Emm H8 ¦ ; ' i* ij, «ti ; - - 4j* j i - . ¦B ¦^^¦^^¦¦^¦¦¦¦¦^¦¦^^¦¦¦¦^¦^^^^^^^¦^¦^^SfliSHi^^^^BH^fl YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG. BT THE SAME AUTHOR. THE BATTLE OF SPICHEREN, August 6th, 1870, and the events that preceded it; A STUDY IN PRACTICAL TACTICS AND WAR TRAINING. WITH NUMEROUS COLOURED MAPS. PllINTED AND PUBLISHED BY GALE & POLDEN, LONDON & CHATHAM. SIX SHILLINGS. Post free to any part of the World. This work will be found especially useful to officers preparing for Taotical examinations for the rank of Major, as well as to officers of lower ranks. THE CAMPAIGN OF FREDERICKSBURG. NOV.— DEC, 1862. A TACTICAL STUDY FOR OFFICERS. BY BREVET-MAJOR G. F. R. HENDERSON, York and Lancaster Regiment, Instructor in Tactics^ 8fc, R.M.G., Sandhurst. AUTHOR OF "The Battle of Spicheren, August 6th, 1870." "It is indispensable and imperatively necessary that those should possess knowledge who aspire to command others." — Table-talk of Napoleon. " Read and meditate on the wars of the greatest captains. This is the only means of rightly learning the science of war." — Ibid. TEIBD EDITIOIT, WITH COLOURED MAPS. LONDON: GALE & POLDEN, 2, AMEN CORN RE, PATERNOSTER ROW, EC, AND BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. FIVE SHILLINGS. Post free to any part of the World. IS Heavy Artillery. (Brigadier-Gen. Pendleton) j J J Total 713. Grand total, 78,228 men, and probably 250 guns, including a complement of heavy cannon. In both armies the strength of divisions varied from 4000 to 12000 ; while the average muster of rank and file in infantry battalions was about 350. Four to six guns (often of different calibre) com posed a battery; and the Confederate cavalry brigade numbered 2000 sabres. Between the military forces of the North and South existed, as we should expect to find, a strong family likeness. They were based upon the same 16 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. military system, were raised at the same moment and in the same manner, and the same causes forbade either assuming the distinctive features of a regular army. It will be instructive to observe the characteristics common to both, and at the same time certain essential differences which bore decisively upon the issue of their campaigns. In the Federal army the officers of the superior grades had, almost without exception, served through out the war, and in three arduous campaigns had won experience. Few of those, however, below the rank of field-officer had any higher military qualifications than zeal and courage. Want of previous training and the fact that they owed their commissions to the vote of the rank and file and not to the selection of the War Department had to answer for their shortcomings. The choice of the privates did not always fall upon the most efficient soldiers, but more often upon those whom self- assertion, a reputation for daring, or even social qualities made the heroes of the hour. Again, many who would have worthily filled the higher rank were unwilling to take up the responsibility of command, and the invidious task of administering discipline on those who had so lately been their equals. A system of examination, instituted by McClellan, had weeded out many of the hard bargains ; but among the company officers the standard of discipline and efficiency was still very low. The same remarks apply to the non-commis sioned ranks. The private soldiers comprised men of every The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 17 grade of society and of many nationalities. Men of substance and education, the best breeding and cul ture of the North, marched and fought shoulder to shoulder with labourers and mechanics, with gamins from New York and half-civilized immigrants. The Federal hosts were not recruited from one continent alone. The proportion of American-born was much larger than has been generally sup posed, but the speech of every European nation might have been heard in the camps of the Army of the Potomac. There were brigades of Irish, famous for their desperate courage, and more than one division of Germans. There were some who had won the red shirt with Garibaldi, and others who had rebelled with Kossuth. Canada sent many gallant riflemen, nor were men wanting who had fought beneath the Tricolor or Union Jack. The unfurling of the Stars and Stripes had gathered together a motley assemblage. Attracted by honour, gold, or sheer love of the soldier's trade, the patriot and the hireling, the citizen and the alien, the prince and the adventurer, stood beneath its folds; and out of this heterogeneous mass the able admin istration of McClellan had welded a highly organized and efficient force. The spirit of the troops was good, and although during its eighteen months of existence the Army of the Potomac had met with many reverses and but few successes, its elan and confidence was still unbroken. The morale of such a force, leavened by the presence of men of intelligence and high principle, was necessarily good. Crime was prac- c 18 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. tically unknown. Public opinion was more dreaded than the provost-marshal, and ever ready to con demn, proved a salutary check on all serious mis behaviour. At the same time the more trifling offences were overlooked. The dogma of absolute equality interfered with the discipline of the republican soldiery, and that habit of prompt obedience was wanting, without which no army can prove a satisfactory instrument in the hands of its commander. The general though tacit consensus of the privates defined the limits of authority, and no superior dared demand further subordination than they thought reasonable to yield. Nor did the regimental officers possess the qualifi cations necessary always, but more especially in an arm)1- where all were socially equal and where the claims of rank were grudgingly allowed, to secure the trust and obedience of the men. Superior knowledge of the art of war, thorough acquaint ance with duty and large experience, seldom fail to command submission and respect. Lacking these qualifications, the Federal officers had but little hold upon their men ; and the soldier was wont to regulate his action rather by the opinion of his comrades or by his own judgment than by the voice of his superior. Later in the war, when General Grant took over the chief command, this state of things had im proved materially ; but by that time the officers were far more competent to command ; and the men, having at length recognized its utility, did not resist the introduction of a somewhat stricter code of discipline. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 19 It may be mentioned that though the patriotism of the majority was pure and exalted and their motives for enlisting most worthy, still there was a large element which had been attracted by the sordid allurements of ample bounties, and whose spirit and resolution were therefore much inferior to those of men who were animated by loftier sentiments. The Federal artillery was numerous, and the weapons of the best and newest patterns, including a large proportion of rifled guns ; but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery in the Army of the Potomac, has testified that the officers of this arm, who were most of them drawn from the regular service, had received a thorough technical but no tactical training what ever, and were ignorant of the value and capabilities of their own weapon. The cavalry was inferior: the troopers well mounted but indifferent horsemen, and their leaders had hitherto shown but little enterprise. The engineers were efficient, for the large num bers of civil engineers who had enlisted, men used to the rough exigencies of a new country, required but little training to become excellent officers. The infantry soldiers, as a rule marched fairly well, were brave and stubborn in the field, and patient under reverses ; armed with a serviceable and long-ranging rifled muzzle-loader, they were but indifferent marksmen, and often extremely careless of the condition of their arms. The staff was in fair working order and full of zeal ; but to the scarcity of professional soldiers in 20 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. the appointments of lower grade many of the Federal disasters were certainly due. Among the corps and division leaders there was great lack of accord and no proper system of subordination. The major- generals in command of Grand Divisions communi cated directly with the military authorities at Washington, without reference to their immediate superior. So little were the claims of discipline acknowledged or understood even in the highest ranks, that Hooker, commanding the Centre Grand Division, before the battle of Fredericksburg, did not hesitate to openly express his disapproval of General Burnside's plans and his forebodings as to the result : these opinions spreading rapidly through his command, sapped the confidence of the soldiers, and sent them into action half-beaten before a shot was fired. So gross an indiscretion has few parallels in history. The Ordnance, Transport, and Supply departments, though the knavery of the contractors has become a byword, were excellently organized and served. The armament and equipment of the troops left little to be desired, and the medical and hospital machinery was well nigh faultless. The vast wealth and resources of the Union Government were un sparingly lavished on the comfort and well-being of the soldiers ; and while none, perhaps, have ever been so well cared for as those of the North, few, on the other hand, have endured greater hardships than did the men who formed the Army of Virginia. . One division of regular infantry and some batteries of the old United States army were with the Army The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 21 of the Potomac, but the remainder of the troops were volunteers, that is, they had received no regular military training, and had only adopted the profession of arms as a temporary measure. The Confedei-ate army was also, with the excep tion of many officers, composed entirely of unprofes sional soldiers; and in organization, composition, and discipline, had much in common with its rival. The same mixture of classes existed in the ranks ; but there were few foreigners. Discipline was perhaps less strict, and how slight were its bonds the follow ing extracts show. In a work on the inner life of this very Army of Northern Virginia, written by one who served in it, it is said that " it took years to teach the educated privates that it was their duty to give unquestioning obedience to officers because they were such ; " and that " the conflict (between officers and men) was soon commenced and main tained to the end." We read elsewhere that " at the drawn battle of Sharpsburg, September 17, 1862, where Lee so successfully resisted the onslaught of a far superior force, 25,000 stragglers, more than one-third of his numbers, were absent from his ranks." That eminent writer, Colonel Charles Chesney, in speaking of Lee's errors, charges him as follows: — " Chief of these was his permitting the continuance of the laxity of discipline which throughout the war clogged the movements of the Confederates, and robbed their most brilliant victories of their reward. The fatal habit of straggling from the ranks on the least pretext; the hardly less fatal habit of 22 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. allowing each man to load himself with any super fluous arms or clothes he chose to carry ; the general want of subordination to trifling orders, which was the inheritance of their volunteer origin, — these evils Lee found in full existence when he took com mand before Eichmond, and he never strove to check them. Nor did he use his great authority, as he might have done^ to purge his command of the many inefficient officers whose example of itself was ruinous to all discipline. ... As the war went on the rifts caused by indiscipline and carelessness in the Confederate armour widened more and more ; and in the end those faults were hardly less fatal to the South than the greater material forces of her adversary. Her fall was to offer new proof to the world that neither personal courage nor heroic leadership can any more supply the place of disci pline to a national force, than can untrained patriot ism or the vaunt of past glories." In numbers the Southern Army was much inferior. The deficiency in quantity, however, was fully compensated for by superiority in quality. The Confederate soldiers were drawn from the farm and the plantation, for there were few large towns in the seceded States. They were consequently trained from childhood to the use of firearms, excellent marks men, practised horsemen, and of hardy constitution. Habituated to a life of sport and adventure in the wildernesses and forests of the South, it was easier for them to become soldiers, and they were more reliable in the emergencies of battle than their city -bred opponents. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 23 No country ever possessed finer material for soldiers than the Confederacy, and it has been conceded on all hands, by none more readily than those who met it so often and proved such worthy foes, that the Army of Northern Virginia was, on a fair field, absolutely invincible.* To say, as we must, that the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac were inferior only to Lee's veterans is to award them the highest praise. From the first battle of Bull Eun, fought in July, 1861, the Confederate forces in Virginia had gone on from victory to victory ; for even indecisive battles, owing to the odds encountered and the terrible loss inflicted, had been moral successes. With un bounded faith in their leaders and well-warranted confidence in their own powers, Lee's battalions feared no weight of numbers their gigantic foe might bring against them. Eeciprocating their trust, the great American captain never hesitated to engage, however overwhelming the odds that faced him. The antipathy of a landed aristocracy to a radical democracy, the deep resentment of a proud minority at what it deemed the arrogance of an unscrupulous majority, nerved the arm and steeled the heart of the Confederate soldier. Loyalty to that young nation which the Ordinance of Secession had called * " Who can forget, that onee looked upon it," says a Northern •writer, " that array of tattered uniforms aud bright muskets, that body of incomparable infantry, the Army of Northern Virginia, which, for four years, carried the revolt on its bayonets, opposing a constant front to the mighty concentration of power brought against it, which, receiving terrible blows, did not fail to give the like, and which, vital in all its parts, died only with its annihila tion?" 24 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. into being, and an earnest belief in the rectitude of his cause, took tbe place of the broader and more practical patriotism of the North. Nor did the knowledge that the homes of the South were being wasted, and that there was no hope of freedom and independence save in victory alone, fail to intensify his resolution. The Confederate Civil departments were as inferior in every respect to the Federal as the resources of the South in comparison with those of her rival were scanty ; and moreover the organiza tion and management of these indispensable branches were exceedingly faulty.* Armament and equipment were good, for they were the spoils of many victories. The personnel of the artillery was efficient ; the guns numerous, but inferior in quality, and the fuzes exceedingly bad. The cavalry, or rather the mounted infantry — for the troopers, armed with rifles and carbines, fought as a rule on foot — did excellent service on the outpost line ; and the extended raids and reconnaissances so successfully carried out by Stuart and his briga diers are models of enterprise and daring. German soldiers have allowed that the lessons of the American War were not sufficiently taken to heart, and that the Uhlans in 1870-71, compared with Stuart's and Sheridan's audacious horsemen, were timid and unenterprising. The senior officers of the Confederate staff were able and energetic ; but the want of trained aides-de- * Lee,-on December the lst, reported to the Secretary for War that several thousands of his soldiers were without boots. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 25 camp was severely felt. The generals of corps and divisions were, without exception, devoted to and in full accord with their great leader, Lee. Between the superior officers of the armies who met at Fredericksburg there can be no comparison. Lee and his famous Lieutenant, " Stonewall " Jack son, were without doubt the greatest commanders the war had yet produced, and with the intuitive per ception of master minds they had gathered round them a group of splendid soldiers. On the Federal side, Meade, Hancock, and Humphreys were gallant and capable officers, and afterwards on many battle fields won well-deserved renown ; during the Frede ricksburg campaign they were but divisional generals, and were prevented, by blundering superiors, from displaying their undoubted talents. One important fact, which materially affected the issue of the campaign before us, may here be noticed. The white population of the South was seven millions, of the North, twenty. The supply, therefore, of men for the Confederate armies fell far short of that commanded by the Union Govern ment; and to increase the disproportion, the tide of immigration, always setting towards the Northern States, produced an endless harvest of recruits, from which source of plenty the Confederacy was debarred. The resources of the North in men, as in all else, were practically limitless. The South foresaw, if circumstances did not intervene, that her very manhood would be ultimately exhausted. Looking at the fact that the United States had been engaged in no conflict since the Mexican war 26 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. of 1847, if we except the warfare of the Indian border, it might fairly be asked, where did the superior officers of the Federal and Confederate armies gain that knowledge of the military art which many of them undoubtedly possessed ? The answer is simple. The great majority had served in the regular army, and had been educated at the Military Academy of West Point, where the training is as complete as the discipline is severe. As showing the value of a sound military education, the fact is worth noting that, with few exceptions, no man made his mark in the Civil War who had not passed through the four years' course of the military school. The volunteer generals had every chance offered them, and in the North were specially favoured ; but, though many made good brigadiers, few proved themselves fit for more independent com mand. At Lexington, in Virginia, an academy, formed on the model of West Point, had existed for some years before the war. There the famous Jackson had been a professor, and there many of the Southern officers had received a semi-military training. Nor had the experience of the protracted Mexican campaigns been thrown away on the American army. Many of the generals on either side had served in them : there the genius of Lee, the daring of Jack son, had first won notice ; there Grant and Beaure gard, McClellan and Johnston, had learnt their earliest lessons in civilized warfare. Burnside was a " West Pointer," but had retired from the army after six years' service. The circum stance that the rank and file of the regular army The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 27 had adhered to the Union colours was not alto gether a fortunate one for the North. Many of the officers continued to serve with their own regiments ; while in the Confederacy, those who had "come South " were placed in command of brigades and regiments or distributed on the staff, and their wholesome influence was thus felt by the army at large, and not confined to any one corps or division. The Confederate infantry, with the exception of some picked divisions, did not excel in marching, although in neither army would the soldiers sub mit to carry the heavy equipment of regular troops. Nor was discipline strong enough to prevent the men wasting their rations. During arduous opera tions the Confederate troops were often starving and exhausted at the critical moment, and their ranks decimated by stragglers in search of food. This state of things was due to the incapacity of the regimental officers and the neglect of their superiors to tighten the bonds of discipline. The drill and formations of both armies were identical. Infantry regiments were composed of one battalion of ten companies. The movements were few and simple. Column formations were seldom employed except on the line of march. For attack and defence eight companies were drawn up in " line of battle " of two ranks, covered by the remaining two as skirmishers ; these latter closed to the flank as the line approached the enemy, and joined their regiments in the assault. Deployments were effected, and the skirmish line thrown out, with rapidity and precision. On the line of march, little 28 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. attention was paid to such necessary details as dressing and distance, and straggling was looked upon as but a venial offence.* The wooded nature of the country over which they fought had taught the intelligent American soldier the value of entrenchments, and the troops were adepts in extemporizing useful defences.! Without waiting for orders they were accustomed, whenever they took up even a temporary position, with axe, spade, and bayonet, to cover themselves from fire. The cavalry of both armies was trained as mounted infantry, and at this period relied far more on the rifle than on I'arme blanche. This mode of fighting, like the use of entrenchments, was made compulsory by the nature of the country, affording as it did but few facilities for cavalry manoeuvres on a large scale. The field artillery of either army- was attached to the infantry divisions. In the Confederate army artillery battalions existed, which formed a reserve and acted independently of the divisional batteries. Nature and resources of the theatre of the Campaign. Map I. That portion of Virginia lying east of the Blue Eidge, which was the theatre of this and many more campaigns, is covered with primasval forest. * Thorough discipline alone assures orderly marching : without orderly marching the exact execution of the leader's combination is difficult, and the timely presence of superior numbers at tha decisive point improbable. t A soldier of Lee's army has recorded that " experienced men in battle always availed themselves of any shelter within reach a tree, a fence, a mound of earth, a ditch, anything . , . only recruits and fools neglected the smallest shelter." The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 29 Clearings are few and far between ; the roads are bad, and the undergrowth of the woods is penetrated with difficulty. The face of the country is undu lating, with gentle gradients, and abrupt or con siderable eminences are seldom met with. The water-courses are numerous, and several attain to the dignity of rivers, notably the Eappa hannook and the Eapidan, the Matapony and the North and South Annas. Their course is, generally speaking, from west to east, crossing at right angles the line of Federal invasion. The State is in many parts exceedingly fertile, but sparsely cultivated and without manufacturing industry or appliances ; and at this period neither food nor forage were plentiful. It is still thinly populated, and between Eichmond and the Potomac there is no large town or market. The railroads have already been remarked. The Eappahannook is tidal as far as Fredericks burg, and two hundred yards wide in the neigh bourhood of the town, increasing in width as it flows seaward. Below Port Eoyal it becomes a formidable obstacle in the path of an hostile army. There are several easy fords above Falmouth ; the river-banks, except near Fredericksburg, are clad with timber, and from Falmouth downwards the left commands the right. Burnside's object and plan. Burnside's objective was, as we have seen, Eich mond, sixty miles south of Fredericksburg ; but be- 30 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. tween him and the Confederate capital intervened the broad waters of the Eappahannook and the Army of Northern Virginia. Before the city could be captured, Lee's army must be annihilated ; before that army could be dealt with, the Eappahannook must be crossed. He had therefore two distinct ends to accomplish: the first, to convey his force across the river ; the second, to bring the Confederates to bay. The first operation he had already attempted, and had failed ; but in no wise disheartened by his ill- success at Skenker's Neck on December 5th, he devoted the following days to maturing a fresh scheme. We will now consider what information he had as to the strength and disposition of Lee's troops — that is, what data he possessed on which to frame his plans ; and also the course of action he ultimately adopted. In the first place, it appears that he knew that Lee's whole army was on the line of the Eappa hannook ; and that, over-estimating somewhat the numbers at his adversary's disposal, he believed himself confronted by a force little inferior in numbers to his own. Secondly, from the plateau of Stafford County, which crowns the left bank of the river, large Con federate camps were visible near the Hop Yard and Port Eoyal, and there were signs of the presence of a considerable force of infantry and artillery on the ridge in rear of Fredericksburg. This was the extent of his information; and The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 31 although between the Confederate position at Frede ricksburg and that near the Hop Yard twelve miles of wooded upland intervened, no attempt was made by him or his cavalry leaders to cross the river and penetrate this screen, or to ascertain the strength and whereabouts of each hostile division. He seems to have assumed that half of Lee's army was in the vicinity of Port Eoyal, the remainder behind Fredericksburg. He neither knew nor sus pected that two strong supporting divisions (A. P. Hill and Taliaferro) were concealed within the re cesses of the forest within easy reach of either point. Fredericksburg, at the head of the railroad, and in close communication with his base at Acquia Creek, was the spot where Burnside would have preferred to cross the river. Unfortunately the ridge behind the town, occupied by the enemy and partially prepared for defence, formed a very for midable position. It was evident that even if it were held by a small force only, loss would be incurred in forcing the passage. Held by the whole of Lee's army it would be almost impreg nable. At Skenker's Neck, twelve miles lower down, Burn- Map I. side had been already foiled. The river there was broad and deep, the enemy in force and entrenched. To cross midway between Fredericksburg and this last named locality was scarcely practicable. The right bank was so carefully patrolled by Stuart's horsemen that surprise was out of the question. The first alarm would have drawn in the Confederate 32 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. wings to occupy a strong line of defence along the forest-clad heights. To operate below Port Eoyal was equally im practicable. The increased width of the river was a serious obstacle ; and as Washington would have been unmasked by the movement, the President would have certainly vetoed any such scheme. There was one last course feasible, and that was to cross above Falmouth, making use of the fords above that village and those west of the junction of the Eapidan with the Eappahannook. This line pre sented many advantages, not the least of which was that the army moving thereon would interpose between Lee and the Union capital. The river- banks are densely timbered to the water's edge, and the gentle, undulating country on the south side offered no special advantage to the defending army. Behind the screen of forest it would be possible to move the whole invading force free from observa tion ; and in any case, as the nearest ford is only seven miles distant by road from Falmouth, to gain a long start on the Confederate right wing at the Hop Yard and Port Eoyal. This ford once seized, and a strong body of troops thrown across, a passage would be secured for the remainder of the army, and the pontoon bridges might be laid without molestation. Above all, the movement would effectually turn the strong Fredericksburg position, and an opportunity would be presented of crushing the enemy's left wing in detail; or, if Lee preferred to retire rapidly, and to The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 33 concentrate further south, of bringing him to battle on a fair field.* In May, 1863, Hooker, under exactly similar circumstances, partially adopted this line, and his complete success thereon up to the moment of collision at Chancellorsville proves conclusively that Burnside ought to have anticipated him; The demonstration at Skenker's Neck had induced Lee to post a large portion of his force in that distant locality; there were no troops save cavalry and horse-artillery near the fords, and with ordinary precautions the passage might have been easily effected. The overwhelming objection to crossing at Frede ricksburg was that if Lee were warned in time to bring in his outlying divisions to Longstreet's assist^ ance, the Federals would be compelled to assail an exceedingly strong position held by the united strength of the Confederate army. The chance of a successful surprise was very slender ; there can be no question, therefore, as to which course Burnside ought to have adopted. Everything pointed to it, and it is almost incredible that he should have neg lected so obvious a solution of the problem which confronted him, i.e. to cross the river without loss, and to engage the enemy with a good prospect of success. Unfortunately for his reputation, however, he had too readily assumed that his adversary, alarmed by the attempt at Skenker's Neck, had posted a large * The river was unfordable below Falmouth, and one division, therefore, would have been sufficient to protect the line of com munication with Acquia Creek against counter- attack. D 34 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. force on that flank, and that, expecting attack to come from that quarter, he would be slow to remove it. The wish was father to the thought. He was at no pains to verify the truth of his assumption, and of the presence of two- strong divisions near Guinea's Station,* as well as of the actual strength of either wing, he remained in igno rance. However, he was perfectly aware that his adversary's army was disseminated; that one por tion held the Fredericksburg position, and that another was from twelve to eighteen miles distant. The Fredericksburg force was within easy reach, and according to his assumption was unsupported ; it appeared possible, therefore, to cross the river at that point, and to crush the Confederate left before the right could come up. The opportunity was tempting, so much so that a more experienced soldier would have suspected a snare, and have divined that the task, seemingly so easy, was exactly what the enemy most wished him to attempt. Burnside, however, wofully under rating the genius of the Virginian general, and I elieving him completely outwitted, resolved to take advantage of the apparently rash dispersion of Lee's divisions, to cross rapidly at Fredericksburg, and defeat the force there posted. For the second time he acted upon a pure assumption. He appears to have confidently ex pected that if he surprised the passage of the river, the Fredericksburg force would await his onset, and give him the opportunity of beating it in detail. * A. P. Hill, 11,000 strong; Taliaferro, 5000 strong. Tlie Campaign of Fredericksburg. 