I 1 YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BISMARCK VOL. II. Copyright 1838. byPhetngnaphisdie. OeselhchafC- BISMARCK THE MAN & THE STATESMAN Being The Reflections and Reminiscences of OTTO, PRINCE VON RISMARCK Written and Dictated by Himself after His Retirement from Office Translated from the German under the Supervision of A. J . Butler, Late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge •WITH TWO PORTRAITS AND A FACSIMILE OF HANDWRITING Volume II. HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS NEW YORK AND LONDON 1899 Copyright, 1898, by Harper & Brothhrs. All rights reserved. CONTENTS THE SECOND VOLUME CHAPTER XIX SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN PAGE Difference with Count R. von der Goltz concerning the Schleswig- Holstein question . . . . . . . . i - Bismarck's letter to Goltz ..... . . I Cabinet council concerning the attitude to be taken up in the Danish question ........... 10 Possibilities of the solution . . . . . . . . n Impracticability of the course indicated by public opinion . . .n Influence of Liberalism on the German Governments . . . 12 > On King William 12 Public opinion on the side of the Prince of Augustenburg . . 13 The last sign of life of the ' Wochenblatt ' party . . . .15 Difficulties of the Gastein treaty ..... 17 Letter from Bismarck to the King ..... .18 Psychological change in the King's disposition since the occupation of Lauenburg .......... 20 Attitude of the Progressive party in regard to Kiel and the Prussian fleet 20 Extract from Bismarck's speech of June I, 1865 . • • .21 Absence of patriotism in political parties in Germany under the influ ence of party hatred ......... 24 A true German idea .......... 24- German party spirit in politics and religion . . . . .25. Bismarck receives the title of Count . , . . . . 25 V BISMARCK PAGE Negotiations with Count Platen concerning an alliance between Prin cess Frederica of Hanover and a son of Prince Albert . . .26 Hanover arming 26 Interview with Prince Frederick William of Hesse . . . .27 Refusal of the February conditions by the Hereditary Prince of Augus- tenburg ........... 28 Guelfic lies 28 A letter from the Hereditary Prince to Bismarck . . . .29 Letters from the King to Bismarck in the matter of the Augusten- burger ........... 30 Memorandum of the Crown Prince of February 26, 1864 . . .31 Interview with the Hereditary Prince on June 1, 1864 . . .31 The peace of Vienna 32 The February conditions of 1865 32 Importance of the Baltic canal 32 Moltke's opposition to the formation of the canal . . . .33 Importance of the canal connexion for the military security of the Ger man coasts .......... 33 Of what value would a continuation of the canal to the Weser mouth or even to Jahde and Ems be ? . . . . . . .34 Heligoland ........... 35 CHAPTER XX NIKOLSBURG With the headquarters at Reichenberg 36 Displeasure of the military at Bismarck's interference in matters relat ing to their department 36 French interference after the battle of Koniggratz . . . .37 Dilatory reply of the King -37 Moltke's opinion respecting the contingency of a war with France as well as with Austria ......... 38 Bismarck for peace with Austria without any gain of territory from the Austrian imperial possessions . . . . . . .38 Dangers of an alliance of French and South German forces . . 38, Bismarck advises the King to appeal to the Hungarian nationality . 39 Council of war at Czermahora ........ 39 Bismarck proposes the passage of the Danube at Pressburg instead of an attack upon the lines at Floridsdorf . . . . .41 Reluctant obedience of the staff ....... 41 Diplomatic considerations concerning the peace conditions to be im posed on Austria 42 Departmental and state policy in opposition . . . . .42 vi CONTENTS First draft of the peace conditions Increase in the King's demands His desire to get back the Franconian principalities . What prevented the acquisition of Bavarian and Austrian territory ? Karolyi refuses any cession of territory and demands the integrity of Saxony as a conditio sine qua non of a peace settlement Armistice ......... Action at Blumenau ........ Negotiations with Karolyi and Benedetti concerning the conditions of the preliminary peace ..... Difficulties of the situation as regarded military influences Bismarck's responsibility for the shaping of the future Council of war of July 23 . A burst of tears Memorandum to the King Report to the King The King's opinion His agitation at Bismarck's opposition Bismarck's state of mind (thoughts of suic: Mediation of the Crown Prince The King's marginal notes The South German plenipotentiaries at Nikolsburg Herr von Varnbiller ..... The French relations with the Stuttgart court sustained by the Queen of Holland's predilection for France Her anti-Austrian disposition ..... Varnbtiler's repulse at Nikolsburg, his reception at Berlin PAGE 4343 4344 de) 45 47 474748 48484949 49 5152 5353 53 54545455 56 CHAPTER XXI THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION Internal condition of Prussia after the war .... War with France a necessity, if Prussia crosses the line of the Main Napoleon Ill's reminiscences of the confederation of the Rhine An error concerning the national disposition in South Germany Bismarck's reasons for postponing the war with France Settlement of the Conflict by a request for indemnity . Uncertainty of a league with Italy ..... Attitude of Italian policy during the Austrian war Probability of a triple alliance of France, Austria, and Italy Russia's uneasiness at Prussia's growth .... Platonic attitude of English policy ..... Results on Bismarck's home policy of considerations upon the situation abroad ........... vii 57 575758-5859 606061 61 62 62 BISMARCK PAGE Short-sightedness of the progressive politicians 6-4 Universal suffrage as a means towards the national aim Bismarck's views of the value of universal suffrage The secrecy of the ballot favours the rise of ambitious demagogues and keeps the influence of educated men out of its rightful sphere A preponderance of those who possess over those who want is advan tageous to the state ........ A preponderance of the wanting element easily leads to a return of the state to dictatorship, government by violence and absolutism Necessity of criticism in a monarchical state .... A free press and parliaments as organs of criticism The task of a Conservative policy ...... Reactionary tendencies inside the Conservative party and their repre sentatives in Prague ........ Proposals for a revision of the Constitution .... Project for a Prusso-Russian alliance as a settlement of the internal conflict and of the German question in the year 1863 . Examination of the Russian proposal by Bismarck The probable development of matters in the event of Prussia and Rus sia being victorious in a war against Austria and France The King declines the Russian proposal ..... The King's abhorrence in 1866 of reactionary proposals of Conservative agitators ......... What results would a decision in favour of reaction have had ? . Criticism of the Prussian Constitution ..... Disinclination of the King to the request for indemnity The King gives in to Bismarck's views ..... The annexations, although not unconditionally agreed to, still desirable for the sake of the territorial cohesion of the Prussian dominions Incompatibility of Hanover's independence with the establishment of German unity under Prussian leadership .... Rejection of George the Fifth's letter ..... Bismarck dissuades the King from the idea of adismemberment of Hanover and the Electorate of Hanover .... The King's dislike to Nassau inherited from his father Treaties of peace with the South German states .... Herr von Varnbuler concludes peace and an alliance with Prussia for Wurtemberg ......... Roggenbach's proposals for an enlargement of Baden at the cost of Bavaria .......... Rejection of these proposals by Bismarck ..... A mutilated Bavaria would have been an ally of Austria and France The Guelf legion, its formation and dissolution .... Bismarck on leave ......... 65 65 666667 686869 6969 707i7i 74 7676 77 78 79 798080 808181-81 8283 83 85 Vlll CONTENTS PAGE Negotiations with Saxony 86 Loyal attitude of Kings John and Albert of Saxony . . . .86 Concentrating pressure upon Bavaria and Saxony of the league with Austria ........... 86 The parliamentary excesses of the German element in Austria endanger the influence of the German national element . . . .86 CHAPTER XXII THE EMS TELEGRAM The Spanish cabinet resolves upon calling Prince Leopold of Hohen- zollern to the throne ......... 87 The name ' Hohenzollern ' no valid pretext according to the law of nations for France to interfere in Spain's free choice of a king. . 87 Bismarck expected no difference between France and Prussia respecting the candidature of the Hohenzollern prince . . . . .87 A conversation of Bismarck's concerning the duties devolving upon the prince in regard to France after being chosen King of Spain . 88 Bismarck's view on the Spanish throne question . . . .88 Bismarck expected more economical than political results from the choice of the Hohenzollern ....... 89 France by falsification turns the Spanish question into a Prussian one . 90 Passivity of Spain in the face of French interference . . . .91 The prince's candidature only a family matter of the House of Hohen zollern ........... 91 The French politicians underrate the national sentiment in Germany . 92 - Ultramontane tendencies in French politics . . . . .92 France's threats against Prussia occasioned by the Spanish election an international impertinence ........ 93 The insulting nature of the French demands intensified by the attitude of the Gramont-Ollivier ministry ...... 93 La Prusse cane ....... • • 93 Bismarck leaves Varzin ... . ... 93 Impression caused by the news at Ems .... 94 Bismarck's resolve to retire from office strengthened by the intimation of the Prince's refusal ........ 94 The object of the journey to Ems . . . 95 Interview with Roon ... . . -95 The negotiations between the King and Benedetti wrong from a consti tutional point of view ...... -95 The Queen's influence upon the King in favour of peace with France . 96 Roon and Moltke dine with Bismarck (July 13, 1870) . . .96 Receipt of Abeken's telegram . . . . . . . -97 IX BISMARCK PAGE Discussion with Moltke upon Germany's readiness for war . . .98 The acceptance of the French challenge a call upon national sentiment including that of the South German states .....98 Editing the ' Ems telegram ' • IO° -The cause of its effectiveness IOX Impression caused by the abridged version on Moltke and Roon . . i'oi Moltke's characteristics ......... 102 His pugnacity occasionally inconvenient ...... 103 May a statesman provoke a probable war ? ..... 103 CHAPTER XXIII VERSAILLES Displeasure of the ' demigods ' against Bismarck .... 104 Bismarck overhears a conversation between General von Podbielski and Roon concerning the measures taken to keep Bismarck out of the military deliberations ........ 104 Disadvantage of this departmental rivalry to the conduct of business . 105 The missions of strategy and diplomacy in war . . . . .106 Necessity for their co-operation ....... 107 Military boycott of Bismarck in Versailles ...... 108 The situation before Paris ........ 108 Humanitarian influences of royal ladies on behalf of the Parisians . 109 Bismarck's fears of intervention by the neutrals ..... 109 Count Beust's efforts to bring about a collective intervention of the neutrals . . . . . . . . . . .no The warning that Bismarck drew therefrom . . . . .111 Friendly disposition of the King of Italy towards Napoleon and France ; anti-French disposition of the Italian Republicans . . . 113 Feelings in Russia . . . . . . . . . .114 Gortchakoff's ill-will towards Bismarck and Prussia . . . .115 His vanity ........... n6 Count Kutusoff and the Grand Duke Alexander as mediators at the Russian Court . . . . . . . . . .119 Stagnation of the siege . . . . . . . . .120 Bismarck's fears of eventual failure . ~ . . . . . . 121 - Dearth of heavy siege-guns and of tiansport material . . . .123 Considerations of the cost . . . . . . , .124 English feminine influences at headquarters in the interests of ' humanity' 125 The assumption of the imperial title by the King a political necessity upon the extension of the North German confederation . .126 Resistance of King William I and its causes . . . . .127 Original dislike of the Crown Prince to the imperial title . . .127 Political fancies of the Crown Prince 128 X CONTENTS PAGE The Crown Prince's diary and its publication by Geffcken . . .128 Count Holnstein as the bearer of a letter from Bismarck to the King of Bavaria .......... 129 Letter from the King of Bavaria to King William .... 130 Difficulties in formulating the imperial title ; Emperor of Germany or German Emperor? ......... 131 Bismarck in disgrace on the day of the Emperor's proclamation . . 134 CHAPTER XXIV THE 'CULTURKAMPF ' Count Ledochowski and Cardinal Bonnechose at Versailles . . 135 The Pope refuses to influence the French clergy in favour of peace . 135 Conflicting tendencies in Italy ........ 136 Effect of the Prussian government siding with the Pope . . . 136 Bismarck's negotiations with Bishop von Ketteler respecting the adop tion in the imperial Constitution of the article in the Prussian Constitution on the position of the church in the state . . 138138 138 139 Reconstruction of the Catholic party (' Centrum') Strength of the ' Centrum ' in relation to the Pope Polish side of the ' Culturkampf '...... Progress of the Polish nationality due to the activity of the Catholic section in the Ministry of Public Worship 139 The Catholic section an organ of the House of Radziwill . . . 140 Bismarck seeks to win the King over to replace the Catholic section by a Papal nuncio .......... 141 Abolition of the Catholic section ..... . 142 Bismarck's share in the May laws ..... . 142 _ Juridical misconception of the Falk legislation . . . 142 Causes of Falk's retirement ........ 143 The superfluous and the indispensable in the May laws . . 145 Von Puttkamer as Falk's successor ....... 146 The settlement of the ' Culturkampf ' is rendered more difficult by the anger of the combative ministers ...... 146 Opposition of the Emperor to peace with Rome .... 146 The secession of the Liberal party and their entry into the league of the ' Centrum ' renders the outlook of the ' Culturkampf ' hopeless 148 Definite results to the state ........ 148 Temporary nature of the peace between church and state . . . 149 Visit of King Victor Emanuel to Berlin . . . . . .150 The box of diamonds ......... 151 Bismarck and Gortchakoff . . . . . . .151 Moritz von Blanckenburg . . . . . . . .152 Bismarck and civil marriage . . . . . . . . 154 xi BISMARCK CHAPTER XXV RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES PAGE Debates upon the Hanoverian ' Provinzialfonds ' . . . .155 Disapproving attitude of the Conservative party in the Chamber of Deputies and the Upper House 156 Expedients to catch votes 156 The Conservatives insist on Bismarck's joining the group . . .157 Roon's letters of February 19 and 25, 1868, on the necessity for a re organisation of the Conservative party and the motives of their opposition 157 The jealousy of his colleagues with respect to the bestowal of the princely title 161 Bismarck's own opinion of the title ....... 161 Opposition of the Conservatives to the law relating to the inspection of schools ........... 162 Extracts from Bismarck's speeches ....... 162 Rupture between Bismarck and the Conservative party . . .164 Political results of the rupture 164 Indifference to party in questions concerning the security against the outer world of advantages gained in the war .... 165 Increased animosity of the Conservatives on account of Bismarck's ad vances to the National Liberals .165 'Junker' gatherings at Roon's ....... 165 Count H. Arnim ... ...... 165 Herr von Caprivi . . . . . . . . . . j^ Bismarck's alleged hostility to the army refuted by facts . . .166 The ' Kreuzzeitung ' challenges Bismarck ...... 167 A campaign of calumny ...... . T6* A judicial decision under the influence of party spirit . . .168 Roughness in party warfare as well as in the contest on religious questions ........... 160 The calumnies of the 'Kreuzzeitung,' the ' Declarants' acting as its compurgators . . . . . . . . . .170 Influence on Bismarck's nerves of the rupture with old friends . .171 Sense of responsibility of an honourrloving minister . . . .171 The National Liberals take no part in Bismarck's struggle with the Conservatives ......... I7, Party narrowness ........ j^ The parliamentary condottieri and their power over their colleagues in the party .174 Greater inertia of the Conservatives ; activity of the parties attacking the existing state of things ..... J74 The ' Reichsglocke ' at Court j.-- xii CONTENTS CHAPTER XXVI INTRIGUES PAGE Count Harry Arnim 177 His youth . . . . . . . . . . .177 Appointed ambassador in Paris . . . . . . .178 His stand in favour of legitimacy . . . . . . .178 Failure of his attempt to bring about Bismarck's fall . . . .178 Press attacks of the ' Spener'schen Zeitung' upon Bismarck . .180 Count Arnim's proposals to attack the Pope, now become ' infallible ' . 180 Aim and motives of the legal proceedings against Arnim . . .181 Views of the diplomatic circles ........ 182 Relations of the ' Reichsglocke ' to Count H. Arnim .... 183 Hopes of the Roman curia for the triumph of France . . .184 Connexion between the Empress Eugenie's interest in the warlike cur rent of French politics and her devotion to the Pope . The restoration of the monarchy in France a danger to peace Arnim and Gontaut Biron as allies against Bismarck . Admiration for Catholic character in Protestant circles ' Every silly boy is a Protestant '...... Predilection of the Empress Augusta for Catholicism Gerard, a French detective, as private secretary to the Empress . The Gontaut- Gortchakoff comedy in 1875 ... Gortchakoff's vanity and his jealousy of his former disciple . Gortchakoff as a professed angel of peace and protector of France The Emperor Alexander II sees through Gortchakoff Bismarck's dislike to a provoked war .... Pacific character of the foundation of the German Empire Gortchakoff's influence on the correspondence of the Czar Alexander II Bismarck's letter of August 13, 1875, to the Emperor The administrative reform of Count Frederick zu Eulenburg Bureaucratisation of the post of ' Landrath ' . . . . The ' Landrath ' then and now ... ... 197 Negotiations with Rudolf von Bennigsen respecting his entry into the ministry ........... 197 Extravagance of the National Liberal demands for a share in the government ....... Rupture of the negotiations with Bennigsen Count Eulenburg as go-between .... Anger of the Emperor at Bismarck's arbitrariness Bennigsen definitively declines ..... Ineptitude of the National Liberal leaders ' No. log, Stauffenberg Regiment ' . . . . xiii 185 185186 186187 188 188 188 1S9 191191192192193 193 196 196 19a 200200200 201202202 BISMARCK PAGE . 203 . 203 204 205 for Bismarck's Causes of the Emperor's dislike to Bennigsen The allies of the National Liberals in the ministry .... The Council Meeting of June 5, 1878 ...... Origin of the expression : ' squeeze them to the wall till they squeal ' . Alliances of the National Liberals at court — General von Stosch their confederate ...... Count Botho zu Eulenburg .... The Tiedemann-Eulenburg-Bismarck difference Letter from Bismarck to Tiedemann . Letter from Count Eulenburg to Bismarck Bismarck's reply . . . . . An imperial dream ...... Correspondence between the Emperor and Bismarck Evil results of the Bismarck-Eulenburg difference health Outbreak of nettle-rash ..... The killing work of a Prime Minister's position Falling off in Bismarck's strength early in the seventies The presidency of the Prussian ministry transferred to Roon Bismarck disheartened by the intrigues of the ' Reichsglocke ' set Insincerity amongst the official staff ....... Bismarck's systematic exclusion from the business of the political leadership .......... Thoughts of a ' Gladstone ' ministry ....... Its impracticability in view of the sentiments of the King and Crown Prince ........... Breach with Free Trade 217 Broken health (Schweninger) .217 Under Secretary of State von Gruner 217 His call to the household ministry and appointment as actual Ge- heimrath without the counter-signature of a responsible minister . 218 Bismarck's letter to Geheimrath Tiedemann 218 - Bismarck's letter to the Minister von Billow .... 223 The announcement of Gruner' s appointment in the ' Gazette' does not take place .......... 224 206206 207207209210 - 211 212213 214 214214 214 215215216 216216 CHAPTER XXVII THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS Bismarck's reserve with regard to the government departments . . 225 His protest against the subordination of a great public interest to private interests ......... 225 And against the excessive use of red tape 226 xiv CONTENTS PAGE Why, in spite of his non-interference, Bismarck's retirement was felt to be a relief .......... 226 The Department of Public Worship opposes the legal assessment of the contribution to be paid to the schools by each separate community 226 The councillors of the Finance Department oppose the principles of a reform in taxation insisted upon by Bismarck .... 227 Opposition in the Department of Agriculture to a cattle quarantine in order to keep off epidemics ....... 227 Good relations between Bismarck and the Imperial Treasury . . 228 Subordination of the Imperial Treasury to the Prussian Minister of Finance ........... 228 Bismarck's relations with the Imperial Postal Department . . . 228 Herr von Stephan .......... 229 CHAPTER XXVIII THE BERLIN CONGRESS General von Werder's enquiries on behalf of Alexander II respecting the attitude of Germany in the event of a Russo-Austrian war . 231 The singularity of the form chosen . . . . , . .231 Position of the Prussian military attache at the Russian court . . 232 His direct intercourse with the Emperor without the mediation of the Foreign Office .......... 232 Gortchakoff's object in making the enquiry 233 Bismarck's tardy reply ......... 233 His proposal to recall Werder is rejected by the Emperor William . 234 Repetition of the enquiry by the Russian embassy .... 234 Bismarck's reply .......... 234 Its effect 235 Russia's advances to Austria 235 Conclusion of the convention at Reichstadt . . . . .235 Aim of the Balkan campaign . . . . . . . .235 Formation of a Bulgaria dependent upon Russia . . . .235- Failure of this calculation 235 A dishonest fiction .......... 236 The Russian proposal to convene a congress 236 Gortchakoff's participation in the Berlin Conference contrary to the Czar's wish 236 Shuvaloff and Gortchakoff as opponents 236 Mendacity of Russian and English politics 237 Press and Parliament easily deceived 237 Russian discontent at the attitude of Germany in the execution of the Berlin treaty 238 XV BISMARCK PAGE Premeditated dishonesty of Gortchakoff's attitude .... 238 The reproach cast at Germany of ' platonic ' love for Russia . . 238 Russia desires from the German commissioners general consent to all Russian demands ...,.•••• 239 The Czar threatens war in a letter to Emperor William . . ¦ 239 Proofs of Gortchakoff's co-operation in the composition of the Czar's letter 240 The Emperor William's journey to Alexandrovo not approved by Bismarck 240 Count Peter Shuvaloff proposes a Russo-German offensive and de fensive alliance .......... 241 Personal character of every alliance with Russia .... 246 Possible displeasure of the Czar due to malevolent reports of the Rus sian representative at the Court of Berlin 246 Highly coloured reports of diplomatic representatives are of no use in general politics .......... 248 Bismarck rejects an ' option ' between Russia and Austria . . .250 CHAPTER XXIX THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE Aim of the alliance of the three Emperors : the maintenance of the monarchy ........... 251 Meeting of the three Emperors in Berlin in 1872 .... 252 Prince Gortchakoff in 1875 disturbs the hopes entertained of the alli ance ........... 252 Bismarck as an opponent of preventive wars . . . . .252 Probable effect of a German attack on France in the year 1875 . . 252 Anti-German character of the Gortchakoff policy . . . .253 Le cauchemar des coalitions . . . . . . . .254 The possibility and danger of a coalition between France, Austria, and Russia ........... 255 England's attitude an impossible basis for calculation . . . 255 Germany confronted with the alternative of an alliance with Russia or Austria ........... 256 Scruples concerning an alliance with Austria ..... 257 The letter from the Czar Alexander forces on a decision . . .258 Popularity of an Austro-German alliance in Germany . . .258 The alliance with Austria viewed by the light of international law . 259 Bismarck's meeting with Count Andrassy at Gastein and provisional understanding concerning the conclusion of a defensive alliance against a Russian attack 260 Letter from Bismarck to the King of Bavaria ..... 261 xvi CONTENTS PAGE Answer of the King of Bavaria and Bismarck's reply .... 266 Bismarck's reception on the journey from Gastein to Vienna . . 268 Popularity of the alliance amongst the Germans of Austria . 268 The Emperor William's dislike to a league with Austria . . .269 Uncertainty of an alliance with Russia 270 Efficacy of treaties then and now 270 Bismarck gets the Emperor to sanction the alliance by making it a cabinet question ....... 27! Chivalry of the Emperor William towards the Russian Emperor . 271 Bismarck's motives in proposing the introduction of the Austro-Ger man alliance into the legislation of both countries . . .273 Limited stability of all treaties between great powers . . .273 Germany, however friendly towards Austria, must still keep the way open to St. Petersburg 275 Germany's role of mediator between the rival efforts of Austria and Russia 275 The Austro-German alliance leaves Germany uncovered as against France ........... 275 Absence of controversial points between Germany and Russia . . 275 Misrepresentation of public opinion in Russia . . . . .276 Germany's good relations with Russia give the alliance with Austria a better guarantee ......... 276 An estrangement between Germany and Russia causes an increase in Austria's demands upon its ally .... . . 276 Inoffensive nature of the Austro-German treaty .... 277 Uncertainty of the future development of Austria . . . .278 Possibility of a rapprochement between Austria and France in the event of a restoration of the French monarchy . . . . .279 Aim of a foreseeing policy of Germany with regard to her Austrian ally 279 Personal displeasure must not determine our policy with regard to Russia ........... 280 National interests alone must decide . . . . . . .281 Confidence of Alexander III in Bismarck's pacific policy . . . 282 His doubts concerning the continuance of Bismarck's chancellorship in the year 1889 283 The clausula rebus sic stantibus in political treaties .... 284 Toujour s en vedette ! . . . . . . . . .284 CHAPTER XXX FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA Causes of Russia's present attitude of reserve . . . . .285 Russia without a pretext for declaring war against Germany . . 285 Probable object of the display of troops in the west .... 286 xvii BISMARCK PAGE Russia's efforts for a Russian closure of the Bosphorus subject to a guarantee of the European possessions of Turkey . . . 286 Probabilities of the success of those efforts 287 Germany's interests in a Russian occupation of Constantinople . . 288 Task of the Austrian policy in such an event ..... 288 What consequences would ensue from Germany's adherence to Austria in the event of a Russian advance upon the Bosphorus ? . .289 The aim of German policy must not be to excite the concupiscence of friendly powers by distributing political gratuities . . . 290 Germany's duty is to stand aloof in all questions not directly concerning national interests 290 Germany's advantage lies in her freedom from direct Oriental interests ; her disadvantage, her central position ..... 291 The preservation of peace remains Germany's most important interest . 292 Bismarck's ideal after the re-establishment of German unity . . 293 Fiasco of the Russian policy of liberation in the Balkan peninsula . 294 Ingratitude of ' liberated ' nations 295 The immediate aim of Russian policy the closing of the Black Sea by Russia ........... 296 CHAPTER XXXI THE COUNCIL OF STATE Reason for recalling the council into activity in 1852 .... 297 Incompleteness of the drafts prepared by the state ministry . . 297 Particularism of the departmental secretaries ..... 297 Reciprocal consideration of the departmental secretaries in the sittings of the state ministry ......... 298 The parliamentary debates no absolute protection against imperfect drafts of laws emanating from the ministry .... 299 Indolence of most of the deputies and party blindness of the leaders . 299 A monument of the cursoriness of the Reichstag proceedings . 300 ' Staatsrath ' and Council of Political Economy as correctives . . 300 Jealousy of the corporate councillors and deputies with regard to the unincorporated interference of others ...... 301 Favourable impression of the Staatsrath in 1884 .... 301 CHAPTER XXXII THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I Good effects of Nobiling's attack upon the Kaiser's health . . . 303 Last illness and death of the Emperor ...... 303 Early military training of Prince William of Prussia .... 304 xviii CONTENTS PAGE His relations to General von Gerlach ...... 305 What is a pietist ?.......... 305 The prince's ignorance of political institutions, especially of the relations between the land-owner and the peasant ..... 307 Industry and conscientiousness of the ' Regent ' in the despatch of state business 307 His common-sense .......... 308 Close adherence to traditions ........ 309 Particularism of William I ........ 309 His fearlessness in the path of honour and duty ..... 309 Cause of the rupture with the ministers of the New Era . . . 310 Opposition of Princess and Queen Augusta to the government policy from motives of principle . . . . . . . .310 Herr von Schleinitz as the Queen's opposition-minister . . . 310 Official reporting of the household ministry in politicis . . .311 Its connection with an agent of Drouyn de Lhuys and the ' Reichsglocke ' party 312 ' Our most gracious Imperial Chancellor is very ungracious to-day ' . 313 The Emperor under the influence of the Empress . . . .313 The Empress Augusta as the pivot of all opposition . . . .314 William I in the struggle between his sense of kingly duty and domestic peace 314 The ' royal distinction ' of William I . . . . . . .314 His freedom from all forms of vanity . ...... 316 His fear of just criticism . . . . . . . . .316 His sense of justice towards both friends and opponents . . . 316 William I a ' gentleman ' translated into terms of a king . . .317 Violent outbreaks of temper in the course of discussion . . .317 Personal relations of Bismarck to William I 318 Addresses and proclamations of William I ; the warmth of his tone a result of his amiability . . . . . . . .310 Loyalty for loyalty 319 King and minister, master and servant 320 The celebration of April 1, 1885 320 Bismarck's royalism 321 Letters from William I to Bismarck . 321 The Empress Augusta's last letter to Bismarck 331 CHAPTER XXXIII THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III Bismarck's relations to the Crown Prince Frederick William . . 332 And to the Crown Princess 333 xix BISMARCK PAGE The alleged renunciation by the Crown Prince in 1887 in favour of his son 333 Bismarck's interference in the medical treatment of the sufferer . . 334 A decision in accordance with constitutional law concerning the right of the Emperor and King of Prussia as opposed to the right of the parliamentary bodies 334 To what extent is the Imperial Chancellor responsible for the conduct of the whole imperial government ?...... 335 The Imperial Chancellor has the right to appear in the Reichstag only as a member of the Federal Council .....'. 336 Considerations respecting the necessity of a readjustment of the balance of parties ........... 336 Over-estimate of the patriotism of the ' Reichstag, ' under-estimate of the good faith of the dynasties 337 Injury to our future from party spirit and the incapacity of the party leaders 338 Anti-imperial character of the ' Centrum ' party .... 338 A letter from the Emperor Frederick III to Bismarck . . . 340 Portrait of Prince Bismarck Frontispiece By P. von Lenbach. BISMARCK CHAPTER XIX SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN My successor at Paris was Count Robert von der Goltz, who had been since 1855 ambassador at Athens, Constan tinople, and St. Petersburg. My expectation that office would have disciplined him, that the transition from liter ary to business activity would have made him more sober and practical, and that the summons to what was then the most important post in Prussian diplomacy would have gratified his ambition, was not to be immediately or fully realised. At the end of the year 1863 I found myself obliged to have a written explanation with him, the whole of which is unfortunately no longer in my posses sion; of his letter of December 22, which was the imme diate occasion of the correspondence, only a fragment ' remains, and in the copy of my reply the beginning is missing. But even so this document has its value as a sketch of the situation at the time, and as illustrating the development that proceeded from it. 'Berlin: December 24, 1863. '. ... As to the Danish matter, it is not possible that the King should have two Ministers of Foreign Affairs ; I 1 See Bismarck-Jahrbuch, v. 231. VOL. II. — I I BISMARCK mean that the post most important in the critical question of the day should represent towards ^he-^ine a policy opposed to that of his ministers. The_friction 6f our state machine, already excessive, must not__be_still further increased. I can put up with any contradiction to myself personally, as long as it proceeds from so competent a source as yourself ; but I cannot officially share with any one the task of advising the King in this matter; and if his Majesty were to call on me to do any such thing, I should have to resign my post. I told the King this on the occasion of our reading one of your latest despatches ; his Majesty considered my point of view very natural, and I can but hold to it. Nobody expects reports to be only the reflection of ministerial views ; yours, however, are not reports in the usual sense, but assume the nature of min isterial proposals recommending to the King a policy opposed to that upon which he has already resolved with his assembled ministry in council, and has already fol- i lowed for four weeks. What I may well call a sharp, if not hostile, criticism of this decision constitutes, however, a fresh ministerial programme, and is no longer an am bassadorial report. A view which so directly traverses ours may certainly do harm, but cannot do good; for it may elicit hesitation and indecision, and I prefer any poli cy to one that is vacillating. ' I entirely echo your observation that a " question of Prussian policy quite simple in itself " is obscured by the dust arising from the Danish., business, and the mirage attafihing-^hereto. T^equestion) is whetherjwe are a _Great Power or a state ~irrTrie^German Federation; and "whether we are, conformably to the former quality, to be governed by a monarch or, a'sin the latter case would be SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN at any rate admissij^ pxprolessors, .district Judges, and the gossips)pf the small towns. The pursuit of the phan- ' tomTof popularity " in Germany " /which we have been car- , rying on for the last forty years has cost us our position in Germany and in Europe; and we shall not win this back again by allowing ourselves to be carried away by i the stream in the persuasion that we are directing its course, but only by standing firmly upon our legs, and being first of all a Great Power,, and German Federal state afterwards. That is what Austria, to our injury, has always recognised as right-~foi\ herself, and she will not allow herself to be wrested awayxby the 'comedy , she is playing with German sympathies, frpm her_F.nrnpp.an alli ances — lf~ indeed shesjtiasi any. Jfwe go too far for her, she will pretend to go along with us a little way, especially will sign what we do ; but the twenty per cent, of Ger mans that she has in her population are not in the last resort to be an element constraining her to let herself be carried away by us against her own interest. At the prop- I er moment she will stay behind us, and will know how to find her proper line towards a European situation as soon as we give it up. Schmerling's policy, the counter part of which appears to you to be an ideal one for Prus sia, has ended in a fiasco for Austria. Our policy, which was so briskly oppiised_byyou in the spring, has been veri fied in the Polish question, while the Schmerling policy has borne bitter FruiFfor'her. Is it not indeecTthe most signal victory we could win that Austria, two months after the reform attempt, should be glad when nothing more is said about it, should be writing identical notes with us to her former friends, and joining in our threats towards her pet, the majority in the Federal Diet, to the effect that 3 BISMARCK she will not allow herself to be bullied by majorities? We have won this summer what we have been vainly striv ing after for twelve years, the split-up of the Bregenz coali tion; Austria has adopted the very policy of ours that she openly scoffed at in October last ; she has chosen the Prus sian instead of the Wiirzburg alliance, and receives her assistance from us ; and if we now turn our back upon her to-day we upset the ministry. Never before has the policy of Vienna been controlled to such a degree en gros et en dttail from Berlin. Add to this that we are sought after by France — Fleury offers more than the King wants ; our voice has, in London and St. Petersburg, the weight it had lost for twenty years ; and all this eight months after you prophesied to me the most dangerous isolation as a result of our Polish policy. If we naw_tunL_aur back upon the Great Powers in order to throw ourselves into the arms of the policy of the minor states — enmeshed as it is in the net of club-democracy — that would be the most wretched position, either at home or abroad, to which the monarchy could be brought. We should be pushed-instead of push ing; we should lean for support upon elements which we do not control, which are necessarily hostile to us, and to which we should have to devote ourselves unconditionally. You believejhat there is some hidden virtue in " German' Cpublic opinion," Chambers, newspapers, and such like, which might support or help us in a " Union " or " Hege mony " policy. I consider that a radical error, a product of the fancy. Our strength cannot proceed frornlTpress anjj^xliamentar^poTicy, butTonly from the policy of a great military Power, and we have not so much "staying power that we can afford to fritter it away by fronting in the wrong direction for the sake of phrases and Augusten- 1" SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN burg. You attach a great deal too much importance) to the whole Danish question, and allow yourself to be blinded_by the fact that it has become the general rallying- i cry of the democracy which controls the speaking trumpet! of the- press and the clubs, and gives a sparkle to this' question, insignificant-as it is in itself. Twelve months ago the question was that of two years' service; eight months ago it was Poland; and now it is Schleswig- Holstein. What was your own view of the European sit uation in the summer ? You were dreading all sorts of dangers for us, and at Kissengen you did not at all conceal your views as to the incapacity of our__policy : have all these dangers suddenly disappeared with the death of the King of Denmark ? and are we now, at the side of Pfordten, Coburg, and Augustenburg, supported by all the chatter boxes and humbugs of the party of movement, suddenly to be strong enough to take, an off-hand tone towards all four of the Great Powers ? and have the latter suddenly become so good-natured or so impotent that we can boldly plunge into every sort of embarrassment without having any anx iety as to what they may do ? ' You call it a " marvellous "..policy that we should have been able to realise the Gagern programme without a Constitution for the whole of Germany. I do not see how we could have got as far as that if we had been in the necessity of overcoming Europe in league with the Wiirz- burgers, and thrown upon them- for support. Either the governments would have stood by us honourably, and the reward of victory would have been one Grand Duke more in Germany, who in his anxiety to preserve his new sov ereignty would vote in the Bund against Prussia — one Wiirzburger more, in fact ; or on the other hand we should 5 BISMARCK have been obliged (and this more probably) to cut the ground from under the feet of our own allies by means of an imperial constitution, and nevertheless have had to reckon upon their fidelity. If this did not succeed, as was to be expected, we should have been shown up ; if it succeeded, we had the Union together with the imperial constitution. ' You speak of a conglomeration of states of seventy million people, with a million soldiers, who are to defy Europe united and compact. Consequently you attribute to Austria a persistence, dead or alive, in a policy which must lead to the hegemony of Prussia. Yet you would not trust further than you could reach her the state which possesses thirty-five of these seventy millions. Neither would I; but I consider it our correct policy at present to have Austria with us. Whether tne moment of separation comes and on whose initiative it will come, we shall see. You ask : " When on earth, then, are we to have war ? What is the use of army reorganisation ? " And your own reports describe to us the necessity to France of having a war in the spring and the prospect of a revolution in Gali- cia to boot. Russia has 200,000 men on their feet, over and above what is wanted for Poland, and she has no money to waste on fancy armaments. It looks, therefore, as if she had made up her mind for war. I am prepared for war combined with revolution. Then you say that " we ' by no means expose ourselves to war." I cannot make that fit in with your own reports during the last three months. I am at the same time by no means shy o^war-^quite the reverse; I "am also as indifferent__ta" revolutionary " or " Conservative " as I am to all phrases/) Perhaps you will very soon be convinced that war is also part of my pro- \ 6\ SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN gramme ; but I consider, your jway of reaching a war the wrong one from the "statesman's point of view.^ The fact that with regard to this you find yourself in agreement with Pfordten, Beust, Dalwigk, or whatever our opponents' names are, makes me look upon the side you represent neither as revolutiorraryTndeed nor Conservative, but as" not the right one' for Prussia. If the pothouse enthusiasm in London and Paris makes any impression, I shall be glad of it; it is part of our stock-in-trade, but it has not impressed me so far, and, in the case of a fight, furnishes us with few pence and no powder. You may call the con vention of London revolutionary if you like ; the Vienna treaties were ten times more so, and ten times more unjust towards many princes, estates, and countries ; it is only by European treaties that European law is established. If, however, you wanLrxLapplv the standard of morality and justice toj)hese latter they must well-nigh all be abolished. ' If you were in office here instead of me, I fancy you would very soon be convinced of the impossibility of the policy yo4jrecommend__tojrie^a1day_^nd_xeg_ard as so exclusively " patriotic " that you threaten to break off your friendship over it. I can only say, " La critique est aisde ; " iris hot difficult, amid the applause of the mob, to find fault with the government, especially a government which has been obliged to lay hold of several wasps' nests into the bargain. If the result proves that the government pro ceeded rightly, there is no further question for blame ; if the government makes a fiasco over things which are in general beyond the control of human will and foresight, you have the glory of having prophesied at the right time that the government was on the "woodman's road."* I * [' Path that goes nowhere.'] 7 BISMARCK have a high opinion of your political insight, but I con sider that I, too, am not stupid, though I am quite pre pared to hear you say that this is self-delusion. Perhaps your opinion of my patriotism and judgment will rise when I tell you that, for the last fortnight, I have been taking my stand on the proposals made in your Report No. . With some difficulty I have determined Aus tria to convoke the Holstein Estates, in case we carry the matter through at Frankfort ; we must first of all be all right in the country. The examination of the succession question at the Bund ensues with our consent, even if, having regard to England, we cannot vote for it. I have left Sydow without any instruction ; he is not made for carrying out delicate instructions. ' It may be that other phases of the matter will follow that do not lie very remote from your programme ; but how am I to make up my mind to let myself out frankly to you as to my latest ideas, after your declaring war against me politically, and pretty candidly acknowledging the inten tion to oppose the present ministry and its policy, and consequently to turn it out? On this point I am judging merely by the contents of what you write to me, and leave out of the question everything I have learnt through col- portage and at third hand, as to your verbal and written diatribes with regard to myself. And yet I am bound as a minister, if the interests of state are not to suffer, to be ruthlessly frank towards our ambassador at Paris with regard to my policy from first to last. The friction which every one in my position has to overcome — with ministers and councillors at Court, with occult influences, with the Chambers, the press, and foreign Courts — must not be aggravated by the substitution for the discipline of my SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN department, of a rivalry between the minister and the ambassador, and by my having to restore the indispensable homogeneity of the service by a discussion through the post. I can seldom write at such length as I can to-day, Christmas Eve, when all the officials are on leave ; and I would not write the fourth part of this to any one but you. I do so because I cannot bring myself to write to you officially and through the clerks in the same autocratic ; tone in which your reports to hand have been couched. I have no hope of convincing you, but I have sufficient con-." fidence in your own official experience and impartiality to make me believe that you will grant me that only one policy can be carried out at_a-jim,e, and that it must be the policy upon which the^-mfawstry and the^Kmgljre at one. If you want to try to overthrow that ami the ministry along with it, you must do it here in the Chamber and in the press, at the head of the Opposition, but not from your present position; in that case I should equally have to abide by your maxim_that, in case of a conflict between ^patriotism and friendship] the former must decide. But I can assure y^uTEItHmy^tnonsm is of so pure and strong a nafrirf___T_t_a friendship whichJhasAn giue way to it may nevertheless be very cordial.' * The gradations which appeared attainable in the Da nish question, every one of them meaning for the duchies an advance to something better than the exj^t-irrg--cpndi- tions, culminated, in my judgmenT,TnJthe_ acquisition of 1 Cf. Bismarck-Jahrbuch. v. 232. See Goltz's answer to this letter with Bismarck's marginal remarks in Bismarck-Jahrbuch, v. 238. 9 BISMARCK the duchies by Prussia, a view which I expressed in a council held immediately after the death of Frederick VII. I reminded the- King that-every_one. of _his_immediate ancestors, not even excepting his brother, had won an increment of territory_for_the_state ; Frederick William IV t had acquired Hohenzollern and the Jahde district ; Fred erick William III the Rhine province ; Frederick William II, Poland; Frederick II, Silesia; Frederick William I, old Hither Pomerania; the Great Elector, Further Pome- rania and Magdeburg, Minden, &c. ; and I encouraged him to do likewise. This pronouncement of mine did not appear in the protocol. As Geheimrath Costenoble, who had drawn up the protocol, explained to me, when I asked him the reason of this, the King had opined that I should prefer what I blurted out not to be embedded in protocols. His Majesty seems to have imagined that I had spoken under the Bacchic influences of a ddjeuner, and would be glad to hear no more of it. I insisted, however, upon the words being put in, and they were. While I was speaking, the Crown Prince raised his hands to heaven as if he doubted my sanity ; my colleagues remained silent. If the utmost we aimed at could not be realised, we might have, in spite of all Augustenburg renunciations, have gone as far as the introduction of that dynasty, and the establishment of a new middle state, provided the Prussian and German national interests had been put on a sure foot ing — these interests to be protected by what was the essen tial part of the subsequent February conditions — that is, a military convention, Kiel as a harbour for the Bund, and the Baltic and North Sea canal. Even if, taking into consideration the European situa tion and the wish of the King, this had not been attainable SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN without the isolation of Prussia from all the Great Powers, including Austria — the question was in what way, whether under the form of a personal union or under some other, a provisional settlement was attainable as regards the duch ies, which must in any case be an improvement in their i position. From the very beginning I kept annexation steadily before my eyes, without losing sight of the other gradations. I considered the situation set up in the public opinion of our opponents as our programme to be the one which I believed must absolutely be avoided — that is to say, to fight out Prussia's struggle and war for the erection of a new grand duchy, at the head of the news papers, the clubs, the volunteers, and the states of the Bund (Austria excepted), and this without the assurance that the Federal governments would carry the affair through, despite every obstacle. Moreover, the public opinion that had developed in this direction, and even the President Ludwig von Gerlach, had a childlike confi dence in the assistance England would render to isolated Prussia. The partnership of France would have been much more easy to obtain than that of England, had we been willing to pay the price which it might be foreseen it would cost us. I have never wavered in the conviction that Prussia, supported only by the arms and associates of 1 848 — and by these I mean public opinion, Diets, political clubs, volunteers, and the small contingents as they were then constituted — would have embarked upon a hopeless course and would have only found enemies in the Great Powers, in England also. I should have regarded as a humbug and a traitor any minister who had fallen back upon the erroneous policy of 1848, 1849, an(* ^o, which must have prepared a new Olmiitz for us. Austria once BISMARCK with us, however, the possibility of a coalition of the other Powers against us disappeared. Even though German unity could not be restored by means of Resolutions of Diets, newspapers, and rifle-meet ings, Liberalism) nevertheless continued to exercise a presVuf^ontljjeJprinces which made them more inclined to make concessions for the sake of the Reich. The mood of the Courts wavered between the wish to fortify the monarchical position by separate particularistkarid auto- i cratic policy in view of the advance of the Xiberals, and anxiety lest peace should be- disturbed by-violence at home or abroad. No German government allowed any doubt to remain as to its C^m«^eritrrn^rrts^--but as to the way in which the future of Germany was to be shaped, neither governments nor parties were agreed. It is not probable that the Emperor William as Regent, or subsequently as King, could ever have been brought so far by the road which he had first trodden, under the influence of his con sort, at the beginning of the new era, to do what was nec essary to bring about unity, namely, to renounce the Bund, and use the Prussian army in the German cause. On the other hand, jLOwever, it is not probable that he could have been guided into the path that led to the Da nish war, and consequently to that in Bohemia, but for his previous attempts and endeavours in the direction of Liberalism, and the obligations he had thereby incurred. Perhaps we should never have succeeded in holding him aloof from the Frankfort Congress of Princes in 1863 if his Liberal antecedents had not left behind in him a cer tain need of popularity in the Liberal direction, which before Olmiitz would have been foreign to him, but since then was the natural psychological result of the desire to 12 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN seek healing and satisfaction on the field of German policy, for the wounds inflicted upon his Prussian sense of honour on the same field. The Holstein question, the Danish war, Diippel and Alsen, the breach with Austria, and the decision of the German question on the battlefield — all this was a system of adventures upon which he would, per haps, not have entered but for the difficult position into which the new era had brought him. Evenjn 1864 it certainly cost us much trouble to loosen the th£e1i3s]_y~wruch the King, with the co-operation of theTLiberaJisinggbifluence of his consort, remained attached to that canux ^Without having investigated"~the compli-. cated legal questions of the succession, he stuck to his motto : ' I have no right to Holstein. ' My representa tion that the~TJuke_of Augustenburg had no right to the Ducal and the Schaumburg portion ; never had had, and had twice (in 1721 and 1852) renounced his claims to the Royal portion; that Denmark had as a rule voted with Prussia in the Federal Diet ; that the Duke of Schleswig- Holstein, from fear of the preponderance of Prussia, would hold with Austria — produced no impression. Even though the acquisition of these provinces, washed by two seas, and my historical reminder in the cabinet council of December 1 863, were not without effect on the dynastic sentiments of the King, on the other hand the realisation of the dis approval which, if he threw over the Augustenburger, he would have to encounter at the hands of his consort, of the Crown Prince and Princess, of various dynasties, and of those who in his estimation at that time formed the public opinion of Germany, was not without effect. Without doubt, public opinion in the cultured middle class of Germany was in favour of the Prince of Augusten- 13 BISMARCK burg, with the same want of judgment as at an earlier period palmed off ' Polonism ' as the German national inter est, and at a later period the artificial enthusiasm for Bat- tenbergian Bulgaria. The press was, in these two some-. what analogous cases, worked with distressing success, and public stupidity was as receptive as ever of its operation. Criticism of the government in 1864 had only reached the lej^l_ofJh^_phrase_L_- _ ' No,^aoii'£]IEeTEe~iiew burgo master.' I do not know if there is anybody to-day who would consider it reasonable that, after the liberation of the duchies, a new grand duchy should be formed out of them, possessing the right of voting in the Federal Diet, and as an ipso facto result called to go in fear of Prussia and hold with her opponents. At that time, however, the acquisition of the duchies by Prussia was regarded as an act of profligacy by all those who, since 1848, had set up to play the part of representatives of national views. My respect for so-called public opinion — or, in other words, the clamour of orators and newspapers — has never been very great, but was still further materially lowered as regards foreign policy in the two cases compared above. How strangely, up to this time, the King's way of looking at things was impregnated with vagabond Liberalism through the influence of his consort and of the pushing Bethmann- Hollweg clique is evident from the tenacity with which he clung to the contradictory attitude in which the Austro- Frankfort-Augustenburg programme stood towards the Prussian efforts after National Unity. This policy could not have recommended itself to the King on logical grounds. He had taken it over, without making a previ ous chemical analysis of its contents, as an appurtenance of the old Liberalism, from the point of view of the earlier 14 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN critical attitude of the heir to the throne, and of the coun sellors of the Queen, Goltz, Pourtales, &c. I will antici pate a little by here inserting the last sign of life given by the ' Wochenblatt ' party, in the shape of the letter of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg to the King, dated June 15, 1 866, whose main points are as follows : ' ' What your Majesty has constantly dreaded and avoided, what all persons of insight have foreseen, namely, that a serious quarrel with Austria would be utilised by France in order to increase her territory at the expense of I Germany, [where?] * — lies patent to all the world in Louis Napoleon's openly expressed programme. . . . The whole of the Rhineland for the duchies would not be a bad exchange for him ; for he certainly would not be contented in the petites rectifications des frontieres that he formerly claimed. And he is the omnipotent arbiter in Europe. .... I have no hostile feeling against the originator of this policy of ours. I am glad to recall how in 1848 I went hand in hand with him to strengthen the King's posi tion. In March 1862 I advised your Majesty to select a helmsman of Conservative antecedents, possessing suffi cient ambition, audacity and adroitness to steer the ship of state out of the rocks among which she had got ; and I should have named Herr von Bismarck had I believed that he combined with these qualities that discretion and logic al sequence of thought and action, the lack of which is scarcely pardonable in a youth, but in a man may endan ger the life of a state which he guides. As a matter of fact, all Count Bismarck's action has from the first been 1 Published in full in L. Schneider's Aus dem Leben Kaiser Wilhelms I, i. 334 &c. , also in Kohl's Bismarck Register, i. 287 &c, 8 Marginal notes in Bismarck's own hand. IS BISMARCK full of contradictions. ... Of old a decided advocate of the alliance with France and Russia, he linked with the help to be furnished in Prussian interest to Russia against the Polish insurrection, political projects1 which were sure to alienate both states from him. In 1863, when the death of the King of Denmark threw into his lap a task as fortunate as ever fell to a statesman's lot, he scorned to take advantage of it to place Prussia at the head of a unanimous rising [in resolutions] * of Germany, whose union under the leadership of Prussia was his object ; and preferred a union with Austria, the opponent in principle of this plan in order subsequently to become her irrecon cilable foe. He ill-treated* the Prince of Augustenburg — to whom your Majesty was well-disposed, and from whom at that time everything might have been obtained — allowing him soon afterwards to be declared the rightful candidate by Count Bernstorff at the London Conference. Then at the peace of Vienna he pledges Prussia to dispose^ definitely of the liberated duchies subject only to an understanding with Austria ; and has arrangements inserted in it which plainly announce the " annexation " he had in view. . . . ' Many regard these and similar measures, which for the very reason that they were self -contradictory con stantly swung round to the opposite of what was intended, as faults of indiscretion. To others they appeared as the steps of a man who proceeds at random, throws everything into a tangle, and brings things into a situation from which he may make his profit, or of a gambler who after every loss only punts higher, and finally cries va banque ! 1 Cf. vol. I. p. 344. s Marginal notes in Bismarck's own hand. * [Cf. the Prince's letter of December n, 1863, infra, p. 29.] f [Why not ? He pledged Austria only with the consent of Prussia.] 16 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN ' All this is bad, but what appears much worse in my eyes is that Count Bismarck, by this mode of procedure, should place himself in contradiction to the inclination and aims of his King, and show his skill chiefly in leading him step by step nearer to a goal diametrically opposed thereto, till a return appeared impossible. According to my opinion a minister's first duty is to give his master loyal counsel, to provide him with the means of carrying out his projects, and above all to keep the King's image unspotted in the eyes of all the world. Your Majesty's straightforward, righteous, and chivalrous sentiments are known to all, and have won for your Majesty universal trust and universal veneration. Count Bismarck, how ever, has brought things to such a pass that your Majesty's noblest words to your own country die away without effect because they are not believed; and any understanding with other Powers is become impossible, because the first condition thereof — I mean confidence — has been destroyed by a policy full of intrigue. Not a shot has yet been fired ; an understanding is still possible on one condition. Our preparations for war must not be discontinued; nay, rather, if necessary, they must be redoubled, if we are triumphantly to encounter antagonists who aim at our annihilation, or to emerge with full honours from this complicated business. But every understanding is impos sible so long as a man remains at your Majesty's side and possesses your decided confidence who has robbed your Majesty of the confidence of all the other Powers.' * By the time the King received this letter he had been 1 King William did not open the letter till he was at Nikolsburg in July 1866. His answer began : ' I first opened your letter at Nikolsburg, and the place and date of my answer should be answer enough, ' &c. Cp. Schneider, op. cit. i. 341. VOL. II. — 2 17 BISMARCK freed from the entanglement of the arguments repeated therein by the Gastein Convention of August 14 to 20, 1865. The difficulties I had still to encounter in dealing with them, and the caution I had still to use, are evident from my following letter to his Majesty: ' Gastein, August I, 1865. ' Your Majesty will be gracious enough to forgive me if a perhaps too excessive care for the interests of your ser vice induces me to revert to the communications you have just done me the honour to make to me. The thought of a partition, even in the administration of the duchies, would, if it became notorious in the Augustenburg camp, arouse a violent storm in diplomatic circles and in the press — because people would see in it the beginning of a definitive partition, and would not doubt that those por tions of the country which are to fall into the hands of exclusively Prussian administration are lost to Augusten burg. I believe with your Majesty that her Majesty the Queen will keep these communications secret, but if an intimation from Coblenz sent in reliance upon the rela tions between kinsfolk were to reach Queen Victoria, the Crown Prince and Princess, Weimar or Baden, then the very circumstance that the secret (which at his desire I told to Count Blome) had not been kept by us would arouse the distrust of the Emperor Francis Joseph, and wreck the negotiations. This wreck of the negotiations would lead almost inevitably to a war with Austria. Your Majesty will kindly credit it not only to my interest on your behalf, but also to my attachment to your person, if I say that I am dominated by the impression that your Majesty would embark on a war with different feelings SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and with a freer courage if the necessity for the war resulted from the nature of events and from a monarch's sense of duty, than if there were room for any afterthought that a premature disclosure of the intended solution of the question restrained the Emperor of Austria from consent ing to the last expedient your Majesty could accept. Perhaps my anxiety is foolish; and even if it were well- grounded, and your Majesty should wish to disregard it, I should still think that God directs your Majesty's heart, and should therefore do my duty none the less joyfully; but for the safeguarding of my own conscience I should, nevertheless, respectfully suggest whether your Majesty would not like to command me to summon back the cou rier from Salzburg by telegraph, (f) The ministerial dis patch-service might offer an ostensible occasion for this, and to-morrow another in place of him or the same man might start betimes. I most submissively beg to append a copy of what I have telegraphed to Werther as to the negotiations with Count Blome. I have the most respect ful confidence in your Majesty's well-approved favour, in the persuasion that your Majesty, even when you do not approve of my scruples, will attribute my insistence on them to my sincere desire to serve your Majesty not only as my duty commands, but also to your personal content ment.' Where the ' (f) ' appears in the above letter, the King wrote in the margin : ' Agreed. — I mentioned the matter because during the last twenty-four hours no mention of it had been made, and I regarded it as quite fallen out of the combination; later, the actual "seisin" had taken place. By my communication to the Queen I wished to pave the way for the future transition to the " seisin," which had *9 BISMARCK gradually developed out of the partition of the administra tion. Nevertheless I can at a later time so represent this if the proprietary partition actually comes about; that, however, I still continue to doubt, inasmuch as Austria would have to draw back too abruptly, after having pushed herself too far forward in favour of Augustenburg, and against occupation though it were only 28 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN the latter's house, and never mentioned the name of Biarritz or Napoleon to him. In 1 864 I went to Baden on October 1, from thence on the 5th to Biarritz. In 1865 I went to the latter place direct on September 30, and in 1863 I was not at Biarritz at all. I twice had conversa tions with him, and the following letter' from him refers to the former of these, which took place on November 1 8, 1863. ' Gotha : December n, 1863. ' Your Excellency will allow me to address a few lines to you, occasioned by an article contained in No. 282 of the " Kreuzzeitung " [of December 3], of which I have only lately been informed. In this article I am reported to have said to a deputation, amongst other things, " Herr von Bismarck is no friend of mine." I am unable to quote my exact words on the occasion, as the reference is to an expression that fell from me in conversation. It is quite possible I may have expressed my regret that your political views on the present position of the Schleswig-Holstein affair did not coincide with my own — an opinion I had no hesitation in expressing openly to yourself during my last visit to Berlin. I am nevertheless absolutely certain that I never used the expression attributed to me in the news paper; as I have always made it a fixed rule to keep political and personal matters apart. I therefore most genuinely regret that such a report should have found its way into the papers. ' I have considered it so much the more my duty not to withhold this explanation, as I am bound to recognise the handsome manner in which you openly said to me at Berlin that personally you were quite convinced of the justice of 1 Bismarck-Jahrbuch, v. 256. 29 BISMARCK my claim and approved of it ; but that if I tried to get it recognised you could, in view of the engagements entered into by Prussia, as well as of the general situation, make me no promises. ' Frederick. ' On January 16, 1864, his Majesty wrote to me1 as fol lows: ' My son came to me again yesterday evening to present to me the request of the Hereditary Prince of Augusten- burg, that I would receive a letter from him by the hand of Herr Samwer, and to ask if in order to do this I would not attend his soirde, where I could meet S. in a private apartment quite unobserved. I declined to do so till I had read the Prince's letter, and so bade my son send it to me. This was done, and I enclose it.2 It contains nothing objectionable, except at the end, where he asks me if I can not give S. any hope. Perhaps you can get an answer ready by to-morrow for me to give to S.3 If I chose to see him incognito at my son's, I could still give him no other hope than what is indicated in the stipulation,4 i.e. that when we have won the victory we will see what new bases can be established for the future, and await the verdict of Frankfort-on-Main as to the succession. ' W.' Again, on January 1 8 : ° ' I inform you that after all I resolved to see Samwer 1 Bismarck-Jahrbuch, v. 254. 8 Published in Jansen-Samwer's Schleswig-Holstein' s Befreiung, p. 695, appendix n. 3 See this letter of the King of January 18, composedly Bismarck, in Jansen-Samwer, p. 601, appendix 13. 4 Signed on January 16 by Rechberg and Werther. 6 Bismarck-Jahrbuch, v. 255. 3° SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN at my son's for about six to ten minutes in his presence,' I spoke to him quite in the tenor of the projected answer,2 but somewhat more coolly and very seriously. Above all, I said most decidedly that the Prince must in no case make a raid into Schleswig. 'W.' In a memorandum of February 26, 1864, the Crown Prince indicated, as justified by the circumstances, the following claims of Prussia : 3 Rendsburg to be a federal fortress, Kiel to be a Prussian marine station, accession to the Customs Union, the construction of a canal between the two seas, and a military and naval convention with Prussia. He cherished a hope that the Hereditary Prince would be ready to agree to these terms. After the Prussian plenipotentiaries at the London Conference had on May 28, 1864, delivered the declaration that the German Powers desired the constitution of Schles wig- Holstein as an independent state under the sovereignty of the Hereditary Prince of Augustenburg, I had a conver sation with the Prince at my residence on the evening of June 1, 1864, from nine till twelve o'clock, in order to decide whether I could advise the King to support his candidature. The conversation turned principally on the points indicated by the Crown Prince in the memorandum of February 26. The expectation of his Royal Highness, that the Hereditary Prince would be ready to agree to this, I did not find to be justified. The substance of the lat- 1 Samwer's memorandum gives the course of this conversation, op. cit. p. 696 &c. appendix 12. 2 I.e. the answer to the letter of the 18th, which was laid before the King in draft on the 17th. 3 It is based on the letter of the Hereditary Prince Frederick of Feb ruary 19, 1864 ; Jansen-Samwer, p. 705 &c, 31 BISMARCK ter's explanations has been given by Sybel,1 from the doc uments. What he most vigorously resisted were the cessions of territory for the purpose of constructing for tresses ; why, they might run to a square [German] mile, he said. I was obliged to consider that our demand was re fused, and that no good would come of any further nego tiation, at which the Prince seemed to hint, for he said, on taking his leave : ' We shall see each other again, I suppose.' He did not say it in the threatening sense in which Prince Frederick of Hesse said the same words to me two years later, but as an expression of a mind not made up. I never saw the Hereditary Prince again till the day after the battle of Sedan, when he was wearing the uniform of a Bavarian general. After peace was con cluded with Denmark on October 30, 1 864, the conditions were formulated under which we would regard the forma tion of a new Schleswig- Holstein state as not endangering the interests of Prussia and Germany. On February 22, 1865, they were communicated to Vienna. They coin cided with those recommended by the Crown Prince. One of the enterprises, the possibility of which I had advanced, is now 2 after long delay being carried into exe cution : the North Sea and Baltic Canal. In the interest of German sea power, which was then capable of develop ment only under the name of Prussia, I (and not I alone) had attached great importance to the building of the canal 1 Sybel, iii. 337 &c. Cf. Bismarck's account of this conversation in the Staats-Anzeiger of July 2, 1865 ; also the expressions in the speeches of June 13, 1865, and December 20, 1866, Politische Reden, iii. 387, 389 ; iv. 102 &c. ; the Duke's statement in Jansen-Samwer, p. 731 (cf. p. 336 &c). 'That is, at the date of the writing of these Reminiscences, 1891-92. 