YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

ixi

AN ANALYSIS

OF

BUTLER'S ANALOGY OF RELIGION,

AND

THREE SERMONS ON HUMAN NATURE.

BY

JOSEPH ANGUS, D.D.

THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY:
56, Paternoster Row ; 65, St. Paul's Churchyard ; aku
164, Piccadilly.

J
Ji

PREFATORY NOTE.

This Analysis is not intended to supersede the Text, but
simply to help in studying it. It is therefore as brief as
possible, and so framed as to require continual reference to
Butler himself. From experience, the Editor can afiErm that,
with raost students, some such aid is essential to the mastering
of the arguments of the volume. The Text recommended
for use with this Analysis is that published by the Religious
Tract Society.

i

CONTENTS.
PACt
Analogy ; Its Nature and Use . . . • 9
Introduction • . • • • • • 'S
^AKT .1.— ON NATURAL RELIGION.
CHAP. I. On a Future Life ...••••"
II. Ofthe Government of God dv Rewards and Punish
ments; AND particularly OF TKE LATTER . H
III. ' Of TitE Moral Govern m knt of God . . .27
IV. Of a State of Prodation as implying Trul, Diffi
culties, AND danger . . . • .32
V. On a State of Prodation as intended for Moral
Discipline and Lmprovement . • .34
VI. On the Opinion of Necessity, considered as Influ
encing Practice . . . • -39
VII. Of the Government of God, considered as a Scheme
or Constitution, Imperfectly Comprehended . 4;
PART II.-OF REVEALED RELIGION.
I. Of the Importance of Christianity . . .46
II, Of the supposed Presumption against a Revelation,
CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS . . . .5°
tn. Of our Incapacity of Judging what were to df.
expected in a Revelation ; and the Credibility,
from Analogy, that it must contain Things ap
pearing liable to Objections . . • S^

ViaCUAI>, IV.

V.

VI.

vn,
VIII."

I.
II.

; Contents.
Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Con-
stitution, Imperfectly Comprehended
Of the Particular System of Christianity ; ths
Appointment of a Mediator, and the Redemption
of the World by Him ....
Of the Want of Universality in Revelation : and
OF the Supposed Deficiency of the Proof of it
On the Particular Evidence for Christianity
On the Objections . which may be .made against
Arguing fro.m the Analogy of Nature, to Re
ligion , 

DISSERTATIONS.
Of Personal Identity , , ,
Of the Nature of Virtue , ,

I.. II., III.

SERMONS.
Upon Human Nature ,

57
59
646873

. 79
. 84

, 89-94

THE

ANALOGY OF RELIGION

TO

THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE.

ANALOGY! ITS NATURE AND USE.

Analogy, the principle of reasoning adopted in this volume,
needs to be carefully defined, " no word in our tongue being
more loosely used " (Mill). Quintilian, whose language Butler
has placed on the title of his book, indicates by the term a
part of grammar. So regarded, its business is to fix the
declension or gender or conjugation of unknown words, by
comparing their forms with those of other words already
familiar. The Schoolmen, on the other hand, used it to
describe terms in connexion with Rhetoric. With them,
analogous words were words founded on resemblance ; pro
perly applicable to one object, and less properly to another.
"Greek nouns in i^iyc are generally patronymics, as are Scotch
names with Mc, so therefore are these " — is an example of the
first ; "A Smiling landscape " is an example of the second. In
both these senses the word analogy is still used in common
life ; and on analogy in the second sense, nearly all the
technical language of moral and mental science is framed. A
very httle examination will show that these senses of the word
are closely connected with the sense in which Archbishop
Whately uses it: i Similarity of relation is implied in each case.
, ' RhctorU, Part I. chap. ii. § 7.

10 Analysis of Butlet's Analogy of Religion.
Properly spealdng, analogy is a kind of resemblance j and an
argument from analogy is founded upon such resemblance'. •
Not any kind of resemblance, but a particular kind. Re
semblances in appearance, in incidental circumstances, or even
in properties, considered by themselves, form no sufficient
basis for analogy. They often form the basis of figures of
speech, or allegories, but they prove nothing. They do not
even appeal to the reason, only to the fancy ; and their use is
— illustration or embellishment If, however, the resemblance
involves, or is supposed to involve, a similarity or identity of
relation, there is analogy. It appeals, more or less, to the
reasoning faculty, and may form a solid argument. Hence
it is defined by Aristotle as a "likeness" or "parity of reason,"i
and by Dr. Copleston, as a similarity, not " of two thmgs,"
but " of two relations." ''¦ " As two is to four, so is four to
^ight, or three to six:" "As the law of projectile forces is to
the motion of a stone thrown from the hand, sb is . the law of
central and centrifugal forces to the motion of the heavenly
bodies through space : " " In nature, means apparently un
desirable are used by God (the deist admits) to produce
desirable ends, the use of similar means for similar ends in a
revelation, is therefore consistent with the supposition that the
revelation is from God : He does sometimes use them in the
one, He may use them in the other : some means He nearly
always uses in the one ; some means, therefore, He will most
probably use in the other." All these are examples -of analogy,
and in each case, it is not the things which are alike^2, 4; 3, 6,
but their relations to each other, or to other things. It will be
observed, thilc the two sets of relations compared may consist -
. of three distinct terms, one reappearing in each set, or of four ;
and that the reasoning is unaffected by this circumstance.
1 \ltyiiiv inoiir-ris : laSr-iis Kiyov, Ethic. Nic, v. 3.
' Enquiry into the Doctrines of Necessity and Fredestination', Notes to
Disc. iii.

A.'

Analogy: Its Nature and Use.

II

¦¦ In studying "The Analogy," it is of the utmost importance
to keep in mind the chief uses of this kind of reasoning.
1. As an argument, it is demonstrative only in proving results
or causes to be not improbable. It meets objections by a
direct negative. It defends Christianity, without in the first
instance contributing materially to the positive evidence on its
side. Origen, for example, affirms " that he who believes the
Scripture to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of
Nature, may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in
'it as are found in Nature." This is an analogical statement.
None, however, can say that the difficulties of Scripture prove
it to be Divine; though it is conclusive to say, "The difficulties
of Scripture do not justify us in denying its Divine origin, for
in Nature there are similar difficulties, and Nature is admitted
to' have sprung from Him." So, should the atheist affirm that
there is no God, and thence infer that there can be no future
state of reward and punishment, Analogy replies — " In this hfe,
though, as is said, there be no God, men are rewarded and
punished; that is, they are under government. If so, that
. there is no God is no reason why they raay not be under like
government in the life to come." "No-God" is consistent
with government now ; nor will it be inconsistent with govern
ment hereafter. To repel objections, therefore, is the first
business of analogy ; and in that department its argument
amounts to demonstration, and its conclusions, expressed in
negative forms ("not inconsistent witli," "not incredible that,")
or their affirmative equivalents (" it may notwithstanding "),
are irrefragable. The whole of the reasonings of Bishop Butler
may be put in this form; and it will be observed that the
second part of his work uses analogy for these defensive
purposes exclusively.
2. There , is, however, a wider application of analogical
reasoning, and indeed it may be said, that there is a wider

12 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
meaning of the term itself. Whately, Copleston, and others,
use the woi-d Analogy in the strict sense, as meaning re
semblance of relations. But by many metaphysical writers,
including Locke, Hartley, Mill, and Butler himself, it is used to
express an argument founded on resemblance of any kind,
though generally falling short of full proof Sir Humphrey
Davy, for example, discovered that potash has a metallic base.
But other alkalies have sensible properties hke potash. He
therefore concluded, that it was probable they had also metallic
bases ; a conclusion verified by subsequent discovery.
Evidence resting upon analogy in this sense admits, of
course, of different degrees. It may amount to the highest
moral certain ty,it may give no more than the lowest presumption.
The positive evidence, for example, in favour of a future life,
founded on the single analogy of the changes of the chrysalis
is small ; i while the evidence founded on the uniform fact
that in Nature nothing is ever wasted ot anmhilated^ihtx&foxe,
not the soul ^ — is strong : the force depending, in each case, on
the frequency of the supposed analogous facts, and the real
resemblance between the things compared. Examples of this
use of analogy abound in the first part of this treatise. -
It is important to remark, that in the affairs of life, all
evidence is of the kind described in the last paragraph.
Mathematical reasoning is demonstrative, and its conclusions
certain, because .they are virtually included in the premises ;
so are thfe conclusions of logic. But in matters of fact, and
in maxims of prudence, we are guided simply by what is
probable. What is often called even positive proof belongs to
the same class. Testimony, written records, the very evidence
of our senses, to take the strongest case, are none of them
certain : they are probable, and probable only.^ The remark
^ Butler, Part I. chap. i.
' Is it Possible to make tlie Best of both Worlds^ p. 220. ^
' See Gambier on Moral Evidence, p. 67. '

, Analogy: fts Nature aiid .Use. 13'
of Butler, therefore, is just, that analogy differs from other
evidence only in degree, not in kind; and that its force depends
on the completeness of the resemblance (in what is raaterial),
of the things we compare.
3. By some Writers, as t)r. Hampden, forms of induction
itself are included under this term ; and Butler seems to
concur in this view. When once an inquirer understands
what a cause is, and why or how it acts, so as to be able to
point out the connexion between it and the result, and then
applies this knowledge to connect other and similar results
with the same or similar causes, testing the accuracy of the
process by experiment, the analogy becoraes induction in the
strictest sense. The existence of a present moral government
is proved in this way, by Butler; and the fact of a future
government is (admitting a future life) all but proved : for the
evidence is traced up to qualities in man, and to attributes in
God, which we can hardly conceive to be capable of change.
Still, as human nature is fallen, the doctrine of causation
abstruse, especially when applied to God and His perfections,
and reasoning from the known to the unkno^\•n, from what is
to what will be, extremely uncertain ; positive arguraents from
analogy in, relation to religion, must be received with great
caution. Arguments against objections to revelation, and
involving negative conclusions, rest on different premises, and
may be admitted without distrust. To show from Nature
what God will do or reveal in Scripture, is one thing : To
show from Nature that parts of Scripture which speak of His
doings,, form no valid objection to its Divine authority, is
another.! 1 The language of Dugald Stewart seems on tlie whole just. After
referring to the opinions of Dr. Reid and Dr. Campbell, and expressing
his doubts " whether both of these ingenious writn-s have not soniewhat
underrated the importance of analogy as a medium of proof," he adds.

14 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religiou.
The reader may find these questions more or less fully
discussed in Locke, Book v. chap. 16, sec. 12 ; Reid's Enquiries,
chap. 4; Stewart's Elements, ii. chap. 4, sec 2, § 3 ; Mill's
Logic, ii. 426 ; and in Hampden's Essay on the Philos. Evidence
of Christianity, p. 60, etc. All these writers concur in giving
the wide? meaning of analogy. Tappan's Logic, Book iv. sec.
10; Dr. Tatham's Chart and Scale of Truth, vol. i. p. 50-62 ;
Wayland's Intellectual Philosophy, chap. vi. sec. 4 ; and Chal
mers" Lectures on Butler's Analogy, favour the narrower view.
See also the works of Whately, Copleston, and Gambler,
already quoted.
The precise place of analogy in the Christian Evidences is
easily assigned to it. It is part of the Internal .Evidencs,
resting on the message itself, not on the credentials of the
messengers. It appeals, not to a priori reasoning, but to
facts and principles already learned by experience in Nature ;
not to minute coincidences between the sacred history and
other records, or to the feelmgs and spiritual insight of renewed
men, but to the consciences and judgments of all. It requires
less learning than External Evidence, involves no assumptions,
and is appreciable by the whole race. In Scripture, it is of
constant occurrence : Every parable and rairacle, every com
parison and figure, being intended to explain and in sorae
degree to enforce Divine truth by things and facts already
familiar. See Matt. v. -viL ; i Cor. xv. 36.

" I acknowledge, at the same time, that between the positive and the
negative application of this species of evidence, there is an essential
difference. When employed to refute an objection, it may often furnish
an argument irresistibly and unanswerably convincing. When employed
as a medium of proof, it can never authorize more than a probable
conjecture. ... In some instances, however, the probability resulting
from a concurrence of different analogies may rise as high as to produce
an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from moral certainty." —
Elements, ii., 423, note.

¦ \

INTRODUCTION.

A. Of the nature of analogical evidence in general.!
1. Such evidence is various in degrees, from low presumptions to
moral , certainty : one slight presumption cannot make
anything probable ; but many can. Ebb and flow of tide.
2. Its foundation is verisimilitude, or likeness to some truth, or
fact ; hkeness either in the thing itself, or in its evidence
or circumstances.
Here the degree of probability is as the frequency with
which we have observed the same or like things. It
becomes presumption, opimon, conviction, and forms a
rule of hope and judgments.
3. Its measure imperfect, but obligatory :
a. Imperfect, and fit for limited capacities, for to God nothing
is probable ;
b. Yet obligatory, however low the presumption in favour of
any opinion, or practice. Indeed, where men must act,

' In these outlines the connexioii and subordination of thoughts are
indicated thus : — A 1 a 1 (a) (1)
B 2 b 2 (b) (2)
C 3 c 3 (c; (3)
and very occasionally (a) (l)
where, for example, (1) is a subdivision under (a), as (a) is under 1, and 1
under a, and a under 1, and 1 under A. Ordinarily A, B, etc., represent
distinct subjects. Corresponding letters .and figures will be found in tha
margin of the text pubhshed by the Religious Tract Society.

l6 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
prudence will select the course which seems right, even
though the chances of success are even or adverse.
B. Of the utility of such evidence, and its application to
rehgion. Its measure not discussed, but yet its utility
obvious.
1. In determining our judgments and practice in common life ;
2. In relation to religion and God's present govemment. From
it one may reason with Origen,
a. That difficulties must be expected in Scripture as in Nature ;
b. That a denial of the Divine origin of Scripture on this
ground will end in a denial of the Divine origin of the
world ; and,
c. That both systems have the same Author ; or, at least, that
objections against the one are answered by the other.
3. In forming our notions ofreligion, it is superior,
a. To reasoning on assumed principles :
b. To reasoning on true principles, the applicability of which
is assumed, and hence,
c. Butler intends to apply it to religion, natural and revealed,
assuming an Author and Governor of Nature ; which
assumption has no prior improbabihty, and has often
been proved by accumulated evidence :
d. To vain speculations how the Woild might have been
better : which speculations may be shown to be vain
thus —
1. Probably the speculator himself would admit his plan to
be not the w^y best, ^whether he contemplated the
greatest amount of virtue or of happiness, or of both.
2. And certainly foolish and extravagant plans would be
formed, involving conclusions like these,— all creatures
must be made at once perfect, free from all hazard
and toil, and without dread or risk of punishment.
3. For such speculations men have not faculties.
(a) Of ends we may judge : hence we believe that the
greatest amount of virtue and happiness is God's

.fl'-

^r

Introduction.

17

>i:

end in providence, a belief to which our whole
nature impels us, and of which that nature is an
evidence ;
(b) But of means we cannot— no,
(c) Not even of the best means of training a single
person, much less a system ; and,
(d) Hence men cannot judge each other ; how then can
they judge God ?
C. Practical conclusion : Leave speculation, and mark,
1. The conduct of Nature with respect to inteUigent creatures.
2. The laws to be gathered from it ; and,
3. The analogy between what we ^>ui in Nature, and what we
beheve or expect m religion; whence it will appear that
they are both of a piece.
D. The force of this analogy,
1. Varies, being sometimes a practical proof, somethnes a con
firmation, of what is otherwise proved.
2. Shows that religion is not ridiculous, unless Namrebe so; and
3. Answers objections against the system of religion, and to a
large extent objections against its evidence.
E. The treatise is divided into two parts, and is thus analysed :
The first, On religion in general, i.e., on natural religion: wherein
it IS shown that there is a future life, Chap. I. : a cultural go
vemment, present and fiiture, Chap. II.; a moral govemment,
Chap. III.; that life is a probation state, involving risits. Chap.
IV. ; promoting impro-vement and testing character, Chap. V. •
that the /acts of moral government are not affected by any
opinions on necessity, Chap. VI. ; and that the perfection of
God's govemment cannot be objected to, for it is as a scheme
incomprehensible. Chap. VII.
The second. On Christianity in , particular, i.e., on revealed reli
gion: where it is shown that Christianity is important, Chap. I,;
thatas w?>a<:«/(7Mjno objection can be urged against it. Chap. II! •
c

1 8 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of ReHgion,
that as a scheme, no valid objections can be urged against it,
either against it as a. fact, though differing from our expecta
tions. Chap. IIL; or against the moral perfections displayed in
it, Chap. IV., § I ; or against the system of means and general
laws whereby it is carried on, Chap. IV., § 2; or against media
tion, Chap, v.; or against its want of universality and supposed'
deficient proof, Chap. VI.; or against its evidence, prophetic,
miraculous, or general, Chap. VIL; and, lastly, that analogy is
strongly and in various ways on the side of religion, general
and revealed {a, b, c), Chap. VIII.

^^

PART I.

ON NATURAL RELIGION.

-^-^

The first part of this treatise, it must be carefully noted,
discusses natural religion — such truths as 7?iay be learned from
creation and providence ; and the language used is generally
such as an imperfect revelation of that kind suggests. The
second part discusses revealed religion — such truths as may
b^ learned from Nature, and are taught in Scripture, together
with such as are peculiar to the Christian system.
The distinction between natural and revealed religion is
itself very liable to be misapprehended. Some hold that
there are not even the elementary truths of such a science
as the religion of Nature. Others, overlooking the fact that
"natural religion has had the opportunity of rekindling her
faded taper by gospel light" (Da\'ison on Prophecy, p. 8),
ascribe to it truths which it cannot claira. It is, moreover,
at all times difficult to distinguish between the possible dis
coveries of reason and the "wisdom that is from above:"
and good men are jealous of dishonouring the Holy Sphit by
ascribing to unassisted reason what is due to His teaching.
In studying this treatise, however, there need be no misgivings
on these points. By natural religion Butler means simply
such truths in relation to God (His character and govemment)
and man (his duties and destiny) as nuiy be learned from God's
works and deaUngs — the pretensions of natural religion in

20 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religiou.
this respect being set forth with much, moderation and reserve.
He holds, moreover, that in fact these truths were not learned
in the first instance by unassisted reason, but that miraculous
instruction was needed to teach men to perceive them (Part
IL, chap. vil.). At the same time such instruction no more
destroys the proof of these truths frora reason, than the
admission of the authority of Euclid as a mathematician
destroys the independent proof which reason gives of his
demonstrations. Happily, if we admit an authentic and
enlarged communication from God, our only business is to
examine how far Nature leads us on in the same path, and
how she confirms the evidence and illustrates the teaching of
revelation.

CHAPTER I

ON A FUTURK LIFK

Though Butler reckons the doctrine of a future life among
the truths of natural religion, he does so rather for the reasons
stated in chapter i., than from any conviction that the truth is,
taught clearly and impressively by Nature. A future life is
natural, as he has shown ; and yet if knowledge imply proof
and conviction, then it must' be adraitted that, apart from
revelation, there is no knowledge of that life, and that in the
gospel alone it is revealed. Whately has proved the accuracy
of this conclusion. (Essays on some of tlie Peculiarities of
the Christian Religion, Essay i.) ' At the same time the
expectation of another life (sometiraes hope, generally fear)
has always been stronger araong nations without the Bible than
any evidence they seem to have possessed would warrant
This expectation Douglas ascribes partly to tradition, and
partly to the aptitude of the soul to receive this truth. {Truths

^l

^
^•^

A Future Life.