35 It was within the bounds of possibility that he might cross so swiftly and suddenly as to inter pose his army between the widely divided Con federate wings, but what conceivable inducement had he to think that if such a movement seemed likely to succeed the left wing would await attack ? Of what paramount importance were the town of Fredericksburg and the line of the Eappahannook to the South that Lee would endeavour to hold them at any cost ? If his whole army were concentrated along the formidable Fredericksburg position, the Confederate general would be ready enough to hold his ground and there join issue ; but if the Federal advance were so rapid as to prevent concentration, was it likely that he would allow one single Virginian rifleman to throw away his life in useless resistance ? The Confederates drew but scant supplies from the ravaged and exhausted district, and Lee would in any case prefer to surrender some iniles of territory than to jeopardize the safety of that army on which depended the existence, not only of the Southern Capital, but of the Eepublic itself. It may be urged that if Burnside had succeeded in surprising a passage at this point, and the enemy's left wing been compelled to retire, he would have attained one end at least — that of establishing him self on the south bank of the river. Perfectly true ; but he ran great risks in the attempt, which by crossing at the fords above Falmouth he would have altogether avoided. To summarize Burnside's faults : firstly, he under rated his antagonist ; secondly, he neglected to 36 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. reconnoitre as far as was within h's power ; thirdly, in preference to a line of operations which was feasible and safe, he selected one which promised no more certain result, and which might possibly lead to terrible disaster. Not once but often, it is true, has the rule that forbids attack with a river in rear been disregarded by the great masters of war, but seldom without fair prospect of success. If Lee had time to con centrate at Fredericksburg — and even Burnside must have admitted it was quite probable that he would — what hope was there the Confederate general with 78,000 * men, would succumb to 110,000 * Federals, when at the Antietam, but three short months previous, with an exhausted army of less than 40,000, holding a less favourable position, he had repulsed the assault of more than twice his numbers ? f Bear ing in mind that there was an alternative course open to Burnside, and that he was not even bound to advance at all, is there another instance in history where a general, free to act, ran so great a risk with so little justification ? It is scarcely necessary to discuss at length the further development of his plan, and the course he intended to follow after gaining possession of the heights. Between that point and Eichmond lay sixty miles of river, hill, and forest, a wilderness * These numbers give the total, not the effective, strength of either army. A percentage must be deducted for the non-effectives, composed of men sick, absent, and on detachment. The effective strength of the Confederate army was probably about 68,000; of the Federals, 100,000. t It must be remembered, too, that the Federal leader believed Lee's strength to be very little inferior to his own. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 37 without towns or highways, and abounding in naturally strong defensive positions. The season was adverse, the population hostile, and the roads in bad order. Little subsistence was to be obtained from the country beyond the river ; the district, always thinly populated and sparsely cultivated, had become ex hausted and impoverished. He had therefore ordered a huge wagon-train to be prepared with supplies sufficient for twelve days. It was absolutely neces sary to be able to move independently if he were compelled to leave the railroad, or if the line were cut or menaced by the Confederates ; but at this season, with the roads liable to be made almost impassable by the breaking-up of the frost, it would have been extremely hazardous to quit the regular line of supply. The reader can estimate for himself the chances of success. He will probably come to the con clusion that Burnside lacked not only the ability, but also the time, the men, and the supplies, neces sary to achieve his purpose, and that the Confede rate Capital was in little danger. During the war no less than six Federal generals attempted to reach Eichmond through Northern Virginia. McDowell, Pope, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, and Grant, recoiled successively, as did the marshals of France before Wellington, from the invulnerable front of the Confederate army. In but one campaign did the Confederate numbers exceed those of the Federals, and then victory was com plete; in the rest they were far inferior. Can 38 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. further proof be needed of the genius of Lee and the stern valour of his soldiers ? Nor v.as it brilliant strategy or the irresistible onset of disciplined valour that at last gave the victory to the North. Not the public foe but her own exhaustion wrought the fall of the Confederacy, and the utmost limit of endurance had been reached on that day when, after four years of battle, the Army of Northern Virginia laid down its arms, " non victus sed vincendo fatigatus." To return to Burnside. Having determined to cross the river and carry the heights beyond Fredericksburg before Lee could concentrate there on, he had before him an operation which rendered necessary great precaution and much nice calculation. Time was the very essence of the contract ; success was altogether dependent upon rapidity of movement. Part of the Confederate army was several miles distant,* and the country roads were in bad con dition. Fifteen hours at, the very least must there fore elapse after the Federal purpose was exposed before the whole force could come together above Fredericksburg, and ten hours before Early's lead ing battalion could arrive from the Hop Yard.f To bridge the Eappahannook, 200 yards wide, and within easy range of the enemy's guns, even * Early's division, 7500 strong, near the Hop Yard, twelve miles from Fredericksburg ; D. H. Hill's division, 9000 strong, near Port Eoyal, eighteen miles from Fredericksburg. t The rate of marching on the bad roads would not exceed two miles an hour. It would take two hours to convey the order from headquarters, and two more to call in outposts and forage parties, strike camp, feed, load wagons, and fall in. More than one road was available for the march of either division. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 39 if the hostile picquets were driven in, and the operation covered by artillery posted on the Stafford heights, was not to be done in a moment. Burnside proposed to lay six bridges, three under cover of the town, and three below the mouth of Deep Eun ; and it was necessary that these should be firmly estab lished before he could venture to attack. By renewing the demonstration near Skenker's Neck it was possible to deceive Lee as to the real point of passage, and to retard, for some time at least, the withdrawal of his troops from that neighbour hood. [Burnside did not fail to make use of this auxiliary operation ; but the feint did not mislead his sagacious adversary, and no Confederate rein forcements were sent from left or centre to the threatened point.] The river spanned, several hours would be consumed in the transit of the troops, and in placing them in line of battle. It must have been quite clear, therefore, to the Federal staff that, even if all went well, they would have but a very narrow margin of time to spare. A few hours' delay, the design once exposed, would enable Lee to bring up his right wing into line; in which case they would have a choice of difficulties, either to attack a strong position held by the whole Confederate army, or to retire across the river in the presence of a skilful and determined enemy. The object of the Confederate leader's strategy and the disposition of his troops have already been examined (pp. 8, 9). He had evidently considered and prepared for every eventuality, and was ready to concentrate at any point between Fredericksburg 40 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. and Port Eoyal, or in the interior of Spotsylvania County, as the enemy's movements might dictate. Why he detained D. H, Hill at Port Eoyal does not appear. His sources of information were excellent, and he was doubtless well aware that Map II. Burnside would not attempt to operate below the Hop Yard. The natural course would have been to withdraw this strong division from the distant point, and to place it within the limits of possible operations, say near Guinea's Station. Whether the position was maintained only for convenience of supply, or whether with the deliberate purpose of enticing Burnside into the toils at Fredericksburg, there is, unfortunately, no direct evidence to show. Topography of the right bank of the Rappahannock. It is now necessary to describe particularly the Map III. topography of that bank of the Eappahannook to which the Federal commander proposed to transfer his force, and of that position on which his opponent hoped rather than expected to meet his onset. The peculiar terrace formation of the terrain is a feature familiar to geologists, being generally observable along the course of great rivers. There are four distinct elevations, indicating, probably, the successive levels of the Eappahannook. The first stage is the narrow strand left by the stream receding as its channel deepens. The second, thirty feet above, is a broad alluvial plain, the region of cultivation. The third is a low and narrow ridge which touches the river opposite Falmouth, curves The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 41 gradually away to an extreme distance of 4500 yards, and approaches it again beyond the Massa ponax, enclosing in its chord the fertile area of the lower level. Half-a-mile in rear rises a loftier and thickly wooded crest, terminating an extensive table land ; and between these two ridges are numerous deep ravines, carved out by the action of the mountain streams. The left bank of the Eappahan nook, held by the Federals, is crowned by a bold line of bluffs, 150 feet above the level of the stream, and beyond, stretching away towards the Potomac, lies the broad plateau of Stafford County. Along the lower ridge of the opposite bank, immediately overlooking Fredericksburg and the surrounding plain, was the main position of the Confederate army. The five principal spurs of this ridge are : — Taylor's Hill, above the river and facing Falmouth; 50 feet high. Stansbury Hill, 1200 yards S.E. ; 50 feet. Marye's Hill, covering the main issues from the town ; 40 feet. Lee's Hill, 900 yards to the right rear ; 90 feet. Prospect Hill, overlooking the Massaponax ; 40 feet. Behind Fredericksburg the surface of the ridge is barren and treeless; the slopes are smooth and grassy, and the gradients generally easy ; from Lee's Hill to the Massaponax the heights are covered with a thick growth of pine and oak, which, except at one point to be hereafter mentioned, does not anywhere encroach upon the plain. Along the front of the position, from the Eappa hannook to the Hazel Creek, a mill-sluice, twenty feet wide and four deep, runs midway between the 42 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. upland and the town. Opposite Stansbury Hill, the depression through which it flows is shallow, and the water-way becomes a formidable obstacle ; but opposite Marye's Hill the hollow is of such breadth and depth as to shelter advancing troops from direct fire, not only when crossing the two bridges by which it is spanned, but also for some distance beyond. Marye's Hill is a steep and abrupt salient, on which a conspicuous object is the picturesque mansion of the Marye family. The ground between the foot of the hill and the mill-sluice, a space of 400 yards, is flat and open, and was broken only by some plank fences and a few wooden houses dotted here and there. The plain extending from Hazel Eun to the Massaponax is of the same character, encumbered by few buildings, but too soft and cut up by too many creeks and ditches to admit of cavalry move ments upon its level surface. Hazel and Deep Euns flow through ravines quite thirty feet in depth, and hid by timber and dense undergrowth. The Massaponax Creek, a stream of larger volume, runs swiftly between wooded and marshy banks, im practicable for troops. The hills to the south are forest-clad, and correspond in height with those fringing the opposite side of the Massaponax valley, the breadth of which, at the entrance, is 500 yards. Above Falmouth, some miles in rear of Stansbury Hill, the Eappahannook may be crossed by two easy fords,* but between that village and Fredericksburg there exists one only, and that difficult anddangerous. * See Map II. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 43 It will be observed that the Stafford plateau so completely commands the plain and lower ridge on the opposite shore, that it would be difficult and costly for a force acting on the right bank to effectually prevent an enemy, if he were to cover the operations by strong batteries posted along this dominating crest, from laying bridges and establish ing himself below the town. Fredericksburg is a small and picturesque city, containing nearly 5000 inhabitants. It possesses many substantial brick houses and public edifices, but the greater part of the buildings are of wood. In appearance and condition it has little altered since the war, nor indeed since the old colonial days. Three principal roads issue from it, and two railway tracks : — 1. The Orange plank road passes through the outlying houses and corn-fields between Marye's Hill and the town, and leads westward over the opposing heights. 2. Two hundred and forty yards south the Tele graph road keeps a parallel direction for some 600 yards; meeting the steep front of Marye's Hill, it turns abruptly to the left, skirting for nearly half a mile the base of the salient ; inclining again to the left it crosses Hazel Eun, ascends the slope of Lee's Hill, and bearing S.S.E. continues its course behind the crest of the lower ridge. 3. The Old Stage road to Eichmond makes its way south, between the river and the railroad, to a point below the Massaponax, where it divides, branching towards Eichmond and Port Eoyal. This 44 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. highway passes between earthen banks, three or four feet high, stiffened, or as it were revetted, by the tough roots of the cedars which line it. Never in good order, these roads were much cut up by the heavy traffic of the war. They are about twenty-five feet wide, and the soil is clayey. 4. Leaving the town at the S.E. angle, the Eichmond and Potomac railroad turns in a southerly direction, and running for some miles nearly parallel to the river cuts the plain in two. The track passes over an embankment from three to four feet high. 5. A second embankment, 550 yards long, carried an unfinished single-gauge line over the depression of Hazel Eun. The stone bridge, by which the Eichmond and Potomac railway spanned the Eappahannook, had been destroyed early in the war, and no other bridge existed. We will now consider the means taken by the Confederates to improve the natural advantages of their position. As early as November 23 rd, twenty-four hours after the arrival of Longstreet's Corps, Lee had ordered the work to be taken in hand. The first thing to be done was to secure the guns frpm the fire of the enemy's pieces on the Stafford Heights. Under the superintendence of Brigadier Pendleton (a minister of the Episcopal Church), Chief of Artillery, forty gun-pits were con structed along the crest of the grassy upland between the river and Lee's Hill. The work progressed but slowly, for the ground was hard frozen, and tools were scarce. SkstchTC INFANTRY SHELTER-TRENCH. STONE-WALL PREPARED FOR DEFENCE . Zamaxm.-.Segan,Taia,,Treruih, & Oo. ZEawWetter.IitJi.. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 45 It was necessary that the approaches from Frede ricksburg, the Telegraph and Orange plank roads, should be effectually blocked : with this view nine gun-pits were sunk on Marye's Hill, along a front of four hundred yards, and four beyond the left shoulder of the spur so as to enfilade the plank road as far as the town. Several pits were dug on Stansbury Hill and the adjoining high ground, and a small work was thrown up between the foot of the slope and the mill-sluice from which a flank fire might be brought to bear on a force advancing from the town by either roads. Cover for infantry was provided as follows : — The Telegraph road, where it skirts the base of Marye's Hill, is hollow, and is sustained on either Sketchrv side by a stout stone wall. A trench was dug on the road-side nearest the town, the earth thrown over and banked up against the outer fence. This wall is rather more than half a mile long, and about forty feet below the crest of the hill, which rises steeply and abruptly above it. The house on the plateau is built of brick, and there are several stone fences enclosing the' premises. Between the Orange and the Telegraph roads, in prolongation of the stone wall, a shelter trench was Sketchl'V dug, which is still to be seen ; it was doubtless improved after the battle of December 13th. Half a mile in rear of Marye's Hill, on the slope of the further ridge, a second line of earthen parapet gave cover for a brigade, and enfiladed the Orange road. At the foot of Lee's Hill and astride the Hazel 46 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Eun log breastworks were raised ; and this section of the position, as well as the central re-entrant, was also protected by abattis. No further artificial cover existed. It has been stated by numerous writers that at the first battle of Fredericksburg the whole Confederate front bristled with entrenchments, but in contemporary records no confirmation of this assertion is to be found, and Burnside himself, in his evidence before a Committee of Congress, testified that the defences were but slight. The elaborate series of works which afterwards lined the hills was constructed after the engagement. Not that the right section of the position, from Lee's Hill to the Massaponax, was neglected. It will be remembered that there the whole surface of the hills is covered with a dense growth of timber, and Lee thought it more essential to employ his men in cutting roads through the woods, and in laying a line of field telegraph, than in constructing breastworks or redoubts. The task of creating good lateral communication was the most important. Cover to a certain extent already existed, and the ground in front was clear and open ; good roads in rear of the crest of the plateau were the one thing necessary to enable the general-in-chief, by rapidly transferring along them reinforcements and reserves, to effect the primary object of all com binations and of every system of defence, i.e. to meet the enemy with superior numbers at the desired point. Existing tracks were improved, gaps opened in banks, fences thrown down, and ditches filled, in order to facilitate the passage of infantry and artillery. The Campaign of Fredericksburg . 47 The houses and buildings in Fredericksburg over looking the river were loopholed. Eifle-pits were constructed on the edgepf the bluffs ; and along the Old Stage road, below the point where it is joined by the track from Hamilton's Crossing, shelter- trenches were dug by Stuart's troopers. The embankment of the Eichmond and Potomac rail way forms a stout breastwork, and was so used by the skirmish line of the right wing in the ensuing battle. To prevent gunboats ascending the river, a bat tery was placed in an earthwork four miles below the town. The weak points of the position were : — 1. It was commanded — except the central re entrant — by the opposite plateau. 2. This command, and the natural entrenchment of the stage road, would make it a hazardous under taking to assume the offensive. An enemy, holding the Stafford Heights and the road, would retire, if repulsed, as it were to a citadel. 3. The grc und was soft and intersected by water courses, and did not therefore admit of cavalry action. 4. The shortest and easiest line of supply and communication with Eichmond, the Eichmond and Potomac railway, was in prolongation of the right flank ; and the main line of retreat, the Telegraph road, ran in rear of that flank and not of the centre. 5. It could be turned by the fords above Falmouth. 6. As the river interposed between the armies, and as the left bank was wooded in parts and higher than the right, the enemy could move in either 48 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. direction on his own side of the stream without being observed. 7. The bend of the river above Falmouth made it possible for guns posted on the heights near that village to enfilade the lower ridge as far as Marye's Hill. The strong points : — 1. The length of the line selected was well proportioned to the numbers available for defence, allowing 11,000 men to the mile, or rather less than six to the yard.* 2. Both the lower and further ridges afforded many good artillery positions, commanding the length and breadth of the plain below. 3. The ground between the hills and the river was open and unobstructed, a fair field both of view and fire. 4. The ravines between the ridges gave good shelter, close at hand, for supports, reserves, field- hospitals, and ammunition-carts. 5. The thick screen of forest and the depth of the ravines served to conceal not only the move ments, but also the numbers of the defending troops ; and made it practicable to mass in unexpected strength at any given point. 6. The lateral communications were good, and had been skilfully improved and supplemented. 7. Communication with Eichmond was direct and rapid, and the supply depots on the Virginia Central railway were within easy reach, Gordons- * " Including all arms and reserves, it may be assumed, as a general rule, that the force for the defence of a position should be equal to five men for each yard in extent." — Field Exercise, 1884. Tlie Campaign of Fredericksburg. 49 ville, the principal magazine, being forty-six miles distant by road. 8. There was a strong second line, nearly three- quarters of a mile in rear, along the crest of a loftier plateau, beyond the range of artillery on the Stafford Heights. 9. In case of retreat the country abounded in strong rear-guard positions. 10. The flanks rested on strong natural obstacles. 11. While the fords were securely held, and the river-banks vigilantly patrolled, it was scarcely possible for the enemy's cavalry to cross in force for purposes of reconnaissance or raid. 12. The enemy's force once transferred to the right bank, his after-movements would be plainly visible. 13. Artillery posted on the lower ridge would render the operation of crossing hazardous and costly. 14. The several bastion-like spurs gave reciprocal flank defence. 15. The enemy would have to fight with a deep and broad river in his rear. 16. About Fredericksburg an attacking force would be compelled to deploy under artillery fire at short range, and its advance would be seriously obstructed by the mill-sluice. 17. The various creeks which intersect the ground in front of the centre and right, over which the Federals were almost bound to advance, would impede communications and the exact execution of combined movements. Having now examined Lee's position from his own point of view, let us cross the Eappahannook E 50 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. and endeavour to realize the prospect that lay before Burnside, and the deductions he ought to have drawn therefrom. Looking west from the windows of the Philip's House, a planter's mansion on the Stafford Heights, distant about 3000 yards as the crow flies from the crest of Marye's Hill, where he had established his headquarters, he could command at single coup d'ceil the whole panorama of the field just described. Before him lay an open plain, narrow to the north, expanding to a greater breadth to the south, and dominated by a double tier of hills. Along the bare surface of the lower ridge between Hazel Eun and the river, earthworks were plainly visible, and below to the left the highlands were covered with dense woods, which his observation could not penetrate. Upon the grassy uplands beyond Fredericksburg, working parties were busily turning up the yellow clay; sentries and picquets watched the river-bank, and across the plain gray- coated vedettes passed to and fro : no large body of men nor encampment was visible, yet who could say how large a force might not be screened by that dark line of forest, or concealed in the deep depressions of the hills ? He had little information as to the number or dispositions of the enemy, and it must have been obvious that before he could advance against the heights confronting him, it would be necessary to pass over the river every avail able man, for there was always a chance, however sudden and rapid his movements, that Lee would be enabled to concentrate against him his whole force. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 51 The Federal sentries upon the edge of the Stafford plateau, looked down into the streets of the little town ; and there, if heavy batteries were brought forward to cover the operation, it would be no hazardous or prolonged task to bridge the stream. But so contracted is the space between the river and the ridge, and so exposed was it in every quarter to the fire of the Confederate guns, that the deployment of the attacking force would be difficult and costly ; and, unless those guns were disabled or driven from the hills, the town itself would prove a mere " shell-trap " to the troops in possession. Away to the left, however, where the highlands stand back at a distance of 4500 yards from the river bank, and the wider strand below the cliffs forms a spacious landing-place, there was room to bridge, to cross, and to manoeuvre unmolested ; there, too, the Old Stage road, with its double embankment, presented a strong place d'armes and base of attack. Moreover the enemy's right, though appuyed on a difficult obstacle, was his weak flank, strategically and tactically, nearest his base and covering his communications, undefended by entrenchments, unprotected by obstruction in front. It was at this flank, if the Federal general desired a decisive victorv, that he must strike his fiercest blow. Could he make good his footing on the slopes, within the dense woods he would find liimself at once, as regards position, upon equal terms with his antagonist, and, if superior in numbers, might await the issue with confidence. 52 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Preliminary operations. On December 10th, Burnside determined to cross the river and attack the Confederate position ; moved thereto, say his apologists, rather by the outcry of the Northern press, clamouring for instant action, than by the approval of his own judgment. Yet it is certain that he still cherished the delusion that Lee was overreached, and had exposed his army to be dealt with in detail. On that date the infantry moved into position directly behind the crest of the plateau above Fredericksburg ; Sumner on the left, Hooker in the centre, and Franklin opposite Deep Eun.* The pontoons were lowered to the water's edge. Three days' rations were issued to the whole army ; the infantry carried sixty rounds of ammunition per man ; and the huge wagon-train, with supplies sufficient for twelve days, was held in readiness to follow the advance. The wagons of a division, states an officer of the Federal Commissariat Service, covered three miles. There were eighteen infantry and cavalry divisions in Burnside's army. The train, therefore, if moving along one road, would have been nearly sixty miles in length. To cover the passage, 143 guns were posted * At the same time a small force stationed near Skenker's Neck was ordered to renew the demonstration of crossing at that point, and troops were marched along the open Stafford plateau as if on route to reinforce it in strength. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 53 behind epaulements along the crest of the Stafford Heights ; distributed as follows : — From beyond the road leading through Falmouth to a point 500 yards below (including 6 twenty- pounders) ... ... ... ... 40 guns. From this point to opposite the centre of the town 36 „ On the ridge south (including 7 four-and-a-half inch siea;e guns) ... ... ... ... 27 „ To Pollock's Mill 40 „ Three bridges were to be thrown across the stream under shelter of the town ; three about a mile below, near the mouth of Deep Eun. Before dawn on the 11th, the pontoniers began the work. At three o'clock the report of two signal guns announced to the Confederate army that hostile movements had begun, and Longstreet's troops, breaking up from their bivouacs, marched to the positions already allotted to them, viz. : — Anderson's division, from Taylor's Hill to the Orange road. Eansom's and McLaws's, Marye's and Lee's Hills and the Hazel Eun defile. Pickett's and Hood's, the wooded slopes as far as Hamilton's Crossing, a little wayside station on the Eichmond and Potomac line. Barksdale's Mississippi brigade* of McLaws's division was posted within and on either side of Fredericksburg; an advanced line of two com panies and several strong detached parties being pushed forward to the verge of the bluffs. No message of recall was sent to Jackson. * About 1600 strong. 