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Gift of

Mrs. Henry Daggett Hooker

1930

(Breat Commanbere
EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON

GENERAL GREENE

ARMY AND NAVY EDITION

GREAT COMMANDERS
? ? ? ?

GENERAL GREENE

BY
FRANCIS VINTON GREENE Ml
AUTHOR OF
THE RUSSIAN ARMY AND ITS CAMPAIGNS IN TURKEY IN 1877-78,
THE MISSISSIPPI (CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR),
ARMY LIFE IN RUSSIA, ETC.

NEW YORK
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
1897

Copyright, 1893,
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.

All rights reserved.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER PAGE
I. — Antecedents and Education, 1742-1770 . . 1
II. — Early Life in -Rhode Island, 1770-1775 . . 10
III. — Boston and Long Island, 177S-1776 . . . 23
IV. — Fort Washington, 1776  43
V. — The- Jerseys, 1776-1777  60
VI. — The Brandywine and Germantown, 1777 . . 76
VII. — Appointed Quartermaster General — Valley
Forge — Monmouth and Newport, 1777-1778 . 94
VIII.— Quartermaster General — Springfield, 1778-
1780  118
IX. — Resigns as Quartermaster General — West
Point, 1780  141
X. — Takes Command of the Southern Army, 1780 . 161
XI. — The Retreat to the Dan and the Battle of
Guilford Court House,. 1781 . . . .191
XII. — The Battle of Hobkirk's Hill and the Siege
of Ninety-Six, 1781  228
XIII. — The Battle of Eutaw Springs and the close
of the Southern Campaign, 1781-1783 . . 263
XIV. — Closing Years and Death, 1783-1786 . . 303
Index  ¦ . 321

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

FACING PAGE
Portrait of Nathanael Greene . . . Frontispiece
From the painting by Charles Wilson Peale.
The Engagement at Harlem Heights  48
From The Campaign of 1776 around New York, by Henry P.
Johnston, published by the Long Island Historical Society.
Fort Washington  58
From The Campaign of 1776 around New York, by Henry P.
Johnston, published by the Long Island Historical Society.
Operations at Newport  116
From Marshall's Life of Washington.
Theater of Operations in the Southern Campaign . . 190
The Battle of Guilford Court House .... 226
From Johnson's Life of Greene.
The Battle of Hobkirk's Hill  242
From Johnson's Life of Greene.
The Siege of Ninety-Six  258
From Johnson's Life of Greene.
The Battle of Eutaw Springs  276
From Johnson's Life of Greene.

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED.

Life of Nathanael Greene, by George Washington Greene, 3
vols., 1871.
Life of Greene, by William Johnson, 2 vols., 1822.
Life of Nathanael Greene, by Charles Caldwell, 1819.
Life of Nathanael Greene, by W. G. Simms, 1849.
Life and Writings of George Washington, by Jared Sparks, 12
vols., 1858.
Correspondence of the American Revolution, by Jared Sparks,
4 vols., 1853.
Life of Washington, by John Marshall, 2 vols., 1832.
Life of Washington, by Washington Irving, 5 vols., 1859.
Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, by General
Henry Lee, 1813.
Campaign of 1781 in the Carolinas, by Henry Lee, third edi
tion, 1824.
Battles of the United States, by Henry B. Dawson, 2 vols, 1858.
Field Book of the Revolution, by Benson J. Lossing, 1859.
Battles of the American Revolution, by Henry B. Carrington,
1876. Campaign of 1776 around New York, by Henry P. Johnston,
published by the Long Island Historical Society,. 1878.
Life of Steuben, by Friedrich Kapp, 1859.
Life of General Kalb, by Friedrich Kapp, 1884.
Life of Knox, by Francis S. Drake, 1873.
Treason of Charles Lee, by George H. Moore, i860.
History of the Independence of the United States, by William
Gordon, 4 vols., 1788.
History of the American Revolution, by David Ramsay, 3
vols., 1793.
Journals of the American Congress, 1774-1788, 4 vols., 1823.
The Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, by Benjamin F. Stevens,
2 vols., 1888.
History of the Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, by Lieutenant-
Colonel Tarleton, 1787.
History of the American War, by C. Stedman, 2 vols., 1794.
Anecdotes of the Revolutionary War, by Alexander Garden,
1822.

GENERAL GREENE.

CHAPTER I.
ANTECEDENTS AND EDUCATION.
Nathanael Greene was born in 1742, "on the
27th day of the fifth month," according to the entry
in his father's diary. The Gregorian Calendar was
not adopted in England or its colonies until ten years
later, and March was then considered the first month.
His birth was therefore on August 7, 1742. He was
of the fourth generation of the descendants of John
Greene, surgeon, of Salisbury, England, whose ances
tors had lived for several generations in Dorsetshire,
and are referred to in. the parish records of births,
marriages, and deaths, as gentlemen and landed pro
prietors. John Greene sailed from Hampton in the
ship James, on April 5, 1635, and landed at Boston
sixty days later. Like many others, he had left Eng
land in order to make his home in a land where he
could worship God according to his own conscience ;
but he soon discovered that the theocratic govern
ment of Massachusetts Bay was more intolerable
than that of the land he had left. He therefore fol
lowed Roger Williams into the wilderness, and aided
him to found the colony of Rhode Island. The serv-

2 GENERAL GREENE.
ices of this little community in establishing civil and
religious liberty have not received in public estima
tion the credit to which they are entitled. The col
ony was so small that it was overlooked among its
more powerful neighbors, but " tall oaks from little
acorns grow." The opinions of Roger Williams were
shared by such an infinitesimal minority of mankind,
two hundred and fifty years ago, that it was neces
sary that they should first be put into practice by
a small community ; and it is the glory of Rhode
Island that the opinions of this handful of settlers
on Narragansett Bay should now be the foundation
principle of government among more than one hun
dred millions of English-speaking people scattered
over the four quarters of the globe.
The principles on which Roger Williams founded
his colony were : the right of every man to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience ;
the right of the people to choose their own public
officials of all classes ; and the right of property— ¦-
which last is upheld by all governments, but was
carried so far by Williams that he denied the au
thority of any one to give or receive original titles
to land in America without the consent of the Indians
as primary owners. These rights were fully and com
pletely secured by the charter for Providence Plan
tations which Williams secured from the Earl of
Warwick and his associates under the Protector in
1643, and in that which Clarke secured from Charles
II in 1663 for Rhode Island and Providence Planta
tions. The latter charter gave such complete civil
and religious liberty, that, when the colonies revolted
in 1776, and the others formed their State constitu
tions; it was only necessary in Rhode Island to pass

ANTECEDENTS AND EDUCATION. 3
an act of the Assembly substituting allegiance to the
colony for allegiance to the King. No other change
was necessary in its fundamental law, and under this
charter its affairs were successfully administered, un
til 1843. With Williams and Clarke and Gorton, John
Greene helped to found this colony. He was in the
first company to follow Williams from Salem, and he
arrived at Providence in the spring of 1636, bringing
with him his wife and five "children — four sons and
an infant daughter. Williams had bought his land
at Providence from the Indian chiefs who owned it,
and he conveyed it for a consideration of ^30 to
his " loving friends and neighbors," twelve in num
ber, among whom was John Greene. Five years later
John Greene, in company with a few others from
Providence and a few from Newport, purchased from
the Indians a tract on the west side of Narragansett
Bay, about four miles wide and twenty miles long,
which was at first called Shawomet, but afterward
named Warwick in gratitude for the kindness shown
them by the Earl of Warwick, then Governor-in-
Chief and Lord High Admiral of the Colonies. Here
John Greene passed the remainder of his days, and
-here his descendants were born. He received his full
share of persecution from Massachusetts. When in
1637 he returned to Salem to sell his house, he was
arrested and thrown into jail for having spoken disre
spectfully of the magistrates, and having charged them
with " usurping the power of Christ over men's con
sciences." In 1643, when Massachusetts attempted
to claim jurisdiction over Shawomet, and seized Gor
ton and his neighbors and carried them to Boston
for trial, Greene was obliged to escape across the

4 GENERAL GREENE.
bay to Newport with his sick wife, who died a few
weeks afterward. In the following year, with Gor
ton and Holden, he was sent to England to lay their
grievances before the Earl of Warwick's Committee,
and from him they secured a decision in their favor,
which, though appealed by Massachusetts, was never
materially reversed. He died in 1659, his last public
service being as one of a committee of ten selected
in 1647 to organize the colony under the charter of
1643. His son was one of the ten " Assistants " to
the Governor named for the first year in the charter
of 1663. His descendants multiplied rapidly in Warwick ;
they married young, lived long, and reared large
families. Each generation in succession furnished
men prominent in the community' — governors, deputy
governors, secretaries of the colony, and delegates
to the General Assembly. Nathanael Greene was
of the fourth generation of these descendants. He
was the fifth of a family of nine children — two by a
first marriage and seven by a second. His father,
also named Nathanael, was a Quaker preacher of the
most vigorous as well as the most narrow-minded
and superstitious type. His son described him in
after years as " a man of great piety, of an excellent
understanding, and governed in his conduct by hu
manity and kind benevolence, but his mind was over
shadowed with prejudice against literary accomplish
ments." He was also a large landed proprietor, and
the owner of a forge, grist mill, flour mill, and saw
mill, as well as a store for the sale of general mer
chandise. The forge and mills had been established
by his father Jabez, and at his death the property
passed equally to his six sons without being divided,

ANTECEDENTS AND EDUCATION. £
and the business was continued by them. It was
situated on Potowomut, a peninsula on the west side
of Narragansett Bay just south of Warwick. In 1741
a second forge was established by the brothers at
Coventry, about ten miles northwest of Potowomut,
and the two establishments continued in operation
till the close of the century. The property at both
places gradually passed into the hands of Nathanael
the preacher, and all of his eight sons were put to
work in the forges or mills at an early age. At his
death, in 1771, his sons inherited the property and
continued the business jointly under the name of
Jacob Greene & Co., but Nathanael Greene never
paid any attention to it after he joined the army in
1775. Its value, exclusive of real estate, was ap
praised in 1743 at ^8,055, with ^2,408 of uncollected
debts — a considerable sum in those days. The prin
cipal product of the forges was anchors, and these,
together with the flour made at the mills, were trans
ferred across the bay in sloops to Newport, bringing
back return cargoes of ore and% black sand from Penn
sylvania, and wheat and coal from Virginia.
At the age of thirty Nathanael Greene wrote sadly
to one of his intimate friends : " I lament the want of
liberal education. . . . I was educated a Quaker, and
among the most superstitious sort ; and that of itself
is enough to cramp the best of geniuses, much more
mine." Certainly his disposition and temperament
and sympathies were very different from those of his
father. The latter was vigorous of mind and body,
but extremely narrow and prejudiced. He believed
that no books were worthy of study but the Bible,
was opposed to war and strife, abhorred worldly
amusements. The son, on the other hand, had an

6 GENERAL GREENE.
active and alert mind, a happy disposition, and a
strong, well-formed body. He craved knowledge
from his childhood, possessed a sympathetic nature
which formed lasting attachments, and was quick to
resent a fancied injury ; took pleasure in athletic con
tests, delighted in society, and, above all, was pas
sionately fond of. dancing — in spite of the corporeal
punishment which he invariably suffered when de
tected in a sin so peculiarly offensive to Quakers.
When he attended a military parade in 1773 and pre
pared to organize the Kentish Guards, the " meeting ''
gave him three several warnings and asked him for
an explanation, being reluctant to take extreme meas
ures against the son of a father so highly respected ;
but these warnings had no effect upon him, and he con
tinued his military investigations. No alternative re
mained but to dismiss him from their communion,
which they promptly did. All of his differences with
the Quakers were, however, of small consequence,
except in the matter of education. This was of last
ing importance. His father was one of the most
prosperous men in the colony, and abundantly able,
had he so chosen, to give his son a thorough educa
tion and send him either to Harvard, Yale, or King's
College. (Rhode Island College, afterward Brown
University, was not fully established till he was thirty
years old.) But his father did not so choose ; such
a course would have seemed to him most sinful. He
employed an itinerant teacher in the long winter
evenings to teach his eight boys to read, write, and
cipher. Having mastered these, the Holy Scriptures
and the writings of George Fox and Robert Barclay
were considered as affording all knowledge that was
needful or useful. Against this programme Nathanael.

ANTECEDENTS AND EDUCATION. 7
the younger instinctively rebelled. At the age of
fourteen he made the acquaintance of a young man
named Giles, who was passing his college vacation in
the village of East Greenwich, a short distance from
his father's home. The result of his conversations
With Giles about college and books led him to ask
of his father better means of study; and after much
hesitation his father so far yielded as to allow him to
study geometry and a little Latin under a teacher
named Maxwell, in East Greenwich. This taste of
knowledge suggested to the lad that he devise means
within his own control for procuring books, and ac
cordingly he made toy anchors and other toys of
iron. The next time, the sloop took her load of
wares from the forge and the mill to Newport he
went in it, and promptly sold his toys for cash.
With this he proceeded to the bookstore and re
marked that he wanted to "buy a book." The book
seller sharply asked, " What book ? " And the boy,
abashed, was unable to reply. But it happened that
in the bookstore at the same time was the Rev. Ezra
Stiles, then pastor of the Second Church in Newport,
and afterward for many years President of Yale
College. He was much interested in a lad who
showed such positive but ill-defined desire for knowl
edge, and at once began to give him welcome advice
about the choice of books. Through this kindly as
sistance young Nathanael became acquainted with
Locke on the Understanding and Watt's Elements
of Logic, which, in connection with Euclid, formed
strong, wholesome food for an acquiring and eager
mind of fifteen. In his trips to Newport he also
formed the acquaintance of Lindley Murray, the fu
ture grammarian, who, although younger than himself,

8 GENERAL GREENE.
was being well educated and anxious to talk about
books and studies. In his nineteenth year the death
of his two stepbrothers led to a law-suit concerning
the disposition of their property, of so complicated a
nature that it was sent to England on appeal. His
father instructed him to collect evidence and confer
with the lawyjers, and this induced him to purchase
Jacob's Law Dictionary and diligently study it. A
little later he purchased an Oxford edition of Black-
stone, in four quarto volumes ; then the Dictionary
of Arts and Sciences, in four volumes. Further addi
tions to his stock were made from time to time, but
it was not until he moved to Coventry and built his
own house that he could fully gratify his taste for
books. Then he had a library of two hundred and
fifty volumes, well chosen and solid books, which had
cost him no little hard-earned money, and which he
thoroughly studied, reading many of them over and
over again — English and Roman History, Vattel and
Hume, translations of Homer, Caesar, and Horace, But
ler's Analogy, Plutarch's Lives, Turenne's Memoirs,
Ferguson's History of Civil Society, the Spectator,
Pope, Swift, and Sterne, and others equally good.
In these days of circulating libraries and count
less novels, magazines, and newspapers, we are apt
to forget that a good education can be obtained
from a library of one hundred well-selected volumes,
especially if they be obtained only by persistent
effort and the sacrifice of time and money. Then
they are appreciated, are pored over and thought
out, read and re-read, stored away in the memory
with an enduring lodgment that no easily-gained
and lightly-read book can secure. Such a library
did Nathanael Greene slowly accumulate and ar-

ANTECEDENTS AND EDUCATION. 9
dently devour, although to the close of his life he
felt conscious of the defects of his early education.
Doubtless he lacked the benefits of mentar training
and discipline, yet he overcame this deficiency, by
his own unguided and persistent efforts, to such an
extent that he was never considered by his asso
ciates an uneducated man ; he acquired a good style,
barring certain errors of grammar and spelling which
were then almost universal ; he wrote lucidly and
concisely, and was agreeable in conversation. Above
all, he had a clear mental vision and sound judgment.
His mind saw realities, and not pictures.

CHAPTER II.
EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND.
In the year 1770, when Nathanael Greene was
twenty-seven years old, his father gave him charge of
the forge and mill at Coventry. This establish
ment had grown to such an extent that over one
hundred families were dependent on it for their liveli
hood, and a local manager was necessary. Nathanael
Greene moved there, built himself a comfortable
house, of which the best room was reserved for his
books, and established himself. Ten years before,
one of his half-brothers had left him in his will an
estate in West Greenwich ; with this he had qualified
under the property test and had been admitted as a
freeman in Warwick in 1765. Immediately after his
removal to Coventry he was elected to the General
Assembly, and he was re-elected in 1771, 1772, and
1775. His father died a few months after his re
moval to Coventry in 1770.
At the time he took his seat in the Assembly the
population of the thirteen colonies was about 2,300,-
000, and of these, about 55,000, or one fortieth part,
lived in " The English Colony of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations." Newport was the principal
town, haying a population of about 11,000, which
was reduced to less than half that number during
the Revolutionary War, and which was not regained

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND. n
until nearly a century later. It was then exceeded
only by New York, Philadelphia, and Boston. It
had an extensive commerce, about two hundred ships
being engaged in the foreign trade with Europe;
Africa, and the West Indies, and about four hundred
in the coasting trade. It imported large amounts of
sugar and molasses from the West Indies, and ex
ported New England rum to Africa. Its surplus
stock of West India goods was shipped to Boston
and New York, and there exchanged for British
manufactures, of which its consumption was valued
at £ 1 20,000 a year. Providence had a population
of less than 4,000, and there \^ere no other towns of
any importance. But there were several villages
scattered along its water front, which was singularly
long in proportion to the area of the colony, and
the inhabitants of these were for the most part en
gaged in maritime commerce in a small way. The
rest of the population was employed in agriculture,
though the soil was largely rock and sand, which
yielded poor returns. The mother country looked
askance at any attempt to introduce manufactures
into the colonies, and called sharply for explanation
of any efforts in that direction. In 1766 the Lords
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations called for
" a particular and exact account of the several
manufactures which have been set up and carried
on within the colony since the year 1734, and of the
public encouragement which has been given thereto.''
No answer having been returned, in 1768 the Earl
of Hillsborough, Colonial. Secretary, warned the
Governor " to pay exact obedience " to the request ;
and the Governor (Lyndon) humbly replied : " Ten
forges for making iron out of ore; two furnaces —

12 GENERAL GREENE.
one for making iron into pigs and the other for mak
ing hollow ware out of ore ; six spermaceti works ;
twelve potash works; three rope walks; and one
paper mill, at which is manufactured wrapping, pack
age, and other coarse paper. These, my Lord, are the
only manufactures which have been set up in the
colony since the year 1734; and neither for these nor
for any other manufactures is any bounty or other
public encouragement given by the colony." Rhode
Island is now the most densely populated State
(319 per square mile) on the American continent,
and three-fourths of its inhabitants are engaged in or
dependent upon manufactures ; but at the beginning
of the Revolution none of these had come into ex
istence, except a few iron forges and furnaces, of
which those owned by Nathanael Greene and his
brothers were the most important.
In means of education Rhode Island was behind
its adjoining colonies. Land had been given for the
support of a school in Newport in 1640, and in
Providence in 1663, and subsequently in the other
towns ; but the free public schools had not been
established until 1768, and then only in the face of
active opposition on the part of those who would be
most benefited by them. Harvard had been estab
lished in 1636, Yale in 1701, Princeton in 1746, and
King's College (Columbia) in 1754. Rhode -Island
College (Brown University) was founded in 1764,
with the primary object of affording education for
Baptist clergymen. It was first situated in the town
of Warren, but in 1770 a change was determined upon,
and the various towns offered subscriptions as an
inducement to cause its removal. Nathanael Greene
labored actively to secure it for East Greenwich, but

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND.

13

the subscription of Providence exceeded that of any
other place, and it was removed there. Failing to
secure the university for his section of the colony, he
set to work to establish a public school in Coventry,
and in this humbler but still useful task he was en
tirely successful.
The local politics of the colony when he took his
seat in the Assembly had for many years turned on
the contentions of the rival factions of Hopkins and
Ward, the standing candidates for Governor. The
origin of the contest was trivial, but the struggle
was none the less active and bitter. Greene's family
was connected by marriage with that of Governor
Ward, and his sympathies were naturally with that
faction; but. he does not seem to have taken, any
very active part in the controversy. In fact, just
before he entered public life the struggle was brought
to a close in face of the vital issues then coming for
ward in reference to the right of the British Parlia
ment to tax the colonies without their consent. Gov
ernor Ward was in office when the Stamp Act was
passed, in 1765, and was the only one of the colonial
governors who refused to take the oath to enforce
it. He was re-elected in 1766, but was defeated by
Hopkins in 1767. At the close of Hopkins's term
both parties agreed to withdraw from the contest ;
they joined hands in opposing the pretensions of
Parliament, and henceforth worked together in the
interests of the colony, which, as it was now evident,
were tending toward independence from Great
Britain. They jointly represented the colony in the
first Continental Congress, and Ward died in Phila
delphia in the spring of 1776.
It does not appear that Nathanael Greene took a

!4 GENERAL GREENE.
prominent place in the Assembly during the four
years in which he was a member of it. One or more
of his brothers were deputies from Warwick at the
same time, but no record has been preserved of any
speeches or acts by any of them which attracted
special attention. It is probable that he gained in
fluence among his fellow-members, for otherwise it
is impossible to explain the confidence they showed
in him on the outbreak of the war, but of the details
there is no record. During this period he formed in
timate friendships with two men — Samuel Ward, Jr.,
and James Mitchell Varnum — which lasted through
life. Ward's father and grandfather had been gov
ernors of the colony, and the family had long been
prominent. Varnum had come from Massachusetts,
where his father owned property on the Merrimac ;
after a year at Harvard he had been sent to Rhode
Island College, and graduated at its first commence
ment in 1769. The graduating exercises consisted
of a " Forensic Dispute " on the question whether it
was good policy for the colonies " to affect to become
an independent State." It fell to Varnum's lot to
argue in the negative,-although for the rest of his
life he fought and argued in the affirmative. The
debate has escaped the usual oblivion of baccalaure
ate efforts, and has been preserved in full. At the
time it attracted wide attention. In 1771 Varnum
began the practice of law in East Greenwich. He
afterward rose to distinction in the army, at the bar,
on the bench, and in Congress, being particularly
famous as an orator. Ward had also graduated at
Rhode Island College, two years later than Varnum,
and settled at his father's home in Westerly. But
Governor William Greene and Governor Samuel

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND. i$
Ward had married sisters, and young Ward was a
frequent visitor at his aunt's house in East Green
wich. Like Varnum, he served with distinction dur
ing the Revolution, but he did not enter political life.
At the close of the war he removed to New York
and established himself in mercantile pursuits.
To both of these young men Nathanael Greene
was strongly attracted. They were younger than
himself — Varnum by six years and Ward by fourteen
years — and from all accounts they were as manly,
handsome, and fine young fellows as were to be found
anywhere. But to Nathanael Greene, who was so
sensitive and almost morbid on the subject of his
education, their chief attraction was in the fact of
their being college graduates. This leveled the dif
ference of age, and he wrote to them, on terms of
equality, long letters on morals and manners and the
theory of the universe — such letters as are common
among thoughtful men at the collegiate age. " The
pursuit of virtue where there is no opposition is the
merit of a common man ; but to practice it in spite
of all opposition is the character of a truly great and
noble soul. . . . What I call false modesty is not
to have "resolution to' deny an unreasonable request
or power to oppose a corrupt custom. . . . Have
you not felt, on seeing or reading of noble deeds or
generous actions, pleasant emotions mixed with the
desire of imitation ? These are the advantages that
spring from choice books and the best of company.
They inspire the mind to action and direct the pas
sions." Evidently he utilized his college friends to
improve his own education and gain practice in the
composition of letters. But he was no snob or syco
phant. " It is very fortunate for you to be able to

t6 GENERAL GREENE.
enumerate a long train of noble ancestors, but to
equal the best and excel the most is to have no oc
casion for any."
At this time he fell deeply in love with young
Ward's sister; but she did not return his affection.
He took it much to heart, and his letters for several
months were of the most gloomy and melancholy char
acter. But in the following year his spirits revived;
he made the acquaintance of Miss Catharine Little-
field, of Block Island, who was an orphan adopted
by her aunt, the wife of Governor William Greene,
at East Greenwich. The acquaintance rapidly passed
into friendship, love, and marriage. They were mar
ried on July 20, 1774, at East Greenwich, and he
took his bride to his own home at Coventry. She
was only twenty, while he was nearly thirty-two years
old at the time of his marriage, but it was a happy
union, blessed with two sons and three daughters,
though for eight of the twelve years between his
marriage and death he was absent in the army. But
his wife, following the example of Mrs. Washington,
joined him several times at the winter quarters dur
ing the long struggle.
During the year of his marriage the strained re
lations between the mother country and the colonies
were rapidly approaching a crisis. The Boston Port
Bill had passed in the spring, and as soon as news of
it reached Providence the freemen met and proposed
the idea of a general congress of the colonies, to de
cide on the best means of maintaining their rights.
The idea was formally approved by the Assembly at
its meeting in June, and Hopkins and Ward were
elected the delegates. In order to be able to main
tain their views, by force if necessary, military com-

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND. fj
panies were organized in different parts of the colony.
At the October session of the Assembly, Varnum,
Nathanael Greene, his kinsman Christopher Greene,
and Archibald Crary applied for and received a
charter for an independent company to be formed
in the towns of East Greenwich, Warwick, and Coven
try, and to be known as the " Kentish Guards."
Varnum was made captain, and Nathanael Greene
was one of the privates. This little company en
joyed the distinction, as the war progressed, of sup
plying thirty-two officers to the regular or Continen
tal army.
But Greene had no musket, and could not buy one
in the colony. He therefore determined to go to
Boston, ostensibly on business connected with his
forges ; his time, however, was employed on other
matters. He watched the morning and evening
parades of the British troops on the Common ; he
made several visits to Henry Knox's bookstore, and
bought copies of Caesar's campaigns, Turenne's
memoirs, and other books; he purchased his musket,
and he engaged a British deserter to go back with
him as drill master for the Kentish Guards. He
and the drill sergeant had to return by different
routes, and the musket by still another, concealed in
the straw of a farmer's cart ; but they all arrived in-
safety, and the drilling began.. At the December
session of the Assembly Nathanael Greene, although
not a member of the Assembly and only. a private in
the Kentish Guards, was appointed one of a com
mittee of five — the other four being field officers of
militia — to revise the militia laws. They reported in
time for the new law to be passed at the same
session.

1 8 GENERAL GREENE.
Four months later the first blood of the Revolu
tion was shed at Lexington. News of it reached
Providence on the afternoon of April 19, 1775, and
passing from mouth to mouth and house to house
with extraordinary rapidity, the report came to
Nathanael Greene at his home at Coventry after
nightfall. He immediately mounted his horse and
rode to the training grounds of the Kentish Guards
at East Greenwich. The whole company was.aroused
and collected during the night, and at daybreak
marched . for Providence, Captain Varnum at the
head, and Nathanael Greene with his brothers in the
ranks with their muskets on their shoulders. They
passed through Providence early in the morning, and
on arriving at the colonial boundary line, a few miles
farther on, they were overtaken by a messenger
from the Governor with orders to return. The com
pany obeyed the order, but Greene, with two of his
brothers and a third companion, obtained permission
to go on to Boston, and they started forward on horse
back. Later in the day they learned that the British
troops had returned to Boston, and they therefore.
retraced their steps to Providence, where, on the 22d,
the Assembly, of which Nathanael Greene had this
year again been elected a member, met in special
session. It resolved that an army of fifteen hun
dred men should be. raised for the defense of the
colony, and to march out to the aid of other colonies
if necessary. In order to co-operate with the ad
joining colony of Connecticut, a committee of two —
Nathanael Greene and William Bradford — was ap
pointed to confer with the Connecticut Assembly
concerning details. The Assembly met again on
May 2d and passed an act in detail for raising the

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND. jg
" army of observation " of fifteen hundred men, or
ganizing it into a brigade of three regiments, and
prescribing rules and regulations for its govern
ment. A loan of ^20,000 was authorized to be
raised by the issue of colonial bills. A Committee
of Safety was appointed, whose duty it was to " pro
vide arms, tents, provisions, and every accouterment
necessary for the army " ; they were also to pay the
troops, and, in accordance with the usual practice,
they were to " be allowed one and a half per cent for
transacting the business." The committee consisted
of six members, and among them was Jacob Greene,
brother of Nathanael, Finally, the Assembly pro
ceeded to the election of officers, and Nathanael
Greene was elected brigadier-general in command
of the army of observation. Varnum was elected
colonel of the Third Regiment, which was to be
raised in and about Warwick ; Christopher Greene,
the future hero of Red Bank, was elected major of
this same regiment, and Samuel Ward, Jr., captain
of one of its companies. The Governor (Wanton)
had recently been re-elected, but he protested against
the act for raising the army of observation ; where
upon the Assembly promptly suspended him from his
functions, and directed the secretary of the colony
to issue the commissions to the officers. They were
so issued under date of May 8, 1775, and before the
end of the month the greater part of the little
" army " was organized and on its march for Boston.
In the foregoing pages has been recorded prac
tically everything that is known of the life of
Nathanael Greene down to the time when he took
command of the Rhode Island troops. It can hardly

•

20 GENERAL GREENE.
be called an extraordinary or remarkable career. He
had gained his education by his own efforts, against
his father's wishes and almost in spite of his father's
opposition. He was the managing partner of an iron
factory which, although it would now seem small, was
then in fact of the same relative importance to the
population and wealth of the colony as the largest
cotton mills are to the State of to-day. He had
served three terms in the Assembly, and had been a
member of a few important committees. His travels
were limited by Boston on one side and New York
on the other. He had had no military experience
beyond service for six months as a private in a militia
company. Suddenly he was elected to command all
the troops of the colony, at the outbreak of a struggle
which had been long preparing, and the importance.
of which no one underestimated. His -office was,
next to that of the delegates to the Continental Con
gress, the most responsible which the colony had at
its disposal. What led the Assembly to select Na
thanael Greene for that office ? From the records
which have been preserved no satisfactory answer
can be made to the question. His ancestor had been
one of the founders of the colony, but this was one
hundred and thirty-seven years before, and there
were hundreds of his kinsmen who enjoyed this slight
distinction ; and while members of other branches of
the family had held high office with credit, his im
mediate progenitors and his near relatives had not
been in public life. His only acquaintance or connec
tion of much influence in public affairs was Governor
Samuel Ward, who was in Providence at the session
of the Assembly in May, 1775, just before leaving for
Philadelphia, where he took his seat in Congress on

EARLY LIFE IN RHODE ISLAND. 2I
May 15th. Probably he advocated the choice of Na
thanael Greene, who was well known to him through
his intimacy with his son Samuel and otherwise ; but
of this there is no authentic record. If he did so, he
not only showed his knowledge of character, but
performed a signal service to Rhode Island and to
the future United States. Whether he did so or not,
the Assembly made the selection by unanimous vote,
and this would not have been done on any one's rec
ommendation unless Greene had already impressed
his associates in the Assembly as a man who, though
still young, was possessed of unusual intelligence,
character, and determination. That the result was
a most fortunate one, never regretted by the colony
or the United States, the result abundantly proved.
That he has now for more than a century been re
garded as the most illustrious man that Rhode
Island has produced, no one will deny. When it
was a question, in 1866, of selecting the two fore
most men of Rhode Island to' be represented by
statues in the Capitpl at Washington, Roger Williams
and Nathanael Greene were quickly chosen; but the
latter solely by reason of what he had done after
May, 1775. There is no distinct clew to what caused
his selection for her most important station at that
time. We can only conjecture that there must have
been something in his manner and action which im
pressed his associates in the Assembly with a sense
of his ability and integrity, and enabled them in
stinctively to discern the qualities for leadership
which he undoubtedly possessed, and which only
needed an opportunity for their proper develop
ment. Whatever the cause, the choice was wisely made ;

22 GENERAL GREENE.
and at the age of not quite thirty-three he left his
home, his young wife, his little manufacturing estab
lishment, and his colonial surroundings, to take his
place among the military leaders in a war of tran
scendent importance.

CHAPTER III.
BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND.
On the 3d of June, 1775, Greene arrived at Boston.
He had been detained at Providence during the
month of May, collecting and forwarding his troops,
and had not been able to visit his home and wife, to
whom he wrote his farewell, commending her to the
care of his brothers, from Providence on June 2d. He
found two of his regiments encamped at Jamaica
Plain, the third, under command of Varnum, not ar
riving until a few days later. The troops were with
out discipline or military training, and, although their
fine tents and the artillery they had brought with
them from old Fort George at Newport attracted
much attention, yet they seemed to Greene sadly de
ficient in all the essential features of military profi
ciency. He set to work with all his energy to remedy
these defects, instituted daily drills, instructed his men
in the use of their arms, instilled in their minds the
rudimentary principles of discipline — in a word, la
bored early and late to convert his enthusiastic, patri
otic farmer lads into a body of soldiers ; and with such
success, that by the time Washington reached camp,
while fully appreciating what they lacked, he was not
ashamed of them. " Though raw, irregular, and un
disciplined," he thought they were " under much
better government than any round about Boston."

24 GENERAL GREENE.
Colonel Reed, Washington's military secretary, wrote
not long after that Greene's " command consisted of
three regiments, then the best disciplined and ap
pointed in the whole American army." He did not
have an opportunity to test their quality at Bunkef
Hill on June 17th, for he was stationed at the opposite
end of the line, and his troops were not brought into
that engagement.
In addition to organizing his little force, he kept
up a constant correspondence with Governor Ward
at Philadelphia, who was habitually chairman of
the Committee on the War. To him Greene wrote
fully of the condition and requirements of the troops
gathered around Boston and Ward acted on this in
formation in the deliberations of Congress. Greene
also carried on a daily correspondence with Govern
or Cooke, of Rhode Island, concerning the supplies
and equipment of, his troops ; and he wrote frequently
and fully to his brother Jacob Greene, who was a
member of the Rhode Island Committee of Safety.
From this very full correspondence it is possible to
follow quite closely his life during the nine months
of the siege of Boston. It contained no striking
episode. The period was one of preparation and or
ganization, and Greene was incessantly hard at work,
drilling, studying, writing, and thinking ; but the
fruits of this work were visible not at Boston, but
in the Jerseys and the Carolinas in the years that .
followed. Washington arrived at Cambridge on July 2d, and
Greene sent a detachment of two hundred men, under
command of a colonel, with a letter of address to
welcome him to camp. Washington "returned a
very polite answer, and invitation to visit him at his

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND.

25

quarters." Thus was formed an acquaintance which
soon grew into a friendship destined to remain un
broken, and year by year' to grow stronger through
out the rest of Greene's life. On the one side it was
based upon profound respect and admiration, un
questioning loyalty, willing obedience, and unbounded
faith ; on the other, upon the fullest confidence, af
fection, and esteem. Greene's temper was quick, and
in his voluminous correspondence he was not slow to
criticise others, and particularly members of Con
gress — sometimes unwisely. But no word of his has
ever been found in which he expressed a thought of
jealousy, or lack of faith or confidence in Washing
ton. He had already studied with care Washington's
career in the French wars and the Virginia House of
Burgesses, and it was a career which peculiarly ap
pealed to a man of his temperament and tastes. Per
sonal acquaintance only confirmed the high opinion
he had formed in advance, and this opinion was
never changed, or even for a moment clouded with
a doubt. The arrival of Washington effected a complete
transformation in the troops about Boston. They
ceased to be colonial militia and became the Conti
nental army. Four major-generals were appointed
by Congress — Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip
Schuyler, and Israel Putnam ; and eight brigadiers —
Pomeroy, Montgomery, Wooster, Heath, Spencer,
Thomas, Sullivan, and Greene. Gates was appointed
adjutant-general: Before the end of the war all of
these, except Putnam, Gates, Heath, and Greene, had
disappeared from the army list, and all but Greene
had ceased to hold active command. The return
which Washington called for immediately .on his
3

26

GENERAL GREENE.

arrival showed the strength of the army to be as
follows :

Rep-
men ts.

Officers.

Noncom
missioned Officers.

PRIVATES.

Present
for duty.

Total pres
ent and
absent.

New Hampshire. . .

26 333

789.. 125 98
107

1,326 174
160 108

9,396 2,105 1,2011,041

11,688 2,353 1,644
1,085

Total 

35

I,IIg

1,768

13.743

16,770

These were organized into three divisions and six
brigades. Ward commanded the right at Roxbury
facing Boston Neck, Lee commanded the left at
Prospect Hill facing- Charlestown Neck, and Putnam
commanded the center or reserve under Washington's
own eye at Cambridge, Greene was assigned to the
second brigade in Lee's division, consisting of the
three Rhode Island regiments and four from Massa
chusetts ; the total strength of his brigade was
twenty-seven hundred and ninety-eight men. Lines
of defense were laid out from the Mystic on the
north to Dorchester on the south, and, in addition to
constant drills, the men were now engaged in build
ing field fortifications. When these were completed
there were occasional small skirmishes with the
enemy, but no serious engagement. Washington
was keenly sensitive to the general desire that he
should attack Boston, and to the criticisms which he
anticipated would be made upon him for not doing
so ; but his judgment was against it, and he de
clined to entertain the idea of sacrificing his men in
what he felt confident would be an unsuccessful
assault. He called several councils of war to discuss

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND. 2J
the question, and they uniformly sustained his judg
ment. Greene, being the junior, next to Gates, was
obliged to express his opinion first, and it is evident
that with his ardent temperament he was seeking to
convince his own mind of the advisability of an
assault; but still his judgment was always finally
against i . At the council of October r8th he voted
" that it is not practicable under all circumstances,
but if ten thousand men could be landed at Boston,
thinks it is." Writing to his brother in the following
February, he expressed the views he had always held —
viz., that " an attack upon a town garrisoned with
eight thousand regular troops is a serious object,
and ought to be well considered before attempted. I
always thought an attack with twenty thousand men
might succeed. I still think so ; and were the bay to
be frozen over, I should be glad to see the attempt
made." But it was neither possible to get an army
of twenty thousand men nor to land ten thousand in
Boston. Moreover, there was not enough powder
for a bombardment preliminary to an assault. What
little they had must be carefully husbanded for use in
their muskets in case the enemy made an attack.
There was nothing to do but to keep at work drill
ing and organizing.
The tedium of this was, however, somewhat re
lieved by pleasant social relations. Many of the
general officers had served -in the French wars, and
were men of distinction in their colonies. They re
ceived Greene with much consideration, and he was
flattered by it, though, in his letter to his brother, he
is careful to say that he considers these " flattering
attentions " due to his office and not to himself. " I
shall study to deserve well, but can not but lament

28 GENERAL GREENE.
the great defects I find in myself to discharge with
honor and justice the important trust committed to
my care. . . .. 1 hope God will preserve me in the
bounds of moderation, and enable me to support my
self with proper dignity, neither rash nor timorous,*
pursuing a conduct marked by manly firmness, but
never bordering on phrenzy." In the late autumn
Mrs. Washington came to camp, and Greene im
mediately sent for his wife. She came, bringing with
her their infant son, born since he had left home,
who was christened in camp and named George
Washington. A warm friendship sprang up between
Mrs. Washington and Mrs. Greene, which was re
newed in subsequent winters at Morristown and
Valley Forge, and lasted through life.
In September his friend Ward volunteered to join
Arnold in his expedition to Quebec. Greene felt it
incumbent on him to advise him against going, but
to such a spirited young fellow his formal advice
counted for nothing in face of his remark that it
would be " a very pretty tour." Doubtless Ward felt
that if his rank had been less, Greene himself would
have been among the volunteers. Ward was taken
prisoner at the assault of Quebec, and was not ex
changed until the following summer. Then he_was
assigned to another part of the army; and Greene
saw no more of him until they went into camp at
Valley Forge in December, 1777.
As the year 1775 drew to its close, so did the
term of enlistment of the men around Boston. On
December 10th Greene writes to Governor Ward that

* The motto on the family arms of his English ancestors, " Nee
timeo nee sperno," was singularly applicable to his character.

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND.

29

" the Connecticut troops are going home in shoals
to-day." New Hampshire, on the other hand, "be
haves nobly ; their troops engage cheerfully." The
Massachusetts troops are also beginning to enlist very
fast, but he is very solicitous about his own colony.
"I sent home some recruiting officers, but they got
scarcely a man. ... I feel for the honor of the
eolony, which I think is in a fair way .... to re
ceive a wound. It mortifies me to death that our
colony and troops should be a whit behind the neigh
boring governments in private virtue or public spirit."
In truth, Rhode Island had undertaken almost
more than it could carry out. The commerce of
Newport had been ruined by the British cruisers ; and
whereas this town formerly paid one sixth of the
taxes, it was now so reduced that the poor had to be
supported out of the colonial Treasury. Bristol had
been bombarded, and Wallace's ships went up and
down the bay plundering on both shores and on the
islands. Over seventeen hundred officers and men
had been sent to Boston and Canada, and now two
regiments had to be raised for the defense of the
colony itself. Instead of re-enlisting for the defense
of Boston, it was a question of protecting their own
homes. Greene, however, looked at the matter with
different and perhaps broader views. From the first
he saw that the contest involved the united colonies,
and that their independence was at stake ; he felt
that success could only be gained by united action,
even if his own colony was the greatest sufferer. He
wrote- to his brother: "We must expect to make
partial sacrifices for the public good. I love the
colony of Rhode Island, and have ever had a very
great affection for the town of Newport; but I am

30 GENERAL GREENE.
not so attached to either as to be willing to injure
the common cause for their particular benefit." And
to Governor Ward : " The interests of our colony
are no ways incompatible with the interests of an
other. We have all one common interest and one
common wish — to be free from parliamentary jurisdic
tion and taxation." And as to the expense, " what
signifies our being frightened at the expense ? If
we succeed, we gain all ; but if we are conquered,
we lose all."
Fortunately, the year passed away without his
fears being realized. The British did not know how
weak Washington's army was at the end of Decem
ber, 1775, or, if they did,-they took no advantage of
it. The new army was enlisted for the year 1776,
and took the place of the old; and, so far as Greene
was concerned, on January 4th he felt strong enough
at Prospect Hill to defend himself " against all the
force in Boston." Finally the siege came to an end
in March. Washington" collected eighty large boats,
and stationed Sullivan and Greene with four thou
sand men on the shore near Cambridge, ready to cross
the Back Bay and attack Beacon Hill if the British
interfered with his movements. He then seized Dor
chester Heights, which commanded the bay as well as
the British lines at Boston Neck. Howe had either
to storm this position or leave. The memory of
Bunker Hill was still fresh, and he sailed away for
Halifax. Washington entered Boston, and assigned
Greene to the command of the city.
The most memorable feature of Greene's service
at Boston was his correspondence with Governor
Ward at Philadelphia, and especially two letters dated
October 23, 1775, and January 4, 1776. In the first,

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND. 3I
he argued in favor of a declaration of independence,
not only because there was no alternative except sub
jugation, but also because without it no help could
be expected from France. He shrewdly and cor
rectly reasoned that " France, as a real enemy to
Great Britain, acts upon"a true plan of policy in re
fusing to intermeddle until she is satisfied that there
is no hope of accommodation. Should France under
take to furnish us with powder and other articles, and
the breach between Great Britain and the colonies
be afterward made up, she would incur the hostility
of her rival without reaping any solid advantage."
• In the second letter he argues still more forcibly for
independence, and expresses his views about the mili
tary measures necessary to achieve it. He says —
speaking of George Ill's speech on the opening of
Parliament, news of which had just reached camp —
" Heaven has decreed that tottering empire to irre
trievable ruin ; and, thanks to God, since Providence
has so determined it, America must raise an empire
of permanent duration, supported upon the grand pil
lars of truth, freedom, and religion, based upon jus
tice, and defended by her own patriotic sons. . . ¦
Permit me, then, to recommend from the sincerity of
my heart, ready at all times to bleed in my country's
cause, a declaration of independence : and call upon
the world, and the great God who governs it, to wit
ness the necessity, propriety, and rectitude thereof.
My worthy friend, the interests of mankind hang upon
that truly worthy body of which you are a member.
You stand the representative not of America only,
but of the whole world, the friends of liberty, and
the supporters of the rights of human nature. How
will posterity, millions yet unborn, bless the memory

j2 GENERAL GREENE.
of those brave patriots who are now hastening- the.
consummation of freedom, truth, and religion ! " In
regard to military measures he says : " No doubt a
large army must be raised in addition to the forces
upon the present establishment. . . . How they must
be divided, and where stationed, is a matter at pres
ent problematical. However, one thing is certain :
the grand body must be superior in number to any
force that the enemy can send. All the forces in
America should be under one commander, raised and
appointed by the same authority, subjected to the
same regulations, and ready to be detached wherever
occasion may require. . . . An army unequipped will'
ever feel the want of spirit and courage ; but properly
furnished, fighting in the best of causes, will bid de
fiance to the united force of men and devils. When
a finishing period will be put to the present dispute
God only knows. We have just experienced the in
conveniences of disbanding an army within cannon
shot of the enemy and forming a new one in its
stead — an instance never before known. Had the
enemy been fully acquainted with our situation, I
can not pretend to say what might have been the
consequence. A large body of troops will probably
be wanted for a considerable time. It will be in
finitely safer, and not more expensive in the end, for
the continent to give a large bounty to any number
of troops, in addition to what may be ordered on the
present establishment, that will engage during the
war, than to enlist them from year to year without a
bounty." These letters were written at a time when a large.
party in Congress was still trying to devise measures
for a reconciliation ; when Pennsylvania required the

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND. 33
members of its Assembly to take the oath of alle
giance to King George, and instructed its delegates
in Congress to reject any proposition looking toward
independence ; when Washington was hampered in
his command by the constant instructions of a com
mittee of Congress, and New England delegates were
proclaiming that " enlistment for a long period is a
state of slavery ; a rotation of service in arms is
favorable to liberty." In the face of this confusion
of ideas Greene saw clearly that the political object
of the war was not a mere redress of grievances by
parliament or king, but the independence' of the
united colonies; and that the military means for
accomplishing it were troops enlisted for the war,
well armed and equipped, ready to serve wherever
ordered, and all directed by the single mind of one
commander-in-chief. The Declaration of Independ
ence came six months later — sooner than almost any
one anticipated ; annual enlistments continued for
several years longer and were never fully aban
doned ; the. course of events in another year gave
Washington full military control as commander-in-
chief ; the measures for raising money to equip the
army properly were never taken, no central govern
ment being formed with power to tax. But Greene
at least had no illusions; he saw plainly what was
before him, and pleaded for what ought to be done.
No one will now dispute the soundness of his views.
He could not secure their adoption in full, but he
could at least devote his life to the cause ; he had
started to get his musket and join his company be
fore midnight on the date of the battle of Lexington,
and he was still fighting after Yorktown had sur
rendered, nearly seven years later.

34 GENERAL GREENE.
These letters afford the clew to his selection to
command the Rhode Island troops. They were writ
ten less than a year after his appointment, and the
man who could write them was easily among the fore
most men in his colony, and must have so impressed
his fellow-members in the Assembly, even though he
was only a private in the Kentish Guards.
Boston was evacuated on March 17th, and on the
18th Washington sent Heath, with his brigade of six
regiments, a battalion of riflemen, and two companies
of artillery, to New York via Norwich and the Sound.
With the rest of the army he waited to make sure of
Howe's departure. On the 27th the fleet sailed away
— for New York, Washington naturally supposed,
although in fact it was for Halifax. Leaving five
regiments in Boston under Ward, the American army
started for New York as rapidly as transportation
could be collected. Washington himself left Boston
April 4th, and arrived in New York on the 13th. His
army was all there before the 1st of May.
Greene received his marching orders on March
29th, and left Boston on Monday, April 1st, at sunrise.
His brigade consisted of two of his Rhode Island
regiments and three from Massachusetts, with a de
tachment of Knox's artillery. Their route lay through
Providence and past his old home to New London,
where they took vessels for New York, arriving on
April 17th. Just as they started, word was received
from Governor Cooke that the English fleet had ap
peared at Newport, and Greene hurried on, expecting
to fight in defense of his own colony. But it proved
to be a false alarm. On arriving at New York. two
changes were made in succession in the organization

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND. 35
of his brigade, but at the end of April, with five regi
ments containing seventeen hundred and sixty-one
men, of whom thirteen hundred and seven were fit
for duty, he was ordered to take post on Long Island.
Other troops were ordered to the same position, and
Greene, as senior brigadier, commanded them all.
On August 9th he was promoted to the rank of major-
general, and the troops on Long Island were formed
into a division under his command.
Washington had about twelve thousand men, sub
sequently increased by militia to twenty thousand, of
whom not more than two-thirds were fit for duty.
He rightly anticipated that Howe would soon appear
at New York, and endeavor to secure control of the
line of the Hudson and thus cut the colonies in two.
He therefore set to work to dispose his little force to
the best advantage in order to make as much re
sistance as possible. Fortifications were laid out
and built on both shores of the lower end of Man
hattan Island, south of Canal Street, on Governor's
Island, and on Long Island. To the latter Greene
was assigned. Brooklyn was then a small village of
less than one thousand inhabitants, situated in the
vicinity of the present City Hall. Gowanus Bay on
one side and Wallabout Bay on the other, with the
creeks and marshes which drained into them, stretched
up into the land behind it so as almost to create an
island about three miles long and one to one and a
half miles wide. Fortifications were laid out to de
fend this peninsula on both sides. On the water
front a battery of seven guns was built on the com
manding position of Brooklyn Heights, which com
pletely dominated New York as well as the entrance
to the East River ; this entrance was further protect-

36 GENERAL GREENE.
ed by a battery of five guns on Red Hook, just north
of the present Erie Basin, which, in connection with
a similar battery on Governor's Island, would pre
vent ships from passing through Buttermilk Channel.
On the land side Greene traced and built his line of
works substantially on the ground selected by Charles
Lee when he was in New York three months before.
It consisted of four small redoubts, mounting in all
twenty guns, and a line of connecting intrenchments
protected by abatis. The line was judiciously selected,
and the works were well built ; for, after his victory
of August 27th Howe did not dare to assault them,
but sat down to a regular siege, and thus gave
Washington an opportunity to withdraw the remnants
of the Long Island force to New York.
While the works were in progress Greene kept con
stantly drilling his men, trying to bring his new regi
ments up to the standard of those he had commanded
at Boston ; and he also reconnoitered the whole
country from Hell Gate to Gravesend Bay, and out
as far as Jamaica, making himself thoroughly familiar
with every road and hill and piece of woods, so as
to be prepared for the British attack which it was
expected would be made from the south and east of
Brooklyn ; for the British could not sail up the Hud
son River and leave this strong post on their' flank
and rear. He also accompanied Knox and other
officers in reconnoissances over Manhattan Island,
and he was frequently summoned to Washington's
headquarters to attend a council of war or receive
instructions. On one of these occasions he walked
from the ferry up through what was then an open
field used for parades and is now the City Hall Park.
A company of artillery was being drilled, and Greene

boston And long island.

37

was attracted by the earnestness and vivacity of the
young captain in command, as well as by the pro
ficiency of the company. He stopped for some time
to watch them, and finally, at an interval in the drill,
he sent one of his aids to compliment the captain on
his excellent drill and to learn his name. It was
Alexander Hamilton. Greene invited him to dinner,
and at once formed a very high opinion of his abili
ties. At the earliest opportunity he introduced him
to Washington, who soon after observed his fine con
duct at the battle of White Plains and in the Jerseys,
and in the following spring invited him to a place on
his staff. The intimacy between Greene and Hamil
ton dated from this parade-ground episode, and it
was never broken. Hamilton was fifteen years
younger than Greene, but his marvelously precocious
mind took no account of difference in age. Through-'
out Greene's life, and after his death, Hamilton was
at all times his stanch adherent and admirer. The
warmth of his eulogies was possibly due in some
measure to his gratitude to Greene, who was the first
among military men to recognize his merit.
While at Long Island, Greene also, as at Boston,
found time to carry on a voluminous correspondence.
His friend and mentor, Governor Ward, had died of
the smallpox at Philadelphia just as Greene was leav
ing Boston. His loss was greatly mourned, but his
place as correspondent was taken by John Adams,
whose acquaintance Greene had probably formed or
possibly revived at Cambridge. Adams was now
chairman of the Board of War in the Continental
Congress, and to him Greene wrote at length on the
political and military situation. In three of these
letters he used the expression " the desperate game

38 GENERAL GREENE.
which you are playing " ; arid this led Mr. Ban
croft, in the earlier editions of his history, to
speak of Greene at this time as " despondent," and
to say that " Greene had once before warned John
Adams of the hopelessness of the contest ; and again
on the 14th [July, 1776] he wrote: ' I still think you
are playing a desperate game.' " In the last edition
this is altered so as to read : " Greene,' on the 14th,
while facing the whole danger without dismay, wrote
to John Adams : " I still think you are playing a
desperate game." " The latter comment is the exact
opposite of the one first made, but it is the correct
one. Greene was not hopeless or despondent, but
he saw the danger of relying upon a militia, which
came and went almost at pleasure, as the military
means of securing independence ; and the desperate
game he referred to was the attempt of Congress to
carry on a revolution without an adequate military
force. On this subject he had written to Governor
Ward in January. He now wrote to John Adams ; and
in the following autumn, when the approaching close
of the year brought with it another dissolution of the
annual army, he wrote to Governor Cooke in Rhode
Island; and always what he pleaded for with all
his strength was an army enlisted for the war, a
system of bounties to encourage enlistments, pensions
to provide for the families of those who should fall,
thorough discipline and equipment of the men, and
sufficient pay for the officers to enable them to main
tain themselves with dignity. In his letter to Gov-
ernor Cooke (October 11,1776) he states the philo-„
sophical basis on which discipline is justified, with
uncommon force and clearness, as follows: "The
Americans possess as much natural bravery as any

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND.

39

people on earth, but habit must form the soldier. He
who expects [that] men brought from the tender
scenes of domestic life can meet danger and death
with a becoming fortitude, is a stranger to the human
heart. There is nothing that can get the better of
that active principle of self-preservation, but a proper
sentiment of pride, or being often accustomed to
danger. As the principle of pride is not predominant
in the minds of the common soldiery, the force of
habit must be called in to its aid to get the better
of our natural fears, ever alarmed at the approach
of danger." In all this Greene was simply in advance of his
time. Washington advocated the same views in favor
of a permanent army with even more force ; but it
does not appear that the other officers of the army
laid stress upon them, and in Congress they fell upon
deaf ears. Nor is this to be wondered at. The mi
litia was one of the colonial institutions — as .much a
parj of the machinery of government as the gov
ernor, assembly, or courts of justice. It had been
instituted in the earliest days of each colony, and
been used with success in the Indian and French
wars, which were the only contests which the colo
nies had had to sustain. Its essential principle was
that every able-bodied man should bear arms, should
have his musket always ready, and when danger ap
peared should promptly rally to suppress it — and then
as promptly return home.
It was not to be expected that these habits and
traditions of five generations would be laid aside in
a moment. On the other hand, there was an almost
rabid prejudice against standing armies, which were
regarded as the instruments of autocratic power, and

40 GENERAL GREENE.
their name as synonymous with tyranny and oppres'
sion. Not a few members of Congress thought that
a standing army was a greater evil than any which
had been inflicted by Parliament, and if independ
ence could not be secured without a standing army
it were better not to attempt it. Finally, there was
not only a contempt for the pomp and pride of war,
but a jealousy of the honors which war would con
fer on the successful military leaders. This is well
illustrated by John Adanis, who, after seeing Wash
ington escorted out of Philadelphia, after his elec
tion as commander in chief, with bands of music and
companies of militia, went to his lodgings and wrote
to his wife : " I, poor creature, worn out with scrib
bling for my bread and my liberty, low in spirits and
weak in health, must leave others to wear the laurels
which I have sown, others to eat the bread which I
have earned."
In view of the feelings which all the public men
of the day had imbibed from their childhood con
cerning the dangers of a standing army and military
heroes, and the advantages of a militia in a free state,
it is not surprising that Washington and Greene never
succeeded in persuading Congress fully to adopt their
views in regard to the proper organization of a mili
tary force. It is none the less to Greene's credit that
he, although brought up in the same atmosphere and
surroundings, saw so clearly the inherent defects of
the militia, and advocated so earnestly the correct
military policy.
While Greene was completing his fortifications,
drilling his men, and writing to John Adams, Howe's
army arrived at New York and landed on Staten
Island. Greene writes, on July 14th : " I wrote you

BOSTON AND LONG ISLAND.

41

some time past I thought you were playing a desper
ate game. I still think so. Here is Howe's army ar
rived, and the re-enforcements hourly expected. The
whole force we have to oppose them don't amount to
much above nine thousand, if any. I could wish the
troops had been drawn together a little earlier, that
we might have had some opportunity of disciplining
them. .However, what falls to my lot I shall endeavor
to execute to the best of my ability." Two weeks
later, Clinton and Cornwallis arrived from the South,
and on the 12th of August came twenty-five hundred
fresh troops from England and eighty-six hundred
Hessians. With the keenest interest Greene had
watched them all sail into the bay and land on Staten
Island, and he made his preparations to receive them
as warmly as possible in case their attack should
be against the Long Island fortifications, as seemed
probable. But just at this time he was taken ill
with a raging fever contracted in the swamps of
Gowanus Bay. He was for several days at death's
door, and was then removed to the Sailors' Snug
Harbor, at what is now Broadway and Ninth Street:
It was a cruel misfortune. He had been for fifteen
months in the army, and had as yet seen no actual
fighting except a few slight skirmishes around Bos
ton. The first large battle of the war was now to be
fought — against his own men and on his own ground
—and he lying in bed with his mind wandering in a
fever. " Gracious God ! to be confined at such a
time ! " he writes to his brother as soon as he re
covers. But there was no help for it. The battle
was fought without him, and was a crushing defeat.
To what extent he could have prevented this defeat
had he remained in command is mere matter of con-
4

42 GENERAL GREENE.
jecture, but all historians concur in attributing the
disaster largely to his sickness and absence. Ban
croft speaks of this as " an irreparable loss." While
success with nine thousand militia against twenty-
four thousand of the best troops of Europe would
seem to have been impossible, yet, when we see what
Greene accomplished in the South four years later,
in the face of odds almost equally great, there is
room to believe that he would at least have retarded
the British advance with small loss, and brought his
men within their lines in good condition. At all
events, with Putnam and Sullivan in command, a ter
rible defeat was suffered, and but for Washington's
extraordinary skill and quickness of action the whole
army would have been captured. After the battle of
the 27th of August, Howe pressed up to Fort Greene,
but the abatis and fallen timber were thick, the lines
looked strong, and Bunker Hill was still not forgot
ten. He decided to besiege, and not to try an assault.
In forty-eight hours, from under his very eyes, Wash
ington had taken the army over to New York. It is
doubtful if a more brilliant military operation of this
kind was ever performed. The whole army rang with
Washington's praises, and Greene among the first. He
tells his brother that, " considering the difficulties, the
retreat from Long Island was the best effected re
treat I ever read or heard of."

