception.
On the 12th of May, 1799, Talleyrand, in reply to
Mr. Murray's notification of his appointraent and its
condition, said, " Be pleased to transrait to your col
leagues, and to receive yourself, the frank and explicit
assurance that it (the governraent) will receive the en
voys of the United States in the official character with
which they are invested; that they shaU enjoy aU the
prerogatives which are attached to it by the law of
nations, and that one or raore rainisters shall be duly
authorized to treat with thera."
On the 30th of March, 1800, the Araerican envoys
raet in Paris, and on the 7th were officially presented to
the First Consul ; for since their appointment, another

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 201
and greater revolution had occurred in the forra of the
French governraent.
The position of the Araerican rainisters on this occa
sion differed very raaterially from that occupied by
General Pinckney, or the commission which succeeded
hira. The forraer ambassadors had borne the remon
strances of one friendly and alUed nation to another,
and their representations were based upon existing
tieaties, which determined the relations of the two gov
ernraents to each pther. And these treaties indicated a
connection of such rautual advantage as to recoraraend
to both a prorapt and an amicable solution of their
difficulties. But, by the act of the American Congress,
these treaties were now declared void, and the question
of the inderanity for the wrongs coraplained of stood
unsupported by the consequential advantages of the
treaties, and would, therefore, inevitably involve in its
discussion a new arrangement of equivalents. The task
of the first ministers had been to settle a difficulty ; the
object of the present Avas to negotiate a treaty, in every
respect a more arduous undertaking. The instructions
to the new rainisters exhibited this difference. The
business details of the instructions Avere prefaced by a
stateraent of the circurastances under which the nego
tiation was undertaken..
" You have been witnesses of the enduring patience
of the United States under the unexampled aggressions,
depredations, and hostUities, authorized and sanctioned
by the French RepubUc, against the comraerce and

202 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
citizens of the United States ; and- you are weU in
formed of the raeasures adopted by our governraent to
put a stop to these evils, to obtain redress for the in
jured, and real peace and security to our country. And
you know, that, instead of indemnity for past wrongs,
our very moderate deraands have been iraraediately
followed by new aggressions and raore extended dep
redations ; while our rainisters, seeking redress and
reconciliation, have been refused a reception, treated
with indignities, and finaUy driven from its territo
ries. " The conduct of the French RepubUc would weU
have justified an immediate declaration of war on the
part of the United Stg;tes ; but, desirous of maintaining
peace, and still wilUng to leave open the door of recon
ciliation with France, the United States contented
theraselves with preparations for defence, and measures
calculated to protect their commerce.
" The treatment experienced by the former envoys of
the United States to the French Republic having de
terrained the President not to send thither other rain
isters, without direct and unequivocal assurances, previ
ously signified by its Minister of Foreign Relations, that
they would be received in character to an audience of
the Directory, and that they should enjoy all the pre
rogatives attached to that character by the law of na
tions, and that a minister or rainisters of equal powers
should be appointed and coraraissioned to treat with
them; the French government, by M. TaUeyrand, its

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 203
Minister of Foreign Relations, has declared that it wUl
receive the envoys of the United States in the official
character with which they are invested ; that they shall
enjoy all the privileges annexed to it by the law of
nations, and that one or more ministers shall be duly
authorized to treat with them. This the President
deems to be substantially the assurance which he re
quired as the previous condition of the envoys entering
on their raission. It now belongs to you, gentleraen,
that this assurance be verified. Your country wiU not
subrait to any new indignity or neglect. It is expected,
when you shaU have asserabled at Paris, and have
given official notice of it to the Minister of Foreign
Relations, that you wUl be received to an audience of
the Executive Directory ; that a rainister or rainisters,
with powers equal to yours, will be appointed to treat
with you ; and that within twenty days at furthest, after
your arrival at Paris, your negotiation will be com
menced. K, however, your passports to Paris should
be unseasonably withheld ; if an audience of the Direc
tory should be denied or procrastinated ; if the appoint
ment of a rainister or ministers with equal powers to
treat Avith you should be delayed ; or if, when appointed,
they postpone the intended negotiation ; you are to
relinquish your mission, demand your passports, and
leave France ; and, having once resolved to terminate
the raission, you are not to resurae it, whatever fresh
overtures or assurances raay be made to you by the
French government.

204 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
" One, more liraitatiou. The subjects of difference
between the United States and France have often, been
discussed, and are weU understood, and therefore adrait
of a speedy decision. The negotiation is expected to
be concluded in 'such tirae that you raay certainly era
bark for the United States by the 1st of next April.
This is highly iraportant, in order that, on your return.
Congress raay be found in session to take those meas
ures which the result of your mission shall require. If
it can be earlier concluded, it wiU be stiU better.
" If any of the periods above mentioned should be
prolonged with your assent, it is expected that the cir
cumstances wiU be .stated for your justification."
They were then instiucted to demand, as an indis
pensable condition of any treaty, a stipulation for in-
derhnity for all condemnation or captures raade con
trary to the laAV of nations, and in violation of the pro
visions of the treaty of 1778, whUe that ti-eaty was
in force, especiaUy where such conderanation or cap
ture was made on either of the three foUowing pre
texts : —
1. Because the vessel's lading, or any part thereof,
consisted of provisions or merchandise coming from
England or her possessions.
2. Because the vessels were not provided with the
roles d^equipage prescribed by the laws of France, and
which, it had been pretended, were also required by
treaty. 3. Because sea letters or other papers were wanting,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 205
or said- to be wanting, where the property was adraitted,
or proved, to be Araerican.
4. Where the owners, masters, or supercargoes had
been refused a hearing, or placed in situations rendering
their presence at the trials impossible.
5. When the vessels or other property captured had
been sold or otherwise disposed of, without a regular
tiial or condemnation.
These indemnities were to be ascertained by a joint
coraraission. These clairas being adraitted, the rainis
ters were directed to negotiate a treaty which should
deterraine the poUtical and comraercial relations of the
two nations. Their instructibns under this head were
minute ; but the XXI. Section, only, heed be quoted.
" XXI. The 17th ahd 22d articles of the coraraercial
tieaty between the United States and France, of Febru
ary 6th, 1778, have been the source of rauch altercation
between the two nations during the present war. The
dissolution of that and our other treaties Avith France
leaves us at liberty with respect to future arrangeraents ;
Avith the exception of the now preferable right, secured
to Great Britain by the 25th article of the treaty of ara
ity and coraraerce. In that article, we proraise rautually,
that, while we continue in amity, neither party will in
future make any treaty that shaU be inconsistent with
that article or the preceding one. We cannot, there
fore, renew with France the 17th and 22d articles of
the treaty of 1778. Her aggressions, which occasioned
the dissolution of that tieaty, have deprived her of the
18

206 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
priority of rights and advantages there stipulated. In
deed, if the pubhc faith pledged in the British treaty
did not forbid a renewal of those engageraents with
France, sound policy should prevent it. We should
preserve to ourselves the right of aUoAving every com
raercial nation, in araity with us, the hke shelter, sup
pUes, and assistance under like circumstances ; and by
excluding aU equally when engaged in war, (saving to
each the rights of huraanity and hospitality,) we raay
keep the calaraities of war at a distance. The engage
raents with Great Britain raay cease in two years after
the close of the present war ; but under the stipulations
contained in the 28th and last articles of the British
treaty, the engageraent in question raay be continued
to a longer period. If, therefore, you should find any
cogent reasons foT renewing in substance the 17th and
22d articles of the coraraercial treaty with France of
1778, it raust be with the explicit declaration, that,
neither at the present or any future time, shaU the said
articles be constiued to derogate frora the whole or any
part of the 24th and 25th articles of the tieaty of araity
and comraerce and navigation between the United
States and his Britannic Majesty, concluded at London
on the 19th of Noveraber, 1794."
The instiuctions concluded with this ex;plicit declara
tion : —
" The foUowing points are to be considered ulti-
mated —
"1. That an article be inserted for estabUshing a

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 207
board with suitable powers, to hear and deterraine the
clairas of our citizens for the causes hereinbefore ex
pressed, and binding France to pay or secure pay
ment of the sums which shaU be awarded.
"2. That the treaties and consular convention, de
clared to be no longer obUgatory by act of Cpngress, be
not, in whole or in part, revived by the new treaty ; but
that aU engagements, to which the United States are
to becorae parties, be specified in the new treaty.
" 3. That no guaranty of the whole or any part of
the dorainions of France -be stipulated, nor any engage
raent made in the nature of an aUiance.
"4. That no aid or loan be promised in any form
whatever. "5. That no engagement be made inconsistent with
the obUgations of any prior treaty, and, as it raay
respect our, treaty with Great Britain, the instruc
tion herein raarked XXI. is to be particularly ob
served. "6. That no stipulation be made granting powers
to consuls or others, under color of which tiibunals can
be estabhshed within our jurisdiction, or personal privi
leges be claimed by Frencbraen, incorapatible with the
coraplete sovereignty of the United States in raatters of
poUcy, commerce, and government.
" 7. That the duration of the proposed tieaty be
Umited to twelve years, at furthest, from the day of the
exchange of the ratifications, with the exceptions respect-

208 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ing its perraanence in certain cases specified under the
instructions marked XXX." *
The plenipotentiaries opened their conferences by
exchanging their powers ; and the American envoys
having objected to the language of the French powers
as not equal in extent with their own, the French gov
ernment, although not admitting the justice of the criti
cisra, issued new powers to their rainisters, in conforra
ity to the Avishes of the Araerican coraraissioners.
Ll order to coraprehend fully the three distinct stages
through which the negotiation passed, the foUoMdng
facts must always be borne in raind.
1. That by the llth article of the tieaty of alUance,
France and the United States had rautually guaranteed
their Araerican possessions, and that by the 17th and
22d articles of the tieaty of coraraerce of 1778, they
granted to each other the rautual and exclusive privi
lege of taking their prizes and privateers into each
other's ports.
2. That by the treaty of 1794 with England, this
same exclusive privilege had been granted by the
United States to that power ; but that, owing to the
priority of the French treaty, and the exclusive char
acter of the privilege, it remained in abeyance, as far as
England was concerned, so long as the French treaty
lasted. * This instruction referred merely to the permanence of such arti
cles as concerned the settiement of claims, as long as there should be
any subject-matter for their action.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 209
3. That by the act of July, 1798, the United States
governraent had cancelled the French treaties of 1778,
and thus given priority and activity to the exclusive
privilege stipulated in the treaty with England.
After the exchange of one or two notes between the
plenipotentiaries, conveying their ' general ideas as to
the mode and principles of their negotiation, the Amer
ican commission, conceiving that the way was now pre
pared, subraitted certain propositions in the forra of a
treaty, both as the frankest raethod of expressing their
opinions, and drawing the discussion to a clear, practi
cal point. These propositions contained a general
sketch of such a treaty as their instructions warranted,
the leading article of which provided for a coraraission
to ascertain the inderanities mutuaUy due. And the
draft of this article, in necessary conforraity A\dth the
views and action of the United States, provided, in
reference to the coraraissioners, that —
" They shaU decide the claims in question according
to the original raerits of the several cases, and to justice,
equity, and the law of nations, and in all cases of com
plaint existing prior to the 1th of July, 1798, according
to the treaties and consular convention then existing
between France and the United States."
The French coraraissioners replied to this corarauni
cation, stating that, in their opinion, the liquidation and
discharge of daraages, which were the result of mutual
misunderstanding, could only be considered as the con
sequence of such a common interpretation of the exist-
18*

210 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ing treaties as the plenipotentiaries could agree upon ;
and they then proceeded.
" The ministers of the French Republic would, for
this reason, have seized the present raoment to develop
their views respecting the various interpretations which,
for years past, have been given to the treaties, if, upon
reading the second article of the project which has been
subraitted, they had not been struck with an interpreta
tion, of which they can conceive neither the cause nor
the object, and which, therefore, seeras to require expla
nation ; " and quoting the article of the American project
just cited, they added : —
" The rainisters plenipotentiary of the French Re
public are not aware of any reason which can authorize
a distinction between the time prior to the 7th of July,
1798, and the time subsequent to that date, in order to
apply the stipulations of the tieaties to the daraages
which have arisen during the first period, and only the
principles of the law of nations to those which have
occurred during the second."
To this demand for explanation the Araerican rain
isters iraraediately replied, that they would cheerfully
explain why they assuraed the date of the 7th of July,
1798, as a dividing point between the two periods, and
also why they could not regard the treaties with France
as the basis of the present negotiation for any other
purpose than that of giving a rule by which causes of
coraplaint, prior to that date, were to be tested.
" It was not tiU after the treaty of araity and com-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 211
merce of February, 1778, had been violated to a great
extent on the part of the French RepubUc, nor till after
explanations and an ?iraicable adjustraent, sought by
the United States, had been refused, that they, did, on
the 7th day of July, 1798, by a soleran public act,
declare that they were freed and exonerated frora the
treaties and consular convention which had been en
tered into between thera and Fra,nce ; nor would such
a declaration, though justified by the law of nature and
of nations, have even then been raade, if it had been
possible for the United States, whUe continuing the
treaties and consular convention as the rule of their
conduct, to guard against injuries which daily in
creased, and threatened their coraraerce Avith total
destruction. That declaration cannot be recalled ;
and the United States raust atide its effects with
respect to the priority of treaties, whatever inconven
iences raay result to themselves. The government, it
was understood, could not Avith good faith give to the
undersigned powers to change or affect such priorities,
and they do not possess them."
Upon the receipt of this reply, the French ministers
inforraed the Araerican plenipotentiaries that the nego
tiation was at a stand; that their instructions would
not perrait them to negotiate on any such basis ; that
their coraraission had designated the treaty of alliance,
and of friendship and coraraerce, and the consular con
vention, as the sole basis of their negotiation, and that
they must refer the matter back to their governnjent for