54 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. A heavy fog hung upon the water, and opposite the town the Federals worked for some time unmolested. Not until the bridge was two-thirds completed, and shadowy figures became visible in the mist did the Confederates open fire. At such close qnarters the effect was immediate, and the builders fled. Twice at intervals of half an hour they ventured again upon the deserted bridge, twice were they driven back. After the third repulse Barksdale ordered up the remainder of his brigade, and prolonged his line to right and left. Strong detachments were now moved forward by the Federals to cover the working parties, and artillery began to play upon the town. Securely posted in rifle-pits and cellars, the Mississippians were not to be dislodged ; but the covering troops, exposed on the bare slopes of the cliff, lost heavily, nor could the working parties live upon the bridge. At ten o'clock Burnside ordered the heavy batteries to concentrate their fire, and every gun that could be brought to bear on Fredericksburg discharged fifty rounds of shot and shell. This bombardment, to which the Confederate artillery did not reply, lasted upwards of an hour. Though the effect on the buildings was appalling, though flames broke out in many places and the streets were furrowed with round shot, the defenders not only suffered but little loss, but at the very height of the cannonade easily repelled another attempt to complete the bridge. After a delay of several hours, Hooker, command ing the Centre Grand Division, recognizing that so The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 55 long as the enemy held the town, the passage could not be achieved, called for volunteers to cross the stream in boats, and to drive the enemy from their cover at the point of the bayonet. Four regiments of Getty's division responded to the summons. A portion descended the cliff, and, from behind what shelter they could find, for fifteen or twenty minutes assailed the defences of the Confederate sharpshooters with a brisk fire. Ten pontoon boats were then manned, and though many lives were lost during the transit, the gallant Federals pushed quickly across and won the shelter of the bluffs. Other boats followed; and Barksdale's brigade, which had no orders to hold the place against an advance in force, retreated skirmishing to the upper town. So rapid, however, were the enemy's movements, and so defective the means of com munication between the buildings occupied, that one hundred Mississipians were cut off and captured. At about 4.30 p.m., three bridges being at last estab lished, the Federals pushed forward, and the Confede rates, retiring in good order, evacuated the town. Franklin, a mile below, thanks to the configura tion of the river bank, and to a diversion he had made lower down the stream, quickly drove the sharpshooters from the rifle-pits, and by one o'clock had constructed three bridges. As Hooker and Sumner were unable to act in concert with him, he passed over only a small part of his force during the afternoon. We have already observed that Burnside's only chance of success lay in prompt action. The rivet 56 Tlie, Campaign of Fredericksburg. which held his plan together, and without which it would utterly fall to pieces, was celerity of execution. Barksdale's stubborn resistance had already caused much delay, and it was doubtful if the concentration of Lee's army could now be anticipated. We should expect to hear that, immediately the bridges were completed, he at once set about transferring his troops across the stream, and placing them in readiness to move forward with the earliest light ; and doubtless the Southern sentries listened from sundown to dawn for the tramp of countless feet, the rolling of heavy wheels upon the frozen roads, for the deep murmur and " the stifled hum " which betray the march of an advancing host. But what was the case ? The long hours of darkness slipped peacefully away, no unusual sound broke the silence of the night, and all was still along the Eappahannook. Had Burnside then abandoned his attempt? Had he, recognizing that no good result could come of the movement, resolved at the last moment to hold to his own opinion, to defy the clamour of the press, and not to hazard, at such a call, the existence of his gallant soldiers? Unfortunately, no such praiseworthy determination inspired him : as has been said of another, "his generalship arrayed every chance against him." Although every moment of delay saw hope of success grow fainter, there was no-question of relin quishing the enterprise. No movement took place during the night, but on the next day, December 12th, all Franklin's and the greater part of Sumner's The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 57 Grand Divisions, covered by a dense fog, leisurely crossed the river and took up their stations on the right bank. Sumner occupied Fredericksburg and the open space between the town and Hazel Eun ; Franklin held the line of the Old Stage road, along which entrenchments were rapidly thrown up, as far as the steep banks of the water-course which bears the name of Deep Eun. A cavalry reconnaissance, pushed forward as far as the railroad, came into collision there with Hood's outposts and Stuart's scouts, but the Federal horsemen were driven back. As soon as Lee, on the morning of the 12th, found that the bridges were completed, he recog nized, from their very position, that his adversary, bound as he was to these two narrow lines of retreat, could not extend his line so far as to operate beyond the Massaponax without unduly weakening his centre. The indication was clear that the battle would be confined to the ground north of that creek ; A. P. Hill and Taliaferro were therefore called up from Yerby's and Guinea's Station respectively, relieving Hood and Pickett about noon, and occupying the space between Hamilton's Crossing and Deep Eun. Hood and Pickett, closing on the centre, filled the interval between Deep and Hazel Euns. The gallant defence of Fredericksburg had frus trated the intention of the Federal general to sur prise a crossing, and to attack Longstreet before Jackson could be brought up ; and Lee, with ample time at his disposal and confident in the wisdom of his dispositions, calmly awaited the development of 58 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. his adversary's plans. Not until noon on the 12th, satisfied at last that the whole of the Federal army was crossing before him, and that the operation in progress was no feint, did he despatch couriers to call in his distant divisions. Shortly after dawn * on the 13th, D. H. Hill and Early arrived from Port Eoyal and the Hop Yard, after a night march of eighteen and twelve miles respectively. These divisions were stationed in rear of the Light Division of A. P. Hill, and the whole Con federate army was now concentrated along the ridge between the Eappahannook and the Massaponax. It is possible that the summons to Hill and Early was not issued till noon, that they were suffered to remain en evidence along the river-bank, and that their march was delayed till night, in order to foster Burnside's delusion, to prevent him taking the alarm and retiring across the stream. While Franklin and Sumner were crossing on the 12th, the Federal batteries maintained a heavy fire, but no reply was elicited from the Southern artillery. Lee, it has been remarked, feared that even at this, the eleventh hour, the foe, if roughly handled, might withdraw from the snare he had so incautiously approached ; and was desirous, moreover, that the position of his guns might remain unknown until it was absolutely necessary to reveal them. The reason of Burnside's untoward delay has never been satisfactorily explained. It may be imagined that he and his staff were incompetent to * About eighteen hours after the order had been issued, hut the divisions did not begin their march until after nightfall. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 59 manoeuvre rapidly so vast a force, or that the force itself was ill- trained and unwieldy, but the after- events completely dispose of these suppositions. It has been asserted that the fog which hung over the river on the 12th prevented his advance, but this statement does not account for his quiescence on the night previous. Fog or no fog, it was clearly his duty to have had his men in position for attack early on the 12th. However it may be, it is certain that much precious time was cut to waste, and that his adversary received ample warning of his intent. It may be that want of definite information as to the numbers, disposition, and movements of the opposing force was the cause of his inaction on the night of the 11th, and of his determination to attack on the 13th, when all hope of surprise had passed away. On the 10th of December, he had learnt from an escaped slave that a road ran in rear of the crest of the opposite ridge, and on the 11th, from a German prisoner, that the commanding heights beyond were partially occupied as second line of defence ; but beyond this he knew little. In contradistinction to the enterprise of Stuart's brigadiers, no attempt was made, even by small scouting parties, to penetrate the hostile lines. The Confederate troopers on either flank had ridden far and wide over the Virginian counties in rear of the Union outposts. At the end of November, Hampton had captured two whole squadrons ; on the 11th of December, had cut off a convoy of wagons near Dumfries, on the Potomac, fifteen miles above Acquia Creek ; and prisoners had been taken at various points within 60 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. the Federal lines. It is true that Burnside, from his commanding position on the Stafford Heights, and with the aid of balloons, was able to form a fairly accurate idea of the strength of the Frede ricksburg position, and also of the whereabouts of portions of Lee's army ; but a few determined men, working on the far side of the river, would have supplied him with information of the utmost value. From their reports he would probably have dis covered that the position — naturally formidable — was thoroughly prepared for defence, that one-half of Jackson's corps was in close support of Longstreet, and that the demonstration at Skenker's Neck had not prevailed on his adversary to weaken his left by sending reinforcements to that quarter. THE BATTLE OF FEEDEEICKSBUEG. Like its predecessor, the 13th of December broke dull and calm, and the mist which shrouded the river and the plain hid from each other the rival hosts. Long before daybreak the Federal divisions Map V. still beyond the stream began to cross ; and as the morning wore on, and Franklin's line moved forward from the bivouacs, the rumbling of artillery, the loud words of command, and the sound of martial music, came muffled by the fog to the ears of the Confederates lying expectant on the heights. Now and again the curtain lifted for a moment, and the Southern guns assailed the long dark columns of the The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 61 foe. Very early had the Confederate army taken up its final position. On the extreme right, 200 yards in rear of Hamilton's Crossing, fourteen guns, under Colonel Walker, were stationed on the spur called Prospect Hill. Supported by two regiments of Field's brigade, these pieces were held back for the present within the thickets. The massive foundation of the railroad, though it formed a tempting breastwork, was only utilized as such by the skirmishers of the defence.* The border of the wood, 150 to 200 yards in rear, looked down upon an open and gentle slope, and along the brow of this natural glacis, covered by the thickest timber, Jackson posted the main body of his fighting line. To that position it was easy to move supports, unperceived and unopposed ; and if the assailants were to seize the embankment, he relied upon the deadly rifles of his infantry to bar their further advance up the bare ascent beyond. The Light Division, under Ambrose Hill, formed the first line of Jackson's corps. To the left of Walker's batteries, posted in a trench within the skirt of the wood, was Archer's brigade of seven regiments, including two of Field's, the left resting on a coppice that projected beyond the general line of forest. On the further side of this coppice, but nearer the embankment, lay Lane's brigade, an un occupied space of 600 yards intervening between his right and Archer's left. Between Lane's right and the edge of the coppice there was a stretch of * The skirmish line of Jackson's corps is not shown in the map. 62 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. open field 200 yards in breadth. Both of these brigades had a strong skirmish line pushed forward along and beyond the railroad. Five hundred yards in rear, along a military road, Gregg's brigade covered the interval between Archer and Lane. On Lane's left rear was Pender's brigade, supporting twelve guns posted in the open, beyond the embank ment, and twenty-one massed in a field to the north of Bernard's cabin. One regiment (the 7th North Carolina), drawn up along the railroad, 200 yards in rear of the guns, acted as immediate escort of the foremost batteries. Four hundred yards in rear of Lane's left and Pender's right, Thomas's brigade of four regiments was stationed in support.* The first line of Jackson's Corps was thus held by one division, three brigades in front and two in sup port; fourteen guns were massed on the left, and thirty-three on the right. It is necessary to notice particularly the shape, size, and position of the projecting tongue of wood land which broke the continuity of Hill's line, as it influenced greatly the conduct of the ensuing battle. A German officer on Stuart's staff had the day previous, while riding along the position, remarked its existence and suggested the propriety of razing it; but, though Jackson himself predicted that there would be the scene of the severest fighting, the ground was so marshy within its recesses, and the undergrowth so dense and tangled, that it was judged impenetrable and left intact and unoccupied, * Approximate strength of brigades : — Field, 1600 ; Archer, 2000 ; Lane, 2000 ; Gregg, 1800 ; Pender, 2000 ; Thomas, 1600. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 63 an error of judgment which cost the Confederates dear. General Lane had also recognized the danger of leaving so wide a gap between Archer and him self, and had reported to his divisional commander, but without effect. This salient of the wood was triangular in shape, extending nearly 600 yards beyond the railway embankment. The base, which faced the Federals, was 500 yards in length. Beyond the apex the ground was swampy and covered with scrub, and the ridge, sinking to a level with the plain, afforded no position from which artillery could command the approach to or issue from this patch of jungle. A space of 700 yards along the front was thus left un defended by direct fire. His right resting on the railroad at Hamilton's Crossing, and his line extending in a semi-circle behind Archer's and Gregg's, Early had drawn up his division in support of Hill. Three brigades, Hayes, Atkinson, and Walker, were deployed in front ; Hoke's brigade on the right flank, along the railroad.* Five hundred yards in rear of Gregg, Paxton's, the right brigade of Taliaferro's division, connected with Early's left.f Branch's brigade was immediately behind Thomas ; Warren and Jones in second line. The division of D. H. Hill, and several batteries formed the reserve, and a portion of Early's artillery * Approximate strength of brigades : — Hayes, 1850 ; Atkinson, 1850 ; Hoke, 1850 ; Walker, 1850. t Approximate strength of brigades : — Branch, 1600 ; Warren, 1600 ; Jones, 1600. p , -7 64 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. was parked about half a mile in rear of his division, in readiness, if necessary, to relieve the guns on Prospect Hill. Jackson's infantry mustered 30,000 strong, and his line covered 2600 yards ; about eleven men to a yard, including reserve : a deep formation, but this was the weakest flank of the position. Opposite Deep Eun, on Jackson's left, Hood's division was stationed, and next in order came Pickett's, prolonging the line to Hazel Eun. Four teen guns were massed before each of these divisions, and the level plain in front was covered with skir mishers. This portion of Lee's line, 3000 yards long, was held by three men to the yard; it was flanked by Jackson's left brigades and the salient of Marye's Hill. Three batteries were held in re serve behind both Hood and Pickett. Kershaw's brigade of McLaws's division covered the wooded ravine of Hazel Eun, with Barksdale's and Semmes's in support. One company was pushed forward along the right bank of the creek, and Howison's mill was held by a battalion. Three regiments of Cobb's brigade occupied the stone wall at the base of Marye's Hill, the 18th Georgia on the right, the 24th Georgia in the centre, and the Philip's Legion on the left. On the reverse slope, 200 yards behind the crest, Cooke's brigade of Ean som's division was stationed, with the 16th Georgia of Cobb's brigade on the right. In the trench between the Telegraph and Orange plank roads lay the 24th South Carolina of Eansom's brigade of Eansom's division; the remainder of this brigade The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 65 being entrenched 600 yards in rear, on the slope of the further ridge.* The gun-pits on Marye's Hill were occupied by nine guns, under Colonel Walton, manned by the Louisiana Washington Artillery ; in pits to the left of the plank road, was Maurin's battery of four pieces, and six guns were placed in immediate support in the depression behind the right shoulder of Marye's Hill. This important section, cover ing the roads, was thus held by three brigades in the first line, twelve regiments ; three brigades, fifteen regiments, in the second line; in all, 11,000 infantry, and nineteen guns. The actual fighting line was composed of one brigade in front, and three (including Kershaw) in close support ; about 7400 infantry, all of whom took part in the engage ment. Furthermore, on Lee's Hill were twenty-one guns, eight of which commanded the Telegraph road and enfiladed the embankment of the unfinished railway ; and three heavy batteries (two under De Ehett) on the slope of the further ridge were ready to sweep the exposed plateau of Marye's Hill, should it be carried by the enemy. In general reserve, seven teen smooth bores were stationed in a gully behind Lee's Hill. The left flank of the position was entrusted to Anderson's division; five batteries in gun-pits on the ridge covered the front, one was * Approximate strength of brigades : — , Kershaw, 2400 „ T Barksdale, 1200 pOTlanm i Eansom, 1700 McLaws SerameSi 2400 Ransom j Cook6( 17Q0 I Cobb, 1600 66 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. held in reserve near Stansbury Hill, and six pieces stood on Taylor's Hill. It was unlikely that this flank would be seriously attacked ; it was therefore held by but 7000 infantry and thirty-four guns, three men to the yard. One battery, occupying the earthwork on the level ground, covered the ford below Falmouth, and at the same time flanked the plank road. Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, two brigades, 4000 strong and eighteen guns, on the right flank of the army and well to the front, filled the interval between Hamilton's Crossing and the Massaponax ; the skirmish line (dismounted) being pushed forward beyond the Old Stage road, and, on the right flank, vedettes occupied a hillock near the mouth of the creek. One Whitworth gun was posted on the heights beyond the Massaponax, north-east of Yerby's House. The entire length of Lee's line was about 11,500 yards, and his combatant strength being probably about 68,000,* the proportion of men to space was 11,000 to the mile, nearly six men to the yard. His left was naturally strong, and the fords above Falmouth were watched by cavalry ; this portion of the position, therefore, was held by one division only. The salient of Marye's Hill, commanding the two roads, was manned by two divisions, and its natural defensive capabilities artificially improved. The re-entrant of the centre, flanked as it was by bastion-like spurs, was thinly occupied by 13,000 men. On the right, the weaker flank, where * Two cavalry brigades, Rosser's and Hampton's, about 5000 men, were detached at a distance from the field of battle. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 67 the greater width of the plain gave the enemy room to deploy, and where defeat would cut the army off from the railroad, and perhaps from the Telegraph road, was massed a whole army corps, with a strong cavalry division operating on the flank. Lee is reported to have expressed his regret after the battle of the 13th, that his line had not been more thoroughly prepared for defence ; and it might be supposed that this oversight caused him some anxiety during the course of the engagement. The contrary, however, was the fact ; probably no general or army ever awaited the attack of a more numerous enemy with greater confidence that did Lee and the Confederates at Fredericksburg. Almost every pre caution had been taken that skill suggested and time allowed ; there was but one weak link in the chain of defence, the projecting coppice, and it may be that this was in Lee's mind when he spoke of in complete preparation. Shortly after eight o'clock on the morning of the 13th, accompanied by his slender personal staff, he rode along the front ; and having satisfied himself that all was in order, returned to the centre, and took his stand with Longstreet upon that wooded height which has since borne the name of Lee's Hill. We will now consider the dispositions for attack made by the Federal commander, and in order to understand his action, it must be held in mind that he still believed, although Lee had received forty-eight hours' warning of his design, that the Confederate right wing was in position near Port 68 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Eoyal, and that he was confronted by only a portion of the enemy's force.* As to his actual plan of battle there is a conflict of evidence, which is, to say the least, curious, but at the same time scarcely worth discussion. As far as can be elicited from the mass of contradictory testimony recorded, his final decision, delivered at an informal council of war, held on the night of the 12th, was to make his principal effort against the enemy's right, his weakest point, and to support it by an assault of Marye's Hill on the left centre. So far, so good ; the deep channel and marshy valley of the Massaponax made a turn ing movement exceedingly hazardous, and the. plan under the circumstances was sound enough. Marye's Hill was certainly too strong to be carried by a direct attack, but it was understood that operations agamst it would be confined to a brisk demonstration until an opportunity for assault should present itself. If, after communicating his scheme to his subor dinates, Burnside had been content to trust to them the execution thereof, it would have been better for his reputation. The commanders of the three Grand Divisions, on the night of the 12th, after the council of war, were under the impression that the above plan was to be carried out to the letter, and that final orders as to the hour of attack would reach them early the next morning. During the night, however, Burn side, inexperienced in command, wavered from his purpose, and committed himself to half-measures. * This was actually the case at sundown on the 12th; but the Federal Intelligence Department seems to have failed to ascertain, or at any rate to report, if it was so on the following morning. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 69 By the council of war the attack of the enemy's right was committed to Franklin, and in addition to his own Grand Division, two divisions of the Third Corps, of Hooker's command, were placed at his disposal. Sumner was in charge of the operations against Marye's Hill, reinforced by Whipple's division of the Third Corps. Franklin had under his orders eight divisions and 116 guns : 55,000 men. Sumner had under his orders seven divisions and 60 guns : 30,000 men. The Fifth Corps remained under Hooker on the far side of the river as a general reserve of three divisions and 30 guns : 19,000 men. The ordnance on the Stafford Heights numbered about 120 guns ; sixty-one, under De Eussey, were posted opposite the Confederate right, the re mainder above the town and along the heights beyond Falmouth. Impatiently on the morning of the 13th Franklin awaited his orders, but when after long delay they at last arrived, he found to his surprise and chagrin, that, instead of receiving carte-blanche, as he expected, to use his whole command against the Confederate right, he was fettered by instructions to employ an attacking column of " not less than a division," and at the same time to hold his troops in readiness to move rapidly down the Old Stage road. Nor had the two promised divisions of the Third Corps been as yet instructed to join him. What was he to infer ? Was the attack and 70 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. defeat of the Confederates to be left to Sumner alone, while he himself, covering his movement by seizing the heights with a portion of his force, prepared to turn against the enemy's wing erroneously supposed to be still at Port Eoyal ? If a serious and determined attack was intended, why was any limit placed on the numbers to be employed ? However weak the Confederates might be upon their right, it was certain that to wrest from them the line of heights, and to inflict upon them a crushing defeat, was scarcely within the power of a single division of 6000 or 7000 bayonets. On the other hand, there was no suggestion that the original scheme had been departed from, and that the main attack would be undertaken by Sumner. The wording of the despatch was certainly vague and unsatisfactory, and the meaning was difficult to fathom. Burnside, however, did not leave his sub ordinate without an interpreter. Before the battle commenced his Chief of the Staff joined Franklin and remained with him throughout the day. But unfortunately the indecision and vacillation of the general-in-chief had become too apparent. Harassed by doubts, and without confidence in his superior, Franklin in his turn resorted to half-measures, than which, in warfare, nothing is more hopeless. It can not be too often repeated that want of determination in the execution is fatal to any plan of action, how ever well-conceived : a weak plan, boldly carried out, is far more likely to be successful than one sound in itself but prosecuted without vigour and resolution. Sumner on the right also received orders which The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 71 limited the numbers of the assaulting force to one division only. Knowing what we do of the strength of the point to be attacked, and bearing in mind that it was apparent to Burnside also, we must convict him of a capital error in directing the assault to be undertaken with an inadequate force ; or, if he meant the assault only to follow demonstra tion, and to be dependent on the success of the left wing, in not clearly expressing his intention. With the vague and misleading instructions of the inexperienced Federal general, readers of military history will compare the clear and precise orders of battle issued by Napoleon, Wellington, or the German generals of 1870-71 ; the minute directions and explanations communicated even to the rank and file by the great Eussian leader, Skobeleff ; or the practice of Burnside's opponent, Lee. The Southern commander, having brought his troops up to the position he had selected, communicated with out reserve to his lieutenants his general plan, and then gave frankly into their hands the conduct of the fight. The lesson should be impressed upon all officers who may have the direction of any military opera tion, however insignificant. Make up your own mind clearly as to the course you intend to pursue. Let your plan be as simple as possible ; well-defined both as to the means to be employed and the objective aimed at : take care that it is prosecuted with the utmost determination, and, if your subordinates are qualified to command, leave them to themselves, and beware of unnecessary interference. Be determined 72 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. at the same time, if necessary, to enforce prompt co-operation towards the end in view. At Gettysburg, Lee's first defeat, a want of determination on the part of the great Virginian general in compelling exact and timely obedience to his orders, is believed by many to have lost the battle. Let your instructions be explicit, plainly-worded, and capable of no double construction ; and, above all, see that in letter and in spirit they are understood by those upon whom you depend to carry them out. Time employed in explaining orders is never thrown away : let all ranks understand what is required of them, and you will ensure the intelligent co-opera tion, not only of the officers, but of your whole force. The position of the Federal army on the night of the 12th and the following morning will be best comprehended by reference to the map. Shortly after nine o'clock on the 13th, the sun, shining out with almost September warmth — for though the year had nearly reached its close, the pleasant Indian summer still lingered among the woodlands of Virginia — quickly dispelled the mists which hid the opposing armies; and as the dense white folds dissolved, Jackson's men beheld the plain beneath them dark with a moving mass of more than 40,000 foes. Franklin's Grand Division was in motion on the Old Stage road : down the face of the cliffs beyond the river, and across the narrow bridges, poured an unceasing stream of men and guns ; and from the long array of batteries upon the Stafford Heights a great storm of shot and shell burst upon the Confederate lines. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 73 And yet that vast array, formidable in numbers, training, and equipment, lacked the moral force without which physical power, even in this its most terrible form, is but an idle show. The dissensions of the leaders, the want of energy and decision in carrying out the preliminary movements, the inse curity of their situation, were but too apparent to the intelligence of the regimental officers and men. Northern writers have recorded that the Army of the Potomac never went down to battle with less confidence and alacrity than on this day of Fredericks- bm'£; Hidden by thick timber, crouching behind their parapets, or ensconced in deep ravines, Lee's soldiers lay secure, undisturbed by the tempest that crashed harmlessly above them through the leafless branches ; and, reserving their fire for the hostile infantry, the guns were silent. How dark and forbidding must that long line of hill and wood, manned by unseen foes and wrapped in silence more terrible than the fiercest din of battle, have appeared to the advancing Federals ! To their credit be it said, the Northern infantry never attacked more resolutely than they did at Fredericks burg; and, had the capacity of the leaders been equal to the courage of the men, Lee's veterans would have been hard set to hold their own. Left Attack. About half-past nine, Franklin, who had moved across Deep Creek and down the Old Stage road for 9-30 a,m. 74 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. nearly half a mile, fronted, and advanced against the heights. In accordance with Burnside's order the attacking line consisted of one division only, the Third of the First Corps, under Meade, composed of Pennsylva- nian regiments. The Second Division of the same corps was in support on the right under Gibbon, and the First, commanded by Doubleday, was placed en potence on the left along the Mine road.