CHAPTER IV.
FORT WASHINGTON.
After the retreat from Long Island Washington
reorganized his army into three divisions. The first,
consisting of five brigades under Putnam, was sta
tioned in the city at the lower end of the island ; the
second, consisting of seven brigades under Spencer
(to whom Greene's brigades were temporarily as
signed), was ordered to march to Harlem to prevent
a landing in that vicinity ; the third, of two brigades,
Was posted at Kingsbridge. The paper strength of
these twelve brigades was about twenty thousand
men, but one third of them were sick, and the
militia were deserting in swarms — going off, in Wash
ington's words, " in some instances almost by Whole
regiments, in many by half ones and by companies
at a time." His effective force probably did not
much exceed ten thousand men.
Howe, having seen with chagrin Washington es
cape from him on Long Island, gradually extended
his right flank along the shore of the East River as
far as Flushing, and leisurely prepared to land on
the upper part of Manhattan Island, hoping by the
aid of his fleet in the North River to coop up Wash
ington's entire force and capture it. Washington,
on the other hand, " never sparing the spade and
pickaxe," put every man at work throwing up forti-

44

GENERAL GREENE.

fications along the East River, at Kingsbridge, and
across the narrow neck from Fort Washington to the
Harlem River.
On September 5th, after being three weeks in
bed, Greene had so far recovered as to be able to
write, and on that day he wrote a long letter to
Washington advising " a general and speedy retreat "
from Manhattan Island, and the posting of the army
at Kingsbridge and along the Westchester shore.
He further advised the burning of the city, reason
ing that if once lost it could not be recovered for
lack of a naval force, and that the enemy should not
be allowed to use it. In this view he was supported
by John Jay and others. But Congress, on Septem
ber 3d, had passed a resolution instructing Washing
ton, " in case he should find it necessary to quit New
York, that no damage be done to the said city by
his troops on their leaving it, the Congress having
no doubt of being able to recover the same, though
the enemy should for a time have possession of it."
Whether the burning of New York would have been
justifiable is a matter of doubt, but as to regaining
it Congress was wrong and Greene was right ; the
British held it without interruption until after the
close of the war.
On receipt of Greene's letter Washington called
a council of war for September 7th. An exact
record Of its proceedings was not kept, but on the
following day Washington reported to Congress the
substance of its deliberations. " There were some
general officers, in whose judgment and opinion
much confidence is to be reposed, that were for a
total and immediate removal from the city, . . . but
they were overruled by a majority, who thought for

FORT WASHINGTON. 45
the present a part of our force might be kept here and
attempt to maintain the city a while longer." It was
therefore concluded to post five thousand men in the
city, nine thousand at Kingsbridge, and the balance
at intermediate points. In this report Washington
stated, " Nor were some a little influenced in their
opinion, to whom the determination of Congress was
known, against an evacuation totally, as they were
led to suspect that Congress wished it to be retained
at all hazards." Congress did not relish this remark,
and tartly informed him, by resolution of the 10th,
that they did. not mean that the army should remain
in New York " a moment longer " than he thought
proper. Just as Washington received this resolution
he also received a petition signed by Greene and six
brigadiers asking for a second council. Washington
promptly called one for September 12th, and at this
council the previous vote was reconsidered, Heath,
Spencer, and Clinton alone voting against it. It was
decided to evacuate the city and all of the island ex
cept Fort Washington and its vicinity, for the de
fense of which eight thousand men were to be left.
Washington immediately began the removal of stores
and prepared for a retreat, which was somewhat
hastened by Howe's movements. On Sunday, Septem
ber 15th, Howe sent five frigates, mounting between
seventy and eighty guns, up the East River, and,
under cover of their fire, he transported a part of his
force across the East River from Newtown Creek to
a point (foot of Thirty-fourth Street) between Turtle
and Kip's Bays. Washington hurried down from his
headquarters near Harlem, and with two brigades
endeavored to oppose Howe's landing. But the
troops, although some of them had been engaged be-

46

•GENERAL GREENE.

fore, ran at the first fire, leaving Washington but a
short distance from the enemy, by whom he narrowly
escaped capture. A hasty retreat was made to Bloom-
ingdale, and Washington sent word to Putnam to
evacuate the city immediately. Had Howe marched
over to the North River he would have completely
cut off Putnam and captured his force of five thou
sand men ; but instead of doing so, he stopped to
lunch at Mr. Murray's house (Park Avenue and
Thirty-sixth Street), and Putnam, by following the
roads along the North River shore, was enabled to
escape with the loss of fifteen men wounded, about
one hundred stragglers missing, and his cannon and
stores. At night the troops were hurriedly assembled
and posted along the heights on the north of Man-
hattanville. The men slept without tents, were wet
through by a heavy rain, and were greatly dispirited.
Howe had completed his landing during the after
noon and advanced his troops to a line extending
from Bloomingdale, through the heights in what is
now the northern part of Central Park, to Hell Gate at
Eighty-ninth Street. The armies were about two and
a half miles apart, separated by the flat Harlem plains.
Before daylight on the following morning (Sep
tember 1 6th) detachments of both armies were in
motion. General Leslie left the British lines and
moved along the high broken ground west of what
is now Morningside Park ; Colonel Knowlton, with
his battalion of " rangers " or scouts, was sent for
ward over this same ground to ascertain the posi
tion of the British. The two detachments came to
gether, apparently, in the vicinity of noth Street,
and a skirmish ensued, Knowlton gradually retreat
ing toward Manhattan viUe. Washington was at his

FORT WASHINGTON.

47

headquarters at the Morris House (161st Street) en
gaged in writing to Congress a report of the pre
ceding day's retreat. Word was brought to him that
the enemy had appeared in force on the Harlem
plains, and, leaving his dispatch to be finished and
forwarded by his secretary, he rode rapidly to the
hill where the Convent of the Sacred Heart now
stands (133d Street), and where Greene was posted
with his division, of which he seems to have then just
resumed the command. On arriving there he heard
the firing and saw the skirmish in progress on the
hills across the Manhattanville valley. He then went
forward to the advanced pickets on the '< Point of
Rocks" (Ninth Avenue and 126th Street), where
Knowlton met him and reported that the force op
posed to him did not exceed three hundred men.
Washington at once planned to effect their capture
by making a demonstration against their front with a
detachment of volunteers from Greene's division,
while Knowlton with his rangers, re-enforced by a
part of a Virginia regiment under Major Leitch, was
to steal around their right flank and gain their rear.
The plan partially succeeded, the British rushing
down into the Manhattanville valley to attack the
small force which was making a feint against their
front. But Knowlton, instead of gaining their rear,
attacked on their flank, and a sharp engagement
took place, in which Knowlton was killed and
Leitch was wounded. In spite of this loss, the men
stood their ground, although it was evident that the
British force was larger than anticipated. Wash
ington therefore sent two Maryland regiments to
their aid. The British, after a vigorous defense,
were forced back about half a mile, when the Forty-

48 GENERAL GREENE.
second Highlanders came up as re-enforcements and
they made a stand about noon. Howe now or
dered additional re-enforcements, and two regiments
of Hessians arrived, but they were unable to hold
their ground and were finally driven back in con
siderable confusion nearly to noth Street. Wash
ington, not deeming it prudent to hazard his advan
tage any further, then stopped the pursuit and re
called his troops to their positions between the Point
of Rocks and the Morris House. A large body of
British re-enforcements arrived just after the Ameri
cans withdrew, but they made no effort at pursuit. In
the evening, however, their pickets advanced to the
heights just south of Manhattanville valley, only a
short distance from those of the Americans at the
Point of Rocks on the north of it.
The losses in this engagement were not very heavy,
being about eighteen killed and ninety wounded on
the British side, and considerably less on the Ameri
can, but it was an engagement of great importance,
because it showed that, in spite of their disgraceful
conduct of the previous day, the men could be relied
upon to fight. It had a wonderful effect in reani
mating the spirits of the army. It brought Howe to
a standstill for four weeks, and caused him to write
home to the ministry that " the enemy is too strongly
posted to be attacked in front, and innumerable dif
ficulties are in the way of our turning him on either
side." He plainly said that the war was not to be
finished in one campaign, and asked that large re-
enforcements be sent in the spring.
In this action Greene first came under fire. His
troops were not engaged (except a small party of
volunteers), but he, as well as Putnam, and Tilghman

FORT WASHINGTON. 49
of Washington's staff, volunteered to take part in
order to encourage the men, and they were in the
thickest of the fight. Reed, the adjutant-general,
also performed similar service, and, on account of his
knowledge of the ground, acted as guide to Knowl-
ton's turning column. As Reed wrote to his wife, it
was rash for officers of their rank to expose them
selves in this way, but they felt it was necessary to
do so in order to encourage the men. They evidently
wished, at any cost, to prevent a repetition of the
shameful business at Kip's Bay.
Greene had now regained his health, and, as at
Long Island, Washington gave him a semi-independ
ent command, while retaining the bulk of the army
under his own eye. It was all-important to preserve
control of the line of the Hudson River, and, if pos
sible, prevent the British ships from ascending it ; at
the same time holding possession of both banks, so
that the army could move in either direction as the
course of events might require. With this view the
high ground at Mount Washington, about 180th
Street, had been selected as the site of a fort even
before the battle of Long Island ; and when it was
determined at the council of war, on September 12th,
to evacuate New York, it was unanimously decided
to hold Fort Washington. After the battle of Harlem
Heights, Putnam's division was stationed in the
vicinity, and the fort was under Putnam's command.
Greene, on the other hand, was detached with his
division, numbering fifty-seven hundred and seven
on paper, and thirty-five hundred and twenty-one fit '
for duty, and sent over into New Jersey, With head
quarters at Fort Lee, at the southern end of the Pali
sades and immediately opposite Fort Washington.

5Q GENERAL GREENE.
Greene remained in this position for the next two
months. In- the middle of October Howe began his
turning movement, intending to get in rear of Wash
ington by way of Throgg's Neck and New Rochelle,
and then march across to the Hudson. With Lord
Percy's detachment at Bloomingdale Heights on the
south, his main army on the north, and his ships on
both rivers, Howe hoped to surround and capture
the whole American force. But as Howe extended ,
his right by way of Long Island Sound, Washington
as steadily extended his left along the line of the
Bronx. Finally Washington reached White Plains,
and there assembled his entire force, except what
was left at Forts Washington and Lee, twenty miles
distant, from which his communication was entirely
severed. An indecisive engagement was fought at
White Plains on October 29th, and then Washington
retreated northward a few miles and took up a strong
position at North Castle. Howe had been com
pletely baffled in his efforts to turn Washington's left
flank, and he thought it unwise to risk an assault at
North Castle ; he therefore marched across to the
Hudson River at Dobb's Ferry and down to Kings-
bridge. Washington saw that this meant an attack
on Fort Washington. He therefore left Lee with
seven thousand men at North Castle in case Howe
should return to that point, posted Heath with three
thousand in the Highlands near West Point, and sent
the rest of his little force — about four thousand men—
across the Hudson and down behind the Palisades to
Hackensack, about nine miles in rear of Fort Lee.
He himself arrived at the latter point on the after
noon of the 13th.
In the meantime Greene had made a small raid

FORT WASHINGTON.

51

into Staten Island and captured a few prisoners, had
begun the formation of depots at convenient 'points on
the road to Philadelphia, to be provided with stores
for twenty thousand men for three months, and had
done everything possible to strengthen the defenses
of Fort Lee. Putnam commanded Fort Washington
until about October 25th, when he wa-s summoned
to White Plains, and Greene, whose command had
originally been limited to the troops on the Jersey
shore, took charge of Fort Washington, Before
Washington started for White Plains he had given
orders that Fort Washington should' be defended to
the last extremity.
Putnam had placed some obstructions in the river,
but they were not effectual in barring the navigation,
although they rendered it more difficult. Early in
October three frigates sailed up the river in spite of
the obstructions and the fire of the forts, whereupon
Congress passed a resolution (October nth) direct
ing Washington, " by every art and 'at whatever ex
pense, to obstruct effectually the navigation of the
North River between Fort Washington and Mount
Constitution" [Fort Lee]. Putnam then added to
the obstructions in the river and hastened the work
on his batteries, and Greene continued to do the
same after Putnam was called away to White Plains.
On the 27th another ship tried to pass up the Hud
son, but it was so badly damaged by the forts that it
had to retire. At the same time a demonstration
was made on the land side by the troops which had
been left at Harlem under Lord Percy, but' it was"
not seriously pressed and was easily repelled. This
encouraged Greene to hope that a successful defense
could be made at Fort Washington, and as Washing-

52 GENERAL GREENE.
ton was some distance away, he sent a report of the
affair direct to Congress. On the 28th, Fort Inde
pendence, which was on the heights just north of
Kingsbridge, was evacuated under orders received
direct from Washington ; and on the 29th the Hes
sians under Knyphausen appeared on the plain just
south of Kingsbridge. On the 31st, Greene, who
only a week before had become responsible for Fort
Washington, wrote to Washington for instructions :
" I should be glad to know your Excellency's mind
about holding all the ground from Kingsbridge to
the lower lines. If we attempt to hold the ground,
the garrison must still be re-enforced; but if the
garrison is only to draw into Mount Washington, and
keep that, the number of troops is too large. ... I
shall re-enforce Colonel Magaw (at Fort Washing
ton) with Colonel Railing's regiments until I hear
from your Excellency respecting the matter." It
took several days for this letter to reach Washington,
so that he did not reply till November 5th, and then
he gave no positive instructions. His secretary
wrote : " It depends upon so many circumstances
that it is impossible for him to determine the point.
He submits entirely to your discretion, and such
judgment as you will be able to form from the
enemy's movements and the whole complexion of
things." On the 6th a frigate and two transports
passed up the river. Greene promptly notified Wash
ington of it on the following day, and his secretary
wrote to Greene to watch the shores carefully and
give the earliest information of any movement of
the British to cross the river. On the following day,
having fully considered the matter and being con
vinced that an attack on Fort Washington would be

FORT WASHINGTON.

53

. the next move on Howe's part, Washington wrote to
Greene in these words. It is this letter which leads
Bancroft to accuse Greene of disobedience of orders,
and hence its language should be carefully noted, for
the accusation is devoid of any foundation in fact :
" The late passage of three vessels up the North
River, of which we have just received advice, is so
plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions
we have thrown into it that I can not but think it
will fully justify a change in the disposition which
has been made. If we can not prevent vessels from
passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the sur
rounding country, what valuable purpose can it an
swer to attempt to hold a post from which the ex
pected- benefit can not be had ? I am therefore
inclined to think that it will not be prudent to hazard '
the men and stores at Mount Washington ; but, as you
are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders
as to evacuating Mount Washington as you may
judge best, and so far revoking the order given to
Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last.
" The best accounts obtained from the enemy as
sure us of a considerable movement among their
boats last evening, and, so far as can be collected
from the various sources of intelligence, they must
design a penetration into Jersey, and to fall down
upon your post. You will therefore immediately
have all the stores removed which you do not deem
necessary for your defense."
This letter contains four things : First, a positive
order to remove the stores from Fort Lee. Second, 4
a revocation of the former order to defend Fort
Washington to the last. Third, authority to General
Greene to evacuate Fort Washington whenever he

54 GENERAL GREENE.
thinks best. Fourth, Washington's opinion that prob;-.
ably it would be best to evacuate it. It contains no
order to evacuate Fort Washington. When Wash
ington wished to give an order he did so in very
plain language, but in this case he merely threw out
a suggestion (" I am inclined to think that it would
not be prudent to hazard ") which evidently implied
a desire for the expression of Greene's views.
Greene promptly replied on November 9th, say
ing that he had already given orders for the removal
of the stores at Dobb's Ferry, and stating fully his
opinion in regard to Fort Washington.
" The passing of the ships up the river is, to be
sure, a full proof of the insufficiency of the obstruc
tions in the river to stop the ships from going up ;
but that garrison employs double the number of men
to invest it that we have to occupy it. They must
keep troops at Kingsbridge to prevent a communi
cation with the country, and they dare not leave a
very small number for fear our people should attack
them. Upon the whole, I can not help thinking the
garrison is of advantage, and I can not conceive
the garrison to be in any great danger ; the men can
be brought off at any time, but the stores may not
be so easily removed, yet I think they can be got off
in spite of them if matters grow desperate.
" This post is of no importance only in conjunction
with Mount Washington. I was over there last
evening. The enemy seems to be disposing matters
to besiege the place, but Colonel Magaw thinks it
will take them till December expires before they can
carry it. If the enemy don't find it an object of im
portance they won't trouble themselves about it. If
they do, it is a full proof they feel an injury from

FORT WASHINGTON.

55

bur possessing it. Our giving it up will open a free
communication with the country by the way of Kings-
bridge that must be a great advantage to them and
injury to us."
On the ioth Greene wrote again to Washington
stating what dispositions he had made for the re
moval of the stores on the west bank of the Hudson,
but saying nothing further about Fort Washington.
Washington had given him discretion to evacuate
Fort Washington if he thought best ; Greene had re
plied, stating at length why he thought the evacua
tion unnecessary and unadvisable. He then waited
for further instructions.
Washington left White Plains on the ioth, was at
Peekskill on the nth, crossed the river at King's
Ferry (Verplanck's Point) on the 12th, and arrived
at Fort Lee on the afternoon of the 13th. At what
point he received Greene's letters of the 9th and ioth
is not known. Washington made no reply to them,
as was evidently unnecessary, in view of his intention
to see Greene in a few days, unless he wished to give
a positive order to evacuate the Fort, and this he
was not prepared to do, for his own mind was not
fully made up. After Washington's arrival, of course,
all responsibility on Greene's part ended. The com
mander in chief was on the spot, and it was for him
to give orders. Washington's report to Congress of
the 16th, his letter to his brother of the 19th, his
letter to Reed, August 22, 1779, and his letter to
Gordon, March 8, 1785 — all tell the same story. He
arrived at Fort Lee and found the fort had not been
evacuated or the stores removed. His own opinion
was that it should be abandoned, yet he recognized
its importance, and if it could be held, undoubtedly

56 GENERAL GREENE.
it would be of the greatest advantage. On this
point his mind was not clear ; personally he thought
it could not be defended with success ; but Magaw,
who was in command of the post, and Greene, in
whose judgment he had great confidence, thought that
it could. He therefore came to no decision ; the op
posing opinions caused, in his own words, " that
warfare in my mind, and hesitation; which ended in
the loss of the garrison."
Washington did not visit Fort Washington on the
14th, but went back to the Hackensack to examine the
ground over which he felt sure he would soon have
to retreat. Here, on the afternoon of the 15th, he
received a brief note from Greene, inclosing one
from Magaw, saying that Howe had demanded the
surrender of the garrison. Washington returned at
once- to Fort Lee, reaching the river bank at dusk.
In the meantime Howe had closed in on Fort
Washington from all sides; from Kingsbridge on
the north, with Knyphausen's division of Hessians ;
from Harlem on the south, with Earl Percy's de
tachment ; and on the east bank of the Harlem, with
detachments from his main force at Yonkers under
Cornwallis and Matthews. In all, the assailants
numbered about nine thousand men. The garrison,
including the re-enforcements sent over by Greene,
numbered about twenty-eight hundred. It was not
stationed in the fort proper, but in the outlying
works, at the point of the hills near 195th Street on
the north and the old lines at Morris House and
beyond it as far as 147th Street on the south, the
distance between the two extreme points being over
two miles. Rawlings commanded at the point of the
hill north of Fort Washington, Baxter at the hill just

FORT WASHINGTON. 57
east of him, overlooking the Harlem River, and Cad-
walader at the lower lines facing Manhattanville.
Magaw commanded the whole force, with his head
quarters at Fort Washington.
On the 15th Howe sent his adjutant-general under
flag of truce from Kingsbridge to Magaw's head
quarters, demanding a surrender. Magaw replied
that he would defend his post to the last. He im-
' mediately sent a copy of his reply across the river to
Greene, who told Magaw to defend his post until he
received other orders, and sent the letter on to Wash
ington, as already stated. Greene then went across
to see Magaw, accompanied by Putnam, who had
crossed the river at King's Ferry a few days before,
marched down behind the Palisades, and taken post
at Hackensack. They spent an hour or more with
Magaw, who assured them of his ability to defend
his post, and they were just returning to Fort Lee
when Washington met them at the shore with the in
tention of crossing, He was so assured by their re
port that he decided not to cross, and all three re-.
turned to Greene's headquarters on top of the
Palisades for the night.
On the morning of the 16th Howe's columns.
converged on the fort from the north, south, and
east. The resistance was at first quite spirited, but,.
being overpowered in numbers and being taken i,n
flank and rear by the column under Cornwallis from
the east, they yielded and retreated to the fort in
considerable confusion. Had a defense like that at
Bunker Hill been made at the fort, the British would
have been held at bay, and the garrison could prob
ably have been brought off in safety. Washington,
who was watching the affair from the heights of
5

58 GENERAL GREENE.
Fort Lee, saw this, and sent word to this effect by a
gallant officer who made his way to the fort, but just
before he arrived Magaw had surrendered his entire
command. The British loss was about four hundred
and fifty in killed and wounded ; the Americans had
lost fifty-four killed and less than one hundred
wounded ; they surrendered two hundred and twenty-
one officers and twenty-six hundred and thirty-seven
men. All the cannon and a considerable amount of
stores which were in the fort fell into the hands of
the British.
It was a terrible disaster. Charles Lee, jealous
of the growing reputation of Greene, who was already
talked of as the probable successor of Washington
in case accident should befall him, did his utmost to
cast discredit on Greene ; but Washington assumed
the full responsibility, and neither then nor after
ward censured Greene in any manner for his action.
Had such a defense been made as was made at
Bunker Hill, or had the Americans fought as they
fought at Harlem Heights two months before, Howe
would have suffered such losses as would again have
brought his campaign to a standstill, and Greene's
opinion would have been vindicated and Washing
ton's hesitation justified. But no such defense was
made, an almost irreparable loss was sustained, and
such blame as, judging after the event, attaches to
it, must be shared equally by Washington and Greene.
Since the place was lost, Greene's advice in favor of
trying to hold it was perhaps an error of judgment;
had his opinion been the other way, he would have
withdrawn the garrison under his discretionary or
ders, and it would have been saved. But no one
can divide the responsibility of the commander in

CAPTURE OF FORT WASHINGTON.
A. Col. Magaw commanding the fort. C. Cornwallis attacking Col. Baxter. E. Lieut.-Col. Stirling intercepting Cadwallader.
B. Knyphausen and Rail attacking Col. Rawling. Z). Percy attacking Col. Cadwallader. ^F. British redoubts covering Cornwallis.

FORT WASHINGTON.

59

chief. Washington was on the ground for nearly
three days before the assault was made. The skill
which withdrew a much larger force from Long
Island in actual contact with the enemy, was quite
equal to withdrawing this garrison had its possessor
so decided. But he made no such decision, not be
ing sufficiently sure of his own opinion to overrule
the strong opposite opinion of Greene, supported by
that of all the officers of the garrison.
Washington fully realized his error and was deeply
mortified. 'He saw that he should have supported
his own judgment with a positive order, and he sub
stantially says so in his letter to Reed three years
later. Had he done so, none would have rendered
more prompt and cheerful obedience than Greene.
On the other hand, Greene felt at once that he would
be blamed for the loss, and on the following day he
wrote to Knox : " I feel mad, vexed, sick, and
soxry. . . . This is a most terrible event; its con
sequences are justly to be dreaded. Pray, what is
said on the occasion ? "
This misfortune was the basis on which Lee and
Gates founded their opposition to Washington ; but
as between Washington and Greene it only cemented
their confidence in each other. Washington never
attempted to shirk his own responsibility by pleading
the advice of his subordinate ; and Greene never an^
swered the criticisms on his advice by calling atten
tion to the indecision of his chief. He sought ever
more and more to merit Washington's confidence by
unflagging devotion to duty ; and he pondered much
on the mistake he had made, so as to avoid a similaf
one in the future.

CHAPTER V.
THE JERSEYS.
Having gained possession of Fort Washington,
the British promptly turned their attention to the cor*
responding fort on the west bank of the river, Fort
Lee. Washington anticipated this, and under his di
rection Greene began at once to remove the stores.
But before this qould be accomplished Cornwallis
caused boats to be transported through Harlem River
into the Hudson and up to Yonkers. On the night of
November 19th, which was dark and rainy, he crossed
at this point with a force of fourteen, battalions, num
bering about six thousand men, and marched toward
the rear of Fort Lee. Greene heard of this on the
morning of the 20th, and immediately marched out
of Fort Lee with its garrison of about two thousand
men, to join Washington at the Hackensack bridge,
five miles in rear of the fort. Greene had the long
est distance to march, but he reached the bridge in
advance of Cornwallis, and held it. Cornwallis then
moved over and took possession of the fort, where
large quantities of stores had necessarily been aban
doned. His force greatly outnumbered Washington's,
and had he made a vigorous attack at once he might
possibly have routed and dispersed Washington's
army. But he did not make the attempt.
Washington withdrew behind the Passaic and re-

THE JERSEYS. 6r
mained in the vicinity of Newark for a week, then
retreated by successive stages to New Brunswick,
Princeton, and Trenton, where he arrived on De
cember 7th, Cornwallis following him very closely
during the latter part of the retreat. It was impos
sible for him to give battle, as his little force was
wasting away by expiration of the year's enlistment
and by desertion, so that he had not more than three
thousand men in hand ; and all efforts to bring out
the Jersey militia-were fruitless. On reaching the
Delaware he collected all the boats within a distance
of seventy miles, and, as Cornwallis was close behind
him, he crossed the river on the 8th, after breaking
the bridges, and stationed his force along the bank
opposite Trenton. Cornwallis made no effort to
cross, but disposed his force in winter quarters;
partly along the opposite bank of the Delaware and
partly in detachments as far back as Amboy. He
himself returned to New York and prepared to sail
for England on leave of absence, confident that no
military operations would take place before spring.
Washington, however, had no such intentions.
The American cause was at its lowest ebb, and he
wrote to his brother : " If every nerve is not strained
to recruit the new army with all possible expedition,
I think the game is pretty nearly up," Everything
depended upon the handful of men along the Dela
ware, and still more on Washington's iron nerve. In
this desperate strait he resolved on striking a blow,
which captured a force one third as large as his own
and drove the British back to New York ! We hear
so much of Washington as the modern Fabius, that
we are apt to forget that no general ever lived who
was quicker to seize a favorable opportunity, and by

62 GENERAL GREENE.
prompt and vigorous action turn it to advantage-.
He had shown this the preceding summer in the rer
treat from Long Island, and was to show it again in
his march to Virginia in 1781. But never did he show
it so clearly as in this midwinter stroke at Trenton,
which brought the sunshine of victory out of the
gloom and darkness of a long series of disasters.
During the two weeks following his arrival on the
Delaware he had managed to augment his little force;
A part of Lee's army had at last reached him under
Sullivan's command after Lee had been captured;
Schuyler had sent a detachment from the Northern
Department, and some militia had been raised in
Philadelphia. These, with what remained of the
force he had brought from Fort Lee, carried his
strength up to about seven thousand men. He der
termined to cross the river at three points, attack
the British and Hessian posts, and, if successful, push
on to New Brunswick and capture the large depot of
British stores. A part of the militia was to cross
near Burlington and strike the British left; another
part was to cross at Trenton and hold the roads at that
point ; while the Continental troops, about twenty-
four hundred strong, in two divisions, under Sullivan
and Greene, were to cross nine miles above Trenton
and take it in flank. The time chosen was the night
after Christmas, when the Hessians would be heavy
with carousing and their guards slack. The night
was intensely cold and stormy, with alternations of
snow and hail, and the river was filled with floating
ice. Both detachments of militia failed to get across,
and accomplished nothing; but the Continentals were
all across by about four o'clock in the morning and
marching toward Trenton, Sullivan on the right along

THE JERSEYS. 63
the river road, and Greene on a road a few miles to
his left. Washington in person accompanied Greene's
column. At daylight the'y reached the town, enter
ing. by converging streets. Greene's division entered
first, seized their artillery, and cut off the retreat to
Princeton ; Sullivan arrived a few minutes later. The
Hessians were surprised, but turned out briskly ; there
was a short, sharp fight in the streets, in which their
commander, Colonel Rail, and thirty others were
killed and wounded; then about five hundred es
caped by the road which the militia detachment was
to have held if it had crossed at Trenton, and the
rest, to the number of about one. thousand, surren
dered. The American loss had been two privates
killed, two frozen to death, and three wounded.
It was a success almost equally startling to friend
and foe. Gordon states that a council of war was
immediately held, and that Greene and Knox were
in favor of pushing on at once toward Princeton, but
the other officers — Sullivan, Stirling, Mercer, St.. Clair,
and Stephen — opposed it, and Washington did not
feel justified in acting against the opinions of the
majority. He therefore retired during the afternoon
to his old positions on the south bank of the river.
On hearing the news of this affair, Cornwallis
abandoned the idea of going on leave, and started
at once for Trenton, picking up the detachments at
Elizabeth and New Brunswick as he came. At the
same time the British and Hessian detachments on
their left flank near Burlington and Mount Holly re
treated hastily toward Princeton. On the 28th, Wash
ington sent Greene across the river again into Jersey
with a force of about three hundred men, and on the
next day he followed in person with the Continen-

64 GENERAL GREENE.
tals, numbering about eighteen hundred. He was
then joined by the Pennsylvania militia, which had
succeeded in crossing at Burlington and had been
increased by fresh arrivals from Philadelphia. His
force varied from day to day, according to the acces
sions of militia on one hand and the desertions and
expiration of service on the other. On January ist
it was about five thousand men in all. On the morn
ing of January 2d Cornwallis moved out from Prince
ton with his army of about eight thousand men. It
was only ten miles to Trenton, and midway of the
distance he met Colonel Hand's regiment of riflemen,
who annoyed him with their fire and delayed his
march. Early in the afternoon Greene was sent out
with six hundred men and two guns to re-enforce
Hand, and he disposed this little force to such ad
vantage that Cornwallis spent the whole afternoon
before he could force Greene back into Trenton. It
was four o'clock of a short winter day before he
reached the town, so that he was obliged to postpone
his attack until the following day. In the meantime
Washington had formed his main body behind a little
stream which runs through Trenton, and was prepared
to make as good a defense as his small numbers would
permit. But Cornwallis prudently decided to put his
men into bivouac for the night, his pickets in con
tact with those of Washington. During the night
Washington executed a movement of extraordinary
boldness and skill. Sending his baggage down to
Burlington, and leaving his camp fires burning, he
withdrew from Cornwallis's front, marched around
his left and rear, and at daylight was at Princeton.
Here he met and overwhelmed with heavy loss three
British regiments on their way to join Cornwallis at

THE JERSEYS. 6j
Trenton. He had intended to push on to New Bruns
wick and seize the British stores, but his men were
too exhausted to justify the attempt, and he moved
off toward the north, and by easy stages reached
Morristown on the 6th of December. Cornwallis,
dumbfounded at the absence of Washington's army
on the morning of the 3d, started quickly for Prince
ton as soon as he heard the firing in that direction.
He arrived just as Washington had left, but, instead
of following Washington, he marched straight to New
Brunswick to secure his stores.-
From Fort Lee to Morristown Washington had
thus described a figure 00 , with Cornwallis always in
pursuit, until the latter gave up the chase at Prince
ton. At one time he was in a corner at Trenton, and
it seemed as if the end must speedily come, either in
an attack by overwhelming force, or in the disinte
gration of the army by expiration of enlistment and
general discouragement and apathy. The English
felt so confident of the latter result that they deemed
it unnecessary to waste blood in an attack. But at
the darkest hour Washington's bold strokes at Tren
ton and Princeton sent Cornwallis back to the line
of the Raritan, and secured for himself a strong po
sition on the British flank, where he could safely pro
vide for the reorganization of his army and at the
same time could paralyze his adversary's advance.
Howe's Jersey campaign was at an end. For the
next six months his force was neutralized, and he
attempted nothing but a few feints. Finally he gave
it up, and sent his troops around by sea to attack
Philadelphia from the south.
To what extent Greene participated in planning
these movements it is impossible to say. In the

66 GENERAL GREENE.
funeral oration pronounced by Hamilton before the'
Cincinnati in July, 1789, he says : " As long as the en
terprises of Trenton and Princeton shall be regarded
as the dawning of that bright day which afterward
broke forth with such resplendent luster, ... so long
ought the name of Greene to be revered by a grate
ful country." Hamilton served through the cam
paign, and at its close became Washington's secre?
tary, so that he was well qualified to speak. But
something must be allowed to the warmth of eulogy
in a funeral oration upon a most intimate friend. To
the Committee of Congress that congratulated him
upon the victory, Washington with his usual gener
osity replied : " I assure you, the other general offi
cers, who assisted me in the plan and execution, have
full as good a right to your encomiums as myself."
To which Bancroft, never partial to Greene, adds;
" The most useful of them all was Greene." That
Greene's relations to Washington were of the most
cordial and confidential nature there is no doubt, but,
being associated in daily intercourse with him, there
is but little record of it extant in writing. Greene
was fully cognizant of the plans against Trenton, for
on December 21st he wrote to Governor Cooke, of
Rhode Island : " I hope to give the enemy a stroke
in a few days." At the same time the Eastern dele
gates applied to have him sent to Rhode Island, which
had just been invaded by a detachment from New
York, but Washington would not consent to his leav
ing the army in Jersey, and Spencer was sent in his
stead. The outlook for the coming year was so
gloomy, that Washington felt compelled to write to
Congress in the most earnest terms urging it to
make provision for an army, and asking for enlarged

\

THE JERSEYS. 6/
powers for himself. This he did on December 20th,
and on the following day Greene wrote a similar let
ter advocating the same measures, and arguing that
while the principle might be dangerous yet the situ
ation was critical, and that there was no danger that
Washington would exceed his powers. " There never
was a man that might be more safely trusted, nor a
time when there was a louder call." No one but his
closest friend would have assumed to write such a
letter. The joint appeal was not without effect, and
at Baltimore, where it had retired from Philadelphia,
Congress passed, on December 27th, a resolution con
ferring upon Washington almost dictatorial powers
for the period of six months. A few months later
Washington selected Greene to proceed to PhiladeU
phia and appear before Congress in person, in order
tp explain fully the requirements of the army and
his plans for the future.
The next six months were passed in and about
Morristown in comparative inaction. Greene went
to Philadelphia in March, as already stated, and in
May he was sent with Knox to examine the defences
about West Point and give such instructions as
he might deem necessary for the greater security
of the passes in the Highlands. Upon the surrender
of Ticonderoga, in July, it was proposed to send him
to the Northern army under Schuyler, but Washing
ton again declined to part with him, and Lincoln and
Arnold were sent in his place.
The winter quarters at Morristown were bright
ened, as in the preceding year at Cambridge, by the
presence of ladies. Mrs. Washington joined her hus
band, and several other ladies came to camp. But
Mrs. Greene was unable to come. Her second child

68 GENERAL GREENE.
— Martha Washington Greene — was born in Marcfr,
and she was subsequently very ill for several weeks ;
so that she did not arrive in Morristown until the
middle of July, a few days before the army marched
to Delaware. In the comparative leisure of this winter Greene
resumed his voluminous correspondence with John
Adams in Congress, Governor Cooke in Rhode Is
land, Generals Spencer and Arnold, who commanded
in Rhode Island, and others. With Spencer and
Arnold he discussed plans for driving the British
out of Newport, but with the others his principal
topic was always the raising of a permanent army to
take the place of the annual levies and the ever-van
ishing militia. During the preceding September Con
gress had acknowledged the principle of a regular
army, and had voted eighty-eight battalions, or sixty-
six thousand men, to be raised by the various States
and armed and equipped by them ; the men to serve
during the war, and receive a bounty of $20 and a
grant of land. Two months later it was resolved td
give the men the option of enlisting for the war or for
three years ; but in the latter case there was to be no
grant of land. On December 27th the same resolu
tion which conferred dictatorial powers on Washing
ton for six months authorized him to raise from any
part of the United States, in addition to the army
voted in September, sixteen battalions of infantry,
three thousand light horse, three regiments of artil
lery, and a corps of engineers ; and he had authority
to appoint the officers, equip the men, and establish
their pay. But, as Washington had written to Con
gress in October, " there is a material difference be
tween voting battalions and raising men." Enlist-

THE JERSEYS. 69
ments were slow, and the New England States, in
order to encourage them, offered a large bounty in
addition to that promised by Congress. This put a
stop to recruiting in other States until they should
offer the same inducements; and it did not help mat
ters in New England, for the recruits held off in the
hope that the bounty would be still further increased.
Finally, Rhode Island, after ordering the two bat
talions allotted by Congress, entered into competi
tion with them by ordering two regiments specially
intended for defense against the British troops in
Newport. Washington highly disapproved of this
course, and Greene was specially mortified that, after
all his arguments in favor of a strong Continental.
army, his own State should take a course so opposite
to his views. He erroneously supposed that the two
regiments were to be enlisted for service in the State
only, and he wrote a vigorous letter to Governor
Cooke protesting against the measure, and pointing
put that if each State was simply to provide inde
pendently for its own defense the general cause must
surely fail. The Governor was offended at the letter,.
laid it before the Assembly, and replied that the two
regiments were to be enlisted for the defense of the
United States in general and their own State in par
ticular, but that they were liable to service in any
State, and differed from the Continental battalions
only in the fact that their term was for fifteen months
instead of three years. Greene replied, apologizing
for his error, and saying that love for his native place
and zeal for the cause had led him to write so strongly,
because he could " not help feeling himself wounded
when anything transpired to the prejudice of the
State." He was glad to know that the proposed regi-

^O GENERAL GREENE.
inents differed from the Continentals only in length
of service ; but still he thought the measure unwise,
because it would delay the formation of the Conti-;
nental battalions.
In fact, the Assembly was hardly to blame. It
simply followed the system, or lack of system, which
characterized all the military measures of the day.
When the State was invaded, a convention of repre
sentatives from all the New England States had met
at Providence to devise means of repelling it* inde
pendent of Congress. Then Charles Lee, without
consulting Washington, had sent to the Governor a
fussy Frenchman named Malm^dy, on the ground
that there was no one in the State competent to com
mand the troops ; this gentleman contributed little to
its defense, but occupied his time in writing letters
in all directions, complaining that he had not been
given sufficient rank, until finally Washington lost
patience and notified him, on May 16th, that his
" scruples were exceedingly perplexing, and he wished
them to cease." Washington sent Spencer to take
command in Rhode Island, and, after being there
four months, this officer wrote to the Governor,
without consulting Washington, requesting him to
raise troops specially for the defense of the State —
the very thing that Washington and Greene com
plained of. Finally, in April, Congress passed a
resolution specifically calling on the State and the
other New England States to collect their " entire
force " and drive the British out of Rhode Island.
Everywhere the militia ideas' prevailed of calling out
troops for a special emergency and then disbanding
them, instead of conducting a well-considered cam
paign with a regular army under one head for the

THE JERSEYS. yx
benefit of the whole country. Washington and
Greene were almost the only officers who appreciated
the necessity of unity of command and a permanent
force in order to secure ultimate success.
In July, Greene came into sharp collision with
Congress on a question of promotion. French of
ficers were beginning to arrive in considerable num
bers, under contracts made with Silas Deane, in Paris,
by which they were to have very high rank. At their
head was M. du Coudray, and it was rumored that
he was to be appointed chief of artillery in place of
Knox, with the rank of major-general, to date from
August i, 1776, which would antedate the commis
sions of Sullivan and Greene. Du Coudray had been
a colonel of artillery in France, and, while a man of
undoubted talent, had seen but little service. Greene
did not relish the idea of being overslaughed, and
though he afterward conceived great admiration and
friendship for Lafayette, Steuben, and Kosciusko,
at this time he looked with distrust upon the advent
of foreign adventurers. Moreover, Knox, who was
to be directly supplanted, was his particular friend,
for whom he had the highest regard.
During the months of May and June Washington
had several times written to Congress, and twice per
sonally to Richard Henry Lee, expressing his anxiety
concerning these appointments, which might lead to
the army being overrun with foreigners, and stating
in particular that the appointment of Du Coudray
to the command of the artillery would " involve
the most injurious consequences." In the intimacy
which Greene enjoyed with Washington he must
have been cognizant of these letters, and doubtless
the matter was fully discussed at headquarters. No

72 GENERAL GREENE.
heed being paid to Washington's warnings, Greene
determined to act on his own responsibility, and on
the ist of July, therefore, he wrote to the President
of the Congress a brief letter, stating the rumors he
had heard, and added : " If the report be true, it
will lay me under the necessity of resigning my
commission, as his appointment supersedes me in
command. I beg you'll acquaint me with respect to
the truth of the report, and, if true, inclose me a
permit to retire." Sullivan and Knox* wrote similar
letters by the same mail.
Congress was highly incensed, and, after deliber
ating on the matter two days, unanimously passed a
resolution that the letters be sent to Washington,
" with directions to him to let those officers know
that Congress considers the said letters as an attempt
to influence their decisions, an invasion of the liber
ties of the people, and indicating a lack of confidence
in the justice of Congress ; that it is expected by
Congress the said officers will make proper acknowl
edgments for an interference of so dangerous a.
tendency; but if any of those officers are unwilling
* Mrs. Knox showed quite as much spirit in the matter as her
husband. A few weeks before, she had written to him from BoSt
ton : " A French general (Du Coudray), who styles himself com
mander in chief of the Continental artillery, is now in town. He
says his appointment is from Mr. Deane ; that he is going immedi
ately to headquarters to take command ; that he is a major-general,
and a deal of it. Who knows but I may have my Harry again ?
This I am sure of: he will never suffer any one to command him
in that department. If he does, he has not the soul which I now
think him possessed of." It is easy to believe that the views of
John Adams and the Continental Congress would weigh but little
in Knox's mind against an opinion of this sort from his " dear
Lucy."

THE JERSEYS. 73
to serve their country, under the authority of Con
gress, they shall be at liberty to resign their com
missions and retire."
Washington simply forwarded the resolution with
out remark to the officers in question, and on July
12th notified Congress that he had done so.
The resolution had been drawn by John Adams,
chairman of the Board of War. He also wrote a
short private note to Greene! calling on him to
apologize or resign. Greene did neither. He made
no reply to Adams, but broke off his correspondence
with him, and did not resume it until five years later.
To Congress he wrote a dignified reply, and doubt
less his knowledge of Adams's character enabled
him to draft it so skillfully. He had already had
considerable correspondence with Adams on the sub
ject of foreign officers, and also of rank in the army.
Adams could form no conception of the sentiments
of pride and honor which actuate a soldier. In
March he had written to Greene : " This delicate
point of honor, which is really one of the most putrid
corruptions of absolute monarchy . . . must be
bridled. It is incompatible with republican princi
ples. I hope, for my own part, that Congress will
elect annually all the general officers. If, in con
sequence of this, some great men should be obliged
at the year's end to go home and serve their country
in some other capacity, not less necessary and better
adapted to their genius, I do not think that the
country would be ruined."
The same hasty temper that wrote these words
had evidently drafted the resolution of Congress.
Greene had no trouble in writing a calm and con
vincing reply, which caused Congress to drop all fur-
6

74

GENERAL GREENE.

ther reference to resignation or apology, and, after
much deliberation, to appoint Du Coudray Inspec
tor-General of Ordnance and Military Manufacto
ries, with the rank of Major-General, to date from
August nth of the year 1777. Thus Knox was not
displaced, and Sullivan and Greene were not super
seded in rank.
Sullivan and Knox made no reply to Congress,
Greene's answer being apparently considered suf
ficient for all three. It was somewhat lengthy, but
its tone was admirable and its logic was unanswer
able. He begins by saying : " I confess that it was
a matter of infinite surprise to me that an interpreta
tion of so deep a complexion should .have been put
upon a meaning so innocent and inoffensive as that
contained in those letters. Nor can I be persuaded
but that Congress, upon a dispassionate review of
the matter, will readily perceive that they have em
braced ideas by no means deducible from anything we
have done, and will in justice recall a censure equally
severe, unmerited, and injurious." He then explains
fully the rumor which had reached camp concerning
Du Coudray's appointment and his reasons for be
lieving it to be true, and continues : " My feelings as
a soldier forbid my holding a command that was
linked with evident signs of personal degradation.
. . . Whatever influence I could have must be in
proportion to the importance of my military char
acter ; take this away, and I stand upon the footing
of a common citizen ; and it seems to me some
what extraordinary that an offer to lay aside should
be deemed to import such dangerous consequences
as are imputed to it. . . . With respect to that part
•of the resolution which declares 'that if any of those

THE JERSEYS. 75
officers are unwilling to serve their country, under
the authority of Congress, he shall have liberty to
retire,' I answer that. I have all the respect for
Congress a free citizen ought to have for the repre
sentatives of himself and the collective body of the
people, and that it is my glory and happiness to
serve my country under the authority of those dele
gated by her to direct her councils and support her
interests. I have not a single thought or wish in
consistent with this ; but at the same time I as
freely answer that I esteem it my duty to do it in a
manner compatible with the dignity of the man, the
citizen, and that of a soldier, while I sustain the
character; and will immediately renounce any sta
tion in which I can not act with honor, and have re
course to that in which I can flatter myself I shall
always be ambitious of, the character of a useful and
good member of society. In my military capacity I
have served and will serve my country to the utmost
of my ability, while I hold it, but I am determined to
hold it not a moment longer than I can do it unsullied
and unviolated." This letter was read in Congress
July 23d, and ordered " to lie on the table " ; from
which it was never taken up. The position and rank
finally accorded to Du Coudray were such as to do
no injury to Sullivan, Greene, or Knox ; arid the
unfortunate Du Coudray himself — the unwitting au
thor of this tempestuous little incident which, in
the mind of John Adams, threatened such danger to
American liberty — was accidentally drowned while
crossing the Schuylkill River, "a month after his ap
pointment.

CHAPTER VI.
THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.
By the middle of May, 1777, Washington had
succeeded in assembling in New Jersey a force of
forty-three battalions of the new Continental levies
authorized in September and December of the pre
vious year. These came from New Jersey and the
States to the south as far as Virginia, the New York
and New England troops being ordered to the North
ern army or the passes of the Hudson. Washington
organized his force into five divisions of two brigades
each. The division commanders were Sullivan and
Greene, whose commissions dated from August 9,
1776, and Stirling, Stephen, and Lincoln, who had
been promoted to be major-generals on the 21st of
February, 1777. Knox was chief of artillery, and
Pickering adjutant-general. The battalions were
all small, the aggregate force amounting to eighty-
three hundred and seventy-eight officers and men, and
of these over two thousand were sick. The effective
rank and file numbered fifty-seven hundred and
thirty-eight. On the 23d of May, Greene was sent to select a
site for an intrenched camp in the high hills just
north of the Raritan at Bound Brook, and the army
was posted in this position during the next few days,
Washington's headquarters being moved there on

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.

77

May 29th. Sullivan's division was at Princeton in
advance of the right wing, in order to keep up com
munications with Philadelphia. Arnold, who com
manded temporarily at the latter point, was collect
ing militia behind the Delaware at Trenton. In this
central position Washington waited to see what Howe
would do. If he moved up'the river to join Bur-
goyne, he would meet him at PeekskiU ; if he marched
to Philadelphia, he would hang on his flanks ; if he
attacked him, he would make a good defense in a
strong position of his own choosing. Howe did not
feel strong enough to attack Washington, and he
deerned it unsafe to march across to Philadelphia
with Washington in his rear. In the month of April
he had already decided to send his army by sea to
attack Philadelphia from the south, but before em
barking he determined to make a final effort to entice
Washington out from his position in the hills, being
confident that if he could meet him in the open
country his superiority in numbers and discipline
would gain him the victory. On the 13th of June,
therefore, he moved out with a strong force from
Brunswick to Princeton, thus cutting Washington's
communications with Philadelphia, and took up a
good defensive position on the south of the Raritan,
in which to receive an attack. But Washington
stood fast ; he let go his communications with Phila
delphia, Sullivan simply retreating from Princeton to
the hills on the west. He rightly judged that Howe
did not intend to march to Philadelphia. This
manoeuvre having failed, Howe retreated on the 19th
to New Brunswick. Washington promptly sent
.Greene with his division, re-enforced by Wayne's
brigade and Morgan's riflemen, in pursuit, at the

- 78 GENERAL GREENE..
same time ordering Sullivan to advance against his
left flank, and Maxwell to intercept his retreat be
tween Brunswick and Amboy. These latter did not
receive their orders in time to take part in the move
ment, but Greene came up with the rear of the Brit
ish at Brunswick on June 22d and pursued them
through the town and across the Raritan, where they
took position in their redoubts. They abandoned
these as Greene advanced, and retreated to Amboy.
He pursued them about five miles, and then, not
wishing to get separated too far from the main body,
he returned to Brunswick.
Having failed in his feint against Washington's
right, Howe now tried to turn his left and get
possession of the passes in the hills, which would
bring him in rear of Washington's left flank. On
June 25th he sent Cornwallis in the direction of West-
field and Scotch Plains. He had a sharp skirmish
with Stirling's division, but, finding the passes well
guarded, he retreated to Amboy. Howe then definitely
abandoned New Jersey, and began the embarkation
of his troops.
For the next six weeks contradictory reports con
cerning the destination of Howe's fleet followed, in
quick succession. At one time they were reported
moying up the Hudson, at. another toward Delaware
or Chesapeake Bay, and at still another toward
Charleston. Washington made corresponding moves
with his army, now toward PeekskiU and again to
ward Philadelphia, always holding his force well in
hand and using his interior lines to be first on the
ground wherever Howe should land. Finally, on the
22d of August, while Washington was near Trenton
and intending to march for the Hudson, he received.

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.

79,

positive intelligence that the fleet was two hundred
miles up the Chesapeake. He turned about forth
with, marched his army through Philadelphia on
Sunday, August 24th, the force drawn out to its
greatest length in order to give an appearance of
strength, and on the evening of the 25th, with
Greene's division in the advance, reached Wilmington.
Howe had landed in the northeast corner of Mary
land, at the head of Chesapeake Bay, on the same
day. The Continental battalions had been filling up,
two brigades had been brought from the Hudson,
and the: militia of New Jersey,, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware had turned out in considerable numbers.
All. told, Washington's force numbered over fifteen
thousand men, of whom eleven thousand were pres
ent for duty.. Howe's muster rolls called for eighteen
thousand, of whom fifteen thousand were available.
On the 26th, Washington and Greene rode for
ward to two hills — Iron Hill and Gray's Hill — about
twenty miles south of Wilmington and six or seven
miles from Howe's camp. Lafayette had been com
missioned a major-general a few weeks before, and
had joined Washington's headquarters as a volunteer
when the army passed through Philadelphia. Wash
ington invited him to take part in this reconnois-
sance, and here, or about this time, Greene first
made Lafayette's acquaintance, and began that warm
friendship which continued unbroken throughout the
remaining years of Greene's life, and after his death
was extended by Lafayette to Greene's son and
grandson. But little was learned on this recon
naissance, which was, in fact, a foolhardy proceeding,
and might easily have resulted in the capture of the
entire party, as Lee had been captured near Morris-

80 GENERAL GREENE.
town in the previous year. But, fortunately, the
British did not suspect what large game was in their
neighborhood, and the little party returned safely
to Wilmington the following day.
Two days later Greene was directed to examine
the ground still further, and select a position on
which the army could be advantageously posted ; for
Washington had decided to accept battle. Greene
selected the ground near Iron Hill, his idea being
that it would be best to fight as close as possible to
the landing place, so as to give Howe no room for
developing his army ; but before Greene's report
reached Washington a council of war had been called,
at which it was decided to post the army behind Red
Clay Creek, a small stream about eight miles in front
of Wilmington and twelve miles in rear of Iron Hill.
When Greene saw this position he was of opinion
that it could not be held. However, he faithfully
complied with his orders, posted his division behind
this stream, and the rest of the army came into line
with him on September 7th.
Howe moved forward slowly from his landing
place, and it was the 8th of September before his
advance began in earnest. He then deployed Knyp-
hausen's division in front of the Red Clay Creek,
but with his main body moved off to the west to
turn Washington's right flank. Washington detected
the movement at once, called a council of war dur
ing the night, saw that the Red Clay Creek position
was untenable (as Greene had predicted), and at 2
a. m. put his troops in motion toward the rear and
right, to take position behind the Brandywine at
Chad's Ford, twelve miles west of Wilmington. They
reached the Brandywine during the morning of the

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN. 8l
ioth, and were all posted before night. Greene,
with his own division, composed of Muhlenberg's and
Weedon's Virginia brigades, re-enforced by Wayne's
brigade and Maxwell's light troops, commanded the
center, in rear of Chad's Ford. Sullivan, with his
own division and those of Stirling and Stephen, com
manded the right wing, posted about two miles along
the river above Greene. The Pennsylvania militia,
under Armstrong, was to watch the fords on Greene's
left. On the ioth Howe moved toward the Brandy
wine and assembled his force at Kennett's Square,
about seven miles south of Chad's Ford. On the
nth he divided his army into two detachments — one,
of about five thousand men under Knyphausen, which
moved toward Chad's Ford, and the other, of over
ten thousand under Cornwallis, which marched off
to the left. About 10 a. m. Knyphausen deployed
in front of Chad's F8rd and began a brisk skirmish
with Maxwell's light troops which crossed the river
to meet him, but he made no real attack. Mean
while the larger force under Cornwallis made a
Wide turning movement, crossed the river several
miles above Sullivan's right, and during the after
noon appeared in the rear of his right flank — having
marched completely around Sullivan without being
discovered. It was the same flanking manoeuvre
Which had succeeded so well at Long Island a year
before, and it only failed of complete success here in
consequence of the prompt action taken by Washing
ton, and the skill and determination with which
Greene carried out his orders.
During the morning Washington had sent officers
to reconnoiter on the south side of the Brandywine,

82. GENERAL GREENE.
and from one of them, about eleven'o'clock, he re
ceived intelligence that a large body of Howe's
army, estimated at more than five thousand men,
had passed along a road parallel to the river and
moving westward. Washington at once suspected
Howe's intention to turn his right flank, and he sent
orders to Sullivan to move across the river and
attack the turning column while still on the march;
and at the same time gave orders to Greene to cross
at Chad's Ford and attack Knyphausen. Some of
Greene's men were already across the river about
noon, when word was received from Sullivan that
the officers sent out by him to reconnoiter had re
ported no enemy on the south side of the river op
posite his position. Supposing Washington's orders
to be based on erroneous information, he waited for
further instructions. Unfortunately, Sullivan's in
formation was wrong and Washington's was right ;
nevertheless, in view of the uncartainty, Washington
was not justified' in sending Greene's division to
attack what might be the entire British army ; he
therefore revoked the order to Greene, and his troops
withdrew to their original position after a brisk
skirmish. The next intelligence was a note from
Sullivan, dated 2 p.m., saying that, "the enemy
are in rear of my right about two miles, coming
down." Between four and five o'clock the sound of
heavy firing was heard in the direction indicated in
Sullivan's dispatch. Washington set off at a gallop
to join Sullivan, telling Greene to leave Wayne to
hold his own against Knyphausen as long as he could,
and with his two brigades of Virginians to come to
Sullivan's aid with the utmost possible speed. Greene
lost no time, and marched his men toward the sound

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN. gj
of the. firing, most of the way at double quick, and
covering nearly four miles of road in forty-five min-
^ utes. When he arrived on the ground between Dil-
worth and Birmingham meeting-house Sullivan's di
vision had just broken, and, in spite of the most gal
lant efforts of Sullivan, Stirling, and Lafayette to rally
the men, they were in full retreat. Greene opened
his ranks to let the fugitives pass through, and then
retired slowly and in good order before Cornwallis,
contesting every inch, and using his artillery to great
advantage. After falling back in. this manner about
half a mile he came to a narrow pass in the road
well secured on each side by woods. Here he made
a determined stand, and held his own until twilight
against a force fully three times more numerous than
his own. During his defense some order was estab
lished in the broken fragments of Sullivan's regi
ments in his rear ;. and Wayne's brigade, which had
been driven back in confusion from Chad's Ford by
the superior force of Knyphausen, also , made good
its retreat behind Greene's division. Finally, as
night came on, Greene withdrew in good order on
the Chester road. Howe did not pursue him, but
went into camp at Dilworth for the night. He re
ported his losses as ninety killed and four hundred
and eighty-eight wounded. The American loss was
estimated at three hundred killed and six hundred
wounded; the dead were left on the field, and. the
greater part of the wounded were made prisoners.
In this action more men were engaged than in
any other battle of the war, and although the losses
were not quite as heavy as at Germantown, three
weeks later, yet there were more killed and wounded
than in any engagement which had taken place up

84 GENERAL GREENE.
to that time. Superiority in numbers, a still greater
superiority in organization, discipline, and equipment,
and, above all, the failure of Sullivan thoroughly to
reconnoiter the ground in his front and obtain ac
curate information of the enemy's movements, gave
the victory to the British. It was a disastrous defeat,
and ultimately gave the enemy possession of Phila
delphia. Nothing but the skill and steadfast cour
age of Greene and the gallant Virginia regiments
under his command saved this defeat from being
turned into a rout and the destruction of the entire
army. In his report, Howe claimed that another
hour of daylight would have completed the "total
overthrow " of the American army. But Greene
fully realized the necessity of holding his position
until dark, and during the last hour of daylight
Howe was unable to make any progress against him.
On the day after the battle Washington retreated
to Germantown. Howe did not follow him, but re
mained for two days in the vicinity of the battlefield
to bury his dead. After giving his men one day's
rest, Washington boldly crossed the Schuylkill again,
determined to attack Howe. The two armies came
together on the 16th, near White Horse Tavern,
about twenty-five miles southwest of Philadelphia.
But here an accident occurred, to which in these
days of fixed ammunition armies are no longer sub
ject. A violent rain-storm arose, and the men were
so drenched that their ammunition, of which they had
just secured a full supply of forty rounds per man,
was completely ruined. There was nothing to do
but to move up the Schuylkill as far as Reading Fur
nace, where there were fresh supplies. Several days
of feints and manoeuvres followed, at the close of

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN. 85
which Howe, having threatened Washington's right
flank and induced him to move up the Schuylkill,
rapidly countermarched, crossed the Schuylkill at
Parker's Ford, and marched down to Germantown.
Washington's army was worn out, and so badly
clothed and shod and so deficient in transportation,
that it was impossible for him to race with Howe for
the possession of Philadelphia. Howe therefore
took possession on September 26th, the main body
of his troops, however, remaining in camp at Ger
mantown. Washington sent immediately to Putnam and
Gates for re-enforcements, and moved up to Skip-
pack Creek, about twenty miles west of Philadelphia.
Here he waited for a favorable opportunity to' attack
Howe, for, in spite of its reverses, the army was in high
spirits and felt confident of success in another battle.
The opportunity came on the 3d of October, when
Washington learned through intercepted letters that
Howe had detached a portion of his force across the
Delaware River to attack the forts below Philadel
phia. Washington called a council of war, which
was unanimously in favor of making an attack with
out waiting for further re-enforcements.
Germantown was then a straggling village, ex
tending for about two miles along the high road
which follows the ridge just east of and parallel to
theWissahickon. Twenty-two battalions, numbering
probably about nine thousand men, of Howe's army
were posted there in a line at right angles to the
main road ; their center was at the market house, in
the middle of the village, their left rested on the
Wissahickon near its mouth, and their right was on
the old York road.