21

of Religion, p. 22.) Cicero ascribes it to the same cause —
omnium consensus, natures vox {Tusc. Quest., L, § 15) — though
holding that the truth none but a god could tell, while what
was likest truth was extremely uncertain.
A. A. future life is probable :
1 From similar changes already undergone in,
a. Ourselves, and in,
b. Other creatures^worms, birds, etc
2. From our present powers, which are likely to continue, unless
death destroy them. We fear death may, but there is 7io
proof that it will,
a. Either from the nature of death. We know not what it is,
nor do we know on what the existence of our powers
(not their exercise) depends.
b. Or from the analogy of Nature, which shows only that the
' sensible proof oi our powers (not the powers themselves)
may be destroyed ; and gives presumptions on the other
side, as above.
B. Still men imagine death will destroy them. This imagina
tion unfounded. Take the question in three forms :
1. Is death the destruction of Uving beings f No reason to think
it is, for this supposes we are compounded, and so dis-
cerptible ; but the contrar>' is probable, having metaphysical
and experimental proofs.
a. Metaphysical : consciousness is indivisible ; so must the sub
ject in which consciousness inheres : hence our bodies are
not the living being, nor is the matter in which the living
being thinks. The living being may exist out of the
body, may animate other bodies, and be as Uttle affected
by the dissolution of all these bodies, as of any other
foreign matter.
b. Experimental : part of the body (limbs) may be lost, the
body may be larger or smaller, or even entirely (though
gradually) changed, and the /zVz«^fe«j-r£//w/«. Note,
moreover,

22 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
1. Even if man is material, still death may not destroy the
elementary particles in vvhich the hving being inheres;
and if not, death does not destroy him.
2. So, as the destruction of the bodily system (by gradual
changes, by amputation) destroys not the living being,
neither will the destruction of any other (say internal)
system. Death, indeed, is a sudden not a ghadual
change, and the living being is affected by the body ;
but the first fact is not decisive, nor is the latter more
true of the body than of other foreign matter that
affects the soul.
3. The body has organs of perception, etc., which may be
removed or destroyed without affecting the living
being ; so may all other organs — eye-glasses, wooden
limbs^perception without organs, as in dreams. In
those cases the organ is an instrument which may be
laid aside ; so the dissolution of matter or of organs
is not the destruction of the being himself.
Obj. It may be objected, this applies to brutes, which must,
therefore, be immortal, and moral too. To which answer,
a. Be it so ; brutes may have latent powers, which fit them to
' be immortal: and,
b. It does not follow ; brutes may have a natural immortaUty
without any higher faculties ; and God may dispose of
them as He shall please.
2. Is death the destruction (not of the living being, but) of our
present Uving powers of reflection, as it is of those of
sensation ?
a. Man lives in two states— sensation, and perception or re
flection.
b. Ideas once gained, sensation may be destroyed and reflection
remain untouched; for now,
1. We can and do reflect independently ofthe senses; and, .
2. In mortal diseases reflection is unaffected up to the
moment of death, and after sensation has ceased.
c Each state, indeed, affects the other ; but the destruction of

A Future Life.

23

'i

.' ¦¦',\

one thing which affects another is not necessarily the
destruction of the two.
d. Diseases even give a presumption to the contrary (see B b 2).
3. Is death even the suspension of our present powers of reflec
tion? No; for,
a. Such suspension is no part of the idea of death, which is
simply dissolution ofthe body.
b. Death may be like birth, a continuation and perfecting of
our powers ; and,
c. At all events, suspension of powers and destruction so differ,
that we cannot argue the second from the first.
I Obj. Death is after all our destruction, as is clear from vegetable
decay. But the things compared differed in the essential
point of comparison— the possession of hving powers of
perception.
Repeat conclusion in a positive form.
C. The future life here shown to be probable is natural:
1. We enter it naturally, by a change like our birth.
2. It is naturaUy social.
3. Ruled by natural yf.jrfi/ laws, according to virtue.
4. Nor less natural that these laws are administered by God, not
, by men, etc.
D. This probable proof of a future life helps rehgion as much
as deraonstration would do ; for,
1. Demonstration would not silence an unbeliever in religion,
since his unbeUef may- admit a future Ufe as it admits this ;
and,
2. Probable proof silences objections, and prepares the mind to
attend to the proper evidence of religion.

24 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.

CHAPTER IL
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS ;
AND PARTICULARLY OF THE LATTER.
Carefully mark that, in chap, ii., Butler is speaking of
govemraent simply, not of moral government, which is the
subject of chap. iii. "Acts have consequences, and those
consequences are foreseen," is the argument here: ''virtuous
acts have happy consequences, and those consequences are
foreseen," is the arguraent in the next chapter.' . . Professor
Fitzgerald has appropriately remarked, that in the outset of
this argument, we have an answer to all who regard religion
as a mere tJuory. It belongs not to speculation, but to those
practical matters on which our condition compels us to make '
up our minds one way or other. The Creator is not only the
first Cause of all, He is moral Governor; and our etemal
destiny is suspended upon our treatment of His claims.
INTRODUCTION. A future life is probable (chap, i,), and im
portant, because (chap, u.) our happiness in it may depend on our
present conduct, i.e., we are under government. Consider that we
are under govemment generally; and, under govemment by
punishment, as well as by rewards.
A, Under govemment generally ; i. e.,
1. Our present happiness and misery depend on our behaviour.
a. Life is preserved through care.
b. The possession of external goods depends on exertion, and
c. Enjoyment and misery are consequences of rashness, passion,
neglect, and their opposites.
Obj. 1. One may ask why, and wish that God had given happi
ness promiscuously ; but, in answer, remember

Government by Rewards, and Puniskments. 25
a. Such an arrangement may be impossible.
b. The present plan may produce more happiness than any
other.
c. God's goodness may be a disposition to make (not all but
only) the good happy.
d. The goodness of moral agents may be more pleasing to God
and better for the universe than mere happiness.
e. The reason may be to us incomprehensible— as colours to
the blind ; and
f. At all events the/a<r/ is (whatever the reason), that happiness
and misery do depend upon ourselves.
Obj. 2. One may object that these consequences of behaviour
follow (and are therefore to be ascribed to) the course of
Nature. Yes ; but
a. The course of Nature means Cod acting uniformly ; and, if
so, and our foresight of the course is His gift, then
b. We ascribe all to God, and deem our foresight a warning
and inducement given by Hun. It may be asked
indeed,
c. Whether, in every case, the pleasure foUowing an act proves
that God intended us to act, and the answer is, No.
^ It is a pleasant thing to behold the sun, and yet thereby
' the eye may be destroyed. The general truth, however,
remains. ¦
2. The knowledge that happiness depends on our behaviour is of
the essence of government, which is simply annexing con
sequences to acts, and giving notice of the arrangement.
a. Nor is it important that God should Himself, and immedi
ately execute His laws. They may execute themselves.
b. Even the lesser pains and pleasures which follow acts are
instances of proper govemment ; nor can this be denied
without denying aU final causes, of which such pains are
examples.
Conclusion. Hence, if told that God wiH reward and punish
hereafter, still attaching consequences to acts, such a state
ment is in harmony with the whole present course of
Nature, and so credible.

26 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
B, We are under governraent h'y punishment now, and so may
be hereafter.
1. Present punishments are analogous to future, of which re
ligion (not only revealed but natural) speaks, in various
respects :
a. Both follow actions of present advantage or pleasure.
b. They are often greater than the advantage or pleasure ob-'
tained by the acts they punish.
c. They are often long delayed, and yet come.
d. They often come not graduaUy, but suddenly.
e. They are never certainly foreseen, and seldom thought of at
the time of the act.
f. Opportunities once lost are never recalled.
g. They are often, after a time, beyond alleviation by re
pentance.
h. They foUow neglect or thoughtlessness as well as passion,
and,
i. They are sometimes final and irremediable.
2. Further note conceming them.
a. That they are not accidental or occasional, but matters of "¦
daily experience.
b. The present and the future are so analogous that both may
be described in the same words. Prov. chap. i.
c. So close is the analogy, that when once a future punishment
is proved (by its proper evidence), nothing can so fully
impress it on the mind as to note the facts above named.
d. Present punishments, however, are not always, it must be
admitted, in proportion to misbehaviour ; stiU they are
sufficient
1. To answer objections founded either on the imagination
that our frailty or temptation will excuse us ; that we
are tiecessary agents, and so guiltless ; or that God is
incapable of offence ; and
2. To create a serious apprehension of future punishment
and to rebuke presumption, scepticism, false security,
and licentiousness.

s

The Jiforal Government of God. 2f

CHAPTER III.
of THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD.
In chapter .ii. the fact of natural govemment was proved.
Here it is intended to prove that we are under moral
governraent A. Introductory remarks on raoral government generally, and
the evidence to be adduced.
1. Moral govemment implies the rewarding of virtue and the
punishment of vice ; perfect moral govemment, an exact
distribution of each.
2. Some hold that the character of God is that of simple bene
volence. But this is not probable ; for
a. This supposes that moral conduct is not regarded for its
own sake, and so gives no place for veracity and justice,
except as forms of benevolence ;
b. And though perhaps God is purely benevolent to some
beings, yet He is to us as we see, a Govemor, and so a
moral one.
3. It is admitted that the moral government of God here is not
perfect. The business of this chapter is to ascertain how
far it exists, and what are likely to be its results.
4. It is not intended to reason here from the presages of con
science, nor from the nature of things, nor from the greater
degree of happiness of virtue over vice (which it is difficult
to estimate), but on other grounds.
,B. A moral govemment, present and future, is argued firom
the following facts ;
- 1. God is a Governor, as we have seen (ch. ii.), and so probably
a moral Governor. Such a conclusion at least falls in with
our sense of things.

28

Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
2. Prudence and imprudence (lower forms of virtue and vice)
are rewarded and punished ; and this Is a moral arrange-
ment.
3. Vice IS punished, as mischievous to society, by penalties, and
by the fear ofthem (itself a kind of punishment).
a. This punishment, moreover, is natural ; and
b. Of God's appointment ; and though
C. It may be objected to that sometimes good actions are
punished (as in persecution) : yet note
1. That such punishment is in no sense necessary to society
and so not natural ; and />
2. Good actions are never punished, considered as such, but
through mistake, as the contrary.
4. Vice is punished as vice, and virtue rewarded as virtue
Where note
a. This statement implies that an action may have one effect,
and the quality of an action another (gain, for example,'
as gain, brings pleasure : gain, as dishonest gain, brings
misery).
b. It afiirms that virtue brings advantages to the virtuous, and
vice evils to the vicious; and the following are examples:
1. In our own temper virtue produces peace ; vice, vexation
and self-reproach ; and that these feelings are owing
to the quaUty of the actions is plain, for, etc.
2. Nor ought ^e. present fear of future punishment to be left
out of this view, and the present peace in prospect of
future happiness.
3. In common Ufe, also, virtue has rewards, and vice punish
ment; a virtuous man being befriended because ofhis
character, and in public life advantages are the natural
rewards of fidelity, patriotism, etc., as such ; while
external annoyances often foUow vice.
4 In domestic government, children and others are rewarded
for veracity, etc., aS such; and punished for falsehood,
as such.

i

\

n

^

The fHoral Government of God. 29
6. In civil government, though law regards actions chiefly,
yet the viciousness of the actor, or the opposite, will
often secure the infliction of the penalty, or induce men
to remit it.
c. The conclusion to which these facts lead is that, as our
moral nature is a proof that we are under moral govern
ment, and will be finally treated as responsible, so ex
amples justify this reasoning, and prove an existing
moral government now,
d. If it be asked, whence it is that virtue is rewarded and vice
punished, and that this rule is not reversed, answer, it is
- because
L Virtue brings present satisfaction to out-own minds ; and
2, With this moral nature God has made our happiness
1 depend largely upon one another; so that vice, being
infamous, brings punishment. Nor is there any such
regard for injustice and falsehood as for their opposites.
If examples can be quoted to the contrary, they are
felt by aU to be monstrous perversions.
e. Not, indeed, that the degrees of reward given to virtue are
always proportionate to it ; but it is rewarded, and vice
punished ; so much is clear.
f. It is admitted, also, that sometimes happiness and misery
are distributed according to other rules. But this is ex
plained ; for, 1. It may be as mere discipUne. 2. It may
be the result of the operation of general laws, which may
render persons prosperous, though wicked. 3. It is,
after aU, not a natural arrangement, since we intuitively
expect fhe opposite. 4. It will be found to be owing, in
most cases, to the perversion of some passion.
g. From the whole it is plain that this arrangement is a
declaration, upon God's part, that He is on the side of
virtue, which assurance is itself a fresh source of comfort
to the good man.
5. In the nature of things there is a tendency in virtue and vice
to greater rewards and punishments than <>'i present;

30. Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
which tendencies are a strong argument in favour of a
perfect moral govemment in tlu: future.
This tendency is seen in individuals; for virtue would be
more fully rewarded, and vice punished, but for accidental
causes ; and in society, where power under the direction of
virtue has a tendency to prevail over power not under its
direction ; as power with reason is stronger than power
without it This, however, needs to be explained.
a. Power with reason will conquer power without it, not neces-
¦- ¦ sarily, but commonly, under certain conditions ;
L There must be some proportion between the two powers.
2. Union among those who possess rational power.
3. Time and scope for the development of rational
power. Sometimes, however, want of reason will
succeed. 4. From its inability to foresee danger. .6.
From its attempting through ignorance what prudence
would avoid. 6. From certain conjunctures of weak
ness and discord. 7. From the force of a union
based upon instinct, and free from the divisions which
the passions of rational beings sometiraes produce. /
b. So, with regard to virtue, it has a tendency to prevail through
the union of the good for the sake of justice and veracity.
That this tendency is natural, and the hindrances to it
accidental, may be shown, either
1. By looking at the -whole universe, where, the visible and
the invisible being supposed analogous, virtue will
finaUy prevail ; as is shown by the analogous case of
reason ; provided, however, the same conditions be
fulfiUed. See above, a. 1, 2, 3-7, '
Obj. This tendency, indeed, is hindered, but it is by causes
which are accidental, and are likely to be removed in a
future state, which will give the requisite scope for the
operation of virtue, etc.
This supposition of a boundless universe, and virtue triumph
ant throughout, is only a supposition, but it is credible.
2. Or by looking at a human society, perfectly virtuous and
united, and working for a succession of ages (indefinite
' time, not as before, indefinite space).

T/te Jiforal Government of God.

. \

31
(a). At home, such a society would certainly prosper ; and
(b). Abroad, it would become the basis of a universal
kingdom.
c. Hence these tendencies are a distinct testimony, upon God's
part, to morality and virtue ; a testimony of great
importance, ifit be considered what the effect would be
if vice had the advantageous tendency of virtue, and
virtue the opposite.
C. The application of this analogy to a future moral govern-
. ment is obvious. It may, indeed, be objected at
the outset.
a. That good and evil may hereafter be mixed as now : Answer,
1. The nature of that future Ufe belongs to religion,
which it is not here intended to prove, but only to
confirm the proper proof of it 2. Even if these facts
did not confirm that proof, the proof itself remams in aU
its force.
b. But these facts confirm the proper proof of reUgion in various
ways. 1. They show that God is in favour of virtue, and
against vice. 2. They show that future perfect moral
govemment wiU be the corapletion of what has already
begun ; differing from the present, not in kind, but only
in degree. 3. They give reason to a hope that virtue
MAY BE more highly rewarded, and vice more severely
punished, in the next hfe than in this ; and they even,
4. Give reason to conclude that these rewards and
punishments will exist in a higher degree than here.
D. On the whole, conclude that, besides arguraents drawn
from our moral nature, the etemal relations of things,
the fitness of actions, there are arguments for a present
' moral govemment, and for a future perfect moral
government, based upon facts, B 1—6. The notion,
therefore, of such a future government is natural, and
even probable.

32 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.

CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION AS IMPLYING TRIAL, DIFFICULTIES,
ANt) DANGER.
In this chapter the difficulties and risks of a religious course,
the aggravatioh of those risks by the acts of others, are all
shown to correspond with what is experienced in coraraon
life, so that if we give up on these grounds the "God of
religion," we raust also give up the " God of Nature."
Commonly probation has the same raeaning as moral govern
ment It is here used, however, to indicate the difficulties and
risks consequent upon teraptatioa In this light it deserves
special consideratioa
A. That religious probation iraplies danger and risk (trial) in
regard to the future is not iraprobable, from the
analogy of our present natural probation, which makes
interest depend upon behaviour. The two are analogous
in many particulars.
1. lufact our interests in both respects are in danger from our
selves, as is clear from the foUowing :
a. God has made our happiness to depend on our own acts. b.
We blame ourselves for misconduct in temporal affahs.
c. We actuaUy miss happiness and incur misery through
our own acts. d. The acknowledged hazards of the
young, and the temptations to vices which are yet
mischievous.
2. The occasions or causes of our natural and religious probations
are analogous. These causes are in our nature or in our
circumstances.
a. Circumstances or temptations often betray men : so do their
passions ; the two mutuaUy implying each other.
b. So close is the analogy, that in both cases the same passions

Probation as implying Trial, etc.

33

•r

are excited by the same means ; so that we may ,
describe both by similar terms.
3. The effects of these temptations on men's behaviour are
analogous.
a. Some gratify themselves without looking at the future.
b. Some are deceived by passion.
' c. Some &XQ forced away by it against their judgment
d. Some shamelessly avow their preference for vice in spite
of consequences ; and
e. At the very least, men do voluntarily go wrong in both cases.
4. The way in which these difficulties and dangers are increased,
and in some sense made, is alike in both cases.
a. Others give us a bad education, set a bad example, encourage
dishonest practices, corrupt religion, and diffuse false
notions of happiness.
b. We ourselves increase our difficulties, by negligence ; by
, indulgence which weakens our moral powers ; by
accumulated irregularities, which make the course of
virtue perplexed and disadvantageous.
B. It is indeed objected that this state is improbable in
two respects.
1. Our condition thus appears to be unfavom-able to our interests.
Answer :
a., StiU it is not to be complained of, for with care our difliculties
may be met ; and, as to God, it is equitable that He
should put upon us what it is clear we can do, nor can
we complain unless, etc.
b. Our very condition in nature makes a similar condition in
religion probable, from the analogy between the two.
2. This condition involves hazards, and may work ruin, and must
be foreseen to work it : Such an arrangement is im
probable.
No doubt, a. Such hazai-d is a mystery, which, however, the
whole case may enable us to explain ; b. At all events
tha constitution of Nature is in favour of such hazard ;
and, c. As for the certainty of the ruin, it is as much
contingent as our conduct is.

34 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
C. The conclusion : in both capacities our interest is offered,
not to our acceptance, but to our acquisition ; we are in
danger of missing it ; and, without attention and self-
idenial, it must be missed.

CHAPTER V.