* Franklin was evidently apprehensive of a counter-attack against his left ; otherwise the First Division would hardly have been retained in this position, as it was throughout the day. The Sixth Corps | held the Old Stage road on either side of Deep Eun ; two divisions in first line and a third in support. A grand battery of thirty-six pieces, stationed 600 yards from the river-bank, served as a tete-du-pont. The numerous field guns were placed along the front in the intervals between brigades, the batteries acting independently. Meade's first brigade, covered by one battalion skirmishing, was followed at a distance of 300 paces by the second, also in line ; the third, marching in column of fours, moved a little to the left rear" of the first, with one regiment thrown out in extended order on the flank. The presence of Stuart's dismounted troopers away to the left evidently dictated this formation. The skirmishers in front were soon briskly engaged * Approximate strength :— Meade, 4600; Gibbon, 5500; Double- dav, 7000. t 21,000 strong. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 75 with Hill's sharpshooters, but no sooner had the compact line of the leading brigade crossed the Old Stage road and gained the crest of a shallow hollow which lay between it and the woods, than the left was assailed by a well-directed and raking artillery fire. Captain Pelham, who commanded the Confederate horse artillery, galloping forward with two guns as the Federals advanced, and escorted by a dis mounted squadron, had come into action near the cross roads, enfilading the enemy's line. So telling was his fire that the first brigade wavered and gave ground; and though Meade quickly brought up his guns and placed his third brigade en potence in support of them, he was unable to con tinue the advance until he had brushed away his audacious antagonist. The four divisional batteries were aided by two of Doubleday's; but, rapidly changing his position as often as the Federal gun ners found the range, for more than half an hour the daring Southerner defied their efforts, and for that space of time arrested the advance of Meade's 4,500 infantry. One of his pieces was soon disabled, but with the remaining gun, a twelve-pounder Napoleon, taken from the Federals six mouths before, he maintained the unequal fight until his ammunition was exhausted, and he received peremptory orders from Stewart to withdraw. That the skirmish line of Meade's third brigade was not used to drive away this intrusive assailant, as would now be the case, is probably due to the fact that at the time skirmishers never attacked on their own account, but were used merely to cover the movements of the main body. 76 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. This gallant action made the name of the young soldier — he was but two-and-twenty years of age — one of the most famous in the Confederacy. On Pelham's retirement, Franklin, bringing several batteries forward to the Eichmond road, for more than half an hour subjected the woods before him and the line held by the dismounted cavalry to a heavy cannonade ; and at the same time demanded from Hooker the two divisions of the Third Corps * il a.m. which Burnside had placed at his disposal. It was past eleven before Meade recommenced his advance. Covered by the fire of the heavy guns upon the Stafford Heights and of field batteries on either flank, his line had gained a point within 800 yards of the foot of the opposing ridge, when suddenly the silent woods awoke to life, and the flash and thunder of more than sixty guns revealed to the Federals the magnitude of the task they had undertaken. Walker's fourteen guns on Prospect Hill, Stuart's eighteen beyond the cross-roads, and the great batteries on the left of Hill's division, opened almost simultaneously. The skirmishers were quickly driven in, and on the closed ranks behind burst the full fury of the storm. Dismayed and decimated by this fierce and unexpected onslaught, Meade's brigades broke in disorder and fell back to the shelter of the road. For the next hour and a half an artillery duel raged in this quarter of the field : the Confederate guns, their position at last revealed, engaged with * Birney's and Sickles's, about 14,000 men. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 11 spirit the more numerous and powerful batteries of the Federals; while Franklin brought up three fresh divisions to support his foremost line. About twelve o'clock, part of D. HiU's division advanced in support of the Southern cavalry, but was almost immediately withdrawn. Bight Attack. The original design, approved by the Federal council of war, had been to make the main effort on the left, and to confine the right wing to demon stration until a favourable opportunity to convert a feigned attack into a real one should present itself. We shall now see how Burnside, having already, by useless limitations as to the force to be employed, fettered and disheartened his lieutenants, was him self the first to depart from the proposed line of action, and to turn awry the current of the enter prise. At eleven o'clock, as Meade on the left was pre paring to advance for the second time, Sumner received instructions to move out to the assault of the heights before him. At the same time Long- street's guns opened fire, and enfiladed the bridges and streets of the town to such purpose, that the Federal columns had to creep forward in single file, clinging to the walls and buildings on either hand. The Second Corps occupied Fredericksburg ; the Ninth lay south of the town on the far side of Hazel Eun ; Whipple's division of the Third Corps 78 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. was in reserve. Sumner had under his orders sixty guns, but not more than eight of his batteries were able to come into action. It was about twelve o'clock when French's division of the Second Corps, 4500 strong, which had been deputed to carry out the assault, issued from the town by the plank and Telegraph roads. At this moment, Meade, as we know, had not only failed to make the slightest impression on the enemy's right, but had actually suffered a decided check. His movement had, however, served the purpose of a reconnaissance in force, and it must have been clear, even to Burnside, that Jackson's corps was present, and the whole Confederate army concentrated on the heights before him. The Federal general, however, notwithstanding the repulse of the left attack, did not recall his instruc tions issued to Sumner at eleven o'clock, but allowed that commander to make an isolated attempt against the most formidable point of Lee's line, unsup ported by any combined movement of the left wing, which at the time was bombarding the woods, but making no effort whatever to engage the enemy's infantry. There was little preparation for the attack on the part of the artillery. The heavy guns on the Stafford Heights had been but for a short time in action. The dense mist, which lifted about nine o'clock from the lower reaches of the stream, lingered long over the ridge which stands above the town ; and the Confederate batteries on the open plateau, visible only at intervals, had as yet escaped disaster. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 79 French's division, covered by the usual screen of skirmishers in front and on the flank, and sup- 12 noon. ported by six batteries posted on the outskirts of the town, advanced along the roads in column of fours, the enemy's picquets retiring slowly before it ; and, though exposed to the fire of Walton's and Maurin's thirteen guns and of the batteries on Stansbury and Taylor's Hills, it crossed the mill- sluice by the bridges, and mounted the slope of the miniature valley through which it runs. In the ploughed fields beyond, the leading brigade' attempted to deploy, but ere the movement was two-thirds completed, scourged by musketry and by volleys of round shot, which burst wide gaps in the ranks that were visible a mile away, the column fell back to the town, having lost 1200 men. Three camp colours, left standing 175 yards distant from the foot of Marye's Hill, marked the extent of the front of the first brigade and the limit of the advance. Fifteen minutes passed and another division, Hancock's, 5000 strong, rushed forward from the 12-30 P-m- town. Zooke's brigade led the way, but quickly recoiled, beaten back by that terrible artillery. Not so its successor. Under cover of the further bank of the ravine, the Irish Brigade,* under General Meagher, threw off their haversacks and blankets and deployed into line. Eesolutely the 1200 — for they were no more — breasted the slope and faced the death-dealing • storm : swiftly they passed the * Composed of the 28th and 29th Massachusetts, the 63rd, 69th, and 88th New York, and the 116th Pennsylvania. 80 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. limit marked by the three solitary colours, and shoulder to shoulder, their own green flag and the blue and scarlet of the Union standard waving above them, swept forward against the low wall which skirts the base of Marye's Hill. So determined was their advance, that Colonel Miller, commanding the Confederate brigade con fronting them — for General Cobb had already fallen — ordered his men to hold their fire for a space. And now occurred a strange and pathetic incident. Though -high was the courage of that thin line which charged so boldly across the shot-swept plain, opposed to it were men as fearless and as staunch : behind that rude stone breastwork were those who were " bone of their bone and flesh of their flesh ; " the soldiers of Cobb's brigade were Irish like them selves. On the morning of the battle General Meagher had bade his men deck their caps with sprigs of evergreen, " to remind them," he said, " of the land of their birth : " the symbol was recognized by their countrymen, and " Oh, God, what a pity ! Here come Meagher's fellows," was the cry in the Confederate ranks. One hundred and fifty paces from the hill, the brigade halted and fired a volley, while the round shot tore fiercely through the ordered line. Still no sign from the wall, looming grim and silent through the battle-smoke ; and again the battalions moved swiftly forward. They were but a hundred yards from their goal, unbroken and unfaltering still ; they had reached a point where Walton's gunners, unable to depress their pieces further, could The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 81 no longer harass them. Victory seemed within their grasp, and a shout went up from the shattered ranks. Suddenly, a sheet of flame leaped from the parapet, and 1200 rifles, plied by cool and unshaken men, concentrated a murderous fire upon the advancing line. To their glory be it told, though scores were swept away, falling in their tracks like corn before the sickle, the ever-thinning ranks dashed on, " The charging blood in their upturned faces, And the living filling the dead men's places." But before that threatening onset the Confederate veterans never quailed ; volley on volley sped with deadly precision, and at so short a range every bullet found its mark. For a while the stormers struggled on, desperate and defiant ; but no mortal men could long face that terrible fire, scathing and irresistible as the lightning, and at length the broken files gave ground. Slowly and sullenly they fell back; fell back to fight no more that day, for beneath the smoke-cloud that rolled about Marye's Hill the Irish Brigade had ceased to exist. Of 1200 officers and men, 937 had fallen. Forty yards from the wall, where the charge was stayed, the dead and dying lay piled in heaps, and one body, supposed to be that of an officer, was found within fifteen yards of the parapet. The adjutant-general of Hancock's division, who witnessed the attack from the town, said that at the time he could not understand what had happened ; the men fell in such regular lines that he thought they were lying down to allow the storm of shot to pass over them. General Eansom, commanding 82 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. one of the divisions which held Marye's Hill, re ported that this assault was made " with the utmost determination ; " and the eloquent words of the Times Special Correspondent, who was present with the Confederates, record the admiration of those who beheld that splendid charge : " Never at Fontenoy, Albuera, or Waterloo, was more un daunted courage displayed by the sons of Erin ; the bodies which lie in dense masses within fifty yards of the muzzles of Colonel Walton's guns are the best evidence what manner of men they were who pressed on to death with the dauntlessness of a race which has gained glory on a thousand battle-fields, and never more richly deserved it than at the foot of Marye's Hill, on the 13th day of December, 1862." After the battle, on the ground over which the divisions of the Second and Third Corps had passed, and within a space not larger than two acres in extent, 680 corpses were counted, lying in many places literally in heaps ; and it was noticed that the faces of most of them were of the Milesian type. This spot was significantly named the Slaughter-pen. Two hundred paces in rear of Meagher's line, Caldwell's brigade had moved forward, but, disheartened doubt less by the fate of its gallant predecessor, was more easily repulsed ; and when the relics of the Irish regi ments had been driven from the frail shelter of the fences and wooden buildings where they had taken refuge, the Confederate fire ceased. Hancock's division, which had gone into action 5006 strong, lost 156 officers and 2013 men. Six Confederate regi ments and about thirty guns were actively engaged. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 83 Twenty minutes only elapsed from the moment Zooke attempted to deploy until the broken and bleeding remnants of Meagher's and Caldwell's brigades reeled back to the bank of the mill-sluice. Colonel Miller's bold action in ordering his infantry to suspend their fire, at the very moment the advance appeared most .formidable, cannot be too highly commended. Far more destructive to the morale of an attacking force is the sudden shock of well-directed volleys delivered at close quarters, than continuous exposure to fire commenced at long range and maintained as the interval decreases, the loss from which is usually slight in proportion to its intensity. Nor does a protracted fire-action tend to steady the nerves of the defenders : men who have been using their rifles for some time are apt to get excited and careless ; and at the same time to lose confidence in their power of resistance, at the sight of the enemy advancing despite their efforts. To keep your men under cover as long as possible and to open fire only at the most effective range, the point-blank, is, when acting on the defensive and supported by artillery, sound tactics. But to do this effectually troops must be not only securely covered but also thoroughly trained and well in hand ; and it speaks volumes for the fire-discipline and steadiness of the Confederate infantry that they were able to carry out the order with such coolness and effect. General Kershaw, who took over the command along the wall soon after Cobb's death, reported that though at one time his line was in parts four deep, and the men, kneeling to load, rose 84 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. by ranks to deliver volleys, not a single soldier was injured by a comrade's fire. On the Confederate side, as French's division debouched from the town, Cooke's brigade of 1600 men was brought up from the reserve slope of Marye's Hill and placed in line before the house and garden ; and, as the Irish Brigade deployed, the two regiments on the right advanced to the crest and aided in repulsing the attack. It was now nearly one o'clock. Two divisions had been hurled fruitlessly against the hill, 10,000 Federals had been easily and bloodily repulsed by a force one-fourth their number, and it seems almost incredible that Burnside should have allowed, with out changing his tactics, another division to be swallowed up in that gulf of fire. The battle was to be won, if at all, by crushing the enemy's right. His centre and left were not only naturally strong, but were adequately defended: moreover, success there would be but partial, for the open plateau was commanded by the further ridge. Franklin's first attempt had failed, it is true, but it had been made with inadequate force, and there was no reason why a stronger effort should not succeed. There was no doubt that on the right, the tactical flank, the Confederates were in strength, and to defeat them it would be necessary to employ every available man and gun. " What Burnside ought to have done was to have reinforced Franklin as strongly as possible, and, refusing his right, to have confined Sumner as strictly to demonstration as was com patible with the security of that wing and of the The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 85 bridges. As usual, he did exactly the contrary. He sent the whole Fifth Corps of Hooker's Grand Division to assist Sumner, and to Franklin but a single division, the first of the Ninth Corps. About 1.15, p.m., Howard's division, in the same formation and on the same narrow front as French 1.15 p.m. and Hancock, supported by one solitary brigade (of Whipple's division) on his right rear, advanced from the lower quarter of the town ; and again the wave of attack broke vainly against that fatal hill. Kershaw, as the Federals came forward, reinforced the centre of the line with two of his own regiments, held hitherto in reserve in the ravine of the Hazel Eun. These were doubled on the Philip's Legion and the 24th Georgia. One of Eansom's regiments was brought up on the left of the Telegraph road lining the crest in rear of the 24th North Carolina, while the remainder of the brigade took post in close support. Howard lost 877 officers and men. Left Attack. At one o'clock, Franklin, having silenced the Confederate guns, again essayed the task of carrying the heights. Gibbon's division had been already posted on Meade's right. Birney's (Third Corps), l p.m. which crossing the bridge at ten o'clock, had arrived on the ground at noon, was in support of the left ; Newton's some distance to the right rear.* Brooks's and Howe's maintained their former position on * Eaoh division about 7500 strong. 86 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. either side of Deep Eun. Sickles's division (Third Corps), which had followed Birney's, was retained in reserve near the bridges ; and Doubleday's, still en potence on the left, held Stuart's cavalry in check. Twenty-one guns on the right and thirty on the left of the attacking line, stationed on the road, 1000 yards from the enemy's position, supported the movement. Preceded by clouds of skirmishers and covered by a tremendous artillery fire, Meade and Gibbon advanced from the Old Stage road in the usual formation, column of brigade at 300 paces' distance, the whole covering a front of 1000 yards ; whilst Birney replaced Meade along the road. When the Federals reached the scene of their former repulse, Jackson's guns again opened; but without the same effect, for they were now exposed to the fire of the enemy's more powerful artillery. Even Pelham could do but little, and the batteries which had been advanced beyond the railroad on Hill's left front were quickly driven in ; * the sup porting regiment advancing to a little hillock twenty yards beyond the embankment and firing volleys to check the enemy's skirmishers and cover the retirement. Meade's rearmost brigade was now brought up and deployed to the left of the first, thus further extending the front. The leading brigade made straight for that tongue of woodland, which, projecting beyond the railroad, interposed between Lane and Archer. As they * These guns joined the great battery posted near Bernard's Cabin. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 87 approached the battalions found that, masked by the timber, they were no longer exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, and that the wood before them was unoccupied. Quickly crossing the border, through swamp and undergrowth deemed impenetrable by the Con federates, an ever-increasing stream of men pressed on, and bursting from the covert to the right hand, attempted to roll up the exposed flank of Lane's brigade. The ground between the northern skirt of the wood, however, and Lane's right was an open field, 200 yards in width, and over this space the Federals made no immediate progress. At length, their ammunition giving out, the Southerners retired, but slowly and in good order. Neither Gregg nor Archer were able to lend assistance, for they themselves were fully occupied with Meade's second brigade; which, though following close on the heels of the first and met at the entrance to the coppice by the oblique fire of Lane's regiments, had, instead of conforming to the change of direction, rushed forward through the wood. Two hundred paces from the embankment it came in contact with Archer's left, which was resting on the very edge of the coppice. The Confederates were completely taken by surprise : relying on the reported inaccessibility of the thickets beyond their flank, neither scouts nor picquets had been thrown out to watch the approaches, and the men were lying about with arms piled. Two regiments, attempting to form up and change front to the left, were assailed in the act, broken by a determined 88 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. charge, and routed in confusion. The remainder, however, stood firm, without changing front, for the Federals, instead of following up their success in this direction, left Archer to be dealt with by the third brigade of the division (which had now reached the railroad and was threatening him in front), and swept on towards the military road, where Gregg's brigade was drawn up in line. It would have been well had a portion at least remained to assist, by a flank attack, in forcing Archer back, for the third brigade, left to itself, proved unequal to the task. So thick was the covert, and so limited the view, that General Gregg, taking the advancing mass for part of Hill's line retiring, restrained the fire of his men. The Federal rush broke upon his right. He himself fell mortally wounded ; his flank regiment, a battalion of conscripts, fled, except one company, without firing a shot. The two regiments on the opposite flank, however, were with great readiness turned about, and changing front inwards, effectually obstructed any movement of the enemy along the rear. But the Federals, though now joined by part of the first brigade, had already reached the limit of their success. The Pennsylvanian regiments found themselves in the heart of the enemy's position; but from the very nature of their advance and of the ground over which they had passed, they had become a confused and disorganized mass, and to them may be well applied the words of Kinglake: — " They were only a crowd, and they all of them, simple and wise, now began to learn in the great The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 89 school of action that the most brilliant achievements of a disordered mass of soldiers require the steady support of formed troops ; then, as it is said, for the first time the men cast a look toward the quarter from which they might hope to see supports advancing." Let us now look at the progress and position of the different bodies from which the much-needed aid was expected. To the right rear, opposite Pender, Gibbon's division, which had moved to the attack almost simultaneously with Meade, had been checked by the fire of the thirty odd Confederate guns posted en masse 300 yards behind the railroad. Two of his brigades had been driven back ; the third had with difficulty gained the shelter of the embankment. To the left rear, Meade's third brigade was held in check by Walker's batteries and the staunch infantry of Archer, who, notwithstanding that a strong force had passed beyond his flank, resolutely held his ground, and prevented his immediate oppo nents from reinforcing the intruding column. Not a single field battery had followed in support of the infantry ; between the railway, therefore, and the Old Stage road, a distance of 950 yards, there was no body of formed troops. Meade, with less than 3000 men, was alone and unsupported within the hostile lines, swallowed up by the forest and surrounded by an overwhelming throng of foes. At this crisis of the fight, when every available battalion should have been hurried to the front and poured through the still open gap, when a determined rush of the whole fighting line and supports would have 90 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. probably driven Hill and Early back upon the reserves, Franklin, incapable of a bold offensive, made no effort to assist his lieutenant, and, despite three urgent appeals for succour, left the gallant Pennsylvanians to their fate. If Birney, generously responding to Meade's cry for help, had, with Newton on his right, swept swiftly across the open, and, overwhelming Lane and Archer, had pressed on to the military road; if Doubleday, abandoning the passive defensive, had threatened Stuart and induced Jackson to detach to the aid of the cavalry a portion of his reserve, all might yet have been well. It was not to be, how ever ; timidity or incapacity neglected the opportu nity. Franklin, holding in his hand 40,000 infantry at least, saw those daring troops who, though num bering scarce 3000, had so successfully cleared the way, destroyed piecemeal by his own violation of the first principles of war. Whether, if he had supported Meade and Gibbon with 20,000 bayonets, he would have hurled Jackson back, is another matter; still he himself would have been quit of blame. Lee on other fields had shown himself a master of the delicate operation of thin ning one part of the line to strengthen another ; in addition to D. H. Hill and Taliaferro, Hood's and Pickett's reserve brigades were not far distant, and the soldiers of the Antietam could boast that the iron front of their resistance had never yet been broken through. The Confederates, in sharp contrast, and prompted, perhaps, by the urgency of the case, were not slow The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 91 to come to the assistance of their comrades. Early, anticipating Jackson's orders, hurled the brigades of Atkinson and Walker against the flank of the hostile column, and despatched Hoke, with Hayes in support, to reinforce Archer. At the same time Thomas, supported by Paxton, charged forward to the relief of Lane ; and the combined brigades bore back the Federals, outnumbered but fighting stub bornly, down the slope, and after a brief yet des perate struggle, thrust them from the woods. Archer also, promptly appreciating the situation, detached four regiments from his right, led them along the rear of the battalion that still faced the front, and dashed upon the struggling mass. Though compelled by sheer force of numbers to retreat, Meade's men still showed a bold front, and on gaining the railway embankment turned fiercely to bay. But in the thick covert they had been thrust from, all order and cohesion had been lost, and ere they could make good their grip upon that line of vantage, the Confederates rushed down upon them with the bayonet, and drove them far across 2.15 p.m. the plain. Walker, Thomas, and Archer, halted at the embankment, for four regiments, sent too tardily by Birney to Meade's aid, were attempting to enter the projecting coppice; but Atkinson and Hoke, carried away by success, pursued the fugitives beyond the railroad. In Atkinson's path stood a field battery, abandoned by the gunners as the Confederates approached. The Georgian regiments, their ammunition already 92 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. exhausted, were within eighty yards of the cannon when the first line of Birney's division, drawn up on the Old Stage road and supported by sixteen guns, shattered their right with sudden volleys of musketry and canister, arrested their progress, and snatched away the anticipated prize. The brigade fell back, leaving the brigadier, his adjutant, and over 300 men upon the field. Before Hoke's onset, Birney's left gave way for fifty yards or more ; but the Con federates, in their turn unsupported, were unable to follow up their success; and after suffering heavy loss, withdrew from the exposed situation where their reckless impetuosity had placed them. In killed, wounded, and prisoners, Meade lost more than 2000 officers and men. When Meade gave way, Gibbon's troops, who, it has been sug gested, were of inferior quality, and had not, in the face of the powerful artillery that confronted them, been able to gain ground beyond the railroad, scat tered over the plain in headlong flight. It should be mentioned that when the Confederate batteries, thrown forward beyond the railroad, were driven in by Gibbon's advance, one division, instead of retiring, took post several hundred yards further to the left front, whence it enfiladed the Federal line with great effect, and probably did much towards preventing Gibbon's brigades firmly establishing themselves upon the embankment. Birney, though he responded too late to Meade's demand for succour, did good service during the repulse. His four regiments sent forward to assist Meade's retiring soldiers in their last attempt to The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 93 rally, became involved in the rout, and lost 600 officers and men. As the fugitives of the First Corps came flying towards the road, he deployed two regiments across their path, but was unable even by such means to stay the career of the defeated divisions. We have already seen how he beat back with heavy loss the isolated counter-stroke of Hoke and Atkinson. In his report he claims, by thus check ing the pursuit, to have saved the left wing of the army from overthrow. However this may be, his words, speculating on the probable disastrous effect of a general counter-attack at this moment, bear strong testimony to the extent of Jackson's success, and of the Federal demoralization. Meade and Gibbon lost together 4000 men, exactly two-fifths of their number, but secured at the same time 200 prisoners. To recapitulate: — 10,000 infantry had attacked a strong position held by unknown numbers; two brigades had penetrated the enemy's line, but when, unsupported, they had been compelled to retire, the whole attack had given way. The artillery of the defence had been silenced — not crushed — by the preparatory fire of the enemy's batteries, and re-opening at the opportune moment, had assailed, with terrible effect, his advancing infantry. Three Confederate brigades, Archer, Lane, and Atkinson, had suffered somewhat severely, losing 1600 out of 5800. Franklin, when his first line broke, had still intact the divisions of Birney, Doubleday, Sickles, 94 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. and the entire Sixth Corps, 42,000 men in all; and at least one division of the Ninth, and one of the Fifth Corps (which had crossed the river about two o'clock) might have been sent to his assistance in case of need. Thirty thousand infantry, of which not more than one-third had been engaged, were, together with the cavalry (4000), available on the Confederate side for offensive movement. Two of Franklin's divisions, however, Howe and Brooks, who had suffered heavily from artillery fire, were occu pied in containing Hood and Pickett, and four only (for Meade's and Gibbon's troops had been badly cut up) were at hand to resist an immediate attack : that is, if Jackson had fallen on the Federals, he would have been met by but 25,000 bayonets, of which 7000 (Doubleday's division) were posted at right angles to his line of attack. Supporting troops would have doubtless been sent over from the Federal right, but, be it remembered, Franklin's masses were bound to a narrow and hazardous line of retreat, and had already been witnesses of the demoralizing repulse of the attacking column. If the Confederate general-in-chief had ordered Jackson and Stuart, together with Hood aud Pickett, to close with the enemy, there appears no valid reason why the whole left wing of the Federal army should not have been driven with fearful slaughter into or beyond the Eappahannook. However, the Confederates, ignorant as they necessarily were of the mistrust and want of con fidence in its leaders with which the Federal army was infected, were unaware of the extent. of the The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 95 demoralization of which this feeling was a cause, and were far from suspecting what a strong ally they had in the very hearts of the enemy. More over, so easily had the attacks been repulsed, that both Lee and Jackson never doubted but that they were merely tentative efforts, the prelude, as it were, to the main assault. To return to Franklin. As soon as the pursuit ceased, Birney and Sickles were ordered to maintain the position held before the attack by Meade and Gibbon. Newton still kept his place in the centre ; and Burns's division of the Ninth Corps,* which, despatched from Sumner's right, reported to Franklin at three o'clock, supplied the place of Sickles in reserve. The broken divisions of Meade and Gibbon were reformed along the river-bank, south of Deep Eun. While these movements were in progress, at 2.30 p.m. Burnside, having just witnessed the signal 2-30 p.m. failure of a fourth attempt to carry Marye's Hill, sent an urgent order to Franklin to renew the attack. Beyond informing the general-in-chief that fresh troops (Sickles's division) had been sent in, Franklin made no response ; he had lost all confidence in his superior, and took upon himself to disobey ; and indeed, had he ordered an advance, his soldiers, disheartened and exasperated by the feeble general ship which had so recklessly and unavailingly sacri ficed their comrades, would in all probability, as they did under Grant at Cold Harbour in 1864, have refused to move. * Probably not more than 3500 bayonets. 