86 GENERAL GREENE.
Washington, with eight thousand Continentals and
three thousand militia, was in rear of the Metuchen
Hills, sixteen miles from the Germantown market
•house. His plan of attack was as follows : Sullivan
was to command the right wing, composed of his own
and Wayne's divisions and Conway's brigade, and
was to follow the main road and attack the British
left. Greene was to command the left wing, com
posed of his own and Stephen's divisions and Mc-
Dougall's brigade, and was to follow the Limekiln
road, which, coming from the northeast, meets the
main road at the market house ; he was to attack
the British right. Stirling with his division was to
¦form the reserve, following the main road, in rear of
Sullivan. The Pennsylvania militia under Armstrong
were to move down between the Schuylkill and the
Wissahickon, cross the latter near its mouth, and
strike the British left flank and rear. The Maryland
and Jersey militia, under Smallwood and Forman,
were to follow the old York road on the extreme
left and attack the British right and rear. The
troops were to move at dusk on the 3d of October,
march all night, and, moving along four different
converging roads, covering a front of five miles,
were to attack at daybreak. It was certainly a bold
design to attack the best regular troops of Europe
with untrained Continentals and militia, on so com
plicated a plan ; yet it came within an ace of success.
The army began moving from Skippack Creek at
7 p. m., and passed the Metuchen Hills at nine.
Washington was with Sullivan's wing. Greene had
two miles farther to march than the rest of the
army. Whether his wing was in advance so as to
insure his arriving in time is not recorded, but

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN. 87
Pickering, who was then adjutant-general, states that
Greene's guide lost the road in the night and caused
a serious delay. Day broke with a dense fog, which
-hindered the march along a road with which the
•officers were not familiar. From these causes Greene
did not come into action until Sullivan had been en
gaged for three quarters of an hour, and his plans
were much deranged by Greene's non-arrival. The
¦Pennsylvania militia. moved down within sight of the
mill at the mouth of the Wissahickon, had a skirmish
in which they lost twenty men, and then retreated.
The Maryland and Jersey militia do not appear to
have come into action at all, and a few days later
the Jersey militia went home. Stephen's division
left the road just as it was coming into action, and
fired into Wayne's division and then retreated.*
In this way nearly half the army was eliminated ; the
battle was fought by the divisions of Sullivan, Greene,
Stirling, and Wayne.
Sullivan's column, with Conway's brigade in the
advance, came upon the British pickets at Mount
Airy, about two miles in advance of the market
house, soon after daybreak. The alarm was at once
given, and the Fortieth British Regiment, under
Colonel Musgrave, was sent forward to support the
picket. A sharp skirmish resulted, the British gradu
ally falling back. Nothing being heard of Greene
on the left, Sullivan deployed Wayne's division on
the left of the main road and his own on the right,
and continued to drive back the British until they
reached a stone house belonging to Chief-Justice #
* Stephen was tried by court-martial a few days after the battle,
found guilty of intoxication, and dismissed.

e

gg ' GENERAL GREENE.
Chew. Musgrave threw his regiment into this house
and opened fire from the windows. Sullivan and
Wayne pushed on toward the market house, while
Maxwell's brigade was brought up from the reserve
to attack the Chew house, but was unable to capture
it. Wayne was at first brought back to assist in this
attack, but was then sent forward again to. join
Sullivan ; and the remaining brigade of the reserve
under Nash was also brought u'p on Sullivan's right.
By this time Howe had brought forward his entire
force, and a very hot fight took place in the village
just north of the market. Washington, with his
usual impetuosity when confronted with danger, was
in the thick of this fight, in spite of the remonstrance
of his officers. Just as it was growing warm, Greene
came up the Limekiln road, with his own division
on the left and Stephen's on the right. Stephen left
the road and marched through the fog toward the
firing on his right. This brought him into collision
with Wayne, and both divisions were thrown into
confusion and began to retreat. In spite of these
checks, however, the battle was not lost. Sullivan
and Nash continued to push the British along the
main road, and Greene, with his own division pushed
their right along the Limekiln road until he reached
the market house in the center of the village. It
was a very spirited engagement, which lasted for
about two hours after Greene came up, and two
hours and forty minutes from the time Sullivan's
advance guard opened fire on the British pickets at
Mount Airy. It was afterward learned that the
British feared the day was going against them and
made all their preparations for a retreat to Chester.
Just as victory seemed within its grasp a panic seized

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.

89:

the American army, and it began a precipitate re
treat. The exact cause of this panic has never been
clearly ascertained or stated. Washington attributed
it to the dense fog, which made it impossible to see
more than thirty paces, and left the different divisions
to fight independently without common command.
Moreover, a part of the troops had exhausted their
ammunition. Some one seems to have raised the
cry that they were surrounded, and color was lent to
this idea by the firing in the rear, which still con
tinued around the Chew house. Whatever its cause,
the panic could not be arrested even by the most
gallant efforts of the commanding officers, and the
troops retreated precipitately by the main road,
Greene's division bringing up the rear. As the re
treat began, Cornwallis, who had been summoned
from Philadelphia, arrived on the field and was sent
in pursuit. Greene's division, with Pulaski's cavalry,
protected the rear, and'kept up a running fight with
Cornwallis for about five miles, when the latter gave
up the pursuit. Not a gun was lost in the retreat.
By night the troops were all back at their original
positions on Skippack Creek. Their losses were one
hundred and fifty-two killed and five hundred and
twenty-one wounded, and four hundred prisoners,
many of whom were among the wounded. Howe
reported his own loss at five hundred and thirty-five
killed and wounded, although, from some papers
afterward found in Germantown, there is reason to
believe it was nearer eight hundred.
Greene seems to have felt very keenly the loss
of this battle, which came so near being a decisive
victory ; for it is probably in reference to this that he
wrote to Washington, six weeks later : " In one in-
7

90 GENERAL GREENE.'
stance I thought I felt the lower of your Excellency's
countenance, when I am sure I had no reason to ex
pect it." But Washington replied in most cordial
terms, subscribing himself " With sincere regard and
affection," and stating, "You seem to have imbibed a
suspicion which I never entertained."
At this time there was considerable jealousy in
the army at Greene's influence and intimacy with
Washington, and this jealousy was shared not only
by the members of the Conway cabal, but by some
of Washington's most loyal supporters. Greene
probably feared that the unavoidable delay in his
arrival on the field would be seized by his enemies
as a pretext to throw the responsibility for the defeat
on his shoulders. No open criticism of this char
acter, however, was made by his contemporaries.
Some hints of censure were made, but, as Henry Lee
described them, "they were too feeble to attract
notice when leveled at a general whose uniform
conduct had already placed him high in the con
fidence of his chief and of the army." It was re
served for Bancroft, ninety years later, with char
acteristic malice, to make the charge, but no other
historian has supported him. In fact, the charge
was without foundation. Greene had shown both
skill and courage on this day, and was in no way re
sponsible for the disaster. It was one of those acci
dents to which untrained troops are always liable, no
matter how great their individual courage.
After the battle of Germantown Washington re
mained in camp facing Howe for over two months.
He was very anxious to attack him again, but his men
were short of, ammunition and badly clothed, and
their numbers were inferior to those of the British.

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.

91

Washington therefore sent Hamilton to visit Gates
at Albany and Putnam at PeekskiU, and obtain re-
enforcements. Howe turned his attention to redu
cing the forts on the banks of the Delaware River
below Philadelphia. In the first effort he was not
successful. Count Donop with twelve hundred Hes
sians, on the 22d of October, attacked Fort Mercer
at Red Bank, commanded by Nathanael Greene's
kinsman, Colonel Christopher Greene. He made a
gallant defense, for which Congress presented him
with a sword and a vote of thanks. Donop was killed,
and his force defeated with a loss of one third of its
strength. On the 15th of November a combined
land and naval attack was made on Fort Mifflin,
which resulted in its capture. A few days later
Cornwallis was sent to Chester with about three
thousand men, and, being joined by twenty-five hun
dred re-enforcements from New York, he crossed
the Delaware and advanced against Fort. Mercer
from. the south. The place was untenable in face of
such a large force, and was evacuated on the night
of the 20th of November. As soon as Washington
heard of Cornwallis crossing the Delaware at Chester,
he detached Greene with his own division (Muhlen
berg's and Weedon's brigades), re-enforced by Mc-
Dougall's brigade, with orders to cross the river at
Burlington and move south to the relief of Fort
Mercer, and, if possible, to engage Cornwallis. But
the movement was ordered too late. On the very
day that Greene started from camp, Fort Mercer
was evacuated. Varnum, who had lately arrived
from the north with his brigade to re-enforce Chris
topher Greene at Fort Mercer, fell back to Mount
Holly. Greene crossed the river at Burlington and.

92 GENERAL GREENE.
reached Mount. Holly on the 23d. Here he was
joined by Morgan's light infantry returning from
Saratoga, and he was expecting daily the arrival of
Glover's brigade. In all, his force numbered be
tween three thousand and four thousand men.,
Greene's instructions from Washington intimated a
wish that he should attack Cornwallis. He was
therefore placed in the same position, on a smaller
scale, as Washington himself. In each case public
opinion demanded an attack and a victory, and ex
pressed its condemnation of Fabian tactics.. And in
each case the judgment of the commanding general
and his subordinates was against an attack, because
it had no prospect of success, on account of in
feriority in numbers, discipline, and position. It was
under these circumstances that, on November 24th,
Greene wrote to Washington the letter from which
an extract has been given so far as it related to Ger
mantown. In relation to the case in hand, it stated
that his own judgment and that of his brigade com
manders were against the propriety of an attack.,
" But if your Excellency wishes the attack to be
made immediately, give me only your countenance,
and, notwithstanding it is contrary to the opinion of the
general officers here, I will take all the consequences
upon myself. ... I will run any risk or engage
under any disadvantage, if I can only have your
countenance if unfortunate." It is small wonder
that toward a subordinate who united such loyal de
votion with intelligence and energy Washington
should have been accused of partiality. When
Washington received this letter he had information.
that Cornwallis was about to recross the Delaware,
and that Howe was meditating an attack. He there-

THE BRANDYWINE AND GERMANTOWN.

93

fore recalled Greene, and two days later he sent a
second order telling him to hasten his march. He
arrived in camp on the 30th, and while he had not
engaged Cornwallis,. yet his good judgment was
fully approved. Marshall sums up this week's cam
paign by saying : " That judicious officer feared the
reproach of avoiding an action less than the just cen
sure of sacrificing the real interests of his country
by engaging his enemy on disadvantageous terms."
Washington's surmise that Howe meditated an
•attack was correct. On December 4th he moved
out to Chestnut Hill in face of Washington's army,
and, after manoeuvring in front of him for four days,
" decamped very hastily and marched back to Phila
delphia," where he went into winter quarters. It
was necessary for Washington to do the same.
¦Greene's opinion was in favor of quartering in the
town of Wilmington, but Washington finally decided
in favor of Valley Forge, on the Schuylkill, twenty-
five miles from Philadelphia. Here the troops ar
rived on December 19th, and began cutting trees to
build their huts for the winter.

CHAPTER VII.
APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL — VALLEY
FORGE, MONMOUTH, AND NEWPORT — I'J'J'J-'jS.
The winter at Valley Forge was destined to be
one of historic hardship, but its beginning was not
more uncomfortable than the summer and autumn
had.been. The men were in good spirits and cheer
fully set about building their huts. Washington
prescribed the manner of construction, personally
watched their progress, and offered a reward for the
!squ'ad which should finish its hut in the quickest and
most workmanlike manner, and another prize to
whomsoever should invent some practical method of
roofing, as boards were not to be had. There were
but two or three houses in or near the camp ground,
and these were taken by Washington, Lafayette, and
Knox. The other officers, including Greene, were
quartered in huts a little larger than those of the
men, but built in the same manner. Early in the
winter Mrs. Washington came to camp, and she was
soon followed by Mrs. Greene, Mrs. Knox, Lady
Stirling, and the wives of other officers. In addition
to Lafayette, there were Fleury, Armand, Duplessis,
and other well-bred and agreeable young Frenchmen ;
De Kalb had lately arrived, and Pulaski was in com
mand of the light horse; in Washington's staff were
Hamilton and Laurens ; and Greene's particular

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, gj
friends Varnum arid Ward were both present with
their commands. On the 23d of February Steuben
arrived, bringing with him letters of recommenda
tion from the highest military authorities in Europe ;
and with him came his light-hearted young secretary,
TJuponceau, who describes Mrs. Greene as " a hand
some, elegant, and accomplished woman, whose
dwelling was the resort of foreign officers, because
she spoke the French language and was well versed
in French literature." * It was a charming society,
though they lived in huts, were surrounded with
deep snow, and had so little to eat or wear that the
subaltern officers gave bachelor dinners of tough
beefsteak and potatoes, with hickory nuts for des
sert, to which no one was eligible who owned a
whole pair of breeches. The principal officers and
the ladies who were in camp met two or three even
ings in the week at their own quarters or those of
Washington; cards' were prohibited, and there was
no place to dance, but every one who could sing was
called upon for a song.
* This remark must be interpreted rather as an evidence of
Mrs. Greene's pleasing manners than as a statement of positive
fact. Only a short time before, Greene, in writing to his wife,
telling her to make arrangements for coming to camp in company
with Mrs. Knox, had cautioned her to be very particular about
her spelling, in which she was sometimes careless. Mrs. Knox,
beirg the wife of a bookseller and fond of books herself, was quite
proficient in this respect, and Greene did not wish his wife to
suffer by comparison. Mrs. Greene had been brought up on Block
Island, and prior to the war had never traveled beyond the homes
of her relatives in Rhode Island. She had a good mind and was m
fairly well educated for the times ; and she was undoubtedly a very
agreeable woman. But her knowledge of the French language
and French literature must certainly have been less than Dupon-
"ceau so politely states.

yS GENERAL GREENE.
In the midst of these mild diversions, however,
Washington was most anxious about the state of his
army. It was deficient in discipline and drill, it was
ragged and barefooted, and it was on the verge of
starvation, the supply of food being so precarious
that sometimes the men had no meat for three or
four days at a time. Unless the discipline of the
army and its methods of obtaining supplies could be
speedily improved, it was likely to dissolve during
the winter. Washington addressed himself to these
problems as soon as the huts were finished, and he
called on each of the general officers to submit his
views on the subject in writing. From these he drew
up his own plan, which was just completed when a
committee of Congress, consisting of Francis Dana,
Charles Carroll, Joseph Reed, Gouverneur Morris,
and Nathaniel Folsom, came to camp to consult with
him. They approved his plan, and it was subse
quently adopted by Congress. The arrival of Steu
ben soon after enabled Washington to solve the
military part of the problem. Steuben studied the
situation, and, with the aid of advice which he says
he received from Greene, Laurens, and Hamilton, he
formulated a plan of inspection and drill which re
ceived Washington's approval. Steuben was ap
pointed inspector general to carry it out. Though
he had been a lieutenant general in Europe, and had
served under the great Frederick, the first soldier of
the age, yet he soon made drilling fashionable by
forming a model squad of one man from each regi
ment and drilling them himself, musket in hand, and
swearing alternately in German and French as he
trudged through the snow.
For the administrative part of the problem Wash-

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 97
ington turned to Greene. The quartermaster's de
partment was in a state of chaos; and the quarter
master general (Mifflin), though he still held office,
ha'cT not been seen or heard of — except as he in
trigued with Gates and Conway against Washington
— for months. Washington pressed Greene to take
the office and introduce some order into the depart
ment; The Committee of Congress seconded this
appeal. But the place was not at all to his taste. A
year later he wrote to Washington : " There is a great
•difference between being raised to an office and de
scending to one, which is my case. There is also a
great difference between serving where you have a
fair prospect of honor and laurels and where you
have no prospect of either, let you discharge your
duties ever so well. Nobody ever heard of a quar
termaster in history." And in a letter to Knox, ask
ing his advice while the matter was still pending, he
•says : " His Excellency also presses it upon me ex
ceedingly. I hate the place, but hardly know what to
do ; the general is afraid that the department will be
so ill managed unless some [one] of his friend's under
takes it that the operations of the next campaign will
in a great measure be frustrated." His tastes were
•entirely in the line of strictly military service, and he
shrank from entering upon a semi-civil employment
where his means would be unequal to his task, and
where he well knew the least mistake or failure
would be seized upon by his enemies and those of
Washington to undermine his reputation. But Wash
ington told the committee that he "would stand*
quartermaster no longer," and finally Greene yielded
to his solicitations, and those of Reed and Morris of
.the committee in whose friendship and judgment he

g% GENERAL GREENE.
had great confidence, so far as to agree that he
would direct the department for a year, provided he
had nothing to do with the accounts and received no
other compensation than that of a major general.
This plan the committee declared was inadmissible.
He then agreed to take the office on the same terms
as his deputies could be engaged for, but he stipu
lated two conditions which were agreed to : first, that
he should retain his rank in the line, and second, that
he should appoint his subordinates. He chose as
assistant quartermasters general Colonel Cox, a
prominent merchant in Philadelphia, and Mr. Pettit,
Secretary of State in New Jersey. The committee
wrote to Congress with much satisfaction of their
success, saying that they had " had great difficulty
in prevailing upon these gentlemen to undertake the
¦business," and that " nothing but a thorough convic
tion of the absolute necessity of straining every
-nerve in the service could have brought the gentle
men into office upon any terms." Congress made
the appointments on March 2d, and, following the
custom of the time, fixed their compensation at a
commission of one per cent upon the money issued
to the department, to be divided among the three as
they should agree. Greene proposed an equal di
vision of the commission.
The details of the measures which Greene adopted
in reorganizing the quartermaster's department have
not been preserved. We only know the general
results. What the army needed most of all was
means of transportation, and for lack of these its
movements had been hampered and its plans frus
trated more than once. It also needed clothing and
tents for the men and forage for the animals.

APPOINTED' QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, gg
Greene therefore scoured the country for horses and
teams, and visited the State Legislature at Lancaster
to confer with it in regard to impressment in case
other means failed. He dunned Congress incessantly
for money to buy shoes and cloth and canvas; and
he established a chain of magazines or depots of
supplies stretching from the head of Elk through
Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Jersey to the Hudson,
and containing in all eight hundred and forty thou
sand bushels of grain. He was obliged to insist to
Congress on his right to appoint his subordinate
agents if he was to he held responsible for his de
partment, and he protested successfully against the
attempts of the new Board of War to interfere in the
management of his business and issue instructions
for the purchase of supplies without consulting him.
The net result of his labors is best, stated in an ex
tract from a letter of Washington written about two
years later : " When you were prevailed upon to
take the office in March, 1778* it was in great dis
order and confusion, and, by extraordinary exertions.
ybii so arranged it as to enable the army to take
the field the moment it was necessary, and to move
with rapidity after the enemy when they left Phila
delphia." While Greene was organizing the quartermaster's
department and Steuben was drilling the squads, the
spring had passed. Howe had been relieved of his
command and Sir Henry Clinton had succeeded him.
The questions which Washington was debating with
his officers were, What will Clinton do ? and What
action shall the army take ? 1'hese questions were
considered at several councils of war. Lee had
recently been exchanged and come back into the

ijOO GENERAL GREENE.
army amid much rejoicing, his weak and treacherous
character not yet being appreciated by Washington
or any of his subordinate commanders. He was as
signed to the command of a division consisting of
Poor's, Varnum's, and Huntington's brigades. ¦ Wash
ington's force consisted of about twelve thousand
Continentals and three thousand militia, and Clinton
had nineteen thousand five hundred men in Phila
delphia. At the first council of war (April 20th) Greene
was in favor of leaving the main body of the army
under Lee at Valley Forge, while Washington with
a picked corps of four thousand men made an attack
on New York. But this proposition was not sup
ported by the other officers. At the second council
(May 8th) the opinion was unanimous to remain on
the defensive and wait events. At the third council
(June 17th) the question was propounded whether
in case the enemy marched toward New York, he
should be attacked on the way. Lee was strongly
opposed to any attack, and such was still his in
fluence that all the other officers supported him
except Greene, Lafayette", Wayne, and Cadwalader.
¦These were in favor of a vigorous attack at the first
favorable opportunity. Washington shared the same
¦ views. In fact, he had not been listlessly waiting;'
his army was in complete readiness to move on short
notice, and he was simply watching his chance to fall
on Clinton the moment he left Philadelphia. This
happened on the day after the council, and on the
same day he put Lee in motion with six thousand
men for Coryell's Ferry, above Trenton; the next
morning he followed in person with the rest of
-the army. The two armies were thus . marching .in

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. roE
parallel lines across Jersey. Washington moved
more rapidly than Clinton, who was encumbered
with a baggage train twelve miles long, and he
reached Princeton in time to head off Clinton's march
on Brunswick, where he had intended to embark his
men. The latter was therefore compelled to deflect
to the right and march for Sandy Hook. At Hope->
well, near Princeton, another council was held on
June 24th, at which the question to be considered was
the advisability of making a general attack. Greene,
Lafayette, and Wayne advocated this, while Lee
again opposed it and carried the majority of the
officers with him. After the council Greene and the.
other two submitted their views in writing, urging-
that a. strong detachment be sent against Clinton's
rear and that the main body of the army be put in
position to support this detachment and bring on
a general engagement. Washington had the same
opinion, and he gave the necessary orders the follow
ing morning.
The result was the battle of Monmouth, .fought
on Sunday, June 28th. It was well planned, the
army was in fine condition, in excellent spirits, and
better drilled and disciplined than at any other peri
od of the war. The advantage of position was on
Washington's side, and there was every reason to ex
pect a crushing defeat and the possible capture of
the British army. But, owing to Charles Lee's com
bined treason and cowardice, the result was a drawn
battle and the escape of the British during the fol
lowing night. The only redeeming feature was that
Lee's career here came to an end. He was court-
martialed, suspended for a year, ahd at the end of
that period dismissed by Congress.

T02 GENERAL GREENE.
In this march and in the battle Greene acted in
the dual capacity of quartermaster general and com
mander of the right wing. As the former he laid
out the route and order of each day's march and
selected the camping grounds. Lee being in com
mand of a large detachment, comprising two fifths
of the entire force, Greene was assigned in his place
to the command of the right wing of the main body
under Washington, the left wing being commanded
by Stirling. This body came on the field about
noon, just after Lee had made his disgraceful retreat,
and it was formed on high ground between the Free
hold meeting-house and Wenrock brook. Clinton
made two vigorous attacks against this position,
first trying to turn Stirling's left and then to turn
Greene's right ; but in both he was repulsed. Some
artillery which Greene had posted on his extreme
right not only aided to defeat Clinton's attack in
that direction, but enfiladed his entire line ; and this,
combined with an advance of Wayne's brigade,
caused him to retire about half a mile to the east of
Wenrock brook. Washington intended to renew
the attack, but, owing to the extreme heat and the
approach of darkness, this was postponed until morn
ing, and then the British were gone.
The American loss was sixty-nine killed, one
hundred and sixty-nine wounded, and one hundred
and thirty-two missing, many of whom were merely
overcome by the heat and turned up in a day or
two. Clinton reported his losses as one hundred
and twenty-four killed, one hundred and seventy
wounded, and sixty-four missing ; but there was a
serious error in these figures, as two hundred and
forty-nine were buried by the Americans alone.

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 103
Clinton's total losses from battle, heat, and desertion,
during his march across Jersey, were about two
thousand men.
This was the last of the series of battles begun
at Long Island nearly two years before; there was
no further fighting in this part of the country, and
none under Washington's immediate direction until
the siege of Yorktown, three years later. Had
Greene or Stirling or Wayne been in command of
the advanced detachment in place of Lee, it is prob
able that these three years of straggling warfare
might have been saved by the capture of Clinton's
army. The proof of Lee's treason was not dis
covered until seventy years later, but it is now evi
dent that it resulted in far greater, injury to the
American cause than that of Arnold.
From Monmouth to Sandy Hook is a distance of
only twenty miles. Clinton had a day's start, and
on arriving at his destination would be under the
protection of the guns of his fleet. Washington saw
that nothing could be accomplished by following
him, and he therefore marched for the Hudson
River, to prevent any possible attack on the passes in
the Highlands. He arrived in his old manoeuvring
ground, between White Plains and Haverstraw Bay,
on July 20th.
While Washington was moving from Monmouth
to White Plains, Greene had been, at various ¦ points
along the Hudson River, engaged in collecting trans
portation and stores, selecting sites for camps, and
otherwise attending to the business of the quarter-*
master's department. While thus employed he was
subjected to one of those outbursts of temper from
which Washington, in spite of his . marvelous self-

I04

GENERAL GREENE.

control, was not free. Hamilton, who lived in daily
contact with Washington, was always anticipating an
outburst of this kind, and he wrote to his father-in-
law, General Schuyler, that he was determined, if a
breach occurred, never to consent to an accommoda
tion. When, therefore, Washington reproved him,
one day in the spring of 1781, with what he con
sidered .unnecessary severity for a slight delay in
answering his summons, he promptly resigned from
his staff, and no persuasion could induce him to re
consider his determination. Greene acted very dif
ferently ; he had the most profound regard and
affection for Washington, and, instead of resigning,.
he replied with great dignity and calmness, disclaim
ing any intentional fault and expressing very clearly
his sense of the injustice done him. The letter was
all the more remarkable because Greene was himself
a man of quick temper, very prompt at various
periods of his career to resent the slightest reflection
cast upon him by Congress or any of its members,
or by any one in the army except Washington. The
nature of Washington's reproof, whether verbal or
written, has not been preserved, but it doubtless re
ferred to something connected with his duties as
quartermaster general. Greene replied at length
from White Plains, July 21st : "Your Excellency has
made me very unhappy. I can submit very patiently
to deserved censure ; but it wounds my feelings ex
ceedingly to meet with a rebuke for doing what I.
conceived to be a proper part of my duty, and in
the order of things. ... If I had neglected my
duty in pursuit of pleasure, or if I had been wanting
in respect to your Excellency, I would have put
my hand upon my mouth and been silent upon the

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 105
occasion ; but as I am not conscious of being charge
able with either one or the other, I can not help
thinking, that I have been treated with a degree of
severity that I am in no respect deserving. . . .
Your Excellency well knows how I came into this
department. It was by your special request, and
you must be sensible that there is no other man
would have brought me into the business b.ut you.
The distress the department was in, the disgrace
that must accompany your operations without a
change, and the difficulty of engaging a person
capable of conducting the business, together with
the hopes of meeting your approbation and having;
your full aid and assistance, reconciled me to the
undertaking. ... As I came into the quartermaster's
department with reluctance, so I shall leave it with
pleasure. Your influence brought me in, and the
want of your approbation will induce me to go out."
There is no record of what Washington replied..
Doubtless, either by word or letter, he removed the
sense of injustice and reassured his loyal subordi
nate. Their relations continued on the same inti
mate and friendly footing as before.
While Washington had been marching from Mon
mouth to White Plains the French fleet had arrived.
The treaty of alliance with France had been signed
in Paris on February 6th, and on April 13th a fleet
of twelve ships of the line and four frigates, con
taining four thousand troops, all under the com
mand of Count d'Estaing, had sailed from Toulon.
It arrived at the mouth of the Delaware on July 8th,
and after landing the French minister it proceeded
to Sandy Hook. Here Washington sent letters on
board by his aids-de-camp Laurens and Hamilton.
8

106 GENERAL GREENE.
It was at first proposed to sail into the harbor and
give battle to Howe's fleet, while Washington made
a land attack on New York. But the pilots declared
that the ships could not be taken across the bar, and
this project was abandoned. The fleet therefore
sailed for Newport on July 22d.
In anticipation of this movement, Washington had
already written on July 17th to Sullivan, who com
manded in Rhode Island, to call upon the States of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut for
five thousand. militia. These States responded so
fully and promptly that inside of three weeks about
seven thousand militia were assembled in Rhode
Island. As soon as Washington learned, by a note
from Hamilton, that the fleet would go to Newport,
he detached Glover's and Varnum's brigades, with
two batteries under Jackson, and, placing them under
command of Lafayette, directed him to march at
once for Providence and place himself under Sulli
van's orders.
Both public and private reasons strongly urged
Greene at this time to go to Rhode Island. When
the British first occupied Newport after the fall of
Fort Washington in 1776 the eastern delegates asked
Washington to send Greene to take command in
Rhode Island ; but Washington was then in a critical
position on the Delaware and declined to part with
him. Spencer was sent in his stead. Spencer re
signed in the spring of 1778, and again it was pro
posed to send Greene to take this command ; but
Washington was then urging him to take the position
of quartermaster general, and the other idea was aban
doned. Now it was evident that the scene of active
operations would be around Newport and not New-

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. iQJ
York; there would be fighting in his own State, and
there would be much work for the quartermaster's
department. Greene was anxious to go in person to
take part in both. Moreover, in going he would
necessarily pass his own home, where he had not
been for over three years, except for one night on
the march from Boston to Long Island. His wife
was there with his two children, one of whom he had
never seen, and a third child was soon expected.
He therefore asked Washington to send him, and
his request was promptly granted, as it was evident
he would be very valuable in this movement on ac
count of his local knowledge of men and ground.
Lafayette had already started, but Washington wrote
to him explaining the situation, and stating that the
troops under Sullivan would be divided,, into two
divisions — one to be commanded by Greene and the
other by himself. The generous young Frenchman
accepted the arrangement with perfect cordiality and
good grace. Greene left White Plains on the morn
ing of July 28th, and arrived at his home at Coventry
on the evening of the 30th. He stopped to rest one
day, then went on to Providence and immediately
gave his whole time to organizing the expedition
under Sullivan.
Newport, as has already been stated, was the
fourth town in the colonies in size and impor
tance. After the close of the campaign around
New York and the retreat of Washington through
the Jerseys in December, 1776, a fleet of seventy-six
ships was sent from New York, with over eight thou-"
sand men under command of Clinton and Percy.
They landed a few miles north of Newport and
took possession of the place, which was guarded by

108 GENERAL GREENE.
only a few hundred militia. In the following spring
Clinton and about half the force were recalled to
New York to take part in the expedition to the
Delaware, and Percy went home on leave. The
command devolved on General Prescott, an unenter
prising and brutal commander who undertook no
military movements but did all the damage in his
power to unarmed inhabitants. He was captured in
his bed in the summer of 1777, and the following
spring was exchanged for Charles Lee. A short
time after his release he was superseded by Sir
Robert Pigott. This officer was now in command
with about six. thousand men, half of whom had only
arrived on July 15th, having been sent by Clinton
from New York on his arrival there after the battle
of Monmouth. The troops occupied two lines of
works stretching across the island just north-of
Newport ; a detachment of Hessians was stationed
opposite to them on Conanicut Island. D'Estaing
arrived at the mouth of Narragansett Bay on July
29th, and Sullivan held a conference with him on
board his ship the next day. Could a prompt at
tack have been made by the combined American
and French troops, supported by a vigorous bom
bardment by the French fleet, it is quite possible
that Pigott's force might have been captured. But
it was only ten days since Sullivan had received
Washington's instructions to call out the militia, and
only a portion of them had arrived. Lafayette's
troops, having two hundred miles to march from
White Plains, did not reach Providence until August
3d, although Lafayette in person arrived on July
29th and visited the fleet the following day. Sulli
van therefore fixed August ioth as the earliest day

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. IOg
when he could be ready ; and in the mean time sug
gested that D'Estaing should attack the British ships.
D'Estaing moved up the east and west passages for
this purpose on August 5th, and all the British ships,
seven in number, were immediately set on fire or
Sunk. Their crews were sent to man the land bat
teries at Brenton's Point, Goat Island, and North
Battery (opposite Rose Island) ; the Hessians had
already been withdrawn from Conanicut on the first
appearance of the fleet, and a detachment at Butt's
Hill, on the northern part of Rhode Island, opposite
Bristol Ferry, was brought back to Newport on the
evening of August 8th.
It had been agreed between D'Estaing and Sulli
van that on August ioth the American troops were to
cross over by Howland's Ferry, from Tiverton von
Xhe mainland, to the northern part of Rhode Island
near Butt's Hill ; the French troops were to land on
the west side, opposite Dyer's Island. In this way
it was hoped to capture the British detachment on
.Butt's Hill, and then the united forces, numbering
about fourteen thousand men, were to move south
and attack the lines at Newport. In accordance
with this plan, Sullivan united all his force at Tiver
ton on the 7th, and on the 8th D'Estaing sailed up
the main channel, exchanging fire with the batteries
near Newport, and anchored off the northern end of
Conanicut, intending on the following day to land
his troops, which had been on shipboard for nearly
four months, and to cross to Rhode Island the day
after, as agreed upon. *
But Sullivan noticed on the morning of the 9th
that the British position on Butt's Hill had been
evacuated. Fearing that it might be r'eoccupied, he

HO GENERAL GREENE.
crossed from Tiverton at once, instead of waiting
till the ioth, as agreed upon. This somewhat dis
concerted the French admiral ; but he visited Sullivan
in his camp, and, on hearing his explanation, approved
his action. As he was returning to his ship on the
afternoon of the 9th the fog lifted, and, to his utter
astonishment, disclosed a British fleet sailing toward
the harbor of Newport, ten miles to the south of
him. In fact, Pigott had not been idle, but had sent
word to Clinton at New York the day (July 29th)
that the French fleet arrived off Newport. By a
curious chance, a portion of Byron's fleet, which had
sailed from Plymouth on June 5th in pursuit of
D'Estaing, arrived at New York a few days after
D'Estaing had left. Joining these to his own squad
ron, Lord Howe sailed for Newport and arrived there
on the morning of August 9th. Washington wrote
D'Estaing on the 8th, informing him of this, but the
letter had not arrived when D'Estaing saw the fleet.
While the latter was ready to conform his movements
to those of the Americans as far as possible, yet the
idea of merely assisting in a land attack while there
was a chance of fighting a British fleet was not to
be thought of.* On the morning of the ioth there
* Captain Mahan, in his Influence of Sea Power on History,
says : " With the prevailing summer southwest breezes blowing
straight into the bay, he [D'Estaing] was exposed to any attempts
his adversary might make " ; and he gives no other reason for
D'Estaing's sailing out the next morning, when the wind unex
pectedly blew from the north. While there is no question of the
soundness of Captain Mahan's reasoning, yet it does not appear
that D'Estaing was moved by such considerations ; for in a long
letter to Congress, dated August 26th, he gives his reasons for
sailing out of Na'rragansett Bay, and he makes no mention of the

APPOINTED- QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, t i r
was a strong breeze from the north, and D'Estaing,
after sending word to Sullivan of his intended de
parture, set all sail and bore down toward the
British. As he had the windward there was nothing
for Howe to do but to weigh anchor and sail out to
sea until a change in the wind should give him a
chance to fight on more even terms. The two fleets
manoeuvred to get to windward of each other for
two days, and then they met a hurricane the memory
of which survived for two generations. Both fleets
were scattered and seriously disabled. Howe re
turned to New York, and D'Estaing only reached
Newport, in a badly crippled condition, on the 20th.
Sullivan was thus left in the lurch. D'Estaing
had promised to put the French troops under La
fayette's command, but, instead of leaving them to
aid Sullivan when he went out to fight the British
fleet, he took them with him in his ships — where they
could only be in the way and do no good to any one.
Nevertheless, Sullivan started to carry out alone the
original plan as far as he could. On the nth he
pushed out light parties . to the vicinity of the
British lines and followed with his main body —
Greene commanding the right wing, Lafayette, the
left, and John Hancock, formerly President of Con-
prevailing breezes— which possibly were not known to him, as he
had only been there twelve days. He justifies his action on the
ground that the British would have landed on Conanicut Island
and erected batteries there, which, in connection with the batteries
which they already possessed on Rhode Island, would have de
stroyed his fleet. In other words, he feared the influence of the
land power on his ships.
All contemporary writers speak of his sacrificing co-operation
in the land attack on Newport to the desire of fighting the British
fleet.

112 GENERAL GREENE.
gress and now major general in command of the
Massachusetts militia, the second line. But the same
hurricane which dispersed the fleets passed over
Rhode Island on the night of the 12th, blew away
the tents, killed several of the animals, injured some
of the men, soaked their clothing, and ruined a large
part of their ammunition. It left the army in a sad
plight, and it took two or three days to put it in
order again.
As soon as D'Estaing's fleet reappeared, Greene
and Lafayette were sent to consult with him and
arrange plans for the further conduct of the expedi
tion. To their surprise, D'Estaing announced his
intention of sailing for Boston to repair damages.
They urged him to land his troops, make a vigorous
assault on the Newport lines, and then refit his fleet
in Newport, where the facilities were almost, if not
quite, as good as in Boston. They urged that, with
their large superiority of force and the discourage
ment of the garrison on having received no further
aid from New York, success was certain. They
spent the night with him trying to convince him of
the soundness of these views, but without success.
They then returned to Sullivan, and a solemn pro
test was drawn up and signed by every general
in camp except Lafayette. But all to no purpose.
D'Estaing sailed away on the 22d, taking wrth him
his four thousand soldiers — which certainly were
not needed to repair his ships in Boston.
This departure wrecked the expedition and set
everybody by the ears. Sullivan wrote to Washing
ton, telling him of his troubles and truly saying :
" To combat all these misfortunes and to surmount
all these difficulties requires a degree of temper and

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 113
¦persevering fortitude which I can never boast of,
and which few possess in so ample a manner as your
Excellency." On the day after D'Estaing sailed
away Sullivan issued a general order in which he
first laments the departure of the French fleet and
then contradicts himself by the remark that " he
can by no means suppose the army or any part
of it endangered by the movement." He goes on
to say that " he yet hopes the event will prove
America able to procure with her own arms that
which her allies refused to assist her in obtaining."
This insult was more than Lafayette could stand,
and he called upon Sullivan to make a public retrac
tion, which Sullivan attempted to do in an order of
the 26th, but his language was so awkward that it
left the matter almost in worse shape than before.
Hancock started at once for Boston, where there
was talk of not allowing the fleet to enter; the
militia, which had been called out for only three
weeks, were so angry at the departure of the fleet
that they concluded they would go home, and over
five thousand of them left in five days. The only
man who seems to have kept his head was Greene.
Washington wrote to him : " I depend much upon
your temper and influence to conciliate that animosity
which I plainly perceive, by a letter from the marquis,
subsists between the American officers and the French
in our service." This reliance was not misplaced:
Greene had felt it his duty to sign the formal protest
of the 22d, but after that his whole efforts were
given to keeping the peace. He saw clearly tha^
giving vent to feelings of disappointment and re
sentment would have a fatal effect upon the French
alliance, now being put to its first test. He there-

II4 GENERAL GREENE.
fore did everything in his power to suppress any ex
pression of feeling against the French. He also
used every effort to conciliate the French officers,
and Lafayette in a letter to Washington took oc
casion to express his appreciation of Greene's efforts
as a peacemaker.
D'Estaing reached Boston on the 27th, and La
fayette, who had been urged by Sullivan and Greene
to go there and if possible persuade the admiral to
send his troops to Newport, arrived on the following
day. In company with Heath and Hancock they
called on the council, and a better feeling was es
tablished. D'Estaing promised to send his troops
to Sullivan, and Lafayette rode back with all speed
to carry the news, but on his arrival he found the
army just retreating from Rhode Island.
Its position, in fact, had become very precarious.
By the desertion of the militia its strength was re
duced to between four thousand and five thousand
men. With these it was attempting to besiege a
force of greater strength than its own within the
lines just north of Newport. Sullivan, in his anger,
was ready to order an assault, but wiser counsels
prevailed. During the night of the 28th the army
retreated in good order to the position originally
fortified by the British on Butt's Hill, at the north
ern end of the island. Pigott followed at daybreak
in two columns, the Hessians taking the west road
and the British the east road. They came up with
the American pickets at seven o'clock, and a council
was held at which Greene advised making a sharp
attack and defeating the columns in detail before
they united. But he was overruled, and it was de
cided to remain strictly on the defensive. The two

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, nj
columns were thus allowed to unite. A determined
engagement began about nine o'clock and lasted for
seven hours. Greene commanded the right, and had
with him the regiments in Varnum's brigade which
had originally marched with him to Boston, Glover's
brigade of Marblehead fishermen, a brigade of
militia under Cornell, and a regiment of negroes re
cently organized in Rhode Island, of which his kins
man Christopher" Greene, the hero of Red Bank, was
colonel, and his old friend Samuel Ward was major. '
The Americans were gradually pushed back into the
works on Butt's Hill, but the British, although they
brought two ships to use their guns against Greene's
right flank, were unable to make any further prog
ress. After several hours of severe fighting they
retired during the afternoon to their own lines on
Quaker Hill. On the following day the British did
not renew the attack, and during the night of the
30th the army was withdrawn over Howland's Ferry
to Tiverton on the mainland ; the boats being rowed
by a militia regiment of boatmen from Providence,
and by that same brigade of Glover's which had
ferried the army across the East River after the
battle of Long Island, and again across the Dela
ware at Trenton. The retreat was made just in
time, for Lord Howe had sailed out of New York on
the 27th with a large fleet, bearing Clinton and five
thousand re-enforcements. Washington. had notified
Sullivan of this in a letter dated the 28th; which Sul
livan received on the morning of the 30th. ' As the
army climbed up the heights of Tiverton on the*
morning of the 31st the topsails of this fleet could
be seen in the distance sailing into Newport harbor.
The American loss in the battle of August 29th

Il6 GENERAL GREENE.
was thirty killed, one hundred and thirty-two
wounded, and forty-four missing. That of the
British is stated by S. G. Arnold in his history of
Rhode Island to have been ten hundred and twenty-
three, including prisoners. The Americans brought
off all their wounded and saved all their artillery and
stores. The balance of the militia now went home,
and Sullivan's force, which had been ten thousand
one hundred and twenty-four, on the 4th of August,
was reduced to about twelve hundred Continentals.
He left a detachment under Lafayette at Bristol,
which was soon withdrawn to Warren, and with the
balance he retired to Providence. Greene went to
Boston on business relating to the quartermaster's-
department. The British retained possession of
Rhode Island until October, 1779, when Clinton
voluntarily evacuated it, taking all the troops to
New York for use in the South.
The Rhode Island expedition was thus a com
plete failure. Nothing was ever undertaken with
fairer chances of complete success, and if it had suc
ceeded it would have been of the greatest possible
importance. Washington, in writing of it to his
brother a few weeks' later, said : "If the garrison of
that place, consisting of nearly six thousand men,
had been captured, as there was, in appearance at
least, a hundred to one in favor of it, it would have
given the finishing blow to British pretensions of
sovereignty over this country ; and would, I am
persuaded, have hastened the departure of the
troops in New York as fast as their canvas wings
could carry them away." D'Estaing's orders en
joined him to be careful of his ships, and, in case of
disaster, to go to Boston for repairs ; but nothing

APPOINTED QUARTERMASTER GENERAL, uj
can justify his failure to put his land forces on shore
at the earliest moment after his arrival. Had he
done so, success would appear to have been certain.
If Washington could have gone to Rhode Island, in
all probability D'Estaing would have- followed his
advice, for Washington possessed an ascendency
over the French as well as over his own countrymen
which was not shared or even approached by any
one else in the army. Washington, however, was
not justified in leaving his central position at New
York in face of the principal force of the enemy for
any separate detachment, no matter how important.
In view of Greene's subsequent success in an inde
pendent command in the South, and of the tact
which he exercised in his intercourse with the
French, it is probable that if he, in place of Sullivan,
had been in command, the result would have been
different. At the time, however, that Sullivan was
sent to Rhode Island (March, 1778) the French fleet
had not sailed from France, and the movement
against Newport was not thought of. When it was
undertaken, Sullivan was already in command, and
there were no reasons sufficient to justify his re
moval. Nevertheless, his bad temper and lack of
tact in dealing with the French were largely respon
sible for the failure.

CHAPTER VIII.
QUARTERMASTER GENERAL — SPRINGFIELD —
1778-1780.
The two years following the expedition against
Newport were years of inaction in the North. Dur
ing the preceding year the Americans had been
everywhere on the offensive, and while they had not
gained the full measure of success which they had
reason to expect, yet this was due to causes on their
own side which could not have been anticipated, and
not to any skill, energy, or courage on the part of
the British. At Germantown the fog saved Howe,
at Monmouth Charles Lee's treason saved Clinton,
and at Newport dissensions between the allies saved
Pigott. At the end of it all, the British found them
selves just where they were in 1776 — i. e, in posses
sion of New York and Newport. All the other terri
tory which they had gained had been lost again, and
the prospect of bringing the Americans back to
allegiance to the King and subjection to Parliament
was as remote as ever. But the year of offensive
operations had been very exhausting to the Ameri
cans. Congress was falling into contempt, its most
distinguished members having returned to positions
in the State governments, or gone abroad as diplo
matic representatives. The finances were in a de
plorable condition. Congress had no power (or, if it

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. ng
had, failed to exercise it) to levy taxation, and it
attempted to meet the expenses of the war by issuing
Continental bills. These had now reached the aggre
gate of over $120,000,000, and were more than doubled
during the next year, with no definite prospect of
redemption. The value of these bills decreased as
their numbers increased. At this time they were
worth about twenty cents on the dollar, and this
value continued to grow less until they ceased to cir
culate at all, and the measure of complete worth-
lessness of anything was expressed in the phrase
" Not worth a Continental." Congress still persisted
in its opposition to a permanent army, and, while the
act of 1776, calling for battalions to be enlisted for
three years or the war, still remained on the statute
books, yet it was not enforced ; the States were
afraid to undertake drafting with any determination,
and laws were passed authorizing enlistments for
one year or shorter periods accompanied by extrava
gant bounties, which of course nullified any efforts
to get long-service men under the law of 1776.
Under these circumstances Washington was forced
to remain on the defensive. He posted his army in
the vicinity of New York, ready to move toward
Philadelphia if Clinton repeated Howe's plan of 1777,
or toward New England in case the force at New
port should take the offensive in the direction of
Boston or elsewhere ; and at all times covering the
line of the Hudson and the posts in the Highlands,
on the security of which depended his line of com
munications between the Eastern and Middle States,
as well as the supply of food for his army, most of
which came from west of the Hudson River.
On the other hand, the British, having campaigned

120 GENERAL GREENE.
for two years in and around New York and from
Philadelphia to Newport, and being at the end sub
stantially where they were at the beginning, con
cluded to change the war to a new theatre. They
therefore sent about thirty-five hundred men tq
Savannah, -and thus began the Southern campaign,
which was finally terminated at Yorktown and Eutaw
Springs three years later. During all this period the
British remained in New York without attempting any
offensive operations beyond mere raids and forays.
As for the French, D'Estaing sailed away for the
West Indies during the autumn of 1778 with his fleet
and his soldiers. Lafayette went home during the
winter to see if he could secure more tangible assist
ance in the way of money, supplies, and a force which
would serve under Washington's orders. In this he was
successful to an extent scarcely hoped for, but it was
eighteen months before he was able to return with
these substantial aids.
Everything being thus brought to a standstill,
Washington was able in the following spring to- de:
tach five thousand men, under Sullivan, to inflict a
well-deserved punishment upon the Indians and their
Tory allies in central New York and northern Penn
sylvania; and in the summer Wayne showed, in the
brilliant capture of Stony Point with the bayonet
alone, what his own daring and Steuben's discipline
could accomplish. With these exceptions, the story
of the two years — from September, 1778, to Septem
ber, 1780 — at the North is a story of military inaction.
The only busy man in the army (always except
ing Washington, upon whose shoulders the whole
burden of the contest now rested) was Greene. He
was all the time engaged in the vexatious and im-

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. I2i
possible task of trying to keep the army supplied and
equipped without cash. We left him at Tiverton
just after the battle of Butt's Hill in Rhode Island.
His home at Coventry was fifteen miles distant across
Narragansett Bay. The sound of the battle was
distinctly heard at his house, and its smoke could be
seen. Two days later Greene rejoined his wife there,
and on September 23d his third child was born. It
was a daughter, and she was named Cornelia Lott,
after the wife of a gentleman residing near Morris
town, who had shown the warmest hospitality to
Greene and his wife during the spring of 1777.
The business of the quartermaster's department
kept him in New England for the next month, about
half the time being passed in Boston and the other
half at his home, whence he could ride into Provi
dence every morning for consultation with Sullivan.
Almost immediately after his arrival at home, John
Brown — a leading merchant in Providence, and a
member of the distinguished family to whose bequests
Brown University owes its continued existence, who
was then rapidly amassing a large fortune, and who
had been a visitor to Sullivan's army — gave vent to
very severe criticisms on the Rhode Island expedi
tion, claiming that it had been badly planned and
worse executed, and that Sullivan was incompetent.
Sullivan and Greene had been division commanders
together, and engaged in every campaign and battle
from Boston in 1775 to Newport in 1778. Greene
had the warmest affection for Sullivan, and an opin
ion of his abilities which was possibly higher than#
was justified. At all events, the idea of Sullivan, his
brother officer, being abused by a merchant whose
trade was being injured in consequence of the failure
9

i. 22 General greene.
of the expedition, and this, too, at Greene's own home,
seemed like an abuse of hospitality in addition to
being grossly unjust. Greene thereupon took up
the cudgels vigorously in Sullivan's defense, and
wrote Brown a long letter — almost a pamphlet, in
fact — reviewing the whole expedition, defending Sul
livan and resenting the criticisms. Brown had at
tempted to censure Sullivan by quoting Greene's
opinion and advice, but Greene repudiated any such
argument. He insisted that " the expedition had
been prudently and well conducted," and that there
was " not a general officer, from the commander in
chief to the youngest in the field, that would have
gone to greater lengths to have given success to the
expedition than General Sullivan." Finally he tells
Mr. Brown, " I can not help feeling mortified that
those that have been at home, making their fortune,
and living in the lap of luxury" and enjoying all the
pleasures of domestic life, should be the first to sport
with the feelings of officers who have, stood as a
barrier between them and ruin."
During his stay in New England Greene did
everything in his power to restore the good feeling
between the allies. At a meeting of the Assembly
at Providence, at which he happened to be present,
he contrived to prevent the reading of letters from
Sullivan in which the latter gave full expression to
his feelings toward D'Estaing, the publication of
which could have done no good and might have done
much harm. And a few days later, at Boston, he
wrote the admiral a letter which D'Estaing describes
as " of a nature to console me for the little irregu
larities which you perceived in General Sullivan's
letter." D'Estaing adds : " It is from you and what

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. I23
you are, that it is doubtless suitable and flattering to
judge of the respectable and amiable qualities of the
American general officers."
On the 6th of October Greene returned to gen
eral headquarters, then at Fishkill on the Hudson.
Sullivan had asked to have him stationed in Rhode
Island for the winter, but Greene wrote to Washing
ton that, however pleasant it might be to be near
his family and among his friends, it would be " very
unfriendly to the business of his department," and
Washington therefore directed him to return. The
headquarters were transferred for a time from Fish-
kill to Fredericksburg, on the Connecticut border,
east of West Point; then to Middlebrook on the
Raritan River, ten miles west of New Brunswick.
Here they remained till the following summer, the
men going into huts as at Valley Forge, but profiting
by the experience of the previous winter to make
them more comfortable. There was also a greater
number of farmhouses available for the officers, and
Greene as well as the other generals had each a
house to himself. The ladies again came to camp ;
Mrs. Washington, Mrs. Greene, Mrs. Knox, Lady
Stirling and her daughter Lady Kitty, and others.
There were the same amusements as at Valley. Forge
with which to pass the long winter evenings, but
here there were rooms large enough to dance in, and
of one of these occasions, in March, Greene writes :
" We had a little dance at my quarters a few even
ings past. His Excellency and- Mrs. Greene danced
upward of three hours without once sitting down. a
Upon the whole, we had a pretty little frisk."
But the "little frisks" were mere oases in the
desert of his troubles in the quartermaster's depart-

124 GENERAL GREENE.
ment, which increased steadily during • the next
eighteen months, until Greene finally threw up the
office in disgust. The chief difficulty was the lack of
hard money to pay for the necessary stores. Con
gress had little or no hard money, and when its paper
promises were worth so little that it took four hun
dred dollars of them to buy a hat and sixteen hun
dred dollars to buy a suit of clothes, there were not
enough printing presses in the country to supply
what was needed to clothe the army and feed the
animals. Impressment was occasionally resorted to,
receipts being given for the property taken, but
there was great objection to this method, and it was
ineffectual. People concealed their property, and,
in the general apathy in regard to the war which
had now supervened, all the farmers and merchants
assisted each other to evade the quartermaster's
agents aud defeat their intentions. The system of
short enlistments was, moreover, most wasteful. The
troops took but little care of public property, and at
the close of their enlistments carried away large
amounts of it ; so that it required from two to three
times the quantity of stores that would have sufficed
for a permanent force — and still the men were never
well supplied. Finally Congress and the Board of
War attempted to interfere in the details of the"
management of the department in such a way as to
destroy all system and discipline. This was not
done from any malicious purpose, but simply from
that lack of experience in executive management
and organization which characterized the govern
ment of all the colonies at this time, and which con
tinued until they were on the verge of anarchy, when
the Federal Constitution was adopted in 1789. In

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. 125
dealing with this interference it must be said that
Greene was not without fault. He had the most un
limited respect and admiration for Washington, and
warm affection for his comrades in the army.. But
he did not entertain such feeling for the members of
Congress, except for a few like Reed, of Penn
sylvania, G. Morris, of New York, and Marchant, of
Rhode Island. For the majority of the delegates he
felt an indifference bordering on contempt, which
was neither justified nor judicious ; and this feeling
was intensified when he saw the extravagant style
of living in Philadelphia, the pursuit of pleasure to
the' postponement of business, and compared this
with the sufferings of the officers and men in the
huts at Valley Forge and Middlebrook. His temper
was quick, and his affections strong. To a friend he
was a stanch friend, and to an enemy a vigorous
hater. Washington had these same good qualities,
but to them he joined a discerning judgment, a
patience, and a tact in dealing with men, which it is
not too much to say has not been possessed by any
other public man in our history, with the possible
exception of Lincoln. Greene possessed these char
acteristics in a far smaller degree, and such measure
of them as he did possess was often overbalanced by
his feelings of indignation and resentment. Hence
his tone in correspondence and intercourse with the
committees of Congress was frequently harsh and
unfriendly, and it resulted in bad feeling rather than
good. Doubtless the provocation was great, but
Washington had equal provocation, and it was his
manner of meeting it which established his incom
parable fame.
The .bad feeling thus engendered was eagerly

126 GENERAL GREENE.
seized by Greene's enemies and those of Washington
to create all the trouble and embarrassment possible.
The Conway cabal had failed, but some of its mem
bers were still in position to do mischief. Lee and
Conway had, it is true, been dismissed, but Gates
was in command at Boston, whence, as Washington
was compelled to say to the President of Congress
in April, 1779, he was practicing "little under
hand intrigues " and " continually giving me fresh
proofs of malevolence and opposition " ; and Mifflin
was in Philadelphia before a committee of inquiry
into his administration of the quartermaster's de
partment, and ready to join any intrigue which would
injure his successor who had so enormously improved
its efficiency. They and their adherents in Congress
lost no opportunity of criticising such defects as
still existed in the department and laying the blame
on its chief, instead of on Congress which expected
the war to be prosecuted without providing its
sinews. They also accused the subordinates of pecu
lation — a charge which, unfortunately, in some in
stances was probably true ; and they hinted that
Greene himself was making a fortune, and that he
was filling the lucrative posts with his relatives and
special friends. No direct charge was ever made
against Greene's integrity, and his enemies well
knew that there was not the slightest ground for any
such accusation. But this did not prevent them
from spreading innuendoes. As for his relatives, the
matter was quickly disposed of. The only ones he
had appointed to places in his department were his
elder brother, Jacob Greene, who had been selected as
chairman of the Committee of Safety of the Rhode
Island Assembly in 1775, and was perhaps better

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. \.2j
qualified than any other man in that State to trans
act the quartermaster's business; and his cousin,
Griffin Greene, who was connected with the Coventry
forges and was a well-trained man of business.
Both were men of the highest integrity, and well
known as such to the public as well as to Greene,
and their appointment to two out of the hundred
places at his disposal was to be commended rather
than criticised. In meeting the gossip that he was
making a fortune, Greene was less fortunate, being
embarrassed by the fact that he was being paid a
commission. As already stated, he had first con
sented to direct the operations of the department
without being connected with the accounts, and with
out other compensation than the pay of his grade in
the army. The committee of Congress declined to
accept this, and thereupon he agreed to serve on the
same terms as his principal Subordinates could be
secured for. The committee fixed this at one per
cent on the money disbursed by the department, and
Greene divided this equally with Colonels Pettit and
Cox. In these days this seems a bad arrangement,
and such it undoubtedly was. But it was not so re
garded at that time ; it was the custom of the day,
the arrangement was proposed by the committee and
not by Greene, and it was considered by them, when
made, a very economical method of compensation.
Now it was used to cast discredit upon Greene ; and
in a letter written in April, 1779, to Mr. Duane, a
delegate in Congress and President of the Treasury
Board, he admits that " the emoluments expectedf
from the office were flattering to his fortune, but
not less humiliating to his military pride." The
idea of its being flattering to his fortune, however,

128 GENERAL GREENE.
proved delusive, and a year later he wrote to a friend
in Rhode Island that if certain private funds in his
hands were not profitably invested he was poor in
deed. " To be thought rich and at the same time to
be poor, is the most disagreeable situation in the
world." His one third of one per cent on the
amount disbursed during the two years and six
months that he held the office was probably about
one hundred thousand dollars in Continental money.
At the time he left the office this was worth one^and
two thirds cents on the dollar in the open market,
and Congress was trying to redeem it at the rate of
two and a half cents on the dollar, or forty for one.
It is evident, therefore, that his compensation in
actual value was' small, and probably did not equal
his expenses. It is certain that at the close of the
war he was poorer than at the beginning. This was
the case with all the general officers, but least of all
with Washington. He had stipulated that he should
receive no pay for his services, but have his ex
penses reimbursed; and on July i, 1783, he sub
mitted his accounts, kept with the most scrupulous
care, of his expenditures during the preceding eight
years, including depreciation, interest, and expenses
of Mrs. Washington in coming to and returning from
camp. The amount was $64,355.30 in specie, which
would have been equivalent to more than one million
dollars in Continental money at the average deprecia
tion during the year 1779. Being reimbursed this
amount, his only loss was for such expenditures as
he had forgotten or neglected to enter in his accounts.
This arrangement, while not so intended, proved
more advantageous to Washington than any salary
would have been. It is doubtful if any other general

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. 129
received enough in pay and allowances to meet his
actual expenses. Certainly Greene did not. In
April, 1783, he wrote to Mr. John Collins, a delegate
from Rhode Island in Congress, as follows: "Con
gress recommended to the several States to settle
with their own officers. Will Rhode Island acknowl
edge me as one of hers ? If she will, I should be
glad to have a settlement, and if the State is not as
poor as I am, I should be glad to get some advance.
I have drawn no pay since '77, and you may well
suppose my friends are tired of lending me money.
The Southern States have voted me an interest, but
it will be a long time before I can make it profitable
either by sale or improvement."
The idea that Greene was making a fortune out of
his commissions was therefore entirely false. Never
theless, these rumors were industriously circulated by
a clique in Congress, and they angered Greene very
much. He felt that he was remaining in a very dis
tasteful office solely from a sense of public duty and
because Washington had asked it. Under these cir
cumstances, to be accused of holding on to the office
from mercenary motives seemed to him an evidence
of the basest ingratitude. He could not keep his
temper in dealing with men who so completely mis
judged him.
His difficulties with Congress did not reach the
acute period until the winter of 1779-80. In the
preceding April he had been in Philadelphia trying
to get money to purchase stores and pay teamsters,
so that Washington could make plans for a summer^
campaign. Congress seemed to him so indifferent
and inattentive to his requests that he asked leave
to resign ; and he wrote at some length to Washing-

130 GENERAL GREENE.
ton, explaining that it was impossible to carry on
the business without financial resources ; that there
was a petty intrigue on foot to injure his reputation;
that the office was in every way disagreeable to him,
and that he desired to give it up and return to his
place in the line. He stated that, as General Lincoln
had just asked to be relieved from the Southern com
mand on account of his wound, he would be glad to
be ordered in his place. Washington replied, ex
pressing sympathy for his troubles, but declining to
give any advice ; he added, that if Greene should
resign from the quartermaster generalship and the
appointment of a successor to Lincoln should be left
to him, he should not hesitate in choosing Greene
for the place. Congress, however, was not disposed
to accept his resignation, and on the 7th of June,
1779, passed a resolution expressing "full confidence
in the integrity and abilities of the quartermaster
general." He therefore continued the business
throughout the'year, and did the best he could with
the totally inadequate means at his disposal. When
the year was over and the army went into winter
quarters at Morristown, he determined to bring
matters to a head, if possible. On December 12th
he wrote a long letter to Congress : " It has been my
wish for a long time to relinquish the office of
quartermaster general. This is the close of the
second campaign since I engaged in the duties of
this office, and I feel a degree of happiness in having
it in my power to say with confidence that every
military operation, whether in the main army or in
any detachment, has been promoted and supported,
as far as it depends upon this department. The
commander in chief has given me the most ample

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL-SPRINGFIELD. 131
testimony of his approbation,* and the success in
every other quarter sufficiently evinces the ample
provision that has been made." But he goes on to
say that he entered the department against his
wishes; the office is " injurious to my health, harass
ing to my mind, and opposed to my military pur
suits7'.; and "as interest was not the object which
induced me first to accept the appointment, it would
be my wish to resign, even if the emoluments could
be made five times as large as they are, provided I
could retire with the approbation of Congress and
without injuring the public service." He then ex
plains in detail the condition and needs of his de
partment, and continues : " In this distressing situa
tion, without money and without credit, necessity
obliges me to give Congress information, and to ask
their advice what are we to do. Here is an expen
sive army to support, and the difficulty hourly in
creasing; besides, the preparations necessary for an
other campaign is fast approaching, while we are
without the means either to defray the current ex
penses or discharge our past contracts, which are
now very great, owing to the poverty of the treasury
for some months past. And so dissatisfied are the
people at being kept out of their money, that they
* On September 3d Washington had written him as follows :
" The services you have rendered the army have been important,
and such as have gained my entire approbation, which I have not
failed to express on more than one occasion to Congress in strong
and explicit terms. The sense of the army on this head, I believe,
concurs with mine. I think it is not more than justice to you to
say that I am persuaded you have uniformly exerted yourself to
second my measures, and our operations in general, in the most
effectual manner which the public resources and the circumstances
of the times would permit."