32 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and the possession and fortification of both its mouths. The desire to make a concentration of our naval forces possible, by cutting through the stretch of land separating the two seas, was still very vigorous as an after-effect of the almost morbid enthusiasm for the fleet in 1848; it slumbered, however, for a time when we had the territory in question at our free disposal. In my endeavours to revive this interest I met with opposition in the Commit tee for National Defence, of which the Crown Prince was President, but Count Moltke the real head. The latter, as a member of the Reichstag, gave it as his opinion on June 23, 1873,1 that the canal would only be navigable in summer, and was of doubtful military value ; with the forty to fifty million thalers which it would cost, it woujd be better to build a second fleet. The rea sons advanced against me in the suit for the royal de cision weighed more with the King because of the great regard his Majesty had for the military authorities than because of their intrinsic value. They culminated in the argument that so costly a public work as the canal would require for its protection in time of war a number of troops which could not be withdrawn from the army with out weakening it. The number of men we should require to have at our disposal for the protection of the canal in the event of the Danes co-operating with a landing of the enemy was estimated at 60,000 men. I objected that we should always need to protect Kiel (with its suburbs), Hamburg, and the road from the latter to Berlin, even if there were no canal in existence. Owing to the excessive pressure of other business and the manifold struggles of the 'seventies, I could not apply the time and energy nec- 1 Moltke's speeches, Werke, vii. 25. VOL. II.— 3 33 BISMARCK essary to overcome the resistance offered by these authori ties to my project in the imperial councils, and the matter was pigeon-holed. I ascribe the resistance I experienced principally to that military jealousy with which, in 1 866, 1870, and also later, I had to maintain struggles that were more painful to my feelings than most others. In my endeavours to win the Emperor's consent I rather gave prominence to the military considerations likely to appeal to him than to any political advantages on commercial grounds. The Dutch navy had the advantage of being able to use inland canals which allowed a passage for the largest vessels. Our corresponding need of a com munication by canals is essentially increased by the exist ence of the Danish peninsula and the division of our fleet between two separate seas. If our united fleet can issue from the harbour of Kiel, from the mouth of the Elbe, and even, if the canal is lengthened, from the Jahde also, without a blockading foe being aware of it beforehand, the latter would be compelled to maintain a squadron equiva lent to our whole fleet in each of the seas. On this and other grounds I was of opinion that the making of the canal would be more advantageous for the defence of our coasts than if we applied the cost of it to building fortresses and enlarging our fleet, especially as we had not unlimited resources for manning our fleet. My wish was to continue the canal from the lower Elbe so far in a west erly direction that the mouths of the Weser, the Jahde, and eventually also of the Ems, could be made into sortie ports which the blockading enemy would have to observe. The western continuation of the canal would be compara tively less costly than the cutting through of the backbone of the Holstein peninsula ; inasmuch as there are lines of 34 SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN uniform elevation, by means of which we should turn the high ground of the Geest on the promontory between the Weser and the mouth of the Elbe. In view of a blockade, presumably by the French, the protection of Heligoland by the neutrality of England has till now been to our advantage; a French squadron could have no coal depdt there, but would be obliged, in order to get supplies, to return to a French port at regular and not too long intervals, or would have to maintain a large number of tenders constantly going backwards and for wards. Now we should have to defend the rock with our own forces if we wished to hinder the French from gain ing a firm footing there in case of war. What the reasons were that relaxed the resistance of the Committee of Na tional Defence in the year 1885, I do not know. Perhaps Count Moltke had in the meantime convinced himself that the idea of an alliance between Germany and Denmark, which he had formerly entertained, was impracticable. CHAPTER XX NIKOLSBURG On the evening of June 30, 1866, his Majesty, together with the headquarters, entered Reichenberg. The town, with a population of 28,000, contained 1,800 Austrian pris oners, and was occupied by no more than 500 Prussian artillerymen armed with old carbines. Only a few leagues off lay the Saxon cavalry. They could have reached Rei chenberg in a night, and carried off the whole of our head quarters, his Majesty included. Thanks to the telegraph, it was generally known that we had our quarters at Reichenberg. I took the liberty of calling the King's attention to the fact, and in consequence the command was given for the artillerymen to repair singly, and with out attracting attention, to the castle, where the King had his quarters. The military set were offended at this inter ference of mine ; and in order to prove to them that my concern was not for my own security, I quitted the castle (whither his Majesty had commanded me) and retained my quarters in the town. This was the germ of a bad feeling towards me on the part of the military authorities on account of my personal position towards the King, which proceeded from departmental jealousy, and was destined to develop still further in the course of this campaign and of the French war. ^- ~n Aftet^eJbaJ±l£^afJKaniggratZ' the situation-was such that a faycjoralil£J£sprjnse^JiJ3Jir4Hr±.±o..the ikstadvances 36 NIKOLSBURG of Austria with a view to peace negotiations^, was not only possible, Jmt seemed demanded by the interference of France. The latter dates from the telegram, addressed to his Majesty, which arrived at Horficz * between July 4 and 5, in which Louis Napoleon informed the King that the Emperor Francis Joseph had ceded Venetia to him, and had invited his intervention. The brilliant success of the King's arms compelled Napoleon to quit 1 the reserve he had hitherto maintained. This interference was evoked by our victory ; up to this time Napoleon had calculated on our being defeated and in need of assistance. If on our part the victory of Koniggratz had been utilised to the ( utmost by the attack of General von Etzel, and by the energetic pursuit of the defeated foe by means of our cav alry, which was still intact, in all probability the mission of General von Gablenz to the Prussian headquarters would even then have led to the conclusion not merely of an armistice, but also to the bases of the future peace, considering the moderation which prevailed on our part, and was at that time still shared by the King, in respect to the conditions of peace — a moderation which, however, even then claimed more from Austria than was of any use, and which would have left us as our future associates all the states which had hitherto been members of the Con federation, but with their territories diminished and their feelings offended. At my suggestion his Majesty sent to the Emperor a reply which was dilatory, but yet rejected any armistice which did not contain guarantees for peace. Subsequently, at Nikolsburg, I asked General von Moltke what he would do if France actively intervened. * So written by the general staff. It is pronounced Horsitz. 1 See the text of the telegram in L. Schneider, i. 253 &c. 37 BISMARCK His reply was : ' I should adopt a defensive attitude towards Austria, confining myself to the line of the Elbe, and in the meantime prosecuting the war actively against France. ' This opinion confirmed me still more in my resolution to advise his Majesty to make peace on the basis of the ter ritorial integrity of Austria. I was of opinion that, in case of French interference, we must either make peace with Austria, imposing moderate conditions, and at the same time if possible contract an alliance with her with a view to an attack on France, or else we must quickly and completely cripple Austria by a sharp onslaught, and also by furthering disaffection in Hungary, and perhaps in Bohemia as well ; until then we must maintain a defensive attitude towards France instead of towards Austria, as Moltke wished. I believed that the war against France, which Moltke said he would conduct first of all, and that rapidly, would not be so easy ; that France had, indeed, but little strength left to take the offensive, but, judging from his torical experience, would soon be strong enough to act on the defensive in the country itself, and so spin the war out. Then, perhaps, we should not be able victori ously to maintain our defensive against Austria on the Elbe if we had to carry on a war of invasion in France, with Austria and South Germany as hostile elements in our rear. I was moved by this prospect to still livelier exertions in the cause of peace. A participation on France's part in the war would have brought, at the moment, only 60,000 French troops (perhaps still less) into the struggle in Germany. Never theless, this accession of strength to the South German federal army would have sufficed to restore energy and 38 NIKOLSBURG unity of command, probably under a French commander-in- chief. The Bavarian army alone, at the time of the sus pension of hostilities, was said to be 100,000 strong, and, with the other available German troops, all of them good and brave soldiers, and 60, 000 Frenchmen, we should have been brought face to face with an army of 200,000 men from the southwest, under united and vigorous French leadership, instead of the former timid and disunited troops ; and we should have had no equivalent forces with which to meet them in front of Berlin without weakening ourselves in the direction of Vienna. Mayence was occu pied by federal troops under the command of the Bavarian general, Count Rechberg ; had the French once got into the place it would have taken hard work to get them out again. Under the pressure of the French intervention, and at a time when it was impossible to see whether we should succeed in making head against them in the field of diplo macy, I resolved to advise the King to make an appeal to the Hungarian nationality. If— Napoleon intervened in the war in the manner indicated, if Russia's attitude re mained doubtful, and especially if the cholera made further ravages in our ranks, our position might become so diffi cult that we should be obliged 1 to seize every weapon offered us by the outbreak of the national movement, not only in Germany, but also in Hungary and Bohemia, in order to avoid succumbing. On July 1 2, in our quarters at Czernahora, there was 1 Cf. the statement in the speech of January 16, 1874, Politische Reden, vi. 140. 39 BISMARCK held a council of war — or as the military prefer to call it, a meeting to hear the reports of the generals ; for the sake of brevity, however, and in order to be more intelligible, I make use of the former expression, which von Roon* also uses, although Field-Marshal Moltke, in a paper sent to Professor von Treitschke on May 9, 1881, has observed that no ' council of war ' was held in either of the wars. * In 1 866, whenever I was within reach, I was included in these deliberations, which were held under the presidency of the King, at first regularly and afterwards at longer intervals. On this particular occasion we discussed the direction of our further advance upon Vienna. I arrived late at the discussion, and the King explained to me that the point before them was how to capture the fortifications of the Floridsdorf lines in order to reach Vienna; that to do this the nature of the works demanded that heavy artillery should be brought up from Magdeburg, f and that for this a fortnight's time would be necessary. After breaches had been made, the works would have to be stormed, and for this the probable loss was reckoned at 2,000 men. The King asked for my opinion on the ques tion. My first impression was that we could not lose a fortnight without bringing at least the danger of French interference very much nearer than it otherwise would * In his letter to his wife of February 7, 1871. Denkwiirdigkeiten, iii.4 297. 1 See Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften, iii. 415 &c. • fin the work by the general staff we read under the date July 14 (p. 484) : Colonel Mertens was telegraphed to at Dresden to have in readi ness fifty heavy guns that were on their way thither [and consequently, it is to be presumed, had not yet arrived], so that they could be sent off with out loss of time by the railroad as soon as the order for them came. The railway on the other side of Lundenburg was destroyed. General von Hindersin was therefore ordered to bring together a park of transport ma terial at the place indicated. 40 NIKOLSBURG be.* I laid stress on my apprehension, and said : 'We can not spend fourteen days in waiting without considerably in creasing the dead-weight of the French arbitrium. ' I asked whether we were obliged to storm the Floridsdorf fortifi cations at all, or if we could not take them in flank — by making a quarter wheel to the left we could make for Pressburg, and there the Danube could be crossed with less trouble. The Austrians would then either accept battle in an unfavourable position south of the Danube with their front to the east, or would retreat upon Hungary, and then Vienna could be taken without drawing a sword. The King asked for a map, and gave his decision in favour of this proposal. The execution of the plan was adopted, unwillingly as it appeared to me, but it was nevertheless carried out. According to the work of the general staff (p. 522) the following order from the general headquarters was issued on July 19 : 'It is the intention of his Majesty the King to concentrate the army in a position behind the Russ- bach. In this situation the army will first of all be in a position to resist an attack which the enemy might under take with about 1 50,000 men from Floridsdorf. After wards, it can, from this position, either reconnoitre and attack the Floridsdorf entrenchments, or, leaving behind a corps of observation before Vienna, march off as quickly as possible to Pressburg. Both armies will push forward their advance-guards and reconnoitring parties to the Russ- bach in the direction of Wolkersdorf and Deutsch- Wag- ram. Simultaneously with this advance, an attempt will be made to take Pressburg by surprise, and there to secure if necessary the passage of the troops across the Danube. ' *The situation was similar to what it was in 1870 before Paris. 41 BISMARCK It was my object, in view of our subsequent relations with Austria, as far as possible to avoid cause for mortify ing reminiscences, if it could be managed without preju dice to our German policy. A triumphant entry of the Prussian army into the hostile capital would naturally have been a gratifying recollection for our soldiers, but it was not necessary to our policy. It would have left behind it, as also any surrender of ancie/it posses sions to us must have done, a wound to the pride of Austria, which, without being a pressing necessity for us, would have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of our future mutual relations. It was already quite clear to me that we should have to defend the conquests of the campaign in further wars, just as Frederick the Great had to defend the results^of his two first_SiIe_s_ian wars in the fiercer fire of the Seven Years' war. I That a war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history, even had we been able to allow the Emperor Napoleon the petty expenses which he looked for from us as a reward for his neu trality. As regards Russia, too, it is doubtful what would happen if it were then made clear to her what accession of strength the national development of Germany would bring to us. We could not foresee how far the later wars would make for the maintenance of what had already been won ; but in any case it would be of great importance whether the feelings we left behind in our opponents were implac able or the wounds we had inflicted upon them and their self-respect were incurable. Moved by this consideration, I had a political motive for avoiding, rather than bringing about, a triumphal entry into Vienna in the Napoleonic style./ In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after a victory not to enquire how much you can 42 NIKOLSBURG squeeze out of your opponent, but only to consider what is politically necessary. The ill-feeling which my attitude earned for me in military circles I considered was the result of a military departmental policy to which I could not concede a decisive influence on the policy of the state and its future. When it came to the point of dealing with Napoleon's telegram of July 4, the King had sketched out the condi tions of peace as follows : a reform of the Federation under the headship of Prussia ; the acquisition of Schles- wig- Holstein, Austrian Silesia, a strip on the frontier of Bohemia, and East Friesland ; the substitution of the respec tive heirs-apparent for the hostile sovereigns of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Meiningen, and Nassau. Subsequently other demands were advanced, which partly originated with the King himself, and were partly due to external influences. The King wished to annex parts of Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, and especially to bring Anspach and Baireuth again into the possession of his house. The reac- quisition of the Franconian principalities touched his strong and justifiable family sentiment very nearly. At one of the first court entertainments at which I was present in the 'thirties, a fancy ball at the residence of Prince William, as he then was, I recollect seeing him in the costume of the Elector Frederick I. The choice of this dress, so different in character from the others, was the expression of family sentiment, of the pride of descent — and seldom can this costume have appeared more natural and becoming than it was when worn by Prince William, then in his thirty-seventh year; and I have always had a lively recollection of his appearance in it. This strong dynastic family feeling was perhaps still more sharply 43 BISMARCK marked in the Emperor Frederick III, but it is certain that in 1866 the King felt it harder to renounce his claims upon Anspach and Baireuth than to give up Austria and Silesia, German Bohemia, and parts of Saxony. I gauged the proposed acquisitions from Austria and Bavaria by the question, whether the inhabitants, in case of future war, would remain faithful to the King of Prussia in the event of the withdrawal of the Prussian officials and troops, and continue to accept commands from him ; and I had not the impression that the population of these districts, which had become habituated to Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would be disposed to meet Hohenzollern predilections. The old original seat of the Brandenburg Margraves to the south and east of Nuremberg, if formed, let us say, into a Prussian province with Nuremberg as its capital, would scarcely be a part of the country which Prussia in case of war could denude of troops and leave under the protection of its devotion to the ruling house. During the short period of the Prussian occupation dynas tic feeling had taken no very deep root in the province despite the skilful administration of Hardenberg, and had since then been completely forgotten during the subse quent Bavarian period, except where it was kept in remem brance by religious agencies ; this occurred but seldom, and never lasted long. Even if occasionally the feelings of the Bavarian Protestants were offended, their sensibility on the point had never expressed itself in the shape of a recollection of Prussia. Moreover, after such an excision, the Bavarian stock, from the Alps to the Upper Palatinate, in the exasperation caused by such a mutilation of the kingdom, would always have to be regarded as an element difficult to appease and dangerous to future unity in pro- 44 NIKOLSBURG portion to its indwelling strength. Nevertheless I did not succeed at Nikolsburg in getting the King to accept my views as to the peace we were to conclude. I was therefore obliged to let Herr von der Pfordten, who had arrived there on July 24, travel back empty-handed, and had to content myself with a criticism of his attitude before the war. He was nervous about giving up Austrian sup port altogether, although he would very readily have with drawn himself from the influence of Vienna if it could have been done without danger ; but the old tendencies of the Confederation of the Rhine, or reminiscences of the position which the minor German states had occupied under French protection from 1806 to 18 14, had no place in his mind — in short, an honest and erudite, but politi cally by no means adroit, German professor. These con siderations, which influenced me as regards the Franconian principalities, I insisted upon to his Majesty with regard to Austrian Silesia as well, which was one of the most loyal provinces of the Austrian Empire, and had, moreover, a preponderance of the Slavonic element in its population. I also insisted upon it with regard to the Bohemian districts, Reichenberg, the Eger valley, and Carlsbad, which the King, at the instance of Prince Frederick Charles, wanted to retain as a glacis in front of the Saxon mountains. To this was to be added that Karolyi later categorically refused every cession of territory, even down to the tiny district of Braunau which I had men tioned to him, and the possession of which had some importance in the interest of our railways. I preferred to renounce our claim even to that, if insistence upon it threatened to delay a conclusion of preliminaries and ac centuate the danger of French interference. 45 BISMARCK The King's wish to retain West Saxony, Leipsic, Zwickau, and Chemnitz, in order to establish communica tion with Baireuth, collided, with Karolyi's declaration that he must insist upon the integrity of Saxony as a con ditio sine qua non of the conditions of peace. This differ ence in Austria's treatment of her allies was due to the personal relations of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Saxony ; and also to the behaviour of the Saxon troops after the battle of Koniggratz, for during the retreat they had been the steadiest and least broken body of troops in the army. The other German troops had fought bravely, when they were actually engaged, but this happened too late, and without practical result, and there prevailed in Vienna an impression, which was not justified by circum stances, that Austria had not been sufficiently supported by her allies, especially Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The work of the general staff says (under the date July 21) : 'At Nikolsburg negotiations had been going on for several days, the immediate object of which was a five days' truce. The point was, above all else, to gain time for diplomacy.* Now, when the Prussian army occupied the Marchfeld, a fresh catastrophe was immediately im pending. ' I asked Moltke if he considered our enterprise at Press burg as dangerous, or whether we might be free of all con cern about it. So far we had not a spot upon our white waistcoat. If we were sure of a happy issue to it, we must allow the battle to be fought out, and the truce post poned by half a day ; victory would naturally strengthen our position in negotiating; otherwise it would be better * In view of the French interference, diplomacy had less time to lose than the army. 46 NIKOLSBURG to abandon the enterprise altogether. He replied that he considered the issue as doubtful and the operations as risky ; but in war everything was hazardous. This decided me to recommend to the King the following arrangement as to the truce : to suspend hostilities at midday on the 22nd and not resume them till midday on the 27th. At half-past seven on the morning of the 22nd, General von Fransecky received news of the truce that was to commence on the same day, with instructions to make his disposi tions accordingly. The battle in which he was engaged at Blumenau had therefore to be suspended at twelve o'clock. Meanwhile in my conferences with Karolyi and with Benedetti, who, thanks to the clumsiness of our military police in the rear of the army, had succeeded in reaching Zwittau on the night of July 11 to 12, and there suddenly appeared beside my bed, I had found out the conditions on which we could procure peace. Benedetti declared as the basis of Napoleon's policy, that an augmentation of Prussia to the extent of four million souls in North Ger many at the utmost, with the retention of the line of the Main as the frontier on the south, would not entail French intervention. He hoped, I suppose, to form a South Ger man confederation affiliated to France. Austria withdrew from the German confederation, and was ready to recog nise all the arrangements that the King might make in North Germany, reserving however the integrity of Sax ony. These conditions contained all we wanted ; that is to say, a free hand in Germany. 47 BISMARCK I was firmly resolved, in consequence of the above considerations, to make a cabinet question of the accep tance of the peace offered by Austria. The position was difficult. All the generals shared the disinclination to break off the uninterrupted course of victory ; and dur ing these days the King was more often and more readily accessible to military influences than to mine. I was the only person at headquarters who was politically responsible as a minister and forced by the exigencies of the situation to form an opinion and come to a decision without being able to lay the responsibility for the result upon any other authority, either in the shape of the decision of my col leagues or superior commands. I was just as little able as any one to foresee what shape future events would take, and the consequent judgment of the world ; but I was the only one present who was under a legal obligation to hold, to utter, and to defend an opinion. This opinion I had formed after careful consideration of the future of our position in Germany and our relations to Austria ; and was ready to be responsible for it and to defend it before the King. I was well aware that the general staff nicknamed me the ' Questenberg in the camp ' — an identification with the Hofkriegsrath in ' Wallenstein,' which was not flattering to me. On July 23, under the presidency of the King, a coun cil of war was held, in which the question to be decided was whether we should make peace under the conditions offered or continue the war. A painful illness from which I was suffering made it necessary that the council should be held in my room. On this occasion I was the only civilian in uniform. I declared it to be my conviction that peace must be concluded on the Austrian terms, but 48 NIKOLSBURG remained alone in my opinion ; the King supported the military majority. My nerves could not stand the strain which had been put upon them day and night ; I got up in silence, walked into my adjoining bed-chamber and was there overcome by a violent paroxysm of tears. Mean while, I heard the council dispersing in the next room. I thereupon set to work to commit to paper the reasons which in my opinion spoke for the conclusion of peace; and begged the King, in the event of his not accepting the advice for which I was responsible, to relieve me of my functions as minister if the war were continued. With this document ' I set out on the following day to explain it by word of mouth. In the antechamber I found two colonels with a report on the spread of cholera among their troops, barely half of whom were fit for service.* The alarming figures confirmed my resolve to make the acceptance of the Austrian terms a cabinet question. Besides my political anxieties, I feared that by transfer ring the operations to Hungary, the nature of that coun try, which was well known to me, would soon make the disease overwhelming. The climate, especially in August, is dangerous ; there is great lack of water ; the country villages are widely distributed, each with many square miles of open field attached; and, finally, plums and melons grow there in abundance. Our campaign of 1 792 in Champagne was in my mind as a warning example ; on that occasion it was not the French but dysentery that caused our retreat. Armed with my document I unfolded to the King the political and military reasons which opposed the continuation of the war. 1 Partly printed in Sybel, v. 294. * During the campaign, 6,427 men succumbed to this disease. VOL. II — 4 49 BISMARCK We had to avoidjwjmnding_Aus±da_.toOL^everely; we ad to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitter ness of feeling or desire for revenge ; we oughtfrather to reserve the possibility ofbecoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard and the renewal of friendly relations with her as_a_moye open to us. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours ; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia. On the other hand, I could see no future acceptable to us for the countries constituting the Austrian monarchy, in case the latter were split up by risings of the Hun garians and Slavs or made permanently dependent on those peoples. Whatf would be put in that portion of Europe which the Austrian state from Tyrol to the Bukowina had hitherto occupied ? Fresh formations on this surface could only be of a permanently revolutionary nature. German Austria we could neither wholly nor partly make use of. The acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and portions of Bohemia could not strengthen the Prussian state ; it would not lead to an amalgamation of German Austria with Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed from Berlin as a mere dependency. If the war were continued, the probable theatre would be Hungary. The Austrian army which, if we crossed the Danube at Pressburg, would not be able to hold Vienna, would scarcely retreat southwards, where it would be caught between the Prussian and Italian armies, and, by its approach to Italy, onc&ga^re revive the military ardour of the Italians which, alf/eacVdepressed, had been restricted 5°x'x NIKOLSBURG by Louis Napoleon ; it would retreat towards the east, and continue its defence in Hungary — if only in the expecta tion of the prospective intervention of France and the weakening of Italy's interest in the matter, through France's agency. Moreover I held, even from a purely military standpoint, and according to my knowledge of Hungarian territory, that a prosecution of the war there/ would not repay us, and that the successes to be won there/ I would be out-^f all proportion to the victories we had hithertcKgamed, and consequently be calculated to dimin ish our prestige — quite apart from the fact that the pro longation of the/ war would pave the way for a French intervention ^We must finish off rapidly ; before France won time to bring further diplomatic action to bear ipon Austria. To all this the King raised no objection, but declared/ the actual terms as inadequate, without, however, definitely formulating his own demands. Only so much was clear, that his claims had grown considerably since July 4. He said that the chief culprit could not be allowed to escape unpunished, and that justice once satisfied, we could let the misguided partners off more easily, and he insisted on the cessions of territory from Austria which I have already mentioned. I replied that vre,were~Tiot th~ere~~to sit in judgment, but to pursue thg^German policy. ^AJstria's conflict in rivalry with us was noTnore~cu1pa5le than ours /with her; our task was the establishment or initiation of a German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia. ~ — Passing on to the German states, he spoke of various acquisitions by cutting down the territories of all our op ponents. I repeated that we were there not tP admin- 51 BISMARCK ister retributive justice, but to pursue a policy; that I wished to avoid, in the German federation of the future, the sight of mutilated territories, whose princes and peo ples might very easily (such is human weakness) retain a lively wish to recover their former possessions by means of foreign help; such allies would be very unreliable. The same wpuld be the case if, for the purpose of compen sating Saxony, Wiirzburg or Nuremburg were demanded of Bavaria, a plan, moreover, which would interfere with the dynastic predilection of his Majesty for Anspach. I had also to resist plans which were aimed at an enlarge ment of the Grand Duchy of Baden, the annexation of the Bavarian Palatinate, and an extension in the region of the lower Main. The Aschaffenburg district of Bavaria was at the same time regarded as a fit compensation to Hesse-Darmstadt for the loss of Upper Hesse, which would result from the projected Main frontier. Later, at Berlin, the only part of this plan still under negotiation was the cession of that portion of Bavarian territory which lay on the right bank of the Main, inclusive of the town of Baireuth, to Prussia; the question then arose whether the boundary should run on the Northern or Red Main or the Southern or White Main. What seemed to me to be paramount with his Majesty was the aversion of the mil itary party to interrupt the victorious course of the army. The resistance which I was obliged, in accordance with my convictions, to offer to the King's views with regard to following up the military successes, and to his inclination to continue the victorious advance, excited him to such a degree that a prolongation of the discussion became impos sible; and, under the impression that my opinion was rejected, I left the room with the idea of begging the 52 NIKOLSBURG King to allow me, in my capacity of officer, to join my regiment. On returning to my room I was in the mood that the thought occurred to me whether it Would not be better to fall out of the open window, which was four storeys high ; and I did not look round when I heard the door open, although I suspected that the person entering was the Crown Prince, Whose room in the same corridor I had just passed. I felt his hand on my shoulder, while he said : ' You know that I was against this war. You considered it necessary, and the responsibility for it lies on you. If you are now persuaded that our end is attained, and peace must now be concluded, I am ready to support you and defend your opinion with my father. ' He then repaired to the King, and came back after a short half- hour, in the same calm, friendly mood, but with the words : ' It has been a very difficult business, but my father has consented.' This consent found expression in a note written with lead pencil on the margin of one of my last memoranda, something to this effect : ' Inasmuch as my Minister-President has left me in the lurch in the face of the enemy, and here I am not in a position to supply his place, I have discussed the question with my son ; and as he has associated himself with the Minister-President's opinion, I find myself reluctantly compelled, after such brilliant victories on the part of the army, to bite this sour apple and accept so disgraceful a peace.' I do not think I am mistaken as to the exact words, although the docu ment is not accessible to me at present. In any case I have given the sense of it ; and, despite its bitterness of expression, it was to me a joyful release from a tension that was becoming unbearable. I gladly accepted- the royal assent to what I regarded as politically necessary S3 BISMARCK without taking offence at its ungracious form. At this time military impressions were dominant in the King's mind ; and the strong need he felt of pursuing the hitherto dazzling course of victory perhaps influenced him more than political and diplomatic considerations. The only residuum that the above note of the King's, which the Crown Prince brought me, left in my mind was the recollection of the violent agitation into which I had been obliged to put my old master, in order to obtain what I considered essential to the interests of the country if I were to remain responsible. To this day these and similar occurrences have left no other impression upon me than the painful recollection that I had been obliged to vex a master whom personally I loved as I did him. After the preliminaries with Austria had been signed, the plenipotentiaries of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Darm stadt appeared. I refused for the present to receive the Wurtemberg minister, Varnbiiler, because our irritation against him was much stronger than it was against Pford- ten. Politically he was more skilful than the latter, but, on the other hand, less fettered by German national scruples. His temper at the outbreak of the war had expressed itself in a ' Vaa victis ! ' and was to be explained by the rela tions between Stuttgart and France, which were chiefly maintained by the partiality of the Queen of Holland, a Wurtemberg princess. As long as I remained at Frankfort she took much interest in me, encouraging me in my opposition to Aus trian policy, and further evincing her anti-Austrian senti- 54 NIKOLSBURG ments by singling me out with an obvious purpose for marked favour at the house of her envoy, Herr von Scherff, and not without discourtesy towards the Austrian envoy- president, Baron Prokesch, at a time when Louis Napo leon still cherished the hope of a Prussian alliance against Austria, and already had the Italian war in his mind. I leave it undecided whether even at that time the predi lection for Napoleonic France alone dictated the policy of the Queen of Holland, or if it were only the restless desire to meddle in politics at any price that led her to take sides in the struggle between Prussia and Austria, and moved her to a conspicuously bad treatment of my Austrian colleague and to a marked preference of me. Anyhow, after 1 866 I found the Princess, who in former days had been so gracious to me, among the keenest op ponents of the policy which I was following in anticipation of the breach of 1870. It was in the year 1867 that sus picion was first thrown upon us in French official state ments of having designs on Holland, especially in the expression of the Minister Rouher in a speech against Thiers, March 1 6, 1 867, to the effect that France would not tolerate our advance to the Zuider Zee. It is not prob able that the Zuider Zee had been discovered by the French themselves, or even that the orthography of the name was correctly given in the French press without for eign help. It is allowable to conjecture that the thought of this piece of water was suggested to French suspicion from Holland. Even the Netherland descent of M. Drouyn de Lhuys does not entitle me to presume in his colleague so exact a local knowledge of geography outside the French frontier. As I assigned the policy of Wurtemberg to the Rhine- 55 BISMARCK confederation category, I determined for the time to de cline to receive Herr von Varnbiiler at Nikolsburg. More over, a conversation between us which was brought about by the intervention of Prince Frederick of Wurtemberg — brother of the commander of our Guards — and the Grand Princess Helene, who was very kindly disposed towards us, was barren of political result. I did not negotiate with Herr von Varnbiiler till a later date at Berlin ; and his mobile susceptibility to the political impressions of every situation showed itself in the fact that he was the first of the South German ministers with whom I could conclude the well-known treaty of alliance. CHAPTER XXI THE NORTH GERMAN BUND At Berlin I was ostensibly occupied with Prussia's rela tions to the newly acquired provinces and the other North German states, but in reality with the humour of the for eign Powers and in pondering upon their probable atti tude. To me, and perhaps to every one, our internal affairs had a provisional and immature aspect. The re action of the aggrandisement of Prussia, of the impend ing negotiations concerning the North German Confeder ation and ksAconstitution, made our internal development appear to be carried along by the current as much as our relations to foreign states, whether in or outside Ger many, in consequence of the European situation prevail ing, when the war had been interrupted. I topik it. as Cassured) that war with France would necessarily have to ^==~— -x — • — • J\ be waged on the road tn_i,iILf]2ltl1f'r nfifioria1 development, for our development at home aswell as the extension be yond the Main, and that we must keep this eventuality in sight in all our domestic as well as in our foreign rela tions. In some aggrandisement of Prussia in North Ger many Louis Napoleon saw not only no danger to France, but a means against the unification and national development of Germany; he believed that the non-Prussian portions of Germany would ,then_fegl a. greater need of French sup port. He cherished reminiscences of the confederation of the Rhine, and wished to hinder development in the 57 BISMARCK direction of a United_Giermany. He believed that he could do~this because he did not realise the national drift of the time, and judged the situation in accordance with his schoolboy reminiscences of South Germany, and from diplomatic reports which were only based on ministerial moods and sporadic dynastic feeling. I was convinced that their importance would vanish ; I assumed that a | United Germany was only a questign_f)f time, that the North German Confederation was only the firststep in its solution ; but that J;he _enmityi of France and perhaps of Russia, Austria's need of revenge of 1866, and the King's Prussian and dynastic particularism must not be called too soon into the lists. I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must Jake.. place~bef ore the construc tion of a United_Germanyjcould--be realised. I was at that time preoccupied with the idea of delaying the out break of this war until our fighting strength should be increased by the application of the Prussian military leg islation not only to Hanover, Hesse, and Holstein, but, as I could hope even at that time from the observation I had made, to the South Germans. I considered a war with France, having regard to the success of the French in the Crimean war and in Italy, as a danger which I at that time overestimated ; inasmuch as I imagined the at tainable number of troops in France, their order and organisation, and the tactical skill to be higher and bet ter than proved to be the case in 1870. The courage of the French soldiers, the high pitch of national senti ment and of injured vanity, were verified to the full extent, as I had estimated them in the eventuality of a German invasion in France, based on a remem brance of the experiences of 18 14, of 1792, and of 58 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND the Spanish War of Succession at the beginning of last century, where the invasion of foreign armies always produced phenomena like putting a stick into an ant- heap. I at no time regarded a^war with France as a simple matter, considered quite apart from the possible allies that France might find in Austria's thirst for revenge, or in Russia's desire foxa_baJance_of^power. My strenuous efforts to postpone the outbreak of war until the effect of our military legislation and our military training could be thoroughly developed in all portions of the country which had been newly joined to Prussia, were therefore quite reasonable ; and this aim of mine was not even ap proximately reached in the Luxembourg question in 1 867. Each year's postponement of the war would add 100,000 trained soldiers to our army. In the attitude I took up towards the King on the question of the bill of indem nity, and in dealing with the question of the constitution in the Prussian Diet, I felt the urgent necessity of letting other countries see no trace of actual or prospective ob stacles consequent on our internal condition ; I wished to offer them the spectacle of a united national sentiment ; and the more so inasmuch as it was impossible to judge what allies France would have on her side in a war against us. The negotiations and rapprochements between France and Austria soon after 1866, at Salzburg and elsewhere, under the direction of Herr von Beust, might prove suc cessful ; and the very appointment of that Saxon minister in a bad temper to the control of Viennese policy already pointed to the probability that it would take the direction of revenge. Italy's attitude was not to be reckoned upon as soon 59 BISMARCK as French pressure was applied, as we discovered by her submissiveness to Napoleon in 1866. During a confer ence I had with General Govone in Berlin, in the early part of 1866, he was horrified when I expressed the wish that he should enquire at home if we could rely on Italy's loyalty to her engagements even against Napoleonic ill- humour. He replied that a question of this kind would be telegraphed to Paris the very same day with the ques tion : ' What answer shall be given ?' To judge by the attitude of Italian policy during the war, I could not place any definite reliance on public opinion in Italy, not only on the ground of Victor Emmanuel's personal friendship to Louis Napoleon, but also by the standard of the parti sanship announced by Garibaldi in the name of Italian public opinion. Not only my apprehensions, but the pub lic opinion of Europe considered that a league of Italy with France and Russia was not outside the bounds of probability. From Russia active support of such a coalition was scarcely to be expected. By the influence which during the time of the Crimean war I had been able to exer cise in favour of Russia on the resolutions of King Fred erick William IV, I had gained for myself the good-will of the Emperor Alexander, and his confidence in me was strengthened during my residence as ambassador in St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, in the Russian cabinet, under the leadership of Gortchakoff, the doubt as to the advan tage for Russia of so important an increase of Prussian power began to outweigh the Emperor's friendship for King William and his gratitude for our policy during the Polish question of 1863. If the communication be accu rate which was made by Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Vitz- 60 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND thum von Eckstadt,1 then in July 1866 Gortchakoff in vited France to a common protest against the overthrow of the German confederation, and experienced a rebuff. In his first feeling of surprise, immediately upon the dis patch of Manteuffel to St. Petersburg, the Emperor Alex ander had acquiesced in the result of the Nikolsburg pre liminaries in general and obiter. At first the hatred against Austria, which, since the time of the Crimean war, had dominated the public opinion of Russian ' so ciety,' had found satisfaction in her defeat; this feel ing, however, was opposed to such Russian interests as were connected with the Czar's influence in Germany and the dangers with which it was threatened by France. I took it indeed for granted that we could count on Russian support against any coalition that France might form against us ; but that we should not receive it till we had had the misfortune to suffer defeats, by which the question whether Russia could tolerate the proximity of a victorious Franco- Austrian coalition on her Polish fron tiers would be brought nearer. The inconvenience of such a neighbour would perhaps be increased if, instead of the anti-papal kingdom of Italy, the Papacy itself were to become a third in the league of the two great Catholic Powers. I considered it, however, probable, that until the nearer approach of a danger such as would result from Prussian defeat, Russia would not be displeased, or at all events would offer no interference, if a numerically supe rior coalition had poured a little water into our wine of 1866. From England we certainly could rely on no active 1 London, Gastein and Sadowa, Stuttgart, 1890, p. 248. 6l BISMARCK support against the Emperor Napoleon, although English policy required a strong and friendly continental Power with many battalions, and this necessity had been attended to under the Pitts, father and son, to the advantage of Prussia, later to that of Austria, then under Palmerston, until the Spanish marriages, and afterwards again under Clarendon, in favour of France. The requirement of Eng land's policy was either an entente cordiale with France, or the possession of a strong ally against the enmity of France. England is, indeed, ready to accept the stronger German- Prussia in place of Austria; and during the situ ation of the autumn of 1866 we could in any case count upon platonic goodwill and didactic newspaper articles from over there; but this theoretical sympathy would' scarcely have condensed itself into an active support by land and by sea. The occurrences of 1870 have shown my estimation of England to have been correct. The representation of France in North Germany was under taken in London with a readiness which was at least mor tifying to us ; and during the war England never compro mised herself so far in our favour as thereby to endanger her friendship with France : on the contrary. It was chiefly under the influence of_ these reflections in the sphere of our foreign policy that I determined to | regulate the movements of ourTiome policy in accordance \ with the question whether it would support or injure the I impression of the power and coherence_of_the state. I y argued to myself that our first great aim must be in dependence and security in our foreign relations ; that to . & THE NORTH GERMAN BUND this end not only was actual_rem.oval-jof internal dissen sions requisite, but also any appearance of such a thing must be avoided in the sight of the foreign Powers and of Germany ;_that, if we first gained independence of foreign influence, we should then be able to move freely in our internal development, and to organise our institutions in as liberal or reactionary a manner as should seem" right and fitting ; that we might adjourn all domestic questions until we had secured our national aims abroad. I never doubted the possibility of giving to the royal power the strength necessary in order that our clock should be cor rectly set at home, provided that we first secured the nec essary freedom from without to live as an independent great nation. Until that should be accomplished I was ready, if necessary, to pay ' black-mail' to the Opposition, \ in order to be in a position in the first place to throw into the scale our full power, and diplomatically to use the ap pearance of this united power and, in case of need, even to have the possibility of letting loose national revolu tionary movements against our enemies. At a meeting of one of the committees of the Prus sian Diet a question was asked by the Progressist party, and, I suspect, not without knowledge of the efforts of the Extreme Rightywhether the government was prepared to introduce the Prussian Constitution in the New Prov inces. An evasive answer would have aroused, or would have animated, the distrust of the constitutional' parties. I was firmly convinced that it was imperative(not to ob struct! the development of the German question" by any doubts as to the loyalty of the government to the Consti tution ; that every fresh dissension between the govern ment and the Opposition would have strengthened the 63 BISMARCK resistance to our new national, structure which we had to expect from abroad. Thereupon I strove to convince the OpposTtlon and its speakers that they would do well for the present to allow all domestic constitutional questions to remain in the background; that the German nation, when once united, would be in a position to settle her internal affairs as she thought best ; that it was our pres ent task to place the nation in this position ; but all these considerations were useless in face of the narrow-minded provincial party politics of the Opposition leaders, while the discussions raised by them placed the national aim too much in the front not only in the sight of foreign countries, but also in that of the King, who at that time still looked more to the power and greatness of Prussia than to the constitutional union of Germany. He was wholly free from any ambitious calculations in the direc tion of Germany. Even in 1870 he described the title of Emperor contemptuously as a ' fancy-dress major,' whereupon I answered, that his Majesty certainly already by the Constitution held the full prerogatives of the posi tion, and that the title of Emperor merely implied the outward sanction; to some extent, as if an officer, who was commissioned to take charge of a regiment, were defi nitely appointed to the command. It was more flattering to his dynastic feeling to exercise this power simply as the born King of Prussia, than as an Emperor who had been elected and set up by a constitution — just as a prince who commands a regiment prefers to be addressed as your Royal Highness, and not as Colonel; and a lieutenant who is a count as Count, and not as Lieutenant. I had to take these peculiarities of my master into account if I wished to retain his confidence; and without him and 64 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND his confidence my way in German politics would have been impassable. Looking to the necessity, in a fight against an over whelming foreign Power, of being able, in extreme need, to use even revolutionary means, I had had no hesitation whatever in throwing into the frying-pan, by means of the circular dispatch of June 10, 1866, the most power ful ingredient known_^at that time to liberty-mongers, namely, \universal suffrage, so as to frighten off foreign monarchies from trying to stick aiing-er-into our national omelette. I never doubted that the German people would be strong and clever enough to free themselves from the existing suffrage as soon as they realised that it was a harmful institution. If it cannot, then my saying that Germany can ride when once it has _got--mtrj the- saddle ' was erroneous. The acceptance of universal suffrage was a weapon in the war against Auitria^Hid— other foreign countries, in the war for German Unity, as_well as a threat to use the last weapons in a struggle against coali- tionsT" lEra~vrar-of"this sort, when it becomes a matter of life and death, one does not look at the weapons that one seizes, nor the value of what one destroys in using them : one is guidedat^the moment by no other thought than the issue of the wary and the preservation of one's exter nal independence ; the settling of affairs and reparation of the damage has to take place after the peaco___More- over, I still hold that the principle of universal suffrage/is a just one, not only in theory but also in practice, pro- 1 Speech on March n, 1867. Political Speeches, iii. 184. VOL. II. — 5 65 BISMARCK vided always that voting be not secret, fck^secrecvjk a quality that is indeed incompatible with the best charac teristics of German blood. _ _____^^ The influence and the ' dependence on others )that the practical life of man brings in its train are TJod-given realities which we cannot, and must not ignore. If we refuse to transfer them to political life, and base thatjiife on a faith in the secret insight of everybody, we fall into a contradiction between public law and the reaJ±ti£S_of human life which practically leads to constant f«e~tibns7and finally to an explosion, and to wh~ich~~there'is no theoretical solu tion except_by_wa.yof the- i«saiiities_of-so.cial^eniocracy, the support given to which rests on the fact that the judg ment of the masses is sufficiently stultified and undevel oped to allow them, with the assistance of their own greed, to be continually caught by the rhetoric of clever and am bitious leaders. The counterpoise to this lies in the influence of the educated classes, which would be greatly strengthened if voting were public,* as for the Prussian Diet. It may be that the greater discretion of the more intelligent classes rests on the material basis of the preservation of their possessions. The other motive, the struggle for gain, is equally justifiable; but a preponderance of those who represent property is more serviceable for the secur ity and development of the state. A state, the control of which lies in the hands of the greedy, of the novarum rerum cupidi, and of orators who have in a higher degree than others the capacity for deceiving the unreasoning masses, will constantly be doomed to a restlessness of de- * Secret voting was, of course, first brought into the law through Fries's motion, while the proposals of (the~government advocated public voting. (66 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND velopment, which so ponderous a mass as the common wealth of the state cannot follow without injury to its organism. Ponderous masses, and among these the life and development of great nations must be reckoned, can only move with caution, since the road on which they travel to an unknown future has no smooth iron rails. Every great state-commonwealth that loses the prudent and restraining influence of the propertied class, whether that influence rests on material or moral grounds, will always end by being rushed along at a speed which must shatter the coach of state, as happen"ed"in the development of the French Revolution. Th^element of greed hits the preponderance arising, from large masses which in the long run must make its way. It is in the interests of the great mass itself to wish decision to take place with out dangerous acceleration of the speed of_the coach of state, and without its destruction."~~If this should hap pen, however, the wheel of history will revolve^gajjar-and always in a proportionately shorter time, tcKdjetatorship, to despotism, to absolutism, because in the end tfieTnasses yield to thelneed of order ,\ if they do not recognise this need a priori, they always realise it eventually after mani fold arguments ad' hominem ; and in order to purchase order from a dictatorship and Caesarism they cheerfully sacrifice that justrfiaHe^amount of freedom which ought to be maintained, and which the political- society of Eu rope can endure without ill-health. I should regard it as a serious misfortune, and as an essential weakening of our security in the future, if we in __ _Germany are driven into the vortex ot this French cycle. Absolutisrnjjyould be trTelideaH form— of— government for an European political structure were not the King and 6f BISMARCK his officials ever as other men are to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman wisdom, insight and jus tice. The most experienced and well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imperfections, such as over- estimation of their own wisdom, the influence and elo quence of favourites, not to mention petticoat influence, legitimate and illegitimate, . M°narcnyVnd the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism ;, the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk of losing his way. Joseph^Hris-a, warning example of this. .Criticism ha.n only be exercised through the medium of a free-press and parliaments in the modern sense of the term. Both correctives. may_easily__ weaken, and finally lose their efficacy if^theyc_ahuae_Jtheir power-s^ To avert this is one of the tasks of a conservative policy, which cannot be accomplished without astruggle "With parlia ment and press. The measuring qf_the limits) within whiclTsucha struggle must be confined, if the control of the government, which is indispensable to the country, is neither to be checked nor allowed to gain a complete power, is a question of political tact and judgment. It is a piece of good^fortune for his country if a mon arch possess the judgment requisite for this — a good for tune that is temporary, it is true, like all human fortune. The possibility of establishing ministers in powej>who possess adequate qualifications must~always~De granted in the constitutional organism; but^alsojthe possibility |)f maintaining in office ministers who satisfy "these re quirements in face of occasional votes of an adverse ma jority and of the influence of courts and camarillas. This aim, so far as human imperfections in general allow its 68 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND attainment, was approximately reached under the govern ment of William I. The opening of the Prussian Parliament was to follow immediately upon our arrival at Berlin, and the speech from the throne was deliberated upon at Prague. Thither came deputies from the Conservative party, whose ranks during the struggle had at times dwindled down to as few as eleven members, but by the election of July 3 had, under the effect produced by the first victories before Koniggratz, been reinforced to more than a hundred. The result would have been even more favourable to the government if the election had taken place a few days after the decisive battle; but even as it was, taken to gether with the enthusiastic disposition of the country, it was, at any rate, adapted to inspire hopes of success not only in Conservatives, but in reactionaries also. The strengthening of the position of the monarchy that had re sulted from the parliamentary situation at the outbreak of the war, and the clumsy and ambitious obstinacy of the opposition, provided those whose aim was a return to absolutism, or at least a restoration on the lines of the Estates General, with a pretext for a suspension and revi sion of the Prussian constitution. It was not fashioned for an enlarged Prussia, still less for being fitted into the future constitution of Germany. The charter of the con stitution itself contained an article (No. 118) which — owing its existence, as it did, to the influence of the na tional temper at the time of the drawing up of the consti tution, and borrowed from the draft of 1848 — justified the 69 BISMARCK subordination of the Prussian constitution to a new Ger man constitution that had yet to be devised. An oppor tunity was thus given of unhinging the constitution and the efforts of the majority during the conflict after parlia mentary government, with a formal appearance of legal ity; and this lay at the root of the exertions of the Ex treme Right and the members they sent as deputies to Prague. Another opportunity of combining the settlement of internal dissensions with that of the German question had fallen into the King's hands, when the Emperor Alexan der, in 1863, at the time of the Polish rebellion and the attempt to surprise us at the Frankfort Diet of Princes, had in an autograph letter vigorously recommended an alliance between Prussia and Russia. The letter, written in the Emperor's delicate hand, over many closely written pages, spun out at great length and in a style more declam atory than his pen possessed, suggested Hamlet's words : ' Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to suffer The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, Or to take arms against a sea of troubles, And by opposing end them ? ' but suggested them in an affirmative instead of an inter rogative sense. Its tenor was that the Emperor was tired of the chicaneries of the Western Powers and of Austria and Poland, and had determined to draw the sword and rid himself of them ; appealing to the friendship of the King, and to their common interests, he invited him to joint action, on lines similar to but wider than those of the Alvensleben convention of February of the same year. It was difficult for the King, on the one hand, to send a refusal as his reply to his near relation and most inti- 70 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND mate friend, or, on the other, to familiarise himself with the resolve to expose his country to the horrors of a great war, and force upon the state and the dynasty the risks contingent on such a course of action. Moreover, that strain in his private feelings which made him inclined to take part in the Frankfort Diet of Princes — I mean his sense of being closely bound up with every old princely house — ran counter in him to the temptation to yield to the appeal of his friend and nephew, and comply with the family traditions of Prussia and Russia, a compliance which must lead to a breach in his relations with the Ger man confederation and the collective body of the German princely houses. In my report, which occupied me several days, I avoided laying stress on the aspect of affairs that would have been important in our internal policy, because I was not of opinion that a war waged in alliance with Russia against Austria and all the adversaries with whom we had to fight in 1 866, would have brought us any nearer the fulfilment of our task as a nation. It is true that war may be used as a means of getting the better of internal difficulties — it is a device much resorted to, especially in French politics; but in Germany such a means would only have been practicable if the war in question lay in the line of the national development. To that end it would above all things have been necessary that it should not be carried on with Russian assistance, which public ^-opinion even tcTEhis day condemns in an impolitic manner. / ^ German unityjnttst be realised without any foreign influ ence, merely by Germany's own strength. Moreover, the conflict of mind under which the .King laboured at the time I entered the ministry, even, up -to— the resolve to abdicate, had considerably lost its, influeiie& over his reso-j ''- .2i- BISMARCK lutions since he had found ministers who were ready to represent his policy openly and without subterfuge. Since then he had acquired the conviction that the position of the Crown, if matters had come to the point of revolution ary outbreak, would have been stronger ; the intimidation of the Queen and the ministers of the new era had lost its power. On the other hand, in my statement to him I did not conceal my estimate of the military strength that an alliance between Germany and Russia would have, particularly at the outset. The geographical position of the three great Eastern Powers is of such a kind that each of them, as soon as it is attacked by the two others, finds itself strategically at a disadvantage, even if she have England or France as an ally in Western Europe. The isolated power would be most at a disadvantage if Austria were exposed to a Rus- so-German attack; least, if it were a case of Russia against Austria and Germany ; but even Russia would at the outset of a war be in a serious plight in face of a combined advance of the two German powers upon the Bug. Her geographical position and ethnographical for mation set Austria at a great disadvantage in the matter of war with the two neighbouring empires, for French as sistance could scarcely arrive in time to restore the bal ance. But whether Austria succumbed at the outset to a coalition between Russia and Germany, or whether the alliance of her opponents were broken up by some clever treaty of peace between the three Emperors, or even merely weakened in consequence of some defeat of Aus tria, the preponderance of Russia and Germany would in any case be decisive. Granting equally good generalship and equal bravery in the great armies, a great strength of 72 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND the German-Russian combination, if it holds firmly to gether from the outset, lies in the conformation of the individual territories of those Powers. But calculation upon military success and belief in it are in themselves uncertain, and will become still more so if the estimated strength on this side is not homogeneous, but rests upon alliances. In my draft of the answer, which turned out still longer than the letter of the Emperor Alexander, stress was laid upon the fact that a joint war against the West ern Powers must necessarily, in its final development, by reason of the geographical conditions of France's craving for the Rhine countries, be reduced to a war between France and Prussia ; that a Prusso- Russian initiative of the war would render our position worse in Germany; that Russia, being at a distance from the theatre of war, would suffer less of its miseries, while Prussia, on the other hand, would have to maintain not only her own but like wise the Russian forces ; and that Russian policy would then — for, if my memory does not deceive me, this is the expression I used — be sitting on the longer arm of the lever, and, just as in the congress of Vienna, and with still greater weight, would be able, if we were victorious, to dictate even to us what form our peace should take, exactly as Austria could have done in 1859, in respect to our conditions of peace with France, if we had then en tered into the war against France and Italy. I do not recall the text of my argument, although I had it again before me a few years ago with reference to our explana tion with Russia on policy, and was happy to find that I then possessed sufficient energy to draw up with my own hand so long a minute in writing which the King could 73 BISMARCK read — a manual labour which could not have been condu cive to the success of my Gastein course. Although the King did not view the question from the German national point of view to the same degree as I did, he did not suc cumb to the temptation to ally himself with Russia in order to put a forcible end to the arrogance of Austrian policy, and of the majority in the Diet, and to the con tempt which both showed for the Prussian Crown. If he agreed to the Russian demand we should probably, con sidering the rapidity of our mobilisation, the strength of the Russian army in Poland, and the military weakness of Austria at that time, have overrun Austria, with or without the help of Italy, whose covetousness was still unsatisfied, and before France could afford her effective help. If one could have been certain that the result of this overrunning would be an imperial triple alliance, on condition of letting Austria off easily, then possibly my judgment of the situation could not appropriately have been called accurate. But this certainty, in view of the divergent interests of Russia and Austria in the East, did not exist; it was hardly probable, and by no means in conformity with Russian policy, that a victorious Prusso- Russian coalition should act towards Austria with even the measure of forbearance which was contemplated on the Prussian side in 1866, in the interest of a possible future rapprochement. For this reason I was afraid that, in the event of our victory, we should not agree with Russia respecting the future of Austria, and that Russia herself, after further successes against France, would not be willing to resign the chance of keeping Prussia in a dependent position on her western boundary. Least of all could help towards a national policy in the sense of 74 THE NORTH GERMAN BUND Prussian hegemony have been expected from Russia. Tilsit, Erfurt, Olmiitz and other historic memories said: Vestigia terrent. In short, I had not confidence enough in Gortchakoff's policy, to let us reckon on the same se curity that Alexander I afforded in 1 8 1 3, until the ques tions of the future came to discussion at Vienna, as to what was to become of Poland and Saxony, whether Ger many had sufficient protection against French invasions independently of Russian decisions, and whether Stras- burg should become a fortress of the Confederation. Such were the varied considerations I had to bear in mind in order to decide upon the proposals I wished to lay before the King and the form in which they were to be drafted. I do not doubt that the time will come when our archives will be accessible to the public, even in respect to these transactions, whether or not in the meantime the proposal is carried out to destroy those documents which testify to my political activity. The temptation had certainly been great for a monarch whose position was exposed to the extravagant attacks of the Radical party and to the pressure of Austrian di plomacy, not only in the national domain of the Frank fort Congress of Princes, but also in that of Poland, from the three great confederate Powers, England, France, and Austria. / ~ That the King, in 1-863, did not allow his deeply mor tified feelings as monarch and as Prussian to overmaster political considerations shows how strong in him were the sentiment of national honour and sound common-sense in politics. BISMARCK In 1 866 the King could not easily make up his mind upon the question whether he shoulorarbitrarily break down parliamentaryTesistance and prevent~its recurrence, so weighty wTrlTThe reaiojisIagain«t— doing so. By the suspension and revision of the Constitution, by the hu miliation of the Opposition in the Diet, an effectual weapon against Prussia in the struggles looming in the future would have been placed in the hands of all those vho were discontented with the events of 1866 in Ger many and Austria. One would have had to be prepared :neanwhile to carry out, in opposition to the parliament iind the presserious and too dan gerous to consider—myself justified, during a conflict in which not only our national future^ but ey_en-our-existence as a state, was at staked in-refusing any support whatever in critical turns of affairs. Just as in 1866, after and in consequence of the intervention involved in Napoleon's telegram of July 4, I had not shrunk from the idea of as sistance by a Hungarian insurrection, so I should also have considered that of the Italian republicans as accepta ble, if it had been a question of averting defeat and of de fending our national independence. The aspirations of the King of Italy and Count Beust, which were thrust back by our first brilliant successes, might revive again in the stagnation before Paris, and all the more easily that in the influential circles of so weighty a factor as England we could by no means count upon trustworthy sympathies, especially such as would have been ready to realise them selves, if only diplomatically. In Russia the personal feelings of Alexander II, not only those of friendship for his uncle but also those against France, afforded us a security which might cer tainly be weakened by the French sympathies and vanity of Prince Gortchakoff and by his rivalry towards myself. It was consequently a fortunate thing that the situation offered a possibility of doing Russia a service in respect to the Black Sea. Just as the sensibilities of the Russian Court, which, owing to the Russian relationship of Queen 114 VERSAILLES Mary, were enlisted by the loss of the Hanoverian crown, found their counterpoise in the concessions which were made to the Oldenburg connexions of the Russian dynasty in territorial and financial directions in 1 866 ; so did the possibility occur in 1870 of doing a service not only to the dynasty, but also to the Russian kingdom, in respect to the politically absurd, and therefore in the long run im possible, stipulations which circumscribed the indepen dence of its Black Sea coasts. They were the most inept conclusions of the peace of Paris ; one cannot permanently deny the exercise of the natural rights of sovereignty on its own coasts to a nation of a hundred millions of inhabi tants. A charge of the kind which was allowed on Rus sian territory to foreign Powers was a humiliation which a great nation could not endure for long. We had in this an opportunity of improving our relations with Russia. Prince Gortchakoff entered only reluctantly upon the initiative with which I sounded him in this direction. His personal ill-will was stronger than his Russian sense of duty. He did not want any obligation from us, but estrangement from Germany and gratitude in France. In order to make our offer effectual in St. Petersburg, I needed the thoroughly honourable and always friendly co operation of the then Russian Military Plenipotentiary, Count Kutusoff. I shall hardly do injustice to Prince r Gortchakoff if, after my relations to him, which lasted for several years, I assume that personal rivalry towards me weighed heavier with him than the interests of Russia ; his vanity and his jealousy of me were greater than his patriotism. Indicative of the morbid vanity of Gortchakoff were some expressions which he used to me on the occasion of "5 BISMARCK his residence at Berlin in May 1876. He spoke of his weariness and his wish to retire, and added : ' Je ne puis, cependant, me presenter devant Saint- Pierre au ciel sans avoir preside la moindre chose en Europe.' I therefore begged him to undertake the presidency of the diplomatic conference held at the time, which however was only semi official, and he did so. While idly listening to his long presidential address I wrote in pencil : ' Pompous, pompo, pomp, pom, po.' My neighbour, Lord Odo Russel, snatched the paper from me and kept it. Another expression on this occasion ran thus : ' Si je me retire, je ne veux pas m'eteindre comme une lampe qui file, je veux me coucher comme un astre.' With these ideas it is not to be wondered at that his last appearance at the Berlin congress in 1878 did not satisfy him, for the Emperor had not appointed him but Count Shuvaloff as chief plenipotentiary, so that only the latter, and not Gort chakoff, controlled the Russian vote. Gortchakoff had, to a certain degree, extorted his membership of the con gress from the Emperor, owing his success, perhaps, to the considerate treatment which is traditional in the higher service of Russia towards meritorious statesmen. He sought even at the congress to keep his Russian popular ity, as understood by the 'Moscow Journal,' free as far as possible from the effects of Russian concessions, and under pretext of illness stayed away from sittings of the congress in which they were in view, but took care to show himself as in good health at the ground-floor window of his resi dence, Unter den Linden. He wanted to reserve the power of maintaining afterwards in Russian society that he was innocent as regarded the Russian concessions — an un worthy egotism at the cost of his country. 