96 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. On the Confederate side Taliaferro and Early, with part of the Light Division, now held the railway embankment and the skirt of the woods ; D. H. Hill was brought up in support, and the shattered brigades of A. P. Hill were withdrawn behind the Mine road. During the rest of the afternoon the skirmishers were actively engaged, but though Jackson's victorious soldiery long and eagerly. awaited a renewal of the assault, the disheartened Federals refused to be again tempted to close conflict. Jackson had lost 3400, Franklin more than 5000; the Confederate wounded, however, far exceeded the usual proportion to the killed. Subjected to a tremendous artillery fire, aud hidden beneath dense timber, while many were injured by splinters of trees, few were mortally hurt. Taliaferro had but five killed out of a total loss of 172, and D. H. Hill about the same number. One thousand Federals were taken prisoners. Shortly after three o'clock, a Federal brigade, with the purpose probably of covering by a diversion the movements on the left, debouched suddenly from the Deep Eun ravine, turned the left of the line of scouts, captured a party of fifteen men, and, deploying left, advanced against the right of Hood. Unsupported, and disconcerted by a sudden counter-attack of two regiments of conscripts, delivered with that impetu osity for which Hood and his division were so famous, it was easily repulsed. The pursuit, continued for some distance, was wisely stopped by Hood, though to the chagrin of the soldiers, before it came within reach of the enemy's main line. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 97 Bight Attack. Shortly after two o'clock, about the same moment that Meade's division began to fall back before 2 P-m- Jackson, Sumner ordered Sturgis's* division of the Ninth Corps to make a last bid for victory. The Fifth Corps, belonging to Hooker's command, the Centre Grand Division, held back hitherto in reserve beyond the river, was at this time passing over the bridges ; and Griffin's division,* which had already crossed, was sent in to support Sturgis. Under cover of a heavy artiUery fire, to which Lee's guns did not reply, and the musketry of the broken Second Corps, which still clung to the ravine of the mill-sluice, Sturgis moved forward from beyond the mouth of Hazel Eun, and Griffin from the town. As the Federals advanced, General Eansom, com manding on Marye's Hill, having observed the passage of the Fifth Corps across the bridges, and probably anticipating a departure from the feeble tactics hitherto pursued, brought up two regiments (of Cooke's Brigade) from the second line on to the plateau, and moved forward two, which had been stationed in front of the house, to the crest of the slope. This assault, though made on a broader front, fared no better than those which had preceded it. Sturgis lost 1028, and Griffin 818. One or more battalions reached the shelter of a hillock 150 yards in front of the right shoulder of Marye's Hill, and * Sturgis, 3500 ; Griffin, 7500. H 98 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. the Confederates were unable to drive them from their position. Towards dusk they were reinforced by a battery. The Fifth Corps, having crossed the stream, took post in the following order (relieving respectively Hancock, French, and Howard) : Griffin on the right, Sykes in the centre, and Humphreys on the left leaning ou Hazel Eun. The remnant of the Second Corps now took refuge in the buildings of the town and beneath the bluffs which stand above the river- beach. Whipple's division still retained its first position. Two corps d'armee broken and demoralized, an enemy outnumbering his own unshattered troops,* invigorated by success and holding a formidable position, were the conditions that now faced Burn side ; and it ought to have been plain, even to him, that with his dispirited army his only course was to abstain from further assault, and either to with draw across the river, or to strengthen the line of defence he already held, and make every effort to maintain it until reinforcements should arrive. Franklin could not advance; Marye's Hill was impregnable ; to retreat or to remain were alike hazardous, and every man and gun would be needed to ward off disaster. Everything pointed out that further assault would be worse than useless; but even the bloody experience of the day had not taught him wisdom. Wielding like an angry child the authority which a government, regardless of the * So, according to his own estimate of Lee's force, he must have believed. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 99 lessons of history, and forgetting that men's lives are the price of a general's incompetency, had en trusted him with, he sent in a fresh corps d'armee, unsupported by any movement of the Left Grand Division, to dash itself to pieces against that invul nerable hill. It is true that at 2.30 p.m. he had ordered Franklin to make another forward movement, but, as we know, that general, if not unable was at least un willing to obey. The fresh attack on Longstreet did not take place till 4 p.m., and at that time Burnside must have been well aware that the left was in no condition to make a simultaneous attempt. Unmolested by Franklin, General Lee was free to turn his whole attention to Sumner and Hooker, to employ all his resources, if necessary, to overwhelm them. He could have had but little fear of this last effort of his baffled and desperate foe. It was not, however, without remonstrance on the part of General Hooker that further lives were sacrificed. To him it was apparent that the army had lost heart, and, riding over the river to head quarters, he endeavoured to dissuade his superior from his mad resolve. Counsel and expostulation, however, were alike unheeded, and, as he returned, 4 p.m. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps, advancing from below the mouth of Hazel Eun, attempted to turn the shoulder of Marye's Hill. As the attack developed, Kershaw brought up the 15th South Carolina and 16th Georgia, and with them stiffened the threatened point. The 15th South Carolina was " trebled " on the Philip's Legion, and the 16th 100 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. prolonged the line to the right. However, the Con federate infantry had but little share in Getty's repulse. The Federals, advancing obliquely to the line of fire from Lee's Hill, were enfiladed (as Sturgis's troops had been) by two of the batteries posted thereon; crossing the unfinished railroad embank ment they were thrown into confusion, and no sooner did they reach the open and feel the musketry than they shrank back to the nearest cover, and made no further effort to storm the breastwork. At the moment Getty moved out of the ravine of Hazel Eun, Walton's guns, occupying the pits on Marye's Hill, their ammunition being expended, were in the act of giving place to two of Alexander's batteries. The relief was delayed by the overturning of the leading gun on the steep and narrow track, and did not come into action. To this fact we must in part attribute the smallness of Getty's loss, which amounted only to 207 officers and men. It was now the turn of the Fifth Corps. Twilight was falling fast, and the incessant flash of musket and cannon shone redly through the gloom when 5-p.m the last devoted Federal division advanced to the assault. In this final attack, however, more method was pursued. Hooker had made, as far as possible, a careful reconnaissance of the position ; and, after consultation with the corps and divisional com manders, had determined to advance with unloaded rifles and to rely upon the bayonet alone. The attack was entrusted to the two brigades of Humphrey's division. Sykes's division of regulars The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 101 followed in close support in echelon upon the right. To cover the advance two batteries were stationed on the left of the Telegraph road, within 440 yards of the hill, and four to the right rear. Four guns, under cover of the gathering darkness, were actually brought up to within 150 yards of the stone wall ; but there, having revealed their presence by a volley of canister, were overwhelmed by so fierce a storm of musketry tbat they were immediately abandoned. Allabach's brigade led the advance. While they were still more than 100 paces distant from the hill, the soldiers, unused to yield implicit obedience to those who led them, took upon themselves the con duct of the fight, halted, and began to use their rifles. Exposed to the full force of the Confederate fire, they were unable to hold their forward position and quickly gave way. Then Tyler's regiments, bracing 'themselves for a more determined effort, charged forward swiftly and silently through the darkness. But where so many had failed how could they hope to succeed ? The pitiless round shot, smiting them front and flank, •dashed them on the corpse-encumbered field. The hill which rose through the smoke a shadowy mass before them streamed and throbbed with flame, and the pitiless musketry piled its victims high within the limits of the Slaughter-pen. There, threescore paces from the wall, the line faltered ; bewildered by the carnage, yet disdaining to fly, the men began to load. In vain the gallant Humphreys urged them on; those that were left unhurt could 102 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. do no more ; and after a brief and irregular fire, the relics of these fine regiments fell slowly back to the ravine. So complete and speedy was the repulse, that Sykes's division was utilized only to cover the retreat. Humphreys lost 1760, little less than half his number. Shortly after this attack, General Longstreet ordered up Kemper's brigade of Pickett's division to Marye's Hill. He appears to have anticipated a bayonet charge under cover of the right, little dream ing that such an attempt had been already made. At the same time, the regiment holding the trench between the plank and Telegraph roads, which had lost heavily and had expended its ammunition, was relieved by a battalion from the second line. There was no need, however, of further precaution against attack. Humphrey's charge was the final effort of the Federals, and with his repulse the battle ceased. During this last assault Marye's Hill had been held by seventeen battalions, about 7400 men. Although nearly 30,000 Federals had been arrayed against it during the day, and it had been exposed to the fire of the heavy batteries above Fredericks burg and near Falmouth, the loss of Longstreet's Corps did not exceed 1550; while that of the enemy in this quarter of the field alone amounted to more than 7000, one-fourth the strength of the force actually engaged. It was thanks only to the forbearance of General Lee, who restrained his artillery from overwhelming the town, filled with stragglers, wounded, and demoralized troops. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 103 that the casualties of the Union army were not far more numerous. To the vicious tactics adopted by the Federals the disastrous result was in great measure due. The soldiers, though they went into battle without confi dence, fought with admirable determination, and it was through no fault of theirs that success escaped them. In the first place, notwithstanding the large force of heavy guns available, little or no preparation was made for the attack ; and the very obvious rule that " the stronger the enemy's entrenchments, the longer the preparation, and the greater the quantity of artillery fire required," was either unrecognized or neglected. Secondly, the assaults were isolated and unsup ported, and no attempt was made to distract the enemy's attention by demonstration right and left. Thirdly, the formation in which the troops attacked was most unsuitable. On a front, probably never exceeding 600 yards in length, their lines of from 1200 to 2000 men advanced at several minutes' interval against a strong position held by a large force of veteran riflemen and numerous batteries. The very formation, occupying as it did but a limited front, compelled the enemy to concentrate his fire : and so wide was the distance between brigades that they were swept away in detail. No attempt was made to reinforce the leading brigade as it reached charging distance ; the wave of attack was not propelled forward by fresh impulse from the 104 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. rear, but left to rely upon its own momentum and to expend its force ere it reached the mark. In their earlier attempt on Plevna, the Eussians, it will be remembered, committed this last error with like fatal result. Again, it showed little tactical judgment in the leaders that the attacking lines were allowed to halt and fire. Every moment the men remained halted but added to the death roll and produced no effect whatever upon the well-protected enemy. The only possible chance of storming the wall, under the conditions adopted, was by a swift, unfaltering rush, which might have carried a few of the assailants within the line of the defence ; where, promptly supported, they would have made good their footing and opened the way for a successful advance. Lastly, the force employed at any one period was wholly insufficient, not only against Marye's Hill but also against the Confederate right. Including Birney's division, 22,000 infantry, one-fifth of the total strength, was the utmost number employed at the same time in the assault, and Birney can scarcely be said to have formed part of the fighting line. At 1.15 p.m., the hour alluded to, Meade, Gibbon (and Birney),on the left,and Howard on the right, advanced almost simultaneously. This was the only combined movement throughout the day. Burnside has been condemned for the fault of making a direct attack upon an unbroken and well-posted enemy, but the error, says Colonel Chesney, was older than his day ; for Napoleon threw away the' same number of men in a vain assault on the Eussian entrenched camp The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 105 at Heilsberg, 1807 ; and it may be added that at Waterloo the French Emperor neglected, as the Federal general, to push local successes and to ade quately support his attacking columns. Grant's battle of Cold Harbour in 1864, where 13,000 Federals fell in little more than ten minutes, has been included by Chesney in the same category as Fredericksburg and Heilsberg. But Burnside was guilty of a far graver error than was committed at Heilsberg, Waterloo, or Cold Harbour. There, whatever other mistakes were made, the attacks were at least made in force. The following principles have been laid down by well-known military writers : " You can never be too strong when making an attack, for you can never be perfectly sure of what force you may encounter, or at what moment the defender may make a counter-attack." Again, " An attack on an enemy presupposes a superiority of force at the place where the attack is made. War is but the art of being the strongest at the right place at the right time . . . for an attack to have a reasonable hope of success, the attackers at the point the attack takes place must be superior." Burnside scarcely appears to have grasped these important principles, and his method of feebly " tapping " (as has been happily said) at different points of the enemy's line is a blunder of which there are few instances. He had, it is true, to provide for the security of the bridges in case of repulse ; but it may be observed that a vigorous attack is the very best means of ensuring unmolested retreat, especially when engaging a smaller force. Though the assault should fail, the 106 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. enemy will probably have suffered too severely to pursue with energy. Wellington has been condemned for failing to follow up his victories, but on more than one occasion his troops were so reduced and exhausted by sheer hard fighting against superior numbers, that they were physically unable to reap the fruits of success. A minor detail connected with the operations against Marye's Hill may here be noticed. If the attack had succeded and the wall been carried by the division forming the fighting line, it would have been necessary to send forward supports from the town : for their speedy transmission to the scene of action, provision was neither made nor contemplated. The mill-sluice was crossed by two wooden bridges, one of which had been partially destroyed. No attempt was made to repair it during the battle; the advance, therefore, of reinforcements would have been long delayed ; and the lengthy column exposed on the open road during the slow passage of the obstacle by the leading troops, would have afforded a fair mark for the enemy's artillery. The practice of the Federal guns, though in every respect aided by position, must have been far from accurate; one gun only was disabled on Marye's Hill, none on Prospect, and the casualties among the Confederate gunners were but trifling. Walton lost three men killed and twenty -three wounded; Alexander, one killed, ten wounded, and fifteen horses ; Walker, on the right, three killed, twenty- four wounded, and ninety horses. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 107 Movements of Jackson's Corps. Shortly before dusk, seeing that the Federals did not intend to risk another attack, Jackson (doubtless with Lee's approbation) directed his divisional leaders to make ready for a general advance. AU the available artillery was ordered to 5 p.m. the front for the purpose of preparing and covering the movement. Stuart on the extreme right had already driven in Doubleday's skirmishers, and had pushed his guns forward as far as the Old Stage road. The divisional batteries were in position, aud those which were to lead the way had advanced a hundred yards beyond the railroad, when so tremen dous an outburst of fire was evoked from the guns on the Stafford Heights and behind the embankments of the road, that Jackson countermanded the order and, for the time at least, abandoned all idea of attack. In his report he stated that " the artillery of the enemy was so judiciously posted as to make an advance of our troops across the plain very hazardous." It would have been necessary to subdue the fire of Franklin's field guns before the Southern infantry could move out. Of that the hour did not permit. During the night the sentries of the two armies stood within a hundred paces of each other. The two following days saw the belligerents hold ing the same positions ; but though there was much skirmishing and artillery fire, no offensive movement was undertaken by either. The Confederates, imme- 108 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. diately the battle ceased on the 13th, set to work to strengthen their line by rifle-pits and abattis, in expectation of further assault. The Union troops were occupied in improving the natural defences of the Old Stage road; a series of entrenchments was constructed on either side of Hazel Eun, and the streets of Fredericksburg were strongly bar ricaded. Fortunately for the thousands of wounded Federals who lay during forty-eight long hours helpless and unaided between the hostile lines — for Burnside, loath to acknowledge his defeat, did not until past noon on the 15th demand permission to remove them — the weather continued comparatively mild ; but the time was one of frightful suffering to those who lay dying on the open fields, and of intense suspense to their comrades, expecting every moment to hear the thunder of Lee's guns and the terrible yell of his exultant infantry. It will scarcely be believed that the force of folly could further go, and that the bloody lesson taught by the defenders of the stone wall should have been utterly lost ; yet, on the night of the 13th, Burnside " as one of sense forlorn," announced to his generals in council that he intended, on the morrow, to attack Marye's Hill with the Ninth Corps in column of regiments. Providentially this scheme was overruled. For two days things remained in statu quo, and when on the night of the 15th a fierce storm of wind and rain burst from the south-west upon the valley of the Eappahannock, under cover of the tempest and the darkness the Federals withdrew across the river, The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 109 and resumed their former position on the Stafford Heights. The retirement was skilfully executed, does credit to the staff, and proves that the Northern army was by no means unwieldy. The movement was kept a close secret up to the last moment, and carried out in such carefully- guarded silence that the main body had already passed the bridges before the outpost line became aware that the operation was in progress. Burnside himself wished to retain Fredericksburg and the bridge-heads, but was overruled by Hooker, who knew that there was a limit to Lee's patience, and that the fire of his numerous batteries being quickly concentrated upon the town and its occu pants, the whole would be involved in the same destruction. It is said that the Confederates were already preparing incendiary shells for this very purpose. The inaction of the Federal commander during the 14th and 15th we can easily understand. Fortune was kinder to him than he deserved. The hours passed away without his beholding the long line of gray-clad soldiery issue from the shadow of the woods, and sweep down the slope upon his de moralized masses; and, when he looked helplessly for an opportunity to escape, the very elements declared themselves on his side. By almost every European soldier who has criti cally considered the battle of Fredericksburg, Lee has been censured for his supineness after the Federal repulse. If he had completed his work by the 110 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. capture or annihilation of Burnside's army, the Confederate cause would have been well nigh won. Eecognition by the European powers would in all probability have followed, the blockade have been raised, and the Union States, stunned by disaster, and realizing that the task of coercion was beyond their strength, have conceded the claims of their Southern sisters. The chance of achieving this great result, of winning at a blow the prize for which he stood in arms, would assuredly have justified him in quitting his defensive attitude. One splendid success alone was needed; it was impossible by adhering to the defensive that such success could be won. What would Waterloo have been had Napoleon been allowed to retire unmolested ? In Lee's own words are given the reasons that he ventured no offensive movement : " The attack had been so easily repulsed and by so small a part of our army that it was not supposed that the enemy would limit his efforts to an attempt, which, in view of the magnitude of his preparations and the extent of his force, seemed comparatively insig nificant . . . and we were necessarily ignorant of the extent of his loss." And again : " It was not deemed expedient to lose the advantages of our position, and expose the troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries beyond the river by advancing against them." These may be admitted as sufficient excuse for not delivering a counter-attack on the 13th, but they scarcely justifiy him in letting the two following The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Ill days slip by. The very inaction of the enemy on the 14th revealed the extent of his discomfiture ; and on the morning of the 15th, at latest, every Confederate gun should have been turned against the Federal lines. There was no time to be lost ; the foe would either receive reinforcements or would escape ; and, in either case, the Army of the Potomac would have to be encountered again on perhaps far less favourable terms. That army was the finest body of troops beneath the Northern flag; it had been delivered into the hands of its enemy, and it ought never to have slipped from them to form, as it did, the solid nucleus of the force which not only saved the Union at Gettysburg, but finally, under General Grant, crushed the life out of the Confederacy. Lee was influenced, say the Southern historians, by the thought of the suffering that would accrue to the inhabitants of Fredericksburg if he turned his guns, as he must have done in case of battle, on the already half-ruined town; and of the loss an offensive operation would have entailed upon his troops. Not for the only time in his life his judgment gave way to his humanity. Soldiers were undoubtedly precious in the South, but, five months later, in conflict with this same Army of the Potomac, he lost at Chancellorsville 12,800 men and his great lieutenant, "Stonewall" Jackson. The destruction of Fredericksburg, and a far heavier loss of life than he had already incurred, would have been but a small price to pay for future peace and the triumph of the cause. 112 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. The Federal position on the 14th and 15th was certainly strong, and was manned by a long array of batteries ; * but it was commanded throughout by the Southern artillery, and exposed to oblique and even enfilade fire ; for the heights beyond the Massaponax gave footing for long ranging guns.f Nor were the entrenchments along the Eichmond road stronger than the successive breastworks carried so brilliantly at Chancellorsville by smaller numbers than were here available. Moreover, the right flank, though the approach was obstructed by a narrow stream (see Maps), was open to attack. The assailants would doubtless have lost heavily from the enfilade fire of the batteries beyond the Eappahannook, but that the Federals at least did not believe such a manoeuvre impracticable, is proved by the disposition en potence of Doubleday's division. On the right, the town of Fredericksburg and the bridges in rear would have been quickly rendered untenable and impassable, under the concentrated fire of Longstreet's guns, and the whole Federal army would have been driven to depend upon the narrow line of escape afforded by the three bridges near Deep Eun. The best troops in the world would have been in danger of demoralization under such circumstances. The heavy guns on the Stafford Heights would have been compelled to give their whole attention * Besides the thirty-six pieces which formed the tete du pont, Franklin had eighty field guns at his disposal. t The single Whitworth, posted here under command of Captain Hardy, is said to have done great execution on the 13th. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 113 to the Confederate artillery, which commanded not only the town, the bridges, and the road, but also that space between Hazel Eun and Smithfield,* where, driven from Fredericksburg, the Federal infantry would have been compeUed to mass. It must be borne in mind too that the fire of these batteries was plunging, little effective against troops moving in the open, and that the practice of the Federal artillery was by no means accurate. If at break of day on the 15th, Longstreet's and Anderson's guns, together with those of the reserve, had concentrated their fire upon Fredericksburg ; if Jackson, reinforced by one division of the First Corps, supported by Hood and Pickett on the left, and on the right flank by Stuart and two brigades of D. H. Hill's, had dashed against Franklin, while the uncertain light disconcerted the aim of the Federal gunners ; if, at the same time, the batteries on Prospect Hill and near Bernard's Cabin, together with those beyond the Massaponax, had swept the ground in rear of the Stage road, the Northern army would in all probability have been driven into the waters of the Eappahannook, and, as Colonel Chesney has said, the awful scenes of Leipzic and the Beresina have been repeated in another hemi sphere. The long array of ordnance beyond the Eappa hannook has been held by many writers as sufficient excuse for Lee's inaction ; but neither weight of * Smithfield is distant 2300 yards from Prospect Hill, 2500 from Bernard's Cabin, not beyond the range of the Confederate siege-pieces and rifled guns. I 114 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. artillery nor superior numbers ever intimidated the Virginian general ; and with the affair of Boteler 's Ford still fresh in their memories, it is unlikely that his soldiers would have hesitated to fall upon the Federals, however numerous and commanding were the batteries that opposed them. The following spirited account of that action, which was fought a few days after the Antietam, is given in Dr. Dabney's " Life of Stonewall Jackson : " — " On the north bank of the Potomac were planted seventy pieces of heavy artillery, while, under their protection, a considerable force of infantry had passed to the southern side, and were drawn up in line upon the high banks next the river. Under the direction of General Jackson, Hill (A. P.) formed his gallant division in two lines and advanced to the attack, regardless of the terrible storm of pro jectiles from the batteries beyond the river. The enemy attempted for a time to resist him, by bearing heavily against his left, but his second line, marching by the left flank, discovered itself from behind the first, and advanced to its support ; when the two charging simultaneously and converging towards the mass of Federalists swept them down the hill and drove them into the river. The troops of Hill rushed down the declivity and, regardless of the plunging shot and shell of the opposing batteries, hurled their adversaries by hundreds into the water, and as they endeavoured to struggle across, picked them off with unerring aim. In this combat, General A. P. Hill did not employ a single piece of artillery, but relied upon the bayonet alone. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 115 Early was at hand to support him, but no occasion arose for his assistance. The whole loss of the Confederates was 30 killed and wounded. The Federalists admitted a loss of 30UO killed and drowned, and 200 prisoners." It must at the same time be admitted that, if Lee in his turn had become the assailant, his loss would have been heavy. The Federal line of defence was strong ; and herein lay the great fault of the Confederate position. It was well suited for a force acting on the defensive absolute, but not for a force whose object was, be sides holding its ground, to inflict a crushing defeat. " Defensive actions," says Colonel Schaw, E.E., " may be classed under two heads — " (a) Passive or delaying, in which the object is chiefly to ward off a blow, either to maintain posses sion of the ground or to gain time. " (b) Active, in which the object is the defeat of the enemy, the defender fighting in a chosen position, with the intention of attacking his adversary when the favourable moment arrives." That Lee intended to confine himself to the former is improbable. The passive defence was uncongenial to his bold and enterprising spirit, ill- suited to the circumstances, and there is no doubt that he was much disappointed at the retreat of the Federals on the night of the 15th. His error was in allowing that day to pass without attack. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the Fredericksburg position was faulty in this respect, that it was diffi cult for counter-attack. StonewaU Jackson, a soldier 116 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. whose genius for war has been universally recognized, is said to have remarked some days before the battle, " I am opposed to fighting here. We shall whip the enemy, but gain no fruits of victory. I have advised the line of the North Anna, but have been over ruled." Lee's original intention also had been to retire to the Annas, and to thus draw Burnside to a distance from his base. " My purpose was changed," he wrote to the President, " not from any advantage in this position, but from an unwillingness to open more of our country to depredation than possible, and also with a view of collecting such forage and provisions as could be obtained in the Eappahannook Valley." The truth probably is that he believed the Army of Northern Virginia capable not only of holding the Fredericksburg heights, but also of assuming the offensive successfully, despite the embankment of the Stage road and the commanding Stafford heights ; and that it was the elements alone which robbed him of a decisive victory. We know, however, from his own report, that the difficulty of counter-attack was one of the reasons which held him back on the evening of the 13th and the two following days, and this lesson may be learnt from his inaction : in the selection of a field whereon it is intended to fight an active defensive engagement, it is above all things important that " no good positions to resist counter-attack," should be available for the enemy. Curiously enough, a pamphlet, written by General Franklin in his own defence, reveals how The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 117 very nearly Lee's expectation of further assault was realized, and how little his judgment was at fault after all. The Federal general states that at the council of war held after the battle, both Burnside and himself were in favour of renewing the attack on the next day, and that it was only after long discussion that they were overruled. Prudence pre vailed also in the Confederate councils ; the Federals were allowed to glide from the toils ; and five months later, the Army of the Potomac, more numerous and as well-equipped as ever, once more stood face to face with its old opponent. The scars ot Frede ricksburg had quickly healed, and the Union Government had gained more than it had lost. At last the President and his advisers had abandoned the idea that a general "nascitur non fit;" had recognized that the art of war is some thing of a mystery after all, and that to make an efficient leader, study and experience must be added to " a cool head and a. stout heart." * An untried man never again commanded the army of the Potomac. It may be interesting to compare the battle with a more recent and greater conflict, and by that light to consider the tactical combinations of the American generals. The position of the French army at Gravelotte answers in one point at least to that of the Confederates at Fredericksburg, and the numbers of the opposing forces bore almost the same propor tion to each other as those of the North and South. * Tide Lord Macaulay's Essay on Hampden. 118 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Both positions were naturally strong ; of both the weak flank, strategically and tactically, was the right. The force employed against this point by the Germans was 140,000 infantry ; by the Federals 50,000 ; eight divisions in either case. The German frontal attack was carried out by five divisions, all of which were vigorously engaged ; one was held back in reserve, while two, marching round the right flank of the enemy, eventually delivered the decisive blow. Franklin employed four divisions in the first line, of which two only were vigorously engaged ; two were merely a containing force, and did no more than skirmish : two were in second line ; one, toge ther with the cavalry, constituted the reserve, and one, en potence * on the left, was held in check by two brigades of cavalry, t With the enormous artillery force at his disposal, and a strong defensive line in rear of his attack, Franklin need not have retained more than one division at most to cover the bridges. A portion of the Federal cavalry might have relieved Doubleday. Five divisions would have been then available for offence. It will be remembered that besides De Eussey's sixty-one guns upon the Stafford Heights, a great battery of thirty-six pieces covered the bridges. The German writer before quoted remarks * Speaking of this formation Jonini remarks : — " A crochet, or as it is better known, the order en potence, if used to protect a flank against an enemy that can manoeuvre, is a remedy worse than tho disease it is used to cure." Against the long-ranging fire of the present day it would be impossible to retain troops in this formation : a flank en Vair must be protected by troops placed in echelon. . f In first line, Meade, Gibbon, Howe, Brooks ; in second line, Birney, Sickles ; in reserve, Newton and the cavalry ; en potence, Doubleday. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 119 that, "the reserve which infantry proceeding to the attack leaves behind should be reduced to a mini mum, being only intended to cover its rear in case of need, perhaps to hold a defile which may happen to be in dangerous proximity ; it will be best if this reserve for the infantry is furnished by the other arms." Franklin, it cannot be doubted, was far too solicitous for the safety of the bridges ; and his dis positions were made with a view of securing his own retreat rather than of compelling that of the enemy. As regards the conduct of the fight on the right wing, the same error seems to have been committed by both the Germans and the Federals. The action against the French left is thus criticized by General Hamley, and his words apply equally well to the useless attacks on Marye's Hill : " Where circumstances would already seem to indicate that the real effort must be made elsewhere, troops are sent on in an indiscriminate fashion. Thus the German right was separated by a ravine from the French left; it rested on the Moselle, and the French could alone advance on that bank by forcing the Germans back. The decisive attack was to be made by the German left; the ground was excellent for defence, bad for offence ; all good reasons for the avoidance of unnecessary slaughter and the risk of defeat, by slightly engaging or even refusing that wing of the German army. Yet the corps there were hurried to the attack no less earnestly than at other parts of the position, suffering enormous losses . . . and inflicting only the most trifling damage on the opposing corps." 120 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. The first repulse of the Guard Corps before St. Privat was due to want of sufficient preparation, as was Meade's first repulse at Fredericksburg. To the measure of success afterwards achieved the co operation of the artiUery in both cases largely contributed. The Federals, however, though the bombardment of Jackson's position was heavy and prolonged, failed to adopt the expedient of concen trated fire. The numerous batteries acted indepen dently of each other, and not as one command. This fault, however, has been conspicuous in more highly trained armies than that of Burnside. The German artillery in '66, the French in '70, and the Eussians in '77, followed the same bad tactics. Perhaps the most essential difference in the con duct of these two great battles is the decisive in fluence exercised by the superior and staff officers, for good in the one case, for evil in the other. The intelligence and energy displayed by the German corps, division, and brigade leaders in working out the tactical end of the Commander-in-chief, stand out in bright contrast to the feeble and ill-con certed tactics of the Federal commanders of like rank. It is not too much to say that Germany owed her success in 1870 to the sound practical and theoretical training of her officers, and that to the want of such training the disasters of the American armies were mainly due. If we compare the defensive dispositions of Bazaine with those of Lee, we shall find that a most important difference exists. The Confederate general reserve, D. H. HiU's division, was placed in The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 121 rear of the weaker right flank. Not so the French Guards, but in rear of the stronger left, seven miles distant from the spot where the battle was decided. " What might have been the result," says a military writer, " had the French Guards been on Bazaine's right flank, and been able to assume the offensive when the Prussian Guards' attack was first brought to a standstill ? " Lastly, the fighting at Fredericksburg furnishes another proof of the truth of that rule so terribly demonstrated at Gravelotte, that good infantry, sufficiently covered, and with free play for the rifle, is, if unshaken by artillery and attacked in front alone, absolutely invincible. Six frontal attacks failed against Marye's Hill. On the left, Meade's division won a measure of success, because his leading battalions, having penetrated HiU's first line, were enabled to take the opposing troops in flank. Archer's brigade was partially routed, and would have been wholly so, if the flank attack from the thicket had been vigorously followed up. Lane was forced to give ground, Gregg's con scripts were driven from the field, and if the Federal brigadiers and battalion leaders had been more intent on developing local flank attacks at the same time that they pushed the enemy iu front, their success would have been far greater. Nothing destroys the morale of men in action so speedily and effectually as a flank attack, and except by this method good infantry will seldom be beaten. Such, it has been said, are now "the difficulties and dangers of mere frontal attacks," that 122 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. "every assailant will in all probability attempt to turn one or both flanks of the enemy's position." It is the main idea of modern tactics. All officers, however small their command, should bear this in mind, and seize every opportunity of bringing a flanking fire to bear upon the enemy and of de veloping local flank attacks. If, for example, a body of troops break in at some weak point of the defence, a portion, let them be ever so few, should at once be directed to face right and left and enfilade the enemy's line. The efficacy of such a fire may be gathered from the following instance, witnessed and recorded by General Valentine Baker: "Our two advanced companies now opened a heavy enfilading fire upon the left of the Eussian line. . . . The effect was most extraordinary. The whole left wavered for a moment, and fell back in confusion. . . . Then the panic extended all along the line, and it retreated precipitately." How fully General Lee recognized the truth of this principle is proved by the fact that each of his offensive victories was won by a terrible stroke on his adversary's flank, delivered by his great lieutenant, Stonewall Jackson. As to the failure of the Federals against Jackson's division, it must be remembered that the troops were engaged in thick covert ; and of all species of combat, wood-fighting is the most difficult, demanding for successful prosecution the highest training on the part of the company officers and men.* In few * May, 1864, eighteen months later, saw this same Army of the Potomac battling in the dense forest of the Virginian wilderness; The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 123 situations has the action of the subalterns and section leaders so much influence upon the issue of the battle, for here, writes Colonel Home, " the direction of events must, to a great extent, pass out of the hands of superior into the hands of subordinate officers. Consequently, self-confidence and habits of individual action within certain limits, are, for such fighting, invaluable." Now, such habits, in valuable under all circumstances, may be attained and fostered by study and thought ; and an officer, thoroughly versed in the theory of tactics and accus tomed to work out practical problems on the map, will, if he is cool and resolute, be able on active service to turn his knowledge to account, to recognize and profit by the opportunity. The Germans, in the war of 1870-1, proved far superior to the French in wood-fighting ; and " the cause," says Colonel Home, "which produced this result, was the Prussian method of instruction, which had developed the individual force of the soldiers, and had accustomed many subordinate officers to the responsibility of command." * That is, the German soldiers owed their efficiency in this kind of fighting (and much of it in all others) to the thorough training of the company officers and the men they led. The eminent military critic, Von Boguslawski, thus compares the training of the Prussians and Throughout that desperate campaign the troops were handled by officers of all ranks with rare skill aud judgment. The lessons of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had not been wasted. * The group system, so strongly advocated by those who propose a reform of our infantry drill and formations, would doubtless bring about the same results, both in men and officers. 124 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. French: "With us every officer gains a knowledge of the tactics of the three arms during his carefully- conducted theoretical studies ; we have also made use of our previous experience in war. The French were wanting in both ways. Their line officers undergo no scientific examination in military matters, . . . and, lastly, it was no business of the officers generally to reflect upon former experience." The theoretical studies of our volunteer officers must perforce be "personally conducted," but let them be assured that if they have drawn on the experience of others, if the golden rules of tactics are, as has been said, tattooed upon the brain, in the hour of action they will find themselves instinctively doing the right thing. Much instruction may be gathered from a con sideration of Lee's tactics and the disposition of his troops. His defensive measures could scarcely have been improved upon. The judicious manner in which his supports and reserves were placed, and his line so manned as to leave little more than a third of his force exposed, yet completely covering his front, cannot be too highly praised. The following points are well worthy of remark : The first line (except at one point) contained as many guns and rifles as could be usefully employed thereon. The second, of equal strength, was disposed at convenient distance, prepared, as soon as the real attack developed itself, to move up rapidly to sus tain the first, or to drive back an intruding force. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 125 This line was drawn from the same division that supplied the first ; thus the fighting line and sup ports were, at all points, under one command. The reserves were not massed in one locality, but distributed at various points : they belonged to the same corps or division as the troops in front of them, and there was, therefore, unity of command through out the whole depth of the position. In rear of the right — the weak flank, and at the same time that from which a counter-attack must have been delivered — was posted a strong, compact division. Here, too, numerous batteries were held in readiness to oppose any turning movement up the valley of the Massaponax, or, in case of counter attack, to reinforce the artillery (under Pelham) to the right front. The strongest sections of the position, viz., the ridge N. of Marye's Hill and the central re-entrant, were but thinly occupied. The action of his artillery was perfectly adapted to the circumstances. Unable to cope with the more powerful and commanding ordnance of the Fe derals, the batteries reserved their fire for the advancing infantry. So well were the positions selected, and so good was the practice, that more than once the enemy's fighting-line was driven back by the guns alone ; and Gibbon's division was, at the last assault, brought to a standstill and utterly demoralized by the thirty-three pieces which con fronted it. Again, the guns were massed as far as possible, not distributed among the infantry divi sions; and the combined action of these large 126 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. batteries appears to have been most effective. Pelham's gallant and remarkable intervention, early in the day, needs no comment. The " incomparable Confederate infantry," excel lently handled throughout, showed itself, as ever, stubborn in defence and impetuous in attack. The ceaseless storm of shot and shell which crashed with terrific uproar through the leafless woods upon the right affected its courage not a whit; and the defenders of Marye's Hill, though exposed to repeated and desperate assaults, maintained their sangfroid and steadiness to the end. Yet at this point, although Sumner and Hooker were always easily repulsed, the front line of the defence lost somewhat heavily. Kershaw's brigade,* actively engaged upon the hill during the afternoon, lost 373 out of 2400; and one regiment, the 3rd South Carolina, lost six successive commanding officers. The regiments actually behind the wall suffered in the same proportion. Cobb's brigade, which held that position throughout the day, lost 234 out of a total strength of 1600. Longstreet, on the left centre, adhered strictly to fire tactics ; and, though the opportunities were tempting, the defenders of the stone wall made no attempt to dash out with the bayonet on Sumner's or Hooker's shattered ranks. The corps commander depended on fire alone to clear his front ; and no useless counter-attacks were permitted to swell the * This brigade fired an average of 55 rounds per man. Walton's nine guns expended 2400 rounds ; Maurin's battery of four pieces, to the left of the Orange road, 200 ; and that of Wilcox, covering the ford, 400. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 127 death-roll of his divisions. It may be here noticed that, before the battle commenced, he had instructed Hood, if opportunity offered, to attack in flank any force which should assail the right wing. Un fortunately that general did not consider that such action was at any time expedient. The manner in which reinforcements were brought up to the stone wall as each column of attack advanced, thus giving moral support to the first line of defence and ensuring a sufficiency of ammunition, was most judicious. All such orders emanated from the corps commander. Atkinson and Hoke certainly acted with much indiscretion in pursuing Meade's routed division across the plain. Such partial and local counter attacks, when once an intruding enemy has been driven from within the position and deprived of his rallying point, are dangerous and useless. It is wiser to leave the retiring lines to the unobstructed fire of artillery and musketry, and not to expose isolated brigades or battalions to inevitable loss by permitting them to encounter, unsupported, the enemy's reserves. However, this is a fault which all high-mettled troops are apt to be led into ; and the instance of the rash advance of the Guards and German Legion at Talavera will occur to all readers of Napier. " In the excitement of success," says that historian, " the English Guards followed with reck less ardour, but the French reserves of infantry and dragoons advanced, the repulsed men faced about, the batteries smote the Guards in flank and front so heavily that they drew back, and, at the same time the Germans being sadly pressed, got into confusion." 128 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. Wellington was far, however, from condoning such imprudence, and his letter on this subject, dated May 15, 1811, ought to be carefully studied and taken to heart by every officer. The arrangements for renewing the ammunition- supply during the fight were evidently defective. A regiment, once engaged, had no means of replenish ing cartridge-boxes, however great the need, except by retiring en masse to the wagons. Thus regiments which had exhausted their rounds became suddenly ineffective at the very crisis of the fight, and were compelled to withdraw or give place to others. The dread of such a contingency doubtless made the soldiers careful, and prevented waste ; but the want of an adequate system was liable, in the heat of an engagement, or when troops had got out of hand, to lead to disaster and defeat. Lane's brigade, for instance, gave ground before Meade's attack from sheer inability to reply to the enemy's fire. Atkinson, brought to a stand by Birney, lost heavily for the same reason ; and the clumsy four and even six-deep formation employed along the stone wall was dictated rather by feat of ammunition failing than of the enemy's onset. Lee was so fully alive to this difficulty and to the danger of rapid firing that, seeing no means by which they might be overcome, he was averse to the employment of breech-loading rifles. " What we want," he remarked, " is a fire-arm that cannot be loaded without a certain loss of time ; so that a man learns to appreciate the importance of his fire, and never fires without being sure of obtaining The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 129 a result." This opinion of a great and experienced soldier, speaking of troops whose standard of discipline was not a high one, is worth consideration. No doubt the lack of discipline and the inferior training of the officers increased the difficulty. Company and section leaders cannot reflect too seriously upon this point: their responsibility is great, for, practically speaking, they alone can con trol the expenditure of cartridges. It is their bounden duty not only to prevent waste in the ex citement of action, but so to train their men in peace that the soldier will consider every round as an article of price, not to be parted with unless he is " sure of obtaining a result." Volley-firing, and limiting the range against infantry to five hundred yards at most, are the surest means of providing against the want of ammunition at the supreme moment ; and the sooner it is recognized that long range fire is a special weapon, to be used only on special occasions, the better for the efficiency of our infantry in general. It is ordered that the system of renewing the supply be practised on the drill-ground ; still men must not be trained to believe that wherever they are the ammunition-cart will invariably be at hand ; * they must be taught to husband the supply they have about them, and to rely on that alone. A strong Federal division was neutralized through out the battle by Stuart's dismounted troopers ; * The Turkish practice of carrying the regimental reserve on pack-animals is far superior to. our own system, for mules or ponies can travel over ground impassable for carts. K 130 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. and it was decidedly advantageous to the Confede rates that they were enabled thus to utilize this arm, precluded as it was from exercising its proper functions. It is curious that the Confederate staff did not recognize the importance of the projecting tongue of forest so often alluded to. Even had it been impassable as was supposed, it covered the advancing enemy from artillery fire, and gave him a place of shelter where he could mass his troops in security. It was, in fact, a bastion, insufficiently provided with flank defence, and the head ought in any case to have been held by a line of rifles, and the occupation of the dead ground in front provided against. The want of vigilance which permitted the Federal escape is inexcusable. Such carelessness in the performance of this most important duty is the inevitable outcome of loose discipline and indif ferent training. The wearisome and monotonous work of the outpost line is of all the phases of field service the most distasteful, especially to volun teer soldiers, who are unused to the exactions of dis cipline, and have not attained the habit of constant and exact fidelity to duty. Burnside's escape shows clearly and forcibly the evils that may arise if the precaution of patrolling is neglected, and from the general slackness apt to prevail after a successful engagement. According to General Hooker's report, it was after eight o'clock in the morning when his last troops left the town, a statement which shows up the lack of enterprise and The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 131 watchfulness of the Confederate picquets in a most glaring light. Nor can General Lee be acquitted of responsibility. There was a possibility that his adversary might slip away. The night was dark and stormy, and he himself, after the Antietam, three months before, under somewhat similar cir cumstances, had eluded the Federals in this very manner. Special orders ought to have been given as to constant and vigorous patrolling, and scouts have been instructed to penetrate at all risks the enemy's lines. Want of vigilance, too, we may notice, appears to have been the cause of the disaster on Archer's left. The wood on that flank was deemed impenetrable, and left unoccupied and unwatched ; and owing to this neglect of the rule that all ground to front or flank must be under observation, the brigade was surprised and partially routed. How often in mili tary history has success been achieved by a movement over ground deemed impassable, and therefore left unwatched ? Moreover, had scouts or connecting links been posted between the Confederate brigades in first line and their supports upon the road in rear, Gregg's brigade would have then received warning of the Federal advance, and have been prepared to resist it. The neglect of such small precautions often gives great opportunities to the enemy ; and it is in attention to such details that an officer shows his efficiency. The large artillery force held in reserve by General Lee calls for some remark. Very nearly 132 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. one hundred guns never came into action. Since the Franco-German War the practice of holding back guns in reserve has been generally condemned. Colonel Home has laid down that " to place guns in reserve is to voluntarily deprive one's-self of a most powerful auxiliary at the very moment its aid is most urgently required. And, further, it would seem that there is no reason why all guns should not be brought into action as soon as possible, and remain in action until the close of the engagement." Lee had, however, excellent reasons for not employ ing all his batteries. The first was scarcity of ammunition. On the night after the battle there remained barely enough for one more day of conflict, and it was not until the evening of the 14th that fresh supplies came up from Eichmond. Secondly, all positions available for artillery on the right were fully occupied. On the open ridge between Lee's Hill and the river it would have been useless to post guns except under cover, and the emplace ments provided were already tenanted. If he had attacked on the 15th, there is no doubt but that every single battery would have been utilized, how ever great the risk. At the same time it may be questioned whether, in view of a possible counter attack, it would not have been well to have brought up into front line the twelve guns held in reserve behind Hood's and Pickett's infantry. The Federal Sixth Corps, immediately opposed to these divisions, suffered severely, as it was, from artillery fire. If it had been assailed throughout the day by a larger mass of guns, it would have been much shaken, and The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 133 perhaps in no position to resist the onset of two of the finest divisions in the Confederate army. Unfortunately for his cause and for his military reputation, Lee confined himself strictly to the defensive. As must always happen in such circum stances, his success was but partial, and the glory he won was the only reward of victory. Before we turn to a very brief consideration of Burnside's conduct of the battle, the following ex tract from General Sir P. McDougall's " Campaigns of Hannibal," which is curiously applicable to Lee's tactics at Fredericksburg, may prove interesting. Besides affording us an opportunity of comparing the tactical skill of the great American soldier with that of the greater Carthaginian, it goes far to prove how invariable are the broad rules of the military art. For the Trebbia read the Eappahannook ; for Eoman, Federal ; for Hannibal, Lee : — " The confidence Hannibal felt in the superiority of his own genius is manifested by his plan for fighting at the Trebbia. " In judging of ordinary men we should be inclined to censure the inactivity which permitted the Eoman army to cross the river and form leisurely on the bank, without taking advantage of the con fusion necessarily occasioned by such an operation, to attack and defeat it when landing, before it could recover from that confusion. A general less con fident than Hannibal, when about to engage his troops against an untried enemy, would have availed himself of the most obvious and certain method of inflicting defeat. But Hannibal's policy was not 134 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. only to defeat but to destroy, and by the moral effect of the annihilation to intimidate the Eomans. . . . Had Hannibal attacked the Eomans during this passage of the river, their defeat would have been less decisive, both in fact and in its moral effect. A much smaller number of Eomans would have fallen ; and both they and Hannibal's allies might have entertained, the one the boast, the other the reflection, that had the terrible Eoman legions been arranged against Hannibal on a fair field, the result might have been very different." So far the parallel, both of situation and of action, is singularly close; but turning to the last para graph, we see in what essential respect the modern general fell short. " When the Eoman infantry came to close, their courage and discipline seemed capable of restoring the balance; but at the critical time Mago's ambush burst upon their rear, while the victorious Carthaginian cavalry charged both their flanks, and Hannibal pressed them in front. No troops could withstand such an onset. The centre legions indeed, overbearing all opposition, burst through their opponents and marched clear off the field; . . . but the remainder were driven back into the Trebbia with tremendous slaughter. Only a small remnant reached the opposite bank." The Carthaginian posi tion was evidently chosen with the primary view of making the counter-attack, which was carried out with such decisive effect. Lee, on the other hand, neglected his opportunity, and "in war as in politics," said Napoleon, " the lost moment never returns." Tlie Campaign of Fredericksburg. 