132 GENERAL GREENE.
have begun to sue the public agents. ... So strict
are the laws of some States, and so attentive are the
magistrates to guard the people's property, that the
forage officers have been prosecuted and heavily
fined for presuming to take forage oh the march of
the army (to save the public cattle from starving)
by virtue of a press warrant granted by the com
mander in chief." He asks that Congress will take
prompt steps to appoint his successor, and states
that he will give every information and assistance in
the matter that is within his power.
This letter was certainly courteous in tone, and
related to matters of the highest importance. Con
gress made no reply, and, as far as could be learned,
paid no attention to it. After a month had passed
Greene wrote another letter, dated January 13, 1780,
calling attention to his previous letter, and saying
that, in view of "the alarming crisis to which things
are drawing, and the necessity of applying a remedy
before the evil becomes incurable," he " can not help
pressing for an answer." He realizes that " there
are many weighty matters before Congress," but he
can not help thinking that the business of the quar
termaster's department " claims their earliest atten
tion," No reply was made to this, but on January
20th a resolution was passed appointing three com
missioners to inquire into the condition of the staff,
to introduce such changes as might be necessary, and
generally to superintend its affairs. Schuyler, Pick
ering, and Mifflin were appointed on this commission.
The first two were eminently qualified for any such
duty, but Mifflin was still under investigation for his
mismanagement and neglect of the business when he
was himself quartermaster general, and he was known

QUARTERMASt ER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD.

133

to be personally hostile to Washington and Greene.
His appointment was evidence that a faction in Con
gress had succeeded in using this commission to
gratify private animosities instead of improving the
public service. As Greene could get no reply from
Congress, he wrote to his friend Reed, who was now
Governor of Pennsylvania, for information, and
Reed replied : " I will venture to tell you that you
have nothing to expect from public gratitude or per
sonal attention, and that you will do well to prepare
yourself at all points for events. . . . Upon the
whole, I still retain my opinion of the propriety of
your being here as soon as possible, and in the mean
time I can only inform you of two things with cer
tainty : First, that the plan of the department will
be altered as to commissions ; second, that nothing
but necessity will induce them to continue the pres
ent department, for, though it may have a great
deal of the utile, it has little of the dulce on the
palate of Congress. But you will be drilled on till
the campaign opens, and, if they can not do better,
they may keep you."
Greene hesitated to go to Philadelphia for fear
that he would be accused of seeking to retain his
place when in reality he desired to give it up. But
Washington advised him to go, and he finally did so,
arriving in Philadelphia on March 25th. He had a
conference with a committee on the 27th, and learned
that Mifflin and others had brought in a plan for the
quartermaster's department, which Schuyler thought
would "starve the army in ten days." Congress,*
having no money and having exhausted its credit,
and being unable to devise any financial system, had
adopted the idea of calling on the States to furnish

134 GENERAL GREENE.
supplies in kind. On this basis Mifflin had con
structed a plan which added enormously to the
duties of the commander in chief, which were already
too heavy, and left the quartermaster general with
almost nothing to do. On April 3d Greene wrote
to Congress saying that on his arrival he had spoken
to the committee of the injury he felt in having
commissioners appointed to superintend his depart
ment, and had " requested to know whether there
was the real want of confidence in my integrity or
ability which those appointments but too strongly
indicated, and urged this as a necessary step to a
further explanation. I have been waiting a whole
week for an answer, but as I find I am not likely to
obtain one, and as I conceive my attendance is no
longer necessary here, I propose to set out for camp
the next day after to-morrow and there await the
issue of the business."
The tone of this letter was not judicious, and its
effect was heightened by the speech of a superser-
viceable friend in the debate which followed. A
resolution was introduced on the 5th, expressing
confidence in his ability and integrity, and requesting
him to continue to act as quartermaster general,
when this friend took occasion to say that Greene
was " an officer in whom the commander in chief had
the highest confidence ; that he was the first of all
the subordinate generals in point of military knowl
edge and ability ; that in case of an accident happen
ing to General Washington, he would be the proper-
est person to command the army, and that General
Washington thought so too." All this was true enough,
but it was put forward in an offensive manner, and it
led another member to reply that he " had a very

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRTNGFIELD. 135
high opinion of General Greene's military abilities ;
that he believed the general had too ; but that he
believed no person on earth was authorized to say
as much as the last words implied " ; whereupon
amendments were moved,- the debate became very
hot, and it was necessary to take an adjournment to
allow the members to cool.
Greene returned to Morristown in a very uncom
fortable frame of mind, and on April 25th wrote to
Reed as follows : " If I force myself out of the de
partment and any great misfortune happens, no
matter from what cause, it will be chargeable to my
account. If I stay in it, and things go wrong or any
failure happens, I stand responsible. What to do or
how to act I am at a loss. I think, upon the whole,
your advice is prudent and on the. safer side of the
question ; and therefore I determine to seek all op
portunities to get out of the business. I feel myself
so soured and hurt at the ungenerous as. well as
illiberal treatment of Congress and the different
boards, that it will be impossible for me to do busi
ness with them with proper temper ; and, besides, I
have lost all confidence in the rectitude and justice
of their intentions. The Board of Treasury have
written me one of the most insulting letters I have
ever received either from a public or private hand.
I shall write them as tart an answer, and, as I ex
pect it will bring on a quarrel, I shall have occa
sion to call on you and others to certify the manner
of my engaging in this business, the circumstances
it was under, and all other masters that may be
necessary to give the public a proper idea of the part
I have acted."
Just before Greene left Philadelphia [April 3d],

136 GENERAL GREENE.
Washington had written to Congress pointing out
the utter impracticability of the system of getting
supplies in kind from the States, and urging the
adoption of some measures that would put the quar
termaster's department in position to supply the
army so that a summer campaign could be under
taken. On receiving this, a committee, consisting of
Schuyler, Matthews, and Peabody, was appointed to
go to camp and consult with the commander in chief.
They arrived during the latter part of April, and re
mained at headquarters for several months. On the
2d of May they asked Greene to give his views con
cerning the system of State supplies, and other
matters pertaining to the quartermaster's depart
ment. Greene had never received any replies to the
various communications he had made to Congress
during the last four months, and he felt much ag
grieved at its treatment of him. He replied to the
committee that he could not venture to give his
opinion on the matters in question until they had
made an inquiry into his past management of the
department. If they found it satisfactory in view of
the difficulties he had had to contend with, he would
cheerfully co-operate with them in any plans for the
future ; but if they found it otherwise, it would be
improper for them to ask or him to give any opinion
on the matters in question. The committee made a
temperate reply, asking him to consider the public
welfare and waive his application, and give them the
benefit of his abilities and experience in their de
liberations. But Greene felt that he had been badly
treated, and he was obstinate. He replied that he
must insist upon an examination of the general-
policy of his department, so that the suspicions

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL— SPRINGFIELD. 137
which had been scattered broadcast might be re
moved. Until that was done he declined to act with
the committee, and in any event he would refuse to
serve under the orders of any superintending board,
except the Board of War or a committee of Congress.
The committee made no written reply. Doubtless
Washington and Schuyler, for whom Greene had
great regard, persuaded him in conversation that his
position was untenable, for he soon after came into
friendly relations with the committee, all of whom
became warmly attached to him, and a few weeks
later certified their full approval of his management
of the department. He went to work with them in
the heartiest manner, assisting them in their investi
gations, and honestly striving to work out some sys
tem for the improvement of the business.
Just as these pleasant relations were established,
however, came another insulting letter from the
Treasury Board about his accounts. He was ordered
to send in his accounts before the end of the month,
or be " published and prosecuted." Greene was
doing everything in his power to get prompt returns,
but his agents and subordinates were scattered from
Massachusetts to Georgia, and it was manifestly
impossible to get their returns in less than a month.
The tone of the order was designedly offensive.
Greene consulted Hamilton, who advised him to
write a mild reply, but he rejected the advice and
wrote them as sharply as possible. Another letter
came from them in June, and then he laid the whole
matter before Congress. His letter was dated June
19th, and with it he transmitted copies of- all his cor
respondence with the Treasury Board. This board
was attempting to. hold him individually and per-

138 GENERAL GREENE.
sonally responsible for any irregularities on the part
of his subordinates in expending public money. He
calls this a "strange, new, and unexpected doctrine,"
argues at length against the propriety or possibility
of enforcing it, and flatly refuses to submit to it.
"The duties of this office are very complex, exten
sive, and extremely disagreeable in the best state of
things, from the great variety of tempers, characters,
and applications attending it ; but when these are
multiplied by improper restriction, accompanied with
orders from different boards, which in the nature of
things can not be conformed to, the business becomes
intolerable ; nor do I choose to contend with such a
complication of difficulties.
'' I hold the office of quartermaster general not
of choice, but with a view of obliging the public, and
I can not think of exposing myself to so many un
necessary embarrassments and mortifications as beset
me in my present standing.
" I beg Congress to give me their sense of the
matter, without which 1 can not proceed further in
the business."
Congress referred this letter to a committee com
posed of Ellsworth, Duane, and Madison. They con
sidered it for a month, and then on July 24th re
ported a resolution, which was adopted, in which the
doctrine of the Treasury Board in regard to respon
sibility is upheld as a general principle ; but they.
say that as " abuses and frauds may possibly happen
notwithstanding all the customary precautions, they
will determine on the circumstances as they arise,
and make such favorable allowances as justice may
require." This was a decision directly against Greene
in his controversy with the Treasury Board, and-

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL—SPRINGFIELD.

139

would undoubtedly have caused his resignation. But
several days before he received it he had already.
resigned in consequence of other action taken by
Congress. During the month of June Greene had a taste of
purely military duty which offered a pleasant break
in his long contest" with Congress about the quarter
master's department. The sufferings of the troops
for lack of food, clothing, and pay had caused a
mutiny among some of the regiments, and when the
British heard of this they sought to take advantage
of it. Knyphausen was therefore ordered to cross
from Staten Island to Elizabeth, about June 6th,
and advance toward Morristown. The militia were
called out, but there was no serious opposition to
his progress until he reached' the village of Spring
field, about half way between Elizabeth and Morris
town. Just back of this village is a broken country
known as the Short Hills, and here Washington was
posted with his army in compact formation, prepared
to receive an attack. The stories about mutinies
were evidently exaggerated, and Knyphausen retired
to Elizabeth. Soon afterward Clinton sailed into
New York Harbor, bringing with him about half of
the force that he had used in the capture of Charles
ton. Washington anticipated that Clinton would
make an attempt on the passes in the Highlands,
which were thinly garrisoned, and therefore, on June
21st, he moved in the direction of the Hudson, leav
ing Greene in command at Springfield with Maxwell's
and Stark's brigades, Lee's corps of light horse, and
the militia. His directions to Greene were "to
cover the country and the public stores." As soon

140

GENERAL GREENE.

as Clinton heard that Washington with the main
body had moved toward the north, he instructed
Knyphausen to make an attack on Greene's detach
ment at Springfield. Knyphausen did so on June
23d, with a force of about five thousand infantry, a
considerable body of cavalry, and fifteen or twenty
pieces of artillery.
This force moved in two columns on roads con
verging at Springfield, and when they arrived at this
village a very considerable skirmish ensued in which
Greene's loss was thirteen killed, forty-nine wounded,
and nine missing. After about an hour's fighting,
Knyphausen began to manoeuvre with the evident
intention of turning Greene's left flank ; whereupon
Greene moved backward about a mile and took a
strong position in the Short Hills, covering the
passes through which the roads led to Morristown.
In this position he waited and hoped for an attack,
but Knyphausen did not follow him. He contented
himself with setting fire to the houses in Springfield,
and then started in retreat tc Elizabeth. Greene
sent one of his brigades and the militia in puisuit,
but the retreat was made so rapidly that it was im
possible to overtake Knyphausen's force. He crossed
over to Staten Island during the night, and his ex
pedition thus came to an end. This was the last
fighting on the soil of New Jersey during the war.
About July 1st Greene joined Washington and the
main body of the army, which was posted in New
Jersey from Ramapo to Orange, waiting for develop
ments on the part of Clinton and the arrival of the
French fleet.

CHAPTER IX.
RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL — WEST
POINT — 1780.
This pleasant little military episode at Spring
field being over, Greene returned to his vexatious
struggle about the quartermaster's business. He
was waiting for a reply to his letter to Congress of
June 19th, protesting against the attempt of the
Treasury Board to hold him personally liable for any
malfeasance on the part of his subordinates. Mean
time he was in daily consultation with the committee,
composed of Schuyler, Matthews, and Peabody, who
had been sent to camp during the latter part of April
to examine the quartermaster's department and had
remained at headquarters ever since, moving from
point to point as Washington moved. They had
spent two months in studying the problem of sup
plies and gaining the information necessary to make
an intelligent report on the subject of their investi
gations. Matthews, who had come to camp strongly
prejudiced against Greene, had now conceived a
great admiration for him, and the committee was
about ready to adopt a plan for the quartermaster's
department which had been proposed by Washington,
Schuyler, and Greene, and as a part of which Greene
had insisted that his compensation should be nothing
but reimbursement of his actual expenses. Congress,

142 GENERAL GREENE.
however, after sending this committee to camp, did
not in any way relax its own consideration of the
subject, nor wait for reports from its committee. It
was daily deliberating upon its own plan for the
quartermaster's department, and it finally adopted
this on July 15th. It was quite lengthy, and it had
to be printed, so that it did not reach Washington in
camp until July 26th. On the ioth of July, however,
the French fleet arrived at Newport with the first di
vision of the French army, amounting to more than
five thousand men, under Rochambeau. Heath, who
had succeeded Gates in the command of Providence,
sent a messenger post-haste to Washington with the
news, and he arrived at Washington's headquarters
at Preakness, in Bergen County, New Jersey, on the
14th of July. Washington, with that promptness
which characterized him in all emergencies of this
kind, instantly made his plans for a prompt move
ment, in connection with the. French forces, designed
to capture New York. He sent Lafayette with letters
to Rochambeau, and on the very day that Heath's
messenger arrived he wrote to Greene, telling him to
make arrangements for the supply of about forty
thousand men, which it was expected would be used
in an attack upon New York. He told Greene to
apply to the States for the supplies in kind which
they were required to furnish under the recent plan
of Congress, and to make requisition on the Treasury
Board for cash to purchase such supplies as the
States were not bound to furnish, but which would
still be necessary. He also says : " I have been in
anxious expectation that some plan would be deter
mined upon for your department ; but as it has not
hitherto taken place, and as it is impossible to delay

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 143
its operations a moment longer, I have to desire that
you will yourself arrange it in some effectual man
ner to give dispatch and efficacy to your measures
equal to the emergency. Your knowledge and ex
perience in the business will be sufficient to direct
your conduct without my going into more particular
instructions." This order placed Greene in a very
embarrassing position. He had himself written to
Congress, stating substantially that, unless the pre
tensions of the Treasury Board were overruled, he
should resign. He knew that Congress was de
liberating upon a plan for the department, and he
had reason to suspect that it would be impossible
for him to act under it. There was a committee in
camp which was also considering the subject. While
all these matters were pending, Washington gave
him a positive order to regulate the department him
self in some manner, so that he could undertake an
expedition against New York. He therefore thought
it best to state his position clearly to Schuyler's com
mittee, which he did in a long letter of the same date-
July 14th — as Washington's order. At the same time
he determined to do everything in his power to com
ply with Washington's order, and on the 15th he wrote
to the governors of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania,
making requisitions for the stores in kind. On the
16th the committee in camp replied, stating that "
they agreed with him in his views concerning his
personal responsibility, and they took occasion to
say that, after having examined his arrangement of
the department, "we are convinced the measures^
you have taken and the principles on which these
measures were founded, were well calculated to pro
mote the service, and they fully evince your attention

144 GENERAL GREENE.
to the public interest." They refrained, however,
from expressing any opinion as to the conduct of his
subordinates. For the next week, Washington, the
committee, and Greene were all busy making plans
for the attack on New York, but on July 26th Wash
ington transmitted to Greene the copy which he had
just received of the plan adopted in Congress on the
15th for the government of the quartermaster's de
partment. It contained all the features which he
had protested against as cumbersome and impracti
cable, and it moreover deprived him of the services
of Colonel Pettit and Mr. Cox, the two deputies for
whose appointment he had expressly stipulated on
taking the office, two and a half years before. Greene
decided instantly that he would not hold the office
under this plan, and he sat down on the same day
that it was communicated to him and wrote his resig
nation. Its language was peremptory, and was not
altogether fitting. He felt so injured that he failed
to keep his temper. He said : " I do not choose to
attempt an experiment of so dangerous a nature where
I see a physical impossibility of performing the duties
that will be required of me. Wherefore I request
that Congress will appoint another quartermaster
general without loss of time, as I shall give no order
in the business further than to acquaint the deputies
with the new system, and direct them to close their
accounts up to the first of August coming.
" It is unnecessary for me to go into the genera}
objections I have to this plan. It is sufficient to say
that my feelings are injured, and that the officers
necessary to conduct the business are not allowed;;
nor is proper provision made for some of those that
are. There is but one assistant quartermaster general,

RESIGNS AS' QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. '145
who is to reside near Congress, and one deputy for
the main army allowed in the system. Whoever has
the least knowledge of the business in this office, and
the field duty which is to be done, must be fully con
vinced that it is impossible to perform it without
much more assistance than is allowed in the present
arrangement. . . . Systems without agents are use
less things, and the probability of getting the one
should be taken into consideration in framing the
other. Administration seem to think it far less im
portant to the public interest to have this depart
ment well filled and properly arranged than it really
is, and as they will find it by future experience. . . .
My rank is high in the line of the army, and the
sacrifices I have made on this account, together with
the fatigue and anxiety I have undergone, far over
balance all the emoluments I have received from the
appointment. Nor would double the consideration
induce me to tread the same path over again, unless
I saw it necessary to preserve my country from entire
ruin and a disgraceful servitude."
Greene sent a copy of this letter to the represent
atives of Congress in camp, and also to Washington.
Washington made no written reply, but the commit
tee consulted with him and wrote to Greene as fol
lows : " . , . We are perfectly in sentiment with him
'that your declining to act at present will be produc
tive of such a scene of confusion and distress that it
will be impossible to remedy the evil or to reduce
the business to a proper channel during the remain
der of the campaign ' ; we have therefore most ear- *
nestly to entreat that you will continue to direct the
department until the sense of Congress can be ob
tained on your letter of the 26th, and on ours of yes-

146 GENERAL GREENE.
terday ; but, as you positively decline acting under
the plan established by Congress on the 15th inst,
which has been officially handed to you by the com
mander in chief, and as the consequences which we
have stated must inevitably follow, and probably be
extended to eradicate every hope which the country
entertains of an efficient operation against the enemy
in conjunction with the force of our ally, we conceive
it indispensably our duty, from these considerations,
to require of you to continue the direction of the
quartermaster general's department under the order
of the commander in chief, as signified in his order
to you of the 14th, and on the conditions stated in
our letter of the 16th, until the further pleasure of
Congress can be known ; and we undertake to justify
you for acting in consequence of this requisition, and
will submit our conduct on this occasion to the judg
ment of Congress."
It was undoubtedly a most unfortunate time for
such a change to take place. Clinton had started
toward Newport with the view of attacking the
French forces, and, as a counter move, Washington
was just drawing up orders for a demonstration on
his part against New York. The troops were to
cross the Hudson River the following day and move
down toward Kingsbridge. These considerations,
and the support which the committee promised him
in their letter, induced Greene to continue the busi
ness for ten days longer. Meantime his resignation
was on its way toward Philadelphia, and it was fol
lowed by two letters — one from Washington and one
from Schuyler's committee — in which it was stated
that " unless effectual measures are immediately taken
to induce General Greene and the other principal offi*

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 147
cers of that department to continue their services,
there must of necessity be a total stagnation of mili
tary business. We not only must cease from the
preparations for the campaign, but in all probability
shall be obliged to disperse, if not disband, the' army
for want of subsistence."
Greene's letter of resignation reached Congress
on Saturday, July 29th, and was referred to a com
mittee to report on the following Monday. When
Congress met on that day, the letters from Wash
ington and their own committee were laid before
them. Congress was in a rage, and its wrath was
increased by the fact that its own committee in camp
seemed to agree with Greene. There was a very hot
discussion, and then Greene's letter was sent back to
the committee, which brought in its report the fol
lowing day, and recommended the passage of these
resolutions :
" That General Greene's refusal be accepted.
"That General Washington be empowered and
directed to appoint a quartermaster general.
" That General Greene be acquainted that Con
gress have no further service for him."
Greene stood too high, however, in public estima
tion to be turned out in this summary fashion. The
report of the committee was taken up and debated
every day for a week, but no action was had upon
it. Finally, on August 5th, this resolution was
passed: "That the absolute refusal of Major-Gen-
eral Greene at this important crisis to act under the
new arrangement of the quartermaster general's de- #
partment has made it necessary that the office of
quartermaster general be immediately filled." They
therefore proceeded to elect Pickering as quarter-

148 GENERAL GREENE.
master general, with the rank of colonel and the pay
of a brigadier general, over and above his pay of one
hundred and fifty-six dollars per month (in specie) as
quartermaster general.
The feeling against the committee'was almost as
strong as against Greene. On August 2d a resolu
tion was passed saying that the question of the
quartermaster general's responsibility had been de
termined by Congress, " and, as the committee knew
that the quartermaster general has requested the
sense of Congress on so important a subject, they
ought not to have interfered therein." A few days
later Congress passed a resolution discharging the
committee from any further attendance in camp and
directing them to immediately report their proceedr
ings to Congress.
Among the members of Congress who had been
instrumental in forming the new system was Joseph
Jones, of Virginia, who wrote to Washington on the
7th of August, giving a statement of the case, saying
that Congress was greatly perplexed at Greene's re
fusal, and that " if General Greene thought the new
system wanted amendment and had pointed out the
defects, Congress would have considered the matter,"
and perhaps have made the necessary alterations ; but,
he went on to say, " the manner of these demands *
made in such peremptory terms, at the moment of
action, when the campaign was opened, the enemy
in the field, and our ally waiting for co-operation, has
lessened General Greene not only in the opinion oif
Congress, but, I think, of the public, and I question
whether it will terminate with the acceptance of his
refusal only."
This threat of summary measures against Greene

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 145
gave Washington an opportunity, which he quickly
seized, to express his own views on the matter. Re
ferring to the intimation contained in Jones's letter,
he says : " Let me beseech you to consider well what
you are about before you resolve. I shall neither
condemn nor acquit General Greene's conduct for
the act of resignation, because all the antecedent
correspondence is necessary to form a right judg
ment of the matter, and possibly, if the account? is
e^er brought before the public, you may find him
treading on better ground that you seem to imagine;
but this by the bye. My sole aim at present is to ad
vertise you of what I think would be the consequences
of suspending him from his command in the line (a
matter distinct from the other) without a proper
trial. A procedure of this kind must touch the feel
ings of every officer. It will show in a conspicuous
point of view the uncertain tenure by which they hold
their commissions. In a Word, it will exhibit such a
specimen of power, that I question much if there is
an officer in the whole line that will hold a commis
sion beyond the end of the campaign, if he does till
then. Such an act in the most despotic Government
would be attended at least with loud complaints. . . .
Each will ask himself this question : If Congress, by
its mere fiat, without inquiry and without trial, will
suspend an officer to-day, and an officer of such high
rank, may it not be my turn to-morrow ? and ought I
to put it in the power of any man or body of men to
sport with my commission and character, and lay me
under the necessity of tamely acquiescing, or, by an*
appeal to the public, exposing matters which must be
injurious to its interests ? . . . Suffer not, my friend,
if it is within the powers of your ability to prevent

150 GENERAL GREENE.
it, so disagreeable an event to take place. I do not
mean to justify, to countenance, or excuse in the
most distant degree any expressions of disrespect
which the gentleman in question, if he has used any,
may have offered to Congress, no more than I do any
unreasonable matters he may have required respecting
the quartermaster general's department; but, as I
have already observed, my letter is to prevent his sus
pension, because I fear, because I feel, that it must
lead to very disagreeable and injurious consequences.
General Greene has his numerous friends out of the
army as well as in it ; and, from his character and
consideration in the world, he might not, when he
felt himself wounded in so summary a way, withhold
himself from a discussion that could not, at best,
promote the public cause. As a military officer he
stands very fair, and very deservedly so, in the opin
ion of all his acquaintance. These sentiments are
the result of my own reflections, and I hasten to in
form you of them. I do not know that General
Greene has ever heard of the matter, and I hope he
never may ; nor am I acquainted with the opinion of
a single officer in the whole army upon the subject,
nor will any tone be given by me. It is my wish to
prevent the proceeding; for sure I am that it can
not be brought to a happy issue if it takes place."
Whether Greene's enemies in Congress could in
any case have mustered enough votes to pass the
proposed resolution dismissing him from the service
is very doubtful ; after the receipt of this letter from
Washington it was not even attempted. The resolu?
tions were never acted upon, and the resentment
gradually simmered away to nothing.
The demonstration against New York made by

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 15 r
Washington on the 27th had been sufficient to recall
Clinton with his troops to New York, but Howe's fleet
went on to Newport and blockaded the French fleet
there. Pending the arrival of the second division,
the French fleet was inferior to the British, and De
Ternay did not feel strong enough to risk an engage
ment. Rochambeau also did not consider his force suf
ficient to attempt any land operations. Washington
certainly had not men enough to attack New York.
The prospect of active operations held out in Wash-'
ington's letter of July 14th to Greene was therefore
postponed, pending the arrival of the second division
of the French fleet. Washington moved the greater
part of his army back to the west side of the Hud
son, and established works on both sides "at Dobb's
Ferry. His headquarters were first at Orange, and
then at Tappan, where he remained until September
1 8th, when he set out for Hartford to have a personal
conference with Rochambeau.
Meanwhile Greene had to continue to act as
quartermaster general, against his protests. He had
agreed with the committee to serve for ten days
from July 26th, the date of his resignation. He had
issued circulars to all his subordinates to send in
their accounts and close up their business. The ten
days came to an end and nothing had been done.
He asked Washington, on August 5th, to " take meas
ures for relieving me as soon as possible from the
disagreeable predicament I am in " ; and he also
asked Washington for his opinion on his conduct in
the management of the quartermaster's department.
Washington replied : " When you quit the department
I shall be happy to give you my sense of your con
duct, and I am persuaded it will be such as will be

152 GENERAL GREENE.
entirely satisfactory '' ; he said, however, that Greene
must not leave the department until it was known
what action Congress took on the letters from Wash
ington and the committee, which were forwarded
the day after Greene's resignation. On August ioth
it was learned that these letters had angered Conr
gress almost as much as Greene's resignation, and
that Pickering had been appointed quartermaster
general. Washington quietly comments on this as
follows : " Whether he will be supplied with the
means of procuring what is necessary in the depart
ment, or whether the new system is calculated to
produce them, is yet to be known." The same
messenger brought the letter of Joseph Jones, to
which Washington replied on the 13th in the lan
guage already quoted. And on the 15th he. gives
Greene his opinion of his administration. The letter
is a model for conciseness and temperate approba
tion, and it is given in full : "As you are retiring
from the office of quartermaster general, and have
requested my sense of your conduct and services
while you acted in it, I shall give it to you with the
greatest cheerfulness and pleasure. You have con
ducted the various duties of it with capacity and
diligence, entirely to my satisfaction, and, as far as I
have had an opportunity of knowing, with the
strictest integrity. When you were prevailed upon
to undertake the office, in March, 1778, it was in
great disorder and confusion, and by extraordinary
exertions you so arranged it as to enable the army
to take the field the moment it was necessary, and to
move with rapidity after the enemy when they left
Philadelphia. From that period to the present time
your exertions have been equally great. They have

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 153
appeared to me to be the result of system, and to
have been well calculated to promote the interest
and honor of your country. In fine, I can not but
add that the States have had in you, in my opinion,
an able, upright, and diligent servant."
Pickering was expected in a few days, and Greene
therefore continued to act as quartermaster general
without asking for further instructions. The few
days, however, proved to- be six weeks, and it was
not until September 30th that he was finally relieved
of this office. In the meantime the condition of the
army grew worse instead of better. The plan of ob
taining supplies in kind from the States was a total
failure, and on August 20th Washington was obliged
to write to Congress that he would have to dismiss
the militia which were assembling, " or let them come
forward to starve, which it will be extremely difficult-
for the troops already in the field to avoid." As
there was almost nothing in camp to eat, for either
men or animals, i became necessary to organize a
raid and collect supplies from the Tory inhabitants
along the west side of the Hudson opposite New
York. As it was to be made in face of Clinton's
army, a considerable force was necessary, and four
brigades were detailed on August 24th, under Greene's
orders. The raid was successful, and collected enough
food to last about a month ; but it led to unauthor
ized plundering, which Greene promptly suppressed.
He asked Washington's authority to hang two of
the culprits, and, on receiving it, he promptly did so.
On the 12th of September Washington received the >
news of Gates's total defeat at Camden, S. C, and he
determined to go to Hartford to meet Rochambeau
and decide upon, a plan for future operations. He

154 GENERAL GREENE.
started on the 18th, leaving Greene in command of
the army at Tappan. In his instructions to Greene
he said : " I have such entire confidence in your
prudence and abilities that I leave the conduct of
it to your discretion, with only one observation:
that with our present prospects it is not our business
to seek an action, or accept one, but upon advan
tageous terms."
Nothing of consequence transpired at headquar
ters during the week that Washington was absent,
Greene's principal occupation was in sending out
foraging parties to collect food and save the army
from starving. About midnight on September 25th
he received a letter from Hamilton, dated at Ver-
planck's Point that afternoon, and reading as follows :
" There has just been unfolded at this place a scene
of the blackest treason. Arnold has fled to the enemy.
Andr6, the British adjutant general, is in our pos
session as a spy. His capture unraveled the mystery.
West Point was to have been the sacrifice. All -the
dispositions have been made for the purpose,' and 'tis
possible, though not probable, to-night may see the
execution. The wind is fair. I came here in pursuit
of Arnold, but was too late. I advise' you putting
the army under marching orders, and detaching' a
brigade immediately this way."
It was a dark night, and the rain was falling fast ;
but if the Hudson, quietly flowing past Greene's tent,
had suddenly burst into flames, it would have been
less startling than this astounding piece of news.
Greene instantly issued the orders which Hamilton
had suggested, and then started a messenger to Con
gress with a copy of Hamilton's letter. ' At three
o'clock in the night the army was paraded, and the

RESIGNS AS. QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 155
Pennsylvania brigade began its march up the river.
A few minutes later came a letter from Washington,
dated at Robinson's house at seven o'clock on the
previous evening, directing him to march the left
wing of the army to King's Ferry, and to hold the
rest in readiness to march at a moment's notice.
Greene replied that these dispositions had already
been taken on the receipt of Hamilton's note. He
waited for further orders, but none came until the
next day, September 27th, when he received word
from Washington that Andr6 and Smith had been
sent to camp, and that Andr6 was to be kept in a
decent room and " be treated with civility, but that
he be so guarded as to preclude the possibility of his
escaping." Washington had meanwhile taken other
steps for the security of West Point, and on the 28th
he arrived at headquarters at Tappan. Greene felt
almost a personal shame at Arnold's treason. In a
letter to his wife, on the 29th, describing the event,
he says: " My pride and feelings are greatly hurt at
the infamy of this man's conduct. Arnold being an
American and a New Englander, and of the rank of.
major general, are. all mortifying circumstances.
The event will be a reproach to us to the latest
posterity. Curse on his folly arid. perfidy." On the
29th Washington resumed command of the army,
and appointed a court, of which Greene was presi
dent, for the consideration of Andrews case. It was
composed of six major generals : Greene, Stirling,
St. Clair, Lafayette, R. Howe, and Steuben ; and eight
brigadiers : Parsons, J. Clinton, Knox, Glover, Pater-
son, Hand, Huntingdon, and Stark. Colonel John
Lawrence was judge advocate.
Greene's careful study of Vattel now stood him

156 GENERAL GREENE.
in good stead against the pretensions that Andre"
was protected by Arnold's flag of truce. This
claim was not indeed raised by Andre, but by Clin
ton, in a letter to Washington which was laid before
the court. Andre told his story briefly. No wit
nesses were examined. The court was cleared in
the usual manner and the case considered. Begin
ning with the junior member, each in turn voted
that Andre be considered as a spy and that he suffer
death. The opinion of the court was written out,
and Greene signed it as president and handed it to
Washington. On the following day, September 30th,
Washington approved it, and ordered that Andre be
executed at 5 p.m. on October 1st. But on the 30th
Washington had informed Clinton of the conclusions
of the court, and Clinton instantly replied, saying
that he had sent Lieutenant-General Robertson,
Lieutenant-Governor Elliot, and Chief-Justice Smith
to make a statement of the case, and he asked a
hearing for them. Washington suspended" the exe
cution, and directed Greene to receive them at Dobb's
Ferry. Greene met their barge at the water's edge
on the afternoon of October 1st. He refused to
allow any one but General Robertson to land, and he
informed him that by Washington's order he met
him as a private gentleman only, and not as an
officer. Robertson endeavored to persuade Greene
that Andre was acting under a flag of truce, but
Greene replied that that question had been con
sidered fully by the court and decided in the nega
tive. Robertson then proposed that the question
should be submitted to " disinterested gentlemen of
knowledge of the law of war and nations," and sug
gested Knyphausen and Rochambeau as such arbi-

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 157
trators ; but Greene declared that the' deliberate
decision of a competent tribunal could not be over
ruled in this fashion. Robertson then submitted a
letter from Arnold justifying Andrews course — prob
ably the most consummately impudent letter ever
written. It is said that Greene read it and then
threw it contemptuously on the ground. The inter
view lasted till nearly nightfall, and without any
result. Then Robertson asked Greene to " represent
my arguments to General Washington in the fairest
light." Greene willingly promised to do so, and
they parted, Greene riding back to Washington's
headquarters at Tappan, and Robertson returning to
his schooner anchored off Dobb's Ferry. On the
following morning Greene wrote to Robertson :
"Agreeably to your request, I communicated to
General Washington the substance of your conversa
tion in all the particulars so far as my memory
.served me. It made no alteration in his opinion and
determination. I need say no more after what you
have already been informed."
At noon on the same day, October 2d, a part of
the American army was paraded under command of
Greene, and in their presence Andr6 was taken out
and hanged.
On the 30th of September, Pickering having ar
rived at camp, Washington issued an order announc
ing to the army his appointment as quartermaster
general. In the same order he thanked Greene " for
the able and satisfactory manner in which he had
discharged the duties of that office." Greene was
thus at last freed from this vexatious business, and
with a light heart he returned to the congenial
duties of the line. He was beyond question the

158 GENERAL GREENE.
most efficient quartermaster general of the war.
With the slender resources placed at his command
by a Congress which, whatever its virtues in other
directions, was wholly lacking in administrative
capacity, he accomplished far more than his pre
decessor Mifflin or his successor Pickering. Wash
ington said deliberately that he had performed the
duties " entirely to my satisfaction," and nothing need
be added to this. But, as Greene wrote Knox in the
beginning, he hated the place ; and he never over
came his repugnance to it. When, instead of grati
tude for what he considered a great sacrifice on his
part, he met criticism for defects beyond his control,
and insinuations that he was holding the place from
mercenary motives, he began the long contest with
Congress which resulted in his peremptorily refusing
to serve any longer. His manner of doing this was
lacking in dignity. But for the fact that Washington
so strongly urged him to take the place, and put
the matter before him in the light of a public duty,
it was a mistake for him ever to have taken it at all.
Having taken it, and found it even more distasteful
than he anticipated, he should have resigned at the
end of the first campaign — in December, 1778 — when
he first learned from his friend Henry Marchant of
the criticisms that were being made upon his admin
istration by a faction in Congress. If he felt it his
duty to continue in office for another campaign, he
was fully absolved from this by the cavalier treat
ment which he received from Congress when it re
fused to answer his respectful, courteous, and most
important letters of December, 1779, and January,
1780. A simple and positive letter, of resignation
would then have freed him from the office without

RESIGNS AS QUARTERMASTER GENERAL. 159
giving the slightest cause for adverse comment. But
he so often spoke of resigning, that he gave color to
the belief that he was only making threats of resig
nation for the purpose of compelling the adoption of
his own views in regard to the method of administra
tion. After six months of wrangling, he finally had
to resign just at a time when an important movement
of the army was thought to be imminent. As to the
manner of his resignation and the tone of his letters,
Washington felt obliged to refrain from expressing
any opinion. He could hardly fail to disapprove
them, for they were very different from those which
he himself adopted, though he had more than once
as great, if not greater, cause for resentment.
But though his exit was not as dignified as might
have been wished, he was at last out of the place,
and he at once sought a regular command in the
line. On the 5th of October he applied for the com
mand at West Point, and Washington immediately
granted it, only taking occasion to observe, that it
would not be an independent command, as he himself
would probably make his headquarters in that
vicinity. Greene accepted, and on October 7th be
gan his march up the Hudson with two divisions.
He set to work to complete the fortifications at
West Point and place the garrisons in them. But
he had been at West Point less, than a week when
Washington received from Congress a copy of
their resolution of October 6th, directing him to
order a court of inquiry on General Gates for his
conduct at Camden, and also to appoint a successor
to Gates. The same messenger brought a letter
from Mr. Matthews (the same whp had been on the
committee of the previous spring to investigate the

l6o GENERAL GREENE.
quartermaster's department), saying that he was
authorized to communicate the wish of the delegates
-of the three Southern States that Greene should be
selected for this command. Washington had wanted
to send Greene there for more than a year, but the
selection had never before been left to his discretion.
Now that he had the authority, and especially since
the choice of the Southern delegates was the same as
his own, he lost no time in exercising it. On the
14th he offered the command to Greene in a letter
full of good wishes, and Greene immediately accepted
it. As he had been away from home (except for two
weeks after the Rhode Island expedition of 1778)
for more than five years, and was now going still
farther away, he asked for a short leave in order to
arrange his private affairs ; but when Washington ex
plained the necessity of his immediate presence in
the South he withdrew his application. He, however,
hoped that his wife, who was planning to make him
a visit, would arrive before he started. But in this
he was disappointed. She was already on the way,
but her journey was delayed, and it was not the day
of telegrams and limited expresses. He felt unable
to wait longer than the 20th, and on that day, after
writing a most affectionate farewell to her, he set
out for Washington's headquarters at Preakness, in
Bergen County, N. J. Here, on the 22d, he received
his instructions from Washington, and went on to
Philadelphia, where, on the 30th, Congress by special
resolution ratified his appointment, and invested him
with very extensive powers as commander in chief of
the Southern army.

CHAPTER X.
TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY — 1780.
For more than five years Greene had been at
Washington's right hand. He had been in every
battle in which Washington had commanded, with
the single exception of White Plains. Washington
had detached him occasionally, as at Fort Washing
ton, Mount Holly, Newport, and Springfield ; but he
had declined all requests to have him go far away
or remain long. Greene had become the chief sub
ordinate, in whom Washington placed his principal
reliance. His first object had always been to strive
to understand Washington's plans and wishes, and
to support and execute them with all the devotion of
a thoroughly loyal nature. Washington had grown
to appreciate fully the merit of such a steadfast sub
ordinate, and he had the most complete confidence
in his judgment and ability. Now this intimate as
sociation was to come to an end. Greene was to be
transferred to a distant theatre, where he was to act
on his own responsibility. For the greater part of
the next year Washington was to be inactive ; the
fighting and marching were to be done under
Greene's sole command, and his responsibility was1"
for the time to be scarcely if at all inferior to that
of Washington himself.
In order to explain the condition of affairs at the

1 62 GENERAL GREENE.
South when Greene took command, it is necessary
to state as briefly as possible what had taken place
there previous to his arrival. The war opened at
the South with a skirmish between loyalists and
State militia at Moore's Creek, near Wilmington,
N. C, on February 26, 1776, which had the same
relative importance in that region as the battle of
Lexington at the North. The loyalists were de
feated. At this time two bodies of British troops
were on their way to invade the Carolinas : one
was coming from Boston, and consisted of about
two thousand regulars under command of Clinton,
who had come out from England in the previous
autumn as lieutenant general under Sir William
Howe ; the other was of about equal strength, and
consisted of seven regiments under Earl Cornwallis.
It left England under a convoy of ten ships, com
manded by Commodore Parker. These two forces
met at the mouth of the Cape Fear River early in
May, 1776. But the militia had turned out in such
large numbers, as a result of the victory at Moore's
Creek, that Clinton deemed it imprudent to land in
that vicinity, and he therefore sailed southward, with
the intention of taking Charleston first and Savan
nah next. In attempting to reduce Fort Moultrie,
in Charleston Harbor, on June 28th, Clinton met with
defeat. His troops were unable to land, the fleet
lost over two hundred in killed and wounded, and
the ships were badly damaged. After making such
temporary repairs as were possible, the whole expe
dition returned to the North, arriving at New York
in time for the troops of Clinton and Cornwallis to
take part in the battle of Long Island.
During the next two years, which were the most

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 163
active years of the war at the North, nothing was
done at the South. Then Clinton determined to
transfer the war again to the South in the hope of
better success ; and accordingly, in the autumn of
1778, a part of the garrison of Newport was with
drawn, and a force consisting of over three thousand
troops, under Colonel Campbell, was sent to Savan
nah. General Robert Howe then commanded the
American troops in the South, but he had only about
twelve hundred men, more than half of whom were
militia. Campbell made short work of him at Sa
vannah, on December 29th — defeated him badly,
captured all his stores and guns and about half of
his men, and took possession of the town. He soon
afterward took Augusta, and all resistance in Georgia
was for the moment at an end.
General Benjamin Lincoln was then sent to the
South to supersede Howe. He arrived at Charles
ton at the end of the year, and soon raised a force
of about two thousand militia and six hundred Con
tinentals. The greater part of these were sent under
General Ashe to threaten Augusta, but in an engage
ment which took place at Brier Creek on March 3,
1779, Ashe was disastrously defeated and most of his
force dispersed.
Lincoln, however, succeeded in calling out more
militia, and began another movement against Augus
ta ; whereupon the British marched toward Charles
ton, which caused Lincoln to retrace his steps, and
after considerable marching and a slight skirmish
each side returned to its former positions — the Brit*
ish along the line of the Savannah River, with an
outpost at Beaufort, and the Americans at Charles
ton. In September, 1779, the French fleet under

I64 GENERAL GREENE.
D'Estaing which, during the year since the attack
on Newport had been cruising in the West Indies,
appeared off the Southern coast, and a plan was
made for a combined attack by land and sea on Sa
vannah. After a three weeks' siege an assault was
made on October 9th, but without success. The
British lost only fifty-five men, and the allies more
than one thousand, Pulaski being among the killed.
D'Estaing then sailed off to France with the greater
part of his fleet, sending the rest to the West Indies.
As soon as Clinton at New York heard of this
affair, he thought the time had come for a decisive
blow at the South. He therefore withdrew the bal
ance of the garrison from Newport, and adding to
them a part of the troops in and around New York,
he formed a force of eight thousand men, and with
these he sailed in person for Savannah in December,
1779, taking Cornwallis with him. He immediately
sent orders for Lord Rawdon to follow him with three
thousand more men from New York, so that when all
the troops brought from New York were joined to
those already in the South, Clinton had between
thirteen thousand and fourteen thousand men. At
the same time Washington was hurrying forward re-
enforcements to Lincoln, but it was impossible to
increase his force much beyond seven thousand men.
Clinton started from Savannah in February to cap
ture Charleston. After a siege of over two months,
on May 12th, Lincoln surrendered with his entire
army of over two thousand Continentals and three
thousand five hundred militia. Clinton then- left
Cornwallis in command at the South with about five
thousand men, and returned to New York with the
rest of his force, arriving there, as we have seen,

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 165
just before the engagement at Springfield, in June,
1780. While the siege of Charleston was in progress
Washington had sent a re-enforcement of two thou
sand men under De Kalb to Lincoln's assistance,
but they had gone no farther than North Carolina
when Charleston fell. On receipt of this news, Con
gress, without consulting Washington, selected Gates,
on June 13th, to take command in the South. He
overtook De Kalb at Hillsborough, N. C, on July
19th. In the meantime Cornwallis had sent Raw
don to overrun the interior of South Carolina and
raise a Tory militia. Rawdon was now at Camden,'
S. C, a meeting-point of several important roads,
about one hundred and twenty miles north of Charles
ton and forty miles south of the North Carolina
line. Gates began his march for this point on July
27th, and Cornwallis left Charleston for the same
place about the same time. Gates arrived first, but
he lost the favorable moment for attacking Rawdon
before Cornwallis arrived. Gates had about -three
thousand men, of whom half were militia, and Corn
wallis had about two thousand, including Rawdon's
detachment, three fourths of whom were trained
soldiers. On the 16th of August the battle was
fought at Camden. Gates was ignominiously de
feated, and fled back to Hillsborough, one hundred
and sixty miles in rear ; Baron De Kalb was killed,
gallantly fighting to the last; the army was practi
cally annihilated.
The British had thus in four months more than
made up at the South what they had lost at the
North during the two years between Long Island
and Newport. Against the surrender of Burgoyne.

1 66 GENERAL GREENE.
they had matched the capture of Lincoln, and they
had offset the retreat from Pennsylvania and Jersey
by the subjugation of the two Carolinas and Georgia,
and the destruction of Gates's army.
Such was the situation when Greene was sent to
the South, not so much to take command as to create
an army. Within nine months from the time he ar
rived he had reconquered Georgia and the Carolinas
with the exception of Charleston and Savannah, and,
though defeated in several engagements, he had
manoeuvred Cornwallis into Virginia, where Wash
ington with extraordinary rapidity fell upon him
with the French army, and what was left of the Con
tinentals. Almost at the same instant Greene de
feated the remnant of the British army in South
Carolina at Eutaw Springs, and drove it into Charles
ton. These two events practically put an end to the
war, although the treaty of peace was not finally
signed until two years later.
Greene reached Washington's headquarters at
Preakness, N. J., on October 22d, and there Wash
ington gave him his instructions for the command
of the Southern army. They were meager enough.
" Uninformed as I am of the enemy's force in that
quarter, of our own, or of the resources which it will
be in our power to command for carrying on the war,
I can give you no particular instructions, but must
leave you to govern yourself entirely according to *
your own prudence and judgment and the circum
stances in which you find yourself. I am aware that
the nature of the command will offer you embarrass
ments of a singular and complicated nature, but I
rely upon your abilities and exertions for everything

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 167
your means will enable you to effect." More spe
cific instructions were given him in regard to the
inquiry he was to make into the conduct of Gates.
With these instructions and a letter to Congress,
and flattering letters of introduction to the Gov
ernors of the Southern States, Greene rode on to
Philadelphia. On the 27th of October he presented
Washington's letter to Congress, adding one of his
own, in which he says that it will be " my pride and
ambition to merit the approbation of Congress, and
I flatter myself that they will be charitably disposed
to make just allowance for the peculiar difficulties I
will have to contend with. ... I am conscious of
my deficiencies, but if I am clothed with proper
powers and receive the necessary support, I am not
altogether without hopes of prescribing some bounds
to the ravages of the enemy. ... At present I am
wholly unacquainted with the intentions of Congress
with respect to the plan and extent of the war they
mean to prosecute in the Southern Department, as
well as the number and condition of the troops they
mean to employ, or the States in which they are to
be levied." I am uninformed how they are to be
paid, fed, and clothed, through what channels the
quartermaster general's ordnance and hospital de
partments are to be supplied. I must request the
orders and information of Congress upon all these
points, and I will endeavor to make the most of the
means put into my hands." This letter was referred
to a committee of which his old friend Sullivan, now
a member of Congress, was at the head ; and two
days later Greene wrote more specifically to this
committee, giving estimates of articles required for
the various departments of his army.

1 68 GENERAL GREENE.
It was but little more than three months since
Congress, in a rage, had discussed the idea of sum
marily dismissing Greene from the army ; but now
he was very kindly received. On the 30th of Octo
ber they passed a series of resolutions, approving
his appointment, directing Steuben to accompany
him, specifying that his army was to consist of all
the regular troops raised or to be raised in the six
States from Delaware to Georgia inclusive, authoriz
ing him to call on the Legislatures and executives of.
these States for " men, clothing, money, arms, in^
trenching tools, provisions, and other aids and sup-1
plies," and requesting. these States to furnish them ;¦
and directing the heads of the staff departments to:
furnish him such articles as he could not obtain in
the South. All the powers granted to Gates in June
in reference to the appointment of officers and call
ing out the militia, were transferred to him, and to
these was added the power to effect exchanges of
prisoners. He was to " organize and employ the
army under his command in the manner he shall
judge most proper, subject to the control of the
commander in chief." As his field of operations was
over eight hundred miles from the latter's head
quarters, and there were no means of communication.
except by horses, this control was almost nominal.
In short, the entire military resources, such as they.
were, of six of the thirteen States were placed at his-
disposal ; and with them he was to raise and equip.
an army and fight the enemy in whatever way he
deemed best.
It is significant of the esteem in which Greene
was held by his companions in arms that so many of
the best men in the army sought the opportunity to;

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. r6o,
accompany him. Lafayette, Steuben, John' Laurens,
Henry Lee, and Dr. McHenry, afterward Secretary
of War, all applied to be ordered with him. La
fayette in particular wrote him the most affectionate
and flattering letters, asking "to have my fate united
with yours." For various reasons these requests
could not be granted, except in the cases of Steuben
and Lee. Steuben was sent with him to organize
and discipline the Southern army, as 'he had drilled-
the main army at Valley Forge three years before ;
and '" Light Horse Harry," the famous father of his-
still more famous son, Robert E. Lee, was sent to a
field where his talents as a cavalry leader would find
full scope. On . his arrival at the South Greene
found the most distinguished lot of partisan chiefs
which the war produced — Marion, Morgan, Sumter,
Pickens, and William Washington. He gave them
every opportunity to display their abilities, and never
did they achieve as much as during the six months
after his arrival ; so that what the army lacked in
men and resources" it partially made up in the superb
character of its chiefs.
Greene passed a short but busy week in Philadel
phia, trying to get arms from President Reed, of
Pennsylvania, clothing from Southern merchants,
and wagons from the quartermaster general. Then
leaving Colonel Feibiger with minute instructions
for forwarding supplies, and writing a last word to
Washington asking him to urge his wants unceas
ingly on Congress, so that they would not be for
gotten the moment he was' gone, he set out for his*
command on November 3d, in company with his two
aids and Steuben and the latter's genial secretary,
Duponceau. His first stop Was at Annapolis, where

170

GENERAL GREENE.

he arrived on the 7th. The Legislature was in session,
and he appeared before them in person, and also ad^
dressed them in writing, stating his wants and urging
the formation of a regular army, by means of a draft
if necessary. But he received little encouragement,
the Legislature having " neither money nor credit, andj
from the temper of the people, afraid to push matters
to extremity." From Annapolis he also wrote to the
Governor of Delaware, and appointed General Gist
to present his requisitions in person, urge them upon
the State, and forward all supplies that he could
collect. From Annapolis he continued his journey
southward, passing the afternoon and night of the
1 2th at Mount Vernon, whence Mrs. Washington
was just starting to pass the winter, as .usual, with her
husband. Both Steuben and himself were delighted
with the place and charmed with the reception they.
met. Greene wrote to Washington : " I don't won
der that you languish so often to return to the pleas
ures of domestic life. Nothing but the glory of
being commander in chief, and the happiness of
being universally admired, could compensate for such'
a sacrifice as you make." Thence he went on to
Fredericksburg, stopping at the home of his former
brigade commander, Weedon, who had fought so
gallantly with him at the Brandywine three years
before, and who was now absent in command of a
detachment of militia. On the 16th he arrived at
Richmond, and immediately entered into a long dis
cussion of the situation with Thomas Jefferson, who
was then Governor
The ideas of Greene and Jefferson on military
matters were naturally wide apart, and Greene there
fore had once more to plead the same arguments in

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. I?i
favor of a regular force that he had used so often
during the last five years. No one appreciated more
fully than Greene the value of the militia in its
proper place ; but he well knew that it was not the
proper instrument with which to carry on a long
war against the best troops of Europe' But though
Jefferson failed to see the deficiencies of the militia,
he did everything in his power to provide supplies
of clothing and wagons ; he met with only indiffer
ent success, however, because the State was without
financial resources, and the people were growing
tired of the war.
The arrival of General Leslie and his force from
New York * had spread considerable alarm through
out the State, and the militia had been called out and
placed under the orders of Muhlenberg and Weedon,
-who had commanded the brigades in Greene's di
vision in the campaign of 1777. Greene decided to
leave Steuben in Virginia, with instructions to or
ganize and command this force, to send on such
portion of it as could be spared, to collect and
forward supplies, and to keep open his communica
tions with the North. After remaining six days in
Richmond to arrange these matters, Greene con
tinued his journey on the 21st of November, and on
December 2d arrived at Gates's headquarters, near
Charlotte, N. C.
Gates had been his enemy throughout the war.
As Fiske well says : " In every campaign since the
beginning of the war Greene had been Washing
ton's right arm; and for indefatigable industry, for
strength and breadth of intelligence, and for un-
 —  . 
* See p. 182.

172

GENERAL GREENE.

selfish devotion to the public service, he was scarcely
inferior to the commander in chief." Greene being
Washington's most trusted subordinate, Gates had
intrigued against him on every possible occasion.
Now Greene's hour of revenge had come ; but he
treated his rival with a magnanimity which made
him his warm friend for the rest of his life. He
came with orders not only to supersede Gates in
command, but to put him on trial for his conduct at
Camden. Yet his first act was to issue an order in
which he " returns thanks to the honorable Major-
General Gates for the polite manner in which he has
introduced him to his command in the orders of
yesterday, and for his good wishes for the success of
the Southern army." The general officers necessary
for Gates's trial could not be spared at this time, and
Greene therefore postponed summoning the court ;
and as he studied the matter he came to the con
clusion that Gates was the victim of misfortune
rather than fault. He therefore reported to Wash
ington that a council of war was of opinion that the
court of inquiry could not be assembled without
manifest injury to the service ; he allowed Gates to
proceed to Philadelphia and report to Congress and
the commander in chief for orders ; and he wrote to
members of Congress expressing the opinion that no
trial was necessary. None was ever held, and in.
August, 1782, Congress rescinded the resolution
ordering an inquiry into Gates's conduct, and re
stored him to a command in the army under Wash
ington at Newburg.
On assuming command of his army, Greene im
mediately called for returns, and from these he
learned that its strength on paper was twenty-three

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 173
'hundred and seven, of whom fourteen hundred and
eighty-two were present, and the whole number "fit
for duty, properly clothed and properly equipped, did
not amount to eight hundred men ! " The rest, as he
wrote to Jefferson, and also to Washington, were
"literally naked, . . . starving with cold and hunger,
without tents and equipage."
As already stated, his army was to be made up of
the Continental troops of the six States from Dela
ware to Georgia, and of such militia as he could
-raise in these States. By resolution of October 3,
1780, Congress had directed that the regular army,
from and after January 1, 1781, should consist of
four regiments of cavalry, four regiments of artillery,
forty-nine regiments of infantry, and one regiment
of artificers. Some slight changes in the proposed
organization were made at Washington's suggestion,
and, as finally agreed upon and ordered by resolu
tion of October 21st, each infantry regiment was to
consist of nine companies, and its strength was to
be thirty-six officers, forty-seven noncommissioned
officers, twenty-two musicians, and six hundred and
twelve rank and file. The quota of the six Southern
States was as follows :
Delaware  I regiment of infantry.
Maryland  5 regiments of infantry.
Virginia  8 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery, and 2 of
cavalry.
North Carolina. . 4 regiments of infantry.
South Carolina . . 2 regiments of infantry.
Georgia  1 regiment of infantry.
Total  21 regiments of infantry, 1 of artillery, and 2 of
cavalry.
•Or a total force of about fifteen thousand men.