116 VERSAILLES ' However, the result for Russia, even after the con gress, remained one of the most favourable, if not the most favourable which she has ever obtained since the Turkish wars. The direct gains to Russia were those in Asia Minor, Batoum, Kars, &c. But if Russia had really found it to her interest to emancipate the Balkan states of the Greek confession from Turkish rule, the result would then have been, in this direction also, a very impor tant advance of the Greek Christian element, and still more a considerable retreat of Turkish domination. Be tween the original conditions of the peace of San Stefano under Ignatieff and the results of the congress the dif ference was politically unimportant, as was clearly proved by the facility with which Southern Bulgaria revolted and became annexed to Northern Bulgaria. And even if it had not taken place, the net gain to Russia after the war, and in consequence of the decisions of the congress, re mained more brilliant than those of earlier times. That Russia, by bestowing Bulgaria on the nephew of the then Russian Empress, the Prince of Battenberg, gave it into insecure hands, was a development which could not be foreseen at the Berlin congress. The Prince of Bat tenberg was the Russian candidate for Bulgaria, and from his near relationship to the imperial house it was also to be expected that these connexions would be firm and last ing. The Emperor Alexander III accounted for the revolt of his cousin simply by his Polish descent : 'Polskaja mat ' was his first exclamation in his disappointment when un deceived as to his cousin's behaviour. The indignation of Russia at the result of the Berlin congress was one of the manifestations which become pos sible, though contrary to all truth and reason, in a press 117 BISMARCK so little intelligible to the people as that of Russia in its foreign relations, and with the coercion which is easily exercised upon it. The whole influence which Gortcha koff, spurred on by chagrin and envy at his former col league, the German Chancellor, exercised in Russia with the support of French sympathisers and their French con nexions (Vannovski, Obrucheff) was strong enough to rep resent in the press, with the Moscow ' Viedomosti ' at its head, an appearance of indignation at the injury which Russia through German perfidy suffered at the Berlin con ference. But the fact is that no wish was expressed by Russia at the Berlin congress which Germany would not have proposed for acceptance if circumstances required, by energetic representation to the English Prime Minis ter, notwithstanding that the latter was ill and kept his bed a good deal. Instead of being thankful for this, it was found conducive to Russian policy, under the leader ship of the worn-out but nevertheless still morbidly vain Prince Gortchakoff and of the Moscow newspapers, to work on towards a further estrangement between Russia and Germany, for which there is not the slightest necessity in the interest of either one or the other of these great adjoining empires. We envy one another nothing, and have nothing to win from one another which we could turn to account. Our reciprocal relations are only endan gered by personal feelings, such as those of Gortchakoff were, and those of high Russian military men are, owing to their French connexions ; or by royal losses of temper such as those which came about before the Seven Years' war owing to the sarcastic remarks of Frederick the Great about the Empress of Russia. For this reason the personal relations of the monarchs of the two coun- 118 VERSAILLES tries to one another are of great importance for the peace of the two neighbour empires; which no diver gence of interests, only the personal sensibilities of influential statesmen could afford occasion for interrupt ing. His subordinates in the ministry said of Gortchakoff : 'II se mire dans son encrier,' just as Bettina used to say about her brother-in-law, the celebrated Savigny: ' He cannot cross a gutter without looking at himself in it.' A great portion of Gortchakoff's dispatches, and espe cially the most important, are not his, but Jomini's, a very clever editor: the son of a Swiss general, whom the Emperor Alexander induced to join the Russian service. When Gortchakoff dictated, there was more rhetorical effect in the dispatches, but those of Jomini were more practical. When he dictated he used t- take a regular pose, which he introduced with the word ' ^crivez ! ' and if the secretary thoroughly appreciated his position he turned at particularly well-rounded phrases an admiring glance on his chief, who was very sensible to it. Gortchakoff was equally perfect master of the Russian, German, and French languages. Count Kutusoff was an honourable soldier without personal vanity. He was originally, as his name would signify, in a prominent position at St. Petersburg, as offi cer of the cavalry guard, but did not possess the favour of the Emperor Nicholas. When the latter, as I was told in St. Petersburg, called out to him in front of the regi ment : ' Kutusoff, you cannot ride, I will transfer you to the infantry,' he sent in his resignation, and it was only in the Crimean war that he again entered the service in a subordinate rank. He remained in the army under Alex- 119 BISMARCK ander II, and finally became Military Plenipotentiary at Berlin, where his honest bonhomie won him many friends. He accompanied us as Russian-aide-de-camp to the Prus sian King in the French war, and it was perhaps a result of the unjust opinion of his horsemanship formed by the Emperor Nicholas that he traversed on horseback all the tracts over which the King and his suite were driven, fre quently from fifty to seventy versts in the day. To give an idea of his bonhomie and of the tone at the hunting- parties at Wusterhausen, he on one occasion mentioned in the King's presence that his family came from Prussian Lithuania, and had arrived in Russia under the name of Kutu ; whereupon Count Fritz Eulenburg remarked in his witty way : ' Consequently you first appropriated the final " soff " * in Russia ' — general amusement, in which Kutu soff heartily joined. Besides the conscientious reports of this old soldier, the regular autograph correspondence of the Grand Duke of Saxony with the Emperor Alexander offered a way of sending ungarbled communications direct to the latter. The Grand Duke, who is and always has been favourable towards me, was an advocate at St. Petersburg for friendly relations between the two cabinets. The possibility of an European intervention was a cause of disquietude and impatience to me in view of the slow progress of the siege. In situations such as ours before Paris the vicissitudes of war are not excluded even with the best generalship and the utmost bravery ; they can be produced by chances of every kind, and to these our posi tion, between the army of the besieged, numerically very strong, and the forces from the provinces so difficult to * \.S°Jtf = guzzle.] 120 VERSAILLES calculate upon as regards number and locality, offered a rich field, even if our troops before Paris and in the west, north, and east of France remained free from disease. The question how the standard of health of the German army would be maintained in the hardships of such an unusually severe winter was beyond all calculation. Un der these circumstances it was no sign of excessive anx iety if I was tormented during sleepless nights by the apprehension that our political interests, after such great successes, might be severely injured through the hesita tion and delay in taking further steps against Paris. A decision, memorable in the world's history, of the secu lar struggle between the two neighbouring peoples was at stake, and in danger of being ruined, through per sonal and predominantly female influences with no histor ical justification, influences which owed their efficacy, not to political considerations but to feelings which the terms humanity and civilisation, imported to us from England, still rouse in German natures. Even during the Crimean war it was preached to us from England, and not without effect on our mood, that we ought to take up arms for the Turks ' for the saving of civilisation.' The decisive questions could, if it were considered desirable, be treated as exclusively military, and that might have been adopted as a pretext for refusing me the right of taking part in the decision. They were such, however, that on their solution depended the possibility of diplom acy in the last resort; and if the conclusion of the French war had been a little less favourable to Germany, then would this mighty war, with its victories and its en thusiasm, have remained without the effect it produced on our national unification. I never doubted that the 121 BISMARCK victory over France must precede the restoration of the German kingdom, and if we did not succeed in bringing it this time to a perfect conclusion, further wars without the preliminary security of our perfect unification were full in view. It must not be assumed that the other generals could, from^a^purs^umilitarystandpoint, have been of a different opinion from Roon; our position, between the besieged army, which numerically was stronger than our selves, and the French forces in the provinces, was stra tegically an exposed one, and its maintenance without promise of success, unless it were utilised as the basis of a forward movement in the shape of an assault. The anxiety to put an end to it in military circles in Versailles was as great as the uneasiness at home concerning the slow progress. Even without taking into account the pos sibility of sickness and unforeseen defeats, in consequence of mishaps or blunders, one could not fail to hit upon the line of thought that disturbed me, and to ask oneself whether the prestige gained and the political impression made upon the neutral Courts by our first rapid and great victories would not be enfeebled by the apparent inactivity and weakness of our position before Paris, and whether the enthusiasm, in the fire of which a lasting unity might be forged, would hold out. The fighting in the provinces near Orleans and Dijon continued to bring us fresh victories, thanks to the heroic courage of the troops, which, indeed, far exceeded the measure that can be relied upon as a basis for strategical calculations. But the moral impetus, by which our inferior forces there had, notwithstanding frost, snow, and a dearth both of victuals and war material, beaten the numerically 12? VERSAILLES stronger masses of the French, might be destroyed at any moment by some accident or other ; a thought sufficient to force every commander, unless he calculated exclusively in optimistic conjectures, to the conviction that we should have to put an end to our uncertain position as speedily as possible by expediting our assault on Paris. To put this assault into effect, however, we had no orders, and were, as was the case before the lines of Flor idsdorf in July 1866, without heavy siege guns. The transport of the latter had not kept pace with the progress of our army ; in order to effect it, our railway resources fell short at the points where the lines were interrupted or where they stopped altogether, as at Lagny. The speedy conveyance of siege ordnance and of the mass of heavy ammunition, without which the bombard ment could not begin, might, however, with the rolling stock at hand have been effected more rapidly than was the case. But as some of the officials informed me, about 1,500 trucks were laden with provisions for the Parisians, in order to assist them at once, if they surrendered, and these 1,500 trucks were therefore not available for the transport of ammunition. The bacon stored in them was afterwards refused by the Parisians ; and after my departure from France, in consequence of the changes made at his Majesty's instance by General von Stosch at Ferrieres in our treaty concerning the maintenance of the German troops, was assigned to them and consumed with great reluctance, as it had been kept in stock too long. As the bombardment could not begin before a sufficient quantity of ammunition was at hand to enable the firing to be proceeded with effectually and without intermission, large numbers of horses were required in the absence of 123 BISMARCK railway material, and for these an outlay of millions was necessary. I am unable to comprehend that any doubts could be entertained as to these millions being available so soon as their necessity for military purposes was proved. It appeared to me to be a considerable step in advance when Roon, who was already nervously excited and ex hausted, informed me one day that the responsibility had now been shifted upon him personally by the question whether he was ready to bring up the guns within some limited time ; he said that he was in doubt whether it was possible. I begged him to immediately undertake the task set him, and declared myself ready to give him an order on the federal Treasury for any sum that might be necessary if he would purchase 4,000 horses — that being his approximate estimate of the number required — and use them for the transport of the guns. He gave the requisite orders, and the bombardment of Mont Avron, which had long been awaited in our camp with painful impatience and was hailed with shouts of joy, was the result of this turn in events for which thanks were really due to Roon. He found in Prince Krafft Hohenlohe a willing supporter in getting the guns brought up and distributed. In putting to oneself the question as to what can have induced other generals to oppose Roon's view, it is difficult to discover any technical reasons for the delay in the measures taken towards the close of the year. The hesi tating course adopted appears senseless and dangerous viewed either from a military or a political standpoint, and, from the rapid and determined conduct of the war right up to the siege, it may be concluded that the reasons are not to be looked for in the indecision of our army leaders. The notion that Paris, although fortified and the strongest 124 VERSAILLES bulwark of our opponents, might not be attacked in the same way as any other fortress had been imported into our camp from England by the roundabout route of Berlin, together with the phrase about the ' Mecca of civilisation,' and other expressions of humanitarian feeling rife and effective in the cant of English public opinion — a feeling which England expects other Powers to respect, though she does not always allow her opponents to have the benefit of it. From London representations were received in our most influential circles, to the effect that the capitulation of Paris ought not to be brought about by bombardment, but only by hunger. Whether the latter method was the more humane is a_debatable point, as is also the question whether the horrors of the Commune would have broken out, had not the famine prepared the way for the liberation of anarchist savagery. Another question that may be left unanswered is whether sentiment alone, unaccompanied by political calculation, played a part in the propagation by England of the humanitarian idea of starving out the city. England was under no prac tical necessity, either economical or political, of protecting either France or ourselves from loss or weakness caused by the war. But in any case, the delays in overpowering Paris, and in putting an end to the military operations, increased the danger that the fruits of our victories would be spoilt. Trustworthy information from Berlin apprised me that the cessation of our activity gave rise to anxiety and dissatisfaction in expert circles, and that Queen Augusta was said to be influencing her royal husband by letter, in the interests of humanity. An allusion to infor mation of this kind which I made to the King occasioned a violent outburst of anger, taking the form not of denial 125 BISMARCK that the rumours were true, but of a sharp reprimand against the utterance of any such dissatisfaction respect ing the Queen. The initiative for any change in the conduct of the war did not as a rule emanate from the King, but from the staff of the Army or from that of the Crown Prince, who was the general in command. That this circle was open to English views if presented in a friendly manner was only natural ; the Crown Princess, Moltke's late wife, the wife of Count Blumenthal, chief of the staff, and after wards field-marshal, and the wife of von Gottberg, the staff officer next in influence, were all Englishwomen. The reasons of the delay in the attack upon Paris, con cerning which those behind the scenes had observed silence, became the subject of discussion in the press in conse quence of the appearance of extracts from Count Roon's papers in the ' Deutsche Revue' of 1891.1 All attempts to refute Roon's statements avoid mention of the Berlin and English influences, as well as of the fact that 800, and according to others 1,500, trucks stood for weeks laden with provisions for the Parisians ; and all, with the excep tion of one anonymous newspaper article, likewise shirk the question whether the leaders of the army paid timely atten tion to the transport of siege ordnance. I have found nothing to induce me to make any alteration in the above notes on the matter, which were written before the appear ance of the numbers of the ' Deutsche Revue ' in question. The assumption of the Imperial title by the King 1 Edition in book form, iii.4 243 sqq. 126 VERSAILLES upon the extension of the North German Confederation was a political necessity, since, by reminding us of days when it meant legally more but practieat}y less than now, it constituted an element making for unity apd centralisa tion. I was convinced, too, that the steadying pressufe upon the institutions of our Empire could not but be more lasting in proportion as the Prussian upholder of them avoided the attempt, dangerous but a vital feature of the old German history, to inculcate upon the other dynasties the superiority of our own. King William I was not free from an inclination to do this, and his reluctance to take the title was not unconnected with the desire to obtain an acknowledgment rather of the superior respectability of the hereditary Prussian Crown than of the Imperial title. He regarded the Imperial crown in the light of a modern office that might be conferred on any one, the authority of which had been disputed by Frederick the Great and had oppressed the Great Elector. At the first mention of it he said, 'What have I to do with the fancy-ball Major*?' To this I replied among other things, 'Your Majesty surely does not desire always to remain neuter — das Prasidium f In the expression " presidency " lies an abstraction, in the word " Emperor " a great power. ' When at the first favourable turn in the war I ap proached the Crown Prince, he also did not always evince sympathy for my endeavours to restore the Imperial title, though they did not spring from Prussian and dynastic vanity, but solely from the belief in its utility for the fur therance of national union. From some one or other of the political dreamers to whom he gave ear his Royal Highness had imbibed the idea that the heritage of the *\Charakter-Major. Or, possibly, 'brevet-major.'] 127 BISMARCK Roman Empire revived by Charlemagne had been the mis fortune of Germany, a foreign idea harmful to the na tion. Historically true though this may be, the guarantee against analogous dangers which the Prince's advisers saw in the title of ' King ' of the Germans was equally unreal. There was not in these days any danger that the title, which lives only in the memory of the nation, would aid in alienating Germany's strength from her own interests and in rendering it subservient to trans-Alpine ambition all the way to Apulia. The desire, emanating from his erroneous conception, that the Prince unfolded to me gave me the impression of being a business proposal seriously meant, which he wished me to put into execution. My objection, which was based on the co-existence of the Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemburg with the pro posed King in Germany or King of the Germans, to my surprise led to the further conclusion that those dynasties would have to cease bearing the regal title and reassume the ducal. I expressed my conviction that they would not do this of their own free will. Were it desired, on the other hand, to use force, this procedure would not be for gotten for centuries, and would sow the seeds of distrust and hate. In the Diary published by Geffcken there is a sugges tion that we did not know our own strength ; the employ ment of our strength in the state of affairs at that time would have become the weakness of Germany's future. The Diary was probably not written at the time day by day, but subsequently completed with turns of phrase, by which courtly aspirants sought to render the contents more credible. In the personal statement which I published ' I 1 Sep. 23, 1888. 128 VERSAILLES expressed my conviction that it was doctored, as well as my indignation at the plotters and sycophants who obtruded themselves upon so unsuspecting and noble a nature as that of the Emperor Frederick. When I wrote those words I had no idea that the forger was to be looked for in the direction of Geffcken, the Hanseatic Guelf, whose enmity to Prussia had not prevented him from aspiring for years past to gain the favour of the Prussian Crown Prince in order more successfully to injure him, his family and state, while playing an important part himself. Geff cken belonged to the pushing lot who had been embittered since 1 866 on account of the disregard in which they and their importance were held. In addition to the Bavarian commissioners there was present at Versailles, as the especial confidant of King Lewis, Count Holnstein, who stood in close relations to the monarch as his Master of the Horse. It was he who, at a moment when the question of the title had become critical and seemed in danger of breaking down on account of Bavaria's silence and the disinclination of King William, undertook at my request to hand his master a letter from me which, in order not to delay its delivery, I wrote on a dinner-table after the cloth had been removed, upon flimsy paper, and with refractory ink.1 In this I set forth my idea that the Bavarian Crown would not, without wound ing Bavarian self-esteem, be able to concede the presiden tial rights to the King of Prussia, though the consent of Bavaria had already as a matter of business been given ; that the King of Prussia was a neighbpur_ofjthe__King of Bavaria, and that criticism of the concessions which Bavaria was making and had made would, in view of the diversity 1 Cf. supra, vol. i. p. 389. VOL. II. 9 129 BISMARCK of racial relations, become keener and more easily affected by the~rivalries of the German races. The exercise of Prussian authority within the frontiers of Bavaria was a nov elty and would wound Bavarian susceptibilities, while a Ger man Emperor was not a neighbour of Bavaria of different stock, but a compatriot; in my opinion, King Lewis could fittingly grant only to a German Emperor, and not to a King of Prussia, the concessions he had already made to the authority of the presidency. To these main points in my case I also added personal arguments recalling the particu lar good-will which the Bavarian dynasty had, at the time that it ruled in the March of Brandenburg (in the person of the Emperor Lewis), borne for more than a generation to my forefathers. I considered this argumentum adhominem useful in addressing a monarch with such leanings as the King, though I believe that the political and dynastic estimate of the difference between the presidential rights of a German Emperor and a Prussian King was what turned the scale. The Count started upon his journey to Hohenschwangau within two hours, on November 27, and completed it under great difficulties and with frequent interruptions in four days. The King was confined to his bed with the toothache, and at first refused to see him, but had him admitted when he heard that the Count had come with a commission and a letter from me. He carefully read my letter twice over in bed in the Count's presence, asked for writing materials, and committed to paper the desired communication to King William of which I had made out a draft. In this the main argument for the im perial title was reproduced, with the more stringent sugges tion that Bavaria could make only to the German Emperor, but not to the King of Prussia, the concession already 130 VERSAILLES agreed to but not yet ratified. I had especially chosen this form of expression in order to overcome the aversion of my royal master to the imperial title. Count Holnstein re turned to Versailles bearing this letter from the King on the seventh day after his departure, that is, on December 3 ; it was officially handed to our King on the same day by Prince Leopold, the present regent, and constituted an important factor in the success of the difficult labours the result of which, owing to King William's resistance and the absence of any definite statement of the Bavarian views, had often been doubtful. By this double journey, per formed in one sleepless week, and by the able execution of his commission at Hohenschwangau, Count Holnstein rendered important service in the establishment of our national unity, through the removal of external obstacles in the question of the imperial title. His Majesty raised a fresh difficulty when we were fixing the form of the imperial title, it being his wish to be called Emperor of Germany if emperor it had to be. In this phase both the Crown Prince, who had long given up his idea of a King of the Germans, and the Grand Duke of Baden lent me their support, each in his own way, though neither openly attempted to overcome the old monarch's violent dislike to the 'fancy-dress major.' 1 The Crown Prince supported me passively in the presence of his father and by occasional brief expressions of his views. These, however, did not strengthen me in my stand against the King, but tended rather to excite further the irrita bility of my august master. For the King, in conscien tious remembrance of his oath to the Constitution and the ministerial responsibility, was more inclined to make concession to the minister than to his son. Differences 1 See above, p. 127. 131 BISMARCK of opinion between himself and the Crown Prince he re garded from the point of view of the paterfamilias. r\ In the final conference on January 1 7, 1 87 1 , he declined the designation of German Emperor, and declared that he | would be Emperor of Germany or no emperor at all. I / pointed out that the adjectival form German Emperor and the genitival Emperor of Germany differed in point both of language and period. People had said Roman Emperor and not Emperor of Rome; and the Czar did not call himself Emperor of Russia, but Russian, as well as ' united-Russian ' (wserossiski) Emperor. The King disputed the latter statement warmly, appealing to the fact that the reports of his Russian Kaluga regiment were always addressed pruskomu, which he translated wrongly. He would not believe my assurance that the form in question was the dative of the adjective, and only allowed himself to be subsequently convinced by Hofrath Schneider, his usual authority for the Russian language. I further urged that under Frederick the Great and Fred erick William II the thalers were inscribed Borussorum not Borussiae rex; that the title Emperor of Germany involved a sovereign claim to the non-Prussian dominions, which the princes were not inclined to allow ; that it was suggested in the letter from the King of Bavaria that ' the exercise of the presidential rights should be associated with the assumption of the title of German Emperor,' and finally, that the said title had, on the proposition of the federal council, been adopted in the new draft of Article 1 1 of the Constitution. The discussion then turned upon the difference in rank between emperors and kings, between arch-dukes, grand dukes, and Prussian princes. My exposition that in 132 VERSAILLES principle emperors do not rank above kings found no ac ceptance, although I was able to show that Frederick Wil liam I, at a meeting with Charles VI, who, in point of fact, stood in the position of feudal lord to the Elector of Brandenburg, claimed and enforced his rights to equality as King of Prussia by causing a pavilion to be erected which was entered by both monarchs simultaneously from opposite sides, so that they might meet each other in the centre. The agreement which the Crown Prince showed to my argument irritated the old gentleman still more, and striking the table he cried: 'And even if it had been so, / now command how it is to be. Arch-dukes and grand dukes have always had precedence of Prussian princes, and so it shall continue. ' With that he got up and went to the window, turning his back upon those seated at the table. The discussion on the question of title came to no clear conclusion; nevertheless, we con sidered ourselves justified in preparing the ceremony for the proclamation of the Emperor, but the King had com manded that there should be no mention of the German Emperor but of the Emperor of Germany. This position of affairs induced me to call upon the Grand Duke of Baden on the following morning, before the solemnity in the Galerie des Glaces, and to ask him how he, as the first of the princes present, who would presum ably be the first to speak after the reading of the procla mation, intended to designate the new Emperor. The Grand Duke replied, ' As Emperor of Germany, according to his Majesty's orders.' Among the arguments with which I urged upon the Grand Duke that the concluding cheers for the Emperor could not be given under this form, i33 BISMARCK the most effective was my appeal to the fact that the forth coming text of the Constitution of the empire was already forestalled by a decree of the Reichstag in Berlin. The reference to the resolution of the Reichstag, appealing, as it did, to his constitutional train of ideas, induced him to go and see the King once more. I was left ignorant of what passed between the two sovereigns, and during the reading of the proclamation I was in a state of suspense. The Grand Duke avoided the difficulty by raising a cheer, neither for the German Emperor nor for the Emperor of Germany, but for the Emperor William. His Majesty was so offended at the course I had adopted, that on descending from the raised dais of the princes he ignored me as I stood alone upon the free space before it, and passed me by in order to shake hands with the generals standing behind me. He maintained that attitude for sev eral days, until gradually our mutual relations returned to their old form. CHAPTER XXIV THE CULTURKAMPF While at Versailles I had, from November 5 to 9, car ried on negotiations with Count Ledochowski, Archbishop of Posen and Gnesen, mainly referring to the territorial interests of the Pope. In accordance with the proverb 'One hand washes the other,' I proposed that reciprocity in the relations between the Pope and ourselves should be effected by bringing Papal influence to bear upon the French clergy in the interests of peace, being always afraid, as I was, that thelnterference of the neutral powers might spoil the results of. ,jour_ victories. Ledochowski, and, within narrower limits, Bonnechose, Cardinal Arch bishop of Rouen, tried to induce several members of the higher clergy to exercise their influence in the direction indicated, but could only report that their advances had been coldly met and declined ; from this I concluded that the Papacy must lack either the power or the will to afford us any assistance in obtaining peace of sufficient value to pay the price for the displeasure felt by Ger man Protestants and the Italian National party at the result of an open championship of Papal interests in regard to Rome; as well as for the reaction of the latter sentiment on the future relations of the two nations. During the vicissitudes of the war, the King at first appeared to be the possibly dangerous opponent for us J35 BISMARCK among the conflicting Italian elements. Subsequently the Republican party under Garibaldi, who had, at the outbreak of the war, led us to look forward to their sup- ', port against any Napoleonic fancies of the King's, op posed us on the battlefield with an enthusiasm more dramatic than practical, and with military performances that shocked our soldiejy"noti6&9u Between these two Lelements there lay the/sympathy) which thepublic opin ion of educated Italians openly expressed, and..evfir cher ished, towards a people whose ^trugglga in the past and the present were parallel to their own ; there lay also the national instinct which eventually proved strong and real enough to enter into the triple alliance with their former opponent, Austria. By openly espousing^ the cause of the Pope and his territorial claims we should have broken with this national tendency manifested by Italy. Whether and how far we should in return have received the assist ance of the Pope in our internal affairs is doubtful. Gal- licanism came to seem to me stronger in regard to infalli bility than I could estimate it in 1870, and the Pope weaker than I had believed him to be on account of his surprising victories over all the German, French, and Hungarian bishops. In our own country the Jesuitic ' Centrum ' was, at the moment, stronger than the Pope, or, at least, independent of him; the Germanic group and party-spirit of our Catholic compatriots is an element against which even the Papal will cannot make its way. In the same way I leave it an open question whether the elections for the Prussian Parliament which were held on the 1 6th of the same month were influenced by the failure of Ledochowski's negotiations. The latter were renewed in a somewhat different form by the Bishop of 136 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' Mainz, Baron von Ketteler, who called upon me for that purpose on several occasions at the beginning of the par liamentary session of 187 1. I had been in communication with him in 1865, when I asked him whether he would accept the archbishopric of Posen, being led to this by a desire to show him that~we~~were ^not_ai)t"'-f~'ar,ir>1lpJ hll± only anti- Polish. Ketteler had, probably after communi cating with Rome, declined on the ground of his ignorance of the Polish language. In 1871 he made representations to me amounting to a demand that the Imperial Constitu tion should include the articles in that of Prussia dealing with the position of the Catholic Church in the state, three of which (15, 16, and 18) were annulled by the law of June 18, 1875. ysSo far as_I_was concerned, Jhe course, of our policy wayjiotjietermined by religious considera- 1 tions, but purely bythe desire to establish as firmly as possible the unity won on the battlefield^ In religious matters, my toleration- ijas^ at all_times been restricted/only by the boundaries which the necessity of various denominations co-existing in the same body/ politic imposes on the claims of each particular creed The therapeutic-Jxeatment of the Catholic Church in ;. temporal state is, however, rendered difficult by the fac that the Catholic clergy, if they desire properly to dis charge what is theoreficallyjheir duty, must claim a share in the secular governmentjextending beyond the ecclesias tical domain ; they constitute a political institution under clerical forms, and transmit to their collaborators their own conviction that for them freedom lies in dominion, and that the Church, wherever she does not rule, is justi fied in complaining of Diocletian-like persecution. It was in this sense thatd had some discussion with \ BISMARCK Herr von Ketteler respecting his more precisely asserted claim to the constitutional right of his Church — that is, of the clergy — to direct the movements of the secular arm. Among his political arguments he used this one, appeal ing more ad_hominem : that with regard to our fate after death, the Catholics had stronger, guarantees than others, since, presuming the _Catholic dogmas to be mistaken, the fate of the Catholic soul .could not be worse even if the Evangelical faith turned -out -to4i£L the right one, but that, assuming the contrary to be the case, the future of the heretic soul was terrible. To this he added the ques tion : ' Do you perchance believe that a Catholic cannot attainjsalvation ? ' I replied : ' A Catholic layman most certainly can, but I am doubtful about a priest, for in the latter is found "the sin against the Holy Ghost," and the text of the Scriptures is against him.' The Bishop smil ingly replied to this rejoinder, which I had made in a bantering tone, by a courteous ironical bow. After our negotiations had ended without resjilts, the reconstruction of f\\f- Catholic party founded invySfjnJ but now known as the 'Centrum]* was pushed on with increasing zeal, especially by Savigny and Mallinckrodt. This party afforded me an opportunity of observing that in Germany as well as in France the Pope is weaker than he seems, or at any rate not so strong as to make it needful for us to buy his assistance in our affairs by a rupture with the sympa thies of other more powerful elements. From the de'saveu contained in Cardinal Antonelli's letter of June 5, 1871, to Bishop Ketteler, from the mission entrusted to Prince Lowenstein-Wertheim by the Centrum, and from the insub ordination of the latter party on the occasion of the Sep- tennate, I received the impression that the party spirit with 138 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' which Providence has endowed the Centrum in the place of the national feeling of other peoples is stronger than the Pope, not in a council without laymen, but on the battle field of parliamentary and literary struggles inside Ger many. Whether this would also be the case if the Papal influence attempted to impose itself without regard to com peting forces, such as that of the Jesuits, is a question which I leave unanswered, without entering into the sub ject of the State- Secretary Cardinal Franchi's sudden death. It has been said of Russia : gouvernement absolu tempore" par le regicide. Would a Pope who went too far in his disregard of the competing forces in Church politics be safer from ecclesiastical 'Nihilists' than the Czar? Op posed to bishops, assembled in the Vatican, the Popeis_ strong, and whenJaejmaxchesjvith the Jesuits stronger than when he seeks beyond the bounds of his own capital to break down the opposition of the lay Jesuits, who are wont to be the supporters of parliamentary Catholicism. The beginning of thpLQ//tttxkompf was) decided for me preponderantly ^byTtinrais^iiu^-Skce the abandon ment of the policy of the Flottwells and Grolmanns, since the solidification of the Radziwill influence upon the King and the establishment of the ' Catholic section ' in the Ministry of Public Worship, statistical data proved beyond doubt the rapid progress of the Polish nationality at the expense of the Germans in Posen and West Prussia, and in Upper Silesia the so far sturdy Prussian element of the ' Wasserpolacken ' became Polonised ; Schaffranek was elected there to the Diet, and it was he who, speaking in J39 BISMARCK parliament, confronted us in the Polish language with the proverb of the impossibility of the fraternisation of Ger mans and Poles. Such things could only happen in Silesia by reason of the offidalajuthcj:ity„jaf.,..theXatholiG section. Upon complaints being made to the Prince- Bishop, Schaff- ranek was forbidden on his re-election to ' sit ' on the Left ; as a consequence of this order, the powerfully-built priest stood as upright as a sentinel before the benches of the Left for five or six hours, and when sittings were long ten hours a day, and was thus spared the trouble of rising when he wished to make one of his anti-German speeches.1 According to official reports, there were whole villages in Posen and West JPrju£sia~£onteinmgJhousands of Germans who through the influence of the Catholic^ec- tion had been educated according to Polish ideas, and were officially described as ' Poles, Oalthough in the previous generation they were officially Germans. By the powers that had been granted to the sectiont there was; ho "remedy except the abolition of the latter. T^s^boiition^svas therefore in my opinion the nextobject to be striven for. It was naturally opposed by the Radziwill influence at Court, and unnaturally by my colleague of Public Worship, his wife, and her Majesty the Queen. The chief of the Catholic section at that time was Kratzig, who had for merly been in the private employment of Radziwill and had probably continued so while in the public service. The representative of the Radziwill influence was Prince Boguslaw, the younger of the two brothers, who was also an influential member of the Berlin common council. William, the elder, and his son Anthony, were soldiers too 1 Cf. the expression in the speech of Jan. 28, 1886. Politisc/ie Reden, si. 438. T.40 THE ' CULTURKAMPF.' honest to take part in Polish plots against the King and his state. The Catholic section in the Ministry of Public Worship — originally intended to be an institution by means of which Prussian CathoJicS-_Diight^ defend the rights of their state in their, relations with .Rome — had, owing to the change of members, gradually become a body in the heart of Prussian bureaucracy defending Roman and Polish interests against Prussia. More than once did I explain to the King that this section was worse than a nuncio in Berlin ; that it acted in accordance with instruc tions which it received from Rome, not always perhaps from the Pope ; and that it had lately become open more particularly to Polish influences. I admitted that the ladies in the Radziwill family were friendly to Germany, that the elder brother William was kept in the same groove by his sense of honour as a Prussian officer, and that this was likewise the case with his son Anthony, who was moreover bound to his Majesty by ties of personal affection. But in the driving element of the family, con sisting of the ecclesiastics, Prince Boguslaw, and his son, Polish national sentiment was strongerfhap any^rdhf^-Tmc] was cultivated on the basis that Polish and Romish-clerical interests were rnnrnrrent — the only basis practicable in times of peace, but then very readily practicable. Kratzig again, the head of the Catholic section, was as good as a serf of the Radziwills. A nuncio would regard it as his chief duty to defend the interests^ of. the Catholic Churchy but not those of the Poles ; would not be in intimate re lations to the bureaucracy, as were the members of the Catholic section who, among the garrison which held the ministerial citadel in our system of defence against revolu tionary attacks, sat as a faction inimical to the state; a 141 BISMARCK nuncio, finally, would as a member of the diplomatic body be personally interested in maintaining good relations between his sovereign and the Court to which he was accredited. Although I was unsuccessful in conquering the Em peror's dislike to a nuncio in Berlin — a dislike that was, for the rest, rather outwardly external and formal — his Majesty was persuaded of the danger of the Catholic sec tion, and gave his sanction to its abolition in spite of the opposition of his spouse. Conjugal influence induced Miihler to oppose the abolition, concerning which all the other ministers were agreed. A difference arising from a personal matter concerning the administration of the museums served as the ostensible pretext for his resigna tion ; in reality his fall was due to Kratzig and Polonism, in spite of the support which he and his wife had procured through their connexion with ladies at Court. I should never have thought of occupying myself with the legal details of the May Laws ;5they were outside my department, and I had. neither the intention nor the quali fications to control or to corxectJFafl^as_aJurist. I could not, as Minister-President, fulfil the duties of the Minister of Public Worship at the same time, even if I had been in perfect health. It was only by seeing them in practice that I became convinced that the legal details had not been properly conceived for the effect they were wanted to produce. The error in their conception was made evident to me by the picture of dexterous, light-footed priests pur sued through back doors and bedrooms by honest but awk- 142 THE ' CULTURKAMPF.' ward Prussian gendarmes, with spurs and trailing sabres. Whoever supposes that such critical considerations surging up in me would immediately have been embodied in the form of a cabinet crisis between Falk and myself has not the correct judgment, which can only be gained by experi- 1 ence, of the manner in which the state machine has to be[ driven, both as regards itself and its connexion with the' monarch and the parliamentary elections. That machine is unable to perform sudden evolutions, and ministers of Falk's talents do not grow wild with us. It was better to have a fellow combatant of such ability and courage in the ministry than to make myself responsible for the administration of the Department of Public Worship, or for a new appointment to it, by encroaching upon the constitutional independence of his office. I adhered to this view as long as I could prevail upon Falk to stay. Only when, contrary to my wishes, he had been so put out by feminine Court influence and ungracious letters from the royal hand that it became impossible to keep him, did I proceed to a revision of what he had left behind — a thing I was unwilling to do so long as that was only possible by a rupture with him. Falk succumbed to the same tactics as had been brought to bear upon me at Court with similar resources, but not with similar success ; he succumbed to them partly because he was more susceptible to .Court, influences than I, partly because he was not supported in the same meas ure by the sympathy of the Emperor. The anti-minis terial activity of the Empress originally sprang from the independence of character which rendered it difficult for her to side with a government that was not in her own hands, and which, for a whole generation, attracted her to i43 BISMARCK the path of opposition against every successive administra tion. She was not quick to adopt the opinion of others. At the time of the Culturkampf this propensity was in tensified by the Catholics surrounding her Majesty, who obtained their information and instructions from the Ultra montane camp. That party utilised with skill and discern ment the old propensity of the Empress to exercise her influence in the improvement of each successive govern- I ment. I repeatedly dissuaded Falk from plans of resigna tion in connexion either with letters of displeasure from the Emperor, which were probably not due to the initiative of the august ruler himself, or with slights offered to his wife at court. I recommended him to maintain a passive attitude towards the ungracious communications of his Majesty, un adorned, as they were, by any counter-signature, and refer ring less to Culturkampf than to the .Minister's relations with the High Consistoriaf Court and the Protestant Church ; but in any case to bring his grievances before the State Ministry, whose suggestions, if unanimous, the King was wont to respect. Finally, however, being exposed to mortifications that wounded his sense of honour, he decided to resign. All the accounts whiclLstate that I ousted him from the ministry rest upon invenJioivaJ^d-Lwas surprised that he never publiclycontradicted them, although he always remained in friendly relations with me. Among the events that decided his retirement I can still remem ber that it was the disputes with the High Consistorial Court and the clerics connected with it that brought about the rupture with his Majesty, though it was easy to detect, from the manner in which the controversial matters that told against Falk were developed and brought to a head, the collaboration of more dexterous hands and higher 144 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' skill than was possessed by the official counsellors of the Emperor in his capacity of summus episcopus. After his departure I found myself face to face with the question whether, and how far, in choosing a new Min ister of Public Worship, I was to keep in sight Falk's rather juristic than political leanings, or follow exclusively my own views, tending more-towards Polonism than Catholi- cism._ In the { Culturkampf , me parliamentary policy of the government had been crippled by the defection of the Pro gressive party andjtsjtransitionJxL the Centrum. Mean time in the Reichstag, without getting any support from the Conservatives, it was opposed by a majority of Demo crats of all shades, bound together by a common enmity, and in league with Poles, Guelfs, friends of France, and Ultra- montanes. The consolidation of our new imperial unity was retarded by these circumstances, and would be im perilled were they to continue or to become aggravated. The mischief to the nation might be rendered more serious in this way than by an abandonment of what was in my opinion the superfluous part of the Falk legislation. The indispensable part I held to be the removal of the article from the Constitution, the acquisition of means for com bating Polonism, and, above all, the supremacy of the state over the schools. If we carried these points we should still have gained considerably" by ^ae'Caiturkampf, con sidering the "state in which things were before the out break of the conflict. I had therefore to come to an agreement with my colleagues concerning the extent to which we might go in our compromise with the Curia. vol. n. — 10 145 BISMARCK The resistance of the whole body of ministers who had taken part in the conflict was more stubborn than that of my immediate colleagues, and primarily of Falk's suc cessor, in which capacity I had proposed Herr von Putt kamer to the King. But even after this change I could not immediately effect an alteration in the Church policy without causing fresh cabinet troubles unwelcome to the King and undesired by myself. The memories of the days when I sought to gain over fresh partisans are among the most unpleasant of my official career. In order to com bine with Herr von Puttkamer I should have had to gain the support of the officials of his department with the habit of the Culturkampf in them, and that was beyond my powers. The explanation ofFalls^s -Church policy is not to be exclusively sougTiFforin the arena of the conflict with the Catholic Church; it was occasionally traversed and influenced~T5y the Evangelical Church question. In the latter Herr von Puttkamer was in closer agreement than Falk with the views entertained at Court, and my desire to limit the conflict with Rome to a narrower sphere would probably have met with no personal opposition on the part of my new colleague. The difficulties, however, lay partly in the preponderance of the officials, still agi- i tated by the passions of the Culturkampf, to whom Herr I von Puttkamer further considered himself bound to sacri fice the natural and traditional development of our orthog raphy, partly in the opposition of my other colleagues to any appearance of yielding to the Pope. My first attempts to introduce peace into ecclesiastical affairs met withv no sympathy from his_Majesty. The influence of the highest Evangelical clergy was at that time stronger than the Catholicising influence of the 146 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' Empress, the latter, moreover, receiving no incentive from the Centrum, because that party considered the prelimi naries of the compromise unsatisfactory, and because, like the Court, it attached_eyen_ more importance to fighting me than to seconding aiLy.jefforts.Lmight putjforth. The conflicts that proceeded from the situation repeated them selves, and became gradually more severe. Many years of labour were still required before it was possible to^nter^upon the.revision- of the May Laws with out occasioning fresh troubles in the cabinet, since a major ity was wanting for the defence of those laws in parliamen tary warfare after the desertion of the Freethought or ' Lib- eralist ' party to the Ultramontane opposition camp. Iwas satisfied when in opposition to Polonism we succeedexLin maintaining as definite gains the relations between school and (§tatejmpos5d_.by..the. Culturkamftf-and the alteration x "" "" made in the articles of the Constitution relating thereto. Both are, in my opinion^ oLmore value than" the injunctions against clerical activity contained in the May Laws and the legal apparatus for catching recalcitrant priests, and I ven ture to regard as a considerable gain in itself the abolition of the Catholic section and of the danger to the state arising from its activity in Silesia, Posen, and Prussia. _After the Freethought party had not only given up the Culturkampf, prosecuted more by themselves under the leadership of Vir- chow and his associates than by me, but began to support the Centrum both in parliament and at the elections, the gov ernment was in a minority as against the last-named party. In the face of a compact^jnajority-consisting of the Cen trum, the Progressives, th^-^odal-Democrats, the Poles, the Alsatians, and the Guelfs, the policy of Falk had no I chance in the Reichstag. For that reason I considered! i47 BISMARCK it more politic to pave the way for peace provided the schools remained protected, the Constitution, freed from -the abolished articles, and the state rid)of the Catholic section. When I had at last won the Emperor over, the new position of the Progressive party and of the Seceders was a matter of decisive weight in determining what was to be retained and what given up; instead of supporting the government, those sections leagued themselves with the Centrum at elections and in the divisions, and had con ceived hopes which found expression in the so-called 'Gladstone-Ministry' (Stosch, Rickert, and others) — that is, in the Liberal-Catholic coalition. In the year 1886 it was at length possible to terminate the counter-Reformation, partlyl^uaghi-f-or— by-me, partly recognised as allowable; and to establish a modus vivendi which may still, compared with the status quo before_i87i, be regarded as a result of the whole Culturkampf favour able to_the_state. How permanent this will be, and how long the con flict of denominations will -now remain quiet, time alone can show. It depends upon ecclesiastical moods and upon the degree of combativeness, not only of the Pope for the time being and his leading counsellors, but also of the German bishops, and of the more or less High Church tendencies governing the Catholic population at different periods. It is impossible to confine within stated limits the claims of Rome upon countries that have religious equality and a Protestant dynasty. It cannot be done even in purely Catholic states. The conflict that has been waged from time immemorial between priests and kings cannot be brought to a conclusion at the present 148 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' day, and of all places not in Germany. Before 1870 the condition of things caused the position of the Catho lic Church in Prussia itself to be recognised by the Curia as a pattern and more favourable than in most of the purely Catholic countries. In our Jiome . politics how ever, and especially in our parliamentary politics, we could trace no effects of this denominational satisfaction. Long before 1871 the group led by the two Reichen- spergers was already permanently attached to the opposi tion against the government of the Protestant dynasty, though its leaders did not on that account incur the personal stigma of being called disturbers of the peace. In any modus vivendi Rome will regard a Protestant dy nasty and Church as an irregularity and a disease which it is the duty of its Church to cure. The conviction that this is the case is no reason for the state itself to com mence the conflict and to abandon its defensive attitude with regard to the Church of Rome, for all treaties of peace in this world are provisional, and only hold good for a time. The political^eiations^Jb^ween independent powers are the outcome of an unbroken series of events arising either from conflict or from the objection of one or other of the parties to renew the conflict. Any temptation on the part of the Curia to renew the conflict in.Germany will alwaysjarise from . the_ excitability of the Poles, .the desire for power among their jwbiHty^jmd^the^ supersti tion of the lower classes fostered by the priests. In the country around "Kissingen I have come across German peasants who had had their schooling, and who firmly be lieved that the priest who stood by the death-bed in the sinful flesh could, by granting or refusing absolution, dispatch the dying man direct to heaven or hell, and that 149 BISMARCK it was therefore necessary to have him for your political friend as well. In Poland I presume it is at least as bad or worse, for the uneducated man is told that German and Lutheran are terms as identical as are Polish and Catholic. Eternal peace, with the Roman Curia is in the existing state of affairs as impossible as is peace between France and herneighbours. If human life is nothing but a series of struggles, this is especially so in the mutual relations of independent political bodies, for the adjustment of which no properly-constituted court exists with power to enforce its decrees. The Roman Curia, however, is an indepen dent political body, possessing among its unalterable qualities the same propensity to grab all round as is innate in our French neighbours. In its struggles against Protestantism, which no concordat can quiet, it has always the aggressive weapons of proselytism and ambition at its disposal ; it tolerates the presence of no other gods. While the Culturkampf was raging King Victor Eman uel paid Berlin a visit lasting from September 22 to 26, 1873. I had heard from Herr von Keudell that the King had ordered a snuff-box set with diamonds, valued at fifty or sixty thousand francs — about six or eight times as much as it is usual to give on such occasions — to be made and forwarded to Count Launay for presentation to me. At the same time it came to my knowledge that Launay had shown the box with an intimation of its value to his neigh bour, Baron Pergler von Perglas, the Bavarian Ambassa dor, who was on terms of very close friendship with our 15° THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' opponents in the. Sulturkampf. The great value of the present intended for me might therefore cause it to be regarded as having some connexion with the rapproche ment with the German empire which the King of Italy at that time sought and obtained. When I submitted to the Emperor my scruples about taking the present, he at first supposed that I considered it beneath my dignity to accept a portrait-box, and saw in this a departure from traditions to which he was accustomed. I said : ' I should not have thought of refusing a present of this kind of the average value. In this case, however, it is not the royal portrait, but the saleable diamonds which are of decisive importance in estimating the matter; out of con sideration for the state of the Ctilturkampf, I am obliged to avoid anything that might serve as a peg for suspi cion, since the value of the box, excessive under the cir cumstances, has been made known through those who stand in neighbourly relations to Perglas, and circulated in society.' The Emperor finally came over to my way of thinking, and closed the incident with the words : ' You are right — don't accept the box.'* On my bringing my views to the knowledge of Count Launay through Herr von Keudell, the box was replaced by a very fine and striking portrait of the King * Prince Gortchakoff was of a different opinion concerning the accept ance of a box set with diamonds. During our visit to St. Petersburg in 1872 his Majesty asked me: 'What can I possibly give Prince Gort chakoff ? He has everything already, including my portrait ; what do you say to a bust or a box set with diamonds ? ' I raised objections to an ex pensive box, basing them on Prince Gortchakoff's position and wealth, and the Emperor said I was right. I thereupon sounded the Prince in confidence, and at once received this reply : ' Get a good big box given me set with fine stones (avec de grosses pierres).' I reported this to his Majesty, feeling somewhat ashamed of my knowledge of human nature ; we both laughed, and Gortchakoff got his box. J5i BISMARCK bearing the following autograph inscription alluding to my order of the Annunciation : AL PRINCIPE BISMARCK EERLINO 26 SETTEMBRE, 1 873 AFFEZIONATISSIMO CUGINO VITTORIO EMANUELE. The King, however, felt a desire to give me a stronger mark of his good-will by a gift as valuable as the one orig inally intended, but unsaleable, and I received in addition to the flattering inscription on the portrait an alabaster vase of unusual size and beauty, the packing and removal of which occasioned me some difficulty when my successor forced me to a precipitate evacuation of my official resi dence. The ' Germania' of December 6, 1891, deduces from the correspondence between Count von Roon and Moritz von Blanckenburg, published in the ' Deutsche Revue,' that I had overcome the Emperor's resistance to civil marriages. Blanckenburg was a comrade in the fight who was above all endeared to me by a friendship dating from our child ish days and lasting till his death. This friendship was, however, on his side not identical with confidence or devo tion in the field of politics ; here I had to contend with the competition of his political and religious confessors, and these had no intention, nor had Blanckenburg the capacity, to form a broad-minded estimate of the historical progress of German and European politics. He was him- 152 THE 'CULTURKAMPF.' self without ambition, and free from the disease of many of his old-Prussian colleagues — jealousy of myself; but it was difficult for his political judgment to tear itself away from the Prussian-Particularistic or even from the Pom eranian-Lutheran standpoint. His thoroughly sound com mon sense and honesty made him independent of Conserva tive party movements in which both were wanting ; this independence had, however, to be discounted by the pru dence and modesty due to his want of familiarity with the political arena. He was yielding, and not steeled against persuasion, not an immovable pillar upon which I might have leant. The conflict between his good-will towards me and his inability to resist other influences finally induced him to retire from politics altogether. The first time that I put him forward as Minister of Agriculture, the proposal fell through owing to the opposition of the very colleagues who had previously approved of my offer of that post to Blanckenburg. I will leave it an open question whether my friend's disinclination to be continu ally exposed to the light of publicity under the supervision of malevolent spirits may have had something to do with the failure of my attempt to bring this Conservative force into the ministry ; but upon his second and definitive refusal on November 10, 1873, this was undoubtedly the case.1 Want of lucidity is shown in his letter to Roon of April 1874," in which he speaks at the same time of his refusal and of Falk's abandonment by me. If the Conservative party had shown their willingness to support me in the persons of their then spokesmen and leaders, Blancken burg and Kleist-Retzow, the composition of the ministry would have been different, and what is called in the letter 1 Deutsche Revue, October 1891. 2 Ibid. December 1891. 153 BISMARCK the Falk cul de sac would perhaps have been unnecessary. The refusal to accept office emanated, however, as the let ter proves, from Blanckenburg himself, not, perhaps, with out being influenced by the last battles of the ' poor Lutherans ' or ' old Lutherans ' with whom Blanckenburg was joined in the 'thirties. When he retired from poli tics I felt as though he had left me in the lurch. The statement that I had overcome the Emperor William's re sistance to civil marriages is one of the inventions of the Democratic Jesuitism which the ' Germania ' represents. The Emperor's aversion was overcome by the pressure which the majority of the ministers present at Berlin, assembled without me under Roon's formal presidency, exercised upon his Majesty, and which went so far that the Emperor had to choose between accepting the draft bill and re-constructing the ministry. In my then state of health it would have been beyond my powers to form out of the parties inimical to me and to each other a new cabinet with a view to continuing the contests in all di- ^ rections. Although the Emperor in his letter of May 8, \1874, says retrospectively that in spite of his having given way he had written against it on two further occasions, (those letters were not addressed to me but to the ministry in Berlin, and in his choice between obligatory civil mar riages and a change of ministers I only advised him to choose the former. His aversion to civil marriages was undoubtedly stronger even than mine ; with Luther I held that marriage was a municipal matter, and my opposition to an acknowledgment of this principle was based rather upon consideration for existing custom and the conviction of the masses than upon any Christian scruples of my own. '54 CHAPTER XXV RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES The rupture between the Conservatives and myself, which occurred amidst much noise in 1872, had been first fore shadowed in 1868 in the debates upon the Hanoverian Provincial Fund. The draft of the bill, submitted to the Diet by the government, in fulfilment of a promise made to the Hanoverians a year before, had already been smartly opposed by the Conservative members in commit tee, when the deputies von Brauchitsch and von Diest brought forward an amendment in the full house sub stantially modifying the measure. The former, as spokes man, explained the reasons why the Conservative party could not vote for the bill. I concluded my exhaustive reply with these words : ' Constitutional government is impossible if the__government. cannot confidently rely upon one of the greater parties even in such exceptional matters as are not entirely to the taste of the party — if that party cannot bajanoejits-aeeeunt in this way : " We support the government throughout; it is true we find that it commits a blunder now and then, but up to the present it has produced fewer blunders than acceptable measures ; for that reason we must take the exceptional cases in with the rest." If a government has not at least one party in the country which regards its views and leanings from such a standpoint, then it cannot possibly rule constitutionally, but is compelled to manoeuvre and !.55 BISMARCK plot against the Constitution ; it must manage to get itself a majority artificially or to recruit a temporary one. It then degenerates into coalition ministries, and its policy betrays fluctuations which have a very prejudicial effect upon the state itself, and more especially upon the Con servative principle.' ' Notwithstanding this warning, the bill, with some modifications agreed to by the government, was passed on February 7 by a majority of only thirty-two, most of the Conservatives having voted against it. In the committee of the Upper House, too, the attack was repeated on the part of the Conservatives. What resources were then brought into play is shown by the following incident. Charles von Bodelschwingh, who was Minister of Finance during the Conflict time, and had in 1866 declined to procure the sums required for the war, being for that rea son replaced by Baron von der Heydt, had spread a report in the Conservative party that I should really be pleased by the rejection of the measure, and offered to adduce proof of this. When business commenced he came up to me in the House and began a conversation of no impor tance by asking after my wife ; on leaving me he returned to his colleagues and declared that, after having consulted me, he was sure of the truth of what he had advanced. From a perusal of the very authentic reports which Roon, who was then at Bordighera, received in February 1868 from members of the Conservative party, and which were reprinted in the ' Deutsche Revue' of April 1891,2 it will be seen that the Conservatives desired me to enter their group. I had little leisure time, was pre-occupied by 1 Politische Reden, iii. 456. * Cf. Denkwiirdigkeiten, iii.4 62 sqq. 156 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES what we had to expect from France ; by the possibility, nay, the probability that Austria, under Beust, would enter into the French war plans in order to undo the events of 1 866 ; by the question what position Russia, Bavaria and Saxony would take up at such a juncture; finally, by the existence of a Hanoverian legion. These cares, and the labour to which they forced me, completely exhausted me, and, to crown all, these gentlemen desired that I should seek out every single private politician of their group and convert him. I did even this, as far as I could, but my efforts were frustrated by Bodelschwingh's intrigues and by the animosity of Vincke, Diest, Kleist-Retzow and other displeased and jealous members of my own class and former colleagues in the same group. What Roon himself thought of the situation reported to him is evident fromhis letter to me of February 19, 1868, written from Bordighera, in which the following passages occur : ' ' According to the newspapers, it appears that you and others have again been quarrelling lustily. This does not surprise me, but I am sorry that differences of such a seri ous nature could not be avoided — differences which cause the Liberals by profession to shout for joy, and appear to render the Conservatives by trade still more confused than they, unfortunately, already are. ' What things, according to Galignani, you are reported to have said ! I have been promised the shorthand reports of the matter, but they are, unfortunately, not yet to hand. I am, nevertheless, perfectly reassured concerning the chief thing — your threatened resignation — for I consider such a step to be absolutely impossible, excepting in the event of 1 Bismarck-Jahrbuch, vi. 198, 199. 