212 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
further instructions. WhUe waiting the result of this
reference, which was delayed in consequence of the
absence of the First Consul, who was negotiating after
another fashion at Marengo, the plenipotentiaries had
several inforraal conversations, and exchanged sorae
explanatory notes. In reference to the abrogation of
the treaties, the Araerican rainisters took two positions.
1. That a treaty being a mutual compact, its viola
tion by one party justified its abrogation by the other ;
and 2. " That it had becorae irapossible for the United
States to save their coraraerce frora the depredations of
the French cruisers, but by resorting to defensive raeas
ures ; and that, as by their constitution existing tiea
ties were the suprerae law of the land, and the judicial
departraent, who raust be governed by thera, is not un
der the control of the executive or legislative, it was
also impossible for thera to legalize defensive raeasures,
incorapatible with the French treaties, while they con
tinued to exist. Then it was they were forraally re
nounced, and from that renunciation, there resulted^
necessarily, a priority in favor of the British tieaty, as
to the exclusive asylura for privateers and prizes."
To these arguraents the French governraent replied
with great force, " that, when on the one hand Congress
declare that France has cOntiavened these treaties, and
that the United States are released frora their stipula
tions ; and when France declares that she has con
formed to these treaties, that she desires their execution,
and that the United States alone have infringed them.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 213
where is the tiibunal or law to enforce the exoneration
in preference to the execution ?
" So long as a difference exists between two contract
ing parties, respecting the existence or abrogation of a
treaty, no right or benefit can result to a third party
from the abrogation contended for by one.
" If France had declared the treaties annulled, and the
United States had raaintained their validity, England
would have no ground for saying to Araerica, ' we suc
ceed to the rights of France.' ... If one of two con
tracting parties is at liberty, whenever he raay please, to
cancel his obligations in virtue of his own judgraent
concerning facts or raen or things, no binding force can
be attached to treaties, and the terra itself should be
erased frora every language. If the right of anteriority
can be destroyed to the prejudice of the nation that
possesses it, by the sole act of one of the parties by
whora that right has been recognized, it must be ac
knowledged as a principle, that the nation making the
second tieaty converts the one with whora she first con
tiacted into an enerhy, and that she raay be certain of
being despoUed by that enemy whenever the time raay
be propitious for an open explanation."
It raust be adraitted that the Araerican positions
were untenable. The first position contiadicted the
fundaraental idea of a treaty ; but adraitting its princi
ple, it is clear that it can only apply to cases where the
oflsets are distinctly reciprocal, and the rautual obliga
tion expressly refused. To admit its application to

214 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
treaties for both special and general purposes, where
the stipulations had been, in a large measure, and for a
long time, carried out in good faith and effectively, sim
ply on account of teraporary raisunderstanding, would
be to sacrifice the whole systera of international law to
a loose, rather than to a liberal, interpretation. Now the
treaty of 1778, under which, and to a large extent by
which, the independence of the United States had been
achieved, had in good faith, on the part of France,
effected this special purpose, and its general provisions
had, for twenty years, regulated the relations between
the two countries. That at the outbreak of the Revolu
tion they had a perfect right not to regard the republic
as the legitiraate successor of the old raonarchy with
whom they had made the alUance, is one thing. But
this position the United States had refused to assume,
and held on to the treaties ; and though, under changed
circurastances, difficulties alraost insuperable had arisen,
and the two nations might even be driven to war, the
United States could not claira, in view of their past
action, and actual receipt of great advantages under the
treaty, the right alone to pronounce the treaties annuUed.
It was, at the very least, an atterapt to force a doubtful
principle to a stiU raore doubtful application. The sec
ond position was even weaker ; for if this one-sided ab
rogation was in itself void, no constitutional necessity
of doraestic governraent could raake it valid, and the
French governraent had no concern with the internal
erabarrassraents of the United States government, re-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 215
suiting from the iUegitimate and illogical a,ction of their
own legislature. The French negotiators were there
fore enabled to place the Araerican rainisters in a most
distressing dileraraa, which they did, with great ingenu
ity and success.
On the llth of August, 1800, they handed in their
official reply, in which they repeated their objections to
the principle offered by the Araerican rainisters, as the
basis of their negotiation. But they added that they
were prepared to admit the iraportance to Araerica of
avoiding the exclusive privUeges of the old tieaties.
They were AvilUng, therefore, to meet the wishes of the
United States, as far as they consistently could. They
would, therefore, consent to the abrogation of the old
tieaties ; but as such an abrogation could only be the
result of war, they were obliged to consider the action
of the. United States preceding, as equivalent to war,
and a new tieaty, in necessary consequence, as a treaty
of peace. In such case, the question of indemnity must
be laid aside, because a war extinguished all mutual
obligation ; each party had taken the remedy of com
plaints in their own hands, and a tieaty of peace was a
fresh start, upon such a new basis as their respective posi
tions warranted thera in proposing. And therefore they
offered to the Araerican ministers, either the abrogation
of the old treaties Avithout indemnity, or indemnity Avith
the old treaties.. And they added, that, in any new
tieaty, whUe Franee would cheerfuUy abandon her priv-

216 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ilege of exclusive asylum, she would not consent to oc
cupy an inferior position to any other nation.
At this point, the American negotiators very cor
rectly inforraed the Secretary of State that they were
obliged to abandon either the negotiation or their in
structions. They resolved upon the latter course ; and
as they could not procure the abrogation of the treaties
and inderanity, they endeavored to obtain inderanity,
and then to relinquish that inderanity as an equivalent,
to purchase the abrogation of the two stipulations in the
old treaties granting the exclusive asylura, and guar
anteeing the French Araerican possessions. There was
sorae difference as to the equivalent to be offered in
exchange for the guarantee ; but the chief and the in
superable difficulty was the priority accruing to the
EngUsh treaty, in consequence of the act of Congress
of July annulUng the French treaty. France declared
she Avas AviUing to give up her exclusive privilege in
deference to the wishes, and in furtherance of the inter
ests, of her old aUy ; but she could not and would not
consent to have this privilege yielded to any other
power, least of all to England, her constant and bitter
est eneray. Indeed, Joseph Bonaparte, the chief of the
French coraraission, declared, that, even if his govern
raent authorized such a concession, he would resign
rather than sign the treaty which contained it. But the
United States could not refuse this privilege to Eng
land, as it necessarily foUowed from their own act of

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 217
abrogation ; and again the negotiation came to a dead
halt. The fact was, that the French government could
not, and did not intend to, pay the indemnity that
would have resulted from the treaty ; and the action of
the United States in complicating their relations by the
act of abrogation afforded a means of escape, which
the French negotiators used with consuraraate skill
and coraplete success.
Upon this unfortunate terraination of the second
stage of their negotiations, it only remained for the
American plenipotentiaries either to demand their pass
ports, or to change entirely the character of their nego
tiations. Considering, justly, that a peremptory con
clusion of amicable discussion Avould be an inevitable
declaration of war, they, after rauch reflection, deter
rained upon the milder, and, as events proved, the wiser,
course ; and they resolved " to attempt a temporary
arrangement, which would extricate the United States
frora the war, or that peculiar state of hostility in which
they were at present involved, save the iraraense
araount of property of our citizens now depending
before the council of prizes, ahd secure, as far as pos
sible, our coramerce against the abuses of capture dur
ing the present war."
With this view, they proposed to the French nego
tiators a temporary convention, based on the four foUow
ing principles : —
1. That the parties, not being able at present to agree
respecting the forraer treaties and indemnity, these sub-
19

218 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
jects should be postponed for further negotiation, and, in
the raean tirae, that the said treaties should have no
operation. 2. The parties shall abstain from all unfriendly acts,
their commerce shall be free, and debts shall be recover
able in the sarae raanner as if no raisunderstanding had
intervened. 3. Property captured, and not yet definitely con
deraned, or which raay be captured before the exchange
of ratifications, shall be rautuaUy restored. Proofs of
ownership to be specified in the convention.
4. Some provisional regulations to be made, to pre
vent abuses and disputes in future cases of capture.
Upon this basis, and after sorae little discussion, the
plenipotentiaries arrived at a mutual understanding.
But before the convention which erabodied the result
of their deliberations was signed, another difficulty
arose, which, although of rainor iraportance to the dif
ficulties they had failed to surraount, was yet irritat
ing enough. On the 29th of Septeraber, 1800, the
French envoys addressed a note to the Araerican rain
isters, in which they said : —
" The ministers of France insist, in relation to the
treaty, upon one of three things : —
" Either that the treaty shall be signed in the French
language only, without any reservation, — the mode
pursued by the consular convention of 1788 between
France and the United States, and by the treaty of
1786 between France and England ;

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 219
" Or, that it shaU be signed in the French language
only, and that a separate article (sirailar to the one at
the close of the treaty of 1783 between France and
England) shaU stipulate, that the French language used
in the treaty shall not constitute a precedent, nor oper
ate to the prejudice of either of the contracting parties.
" Or, finally, that it shall be signed in the French
and EngUsh languages, accorapanied by the foUowing
declaration, conforraing to the one at the etid of the
treaty of alliance and the treaty of coraraerce of 1788 :
' In faith whereof, the respective plenipotentiaries have
signed the above articles, both in the French and Eng- ,
lish languages ; declaring, nevertheless, that the present
tieaty was originaUy Avritten and concluded in the
French language.' "
The American ministers, as they inforraed their gov
ernment, " finaUy, but with great reluctance, agreed to
the signing in the form of the treaty of 1778 ; " and on
the 30th of Septeraber, 1800, the convention Avas
signed by the plenipotentiaries of both nations.
The convention was very general in its provisions;
— it contained certain regulations to avoid abuses in
cases of capture ; relinquished on the part of France
the deraand for a role d'equipage, which had caused so
much injustice and irritation ; recognized the right of
convoy; placed France upon a footing with the most
friendly nation as to the right of asylum for privateers ;
repeated the principle of free ships free goods ; and pro-

220 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
vided for the exchange of consuls. It differed very Uttle,
in points outside of the recent controversy, from the
provisions of the treaty of coraraerce of 1778 ; and the
second article declared expressly : —
" The rainisters plenipotentiary of the two parties,
not being able to agree at present respecting the tieaty
¦ of alUance of February 6, 1778, and the tieaty of araity
and coraraerce of the same date, and the convention of
the 14th of November, 1788, nor upon the indemnities
mutually due and clairaed, the parties will negotiate
further on these subjects at a convenient tirae, and
until they raay have agreed upon these points, the said
treaties and convention shaU have no operation, and the
relation of the two countries shall be regulated as fol
lows." When this convention was subraitted to the Senate
of the United States for ratification, they expunged the
second article, and liraited the duration of the treaty to
eight years. With these very iraportant raodifications,
the French governraent accepted the ratification ; but
the First Consul added to the instruraent of ratification,
on the part of France, a declaratory clause, providing,.
" that by this retrenchraent, the two states renounce the
respective pretensions which are the objects of the said
article." The effect of this anoraalous procedure wiU
be discussed hereafter. At present, it is only necessary
to state, that Mr. Madison, the Secretary of State in
the adrainistration which had just (March 4, 1801) sue-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 221
ceeded Mr. Adaras, Avrote to Mr. Livingston, rainister
to France, on the 18th of December, 1801 : —
" I am authorized to say that the President does not
regard the declaratory clause as more than a legitiraate
inference from the rejection by the Senate of the second
article." Mr. Jefferson, however, deeraed it proper to subrait
the convention thus ratified anew to the Senate, when
that body declared by resolution, that they considered
the ratification as already perfected, and returned it to
the President for the usual publication.
Such was the convention ; and such as it was, it could
not, either in its arguraent or its result, be claimed as a
diplomatic triuraph. The history of its consequences
belongs to another period ; but, like the EngUsh treaty,
which in raany features it reserabled, it was at the time
a positive advantage. It is true that it raerely terapo-
rized, but to teraporize wisely is soraetiraes the raost
skilful pohcy. It unquestionably saved the United
States frora war ; for had the negotiators returned Avith
out succeeding in any arrangement, it is difficult to see
how war could have been avoided, in face of the hostUe
preparations and energetic language of the governraent.
The United States had openly prepared for war, and
declared that this raission was its final effort at con
cUiation ; if that faUed, the honor of the country had no
alternative. Disastrousas such a necessity would have
been at the outset of the raission, it would have been
19*

