YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY HISTORY DNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURINQ THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF THOMAS JEFFERSON By henry ADAMS Vol. I. NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1890 Copyright, 1890 By Charles Scribner's Sons. Janibtrst'tio ^rcss: John Wilson and Son, Cambridge. CONTENTS OF VOL. I. ciiai>tbk 1. Internal Improvement . . . II. Monroe's Diplomacy .... III. Cabinet Vacillations IV. Betwken France and England Y. Tue Florida Message . YI. Tue Two-Million Act VII. John Randoliu's Sciiis.m VIII. Madison's Enemies . . ,IX. Domestic Affairs X. Burr's Schemes . . XI. Burr's Preparations XII. Escape past Fort Massac XIII. Claiborne and Wilkinson XIV. Collapse of the Conspiracy XV. Session of 1806-1807 . XVI. The Berlin Decree . . XVII. Monroe's Treaty . . XVIII. Re.iection of Monroe's Treaty XIX. Burr's Trial , PAGE 1 22 5480 103 126 147 172197 219245268295 .318344 370 392 415441 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CHAPTER I. A SECOND time President Jefferson appeared at the Capitol, escoi-ted with due formalities by a procession of militia-men and other citizens ; and once more he delivered an inaugural address, " in so low a voice that not half of it was heard by any part of the crowded auditory." ^ The second Inaugural roused neither the bitterness nor the applause which greeted the first, Slthough in part it was intended as a cry of triumph over the principles and vanishing power of New England. Among Jefferson's manuscripts he preserved a curions memorandum explaining the ideas of this address. As the first Inaugural declared the princi ples which were to guide the government in Repub lican hands, the second should report the success of these principles, and recall the results already reached. The task deserved all the eloquence and loftiness of thought that philosophy could command ; 1 Diary of J. Q. Adams (March 4, 1805), i. 373. vol. III. — 1 2 HISTOKY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn 1. for Jefferson had made a democratic polity victorious at home and respectable in the world's eyes, and the privilege of hearing him reaffirm his doctrines and pronounce their success was one that could never be renewed. The Moses of democracy, he had the glory of leading his followers into their promised and con quered Canaan. Jefferson began by renewing the professions of his foreign policy : — " With nations, as with individuals, our interests, soundly calculated, will ever be found inseparable from our moral duties ; and history bears witness to the fact that a just nation is taken on its word, when recourse is had to armaments and wars to bridle otliers." The sentiments were excellent ; but many of Jef ferson's followers must have asked themselves in what history they could find the fact, which the President asserted, that a just nation was taken on its word ; and they must have been still more per plexed to name the nation, just or unjust, which was taken on its word by any other in the actual condi tion of the world. Without dwelling on this topic, which had already become one of interest in the councils of his Cabinet, Jefferson, passing to practical questions involved in redemption of debt, advanced a new idea. "Eedemption once eflfected," he said, "the revenue thereby liberated may, by a just repartition among the States and a corresponding amendment of the Constitu tion, be applied, in time of peace, to rivers, canals, roads, 1805. INTERNAL IMPROVEMEXT. 3 arts, manufactures, education, and other great objects within each State. In time of war, — if injustice, V)y our selves or others, must sometimes produce war, — iacreased as the same revenue will be increased by population and consumption, and aided by other resources reserved for that crisis, it may meet within the year all the expenses of the year witiiout encroaching on the rights of future generations by burdening them with the debts of the past. War will then be but a suspension of useful works, and a return to a state of peace a return to the progress of improvement." Ten years earlier, in the mouth of President Wash ington, this sentiment would have been generally denounced as proof of monarchical designs. That Jefferson was willing not only to assume powers for the central government, but also to part from his State-rights associates and to gratify the Northern democrats by many concessions of principle, his first Administration had already proved ; but John Ran dolph might wonder to see him stride so fast and far toward what had been ever denounced as Roman imperialism and corruption ; to hear him advise a change of the Constitution in order to create an annual fund for public works, for the arts, for edu cation, and even for such manufactures as the people might want, — a fund which was to be distributed to the States, thus putting in the hands of the central government an instrument of corruption, and making the States stipendiaries of Congress. Every principle of the Republican party, past or to come, was put to 4 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. nought by a policy which contradicted the famous sen timent of Jefferson's first annual message : " Sound principles will not justify our taxing the industry of our fellow-citizens to accumulate treasure for wars to happen we know not when, and which might not perhaps happen but from the temptations offered by that treasure." Yet pregnant as this new principle might be in connection with the Constitution and the Union, its bearing on foreign affairs was more start ling. Jefferson, the apostle of peace, asked for a war fund which should enable his government to wage indefinite hostilities without borrowing money ! Ilis mind dwelt on the possibility of conquests ! Quitting this dangerous ground, the President spoke of the Louisiana purchase. Then followed a paragraph upon religion. Next he came to the sub ject of the Indians, and chose this unusual medium for enforcing favorite lAilosojjIiical doctrines. The memorandum written to explain his address de clared the reasons that led him to use the mask of Indian philanthropy to disguise an attack upon con servatism. "Every respecter of science," said this memorandum, " every friend to political reformation, must have ob served with indignation the hue-and-cry raised against philosophy and the rights of man ; and it really seems as if they would be overborne, and barbarism, bigotry, and despotism would recover the ground thoy have lost by the advance of the public understanding. I have thought the occasion justified some discountenance of these anti-social 1835. IXTERXAL niPROVEMEXT. 5 doctrines, some testimony against them ; but not to com mit myself in direct warfare on them, I have thought it best to say what is directly applied to the Indians ouly, but admits by inference a more general extension." In truth, under the lead of Napoleon and Pitt, Europe seemed bent on turning l)ack the march of time and renewing the bigotry and despotism of the Middle Ages ; but this occasion hardly dignified Jefferson's method of bearing testimony against the danger, by not committing himself to direct warfare upon it, but by applying to Indians the homily which by inference included the churches of New England. "The aboriginal inhabitants of these countries," said the President to his great audience, '• I have regarded with the commiseration their history inspiri'S. Endowed with the faculties and the rights of meu, Ijreathiug au ardent love of liberty and independence, and occupying a coun try wiiich left them uo desire but to be undisturbed, the stream of overflowing population from other regions directed itself on tliese sliores." If the Boston newspapers were not weary of ridi culing Jefferson's rhetoric, this sentence was fitted to rouse their jaded amusement ; but in a few moments they had reason to feel other emotions. He said that he had done what humanity required, and had tried to teach the Indians agriculture and other industries in order to prepare theni for new conditions of life, — a claim not only true, but also honorable to hini. Unfortunately these attempts met with obstacles from the Indians themselves : — 6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. "They are combated by the habits of their bodies, prejudice of their minds, ignorance, pride, and the influ ence of interested and crafty individuals among them, who feel themselves something in the present order of things, and fear to become nothing iu any other. These persons inculcate a sanctimonious reverence for the cus toms of their ancestors ; that whatsoever they did must be done through all time ; that reason is a false guide, and to advance under its counsel, in their physical, moral, or political condition, is perilous innovation ; that their duty is to remain as their Creator made them, ignorance being safety, and knowledge full of danger. In short, my friends, among them is seen the action and counter action of good sense and bigotry ; they too have then- anti-philosophers, who find an interest in keeping things in their present state, who dread reformation, and exert all their faculties to maintain the ascendency of habit over the duty of improving our reason and obeying its mandates." Gallatin remonstrated in vain against this allusion to New England habits ; ^ the President could not resist the temptation to strike once more his old ene mies. Gallatin, whose sense of humor was keener than that of Jefferson, must have been amused bv the travesty of New England under the war-paint and blankets of the Choctaws and Kickapoos; but Jefferson was never more serious than in believing that the people of Massachusetts and Connecticut were held in darkness by a few interested " medicine men," and that he could, without committing him- 1 Gallatin's Writings, i. 227. 1805. IXTERNAL IMPROVEMEXT. 7 self in direct warfare, insult the clergy, lawyers, and keen-witted squirarchy of New England, thus held up " by inference " to the world as the equivalent to so many savages. The rest of the Inaugural was chiefly devoted to the press and its licentiousness. Jefferson expressed himself strongly in regard to the slanders he had re ceived, and even hinted that he would be glad to seo the State laws of libel applied to punish the offenders ; but he pointed out that slander had no political suc cess, and that it might safely be disregarded as a political weapon. He urged " doubting brethren " to give up their fears and prejudices, and to join with the mass of their fellow-citizens. " In the mean time let us cherish them with patient affection ; let us do them justice, and more than justice, in all compe titions of interest." Finally, as though to silence the New-England pulpit, he closed with a few words which the clergy might perhaps think misplaced in the mouth of so earnest a deist, — an invocation of "that Being in whose hands we are, who led our fore fathers, as Israel of old," to the " country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life, . . . and to whose goodness I ask you to join with me in supplications." The Second Inaugural strode far lieyond the first in the path of democracy, away from the landmarks of Yirginia republicanism, betraying what Jefferson's friends and enemies alike thought a craving for jiopularity. If this instinct sometimes led him to 8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. forget principles he had once asserted, and which he would some day again declare vital, the quality was so amiable as to cover many shortcomings ; but its influence on national growth could not be dis puted. Jefferson cherished but one last desire, — to reach the end of his next term without disaster. He frankly expressed this feeling in a letter writ ten to General Heath soon after the autumn elec tion of 1804, which gave him the electoral vote of Massachusetts : — "I sincerely join you," said he, "in congratulations on the return of Massachusetts into the fold of the Union. This is truly the case wherein we may say, ' This our brother was dead, and is alive again ; and was lost, and is found.' It is but too true that our Union could not he pronounced entirely sound while so respectable a member as Massachusetts was under morbid affection. All will now come to riglits. . . . The new century opened itself by committing us on a boisterous ocean ; but all is now subsiding ; peace is smootliing our path at home and abroad ; and if we are not wanting iu the practice of jus tice and moderation, our tranquillity and prosperity may be preserved until increasing numbers shall leave us uoth ing to fear from abroad. AN'ith England we are in cordial friendsliip ; with France in the most perfect understand ing ; with Spain we shall always be bickering, but never at war till we seek it. Other nations view our course with respect and friendly anxiety. Should we be able to preserve this state of public happiness, and to see our citizens, whom we found so divided, rally to their genuine prmciples, I shall hope yet to enjoy the comfort of that 1806. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 9 general good-will which has been so unfeelingly wrested from me, and to sing at tlie close of my term tlie yuitc (limitti.^, Domine, with a satisfaction leaving nothing to desire but the last great audit." ^ He could not forgive the New England clergy their want of feeling in wresting from him ever so small a share of the general good-will, and he looked for ward with impatience to the moment when he should enjoy univci'sal applause and respect. In Decem ber, 1804, when this letter was written, he felt confi dent that his splendid triumph would last unchecked to the cud of his public career ; but the prize of general good-will, whicii seemed then almost won, continually eluded his grasp. The election of Novem ber, 1804, was followed by the session of 1804-1805, whicii stirred bad blood even in Virginia, and betrayed a spirit of faction aniong his oldest friends. His In augural A(I(li-ess of JIarch, 1805, with its mixture of bitter-sweet, was answered within a few weeks by Massachusetts. At the April election the Federalists reversed the result of November, and re-elected Caleb Strong as governor by a vote of about 35,200 against 3;1,800, with a Federalist majority in the Legislature. Even in Pennsylvania divisions among Jefferson's fol lowers increased, until in the autumn of 1805 Duane and Leib set up a candidate of their own choice for giivernor, and forced ]\IcKcan, Dallas, and Gallatin's friends to unite with the Federalists in order to re elect McKean. Jefferson balanced anxiously between 1 JufFerson to General Heath, Dec. 13, 1804; Jefierson MSS. 10 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 1. these warring factions, trying to offend neither Duane nor John Randolph, nor even Burr, while he still drew the mass of moderate Federalists to sympathize in his views. Thus the new Presidential term began, bringing with it little sign of change. The old arrangements were continued, with but one exception. Madison, Gallatin, Robert Smith, and Dearborn remained in the Cabinet ; but Attorney-General Lincoln resigned, and Robert Smith asked to be transferred from the Navy Department to the Attorney-General's office.^ After some hesitation Jefferson yielded to Smith's request and consented to the transfer. As Smith's successor in the Navy Department Jefferson selected Jacob Crowninshield, a member of Congress from Massachusetts, who was then at Washington. Crown inshield, in consequence of his wife's objection to leaving her family, declined the offer, Jan. 29, 1805,^ but the President nevertheless sent the nomination to the Senate, March 2, 1805, together with that of Robert Smith, " now Secretary of the Navy to be Attorney-General of the United States." The same day the Senate confirmed both appointments, and the commissions were regularly issued, March 3, — Robert Smith apparently ceasing thenceforward to possess any legal authority over the Navy Department. Nevertheless Crowninshield persisted in declining 1 Jefferson to Robert Smith, Jan. 3, 1805; Jefferson MSS. = Crowninshield to Jefferson, Jan. 29, 1805; Jefferson MSS, State Department Archives. 1805. INTERNAL BIPROVEMENT. 11 the office, and Robert Smith continued to act as Secretary of the Navy, probably by the verbal request of the President. At length he consented to retain his old position permanently, and Jefferson sought for a new attorney-general. He offered the post, June 15, to John Julius Pringle of South Carolina, who declined. He then offered it, July 14, to Johu Thompson Mason, who also declined. August 7, Jefferson wrote to Senator Breckinridge of Ken tucky, asking him to accept the office of attorney- general, and a temporary commission was the same day issued to him. When Congress met, Dec. 2, 1805, Breckenridge was attorney-general under a temporary commission, and Robert Smith, who had ceased to be Secretary of the Navy on the confirmation of his successor, March 3, was acting as secretary under no apparent authority. Dec. 20, 1805, the President sent a mes sage to the Senate making nominations for vacan cies whicii had occurred during the recess, for which commissions had been granted "to the persons herein respectively named." One of these persons was John Breckinridge of Kentucky- to be Attorney-General of the United States, and the nomination was duly confirmed. Breckenridge's permanent commission bore date Jan. 17, 1806. These dates and facts were curious for the reason that Robert Smith, who had ceased to be Secretary of the Navy, March, 3, 1805, ceased necessarily to be attorney-general on the confirmation of Breckin- 12 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. ridge, and continued to act as Secretary of the Navy without authority of law. The President did not send his name to the Senate, or issue to him a new commission either permanent or teinporary. On the official records of the Department of State, not Robert Smith but Jacob Crowninshield was Secretary of the Navy from March 3, 1805, till March 7, 1809, when his successor was appointed, although Jacob Crown inshield died April 15, 1808, and Robert Smith never ceased to aet as Secretary of the Navy from his ap pointment in 1801 to his appointment as Secretary of State in 1809. During the whole period of Jef ferson's second administration, his Secretary of the Navy acted by no known authority except the verbal request or permission of the President. In perfect quiet, disturbed only by rumors of wars abroad, spring crept forward to summer, summer ripened to autumn. Peace was restored with Tripoli; commerce grew apace ; tho revenue rose to 114,000,- 000 ; the Treasury was near a surfeit ; no sign ap peared of check to the immense prosperity which diffused itself through every rivulet in the wilder ness, and the President could see no limit to its future increase. In 1804 he had sent out an expedb tion under Captain Meriwether Lewis to explore the Louisiana purchase along the course of the Missouri River. May 14, 1804, Lewis and his party began their journey from St. Louis, and without serious difficulty reached the Mandan . towns, sixteen hun dred and nine miles from the starting point, where 1805. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 13 Nov. 1, 1804, they went into winter quarters. April 8, 1805, Lewis resumed his journey to the westward, sending the report of his wanderings to Washington. This report told only of a vast region inhabited by Indian tribes and disturbed by the restless and mur derous Sioux ; but it served to prove the immen sity of the new world which Jefferson's government had given to the American people. Other explora tions had been begun along the line of the Reil and Washita rivers. In such contributions to human knowledge Jefferson took keen interest, for he had no greater delight than in science and in whatever tended to widen the field of knowledge. These explorations of the territory beyond the Mis sissippi had little immediate bearing on the interests of commerce or agriculture ; but the government was actively engaged in measures of direct value. July 4, 1805, William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, closed a bargain with the Wyan dots, Ottawas, and other Indian tribes, liy wliich the Indian title over another part of Ohio was extin guished. The Indians thenceforward held within the State of Ohio only the country west of Sandusky and north of the old line fixed by the treaty of Greenville. Within the year the Piankeshaw tribe sold for a small annuity a tract of land in southern Indiana, along the Ohio River, which made the United States govern ment master of the whole north bank of the Ohio to its mouth. These concessions, of the utmost value, were obtained at a trifling cost. " The average price 14 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. paid for the Indian lands within the last four years," wrote the Secretary of War,i a ^q^^ ^ot amount to one cent per acre." The Chickasaws and Cherokees sold a very large district between the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers in Tennessee, so that thence forward the road from Knoxville to Nashville passed through no Indian land. In Georgia the Creeks were induced to sell an important territory between the Oconee and Ocmulgee rivers. In these treaties pro vision was also made for horse-roads through the Creek and Cherokee country, both from Knoxville and from central Georgia to the Mobile Oliver. Besides the many millions of acres thus gained for immediate improvement, these treaties had no little strategic value in case of war. No foreign country could . fail to see that the outlying American set tlements were defenceless in their isolation. Even the fort and village at Detroit were separated from the nearest white village by a wide Indian country impassable to wagons or artillery; and the helpless ness of such posts was so evident as to impress every obseiwer. "The principles of our government," said Jefferson when danger at last arose, ^ "leading us to the employ ment of such moderate garrisons in time of peace as may merely take care of the post, and to a reliance on the 1 Dearborn to Robertson, Maroh 20, 1805 ; State Papers, vol. V. ; Indian Affairs, i. 700. 2 Message of Jan. 30, 1808 ; State Papers, vol v • Indian Affairs, i. 752. 1805. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 15 neighboring militia for its support in the flrst moments of war, I have thought it would be important to obtain from the Indians such a cession in the neighborhood of these posts as might maintain a militia proportioned to this object." This " principle of our government " that the set tlers should protect the army, not the army the set tlers, was so rigorously carried out that every new purchase of Indian lands was equivalent to providing a new army. The possession of Sandusky brought Detroit nearer its supports ; possession of the banks of the Ohio strengthened Indiana. A bridle-path to New Orleans was the first step toward bringing that foreign dependence within reach ; and although this path must necessarily pass through Spanish territory, it would enable the government in an emergency to hear from Louisiana within six weeks from the de spatch of an order. In spite of these immense gains, the military situa tion was still extremely weak. The Indians held in strong force the country west of Sandusky. The boundary between them and the whites was a mere line running from Lake Erie south and west across Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to the neighborhood of St. Louis. Directly on this boundary line, near Green ville, lived the Shawanese, among whom a warrior named Tecumthe, and his brother called the Prophet were acquiring an influence hostile to the white men. These Indians, jealous of the rapid American en croachments, maintained relations with the British 16 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. officials in Canada, and in case of a war between the United States and England they were likely to enter into a British alliance. In this case unless the United States government could control Lake Erie, nothing was more certain than that Detroit and every other post on the Lakes beyond must fall into British hands, and with them the military posses sion of the whole Northwest. Whether Great Britain could afterward be forced to surrender her conquests remained to be seen. Even in Kentucky the country between the Ten nessee River and the Mississippi still belonged to the Chickasaws ; and south of the Tennessee River as far as the Gulf of Mexico, and east to the Ocmulgee, all belonged to Cherokees, Creeks, and Choctaws, who could not boast, like the Chickasaws, that " they had never spilt the blood of a white man." These tribes maintained friendly relations with the Spanish author ities at Mobile and Pensacola, and, like the Shawa nese and Northwestern Indians, dreaded the grasping Americans, who were driving them westward. In case of war with Spain, should New^ Orleans give trouble and invite a Spanish garrison, the Indians might be counted as Spaniards, and the United States government might be required to protect a frontier euddenly thrust back from the Fioridas to the Duck River, within thirty miles of Nashville. The President might well see with relief every new step that brought him within nearer reach of his remote military posts and his proconsular prov- 1805. INTERNAL IMPROVEMEXT. 17 ince at New Orleans. That he should dread war was natural, for he was responsible for the safety of the settlements on the Indian frontier, and he knew that in case of sudden war the capture of these posts was certain, and thc massacre of their occupants more than jirobable. New Orleans was an unmediate and incessant danger, and hardly a spot between New Orleans and Mackinaw was safe. Anxiety caused by these perils had probably much to do with the bent of the President's mind toward internal improvements and democratic rather than Yirginia principles. In 1803 the United States gov ernment liccame owner of a territory which dwarfed the States themselves, and which at its most impor tant jKiint contained a foreign population governed by military meth(jds. Old political theories had been thrown aside both in the purchase and in the or ganization of this New World ; their observance in its administration was impossible. Thc Louisiana purchase not only required a military system of government for itself, but also reacted on the other national territory, and through it on the States in their relations to Washington. New England was thrown to the verge of the political system ; but New York and Pennsylvania, Georgia and Tennessee, Ohio and Kentucky found many new interests which they wanted the central government to assist, and Yirginia, holding the power and patronage of the central government, had every inducement to satisfy these demands. 18 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1, So it happened that Jefferson gave up his Virginia dogmas, and adopted Gallatin's ideas. They were both jealous of the army and navy; but they were willing to spend money with comparative liberality on internal improvements ; and the wisdom of this course was evident. Even in a military point of view, roads and canals were more necessary than forts or ships. The first evidence of change was the proposed fund for internal improvements and war purposes described in the second Inaugural Address. The suggestion was intended to prepare the public for a relaxation of Gallatin's economy. Although the entire debt could not be paid before 1817, only ten and a half millions of bonds remained to be immedi ately dealt with. By the year 1809 these ten and a half millions would be discharged ; and thereafter Gallatin might reduce his annual payments of princi pal and interest from 18,000,000 to 14,500,000, free ing an annual sum of 13,500,000 for use in other directions. During the next three years Gallatin was anxious to maintain his old system, and es pecially to preserve peace with foreign nations ; but after the year 1808 he promised to relax his severity, and to provide three or four millions for purposes of internal improvement and defence. The rapid increase of revenue helped to create confidence in this calculation, and to hasten decision as to the use of the promised surplus. The President had already decided to convert it into a permanent re- 1805. IXTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 19 serve fund. He looked forward to the moment when, as he expressed it, he could " begin upon canals, roads, colleges, etc." ^ He no longer talked of " a wise and frugal government which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of indus try and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned ; " he rather proposed to devote a third of the national revenues to im[iroycnients and to regulation of industries. This theory of statesmanship was broader than that which he had proclaimed four years earlier. Jefferson proved the liberality and elevation of his mind ; and if he did this at some cost to his consistency, he did only what all men had done whose minds kept pace with the movement of their time. So far as he could see, at the threshold of his second term, he had every reason to hope that it would be more succes,^- ful than his first. He promised to annihilate oppo sition ; and no serious obstacle seemed in his path. No doubt his concessions to the spirit of nationality, in winning support from' moderate Federalists and self-interested democrats, alienated a few State-rights Republicans, and might arouse uneasiness among old friends ; but to this Jefferson resigned himself. He parted company with the " mere metaphysical sub tleties" of John Randoli)h. Except in his aversion to military measures and to formal etiquette, he stood ' Jefferson to Gallatin, May 29, 1805 ; Gallatin's Writhig.s S32. 20 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1. nearly where President Washington had stood ten years before. The New England hierarchy might grumble, hut at heart Massachusetts was already converted. Only with the utmost difficulty, and at the cost of avoid ing every aggressive movement, could the Federal ists keep control of their State governments. John Randolph flattered himself that if Jefferson's per sonal authority were removed from the scale, Virginia would again incline to her old principles ; but he was mistaken. So long as Virginia held power, she was certain to use it. At no time since the Declaration of Independence had the prospects of nationality seemed so promising as in the spring of 1805. With the stride of the last four years as a standard for the future, no man could measure the possible effects of the coming four years in extending the powers of the government and developing the prosperity of the na tion. Gallatin already meditated schemes of internal improvements, which included four great thorough fares across the AUeghanies, while Fulton was nearly ready with the steamboat. The Fioridas could not escape the government's grasp. Even New England must at last yield her prejudices to the spirit of democratic nationality. No one could wonder if Jefferson's head was some what turned by the splendors of such a promise. San guine by nature, he felt that every day made more secure the grandeur of his destiny. He could scarcely be blamed for putting a high estimate on the value 1805. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 21 of his services, for in all modesty he might reasona bly ask what name recorded in history would stand liigher than his own for qualities of the noblest order in statesmanship. Had he not been first to conceive and to put in practice the theories of future democ racy ? Had he not succeeded in the experiment '.' Had he not doubled the national domain ''. Was not his g(.iverninent a model of republican virtues ' With what offence against the highest canons of per sonal merit could he be charged ? What ruler of ancient or modern times, what Trajan or Antonine, what Edward or Louis, was more unselfish or was truer to the interests intrusted to his care ''. Who had proposed to himself a loftier ideal ? Among all the kings and statesmen who swayed the power of empire, where could one be found who had looked so far into the future, and had so boldly grappled with its hopes ? CHAPTER II. DuEiNG the administrations of Jefferson and Madi son, the national government was in the main con trolled by ideas and interests peculiar to the region south of the Potomac, and only to be understood from a Southern stand-point. Especially its foreign relations were guided by motives in which the North ern people felt little sympathy. The people of the Northern States seemed almost unwilling to know what the people of the Southern States were thinking or doing in certain directions, and their indiffer ence was particularly marked in regard to Florida. Among the varied forms of Southern ambition, none w'as so constant in influence as the wish to acquire the Fioridas, which at moments decided the action of the government in matters of the utinost interest; yet the Northern public, though complaining of Southern favoritism, neither understood nor cared to study the subject, but turned impatiently away whenever the Fioridas were discussed, as though this were a local detail which in no way concerned the North. If Florida failed to interest the North, it exercised the more control over the South, and over a govern ment Southern in character and purpose. Neither 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 23 the politics of the Union nor the development of events could be understood without treating Florida as a suljjcct of the first importance. During the summer and autumn of 1805, — a period which John Randolph justly regarded as the turning point of Re publican administration, — Florida actually engrossed the attention of government. On arriving at Madrid, Jan. 2, 1805, Monroe found Charles Pinckney waiting in no hapjjy temper for a decision in regard to himself. Pinckney's recall was then determined upon, and his successor chosen. He was anxious only to escape the last humiliation of being excluded from the new negotiation by Monroe. From this fear he was soon relieved. Monroe shared his views ; allowed him to take part in the conferences, and to put his name to the notes. The two ministers acted in harmony. Nearly a month was consumed in the necessary preliminaries. Not until Jan. 28, 1805, were matters so far advanced that Monroe could present his first note.i Following his instructions, he put forward all the clainis which had been so often discussed, — the Spanish and French spoliations ; the losses resulting from suppression of the entrepot at New Orleans in 1802 ; the claini of West Florida, and that to the Rio Bravo. With the note the two envoys enclosed the projet of a treaty, — to which could be made only the usual objection to one-sided schemes, that it required 1 Monroe and Pinckney to Cevallos, Jan. 28, 1805 ; State PapcK, ii. 636. 24 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. Spain to concede every point, and offered no equiva lent worth mention. Spain was to cede both the Fioridas, and also Texas as far as the Rio Colorado, leaving the district between the Colorado and the Rio Bravo as a border-land not to be further set tled. She was to create a commission for arranging the spoliation and entrepot claims ; and this com mission should also take cognizance of all claims that might be made by Spanish subjects against the United States government. To this note and projet Don Pedro Cevallos quickly replied.^ Availing himself of an inadvertent sentence in Monroe's opening paragraph, to the effect that it was necessary to examine impartially the several points at issue in each case, Cevallos informed the Americans that in accordance with their wish he would first examine each point separately, and then proceed to negotiation. He proposed to begin with the claims convention of August, 1802. Commonly nothing gratified American diplomatists more than to discuss questions whicii they were ordered to take in charge. Yet the readiness shown by Cevallos to gratify this instinct struck Monroe as a bad sign ; he saw danger of lowering the national tone, and even of becoming ridiculous, if he allowed the Spaniards to discuss indefinitely clainis which the United States had again and again asserted to be too plain for discussion. He felt too the influ- 1 Cevallos to Monroe and Pinckney, Jan. 31, 1805 ; State Papers, ii. 636. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 25 ence of Pinckney, who had never ceased to urge that nothing could be done with the Spanish governnient except through fear or force. He could not refuse discussion, but he entered into it with the intention of promptly cutting it short.i To cut the discussion short was precisely what. Cevallos meant should not be done ; and a contest began, in which the Spaniard had every advantage. Monroe replied to the Sjianish note of January 31 by imposing an ultimatum at once.^ " We consider it our duty to inform your Excellency that we cannot consent to any arrangement which does not provide for the whole subject " of the claims, including the French spoliations. " It is in his Majesty's power, by the answer which you give, to fix at once the re lations which are to subsist in future between the two nations." Cevallos, leaving the ultimatum and the French spoliations unnoticed, rejoined by discussing the conditions which the King had placed on his con sent to ratify the clainis convention of 1802.^ Taking up first the Mobile Act, he expressed in strong ternis his opinion of it, and of the explanation given to it by the President. Nevertheless, he withdrew his demand that the Act should be annulled. The King's " well-founded motives of complaint in respect to that 1 Monroe and Pinckney to Madison, May 23, 1805 ; State Papet-s, ii. 667. ^ Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, Feb. 5, 1805 ; State Papers, ii. 640. ' Cevallos to Monroe and Pinckney, Feb. 10, 1805 ; State Papers, ii. 541. 26 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. Act still exist," he said, " and his Majesty intends to keep them in mind, that satisfaction may be given by the United States ; but as it relates to ratifying the convention of August, 1802, his Majesty agrees from this time to be satisfied in this respect." The . question of French spoliations he reserved for sepa rate discussion. Monroe replied briefly by referring to his ultima tum, and by inviting discussion of the boundary ques tion ; but Cevallos, instead of taking up the matter of boundaries in his next note, discussed the French spoliation clainis and the right of deposit at New Orleans.^ To rebut the first, he produced a letter from Talleyrand dated July 27, 1804, in which Na poleon announced that neither Spain nor the United States must touch these claims, under penalty of in curring the Emperor's severe displeasure. In regard to the right of deposit, Cevallos took still stronger ground : — " The edict of the Intendant of New Orleans, suspend ing the deposit of American produce in that city, did not interrupt, nor was it the intention to interrupt, the navi gation of the Mississippi ; consequently these pretended injuries are reduced to this small point, —that for a short time the vessels loaded in the stream instead of taking in their cargoes at the wharves. ... If the erroneous opinions which were formed iu the United States, if the complaints pubUshed in the papers of your country, — 1 Cevallos to Monroe and Pinckney, Feb. 16, 1805 • State Papers, ii. 643. 1806. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 27 as false as they were repeated, — that the navigation of the Mississippi was interrupted, if the virulent writings by which the public mind was heated, and which led to compromit the American government and tarnish the good name of that of Spain, were causes that the in habitants of the western territory of the United States could not form a correct idea of what passed at New Orleans ; and if, in this uncertainty, they were disap pointed in the extraction of their produce, or suffered other inconveniences, — they ought to attribute the same to internal causes, such as the writings before mentioned, filled with inflammatory falsehoods, the violence of en thusiastic partisans, and other occurrences which on those occasions served to conceal the truth. The Gov ernment of Spain, so far from being responsible for the prejudices occasioned by these errors and erroneous ideas, ought in justice to complain of the irregular conduct pur sued by various writers and other individuals iu the United States, which was adapted to exasperate and mis lead the public opinion, and went to divulge sentiments the most ignominious, and absurdities the most false, against the government of his Majesty aud his accredited good faith." Not satisfied with this rebuttal, Cevallos added that the persons who complained of this trifling inconve nience "had been enjoying the rights of deposit for four years more than was stipulated in the treaty, and this notwithstanding the great prejudice it oc casioned to his Alajesty's revenue, by making New Orleans the centre of a most scandalous contraband trade, the profits of which it is not improbable but that some of those individuals have in part received." 28 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. Finally, he affirmed the Intendant's right to prohibit the deposit. On receiving this paper, Monroe hesitated whether to break off the negotiation ; but quickly came to the decision not to do so. His instructions expressly authorized him to abandon the entrepdt claims ; while a rupture founded on the French spoliations, in the face of Talleyrand's threats, was rupture with France as well as with Spain, and exceeded his authority. He concluded to go on, although he saw that every new step involved new dangers. Before Monroe had prepared a reply to the sharp letter on the claims convention, Cevallos wrote again.^ In this letter, dated February 24, he discussed the West Florida boundary, and contented himself with stating the Spanish case as it stood on the treaties and public evidence. His argument contained no new points, but was evidently intended to lure the Americans into endless discussion. Monroe was obliged to follow where Cevallos led. February 26 he replied to the Spanish note on the claims. Begin ning with complaints that Cevallos had not met with directness the American proposals; branching into other complaints that he had renewed propositions which Monroe had already declared incompatible with the rights of the United States ; that he had charged the American government with trying to obtain double payment for the same loss, and had branded 1 CevaUos to Monroe and Pinckney, Feb. 24, 1805 ; State Papers, ii. 644. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 29 the whole American people as being in league with smugglers ; that he had attacked the freedom of the press, and had called the right of deposit a charity of King Charles, — after adding that " it was impos sible for us to have received a note which could have been more unexpected," the two American envoys began to discuss the French spoliation claims, " on the presumption that no premeditated outrage was intended." i After a long argument on the French spoliations, Monroe's note next reached the most delicate point in discussion, — the positive order of Na])oleon forbid ding rcciignition of the claims. Treating the order as th(jugh it wcre only an expression of opinions, Monroe said, " We have received them with the con sideration which is due to the very respectable au thority from whicii they emanate. . . On all treaties between independent Powers each party has a right to form its own opinion. Every nation is the guardian of its (iwn honor and rights ; and the Emperor is too sensible of what is due to his own glory, and enter tains tlio high a respect for the Laiited States, to wish them to abandon a just sense of what is due to their own." Appealing finally to the positive orders of his own governnient, Monroe repeated that on these clainis he must insist. Cevallos replied with a disavowal of " premeditated outrage ; " and there, March 1, 1805, after Monroe had passed two months 1 Monroe and Pinckney to CevaUos, Feb. 26, 1805 ; State Papers, ii. 646. 30 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. in Spain, he found himself at his starting-point, at a loss how to go forward or to recede. Monroe received early in February Talleyrand's letter of Dec. 21, 1804, on the boundary of West Florida ; ^ he next suffered the mortification of listen ing to Talleyrand's order of July 27, 1804, forbidding Spain to " condescend " to pay or even to discuss the French spoliation claims ; and from these docuinents he saw that for nearly a year past the French and Spanish governments had combined to entrap and humiliate him. The fault was his own, for he had received plain, not to say rude, warning ; but he was perhaps only the more angry on that account, and in his irritation he undertook to terrify Napoleon. March 1, 1805, under the full consciousness of his situation, he wrote to Armstrong at Paris ; ^ — " It cannot be doubted that if our Government could be prevailed on to give ground, that of France would be very glad of it, as it would be to take us and all our con cerns, especially our funds, under its care. We are in clined to believe, with almost equal confidence, if we are firm, and show that we are not only able but resolved to take care of ourselves, that she wUl let us do so, and in regard to this question with Spain throw her weight into our scale to promote an adjustraent between us on the fair principles insisted on by our Government. To bring her to this, she must clearly understand that the negotiation 1 Monroe's diary at Aranjuez, March 16, 1805 ; Monroe MSS. 2 Monroe to Armstrong, March 1, 1805 ; MSS. SUte Depart ment Archives. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 31 is about to break up without doing anything, and that the failure is entirely owing to the part she has taken agaiust us. AVhen she sees that this is the literal fact, I do not think that her government will expose itself to the conse quences resulting from it. It is not prepared to quarrel with us for many reasons : first, as we are a republic, and that system of government too recently overset there, and the one established in its stead too feebly founded, to make it a desirable object with the Emperor ; second, as she relies altogether for supplies on our flag, and ou our merchants and people for many other friendly offices iu the way of trade, which none others can render ; third, as our government pursues, by prohibiting our trade with St. Domingo, and in many other respects, a system of the most friendly accommodation to the interests of France, she ought not to hazard those advantages if there were no other objections to a rupture with us; fourth, — but there are other and much stronger objections to it, — we should come to a good understanding with England. . . . These considerations incline us to think that a rupture with us is an event which of all others she least seeks at the present time ; and that it is ouly necessary to let her see distinctly that one with Spain is on the point of taking place, and will be owing altogether to her support of her pretensions, to induce France to change her policy and tone in the points depending here." Pursuing this train of reasoning, Monroe tested its correctness by challenging a direct issue of courage. His letter, thus inspired, reached Paris in due time, and its ideas were pressed by Armstrong on members of the French government. Their answer was prompt and final ; it was instantly reported by Armstrong to 32 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. Monroe in a letter ^ so pregnant with meaning that two of its sentences may be said to have decided the fate of Jefferson's second administration : — " On the subject of indemnity for the suspended right of deposit (professing to know nothing of the ground on which the interruption had been given) they would offer no opinion. On that of reparation for spoliations com mitted on our commerce by Frenchmen within the terri tory of his Catholic Majesty, they were equally prompt and decisive, declaring that our claim, having nothing of solidity in it, must be abandoned. " With regard to boundary, we have, they said, already given an opinion, and see no cause to change it. To the question. What would be the course of this government in the event of a rupture between us and Spain? they answered. We can neither doubt nor hesitate, — we must take part with Spain ; and our note of the SOth Frimaire [Dec. 21, 1804] was intended to communicate and ira press this idea." This stern message left Monroe helpless. To escape from Madrid without suffering some personal mortification was his best hope ; and fortunately Godoy took no pleasure in personalities. The Span iard was willing to let Monroe escape as soon as his defeat should be fairly recorded. The month of March had nearly passed before Monroe received Armstrong's letter; meanwhile Cevallos consumed the time in discussing the West Florida boundary. At the end of the month Monroe, fully aware at last 1 Armstrong to Monroe, March 12 and 18, 1805; State Papers, ii. 636. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 33 of his situation, attempted to force an issue. March 30 he wrote to Cevallos that he was weary of delay : ^ " It neither comports with the object of the present mission nor its duties to continue the negotiation longer than it furnishes a well-founded expectation that the just and friendly policy which produced it, on the part of the United States, is cherished with the same views by his Catholic Majesty." Unfortunately he had no excuse for breaking ab ruptly a negotiation which he had himself invited ; and Cevallos meant to give him at that stage no such excuse, for the important question of the Texan boun dary remained to be -discussed, and Talleyrand's in structions on that point must be placed on record by Spain. Monroe wrote to Cevallos, April 9, that he consid ered " the negotiation as essentially terminated by what has already occurred.^ . . . Should his Majesty's government think proper to invite another issue, on it will the responsibility rest for the consequences. The United States are not unprepared for, or unequal to, any crisis which may occur." Three days later he repeated the wish to " withdraw from a situation which, while it compromits the character of our gov ernment, cannot be agreeable to ourselves." ^ Cevallos 1 Pinckney and Monroe to CevaUos, March 30,. 1805; State Papers, ii. 657. '^ Monroe and Pinckney to CevaUos, April 9, 1805; State Papers, ii. 658. 8 Monroe and Pinckney to CevaUos, April 12, 1805; State Papers, ii. 660. VOL. III. — 3 34 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. took no notice of the threats, and contented himself with repelling the idea that the blame of breaking off the negotiation should rest upon him. Nevertheless he hastened to record the opinion of his Government in regard to the last claim of the United States, — the Texan boundary. Here again Cevallos followed the guidance of Tal leyrand. The dividing-line between Louisiana and Texas, he said, ought to be decided by the line be tween the French and Spanish settlements. The French post of Natchitoches, on the Red River, was distant seven leagues from the Spanish post of Nues tra Seiiora de los Adaes ; and therefore the boundary of Louisiana should run between these two points southward, along the watershed, until it reached the Gulf of Mexico between the Marmentou and the Cal casieu, — a boundary which deprived the United States not only of Texas, but of an important terri tory afterward included in the State of Louisiana.^ Eager as Monroe was to close the negotiation, he could not leave this note without reply ; and accord ingly he consumed another week in preparing more complaints of Cevallos' dilatory conduct, and in prov ing that Texas was included in the grant made by Louis XIV. to Anthony Crozat in 1712. After dis posing of that subject, he again begged for a conclu sion. " As every point has been thus fully discussed, we flatter ourselves that we shall now be honored ^ CevaUos to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805; State Papers, ii. 660. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 35 with your Excellency's propositions for the arrange ment of the whole business." ^ He flattered himself in vain; ten days passed without an answer. May 1, at a ])rivate interview, he tried to obtain some promise of action, without lietter result than the usual oblig ing Spanish expressions ; a week afterward he made another attempt, with the same reply, followed on Monroe's part by an offer to concede even the point of dignity. " Would Seiior Cevallos listen to a new and more advantageous offer on the part of the United States ? " Cevallos replied that such a step would be premature, as the discussion was not yet ended.^ Monroe had no choice but to break through the diplomatic net in which he had wound himself ; and at length. May 12, 1805, he sent a general ulti matum to the Spanish government : If Spain would cede the Fioridas, ratify the claims convention of August, 1802, and accept the Colorado as the Texan boundary, tho United States would establish a neutral territory a hundred miles wide on the eastern liank of the Colorado, from the Gulf to the northern boundary of Louisiana ; would assume the French spoliation claims, abandon the entrepdt claims, and accept the cession of West Florida from the King, thereby aban doning the claim that it was a part of Louisiana.^ 1 Monroe and Pinckney to CevaUos, AprU 20, 1805; State Papers, ii. 662. * Monroe and Pinckney to Madison, 23 May, 1805; State Papers, ii. 668. ' Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, May 12, 1805; State Papers, ii. 665. 36 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. To this note Cevallos replied three days after ward by a courteous but decided letter, objecting in various respects to Monroe's offers, and sum ming up his objections in the comment that this scheme required Spain to concede everything and receive nothing ; she must give up both the Fiori das, half of Texas, and the claims convention, while she obtained as an equivalent for these concessions only an abandonment of claims which she did not acknowledge : ^ — "The justice of the American government will not permit it to insist on propositions so totally to the disad vantage of Spain ; and however anxious his Majesty may be to please the United States, he cannot on his part assent to them , nor can he do less than consider them as little conformable to the rights of his Crown." Three days later Monroe demanded his passports. For once, Cevallos showed as much promptness as Monroe could have desired. Without expressing a regret, or showing so much as a complimentary wish to continue the negotiation, Cevallos sent the pass ports, appointed the very next day for Monroe's audience of leave, and bowed the Anierican envoy out of Spain with an alacrity which contrasted strongly with the delays which had hitherto wasted five months of time most precious to the American minister at the Court of St. James. In truth, the Prince of Peace had no longer an object to gain 1 CevaUoa to Monroe and Pinckney, May 15, 1805; State Papers, ii. 666. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 37 by detaining Monroe ; he had won every advantage which could be wrung from the situation, exce]it that of proving the defeat of the United States b>' publishing it to the world. For this, he could trust Monroe. After writing an angry letter to the French ambas sador at Madrid, Monroe went his way. May 20, leav ing Pinckney to maintain the forms of diplomatic relations with the Spanish government. Pinckney had still more to suffer before escaping from- the scene of his diplomatic trials. The Spaniard.^ began to plunder American commerce ; the spdliations of 1798 were renewed ; the garrisons in West Florida and Texas were reinforced ; Cevallos paid no atten tion to complaints or threats. In October Pinckney took leave and returned to America, and George W. Erving was sent from London to take charge of the legation at Madrid. Erving made an excellent repre sentative within tlie narrow field of action open to him as a mere cliargS d'affaires ; but he could do little to stem the current of Spanish desperation. The Prince of Peace, driven by France, England, and America nearer and nearer to the precipice that yawned for the destruction of Spain, was willing to see the world embroiled, in the hope of finding some last chance in his favor. When Erving in December, five months after Monroe's departure, went to remon strate against seizures of American ships in flagrant violation of the treaty of 1795, Godoy received hini with the good-natured courtesy which marked his 38 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. manners. " How go our affairs ? " he asked ; " are we to have peace or war ? " Erving called his atten tion to the late seizures. The Prince replied that it was impossible for Spain to allow American vessels to carry English property. " But we have a treaty which secures us that right," replied Erving. " Cer tainly, I know you have a treaty, for I made it with Mr. Pinckney," rejoined Godoy ; and he went on with entire frankness to announce that the "free-goods" provision of that treaty would no longer be respected. Then he continued, with laughable coolness, — "You may choose either peace or war. 'Tis the same thing to me. I will tell you candidly, that if you will go to war this certainly is the moment, and you may take our possessions from us. I advise you to go to war now, if you think that is best for you ; and then the peace which will be made in Europe will leave us two at war. " ^ Defiance could go no further. Elsewhere the Prince openly said that the United States had brought things to such a point as to leave Spain indifferent to the consequences. In war the President could only seize Florida ; and Florida was the price he asked for remaining at peace. Mexico and Cuba were be- j'ond his reach. Meanwhile Spain not only saved the money due for the old claims, but plundered Ameri can commerce, and still preserved her title to the Fioridas and Texas, — a title which, at least as con- 1 Erving to Madison, Dec. 7. 1805; MSS. State Department Arcliives. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 39 cerned the Floi'idas, the Americans must sooner or later extinguish. Such was the result of the President's diplomacy in respect to Spain. War was its only natural outcome, — war with S[)ain ; war with Napoleon, who must make common cause with King Charles ; coalition with England ; general recurrence to the ideas and precedents of the last Administration. Jefferson had exasperated Spain and irritated France. He must next decide whether this policy should be pursued to its natural result. Meanwhile Monroe returned to Paris, where he passed six weeks with Armstrong and with his French acquaintances in conference on the proper course to be pursued. Talleyrand was absent in Italy with the Emperor, who May 26 received at ililan the iron crown of the Lombard kings. That Napoleon was the real element of danger was clear to both envoys. A policy which should force France to interfere on behalf of the United States was their object ; and on this, as on many points, Armstrong's ideas were more definite than those of Jlonroe, Madison, or Jefferson. Even before Monroe left Madrid, he received a letter from Armstrong in which the outline of a decisive plan was sketched : — - " It is simply to take a strong and prompt possession of the northern bank of the Bio Eravo, leaving the eastern limit in statu quo. A stroke of this kind would at once bring Spain to reason, aud Fi'auce to her rescue, and without giving either room to quarrel. You might 40 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. then negotiate, and shape the bargain pretty much as you pleased." ¦¦• Evidently the seizure of Texas, leaving West Flor ida untouched, was the only step which the President could properly take ; for Texas had been bought and paid for, whereas West Florida beyond doubt had never been bought at all. Armstrong saw the weak point of Napoleon's position, and wished to attack it. He had no trouble in bringing Monroe to the same conclusion, although in yielding to his arguments Monroe tacitly abandoned the ground he had been persuaded by Livingston to take two years before, that West Florida belonged to Louisiana. " There is no shade of difference in our opinions," wrote Armstrong to Madison after Monroe's arrival at Paris, '^ "and so little in the course to be pursued with regard to Spain that it is scarcely worth noticing. The whole may be reduced to this : that instead of assailing the Spanish posts in West -Florida, or even indicating an intention to do so, I would (from motives growing more particularly out of the character of the Emperor) restrict the operations to such as may have been established in Louisiana. This, with some degree of demonstration that we meditate an embargo on our commercial inter course with Spain and her colonies, would compel this gov ernment to interpose promptly aud erticiently, and with dispositions to prevent the quarrel from going further." 1 Armstrong to Monroe, May 4, 1805; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. 2 Armstrong to Madison, July 3, 1805; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. 1805. MONROE S DIPLOMACY. 41 Throughout these Spanish negotiations ran a mys terious note of corruption which probably came not from Cevallos, Godoy, or King Charles; for Spain was always the party to suffer, and France was alwa}-s the party to profit by Spanish sacrifices. That the jobbery had its origin in Napoleon was improbable, for he too suffered from it. Neither Napoleon nor Godoy was open to bribery in such a sense ; they were so high in power that small pecuniary motives had no influence on their acts. Yet the Treasuries both of France and Spain were in trouble, and were seeking resources. That Talleyrand had private motives for conniving in their expedients cannot be proved ; but in 1805, as in 1798, every attempt to turn negotiation into a job came from Talleyrand's intimate circle, the suliordinates of the French Foreign Office. ^ In June, Monroe found at Paris the same hints at the influence of money which had irritated him in the ]n-eccding autumn ; and he wrote to Madison in a tone which showed that he gave them weight. " I have conferred much," he said,'^ " with the gentle man alluded to in my letter from Bordeaux of December Hi, and from what I can gather am led to believe that France has withheld her opinion on the western limits [lY'xas], to favor our pretensions when she thinks proper to take a part in it ; that she does not think it proper so to do in the present stage, or until our Government acts ' Cf. Correspondance de Napoleon, xxxii. 321. 2 Monroe to Madison, June 30, 1805 ; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. 42 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. so as to make Spain apply to her. He thinks she will then act ; and settling the Spanish spoliation business as by the treaty of 1802, and getting all that cau be got for Florida (he says eight millions of dollars are expected), proinote an adjustment." If Jefferson's administration cared to commit an error of colossal proportions, it had but to follow the hints of these irresponsible agents of Marbois and Talleyrand, who presumed to say in advance what motives would decide the mind of Napoleon. No man in France — neither Talleyrand nor Berthier, nor even Duroc — knew the scope of the Emperor's ambition, or could foretell the expedients he would use or reject. Monroe's friend was ill-informed, or deceived him. France had not withheld her opinion on the western limits ; on the contrary, her opinion had been ex actly followed by Spain. Not Talleyrand, much less Napoleon, but Cevallos himself had withheld that opinion from Monroe's knowledge, doubtless because he wished to keep a weapon in reserve for use at close quarters if his antagonist should come so near. Had Monroe not been discomfited before Cevallos exhausted his arsenal, this weapon would certainly have been used for a final blow. Cevallos still held it in reserve. Leaving the Spanish affair embroiled beyond disen tanglement, Monroe recrossed the Channel, and July 23 found himself again in London. During a cen tury of American diplomatic history a minister of the United States has seldom if ever within six months 1805 MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 43 suffered, at two great Courts, such contemptuous treatment as had then fallen to Monroe's lot. That lie should have been mortified and anxious for escape was natural. He returned to England, meaning to sail as quickly as possible for Anierica. " It was very much my wish," he wrote.^ Hoping to sail at latest by November 1, he selected his ship, and gave notice to the British Foreign Office. In his own interests no step could have been wiser, but it was taken too late ; the time lost in Spain and at Paris had been fatal to his plan, and he could no longer avoid an other defeat more serious, and even more public, than the two which had already disturbed his temper. That the American minister in London at any time should for six nionths leave his post, even in obedi ence to instructions, was surprising ; but that he should have done this in 1804, after Pitt's return to power, was matter of amazement. Monroe ex pected an unfriendly change of policy in the British government. As early as June, 1804, he wrote to Madison : " My most earnest advice is to look to the possibility of such a change." ^ Four months later, although the attitude of the British ministry had become more threatening, Monroe started for Madrid, leaving Pitt in peace, unwatched, to take his measures and to fix beyond recall his change of policy. July 23, 1805, when the Anierican minister at last returned from his Spanish journey and arrived 1 Monroe to Jladison, Oct. 18, 1805 ; State Papers, iii. 106. " Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1805 ; State Papers, iii. 93. 44 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. in London, after some weeks lost at Paris, he found a state of affairs such as might have alarmed the most phlegmatic of men. Pitt had made good use of Monroe's absence. During the winter of 1804-1805 Parliament passed several Acts tending to draw all the West Indian commerce into British hands. Throughout the West Indies free ports were thrown open to the enemy's vessels, which were encouraged to bring there the produce of their colonies, receiving British merchan dise in return, while the Act further provided for the importation of this enemy's produce into Great Britain in British ships. Other Acts and Orders extended the system of licenses, by which British subjects were allowed to trade with their enemies in neutral vessels, and concluded by requiring that all their trade with the Prench islands should be carried on through the free ports alone. ^ These measures were intended to force the trade of the French and Spanish colonies into a British chan nel ; but all w^ere secondary to a direct attack on American coinmerce. While Parliament and Coun cil devised the legislation and rules necessary for taking charge of the commerce of Cuba, Martinique, and the other hostile colonies, the Lords of Appeals were engaged in providing the law necessary for de priving Anierica of the same trade. July 23, 1805, Sir William Scott pronounced judgment in the case 1 Act of April 10, 1805; Instructions of June 29, 1805; Orders of Aug. 3, 1805. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 45 of the " Essex." Setting aside his ruling in the case of the " Polly," ^ he held that the neutral cargo whicii came from Martinique to Charleston, and thence to London, was good prize unless the neutral owner could prove, by something more than the evidence of a custom-house entry, that his original intention had been to terminate the voyage in an American port. In consequence of this decision, within a few weeks American ships by scores were seized without warning ; neutral insurance was doubled ; and the British merchantmen vied with the royal navy in applauding the energy of William Pitt. Of the decision as a matter of morality something might he said. That Pitt should have planned such a scheme was not surprising, for his moral sense had been blunted by the desperation of his political strug gle ; but the same excuse did not apply to Sir William Scott. The quarrel between law and history is old, and its source lies deep. Perhaps no good historian was ever a good lawyer : whether any good lawyer could be a good historian niight be equally doubted. The lawyer is required to give facts the mould of a theory ; the historian need only state facts in their sequence. In law Sir William Scott was considered as one nf the greatest judges that ever sat on the English bench, a man of the highest personal honor, sensitive to any imputation on his judicial indepen dence, — a lawyer in whom the whole profession took pride. In history he made himself and his court a ' See First Administration, ii. 400. 46 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. secret instrument for carrying out an act of piracy. The law defends him by throwing responsibility upon the political chiefs who were bound to make compen sation to the plundered merchants if compensation was due. The judge's duty began and ended by de claring what was law. Experience had proved that the evidence previously required to convince the court of a certain fact was insufficient. The judge said this, and no more. History replies that whatever may be, the strictly professional aspect of this famous judgment, in its nature it was a political act, and was known by the judge to be such. As a political measure its character was equivalent to a declaration of war, and did not materially differ from the more violent seizure of the Spanish treasure-ships by Pitt's order in the previous October. The lawyers justified that seizure also ; the King's Advocate defended it in the House of Commons by the simple explanation that England was not in the habit of declaring war, but usually began hostilities by some act of force.^ Lord Grenville, whom Pitt had entreated, only a few months before, to join the new ministry, and who was certainly considered as, next to Pitt himself, the highest political authority in England, was not deterred by this reasoning from denouncing the seizure of the Spanish galleons as an atrocious act of barbarity, contrary to all the law of nations, which stamped indelible infamy on the English name. 1 Speech of Sir John NichoU (Advocate-General), Feb. 11, 1805 ; Cobbett's Debates, iii. 407. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 47 Lord Grey, another high authority, stigmatized it as combining violence, injustice, and bad faith. The seizure of the American ships was an act different in its nature only in so" far as Sir William Scott condescended to throw over it in advance the ermine that he wore. Monroe reached London on the very day when Sir William Scott pronounced his fatal decision in the case of the " Essex." Lord Harrowby no longer pre sided over the Foreign Office ; he had taken another position, making way for Lord Mulgrave. The new Foreign Secretary was, like most of Pitt's ministers in 1805, a Tory gentleman of moderate abilities. Except as a friend of Pitt he was unknown. His character and opinions seemed wholly without im portance. To Lord Mulgrave, Monroe addressed him self ; and he found the Foreign Secretary as ready to discuss, and as slow to concede, as Don Pedro Cevallos had ever been.^ " He assured me in the most explicit terms that nothing was more remote from the views of his Governnient than to take an unfriendly attitude toward the United States ; he as sured me also that no new orders had been issued, and that his Government was disposed to do every. thing in its power to arrange this and the other points to our satisfaction." Yet when Monroe called his attention to the seizure of a score of American vessels in the Channel, by British naval officers who declared themselves to be acting by order. Lord Mulgrave ' Monroe to Madison, Aug. 16, 1805 ; State Papers, iii. 103. 48 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 2. quietly replied that the Rule of 1756 was good law, and that his Government did not mean to relax in the slightest degree from the rigor of Sir William Scott's decision.! Monroe had felt the indifference or contempt of Lord Harrowby, Talleyrand, and Cevallos : that of Lord Mulgrave was but one more variety of a wide experience. The rough treatment of Monroe by the Englishman was a repetition of that which he had accepted or challenged at the hands of the French man and Spaniard. Lord Mulgrave showed no wish to trouble himself in any way about the United States. He would not discuss the questions of im pressment and commerce ; and his only sign of caring to explain or excuse the measures of his Government was in regard to Captain Bradley of the " Cambrian," who had been recalled from the Amer ican station for violations of neutrality. Monroe complained that Bradley had since been given a ship of the line. Mulgrave explained that the command of a line-of-battle ship was not necessarily a promo tion, especially to an active officer accustomed to the independence and prize-money of the " Cambrian's " cruising ground. With this result Monroe's diplomatic activity for the year 1804-1805 came to an end. The only con clusion he drew from it was one which Jefferson seemed little likely to adopt. He urged his Govern ment to persevere in its course, and to threaten war 1 Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20, 1805; State Papers, iii. 105. 1805. • MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 49 upon France, Spain, and England at once.^ " We jiroliably shall never be able to settle our concerns with either Power without pushing our just claims on each with the greatest decision. ... I am strong in the opinion that a pressure on each at the same time W(juld produce a good effect with the other." Nevertheless, Monroe had not yet reached the bottom of his English disaster. Neither the Acts of Parliament, the Orders in Council, nor the Judgment of the Lords of Appeal satisfied the suffering interests of England, however harsh they might seem to the interests of America. The new rules, the extension of licenses, the opening of free ports, tended to please the navy and shipping interests, but left the British colonists in a w'orse position than before ; for as matters stnod the whole produce of the West Indian Islands, French, Spanish, and British, was to be col lected in a single mass and thrown on the London market. The warehouses on the Thames wereto be overfilled with sugar, on the chance that neutral ships might convey it to France. For five years the colo nists had insisted that their distress was due to excess in production ; but how could they check production when the French and Spanish islands were encouraged to produce ? Forgetting in their despair the attach ment they felt to America, the colonists attributed all their troubles to American competition. The East 1 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805 ; State Papers, in. 106. Monroe to Colonel Taylor, Sept. 10, 1810 ; Monroe MSS., State Department Archives. VOL. III. — 4 50 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2. India Conipany, whose warehouses were also loaded with unsalable goods, could discover no better rea son than the same neutral rivalry for the cessation of Continental demand. The shipowners, not yet satisfied by Sir William Scott's law, echoed the same cry. All the interested classes of England, except the manufacturers and merchants who were con cerned in commerce with the United States, agreed in calling upon government to crush out the neu tral trade. Sir William Scott had merely required an additional proof of its honesty ; England with one voice demanded that, honest or not, it should be stopped. This almost universal prayer found expression in a famous pamphlet that has rarely had an equal for ability and effect. In October, 1805, three months after the " Essex " decision, while Monroe was advis ing Madison to press harder than ever on all the great belligerent Powers, appeared in London a book of more than two hundred pages, with the title: " War in Disguise ; or, the Frauds of the Neutral Flags." The author was James Stephen, a man not less remarkable for his own qualities than for those which two generations of descendants have inherited from him ; but these abilities, though elevating him immensely above the herd of writers who in Eng land bespattered America with abuse, and in America befouled England, were yet of a character so pecu liar as to bar his path to the highest distinction. James Stephen was a high-minded fanatic, passion- 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 51 ately convinced of the truths he proclaimed. Two years after writing " War in Disguise," he published another pamphlet, maintaining that the Napoleonic wars were a divine chastisement of England for her tolerance of the slave-trade ; and this curious thesis he argued through twenty pages of close reasoning.^ Through life a yeheinent enemy of slavery, at a time when England rang with abuse of America, which he had done much to stimulate, he had the honesty and courage to hold America up as an example before Europe, and to assert that in abolishing the slave- trade she had done an act for which it was impossible to refuse her the esteem of England, and in conse quence of which he prayed that harmony between the two countries niight be settled on the firmest foundation. This insular and honest dogmatism, characteristic of many robust minds, Stephen carried into the ques tion of neutral trade. He had himself begun his career in the West Indies, and in the prize-court at St. Kitt's had learned the secrets of neutral com merce. Deeply impressed with the injury which this trade caused to England, he believed himself bound to point out the evil and the remedy to the British jiublic. Assuming at the outset that the Rule of 1756 was a settled principle of law, he next assumed that the greater part of the neutral trade -was not neu tral at all, but was a fraudulent business, in which French or Spanish property, carried in French or 1 New Reasons for abolishing the Slave-Trade, 1807. 52 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 2, Spanish ships, was by nieans of systematic perjury protected by the prostituted American flag. How much of this charge was true will never be certainly known. Stephen could not prove his asser tions. The American merchants stoutly denied them. Alexander Baring, better informed than Stephen and far less prejudiced, affirmed that the charge was untrue, and that if the facts could be learned, more British than enemy's property would be found afloat under the American flag. Perhaps this assertion was the more annoying of the two ; but to prove either the one or the other was needless, since from such premises Stephen was able to draw a number of startling conclusions which an English public stood ready to accept. The most serious of these was the certain ruin of England from the seduction of her seamen into this fraudulent service ; another was the inevitable decay of her merchant marine ; still an other pointed to the loss of the Continental market ; and he heightened the effect of all these evils by adding a picture of the British admiral in the decline of life raised to the peerage for his illustrious actions, and enjoying a pension from the national bounty, but still unable to spend so much money as became au English peer, because his Government had denied to him the " safe booty " of the neutral trade ! ^ Humor was not Stephen's strongest quality, or he never would have caricatured the British mind so coarsely ; but coarse as the drawing might be, England was 1 War in Disguise, pp. 131-133. 1805. MONROE'S DIPLOMACY. 53 not conscious of the caricature. Cobbett alone could have done justice to the pecuniary sanctity of the British peerage ; but on this point humor was lost to the world, for Colibett and Stephen were in accord. Thus a conviction was established in England that the American trade was a fraud whicii must soon bring Great Britain to ruin, and that the Americans who carried on this commerce were carrying on a " war in disguise " for the purpose of rescuing France and Spain from the pressure of the British navy. The conclusion was inevitable. " Enforce the Rule of 1750 ! " cried Stephen ; " cut off the neutral trade altogether ! " This policy, which went far l)eyond the measures of Pitt and the decision of Sir William Scott, was urged by Stephen with great force ; "vvhile he begged the Americans, in temperate and reason able language, not to make war for the protection of so gross a fraud. Other writers used no such self- restraint. The austere and almost religious conviction of Stephen could maintain itself at a height where no personal animosity toward Anierica mingled its bitterness with his denunciations ; but his followers, less accustomed than he to looking for motives in their BibU's, said simply that the moment for going to war with the United States had come, and that thc opportunity should be seized.^ ' Bosanqnet, Causes of the Depreciation, etc. p. 42. CHAPTER IIL The Eighth Congress had hardly expired, March 3, 1805, amid the confusion and ill-temper which fol lowed the failure of impeachment, when President Jefferson and Secretary Madison began to hear the first mutterings of European disaster. Talleyrand's letter to Armstrong, Dec. 21, 1804, arrived with its blunt announcement that Napoleon meant to oppose every step of Monroe's negotiation at Madrid, and with its declaration that West Florida had not been included in the retrocession of Louisiana to France, but had been refused to France by King Charles. Jefferson was then at Monticello, and thither the documents from Paris followed him. He wrote to Madison that Monroe's case was desperate. "I consider," said the President,' "that we may an ticipate the efifect of his mission. On its failure as to the main object, I wish he may settle the right of navi gating the Mobile, as everything else may await further peaceable proceedings ; but even then we shall have a difHcult question to decide, — to wit, whether we will let the present crisis in Europe pass away without a settlement." i Jefferson to Madison, March 23, 1805 ; Madison MSS, 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 55 This letter showed that as early as the month of March, 1805, the President foresaw Monroe's disas ters, and began to speculate upon the next step to be taken. The attempt to obtain Florida through Span ish fears had failed ; but his first impression was that everything might go on as before, if the Spaniards would consent to a free navigation of the Mobile. Madison was still more vague ; his first impulse was to retrace his steps. He wrote to the President a singular letter of contradictions. " I cannot entirely despair," said he, March 27,^ " that Spain, notwithstanding the support given by France to her claim to West Florida, may yield to our proposed arrangement, partly from its intrinsic value to her, partly from an apprehension of the interference of Great Britain ; and that this latter consideration may, as soon as France despairs of her pecuniary object, transfer her weight into our scale. If she [France] should persist in disavow ing her right to sell West Florida to the United States, and above all can prove it to have been the mutual un derstanding with Spain that West Florida was no part of Louisiana, it will place our claini on very different ground, — such probably as would not be approved by the world, and such certainly as would not with that approbation be maintained by force. If our right be good against Spain at all, it must be supported by those rigid maxims of technical law which have little weight in national questions generaUy, aud none at all when op posed to the principles of universal equity. The world would decide that France having sold us the territory of 1 Madison to Jefferson, March 27, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 56 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. a third party, which she had no right to sell, that party having even remonstrated against the whole transaction, the right of the United States was limited to a demand on France to procure and convey the territory, or to remit pro tanto the price, or to dissolve the bargain altogether." For eighteen nionths every French and Spanish agent in Washington, Paris, and Madrid had assured Madison, in language varying between remonstrance and insult, that Spain had not ceded West Florida to France ; the records of the State Department proved that France had asked for West Florida and had been refused ; Jefferson had not ventured to record a claim to West Florida when he received posses sion of Louisiana, and had been obliged to explain, in language which Gallatin and Randolph thought un satisfactory, the words of the Mobile Act. In spite of this, Madison committed himself and government to the claim that West Florida was a part of Louisiana ; he pressed that claim, not against France, but against Spain ; he brought Monroe to a rupture with the Span ish government on that issue, — yet with these recol lections fresh in his mind, he suddenly told Jefferson that if France could prove a matter of common noto riety, the world would decide that the United States had acted without regard to law or equity, while in any case the claim to West Florida as against Spain was a mistake. That Madison should have followed a train of rea soning so singular, Avas less surprising than that he J 805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 57 should have advanced so far without showing a sign that he was prepared for the next step. Knowing as early as ilarcli, 1805, that his plans were defeated, and that he might expect a repulse from Spain and France, he selected a new minister to succeed Pinck ney at Madrid. This diplomatist, whose career was to 1)0 as futile if not as noj^y as that of his prede cessor from South Carolina, was James Bowdoin of Massachusetts, son of a celebrated governor of that State. Jefferson wrote privately to him, April 27, announcing the appointment ; and the tone of the letter implied that in the month's interval since the arrival of Talleyrand's manifesto the President's pacific views had suffered a change. " Our relations with that nation are vitally interest ing," he wrote.' "That they should be of a peaceable and friendly character has been our most earnest desire. Had Spain met us with the same disposition, our idea was that her existence ou this hemisphere and ours should have rested on the same bottom, should have swum or sunk together. We want nothing of hers, and we want no other nation to possess what is hers ; but she has met our advances with jealousy, secret malice, and ill-faith. Our patience under this unworthy return of dinpfisition is now on its last trial, and the issue of what is now depending between us will decide whether our ii'lations with her are to be sincerely friendly or perma nently hostile. I stUl wish, and would cherish, the for mer, but have ceased to expect it." ^ JufftTson to Bowdoin, April 27, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 58 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. Jefferson had the faculty, peculiar to certain tem peraments, of seeing what he wished to see, and of believing what he willed to believe. Few other Amer icans could have seriously talked of the Spanish em pire in America as swimming or sinking with that of the United States ; but Jefferson, for the moment, thought that the earthe* pot of Spanish dominion could trust itself to float safely under charge of the iron energy of Americ&n democracy. He could gravely say in regard to Spain, " we want nothing of hers," when for eighteen months he had exhausted every resource, short of force, to gain Baton Rouge, Mobile, and Pensacola, not to speak of East Florida and Texas. He charged that Spain met his advances with jealousy, secret malice, and ill-faith, after his ministers had intrigued with Napoleon for nearly two years, in the constant hope of depriving her of her property. Dec. 13, 1804, he wrote to General Heath: " With Spain we shall always be bickering, but never at w^ar till we seek it ; " ^ and six months later he wrote to Bowdoin that her secret malice and ill faith were leading to permanently hostile relations. He had not much further to go ; for if he meant to main tain his authority ainong rulers, the war that would never come till he sought it must be sought. As Monroe's overthrow became more and more evident, the President grew uneasy, and turned rest lessly from one device to another. In the first days of August Monroe's despatches arrived, announcing ' See p. 8. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 69 that he had left Madrid, and that all his offers had been rejected by Spain. Madison was in Philadel phia, where his wife was detained by a long and troublesome lameness. The President was at Mon ticello. A brisk interchange of letters took place, marking from day to day the fluctuations of feeling peculiar to the characters of the two men. One ques tion alone was to be decided, — should they seize this moment to break with Napoleon ? Madison's first reflections reached no result. He shrank from admitting that the government stood be tween war and humiliation more dangerous than war. "The business at Madrid," he said, August 2, ^ "has had au awkward termination, and if nothing, as may be expected, particularly in the absence of the Emperor, should aUeviate it at Paris, involves some serious ques tions. After the parade of a mission extraordinary, a refusal of all our overtures in a haughty tone without any offer of other tenns, and a perseverance in with drawing a stipulated provision for claims admitted to be just, without ex post facto conditions manifestly unrea sonable and inadmissible, form a strong appeal to the honor and sensibility of this country." The conclusion drawn from this somewhat mild review was not such as Monroe, Armstrong, or Liv ingston had recommended. " I find that, as was apprehended from the tenor of former communications," continued the secretary, " the mUitary status quo in the controverted districts, the navi- 1 Madison to Jefferson, Aug. 2, 1805 ; Jefferson MSS. 60 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. gation of the rivers running through West Florida, and the spoliations subsequent to the convention of 1802 have never had a place in the discussions. Bowdoin may perhaps be instructed, consistently with what has passed, to propose a suspension of the territorial ques tions, the deposit, and the French spoliations, on condi tion that those points be yielded, with an incorporation of the convention of 1802 with a provision for subse quent claims. This is the utmost within the Executive purview. If this experiment should fail, the question with the Legislature must be whether or not resort is to be had to force, to what extent, and in what mode. Per haps the instructions to Bowdoin would be improved by including the idea of transferring the sequel of business hither. This would have the appearance of an advance on the part of Spain, the more so as it would be attended with a new mission to this country, and would be most convenient for us also, if not made by Spain a pretest for delay." Madison, after enduring one " refusal of all our over tures in a haughty tone," suggested that another be invited. The slightly patronizing air whicii charac terized Jefferson's attitude toward Madison, but which he never betrayed toward Gallatin, was explained by this "want of directness in Madison's nature, and by the habitual slowness of his decisions. The action suggested by Madison threw the control of events into the hands of France. This at least was the opinion of Jefferson, whose mind was wrought by the news from Pinckney to a state of steadily growing alarm. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 61 " I think the status quo, if not already proposed, should be immediately offered through Bowdoin," wrote .Tefferson, August 4, before receiving ^Madison's letter of August "i.^ " Should it even be refused, the refusal to settle a limit is not of itself a sufficient cause of war, nor is the withholding a ratification worthy of such a re dress. Yet these acts show a purpose, both in Spain aud France, against which we ought to pro\-ide before the conclusion of a peace. I think, therefore, we should take into consideration whether we ought not hnmediately to propose to England an eventual treaty of alliance, to come into force whenever (within years) a war shall take place with Spain or France." Three days later he wrote again, and his alarm had increased : ^ — ' " The papers now enclosed to you confirm me in the opinion of the expediency of a treaty with England, but make the offer of the status quo [to Spain] more doubt ful ; the correspondence will probably throw light on that question. From the papers already received I infer a confident reliance on the part of Spain on the omnipo tence of Bonaparte, but a desire of procrastination till peace in Europe shall leave us without an ally." Ten days more passed ; the whole mortification became evident ; the President's anger and alarm rose to feverishness.^ He wrote to Madison, Au gust 17, — " I am anxious to receive opinions respecting our pro cedure with Spain, as should negotiations with England 1 Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 4, 1805 ; Madison MSS. 2 Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 7, 1805 ; Works, iv. 583. ^ Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 17, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 62 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. be advisable they should not be postponed a day un necessarily, that we may lay their result before Congress before they rise next spring. Were the question only about the bounds of Louisiana, I should be for delay. Were it only for spoliations, just as this is as a cause of war, we might consider if no other expedient were more eligible for us. But I do not view peace as within our choice. I consider the cavalier conduct of Spain as evidence that France is to settle with us for her, — and the language of France confirms it, — and that if she can keep us insulated tUl peace, she means to enforce by ai'ms her will, to which she foresees we will not truckle, and therefore does not venture on the mandate now. We should not permit ourselves to be fouud off our guard and friendless." The President's plan presented difficulties which Madison could not fail to see. That Jefferson should wish Pitt to fight the battles of the United States was natural ; but Pitt was little in the habit of doing gratuitous favors, and might reasonably ask what price he was to receive for conquering the Fioridas and Texas for the United States. Madison's com ments on the President's proposed British treaty pointed out this objection. Madison agreed that the Executive should take provisional measures, on which Congress niight act.i " An eventual alliance with Great Britain, if attainable from her without in admissible conditions, would be for us the best of all possible measures ; but I do not see the least chance of laying her under obligations to be called 1 Madison to Jefferson, Aug. 20, 1805 ; Jefferson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 63 into force at our will without correspondent obliga tions on our part." Objection to the President's ])lan was easy ; but when the secretary came to a plan of his own, he could suggest nothing more "vigorous than to renew a moderate degree of coquetry with Merry, which would have the side advantage of alarming France and Spain, " from whom the grow ing communication with Great Britain would not be concealed " Such a weapon was no doubt as effective against Napoleon as heelless slippers against Pitt ; but the President thought the situation to have passed be yond such tactics. Madison's proposed coquetry with Merry met with less favor in Jefferson's eyes than his own proposed one-sided alliance with England had met in the eyes of Madison. Upon a treaty of alliance with England thc President was for the moment bent, and he met Madison's objections by arguments that showed lively traits of the writer's sanguine temper. He complained that Madison had misconceived the nature of the proposed British treaty. England should stipulate not to make peace without securing West Florida and the spoliation claims to America, while American co-operation in the war would be sufficient inducement to her for making this contr act.i "Another motive much more powerful would indubi tably induce England to go much further. Whatever ill humor may at times have been expressed against us ' Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 27, 1805 ; Works iv. 585. 64 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. .3. by individuals of that country, the first wish of every E;nglishman's heart is to see us once more fighting by their sides against France ; nor could the King or his ministers do an act so popular as to enter into an alli ance with us. The nation would not weigh the consider ation by grains and scruples ; they would consider it as the price and pledge of an indissoluble friendship. I think it possible that for such a provisional treaty they would give us their general guaranty of Louisiana ancl the Fioridas. At any rate we might try them ; a fail ure would not make our situation worse. If such a one could be obtained, we might await our own convenience for calling up the casus foederis. I think it important that England should receive an overture as early as possible, as it might prevent her listening to terms of peace." If Jefferson was right in thinking that every Englishman's heart yearned toward America, he was unfortunate in delaying his offer of indissoluble friendship until the moment when Sir William Scott delivered his opinion in the case of the " Essex." Madison's scheme was equally unpromising, because he had made a personal eneiny of Merry, on whom the success of Madison's tactics depended. Each of the two high authorities felt the weakness of the other, and the secretary even went so far as to hint, in courteous language, that the President's idea was unpractical : — "The more I reflect on the papers from Madrid, the more I feel the value of some eventual security for the active friendship of Great Britain, but the more I see at 1805. CABINET VACILLATIOXS. 65 the same time the ditficulty of obtaining it without a like security to her of ours. If she is to be bound, we must be so too, either to the same thing, — that is to join her in the war, — or to do what she will accept as equivalent to such an obligation. What can we offer to her? A mutual guaranty, unless so shaped as to involve us pretty certainly iu her war, would not be satisfactory. To offer commercial regulations or concessions ou points in the law of nations as a certain payment for aids which might never be received or required, would be a bargain liable to obvious objections of the most serious kind. Unless, therefore, some arrangement which has not occm-red to me can be devised, I see no other course than such au one as is suggested in my last letter." ^ In this state of things, the remaining meinbers of the Cabinet were asked for their opinions ; and in the course of a few days the President received written papers frora Gallatin and Robert Smith. Gallatin was annoyed at the results of Jefferson's diplomacy. Emphatically a Northern man, he cared little for Florida; and a war with Spain would have been in his eyes a Southern war. He made no con cealment of his opinion that the whole negotiation rested on a blunder ; and he told Madison as much, with a bluntness which the secretary could scarcely have relished. "The demands from Spain were too hard,'" said he,' " to have expected, even independent of French intei- 1 Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 1, 1805; Jefferson MSS. ' ( iallatin to Madison, Aug. 6, 1805 ; Gallatin's Writings, i. 237. VOL. in— 5 66 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. ference, any success from the negotiation. It could only be hoped that the tone assumed by our negotiators might not be such as to render a relinquishment or sus pension of some of our claims productive of some loss of reputation. If we are safe on that ground, it may be eligible to wait for a better opportunity before we again run the risk of lowering the national importance by pretensions which our strength may not at this mo ment permit us to support. If from the manner in which the negotiation has been conducted that effect has already been produced, how to save character with out endangering peace will be a serious and difiicult question." These words were written before he had seen Monroe's despatches. When the whole correspon dence was put into his hands he read it, and in returning it to Madison made the dry comment that the business had not ended quite so badly as he had previously supposed.^ The phrase bore a double meaning, for even Madison must have admitted that the business could not have ended much worse. Gallatin sent to the President a remarkable paper,^ in substance an argument for peace, and in tenor a criticism of the grounds which Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney had thought proper to take in their dispute with Spain. Gallatin held that, owing to the " unpardonable oversight or indif ference " of Livingston and Monroe in failing to in- 1 Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 1, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 2 GaUatin to Jefferson, Sept. 12, 1805; Gallatin's Writings, i. 241. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 67 sist on a boundary to Louisiana, the United States government was debarred from holding Spain respon sible for the inevitable consequences of its own fault. Neither Spain's qualified refusal to ratify the claims convention of 1802 nor her rejection of the French spoHation clainis would justify war. As a matter of abstract justice, war was not to be defended ; as a matter of policy, it could not be recommended. The expense and loss would exceed the value of Florida ; the political result would entangle America in alli ance with England ; and, " in fine, a subversion of all our hopes must be the natural consequence." Re newal of negotiation was the proper step, with the Sabine and Perdido as boundaries and a temporary arrangement under the status quo, acceptance of the Spanish condition precedent to ratifying the claims convention, and insistence against the new spolia tions which French and Spanish privateers were daily making on Anierican commerce in the West Indies. Pending the result of this negotiation Congress might spend some money on the militia, and might appro priate a million dollars annually to build ships of the line. In effect, Gallatin threw his influence on the side of Madison against the President's semi-warlike views. The opinion of Robert Smith did not weaken the force of Gallatin's reasoning. Already a perceptible divi sion existed in the Cabinet between the Treasury and the Navy. Hardly three months before the Spanish embarrassment, Gallatin had spoken to the President 68 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. in strong terms of Robert Smith's administration, and had added,^ — " On this subject, — the expense of the Navy greater than the object seemed to requhe, and a merely nominal accountability, — I have, for the sake of preserving per fect harmony in your councils, however grating to my feelings, been almost uniformly silent." Smith's present views tended to confirm Gallatin in his irritation, and to reconcile Jefferson to aban doning his energetic schemes. The Secretary of the Navy said that throughout these negotiations Spain had presumed much on American predilection for peace, and on the want of means to annoy her either by land or by water. He urged the necessity of working on her fears, and advised that Congress be recommended to provide additional gunboats, to put all the frigates in commission, and to build twelve seventy-fours. With these means he was disposed to take a commanding attitude ; and if Spain were supported by France, to make an alliance with England.^ Gallatin and Robert Smith agreed only on one point, — • that the affair had been mismanaged. Both secretaries held that America had made pretensions which she had not strength at the moment to sup port. Rather than " again run the risk of lowering national importance," Gallatin preferred to submit to 1 Gallatin to Jefferson, May 30, 1805; GaUutin's Writings, i. 233. 2 Robert Smith to Jefferson, Sept. 10, 1805 ; Jefferson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 69 the consequent loss of reputation, and return to a true peace-policy. Robert Smith wished to maintain a high tone, and to arm. All Jefferson's instincts were with Gallatin ; but the path that Gallatin pro posed was hard and mortifying, and although he made it as little abrupt as possible, he could not prevent it from seeming what it was, — a severe humiliation to the President. Not without some inward struggle could a President of the United States bow his neck to sueh a yoke as Spain and France imposed. At that moment, the middle of September, ar rived Armstrong's letter advising the military occu pation of Texas and a cessation of intercourse with Spain. His plan was the first well-considered sug gestion yet made for carrying out the policy hitherto pursued ; and although contrary to Gallatin's advice, it agreed so well with the President's views that he caught at it with the relief of a man unable to solve his own problem, who hears another explain what to himself is inexplicable. Jcffersdu seized Armstrong's idea, and uniting it with his own, an nounced the result to Madison as the true solution of tlic difficulty:! — " Supposing a previous alliance with England to guard us in the worst event, I should propose that Congress should pass acts ( 1 ) authorizing the Executive to sus pend intercourse with Spain at discretion ; (2) to dislodge the new establishments of Spain between the Mississippi ^ JeHui-son to Madison, Sept. 16, 1805; Works, iv. 5S7. 70 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 8. and Bravo ; (3) to appoint commissioners to examine and ascertain all claims for spoliation." Here at length was a plan, — uncertain, indeed, because dependent on British help, but still a scheme of action wdiich could be discussed. The President appointed October 4 as the day on which the Cabinet should reunite at Washington to consider his project, but Madison replied that he could not return so soon; and in order that the Cabinet should know his \dews, he explained at some length the course he ad^dsed, which differed widely from that of the President. "With respect to Great Britain," he said,^ "I think we ought to go as far into an understanding on the sub ject of an eventual coalition in the war as will not pre clude us from an intermediate adjustment, if attainable, with Spain. I see not, however, much chance that she will positively bind herself not to make peace, while we refuse to bind ourselves positively to make war, — unless, indeed, some positive advantage were yielded on our part in lieu of an engagement to enter into the war. No such advantage as yet occurs as would be admissible to us and satisfactory to her.'' In regard to England, therefore, Madison had nothing to propose except negotiation without end. Having settled this point, he went on : — " At Paris I think Armstrong ought to receive instruc tions to extinguish in the French government every hope of turning our controversy with Spain into a French job, public or private ; to leave them under apprehensions 1 Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 30, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. il of an eventual connection between the United States and Great Britain ; and to take advantage of any change in the French Cabinet favorable to our objects with Spain." To leave Bonaparte "under apprehensions" was U> be the object of Madison's diplomacy at Paris, — a task whicii several European governments were then employing half a million armed men to accomplish, hitherto without success, but which Madison hoped to effect by civilities to Merry. After this decision, nothing remained but to mark out a line of conduct in regard to Spain. In the course of the summer Bowdoin, the new minister, had sailed ; but on arriving in Spain, and learning the failure of Monroe's negotiation, he went to Paris and London without visiting Jladrid. " As to Spain herself," continued Madison, " one question is, whether Bowdoin ought to proceed or not to Madrid. My opinion is that his trip to Great Britain was fortunate, and that the effect of it will be aided by his keeping aloof until occurrences shall invite him to Spain. . . . The nicest question, however, is whether any, or what, steps should be taken for a communi cation with the Spanish government on the points not embraced by the late negotiation. On this question my reflections disapprove of any step whatever other than such as may fall within the path to be marked out for Armstrong, or as may be within the sphere of Claiborne's intercourse with the Marquis of Casa Calvo. Perhaps the last may be the best opportunity of all for convey ing to Spain the impressions we wish, without com mitting the government in any respect more than may (2 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. be advisable. In general it seems to me proper that Claiborne should hold a pretty strong language in all cases, and particularly that he should go every length the law will warrant against Morales and his project of selling lands. If Congress should be not indisposed, proceedings may be authorized that will be perfectly effectual on that as well as other points ; but before their meeting there will be time to consider more fully what ought to be suggested for their consideration." Having brought the government face to face with the government of Spain, in the belief that Spain and Prance must yield to a peremptory demand, — finding that Spain not only refused every concession, but re newed depredations on American commerce and took an attitude of indifference to threats or entreaties, — Madison proposed no more vigorous measure than to " go every length the law will warrant " against certain Spanish land-grants. Such a course pleased no one, and threatened to create new dangers. Monroe and Armstrong urged that a supposed devotion to peace on the part of the President weighed heavily against him with Spain and France. Jefferson approved their proposed aggres sive policy, as he wrote to Madison, chiefly because it would " correct the dangerous error that we are a people whom no injuries can provoke to war." ^ He shrank from war, except under the shield of England, and yet he feared England for an ally even more than Spain for an enemy. His perplexity ended in help- 1 Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 18, 1805 ; Jefferson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIOXS. 73 lessness. The Cabinet meeting was held October 4 ; but he rejjorted to Madison that nothing came of it : - " The ouly questions which press on the Executive for decision are whether we shall enter into a provisional alli ance with England, to come into force only in the event that dnrinrj tin.' present war we become engaged in war ii'ith France, leaving the declaration of the casus federis ultimately with us ; whether we shall send away Yrujo, Casa Calvo, Morales ; whether we shaU instruct Bowdoin not to go to IMadrid till further orders. But we are all of the opinion that the first of these questions is too important and too difHcult to be decided but ou the fuUest cuusideration, in which your aid and counsel should be waited for." Again Madison wrote back his opinion. More than six months had elapsed since the President, March 23, despaired of Monroe's mission ; every alternative had been repeatedly discussed ; every advice had been taken. Congress would soon meet ; soinething must be decided, — in reality delay was itself a de cision ; yet the President and Secretary of State seemed no nearer a result than they had been six montlis before. Meanwhile the European packets brought news that put a different face on the prob lem. Sir William Scott's decision in the case of the •¦ Ksscx " arrived ; seizures of American ships by England began ; Pitt's great coalition with Russia and Austria against Napoleon took the field, and August 27 Xapoleon broke up the camp at Boulogne 1 Jefferson to Madison, Oct. 11, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 74 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 3. and began his long-intended movement across the Rhine. Upon Madison's mind this European con vulsion acted as an additional reason for doing nothing : ^ — "Considering the probability of an extension of the war against France, and the influence that may have on her temper toward the United States, the uncertainty of effecting with England such a shape for an arrangement as alone would be admissible, and the possible effects elsewhere of abortive overtures to her, I think it very questionable whether a little delay may not be expedi ent, especially as in the mean time the EngUsh pulse will be somewhat felt by the discussions now on foot by Mr. Monroe." Accordingly the Secretary advised that Morales, Casa Calvo, and Yrujo should be ordered out of the country, while Bowdoin should remain in England, — and so left it. Madison's measures and conduct toward Europe showed the habit of avoiding the heart of every issue, in order to fret its extremities. This mark of Madison's character as a diplomatist led him into his chief difficulties at home and abroad ; but the Spanish imbroglio of 1805 first brought the weak ness into public notoriety, and he recovered from the subsequent revelation only after years of mis fortune. The same habit of mind made him favor commercial restrictions as a means of coercion. So ho disregarded Armstrong's idea of seizing Texas, 1 Madison to Jefferson, Oct 16, 1805; Jeft'erson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 75 but warmly approved of his passing suggestion as to an embargo : ^ — " The efficacy of an embargo cannot be doubted. In deed, if a commercial weapon can be properly shaped for the Executive hand, it is more and more apparent to me that it can force all the nations having colonies in this quarter of the globe to respect our rights." This nientai trait was closely connected with Madi son's good qualities, — it sprang from the same source as his caution, his respect for law, his instinctive sense of the dangers that threatened the Union, his curious mixture of radical and conservative tastes ; but whatever its merits or defects, it led to a strange delusion when it caused him to believe that a man like Xapoleon could be forced by a mere pin-prick to do Jefferson's will. Jcffersiin himself was weary of indecision. He had rested his wish for an English alliance on the belief that Napoleon meant to make peace in Europe in (irilcr to attack America; and this idea, never very reasonable, could have no weight after Napoleon had plunged into a general European war. No sooner did he receive Madison's letter of October 16, than he again changed his plan. " The probability of an extensive war on the continent of Europe, strengthening every day for some time past, is now almost certain," he wrote October 23 to IMadison.^ " This gives us our great desideratum, time. In truth it ' Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 14, 1805; Jefferson MSS. « Jefferson to Madison, Oct. 23, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 76 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Cn. 3. places us quite at our ease. We are certain of one year of campaigning at least, and one other year of negotia tion for their peace arrangements. Should we be now forced into war, it is become much more questionable than it was whether we should not pursue it unembar rassed by any alliance, and free to retire from it when ever we can obtain our separate terms. It gives us time, too, to make another effort for peaceable settlement. "Where should this be clone? Not at Madrid, certainly. At Paris ! through Armstrong, or Ai-mstroug and Mon roe as negotiators, France as the mediator, the price of the Fioridas as tlie means. We need not care who gets that, and an enlargement of the sum we had thought of may be the bait to France, while the Guadeloupe as the western boundary may be the soother of Spain ; provid ing for our spoliated citizens in some effectual way. We may announce to France that determined not to ask jus tice of Spain again, yet desirous of making one other effort to preserve peace, we are willing to see whether her inter position can obtain it on terms which we think just; that no delay, however, can be admitted ; and that in the mean time should Spain attempt to change the status quo, we shall repel force by force, without undertalring other active hostilities till we see what may be the issue of her interference." A similar letter was sent on the same day to Gal latin ; and the next day Jefferson wrote to Robert Smith, suggesting the same idea, with some charac teristic additions.! Jefferson's idea that Napoleon would require two years of war seemed reasonable ; for how could Jeffer- 1 Jefferson to Robert Smith, Oct. 24, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 130.5. C.