157 BISMARCK physical incapacitation. I am still, however, uneasy about the ever more threatening dismemberment of the Conser vative party, which, supposing it were to be accomplished in the manner desired by the Liberals, would be regarded by me as a very serious and significant matter, a proceed ing which would degrade you and the government to obe dient tools of the Liberal party. Of course I understand that it is advantageous for our policy that the Liberals should nourish a hope of being able to put their hand to the oar as well. But I also realise that it would be disas trous if the situation were to take such a turn as to render their participation in the government an inevitable neces sity. You will perhaps object to this, that the confusion, helplessness, and stupidity of the Conservatives — apart from the envious and spiteful presumption of individuals — would of itself bring this about, and that you can do nothing to hinder it. But is that quite the case ? If you had seriously devoted your considerable resources to in doctrinating and organising the Conservative party, which unfortunately does not yet clearly recognise that its task of to-day must differ from that of 1862 and the following years — ay, if you would but attempt this to-day, it will be possible not only to avert the mesalliance with the Liberals, but also to convert the reformed Conservative party into the most enduring and secure staff for your jour ney on the difficult but inevitable road of Conservative progress in internal reforms and renovation. One man, no matter how excellent the endowments which God has given him, cannot do everything which has to be done himself. In saying this I desire to exclude any reproach which what I have said above might seem to cast on you. Rather, I am ready to admit willingly and repeatedly that you and 158 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES your aims are not sufficiently supported by your official colleagues. And if I spoke of the reform of the Con servative party, I recognise that this task must, in the first instance, devolve on the Minister of the Interior. But does Count E. possess the confidence (and sense of duty!) necessary for its performance? Where will you find other colleagues, especially another Minister of the Interior ? In the ranks of the National Liberals ? The idea is to me intolerable. Among the Conservatives ? But whom ? The organising and creative spirits in their ranks are unknown magnitudes, and much as I dislike our bureaucratic disorder, I am aware that the person concerned must know it in order to be able to reform it.' A few days later, on February 25, Roon wrote to his eldest son : ' '. . . I should prefer to write nothing at all about politics and conflicts, after writing on the 19th on the basis of a confidential report sent me on the 9th to express to Count Bismarck my regret that matters should have turned out thus, &c. The shorthand reports which have been promised me are not likely to change my view of things; it is impossible for Bismarck to do everything. The organisation or re -organisation of the Conservative party, which has become necessary, is rightfully the busi ness of the Minister of the Interior, and neither Bis marck, nor I, nor Blanckenburg, nor anyone else is offi cially called upon to do it. If the one person whose business it is, is neither inclined nor fitted for it, he lacks some indispensable qualification for his office, and we may draw the necessary conclusion and act accordingly. The loss of any wholesome influence due to Bismarck's atti- 1 Denkwiirtigkeiten, iii. 4 70 &c. J59 BISMARCK tude towards the Conservatives, or to my absence or Blanck- enburg's, scarcely permits us to reproach Bismarck on good grounds. Those who know, as I do, what enormous duties B. has to, and does, perform, cannot justly blame him for not doing even more, and making up for his col league's neglect or incapacity. The only possible ground on which we could justly reproach him would be if we could maintain with truth that he has not done all in his power to procure more competent colleagues. Perhaps this might be said, but I, who, in spite of distance, can perhaps judge better and more accurately than any one else of the personal relations in question, feel scarcely able definitely to make any such assertion. However, the breach will be healed, for it must be healed. There is no other party on which we can depend for the main ques tion, but the party must at last understand that its ideas and tasks cf to-day must be essentially different from those of the Conflict time. It must be, and become, a party of Conservative progress, and abandon the policy of the drag, however essential and necessary this may have been, and in fact was, at the time of the ascendancy of democratic progress, and the demagogic precipitation which it threat ened. These are my ideas in nuce about the latest situa tion; of course they are only suited for communication in the most confidential circles. . . ' Roon's anticipation was not fulfilled. The Conserva tive party remained what it was ; the contest, which it had begun with me, continued in more or less latent fash ion. I can understand that my policy was opposed by that 160 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES Conservative party which commonly went by the name of 'Kreuzzeitung,' by some of its members from honourable motives of principle, which exercised in some individuals a stronger motive power than their national feeling, which was Prussian rather than German. In others, whom I might almost call my second class opponents, the motive was due to place-hunting — dte-toi, que je my meltc — of these the prototypes were Harry Arnim, Robert Goltz, and others. In the third class I might include those of my own rank among the country nobility, who were an noyed because my exceptional career had caused me to outgrow the conception, more Polish than German, of a traditional equality among the members of that class. They would have pardoned my transformation from a country Junker into a minister, but not my emoluments nor per haps the princely title which had been conferred on me much against my will. 'Your Excellency' was within the limit of customary attainment and appreciation ; 'your serene Highness ' challenged criticisms. I can under stand this feeling, for this criticism was in correspon dence with my own. On the morning of March 21, 1871, when an autograph letter of the Emperor announced my elevation to the rank of prince, I was determined to beg his Majesty to abandon his intention, because this eleva tion of rank would bring a very uncongenial change in the basis of my fortune and all the conditions of my life. Glad as I was to think of my sons as comfortably situated country nobles, I disliked the idea of princes with an in adequate income, like Hardenberg and Bliicher, whose sons did not assume the hereditary title ; in fact the Bliicher title was only renewed many decades later (1861) in con sequence of a wealthy Catholic marriage. While consid- vol. 11. — 11 161 BISMARCK ering all the reasons against an elevation of rank, which was quite outside the domain of my ambition, I reached the top steps of the palace stairs, and there found, to my surprise, the Emperor at the head of the royal family. He embraced me warmly and with tears, addressing me as Prince, and giving loud expression to his joy at being able to confer this distinction on me. In face of this and the hearty greetings of the royal family, it was impossible for me to express my hesitation. I have never since then lost the feeling that a count may be merely well to do without attracting undue attention, but a prince, if he wishes to avoid this, must be actually rich. It would have been easier for me to put up with the ill-will of my former friends and compeers if it had been due to my opinions. It found its expression and its pretexts in the condemnatory criticism to which my policy was' subjected by the Prussian Conservatives under the leadership of my kinsman, Herr von Kleist-Retzow, at the time of the School Inspection Bill of 1872, and on several other occa sions. The opposition of the Conservatives to the School In spection Bill, which had been introduced in Muhler's time, was already beginning in the House of Deputies. It aimed at legally vindicating the claims of the local clergy to the inspection of the common schools, even in Poland ; while the proposal gave the office a free hand in the choice of the inspector. In the course of the animated debate which many old members will have recalled in 1892, 1 spoke thus on February 13, 1872: 'The previous speaker (Lasker) stated that he and his party could not conceive that on a question which was a matter of principle and had been declared by us impor- 162 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES tant for the safety of the state, on a question of this sig nificance, what had hitherto been the Conservative party should openly declare war against the government. I do not wish to adopt this expression, but I may assuredly declare that I too cannot think that that party is going to leave the government in the lurch on a question which the government is determined for its part to carry by every constitutional means.' 1 After the Bill had been accepted in the form approved by the government, by 207 votes against 155, the latter given by clericals, Conservatives, and Poles, it was brought on for discussion in the Upper House on March 6. I will quote a passage from my speech : ' The matter has been inflated by the evangelicals to such excessive importance, as though we now desired to depose the clergy in a lump, make a tabula rasa, and over turn the whole evangelical state, with the 20,000 thalers which we are demanding. But for these exaggerations the regrettable disputes and frictions in connexion with this Bill would have been altogether superfluous ; the Bill has only gained its exaggerated importance from the quite unexpected resistance of the evangelical portion of the Conservative party, a resistance into whose origin I will not enter here in detail — I could not do so without becoming personal — but which is a most painful experience for the government and a most discouraging sign for the future. Now that I have declared to you with an openness to which Conservatives ought never to compel the govern ment, the origin and drift of this Bill, you ought to recognise the necessity of compelling our country men, who have hitherto not spoken German, to learn 1 Politische Reden, v. 283. 163 BISMARCK German. That is, in my view, the main point of this Bill.1 In a house of 202, 76 voted against the Bill. On the previous evening I had exerted myself in trying to repre sent to Herr von Kleist the probable results of the policy into which he was leading his friends, but found myself in face of a parti pris, the basis of which I could not con jecture. On that side the breach with me was marked externally by a distinctness which revealed as much per sonal as political animosity. The conviction that that party-politician, who was on terms of personal intimacy with me, did grievous mischief to the country and the Conservative cause, remains with me to this day. If the Conservative party, instead of breaking with me and at tacking me with a bitterness "and fanaticism second to no party in the Opposition, had assisted the imperial govern ment in building up the structure of imperial legislation with honest joint labour, it would not have failed to show deep traces of this Conservative co-operation. The com pletion of the structure was necessary if the political and military attainments were to be protected from crumbling away and from centrifugal retrogression. I do not know how far I could have gone to meet Conservative co-operation, certainly further than was the case under the circumstances to which the rupture gave rise. At that time, in face of the dangers resulting from our wars, I regarded the differences between parties as subordinate, in comparison with the necessity of polit ical protection from external attack by serrying our ranks as far as possible as a united nation. The first condition was, in my view, the independence of Germany, based 1 Politische Reden, v. 304, 305, 164 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES upon a unity sufficiently strong for self-protection. I had then, and still have, sufficient confidence in the sense and reasonableness of the nation to believe that it will heal and extirpate excrescences and mistakes in the na tional institutions, if only it is not hindered by its depen dence on the rest of Europe and by internal interests of separate groups, as was the case before 1866. With this view I regarded, as I do to this day, the question of Lib eral or Conservative as of secondary importance in face of the impending danger of war and coalition, and rather laid stress on the free self-determination of the nation and its princes. I do not yet renounce the hope, although I feel no security, that our political future will not be in jured in its future developments by blunders and mishaps. The more exclusive rapprochement with the National Liberal party, to which I was of necessity brought by the desertion of the Conservatives, became a reason or a pre text in the circles of the latter for increased animosity against me. During the time that I was compelled by illness to surrender to Count Roon the chairmanship of the ministry, i.e. from New Year till September 1873, he used every evening to hold large or small meetings at his house, attended by politicians of the Right who were op posed to me. Count Harry Arnim, who was not in the habit of attending gentlemen's parties without some polit ical object, came to these whenever he was at Berlin on leave, playing his part so as to give the company the im pression conveyed to me by Roon himself in the words : 'After all he has the making of a capital Junker !' The 165 BISMARCK context in which he expressed this opinion and its fre quent sharply accentuated repetition in the mouth of my friend and colleague, had the effect of reproaching me for my lack of similar qualities, and conveyed a hint that Arnim would manage our domestic policy in a more spirited and Conservative manner if he were in my place. The conversation in which this theme of Arnim' s Junker ten dencies was developed in detail, gave me the impression that even my old friend Roon, under the influence of the conventicle meeting at his house, felt his confidence in my policy somewhat shaken. To these circles belonged also Colonel von Caprivi, at that time chief of a department in the War Ministry. I will not determine to which of the categories of my oppo nents enumerated on pp. 159, 160 he belonged at that time. I am only acquainted with his personal relations to the staff of the 'Reichsglocke,' e.g. Geheimrath von Lebbin, an offi cial in the Ministry of the Interior, who also exercised in his department an influence hostile to me. Field- Marshal von Manteuffel told me that Caprivi had tried to strain his (Manteuffel' s) influence with the Emperor against me, indicating as a ground of complaint and source of danger my 'hostility to the army.' * It is ex traordinary that Caprivi did not remember in that con nexion how before, and at the time of my taking office in 1862, the army had been attacked, criticised, and curtailed in step- motherly fashion by civilians, and how during my office and under my guidance it had been raised from its common-place garrison existence, and from 1864 to 1 87 1 had passed by way of Duppel, Sadowa, and Sedan, * Compare with this reproach the letter of the Emperor Frederick, March 25, 1888, infra, p. 340. 166 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES to three triumphal entries into Berlin. I may presume without exaggeration that King William would have abdi cated in 1 862, that the policy which laid the foundations of the glory of the army would never have come into being, or, at any rate, not in that fashion, if I had not taken over its direction. Would the army have had the opportunity of performing its deeds of heroism and Count Moltke been able to draw his sword if King William I .had received other counsels from other persons? As suredly not, if he had abdicated in 1 862 because he could find no one prepared to share and to face the dangers of his position. As early as February 11, 1872, the 'Kreuzzeitung, had declared a feud against me on the ground that I had proclaimed the supremacy of parliament and atheism. In 1875, under Nathusius Ludom, it opened its campaign of slander against me, with what were known as the Era ar ticles of Perrot.* I then applied by letter to Amsberg, one of our highest legal authorities, and to the Minister of Justice, to ask whether, if I brought a penal action, I might count with any certainty on the condemnation of the author ; if not, I should refrain from bringing one, for a sentence of acquittal might give my enemies a fresh pretext for calumny. The answer of both coincided with that given by my own legal adviser. The condemnation was probable, but in view of the cautious wording of the article, not certain. At that time, I had not formed any * Dr. Perrot. retired captain ; born at Treves, died 1891. Author of pamphlets on political economy ; ultimately merchant. 167 BISMARCK definite principles on the subject of penal actions, and the experiences which I had had in the time of conflict were not exactly encouraging. I remember that one local tri bunal, I believe at Stendal, in basing its sentence, fully admitted the grievous character of the insults publicly directed against me, but explained its reasons for fixing the minimum penalty of iothalers, by saying that I really was a bad minister. At the time of the appearance of Perrot's articles, I could not yet foresee the dimensions which the campaign of slander against me would assume, on the part of my former comrades and particularly among those of my own rank. No one who has taken part in the political struggles of the present day can fail to have noticed that party poli ticians, whose courtesy and honour in private life are quite above suspicion, as soon as they enter upon struggles of this nature, regard themselves as exempt from all those rules of honour and decency, whose authority they recog nise in other cases. A grotesque exaggeration of the phrase salus publica suprema lex causes them to justify baseness and vulgarity in speech and action, which outside the domain of religious and political conflict would repel them. This renouncing of all that is decent and honour able is dimly connected with a feeling that, in the interest of the party which is substituted for their country, they have to make use of a different standard from that of pri vate life, and that the precepts of honour and good breed ing may be interpreted differently and more loosely in 168 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES party strife than even in war against foreign foes. The irritability which leads to the transgression of the ordi nary forms and limits is unconsciously accentuated by the circumstance that in politics and religion no one can give his opponent a conclusive proof for his own conviction, and that no court exists which by its decisions can set at rest differences of opinion. In politics, as in the domain of religious belief, no other argument can be brought by a Conservative against a Liberal, a Royalist against a Republican, a believer against an infidel, than the tune which is hackneyed by a thousand variations of eloquence. My political convic tions are right and yours are wrong ; my belief is pleasing to God, your unbelief leads to damnation. This explains why ecclesiastical differences of opinion bring about relig ious wars ; and why political party conflicts, even if not settled by civil war, still help to overthrow the barriers which in the intercourse of life outside of politics are main tained by the honour and decency of well-bred persons. Would any cultivated and well-bred German attempt in ordinary intercourse to use the smallest part of the imper tinences and insults which he does not hesitate to throw in the face of his opponent, though as good a citizen as him self, using, when he speaks from the platform before a hun dred witnesses, an aggressive tone, quite inadmissible in ordinary respectable society ? Would any one outside the domain of politics consider it consistent with the position which he claims to hold as a gentleman of good family, to make a business in the society with which he associates of hawking about lies and slanders against other members of his own society and his own class ? Who would not be ashamed to accuse blameless persons of dishonest actions 169 BISMARCK in this way, without being able to bring any proofs ? In short, where, except in the region of political party strug gle, would any one be found willingly to undertake the part of an unconscientious slanderer ? But as soon as a man can protect himself before his own conscience and his group, by the plea that he is acting in the interest of his party, the meanest action is considered permissible and even excusable. The slanders against me began in the paper which, under the Christian symbol of the Cross, and the motto 'With God for King and Fatherland,' had for years rep resented, not the Conservative group and still less Chris tianity, but only the ambition and spiteful malice of indi vidual editors. On February 9, 1876,1 I complained in a public speech of the venom of this paper, and was an swered by a declaration on the part of the signatories, whose educated contingent consisted of a few hundred evangelical ministers. In this form they opposed me in their official character, making themselves accomplices in the lies of the ' Kreuzzeitung,' and testifying to their mission as servants of a Christian Church and its peace, by publicly countersigning the slanders of this paper. I have always felt a mistrust of politicians in long skirts, whether feminine or ecclesiastic ; and this declaration of some hundreds of evangelical pastors in favour of one of the most frivolous slanders directed against the first offi cial in the land was not calculated to strengthen my con fidence in politicians who wear the cassock, even though it be the evangelical. The possibility of personal inter course between me and any of the signatories, many of whom had previously been acquaintances, or even friends 1 Politische Reden, vi. 351. 170 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES of mine, was absolutely at an end after they had associ ated themselves with the dishonourable insults from Per rot's pen. It is a hard trial for the nerves of a man of mature age when he is compelled suddenly to break off his former intercourse with all, or almost all, his friends and ac quaintances. My health at that time had long been im paired, not by the labour which I had to perform, but by the continuous sense of responsibility for the great events which placed the future of my country at stake. Of course it was impossible during the animated and some times stormy development of our politics always to fore see with certainty whether the road which I took was the right one, and yet I was obliged to act as though I could predict with absolute clearness both coming events and the effect which my own decisions would have upon them. The question whether his own estimate, his political in stinct, is leading him rightly, is difficult enough for a minister whose doubts are set at rest as soon as he feels himself sheltered under the royal signature or a parlia mentary majority: a minister, one might say, of Catholic politics, who has got absolution and is not troubled by the more Protestant question, whether he has got absolution from himself. But for a minister who completely identi fies his own honour with that of his country, the uncer tainty of the result of each political decision has a most harassing effect. It is just as impossible to foresee with any certainty the political results at the time when a measure has to be carried, as it would be in our climate to predict the weather of the next few days. Yet we have to make our decisions as though we could do so, often enough fighting against all the influences to which we are 171 BISMARCK accustomed to attach weight. Thus, for instance, at Ni kolsburg, at the time of the peace negotiations, I was, and remained, the only person who was finally made respon sible, and in fact, according to our institutions and cus toms was responsible, for the events and their results. On that occasion I was obliged to maintain my decision in a hard struggle in opposition not only to all the sol diers, that is to all who were present, but also to the King. The consideration of the question whether a decision is right, and whether it is right to hold fast and carry through what, though upon weak premises, has been recognised as right, has an agitating effect on every conscientious and honourable man. This is strengthened by the circum stance that often many years must elapse before we are able in political matters to convince ourselves whether our wishes and actions were right or wrong. It is not the work which is wearing, but rather the doubts and anxie ties; the feeling of honour and responsibility, without being able to support the latter by anything except our own convictions and our own will, and this is more espe cially the case in the most important crises. The intercourse with others whom we regard as simi larly situated helps us to overcome these crises ; and if this suddenly ceases, from motives which are personal rather than external, envious rather than honest, and in as far as they are honest, of the most illiberal character, and the responsible minister suddenly finds himself boy cotted by all his former friends, treated as an enemy, and then left alone with himself and his deliberations, this must increase the ill-effect of all his official anxieties upon his nerves and health. RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES It was by favouring the National Liberal party that I had brought upon myself the ill-will of my former Con servative colleagues, and it might have been expected that they would have been induced by the vulgar and undigni fied attacks on my personal honesty to give me some help in repelling them, or, at any rate, to show that they did not approve of the attacks, and did not share my slanderers' views about me. I cannoJ:^-hQwever,__r.e.member at that time noticing any attempt on the part of the National Lib erals to come to my aid, either in the press or by any other public means. There appeared rather to be a certain sat isfaction in the National Liberal camp at the attacks made upon me by the Conservative party, and at their rupture with me, as though they were anxious to widen the breach and push the goad a little further in. Liberals and Con servatives were agreed in making use of me, letting me drop, and attacking me, according as the interest of their section dictated. Of course every group professes to be dominated by the interests of the country and the general welfare, and maintains that the party road is the most conducive to the good of the community. But, as a mat ter of fact, I have retained the impression that each of our groups conducts its politics as though it alone existed, iso lated on its own sectional island, without the slightest con sideration for the whole or for foreign countries. Nor can it be maintained for a moment that the differences of the group on the political battlefield had been transformed, by the varying political principles and convictions of each individual, into a question of conscience and necessity. Most partisans resemble the adherents of different creeds : they are puzzled when asked to point out the character istic differences between their own convictions and those i73 BISMARCK of rival creeds. In our parties, the real point of crystal lisation is not a programme so much as a person : a parli amentary condottiere.. Nor do their conclusions originate in the opinions of the members, but only in the will of the leader or some conspicuous orator, and as a rule these two coincide. The attempt of individual members to make war against the party leader and the fluent orator is combined with so much annoyance, defeat in voting, and interruption of daily customary social intercourse, that it requires a very independent character to represent an opinion differing from the party lead; nor is even character sufficient unless accompanied by a considerable equipment of knowl edge and energy. Now this latter increases as we go fur ther to the Left. Conservative parties are, as a rule, com posed of contented citizens ; those which attack the status quo are naturally more largely recruited from the ranks of persons discontented with existing institutions. Among the elements on which contentment depends, a comfortable income does not occupy the smallest place. Now, it is a peculiarity, if not of mankind in general, at any rate of the German nation, that the discontented are more indus trious and active than the contented; the needy more energetic than the satisfied. Those Germans who are intellectually and physically satisfied are doubtless some times industrious from a sense of duty. But this is not the case with the majority; and among those who fight against the existing system, we seldom find well-to-do people acting from conviction, but often out of ambition, which hopes for speedier satisfaction on this road, unless indeed they have been forced upon it by political or de nominational annoyances. The general result is the pro- i74 RUPTURE WITH THE CONSERVATIVES motion of superior industry among those forces which attack the existing order of things, and inferior among those who defend it, i.e. the Conservatives. This lack of industry in the majority considerably facilitates the leadership of a Conservative party, and serves to help it more than individual independence and violent obstinacy on the part of individuals can avail to hamper it. Ac cording to my experience, the dependence of the Conser vative sections on the commands of their leader is at least as strong as, perhaps stronger than, on the Extreme Left. The aversion to rupture is probably greater on the Right than on the Left, and the reproach ' of being min isterial,' which had so strong an effect on every individ ual, was often a greater hindrance to objective judgment on the Right than on the Left. This reproach immediately ceased to give offence to the Conservative and other sections when my dismisal rendered the place of ruler vacant, and every party leader, in the hope of having a share in filling it, again became servile and ministerial, to the extent of dishonestly denying and boycotting the late Chancellor and his policy. During the period of the ' declarations,' the anti-min isterial current, i.e. the disfavour with which I was re garded and treated by many of my compeers, was greatly furthered by strong influences at Court. The Emperor never refused me his favour and support in matters of business, but that did not prevent him from reading the ' Reichsglocke ' every day. Of this paper, which only supported itself by calumniating me, thirteen copies were provided by the royal Treasury for our and other Courts, and it sought its collaborators not only among the Cath olic court and country nobility, but even among the evan- 175 BISMARCK gelicals. The Empress Augusta made me permanently sensible of her dislike, and her adherents, the highest officials at the Court, carried their lack of courtesy to such a pitch that I was forced to make a written com plaint to his Majesty. The result of this was that at least the outward forms of courtesy were no longer neg lected. It was incivilities of this kind to which he and his wife were subjected at court, rather than actual diffi culties, which helped to disgust Falk with his position.1 'Seep. 143. CHAPTER XXVI INTRIGUES Count Harry Arnim carried his wine badly, and one day, after a glass at lunch, he said to me : 'I look upon every front rank man in the profession as a personal enemy, and treat him accordingly. Only he must not be allowed to notice it as long as he is my superior.' This was at the time when he had returned from Rome after the death of his first wife, and his son's Italian nurse was exciting at tention on the promenades by her red and gold costume, while Ajaiim^Jf^requently in political discussions quoted MachiaveJH and the works of Italian Jesuits and biog raphers. At that time he posed in the character of an ambi tious and unscrupulous man, played the piano fascinatingly, and in consequence of his beauty and versatility was a dangerous character for ladies to whom he paid his court. He had begun very early to develop this versatility, for as a pupil at the Gymnasium of Neustettin, he had served his apprenticeship to the ladies of a company of strolling ac tors, by replacing the missing orchestra at the piano. Among the personages who joined with foreign influ ence, with the ' Reichsglocke ' and its collaborators in aris tocratic and court circles and in the ministries of my col leagues, and with the disappointed Junkers and their Era articles in the ' Kreuzzeitung,' in the attempt to deprive me of the Emperor's confidence, Count Harry Arnim played a prominent part. vol. ii. — 12 177 BISMARCK On August 23, 1 87 1, he was appointed ambassador, at my suggestion, and sent in that capacity to Paris, where I hoped that, in spite of all his faults, it would be possible to utilise his distinguished abilities in the ser vice of his Majesty; but he regarded his post there only as a stepping-stone, by help of which he would be able to work more effectively at getting rid of me and becoming my successor. He pointed out, in his private correspon dence with the Emperor, that the Prussian Royal House was at that time the oldest in Europe which had main tained itself in unbroken rule; and that this favour of God laid upon the Emperor, as doyen of the sovereigns, the duty of watching over and protecting the legitimacy and continuity of other old dynasties. He judged rightly the mental effect of touching this chord in the Emperor's disposition; and had Arnim been our master's only coun sellor, he might perhaps have succeeded in obscuring his clear and sober judgment by an artificial and exaggerated sentiment of hereaitary and princely duty. But he did not know that his Majesty, in his honest and straightfor ward fashion, communicated the letters to me, and thus gave me an opportunity of representing to the political understanding, I might almost say the sound common- sense of my master, the risks and dangers of these coun sels, which we should encounter if we attempted the res toration of legitimacy in France, on the road recommended by Arnim.The Emperor afterwards permitted me to publish my written expressions on the subject in answer to Arnim's libels. In one of these I referred to the King's knowl edge of the fact that Arnim's sincerity was doubted in authoritative circles, and that he was not desired as am- 178 INTRIGUES bassador at the English Court ' because no one would believe a word he said.' * Count Arnim made repeated attempts to obtain from the English cabinet a testimonial contradicting this accu sation of mine, and received from the English statesmen, who were more friendly to him than to me, the assurance that they knew nothing whatever of the matter. Still, the anticipatory rejection of Arnim, to which I had referred, had reached the Emperor in a fashion which enabled me to make public reference to his Majesty's testimony about the matter. When Arnim had convinced himself at Berlin in 1873 that his prospects of taking my place were not yet as mature as he had assumed, he attempted, for the time being, to restore the former friendly relations. He called upon me, regretted that we had drifted apart owing to mis understandings and the intrigues of other persons, and reminded me of the relations with me that he had once had and valued. Too well acquainted with his mode of pro cedure and the serious character of his attack on me to be deceived, I spoke quite openly to him, represented to him that he had entered into connexion with all the elements hostile to me with a view to shaking my political position, in the erroneous presumption that he would become my successor, and I declared that I did not believe in his con ciliatory attitude. As he left me, the facility to tears which was peculiar to him enabled him to brush one away from his eyes. I had known him from childhood. My official proceedings against Arnim had been pro voked by his refusal to obey official instructions. I said noth ing in the legal proceeding about the fact of his having used * Letter to the Emperor, dated April 14, 1873. 179" BISMARCK the money which had been given him to represent our policy in the French press (6,000 to 7,000 thalers) in attacking our policy and my position in the German press. His chief organ, in which he attacked me with ever- increasing confidence of victory, was at that time the ' Spener'sche Zeitung,' which, already moribund, was at his purchase. In this he let fall hints that he alone was acquainted with the means of bringing the struggle with Rome to a victorious issue, and that it was only my unjus tifiable ambition which kept a superior statesman, like himself, from taking the helm. He never expressed him self to me on the subject of this secret remedy. It con sisted in the theory endorsed by a few canonists, that the character of the Roman Catholic Church had been changed by the Vatican decisions ; it had become a differerent per sonage legally, and thereby lost the rights of property and treaty, which it had acquired in its former existence. I had already considered this plan, but do not think it would have had a stronger effect on the issue of the quarrel than the foundation of the Old Catholic Church, whose legality was clearer and more justifiable, both logically and juris- tically, than the suggested renunciation by the Prussian Government of its relations to the Roman Church. The number of Old Catholics gives the 'measure of the effect which this move would have exercised on the stability of the Pope's adherents and of Neo-Catholicism. Still less promising seemed to me the proposal, made by Count Arnim in one of his public reports, that the Prussian Government should send Oratores to help in deliberating the dogmatic questions at the Council. I imagine that this idea was suggested to him by the frontispiece of Paolo Sarpi's 'History of the Council of Trent,' which repre- 180 INTRIGUES sents the Council, and designates two persons seated at a table apart as Oratores Ccesarece Majestatis. If my assump tion is right, Count Arnim ought to have known that Orator in the clerical Latinity of that day is the expres sion for ambassador. My only object in the proceedings against him was to obtain the surrender of certain portions, undoubtedly official, of the embassy documents, a demand which Arnim had definitely refused. I only wanted to maintain my official authority as his chief. I never desired a penal sentence against Arnim, nor yet expected it ; on the con trary, after it was pronounced, I would have done my best to advocate his pardon, had this been legally admissible in the case of a sentence by default. My motive was not personal revenge, but, if any one desires to find a term of blame for it, rather bureaucratic dogmatism on the part of a superior official, whose authority had been disregarded. In my opinion the sentence of nine months' imprisonment in the first suit was of excessive severity. As for his condemnation in the second trial to five years' imprison ment, this was only rendered possible, as the condemned man himself truly remarked, by the fact that the ordinary judge in a criminal court was not in a position to gauge with full comprehension the sins of diplomacy in interna tional relations. I should only have regarded this sentence as adequate if the suspicion had been proved that the con demned man had utilised his relations to Baron Hirsch in such a way as to render the delay in executing my instruc tions serviceable in speculations on the Bourse. This was not proved in the legal proceedings, nor was any attempt made to prove it. The assumption that it was mere busi ness reasons which caused him to neglect the execution BISMARCK of a distinct order always remained a possible point in his favour, although I could not understand the train of thought which must have led him to it. But I never, for my part, gave expression to this suspicion, although it was communicated to the Foreign Office and court society, by correspondence and travellers from Paris, and was carried around in these circles. It was a loss for our diplomatic service that Arnim's uncommon qualifications for it were not coupled with an equal measure of trustworthiness and credibility. The impression made on diplomatic circles is shown, among other proofs, by the following letter written by the Secretary of State, von Biilow, on October 23, 1874 : ' The " Kreuzzeitung " to-day contains a dishonest communication, evidently composed by Count Arnim him self to the tune, What harm have I done? Nothing, except saving entirely personal documents from the indis cretion of ambassadors and government clerks; I should have given them up long ago if the Foreign Office had not been so rude and inconsiderate. It is difficult, during the course of the inquiry, to answer such lies and distortions. Meantime, the " Weser Zeitung " yesterday contained a very useful notice of the contents of several of the missing documents. Yesterday, Field-Marshal von Manteuffel called on me, chiefly with the view of inquiring about the Arnim affair. He expressed in very suitable language his conviction that it would have been impossible to act dif ferently, and his pity for the Chancellor and the Diplo matic Service, who were obliged to carry on business with such experiences. However, he had known Arnim from a child, and had suffered sufficiently under or side by side with him at Nancy, not to be surprised by the catastrophe. INTRIGUES Arnim, he said, was a man who, on every occasion, only asked: What personal advantage or disadvantage do I derive from it ? Word for word, the same was the testi mony of Lord Odo Russell, as the result of his Roman experience, and of Nothomb with his memories of Brus sels. What struck me most was the Field-Marshal's repeated assertion that Arnim had begun to conspire against your serene Highness in the summer of 1872, had tried to sound him (Manteuffel) in this connection in the summer of 1873, and, by his attitude towards Thiers, had been really responsible for his fall and all its disastrous political consequences. On this last matter he spoke with considerable knowledge of the subject and persons, not without a hint of the influence which Arnim had at that time been able to acquire in the very highest quarters, by incitements against the Republic and in favour of the Legitimist succession. On the day of Thiers' fall, he had dined with several prominent Orleanists. The bulletins from Versailles reached him during dinner and were greeted with joy — it was a support for the party, without which it might not have had the moral courage for the coup d'e"tat of May 24. Similarly, Nothomb told me that Thiers had said to him the previous winter, speaking of Arnim : " Cet homme m'a fait beaucoup de mal, beau- coup plus meme que ne sait ni pense Monsieur de Bis marck." ' In the libel action against the editor of the ' Reichs glocke,' January 1877, the Attorney- General said: ' I regard as morally responsible for this criminal line of action all the collaborators of the paper, as well as those who support the paper in word and deed, but in par ticular Herr von Loe, and next to him Count Harry 183 BISMARCK Arnim. It is impossible to doubt that all the articles " Arnim contra Bismarck," which have, for the last year, been devoted to attacking and depreciating the person of Prince Bismarck, were written in the interest of Count Arnim. It is my conviction that after 1 866 the Roman Curia, as well as most politicians, regarded a war between France and Germany as probable, and thought it equally probable that Prussia would be the loser. Assuming the war, the reigning Pope must have considered that the victory of France over evangelical Prussia would enable him to push to its furthest consequences the attack which he had made with his Council and his infallibility on the non-Catholic world and nervous Catholics. Considering the relations then prevailing between imperial France, and in particular the Empress Eugenie and the Pope, it would not be too bold an assumption that France, if its armies should reach Berlin victoriously, would not leave the interest of the Catholic Church in Prussia unconsidered at the conclusion of peace; similarly, the Emperor of Russia was in the habit of using treaties of peace for the protection of his co-religiiinists in the East. - Perhaps the gesta Dei per Francos would have been enriched by some fresh advances of the Papal power ; and the decision of the denomina tional contests, which, in the opinion of Catholic writers (Donoso Cortes de Valdegamas) , must eventually be fought out ' on the sands of the March of Brandenburg, ' would be promoted in various directions by a preponderating posi tion of France in Germany. The Empress Eugenie's par- "184 INTRIGUES tiality for the warlike tendency in French politics can hardly have been unconnected with her devotion to the Catholic Church and the Pope. If French policy and Louis Napoleon's personal relation to the Italian move ment rendered it impossible for the Emperor and Empress to satisfy the Pope in Italy, the Empress would, in case of victory, have been able to show her devotion to the Pope in Germany, and on this domain would have provided a fiche de consolation, even if an inadequate one, for the injuries which the Papal See had sustained in Italy with and by means of Napoleon's concurrence. After the peace of Frankfort, if a Catholic party, no matter whether Royalist or Republican, had remained at the helm in France, it would scarcely have been possible to postpone the renewal of war for so long a time. In that case there would have been a fear that the two neigh bouring powers against whom we had made war, Austria and France, would approach one another on the ground of their common Catholicism, and make a joint attack on us, and the circumstance that both in Germany and in Italy there was no lack of elements with whom denominational sympathies were stronger than national, would serve to strengthen and encourage such a Catholic alliance. It was impossible to predict whether, in face of it, we should find allies ; at any rate, it would have been in t! j power of Russia by joining the Austro-French alliance, to develop it into a preponderating coalition, as in the Seven Years' war, or, at any rate, to keep us in a state of dependence, under the diplomatic pressure of this possibility. The re-establishment of a Catholic monarchy in France would have greatly increased the temptation to seek revenge with the help of Austria. On this account I con- 185 BISMARCK sidered it contrary to the interests of Germany and of peace, for us to promote the restoration of the monarchy in France, and therefore I opposed the persons who repre sented this idea. This opposition became personal, and was directed against the French ambassador, Gontaut- Biron, and our own ambassador in Paris, Count Harry Arnim. The former was acting in accordance with the party to which he naturally belonged, the Legitimist Cath olic; but the latter was speculating on the Emperor's sympathies with a view to discrediting my policy and becoming my successor. Gontaut, an amiable diplomat of good family, found a point of contact with the Empress Augusta, both on account of her preference for Catholic elements in and near the Centrum, with which the govern ment was in conflict ; and also in his quality as French man, which, recalling the Empress's youthful memories of the German court in pre-railway days, was almost as good a recommendation as that of being an Englishman.1 Her Majesty had French-speaking servants; her French reader Gerard* had entrance to the imperial family and correspondence. Everything foreign, except what was Russian, had the same attraction for the Empress as it has for so many natives of little German towns. At the time of the old-fashioned slow means of communication, a for eigner at the German courts, especially an Englishman or a Frenchman, was almost always an interesting visitor. 1 See vol. i. p. 132. * This man. probably recommended by Gontaut to her Majesty, carried on an animated correspondence with Gambetta, which, after the death of the latter, fell into the hands of Madame Adam, and served as the main material for the work, La Socie'te' de Berlin. On his return to Paris, Gerard was for a time director of the official press, then Secretary of Legation at Madrid, Charge d'Affaires in Rome, and in 1890 Envoy to Montenegro. 186 INTRIGUES No careful inquiries were made about his position at home ; to make him presentable at court it was sufficient that he should come from 'a long way off,' in fact, not be a fellow-countryman. The interest shown at that time in exclusively evan gelical circles in the unusual apparition of a Catholic, and at Court, of a dignitary of the Catholic Church, sprang from a similar source. In the days of Frederick William III it was an interesting break in the general uniformity when any one was a Catholic. A Catholic fellow-pupil was regarded without any denominational ill-will, but with a sort of amazement, as an exotic apparition ; not without some satisfaction at his showing no traces of St. Bartholo mew, the stake, and the Thirty Years' war. In the house hold of Professor von Savigny, whose wife was a Catholic, the children, when they reached the age of fourteen, were allowed to choose their religion. They all chose their father's evangelical creed, with the exception of one, who was my own age, and afterwards became envoy at the Federal Diet and one of the founders of the Centrum. At the time when we were both either in the first class at school or at the University, he spoke without any trace of polemics about the motives of his choice, referring to the impressive dignity of the Catholic services, but also adducing as a reason that on the whole it was much more distinguished to be a Catholic, ' after all, every silly boy is a Protestant.' Conditions and feelings have changed during the last half-century, and political and economical developments have brought every variety of nationality, both in and out of Europe, into closer contact one with another. At the present day it would be impossible in any Berlin circles to 187 BISMARCK arouse any excitement or make the least impression by the fact of being a Catholic. The Empress Augusta alone never got rid of the impressions of her young days. In her eyes a Catholic ecclesiastic was more distinguished than an evangelical of equal rank and equal standing. The task of winning over a Frenchman or an Englishman was more attractive to her than if he were one of her own countrymen; and she cared more for the applause of Catholics than of her own co-religionists. Gontaut-Biron, who came of a good family, had no difficulty in creating for himself a position in Court circles, whose connexions reached, by more than one road, even to the person of the Emperor. The choice of a French secret agent as the Empress's reader was a proceeding so extraordinary as to be only explicable by the confidence which Gontaut's dexterity and the co-operation of part of his Catholic environment inspired in her Majesty. It was, of course, an enormous advantage for French policy and the position of the French ambassador at Berlin to have such a man as GeYard in the imperial household. He was a very smart fellow, but incapable of overcoming his vanity in externals. He delighted in figuring as a specimen of the latest Parisian fashions, exaggerated in a manner which attracted atten tion at Berlin, a blunder which, however, did him no harm at the palace. The interest in exotic, and especially Parisian, types was stronger than the feeling for simple taste. Gontaut's activity in the service of France was not confined to the domain of Berlin. In 1875 he went to St. Petersburg to concoct, together with Prince Gortchakoff, the theatrical coup which was to make the world believe, 188 INTRIGUES on the occasion of the Emperor Alexander's impending visit to Berlin, that he alone had saved defenceless France from a German attack by seizing our arm with his Quos ego, and that this was his object in accompanying the Emperor to Berlin. I do not know with whom this idea originated. If it was Gontaut's, he must have found Gortchakoff very con genial soil, owing to his vanity and jealousy of me, and the resistance which I had been obliged to offer to his claims of precedency. I was obliged to say to him in a confidential conversation, 'You do not treat us like a friendly power, but " comme un domestique, qui ne monte pas assezvite quand on a sonne."' Gortchakoff made the most of the circumstance that his authority was superior to that of the ambassador, Count Redern, and the charge's d'affaires who succeeded him, and preferred to transact negotiations by communicating with our representative at St. Petersburg, thus avoiding the necessity of instructing the Russian ambassador at Berlin with a view to discus sion with me. Probably it was a mere slander when some Russians asserted that the motive for this proceeding was that a lump sum was allowed for telegrams in the Budget of the Foreign Minister, and Gortchakoff therefore pre ferred to make his communications at German rather than Russian expense, by means of our charge" d'affaires. Doubtless he was very avaricious, still, I fancy that the motive was political. Gortchakoff was a clever and bril liant speaker, and liked to appear as such, especially before the foreign diplomatists, who were accredited at St. Peters burg. He spoke French and German with equal fluency, and as envoy, and afterwards as his colleague, I used often to enjoy listening for hours to his didactic discourses. . He 189 BISMARCK preferred as auditors foreign diplomats, especially young intelligent charge's d'affaires, in whose case the oratorical impression was strengthened by the distinguished position of the Foreign Minister, to whom they were accredited. By this road Gortchakoff's opinions reached me in a form which suggested Roma locuta est. I complained direct to him in my private correspondence about this method of carrying on business and about the tone of his communi cations, and requested him no longer to consider me his diplomatic pupil, as I had gladly been at St. Petersburg, but rather to reckon with the fact that I was his colleague, and responsible for the policy of my Emperor and of a great country. In 1875, when the post of ambassador was vacant and a secretary of legation was acting as charge" d'affaires, Herr von Radowitz, at that time ambassador at Athens, was sent to St. Petersburg, en mission extraordinaire, in order that the conduct of business might outwardly also be placed on a footing of equality. This gave him an opportunity, by a determination to emancipate himself from Gortchakoff's preponderating influence, of earning his dis like in such a high degree that the ill-will of the Rus sian cabinet, in spite of his Russian marriage, is proba bly not extinct to this day. The part of peacemaker, well suited to satisfy Gortchakoff's vanity by the im pression made in Paris, which he valued more than any thing else, had been prepared in advance by Gontaut in Berlin. We may assume that his conversations with Count Moltke and Radowitz, which were afterwards ad duced as proofs of our warlike intentions, were cleverly led up to by him in order to represent to Europe an image of France threatened by us and protected by Russia. 190 INTRIGUES Gortchakoff arrived at Berlin on May 10, 1875, and dated from this place a telegraphic circular, destined for publi cation, beginning with the words, ' Maintenant,' i.e. un der Russian pressure, ' la paix est assur/e,' as though this had not been the case before. One of the non-German sovereigns who received this communication afterwards showed me the wording. I reproached Prince Gortchakoff sharply. It was not, I said, a friendly part suddenly and unexpectedly to jump on the back of a trustful and unsuspecting friend, and get up a circus performance at his cost ; proceedings of this kind between us, who were the directing ministers, could only injure the two monarchies and states. If he was anxious to be applauded in Paris, he need not on that account injure our relations with Russia; I was quite ready to assist him and have five-franc pieces struck at Berlin, with the inscription Gortchakoff protege la France /* we might also set up a theatre in the German Embassy, where he could appear before a French audience with the same inscription, in the character of a guardian angel, dressed in white with wings, to the accompaniment of Bengal fire ! My cutting invectives made him sing rather small, but he combated the facts which I considered established, without showing his usual security and fluency; thus causing me to conclude that he was doubtful whether his imperial master would approve his proceedings. This was further confirmed on my complaining to the Emperor Alexander, with the same openness, of Gortchakoff's dis honest proceedings. The Emperor admitted all the facts and confined himself to saying, laughingly, smoking the * [An allusion to the inscription on the rim of five-franc pieces.] 191 BISMARCK while, that I must not take this vanite" se"nile too seriously. The disapproval thus expressed never found sufficient authentic expression to rid the world of the myth of our intending to attack France in 1875. So far was I from entertaining any such idea at the time, or afterwards, that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a quarrel, which could have had no other motive "than preventing France from recover ing her breath and her strength. A war of this kind could not, in my opinion, have led to permanently tenable conditions in Europe, but might have brought about an agreement between Russia, Austria, and England, based upon mistrust of us, and leading eventually to active pro ceedings against the new and still unconsolidated empire ; and we should thus have been entering upon the path which led the Second French Empire to destruction by a continuous policy of war and prestige. Europe would have seen in our proceedings a misuse of our newly acquired power ; and the hand of every one, including the centrifugal forces within the empire, would have been permanently raised against Germany, or at any rate been ready to draw the sword. It was just the peaceful char acter of German policy after the astonishing proofs of the nation's military strength, which induced foreign Powers and internal opponents, even sooner than we had expected, at least to tolerate the new development of German power, and to regard either with a benevolent eye or else in the character of a guarantee of peace the development and strengthening of the empire. It seemed strange from our point of view that the Emperor of Russia, in spite of the contemptuous manner in which he had expressed himself about his chief minis- 192 INTRIGUES ter, still left the whole machinery of the Foreign Office in his hands, and thus permitted the influence on the mis sions which he actually exercised. Although the Emperor distinctly recognised the by-paths which his minister had been led by personal reasons to adopt, he did not submit the drafts drawn up by Gortchakoff for his autograph let ters to the Emperor William to the careful examination necessary to prevent the impression that the Emperor's friendly disposition had given way on main points to Gortchakoff's exacting and threatening attitude. The Emperor Alexander wrote a tiny hand, elegant and clear, and did not dislike the labour of writing ; but although the letters from Sovereign to Sovereign, which as a rule were very long and detailed, were entirely in the Emper or's handwriting, I still felt justified in concluding from their style and contents that they were usually based on a draft drawn up by Gortchakoff; as in fact my master's autograph answers were similarly drafted by me. By this means, the autograph correspondence in which the 'two monarchs treated the most serious political questions with decisive authority, though lacking the constitutional guar antee of a ministerial counter-signature, still had the cor rective of ministerial co-operation, always supposing that the imperial correspondent kept closely to his draft. Of course its author never received any security on that point, as the fair copy either never passed through his hands at all, or reached him sealed up. The wide ramifications of the Gontaut -Gortchakoff intrigue are evident from the following letter, which I addressed to the Emperor from Varzin, August 13, 1875 : ' ' I received with respectful gratitude your Majesty's 1 Bismarck- fahrbuch, iv. 35 &c. VOL. II. — 13 193 BISMARCK gracious letter from Gastein of the 8th inst., and was es pecially rejoiced to find that your Majesty was the bet ter for the waters, in spite of the bad weather in the Alps. I have the honour of returning herewith Queen Victoria's letter; it would have been very interesting if her Majesty had expressed herself in further detail as to the origin of the war rumours at that time. The sources must, how ever, have seemed to her very sure, else her Majesty would not have referred to them afresh, and the English govern ment would not have been induced by them to take such important steps, so unfriendly towards us. I do not know whether your Majesty would consider it feasible to take Queen Victoria at her word, when she assures your Majesty that she would find it " easy to prove that her fears were not exaggerated." Otherwise it would certainly be of importance to discover from what quarter such " seri ous errors " could have been conveyed to Windsor. The hint about persons who must be regarded as " representa tives" of your Majesty's government is apparently aimed at Count Miinster. It is quite possible that both he and Count Moltke may have spoken theoretically of the utility of a timely attack on France, although I am not aware of it, and he never received any such instructions. It may indeed be said that it is not conducive to peace for France to feel secure that she will not be attacked under any circumstances, whatever she may do. At this day, as in 1867 in the Luxemburg question, I should never advise your Majesty to begin a war at once, on the score of a like lihood that our enemy would afterwards begin it better prepared. For this we can never sufficiently predict the ways of divine Providence. But, on the other hand, it is not advantageous to give our enemy the assurance that 194 INTRIGUES we shall in any case await his attack. Therefore I should not be inclined to blame Munster if he had let fall an occasional remark to that effect ; and this would by no means give the English government the right to base official action upon the unofficial speeches of an ambassa dor, and sans nous dire gare call upon the other Powers to bring pressure to bear on us. A step so serious and so unfriendly leads us to suppose that Queen Victoria must have had some other reasons for believing in our warlike intentions, besides occasional remarks of Count Miinster's, in which I do not even believe. Lord [Odo] Russell as sured me that he always reported his firm belief in our peaceful intentions. On the other hand, all the Ultra- montanes and their friends have attacked us both secretly and openly in the press, accusing us of wanting to begin war very shortly, and the French ambassador, who lives in these circles, has passed on their lies to Paris as certain information. But even that would not be really sufficient to give Queen Victoria that assured confidence in the un truths to which your Majesty yourself gave a denial, which she again expresses in her letter of June 20. I am too little acquainted with the Queen's character to have any opinion as to the possibility of her using the expression " it would be easy to prove " in order to cover an act of precipitation which has already been committed, instead of openly acknowledging it. ' I trust your Majesty will pardon me if my profes sional interest has led me to deal in detail, after three months' silence, with a point already settled.' BISMARCK In the summer of 1877, Count Frederick Eulenburg declared that his health was bankrupt; and in fact his activity was greatly diminished, not by over-work so much as by unsparing indulgence from his youth in every kind of pleasure. He had plenty of ability and courage, but not always sufficient inclination for persevering labour. His nervous system was impaired and fluctuated at last between lachrymose depression and artificial excitement. Besides this, in the middle of the 'seventies he had, as I conjec ture, been attacked by a certain desire for popularity which had been foreign to him as long as he had had sufficient health to enjoy himself. This attack was not without a touch of jealousy of me, even though we were old friends. He tried to satisfy it by taking up the question of admin istrative reform. It must be successful, if it was to bring him honour. In order to secure its success he made unpractical concessions in the parliamentary deliberations on the subject and bureaucratised the post of district president, which is the essential support of our rural affairs, and along with it the new Local Administration. The district presidency had formerly been a Prussian peculiarity, the last offshoot of the administrative hier archy, which brought it into immediate connexion with the people.* But in social position the district president stood above other officials of the same rank. In former days a man did not become district president as a stepping- stone to a career, but rather with the intention of spending his life as president of that particular district. His au thority increased with the years of his tenure; he had no ideas to represent but those of his district and no wishes to strive for but those of its inhabitants. It is * [See vol. i. chap. I.] 196 INTRIGUES obvious how useful must be the effect of such an institu tion, both upward and downward, and what small re sources of men and money were sufficient for performing the district business. Since that time the district presi dent has become a mere government official, his position a stepping-stone to further promotion in the government service, facilitating his election to parliament ; and in this latter capacity, if he is an energetic person, he will con sider his relations as an official with his superiors more important than those with the inhabitants of his district. At the same time, the newly created official presidents are not instruments of self-government on the analogy of the municipal authorities, but rather an inferior class of the bureaucracy, doing the work of clerks. This helps to spread over the country districts every unpractical or use less suggestion made by the central bureaucracy, insuffi ciently occupied as it is and unfamiliar with the realities of life ; thus the unfortunate local self -administrators are forced to prepare reports and lists in order to satisfy the curiosity of officials who have more time than business on their hands. It is impossible for agriculturists or manu facturers to comply with such demands in an office beside their own work. As a natural result their place tends to be more and more filled by paid clerks, whose expenses must be defrayed by the inhabitants and who are dependent on the nod of the higher bureaucracy. I had cast my eye on Rudolf von Bennigsen as suc cessor to Count Eulenburg, and in the course of the year 1877 I had two interviews with him, in July and Decem ber. It turned out that he was trying to extend the ground of our discussion beyond what was consistent with the opinions of his Majesty and my own views. I knew 197 BISMARCK that it would in any case be a difficult task to render him personally acceptable to the King, but he regarded the matter in the light of a change of system, necessitated by the political situation and a surrender of the lead to the National Liberal party. Their desire to share in the government had already been apparent in the zeal with which the party had urged the ' Substitutes Bill,' expect ing by these means to pave the way for an imperial min istry in the form of a board, where the solely responsible Imperial Chancellor should be replaced by independent offices and ministerial voting, as was the case in Prussia. Bennigsen was therefore not content to be merely Eulen burg' s successor, but demanded that, at any rate, Forck- enbeck and Stauffenberg should enter with him. The former he considered a most suitable man for the Interior, who would exercise it with the same skill and energy he had shown in the administration of the city of Berlin ; he himself would choose the Ministry of Finance ; Stauf fenberg must be put at the head of the Imperial Treasury, in order to work together with him. I told him there was no place vacant except Eulen burg' s ; I was prepared to recommend him to the King for this and should be glad if I could carry through the pro posal. But if I were to advise his Majesty to set free two other ministerial posts proprio motu, in order to fill them with National Liberals, the Emperor would feel that it was not so much a question of filling a post suitably, as of a change of system ; and any such he would reject on prin ciple. In any case, considering the views of the King and our whole political situation, Bennigsen must not count upon the possibility of taking, as it were, his party into the ministry with him, and as its leader exercising 198 INTRIGUES within the government an influence corresponding to its importance, thus, as it were, creating a constitutional majority ministry. In our country the King was actually and undeniably, according to the wording of our Constitu tion, President of the ministry, and Bennigsen, if he tried as minister to keep on the path designated, would soon have to choose between the King and his party. He must realise that if I succeeded in obtaining his appoint ment, this would give him and his party a powerful handle for strengthening and widening their influence; he need but recall the example of Roon, who entered Auerswald's Liberal ministry as the only Conservative, and became the point of crystallisation around which it was transformed into a Conservative ministry. He must not ask the im possible of me ; I knew the King and the limits of my in fluence well enough; parties were tolerably indifferent to me, in fact altogether indifferent, if I excepted the avowed and unavowed Republicans, who terminated to the Right in the Progressive party. My aim was the strength ening of our national safety ; the nation would have time enough for its internal development when once its unity, and with it its outward security, was consolidated. At present the National Liberal party was the strongest ele ment on the parliamentary domain for the attainment of this last object. The Conservative party, to which I had belonged in parliament, had attained all the geographical extension of which, in the present condition of the popu lation, it was capable, and had not sufficient elements of growth to transform it into a national majority. Its natural occurrence and abiding-place were limited in our new provinces ; in the west and south of Germany it had not the same substratum as in old Prussia ; in Hanover, 199 BISMARCK Bennigsen's home, in particular, the choice lay between Guelfs and National Liberals, and for the time being the latter supplied the best substratum of any in which the Empire could strike root. It was these political considera tions which induced me to make overtures to them, as at the present time the strongest party, by seeking to win their leader as my colleague; whether for financial or internal business was indifferent to me. I regarded the matter from the purely political standpoint conditioned by my view that, for the present and until after the next great wars, the main issue was the firm consolidation of Germany, protected by its army against external dangers and by its Constitution against internal dynastic schisms. Whether our domestic Constitution turns out a little more Conservative or a little more Liberal, is a question of expediency which can only be calmly considered when the building is weather-proof. I desired sincerely to persuade him, as I expressed it, to jump into my boat and help me steer ; I was drawn up by the landing-stage and waiting for him to embark. Bennigsen, however, insisted on his refusal to enter without Forckenbeck and Stauffenberg, and left me under the impression that my attempt had failed. This impres sion was quickly strengthened by the arrival of an excep tionally ungracious letter from the Emperor, informing me that Count Eulenburg had entered his room with the question : 'Has your Majesty heard yet of the new min istry? Bennigsen.' This communication was followed by a violent outburst of imperial indignation at my arbi trary proceedings, and my venturing to suggest that he should cease to govern in 'Conservative fashion.' I was ill and tired out, and the wording of the imperial letter, INTRIGUES together with Eulenburg' s attack, took such a hold on my nerves that I once more fell seriously ill. I sent the Emperor an answer by Roon, to the effect that I could not propose to him a successor for Eulenburg without having previously gained the assurance that the person in ques tion would accept the appointment. I had considered Bennigsen a suitable person, and sounded his views, but my overtures had not been received in the manner which I had expected, and I was therefore convinced that I could not propose him as minister. The ungracious condemna tion conveyed to me' in his Majesty's letter compelled me to renew the resignation which I had offered in the spring. This correspondence took place during the last days of 1877, and my fresh illness began during New Year's night. In answer to Roon's letter, the Emperor replied to me that he had been deceived about the position of affairs, and desired me to regard his last letter as not written. These events of themselves precluded my treating any further with Bennigsen; but I did not think it for our political interest to acquaint the latter with the judgment expressed by the Emperor on his person and candidature. Although the matter was, in my mind, definitely termi nated, I allowed it to appear outwardly in suspenso ; next time I was in Berlin, Bennigsen took the initiative, with a view to bringing the matter, which he regarded as still unsettled, in friendly fashion to a negative conclusion. He asked me in the parliament building whether it was true that I was trying to introduce the tobacco monopoly, and on my answering in the affirmative, he said that in that case he must decline his co-operation as minister. Even then I did not inform him that as early as the New BISMARCK Year the Emperor had cut off every possibility of treating with him. Perhaps he had assured himself by some other means that his scheme of modifying the principles of the government policy on the lines of National Liberal views would meet with insuperable obstacles on the part of the Emperor, especially after the speech made by Stauffenberg about the necessity of abolishing article 109 of the Prus sian Constitution (Continued Levy of Customs). If the National Liberal leaders had conducted their policy skilfully, they ought to have known long ago that the Emperor, whose signature they required and desired for their appointment, felt more sensitive on the subject of this article than on any other political question, and that the surest way of alienating him was by an attempt to deprive him of this Palladium. When I gave his Majesty the confidential report of my negotiations with Bennigsen, and mentioned his wish with regard to Stauf fenberg, the Emperor, still under the impression of the lat- ter's speech, said, pointing to his shoulder where the regi mental number is placed on a uniform: 'Number 109 Stauffenberg regiment.' If the Emperor had at that time approved the admission of Bennigsen, which I desired with the view of readjusting the conformity with the majority in parliament, even though the latter had soon recognised the impossibility of bringing the government and the King over to his party, still I am now convinced that the party programme, which inclined a good deal to doctrinaire acri mony, could not long have been brought into accord with the strong monarchical views of the Emperor. At that time I did not feel sufficiently sure of this not to attempt inducing his Majesty to draw somewhat nearer to the Na tional Liberal views. The strength of his resistance, INTRIGUES increased, no doubt, by Eulenburg's hostile interference, ex ceeded my expectations, although I was aware that the Em peror cherished an instinctive monarchical dislike to Ben nigsen and his late proceedings in Hanover. Although the National Liberal party in Hanover, and the energy of their leader before and after 1866, had greatly facilitated the 'as similation ' of Hanover, and the Emperor was quite as little disposed as his father in 1805 to abandon this acquisition, the princely instinct was sufficiently strong in him to make him view with some inward disapproval such proceedings on the part of a Hanoverian subject against the Guelf dynasty. Among the number of current untrue myths belongs the statement that I desired to 'squeeze the National Liberals to the wall.' On the contrary, this is what these gentlemen tried to do to me. The breach with the Con servatives, brought about by the whole slander episode of the 'Reichsglocke' and 'Kreuzzeitung,' and by the result ing declaration of war, under the leadership of my discon tented former friend, Kleist-Retzow, together with the jealous ill-will Of my own class, the country Junkers, all these losses, and the enmities at Court combined with Catholic and feminine influences there, had tended to weaken my supports outside the National Liberal party, so that I could now only rely on the Emperor's personal relations to me. The National Liberals did not use this opportunity to strengthen our mutual relations by giving me their support ; but, on the contrary, attempted to take me in tow against my will. With this object they entered into relations with several of my colleagues ; by help of the ministers Friedenthal and Botho Eulenburg, the lat ter of whom possessed the ear of my vice-president, Count Stolberg, official understandings were entered into, un- 203 BISMARCK known to me, with the presidents of both parliaments, and these related not only to questions of session and adjourn ment, but also to important proposals in opposition to my wishes, with which my colleagues were acquainted. The general attack on my position, the striving after a share in the government, or sole dominion in my stead, betrayed by the scheme of independent imperial ministers, and by the above-mentioned secret negotiations, was very clearly marked at the council meeting held by the Crown Prince on June 5, 1878, as representative of his wounded father. The subject of discussion was the dissolution of parlia ment after Nobiling's attempt at assassination. Half, or more, of my colleagues, at any rate the majority of the ministry and the council, voted adversely to me against dissolution, on the ground that the present parliament, now that Nobiling's attempt had followed on Hodel's, would be prepared to reverse its recent vote and meet the views of the government. The confidence expressed by my col leagues on this occasion evidently depended on a confiden tial understanding between them and influential parlia mentarians, though not one of the latter made any utterance to me on the subject. It appeared that they had already come to an understanding about the division of my inheri tance. I was certain that the Crown Prince would accept my view, even if all my colleagues had been of a different opinion, and I also had the approval of the twenty or more generals and officials present, certainly of the former. If I wanted to keep my post as minister at all, a question really of official and personal expediency, which, on ex amining myself, I answered in the affirmative, I found myself compelled to stand on my defence, and try to 204 INTRIGUES bring about a change in the parliamentary situation and in the personnel of my colleagues. I intended to keep my post, because, if the Emperor were to recover from his severe wound, which was by no means certain in the case of so old a man after his severe loss of blood, I would not forsake him against his will. I also regarded it as my duty, if he should die, not to refuse to his successor unless he wished it those services which the confidence and expe rience I had acquired enabled me to render him. It was not I who sought a quarrel with the National Liberals, but they who plotted with my colleagues in an attempt to squeeze me against the wall. The tasteless and vulgar phrase ' to squeeze them to the wall until they squeal ' never found a place in my thoughts, and still less on my lips. It was one of the lying inventions with which people try to injure their political opponents. Besides, this phrase was not even the original product of the persons who spread it abroad, but only a clumsy plagiarism. In his memoirs,' Count Beust relates the following: ' The Slavs in Austria have quoted against me the expression which, I may state, was never used by me, "that they must be squeezed against the wall." The origin of this phrase was the following : The former min ister, afterwards Stadtholder of Galicia, Count Goluchow- ski, used to converse with me in the French language. It was chiefly thanks to his efforts that after I became presi dent of the ministry in 1867, the Galician parliament voted unconditionally in favour of the imperial council. At that time I had said to Count Goluchowski : " Si cela se fait, les Slaves sont mis au pied du mur," a very differ ent expression from the other.' 