174 GENERAL GREENE.
But all this was on paper. It was even more true
now than when Washington said it four years before,
that " there is a material difference between voting
battalions and raising men." Washington had about
seven thousand men in the Northern army, and
Greene had two thousand at the South ; the rest of
the forty thousand men called for by the resolutions
of Congress did not exist. The regiments of South
Carolina and Georgia had never been raised, and
nearly all the regiments of Virginia and North Caro
lina had been made prisoners at the fall of Charles
ton. The regiments of Delaware and Maryland had
marched from New Jersey to North Carolina, under
De Kalb, in the spring of 1780. They had formed
the Continental portion of Gates's army, and had
been in the disaster at Camden. What was left of
them constituted the eight hundred men fit for duty
when Greene took command.
The so-called Southern army, as Greene wrote to
Knox, was " rather a shadow than a substance, hav
ing only an imaginary existence." It was not only
deficient in numbers, but lacking in organization,
discipline, equipment, supplies, and everything that
constitutes an efficient force. The men had little or
no clothing, there were no wagons or other means of
transportation, there was but little ammunition, there
was no organized medical department, and there was
no ready money to purchase supplies ; the men were
dispirited by defeat, and they were in the habit of
going home when they felt so inclined and returning
at their pleasure. The outlook was in the last de
gree discouraging.
Nevertheless Greene was hopeful, and he imme
diately set to work to introduce some degree of order.

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY.

175

-His first step was to put a stop to men absenting
themselves without leave. A deserter was tried,
convicted, and hanged in the presence of the entire
force. He next put Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington
in charge of the quartermaster's department, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Davie in charge of the commissa
riat — both excellent appointments. Though their re
sources were slender, yet they soon contrived to keep
the army so far supplied that it was able to move.
Greene kept up an incessant correspondence with his
representatives in Virginia, Delaware, and Pennsyl
vania, urging them to forward men and supplies.
He made arrangements for collecting a- supply of
boats to transport his stores up and down the rivers,
and for another lot of boats to form an improvised
pontoon train, which was of the greatest value a few
months later in his rapid marches across the numer
ous rivers which run from the Alleghanies through
the Carolinas to the sea. His army was so destitute
of everything, that he was compelled in his corre
spondence to specify the urgent necessity of such
minor articles as boards, nails, and horseshoes.
Governor Rutledge, of South Carolina, came to
Greene's camp and passed some time with him, con
sulting how his State could render assistance. He
could do but little, as the State was completely occu
pied by British troops, and the Legislature could not
convene. But the Legislature of North Carolina was
in session, and Colonel Davie was sent to Governor
¦Nash with letters explaining fully the needs of the
patriot army. *
The situation of the troops at Charlotte did not
meet Greene's approval, as the surrounding country
was destitute of supplies; he therefore sent his

176 GENERAL GREENE.
engineer, Kosciusko, to reconnoiter down the Pedee
River and find a more eligible situation. He also
opened correspondence with the partisan chiefs
Marion, Pickens, and Sumter, with a view to. bringing
their operations under his control. As soon as Kos
ciusko made his report, and within two weeks of his
arrival, Greene issued his orders for moving to his
new camp at Cheraw, and, although the movement
was delayed by rains, he arrived there before the
end of the month. Meanwhile Steuben had been
doing everything possible in Virginia to forward
men to re-enforce Greene, but the first detachment
he intended to send refused to leave Virginia, and
they were discharged. Steuben succeeded, however,
in getting together another detachment numbering
four hundred and fifty-six men, enlisted for eighteen
-months, and they were started forward on December
14th. They arrived at the camp at Cheraw before
the end of the month ; and two weeks later Lee ar
rived with his legion, consisting of a little more than
three hundred picked men, partly cavalry and partly
infantry, in fine order. The arrival of these re-en
forcements brought Greene's army up to about three
thousand men, of whom perhaps two thirds were fit
for service. In addition to these were the irregular,
partisan troops of Marion, Pickens, and Sumter. It
is impossible to give any accurate statement of their
numbers, which varied from day to day. They were,
in fact, what has been denominated in recent years
under the more offensive term of guerrillas — farmers
one day and soldiers the next. Their principal
chiefs were commissioned as officers of militia and
authorized to raise as many men as they could, but
further than this they had no regular organization.

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY.

177

Marion operated in- the eastern part of the State, in
the swamps between the Pedee and Santee Rivers;
Pickens in the western part, between Ninety-Six and
Augusta ; and Sumter in the northwestern part, along
the Broad River and its branches. Having no regu
lar cavalry except the small body in Lee's legion,
Greene designed to use these partisan troops, so far
as he could control their actions, to gain informa
tion of the enemy's movements and to threaten and
harass their posts. The numbers of the three bodies
aggregated between five hundred and one thousand
men at different periods. In all, Greene had thus
between thirty-five hundred and four thousand men
at the opening of the campaign.
Opposed to Greene, in command of the British
army in the South, was Lieutenant-General Earl
Cornwallis, in many respects the best soldier that
England sent to America. He came out in 1775, and
served continuously for over six years, returning
home a few months sJter his surrender at Yorktown.
He subsequently attained great distinction during
-the seven years of his administration as Governor
General of India, and three years as Lord Lieutenant
of Ireland. He was four years older than Greene,
and was now just forty-two years of age. He had
been opposed to Greene in all the campaigns in New
York, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania, and had learned
to respect him thoroughly. In the Jerseys Corn
wallis had written : " Greene is as dangerous as
Washihgton ; he is vigilant, enterprising, and full of
•resources. With but little hope of gaining an advan
tage over him, I never feel secure when encamped
in his neighborhood."
Next in command to Cornwallis was Lord Raw-

¦178 GENERAL GREENE,
don, who also in after-life, as Earl of Moira and
Marquis of Hastings, was a famous governor general
of India. He was now only twenty-six years of age,
but he had had five years of unbroken service in
America, beginning at Boston as a captain in the
Sixty-third Foot. He had greatly distinguished him
self at Monmouth, and in the following autumn had
raised a regiment of provincials in New York, known
as the " Volunteers of Ireland," and had been com
missioned as colonel. With these and a considerable
body of British and Hessian troops he had followed
Clinton to Charleston, arriving there April 18th.
The third officer of importance on the British side
was Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, who also was a
youngster of twenty-six. He had come out as a
major of dragoons under Cornwallis, in the spring.
of 1776, and had been continuously in active service
ever since. He now commanded a force known as
the "British Legion," numbering about four hundred
and fifty men, and consisting, like Lee's Legion, of
infantry and cavalry. His memoirs are full of
vanity and egotism, but he possessed all the charac
teristics of a splendid partisan leader.
According to the returns in the British Record
Office, the effective force under Cornwallis's com
mand in December, 1780, numbered 7,384 in South
Carolina, 968 in Georgia, and 2,274 on their way
from Virginia to Charleston, under command of
General Leslie, making a total of 10,622. This
force consisted of two regiments of the Guards, the
Seventh, Sixteenth, Twenty-third, Thirty-third, Sixty-
third, Sixty-fourth, and Seventy-first (two battalions)
Regiments of the line, the -British Legion, the Hes
sian Yagers, and the regiment of Bose, a large de-

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 179
tachment of royal artillery, the Volunteers of Ireland,
De Lancey's and Cruger's battalions of New York
Loyalists, and several battalions of Tory militia
from North and South Carolina and Georgia.
On one side, therefore, was a force of regular
troops, small in numbers, but composed of the best
material in the British army, well trained, disciplined,
and equipped, and supplied with everything that an
ample military chest could purchase. Supporting
these was a numerous body of Tory militia. On the
other side was a force still smaller in numbers, com
posed principally of militia, deficient in every requi
site of a well-equipped force, without money, and
living on the country as best they could. On both
-sides were officers of the highest class — Greene,
Morgan, and Lee on one side, and Cornwallis, Raw
don, and Tarleton on the other. The numbers were
small, but the field of operations was immense, the
marches prodigious, the manoeuvring incessant. The
game was played with the greatest . skill on both
sides, and no campaign in American history has illus
trated the art of war in its highest branches more
fully than the campaign of 1781.
When Clinton went North, in June, 1780, after the
capture of Charleston, the instructions he gave Corn
wallis were to march into the interior of South Caro
lina, capture the province, and then move north
through North Carolina. He was to put down the
Revolution and re-establish the King's authority in
these two provinces ; and when this was done he
was to assist in a projected expedition up the Chesa
peake against Baltimore. •
In pursuance of this plan, Cornwallis overran the
State' soon after the fall of Charleston, and in the

l8o GENERAL GREENE.
month of June established a circular line of posts
on its western and northern borders, as follows : At
Augusta, on the Savannah River, Lieutenant-Colonel
Brown, with a detachment of militia ; at a small set
tlement called Ninety-Six, Lieutenant-Colonel Bal
four, with the Sixteenth Foot, three light companies
and three battalions of provincials ; at Rocky Mount,
on the Catawba, Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, with a
regiment of New York provincials and some South
Carolina militia ; at Camden, Lord Rawdon, with the
Twenty-third and Thirty-third Regiments, the Vol
unteers of Ireland, Tarleton's Legion, a detachment
of artillery, and two regiments of militia; at the
Cheraws, on the Great Pedee River, south of the
North Carolina line, Major McArthur, with the Sev
enty-first Regiment. There was a large garrison in
Charleston, consisting of the Seventh, Sixty-third,
and Sixty-fourth Regiments, two battalions of Hes
sians, and a detachment of artillery ; and there were
smaller garrisons on each flank at Georgetown and
Savannah. Having thus occupied the State with his troops,
Cornwallis returned to Charleston to put the civil
machinery in running order, and this occupied the
entire summer. There were no military movements
except the skirmishes with the partisan corps of
Marion, Sumter, and Pickens, until the advance of
Gates's army toward Camden, in August. Corn
wallis came up from Charleston to meet him, and
arrived just in time to take command in the battle
which ensued, but after defeating Gates he did not
pursue him ; he returned to Charleston to complete
the establishment of the civil government.
By the middle of September Cornwallis was ready

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 181
to begin the advance into North Carolina, and he
again came up to .Camden, bringing with him the
Seventh Regiment, and drawing in the Seventy-first
from the Cheraws ; otherwise the " frontier " posts
were not disturbed. Joining these two regiments
to the force under Rawdon at Camden, Cornwallis
marched across the State line and took possession of
Charlotte. His reception was far from what he an
ticipated. Mecklenburg County was a hotbed of pa
triots ; he found it difficult to collect supplies for his
troops, and the raising of a Tory militia in this vicin
ity was out of the question.
Early in October a serious disaster overtook
Cornwallis in the loss of one of his largest detach
ments. The communications between Ninety-Six,
Rocky Mount, and Camden were kept up by a corps
of light infantry and some militia, under command
of Major Ferguson, of the Seventy-first Regiment.
During the latter part of September seven American
colonels, each with his band or corps of one hundred
and fifty to two hundred men, mountaineers, back-
Woodsmen, and frontiersmen, well mounted on their
own horses, and armed with hunting rifles and such
swords as they could make out of domestic tools,
assembled on the western border of South Carolina
for the purpose of attacking Ferguson. They over
took him at King's Mountain on October 7th and
annihilated his force. Ferguson and two hundred
and twenty-five of his men were killed, one hundred
and sixty-three were wounded, and the rest (about-
seven hundred and twenty) were made prisoners. •
This was the first turn of the tide in favor of the
Americans at the South. For two years the current
had been strong against them, but now began a

1 82 GENERAL GREENE.
change. Cornwallis retreated from Charlotte as
soon as he heard of the disaster, somewhat precipe
tately, abandoning part of his baggage. He estab
lished his camp at Winnsborough, in rear of the cen
ter of his line of posts. Gates advanced to and
occupied Charlotte.
In the meantime the news of the British victory
at Camden had reached Clinton at New York, and,
supposing everything ready for Cornwallis's ad
vance northward, he detached twenty-three hundred
men under General Leslie and sent them to enter
Virginia at the mouth of the James River, and then.
advance to meet Cornwallis on his way north, or
make such other movements as Cornwallis might
direct. Their arrival caused great excitement in
Virginia. The militia were called out, and Steuben
was left at Richmond when Greene passed through,,
in November, on his way South to take command of
all the troops in the State and prevent Leslie from
cutting Greene's communications with the North.
But Cornwallis, as soon as he heard of Leslie's ar
rival in Virginia, sent orders to him to re-embark
and come to Charleston. On arriving there, on De
cember 13th, he found orders to join Cornwallis with
a part of his. force. Lack of wagons and horses pre
vented him from starting until December 30th. On
that day he began his march with two battalions of
Guards, the regiment of Bose, one hundred and
twenty Yagers, and a detachment of light dragoons;
— in all, fifteen hundred and thirty men.
With the arrival of Leslie's force Cornwallis had
more than ten thousand men under his command, and,
without disturbing the large garrison in Charleston
or the numerous posts on the " frontier," he intended

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 183
to form a marching army of about four thousand
men and resume his long-contemplated march into
North Carolina, which had been postponed from
various causes for more than six months, and had
then been interrupted by the defeat at King's Moun
tain and the retreat from Charlotte to Winnsborough.
But his plans were disarranged by Greene, who'
boldly took the initiative. On arriving at Charlotte,
Greene found that Gates had contemplated going
into winter quarters. But Greene had no such plans.
He intended to open a vigorous campaign just as
quickly as he could get his troops in hand. But, in
view of the disorganized condition of his army, he
thought that at first he could do nothing more than
organize a partisan warfare. Just before leaving
Philadelphia he had written to Washington, October
31st: " My first object will be to equip a flying army,
to consist of about eight hundred horse and one thou
sand infantry. This force, with the occasional aid of
the militia, will serve to confine the enemy in their
limits, and render it difficult for them to subsist in
the interior county. I see but little prospect of get
ting a force to contend with the enemy upon equal
grounds, and therefore must make the most of a kind
of partisan war until we can levy and equip a larger
force." With this idea in mind, immediately after
taking command, he resolved to divide his army,
small as it was, into two bodies, and on December
16th he issued the necessary orders. The first de
tachment, consisting of three hundred and twenty
infantry of the Maryland line, two hundred Virginia
militia, and Colonel William Washington's regiment
of light horse, numbering less than one hundred
men, was placed under Morgan's command. He was

1 84 GENERAL GREENE.
directed to cross the Catawba River, where he would
be joined by the partisan corps of Davidson and
Sumter. Morgan was instructed to use these forces,
and any that might join him from Georgia, against
the enemy on the west side of the Catawba, either
offensively or defensively, as he might deem best.
" The object of this detachment is to give protection
to that part of the country .and spirit up the. people,
to annoy the enemy in that quarter, to collect the pro
visions and forage out of their way." The second
detachment, consisting of the rest of the army, was
placed under command of General Huger, and di
rected to move down the Pedee River to the camp
which Kosciusko had selected at the mouth of Hick's
Creek, near the Cheraw hills. Greene accompanied
the main body.
Greene was probably well aware, from his study
of Turenne, of the military maxim against dividing a
force and exposing it to the risk of being beaten in
detail ; but he seems to have felt that in the present
instance there were imperative reasons which justified
the risk. He knew that Cornwallis designed to march
into North Carolina with his main body, leaving in
tact the garrisons in his numerous posts, and his only
chance of delaying Cornwallis's advance while he was
collecting his own army was in threatening these
posts. By sending Morgan beyond the Broad River
he threatened the important post of Ninety-Six, and
by advancing down the Pedee with Huger he made a
feint against Camden, and even against Charleston.
He also placed Huger in support of Marion, who was
raiding the country between the Pedee and Santee
rivers. As he expressed it, in a letter writteji on
January 24th to his old friend Varnum, now a mem:

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 185"
ber of Congress : " I am well satisfied with the move
ment. ... It makes the most of my inferior force,
for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds
him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. He can
not leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his
posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta would be exposed ;
and he can not chase Morgan far or prosecute his
views upon Virginia while I am here with the whole
open country before me." While he threatened
Charleston, however, he had no intention of really
marching in that direction, for he fully explained
how necessary it was for him to keep near the head
waters of the streams where they could be easily
crossed, and where the broken nature of the country
would enable his inferior force to make a stand.
Lower down, where the rivers were deep and the
country open, he would have no chance against
Cornwallis's superiority of force. But in order still
further to disconcert Cornwallis, he made his feint
against the posts on the seacoast as effective as pos
sible, and as soon as Lee arrived with his legion he
sent him to re-enforce Marion and try to capture
Georgetown by a sudden dash. He even contem
plated sending them, after making this attempt, en
tirely around the rear of Cornwallis to rejoin Morgan
on the Broad River. The attempt against George-:
town failed, but the general result of the division of
his force was just what Greene had desired. It ar
rested Cornwallis's march into North Carolina for
nearly a month, and caused him to divide his own
force. He could not go forward, leaving Morgan on
his flank. He therefore detached Tarleton with the
legion, the Seventh Regiment, one battalion of the
Seventy-first, and two pieces of artillery — in all about
13

1.86 GENERAL GREENE.
eleven hundred men — and directed hinTto cross the
Broad River and "push Morgan to the utmost."
These instructions were sent to Tarleton on January
2d, and in the same letter Cornwallis asked Tarleton
whether he thought that the moving of the whole or
any part of the main body could be of use. At the
same time he directed Leslie, instead of taking the
direct route up the Congaree to Winnsborough, to
follow the Wateree to Camden, so as to be prepared
to meet any movements that Greene might make in
that direction,
Greene's action in dividing his little force and
threatening both of Cornwallis's flanks thus seemed
to be fully justified, for it caused Cornwallis to di
vide his force into three bodies, and left him in great
uncertainty how to act. Tarleton, however, promptly
.suggested a plan of campaign in response to Corn
wallis's letter of the 2d. He proposed that he him
self should move well to the west and then drive
Morgan back on King's Mountain, while Cornwallis
advanced with the main body to that point in order
to strike Morgan in flank or rear on his anticipated
retreat. Cornwallis adopted these suggestions, and
on January 5th he wrote Tarleton in reply: "You
have exactly done what I wished you to do, and underr.
stood my intentions perfectly." Cornwallis himself.''
began his march on the 7th, but he moved very
slowly, being still anxious as to what Greene might
dp against Camden, and waiting for Leslie to join
him. In this way eleven days went by without
finding Cornwallis farther advanced than Turkey
Creek, only thirty miles from Winnsborough and
about twenty-five miles south of King's Mountain,
In the meantime the battle of the Cowpens had been

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY.

I87

fought, with disastrous results to Tarleton. Corn
wallis thus lost his only chance of complete success,
which was to crush Morgan with his entire force
before Greene could come to his assistance, and then
throw himself quickly across the line of Greene's
communications with Virginia.
Tarleton received his instructions on January 2d,
promptly crossed the lower part of the Broad River,
ascertained that Ninety-Six was in no immediate
danger, and reported the facts to Cornwallis as we
have seen. On receiving his reply approving his
plans, he marched against Morgan, and after some
manoeuvring came up with him on the morning of
January 17th. Morgan's force was now increased
by the arrival of militia to about nine hundred and
fifty men. His only trained troops were two weak
battalions of the Maryland line, Washington's cavalry,
and some Virginia militia, who had served their term
of three years in the Continental line. Three fifths
of his force was composed of militia from the two
Carolinas and Georgia. He posted this force on the
line between North and South Carolina, in the vicinity
of one of the inclosures then common in that section
of the country where cattle were driven in winter,
known as Cowpens. He was in an open piece of
woods,- with the Broad River at his back, and with
out any protection on either flank. A better place
for the British regulars to attack, and a worse place
for ordinary troops to defend, could not be imagined.
But Morgan had seen long service with the militia ;
he thoroughly understood their good and bad points,
and he knew what he was about. He afterward
justified his selection of the position, and said that
he did not want any protection on his flanks, for he

188 GENERAL GREENE.
knew his adversary well and was satisfied he would
have nothing but hard fighting. As for resting his
flanks on a swamp : " I would not have had a swamp
in the view of my militia on any consideration ; they
would have made for it, and nothing could have de
tained them from it " ; and as for a river at his back,
it was what he wanted to keep the militia from going
away, and make them fight. " Had I crossed the
river," said Morgan, " one half of the militia would
have abandoned me."
He disposed his force in three lines, about one
hundred and forty yards apart : first, a line of
skirmishers taken from the militia ; next, the militia
from the adjoining States ; and last, the Maryland
line and the Virginia veterans. Washington's cavalry
was posted as a reserve in rear, under cover of a
slight eminence. Morgan had gone about among
his men the evening before the battle, talking freely
with them and telling them what they were expected
to do. Then they had a quiet night's sleep, and a
good breakfast in the morning. The formation was
completed soon after sunrise, and the two lines of
militia were instructed to fire two rounds carefully
aimed and then retire, but not to run or take fright.
On the previous day Tarleton had learned by his
scouts, and a prisoner whom they had taken, that he
was in close proximity to Morgan. He therefore
called up his troops at three o'clock in the morning
and marched rapidly to attack Morgan before he
should cross the river. At sunrise he came in sight
of Morgan, who was posting his troops in their
positions. Tarleton at once deployed his force : the
Seventh Regiment, the Legion infantry, and the light
infantry in a single line, with the two field pieces in

TAKES COMMAND OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY. 189
the intervals ; a company of dragoons was on each
flank, and the rest of his cavalry, two hundred strong,
and the battalion of the Seventy-first Regiment,
formed the reserve, posted one hundred yards in
rear of his left flank. As soon as the deployment
was complete, Tarleton ordered his main line to
advance on the militia skirmishers, two hundred
yards away, and the advance was promptly and
impetuously made. The militia waited until they
were within fifty yards, fired their two rounds with
the most careful and deliberate aim, and then retired
around the left flank in accordance with their orders.
The British were staggered by this reception, in
which they lost heavily in officers ; but as the militia
retired they again pressed on until they came up
with the Maryland line under Colonel Howard.
Then a stubborn fight ensued for about thirty
minutes, but they could make no progress. Tarle
ton thereupon brought up his reserve and threw it
upon the right flank of the Continental line. But
Morgan executed a change of. front with the Virginia
veterans, refusing .his right flank, and this attack
was brought to a standstill. Washington's cavalry
was then brought up and charged Tarleton's right
flank, causing it to retreat, and soon afterward
Tarleton's cavalry, on the opposite flank, broke and
ran. The panic was soon taken up by his infantry,
which lay down its arms and surrendered, and nothing
was left of the British but the detachment of Royal
Artillery, who stood gallantly by their guns until
every man was killed or wounded and the two guns*
captured. Morgan's victory was as complete as it was
brilliant. With a loss of only eleven killed and six-

GENERAL GREENE.

ty-one wounded, he had practically removed Tarle
ton's force from the list of combatants. Corn
wallis's returns of " rank and file, present and fit for
duty," in the regiments which fought at the Cow-
pens, under the respective dates of January 15th and
February 1st, are as follows :

Feb. 1st.

Seventh Regiment 
Seventy-first Regiment, First Battalion..
Sixteenth Regiment, three companies. . .
Seventy-first Regiment, Light Company.
British Legion 
Total 

The detachment of artillery and a company of
militia which were also with Tarleton are not men
tioned in the returns. They carried his strength to
between ten hundred and fifty and eleven hundred,
and of these, all that were " fit for duty " in the re
turns of the next three months were one hundred and
seventy-four men of the Legion. Morgan turned
over six hundred prisoners to the Commissary of
Prisoners a week later ; and this places the killed and
wounded who were left on the field at about three
hundred. Besides the prisoners, Morgan captured
two field guns, eight hundred muskets, the colors of
the Seventh and Seventy-first Regiments, thirty-five
wagons, one hundred horses, and a large number of
tents, which were very acceptable to the Americans,
as they had none of their own.

bl Longitude

CHAPTER XI.
THE RETREAT TO THE DAN AND THE BATTLE OF
GUILFORD COURT HOUSE — 1781.
Morgan's cool judgment was hot disturbed by
this victory. He had annihilated the force in front
of him, and there was nothing more to be gained by
remaining where he was. He knew that Cornwallis
was either already on his way, or soon would be,
With a greatly superior force, to cut off his retreats
Soon after noon of the day of the battle, therefore,
he left the wounded under a flag of truce and began
crossing the Broad River on his retreat eastward
toward the main body under Greene. He was so
much encumbered not only by the prisoners but by
the valuable ammunition, muskets, and guns which
he had captured, that he did not reach the north
branch of the Catawba River until January 23d. He
Crossed the river on the 24th, and then halted in a
secure place until he should ascertain what Corn
wallis's intentions were. But Cornwallis was not
heard from until the 25th, and then at Ramsour's
Mill on the West fork of the Catawba, over twenty
miles in his rear. Morgan therefore sent off his
prisoners to Virginia by a route near the mountains
-Where they could be easily guarded, and determined
to wait until Cornwallis should come up ; and in the
meantime he hoped to be able to collect some militia.

1 92 GENERAL GREENE.
Cornwallis on the day of the battle (January 17th)
was at Turkey Creek, about twenty-five miles south
east of the battle ground. Leslie was moving from
Camden to join him, and was a day's march in his
rear. In the plan suggested by Tarleton in his
letter of January 4th, and fully approved by Corn
wallis in his reply of the 5th, it was specified that
Cornwallis should move with the main army toward
King's Mountain at the same time that he gave the
order for Tarleton to advance, so that while Tarle
ton should attack Morgan in front, Cornwallis with
the main force should be in Morgan's rear and inter
cept the retreat. Cornwallis accordingly moved on
the 7th, but so slowly that at the end of eleven days
he had only marched thirty miles, and was twenty-
five miles away from Morgan. He was moving
leisurely so as to give time for Leslie to join him,
which, as Tarleton justly observes, formed no part of
the original plan, and was, moreover, unnecessary, as
Cornwallis's force, even without the addition of
Leslie's, largely outnumbered Morgan's. Tarleton's
fugitives reached Cornwallis's camp at Turkey Creek
on the evening of the 17th, but Cornwallis still
waited another day for Leslie to join him. On the
19th he advanced, but instead of moving north
through Yorkville to intercept Morgan at the fords
of the Catawba, which were as near to him as to Mor
gan, he moved northwest toward King's Mountain,
according to the original plan, and apparently with
the idea that Morgan would remain on the Broad
River after his victory. When he reached the Little
Broad on the 21st, he learned that Morgan had
passed it on his retreat three days before. Corn
wallis therefore turned east in pursuit of Morgan^

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. ig$
but still moved so slowly that he was four days in
covering the twenty-five miles to Ramsour's Mill on
the west fork of the Catawba. He then decided
that his army had too much baggage for the rapid.
movements that would be required of it, and he
stopped two days on. the banks of the west fork to
burn up his own baggage and that of his men, and
all his wagons except those which were loaded with
hospital stores, salt, and ammunition, and four which
were reserved empty for the use of the sick and
wounded. On the 28th he cautiously resumed his
march, and on the 29th arrived on the west bank of
the Catawba opposite Morgan. His conduct during
the three weeks of this tardy pursuit was not up to
his reputation, and was far different from the energy
which he had displayed in his march from New
Brunswick to Trenton in the Christmas week of
1776. He lost the chance which was easily within
his grasp of crushing Morgan and placing himself
across Greene's line of retreat at the very beginning
of the campaign.
In the meantime Greene had heard of the victory
at the Cowpens by a brief note from Morgan, re
ceived at his camp at Cheraw, on the Pedee, on the
evening of the 24th. Greene's first idea was, that he
could utilize this victory to act on the offensive in
the western part of South Carolina, and on the 25th
he wrote to Marion to ask his opinion on the feasi
bility of crossing the Santee and making a raid with
three hundred or four hundred horsemen around
Cornwallis's rear, rejoining him at Ninety-Six. On
the 26th he wrote to Lee that he intended to start
for Charlotte and consult with Morgan, Davidson,
Sumter, and Pickens in regard to assembling all his

i94 GENERAL GREENE.
force and moving against Ninety-Six. But, on furthef
reflection, he seems to' have abandoned these ideas
and determined to limit his plans to a junction of
-his main body with Morgan, and resisting, if possi
ble, Cornwallis's advance toward Virginia. He there
fore wrote to the governors of North Carolina and
Virginia appealing for militia to -join him on the
Catawba, ordered Huger to break camp immediately
and march up the Yadkin toward Salisbury, sent in
structions to Colonel Lee to rejoin Huger as soon as
possible, and then taking his aid, Major Burnett, a
sergeant, and three mounted militiamen, he started
on the 28th to ride across the country ninety miles
to Charlotte and then join Morgan wherever he"
should find him on the Catawba. He reached Mor
gan's camp at Beatty's ford on the 30th, and learned
that Cornwallis was only a few miles away, across
the river. During the 27th and 28th it had rained
very heavily, and the Catawba had risen during the
29th so that the fords were impassable. The water
was at its height during the night of the 29th, but
on the 30th, when Greene arrived, it had already
begun to subside. It was evident that the fords
would be passable on the following day, and Morgan's
force was insufficient to prevent the passage by
Cornwallis. Greene therefore determined at once
to send Morgan in retreat toward Salisbury and
there join Huger and the main body of Continentals,
reserving the militia under Davidson as a rear guard
to protect the fords and delay Cornwallis's crossing
as long as possible. It is said that Morgan did not
approve this plan, but preferred a divergent retreat;
his own force going westward over the mountains;
and he insisted on this so urgently, that he told

the Retreat to the dan.

•io.s

Greene he would not be answerable for the conse
quences if his plan was not followed. -But Greene
quickly asserted his authority by replying: "Neither
will you, for I shall take the measure upon myself."
-And Morgan cheerfully complied with his orders.
The river continuing to fall during the next two
days, on the evening of January 31st Cornwallis
determined to force a passage. He divided his force
into two bodies, sending Lieutenant-Colonel Webster
with the Thirty-third Regiment, the second battalion
of the Seventy-first, Hamilton's corps of militia, the
Yagers, the six-pounders, and all the wagons — about
nine hundred men in all — to make a feint at Beatty's
ford, where he supposed the main body to be; while
with the balance of his force, about -fifteen hundred
and fifty men, consisting of the Brigade of the
Guards, the Twenty-third Regiment, the regiment
of Bose, and what was left of Tarleton's Legion, he
moved against McGowan's ford, six miles lower
down the river, which he supposed to be unguarded.
In fact, however, Morgan had been stationed at
Beatty's ford, and had left it that morning to march
to Salisbury ; and McGowan's ford was guarded by
the North Carolina militia under Davidson, number
ing about five hundred men.
Both detachments marched during the night, and
just before dawn Cornwallis arrived at McGowan's
ford. It was beginning to rain, and he feared an
other rise in the river ; so the Guards were ordered
to lead across the ford, and not to fire until they
reached the opposite bank. The river was about
five hundred yards wide, the bottom rocky and the
current swift. When the Guards were about half
way across they were discovered by the militia, who

to,6 GENERAL GREENE.
promptly opened fire on them. Lieutenant-Colonel
Hall, of the Guards, was killed, and Cornwallis's horse
was shot under him and only lived long enough to
reach the bank. The Guards pressed on in spite of
the fire and without returning it, but, the guide be
came frightened and managed to escape. Instead of
following the ford, which inclined down the stream,
the column then moved straight across the river;
the men got into very deep water, but they reached
the bank in safety. The escape of the guide was
fortunate for the British and equally unfortunate
for the militia. The latter were posted behind rocks
and trees at the end of the ford, where they could
pick off the British as they approached the shore;
but as the British did not follow the ford, they
reached the bank some distance above the militia.
This made it necessary for the latter to leave their
chosen position and form to meet a flank attack from
the British. In attempting to do so, Davidson and
several of his men were killed, whereupon the rest
fled and dispersed. On the British side, in addition
to Lieutenant-Colonel Hall, three men had been
killed and thirty-six wounded.
During the previous day Morgan had marched
from Beatty's ford to Salisbury, and Greene had
followed him on February ist to Mr. David Carr's
house, about five miles from Salisbury, which had
been appointed as the rendezvous of the militia of
the adjoining counties, which Greene had endeavored
to call out as soon as he reached Morgan's camp.
As soon as Cornwallis established himself on the
east bank of the river, he sent Tarleton with the
Legion and the Twenty-third Regiment to attack the
rear of the American camp at Beatty's ford ; but on

the Retreat to the dan.

197

arriving there they found the camp deserted, and
Tarleton began scouting toward Salisbury. He soon
learned that some of Davidson's men, who had fled
from the river, and some of the militia from the
county, were to meet during the afternoon at Tar
rant's tavern, about ten miles from the Catawba. He
rode forward to disperse them, and did so after a
short skirmish in which he lost seven men and twenty
horses. He then returned to Cornwallis's camp.
Had he continued his scouting five miles farther
toward Salisbury he would have captured 'Greene,
who was waiting at Carr's house for the militia to
assemble. He was attended only by his staff. The
militia did not assemble, but about midnight, in the
midst of a drenching rain, a few of those who had
been dispersed at Tarrant's tavern came to Carr's
house and told Greene that Davidson was killed, the
militia dispersed, and Cornwallis over the Catawba.
It was bad news, and as Greene rode on in the rain
toward Salisbury the outlook for his campaign was
as dark as the night itself. Two days before, he
had written to Lee to make a forced march to join
him, and in exuberant spirits had added, " Here is a
fine field and great glory ahead." But now, when
at the close of this night of February ist he dis
mounted at the tavern in Salisbury, and some one
expressed surprise at his being alone, he truthfully
arid sadly answered, " Yes, tired, hungry, alone, and
penniless." On that same morning of February 2d Cornwallis
pushed forward in pursuit, and he pushed actively.
There was no more of that delay which had charac
terized him at the time of the battle of the Cowpens.
During the chase from the Catawba to the Dan he

I98 GENERAL GREENE,
acted with his old-time vigor and energy, He en
tered Salisbury on the morning of February 3d, and
found it already evacuated, not only by Morgan's
troops but by a large portion of its inhabitants, who
had packed their household goods on horses or in
wagons and preferred to take their chance with
Morgan in his retreat rather than remain in their
homes during the occupation by the British.
On entering Salisbury, Cornwallis was informed
that Morgan was only a few miles ahead of him at
the Trading ford on the Yadkin, and that he had
not yet crossed. Cornwallis therefore sent forward
an advance guard under General O'Hara, consisting
of the Guards, the regiment of Bose, and the cavalry.
But they did not reach the ford until after dark, and
then learned that Morgan had crossed on the pre
vious day and night in boats, and had kept all these
boats on the north shore. Owing to heavy rains the
river was not fordable, and O'Hara could only sit
down on the bank opposite Morgan, with his infantry,
and send Tarleton and the cavalry back to report
the facts to Cornwallis. Tarleton was then ordered
to reconnoiter up the stream and, if possible, find a
crossing place. He reported that the upper fords
above the forks of the Yadkin were passable and
unoccupied. O'Hara was therefore brought back to.
Salisbury, and on the 7th the. entire force moved up
to the Shallow fords, crossed there, and continued
their march to Salem, where Cornwallis arrived on
the ioth. On the previous day Greene's army was
united at Guilford, twenty-five miles east of Salem.
Before leaving the Catawba, on the morning of
February ist, Greene had written to Huger, who was
marching toward Salisbury, telling him • that Corn-

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

199

wallls had just crossed the Catawba and would
doubtless press- vigorously to Salisbury and soon be
there, Huger was therefore directed to push for
Salisbury, if he was in condition to make a forced
march, and arrive before Cornwallis ; otherwise to
move north to Guilford, where Morgan would join
him ; in any event, the baggage and stores were tq
go to Guilford, and horses were to be impressed in
order to hasten the march. On the. 2d, Greene wrote
Huger from Salisbury, telling him to move direct to
Guilford, as there was no chance of his reaching
Salisbury before Cornwallis, Greene then went on
to the Trading ford with Morgan, crossed with him
on the evening of the 2d or morning of the 3d, and
saw O'Hara arrive there on the evening of the 3d.;
The river began falling on the 4th, and it was evi
dent that Cornwallis would soon be able to cross
either at the Trading ford or the fords above. Mor
gan's force was entirely too small to meet him alone,
and Greene therefore resumed his march on the night
of the 4th, drawing Morgan back about twenty-five
miles to the vicinity of. Salem and waiting there to see
what Cornwallis would 'do. On the 7th he learned
that Cornwallis was marching toward the Shallow
ford, and Greene thereupon moved over to Guilford,.
where Huger and Lee joined him on the 9th. At
the same time Morgan was compelled by ill health.
to leave the army,
Greene's returns at this date show a total force
of 2,036, of whom 1,426 were Continentals. Corn
wallis's return of February ist shows 2,440, afld
March ist, 2,213 "present and fit for duty." At
this date the numbers were probably about 2,300,
ajid nearly the whole force was of British regulars,

200 GENERAL GREENE.
the best troops in the army, with the. two battalions
of the Guards at their head.
Greene was anxious to give battle. He feared
that the effect of his retreat would discourage the
people of the Carolinas and Virginia, and he had no
intention of retreating forever before Cornwallis.
He had hoped that by the time the two divisions of his
army were united he would be joined by twelve hun
dred or fifteen hundred militia, and, if so, he was deter
mined to fight. But, in spite of his appeals in every
direction, not a man had appeared. He therefore
felt obliged to submit the question to a council of
war, and the members of this promptly and unani
mously decided against a battle and in favor of con
tinuing the retreat to Virginia.
Cornwallis, on the other hand, was using every
effort to force Greene to battle. He was already
one hundred and fifty miles from his base of supplies
at Winnsborough and Camden, and every day was
increasing the distance. He had destroyed .his bag
gage and wagons, and although he might subsist on
the country, he had no means of replenishing his
ammunition. He knew that he was superior to
Greene in numbers and much more in the quality of
his men, and he felt confident that if he could force
him to battle he could inflict such a defeat as would
dispose of all armed resistance in the Carolinas and
open the way unobstructed to Virginia. When he
succeeded in getting across the Yadkin, on February
7th, he debated between two plans. If he pushed
rapidly between Morgan and Huger he might suc
ceed in beating each in succession before they ef
fected a junction. But, on the other hand, if he got
between Greene's two detachments and the Dan

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. 2OI
River, he could cut Greene off from the fords of the
upper Dan and force him to the lower part of the
river, where it was not fordable. He felt sure that
Greene could not collect enough boats to carry his
force across the river, and his retreat to Virginia
would thus be completely cut off and he would be
at Cornwallis's mercy. Cornwallis decided on the
second plan, and his decision was based on correct
principles. It was a perfectly fair and proper pre
sumption that Greene could not collect the boats.
Nevertheless, Greene did collect the boats, and so
Cornwallis's plan came to grief.
Having made his decision, Cornwallis moved out
from Salem on the nth, marched nearly due north
till he came close to the Dan, and then followed
along its southern bank to the eastward.
On the ioth Greene began his march straight for
Boyd's Ferry, on the Dan River, eighty miles away.
Carrington had joined him the day beforehand re
ported that the boats had all been collected in the
vicinity of the ferry, in accordance with Greene's
order given six weeks before, when Carrington was
appointed quartermaster general. Before starting,
Greene sent orders to Sumter to collect his followers
in South Carolina and threaten the posts at Ninety-
Six and. Camden. He also sent Pickens, who had
just returned after conducting the prisoners taken at
the Cowpens to Virginia, to Charlotte, to raise the
militia in that vicinity and hang upon Cornwallis's
rear, break up his communications with South Caro
lina, and pick up any bodies of stragglers. Finally
he formed a detachment of seven hundred men, and
gave the command of it to his young adjutant gen
eral, Colonel Otho H. Williams. It consisted of a
14

202 GENERAL GREENE.
body of picked infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel
Howard, of Washington's Cavalry, and Lee's Legion.
Greene sent this detachment off on his left flank,
toward the upper fords of the Dan, with instructions
to get in front of Cornwallis, delay his march as
much as possible, and keep always between Corn
wallis and the main body of Greene's army. Wil
liams performed this duty with marked ability. His
rear guard under Lee was in sight of Cornwallis's
advance guard under O'Hara all the time during the
next four days, and most of the time was skirmish
ing with it.
Greene made good time with the main body, and
covered the eighty miles to Boyd's Ferry in a little
over three days. On the morning of the 13th he
arrived at the river bank and was ferried over, estab
lishing himself under cover of the partially com
pleted earthworks which Kosciusko had been sent
back to build a week before. Williams arrived the
next afternoon, and, leaving Lee to hold the rear
against O'Hara, ferried his infantry over before
dark. Lee skirmished with O'Hara till after night
fall, and then silently withdrew. As he reached the
river bank the boats were there to carry over his
men, and the horses were forced to swim. Before
midnight all were safe on the northern bank. Corn
wallis came up the next day and saw Greene's force
on the other side of the river. He had no means of
crossing, and was forced to encamp on the south
side of the Dan River.
Thus ended this memorable retreat of two hun
dred and thirty miles, made by a half-clad army, over
miry roads, in the dead of winter, " several hundreds
of the soldiers tracking the ground with their bloody

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

203

feet." It elicited the admiration of friend and foe
at that time, and it has since called forth the praise
of every student who has examined it. In a burst
of generous enthusiasm for his own commander,
Harry Lee said: "Happily for. these States, a sol
dier of consummate talents guided the destiny of the
South." And Tarleton, in calmer but not less com
plimentary language, wrote : " Every measure of
the Americans, during their march from the Catawba
to Virginia, was judiciously designed and vigorously
executed." Washington wrote to Greene: "You
may be assured that your retreat before Lord Corn
wallis is highly applauded by all ranks, and reflects
much honor on your military abilities."
Cornwallis had reached the border of Virginia,
but there his progress-was blocked. He could only
retreat to the fords of the upper Dan, and, crossing
these and the head waters of the Roanoke, make a
long and circuitous march, with Greene on his flank,
to join Arnold on the James, or else retire into
North Carolina and give up the -offensive. Having
destroyed all his baggage, the former plan was out
of the question, and he chose the latter. By easy
marches he returned to Hillsborough, in North Caro
lina, and there " raised the royal standard " on Feb
ruary 20th, and issued his proclamation inviting the
King's " faithful and loyal subjects to repair, with
out loss of time, with their arms and ten days' pro
visions, to the royal standard now erected at Hills
borough, where they will meet with the most friendly
reception." Pending the acceptance of this invita
tion, he did what he could to refit his army, which
was exhausted by its long and arduous march.
Greene had made a masterly retreat, but to his

204 GENERAL GREENE.
mind that was not the whole of generalship. He
meant to resume the offensive at the earliest possi
ble moment, and no sooner did Cornwallis withdraw
from the Dan than Williams and Lee were sent in
pursuit, to hang upon his flanks and rear and keep in
close contact with him. Pickens had also collected
a few hundred militia about Charlotte, and, march
ing along the route over which the two armies had
just passed, he was already nearly at Guilford.
Greene intended to cross the Dan with his main
body just as soon as re-enforcements, which were
expected from Virginia, should arrive. It has been
contended that Greene's retreat was part of a deep-
laid plan to draw Cornwallis away from his base,
while Greene constantly approached his. There is
no evidence of this. The retreat was forced upon
Greene by Cornwallis, and Greene accepted it re
luctantly. Nevertheless, the result was the same as
if it had been Greene's own plan. Every day Corn
wallis had been getting farther away from his sup
plies of clothing and ammunition, and he was now
in need of both ; and every day Greene had been
coming nearer Virginia, from which alone he could
hope for re-enforcements, clothing, and arms. All
.Virginia was now thoroughly alarmed at Cornwallis's
approach, and the militia were finally beginning to
turn out in force.
During the two months that Steuben had been in
Virginia he had done everything in his power to call
out the military resources of the State, and Governor
Jefferson had spared no effort to assist him. Steu
ben's main purpose had been to collect men and sup
plies and forward them to Greene, but he had only
been able to send forward one detachment in Decern-

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

205

ber, when Arnold landed at the mouth of the James
with a force from New York, and advanced toward
Richmond. The month of January was consumed in a
campaign against Arnold, driving him back to Ports
mouth, and during this month not a man could be
sent South. Steuben worked at the problem with
indefatigable energy, but his irascible temper was
sorely tried by the difference between the way in
which military affairs were conducted in Virginia
and in Prussia. Jefferson issued his orders calling
out the militia in every county, and making requi
sitions to fill the Continental quota ; but he declined
to take any steps for procuring clothing, arms, or
equipment, claiming that this was the duty of the
Continental authorities. As Congress had no power
to enforce its requisitions, and neither Congress nor
Virginia had any ready money, when the men ar
rived at the rendezvous nothing could be done to
organize or equip them. Interest in the war had
died out, and advantage was taken of every defect
in the militia law to escape service. Boys and dwarfs
were sent to fill requisitions, and if the militia had
been called out once during the year they refused to
assemble a second time ; if the militia was in service
the counties refused to fill the Continental quota:
No longer service than eighteen months was talked
of, and in most cases this was reduced to two. Large
bounties in paper money were promised, but as the
currency was depreciated to 140 for 1, the actual
amount was small, and only a portion of this was
paid, whereupon the recruits deserted.
By reason of these various obstacles Steuben was
unable to send Greene more than four hundred men,
who left Chesterfield Court House under command

206 GENERAL GREENE.
of Colonel Campbell on February 25th; but the ap
proach of Cornwallis had so alarmed the border
.counties of Virginia that the militia from these
counties turned out in considerable force. Jefferson
had sent an aid-de-camp to Greene's headquarters to
learn the exact situation, and this officer reported on
March 2d that seven hundred men under General
Stevens and four hundred from Botetourt had al
ready arrived ; Colonel Campbell was daily expected
with four hundred, and Colonel Lynch with three
hundred from Bedford. In all, this made eighteen
hundred from Virginia. A small number of recruits
were on their way for the Maryland line, and Pick
ens's force was being daily increased by fresh acces
sions of North Carolina militia.
On the other hand, the loyalists of North Carolina
at first began to rally around the King's standard at
Hillsborough, but the misfortune which overtook the
largest of these bodies, under Colonel Pyle (as will
presently be narrated), put an effectual damper on
the loyalist ardor, and the King's supporters returned
to their homes instead of joining his army. Corn
wallis was bitterly disappointed at this desertion,
and characterized the loyalists as " dastardly and
pusillanimous." Cornwallis, as we have seen, remained only a day
on the banks of the Dan. He arrived on the after
noon of February 15th and left early on the 17th,
arriving at Hillsborough on the 20th. Greene fol
lowed him closely. On the 17th he issued orders
for Picke'ns and Lee to cross the Dan, get in front
of Cornwallis, keep watch of his movements, and
prevent any body of loyalists from joining him.
Pickens and Lee crossed the river on the morning

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

207

of the 18th, and marched about twenty-five miles on.
the road to Guilford. During the night Greene
made a hurried visit to their camp to explain still
further his instructions, and to notify them that he
would cross the Dan with the main body just as soon
as the expected re-enforcements from Virginia ar
rived. The next day Pickens and Lee continued
their march to the southward, leaving the Guilford
road and moving through the broken country so
as to strike the highroad from Hillsborough to
Salisbury, along which, as they learned- from their
reconnoitering parties, Tarleton was advancing to
meet a party of Tories and escort them back to
Hillsborough. After several days of cautious ma
noeuvring, on February 25th Pickens and Lee came
tip with this party, which proved to be a body of four
hundred loyalists under Colonel Pyle. They were
moving through a lane in a southerly direction in
the hope of meeting Tarleton on the road from
Hillsborough to Salisbury. Tarleton was on this
road a few miles south of them, and was just going
into camp for the night. Pickens and Lee had
formed their detachment for the purpose of attack
ing Tarleton, but as they advanced they learned
from two prisoners that Colonel Pyle was between
them and Tarleton. Lee instantly formed the plan
of capturing this- detachment bodily. The uniform
of his 'men closely resembled that of Tarleton's
Legion. He therefore compelled the two prisoners,
under pain of instant death, to act as if his legion
was a re-enforcement moving to Tarleton's assist
ance, and with the two prisoners at the head of the
column hemoved along the lane toward Pyle. Pres
ently two well-mounted young countrymen were met

208 GENERAL GREENE.
and cordially received by Lee, who assumed his part
so well that they were completely deceived, and
rode back to Pyle with a request that he form his
men on the right of the road so as to allow this re-
enforcement, tired with their march, to pass. Pyle
did so, and Lee with his legion passed along their
entire front. Lee had just shaken hands with Pyle,
who was on the right of his line, and was about to
explain his true character and demand his surrender,
when some of Pyle's men on the extreme left saw
Pickens's men in rear of the Legion, and, recognizing
their uniform as that of Americans, opened fire on
them. The stratagem being thus exposed, there was
nothing for the Legion to do but return their fire;
they faced to the right and did so at arms' length.
The result was that ninety of Pyle's force were killed
outright, nearly all the rest, including Pyle himself,
were wounded, and those who were able to run in
stantly dispersed. Lee did not lose a man. Corn
wallis, having heard- on the previous day that Greene
had crossed the Dan, sent three messengers in suc
cession to Tarleton with orders to return to Hills
borough at once. Pickens and Lee were at first
disposed to attack Tarleton that same afternoon,
but, on account of the long march and fatigue of the
men, they decided to postpone' it until morning.
Tarleton on his side was equally determined to at
tack Lee in the morning ; but during the night the
three couriers arrived from Cornwallis, and he had
no option but to retreat. He did so promptly, and
by morning had passed Lee and was at the fords on
the Haw River. Pickens and Lee followed them,
but as they anticipated that Cornwallis had sent a
re-enforcement to Tarleton, it was deemed impru-

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

209

dent to attack him, and Tarleton effected his retreat
without molestation.
Meanwhile Greene, having received a portion of
the re-enforcements expected from Virginia, had
recrossed the Dan on February 23d, and was march
ing up the same road to Guilford, over which he had
retreated two weeks before. On the 28th he crossed
the head waters of the Haw at High Rock ford,
about fifteen miles from Guilford ; and on the fol
lowing day he moved forward a few miles in the
country between Troublesome and Reedy Forksy
two branches of the Haw.
Cornwallis had given the loyalists ten days from
February 20th to assemble at Hillsborough, but none
came, and the country in that vicinity was destitute
of provisions. On February 26th, the day after Pyle's
detachment was cut to pieces, he broke up his camp
at Hillsborough, marched on the road to Salisbury
until he had crossed the Haw, and then turned to the
right a'nd went into camp on the banks of Allemance
Creek, on February 28th. Two days later he sent
Tarleton with the cavalry of his Legion and about
two hundred and fifty infantry to reconnoiter in the
direction of Greene's army ; on the previous day
Greene had sent out a similar force for the purpose
of reconnoitering Cornwallis's position. It was under
command of Colonel Williams, ' and consisted of
Pickens's militia, Lee's Legion, and a body of moun
taineers under Colonel Preston, who had joined Lee
the evening after Pyle's defeat. The two bodies
met on the afternoon of March 2d, about three milet
from Cornwallis's camp, and a sharp skirmish resulted,
after which Williams retreated toward the main body.
The two a-rmies were thus in contact. Corn-

2IO GENERAL GREENE.
wallis was anxious to bring Greene to battle at once.
Greene was equally anxious to fight, but not till his
militia had all arrived. In following Cornwallis so
closely when the latter retired from the Dan, and
before his own re-enforcements had arrived, Greene
took great risk. But he had a most important object
in view, in which he was entirely successful — viz., to
prevent the uprising of the royalists in support of
Cornwallis ; and as Lee well says, he assumed the
risk, " depending on the resources of his fertile mind
and the tried skill and courage of his faithful though
inferior army." It was now imperative, however,
that Cornwallis should not force him to battle until
the militia had arrived. For the next ten days both
sides sparred for position, Cornwallis trying to bring
on an engagement and Greene determined to avoid
one. Every night Greene changed his position, and
every day his troops were in motion, until Corn
wallis was equally bewildered as to his position and
his strength, and came finally to believe that he had
between nine thousand and ten thousand men. The
gallant Earl, however, was nothing daunted, though
he had but two thousand men ; he knew their good
quality, and was determined to force a battle at the
earliest moment. His camp on the Allemance Creek
was well chosen, for it was at the meeting point of
roads leading to Salisbury, Guilford, High Rock
ford, and Hillsborough. He could strike in any one
of these directions if the favorable opportunity of
fered. On the 6th he learned that the Virginia re-
enforcements, which should have followed the direct
road from Boyd's Ferry to Guilford, had turned off
to Hillsborough. They had heard that Cornwallis
had left Hillsborough and was moving down toward

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. 2II
the Cape Fear River. Presuming that Greene would
be following him, they marched toward Hillsborough
instead of continuing on the road to Guilford.
Greene heard of it and sent them instructions to
march west from Hillsborough. But Cornwallis
heard of it too, and he determined to strike a blow
before they arrived, and in a direction which would
prevent their junction. On the 6th of March, there
fore, in a heavy fog, he crossed Allemance Creek and
moved rapidly toward High Rock ford. Williams
with his detachment of light troops was a few miles
in front of him and to his left, and Greene was in
rear of Williams at Boyd's Mills on the Reedy Fork.
Tarleton and his Legion, and Webster with his bri
gade (Twenty-third, Thirty-third,- and Seventy-first
Regiments), were in the lead of Cornwallis's army,
and their road led to a crossing of Reedy Fork at
Wetzell's Mill, and thence to the High Rock ford on
the Haw. If Cornwallis could gain and hold this
point, the Virginia re-enforcements would be com
pletely cut off before they could join Greene. Web
ster and Tarleton on one road, and Williams with
Pickens and Lee on the other, thus raced for the
crossing at Wetzell's Mill. Greene with the main
body moved back to the fords on the Haw some
miles above High Rock ford, and then marched
down the north bank to that point. He thus avoided
the risk of being cut off by Cornwallis before he
could cross the river.
Williams reached the river first, got his men
Safely across, and retreated about five miles to "a
place he had picked out for a camp for the night
-Webster was close behind him at the mill, and there
was skirmishing there and on the north side of the

212 GENERAL GREENE.
creek between Tarleton and Lee all the afternoon.
But the losses were slight, and Cornwallis's main
body was not near, enough to make a vigorous as
sault upon Williams. Just as Williams was going
into camp at dusk, Major Burnett, Greene's aid-de
camp, rode up with instructions to cross the Haw.
Williams did so, and the next morning joined Greene
just above the High Rock ford.
This move of Cornwallis's was a brilliant one,
and if it had been as vigorously executed as it was
skillfully conceived, it is hard to see how Greene
could have escaped. If Cornwallis had had his en
tire force in hand, he must' have crushed Williams
and reached and crossed High Rock ford before
Greene could get there ; he would then have cut off
the re-enforcements coming from Virginia via Hills
borough ; and Greene, with one third of his best
troops gone, would have been forced to retreat to
Virginia with all haste. But Greene was quicker
than Cornwallis ; Williams and Lee made a skillful
defense, and Greene reunited his whole force on the
north of the Haw before Cornwallis got there. The
latter knew it would be useless to attempt to force a
passage in the face of Greene, and he did not attempt
it. Thus, for the fourth time — first at the Catawba,
then at the Yadkin, then at the Dan, and now at the
Haw — Greene, by his literally sleepless energy and
the celerity of his movements, put a river between
himself and his foe, and saved his little army from
destruction. Cornwallis saw that he had been out
manoeuvred, and on the following day retreated
about twenty miles to Deep River, partly, as he says,
to attempt to raise the loyalists, and partly to ap
proach the Cape Fear River with a view to opening

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

213

up communications with the coast. Tarleton blames
Cornwallis for not continuing the movement and vig
orously attacking Greene after Williams had joined
him. He claims that if this had been done it " would
probably have averted many of the subsequent ca
lamities." But the criticism is not warranted. Corn
wallis had lost, in this particular manoeuvre, and was
now in an unfavorable position for attack ; he was
quite right in retreating a few miles and manoeuvring
for a more favorable position.
Three days later (March ioth) the long-expected
re-enforcements joined Greene at the Iron Works on
the Haw, just above High Rock ford. He spent
two days in organizing and arranging them, and then
moved forward to Guilford to fight. His army now
numbered more than at any other time during the
Southern campaign — forty-four hundred and forty-
four men in all, organized as follows :
Virginia Brigade, Brigadier General Huger, two regi
ments  778
Maryland Brigade and one company of Delaware
Battalion, Colonel Williams, two regiments  630
Washington's Cavalry, two companies.  86
Lee's Legion, one battalion of infantry, one company
of cavalry  157
Total regulars  1.651
First Brigade, Virginia militia, General Stevens. .
Second Brigade, Virginia militia, General Lawson
Two rifle regiments, Virginia militia, Colonels
Lynch and Campbell 
First Brigade, North Carolina militia, General
Butler 
Second Brigade, North Carolina militia, General
Eaton  ,
One company of cavalry, Major Bretagne  4°
Total militia  ,  2,793
Aggregate  4.444

1.693

1,060

214 GENERAL GREENE.
The artillery consisted of two detachments of two
guns each, commanded by Lieutenants Singleton and
Furey, and numbering sixty gunners — or, as they •
were then called, matrosses. They were attached to
the Maryland and Virginia brigades, and are in
cluded in the numbers given above.
There was much difference in the quality of these
troops. The Maryland brigade had fought with great
gallantry at Long Island, Trenton, Brandywine, Ger
mantown, Camden, and Cowpens. The First Regi
ment still contained a large number of veterans, but
the Second had been cut to pieces at Camden and
was now almost wholly composed of recruits. The
Virginia brigade had served under Greene's own
command in the Pennsylvania battles, but the old
men had nearly all been discharged at the expiration
of three years' service, and this brigade also was
now principally made up of recruits. In the Virginia
•militia, Stevens's brigade was partly composed of
men who had served their time in the Continental
line and partly of substitutes and drafted men ; Law-
son's Brigade was made up of fresh levies without
discipline or experience, and both the North Carolina
brigades were of the same character. Washington's
Cavalry and Lee's Legion were picked veterans, as
fine troops as ever fought, and commanded by offi
cers of unsurpassed merit. Greene's opinions con
cerning the relative value of regulars and militia were
to have in this memorable battle a sad but complete
vindication. Had his force, or even half of it, been
composed of troops like the First Maryland or Lee's
Legion, he would have destroyed Cornwallis's army
and terminated the Southern campaign at one blow.
Cornwallis reported to Clinton, under date of