^BIXET VACILLATIONS. i ( son know that Ulra had already surrendered, that Austerlitz would be fought within six weeks, and that peace would be restored before the new year, with the Emperor Napoleon more terrible than ever ? In truth Jefferson only reverted to his policy of peace which he had seemed to abandon, but to whicii he really clung even when most earnest for a British alliance. His conduct in that sense was at least consistent. So much could hardly be said for Madi son, even though the President apparently yielded to the secretary's advice. Of all the points on which Madison, and Monroe in obedience to his orders, had most strongly insisted, even to the extent of offend ing Talleyrand, the strongest was that under no cir cumstances should the Florida negotiation be turned into a bribe to France. As late as September 30, in writing the opinion intended to guide the Cabi net, Madison asked authority " to extinguish in the French government every hope of turning our con troversy with Spain into a French job, public or pri vate." ! The President's suggestion of October 23 avowedly turned the controversy with Spain into a French job, which must inevitably become private as well as public. JIadison made no protest. He soon returned to Washington, and there, Nov. 12, 1805, a Cabinet meeting was held, whose proceedings were recorded by the President in a memorandum, probably written at the moment. This memorandum closed a record, ' Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 30, 1805; Jefferson MSS. 78 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cii. 3. unusually complete, of an episode illustrating better than any other the peculiarities of Jefferson and Madison, and the traits of character most commonly alleged as their faults.-' "1805, Nov. 12. Present, the four secretaries; subject, Spanish affairs. — The extension of the war in Europe leaving us without danger of a sudden peace, depriving us of the chance of an ally, I proposed we should address ourselves to France, informing her it was a last effort at amicable settlement with Spain, and offer to her, or through her, (1) A sum of money for the rights of Spain east of Iberville, say the Fioridas; (2) To cede the part of Louisiana from the Rio Bravo to the Guadeloupe ; (3) Spain to pay within a certain time spoliations under her own flag, agreed to by the conven tion (which we guess to be a hundred vessels, worth two millions), and those subsequent (worth as much more), and to hypothecate to us for those payments the country from Guadeloupe to Rio Bravo. Armstrong to be em ployed. The flrst was to be the exciting motive with France, to whom Spain is in arrears for subsidies, and who will be glad also to secure us from going into the scale of England ; the second, the soothing motive with Spain, which France would press hond Jide, because she claimed to the Rio Bravo ; the third, to quiet our mer chants. It was agreed to unanimously, and the sum to be offered fixed not to exceed five million doUars. Mr. Gallatin did not like purchasing Florida uuder an ap prehension of war, lest we should be thought in fact to purchase peace. We thought this overweighed by tak ing advantage of an opportunity which might not occur 1 Cabinet Memoranda; Jefferson MSS. 1805. CABINET VACILLATIONS. 79 again of getting a country essential to our peace and to the security of the commerce of the Mississippi. It was agreed that Yrujo should be sounded through Dallas whether he is not going away, and if not, he should be made to understand that his presence at Washington will not be agreeable, and that his departure is expected. Casa Calvo, Morales, and all the Spanish officers at New Orleans are to be desired to depart, with a discretion to Claiborne to let any friendly ones remain who will resign and become citizens, as also women receiving pensions to remain if they choose." CHAPTER IV. President Jefferson's decision, in October, 1805, to retrace his steps and reverse a policy which had been publicly and repeatedly proclaimed, was the turning-point of his second Administration. No one can say what might have happened if in August, 1805, Jefferson had ordered his troops to cross the Sabine and occupy Texas to the Rio Bravo, as Arm strong and Monroe advised. Such an act would probably have been supported, as the purchase of Louisiana had been approved, by the whole coun try, without regard to Constitutional theories ; and indeed if Jefferson succeeded to the rights of Napo leon in Louisiana, such a step required no defence. Spain niight then have declared war ; but had Godoy taken this extreme measure, he could have had no other motive than to embarrass Napoleon by drag ging France into a war with the United States, and had this policy succeeded. President Jefferson's dif ficulties would have vanished in an instant. He might then have seized Florida ; his controversies with England about neutral trade, blockade, and impressment would have fallen to the ground; and had war with France continued two years, until Spain 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 81 threw off the yake of Napoleon and once more raised in Europe the standard of popular liberty, Jefferson niight perhaps have effected some agreement -with the Spanish patriots, and would then have stood at thc head of the coming popular movement through out the world, — the movement which he and his party were destined to resist. Godoy, Napoleon, Pitt, ilonroe, Armstrong, John Randolph, and even the Xcw England Federalists seemed combined to drag or drive him into this path. Its advantages were so plain, even at that early moment, as to overmaster for a whole sumnier his instinctive repugnance to acts of force. After long hesitation, Jefferson shrank from the stcii, and fell back upon his old policy of conquering by p('ac(.'; but such vacillations were costly. To Gal latin the decision was easy, for he had ever held that on tlic whalt' the nation could better afford a loss of dignity than a war ; but even he allowed that loss of dignity would cost something, and he could not forct(dl what equivalent he must pay for escape from a Franco-Spanish war. Neither Jefferson nor Galla tin could expect to be wholly spared ; but Madison's position was worse than theirs, for he had still to reckon with liis personal enemies, — John Randolph, Yrujo, and iferry, — and to overawe a quasi friend more dangerous than an enemy, — the military diplo- mate, Turreau. Turreau during this summer kept his eye fixed on the Secretary of State, and repeatedly hinted, in a 82 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. manner extremely frank, that he meant to tolerate no evasions. He wrote to Talleyrand in a tone of cool confidence. July 9 he said that the Emperor's mea sures for the protection of Florida were sufficient : " The intervention of France in the negotiations with Spain has stopped everything. They have been affected by it here, but have not shown to me any discontent at it. ' Well,' said Mr. Jefferson to me lately, ' since the Emperor wishes it, the arrangement shall be adjourned to a more favorable time.' " That Jefferson made this remark could be believed only by his enemies, for it contradicted the tenor of his letters to Madison ; but although Turreau doubt less overstated the force of the words, he certainly gave to Talleyrand the impression that the Presi dent was reduced to obedience. The impression was enough ; correct or not, it strengthened Napoleon's natural taste for command. A few weeks afterward, Turreau wrote to Madison a note in regard to General Moreau's reception in the United States. In a tone excessively miHtary he said : ^ — "General Moreau ought not (ne doit point) to be, in a foreign country, the object of honors which the conside ration of his services would formerly have drawn upon him ; and it is proper ((7 convient) that his arrival and his residence in the United States should be marked by no de monstration which passes the bounds of hospitality." ' Turreau to Madison, 26 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 14, 1805) ; MSS. State Department Archives. 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AXD EXGLAND. 83 Madison was indignant at this interference, and proposed to resent it. The President encouraged him to do so, on the express ground that they had not ventured to resent the conduct of France in regard to Monroe's negotiation : ^ — - "The style of that government in the Spanish busi ness was calculated to excite indignation ; but it was a case in which that might have done injury. But the present is a case which would justify some notice in order to let them understand we are not of those Powers who will receive and execute mandates." Meanwhile General Smith, wdio had not resented the repudiation of his niece by the Emperor, and to whom Madison showed the offensive letter, undertook to soothe the irritation. " He says," wrote Madison in his next letter to the President,^ " that Turreau speaks with the greatest respect, and even affection, toward the Administration ; and such are the dispo sitions which it is certain he has uniformly mani fested to me." Upon these assurances Madison toned down the severity he had intended. Turreau had resided hardly six months in the United States before he announced to Talleyrand the conviction of all American politicians that any war would end in driving from office the party which made it : ^ — ' Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 25, 1805; Works, iv. 584. 2 Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 1, 1805; Jefferson MSS. » Turreau to Talleyrand, 20 Messidor, Au xiii. (July 9, 1805); Archives des Aff. ttr., M.SS. 84 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. " To such an extent is the actual Administration con vinced of this fact, that it allows itself to be outraged every clay by the EngUsh, ancl accepts all the humiliations they care to impose ; and notwithstanding the contempt generally felt here for Spain, against whom a war was last year quite openly provoked, the members of the United States government have not dared to undertake it, although sure of beginning it with public opinion in their favor. And no one need think that this indisposition to war depends only on the personal character and the philanthropic principles of Mr. .Jefferson, for it is shared by all tbe party leaders, even by those who have most pretensions and well-founded liopes to succeed the actual President, — such as Mr. Madison." Turreau's sketch of Anierican character and ambi tion was long and interesting, and suggested the vulnerable point where France should throw her strength against this new people. Neither as a mili tary nor as a naval power did he think the United States formidable. Their government made no con cealment of its weakness : — " They especially lack trained oflScers. The Americans are to-day the boldest and the most ignorant navigators in the universe. In brief, it seems to me that, considering the weakness of the military constitution, the Federal government, which inakes no concealment of this weak ness, will avoid every serious difference which might lead to aggression, and will constantly show itself an enemy to war. But does the system of encroachment which pre vails here agree with a temper so pacific ? Certainly not, at first sight ; and yet unless circumstances change, the 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 85 United States wUl succeed in reconciling the contradic tion. To conquer without war is the first fact in their politics (Conqiicrir sans guerre, voild, les piremiers faits politiques.) " These reflections were written early in July, 1805, before the President and his Cabinet had begun to discuss Monroe's failure and the policy of a Spanish war, and more than three months before the Presi dent wholly abandoned the thought of warlike mea sures. Turreau's vision was keen, but he had no excuse for short-sightedness. Madison made little effort to disguise his objects or methods. " I took occasion to express to Mr. Madison," wrote Turreau in the same despatch, " my astonishment that the schemes of aggrandizement which the United States government appeared to have, should be always directed toward the south, while there were still iu the north im portant and convenient territories, such as Cauada, Nova .Scotia, etc. 'Doubtless!' replied the secretary, 'but the moment has not yet come ! W^hen the pear is ripe it will fall of itself.' " Had Turreau asked why, then, Madison gave so violent a shaking to the Florida pear-tree, Madison must havo answered, with the same candor, that he did so because he supposed the Florida pear to be ripe. The phrase was an admission and an invita tion, — an admission that Florida would have been left alone if Spain had been as strong as England; and an invitation to Turreau to interpose with safety the sword of France. Turreau could not doubt thc 86 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. i. effect of his own blunt interference. So confident had the new French minister already become, in July, 1805, that he not only told Madison to stop these petty larcenies of Spanish property, but also urged Napoleon to take the Fioridas and Cuba into his own hand solely to check American aggression. " I believe that France alone can arrest these Ameri can enterprises and baffle (^dSjouer') their plan." Had Turreau's discipline stopped there, niuch might have been said in his favor ; but in regard to still another matter he used expressions and made de mands such as Madison never yet had heard from a diplomatic agent, although the secretary's experience was already considerable. Neither Yrujo nor Merry had succeeded in giving to their remonstrances or requests the abruptness of Napoleon's style. The Federalist newspapers during Jefferson's first term had found so little reasoii for charging him with subservience to France, that this old and stale re proach had nearly lost its weight. Neither the New England merchants whom France had plundered, and whose claims Jefferson consented to withdraw, nor the British government or British newspapers had thought it worth their while to press the charge that Jefferson was led astray by love or fear of Napoleon or the Empire. Not until the winter of 1805-1806 did the doctrine of French influence re cover a certain share of strength ; but as John Ran dolph and his friends, who detested Madison, were outraged by the conduct of France in Spanish affairs, 1805. BETWEEX FRANCE AND EXGLAX^D. 8( so Timothy Pickering and the whole body of Federal ists, who hated the South and the power which rested on the dumb vote of slaves, were exasperated by the conduct of France in regard to their trade with St. Domingo. In both cases Madison was the victim. St. Domingo was still in name and in international law a colony of France. Although Rochambeau sur rendered himself and his few remaining troops as prisoners of war to the English in November, 1803 ; although the negroes in January, 1804, proclaimed their independence, and held undisputed control of the whole French colony, while their ports were open, and not an armed vessel bearing the flag of France jiretcnded to maintain a blockade, — yet Napoleon claimed that the island belonged to him. General Ferrand still held points in the Spanish colony for France, and defeated an invasion attempted by Dessa lines ; nor did any government betray a disposition to recognize the black empire, or to establish rela tions witb Dessalines or Christophe, or with a negro republic. On the other hand, the trade of Hayti, being profitable, was encouraged by every govern ment in turn ; but because it was, even more than other West Indian trade, unprotected by law, the ves sels which carried it were usually arined, and sailed in coinpany. In the winter of 1804-1805, soon after General Turreau's arrival at Washington, a flotilla armed with eighty cannon and carrying crews to the number of seven hundred men, set sail from N^ew York with carixoes which included contraband cf wr.r 88 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ci..4. of all kinds. Turreau remonstrated with Madison, who assured him that a law would soon be reported for correcting this abuse. A Bill was accordingly reported ; but it prohibited only the armed commerce and put the trade under heavy bonds for good behavior. To answer Turreau's object the trade must be prohibited altogether. Dr. Logan, one of the senators from Pennsylvania, who led the Northern democrats, with the "Aurora's" sup port, in hostility to the Haytian negroes, moved an amendment to the Bill when it came before the Sen ate. He proposed to prohibit every kind of commerce with St. Domingo ; and the Senate was so closely divided as to require the casting vote of thc Vice- President. Burr gave his voice against Dr. Logan's amendment, and the Bill accordingly passed, March 3, 1805, leaving the unarmed trade still open. Turreau duly reported these matters to his Gov- ernment.i The facts were public, and were given needless notoriety by the merchants themselves. On the return of the Haytian flotilla to New York, they celebrated the event in a public dinner, and the company drank a health to the government of Hayti. Another expedition was reported to be pre paring. General Ferrand issued severe proclama tions against the trade,^ and Madison remonstrated strongly against Ferrand. One armed American ves- 1 Turreau to Talleyrand, 30 Germinal, An xiii. (April 20, 1805) ; Archives des Aff. Etr., MSS. 2 State Papers, ii. 728. 1805. BETWEEX FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 89 sel, whicii had carried three cargoes of powder to the Ilaytians, was taken by a British cruiser, sent into Halifax, and there condemned by the British court as good ])rize for carrying on an unlawful trade. Early in August, 1805, after Monroe's return to London, and while Jefferson and Madison were dis cussing the problem of protecting themselves from French designs, the Emperor Napoleon, who had re turned from Italy and gone to the camp at Boulogne, received Turreau's despatch, and immediately wrote ih his own emphatic style to Talleyrand : ^ — "The despatch from "Washington has fixed my atten tion. I request you to send a note to the American miuister accredited to me. You will join to it a copy of the judgment [at Halifax] ; and you will declare to him that it is time for this thing to stop (que cela fini.ssc) ; that it is shameful (indiqne) in the Americans to provide siqjplies for brigands and to take part in a comineree so scandalous ; that I will declare good prize everything which shall enter or leave the ports of St. Uomiugo ; aud that I can no longer see with indiffer ence the armaments evidently directed against France which the American govermnent allows to be made in its ports." In this outburst of temper Napoleon's ideas of law beeainc confused. The American government did not dispute his right to seize American vessels trading \vith Hayti : the difficulty was that he did not or could not do so, and for this reason he made the ' Napoleon to TaUeyrand, 22 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 10, ISO,')) ; Correspondance, xi. 73. 90 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 4. demand that the American government should help him in doing what he was powerless to effect without its aid. Talleyrand immediately wrote to Armstrong a letter in which he tried to put the Emperor's com mands into a shape more diplomatic, by treating the Haytians as enemies of the human race, against whom it was right that the United States should interpose with measures of hostility : ^ — " As the seriousness of the facts which occasion this complaint obliges his Majesty to consider as good prize everything which shall enter into the part of St. Domingo occupied by the rebels, and everything coming out, he persuades himself that the government of the United States will take on its part, against this commerce at once illicit and contrary to all the principles of the law of nations, all the repressive and authoritative measures proper to put an end to it. This system of impunity and tolerance must last no longer (ne poun-ait durer davantage) ." For the third time within six months Talleyrand used the word " must " to the President of the Uni ted States. Once the President had been told that he must abandon his Spanish claims ; then that he must show no public respect for Moreau ; finally he was told still more authoritatively that he must stop a trade which France was unable to stop, and which would continue in British hands if Congress should obey Napoleon's order. Talleyrand directed 1 TaUeyrand to Arrastrong, 29 Thermidor, An xiii. (Aug. 16, 1805) ; State Papers, ii. 726. 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 91 Turreau to repeat at Washington the Emperor's re monstrance, and Turreau accordingly echoed in Madi son's ear the identical words, " must last no longer." ^ His letter, to his indignation, received no answer or notice. Thus at the moment when Congress was to meet, Dec. 2, 1805, serious problems awaited it. The con duct of Spain was hostile. At sea Spanish cruisers ca]itured American property without regard to treaty- rights ; on land Spanish armed forces made incur sions from Florida and Texas at will.^ The conduct of France was equally menacing, for Napoleon not only sustained Spain, but also pressed abrupt demands of his own such as Jeft'erson could not hear without indignation. As though Congress had not enough difficulty in dealing with these two Powers, Great Britain also took an attitude which could be properly met by no resistance short of a declaration of war. During the whole year the conduct of England changed steadily for the worse. The blockade of New York by the twcj frigates " Cambrian " and " Lcander " became intolerable, exasperating even the mercantile class, who were naturally friendly to England, and who had most to dread from a quarrel. On board the " Leander " was a young midshipman named Basil Hall, who in later years described the mode of lib' he led in this service, and whose account of the blockade, coming from a British source, was 1 Turreau to Madison, Jan. 3, 1806 ; State Papers, ii. 726. " State Papers, ii. 682-695. 92 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. less liable than any American authority to the charge of exaggeration. " Every morning at daybreak," according to his story,' " we set about arresting the progress of all the vessels we saw, flring off guns to the right and left to make every ship that was running in heave to, or wait until we had leisure to send a boat on board ' to see,' in our lingo, ' what she was made of.' I have frequently kuown a dozen, and sometimes a couple of dozen, ships lying a league or two off the port, losing their fair wind, their tide, and worse than all their market, for many hours, sometimes the whole day, before our search was completed." An informality in papers, a suspicion of French ownership, a chance expression in some private let ter found and opened in the search, insured seizure, a voyage to Halifax, detention for months, heavy costs, indefinite damage to vessel and cargo, and at best release, with no small chance of re-seizure and con demnation under some new rule before the ship could reach port. Such vexations were incident to a state of war. If the merchants of New York disliked them, the mer chants might always ask Government to resent them ; but in truth commerce found its interest in submis sion. These vexations secured neutral profits ; and on the whole the British frigates and admiralty courts created comparatively little scandal by in- 1 Fragments of Voyages and Travels, by Capt,ain Basil Hall, R. N., F. R. S., London, 1856. 1805. BETAVEEX FRANCE AND EXGLAXD. 93 justice, while they served as a protection from the piratical privateers of Spain and France. Madison, Gallatin, and the newspapers grumbled and com plained ; but the profits of neutrality soothed the offended merchant, and the blockade of New York was already a fixed practice. Had the British com manders been satisfied with a moderate exercise of their power, the United States would probably have allowed the habit of neutral blockade to grow into a belligerent right by prescription. Neither the mer cantile class nor the governnient would have risked profit or popularity on such a stake ; but fortunately the British officers steadily became more severe, and meanwhile in their practice of impressment roused extreme bitterness among the seafaring classes, who had nothing to gain by submission. In Basil Hall's words, the British officers took out of American ves sels every seaman " whom they had reason, or sup posed or said they had reason, to consider " a British subject, " or wdiose country they guessed from dialect or a]ipcarancc." By these impressments American vessels wcre often left short-handed, and were some times cast away or foundered. In such cases the owners were greatly irritated; but commonly the ex- asperati(.>n was most deeply felt by the laboring class and among the families of seafaring men. The se verity with which impressment was enforced in 1805 excited hatred toward England among people who had at best no reason to love her. More than twenty years afterward, when Basil Hall revisited 94 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 4. New York, he was not surprised to find the name of his old ship, the " Leander," still held in detes tation. Not only were the duties harsh, but, as he frankly admitted, they were harshly performed. After Pitt's return to power impressments increased until they averaged about a thousand a year. Among them were cases of intolerable outrage ; but neither President, Congress, nor people, nor even the victims themselves, cared as a body to fight in defence of their rights and liberties. Where an American-born citizen had been seized who could prove his birth, Madison on receiving the documents sent them to Monroe, who transmitted them to the British Admi ralty, which ordered an inquiry ; and if the man had not been killed in action or died of disease and hard usage, he was likely, after a year or two of service, to obtain a release. The American-born citizen was ad mitted to be no subject for impressment, and the num ber of such persons actually taken was never so large as the number of British-born sailors who were daily impressed ; but both the mercantile and the national marine of the United States were largely manned by British seamen, and could not dispense with them. According to Gallatin's calculation,^ American ton nage increased after 1803 at the rate of about seventy thousand tons a year ; and of the four thousand two hundred men required to supply this annual increase, about two thousand five hundred were British. If the British marine lost two thousand five hundred meu 1 Gallatin to Jefferson, AprU 16, 1807 ; Works, i. 335. 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 95 annually by desertion or engagement in the American service, even after recovering one thousand seamen a year by impressment, the British navy made good only a fraction of the loss. On the other hand, if the United States government went to war to protect British seamen, America would lose all her mercan tile marine ; and these same seamen for whom she was fighting must for the most part necessarily re turn to their old flag, because they would then have no other employer. The immediate result of war must strengthen the British marine by sending back to it ten thousand seamen whom America could no longer employ. Nations rarely submit to injury without a motive. If Jefferson and the Republican party, if Timothy Pickering and George Cabot, the merchants of Bos ton and New York, and even the seamen themselves, rejected the idea of war, it was because they found a greater interest in maintaining peaee. This interest consisted, as regarded England, in the large profits realized in neutral freights. So long as the Brit ish navy protected this source of American wealth, Americans said but little about impressments ; but in the summer of 1805 Pitt thought proper to ob struct this source, and suddenly the whole American seaboard, from Machias to Norfolk, burst into ex citement, and demanded that the President should do something, — they knew not what, but at moments they seemed to ask for war. The news of Sir William Scott's decision in the 96 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 4. case- of the " Essex " reached America in the month of September, while the President and Madison were discussing an alliance with England to protect them selves against France and Spain. The announcement that Great Britain had suddenly begun to seize Ameri can ships by scores at the moment when Jefferson counted most confidently on her willingness to oblige, was a blow to the Administration so severe that a long time elapsed before either Jefferson or Madison realized its violence. Their minds were intent on the Spanish problem ; and with the question of war pressing upon them from the south, they did not at once perceive that another war was actually declared against their commerce from the north. Jefferson disliked commercial disputes, and gladly shut his eyes to their meaning; Madison felt their impor tance, but was never quick to meet an emergency. Merry was near Philadelphia during the autumn, wdien Mrs. Madison's illness obliged the secretary to remain in that city. Early in September Merry wrote to his Government that the complete failure of Monroe's Spanish mission was no secret, and that Madison expected some collision with Spain in West Florida, but would wait for the meeting of Congress before taking action. " Such a determination on the part of the President," continued Merry ,^ " is so con sonant with his usual caution and temporizing sys tem (to whicii the opposition here give the character of timidity and irresolution), that I cannot but be 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Sept. 2, 1805; MSS. British Archives. 1805. BETWEEX FRANCE AXD ENGLAND. 97 disposed to give entire credit to the information." Shortly after the date of this despatch, news arrived that the British government had altered its rules in regard to the neutral carrying-trade, and that British cruisers were everywhere seizing Anierican ships. Merry, who had not been forewarned by Lord Mul grave, and who had no wish to see his own position made more uncomfortable than it already was, became uneasy. " The sensation and clamor," he wrote,' " excited by this news from England (wdiich has already caused the insurance on such cargoes to be raised to four times the usual premium) is rendered the greater by such events having been totally un expected, and by the merchants here having, on the contrary, considered themselves as perfectly secured against them." Merry saw that his Government had in the midst of peace taken a measure which Madison could hardly fail to denounce as an act of war. Dreading a violent explosion, the British min ister waited anxiously ; but, to his surprise, nothing happened. " Although I have seen Mr. Madison twice since the attention of the public has been so much engaged with this object, he has not thought proper to mention it to me." ^ At first Merry could not account for this silence ; only by degrees was he taught to connect it with the Spanish quarrel, and to understand that Madison hoped to conciUate England in order to overawe France. In this play 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Sept. 30, 1805 ; MSS. British Archives. 2 Ibid. VOL. III. — 7 98 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. of cross-purposes Merry's account of Madison's con versation was not calculated to alarm the British government : ¦" — " Before I quitted the vicinity of Philadelphia to return to this place [Washington], I had an interview with Mr. Madison, who having then received accounts from Mr. Monroe respecting the detention by his Majesty's ships of several American vessels in consequence of their being loaded with the produce of the enemy's colonies, brought forward that subject to me, — speaking upon it, however, with much more moderation than from his natural irrita bility, and tbe sensation which it had produced through out tbis country, I could have expected on his part. It is unnecessary for me to trouble your Lordship by detail ing to you the several observations which he made to me to endeavor to prove the unpropriety of the principle up on which the detention of those vessels has taken place. . . . As I had the honor to observe in the former part of this letter, the American Secretary of State delivered his sentiments on this subject with great temper, and concluded by expressing only a wish that Mr. Monroe's remonstrances upon it might prove so far efficacious as at least to procure the liberation of the vessels and cargoes which were already detained, as well as of those which might be stopped before the new system adopted by his Majesty's government in regard to the trade in question shoidd be generally known. Our conversation afterward turned upon some circumstances, the accounts of which had just been received, of the recent conduct of Spain toward tbis country, when Mr. Madison was much less reserved in expressing his sentiments than on former 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Nov. 3, 1805 ; MSS. British Archives. 1805. BETWEEX FRANCE AND EXGLAND. 99 occasions, and gave me the detail of the perfidious and jnsolent proceedings of some of the Spanish officers who still remain at New Orleans, and of others who com mand in the disputed territory, — which, combined with information he had received of the departure of four hundred troops with a quantity of military stores from the Havana, supposed to be destined to reinforce the garrisons in East and West Florida, and witb a re port which prevaUed at New Orleans of a considerable force advancing from ^Mexico toward Louisiana, could not, he observed, fail to render the differences subsist ing between the two governments still more difficult of accommodation . " This conversation took place about the middle of October, before the President had decided to acqui esce in the acts of Spain and France. As a result of thc high tone taken toward England in the winter of 1803-1804, the secretary's mildness might well surprise a British minister, who was not quick of comprehension, and rc(iuired to be told in plain lan guage the meaning of Madison's manoeuvrcs. No S(3oner had Merry returned to 'Washington than " a confidential jierson" was sent to him to explain the mystery : ' — " On this subject it has been remarlted to me by a person in a confidential situation here that the detention of the American vessels by his Majesty's ships has happened very unseasonalily to divert the attention of the people of the United States and of the Government from a proper consideration of the grievances aud injuries 1 Merry to Mulgrave, X"ov. 3, 1805 : MSS. British Archives. 100 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. which they bave experienced from Spain, and which the Government were disposed and had actually taken the measures to resent ; and he conceived that when the state of the relations between the United States and other Powers should be laid by the President before Congress at their approaching meeting, the circumstance above- mentioned, of what is considered to be so unfriendly a proceeding on the part of Great Britain, will have the same effect upon the resolutions of that body by blunting the feelings which would otherwise have been excited by the conduct of Spain, supported by France, against this country." The " confidential person " usually employed by Jefferson and Madison on such errands was either Robert or Samuel Smith ; partly because both these gentlemen were a little inclined to offioiousness, partly because they w^ere men of the world, or what Pichon called " hommes fort polls." In this instance the agent was probably the Secretary of the Navy^ In telling the British minister that the President had already taken measures to resent the conduct of Spain, this agent was unwise, not so much because the assertion was incorrect, as because Merry knew better. In the same despatch, written Nov. 3, 1805, Merry informed his Government of the President's hopes of an agreement with Spain, founded on the war in Europe, — hopes which had been entertained only ten days, since October 23. He had the best reason to be well informed on this subject, for he drew his information directly from Jefferson himself. That Merry should have been exceedingly perplexed 1805. BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. 101 was no wonder. Two years had elapsed since his first arrival in Washington, when he had been harshly treated without sufficient reason, by Presi dent, Cabinet, and Congress ; and on returning to the same place in this autumn of 1805, immediately after his Government had made war on United States commerce, he found himself received with surprising cordiality. Immediately on his return, about October 20, he called at the White House. Instead of finding the President in a passion, denouncing Pitt and the British nation, as he might reasonably have expected. Merry was delighted to find Jefferson in his most genial humor. Not a word was said about British outrages ; his conversation assumed the existence of a close concert and alliance between England and the United States : ^ — " Upon my seeing the President on my return to this place a fortnight ago, he spoke to me with great franlt- ness respecting the state of affairs between this country and Spain ; saying that it was possible that the accumu lation of the injuries which they had sustained might produce a resolution on the part of the Congress to resent them. AVith a view to the hostile situation of affairs, he lamented that unfortunately [notwithstanding] the su periority of his Majesty's naval force and the vigUance of his officers, it had not been possible to prevent the enemy's fleet from crossing the Atlantic. He said that this experience would render it necessary for the United •States to proceed with great caution and to gain time, in order to put their principal seaports in a state of defence, 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Nov. 3, 1805 ; MSS. British Archives. 102 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 4. for whicb he had already given dhections. In the event of hostilities he considered that East and West Florida, and successively the Island of Cuba, the possession of which was necessary for the defence of Louisiana and Florida, as being the key to the Gulf of Mexico, would, in the manner in which that island might and would be at tacked, be an easy conquest to them. He, however, ex pressed that his individual voice would constantly be for the preservation of peace with every Power, till it could no longer be kept without absolute dishonor." Such speculations were not so practical as to affect Merry's antipathy to the Anierican government, but he reported them to Lord Mulgrave without comment, as intended to express the President's plan in case of a Spanish war. Meanwhile the Secretary of State was engaged in composing a pamphlet, or book, to prove that the new rule adopted by Great Britain was an act of bad faith, in violation of international law. The task was not difficult. Such was the diplomatic situation at Washington, Nov. 12, 1805, when the Cabinet adopted Jefferson's plan of reopening negotiations for the purchase of Florida on the line so persistently recommended by the irresponsible creatures of Talleyrand, and so steadily rejected to that moment by Madison and Monroe. Congress was to meet in three weeks, and within that time the diplomatic chaos must be re duced to order. CHAPTER Y. Aur.usT 27, 1805, President Jefferson, writing to Madison from Monticello, said : i " Considering the character of Bonaparte, I think it material at once ti) let him see that we are not of the Powers who wdll receive his orders." In Europe, on the same day, the Emperor broke up the camp at Boulogne and set his army in motion toward Uim and Austerlitz. Sep tem! icr 4 he was at Paris, busy with the thousand details of imminent war : his armies were in niotion, his vast diplomatic and military plans were taking shape. The United States minister at Paris had little to do except to watch the course of events, when during the Emperor's absence at Boulogne he received a visit from a gentleman wdio had no official position, but who brought with him a memorandum, written in Talleyrand's hand, sketching the outlines of an arrangenient between the United States and Spain. The United States, said this paper, should send an other note to the Government at Madrid, written in a tone and manner that would awaken Spain from 1 Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 27, 1805 ; Writings, iv. 585. 104 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. her indifference. In this note the Prince of Peace should be warned of the consequences that would follow a persistence in his course, and should be en couraged to join with the United States in referring to Napoleon the matters in dispute. In case Spain would not unite in asking the good offices of France, a copy of the note must be sent by Armstrong to Talleyrand, with a request for the good offices of Napoleon. " The more you refer to the decision of the Emperor, the more sure and easy will be the settlement." If Spain, on the Emperor's representa tions, should consent to part with the Fioridas, as she no doubt would do, France would propose the follow-. ing terms : Commercial privileges in Florida as in Louisiana ; the Rio Colorado and a line northwest wardly, including the headwaters of all those rivers which fall into the Mississippi, as the western boundary of Louisiana, wdth thirty leagues on each side to remain unoccupied forever ; the claims against Spain, excluding the French spoliations, to be paid by bills on the Spanish colonies ; and, finally, ten million dollars to be paid by the United States to Spain. Armstrong rejected the conditions on the spot. They sacrificed, he said, the whole country between the Colorado and the Rio Bravo ; abandoned the claim to West Florida, the claim to damages from the violation of entrepdt at New Orleans, and the claim, estimated at six millions, for French spolia tions. They gave to Spain an accommodation for 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 105 her payments beyond what she herself required ; and they exacteil the enormous sum of ten million dollars for a barren and exjjensive province. September 4, the day of Napoleon's return to Paris, a long conversation followed. Ou both sides vig orous argunient was pressed ; but the Frenchman closed by saying : " I see where the shoe pinches. It is ' the enormous sum of ten million dollars ; ' but say seven ! Your undisputed claims on Spain amount to two aud a half or three millions. The arrangenient as thus altered would leave four for Spain. Is not this sum within the limits of mod eration ? " Armstrong replied that he had nothing to say on the money transaction, but would imme diately transmit Talleyrand's memorandum to the President. His despatch on the subject was accord ingly sent, Sept. 10, 1805.i Armstrong had little acquaintance with the per son who brought the memorandum for his sole cre dential, and knew him only as a political agent of the government, wdio rested his claim to credit not on any authority from the Emperor, but on an unsigned document in Talleyrand's handwriting. " This form of communication he said had been preferred on account of greater security ; it was a proof of the minister's habitual circumspection, and of nothing else." To most Frenchmen it might liave seemed rather an example of Talleyrand's sup- 1 Armstrong to Madison, Sept. 10, 1805 ; MSS. State De- jiartment Archives. 106 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. posed taste for jobbery, and the United States gov ernment had reason to know what was likely to be the outcome of such overtures ; but Armstrong w^as not unused to intrigue, and did not affect virtue above the comprehension of the society in wdiich he lived. A fortnight afterward the Emperor left Paris for his campaign in Germany. While Armstrong's des patch was still on its way to Washing-ton, Napoleon captured Uim, and November 18 entered Yienna. On the same day the despatch reached the United States. Jefferson's Cabinet council of November 12 had barely come to its long-disputed conclusion, and de cided to reopen the Florida negotiation as a french bargain, when Talleyrand's memorandum arrived, fixing definitely his terms. Naturally, the President supposed that Florida might thenceforward be looked upon as his own. At the next Cabinet he laid Arm strong's letter before the four secretaries ; and the re sult of their deliberation was recorded in his own hand;! — "November 19. Present the same. — Since our last meeting we have received a letter from General Arm strong containing Talleyrand's propositions, which are equivalent to ours nearly, except as to the sum, he re quiring seven million doUars. He advises that we alarm the fears of Spain by a vigorous language and conduct, in order to induce her to join us in appealing to the inter- 1 Cabinet Memoranda, Nov. 19, 1805; Jefferson MSS. ' 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 107 ference of the Emperor. We now agree to modify our propositions, so as to accommodate them to his as mucli as possible. We agree to pay flve million dollars for the Fioridas as soon as the treaty is ratifled by Spain, a vote of credit obtained from Congress, and orders delivered us for the surrender of the country. ^Ve agree to his prop osition that the Colorado shall be our western boundary, aud a belt of thirty leagues on each side of it to be kept unsettled. We agree that joint commissioners shall settle all spoliations, and to take payment from Spain by bills on her colonies. We agree to say nothing about the French spoliations in Spanish ports which broke off tbe former convention. We propose to pay the five mUlions after a simple vote of credit, by stock redeemable in three years, within which time we can pay it. AVe agree to order to the commanding officer at Natchitoches to patrol the country on this side the Sal iine and all the Red River as being in our possession, except the settlement of Baj'ou Pierre, which he is not to disturb unless they aggress ; he is to protect our citizens and repel all inva sions of the preceding country by Spanish soldiers ; to take all offenders without shedding blood, unless his orders canuot otherwise be executed." At last, after more than six months of hesitation, a Spanish policy was fixed ; and since it conceded every point which had been required by France, the President might reasonably hope that his difficulties were at an end. He did not venture to send instruc tions to Armstrong at once, because the authority of Congress was needetl before pledging the government to pay so large a sum of money ; but Congress was to meet within a few weeks, and Jefferson could 108 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. safely .assume that the instructions would not be de layed beyond the New Year. The President was greatly relieved to see the end of this annoying imbroglio ; the more, because he could no longer shut his eyes to the conduct of Great Britain. The merchants of Boston, New York, Phil adelphia, and Baltimore were frantic with rage and despair, hearing every day of new seizures, which swelled their losses to a sum then quite appaUing, and carried ruin to their fairest fortunes. The carry ing-trade was not a matter about whicii Jefferson cared to quarrel, for he held that Americans should not meddle with a commerce which did not belong to them ; yet the public anger was far stronger against England than against Spain, and although the news papers talked incessantly of a Spanish war, Jefferson soon felt that he should find great difficulty in pre serving a British peace. That he should incline to a war with Spain in alliance with England was natural ; but under no circumstances, and for no object, did Jefferson wish for war with Great Britain. From the first he had relied upon his power to coerce her by peaceable means ; and the time had come when some coercion must be applied. No one could longer doubt that Pitt meant to keep what he had taken, and that the British policy was preconcerted with deliberate purpose. When Merry next called at the State Departinent he heard nothing more al:)out the misconduct of Spain or the advantages of a powerful British navy. 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 109 " The lively sensation " produced by the seizures, wrote Alerry to Mulgrave,^ December 2, " appears to have increased considerably since I had the honor of writing to your Lordship by the last mail. The commercial bodies at Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk have held public meetings on this subject, aud come to resolutions to transmit to the Government of the United States par ticular statements of the injuries they allege to be sus taining daily in their trade. I am sorry to add that those public prints which are considered as the organs of the Government . . . have of late lost sight in a great meas ure of their complaints against Spain, with a view, as may be suspected, to excite and direct the whole national indignation against Great Britain. . . . " In addition, my Lord, to these circumstances, I have been sorry to find in my recent conversations with Mr. Madison that he has treated this subject in a much more serious light than he had at first represented it to me. At my last interview with him, two days ago, he said that he had flattered himself that Mr. Monroe's remon strances to your Lordship would not ouly have produced the liberation of all the vessels which should have been detained previously to the 1st November, but that, as that minister had been promised an answer in writing to his representations, the reconsideration of the matter which would probably have taken place before a written answer w.as given might have induced his ISIajesty's government, if not to give up entirely, at least to modify to a tolerable degree, the principle upon which they acted. It was true that the answer in question had not as yet reached him, nor had he heard lately from Mr. Monroe ; but he had recently received information from an authentic 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Dec. 2, 1805 ; MSS. British Archives. 110 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. though not an oflBcial quarter, which gave him the strongest reason to apprehend that if any reply at aU in writing should be made on the subject, it would contain nothing satisfactory." Aladison raised his tone awkwardly. Mysterious " information from an authentic quarter " was scarcely sufficient ground for so abrupt a change, but Merry failed to press him on this point. The secretary told the British minister that the government of England had committed " an act of commercial hos tility on this country, and that the citizens of the United States would have a just claim of indemnity for whatever effective losses they might sustain in consequence of it; and he feared that these would be very considerable." He hinted that measures would be taken to seek redress ; and although he did not then foreshadow these measures. Merry read two days afterward in the " National InteUigencer " the Resolutions and speech in which Madison, in the year 1794, had urged commercial restrictions as the true policy of the United States against the same British outrages. The motive of republication was plain. At about the same time Madison finished his pam phlet called " Examination of the British Doctrine," which in the course of the coming session was laid on the desk of every senator and member. The book was creditable to his literary and scholarly qualities. Clear, calm, convincing, it left the British government no excuse for its conduct; but, not without reason, 181.J. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. Ill John Randolph objected that as an argument it was but a shilling pamphlet against eight hundred British ships of war. That Pitt could occasionally be con vinced of his mistakes was certain ; but no reasoners except Napoleon and Moreau had ever effectually con vinced him. ]\Ieanwhile the President prepared his Alcssage. Of all Jefferson's writings none had a livelim- in terest than the Annual Message at the meeting of the Ninth Congress. The Second Inaugural, nine months before, prepared the public for new political opinions ; but the Message surprised even those who looked for surprises. The Second Inaugural seemed to sweep old Republican principles to the conimon rubbish-heap of out-worn piditical toys. The iles- sage went even further, and seemed to announce that the theory of foreign affairs on wdiich the Republican Administration began its career must be abandoned. Jefferson intended it to carry such a meaning. "The love of peace," he wrote to one of his old friends,' " which we sincerely feel and profess, has begun to produce an opinion in Europe that our govern ment is entirely in Quaker principles, and will turn the left cheek when the right has been smitten. This opinion must be corrected when just occasion arises, or we shall become the plunder of all nations. The moral duties make no part of the political system of those governments of Europe which are habituaUy beUigerent." 1 Jefferson to Judge Cooper, Feh. 18, 1806 ; Jefferson MSS. 112 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. The Message began by an allusion to the yellow fever ; from which it quickly turned to discuss the greater scourge of war : — " Since our last meeting the aspect of our foreign re lations has considerably changed. Our coasts have been infested aud our harbors watched by private armed ves sels ; some of them without commissions, some with il legal commissions, others with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts beyond the authority of their commissions. . . . The same system of hovering on our coasts and harbors, uncler -color of seeking enemies, has been also carried on by public armed ships, to the great annoyance and oppression of our commerce. New prin ciples, too, have been interpolated into the law of nations, founded neither in justice nor the usage or acknowledg ment of nations. . . . With Spain our negotiations for a settlement of differences have not had a satisfactory issue. . . . Propositions for adjusting amicably the boun daries of Louisiana have not been acceded to. . . . In roads have recently been made into the territories of Orleans and the Mississippi ; our citizens have been seized and their property plundered in the very parts of the former which had actually been delivered up by Spain, and tbis by the regular officers and soldiers of that gov ernment. I have therefore found it necessary at length to give orders to our troops on that frontier to be in readiness to protect our citizens and to repel by arms any similar aggressions in future. Other details necessary for your full information of the state of things between this country and that shall be the subject of another com munication. In reviewing tbese injuries from some of tbe belligerent Powers, the moderation, the firmness, and 1805. TIIE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 113 the wisdom of the Legislature wUl all be called into action. AVe ought still to hope that time, and a more correct estimate of interest as well as of character, will produce the justice we are bound to expect ; but should any nation deceive itself by false calculations, and dis appoint that expectation, we must join iu the unpro fltable contest of trying which party can do the other the most harm. Some of these injuries may perhaps admit a peaceable remedy. AVhere that is competent it is always the most desirable. But some of them are of a nature to be met by force only, and all of them may lead to it." From this preamble the public would naturally infer that measures of force were to be the object of the special message promised in regard to Spanish aggressions. As though to leave no doubt on the subject, the President urged the fortification of sea ports, the building of gun-boats, the organization of mUitia, the prohibition of the export of arms and ammunition ; and added that the materials for build ing shijis of the line were on hand. All this formality of belligerent language was little better than comedy. Jefferson could hardly be charged with a wish to deceive, since he could not wear the mask of deception. Both friends and ene mies were amused to see how naturally he betrayed objects which his plan required should be concealed. In thc first draft of the Message, sent for correction to Gallatin, the financial prospect was as pacific as the diplomatic was warlike ; the Message not only announced a surplus for the coming year, but sug- VOL. III. — 8 114 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. gested the reduction of taxes. Gallatin pointed out that the English seizures alone would affect the reve nue, and any measure of retaliation would still further diminish it; while the navy had increased its esti mates from six hundred and fifty thousand dollars to one million and seventy thousand dollars. As for the hint at a reduction of taxes, Gallatin at once struck it out.i "As it relates to foreign nations, it will certainly destroy the effect intended by other parts of the Message. They never can think us seri ous in any intentions to resist, if we recommend at the same time a diminution of our resources." The President made these corrections, and returned the draft for revisal, with a note : ^ — "On reviewing what had been prepared as to Great Britain and Spain, I found it too soft toward the for mer compared with the latter, and that so temperate a notice of the greater enormity of British invasions of right might lessen the effect which the strong language toward Spain was meant to produce at the Tuileries. I have therefore given more force to the strictures on Britain." In studying " the effect which the strong lan guage toward Spain was meant to produce at the Tuileries," Jefferson had in mind the effect which his strong language produced at the Tuileries in 1803. 