1 A us drei Viertel-Jahrhunderten, part i. p. 5. 2°5 BISMARCK Among my arguments in favour of dissolution I espe cially emphasized this one : that parliament could not rescind its resolution without injuring its prestige, unless it had been previously dissolved. It is of no moment whether prominent National Liberals intended at that time to become my colleagues or my successors, since the for mer could only have been a stepping-stone to the other alternative. But I acquired a certain conviction that the negotiations between some of my colleagues, some National Liberals and some influential persons at Court, about the division of my heritage, had reached the point of agree ment, or, at any rate, were not far from it. This agree ment would have necessitated a combination, like that of the Gladstone ministry, between Liberalism and Catholi cism. The latter extended through the immediate envi ronment of the Empress Augusta, including the influence of the ' Reichsglocke ' and of the Treasurer of the House hold, von Schleinitz, into the very palace of the old Em peror; and here the combined attack against me found an active ally in General von Stosch. The latter had a good position too, at the Crown Prince's court, due, partly to his own abilities, partly to the assistance of Herr von Normann and his wife, with whom he had been on inti mate terms at Magdeburg, and whose migration to Berlin he had effected. The plan of replacing me by a cabinet a la Gladstone was calculated with a view to Count Botho Eulenburg, who had been Minister of the Interior since March 31, 1878, and was assured by his connexions of the traditional 206 INTRIGUES Court influence of his own family and that of Donhoff. He is clever, distinguished, of a nobler nature than Harry von Arnim, more polished than Robert Goltz; but in his case also it was my experience to find that gifted col leagues and eventual successors, whom I was anxious to train up, did not retain a permament feeling of good-will towards me. My relations to him were impaired, in the first place, by an outbreak of touchiness which, though outwardly covered by all the courtesy of good- breeding, was acute enough to disturb the easy and confidential course of business relations. Geheimrath Tiedemann, at that time my assistant in confidential business, brought about a most unexpected epistolary explosion, by the form in which he delivered a message to the Count during my absence from Berlin. As my commission to Tiedemann is a matter which still possesses an actual and lively inter est, I will subjoin the correspondence. ' Kissingen : August 15, 1878. ' Dear Sir, — I must request you to express to the Minister Count Eulenburg and to Geheimrath Hahn my regret that the draft of the Socialist Law was officially published in the " Provincial Correspondence " before it was laid before the Federal Council. This publication is prejudicial to any amendment on our part, and is discour teous to Bavaria and other dissentients. From the nego tiations which I have carried on from this place with Bavaria, I must assume that it maintains its opposition to the imperial ministry. Wurtemberg and, as I am told, Saxony are not opposed to the imperial ministry on the principle, but on a special matter ; they dread the calling- in of judges, For my part, I can but sympathise with 207 BISMARCK this ground of opposition. It is a question not of judicial but of political functions, and the Prussian. ministry, too, must not be subordinated to a judicial board in its prelimi nary decisions, for this would weaken it in its future po litical proceedings against Socialism. The functions of the imperial ministry can only, in my opinion, be exercised either direct by the Federal Council or by delegation to an annually appointed committee. The Federal Council represents the governing board of the joint sovereignty of Germany, thus corresponding to the State Council in dif ferent circumstances. ' For the present, however, I am forced to assume that Bavaria will not agree to this expedient, which is accept able to Wurtemberg, Saxony, and personally to myself. The clause in No. 3, article 23, that only unemployed per sons may be expelled, does not seem to me sufficient for the purpose. ' Moreover, in my opinion the law requires an adden dum dealing with officials, to the effect that participation in Socialist politics will bring upon them dismissal with out a pension. The majority of the ill-paid subordinate officials in Berlin, as well as the railway guards, points men, and other similar classes, are Socialists ; a fact of dangerous tendency, as would be obvious in the case of insurrections and transport of troops. ' Further, if the law is to be effective, I do not think it will be permanently feasible to allow those citizens who are legally proved to be Socialists, the enjoyment of active and passive electoral rights, and all the privileges of par liamentary members. ' Now, when once the milder form of the law has been simultaneously announced in all the papers, being doubt - 208 INTRIGUES less officially communicated to them, there will be much less prospect of carrying these additional severities in par liament than would have been the case if no milder ver sion had been officially communicated. ' The proposal in its present condition will do Social ism no practical harm, nor in any way suffice to render it harmless, particularly as it is quite certain that parliament will discuss away something from every proposal. I re gret that my health absolutely forbids me to take part, for the present, in the deliberations of the Federal Council ; I must therefore postpone my further motions in the Fed eral Council until the regular session of parliament in winter. ' v. Bismarck.' 'Berlin: August 18, 1878. ' Your Serene Highness commissioned Geheimrath Tiedemann to express to me and to Geheimrath Hahn your regret that the draft of the Socialist Law was officially published in the " Provincial Correspondence " before being submitted to the Federal Council. Hahn is in no way responsible, since he did not act without my consent. This I only gave after the printed papers of the Federal Council, which contained the draft, had been given out on the previous evening, without any special directions as to confidential treatment, and I had been informed by the President of the Imperial Chancery that, under these cir cumstances, the publication of the draft in the papers might be certainly expected on the following day, i.e. the very day on which the " Provincial Correspondence " ap peared — an assumption which was afterwards proved to be correct. The sitting of the Federal Council took place vol. 11. — 14 209 BISMARCK at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 14th inst.; the " Provincial Correspondence " was published on the after noon of the same day. The communication in it of the contents of the draft Bill, therefore, did not take place pre viously to laying the draft before the Federal Council. ' Whether it would even so have been better to omit that communication in the " Provincial Correspondence" is a matter I do not propose to discuss further. It will always be of the greatest value to me to hear your Serene Highness's enlightened judgment, even if it should hap pen to differ from my own. Still, I cannot pass over in silence the circumstance that your Serene Highness should have expressed your disapproval to me by means of one of your subordinates, and the contempt of my position which this implies is the more distinctly marked, that in doing so you place me in the same category as one of my own subordinates. The insulting character of this proceeding is so obvious that the assumption of its being done on pur pose, with all the considerations which would naturally spring from this, seems natural. I shall not hesitate to follow their dictates as soon as I am convinced that this assumption is correct. Assuming, in the meantime, that this is not the case, I confine myself to imploring your Serene Highness most strongly not to permit a recurrence of a similar proceeding. ' Yours, &c, ' Count Eulenburg.' ' Gastein: August 20, 1878. ' I learn from your favour of the 1 8th that your Excel lency ascribes to me the manner, apparently incautious and certainly unexpected, in which Geheimrath Tiedemann INTRIGUES gave expression to my confidential and informal remark, and lays full weight upon it, without even giving me the benefit of the incomplete way in which business can be done during a trying course of treatment at the baths. The contents of your letter lead me to suppose that you were subjected to a piece of tactlessness for which I must ask your pardon, although I did not commit it, but at most rendered it possible. That your Excellency should have conceived the thought of any intentional proceeding on my part is surprising and distressing to me, for I supposed that the friendly character of our personal relations to one another was too well secured to make any such misunder standing possible. ' Yours, &c, ' v. Bismarck. ' The circumstances under which Count Eulenburg gave in his resignation in February 1881, are well known; also that in August of the same year he was appointed head president at Cassel. His name is connected with the following correspondence between his Majesty and myself. I have not been able to trace the subject of my speech of December 17, 1881, to which he refers: ' Berlin : December 18, 1881. ' I must tell you a curious dream which I had last night, as clear as I am describing it to you here. ' It was the first meeting of the Reichstag after the present vacation. During the discussion Count Eulen burg entered. The discussion ceased at once. After a long pause the President called upon the last speaker to continue. Silence ! The President dissolves the sitting. BISMARCK The result is tumult and confusion. No member is to receive a decoration during the session of the Reichstag ; the Monarch must not be named in the session. Next day another sitting. Eulenburg appears and is greeted with such hisses and noise — I wake up in the middle, in a state of nervous agitation, from which I could not recover for a long time, and lay awake for two hours from half- past four to half -past six. 'All this took place in my presence in the House, just as clearly as I am writing it down here. I must hope that the dream will not be realised, but still it is a curi ous thing. 'As this dream did not begin until I had had six hours' quiet sleep, it could scarcely be an immediate re sult of our conversation. ' Enfin, I really had to tell you this curiosity. 'Your ' William. ' ' Berlin : December 18, 1881. ' I thank your Majesty most humbly for your gracious autograph letter. I think that after all the dream was the result, if not exactly of my previous discourse, still of the general impressions of the last few days, based upon Puttkamer' s verbal reports, newspaper articles, and my speech. The images of our waking life do not imme diately reappear on the mirror of our dreams, but only after the mind has been quieted by sleep and rest. Your Majesty's communication encourages me to relate a dream which I had in the spring of 1863, in the hardest days of the Conflict, when no human eye could see any possible issue. I dreamed (as I related the first thing next morn- 212 INTRIGUES ing to my wife and other witnesses) that I was riding on a narrow Alpine path, precipice on the right, rocks on the left. The path grew narrower, so that the horse refused to proceed; and it was impossible to turn round or dis mount, owing to lack of space. Then, with my whip in my left hand, I struck the smooth rock and called on God. The whip grew to an endless length, the rocky wall dropped like a curtain and opened out a broader path, with a view over hills and forests, like a landscape in Bohemia ; there were Prussian troops with banners, and even in my dream the thought came to me at once that I must report it to your Majesty. This dream was fulfilled, and I woke up rejoiced and strengthened. The bad dream from which your Maj esty woke in nervous agitation can only be fulfilled, in so far that we shall still have many a stormy, noisy meeting of parliament, such as unfortunately undermine the prestige of parliament and hinder the progress of business. But your Majesty's presence is impossible, and though I con sider such occurrences as the latest sittings of parlia ment regrettable as a standard of our manners and polit ical education, perhaps even of our political capacity, they are not in themselves a misfortune : " l'exces du mal en devient le remede. " ' I trust your Majesty will pardon with your customary graciousness this holiday meditation, suggested by your Majesty's own letter, for yesterday we entered on the va cation and peace until January 9. ' The form of Count Eulenburg' s complaint about Tiede mann, and the cabinet question which it involved, took all the stronger hold of my nerves, that I was suffering from the effects of a severe illness. This had been in- 213 BISMARCK duced by the impression left by the attempt on the Em peror's life, and the labour in connexion with the presi dency of the Berlin congress which I had to undertake at the same time. A sentiment of official duty helped me to fight against it, but the baths at Gastein tended rather to increase than to cure it. The treatment at this place, to which my colleague in the ministry, Bernard von Bulow, succumbed on October 20, 1879, has not a calming effect on overstrained nerves, if disturbed by work or excitement. Immediately after my return to Berlin I had to support the introduction of the Socialist Bill in the Reichstag, and this again confirmed my experience, that the labour of ora torical delivery on the platform involves less nervous strain than the correction of a long speech, quickly spoken, the wording of which has to be defended in the leader's place. While I was occupied with a correction of this kind, a ner vous crisis which had been impending for months came to a head, happily only in the more trivial form of a nettle-rash. The task of a leading minister of a great European, Power, with a parliamentary constitution, is in itself of a sufficiently wearing character to absorb a man's whole energy. This is even more the case when the minister, as in Germany and Italy, has to help a nation over the stage of its development and, as is the case with us, to combat a strong separatist tendency in parties and individ uals. When a man devotes the whole of his strength and health to the solution of these tasks, he is more sensitive to any increased difficulties which are not actually neces sary. Even at the beginning of the 'seventies I thought that my health was giving way, and therefore made over the Presidency of the Cabinet to Count Roon, the only one of my colleagues who was on personal terms of in- 214 INTRIGUES timacy with me. But at that time there were no material difficulties to discourage me. These were caused by the hostile intrigue of those circles on whose support I thought I could specially reckon, and they were characterised in the days of the ' Reichsglocke ' by the direct relations which the elements represented by this paper had with the Court, the Conservatives, and with many of my official colleagues. The Monarch, who was as a rule so gracious to me, had given me no adequate support against the court and domestic influence of the ' Reichsglocke ' ring ; and this circumstance specially discouraged me, and completed the tale of those considerations which induced me to hand in my resignation on March 20, 1877. The attack of shingles from which I was suffering in 1878, when Count Shuvaloff called upon me to summon the congress, was a sign of the unsatisfactory condition of my health at that time, and of the exhaustion of my nerves. This was due to the lack of sincere co-operation on the part of some of my official colleagues, even more than to the ' Reichsglocke ' and its party at court. The way in which I was repre sented by the Vice-president, Count Stolberg, owing to the influence which the ministers Friedenthal, and later Count Botho Eulenburg, exercised over my representative, took such a form that I ultimately had the impression of being face to face with a system of gradual pressure which aimed at ousting me from the political leadership. The outward sign of this system was at that time the lack of my signa ture on the official announcements of the ministry. This was not done at my wish or with my consent ; but they profited by my indifference to externals, and I allowed these proceedings to pass unchecked, until I was no longer able to doubt their systematic intention. 215 BISMARCK The separate occurrences which throw light on after events do not all fall into the time of the council's session in June 1878, but they illumined, to some extent retro spectively, the situation of that time and its springs of action. Count Botho Eulenburg, then Minister of the Interior, gave an uncalled-for expression of his good-will towards the deputy Rickert in the Prussian parliament, in answer to an article of the ' Nord-Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,' with such intentional distinctness that it re vealed to me, without any possibility of doubt, the con nexion which he drew between me and the article he disapproved. Just as every flash of lightning lights up a landscape by night, so the individual moves of my oppo nents enabled me to overlook the whole situation, pro duced by outward demonstrations of personal good-will, combined with an actual system of boycotting. Suppos - ing it had been possible to form a cabinet a la Gladstone, whose mission would be indicated by the names of Stosch, Eulenburg, Friedenthal, Camphausen, Rickert, and other dilutions of the generic concept ' Windthorst ' with Cath olic Court influence, the question whether it could have maintained itself is one which the persons concerned do not seem to have considered. The main object was the negative one of getting rid of me, and in that all the hold ers of drafts oh the future were agreed. Each of them might then hope afterwards to drive out the others, as is with us always the natural result of heterogeneous coali tions, agreed only in their dislike to the existing order of things. The whole combination was at that time unsuccessful, because they failed to win over either the King or the Crown Prince. As to the relations of this latter to me, my place-hunting opponents were always 216 INTRIGUES misinformed at that time, and afterwards in 1888. To the end of his life he maintained the same confidence in me as his father; and his wife's desire to undermine it never amounted to the same pugnacious determination as in the case of the Empress Augusta, who had a freer choice of methods. Besides the harassing struggles of a personal character, material difficulties and exhausting labour were necessi tated by the breach with the Free Trade policy, which is characterised by my letter to Freiherr von Thiingen on a Protective Tariff,1 and afterwards by the secession and the transition of the secessionists to the Centrum. My health broke down in such a manner as to paralyse my work, until Dr. Schweninger recognised the true nature of my illness, introduced the right treatment, and pro cured me a feeling of relative health to which I had been a stranger for many years. Herr von Gruner, who during the new era had been Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was pensioned off soon after I took over the ministry, and replaced by Herr von Thile. Ever since my appointment as Federal Ambassador he had been among the number of my enemies, since he regarded this post as an inheri tance from his father, Justus Gruner. He remained hos tile to me, and was politically incapable. In November 1863 he addressed to his Majesty a letter about the Bud get dispute, in the same sense in which Lieutenant-Colonel Colonel von Vincke at Olbendorf (cf. vol. i. p. 335) and 'April 16, 1879: Politische Reden, viii. 54, 55. 217 BISMARCK Roggenbach had thought good to take the same step. These gentlemen, in laying their proposals before the King, started from the assumption that if he were to fol low their advice, and give way to the House of Deputies, a new minister, or at any rate a new President of the Min istry and Minister of Foreign Affairs, would be appointed — a result for which influences were at work even outside the domain of public life, assisted by the Treasurer of the Household and other persons closely connected with the Court. Afterwards Herr von Gruner still continued to associate with the circles which in 1876 had protected and nourished the ' Reichsglocke.' After the condemnation of the editor of this journal, in January 1877, and when I had renewed in March the resignation which his Majesty had declined to accept, I learned by official means, while taking the baths at Kis- singen, that Herr von Gruner had been appointed to the Household ministry, and without the counter-signature of any responsible minister had been nominated as actual privy councillor; also that Herr von Schleinitz had requested the manager of the ' Imperial and State Gazette ' to pub lish this appointment in the official paper. On this subject I wrote, on June 8, to the head of the Chancery, Geheimrath Tiedemann, requesting him to com municate my views to the ministry : ' In my opinion the official part of the " Imperial and State Gazette " is destined for those communications which deal with imperial and Prussian state affairs, and for which the imperial Chancellor, or the Prussian minis try, as the case may be, is responsible. If Gruner's pro motion is inserted in the official part without further ex planation, it is impossible to avoid the presumption, even 218 INTRIGUES by a previous mention of his appointment to the house hold treasury, that the ministry makes itself responsible for Gruner's nomination as an acting privy councillor. Public opinion and the Prussian parliament would scarcely assume that the ministry could have desired to confer this distinction on its notorious opponent; they would prob ably guess the truth that the ministry is not held in suffi cient respect at Court, and does not enjoy sufficient influ ence with his Majesty to prevent this nomination; nor would there be the least doubt in their minds that this appointment, published in the " State Gazette," had been countersigned more solito by the ministry. The belief that the ministry possesses the influence upon his Maj esty's decisions, which is assumed by the Constitution, would not be promoted by the published communication of his Majesty's ungracious marginal comment, and the ensuing answer of the ministry. People might be tempted to compare the contents and their effect with the pro ceedings in France, which have brought about the latest change of ministry there. 'I am not without some anxiety if we ought not to regard the proceedings in the Gruner case as only a probe used by Herr von Schleinitz and his advisers (not by his Majesty the Emperor) for sounding us, in order to see how much we will stand, and how highly we rate our minis terial authority. In my opinion, to yield to these unjus tifiable ways of influencing his Majesty's decisions is not the best method of putting an end to them. On the con trary, they will only increase, and the conflict, which is now a merely formal one, would soon be repeated on a more unfavourable domain, confused with great party issues. 219 BISMARCK ' In my present position I might refrain from any offi cial utterance; but I have a feeling that my return to business, which is a very important matter for me person ally, may be prejudiced by these means, quite apart from any considerations of health. As I hope that my health will improve, and as in this case I should wish to keep open the possibility of returning to business, if this is in accordance with his Majesty's wishes, I feel a personal interest in adequately guarding the prestige of the minis terial position in such a way that I may be able consci entiously to maintain my resumption of it. ' In my opinion the proper and logical solution of the first decision would have been the refusal of the request made by the Minister of the Household to insert the nomi nation in the official part of the " State Gazette." This official insertion cannot be protected from misinterpreta tion by public opinion, and must always remain a partial victory of the " Reichsglocke " intrigues over the present government. Announcements concerning the royal house hold have properly no place in the " Imperial and State Gazette." Even if the latter is also to be a " Royal Household Gazette, " the orders of the Household Minis ter have, in my opinion, no right to a place in the official portion, since he has no responsibility for the contents of the official journal. These announcements must, in some form or other, bear the placet of a responsible minister, which the Household Minister must seek to obtain before they are printed off. This placet was not sought in the present case ; the Household Minister assumed a right of disposal over the " State Gazette," and on this account alone his request ought properly to have been refused on the ground of its informality. If a command to insert INTRIGUES any matter relating to the royal household is given by his Majesty the King himself, there can be no hesitation about executing it in the majority of cases; but even in perfectly straightforward cases it is advisable to keep the official announcements of the royal household apart in po sition from those of the state. The separation might, in my view, be managed by publishing the regulations refer ring to the royal household, not promiscuously with those of the ministry, but in a third column, side by side with the two great official headings of the " State Gazette," " German Empire " and " Kingdom of Prussia." A place between the two would show the greatest courtesy; if necessary, it might follow the " Kingdom of Prussia," and bear the designation " Royal Household," separated from the two other headings by continuous lines, just as " Prus sia " and " Empire " are now separated. That would set tle the formal question for the future in a manner which, it seems to me, can give no offence to either side. ' It is quite a different matter, however, when a reso lution of his Majesty's is officially announced, which, in spite of assurances to the contrary confined to official documents, proclaims to the public what in constitutional language is usually called a want of confidence in his ministers on the part of the Monarch. Of course, in such a case, there is no remedy open to the ministers but resig nation. Undoubtedly the present case, in as far as it has this character, is aimed rather at me than at my colleagues. The " Reichsglocke " and other papers which represented the tendencies of Herren von Gruner, von Schleinitz, Count Nesselrode, and Nathusius-Ludom, did not libel them pub licly, or at any rate not in the same degree as myself. ' The pardon of Herr von Nathusius, the distinction BISMARCK conferred on Count Nesselrode and Herr von Gruner, at the very time when the libels of the organ which represented those gentlemen were occupying public opinion and the law courts, and the connexion of those gentlemen with these pa pers was becoming apparent, pointed to an act of royal fa vour towards persons who were only known for their hos tility to the government and their open attacks on my honour. But as long as I was his Majesty's servant, this last ought to be under his protection. If I experience the opposite of this protection, it must be due to a personal motive, which urges me far more imperatively to leave the service than • any considerations of health could ever do. These reasons for taking the resolution are only personal to myself, but, according as matters develop, will be deci sive as to the possibility of my return to my post. ' I do most earnestly call upon my colleagues, in the interest of their ministerial future, to take care that the official publication of Gruner's appointment, if his Maj esty is not willing to abandon it altogether, may still be made in a form which will make the absence of counter signature evident. This could be obtained by the above- mentioned division into three parts, the Empire, Prussia, and the household, especially if the press received an explanationon the subject. But in my view it would be desirable that Gruner's appointment to the royal house hold should be previously published separately in the house hold column, and it would then announce next day that his Majesty had been graciously pleased to confer upon the person appointed to the household ministry, &c. &c, the title of an acting privy councillor, &c. &c. A slightly dif ferent form of wording from that of the usual announce ments, no matter how slight, would still be an advantage. ' INTRIGUES This letter, addressed to Geheimrath Tiedemann, and forwarded under flying-seal to the Minister von Biilow, contained an addition meant for this latter, requesting him to make confidential use of it among his colleagues. '. . . This occurrence, to my mind, hits me more severely than my colleagues, who have not been libelled by the " Reichsglocke " party, with the exception perhaps of Camphausen, nor was he subjected to the same measure of malignity as I. He was attacked by unworthy means about actual facts connected with his office, but his per sonal honour was left untouched. The ministry, as a whole, is certainly in a position to feel itself aggrieved by the mode of Gruner's appointment, and must take notice of this treatment in order to secure its rights and dignity for the future. But the insult conveyed in the fact of Gruner's appointment is aimed at me alone. It is only his long-continued enmity to me personally which has succeeded in drawing attention to him, for he lacks both talent and merit. While at the Foreign Office he was a real hindrance, in consequence of his incapacity, which at critical moments bordered on idiotcy. For the last fifteen years he has done nothing but write, speak, and intrigue against me with all the bitterness of over weening self-conceit which thinks it lacks appreciation. I am momentarily disregarding the fact that it was these very " Reichsglocke " elements which increased the diffi culty of performing my official duties to an extent with which I had not sufficient strength to cope. I speak now only of the blow to be aimed at me personally in the possi bility of successfully recommending this man to his Maj esty. In face of this, if I say in my letter to Tiedemann that this Gruner case does not supply a sufficient motive 223 BISMARCK to compel my colleagues to resign, my own position in ref erence to it appears to me an essentially different one. ' I should be very grateful to you if you would speak confidentially in this sense to Camphausen, Friedenthal, and Falk. Wilmowski's attitude is different from what I should have expected. I had hitherto counted on him as a safe ally against the Schleinitz Camarilla; but I do not understand his action in this case. Together with Eulenburg and Leonhardt he will cause the ministry to lose the measure of self-esteem and consideration which it enjoys in this country, and without which in these diffi cult situations at Court and in the country the state busi ness cannot be carried on. In speaking to Eulenburg you must only use those expressions which will bear re peating. What is Hofman's attitude in the matter? ' The baths seem to suit me very well, but every re lapse, caused by unpleasant impressions, is very strongly marked, and makes me realise that the state of my health will scarcely be sufficient for carrying on business. I should not shrink from the simple performance of official business ; but I am no longer able to bear as I could for merly the faux frais of Court intrigues, perhaps because they have increased so alarmingly in extent and influence. Three months ago I kept silence about these, the real rea sons of my continued intention to resign, although they were essentially the same as now. At the present time too J shall mention no other motive for resignation, out of consideration for the Emperor, than the state of my health.' The matter was terminated by the non-publication in the ' State Gazette ' of Gruner's appointment as an acting privy councillor. CHAPTER XXVII the government departments My frequent absences caused me to lose touch with my colleagues. The fact that I had raised them all, in some cases from very unimportant posts, to the rank of minis ter, and had not troubled them with any interference in their departments, made me over-estimate their personal regard for me. I seldom interfered with the current busi ness of their departments, and only when I saw that an important public interest ran a risk of being sacrificed to private interests. Thus, for instance, I opposed the ca nalisation of the Rhine through the Rheingau, projected for the sake of the navigation, which would in the course of thirty years have transformed the river bed, between the banks and the two dikes to be constructed, into a marsh; as also the plan of macadamising the Elector's Embankment only for the usual width of the chauss/es, and building on it close up to the edge of the old road. In both cases I crossed the intentions of the authorities immediately concerned, and I believe that in so doing I effected a lasting benefit. Nor did I trouble my colleagues or the subordinate imperial officers with patronage. The Constitution would have allowed me to appoint all the post office, telegraph, and railway officials, and to fill all the posts in the separate imperial, departments. But I do not believe that I ever asked Herr von Stephan or any one vol. n.— 15 225 BISMARCK else for a post for a candidate recommended by me, not even for a postman. I had however frequently to oppose the tendency to create new far-reaching laws or organisa tions, the tendency to regulate from the green table, be cause I knew that even if they did not exaggerate this law- mongering themselves, their officials did, and that many a reporting official in the home departments, ever since tak ing his degree, had carried about projects concerning his own specialty, which aimed at promoting the happiness of the subjects of the Empire as soon as he could find a chief ready to agree to them. In spite of my non-interference the majority of my official friends seemed to have felt as though relieved from pressure after my resignation. In many cases this could be explained by the resistance which I showed to the ram pant tendency to unnecessary attacks on the stability of our legislation. In the domain of the schools I continually but unsuccessfully combated the theory that the Minister of Education, without any law and without being limited by the existing school property, might determine, as a matter of administration, and without any regard to its capacity to pay, the amount which each parish must con tribute to the school. This absolute authority, which ex isted in no other branch of administration, and the appli cation of which was in some cases carried so far that the parishes were unable to exist, was based not upon any law, but upon a rescript of the former Minister of Educa tion, von Raumer, making the School Budget dependent on the disposition of the government department in ques tion, and in the last resort on that of the minister. The endeavour to consolidate this ministerial absolutism by a law was an obstacle which prevented my giving my adhe- 226 THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS sion to the various proposals for school bills presented to me from time to time. In the domain of finance, my assent to any reform in taxation was always subordinate to the desire not to use those direct taxes which are independent of the taxpayer's property as a standard for future annual additions. Al though the injustice once committed by the imposition of a ground and house tax could not be removed, it is not on that account consistent with justice to repeat it by annual additions. Scholz, my last colleague in the Fi nance Ministry, with whom I always maintained friendly relations, shared this view, but had to contend against the parliamentary and ministerial difficulties in the way of a remedy. The combative forces among his officials were doubtless glad of the freer movement which they experi enced after I had left the ministry. Demands with which I could for many years find no agreement in the Finance Ministry were self-assessment and a higher taxation of income from foreign securities than from German, a sort of protective tariff for German securities, and of interest on invested capital compared with money which had to be earned afresh every year. In the domain of agriculture, the removal of the agrarian pressure which I was supposed to exercise chiefly benefited diseased swine and the cattle plague, as well as those higher and lower officials to whose lot fell the task of combating in parliament and in the country the lying party-cry about raising the price of food. The disposition to yield in this domain and the facilities given to French communication with Alsace (revoked, after unpleasant experiences, in February 1891) are to my mind the common expression of a cowardice which is ready to sacrifice the future for a little more 227 BISMARCK comfort in the present. The desire of obtaining cheap pork will be no more permanently furthered by any lax treatment of the danger of contagion than the detachment of Alsace from France will be promoted by the weak striving after applause which shows itself in the treatment of local grievances and frontier difficulties. As regards the imperial offices, I always, during the time of Scholz as during that of Maltzahn, kept up a good feeling with the Treasury. The task assigned to this office was of no greater range than to assist the Chancellor with technical knowledge and trained powers of work, in his discussions and understandings with the Prussian Min ister of Finance. In questions of finance, the Prussian Minister of Finance and the ministry of state remained the decisive authority. The characters of both men en abled one to settle differences of opinion, without ill-feel ing, by fair discussion. The idea which has lately been represented in the press, and even put into practice, that there could be a financial policy of the Chancellor or even of the Imperial Treasury, which is subordinate to him, on the one side, and of the Prussian Minister of Finance on the other, independent of one another, was in my time considered unconstitutional. Differences between the de partments found their solution in the common delibera tions of the ministry of state to which the Chancellor as Foreign Minister belonged, and without whose implied or express assent he is not empowered to give the Prussian votes in the Federal Council, or to propose a project of law. My relations with the Imperial Post Office were less clear to me. During the French war there were occur rences which brought me very near a breach with Herr von Stephan ; but I was then already so convinced of his 228 THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS unusual ability, not only as regards his special depart ment, that I successfully supported him against his Maj esty's displeasure. Herr von Stephan had addressed to his subordinates an official circular in which he instructed them to supply certain newspapers for all the military hospitals in France, and in explanation of this order re ferred to the wishes of her Royal Highness the Crown Princess. How far he was justified in that I do not know, but whoever knew the old master will be able to imagine his state of mind when this postal edict was brought to his knowledge through military reports. The political colour of the papers which were recommended would alone have sufficed to bring Stephan under his Majesty's displeasure, but still more irritating was the appeal to a member of the royal family, and especially to the Crown Princess. I restored the peace with his Maj esty. The desire for recognition in high quarters is one of the encumbrances that weigh upon most men of un usual ability. I assumed that, as Stephan grew older and became more distinguished, the weaknesses which he brought from his early employments into his higher posts would disappear. I can only wish that he may grow old in office, and preserve his health, and I should regard his loss as one very difficult to make up for ; * but I conjec ture that he also formed one of those who thought that they experienced a feeling of relief at my departure. I have always been of opinion that the transport and corre spondence traffic should contribute to the good of the state, and that the contribution should be included in the cost of postage and carriage. Stephan is more of a de partmental patriot, and as such has certainly been useful, 1 Stephan died April 8, 1897. 229 BISMARCK not only to his department and its officials, but also to the Empire, in a measure to which any successor would find it difficult to attain. I always treated his arbitrary deal ings with the indulgence inspired by my respect for his eminent ability, even when they interfered with my juris diction as Chancellor and as the representative who had to give the Prussian votes at the council, or when he spoiled the financial results by his love of fine buildings. CHAPTER XXVIII THE BERLIN CONGRESS In the autumn of |j8 764 received at Varzin a ciphered telegram from General von Werder, our military plenipo tentiary at Livadia, in which, on behalf of the Emperor Alexander, he demanded from me some expression on the question whether, if Russia went to war with Austria, we should remain neutral. In replying to it I had to take into consideration that General von Werder's cipher was not inaccessible within the Emperor's palace; for I had learned that even in our embassy at St. Peters burg the secret of the cipher could not be preserved by any ingenious method of locking it up, but only by con stantly changing it. I was convinced that I could tele graph nothing to Livadia that would not come to the knowledge of the Emperor. That such a question should be asked in such a way at all presupposed a dislocation of the traditional method of doing business. If one cabinet desires to address questions of this kind to another, the correct way is to sound them in confidential conversation, either by means of its own ambassador or by a personal interview between the Sovereigns. That there are serious objections to sounding by means of an inquiry addressed to the representative of the Power which is being sounded, Russian diplomacy experienced in the transactions be tween the Emperor Nicholas and Sir H. Seymour. Gort chakoff's preference for asking questions of us by tele- 231 BISMARCK graph not through the Russian representative at Berlin, but through the German one at St. Petersburg, compelled me to remind our missions at St. Petersburg more often than those at any other Court, that their duty lay not in representing to us the desires of the Russian cabinet, but in placing our wishes before Russia. The temptation for a diplomatist to foster his official and social position by doing favours to the government to which he is accredited is great, and is the more dangerous if the Foreign Minis ter can work on our agent and win him over to his wishes, before the latter knows all the circumstances that make acquiescence, or even the suggestion, inopportune for his government. But it lay beyond all, even beyond Russian usages, for the German military plenipotentiary at the Russian Court to place before us, and that in my absence from Berlin, by order of the Russian Emperor, a political question of far- reaching importance in the categorical style of a telegram. I had, inconvenient as I found it, never been able to pro cure a change in the old custom whereby our military plenipotentiaries at St. Petersburg made their communica tions not, like the others, through the Foreign Office, but direct to his Majesty in letters in their own hand — a cus tom which had its origin in the fact that Frederick Wil liam III gave to Lucadou, formerly commandant of Kol- berg, and the first military attache at St. Petersburg, a particularly intimate position with the Emperor. In these letters the military attache" certainly wrote down every thing that the Russian Emperor told him in the course of ordinary confidential conversation at Court, and not sel dom that was much more than Gortchakoff told the am bassador. The ' Pruski Fligel -adjutant,' as he was called 232 THE BERLIN CONGRESS at Court, saw the Emperor almost every day, and in any case much oftener than Gortchakoff; the Emperor did not talk to him of military matters only, and the mes sages entrusted to him for our Sovereign were not con fined to family affairs. The diplomatic negotiations be tween both cabinets often found their centre of gravity, as at the time of Rauch and Miinster, far more in the re ports of the military attaches than in those of the officially accredited envoys. But as the Emperor William never omitted to communicate to me in course of time, although often too late, his correspondence with the military at tache at St. Petersburg, and as he never came to a politi cal decision without reference to his official advisers, the disadvantages of this direct intercourse were confined to the retardment of such information and announcements as were contained in direct reports of this kind. It lay, therefore, beyond this usage in the transaction of business that the Emperor Alexander, undoubtedly at the instiga tion of Prince Gortchakoff, should employ Herr von Wer- der as the means of placing before us that leading ques tion. Gortchakoff was at that time anxious to prove to his Emperor that my devotion to him, and my sympathy with Russia, was insincere, or at least ' Platonic, ' and also to shake his confidence in me, in which he afterwards succeeded. Before positively answering Werder's question, I made an attempt to do so by dilatory replies referring to the impossibility of expressing myself on such a question without higher authorisation, and when I was repeatedly pressed, I recommended them to put the question, in an official, though confidential, manner, by means of the Rus sian ambassador at Berlin, to the Foreign Office. How- 233 BISMARCK ever, repeated interpellations through Werder's telegrams put an end to this evasive method. In the meantime I had begged his Majesty to recall Herr von Werder by telegram to the Imperial Court, as he was being misused at Livadia for diplomatic purposes without being able to defend himself, and to forbid him to undertake political commissions, as that belonged to the Russian but not to the German service. The Emperor did not accede to my wish, and as, at length, the Emperor Alexander, on the ground of our personal relations, desired from me the ex pression of my own opinion through the Russian ambas sador at Berlin, it was no longer possible for me to evade replying to the indiscreet question. I asked the ambas sador von Schweinitz, who was just at the end of his leave, to visit me at Varzin before his return to St. Petersburg, in order to receive my instructions. Schweinitz was my guest from the nth to the 13th of October. I commis sioned him to repair as soon as possible via St. Peters burg to the Czar's Court at Livadia. My instructions to Schweinitz were to the effect that our first care was to preserve the friendship between the great monarchies, which in a struggle with one another had more to lose as regarded their opposition to the revolution than they had to win. If, to our sorrow, this was not possible between Russia and Austria, then we could endure indeed that our friends should lose or win battles against each other, but not that one of the two should be so severely wounded and injured that its position, as an independent Great Power taking its part in the councils of Europe would be endangered. The result of the unequivocally plain dec laration that Gortchakoff prevailed on his Sovereign to wrest from us, in order to prove to him the Platonic char- 234 THE BERLIN CONGRESS acter of our love, was that the Russian storm passed from Eastern Galicia to the Balkans, and that Russia, in place of the negotiations with us which were broken off, began similar negotiations with Austria — first of all, as far as I remember, at Pesth — in the sense of the settlement come to at Reichstadt, where the Emperors Alexander and Fran cis Joseph met on" July 8, 1876, and requested that they should be kept secret from us. This treaty,1 and not the Berlin congress, is the foundation of the Austrian posses sion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and during her war with the Turks secured to Russia the neutrality of Austria. That the Russian cabinet in the settlement at Reich stadt conceded to the Austrians the acquisition of Bosnia as an equivalent for their neutrality makes us assume that Herr von Oubril did not speak the truth when he assured us that the Balkan war would be only a question of a ' promenade militaire,' of giving occupation to the ' trop plein ' of the army, and of Turkish horses' tails and crosses of St. George ; in that case Bosnia would have been too high a price to pay. Probably at St. Petersburg they had reckoned on Bulgaria, when it was separated from Tur key, remaining permanently in dependence on Russia. Even if the peace of San Stefano had been carried out intact, this calculation would probably have proved false. In order not to be held responsible for this error by their own people, they sought with success to lay the guilt of the unsuccessful issue of the war on the German policy, on the ' disloyalty ' of the German friend. It was a dis* 1 Concluded January 15, 1877. 235 BISMARCK \ honest fiction; we had never let them expect anything but a benevolent neutrality, and the honesty of our inten tions is manifested by the fact that we did not let our selves be disturbed by the demand of Russia that the Reichstadt arrangement should be kept secret from us, but readily acceded to the desire communicated to me at Fried- richsruh by Count Shuvaloff to summon a congress at Berlin. The desire of the Russian government to arrive at peace with Turkey by means of a congress proved that they did not feel themselves strong enough on the mili tary side to let the matter Come to a war with England and Austria, after they had once let slip the opportunity of occupying Constantinople. Prince Gortchakoff doubt less shares the responsibility for the blunders of the Rus sian policy with younger and more energetic men holding similar views, but he is not free from it. How strong, measured by Russian traditions, his position as against the Emperor was is shown by the fact that he took part in the Berlin congress as representative of Russia, although he knew that this was against the wish of his master. When, relying on his character as chancellor and foreign minister, he took his seat, the peculiar situation arose that the chancellor, who was at the head of the state, and the ambassador Shuvaloff, who was subordinate to his depart ment, figured side by side, but the holder of the Russian plenary powers was not the chancellor but the ambassador. This, which, by what I observed, was undoubtedly the situation, though we could perhaps not find documentary proof of it, except in the Russian archives, and perhaps not even in them, shows that even in a government with so absolute and despotic a ruler as Russia, the unity of political action is not secured. It is so, perhaps, in a 236 THE BERLIN CONGRESS greater degree in England, where the chief minister and the communications he receives are exposed to public criti cism, while in Russia only the Emperor ruling at the time is in a position to judge, according to his knowledge of men and to his capacity, which of the servants who make reports to, and advise, iiim on current affairs is in error or lies to him, and from which he learns the truth. By this I do not mean to say that the current business of the Foreign Office is more cleverly carried on in London than in St. Petersburg, but the English government falls less often than the Russian into the necessity of repairing by insincerity the errors of its subordinates. Lord Palm- erston did indeed on April 4, 1856, say in the House of Commons, with an irony which was probably not under stood by the mass of the members, that the selection of the papers regarding Kars, to be laid before the House, had demanded great care and attention from persons occu pying not a subordinate, but a high position in the For eign Office. The Blue Book on Kars, the castrated dis patches of Sir Alexander Burnes from Afghanistan, and the communications of ministers regarding the origin of the note which the Vienna conference of 1854 recom mended to the Sultan for signature instead of that of Mentchikoff, are proofs of the ease with which parlia ment and the press in England can be deceived. That the archives of the Foreign Office in London are more carefully guarded than those of other places makes us suspect that many similar proofs might be found in them. But on the whole it may be said that it is easier to deceive the Czar than the parliament. It was expected at St. Petersburg that in the diplo matic discussion for carrying out the decisions of the 237 BISMARCK Berlin congress we should immediately in every case sup port and carry through the Russian interpretation as op posed to that of Austria and England, and especially with out any preliminary understanding between Berlin and St. Petersburg. The demand which I at first only indicated, but afterwards unequivocally expressed, that Russia should tell us confidentially, but plainly, her wishes, so that they might be discussed, was evaded, and I had the impression that Prince Gortchakoff expected from L me7_"as~aTTatty "from her admirer, that I should guessjrtjmdjepxesent-t-he Rus sian wishes without Russia having herself _to_utter them, and thereby to undertake any responsibility. Even in cases where we could assume that we were completely cer tain of Russian interests and intentions, and where we believed ourselves able to give a voluntary proof of our friendship towards the Russian policy without injuring our own interests, instead of the expected acknowledg ment we received a grumbling disapproval, because, as it was alleged, in aim and degree, we had not met the ex pectations of our Russian friends. Even when that was undoubtedly the case, we had no better success. In the whole proceeding lay a calculated dishonesty, not only towards us, but towards the Emperor Alexander, to whose mind the German policy was to be made to appear dis honest and untrustworthy. ' Votre amitie* est trop plato- nique,' said reproachfully the Empress Marie to one of r our representatives. It is true that the friendship of the cabinet of one Great Power for the others always remains Platonic to a certain point ; for no Great Power can place itself exclusively at the service of another. It will always have to keep in view not. only existing, but futureTrela- tions to the others,_ and must, as far as possible, avoid 238 THE BERLIN CONGRESS lasting fundamental hostility with any of them. That is particularly im"p^rfantrfor Germany, with its central posi- tion, whjch is open to attack onjhree sides. Errors in the policy of the cabinets of the Great Powers bring no immediate punishment, either in St. Petersburg or Berlin, but they_are never harmless. The logic of history is even more exact in its revisions than our chief audit office. In carrying out the decrees of the congress, Rus sia expected and required that, in the local discussions about them in the East, when there was any difference of opinion between the Russian and the other interpreta tions, the German commissioners should^ on principle, support Russia.1 In many questions the objective deci sion might certainly be fairly indifferent to us ; therefore it was only incumbent on us to explain the stipulations honestly, and not to disturb our relations with the other Great Powers by party support _of local questions that did not affect Germans-interests. The passionate and bitter language of all the Russian organs, the instigation of Rus sian popular opinion against us which was authorised by the censorship of the press, seemed to make it advisable that we should not alienate from us the sympathies which we might still possess among the non-Russian Powers. In this situation there now came a letter from the Em peror Alexander, written in his own hand, which, in spite of all the respect shown for his aged friend and uncle, contained in two passages decided menaces of war in the form which is customary by the laws of nations, something to this effect : if the refusal to adapt the German vote to the Russian is adhered to, peace between.us cannot last. 1 Cf. the estimate of the situation quoted from a dispatch in the Bis marck-Jahrbuch, i. 125 ff. 239 BISMARCK In two passages was a variation of this theme in sharp and unequivocal terms. That Prince Gortchakoff, who on Septernber-6,.. 1.879, made France a very striking declara tion of love in an interview with Louis Peyramont, the correspondent of the Orleanist 'Soleil,' had also had a share in that letter, I could see in it ; my suspicion was confirmed through two later observations. In October a lady in Berlin society, whose room in the Hotel de 1' Europe at Baden-Baden was next Gortchakoff's, heard him say : ' I should have wished to go to war, but France has other intentions.' And on November 1 the Paris cor respondent of the 'Time's ' was in a position to inform his paper that before his arrival at Alexandrovo, the Czar had written to the Emperor William complaining of the atti tude of Germany, and using the phrase: 'Your Majesty's chancellor has forgotten the promises of 1870.' * In face of the attitude of the Russian press, the in creasing excitement of the great mass of the people, and the aggregation of troops all along the Russian frontier, it would have been levity to doubt the serious nature of the situation and of the Emperor's threats to the friend whom he had formerly so much honoured. The Emperor William, in going by the advice of Field-Marshal von Manteuffel to Alexandrovo on September 3, 1879, in order to give a verbal and propitiatory answer to the written threats of his nephew, acted^ contrary to my feeling and my judgment as to what was necessary. * The correspondent, Herr Oppert from Blowitz in Bohemia, doubtless undertook the more willingly to spread this news, which must have come to him from Gortchakoff, because he bore me a grudge ever since the congress. At the desire of Beaconsfield, who wished to keep him in good humour, I procured for him the third class of the Crown Order. Angry at what, ac cording to Prussian ideas, is considered an unusually high distinction, he refused it, and demanded the second class. 240 THE BERLIN CONGRESS Considerations analogous to those which dissuaded any attempt at solving the complicated difficulties of 1 863 by means of a Russian alliance were in the second half of the 'seventies opposed in the same way to any stronger accen tuation of the Russian alliance without Austria. I do not know how far Count Peter Shuvaloff, before the begin ning of the last Balkan war, and during the congress, was expressly commissioned to discuss the question of a Russo- German alliance. He was not accredited to Berlin but to London; his personal relations with me, however, enabled him on his occasional visits to Berlin on his journeys to and from England, as well as during the congress, to dis cuss with me without restraint all eventualities. In the beginning of February( 1877,^ received a long letter from him from London ; my answer and his reply here follow. 'Berlin: February 15, 1877. ' Dear Count,* — I thank you for the kind words you have been good enough to write me, and I am much obliged to Count Miinster for having on this occasion so well interpreted the sentiments which since our first ac quaintance have formed between us a bond that will sur vive the political relations that now draw us together. Among the regrets which official life will leave me, that which will arise from the remembrance of my relations with you will be the most poignant. 'Whatever the political future of our two countries may be, the part I have played in the past allows me the satis faction of knowing that, respecting the necessity of their alliance, I have always been in agreement with the states man most worthy of esteem among your compatriots. As * [In the German original this and the following letter are in French. J VOL. II. — 16 241 BISMARCK long as I am in office, I shall be faithful to the traditions by which I have been guided for five-and-twenty years, and of which the principles coincide with the ideas expressed in your letter in regard to the reciprocal services which Russia and Germany can render to one another, and have rendered" for more than a century, without harming the particular interests of—either.—. It was' that conviction which guided me in 1848./ in i854^)in 1863, as in the pres ent instance, and for which I succeeded in gaining the suffrages of the great majority of my countrymen. It is a work that will perhaps be easier to destroy than it was to create, especially if it happens that my successors do not use the same patience as I have done in cultivating traditions the experience of which they will lack, as well as sometimes the self-abnegation necessary for subordinat ing appearances to realities, personal susceptibilities to great monarchical interests. An old stager of my stamp does not let himself be easily put out by false alarms, and in the interests of my Sovereign and of my country, I can forget the mortifications that, during the past two years, have not been spared me from your direction. I pay no heed to the " flirtations " in which my old friend and pro tector at St. Petersburg and my young friend at Paris * are indulging ; but it will perhaps be easier to lead astray the judgment of the chancellors who will come after me, by giv ing them a glimpse, as has been done for the last three years, of the facility with which, on your part, a coalition could be built up on the basis of revenge. The calmness with which I regard this eventuality I shall not be able to bequeath to my successors. With the menaces of semi official journals, with Parisian blandishments in feuilletons, Orloff. 242 THE BERLIN CONGRESS and in letters to political ladies, it will not be very difficult one of these days to derange the compass of a German min ister dismayed by the idea of isolation./^ To avoid this he wilTcommit himself to maladroit pledges which it will be difficult to discharge. In any case it will not be my affair ; as soon as I have satisfied, well or ill, the require ments of the Diet, which opens on the 22nd, and which should only last a few weeks, I shall go to the baths, and shall return no more to office. I have the faculty's cer tificate that I am " untauglich," the official phrase for per mission to retire, which in this case only expresses the sad truth. I have no more interest in it. 'Before that period I must reply to_the latest enigma of your policy ; I am not clever at divination^ _Lneed to be enlightened on a deep-seated thpjight_wju£h,_as_ it seems, I have not Tightly Iinaerstood in the past. With out instructions or advice, I cannot find the narrow line between the reproach of encouraging TurkeyTSy speaking of peace, and the . suspicion oT^reacherou^}Turgrng~war. I have just passed under- the fire of those incompatible accusations, and I have no desire to expose myself to them afresh without a pilot, and even without a lighthouse, which will indicate the port at which you desire us to dis embark. 