135 A last word as to Burnside. In the preceding pages many grave faults have been laid to his charge, but yet we cannot condemn him as wholly wanting in capacity. A more enterprising com mander would have certainly attempted to deal with the Confederate wings in detail before chang ing his base, but the Fredericksburg-Eichmond line of operations, with a navigable river on the further flank, was, under the circumstances, a sound choice. After the arrival of pontoons and the accu mulation of supplies he wasted valuable time, but he probably felt that, winter being close at hand, it was too late for action, and only yielded his better judgment to the irresponsible critics of the press. " Male imperatur cum regit vulgus duces," wrote Seneca, yet in these days of special correspondents and daily telegrams, the general, who, true to his own purpose, carries out a Fabian policy, must be a man of rare strength of mind. Delay will be denounced as failure ; sympathy will give way to accusation, and the task be fourfold more difficult than even in the days which saw the occupation of Torres Vedras and the retreat from Burgos. In withholding Sumner from crossing the river and seizing Fredericksburg and the heights beyond when the advanced Grand Division first reached Falmouth, he acted with due discretion. The town, it is true, was held only by an insignificant force, but the only means of communication were the fords ; the river was rising rapidly ; no pontoons were available ; supplies were scarce, and Sumner's troops would have been exposed to attack in a / P.1 136 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. position where they could not have been easily supported ; and where, if defeated, they would have been destroyed. Moreover, it is doubtful if the whole Grand Division with its artillery would have had time to cross before the arrival of the Confede rate First Corps. Again, his arrangements for crossing the river and occupying the left bank were well conceived and skilfully executed, and compare favourably with Napoleon's imprudent conduct at Essling, under very similar circumstances. But when he had gained the further bank and stood face to face with his great opponent calmly awaiting him upon the hills, he appears to have become mentally paralyzed. Perhaps then for the first time he became conscious that he had committed an irreparable blunder, that he was playing his adver sary's game, and had placed his army in that very situation where Lee most wished to find it. In prompt and vigorous action lay his only hope of success, whether to prevent, as he still hoped, the Confederate army from concentrating, or whether hew himself free from the toils that bound him. But what do we find ? Instead of rapid movement, delay and irresolution ; instead of the impetuous advance of overwhelming masses, a series of feeble and ill-supported attacks. The last was his chief ana" crowning error. To a daring general much may be forgiven, but from him who has grappled with his enemy and failed to put forth all his strength, even pity stands aloof. Turn to the story of Orthez, read how at the crisis of the fight every Tlie Campaign of Fredericksburg. 137 man save one single Portuguese battalion was thrust into the battle, and understand with what stern energy victory is compelled. Although the errors of the Federal generals have been already commented upon, three still remain which ought not to be overlooked. The first' of these relates to Franklin's conduct of the attack upon Lee's right. If he intended Birney to support Meade, and that he did there can be little doubt, it was exceedingly bad policy not to have given the duty to Doubleday, whose division belonged to the same corps as those of Meade and Gibbon. Bodies of troops destined to carry out an offensive move ment, ought to be, as far as possible, under the same command, so that the officer who directs the advance of the fighting line, and who can best " feel the pulse of the battle," may have it in his power to confirm success by sending forward supports and reserves, at that favourable moment of which he alone can judge. Otherwise, even in highly trained armies, friction and misunderstanding will inevitably occur. "Troops formed for attack," says Colonel Home, " should be in at least three bodies, and these bodies should, under one direction, work for oue object, and be closely linked together." Birney's division appears to have acted independently, and not under the orders of General Eeynolds, com manding the First Corps, who ought to have had the control of the whole attacking force. A want of concert between brigades and between divisions, and a neglect of the harmonious co-operation neces sary to achieve a tactical end, is generally observ- 138 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. able in the earlier battles of the American War, and is probably due to the fact that many of the division leaders, brigadiers, and staff-officers had little practical training and possessed but slight knowledge of the art of war. There was too much inclination to indulge in independent enterprise, and to forget that the leader of any body of men depends for success upon the timely and exact obedience of his subordinates. If at Gettysburg, where, it has been said, the South stood " within a stone's throw of independence," Lee's orders had been promptly and strictly carried out, the battle would probably have ended in a Confederate victory. Again, the whole available strength of the three Grand Divisions should have been brought over the river before the battle opened. The Fifth Corps, which may be said to have constituted the general reserve until 4 p.m., did not commence the passage until after noon ; and at 2.15 p.m., when Meade had been repulsed and a counter-attack was to be apprehended, but one division had crossed. A reserve posted at a distance from the decisive point is, as was Bazaine's at Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, almost absolutely useless. It has two duties to fulfil: to confirm success, or to ward off counter attack. The Fifth Corps, placed as it was, could have have done neither. It may be, however, that Burnside, ignorant of the presence of Jackson's Corps, thought, when the battle opened, that the services of these 19,000 men would not be needed. Lastly, a conspicuous mistake was the inaction of i the Federal cavalry. Eight thousand men at least, Tlie Campaign of Fredericksburg, 139 trained to fight on foot, were retained during the whole of the engagement under the shelter of the river-bluffs, or out of range upon the Stafford Heights. Stuart and his brigadiers would hardly have consented to remain idle spectators of the battle, and it is difficult to understand why some regi ments at least of the Federal horsemen were not, like their Confederate rivals, converted into infantry for the time being. Two brigades so constituted would have done good service on Franklin's left, and have rendered it possible to utilize Double- day's division for offensive purposes. The loss of the armies during the three days' fighting was as follows : — Federals (1284 killed)— Sumner ... ... ... ... 5444 Hooker ... ... ... ... 3355 Franklin (not including Birney and Sickles) 3787 Engineers, etc ... ... ... 67 12,653 Confederates (595 killed) — Jackson ... ... ... ... 3415 Longstreet ... ... ... ... 1894 Cavalry ... ... ... ... 13 5322 Less than 30,000 Southern troops were actually engaged. Eighty-one per cent, of the Federal casualties were reported to have been caused by musketry, five per cent, by shell, fourteen per cent. by round shot; a much larger proportion than is usually due to artillery fire. 140 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. After the Federals had crossed the Eappahan nook the Confederates prepared to go into winter quarters. Stuart, however, did not long remain in active. Eeconnoitring expeditions were pushed far within the Union lines ; the outposts were harassed, the communications disturbed, and convoys captured. On Christmas Day, three cavalry brigades, led by Stuart in person, passed the rivers by Ely's and Kelly's Fords, and remained absent ten days. During that time they extended their incursion as far as Dumfries, upon the Potomac, fifteen miles N. of Acquia Creek, and to Fairfax Court House, in the vicinity of Washington, thirty miles N.W. of Fredericksburg. Much booty and many prisoners were the result of this expedition ; and the fact that at the time 120,000 Federal troops were cantoned between the Eappahannook and the Union Capital, testifies to the skill and audacity of the Confederate leader.* Late in January, Burnside, eager to retrieve his reputation, resolved to cross the river by Banks's and U.S. Fords, and to turn Lee's left. The severity of the weather and the state of the roads made all operations on a large scale impossible, and after tliree days of intense suffering to his troops he was compelled to abandon the attempt. On the 26th of the same month he was superseded in his turn and replaced by Hooker. The demoralization of the Army of the Potomac after Fredericksburg was very great. Desertions * It may be questioned, at the same time, if the success of this and similar raids compensated for the waste of horse-flesh incurred. The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 141 were frequent, reaching at one period a total of 200 daily, and a large number of officers resigned their commissions. The desponding tone of the Northern press at this time was remarkable, and it is clear that Lee's victory was an unexpected and crushing blow to the people at large. However, the stout heart of the nation quickly rallied, and inspired by the loyal determination of President Lincoln, the Union States turned once more to their apparently hopeless Burnside, by magnanimously taking on himself the whole responsibility of failure, won the regard of the President and of his countrymen. The popular voice persisted in attributing the disaster rather to the errors of his lieutenants than to the incapacity of the general, and it was not long before he was reinstated in the command he had held previous to his unfortunate campaign. Sumner, advanced in years and worn out by service, retired from active duty, and in a few months died. Franklin, condemned as the chief cause of the defeat, was removed from the Army of the Potomac and relegated to a less important sphere of action. One-and-twenty years have passed since the Con federacy fell, but Virginia still bears the scars of the devastating strife; her people are scattered, her broad plantations waste, " And where the happy homesteads stood The stars look down on roofless halls." Standing one summer morning not long ago on 142 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. the vine-clad slopes near Falmouth, and looking south down the tranquil valley of the Eappahanock, so far removed from the ceaseless din of European warfare, I found it hard to realize that those lonely hills had once reverberated to the thunder of five hundred guns, and that the recesses of the forest, stretching away into the dim blue distance, had rung with the rattle of musketry and the fierce cries of struggling hosts. Yet memorials enough of those dark December days are here. The fields whose furrows ran with the blood of Sumner's gallant infantry are high with corn, but the ridge beyond is still crowned with grass-grown trenches ; and the village children play among the crumbling earth works on the Stafford Heights. The quaint red houses of the little city and the trees of the sur rounding orchards are scarred with shell and bullet ; and in the deep woods beyond the Hazel are traces of long-deserted camps, and paths cut by the axes of the Confederate soldiery. Upon the summit of Marye's Hill lie those who fell before it ; and more than 15,000 Federals, the harvest of this and many another bloody field, rest beneath the earth where Walton's batteries were arrayed. The great Eepublic, mindful of their good service, has done well by those who died for her, and the beautiful and well-kept cemeteries scattered through out the North are monuments worthy alike of the soldiers' valour and the generosity of their country men. Here, above Fredericksburg, under the shade of trees and flowering shrubs, rank upon rank of The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 143 low white headstones face the west ; in the midst a loftier cenotaph enshrines the dust of the unknown dead, and about the regular lines of narrow mounds the turf is green and trim. So sleep the victors, cherished in death with all tenderness and honour, and surrounded by the tokens of a nation's gratitude. Amid the homes of their own kindred, in the green God's acre of the quiet town, their foemen lie ; but though the mourners are more constant, within those gloomy gates are no signs of the lavish care of a victorious Commonwealth ; few and poor are the hands that tend the rebels' graves ; the grass grows rank about the mouldering headstones, and above them broods the shadow of defeat. Far and wide, between the mountains and the sea, stretches the fair Virginia for which Lee and Jackson and their soldiers, " One equal temper of heroic hearts," fought so well and unavailingly ; a land rich and lovely, but lonely and desolate, bereft of her sons, and mourning always her unforgotten dead. Yet her brows are bound with glory, the legacy of her lost children; and her spotless name, uplifted by their victories and manhood, is high among the nations. Surely she may rest content, knowing that so long as men turn to the records of history will their deeds live, giving to all time one of the noblest examples of unyielding courage and devotion the world has known. This is no place to question the righteousness of their cause, but let none be deceived by the statements of those from whom 144 The Campaign of Fredericksburg. unreasoning prejudice still hide's the truth. It was not to preserve slavery, not in open rebellion against the Federal Constitution, that the Con federates stood in arms, but in the defence of their rights as citizens of sovereign and independent States, bound to the Union by a voluntary compact, which they were free to maintain or cancel as they would. Such was the faith of the Southern peop'e. That it was inexpedient may be admitted ; that it was illegitimate has not yet been proved. In the foregoing pages enough has been told to make manifest the splendid fighting qualities of the American soldiers. They were men of the same stock, possessing the same characteristics as our selves. Those of the South, bred as the majority were to a hardy country life, and hunters to a man, were perhaps more fitted for military service than the greater number of our own volunteers; but their previous knowledge of warfare and its needs was slight. There is, then, no reason why, equal in patriotism, courage, and intelligence, if knit together by strict discipline and led by well-trained officers, our own civilian troops, home and colonial, should not, after some short experience of war, excel even Lee's battalions in mobility and efficiency. To emulate their achievements they can scarcely hope, unless a second Lee arise to guide them ; for as surely as the legions of Carthage and the Macedonian phalanx derived their invin cibility from the genius and inspiration of Han nibal and Alexander, so the Army of Northern Virginia, resolute and daring as were the individual The Campaign of Fredericksburg. 145 soldiers, owed its matchless endurance to the master mind and magnetic influence of Lee; that great chief of whom it has been written that, " in strategy mighty, in battle terrible, in adversity, as in pros perity, a hero indeed, with the simple devotion to duty and the rare purity of the ideal Christian knight, he joined all the kingly qualities of a leader of men." THE END. ^CcCe^^ PRINTERS AND PUBLISHERS, BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 1891. SPECIAL 1891. LIST OF MILITARY WORKS. 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Regt. : E.York Regt. ; Bedford Regt. ; Connaught Rangers; Essex Regt. ; Coldstream Guards ; Seaforth High. ; Royal Irish Rifles ; Berkshire Regt. ; Dorset Regt. ; Leicester Regt. ; York Regt. ; Royal Irish Fusiliers ; Northampton Regt. ; Worcester Regt. ; Suffolk Regt. ; W. York Regt. ; Sherwood Foresters ; 1 1th Bn. (Soudanese) Egyptian Army, and many others. Also the Historical Records of the 44th, The East Essex Regt. ; 89th, The Royal Irish Fusiliers ; 6ih Dragoon Guards (Garabiniers) ; fyc., Sfc. They are pronounced to be the best that have ever been published, both for the high-class style of Printing, fyc., and excellent Binding, for which they are universally admired. We shall have pleasure in sending specimen copies for inspection to any customer desirous of seeing them. PERMANENT PASSES, In accordance with G.O. 36, March. These Permanent Passes are now being universally used throughout the Service, they are made in three sizes, suitable for the pocket, as under ; No. 1 size can be supplied with Army Form B 295 inside, they can also be printed to any Regimental Pattern for initialling monthly or otherwise ; if 50 or more are ordered, the Crest of Corps is added free of charge. We may add, that since the issue of the new G.O. re Passes, we have sold over a Hundred Thousand. In most Corps they are sold at the Regimental Canteen at 2d. each ; and wherever they have been tried, the men have gladly purchased them. No. 1 size folded, No 2 size folded, No. 3 size folded, 3-ins. x 2|-ins. 3-ins. X 2-ins. 2^-ins. x 2-ins. SAMPLES SENT ON APPLICATION. All one Price as under — 1 dozen, 3/-; 50 @ 2/6 per dozen;- 100 @ 2/3 per dozen; 200 @ 2/- per dozen; 500 @ 1/9 per dozen; 1,000 @ 1/6 per dozen- Strongly made in Red and Blue Cloth, and in Green Cloth for Rifle Battalions. The Passes quoted above are all made of very best strong cloth, but can be made of a cheaper cloth, if desired, and also at a cheaper price. PROMPTITUDE IN DESPATCH OF GOODS IS ONE OF OUE SPECIALITIES. 6 COPY OF WAR OFFICE LETTER. 62 HOESE GUAEDS, General No. _„ ~ 975; War Office, 9th August, 1890. Sir, With reference to paragraph 108, Section XV., Part II., Queen's Regulations, I have the honor, by desire of the Commander-in- Chief, to invite your attention to a Book called "The JV on- Commissioned Officer's Guide to Promotion," published at 216, by Messrs. Gale 8f Polden, Chatham, which appears to His Royal Highness to be a useful booh to be brought into Garrison Libraries, Reading and Recreation Rooms, in order that the young soldiers may have an opportunity of reading it. I have the honor to be, Sir, Jour obedient servant, (Signed) A. DELAVOYE, Assistant Director for Director General. For full particulars of these books see page 11. NOW READY; POST FREE FOE CASH WITH ORDERS. S. d. Aldershot Divisional Standing Orders. Revised Edition ... 1 6 Aldershot, Military Map Of. 3-in. scale, specially surveyed and Plate engraved, to meet Military requirements. Printed on Paper and folded in Cloth Case ... ... ... 2 0 Linen .. ... ... ... ... ... ... 3 6 " We have received from Messrs. Gale & Polden, a most excellent Military Map of Aldershot and the surrounding Country. It is on the scale of 3-inches to a mile, and is admirably clear in regard to the camps, rifle ranges, roads, waterways, &c." — Army and Navy Gazette. Army Allowances, Regulations Relative to issue of 1 6 Army Signalling, Morse Alphabet and Auxiliary Signs Or Signals. Printed on Cards .. . ... ... ... ... 0 3 Army Signalling Regulations. Being a complete compilation of all orders, regulations and. warrants relating to signalling. Compiled by F. "W. Sibbald, Sergt. -Major, School of Signalling, Aldershot. 1 0 Army Signalling, Manual of Instruction in 1 0 Army Signalling Flag Drill, By Sergt.-Major Sibbald 0 3 Army Telegraph and Signalling Message Book. Army Book, 119, A 2 0 Army Signalling Test Message Cards Per Doz. 0 9 Army Signalling Scribbling Book. A. B. 119, C 1 o Attack of a Company, Normal (in the first line), printed on Card, with Diagram of Enemy's position, by Capt. J. D. Fullerton ... ... ... ... ... per doz. 3 0 Aldershot Military Society Lectures :— Vols. 1, 2 and 3, containing 5 Lectures each ... (All sold) 2 6 Vol. 4, containing 5 Lectures ... ... ... ... ... 2 6 8 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Battalion Drill Made Easy (with 57 illustrations), in accord ance with the New Infantry Drill. By William Gordon, 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders (late Sergt.-Major, 2nd Batt. Scots Guards). 7th Edition 2 0 " It is so clear and simple, and leaves nothing to be imagined by the student, as every single movement in Battalion Drill is explained under all the various positions. The book merely wants to be read in order to be appreciated and admired." — Aimy and Navy Gazette. "In the Infantry Drill, references are continually made to preceding paragraphs. The result is confusing and troublesome. Mr. Gordon to obviate this blemish has produced the work before us. Mr. Gordon has performed his task well, and we venture to assert that an officer or non-commissioned officer who masters this book has practically ab sorbed the essence of Battalion Drill." — Colburn's United Service Magazine. t Battalion Drill, Catechism on, including Skirmishing and Attack 2 0 Brigade Drill made Easy. By W. Gordon, 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders. 6th Edition, Be vised and Enlarged 2 0 " All explanations requisite for the comprehension and execution of any movement are given with the description of the evolution under notice, thus enabling the student to perceive at a glance the details for carrying it out, together with the place assigned to each individual connected with the Brigade. The work is com pendious, the diagrams clear, and Sergt.-Major Gordon has carried out his duties in the most satisfactory way." — Broad Arrow. t Brigade Drill, Catechism on. By William Gordon 2 0 Brackenbury's, Lieut.-Colonel, Handbooks for Officers. Modern Tactics, Elements of, by Colonel Schaw 9 0 Military Law, by Major Pratt 4 6 Military Administration, by Major Buxton 7 0 Field Works : their Technical Construction and Tactical Application, by Colonel C. B. Brackenbury, R.A. In Two Volumes 12 0 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM 9 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Company Drill Made Easy. By William Gordon, 2nd Bait. Gordon Highlanders. 7th Edition. With 54 illus trations, in accordance with the New " Infantry Drill" ... I 6 "The direction of all ranks, and explanation of the words of command, are clear and concise." — Broad Arrow. "It is simple, clear, and will be found most useful by thoBe for whose benefit it is intended." — United Service Gazette. t Catechism on Company Drill, with Appendix on words of Command. By William Gordon ... ... ... ... 1 0 t These are works of the utmost value, and are intended to answer a, twofold purpose : — lst, to afford the student an easy and ready means of committing to memory all the various movements in Drill ; 2nd, to enable the examiner to put every question in a much more concise and intelligible form than could otherwise be accomplished if depending on the Infantry Drill alone. The Appendix on words of Command will be found equally useful, more especially to those who have acquired a habit of giving them incorrectly, and for whose information and guidance this has been specially introduced, as it not only contains the incorrect words of Command so frequently made use of, but also shows the reason why they ought not to be given. Catechism on Field Training. By Major H. Eitzroy- Marryat. 6th Edition, in accordance with the Revised , Syllabns in New Infantry Drill ... ... ... ... 2 0 " The instruction is divided into periods of a week each, and is concise, simple, and well arranged. An index facilitates harking back when necessary." — The Times. " The form of question and answer is adopted, and, in our opinion, is suited to the purpose. The book is rendered more valuable by some good illustrations and an index." — United Service Gazette. Catechism on the Manual of Instruction in Army Sig nalling, by Major L. Edyb, B.M.L.I., and Capt. Elmhirst Rhodes, D.S.O., The Royal Berkshire Regiment 2 6 The value of visual signalling is now fully recognised ; an indifferent signaller is worse than useless, and the great responsibility resting on all signal officers and men in the field renders it necessary for men to make themselves acquainted with eveiy detail connected with this service; additional inducements have lately been held out to volunteers to qualify themselves in this branch of military training, and this work is intended as an aid to all in reading the Manual, and becoming thoroughly at home in the various methods of signalling. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 10 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Catch. Questions in Infantry Drill. By Lieut. G. D'Arcy Evans, 1st Royal Irish Rifles _ ... 0 6 Cavalry Roll Book and Handbook of General Information. By Qr.-Mr.-Sergt. Pillinger, O.R.C., 10th Royal Hussars 2 6 Contents: — Instructions for keeping the Roll Book; Discharges; Discipline ; Arrest ;. Drunkenness ; Orders of Parade ; Mode of Carry ing Equipment ; Education ; Troop Roll ; Roll of Horses ; Numerical Roll of Arms, &c. ; Mountings. Cavalry Outposts, Questions and Answers on. By Capt. R. H. Morrison, late Comdt., S. of Ins. for Aux. Cavalry... 0 9 " A useful little book, must be of service to officers and men of the yeomanry by elucidating the true object of outposts and the duties connected with them. It may also, with great advantage, be put into the hands of non-commissioned officers of the regular cavalry." — Army and Navy Gazette. Cavalry On Vedette, an easy aide memoire to Vedettes on Outpost Duty. Arranged by Capt. R.S.S. Baden-Powell, 13th Hussars ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0 3 Cavalry Kit Plate, Arrangement of Shelf Per doz. 1 0 Cavalry Kit Plate, Arrangement of Kit on Bed. Official pattern Per doz. 1 0 Cricket Scoring Book, The Official. Made of the best paper and containing the amended Rales of the Game. Cloth Bound 1/6 & 2 6 Conventional Signs, as used in Military Topography ... Per Doz. 1 0 Defence and Atta"ck of Positions and Localities. By Col. Schaw 3 6 Drill Cards— Recruit or Squad Drill, Part 1 0 3 „ „ Company Drill, Part II 0 3 ,, „ Formation and Evolutions of a Battalion, Part III 0 3 „ Brigade Drill, Part IV 0 2 Dress Regulations for Army 1 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 11 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Elements of Taetics for Volunteers. By Captain Blommeld, The Lane. Ensiliers, Adjt. lst Vol. Batt. Lane. Fusiliers ... 1 6 Encampments, Regulations and Instructions for 0 9 Equipment Regulations 1 6 Engineering, Elementary Manual of Field 1 6 Field Fortification, Notes on the Text -books. Specially arranged for Officers preparing for Promotion Examina tions. 3rd Edition. Entirely new and fully illustrated with upwards of Thirty Plates. By Mai. H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C .. 4 o " A compilation which will prove useful. A most practical work in every way." — The Pioneer. " Major Hutchinson'E past experience as a Garrison Instructor eminently qualifies him to know the pitfalls that students are likely to fall into, and to point them out. "We fancy all candidates will find his Notes of the greatest assistance in preparing for examination."— Civil and Military Gazette. " A little volume, compact, well-digested, and curiously complete, without looking formidable." — The Saturday Review. Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill. For Martini-Henry Rifle and Carbine. Corrected to date, from time to time, as alterations take place at Hythe. ... ... ... ... 0 3 Firing Exercise and Aiming Drill. Eor Martini-Henry Rifle and Carbine. As taught at the School of Musketry. Illustrated. PRINTED IN URDU 0 6 PRINTED IN NAGRI Q 6 These Translations have been made specially for the use of the Native Ranks of the Army in India, by Major H. D. Hutchinson. Fire Discipline. By Col. J. L. T. Toke, 1st V.B. R. Berks Regt. 0 3 Field Report Book. Eor writing orders and reports of reconnaissance and outpost duties in the Field, &c. Each book contains concise directions, carbon paper for copying report in duplicate at one operation, and pencil ... ... 