ON A STATE OF PROBATION AS INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE
AND IMPROVEMENT.
Introduction.— Why should there be the risk indicated in
the last chapter? is a question attended with insuperable
difficulties, a. All vice, indeed, is voluntary, and many
miseries have some good effects; yet the reason for the
existence of vice and misery we cannot give, and perhaps, b.
it is beyond our faculties to understand it, or it may be better
for us not to know it Yet, c. the existence of these conduces
to our fitness for another life. Though this be d. partial reason
only, it shows at least what our present business is— improve
ment in holiness;
A, The present trial, preparing us for a future life, is analogous
to the education raen now undergo in one state of life
preparing thera for another. This analogy will appear
from some considerations comraon to both probations
(1) 2) ; and. from a distinct consideration of each, the
natural (3) and the religious (4).
1. All creatures have capacities, etc., for a particular way of life.
Happiness depends now upon the agreement between
their capacities and their condition. So it must be in the
future.
2. The constitution of creatures is such that they may become
qualified for states of life for which they were once un
qualified, on which observe,

V

Probation as intended for Moral Discipline, 33
¦ a. Men experience increased facility of action, a settled altera
tion of character, an improvement by exercise of their
intellectual facuUies.* The first two are habit, as perhaps
is the third.
b. Habits are, according to their nature, either perceptive or
passive and af/«'wy or, according to man's ntX-a-c^, bodily
and mental; which last are either inteUectual or moral.
1. Our habits are formed by repeated acts, which acts, in
the case of moral habits, are either the carrying out
of practical principles and resolutions, or attempts to
induce others to act
2. Passive impressions, it must be noticed, are weakened by
repetition, and will not of themselves form habits.
3. From the two previous remarks it follows that, with
repetition, the motives and excitements to act become
feebler, as passive impressions, but stronger, as
active principles. Three examples, (a), (b), (c).
4 Hence habits are not strengthened by admonitions or
passive impressions, but by appropriate action.
6. Of much connected with them we may be ignorant, and
whether they can be formed in any other way, etc.
The facts, however are clear, and are such as the
foregoing.
6. With repeated acts, the faciUty and the pleasure increase,
etc., tiU a new character is gained.
3. Looking more closely at our present natural probation only
(one state oflife preparing us for another), we note,
a. Men start in hfe unfumished ; «^^^/«f acquired quaUfications
of knowledge and experience to fit tliem for after life.
, 1. If man were bom with matured faculties, yet without
training, he would be distracted how to use them;
and, probably, 2, so self-willed as to be unfit to leam.
b. This need Nature supplies, by placing us in the outset in a
condition for acquiring the necessary discipUne and
improvement
1. Children learn graduaUy the objects and facts around
them ; are placed under domestic government, where

36 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion,
they are taught self-control and obedience, and after
wards by experience they acquire caution and ac
quaintance with rules of conduct innumerable. 2.
This learning, however, depends much upon them
selves ; though part is communicated by others. 3.
Upon their behaviour and use of this discipline their
character and station depend.
c. To all this our religious probation is analogous, so that
Even if the manner of that religious probation is not
quite discernible, this is no objection. For we see not
the manner of our present probation, though we see its
results (sleep, food, restraint). ,
4. Looking more closely at our present religious probatioi\ only
(the present life preparing us for another), note,
a. That future lifo will apparently be moral, social, with scope
for virtue, and requiring it, though there is much not
revealed.
b. Our capability of moral improvement in preparing for that
state has already been proved (see above, 2, b, 1-6).
c. Our need of moral improvement will appear from the
foUowing considerations.
1. In fact, mankind are wicked, and at best imperfect.
2. From our nature, as finite beings, we are in danger of
deviating from right (a) through particular affections,',
which fix on external objects, are excited by them
independently of the moral principle, and our only
securityis(b) from the moral principle strengthened into
habit, as Butler describes. To apply this to a future
life supposes that particular affections will exist there.
If they do, then this discipline will be required. If
they do not, still the discipline will secure increased
happiness, if the government of the universe is moral.
3. The conclusion, and a fresh proof is, that a nature
originally upright may, through these laws, fail or be
improved in virtue.
(a) An upright nature may fail ; not through liberty,
which can account for nothing, but. through parti-

Probation as intended for Moral Discipline, 37
cular affections in themselves sinless, the operation
of which Butler describes in five particulars.
(b) Or be improved to higher and securer virtue, by
following the moral principle, which would be
strengthened as the particular affections would be
weakened, till at last security would be perfect ;
though a fall would always be possible, because the
affections and the moral principle would never be
absolutely coincident.
(c) Hence creatures made perfect may need discipline as
a security against faUing, and a state fit for discipline
may be requisite even for them.
4, If an upright nature needs improvement, much more does
one that is faUen.
d. The present state is peculiarly fit for such discipUne, for
1. It teaches moderation and self-restraint
2. Shows peculiarly our liability to vice ; a different thing
from speculative knowledge.
3. It puts us on our guard, exercises self-denial, the moral
principle, and forms virtuous habits. Self-denial,
indeed, is not necessary to virtue, but it conduces to
form habits of virtue.

'B. ^Objections —
1. It may be said, this state of discipUne overtaxes our powers,
and supposes a degree of improvement greater than we
are capable of.
2. It is said that, in fact, this life is rather a discipline in vice
than in virtue. Answer : a. It is not intended to give all
the reasons why men are placed here, but some only. b.
And, in fact, this life is a discipline in virtue to aU who
are willing to make it so. c. The fact that such discipline
is wasted with sorae is only analogous to other facts of
waste ; of seeds, for example, which yet God created to
becoine fruitful. The things here compared are, indeed,
different in value, but the facts are equaUy unaccountable.

38 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion,
3. It is said, against the whole of this discipline, that it makes
moral conduct proceed from fear and self-love, and so is
not properly moral discipline at all. To which answer,
a. To do God's commands because He gives them is obedience,
even though it proceed from fear or hope ; and repeated
acts of obedience will form the moral habit.
b. This distinction between self-love and regard to God's
authority may be too finely drawn. Both are coincident,
and may coexist as just principles of action. He,
moreover, who begins to act from the first, wUl come
ultimately to act morally in the highest sense.
¦ 4. The discipline here spoken of includes passive resignation,
and this can have no place in heaven, because tlure are
no afflictions. Answer,
a. Prosperity may beget discontent, as well as affliction.
b. And, though resignation is not needed in heaven, the habit
may be, for, without such habits, self-love and particular
aftections may be excited beyond their proper hmits.
And,
C. Submission to God's sovereignty, which is not usurped and
precarious, but just and etemal, requires in heaven the
same temper as resignation upon earth.
5. But might not all the difficulty and risks of this discipline,
have been prevented, if men had been made at once what
they were to be ? To which answer,
a. The law of life is not to save us trouble, but to impose it,
and enable us to go through it. What we become seems
ever dependent upon what we do.
b. Improvement by habit supplies natural deficiency, and
creates natural security, as acquirement in natural things
meets our bodily needs.
c. And everywhere we are to choose improvement at the price
of effort, or misery as the result of neglect.
C Probation not only iraplies risks (ch. iv.) and aids improve
ment (ch. v.), but it seems also intended for a third
purpose — manifestation of character. . ¦

^

Opinion of Necessity as influencing Practice. 39
1. This manifestation may refer only to this life ; but it may
refer also to the next : God intending to show what men
are, in order to make it clearer on what principles He deals
with them.
2. Certainly in this life such manifestation is a means of present
moral govemment, and seems essential to it ; always un-
proving men, if they act well.

CHAPTER VL
ON THE OPINION OF NECESSITY, CONSIDERED AS INFLUENCING
practice.
On the supposition that necessity is reconcilable with the
experienced constitution of Nature, the question, Is it also
with religion : answered in the affirmative.
Thus far the controversy has been with the deist Atheism,
however, may be supposed to maintain that necessity itself
accounts for the existence of things— an opinion which needs
first to be examined,
A. Does necessity (supposed reconcilable with Nature) destroy
the proof of an inteUigent Author, and so support
Atheism? No; for,
1. Necessity does not set aside an agent ;
2. Nor does.it exclude design and intelligence, either m men or
, in God. ' ,
' 3, It is trufe that men ascribe (in a loose way) the existence of
God to necessity ; but this is a new meamng of the word,
and is intended merely to imply that, prior to design iix
Nature, there must be a Divine existence. Answer re
stated.

40 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
B. Does necessity, supposed reconcilable with Nature, destroy
the belief that we are under moral government ? No ;
for, >
L When applied to practical matters (therefore religion included)
necessity is as if it were false : e.g.,
a. Let a child act upon it, and he will find that it is either not
true, or not acted upon as true.
b. Or a man in common life. Hence, probably, men are free.
Upon this, however, Butler does not here insist
Nor let any be surprised that, upon the opinion of necessity
being true, we act upon it as false, and thence blame our
reason ; for God has given us practical principles, which
we follow instead of reason, and to object to these is mere
conceit
2. Necessity, if true, is reconcilable with the possession of a
moral character, the foundation of veracity, benevolence,
and justice, both in us and in God.
a. That He possesses such a character is shown by His natural
character, and by final causes.
b. Necessity is reconcilable with some kind of character in us,
for it hinders neither truth nor falsehood.
If this be denied, and it be said. Admit necessity, and there
can be no moral characterin us, and so no just punish
ment. Answer, The necessity which destroys the in
justice of an act destroys the injustice of a punishment ;
and, after all, our conviction of a character remains ;
we StiU deem ourselves just or unjust, necessity notwith
standing.
c. So necessity is reconcilable with the character of God : as
reconcilable with veracity and justice as with any other.
Obj. And if it be objected that necessity destroys the proof of
such character, by making the happiness that follows virtue
a mere necessity, and no part of God's arrangement-
answer,
1. Happiness follows conduct, and is a consequence of it,
and not of necessity or fate: besides.

Opinion of Necessity as influencing Practice, 41
2. God governs according to some rule ; and veracity and .
justice seem the natural rule with One who can have
no competition with His creatures.
C. Nor, further, does necessity destroy the obligations and
proofs of religion, such as the following : —
L .The proof, from final causes, of an inteUigent Creator ;
» 2. The proof, from present govemment, ofa future govemment;
3. The proof, from our moral faculty, of the final reward of
virtue :
Which faculty is a rule, having authority, and enforcing its
decisions wilh sanctions. Every rule impUes such sanc
tions. But, in Oiis rule, the sanctions are expressed in the
very sense of good or ill desert connected with it, and the
dread of future punisiiment
Nor does any objection of necessity lie againsti this faculty or
its conclusions ; the existence of the faculty being a fact,
and the conclusion being drawn immediately from it.
4. This reasoning is confirmed by various facts, such as the ten
dencies of virtue and vice; the punishment of vice, as mis
chievous to society, and as vice.
5. The external evidence of religion, as,
a. .The general consent of aU ages and countries :
b. The early belief in religion, which implies either the natural
ness of religion, or the Divine origin of it ; which latter
is probable on various grounds : and,
c. Ancient tradition of a revelation, which has force irrespective
of tlie claims of any particular book, or the present
purity of any religious system.
• Note carefuUy, that in studying all such doctrines our facul
ties are peculiarly Uable to err ; so that, though we are
not to neglect them, we must be on our guard.
D. After all, the objector may say, I cannot confute this
argument, or answer these proofs ; nor need I. We
are not free, whatever we think, and so are not to be

42 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion. ''
punished; and any systeni that affirras we are must
be rejected. But answer. Experience shows
The conclusion is false wherever the fallacy lies. Either
we are free, and so punished; or, being necessary
agents we are punished still,— now and in the life to
come.
From the whole gather a double conclusion :
1. Necessity, supposed consistent wth the present constitution of
things, does in no sort prove. that we shall not be rewarded
eternally according to our deserts; nor does it affect the
proof that we shaU. It leaves untouched all religion,
natural and revealed,
2. Hence the only senses in which necessity, if taught in religion,
can be said to destroy religion :
a. Practically, by leading atheists to encourage themselves in
vice :
b. ReaUy, by contradicting our experience that we are free,
and the course of Nature : ' "
c Though not in this sense, that it is reconcileable with
Nature, but not with religion.

V

CHAPTER VIL

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR
CONSTITUTION, IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
The subject of this chapter is a favourite one with many
emuient writers ; and Butler himself (Serraon xv.) has stated,
it at~ large. Leibnitz has repeatedly enforced the sarae
arguraent, as has Addison in the Spectator, No. 207.

fmpcrfect Comprehension of God's Government. 43
Objections against ih&fact of raoral govemraent have been
considered. There are others against its moral character :
Is it wise aud good, and can objections to its wisdom and
goodness (founded on the existence of evil) be answered?
They may indirectly, thus :
A. God's moral and natural governraent are so analogous,
'''that it is credible His raoral government is like His
natural govemment, an incoraprehensible scheme.
And this general fact raay answer particular objections.
Note the fact itself, 1, 2 :
1. God's natural government is an incomprehensible scheme.
a. A scheme, 1, with parts and correspondences ; 2, relations
between different events and actions throughout all
, space ; and, 3, through all time.
b. An incomprehensible scheme ; so that we can, 1, give no
account of things in all their connexions; nor can we,
2, say that anything, however insignificant, is not a
necessary condition of something most important
2. God's moral government is also an incomprehensible scheme :
a. A scheme, as appears from
' ' 1. The connexion between the two govemments ;
2. The subservience of the natural to the moral ; and,
3. The analogy between the two.
b. And so incomprehensible. Hence no objections against
parts of this scheme can be insisted upon by reasonable
men.
3. Our ignorance (though often overlooked) is a satisfactory
', ,' answer to objections against the wisdom and goodness of
the whole arrangement, as it will further appear '
a. From the weakness ofthe assertions on which the objections
J ' rest : " in some way (by repeated interpositions, or by
making all acts single and unrelated), things might be
better:" — which is saying but little; and is, after all,
. only arbitrary assertion without proof.

44 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
I. b. From the nature of our ignorance, which includes the very
related parts to which existing works belong. Did we
see the related parts, our objections might at once cease.
B. Some particular analogies between the two govemments
further show the weakness of these objections.'
1. In both, means are connected with ends; and,
a. In natural government, undesirable means are connected
with desirable ends; and so,
b. May it be in moral government
Obj. And though an absurd conclusion is thence derived that
evil is better than good, yet this may be answered ; for to
permit evil may be better than forcibly to prevent it ; yet
the non-commission of it may be better still, as health is
better than disease, and yet some diseases are remedies
for others which are worse.
2, In both, govemment is carried on by general laws.
a. God's natural govemment is; and those laws are wisest, be
cause general, though not preventing (so far as we at,
present see) great irregularity.
Obj. 1. It may be said that this irregularity might be prevented
by dhect interposition ; but such interposition would
have other and bad effects (in promoting negligence,
for example).
2. And if it be said that these bad effects might be pre
vented by further interposition, this is mere random
talk.
b. So God's moral government may be : the general laws wise
and good, but admitting of irregularity, and forbidding
interposition.
C Obj. To the whole of this arguraent We must judge
of God's govemment from what we know, not from
what we do not know. At any rate such answers
(founded on ignorance), to objections against God's
government are answers to the proofs of it To which,
reply

Imperfect Comprehension of God's Government. 45
L Total ignorance precludes both objections and proof ; but
partial does not. We may know, for. example, the
character of an agent, and the ends he wiU pursue,
but not the means he will use. So here we have
distinct proofs of God's character and of His ends :
how best to attain those ends we may not know.
'2. Even if our ignorance invalidated the proofs of God's
moral government, moral obligations would remain,
because
They rise frora our nature, which we cannot neglect
without self-condemnation ; and, as the possibiUty of
moral government is established, prudence leads us
to obey them.
3. What answers objections against God's moral govemment
 our ignorance — does not invalidate the proofs of
that government
4. The answers above given are founded not upon our
1 ignorance, however, but upon our incompetency
through ignorance ; a very different thing. Our
• incompetency is taught by experience, and is reaUy
knowledge.

PART n.
OF REVEALED RELIGION.

CHAPTER L
OF the IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Introduction. — To two
revelation is not obvious.

classes the importance of ' a

a. Some reject it as incredible or superfluous, and they are
answered by the state of the heathen.
b. Others neglect it (even when they admit its truth), suppos
ing that it is only the teaching of Nature in another
form.
c. As a fact, however, God has given it, and it may thence be
presumed to be important
A. Christianity may be shown to be important by considering it
1, As a republication of natural religion (God, His government,
laws, etc.).
a. In its genuine simplicity :
b. With authoritativeness— /. e., with new proofs, as miracles
and prophecy. These latter add
1. To the evidence of natural religion, inasmuch as natural
religion is part of revealed, and they confirm both.
They also give authoritative or -n&w proofs.
2. Though Nature is in a sense a miracle, and so has its
own miraculous evidences; yet, practicaUy, the miracles
of Scripture are more authoritative, as is seen in two
cases— a teacher working miracles among an ignorant

V I

Of the fmportance of Christianity. 47
people, and an intelligent inquirer who has leamt all
that Nature can teach, and is waiting to have his
doubts removed.
c. With fiew light, especially on a future state, repentance, etc. ;
d. With a visible church, having positive institutes and pubUc
worship ; the first,
1, As a form ever reminding men of the reality ; and the
second,
2. Instructing and reproving them ; both tending to perpe
tuate and diffuse the tmth, as may be seen
3. If we compare the state of the world be/ore and since
revelation was given. It may indeed be said,
4. That Christianity in this visible church has been perverted
and uninfluential, and so is unimportant But answer,
(a) Such reasoning sets aside all religion, for natural
religion has also been perverted ; and
(b) The good effects of Christianity are not small, whUe
its bad effects are not effects ofit at aU.
(c) These effects, moreover, are exaggerated, ¦ or are
charged to Christianity as a pretence ; and
(d) In all dispensations we must judge them by their
tendencies, if men did their part, and not by their
perversion.
e. With express commands to aU Christians to preserve and
transmit it.
2, As a revelation of a distinct dispensation ; . whh new truths
and duties.
a. New truths : redemption by the Son and Spirit ; and
b. New duties to the Son and the Spirit ; which duties spring
from our relations to each, as our duty to God springs
, from our relation to Him ; more particularly these duties
are all internal or external.
1. Internal: natural religion referring to the internal acts
, or states of the heart in religion to God ; revealed, to
internal acts or states in relation to the Son and the
¦•.^ Spirit These duties arise out of our relations ; nor is

48 Analysts of. Butler's Analogy qf Religion.
I it important how we come to know them (by reason
or by revelation) : and external; expressions, that is,
of intemal states, according to revealed command :
whether as to the Father, the Son, or the Spirit
These duties also ariie .out of relations ; and are
many of them
2. Moral ; i. e. —
(a) The obligations we owe the Son are as moral as the
obligation of charity ; they spring out ofthe nature
of the case :
(b) While the violation of them has evil consequences,
and is as inexcusable in the case of revelation as in
the case of reason, a truth appUed to the Son and
to the Spirit
Conclusion.
B. Note two deductions to illustrate the foregoing and prevent
mistakes.
1. Mark the distinction between moral and positive in religion.
a. In moral duties we see the reason for them ; in positive we
do not.
b. Moral duties arise out ofthe nature of the case (relations),
positive from external command.
c. How we come to know relations and duties is a question
that does nothing in deciding what duties are positive
and what moral : external obligations due to God and
Christ are positive ; though the relation of the Father
to us is taught by reason, — the relation of the Son, by
Scripture, etc.
d. Positive institutions (though always fixed by external com--
mand) , are founded either on natural religion or on
revealed.
2 Mark, that from this distinction we gather the ground of the
preference given in Scripture to moral over positive duties.
a. Carefully note, however, that positive duties, as a whole
(though not any particular modes), are morally binding ;
and the two must not be contrasted further than as
they differ.