'Bismarck.' From Count Shuvaloff to Bismarck ' London : February 25, 1877. ' My dear Prince, — I was very deeply touched by your kind letter, but I feel genuine remorse when I think of the trouble you have taken in writing it, and of the time, so precious when it is yours, which it cost you. 243 BISMARCK ' The letter will form one of the pleasantest souvenirs of my political career, and I shall bequeath it to my son. ' Having been for a year far away from Berlin and St. Petersburg, doubt had taken possession of me. ' I thought that what had existed — perhaps existed no longer. You have given me proof of the contrary. As a good Russian I rejoice with all my heart. ' If, my dear Prince, I had not again found in you the man who never changes, either in policy or in' goodwill towards his friends, I should this time have sold my Rus sian stock, as you wanted to do three years ago, because you had too high an opinion of me. ' I have copied some passages in your letter and sent them to my Emperor. I know it will give him pleasure to read them. On every occasion on which he has come into direct contact with you, the result has been beneficial and useful ; and to read what you write to one whom you honour with the title of friend is for the Emperor exactly as if he was in direct communication with you. ' It is needless to add that I have left out everything that concerns Gortchakoff because I regarded your allu sions to him as a proof of your confidence in my discretion. ' Ill-informed as I am (and for good reasons) of what they want at St. Petersburg, postponement and disarma ment appear to me probable. ' It is said that peace is to be concluded with Servia and Montenegro. The Grand Vizier has sent letters to Decazes and Derby informing them that the Sultan prom ises ' to carry out of his own accord all the reforms de manded by the conference. Europe is going to ask. us to grant Turkey time. Would it be a favourable moment 244 THE BERLIN CONGRESS i for us to declare war, and alienate still further from us the feelings of Europe ? ' As private business imperiously summons me to Rus sia, I intend to ask for a short leave of absence as soon as we arrive at a decision one way or another. I hope, my dear Prince, that when I pass through Berlin you will per mit me to see you — I am immensely anxious to do so. ' Pardon the length of this letter for the reason that you have not to reply to it. ' Accept, once again, my dear Prince, my cordial thanks for your " kindness " [in English], and for your let ter, to which I make only one objection : it is the way in which I am sorry to see you speak of your health. God will keep it from failing, I am sure, as He preserves all that is useful to millions of men, and for the maintenance of vast and great interests. ' Rest assured, my dear Prince, that you will always find in me more than an admirer — the number of them is large enough without me — but a man who is with all his heart sincerely and devotedly attached to you. ' Shuvaloff.' Even before the congress Count Shuvaloff touched on the question of a Russo-German offensive and defensive alliance, and put it to me directly. I discussed openly with him the difficulties and prospects that the question of the alliance offered us, and especially the choice be tween Austria and Russia if the triple alliance of the Eastern Powers were not maintained. Among other things he said, during the discussion : ' Coalitions are your nightmare,' to which I replied: ' Necessarily.' He pointed out that a firm and steadfast alliance with Russia 245 BISMARCK would be the safest means against this, because, by the exclusion of the latter Power from the circle of our coali tion-adversaries, no combination which would endanger our existence would be possible. I admitted as much, but expressed a fear that if the German policy confined its possibilities to the Russian alliance, and, in accordance with the wishes of Russia, re fused all other states, Germany would with regard to Russia be in an unequal position, because the geograph ical situation and the autocratic constitution of Russia made it easier for her to give up the alliance than it would be for us, and because the maintenance of the old tradi tions of the Russo-Prussian alliance after all rests on a single pair of eyes — that is, it depends on the moods of the reigning Emperor of Russia. Our relations to Russia rested essentially on the personal relations of the two sov ereigns to one another, and upon the proper fostering of this by the tact of the Courts and diplomatists and the sentiments of the representatives on either side. We had had an example that even with somewhat helpless Prussian ambassadors at St. Petersburg, the intimacy of our mutual relations had been maintained by the tact of military attaches like the Generals von Rauch and Count Miins- ter, notwithstanding much justifiable sensitiveness on either side. We had also learned that hasty, irritable, quick-tempered representatives of Russia like Budberg and Oubril by their attitude at Berlin, and by their official reports when they were personally out of humour, engen dered impressions which might react dangerously on the whole mutual relations of two peoples numbering a hun dred and fifty millions. I remember that Prince Gortchakoff, when I was envoy 246 THE BERLIN CONGRESS at St. Petersburg, and enjoyed his unbounded confidence, used, if he had to keep me waiting, to give me unopened dispatches from Berlin to read before he had looked through them himself. I was at times astonished to learn from them with what malevolence my former friend Budberg subordinated the task of maintaining the exist ing relations to his personal sensitiveness over some oc currence in society, or merely to the desire of introducing a witty sarcasm on the affairs of the Berlin Court or min istry. His dispatches were naturally laid before the Em peror, and this was done without comment or explana tion. The imperial marginal notes, which Gortchakoff, in the course of further business correspondence, at times permitted me to glance at, gave me undoubted proof how susceptible the Emperor Alexander, well disposed towards us though he might be, was to the ill-natured dispatches of Budberg and Oubril, and inferred from them not false statements on the part of his representatives, but a preva lent lack of intelligent and friendly policy at Berlin. When Prince Gortchakoff gave me things of this kind to read with their seals unbroken, in order to coquet with his confidence, he used to say : ' Vous oublierez ce que vous ne deviez pas lire,' which I, after I had looked through the dispatches in the next room, naturally agreed to do, and as long as I was at St. Petersburg, kept my promise ; for it was not my business to render the relations of the two Courts worse by complaints of the Russian represen tative at Berlin, and I feared that my information would be clumsily turned to account in fostering intrigues and quarrels at Court. It is especially to be wished that we should be repre sented at every friendly Court by diplomatists who, with- 247 BISMARCK out encroaching on the general policy of their own coun try, should as far as possible foster the relations of both interested states, suppress as far as possible ill-humour and gossip, bridle their desire to be witty, and rather bring forward the practical side of the matter. I have often not shown dispatches from our representatives at German Courts in the highest quarters, because they had a tendency to be piquant, or to relate and give importance to annoying expressions or occurrences, rather than to foster and improve the relations between the two Courts, so long as the latter, as in Germany is always the case, was the task of our policy. When I was in St. Petersburg and Paris I always considered myself justified in sup pressing things which would merely have caused useless ill-feeling at home, or were only adapted for satirical rep resentations ; and when I was minister I did not lay dis patches of this kind before those who filled the highest place in the state. In the position of an ambassador at the Court of a Great Power there is no obligation to report mechanically all the foolish talk and spiteful things that arise at the ambassador's place of residence. Not only an ambassador, but also every German diplomatist at a Ger man Court ought to avoid writing dispatches like those which Budberg and Oubril sent home from Berlin, and Ba- labin from Vienna, under the calculation that they would be read with interest and complacent gaiety as witty effu sions ; but as long as the relations between the Courts are friendly, he ought to refrain from stirring up irritation and from gossip. A man who looks only at the formal parfeof the course of business will certainly consider it the most correct thing that the ambassador shall report all that he hears without reserve and leave it to the minister to decide 248 THE BERLIN CONGRESS what is to be passed over and what is to be emphasised. Whether such a method is practically useful depends on the personality of the minister. As I considered that I had quite as much insight as Herr von Schleinitz, and as I took a deeper and more conscientious interest in the fate of our country than he did, I considered myself entitled, nay, bound not to bring to his knowledge many things that in his hands might have served the cause of provoca tions and intrigues at Court in the sense of a policy which was not that of the King. I return from this digression to the conversations which I had with Count Peter Shuvaloff at the time of the Balkan war. I told him that if we sacrificed our relations with all the other Powers to the firmness of our alliance with Russia, we should find ourselves, with our exposed geographical situation, in a dangerous dependence on Russia in the event of an acute manifestation of French or Austrian desire of revenge. The friendliness of Rus sia with Powers which could not exist without her good will had its bounds, especially in a policy like that of Prince Gortchakoff — a policy that occasionally reminded me of Asiatic conceptions. He had often simply beaten down every political objection with the argument : ' L'Em- pereur est fort irrite,' to which I used ironically to reply : ' Eh, le mien done ! ' On that Shuvaloff remarked : ' Gortschakoff est un animal,' which, in the slang of St. Petersburg, is not so rude in meaning as in sound, ' il n'a aucune influence.' He owed it in the main only to the Emperor's respect for his age, and his esteem for his past services, that he still formally conducted affairs. About what could Russia and Prussia seriously fall into dispute ? There was absolutely no question between them of suffi- 249 BISMARCK cient importance for such an issue. I admitted the latter, but reminded him of Olmiitz and the Seven Years' war, and how a quarrel might arise out of an unimportant cause, even from questions of form. Even without Gort chakoff it would be difficult for many Russians to con sider and treat a friend as having equal rights ; I was not personally sensitive on points of form, but modern Russia had for the future not merely Gortchakoff's methods of procedure but also his pretensions. I declined at that time also the ' option ' between Aus tria and Russia, and recommended the alliance of the three Emperors, or at least the preservation of peace between them. CHAPTER XXIX THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE The triple alliance which I originally sought to con clude after the peace of Frankfort, and about which I had already sounded-^ienna and St. Petersburg, from Meaux, in ^September i87q,)was an alliance of the .three Emperors with the further idea of bringing into it monarchical Italy. It was designed for the struggle which, as I feared, was before us; between the two European tendencies which Napoleon called Republican and Cossack, and which I, according to our present ideas, should designate on the one side as the system of order on a monarchical basis, and on the other as the social republic to the level of which the anti-monarchical development is wont to sink, / either slowly or by leaps and bounds, until the conditions thus created become intolerable, and the disappointed populace are ready for a violent return to monarchical in stitutions in a Csesarean form. I consider that the task of escaping from this circulus vitiosus, or, if possible, of sparing the present generation and their children an en trance into it, ought to be more closely incumbent on the strong existing monarchies, those monarchies which still have a vigorous life, than any rivalry over the fragments of nations which people the Balkan peninsula. If the monarchical governments have no understanding of the necessity for holding together in the interests of political and social order, but make themselves subservient to the 251 BISMARCK chauvinistic impulses of their subjects, I fear that the international revolutionary ahoTsocial struggles which will have to be fought out wiTHae all the more dangerous, and take such a form that the_victory on the part of monarch ical order jvill 1?e~more difficult. Since 1871 I have sought for the most certain assurance against those strug gles in the alliance of the three Emperors, and also in the effort to impart to the monarchicaljmnciple in Italy a firm support in that alliance. I was not without hope of a lasting success when the meeting of the three Emperors took place at Berlin in September 1872, and this was fol lowed by the visits of my Emperor to St. Petersburg in May, of the King of Italy to Berlin in September, and of the German Emperor to Vienna in the October of the next year. The first clouding over of that hope was caused in 1875 by the provocations of Prince Gortchakoff,1 who spread the lie that we intended to fall upon France before she had recovered from her wounds. At the time of the Luxemburg question (1867) I was on principle an adversary of preventive wars, that is, of offensive wars to be waged because we thought that later on we should have to wage them against an enemy who would be better prepared. According to the views of our military men it was probable that in 1875 we should have conquered France; but it was not so probable that the other Powers would have remained neutral. Even during the last months of the negotiations at Versailles the danger of European intervention had been daily a cause of anxiety to me, and the apparent hatefulness of an attack under taken merely in order not to give France time to recover her breath would have offered a welcome pretext first for 1 Cf. chap. xxvi. supra, p. 189. 252 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE English phrases about humanity, but afterwards also to Russia for making a transition from the policy of the per sonal friendship of the two Emperors, to that of the cool consideration of Russian interests which had held the bal ance at the delimitation of French territory in 1814 and 1 81 5. That for the Russian policy there is a limit be yond which the importance of France in Europe must not be decreased is explicable. That limit was reached, as I believe, at the peace of Frankfort — a fact which in 1870 and 1 87 1 was not so completely realised at St. _ Petersburg as five years later. I hardly think that during our war the Russian cabinet clearly foresaw that, when it was over, Russia would have as neighbour so strong and consolidated a Germany. In 1875 I had the impression that some doubt prevailed on the Neva as to whether it had been prudent to let things go so far without interfering in their development. The sincere esteem and friendship of Al exander II for his uncle concealed the uneasiness already felt in official circles. If we had wished to renew the war at that time, so as not to give invalided France time to recover, after some unsuccessful conferences for prevent ing the war, our military operations in France would un doubtedly have come into the situation which I had feared at Versailles during the dragging on of the siege. The termination of the war would not have been brought about by a peace concluded tete-a-tite, but, as in 18 14, in a con gress to which the defeated France would have been ad mitted, and perhaps, considering the enmity to which we were exposed, just as in those days, at the dictation of a new Talleyrand. Even at Versailles I had feared that the participation of France in the London conference Upon the clauses of 253 BISMARCK. the treaty of Paris dealing with the Black Sea might be used in order, with the assurance that Talleyrand had shown at Vienna, to graft the Franco-German question on to the programme for discussion. For that reason, not withstanding recommendations from many quarters, I pre vented, by influences at home and abroad, the participation of Favre in the conference. Whether France in 1875 would have been so weak in her defence against our attack, as our military men assumed, seems questionable when one remembers that in the Franco-Anglo-Austrian agree ment of January 3, 1815, France, although defeated, partly occupied by foreign troops, and exhausted by twenty years of fighting, was still prepared to lead at once into the field, for the coalition against Russia and Prussia, 1 50,000 men, and shortly after 300,000 men. The 300,000 trained soldiers who had been our prisoners were back in France, and we should not, as in January 181 5, have had the Russian power behind us in benevolent neu trality, but very likely in hostility. From the Gortchakoff circular telegram of May 1875 to all Russian embassies, it is clear that Russian diplomacy was already urged to activity against our alleged inclination to disturb the peace. On this episode followed the Russian chancellor's un easy efforts to disturb our, and especially my, friendly personal relations to the Emperor Alexander ; among other ways, he extorted from me, as is related in Chapter xxviii, through General von Werder, a refusal to promise neu trality in the event of an Austro-Russian war. That the Russian cabinet should have then immediately and secretly turned to Austria again shows a phase of the Gortchakoff policy which was not favourable to.. my effort^ towards a monarchical conservative triple alliance. 254 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE Count Shuvaloff was perfectly right when he said that the idea of coalitions gave me nightmares. We had waged vicJc«^us-waTS-against two of the European Great Powers ; everything dependecfoH^ inducing at least one of the two "nrighty foes whom we had beaten inTKe field to renounce the anticipated design of uniting with the other in a war of revenge. To all who knew history and the character of the Gallic race, it was obvious that that Power could not be France, and if a secret treaty of Reichstadt was possible without our consent, without our knowledge, so also was a renewal of the old coalition — Kaunitz's handi work — of France, Austria, and Russia, whenever the ele ments which it represented, and which beneath the surface were still present in Austria, should gain the ascendency there. They might find points of connexion which might serve to infuse new life into the ancient rivalry, the an cient struggle for the hegemony of Germany, making it once more a factor in Austrian policy, whether by an alliance with France, which in the time of Count Beust and the Salzburg meeting with Louis Napoleon, August 1867, was in the air, or by a closer accord with Russia, the existence of which was attested by the secret convention of Reich stadt. The question of what support Germany had in such a case to expect from England I will not answer without more in the way of historical retrospect of the Seven Years' war and the congress of Vienna. I merely take note of the probability that, but for the victories of Fred erick the Great, the cause of the King of Prussia would have been abandoned by England even earlier than it actu ally was. This situation demanded an effort to limit the range of the possible anti-German coalition by means of treaty 255 BISMARCK arrangements placing our relations with at least one of the Great Powers upon a firm footing. The choice could only ' lie between Austria ancTRussia, for the English constitu tion does not admit of alliances of assured permanence, and a union with Italy alone did not promise an adequate counterpoise to a coalition of the other three Great Powers, even supposing her future attitude and formation to be considered independently not only of French but also of Austrian influence. The area available for the formation of the coalition would therefore be narrowed till only the alternative remained which I have indicated. In point of material force I held a union with Russia to have the advantage. I had also been used to regard it as safer, because I placed more reliance on traditional dynastic friendship, on community of conservative mon archical instincts, on the absence of indigenous political divisions, than on the fits and starts of public opinion among the Hungarian, Slav, and Catholic population of the monarchy of the Habsburgs. Complete reliance could be placed upon the durability of neither union, whether one estimated the strength of the dynastic bond with Russia, or of the German sympathies of the Hungarian populace. If the balance of opinion in Hungary were al ways determined by sober political calculation, this brave and independent people, isolated in the broad ocean of Slav populations, and comparatively insignificant in numbers, would remain constant to the conviction that its position can only be secured by the support of the German element in Austria and Germany. But the Kossuth episode, and the suppression in Hungary itself of the German elements that remained loyal to the Empire, with other symptoms showed that among Hungarian hussars and lawyers self- 256 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE confidence is apt in critical moments to get the better of political calculation and self-control. Even in quiet times many a Magyar will get the gypsies to play to him the song, ' Der Deutsche ist ein Hundsf ott ' ( ' The German is a blackguard '). In the forecast of the future relations of Austria and Germany an essential element was the imperfect apprecia tion of political possibilities displayed by the German ele ment in Austria, which has caused it to lose touch with the dynasty and forfeit the guidance which it had inherited from its historical development. Misgivings as to the future of an Austro-German confederation were also sug gested by the religious question, by the remembered in fluence of the father confessors of the imperial family, by the anticipated possibility of renewed relations with France, on the basis of a rapprochement by that country to the Catholic Church, whenever such a change should have taken place in the character and principles of French statesmanship. How remote or how near such a change may be in France is quite beyond the scope of calculation. Last of all came the Austrian policy in regard to Poland. We cannot demand of Austria that she should forgo the weapon which she possesses as against Russia in her fostering care of the Polish spirit in Galicia. The policy which in 1846 resulted in a price being set by Austrian officials on the heads of insurgent Polish patriots was possible because, by a conformable attitude in Polish and Eastern affairs, Austria paid (as by a contribution to a common insurance fund) for the advantages which she derived from the holy alliance, the league of the three Eastern Powers. So long as the triple alliance of the Eastern Powers held good, Austria could place her rela- vol. n. — 17 257 BISMARCK tions with the Ruthenes in the foreground of her policy ; as soon as it was dissolved, it was more advisable to have the Polish nobility at her disposal in case of a war with Russia. Galicia is altogether more loosely connected with the Austrian monarchy than Poland and West Prussia with the Prussian monarchy. The Austrian trans-Car pathian eastern province lies open without natural bound ary on that side, and Austria would be by no means weakened by its abandonment provided she could find compensation in the basin of the Danube for its five or six million Poles and Ruthenes. Plans of the sort, but taking the shape of the transference of Roumanian and Southern- Slav populations to Austria in exchange for Galicia, and the resuscitation of Poland under the sway of an archduke, were considered officially and unofficially during the Crimean war and in 1863. The Old- Prussian provinces are, however, separated from Posen and West Prussia by no natural boundary, and their abandonment by Prussia would be impossible. Hence among the pre conditions of an offensive alliance between Germany and Austria the settlement of the future of Poland presents a problem of unusual difficulty. While occupied with the consideration of these ques tions I was compelled by the threatening letter of Czar Alexander_(i_879) to take decisive measures for the defence and preservation of our independence of Russia. An alliance with Russia was popular with nearly all parties, with the Conservatives from an historical tradition, the entire consonance of which, with the point of view of a 258 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE modern Conservative group, is perhaps doubtful. The fact, however, is that the majority of Prussian Conserva tives regard alliance with Austria as congruous with their tendencies, and did so none the less when there existed a sort of temporary rivalry in Liberalism between the two governments. The Conservative halo of the Austrian name outweighed with most of the members of this group the advances, partly out of date, partly recent, made in the region of Liberalism, and the occasional leaning to rapprochements with the Western Powers, and especially with France. The considerations of expediency which commended to Catholics an alliance with the preponderant Catholic Great Power came nearer home. In a league, having the form and force of a treaty, between the new German Empire and Austria the National-Liberal party discerned a way of approximating to the quadrature of the political circle of 1848, by evading the difficulties which stood in the way of the complete unification, not only of Austria and Prussia-Germany, but also of the several con stituents of the Austro- Hungarian Empire. Thus, out side of the social democratic party, whose approval was not to be had for any policy whatever which the govern ment might adopt, there was in parliamentary quarters no opposition to the alliance with Austria, and much partial ity for it. Moreover, the traditions of international law from the time of the Holy Roman Empire, German by nation, and of the German confederation tended to the theory that be tween Germany as a whole and the Habsburg monarchy there existed a legal~tie. binding these central European territories togetherjfgr,pur.p.osgs_of_ mutual support. Prac tical effect had indeed rarely been given to this consortium 259 BISMARCK in former ages ; but it was possible to vindicate in Europe, and especially in Russia, the position that a permanent confederation of Austria and the modern German Empire was, from the point of view of international law, no new thing. These questions, whether the alliance would be popular in Germany, how far it could be justified by inter national law, were to me matters of subordinate impor tance, merely subsidiary to its eventual completion. In the foreground stood the question whether the execution of the design should be begun at once or deferred for a time, and with what degree of decision it would be advisable to combat the opposition which might be anticipated on the part of Emperor William — an opposition sure to be de termined rather by his idiosyncrasy than by policy. So cogent seemed to me the considerations which in the political situation pointed us to an alliance with Austria that I would have striven to conclude one even in the face of a hostile public opinion. When Emperor William went to Alexandrovo (Sept. 3), I had already made arrangements at Gastein for a meet ing with Count Andrassy, which took place on August 27-28. When I had explained the situation to him he drew therefrom the following conclusion : To a Russo- French alliance the natural counterpoise is an Austro- German alliance. I answered that he had formulated the question to discuss which I had suggested our meeting and we came readily to a preliminary understanding for a merely defensive alliance against a Russian attack on one of the two sides ; but my proposition to extend the alliance 260 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE to other than Russian attacks found no favour with the Count. When, not without difficulty, I had obtained his Majesty's authorisation to commence official negotiations, I travelled home for that purpose by Vienna. Before my departure from Gastein I addressed (Sept. 10) the following letter to the King of Bavaria: 'Gastein : September 10, 1879. ' Your Majesty was so gracious on a former occasion as to express your most exalted satisfaction with the efforts which I directed to the object of securing for the German Empire peace and friendship with both her great neigh bours, Austria and Russia alike. In the course of the last three years this problem has increased in difficulty, as Russian policy has come to be entirely dominated by the partly warlike revolutionary tendencies of Panslavism. Already in the year 1876 we received from Livadia re peated demands for an answer in such form as might be binding upon us to the question whether the German Em pire would remain neutral in a war between Russia and Austria. It was not possible to avoid giving this answer, and the Russian warcloud drew for a time Balkanward. The great results which, even after the congress, Russian policy reaped from this war have not subdued the restless ness of Russian policy in the degree which would be de sirable in the interests of peace-loving Europe. Russian policy has remained unquiet, unpacific; Panslavistic Chau vinism has gained increasing influence over the mind of Czar Alexander, and the serious (as, alas, it seems) disgrace of Count Shuvaloff has accompanied the Czar's censure of the Count's work, the Berlin congress. The leading minister, in so far as such a minister there is at present 261 BISMARCK in Russia, is the War Minister, Milutin. At his demand the peace, in which Russia is threatened by no one, has yet been followed by the mighty preparations which, not withstanding the financial sacrifice involved in the war, have raised the peace footing of the Russian army by 56,- 000 men, and the footing of the army of the West, which is kept ready for active service, by about 400,000 men. These preparations can only be intended as a menace to Austria or Germany, and the military establishments in the kingdom of Poland correspond to such a design. The War Minister has also, in presence of the technical com missions,* unreservedly declared that Russia must prepare for a war " with Europe." ' It it is indubitable that Czar Alexander, without de siring the war with Turkey, nevertheless waged it under stress of Panslavist influence, and if, meanwhile, the same party has gained in influence in consequence of the greater and more dangerous impression which the agitation at the back of it now makes on the mind of the Czar, we may readily apprehend that it may also succeed in obtaining Czar Alexander's sanction for further warlike enterprises on the western frontier. The European difficulties, which Russia might encounter by the way, have few or no ter rors for a minister like Milutin or Makoff, if it is true, as the Conservatives in Russia fear, that the party of move ment, while seeking to involve Russia in grievous wars, is less concerned to secure Russia's victory over the foreigner than to bring about an internal revolution. ' In these circumstances I cannot resist the conviction that in the future, perhaps in the near future, peace is * Appointed to carry out certain decisions of the Berlin treatv of Tulv 13.1878. ' 262 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE threatened by Russia, and perhaps only by Russia. The attempts which, according to our intelligence, have been made of late to ascertain whether Russia, on the com mencement of hostilities, would find support in France and Italy have certainly yielded only a negative result. The impotence of Italy has been revealed, and France has declared that at present she has no desire for war, and does not feel strong enough for an offensive war against Germany without other ally than Russia. ' In this situation of affairs Russia in the course of the last few weeks has presented to us demands which amount to nothing less than that we should make a definite choice between herself and Austria, at the same time instructing the German members of the Eastern committees to vote with Russia in doubtful questions ; while, in our opinion, the true construction of the decisions of the congress is that taken by the majority formed by Austria, England, and France, with which Germany has accordingly voted, so that Russia, partly with, partly without Italy, forms by herself the minority. Though these questions, e.g. the position of the bridge at Silistria, the concession to Tur key by the congress of the military road in Bulgaria, the administration of the postal and telegraphic system, and the frontier dispute (which concerns only a few villages) are in themselves very unimportant in comparison with the freedom of great empires, yet the Russian demand that we should vote upon them no longer with Austria, but with Russia, was accompanied not once, but several times, by unambiguous threats of the consequences prejudicial to the international relations of both countries which our refusal would eventually entail. This surprising circum stance, coinciding as it did with the withdrawal of Count 263 BISMARCK Andrassy,* was calculated to awaken a misgiving that be tween Russia and Austria a secret understanding had been established to the prejudice of Germany. This misgiving, however, is unfounded. Austria regards the restless Rus sian policy with as much disquietude as we, and seems to be inclined for an understanding with us for common de fence against a possible Russian attack on either of the two Powers. ' If the German Empire were to come to such an under standing with Austria, an understanding which should have in view the cultivation of peace with Russia as sedu lously as before, but should also provide for joint defence in the event of an attack by her upon either of the allied powers, I should see in it an essential security for the peace of Europe. Thus mutually assured, both empires might continue their efforts for the further consolidation of the Three Emperors' Alliance. The German Empire in alliance with Austria would not lack the support of England, and the peace of Europe, the common interest of both empires, would be guaranteed by 2,000,000 fighting men. In this alliance, purely defensive as it would be, there would be nothing to excite jealousy in any quarter: for in the German Confederation the same mutual guar antee subsisted with the sanction of international law for fifty years after 181 5. If no such understanding is come to, Austria will not be to blame if, under the influence of Russian threats, and uncertain of the attitude of Germany, * On August 14 the Emperor Francis Joseph had sanctioned in principle the discharge requested by Count Andrassy, but had deferred letting him go definitively until his successor should be appointed. The Count agreed to retain his position a little longer in order to complete the alliance with Germany. On October 8 his resignation and the appointment of his suc cessor Haymerle were published. 264 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE she finally seeks an entente cordiale with either France or Russia. In the latter case, Germany, by reason of her relation to France, would be in danger of entire isolation on the Continent. Supposing, however, that Austria were to effect an entente cordiale with France and England, as in 1854, Germany, unless prepared for isolation, would be forced to unite with Russia alone, and, as I fear, to follow in the mistaken and perilous course of Russian domestic and foreign policy. ' If Russia compel us to choose between her and Aus tria, I believe that the disposition which Austria would display towards us would be conservative and peaceable, while that of Russia would be uncertain. ' I venture to entertain the hope that your Majesty, consistently with what I know of your most exalted politi cal views, shares the sentiments which I have expressed, and would hail their corroboration with satisfaction. ' The difficulties of the problem which I propose to myself are great in themselves, and will be yet more materially increased by the necessity to which I am reduced of treating so large and many-sided a subject in writing, and that too at this place where I have nothing to rely on but my own energy, which previous excessive strain has rendered quite inadequate for the purpose. Considerations of health have already compelled me to protract my sojourn here. I hope, however, to be able to start on my journey homeward by Vienna after the 20th instant. If in the interim we do not succeed in coming to an understanding, at least on the question of principle, I fear that the present favourable opportunity will be missed, and the retirement of Andrassy forbids us to calculate on its return at any future time. In deeming it my duty 265 BISMARCK respectfully to submit to your Majesty my view of the political situation of the German Empire, I pray your Majesty graciously to bear in mind that Count Andrassy and I are bound by mutual promises to keep secret the plan of which the foregoing is an exposition, and that hitherto only their Majesties, the two Emperors, are acquainted with the design of their principal ministers to bring about a coalition of their two most exalted Majes ties. ' For completeness sake I subjoin the answer of the King and my reply thereto. 'My dear Prince von Bismarck, — With sincere regret I learned from your letter of the ioth instant that the strain and excitement of attending to business prevented you from deriving full benefit from the baths of Kissingen and Gastein. I have followed with the greatest interest your detailed exposition of the present state of politics, for which I tender you my most hearty thanks. Were the German Empire to become involved in war with Russia, a change so deeply to be regretted in the mutual relations of the two empires would cause me the most poignant grief, and I still entertain the hope that success may attend an effort to prevent such a turn of affairs by influ ence brought to bear in the cause of peace on the mind of his Majesty the Czar of Russia. Under all circumstances, however, your exertions to bring about a close union between the German Empire and Austria- Hungary have, I may assure you, my full approval,, and I most earnestly desire that they may be crowned with success. I trust that you may return home with health restored, and I heartily add and reiterate my assurance of the especial 266 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE esteem in which you are, and ever will continue to be, held by Your sincere friend, ' Lewis. 'Berg: Sept. 16, 1879.' ' Gastein : Sept. 19, 1879. ' With respectful gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your Majesty's gracious letter of the 16th instant, from which I am delighted to find that your Majesty is in ac cord with me in my endeavours to bring about an alliance for mutual defence with Austria- Hungary. In regard to the relations with Russia I remark, with the utmost sub mission, that the danger of hostile complications, which not only from a political, but also from a personal, point of view I should most deeply deplore, does not in my re spectful judgment confront us immediately, but would only become imminent in the event of France being ready to make common cause with Russia. So far this is not the case, and it is the intention of his Majesty the Emperor that our policy should leave no stone unturned in order now, as heretofore, to promote and assure peaceable rela tions between the Empire and Russia by such influences as ymay best operate upon the mind of his Majesty Czar Alexander. The negotiations for a closer alliance with Austria are only directed to assure peace, provide for com mon defence, and promote neighbourly intercourse. 'I think of leaving Gastein to-morrow, and hope to enter Vienna on Sunday. With humblest thanks for your Majesty's gracious expression of concern for my health, I remain, with profound respect, 'Your Majesty's most obedient servant, ' von Bismarck. ' 267 BISMARCK During the long journey from Gastein by Salzburg and Linz my sense of being in true German territory and among a German population was deepened by the recep tion which I met with from the public at the stations. At Linz the crowd was so great, its frame of mind so ani mated, that, from fear of giving occasion to misapprehen sions in Viennese circles, I drew the blinds of my carriage- windows, made no response to any of the greetings of welcome, and allowed the train to leave the station without even showing myself. In Vienna I found the people in the streets in a similar frame ; the greetings of the closely- packed throng were so continuous that, as I was in civilian dress, I was reduced to the awkward necessity of driving to the hotel with a head as good as bare the whole way. Moreover, during the days which I spent at the hotel I could not show myself at the window without eliciting friendly demonstrations from watchers or passers by it. These manifestations were multiplied after the Emperor Francis Joseph had paid me the honour of a visit. All these phenomena were the unequivocal expression of the desire of the population of the capital, and of the German provinces which I had traversed, to witness the formation of a close friendship with the new German Empire, as pledge of the future of both powers. I could not doubt that community of blood would meet with similar sympa thies in the German Empire, in the South yet more than in the North, among Conservatives yet more than among the opposition, in the Catholic West more than in the Evangelical East. The nominally religious struggles of the Thirty Years' war, the purely political struggles of the Seven Years' war, and the strife of rival diplomacies that went on between the death of Frederick the Great 268 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE and 1866, had not stifled the sense of this community of blood, notwithstanding the otherwise strong disposition of the German to fight his fellow-countryman, when occasion serves, with more zeal than the foreigner. It is possible that the wedge of Slav (Czech) population by which the true German stock of the Austrian Fatherland is separated from the people of the north-west provinces has mitigated the results which: are commonly produced by neighbourly shoulder-rubbing with Germans of similar stock, but ow ing allegiance to different dynasties, and intensified in the German-Austrian those German sympathies which have only been over-laid, not extinguished, by the debris depos ited by the struggles of the past. I met with a very gracious reception from the Emperor Francis Joseph, who evinced willingness to conclude with us. In order to make sure of the assent of my most gra cious master I had daily spent at the writing-table part of the time which ought to have been devoted to the 'course,' explaining the necessity under which we stood of limiting the number of possible coalitions against us, and that an alliance with Austria was the expedient most conducive to that end. I had, of course, little hope that the dead letters of my argumentation would alter the view of his Majesty, which rested rather on mental idiosyncrasy than political calculation. To conclude a treaty, which though merely defensive in form yet contemplated the possibility of war, and thus evinced suspicion of a friend and nephew, from whom he had only just parted at Alexandrovo amid mutual tears and heartfelt pledges of the continuance of the cordial relations of the past, ran too directly counter to the chivalrous feelings with which the Emperor re garded a friend and equal. I had no doubt whatever that 269 BISMARCK the sentiments of Czar Alexander were equally frank and honourable, but I knew that he brought to political affairs neither the native acumen nor the close study which would have afforded him permanent protection against the insidi ous influences by which he was surrounded, nor yet the scrupulous trustworthiness in personal relations which characterised my lord. Czar Nicholas, for good or for evil, had displayed a frankness of which his more yielding successor had not inherited his full share ; nor was the son superior to feminine influences in the same high degree as his father. Now the sole security for the permanence of Russian friendship is the personality of the ruling Czar, and whenever that security falls below the standard set by Alexander I, who in 1 8 1 3 evinced a loyalty to the Prus sian dynasty not always to be expected on the same throne, the Russian alliance cannot be counted upon to afford in the hour of need a resource adequate to every occasion. Even in the last century it was perilous to reckon on the constraining force of the text of a treaty of alliance when the conditions under which it had been writ ten were changed ; to-day it is hardly possible for the gov ernment of a Great Power to place its resources unreserv edly at the disposal of a friendly state when the sentiment of the people disapproves it. No longer, therefore, does the text of a treaty afford the same securities as in the days of the ' cabinet wars,' which were waged with armies of from 30,000 to 60,000 men; a family war, such as Frederick William II waged on behalf of his brother-in- law in Holland, could hardly to-day be put upon the Euro pean stage, nor could the conditions preliminary t» such a war as Nicholas waged on Hungary be readily again found. Nevertheless the plain and searching words of a 270 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE treaty are not without influence on diplomacy when it is concerned with precipitating or averting a war ; nor are even treacherous and violent governments usually inclined to an open breach of faith, so long as the force majeure of imperative interests does not intervene. All the well-pondered arguments which I reduced to writing at Gastein, and thence transmitted to the King at Baden, as also those which I afterwards sent him from Vienna, and finally from Berlin, were entirely without effect. In order to secure the Emperor's approval for the projet de traite", which I had concerted with Andrassy, and which had been sanctioned by the Emperor Francis Jo seph under the impression that the Emperor William would also concur, I was compelled to bring the cabinet into play, a method of procedure extremely against my grain. I succeeded, however, in gaining the approval of my colleagues. As I was myself so worn out by the exer tions of the last few weeks, which, as I said before, had broken in upon the time required for the treatment at Gastein, as to be unfit to travel to Baden-Baden, Count Stolberg went thither in my stead. He brought the nego tiations, notwithstanding the stout opposition of his Maj esty, to a successful issue. The Emperor was not con vinced by the arguments of policy, but gave the promise to ratify the treaty only because he was averse to minis terial changes. The Crown Prince was from the outset a strong advo cate of the Austrian alliance, but had no influence on his father. The Emperor's chivalrous temper demanded that the Czar of Russia should be confidentially informed that in the event of his attacking either of the two neighbour- 271 BISMARCK powers he would find himself opposed by both, in order that Czar Alexander might not make the mistake of sup posing that he could attack Austria alone. I deemed this solicitude groundless inasmuch as the cabinet of St. Peters burg must by our answer to the questions sent us from Livadia have already learned that we were not going to let Austria fall, and so our treaty with Austria had not created a new situation, but only legalised that which existed. A renewal of Kaunitz's coalition might be confronted without despair by a United Germany which conducted her campaigns with skill ; nevertheless it would be a very serious combination, the formation of which it must be the aim of our foreign policy, if possible, to prevent. If the united Austro-German power had by the closeness of its cohesion and the unity of its counsels as assured a position as either the Russian or the French power re garded per se, I should not consider a simultaneous attack by our two great neighbour empires, even though Italy were not the third in the alliance, as a matter of life and death. But if in Austria anti-German proclivities, whether national or religious, were to gain strength ; if Russian tentatives and overtures in the sphere of eastern policy, such as were made in the days of Catherine and Joseph II, were to be thrown into the scale, if Italian ambitions were to threaten Austria's possession on the Adriatic sea, and require the exertion of her strength to the same de gree as in Radetzky's time — then the struggle, the possi bility of which I anticipate, would be unequal. And if 272 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE we suppose the French monarchy restored, and France and Austria in league with the Roman Curia and our ene mies for the purpose of making a clean sweep of the results of 1 866, no words are needed to show how greatly aggra vated would then be the peril of Germany. This idea, pessimistic, but by no means chimerical, nor without jus tification in the past, induced me to raise the question whether it might not be advisable to establish between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary an organic con nexion which should not be published like ordinary treaties, but should be incorporated in the legislation of both Em pires, and require for its dissolution a new legislative Act on the part of one of them. Such a guarantee has a tranquillising effect on the mind; but whether it would stand the actual strain of events may reasonably be doubted, when it is remembered that the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, which in theory had much more effective sanctions, yet failed to assure the cohesion of the German nation, and that we should never be able to embody our relation with Austria in any more binding treaty-form than the earlier confed eration treaties, which in theory excluded the possibility of the battle of Koniggratz. All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by ' the struggle for existence.' No great na tion will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim ' ultra posse nemo obliga tor ' holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie vol. il- — 18 273 BISMARCK under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation. If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German policy appear salus publica for Austria-Hun gary, public faith could no more be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice than we saw gratitude do during the Crimean war, though the obligation was per haps stronger than any can be established by the wax and parchment of a treaty. An alliance under legislative sanction would have re alised the constitutional project which hovered before the minds of the most moderate members of the assembly of the Paulskirche, both those who stood for the narrower Imperial- German and those who represented the wider Austro-German confederation ; but the very reduction of such a scheme to contractual form would militate against the durability of its mutual obligations. The example of Austria between 1850 and 1866 was a warning to me that the political changes which such arrangements essay to control outrun the credits which independent states can assure to one another in the course of their political trans actions. I think, therefore, that to ensure the durability of a written treaty it is indispensable that the variable element of political interest, and the perils involved therein, should not be left out of account. The German alliance is the best calculated to secure for Austria a peaceful and conservative policy. The dangers to which our union with Austria are ex posed by tentatives towards a Russo-Austrian understand ing, such as was made in the days of Joseph II and Cath erine, or by the secret convention of Reichstadt, may, so far as possible, be minimised by keeping the strictest pos- 274 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE sible faith with Austria, and at the same time taking care that the road from Berlin to St. Petersburg is not closed. Our principal concern is to keep the peace between our two imperial neighbours. We shall be able to assure the future of the fourth great dynasty in Italy in proportion as we succeed in maintaining the unity of the three empire states, and in either bridling the ambition of our two neighbours on the east or satisfying it by an entente cor diale with both. Both are for us indispensable elements in the European political equilibrium ; the lack of either would be our peril — but the maintenance of monarchical government in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and in Rome as dependent upon Vienna and St. Petersburg, is for us in Germany a problem which coincides with the mainte nance of our own state regime. The treaty which we concluded with Austria for com mon defence against a Russian attack is publici juris. An analogous treaty between the two powers for defence against France has not been published. The German- Austrian alliance does not ' afford the same protection against a French war, by which Germany is primarily threatened, as against a Russian war, which is to be ap prehended rather by Austria than by Germany. Germany and Russia have no divergencies of interest pregnant with such disputes as lead to unavoidable ruptures. On the other hand, coincident aims in regard to Poland, and in a secondary degree the ancient solidarity which unites their dynasties in opposition to subversive efforts, afford both cabinets the bases for a common policy. They have 275 BISMARCK been impaired by the false bias given now for ten years past to public opinion by the Russian press. This has assiduously planted and fostered in the mind of the read ing part of the population an antipathy to everything German, with which the dynasty will have to reckon, even though the Czar may wish to cultivate German friendship. Scarcely, however, could anti-German rancour acquire in Russia a keener edge than it has among the Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia, the Slovenes of the countries com prised within the earlier German confederation, and the Poles in Galicia. In short, if in deciding between the Russian and the Austrian alliance I gave the preference to the latter, it was not that I was in any degree blind to the perplexities which made choice difficult. I regarded it as no less enjoined upon us to cultivate neighbourly re lations with Russia after, than before, our defensive alli ance with Austria; for perfect security against the dis ruption of the chosen combination is not to be had by Germany, while it is possible for her to hold in check the anti-German fits and starts of Austro-Hungarian feeling so long as German policy maintains the bridge which leads to St. Petersburg, and allows no chasm to intervene between us and Russia which cannot be spanned. Given no such irremediable breach Vienna will be able to bridle the forces hostile or alien to the German alliance. Sup pose, however, that the breach with Russia is an ac complished fact, an irremediable estrangement. Austria would then certainly begin to enlarge her claims on the services of her German confederate, first by insisting on an extension of the casus fcederis, which so far, according to the published text, provides only for the measures nec essary to repel a Russian attack upon Austria; then by 276 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE requiring the substitution for this casus fcederis of some provision safeguarding the interests of Austria in the Balkan and the East, an idea to which our press has al ready succeeded in giving practical shape. The wants, the plans of the inhabitants of the basin of the Danube naturally reach far beyond the present limits of the Aus tro-Hungarian monarchy, and the German imperial consti tution points out the way by which Austria may advance to a reconciliation of her political and material interests, so far as they lie between the eastern frontier of the Rou manian population and the Gulf of Cattaro. It is, how ever, no part of the policy of the German Empire to lend her subjects, to expend her blood and treasure, for the purpose of realising the designs of a neighbour Power. In the interest of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might in case of need stake her own peace with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from going outside this security, and deducing from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support. Peace between Germany and Russia may be imperilled by the systematic fomentation of ill-feeling, or by the am bition of Russian or German military men like Skobeleff, who desire war before they grow too old to distinguish themselves, but is hardly to be imperilled in any other way. The Russian press must needs be characterised by stupidity and disingenuousness in an unusual degree for it to believe and affirm that German policy was determined by aggressive tendencies in concluding the Austrian, and thereafter the Italian, defensive alliance. The disingenu ousness was less of Russian than of Polish-French, the 277 BISMARCK stupidity less of Polish-French than of Russian origin. In the field of Russian credulity and ignorance Polish- French finesse won a victory over that want of finesse in which, according to circumstances, consists now the strength, now the weakness of German policy. In most cases an open and honourable policy succeeds better than the subtlety of earlier ages, but it postulates, if it is to succeed, a degree of personal confidence which can more readily be lost than gained. The future of Austria, re garded in herself, cannot be reckoned upon with that cer tainty which is demanded when the conclusion of durable and, so to speak, organic treaties is contemplated. The factors which must be taken into account in this shaping are as manifold as is the mixture of her populations, and to their corrosive and occasionally disruptive force must be added the incalculable influence that the religious ele ment may from time to time, as the power of Rome waxes or wanes, exert upon the directing personalities. Not only Panslavism and the Bulgarian or Bosnian, but also the Servian, the Roumanian, the Polish, the Czechish ques tions, nay even to-day the Italian question in the district of Trent, in Trieste, and on the Dalmatian coast, may serve as points of crystallisation not merely for Austrian, but for European crises, by which German interests will be directly affected only in so far as the German Empire enters into a relation of close solidarity with Austria. In Bohemia the antagonism between Germans and Czechs has in some places penetrated so deeply into the army that the officers of the two nationalities in certain regiments hold aloof from one another even to the degree that they will not meet at mess. There is more immediate danger for Germany of becoming involved in grievous and dangerous 278 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE struggles on her western frontier, by reason of the aggres sive, plundering instincts of the French people, which have been greatly developed by her monarchs since the time of Emperor Charles V, in their lust of power at home as well as abroad. Austria's help is more readily to be had by us in a struggle with Russia than in a struggle with France, see ing that the jealousies which sprang from their courtship of Italy no longer exist for these two Powers in their old form. Should France once more become monarchical and Catholic she need not abandon the hope of recovering such relations with Austria as she held during the Seven Years' war, and at the congress of Vienna before the return of Napoleon from Elba, such as were threatened during the agitation of the Polish question in 1863, and bade fair to be actually established during the Crimean war, and in the time of Count Beust, 1866-70, at Salzburg and Vienna. In the event of the possible restoration of monarchy in France the mutual attraction of the two great Catholic Powers, no longer counteracted by the Italian rivalry, would induce enterprising politicians to try the experi ment of reviving the old alliance. In taking account of Austria it is even to-day an error to exclude the possibility of a hostile policy such as was pursued by Thugut, Schwarzenberg, Buol, Bach, and Beust. May not the policy which made ingratitude a duty, the policy on which Schwarzenberg plumed himself in regard to Russia, be again pursued towards another Power? The policy which from 1792 to 1795, while we stood in the field by Austria's side, led us into difficulties, and left us in the lurch in order thereby to retain the power of settling the Polish question to our disadvantage ; 279 BISMARCK which in fact was pushed so far as all but to involve us in a war with Russia, while we as nominal allies were fight ing for the German Empire against France ; which at the congress of Vienna all but resulted in a war between Russia and Prussia. Spasmodic symptoms of a tendency towards a similar policy will for the present be suppressed by the personal honour and loyalty of the Emperor Francis Joseph, who is neither so young nor so inexperienced as when he allowed Count Buol's personal antipathy to Czar Nicholas to dictate a policy hostile to Russia, a few years after Vilagos ; but he affords only a personal guarantee, which disappears so soon as another succeeds to his place, and the elements which from time to time have served to support a policy of rivalry with Germany may acquire fresh influences. The love of the Poles of Galicia, of the Ultramontane clergy, for the German Empire is of a fitful and opportunist nature ; nor have we any better guarantee that a perception of the value of German support will per manently outweigh the contempt with which the Magyar of full blood regards the Suabian. In Hungary, in Poland, French sympathies are still lively, and the restoration of monarchy upon a Catholic basis in France might cause the renewal of those relations with the clergy of the united Habsburg monarchy which in 1863 and between 1866 and 1870 found expression in common diplomatic action, and more or less mature schemes of union by treaty. The security which, in re gard to these contingencies, is to be found in the person of the present Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary is, as has been said, manifest enough, but a far-sighted policy must take account of all eventualities which lie within the region of possibility. The possibility of a THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE rivalry between Vienna and Berlin for the friendship of Russia may return upon us just as in the days of Olmiitz, or when, under the auspices (propitious for us) of Count Andrassy, it once more attested its existence by the con vention of Reichstadt. In face of this eventuality it makes in our favour that Austria and Russia have opposing interests in the Balkan, while none such in strength enough to occasion an open breach and actual struggle exist between Russia and Prus sia with Germany. This advantage, however, may be taken from us — thanks to the peculiar character of the Russian constitution — by personal misunderstanding and maladroit policy, no less easily to-day than when Czarina Elizabeth was induced by the bitter bon mots of Frederick the Great to accede to the Franco-Austrian alliance. Mischief -making intrigues, such as then served to irritate Russia, scandalous fabrications, indiscreet utterances or acts, will not be wanting even to-day at either Court ; but it is possible for us to maintain our independence and dig nity in face of Russia without wounding Russian sensi tiveness or damaging Russia's interests. The wanton stir ring up of bad and bitter feeling reacts to-day with no less effect on the course of history than in the times of Czarina Elizabeth of Russia and Queen Anne of England. But this reaction exerts to-day a much more powerful influence upon the present and future weal of the nations than a hundred years ago. An anti- Prussian coalition like that of the Seven Years' war between Russia, Austria and France, in union perhaps with other discontented dynas ties, would to-day expose our existence to just as grave a peril, and if victorious would be far more disastrous. It is irrational, it is criminal by fomenting personal misun- BISMARCK derstandings to cut off the way of access to an entente cor diale with Russia. We must and can honourably maintain the alliance with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy ; it corresponds to our interests, to the historical traditions of Germany, to the public opinion of our people. The influences and forces under and amid which the future policy of Vienna must be shaped are, however, more complex than with us, by reason of the manifold diversity of the nationalities, the divergence of their aspirations and activities, the in fluence of the clergy, and the temptations to which the Danubian countries are exposed in the Balkan and Black Sea latitudes. We cannot abandon Austria, but neither can we lose sight of the possibility that the policy of Vienna may willy-nilly abandon us. The possibilities which in such a case remain open to us must be clearly realised and steadily borne in mind by German statesmen before the critical moment arrives, nor must their action be deter mined by prejudice or misunderstanding, but by an en tirely dispassionate weighing of the national interests. It has always been my endeavour to promote not merely the security of the country against Russian attacks, but also in Russia itself a peaceful tone, and a belief in the unaggressive character of our policy. Nor (thanks to the personal confidence which Czar Alexander III reposed in me) did I ever fail so long as I remained in office to turn the edge of the mistrust which again and again was aroused in his mind by misrepresentations on the part both of his 282 THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE own subjects and of foreigners, and occasionally by sub terranean influences of a military kind from this side of the frontier. At my first interview with him after his accession (in the Dantzic roads), and at all subsequent meetings, he was prevented neither by falsehoods disseminated in re gard to the congress of Berlin, nor by the knowledge which he possessed of the Austrian treaty, from display ing towards me a good -will which at Skiernevice and at Berlin received authentic expression — a good-will which rested on personal trust in me. Even the affair of the forged letters placed in his hands at Copenhagen — an in trigue which by its shameless audacity was capable of producing the worst impression — was rendered innocuous by my mere disavowal. No less success had I at the meeting in October 1889 in dissipating the doubts which he had brought with him from Copenhagen, including the last, which concerned my own continuance in office. He was far better instructed than I when he put the question, whether I was quite sure of retaining my place under the new Emperor. I answered, as I then thought, that I was convinced that I possessed the confidence of Emperor William II, and did not believe that I should ever be dis missed against my will, because his Majesty, by reason of my prolonged experience in office, and the confidence which I had won for myself, not only in Germany, but in foreign Courts, had in my person a servant whom it was very difficult to replace. My assurance elicited from his Majesty an expression of great satisfaction, though he hardly seemed to share it unreservedly. International policy is a fluid element which under certain conditions will solidify, but on a change of atmos- 283 BISMARCK phere reverts to its original diffuse condition. The clause rebus sic stantibus is tacitly understood in all treaties that involve performance. The Triple Alliance is a strategic position, which in the face of the perils that were immi nent at the time when it was concluded was politic, and, under the prevailing conditions, feasible. It has been from time to time prolonged, and may be yet further pro longed, but eternal duration is assured to no treaty be tween Great Powers ; and it would be unwise to regard it as affording a permanently stable guarantee against all the possible contingencies which in the future may modify the political, material, and moral conditions under which it was brought into being. It has the significance of a strategic position adopted after strict scrutiny of the politi cal situation of Europe at the time when it was concluded, but it no more constitutes a foundation capable of offering perennial resistance to time and change than did many another alliance (triple or quadruple) of recent centuries, and in particular the Holy Alliance and the German Con federation. It does not dispense us from the attitude of toujours en vedette. CHAPTER XXX THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA The danger of foreign wars, the danger that the next war on our west frontier might bring the red flag into the struggle, just as a hundred years ago it brought the tri color, was present at the time of Schnabele and Boulanger, and is still present. The probability of a war on two sides has been to some extent diminished by the death of Kat- koff and Skobeleff; a French attack upon us would not necessarily bring Russia into the field against us with the same certainty as a Russian attack would bring France ; but the inclination of Russia to sit still depends not only on moods and feelings, but still more on technical ques tions of armament by land and sea. As soon as Russia is in her own opinion ' through ' with the construction of rifles, the choice of powder, and the strength of the Black Sea fleet, then the tone in which at present the variations of Russian policy are maintained will perhaps make room for a freer one. It is not probable that Russia when she has completed her armaments will, calculating on French assistance, use them in order at once to attack us. A German war offers to Russia just as few immediate advantages as a Russian war offers to Germany, at most in regard to the war contri bution. The Russians, if victorious, would be in a more favourable position than the Germans, but even so they would scarcely recover their expenses. The thought of 285 BISMARCK acquiring East Prussia which appeared during the Seven Years' war will scarcely find adherents now. If the Ger man element in the population of the Baltic provinces is already more than they can do with, we cannot suppose that Russian policy would be directed towards strengthen ing this minority, which is considered dangerous, by so vigorous an addition as East Prussia. Just as little can a Russian statesman desire an increase of the Polish subjects of the Czar by Posen and West Prussia. If we consider Germany and Russia as isolated, it is difficult on either side to discover a compelling or even a justifiable ground of war. The mere satisfaction of pugnacity, or the desire to avoid the dangers of an unoccupied army, might perhaps make them enter on a war in the Balkans ; a German- Rus sian war is, however, too serious for either side to use it simply as a means for occupying their army and their officers. I also do not believe that Russia, when she is ready, would at once attack Austria, and I am still of the opinion that the massing of troops in the west of Russia is not cal culated for any directly aggressive tendency against Ger many, but merely for defence, in case Russia's advance against Turkey should decide the Western Powers to attempt to check it. When Russia considers herself suffi ciently armed — and for this an adequate strength of the fleet in the Black Sea is requisite — then, I think, the St. Petersburg cabinet will act as it did in 1833 at the treaty of Hunkiar-Iskelessi ; they will offer the Sultan to guar antee to him his position in Constantinople and in the provinces which remain to him, on condition that he will give to Russia the key to the Russian house— that is to the Black Sea — in the form of a Russian control of the 286 THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA Bosphorus. It is not only possible, but, if the affair is cleverly managed, it is probable that the Porte would agree to a Russian protectorate in this form. In former years the Sultan could believe that the jealousy of the European Powers would give him guarantees against Russia. For England and Austria the maintenance of Turkey was a traditional policy ; but Gladstone's public utterances have deprived the Sultan of this support not only in London but also in Vienna, for one cannot suppose that the cabinet of Vienna would at Reichstadt have dropped the traditions of the Metternich period (Ypsilanti, hostility to the liberation of Greece), had it been sure of English support. The check of gratitude to the Emperor Nicholas had already been broken by Buol during the Crimean war, and at the congress of Paris the attitude of Austria had turned back to the old Metternich direction ; this was all the more evi dent, since it was not softened by the financial relations of that statesman to the Russian Emperor, but rather had been intensified by the injury done to Count Buol's vanity. The Austria of 1856 would, but for the dissolving effects of the blundering English policy, not have cut itself adrift from England, or from the Porte, even for the sake of Bos nia. As things are at the present day, it is not probable that the Sultan expects from England, or Austria, as much assistance and protection as Russia could promise without surrendering her own interests, and in virtue of her prox imity successfully afford. If Russia, as soon as she is sufficiently ready, if neces sary, to fall upon and overrun the Sultan and the Bosphorus by land and sea, makes a personal and confidential proposal to the Sultan to guarantee him his position in the Seraglio and all his provinces, not only against foreign countries 287 BISMARCK but also against his own subjects, in return for permission to erect sufficient fortifications and maintain a sufficient number of troops at the northern entrance to the Bosphorus — this would be an offer which he would be much tempted to accept. Let us assume the case, however, that the Sul tan of his own impulse or under foreign pressure rejects the advances of Russia, then the new Black Sea fleet might be destined, even before trying conclusions, to secure that position on the Bosphorus which Russia believes she re quires, in order to come into possession of the key to her own house. Whatever may be the future course of this phase of the Russian policy the existence of which I have assumed, anyhow it will produce a state of things in which Russia, as in July 1853, takes some security and waits to see whether and by whom it will be taken away again. The first step of Russian diplomacy after these long-prepared operations would probably be to find out by cautious sounding in Berlin, whether Austria or England, if they opposed by war the Russian advance, could reckon upon the support of Germany. In my opinion this question would have to be met by an unconditional negative. I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomat ically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position. We should then cease to be in the condition of being hounded on by England and occa sionally also by Austria, and exploited by them to check Russian lust after the Bosphorus, and we should be able to wait and see if Austria were attacked and thereby our casus belli arose. It would be better for the Austrian policy also to with THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA draw itself from the influence of Hungarian Chauvinism, until Russia had taken up a position on the Bosphorus, and had thereby considerably intensified its friction with the Mediterranean states — that is with England, and even with Italy and France — and so had increased the necessity of coming to an understanding with Austria ct I'aimable. Were I an Austrian minister I would not prevent the Rus sians going to Constantinople, but I would not begin an understanding with them until they had made the move forward. Under any circumstances, the share which Aus tria has in the inheritance of Turkey will be arranged in understanding with Russia, and the Austrian portion will be all the greater the better they know at Vienna how to wait, and to encourage Russian policy to take up a more advanced position. As regards England, the position of modern Russia might perhaps be considered as improved if it ruled Constantinople; but as regards Austria and Germany, Russia would be less dangerous as long as it remained in Constantinople. It would no longer be possi ble for Prussia to blunder as it did in 1855, and to play ourselves out and hazard our stake for Austria, England, and France, in order to earn a humiliating admission to the congress and a mention honorable as a European Power. If the inquiry whether Russia, if it be attacked on its advance towards the Bosphorus by other Powers, can reckon on our neutrality so long as Austria is not endangered, is answered at Berlin in the negative, or indeed with threats, then Russia will first of all enter on the road she took in 1876 at Reichstadt, and again attempt to win Austrian fellowship. The field in which Russia can make offers is a very wide one; there is not only the East at the expense of the Porte, but Germany vol. 11. — 19 289 BISMARCK at our expense. How far we can rely on our alliance with Austria-Hungary against temptations of this kind will depend not only on the letter of agreement, but also to some extent on the character of the personali ties and the political and confessional currents, which at the time are influential in Austria. If Russian policy succeeds in winning Austria, then the coalition of the Seven Years' war against us is complete, for France will always be to be had against us, her interests on the Rhine being more important than those in the East and on the Bosphorus. Anyhow, in the future not only military equipment but also a correct political eye will be required to guide the German ship of state through the currents of coalitions to which we are exposed in consequence of our geograph ical position and our previous history. We shall not avoid the dangers which lie in the bosom of the future by amiability and commercial pourboires to friendly Powers. We should only increase the greed of our former friends and teach them to reckon on our anxieties and necessities. What I fear is, that by following the road in which we have started our future will be sacrificed to small and tem porary feelings of the present. Former rulers looked more to the capacity than the obedience of their advisers ; if obedience alone is the criterion, then demands will be made on the general ability of the monarch, which even Fred erick the Great himself would not satisfy, although in his time politics, both in war and peace, were less difficult than they are to-day. Our reputation and our security will develop all the more permanently, the more, in all conflicts which do not immediately touch us, we hold ourselves in reserve and do 290 THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA not show ourselves sensitive to every attempt to stir up and utilise our vanity. Attempts of this kind were made during the Crimean war by the English press and the English Court, and the men who tried to push them selves forward at our own Court by depending on Eng land; we were then so successfully threatened with the loss of the title of a Great Power, that Herr von Man teuffel at Paris exposed us to great humiliations in order that we might be admitted to take part in sign ing a treaty, which it would have been useful to us not to be bound by. Now also Germany would be guilty of a great folly if in Eastern struggles which did not affect her interests she were to take a side sooner than the other Powers who were more directly concerned. Even during the Crimean war there were moments in which Prussia, weaker though she then was, by resolutely arming to support Austrian demands, and even going beyond them, could command peace and further an under standing with Austria on German questions ; and just in the same way in future Eastern negotiations Germany, by holding back, will be able to turn to its advantage the fact that it is the Power which has least interest in Oriental questions, and will gain the more the longer it holds up its stake, even if the advantage were to consist in nothing more than a longer enjoyment of peace. Austria, Eng land, Italy will always have to take up a position with regard to a Russian move forward upon Constantinople sooner than the French, for the Oriental interests of France are less imperative, and must be considered more in connexion with the question of the German frontier. In Russo-Oriental crises France would not be able to en tangle herself either in a new policy for gaining power in 291 BISMARCK the West, or in threats against England based upon friend ship with Russia, unless she had previously come to an understanding or a breach with Germany. If Germany has the advantage that her policy is free from direct interests in the East, on the other side is the disadvantage of the central and exposed position of the German Empire, with its extended frontier which has to be defended on every side, and the ease with which anti-Ger man coalitions are made. At the same time Germany is perhaps the single_Great Power in Europe which is not tempted by any objects which can only be attained by a successful war. It is our interest to maintain peace, while without exception our continental neighbours have wishes, either secret or officially avowed, which cannot be fulfilled except by war. We must direct our policy in accordance with these facts — that is, we must do our best to prevent war or limit it. We must reserve our hand, and not allow ourselves before the proper time to be pushed out of a waiting into an active attitude by any impatience, by the desire to oblige others at the expense of the country, by vanity or other provocation of this kind ; otherwise plec- tuntur Achivi. Our non-interference cannot reasonably be directed to sparing our forces so as, after the others have weakened themselves, to fall upon any of our neighbours or a pos sible opponent. On the contrary, we ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling which has been called out througn our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan and also less harmful for the freedom of others than that of France, Russia, or England. 