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

215

April ioth, that his force at Guilford numbered
thirteen hundred and sixty infantry and about two
hundred cavalry. But Clinton asked how it was pos
sible that his strength was reduced to such a small
figure, and Cornwallis's own returns disprove it. His
force was probably in excess of twenty-five hundred,
and the exact numbers of " rank and file, present and
fit for duty," are given in his return of March ist as
follows:Brigade of Guards, First and Second Battalions, and Grena
diers, Brigadier General O'Hara  605
General Leslie's Brigade :
Seventy-first Foot (Fraser's Highlanders)  212
Regiment of Bose, Major Du Buy.  313
Lieutenant Colonel Webster's Brigade :
Twenty-third Foot  .'  258
Thirty-third Foot  322
British Legion, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton  174
Battalion of Yagers  .".... 97
.Hamilton's North Carolina Regiment and other provincials. 232
Total  2,213
There was, in addition, a detachment of the Royal Ar
tillery, under Lieutenant McLeod, numbering about
one hundred men, with four guns.
The quality of these troops was of the very best;
Most of them had been in America since 1776, and
had fought at all the battles around New York and
Philadelphia, at Charleston and at Camden. In this
campaign Cornwallis proudly says of them : " Their
persevering intrepidity in action, their invincible pa
tience in the hardships and fatigues of a march of
above six hundred miles, in which they have forded
several large rivers and numberless creeks, many of
which would be numbered large rivers in any other
country in the world, without tents or covering

2l6 GENERAL GREENE.
against the climate, and often without provisions,
will sufficiently manifest their ardent zeal for the
honor and interests of their sovereign and their
country." On the 1 2th of March Greene put his army in
motion from High Rock ford, and on the 14th
reached Guilford. On the same day Cornwallis sent
his baggage down the Deep River, under escort of
Hamilton's North Carolina Regiment, and marched
toward Guilford. Both were anxious for battle, and,
as Greene said in his letter to Washington, " when
both parties are agreed in a matter all obstacles are
soon removed." On the morning of the 15th, Lee and
Tarleton, who were reconnoitering in front of their
respective armies, came together on the Salisbury
road, about four miles south of Guilford, and there
was a sharp skirmish, in which Tarleton was wounded
in the hand. Greene immediately sent his baggage
back to the Iron Works on the Haw, which was desig
nated as the rallying place in case of defeat, and be
gan posting his men. His position was along the
Salisbury road, just south of the courthouse at Guil
ford. Both Tarleton and Lee, as well as subsequent
historians, unite in saying that the position was ad
mirably chosen and the troops judiciously posted.
Guilford Court House was situated on a hill from
which the ground sloped gradually for half a mile to
the southward, ending in a small rivulet. The sur
rounding country was mostly a wilderness, with
cleared fields here and there. Around the court
house was such a clearing of old fields about three
hundred yards in extent. In the middle of this a
branch road from Reedy Fork united with the high
road to Salisbury. This latter wound down the gen-

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. 217
tie slope through tall woods with dense underbrush ;
and at a distance of about half a mile, just before
reaching the brook, there were fields on either side of
the road about two hundred yards in extent, which
had been planted the previous summer in corn. Be
yond the field, on the east of the road, was a strip of
woods, and then another field about one hundred
yards in extent.
Greene placed his army in three lines. In the
first were the two brigades of North Carolina militia,
under Generals Butler and Eaton. They were post
ed on both sides of the road, in the edge of the wood,
behind a fence which surrounded the fields. On
their right flank were the Delaware battalion, under
Kirkwood, and Lynch's Virginia Riflemen, and on
the left the infantry of Lee's Legion and Campbell's
Riflemen. The second line was composed of the
Virginia militia, under Generals Stevens and Law-
son ; they were posted about three hundred yards in
rear of the first line, in the woods on either side
of the road. The Continental regiments, the best
troops, were naturally posted in the third line, or re
serve, about four hundred yards in rear of the second.
They were on the edge of the hill, in the' clearing
just south of the courthouse — the Virginia Brigade on
the right and the Maryland on the left. Between the
two were two guns, under Lieutenant Furey ; the
other two guns were in the center of the first line.
Washington's Cavalry was in rear of the right flank,
and Lee's in rear of the left.
After crossing the brook, Cornwallis deployed in
the following order : General Leslie on the right,
with the regiment of Bose and the Seventy-first
Highlanders ; Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the
15

2i8 GENERAL GREENE.
Twenty-third and Thirty-third Regiments in the cen
ter, on either side of the road ; the Yagers and Light
Infantry of the Guard on the left. The Guards were
in reserve close behind the main line — the first bat
talion in rear of Leslie, the second in rear of the
Twenty-third Regiment, and the Grenadiers in rear
of the Thirty-third. The artillery was in the road,
between the Twenty-third and Thirty-third, and
Tarleton's Cavalry was in rear of the whole line.
The battle opened at half past one o'clock in the
afternoon by a cannonade from the British guns,
which lasted twenty minutes. Then the infantry ad
vanced. The position of the North Carolina militia
was so advantageous — in the edge of a wood behind
a fence, and with open fields in front, the flanks pro
tected by riflemen so posted as to enfilade the British
line as it advanced — that it was anticipated that very
serious and possibly successful resistance could be
made to the British advance at this point. But, to
the dismay of the Americans, when the militia saw
the redcoats advance in a steady line across the field,
then discharge their pieces and start to charge with
a loud yell, they threw away their guns and scattered
in every direction through the woods without firing
a shot. The riflemen on either flank stood their
ground, and this caused Leslie to gain ground to the
right and Webster to the left ; the three battalions of
guards were brought up to fill the gaps in the line —
the First Battalion between the regiment of Bose
and the Seventy-first, and the Second Battalion and
Grenadiers between the Twenty-third and Thirty-
third. The riflemen on each flank held their own
so well that it became necessary for Leslie to or
der the regiment of Bose to change front in order

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

219

to meet Lee's infantry ; and Webster did the same
on the left, with the Thirty-third Regiment to op
pose Lynch and Kirkwood. The main body then
pushed forward to attack the Virginia militia. These
made an excellent .defense, and held the British in
check for some time ; every man of the latter was
brought into action, and Tarleton says that " at this
period the event of the action was doubtful, and vic
tory alternately presided over each army." Gradu
ally, however, Webster with the Thirty-third began
to push back Lynch and Kirkwoo'd's Riflemen, and
O'Hara, with the Second Battalion of the Guards and
the Seventy-first, caused Lawson to give way ; Ste
vens was badly wounded and had to be carried off
the field, which had a demoralizing effect upon the
Virginians. But the infantry of the Legion and
Campbell's Riflemen, on the American left, woultl not
yield a foot to the Hessians and the First Battalion
of the Guards. Thus the success of the British on
their left and center caused them to execute a right-
wheel in advancing, O'Hara passing across the
Salisbury road and Webster coming into it. The
road being thus opened, McLeod brought up two
three-pounders and put them in position on a slight
eminence at the southern side of the open ground,
about two hundred and fifty yards from the court
house, where, half an hour later, they did great serv
ice, and saved the British army from defeat. As
the British continued to advance, gradually wheeling
to the right, the Virginia militia finally gave way
and retreated in fairly good order — part of them
through the woods to the northeast and part through
the open ground, passing around the left flank of the
Continentals to the courthouse. The riflemen under

220 GENERAL GREENE.
Lynch and Kirljwood, and the cavalry under Wash
ington, fell back straight to the position of the Con
tinentals, and passed through-' the gap between the
Virginia and Maryland regiments. Webster followed
up this advantage closely with the Thirty-third, but
when he came in front of the Continental line the
First Maryland received him with such a deadly fire
that his men fell back somewhat precipitately to his
left and rear across a ravine, where they rallied —
Webster himself, a most gallant and able officer, be
ing killed.
The Virginia militia having been driven off into
the woods on the right, there was nothing left be
tween O'Hara and the Continental troops in front of
the courthouse. He therefore sent the Second Bat
talion of the Guards, commanded by the Honorable
Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, closely followed by the
Grenadiers and the Seventy-first, along the Salisbury
road against this position. Their advance led them
against the Second Maryland, and Williams, who com
manded the Maryland Brigade, hastened to this regi
ment expecting to give the Guards as warm a recep
tion as the First Maryland had given to the Thirty-
third. But the Second Regiment was made up of new
recruits, and was a far different body from that First
Maryland which had done such splendid service in
nearly every important battle of the last five years.
To the intense mortification of Williams, the Second
Regiment broke and ran. Stewart pressed on and
carried the position, capturing the two guns which
Singleton had originally placed in the line of the
North Carolina militia, and after their flight had
brought back and planted on the flank of the Second
Maryland. Stewart's advantage, however, was of

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. 22I
short duration. Williams rushed back to the First
Maryland, wheeled them to the left, and struck Stew
art full in the flank. His men retreated hastily, carry
ing back with them the Grenadiers and Seventy-first
Regiment, who' were hastening to their assistance,
and losing the two pieces which they had captured.
Washington's Cavalry was now brought forward in a
fine charge, which still further accelerated the retreat
of the British.
The battle was now at its most critical stage.
Greene and Cornwallis were both personally in the
thick of it, and each in quick succession narrowly
escaped capture. O'Hara was dangerously wounded,
and Stewart was instantly killed in a hand-to-hand
encounter with Captain Smith, of the First Maryland.
Had Greene thrown forward "the two Virginia regi
ments, both of which were still fresh and unengaged,
he might possibly have completed the rout of Corn
wallis's army. But he had seen not only the North
Carolina militia run at the first fire and the Virginia
militia driven off after a stubborn contest, but also the
Second Maryland leave the field without any serious
resistance. The two Virginia regiments were Con
tinentals, but they were both composed entirely of
recruits. If they failed him as the Second Maryland
had done, his army was annihilated. He was not
willing to take the risk of total destruction, and, in
stead of sending the two Virginia regiments after
the retreating Guards, he placed the better of them,
the First Virginia, under Colonel Greene, in reserve
in rear of the position which the Maryland Brigade
had formerly occupied. Cornwallis, on his side, see
ing the retreat of the Guards, concluded that if it
could not be stopped the day was lost. He there-

222 GENERAL GREENE.
fore rode rapidly to the little hill where McLeod
had posted his two three-pounders, and ordered him
immediately to open fire with grape. O'Hara, dis
mounted and badly wounded, remonstrated against
the order, because the First Maryland was so close
upon the Guards in their retreat that the fire would
do as much damage to his own men as to the enemy.
But Cornwallis peremptorily insisted on the execu
tion of the order. Though a number of his men
were killed and wounded by it, yet it had the de
sired effect. The assault of the First Maryland and
Washington's Cavalry was arrested, and they soon
returned to their original position in front of the
courthouse. There was now a short lull in the fight. While
the contest had been going on in front, the struggle,
now far in the rear, between the Hessians and the
First Battalion of the Guards on one side, and the
infantry of Lee's Legion and Campbell's Virginia
Riflemen on the other, had still been going on, and
the latter were in the same position as at the begin
ning. But Lee finally saw that he was completely
separated from the rest of the army, and therefore
withdrew though the woods, making a circuit with
the intention of joining the left flank of the Conti
nentals near the courthouse. This left the Hessians
and the First Battalion of the Guards with no enemy
in their front, and they moved by the left to rejoin
the rest of the British force. Cornwallis then re
formed his line on the edge of the clearing south of
the courthouse, and prepared for a final assault.
Greene had nothing that he could depend on ex
cept the First Maryland, two hundred and eighty-five
strong, and Washington's cavalry, eighty-six in num-

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

223

ber. Lee and Campbell had not yet come up from
the left, and, in fact, did not join him until the next
day. The militia were all broken, as well as the
Second Maryland, and the two Virginia regiments
were composed of recruits who had never been
under fire. Cornwallis had still fifteen hundred
trained, well-disciplined soldiers; they had been
roughly handled, but they were full of determina
tion, and were now being reformed under his eyes
for a final effort. Greene had the alternative of re
ceiving their assault — which, if unsuccessful, would
give him the victory, and if successful, would com
pletely destroy his army and lose the Southern
States forever — or of retreating while retreat was
still possible. He chose the latter, and at half past
three, after two hours of as hard fighting as the
Revolution saw, he withdrew his army in good order,
Colonel Greene with the First Virginia covering the
retreat. The artillery horses had all been killed, and
his four guns and two ammunition wagons had to be
left on the field. He moved out to the west by the
Reedy Fork road, and after a march of three miles
he reached that stream and halted to reform his
men. Cornwallis attempted a feeble pursuit with
the Twenty-third and Seventy-first Regiments, but it
was quickly abandoned.
The day had been cloudless, with a sharp, frosty
air. As night fell, a cold drizzle set in, and later
this turned into a pouring rain. Through this and
the deep mud of the clay road Greene's army pur
sued its retreat, crossing the Haw at the Iron Works
just before daybreak. Here the troops were posted
in a defensive position before they lay down to
sleep, and were readv to receive Cornwallis in case

224 GENERAL GREENE.
he continued the attack. But Cornwallis was in no
condition for further offensive movements. He had
fought his last battle in the Carolinas.
The British loss was about one fourth of their
total strength — ninety-three killed, four hundred and
thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing ; total, five
hundred and thirty-two. The loss in officers was
appalling — Webster,. Stewart, and nine others killed ;
O'Hara, Tarleton, and seventeen more wounded.
On the American side the losses were seventy-eight
killed, one hundred and eighty-three wounded, and
ten hundred and forty-six missing ; total, thirteen
hundred and seven. The missing were nearly all in
the militia, which had broken at the beginning of
the engagement. Major Anderson, of the First
Maryland, was killed; General Huger slightly and
General Stevens severely wounded.
Stedman, the British historian, compares this bat
tle of Guilford with Crecy, Poictiers, and Agincourt,
the most glorious feats of British arms; and he is
fully justified. The British general had attacked a
force of double his strength, advantageously posted
in a strong position of the enemy's choosing; and
he had won the day after as hard fighting and as
heavy losses, in proportion to his strength,' as in any
battle which the English had. until then fought. It
was a splendid victory for the British soldier. As
Lee says, " On no occasion, in any part of the world,
was British valor more heroically displayed."
On the other hand, Greene, although apparently
superior in force, had only three hundred and
seventy-one veterans in his command — viz., the First
Maryland, Lee's Legion, and Washington's Cavalry.
Opposed to him was the flower of the British army,

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN. 225
over two thousand strong, well disciplined, and all
veterans of nearly five years' incessant fighting in
America. The rest of Greene's force was militia or
recruits now for the first time under fire. Part of
these ran at the first shot, but another part made a
stout resistance against the British Guards. As for
•the few veterans that Greene had, their conduct even
excelled that of the British. Greene chose his posi
tion skillfully, posted his men to the best possible
advantage, and handled them well during the course
of the fight. He had two opportunities — one just
after the charge of the First Maryland, and the other
when Cornwallis prepared for a final assault, when,
by a vigorous charge, he might perhaps have put
Cornwallis to rout. But had he failed — and the
chances were in favor of failure — his army would
have been destroyed. He had previously expressed
his firm determination never to put his army in a
position where its total destruction was possible;
and, though the temptation was great, he rigidly
adhered to his decision. As for the final result, all
the advantages were on Greene's side. He lost the
battle but gained the campaign. He retreated a
few miles and took up another defensive position,
ready to accept battle again if Cornwallis offered it.
But three days later Cornwallis began a precipitate
and long retreat to the seaboard.
The news of this little battle, fought in the back
woods of America with a few thousand men on each
side, created a sensation in England. Fox declared
that "another such victory will ruin the British
army. ... In the disproportion between the two
armies, a victory was highly to the honor of our
troops; but had our army been vanquished, wha,t

226 GENERAL GREENE.
course could they have taken ? Certainly they would
have abandoned the field of action, and flown for
refuge to the seaside— precisely the measures the vic
torious army was obliged to adopt." He moved that
measures be taken immediately for concluding a
peace. Pitt supported the motion, and affirmed that
it was " a most accursed war, barbarous, cruel, and
unnatural," full of " ineffective victories and se
vere defeats." Fox added that '.' we can lose noth
ing by a vote declaring America independent,"
for "America is lost, irretrievably lost, to this
country." As for Greene himself, he was so worn out that
he did not realize how well he had done. In his let
ters to Washington and Congress he claimed but
little for himself ; he simply recited the facts, re
gretted that he had lost the day, and expressed his
unabated determination to continue the struggle,
and his " hope, by little and little, to reduce him
[Cornwallis] in time." In truth, he had nearly
reached the limit of physical endurance. For six
weeks, since he left his camp on the Pedee to join
Morgan on the Catawba, he had not taken off his
clothes. During the four days' retreat from Guil
ford to the Dan he had not slept over four hours,
and in the ten days' manoeuvring prior to the battle
of the 15th he had hardly done better. While making
the rounds one night during this time he found the
colonel in command of a large outpost asieep, and
asked him how he could sleep when he was in con
tact with the enemy, and might be attacked at any
time. The ready answer was, "Why, General, we
all knew you would be awake." But now the nerv
ous strain and loss of sleep began to tell upon him,

BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURT HOUSE.

Topography from Stedman's History of the American War.
Johnson's Life of Greene.

Position of Troops from

A. A. British. Line.
B. B. North Carolina Militia.
O. C Virginia unntia.
D.D. American 8 Line or Re
serve of Continentals.
BRITISH CORPS.
b. Light Infantry of the Guards.
c. Tapers.
d. 33rd Regiment.
e. 23rd Regiment.
/. 71st Regiment.

Regiment of Boze,
Grenadiers of the Guards.
and Bat. of the Guards.
1st " " "
Tarlton's Draeoons. *
. British. Artillery.
AMERICAN CORPS.
Dela wares.
Lvneh's Riflemen.
Washington's Cavalry.
American Artillery-Singleton

. Campbell's Riflemen.
. Infantry of tne Legion-
. Cavalry of the Legion.
> . Greene's Regiment oi Virginia
Regulars.
•¦. Buford's Regiment under
Hawes.
. 1st Maryland Regt— Gunby.
. 2nd Maryland Reg't— Ford.

THE RETREAT TO THE DAN.

227

and the day after Guilford he fell over in a fainting
fit of dizziness ; and this was repeated on the follow
ing days, so that he was compelled to take some
rest; this, with his robust constitution, quickly re
stored him to health.

CHAPTER XII.
THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL AND THE SIEGE
OF NINETY-SIX — 1781.
On the 18th of March Cornwallis issued a procla
mation boasting of " the compleat victory obtained
over the Rebel forces on the 15th inst," offering a
pardon to all the rebels who would surrender them
selves with their arms and ammunition, and promis
ing them protection in their persons and properties.
This proceeding subjected him to considerable ridi
cule, for on the same day he abandoned his wounded
in hospital and began a rapid retreat.
In truth, Cornwallis had spent his force at Guil
ford. He was too weak to think of renewing the
battle, and his army was so much in need of supplies
of all kinds that he could not remain where he was.
Retreat was inevitable, and his only alternative was
between going back to South Carolina or turning
toward the seacoast. At the outset of the campaign
he had given orders for supplies to be sent to Wil
mington, and he had recently given instructions to
have these sent up the Cape Fear River to Cross
Creek, or Fayetteville. His nearest post in South
Carolina was at Camden, and the distance was about
the same as to Wilmington — one hundred and forty
miles; but the distance to Cross Creek was only

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

229

about half as much, and he hoped (though he had no
positive information) that his supplies had been sent
up to that point. The idea of going back to South
Carolina was intolerable to him ; it would be to ac
knowledge the complete failure of the campaign. If
he went to the seacoast perhaps Greene would follow
him ; at all events, he would save appearances, and,
after refitting his army, he could resume the of
fensive. He therefore decided to march to Cross
Creek, and he put his army in motion on the after
noon of the 18th. Greene started in pursuit the fol
lowing day, sending the indefatigable Lee again in
advance with his Legion and Campbell's Virginia
Riflemen, and telling Lee: "I mean to fight the
enemy again, and wish you to have your Legion and
Riflemen ready for action on the shortest notice. If
in the meantime you can attempt anything which
promises an advantage, put it in execution. Lord
Cornwallis must be soundly beaten before he will re
linquish his hold." Greene could not move as
rapidly as he wished, for there were " provisions to
draw, cartridges to make, and several other matters
to attend to, which will oblige us to halt a little
earlier than common " at the end of each day's
march. Moreover, Cornwallis had a full day's start
of him and was losing no time. Greene did not,
therefore, come up with Cornwallis until the 28th,
when he reached the Cape Fear River at Ramsay's
Mills, a few hours after Cornwallis had crossed on a
temporary bridge of his own construction. Lee was
so close on Cornwallis's heels that the latter was un- *
able to destroy the bridge. But Greene did not
cross, for he had other plans. Cornwallis then hur
ried along unmolested,, reaching Cross Creek a few

230 GENERAL GREENE.
days later. Here he found no provisions or signs
of his orders having been received, and he was
obliged to continue his march to Wilmington, arriv
ing there on April 7th.
Greene decided not to pursue Cornwallis any fur
ther. During the retreat to the Dan, Corriwallis had
had the benefit of the initiative, but since then
Greene had possessed this advantage and had kept
the control of the campaign in his own hand — pur
suing Cornwallis only so far as he thought best,
fighting only on ground of his own choice and at his
own time. He did not purpose to give up this con
trol by following Cornwallis off to one side of the
theatre of campaign. He stopped pursuit at Ram
say's Mills, and determined to carry the war into
South Carolina. On the following day (March 29th)
he wrote to Washington explaining his reasons for
this course. He was " remote from re-enforcements,
inferior to the enemy in numbers," and had "no
prospect of support." By going to South Carolina
he would force Cornwallis to follow him, and thus
give up the contest in North Carolina, or else lose
his posts in South Carolina. He considered the
movement warranted by the soundest reasons, both
political and military ; and while it would be critical
and dangerous, and subject the troops to every hard
ship, yet, as he shared this with them, he hoped they
would " bear up under it with that magnanimity
which has already supported them, and for which
they deserve everything of their country." He wrote
to Sumter to the same effect on March 30th, and to
Steuben and Lafayette on April 2d.
There is no doubt that his resolution was as sound
as it was bold, and it resulted in the brilliant success

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL. 231
. which it deserved.* Having made his decision,
Greene at once undertook the necessary prepara
tions to carry it into effect. First of all, he had to
send off all the Virginia militia. These men had en
listed for six weeks, and they claimed that their time
should count from the day of enlistment at their
homes to the date of discharge, also at their homes.
They insisted, during his march to Ramsay's Mills,
on being sent back at once, so as to reach Virginia
before their time was up. Greene had managed to
hold them, as he hoped every day to overtake Corn
wallis and bring him to battle, but when he gave up
the pursuit this was no longer possible. He there
fore sent them off on April 2d. They had joined
him on March ioth, and were present with the army
only twenty-three days. The North Carolina militia
had fled at the battle of Guilford, and only a small
part of them had since returned. Greene's army
was thus reduced to the four Continental regiments,
two of Virginia and two of Maryland, Lee's Legion,
Washington's Cavalry, and Campbell's Riflemen, num
bering in all fourteen hundred and fifty men. With
these he intended to move as rapidly and secretly as
possible on Camden, which was at the center of the
British line of posts in South Carolina. At the same
time he planned to secure the co-operation of the
* Greene consulted Lee concerning his plan of operations, and
probably referred to the Second Punic War and the famous " carry
ing the war into Africa." Lee replied on April 2d : " I am de
cidedly of opinion with you that nothing is left for you but to
imitate the example of Scipio Africanus " In his funeral eulogy
on Greene, Hamilton says : " This was one of those strokes that
denote superior genius and constitute the sublime of war. 'Twas
Scipio leaving Hannibal in Italy to overcome him at Carthage.''

232 GENERAL GREENE.
partisan corps of Marion, Pickens, and Sumter in
his effort to reconquer South Carolina. Sumter had
been disabled by a wound in an engagement with
Tarleton in the previous month of November. But
he had recovered in January, and during Greene's
retreat to the Dan he had been collecting his follow
ers on the Broad River. Greene directed him to be
prepared to join the main body at Camden. Pickens,
as we have seen, had been with Lee when Pyle's de
tachment was destroyed on February 25th, but a few
days later he had been detached, and had returned
to his old recruiting ground in the western part of
South Carolina. He was now directed to advance
against Ninety-Six, and either attack that post, or at
least prevent its garrison from marching to the re
lief of Camden. Marion, assisted by Lee, had been
engaged in an expedition against Georgetown in
January, when Greene began his retreat. It then
became necessary to recall Lee, and Marion's own
followers were not sufficient to keep up the contest
alone. They were therefore forced to retreat into
their hiding places in the swamps along the Black
River, where they had since remained. Marion was
now instructed to attack the posts along the Santee
between Camden and Charleston.
In brief, then, Greene was to attack the center of
the line of posts with his main body of four small
Continental regiments; to threaten the left flank at
Ninety-Six with Pickens's partisans, and the right
flank between Camden and Charleston with those
of Marion. The campaign was planned as accurate
ly and elaborately, and the issue at stake was as great,
as if the contending forces were great armies; yet
Greene had less than fifteen hundred men in his main

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

233

body, and his partisans on either flank were num
bered only by hundreds. It is true that he had hopes
of re-enforcements. He had written to Governor
Jefferson, of Virginia, asking for fifteen hundred
militia to take the place of those who had fought
so well at Guilford, but had made so short a stay
in his army; he had heard also that General Gist
was on his way southward with recruits for the Delar
ware and Maryland line. Lafayette had recently
come to Virginia with twelve hundred men, and he,
as well as Steuben, was under Greene's orders. But
it was more difficult for them to communicate with
Greene than with the Northern headquarters, and
they received their orders direct from Washington,
or acted on their own responsibility. Wayne was
now on his way with the Pennsylvania line to re-
enforce Lafayette. The possibility of all these
troops joining Greene was discussed in his letters
to Lafayette and Steuben, and both were personally
anxious to march southward. But it was necessary
at all hazards to preserve intact his line of commu
nications through Virginia, against which Clinton
had just sent his third expedition, under Phillips.
Greene therefore had no definite expectations of re-
enforcements. He knew that he must rely on his
small Continental force, and such assistance as he
could derive from the roving bands of partisans and
the local militia that could be raised in the two
Carolinas. On the 6th of April he began his march, sending
Lee, with the Legion, re-enforced by Oldham's com-*
pany of the Second Maryland, toward Cross Creek,
and marching with the main body almost .due west
on the road to Charlotte. His instructions to Lee
16

234 GENERAL GREENE.
gave that officer great latitude, but their general
intent was to use the Legion as a cover between
Cornwallis and himself (in the same way that it had
been used on the retreat to the Dan) in case Corn
wallis followed Greene into South Carolina — a course
which Greene expected and somewhat desired that
Cornwallis would follow. Lee was therefore to follow
the road to Cross Creek so far as he thought proper
in order to give Cornwallis the idea that Greene was
pursuing him ; then he was to turn abruptly to the
west, and, keeping on Greene's left flank, to advance
with him to the line of the Santee and attack or
threaten the post of Fort Watson, about fifty miles
below Camden. In case Cornwallis pursued, Lee
was to keep close to the main body ; otherwise he
was to use his own discretion as to the point of
crossing the Pedee and approaching the Santee.
Cornwallis made no effort at pursuit, and Lee there
fore kept well to the eastward, quite out of communi
cation with Greene, crossed the Pedee near its mouth
at Georgetown, and put himself in communication
with Marion, with whom he effected a junction on
the 14th of April, after a march of one hundred and
sixty miles accomplished in eight days. Marion had
four hundred followers, and Lee brought him about
three hundred good troops. Together they laid
siege to Fort Watson on the 15th. This was one of
a series of small posts extending along the line of
the Santee, from Camden to Georgetown, and cover
ing the communications with Charleston, which was
the headquarters of the British army in the South.
These posts consisted of Camden, garrisoned by nine
hundred men, under Lord Rawdon ; Fort Motte, at
the point where the Congaree and Wateree unite to

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL. 235
form the Santee, garrisoned by one hundred and
fifty men under Lieutenant McPherson ; Fort Wat
son, about thirty miles below Fort Motte, garrisoned
by one hundred and twenty men under Lieutenant
McKay ; and a small force at Georgetown, at the
mouth of the Pedee. On the west of these was an
other line, consisting of Augusta, occupied by Lieu
tenant-Colonel Brown with six hundred and thirty
men ; Ninety-Six, with Lieutenant-Colonel Cruger
and five hundred and fifty men ; Fort Granby, near
the site of the present city of Columbia, where the
Broad and Saluda join and become the Congaree,
garrisoned by sixty regulars and two hundred and
eighty loyalists under Major Maxwell ; and Orange
burg, south of Fort Granby and west of Fort Wat
son, occupied by three hundred and fifty men. In
addition to the garrisons of these eight small posts,
a large force was stationed in Charleston. The total
effective force in South Carolina on May 1, 1781,
according to the returns in the British Record Office,
was seventy-two hundred and fifty-four. They were.
spread over a tract one hundred and sixty miles
long and fifty miles wide. It was against these that
Greene was advancing with his fifteen hundred Con^
tinentals and their partisan allies.
Fort Watson consisted of a stockade built on an
Indian mound, about thirty-five feet high, on the
bluff of the Santee River. It was garrisoned by
eighty regulars and forty loyalists under Lieutenant
McKay, Neither the garrison nor the assailants had
any artillery. Marion summoned McKay to sur
render on the 15th, and McKay promptly refused to
do so. Marion then cut off his communications with
a neighboring lake from which McKay derived his

236 GENERAL GREENE.
supply of water, and completely surrounded the
stockade. But McKay dug a deep well within the
fort from which to get a fresh supply of water, and
he was well stocked with provisions. As Marion had
no artillery, he was at a loss to see how to make
any impression on the garrison. Whereupon one of
his officers, a Colonel Maham, suggested a device
similar to those employed in the time of Caesar.
The surrounding country was heavily wooded, and
Marion's men were good backwoodsmen. They
promptly set to work with the axes which were
gathered from neighboring farms, and after they had
cut a sufficient amount of timber a large force of the
besiegers was employed one night in bringing it up
on their shoulders to the immediate vicinity of the
stockade ; and there a high wooden tower was erected
during the night, completely dominating the interior
of the stockade. When day broke on the morning
of April 23d the garrison was treated to a fusillade
fired from the- top of this tower by a picked detach
ment of skilled marksmen selected from Lee's Le
gion. Under cover of this fire a breach was made
in the stockade. McKay saw that resistance was
useless, and at once surrendered his entire garrison.
Marion had lost only two killed and six wounded.
But he had lost eight important days at this
place, and time was precious. On the one hand,
Greene must now be approaching Camden, and
Marion was anxious to join him. On the other
hand, Colonel Watson with five hundred men bad
been detached from Camden a few weeks before and
sent down to find and punish Marion in the vicinity
of Georgetown. Marion had eluded him by first
retiring into the swamps, and then joining Lee and

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

237

marching to Fort Watson. Rawdon, having heard of
Greene's approach, had recalled Watson in all haste,
and the latter was now moving back from George
town toward Camden. Marion had heard of this,
and was determined, if possible, to intercept Watson
and prevent him from re-enforcing Rawdon. For
this purpose he moved to the High Hills of Santee,
whence he could throw himself in front of Watson
by whatever route he approached. Watson, on the
other hand, was equally determined to avoid Marion.
¦Finding the route blocked on the east side of the
Santee, he returned nearly to its mouth, crossed, and
made a wide detour to the left, reaching the river
again at Fort Motte and joining Rawdon on May
7th. In the meantime the battle of Hobkirk's Hill,
or Camden, had been fought.
Greene, as before stated, left his camp at Ram
say's Mills, on Deep River, on the same day as Lee-
April 6th. He reached the Pedee, at the mouth of
-the Yadkin, on April nth. There he was detained
three days in getting boats to cross. Then he
moved south to Camden, and arrived there on the
20th. He had not overtaxed his men, for he wished
to bring them before Camden in good order. Still,
he had marched one hundred arid forty miles in
fourteen days, three of which had been lost in col
lecting boats. He had hoped to surprise Rawdon,
but the inhabitants gave word of his approach, and
this was impossible. He reconnoitered the Works
with a view to making an assault, but he found them
too strong, and he therefore fell back to a woodec?
slope known as Hobkirk's Hill, about two miles
north of the town, and there selected a defensive
•position. He was in hopes that Rawdon would come

238 GENERAL GREENE.
out to attack him ; if not, he would observe the place
and attack any troops moving into or out of ,it.
Camden had now been occupied by the British for
nearly a year, and during that time they had con
structed fortifications of considerable importance.
The village lay in open ground, about two miles
wide, inclosed on the east and south by Pine Tree
Creek, and on the south and west by the Wateree
River. In the center was a large stockade, and out
side of this was a line of strong independent redoubts
curving around from river to creek. The garrison
(after Watson had been detached) consisted of nine
hundred men, under Lord Rawdon, and some loyal
ist militia, which came in just before Greene arrived.
Greene had sent over three hundred men with
Lee, and had lost a few by sickness on the march ;
so that the force which he brought to Camden num
bered only eleven hundred and s.eventy-four Conti
nentals and two hundred and fifty-four North Caro
lina militia, who had just joined him. He sent or
ders to Sumter to collect all his adherents along the
Broad River and its branches and be ready to join "
him at Camden. But Sumter was less fond of com
plying with orders than of conducting an independ
ent raid. Instead of coming to Camden, he moved
independently against Fort Granby, and, far from
aiding Greene, the result of his movements was to
increase Rawdon's strength at Camden by driving
the loyalist militia to that point.
On the evening of April 21st, the day after Greene
arrived in front of Camden, he heard a rumor that
Watson was returning to join Rawdon, and he there
fore moved a few miles to the eastward in order to
intercept Watson. As he had to cross a marshy

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL. 239
creek, the two pieces of artillery which he had re
cently received from Virginia, and his baggage, were
sent under charge of Colonel Carrington and the
North Carolina militia to get around this marsh by
making a detour of twenty miles to the north. On
the 23d he received more accurate information, and
returned to his position in front of Camden, sending
word to Carrington to rejoin him at once. His force
was posted in a defensive position on the brow of
Hobkirk's Hill, the two Virginia regiments on the
right of the Charlotte road, the two Maryland regi
ments on the left, and the two guns in the center. The
North Carolina militia was in rear, and Washington's
Cavalry supported the right flank. Kirkwood's Dela
ware battalion formed the outpost stationed at the
foot of the hill, about five hundred yards in advance
of the line. In this position the men camped and
slept, ready to take arms at a moment's notice. On
the night of the 24th one of the men deserted, and
told Rawdon that Greene's artillery and militia had
been sent to the rear. Rawdon thought it a judi
cious moment to attack, especially as he feared that
Marion and Lee might join Greene any day. At
nine o'clock on- the morning of the 25th, therefore,
he sallied out with every man in the garrison that
could carry a musket — about nine hundred in all.
He moved through the woods along the swamps of
Pine Tree Creek, as the approach to Hobkirk's Hill
was easiest from that direction. About ten o'clock
he came upon Kirkwood's pickets, who fell back on
the main body of the outpost and retreated skirmish
ing up the hill.
Greene's men had received some supplies that
morning. These were being issued, and the, men

240 GENERAL GREENE.
were washing their clothes, when the alarm was given
by the firing of the pickets. The men were called in
and quickly formed in position, so that they were
ready to receive Rawdon by the time he reached the
hill — about n a. m. After driving Kirkwood back,
Rawdon deployed- his force in line, the Sixty-third
Foot, supported by the Volunteers of Ireland (Raw-
don's own regiment) on the right ; the King's Amer
ican Regiment, supported by Captain Robertson's
detachment, on the left ; and the New York Volun
teers in the center. The South Carolina regiment
and a detachment of cavalry was in the rear. In
this formation he advanced slowly up the slope.
Greene watched the formation, and, thinking that it
presented a narrow front, he determined not to wait
on the defensive, but to make a counter attack in
stantly. He therefore directed Campbell, with the
First Virginia, on his right, to wheel to the left, so as
to envelop Rawdon's left flank, and Ford, with the
Second Maryland, to make a similar movement on
his left ; he also ordered the two remaining regi
ments in the center to advance with the bayonet,
and Washington's Cavalry to make a charge around
Campbell's right. The artillery meanwhile opened
with grape. These manoeuvres were somewhat com
plicated for troops most of whom had had so little
experience. Still, they were executed with tolerable
precision, and a vigorous engagement was soon
brought on. It resulted in Rawdon's left flank be
ginning to retire, and his center to waver. Washing
ton's charge was most successful, and he penetrated
to Rawdon's rear and took two hundred prisoners,
including all the surgeons in the army. Everything
was tending to a brilliant victory for Greene, when

• THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL. 241
Captain Beatty, of the famous First Maryland, was
killed. This caused his company to halt and then
to fall back in disorder. In order to retrieve this,
Colonel Gunby ordered the entire regiment to fall
back with the intention of reforming their line. But
once the retreat began it was impossible to stop it,
and this regiment, which was the pride and boast of
the army, and had done such splendid service on so
many, fields, now broke and ran. The panic was
communicated to the Second Maryland, and leaving
its commander, Colonel Ford, mortally wounded, it
also left the field in disorder. Seeing this, Rawdon's
line quickly rallied and pushed forward in pursuit,
turning the left flank of the Second Regiment under
Hawes. Greene saw that there was no hope of sav
ing the day, and bent his whole energy to making an
orderly retreat and saving his artillery. This was
accomplished by Washington's cavalry, which re
turned from its charge, and, abandoning its prison
ers, rushed into the mile'e which was in progress
around the guns, and stayed the advance of the
British long enough for' the guns to be withdrawn
and the army to effect its retreat under cover of
Hawes's regiment. Greene retreated in good order
for about five miles, and took up a new position in
Which to receive an attack. But Rawdon did not
attempt any pursuit.
The losses on the American side were nineteen
killed, one hundred and fifteen wounded, and one
hundred and thirty-six missing — total, two hundred
and seventy ; on the British side, two hundred and "
fifty-eight, of whom thirty-eight were killed.
Greene took his defeat much to heart. It seemed
as if he were fated never to win a battle. But he had

242 GENERAL GREENE.
no idea of giving up the struggle. To the French
Minister (Luzerne) he wrote : " We fight, get beat,
rise, and fight again " ; * and in his orders for the
day following the battle the parole was " Persevere,"
and the countersign was " Fortitude."
Greene attributed his defeat to the action of
Colonel Gunby, and time only confirmed him in this
opinion. Months afterward he wrote, in a personal
letter to his friend Reed, of Pennsylvania, that
Rawdon and his whole command would have been
made prisoners in three minutes more if Gunby had
not ordered his regiment to retire ; and he added :
" I was almost frantic with vexation at the disap
pointment." In his order to the army the day after
the battle he complimented several organizations,
and then added : " Our loss is so inconsiderable that
it is only to be lamented that the troops were not
unanimous of a disposition to embrace so excellent
an opportunity of gaining a victory." This pointed-
allusion caused Gunby to apply immediately for a
court of inquiry. It made its report on May 2d, and,
after reciting the facts, stated that "it appears from
the above report that Colonel Gunby's spirit and
activity were unexceptionable. But his order for the
regiment to retire, which broke the line, was ex-
* Greene's main object, in his correspondence with Luzerne, was
to persuade him to put into active service the French army of five
thousand men which now for nearly a j[ear had been cooped up in
Newport, doing nothing. If these joined Washington, doubtless
a re-enforcement could be spared for Greene. Luzerne wrote a
flattering reply to the letter from which the above extract is made,
but it contained nothing more definite than this : " Be assured that
his Majesty will think his troops well employed in co-operating
with a general who has effected such great things with such inferior

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BATTLE OF
HOBKIRK'S HILL,.
Topography from Stedman's History of
the American War. Position of
Troops from Johnson's Life
of Greene.
 SCALE OF YARDS 
0 100 200 300 400 500

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL 243
tremely improper and unmilitary, and in all proba
bility the only cause why we did not obtain a com
plete victory."
Greene remained for two days in the position he
had chosen just after the battle, and then retired ten
miles farther north to Rugely's Mill. On the 7th of
May, Watson succeeded in making his way into
Camden, and with this large re-enforcement Rawdon
again moved out to attack. Greene ; but the latter
marched to the west side of the Wateree and ma
noeuvred for two days until he occupied a position
where he was willing to fight. Rawdon reconnoitered
this position and deemed it too strong for attack ;
he therefore returned to Camden. In the mean
time Marion and Lee had been sent to besiege Fort
Motte, and Sumter was operating against Fort Gran
by and Orangeburg. Rawdon at Camden was com
pletely surrounded, his communications with Charles
ton were interrupted, and his supply trains were
being captured. It was difficult to obtain provisions
in the neighboring country, and he saw that he would
soon be cut off and starved. out. On the ioth, there
fore, he abandoned Camden, burned such stores as
he could not carry, and began his retreat to Charles
ton. On the nth Sumter captured Orangeburg; on
the 12th Marion took Fort Motte; on the 15th Fort
Granby surrendered to Lee. Early in June Marion
entered Georgetown, the garrison escaping to Charles
ton. The whole eastern line of posts thus went down
with a crash within a month from the time that
Greene crossed the South Carolina line. He had '
captured four posts with their garrisons, amounting
to over eight hundred men, and had driven the Brit
ish back to the vicinity of Charleston. He had lost

244

GENERAL GREENE.

the principal battle, but his movements were so well
planned that again, as at Guilford, he had gained all
the objects of the campaign.
Meanwhile, where was Cornwallis ? As already
stated, he reached Wilmington on April 7th. On his
retreat he had feared that possibly Greene might go
into South Carolina, and he had therefore sent mes
sages to Rawdon from Cross Creek to be on the
lookout for him. On the 22d a small vessel arrived
from Charleston, bringing him news which confirmed
his worst fears. Greene had marched into South
Carolina, was already approaching Camden, and the
upper posts were all in danger on account of the
uprising of the people. There is something almost
comical in the way in which Cornwallis complained
of being outmanoeuvred. To Phillips, in Virginia,
he wrote, April 24th : " My situation here is very dis
tressing. Greene took the advantage of my being
obliged to come to this place, and has marched to
South Carolina." Greene had indeed taken advan-i
tage of the misfortunes of his adversary,, as skillful
generals usually do ; he had manoeuvred him out of
the theatre of operations, and had then quickly gone
to attack his posts. The question with Cornwallis
was, What should he do ? Should he follow Greene
into South Carolina ? or should he march north to
join the British troops at the mouth of the Chesa
peake ? He decided to march north.
This decision had a most important bearing on
the termination of the war, and it gave rise in after
years to an elaborate and acrimonious discussion
between Clinton and Cornwallis. Clinton maintained
that his written instructions of June ist and Novem
ber 6, 1780, positively enjoined upon Cornwallis the

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

245

protection of Charleston, and forbade any movement
to the north until the two Carolinas were entirely
subjugated; and then the movement, if any, was to
be by vessel to the Chesapeake, there to act in con
cert with Clinton on the Delaware in an expedition
against Philadelphia. He contended that Cornwallis
by his first move into North Carolina, and still more
by his march to Virginia, violated the letter and
spirit of his orders, and in so doing brought about
the disaster at Yorktown and the ruin, of British afr
fairs in America. In Clinton's opinion, Cornwallis
should have retreated to Camden immediately after
the battle of Guilford ; having failed to do so then,
he should have done so from Wilmington, when he
heard that Greene was approaching Camden.
Cornwallis does not seem to have taken his in
structions so literally, but rather to have considered
himself as having more latitude in his separate com
mand, hundreds of miles away from the commander
in chief, and unable to communicate with him and
get a reply in less than two to three months. He
contended that it was necessary for him to act on
his own judgment ; that he was compelled to fall
back to Wilmington to refit his army ; that it was
impossible for him to reach Rawdon in time to be of
any assistance ; and that he thought he could be of
most service in uniting his force, now reduced to
fifteen hundred men, with that which had recently
been sent to the Chesapeake under Phillips. This
was the position he maintained in the pamphlets
with which he and Clinton pelted each other on#
their return to England after the close of the war.
It is out of place in a biography of Greene to go
into the details of this interesting controversy. It

246 GENERAL GREENE.
may be remarked, however, that one of the reasons
Which Cornwallis gives for not marching back to
South Carolina was as follows : " I did not think
that I could, with thirteen hundred infantry and two
hundred cavalry, undertake such a march, and the
passage of two such rivers as the Pedee and Santee,
without exposing the corps under my command to
the utmost hazard of disgrace and ruin." Yet
Greene made just such a march, with a smaller
force, not so well equipped, and at the end of it at
tacked and broke up a line of posts garrisoned by
nearly twice his numbers. Cornwallis would not
have hesitated to attempt this march, or one even
more hazardous, had it followed the line of glory
instead of that of disgrace. To go back to South
Carolina was to acknowledge himself beaten and his
campaign a failure ; and this was doubtless the main
reason why he marched north. Nevertheless, there
was a fair chance of success in Virginia ; and had he
beaten Washington at Yorktown, he would have over
run Virginia and cut off all Greene's communications
with the north, thus strangling his Southern cam
paign. Greene saw this clearly. He expected and
hoped that Cornwallis would follow him; and when
he learned that he had gone to Virginia he seriously
meditated on two separate occasions— the first, after
the battle of Hobkirk's Hill, and the second after
the siege of Ninety-Six — leaving Huger in command
in South Carolina to hold his own on the defensive
as best he could, while he [Greene] went to Virginia
to take command in person of the troops under La
fayette and Steuben, and with them fight Cornwallis.*
* His instructions from Congress and from Washington, both
at the beginning of the campaign and subsequently, fully author-

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

24;

So important did Greene consider his line of com
munications through Virginia. Without aid from the
North — as he was now writing incessantly to Wash
ington, Lafayette, Luzerne, the President of Con
gress, Governor Reed, and others — he felt that his
little army could not much longer sustain itself;
and if that failed, the partisans and militia would
soon disband and the Southern States be hopelessly
lost. Washington entertained the same opinion, and
determined to drive the British out of Virginia the
moment he succeeded in getting the co-operation of
the French army at Newport. It would seem, there
fore, that Cornwallis's fault was not so much in
marching to Virginia as in being beaten after he got
there. Why he was beaten in Virginia, and whether
he or Clinton was responsible for it, can not be dis
cussed here.
As soon as Rawdon began his retreat toward
Charleston, Greene made his preparations for mov
ing against Ninety-Six. They were slightly delayed
by the sensibilities of his partisan chiefs. Sumter
made a written protest against the taking of Fort
Granby by Lee, asserting that he- had been at great
pains to reduce the post, that it was in his power to
ized this. His command reached from Delaware to Georgia, and
all operations in these six States were under his control. As late
as April and May, 1781; Washington continued to direct Lafayette
and Steuben to act under Greene's orders, and they were in con
stant communication with him. The delays in this communica
tion, however, were so great that Greene usually left them to act
on their own discretion. But early in May, when Greene learned
definitely that Cornwallis was marching to Virginia, he sent orders
to Lafayette, who was then preparing to march to South Carolina,
to remain in Virginia ; and also to halt the Pennsylvania line under
Wayne when it arrived, and with them to oppose Cornwallis.

248 GENERAL GREENE.
do it, and he thought it " for the good of the public
to do it without regulars." Greene replied that Lee
had acted in accordance with his orders. Where
upon Sumter tendered his -resignation, but Greene
wrote him a flattering letter and declined to accept
it. Marion also was offended. There had been
much controversy about the impressment of horses.
On the one hand, people in Virginia complained
that Greene's officers were carrying off their stallions
and brood mares, and the Legislature took up their
complaint and directed the return of all such animals,
and of all geldings worth more than ,£5,000 (in paper
currency). Greene protested through Jefferson that
a horse worth less than .^5,000 would be useless to
carry a dragoon, and the act was repealed.* On the
other hand, Greene had great difficulty in getting
mounts for his cavalry, and Lee wrote him that
Marion's men were, not only all well mounted, but
had horses to spare. Greene called upon Marion to
furnish them. Marion took offense at the tone of
the letter, offered to dismount his own men, and
asked leave to retire to Philadelphia, alleging as a
reason that his men could never be depended upon.
Greene replied in excellent temper, alternately prais
ing Marion's past services and appealing to his
patriotism. " It is true your task has been disagree
able, but not more so. than others'. It is now going
on seven years since the commencement of the war ;
I have never had leave of absence an hour, or paid
the least attention to my own private affairs. Your
State is invaded; your all is at stake; what has
been done will signify nothing unless we persevere
* Tarleton and Simcoe soon afterward raided through Virginia
and carried off all the best horses, regardless of their value.

THE BATTLE OF HOBKIRK'S HILL.

249

to the end. I left a wife in distress, and everything
dear and valuable, to come and afford you all the
assistance in my power ; and if you leave us in the
midst of our difficulties, while you have it so much
in your power to promote the service, it must throw
a damper on the spirits of the army to find the first
men in the State are retiring from the busy scene to
indulge themselves in more agreeable amusements."
Marion yielded to this appeal, and remained with
the army till the last British soldier had left the
United States.
Having adjusted these matters, Greene put his
little force in motion toward Ninety-Six and Augusta,
the only posts in the interior of the State now re
maining in British possession. On the 16th of May
he sent Lee with the Legion against Augusta, and
this officer with his usual energy marched over one
hundred miles in four days, and reached the banks
of the Savannah River on the 19th. Greene started
with the main body on the 17th, and five days later
arrived in front of Ninety-Six. Numerous messen
gers had been sent by Rawdon to Colonel Cruger, at
Ninety-Six, directing him to abandon his post and
retire to Augusta, there joining his force to that of
Colonel Browne, and subsequently acting on his dis
cretion ; but these messengers had all been inter
cepted, and Cruger had no very -definite information
of what had taken place in and around Camden in
the last .three weeks except such as he had been able
to gain from an American militia officer who had
been captured. He therefore remained at Ninety-*
Six, and employed his entire force in strengthening
its fortifications, in the anticipation that Greene
would probably besiege it.
17

2 SO

GENERAL GREENE.

On approaching the Savannah River, Lee learned
that the annual presents for the Indians were being
transported up the river and had reached a point
about twelve miles below Augusta, called Fort
Galpin, where they were guarded by two companies
from the garrison of Augusta. The presents con
sisted of powder, ball, small arms, rum, salt, blankets,
and other articles of which the Americans were much
in need. Against this place Lee employed the well-
known stratagem of which the first recorded use is by
Joshua at the attack of Ai in 145 1 b. c. Concealing
the greater part of his force in the vicinity of the
stockade, he sent a small body to attack it on the
opposite side! The defenders rushed out to drive
off or capture this small force, and, as it retreated,
the main force charged into the stockade and took
possession of it. In this manner Lee not only cap
tured all of these valuable stores, but the entire
garrison of one hundred and twenty-six men; his
own loss was only one man, who was overcome by
the heat. After resting only a few hours he pressed
on later in the same day (May 21st) toward Augusta,
approaching it from the west, and joining on his
way the militia of Pickens and Clarke, who had been
assembling in this vicinity.
Augusta was then a small village, and its de
fenses consisted of Fort Cornwallis, a stockade in the
middle of the village, garrisoned by five hundred
and fifty men, mostly regulars, under Lieutenant-
Colonel Browne; and another stockade called Fort
Grierson, situated about half a mile up the river,
and defended by eighty Tory militia. Lee sum7
moned Browne to surrender, and this being con
temptuously refused, he surrounded Fort Grierson.

THE SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX.

251

The garrison attempted to escape to Fort Cornwal
lis, and as soon as they came out of their stockade
nearly half of them, including Lieutenant-Colonel
Grierson and the major, were killed by the Georgia
militia, who were exceedingly bitter on account of
the cruelties which they and their families had suf
fered from the Tories: Several of the others were
wounded and taken prisoners, and a few only man
aged to make good their escape.
Lee and Pickens then closed in around Fort Corn
wallis ; but Browne made a good defense. On three
successive nights he made vigorous sallies, and by
means of mines he blew up one of the houses which
he supposed was occupied by the besiegers. Recourse
was then had by Lee to the Maham tower, which
had been so successfully used at Fort Watson, and
this time it was built strong enough to hold a six-
pounder on its top. This completely dominated the
fort and dismounted its two guns. A renewed de
mand being made for surrender, it was finally agreed
to, and on June 5th the garrison marched out and
laid down its arms. Leaving Pickens to dispose of
the stores, Lee set out on the following morning to
join Greene at Ninety-Six, arriving there on June
8th. Pickens followed a few days later.
Greene, with his so-called army, consisting of the
four Continental regiments, two from Virginia and
two from Maryland, the remnants of Kirkwood's
Delaware battalion, and one from North Carolina,
numbering in all, according to the May returns, nine
hundred and eighty-four men, had left the vicinity '
of Camden on May 17th and arrived in front of
Ninety-Six on the 22d. This place derived its name
from being ninety-six miles from Keowee, the prin-

252 GENERAL GREENE.
cipal village of the Cherokees. It was a frontier
post, consisting originally of a stockade for defense
against the Indians; but during the last year ad
ditional works had been planned under direction of
Lieutenant Haldane, of the Royal Engineers, an
aid-de-camp on Cornwallis's staff. These had only
been partially completed in the spring of 1781, but
when Greene approached Camden, Cruger laid waste
the surrounding country, which was one of great fer
tility, and, calling in all the slaves, set them to work
night and day on the defenses. On the west of the
village stockade there was a spring and rivulet from
which the garrison obtained its supply of water. To
protect this, the jail, which stood just within the
stockade, was strengthened and put in condition for
defense ; and on a slight eminence across the rivulet
a stockaded fort was built, inclosing two block
houses. This fort and the jail completely command
ed every point from which water was taken. On the
east of the village a redoubt was built about seventy
yards in diameter, with sixteen salient and re-entrant
angles, giving cross-fire on every point of approach.
From its shape, this was called the Star. .Around
this a ditch was dug, the bottom of which was twelve
feet below the parapet of the'redoubt. This ditch
was continued with less depth around the entire vil
lage stockade, and it was protected with fraise and
abatis. A covered way connected the stockade fort
and the village stockade, and this in turn connected
with the Star redoubt, so that there was covered com
munication from one end of the defenses to the other.
Three pieces of light artillery, one six-pounder and
two four-pounders, were within the Star, and plat
forms had been built at several points along its para-

THE SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX.

253

pet, to which the guns could be moved as required.-
The garrison consisted of one battalion of De Lan-
eey's Loyalists, of New York, the Second Battalion of
.New Jersey Volunteers, and a body of South Caro
lina Tories. They numbered five hundred and fifty
men in all, and those from New York and New Jersey
had been enlisted at the beginning of the war and
had been in active service ever since. The com
manding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel John H.
Cruger, of New York.
During the 2 2d, Greene, accompanied by Colonel
Kosciusko, his chief engineer, made a careful recon-
noissance completely around the enemy's works. He
found them so strong that, as he wrote to Lafayette
the next day, success with his small force was almost
impossible. Yet he determined to make a vigorous
effort. During the evening his little force was posted
at four points, so as practically to surround the gar
rison and prevent any escape. During the night,
which was dark and rainy, Kosciusko broke ground
for his first parallels at seventy yards from the Star
redoubt. 'When Cruger saw this in the morning he
determined to punish such an insult, and he ordered
a sally with one company under Lieutenant Roney,
protected by the fire of the three guns and all the
infantry of the garrison. It was entirely successful,
broke up the intrenching party, captured their tools,
destroyed the work which they had done, and escaped
back to the redoubt before the supporting parties
could come to their assistance. On the following
night ground was again broken for the first parallel, *
but this time at a distance of four hundred yards.
The work was continued vigorously night and day,
in spite of constant and vigorous but unsuccessful

254 GENERAL GREENE.
sorties on the part of the garrison. A mine was
begun from the end of the first parallel, and a bat
tery built in the second ; the second parallel was
completed on June 3d, and the garrison was then
formally summoned to surrender. Cruger rejected
the summons, and the third parallel was begun, its
progress being greatly assisted by resorting to the
now familiar device of the Maham tower.
While the siege was in progress Marion was oper
ating in the lower districts. He procured the Charles
ton papers of June 2d, and his messengers covered
the two hundred miles to Ninety-Six in four days
and placed these papers in Greene's hands on the
night of the 6th. They contained the worst possible
news. The long-expected re-enforcements from Ire
land had arrived, and Greene knew that Rawdon
would now soon be marching against him. Rawdon
had retreated after the evacuation of Camden and
the loss of his other posts to the vicinity of Charles
ton, and was there awaiting these re-enforcements,
which consisted of the Third, Nineteenth, and Thir
tieth Regiments of foot, a detachment of the Guards,
and a considerable body of recruits. After his ar
rival in Virginia Cornwallis had sent a dispatch boat
to Charleston with orders to Rawdon not to let these
re-enforcements cross the bar, but to turn them
northward to Virginia the moment they were sighted.
Unfortunately for Greene, this dispatch boat was
captured by an American privateer, and Rawdon did
not receive these orders until after he had marched
to the interior with these re-enforcements. On his
side, Greene was also expecting the re-enforcements
of Virginia militia, which he had asked for in March,
when the six weeks' militia had gone home. He had

THE, SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX. 255
asked for fifteen hundred, and Jefferson had ordered
out two thousand. After long delays and innumer
able difficulties, Steuben had finally collected about
five hundred and fifty men, and he was impatient to
march with them to Greene's assistance. They were
just starting during the latter part of May, when
they were recalled by Jefferson in consequence of
Cornwallis's operations in Virginia. Greene heard
of this a few days after he learned that Rawdon's
re-enforcements had arrived at Charleston. In con
sequence of two unforeseen events, Greene was thus
deprived of his own re-enforcements, and his adver
sary received his.
In order to oppose Rawdon's advance, Greene
sent the most explicit instructions, under date of
June ioth, to Sumter, to summon Marion to his as
sistance, and to put himself in front of Rawdon,
retard his advance in every way possible, to fall back
slowly before him and put himself in communication
with Greene, his intention being to fight Rawdon
before he reached Ninety-Six. On the nth Greene
received information that Rawdon had begun his
march, and on the same day Pickens arrived at
Ninety-Six from Augusta. Greene immediately sent
him to re-enforce Sumter; but Sumter could not or
would not move his men out of their own district.
They took post at Fort Granby, thinking that Raw
don would besiege them. But Rawdon naturally
pushed past Sumter without noticing him, arriving
in the vicinity of Ninety-Six on June 21st. Thus
Greene was not only deprived of his re-enforcements,
but lost; all assistance from his partisan bands
through their failure to carry out his instructions.
, Meanwhile the siege had been. progressing. Lee

256 GENERAL GREENE.
had arrived on the 8th, and had immediately broken
ground on the left, opposite the stockade fort. On
the night of the 9th a sortie was made by two strong
parties, who penetrated to the battery in the third
parallel, destroyed the mine, and wounded Kosciusko.
But they were driven back before they had been able
to injure the guns. Lee pushed his works vigorously
against the stockade fort, and soon had it so com
pletely under his fire that the defenders could not go
out for water during daylight, and were reduced to
obtaining it at night by means of slaves, whose black
bodies it was supposed would not be seen. On the
night of the 12th he attempted to set fire to the aba
tis, but the result was a disastrous failure, the party
sent out for this purpose being all killed or wounded.'
On the afternoon of the 12th a picturesque incident
occurred. A countryman rode into the lines from
the south and moved along conversing with the offi
cers and men. This was a daily occurrence, and at
tracted no attention. But this man, when he reached
a favorable point, put spurs to his horse and gal
loped toward the village stockade. Hundreds of
bullets were sent after him, but he escaped unhurt,
and as he neared the stockade he turned in his sad
dle and waved a letter in his hand. It was a dis
patch from Rawdon to Cruger, telling him " that he'
had passed Orangeburg and was in full march to
raise the siege."
Greene now knew that he -could not hope for a
surrender. His only possible chance of success was
in a speedy assault, and for this he made prepara
tions. The troops were all anxious to try it. The
third parallel was now' within thirty yardsrof the re
doubt, and a mine and two trenches, led from it to

THE SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX.