1 6 (Strong envelopes for reports, 6d. per dozen, 2/6 per 100). Free Gymnastics, and Light Dumb Bell Drill as practised at the Gymnasia at Aldershot. By Sergt.-Major Noakes, Gymnastic Staff 1 0 Gymnastics. Upwards of 100 Tricks on Horizontal Bar. By A. Dimmock, Gymnastic Instructor ... ... ... 1 0 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 12 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, t Guide to obtaining a First Class Army School Certificate. 3rd Edition. By an Army Schoolmaster. Carefully compiled in compliance with the New Orders referring to the First Class Certificate ... ... ... ... ... 3 6 In this volume will be found enough to secure a good pass for a First Class Certificate. It has been compiled by an experienced and successful Army Schoolmaster, who has omitted nothing that is necessary, and admitted nothing superfluous. The aim of the volume is to place the requisite information in a compact and inexpensive form before the intending candidate. t Guide to obtaining a Second Class Army School Certificate. By an Army Schoolmaster. 5th Edition ... 1 6 "Non-commissioned officers and men seeking to qualify, will find the ' Guide to Second Class School Certificate ' a very' valuable little work, aiding them, as it must do, to secure success. . It covers all the ground and gives hints and specimen papers in every subject. As it is an inexpensive book, it should meet with a large amount of support from those for whose special benefit it has been put together." — Army and Navy Gazette. t Guide to obtaining a Third Class Army School Certificate. By an Army Schoolmaster. 4th Edition ... ... ... 0 6 t The Soldier's Spelling Book for obtaining a School Certificate, including Technical Terms and Words Of daily use in Army Matters. By an Army School master. " To candidates for a School Certificate, who are bad spellers, this book is so arranged that a few hours' study will make a good speller of a bad one." ... ... ... 0 6 + The Soldier's Table Card. Giving the Tables, &c., necessary for an Army School Certificate ... ... ... ... 0 1 t These works have the approval of the Inspectors and Schoolmasters throughout the entire Service, and are specially recommended by them. Forms for Practising on for the Examination. Form C. 313, Examination Paper, 9d. per doz. ; 3/- per 100. Form C. 315, Arithmetic Examination Paper, No IL, 1/3 per doz. ; 5/- per 100. Form C. 316, Arithmetic Examination Paper, No. III., 9d. per doz.; 3/- per 100. Form C. 317, Savings' Bank Forms, 9d. per doz.; 3/- per 100. Form C. 2107, Monthly Pay List and Ledger combined, 9d. per doz. ; 3/- per 100. For other Educational Works please see page 16. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 13 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Gall's Modern Tactics 10 6 Gall's Tactical Questions and Answers on the Infantry and Artillery Drill Books 1 6 t Guide to Obtaining Civil Employment. Compiled for the use of soldiers about to be discharged or transferred to the Army Reserve. By Conductor E. R. Hawks, A.S. Corps. 3rd Edition. Revised and Enlarged throughout ... ... 0 6 "This little volume should be in the hand of every man who is approaching the term of his Army Service. Its object is most praise worthy, and its hints will be found invaluable ; for, in a concise form, it provides full information concerning all the associations through which employment for discharged soldiers may most readily be found." — Army and Na^>y Gazette. f Recommended by General Viscount Wolseley. Guide to Fitting the Slade-Wallace Equipment. Illus trated with 14 plates, as worn on the Field, laid out on Parade and in the Barrack Room, as approved at Aldershot 0 6 This pamphlet gives numerous plates shewing how to fit valise in the various marching and review orders, &c, how to pack valise in peace and war, hints for wearing, &c. The various plates are so arranged that they can be detached for pasting on barrack-room walls, &c. Guides and Markers' Duties in Company, Battalion and Brigade Drill. By W. Gordon, late Scots Guards. 6th Edition, with 141 Illustrations ... 2 0 "Messrs. Gale and Polden, of Chatham, who are coming to the front as the bond-tide service publishing Company, have issued a number of military handbooks in a portable form, of which Guides and Martcers' Duties, by Sergt.-Major Gordon, is a fair specimen. The book isintend- ed to enable Guides and Markers to perceive the posts assigned to them, sparing them waste of time in the perusal of each seotion, and ever-recurring references which are made to preceding sections, &c, during the explanation of movements in the Infantry Drill. The plaoes assigned to Guides and Markers are given in well executed Plates, with the description of each movement, rendering each intelligible in itself." — Army and Navy Gazette. Guides and Markers' Duties in Company Drill. By W.Gordon. 7th Edition, with 54 illustrations 0 9 Guide to Court-Martial Procedure- By Lieut. C. G. Morrison, The Rifle Brigade 1 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 14 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Guide to the Examination for Promotion. By Colonel Bannatyne. Regimental Duties. Part I. — Rank of Lieut, and Captain, 7/-. Part II. — Rank of Major 7 0 t Guide to the Examination for Promotion, for Non-Coms. In accordance with the Syllabus issued with Army Orders for May, 1890. Including Questions and Answers thereon. Lance-Corporal to Corporal. By William Gordon. 2nd Edition. Revised ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 6 " This book has been carefully arranged by William Gordon, its author, whose name is a good guarantee to the N.-C. Officer and private, for whose benefit and education he has so often written. Everything pertaining to the subjects is first explained in a simple and plain manner, then the questions usually asked at their examination, with appropriate answers, are given. " The drills are fully illustrated by many well-executed plates and diagrams, and made so clear to the reader that he cannot but fully understand them." — Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette. t Guide to the Examination for Promotion, for Non-Coms. In accordance with the Syllabus issued with Army Orders for May, 1890. Including Questions and Answers thereon. Corporal to Sergeant. By William Goedon. 2nd Edition. Revised 2 6 " Whilst the first part dealt with promotion up to the rank of Corporal, the one now before me contains all that is new up to the rank of Sergeant, or, in other words, all that a N.-C. Officer need know, and that is saying a great deal. It is impossible for any one of ordinary intelligence not to grasp the various subjects, as each section with its questions and answers is written in such a clear and concise manner. "Therefore, 1 advise all aspirants for promotion, whether Corporal or Private, likewise those who have been promoted, to purchase the complete work." — Naval and Military Argus. t Hints to Young Soldiers. By William Gordon, 2nd Batt. Gordon Highlanders. 3rd Edition. Revised and Enlarged. 0 6 " A little budget of sound, good, wholesome advice, in plain language. It would be well if a copy could be given to every young soldier just starting on his new oareer." — Broad Arrow. t These Books have been recommended by the Commander-in-Chief. How to Post and Tell Off a Picquet, and the Details of Outpost Duty. By Capt. H. Staptlton-Marshall. 2nd Edition. Revised and Enlarged , ... 0 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM 15 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Historical Records of the Forty-fourth, or the East Essex Regiment, illustrated 5 0 89th Princess Victoria's Regiment. Compiled by Capt. R. Brinckman, 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers. Fully Illustrated 5 0 The Sixth Dragoon Guards (Carabiniers), a continuation Of, from 1839 to 1887. By Capt. A. Sprot, Sixth Dragoon Guards ... ... ... ... ... ... .. _ g q Handbook to Field Training. By Capt. J. w. Malet, 5th Fusiliers. Fully Illustrated ... ... ... ... ... 3 Q " This is one of the most useful hand books we have recently seen. Every authorised instruction book has been consulted, in addition to works of accepted value, and the essentials of these have been digested into four sections corresponding with the ' Four Weeks' Course.' Here, then, we have a precis— and a most admirable one, too— of the guiding principles concerning infantry attack and defence, Are discipline, the order, field fortifications, advanced guards, flanking parties and rear guards, reconnoitring, outposts and night operations, campaigning, bivouacking, &c. Nothing could be better than the clear and concise arrangement of this matter, which is at once informing and suggestive. A book to be emphatically recommended." — Army and Navy Gazette. Infantry Fire Tactics. By Capt. c. B. Mayne. 2nd Edition, Enlarged &, Revised throughout with Diagrams and Illustrations. This is the only complete work on a subject of vital importance to Infantry in the Field. It fills a want that has hitherto existed in Enghsh Military Literature, and should be in the hands of all officers. Besides dealing with the question of Infantry fire and how to use it at a.11 ranges so as to obtain the maximum effect, it also embraces subjects which have a direct hearing on Infantry fire, such as range finding, supply of ammunition on the battle-field, influence of ground on effects of fire, principles of musketry instruction, and the use of the magazine rifle ... ... ... ... 6 0 " Capt. Mayne has done a real good to the Service in giving us a work which places before us clearly and concisely the whole question." — Journal B. U. S. Institution. " Capt. C. B. Matne has contributed a valuable addition to our knowledge of the functions of Infantry in Wa,T."-Army 8f Navy Gazette. Infantry Fire Control, Discipline, and Indirect Fire, Notes on. By Capt. Sir R. A. W. Colleton, Bt 1 6 The contents of this work were originally compiled for delivery as Lectures to Officers and N.C.O's, and will be found by them to be a very useful supplement to the chapter on Fire Tactics in the New Infantry Drill. As, from experience, the author finds that para. 88 of Musketry Regulations is a stumbling-block, as it were, to the majority of Officers and N.C.O's, who have not hitherto studied the subject, he has added the Notes on Indirect Fire, and now does away with the difficulty. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 16 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Instructions in Military Engineering ¦¦— Part I. Field Defences ... ... ... ... ... 2 0 ... 2 6 ... 3 0 ... 1 6 ... 3 6 „ II. Attack of Fortresses „ III. Military Bridges ,, IV. Military Mining „ T. Miscellaneous Infantry Drill ... ... 1 0 Letters on Infantry. By Prince Kraft Zu Hohenlohe Ingelpingen 6 0 Letters on Cavalry. By Prince Kraft Zu Hohenlohe Ingelfinqen ... ... ... ... ... ... ... g Q Letters on Artillery. By Prince Krapt Zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen 7 g Military Geography. By the Author of Guide to lst Class Certificate ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 1 g Military History. By the Author of Guide to lst Certificate ... ... ... ... ... ... ... \ g Military Handwriting and the copying of Official and other manuscripts 1 g Military Atlas. Containing colored maps comprising the whole world ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 2 0 Magazine Rifle, Manual Exercises 0 3 „ „ Firing Exercises 0 3 Musketry, How to Improve Shooting in the Ranks. By Marksman ... ... ... ... ... ... j g Musketry Regulations 1 0 Memoranda on the Messing of the Soldier. As used at Aldershot ... ... ... ... ... ... .06 Forms for same : Appendix A, in books, 3/- per dozen. B, per 100 3/-. » C, „ „ 2/-. D, „ „ 4/-. ¦B, „ „ 3/-. Manual of Military Law. Containing Army Act and Reserve Forces Act, 2/6. Abbreviated Edition 1 g BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 17 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Manual and Firing Exercises, with Aiming Drill, for the Martini-Henry 0 6 Contents : — General Directions ; Manual Exercise ; Manual Bxeroise in Two Ranks, and Piling Arms ; Funeral Exercise; Paying Compliments with Arms ; Dismissing a Company ; Review Exercise ; Manner of Inspecting Arms on Parade ; Rifle Exercises for Sergeants ; Guards and Sentries ; Bayonet Exercise ; Care of Arms and Am munition ; Questions on Ditto ; Firing Exercise ; Questions on Ditto ; Aiming Drill ; Questions on Ditto. * Do. do. for ARMY SERVICE CORPS, specially arranged, as used at Aldershot ... ... ... ... ... ... 0 6 Military Sketching for Non-Corn's and Men. Fully Illustrated ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 0 6 Military Sketching Made Easy and Military Maps Explained. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C., Garrison Instructor. 4th Edition. Revised throughout ... ... 4 0 " This useful work, besides conforming in every way to the Official Tenet- book of Military Topography, aims at being more explicit and explan atory than this latter on the various points dealt with. In this the Author has succeeded." — Royal Engineers1 Journal. " All these points he very clearly explains. * * we are sure that . many an Officer will feel obliged to Major Hutchinson, for easing his weary way through the mazes of this subject." — Broad Arrow. t Military Training in English and Hindustani. Strictly in accordance with the New Infantry Drill, and on the lines laid down by H.E. the Commander-in-Chief in India, in G.O.C.C, dated 24th August. For the use of British Officers, and Native Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of the Native Army in India. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, lst Batt. 3rd Goorkhas. Author of " Military Sketching Made Easy," " Fortification Notes," Sfc, Src. English and Urdu Edition 2 6 English and Nagri Edition 2 6 This work on "MILITARY TRAINING" is printed in parallel pages, in English and Urdu, and English and Nagri. Fully Illustrated With this book in their hands, British Officers, Native Officers and .Non-commissioned Officers will be able to learn and to teach m the 11 most thorough and systematic manner. t Recommended by H. E. Sir Frederic Eoberts, Bart., V.C, Commander-in-Chief. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 18 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. * Manual of Drill and Physical Exercises. With or without Dumb-bells or Music. By Thomas Chesterton, Instructor of Physiqal Exeroises to the London School Board. Carefully illustrated with upwards of 150 Plates 2 6 For the use of Teachers in day and evening Schools, Instructors,; of Physical Exeroises, &c, as taught at the Military Gymnasia at homej ' and abroad, also in the London and other Board Schools, Principaj| j Public Schools, Civil Gymnasia, Polytechnic Institutions and Evenrng| j Classes throughout the country. tj *Thls wopk has now been adopted by the London School Board, for use In their Schools; and also by the Dlpectop-General of Military Education, fop . , use in all Army Schools. Militia Regulations 2 0 „ Officer's Examiner & 6 Movements of Color Party at Battalion Drill, &c 0 6 Nicknames in the Army. Nearly every Regiment in the Service has (or has had) a Nickname, and this little book gives the most complete record of the same ever printed ... 1 0 Physical Training Without Arms, in accordance with New Infantry Drill. Illustrated with Twenty-six Plates, as taught at Aldershot, 3rd Edition, 9d. Bound in Cloth 1 fl " Physical Training, with its numerous and rich plates, and costing but a shilling, ought to be in the hands not only of military mea, ; ' but all schoolmasters. It is a most useful, handy, and interesting ij ', volume. ' It's hints and directions are invaluable." — Free Press. *) ' t Printed in Urdu or Nagri each 0 9 Physical Drill With Arms, New Bayonet Exercise and Attack and Defence, in accordance with the New Drill. Illustrated with Thirty-Six Plates, as taught at Aldershot 9d. Bound in cloth 10 'A invaluable little book, for, thanks to the admirably drawn * plates, of whioh there are thirty-six, it will be of great use to the thousands of desk-workers who can get no such training as that of the soldier, aud for whose health it is at least as necessary."— United' Service Gazette. t Printed in Urdu or Nagri each 0 9 t These two Books are now ready in Urdu and Nagri, the; Translations having been made speoially for the use of the Native • ranks of the army in India, by Major H. D. Hutchinson. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 19 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, _ a. d. Passes (W.O. Pattern). Per 100, 6d Per 1000 4 0 „ Permanent, cloth bound, will last for years ... Per Doz. 3 0 For full particulars of Permanent Passes in aocordance with G.O. 36, of March, see page 5. Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army. Part 1.1/6; Part II _ ,26 Do- do. do. do. Interleaved. Two Yols. Bound together in Best Cloth ... 9 6 Royal Warrant for Pay, Promotion, &c 1 6 Register Cover for Marking Points at the Target, Black Waterproof , with Elastic Band, greatly improved 2 0 Regulations for Mounted Infantry 16 On Guard; What to do and How to do it. Gth Edition... 0 6 '< A useful little handbook, the very thing that the young and Inexperienced stand in need of, arranged by Capt. M. QuATiE-Joiras, 6th Royal Warwickshire Regt., has been forwarded to us for notice. A more concise and better guide could not have been compiled. Every officer will remember the fear and tremor m which he stood when the startling cry of " Guard, turn out ! " first broke upon his ears, and will, although smiling at the recollection, reflect to himself that the instructions contained in the Queen's Regulations and on the board of orders of the guard-room, were not altogether of an explicit and satisfactory nature. Capt. QuAira-Joiras has remedied this defect:"— Army 4- Navy Gazette. On Outpost ; What to do and How to do it. By William Gordon. 7th Edition 0 6 In compiling this Hand-book, the chief aim has been to embody tho very essence of Outpost work, in the dearest and simplest manner, in a handy sized form, well adapted to carry in the pocket, and easy for reference at any time, either in the field, camp or quarters. ' ' Never have we met with a more clever little work on Outpost Duty." — Broad Arrow. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. b 2 20 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Official Letter Writing, Orders, &c, Guide to, by an Army Schoolmaster. 3rd Edition ... 16 " A most useful work for young Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of all Branches of the Service. In this work are compressed concise, yet full directions, not only upon Official Letter Writing and Orders, but also upon Handwriting, Style of Composition, Punctuation, Precis Writing, Military Abbreviations and Relative Rank, together with such business terms as are, or may be, appli- cable to Military life. To those whose duties require an acquaintance with clerical work of any kind it can be confidently recommended." — Army 8f Navy Gazette. Roll and Memo. Book for R.E. Field Companies. By Capt. J. C. Tyler, R.E. 3rd Edition. Revised throughout 2 0 " This work contains various roll forms that are required by an officer in charge of a company ; details of daily routine ; the duties of all ranks ; full list of equipment ; directions which embrace the remotest item ; hints on a variety of subjects, useful recipes, scales of forage, and indeed information on nearly every point likely to be useful to company officers, no mattef how experienced they may be." — Admiralty Sf Horse Guards Gazette. Rhymes from the Ranks. By Qr.-Mr.-Sergt. H. Morey (late 2nd Batt. The Royal Irish Rifles) 1 0 " ' To the Army, in which I spent the best years of my life, this little book is, with all its defects, most respectfully dedicated by the Author.' Many of the Rhymes are of considerable merit, and will be popular in the Ranks, for whom they have been principally written." — Irish Times. Regulations for the Royal Engineers 3 0 Road Reports, printed, and ruled. 3d. each or Per Dozen ... 2 0 Scoring Book, The All Range (Wimbledon) ... ... 1 6 Scout's Guide. By Captain Delavoye 2 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 21 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Skirmishing, Attack & Defence for a Company, Battalion and Brigade. By Sergt.-Major W. Gordon. Illustrated with Forty Plates. 2nd Edition. Revised 2 0 "Some forty well-executed plates render the subjects treated of extremely intelligible, and the letter-press is succinct, so that these very important subjects are brought under the student's notice in so clear and interesting a manner, as to render the subject pleasing to the reader, and not, as is often the case with treatises of this descrip tion, a mere repetition, in other words, of the drill-books. Mr. Gordon is a thorough master of the matters on which he writes, and his publishers are certainly doing a good service by offering such a handy and valuable work at the very moderate cost of two shillings." — United Service Gazette. Sergeant's Pocket Book for Home and Foreign Service. By Sergt.-Major W. Gordon ... Leather, 3/6. Cloth 2 6 " Quartermaster Gordon has done for the Non-commissioned Officer what Lord Wolseley has done for the Officer, in compiling a work which contains the cream of a large number of standard books on military subjects. We consider this little book simple, clear, and practical, and no doubt valuable additions will be made to it in each of the many succeeding editions which we hope to see appear." — Colburn's United Service Magazine. Soldiers' Shooting. By Capt. H. de B. Hovell, Worcester Regt 1 g " There is much in the book which is worthy of discussion, and we can only hope that it will meet with the attention which it deserves." ¦ — Admiralty and Horse Guards Gazette. Soldier's Pocket Book. By General Viscount Wolseley ... 5 0 Squad Book for Pocket— Infantry 10 „ Cavalry 2 6 ,, „ Royal Artillery 1 6 „ „ Army Service Corps 1 6 „ „ Militia 1 0 „ „ Volunteer 1 0 Sword Exercise, and Carbine Sword Bayonet Exercise ... 0 6 Target Practice Score Register (for 3 distances) 3 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 22 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Tactics, Practical, and War Training. By Major G. F. R. Henderson, The Tork and Lancaster Regt., Instructor in Taptics, R. M. Col., Sandhurst 6 0 This work will be found especially useful to officers preparing for Tactical examinations for the rank of Major, as well as to officers of lower ranks. Tactics Made Easy, for Non-Coms and Men. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C 0 6 "Believing that there are many men in the Army who will read a small book on Tactics, though they may shy at a big one, I venture to offer them these short notes on a subject full of interest to all good,; soldiers, whatever their rank or standing." — Author's Preface. Tactics, Pocket, for Officers of Militia desirous of entering the Army, and Militia and Volunteer Officers desirous of passing in Tactics. By Capt. Russell N. Darbishire, The King's Own" (3rd Batt. Royal Lancaster Regt.) 2 0 " Pocket Tactics for Officers of Militia and Volunteer Officers, hy Captain Russell N. Darbishire, of The King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment, is a useful little military catechism which, as it is a digest of the leading features of Minor Tactics as dealt with by such able exponents as Col. Clery, C.B., Commandant of the Staff College, and P. H. Dyke, should be welcomed by all those who would gain an elementary know ledge of the subject before seeking the assistance of the larger works." — Madras Times. 4 0 6 0 Tactics, Lectures on. By Col. F. H. Dyke Tactics, Questions and Answers on. By Capt. Dbmangel Tactics, Modern, The late Battles in the Soudan. By Capt. C. B. Matne Tactics, Minor. By Lieut.-Colonel Clery.. Trifles ; or, Little Things for Volunteers to know ... Text Book of Fortification and Military Engineering. Part I., 5/-. Part II' Treatise on Small Arms and Ammunition. Text Book for the Army. By Colonel Bond, R. &.. Topography, Military Official Text Book of. By Colonel Richards Trumpet and Bugle Sounds Volunteer Force, Regulations for 2 0 9 0 0 6 7 6 i 0 3 0 2 0 1 6 BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 23 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, s. d. Volunteer Military Administration for Officers of the Volunteers and Militia. By Capt. H. Walker, Adjt., 2nd Vol. Batt. West York Regt 1 6 " We have nothing but praise for this book, the idea is excellent to help Volunteer Officers to understand the interior economy of their Battalions, and to enable them to take up the administrative reins in time of need." — Army and Navy Gazette. This book oontains complete Specimen Forms (shewing how to keep the accounts) of the Pay List, Pay and Mess Book, &c, &c. Volunteer Members' Tickets, strongly made in cloth Covers with Crest and Title of Corps ... per doz. 3 0 Volunteer Company Squad Roll Book. Specially arranged, with Instructions for Camping, Marches, &c, &c. ... ... 1 0 Volunteer Drill Attendance Register 10 Waterloo. A popular account of the Campaign of 1815. By Major H. D. Hutchinson, B.S.C. Paper, 1/-. Cloth, 2 0 "Very graphic and succinct. No point omitted necessary to enable the reader to understand the strategy of Napoleon and his opponents." — Broad Arrow. "An excellent guide, and a most perspicuous exposition of 'the cam paign." — Saturday Review. Official Crests Of the Army. Iu Packets containing four dozen Designs. All beautifully executed in various colored relief. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Packets, now ready ... each 0 6 "We have received from Gale & Polden, the well-known Army Stationers, Packets of Regimental Crests. They embrace some 300 varieties, each and all exceedingly well done. We suppose the Dies were primarily executed for the Stamping of Regimental Stationery, but embossed in various colors on separate circles of paper, as these before us, they form useful and interesting presents to collectors of Armorial Insignia." — Broad Arrow. Badges and Honors of the British Army. In Packets containing two dozen. Handsomely Printed in Gold and Colors. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Packets, now ready, each 0 6 British Army Crest Album, containing Honors and Nick names of the Army, with spaces for all Regimental Crests, Badges, &o ¦ ••¦ 4 0 "The Album is well got up, and is certain to become popular with our readers. All will take particular interest in filling up with crests, &c, of the various regiments the blanks left for that purpose, and thus making a pleasing collection." — United Service Gazette. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 24 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS & PUBLISHERS, Regimental Marches. The following are now ready : — Coldstream Guards, Royal Engineers, Royal Marines and Berkshire Regiment, each 16 Coloured Pencils for Surveying, Red, Blue, Green, Burnt Sienna, White and Yellow, 3d. each. Per Doz. 2 6 Specially manufactured for military Sketching. Field Sketching Companion (Registered). This useful Companion is invaluable when sketching in the Field, or at an examination, containing, as it does, a Protractor ; Pencils, -*$ hard, soft, medium, red, blue, green, sepia ; drawing stump ; scale of shade, and pointed India rubber, in compact leather case, each 6 0 Field Sketching Case. Size ll-in. by ll-in. Made in strong Waterproof Leather, with pocket for Drawing Paper, Pencils, Protractor, &c • 2 6 Do. do. Size ll-in. by 13-in. do. do. 3 6 Field Service1 Sketching Case and Note Book, By Lieut. W. W. Norman, B.S.C. Complete with Compass ... ... ... ... ... 10 0 Without Compass ... ... ... ... ... ... ... g g The above has been especially designed for the use of officers engaged on Outpost and tleconnoitriiig duties. At such times, officers are expected to carry with them a pocket book for ordinary notes, another for writing Field Keports, and, in addition, instruments for making sketches. All these requisites are contained in one hook, the contents being as follows — (1.) A drawing board 9"x 7§" (which can be folded to half the size), a compass, a rough clinometer and a ruler. (2.) Wiiiesden waterproof drawing paper for sketches, and ruled paper for reconnaissance reports. (3.) A refill note, book with printed' forms for field reports, and also some blank pages for temporary notes. (4.) Some very useful memoranda relative to reconnaissance reports, &c, &c. Field Service Sketch and Note Book. Made of Wiiiesden Waterproof Paper. Arranged by Capt. Willoughby VERNER,RifleBrigade,D.A.A.G.,Shorncliffe. With compass 5 0 Field Sketching Book ruled in squares 0 6 Protractors for Surveying. As used at the S.M.E., Chatham; ( and the authorized Pattern in India. Ivory 7/-. Boxwood 2 6 " Gale and Polden have just brought out a new surveying protractor, which . possesses the following advantages. It is provided with a diagonal scale, from which any. suitable scale can be made by the Surveyor in the field • instead"bf the numerical figures, on the face of the protractor is engraved a simple rule for '.' ?$£"%%** th°™*cal mtervals, and a formula for constructing any scale of - slope differing from the engraved normal one. A formula for the conversion of . ™?f 1fxP1re8se'? m de£,rees mto the same slopes expressed as fractions and via " IZ L t„ ll g"?n;, = Vr?.traotor IS also *«rnished with scales of four and six in. to the mile."— Royal Engineers' Journal. BROMPTON WORKS, CHATHAM. 25 SPECIAL NEW MILITARY WORKS, SUITABLE FOR COMPANY, TROOP, AND BATTERY. Alphabetical Roll and Descriptive Book. This Alphabetical Roll and Descriptive Book is so arranged as to meet the present requirements of the Army; plenty of room being allowed for the constant changes that now take place in the company ... 1 Barrack Room Arrangements (Infantry). Official. Being instructions for the Soldier in the arrangement of his Barrack Room ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Per Doz. 2 Bed Cards, No. 1 size, 4i by 3-ins. Without Crest, per 100 2/6, 200 4/- 500 8 „ „ „ ,, With Crest beautifully Stamped in Relief, per 100 3/6, 200 5/- ...500 10 „ „ No. 2 Size, 3£ by 2£-ins. Without Crest, per 100 1/6, 200 2/9 500 6 „ „ „ „ WithCrest, 1002/6, 200 4/-, 500 8 Door Cards, No. 1 Size, 4£ by 3J-ins. Without Crest, per 100 3/6, 200 5/- 500 10 „ ,, ,, „ With Crest beautifully Stamped in Relief, per 100 4/6, 200 6/- ... 500 15 „ „ No. 2 Size, 4J by 3-ins. Withont Crest, per 100 2/6, 200 4/-, 500 8 „ „ „ With Crest, per 100 3/6, 200 5/- 500 10 Order Book (A. B. 137) 1/6. Washing Book o Case for Soldier's Pocket Ledger, without Pocket i „ „ „ „ „ Best Leather, with Pocket 2 Any Soldier can bind his Pocket Ledger in these cases. „ „ Annual Musketry Return. Whole Cloth Cover ... 2 „ „ Pay and Mess Book, lettered, with Pocket. Leather... 7 „ „ Pay List, lettered, with Pocket. Leather 7 „ „ Passes (Army Form B. 295) Cloth 1 „ „ Daily Messing Book. Plain or with letter of Co. „ 1 „ „ Army Orders > „ Target Register. Black Waterproof 2 „ „ Judging Distance Register. Biaok Waterproof ... l 1 26 GALE & POLDEN, PRINTERS