292 THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA That respect for the rights of other states in which France especially has always been so wanting at the time of her supremacy, and which in England lasts only so long as English interests are not touched, is made easy for the German Empire and its policy, on one side owing to the practicality of the German character, on the other by the fact (which has nothing to do with our deserts) that we do not require an increase of our immediate territory, and also that we could not attain it without strengthening the centrifugal elements in our own territory. It has always been my ideal aim, after we had established our unity within the possible limits, to win the confidence not only of the smaller European states, but also of the Great Powers, and to convince them that German policy will be just and peaceful, now that it has repaired the injuria tem- porum, the disintegration of the nation. In order to pro duce this confidence it is above everything necessary that we should be honourable, open, and easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events. I have followed this recipe not without some personal reluctance in cases like that of Schnabele (April 1887), Boulanger, Kauffmann (September 1887); as towards Spain in the question of the Caroline Islands, towards the United States in that of Samoa, and I imagine that in the future also opportu nities will not be wanting of showing that we are appeased and peaceful. During the time that I was in office I advised three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian, and the French ; but every time I first made myself clear whether the war, if it were successful, would bring a prize of vic tory worth the sacrifices which every war requires, and which now are so much greater than in the last century. Had I had to say to myself that after one of these wars 293 BISMARCK we should find some difficulty in discovering conditions of peace which were desirable, I should scarcely have con vinced myself of the necessity for these sacrifices as long as we were not actually attacked. I have never looked at international quarrels which can only be settled by a na tional war, from the point of view of the Gottingen stu dent code or the honour which governs a private duel, but I have always considered simply their reaction on the claim of the German people, in equality with the other great states and Powers of Europe, to lead an autonomous political life, so far as is possible on the basis of our peculiar national capacity. The traditional Russian policy, which was based partly on community of faith and partly on blood relationship — the thought of freeing from the Turkish yoke and thereby binding to Russia the Roumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, occasionally also the Roman Catholic Servians who under various names are to be found on either side of the Austro-Hungarian frontier — has not stood the test. It is not impossible that in the far future all these races will be forcibly incorporated in the Russian system; but the Greek race has been the first to show that liberation alone does not change them into adherents of the Russian power. After Tchesme (1770) the Greeks were regarded as the support of Russia, and as late as the Russo-Turkish war of 1 806 to 1 8 1 2 the aims of the Imperial Russian policy seemed to be unchanged. It is immaterial whether the undertakings of the Hetaeria at the time of Ypsilanti's rebellion (and this, which had been made popular also in the West, was the outcome of the Hellenising Eastern policy of which the Fanariots were the intermediaries) had the united support of the different currents of Russian life 294 THE FUTURE POLICY OF RUSSIA which crossed one another from Araktcheyeff down to the Decembrists; anyhow the Greeks, the firstborn of the Russian policy of liberation, were a disappointment to Russia, if not a decisive one. The policy of the libera tion of Greece has, from the time of Navarino, ceased, even in the eyes of the Russians, to be a Russian spe ciality. It was a long time before the Russian cabinet drew the conclusion from this critical event. The rudis indigestaque moles of Russia is too heavy to be easily moved by every observation of political instinct. They went on liberating, and the experience they had had with the Greeks repeated itself with the Roumanians, Servians, and Bulgarians. All these races have gladly accepted Russian help for liberation from the Turks; but since they have been free they have shown no tendency to accept the Czar as successor of the Sultan. I do not know whether in St. Petersburg they share the conviction that even ' the only friend ' of the Czar, the Prince of Monte negro, will continue to hoist the Russian flag only so long as he expects equivalents in gold and power, though this, considering his distant and isolated situation, would to some extent be excusable; but it cannot be unknown in St. Petersburg that the Vladika was ready and perhaps is still ready to come forward as constable for the Grand Turk at the head of the Balkan peoples, if this idea were to find at the Porte an acceptance and support sufficiently favourable to make it profitable for Montenegro. If at St. Petersburg they wish to draw conclusions from their previous mistakes, and profit by their experience, the natural thing would be for them to limit themselves to the less fantastical progress which can be attained by the weight of regiments and cannons. Experience has not 295 BISMARCK pronounced its placet on the historical and poetical side which was in the mind of the Empress Catherine when she gave her second grandson the name of Constantine. Liberated nations are not grateful but exacting; and it seems to me that the advance of Russian policy in dealing with Eastern questions in the present realistic time would be rather technical than enthusiastic. Their first practical requirement for developing their power in the East is to make the Black Sea safe. If they succeed in attaining a firm control over the Bosphorus by laying down torpedoes and placing guns in position, then the south coasts of Russia will be even better protected than the Baltic ; and in the Crimean war the superior English and French fleets could do little to the latter. This is the form which the calculation of the St. Petersburg cabinet may take if its first object is to close the Black Sea and to win over the Sultan for this purpose by love, by money, or by violence. If the Porte rejects the friendly approach of Russia and draws the sword against the threatened violence, then Russia will probably be attacked from another side, and in my opinion the mass ing of troops on the western frontier is calculated to meet this event. If they succeed in closing the Bosphorus by good-will, then perhaps the Powers who find themselves injured by this will sit still for a time, since each one would wait for the initiative of the other and the decision of France. Our interests are more easily reconciled with the gravitation of the Russian power to the south than those of other Powers ; one can even say that they are advanced by it. We can await longer than the others the unravelling of the new knot which has been tied by Russia, 296 CHAPTER XXXI THE COUNCIL OF STATE The Council of State which was introduced by the law of March 20, 18 17, was intended to advise the absolute King. In his place has now been put the King who by the con stitution is advised by his ministers, and thereby the min istry of state has been absorbed into that governing factor which has to be assisted by the previous discussion in the council — a factor which in former days was represented by the King alone. The discussions in the council are nowa days for the information not only of the King, but also of the responsible ministers. When it was brought into activity again in 1852, the object was to prepare not only the decisions of the King, but the votes of the min isters. The preparation of drafts of law by the ministry of state is incomplete. A reporting secretary is in a position to determine the fate of a bill right down to the time of its promulgation, for, supposing the subject is difficult and the number of paragraphs large, he can divert all attempts to influence the contents, which are made either in the ministry of state or in the different stages of parliamen tary discussion, to the outward form of the draft. Even within the ministry the departmental ministers do not always really comprehend the matter which the secretaries lay before them in the form of a draft bill accompanied by motives and explanations. Much less do the other min- 297 BISMARCK isters spend time and trouble in making themselves ac quainted with the contents and importance of a new law in every detail, unless it will affect their own department. If this is the case, then the feeling of independence and the particularism which animates each one of the eight fed erated ministerial provinces, and every secretary in his own sphere, are set in motion. The departmental minister, however, will not be in a condition to judge the effect of an intended law on practical life, if he himself be a one sided product of the bureaucracy; much less will his col leagues. Not five per cent, of those whom I have had the opportunity of observing are conscious of being not merely departmental ministers, but also ministers of state who share in the common responsibility for their joint policy. The others confine themselves to attempting to administer their own departments free from blame, to getting the necessary supplies from the Minister of Finance, and hav ing them passed by the Diet, and to defending themselves successfully against parliamentary attacks on their depart ment by their eloquence and, if necessary, by throwing over their subordinates. The receipts which come to them in the form of the royal signature and parliamentary grants are sufficient to prevent the question whether the law is in itself desirable from coming before the bureau cratic ministerial conscience. The interference of a col league whose department is not directly concerned arouses the sensitiveness of the departmental minister, and, as a rule, this is spared in return for the similar consideration which each one expects for his own proposals. I can remember that the discussions of the old Council of State before 1848, some prominent members of which I knew, were carried on with more pointed exertion of the individ- 298 THE COUNCIL OF STATE ual judgment and stronger stirrings of the conscience than the ministerial consultations which I have been in a posi tion to observe for more than forty years. It is also, I consider, misleading to assume that the draft of a bill which leaves the ministry badly drawn is sufficiently discussed in the Diet. It can and, let us hope, it will as a rule be rejected. If, however, the ques tion with which it has to do is pressing, then there is a danger that ministerial nonsense goes smoothly through the parliamentary stages, especially if the author of the scheme succeeds in winning for his product some influen tial or eloquent friend. Considering the great number of members who have been at the universities, and who hold judicial or administrative posts, there must, one would suppose, be some who give themselves the trouble to read a draft bill of more than a hundred paragraphs, or who might even be able to read it with understanding ; but few have the love of work and the feeling of duty, and these are divided among groups and parties which are in constant conflict with one another, and whose tendencies make it difficult for them to come to a judgment on the matter itself. Most members, read without criticising, and ask the party leaders, who work and speak for their own ends, when they are to attend the sitting and how they are to vote. This all is to be explained by human nature, and nobody is to be blamed that he cannot change his skin; only we must not deceive ourselves, and it is a serious error to suppose that our laws nowadays have that investi gation and preparatory work which they require, or even that which they enjoyed before 1848. The Reichstag has set up a monument of this super ficiality in the constitution of the North German confed- 299 BISMARCK eration, which has been transferred to the constitution of the German Empire. Article 68 of the draft constitution, which was imitated from a resolution of the Frankfort Diet, enumerated five forms of crime which, if they were com mitted against the confederation, were to be punished in the same way as though they had been committed against a single federal state. The fifth number was introduced with the word ' lastly.' Twesten, whose thoroughness was well known, proposed as an amendment to strike out the three first numbers; he had, however, obviously not read to the end the article which he proposed to amend, and left the word ' lastly ' in it. His proposal was accepted, and retained in all stages of the discussion, and the article (now No. 74) has the remarkable reading : ' Every undertaking against the existence, the integrity, the safety, or the constitution of the German empire, lastly insults against the Federal Council, the Reichstag,' &c. Before 1848 people took trouble to find out what was right and reasonable ; now they are satisfied with a majority and the signature of the King. I can only regret that in preparing laws the co-operation of wider circles of the kind which was given in the Council of State and in the Board for Economics has not been made sufficiently powerful against ministerial or monarchical impatience. When I found leisure to occupy myself with these prob lems, I occasionally expressed to my colleagues the wish that they should begin their legislative activity by pub lishing the draft of laws, exposing them to the criticism of publicists, listening to the greatest possible number of cir cles who understood the matter and were interested in the question — that is the Council of State, the Economic Board, and, under circumstances, the provincial Diets — 300 THE COUNCIL OF STATE before they brought them up for discussion in the ministry. I attribute the repression of the Council of State and sim ilar consultative bodies chiefly to the jealousy with which these unprofessional advisers in public affairs are regarded by the professional secretaries and the parliaments, at the same time also to the discomfort with which ministerial omnipotence within its own department looks on the inter ference of others. The first meetings of the Council of State which I attended after 1884, under the presidency of the Crown Prince Frederick William, made a businesslike and favour able impression not only on me, but, as I believe, on all others who took part in them. The Prince listened to the speeches without showing any desire to influence the speakers. It was noticeable that the speeches of two for mer officers of the guards, von Zedlitz-Triitzschler, after wards chief President in Posen and Minister of Religion and Education, and von Minnigerode, made such an impression that the Crown Prince afterwards appointed both of them to draw up reports, and in this acted in accordance with the opinion of the meeting, although without doubt the speeches which showed more theoretic knowledge of the subject were made by the specialist professors who were present. The influence which in this way men who had formerly been officers in the guard exercised in projects of law confirmed me in my convic tion that the mere testing of drafts in the ministry is not the right way of avoiding the danger that unpractical, harmful, and dangerous proposals, drawn up in very incor rect language, should make their way from the composi tions of the dilettante legislative activity of a single re porting secretary unchecked, or at any rate without any 301 BISMARCK sufficient correction, through all the stages of the minis try of state, the parliaments, and the cabinet, into the collections of laws, and then, until some remedy is found, form a portion of the burden which creeps among us and drags on like a disease. CHAPTER XXXII THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I About the middle of the 'seventies the Emperor's intel lect began to work less easily, he had difficulty in compre hending what others said and in developing his own state ments; at times he lost the thread in listening and speaking. Curiously enough a change for the better began after Nobiling's attempt on his life. Moments like those I have described did not occur; the- Emperor was freer, had more life, and was also more easily moved. When I expressed my delight at the good state of his health he was moved to the jest, ' Nobiling knew better than the doctors what I wanted — a good letting of blood.' The last illness was short; it began on March 4, 1888. On the 8th at midday I had my last interview with the Emperor, at which he was still conscious, and I obtained from him the authorisation to publish the order, \hich had been drawn up as long ago as November 17, 1887, in which Prince William was commissioned to act as the Emperor's representative in cases where his Majesty should believe that he required one. The Emperor said he expected me to remain in my position and stand at the side of his successors ; at first there seemed to be in his mind chiefly the anxiety that I should not be able to get on with the Emperor Frederick. I expressed myself so as to calm his apprehensions, so far as it seemed fitting to speak to a dying man of that which his successors and I 3°3 BISMARCK would do after his death. Then, thinking of his son's ill ness, he required from me the promise that I would allow his grandson to have the benefit of my experience and remain at his side, if, as seemed probable, he should soon come to the government. I gave expression to my readi ness to serve his successor with the same zeal as himself. His only answer was a slightly more noticeable pressure of my hand ; then his mind began to wander, and the occu pation with his grandson came so much into the front, that he thought the Prince, who in September 1886 had paid a visit to the Czar at Brest Litewsk, was sitting in my place at his bedside, and suddenly addressing me with ' Du,' he said, ' Thou must always keep touch with the Russian Emperor ; there no conflict is necessary. ' After a long interval of silence the hallucination had disappeared ; he dismissed me with the words, ' I still see you. ' He saw me once more when I came in the afternoon, and again at four o'clock in the night on the 9th, but he can scarcely have recognised me among the many who were present ; there had been a return of full clearness and conscious ness late in the evening of the 8th, and he was able to speak with those who were standing round his deathbed in the narrow bedroom in clear and connected words. It was the last flicker of that strong and brave spirit. At half -past eight he drew his last breath. Under Frederick William III only the Crown Prince had been consciously educated as successor to the throne ; the education of the second son had been on the other hand exclusively military. It was natural that throughout 3°4 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I his whole life military influences should have in them selves a stronger influence on him than civil, and I myself thought that my influence on him was to some extent strengthened by the impression of the military uniform which I used to wear in order to avoid the necessity of changing my clothes many times a day. Among the peo ple who, so long as he was only Prince William, could have influence on his development, officers without political duties took the first place, after General von Gerlach, who had been his aide-de-camp for many years, had temporarily dropped out of political life. He was the ablest among the aides-de-camp whom the Prince had had; he was not a theoretical fanatic in politics and religion like his brother the President, but still he was enough of a doctrinaire not to find so much response in the practical understanding of the Prince as he did with the brilliant intellect of the King, Frederick William. ' Pietism ' was a word and an idea which were easily connected with the name of Gerlach, on account of the role which the general's two brothers, the President and the clergyman, who was author of an exten sive work on the Bible, played in the political world. A conversation connected with the name of Gerlach, which I had in 1853 with the Prince at Ostend, where I had been brought into closer connexion with him, has remained in my memory, for I was much struck by the Prince's want of acquaintance with our public institutions and the political situation. One day he spoke with a certain animosity about Gen eral von Gerlach, who as it seemed, in consequence of a want of agreement, had in bad humour resigned his post as adjutant. The Prince spoke of him as a ' Pietist.' /. — What does your Royal Highness mean by a pietist ? vol. 11. — 20 305 BISMARCK He. — A man who plays the hypocrite in religion in order to advance in his career. /. — There is nothing of that in Gerlach : what could he become ? In the language of the present day the word pietist has quite another meaning, viz. a man who believes in the Christian religion according to the orthodox creed and makes no secret of his belief ; and there are many of them who have nothing to do with political life and do not think of making a career. He. — What do you mean by orthodox ? /. — For example, one who seriously believes that Jesus is the Son of God and died for us as a sacrifice for the pardon of our sins. At the moment I cannot give a more accurate definition, but that is the essential part in the difference of belief. He (growing very red). — Who is there, then, so for saken by God that he does not believe that ? I. — If what you have just said were publicly known, your Royal Highness would yourself be counted among the pietists. In the further course of the conversation we touched on the question of the ' regulation for districts and villages ' which at that time was in suspense. On this the Prince spoke as follows : He was, he said, no enemy to the nobility, but he could not allow that the peasant should be ill-treated by the nobleman. I answered : ' How can the nobleman set to work ? If I wanted to ill-treat my Schonhausen peasants, I should be without any means of doing so, and the attempt would end with my ill-treatment either by the peasants or by the law.' 306 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I He rejoined : ' That may be the case with you in Schonhausen; but it is an exception, and I cannot allow that the poor in the country should be cruelly used. ' I asked for permission to lay before him a short expla nation of the origin of our rural conditions and the rela tion between landlord and peasant. He accepted the offer with pleasure, and afterwards in Norderney I devoted my spare hours to explaining to the heir to the throne, who was already fifty-six years old, the legal position of manors and peasants in 1853, quoting the passages from the laws. I sent him the work not without some fear that the Prince would answer curtly and ironically that I had told him nothing which he had not already known for thirty years. On the contrary, however, he thanked me warmly for the interesting collection of facts which were new to him. From the moment when the regency began, Prince William felt so keenly the want of a proper business edu cation that he shunned no labour by day or night in order to make good the deficiency. When he was ' transacting public affairs,' then he really worked, seriously and con scientiously. He read all papers which were sent in to him, not merely those which attracted him, and studied the treaties and laws so that he might form an independent judgment. He knew no pleasure which would have taken away time from affairs of state. He never read novels or other books which did not concern his duties as ruler. He did not smoke or play cards. When there was a shooting party at Wusterhausen and after dinner they went into the room where Frederick William I used to 3°7 BISMARCK collect the tabakscollegium in order that the others might be able to smoke in his presence, he had a long Dutch clay pipe handed to him, took a few puffs at it, and then put it down with a wry face. Once when he was in Frank fort, while he was still Prince of Prussia, he came into a room where hazard was being played, and said to me, ' I will just try my luck once, but I have no money with me; give me some.' As I also did not carry money about with me, Count Theodor Stolberg came to our help. The Prince staked a thaler several times, lost each time, and left the room. His only recreation was, after a hard day's work, to sit in his box at the theatre ; but even there I, as minister, was allowed to seek him out for pressing business, and make reports to him in the small room behind the box and receive his signature. A good night's rest was so necessary to him that he would complain of a bad night if he was disturbed twice, and of sleeplessness if he were disturbed three times, and yet I never saw the slightest touch of annoyance when in difficult circum stances I had to wake him up at two or three o'clock to ask for a hasty decision. Besides the diligence to which he was impelled by his strong sense of duty, he was helped in fulfilling his du ties as ruler by an unwonted measure of clear and healthy human understanding, common sense, which was neither dependent on nor limited by acquired knowledge. He was hindered in understanding affairs by the tenacity with which he clung to princely, military, and local traditions ; it was always difficult for him to give them up, or to turn into new paths when the course of circumstances made it necessary, and it easily appeared to him in the light of something unpermissible or undignified. He clung firmly 308 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I to impressions and convictions just as he did to the per sons by whom he was surrounded and the things he used ; the remembrance of what his father had done in similar cases, or would have done, always had much influence on him ; especially during the French war he always had be fore his eyes the remembrance of the parallel course of the wars of liberation. King William once during the Schleswig- Holstein episode asked me reproachfully : ' Are you then not also a German ? ' because I opposed his intention, which was predisposed by domestic influences, to create at Kiel a new grand duchy which would vote against Prussia; and yet when he followed his own natural feelings without being weakened by political thoughts, he was one of the most resolute particularists among the German princes, following the line of a patriotic and conservative Prussian officer of his father's time. In riper years the influence of his wife brought him into opposition to the traditional principle ; the incapacity of his ministers of the new era and the precipitate blunders of the Liberals in parliament during the Conflict once more made his pulse beat like a Prussian prince and officer, the more so that he never considered whether the road on which he was entering was dangerous. If he was convinced that duty and hon our, or one of the two, required him to enter on a path, he went his way without caring for the dangers to which he might be exposed, in politics as much as on the field of battle. He was not to be intimidated; the Queen was : the necessity of living in domestic peace being with her a force, the effect of which one could never foresee ; but parliamentary rudeness or threats had no effect but to strengthen his resolution not to give in. The ministers 3°9 BISMARCK of the new era and their parliamentary supporters and fol lowers had never taken this quality into account. Count Schwerin went so far in his want of comprehension of this fearless officer on the throne, that he thought he could intimidate him by an overbearing manner and want of courtesy. This was the turning point of the influence of the ministers of the new era, the old Liberals and the Bethmann-Hollweg party, and from this time the current turned in the opposite direction ; the lead fell into Roon's hands ; and the Minister- President, Prince Hohenzollern, with his adjutant Auerswald, desired my entrance into the ministry. The Queen and Schleinitz prevented this for a time when I was in Berlin in the spring of 1 860, but the. scenes which had passed between the ruler and his ministers had made a rent in their mutual relations which was never healed. During the reign of Frederick William IV the Princess Augusta generally was in opposition to the policy of the government ; she regarded the new era of the regency as her ministry, at least until the retirement of Herr von Schleinitz. Before and after that it was a necessity for her to be in opposition to the attitude of the government, whatever it might be, both to that of her brother-in-law and afterwards of her husband. Her influence changed, and in such a way that to the very last years of her life it always fell into the scale against the ministers. If the policy of the government was Conservative, then Liberal persons and Liberal tendencies were marked out for dis tinction and advance in her domestic circle; when the 310 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I government of the Emperor in its task of strengthening the new Empire entered the path of Liberalism, then her favour inclined to the side of the Conservative elements, and especially to the Catholics; as under a Protestant dynasty these were often and, to a certain point, regularly in opposition, the support of the Catholics was of much interest to the Empress. During the periods when our foreign policy could go hand in hand with Austria, her mood towards Austria was distant and unfriendly ; when our policy made opposition to Austria necessary, then the Queen became the repre sentative of Austrian interests, and this was the case right into the beginning of the war of 1866. Even after fight ing had begun on the Bohemian frontier, the organ of Herr voii Schleinitz, under the patronage of her Majesty, kept up relations and negotiations of a very dubious na ture. After I became Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Herr von Schleinitz Minister of the Royal House, he held the position of a kind of opposition minister to the Queen, who could provide her Majesty with material for criticism and for influencing the King. He used for this purpose the connexions which, when he was my predecessor, he had made by private correspondence, and concentrated in his hands a system of regular diplomatic reports. I re ceived the proof of this by accident ; some of these reports came into my hands by a mistake of the courier or of the post ; they were so drawn up that one could see they were not isolated, and they so closely resembled official reports that I noticed nothing till I was startled by some refer ences in the text ; then I looked for the envelope in the wastepaper basket and found on it the address of Herr von Schleinitz. To the officials with whom he maintained 31* BISMARCK connexions of this kind belonged, among others, a consul about whom Roon wrote to me on January 25, 1864, that he was in the pay of Drouyn de Lhuys, and, under the name of Siegfeld, wrote articles for the ' Memorial Diplo matique,' which among other things supported the occupa tion of the Rhine by Napoleon and compared it to our occupation of Schleswig. At the time of the ' Reichs glocke ' and the venomous attacks of the Conservative party and the ' Kreuzzeitung ' against me, I was able to find out that the distribution of the ' Reichsglocke ' and similar libellous publications was managed in the office of the ministry of the royal family. The person employed was one of the higher subordinate officials of the name of Bernhard, who cut Frau von Schleinitz' s pens and kept her writing table in order. By his means thirteen copies of the ' Reichsglocke ' had gone to the very highest per sonages only, of which two went to the imperial palace and others to nearly related Courts. One morning, when I had to visit the Emperor, who had been made ill through annoyance, in order to lodge what, under the circumstances, was a complaint of press ing importance about a demonstration of the Court in favour of the Centrum, I found him in bed, and with him was the Empress in a costume from which one would con clude that she had come down after I had been announced. On my request to be allowed to speak alone with the Em peror she went away, but only as far as a chair which was just outside the door, which she had not quite shut; and she took care to let me know by her movements that she heard everything. I did not allow myself to be prevented by this attempt at intimidation (and it was not the first) from completing my report. On the evening of the same 312 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I day I was at a party in the palace. Her Majesty ad dressed me in a manner which made me suppose that the Emperor had supported my remonstrance to her. The conversation took the turn that I begged the Empress to spare the health of her husband, which already was unsat isfactory, and not expose him to conflicting political influ ences. This suggestion, which, according to all Court traditions, was quite unexpected, had a remarkable effect. During the last ten years of her life I never saw the Em press Augusta so beautiful as she was at this moment ; her figure drew itself up, her eyes brightened with a fire which I have never seen there before or since. She broke off the conversation, left me standing alone, and, as I was told by one of the courtiers who was a friend of mine, said, ' Our most gracious Chancellor is very ungracious to-day.' The experience of many years had enabled me by de grees to judge with some certainty whether the Emperor opposed suggestions, which seemed to me logically neces sary, from his own conviction or in the interest of his domestic peace. In the first case I could as a rule reckon on coming to an understanding if I awaited the time when the clear understanding of my master had assimilated the matter ; or he would appeal to the council of ministers. In such cases the discussion between me and his Majesty always remained practical and confined to the subject at issue. It was different when the cause of the royal oppo sition to ministerial opinions lay in the previous discus sion of the question which her Majesty had aroused at breakfast, and carried on till he had positively expressed his agreement with her. When the King at such mo ments, influenced by letters and newspaper articles which had been written for the purpose, had been brought to 3I3 BISMARCK hasty expressions opposed to the ministerial policy, then her Majesty was accustomed to confirm the success she had obtained by giving utterance to doubts whether the Emperor would be in a condition to uphold the purpose or opinion he had expressed ' against Bismarck.' When his Majesty opposed me not from his own conviction, but as a result of repeated feminine pressure, I could see what had happened, for his arguments were not to the point and illogical. When he could not find any more argu ments against what I said, then he would end the discus sion with the expression : ' Ei der Tausend, da muss ich doch sehr bitten' (' Oh, come, I say! please'). Then I knew that I had met not the Emperor, but his wife. All the opponents belonging to the most different re gions, whom during my political struggles I had been compelled to make in the interest of the public service, found in their common hatred of me a bond of union which sometimes was stronger than their mutual antip athies. They made a truce in their feuds in order for the time to serve the stronger hostility to me. The Em press Augusta formed the point about which their agree ment crystallised ; her temperament when it was a matter of getting her way did not always observe the limits re quired by regard for the age and health of her husband. During the siege of Paris, as often before and after wards, the Emperor had often to suffer in the struggle between his understanding and his feeling of duty as a King on one side, and the requirements of domestic peace and female assent to his policy on the other. His chival rous feeling towards his wife, his mystical feeling towards the crowned Queen, his sensitiveness to interruptions in his domestic life and his daily habits, put obstacles in my 3*4 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I way, which were at times more difficult to overcome than those caused by foreign Powers or hostile parties ; in con sequence of the hearty attachment which I had for the person of the Emperor, this considerably increased the exhausting effect of the struggles which I had to go through when in my reports to the Emperor my duty compelled me to defend my convictions. The Emperor felt this, and in the last years of his life he made no secret to me of his domestic relations, and used to discuss with me what ways and forms we should choose so as to spare his household peace without injury to interests of state; when in a confidential mood, with a mixture of annoyance, respect, and good-will, he used to speak of her as Feuerkopf, and accompanied this expression with a motion of his hands as though he would say, ' I cannot alter it. ' I found this designation extraor dinarily happy ; the Queen was a spirited woman as long as physical dangers did not threaten ; she was upheld by a high feeling of duty, but her royal feelings made her indisposed to recognise other authorities than her own. The great influence which, after his accession to the government, the will and convictions of the Prince of Prussia, afterwards Emperor, exercised outside the military and in the political sphere was simply the result of the powerful and distinguished nature which was inborn in this prince, and quite independent of the education he had received. The expression ' koniglich vornehm ' (royal dis tinction) is characteristic of his appearance. With mon archs vanity can be a spur to action and to labour for the 3i5 BISMARCK happiness of their subjects. Frederick the Great was not free from it ; his impulse to his first actions sprang from the desire for historical fame. I will not discuss the question whether this motive degenerated towards the end of his reign, as was said, or whether he secretly gave ear to the wish that posterity should notice the difference be tween his government and that of his successors. He dated one of his political effusions from the day before a battle and communicated it in a letter with the words ' Pas trop mal a la veille d'une bataille. ' The Emperor William I was completely free from vanity of this kind ; on the other hand he had in a high degree a peculiar fear of the legitimate criticism of his contemporaries and of posterity. In this he was com pletely the Prussian officer, who, as soon as he is protected by a higher command, goes without wavering to most cer tain death, but through fear of the blame of his superior officer or public criticism falls into such doubt and uncer tainty as to choose the wrong path. No one would have dared to flatter him openly to his face. In his feeling of royal dignity he would have thought, ' if any one had the right of praising me to my face, he would also have the right of blaming me to my face. ' He would not admit either. Monarch and parliament had learnt to know and re spect one another by long internal struggles ; the King's noble dignity and quiet confidence had at last won the respect even of his opponents, and the King himself was enabled justly to judge the two sides of the situation ow ing to his own high feeling of personal honour. He was governed by the feeling of justice, not only towards his friends and servants, but also in the struggle against his 316 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I opponents. He was a gentleman expressed in terms of a king, a nobleman in the primary sense of the word, who never felt himself dispensed from the principle Noblesse oblige by any temptations of the power which belonged to him; his attitude both in home and foreign policy was always subordinated to the principles of a cavalier of the old school and to the normal feeling of a Prussian officer. He held fast to honour and loyalty not only towards prin ces but also towards his servants, even down to his valet. If in momentary excitement he trespassed on his fine feel ing for royal dignity and duty, he soon recovered and re mained at the same time ' every inch a king, ' and more over a just and kindly king, and an honour-loving officer whom the thought of his Prussian porte-e'pe'e kept in the right way.1 The Emperor could lose his temper, but did not let himself be infected by the ill-temper of any one with whom he was conversing; he would break off the discussion in a friendly and dignified manner. Outbreaks like that at Versailles, when he refused the title of Emperor, were very rare. If he got angry with any one to whom he was well disposed, as Count Roon and myself, then he was either excited by the subject itself, or he had beforehand been bound by unofficial promises which could not be de fended. Count Roon listened to explosions of this kind as a soldier at the front listens to the rebuke of a superior officer, which he believes to be undeserved, but his nerves suffered from it and they affected his physical health. I did not experience outbreaks of anger on the part of the Emperor so often as Roon, and they never had a conta gious but rather a cooling effect on me. I had thought 1 Cf. vol. i. p. 315. 317 BISMARCK it out for myself in this way : any irregularities in a ruler who showed me confidence and good-will to such a degree as did William I should be for me of the nature of vis major which it was not for me to resist ; I must look on it as the weather or the sea, or any natural event to which I must accommodate myself. This impression rested on my personal love for the Emperor William I, not on my general conception of the relation of a king by the grace of God to his servants. Towards him I was not person ally sensitive; he could treat me with much injustice without creating feelings of indignation in me. The feel ing that I had been insulted was one which I had towards him as little as I should have had in my father's house. This did not prevent me from being led into a passive opposition to him by the nervous excitement which was engendered by uninterrupted struggles, when I found him without understanding for political matters and interests or prejudiced against them by her Majesty 01 by the re ligious or masonic Court intrigues. Now, in thinking over this quietly, I disapprove of this feeling and regret it, as in remembering points of disagreement one has similar feelings after the death of one's father. His natural uprightness, the genuine kindliness of his disposition, and the amiability which with him came from the heart, enabled him to perform with ease and success one of the duties which at times causes much trouble to the intellectual activity of constitutional rulers and min isters. The annually recurring utterances of those mon archs who are regarded as the patterns of constitutionalism 3i8 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I contain a rich storehouse of expressions useful for public utterances ; but, notwithstanding all their linguistic skill, both Leopold of Belgium and Louis Philippe pretty well exhausted constitutional phraseology, and a German mon arch will scarcely be in a position to enlarge the circle of available expressions in writing and print. I found no work more disagreeable and difficult than the provision of the necessary supply of phrases for speeches from the throne and similar utterances. When the Emperor Wil liam himself drew up proclamations or when he wrote let ters with his own hand, then, even if the language was incorrect, they still had something winning and often in spiring. They moved one in an agreeable way by the warmth of his feeling and the security which shone from them that he not only required loyalty but gave it. ' II &ait de relation sure ; ' he was one of those figures, princely alike in soul and body, whose qualities belong more to the heart than the understanding, and explain the life-and-death devotion of their servants and adherents which appears now and again in the German character. The extent of monarchical devotion is not identical as regards every prince ; it makes a difference whether the limit is drawn by political understanding or by feeling. A certain measure of devotion is determined by the laws, a still greater by political conviction; anything beyond that requires a personal feeling of reciprocity, and this it is which brings it about that loyal masters have loyal ser vants whose devotion extends beyond what is required by public considerations. It is a peculiarity of royalist feel ing that any one who is moved by it does not cease to feel himself the servant of the monarch, even when he is con scious that he influences the decisions of the King. One 319 BISMARCK day (in 1865) the King spoke to his wife with admiration of my skill in guessing his intentions, and, as he added after a pause, of directing them. In acknowledging this he did not lose the feeling that he was the master and I the servant — a useful but a respectful and devoted ser vant. This did not leave him even when, after an excited discussion about my resignation in 1877, he broke out into the words : 'Am I to make a fool of myself (blamiren) in my old age? It is disloyal of you to desert me.' Even with feelings like this he stood so high in his own royal estimation and in his sense of justice, that he was never accessible to any feeling of Saul-like jealousy of me. He had the true kingly feeling ; not only was the posses sion of a powerful and respected servant not disagreeable to him, but the thought was an elevating one to him. He was too distinguished to feel like a nobleman who cannot endure to have a rich and independent peasant in the vil lage. This royal and noble character was displayed for the public and history in a proper light by the cheerful way in which, when I celebrated in 1885 the fiftieth anni versary of my entrance into the public service,* he did not order and arrange the celebrations, but allowed them and shared in them. It was not commanded by him, but he permitted it and cheerfully assisted. Never for a moment did the thought of jealousy towards his servant and sub ject come into his mind, and never for a moment did the royal consciousness that he was master leave him, just as with me all the homage that was paid me, exaggerated though it were, never affected my feeling that I was the servant of my master and was it gladly. * By the wish of the Emperor it was joined with the celebration of my seventieth birthday. 320 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I Our relations and my attachment to him were in prin ciple based on the fact that I was by conviction a royalist; but the special form which it took is only possible by the exercise of a certain reciprocity of good- will between mas ter and servant, just as our feudal law assumed ' loyalty' on both sides. Relations like those in which I stood to the Emperor William are not exclusively of a political or feudal nature ; they are personal and they must be won by the master as well as the servant if they are to be effec tive ; they are easily transferred to one generation rather personally than logically, but to give them a permanent character and require them as a matter of principle an swers more to the feelings and character of the Romance than of the German races ! We cannot transfer the Portu guese porteur du coton into German ideas. Certain characteristics of the Emperor will be more clearly seen in the following letters than in any descrip tion: ' Berlin: Jan. 13, 1870. ' Unfortunately I have always forgotten to give you the medal of victory, which really ought to have been in your hands first, and so I send it to you now as a seal of your historical achievements. 'Yours, ' William. ' On the same day I wrote to the Emperor : ' I present to your Majesty my humble duty, and offer my heartfelt thanks for your gracious presentation of the medai, and for the honourable place which your Majesty has been vol. 11. — 21 321 BISMARCK pleased to assign to me on this historical monument. The remembrance which this engraved document will maintain for posterity wins for me and mine a special importance by the gracious lines with which your Majesty has accom panied the presentation. If my self-esteem finds a great satisfaction that it is given to me to see my name go down to posterity under the wings of the royal eagle which points her way to Germany, my heart derives still more satisfaction from the feeling that under God's visible blessing I serve an hereditary master, to whom I am at tached with full personal love, and the possession of whose approbation is for me the most desirable reward in this life.' ' Berlin : March 21, 1871. ' With to-day's opening of the first German Reichs tag, after the restoration of a German Empire, begins its first public activity. Prussia's history and fate have'for long pointed to an event like that which has now been completed by her summons to the head of the newly- founded Empire. Prussia owes this not so much to the extent of her territory and her power, although both have been increased together, as to her intellectual develop ment and the organisation of her army. In the course of the last six years the fortunes of my country have with unexpectedly rapid succession developed themselves to the culmination at which it now stands. To this period be longs an activity for which I summoned you to me ten years ago. All the world can see how you have justified the confidence from which I then summoned you. To your counsel, to your wisdom, to your untiring activity, Prussia and Germany owe the historical event which to day takes place in my residency. 322 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I 'Although the reward for these deeds lies within your self, I am still forced and bound to express to you in pub lic and enduring form the thanks of my Fatherland and myself. I therefore raise you into the Prussian Order of Princes, and decree that the rank shall always be heredi tary in the eldest male member of your family. ' May you see in this distinction the never failing gratitude of your Emperor and King ' William. ' ' Berlin : March 2, 1872. ' We celebrate to-day the first anniversay of the con clusion of that glorious peace which, won by courage and sacrifices of every kind, by your wisdom and energy, led to unthought-of results. Again to-day I repeat to you with grateful emotion the recognition and thanks to which I have already given public expression in iron and the noble metals. One metal still remains — bronze. I to-day place at your disposition a token of this metal, and one in the form which a year ago you brought to silence ; I have arranged that some of the conquered cannon, which you yourself shall choose, should be handed over to you, and you shall erect them on your own estates as a lasting memorial of the great services you rendered to me and the Fatherland. ' Your truly devoted and grateful ' William. ' 'Coblenz : July 26, 1872. ' On the 28th of this month you will celebrate a happy family festival, which the Almighty in His grace grants to you. Therefore I can and must not remain behind in 323 BISMARCK my sympathy at this festival, and I ask that you and the Princess your wife will accept my sincere and warmest congratulations at this festival. That among all the many gifts of fortune which Providence has chosen for you, for both of you domestic happiness stands above all — this it is for which your prayers and thansgivings rise to heaven. Our and my thansksgiving go further, for they include our gratitude that at the decisive hour God set you at my side, and thereby opened to my government a course which went far beyond my thoughts and under standing. But for this also you will send your feelings of gratitude above, that God in His mercy granted you to achieve such great things. Through all your labours you ever found recreation and joy in your home, and that it is which preserves you for your difficult calling. I never cease to urge you that you will maintain and strengthen yourself for this, and I am glad to hear from your letter to Count Lehndorff and from himself that you will now think more of yourself than of the papers. 'As a reminiscence of your silver wedding a vase will be handed over to you, representing a grateful Prussia, which, fragile though the material may be, still in every fragment shall express what Prussia owes to you for rais ing her to the height at which she stands. ' Your truly devoted, grateful King, 'William.' ' Coblenz : November 6, 1878. ' It has been granted to you within a quarter of a year, by your insight, wisdom, and courage, partly to restore, partly to maintain, peace in Europe, and in Germany by legal means to oppose an enemy who threatened destruc- 324 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I tion to all public institutions. These two historical events are understood by all who are well disposed, and their acknowledgment has been imparted to you ; I myself have been able to give proof of my acknowledgment of that which I have first named, the congress of Berlin, and it is now again my duty publicly to express to you my acknowledgment for the decisive manner in which you have defended the basis of law. The law * which I have in my mind, and which owes its origin to an event painful to my heart and feeling, will insure that the German states, and therefore also Prussia, will continue to be based on law and justice. ' I have chosen as signs of my acknowledgment of your great deserts for my Prussia, the emblems of her power — crown, sceptre, and sword — and had them added to the Grand Cross of the Red Eagle which you always wear; and I now send you the decoration. ' The sword speaks for the courage and insight with which you know how to protect my sceptre and my crown. ' May Providence grant you the power for long years to devote your patriotism to my government and the weal of the Fatherland. ' Your truly devoted, grateful ' William.' ' Berlin : April i, 1879. ' Unfortunately I cannot personally and verbally bring you my good wishes for to-day, for although I am to drive out to-day for the first time, I may not yet go upstairs. ' Above all, I wish for you good health, for from that *The law of October 21, 1878, against social democracy and its efforts, perilous to the community. 325 BISMARCK all activity depends, and this you are developing now more than for a long time, a proof that activity also keeps one in health. May it so continue for the good of the Fatherland, large and small alike. ' I use the day to appoint your son-in-law, Count Rantzau, a councillor of legation, for I believe I shall in this do you a pleasure. ' I shall also send you a copy of my great ancestor, the Great Elector, as he stands on the Long Bridge, as a memorial of the present day, which will I hope often recur for you and us. ' Your grateful ' William.' At Christmas 1883 the Emperor presented to me a copy of the Niederwald monument, on which was fast ened a small leaf with the following words : ' Christmas 1883. ' The corner-stone of your policy, a celebration which was chiefly for you and which you were unfortunately * unable to attend.' ' Berlin: April 1, 1885. 'My dear Prince, — If a warm desire has appeared in the German country and people to assure you, at the cele bration of your seventieth birthday, that the remembrance of all which you have done for the greatness of the Father land lives in so many grateful hearts, I feel deeply the necessity of expressing to you to-day how much pleasure it gives me that this wave of gratitude and respect runs through the nation. I rejoice at it, for it is an * Owing to ill-health. 326 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I acknowledgment which you have truly deserved in the highest degree ; and it warms my heart that these feelings find such widespread utterance, for it is an adornment to the nation in the present, and it strengthens our hope for the future, if it recognises what is true and great, and honours and celebrates men of great deserts. To take part in a celebration of this kind is a special pleasure for me and my house, and we wish to express to you by the accompanying picture (the proclamation of the Emperor at Versailles) with what feelings of grateful remembrance we do this. It recalls to us one of the greatest moments in the history of the House of Hohenzollern, of which we can never think without at the same time remembering your services. You, my dear Prince, know how I shall always have the fullest confidence, the most genuine and the warmest gratitude towards you. ' I therefore in this say nothing which I have not often enough already told you, and I think that this picture will place before the eyes of your distant descendants that your King and Emperor and his house will know what we owed to you. With these feelings and thoughts I end these lines, as lasting beyond the grave, ' Your grateful, truly devoted Emperor and King, ' William.' ' Berlin : September 23, 1887. ' To-day, my dear Prince, you celebrate the day on which, twenty-five years ago, I summoned you to my min istry, and after a short time appointed you President of it. The services which up to that time you had rendered to the Fatherland in the most varied and important commis sions justified me in giving you this highest post. The 327 BISMARCK history of the last quarter of the century proves that I did not err in my choice. 'A shining picture of true love to the Fatherland, of unwearied activity, often to the neglect of your own health, with unwearied zeal you kept clearly in your eye the often overwhelming difficulties in war and peace, and guided them to good ends which with honour and glory led Prussia to a position in history of which we had never dreamt. Such achievements may well cause us to cele brate the twenty-fifth anniversary of September 23 with thanks to God that He has put you at my side in order to carry out His work on earth. 'And these thanks I once more lay to your heart, as I have so often before been able to express and assure you of them. ' With thankful heart I wish you happiness on the celebration of such a day, and from my heart I wish that your powers may long remain unimpaired to the blessing of throne and Fatherland. ' Your ever grateful King and friend, ' William.' ' P.S. As a remembrance of the twenty-five years which have passed I send you the view of the building in which we had to discuss and carry out such decisive resolutions, which I hope will always be for the honour and good of Prussia, and now I hope also of Germany.' I received the last letter of the Emperor on December 23, 1887. Compared with the previous ones it shows, both in the structure of the sentences and in the hand writing, that during the last three months both writing and expressing himself in writing had become much more 328 THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I troublesome to the Emperor ; but these difficulties did not interfere with the clearness of the thoughts, the fatherly regard for the feelings of his invalid son, or the anxiety which as ruler he felt for the proper education of his grandson. It would be wrong in reproducing this letter to attempt to improve anything in it. ' Berlin : December 23, 1887. ' Enclosed I send you the appointment of your son to be an actual Privy Councillor with the title of Excellency, that you may give it to your son — a pleasure of which I did not wish to deprive you. The pleasure will, I think, be threefold — for you, for your son, and for me. ' I take the opportunity of explaining to you my pre vious silence as to your proposal to introduce my grandson Prince William more into state affairs in the melancholy state of health of the Crown Prince my son. In principle I am quite agreed that this should be done, but it is very difficult to carry it out. You will know that the decision (natural enough in itself) which at your advice I adopted, that my grandson W., if I were prevented, should sign the current orders of the civil and military cabinet under the words "by order," that this decision has much irritated the Crown Prince, as though in Berlin they were already thinking of a substitute for him. When he has considered it more quietly my son will probably have calmed himself. This consideration would be more difficult if he were to hear that his son is allowed still greater insight into affairs of state, and that even a " civil aide-de-camp " is given him — as I in my time called the secretary who had to make reports to me. At that time, however, the posi tion of affairs was quite different, for no reason could 329 BISMARCK induce my royal father to appoint an understudy to the then Crown Prince, although it had long been possible to foresee my succession to the crown, and my introduction was omitted till my forty-fourth year, when my brother at once appointed me a member of the ministry with the ad dition of the title Prince of Prussia. With this position the appointment of an experienced man of business was necessary to prepare me for every meeting of the minis try. At the same time I daily received the political dis patches after they had gone through four, five, six hands, to judge by the seals ! Merely for conversation, as you propose, to assign a statesman to my grandson is not, as in my case, justified by the preparation for a definite ob ject, and would decidedly irritate my son again and still more, which we must certainly avoid. I therefore pro pose that the previous method of learning the business and management of, and the way-about of public affairs be maintained, i.e. be assigned to single ministries and perhaps be extended to two, as during this winter, when my grandson should be allowed as a volunteer to visit the Foreign Office as well as the Ministry of Finance, and then at the new year this might cease to be left to his own free will, and perhaps also the Ministry of the Inte rior, and at the same time my grandson might be allowed in cases to make himself acquainted with the Foreign Office. This continuation of the present procedure can irritate my son less, although you will remember that he was sharply opposed to this procedure also. I beg, there fore, for your opinion in this matter. Wishing you all a pleasant festival, ' Your grateful ' William. 33.° THE EMPEROR WILLIAM I ' Will you be so good as to sign the accompanying patent before delivering it ? W. ' » 1 I very rarely received letters from the Empress Au gusta; her last letter, during the composition of which she doubtless thought of the struggles which I had to wage with her as much as I did in reading it, runs as follows : (Dictated?) Baden-Baden : December 24, 1888. ' Dear Prince, — If I write these lines to you it is simply in order to fulfil a duty of gratitude at the turning-point of a grave year of my life. You have stood loyally by our departed Emperor and fulfilled my request to care for his grandson. In hours of bitterness you have shown sympathy to me, therefore I feel myself called upon, before I com plete this year, to thank you once again and at the same time to reckon on the continuance of your help in the midst of the painful events of a stirring time. I am about to celebrate the end of the year quietly in the circle of my family, and send a friendly greeting to you and your wife. 'Augusta.' The signature is in her own hand, but very different from the firm strokes with which the Empress was wont to write in former times. 1 A large number of letters of the Emperor William I to Bismarck are published in the Bismarck-Jahrbuch, i. 140-141 ; iv. 3-12 ; v. 254-5 ; vi. 203. 331 CHAPTER XXXIII THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III It was a widespread error that the change of government from the Emperor William I to the Emperor Frederick must be associated with a change of ministry and that a tame successor would be appointed. In the summer of 1848 I had for the first time an opportunity of be coming acquainted with the young Prince, who was then seventeen years of age, and received from him proofs of personal confidence; this may from time to time have wavered up till 1886, but was clearly and decidedly shown at the settlement of the Dantzic episode at Gastein in 1863.1 During the war of 1866, especially in the strug gle with the King and the higher military authorities re garding the wisdom of the conclusion of peace at Nikols burg, I enjoyed a confidence from the Crown Prince which was quite independent of political principles and differ ences of opinion. Attempts to shake this confidence were made from many sides, not excluding the Extreme Right ; many excuses were made and many pretexts invented, but they had no permanent success. At any time after 1 866 a personal conversation between the Prince and myself was all that was necessary to make them unavailing. When the state of William I's health in 1885 gave occasion to serious anxiety, the Crown Prince summoned me to Potsdam and asked whether, in case of a change on 'Cf. vol. i. p. 355. 