257

within a few feet of the ditch. The Maham tower
commanded the interior of the redoubt, and all efforts
of the garrison to destroy it had failed. From its
top the riflemen picked off the gunners so that the
guns were silent during the day. At night, however,-
the guns resumed fire, as the besiegers had not suc
ceeded in dismounting them. The parapet had been
raised three feet higher, making its total height above
the ditch fifteen feet, by means of sandbags, leaving
openings through which the field pieces as well as
the muskets could fire.
The 1 8th of June was fixed as the day of the as
sault. Axes were provided to cut out the abatis,
fascines to fill up the dkch, and long poles with
hooks at the end to pull down the sandbags. Camp
bell, with his own regiment, the First Virginia, and a
detachment of Marylanders, was to storm the Star
redoubt, and Lee, with the Legion, was to attack the
stockade fort. The rest of the force was to man the
Maham tower, the battery and the third parallel, and
cover the assault with their fire. At eleven o'clock
in the morning Greene opened the most vigorous can
nonade that his four guns could produce, and his
riflemen were ready to pick off every head that
showed itself above the parapet. At noon the storm
ing parties rushed forward and soon gained the ditch.
Here they were subjected to a terrible cross-fire on
their flanks from the salient angles of the redoubt,
and from above their heads through the loopholes of
the sandbags. It was found impossible to pull down
these bags, either because the bags were too heavy*
or the poles were not long enough. Nevertheless, the
men continued to work in the ditch for nearly an
hour, clearing out the abatis and piling up the fas-

258 GENERAL GREENE.
cines ; but finally, of their leaders, Captain Arm
strong was killed and Lieutenants Seldon and Duval
were wounded, and just then two parties of the gar
rison — one under Campbell, of New Jersey, and the
other under French, of De Lancey's battalion — came
out through the sallyport of the redoubt, and, en
tering the ditch at that point, one part on each side,
charged the assailants in the flank. Attacked thus on
all sides, the storming parties were driven out of the
ditch and forced back into the third parallel.
On the left, Lee's attack upon the stockade fort
met with much better success. The storming party
was led by Captain Rudolph, of the Legion, and it was
supported by the rest of the Legion and Kirkwood's
Delaware battalion. It captured the stockade fort,
and was preparing to assault the jail and then take
the Star redoubt in reverse, when Lee was recalled
by Greene.When his storming party found it impossible to
make any headway out of the ditch, Greene had the
same opportunity that had presented itself to him at
the close of the battle of- Guilford. He could send
every man to the support of the storming party and
risk everything on the result, which would be either
success or the total destruction of his entire force.
Now, as then, he adhered to his resolution never to
place his army within the possibility of complete de
struction. He therefore withdrew within his own
lines and made preparations to raise the siege and
begin his retreat toward Charlotte, North Carolina,
in the morning. The siege had lasted twenty-eight
days. Greene had lost fifty-seven killed, seventy
wounded, and twenty missing; the garrison lost
twenty-seven killed and fifty-eight wounded.

33$ 3,

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VIEW OF
NINETY SIX
SCALE OF'YARDS

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REFERENCES.
a.
The Spring.
6.
•' Stockade Fort.
C.
" Old Jail.
d.
" Court House.
e.
" Star Redoubt.
/•
" First Mine.
ff> ff> ?» ff* The bedeginn
encampments,
A,
A. The Lines enclosing
the Town.
'.J
{Of- *** * s i» j? A A A A
q
A A A A
From Johnson's Life of Greene
THE SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX.

259

RaWdon arrived at Ninety-Six on the 21st of
June, bringing with him fresh troops to the number of
about eighteen hundred infantry and two hundred
cavalry, besides irregular partisans. He was hailed
with delight, and Cruger was congratulated on the
gallant defense which he had made. Greene had be
gun his retreat on the morning of the 20th, taking
the road toward Charlotte, and sending orders to
Sumter to join him. Rawdon wasted no time at
Ninety-Six, but marched in pursuit of Greene a few
hours after his arrival. On the 23d he came up with
the rear guard, under Lee and Washington, oil the
banks of the Enndree, Greene with the main body
being farther on, behind the Broad River. He had
retreated about fifty miles in three days. Rawdon
saw that he could accomplish nothing by continu
ing the pursuit, and he therefore retraced his steps
to Ninety-Six, Lee and Washington following him
closely all the way.
It was impossible for the British to retain a gar
rison at Ninety-Six. The distance from Charleston
was about one hundred and sixty miles, all the inter
mediate posts had been broken up, and communica
tions could not be maintained through a country in
fested with hostile partisans and an active adversary.
Rawdon therefore made preparations for its imme
diate abandonment. Thus, for the third time, the
British had won the action, but Greene had gained
the object of the campaign.
The entire population of the State being in arms
on one or the other side, and both pursuing each
other with relentless vigor and cruelty, it was neces
sary to- provide for removing the Tory inhabitants of
the district around Ninety-Six at the same time that

260 GENERAL GREENE.
the post was abandoned. This duty, as well as the
removal of the stores, was intrusted to Cruger and
considerably more than half of the united force,
while Rawdon, with eight hundred infantry and sixty
cavalry, began his retreat to Charleston on June
29th. His route lay through Fort Granby, or Fri
day's Ferry, where he expected to be joined by Lieu
tenant-Colonel Stuart and the Third Regiment from
Charleston. Lee hung close to Rawdon in all his
movements and kept Greene fully informed of them.
The latter immediately marched to Winnsborough
(whence Cornwallis had started on the campaign six
months before), and leaving there his baggage, stores,
and invalids, with orders to proceed to Camden, he
continued his march toward Fort Granby. Sumter
and Marion were again urged to join him, and Lee
was directed to put himself in front of Rawdon and
delay his march as much as possible. Rawdon
reached Fort Granby on July 3d, two days before
Greene, but Lee was constantly on his flanks, and
picked up between forty and fifty of his dragoons
who imprudently left the column on a foraging ex
pedition. At Fort Granby Rawdon expected to find
Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart and the Third Regiment,
who were under orders to march from Charleston
and meet him at that point. But he was not there.*
His march had been delayed, and the letter from
Colonel Balfour to Rawdon, informing him of this
fact, had been intercepted and placed in Greene's
hands. Rawdon therefore continued his retreat to
Orangeburg, Lee in front of him and harassing him
all the way. On the 8th he reached that point, his
men half dead with heat and fatigue; and here he
was joined by Stuart and the Third Regiment, or

THE SIEGE OF NINETY-SIX. 2f5l
Buffs. On. .the same day Cruger, with over thirteen
hundred troops and his caravan of emigrants, left
Ninety-Six, closely watched by Pickens and Clarke.
On the ioth, Sumter and Marion joined Greene at
Fort Granby with about one thousand State troops
and militia, carrying Greene's total strength to over
two thousand men. He immediately marched from
Fort Granby to Orangeburg, hoping to fight Raw
don on favorable ground before Cruger could join
him. He took up a position in front of Orangeburg,
in the expectation that Kawdon would come out to
attack him ; but Rawdon occupied an excellent po
sition at Orangeburg and declined to leave it. On
the other hand, this position was too strong for Greene
to attack it. Cruger, having convoyed his refugees
well on their way toward Charleston, was now march
ing across to join Rawdon at Orangeburg, giving him
a united force o'f nearly three thousand regulars.
Greene therefore decided, on July 13th, to retreat
from Orangeburg and post his Continental troops
on the High Hills of Santee, for the purpose of giv
ing them a short but much-needed rest and recupera
tion,* while the partisan troops and the Legion were
sent on a raid against the posts just outside of
Charleston. This expedition did not realize all that
was expected of it, but it captured or destroyed a
considerable amount of stores, horses, and wagons,
took one hundred and fifty prisoners, drove the Nine
teenth Regiment from Monk's Corners into Charles
ton and penetrated within five miles of that city, and
all without any losses of consequence. They then re- ?
* For the last ten days the army had subsisted almost entirely
on rice and frogs.

262 GENERAL GREENE.
turned, and on the 22d of July the force was posted
as follows : Greene with the main body and Lee's
Legion on the High Hills of Santee; Sumter at
Friday's Ferry, on the right ; Marion at Nelson's
Ferry, on the left ; and Pickens recruiting on his old
ground, in the vicinity of Ninety-Six.
Rawdon returned to Charleston, and thence sailed
for New York on leave of absence. His vessel was
captured by De Grasse on his way to Yorktown, and
he joined Cornwallis as a prisoner at the latter's sur
render. Stuart, who was left in command of the
troops in the field, advanced slightly from Orange
burg toward Friday's Ferry. In these positions both
armies, prostrated with the intense heat and worn
out with their prodigious marches and incessant com
bats, rested for the next six weeks-

CHAPTER XIII.
EUTAW SPRINGS AND THE CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN
CAMPAIGN — I78l-'83.
On the 2d of December, 1780, Greene had taken
command at Charlotte, and early in January the active
campaign had begun with the battle of the Cowpens.
It was now the last of July, 1781, and during these
seven months — through the snows of winter, the mud
and rains of spring, and the torrid heat of summer —
.the campaign had been in progress with hardly a
day's intermission. It was a superbly sustained ef
fort. Without assistance from the North, without
proper equipment, without money, without any rer
sources except such as his genius called forth from
an exhausted country, opposed to an enemy outnum
bering him three to one, he had broken up all their
posts in the interior, had manoeuvred one part of
their force into Virginia and driven the rest back
toward the seacoast, where their fleet gave them
immunity. He had marched nine hundred and fifty
miles, fought three battles, carried on a siege, con
ducted a most skillful retreat and an equally bril
liant advance. When the enemy concentrated their
army for attack he divided his force for the purpose
of distracting their attention ; and when they dis
persed in order to hold the conquered territory and
reintroduce their Government, he assembled his

264 GENERAL GREENE.
troops to fall upon their posts in quick succession
and destroy them. Defeated in every general en
gagement and losing his principal siege, he yet
gained the ultimate object of every movement.
His adversaries as well as his companions have
united in testifying to his well-merited success. The
British historian Steedman says : '* Through his own
firmness and perseverance ... he succeeded in the
main object of the campaign." And the brilliant
and generous Lee, to whom more than to any one
else of his subordinates he owed his success, and
who, more fortunate than Greene himself, failed in
hardly a single one of the enterprises confided to
him, wrote that " such results can only be attributed
to superior talents, seconded by skill, courage, and
fidelity. Fortune often gives victory ; but when the
weak, destitute of the essential means of war, suc
cessfully oppose the' strong, it is not chance but sub
lime genius which guides the intermediate operations
and controls the -ultimate event." Greene was
cheered at the time by-a cordial letter from Washing
ton, saying : " It is with the warmest pleasure I ex
press my full approbation of the various movements
and operations which your military conduct has
lately exhibited, while I confess to you that I am un
able to conceive what more could have been' done
under your circumstances than has been displayed
by your little, persevering, and determined army."
The hot and sickly season was now at its height,
and it was imperatively necessary to rest and recruit
his exhausted force. For this purpose Greene se
lected the High Hills of Santee, an elevated and
comparatively healthy region about ninety miles
from Charleston. Here he placed his little force in

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 265
tents, instituted daily drills, parades, and guard duty,
and re-established its discipline.
He had now practically abandoned all hope of re-
enforcements from the North, and hisronly resource
was to draw fresh men from the two States he had re
conquered. He had been so disappointed in regard
to the Virginia militia that it seemed useless to ask
for any more ; but he did ask of the new Governor
(Nelson) that recruits might be sent to fill up the
quota of the two Continental regiments from Vir
ginia. His appeal was unsuccessful, for all the men
that could be raised in Virginia were needed within
her own borders. In North Carolina the draft had
been ordered. It was feebly enforced, but two hun
dred recruits were sent to the Continental regiments,
and about five hundred militia came forward, im
perfectly armed, under General Sumner. In South
Carolina the Governor (Rutledge) had just returned
from the North and was at Greene's camp. Measures
were taken to restore civil government throughout
the State. It was not deemed expedient to order a
draft, but Sumter was authorized to raise a brigade
to fill the State's Continental quota. So far from
doing this, however, Sumter, without consulting
Greene, retired to his home on the plea of ill health,
and did not rejoin the army until four months later.
Moreover, he left instructions with the officer to whom
he turned over his command that he wished " the
troops to have a respite from service until the ist of
October, and as many of them furloughed from time
to time as the service will permit of." And he did this
in face of a letter from Greene, received only a few
days before, saying that " as soon as re-enforce
ments arrive and ..the. troops have had a little relax-
18

266 GENERAL GREENE.
ation, we will draw our force to a point and attack
the enemy wherever he may be found." Such a fla
grant case of insubordination deserved the severest
punishment, and Greene's first thought was to bring
Sumter to immediate trial. But on reflection he saw
that this would introduce dissension in a State where
he needed every available assistance. Moreover, he
fully appreciated Sumter's brilliant abilities as a par
tisan leader, and he was perhaps not without hopes
that Sumter might soon return to duty. He there
fore decided to pass over his dereliction in silence.
He had no hesitation, however, in peremptorily re
scinding the order for furloughing the men ; and he
directed their new commander, Colonel Henderson,
not only to give no furlough, but to call out every
man at home. In this Henderson was only partially
successful, and the number of men he brought to the
battle of Eutaw Springs was less than two hundred.
In the final effort which Greene was about to make
to drive the British out of South Carolina the troops
of that State numbered barely seven hundred in all.
In Georgia a small force of about one hundred
and fifty militia had. been raised, but before they
could take the field they were smitten with small
pox, and were disbanded.
The six weeks of repose on the High Hills of
Santee had thus brought nothing in the way of re-en
forcements but about seven hundred raw levies from
North Carolina, and these so deficient in arms that
only half of them could be brought into action. It
had brought nothing in the way of clothing or other
equipments. Rutledge had indeed come back with
promises of money from Robert Morris, the new
Superintendent of Finance. But the promises were

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 267
not cash ; only authority to draw drafts on Morris
to a limited extent, and these were conditioned upon
subscriptions being obtained from Southern planters
to shares in the new bank. The idea of expecting
planters, in the midst of a civil war, to subscribe to a
new-fangled idea of a bank away off in Philadelphia
was in the last degree visionary. Rutledge could
not secure a subscription for one share along the
whole line of his journey from Philadelphia to the
Santee. Greene wrote to Morris telling him of the
result ; and thinking that Morris could not possibly
comprehend his situation, he endeavored to paint it
for him in unmistakable colors. " When I tell you
that I am in distress, don't imagine that I mean little
difficulties, but suppose my situation to be like a
ship's crew in a storm, where the vessel is ready to
sink and the water gains ground in the hold with
every exertion to prevent it. It is a maxim in re
publican governments never to despair of the com
monwealth ; nor do I. But I foresee more difficul
ties than I can readily see how to conquer. I wish
to discharge my duty, but events will depend upon
the means and upon the hand of Providence. If I
have any opportunity of obtaining money and draw
ing bills on you, I shall embrace it. But 'tis a very
uncertain source, and therefore I leave you to judge
of the prudence of exposing an army to such contin
gencies." For the present he found no one ready to
buy drafts on Morris. But the Governor discovered
a small source of revenue in seizing indigo, of which
a considerable amount was raised in the State, and
this was sold for cash, with which the wants of the
army in the matter of clothing were slightly relieved.
For food the army depended now, as it always

268 GENERAL GREENE.
had, on forced impressment from the surrounding
country. The necessity for this was a constant in
centive to plunder, and the intense hatred between
Whig and Tory still further increased this tendency.
This disposition was naturally more noticeable among
the partisan troops of the State than among the Con
tinentals. Greene repressed it with a heavy hand,
several marauders being hanged. The same punish
ment had to be meted out to deserters, and one ser
geant was shot for inciting to mutiny. While Greene
did not shirk the responsibility for these acts, yet bis
kindly nature was sickened at the sight of them and
of the miseries of the people around him. In writing
to his wife he could not repress his longing "for a
peaceful retirement, where love and softer pleasures
are to be found. Here, turn what way you will, you
have nothing but the mournful widow and the plaints
of the fatherless child, and behold nothing but
houses desolated and plantations laid waste. Ruin
is in every form and misery in every shape." It was
more than six years since he had left his home, and
nearly two years since the last glimpse of his wife at
the winter camp at Morristown. The activity and
excitement of the campaign had absorbed his atten
tion, and it was doubtless not lacking in that pleas
ure which a vigorous man always feels in the
accomplishment of important deeds; yet, in the
temporary inaction of camp, surrounded by misery,
and with a still uncertain future before him, there
must have been many a long, sad, and weary hour,
in which his thoughts turned to home and wife and
children. But these six weeks, though they brought but a-
handful of re-enforcements and a pittance in money,

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 269
had refreshed and invigorated his army, restored its
discipline, and raised its hopes. It was in good
spirits in spite of its almost incredible hardships,
and nothing was to be gained by further inaction-
He therefore sallied forth from his camp to fight the
British army once more, hoping to inflict a disastrous
defeat upon it and drive the remnants into Charles
ton, where, as he more than once suggested to
Washington, he hoped that the French fleet would
come to capture them.
On the 23d of August he broke camp at day
break and marched up the Wateree toward Camden.
Stuart, with a force slightly larger than his own, was
encamped nearly opposite to him and about sixteen
miles distant, at the junction of the Congaree and
Wateree. It was open to Greene to march down the
river to Nelson's Ferry, about two miles from Eutaw
Springs, and, crossing there, place himself between
Stuart and Charleston ; but to this there were mani
fold objections. The rivers were enormously swollen
by recent rains, and Greene did not possess enough
boats to insure his crossing; if Stuart reached Nel
son's Ferry before him, his army was not sufficiently
numerous to force a passage across the river. More
over, throughout the whole campaign he always ma
noeuvred so as to keep as near as possible to the head-
Waters of the streams, and never to allow the enemy
to get between him and the base of the moun
tains, along which in case of necessity lay his line of
retreat to Virginia. Finally, the militia of Pickens
and Henderson (formerly Sumter's) were in the vi
cinity of Fort Granby, and he wished to unite with
them before making an attack. The plan of moving
down the river was therefore renounced in favor of

270 GENERAL GREENE.
a circuitous march through Camden and Howell's
Ferry, thus approaching Stuart from the north and
west, and on the same side of the river that he was.
Owing to the intense heat, Greene moved slowly,
and on the 28th reached Fort Motte. Stuart, as
soon as he heard that' Greene was at Camden, began
his retreat toward Charleston, and established him
self at Eutaw Springs. Sending all his heavy bag
gage back to Howell's Ferry, and keeping only two
wagons loaded with hospital stores and rum, Greene
moved slowly forward in pursuit. On the 5th he
learned of a successful encounter between Marion
(who with his own partisans and Washington's
Dragoons was raiding the lower country toward
Charleston) and a party of British and Hessians at
Parker's Ferry on the Edisto, in which Marion
killed and wounded about one hundred of his oppo
nents, with only a trifling loss on his own side.
Marion joined him on the evening of September 7th,'
about seven miles from Eutaw Springs.
On the morning of the 8th Greene formed his
army in two columns, each ready for instant deploy
ment. In the first were four small battalions of
militia — two from North Carolina, under Colonel
Malmedy, and two from South Carolina, under
Pickens and Marion ; in the second were three small
brigades of Continentals, from North Carolina, Vir
ginia, and Maryland, under Sumner, Campbell, and
Williams respectively. Lee with his legion covered
the right flank, Henderson with the South Carolina
partisans the left flank, and Washington's Cavalry
with the remnants of Kirkwood's Delaware Battalion
formed the rear. Two three-pounders were with the
first column and two six-pounders with the second.

CLOSE OF' THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

271

In this order- Greene moved forward at daylight to
ward Eutaw Springs. His total strength was about
twenty-three hundred, of whom twelve hundred and
¦fifty-six were Continentals and the rest militia,
Stuart's force was almost exactly equal in
strength, and consisted of the Third Regiment or
" Buffs," lately arrived from Ireland, the Sixty-third
and Sixty-fourth Regiments, which had served
•through the whole war, a battalion of Grenadiers,
and the New York and New Jersey Volunteers under
Cruger. They were camped in a clearing about two
hundred yards west of Eutaw Springs, on the main.
road along the Congaree. Except in this clearing
the surrounding country was heavily wooded. They
do not seem to have kept a very good watch, for al
though Greene had passed the night within less than
seven miles of them, they had no knowledge of his
approach, and on the morning of the 8th the usual
detachment of " rooting parties " was sent out from
each regiment, unarmed and accompanied only by a
small escort, to dig for sweet potatoes. Two de
serters came into Stuart's camp during the night
telling of Greene's approach, but their story was not
credited ; they were thought to be spies, and were
sent to the guard house. Nevertheless, a detach
ment of cavalry under Captain Coffin was sent out
after the " rooting parties " to reconnoiter. This
detachment met Greene's advance guard about 8
a. m., four miles from Eutaw. Supposing it to be
a party of militia, Coffin charged impetuously. He
soon learned his mistake, and his men broke and*
fled, leaving forty prisoners and a number of dead
and wounded on the field. The "rooting parties"
who were in the fields near the river, hearing this

272 GENERAL GREENE.
firing, came through the woods to the road, where
they were all captured.
The sound of Coffin's skirmish told Stuart that
the enemy was near him, and he quickly put his force
in position across the road, about two hundred yards
in front of his camp. The Third Regiment was
placed on the right, the Volunteers under Cruger in
the center, and the Sixty-third and Sixty-fourth on
the left. A battalion of light infantry under Major
Marjoribanks protected his right' flank, extending
from the Third Regiment to the steep bank of Eutaw
Creek. His three pieces of artillery were placed in
.the center, on the road.
Greene moved forward quickly in pursuit of Cof
fin, deploying his two columns into lines as rapidly
as the ground would permit, and sending his artil
lery in advance to open the engagement. In this
manner he continued to move forward until he came
upon the enemy's main line. Here a very hot fight
took place. The militia, under the lead of Pickens
and Marion, fought with great determination and
held their ground for a long time, but they were
finally forced back in the center, and Sumner was or
dered from the second into the first line. Thus re-
enforced, the first line renewed the battle and again
gained ground, but after a while it was again forced
back. Greene then sent Williams and Campbell for
ward with orders not to fire, but to use their bayonets ;
at the same time Washington's Cavalry was advanced
against the British right under Marjoribanks, and
Lee with the infantry of the Legion against, their
left. A most determined assault was then made on
all sides; the men came to close quarters and the
bayonet was freely used. On the left Washington

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

273

met with disaster. Marjoribanks made a stubborn
defense, and the ground was much too densely wooded
to allow the cavalry to operate with advantage.
Washington's horse was shot under him, -he was
bayoneted, and would have been killed but for the
intervention of a British officer, who made him pris
oner. All of his officers but two were killed or
wounded, and nearly half of his men met the same
fate. The remnants were withdrawn by the two
surviving officers, and their retreat was covered by
Colonel Wade Hampton and the South Carolina par
tisans. In the center and on the right the Ameri
cans met with complete success. In the desperate
struggle Campbell was killed, Howard and- Henderson
were wounded, the gallant Duval, who had led the
storming party into the ditch at Ninety-Six, was
killed, and many others were wounded ; but the line
pressed on, greatly assisted by the fire of the Legion
upon the British left flank. Two of the three British
guns were captured and three hundred prisoners were
taken ; and finally their whole line gave way and
fled in confusion through their camp. Marjoribanks
from the right followed and covered their retreat.
The greater part of the British force ran until
they reached the two roads some distance in rear
of their camp. Here Stuart succeeded in rallying
them. But a portion of the New York Volunteers
under Major Sheridan rushed into a strongly built
brick house on the edge of a garden surrounded by a
stout fence. Marjoribanks halted in the garden on
the right of this house. Sheridan was pursued so
closely by the infantry of Lee's Legion that both
reached the brick house at the same moment, and for
a time there was a struggle for the possession of the

274

GENERAL GREENE.

door. But the British finally held it and closed it;
and then began a vigorous fire from the windows.
Unfortunately, the line of the American advance led
directly through the British camp, and it was filled
with an abundance of good things to eat and drink.
The Americans could not resist the temptation to
stop and enjoy these luxuries, to which they had so
long been strangers; they considered the battle won,
and no efforts of their officers could induce- them to
continue the pursuit. Thus the Legion, alone, and
unsupported, reached the house. It could not main
tain itself against the fire from the windows and was
forced to retreat. It did so, protecting itself from
the fire by means of the prisoners which it took.
Seeing their retreat, Coffin with his cavalry, which
was in the woods on the British left and had not been
carried away in their retreat, emerged and made a
vigorous charge against the American right, and Mar
joribanks resumed the offensive against Kirkwood on
their left. Coffin was met by Hampton in a desperate
encounter, in which the former was routed. The two
six-pounders from the American second line, together
with the two which had been captured from the Brit
ish, were then brought up for the purpose of demol
ishing the house. Hampton was so successful that
both he and the artillery pushed on too far and with
out proper support, the bulk of the American force
still being in complete disorder, eating and drinking
in the British camp. Seeing this, Marjoribanks
made a bold and successful flank attack, inflicting
great loss on Hampton, driving him back, and cap
turing three out of the four pieces of artillery. This
put an end to the action. The American force was
in such confusion that their only safety was in re-

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

275

treat, which Greene now ordered. It was nearly
noon, the battle had lasted between three and four
hours, the heat was now intense, and there was no
water available. Collecting his wounded, Greene fell
back seven miles to Burdell's plantation, whence he
had marched in the morning. Hampton brought up
the rear, but the British attempted no pursuit beyond
the line of their camp. On the following evening
Stuart- destroyed such stores as he could not carry
away, and, leaving seventy-two of his wounded and
one thousand stand of arms, began a hasty retreat
toward Charleston. Greene thereupon moved for
ward as far as Eutaw Springs with his main body,
and sent Marion and Lee in pursuit. They skir
mished with Stuart's rear guard, but were not strong
enough to accomplish anything. Greene followed
them with his entire force to Ferguson's Swamp,
fourteen miles from Eutaw ; but here Stuart was
joined by a considerable re-enforcement from Charles
ton, and Greene was not in condition to attack this
.increased force ; he therefore retreated slowly
through Eutaw Springs, across Nelson's Ferry, and
up the east bank of the river to his former camp on
the High Hills of Santee.
The battle of Eutaw Springs was the most hotly
contested engagement of the war. Greene, who had
been in nearly all the battles at the North, wrote to
Washington that it was " a most bloody battle — by
-far the most obstinate fight I ever saw." The num
bers were small — only twenty-three hundred on each
side — but the losses were proportionately very great.
On the American side eighteen officers and one hun
dred and two men were killed, forty:three officers
and three hundred and thirtv-two men wounded, and

276 GENERAL GREENE.
eight missing; a total of five hundred and twenty-
two, or about one fourth of their entire strength —
the proportion in officers being still greater. The
British, according to their own account, lost three
officers and eighty-two men killed, sixteen officers
and three hundred and thirty-five men wounded, and
ten officers and two hundred and forty-seven men
missing; a total of six hundred and nine y, or nearly
one third of their strength. But these figures were
inaccurate, at least in the number missing, for Greene
carried off the field four hundred and thirty prisoners,
¦in addition to seventy-two wounded who were aban
doned by Stuart on the day after the battle. Their
loss was thus at least nine hundred men out of a
force of twenty-three hundred. The gallant Marjori
banks, who had contributed so much to save their-
army from complete capture, died on the retreat to
Charleston. Greene claimed a victory because, although he
retreated from the field, he regained it the second
day afterward, arid pursued the enemy more than
fourteen miles beyond it. It was in reality a drawn
battle, but it was remarkable not only on account of
the fierceness of the fighting, but as being the only
case during the war in which the British regulars
were driven headlong in an open fight ; it was the sec
ond case — Stony Point being the first — in which the
Americans freely and successfully used the bayonet.
It was still more remarkable for the unflinching stub
bornness with which the militia fought. The sub
stantial results of victory were all on Greene's side,
and were so recognized by Washington, Congress,
and the people generally. Congress passed a highly
eulogistic vote of thanks to Greene for his " most

REFERENCE,

1. American Reserve.
2. Maryland Line.
3. Virginia Line.
4. N .Carolina Line.
5, 5. S. Carolina Militia.
6, 6. N. Carolina Militia.
7. Lee's L-'trion.
8, 9. Henderson's Com
mand. '
10. Maj on banks.

11. The British Line.
IS, British Reserve.
13. Kirk wood.
14. Lee's Infantry.
15. Hampton.
16. Capt. Coffin.
17. Cavalrv i»t' tn*> Legion
after ui_- Lucmy'sde-
l A fe(lt-
1 A bnt.sh Encampment.

.:%•;«>?

6 6?
« $> y 9
?!'s' ®
% s ?'} s

9- a « 9

5

a ?

§>

§ §i 9 9
«• 5. 9

<? '

9 ? g, 9
g, s ?¦
9 V 9

B (J o

*o' *

' y *¦ . -j1 s - . ¦

From Johnson's Life of Greene

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

277

signal victory," and ordered a gold medal and a
British standard to be presented to him; and Wash
ington wrote him a most flattering letter, saying;
" How happy am I, having it in my power to con*
gratulate you upon a victory as splendid as I hope
it will prove important ! Fortune must have been
coy, indeed, had she not yielded at last to so perse
vering a pursuer as you have been."
The battle of Eutaw Springs was fought on the
8th of September, 1781, and Yorktown with Corn
wallis's army surrendered on the 19th of October.
The two events practically terminated the war, al
though Charleston was not evacuated until December
14, 1782, and New York till November 25, 1783. De
Grasse, with his fleet and the troops he had brought
with him, sailed back to the West Indies ; Rochambeau
wintered his army in Virginia ; Washington divided
the American troops at Yorktown into two bodies,
sending one under Lincoln back to the Hudson, and
the other under St. Clair to re-enforce Greene.
This scattering of the force which had taken
Yorktown was a grievous disappointment to Greene
and Governor Rutledge. When the latter arrived
at Greene's camp on the Santee at the beginning
of August, he brought the news that De Grasse's
fleet would be on the coast by the latter part
of the month. Greene thereupon wrote to Wash
ington, under date of August 6th, a long letter,
giving an exact account of the situation in the
South and his own suggestions as to the way in
which the French fleet might be utilized. Wash
ington had written for just such a report on July
30th, but his letter was not received until six weeks
after Greene had sent his. In this letter Greene ex-

5*78 GENERAL GREENE.
pressed confidence in the success of the intended op
erations against New York, of which Washington' had
informed him in June. When this should be accom
plished, he suggested as follows : " Twenty-five hun
dred regular forces, to be added to the Marquis's
army, besides what may be expected from Pennsyl
vania and Virginia, would oblige Cornwallis to take
a position and fortify himself ; and if the supplies to
his army could b.e cut off by water, which the fleet
may easily effect after the reduction of New York,
he would be obliged to surrender in a fortnight, or
three weeks at most, for want of provisions." This
letter outlined with remarkable accuracy the subse
quent result at Yorktown. Washington did not re
ceive it till he was on his way thither, and the sug
gestion had no special influence on his plans, which
were already formed before he received it ; but the
letter is interesting as showing how completely
Greene understood the situation, and how fully his
mind was in accord with Washington's. He then
goes on to state that the most important point in
the South is Charleston, and urges that, as soon' as
Yorktown is taken, a force of ten thousand men be
sent to reduce that place " with certainty and dis
patch " ; or, if so many can not be sent, that the at
tempt be made with a smaller force, provided the
French naval force be strong enough to maintain
absolute control on the sea.
Washington was too busy at Yorktown to make
any immediate reply to this letter, and on September
17th Greene, having received word from Lafayette
of the march toward Yorktown, wrote again to
Washington, expressing the fullest confidence in the
capture of Cornwallis's army, and urging once more

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

279

the advisability of the entire force moving against
Charleston as soon as this should be accomplished.
" Charleston itself may be easily reduced if you will
bend your forces this way. And it will afford me
great pleasure to join your Excellency in the at
tempt; for I shall be equally happy, whether as prin
cipal or subordinate, so that the public good be pro
moted." Governor Rutledge was at Greene's camp on the
Santee after the battle of Eutaw and in daily com-
, munication with him. Greene doubtless impressed
upon him the importance of these views, and on Oc
tober 5th Rutledge wrote a long letter to Washing
ton of the same tenor. Washington on his part had
already come to the same conclusions, and although
De Grasse before leaving the West Indies had writ
ten him that he could not remain longer than Oc
tober 15th, yet in his first interview with him after
his arrival Washington had ventured to suggest the
desirability of an expedition against Charleston as
soon as Yorktown should fall. De Grasse did not
think favorably of it, and replied that he could not
remain longer than November ist at the very latest.
Nevertheless, when Yorktown fell, on October 19th,
Washington on the very next day wrote at length to
De Grasse urging the project in the strongest possi
ble language, proving conclusively that it would be
successful, and telling De Grasse that it was in his
power " to terminate the war and enable the allies to
dictate the law in a treaty." De Grasse replied that
he " would be happy to be able to make the expe
dition to Charleston, all the advantages of which he„
feels; but the orders of his court, ul|erior projects,
and his engagements with the Spaniards render it

280 GENERAL GREENE.
impossible to remain here the necessary time for this
operation." In his letter he stated that he would be
very happy to co-operate in the campaign of the
next year, if not incompatible with the orders of, his
court. Washington eagerly grasped at this, and
wrote back that it could not be decided until spring
whether the expedition should be against New York
or Charleston ; but he urged upon him the " indis
pensable necessity of a maritime force capable of
giving an absolute ascendency in these seas," and
requested that his fleet rendezvous in Chesapeake
Bay in May. De Grasse said that he would lay the
proposition before the French court ; and then, on
the 4th of November, with his fleet and his troops,
he sailed away to the West Indies, to meet destruc
tion and capture at the hands of Rodney in the fol
lowing April.
Thus, by the French making their co-operation
with the Americans secondary to theii " ulterior
projects," was lost the chance of putting a summary
end to the war, which was to continue in a sputter
ing fashion for more than a year longer. Washing
ton made one effort toward terminating it by consid
ering the plan ,of marching overland to the siege of
Charleston. Lincoln, having been besieged and cap
tured in Charleston, and being thus familiar with the
locality, was asked to give his views in writing on
this project. He did so, and showed conclusively
that it was impracticable, because the siege material
alone would weigh twenty-five hundred tons, and
there was no possibility of obtaining the necessary
transportation for such an amount. He advised
that a part of the American army be sent to re-en
force Greene so as to enable him to confine th§

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 28 *
British in Charleston ; the rest to go back to the
Hudson, and Rochambeau to winter his troops in
Virginia, where they could give assistance in either
direction as might be necessary. Washington adopt
ed his recommendations, issued the necessary orders,
and the troops were put in motion on the ist of No
vember. Those destined for the South consisted of the
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia lines. St.
Clair commanded the whole, and Wayne those from
Pennsylvania. But the Virginia troops refused to
rnarch unless they received their arrears of pay, and
as there was no money to pay them they were left
behind. The others came on, consuming more than
two months in the march of over five hundred miles
from Yorktown to Charleston, and joining Greene be
fore the latter place on the 5th of January. Greene
had meanwhile been resting his troops at the High
Hills of Santee. He had an enormous number of
wounded to care for, and his hospitals extended
from the Santee back to Charlotte. Unfortunately,
the hospital stores destined for his army had been
captured in passing through Virginia, by Tarleton and
Simcoe. There were none to be had in the South,
even if he had possessed the means to buy them.
There was thus great suffering among the wounded,
and the exposure "to which his troops had so long
been subjected, combined with insufficient food, lack
of clothing, and a sickly climate, had produced the
usual result of a great amount of sickness. Never
theless, when the cool season came on in November,
and he finally learned that there was no hope of the
French co-operating in a determined effort against
Charleston, Greene broke up his camp on the Santee
*9

282 GENERAL GREENE.
for the last time and marched into the low country,
partly to obtain supplies for his army and partly to
hem the enemy in at Charleston. No re-enforce*
ments had reached him except five hundred militia
from the mountains of North Carolina, who deserted
in a body a few days after his movement had begun ;
his losses at Eutaw and by sickness had reduced his
force to about 1,500 men, including militia. It is
astounding to learn from the official returns in the
British Record Office that their force in South Caro-i
Una at this time (and they occupied no other point
than Charleston) consisted of no less than 9,775 ef
fectives — viz., 5,024 British regulars, 1,596 Hessians,
and 3,155 Provincials. That Greene should be able,
with the handful of men which by courtesy was called
his army, to shut this force up in Charleston and
hold them there for the remaining year of the war
without any further attempt on their part to resume
the offensive, is hardly" less than incredible. It leads
one to think that there was truth as well as rhetoric
in the remark of Dr. Ramsay, the historian, that
when Congress sent Greene to the Southern States
they sent " a general whose military talents were
equal to a re-enforcement"; and the similar remark
of Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, giving his
" fullest applause to an officer who finds in his own
genius an ample resource for the want of men, money,
clothes, arms, and supplies." The lessons of GuiU
ford, Hobkirk's Hill, Ninety-Six, and Eutaw Springs
must have made a profound impression upon the
British commanders, when they allowed themselves
to be reduced to impotence by a ragged and half-
Starved force less than one fifth their own in num
bers.

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 283
That Greene had succeeded in overawing the
British is evident from their behavior as he ap
proached Charleston. He had left the Santee on
November 18th, following the familiar route across
the Congaree and Wateree to Orangeburg, and
thence down the Edisto toward Charleston. Placing
i Williams in command of the main body with instruc
tions to continue the advance slowly, Greene took
four hundred men, selected from the Legion, Wash
ington's Cavalry, and Sumter's partisans, and with
them he pushed rapidly to the front. Stuart was
then at Goose Creek Bridge, about fifteen miles north
of Charleston, with about two thousand men ; and
eight miles on his left, at the village of Dorchester,
on the Ashley River, was another post with one
thousand men, of whom eight hundred and fifty
were infantry and one. hundred and fifty cav
alry. Greene made a dash at Dorchester on the
morning of December ist. There was a. short but
sharp skirmish between Hampton's " State Horse "
and the British cavalry, in which the latter were de
feated. Then throwing his cannon into the river and
destroying his stores, the British commander retired
with great haste toward Charleston, Stuart doing the
same from Goose Creek Bridge. The two roads on
which they were retreating united at the Quarter
House, a few miles out of Charleston, and here they
made their first stand. So great was the alarm that
the entire garrison of Charleston was ordered out,
and even the negroes were called to arms and en
rolled. As Williams wrote to Greene, '' Your success
at Dorchester would make your enemies hate them
selves if all the circumstances were generally known."
Having thus driven the enemy into the city limits

284 GENERAL GREENE.
of Charleston by a mere feint, Greene rejoined the
main body and stationed them at a camp which Kos
ciusko had selected at a place called the Round O,
about forty miles northwest of Charleston, in a dis
trict of great fertility, where good crops had been
raised, as it had seen no campaigning since 1779.
Here he established his main body on December 9th,
with Lee's Legion and the partisans spread out fan-
shape over a wide territory thirty miles in front of
him. His " main body " contained only about eight
hundred effective men, and after supplying the de
tachments with ammunition it had only four rounds
per man left ; but Greene relied upon the detach
ments in his front to keep these disagreeable facts
from being known to General Leslie, who had now
taken command in Charleston.
On the 4th of January St. Clair at last arrived
from Yorktown with numbers largely reduced by
his long march. At the same time the term of serv
ice of the Virginia line expired, and they were sent
home. St. Clair's re-enforcement barely brought
Greene's strength up to what it had been before the
battle of Eutaw. It was necessary to retain all the
infantry with him in South Carolina, but part of the
cavalry which had arrived was united with detach
ments from the State troops to form a command for
Wayne, with which he was dispatched to the conquest
of Georgia. He started on January 9th, and reached
the Savannah River, about thirty miles above the
city of Savannah, on the 16th. The British forces in
Georgia at that time numbered about one thousand
men, composed of a small body of regulars, some
Tory militia and Creek and Choctaw Indians. Gen
eral Clarke was in command, and next in rank to

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 2$%
him was Colonel Browne, who had. been captured and
paroled at Augusta, and subsequently exchanged.
At Wayne's approach Clarke retired into Savannah
and Browne retreated toward the interior. Wayne's
force was so small— never exceeding four hundred in
all, and fluctuating from time to time as the militia
came and went — that he was unable to undertake
any serious movements. He kept his little force be
tween Savannah and Browne's detachment, con
stantly manoeuvring, destroying the enemy's stores
with small raiding parties, and never placing him
self in a position where he could be advantageously
attacked. He had two skirmishes with Browne's
militia and Indians, one on May 21st and the other
on June 23d, in both of which he was successful.
The Indians then retired to the mountains, and the
Tory militia under Browne retreated to Florida.
Clarke evapuated Savannah on July nth and took
its garrison to Charleston. The State was thus com
pletely freed from British occupation, and the As
sembly convened at Savannah to restore civil order,
Wayne rejoined Greene.
There were no further movements of any mili
tary importance. During the year 1782 and the first
half of 1783 Greene's attention was absorbed in
assisting the civil authorities to restore the State
governments, in confining the British to the limits
of Charleston, and in finding food and clothing for
his army. Expeditions were undertaken from time
to time, under Pickens, Marion, and Lee, against the
islands north and south of Charleston, but none of
them were of permanent importance, except one in
August, in which young John Laurens — one of the
most gifted men of his time, with a future of great

286 GENERAL GREENE.
usefulness before him — lost his life. Greene moved
his camp from one place to another in front of
Charleston, in order to afford protection to the
Legislature and to find provisions for his men.
The Legislature of South Carolina convened, for
the first time in two years, on January 18, 1782, at
the village of Jacksonborough, about thirty-five miles
northwest of Charleston. Rutledge was Governor,
and he fully appreciated how much the State owed
to Greene. The greater part of his address was
taken up with a eulogy of him. He spoke of the
"wisdom, prudence, address, and bravery, of the
great and gallant General Greene, and the intre
pidity of the officers and men under his com
mand. ... A general who is justly entitled, from
his many signal services, to honorable and singular
marks of your approbation and gratitude." The
Legislature replied in a similar strain, and a few
days later, putting their thoughts into deeds, they
passed a bill " for vesting in General Nathanael
Greene, in consideration of his important services,
the sum of ten thousand guineas." As soon as the
Legislature of Georgia heard of this it took similar
action, making him a grant of five thousand guineas.
And this was followed by North Carolina, which
gave him twenty-four thousand acres of the best
lands in the western part of the State, which sub
sequently became Tennessee. The two former
grants were not paid in money, but in confiscated
lands. South Carolina allotted him -a plantation
known as Boone's Barony, to the south of the
Edisto, together with the slaves that were attached
to the land. Georgia gave- him a beautiful and
highly improved estate belonging to the late Tory

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 287
Governor Graham ; it was called Mulberry Grove,
and was situated on the south bank of the Savannah
River, about fourteen miles above Savannah. The
adjoining estate was presented to his friend and
•fellow-soldier, Wayne. These valuable gifts would
have made Greene independent in fortune if they
had not been swept away by the obligations he had
assumed in the effort to find clothing and food for
his men, as will be afterward explained.
As has already been stated, it was fifteen months
after hostilities practically ceased with the battle- of
Eutaw Springs before Charleston was finally evacu
ated, and it was twenty-one months before the troops
were discharged and sent home. Nothing is more
trying to the discipline of an army than the period
of inaction between the close of hostilities and the
declaration of peace. At the North, Washington
barely succeeded in preventing a mutiny at New-
burg, and in the South, Greene had an equally
difficult problem. Several hundred of his men had
no other clothing than the remnants of a coat or
blanket, which they pinned around the waist with a
thorn. They were so ragged that they could not in
decency leave their tents. They had received no
pay for more than a year, some of them for longer
periods. They had subsisted by means of forced
impressments of food, but now the Legislature
passed a law forbidding this method. They were
camped in a sickly country, and large numbers were
sick with dysentery and fever. They had suffered
hardships and privations beyond description, and
now, when the war seemed practically over, the
longing to. return to their homes was almost irre
sistible. Many of the officers succeeded in getting

288 GENERAL GREENE.
away. St. Clair obtained a leave of absence; Car
rington, Williams, and others went North on public
business, in the hope of securing supplies or money
for the army ; Lee pleaded ill health and unrequited
services, and went to Virginia to marry his beauti
ful and rich cousin, Mildred Lee. The officers of
the Legion were . dissatisfied with their new com
mander, and other officers were restive under the
enforcement of proper regulations regarding pub
lic property. Finally the men became mutinous.
Wayne's division had mutinied at Morristown two
years before, and, as Lafayette said, " had been well
paid and well clothed in consequence of it." These
men were now in Greene's army, and among them
was a sergeant named Gornell, who had commanded
one of the regiments in the New Jersey mutiny.
He put himself in communication with the enemy
and concocted a scheme to seize Greene in the night
and deliver him to the enemy. This was to be fol
lowed by a general mutiny of the Pennsylvania and
Maryland troops
The difficulties connected with holding his troops
together during the last eighteen months of their
service were among the most serious that Greene
ever had to contend with ; but he faced them man
fully. As for the mutiny, he put it down with a
heavy hand. Having gained satisfactory proofs of
the conspiracy, he caused Gornell to be arrested,
tried, and hanged, on April 22d. Four other ser
geants were sent into the interior under guard, and
the other ringleaders succeeded in escaping that
night to the enemy. There were no further overt
acts on the part of the men. In dealing with the
officers he used firmness mingled with patience. The

CLOSE OF'THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, ggg
officers of the Legion resigned in a body because
their requests, presented in respectful language, in
regard to their commanding officer and the method of
reorganizing the corps, were not approved. To their
astonishment, Greene accepted their resignations.
Seeing that they were in the wrong, they pleaded to
have their commissions restored, and to be allowed
to present their grievances to Congress. Greene
somewhat reluctantly acceded to this. As soon as
the matter came before Congress his orders were
confirmed. Another trouble with the officers arose from their
appropriating public horses to their private use and
selling or exchanging them. A flagrant offender
was a certain Captain Gunn. Greene brought him
before a court of inquiry, when, to his surprise, the
¦court acquitted him and justified the transaction.
Greene disapproved the finding in general orders,
required the horse to be restored, and referred the
matter to Congress, by whom he was fully sustained.
The greatest difficulty of all, however, was to
keep his army from starving to death and to secure
enough clothing to cover its nakedness. For sup
plying the Northern army the Superintendent of
Finance had entered into contracts payable at the
Treasury of the United States, but he left the South
ern army to be. supported by the Southern States.
Virginia and North Carolina repudiated this arrange
ment and refused to contribute anything. The entire
expense of supporting the Southern army thus fell
upon South Carolina. Its Legislature passed a law
to stop the method of impressment, by which the
army had hitherto obtained food, and appointed its
own agent to collect supplies and turn them over to

2CjO

GENERAL GREENE.

the army. The system worked well for a time, but
during the summer, through the lack of energy^ of
the agent or from other causes, it began to work
very badly. Greene addressed urgent letters to the
Governor on the subject, but, in spite of every dis
position on the latter's part to aid him, there was no
improvement. Finally he had to take the matter
into his own hands. On the 24th of October he ad
dressed a letter to the agent in which he said : " The
army have had but a few days' rice for more than a
month. Our prospects of beef are not less alarming
than our supplies of rice have been deficient. The
discipline and temper of the army have been ruined
from the irregular manner in which they are sub
sisted ; and a continuance, not to say an increase, of
the difficulties on this head will soon reduce things
to a state of desperation. My duty obliges me, there
fore, to call on you to give me a decisive answer,
whether you can by the present mode afford certain
¦and effectual supplies for the army or not. If you
can not, some other measures must be adopted."
The agent referred the letter to the Governor and
Council, and, no answer being returned, four days
later Greene issued orders for resuming the method
of impressment, taking care to provide strict rules
in regard to it, and cautioning his men that it
"should be conducted with the greatest prudence,
delicacy, and equality among the people." In taking
this step, he acted in disregard of the State law, but
his soldiers were starving, and their safety was to
him the supreme law.
In the matter of clothing, the situation was
equally bad, but different measures had to be adopt
ed. There was abundance of it in Charleston,, and

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN. 29 1
the British garrison was short of food. A contra
band trade to a limited extent was therefore per
mitted under the supervision of Lee and Laurens —
rice going into the city, and shirts and other articles
coming out. But this could not be permitted to any
large extent, and in the spring Greene employed
Mr. John Waties, afterward Chancellor of North
Carolina, to obtain supplies of rum, blankets, hos
pital stores, and salt from Georgetown, paying for
them in bills drawn on the Superintendent of Finance,
which the people were now persuaded to take, though
with some hesitation and at a considerable discount.
These means, however, afforded only a partial relief.
In the month of May Leslie proposed to Greene a
cessation of hostilities and the opening of a trade
between Charleston and the interior. Greene was
too good a soldier to enter into any negotiations re
lating to peace, and merely referred the offer to
Congress, by whom it was promptly rejected. In
regard to permitting trade, he consulted with the
Governor and Council, and at their request he de
clined it. This possible source of supply was thus
cut off, and the suffering for lack of clothes con
tinued to increase. In August some of the clothing
which had been nearly nine months on the way from
Yorktown arrived, just as the condition of the army
was growing desperate. At this time Greene wrote :
" For upward of two months more than one third of
our men were entirely naked, with nothing but a
breech-clout about them, and never came out of their
tents, and the rest were as ragged as wolves." Soon
after this the army was reorganized and consolidated
in pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and a con
siderable number of men whose term was about ex-

292

GENERAL GREENE.

piring were sent home. The Yorktown clothing had
to be issued to them to fit them for their long march,
and those who remained were as badly off as ever.
Finally, in October, winter was coming on and some
arrangements had to be made. At this time appeared
in camp a man named John Banks, of the firm of
Hunter & Banks, of Fredericksburg, Va. They were
merchants of a speculative turn, and had lately been
engaged in privateering. Banks had met Mr. Waties
at Georgetown in the previous spring, and had then
made a proposition for supplying the army which
was favorably received ; but before getting a reply
he had obtained permission from the local comman
dant to visit Charleston. He now came forward with
a proposition to supply the army with clothing, tak
ing his pay in. bills on the Superintendent of Finance
at par, provided he could be paid twelve hundred
guineas in hard cash. An agent of Mr. Morris was
present at Greene's headquarters with a small amount
of ready money which he was authorized to dole out
when Greene's difficulties became finally insurmount
able. With some difficulty Greene persuaded this
agent to part with the twelve hundred guineas ; the
'bargain with Banks was carried out, and the army
was clothed — "better clothed," said Wayne, " than I
ever saw an American army before."
The long months of inaction thus dragged slowly
along, beset with petty difficulties of army house
keeping and devoid of any military operations of im
portance. As early as August Leslie had announced
a speedy evacuation of Charleston, but from week
to week it was postponed. Finally, on the 14th of
December, the British filed through the streets and
went on boards their ships, and Wayne, at the head of

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

293;

the American army, closely followed them. Greene
and Governor Matthews rode into town at three
o'clock in the afternoon, the entire population lining
the streets to shout their welcome.
The evacuation of Charleston did not, however,
put an end to Greene's difficulties. Three months
before, Congress had passed a resolution directing
him to remain in the Southern States until further
orders, to employ his troops offensively or defen
sively as he might think proper, and saying that it
was indispensably necessary to keep a regular force
in that department. When the evacuation of Charles
ton was arranged, Greene wrote to Washington ask
ing for instructions as to the disposition of the
troops. Washington replied, giving him authority to
march his troops to the northward, but leaving the
time and manner almost wholly to his discretion.-
Greene was much in doubt what course to pursue.
Peace was not yet signed, and he hesitated to leave
the State -defenseless in case hostilities should be
resumed ; on the other hand, he wished to save fur
ther expense, and also to gratify the natural desire
of the men to return home. Finally, on the 20th of
April, he received news of the ratification of the pre
liminary articles between Great Britain and the
United States.
Greene's first act was to write to Washington,'
from whom he had recently received a most cordial
letter, written on receipt of the news that Charleston
Was evacuated. The two letters are worth quoting
somewhat at length, as showing the relations between •
the commander in chief and his principal subordi
nate after nearly eight years of service. Washing
ton's was dated at Newburg on February 6th, and

294

GENERAL GREENE.

Greene's at Charleston on April 20, 1783. Washing
ton writes : " It is with a pleasure which friendship
only is susceptible of that I congratulate you on the
glorious end you have put to hostilities in the South
ern States. The honor and advantage of it I hope
you will long live to enjoy. ... If historiographers
should .be hardy enough to fill the page of history
with the advantages that have been gained with un
equal numbers on the part of America in the course
of this contest, and attempt to relate the distressing
circumstances under which they have been obtained,
it is more than probable that posterity will bestow
on their labors the epithet and marks of fiction ; for
it will not be believed that such a force as Great
Britain has employed for eight years in this country
could be baffled in their plan of subjugating it by
numbers infinitely less, composed of men oftentimes
half-starved, always in rags, and experiencing at;
times every species of distress which human nature
is capable of undergoing. ... I let no opportunity
slip to inquire after your son George at Princeton,
and it is with pleasure I hear he enjoys good health
and is a fine, promising boy. With great truth and sin
cerity and every sentiment of friendship, I am, etc."
Greene's letter reads thus : " I beg leave to con*
gratulate your Excellency upon the returning smiles
of peace and the happy establishment of our inde
pendence. This important event must be doubly
welcome to you, who have so successfully conducted '
the war, through such a variety of difficulties, to so
happy a close. If universal respect and the general
affections of a grateful country can compensate for.
the many painful hours which you have experienced
in your country's cause, you are richly rewarded.