222 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
-^Vorse at its close. The campaign of 1800, illustrated
by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, had scat
tered the eneraies of France. The tieaty of LuneviUe
raade her raistress of Europe. The renewal of the
arraed neutiality had detached the Northern raaritime
states frora their natural alliance with England ; and but
a very few raonths after the signature of the conven
tion, after the experience of the negotiations at Paris
and at Lisle, where her ablest diploraatist had raet with
no better success and scarcely better treatraent, than
our own rainisters, Great Britain was forced to the
huraiUating truce known as the Peace of Araiens. Had
this state of things found the United States in open
hostility with France, who can anticipate the result ?
This convention avoided these difficult issues ; and it is
a curious fact, worthy of notice, that the treaty of
LuneviUe, whicb aggrandized to such vast extent the
power of France, enabled her to take Louisiana frora
Spain, while our convention, forced on us by the con
trast of our weakness with such strength, enabled us,
by avoiding the cost and suffering of war, to move on
our path slowly but surely, and to purchase that very
Louisiana from the power avc could not have resisted.
For it scarcely needs an arguraent to show, that a war
with France, in 1800, would have forbidden aU hope of
the acquisition of Louisiana in 1806. Another great
benefit resulting frora this convention was, that it saved
the necessity of an extreme pohcy just at a most crit-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 223
ical time in the domestic history of the country. For if
the ministers had corae home without effecting even an
armistice, Mr. Adaras would have been •going out of
office, and in the few remaining months of his adminis
tration, could have pursued no vigorous line of conduct ;
Avhile Mr. Jefferson would not yet have assumed the
responsibility of office, and would naturally have re
garded the war as an odious inheritance frora an
administration whose mischievous career he had been
elected to check. Between the two parties, the inter
ests as well as the character of the country would have
been in serious danger.
This convention Avas, in fact, the necessary coraple-
ment to the treaty with England. They were both the
efforts of a nation too weak to hold its own in the face
of stionger and unscrupulous powers. The most which
it could do was to subrait without yielding, — to put
certain rights in abeyance, and adjourn final principles
to a day of raore equal arguraent. Neutrality is scarcely
ever a briUiant policy. It is always difficult, sometiraes
dangerous, and often deraands hard sacrifices from na
tional pride. But in the case of the United States, their
interests clearly required it; it called, on the part of
their rulers, for firmness, wisdom, and self-reUance ; and
the manly and raodest hope, expressed by the Araerican
rainisters on closing their harassing and unsatisfactory
labors, raay be adopted as the fair verdict of history on
their patriotic efforts.

224 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT
" If, with the siraple plea of right, unaccompanied with
the raenaces of power and unaided by events either in
Europe or America, less is at present obtained than jus
tice requires, or than the policy of France should have
granted, the undersigned trust that the sincerity and
patience of their efforts to obtain all that their coun
tiy had a right to deraand, Avdl not be drawn in ques
tion."

CHAPTER IV
NEGOTIATIONS AND TKEATY WITII SPAIN AND ALGIERS.
The condition of the negotiations between Spain
and the United States, at the adoption of the Constitu
tion, has already been described. Both parties had ar
rived at that point where their differences were distinct
and in-econcilable ; Spain having asserted a positive
and prohibitory right to the navigation of the Missis
sippi, and the United States having exhausted every
conceivable raodification to which they could give even
a qualified assent.
Not long after Mr. Jay's return frora Spain, where he
had resided as rainister during the Revolution, Mr. Car
raichael, who reraained as Charg^ d' Affaires, received
from the Spanish government, what had never been
vouchsafed to Mr. Jay, a formal recognition as the
diploraatic representative of the United States ; and the
recognition was accorapanied by circurastances intended
to iraply, on the part of the governraent, its distinguished
consideration. The negotiations were, however, trans
ferred frora Madrid to Philadelphia, to be conducted by
Mr. Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Don

226 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Diego de Gardoqui, the Spanish representative. Their
failure has been narrated in the opening chapter of this
volurae. In 1790, the probability of a rupture between Spain
and England induced the governraent of the United
States to send a special raessenger to JMr. Carraichael,
charged with instructions, to be used if circurastances
perraitted, suggesting that in case of war the part of
the United States was uncertain, and would be difficult.
Mr. Jefferson intiraated, that the unsettled condition of
our affairs with Spain raight give a direction to our con
duct not altogether desirable ; and directed the United
States rainister, in conversation with the Spanish secre
tary, to "irapress hira thoroughly with the necessity of
an early, and even iraraediate, settleraent of this raatter,
and of a return to the field of negotiations for this pur
pose ; and though it must be done with deUcacy, yet he
must be raade to understand, unequivocally, that a re
sumption of negotiation is not desired on our part,
unless he can determine, in the first opening of it, to
yield the iraraediate and full enjoyraent of that navi
gation." Circumstances, however, did not take the favorable
turn hoped for ; and nothing was done until the admin
istration received an intimation frora the Spanish gov
ernraent, that it Avould resurae negotiations at Madrid.
Washington accordingly norainated, in Deceraber, 1791,
Mr. Carraichael, then Chargd d'Affanesin Spain, and Mr.
Short, then Chargd d' Affaires in France, Commissioners

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 227
Plenipotentiary, to negotiate and conclude " a conven
tion or treaty concerning the navigation of the river
Mississippi by the citizens of the United States." The
coraraissioners were araply and thoroughly instructed
on- three points : I. Boundary. II. The navigation of
the Mississippi. III. Coraraerce.
I. Boundary. Spain clairaed certain possessions
within the limits of the United States, as having been
taken by force from the British during the revolutionary
war. To this claira, the reply was, 1. That Spain had
acted, along with Holland and France, as an associate
of the United States in that war ; that, having a cora
raon eneray, each sought that eneray wherever he was
to be found; that dislodging the British frora frontier
settleraents, where they threatened the colonial posses
sions of Spain, and even holding such possessions by
force to prevent the return of the British, could raise no
right against the lawful possessors, who were acting
with Spain against a coraraon enemy. 2. That, even
supposing such possession to be held as a conquest of
the places in dispute, conquest is, in its fullest extent,
only an inchoate title, which must afterwards be per
fected by treaty with the rightful possessor. Now
either Great Britain or the United States were rightful
possessors. The United States had never by any
treaty perfected any such title ; and Great Britain, by
her treaty with Spain of 1783, had expressly stipulated,
that Spain should restore all conquests without com-

228 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
pensation, except Minorca and Majorca. And the
United States, standing by the treaty of 1782 exactiy
in the place of Great Britain, was entitled to the ben
efit of this return. 3. That the Spanish governraent
had expressly and voluntarily declared, through Count
Florida Bianca, to General Lafayette, that it recog
nized the hmits of the United States as defined in the
treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United
States, and authorized hira so to state to the United
States' governraent.
II. The Navigation of the Mississippi. Spain clairaed
the right to prohibit the navigation of the river, frora
the 31st degree of latitude, where the southern boun
dary of the United States crossed, on to the Gulf, rest
ing her claim upon the possession of both banks. To
this the United States replied, 1. That the navigation
of the river had been granted by Spain to England, by
the treaty of 1763. 2. That by the treaty of peace of
1782, the United States were placed in the position of
Great Britain, and that nothing had tianspired during
the war which was closed by the treaty of 1782, which
could possibly affect the right of navigation guaranteed
by the treaty of 1763. And 3. That by the law of
nations, the United States, holding the upper portion of
the river, and possessing a territory of such immense
extent, had a right to the navigation of the river, as an
outlet created by Providence itself.
On the subject of the boundary and navigation, the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 229
coraraissioners were to consider each and every of the
foUowing conditions as a sine qua non of any treaty
between the two countries.
" 1. That our southern boundary rerriains established
at the .corapletion of 31 degrees of latitude on the Mis
sissippi, and so on to the ocean, as before described,
and our western one along the middle of the channel
of the Mississippi, however that channel may vary, as
it is constantly varying ; and that Spain cease to occupy,
or to exercise jurisdiction in, any part northward or
eastward of those boundaries.
"2. That our right be acknowledged of navigating
the Mississippi, in its whole breadth and length, frora
its source to the sea, as established by the treaty of
1763. " 3. That neither the vessels, cargoes, or persons on
board be stopped, visited, or subjected to the payraent
of any duty whatsoever ; or, if a visit must be permit
ted, that it be under such restrictions as to produce the
least possible inconvenience. But it should be alto
gether avoided, as the parent of perpetual broils.
" 4. That such conveniences be allowed us ashore as
raay render our right of navigation practicable, and
under such regulations as raay bond fide respect the
preservation of peace and order alone, and raay not
have in object to erabarrass our navigation or raise a
revenue on it^ WhUe the substance of this article is
made a sine qua non, the modifications of it are left
20

230 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
altogether to the discretion and raanageraent of the
coraraissioners. " We raight add, as a fifth sine qua non, that no
phrase should be adraitted in the treaty which could
express or iraply that we take the navigation of the
Mississippi as a grant from Spain. But, however dis
agreeable it would be to subscribe to such a sentiment,
yet were the conclusion of the treaty to hang on that
single objection, it would be expedient to waive it, and
to meet at a future day the consequences of any re
sumption they may pretend to raake, rather than at
present those of a separation without coraing to any
agreeraent." The coraraissioners were further instructed, as a con
sequence of the ground they were directed to take, that
no proposition could be entertained for compensation
in exchange for the navigation ; and in case of any
such proposition, it was to be offset by a claim for dara
ages to the coramerce of the United States by duties
and detention at New Orleans for nine years.
III. Commerce. Under this head it is unnecessary
to recapitulate the details of the insti-uctions. It is
sufficient to state briefly, that the coraraissioners were
authorized to negotiate only on one of two bases ; either,
1. That of exchanging the privUeges of native citizens,
or, 2. That of the raost favored nation.
Provided with these instructions, the coraraissioners
raet at Madrid about the 1st of February, 1793, almost

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 231
at the sarae tirae with the arrival of the news of the
execution of Louis XVI. They found circumstances
very much altered from the condition Avhich had in
duced their appointment. The ministerial power of
Spain, which had been transferred frora Count Florida
Bianca to Count d'Aranda, had again been shifted, and
was now firraly held by Godoy. The difficulty be
tween Spain and England had been settled. The con
cUiatory, or rather deprecatory, policy which Godoy had
adopted towards France, in the delusive hope of saving
Louis by the intervention of a friendly diploraacy, was
violently destroyed by the execution of that unfortunate
prince. France soon declared war against Spain ; and
the commissioners Avere thus deprived of the support
which they had relied upon, frora the only power in
Europe able and wilUng to facilitate their Spanish
negotiations. It was even worse than that; for the
inevitable tendency of pubUc events led to an alliance
between Spain and the corabined eneraies of France,
then, as afterwards, headed by England. The relations
between England and the United States were of the
most unfriendly description ; and at this very period, just
preceding the institution of Mr. Jay's mission, war was
considered as irarainent between the two countries. In
fact, during the negotiation — if it can be so called —
of the coraraissioners, Spain concluded an alliance, of
fensive and defensive, with England, and its terras were
such as could be easily appUed to the contingency of
hostiUties with the United States. Well might the

232 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
commissioners write to the Secretary, " We cannot help
considering it unfortunate that an express commission
should have been sent to treat here."
Another unfavorable circumstance was the appoint
ment of Diego de Gardoqui as Spanish plenipotentiary.
All the forraer negotiations on this subject had been
carried on with him, and he had rejected the same con
clusions too often to be open to ncAv argument ; while
his experience of the weak and wavering character of
the old Confederation, which he had personally studied,
would not easily permit a conviction of the increased
strength and efficiency of the new government.
After much deliberation, the commissioners Avisely
deterrained not to press their clairas. Outside of then-
instructions they could not go, and even within that
lirait, they were powerless as they stood. With great
judgraent they concluded, that, to urge claims con
sidered so preposterous by the Spanish court, just at
the moment that it was negotiating a treaty with Eng
land, would only draw the attention of both powers
more specially to these interests, and secure on their
part a provision for their joint action against the rights
of the United States. They accordingly temporized,
and found in the dilatory spirit of Gardoqui araple
opportunity for procrastination.
The news of these changes in the relations of the
European powers did not, however, make the sarae
irapression at home ; and the despatches Avhich reached
the coraraissioners, after fuU inforraation frora Em-ope

¦DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 233
had reached Philadelphia, left thera no alternative but
to carry out their instructions. In the raean time, how
ever, they had so far improved their condition that they
were now in direct coraraunication with Godoy. To
hira they subraitted the clairas of their governraent, as
well as the complaints, uoav become loud and angry, of
Spanish interference with the Indian tiibes on the
western and south-western frontier. As to the great
objects of their mission, they raade no progress. Spain
shoAved no disposition to recognize their clairas, nor
any profound consideration for the citations of interna
tional law with Avhich they fortified their positions.
With regard to the Indians, they were raore fortunate,
as they obtained from Godoy Avhat raight fairly be
interpreted as a disclairaer of any intention to interfere
between thera and the United States, should the latter
be forced into active hostilities.
The commission Avas finally dissolved by the depart
ure of Mr. Carmichael, leaving Mr. Short accredited as
Charg^ d'affaires. The reception of Mr. Short, in that
character, seeras to have raet with sorae difficulty,
which, in aU probability, Avas meant to indicate more
than a mere difference of etiquette. Writing under
date of December 17, 1794, to Mr. Pinckney, in Lon
don, he says : " I regret exceedingly the miscarriage of
my letter of September 24th, as it was to apologize to
you for having so long delayed to announce to you (as
is the general custom, and was ray particular duty)
that I had presented ray credentials to H. C. M., on the
20*