1 GaUatin to Jefferson, Nov. 21, 1805 ; Gallatin's Writings, i. 261. 2 Jefferson to GaUatin, Nov. 24, 1805; Gallatin's Writings, i. 264. 1805. THE FLORIDA ^MESSAGE. 115 He played a game of finesse hardly safe in the face of men like Godoy, Talleyrand, and Napoleon, whose finesse was chiefly used to cover force, and was not betrayed or derided by factious opposition in the press. Besides being unsafe, it was unfair to himself. Jefferson was an honest man, and in putting on the outward appearance of a Talleyrand, he resembled an amateur imitating Talma and Garrick. Gestures and tones alike were unnatural, awkward, and false ; they exposed him to ridicule. If President Jeffer son had taken the public into his confidence, he would have told the people that under no circumstances would he consent to war ; but that if the great Powers of Europe combined to injure Anierica, she would close her ports, abandon her commerce, shut herself within her own continent, and let the world outside murder and rob elsewhere. Such an avowal implied no disgrace ; the policy it proclaimed was the alternative to war ; and as the radical doctrine of the Republican party, the course was not only that which Jefferson meant to take, but it was that which he took. The avowal niight have invited aggression, and have been followed by failure ; but he would have done better to fail on a direct issue of principle, than to fail after evading the issue until the issue itself was lost. To carry out his scheme, the President put forward two policies, — a public and a secret ; or, as he called it, an ostensible and a real one. The warlike recom mendations of the Annual Message were the public 116 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. and ostensible policy ; the real one was to be ex pressed in a secret message, announced in advance. To this coming message the President next turned his attention ; but he found himself quickly involved in complications of his own creating. He had not only to recommend a double series of measures to Congress, but he had to frame a double series of replies whicii Congress was to return to him. He tried at first to combine the two answers in one. After writing a secret message asking for money to buy Florida, he drafted a series of Resolutions ^ which Congress was to adopt in reply to both messages at once, and in which " the citizens of the United States, by their Senate and Representatives in Congress as sembled, do pledge their lives and fortunes " to main tain the line of the Sabine and the free navigation of the Mobile, pending negotiations, while the President should be authorized to take whatever unappropriated moneys inight lie in the Treasury in order to carry these Resolutions into effect. Clearly this would not do ; and Gallatin undertook to set the matter right. "The apparent difficulty in framing the Resolutions," he wrote to the President,^ " arises from the attempt to blend the three objects together. The same reasons whicb have induced the President to send two distinct 1 Jefferson to Gallatin: Spanish Resolutions, 1805 ; Gallatin's Writings, i. 277. 2 GaUatin to Jefferson, Deo. 3, 1805; GaUatin's Writings, i, 278. 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 117 messages render it necessary that the pubUc Resolutions of Congress should be distinct from the private ones ; that those which relate to the war posture of the Spanish affairs, which are intended to express the national sense on that subject, and to enable the President to take the steps which appear immediately necessary on the frontier, should not be mixed with those proceedings calculated only to effect an accommodation." The Secretary of the Treasury frequently corrected his chief, and still more frequently hinted a correction. Only a few days had passed since Jefferson had spoken to Gallatin of the " strong language toward Spain " as " meant to produce an effect at the Tuil eries." Gallatin ignored this object, and spoke of the strong language toward Spain as intended to ex])ress the national sense, and as restricted in its bearing to the steps immediately necessary for protecting the frontier. The difference was worth noting. Evidently Gallatin felt no great confidence in producing an effect on the Tuileries. "The course now recommended," he continued, "is precisely that which was followed in the Louisiana busi ness when the deposit was withdrawn. .A public Resolu tion . . . was moved by Randolph, aud adopted by the House. A committee in the mean while brought in a confidential report sufficient to support and ju-stify the President in the purchase he was going to attempt, aud to this au appropriation law in very general terms was added. To foUow a simUar course appears not only best, but will also, as founded on precedent, be the smoothest mode of doing the business in Cougress." 118 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. The President adopted Gallatin's suggestions.^ The double messages breathing war and peace were pre pared. The double answers were sketched out. Con gress had only to act with the same quickness and secrecy which it had shown in the Louisiana business ; and of its readiness to do so, no one in the Cabinet seemed to doubt. Yet nations could not so readily as individuals swing about on a course opposite to that which they had been led to expect. The American public had been wrought to anger against Spain. Of the nego tiations little was publicly known. Monroe had come, and gone ; the Marquis Yrujo had remonstrated, and had written in newspapers ; but the rights and wrongs of the Spanish dispute remained a mystery to the public at large, which knew only that Spain had re jected all the offers made by the United States, had resumed her depredations on American commerce, and had taken a menacing attitude at Mobile and on the Sabine. Throughout the year the Republican press had followed hints from the Government at Washington, all looking toward a rupture with Spain. The same newspapers had shown at first a wish to make light of the late British seizures, — a course which misled the Federalist press into denunciations of England such as would never have been risked had the party in power not seemed disposed to apolo gize for England's conduct. The country at large 1 Jefferson to Gallatin, Dec. 4, 1805; Gallatin's Writings, i. 281. 1800. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 119 was prepared to hear the President advise a rupture A\itli Spain, and upon that rupture to found his hope of success in negotiating with Pitt. The warlike tone of the Annual Message was certain to give additional strength to this expectation ; and Jefferson might have foreseen that the sudden secret change of tone to be taken immediately afterward in the special message on Spanish affairs would produce bewilder ment among his followers. No one could doubt where the confusion would first appear. The last session had ended in a scries of quarrels, in which party distinctions had been almost forgotten. The summer had done nothing to reunite the factions ; on the contrary, it had done much to widen the breach. Already the "Aurora" announced that the Yazoo question was to determine " the rela tions, the principles, the characters, and the strength of parties in the next session of Congress ; " and the public knew that the Yazoo question had passed beyond the stage of rational argument, and had be come the test of personal devotion, the stepping-stone to favor or proscription with the next President. Three years before the election of 1808 Congress was already torn by a Virginia feud, — a struggle for power between John Randolph and James Madison. As though to hurry and prolong this struggle, Jef ferson announced, after his second inauguration, that he should retire at the close of his term, March 4, 1800. Without expressly recommending Madison as his successor, his strong personal attachment insured 120 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. to the Secretary of State the whole weight of Ex ecutive influence. The whole weight was needed. The secretary, with all his amiable qualities, was very far from controlling the voice of Virginia. His strength lay rather among the Northern deinocrats, semi-Federalists, or " Yazoo men," as they were called, who leaned toward him because he, of all the prominent Virginians, was least Virginian. His dip lomatic triumph in buying Louisiana had given him an easy advantage over his rivals ; but even his reputa tion niight sink with the failure of the Spanish treaty and the aggression of England. No one who knew the men, or who had followed the course of President Jefferson's first Administration, could feel surprise that Madison's character should act on John Randolph as an irritant. Madison was cautious, if not timid ; Randolph was always in ex tremes. Madison was apt to be on both sides of the same question, as when he wrote the "Federalist" and the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 ; Randolph pardoned dalliance with Federalism in no one but himself. Madison was in person small, retiring, modest, with quiet malice in his humor, and with niarked taste for closet politics and delicate man agement; Randolph was tall in stature, abrupt in manner, self-asserting in temper, sarcastic, with a pronounced taste for publicity, and a vehement con tempt for those silent influences whicii more practical politicians called legitimate and necessary, but which Randolph, when he could not control them, called 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 121 corrupt. Jefferson soon remarked, in regard to what Randolph denounced as back-stairs influence, " We never heard this while the declaimer was himself a back-stairs man." ^ Just as the criticism was, no one could deny that Randolph seemed much out of place on the back-stairs of the White House, where as Madison seemed to him in place nowhere else. The Spanish papers, which Randolph must read, were not likely to increase his respect for the Secre tary of State ; while Madison's candidacy made a counter-movement necessary for those Virginians wdio would not be dragged at the heels of the North ern democracy. Long before the month of December Randolph foresaw the coming trouble. The Yazoo men in the Ninth Congress Avere more numerous than ever ; and they were credited with the wish to eject Speaker JIacon from the chair, and to put some Northern democrat in Randolph's place at the head of the Committee of Ways and Means. Oct. 25, 1805, Randolph wrote to Gallatin from Bizarre : — " I look forward to the ensuing session of Congress with no very pleasant feelings. To say nothing of the disadvantages of the place, natural as well as acquired, I anticipate a plentiful harvest of bickering and blun ders ; of whicb, liowever, I hope to be a quiet, if not au unconcerned, spectator. ... I regret exceedingly Mr. Jefferson's resolution to retire, and almost as much the premature annunciation of that determination. It 1 Jefferson to BidweU, July 5, 1800; Writings, v. 14. 122 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. almost precludes a revision of his purpose, to say noth ing of the intrigues which it will set on foot. If I were sure that Monroe would succeed him, my regret would be very much diminished." ^ Intrigue and dissension could not be confined to the House, but must spread to the Senate, and could hardly fail to affect eveu the Cabinet. While Gal latin's personal sympathies were with Madison, his political bias was on the opposite side. The old Republicans, with John Randolph at their head, had steadily protected the Treasury from jobs and extrav agance ; without their help GaUatin would lie at the mercy of the Northern democrats, who were not be hind the Federalists in their willingness to spend money. He might expect an alliance between the Northern democrats and the Smith faction which controlled the Navy Department. To such a com bination he must have foreseen that Madison would yield. In the face of such latent feuds nothing could be more hazardous than to spring upon Congress, in Madison's interests, a new, tortuous, complicated Spanish policy, turning on the secret assurance that France could be bribed with five million dollars, at the moment when Congress would be required to begin a commercial w^ar upon England. Whether Madison was responsible for these measures or not, his enemies would charge him with the responsibility ; and even without such attacks from his own party, he 1 Adams's Randolph, p. 161. 1806. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 123 was struggling with enemies enough to have crushed Jefferson himself. Early in December, all the actors in the drama assembled, to play another act in a tragi-comedy of increasing interest. With his old sanguine hopes, but not with all his old self-confidence, the President watched them slowly arrive, — Democrats, Federalists, S(jutliern Republicans, all equally ignorant of what had been done, and what they were expected to do ; but more curious, better-informed, and more sharp- sighted than these, the three diplomatists, Turreau, Merry, and Yrujo, waiting with undisguised contempt to see wdiat species of coercion was to be employed against England, France, and Spain. To impose on hostile forces and interests the com pulsion of a single will was the task and triumph of the true politician, which had been accomplished, under difficult conditions, by men of opposite char acters. A political leader might be combative and desjiotic, or pliant and conciliatory. The method mattered little, provided it obtained success, — but success depended more on character than on manoeu vres. In the winter of 1805-1806 President Jefferson dealt with a problem such as few Americans have been required to solve. Other Presidents have met with violent opposition both within and without the ranks of their party ; but no other President has been obliged to face a hostile minority, together with vio lent factiousness in the majority, and at the same time a spirit of aggression showing itself in acts of 124 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 5. war from three of the greatest Powers of Europe. By what resources of skill or character President Jefferson was to restrain this disorder from becoming chaos, only a prophet could foretell. If ever the Fed eralist " crisis " seemed close at hand, it was in De cember, 1805. Some energetic impulse could alone save the country from drifting into faction at home and violence abroad. All might go well if England, France, and Spain could be obliged to respect law. To restrain these three governments was Jefferson's most urgent need. The three envoys w^aited to see what act of energy he would devise to break through the net which had been drawn about him. Turreau enjoyed most of his confi dence ; and soon after the meeting of Congress, at the time when Jefferson was publicly using " strong lan guage toward Spain," meant to produce an effect at the Tuileries, Turreau wrote interesting^ accounts of his private conversation for the guidance of Talley rand and Napoleon : ^ — " One may perhaps draw some inferences in regard to the true sense of the Message from some v/ords which escaped the President in a private conversation with me. ' I see with pain,' he said, ' that our people have a ten dency toward commerce which no other kind of interest will be able to balance ; we should be essentially agri cultural, and yet agriculture will never be more than a secondary interest here.' ... In a preceding inter- 1 Turreau to TaUeyrand, Jan. 20, 1806; Archives des Aff. ttr., MSS. 1805. THE FLORIDA MESSAGE. 125 view the President invited me to a discussion of Spauish affairs. . . . After some complaints about Spanish pri vateers, and the protection which Spain granted to ours in iiarticnlar, Mr. Jefferson expanded on the griefs of the Americans in regard to some excursions of Spanish pa trols beyond the limits provisionaUy established, and, in consequence, within the territory of Louisiana. I replied that doubtless the Spanish government had not authorized these steps, and that the mistakes of a few subalterns could not produce serious differences between the two Powers. ' That is true ; but,' he added, ' these Span iards are so stupid (b&tes), their government so detested,' etc. It was not easy to contradict him on this point. As for the English, his complaints and reproaches have been much more serious. He has assured me that they have taken five hundred American ships ; that tbey could not have done more harm had they been at war with America ; yet that Ihigland would iu vaiu try, as against the Amer icans, to destroy neutral rights. ' In that respect,' added Mr. Jefferson, ' we have principles from which we shall never depart ; our people have commerce everywhere, and everywhere our neutrality should be respected. On the other hand, we do not want war, — and all this is very embarrassing.' " Turreau's comment on these words may have affected the policy of Napoleon, as it must certainly have had weight with TaUeyrand : — " If your ExceUency was not already acquainted with the mau aud his government, this last phrase would be enough to enable you to judge the one and the other." CHAPTER VI. The Ninth Congress met Dec. 2, 1805. During no period of eight years did Congress contain a smaller number of remarkable members than during the two administrations of Jefferson, from 1801 to 1809 ; and if the few Federalists in opposition were left out of view, the American people had in the Ninth Con gress hardly a single representative, except John Randolph, capable of controlling any vote but his own. In the Senate, when George Clinton took his seat as Vice-President, he saw before him, aniong the thirty-four senators, not less than twenty-seven who belonged to his own party ; yet among these twenty- seven Republican members of the Senate was not one whose name lived. Senator Bradley of Vermont exer cised a certain influence in his day, like Dr. Mitchill of New York, or Samuel Smith of Maryland, or William B. Giles of Virginia, or Abraham Baldwin and James Jaekson of Georgia. These were the leaders of the Senate, but they were men whose influence was due more to their office than to their genius ; the Govern ment gave them more weight than they could give back to it. Breckenridge of Kentucky had become 1805. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 127 attorney-general, and his seat was fiUed by John Adair. In the whole Senate not a Republican mem ber could be found competent to defend a difficult financial or diplomatic measure as Gallatin or iladi- son could have done it, or would have wished it to be done. In the House the Administration could count upon equally little aid. Setting aside John Randolph and Joseph Nicholson, who were more dangerous than any Federalist of New England to Government, the huge Republican majority contained no man of note. Its poverty was startling. Gallatin clung to Randoliih as the only member of the House competent to conduct the public business ; and no small part of Randolph's arrogance toward his own followers was due to his sense of intellectual superiority, and to the constant proof that they could do no business without his aid. Randolph was rarely arrogant in the face of men whose abilities were superior to his own, or whose will was stronger ; he domineered over those whom he thought his inferiors, but he liked no contest in which he saw an uncertain hope of victory. In the Ninth Congress he met no rival in his own party. Massa chusetts sent a new meinber, from whose oratory much was expected, — a certain Barnabas BidweU; " but as a popular speaker he never can stand as the rival of John Randolph," was the comment of a Mas sachusetts senator on listening to him in the House.^ Sow York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania were repre- ' Diary of J. Q. Adanis (March 8, 1806), i. 419. 128 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. o. sented by an almost solid mass of Democrats, without a single leader. Virginia and the other Southern States sent many men of excellent character and of the best social position to Washington, but not one who made a national name or who tried to master the details of public business. Perhaps the ablest new member was Josiah Quincy of Boston, whose posi tive temper, marked abilities, and vehement Feder alism made him troublesome to the majority rather than useful in legislation. When the House met, it proceeded at once to the election of a Speaker ; and the old feuds of the last session broke out again. Fifty-four votes were re quired to elect ; and on the first ballot Macon had but fifty-one. Twenty-seven Republicans voted for Joseph B. Varnum of Massachusetts, besides others who threw away their votes on candidates from Vir ginia and Pennsylvania. Only at the third ballot did Macon get a majority, and even then he received but fifty-eight votes, while the full strength of his party was more than one hundred. His first act was to reappoint Randolph and Nicholson on the Ways and Means Committee, where a place was also given to Josiah Quincy. The President's Message was read December 3, and produced the effect to be expected. The coun try received it with applause as a proof of vigor. In Baltimore, and along the seaboard, it was regarded as equivalent to a declaration of war against Spain; it stopped trade, raised insurance, and encouraged 1805. THE TWO-JIILLION ACT. 129 piracy. The Federalist press throughout the country, except the " Evening Post," affected to admire and praise it. " Federalism revived ! " said the bitter " Washington Federalist ; " " dignified, firm, and spirited." " This day we have ))een astonished," wrote a correspondent to the " Boston Centinel ; " ^ "the President's speech is, in principle, almost wholly on the Washington and Adams systeni. It has puzzled the Federalists and offended many of the Democrats. It is in perfect nonconformity to all the former professions of the party." The Federalists exaggerated their applause in order to irritate John Randolph and his friends, who could not fail to see that the Message strengthened Madison at the expense of the old Republicans. Jefferson's private language was not less energetic than his public mes sage. Aniong the favorite ideas which the President urged was that of claiming for America the ocean as far as the Gulf Stream, and forbidding hostilities within the line of deep-sea soundings.^ One of the Massachusetts senators to whom he argued this doc trine inquired whether it might not be well, before assuming a claim so broad, to wait for a time when thc Government should have a force to maintain it. The President replied by insisting that the Govern ment, " should squint at it ; " ^ and he lost no chance of doing so. He assured his friends that no privateer 1 Celumbian Centinel, Dec. 21, 1S05. 2 Cabinet Memoranda, July 5, 1805; Jefferson MSS. « Diary of J. Q. Adams (Xov. 30, 18ti5), i. 376. VOL. III. — 9 130 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6. would ever again be permitted to cruise within the Gulf Stream.^ Such an attitude, public and private, roused much interest. Congress waited anxiously for the promised special message on Spanish affairs, and did not wait long. December 6, only three days after the Annual Message was sent in, the special and secret message followed ; the House closed its doors, and the mem bers listened eagerly to a communication which they expected to be, what it actually was, a turning-point in their politics. The Message ^ very briefly narrated the story of the unratified claims convention, ending in Monroe's dip lomatic misfortunes, and announced that the Span iards showed every intention of advancing from Texas, until they should be repressed by force. " Considering that Congress alone is constitutionally invested with the power of changing our condition from peace to war, I have thought it my duty to await their authority for using force in any degree which could he avoided. I have barely instructed the officers stationed in the neighborhood of the aggressions to protect our citizens from violence, to patrol within the borders actuaUy delivered to us, and not to go out of them but when necessary to repel an inroad or to rescue a citizen or his property." Passing next to the conduct of Napoleon, the Mes sage mentioned the decided part taken by France 1 Jefferson to Monroe, May 4, 1806; Writings, v. 9. 2 State Papers, n. 613. 1805. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 131 against the United States on every point of the Span ish dispute, — " her silence as to the Western boundary leaving us to infer her opinion might be against Spain iu that quarter. "Whatever direction she might mean to give to these differences, it does not appear that she has con templated their proceeding to actual rupture, or that .at the date of our last advices from Paris her Government had any suspicion of the hostUe attitude Spain had taken here. On the contrary, we have reason to believe that she was disposed to effect a settlement on a plan analo gous to what our ministers had proposed, and so com prehensive as to remove as far as possible the grounds of future collision ancl controversy on the eastern as well as western side of the Mississippi. The present crisis iu Europe is f.avorable for pressing such a settlement, and not a moment should be lost in availing ourselves of it. Should it pass unimproved, our situation would become much more difflcult. Formal war is not necessaiy, it is not probable it will follow ; but the protection of our citizens, the spirit and honor of our country, require that force should be interposed to a certain degree. It will probably contribute to advance the object of peace. But the course to be pursued will require the command of means which it belongs to Congress exclusively to yield or to deny. To them I communicate every fact material for then' information, and the documents necessary to enable them to judge for themselves. To their wisdom, then, I look for the course I am to pursue, and will pur sue with sincere zeal that which they shall approve." After the reading of this Message the House was more perplexed than ever. The few Federalists 132 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.c. sneered. The warlike tone of the Annual Message, contradicting their theory of Jefferson's character, had already ended, as they believed, in surrender. John Randolph was angry. He felt that the President had assumed, for Madison's political profit, the tone of public bravado toward England and Spain, while Congress was required to overrule Madison's bold policy and to impose on the country what would seem a crouching cowardice of its own. The Message was at onee referred to a special committee of seven mem bers, with Randolph at its head, his friend Nich olson second in the number, John Cotton Smith, a \dgorous Federalist, coming third ; while, whether the Speaker intended it or not, the only person in the comniittee on whom the President could depend for useful service was Barnabas BidweU, the new member from Massachusetts. Bidwell's conversion from Federalism was but recent, and neither his Federalism nor his democracy was of a kind that Randolph loved. To this point the Louisiana precedent was closely followed, and Randolph seemed to have no excuse for refusing to do in 1805 what he had done in 1802 ; yet nothing could be surer than that the Randolph of 1805 was a very different man from the Randolph of three years before, as the Republi can party of 1805 widely differed from the party which first elected Jefferson to the Presidency. No double-dealing, hesitation, or concealment was charged against Randolph. According to his own 1805. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 133 story, he called upon the President immediately, and learned, not without some surprise, that an appro priation of two millions was wanted to purchase Florida. He told the President wdthout reserve "that he would never agree to such a measure, because the money had not been asked for in the Message ; that he could not consent to shift upon his own shoulders or those of the House the proper re sponsibility of the Executive ; but that even if the money had been explicitly demanded, he should have been averse to granting it, because, after the total failure of every attemjit at negotiation, such a step would disgrace us forever," — with much more to the same effect, which was mildly combated by Jefferson. 1 The next day, December 7, the committee met, and Randolph, as he probably expected, found that BidweU alone intended to support the Administration. Bid- well did not venture to act as the direct mouthpiece of the President, but undertook on his own authority to construe the Message as a demand for money, and proposed a grant to that effect. The rest of the com mittee gravely followed Randolph in professing to find no such meaning in the Message ; Bidwell's mo tion had no supporter, and was promptly overruled. Jefferson's labored Resolutions, which Nicholson car ried in his pocket for the committee to adopt, were suppressed ; Nicholson returned them the next day 1 First Ijetter of Decius, in the " Richmond Enquirer," August, 1806. 134 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. o. to GaUatin, with a brief expression of his own decided disapproval.^ Thc committee separated, not to meet again for a fortnight; but during the foUowing week Randolph had several interviews with the President and Secre tary of State. Madison told him " that France would not permit Spain to adjust her differences with us ; that France wanted money, and that we must give it to her, or have a Spanish and French war."^ If Madison said this he told the truth. Randolph made an unfair use of the confidential words ; for he pro claimed them as his excuse for declaring a public and personal war on the Secretary of State, which he waged thenceforward in a temper and by means so revolting as in the end to throw the sympathies of every unprejudiced man on the side of his victim. " From the moment I heard that declaration," said Randolph afterward, " all the objections I originally had to the procedure were aggravated to the highest possible degree. I considered it a base prostration of the national character to excite one nation by money to bully another nation out of its property ; and from that moment, and to tbe last moment of my life, my confidence in the prin ciples of the man entertaining those sentiments died, never to live again." These words would have carried more conviction had Randolph's quarrel with Madison not been of 1 Nicholson to Gallatin, Dec. 8, 1805 ; Gallatin MSS. ^ Decius, No. 1 ; Randolph's speech of April 5, 1806 ; Annals of Congress, 1805-1806, pp. 984-985. 1805. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 135 much older date. In truth he wanted a means to Ijreak down the secretary's chance of election as President, and he thought to find it here. As he said openly in Congress and in the press, " his confidence in tlie Secretary of State had never been very high, but now it was gone forever." i The serious charge against Madison was one which Madison alone could reveal. Down to October 23 he had held Randolph's view and had ])rotested against turning the Spanish negotiation into a French job. He could hardly blame Randolph for adhering to an opinion which had been held by President and Cabinet until within a few weeks, when they had abandoned it without explanation or excuse. Stubbornly refusing to act, Randolph, December 14, mounted his horse and rode to Baltimore, leaving the President for the moment helpless. E\ery hour's delay shook party discipline, and imperilled Arm strong's success. The President appealed to Nichol son ; but Nicholson also disliked the intended policy, and could be persuaded to use his influence only so far as would enable the committee to act, with the undi'istanding that its action would be adverse to the President's wishes. Although the situation was still secret, it threatened to become scandalous, and soon became so altogether. December 21 Randolph returned. As he dis- imninted at the Capitol, he was received by Nicholson, who told him of the irritation which his delay had 1 Decius, No. 1. 136 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6 caused. The committee was instantly called together. As Randolph went to the committee-room he was met by Gallatin, who put into his hands a paper headed, " Pro^dsion for the purchase of Florida." Although Gallatin's relations with Randolph were friendly, they did not save the Secretary of the Treasury from a sharp rebuff. Randolph broke out roughly : he would not vote a shilling for the purchase of Florida ; the President should not be allowed to throw upon Con gress the odium " of delivering the public purse to the first cut-throat that demanded it ; " on the record the Executive would appear as recommending manly and vigorous measures, while Congress would appear as having forced him to abandon them, when ¦ in fact it was acting all the while at Executive instigation ; " I do not understand this double set of opinions and principles, — the one ostensible, the other real: I hold true wisdom and cunning to be utterly incom patible." With this sweeping censure of President, Cabinet, and party, Randolph turned his back on Gallatin and walked to the committee-room. There he had no trouble in carrying matters with a high hand. Instead of recommending an appropriation, the committee instructed Randolph to write to the Secretary of War asking his opinion what force was needed to protect the Southern frontier. Christmas was then at hand, and not a step had yet been taken. Unless the spirit of faction could be crushed, not only was the fato of Madison sealed, but the career of Jefferson himself must end in 1805. TIIE TWO-MILLION ACT. 137 failure. Nothing could be done with Randolph, who in a final interview at the White House, flatly de clared " that he too had a character to support and principles to maintain," and avowed his determined ojiposition to the whole scheme of buying Florida of France. Jefferson, little as he liked to quarrel, ac cepted the challenge. Negotiations then ceased, and a party schism began. If Randolph could not be overcome in del)ate, he might at least be overborne by numbers ; if the best part of the old Republican party went with hini, the rank and file of Northern and Western democrats would remain to support the Administration. Once more the committee was called together. BidweU moved to appropriate tw^o millions for foreign rela tions ; the majority rejected his motion and adopted a report echoing the warlike tone of the President's public message, and closing with a Resolution to raise troops for the defence of the Southern frontier " from Spanish inroad and insult, and to chastise the same." This report w^as laid before the House by Randolph Jan. 3, 1806, when two additional Resolutions were immediately nioved, — one appropriating money for extraordinary expenses in foreign intercourse, the other continuing the Mediterranean Fund for a new term of years ; and the three Resolutions wcre referred to thc House in Comniittee of the Whole, with closed docu's. Monday, Jan. 6, 1806, the debate began ; and throuuliout the following week the House sat in secret 138 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6. session, while Randolph strained every nerve to break the phalanx of democrats whicii threatened to over whelm him. Perpetually on the floor, he declaimed against the proposed negotiation at Paris ; while Nicholson, unwillingly consenting to vote for the two millions, said openly that he hoped in God the ne gotiation would fail. When at length a vote could be reached, the Administration carried its point, — seventy-two members supporting the President, against a minority of fifty-eight ; but in this minority was included no small number of the most respectable Republicans. Twelve of the twenty-two Virginia members broke away from the President ; and for the first time in a struggle vital to Jefferson's credit, more than half the majority consisted of Northern men. The House having recovered control of the matter, thrust Randolph aside, rapidly passed a Bill appropri ating two million dollars for extraordinary expenses in foreign relations, and Jan. 16, 1806, sent it to the Senate by a vote of seventy-six to fifty-four. It was accompanied by a secret message explaining that the money was intended for the purchase of Spanish territory east of the Mississippi. The Senate closed its doors, and with the least possible debate, Feb. 7, 1806, passed the bill, which, February 13, received the President's approval. Not until March 13,^ six months after Armstrong's despatch had been 1 Madison to Armstrong and Bowdoin, March 13, 1806 ; State Papers, ui. 539. 1805. TIIE TWO-MILLION ACT. 139 written, did Madison at length send to Paris a public authority for Armstrong to offer France five million dollars for Florida and Texas to the Colorado, — an authority which should have been secret and }irompt, to be worth sending at all. Jefferson carried his point ; he won a victory over Randolph, and silenced open resistance within the party ; but his success was gained at a cost hither to unknown in his experience. The men who were most oliedient in public to his will growled in pri vate almost as fiercely as Randolph himself. Senator Bradley made no secret of his disgust. Senator An derson of Tennessee frankly said that he wished the Devil had the BiU ; that the opposition did not half know how bad it was ; that it was the most pernicious measure Jefferson had ever taken ; " but so it was, so he would have it, and so it must be ! " ¦* Three Republican Senators — Bradley, Logan, and ilitchill — absent(3d themselves at the final vote ; four more — Adair, Gilman, Stone, and Suniter — voted against the Bill, which on its third reading obtained only seven teen voices in its favor against eleven in opjiosition. Worse than this, the malcontents felt that for the first time in the history of their party the whip of Executive power had been snapped over their heads; and, worst of all, the New England Federalists took for granted that Jefferson had beconie a creature of Napoleon. Of all political ideas that could gain a lodgment in the public mind, this last was the most fatal ! 1 Diary of J. Q. Adams (Feb. 8, 1806), i. 405. 140 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6. That either Jefferson or Madison was led by French sympathies has been shown to be untrue. Both of them submitted to the violence of all the belligerents alike, and their eagerness for Florida caused them by turns to flatter and to threaten Spain, France, and England ; but not even for the sake of Florida would they have taken either a direct or an indirect part with France. Their unwillingness to offend Napoleon -rose not from sympathy with him, but from the conviction that he alone could give Florida to the United States without the expense and losses inevitable in a war. Unhappily the public knew little of what President Jefferson had done or was doing; and another piece of legislation, carried through Congress at the same moment with the " Two-million Act," went far to fix the Federalists in their belief that the Administration obeyed the beck and call of the French Emperor. The Annual Message made no allusion to St. Do mingo ; no public announcement had been given that the Executive wished for further legislation in regard to its trade, when, Dec. 18, 1805, Senator Logan of Pennsylvania brought forward a Bill to prohibit the trade altogether. That he acted without concert with Madison was not to be conceived. Logan privately ad mitted as his only object the wish of enabling Madison to tell the French government that the trade was for bidden, and that the merchants who carried it on did so at their own peril.^ The Federalist senators op posed the Bill, and were joined by several Republi- 1 Diary of J. Q. Adams (Jan. 15, 1806), i. 383. 1806. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 141 cans. General Smith and Dr. Mitchill spoke against it. The opposition showed that the measure would sacrifice several hundred thousand dollars of revenue ; that it would close the last opening wdiich the new British policy left for American commerce with the West Indies ; that it would throw the coinmerce with St. Domingo wholly into British hands ; that it was an attenipt to carry out French objects Ijy American legislation, which would endanger the property and lives of American citizens in the island ; and finally, that it was dime in obedience to Napoleon's orders. Decemlier 27 the Senate called for the diplomatic cor respondence on the subject, and the President commu nicated the extraordinary notes in which Talleyrand and Turreau declared that the commerce " must" not continue. The Senate received this mandate without protest or remonstrance ; and after a long debate passed the Bill, Feb. 20, 1806, by a party vote of twenty-one to eight. Of the twenty-seven Republican senators. Stone of North Carolina alone voted against it. Amid execrations against the Haytian negroes, the Bill was next forced through the House almost without debate, and Feb. 28, 1806, received the Presi dent's signature. This law,i limited to one year, declared that any .Viiicrican vessel " which shaU be voluntarily carried, or shaU be destined to proceed" to St. Domingo should be whoUy forfeited, ship and cargo. Passed 1 Act of Feb. 28, 1806; Annals of Congress, 1805-1806, p. 1228. 142 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 6. in consequence of Napoleon's positive order, commu nicated by the President to Congress as though to overawe objection, the Act violated the principles of international law, sacrificed the interests of Northern commerce, strained the powers of the Constitution as formerly construed hy the party of State-rights, and, taken in all its relations, might claim distinction among the most disgraceful statutes ever enacted by the United States government. Nevertheless, this measure, which bore on its face the birth-mark of Na poleonic features, did in fact owe its existence chiefly to a different parentage. In truth, the Southern States dreaded the rebel negroes of Hayti more than they feared Napoleon. Fear often made them blind to their own attitudes ; in this instance it made them indifferent to the charge of servility to France. The opportunity to declare the negroes of Hayti enemies of the human race was too tempting to be rejected ; and not only did the Southern Republicans eagerly seize it, but they persuaded their Northern allies to support them. John Randolph himself, though then wearying the House day after day with cries that Madison had sold the honor of the United States to France, never alluded to this act of subservience, which would have made any other Administration in famous, and quietly absented himself at the vote, that he might seem neither to obey Bonaparte's mandate nor to oppose the Bill. Of the twenty-six voices against it, nearly all were Federalists ; yet in this curious list, side by side with Josiah Quincy, Samuel 1806. THE TWO-MILLION ACT. 143 Dana, and John Cotton Smith, stood the names of Jacob Crowninshield and Matthew Lyon, democrats of the deepest dye and objects of John Randolph's bitterest sneers. The " Two-mUlion Act " and the Act forbidding commerce with St. Domingo were measures equally necessary for the success of the Florida purchase. Without conciliating Napoleon at St. Domingo, Jef ferson could not expect his help at Paris. These measures, together with some appearance of military activity, completed the Executive scheme of foreign policy in regard to France and Spain ; the more dif ficult task remained of dealing with England. When the first news of Sir William Scott's decision in the case of the " Essex " arrived in America, the merchants were indignant ; and their anger steadily rose as the confiscation of American ships became more general, until at length, in December, 1805, Stephen's pamphlet, " War in Disguise," arrived, and was reprinted in the newspapers. By the close of the year 1805 no one could longer doubt that Great Britain had, so far as suited her purposes, declared war against the United States. The issue was simple. The United States might make war in return, or submit. Any measure short of open hostilities had unquestionably been taken into Pitt's account, and would produce no effect on his policy. War alone could move him from his pur pose ; but war would destroy Anierican commerce and .ruin Federalist resources, wdiile any retaliation 144 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6. short of war would not only prove ineffective, but would injure the American merchants alone. Their dilemma was so unavoidable that they could not fail to be caught in it. George Cabot saw their danger from the first. Much against his will the merchants of Boston placed him upon a committee to draw a remonstrance to Congress against the British doctrine of neutral trade. " Our friend Cabot," wrote Fisher Ames,^ " is much, too much, mortified that he is one of them. He hates hypocrisy, and respects princi ples ; and he dreads lest the popular feeling should impel the committee to deny what he believes to be true, or to ask for what he knows to be mischiev ous." The Boston " Memorial," ^ drawn by James Lloyd, was as cautious as popular feeling would tol erate, and asked no action from Government except the appointment of a special mission to strengthen the hands of Monroe at London ; but Cabot signed it with extreme reluctance, and only with the under standing that it did not represent his personal views. The Philadelphia " Memorial " closed with stronger language, suggesting that war must be the result if Great Britain refused redress. The Baltimore " Memorial," drawn by William Pinkney, spoke in strong tones, but offered no advice. Toward the mid dle of January, 1806, these memorials, together with 1 Ames to Pickering; Ames's Works, i. 342. Cf. Lodge's Cabot, p. 315. " Boston Memorial; Annals of Congre.ss, 1806-1809, Appen dix, p. 890. 1806. TIIE TWO-MILLION ACT. 145 others, were sent to Congress by the President, with a Message inviting the Legislature to take the inatter in hand, but offering no opinion as to the proper course to pursue.^ The fears of George Cabot were quickly justified. He chiefly dreaded the theories of the Republican party, which in his opinion were more destructive to American commerce than the British doctrines them selves or the demands of Janies Stephen. Jefferson and Madison were bent on testing the theory of the first Inaugural Address, — that commerce was the handmaid of agriculture ; but in the harshest applica tion of the slave-code of South Carolina or Georgia such treatment as agriculture proposed to her hand maid would have been rejected as inhuman, for it was a slow torture. The theory of peaceable coercion, on which Jeffer son relied, had often been explained as a duel in which either side counted ui)on exhausting its oppo nent liy injuring itself. As Madison once said of the British manufacturers : " There are three hun dred thousand souls who live by our custom : let them lie driven to poverty and despair, and what will be the consequence ? " The question was more easily asked than answered, for in the actual con dition of Europe economical laws were so violently disturbed that no man could venture to guess what fresh extravagance might result from new delirium ; but while the three hundred thousand Englishmen ' Message of Jan. 17, 1806; State Papers, ii. 727. VOL. III. — 10 146 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.6. were starving, three hundred thousand Americans would lose the profit on their crops, and would idly look at empty warehouses and rotting ships. Eng lish laborers had for many generations been obliged to submit to occasional suffering ; Americans were untrained to submission. Granting that the Boston merchant, like the injured Brahmin, shoidd seat him self at the door of the British offender, and slowly fast to death in order that his blood might stain the conscience of Pitt, he could not be certain that Pitt's conscience would be stimulated by the sacrifice, for the conscience of British Tories as regarded the United States had been ever languid. Cabot saw no real alternative between submission to Great Britain and the entire sacrifice of American commerce. He preferred submission. The subject in all its bearings quickly came before Congress. Jan. 15, 1806, the Senate referred to a special committee that part of the President's Mes sage which related to the British seizures. February 5, General Smith reported on behalf of the commit tee a series of Resolutions denouncing these seizures as an encroachment on national independence, and recommending the prohibition of British woollens, linens, silks, glass-wares, and a long list of other articles. On this Resolution the debate began, and soon waxed hot. CHAPTER YII. Nothing in Jefferson's life was stranger to modern ideas of politics than the secrecy which as President he succeeded in preserving. For two months the })eoplc of the United States saw their representatives go day after day into secret session, but heard not a whisper of what passed in conclave. Angry as Randolph was, and eager as the Federalists were to make mischief, they revealed not even to the senators or the foreign ministers wdiat was passing in the House ; and the public at large, under their democratic government, knew no more than Frenchmen of their destinies of war and peaee. Such a state of things was contrary to the best traditions of the Republican party : it could not last, but it could end only in explosion. ' ^ When the debate on Smith's non-importation Reso lutions began in the Senate February 12, the previous struggle which had taken plac^ over the Spanish policy and the " Two-million Act " was'-^till a secret ; Randolph's schism was uplyiowti beyond the walls of the Capitol ; th'e^ Pr^dent's scheme of buying West Florida frpm^France after having, as he maintained, bought it bnce already, was kept, as he wished, un told. The world knew only that some mysterious 148 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. business was afoot ; and when Senator Samuel Smith's attack on trade began, the public naturally supposed it to be in some way connected with the measures so long discussed in secret session. The President's attitude became more and more uneasy. Jefferson disliked and dreaded the point in dispute with England. The Spanish policy was his own creation, and he looked upon it with such regard as men commonly bestow upon unappreciated inven tions, — he depended on its success to retrieve defeats elsewhere ; but for the very reason that he exhausted his personal influence to carry the Spanish policy against opposition, he left British questions to Con gress and his party. Where England was to be dealt with, Madison took the lead which Jefferson declined. For many years past Madison had been regarded as the representative of a policy of commercial restric tion against Great Britain. To revive his influence, his speeches and resolutions of 1794 ^ were reprinted in the " National Intelligencer " as a guide for Con gress ; his pamphlet against the British doctrines of neutral trade was made a political text-book ; while his friends took the lead in denouncing England and in calling for retaliation. He himself lost no chance of pressing his views, even upon political opponents. " T had considerable conversation with Mr. Madison," wrote one of them February 13, " on the subjects now most important to the public. His system of proceed ing toward Great Britain is to establish permanent 1 Annals of Congress, 1793-1795, p. 155. 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 149 commercial distinctions between her and other na tions, — a retaliating navigation act, and aggravated duties on articles imported from her." i By his own choice, and in a manner almost defiant of failure, JIadison's political fortunes were united with the policy of coercing England through restrictions of trade. At first much was said of an embargo. Senator Jackson of Georgia, Dec. 20, 1805, declared with his usual vehemence in favor of this measure. " Not a nation," said he, " exists whicii has Wi;st Indian colonies but is more or less dependent on us, and cannot do without us ; they must come to our terms, or starve. On with your embargo, and in nine months they must lie at your feet ! " John Randolph, sure to o[ipose whatever Madison wished, also looked with favor on this course. " I would (if anything) have laid an embargo," he said.^ The embargo jiartv at best was small, and became smaller when toward the close of December, 1805, news arrived that Admiral Nelson had fought a great naval battle, October 21, against the combined French and Spanish fleets, off Cape Trafalgar, ending in a victory so com plete as to leave England supreme upon the ocean. The moral effect of Nelson's triumidi was great. Embargo was the last step before war, and few Americans cared to risk war with England under any ' Diary of J. Q. Adams' (Feb. 13, 1806), i. 408. 2 R,andolph's Speech of March 5, 1805 ; Annals of Congress, 1S05-ISO6, p. 571. 150 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. circumstances ; with harbors undefended and without an ally on the ocean, v^^ar was rashness which no one would face. Madison's more gentle plan of partial restrictions in trade became the Republican policy. Even before Senator Samuel Smith reported his Resolutions, February 5, to the Senate, the British minister Merry wrote to his Government that the members most opposed to commercial restrictions, despairing of effectual resistance, would endeavor only to liinit the number of articles to be prohibited, and to postpone the date on which the law should take effect, in order to send a special mission to England and negotiate an amicable arrangenient. Merry added that a special mission had been under discussion from the first : — "But 1 now learn that it has been, and continues to be, opposed by the President, who wishes that Mr. Monroe . . . should continue to carry on the negotiation alone. Matters, however, being now brought to a disa greeable crisis by the clamor of the nation and the instigation of the Administration, some of the meinbers of the Senate are, I find, endeavoring to engage the rest of their body to join them in exercising their constitu tional privilege of advising the President on the occa sion ; and that their advice to him will be to suspend any step that can have a hostUe tendency untU the experiment has been tried of an extraordinary mission." '¦ Merry was exactly informed as to the fate of General Smith's Resolutions even before they had 1 Merry to Mulgrave, Feb. 2, 1806 ; MSS.' British Archives. 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHIS.M. 151 been reported to the Senate. They were three in nuniber ; but only the third, which recommended non-importation, was drawn by Smith. The first and second, the work of Senator Adanis of Massachusetts, were not wholly welcome either to the Administra tion or to the minority. The first declared the British seizures " an unprovoked aggression," a " violation of neutral rights," and an " encroachment upon national independence." The second requested the President t(j " demand and insist upon " indemnity, and to make some arrangenient about impressments. The first Resolution, although fatal to future Federalist coii- sistenc}', was unanimously adopted by the Senate, February 12, almost without debate, — even Timothy Pickering recording his opinion that the British gov ernment had encroached upon national independence. The second Resolution was criticised as an attenipt at dictation to the Executive, which would give just cause of offence to the President. By this argument the Senate was induced to strike out the words " and insist ; " but although the Resolution, thus altered, was weak, seven Republican senators voted against it as too strong. The reason of this halting movement had been explained by Merry to Lord Mulgrave nearly two weeks before. The Senate stumbled over the impor tant personality of James Monroe. The next Presi dential election, some three years distant, warped the national policy in regard to a foreign encroachment. Senator Samuel Smith, ambitious to distinguish him- 152 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. self in diplomacy, having failed to obtain the mission to Paris, wished the dignity of a special envoy to London, and was supported by Wilson Cary Nicholas. The friends of Madison were willing to depress Monroe, whom John Randolph was trying to elevate. Even Mr-s. Madison, in the excitement of electioneering, allowed herself to talk in general society Tery slightingly of Monroe ; ^ and there were reasons which made interference from Mrs. Madison peculiarly irritating to Monroe's friends.^ Dr. Logan, the senator from Pennsylvania, while helping Madison to satisfy Napoleon in regard to St. Domingo, was prominent in suggesting that it would be well to set Monroe gently aside.^ This coalition of Madison, Smith, Logan, and Wilson Cary Nicholas was so strong as to control the Senate. The second Resolution was adopted Feb. 14, 1806 ; and a week afterward. General Smith and Dr. Mitchill were appointed a committee to carry the two Resolu tions to the White House. Two years later, in response to Monroe's complaints. President Jefferson explained how these senators managed to impose on the Executive a policy of their own. " After delivering the Resolutions," said Jefferson * in an aggrieved tone, " the cominittee entered into free con versation, and observed that although the Senate could 1 Diary of J. Q. Adams (March 13, 1806), i. 420. ^ Adams's Randolph, p. 203. » Diary of J. Q. Adams (Feb. 1, 1806), i. 395. ^ Jefferson to Monroe, March 10, 1808 ; Works, v. 253. 