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

295:

Every heart feels and. every tongue confesses the
merit and importance of your services. The polite
attention which I have experienced since I have had
thfe honor to serve under your command claims my
particular acknowledgment ; and I feel a singular
satisfaction in having preserved your confidence and
esteem through the whole progress of the war, not
withstanding many jarring interests. ... I have the
honor to be, with great respect and esteem, your
Excellency's most obedient, humble servant."
These two letters bring to mind those which
passed between Grant and Sherman just eighty-one
years later, when Grant left the West to assume com
mand of all the armies in the civil war, In fact, the
relations between Washington and Greene were very
similar to those which existed between Grant and
Sherman ; and there are no more pleasing facts in
all our history than these. The two chief soldiers
in our two principal wars were constant friends from
their first acquaintance till death separated them.
No intrigue — and many were tried in both cases — ;
could break or mar this friendship, or stir up jeal
ousy or discord. Each time there was a faithful,
loyal subordinate, and a grateful, generous chief —
both striving in harmony to achieve objects of sur
passing importance, and both succeeding in confer
ring priceless benefits on their countrymen and their
descendants. Peace being now definitely assured, Greene no
longer hesitated about sending his troops to their
homes. As the march would be a long and fatiguing
one, he arranged to get transports to take the Penn
sylvania and Maryland divisions, now reduced by
battle and sickness to such small numbers that they

296 GENERAL GREENE.
were consolidated into one regiment each, by sea to
Philadelphia.. The Virginia and North Carolina
troops marched home. The Delaware battalion had
gone home in December. The South Carolina parti
sans were disbanded, and there were none from
Georgia in service. The arrangements for the march
and the vessels consumed much time, and it was not
until July that the troops were all started to their
destinations. As they left, Greene wrote a parting
letter to the Governors of each of the six States
within his command, commending the returning sol
diers to their care and gratitude, and saying : " Often
in the worst of times have I assured them that their
country would not be unmindful of their suffering
and services ; and humbly, yet confidently, do I hope
that their just claims will not be forgotten. "
While Greene was in Charleston, after its evacua
tion by the British, occurred an event which caused
him the deepest mortification, clouded the rest of his
life, subjected him to the most unjust and unmerited
insinuations, and ended in the ruin of his pecuniary
fortune. As we have seen, he had been compelled
in October to disregard the State law and resort to
impressment to obtain food for his starving army.
But the State authorities were as much opposed to
the practice as ever ; and when the new Legislature
assembled in January, Greene was notified that the
civil power of the State would be fully exercised to
stop the practice. At that time Banks, who had ,
succeeded in clothing the army, came forward and
offered to take a contract to feed it at eleven pence
per ration, and take his pay in bills on Morris.
Though his price was considered high, yet no one else
would undertake the contract on any terms, in. spite

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

29?

of the fact that an advertisement inviting bidders had
been published for more than three months. Banks's
proposition was therefore accepted. This man had
many schemes on hand besides feeding and clothing
¦the army. He was speculating in various directions
in anticipation of the change in prices that would re
sult from a declaration of peace, and he soon became
deeply involved. Distrust of the value of the bills
on Morris also began to spread, and Banks's credit
ors refused to advance him anything further. No
one else would take the contract, and the only alter
native was to resort again to impressment, which
would have brought on a most deplorable conflict
between the civil and military authorities. The
former were tired of seeing the soldiers remain, now
that peace seemed assured, and they were for the
moment ill-disposed toward Greene, because he had
insisted on having certain engagements carried out
which he had made with loyalists prior to the evacua
tion, and also because he was opposed to the harsh
legislation which was proposed for'confiscating their
property and otherwise maltreating them. At this
juncture the merchants proposed that if Greene would
guarantee Banks's debts they would furnish the
latter further credit, and would surrender the inter
est which Banks had assigned to them in the bills
on Morris. For the purpose of keeping his men from
starvation Greene agreed to this, and executed a
bond of surety guaranteeing the. debts of Banks.
For his security Banks pledged all the bills he had
received, both for the clothing and the feeding con
tracts; the merchants executed a release of their
interest in them, and an agent was sent on to Phila
delphia during the latter part of May with an order

298

GENERAL GREENE.

for them on Mr. Pettit (formerly associated with
Greene in the Quartermaster General's Department),
in whose hands they were reported to be. Before he
could return, Greene started North, and, traveling
leisurely, did not reach Philadelphia until the autumn.
Then, to his dismay, he learned that Banks had previ
ously disposed of the bills in Pettit's hands, and that
his security was lost. Banks meantime had gone
into bankruptcy, with liabilities of over thirty thou
sand pounds. In the following summer (1784)
Greene returned to South Carolina, and Banks's cred
itors demanded that Greene pay Banks's debts, ac
cording to his bond. They acknowledged that
Greene had no interest in the matter except a desire
to keep his men from starving, but nevertheless they
demanded their money. Banks, hearing of Greene's
arrival, immediately left for the interior of the State ;
and Greene, mounting his horse and putting his pis
tols in his holsters, started in pursuit. He followed
him for more than four hundred miles, mainly over
the route of his own marches in 1781, only to overtake
him on his death-bed in a raging fever and to see
him expire. He then returned to Charleston, and
endeavored to raise money in England by a mort
gage on his estates in South Carolina and Georgia,
but in this he failed ; and he was obliged to sell his
South Carolina plantation at a ruinous sacrifice, in
order to get means to satisfy in part the claims of
Banks's creditors. In the summer of 1785, on the
advice of his friends, he laid the whole matter before
Congress and asked for relief. But before action
was taken Greene died. His widow was then left to
prosecute the claim, warmly assisted by Hamilton
and opposed by Sumter, who was then in Congress,

CLOSE OF THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

299

and it was not until June, 1796, that relief was final
ly granted. Thus an act of kindness, imprudent in a business
sense, but inspired by the generous motive of reliev
ing his suffering soldiers, led to endless trouble and
pecuniary ruin. Lafayette had done the same thing
on a small scale in purchasing clothing for his men
when he went through Baltimore in 1781. His act
led only to applause, and he was promptly reim
bursed by Congress. But in the confusion and weari
ness at the end of the war Greene's generosity was
overlooked. Worse than this, his motives were impugned, and
it was insinuated that he was a silent partner of
Banks. To a man of Greene's temperament, con
scious of his own integrity, this was a blow tenfold
heavier than the loss of fortune. What gave cur
rency to these rumors was the fact that two of
Greene's own aids-de-camp, Majors Burnet and For:
syth, had entered into partnership with Banks ; not
specially with reference to the clothing and feeding
contracts, but in his general speculations. Peace
was approaching, and they had to look for some oc
cupation in private business. Without consulting
Greene and without his knowledge, regardless of
propriety, their own dignity and the reputation of
their chief, they formed a business connection with
the man who had received from their chief what was
considered a lucrative contract. Finally, to complete
the chain of unfortunate circumstances, Banks had
written to a friend at the North, in a letter whic'h'
was opened by the bearer, " I find General Greene an
exceedingly agreeable man ; and, from hints dropped'
already, expect his proposal's for an ' interest in a

3°o

GENERAL GREENE.

house we may establish in Charleston." Greene's
independent character had made him many enemies,
as well as stanch friends, and when this letter of
Banks's was made public, and it became known that
two of Greene's aids-de-camp were interested in
Banks's speculations, his enemies asserted that
Greene had become surety for Banks's debts because
he was his partner, and not because he wanted to
keep the army from starving. What made the mat
ter all the more galling to Greene was the evident
fact that he could not treat these rumors with silent
contempt, but must notice and answer them. As he
afterward said in laying the matter before Con
gress, " I despise popular prejudices and disdain vul
gar suspicions " ; but this was a case which must
be met. Banks therefore published a card in which
he declared that his .only reason for imagining that
General Greene desired a business connection with
him arose from Major Burnet's negotiations with
reference to himself ; that he regretted having taken
an improper liberty with General Greene's name, and
that he had already declared "under the solemni
ty of an oath that he neither has',' nor ever had, any
commercial connection with me of a private nature^
or intimated a wish or desire of the kind ; and also
that he never granted me a flag in his life, or any
other privilege or indulgence for commercial pur
poses." Greene also placed in the hands of Wayne
and Carrington all. the papers in the matter, includ
ing authority from the Secretary of War to procure
clothing from Charleston, his acknowledgment of
Greene's full reports of the transaction and his ap
proval thereof, and the satisfaction of the Superin
tendent of' Finance, who was prepared to pay the

CLOSE OF. THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

301

drafts on presentation. Greene asked Wayne and
Carrington to examine the whole matter and state
¦their conclusions. They did so, and. fully approved
of all his acts, and exonerated him from the slightest
suspicion of wrongdoing.
Further than this, there was nothing for Greene to
do. His conduct throughout this humiliating inci
dent was dignified and proper, with one single excep
tion. He should have instantly dismissed his aids-
de-camp. They had compromised his reputation in a
manner wholly without justification. But they had
served him faithfully and gallantly through five
years of war; they had been with him in battle, and
had suffered in common with him every possible
hardship. One of them was now absent, carrying to
Washington the news of the evacuation of Charles
ton. Both of them were soon to be thrown on the
world to earn their livelihood as best they could.
Greene could not bring himself to punish them, or
even to treat them harshly.
The subject may well be dismissed by quoting
what Washington thought of it, from a letter written
to Jeremiah Wadsworth, of Connecticut, soon after
Greene's death : " Persuaded as I always have been
of General Greene's integrity and worth, I spurned
those reports which tended to calumniate his conduct
in the connection with Banks, being perfectly con
vinced that, whenever the matter should be investi
gated, his motives for entering into it would appear
pure and unimpeachable. I was not without my
fears, though, that he might suffer in a pecuniary
way by his engagement with that man. I would
fain hope, however, that the case ultimately may be
otherwise ; *and that upon a final settlement of his

302 GENERAL GREENE.
affairs there will be a handsome competency for Mrs.
Greene and the children. But, should it turn out
differently, and Mrs. Greene, yourself, and Mr. Rut
ledge should think proper to intrust my namesake,
G. W. Greene, to my care, I will give him as good an
education as this country (I mean North America)
will afford ; and will bring him up to either of the
genteel professions that his friends may choose, or
his own inclination shall lead him to pursue, at my
own cost and charge."
Washington's generous intentions with reference
to his namesake were not carried out, as Lafayette
had previously made a similar offer, which was ac
cepted. The lad went abroad and was educated un
der Lafayette's care, until the troubles of the French
Revolution caused his mother such anxiety as to
induce her to recall him in 1794. Just after his re
turn, at the age of nineteen, he was drowned in an
accident in the Savannah River.

CHAPTER XIV.
CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH — 1783-'86.
By the middle of July, 1783, all the arrangements
had been completed for sending the troops to their
homes. Greene then spent a short time in examin
ing the estates which had been given to him in South
Carolina and Georgia, and on August 15th he began
his long horseback ride of more than a thousand
miles to Rhode Island. His wife had been with him
during the last year of the war, having joined him in
front of Charleston in March, 1782; but the journey
overland was far too long for her, and she had gone
North by water in the spring of 1783. Greene's
route lay along the coast through Wilmington, Tar-
borough, Halifax, Petersburg, Richmond, Freder
icksburg, Mount Vernon, Alexandria, Arlington, and
Annapolis to Baltimore; thence over the battle
grounds of 1777 to Philadelphia and on to Trenton,
where, at the house of his old friend Colonel Cox, he
met Washington and rode with him to Princeton,
where Congress was in session. Here he parted
from Washington for the last time, and, traveling
through New York and Connecticut, reached Rhode
Island at the close of November. At nearly every
town he entered on his journey of fifteen weeks he
was met by the local authorities and a delegation of
citizens to present him an address of welcome and

3°4

GENERAL GREENE.

ask him to stop and accept their hospitality. At the
capitals of Virginia and Maryland he was specially
received by the Legislature and given a vote of
thanks for his distinguished services. When he
reached Princeton he addressed a letter to the Presi
dent of Congress stating that it was going on nine
years since he had had an opportunity to visit his
family or friends, and asking permission to return
to Rhode Island, having already obtained the per
mission of the Commander in Chief. A committee
was appointed to prepare a suitable resolution, and
on their report Congress resolved that he have per
mission to visit his family in Rhode Island ; and that
two pieces of field ordnance, taken from the British
army at Cowpens, Augusta, or Eutaw, be presented
to him " as a public testimonial of the wisdom, forti
tude, and military skill which, distinguished his com
mand in the Southern Department, and of the emi
nent services which, amid complicated difficulties
and dangers and against an enemy greatly superior
in numbers, he has successfully performed for his
country." The pieces were ordered to be suitably
engraved, expressive of the substance of the resolu
tion. When he reached Rhode Island, the towns of
Newport and Providence and the State Legislature
voted him addresses and thanks. But probably even
more gratifying was the reception he met on his ar
rival at his old home in Warwick, where the Kentish
Guards turned out to cordially welcome him and to
claim the honor of having given him his first mili
tary instruction.
During his long absence he had lost all connec
tion with the business of the forge at Coventry. He
had sold his interest to his brothers, asking them to

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH. 305
use the proceeds in such manner as they saw fit.
They had invested it in privateers and had lost it
all. Having nothing to keep him in Coventry, he
fixed his residence at Newport, and there passed the
winter with his wife and four children, whom now for
the first time he saw together. He took a house on
Mill Street, nearly opposite the old stone mill, and it
was his intention to pass the summer months here and
the rest of the year on his plantation in South Caro
lina. But early in the summer of 1784 he was obliged
to go South, as we have already seen, in connection
With the obligations he had assumed for Banks.
These led to the sacrifice of his South Carolina es
tate, and the necessity of his living in a much more
restricted manner than he had planned. He gave
up his Newport home and decided to live on his
Georgia plantation, Mulberry Grove, where' he took
his family in the autumn of 1785.
Immediately after his arrival he received a chal
lenge to a duel with Captain Gunn. This officer, as
already stated, had made improper use of public
horses in 1782, and Greene had brought him to trial.
The Court having acquitted him, Greene disapproved
the proceedings and referred the matter to Con
gress. This body not only confirmed his action, but
passed a special resolution expressing its satisfaction
therewith, approving the principles laid down in his
orders, condemning the action of the Court, directing
Captain Gunn to replace the horse he had sold, and
announcing that any officer convicted of a similar
offense hereafter should be deemed guilty of a breach
of the Twelfth Article of War — i. e., be guilty of em
bezzlement and be dismissed from the service. Gunn
had nursed his wrath for three years, during which

306 GENERAL GREENE.
time he had married a lady of fortune, settled irif
Georgia, and gone prominently into politics. He
now demanded personal satisfaction for Greene's of
ficial acts. Such a proceeding in these days would
seem preposterous. But at that time the views about
dueling were such that, no matter what might be
the cause of the challenge, a public man could only
reject a challenge at the peril of his reputation.
Hamilton sacrificed his life in deference to this preju
dice. Greene was not insensible to the prejudice,
but after mature deliberation he determined to dis
regarded it. He declined the challenge, stating his
reasons in a courteous letter to Colonel Jackson,
who was Gunn's second. Jackson then withdrew-
from the affair ; but Gunn sent a second challenge
through another officer. To this Greene declined
any answer further than a reference to his letter to
Colonel Jackson. Gunn then sent him word that
he should attack him wherever he met him. Greene
merely remarked that he should always carry pistols.
The matter then dropped, and, fortunately, the two
men never met.
Greene, in this as in every important act of his
since the beginning of the war, wished to feel sure of
Washington's approbation. He therefore wrote to
him a full account of the affair, and said: " If a com
manding officer is bound to give satisfaction to every
officer who may pretend to be injured (and this pre
tense would not be wanting to try to wipe off the
stain of public trial and condemnation), it places him
in a more disagreeable situation than had ever oc
curred to me before. But as I may have mistaken the
line of responsibility of a commanding officer, I wish
for your sentiments upon the subject. It is possible

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH.

307

you may be placed, by the ignorance of some or the
imprudence of others, in the same predicament,
though I believe few will be hardy enough to try such
an experiment. If I thought my honor or reputation
would suffer in the opinion of the world, and more
especially with the military gentlemen, I value life
too little to hesitate a moment to answer the chal
lenge. But when I consider the nature of the pre
cedent, and the extent of the mischief it may pro
duce, I have felt a necessity to reject it."
Washington replied: "I give it as my decided
opinion that your honor and reputation will stand not
only perfectly acquitted for the nonacceptance of
the challenge,- but that your prudence and judgment
would have been condemned for accepting it, be
cause, if a commanding officer is amenable to private
calls for the discharge of his public duty, he has a
dagger always at his breast, and can turn neither
to the right hand nor the left .without meeting its
point. In a word, he is no longer a free agent in
office, as there are few military decisions which are
not offensive to one party or the other. ... A prece
dent of the sort once established in the army would
no doubt have been followed up, and in that case
would unquestionably have produced a revolution,
but of a very different kind from that which, happily
for America, has prevailed."
During the few years which intervened between
the close of the war and Greene's death public office
of different kinds was offered to him. His name
was suggested for Secretary of War when Lincoln
resigned in 1784; in the same year he was appointed
by Congress a commissioner to negotiate a general
peace with the Indians ; and on his settling in Geor-

308 GENERAL GREENE.
gia he was appointed County Judge. But he de
clined each in succession, being firmly determined to
lead the life of a private gentleman. Even the So
ciety of the Cincinnati failed to interest him. He
was made president of the Rhode Island Branch, but
he never attended a meeting. In the spring of 1784
Washington wrote urging him to attend the meeting
which was to be held, to meet the opposition which
had been aroused against the hereditary principle of
the society. He was suffering at the time from a re
lapse of the fever which he had had in each year of
his service in the South, and was thus unable to at
tend. But his reply to Washington showed that he
took little interest in the matter. It is possible that
he did not fully approve the rules of the society.
Gordon asserts that, in conversation with him, Greene
intimated that such was the case.
In spite of his indisposition to enter public life,
however, he could not remain wholly indifferent to
the important public questions which arose immedi
ately after the war. His correspondence with Rob
ert Morris, Hamilton, Governor Reed, of Pennsyl
vania, and finally with Washington, was now almost
entirely devoted to questions of politics. The cor
respondence with Morris had in fact begun in 1780,
and one of the first letters from Greene shows such
a remarkable grasp of the situation, and outlines so
plainly the history of the next seven years, that it is
well to give somewhat lengthy extracts from it. Af
ter arguing in favor of a regular army enlisted for
the war, and showing that public credit had been
.ruined by sporting with the national faith and trying
to redeem the currency at forty for one, he says:
" What is to be done ? I will tell you in a few words :

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH. 309
Call a convention of the States and establish a Con
gress upon a constitutional footing. Give them full
powers to govern the empire, and make them ac
countable for their conduct; and oblige them to es
tablish boards for all executive business, independent
of their body. . . . Congress, upon their present
footing, have not powers to. govern the empire ; nor
will the people ever have confidence in this body of
men upon the present Constitution. It is my opinion
that, unless we have some supreme power to govern
the empire, and that have authority to bring the
force and resources of the States all to one point,
we can never support the contest." Many people
thought that the solution of the difficulty was in ap
pointing a dictator ; but Greene had no such idea.
He was " in great doubt whether there would be as
prompt obedience from the people at large under a
dictator as under a congress vested with ample pow
er to command the resources of the country." He
was very clear, however, that Congress should be
limited solely to legislative functions. " I would ad
vise the appointment of a minister of war and a min
ister of finance ; and let merit, and not family and
fortune, direct the choice of these persons. The
business of Congress should be merely legislative,
and not executive." Here was the essence of the
ideas which were finally adopted seven years later.
In the following spring the idea of ministers of war
and finance was accepted in Congress, and a few
days later the Articles of Confederation, which had
been under consideration for nearly four years, were
at last ratified by all the States. But they con
tained the fatal defect of leaving the revenues to
be- raised by the Legislatures of the several States

3io

GENERAL GREENE.

and by them paid over to Congress. The States
failed to comply with their obligation. Congress
therefore, in February, 1781, recommended to the
several States, " as indispensably necessary, that they
vest a power in Congress to levy for the use of the
United States a duty of five per cent ad valorem "
upon imports. But this plan never went into effect.
To Greene's mortification, Rhode Island was always
obstinately opposed ¦ to it. Georgia also failed to
give its assent, and Virginia and South Carolina,
which had at first adopted it, subsequently repealed
the acts. Greene saw clearly that without power to
raise its own revenues the Confederation was a rope
of sand, and for the last two years of his life his cor
respondence about political affairs almost always
turned on this question. He did his utmost, both at
the South and at the North, to secure its adoption by
the State Legislatures, but without success. He
feared that, unless a stronger central government
was formed, the Confederation would dissolve ; and
in writing to Washington from Charleston, in the
summer of 1784, he says: "Many people secretly
wish that every State should be completely inde
pendent, and that, as soon as our public debts are
liquidated, Congress should be no more — a plan that
would be as fatal to our happiness at home as it
would be ruinous to our interest abroad." As in
1775 he had recommended a declaration of inde
pendence, so in 1785 he advocated a union of the
States into one nation, with a central government
endowed with sufficient power to collect its own
revenues and make itself respected.
But at the latter date his thoughts were mainly
turned to the establishment of his Southern home

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH. 3H
and the pleasures which he anticipated therein. He
was charmed with Mulberry Grove, and found it in a
much less ;n jured condition than he expected. " The
prospect is delightful and the house magnificent.
We have a coach house and stables, a large, out-
kitchen, and a poultry house, . . . with a pigeon
house on the top which wili contain not less than a
thousand pigeons. Besides these are several other
buildings convenient for a family, and among the
rest a fine smokehouse. The garden is in ruins, but
'there are still a great variety of shrubs and flowers
in it." Here he expected to live and enjoy life.
Anthony Wayne was on the adjoining plantation,
and another of his intimate friends, Governor Reed,
of Pennsylvania, was proposing to move South ¦ the
following year and settle in his neighborhood. Cap
tain Pendleton, of Virginia, one of his aids-de
camp, had established himself in Savannah, only
fourteen miles down the river. Greene had a large,
comfortable house, with plenty of books in the libra
ry, and horses in the stable, both his wife and him
self being very fond of horseback riding. .His chil
dren were about him. He seemed to have everything
he wished for, and, but for the cloud of the Banks
trouble, his happiness was 'complete. With the open-
ing/of spring the farmer was full of business. " This
is a busy time with us, and I can afford but a Small
portion of time to write. We are planting. We have
got upward of sixty acres of corn planted, and ex
pect to plant one hundred and thirty of rice. The
garden is delightful. The fruit trees and flowering
shrubs form a pleasing variety. We have green peas
almost fit to eat,and as fine lettuce as you ever saw.
The weather is mild, and the vegetable kingdom pro-

312

GENERAL GREENE.

gressing to perfection. . . . We have in the same
orchard apples, pears, peaches, apricots, nectarines,
plums of different kinds, figs, pomegranates, and
oranges. And we have strawberries which measure
three inches around." What more charming picture
could there be than this, after eight years of war and
anxiety and privation ? AH his energy and enthusi
asm were now enlisted in his new occupation of
planter, and he bade fair to be as famous a farmer
as soldier. But the Southern sun produces not only
figs and pomegranates and nectarines, but . deadly
diseases as well ; and two months after writing this
joyous letter Greene's dead body was in the vault at
Savannah. On the 1 2th of June he was called to Savannah
to meet one of Banks's creditors. His wife drove
into town with him, and they passed the night at
Captain Pendleton's house. They started home in
the cool of the morning, but Greene's enthusiasm as
a planter led him to stop at a neighbor's plantation
on the way and examine his rice fields. They were
extensive, and Greene spent several hours in the
middle of the day examining them. His neighbor
(Mr. Williams) carried an umbrella, but Greene had
campaigned so long that he neglected this precau
tion. Driving home in the afternoon, his head began
to ache ; the next day the pains in his head were in
tense, and there was a swelling of the forehead.
Captain Pendleton came, and two physicians were
summoned. Cupping and blisters were about the
limit of their science. Wayne came over from his
plantation and watched by his bedside day and
night. The pains and inflammation increased, until- -
finally relief came in a stupor from which he never

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH. 3^
roused. A little after daybreak on June 19, 1786,
he ceased breathing. " Mad Anthony " Wayne, the
same who had stormed Stony Point, sat down, over
whelmed with grief, to write a few words to Colonel
Jackson, asking him to make arrangements for the
funeral, " My dear friend General Greene is no
more. . . . He was great as a soldier, greater as a
citizen, immaculate as a friend. . . . Pardon this
scrawl ; my feelings are but too much.affected, be
cause I have seen a great and good man die."
The next morning his body was taken down the
river in a boat to Savannah. The militia of the ad
joining counties turned out, the artillery at Fort
Wayne fired minute-guns, the shipping in the harbor
hung their flags at half mast, all business in the town
was suspended, and the citizens in mass attended the.
funeral of the man who had reconquered the South
from the British.
The news of his death traveled northward as fast
as the means of communication of that day per
mitted, and everywhere produced profound sorrow
and surprise. Lee, then in Congress, was the first to
convey the intelligence to Washington. " Your friend
and second, the patriot and noble Greene, is no
more. Universal grief reigns here. How hard is
the fate of the United States to lose such a man in.
the middle of life ! Irreparable loss ! "
Lee was also chairman of a committee upon
whose report, on August 8, 1786, Congress passed a
resolution in these words :
"Resolved, That a monument be erected to the
memory of Nathanael Greene, Esq., at the seat of the
Federal Government, with the following inscription :
Sacred to the memory of Nathanael Greene, Esq., a
21

314

GENERAL GREENE.

native of the State of Rhode Island, who died on the
19th of June, 1786 ; late Major General in the service
of the United States, and commander of their army
in the Southern Department.
" The United States in Congress assembled, in
honor of his patriotism, valor, and ability, have
erected this monument.
"Resolved, That the Board of Treasury take order
for the due execution of the foregoing resolution."
The order remained unexecuted for ninety years,
but in 1875, at the instance of the senators from
Rhode Island, the necessary money was appropri
ated, and two years later an admirable equestrian
statue in bronze, by Henry K. Brown, was erected
on the public square at the intersection of Massa
chusetts and Maryland Avenues, in Washington.

Thus died, at the early age of not quite forty-four,
the man of whom Sparks said that " he may justly
be regarded as the most extraordinary man in the
Army of the Revolution." The words are care
fully chosen. He was not the greatest man of
the Revolution, for Washington, by common con
sent, had no rival. But when we consider Greene's
early education, the suddenness with which he leaped
from obscurity to high military command, the "great
services he rendered in organizing the Quartermas
ter General's Department, his unflagging devotion
to the- service (Washington and himself being the
only ones of the generals at Boston who served con
tinuously through the eight years of the war), the
skill with which he conducted the military operations
at the South, and the solidity of the results which

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH.

315

he accomplished there — when we consider these, and
remember his youth and his total lack of experi
ence at the outbreak of the war, we see that he was
indeed the most remarkable man among the soldiers
of the Revolution, and that there was " no one whose
reputation and advancement can with more justice
be attributed exclusively to personal merit."
His fame rests upon his military achievements,
for his short service in the Rhode Island Assembly
was unimportant. What the future would have
brought him had he lived to the age he had reason
to expect, is mere conjecture. And yet such con
jecture is not wholly idle. With his vigorous con
stitution, outdoor life and temperate habits, he had
fairly thirty years more to look forward to. This
period would have carried him through Washington's
administration, the quarrel between Hamilton and
Jefferson, the threatened war with France, the defeat
of the Federalists, the long bickering with England,
and finally the war of 1812. In all of these events, so
important in determining the future of the Republic,
he would necessarily have been a prominent factor.
Of his talents for civil administration we have no
very positive proofs, yet such experience as he had
had before the war broke out had been in the direc
tion of civil rather than military affairs. Of his mili
tary genius there is no question, and there' is reason
to believe that he would have developed equally
great powers as a statesman. Hamilton was fully
convinced of this, and in his eulogy on Greene, al
ready quoted, he speaks of " the vast, I had almost
said the enormous, powers of his mind. . . . The
sudden termination of his life cut him off from those
scenes which the progress of a new, immense, and

316 GENERAL GREENE.
unsettled empire could not fail to open to the com
plete exertion of that universal and pervading genius
which qualified him not less for the Senate than for
the field." And Washington, writing soon after his
death, speaks of "the loss [that] the public has sus
tained by the death of this valuable character, espe
cially at this crisis, when the political machine seems to
portend the most awful events." We have glimpses of
what induced these opinions in Greene's correspond
ence about political affairs. He was a close student,
and thought much on them, though he had no part
in them. His shrewd reasoning while at Boston con
cerning the probability of a French alliance ; his clear
ideas as to the advisability of a declaration of inde
pendence and the proper military means for carrying-
on the war ; his prompt appreciation of the weakness
of Congress, the evils which this would produce, and
the necessity for a more perfect union ; his sound
views about currency and finance expressed in his
letters to Robert Morris — all tend to show that with
the responsibility and experience arising from active
participation in public affairs he would have come to
prominence in politics as quickly as he did in war.
His name was twice suggested for the office of Sec
retary of War — once when the office was established,
in 1 781, and again when Benjamin Lincoln resigned,
in 1784. In each case he positively declined to con
sider the appointment. After so many years of war
and separation, his one thought was a quiet home,
surrounded by his wife, to whom he was devotedly at
tached, and his children of whom he had seen so little,
and of whom he wrote with unaffected simplicity, " I
have a family whom I dearly love." But after a few
years of rest he would have felt the longing for action,

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH.

317

and there is little doubt that, had he been living in
1789, he would have been called to the Cabinet by
Washington in a manner that would have admitted of
¦no refusal. Once there, his natural inclinations would
have led him into the Federal party, as a warm and
vigorous ally of Hamilton, bringing him additional
strength in his struggle with Jefferson. It is not
impossible that his good judgment and tact in dealing
with men might have averted the disaster to which
John Adams led the Federalists in 1800. At all
events, he, and not Hamilton, would naturally have
been appointed general in chief at the time of Wash
ington's death, when war with France seemed immi
nent, and at the outbreak of the war with England,
in 1812 he would have been the chief military man
in the country. It is safe to say that the wretched
•blunders and defeats of that war would not have
taken place under his administration.
But all of these possibilities were cut short by
the sunstroke on the banks of the Savannah River
in June, 1786. It only remains to consider his actual
military career. In studying this we must remember
that he was not a trained soldier, commanding part
or all of a regular army. He was a self-educated
man, who among his studies had included that of
the military art simply as a means to an end. He
was brought up in an atmosphere where the old-
fashioned ideas of militia prevailed. When war came
he discarded these ideas instantly, and did all in his
power to persuade others to do the same. A force
enlisted for the war, ready to go wherever ordered, ^
subject to the orders of one commander in chief,
uniformly armed, equipped, and disciplined-^- this
was his conception of the force needed to fight the

3 18 GENERAL GREENE.
soldiers of Great Britain. These ideas are common
place and universal to-day, but in 1775 they were
novel and original ; to the majority of the colonists
they seemed little less than dangerous, and subver
sive of all liberty. His chief task, therefore, as a
brigade and division commander, as quartermaster
general, and as commanding general at the South,
was to introduce order, discipline, and system in his
command, and to keep his men fed, clothed, and
armed in the absence of all those resources, without
which an army ordinarily can not exist. What he
accomplished in these directions seemed then, and
still appears now, incredible.
But if he was not a trained soldier, in command of
a regular force, he had all the instincts of a soldier of
the highest grade. The conditions in other wars were
so dissimilar that it is difficult to compare him with
other soldiers, with Sherman or Sheridan, _or with
the famous lieutenants of Napoleon and Frederick.
He can, however, be easily compared with his fel
low-soldiers of the Revolution, and it is safe to say
that in the strictly military domain of strategy and
tactics he had no superior among them, not even
the immortal Washington himself. He showed these
qualities clearly while yet a subordinate, in command
of. a division at Trenton and Monmouth and New
port, and above all at the Brandywine, when he
moved his men for nearly four miles at the double
quick toward the sound of the cannon. He had the
true military eye for topography and the choice of a
position, and he coupled with this a quick decision
in the changing events of battle. The formation of
his troops for attack or defense was in strict accord
ance with military principles — the infantry in two or

CLOSING YEARS AND DEATH. 7,19
three lines, the cavalry on the flanks, and the artil
lery in the intervals ; the best troops in the second
or third line, the action opened by the artillery, and
the reserve brought up at the decisive moment ; the
cavalry well in advance on the march to learri the
enemy's movements and in battle threatening the
enemy's flanks, leading in pursuit after a victory or
covering the retreat after a defeat.
All of these principles were more scientifically
applied under his command at the South than at any
other time during the war. In spite of this, he was
clearly defeated at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill ; he
lost the siege of Ninety-Six, and Eutaw Springs was
at best a drawn battle. The cause in each case was
the inexperience and lack of discipline in a portion
of his troops, due not to any defect in the individual
qualities of the men, but to their short service and
want of training. In each of these battles there
was a critical moment when victory might have
been secured by a final desperate effort ; but if
the effort failed, destruction was inevitable. It is
an interesting subject of discussion whether he
should have made this effort. To a man of his im
pulsive temperament the temptation to do so must
have been great. But in each case he resisted it,
and adhered to his deliberate intention never to
place his little army within the possibility of de
struction. In this he certainly showed great self-
control, and it is fair to accept the verdict of his
contemporaries, who universally applauded his pru
dence. But if his battles failed through the imper- „
fection of the tools with which he had to work, he
showed the talent of a master workman in that por
tion of his task which depended on himself alone.

320 GENERAL GREENE.
In the rapidity of his retreat to the Dan, the prompt
ness with which he then turned on Cornwallis and
pursued him to Guilford, the boldness with which he
disregarded Cornwallis and carried the war back into
South Carolina, and the skill with which he ma
noeuvred around the head waters of the streams,
always keeping his back to the mountains, and
finally pushed a much superior force into the forti
fications of Charleston and held them there — in all
his strategic combinations his plans were so well
laid that, in spite of temporary defeat in battle, the
ultimate end of each campaign was fully achieved.
His personal character was very attractive. He
had a frank, confiding, loyal nature, above petty
meanness of any sort. He made strong friendships
among those with whom he was associated, and,
though a strict disciplinarian, he was respected and
beloved by his men. He showed ill temper and a lack
of calm judgment in his controversy with Congress
while quartermaster general, but it must be admit
ted that the provocation was very great. On the
other hand, when he arrived at chief- command, he
exhibited rare patience and tact in dealing with the
complaints and jealousies of the officers who served
under him. He was devoted to his wife and children,
and in all his family relations his life was exemplary.
He showed proper respect to his superiors, but he
never cringed to any man. His loyalty to Washing
ton never failed for one moment, either in deed or
thought. Taken all in all, he was a fine type of that sturdy
New England manhood which has been so potent in
shaping the destinies of the Western world.

INDEX.

Adams, John, correspondence
with Greene, 37, 38, 40, 68,
73- 75-
Alliance with France, 105.
Andre, Major John, trial and
execution of, 154, 157.
Arnold, General Benedict, at
Philadelphia, 77 ; treason at
West Point, 154, 157 ; opera
tions in Virginia, 203, 205.
Augusta, siege of, 250.
Balfour, Colonel Nisbet, 260.
Bancroft, George, historian, criti
cisms on Greene at Long Is-
- land, 38 ; at Fort Washing
ton, 53 ; at Trenton, £6 ; at
Germantown, 90.
Banks, John, speculator, receives
contract to clothe the South
ern army, 292 ; receives con
tract for feeding the Southern
army, 296 ; becomes financial
ly embarrassed, and induces
Greene to become surety for
his debts, 297 ; fraudulently
disposes of the security, 298 ;
flees before Greene, 298 ; his
death, 298 ; makes statement

in regard to his transactions
with Greene, 300.
Brandywine, battle of, 81.
British forces in South Caro
lina, strength of, 178, 190, 199,
215, 282.
British posts in South Carolina,
234, 235-
Brown, John, merchant in Provi
dence, letter from Greene to,
121.
Browne, Lieut.-Colonel Thomas,
at siege of Augusta, 235, 250,
251 ; at Savannah, 285.
Burnet, Major, aide-de-camp to
Greene, involved in specula
tion with Banks, 299, 300;
compromises Greene, 301.
Butt's Hill, on Rhode Island,
engagement at, 114.
Camden, battle of, 165 ; occu
pied and fortified by the Brit
ish, 180, 234, 238.
Campbell, Colonel Richard, at ,
Guilford, 217, 219, 222 ; at
Hobkirk's Hill, 240 ; at Nine
ty-Six, 257 ; at Eutaw Springs,
270, 272 ; killed, 273.

322

GENERAL GREENE.

Charleston, siege of, 162 ; plans
for combined land and naval
attack after fall of Yorktown,
277, 279, 280 ; evacuated, 292.
Cincinnati, order of the, Greene's
lack of interest in it, 308.
Clinton, General Sir Henry, at
Long Island, 41 ; succeeds
Howe as commander in chief,
99 ; at Monmouth, 101 ; at
Newport, 115, 146; defeated
at Charleston, 162 ; captures
Charleston, 164 ; instructions
to Cornwallis, 179 ; sends re-
enforcements to the South,
182, 204, 233 ; controversy
with Cornwallis, 244, 245.
Cornwallis, Lieutenant-General,
Earl, at Long Island, 41 ; at
Fort Washington, 56 ; at Fort
Lee, 60 ; at Trenton, 61, 64 ;
at Princeton, 65 ; at West-
field, 78 ; at Brandywine, 81,
83 ; at Germantown, 89 ; in
East Jersey, 91 ; at siege of
Charleston, 164 ; in command
at the South, 177 ; advances
into North Carolina, 181, 183 ;
instructions to Tarleton, 186 ;
advances to the Dan, 191-
203 ; retreats to Hillsborough,
206 ; manoeuvres near Guil
ford, 210; gains victory at
Guilford, 217 ; retreats to the
seacoast, 229 ; marches to
Virginia, 244 ; controversy
with Clinton, 245.
Cowpens, battle of, 187.
Cruger, Lieutenant - Colonel
John H., in South Carolina,

179; at Ninety-Six, 235 ; de
fends Ninety-Six, 249, 252,
253, 259 ; evacuates Ninety-
Six, 261 ; at Eutaw Springs,
271, 272.
De Grasse, Admiral, Count,
captures Rawdon, 262 ; ar
rival at Yorktown, 277 ; de
clines to attack Charleston,
279 ; captured by Rodney,
280.
De Lancey, Colonel Oliver, 179,
258.
D'Estaing, Admiral, Count, at
Sandy Hook, 105 ; at New
port, 108, 111 ; at Boston,
114; sails to the West Indies,
120.
Du Coudray, General, proposed
appointment of, as chief of ar
tillery, 71 ; death of, 75.
Duponceau, Peter Stephen, Steu
ben 's secretary, remarks about
Mrs. Greene, 95.
Duval, Lieutenant, leads storm
ing party at Ninety-Six, 258 ;
killed at Eutaw Springs, 273.
Eutaw Springs, battle of, 271 ;
relation of this battle to
Yorktown, 275.
Ferguson, Major Patrick, 181.
Finances, condition of, 118.
Fiske, John, historian, opinion
of Greene, 171.
Fort Galpin, capture of, 250.
Fort Granby, 235 ; capture of,
243 ; occupied by Sumter,
255-

INDEX.

323

Fort Lee, headquarters of
Greene, 49 ; evacuated, 60.
Fort Motte, 234 ; capture of,
243-
Fort Washington, capture of,
49. 56, 59-
Fox, Charles James, comments
on the battle of Guilford, 226.
Gates, General Horatio, at Bos
ton, 25 ; opposition to Wash
ington* 59, 97, 126 ; appoint
ed to command in the SQUth,
165 ; defeated at Camden,
r53i z59. I05 ; succeeded by
Greene, 167, 171 ; restored to
duty, 172. .
Germantown, bstttle of, 87.
. Gornell, Sergeant, ringleader in
a mutiny, 288 ; hanged, 288.
Grant, General U. S., corre
spondence with Sherman in
1864, 295.
Greene, Catharine Littlefield,
wife of General Greene, mar
riage, 16 ; at Boston, iS ; at
Morristown, 68 ; at Valley
Forge, 94 ; dances with Wash
ington at Middlebrook, 123 ;
starts for West Point, 160 ; let
ter from her husband in South
Carolina, 268 ; Washington
offers to assist in the edu
cation of her children, 302 ;
returns to Rhode Island at
the close of the war, 303 ;
herself and o family reunited
with her husband in their
Georgia home,3ii, 312.
Greene, Colonel Christopher, 17,

19 ; defends Red Bank, 91 ;
at Newport, 115.
Greene, John, ancestor of Gen
eral Greene, 1, 5, 6.
Greene, Nathanael, father of
General Greene, 4.
Greene, Nathanael, ancestry, 1 ;
education, 4 ; member of As
sembly, 10 ; marriage, 16 ;
military studies, 17 ; in com
mand of Rhode Island troops,
rg ; at Boston, 23 ; corre
spondence with Governor
Ward, 30 ; at Long Island,
35 ; appointed major general,
35 ; correspondence with John
Adams, 38 ; at Harlem
Heights, 47 ; at Fort Lee,
49 ; at Fort Washington, 51,
56, 59 ; at Trenton, 62, 66 ;
at Morristown, 68 ; protests
against appointment of M. du
Coudray as chief of artillery,
71 ; engagement at Bruns
wick, 78 ; at Brandywine, 82 ;
aT Germantown, 87 ; at Valley
Forge, 94 ; appointed quarter
master general, 98 ; at Mon
mouth, 101 ; reproved by
Washington, 104 ; at New
port, 106 ; at Butt's Hill, 114 ;
at Middlebrook, 123 ; diffi
culties of the Quartermaster's
Department, 124 ; approved
by Congress, 130 ; controver
sy with Congress, 134 ; en
gagement at Springfield, 139 ;
resigns as quartermaster gen
eral, 144 ; action of Congress
on his resignation, 147 ; in

324

GENERAL GREENE.

command of the army on the
Hudson, 154 ; president of
board to try Andre, 155 ; as
signed to command at West
Point, 159 ; appointed to com
mand the Southern army, 161 ;
arrival at Charlotte, 171 ;
strength and condition of his
army, 173 ; opens the cam
paign, 183 ; retreats to the
Dan, 194 ; pursues Cornwal
lis, 206 ; defeated at Guil
ford, 216 ; again pursues
Cornwallis, 229 ; carries the
war into South Carolina, 230,
237 ; defeated at Hobkirk's
Hill, 239 ; captures the Brit
ish posts in South Carolina,
243 ; advances against Ninety-
Six, 247 ; siege of Ninety-
Six, 253 ; retires from Ninety-
Six, 259 ; pursues Rawdon to
Orangeburg, 261 ; goes into
camp at High Hills of Santee,
262, 264 ; his efforts to secure
re-enforcements, money, and
supplies for his army, 265,
266, 267 ; advances against
Stuart, 269 ; fights battle at
Eutaw Springs, 270-276 ;
recommends to Washington
an attack upon Charleston,
277-280 ; receives re-enforce
ments from Yorktown, 281,
284 ; advances to Charleston,
283 ; sends Wayne to conquer
Georgia, 284 ; receives resolu
tions of thanks and awards of
land from the Legislatures of
Georgia, South Carolina and

North Carolina, 286 ; "his diffi
culties in securing food and
clothing for the army, 288-293;
takes possession of Charles
ton and ends hostilities, 292 ;
his correspondence with Wash
ington on the termination of
the war, 294 ; comparison
with letters of Grant and
Sherman, 295 ; guarantees the
obligations of Banks in re
gard to feeding the army,
297 ; loses the bulk of his
fortune in consequence there
of, 298 ; is accused of hold
ing improper relations with
Banks, 299 ; is fully acquitted
of the charge, 300, 301 ; re
turns to Rhode Island, 303,
305 ; receives thanks of Con
gress and State legislatures,
304 ; challenged to a duel
with Captain Gunn, 305 ; de
clines all public office, 307 ;
correspondence with Robert "
MSrris concerning political
affairs, 308 ; establishes his
home on his Georgia planta
tion, 311 ; dies, 312 ; estimate
of his services and character,
315-
Greene, Governor William, 14,
16.
Guilford Court House, battle of,
216.
Gunby, Colonel, conduct at
Hobkirk's Hill, 241.
Gunn, Captain, makes improper
use of public horses, 289 ; chal
lenges Greene to a- duel, 305.

INDEX.

325

Hamilton, Alexander, noticed
by Greene while drilling- his
company at New York, 37;
appointed secretary to Wash
ington, 66 ; at Valley Forge,
94 ; resigns from Washing
ton's staff, 104 ; advises Greene
in his controversy with Con
gress, 137 ; informs Greene of
Andre's treason, 154; advo
cates legislation for the relief
¦of Greene's widow,, 298 ; his
opinion of Greene, 66, 231, 316.
Harlem Heights, engagement
at, 46, 48.
Hampton, Colonel Wade, at
Eutaw Springs, 273, 274 ; at
Dorchester, 283.
Henderson, Colonel, temporarily
in command of Sumter's par
tisans, 266, 270 ; wounded at
Eutaw Springs, 273.
High Hills of Santee, encamp
ment at, 237, 261, 264, 266,
275, 281, 282.
Hobkirk's Hill, battle of, 239.
Howe, Admiral, Lord, at New
port, no.
Howe, General Sir William,
British commander in chief at
Boston, 30 ; at New York, 35 ;
at Long Island, 42 ; at Kip's
Bay, 45 ; at White Plains, 50 ;
at Fort Washington, 56 ; ma
noeuvres in New Jersey, 77 ;
moves to the Chesapeake, 77 ;
victory at Brandywine, 82 ;
. enters Philadelphia, 85 ; vic
tory at .Germantown, 87;
superseded by Clinton, 99.

Huger, General Isaac, com
mands detachment in South
ern army, 184, 194, 198, 200,
246.
Jefferson, Governor Thomas, ar
rangements for supplying the
Southern army, 170, 173, 204-
206, 248, 255.
Kentish Guards, organized by
Greene and others, 6, 17 ;
marches to Boston, 18.
King's Mountain, battle of, 181.
Kip's Bay, engagement at, 45,
46.
Kirkwood, Major Robert, com
mands the Delaware battalion
at Guilford, 217, 219, 220 ; at
Hobkirk's Hill, 239, 240 ; at
Ninety-Six, 251, 258 ; at Eu
taw Springs, 270, 274.
Knox, General Henry, visit of
Greene to his bookstore, 17 ;
chief of artillery at New York,
36 ; examines defenses at
West Point, 67 ; protests
against being superseded by
Du Coudray, 71, 72, 74, 75 ; at
Valley Forge, 94 ; member of
board to try Andre, 155.
Kosciusko, Colonel Thaddeus,
engineer of the Southern
army, selects camp on the
Pedee River, 176 ; constructs
earthworks at the crossing of
the Dan, 202 ; makes recon-
noissanceat Ninety-Six, 253 ;
wounded in a sortie, 256 ; se
lects camp at Round O, 284:

326

GENERAL GREENE.

Lafayette, Marquis, joins the
army, 79 ; gallantry at the
battle of Brandywine, 83 ; at
Valley Forge, 94 ; at Mon
mouth, 100, 101 ; ordered to
Newport, 106 ; in the opera
tions at Newport, 111-114,
116, 117 ; returns to France,
120 ; in operations against
New York, 142 ; member of
board to try Andre, 155 ;
applies to be ordered with
Greene, 169 ; in command
in Virginia, 230, 233, 246,
247, 278 ; his action in pur
chasing clothing for his sol
diers in Baltimore, 299 ; edu
cates Greene's son in France,
302.
Laurens, Colonel John, aid-de
camp to Washington at Val
ley Forge, 94, 96 ; meets
D'Estaing at .Sandy Hook,
105 ; applies to be ordered to
the South with Greene, 169 ;
in front of Charleston, 285,
291 ; death of, 285.
Lawson, General Robert, com
mands brigade of Virginia
militia at Guilford, 217.
Lee, General Charles, at Bos
ton, 25 ; at Long Island, 36;
criticisms on the fall of Fort
Washington, 58 ; sends Colo
nel Malmedy to Rhode Island,
70 ; rejoins the army at Val
ley Forge, 99, 100 ; on the
march to Monmouth, 101 ; his
conduct at Monmouth, 102 ;
end of his career, 101, 103.

Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry,
remarks about the battle of
Germantown, 90 ; ordered to
the Southern army, 169, 179 ;
arrives at Charlotte,' 176 ; in
the retreat to the Dan, 194,
197, 199, 202-204 ; in pur
suit of Cornwallis, 205 ; cap
tures Pyle's detachment, 206,
207 ; skirmish with Tarleton,
209 ; at the battle of Guilford,
211, 212, 214, 216, 217, 222,
224 ; pursues Cornwallis
toward the coast, 229 ; advice
concerning carrying the war
into South Carolina, 231 ; ad
vances into South Carolina,
232-234 ; at the capture of
Fort Watson, 236, 239 ; cap
tures Fort Granby, 243 ; cap
tures Fort Galpin, 250 ; cap
tures Augusta, 251 ; arrives at
Ninety-Six, 251 ; at the siege
of Ninety-Six, 256, 258, 259 ;
pursues Rawdon, 260 ; com
ments on the Southern cam
paign, 203, 264 ; at Eutaw
Springs, 270, 272, 273 ; in
front of Charleston, 284, 285,.
291 ; obtains leave, of absence
and marries, 288 ; his opinion
of Greene, 313.
Leslie, General Alexander,, at
Harlem Heights, 46 ; arrives
in Virginia, 171 ; sails to
Charleston, 178, 182 ; marches
to join Cornwallis, 186, 192 ;
at Guilford, 215, 217 ; takes
command at Charleston, 284 ;
proposes cessation of hostili-

INDEX.

327

ties, 291; evacuates Charles
ton, 292.
Lincoln, General Benjamin, ap
pointed major-general, 76 ;
• in command at the South,
130, 163 ; surrenders at
Charleston, 164, 166 ; ordered
to march to the Hudson after
the fall of Yorktown, 277 ; his
- advice, about marching to
. Charleston, 280.
Luzerne, Minister of France,
correspondence with Greene,
242, 247.
Lynch, Colonel Charles, com
mands Virginia riflemen at
Guilford, 217, 219, 220.
Magaw, Colonel Robert, com
mands at Fort Washington,
¦ 53, 57-
Maham Tower, used at Fort
Watson, 236 ; at Fort Corn
wallis, 251 ; at Ninety-Six,
254. 257-
Mahan, Captain Alfred T., com
ments on the French fleet at
Newport, no.
Marion, General Francis, quali
ties as a partisan chief, 169,
176; attacks Georgetown, 185;
captures Fort Watson, 232,
234-236 ; marches to Camden,
239; captures Fort Motte, 243;
offers to resign, 248, 249; sends
couriers to Greene at Ninety-
Six, 254 ; joins Greene at
Fort Granby, 261 ; at Eutaw
Springs, 270, 275.
Marjoribanks, Major, at the bat

tle of Eutaw Springs, 272-274,
276.
McGowan's ford, passage of, 195.
Middlebrook, winter camp at,
123.
Monmouth, battle of, 101.
Morgan, General Daniel, joins
Greene in East Jersey, 92 ; at
the South, 169, 179 ; ordered
to western South Carolina,
184-186 ; gains a victory at
the Cowpens, 187-190 ; re
treats to North Carolina, 191-
196, 198 ; resigns, 199.
Morris, Robert, Superintendent
of Finance, authorizes bills to
be drawn on him to provide
funds for the support of South
ern army, 267 : correspond
ence with Greene, 267 ; opin
ion of Greene, 282 ; leaves
the Southern army to be sup
ported by the Southern States,
289 ; sends agent with small
amount of money, 292 ; ap
proves Greene's arrangements
for feeding and clothing the
army, 300 ; correspondence
with Greene concerning po
litical questions, 308.
Morristown, winter camp at, 65,
129. 135-
Newport, operations at, 106.
Ninety-Six, siege of, 249.
O'Hara, General Charles, in the
pursuit to the Dan, 202 ; at
Guilford, 215, 219, 220 ;
wounded, 221, 222.

328

GENERAL GREENE.

Phillips, General William, expe
dition to Virginia, 233 ; Corn
wallis's letter to him, 244.
Pickens, General Andrew, par
tisan chief, 169, 176, 180 ;
sent to raise militia at Char
lotte, 201, 204 ; pursues Corn
wallis, 206 ; captures Pyle's
detachment, 207, 208 ; skir
mish with Tarleton, 209 ; at
Guilford, 211 ; sent against
Ninety-Six, 232 ; captures
Augusta, 250, 251 ; at Nine
ty-Six, 255, 262 ; at Eutaw
Springs, 270.
Pitt, William, speech on the
battle of Guilford, 226.
Princeton, engagement at, 64.
Putnam, General Israel, ap
pointed major general, 25 ;
at New York, 43, 46 ; at Har
lem Heights, 48 ; at Peeks-
kill, 91.
Pyle, Colonel, captured with his
detachment, 207, 209.
Ramsay, Dr. David, historian,
opinion of Greene, 282.
Rawdon, Colonel, Lord, second
in command at the South, 177,
178 ; at Camden, 234, 237,
238 ; gains victory at Hob
kirk's Hill, 239-242 ; retreats
from Camden, 243 ; receives
re-enforcements at Charles
ton, 254, 255 ; marches to
Ninety -Six, 256; relieves
Ninety-Six, 259 ; retreats from
Ninety-Six, 260, 261 ; cap
tured by De Grasse, 262.

Reed, Governor Joseph, secretary
to Washington at Boston, 24 ;
praises condition of Greene's
troops, 24 ; conduct at Har
lem Heights, 49 ; visits Val
ley Forge as member of Con
gress, 96 ; persuades Greene
to accept office of Quarter
master General, 97 ; Governor
of Pennsylvania, 133 ; corre
spondence with Greene, 133,
T69, 242.
Rochambeau, General, Count,
arrives at Newport, 142 ;
meets Washington at Hart
ford, 151, 153 ; proposed as
arbitrator in case of Andre,
156 ; movements of his army
after the fall of Yorktown,
277, 281.
Rodney, Admiral Sir George
B., destroys De Grasse's fleet,
280.
Rutledge, Governor John,, ar
rives at Greene's camp, 175 ;
takes measures to restore civil
government in South Caro
lina, 265 ; fails to secure sub
scriptions for Morris's bank,
266, 267 ; endeavors to secure
re-enforcements Irom York-
town, 277, 279 ; convenes
Legislature and eulogizes
Greene, 280.
St. Clair, General, member of
board to try Andre, 155 ; or
dered to re-enforce Greene
after fall of Yorktown, 277 ;
arrives in front of Charleston,

INDEX.

329

284 ; obtains leave of absence,
288.
Savannah, siege of, 162 ; cap
tured by Wayne, 285.
Schuyler, General Philip, ap
pointed major general, 25 ;
sends re-enforcements to
Washington, 62 ; member of
Congress, 132 ; goes to Wash
ington's camp to consult with
him about Quartermaster's
Department, 136, 137, 141 ;
Greene's letter to him, 143 ;
persuades Greene to remain
temporarily as quartermaster
general, 145 ; his report to
Congress, 146.
Sheridan, Major, at the battle of
Eutaw Springs, 273.
Sherman, General W. T., corre
spondence with Grant in 1864,
295.
Smallwood, General William,
commands Maryland militia
at Germantown, 86.
Spencer, General Joseph, at Bos
ton, 25 ; at Harlem, 43, 45 ;
sent to Rhode Island, 70, 106 ;
resigns, 106.
Springfield, engagement at, 140.
Stedman, Charles, British histo
rian, comments on the battle
of Guilford, 224 ; on the suc
cess of Greene's operations in
the South,' 264.
Stephen, General Adam, ap
pointed major general, 76 ; at
Germantown, 86, 87 ; dis
missed, 87.
Steuben, General, Baron, arrives
22

at Valley Forge, 95 ; appoint
ed inspector general and drills
the squads, 96 ; member of
board to try Andre, 155 ; or
dered to the Southern army
with Greene, 168, 169 ; stops
at Mount Vernon, 170 ; ap
pointed to command in Vir
ginia, 171 ; endeavors to send
re-enforcements to Greene,
176, 204, 205 ; letters from
Greene, 205, 233, 246.
Stewart, Lieut.-Colonel Alex
ander, commands the second
battalion of Guards at Guil
ford, 220 ; killed, 221, 224.
Stiles, Rev. Ezra, gives Greene
advice about the choice of
books, 7.
Stirling, General, Earl of, ap
pointed major general, 76 ;
at Germantown, 86 ; at Mon
mouth, 102 ; member of board
to try Andre, 155.
Stony Point, capture of, 120.
Stuart, Lieutenant-Colonel John,
succeeds Rawdon in command
at the South, 262 ; defeated at
Eutaw Springs, 269 ; retreats
toward Charleston, 273 ; at
Dorchester, 283.
Sullivan, General John, ap-
* pointed brigadier general,
25 ; at Boston, 30 ; at Tren
ton, 62 ; protests against ap
pointment by Du Coudray,
71, 74 ; at Brandywine, 81- *
83 ; at Germantown, 86-88 ;
in command in Rhode Isl
and, 106, 107 ; meets D'Es-

330

GENERAL GREENE.

taing,' 109 ; advances against
Newport, no, in ; publishes
order reflecting on the French,
113 ; retreats from Newport,
114 ; fights at Butt's Hill, 115,
117 ; defeats Indians in New
York and Pennsylvania, 120 ;
Greene defends his conduct at
Newport, 121, 122.
Sumner, General Jefhro, brings
re-enforcements from Vir
ginia, 265 ; at Eutaw Springs,
270, 272.
Sumter, General Thomas, par
tisan chief, 169, 176 ; ordered
to threaten Ninety-Six, 201 ;
ordered to be prepared to join
Greene at Camden, 232 ; fails
to comply with his instruc
tions, 238 ; captures Orange
burg, 243 ; protests against
capture of Fort Granby by
Lee and regular troops, 247,
248 ; fails to obey instructions
for retarding Rawdon's ad
vance, 255 ; joins Greene at
Fort Granby, 26 1 ; leaves his
command without authority,
265, 266 ; at Dorchester, 283 ;
opposes legislation for the re
lief of Greene's widow, 298.
Tarleton, Colonel Banastre, in
command of British Legion,
178 ; ordered to attack Mor
gan, 185, 186 ; advances
against Morgan, 187 ; defeat
ed at the Cowpens, 188 ; pur
sues Morgan, 195-197 ; com
ments on Greene's retreat to

the Dan, 203 ; advances to
meet Pyle's detachment, 207 ;
manoeuvres near Guilford,
211 ; wounded in skirmish
with Lee, 216; at Guilford,
218, 224; raiding in Virginia,
248, 281.
Trenton, battle of, 62.
Valley Forge, camp at, 94, 100.
Varnum, General James M.,
friend of Greene in his youth,
14, 15 ; elected captain in
Kentish Guards, 17, 18 ; ap
pointed Colonel Third Rhode
Island Regiment, 19 ; arrives
at Boston, 23 ; joins Greene
in East Jersey, 91 ; at Valley
Forge, 95 ; ordered to New
port, 106 ; at Butt's Hill,
115; member of Congress,
184.
Wadsworth, Jeremiah, letter
from Washington to him con
cerning Greene's connection
with Banks, 302.
Ward, Governor Samuel, promi
nence in Rhode Island poli
tics, 13, 16 ; delegate to Con
tinental Congress, 16 ; influ
ence in securing Greene's ap
pointment to command Rhode
Island troops, 20 ; correspond
ence with Greene, 24, 28, 30 ;
death of, 37.
Ward, Major Samuel, Jr., friend
of Greene in his youth, 14 ;
elected captain in Rhode
Island regiment, 19 ; volun-

INDEX.

33 r

teers to join expedition to
Quebec and is taken prisoner,
28 ; at Valley Forge, 95 ; at
Newport, 115.
Washington, General George,
takes command at Boston, 24 ;
his first meeting with Greene,
25 ; captures Boston, 30 ;
marches to New York, 34 ;
his skill in retreating from
Long Island, 42 ; in action at
Kip's Bay, 46 ; fights battle
of Harlem Heights, 47 ; ma
noeuvres toward White Plains
and thence to the Hudson,
50 ; his instructions to Greene
concerning Fort Washington,
53 ; his share of responsibility
for the disaster, 58 ; retreats
through New Jersey, 61 ; his
brilliant success at Trenton,
62 ; arrives at Morristown,
65 ; protests against appoint
ment of Du Coudray, 71 ;
marches to Delaware, 78 I
makes reconnoissance with
Greene and Lafayette, 80;
fights battle of Brandywine,
81 ; of Germantown, 85 ; goes
intj camp at Valley Forge,
94 ; persuades Greene to ac
cept position of Quartermaster
General, 97 ; fights battle of
Monmouth, 101 ; reproves
Greene, 104 ; sends detach
ment to Rhode Island, 106 ;
his comments on the failure
of the Rhode Island Expedi
tion, 116 ; goes into winter
quarters at Middlebrook, 123 ;

account of his expenses dur
ing the war, 128 ; his opinion
of. Greene's service while
Quartermaster General, 131,
151,, 152, 158 ; plans an at
tack on. New York, 142 ; or
ders Greene to remain as
Quartermaster General, 143 ;
writes to Congress giving his
opinion of Greene, 149, 151;
meets Rochambeau at Hart
ford, 153 ; approves sentence
against Andre, 155 ; orders
Greene to West Point, 159 ;
assigns him to command the
Southern army, 160 ; his rela
tions with Greene, 161, 171 ;
his instructions to Greene,
166 ; writes to Greene approv
ing his operations, 264, 277 ;
corresponds with Greene con
cerning an attack on Charles
ton, 278 ; tries to persuade
De Grasse to undertake an
expedition against Charleston,
279 ; orders re-enforcements
to Greene, 281 ; writes to
Greene on the close of the
Southern campaign, 293 ; his
comments on the charges
against Greene in connection
with Banks, 302 ; offers to
educate Greene's eldest son,
302 ; meets Greene for the
last time, 303 ; approves
Greene's decision in declining
the duel with Captain Gunn,
307 ; his opinjon concerning
the loss sustained by Greene's
death, 316.

332

GENERAL GREENE.

Washington, Martha, joins her
husband at Boston, 28 ; at
Morristown, 67 ; at Valley
Forge, 94; at Middlebrook,
123, 128 ; receives Greene at
Mount Vernon, 170.
Washington, Colonel William,
cavalry leader, 169 ; ordered
to join Morgan, 183 ; at the
Cowpens, 187-189 ; in the
retreat to the Dan, 202, 204 ;
at Guilford, 211, 213, 214, 217,
221, 232, 224 ; at Hobkirk's
Hill, 239-241 ; at Eutaw
Springs, 270, 272; at Dor
chester, 283.
Wayne, General Anthony, at
Brandywine, 82 ; at German-
town, 87, 88 ; at Monmouth,
100-103 ; storms Stony Point,
120 ; marches to Virginia,
233 ; conquers Georgia, 284,
285 ; presented with an estate
by the Legislature of Georgia,
287 ; exonerates Greene in his

transactions with Banks, 300,
301 ; settles on a plantation
in Georgia, 311 ; at Greene's
deathbed, 312 ; his opinion of
Greene, 313.
Webster, Lieutenant - Colonel
James, commands brigade at
Guilford, 211, 215, 217-219 ;
killed, 220, 224.
Williams, Colonel Otho H., in
command of rear guard dur
ing retreat to the Dan, 201,
202 ; captures Pyle's detach
ment, 209; at Guilford, 211-
213, 220, 221 ; at Eutaw
Springs, 270, 272 ; at Dor
chester, 283 ; obtains leave of
absence, 288.
Williams, Roger, founder of
Rhode Island, 1-3, 21.
Yorktown, battle of, 278 ; its
relation to Eutaw Springs and
the Southern campaign, 277,
279, 280.

THE END.

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