234 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
7th of that raonth. I raentioned to you, at the sarae
tirae, the difficulties and delays which Avere occasioned
by the United States having given rae a character,
of which they had no precedent at this court, and of
Avhich they could find none in their archives, notwith
standing much time and trouble were spent in turning
them over and over, perhaps frora the beginning of the
monarchy, and, as they assured me, during the Avhole of
the Austrian and Bourbon race. I do not suppose it
was the intention of our government to have brought
into value old archives, forras, and etiquette, yet they
have certainly not been so rauch recurred to, for half a
century back, as in ray case. Such things wUl often
happen to those who leave the beaten and known track,
in order to raake new experiraents for finding out a
better. I ara sorry that I should have been chosen for
the experiraental instruraent in these cases ; but it has
been the case in every commission I have had, both in
the Hague and here, in three succeeding instances. If
they were only my personal feelings which suffered, it
would be less painful ; but in the two instances Avhich
occurred at this court, where form is the primum mobile,
the public interests have been affected thereby, in a
manner, of which it would be as impossible to give an
adequate idea to a person who had not been here, as of
color to the blind, or of sound to the deaf" *
* T. P. MSS. Letters. That this difficulty in Mr. Short's recep
tion sprang from an objection to him, rather than to his rank, is
clear from the facts of the reception of Mr. Carmichael, some time

DIPLOMATIC) HISTORT. 235
But another and still raore important change in the
policy of Spain Avas at hand. The three carapaigns
against France, after the junction of England and
Spain, had not been fortunate, however honorable to
the spirit and patriotisra of the Spanish troops. The
aUiance against France gave sure signs of rapidly
approaching- dissolution. The corabination between
England and Spain had been a forced one, and at that
tirae there was little real syrapathy between the two
countries. The internal changes in French poUtics
previous, -with precisely the same diplomatic grade, and from the
language of the Spanish commissioner In the United States, quoted
further on in the text. As it may be interesting to learn the Impres
sion made by Godoy on those who had an opportunity of judging him
fairly, I subjoin two extracts from Mr. Short's correspondence with
Mr. Pinckney.
" In the mean time, this government manage their money affairs,
at least, with much prudence and success ; their finances were prob
ably never in a more flourishing state, and, whatever may be thought
elsewhere of the administration of a young man without experience
in affairs, and who is first minister in fact. It has hitherto been mild,
prudent, and prosperous, and is every day becoming by that means
more acceptable to the public." — San Lorenzo, October 12, 1793.
" You will have formerly learned the progress of ministerial
changes in this country since the spring of the year 1792, and, of
course, you will not be surprised at the exile of Comte D'Aranda.
He Is probably too old and too much lost ever to come again on the
carpet. The present first minister Is all-powerful, and possesses many
qualities to keep so. Besides, his mannei-s are affable ; he is really
obliging, and possesses that necessary quality, prudence, to a degree
ofwhich there are few examples.'' — Aranjuez, April 2, 1794.

236 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
opened the prospect of a raore stable and conservative
governraent for that unhappy country ; and the peace of
Basle, of the 5th of April, 1795, proclairaed the defec
tion of Prussia, the centre of the continental corabina
tion. This state of things could not. long endure. " I
lay it down as a principle," said Mr. Pitt, soon after
that peace, in a conference with the Spanish ambassa
dor, " that the distance between friends and neutrals is
immense ; it is small, on the contrary, between enemies
and neutrals ; the slightest accident, a mere chance, the
least mistrust, a false appearance, is enough to efface
the distinction between them." * On the 29th of July,
the treaty of peace was signed by the French and .
Spanish rainisters ; and the Spanish arabassador in
London soon after inforraed his court, that the follow
ing questions had been debated in a cabinet council : —
1. To take possession of a Spanish harbor. 2. To land
an army. 3. To renew the offer of an alliance AAdth
England, and compel Spain, by fair means or by force
of arras, to renew the war against . France. And in
subsequent reports he alluded to projects, on the part of
England, of seizing upon several points of the Spanish
Araerican possessions.
It raust also be reraerabered, that, while these events
Avere transpiring, the relations between England and the
United States Avere generally supposed to be growing
raore hostUe, and those with France to be iraproving,
* Godoy's Memoir, Vol. I. p. 468.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 237
under the raanageraent of Mr. Monroe. In view of
these anticipated and inevitable results, the governraent
of Spain raade advances to France through the Amer
ican minister in Paris, and also took the necessary steps
to resurae direct negotiations with the United States.
In 1794, Diego de Gardoqui desired the intervention
of Mr. Monroe with the French governraent, to obtain
perraission for a visit to certain French baths, his health
being the ostensible raotive of the journey. This cor
respondence Mr. Monroe subraitted to the French au
thorities, who desired him to inform Gardoqui that his
application must be raade directly to them, and inti
raated that it would be favorably received. ]Mr. Monroe
took advantage of this opportunity to press upon the
French governraent the propriety of supporting the
clairas of the United States, and insisting upon a set
tleraent of such points as were in dispute between
Spain and his own governraent, whenever a negotiation
should be opened for a treaty between France and
Spain. Early in 1795, and beforfe it was aware of the
character of Mr. Jay's treaty, the French governraent
notified Mr. Monroe of its readiness to aid the United
States in bringing its differences with Spain to an arai
cable terraination. And in May, 1795, JMr. Short, at
the express request of Godoy, wrote to Mr. Monroe,
stating that the Spanish court AA^as anxious to adjust
its relations with France, suggesting hints to be con
veyed to the French rainisters, and adding, that Godoy
would assure the settleraent of the difficulties with the

238 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
United States at the sarae tirae, and on the raost favor
able terras.* But fortunately, before any steps could be
taken involving the United States in any joint negotia
tions with France, or in any stipulations dependent
upon the adjustraent of interests foreign to theraselves,
the governraent, at the instance of the Spanish court,
transferred the whole subject to Madrid, and intrusted
its arrangeraent to Mr. Pinckney. It has already been
stated, that when the Spanish court endeavored to
sound the French governraent through Mr. Monroe, it
also raade a direct approach to the United States. On
the 16tli of August, 1794, Mons Jaudenes, the Spanish
coraraissioner in the United States, addressed to the
Secretary of State a communication, in which he ex
pressed his great regret at the little progress raade in
the negotiation between the two countries, owing, how
ever, as he had repeatedly, both by letter and oraUy, in
formed Mr. Randolph's predecessor, to the fact that his
Majesty would not treat, so long as the plenipotentiaries
ofthe United States 'were not furnished with the am
plest powers, or Avere directed by their secret instruc
tions to conclude a partial, and not a general, treaty. At
the least, his Majesty expected that the ministers ap
pointed by the United States should be persons of such
character, erainent distinction, and teraper, as Avould
becorae a residence near the royal person, and were re-

* For the correspondence of M. Gardoqui with Mr. Monroe, and
Mr. Short's letter, see Mr. Monroe's " View."

diplomatic histort. 239
quired by the gravity of the questions under negotiation.
That under such circurastances, Spain would be ready
to treat on the subject of boundary, Indians, coraraerce,
and whatever else raight conduce to the best interests
of the two countries. That the powers given to Messrs.
Carmichael and Short were not ample ; that the well-
known raisconceptions of Mr. Carraichael, and the want
of circuraspection in the conduct of Mr. Short, rendered
it irapossible to conclude this negotiation with thera.
And that his Majesty hoped that sorae other person or
persons would be appointed, Avith fuU powers, to settle
this treaty, and graced with such a character as became
the royalty to which he was accredited.*
* As the above paragraph is rather a liberal interpretation than a
literal translation of the Spanish letter, and as this letter, with the
one which followed it, are referred to on several occasions, In such
papers relating to this negotiation as have been published, while
they themselves have never been printed, I subjoin the original let
ter, in Spanish, from among Mr. Pinckney's MSS.
" Mui Senor mid : Con no poco sentimiento me veo en la presi-
clon de anunciar A, V. S. el ningun progreso que se ha hecho en la
negociacion planta entre el Rey mi Amo y los Estados Unldos &
causa de lo que tantas vezes predixe al Antecesor de V. ^.de escrito
y de palabra relatlvo a que Su Majestad no entraria en tratado al-
guno'slempre que los Poderes conferidos a los Ministros de los Esta
dos no fuesen amphos o se hallasen cohartados con instruc9lones se-
cretas que tublesen por objeto concluir un tratado parcial y no gene
ral ; y amenos que los Ministros que los Estados nombrasen para el
intento fuesen por todas suo circanstan9las conslderados por Su Ma
jestad como personas de aquel carracter, esplendor, y conducta que

240 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Upon the receipt of this letter, Mr. Randolph desired
an interview with Mr. Jaudenes, which took place on
the 26th of August. Referring to the letter of the 16th,
Mr. Randolph " desired to understand the nature of the
objection as to the power of the commissioners not
being araple." Mr. Jaudenes entered into a detail of the
transaction from its comraenceraent, in Deceraber, 1791,
as it appears frora the raeraoranda of Mr. Jefferson, and
the letters between the Spanish coraraissioner and hira ;
corresponden para reslder eerca de su Real persona y que requiere
la gravedad de los asuntos que deben tratarse.
" En esta atencion me manda el Rey hazer presente al Presidente
de los Estados Unldos que Espana esta pronta d, tratar con los Esta
dos sobre los puntos de Limites, Indios, Comer9lo, y demas que
conduscan a la mexor amistad entre los dos Raises : peroque no Si-
endo amphos los Poderes conferidos a los S'nes Carmichael y Short,
y notorio lo desconceptuado que se hallava el primero y que la con
ducta del segundo tampoco ha sido mui clrcunspecta, no es posible
concluir asuntos tan importantes ; y que en consideracion a estos mo
tives espera Su Majestad que los Estados Unldos embriaran otra per
sona 0 personas con plenos poderes para ajustar el tratado y adoi^
nado de aquel Caracter y prendas que pueda hazerse bien admitido
por el Rey.
" En vijta do lo expuesto pido a V. S. se sirva informar al Presi
dente de los Estados Unldos : quien me hsonjeo se prestara gustoso
^ efectuarlo segun lo desea Su Mag'd d con la brevedad que lo exio-e
el interez de ambos paises ; y suplico a V. S. me comunlque las re-
sultas para hacer las saber el Rey. " Me reltero, &c., &c., &c.
" Josef de Jaudenes.
"Nueva York, 16th Agto., 1794.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 241
adding, that it appeared to be Mr. Jefferson's policy to
negotiate for the Mississippi alone, whereas his Catholic
Majesty would never treat but upon all the subjects un
adjusted between him and the United States. Mr. Jau
denes observed, that he had indeed understood that
very coraprehensive powers had been afterwards given
to the coraraissioners ; but the nature of thera was not
made known to him by Mr. Jefferson. As Mr. Jau
denes did not appear to have seen thera, and as he laid
much stress upon an admonition which he contends he
frequently gave Mr. Jefferson, that the powers of the
coraraissioners should be as coraprehensive as those
which M. Gardoqui formerly brought with hira, Mr.
Randolph showed him the powers of the American
coraraissioners. He considered thera sufficiently com
prehensive npon the face of them. Mr. Randolph
remarked, that their comprehensiveness must have been
known to the Spanish rainister at a very early period,
as the exchange of powers precedes every act of nego
tiation. This Mr. Jaudenes thought probable. Mr.
Randolph expressed sorae degree of surprise, that, after
so rauch tirae spent in the negotiation, after repeated
recognition of its pendency, as weU by the Spanish
rainistry at Madrid as the Spanish minister here, the
progress of it should be checked by an objection which,
if valid, ought to have been urged at the beginning,
when it might have been iraraediately removed. To
this, Mr. Jaudenes repUed, that he was not instructed in
the reasons of his court further than he had quoted to
21