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 153 not in form recominend any extraordinary mission, yet that as individuals there was but one sentiment among them on the measure, and they pressed it. I was so much averse to it, and gave them so hard an answer, that they felt it and spoke of it. But it did not end here. The members of the other House took up the subject and set upon me individually, and these the best friends to you as well as myself, and represented the respon sibUity which a faUure to obtain redress would throw on us both, pursuing a conduct in opposition to the opinion of nearly every member of the Legislature. I fouud it necessary at length to yield my own opinion to the gene ral voice of the national council, and it really seemed to produce a jubilee among them." Jefferson saw his most devoted followers waver in their allegiance, and was reduced to temporize in order to avoid worse evils. General Smith in the Senate seemed interested in embarrassing him. If Smith could not be minister to England, he was bent upon becoming minister to France. Armstrong had challenged attack by his management of Anierican claims before the French commission, and had written to the French government an indiscreet letter against a certain claini made by a firm of Nicklin tk Griffith, of Philadcdphia. When the President nominated him as special minister, with Bowdoin, to conduct the new Florida negotiation, a strong opposition appeared in the Senate, at the head of which was General Smith. Jhirch 17 the vote was taken ; the Senate was equally divided, fifteen to fifteen, and Vice-President Clinton's voice alone saved Armstrong from rejection. Had 154 HISTORY. OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. the Senate been left to follow out its own aims, thc President's authority might perhaps have been shaken, and a period of faction might have followed ; but for tunately for the President and for the Secretary of State, among the enemies with wdiom they had to deal was one whose teinper passed the bounds of common-sense. Until the month of March, 1806, Randolph's opposi tion was confined to Spanish affairs in secret session. The House was even slower than the Senate to take up the inatter of British relations. Dec. 4, 1805, the subject was referred to the Cominittee of Ways and Means. Jan. 17, 1806, another message was sent to the same committee ; but day after day passed with out bringing a report from Randolph, until Sniilie of Pennsylvania moved to discharge the Comniittee of Ways and Means in order to bring the subject before the House in Committee of the Whole. Randolph was ill and absent when the House, Jan. 29, 1806, decided to take the matter from his hands. On the same day Andrew Gregg, a member from Pennsylvania, moved a Resolution forbidding the im portation of all goods the growth or product or manu facture of Great Britain. Still the House left the subject without decision or discussion. February 10 Joseph Nicholson introduced another Resolution, which came probably from Gallatin. Gregg's non importation measure would cost the Treasury five mib lion dollars a year, and Gallatin preferred a less sweeping prohibition. Even Senator Smith's scheme 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 155 was too strong for Nicholson, who pointed out that coarse wooUens, Jamaica rum, Birmingham hardware, and salt were necessities with whicii America could not sujiply herself, nor could any nation except Eng land supply her. Nicholson's Resolution prohibited only such British goods as might be replaced by other nations than England, or might be produced at home, — manufactures of leather, tin, brass, hemp, flax, silk ; high-iiriced wooUens ; woollen hosiery ; glass, silver, and plated ware, paper, pictures, prints, — a forniidalde Hst of articles, which if not, like Jamaica rum, necessary to America, were essentials to civilized existence. Other Resolutions were introduced, but those of Gregg and Nicholson by common consent maintained pre-eminence ; and between the policies marked by them as cijinplete or partial non-importation Congress had to decide. Although the subject was before the House, the montii of February passed without debate. Not until March 5, 1806, did Gregg call up his Reso lution. In doing so, he made a speech studiously moderate. He seemed disinclined to defend the carrying-trade, and abstained from treating the Brit ish seizures as cause for war, but rather threw the weight of his argument on the manifest outrage of impressments ; yet even this he treated as though it were a question of unfriendly fiscal regulation. " 1 have no apprehension whatever of a war," he said, " Great Britain is too well versed in the business of cal culation, and too well acquainted with her own interest. 156 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. to persevere in this lawless system at the hazard of losing customers whose annual purchases of her manufactures and other merchandise exceeds, I believe, thhty mUlions of dollars." Gregg would not endanger peace, but he would say to Great Britain, — "in this mild and moderate, though manly and firm, language : ' You have insulted the dignity of our country by impressing our seamen and compelUng them to fight your battles against a Power with whom we are at peace ; you have plundered us of much property by that preda tory war which you authorize to be carried on against our commerce. To these injuries, insults, and oppression we will submit no longer. ... If you persist iu j'our hostUe measures, if you absolutely refuse acceding to any propositions of compromise, we must slacken those bonds of friendship by which we have been connected. You must not expect hereafter to find us in your mar ket purchasing your manufactures to so large an amount.' This is their vulnerable part ; by attacking them in their warehouses and workshops, we can reach their vitals." If Pitt should retaliate, Gregg would go further ; he would confiscate all the private property belonging to British subjects on which he could lay his hands, treaty stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. The Pennsylvanian contented himself with pacific measures, and his oratory had the merit of consistency with his party doctrines and principles ; but the democracy of Massachusetts, which would never un derstand or obey the theories of Virginia and Penn- 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 157 sylvania, could not rest content with Gregg's Quaker ideas. " After the course we are now taking," said Crownin shield, " should Britain persist in her captures and in her oppressive treatment of our seamen, aud refuse to give them up, I would not hesitate to meet her in war. But, as I observed before, I do not believe Great Britain wUl go to war. Our trade is too valuable to her. She knows, too, that in such an event she will lose her eastern prov inces ; tbe States of Yermont and Massachusetts will asli no other assistance tlian their own mUitia to take Canada and Nova Scotia. Some of her West Indian islands will also fall. She knows also other things. Her subjects own sixteen millions of the old public debt of the United States, eight mUlions of the Louisiana stock, and three or four millions bank stock, and have private debts to the amount of ten or twelve miUions, — amounting in the whole to nearly forty millions of doUars. AViU Great Britain, by going to war, risk her provinces and this large amount of property ? I think she will not put so much to hazard." When Crowninshield sat down, John Randolph took the floor. In Randolph's long career of ora torical triumphs, no such moment had offered itself before, or was to occur again. Still in ^'irginian eyes tbe truest and ablest Republican in Congress, the representative of power and principle, the man of the future, Randolph stood with the halo of youth, courage, and genius round his head, — a sort of A'ir- ginian Saint Michael, almost terrible in his con tempt for whatever seemed to him base or untrue. 158 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. He began by saying that he entered on the subject "manacled, handcuffed, and tongue-tied;" his Hps were sealed ; he could but " hobble over the subject as well as his fettered limbs and palsied tongue would enable him to do it ; " and with this preamble he fell upon Gregg and Crowninshield : ^ — " It is mere waste of time to reason with such persons ; they do not deserve anything like serious refutation. The proper arguments for such statesmen are a strait-waist coat, a dark room, water-gruel, and depletion." The proposed confiscation of British property called out a sneer at Crowninshield : — " God help you if these are your ways and means for carrying on war ! if your finances are in the hands of such a chanceUor of the exchequer ! Because a man can take an observation and keep a log-book and a reckoning, can navigate a cock-boat to the West Indies or the East, shall he aspire to navigate the great vessel of State, to stand at the helm of public councils ? Ne sutor idtra crepidam ! " Again and again he turned aside to express con tempt for the Northern democrats : — " Shall this great mammoth of the American forest leave his native element and plunge into the water in a mad contest with the shark? Let him stay on shore, and not be excited by the muscles and periwinkles on the strand ! " On the point of policy Randolph took groimd whieh, if not warlike, was at least consistent, — the ground which all Southern Republicans of the Jeffer- 1 Annals of Congress, 1805-1806, p. 555, 1800. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 159 son school would have taken, if shame had not withheld them. Even if determined in the end to submit, the President and Secretary wished to keep up the form of resistance. Randolph declared that the form was absurd ; he would do nothing to protect " this mushroom, this fungus of war," — a carrying- trade whicii at the first moment of peace would no longer exist : — "I will never consent to go to war for that which I canuot protect. I deem it no sacrifice of dignity to say to the Leviathan of the deep : We are unable to contend with you in your own element ; but if you come within our actual limits, we will shed our last drop of blood in their defence." Had Randolph contented himself with taking this position, he could not have been overthrown, for he carried with him the secret sympathy of the Southern Republicans ; but he had not the self-control that was needed in thc face of an opponent so pliant and con ciliatory as Jefferson. Randolph took rare pleasure in making enemies, while Jefferson never made one enemy excei)t to gain two friends. Not satisfied with attacking Crowninshield and Gregg, Randolph gave full play to his anger against the whole House, and even assailed the Executive : — " I have before protested, and I again protest, against secret, irresponsible, overruling influence. The flrst ques tion I asked when I saw the gentleman's Resolution was. Is this a measure of the Cabinet? Not of an open de clared Cabinet, but of an invisible, inscrutable, unconsti- 160 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 7. tutional Cabinet, without responsibUitj', unknown to the Constitution. I speak of back-stairs influence, — of men who bring messages to this House, which, although they do not appear on the Journals, govern its decisions. Sir, the flrst question that I asked ou the subject of British relations was. What is the opinion of the Cabinet ; what measures will they recommend to Congress ? — well knowing that whatever measures we might take they must execute them, and therefore that we should have their opinion on the subject. My answer was (and from a Cabinet minister too), ' There is no longer any Cabinet ! ' " Though forbidden to mention what had occurred in secret session, " manacled, handcuffed, and tongue- tied" as he was, Randolph dragged the Spanish secret to light : — " Like true political quacks, you deal only in handbills and nostrums. Sir, I blush to see the record of our pro ceedings ; they resemble nothing but the advertisements of patent medicines. Here you have ' the worm-destroy ing lozenges ; ' there ' Church's cough-drops ; ' and to crown the whole, ' Sloan's vegetable speciflc,' — an infal lible remedy for all nervous disorders and vertigoes of brainsick politicians. . . . And where are you going to send your political panacea, resolutions and handbills excepted ; your sole arcanum of government, your King Cure-all ? To Madrid ? No ! you are not such quacks as not to know where the shoe pinches. To Paris 1 You know at least where the disease lies, and there you apply your remedy. When the nation anxiously demands the result of your deliberations, you hang your head and blush to tell. You are afraid to tell ! " 1806. JOHN RANDOLPH'S SCHISM. 161 Randolph next attacked Madison. He took up the secretary's late pamphlet and overwhelmed its argu ment with contempt. He declared that France was the real enemy of America ; that England was acting under the dictates of necessity ; that thc situation of Euro}ie had completely changed since 1793, and that England occupied the place which France then held : " she is tho sole bulwark of the human race against universal dominion, — no thanks to her for it ! " As for a policy, he proposed to aljandon commerce and to amputate mercantile interests : — "I can readUy tell gentlemen what I wUl not do. I will not propitiate any foreign n.ation with money. I will not launch into a naval war with Great Britain. . . . I will send her money on no pretext whatever ; much less on pretence of buying Labrador or Botany Ba}', wheu my real object was to secure limits whicii she formall}' ac- kiiowle Yrujo to Cevallos, Jan. 1, 1806 ; MSS. Spanish Archives. 238 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cii. 10. has on hand. Miranda has returned to New York, much piqued at flnding that Colonel Burr was very determined to have nothing to do with him. He also told me that Colonel WiUiamson, who was sent to London with the plan for the British ministry, not finding Mr. Pitt so warm as Lord MelvUle for the project of raising the Western States, had turned to plans in that capital, and showed, by the want of exactness in his correspondence, that he was not foUowing up the object with the same zeal as at first he undertook it ; that in consequence they were disposed to despatch to London a New York gen tleman named Warton, well known for his intimacy with Burr, but that on the verge of his departure another plan suggested itself to Burr, which he seems rather inclined to execute. This plan, excepting the attack on the Fioridas, has the same object, which he, as well as his chief friends, hope may be put in execution even without foreign aid. For one who does not know the country, its constitution, and, above all, certain localities, this plan would appear almost insane ; but I confess, for my part, that in view of all the circumstances it seems to me easy to execute, although it will irritate the Atlantic States, especiaUy those called central, — that is, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. It is beyond question that there exists in this country an infinite number of adventurers, without property, full of ambition, and ready to unite at once under the standard of a revolution which promises to better their lot. EquaUy certain is it that Burr and his friends, without discovering their true object, have suC' ceeded in getting the good-will of these men, and inspir ing the greatest confldence among them in favor of Burr." 1805. BURR'S SCHEMES. 239 The " almost insane " plan which Dayton unfolded to the Spanish minister was nothing less than to introduce by degrees into the city of Washington a certain nuraber of men in disguise, well armed, who, at a signal from Burr, were to seize the President, Vice-President, and the President of the Senate, — the substitute always named at the beginning of each session, in case of the death, illness, or absence of the two first. Having thus secured the heads of gov ernment, the conspirators were to seize the public money deposited in the Washington and Georgetown banks, and to take possession of the arsenal on the Eastern Branch. Burr hoped by this blow to delay or paralyze opposition, and perhaps to negotiate with the individual States an arrangement favorable to himself ; but in the more probable case that he could not maintain himself at Washington, he would burn all the national vessels at the Navy Yard, except the two or three Avhich w^ere ready for service, and em barking on these with his foUowers and the treasure, he Avould sail for New Orleans and proclaim the emancipation of Louisiana and the Western States. AVild as this scheme was, it occupied Burr's mind for the rest of the winter, and he made many efforts to draw discontented officers of the government into it. He sounded Commodore Truxton, without rcA'eal- ing his whole object ; but to William Eaton, the hero of Derne, he opened himself with as much confidence as to Merry and Yrujo. Eaton was at Washington in January and February, 1806, sore at the manner 240 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 10, in which his claims were treated by Congress, and extravagant in ideas of his own importance. To him Burr laid open the whole secret, even in regard to the plan for attacking Washington. The story Avas the same which had been told to Merry and Yrujo.^ He spoke of Wilkinson as his second in command ; of his son-in-law, AUston, as engaged in the enterprise ; and of New Orleans as the capital of his Western empire, Avhence an expedition would be sent for the conquest of Mexico. The line of demarcation was to be the Alleghany Mountains ; and although he ex pressed some doubts about Ohio, he declared himself certain of Kentucky and Tennessee. "If he could gain over tlie marine corps and secure to his interests the naval commanders Truxton, Preble, Decatur, and others, he would turn Congress neck aud heels out of doors, assassinate the President (or what amounted to tbat), and declare himself the protector of an energetic government." The scheme of attacking Washington was merely an episode due to Burr's despair of British or Spanish aid. Burr was reduced to many devices in order to keep his conspiracy alive. December 12, immediately after the disappointing interview with Merry, and Dayton's first advance to Casa Yrujo, Burr wrote to Wilkinson a letter evidently intended to conceal his diplomatic disaster and to deceive his friend. He said that there would be no war with Spain, and fore- 1 Deposition of General Eaton ; Life of WiUiam Eaton, p. 396. 1806. BURR'S SCHEMES. 241 told the peaceful course of Government.^ " In case of such warfare, Lee would have been commander- in-chief. Truth, I assure you. He must you knoAV come from Virginia." As to the conspiracy, he re served it for a few short lines, intelligible enough to those who knew that New Orleans was to declare its independence on the arrival of a British squad ron in February, and that the revolutionary govern ment would at once send a delegation to Natchez or St. Louis to make a formal tender of military command to General Wilkinson. " On the subject of a certain speculation it is not deemed material to write till the Avhole can be communi cated. The circumstance referred to in a letter from Ohio remains in suspense. The auspices, however, are favorable, ancl it is believed that Wilkinson wUl give audience to a delegation, composed of Adair and Dayton, in February." Meanwhile the Governnient asked no questions. Denunciation of Burr and Wilkinson was dangerous ; it was tried again and again with disastrous results. Major Bruff, at St. Louis, who suspected the truth, dared not bring such a charge against his superior officer : ^ but a certain Judge Easton, to Avhoin Burr confided at St. Louis, ventured to Avrite a letter to a senator of the United States charging Wilkinson ' Burr to WUkinson, Dec. 12, 1806 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ii. Appendix, Ixxxiv. ' Evidence of Major Bruff, Burr's Trial ; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 597. VOL. III. — 16 242 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. lo. Avith being concerned in Miranda's expedition ; and was told in reply that the letter was burned, and that the writer should mind his own business, and take care Iioav he meddled with men high in power and office. So thick an atmosphere of intrigue, especially in Spanish matters, was supposed to pervade the White House ; men's minds were so befogged with public messages about a Spanish war and secret messages about peace, with private encouragement to Miranda and public punishment of Miranda's friends, with John Randolph's furious charges of duplicity and Madison's helpless silence under these charges, — that until the President himself should say the word. Burr, Wilkinson, Dayton, and their associates were safe, and niight hatch treason in the face of all the world. President Jefferson had already too many feuds on his hands, and Burr had still too many friends, to warrant rousing fresh reprisals at a time when the difficulties of the Administration were extreme. The President continued to countenance Burr in public, alleging in private that the people could be trusted to defeat his schemes. Doubtless the people could be trusted for that purpose, but they had instituted a government in order to provide themselves with proper machinery for such emergencies, and the Pres ident alone could set it in action. General Eaton made an attempt to put the President on his guard. He first consulted two leading Federalist Congress men, — John Cotton Smith and Samuel Dana, — who 1806. BURR'S SCHEMES. 243 advised him to hold his tongue, for his solitary AVord would not avail against the weight of Burr's charac- ter.i Nevertheless, in March, 1806, he called at the White House and saw the President. "After a desultory conversation, in which I armed to draAV his attention to the West, I took the liberty of sug- cesting to the President that I thought Colonel Burr ought to be removed from the country, because I con sidered him dangerous in it. The President asked where he should send him. I said to England or Madrid. . . . The President, without any positive expression, in such a matter of delicacy, seemed to think the trust too impor tant, and expressed something like a doubt about the integrity of Mr. Burr. I frankly told the President that perhaps no person had stronger grounds to suspect that integrity than I had ; but that I believed his pride of ambition had so predominated over his other passions that when placed on an eminence and put on his honor, a respect to himself would secure his fidelity. I per ceived that the subject was disagreeable to the President ; and to bring him to my point in the shortest mode, and in a manner which would point to the danger, I said to him, if Colonel Burr was not disposed of, we should in eighteen months have an insurrection, if not a revolution, on the waters of the Mississippi. The President said he had too much confidence in the information, the integrity, and attachment of the people of that country to the Union, to admit any apprehensions of that kind." If the President had confidence in the people of New Orleans, he had not shoAvn it in framing a form ' Evidence of WiUiam Eaton, Burr's Trial; Annals of Con gress, 1807-1808, pp. 511, 512. 244 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. lo. of government for them ; and if he admitted no appre hensions in March, 1806, he admitted many before the year closed. In truth, he deceived himself. That he was afraid of Burr and of the sympathy which Burr's career had excited, was the belief of Burr him self, who responded to Jefferson's caution by a con tempt so impudent as to seem even then almost in credible. Believing that the President dared not touch him. Burr never cared to throw even a veil over his treason. He used the President's name and the names of his Cabinet officers as freely as though he were President himself ; and no one contradicted or disavowed him. So matters remained at Washington down to the close of the session. " I detailed," said Eaton,' " the whole projects of Mr. Burr to certain members of Congress. They believed Colonel Burr capable of anything, and agreed that the fellow ought to be hanged, but thought his projects too chimerical, and his circumstances too desperate, to give the subject the merit of serious consideration." 1 Deposition of Jan. 26, 1807 ; Life of Eaton, p. 401. CHAPTER XI. The death of Pitt destroyed all immediate possi bility of drawing England into conspiracy with Burr, — if indeed a possibility had CA'er existed. The attempt to obtain money from Spain was equally hopeless. Except for Madison's conduct in receiving Miranda and refusing to receive Yrujo, Dayton would probably have obtained nothing from Spain ; but the information he was able to give Yrujo in regard to Miranda's plans and proceedings deserved reward, and Dayton received at different times sums of money, amounting in all to about three thousand doUars, from the Spanish treasury. Dayton's private necessi ties required much larger sums. Burr was also ruined. He could not return to New York, where an indictment hung over his head. Conspiracy was easier than poverty ; but conspiracy without foreign aid was too wild a scheme for other men to join. Jefferson might at that moment have stopped Burr's activity by sending Avord privately to him and his friends that their projects must be dropped ; but Jefferson, while closing every other path, left that of conspiracy open to Burr, who fol lowed it only with much difficulty. In order to 246 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11. retain any friends or followers he was obliged to deceive them all, and entangle himself and them in an elaborate network of falsehood. Dayton alone knew the truth, and helped him to deceive. April 16, 1806, a few days before the adjournment of Congress, Burr wrote to Wilkinson a letter imply ing that Wilkinson had required certain conditions and an enlargement of the scheme; Burr assured him that his requirements, which probably concerned aid from Truxton, Preble, Eaton, and Decatur, had been fully satisfied : — " The execution of our project is postponed till Decem ber. Want of water in Ohio rendered movement imprac ticable ; other reasons rendered delay expedient. The association is enlarged , and comprises all that Wilkinson could wish. Confidence limited to a few. Though tliis delay is irksome, it will enable us to move with more cer tainty and dignity. Burr will be throughout the United States this summer. Administration is damned which Randolph aids. Burr wrote you a long letter last De cember, replying to a short one deemed very silly. Nothing has been heard from the Brigadier since Octo ber. Is Cushing and Porter right? Address Burr at Washington." ^ Burr's letters to Wilkinson were always in cipher, and mysteriously worded ; but in this despatch noth ing was unintelligible. Wilkinson afterward explained that he was himself the " Brigadier," and the two names were those of officers under his command. ' ' Wilkinson's Memoirs, ii. Appendix, Ixxxiii. 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 247 The same western mail which carried this letter to Wilkinson carried another to Blennerhassett, in viting him to join in a " speculation," which Avould " not be commenced before December, if ever." Prob ably Burr made many other efforts to obtain money from petty sources ; he certainly exerted himself to delude the Spanish government into lending him assistance. Hitherto he had left this task to Dayton, his secretary of state, but May 14, 1806, the Spanish minister wrote to Don Pedro Cevallos ,i — "The principal [Burr] has opened himself to me; and the communications I have had with him confirm me in the idea, not only of the probability, but even of the facUity, of his success, under certain circumstances. To insure it, some pecuniary aid on our part ancl on that of France is wanted. I have been careful to be very cir cumspect in mj' answers, and have not compromised my self in any manner ; but when I return to Spain next spring I shall be bearer of the whole plan, with the de tails that may be wanted. There wUl also arrive in Spain before long, more or less simultaneously with me though by different ways, two or three very respectable persons, both from Louisiana and from Kentucky ancl Tennessee, with the same object. They all consider the interests of these countries as united and in conformity Avith those of Spain and France ; but the principal, or more correctly the principals, here do not wish to open themselves to the Emperor Napoleon's minister [Tur reau], as they lack confldence in him. Consequently, it will be proper either not to communicate the matter at all ' Yrujo to Cevallos, May 14, 1806; MSS. Spanish Archives. 248 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11. to that government, or to do it with the intimation that its representative here shall not have the least notice of it; for, I repeat, they have no confldence in him, and this has been a condition imposed on me in the communi cations I have received." Finding Yrujo obstinate in refusing to advance money. Burr tried to alarm him by pretending to take up again the scheme of attacking Florida and Mexico. June 9, 1806, Yrujo wrote another long despatch on the subject. Burr, he said, had suddenly ceased to visit him as frequently as usual, and Dayton had explained the coldness as due to Burr's belief that the new Administration in England would be more liberal and zealous than that of Pitt. Dayton added that Burr was drawing up new instructions for Williamson ; that he had even decided to send Bollman to London to invite co-operation from the British government in an attack on the Spanish pos sessions. Dayton professed to have acted as the pro tector of Spain from Burr's unprincipled ambition. "Dayton told me' he had observed to Burr that al though he (Burr) was assuredly the principal, yet a plan of this nature ought to be put in deliberation in the cabi net council which certain chiefs are to hold in New Or leans in the month of December next, and that for his own part he thought this idea unjust and impolitic ; to which Burr answered that they would always be able to alter the plan as circumstances should require, and that in fact this point, or at least the direction to be given to it, would be determined in New Orleans. Dayton told 1 Yrujo to CevaUos, June 9, 1806; MSS. Spanish Archives. 1306. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 249 me that he would oppose with all his strength measures of this nature, and that he knew General WUkinson, who was to be a member of the Congress, would make the same opposition ; and that in order to drive the idea of such a temptation out of Burr's head, ancl of other people's also, it would be well for us to reinforce our garrisons at Pensacola and Mobile, ancl that then the circumstance of our respectable condition of defence might be used as a weighty argument for abandoning such a project. After holding this conference with me, Dayton returned to his residence ; and before starting, wrote me a note to say that the night before Burr had read him the instructions to be given to BoUman, and that they were of the tenor indicated to me." Godoy and Cevallos were hardly so imbecile as to pay for creating at New Orleans a new American empire more dangerous to Spanish possessions than the peaceful republic over which Jefferson presided at Washington. Don Pedro Cevallos read Yrujo's despatches with great interest. At first he even hinted that if the United States were bent on forc ing a war with Spain, these adventurers, in case of actual hostilities, might be made useful ; ^ but this suggestion was accompanied by many warnings to Yrujo not to commit himself or to contribute money, and at last by a flat announcement that the King would not in any way encourage Burr's designs.^ 1 CevaUos to Casa Yrujo, March 28, 1806 ; MSS. Spanish Archives. ^ Cevallos to Casa Vrujo, July 12, 1806; MSS. Spanish Archives. 250 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. ll. The conspirators were in a worse position as re garded England. By a fatal stroke of ill-luck, Merry's despatch of Nov. 25, 1805, written to be read in secrecy by the Tory Lord Mulgrave, Avas received at the Foreign Office Feb. 2, 1806, ten days after Pitt's death, and was probably opened by Charles James Fox, — almost the last man in England to whom Merry would have willingly shown it. The only answer received by Merry reached Washington about June 1, 1806, and consisted in the dry announce ment that his Majesty had been pleased to listen favorably to Mr. Merry's request for a recall, and had appointed the Hon. David Montague Ersldne as his successor. Merry complained piteously that he had never sug gested a wish to be recalled, that he had indeed the strongest desire to remain, and felt himself greatly aggrieved at his treatment ; but Fox was remorse less, and Merry could only prepare for Erskine's arrival. Smarting under this sudden reproof. Merry held his parting interview with Burr. Doubtless it was as little cheerful on one side as on the other; but Merry did not think himself required to give an immediate or a minute account of it to Fox. He Avaited until Erskine's arrival, and then, in one of his last despatches, Nov. 2, 1806, after Burr had begun his operations in the West, Merry wrote,^ — ' ' I saw this gentleman [Burr] for the last time at this place [Washington] in the montii of June last, when he 1 Merry to C. J. Fox, Jnne 1, 1806; MSS. British Archives. 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 251 made particular inquiry whether I had received any an swer from my Government to the propositions he had requested me to transmit to them, and lamented exceed ingly that I had not, because he, and the persons con nected with him at New Orleans, would now, though very reluctantly, be under the necessity of addressing them selves to the French and Spanish governments. He added, however, that the disposition of the inhabitants of the Western country, and particularly Louisiana, to sepa rate themselves from the American Union was so strong that the attempt might be made with every prospect of success without any foreign assistance whatever ; ancl his last words to me were that, with or without such support, it certainly would be made A'ery shortly." After receiving this rebuff from England, Burr and Dayton needed singular impudence to threaten Yrujo with the terror of Charles James Fox ; but impudence had become their only resource. Every step taken thenceforward by the conspirators Avas taken by nieans of a new imposture ; until at last they became petty swindlers who lived from day to day by cheat ing each other. How flagrant their imposture was, has been partly shown in their attempt to deceive Yrujo ; but their treatment of Wilkinson was far more dishonest. Toward the end of July, 1806, Burr had accom plished all that could be done in the East, and pre pared to begin his campaign to New Orleans. By strenuous efforts money had been raised to set the subordinate adventurers in motion. Among these AV'cre Eriek Bollman, famous for an attempt to rescue 252 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. u. Lafayette from confinement at Olmiitz ; a French officer named De Pestre, or Dupiester ; Samuel Swart wout, a younger brother of Robert ; and finally young Peter V. Ogden, a nephew of Dayton. The time had come when each actor must take his place, and must receive orders as to the rSle he was to play. Of all Burr's intimates, Wilkinson was not only the most important, but also the most doubtful. He had hung back and had made conditions. Since October, 1805, nothing had been heard from him, and his last letter had contained objections " deemed very silly." At last a letter, dated May 13, arrived. This letter never saw the light ; afterward, at the trial, Wilkin son challenged its production, and accused Burr of falsehood in asserting that it had been destroyed at Wilkinson's request or with his knowledge. Only one conclusion might be taken as certain in regard to its contents, — they did not suit the situation of Dayton and Burr. Dayton's reply was dated July 24, 1806, and waa sent by his nephew, Peter V. Ogden, to Wilkinson. "It is now well ascertained that you are to be dis placed in next session," wrote Dayton, working on his old friend's pride and fears. "Jefferson will affect to yield reluctantly to the public sentiment, but yield he will. Prepare yourself, therefore, for it. You know the rest. You are not a man to despair, or even despond, especially when such prospects offer in another quarter. Are you ready? Are your numerous associates ready? Wealth and glory ! Louisiana and Mexico ! " 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 253 Together with this exhortation from Dayton, Burr sent a cipher despatch, afterward famous as the key to the Avhole conspiracy. Published at different times with varying A'crsions, as suited Wilkinson's momen tary objects, the correct reading probably ran very nearly as follows : — "July 29, 1806. Your letter, postmarked 13th May, is received. At length I have obtained funds, and have actually commenced. The Eastern detachments, from different points and under different pretences, will ren dezvous on the Ohio 1st of November. Everything in ternal and external favors our views. Naval protection of England is secured. Truxton is going to Jamaica to arrange with the admiral on that station. It wUl meet us at the Mississippi. England, a navy of the United States, are ready to join, and flnal orders are given to my friends and followers. It will be a host of choice spirits. Wilkinson shall be second to Burr only ; Wilkinson shall dictate the rank and promotion of his officers. Burr will proceed westward 1st August, never to return. With hira goes his daughter ; the husband wUl foUpw in October, with a corps of worthies. Send forthwith an intelligent and confidential friend with whom Burr may confer ; he shall return immediately with further interesting detaUs ; this is essential to concert and harmony of movement. Send a list of all persons known to Wilkinson west of the mountains who could be useful, with a note delineat ing their characters. By your messenger send me four or five commissions of your officers, which you can bor row under any pretence you please ; they shall be re turned faithfully. Already are orders given to the contractor to foi-ward six months' provisions to points 254 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. ll. Wilkinson may name ; this shall not be used untU the last moment, and then under proper injunctions. Our object, my dear friend, is brought to a point so long desired. Burr guarantees the result with "his life and honor, Avith the lives and honor ancl the fortunes of hun dreds, the best blood of our country. Burr's plan of operation is to move down rapidly from the FaUs, on the 15tli of November, with the first five hundred or a thou sand men, in light boats now constructing for that pur pose ; to be at Natchez between the 5th and 15th of December, there to meet you ; there to determine whether it will be expedient in the flrst instance to seize on or pass by Baton Rouge. On receipt of this, send Burr an answer. Draw on Burr for all expenses, etc. The people of the country to which we are going are prepared to receive us ; their agents, now with Burr, say that if we will protect their religion, and will not subject them to a foreign Power, that in three weeks all will be settled. The gods invite us to glory and fortune ; it remains to be seen whether we deserve the boon. The bearer of this goes express to you. He is a man of inviolable honor ancl perfect discretion, formed to execute rather than project, capable of relating facts with fidelity, aud inca pable of relating them otherwise ; he is thoroughly in formed of the plans and intentions of Burr, and wUl disclose to you as far as you require, and no further. He has imbibed a reverence for your character, and may be embarrassed in your presence ; put him at ease, and he will satisfy you." Had Burr and Dayton not felt strong reason to doubt Wilkinson's course, they would not have in vented a tissue of falsehoods such as these letters 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 255 contained. So far as concerned Wilkinson's future conduct, no one could deny that this gross deception set him free from any ties that might have previously bound him to Dayton or Burr. Furnished with these and other letters almost equally compromising, Ogden and Swartwout, at the end of July, started on their way. SAvartwout was directed to see Adair in Kentucky, and to deliver to him despatches, the contents of which have never been made known, but were doubtless identical Avith the letters to Wflkinson. At the same time Eriek Bollman started by sea Avith similar despatches for New Orleans. Early in August Burr followed, taking with him his daughter Mrs. AUston, and his chief of staff Colonel De Pestre. After crossing the mountains he threAV aside ordinary caution. At Canonsburg, about fifteen miles beyond Pittsburg, he stopped at the house of an old friend. Colonel Morgan, and there so freely as serted the imbecility of the Federal government and the certainty of a speedy separation of the Western States from the Eastern, that Morgan thought himself bound to give President Jefferson a warning. The conversation at Canonsburg took place in the afternoon and evening of August 22. A few days afterward Burr arrived at Blennerhassett's island, where he found the owner waiting with enthusiasm to receive him. Of all the eager dupes with whom Durr had to deal, this intelligent and accomplished Irish gentleman Avas the most simple. After wasting 256 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. U. half his property on his island, he discovered that he had left himself not more than thirty or forty thou sand dollars to live upon ; and this small property Avas invested in funds Avhich produced so little as to leave him always embarrassed. He Avished ardently to make his fortune by some bold speculation ; and Burr had no more pressing necessity than to obtain the funds whicii Blennerhassett burned to iiiA'est. Burr said to Blennerhassett in effect what he said to Wilkinson ; but Blennerhassett was less able than Wilkinson to detect falsehood. The actual specula tion which was to make Blennerhassett's fortune seemed certain of success. Burr had invented more than one way of getting money ; and among his various expedients none was more ingenious than that of buying a certain Spanish claim, known as the Bastrop grant, covering an immense district on the Red River, and supposed to be owned in part by one Lynch in Kentucky. Burr had undertaken to buy Lynch's interest for forty thousand dollars, of which only four thousand or five thousand dollars need be paid in money ; and he persuaded Blennerhassett that on the most moderate estimate, they could reap from it the profit of a million. Blennerhassett was assured that before the end of the year Louisiana would be independent, with Burr for its ruler, under the protection of England. Wilkinson and the United States army were pledged to accept the revolution and to support Burr. Tennessee was secured; and though Kentucky and Ohio were doubtful, they would 1306. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 257 end hj foUoAving Tennessee. The government at Washington Avould fall to pieces, and the new empire under a stronger government, would rise at once to power. Then Bastrop's grant would take character ; its actual cheapness Avas due to doubts as to its valid ity : but the moment its validity was decided by the new government, all whose members would be inter ested in it, the value of the grant would become enor mous ; emigration Avould be directed to the spot, and Blennerhassett's fortune Avould be vast. He would, meauAvhile, go at once as minister to England, with Eriek Bollman for secretary of legation.^ In an incredibly short time Blennerhasset's head was turned. Unluckily for him, his wife's head was turned even more easily than his own ; and the charms of Theodosia AUston, who became a guest at the island, dazzled the eyes of both. Before Burr had been tAvo days in the house, Blennerhassett was so enthusiastic a supporter of the scheme that he set himself to work, under Burr's eye, to publish a series of essays in order to show the State of Ohio that disunion was an infallible cure for all its natu ral or acquired ills. The first of these essays was quickly finished, taken to Marietta, and printed in the " Ohio Gazette " of September 4 under the sig nature " Querist." September 2, before the " Querist " appeared. Burr continued his journey down the river to Cincinnati, where he arrived September 4, and remained a few 1 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 351. VOL. III.— 17 258 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 11. days with Senator Smith, talking freely about the impotence of the government, the rights and wrongs of the Western people, and their inducements to set up a separate empire. September 10 he crossed the river to Lexington in Kentucky, and shortly after ward went to Nashville in Tennessee. OAving chiefly to the frielidship of Andrew Jackson, the town of Nashville was strongly attached to Burr, and was supposed to favor the disunion scheme. Ten nessee was the only State which Burr always claimed positively as his own. Whether he had better grounds for his confidence in Jackson than for his faith in Wilkinson and Daniel Clark might be doubted; but Tennessee was at least vehement in hatred of the Spaniards. The Spaniards were pressing close against Wilkinson's little force at Natchitoches, and Burr made use of the threatened war in order to cover his own scheme. Septeinber 27 a public dinner was given to him at NashviUe, and Jackson offered as a toast the old sentiment of 1798 : " Millions for de fence ; not a cent for tribute." A few days later Burr returned to Kentucky ; and within a week sud denly appeared in the newspaper at NashviUe a strange proclamation signed " Andrew Jackson, Major-Gene ral Second Division," and dated Oct. 4, 1806, in which the brigade commanders were ordered to place their brigades at once on such a footing as would enable them on the shortest notice to supply their quotas '.' when the government and constituted authorities of our country" should require them to march. This 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 259 unauthorized step was commonly supposed to be taken in the interest of Burr's conspiracy, and com promised Jackson gravely in the eyes of the Govern ment at Washington. Meanwhile Theodosia AUston and her husband had been left in charge of the Blennerhassetts, while Blennerhassett himself behaved as though he were a village school-boy playing the part of chieftain in an imaginary feudal castle. He ivent about the country raising recruits and buying supplies, chattering to every young and active man he met about the expe dition which was to make their fortunes. He con fided in his gardener, a simple, straightforward fellow named Peter Taylor, " that Colonel Burr would be king of Mexico, and that Mrs. AUston would be queen of Mexico whenever Colonel Burr died." He added that Burr " had a great many friends in the Spanish terri tory ; two thousand Roman Catholic priests were en listed in his corps ; that those priests and the societies which belonged to them Avere a strong party ; that the Spaniards, like the French, had got tired of their gov ernment and wanted to swap it ; that the British were also friends to this expedition ; and that he was the very man who was to go to England on this piece of business for Colonel Burr." When at the subsequent trial Taylor told this tale, the world Avas incredulous, and insisted upon disbelieving his story ; but Blen nerhassett's papers proved the extent of his delu sion. By common consent the Blennerhassetts and AHstons agreed that Theodosia was to inherit the 260 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 11. empire from her father; but doubts existed whether AUston could take the crown as Theodosia's husband. " I will win it by a better title," he cried, — " by my deeds in council and in field ! " ^ Mrs. Blennerhas sett was impatient to exchange her solitary island for the court of her young empress ; and Blennerhassett longed to set sail as minister for England with Eriek Bollman for secretary of legation. Under the influ ence of this intoxication, Blennerhassett offered to advance money to the extent of all his property for Burr's use if AUston would give him a written and sealed guaranty to a certain amount ; which Allston did.2 Leaving his wife at the island, while fifteen boats were building at Marietta and kilns for baking bread were constructed on the island itself, Blennerhassett went with the AUstons down the river to Lexington, and there rejoined Burr on his return from Nashville, about October 1. No time had been lost. The boats building at Marietta would carry about five hundred men ; others to be built elsewhere would carry five hundred more. Recruiting went rapidly forward. Finally, the purchase-money for Lynch's interest in Bastrop's grant, about four or five thousand dollars, Avas paid ; and Blennerhassett congratulated himself on owning a share in four hundred thousand acres of land in the heart of Louisiana. 1 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 333; Blennerhassett to AUston, March 2, 1811. ^ Blennerhassett Papers, pp. 397, 535, 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 261 To communicate with his friends in New York and Philadelphia, Burr sent De Pestre October 25, with directions to report the movements of the Western conspirators to the Marquis of Casa Yrujo, as avcU as to SwartAVOut and Dayton. Burr gave De Pestre to understand that one object of his mission Avas to blind the Spanish minister in regard to the schemes against Mexico and Florida; in reality De Pestre's mission Avas probably for the purpose of raising money. Yrujo was already well informed from other sources. No vember 10, before De Pestre's arrival, the Marquis wrote to his GoA'crnment that some Ua'c hundred men were collecting on the upper Ohio to move down the river in squads : ^ — " Colonel Burr will go down with tliem under pretext of establishing them on a great land-purchase he is sup posed to have made. In passing Cincinnati they expect to get possession of flve thousand stand of arms which the government deposited there at the time of its cliffer ences with us about the navigation of the Mississippi. After thus dropping the mask, this armed troop will follow down the course of the Mississippi. Colonel Burr will stop at Natchez, where he will wait until the Assembly of New Orleans has met, Avbich will happen at onee ; and in this meeting (junta) they wUl declare the independence of the Western States, and will invite Burr meanwhUe to place himself at the head of their govern ment. He wUl accept the offer, will descend to New Orleans, and wUl set to work, clothed in a character which the people will have given him. I understand ' Yrujo to CeA^aUos, Nov. 10. 1806 ; MSS. Spanish Archives. 262 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch. u. that Colonel Burr has already written the declaration of independence, and that it is couched in the same terms that the States adopted in theirs against Great Britain. This circumstance is the more notable inasmuch as the actual President was the person who drew it up in 1776. When Burr made the project of acting in agreement with England and seizing the Fioridas, he expected to master them with troops that should accompany him from Baton Rouge. Although I am assured that this project is aban doned, and that on the contrary he wishes to live on good terms with Spain, I have written to Governor Folch of West Florida to be on his guard ; ancl although I am persuaded that by means of Governor Folch's connection with General Wilkinson, he must be perfectly informed of the state of things and of Burr's intentions, I shall write to-day or to-morrow another letter to the Governor of Baton Rouge to be on the alert." Yrujo believed that Wilkinson, the General in com mand of the American army, then supposed to be on the point of attacking the Spanish force in his front, was secretly and regularly communicating with the Spanish Governor of West Florida. Burr was engaged in deceiving every one ; but his attempt to deceive Yrujo, if seriously meant, was the least comprehensible of all his manoeuvres. Decem ber 4 the Spanish minister wrote to his Government another despatch which betrayed his perplexity at Burr's conduct : — "I am positively assured," he said, "that from one day to another will embark from New York for New Orleans, to join Colonel Burr in Louisiana, three of his 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 263 intimate friends, depositaries of his whole confldence ; namely, Mr. Swartwout, lately marshal of the district of New York, a certain Dr. Erwin, and the famous Colonel Smith, the same who was implicated in the busi ness of Miranda, and whose son went out as an aide- de-camp of that adventurer. Accordingly I wrote to the governors of both Fioridas and to the Viceroy of Mexico, giving them a general idea of this affair, and recommending them to watch the movements of Colonel Burr and of his adventurers. This is an excess of precau tion, since by this time they must not only know through the New Orleans and Natchez newspapers of the projects attributed to Colonel Burr, but also through the confiden tial channel of the No. 13 of the Marquis of Casa Calvo's cipher with the Prince of Peace, who is one of the con spirators, and who is to contribute very efficaciously to the execution of the scheme in case it shall be carried into effect." The person designated as No. 13 in the cipher used between Casa Calvo and Godoy was the general-in- chief of the American forces, Wilkinson. The Mar quis's despatch next mentioned the arrival of De Pestre, who appeared about November 27 at Yrujo's house : — " About a week ago a former French officer came to see me, one of Burr's partisans, who came from Kentucky in search of various articles for the execution of his under taking. . . . This officer handed me a letter from Colonel Burr, in which, after recommending him to me, the writer said simply that as this person had lately visited those States, he could give me inforraation about them worthy 264 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. u. of my curiosity. The date of this letter was Lexington, October 25." De Pestre gave to Yrujo the assurance that all Avas going well with the undertaking ; but the special message he was charged to deliver seemed to be the following : — " He also told me, on the part of the Colonel, that I should soon hear that he meant to attack Mexico, but that I was not to believe such rumors ; that on the con trary his plans were limited to the emancipation of the Western States, and that it was necessary to circulate this rumor in order to hide the true design of his arma ments and of the assemblages of men Avhich could no longer be kept secret ; that Upper and Lower Louisiana, the States of Tennessee and Ohio, stood ready and ripe for his plans, but that the State of Kentucky was much divided ; and as this is the most important in numbers and population, an armed force must be procured strong enough to control the party there which should be dis posed to offer resistance. He added, on Burr's part, that as soon as the revolution should be complete, he should treat with Spain in regard to boundaries, and would con clude this aflair to the entire satisfaction of Spain ; mean while he wished me to write to the Governor of West Florida to diminish the burdens on Americans who navi gate the Mobile River, and ask him, when the explosion should take place, to stop the courier or couriers who might be despatched by the friends of Government from New Orleans." Burr's message caused Yrujo to warn all the Spanish officials in Florida, Texas, and Mexico that " although 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 265 No. 13 seems to have acted in good faith hitherto, his fidelity could not be depended upon if he had a greater interest in violating it, and that therefore they must be cautious in listening to him and be very vigilant in regard to events that would probably happen in their neighborhood." De Pestre's mission made Yrujo more suspicious than ever, and he spared no precaution to render impossible the success of any attack on Florida or Mexico. After De Pestre had visited New York, he returned to Philadelphia, and December 13 again called upon Yrujo. "He told me," reported Yrujo, ^ "that he had seen Mr. Swartwout in New York, whom he had informed of Burr's wish that he, as well as Dr. Erwin, Colonel Smith, and Captain Lewis, who was captain of the mer chant ship ' Emperor ' and brother of the captain of Miranda's vessel the ' Leander,' should set out as soon as possible for New Orleans. Likewise he instructed him, on the part of the colonel, that the youths enlisted to serve as officers should set out as soon as possible for their posts. These, my informant told me, are dif ferent. Some two or three of them, the quickest and keenest, go to Washington to observe the movements of Government, to keep their friends in good disposition, and to despatch expresses with news of any impor tant disposition or occurrence. Three go to Norfolk to make some despatch of provisions. A good number of them will go direct to Charleston to take command as officers, and see to the embarkation of the numerous > Yrujo to CevaUos, Dec. 16, 1806; MSS. Spanish Archives. 