332 THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III the throne, I would remain in office; I declared that I was ready to do so under two conditions : no parliamentary government and no foreign influence in politics. The Crown Prince with a corresponding gesture answered, ' Not a thought of that. ' I could not assume that his wife had the same kindly feeling for me ; her natural innate sympathy for her home had, from the beginning, shown itself in the attempt to turn the weight of Prusso-German influence in the group ings of European power into the scale of her native land ; and she never ceased to regard England as her country. In the differences of interests between the two Asiatic Powers, England and Russia, she wished to see the Ger man power applied in the interests of England if it came to a breach. This difference of opinion, which rested on the difference of nationality, caused many a discussion between her Royal Highness and me on the Eastern question, including the Battenberg question. Her influ ence on her husband was at all times great, and it in creased with years to culminate at the time when he was Emperor. She also, however, shared with him the con viction that in the interests of the dynasty it was neces sary that I should be maintained in office at the change of reign. It is not my intention, and it would in fact be an im possible task, expressly to contradict every legend and malicious invention. As, however, the story that in 1887, after his return from Ems, the Crown Prince signed a docu ment in which, in the event of his surviving his father, he renounced his succession to the throne in favour of Prince William, has found its way into an English work on the Emperor William II, I will state that there is not a 333 BISMARCK shadow of truth in the story. It is also a fable that, as in 1887 was maintained in many circles and believed in others, an heir to the throne who suffers from an incur able physical complaint is by the family laws of the Hohenzollern excluded from the succession. The family laws contain no provision on the matter, any more than does the text of the Prussian constitution. On the other hand there was one point in which a question of a public nature compelled me to interfere in the treatment of the sufferer, which otherwise belonged to medical science. The doctors who were treating him were at the end of May 1887 determined to make the Crown Prince uncon scious and to carry out the removal of the larynx without having informed him of their intention. I raised objec tions, required that they should not proceed without the consent of the Prince, and, as they were dealing with the successor to the throne, that the approval of the head of the family should also be required. The Emperor, after being informed by me, forbade them to carry out the oper ation without the consent of his son. Of the few discus sions which during his short government I had with the Emperor Frederick I may mention one to which I can connect some remark about the constitution of the Em pire which occupied me on former occasions and again in March 1890. The Emperor Frederick was inclined to refuse his consent to the law prolonging the period of the legislative assembly from three to five years in the Empire and in Prussia. As regarded the Reichstag, I explained to him that the Emperor as such was no factor of the legislature, but that his co-operation took place only as King of Prus sia by the Prussian vote at the federal council ; he did not 334 THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III possess by the imperial constitution a veto against unani mous resolutions of the two legislative assemblies. This explanation was sufficient to determine his Majesty to complete the document by which the publication of the law of March 19, 1888, was ordered. To the question of his Majesty in what position the matter stood as regards the Prussian constitution, I could only answer that the King had the same right of adopting or rejecting every project of law as either of the two houses of the Prussian Parliament. His Majesty then for the time refused his signature, reserving his decision. The question then arose how the ministry of state which had requested the royal consent must behave. I supported the view that for a time we should not insist on a discus sion with the King, since he was exercising an undoubted right; since, moreover, the project of law had been intro duced before the change of ruler; and lastly, since we must avoid intensifying, by raising cabinet questions, the situation which, even without this, was sufficiently difficult on account of the illness of the monarch. My view was adopted. The end of the matter was that his Majesty, of his own accord, sent to me on May 27 the Prussian law also completed. In practice people have been accustomed to regard the Chancellor as responsible for the whole policy of the gov ernment of the Empire. This responsibility can only be maintained if we admit that the Chancellor is justified first in refusing to countersign, then in rendering inoperative the imperial messages by means of which proposals of the allied governments find their way to the Reichstag (Art. 16). The Chancellor himself, if he is not at the same time a Prussian plenipotentiary at the imperial council, would, 335 BISMARCK according to the text of the constitution, riot even have the right personally to take part in the debates of the Reichstag. If, as has hitherto been the case, he has at the same time a Prussian commission for the federal coun cil, then he has by Art. 9 the right of appearing in the Reichstag and being heard at any time. No clause of the constitution gives this right to the Imperial Chancellor as such. If, therefore, neither the King of Prussia nor any other member of the confederation provides the Chancel lor with a commission for the federal council, he is en tirely without any constitutional claim to appear in the Reichstag ; he presides indeed in the federal council by Art. 15, but without a vote, and the Prussian plenipoten tiaries would be just as independent of him as those of the other allied states. Supposing the existing relations were altered so that the responsibility of the Chancellor was limited to the ordinances of the imperial executive power, and the quali fication, let alone the duty of appearing and taking part in the discussions of the Reichstag, were withdrawn from him, it is obvious that this would be not merely a formal change, but would essentially alter the centre of gravity of the factors of our public life. I considered the ques tion whether it was desirable to discuss eventualities of this kind at the time when, in December 1884, I found myself opposed to a majority in the Reichstag which con sisted of a coalition of the most varied elements — of Social Democrats, Poles, Guelfs, the French party in Alsace, the Radical Crypto- Republicans, and occasionally also the discontented Conservatives at Court — the coalition which, for example, refused the vote for a second director at the Foreign Office. The support which I found at Court, in 336 THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III parliament and elsewhere against this opposition was not unconditional, and was not free from the co-operation of grudging supporters who were trying to push their way in the world as my rivals. At that time I for some years considered, both alone and with others, whether the amount of national unity which we had attained did not require for its security another form than that which pre vailed at the time, which had been delivered to us by the past, had been developed by active life and compromise between governments and parliaments; my opinion on the pressing importance of this often wavered. At that time I have, as I think, also hinted in public speeches ' that the King of Prussia might see himself compelled to lean for stronger support on the foundations which the Prussian constitution afforded him, if the Reichstag car ried its hindrance to the monarchical establishment be yond the limits of what was possible. At the restoration of the imperial constitution I feared that danger to our national unity was in the first place to be feared from the separate interests of the dynasties, and had therefore set myself the task of winning the confidence of the dynasties by an honourable and friendly maintenance of their con stitutional rights in the Empire, and I had the satisfaction that the prominent princely houses more especially found at the same time their national feeling reconciled with their particular rights. In the feeling of honour which always inspired the Emperor William I towards his allies I always found an understanding for what was politically necessary, which in the end outweighed his own strong dynastic feeling. On the other side I had calculated on setting up a 1 Political Speeches, vol. xi. p. 468. vol. 11 — 22 337 BISMARCK bond of union in the common public institutions, espe cially in the Reichstag, in finances based on indirect taxes, and in monopolies, the receipts of which would only re main available if the permanence of our connexion were assured, and that this bond would be sufficiently strong to resist the centrifugal movements of certain of the allied governments. Notwithstanding all the bad will which I had had to combat in the Reichstag, at Court, in the Con servative party, and from the declaranten at the end of the 'seventies, I had not yet been confirmed in the conviction that I was mistaken in this calculation, that I had under estimated the national feeling of the dynasty, and over estimated that of the German voters, electors, or the Reichstag. Now I have to ask pardon of the dynasties ; history will some day decide whether the group-leaders owe me a pater peccavi. I can only bear witness that I lay to the charge of the parties more blame for the injury done to our future than they themselves feel, and I in clude in this the idle members who shunned their work as much as those ambitious men in whose hands lay the lead ing and the votes of their followers. ' Get you home, you fragments,' says Coriolanus. The Centrum is the only party of which I can say it has not been incapably led ; but it is calculated for the destruction of the disagreeable edifice of a German Empire with a Protestant Emperor ; at elections and divisions it accepts the assistance of every party, hostile though it may be in itself, but which for the moment is working in the same direction, not only of the Poles, Guelfs, and French, but also of the Radicals. The leaders alone would be able to judge how many of the members work consciously for ends hostile to the Empire, and how many do so from the limitations of their intel- 33» THE EMPEROR FREDERICK III lect. Windthorst, politically a latitudinarian, in religion an unbeliever, was by accident and the blunders of the bureaucracy driven on to the side of our enemies. Not withstanding all, I still hope that in times of war the national feeling will rise high enough to tear asunder the web of lies in which the party leaders, ambitious orators, and party newspapers hold the masses during the times of peace. Any one who recalls the period in which the Centrum (relying less on the Pope than on the Jesuits) , the Guelfs (not merely from Hanover), the Poles, the French Alsa tians, the people's party, the Social Democrats, the Free- thought party, and the Particularists, linked together only by hostility to the Empire and the dynasty, held under the leadership of the same Windthorst, who before and after his death was made a national saint, a firm and com manding majority against the Emperor and the allied gov ernments, and who is also in a position fully to judge the situation of that time and the dangers which threatened us to East and West, will find it natural that an imperial chancellor who was responsible for the final results should have thought of meeting possible foreign combinations, and an alliance of them with internal dangers, with no less independence than we had undertaken the war in Bohe mia, without considering political feelings, and often in opposition to them. Of the Emperor Frederick's private letters I add one, for his sake and for mine, as an example of his character and his method of writing, and also to overthrow the le gend that I have been an enemy of the army. 339 BISMARCK ' Charlottenburg: March 25, 1888. ' To-day, my dear Prince, I think with you of the fifty years which have gone by since you entered the army, and I am genuinely glad that the Garde Jdger of that time can look back with so much satisfaction to this half-cen tury which has gone by. I will not to-day enter on long considerations on the political services which have for ever enwoven your name with our history. One thing I must lay stress on, that where it was a question of the welfare of the army, of completing its strength and readi ness, you never failed to fight out the struggle and carry it through. The army therefore thanks you for the bless ings attained, which it will never forget ; at its head the war-lord who but a few days ago has been called to take up that place after the departure of him who never ceased to carry in his heart the welfare of the army. ' Yours most truly, ' Frederick.' INDEX. Aachen (Aix), i. 10 sq, 15, 282, 322 Abeken, Herr, i. 384 ; his telegram from William I (at Ems) to Bis marck, ii. 97 », 100 Ache, the (Gastein), i. 374 Adam, Mme. : her work ' La So- ciete de Berlin,' ii. 186 » Adlerberg, Count, i. 241 Adrianopole, the peace of, i. 302 Aix. See Aachen Albert, King (Saxony), ii. 86 Albert, Prince Consort (England), i. 120, 123 ; the visit to Paris in 1855, 163 ; his estimate of Bis marck, 164 Albrecht, Prince (of Prussia), ii. 26 Alexander I, Czar, i. 241, 245, 302, 320, 340 Alexander II, Czar, i. 103, 217, 252, 340; acquiesced in the Nikolsburg preliminaries of peace (1866), ii. 61 ; his project for a Prusso-Rus- sian alliance in 1863, 70 ; examina tion of the proposal by Bismarck, 70 sqq ; inquiries of Prussia as to its neutrality in case of Russian war against Austria, 231 ; singular form of the inquiry, ii. ; Bis marck's tardy reply, 233 ; the storm passes, 235 ; meeting of Alexander and Francis Joseph : the convention of Reichstadt, ib. ; the Balkan campaign, ii. ; Bul garia, ii. ; Berlin Congress, 236 ; the Czar threatens war in a letter to William I, 239 Alexander III, Czar, i. 397; his coronation, 4 1 3 ; his love of peace, 414 ; Bismarck complains to him of Gortchakoff's dishonest pro ceedings, ii. igi ; the Emperor's treatment of his minister, 193 ; letter of Bismarck to Alexander, ib. ; his confidence in Bismarck, 282 ; his doubts of Bismarck's con tinuance in office (1889), 283 Alexandrovo, ii. 240, 260 Altmark, the, i. 36, 37 Alvensleben, Count Albrecht von, i. 119, 150; (called the 'old lark- eater') 150, 160 Alvensleben, General Gustav von, i. 139. 346 Allemans (Palatinate), the, i. 321 Alsace, ii. 227 Alsen, ii. 13 American Republics, the, i. 193 Amsberg, Herr (a great legal au thority), ii. 167 Ancillon (minister), i. 3, 5 Andrassy, Count (Austrian Minis ter) : meeting with Bismarck at Gastein (1879): their provisional understanding, ii. 260 ; resignation of Andrassy, 264 n, 281 Anglo-European interference : Ger many's safeguard against, i. 370 Anne. Queen (England), ii. 281 Anspach, ii. 43 sq, 82 sq Anthony, Prince, ii. 90 Antonelli, Cardinal, ii. 138 Araktschejew, ii. 295 Archdukes, Grand Dukes, and Princes : their order of prece dence, ii. 132 Army, the Prussian : the growth of, ii. 59 ; the charge that Bismarck was ' hostile to the army,' 166 Arnim-Boitzenburg, Count, i. 11, 16 Arnim, Count von (Arnim-Hein- richsdorf-Werbelow : d. 1859), i. 9L 95 Arnim, Count Harry von, i. 102, 312, ii. 161, 165 ; sketch of his 341 BISMARCK life and character, 177 ; ambassa dor to Paris, 178 ; beginning of his intrigues against Bismarck, ib. ; his untruthfulness, ib. ; his claims to be able to settle the struggle with Rome, 180 ; his proposal to send Oratores from the Emperor to the Vatican Council, ib. ; his de tention of official documents, 181; trials and sentences, ib. ; relations with Baron Hirsch, ib. ; dishonest communications to the press, 182; opinions of the Arnim case ex pressed by various statesmen, 182 sq Aschaffenburg district (Bavaria) , the, ii. 52, 82 Asia Minor, ii. 117 Attila, i. 208 Auerswald, Alfred, i. 20 Auerswald, General von, the murder of, i. 74 Auerswald, Rudolf von, i. 102 ; 261; his death, 264, n Augusta, Princess of Prussia (after wards Queen, later Empress), i. 21 sq, 24 ; proposal to make her Regent, 40 sq ; her method of ex posing her political views, 44; liking for French and English : aversion to everything Russian, 132 sq; prejudice in favour of Catholicism, 136 sq ; political in fluence, 233 ; political dislikes, i. 263; Queen becomes more friend ly to Bismarck, 274 ; influence over her husband, 296 ; her per sonal policy, 333; her restraining influence on the King in 1870, ii. 96, 125 ; favoured the ' Catholic section,' 140 ; her Catholicising in fluence at the time of the Cultur kampf, 144 ; dislike of Bismarck openly manifested, 176; Bismarck complains of the discourtesy shown him by the Empress's ad herents, ib. ; she always retained her Catholic predilections, 188; generally in opposition to the policy of the Government, 310; her varying moods on foreign policy, 311 ; Schleinitz, her Oppo sition minister : his regular diplo matic reports, ib. ; an assistant of his, 312 ; example of the Empress's influence over her husband, ib. ; the pivot of opposition, 314 ; her last letter to Bismarck, 331 Augustenburg, Prince of, i. 154, ii. •r?, 13 Augustenburg, Hereditary Prince of, ii. 28, 30 sqq Austria: position in 1848, i. 71; during the Crimean war, i. 105 sqq, 113 sqq, 1 29 ; relations with Russia, 204 ; helped by Russia in 1849,239 ; severe measures against unfaithful employes, 254 ; Bis marck's estimate of the relation ship of Austria and Prussia, 318 sq; the Schleswig-Holstein ques tion (1864), i. 378 sqq ; relations with Prussia in 1863, ii. 4 ; nego tiations with Hanover (1866), 26 ; end of the war against Denmark, 32 ; war of 1866, 36 sqq ; cession of Venetia to France, 37 ; invites Neopoleon's intervention, ib. ; the behaviour of her allies at Konig- gratz, 46 ; a truce, ib. ; battle of Blumenau, 47 ; negotiations for peace, ib. ; rapprochement with France, 59 ; the danger of a Rus sia, war in 1876, 231 sqq ; the con vention of Reichstadt : Austria acquires Bosnia and Herzegovina, 235 ; the Berlin Congress, 236 ; Bismarck's arguments on behalf of an alliance between Germany and Austria, 256 sqq ; his fore cast of the future relations of Austria and Germany, 257 ; her Polish policy, ib. ; preliminary agreement between Count An drassy and Bismarck, 260 Austria, House of : lessons of its neglected opportunities, i. 301 Avars, the, i. 182 Avron, Mont, the bombardment of, ii. 124 Babelsberg, Castle of, i. 42, 44, 280. 351 Bach, Herr (Austrian statesman), i. 93, 204, ii. 279 Bacmeister, Herr (Prussian states man), i. 97 Baden, i. 66, 69 sqq Baden-Baden, i. 274, 312 Baden, Duke of, ii. 131 342 INDEX Baden, Prince William of, i. 248 Baden, Princess William of (ne'e Princess Leuchtenberg), i. 248 Baden, Grand Duchy of, ii. 52, 54 Baden, Grand Duchess of, i. 258 Baden. Grand Duke of, ii. 81; his proclamation of the ' Emperor William,' 133 Baden guerillas, i. 74 « Baireuth, ii. 43 sq. 52 Bajuvarian dynasty, the, i. 321 Balabin, Herr, Prussian ambassa dor, ii. 248 Balkan States, the, ii. 117, 281 Balkan war (1876), the, ii. 235 Baltic and North Sea Canal, ii. 10, 32 Bamberg, i. 108, 111 Bamberg, Herr (Consul at Paris), i- 237 Basle, the peace of, i. 184, 202 Bassewitz, Herr von, i. 11 Batoum, ii. 117 Battenberg, Prince of, ii. 117 Battenberg question, the, ii. 333 Battenbergian Bulgaria, ii. 14 Bavaria, i. 45, 62, 69 sqq, 111, 113, 128, 130, 184; (the dynasties of), 311 ; political events of Lewis II's reign) 388 sqq, ii. 44, 82 sqq Beauharnais House, the, i. 323 Beaumont, i. 139 Beckerath, Herr, i. 20, 54 Befehlerle ( := ' red tape '), i. 12 Belgium, i. 184, 193, 195, 207, 212 ; the constitution of, 361 Belgrade, i. 323 Belle-Alliance, ii. 99 Below, Herr von, i. 260 Below-Hohendorf, Herr, i. 160, 374 Benckendorf, Count (Russian mili tary attache, 1850), i. 82, 162 Benecke, Professor (surgeon), i. 260 Benedetti, Count (French ambassa dor) : assists at the conferences for peace (1866), ii. 47 ; propo sals submitted by him from Na poleon, ib. ; at Ems (1870), 94 sqq; his final demand from Wil liam I, 97 « Bennigsen, Herr Rudolf von : nego tiations for his succession to Count Eulenburg, ii. 197 ; his demands, I98 ; rupture of the negotiations, 201 ; Bennigsen definitely de clines, ib. Berlichingen, Goetz von, i. 33 Berlin : song of the troops in their retreat from, 1848, i. 42 ; the events of 1848, i. 46, 49 Berlin Congress (1878) thp, Rus sian gains in, ii. 117 232, sqq Bernadotte, the House of i. 194 Bernhard, Herr (private secretary to Frau von Schleinitz). ii. 312 Bernstorff, Count, i. 237, 272, 275, 279, 280, 283 n, 285, ii. 16 Bessarabia, i. 205 Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von : let ter to William I, 1866, ii. 15 Bethmann - Hollweg group, the (Prussian political party), i. 101 sqq, 121, 125, 134, ii. 14 Beust, Count von (Saxon minister), i. 130, 376 Beust, Count (Austrian minister), ii. 6, 59 ; the Austrian policy dur ing the Franco-Prussian war, ii. no sqq; the origin of the phrase ' They must be squeezed to the wall,' 205 Biarritz, i. 384, ii. 28 Bismarck-Bohlen, Count (cousin of Bismarck) , ii. 85 Bismarck, Count Herbert, i. 405 ; made Privy Councillor with the title of Excellency, ii. 329 Black Sea : Russian restrictions in, by the treaty of Paris, ii. 115, 254 ; Russian aim at the control, 285 Blanckenburg, M o r i t z Henning (Roon's nephew), i. 294, ii. 152, 159 Blind's attempt to assassinate Bis marck (1866), i. 372 ; a satirical cartoon on the occasion, 372 n Blome, Count, ii. 18 sq Bloomfield, Lord, i. 253 Bliicher, Prince, i. t, ii. 161 Bludoff, Count, i. 241 Blumenau, battle of, ii. 47 Blumenthal, Count (later Field Mar shal), ii. 126 Blumenthal, Countess (an English lady), ii. 126 Bockum-Dolffs, Herr, i. 336 Bockheim Wood, i. 366 Bodelschwingh, Herr Ernst von 343 BISMARCK (Minister of the Interior ; resigned in 1848), i. 23, 32, 60, 70, 104, 148 Bodelschwingh, Herr Karl von (Minister of Finance), i. 309, 328 ; (letter to Bismarck) 356, 385, ii. 156 jy Bodelschwingh, Pastor von, i. 33 n Boetticher, Oberprasident von, i. 87 Bohemia, i. 71, 302, 374, ii. 12, 43, 276, 311 Bonapartism, i. 116, 144, 196 sq, 206 Bonin, Herr von, i. 28, 232 Bonnechose, Cardinal (Archbishop of Rouen), ii. 135 Bordeaux, ii. 112 Bordeaux, Duke of, i. 199 Bordighera, ii. 156 ' Borussian ' sentiment, i. 72 Bosnia, ii. 235 Bosphorus, Russia's aim at the con trol of, ii. 287 sq Boulanger, General, ii. 285, 293 Bourbons, the, i. 196, 206, 209 Boycott, a military, ii. 104, 108 Boyen, General von, i. 231 Brabant dynasty, the, i. 321 Brandenburg, i. 58 Brandenburg, House of, i. 325 Brandenburg, the March of, ii. 130, 184 Brandenburg Margraves, the, i. 182 ; their old seat, ii. 44 Brandenburg, Count (Minister- President) i, 53, 55, 58, 62 ; at Erfurt, i. 72 ; his death, 73, 77 Brandenburg, Count : his physical weakness, i. 308 Brassier, Herr (Prussian ambassa dor), i. 6 Brater, Herr, i. 353 Brauchitsch, Herr von (Rath), i. 7, 20, ii. 155 Braunau, the district of, ii. 45 Bregenz coalition, the, ii. 4 Breslau, i. 105 Bresson, Count (French ambassador to Berlin, 1854), i. 125 Brints, Frau von (sister of Count Buol), i. 242 Brack, Baron von (Austrian states man) i. 93 ' Bruderstamm ' movement, the Polish, i. 347 Brunnen (Canton Schwyz), i. 270 Brunnow, Baron von, i. 129 Brunswick, i. 76, 210, ii. 80 Brunswick dynasty, the, i. 321 Brunswick, Elector of, i. 325 Budberg, Baron von (Russian dip lomat, 1850), i. 82, no, 254, 283, ii. 247, 248 Biilow, Baron von, i. 137 ; letter to Bismarck on Harry Arnim, ii. 182 Biilow, Herr Bernard von, ii. 214 ; letter from Bismarck on von Gru ner's case, 223 Bug, the, ii. 72 Bukowina, the, ii. 50 Bulgaria, ii. 117, 235, 263, 294^ Bund, the, i. 85, 90, 174 sq, 188, 319. 327, 368 Bunsen, Chevalier de (ambassador to London), i. 114 n, 118, 122, 152, 3°9 Buol, Count von (Austrian states man), i. 93, 108, 115, 127 sqq, 161, 204, 235, 385, ii. 279 Bureaucracy, the Prussian, i. 12 sqq Burnes, Sir Alexander : his dis patches from Afghanistan, ii. 237 Burschenschaft, the, i. 2, 46 Byzantinism, i. 64, 312 ' Cabinet wars, ' ii. 270 Caesarism, i. 208, ii. 67 Camarilla, the, i. 52, 138, 144, 159 Camphausen, Herr Ludolf (Minis ter-President), i. 47 sq, 354, ii. 216, 224 Canitz, General von. i. 6, 170 Caprivi, Count von, i. 35 «, ii. 166 Carlowitz, Herr, i. 58 Carlsbad, ii. 45 Carlsruhe, i. 253, 291 Caroline Islands, the, ii. 293 ' Cartridge, Prince ' (nickname of Prince of Prussia, 1848) , i. 40 Caspar Hauser story, the, i. 323 Cassel, ii. 27 Catherine, Empress (Russia), i. 250, ii. 272, 274, 296 Catholicism : favoured by Princess (later Empress) Augusta, i. 136 j^ Catholic party in Germany, the, i. 402 'Catholic section,' the, in the Min istry of Public Worship, ii. 139, 141 ; its abolition, 142 344 INDEX Catholics, German : the ' Cultur kampf,' ii. 135 sqq; party spirit of the Catholics, 136; the May Laws, 142, 147 sqq; position of Prussian Catholics before 1870, 149; changed conditions in recent times, 187 Cattaro, Gulf of, ii. 277 Cattle plague, ii. 227 ' Centrum ' party, ii. 138 ; its anti- Imperial character, 338, 339 Champagne, the Prussian campaign in (1792), ii. 49 Chamisso'spoem, Vetter Anselmo,\. 102 Chancellor, Imperial : his duties, responsibility, and rights, ii. 335 sqq Charles the Great, i. 182, ii. 127 Charles I, King (England), i. 314 Charles I, King (Portugal), i. 194 Charles V, Emperor, i. 326, ii. 279 Charles X (France) , i. 302 Charlotte, Empress Dowager (Rus sia) , i. 248 Charlottenburg, i. in, 153 sq Chasseurs de Vincennes, i. 243 Chauvinism, Hungarian, ii. 289 Chemnitz, ii. 46 Chevkin, Herr (the railway ' gener al'), i. 242 Cholera, attack of, among the Prus sian troops (1866), ii. 49 Chotek, Count, ii. 112 Christian IX, King (Denmark), ii. 22 Church, the Christian : its old time influence on European politics, i. 182 Cipher dispatches : difficulty of keeping the cipher secret, ii. 231 'Circle,' the (Stettin): Bismarck deputy of, i. 19 Cis-Leithania, i. 94 Civil-diplomats, Prussian, character of, i. 4 Civil Marriages : Bismarck's opin ion on, ii. 152 Clarendon, Lord, i. 306 n ' Classen-Steuer,' the, i. 38 n Coalitions : Bismarck's objection to, ii. 245, 255 Cobenzl, Count von, i. igo, 202 Coblenz, i. 135, 169, ii. 81 Coburg, Duke of, i. 100, ii. 5 Cologne, i. 169 Committee of National Defence (Prussia), ii. 33, 35 Confederation, the North German, ii. 57 sqq, 284 Conflict, the Ministry of, i. 328 sqq Conservative party the Prussian : reactionary tendencies in. 1867, ii. 69 sq; Bismarck's rupture with (1872), ii. 155 sqq; political re sults, 165 Constance, Lake of, i. 205 Constantine, Grand Duke, i. 245, 304. 346 Constantinople, i. 396, ii. 289 Constitution, the English, i. 355, 361 Constitution, the French (1791), i. 196 Constitution, the Prussian : the King's position in, i. 156 ; Bis marck's criticism of it, ii. 77 Copenhagen, i. 151, 215, ii. 283 Cossacks in Berlin (1813) , i. 302 'Cossacks of the Spree,' i. 188 Costenoble, Geheimrath, ii. 10 Council of State, the Prussian : its institution (181 7) and object, ii. 297 ; why it was recalled into ac tivity (1852), ib. ; causes of its defective drafting of proposed laws, 294 sqq ; results of indolence and party blindness, 299 ; a strik ing example, 299 sq ; corrective influences, 300 ; excellence of the Council's work after 1884, 301 Courland, i. 216 Court etiquette and manners in var ious countries compared, i. 167 Creisau, ii. log n Crimean war : Prussia's position during the, i. 105 sqq, 161, 213, 303 Culturkampf, the, ii. 135 Curia, the Roman, ii. 149 sq ; its policy towards Prussia after 1866, 184 Czechs, ii. 269, 276, 280 Czernahora, the ' council of war ' at (1866), ii. 39 Dalwigk-Coehorn, Herr von, i. 108, ii. 7 Danish question, the, i. 312 Danish war (1864), the, i. 76 Dantzic, i. 75, 233, 264, 301, ii. 283 Dantzic episode, the, i. 349, ii. 332 345 BISMARCK Danube, the, ii. 41 Danube principalities, the Russian retreat from, i. 161 Dardanelles, the, i. 113 Darmstadt, i. 86, 108, 128, 184, 378 Dauner, Countess, i. 216 Decazes, M., ii. 244 December Constitution, the, i. 144 Decembrists, the, ii. 2g5 'Decorations,' popular admiration of, in St. Petersburg, i. 243 Delbrtick, Herr, i. 3, 329, 384 Denmark, i. 195, 215, 303, 380; voted in the Federal Diet, ii. 13 Departments, Government, B i s- marck's relation with, ii,225, sqq; Ministry of Education, 226 ; Fi nance, 227 ; Agriculture, ib. ; Treasury, 228 ; Post Office, ib. Deputies, Chamber of (Prussian), i. 157, (1849) 313. (1863) 316 Derby, Earl of, ii. 244 Dispatches, political : general and systematic tampering with en route, i. 251 sqq Dessau, i. 45, 184 Deutsch-Wagram, ii. 41 Diest, Herr von. ii. 155, 157 ' Diet of Princes, ' the Frankfort (1863), i. 366 sqq; its object, a union of all Germany on the basis of dualism (Prussia and Austria) , 368 ; different from Schwartzen- berg's scheme, ib. Dijon, ii. 122 Diplomacy, Prussian training in, i. 3 sqq District president (' Landrath ') , bu- reaucratised into a Government official, ii. 196 ; the result, 197 Divorce and matrimonial proceed ings in Prussia (1835), i. 8 Doberan, i. 289, 293 Donhoff family, the, ii. 207 Dohna, Count Frederick zu, i. 138 Dolgorouki, Prince, i. 255 Donchery, ii. 87 Drahnsdorf, i. 119, 149 Dresden, i. 46^, 66 sq, 84, 371, ii. 40 n Drouyn de Lhuys, ii. 55, 60, 312 Diippel, ii. 13, 22, 166 Duncker, Max, i. 349, 354 Dynasties and stocks, the importance of to German patriotism, i. 318 ; lack of the dynastic sentiment in other European nations, 322 ; in Germany, ii. 44 Economics, Board for, ii. 300 Echstaedt, Count Vitzthum von, i. f b », ii. 60 Eger valley, the, i-„ 45 Elbe the, ii. 34 Elbe Duchies, the, i. 122, 322 Elector, the Great, i. 183, i:. 10, 326 Elizabeth, Czarina, ii. 281 sq Elizabeth, Queen (wife of Freder ick William IV), i. 4^, 135, 169, 218 sq, 375 Elsass-Lothringen, the organization of (1871) i. 10 Emperor : William I's dislike for the title, ii. 64 ' Emperor ' and ' King of Prussia,' distinction between, as to func tions, ii. 221 Ems telegram : the original, ii. 97 n; as edited for t.ie press, 100 Enghien, Due d' , i. 207 England : rival Continental policies of Lord Palmerston and Prince Albert, i. 120 ; Napoleon Ill's objection to the naval preponder ance of England, 214 ; lack of the dynastic sentiment in, 323, the Constitution, 354, 361; her varying policy in seeking allies, 370; the Turkish question (1876), 396 ; relations with Germany (1877), 400 ; the cant of humani- tarianism during the siege of Paris, ii. 125 ; capitulation through bombardment or through famine : which is more humane ? 125 English female influences at ¦ Prussian headquarters, ib. ; ' se lection' of papers for the public eye, 237 ; little hope of support in Germany in case of war (1875), 255 ; her old policy towards Tur key modified through Mr. Glad stone's denunciation of the Sul tan, 287 ' Era articles of Perrot,' the, ii. 167, 177 Erfurt parliament, the, i. 71, 143 Ernestine line (Saxony), i. 122 Erxleben, i. 119, 150 Etzel, General von, ii. 37 346 INDEX Eugenie, Empress, i. 277, 344, ii. 184 sqq Eulenburg, Count Botho zu, ii. 202, 206 sqq ; correspondence with Bismarck, 209 ; his resignation, 211 Eulenburg, Count Frederick zu, i. 228 ; specimen of his business ca pacity, 330 sqq ; ii. 196 ; his ad ministrative reform, 196 ; choice of his successor, 197 ; as go-be tween, 200 European politics in the middle ages, i. 182 Evangelical Church question, the, ii. 146 Falk, Herr, i. 137 Falk, the May Laws, ii. 142 ; causes of his retirement : feminine Court influence, 143 Fanariots, the, ii. 294 Faubourg St. Germain, the, ii. 246 Favre, M. Jules, ii. 254 ' February conditions,' the, ii. 28 Federal Council, the, i. 3g4, 3g8 Federal Diet (restored to activity by Austria), i. 85, (Bismarck en voy to) 86, 142, ii. 3 Federation, German, i. 310, ii. 43 Fischer, Hannibal, ii. 21 sq Flemming, Count, i. 253 Flenry, General, i. 346 Florence, i. 225 sq Floridsdorf lines, the, ii. 40 sq, 123 Fontainebleau, i. 282 Forckenbeck, Herr, ii. ig8 France : relations with England after 1855, i. 187 ; a war with Prussia a logical sequence to the war with Austria (1866), ii. 42 ; the contin gency of its again becoming mon archical and Catholic, 279 Franchi, Cardinal, i. 402 Francis Joseph, Emperor, i. 91, 160, 23g sq ; at Gastein : the summon ing of the ' Diet of Princes,' 374 ; inherent difficulties of his political position, 386 sq Franconian principalities, the, i. 184, «¦ 45 Franco- Prussian war, Bismarck's preparations for, ii. 58 sqq, 73 sqq Frankfort, (the outbreak of 1833) i. 2, 140, 377 sq Frankfort Assembly, the (Pauls- kirche), i. 61 sq Frankfort, Diet of, i. 74 Frankfort, the peace of, ii. 185 Franks (of the Main), i. 321 Fransecky, General von, ii. 47 Frantz, Constantine, i. 146 Frederica of Hanover, Princess, ii. 26 Frederick I (Elector), ii. 43 Frederick II (the Great), i. 84, in, (subsidies paid by him to Russia) 183, 2g8 sqq, 320, ii. 42, 281 ; his desire for historical fame, 316 Frederick I II. See Frederick, Prince Frederick VII, King (Denmark): Bismarck's interview with (1857), i. 215 ; his death (1863), 378 Frederick, Prince (afterwards Crown Prince: later Emperor Frederick III),i. 44 ; his visit to Italy (1878), 137 ; Bismarck's relations with him in 1863 (the Dantzic episode), 34g ; the result, 351 sqq ; visit to Bismarck at Gastein, 355 ; letter to Bismarck, ib. ; a conversation between them, 357; the King's reply to the Prince's requests, 358 sqq ; statement of the claims of Prussia in the Augustenburger question, ii. 31 ; head of the Com mittee for National Defence, 33 ; his strong dynastic family feeling, 43 ; supports Bismarck's views on peace proposals of Austria (1866), 53 ; objection to the restoration of the Imperial title, 127 ; views about the form of his father's title, 131 ; unchanging confidence in Bismarck, 217; a strong advocate of the Austrian alliance, 271 ; his illness at the time of his father's death, 304 ; cordial relations with Bismarck from his youth up, 332 ; contradiction of the story that (in 1887) he renounced his succession in favour of his son, 333 ; and the myth about an incurable physical complaint excluding from the suc cession an heir to the throne, 334 ; reason of Bismarck's interfering in the medical treatment of the Prince, ib. ; differences of opinion between Frederick III and Bis marck' on some points of consti- 347 BISMARCK tutional law, 334 sqq ; distinction between 'Emperor' and ' King of Prussia,' 334; a letter from the Emperor Frederick to Bismarck, 340 Frederick, Hereditary Prince (Hesse), ii. 27 ; letter to Bismarck, 2g, 31 Frederick of Prussia, Prince, i. i6g Frederick of Wurtemburg, Prince, ii. 56 Frederick Charles, Prince (Prussia), i. 24 sq, ii. 45, 99 Frederick William I, i. 96 Frederick William II : his policy criticised, i. 301 Frederick William III, (his suppres sion of student aspirations for German unity) i. 44, (object of his wars against France) 183, 255, (his will) 262, 320, ii. 81. Frederick William IV : his at tempted alteration of the Prus sian marriage law, i 9 ; his princi ples of government, 18; treatment of Bismarck (1847) , 21 ; the events of 1848, 22 sqq, 29 ; his 'Deutsch' national sentiment, 44 ; relations with Emperor Nicholas (Russia), 46; estimate of his conduct dur ing the revolution of 1848, 47 ; visit of Bismarck to, at Sans- Souci, 47 ; his conduct in 1848, 48 sq; his policy after 1848, 59 sqq ; the imperial crown offered to him by the Paulskirche parliament, 60 n, 62 sq ; objected to his mini sters dancing, 90 ; letter to Em- perior Francis Joseph, 91 ; letter to Bismarck on the proposed Second Chamber, 153 ; his man ner of living, 154 ; ' edited ' auto graph letters, 160 ; his treatment of Bismarck in 1854, 161 ; strange proposal for bringing Bismarck into his ministry, 211 ; sudden ill ness : Prince of Prussia appointed Regent, 216 sqq; letters to Bis marck, 226, 228 ; estimate of the policy of Frederick William IV, i. 308, 371 Frederick William, Prince (Electoral Hesse), ii. 27 sq Frederick William, Prince (Prussia): work as President of the Council of State (1884), ii. 301 Freemasonry, i. 225 Free press : benefit of its criticism to a state, ii. 68 Free trade, ii. 217 French (language) , former apprecia tion of in Prussia, i. 4 ; used in ambassadorial reports, 5 Friendenthal, Herr, ii. 203, 215 sq, 224 Friesland, East, ii. 43 Frobel, .Herr Julius : initiator of the ' Diet of Princes,' i. 374 Furstenberg - Stammheim, Count, i. 101 Fulda, ii. 80 Gablenz, General von, i. 373, ii. 37 Gagern, General Frederick von, i. 73 ; his death, 74 » Gagern programme, the, ii. 5 Galicia, i. 94, 107, ii. 6, 276, 280 Gallicanism, ii. 136 Garde Jdger, the, ii. 340 Garibaldi, General, i. 225, ii. 60 ; his dramatic military performances on behalf of France, 136 Gastein, i. 344, 374, ii. 214, 267, 332 Gastein Convention, the, ii. 18, 25 Geffcken, Herr (Hanseatic Guelf) : his pseudo-diary of the Crown Prince, i. 353, ii. 128 Geheimer Rath, i. 147 Geheimrath, i. 89 Gensdarmenmarkt, i. 56 Genthin, i. 32, 41 George V, King (Hanover), i. 97 ; Bismarck's visit to him, 97 ; under Austrian influence (1866), ii. 27 ; letter to William I (1867), not ac cepted by the latter, 80 Geppert, Justizrath, i. 77 Gerard, M. (reader to Augusta), i. 133 n, ii. 186, 188 ; in correspon dence with Gambetta, 186 « Gerlach, General von. i. 51, 99 ; on Frederick William IV and General Radowitz, 71 n ; letter to Bis marck, 104 ; correspondence in cipher between him and Bismarck (1S54), 109 sqq, 113 ; letter from Bismarck to (1856), 126 ; on Man teuffel and Rhino Quehl, 144 sq ; 348 INDEX correspondence between Bismarck and him (1857), 171 ; his early relations with William I (when Prince), ii. 305 ; called a 'Pietist' by the Prince, ib. Gerlach, Leopold von, i. 61 Gerlach, Ludwig von (President ; brother of the General), i. 51, 159, ii. 11 German element in Austrian parlia ment after 1866, ii. 86, 269 ' German Emperor ' or ' Emperor of Germany' : difficulties about the title, ii. 131 German Empire : its foundation more firmly laid through intestine conflicts, i. 47 ' German-National ' political aims (1832) among students, i. 2 German national unity, the initia tion of, the aim of Bismarck, ii. 51 Germany : the various dynasties in, i. 318; influence of party spirit in politics and religion, ii. 23; its position in regard to Russia's fu ture policy, 288 sqq Gerstenberg, Governor - General : death by violence, i. 338 'Gladstone Ministry,' the so-called (i.e. Stosch, Rickert, and others), ii. 148, 206 sq, 216 Gladstone, Mr. , result of his denun ciations of the Sultan, ii. 287 Glatz, i. 381 Gneisenau, General, i. 6, 191 Goeben, General, i. 6 Gorres, Herr, ii. 99 Goethe, i. 132 Goltz, Count Charles von der (aide- de-camp to Emperor William), i. 100 Goltz, Count Robert von der, i. 101, 122, 124, 312; letter to Bismarck, 344 ; difference with Bismarck concerning the Schleswig-Hol- stein question, ii. 1 Goluchowski, Count (Stadtholder of Galicia) , ii. 205 Gontaut- Biron, Vicount de (French ambassador), ii. 186; his activity in St. Petersburg, 188 Gontaut-Gortchakoff intrigue, the, ii. 188 sqq Gortchakoff, Prince, ii. 60, 75, in ; antipathy to Bismarck stronger than his patriotism, 115; his van ity : epigram by Bismarck, 116; his best dispatches the work of Jomini, ng; story of a box set with diamonds, 151 n; on the re lations of France and Prussia in 1875, 188; claims to have pre vented the outbreak of war, 189; rebuked by Bismarck, 190 ; his methods in 1876, 231 ; took part in Berlin congress contrary to his master's wish. 236; premeditated dishonesty, 238; his share in the Czar's threatening letter to Wil liam I, 240; examples of his old confidence in Bismarck, 247 sq ; opposed the proposed alliance of the three Emperors, 254 sq Gossler, Herr von (Minisfer of Reli gion), i. 333 ' Gotha, ' meaning of, as a political term, i. 100, 120 Gottberg, Frau von, ii. 126 Gottberg, Herr von, ii. 126 Gottorp, the House of, i. 322 Govone, General, ii. 60 Gramont, Duke of, ii. 90, 93 Graudenz, i. 349 Greece, i. 193 ; a disappointment to Russia, ii. 295 Griesheim, Colonel von, i. 57 Groben, Count von der, i. 138 Grote-Schauen, Freier Standesherr von, i. 68 Gruner, Herr Justus, ii. 217 Gruner, Herr von, i. 85; an enemy of Bismarck, ii. 217; appointed to an office irregularly, 218; Bis marck interferes, ib. ; the appoint ment not gazetted, 224 Guelf, House of, i. 325 Guelf legion, the : its formation and dissolution, ii. 84 Guelfs, the, ii. 26, 28 sq Guntershausen, i. 140 Habsburg-Lothringen, the House of, i. 207 Habsburgs, the, i. 327, ii. 280 Hague, treaty of the (.1785). i- 194 Hahn, Geheimrath, ii. 207 Hambach festival (1832), the, i. 2 Hamburg, i. 368, ii. 33 Hanau, i. 327. ii- 80, 99 349 BISMARCK Hanover, i. 68, 71, 97, 111, 113, 368, ii, 26, 43 ; its position after the war of 1866, ii. 79 sq Hanse towns, i. 322 Hantge, Herr, i. 114 » Hapsburg monarchy, the composite character of the, i. 386 Hardenberg, Prince (Prussian diplo mat), i. 6, 320, ii. 44, 161 Harkort, Herr, i. 54 Hassenkrug (a secret agent), i. 126 Hatzfeldt, Count (Prussian ambas sador in Paris, 1855), i. 118, 163, 176 Hatzfeldt, Count Max, i. 6 Haugwitz, Count von, i. 190, 201, 302, 371 Haxthausen-Abbenburg, Baron von, i. 120 ; his theory of the three zones, 132 Haymerle, Baron (Andrassy's suc cessor), ii. 264 n Hecker, Herr, i. 74 n Hedemann, General von, i. 28 Heidelberg, i. 3, 258 Heidt, Herr, i. 20 Heinzes, the (husband and-wife), the proceedings against (1891), i. 7 Helene, Grand Duchess, i. 271 Helene, Princess, ii. 56 Heligoland, ii. 35 Henry the Lion, i. 325 Henry V, King (France), i. 198 Herzegovina, ii 235 Hess, General, i. 109 Hesse, i. 66, 368 Hesse-Darmstadt, ii. 52, 54 Hesse, Electorate of, i. 210, ii. 27 sq, 43; its position after the war of 1866, ii. 79 sq Hetseira, the (Greece) , ii. 294 Heydt Baron von der, i. 271, 288, 3og, 32g, ii. 156 High Consistorial Court, the, ii. 144 Hinckeldey, Herr von (First Com missioner of Police), i. 126, 146 Hindersin, General von, ii. 40 n Hirsch, Baron: Harry Arnim's re lations with, ii. 181 Hodel: attempt to assassinate Wil liam I, ii. 204 Hofburg. the. i. 284 Hohendorf, i. 260 Hohenlohe - Ingelfingen, Prince Adolf von (President of the Min istry, 1862), i. 275 Hohenlohe, Prince Kfafft, i. 399, ii. 124 Hohenschwangau, i. 391 Hohenstaufen, the, i. 326 Hohenzollern (acquired for Prussia by Frederick William IV), ii. io, .81 Hohenzollern dynasty, the, i. 322, 327 ; the family laws of the, ii. 334 Hohenzollern, Leopold, Hereditary Prince of : selected by Spanish Ministry for the throne of Spain, ii. 87; events arising out of this, 87 sqq ; the Prince renounces his candidature, 94 Hohenzollern, Prince von (Ministry of the 'New Era'), i. 222, 261, 263, 271, ii. 310 . Holland, i. 183, 193, 212; rumoured German designs on, 400 (also ii. 55) ; importance of its large inland canals, ii. 34 Holland, Queen of (1866): her an ti-Austrian sentiments, ii. 54; changed feelings towards Bis marck, 55 Holnstein, Count, i. 390, ii. 129 Holstein, i. 322 Holstein Estates, the, ii. 8 Holy Alliance, the, i. 209, ii. 284" Holy Roman Empire, the, ii. 273 ' Homage ' question, the, i. 264, 267 Homburg, ii. 113 Horriez (pronounced ' Horsitz ' ), ii. 28, 37 Hotel Meinhard, the, i. 26 Hiibner, Baron von, i. 176 Humbert, King (Italy), i. 137 Humboldt, Baron von, i. 28, 320 Hungarian Diet, the, i. 209 Hungary, i. g4, 114, 23g, 383, ii. 38 Ignatieff, General, ii. 117 ' Immediatbericht,' the, ii. 128 Indemnity, Bill of (Prussian), ii. 59 Indemnity for ministers during the ' Conflict ' period, ii. 77 ' Interim,' the, i. 205 ' Interimisticum.' the, i. 211 Intrigues against Bismarck, ii. 177 sqq 35° INDEX Iron Cross, the, i. 22, 255 Italian war (i8sg), i. 251, 310 Italy, i. 114 sq, 185, 209 ; position in 1866, ii. 50; subservience to France after the war of 1866, 5g ; Republican protest against Ital ian subservience to France, 113 ; relations with Prussia, 273 Itzenplitz, Count (Minister of Com merce), i. 328 sq Jacobini, Monsignor (Nuncio at Berlin, i87g), i. 407 Jagow, Herr von (Minister of the Interior), i. 280, 329 Jahde, the, ii. 34 Jahde district : acquired by Freder ick William IV, ii. 10 Jahde harbour, the, i. 179 Jahn, Herr, ii. gg Jahn's drill-system in schools, i. 1, 16 Jena, i. 141 Jerichow, 1. 23 Jesuits : Bismarck's relations with, i. 223 ; their influence in parts of Germany, i. 402, ii. I3g John, King (Saxony), i. 216, 376, ii. 86 Jomini, Baron : wrote Gortchakoff's best dispatches, ii. ng Jordan, Herr von (ambassador at Dresden), i. 88 Joseph II, Emperor, ii. 68, 272, 274 Jiiterbogk, i. 312 July revolution, the, i. 304 ' Junker ' policy, i. 164 Jutland, the invasion of, i. 37g Kalenburg, ii. 80 Kammergerichts-Auskultator, i. 3, 7 Kandern, i. 74 n Karlsburg, ii. 85 Karolyi, Count, i. 222, 370, 380, ii. 45 sq, 47 Kars, ii. 117 ; the Blue Book on, 237 Katkoff, Herr, ii. 285 Kauffmann, Herr, ii. 2g3 Kaunitz, Prince von, i. 254, ii. 272 Ketteler, Baron von (Bishop of Mainz), ii. 137 ; his demand in regard to the position of the Catholic Church in Prussia, 137 ; argument with Bismarck, 138 Keudell, Herr von, i. 90, 229, ii. I50_ Kiel, ii. 10 ; the harbour of, 20 sqq ; claimed as a Prussian marine sta tion, 31 ; importance of the pro posed canal, 34 1 King of the Germans ' title pro posed in 1870, ii. 128 ; objections to it, 128 Kisseleff , Count von, i. 1 76 Kissingen, i. 394 sqq Kissinger, Herr, i. 266 Kleine Mauerstrasse, i. 27 Kleist-Retzow, Oberprasident von, i. 138, ii. 153, 157 Klenze, Herr (Director-General of Taxes), i. g5, 140 Kliitzow, Herr, i. 142 Knesebeck, Herr, i. igl Kniephof, i. 317 Kniephausen, Count (Hanoverian Minister, Berlin, 1848), i. 57 Koniggratz, battle of, ii. 36 Konigsberg, i. 322 Kolberg, ii. 225 Kossuth, i. 114. ii. 256 Kratzig, Herr, ii. 140, 142 Krause, Herr (a dyke-surveyor), i. 23 Kremlin, the, i. 256 ' Kreuzzeitung, ' the : the Rhino Quehl question, i. 143 sqq ; its campaign of calumny against Bis marck, ii. 167 Kiihne, Herr, i. 269 Kttlz, i. ig KUstrin, i. 351 Kullmann (would-be assassin of Bis marck), i. 3g3 Kulm, the battle of, i. 255 ' Kulturkampf,' the, i. 41 Kutusoff, Count, ii. 115, 119 ; a witticism on the Russian termina tion of his name, 120 Lake, Province of Baden, the, i. 205 La Marmora, i. 229 Lambert, Count (Governor of War saw), i. 338 Landlords and peasants, the relation between, in Prussia, ii. 307 ' Landrath, ' the (district president), i. 19, ii. 196 Landshut, i. 321 Land-tag, the first United, i. 17 351 BISMARCK Landwehr, the, i. 15, 59, 77, 304 Languages, foreign, former appre ciation of a knowledge of, in Prussia, i. 4 Lasker, Herr, ii. 162 Latenberg, Herr, i. 104 Lauenburg, Duchy of : taken pos session of by Prussia (1865), ii. 20, 25 Launay, Count, ii. 150 sq Lebbin, Geheimrath von, ii. 166 Le Coq, M. (a Prussian diplomat), i. 104, 141 Ledochowski. Count (Archbishop of Posen and Gnesen), ii. 135 sq Legationsrath, i. 85 Legitimists, French: their manners, i. 168 Legnano, battle of, i. 325 Lehndorff, Count, ii. 324 Lehrbach, Herr, i. 190, 202 Leipzig, i. 141, ii. 46, g9 Leo XIII, Pope: relations with Germany, i. 402, 407 sqq Leopold, King (Belgium), ii. 319 LeopoId.Grand Duke (Baden) , i.323 Leopold, Prince (present Regent of Bavaria), ii. 131 Lerchenfeld, Count (Bavarian am bassador), i. 69 Leuchtenberg, Princess, i. 248 Levinstein, Herr (banker) : his at tempted ' transaction, with Bis marck, i. 234 sqq Lewis, Emperor, ii. 130 Lewis II, King (Bavaria, 1864): de scription of (as Crown Prince) , i. 388 ; extracts from his corre spondence with Bismarck, 39 1 j qq ; letter of Bismarck to, ii. 129 ; the King's letter in reply to William I, 130; correspondence of Bismarck with (1879), ii. 261, 267 Lewis XIV (France), i. 18, 112, 196 Lewis XVI (France), i. 196, 314 Lichnowski, Prince Felix, i. 3, 34 Linz, ii. 268 Lippe, i. 368 Lippe, Count zur (Minister of Jus- tioe), i. 334 Lissi, i. 106 Livadia, ii. 231 Loe, Herr von, ii. 183 Lowenstein-Wertheim, Prince, ii. 138 London Conference, ii. 16, 31; Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, ii. 254 London, the Convention of, 11. 7 London protocol, the, i. 185 Louis Philippe (France), (manners of his Court), i. 168, 209, 360, ii.3ig Lucadou, Herr, ii. 232 Ludom, Nathusius, ii. 167 Ludwig, Margrave, i. 323 Liichow, i. 326 Liineburg, ii. 80 Lusatia, i. 77 Luther: his views of civil marriages, ii. 154 Luxemburg, i. 212, 368, ii. 5g, 103, 194, 252 Lyons, i. 293 Magdeburg, i. 28, 35 (acquired by the Great Elector), ii. 10, 40 Magyars: their opinion of Germans, ii. 257; feelings towards the Suabians, ii. 280 Main, the, ii. 52 Maintz (commission of inquiry), i. 36g, ii. 39 Makoff, M. (Russian statesman), ii. 262 Mallinckrodt, Herr, ii. 138 Malmo, the armistice of, i. 369 Maltzahn, Herr, ii. 228 Manche. Hofrath, i. 238 n Manteuffel, Edwin von, i. 31, 48, 138; arrested for a duel with Twesten, i. 265 Manteuffel. Field-Marshal von, i. 230, ii. 166, 182 Manteuffel, Herr von (Minister), i. 18, 55 sq, 73, 83, 85 sq, (letter to Bismarck) 106, 109, 111, 132, 134, 136, (relation with Rhino Quehl, a journalist) 141 sq (dis agreement with the King 1853) 149 (severance from Quehl), 151, 159. 185, 211 (action during the Regency 1857-58), 218, (letter to Bismarck) 219, (dismissed from office) 222, 305, ii. 291 Marburg, i. 260 Marchfeld, the, ii. 46 Marienbad, i. 216 Marriage, Luther's view of, as a municipal matter, ii. 154 Mars-la-Tour, i. 139, ii. 113 352 INDEX Mary, Queen (Bavaria, i860), i. 388 Mary, Queen (Hanover), ii. 115 Massenbach, Herr, i. 191 Maximilian II (Bavaria), i. 113, 388 ( = King Max) May Laws, the, ii. 142 Mazzini, Signor, i. 225 Mecklenburg, i. 42, 66 Mediterranean: the desire to make it a French lake, i. 213 Meier, Herr, i. 26 Meiningen, ii. 43 Memel-Tilsit railway, the, i. 230 Mencken, Fraulein (Bismarck's mother), i. 16 Mencken, Privy Councillor (Bis marck's maternal grandfather), i. 16 Mensdorff, Count, i. 384 Mentchikoff, Prince, i. 241, 245, ii. 237 Mertens, Colonel, ii. 40 n Metternich, Prince, i. 65 (proposi tions to Napoleon III from Aus tria) i. 283, 300, 304, 386, ii. 288 Metz, i. 137, I3g,-ii. in Mevissen, Herr, i. 20 Meyendorff, Baron (Russian ambas sador), i. 83 Meyendorff, Baroness von (sister of Count Buol), i. 242 Meyendorff, Baron Peter von, i. 242 Meyer, Herr (Councillor to the em bassy), i. 353 sq Meyerinck, Lieut. -General von, i. 31 Michael Feodorowitch, Czar, i. 256 Milutin, M. (Russian War Min ister), ii. 262 Minden, (acquired by the Great Elector) ii. 10, 27 Minnigerode, Herr von, ii. 301 Minutoli, Herr von (Chief Commis sioner of Police, 1848), i. 32 Moabit, i. 125 Mollendorf , General von, i. 24, 27 Moller, President von, i. 266 Mohammed, i. 208 Moldavia, i. 108 Moltke, Count, i. 6 ; opposed the construction of the Kiel Canal, ii. 33 ; relaxed his opposition later, 35 ; his intended action in case of active French intervention in 1866, 40 ; his estimate of the en terprise at Pressburg, 46 ; the telegram from Ems, g7 ; pre pared for war, 101 ; perpetrates a pun, 102 ; his tactful courtesy, 104 Moltke, Countess (an English lady), ii. 126 Moltke, Herr Adolf, ii. log n Monarchy, the old Prussian, esti mate of, i. 17 ; Bismarck's ideal of a monarchy, 18 ' Monosyllabic' ministry, the (Buol, Bach, Bruck), i. 93 Montenegro, ii. 244 ; Prince of, 2g5 Montpellier, i, 2g2 n Moravia, ii. 276 Moritz, Herr, i. 273 Moscow, i. 255 Motley, Mr. J. L. , i. 85 Motz (Prussian diplomat), i. 6 Moufang, Dr., i, 403 Moustier, Marquis (French ambas sador), i. 126, 141, 222 Muhler, Herr von (Minister of Religion), i. 333, ii. 142 Muhler, Frau von (wife of the above), i. 333 Miinster, Count, i. 123, 138, 251, ii. ig4 Mulert, Pastor, ii. 94 Munich, i. 70, 388 Myslowitz, i. 347 Naples, i. ig8 Napoleon III, Emperor : his desire (1855), for an alliance with Prus sia, i. 168 ; Bismarck's opinion of him in 1855, i6g ; General Ger- lach's opinion of his position, 185 ; Bismarck's estimate of his posi tion, 196 sq ; his desire to effect a landing in England, 2og ; notes of an interview of Bismarck with, in 1857, 212; Bismarck's reticence thereon, 215; interview of Bis marck with him (1862), proposal of a Franco-Prussian alliance, 282; Austria's propositions to the Em peror, 283 ; desired the friendship of Russia (after Crimean war), 306 ; after the battle of Konig- gratz : Venetia ceded to him, and his intervention invited by Aus tria, ii. 37 ; proposed conditions VOL. II. — 23 353 BISMARCK of peace between Austria and Prussia, 47 ; desire to form a South German Confederation affil iated to France, ib. ; events after the war, 57 sqq ; his attempts to hinder the development of a United Germany, 58 ; the begin nings of the war of 1870: the Hohenzollern candidature for Spain, 87 ; how the Spanish question was garbled into a Prus sian one, 90 ; the first demands from Prussia, 91 ; a wrong esti mate of the national sentiment in Germany, 93 ; working of Ultra montane influences, ib. ; attitude of the Gramont-Ollivier ministry, 93 ; Benedetti at Ems, g5 ; the Ems telegram, g7, 100 ; the Salz burg meeting (1867), 255 Nassau, ii. 43, 80 Nassau, Duke of, i. 86, ii. 80 Nathusius-Ludom, Herr von, ii. 221 National Assembly, Prussian ( 1 848). i- 37> 39 ! the ' day-labourer par liament,' 49 sq, 54 ; transferred to Brandenburg, i. 58 National Defence, Committee of, ii. 33. 35 National Liberal party, Bismarck's dealings with, ii. igS sqq; a cur rent untrue myth contradicted, 205 Navarino, ii. 295 Navy, the German, ii. 21, 33 Nauheim, the baths of, i. 260 Neocassarea, Archbishop of (Papal diplomat, 1878), i. 402 Nesselrode, Count, i. 144, 204, 241, 312, ii. 221 Netherlands, the, i. 304 Neuchsttel, the royalist rising at, i. 18, 144, 176, 178, 185, 205 Neustettin, the gymnasium at, ii. 177 Neutrals, conduct of the, in the war of 1870, ii. no sqq 'New Era,' the Ministry of the, i, 222 Nicholas, Emperor (Russia), i. 46, 82, (alleged instructions to his heirs), 122 ; service rendered by him to Austria (1849), 239; ex ample of his distrust of his Rus sian subjects, 240 ; description of the members of his Court, 241 sqq ; life in his palaces, 247 sqq, ; peculation by his servants, 249 sq, ; transactions with Sir H. Sey mour, ii. 231 Niebuhr, Herr (private secretary to Frederick William IV), i. 51, no, (letter to Bismarck), 112, 138, 147 j?, 159, 3°9 Niederwald monument, the, ii. 326 Nikolsburg, i. 44, ii. 37, 45, 332 Nobiling : attempt to assassinate William I, ii. 204, 303 Norderney, the baths at, i. 97, ii. 307 Normann, Herr von, ii. 206 Nothomb, Herr, ii. 183 Nuremberg, ii. 44, 52 Obolenski, Prince : letter to Bis marck, i. 256 Obrucheff, Herr, ii. 118 Oertzen, Herr von (Mecklenburg envoy), i. 319, 367 Of en-Frankfort, i. 145 Ohm, Herr, i. 114 n Old-Bavarians, the, i. 321 Old Catholic Church, the establish ment of the, ii. 180 Oldenburg, i. 76, 128, ii. 115 Old-Hanoverians, i. 324 Old Mark, the, i. 326 Olmiitz meeting (1848), the, i. 68, 83, 23g, 261 sq, 3lg, ii. 281 Oriula, Count (Prussian ambassa dor), i. 6, 31 Orleans, ii. 122 Orloff, Prince, i. 241 Oscar I, King (Sweden), i. 206 Ostend, ii. 305 Oubril, Herr von, ii. 235, 246, 248 Palatinate : the insurrection in (1848), i. 68 sq; Upper Palati nate, ii. 44 ; Bavarian Palatinate, 52 Palmerston, Lord, i. 120, 185, ig8, 207, 2og Panslavist party, the, i. 33g, 347, ii. 278 Pardubitz, ii. 28 Paris, i. 81, ng; popularity of ' decorations,' 8g, 244 sq Paris conferences on the dispute 354 INDEX between Prussia and Switzerland, 1857, i. 212 Paris : the siege of, ii. 109 ; Prus sian losses, ib. ; the Parisians re jected the provisions stocked for them by the Prussians before their surrender, 123 Paris, treaty of (1856), i. 109, 185, 247 ; Prussia's share in, ii. 291 Parliamentary government, Bis marck's dislike of, i. 296 Party spirit in Prussia : instance of a judicial decision influenced by. ii. 168 ; political and religious party conflicts conducted with no regard for honour and courtesy, i6g ; party spirit in the Reichs tag, 338; enumeration of the t many various parties, 339 Patow, the Presidency of, i. 271 Patow, Herr, i. 336 Patzke, Herr, i. 268 Paul, Czar (grandfather of Empress Augusta), i. 133 Paulskirche parliament (Frankfort, l848-4g), i. 60 n, 62, 82, ii. 274 Paul's Palace (St. Petersburg), i. 250 Perglas, Baron Pergler von (Bava rian Ambassador), ii. 150 Perponcher, Herr (Prussian am bassador), i. 6 Perrot, Dr., ii. 167 Pestalozzi's system of teaching, i. 16 Peter the Great, Czar : his apo cryphal will, i. 122 Peterhoff, palace of, i. 247 Peucker, General von, i. 87 sq ' Peucker, to,' meaning of, i. 88 Pfaueninsel, the, i. 25 Pfordten, Herr von der, i. 128, 130, «•, sq 545 Pfretzschner, Herr von (Bavarian Minister), i. 3g3, 401 Pfuel, General von, i. 71 ' Phseacian governments,' i. 60 Philippe Egalite, i. ig6 ' Pietist,' William I's definition of, ii. 306 ' Pigtail,' intellectual, i. 11 Pillnitz, i. 216 Pirogow, Dr. i. 25g Pius IX, Pope, i. 137; policy to wards Prussia, ii. 184 Plamann's preparatory school, i. 1, 16 Platen, Count, i. 57, ii, 26 Platen, Count Adolf (Hanoverian ambassador), i. 94 ' Plonplon ' (Prince Napoleon) i 187 Podbielski, Generil von, ii. 104 Poland (and Poles), i. 82, 107 (pro posed kingdom of), 114, 116, 239, 300; the insurrection of 1831, 302 ; revolutionary movement in 1862, 338 ; Austrian friendly action towards, in 1863, 343 ; Prussian Poland acquired by Frederick William II, ii. 10; the ' Culturkampf ' in, 139 Polignac, M., i. 314 Political training, Prussian, i. 3 sqq Pomerania, i. 322 Pomerania, Further : acquired by the Great Elector, ii. 10 Pomerania, Hither : acquired by Frederick William I, ii. 10 Pomeranian estates of Bismarck's family, the, i. 15 Pommer-Esche, Herr, i. 3 Pope : the territorial claims, ii. 135 Portugal, i. 193, 195 Poschinger, Herr, ii. 104 Posen, i. 105, ii. 140 Potsdam, i. n, 15, 25, 27, ii. 332 Potsdam Stadtschloss, the, i. 41 Pourtales, Count Albert, i. 101, 118, 124, 141 Pratorius, Herr (Rath), i. 8 Prague, i. 241, ii. 69 Pressburg, ii. 41 Prim, Marshal : an alleged letter of Bismarck to, ii. go Prince Imperial (son of Napoleon III), i. 208 Princes, the Congress of, i. 344 Prittwitz, General von, i. 24, 27, (letter from Bismarck to, 1848) 2g, 32 Prokesch, Baron (Austrian diplo mat), i. 112, ii. 55 Propertied class, the prudent and restraining influence of the, ii. 66 Protective Tariff, a, Bismarck's let ter on, ii. 217 Provincial Fund, the Hanoverian, the dispute about (1868), ii. 155 sq 355 BISMARCK Prussia: politics in 1847, i. 20; its position (1848) compared with that of other German states, 44 sq; condition after 1848, 63 sqq; partisan schemes against Russia, 123 ; letter of Bismarck on her abdication of her European posi tion, 126 ; political parties in, 278 ; retrospect of Prussian policy, 2g8 sqq; neglected opportunities in its history, 301 ; particularism, 324 sq ; growth of its possessions, ii. 10 ; internal condition after the war of 1866, 57 ; growth and organization of its army, 5g Prussia, West : Catholic influences in, ii. 140 Prusso-Franco-Russian alliance, a possibility (1857), i. 201 Piickler, Prince, i. 167 Putbus, i. 112, 161 Putbus, Prince, ii. 85 Putbus, Princess, ii. 86 Puttkamer, Herr von (successor to Falk), ii. 145, 212 Pyrenees, the, i. 2gi Quehl, Rhino (journalist) : his writ ings, i, 116 ; his relations with Minister Manteuffel, 142 sqq; how their separation was effected, 150 1 Questenberg in the camp ' (a nick name of Bismarck), ii. 48 Radetzky, General, ii. 272 Radowitz, General, i. 50, 68, 70 sq, 74, 146, ii. 190 Radziwill, House of, ii. 138 sq Radziwill, Prince Anthony, ii. 139 sq Radziwill, Prince Boguslaw, i. 26, ii. I3g sq Radziwill, Prince William, ii. I3g sq Rantzau, Count (Bismarck's son-in- law), ii. 326 Rastatt. i. 188 Rathenow, i. 23 Raumef, General von, i. 51, 148 (his character), .53 sq, 104, 148, sq, 3og, ii. 226 Rechberg, Count (Austrian Minister President, and Minister for For eign Affairs, i85g-64),i. I2g, 253, (a quarrel with Bismarck), 366, (pacification and friendship), 367, 377. 378 ; the Schleswig-Holstein question, 381 sqq ; dismissed from office, 384, Rechberg, (General) Count, ii. 39 Recke-Volmerstein, Count von der, i- 137 Red Cross, the, ii. 105 Red Eagle, Order of the, ii. 325 Redern, Count (Russian ambas sador), ii. l8g Redern, Count William, i. 163 Reform Bill, the English, i. 144 Regency (France), the, i. ig6 Regency, the Prussian (1857), i. 217 sqq Pegirungs-Assessor, i. 6 Kegirungs-Referenda : studies for attainment of the position, i. 3 sqq Reichenbach, the Convention of, i. 183, 301 Reichenberg, ii. 36, 45 ' Reichsglocke ' (libel action against : the Arnim case), ii. 166, 175, 183 Reichstadt, the convention of (1876), ii. 235, 255, 274, 281 Reichstag : attempt to institute a ' responsible Minister to the Em pire,'!. 3g8 Reichstag, the variety of parties in the, ii. 336 ; Bismarck's over-es timate of its patriotism, 338 ; anti- Imperial character of the Centrum party, ib. Reinfeld, i. 161, 266, 274, 2g2 Rendsburg, ii. 31 Representatives, House of, i. 336 sq Reuss, Prince, i. 407 Revolution, the American, i. 193 Revolution, the English (1688), i. 193 sq Revolution, the French, i. 183, 195 Revolution, modern : its widespread character, i. 192 sqq ; its real origin, 195 Revolutionary movements of 1848, i. 22 sqq ' Rheinbiindelei,' ii. 81 Rhine Confederation, the, i. in, 189, 202, ii. 45 Rhine frontier, the (1857),!. 212 356 INDEX Rhine : proposed canalization by the Rheingau, ii. 225 Rhine, the French army of the, i. 138 Rhine Province (acquired by Frede rick William III), i. 135, ii. 10 Rickert, Herr, ii. 148, 216 Rochow, General von (envoy to the Federal Diet), i. 85 sqq Roggenbach, ii. 82 Roon, Count von, (correspondence between him and Bismarck 1861-62), i. 227, 264, 266, 270, 276, 278 sq, 284, 288, 291, 293, 313, (his character) 331 sqq, ii. 40, 96, 102, 104, 122, 124 sqq, 153 ; correspondence with Bis marck in 1868, 157 sqq; acts for Bismarck during an illness, 165 ; other references, 199, 310, 317 Rossbach, i. 141 Rotzi, the embankment at, i. 15 Roumania, ii. 278, 294 sq Roumania, King of, ii. 90 Rudhart, Herr von, i. 399 sq Riigen, i. 161 Russbach, the, ii. 41 Russell, Lord John: a sarcasm on his versatility, i. 211 Russell, Lord Odo, ii. 116, 183, 195 Russia: action during the 1848 rev olutionary movement, i. 82 sq ; the Crimean war, 105 sqq ; the evacuation of Wallachia and Mol davia, 108 ; its internal condition, 120 ; schemes for its dismem berment, 123 sqq ; the retreat from the Danubian principalities, 161 ; Polish movement of 1862, 338 sqq ; relations with Germany in 1883; i, 413 sqq; its army in 1863, ii. 6; estimation of her posi tion towards Prussia in 1 866, 41 ; uneasiness at Prussia's growth, 60; danger of war with Austria (1876), 231; and with England and Austria, 236; Bismarck's forecast of the future policy of Russia, 285 sqq ; no pretext for fighting Germany, 285; its aim the occu pation of Constantinople, with a protectorate of the Sultan, and the control of the Black Sea, 286; fiasco of the Russian policy in the Balkan peninsula, 294; its experi ence of the ingratitude of ' libe rated ' nations, 295 SadowA, ii. 166 St. Petersburg: popularity of ' dec orations' in, i. 89; society in reign of Nicholas I, 241; the flood of 1825, 250; no cipher secure from officials there, 252; Bismarck's desire to remain as ambassador there, 341 Salzburg, ii. 59, 268 Salzwedel, i. 326 Samoa, ii. 293 Samwer, Herr, ii. 30 Sand, the crime of, ii. gg Sans-Souci, i. 47, no sq, 113, 135 San Stefano, the peace of, ii. 117, 235 Saracens, the, i. 182 Sardinia, i. 130, 185, 209 Sarskoe, palace of, i. 247 Sassulitch, Vera, the acquittal of, i. 339 Saucken-Tarputschen, Herr, i. 20 Savigny, Herr von (Prussian am bassador), i. 6, ii. 86, 138, 187 Savigny, Professor von, ii. 86 Saxony, i. 66, 68, 71, in, (relations with Prussia) 130, 210, (Lower Saxony) 326, (West Saxony) ii. 43, 44, 52, 83, 86 Saxony, Grand Duke of, ii. 120 Saxony, John, King of, ii. 46 Schack, Herr von, i. 42 Schaffranek, Herr, ii. 139 Scharnhorst, General, i. 191 Schaumburg, ii. 13 Scheie, Herr von (Prussian states man), i. 97 Schenk Flechtingen, the house of, i. 88 Scherff, Herr von (Dutch envoy), ii. 55 Schierstadt-Dahlen, Herr. i, 20 Schiller, i. 132 Schillerplatz (Gastein), i. 375 Schlei, the battles on the, i. 37g Schleinitz, Herr von, i, 134, 232, 237, 261 sq, (the creature of Princess Augusta) 263,^, 271, (his withdrawal) 274, (Foreign Minister) 310 sq. ii. 206, 224, 249, 310 Schleinitz, Frau von, ii. 312 357 BISMARCK Schleswig-Holstein, i.322, 378, 380, «• 43 Schleswig-Holstein, Duke of, ii. 13 Schleswig-Holstein question, ii. 1.; Bismarck's aim, 10 Schlieffen, Count, i. 225, 266 sq Schloss Berg, i. 409 sqq Schmerling, Herr, i. 384,ii. 3 Schnabele, Herr, ii. 285, 2g3 Schneider, Hofrath, ii. 132 Schonbrunn, i. 216, 380 Schonhausen, i. lg, 22, 28, 36 Scholz, Herr, ii. 227 sq School Inspection Bill (1872), ii. 162 Schramm, Assessor Rudoif (revolu tionary leader, 1848), i. 45, 313 Schulenburg, Countess (wife of General von Peucker), i. 87 Schwark, Herr, i. 268 Schwartau, i. 76 Schwarzenberg, Prince, i. 84, 103, 200, 205, 302, 319, 368, ii. 279 Schweinitz, General von, i. 414, ii. 234 Schweninger, Dr. (Bismarck's medi cal attendant), ii. 217 Schwerin, Count, i. 232 sq, 266, 336 Second Chamber ('House of Lords') proposed for Prussia 1852), i. 152, 156 Second Empire, the: Court manners under, i, 168 Secret voting: disliked by Bismarck, ii. 66; introduced by Fries's mo tion into Prussian law, 66 n Sedan, i. 139, ii. 32, 87, 166 Selchow, Herr von (Minister of Agriculture), i. 330 ' Separation Compacts,' i. 3g Septennate, the, ii. 138 Servia, ii. 244, 2g4 sq Seven Years' war, the, i. 370, ii. 42, 250, 268 Seymour, Sir H., ii, 231 Shipka Pass: Russian sentinels in (1877), i. 250 Shuvaloff, Count, ii. 116, 215, 236, (in disgrace) 261 Shuvaloff, Count Peter: correspon dence with Bismarck, ii. 241 ; he suggests a Russo-German offensive and defensive alliance, 245; Bis marck's objections, 246 sq, 24g; Bismarck preferred the alliance of the three Emperors, 250 Shuvaloff, Herr Peter, i. 241 Siegfeld, Herr (an agent of Drouyn de Lhuys), ii. 312 Silesia, i. 106, 322, 346 (acquired by Frederick II) ii. 10 8ilesia, Austrian, ii. 43 sq Silesian wars, the (1740-' 63), i. 183, ii. 42 Silistria, the bridge of, ii. 263 Skiernevice, ii. 283 Skobeleff, Herr, ii. 277, 285 Slavonic element in Austria, the, ii. 45 Slavonic movement, the (1876), i. 397 Slavs, ii. 205, 26g Slovenes, the, ii. 276 Social Democracy, the law (1878) against the dangerous endeavours of, ii. 325 Socialist Bill, the, ii. 207, 214 Socialist party in Germany, the, i. 402 sqq Solms, Prince, ii. 27 Spain, i. 184, ig3, ig5; selection of a Hohenzollern for its throne (1870), ii. 87; Spanish passivity during the resulting Franco - German war, 91 Spichern, ii. 113 Spiegelthal,Herr (a Prussian consul), i. gg Spires, i. 3 Spree, the, i. 125 Squirearchy, the Prussian, i. 3 Stahl, Herr, i. I5g Stanzke, Herr (a Pomerania mayor), i. 74 » States-General, the, i. 194 Stauffenberg, Herr, ii. 198 Steigerwald, the, i. 72 Stein, Baron von, i. 6, 280,320, ii. gg Stendal, i. 36 Stephan, Herr von, ii. 225, 228 sqq Stettin, i. 19, 161, 25g Stieber, Herr, i. 268 Stillfried, Count, i. 222, 312, 268 Stockhausen, General von (War Minister, 1850), i. 75 sqq Stockmar, Baron von, i. 123, 354 Stolberg, Count, ii. 215 Stolberg, Count Anthony, i. 138 Stolberg, Count Eberhard, ii. 105 Stolberg, Count Theodor, ii. 308 Stolpmiinde, i. 266, 274 358 INDEX Stolzenfels, i. 126 Stosch, General von, ii. 86, 148, 206, 216 Strafford, Earl of, i. 314 Strasburg, i. 3, 107, ii. 75 Strotha, General von (War Minister, 1848), i. 56 Stuarts, the, i. 194, 354 Stuttgart, i. 107 Sub-Diets, district, i. 2g6 Substitutes Bill, the, ii. ig8 Succession, the Spanish War of, ii. 50 Sultan: Russian desire to have a protectorate of him and his domin ions, ii. 286 sq Sulzer, Herr (Under-Secretary of State), i. 228 Summer Garden, the (St. Peters burg), story of a sentry there, i. 250 Suworoff. Prince, i. 241 Swabia, i. 321, ii. 280 Sweden, i. 193, 215 Swiss Radicals, i. 187, 191 Switzerland, i. 193, 207, (the dis putes with Prussia, 1857) 212 Sybel, Herr von, i. iog, ii. 28, 32 Sydow, Herr, ii. 8 Taaffe, Count, i. 309 Tabakscollegium, ii. 308 T&chen (a police agent), i. 125 ' Tallenay, M. le Marquis de,' i. go Talleyrand : his introduction of ' Le gitimacy,' in its modern sense, i. 170 Tangermiinde, i. 22 Tausenau, Herr, i. 114 n Taxis Palace, the. i. 174 Tchesme (1770), ii. 294 Tegernsee, the, i. 93 rempelhoff, Herr (Rath), i. 8 Templin, i. 94 Teplitz, treaty of, i. 310 Teutonic Order, the, i. 182 Thiers, M., ii. no, 183 Thile, Herr von, i. 145, (letter to Bismarck) 384, ii. 217 Thirty Years' war, the, ii. 268 Thorn, i. 301 Three Kings, the League of the, i. 65 Thugut, Baron, i. 190, 202, 311, ii. 279 Thuringia, i. 113 Thurn and Taxis post office : tam pering with correspondence, i. 253 Tiedemann, Geheimrath : letter of Bismarck to, ii. 207 ; his relations with Eulenburg, 207 sqq, 210 ; letter to him from Bismarck, on von Gruner's irregular appoint ment, 218 Tilsit, the peace of, i. 320 'Times,' the: its account of the Dantzic episode, i. 352 ; surmises of the source of this account, 353 Timur, i. 208 Titles, Bismarck's opinion of, ii. ibi Toleration, religious, Bismarck's pol icy of, ii. 137 Tours, ii. 112 Trans -Leithania, i. 94 Treaties : no longer afford the same securities as of old, ii. 270 ; treaties between Great Powers are of limited stability, 273 ; the clause rebus sic stantibus always tacitly understood, 284 Treitschke, Professor von, ii. 40 Triad, the, i. 11 1 Triple Alliance, the, ii. 251 sqq; its original aim : alliance of the three Emperors, with Italy brought in, 251 ; Bismarck's estimate of the value of certain alliances, 255 sqq ; his inclination to Austria, 2 59 sqq ; a provisional under standing with Count Andrassy, 260 Tuileries, Bismarck ambassador at the (1862), i. 276 Turin, i. 225 sq, 229 sq Turkey, i. 130, 3g5, ii. 235, 244 Turks, the Austrian wars against the, i. 182 Twesten, Herr, i. 265 n, 268 Tyrol, ii. 50 Ultramontanism, i. 115 sq United Diet, the first, i. 17, 20, 34, 37 United States (America), i. 194 Universal suffrage, the question of, in Germany, ii. 65 Unnatural vice, prosecution against, in Berlin (1835), i. 7 359 BISMARCK Upper Chamber (Prussian), (dispute about the formation of), i. 143, 152, 156 sqq, 286, 337 Usedom, Count, i. 118, 124, 185, 223 ; his conduct as ambassador to Italy, 225 sq, 228, 232 Usedom, Countess von, i. 224 Valdegamas, Donoso Cortes de (Catholic writer), ii. 184 Vannovski, Herr, ii. 118 Varnbiiler, Herr von, i. 374, ii. 54 sq, 81 Varzin, i. 226, 412, ii. 231 Vatican Council, the, ii. 92, 180, 184 Venetia : ceded to France by Aus tria (1866), ii. 37 Venice, i. 21 Versailles, ii. 108, 135, (a state ball and supper at) 166, 317, 327 Victor Emmanuel, King, ii. 60 ; friendly disposition to Emperor Napoleon in 1870, 113 ; visit to Berlin (1873), 150 ; valuable pres ents to Bismarck, ib. Victoria, Princess Royal of Eng land (afterwards Crown Princess of Prussia : later Empress) : in herited her father's opinion of Bismarck, i. 1 64 ; her strong Eng lish prejudices in all political dis cussions, ii. 333 ; approved the re tention of Bismarck in office at her husband's accession, ib. Victoria, Queen : her visit to Paris in 1855, i. 163; letter to Alexander III (1875), ii. 192 ; Bismarck's comments on it, 193 sqq Vienna, (in 1848) i. 45, (relations with Prussia) 47, (Bismarck deputy to Count Arnim at) 92, 128, 140 ; Prussian proposal to advance on (1866), ii. 40; Bismarck's desire to avoid a triumphal entry into, 42 Vienna conference, the, log, ii. 237 Vienna, Congress of, i. 184, 201, 302, 320 Vienna, peace of, ii. 16 Vienna, treaty of, i. 1 10 Vilagos, ii. 280 Villeneuve (Lake of Geneva), i. 97 Vincke, George von, i. 20, 25, 40 sq, 54 Vincke, Lieut. -Colonel von : letter to William I on constitutional law, i. 335 Vionville, i. 139 Vistula, the, i. 82, 340 ' Von ' : Bismarck's reason for using it, i. 37 WAGENER, Herr, i. 146 sqq Walewska, Countess, i. 166 Walewski, Count ii. 207 Wallachia, i. 108 Walz, Dr. : the injury he did to Bismarck, i. 258 sq War of 1870: the Hohenzollern candidature, ii, 87 ; Bismarck's surprise at the position taken up by France, ib. ; his view on the whole question, 88 ; Spain's pas sivity in the event, 91 ; French threats take the form of interna tional impudence, 93 ; ' La Prusse cane ' a climax, ib. ; Prince Leo pold renounces his candidature : Bismarck's indignation, 94 ; King William's direct transactions with Benedetti at Ems : Bismarck determines to resign, 94 sq ; the Ems telegram, g7, 100 ; Versailles, 108 ; before Paris : Prussian losses, 109 ; conduct of the ' neutrals,' no; the position of Italy, 113; of Russia, 114 ; stagnation of the siege, 120 ; the besieged army stronger than the besiegers, 122 ; the fighting in the provinces, ib. ; want of siege-guns and transport material, 123 ; provisions stocked for the Parisians on their surren der, refused by these, ib. ; great cost of the siege, 1 24 ; energy of von Roon, ib. ; interference of fe male influences on the side of ' hu manity,' 125 sq; von Roon's state ments of the reasons for the delay in the attack on Paris, 126 Warsaw, i. 81, 260 Wartburg, Herr, ii. gg Wartensleben-Karow, Count, i. 20, 22 Wehrmann (Privy Councillor), i.226, 22g sq Weimar, i. 132, 210 Weimar, Grand Duchess of (mother of Empress Augusta), i. 134 360 INDEX Werder, General von, ii. 231 Werther, Baron, i. 3g5, ii. ig Werther, Baron Carl von, i. 6, 116 Weser, the, i. 76, ii. 34 Westminster [?], Dean of : wit ticism on Lord John Russell, i. 211 Westphalen, Herr, i. 104, 142, 147 sq Wielopolski, Marquis, i. 346 Wildbad, i. 375 sq William II, King (Wurtemberg), i. 107 William III (England), i. ig4, 206 William, Prince of Prussia (after wards King and Emperor Wil liam I), i. 24, 40 sqq, 100, 103; domestic life at Sans-Souci, 134; residence at Coblenz (i84g), 135; appointed Regent (1857), 218; letter to Bismarck, 226; the Homage question, 264; his coronation, 264 n; political worries after his accession, 272; his coronation, 274; conceives the idea of abdication, 2g5 ; appoints Bismarck provisional President of the ministry of state, 2g7 ; his natural fearlessness, 315 ; letter of von Vincke on Constitutional law, 335 ; memorandum on the Crown Prince's position (the Dantzic episode), 358 sqq ; the summoning of the Frankfort ' Diet of Princes, ' 374 ; refusal to attend it, 376 ; letter from Bismarck to(i86s),ii. 18; letters to Bismarck (1864), 30 sq ; after Koniggratz : expected active intervention of France, 36 sqq ; Bismarck's advice, 37 ; dan ger on the South German side, 38 ; the proposed advance upon Vienna, 40 ; Bismarck's proposal to pass the Danube at Pressburg, 41 ; first draft of the peace con ditions, 43 ; the King's demands increased, ib. ; an armistice, 47 ; terms of peace proposed by Ka rolyi and Benedetti, ib. ; Bis marck's reasons for advising their acceptance, 48 ; the King's reply, 51; heated discussion, 51 sq ; intervention of the Crown Prince: the King agrees with Bismarck, 53 ; question of introducing the Prussian Constitution in the new provinces, 63 ; William's dislike for the title of ' Emperor, ' 64 ; the suggested revision of the Con stitution, 76 ; question of indem nity for ministers, 11 sq; the Ho henzollern candidature for the throne of Spain : See War of 1870; on the military boycott of Bismarck, 105 ; reasons for as sumption of the Imperial title, 126; question of form of title: ' King of the Germans,' ' German Emperor,' or ' Emperor of Ger many, '127 sqq ; the form of proc lamation : Bismarck in disgrace, 134; his aversion to civil mar riages, 152 sqq ; bestows the title of Prince on Bismarck, 161 ; an gry letter to Bismarck about the Bennigsen negotiations, 200 ; ' No. log Stauffenberg Regiment,' 202. attempted assassination, 204; cor respondence with Bismarck ( 1 88 1 ), 211 ; a curious dream, ib. ; object of his visits to St. Petersburg and Vienna in 1873, 252 ; dislike of a league with Austria, 269 ; Bis marck overcomes his objections, 271 ; chivalry towards the Czar, ib. ; improved health after Nobil ing's attempt to assassinate him, 303 ; his last illness, ib. ; his death, 304 William I : Bismarck's sketch of his life and character : as second son of Frederick William III, his early training was exclusively military, ii. 304; relations with General von Gerlach, 305 ; his definition of a 'Pietist,' 306; his strong religious convictions, ib. ; ignorance of political institutions, lb. ; his conscientious industry when Regent, 307 ; his only rec reation, 308 ; possessed an un wonted measure of common sense, ib. ; influenced by remembrance of his father's methods, 309 ; par ticularism, ib. ; fearlessness in the path of duty, ib. ; rupture with the ministers of the New Era, 310 ; influence of the Prin cess Augusta, ib. ; his chivalrous feeling towards his wife, 314; yet 361 BISMARCK she was a Feuerkopf, 315; the ' royal distinction' of William, ib. ; he was free from all vanity, 316; fear of just criticism, ib. ; a ' gentleman expressed in terms of a King,' 317; his temper, ib. ; the tone of his addresses and procla mations, 319; he returned loyalty for loyalty, ib. ; mutual relations of William and Bismarck, 321 ; letter from William I to Bis marck, 321 sqq William, Prince (grandson of Wil liam I: present Emperor), ii. 305; his grandfather's instructions to Bismarck regarding him, ii. 329 sq Wimpffen, Count, ii. in Windischgratz, Prince, i. 241 Windthorst, ii. 216, 339 Winter, Herr (Burgomaster of Dant zic), i. 233, 349 Wirsitz, i. 41 Wittelsbach dynasty, the, i. 321 Wittgenstein, Prince, i. 7 ' Wochenblatt ' party, the, 1. 101, 119, 310 Worth, ii. 113 Wolkersdorf, ii. 41 Woronzoff, Prince, i. 241 Wrangel, Field-Marshal, i. 28, 58, 379; breach and- reconciliation with Bismarck, 379 » Wurzburg, ii. 4, 52 Wurtemberg, i. 62, 70, 107, in, 184, ii. 54, 81 Wussow, ii. g4 Wusterhausen, i. 15, ii. 307 York's corps (1 81 2), i. 87, 125 Ypsilanti's rebellion, ii. 287, 2g4 Zedlitz-Trutzschler, Herr von, ii. 3°! Zimmerhausen, i. 274, 28g Zollverein, the, i. 92 sq, 175 sq, 186, 189, ii. 30 Zuider Zee, ii. 55 Zwickau, ii. 46 (i_t umAvERSITY a 39 0 02 001769057b