242 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
Mr. Randolph, in his letter of the 16th of August.
But as the conference was free, he might conjecture
that they were governed by considerations like these :
that the objection to powers was never too late, if, as
the business advanced, it was found that they were nar
rowed by the instructions of the coraraissioners, or by
the obstinacy of their conduct, raore than they appeared
to be on the face of the papers which contained them ;
that his CathoUc Majesty might be resolved to treat
upon all the raatters, or none, being desirous of settUng
every controversy, and possibly seeing some connection
between them ; that Mr. Jaudenes had expressed his
apprehension to his court, that the Mississippi was the
object which the negotiation had principally in view ;
that this Avould naturaUy attract their attention, and
induce them to sound and explore ; and if they did not
find perfect explicitness on the occasion, ' they might
suspect that the union of all the subjects was not in
tended by the LTnited States. Indeed, Mr. Jaudenes
dropped an idea that all the States were not solicitous
for the Mississippi; that a majority of them were
against it, and the atterapt to gain it might perhaps be
conceived as in fact rather to pacify Kentucky than
really to obtain it. This idea Mr. Randolph denied to
have any foundation. Mr. Jaudenes seemed to renew it
in another form, namely, that any concession which
raight be necessary to adjust the dispute, though agree
able to sorae of the States, would be disagreeable to the
others ; and that there was a kind of indisposition in the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 243
States for one of thera to give up any of its owh advan
tages for.the accoraraodation of the others. To this,
Mr. Randolph answered, that there ought not to be a
doubt, for a raoraent, that what was stipulated by the
United States in treaty would be faithfuUy fulfilled.
But it was necessary to return to the supposition above
mentioned, of secret instructions, or the particular con
duct of the coraraissioners, restricting the powers to the
Mississippi only. This is the second part of Mr. Jau-
denes's letter, requiring explanation. Mr. Randolph
inquired whether the coraraissioners had been interro
gated upon their instructions, and had answered, that
they were restiicted ? Whether they had declared that
they would not proceed upon a new subject until the
Mississippi was definitely 'settled, without relation to
any other raatter ? Mr. Jaudenes could afford no infor
mation, not being himself informed. He only observed,
that the Spanish nation, being candid and sincere in its
tiansactions, would quickly receive disgust if it should
have appeared that the coraraissioners deviated frora
sincerity and candor on their part.
In the third place, Mr. Randolph desired an explana
tion of what was meant by the requisition of a minister
whose character, conduct, and splendor would render
thera proper, etc. etc. Mr. Jaudenes replied, that, when
the negotiation was first talked of, Mr. Jefferson asked
hira if Mr. Carraichael would be acceptable ; to which
Mr. Jaudenes answered, with a reluctance which noth
ing but a sense of duty could overcome, that there was

244 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
a deficiency of decorura, etc., in Mr. Carmichael. Mr.
Jefferson then said, suppose we unite Mr. Short with
him? Mr. .laudenes replied, that he was not per
sonaUy acquainted with Mr. Short; but he presuraed
that Mr. Jefferson would not contemplate an unfit per
son. Some time afterwards, Mr. Jaudenes was about
to say to Mr. Jefferson, that Mr. Pinckney would be
acceptable, and might probably touch at Madrid for
that purpose ; but he was told by Mr. Jefferson that the
President had already norainated Messrs. Carraichael
and Short. Upon hearing this, Mr. Jaudenes consid
ered himself as no longer at liberty to aniraadvert
upon an appointraent which was consummated. But
Mr. Jaudenes, stiU declaring his inabUity to assign any
reasons, except those contained in his letter of August
16, which were the whole of what had been Avritten by
his court, said that he raight conjecture it to be pos
sible, that Mr. Short, being, as Charg^ d'affaires, the
author of the offensive raeraorial which was addressed
to Spain through the French rainister at Madrid,-fetd
imbibed sentiraents too violent, and expressed thera too
veheraently. He raight, perhaps, too, (have) partaken
too rauch of Mr. Carmichael's style of behavior. Mr.
Jaudenes then explained the words, "character, con
duct, and splendor," thus : — By " character," he raeant
a diploraatic grade (no matter what) invested AAdth full
powers for all objects ; by " conduct," a proper attention
to the court, and a proper behaviour in the raanage
raent of the negotiation ; by " splendor," personal dig-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 245
nity and self-respect. Splendor as the effect of honor
ary birth, or proceeding frora any sirailar considera
tions, was not included in his requisitions.
Mr. Randolph asked Mr. Jaudenes if the negotiation
A\ras at a stand. He answered that he presuraed it
was. Mr. Randolph, disclairaing all knowledge of what the
President's ultiraate opinion would be, but desirous of
knowing whether, if another character was to be sent to
Spain, the old delays would be repeated, was assured
by Mr. Jaudenes, that, in his opinion, the business
might be iraraediately settled, either by a tieaty signed
and executed, or by a stateraent of terras upon which a
tieaty raight be concluded." *
In consequence of these intimations, the President, in
November, 1794, appointed General Thomas Pinckney,
then rainister at London, and whose character fulfiUed
the most fastidious requirements of his Catholic Maj
esty, minister plenipotentiary with full powers to con
clude a treaty. Before Mr. Pinckney reached Madrid,
the Spanish commissioner addressed another corarauni
cation, on the 28th of March, 1795, to the government
of the United States, indicating cautiously, but more
specificaUy, the probable basis of the negotiation on the
part of Spain.
" Dear Sir : In reply to your ExceUency's favor of
* Memorandum of conference between Mr. Randolph and Mr.
Jaudenes, 25th of Aug. 1794. —T. P. MSS. Spanish Papers.
21*

246 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
the 25th instant, I raust repeat, that the last despatch:
received by rae frora ray court was under date of the
25th of July, of the past year, with sorae private letters
of the beginning of August.
" As the channel through which the said despatch
reached me was not to be relied on, it is confined
merely to a suggestion of the raatters about which, as
your Excellency indicated to rae, the executive power of
the United States desired so earnestly to be inforraed.
" The brevity of these suggestions has, hitherto, je-
strained rae frora venturing upon propositions of so
rauch delicacy, raore especially as I have had reason to
expect, from day to day, since that time, despatches ex
planatory of the suggestions previously coraraunicated.
" StiU, in the spirit of directness and good understand
ing, which has always prevailed in the correspondence
between your Excellency and rayself, I wiU set forth
the basis upon which, as I understand, it is the inten
tion of the King, ray raaster, to adjust with the United
States the pending negotiation; subject, nevertheless,
upon the receipt of the explanatory despatches which I
ara expecting, to. any raodification of the foUowing
propositions : —
" 1. His Majesty Avill enter into negotiation with the
United States, as soon as any one shaU have been
authorized, with full powers, to attend his court for that
purpose. This point, I flatter rayself, is already cleared
up by the noraination lately raade by the executive
power of the United States.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 247
" 2. The King will be prepared to fix boundaries as
favorable to the clairas of the United States as raay be
corapatible with-his treaties with the Indians.
" 3. His Majesty wUl agree to consider the navigation
of the river Mississippi, subject to such restrictions as
may be deraanded by the interest of his subjects.
" 4. The King expects, in return for these concessions,
that there should be a substantial treaty of aUiance, irre
spective of the relations growing out of the existing
war, and a reciprocal guarantee of his own possessions
and-those of the United States.
"5. His Majesty also hopes that questions of trade
will likewise be arranged on a footing of reciprocity.
" I have thus stated what I think we raay presurae to
be the intention ofthe King, as far as I am at liberty to
deduce it from the despatch in question, and which,
up to this tirae, I have received frora his highness,
etc."* Mr. Pinckney arrived in Madrid about the 18th of
June, 1795 ; and after the usual forraal reception, cora
menced his negotiation directly with the first rainister,
Godoy. He found the Spanish court stiU anxious for
delay ; a very natural course, as they were in posses
sion of the chief subjects in controversy. In pursu
ance of this procrastinating policy, the Due d'Alcudia
* T. P. MSS. Spanish Letter Book. This letter is iii Spanish, and,
with the others quoted, was sent to Mr. Pinckney from the State de
partment.

248 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
(Godoy) informed Mr. Pinckney that he could corae to
no positive conclusion until he had received the answer
of the United States to the propositions tiansraitted
through Mr. Jaudenes, the Spanish Charg^ at PhUadel
phia. Although unprovided Avith special instiuctions
on this head, Mr. Pinckney first objected, that no
definite propositions had been made, and that the
informal suggestions, of the 24th of May, could not
expect a formal reply ; and that, raoreover, as his pres
ence in Madrid was the direct consequence of the sug
gestion of the Spanish Charg^ d'affaires, any discussion
relating to terras of settleraent should fairly be consid
ered as adjourned, in deference to his Spanish Majesty,
frora Philadelphia to Madrid. He further added, that,
although unprovided with special instiuctions as to the
last - communication of the Spanish minister, he was
fully authorized to say, that a mutual guarantee of the
national possessions was impossible. Godoy also sug
gested, that, as the American negotiation aveis very
much connected with the accommodation with France,
they should proceed together; and proposed, that, in
fact, there should be a tiiple alliance between France,
Spain, and the United States. This proposition the
American negotiator respectfully but decidedly put
aside. The plenipotentiaries then proceeded to the dis
cussion and arrangeraent of the old issues between
their governraents ; and, after an interchange of notes
and projects, it becarae apparent, that, without conces-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 249
sion, they could not come to a satisfactory agreeraent.
Their difference resolved itself into three important
points : —
1. The Spanish governraent refused to treat on the
subject of comraerce. Mr. Pinckney complained, justly,
that his raission had been instituted upon the explicit
invitation of the Spanish Charg^ d'affaires in Philadel
phia; that in August, 1794, that representative had
stated that " his Majesty would not enter into any
treaty, unless the powers to the rainister were ample, or
accompanied Avith secret instructions having for their
object to conclude a partial, and not a general, treaty." *
* I have quoted this language of Mr. Pinckney precisely as it is
found in his letter to the Secretary of State. (See American State
Papers, folio; Foreign Relations, Vol. I. page 542.) But it is
clearly a mistranslation. To say that his Catholic Majesty would not
treat unless the powers of the ministers of the United States were
ample or restricted by secret instructions, is simply an unmeaning
contradiction, and renders Mr. Pinckney's argument utterly unintel-
hglble. By reference to the original letter (at page 239) referred to
by Mr. Pinckney, it will be seen that the mistake results from trans
lating " siempre que " " unless," instead of " so long as,'' and oniitting
altogether the negative particle, " no." The correct translation is,
" That his Majesty will not enter into any treaty so long as the
powers conferred on the ministers of the United * States are not
ample, or are restricted by secret instructions having for their object
the conclusion of a, partial, and not a general treaty." This not only
makes Mr. Pinckney's objection clear, but also renders intelligible
the conversations between Mr. Randolph and M. Jaudenes. I can-

250 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
He had expressly added, " that Spain is ready to treat
upon the points of hmits, Indians, commerce, and what
ever raay conduce to the best friendship between the
two countries ; " that he had therefore a right to expect
an arrangeraent of the coraraercial interests of the two
countries ; but as the United States were not wiUing to
force theraselves into connection with a reluctant peo
ple, he would not press what he could not but consider
his right.
2. As to the Mjississippi, while the Spanish govern
ment adraitted that its navigation should be free to
both nations, it objected to the arrangeraent, proposed
by the Araerican minister, in reference to a depot for
the coraraerce of the United States at New Orleans ;
and also insisted, that the language of the article con
veying the right should be of a strictly exclusive char
acter, restricting the right of navigation to the subjects
of Spain and to the citizens of the United States.
3. As to reclaraations, the Spanish governraent in
sisted that all captures- should be divided into two
periods, — the one preceding the 6th of April, 1795,
in which the rule of decision should be the raaritirae
regulations of Spain, then at Avar with France ; the
other foUowing that date, in which the decisions
not see how such a misconstruction escaped attention; but I have
thought it best to leave the text as in the official pubhcation, and
make the correction in the note.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 251
should be upon the usual grounds of international law.
To this division Mr. Pinckney positively refused his
assent. Finding that the Spanish court held to its positions,
Mr. Pinckney deraanded his passports on the 24th of
October. The result of this prorapt deterraination to
close the negotiations was a coraproraise of the dif
ficulties ; and on the 27th of October, 1795, a treaty of
friendship, liraits, and navigation was signed by Mr.
Pinckney and Godoy, or, as he had recently been cre
ated. The Prince of the Peace.
By this treaty, Spain, Art. 2, acquiesced in the
boundaries of the United States, as described in the
tieaty of peace between the United States and Great
Britain, and appointed a joint coraraission to fix the
Uraits. As to the Indians, the two countries stipulated,
Art. -5, that they would restrain hostUities on the part
of those tribes Avithin their respective boundaries, and
hereafter would enter into no treaties with such tribes
as lay without their respective Umits. As to the JMis-
sissippi, it was determined by Art. 4, as foUows : —
" It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of
the United States, which separates thera fi-om the
Spanish colony of Louisiana, is the middle of the chan
nel or bed of the river Mississippi, from the northern
boundary of the said States to the completion of the
thirty-first degree of latitude north of the equator.
And his Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that the
navigation of the said river, in its whole breadth, from

252 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
its source to the ocean, shaU be free only to his sub
jects and the citizens of the United States, uidess he
should extend this privilege to the subjects of other
powers by special convention." And Art. 22 further
provided, that, " in consequence of the stipulations con
tained in the 4th article, his Cathohc Majesty wUl per
rait the citizens of the United States, for the space of
three years frora this time, to deposit their merchandise
and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export
thera frora thence, without paying any other duty than
a fair price for the hire of the "stores ; and his Majesty
promises, either to continue this permission, if he finds
during that time tbat it is not prejudicial to the inter
ests of Spain, or, if he should not agree to continue it
there, he wiU assign to thera, on another part of the
bank of the Mississippi, an equivalent estabUshraent."
As to the reclamations of the United States, a joint
commission was appointed. Art. 21, to sit at Philadel
phia and pronounce upon all claims.-
Articles 12 to 18 adjusted various questions of prize
and raaritirae law, declaring that free ships raake free
goods, and exerapting frora contraband, araong other
things, hemp, flax, tar, anchors, cables, masts, planks,
etc. etc., and aU other things proper for building or
repairing ships.
This treaty was all that the United States could
have hoped for. It secured the navigation of the Mis
sissippi, and thus opened the way for that magnificent
internal commerce, almost fabulous in its present ex-