, ' , Of the fmportance of Christianity, 49
b. If they interfere, fulfil the moral, because,
1. The moral has always a reason in its favour, and
2. It is itself an end, whUe positive duties are only means.
C. Popularly speaking, both are commanded, and so both are
binding, yet still the moral are also written in our
hearts, and so are to be preferred.
d. The question, moreover, is settled for us. The moral is
decided to have superior claims —
1. By the nature of the case, which tells us that nothing can
be acceptable to God without holiness (moral virtue),
and,
2. By Scripture, which lays stress ever on the moral, and
teUs us of our Lord's declarations (Matt. ix. 13, etc.),
which are general and decisive.
e. -Guard, however, against the mistake of supposing that be
cause positive are less important than moral duties,
therefore they are of no importance. Positive Divine
commands lay us under a moral obUgation to obey
them.
C. Another deduction or inference (afterwards expanded, chap.
ill.) is, that as Christianity is not discoverable by
', reason, its- scheme must be sought in Scripture ; nor
is it an objection to any interpretation of Scripture that
it discloses a doctrine or a precept, not contrary to
reason and natural religion, but above them, that is
neither discoverable through their teaching nor made
obligatory by their authority.

so Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion,

CHAPTER IL
OF THE SUPPOSED PRESUMPTION AGAINST A REVELATION,
' CONSIDERED AS MIRACULOUS.
Christianity is, as we have seen (chap, i.), important
Before considering particular objections to it, revelation in
general is objected to ; because, from the very nature of the
case, it is above Nature, and so miraculous. The miraculous
ness of revelation, and miracles generally, will therefore be
first considered. Are objections to revelation on this ground
well founded?
A. The objection lies, not against the particular doctrines of
Christianity, but against revelation ; and that on one
of two grounds ; either
1. Because the scheme of religion is not discoverable without
revelation. But this is no just objection ; because there
are in Nature innumerable things not discoverable by
our natural faculties, but yet true and real.
2. Or, because revelation, as miraculous, is unlike the known
course of Nature. But this is no just objection ; because
a. It is not probable that everything in the unknown course of
Nature, is like something in the known.
b. And, even in the known course of Nature, many things are
unlike one another.
c. The course of Nature is not so unUke revelation as many
suppose, and this will hereafter appear. - '
Whether the above examples include aU that is meant
by miraculous, may be questioned. But the general
idea expressed by the word being clear, note further

V

\

Presumption against Miraculous Revelation. 51
B. That against revelation as miraculous, or against miracles
as proofs of it, there could be no presumption at the
, beginning of the world ; for,
1. A miracle has reference to the course of Nature, and implies
something different from it But at first no course had
been established, and so there is no other objection to
miracles at that time than to any other fact.
2. Or the argument may be put thus. The power exerted in
creation (whether called miraculous or not), was different
from what is exerted in the present course of nature ; and
,, , whether that power was exerted so as to give a revelation,
is a question that affects the degree, not the kind of power
put forth. If this power bc caUed miraculous, then the
presumption against the use of such a power to give a
¦ revelation, is even less.
3. Add, that from history it seems that religion was not first
reasoned out, but revealed— a fact that confirms natural -
religion, and may remove prejudices against subsequent
communications.
C. Nor is there any presumption against miracles, or
revelation as rairaculous, after the course of Nature
has been settled ; for
, L Generally, we need a second ruined world, from which to take
, ¦ the analogy; and, even from that case (a single one),
.our proofs would be precarious ; and,
2. Particularly, though there be presumption against mhacles,
yet
a. As, in common facts, even a small amount of proof in their
favour may set aside the presumption against them.
b. We know so little upon what the course of Nature depends,
that we cannot say miracles, are more improbable than
many general facts.
c. Looking at the religious interests of the race, we see reasons
for them.

52 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion,
d. Comparing them, as we ought, with extraordinaiy events
(as comets, earthquakes), the presumption against them
seems almost as unfounded as the presumption against
those events.
D. Hence Conclude
1. That there is no such presumption against miracles as renders
them incredible,
2. That, on the contrary, as there are reasons for them, there is
a presumption in their favour ; and
3. That, as compared with the extraordinary facts of Nature,
there is no peculiar presumption against them at all.

CHAPTER IIL
OF OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT WERE TO BE EXPECTED
IN A revelation; and THE CREDIBILITY, FROM ANALOGY,
THAT IT MUST CONTAIN THINGS APPEARING, LIABLE TO
OBJECTIONS,
The objection to Christianity, as miraculous, has been
already considered (chap. ii.). Other objections agamst its
deficiencies, its doctrine of redemption, its want of universality,
its evidences, are considered hereafter. In this chapter,
objections against Christianity as a scheme (not against its
evidences), are shown to be frivolous. It is probable, from
analogy, that Christianity will contain rauch that is different
FROM OUR EXPECTATIONS (or anticipations, see note 3), antj
therefore objectionable.
A. Apply the first part of this statement to Christianity, as a
whole. It is likely to contain much that is different
from our expectations.

fncapacity in Judging of Revelation.

53

1; In Nature we find that God rules and instructs according to
¦ certain laws. In Scripture we are told new truths con-
^ nected with His government j and these two make together
one scheme of Providence.
' 2. We are, in fact,, incompetent judges of the first, as has been
shown. It is, therefore, probable that we shall be in
competent judges of the second. Both are likely to
appear objectionable,
B. Apply this statement to instruction by inspiration. It is
hkely to differ from what we expect
In the case of natural religion, we know not, before
experience, by what laws or means, or to what degree,
or by what evidence, or in what mode, or even through
what faculty it will be imparted. So in what is
revealed. And, if any object that we are competent judges oni
' some points, that oral revelation, for example, is a'
better means of avoiding mistakes than written, it is
answered, that we are not told what God's purpose is,
and so cannot compare the different means for
securing it
C. Hence the following conclusions :
1. As to Christianity as a whole, w'e are incompetent judges ol
what may be expected in a revelation. Therefore, the
only question is, whether Christianity is a real revelation ;
not whether it is what we expect it to be. The only valid
objection to it, if there be any, is against its evidence.
2. As to the way in which its instruction is given, the only
question is, whether it is a Divine book, not whether it is
such or such a book. For deficient style, or deficient
evidence of genuineness, or various readings in the text,
are no proofs against it, unless it was promised that a
Divine revelation should be free from these presumed
difficulties. And

54

Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.

Obj

les?.l , "' """^'T^ "°' '^'^^ ^"y "•'^"io" that it is
less clearly expressed than we hoped.
'^L'^'TuT'^^t"'' '' ™*y "^^ °'^J"t'=''. that internal
improbab.ht.es (that is, things contrary, to expectation)
weaken external probable proof. True. But, as has been
seen, real intemal improbabilities are overcome by the
most common testimony. And, in revelation, we scarcely
know what improbabilities are.
D. To^expand this last statement, and explain the second part
ofthe statement made at the outset, that revelation is
likely to contam much that appears objectionable,
note '
1. That the instmction given to men and brutes respectively, is
very objectionable in its limits, thus : it is objectionable
a. That we should be instrt.cted in the laws of matter more
easily and truly than in the cure of diseases.
b. That we discover, as by accident, what years of inquiry fail
to attain. ? ¦^
c. That language is liable to infinite abuse ; and is, at best
ambiguous. >
d. That brute instinct is. often more skilful than human
prudence. , ,
2. So is revealed instmction likely to be liable to similar
objections, as to its character and degrees. Nor are these
objections more numerous than we might expect them
to be.
E. Apply this reason to a particular case, to see, more clearly
its force and applicability. It is said, the gifts in the
apostohc age were not miraculous, because not used
in an orderly manner. To which answer
L Those who used them had power over them ; and the use ot
them depended, as might be expected, on the prudence or
imprudence of the possessor. So they are like other gifts ; '

X

'\

V

fncapacity in Judging of Revelation, 55
and, if it be said, these gifts should have been given only
to the prudent or that prudence ought to have been added
to the gift, or that God should have interposed. Answer—
2, We cannot judge what ought to have been the degree of the
gift ; nor are gifts generally given in Nature according to
the pmdence of those who own them. Nor is instmction
generally given in common life, in such forms only as
best commend it to us,
F. The analogy between the natural and revealed methods of
instruction, raay be further applied,
L In Nature, practical rules of conduct are generally plain. So
are the faith and behaviour of practical Christianity.
2, In Nature exact thought is sometimes required for the study
of parts ; so in the study of parts of Scripture,
3. Progress in each department is hindered by the same, or
similar, causes.
4, In Nature, as in Scripture, the full discovery of tmth seems to
depend on the progress of leaming, of Uberty, and upon
the diligence of the studious. All the Bible is not now
understood ; nor is the whole of Nature.
G. To these analogies, between the instruction imparted by
the two schemes (l),«and between the two schemes
themselves (2), it is objected,
1. That natural instmction is comparatively unimportant ;
whereas religious instmction is essential. ' Answer—
a. This distinction is not material to the argument ; which
is, that Nature gives, not as we expect, but differently.
- b. Some ofthe things not told us in Nature are important, and
even essential, to comfort ; and
c. Whatever be thought of these statements, still, neither in
Nature, nor therefore in religion, does God dispense in
struction according to our notions of it§ importance.
2. That Christiaiiity, being professedly a remedial system, is not

$6 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
likely to be so open to objections or perversions, as natural
revelation. Answer —
a. If both are from the same hand, this an-angement is by no
means incredible ; since remedies in Nature (for diseases
reaUy fatal) are often late discovered, doubted, and
perverted, etc. And further, on this principle of
reasoning,
b. If the remedies, natural or Christian, are not true, because
not what we might expect, then the diseases themselves
are not tme, for they also are against expectation,
H. From the whole gather two conclusions ; the one negative,
and the other positive.
1. Not that reason is no judge of anything in regard to revela
tion (because it is not judge of everything), for reason may
judge—
a. Of the meaning of Scripture, and also,
b. Of its morality ; that is, not whether it is what we might
expect from a holy God, but whether it is plainly not
contrary to holiness, and to what Nature teaches us of
Him. It is true that objections are taken to Scripture
morality, but they apply equally to the constitution of
Nature. Particular precepts also are objected to, but
they are temporary, and refer to actions, not habits ;
and though liable to be perverted by enthusiasm, are of
a piece with religion as a system of probation,
c. Of its evidence.
2. Positively, the truth of Christianity is cleariy not affected by
objections against its scheme.
a. For such objections are founded upon principles which
Nature contradicts. And the particular things objected
to are reaUy analogous to the course of Nature.
b. The scheme of Christianity may even supply positive
arguments in its favour, if it differs from the schemes
which enthusiasm and imposture have framed.

Christianity Imperfectly Comprehended,

S7

CHAPTER IV.
OF CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED AS A SCHEME OR CONSTITUTION,
IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.
The aphorisms of three very different men are worth quoting
in connexion with this chapter. " Either nothing is mysterious,"
says Dr. Thomas Brown, "or everything is." "The last
step of reason," says Blaise Pascal, " is to know that there
•is an infinitude of things which surpass it." " Of the dark
parts of revelation," says Warburton, " there are two sorts :
one which may be cleared up by the studious application of
well-employed talents; the others, which will always reside
within the shadow of God's throne, where it would be impiety
to intrude." A Christianity without mystery is a shallow
faith, as nnphilosophical as it is unscriptural.
It raay be true, as shown (chap, ill.), that we are imperfect
judges ofthe Christian system. Still are the things objected
to really wise and good ? And, before proceeding to notice
these things in detail, there is a general argument, similar to
the one given in Part I. chap, vit., which needs to be
remembered — viz., that Christianit)' is a scheme, like God's
natural government, imperfectly comprehended; that the '
whole is credibly consistent with goodness, and iUustrative of
it ; and tliat, if we knew all, it would appear to be so.
A. As moral govemment, so Christian, is an incomprehensible
scheme.
1. It is a scheme, under the plan of Providence, seeking the final
perfection of man ; beginning with our recovery, and
, mvolving the office of a Messiah, a sanctifying Spirit,

58 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion. '
invisible government over the Church, a gradual prepara
tion ofthe redeemed for heaven, and a final judgment.
2. And it is a scheme imperfectly comprehended ; a mystery of
godliness ; the things revealed ever running up into
mysteries, and a large part of it still undisclosed.
B. Note two important particular analogies between the two :
1. As the natural govemment of God, so Christianity uses, to
accomplish ends, means, undesirable it may be, or foolish,
yet, in Nature, none the less appropriate to secure the
desired result.
2. As the natural government of God, so Christianity is carried
out by general laws,
a. That God's natural government is so carried on We conclude
from the many cases in which we can trace those laws.
" By analogy " we apply to all what we see to be tme of
a part So,
b. We may conclude that Christianity is carried on by general
laws, even though, in particular cases, we see only the
fact, and not the law, as in miracles. Hence, though
some exigencies may be met by miracles, yet every
exigency may not be so met ; a reason for miraculous
interposition in some cases, and not in all, ^
C. Hence conclude that, as Christianity is a scheme with
means and general laws, it is liable to objections frora
apparent deficiencies and irregularities, which would
cease if the whole case were known.
C, Objections to a Christian scheme, as a fact, have been
met (chap, iii.). Objections against its consistency
with wisdom and goodness have been already met in
this chapter. Objections to particular parts of the
scherae may be met by particular analogies in Nature,
In the following chapter other parts are taken up.
There it is intended to notice a particular objection

The System of Christianity.

59

to the scheme as a whole, involving especially a use
of intricate means for the salvation of the world. No
just objection to Christianity can hence arise ; for
1. In Nature and in Providence (the seasons, the progress of
nations, for example,) means equally intricate and tedious
are employed, so that the objection applies equally to
Nature and to religion. And, further,
2; We distinguish means and ends ; while, in fact, the distinction
may be absurd. And certainly, with God, means may be
as important a part of the proccss as the end itself.
These are expanded.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PARTICULAR SYSTEM OF CHRISTIANITY ; THE APPOINT
MENT OF A MEDIATOR, AND THE REDEMPTION OF THE
WORLD BY HIM.
The mediation of Christ has been greatly objected to, but
without reason; for
A. The analogy of Nature supplies no presuraption against
the general notion of mediation, but the contrary :
For upon the instrumentality or mediation of others
we depend for our birth and nature ; for happiness and
misery.
B. The moral government of God, which mediation presup
poses, and which religion tells us extends into another
life, is natural.
L Present punishment, one effect of moral govemment, is cer-

6o Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
tainly natural, ever following vice ; and, in the same way,
future punishment may naturaUy follow vice.
2. Nor need any object that, upon this supposition, justice is
taken out of God's hand, and given to Nature ; for
a. It is God who does what Nat'&re is said to do ; and
b. In Scripture natural punishments are ascribed to God, and
yet are deemed natural, as distinguished from miraculous ;
and
c. By "natural" is meant, not arbitrary, but just and reason
able ; such, moreover, as are in accordance with general
laws.
0. All the present penal consequences of vice are not always
inflicted, but a provision is made to prevent them, and
so may some of the future consequences be prevented.
1. Men may think that it would have been better for evil not to
have existed ; still it does exist, though God often provides
remedies even for such evils as are penal.
2. Such provision might have been withheld ; an arrangement
severe, perhaps, but not unjust.
3. In fact, however, there is such a provision, and analogously wc
may hope that it will extend into the future, so that the
consequences of vice may not follow universally in all
cases.
4. Some may be surprised that this is stated as a supposition
only. But if the consequences of irregularities even (not
vice) be so serious, and of vice often extreme misery and
death, what may we not fear that the consequences of
irreligion will be, looking at the disorder it introduces ?
However, some of the future penal consequences of sin
may be prevented.

D. We have no reason, however, to suppose that these
consequences can be prevented by anything we can do ;
for.

Tite System of Christianity.

6i

1. We know not what reasons for punishmeAt may exist, or what
' the natural consequences of vice are, and so cannot tell
what can prevent them.
,2. Nature, moreover, leads to the conclusion that we cannot pre-
, vent them ; for min is often the consequence of vice, nor
i' I ¦ can repentance repair the evil. Our ability to repair it is
often weakened ; and, even if not, we have to depend on
• others.
3, Our notions of government are all against the supposition that
repentance wiU prevent the future painful consequences of

4. This conclusion is favoured by the general sense of mankind,
who add sacrifices to their repentance.
E. The general doctrine of revelation on these questions
confirras these views. It confirras our fears, and tells
us of the future consequences of vice. It supposes a
, state of ruin (a supposition not contrary to reason) ;
teaches us that we cannot be pardoned through
repentance alone, yet affirras that pardon is possible,
therein revealing God's goodness in preventing punish
ment and bestowing salvation through the suffering of
another, all which is consistent with what we already
.. know of God ; and if any object
1. That this doctrine is inconsistent with goodness ; answer, that
even the supposition that the whole creation had perished
would not be inconsistent with it, therefore much less is
this. Or,
2. That it presupposes a degraded state ; answer,
a. That Christianity does not put us into this state.
b. That the fact we are in this state is confirmed by aU ex
perience (the best complain, and most grow worse with
age) ; and
c. How we are so, and why, may be difficult to explain ; yet
the Scripture account is analogous to' much around us,
and to our recovery by Christ

62 Analysis of Butler's Analogy qf Religion,
F, These considerations show that mediation generally is
analogous to what we see in Nature; nor can any
valid objection be taken to the particular manner in
which Christ Interposed.
1, The doctrine of Scripture is in general, that Christ came to
teach, and then to die for us. This last fact, especially set
forth in the law, and clearly revealed in the gospel,
2, More particularly He appeared
a. As a Prophet ; teaching the law of Nature, purely, authori
tatively, with new light, and adding many truths peculiar
to Himself, besides leaving us His own example,
b. As King ; mling in His Church ; the number of which He
is about to perfect, and to receive to glory.
C. As Priest ; offering up Himself a sacrifice, universal, effica
cious, and final.
Men may ask how this sacrifice is availing. But this
question is not answered ; our conjectures are, therefore,
uncertain. Scripture teaches that He makes repent
ance acceptable, and our wisdom is to accept the
blessing without curiously inquiring how it affects its
, end.
G. Hence, since we are ignorant of much that mediation
involves, objections against the scheme of mediation
generally, and against the Scriptural scheme, are futile ;
whetiier against '
1, The necessity of it.
2. The nature, parts, and duties of the Mediator's office, unless
such objections are founded upon the unfitness of the means
to the end proposed.
3. Of unfit means, the suffering of Christ, as innocent for guilty,
is supposed to be an example ; but the answer is obvious :
a. In the constitution of Nature men thus suffer.
b. Against that constitution the argument is stiU stronger, for
Christ suffered w/««i^ar/^. ' . -.

The Systein of Christianity. -

63

I

V

I

c. In the end, aU (Christ included) will be treated according to
their deserts.
d. Such suffering is found, in fact, to contribute largely to the
relief of man ; and
e. The, reasonableness of the doctrine, and its fitness for the
end, is seen in its natural tendency to vindicate God's
laws, and deter men from sin.
f. The objection, moreover, really means that it is not fit,
because we do not see it to be so,
4.- Such objections are all unreasonable, for they are based upon
our ignorance; that is, the reason of the arrangement isnot
told us, and yet we object to it; they are most unreasonable
' because, so far as we can judge, it is analogous to natural
facts ; besides, it is part of the doctrine in which we are
not actively concemed ; further
5. From Scripture and from analogy we leam that, while our duty
is made clear, we are not to expect the same cleamess in
what Scripture tells us ofthe Divine conduct
a. In Nature we gather mies oflife by experience. Ofthe vast
scheme of Providence we know little ; so,
b. Analogously in Scripture, the things not understood relate
to God's part, not to human duty. In both there is much
we can understand; but our duties are always clear, whe
ther moral or positive, and the reasons for them; and
' even if they were not, the fact that they are commanded
is sufficient to make them binding.

64 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.

CHAPTER VI.
OF THE WANT OF UNIVERSALITY IN REVELATION : AND OF
THE SUPPOSED DEFICIENCY IN THE PROOF OF IT.
The evidence of revelation is deficient, it is said,, and so
the revelation is not true. Revelation is not universal, it is
said, and therefore not true. These objections, which are
made (it will be noticed) positive arguments against religion,
are against both natural and revealed. Note —
A. These objections are groundless, for they rest upon these
two groundless suppositions :
1, That God will not bestow favour upon us, except in that de
gree which we think most advantageous,
2, That God will not bestow blessings upon some, except He
bestow them upon all. Suppositions which the general
analogy of Nature contradicts.
B. These objections are answered by analogies in God's
natural governraent
1. The evidence, it is said, is doubtful, because deficient. But
so is the evidence
a. Of what constitutes our temporal interests ; and
b. Of the best and surest means of attaining it
2. Revelation is not, it is said, universal. But so neither is the
bestowal of natural gifts ; which want of universality, how
ever, is no argument against God's natural government, nor
against the prudent management of our affairs under it.
This evidence, and the partial bestowment of tmth, illus
trated in the successive ages of Judaism and Christianity ;
in the condition of the heathen and of Mahometans, and
of those who live under a corrupt religious system, etc;
and the whole shown to be analogous to facts in Nature,
and in the providence of God.'