266 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. U. recruits whom Colonel Burr's son-in-law has raised in South Carolina. He himself wUl then have returned there from Kentucky, and will embark with them for New Orleans. The rest wUl embark directly for that city from New York." Yrujo could not see the feebleness of the conspir acy. So far as he knew, the story might be true; and although he had been both forewarned and fore armed, he could not but feel uneasy lest Burr should make a sudden attack on West Florida or Texas. The Spanish minister Avas able to protect Spanish interests if they were attacked ; but he would have preferred to prevent an attack, and this could be done by the United States government alone. The indifference of President Jefferson to Burr's moA'ements astounded many persons besides Yrujo. " It is astonishing," wrote Merry in November ,i " that the Governraent here should have remained so long in ignorance of the intended design as even not to know with cer tainty at this moment the object of the preparations whicii they have learned are now making." Merry would have been still more astonished had he been told that the President was by no means ignorant of Burr's object ; and Yrujo might well be perplexed to see that ignorant or not, the President had taken no measure for the defence of New Orleans, and that the time had passed when any measure could be taken. The city was in Wilkinson's hands. Even of the five small gunboats which were meant to be stationed at 1 Merry to C. J Fox, Nov. 2, 1806 ; MSS. British Archives. M jd 1806. BURR'S PREPARATIONS. 207 the mouth of the Mississippi, only one was actually there. That Burr and Wilkinson should meet resist ance at Ncav Orleans Avas not to be imagined. Yrujo saw no chance of checking them except in Ohio and Kentucky. CHAPTER XII. Had Burr succeeded in carrying out his original plan of passing the Falls of the Ohio as early as November 15, he might have reached Ncav Orleans Avith all his force ; but he made too many delays, and tried too far the patience of Ohio. October 1 he returned from Nashville to Lexington, Avliere he Avas joined by Blennerhassett and Allston. From that moment he was beset by difficulties and growing opposition. As yet the Government at Washington had not moved, and Burr freely said that his military prepara tions were made with its knowledge and for the probable event of Avar with Spain ; but he had not foreseen that these tactics might rouse against him the class of men from whom he had least reason to expect opposition. In Kentucky a respectable body of old Federalists still existed, with Humphrey Marshall at their head. The United States District Attorney, Joseph H. Daveiss, was also a Federalist, left in office by Jefferson. Burr's admirers were Republicans, so numerous that the President shrank from alienating them by denouncing Burr, Avhile they in their turn Avould not desert Burr until the 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 269 President denounced him. The Federalists saAv here a chance to injure their opponents, and used it. As early as the year 1787 Governor Mir5, the Spanish ruler of Louisiana, tried to organize a party in Kentucky for establishing an independent empire Avest of the AUeghanies under the protection of Spain. His chief agent for that purpose was James Wilkin- son.i The movement receiA'ed no popular support, and failed ; but during the next ten years the Spanish governors who succeeded Mirb maintained relations Avith Wilkinson and his friends, always hoping that some change in American politics would bring their project into favor. Godoy's policy of conciliation with America crossed these intrigues. His treaty of 1795 did rauch to neutralize them, but his delivery of Natchez in 1798 did more. The settlement of boun dary came at a moment when Kentucky, under the lead of Jefferson and Breckenridge, seemed about to defy the United States government, and when the celebrated Kentucky Resolutions promised to draw the Western people into the arms of Spain. Talleyrand's indignation at Godoy's conduct ^ Avas not more acute than the disgust felt by the Spanish officials at New Orleans. Thc Spanish intrigues among the Republicans of Kentucky Avere not AvhoUy unknown to the Federalists iu that State; and as time went on, Humphrey Marshall and Daveiss obtained evidence warranting ' Gayarrd's Louisiana ; Spanish Domination, pp. 192-199. ' See History of First Administration, p. 240. 270 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. an assault on the Republicans most deeply impli- cated.i The attempt was a matter of life and death to the Spanish pensioners ; and in a society so clannish as that of Kentucky, violence was not only to be feared, but to be counted upon. Daveiss took the risks of personal revenge, and laid his plans accordingly. Burr's appearance on the Ohio and at St. Louis in Wilkinson's company during the summer of 1805 called attention to the old Spanish conspiracy, and gaA'e Daveiss the opportunity he wanted. As early as Jan. 10, 1806, Avhile Burr was stfll struggling at Washington to save' his plot from collapse for want of foreig' i aid, and Avhfle John Randolph was beginning his invectives in Congress, tlie district- attorney wrote to the President a private letter denouncing the old Spanish plot, and declaring that it was still alive.2 " A separation of the LTnion in favor of Spain is the object finally, I know not what are the means." Assuming that Jefferson was ignorant of the facts, because he had " appointed General Wilkinson as Governor of St. Louis, who, I am conAinced, has been for years, and now is, a pensioner of Spain," Daveiss asserted his own knowledge, and contented himself with a general warning; — 1 MarshaU's History of Kentucky, ii. 376-384. ' Daveiss to Jefferson, Jan. 10, 1806; View of the Presi dent's Conduct, by J. H. Daveiss, 1807. Clark's Proofs, pp. 177-179. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 271 "This plot is laid wider than you imagine. Mention the subject to no man from the Western country, how ever high in offlce he may be. Some of them are deeply tainted with this treason. I hate duplicity of expression ; but on this subject I am not authorized to be explicit, nor is it necessary. You will despatch some fit person into the Orleans country to inquire." February 10 Daveiss wrote again calling attention to Burr's movements during the previous summer, and charging both him and Wilkinson with con- spiracy.^ At about the time when these letters arrived, the President received another warning from Eaton. The air was full of denunciations, waiting only for the President's leave to annihilate the con spirators under popular contempt. A word quietly written by Jefferson to one or two persons in the Western country would have stopped Burr short in his path, and would have brought Wilkinson abjectly on his knees. A slight change in the inilitary and naval arrangements at New Orleans would have ter rified the Creoles into good behavior, and would have made Daniel Clark denounce the conspiracy. The President showed Daveiss's letter to Gal latin, Madison, and Dearborn ; but he did not take its advice, and did not, in his Cabinet memo randa of October 22,^ mention it among his many sources of information. February 15 he wrote to > Daveiss to Jefferson, Feb. 10, 1806 ; View, etc. Cf. Mar shaU's History of Kentucky, ii. 401. ^ See p. 278. 272 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. DaA'ciss ' a request to communicate all he knew on thc subject. No other acts followed, nor Avas either Wilkinson or Burr put under surveillance. Perhaps this was what Daveiss wished ; for if Jefferson pursued his course much further, he Avas certain to compromise himself in appearing to protect Burr and Wflkinson. DaA-eiss not only continued to write letter after letter denouncing Wilkinson to the President, without receiving answer or acknowledg ment; he not only made a journey to St. Louis in order to collect evidence, and on his return to Ken tucky wrote in July to the President that Burr's ob ject Avas " to cause a revolt of the Spanish provinces, and a severance of all the Western States and Ter ritories from the Union, to coalesce and form one goA'- ernment," — but he also took a new step, of which he did not think himself obliged to inform the Presi dent in advance. He established at Frankfort a weekly newspaper, edited by a man so poor in character and means that for some slight gain in notoriety he could afford to risk a worthless life. John Wood was a newspaper hack, not quite so successful as Cheetham and Duane, or so vile as Callender. Hav ing in 1801 written a " History of the last Adminis tration," after getting from Colonel Burr, by working upon his vanity, an offer to buy and suppress the book, it Avas probably Wood who furnished Cheetham with the details of the transaction, and connived at Cheet- 1 Jefferson to Daveiss, Feb. 15, 1806; View, etc. Clark's Proofs, p. 179. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 273 ham's " Narrative of the Suppression," in order to giA'e notoriety to himself. Cheetham's " Narrative " called for a reply, and Wood in 1802 printed a " Correct Statement." Both pamphlets were contemptible ; but Cheetham was supported by the Clintons, while Wood could find no one to pay for his literary Avares. He drifted to Richmond, and thence across the mountains ; until, in the winter of 1805-1806, he dropped quietly, unnoticed, into the village of Frank fort, in Kentucky. Humphrey Marshall and District Attorney Daveiss needed such a man. July 4, 1806, appeared at Frankfort the first num ber of the " Western World," — a weekly newspaper edited by John Wood. The society of Kentucky was alarmed and irritated to find that the " Western World" seemed to have no other object for its existence than to drag the old Spanish conspiracy to light. Passions were soon deeply stirred by the persistency and vehemence with which this pretended Republican newspaper clung to the subject and cried for an investigation. Wood had no fancy for being made the object of assassination, but he was given a fighting colleague named Street; and while Wood hid himseff. Street defended the office. In spite of several attempts to drive Street away or to kill him, the "Western World" persevered in its work, until October 15 it published an appeal to the people, founded on Blennerhassett's " Querist " and on the existence of a Spanish Association. MeanAvhile tAvo men in high position dreaded exposure, — Judge VOL. III. — 18 274 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. Sebastian, of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, and Judge Innis, of the United States District Court. Daveiss was right in thinking the Spanish conspir acy of 1787-1798 closely allied with Burr's conspiracy of 1805. In striking at Sebastian and Innis, he thrcAv consternation into the ranks of Burr's friends, all of whom were more or less familiar with the Spanish intrigue. Senator Adair, bolder than the rest, stood by Wilkinson and defied exposure ; but the greater number of Wilkinson's accomplices were paralyzed. Daveiss gave them no respite. In October Burr's appearance in Kentucky offered a chance to press his advantage. Jefferson's persistent silence and in action left the energetic district-attorney free to do what he liked ; and nothing short of compromising the Administration satisfied his ambition. Burr passed the month of October in Kentucky ; but his preparations were far from complete. The delay A\'as probably due to the time consumed in getting Blennerhassett's money. At last Burr paid to Lynch the purchase-money of four or five thousand dollars for Bastrop's grant. He had already ordered the construction of boats and enlistment of men at various points on the Ohio, and especially at Marietta, near Blennerhassett's island ; but he waited too long before beginning operations on the Cumherland, for not till November 3 did Andrew Jackson at NashA'ifle receive a letter from Burr, inclosing three thousand dollars in Kentucky bank-notes, with orders for the building of five large boats, the purchase of supplieSj 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 275 and the enlistment of recruits, — all of which Avas promptly undertaken by Jackson, but required more time than could be spared by Burr. Meanwhile Burr's affairs were going ill in the State of Ohio. Blennerhassett's foolish " Querist," and the more foolish conversation of both Blennerhassett and Burr, combined with the assaults of the " Western World," drew so much attention to the armaments at the island that Mrs. Blennerhassett, left alone AA'hile her husband Avas with Allston and Burr in Kentucky, became alarmed, and thought it necessary to send them a warning. October 20 she wrote to Burr that he could not return with safety. Thinking the note too important to be trusted to the post, and ignorant of Burr's address, she sent her gardener, Peter Taylor, on horseback, through Chillicothe, to Cincinnati, Avith orders to ask Senator Smith for the address. Tay lor reached Cincinnati October 23, after three days of travel, and went, according to his mistress's ordere, directly to Senator Smith's house, which was in the same building with his store, — for Smith was a store keeper and array contractor. The senator Avas al ready too deeply compromised with Burr, and his courage had begun to fail. At first he denied knowl edge of Burr or Blennerhassett. In Taylor's Avords, " He alloAved he knew nothing of either of them ; that I must be mistaken ; this was not the place. I said, ' No ; this .w^as the right place, — Mr. John Smith, storekeeper, Cincinnati.' " In the end, Smitli took him upstairs, and gave him, with every injunc- 276 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. tion of secrecy, a letter to be delivered to Burr at Lexington. Taylor reached Lexington October 25, found Burr, delivered his letters, and candidly added : " If you come up our Avay the people will shoot you." The following Monday, October 27, the gai-dener started on his return, taking Blennerhassett with him, and leaving Burr at Lexington to face the storms that threatened from many quarters at once. The impossibility of returning to the island was but one warning ; another came from Senator Smith, who dreaded exposure. The letter he sent by Peter Tay lor, dated October 23, affected ignorance of Burr's schemes, and demanded an explanation of them. October 26 Burr sent the required disavowal : — " I was greatly surprised and really hurt," said Burr,' " by the unusual tenor of your letter of the 23d, and I hasten to reply to it, as well for your satisfaction as my own. If there exists any design to separate the Western frora the Eastern States, I am totaUy ignorant of it. I never harbored or expressed any such intention to any one, nor did any person ever intimate sueh design to me." From that moment to the last day of his life Burr persisted in this assertion, coupling it always in his own mind with a peculiar reservation. What he so solemnly denied was the intention to separate the Western States " by force " from the Eastern ; what he never denied was the plan of establishing a West ern empire by consent. 1 Burr to John Smith, Oct. 26, 1806; Senate Eeport, p. 33. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 277 Of disunion Burr never again dared to speak. On that subject he was conscious of having already said so much as to make his stay in Kentucky a matter of some risk. The leading Republicans would have re joiced at his departure ; but to desert him was more than their tempers would allow. Daveiss saAV another opportunity to compromise his enemies, and used it. A week after Blennerhassett and Peter Taylor left Lexington, carrying with them Burr's letter in reply to Senator Smith, on the same day when Andrew Jackson at Nashville received Burr's order, Avith Kentucky bank-notes for the sum of three thousand doflars, the United States District Court opened its session at Frankfort. Within eight and forty hours, November 5, District- Attorney DaA'eiss rose in court and made complaint against Burr for violating the laws of the United States by setting on foot a mili tary expedition against Mexico. Besides an affidavit to this effect, the district-attorney asserted in court that Burr's scheme extended to a revolution of all the Western States and Territories. In the nervous condition of Kentucky society, this attack on Burr roused great attention and hot criti cism. The judge who presided over the court was the same Harry Innis who had been privy to the Spanish conspiracy, and was harassed by the chargea of the " Western World." Daveiss could count with cer tainty upon the course which a man so placed Avould follow. The judge took three days to reflect, and then denied the motion ; but Burr could not afford to 278 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. rest silent. November 8, when Judge Innis overruled the motion and denied the process. Burr appeared in court and chaUenged inquiry. The following Wednes day, November 12, was fixed for the investigation. A grand-jury was summoned. Burr appeared, sur rounded by friends, with Henry Clay for counsel, and with strong popular sympathy in his favor. Daveiss too appeared, with a list of witnesses summoned; but the chief witness Avas absent in Indiana, and Daveiss asked a postponement. The jury was dis charged ; and after a dignified and grave harangue from the accused, Burr left the court in triumph.^ On the strength of this acquittal he ventured again to appear in Cincinnati, November 23, in confidential relations Avith Senator Smith ; but the term of his long impunity was soon to end. October 22, while Burr was at Lexington, Presi dent Jefferson held a Cabinet council at Wash ington. The Spaniards were then threatening an attack upon Louisiana, while Wilkinson's force in the Mississippi and Orleans Territories amounted only to ten hundred and eighty-one men, with two gunboats. Memoranda, written at the time by Jef ferson, detailed the situation as it was understood by the Government : ^ — ¦ "During the last session of Congress, Colonel Burr who was here, finding no hope of being employed in any department of the government, opened himself confiden- ^ Marshall's History of Kentucky, ii. 396. 2 Cabinet Memoranda, Oct. 22, 1806 ; Jefferson MSS. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 279 tiaUy to some persons on whom he thought he could rely, on a scheme of separating the Western from the Atlantic States, and erecting the former into an indepen dent confederacy. He had before made a tour of those States, which had excited suspicions, as CA'ery motion does of sUch a Catilinarian character. Of his having made this proposition here we have information from General Eaton through Mr. Ely ancl Mr. Granger. He went off this spring to the Western country. Of his movements on his way, information has come to the Secretary of State and myself from John Nicholson and Mr. WiUiams of the State of New York, respecting a Mr. Tyler ; Colonel Morgan, Nevill, and Roberts, near Pittsburg ; and to other citizens through other channels and the newspapers. We are of opinion unanimously that confidential letters be written to the Governors of Ohio, Indiana, Mississippi, and New Orleans ; to the district- attorney of Kentucky, of Tennessee, of Loui siana, to have him strictly watched, and on his com mitting any overt act, to have him arrested and tried for treason, misdemeanor, or whatever other offence the act may amount to ; and in like manner to arrest and try any of his followers committing acts against the laws. We think it proper also to order some of the gunboats up to Fort Adams to stop by force any passage of suspicious persons going down in force. General Wilkinson being expressly declared by Burr to Eaton to be engaged with him in this design as his lieutenant, or first in command, and suspicions of infidelity in Wil kinson being now become A'ery general, a question is proposed what is proper to be done as to him on this account, as well as for bis disobedience of orders received by him June 11 at St. Louis to descend with 280 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. all practical despatch to New Orleans to mark out the site of certain defensive works there, and then repair to take command at Natchitoches, on which business he did not leave St. Louis till September. Consideration adjourned. " October 24. It is agreed unanimously to call for Captain Preble and Decatur to repair to New Orleans, by land or by sea as they please, there to take command of the force on the water, and that the ' Argus ' and tAVO gunboats from New York, three from Norfolk, and two from Charleston shall be ordered there, if on a consultation between Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Smith the appropriations shall be foupd to enable us ; that Preble shall, on consultation with Governor Claiborne, have great discretionary powers ; that Graham shall be sent through Kentucky on Burr's trail, with discretionary powers to consult confidentially with the Governors to arrest Burr if he has made himself liable. He is to have a commission of Governor of [Upper] Louisiana, and Dr. Browne is to be removed. Letters are to be written by post to Governor Claiborne, the Governor of Missis sippi, and Colonel Freeman to be on their guard against any surprise of our posts or vessels by him. The ques tion as to General Wilkinson postponed till Preble's departure, for future information," Although these measures provided no protection against the chance of Wilkinson's misconduct, they could not fail to put an instant stop to Burr's activity. All that remained was to carry them out. Unfortunately Gallatin found that his hands and those of Robert Smith were tied by Acts of Congress. The next day the Cabinet met again. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 281 "October 25. A mail arrived yesterday from the .westward, and not one word is heard from that quarter of any movements by Colonel Burr. This total sUence of the officers of the government, of the members of Congress, of the newspapers, proves he is committing no overt act against law. We therefore rescind tbe determination to send Preble, Decatur, the ' Argus,' or the gunboats, and instead of them to send off the marines which are here to reinforce, or take plaee of, the garrison at New Orleans, with a view to Spanish operations ; and instead of writing to the Governors, etc., we send Graham on that route, with confidential authority to inquire into Burr's moA'ements, put the Governors, etc., on their guard, to provide for his arrest if necessary, and to take on himself the govern ment of [Upper] Louisiana. Letters are still to be written to Claiborne, Freeman, and the Governor of Mississippi to be on their guard." The result of this Cabinet discussion, extending frora October 22 to October 25, was merely an order to John Graham, Secretary of the Orleans Territory, to stop in Ohio and Kentucky on his way westward and inquire into Burr's movements Graham, following orders received from Madison, reached Marietta about the middle of November, when Burr should have already begun his movement, according to the original plan. Blennerhassett, who had been told by Burr that Graham was concerned in the plot, welcomed him with great cordiality, and talked much more freely than wisely. The infor mation Avhich crowded on Graham at Marietta led 282 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12. him to go at the end of November to Chillicothe, Avhere the Legislature Avas in session, and Avhere he' caused a law to be passed, December 2, empowering the governor to use the militia against the conspira tors. Had this measure, or one equally energetic, been taken by the President three months earlier, it would have put an end to Burr's projects before they Avere under way, would have saved many deluded men from ruin, and would have prevented much trouble at New Orleans ; but Graham's progress was not quite so rapid, even though late, as it should have been. Burr had ample warning. November 25 District- Attorney Daveiss renewed his motion in court at Frankfort, and the court appointed December 2 as the day for hearing evidence. Henry Clay became uneasy, and exacted from Burr a written denial of the projects imputed to him. Fortified with this evi dence to his own credulity. Clay again went into court with Burr, " for whose honor and innocence," he said, " he could pledge his own," and assailed the district- attorney. A second time the scene of outraged virtue was acted. Once more the witnesses vanished. Sen ator Smith saddled his horse and fled ; Adair would not appear ; and the judge lent his weight to the criminal. To crown all, December 5 the grand-jury of twenty-two persons signed a paper declaring that they could discover nothing improper or injurious to the interests of the United States gOA'ernment in the conduct of Burr and Adair. Burr was discharged, 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 283 with enthusiastic applause, without a stain on his character; and to prove its devotion, the society of Frankfort gave a ball in his honor.^ Nov. 25, 1806, was a date to be remembered in the story of Burr's adventures. On that day Daveiss made his second motion in court at Frankfort, wdiile at Washington the Government at length woke to action. An officer, bringing despatches from General Wilkinson at Natchitoches, presented himself at the White House with news so startling that Jefferson imraediately called his Cabinet together. Another memorandum in the President's handwriting recorded the action taken : — " November 25. Present at first the four heads of department ; but after a while General Dearborn Avith- drew, unwell. DespatcheiB from General Wilkinson to myself of October 21, by a confidential officer (Lieuten ant Smith), show that overtures have been made to bim which decide that the present object of the combination is an expedition by sea against Vera Cruz ; and by cora paring the contents of a letter from Cowles Meade to the Secretary of State, with the information frora Lieutenant Smith that a Mr. Swartwout from New York, brother of the late marshal, had been at General Wilkinson's camp, we are satisfled that Swartwout has been the agent through whom overtures have been made to Wilkinson. We came to the following determinations, — that a proc- hunation be issued (see it), and that orders go as fol lows : To Pittsburg, if we have a military officer there ; . . . Marietta, Mr. Gallatin is to write to the col- 1 National Intelligencer, Jan. 12, 1807. 284 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12. lector ; . . . General Dearborn to write to Governor Tiffin, . . . and to write to General Jackson, supposed to be the general of the brigade on the Virginia side of the river; . . . LouisviUe, General Dearborn to write to the Governor of Kentucky ; . . . Massac, General Dear born to give orders to Captain Bissell of the same tenor, and particularly to stop armed vessels suspected on good grounds to be proceeding on this enterprise, and for this purpose to have in readiness any boats he can procure fltted for enabling him to arrest their passage ; Chicka saw Bluffs, giA'e same orders as to Bissell ; New Or leans, General WUkinson to direct the. station of the armed \'essels ; and if the arrangements with the Span iards will permit him to withdraw, let him dispose of his force as he thinks best to prevent any such expedition or any attempt on New Orleans, or any of the posts or mUi tary stores of the United States. (He is also to arrest persons coming to his camp and proposing a concur rence in any such enterprise, and suspected of being in camp with a view to propagate such propositions. This addition is made by General Dearborn with my approbation.) " The orders to Wilkinson were instantly sent. " You will use every exertion in your power," Dear born said,^ " to frustrate and effectually prevent any enterprise which has for its object, directly or indi rectly, any hostile act on any part of the territories of the United States, or on any of the territories of the King of Spain." Persons found in or about the military camps or posts, with evident intention of 1 Dearborn to Wilkinson, Nov. 27, 1806; Report of Commit tee, Feb. 26, 1811; 3 Sess. 11 Cong. p. 408. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 285 sounding officers or soldiers, were to be arrested, and if not amenable to martial law, were to be delivered over to the civil authorities. The orders were remarkable chiefly for the poAver they trusted in the hands of Wilkinson, and the confi dence they showed in his good faith. Yet nothing could on its face be more suspicious than his report. The idea that Burr's expedition could be directed against Vera Cruz was unreasonable, and contrary to the tenor of the President's information from all other sources.^ A moment's thought should have satisfied the President that Wilkinson was deceiving him, and that the city of New Orleans must be the real point of danger. In truth, Wilkinson's letters suppressed more than they told, and Avere more alarm ing than the warnings of Eaton or of Daveiss ; for they proved that Wilkinson was playing a double part. No measure that promised safety could be taken which would not require an instant removal of Wil kinson and a vigorous support of Claiborne at New Orleans. Nov. 27, 1806, the same day with Dearborn's let ter, the proclamation was issued. ^ Without men tioning Burr's name, it announced that sundry persons were conspiring against Spain, contrary to the laws ; it warned all persons whatsoever to with draw from such conspiracy ; and it directed all offi- ' See Cabinet Memoranda of October 22, p. 278. ' Proclamation of Nov. 27, 1806 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ii. Appendix, xcvii. 286 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12. eers, civil and military, of the United States to seize and detain all persons and property concerned in the enterprise. The last chance of stopping the conspirators before they could enter the Mississippi was at Port Massac. Beyond that point they could not easily be molested until they should reach a country more friendly than Ohio or Kentucky to their purposes ; but the Presi dent had reason to suppose that his proclamation came in ample time to stop the conspirators while they were still on the Ohio River. The Governor of Ohio, without waiting for the proclamation, acted promptly. On Graham's re quest, the necessary law was passed, and measures were taken to seize Burr's boats at Marietta. The boats and supplies were brought by Burr's men to Blennerhassett's island ; but finding that militia were about to take possession of the island itself, the conspirators, with Blennerhassett in their company, at midnight of December 10-11, fled down the river, — a half-dozen ill-fitted boats, with thirty or forty men, — and passed the Falls of the Ohio at about the time when Burr and Adair entered NashA'ille. Graham, leaving Ohio, reached Kentucky Decem ber 22, and induced the Governor and Legislature, December 24, to foUoAV the example of Ohio ; but he lost much time between Chillicothe and Frankfort, so that even after driving Burr from Ohio to Ken tucky, and from Kentucky to Tennessee, the quickest 3806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 287 pursuit could not prcA'ent the conspirators from taking their path doAvn the Cumberland. Graham in Ohio heard nothing of Burr's doings in Tennessee, al though since November 3 Jackson's close friend Patton Anderson Avas scouring the country round Nashville for recruits, and had raised a company of seventy-five men. As Burr went farther South, the secrecy of his intimates became more closely guarded, and their movements more obscure. Burr and Adair reached Nashville December 14, and went directly to the river, where their boats were building. By that time Burr was well trained in the comedy he had within the last month so often played. Senator Smith of Ohio began it October 23, by writing the request that Burr's design should be "candidly disclosed," because Smith had fears that it might interrupt the tranquiUity of the coimtry. A month later Henry Clay made the same request. No sooner did Burr reach CloA'er Bottom, where his boats Avere building under Andrew Jackson's charge, than he found himself required to repeat the famil iar formula. Jackson, in company with General Overton as his witness, soon appeared at CloA'er Bottom, and intimated as plainly as had been, done by John Smith and Henry Clay that his own credit re quired a disavowal of designs against thc Union. Burr, Avith his usual dignified courtesy, instantly com plied ; and his denials were accepted as satisfactory by Jackson. On Jackson's part this conduct was peculiarly sur- 288 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12, prising, because more than a month before he had Avritten to Governor Claiborne ^ at Ncav Orleans a secret denunciation of Burr and Wilkinson, couched in language Avhich showed such intimate knowledge of Burr's plans as could have come only from Burr himself or Adair. In accepting Burr's . disavowals, December 14, Jackson did not mention to Burr his denunciatory letter written to Claiborne, November 12, in which he had said, " I fear treachery has be come the order of the day." Like Senator Smith, he was satisfied to secure his own safety ; and upon Burr's denial of treasonable schemes, Jackson, al though he did not write to Claiborne to withdraw the secret charges, went on buflding boats, providing supplies, and enlisting men for Colonel Burr's ex pedition. His motives for this conduct remained his own secret. Many of the best-informed persons in Tennessee and Kentucky, including Burr's avoAved partisans, held but a low opinion of Jackson's char acter or veracity. Eight years afterward Jackson and John Adair once more appeared on the stage of New Orleans history, and quarrelled, wdth charges and countercharges of falsehood and insinuations of treason. "Whatever were the intentions of Colonel Burr," wrote Adair in a published letter,^ " I neither organized troops at that time, nor did I superintend the buUding of 1 Jackson to Claiborne, Nov. 12, 1806; Burr's Trial. Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 571. '^ Letters of General Adair and General Jackson, 1817. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 289 boats for him ; nor did I write confidential letters recom mending him to my friends ; nor did I think it necessary, after his failure was universally known, to save myself by turmng informer or State witness." By that time the people of Nashville had heard what was doing in Ohio and Kentucky. The public impeachment of the conspirators checked enlistments and retarded purchases ; but Burr seemed to fear no such personal danger as had prevented his return to Blennerhassett's island. The Governor and Legis lature of Ohio had taken public measures to seize boats and supplies as early as December 2 ; Burr had been driven from Kentucky, and Blennerhassett had fled from his island, by December 11 ; but ten days later Burr was still fitting out his boats at NashviUe, undisturbed by the people of Tennessee. December 19 the President's proclamation reached NashviUe,^ but still nothing was done. At last some unmentioned friend brought to Burr a secret warning that the State authorities must soon take notice of his armaments. The authorities at Nashville could no longer delay interference, and Burr was made to understand that his boats would be seized, and that he was himself in danger unless he should immediately escape ; but between December 19 and 22 he was undisturbed. The announcement that Graham was expected to arrive December 23 probably decided his movements ; for on the 22d he hastily abandoned all except two of his boats, receiv- 1 Parton's Burr, ii. 87. VOL. III. — 19 290 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. ing back from Jackson seventeen hundred and twenty- five dollars and taking the two boats and other arti cles for his voyage.^ Jackson afterAvard declared that he suffered in the end a loss of five hundred dollars by a note which Burr had induced him to indorse, and Avhich was returned from Ncav York protested. Without further hindrance Burr then floated down the Cumberland River, taking with him a nephew of Mrs. Jackson, furnished by his uncle with a letter of introduction to Governor Clai borne, — a confidence the more singular because Gov ernor Claiborne could hardly fail, under the warnings of General Jackson's previous secret letter, to seize and imprison Burr and every one who should be found in his company. Thus, by connivance. Burr escaped from NashviUe three days after ncAvs of the President's proclamation had arrived. The Government had tAvo raore chances to stop him before reaching Natchez. He must join Blennerhassett and Comfort Tyler at the mouth of the Curaberland, and then move down the Ohio River past Fort Massac, garrisoned by a conipany of the First Infantry, commanded by a Captain Bissell. HaA'ing passed Massac, he must stfll run -the gauntlet at Chickasaw Bluff, afterward called Memphis, where another military post was stationed. The War De partment sent orders, November 27, to the officers commanding at Massac and Chickasaw Bluff to be on their guard. ' Parton's Jackson, i. 322. 1806, ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 291 December 22 Burr left NashA'ille, while Adair at about the same time started for New Orleans on horseback through the Indian country. At the mouth of the Cumberland, Burr joined Blennerhassett, who had with him the boats which had succeeded in es caping the Ohio militia. The combined flotilla con tained thirteen boats, which carried some sixty men and as many stand of arms, the arms being stowed in cases as cargo. December 25 Burr sent a note to Captain Bissell announcing that he should soon reach Fort Massac on his way South, and should stop to pay his respects. Bissell had received neither the President's proclamation nor the orders from the Secretary of War. As an old friend of Burr, he sent a cordial Avelcome to the party. In the night of December 29 the boats passed the fort, and landed about a mile below. The next morning Captain Bissell went in his own boat to pay his respects to Colonel Burr, who declined iuAdtations to break fast and dinner, but asked a furlough of twenty days for a Sergeant Dunbaugh, who had been per- suaded to join the expedition. Bissell gaA'e the fur lough December 31, and Burr's party at once started for the Mississippi. Five days afterward, January 5, Bissell received a letter, dated January 2, from Andrew Jackson, as Major-General of Tennessee militia, warning him to stop any body of men Avho might attempt to pass, if they should appear to have fliegal enterprises in view. The President's proclamation had not yet reached Fort Massac, nor 292 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.12. had Captain BisseU received any instructions from Washington.^ The proclamation, dated November 27, and sent immediately to the West, reached Pittsburg Decem ber 2,2 and should, with ordinary haste, have reached Fort Massac — the most important point between Pittsburg and Natchez — before December 15. The orders which accompanied it ought to have prevented any failure of understanding on the part of Captain Bissell. Bissell's reply to Jackson, dated January 5, reached Nashville January 8, and was forwarded by Jackson to Jefferson, who sent it to Congress with a message dated January 28. Twenty-three days were sufficient for the unimportant reply; forty days or more had been taken for the orders to reach Massac, although they had only to float down the river. That some gross negligence or connivance could alone ex plain this shortcoming was evident ; but the subject was never thought to need investigation by President or Congress. The responsibility for Burr's escape was so equally distributed between the President himself, the War Department, and the many accomplices or dupes of Burr in Kentucky and Tennessee, that any investigation must have led to unpleasant results. Burr for the moment escaped, and everything depended on the action of Wilkinson. Dayton and ^ BisseU to Andrew Jackson, Jan. 5, 1807; Annala of Con gress, 1806-1807, p. 1017. " Jefferson to WUkinson, Jan. 3, 1807; Burr's Trial. Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 580. 1806. ESCAPE PAST FORT MASSAC. 293 the other conspirators who remained in the Eastern States thought it a matter of small consequence whether Burr carried with him a party of sixty men or of six hundred. Doubtless the unexpected energy shown by the people and the legislatures of Ohio and Kentucky proved the futility of attempting to revolu tionize those States ; but if Wilkinson were true to Burr, and if the city of New Orleans should welcome him, it remained to be seen whether the Government at Washington could crush the rebellion. A blockade of the Mississippi was no easy affair, and slow in its results ; England, France, and Spain might have much to say. Meanwhile Humphrey Marshall and his friend Daveiss enjoyed the triumph they had Avon. In spite of silent opposition from the Republican lead ers, Marshall drove the Kentucky Legislature into an inquiry as to the truth of the charge that Judge Sebastian was a Spanish pensioner. Sebastian in stantly resigned. The coinmittee took no notice of this admission of guflt, but summoned Judge Innis to testify. Yery reluctantly Innis appeared before the committee and began his evidence, but broke down in the attempt, and admitted the truth of what had been alleged.^ Before the close of the year Daveiss and Marshall drove Burr and Adair out of flic State, forced Sebastian from the bench, humil iated Innis, and threw ridicule upon young Henry ' Eeport of the Select Committee to the Kentucky Legislature, Dec. 2, 1806; National InteUigencer, Jan. 7, 1807. 294 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 12. Clay and the other aggressive partisans of Jefferson, besides placing Jefferson himself and his Secretary of State in an attitude neither dignified nor creditable. Of all the persons connected Avith the story of Burr's expedition, Daveiss and Marshall alone showed the capacity to conceive a plan of action and the courage to execute the plan they conceived ; but Jefferson could not be expected to feel satisfaction with ser vices of such a nature. A few months later he ap pointed another person to succeed Daveiss in the oifice of districl^attorney. CHAPTER XHI. Samuel Swartwout and Peter V. Ogden, the young men Avhom Burr and Dayton charged with the duty of carrying despatches to Louisiana, crossed the AUe ghanies in August and floated down the Ohio River to Louisville.^ There they stopped to find Adair, for whom they brought letters from Burr. After some search Swartwout delivered the letters, and continued his journey. Adair never made knoAvn the contents of these papers ; but they probably contained the same inforination as was conveyed in the despatches to Wilkinson which came in their company. Supposing Wilkinson to be at St. Louis, the two young men bought horses and rode across the Indiana Territory to Kaskaskias ; but finding that the General had gone down the Mississippi, they took boat and followed. At Natchez they learned that the object of their search had gone up the Red River. Swartwout Avas obHged to follow him ; but Ogden went to New Orleans with despatches from Burr to his friends in that city. 1 Wilkinson's Evidence, Burr's Trial; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 515. 296 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. Among the mysteries that still surround the con spiracy, the deepest covers Burr's relations in New Orleans. That he had confederates in the city was proved not only by Ogden's carrying letters, but also by Eriek BoUman's arrival by sea, as early as Sep tember 27, with a duplicate of Burr's letter of July 29 to Wilkinson ; and above afl, by the significant disappearance of Burr's letters carried by Ogden and Bollman to persons in New Orleans. The persons implicated proved their complicity by keeping Burr's letters and his secret. One of these correspondents was almost certainly Judge Prevost, Burr's stepson, whom Jefferson had appointed District Judge for the Territory of Orleans. That Daniel Clark was another hardly admits of doubt. Swartwout assured Wilkinson of the fact;' but apart from this evidence, the same reasons which obliged Burr to confide in Wilkinson required him to confide in Clark. The receivers of the letters, who ever they were, hastened to make their contents known to every one whom they could trust. Im mediately after the arrival of BoUman and Dayton about October 1, before any serious alarm had risen in Ohio, the town of New Orleans rang with rumors of Burr's projects. The news excited more conster nation than hope ; for although the Creoles had been bitter in complaints of Claiborne's administration and of the despotism imposed upon them by Congress, » Wilkinson to Daniel Clark, Oct. 5, 1807; Clark's Proofs, p. 154. 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILIONSON. 297 they remembered their attempt to revolt in 1768, and were far from eager to risk their safety again. Never theless, the temper of the people was bad ; and no one felt deeper anxiety as to the number of Burr's adherents than Governor Claiborne himself. Nearly three years had elapsed since Dec. 20, 1803, when the Spanish governor surrendered Louisiana to the United States, and tho history of the Territory dur ing that time presented an uninterrupted succession of bickerings. The government at Washington was largely responsible for its own unpopularity in the new Territory, its foreign and domestic policy seem ing calculated to create ill-feeling, and after creating it, to keep it alive. The President began by appoint ing as Governor of Louisiana a man who had no pecu liar fitness for the place. Claiborne, in contrast with men like Wilkinson, Burr, and Daniel Clark, rose to the level of a hero. He was honest, well-meaning, straightforward, and thoroughly patriotic ; but these virtues Avere not enough to make him either feared or respected by the people over whom he was to ex ercise despotic powers ; while Claiborne's military colleague, Wilkinson, possessed fewer virtues and a feebler character. The French Prefect, Laussat, who remained for a time in New Orleans to protect French interests, wrote his Government April 8, 1804, an interesting account of the situation as seen by French eyes : ' ' Laussat to Decrfes, 18 Germinal, An xii. (April 8, 1804); .-Vrchives de la Marme, MSS. Gayarrd's Louisiana, in. 10. 298 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. "It was hardly possible that the government of the United States should have made a worse beginning, and that it should have sent two men (Messrs. Claiborne, governor, and Wilkinson, general) less flt to attract affection. The first, with estimable private qualities, has little capacity and much awkwardness, and is extremely beneath his place ; the second, already long known here in a bad way, is a flighty, rattle-headed fellow, often drunk, who has committed a hundred impertinent follies. Neither the one nor the other understands a word of French or Spanish. They have on all occasions, and without delicacy, shocked the habits, the prejudices, the character of the population." Claiborne began his sway, assuming that the Creoles were a kindly but ignorant and degraded people, who must be taught the blessings of American societj'. The Creoles, who considered themselves to be more refined and civilized than the Americans Avho de scended upon them from Kentucky and Tennessee, were not pleased that their language, blood, and cus toms should be systematically degraded, in defiance of the spirit in which the treaty of cession had been made. Their anger was not without an element of danger. England and France could safely defy pubhc opinion and trample on prostrate races. Their empire rested on force, but that of Jefferson rested on con sent ; and if the people of New Orleans should rebel, they could not be conquered without trouble and e.x- pense, or without violating the free principles which Jefferson was supposed to represent. The colonists in Louisiana had been for a century 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILIONSON. 299 the spoiled children of France and Spain. Petted, pro tected, fed, paid, flattered, and giA'en every liberty ex cept the rights of self-government, they liked Spain ' and loved France, but they did not love the English or the Americans; and their irritation was extreme when they saw Claiborne, who knew nothing of their society and law, abolish their language, establish American judges who kncAV only American laAV, Avhile he himself sat as a court of last resort, without even an attorney to advise him as to the meaning of the Spanish law he administered. At the same time that as judge he could hang his subjects, as intend ant he could tax them, and as governor he could shoot the disobedient. Even under the Spanish des potism, appeal might be made to Havana or Madrid ; but no appeal lay from Claiborne's judgment-seat. Before this temporary system Avas superseded, the Creoles already yearned for a return to French or Spanish rule. They had but one hope from the United States, — that, in the terms of the treaty, Louisiana might be quickly admitted into the Union. This hope was rudely dispelled. Not only did Con gress treat their claims to self-government with in difference, but the Territory was divided in halves, so that it must be slower to acquire the necessary popu lation for a State; while as though to delay still longer this act of justice, the growth of population Avas checked by prohibiting the slave-trade. Years must pass before Louisiana could gain admission into ' Gayarre, Spanish Domination, p. 627. 300 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 1.3. the Union; and even when this should happen, it must be the result of American expansion at creole expense. Jefferson's Spanish policy, which kept the country always on the verge of a war with Spain, prevented the French and Spanish population from feeling that their submission was final. In case of war between the United States and Spain, nothing would be easier than to drive Claiborne away and replace Casa Calvo in the gOA'crnment. Claiborne soon found himself confronted by an opposition which he could neither control nor understand. Even the leading Americans joined it. Daniel Clark, rich, eccentric, Avild in his talk and restless in his movements, distinguished himself by the personal hatred which he shoAved for Claiborne ; Evan Jones, another wealthy resident, rivalled Clark ; Edward LiA'ingston, who had come to New Orleans angry with Jefferson for removing him as a defaulter from office, joined the old residents in harassing the Governor; while the former Spanish officials, Casa Calvo and Morales, remained at New Orleans under one or another pretext, keeping the Spanish influence alive, and maintaining communica tions with Governor Folch of West Florida, who con troUed the Mississippi at Baton Rouge, and with General Herrera, who commanded the Spanish force in Texas. So bad was the state of feeling that when Oct. 1, 1804, the new territorial system was organized, Messrs. Bore, Bellechasse, Cantrelle, Jones, and Daniel Clark, whom the President had named as members of 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 301 the legislatiA-e councfl, refused to accept the office ; while Messrs. Sauv^, Destrdhan, and Derbigny were deputed by a popular assembly to present their griev ances at Washington. Two months elapsed before Governor Claiborne could form any council at all ; not untfl Dec. 4, 1804, was a quorum obtained. No pretence of disguising their feelings was made by the Spanish population. In French minds the power of Bonaparte was a stronger reliance than the power of Spain; no Frenchman wiUingly admitted that Napoleon meant to sacrifice Louisiana forever.^ " The President's Message," wrote Governor Claiborne to Machson, Dec. 11, 1804,^ " has been translated into the French language, and I will take care to have it cir culated among the people. It will tend to remove an unpression whicii has heretofore contributed greatly to embarrass the local administration ; to wit, that the coun try west of the Mississippi would certainly be re-ceded to Spain, and perhaps the whole of Louisiana. So^eneral has been this impression, particularly as relates to the country west of the Mississippi, that many citizens have heen fearful of accepting any employment under the American government, or even manifesting a respect therefor, lest at a future time it might lessen them in the esteem of Spanish officers." Under the remonstrances of Sauv^, Destr^han, and Derbigny, and at the intercession of John Randolph, Congress was induced to yield a single point. The * Laussat to Decrfeg, 18 Germinal, An xii. (AprU 8, 1804) ; ArchivoH de la Marine, MSS. ' Gayarrd's Louisiana, iii. 35. 302 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. Act of March 2, 1805, gave Louisiana ordinary Terri torial rights, an elected legislature, and a delegate to Congress. After its passage, Claiborne wrote to Madison that the people were disappointed ; and in fact the concessions were so trivial as to irritate rather than soothe. Claiborne, whom the people obstinately disliked, was re-appointed governor under the Act, and nothing in reality was changed. Burr visited New Orleans in June and July, 1805. The new Legislature assembled, Nov. 4, 1805, when Claiborne found himself surrounded by a council partly elected by the Legislature, and a Legislature wholly elected by the people. He was soon at odds with both. The leader of opposition was Daniel Clark ; and for a moment in May, 1806, the quarrel went so far that the two legislative bodies were on the point of voluntary disbandment, and a majority of the council actually resigned. The Legislature chose Daniel Clark as their delegate to Congress. Claiborne thought that the choice was made mere ly out of personal spite ; but no sooner did he hear of Burr's disunion scheme than he wrote to Madison,^ — " If this be the object of the conspirators, the delegate to Congress from this Territory, Daniel Clark, is one of the leaders. He has often said that the Union could not last, and that had he children he would impress early ou their minds the expediency of a separation between the Atlantic and Western States." * Gayarrd's Louisiana, iii. 161. 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WfLKINSON. 303 In the same month of May Lieutenant Murray of the artillery, an intimate friend of Daniel Clark, came Avith a Lieutenant Taylor from Fort Adams to New Orleans, and heard the ordinary conversation of society. " Lieutenant Taylor and myself," he afterward testi fied,' " were invited to dine with a gentleman there whose name was on the list before mentioned [of persons engaged in an expedition against Mexico] ; it was Judge Workman. We three dined together. After the cloth was removed, Mr. Lewis Kerr came in. . . . After a number of inquiries about Baton Rouge aud the Red River country, they proceeded to lay open their plan of seizing upon tbe money in the banks at NeAV Orleans, impressing the shipping, taking Baton Rouge, and join ing Miranda by way of Mexico. . . . Wheu I told Mr. Clark that I was calculated on as the oflficer to attack Baton Rouge, he advised me by all means to do it. He urged as an inducement that he was coming on to Con gress, and would do all he could in my favor ; that he would represent to the Government that it would require a large force to retake it ; ancl he further observed that, at any rate, if the Government should be disposed to trouble me, before they could send off a sufficient force I should be in a situation to take care of myself." This atterapt to seduce officers of the United States army into Burr's conspiracy was flagrant ; for al though Burr's name was not mentioned, no one could fail to see that the seizure of goA'er nment money in ' Report of the Committee to inquire into the Conduct of General Wilkinson, Feb. 26, 1811; 3 Sess. 11 Cong. p. 320. 304 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. the banks at New Orleans was an act of treason, and that the attack on West Florida implied a perma nent military establishment on the Gulf. June 7, 1806, the first Louisiana legislature ad journed, and Governor Claiborne felt relief as deep as was felt by Jefferson at escaping the stings of John Randolph ; but although for a time Claiborne flattered himself that his difficulties were lessening, he soon became aware that some mystery surrounded him which he could not penetrate. General Herrera be gan to press upon the Red River from Nacogdoches in Texas with a force considerably stronger than any whicii Claiborne could oppose to him. The militia showed indifference. August 28 the Governor wrote to the Secretary of War that the French population would not support the government in case of hostfl ities.^ September 9 he wrote to Cowles Meade, then acting-governor of the Mississippi Territory, a letter of uneasiness at the behavior of Wilkinson's troops : " My present impressioa is that all is not right. I know not whom to censure, but it seems to me that there is wrong somewhere." The militia could not be stimulated to action against Herrera, and the feeling of hostility between Americans and Creoles was so 'bitter that Claiborne intervened for fear of violence.^ October 6, 1806, the GoA^ernor returned to New Orleans after a tour of inspection. Eriek Bollman had ^ Gayarre's Louisiana, iii. 151. * Gayarre's Louisiana, iii. 153. 1808. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 305 been then ten days in the city, and young Ogden had arriA'cd about October 1, bringing Burr's despatches. According to Bellechasse and Derbigny the creole society was already much excited; but this excite ment showed itself to Claiborne in a display of as sumed stolidity. " There is in this city," wrote Claiborne to the Sec retary of War October 8,' " a degree of apathy at the present time which mortifies and astonishes me ; and some of the native Americans act and discourse as if perfect security everywhere prevailed. ... I fear the ancient Louisianians of New Orleans are not disposed to support with firmness the American cause. I do not believe they would flght against us ; but my present im pression is tbat they are not inclined to rally uncler the American standard." Claiborne's spirits fluctuated from day to day as he felt the changes in a situation which he could not fathom. October 17 he Avas elated because the militia of New Orleans unexpectedly, and contrary to the tenor of all its previous conduct, made a voluntary tender of serA'ices. November 7 he was again dis couraged ; and November 15, and even as late as November 25, he fell back into despondency. During all that time the enemies whom he feared were Spaniards in Texas and West Florida ; the thought of conspiracy among the apathetic Creoles had not yet entered his mind. Yet aroimd him the city was trembling with excite- * Gayarrd's Louisiana, iii. 154. VOL. HI. — 20 306 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. ment ; and of all persons in the city Daniel Clark was the one whose conduct showed most signs of guilty knowledge. A few months later, he coflected affidavits from four or Ha'c of the most important gentlemen in New Orleans to show what his conduct had been. At the moment when Bollman and Ogden arriA'cd, Clark was preparing for his journey to Washington, where he meant to take his seat in Con gress as the Territorial delegate. The news brought by Bollman and Ogden that Burr was on his Avay to New Orleans placed him in a dilemma. Like Senator Smith and Andrew Jackson, his chief anxiety re garded his own safety ; and he adopted an expedient which showed his usual intelligence. An affidavit of Bellechasse,! on whose character he mainly depended, narrated that — - " in the month of October, a very few days before Mr. Clark left tbis city to go to Congress, he called together ' a number of his friends, and informed them of the views ancl intentions imputed to Colonel Burr, which were then almost the sole topic of conversation, and which, from the reports daily arriving from Kentucky, had caused a serious alarm ; and he advised them all to exert their influence with the inhabitants of the country to support the Government of the United States and to rally round the Governor, although he thought him incapable of ren dering much service as a military man, — assuring them that such conduct only would save the country if any hostile projects were entertained against it, and that this would be the best method of convincing the Government 1 Clark's Proofs, p. 145. 