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 253
tent, which has raade that great river a crowded high
way of an unrivaUed doraestic trade. And it placed all
the other questions in a fair way for solution. Its
negotiation required rather firraness than skill, and its
difficulties were, perhaps, raore apparent than real.
PoUtical circurastances corapelled Spain to yield ; and it
raay be inferred that she would have gone even further
in the Avays of concession, frora the language of the
Prince of the Peace hiraself, in the account of the treaty
which he has given the world in his Memoirs. Refer
ring to his course as minister of Spain, he says : —
" I did raore; I had taken to heart the treaty, which,
unknown to us, the English cabinet had negotiated
A\dth the United States of Araerica ; this treaty afforded
great latitude to evil designs ; it was possible to injure
Spain in an indirect raanner, and without risk, in her
distant possessions.
" I endeavored to conclude another treaty with the
same states, and had the satisfaction to succeed in my
object; I obtained unexpected advantages, and met with
syrapathy, loyalty, and generous sentiraents in that
nation of repubUcans.
" This was a raere treaty or aUiance ; it was, raoreover,
a forraal act of navigation. Independently of carefuUy
providing for the coraraon interests of both nations, we
realized the first appUcation of raodern ideas respecting
the equality of raaritirae rights, and the raeasures which
huraanity enjoins in order to lessen the evUs of war;
ideas hitherto recorded in books, proclairaed by the
22

254 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
civiUzation of the age, but the practical application of
which has at aU tiraes been opposed by England. This
creditable and successful transaction has been suffered
to pass unnoticed, hke so raany important facts of my
political Ufe. The treaty was signed at the Escurial,
the 27th of October, 1795, by citizen Thomas Pinckney
and rayself, without any other intervening party. The
secret was so well kept for a whole year, that the Eng
hsh only had knowledge of it on the 4th of Septeraber,
1796, when it was raade public, the war having been
deterrained on." *
Whatever "unexpected advantages" Godoy raay
have obtained in this treaty, and satisfied as he raay
have been that he had counteracted any raischievous
effects of the treaty Avith Great Britain, it is certain
that neither the language nor the conduct of his gov
ernment manifested the same satisfaction. During the
years of Mr. Adams's adrainistration, which followed the
treaty, the correspondence of the two governraents was
full of mutual complaint. The coraraissioners ap
pointed under the treaty to run the boundary lines, Mr.
ElUcott on the part of the United States, and Baron
Carondelet on the part of Spain, could not agree ; and
the Spanish governraent finaUy refused to withdraw its
troops from the territory of the United States, on vari
ous grounds. It resolved to retain its troops untU it
was decided whether, under the treaty, the Spanish gar-
* Godoy's Memoirs, Vol. I. p. 458-460.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 255
risons were to leave their "works standing or to destroy
thera, and until, by an additional article, the property of
the inhabitants should be secured, and also until the
Spanish officers were sure that the Indians would con
tinue pacific after their A\dthdrawal. To raeet the first
objection, the President left it to the discretion of the
Spanish officers to leave or deraolish their works, as they
pleased ; and proposed to obviate the second by caus
ing an assurance to be published, that the settlers or
occupants of the lands in question should not be dis
turbed in their possession by the United States troops.
The Spanish coraraander then declared his deterraina
tion to reraain, as he expected an invasion frora Can
ada on the part of the British, a pretext sufficiently
exposed by the explicit denial of the British rainister.
To arrange these difficulties required another negotia
tion and treaty, the history of which,- however, belongs
to the period. of Mr. Jefferson's administration.
Besides these practical and persistent annoyances,
the Spanish government, having entered upon a war
with England, thought proper, in May, 1797, to raake a
forraal protest and remonstrance against the provisions
of the treaty of 1794, between the United States and
Great Britain. The Chevalier de Yrujo, the Spanish
minister, addressed, on the 6th of May, 1797, a letter to
the Secretary of State, in which he said: —
" The King, my master, desirous of drawing closer
the connections of friendship and good correspondence
already subsisting between Spain and the United

256 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
States, concluded with thera, on the 27th of October,
1795, a tieaty dictated by the raost generous princi
ples, opening to the Araericans the navigation of the
Mississippi to the ocean, and ceding to the United
States a considerable portion of territory, by agreeing
to draw a line of demarcation between the possessions
of both parties. Equally animated by the desire of
dirainishing, for humanity's sake, the horrors of war, he
adopted the liberal principle, that free ships make free
goods. This stipulation was, in reahty, an incalculable
advantage for the American citizens, who, by the
extension of their navigation, the geographical situation
of their country, and the nature of then- political con
nections at that , epoch, promised a neutiality as advan
tageous as desirable. At the same tirae, his Majesty
agreed, by the said tieaty, that articles necessary to the
construction and repair of vessels should not be deeraed
conti-aband. In a word, the concessions on the part of
Spain, for ceraenting a sincere union between both
nations, were such, that the treaty was received through
out the United States with enthusiasra, and AAdth the
raost evident marks of general approbation. In these
circumstances, the king, ray master, who had so effica
ciously advanced the interests of Americaj proraised
hiraself, by the effect of good correspondence, as
sacred araong nations as between individuals, that the
United States, at least, AA'ould not contribute to the
injury of Spain. What should be the surprise of his
Majesty on knowing that this country had contracted

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 257
engageraents with England prejudicial to his rights and
to the interests of his subjects, nearly at the sarae tirae
in which, with so much Uberality, he was giving to the
United States the raost striking proofs of the raost sin
cere friendship.
" Upon the Avhole, the King, my master, well persuaded
that England, in her treaty with America, had surprised
the good faith of the federal government, reserved to
hiraself to raake, on a proper opportunity, the necessary
representations, not doubting but that the equity of the
United States would place Spain, in relation to other
powers, upon that footing of equality, without which.
the neutiality adopted by America would exist only in
appearance, and be purely nominal ; but experiencing,
since the declaration of war against Great Britain,
injuries and evils which he had foreseen from the rao
ment he was inforraed of the English treaty, he finds
himself under the necessity of anticipating this step,
and, therefore, has ordered rae to raake to this govern
raent, through you, the foUowing observations."
It is hardly necessary to point out how utterly incon
sistent is this stateraent with the claira of Godoy, that
he had intended this treaty as an antidote to the rais
chief of the English one. Referring to the 17th article
of the British tieaty, which waived the principle of free
ships free goods, and the 18th article, which included
the raaterial for ship-building among the articles of
contraband, the Spanish minister continued : — " In
the preamble to the Spanish treaty, its object is said to
22*

258 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
be for the rautual advantage and reciprocal utility of
both countries. I leave you to deterraine Avhat advan
tages either Spain or Araerica can derive frora the 15th
and 16th articles of their treaty, whilst those of the 17th
and 18th of the English tieaty reraain in full force."
The 4th and 22d articles of the Spanish treaty, it
will be recoUected, referred to the navigation of the
Mississippi, and the dep8t at New Orleans. When he
sent the treaty horae for ratification, Mr. Pinckney had
observed : —
" The wording of the latter part of this article (4th)
seeraed objectionable, and various alterations were pro
posed. It required rauch contest to obtain any altera
tion frora the mode first proposed by Spain, whose
doubts were principaUy founded on a jealousy of our
letting in others. The substance, however, appears to
rae not disadvantageous, when considered as connected
with the provision in the 22d article, and the wording
as fuUy authorized by my instructions."
The Spanish rainister now insisted upon the exclu
sive character of that article : —
" Thus far," said he, in continuation of his reraon
strance, " I have represented raerely the injm-y done to
the interests of Spain ; but I shaU now state to you a
point in which her rights are essentially concerned. I
raean the navigation of the Mississippi.
" The just ground upon which Spain refused to
acknowledge the rautual and illegal cession Avhich Eng
land raade to the United States, in the 18th article of

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 259
the tieaty, of the 3d of Septeraber, 1783, of the free
navigation of the Mississippi to the ocean ; the neces
sity in which Araerica has found herself of recurring to
a special treaty with Spain for obtaining it ; and above
all, the tenor of the 4th article of the said treaty, in
which it is agreed that the free navigation of the said
river to the ocean belongs exclusively to the subjects of
the King, and to the citizens of the United States, had
given his Majesty reason to believe that the federal
governraent, by this stipulation, annulled as illegal the
claira which it had raade with England as to this point
in the Sth article of the treaty of 1783. But his Maj
esty has seen with equal surprise, that the United
States not only pretend to confirra that right to Eng
land by the 3d article of their commercial treaty, but
that they have, since the conclusion of that with Spain,
in which the navigation of the Mississippi is confined
exclusively to the Spaniards and Americans, agreed to
the explanatory article signed here by yourself, and the
English Charg^ d'affaires, Mr. Bond, on the 4th of
May, 1796, in which it is declared : That no other stipu
lation or treaty concluded since, by either of the contract
ing parties, with any other power or nation, is under
stood in any manner to derogate from the right to the
free communication and commerce guaranteed by the Zd
article of the treaty to the subjects of his Britannic Ma
jesty." The Spanish rainister then proceeded to argue that
by the treaty of 1763, Spain ceded to England both

260 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
banks of the Mississippi, which cession carried with it
ihe navigation of the river ;
That by the treaty of 1783, England granted that
right to the United States, she stiU being raistress of
the two banks ;
But by a treaty of the sarae date, 1783, with Spain,
England restored to Spain both banks of the Missis
sippi, without reserving the right of navigation. This
right, therefore, passing away from England, with the
possession of the banks, she could no longer cede it to
any other power.
Further, that if the absence of any reservation in the
treaty of 1783 did not really deprive England of the
right to use the navigation, the separation of the colo
nies destroyed the right which, as English subjects, the
Americans might formerly have plead. If, therefore,
the Araerican right could not be derived either frora
their forraer character as British subjects, or from the
void grant of England in the treaty, there was but one
other source of derivation, namely, the special treaty with
Spain. But that treaty confined the privilege of navi
gation exclusively to the subjects of Spain and the citi
zens of the United States, and therefore gave no poAver
to the United States to grant this privilege to any one
else. To this remonstrance, Mr. Pickering, then Secretary
of State, replied seriatim. The first class of com
plaints, springing frora the difference in the principles of
the EngUsh and the Spanish treaties, on the raaxira of

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 261
free ships free goods, and the extension of contraband,
he disposed of suraraarily and effectually : —
" 1. Free ships shaU raake free goods. It is irapos
sible that the two contracting parties should ever have
conceived that this rule, as between theraselves, could
have any operation, except when one was at war and
the other at peace. The United States, being in the
latter situation, have a right to carry in their vessels
goods of the enemies of Spain, without being liable, on
that account, to capture. On the other hand, if the
United States were at war, and Spain at peace, her
subjects would have a right to transport in their vessels
the goods of our eneraies, free frora capture by the
arraed vessels of the United States. And thus, the
stipulation is exactly equal on both sides.
" 2. Ship tiraber and naval stores are, by the law of
nations, contiaband of war ; but the United States and
Spain, for their rautual benefit, agreed to consider thera
as free wods, in order that either party, reraaining at
peace, raight safely continue its coraraerce in those arti
cles, even by carrying them to the enemies of the other.
And this rule will operate equally like the former.
" .You compare the liberal stipulations in these two
articles, with those of a contrary nature in the treaty
between the United States and Great Britain, and ask,
what should be the surprise of his Catholic Majesty on
knowing of the latter engageraents ? After reraark
ing, that, if these stipulations were liberal on the part
of Spain, they were alike liberal on the part of the

262 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
United States, seeing that they were perfectly recip
rocal, permit me to say, that the engageraents with
Great Britain do not appear to offer any cause for
' surprise ' on the part of his CathoUc Majesty ; because
his Majesty had seen, during the whole course of the
American war, how steadily Great Britain persisted, in
opposition to the demands of aU the maritime powers,
to maintain her clairas under the law of nations to cap
ture enemies^ property and timber and naval stores as
contraband in neutral ships. His Majesty has also
seen, in the present war, in which he was for a tirae a
party with Great Britain against France, that Great
Britain continued to avow and practise upon the same
principles. And, with such perfect knowledge of the
principles and conduct of Great Britain, and while she
was still engaged in the war with a power which she
strenuously endeavored to deprive of timber and naval
stores, and whose raercantile shipping was greatly
reduced, could his Catholic Majesty expect tiiat Great
Britain would relinquish her legal rights to a nation (the
United States) which abounded in raaterial for build
ing and equipping ships, and whose vessels, adapted
to the carrying trade, traversed every sea, and visited
every quarter of the globe ? You seem to imagine
there is raore reason for ' surprise ' because, as you say,
the engageraents between the United States and Great
Britain were contracted ' nearly at the sarae tirae,'
' almost at the same raoraent,' with our stipulations
Avith his Catholic Majesty. But aUow rae to bring