"^

Want of Universality in Revelation. 6$.
C. ,This reasoning, defended by the fact, that every man will
be treated according to his light and privileges;
though this statement does not imply either
1, That all rrlen's religious condition is equally advantageous; or
2. That we ought not, therefore, to improve our own condition,
or that of others,
D.' What the reasons of this arrangement are, we cannot tell ;
but it may be said,
1. Generally, that the same principle which disposed God to
make various orders of creatures, and with various
capacities, disposed Him to place creatures of the same
order (and even the same creatures, at different periods),
in different positions.
2. More particularly, it is very difficult to give a reason; as may
be seen from our own case. A system like ours, implies /
' Things past and future, unknown to us, but possibly con-
i taining the explanation :
It requires, too, variety ; which may supply the reason.
And, at all eVents, the reason why we are placed in a
state of ignorance, is probably also the reason, why the
reason of our being in that state is not told us.
E. That this arrangement is no ground of complaint, appears
from the follo\ving facts : —
1, The deficiency of Christian evidence may be part ofour intel
lectual probation, intended to e.xercise our minds virtuously '
in examining the evidence. Such e.xercise in inteUectual
matters may as easily test our fairness and candour as pro
bation in practice.
2, It may be part of our general moral and religious probation,
that it proves our character, thus: —
If religion is only supposably credible,
a. Serious inquiry, and moral self-control, are made obligatory;
and profanity, carelessness, and presumption are thereby
condemned : especially ¦ F

66 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
b. As our example will have influence with others ; the reason
being,
L That doubt supposes some evidence; and
2, The lowest evidence ought to have some practical in
fluence. The degree of that influence depends on the
fairness and honesty of our character ; the practical
neglect of any evidence showing moral deficiency, just
as the incapacity to discern it shows our intellectual
deficiency.
3. It may constitute moral discipline and improvement ; as do
difficulties in practice, when the truth is believed.
Temptation of any kind (as to evidence, for example),
exercises, and so proves, the moral principle,
a. Teaching us not thoughtlessly to reject evidence, nor to
conceal it, and to act virtuously, even though the results
are uncertain ; and
b. What is thus exercised and proved is thereby strengthened.'
So that there is the same reason for deficient evidence, as
for our trials ; nor is it unlikely
C. That with some (whose external temptations are small),
these difficulties form the chief part of their discipline;
as in common life some are tried, not by having to
practice pmdence, but by having to find out what pru
dence is.
F. After all, though it is thus far supposed that the deficiency ¦
of the evidence of religion belongs to the evidence
itself, it is possible that the deficiency may be owing
to something in the objector; either
1. To his fault— virant of earnestness in attention to evidence, etc.,
just as in practical matters ; or '
2. To his requiring more than a popular proof of Christianity,
without applying the necessary examination or knowledge.
That evidence is level to the common understanding; but
is liable to objections. Many see those objections, with
out giving time to see through them. Still the evidence.

\

Want of Universality in Revelation. 67
property regarded, or thoroughly considered, is real and
conclusive. It may, indeed, be objected,
3. That, whatever the, source of this deficiency, the evidence
ought to be without doubt, as the directions of earthly
masters are. To which, answer —
a. That wherever the fallacy lies, there is fallacy ; for in tem
poral affairs, God (our Master) does not give evidence
free from doubt : moreover,
b. Religion differs from aU external commands. It seeks not
external obedience simply, but the testing and exercise
, ofour principles. That is best secured by commands less
plain. Besides, God's wiU is conditional; ending in either
obedience and reward, or vice and punishment
G. In conclusion, as religion Implies probation, the probation
may consist in the very things which are here made
grounds of objection :
1, Judging from the reason of the thing, it seems that we may
be tried by deficient evidence, as easily as by inattention or
passion.
- 2, Judging from experience, we are as often tried by causes
which produce doubts (imperfect information, etc.), as by
inattention or passion.
3. Hence (to sceptics), it may be said, that scepticism may
spring from want of solicitude, not fi-om want of evidence;
and that in daily life we act, where the probability is against
success, and if only it 'impossible we raay succeed.

68 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.

CHAPTER VIL
ON THE PARTICULAR EVIDENCE FOR CHRISTIANITY.
BuTLER now passes from the truths of Christianity to its
evidence. He has met objections against Christianity, he now >
meets objections against the proof of it In previous chapters
he seeks to free the gospel from groundless objections, and so
to leave it to the support of its proper evidence. In this
chapter he frees the evidence itself from objections, and so
leaves it with its proper force to support the gospel
Having considered objections against any revelation, and
against the Christian revelation particularly, consider now the
positive evidence for Christianity, and the objections against
that evidence; the whole divisible into two parts — (1.) The
evidence from miracles and prophecy ; (ii.) The direct and
collateral evidence considered as making one argument
i.
A. On miracles as evidence for Christianity, note
1. The Bible gives the same evidence for miraculous as for
common history.
a. The narrative of miraculous and of common history is
equaUy plain.
b. The accounts of miracles are quoted as genuine.
c. The accuracy of the account of miracles is attested by con
temporaneous and by later events.
d. And the most obvious explanation of the reception of this
history is its tmthfulness, so that
e. It ought to be received tiU there is reason for rejecting it.
2. Paul's Epistles, which are proved genuine, are an additional
and peculiar proof of the miracles of Christianity.

Particular Evidence for Christianity,

69

. a. Additional, because Paul received the gospel direct from
God ; and
b. Peculiar, because he speaks of a great variety of miracles as
wrought by himself and by others, and as admitted.
3. Christianity demands to be received for its miracles— a fact
peculiar to it — and it was received at first on that ground,
a. The demand is peculiar, for Mohammedanism was not
founded upon miracles ; and other systems, whether of
popery or of paganism, were founded upon alleged
miracles, only after they had been instituted, and not
BEFORE,
b. In part Christianity was received on the ground of its
miraculousness, a fact which, under the circumstances,
proves the reality of these miracles, and is testimony for
them, additional to the testimony of history.
Conclusion. Hence there is a large historical
evidence in favour of Christianity which ought to be
credited.
B, The objections to this reasoning are obvious :
L Under the influence of enthusiasm men lay down their lives
for every kind of folly : Answer,
a. Perhaps so, when the foUies are matters of opinion ; but
here the thing attested, in the case of the first Christians,
is fact, and for testimony to the reality of facts en
thusiasm cannot account.
b. And, if it be said that the evidence of religious facts is
weakened by enthusiasm, answer,
- 1. Yes, if the facts are in themselves incredible, a thing not
shown ; and, besides,
2. ReUgious facts, as attested, are not more liable to the
influence of enthusiasm than common facts are to other
influences, party spirit, etc., which yet are believed.
2. A mixture of enthusiasm and knavery, it is objected, weakens
the evidence for miracles.

70 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
That there is this mixture in human nature is certain, but it
is seen also in common matters, which yet are beUeved on
testimony.
3. However, men have been themselves deluded by pretences to
miracles. Answer, Not more so than by other pretences, of
honesty or benevolence, for example
4. Fabulous miracles have historical evidence ; yet,
Answer. Even if this be admitted, that would not prove
the falsehood of Christian miracles, even though they
fumish a precisely analogous example.
C. Conclusions : —
1. From objections, note
a. They weaken the evidence, but cannot destroy it
b. Nor can that evidence be destroyed but by proof of the un-
tmstworthiness ofthe witnesses.
c. This very mode of speaking implies that there is something
in the evidence itself ; an important reflection on such a
subject
d. It should be remembered that the importance of Christianity
and its precepts on veracity must have made the early
Christians pecuUarly careful not to deceive or be
deceived.
2. Frora the -whole argument it is plain that the proof of miracles
is of real weight and sufficient : and so men ought to
admit it where there is nothing in reUgion itself incredible.
D. On evidences from prophecy the following reraarks are
iraportant : —
L Not perceiving the wJu)le sense of a prophecy does not weaken
the proof of foresight, nor does the not understanding the
whole fulfilment
2. If a long series of prophecies be applicable to certain events,
the applicability proves such an application is intended.
This meets the objection, that the application of each
prophecy apart may not be apparent, and so was not
intended. ' ' ' ^ • .

t^

Particular Evidence for Christianity. yi
Note the analogous case of mythological or satirical
writing ; and mark, that Old Testament prophecy was
understood by the Jews generally as it now is by Christians.
3. A prophecy may be completed in a sense different to the
sense of the prophet, and a prophecy may seem applicable;
to other events than the aUeged completion ; but neither
weakens the evidence, for
a. The Scriptures are the work, not of the men who wrote
thera, but of the Spirit, and the forraer may not have
known aU the meaning.
b. The applicability to more than one event may have been
intended by the Spirit
Conclusion. The conclusion is, that this evidence is
real, though not peifect, and needs fahness and modesty
in weighing it.

E. On other direct and collateral evidence, note
L Introduction. This evidence is peculiarly important, for
a. It is what is commonly given us in practice ; and
. ¦ b. Such evidence, being circumstantial, is, when taken together,
of great weight, and
, c. Would if considered simply as matter of fact, have great
influence with unbelievers.
d. It is intended then to prove that God has given us a system
of natural religion and of revealed ; the first ascertainable
by reason, and thc second not ; the latter intended to
secure our recovery and hoUness.
, 2. Note what this religion is, as a real or supposed history.
^ a. It teaches the creation ofthe world as God's world ; reveals
the Son as Creator.
b. It teaches the histoi-y ofreligion in its various aspects.
c. It teaches as much of politics as is needed to make the
history of religion complete.

72 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
d. It gives an account of. the origin of mankind, and a thread
of history extending over 4,000 years, with many
particulars which need to be carefully noted, and ending
in the establishment ofthe Christian faith.
3. Let it be asked, "Is this true?" and take, as answer, the,
following facts, first separately, and then Unitedly. -
a. Natural religion has owed its establishment in a large
degree to the Scriptures, as many allow, so that Scripture
has claims upon our natural piety. Nor must it be
thought that the establishment of natural religion by re
velation destroys the proof from reason.
b. The first parts of Scripture are of acknowledged antiquity,
I and its history and chronology credible, both from
1. Common history, and
2. Intemal evidence,
c. The Jews, the peculiar people of God, owed most of their
history to their religion, and preserved (and they alone)'
the tmths of natural religion uncormpted.
d. A Messiah has appeared, fulfiUing ancient prophecies, whose
religion, sometimes above, but never contrary to reason,
became the religion of the worid ; the Jewish polity in
the mean time destroyed, and the Jews scattered yet
preserved ; each part, and much more the whole, in '
fulfilment of prophecies, supplying fresh evidence.
Note further,
1. That, though the immediate facts may be explained on
natural principles, the correspondence between these
facts and predictions cannot, as in the case of the dis
persion of the Jews and the birth of the Messiah.
2. There are to be added many prophecies still in course of
fulfilment, the fulfilment of which is highly probable
from the fulfilment of prophecy in the past.
e. Let all this be considered apart and together, and then add
other obvious examples of harmony between prophecy
and facts.

' ' V V

Obf ect ions against Arguing from Analogy. 73
F. In conclusion,' let it be remembered,
I, The force of this evidence depends on the whole taken unitedly
^ and must be admitted to have great weight.
2. Even as far as it has been here given, the evidence is more
than human— miracles, prophecies, other proofs,
, 3. These proof, taken together, not only add to the evidence—
they multiply it,
4, And, though proofs to the contrary may also be set down, yet
in matters of conduct (not in case of events or of specula
tion) the question ofwhich view is safer is important A
mistake on the one side, in rejecting Christianity, is more
., ' dangerous than a mistake on the other, in accepting it: and
the more so, as,
5, C:hristianity is tme, not only if one particular fact prove it,
' but unless all the things herein aUeged can reasonably be
supposed to be accidental,
¦ 6. There being no presumption against Christianity as mhaculous,
^ or against its scheme or parts, this evidence, though it may
,be lessened, cannot be destroyed. '

CHAPTER VIIL

ON THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING
FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE, TO RELIGION.
Against reasonings founded on analogy some may raise
objections ; and a few of these it is intended here to consider.
A, Enumerated 1—5. It is alleged, for example,
1, It is a poor thing to meet difficulties in revealed religion by
saying that there are the same difficulties in Nature, when
we want to clear religion from aU difficulties. Answer,

74 Analysis of Butlers Analogy of Religion.
a. The thing wanted is, it seems, to comprehend Providence
and God.
b. To reason from the known (natural religion), to the unknown
(revealed) is not a poor thing, compared with no know
ledge ; so it is aUowed in science and medicine.
c. If natural religion is admitted to be true, it is important to
show that objections to revealed reUgion apply equally
to natural, for so revealed reUgion is vindicated.
2. But it is surely a strange way of convincing men of the
obligations of religion to show that they have as little
reason for their worldly pursuits.
Answer, a. Religion is a practical thing, as business is; and, like reasons,
or any reasons, may be sufficient to guide us in both cases,
and ought, from prudence, to guide us.
b. If the objection be that religion should not have doubtful
evidence ; then note that worldly pursuits are often
doubtful, yet men foUow them. Besides, the case of
religion, though not free from all doubt, is much stronger
than the case of worldly conduct.
3. It is a strange way of vindicating God's character in religion
for goodness and justice, to show that like objections lie
against Providence, when we ought rather to answer the
objections themselves.
Answer :
a. The treatise does not profess to vindicate God's character,
but to show men their obligations; and to do this, aU that
is needed is to show that, for aught we know, the objec
tions are consistent with goodness and justice, and may
be even proofs of them.
b. It is attempted to answer objections to God's goodness and
justice, not by showing that the like objections {supposed
toiulusive), be against Providence, but by showing that
the objections are not conclusive, applying equally to
God's present govemment as a matter of fact
c. Even if these objections are not answered in this way, the
facts of religion remain as credible, in spite of the objec
tions.

'I

Obf ect ions against Arguing from Analogy. 75
d. Though objections to the reasonableness of reUgion cannot
be answered without considering its reasonableness, ob
jections against its credibility may : for
L It is a systera of facts, and
2. Though sometimes useful to show how reasonable any
part is, this cannot always be necessary, and
3. The obligations of religion depend upon the reasonable
ness, not of thc system, but of the practice, and so it is
enough if in the system there be nothing unreasonable;
and
e. Analogy may supply no answer to objections against the
goodness of the system, but it does to objections against
the credibility of the system as a matter of fact This is
what is meant in these remarks.
4. Religion rests on unsatisfactory evidence; that is, on evidence
not sufficient for certainty ; but
a. So is the evidence of any system of life — what is best — what
rules will secure it ? Religion, theiefore, is like every
other real thing in this world, its evidence real, but not
certain ; uncertainty belonging to our very condition.
b. Moreover, religion is simply intended to try and discipline
our virtue. It is a probation, as it would not be, if its
evidence were overbearing.
c. So that the only question is, whether its evidence is sufficient
in pmdence to influence thejudgment aud practice, while
thus testing our virtue.
5. In fact (it will be said) men are not influenced by this evidence,
and that is a fatal objection.
Answer :
a. The question is not what men do, but what they ought to do
in practice.
,b. The objection is nothing against religion, which answers its
end in testing men, whether they are influenced by it or
not.
c. It is aUowed the evidence of religion has some weight, but so
it ought to have some influence ; and if such influence
be allowed to this treatise, it has not missed its end. ,

76 Analysis of Butler's Analogy^ of Religion.
B. On the argument of the treatise Butler notes,
1. That he reasons, not upon his own ^inciples, but upon (that
is, notwithstanding) the principles of his opponents, admit
ting fatalism, and affirming nothing of the moral fitness of
moral acts, independent of the wiU of the Creator.
, 2, He treats religion siraply as a matter of fact ; as a history
which, moreover, reveals as facts God's moral government,
present and future, etc., and which are proved, not demon
stratively (a thing impossible in matter of fact), but prac
tically. Abstract questions, and the principles of things
involved in all those facts, are not discussed.
3. Hence the force of this treatise.
a. To those who hold liberty and moral fitness it is an additional
proof of the tmth of religion, and to those who deny them
it is a new proof.
b. To believers, it strengthens existing evidence, and answers
objections; to unbelievers, it proves Christianity credible,
and,
^ c. More generally, analogy confirms aU facts to which it can be
appUed, and is the only proof of most It is on the side
of religion, and ought to be followed especiaUy by aU who
profess to follow Nature.

>/

DISSERTATION I.
OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

The question to which this dissertation is devoted is
metaphysically of considerable interest. Does each man
continue, through his whole existence, the same thinking
being; and if so, wherein does the sameness consist, and
what is evidence of it ? The question is now not often
discussed ; but in the writings of the last century it was one
of the most popular subjects of inquiry.^
,, As the question is generally expressed, It Is, unhappily,
ambiguous.^ Person or substance, for example, may mean, or
be taken to include, the material elements of which the body
is composed ; and as it is known the human frame is gradually
changed ' every few years, the question whether a man is in
this sense, and for seven years together, the same person or
, substance, must be answered in the negative. It raust be
noticed also that sameness (like identity) is used in two senses.
It \% properly applicable to a single object which we affirm to
be not another. In a secondary sense it is applied to objects
which are very much alike ; as when we say that one house
is built of the sarae raaterials as another, raeaning that the
materials are of similar quality. In the first sense, sameness
does not involve the idea of sirailarity — "The same person,
but how altered !" In the. second sense similarity is essential
' See Martinus Scriblerus, ch. vii.
' Shaftesbury's Characteristics, iii. 172, ed., 1745.

l\ '?¦-'

7$ Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
The secondary sense admits of degrees ("nearly the same");
the proper sense does not^
It is in forgetfulness of this last distinction that some have
stated the question to be, whether the thinking being (person
or substance) continues to possess hke qualities through its
whole existence. In fact, men's minds, affections, judgments,
all change. A man raay even be renewed, and still be, in the
proper sense, the sarae man. The question is really, freed
from all ambiguities. Does each man continue, througli his
whole being, the same person, or does he become another f
a question that carries with it its answer.
What constitutes this sameness, and what is its evidence,
are questions less easily answered. Clearly, the sameness does
not depend on the identity of the particles of our bodies, nor
even upon the possession of any body. Through life, we have
the same body ; that is, in the secondary sense of same, our
bodies are "natural;" the resurrection (or spiritual) body is
not yet given to us : in the proper sense of same our bodies
are not the same, they are ever changing. Nor does this
sameness consist in or depend on our consciousness, as Locke
seems to have held. In states of disease or in intemperance
a man may lose all consciousness of identity, and yet not cease
to be the same person. It is true our conviction of personal
identity and the idea of it raay be obtained through conscious
ness and raemory, as in fact they are, but our identity itself
is prior to this consciousness, as (to use Butler's comparison)
truth is prior to knowledge. I ara now conscious of existence ;
I ara conscious, moreover, of the memory of prior states of
existence : I conclude, therefore, instinctively and intuitively,
as Butler seeras to teach, that the being (or person) in whom
this double consciousness inheres is the same being, and not
another. The evidence is intuitive, and the identity is of the
^ Whately's Zo^ic, book iv., iv, § I,

Of Personal Identity.

79

V

conscious substance or thinking being — not of consciousness,
still less of material substance,'
The importance of this speculation, as a practical question,
in connexion with a future life is obvious. If in that life each
raoral agent is uo longer the same, but another, moral
government, in the largest sense, is at an end. That govern
ment implies the dependence of the condition of our future
selves upon our present behaviour.
It is also worth noting, that the consciousness of mental
identity is a presumption, as Dr. T. Brown has intiraated,
that the raind is not material. It seems free at least from the
common quality of all that is material — liability to change and
decay.

" The sameness of person " implied in our living in a future
life has created strange difficulties, and stranger solutions of
them ; ending in the denial that we shall ever enter it Hence
it may be worth considering.
What "personal identity "is, is a question not easily defined.
It is clear, however,
1., In relation to consciousness,
That the comparison of two or more acts of consciousness
of one's self gives the idea of this identity, and proves it.
Yet such consciousness does not mahe the identity, nor is it
necessary to it
The notion that consciousness makes identity seems to sprino-
from the fact, that consciousness is inseparable from our
idea of person or thinking substance ; and so sameness of
, , consciousness, it is concluded, makes sameness of person.
In fact, however, wc may be the very persons who did
past acts, though the acts are all forgotten.
2. In relation to material substance or properties, identity or
sameness is generaUy used in a secondary sense only ; to
' See Reid's Works, Hamilton's edition, pp. 344 and 350.

So Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
indicate the qualities possessed or the uses to which things
may be applied.
A tree is the same, though all the material particles of it are
changed, and tho properties inherent in those particles,
and inseparable from them, have been withdrawn and
succeeded by others.
Conclusion. Personal identity, therefore, is neither identity of
consciousness, nor identity of material qualities or proper
ties ... It is really, as Locke's statements imply, the
sameness of the person, or conscious substance, or thinking
being : those terms having the same meaning.
3. Objections :
1. But, it is said that identity is ascertained by two or more
acts of consciousness : can we be sure that those two
acts refer to the same person ? Answer : As sure as
that two perceptions of one object are to be referred
to the same object
2. Others go further, and say consciousness is personaUty ;
and as the first is successive, and ever changing, so is
the second. Answer : Then is not our present self
interested in the self of yesterday or of to-morrow ;
for certainly our consciousness in each case differs.
Is this true ? And if it be said we are the same, as
far as we remember ; then, it is answered, that this
either gives up the question, uses " same "in a nevv
sense, or maintains the absurdity that personality is
the same, while consciousness, which alone constitutes
it, is not.
The futility of objections to this "sameness," founded on
variations in consciousness and actual changes of raaterial
substance, is thus proved: —
a. The supposition that a man may become another man is
(1) contradicted by our natural sense of things ; and (2)
even if true, is never applied to temporal concerns, and
so ought not to religion.
b. Suppose a being without memory, yet with life. It will
continue the same while it hves, though not able to

Of Personal Identity.

8i

sr

v, ' remember previous states. Add memory, suppose some
states remembered and others forgotten, why doubt that
it is still the same being as before ?
c. All are conscious that a man is thc same person as far back
as he remembers. But personality is either a sub
stance or a property. If a substance, then consciousness
proves the sameness of substance. If a property, then
it proves the sameness of the property, and therefore
the sameness of the substance, for the same property
cannot be transferred.
3. But does not our conviction of personal identity, or memory
on which it rests, deceive us? We are conscious of
sameness, are we the same? An objection which
leads to absurd results, for (a) if we cannot tmst
consciousness or a perception of memory, neither can
' we our reasoning, which includes memory ; and besides
(b) it requires us to prove the tmth of perceptions
or faculties, by means of the very faculties we suspect
and eondenm.

G

02

DISSERTATION IL
OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

To appreciate this dissertation, we need to keep in mind
the theories in vogue when it was published. Within a
hundred years Hobbes had published his theory of Human
Nature, in which he taught that personal gratification was the
sole end of every act, that every exercise of passion or faculty
was equally authoritative, and that raan has no moral faculties
of perception or action. Cudworth and Clarke held in
opposition to this theory that the distraction between right
and wrong is eternal, and that the quality of moral , acts is
discerned by our reason. The first and last parts of Hobbes'
theory Butler here refutes; the second he notices in his
sermons. He admits, with Clarke, that the distinction
between right and wrong is eternal, and that the distinction
is founded on the fitness of things; but with- characteristic
wisdom he seeks the evidence of this distinction and one
foundation for it in human nature. He holds also that our
approbation of virtue is not an act of reason simply, but an
eraotion. His account of the origin of the idea of merit, and
of its connexion with a reflex sense, is probably taken from
Shaftesbury, to whose " Characteristics " he frequently refers.
By giving prudence a place among the vhtues, he opposes
Hutcheson, allows whatever of truth is to be found in Hobbes'
systera, and explains it By denying that prudence is the
whole of virtue, he meets the abuse which Hobbes committed,
and which some modern writers have revived. Benevolence

T

Of the Nature of Virtue.

83

¥

he reckons a most important virtue, and yet denies, against
Leibnitz, that all virtue is resolvable into it. In his doctrine
of a moral sense he agrees substantially with Hutcheson, his
contemporary, and in the iraportance he attaches to the
distinction between mere acts and the dispositions or principles
from which they spring, he condemns Hobbes and sanctions
Malebranche. , In his thhd division he gives an idea of the
"fitness of moral acts;" an idea more practical at all events
than that of Clarke. His fifth division answers by anticipation
the theory of Bentham, that virtue is a regard for the happiness
of others ; as the dissertation throughout answers the theory
of Paley. Of course he maintains that virtue and happiness
generally coincide, and in the long run will always comcide
—the first parts of the Analogy being largely based on this view ;
but he denies that happiness or interest can be a rule to us,
our^ rule being, in truth, God's wil, as revealed in His word'
or in the moral nature He has given.
A. Introduction.
1. Moral government impUes a moral nature and moral faculties.
2. Proofs ofthe existence of such faculties are various.
3. Nor is there doubt as to the general qualities which these
faculties approve, such as veracity, justice, and a regard
for the public good.
B. Note then a few things concerning it.
1. Its object is not events but actions in connexion with prin
ciples or character ; including therein will and intention.
without necessary regard to the actual /^a/^r ofthe agent.
2. Our sense of actions as good or bad implies a sense of good
or ill desert, which again involves
,' a. That they deserve punishment Or reward,
b. Irrespective of any mischief or advantage to society ; for
an innocent action, which is yet mischievous, would be
, differently regarded. ,, .

84 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
c. Ill desert supposes guUt, and seems necessarily connected
with misery.
d. In common cases of virtue good desert is thought but smaU,
because little virtue may induce men to act well.
e. In vice ill desert is lessened according to the temptation.
3, 111 desert implies a comparison of an act with the capacities of
the agent ; compare a child or idiot and a man. Unfit,
unnatural, describe this perception,
4. Pmdence (a reasonable desire to secure happiness) is approved,
and imprudence condemned.
a. This feeling quite independent of the tendency of impru
dence to lessen happiness. We condemn the conduct,
while pitying the condition.
b. Though not so strenuously condemned as falsehood or
cruehy, because (1) impmdence brings immediately its
punishment, and is so self-corrective, and (2) then punish
meut excites pity, which lessens displeasure,
c. Still it is condemned.
d. Hence pmdence is a species of virtue, and impmdence of
vice,
e. Whether or not we give them these names.
5. Virtue is not wholly benevolence, or vice whoUy the opposite ;
for if they were
a. Benevolence would be approved equally to whomsoever it
was shown, and falsehood would be condemned only
as injurious.
' b. To take from one and give to another, so adding to the sum
of happiness, would be a virtue, whatever the moraUty.
c. Injustice would be no fault, if it added to the sum of happi
ness ; moreover,
d. We are so made that we condemn falsehood, etc., without
respect to overbalance of happiness, so that even if
benevolence be God's sole end, it is not ours.
e. Hence moral government must consist, not in the exercise

y'i

Of tlie Nature of Virtue,

85

of benevolence simply, but in treating men according to
their moral nature.
f. Most, perhaps, agree in these last principles, yet many seem
disposed to hold that the whole of vice consists in its
tendency to increase misery — a terrible mistake, which
if admitted would excuse many flagrant crimes.
g. And in tmth creatures like men know not what they are
about, when they attempt to promote happiness other
wise than through veracity and justice,
h. When these are not opposed, however, then benevolence is
our duty,
L Caution : though veracity is our mle, this does not forbid all
acts or words not designed to deceive, nor likely to
deceive, but through want of care and thought

§

— "S  : — '^  r-  ^  :-'' — --°  — —— ----^

SERMONS UPON HUMAN NATURE.

There are two ways of treating morals. One begins from the
abstract relation of things, as in the systeras of Cudworth and
Clarke ; the other begins with the nature of man. In these
discourses the latter order is adopted, and the author mtends
to show in what sense virtue consists in following man's nature,
and vice in deviating from it
Man's nature, it must be carefully marked, includes two
distinct things : the parts or elements of which it is composed,
and_the relation or connexion of those parts. The frst sermon
is devoted to the consideration of the " distinct parts of our
internal frame." It is there shown that these parts are distinct,
and not resolvable, as some have supposed, into one or more
elements, as benevolence or self-love. The parts are also
enumerated and classified. The second and third sermons
discuss the relation between the several elements of our nature,
proving the superiority, as a principle of action, of self-love
over passion, and of conscience over both. Frora man's
nature or constitution, as thus explained, it is shown that virtue
is following nature; i.e., it is obedience to the principles of
action of which that nature is coraposed in due subjection to
the laws which subsist among them.
This view of the connexion of the three sermons is important,
and is taken partly frora Butler's own preface, which should
be carefully read — and partly frora the close of the thhd
sermon. For a brief view of some doctrines which Butler
quietly refutes, see Introductory Note to the " Dissertation on

90 Analysts of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
Virtue.'' "In these serraons," says Mackintosh, "Butler has
taught triiths more capable of being exactly distinguished from
the doctrines of his predecessors, more satisfactorily established,
more comprehensively applied to particulars, more rationally
connected with each other, and, therefore, more worthy ofthe
name of discovery, than any with which we are acquainted."
Sermon i. Human nature— xa. its principles, private and social.
II. Human nature— \n its constitution ; or these principles
in relation to each other ; the. supremacy of
conscience.
in. Human nature, as thus explained, in relation to
virtue,
SERMON' L
A. Original reference of the text : each member of the body
of Christ connected with the rest for the good of the
whole.
B. Applying this principle, there are tendencies in man to his
own good, and tendencies to the good of society :
distinct in themselves, though coincident in their results.
1 L There is in man a natural principle of benevolence, which is to
1 , society what self-love is to the individual.
Proofs : friendship, compassion, parental love.
These coincide in their results, and each requires the
exercise of the other, a fresh proof that we are made
for both.
(Note on Hobbes' account of benevolence, that (1). It is
love of power. (2) Origin of this theory, and un
satisfactoriness of it (3) Cases in which benevolence
cannot be love of power. (4) If true, cruelty, when
displaying more power than kindness, is more benevolent.
(6) A question of fact, and proved by facts. (6)
Whence it appears that benevolence is as independent
a thing as resentment, though needing cultivation.)

a.b.

t

Upon Iiuman Nature.

91
2. There are in man other affections contributing to public and
private good.
a. They may be classified thus : Passions distinct from bene
volence, tending to pubUc good ; passions distinct from
self-love, tending to private good.
(Note, on the distinction between self-love and other
affections. They differ in themselves, though sometimes
using the same means of gratification.
1. Difference where the same means are used ; hunger
' shame. '
2. Difference where the same means are nbt used.
. Note on this classification.
Hunger and desire of esteem : theforraer not self-love •
the latter not benevolence.) '
b. Social affections have respect to others, though tending also '
to individual good.
c. The public good is not necessarily contemplated m each
, act by men themselves.
d. Conclusion.
3. There is in man a conscience or reflex sense, whereby we
survey ourselves and pass sentence on our acts.
a. Its tendency to the good of society.
b. Shown to differ from affection.
c. Proved to exist
d. Not intended to compare its relation to public and private
good, but to note that it tends to both, especiaUy the
former.
,; ¦, Conclusion from these three-fold facts : men are made for
, , society, as weU as for themselves, whence may be drawn
a new picture of human nature and of the relations of
men. Nationalities, etc., spring from their nature more
than from other causes.
Obj. There are in man tendencies mischievous to society ¦
answer.

93 Analysis of Butler's Ahalogy of Religion.
a. So are there tendencies mischievous to himself ; so that if
the good of others iS not part of our nature, neither
' ' is self-love. - , .
,b. But these are good tendencies abused.
Note on envy and emulation. They differ not in their
end, which is equality and superiority, but in their
means. The end good ; the means, in the case of
envy, bad.
C, There are exceptions to the rule in both cases.
Some have no aifection for others ; some, none for
tiiemselves, Ex.
Summary. Men are led by their nature to seek the happiness
of themselves and also of others, though it must be noted
(a) that men fulfil those duties imperfectly, and (b)
often violate their nature in both respects,
SERMONS IL, IIL
1. Morality, or the course God intends meri to take, may be
known from our nature.
a. Moral obUgation admits this kind of proof.
b. Man's nature may be knovra, and so God's intention, though
with some difficulty.
c. Such reasoning is as just, as that from our physical con
stitution. '"-
X The elements of our nature have been aheady ascertained
and so morality may be defined.
2. But herein, it is objected, there can be no law. " Nature "
means passion, emotion, reflection, yet these differ in
different men : it is their " nature," therefore, to follow the
strongest. So that vice and morality, the violation of
mies and the observance of them are alike natural ;
answer,
a. Ancient writers and Scripture concur neverlheless in affirm
ing a " natural law," and in describing vice as deviation
from that law.

j;
¦ .1

upon Human Nature. 93
b. Nature, moreover, has different meanings ;
1, It means any principle in man, whatever its kind or
degree, as anger, benevolence. This cannot be the
meaning here, for in this sense angeris both "natural"
and unnatural.
2, It means any principle that is strongest : pride is the
nature of a proud man. This meaning must be re
jected : for in this sense, vice is often following
nature.
3, It means a good law, not identical with feeling, though it
is said to be written on the heart
3. This law of nature is conscience, with the prerogative qf
supremacy over other principles.
a. Some such supremacy shown from what is unnatural;
following desires like bmtes.
b. Some such supremacy shown from what is natural, making
passion subservient to self-love ; whence one principle is
clearly superior to another.
c. Such supremacy part of the idea of conscience ; not in fact
perhaps (power), but at least of right (authority) :
d. Hence it has not only some place in our nature, but the
first ; passion and interest may rebel ; stiU its authority
and rights are sacred.
e. If this be questioned, suppose that conscience has no su
premacy, then nothing done in accordance with natural
feeling or passion is unnatural or wTong. Parricide and
filial obedience, being both expressions of emotion, are
equally approved.
4. The constitution of human nature, thus explained, gives rules
of virtue, and creates an obligation to obey them.
a. A constiution implies not only parts, but parts in their
connexion and dependency.
b. A constitution is violated, not only by removing parts but
by giving to the lower the supremacy; hence the saying
that injustice is contrary to nature.
(Note on the meaning of "a constitution."

94 Analysis of Butler's Analogy of Religion.
1. Constitution defined, in relation to man especially, f
2. Its nature iUustrated,
3. Constitution conceived of as perfect when, virtuous ;
though actually imperfect.)
c. Whence man, having in his make parts lower and supreme,
IS a law to himself.
^' "^^^onlw ^"' '^'^"^'^ ^'" '''^ "'° '""'' important qualities
1. It is easily appUed, and
2. It brings with it its own obligation. " -
5. Against this law it is objected—
a. It teaches us to regard others, and places us under restraints :
better be free, and seek only our own good. Answer-
I. You cannot disregard others, and secure your own good.
2. Nor can you gain anything without restraints of some
kmd.
b. To which it is objected again-
Then we are it seems to seek happiness, and so far to
regard others and practice restraints, as these restraints
bring greater convenience ; hence
We agree,ani our own happiness is, after all, h seems, the
measure and end of virtue.
Yes, only note,
1. That not vice, but virtue, secures happiness.
2. That vice, not virtue, has most restraints, especiaUy when
virtue becomes habitual
However,
3. Duty and interest (i. e., happiness) really coincide ; gene-,
raUy even here, and certainly in the end.
Conscience and enlightened self-love therefore lead the
same way, though of the two the former is supreme.
Summary.

V

y^

\'t''

EDUCATIONAL WORKS

published by

^h^ 'gzlxQionsi "^xntt §ocut^.

LONDON : KNIGHT, fRINTER, MIDDLE STREET, B.C.

The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature; also
Fifteen Sermons. By JosapH Butler, d.cu, Bishop of Durham. With a Life of
the Aiillior, a copious Analysis, Notes, and Indexes, by Joseph Angi;s, d.d.
Crown Svo. as, cloth boards.
Ditto, The Analogy, with the three Sermons on Human Nature only.
Crown Svo. is. cloth boards.
The Bible Handbook; or, an Introduction to the Study of Sacred Scripture.
By J. Angus, d.d. izmo edition map, Ss, 6d. calf. Cloth bds. ss. Half-Bound 7s.
Handbook Of the English Tongue. By J. Angus, d.d. izmo. 5^. doth
Boards, ji. half-bound. 8*. 6rt. calf.
Handbook of English Literature, By J, Angus, d.d. ss- cloth boards ;
6s. 6d. extra boards ; -js. half-bound ; Zs. 6d. calf.
Handbook of Specimens of English Literature. By J. Angus, d.d. i2mo.
Sf, 6d. cloth boards ; js. dd. half-bound ; 91. calf.
Wayland's Moral Science; viiih Notes, &c. By Dr. Angus, ramo. jj.
cloth boards.
The Wisdom of our Fathers. Each with Memoir. 2j. 6,/. in glazed cloth '
covers. I. Selections from Archdishop Leighton.
3. Selections from Lord Bacon.
3. Selections from Thomas Fuller.
4. Selections from Isaac Baurow, d.d.
5. Selections from Robert South, d.d.
6. Selections from Stephen Charnock, d.d.
Paley's Evidences of Christianity, with Introduction, Notes and Supple
ment, BytheRev,T.R. BlRKs,A,M, i2mo. 31. cloth boards. 5i. Si half-bound.
Paley's Hora Paulina; with Hone Apostolica:. By Rev. T. R. Birks.
3*. doth boards. '5*. €if. half-bound.
Handbook to the Grammar of the Greek New Testament. Together with
complete Vocabulary, and nn Explanation of Uie chief New TesUment Synonyms.
By the Rev. S. G. Green, d.d. Svo. js. 6d. cloth boards.

1 1

•JgUt aUclifltottSi "(Erjut .grwictB'i* OEitttrttiottaX JJxxhltrathmfli

The Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, an Historical Fact. With an
Examination of Naturalistic Hypotheses. By the Rev. John Kennedv, d.d.
Author of ff'orA a»d ConJlUt, etc Crown 8vo. ! m. td. cloth boards.
Critical Handbook. A Guide to the Study of the Greek New Testament.
By E. a Mitchell, d.d. Map, Diagrams, etc. 3»- 6<i. doU. boards.
The Philosophy of Prayer, and other Essays. By Professor Reynolds, of
Chcshunt College. Crown Svo. sf . 6d. cloth boards.
Ufe of Howe. With Analysis of Writings. By Hbnrv Rogers. Portrait.
8vo. New Edition. S'. cloth boards. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo. 3». cloth
boards.
The Progress of Divine Revelation; or. The Unfolding Purpose of Scrip
ture. By JoHt< STOUGHTON, D,D. Crown Svo, 6j, 6rf, cloth boards.
An Introduction to Historical Theology. Being a Sketch of Doctrinal
Progress from the Apostolic Era to the Reformation. By JoHS Stouohton, d.d.
Crown Svo. 6s. 6d. cloth boards.
' The Truth of the Christian Religion, as Established by the Miracles of
Christ. By Baboo Ram Chandra Bose. Crown Svo, 31, cloth boards.
Outlines or the Ufe of Christ A Guide to the Study of the Chronology,
Harmony, and Purpose of the Gospels. By Eustace R. Conder, ma. With Map
pret>ared by Captain Conder, of the Palestine Exploration Fund. Crown Svo.
31. 6d. cloth boards.
Biblical Atlas and Scripture Gazetteer. With Sixteen finely Engraved
Coloured Maps by W. and A. Keith Johnson, and a very elaborate Gazetteer.
5i. cloth boards.
Grounds of Christian Hope: a Sketch of the Evidences of ChrisU^ity.
Iiv STANLEY LEATHES, M,A„ Prebendary St. Paul's, Professor of Hebrew, King's
College, Crown Svo, 41. 6d. cloth boards
The Chain of Life in Geological Time: a Sketch of the Origin and Succes-
sion of Animals and Plants. By J. VT. Dawson, ll,d Author of^«</«.» C«fc^,
etc With Numerous Engravings. Crown 8vo„ 6x. 6-/. cloth boards.
The Origin of Nations. In two parts, i. On early Civilisations. 11. On
Ethnic Affinities. By Canon Rawlinson, "-a-. Ou-len Professor of Ancient
History, Oxford. With Maps. Crown Svo. 4^, 6rf. cloth boards.
The Great Problem; or, Christianity as it is. By a Student of Science.
. Crown 8vo.i s'- ^ doth boards.