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 263
to your recollection the periods when these different
treaties were forraed. That with Great Britain was
concluded on the 19th day of Noveraber, 1794 ; that
with Spain, on the 27th of October, 1795; Further, the
treaty with Great Britain was published in Philadel
phia on the 1st day of July, 1795, alraost four raonths
before the tieaty with his Catholic Majesty was con
cluded, and nearly ten raonths before it received his
ratification, at which tirae (Spain and the United States
being then at peace with all the world) it does not
appear that, his Catholic Majesty found the sraallest
difficulty in giving his final sanction to this treaty with
the United States on account of their prior treaty with
Great Britain."
On the next point, the navigation of the Mississippi,
the Secretary was not so happy. It was clear, that, if
the preraises of the Spanish minister were granted, his
conclusions foUowed inevitably. As Mr. Pickering
said : " If the right of the United States to the naviga
tion of the Mississippi originated in their treaty with
Spain, which was concluded on the 27th of October,
1795, it requires no arguraent to prove that they could
not have granted the right of that navigation to Great
Britain on the 19th of Noveraber, 1794."
Now, the United States had always, frora the begin
ning of this tedious negotiation to its close, denied this
dependence of their right upon the grant of Spain.
They had maintained it upon the laws of nations, and
upon the fact that their separation frora the raother

264 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
country left thera in independent possession of aU rights
they had forraerly clairaed as British subjects. But
the great difficulty in the Avay of the arguraent was,
whether the language of the 4th article of the Spanish '
treaty had not waived these strong points, and had
they not voluntarily, under that treaty, corae down to
the lower ground of Spanish perniission ? Mr. Picker
ing contended not, on two grounds, both ingenious, but,
it raust be added, of very little strength. He quoted
the following extract frora Mr. Pinckney's notes, on the
project of a convention subraitted by Godoy during the
discussion, which project contained a stipulation, which
would have gone to the exclusion of Great Britain from
the Mississippi : —
"The words 'alone' and 'exclusively' should be
omitted, for Spain could scarcely confide in the good
faith of the United States, or in the convention which
she- is about to conclude with thera, if they agreed to
an article which would be an infraction of a tieaty
previously concluded; for, by the treaty of peace be
tween the United States and Great Britain, concluded
in 1783, it is stipulated that the navigation of the river
Mississippi shaU continue free to the subjects of Great
Britain and to the citizens of the United States."
" Here, sir," continued the Secretary, in seeming
triumph, "you see that the Federal government, far
from 'giving his CathoUc Majesty (as you suggest)
reason to believe that they had annulled, as iUegal, the
claira which they raade with England as to this point

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 265
in the 8th article of the treaty of 1783, ' expressly de
clared that the atterapt would be a violation of the
good faith of the United States, pledged to Great
Britain in that treaty.' Mr. Pickering does not seera to
have realized the daraaging reply to which he laid hira
self open ; for what could he have said had the Spanish
minister replied : " I adrait the good faith of Mr. Pinck
ney's reasoning, and had he adhered to his note, his
Majesty raust have found sorae solution of this dif
ficulty, giving aU credit to the frankness and honesty of
the Araerican rainister. But, sir, Mr. Pinckney's notes
on a project are not the articles of a treaty; and
although, as you say, he undoubtedly declared that the
insertion of such words would be bad faith to which
he could not consent, it is equally undeniable that he
did finaUy consent, and that article 4th does contain
Avords of exclusion fully equivalent to ' alone ' or ' ex
clusively ; ' naraely, ' and his Catholic Majesty has
lUtewise agreed that the navigation of the said river,
etc. etc., shaU be free only to his subjects and the citi
zens of the United States, unless he should extend this
privilege to the subjects of other powers by special con
vention.' Now, beheving as fuUy as you do, in the
high character and good faith of Mr. Pinckney, I ara
justified in ray conclusion, that before he consented to
the insertion of these words, the effect of which you
cannot dispute, he was satisfied that his Catholic Maj
esty was right in the pretensions that rendered their
insertion proper; and .signing the treaty with that
23

266 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
article, he did mean to adrait its full significance.
Otherwise you force me to suppose that he committed
one breach of faith against England, only to provide
the opportunity of another against Spain."
The second ground upon which Mr. Pickering rested
his defence was the fact, that, in article 4th, the stipula
tion as to the navigation was not a joint stipulation,
but sole on the part of the Spanish king, and that it
concerned the United States no further than as it gave
them the freedora of the navigation. It would be dif
ficult to support this position in relation to a treaty
consisting of rautual stipulations ; but, supposing it to
be well founded, it went too far. Because, if the free
navigation of the Mississippi was the sole stipulation
of Spain, it could only be because she had the sole right
to stipulate, and to adrait this Avas to give up the whole
arguraent of the United States.
The tiuth was, that the face of the 4th article was
against the United States. But that article was not
entitled to its full significance. For, in fact, it Avas
understood between the two countries, that the United
States would accept any arrangement from Spain
which would effect the great practical object of opening
the navigation of the river, Avithout a too strict scru
tiny of the language of the concession ; provided always,
that it did not rest that concession expressly upon a
grant frora Spain. And this article was the result of
such a determination. The objection to the supple
mentary article, signed by Mr. Bond and the Secretary

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 267
of the United States, was simply captious, for it could
confer no possible right, and in no Avay go a step beyond
the original article in the treaty of 1783, by which the <
United States did nothing more than grant to Great
Britain whatever right to the navigation she might pos
sess, — neither the original nor the suppleraentary arti
cles undertaking to express what those rights were.
These difficulties between the two countries rendered
another negotiation and another treaty necessary ; but
their history belongs to the period of Mr. Jefferson's
adrainistiation. The treaty with England, 1794, with Spain, 1795,
and Avith, France, 1800, sura up the negotiations during
the twelve years of the adrainistrations of Washington
and Adams. -There were resident ministers at the
courts of BerUn, Lisbon, and at the Hague; but their
correspondence involved no matter of large or lasting
poUtical importance. The only remaining negotiation
of sufficient iraportance for a detailed history is that
Asdth the Barbary powers, and a brief summary of its
course and results will be araply sufficient. For a
minute account of the pious efforts of the Order of the
Mathurins, or a discussion of the respective influence of
the great Jewish houses of Bassara and Bacri upon the
Dey of Algiers, would have at present but sraaU
interest. The Araerican trade in the Mediterranean was at
one time not inconsiderable, eraploying, as it did, from
eighty to a hundred ships annually, amounting to

268 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
-about twenty thousand tops, and navigated by about
twelve hundred sailors. Its articles of trade coraprised
about one sixth of the wheat and flour exported from
the United States, one fourth of the dried and pickled
fish, and sorae rice. This trade was abandoned early
in the war, and was not resuraed, to any noticeable
extent, for a long tirae after the peace. The necessity
of its preservation, however, induced the old Confedera
tion, as early as 1784, to authorize the conclusion of
peace with these piratical powers. In March, 1785,
certain of the United States rainisters in Europe Avere
erapowered to send agents to negotiate such treaties.
Their expenses were liraited to eighty thousand dollars,
and they were sent to Morocco and Algiers. A tieaty
with Morocco was then effected at a very reasonable cost,
about nine thousand dollars ; and even previous to the
treaty, the Eraperor of Morocco had, at the instance of
the court of Spain, restored an Araerican vessel which
had been captured, and liberated the prisoners. This
treaty was terrainated by the death of the Eraperor,
and as it was not renewed Avith his son, owing to the
civil coraraotions -in Morocco which accompanied his
succession, and as the condition of Morocco, conse
quent upon these internal dissensions, rendered her
powerless for evU, the only negotiation which it is
necessary to follow is that with Algiers.
At the time of the appointment of the minister,
there were no American captives ; but before the com
raenceraent of any negotiation, sorae tirae in July and

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 269
August, 1785, two Araerican ships were taken by the
Algerines ; and, with their cargoes and crews, araount
ing to about twenty-one persons, were carried into
Algiers. Their ransora became, therefore, a necessaty
eleraent in the negotiation, and the agent sent to
Algiers was authorized to offer, in rederaption, two
hundred doUars per raan. This offer was rejected, and
he returned in 1786, without, having effected either the
ransora or a peace.
Early in 1787, Mr. Jefferson, the American minister
then in Paris, appealed to the good offices of the Gen
eral of the Mathurins, a religious Order of France, insti
tuted in ancient times for the rederaption of Christian
captives frora the infidel powers, and which had been
very successful in redeeming French captives at a very
moderate ransom. Th-^^ general of the Order promised
every assistance in his power, although he stated the
difficulties in the way, and the utter irapossibility of
ransoraing Araerican prisoners at the low prices ac
cepted for French captives. The necessary corarauni
cations between the Araerican rainister in Paris and
his governraent consuraed a long tirae ; but the assist
ance ofthe Order was finaUy accepted, and the general
authorized to offer five hundred and fifty-five dollars a
man. But in the mean time, the Spaniards, the Nea
politans, and the Russians had redeemed captives at
exorbitant sums ; and the appropriation by the French
republic of the lands and revenues of the clergy had sus
pended the proceedings of the Mathurins in the pur-
23*

270 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
poses of their institution ; and when General Wash
ington entered upon his adrainistration, all hope of
relief in that quarter had vanished.
The policy of Algiers, moreover, was to be at peace
only with a certain proportion of the nations trading in
the Mediterranean at one tirae, in order that their
cruisers raight always have sufficient eraployraent, and
their piratical revenue never be altogether suspended.
They were now at peace with France, Spain, England,
Venice, the United Netherlands, Sweden, and Den
raark, and at war with Russia, Austria, Portugal, Na
ples, Sardinia, Genoa, and Malta. And frora 1786 to
1790 the ransoms had ranged from $1,200 to $2,920 ;
and the number of captives, from 2,200 in 1786, had
been, by death or ransom, reduced in 1789 to 655.
In 1792, Congress having deliberated upon the policy
necessary under the circurastances, raade the requisite
appropriation for a raission, and General Washington
appointed Mr. Barclay agent to Morocco, with the rank
of consul, and Adrairal Paul Jones, agent to Algiers.
Admiral Jones died before his instructions reached him,
and Mr. Barclay's presence not being needed at Mo
rocco for the reasons already stated, the powers of
Admiral Jones were transferred to hira. The instruc
tions were as follows : —
" Since, then, no ransom is to take place Avithout a
peace, you wiU, of course, first take up the negotia
tion of peace ; or if you find it better that peace and
ransora should be treated of together, you will take care

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 271
that no agreement for the latter be concluded, unless the
forraer be estabUshed before or in the sarae instant.
" As to the conditions, it is understood that no peace
can be raade with that governraent but for a larger
sura of raoney, to be paid at once, for the whole tirae of
its duration, or for a sraaller one, to be annually paid.
The forraer plan we entirely refuse, and adopt the lat
ter. We have also understood that peace raight be
bought cheaper with naval stores than with money ;
but we wiU not furnish them with naval stores, because
we think it is not right to furnish thera the means
which we know they will eraploy to do wrong, and
because there raight be no economy in it as to our
selves in the end, as it would increase the expense of
that coercion which we may in future be obliged to
practise towards them. The only question then is,
what sura of money will we agree to pay thera annually
for peace? . . . You will, of course, use your best
endeavors to get it at the lowest sum practicable ;
whereupon I shaU only say, that we should be pleased
with $10,000, contented with $15,000, think $20,000 a
very hard bargain ; yet go as- far as $25,000, if it be
impossible to get it for less ; but not a copper further,
this being fixed by law as the utmost limit. These are
meant as annual sums. If you can put off the first
annua,l payment to the end of the first year, you may
employ any sums not exceeding that in presents, to
be paid down ; but if the first payment is to be raade

272 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
in hand, that and the presents cannot by law exceed
25,000 doUars."
On the subject of the ransora of the prisoners, thir
teen in number, the Secretary said : —
" It has been a fixed principle with Congress to
establish the rate of ransora of Araerican captives with
the Barbary States at as low a point as possible, that
it may not be the interest of these States to go in quest
of our citizens in preference to those of other countries.
Had it not been for the danger it would have brought
on the residue of our seamen, by exciting the cupidity
of these rovers against thera, our citizens now in Al
giers would have been long ago redeeraed, without
regai-d to price. The mere money for this particular
rederaption neither has been, nor is, an object with
anybody here. It is frora the sarae regard to the safety
of our searaen at large, that they have now restrained
us from any ransom unaccompanied with peace; this
being secured, we are led to consent to terms of ransora
to which, otherwise, our government would never have
consented. . . . You will consider this sum, therefore,
say $27,000, as your ultiraate lirait, including ransom,
duties, and gratifications of every kind."
Mr. Barclay had scarcely received these instructions,
and was preparing to start for Algiers, when he died at
Lisbon, in January, 1793. Colonel Huraphreys, the
minister of the United States resident at Lisbon, was
then authorized to conduct the negotiation. Before,