-*+<g»+-

LONDON ¦ THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY :
¦5fi, PATERNOSTER R6W J 65. ST. PaUL'S CHURCHYARD i AND 164, PICCADILLY.

!""4r

ILLUSTRATED

GiBT BoO^$

Jntevesttngt^^ , Jnsttucttve,^

^

t'

EHttuacttvel^ Bounb.

— sStjctC^-

For ADULT READERS
and for YOUNG PEOPLE.

PUBLISHED BY THE
RELIGIOUS TRACT
SOCIETY,
56, Paternoster Row,
LONDON.

fHE kHiJGioUs TRACT SOCIETY'S USf.

ILLUSTRATED TABLE BOOKS.
Ipen anb pencil Series,
tmpfriat »:¦(» (siae of page, ii Av 7i inchfs), itautifvlly ittnstrtttta, aii(f prtnted a,t superior
paper, price ftr in handsotnt cloth, gitt etigts ; or c&r. mcA t'« morocco, elegant.
See also. "Irish Pictures " aHit " London Pictures,- on next past.
AMEJtlCAlf FICTXaiES. Drawn bv Pen and Pencil. By the Rev.
Samuel Manning, LL.D. Profusely Illustrated. Ss.
AVSTllAZIAN PICTUItES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil, By
Howard Willoughby. With Map and 107 lUuatrations by E,
Whymper. Ps. '
CANADIAN PICTVJtES. Drawn with Pen nnd Pencil. By the
Marquis of Lorne, With numerons fine Engravings by E, Whysiper,
from Sketches by the Marquis of Lorne, Sydney Hall and others.
Ss.
ENGLISH riCTVItES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By Saml,
Manning, ll.d., and S, G. Green, D D. With numerous wood engra
vings, 8s. ¦ ¦
EJtENCn PICTUItES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By the Rev.
Samuel G. Green, d.d. With 150 fine Engravings. 8s.
OREEK PICTUItES. Drawn with Pen ond Pencil. By T, P. Mahaffv,
^ m,a., d,d,, Fellow of Trinity CoUege, Dublin. Two Map3 and many
lUustrhtions. Ss.
INDIAN PICTURES, Drawn with Pen nnd I'enci]. By thc Rcv.
William Urwick, m.a. Profusely Illustrated with fine Engravings. 8s.
ITALIAN PICTURES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By the Rev. S.
Manning, ll.d. Revised, with additions by the Rev, S. G. Green,
D,D. Profusely Illustrated. Bs.
LAND OP THE PUARAOHS. Including a Sketch of Sinai. Illus
trated by Pen and Pencil. By the Rev, Samuel Manning, ll.d. New
Edition, revised .and partly rewritten by the Rcv, Richard Lovett,
M.A. With many New Engravings. Ss.
NORWEGIAN PICTURES. Drawn with Pen nnd Pencil. With a
Glance at Sweden and the Gotha Canal. By the Rev. Richard Lovett,
M.A, With 136 Engravings, 8s.
PICTURES FROM HIBLE LANDS. Drawn with Pen and Pencil.
Edited by the Rev. S. G, Green, D.D. With Fine Engravings, Ss.
PICTURES EROM HOLLAND. Drawn with Pen and Pencil, By
the Rev. Richard Lovett, m,a. With 132 Illustrations. 8s.
PICTURES EROM THE GERMAN FATHERLAND. Drawn
with Pen and Pencil. By the Rev. S. G. Green, d,d. With Fine
Engravings. Ss,
RUSSIAN PICTURES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil, By Thomas
MiCHELL, C.B. Engravings. Ss.
SCOTTISn PICTURES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By the Rev.
S. G. Green, d.d. Profusely Illustrated. 89.
SEA PICTURES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By Dr. Macaulay,
Author of *' Victoria R,I. : Her Life and Reign," etc. 88,
SWISS PICTURES. Drawn with Pen and Pencil. By the Rev. Samuel
Manning, ll.d. With numerous Illustrations by Whymper and
others. 8s.
" TIIOSE HOLT FIELDS." Palestine Illustrated by Pen and Pencil.
By the Rev. Samuel Manning, ll.d. Ss.

thk kELICIOVS TUAtT SOCIETY'S LiS'f.

I

'^^

¦

¦";, H
''/'/

V

i6, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON } and 0/ all Booksellers.

->5lc JPPB •!• PE]M -t- 7I]S[D '^ PENCIL -5- gE^IE^. t^

\[3

Irish Pictures

(Continued from pa ^e -z.)
A Series of Imperial Svo finely
UlustratQcl Table Books (size
of page, 11 by 1\ Ins). Bound
in handsome cloth, gilt, EIGHT
SHILLINGS EACH, or for
special prosontatlon, in mo
rocco, elegant, 26s. each.

IltTSU riCTURKS. Drawn
with Pen and Pencil, By
Richard Lovett, m.a. With
a Map and over one hundred
Illustrations from Sketches
and Photographs. Imperial
Svo, 8s., handsome clolh
boards, gilt edges, or 28s. in
morocco, gilt.
*'A really splendid volume."—
Cork Herald.
"The illustrations arc ex
cellent." — Irish Ecchsiaslical
Gazette,
JjOKDON PICTIfJiKS. Drawn udth Pen and Pe^icil. By the
B. KrCHARD Lovett, M.A. , Author of "Norwegian Pictures." "Jrish
Pictures," etc. Profusely Illustrated, 8s. handsome cloth, gilt.
"The handsome form of the
book, with its admirable print
ing, is fullyjustificd by the inte
resting nature of its contents."
— The Times.
"This pleasant, chatty account
of London — with just enough
arcbffiology and historv to in
struct and yet not to bore — is
the very book to interest both
Ihe dweller and the visitor to
the metropolis." — The Record.
*' One of the bent books
written on London. The style
is graphic, the usual humdrum
statistics are happily absent, and
historical and geographical Lon
don is portrayed in a most in
teresting manner. The book is
nicely printed, well-bound, and
is admirably suited for presenta
tion." — The Metropolitan.
"An interesting book, admi
rably adapted for being taken
away from thc metropolis by
country cousins, or by American
and Colonial kinsfolk.',' — The
Graphic.

L°^P,TUBES

-:?;i;-(Hi

r; i'i, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and o/ all Booksellers.

rilE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIE'/'YS LIST,

HANDSOME GIFT-BOOKS

FOR

AXiy liBCRK.iTIONS.
A popular Encyclopaedia for Boys.
Edited bj' G. A. Hutchison.
Including chapters bv J. N,
MaSKELVNE, Lt.-Col. CuTlfKLL,
JV. Gordon Stables, r.n., Kev.
A. N. Malan, m,a., C. Stans-
field-Hicks, Dr, Sthadling,
and others. With nmny En
gravings. Quarto. A splen
did Giit-book or Prize fnr Boys.
528 p.igcs (Zh by oi). Ss. cloth
boards, gilt cclges.
" No more valuable g;ift-book could
bc chosen for young people with
active brains."— !S«//(/ti'<(y hei'iciv.

Tll±: QIRJj'S ovx
IXnOOR BOOK.
Edited by Charles Peters. 528
pages (8j by 65). with over one
nund red and hfty Illustrations.
83. cloth, gilt edEfcs.
" A complete repertory of female
occupation." — Tinies. '* Our girls
who profit by the teaching will cer-j
tainly be as u.-icful in domestic life as
ornamental in society." — Graphic,

'ijii

The BoviO*"
[indoor

BOOKSHI

G

TJU: GIRL'S oir.v
ovmooR HOOK.
, Containing Practical Hnlp on
Subjects relating to Girl-Life
when out of doors or when
absent from the F.amily Circle.
Edited by Charles Peters.
Profusely Illustrated. 528 pages.
Quarto. (Size of page SA by oA.)
8s. cloth boards, ciit edges.
"So interesting and useful a book
would make an excellent present." —
Thc Record. " An excellent compen
dium of open-air games and exer
cises."— 5ai'Hrrfay Review^

56, PATERNOSTER ROIF, LONDON ; mid of aU Booksellers.

V

^

THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST.

4
SO

"imiiinHr'"*!^

4, Hich/-*''"

ILLUSTRATED GI FT-BOOKS.

THIJ TIA R VEST OR A ^UIET
ICY12 f or, Lelfiure ThoUff'hts for*
Rn.9*/ lAvea, By thc Rcv. J. R.
Vernon, m.a. With numerous En-
f ravings. 63. 6d. cloth, gilt edges.
never saw anything more gracefully
or more rightly done— more harmoniously
pleasant in text and illustration."— il/r.
Ruskin.RANDOM TRUTHS TX COJIMOX
THIXOS, Occasional Papers from
my Sludy Chair. By the Kev. J. R.
Vernon, m.a,. Author of "The Har
vest of a Quiet Eye." With numerous
Illustrations. 7s. cloth gilt.
"It seems even better than 'The Har
vest of a Quiet Eve.* "—Mr. RiiskiM.
"Should be placed next to Wordsworth
on every student's bookshelf."— S/a^rfora'.
ITArS AXD MEAXS; or, I'nirr.-^
front tho Ilif/hirat/8 aiul Ilrd^ct.
A Scries of Sketches on Social Subjects, By Isabella P-i-viE Mayo,
Author of "Thc Occupations of a Retired Life," etc. Imperial i6mo,
5s. cloth, gilt edges.
"At almost evcrypage we are disposed to slop and exclaim, ' How true
and wise this is ! ' There is a deep, sound underl3ing principle throughout,
and the suggestions are such,
thatall concemed with homes
as a means of influencing others
may well be helped by reading
it.' —Thc Guardian.

ROMAXCE OF REAL
LIRE. True Incidents in
the Lives of the Great and
Good. With Illustrations
by well-known artists.
Large Quarto. 3s. 6d. cloth
boards, gilt edges.
A scries of twenty-four inlr-
resting sketches, giving true
incidents frora the lives of nun
renowned in the world's history,
amongst them being Sir John
Franklin, Commodore Goode
nough, Bishop Hanninpton.
Sir Henry Havelock, john
Knox, President Lincoln, Lord
.Shaftesbury, Sampson Wilder,
James Braidwood, and many
otiiers. Thc admirable lessons
suggested, and the attractive
appear.ince of the book gene
rally, well adapt it for Prizes in
Schools and families.

K,b, PATERNOSTEH EOlV, LONDON; aiidofallBontse/ler.;.

6 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST.

7'HE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIET'i^'S LIST.

THE
I'OR ALL READERS.
The " Siinjloicers Series " is /or Adults, rather than /or Children. Tht books firm very
use/ut volumes/or ISirlhday Ci/ls, and/or Presentation at aU seasons.to readers, say /rom
16 lo (a. They are in Crown Bvo, mith illustnulons, pretty dolh cavers, and with ciit edges.
OP ALL DEGREES. By Leslie Keith, Author of "Great Grandmnirma
Eiiiivn?^/; ^.'iii.'P!! ^'!l^°^= Opportunity," etc. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
SHAYNINQ CASTLe. By Ellen L. Davis. Illustrated. 3s: 6d. cloth,
ellt edge,*;, ^ '
RAL>H ELLISONS OPPORTUNITY, AND EAST AHD WEST. By Leslie
...A";""- illustrated, is. 6d. doth, irilt cdires.
MARCUS STRATFORD'S CHARGE ; or, Roy'k Temptation. By Evelyn
<ipJi;,™?J?- With Illustrations, is, Ccl. cloth, gilt. .
GENEY EYE; or, rhe Children of Port Royal. \ Story of Old Frdnce.
7 iA,'?L"Tn°'' °' ^^'"= Spanish Brothers," "The King's Service,"
n,.„?',1-. ."'Ith Illustrations. Crown Svo. 3s. 6d. cloth, ciit eds-cs
THE MANSE OF GLEN CLUNIE. By Eglan^on Thorne. IllS.ited by
m,.,_ ".J^'-^^ Whymper. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. cloth, eilt edtres
TWO ENTHUSIASTS. By E. Everett Green. lilLtrarJd bV Edward
vviiYMPEn, Crown Svo. ss. cloth, gilt cdircs '
CHA'TEAU DE LOUARD. A Story of france tt the period of tho Revoca.
JOINT VlIJBnTJHc'^'^n"^?-- ^>- "¦ C CoAPE. Illustrat.:d. js. cloth, gilt.
JOINT GUARDIANS. By E. Everett Green. Illustrated, ss. cloth,
gilt edges, '
JOYCE GRAHAM'S HISTORY; or, Overcoming Evil with Good. By H,
ANOTHpT'UTHr "''!!"¦'",=''• Crown 8vo 3s. 6d, cloth, gilt edges.''
ANOTHER KING. By Janet Lden. Illustrated by Tj. Wijymper,
n„Ti''?.S,'2 ^"'°- 3S, Sd. cloth, gilt edges,
THE HEAD OF THE HOUSl!. a" Story of Victory over Passion and
TT^ll ktpAi.iJt •t,'^'^""''' Illustrated. Crown 8vo. 5s. cloth, gilt.
IDA NIOOLARL By Eglanton Thorne. Illustrated. 3s. 6d. cloth, gilt
edges. °
THE OLD MANUSCRIPT ; or, Anaise Robineau's Historv. A T.ale of the
Huguenots of La Vendee. By Blanche M. Moggridce. Illustrated
„-,Sy J" Whymper. Crovvn Svo. 5s, cloth, Eilt edces.
YOUNG SIR RICHARD. By H. Woer.ck CHrRLES. Illustrated.
Crown Svo. 5s. cloth, mit edges,
MAMJALEHAj The WALDENSIAN MAIDEN AND HER PEOPLE.
TiinHfi^ i^^.^X.i""^ S.""*^,";- Illustrated. 35. 6d. doth, gilt edges,
TURNING POINTS; or. Two Years in Maud Vernon's Life. By L. C.
t.f.ni'v'Jn' mU'i'^^™''='l- Crown Svo. 3S. 6d. cloth, gilt edges, ,
HEAPING THE WHIRLWIND. A Story of Three Lives. Illustrated.
„„ ^''Si''" ^^°' 3S, 6d, cloth, gilt edges.
ONE DAY AT A TIME. By Blanche E, M. Gkene. Illustrated by E.
-,,,„ X.'i''"™''- Crown Svo, 3s. fd, doth, gilt edges.
THE MISTRESS OF LYDOA'fE PRIORY; or, TBe Story of a Long Life.
«.._ i'^'^^'-''" I^" Green, Crown 8vo, 3S, 6d, cloth, Kilt edircs.
THE TWO CROWNS. iBy Eglanton Thorne. With ilfustratfons; Crown
8vo, 3s. 6d, clolh, gilt edges.
LENORE AHNANDALE'S STORY. Bv Evelyn E. Green. With Illus-
tralions. Crown Svo. 5s. cloth, gilt edges.
CAROLA. By Hesba Stretton. Vvith Illustrations. 3s. 6d, cloth. Eilt
edges, **
SUNFLOWERS. A Story of To-day. By G. C. Gedge. Illustrated.
Crown Svo, ;s, 6d, cloth, gilt edges.

,^'

^i^.

.•f>

56, PATERNOSTER POIV, EOiVpOiY,- and of all Bogisellers,

nm BffLF-eRoojn book?
SUITED FOR ALL READERS.
This is a veri/ cheap Sr.rie.K of Pnpiiliir lifpriiiln. Eitrfi book
contains 3S4 paaes with Illustrations. C'rnirn Sm, Ss. Oil.,
in bevelled, cloth boards, yilt ctli/cs.
I THE BLACK TROOPERS, and other Tale«.
a STRANGE TALES OF PERIL AND ADVENTURE.
3 REMARKABLE ADVENTURES FROM REAL LIFE.
4 ADVENTURES ASHORE AND AFLOAT.
5 FINDING HER PLACE. By Howe Benning.
6 THE MOUNTAIN PATH. By Lily Watson,
7 AMONG THE MONGOLS. By James Gilmour, ILA.
8 WITHIN SEA WALLS. By G, E. Sargent and Miss Walshe.
9 THE FOSTER BROTHERS OF DOON. A Talc of the Irish Rebellion
of 1798. By the Author of " Cedar Creek."
10 CEDAR CREEK. A Talc of Canadian Life.
II CHRONICLES OF AH OLD MANOR HOUSE. By G, E. Sargent.
12 A RACE FOR LIFE, and other Tales.
13 THE STORY OP A CITY ARAB, By G, E. S.\rgent.
14 MERLE'S CRUSADE. By RosA Nouchette Carey.
15 ONLY A GIRL WIFE. By Ruth Lamb.
16 THE STORY OF A POCKET BIBLE. By G. E. Sargent.
17 HER OWN CHOICE. By Ruth Lamb.
18 THE AWDBIE8 AND THEIR FRIENDS. By Mrs, Prosseh.
19 FRANK LAYTON. An Australian Story, By G. E, Sargent.
20 SHADES AND ECHOES OF OLD LONDON. ByJouN Stoughto.v, D.D.
It RICHARD HUNNE. By G. £. Sargent.
23 ONCE UPON A TIME; or, The Boy's Book of Adventures.
33 GEORGE BURLEY: His Historj', Experiences, and Observations. By
G. E. Sargent,
24 SUNDAY EVENINGS AT NORTHCOURT. By G. E. Sargent.
25 LUTHER AND THE CARDINAL. Given in English by Julie Sutter.
26 CAPTAIN COOK: His Life, Voyages, and Discoveries. By W, H. G.
Kingston.
27 POMPONIA; or, The Gospel in Ca3sar's Household, By Mrs. Webb,
28 IHE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS, By John Bunyan. Wiih Illustrations
by Sir John Gilbert.

i6, PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON; md of all Booksellers.

TIIE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST.

Jllustrateb ^ Stories*

.T.*. rarh.
A YACHT VOYAGE ROUND ENGLAND. By William H, G, Kingston,
Author of "Captain Cook: His Life, Voyages, and Discoveries," etc.
New Edition revised and enlarged, and profusely illustrated. Small
4to, Clolh gilt. ss.
NO CHOICE. A Story of thc Unforeseen. By Rcv. T, S. Millincton,
Author of "Straight to thc Mark," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo.
Cloth boards, 5s. ,7,«, (Id. each.
THE PERCIVALS; or, A Houseful of Girls. By Evelyn Everett
Green. Author of "Joint Guardians," etc. Illustrated. Crown Bvo.
Cloth boards, gilt edges. 3s. 6d.
IDA HATHERLEY AT SCHOOL. By Constance Evelyn, Author of
" Miss Nellie's Girls," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo, Cloth boards,
gilt edges. 3s, 6d,
HOT BY BREAD ALONE. By Isabella Fvvie Mayo, thc Author of
"The Occupations of a Retired Life," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo.
Cloth boards. 3s, 6d, ' .• ¦
A YOUNG OXFORD MAID IN THE DAYS OF THE KING AND THE
PARLIAMENT. By Sarah Tytler. Illustrated. Crown Svo.
Cloth hoards. 3s, 6d,
NOT HIS OWN MASTER; or, Ronald's Experiences. By Mrs. Lucas
Shadwell, Author of " Golden Sheaves," etc. Illustrated. Crown
Bvo. Cloth boards. 3s. 6d.
FROM PRISON TO PARADISE, A Story of English Peasant Life in 1537,
By Alice Lang, Author of " Eield Court," " Angel Meadow," etc. Il
lustrated, Crown Svo. Cloth boards. 3s, fid,
RALPH ELLISON'S OPPORTUNITY, AND EAST AND WEST, By Leslie
Keith, Author of " Great Grandmamma Severn," etc. Cloth, gilt
edges, 3s, 6d, 3s. each.
HIS YOUNG NEIGHBOUR. By Ellen Louisa Davis, Author of
"Shayning Cistlc." Ilinstr.ited. Cloth. 3s,
PETER'S SISTER. By Janet Eden, Author of "Another King," etc.
Illustrated. Clolh, 35. By

FOR FRANCE AHD FREEDOM
Emma Leslie, Illustrated.