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 273
however, he could effect any thing, a truce was raost
unexpectedly arranged between Portugal and Algiers,
which, by \\dthdraAving the Portuguese fleet, left Araeri
can coraraerce very much exposed ; and which Avas so
sudden that it gave the Algerines an opportunity,
which they iraproved so weU that the nuraber of Araeri
can captives was raised frorn thirteen to between one
and two hunclred.* Colonel Huraphreys was finaUy
* As this very unexpected truce was effected through the agency
of the British consul at Algiers, it gave rise to a very angry sus
picion, on the part of the United States, that it was a deliberate
effort by the British government to injure our commerce by with
drawing the pi-otectlon of the Portuguese fleet, and exposing us to
the Algerine cruisers. Mr. Pinckney communicated these suspicions
to Lord Granville, and the following letter records their conversa
tion : —
" His Lordship, In answer to what I had advanced, stated, that
TTith respect to the truce between the Portuguese and Algerines, this
country had not the least intention or a thought of injuring us
thereby ; that they had been appealed to by their friend and ally, the
court of Portugal, to procure a peace for them with the Algerines,
and that Mr. Logie had been Instructed to use his best endeavors to
effect this purpose ; that he, finding the arrangements for a peace
could not Immediately take place, had concluded the truce ; that in
this they conceived they had done no more than their friendship for
a good ally required of tbem ; but that the measure was particularly
advantageous to themselves, as they wanted the cooperation of the
Portuguese fleet to act against their common enemy, which it was at
liberty to do, when no longer employed In blocking up the Algerine
fleet. As I had stated that the Court of Portugal had promised a
convoy to the American vessels then in their harbors, he assured me

274 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
authorized to purchase peace with $800,000, on the
same principles as the former instructions, if possible ;
if not, he was to arrange the distribution of the money
as he thought best. In the latter part of 1795, he suc
ceeded, through the agency of Mr. Donaldson, recently
appointed consul to Tunis and TripoU, and the Danish
consul at Algiers, in effecting a treaty, by which the
prisoners were ransomed and a peace granted, in con
sideration of the further sura of 12,000 sequins, to be
paid annually in naval stores. The ransora raoney
stipulated not having been paid punctually as it carae
due, the Dey threatened to annul the treaty, and was
only induced to lengthen the time for payraent by the
offer of a thirty-six gun ship. The annual payraent in
naval stores, as stipulated in detail, was found to be
considerably larger than the araount specified in raoney,
and the final appropriation for this treaty, including the
annual payraent for two years, made it cost, up to that
date, nine hundred and ninety odd thousand dollars.
that they would give no opposition to that measure." — T. P. MSS.
Letter Book, Vol. L p. 474, 475.

CHAPTER V.

CONCLirSION.

The chief feature of the foreign policy of the United
States throughout this period — the twelve years com
prised inthe adrainistrations of Washington and Adams
— was its negative character. Its great object was to
prevent, rather than to accompUsh. It is true that it
had iraportant and positive results. By the treaty with
England, the frontier posts were restored, and the ter
ritory of the United States freed from British occupa
tion ; by the tieaty Avith Spain, their southern boun
daries were defined, and the navigation of the Missis
sippi secured ; by the treaty with France, they were
released from the unprofitable and dangerous guarantee
of the French possessions. But beyond these ques
tions — indeed, to a large extent, involving them in a
wider and more general decision — lay the perplexed
field of our foreign relations. Had we reaUy an inde
pendent place in the world's history, or was our posi
tion in the political systera of Christendora to be deter
rained by the logic of European interests, and enforced
by the power of European arras ?

276 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
At the declaration of American independence, the
European balance of power had raore nearly arrived at
perfection in its details than at any period since the
peace of Westphalia. The terraination of the Revolu
tionary war had restored to France rauch of the conse
quence which had been dirainished by. the peace of
1763, while neither Russia on the one side, nor the
iraraense maritime and colonial development of Eng
land on the other, had become permanent disturbers of
the political equation. And although there were, as
before and afterwards, national interests and national
jealousies, there was a certain dynastic and cabinet
sympathy araong the raonarchies of Europe, which
assirailated their policies to one coraraon type. When,
therefore, France effectually assisted at the separation
of the colonies frora England, and introduced a new
power into the council-chamber of history, few realized
the full consequences of this action, and those few were
rather far-seeing thinkers than active politicians. The
European statesmen generally considered it as Uttle
more than the substitution of one influence for another,
and considered it rather in its consequences upon the.
strength of an European power, than as an iraportant
and independent fact. There was, therefore, a raani
fest intention to use the young repubUc as one of the
sniaU weights, to be shifted, by diploraatic raanipula-
tion, frora one scale to the other, according to the polit
ical necessities of the European balance. And, had the
general condition of things remained as before, the

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 277
United States could scarcely have prevented such a
destiny ; for against the united diplomacy and strength
of Europe, they could have accomplished nothing.
But before the various interests of Europe could adjust
theraselves for this new relation, the French Revolution
broke to pieces the old systera, scattered the elaborate
calculations ofthe old diploraacy, and, by involving all
Europe in a war for existence, left the United States
coraparatively undisturbed, to mature their own inter
ests into an independent system. Washington and
Adams found themselves just in this transition period,
when the traditionary pohcy of Europe was destroyed,
and every state was in the uncertainty of panic, seek
ing its own interests and safety, and before the strife
had been concentiated into that absorbing struggle for
national existence which lasted through the first fifteen
years of the present century. With three of the great
European powers they had questions of direct concern.
Besides this complication, they had endeavored, in such
tieaties as they had already negotiated, to introduce the
mUd principles of a humane and liberal system of
neutral rights, and they had succeeded in establishing
stipulations of this character in their relations with sev
eral European powers. But in the general and con
fused hostility which foUowed upon the outbreak of the
French Revolution, not only these principles could not
be enforced, but their existence coraplicated the rela
tions of the United States with those aUies who, as
regarded theraselves, were rautual and bitter enemies.
24

278 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
The position of the United States, therefore, as far as
their immediate interests were concerned, was raost
unfortunate. They could not obtain an impartial hear
ing at any court in Europe ; and they had not the
strength to force from greater powers that respect to
Avhich their national and independent interests were
fairly entitled. But embarrassing as was this position,
the causes that produced it, corrected, in their develop
ment, the very difficulties which they had created. The
uncertain and conflicting interests of the European
powers induced a jealous watchfulness of each other's
policy. ; and, by a skilful use of their various and chang
ing relations, the United States were enabled to obtain,
at different periods, concessions from each, granted, it is
true, rather from a selfish instinct in, the special policy
of each state, but not the less important on that ac
count in their results upon American interests. Thus,
the treaty with England was yielded to the necessities
of the condition of hostility between England and
France; the treaty with Spain was the result of the
changed attitude' of that power toward England on the
one side, and France on the other ; and the treaty with
France depended upon the special relation Avhich
France at the moment wished to assume, for her own
purposes, towards, the other powers of Europe. Not
one of these treaties was based upon any honest regard
for the interests or rights of the United States ; and it
thus Uterally and providenti-ally happened, that the
French Revolution, which at one time threatened to

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 279
absorb the interests of the United States as the neces
sary but inferior consequences of European pohcy, did
finaUy play a raost iraportant, though unforeseen, part
in accoraplishing that very independence, which, at the
outset, it so seriously coraproraised.
Another erabarrassraent under Avhich the governraent
labored, was the want of an efficient and experienced
diplotnatic corps. The character and ability df the
diploraatic representatives of the United States were of
the highest class ; but no natural excellence could en
tirely supersede the necessity of that farailiarity AAdth the
details of European policy, which was, perhaps, raore
important at this period than at any other in our his
tory, for our poUcy was in great raeasure dependent on
the contingent relations of other powers. Added to
this, the tirae necessary for coraraunication, at that day,
between Europe and America, and the uncertainty of.
even this dilatory coramunication, owing to the chances
of capture from both beUigerents, rendered an exchange
of despatches alraost idle. Months elapsed between
the raost iraportant letters ; papers, absolutely necessary
to pending negotiations, wandered away frora their
direction; and in the archives of that period, the place
of raore than one iinportant docuraent is supplied by
the notice, " never received." The critical corabination,
in the raidst of which a rainister Avrote for instructions,
was passed long before his letters reached Philadelphia ;
and the state of affairs to which his home correspond-

280 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
ence related had been weUnigh forgotten before he fully
coraprehended its detaUs. Our foreign rainisters, there
fore, were not only subjected to great difficulty in the
discharge of their duties, but their real and unaffected
ignorance of what was going on at horae dirainished
their consideration in the eyes of the practised diplo
matists with whom they Avere deaUng.
" I beUeve," says one of thera, who had enjoyed con
siderable experience, " that the members of no corps
diplomatique whatever, in any countiy or at anytime,
have been furnished with so Uttle or so irregular infor
mation of the important occurrences of their own coun
try, or of others, as those frora Araerica have ever been.
I know not how this raay affect others, but as to rayself,
I have often felt, though never so rauch as lately, that
it adds cruelly to the distrust and erabarrassment which
are experienced in those cases which are inevitable, and
which force to the adoption of one of several lines of
conduct, which may lead to different, and even to
opposite, ends. Under these circumstances, it is irapos
sible not to be subject to constant error, unless one is
endowed with the sptiit of divination, to which I have
no pretensions. I have been led to these reflections
frora what I have seen rayself, and learned from other
foreign agents of the United States, and which would
seera to show, from this systera having been practised
under the successive adrainistrations of our country,
that it was considered there as the proper one. If

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 281
SO, I am persuaded time and experience will change
it." *
But not only had the governraent to contend with
difficulties like these ; it had to raeet at home an ex
cited and powerful opposition. For, unfortunately, on
the foreign policy of the country, public opinion was
widely and passionately divided. Not only did parties
see the interests of the country in different lights, but
they becarae; as the controversy grew warraer, active
partisans of the foreign influences which atterapted to
control our policy for their own ends. The contest be
carae one of sentiraent rather than opinion, and roused
into unscrupulous activity aU the bitterness that had
been engendered in the Seven Years' war. Confounding
the principles of our own Revolution with tlie eleraents
of civil stiife at work in France, the great popular raind
was deceived by its own highest and raost honest syra
pathies, while the party which supported the adrainis
tration becarae, in the heat of the long and angry argu
raent, less tolerant of opposition than was either just or
politic. The truest patriots raistrusted each other, and,
misinterpreting each other's raotives Avith the acute
ness of excited and jealous suspicion, their opposition
threatened to render any raoderate policy irapracti
cable. Without a fixed policy, with a limited and
enemy-bounded territory, and enfeebled by radical po
litical dissension at horae, it is now alraost irapos-
* T. P. MSS. Letter from Mr. Short, Oct. 12, 1793,

282 DIPLOMATIC HISTORT.
sible to realize the extent of our peril. And had foreign
powers been aUowed to obtain comraanding influence
in the national councils, the character of the country
would have been diminished, its interests mutilated,
and our national existence raust have dragged its slow
way frora a crippled and sickly infancy to a raairaed
and dependent manhood. Fortunately for us, how
ever, sustained by wise, informed, and firm counsellors,
Washington succeeded, even against a strongly excited
popular prejudice, in establishing the perfect national
independence of the country. And to have effected
this, as they did, without war, and in faCe of the dif
ficulties, both foreign and doraestic, of the new govern
raent, is the crowning glory of those great raen, whose
arms enfranchised an empire, whose Avisdom created a
constitution, and whose steadfast sagacity inaugurated
a national life of unbroken and alraost fabulous pros
perity. They differed, as raen Avill do, soraetiraes in
ignorance, sometimes in passion; but in their labors,
they were joined together, and in their fame, they should
not be divided. Honored be their memories, — the
severe simplicity of Jay's antique virtue, the subtle
and eloquent reasoning of Jefferson's wonderful intel
lect, the broad and ample sweep of Harailton's na
tional pride, the irapetuous and . abounding patriotisra
of the elder Adams, the varied excellency of Pinckney
and Morris and Monroe, but above all, the calra, sure
judgraent of hira in whose raajestic presence even these
raen bowed. With feeble means, they achieved great

DIPLOMATIC HISTORT. 283
ends ; in doubt and difficulty, they never faltered in a
great purpose. They were raen true and brave and
elevated ; their terapers chastened by a long and patient
experience, their amotions terapered by a Avise forbear
ance, and their abilities quickened by a devoted patriot
isra, which gave vigor and purpose to their policy.
But the student of the world's fortunes, who looks down
upon this mighty empire, with its tributary oceans, and
sees its vast extent gemraed with the civilized beauty
of a thousand cities, peopled with untiring raiUions, by
whose energy its rivers roU down gold, its forests van
ish, and its fields burst into luxuriant harvests, while
arts and science, laws and coraraerce, direct, protect,
and refine the objects of their unstinted labors, — be
holds but a portion of their work.
For, in the darkest hours of their perplexity, they
trusted with a grave and beautiful, siraplicity to Truth.
And the success of their policy thus afforded to the
science of history another of those rare observations, by
which we learn, that, beyond our obscure and cloudy
prospect, the eternal laws of a Divine raorality are at
work, and that with nations, as with men, the law of
progress is the rule of right.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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