A Tale of the French Revolution.
Cloth. 3s,
THE TENANTS OF PARADISE ROW. By the Author of "Constable
43 Z," " Adopted," ete. Illustrated, Crown Bvo. Cloth boards. 33.
3s. Gd. each.
ADOPTED ; or, An Old Soldier's Embarrassments, By E, A. B. D.,
Author ot " Constable 41 Z," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. Cloth
boaids. 2S. fid,
TOM DOUGLAS ; or, A MarVed Man. Bv E. A. P. D„ Author of " Young
Ishmael Conway," " Constable 42 Z"," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo.
Cloth boards, 2s, fid.
MYRTLE AND RUE. A Storv for the Young. Illustrating the Twenty-
third Psalm. By Margaret Scott Haycraft. Illustiated. Cloth

boards. 2s. fid.'
SHADOW ON THE THRESHOLD ; or, A Little Leaven,
Armstrong, Author ot " Frank Horton's Vintage," etc.
Cloth boards. 2s, fid.

Bv Jessie
illustrated.

'^

THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST. 9

Jllustrateb * Stones.

*«. each.
HESS AND JAMIE. A Story of London Life, By Henry Johnson,
Author of " All lor Number Onc," etc. Illustrated., Cloth. 28.
HAROLD'S FRIENDS; or, The New Rector of Grcythorpe. By C. A,
BuKNABY, Illustrated, Cloth boards. 28.
CHRISTIE'S NEXT THIHGS. By the Author of " Mrs. Morse's Girls,"
etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. Cloth. 23.
DOT-AND-GO-ONE. By M. Blanche Hayward. Illustrated. Crown
8,^0, CloLh toai'ds, 2s.
THE MUSGROVE RANCH, A Talc of Southern California. By I. M.
Bhowne. Illustrated. Coth. ss.
Js. Oti. each.
WITHIN SIGHT OF THE SHOW 1 A Slory of a Swiss Holiday : and " A
burrcv Idyl." By Lily Watson, Author of "The Mountain Palh,"
etc. Crown Bvo, Cloth, is. fid.
HOT LIKE OTHER FOLKS. A City Story. By Jessie Armstrong. Il
lustrated. Cloth. IS, Cd,
MR. FARRER'S BIG O's. By Emily Brodie, Author of "Dandy Blue,"
etc. Illustrated, Crown Svo. Clolh. is, fid,
HONOUR HOT HONOURS. Bv Mrs, Austin Dobsqv, Author of " Cbcrn-
bui'n," etc, illustrated. Cloth. . is. fid.
**************
InvQC ?r^pe Boofta for
YOUNG READERS.
/•ach In very large ty/e, ^L.ith /imrraz'tngs. Small Ato, is. in Coloured Cavers,
crts.6.i. cloth, gilt edges.
WHEN JESUS WAS HERE AMONG MEN. By Mrs. E. M. Waterworth.
THE NAME ABOVE EVERY NAME. By Mrs. E. M. WamrworiiI.
THE BEAUTIFUL HOUSE AHD ITS SEYEH PlLLiRS. By Irakces
M. Savill.
READINGS WITH THE LITTLE ONES. By Agnis Giberne.
STORIES OF BIBLE CHILDREN. A Sonday Book for very Little Chil
dren. By Mrs, E. M, Waterworth,
LISTENING TO JESUS. A Sunday Book for Uie Little Ones. By E. M,
Waterworth.
BLESSINGS FOR THE LITTLE ONES.
THE LILIES OF THE FIELD, and other Readings for the Little Ones.
WALKING WITH JESUS. A Sunday Book for Children.
THE THREE BRAYE PRINCES, and other Bible Stories.
SUNDAY AFTERNOONS AT ROSE COTTAGE. Bible Talks with Mamma.
By Mrs. Waterworth.
THE CHILDREN'S KING, and other Readings for the Young.

Sd, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and of all Booksellers.

^6, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and of all Booksellers.

to THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST.

.[\

ILLUSTRATED BOOKS BY
mR$. 0. F. tDALTOn,

TAe Mifslerlous Uouse. With
trontispiece by M. E, Edwards.
Crown Svo. is. cloth boards.
Vtutcr's Follif. i8 Illustrations.
Crown Svo. as. cloth boaids.
OoldeH Threads for Dalh/
Weavtnif. A Text, Meditation,
and Verse for each Morning and
Evening of a Week, fid., ex
quisitely printed in colours,
Christie's Old Orf/an i or. Home,
Sweet Home. is. cloth.
AngeVa Christinas, ifiino. fid.
cloth.
Launch tlie Lifeboat. With 44
Coloured Pictures or Vignettes.
4to. 3B. Coloured Cover.
Little Dot. Coloured Frontis
piece, fid.
Little Faith ; or. The Child ofthe
Toy Stall, is. cloth.

Author of ••Chrislie's Old Organ." tte.

Nobodi/ Loves JUe. is, cloth.
Olive's Story; or, Life at Ravcns-
cliire. 2S. cloth, gilt.
iras I Jtl(ihf/ illustrated. 3s. fid.
cloth, gilt.
Our Oraelons Queen 1 Pictures
and Stories from Her Majesty's
Life. With many illustrations.
IS, cloth.
Taken or Left. Crown 8vo. is.
cloth.
'* ..^''"i' liehlnd the Scones.
Illustrated. Imperial ifiino. 3s. u-.
cloth, gilt edges.

Popple's Presents.
IS. cloth.

Saved at Sea,

Crown 8vo,
A Lighthouse

Story. New and Cheaper^Edi'tion.
IS. cloth boards.
Shadows. Scenes in the Life of
an Old Arm Chair. Illustrated.
45, cloth, gilt edges.

ILLUSTRATED BOOKS BY
Be^BA $TRGTTOn,

Aittltor 0/
Alone in London, is. fid

yessica's First Prayer," etc.

A Miserable Christmas and a
UapPU Ifew Year. gd.
A yight and a Day. gd.
A Thorny Path. 2s.
licdc's Charity, ss. fid.
Carola. 3s, fid.
Cassy. IS. fid,
Christmas Child, fid.
Children of Cloverlcy, 2S.
Cobwebs and Cables. 5s.
Crow of the Dolphin, is, fid.
Enoch Roden's Training, ss.
Pern's Hollow. 2S.
Fishers of Derby Haven. 2S.
Friends till Death, gd.

JIow Apple-Tree Court u-as
Won. 6d.
Jessica's First Prayer, is.
Left Alone, fid.
Little Meg's Children, is. fid.
Lost Oip, IS, fid.
Ma.-e liromar, is, fid.
Michel Lorlo's Cross, fid.
No Place Like Itom«. is. _
Only a Dog. fid.
Pilgrim Street, 23.
Sam Franklin's
Dank. fid.
Storm of Life. is. fid.
The King'a Servants.
Under tlie Old Hoof.
Worth of a Baby, fid.

Savings \
IS. fid.
IS.

56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, l,ONpON; and of all Booksellers.

y ]

, I

^l'

THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY'S LIST. 11

F01^ ?^EgEj\lT3 W^ PJ^IZEg.

FOURPENNY BOOKS IN CLOTH BOARDS. A
Series of Thirty-two Story Books, each with Illustration.
"LITTLE DOT" SERIES OF SIXPENNY BOOKS.
A pretty Scries of 112 Story Books, each \vith Coloured Frontispiece
~ and bound in cloth.
NEW NINEPENNY SERIES. A .Series of Sixty-two
' Children's Story Books wilh Coloured Frontispieces and other illustra
tions. Bound in attractive cloth boards.
NEW SHILLING SUNDAY BOOKS for Little Children.
Large type. Illustrated, is, in very attractive coloured paper boards ;
IS, fid, ill cloth, gilt edges,
SHILLING LARGE-TYPE BOOKS FOR ADULTS.
A Cheap Series of 120 Story and other Hooks for Working People.
Large crown Svo. Illustrated. Cloth boards.
MONTHLY SHILLING VOLUMES FOR THE YOUNG
Upwards of 200 \'olumes of Stories. Each Illustrated and bound in
attractive cloth boards.
"R. T. S." LIBRARY. A Series of Thirty Books, n-osily
reprints of Popular Books for Adults. Illustrated, Each book with
ig2 pages. 3d, iu paper covers ; fid. cloth.

The Society also Issues a great variety of cheap paper-covered
Boobs tor Sunday School Rewards and for distribution.
Amongst thoso aro the
SILVER SERIES OF THREEPENNY BOOKS.
A. twu' Series of 24ino Dool.-s for the I'ouuff. With. Copers
prlntf'fl, tmek. and frotit, in Colours, on jiolrt aud silver
grouud, Faell book in clear typo with a I.'roitti.f2'iccc i'li-
graving.
"FLORAL COVER" SERIES OF - TWOPENNY
REWARD BOOKS.
Fetch containing 48 pages of clearly-printed Letterpress,
in siuipio language for Children. With Numerous Fn-
gravings, and in attractive coloured covers,
SIXPENNY AND SHILLING PACKETS OF PIC-'
TURE AND STORY BOOKS FOR THE YOUNG.
Cnnttiining Penny, Jlalfjicnuy. atid Farthing Books, also
Coloured Leaflets and small 'Iracts for Children.

¦ 56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON,- aud of all Bookseller.^.

J

12 THE RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETYS LIST,

popular Hnnuala
lUsion of Illustration.; aud l.-eruaU^l'ct'lZ'bl::,'!!,,^''. " ^'¦"-
THE LEISURE HOUR ANNUAL. '
^?*.uP°5'^''' J"'PS''ial 8vo. Profusely llluslratecl. vs. in han,l<:n„,„
cloth ; 8s. extra boards, gilt edges ; ics. fid. half bound in «lf'''°""'
THE SUNDAY AT HOME ANNUAL
THE BOY'S OWN ANNUAL.
The Volume of the Boy's Own Paper, Sii iwo-es Will, .„ r„l„, j
g!l? s^^ld^r;^ ^Sfcc^^ - ^S:^.^l^:^f^si.
THE GIRL'S OWN ANNUAL.
The Volume of the Girl's Own Paper. 8,3 pages- prof sclv illns
S\'ll-.l?arf:"o,';rc'of™^^ '""''¦' '^- "'¦ --"'i' s£°^and'\d'^'e"s^:
THE CHILD'S COMPANION
AND JUVENILE INSTRUCTOR ANNUAL.
ind"oirnl™',?l"? ""?¦ 'n"^'-«ling Papers with superior Engravings
and Oleograph Frontispiece, is, fid, in ornamental cover -ss rlni U
boards, -with coloured design ; 2S, fid. cloth, e egant, gilt edges!
OUR LITTLE DOTS' ANNUAL.
Pretty Stories and Pictures for Little People
cover ; as, cloth boards, with coloured desisrn ;
edges, full gilt. " '
THE COTTAGER AND ARTISAN:
THE PEOPLE'S OWN ANNUAL.
144 large pages. Profusely Illustrated. Forming quile a family scrao-
pUedgcs. """"¦'P""'"'''" °" Colours; "2?. fid. cloth ioards,
FRIENDLY GREETINGS;
Illustrated Reading for the People, Half-Vearlv Vouibies. With
manv I.arge ingravings and Coloured Pictures. 2s. fid, cloth boards
lhe y early Volume (or 1S90, h.indsomely bound, 5s, cloth boards. '
THE TRACT MAGAZINE ANNUAL.
Short Stories Biographical Sketches, and interesting Papers. With
many Engravings, is. fid. cloth boards. a r a.

IS. fid, in ornamental
25. fid. cloth, bevelled

56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and of all Boaksellets.

.\

I

TIIE RELlCtOUS r/UCf SOCtErY'S LIST. 13

y

'This is a Series of Vopuliir
Iteprints frotnvolutncs of the It01''S
OinV FAPEJt, -most of xvhich arc
now quite out of print,\ The Boohs

are vi:ry a.iractirely

bound, and arc freely illustrated.
ADVENTURES OF A THREE-GUINEA WATCH.
By Talbot Baines Reed. Illustrations. New Edition, reduced in
price. Crovvn Bvo. 3s. fid.
FOOTBALL.
This Volume contains the Rules ofthe Game, With Papers on how the
Game should be played, by such authorities as C. W. Alcock and Dr.
Irvine. Illustrated, is. fid.
CRICKET, By Dr, W. G. Grace, Rcv. J, P\cRoiT, Lord Charles Russell,
Frederick Gale, and others. Many Illustrations. Crown Svo. 2s,
A GREAT MISTAKE.
ByT. S. MiLLiNGTON. With many Illustrations.

Small 4to. 3s. fid.

THE FIFTH FORM AT ST. DOMINIC'S.
By Talbot B. Reed, Author of " The Adventures of a Three-Guinea
\Vatch," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo, 3s. fid,
THROUGH FIRE AND THROUGH WATER.
A Story of Adventure and Peril, By T. S, Millington, Author of
" Straight to the Mark," etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo. 3s. fid.
HAROLD, THE BOY EARL,
A Story of Old England, ByJ, F. Hodgbtts
" ¦¦" ' ¦' - Vikin;

Norseman, '
3s. fid.

* Kornak the

Author of "Edric the
etc. illustrated. Crown Svo,

MY FRIEND SMITH.
By Talbot Baines Reed, Author of "Adventures of a Three-Guinea
Watch,' etc. With an Introduction by G. A. Hutchison. Illustrated.
Crown Svo. 5s.

56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and vf all Booksellers.

-il '^"'^ liELfGtOUs TRACT SOC/Etys LtsT,

'•THE QIItL'S OWN BOOKSHELF" is a Series of Heprtnts
of some of thc chief stories and articles from "THE OIFL'S
OWN PAPEIt." As most ofthe annual volumes of this popular
periodical are tioxv out of pritU, fhe Girl's Own Bookshelf is
the only fortn in which ihese productions can be obtained.
They nre mostly in imperial IGmo, cloth boards.
^^ ^?r°'^?^OW W^^^^^°-.. ^y ECLANTON Thorne, Author
ol The Old Worcester Jug," etc. 3s, fid
"°^foT?ri^^,^^ COMMON THINGS. A Handy Book
for Girls. With many Illustrations, is.
CORA ; or, Three Years of a Girl's Life. Illustrated by M. E.
U-DWARDS. 2S. 6d. "^
"^^^ nl\vK?^.'^s,°^^ COOKERY BOOK. By P„ill.s
THE QUEEN O- THE MAY. By Anne Beale. 2s. 6d.
THE MASTER'S SERVICE. A Practical Guide for Girls,
i^Lwoo^J. iTd"""' °°"^ "•""'' ^•¦"^'^ '^""¦" »"<» M-^"^-
"^"^ 2^.^d^^^^^ °^ '^^^ FACTORY, and other Stories.
ESTHER CAMERON'S STORY. By Rosa N. Carey. 3s. 6d
^^^^,?fid^^^^^ ^°^ RACHAEL. By Anne Beale.
HOME HANDICRAFTS. Edited by Charles Peters
gilt c°d' °es" ^""''^ °^™ Indoor Book," etc. Illustrated. 2s."6d,'
THE TWIN HOUSES, and other Stories. By Anne Beale,
cloth boa°ds ^""" "'" ^^''^'" ¦="=• "'"^"--"^d. 2S, fid,
THE SHEPHERD'S FAIRY. By Darley Dale, Author of
The Great Auk s Eggs." 2s. fid.
AUNT DIANA. By Rosa Nouchette Carey, Author of "Not
23 fid ^"'^^¦" "Esther Cameron's Ston'," etc. Illustrated,
SERVAN-rS AND SERVICE. By Ruth Lamb, Author of
"Comfortable Mrs, Crook," etc, is. fid.
HER OBJECT IN LIFE. By Isabella Fy\'ik Mayo, as. 6d.

56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; aud of all Bookselfers.

I . ' 1'

j;

V: t

J

WE ktUCtOUS TRACT SOCIErV'S UST. 15

SUNDAY BOOKS, FOR
YOUNG PEOPLE.

©ur Xfttle Dot's picture
Scrap=313ooh0,
First and Second Series.

Royal 4to, Ss. ed. each Series;
tn hantisotne coloured boards,
or the TWO Series COMPLETE
in ONK VOLUME, Ss, cloth.
- Each series contains a large number of
Piciurcs by well-known Artists, with
iusf enough descriptive letterpress lo
suggest an interesting storv connected
Wl fi each picture. A most useful book
lor parents nnd others who havc the care
ol young children,
BIBLE STORIES AHD PICTURES.
With Twenty-four Coloured page
Pictures and Forty Vignettes. With
simple letterpress in large type. 4s,
handsomely bound, cloth gilt.
BIBLE TALES FOR CHILDBEH. With
Forty illustrations. Small 410. 3s. fid
cloth, gilt edges.
THE HAPPIEST HALF-HOUR; or, Sunday Talks with Children
Frederick Langbridge, m.a. With many 111
410, 3S, fid. cloth boaids, gilt edges.

CCRAP

v/'plCTUR^

many lii usi rati ons.

SmaJi

Stepping Stonea to Bible TIMstor^.
A scries of books for children and young people, intended lo cover in
time the whole Bible History. Each volume embraces a period complete in
lisell, ihe writers arc selected lor their known aptitude in wnling for
clii dren, and alao for their accurate acquaintance with Scripture, and their
rower of making It attractive lo the vouog. The style is such lhat rtic
book can be read by children of eight years old and upwards. It will also
be lound very suitable lor reading to very Utile children.
1. STOniES FBOM OENE.IIS. By Annie R. Butler, Author of
•Ijlimpscs of Maori Land," and "Stories of the Children's Medical
Mission. With thirty-nine Illustrations. Small crown Svo, 2s. fid,
cloth,
g. THE PBOMLSED KING : Tlie Story of the Children's
Saviour. Bv Annie R, Butler, Author of "Stories Irom Genesis,"
etc. Wo. a. Wuh many Illustrations. Small crown Svo, 25. fid. clolh.
3. STOBIES FBOM THE LIVES OF MO.SES AND .JOSHUA.
By Joseph Johnson, Author of •' The Master's Likeness." " Dibs "
etc. Illustrated. Crown Svo, 2s. fid. cloth.

56, PATERNOSTER ROIV, LONDON; and of all Bookseller^.

zine^ foil BVeri

Sixpence Monthly! One Penny
l'-- Weekly.
; THE
SUNDAYn / .¦
AT HOME.
. A FAMILY MAGAZINE
FOR SABBATH READING.

Sixpence Monthly. One Penny
Weekly.
' THE
(ilRL'S OWN
;"" PAPER.

One Penny Monthly. In Cover.

THE

CHILD'S .
COMPANION AND
JUVENILE INSTRUCTOR.
The Magazine FOR Little Folks.

New Series. One Penny Monthly,
• , THE
TRACT ^ ' MAGAZINE.
, SPECIALLY USEFUL FOR
LOCALISATION.

New Series. Sixpence Monthly,
THE •
LEISURE,.,- r
•vx'^^--V;HduR;
'' -A MAGAZINE FOR
FAMILY & GENERAL READING

Sixpence Monthly. One Penny
Weekly.
TIIE ¦
BOY'S OWN PAPER.

New Series. ' One Penny Monthly.
THE -
COTTAGER AND
,. ... -ARTISAN.
THE I'EOf'LE'S OWN PAPER,

lourpence Monthly. Halfpenny
Weeklj-.
FRIENDLY GREETINGS.
ILLUSTRATED READINGS
FOR THE PEOPLE.

OUR LITTLE DOTS:''-^^^^-^^^:^"''
, ,„Sixtecn Pages. Large Type. Easy Words. One Penny Monthly.

London : 56, Paternoster Row, and of all Newsagents.

HAIELI, WATSON * VIHtY, LP, J

YALE UNIVERSITY

a39002 00227i*620b