1800. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 307 of the United States of the attachment of the inhabitants of Louisiana, and of the falsity of all the reports circu lated to their prejudice. Aud Mr. Clark strongly recom mended to such members of the Legislature as were then present not to attend any call or meeting of either House in case Colonel Burr should gain possession of the city, stating that such a measure would deservedly expose every individual concerned to punishment, and would occasion the ruin of the country." According to Bellechasse, the society of New Orleans betAvcen Oct. 1 and Oct. 15, 1806, was in serious alarm. Burr's intentions formed " almost the sole topic of conversation ; " daily reports Avere arriving from Kentucky, although in Kentucky, down to Octo ber 1, no alarm existed, and Burr's intentions Avere not even developed. Each of the four affidaA'its Avhich Clark obtained, one of them signed by Peter Derbigny, affirmed that about the middle of October, 1806, Burr's projects were the general theme of conversation in the city ; but nothing was more certain than that this knowledge of Burr's projects must have come not from Kentucky, but from Burr's own letters and from the messages brought by Ogden and Bollman. Clark, having thus secured himself from the charge of abetting Burr, sailed for the Atlantic coast, and in due time made his appearance at Washington ; but neither he nor Bellechasse nor Derbigny nor Bouligny, although officers of the governraent, giving each other excellent advice, communicated to Gov ernor Claiborne what they knew about Burr's plans. 308 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. From October 1 to November 25, the projects of Burr were " the exclusive subject of every conversation " in the city, yet the single official who ought to have been first informed, and Avho bore all responsibility, had not a suspicion that any conspiracy existed. Clai borne's isolation was complete. This isolation Avas natural, since all the gentlemen of New Orleans quar relled with the GoA'ernor ; but the same silence Avas preserved where their social relations were friendly. Neither Clark nor any of the persons who talked so much with each other about Burr's projects commu nicated with General Wilkinson, who Avas in full sym pathy with their hatred of Claiborne. Wilkinson stood in relations of close confidence with Clark ; intiinate letters passed between them as late as October 2.i Clark knew that Wilkinson was Burr's most intimate friend ; yet he neither warned Claiborne nor Wil kinson nor President Jefferson, although as early as October 15 he warned a number of other gentlemen who needed no warning, and although October 17 the militia of New Orleans, evidently in conse quence of his advice, tendered their services to the Governor. For two months, between September 27 and Novem ber 25, Burr's emissaries were busy in New Orleans, without suspicion or hindrance from the United States authorities ; whfle every prominent Frenchman in the Territory knew the contents of Burr's letter to Wilkinson as soon as Wilkinson could have knoAvn 1 Clark to Wilkinson, Oct. 2, 1806 ; Clark's Proofs, p. 157. 1896. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 309 them. That Burr had few active adherents might be true ; but nothing showed that Bollman regarded the result of his mission as unfavorable. Toward the end of October Bollman sent letters by a certain Lieu tenant Spence, who reached Lexington in due course, and November 2 deliA'cred his despatches to Burr ; i but whatever their contents may have been, they were not so decisive against Burr's hopes as to stop his movement. The people of New Orleans were careful not to commit themselves, but they guarded Burr's secret with jealousy. They warned no United States official of the danger in Avhich the city stood ; they wrote no letters to the President ; they sent no mes sage to Burr forbidding his approach. This was the situation in Ncav Orleans Nov. 25, 1806, the day when District- Attorney Daveiss at Frankfort made his second attempt to procure an indictment against Burr, and when President Jeffer son at Washington Avas startled into energy by re ceiving a letter, almost equiA'alent to a confession, from General Wflkinson. From the Ohio River to the Gulf of Mexico the conspiracy had numerous friends ; and in New Orleans it had the most alarm ing of all qualities, — silence. MeauAvhile young Samuel Swartwout, after parting from his friend Ogden, had sloAvly ascended the Red River, pursuing General Wilkinson, as Evangeline ' Wilkinson's Evidence, Burr's Trial ; Annals of Congress, 1^07-1808, p. 518. Evidence of Lieutenant Spence, Report of House Committee, Feb. 26, 1811 ; 3 Sess. 11 Cong., p. 312. 310 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. pursued Gabriel, even as far as " the little inn of the Spanish toAvn of Adayes." The military point for Wilkinson to decide was whether he should make an effort to drive the Spaniards back to their toAvn of Adayes, or whether he should allow them to fix themselves on the Red River. The movements of the Spanish General Herrera, who had brought a considerable mounted force to Nacogdoches, were supposed at the moment by many persons to have been made in concert Avith Burr ; but in reality they were doubtless intended only to derange the plan, recommended by Armstrong and Monroe to Jefferson, by Avliich Texas should be seized for the United States, while West Florida for the moment should be left aside. The Spanish gOA'ernment saw the danger, and sent a little army of some fifteen hundred men to the Red River, where they posted a strong garrison at Bayou Pierre, and pressed close upon Natchitoches. The Americans, instead of taking the offensive and advancing .with five thousand men, as Wilkinson wished, to the Rio Grande, were thrown upon the defensive, and trembled for New Orleans, protected only by a French militia which neither Claiborne nor Wilkinson could trust. Under orders from Washington, General Wflkin son reached Natchitoches September 22, and found the Spaniards in force between his oavu post and the Sabine. For a few days Wilkinson talked loudly, after his peculiar manner. War seemed imminent. Septeinber 28 he wrote from Natchitoches a letter 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 311 to Senator Smith of Ohio, the contractor for his suppHes : ^ — " I have made the last effort at conciliation in a solemn appeal to Governor Cordero at Nacogdoches, wbo is chief in command on this frontier. Colonel Cushing bore my letter, and is now with the Don. I expect his return in four days ; and then, — I believe, my friend, I shall be obliged to fight and flog them." Governor Cordero, whose object was probably no more than to restrict American possession Avithiii the narrowest possible limits, withdrew his troops from Bayou Pierre, September 27, to the Avest bank of the Sabine, and left open to Wilkinson the road to the eastern bank. The Spanish forces recrossed the Sabine before September 30, but a week later, October 8, General Wilkinson had not begun his ostentatious march, of some fifty miles, to retake possession of the east bank of the river. On the evening of October 8, General Wilkinson Avas sittii^ with Colonel Cushing, of the Second Infantry, alone in the Colonel's quarters at Natchito ches, discussing the military problem before them, when a young man was introduced who said that his name was SAvartwout, and that he brought a letter of introduction from General Dayton. After some Httle ordinary talk. Colonel Cushing haA'ing for a moment been called out of the room, Swartwout slipped into General Wilkinson's hands a packet 1 Wilkinson to Smith, Sept. 28, 1806 ; Senate Report, Dec. 31, 1807, p. 41. 312 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. which he said contained a letter from Colonel Burr. Wilkinson received the letter, and soon afterAvard retired to his chamber, where he passed the rest of the evening in the labor of deciphering Burr's long despatch of July 29.^ If the falsehoods contained in the letters of Burr and Dayton found any credit in Wilkinson's mind, they should have decided him to follow his old bent toward revolution. Everything beckoned him on. His secret relations, nearly twenty years old, with the Spanish officials guaranteed to him the con nivance of the Spanish force. The French militia of Louisiana, deaf to Governor Claiborne's entreaties, would have seen with pleasure Claiborne deposed. About five hundred United States troops were under Wilkinson's command on the Red River, of whom few were native Americans, or cared for the Government except to obtain their pay. In New Orleans a breath Avould blow away the national authority ; and what power would restore it? If it were tru«, as Burr Avrote, that a British fleet stood ready to prevent a blockade of the Mississippi, the success of the Western empire seemed assured. Severance of the ties that bound him to Dayton and Burr was not a simple matter for Wilkinson. That they were old friends was soinething ; and that all three had fought side by side under the walls of Quebec in the winter of 1776, with the father of young Peter Ogden for a friend, and with Benedict » See p. 253. 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 313 Arnold for their commander, was still more ; but the most serious difficulty Avas that Wilkinson stood in the power of these men, who knew his thoughts and could produce his letters, and who, in case of his deserting thera, would certainly do their utmost to destroy what character he possessed. Whatever may haA'c been his reflections, Wilkinson took at once measures to protect his own interests. Like Senator Smith, Andrew Jackson, and Daniel Clark, his first step Avas to provide against the danger of being charged with misprision of treason. The morning after Swartwout's arrival, Wilkinson took Colonel Cushing aside, and after telling him the contents of Burr's letter, announced that he meant to notify the President of the plot, and that after making sorae teraporary arrangement with the Span iards, he should move his Avhole force to New Orleans. In one sense this avowal was an act of patriotism ; in another light it might have been regarded as an attempt to sound Colonel Cushing, whose assistance Avas necessary to the success of the plot. In any case the deliberation of his conduct proved no eagerness to act. A week passed. Although time pressed, and Burr was to move down the Ohio RiA'er November 15, Wilkinson did not yet warn the Presi dent or the authorities in Mississippi and Tennessee, or thc commanding officers at Fort Adams or Chick asaw Bluffs. About October 15 a troop of militia reached Natchitoches ; and Wilkinson confided his plans to Colonel Burling, who accompanied it. One 314 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. niight almost have suspected that he was system atically sounding his officers. Not until October 21 did he send the promised letter to President Jefferson, and in that letter he did not so mueh as mention Burr's name.^ He spoke of the expedition as des tined for Yera Cruz. " It is unknown under what authority this enterprise has been projected, from whence the means of its support are derived, or what may be the intentions of its leaders in relation to the Territory of Orleans." The communication was so timed as to reach Washington after Burr should have passed doAvn the Ohio ; and it was so worded as to protect Wilkinson in case of Burr's failure, but in no event to injure Burr. After sending this despatch to Washington by a special messenger, Wilkinson wrote October 23 a letter of mysterious warning to Lieutenant-Colonel Freeman, who commanded at New Orleans.^ He wrote also a letter to Burr, which he afterward recovered at Natchez and destroyed.^ He sent his force forward to the Sabine, and passed ten days in making an arrangement with the Spanish officers for maintaining the relative positions of the outposts. Not until November 5 did he return to Natchitoches. 1 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Oct. 20 and 21, 1806; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ii. Appendix, xov. 2 Wilkinson to Freeman, Oct. 23, 1806 ; Wilkinson's Me moirs, ii. Appendix, ci. 3 Wilkinson's Evidence, Burr's Trial ; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 541. 1806. CLAIBORNE AND WILKINSON. 315 Then, at last, his moA'ements became as rapid as they had hitherto been dilatory. November 7 he wrote to Colonel Cushing from Natchitoches : ^ "On the 15tli of this month Burr's declaration is to be made in Tennessee and Kentucky. Hurry, hurry after me ; and if necessary, let us be buried together in the ruins of the place we shall defend ! " He had at last chosen his part ; and having decided to act as the savior of the country, he began to exaggerate the danger. " If I mistake not, we shall have an insurrection of blacks as well as whites to combat." ^ "I shall be with you by the 20tli instant," he wrote to Freeman the same day ; ^ " in the mean time be you as silent as the grave I " He left Natchitoches NoA'cmber 7, and reached Natchez on the llth, whence he Avrote " from the seat of Major Minor" a letter of alarm to the President, confiding to the messenger an oral account of Burr's letter, for Jefferson's benefit : * — "This is indeed a deep, dark, and widespread con spiracy, embracing the young and the old, the Democrat and the Federalist, the native and the foreigner, the patriot of '76 and the exotic of yesterday, the opulent and the needy, the ' ins ' and the ' outs ; ' ancl I fear it will receive strong support in New Orleans from a quarter little suspected. ... I gasconade not when I ^ Wilkinson to Cushing, Nov. 7, 1806 ; Memoirs, ii. Appen di.x, xcix. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. * WUkinson to Jefferson, Nov. 12, 1806 ; Memoirs, ii. Appen dix, c. 316 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 13. tell you that in such a cause I shall glory to give my life in the service of my country; for I verily believe such an event to be probable, because, should seven thousand men descend from the Ohio, — and this is the calculation, — they will bring with them the sympathies and good wishes of that country, and none but friends can be afterward prevailed on to follow them. With my hand ful of veterans, however gaUant, it is improbable I shaU be able to withstand such a disparity of numbers." If this was not gasconade, it sounded much like intoxication ; but on the same day the writer indulged in another cry of panic. He should have written to Governor Claiborne a month before; but having made up his mind to speak, he was determined to terrify : i — "You are surrounded by dangers of which you dream not, and the destruction of the American government is seriously menaced. The storm will probably burst in New Orleans, where I shall meet it, and triuraph or perish ! " If the courage of Claiborne did not, on the arrival of this letter, wholly desert him, his heart was stout ; but he had yet another shock to meet, for on the same day that Wilkinson at Natchez was summoning this shadowy terror before his eyes, Andrew Jackson at Nashville was writing to him in language even more bewildering than that of Wilkinson : ^ — 1 Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 12, 1806 ; Memoirs, ii. 328. 2 Jackson to Claibome, Nov. 12, 1806 ; Burr's Trial. Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 571. 1806. CLAIBORNE AND ^^YILKINSON. 317 " I fear treachery has become the order of the day. This induces me to write you. Put your town in a state of defence ; organize your miUtia, ancl defend your city as well against internal enemies as external. My knowl edge does not extend so far as to authorize me to go into details, but I fear you will meet witb an attack frora quarters you do not at present expect. Be upon tbe alert ! Keep a watchful eye on our General [Wilkinson], and beware of an attack as well from your own country as Spain ! I fear there is something rotten in the state of Denmark. . . . Beware of the month of December ! . . . This I will write for your own eye and for your own safety. Profit by it, and the ides of March remember ! " A storm of denunciations began to hail upon Claiborne's head ; but buffeted as he was, he could only bear in silence whatever fate might be in store, for General Wilkinson, who Avas little more trust worthy or trusted than Burr himself, arrived in New Orleans November 25, and took the reins of power. CHAPTER XIY. For several days after Wilkinson's arrival at New Orleans he left the conspirators in doubt of his inten tions. No public alarm had yet been given; and Avhile Colonel Cushing hurried the little army for- Vard, Wilkinson, NoA-ember 30, called on Eriek Boll man, and had Avitli him a confidential interview. Not until December 5 did he tell Bollman that he meant to oppose Burr's scheme ; and even then Bollman felt some uncertainty. December 6 the General at length confided to the GoA'ernor his plan of defence, which was nothing less than that Claiborne should consent to abdicate his office and invest Wilkinson with ab solute poAver by proclaiming martial law. Considering that this extraordinary man knew himself to be an object of extreme and just sus picion on Claiborne's part, such a demand carried effrontery to the verge of insolence ; and the tone in which it was made sounded rather like an order than like advice. "The dangers," said he,^ "which impend over this city and menace the laws and government of the United States from an unauthorized and formidable association ^ Gayarre's Louisiana, iii. 163. 1806. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 319 must be successfuUy opposed at this point, or the fair fabric of our independence, purchased by the best blood of our country, wUl be prostrated, ancl the Goddess of Liberty will take her flight from this globe forever. Under circumstances so imperious, extraordinary measures must be resorted to, and the ordinary forms of our civil insti tutions must for a short period yield to the strong arm of miHtary law.'' Claiborne mfldly resisted the pressure, with much good temper refusing to sanction either the impress ment of seamen, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the declaration of martial law, or the illegal arrest of suspected persons, while he insisted on meeting the emergency with the ordinary legal nieans at his disposal. Wilkinson was obliged to act in defiance of his advice. Sunday, December 14, arrests at New Orleans began. Bollman was first to be seized. Swartwout and Ogden had been arrested at Fort Adams. These seizures, together with that of BoUman's companion, Alexander, and Wilkinson's wild talk, spread panic through the city. The courts tried to interpose, and applied for support to Governor Claiborne. The GoA'ernor advised Wilkinson to yield to the ciA'il authorities ; but Wilkinson refused, thus establish ing in the city soniething equivalent to martial law. He knew, or believed, that both Judge Workman and Judge Prevost were engaged in the conspiracy with Burr, and he was obliged to defy them, or to risk his OAvn success. The only effect of the attenipt to 320 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14. enforce the writ of habeas corpus in favor of the prisoners was to draw out what had been hitherto concealed, — Burr's letter of July 29. Not until December 18 did Wilkinson send a written version of that letter to the President.^ In order to warrant the arrests of Swartwout and Ogden, Wilkinson, De cember 26, swore to an affidavit which embodied Burr's letter. This step brought the panic in New Orleans to a climax. Wilkinson's military measures were evidently directed rather against the city than against Burr. His previous complicity in the projects of Burr was evident. His power of life and deatii was undisputed. EA'cry important man in New Orleans was a silent accomplice of Burr, afraid of denunciation, and at Wilkinson's mercy. He avowed publicly that he would act Avitli the same energy, without regard to standing or station, against all indi Ad duals who might be participants in Burr's combination ; and it would have been difficult for the best people in New Orleans to prove that they had no knowledge of the plot, or had given it no encouragement. The creole gentle men began to regret the mild sway of Claiborne when they saw that their own factiousness had brought them face to face with the chances of a drumhead court-martial. Wilkinson's violence might have provoked an out break from the mere terror it caused, had he not ' President's Message of Jan. 22, 1807. Annals of Congress, 1806-1 S07, p. 43. 3806. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 321 taken care to show that he meant in reality to pro tect and not to punish the chief men of the city. After the first shock, his arrests were in truth reas suring. The people could afford to look on Avhile he seized only strangers, like Bollman and Alexander ; even in Swartwout and Ogden few citizens of Ncav Orleans took much personal interest. Only in case the fieneral had arrested men like Derbigny or EdAvard Livingston or Bellechasse Avould the people be likely to resist ; and Wilkinson showed that he meant to make no arrests among the residents, and to close his eyes against evidence that could compro mise any citizen of the place. " Thank God ! " he wrote to Daniel Clark, December 10,' "your advice to Bellechasse, if your character Avas not a sufficient guaranty, would A'indicate you against any foul impu tation." In another letter, written early in January, he added,2 — " It is a fact that our fool [Claiborne] has Avritten to his contemptible fabricator [Jefferson], that you had de clared if you had children you would teach tbem to curse the United States as soon as they were able to lisp." Claiborne had brought such a charge only a few weeks before, and Wilkinson must have heard it from Claiborne himself, who had already written to Avithdraw it on learning Clark's advice to Belle chasse. Nevertheless Wilkinson continued, — ' Wilkinson to Daniel Clark, Dec. 10, 1806 ; Clark's Proofs, p. 150. ' Clark's Proofs, p. 151. VOL MI. — 21 322 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u. " Cet bete [Claiborne]" is at jiresent up to the chin in folly and vanity. He cannot be supported mueh longer, for Burr or no Burr we shall have a revolt if he is not removed speedily. The moment Bonaparte compromises with Great Britain will be the signal for a general rising of French and Spaniards ; and if the Americans do not join, they wUl not oppose. Take care ! Suspicion is abroad ; but you have a friend worth having." Clark's business correspondents in New Orleans delivered to Wilkinson a letter which came to them from Burr without address, but which was intended for Bollman.' "For your own sake," said the Gen eral, " take that letter away ! Destroy, and say noth ing of it ! " A year later, when the frightened crew of conspirators recovered from their panic and be gan to turn upon him with ferocity on account of his treason to them and to Burr, Wilkinson wrote to Daniel Clark a last letter, mentioning in semi- threatening language the written evidence in his pos session against Clark himself, and adding, ^ ^ " Much pains were taken by Bollman to induce me to believe you were concerned. Swartwout assured me Ogden had gone to New Orleans with despatches for you from Burr, ancl that you were to furnish proAdsions, etc. Many other names were mentioned to me which I have not exposed, nor will I ever expose them unless com pelled by self-defence. . . ." 1 Wilkinson to Daniel Clark, March 20, 1807; Clark's Proofs, p. 151. 2 WUkinson to Daniel Clark, Oct. 5, 1807; Clark's Proofs, p. 154. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 323 Wilkinson ncA'er did expose them, nor did he molest in any serious degree the society of Ncav Orleans. Had Wilkinson been satisfied to secure the city without magnifying himself, he might perhaps have won its regard and gratitude ; but he could do noth ing without noise and display. Before many days had passed he put an embargo on the shipping and set the whole city at work on defences. He spread panic-stricken stories of Burr's force and of negro insurrection. He exasperated the judges and the bar, alienated Claiborne, and disgusted the Creoles. Nothing but a bloody convulsion or an assault upon the city from Burr's arined thousands could save Wilkinson from becoming ridiculous. Jan. 12, 1807, the Legislature met. Probably at no time had' Burr's project receiA'ed much avoAved sup port, even among those persons to whom it had been confided. Men of wealth and character had no fancy for so Avfld a scheme. The conduct of Daniel Clark was an example of what Burr had to expect from every raan of property and standing. The Legis lature was under the influence of conservative and somewhat timid men, from whom no serious danger A^'as to be expected, and whose fears were calculated to strengthen rather than to weaken the government ; yet it was true that Burr had counted upon this ineeting of the Legislature to declare Louisiana in dependent, and to offer him the government. He Avas to have waited at Natchez for a delegation to bring 324 HISTORY' OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u. him the offer ; and he was supposed to be already at Natchez. The city had been kept for a month in a state of continual alarin, distracted by rumors, and expecting some outbreak from day to day, assured by Wilkinson that Burr with seven thousand men might appear at any moment, with a negro insurrec tion behind him and British ships in the river, when suddenly John Adair rode into town, and descended at the door of Madame Nourage's boarding-house. Judge PrcA'ost, Burr's stepson, was so indiscreet as to announce publicly that General Adair, second in conimand to Burr, had arrived in town with news that Burr would f(fllow in three days, and that it would soon be seen whether Wilkinson's tyranny would pre- vail.i The same afternoon Lieutenant-Colonel Kings bury of the First Infantry, at the head of a hundred and twenty men, appeared at the door of the hotel and marched Burr's second in command to prison. Adair afterward claimed that if he had been alloAved forty-eight hours no one could have arrested him, for he had more friends in New Orleans than the General had ; but even he must have seen that the conspiracy was dead. For a moment his arrest, and a few others made at the same time, caused ex citement, and Wilkinson ordered detachments of troops to patrol the city ; but thenceforward confi dence began to return and soon the crisis passed away, carrying with it forever most of the discontent 1 Deposition of John Shaw, Burr's Trial ; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 573. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 325 and danger whicii had marked the annexation of Louisiana. If Ncav Orleans never became thoroughly American, at least it was ncA'cr again thoroughly French. Unfortunately for Wilkinson's hopes of figuring in the character of savior to his country. Burr's expe dition met Avith an inglorious and somcAvhat ridicu lous end before it came Avithin sight of Wilkinson or his command. After leaving Fort Massac, the lit tle flotflla entered the Mississippi, and in a fcAv days reached Chickasaw Bluffs, where a small military post of nineteen men was stationed, coinmanded Ijy a second lieutenant of artillery, Avho had receiA'ed no more instructions than had been received by Captain Bissell. So far from stopping the flotilla. Lieutenant Jackson Avas nearly persuaded to join it, and actually accepted money from Burr to raise a company in his service.^ January 6, leaving ChickasaAv Bluffs, the flotilla again descended the riA'er until, January 10, it reached the mouth of Bayou Pierre, about thirty miles aboA'e Natchez. There Burr Avent ashore, and at the house of a certain Judge Bruin he saw a ncAvs- paper containing the letter whicii he had himself written in cipher to Wilkinson July 29, and Avhich Wilkinson had published December 26. From the moment Burr saAv himself denounced by Wilkinson, his only hope was to escape. The Presi dent's proclamation had reached the Mississippi Ter- ' Evidence of Lieutenant Jacob Jackson, Burr's Trial; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, p. 683. 326 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14. ritory ; CoAvles Meade, the acting-governor, had called out the militia. If Burr went on he Avould fall into the hands of Wilkinson, Avho had every motive to or der him to be court-martiaUed and shot ; if he stayed Avliere he w^as, Cowles Meade would arrest and send him to Washington. Moving his flotilla across the river. Burr gave way to despair. Some ideas of re sistance were entertained by Blennerhassett and the other leaders of the party ; but they were surprised to find their " emperor " glad to abdicate and submit. January 17 Burr met Acting-Governor Cowles Meade and surrendered at discretion. His couA'crsation at that moment Avas such that Meade thought hira in- sane.i January 21 he caused his cases of muskets, AA'hich had been at first secreted in the brush, to be sunk in the river. After his surrender he was taken to Washington, the capital of the Territory, about seven miles from Natchez. A grand-jury was sum moned, and the attorney-general, Poindexter, at tempted to obtain an indictment. The grand-jury not only threw out the bill, but presented the seizure of Burr and his accomplices as a grievance. The very militia Avho stopped him Avere half inclined to join his expedition. Except for a score of United States officials, civil and military, he might have reached New Orleans without a check. Fortunately neither the civil nor the military au thorities of the national government were disposed to be made a jest. The grand-jury could grant but 1 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 426. 1807. C(;LLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 327 a respite, and Burr had still to decide betAveen evils. If he fell into Wilkinson's hands he risked a fate of Avhich he openly expressed fear. During the delay his men on the flotilla had become disorganized and insubordinate ; his drafts on NeAv York had been re turned protested; he kncAv that the military authori ties at Fort Adams were determined to do what the civil authorities had failed in doing ; and his cour age fafled him Avhen he realized that he must either be delivered to President Jefferson, Avhom he had de fied, or to General Wilkinson, whom he had tried to deceive. Feb. 1, 1807, after sending to his friends on the flo tilla a note to assure them of his immediate return,^ Burr turned his back on them, and left them to the ruin for which he alone was responsible. Disguised in the coarse suit of a Mississippi boatman, Avitli a soiled white-felt hat, he disappeared into the Avoods, and for nearly a month Avas lost from sight. ToAvard the end of February he was recognized in a cabin near thc Spanish frontier, about fifty miles above Jlobile ; and his presence was announced to Lieu tenant Gaines, commanding at Fort Stoddert, near liy. Gaines arrested him. After about three weeks of confinement at Fort Stoddert he Avas sent to Rich mond in Yirginia. In passing through the toAvn of Chester, in South Carolina, he flung himself from his horse and cried for a rescue ; but the officer com manding the escort seized him, threw him back like a ' Blennerhassett Papers, p. 206. 328 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. -Ch.u. child into the saddle, and marched on. Like many another man in American history. Burr felt at last the physical strength of the patient and long-suffering government which he had so persistently insulted, outraged, and betrayed. Not until the end of March, 1807, did Burr reach Richmond ; and in the mean while a Avhole session of -Congress had passed, revolution after revolution had taken place in Europe, and a new series of political trials had begun for President Jefferson's troubled Administration. The conspiracy of Burr was a mere episode, which had little direct connection with foreign or domestic politics, and no active popular sup port in any quarter. The affairs of the country at large felt hardly a perceptible tremor in the midst of the excitement Avliich convulsed New Orleans; and the general public obstinately refused to care what Burr was doing, or to believe that he was so insane as to expect a dissolution of the Union. In spite of the President's proclamation of Nov. 27, 1806, no special interest was roused, and even the Congress which met a few days later, Dec. 1, 1806, at first shoAved indifference to Burr and his affairs. If this was a matter for blame, the fault certainly lay Avith the President, who had hitherto refused to Avhisper a suspicion either of Burr's loyalty or of the patriotism whicii Jefferson believed to characterize Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee. Even the proclamation had treated Burr's enterprise as one directed wholly against Spain. The Annual 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY^ 329 Message, read December 2, showed still more strongly a wish to ignore Burr's true objects. Not only did it allude to the proclamation with an air of apology, as rendered necessary by " the criminal attempts of pri vate individuals to decide for their country the ques tion of peace or Avar," but it praised in defiance of evidence the conduct of the militia of Louisiana and Mississippi in supporting Claiborne and Wilkinson against the Spaniards : — " I inform j'ou with great pleasure of the promptitude with which the inhabitants of those Territories have ten dered their services in defence of their country. It has done honor to themselves, entitled them to the confidence of their fellow-citizens in every part of the Union, and must strengthen the general determination to protect them efficaciously under all circumstances which may occur.'' On sorae subjects Jefferson was determined to shut his eyes. He officially asserted that the Orleans militia had done honor to themselA'es and won the con fidence of their feUow-citizens at a moment when he Avas receiving from Governor Claiborne almost daily warnings tbat the Orleans militia could not be trusted, and would certainly not fight against Spain. By this course of conduct Jefferson entangled him self in a new labyrinth of contradictions and incon sistencies. Until that moment, his apparent interests and Avishes led him to ignore or to belittle Burr's con spiracy ; but after the moment had passed, his in terests and convictions obliged him to take the views 330 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. w. and share the responsibilities of General Wilkin son. Thus John Randolph found fresh opportunities to annoy the President, while the President lost his temper, and challenged another contest Avith Luther Martin and Chief-Justice Marshall. After shutting his ears to the reiterated warnings of Eaton, Truxton, Morgan, Daveiss, and even to the hints of Wilkinson himself ; after neglecting to take precautions against Burr, Wilkinson, or the city of New Orleans, and after throwing upon the Western people the responsibility for doing what the gOA' ernment had been instituted to do ; after issuing a proclamation which treated Burr's armament as a fili bustering venture like that of Miranda; and after sending to Congress an Annual Message Avliich excused the proclamation on the ground that it was an act of good faith toward Spain, although Spain took no such A'iew of it, — Jefferson could not reasonably expect the opposition in Congress to accept without a protest sudden legislation resting on the theory that the Constitution and the Union were in danger. The month of December, 1806, passed at Washing ton without producing a public display of uneasiness on the President's part ; the Government Avas waiting to hear from Kentucky and Ohio. Outwardly Jeffer son continued to rely on the patriotism of the people of Louisiana, but inwardly he was troubled with fears. December 22 Robert Smith, anxious to save himself from possible calamity, wrote to him a letter of remonstrance. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 331 " In the course of our various comraunications," said Smith,' " Ln relation to the movements of Colonel Burr in the Western country, I have from time to time expressed the opinions which, as they were not at all countenanced by any of the other gentlemen, I did not deem it expe dient to press upon your attention. ... If , as was pro posed on the 24th of October, the sloops-of-war and the gunboats stationed at Washington, New York, Norfolk, and Charleston had been sent to New Orleans under the command of Commodore Preble, with Captain Decatur second in command, we would at this time have nothing to apprehend from the mUitary expedition of Colonel Burr. Such a naval force joined to the ketches and gun boats now on the Mississippi, would beyond a doubt have been sufficient to suppress such an enterprise. But this step, momentous as it was, the Executive could not take consistently with the limitations of existing statutes ancl Avitli the spirit manifested by the House of Represen tatives at their last session. The approaching crisis Avill, I fear, be a melancholy proof of the want of fore cast in so circumscribing the Executive within such uaiTow limits." Robert Sraith, conscious of being the person whom Congress most distrusted, grasped at the idea of free ing himself from restraint, and did not stop to ask whether Burr's impunity were due to want of forecast iu Congress or in the Executive. He was alarmed ; and the President's reply to his letter showed that Jefferson was equally uncomfortable."'' 1 Robert Smith to Jefferson, Deo. 22, 1806 ; Jefferson MSS. = Jefferson to Robert Smith, Dec. 23, 1806 ; Jefferson MSS. 332 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u. " What I had myself in contemplation," the President answered, " was to wait till we get news from LouisvUle of December 15, the day of Burr's proposed general ren dezvous. The post comes from thence in twelve days. The maU next expected wUl be of that date. If we then flud that his force has had no effectual opposition at either Marietta or Cincinnati, and will not be stopped at LouisvUle, then, without depending ou the opposition at Fort Adams (though I have more dependence on that than any other) , I should propose to lay the whole mat ter before Congress, ask an immediate appropriation for a naval equipment, and at the same time order twenty thousand militia, or volunteers, from the Western States to proceed down the river to retake New Orleans, pre suming our naval equipment would be there before them. In the mean time I would recommend to you to be get ting ready and giving orders of preparation to the officers and vessels which we can get speedUy ready." Not a trace of confidence in the people of Louisiana Avas to be detected in this plan of operations. The duty of the government not only to act, but to act AAdtli extreme quickness and vigor, before Burr should come within a long distance of New Orleans, was avowed. The idea of calling out twenty thousand men to retake New Orleans showed a degree of alarm contrasting strongly with the equanimity that pre ceded it, and with the inertness which had allowed such an emergency to arise. The difference of tone between this letter and the President's public lan guage was extreme. Nevertheless, the Western mail arrived, bringing news that the State of Ohio had 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 333 seized the greater part of Burr's boats, that six or eight had escaped, and that Burr had gone to Nash ville ; and in this partly satisfactory report the Presi dent saw reason for further silence. Next came, Jan. 2, 1807, Wflkinson's letter of November 12 frora Nat chez, with its pledge to perish in New Orleans, and Avith messages, not trusted to writing, but orally imparted to the messenger, about Burr's cipher letters and their contents. Still the President made no sign. For want of some clew his followers were greatly perplexed ; and men like John Randolph, who hated the President, and Samuel Smith, who did not love hira, began to suspect that at last the Administration was fairly at a standstill. Randolph, with his usual instability, swayed between extremes of scepticism. At one moment he believed that the situation was most serious ; at another, that the conspiracy was only a Spanish intrigue. January 2 he wrote to Monroe, in London, a letter full of the conviction that Spain was behind Burr : ^ "I am informed also, through a very direct and respectable channel, that there is a considerable party about Lexington and Frankfort highly propitious to his views, and Avith strong Spanish prepossessions. Some names which have been mentioned as of the number would astonish you." Jefferson's conduct irritated him more than that of Burr or Yrujo : — "The state of things here is indeed unexampled. Al though the newspapers teem with rumors dangerous to ' Randolph to Monroe, Jan. 2, 1807 ; Monroe MSS. 334 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch u. the peace and safety of the Union, and notwithstanding Government give full faith and credit to the existence of a formidable conspiracy, and have given information and instructions to the several State authorities how to act (under whicii Ohio has done herself much honor), yet not one syllable has been communicated to Congress on the subject. There are some other curious circumstances which I raust reserve for oral communication, not caring to trust them by letter. One fact, however, ought not to be omitted. The army (as it is called) is in the most contemptible state, unprovided with everything, and men and officers unacquainted with their duties." In what state Randolph expected the army to be, after six years of such legislation as his, could not be guessed. Officers and soldiers, distributed by companies, in forts hundreds of miles distant from each other, could hardly become acquainted with any other duties than those of a frontier garrison. General Smith did not, like Randolph, complain of others for the consequences of his own acts. He too wrote at that moment a confidential letter, de scribing the situation, to his brother-in-law, Wflson Cary Nicholas : ^ — " I fear that Burr will go down the river and give us trouble. The proclamation, it seems, in the Western country is very little attended to. They, no doubt, see ing no exertion making, consider that it has originated from false information. The President has not yet given any kind of information to Congress, and gentlemen 1 Samuel Smith to W. C. Nicholas, Jan. 9, 1807 ; Nicholas MSS. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 335 (GUes among the number) will not believe tbat there is any kind of danger. . . . Burr's letter to WUkinson is explicit. (This is secret.) He had passed the Alleghany never, never to return ; his object. New Orleans, — open and avowed. And yet not one step taken, except tbe proclamation ! Duane calls on Congress to act. How can Congress .act? Would you force from the Executive the information they are unwilling to give? This would be imprudent. I have (with consent of the President) in troduced a Resolution proposing an addition to our mili tary estabUshment. Will it pass? That I can't teU. . . . It is curious that the nation should depend on the unauthorized exertions of a raan whose honor and fidelity were doubted by all except a very, very few, not flve in the United States, for its preservation and character. Had he not disclosed the conspiracy, the President would have folded his arms and let the storm collect its whole strength. Even now, not an energetic measure has been taken except by him [WUkinson] and Tiflfin." Another week passed. Then at last, January 16, John Randolph rose in the House and moved a Reso lution asking the President what he knew about Burr's affairs, and what he had done or meant to do in the niatter. " The United States are not only threatened with external war," Randolph said, " but with conspiracies and treasons, the more alarming from their not being defined ; and yet we sit and adjourn, adjourn and sit, take things as schoolboys. do as we are bid, and ask no questions ! " His Reso lution annoyed the democrats; but his sneers were more convincing than his arguments, and after some 336 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14. contradictory and unorganized resistance, a majority supported him. The Resolution was adopted and sent to the President. Two days afterward, January 18, Wilkinson's de spatches from New Orleans to December 18, erabrac ing his first written version of Burr's cipher despatch reached Washington. The country learned that Wib kinson had arrested Bollman and other accomplices of Burr, and in defiance of their legal rights had shipped them to Washington for trial. Jefferson was obliged to decide whether he should sustain or re pudiate Wilkinson ; and in the light of Burr's revela tions and Wilkinson's quasi confession, he could not deny that a serious conspiracy existed, or affirm that the General had gone beyond the line of duty, even though he had violated the laws. Dearborn's in structions, indeed, had to some extent authorized the arrests. At that moment if the President had repu diated Wilkinson, he would have only diverted public indignation from Burr, and would have conderaned the Executive itself, which after so many warnings had left such power in the hands of a man univer sally distrusted. Thus at last Jefferson was obliged to raise his voice against Burr's crimes. Thenceforward a sense of having been made almost a party to the con spiracy gave a sting of personal bitterness to the zeal with which he strove to defend Wilkinson and to punish Burr. Anxiety to excuse himself Avas evident in the Message which he sent to Congress 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 337 January 22, in response to Randolph's Resolution of January 16. " Some time in the latter part of September," he said, " I received intimations that designs were in agitation in the Western country, unlawful and unfriendly to the peace of the Union, and that the prime mover in these was Aaron Burr." He had received such intimations many times, and long before the month of September. ' ' It was not till the latter part of October that the objects of the conspiracy began to be perceived." Absolute truth would have required the President to say rather that it was not till the latter part of Oc tober that inquiry on his part began to be made. " In Kentucky a premature attempt to bring Burr to justice, without a sufficient evidence for his conviction, had produced a popular impression in his favor and a general disbelief of his guilt. This gave him an unfor tunate opportunity of hastening his equipments." Complaint of District-Attorney Daveiss was natu ral ; but the reproof was inexact in every particular. The attempt to indict Burr, if any attempt were to be made, was not premature. The impression in his favor did not give Burr an opportunity to hasten his equipments, since Graham appeared at Marietta the same day with the news of Burr's first discharge at Frankfort. Finally, if Daveiss's attempt failed, the fault was chiefly with the Government at Washing- biii, Avhich had taken no measures to direct or to Vol. hi. — 22 338 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14. support it, and whicii was represented on the bench by a judge himseK implicated in the charge. "On the whole," said the Message, "the fugitives from the Ohio, with tbeir associates from Cumberland, or any other place in that quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New Orleans." Yet a conspiracy against the Union existed ; the President communicated Burr's cipher letters ; he proclaimed Burr's expectation of seizing upon New Orleans, as well as the panic prevailing there ; and he approved Wflkinson's arrest of BoUman and Swartwout. Finally, the Message spoke of the people in New Orleans in a tone of confidence quite different from that of Wilkinson's despatches, communicated with the Message itself.^ The Senate interpreted the Message in the sense it was doubtless meant to bear, — as a request from the President for support. Bollman and Swartwout, who would arrive in Washington within a few days or hours, had been illegally arrested, and they, as well as the other conspirators, could not without special legislation be held longer in custody. Giles at once introduced a Bill suspending for three months the writ of habeas corpus with respect to such persons ; and the necessity of this measure seemed so obvious to the Senate that the Rules were suspended by unanimous consent, and the Bill was passed on the 1 WUkinson to Jefferson, Dec. 14, 1806 ; Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 1009. 1807. C0LL.4PSE OF THE CONSPIRACY 339 same day through all its stages. Bayard alone voted against it.^ Monday, January 26, the Bill was brought before the House, and Eppes of Virginia, the President's son-in-law, immediately moved its rejection. The debate that foUowed was curious, not only on account of the constitutional points discussed, but also on account of the division of sentinient among the President's friends, who quoted the Message to prove that there was no danger to public safety such as called for a suspension of habeas corpus, and appealed to the sarae Message to proA'e the existence of a more wanton and malignant insurrection than any that had ever before been raised against the Govern ment. John Randolph intimated that the President was again attempting to evade responsibility. "It appears to my mind," said he, " like an oWique attempt to cover a certain departure from au established kw of the land, and a certain violation of the Constitu tion of the United States, which we are told have been committed in this country. Sir, recollect tbat Congress met on the flrst of December; that the President had information of the incipient stage of this conspiracy about the last of September ; that the proclamation issued before Congress met; and yet that no suggestion, either from the Executive or frora either branch of tbe Legislatm-e, has transpired touching the propriety of sus pending the Avrit of habeas corpus until this violation has taken place. I will never agree in this side way to cover up such a violation by a proceeding highly dan- » Diary of J. Q. Adams (Jan. 23, 1807), i. 445. 340 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 14. gerous to the Uberty of the country, or to agree that this invaluable privUege shall be suspended because it has been already violated, — and suspended, too, after the cause, if any there was for it, has ceased to exist. . . . With whatever epithets gentlemen may dignify this conspiracy, ... 1 think it nothing more nor less than an intrigue ! " Tlic Bill was accordingly rejected by the great ma jority of one hundred and thirteen to nineteen. On the sarae day the attorney-general applied to Judge Cranch of the District Court for a warrant against Bollman and SAvartwout on the charge of treason, fil ing Wilkinson's affidaA'it and a statement given under oath by \Yilliain Eaton in support of the charge. The Avarrant Avas issued ; Bollman and SwartAvout at once applied to the Supreme Court, then in session, for a Avrit of habeas corpus. February 13 Chief-Justice MarshaU granted the writ ; February 16 their coun sel nioved for their discharge ; and February 21 the chief-justice decided that sufficient evidence of levy ing war against the United States had not been pro duced to justify the commitment of SAvartwout, and still less that of Bollman, and therefore that they must be discharged. Adair and Ogden, Avho had been sent to Baltimore, were liberated by Judge Nicholson. The friends of the Administration, exasperated at this failure of justice, again talked of impeaching the judges.! Giles threatened to move an amendment of ' Diary of J. Q. Adams (Feb. 21, 1807), i. 459. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 341 the Constitution taking all criminal jurisdiction from the Supreme Court. Meanwhile Randolph and the Federalists assailed Wilkinson, and by implication tbe President. They brought forward a Resolution declaring the expediency of making further provision by laAV for securing the privilege of habeas corpus ; and in the Avarm debate raised by this manoeuvre John Randolph made himself conspicuous by slurs upon Wilkinson, whom he did not scruple to charge Avith double treason, — to the Constitution and to Burr. By a close vote of sixty to fifty-eight this Resolution was indefinitely postponed ; but the de bate showed the settled drift of Randolph's tactics. He meant to attack the President by attacking Wil kinson ; and the President could no longer CA'ade responsibility for Wilkinson's acts. To be thAvarted by Chief-Justice Marshall and baited by John Ran dolph ; to be made at once the scapegoat of Burr's crimes and of Wilkinson's extravagances, — Avas a fate peculiarly hard to bear, but was one Avliich Jef ferson could not escape. Thenceforward the situation changed. What seemed to be the indictment and trial of Burr became, in a po litical point of A'icAv, the trial of Wilkinson, Avith John Randolph acting as accuser and President Jefferson as counsel for the defence, while Chief-Justice Marshall presided in judgment. No more unpleasant attitude could be readily imagined for a man of Jefferson's high position and pure character than to plead before his two most formidable and unforgiA'ing enemies as 342 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u. the patron and protector of a client so far beneath respect. DriA'en by forces which alloAved no choice of paths, he stood by the man Avho had saved him; but in order to understand precisely Avhat he ef fected in sustaining Wilkinson, Americans must look in the archiA'cs of the King of Spain for knowledge of- facts disbelieved by the President of the United States. "According to appearances," wrote Yrujo Jan. 28, 1807,^ " Spain has saved the United States from the separation of the Union which menaced them. This Avould have taken place if Wilkinson had entered cor dially iuto the views of Burr, — which was to be expected, because Wilkinson detests this government, and the sepa ration of the Western States has been his faA'orite plan. The evil has come from tbe fooUsh and pertinacious per severance with which Burr has persisted in carrying out a wild project against Mexico. Wilkinson is entirely devoted to us. He enjoys a considerable pension from the King. With his natural capacity and his local and military knowledge, he anticipated with moral certainty the failure of an expedition of this nature. Doubtless he foresaw from the flrst that the improbability of success in case of making the attempt would leave him like the dog in the fable with the piece of meat in his mouth ; that is, that he would lose the honorable employment he holds and the generous pension he enjoys from the King. These considerations, secret in their nature, he coukl not explain to Burr ; and when the latter persisted in an idea so fatal to Wilkinson's interests, nothing remained 1 Yrajo to CevaUos, Jan. 28, 1807 : MSS. Spanish Archives. 1807. COLLAPSE OF THE CONSPIRACY. 343 but to take the course adopted. By this means he as sures his pension ; ancl will allege his conduct on this occasion as an extraordinary service, either for getting it increased, or for some generous compensation. On the other hand this proceeding secures his distinguished rank in tiie military service of the United States, aud covers him with a popularity which may perhaps result iu pecuniary advantages, and in any case will flatter his vanity. In such an alternative he has acted as was to be expected ; that is, he has sacriflced Burr in order to obtain, on the ruins of Burr's reputation, the advantages I have pointed out." Whether Yrujo was right in his theory of Wilkin son's motives might be doubted, but on one point he could not be mistaken. The general-in-chief of the United States Army was in the employment of Don Carlos IV. ; he enjoyed a pension of two thousand dol lars a year in consideration of secret services, and for twenty years the services had been rendered and the pension had been paid.^ 1 Clark's Proofs against Wilkinson, 1809. CHAPTER XV. Jefferson's effort to suppress the scandal of Burr's disunion scheme had its source in motives both pure and generous. Distressed by the factiousness of the last session, he could feel no wish more ardent than to restore harmony to his party. The struggle for the succession threatened to tear from his brows the hard-won laurels which were his only pleasure, and the reward for infinite labors and mortifications. So far as he could, he stifled discussion in regard to the coming change. " The question," he wrote to Leiper of Pennsylvania,' " cannot be touched without endangering the harmony of the present session of Congress, and disturbing the tran quillity of the nation itself prematurely and injuriously. . . . The present session is important as having new and great questions to decide, in the decision of which no schismatic views should take any part." In this spirit the President shaped his acts. Re union in a common policy, a controlling impulse, was the motive of his gentleness toward Randolph and the Virginia schismatics, as it was that of his blindness to the doings of Burr. 1 Jefferson to Leiper, Dec. 22, 1806; Jefferson MSS. 1806. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 345 The Annual Message of December, 1806, was in tended to unite the party on a new plane of action, and to prepare the way for Madison's gentle rule. Foreign affairs were to be allowed to drop from sight; France, England, and Spain were to be forgotten ; Florida was to be ignored ; political energy was to be concentrated upon the harvesting of fruits already ripe. For six years, carrying out the policy of dis charging public debt, Gallatin had pursued his econo mies, in the opinion of many good men pressing them so far as to paralyze Government. The time had come when he could do no more. Twenty-four millions of debt had been paid. Of the remainder about ten millions only could be dealt Avith ; and ar rangements Avere made for discharging these ten mil lions before Jefferson's term should end. Meanwhile the revenue was growing ; the surplus must be dis posed of, and the period of pinching economies inight cease. Henceforward Republicans, Democrats, and Federalists might agree on some cominon system of expenditure. "The question now comes forward," said the Annual Message, "to what other objects shall these surpluses be appropriated, and the whole surplus of impost, after the entire discharge of the public debt, and during those intervals when the purposes of war shall not call for them? Shall we suppress the impost, and give that ad- vfintage to foreign over doraestic manufactures? On a few articles of more general and necessary use the sup pression in clue season will doubtless be right ; but the 346 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. great mass of the articles on which impost is paid are foreign luxuries, purchased by those only who are rich enough to afford themselves the use of them. Their patriotism would certainly prefer its continuance and application to the great purposes of the public education, roads, rivers, canals, and such other objects of public improvement as it may be thought proper to add to the constitutional enumeration of federal powers. By these operations new channels of communication wUl be opened between the States, the lines of separation will disap pear, their interests will be identifled, and their union cemented by new and indissoluble ties. Education is here placed among the articles of public care, not that it would be proposed to take its ordinary branches out of the hands of private enterprise, which manages so much better all the concerns to which it is equal ; but a public institution can alone supply those sciences which, though rarely called for, are yet necessary to complete the circle, all the parts of which contribute to the im provement of the country, and some of them to its preservation." With an air of apology, as though his old opinions were no longer of practical interest, the President added that an amendment to the Constitution would be necessary in order to bring these new functions within the enumerated objects of government ; but to such an amendment he saw no objection, nor did he apprehend difficulty in obtaining it. A broad system of internal improvements ; a national university ; " a steady, perhaps a quickened, pace in preparations for the defence of our seaport towns and waters ; an 1806. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 847 early settlement of the most exposed and vulnerable parts of our country ; a militia so organized that its effective portions can be called to any point in the Union, or volunteers instead of them, to serve a suffi cient time," — these were the objects to which Con gress should devote its energies, in order that when the two remaining years of Jefferson's power should come to an end, the fabric of Republican government might be complete. That Federalist and Democrat could join in accept ing such a scheme of action, and could lay aside for ever their old, unprofitable disputes, seemed no Avild dream. The hope was strengthened by a paragraph of the Message whicii held out the prospect of remov ing another serious barrier to perfect harmony : — " I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may interpose your authority constitutionaUy to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have been so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation, and the best interests of our country have long been eager to proscribe." Almost ignoring foreign politics, Jefferson recom mended Congress to abolish the slave-trade, begin a system of national roads and canals, found a national university, fortify the coasts, and organize the na tional militia; and had Congress been able or will ing to follow promptly his advice, many difficulties Avould have been overcome before the year 1810 348 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. Avhich seemed even twenty years later to bar the path of national progress. Congress, indeed, never suc ceeded in rising to the level of Jefferson's hopes and wishes ; it realized but a small part of the plan which he traced, and what it did was done with little system. The slowness Avith which political movement lagged behind industrial and social progress could be measured by the fate of President Jefferson's scheme of 1806 for crowning the fabric of Republican govern ment. Not by means of the government, or by virtue of wisdom in the persons trusted with the govern ment, were Jefferson's objects destined at last to be partially attained. Notwithstanding the favor shown to internal im provements, John Randolph exulted in the Presi dent's Message, which he regarded as expressing his own views. He scoffed at the Smiths, Crownin shields, and other orators who in the last session had talked loudly of war.^ "The Message," he wrote to Nicholson, "was, as you supposed, wormwood to certain gentry. They made wry faces, but in fear of the rod and in hopes of sugar plums swallowed it with less apparent repugnance than I had predicted." General Smith and the politicians who wanted armaments were annoyed. " We have established theories," wrote Smith, ^ "that would stare down any possible measures of offence or 1 Adams's Randolph, p. 206. "^ Adams's Randolph, p. 208. 1806 SESSION OF 1806-1807. 349 defence. Should a raan take a patriotic stand against those destructive ancl seductive flne-spun follies, he will be written down very soon. Look at the last Message ! It is such that the President cannot recommend (al though he now sees the necessity) any augmentation of the army. Nay I, even I, did not clare to bring forward the measure untU I had first obtained his approbation. NeA'er was there a time when Executive influence so com pletely governed the nation ! " No man of ordinary sense could fail to feel some shame at the recollection of what had taken place in regard to Florida, or to Avish that it might be forgot ten ; and the friends of Madison had every reasoii for ignoring it and for Avelcoming Randolph's foUoAvers back into the party, if they Avould consent to come. The session took character from this spirit of recon ciliation. The first Bill adopted by Congress sus pended, at the President's judgment, the operation of the Non-importation Act passed in April ; and Ran dolph did not fail to suggest that his sarcasms against those who had urged this law were justified by its instant suspension. The next important measure, brought forAvard under the President's patronage, Avas the abolition of the duty on salt ; and Randolph reminded the House that this relief from taxation followed close upon his own strenuous efforts of the year before. Throughout the session Randolph took the tone of a dictator ; and on most questions a majority of the House tried only to vie with him in the race for popularity. Old subjects of dispute were 350 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. laid aside ; the Yazoo claims were forgotten. In regard to the army and naA'y, Randolph was allowed to have his way ; in the case of BoUman and Swart wout, he stopped the attempt to suspend the writ of habeas corpus ; in sympathy with his opinions the House cut down appropriations, refused to fortify Ncav York, declined to increase the army, and reverted to the first principles of the Republican party. The ses sion of 1806-1807 was a perpetual effort to win back the confidence and support of Virginia for Madison, and leave no excuse for defection to Monroe. General Smith thought Executive influence more poAverful than ever, but the President seemed to in fluence only by disguising his weakness. Little or no attention was paid to his wishes. He would gladly have built ships of the line, he would willingly have fortified New York, he would have liked tAvo more regiments to garrison the military posts ; but he could do nothing in face of the reaction which, at Ran dolph's bidding, swept the Southern Republicans bacl^ to their practices of 1801 and their professions of 1798. The force of reactionary feeling was shown in speeches which revealed a dangerous chasm be tween North and South. On the question of forti fying New York, Southern Republicans took ground which caused New York Democrats to feel toward Virginia a disgust as deep as ever had been felt by Burr. Nelson of Maryland favored abandoning the cities altogether in case of attack : ^ " When the 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 389. 1806. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 351 enemy comes, let them take our towns, and let us retire into the country." HoUand of North Carolina regarded the seaboard cities as so many enemies : ^ " If New Y'ork and our other cities were only tolerably fortified, Mr. HoUand was confident tbat we should go to war. He lamented the consequences of that disposition that is for novelty in this country, — a disposition that cannot be quelled. Our commercial towns are defence less, and that is our only safety at present. I want to see not a single ship, or any preparation for war." Eppes of Virginia, the President's son-in-law, spoke hotly against the doctrine of defence : — " If there is any principle which ought to be hooted at in a Republican government, it is the very principle laid down by the gentleman from New Y^ork as the basis of his reasoning, — that to preserve peace we ought to be prepared for war. Sir, it is this very principle Avhich is the source of all the miseries of Europe." John Randolph also favored abandoning New York in case of attack : ^ — " Suppose New York ever so well fortified, an army may land above the city and cut off its intercourse with the country. A fortification there would be made for the enemy. Not a man of our army would have escaped in the last war from Long Island, if the enemy's general had not been treacherous to his duty ; and all the calami ties of that campaign might have been avoided if our army had retreated into the country." 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 598. '^ Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 610. 352 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch 15. Answer to arguments like these was of course impossible. The only final answer was to take the Southern people at their word, and to assert as a principle the rule that seaboard cities, being entitled to no protection from government in case of attack, should have the right to protect themselves by in viting the enemy to occupy them. Boston and Ncav York had no reason to fear the operation of sucli a rule, if it suited the interests of Virginia ; but as an argument even this logic would have availed nothing, because so deep was Virginian antipathy to cities that Randolph and all his friends would have answered with one A'oice, " We expect no better I " The unwillingness of the Southern Republicans to fortify extended only to forts and ships, not to gun boats. Randolph had not much faith in gunboats ; but his friends were willing to spend comparatively large sums on these cheap defences. Their theory was reasonable. A coast Hke that of America could not be protected by fixed fortifications alone, — only some system of movable batteries could answer the whole purpose ; but in such a system everything de pended on the effectiveness of the battery to be selected, and no one could say that the gunboat would prove to be effective. Most sea-going people pro nounced it a failure ; and in the navy, gunboat service was never popular. The real argument for gunboats was their assumed cheapness ; but Gallatin and the Northern Democrats, as well as the Federalists, fore saw that the supposed economy was a delusion. A 1806. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 353 gunboat cost some ten tiiousand dollars or less, and a whole flotilla of gunboats could be built for the price of a frigate ; but no one could say hoAV much this flotilla would cost in annual repairs or in actual service. The life of a gunboat Avas short. These doubts had no effect on the majority of the House. " Fortifications Avill be of no possible service imless they are manned," argued Nelson ,i " and to man them we must haA'e a large standing army.'' He Avanted to know whether the House was prepared to adopt a system that would require the raising of aboA'C one hundred thousand men. If forts Avere of no possible serA'ice unless they were always manned, — new as the assertion was, — surely gunboats were open to the same objection ; yet Nelson wanted to spend three hundred thousand dollars in building gunboats, and he was willing to build any number of gunboats the naA'y might ask for.^ The Northern seaboard representatives rejected the offer of gunboats, and alloAved the Southern States to dispose of them. No appropriation for fortifying New York could be obtained. The theory that sea board cities could not be defended received general assent ; but many, of the meinbers went further, and declared that no danger to those cities existed. A policy of neglecting defence might be safe in peace, when foreign nations had every interest to avoid a war; but nothing could warrant the cominon asser- 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 398. 2 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 400. VOL. III. — 23 354 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. tion that danger of war existed only from America herself, at a moment when France was attackins: American coinmerce by measures of actual warfare, when England was hesitating whether to permit Amer ica to trade at all except with the British Islands, and when diplomatic relations with Spain had ceased, the ministers at Madrid and Washington had been withdrawn, and a Spanish army was threatening New Orleans. Willis Alston of North Carolina, chiefly known as an object of Randolph's peculiar contempt and perso nal violence, took as strong ground as Randolph him self on these questions. On the other hand Josiah Quincy showed in a high degree the art of irritating opponents by his manner of expressing a Ioav opin ion of their sense and motives ; and the Southern members resented this treatment the more because Quincy was a man well born and well educated, whose social standing could not be questioned. In reply to his taunts Alston resorted to the weU-worn commonplaces of the Republican party. " The pres ent Administration," said he, "has taken up a ncAv system of defence, — it is that of saving the pub lic money. This system is new, and not known in Federal times. We have not gone on increasing taxes, like our predecessors." The assertion could not be denied ; but Quincy's retort was not the less pungent. " The Federal Administration," he replied, " saved the country from danger and disgrace : I wish I coifld say as much of their successors." 1806. SES.SION OF 1806-1807. 3.55 The whole issue lay in these short charges and counter-charges. To some extent the President, his Cabinet, and the Senate had become converted to Federalist views ; but the influence of Randolph and ot popular prejudices peculiar to Southern so ciety held the House stiffly to an impracticable creed. Whatever the North and East wanted the South and West refused. Jefferson's Avishes fared no better than the requests of the State and city of New York ; thc House shoAved no alacrity in taking up the subject of roads, canals, or uniA'crsities. The only innovation which made its way through Congress Avas the Act of Feb. 10, 1807, appropriating fifty thousand doUars for the estabHshment of a coast survey, for this was an object in which the Southern States were interested as deeply as the Northern. Even the Senate's appro priation for beginning the Cumberland Road was in definitely postponed by the House. This jealousy of government could not without ill- temper be so severely enforced. Randolph's man ners were unconsciously imitated by the men Avho imitated his statesmanship, and the Southern Repub licans treated their Northern allies with autocratic harshness as offensive as that of Randolph. The Fed eralist members, for the most part able to hold their own and even to return such treatment with manners still more arrogant, enjoyed the irritation of Demo crats Hke Sloan and Smilie, BidweU and Varnum. If thc Southern planters refused to aid in fortifying Ncav York, the Federalists were the stronger for the 356 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. refusal ; and if Virginia was anxious not to risk her tobacco and corn for the sake of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the Federalists for the most part hoped that the Northern cities might be induced to take care of themselves. Yet although the Fed eralists were not sorry to see the Pennsylvania Dem ocrats ground under the heel of Virginia, they were surprised to find how rapidly the sectional spirit in creased in the Southern States when slavery was in question. The debate on the abolition of the slave- trade startled Democrats and Federalists alike. The paragraph in the President's Message which related to the slave-trade was regularly referred to a special committee. Peter Early of Georgia was chairman, while Thomas Mann Randolph of Yir ginia, John Campbell of Maryland, Thomas Keenan of North Carolina, and three Northern representa tives completed the number. Early took the subject promptly in hand, and Dec. 15, 1806, reported a Bifl, whicii was referred to the House in committee, and eame up two days afterward for debate. The Bifl declared the importation of negroes as slaves unlaw ful ; imposed a fine on the importer, with forfeiture of ship and cargo ; and authorized the President to employ the armed vessels of the United States in enforcing the law. Under the Act which prescribed rules for forfeit ure, the cargo of a forfeited vessel was to be sold on behalf of the United States governnient. The cargo of a slave-ship consisted in negroes. Under Early's 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 357 Bill, every negro imported thenceforth into the coun try became forfeit to the United States, and must be sold by the United States governnient to the highest bidder. The Pennsylvania Democrats, imbued Avitli Quaker principles in regard to slavery, could scarcely be ex pected to approA'c of a policy which made the gov ernment an owner and trader in slaves. Tbe Ncav Englanders, though the slave-trade had been to a great extent a Rhode Island interest, Avere little in clined to adopt a laAv under Avliicb any cargo of negroes that might be driA'cn on their coast must be sold at public auction in the streets of NcAvport or Boston ; and perhaps even some of the S(3uthern members might have admitted that the chance of collusion between importers and buyers was a se rious objection to the Bill. No one could suppose that such a measure Avould pass Avithout strenuous opposition, and no one could have felt surprise at seeing Sloan of Ncav Jersey immediately rise to offer an amendment proA'iding that every forfeited negro should be entitled to freedom.^ Upon this amendment a debate began which soon became hot. Early took the ground that without his proA'ision for forfeiture and sale, the laAv Avould bo ineffectual ; that no man in the South would inform against the slave-dealer if his act Avere to turn loose a quantity of savage negroes on the public at large. ' Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p 168. 358 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.u. " We must either get rid of them or they of us ; there is no alternative ; and I leave it to gentlemen to be deter mined which course would be pursued. There can be no doubt on this head. I will speak out ; it is not my prac tice to be mealy-mouthed on a subject of importance. Not ohe of them would be left alive in a year.'' The Southern meinbers supported Early, and the Northern meinbers knew not what to propose. The negroes could not be returned to Africa, because they Avere all brought from the interior, and thc coast tribes Avould re-enslave or massacre them. Pennsyl vania and Ohio were little more anxious than Virginia to receiA'e such citizens. Binding them to masters for a term of years Avas suggested, but objections were made on both sides. The debate was adjourned, resumed, adjourned again ; and although the Northern speakers Avere forbearing, the Southern members more and more lost their temper. " Y'ou have got into a great difificulty," said David R. WiUiams of South Carolina ; ' " you are completely hobbled. It is so bad that you cannot go on, ancl you must stick wbere you are. Let rae ask what is the usual conduct of legislatures on local subjects. Do they not inquire of those who are inforraed ? Are they not guided by those who are competent to judge? The gentlemen from tbe South, who understand this subject, tell you bow this business must be done ; but the gentlemen over the way seem anxious now, as on a former occasion, to draw a revenue from the blood and sweat of the mis- 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 183. 1807. SESSION OF 180G-1807. 359 erable Africans. I will not say that this is tbeir mo tive, but their conduct certainly justifies a suspicion that their object is to pass such a law as will connive at the continuance of the trade for the emoluments of their constituents." The discussion was further embittered by a motion made by Smilie of Pennsylvania to make the impor tation of negroes a felony to be punished by death. This proposition called out another display of Early's frankness. "We have been asked," said he,^ "what punishraent can be considered too severe for so atrocious a crirae. Without answering the question in the abstract, it will be suflleient to answer it by a practical view of the subject. How do people consider tbe transaction? Do they consider it such an atrocious crirae? They do not." The Pennsylvania philanthropists had assumed that they could at least foUoAv Jefferson in holding slavery to be an evil and the slave-trade to be a violation of human rights ; but even these points were no longer conceded. " All the people in the Southern States," continued Early, "are concerned in slavery. It is not, then, con sidered as criminal. . . . I will tell the truth, — a large majority of people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as eveu an evil." The death-penalty was rejected by a vote of sixty- three to fifty-three, almost the whole Pennsylvania delegation voting in its favor. BidweU of Massachu- 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 238. 360 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 15. setts then niOA'cd an amendment, "that no person shall be sold as a slave by virtue of this Act ; " and the House divided, sixty against sixty ,i nearly all the Pennsylvanians supporting BidweU, while ten of the seventeen Nevv York members showed the influence of slavery in their State by voting with the Southern slave-owners. Six Southern men, including the mem ber for Delaware, joined the Pennsylvanians and Ncav Englanders in this protest against- turning the gov ernment into a slave-trading agency ; while but two Northern men besides the members from Ncav York voted with the South. Macon, the Speaker, by his casting vote threAV out the amendment. Even after this point Avas carried, notwithstanding the time Avasted in going over and OA'er again the sarae arguments on either side, the Bill made no progress. Men like Sloan and Smilie were not gifted with great genius, but found infinite resources in their patient obstinacy ; and no one could fail to see that the true sympathies of the House were with them. Their first object was to prevent the forfeiture of the negroes, because forfeiture implied title, and the United States government could have no title in these human be ings, mere captives in war of barbarous tribes ; but on that point the House was decidedly against them, and even Josiah Quincy insisted that they were wrong. Forced to yield on the issue of forfeiture, they resisted Avith the greater obstinacy the sale of the forfeited negroes ; and their objections were so obviously sound 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 267. 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 361 that in spite of adverse votes they held the Bill in suspense, and even secured its recommittal to a select cominittee of their own choice. The Southerners, Avho insisted that their knoAvledge and experience should guide the House on a matter Avhich they then preferred to consider local, chafed under the patient stolidity of Quaker conscientious ness, but submitted, rather in defiance than in conci liation, to throw the Bill into Northern hands. The recommittal Avas ordered Jan. 8, 1807, by a vote of 7fj to 40 ; January 20 the noAV Bill was reported, and the struggle began again as at first. January 28 the Senate sent down a Bill of its owm for the same pur pose. The Senate deba. 3S during the session Avere not reported, and those of the House were reported only in part, and briefly ; but by some means the Senate Avas persuaded to introduce one rigorous provision into its Bill, prohibiting the coastAvise domestic slaA'e-trade in vessels of less burden than forty tons, so that small craft found at sea Avith cargoes of slaves could not escape under pretence of being engaged in the do mestic slave-trade. At best, the Bill could not be effective. The Southern members frankly said that they could frame no Bill likely to be executed, Avliich would jircvent slave-traders from smuggling negroes across the Florida boundary or from the West Indian Islands ; but the prohibition of the coastAvise transport of negroes in small vessels seemed necessary in order to maintain even a pretence of stopping the trade, and the Senate saAv no objection to it. 362 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. The House hesitated painfully between Pennsyl vanian and Virginian influence. Very rarely did the Pennsylvanians assert themselves, and they did so Avith great moderation ; but they were conscientious men, and they had behind them not only the moral support of Jefferson, but also the steady influence of Secretary Gallatin, whose determined hostility to slavery and the slave-trade was proved at every moment of his public life. When, Feb. 9, 1807, the debate was resumed in Committee of the Whole, a majority began by voting in favor of the death- penalty. The next question rose on a noAV section in regard to forfeitures. The Pennsylvania Bill provided that the forfeited negroes should be inden tured for a term of years in some free State or Territory. The proposition seemed reasonable in it self, and calculated to give no offence to the South ; but Early declared that the inhabitants of the South ern States would resist this provision with their Ha'cs.^ " We want no civil AV'ars, no rebellions, no insurrections, no resistance to the authority of the government. Give effect, then, to this Avish, and do not pass this Bill as it now stands." Even Pennsylvania patience was disturbed by an outbreak so extravagant. Smilie, who was Irish by birth, obliged Early to take back and explain away his words ; but the flash of temper answered its purpose, — Early carried his point. Throughout the struggle the Southern representatives took the ground 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 477. 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 363 that the subject belonged to them ; that they were well aware of the defects in the Bill ; that they did not expect wholly to stop the trade, although they Avished to do so ; but that any stronger measure would revolt public opinion in the South, and Avould leave the trade open, because no one would venture to enforce the Act. Under such circumstances, see ing that in any case the trade would continue, the Pennsylvanians naturally argued that if only in order to assert a principle, the law should be made scA'cre ; but they were abandoned by the New Englanders, and beaten. Eleven of the Pennsylvanians clung to the death-penalty in spite of Quaker principles ; while not only Barnabas BidweU, but even Josiah Quincy deserted them. The House ended by leaA-ing to each State the decision as to the fate of the forfeited negroes ; and at length, February 13, weary of the interminable dispute, the House adopted the Senate Bill with some amendments. Hitherto John Randolph had taken little part in the debate ; he voted steadily Avith the Southern rep resentatives, but his well-knoAvn antislavery theories kept him quiet. His silence did not last. The Senate disagreed to one of the amendments Avliich had passed the House ; a cominittee of conference reported, and the Bill came up again on their report. In a final debate the Southern members attacked the prohibition of the coastwise trade, the Avhole mea sure being thus in their eyes A'itiated. Early declared that the Act would not prevent the introduction of 364 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15; a single slave ; Randolph asserted that the coastwise prohibition touched the right of private property : ^ " He feared lest, at a future period, it might be made the pretext of universal emancipation ; he had rather lose the Bill, he had rather lose all the Bills of the session, he had rather lose every Bill passed since the establishment of the government, than agree to the provision contained in this slave-bill. It went to blow up the Constitution in ruins." He prophesied that if ever the time of disunion between the States should arrive, the line of severance would not be between Eastern and Western, but between slave- holding and non-slaveholding States. He said that if ever the time should come when the South should have to depend on the North for assistance against the slaves, he should despair. " All he asked Avas that the North should remain neutral ; that it should not erect itself into an abolition society." The vehe mence of the Southern orators was in this instance natural, for the coastAvise prohibition cut far more deeply into the constitutional rights of slave-owners than all the other provisions of the Bill Avliich they had so obstinately and successfully resisted ; yet on the division they were beaten by the large majority of sixty-three to forty-nine. New York, whicii cared little for the slaves, cared less for the Constitution, and reversed its former vote. The Senate Bill, Feb. 26, 1807, Avas sent to the President.^ 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 626. 2 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 635. 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 365 That Randolph and other State-rights Republi cans should be deeply irritated was a inatter of course. In their effort to tone the Bill to make it suit the opinions of slaveholding communities, they exhausted their strength and the public patience ; and they found a precedent slipped upon them, which would warrant alraost any legislative interference with slavery. Randolph, aliA'e to the bearings of all legislation Avhich touched his class interests, at once introduced a Bill to explain and amend the Act. Josiah Quincy promptly moA'cd its reference. The day was February 27, and in another week the Ninth Congress Avould expire. Randolph opposed the refer ence, and urged the immediate passage of his BiU, but was defeated by a vote of sixty to forty-nine. His Bill Avas referred to the House in coinmittee; it was even made an order for the next day, but it was never taken up. Randolph declared the hope that should his Bill fail, the Virginia delegation would wait on the Presi dent and remonstrate against his signing the Act for Prohibiting the Slave Trade ; but no such step was taken, and March 2, 1807, President Jefferson ap proved this alarming measure. He at least had no constitutional scruples, and paid no attention to the scruples of others. The only result of the long sec tional struggle Avas to disgust the Southern Republi cans and their Pennsylvanian allies alike ; while, so far from obtaining a law which should suit Southern vicAvs of the slave-trade, tlieir Act shocked the pride 366 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15. and threatened the property of every slave-owner in the South. The disasters of the Southern, or what was after ward knoAvn as the State-rights, party were largely due to temper. The habit of conimand, giving self- confidence and vigor of will, opened a boundless field for extravagances. The strength of men like Randolph and Early was their chief weakness ; they had CA'cry sense except the sense of proportion. The mole-hill which tripped them seemed as serious an obstacle as the distant mountain range, where a false step would dash them to fragments; and AA^hen at last they reached the mountain range, Avith its impassable chasms, where temper was helpless, they saAV in it only a mole-hill. That men like Sloan, the butt of the house, and like Smilie and Findley, the ordinary representatives of an intellectual medio crity somewhat beneath the Pennsylvanian average, shoifld habitually end in carrying their points, in singular and unexpected ways, against the ablest leaders of New England Federalism and the most gifted masters of Virginian oratory ; that they should root up everything in their path, and end by giving to the whole country the characteristics of their own common-place existence, — was partly due, not to their energy or their talents, but to the contempt which their want of genius inspired. Not their own wisdom, but their antagonists' errors decided the result, and overthrew successively Church and State in New England and a slave-owning oligarchy 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 367 throughout half the continent. The Southern gentry could not learn patience. John Randolph, in many respects the most gifted man produced by the South in his generation, and certainly the one Avho most exaggerated the peculiar qualities and faults of his class, flung away the adA'antages of every success by attempting to punish his opponents, — as though the hare had stopped in his race to beat the tortoise with a whip. Punishment of Pennsylvania Demo crats was waste of time and strength ; sarcasm did not affect them ; social contempt did not annihilate them ; defeats made no impression upon them. They had no leaders and no well-defined policy, but they gravitated like inert Aveights to an equi librium. What they wanted they were sure in the end to get. Randolph's disappointment in regard to the slave- bill was but a single example of a law. After domi neering over the House during the whole session, and impressing his own character upon its acts, he at tempted at the end to coerce it into a quarrel with the Senate. A Bill for repealing the salt-tax and continuing the Mediterranean Fund was sent to the Senate, and the Senate sent it back with an amend ment Avhich reduced the duty on salt from twenty cents a bushel to twelve cents, without wholly abolish ing it. Usage and courtesy required that a committee of conference should be appointed ; but Randolph insisted that the House should abruptly adhere to its original Bill, and he carried his point by the large 368 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cu. 16. majority of ninety-three to twenty .^ The Senate ac cepted the challenge, and in its turn voted to adhere. The Bill was lost ; and while the salt-tax continued in force, producing some five hundred thousand dob lars, the Mediterranean Fund, producing one million two hundred thousand dollars, must expire by limi tation. Congress reached this point February 26, the same day Avhen the slave-bill was passed against Randolph's protest. The Pennsylvania members allowed themselves to be drawn into this step ; but they had hardly given their votes before waking to their mistake. The next day a committee was moved to reconsider •the subject ; and in spite of Randolph's reiiion- Svi ances, the niotion Avas carried by sixty to forty, every Pennsylvanian changing his vote. Randolph, exasperated to the last degree, attempted to block the measure by obstinacy. When the new Bill was taken up in committee of the whole. House February 28, he consumed the day in dilatory motions, calling the yeas and nays until he could no longer induce one fifth of the members to support him in asking for them. The House sat until half-past one in the niorning ; and when at last the Bill came to a vote, Randolph and his friends left the House without a quorum.^ After several counts, a quorum was reported, and the Bill was passed ; but the yeas and nays were not taken, and many suspicions were ex- 1 Annals of Congress, 1806-1807, p. 635. * Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 464. 1807. SESSION OF 1806-1807. 369 pressed that a quorum was not actually present. Nevertheless the Pennsylvanians won their victory ; the Bill became law at the last moment of the session. Randolph's conduct ended in destroying his own influence ; and the Pennsylvanians felt that the time had come when an alliance with the Democrats of New England against the oligarchy of Virginia could no longer be postponed. This Avas the situation at Washington Avhen, on the last day of the Ninth Congress, a messenger arrived from England bringing from Monroe and Pinkney a treaty of commerce. The President's at tempt to unite his party on a liberal domestic policy had not succeeded ; and many years were to pass be fore Congress should see another session devoted to domestic affairs. VOL. III. — 24 CHAPTER XVL While the summer of 1806 was passing in America, carrying Burr and his insane projects to failure. Gen eral Armstrong in Paris Avas Avatching the progress of another adventurer, whose plans were as dark as those of Burr, but whose genius was of a very differ ent order. Talleyrand's mysterious instructions re garding Florida were given to Armstrong early in September, 1805. Uim capitulated October 17 ; the battle of Trafalgar was fought October 21. Napo leon was thenceforward master of the Continent, and England of the ocean. December 2 Napoleon won the decisive battle of Austerlitz, and December 26 he signed the treaty of Pressburg which humbled Austria. The wit of man often lagged behind the active movement of the world ; but never had diplomatists a harder task than to keep abreast of Napoleon. Other men had moments of repose ; but Napoleon's mind seemed never to rest. His schemes were dcA'cloped, and swept over Europe like so many storm-centres. His plans sometimes succeeded and sometimes fafled, but the success or the failure equally implied a greater effort behind ; and while Armstrong and his brother 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 371 diplomatists speculated about the Emperor's motives in pursuing one object, the Emperor was already de vising and using new machinery for gaining another. At the close of the war with Austria, Armstrong needed to learn Avhether Napoleon still Avanted money, whether Talleyrand favored the sale of Florida, whether the treaty of Pressburg had or had not left American affairs where they Avere ; and none of these questions could be answered except by Napoleon him self, who was already far advanced in schemes whicii no one could fathom, and Avhich largely depended for their success on the skill with which he could conceal them from Jefferson. Armstrong could only wait. Through the winter of 1805-1806, while John Randolph's opposition de layed Madison's instructions to the minister at Paris, Armstrong had nothing to do. The Emperor and Talleyrand returned to Paris at midnight Jan. 26, 1806. More powerful than eA-er and more absolute. Napoleon came back from Vienna rich Avith the contributions he had IcA'ied in Germany, but angry at the condition into which Marbois had brought the Treasury of France. Within twelve hours after ar riving at the Tuileries he called a council of his ministers, disgraced Marbois, and appointed MoUien in his place. That this revolution in the Cabinet had some bear ing upon American interests w^as more than likely ; for not only was Marbois an honest man and a warm friend of the United States, but the Aveight that 372 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn.ie. dragged him down was nothing less than the weight of Spanish finances. The story may be shortly told.^ Napoleon's Avars and repudiation of every inconvenient debt thrcAV the French mercantile class into general bankruptcy. In the want of coin to supply the de mands of the Emperor and of the merchants, the Bank of France issued dangerous amounts of paper money. To support these issues specie had to be ob tained ; and the empire which "produced specie was Spain. Spain niight be forced to give up her treas ures ; her arrears of subsidy alone would if paid add greatly to Marbois's resources. Yet the treasures of Spain Avere shut in Mexico and Peru ; they could be brought to Europe only under danger of capture ; and a means by which ten or twenty million Mexican dol lars could run the gauntlet of British cruisers and reach in safety the Bank of France was a matter of necessity to Marbois. The ordinary business of the Treasury in discounts and contracts was conducted through a firm called the " N^gociants r^unis," consisting of three capital ists, — Messrs. OuA'rard, Desprez, and Vanlerberghe. Ouvrard, the most active of the three, went to Madrid; and by lending assistance to the sorely pressed Treas ury and trade of Spain induced the Spanish govern ment to give him the privilege of importing bullion from Mexico at the rate of seventy -five cents on the dollar. The risk of importation was worth twenty- five per cent on any cargo ; but Ouvrard meant to 1 Thiers, Consulat et Empire, vi. 30. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 373 escape all risk. He had plans of his own, involving partnership with the British government itself through the Hopes and Barings of Amsterdam and London ; he proposed to draAV some five million dollars from Mexico by giving to the United States gOA^ernmeiit drafts on South America in settlement of the Spanish spoliations, besides getting no less than ten mfllion doflars from the United States government for the Fioridas. The unnamed negotiator who came to Armstrong in September, 1805, Avith Talleyrand's autograph in structions Avas an agent of Marbois and Ouvrard, whose errand was doubtless known to the Emperor. Meanwhile the Treasury, the Bank, and the "N6go- ciants r^unis " supported each other by loans, dis counts, and indorsements, largely resting on Spanish bonds, and made face as well as they could against commercial embarrassments and Napoleon's arbitrary cafls for great sums of coin ; but the Treasury, being in truth the only solvent member of the partnership, must ultimately be responsible for the entire loss Avhenever matters should come to liquidation. This was the state of the finances Avhen, Jan. 27, 1806, Napoleon called Marbois and OuA'rard before him. No one charged criminality on any of the par ties to the affair. In truth one person alone Avas to blame, and that person was the Emperor himself ; but men who serA'ed such masters Avere always in the wrong, — and in fact Marbois, Ouvrard, Desprez, and Vanlerberghe accepted their fate. Marbois was dis- 374 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. ic. graced; AA'hile the three others Avere obliged to sur render all their property, under the alternative of going to Vincennes, with its memories of the Due d'Enghien. The dismissal of Marbois and the ruin of Ouvrard had no immediate effect on the Florida negotiation. So far from discouraging Armstrong's hopes, they seemed at first likely to bring about some arbitrary decision, after the Emperor's well-known style of set tling questions in which he had an interest. In the middle of February Armstrong wrote in some alarra to Madison : ^ — '-'¦ All the points in controversy between his Catholic Majesty and the United States were submitted on the 14th instant to this Government by the Spanish ambassa dor, with an order from his Court to solicit the immediate interposition of the Emperor and King. That his Majesty will take upon himself the mediation is not to be ques tioned ; but the form he may think proper to give to it is a pioint equally doubtful and important. Should this movement on the part of Spain have been spontaneous, growing merely out of her own policy and feelings, there is reason to believe that I may be able to prevent any sudden and unfavorable determination from being taken ; but if, on the other hand, it should have been either dic tated or invited by this Cabinet, the presumption is strong that the deciaon is already taken, and will present only the alternative, — submission or hostility. Of the two conjectures, the latter is the more probable." 1 Armstrong to Madison, Feh. 17, 1806; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 375 For the moment, while Napoleon was struggling with the confusion of his finances, he held Florida in reserve as a resource for extremity. Armstrong was officially or senii-(jfficiaUy told that the EmperOr sup posed the whole matter of the Spanish-American dis pute to be regularly before him by consent of both parties.^ He had another long interview with his unnamed negotiator, who pressed him to accept Span ish drafts on South America in payment of the claims for Spanish spoliations, and who argued with much obstinacy that Florida was well worth ten million dollars to the United States. During all this time Armstrong had heard not a word from his GoA'crnment. While the minister Avas listening to these whispers of imperial policy at Paris, Madison had but begun to write the long-delayed in structions which were in effect an acceptance of Tal leyrand's proffered terms. The long-delayed " Two- Million Act " received the President's signature Feb. 13, 1806 ; but not until March 13 did Madison sign the instructions which contained the project of a con- vention.2 This despatch was accompanied by another of March 15, which contained an explanation of the Miranda affair and long complaints of Yrujo's con duct. The law prohibiting trade with St. Domingo, "although it must be understood to have proceeded 1 Armstrong to Madison, March 9, 1806; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. ' Madison to Armstrong aud BoAvdoin, March 13, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives. 376 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. . . . not from any rightful requisition on the part of France, and still less from a manner of. pressing it which might have justly had a contrary tendency," was enclosed in the despatch, with instructions to sound the French government in the hope of inducing Napoleon to lay aside his objections to the traffic. The packet sailed at once ; and after a voyage of the usual length arrived in France in time to bring the despatches. May 1, to Armstrong's hands. No apparent change had then taken place in the Em peror's plans ; but during the three months of labor since his return from Austria he had succeeded in restoring order to his finances and was richer than ever before. The Spanish government sent to Paris a certain Seiior Izquierdo as special agent to raake a financial arrangement with Napoleon; and through him much business was done unknown to the depart ment over whicii Talleyrand presided. In short the situation had changed, although no one, even araong the Emperor's immediate household, knew what had taken place. In pursuance of the secret memorandum in Talley rand's handwriting, Armstrong, May 1, sent a note to the Foreign Office in the language of his instruc tions. Talleyrand acted promptly ; May 2 he carried Armstrong's note to Napoleon's closet.^ Without dis cussing the matter the Emperor said : " I have some papers in relation to that business which you have not ' Armstrong to Madison (private), May 4, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 377 seen." The next day these papers were given to him. They consisted in maps and charts of the Fioridas, with many arguments to prove their mili tary and naA'al importance to Spain, and a formal declaration from Don Carlos IV. that on no account Avould he consent to alienate them either by sale or otherwise. Talleyrand immediately sent for the American min ister and told him what had occurred. Only a fcAv Aveeks before, Avith equal appearance of seriousness, Armstrong had been assured that the Avhole matter was in the Emperor's hands by the request of the Spanish government. May 3 he Avas suddenly told that King Charles would on no account consent to alienate Florida. If the first story were true the second must be false. Armstrong hinted as much. " Though I have not seen the overture on paper," said he, "yet I am not the less assured that it had existence ; and if I have not been much deceiA'cd, it raay at tliis moment be found in the portfolio of M. Ouvrard." " That may be," replied Talleyrand ; " but it is not the less true that circumstances have produced an entire change in the dispositions of Spain." Then, as though to protect himself from the charge of decep tion by making a counter-charge against Armstrong, he suddenly hinted that Armstrong's own conduct had much to do with alarming the pride of Spain. " Do you know," said he, " that Mr. ErA'ing has com municated to the Prince of Peace the confldential propo- 378 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 16. sitions of which you were made the depositary last summer, and that they were derived from Mr. Bowdoin, as it would appear for the express purpose of being so communicated ? " At this unexpected shock, coming instantly after the other, Armstrong was thunderstruck. " Y''ou may readily imagine my confusion and aston ishment at this discovery," he continued in his narrative to; Madison. " I had conflded the propositions to Mr. Bowdoin uncler the most solemn injunctions of secrecy. . . . Could I believe that a man to whom his country has committed so high an oflSce could so flagrantly violate a trust so sacred ? " His anger was diverted from Talleyrand to his col league ; but in spite of this successful diversion, one might suppose Armstrong capable, even in anger, of seeing that Talleyrand's story was not altogether clear, — that he was trying to distract attention from his own failures. The more closely Ouvrard's scheme was brought to light, the more clearly it seemed to take the form of an intrigue or a job. The notorious corruption that surrounded Talleyrand explained the favor shown it by the French Foreign Office; but neither the Em peror of France nor the King of Spain was ruled in such matters by subordinates, and Armstrong began to feel the error of making his own Government the instrument of Ouvrard's speculations. Too deeply involved to draAv back he took refuge in caution, and said even to the Secretary of State as little as he 1800^ THE BERLIN DECREE. 379 could. Above all, he avoided reference to possible corruption involved in the bargain. His colleague Bowdoin, whose garrulity had already annoyed him, did not imitate Armstrong's reticence, but Avrote to the President the facts which Jefferson least cared to knoAv. The profits on the Louisiana stock, he said,^ had stimulated, jobbery ; fifteen per cent discount on one raillion scA'en hundred and ten thousand dollars had been divided among the individuals concerned. The two Fioridas were offered by Daniel Parker, agent of tbe Hopes in Amsterdam, who came with a letter of recoraraendation from Labouchere, Sir Francis Bar ing's son-in-law, and who held or pretended to hold powers of transfer from the Prince of Peace. The highest point to which the propositions could be traced was to one Cazeneau, Parker's friend, who lived in Talleyrand's house. Some time afterward Bowdoin added ^ that a new negotiator had appeared, — a former private secretary to Talleyrand, — a M. Dautremont, who came to Skipwith, the American consul at Paris, and after explaining that the X. Y. Z. business and the jealousy of the American govern ment had caused much uneasiness in matters of this delicate nature, suggested that other means less ex posed than money to observation might be devised. He thought well of land-grants to Talleyrand's brother, in which Skipwith might take a share. With so many different persons and interests in- " Bowdoin to Jefferson, May 20, 1806; Jefferson MSS. " Bowdoin to Jefferson, Oct. 20, 1806; Jefferson MSS. 380 HISTORY OF THE UNITED ST .ATES. Ch. 16. volved in the Fioridas and the claims, Armstrong might feel confident that a single rebuff from the Emperor would not end the matter. After a few Aveeks Talleyrand quietly instigated the American minister to renew his request, which Avas done by a note of May 25 ; ^ and May 28 Armstrong received in reply an official assurance of " his Majesty's wishes to see the controversy amicably terminated, and his readiness to lend himself to that object." Talleyrand was not only in earnest but in haste ; for on the same day. May 28, he wrote to M. de Vandeul, who Avas in charge of the French embassy at Madrid, a cautious letter of instructions. The United States govern ment, he said,^ seemed disposed to renew negotiations with Spain. He ran over the points in dispute, and sketched the outlines of an arrangement, including the cession of West Florida. " You will have, sir, to express no official opinion oa this point," he said. " I need only tell you, in order that you may make use of it in your conversations, that this part of the Fioridas must be warmly desired by the Americans, because it closes the mouths of several rivers which have a great part of their course within the United States. Under another Power Florida, so situated, can intercept American commerce ; and since the Province is thinly populated and very accessible by land, it is to be presuraed that the United States would seize the first 1 Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 10, 1806; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. "^ Talleyrand to Vandeul, May 21^ 1806; Archives, des Aff. ]6tr., MSS. 1808. THE BERLIN DECREE. 381 pretext for invasion. If Spain is not bent on preserving this colony, she may Usten to the American propositions ; and all that she would have to remark iu making this arrangement is that West Florida, which brings very little revenue to her, would be a much more valuable possession for the United States." Vandeul was intimate with G. W. Erving, the Amer ican chargS at Madrid ; and with friendl}' zeal he entered into the negotiation. Taking Talleyrand's despatch and Armstrong's note, a copy of which Avas inclosed for his guidance, he Avent to the Prince of Peace, Avith Avhom he had a long conversation June 18, 1806. " To tell your Excellency the truth," he wrote the next day to TaUeyrand,^ " I ought to inform you that the Prmce of Peace appears to me to hold pronounced opin ions excessively opposed to the conciliatory views which I should have wished to flnd in him. Nevertheless I did my best to bring him to less passionate ideas, and asked him whether he did not think it a matter of general in terest that the old relations should be restored between Spain and the United States, eAcn admitting (for this is one of the Prince's aUegations) that they were only sus pended for the moment as to ofl9cial forms. He answered me that this state of things was in no way prejudicial to the interests of the two countries ; that commerce con tinued between them uncler the safeguard of reciprocal good faith ; and that this mode of existence might last a long time without disquieting Spain." ' Vandeul to Talleyrand, June 19, 1806; Archives des Aff. £tr., MSS. 382 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. Vandeul was obliged to urge the Emperor's wish for a reconciliation and the advance made by Arm strong at Paris. Thereupon Godoy suddenly changed his tone. " At bottom," said he, " we are quite ready to see where they Avant to come out ; you may as sure your Court of that." Vandeul thanked him, and added that he hoped the Prince would be pleased to have the matter negotiated at Paris. " Well, granted again ! " answered Godoy ; " I see no inconvenience in consenting to that." " Your Excellency authorizes me to inform M. de TaUeyrand by my first despatch?" " By your first despatch." Greatly pleased at his success, Vandeul immedi ately Avrote to Talleyrand. A few days afterward he returned to the Prince of Peace, and in a long inter view undertook to dispose of the whole subject.^ Godoy objected chiefly that as yet no official repre sentation had been made on which the GoA'crnment of Spain could act. Vandeul urged that Armstrong's note and Talleyrand's instructions were sufficient proof that the Americans had changed their tone and system. In his earnestness he insisted upon expressing his opinion on aU the points in dispute, including the cession of West Florida., " Then the Prince gave way entirely to the accession that I asked ; and in a manner that I found not only open, but even friendly, told me to renew to you what he had previously authorized me to write to you, and to add 1 Vandeul to Talleyrand, June 23, 1806; Archives -des Aff. £tr., MSS. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 383 that ministerial measures should decidedly be taken for a suitable expression of the intentions of the Spanish Court both to your Highness and to the American rainis ters, with views of conciliation and deflnite arrangement, in the dispute with the United States." Vandeul was convinced that the Prince spoke the truth, and he hurried to tell Erving. The American eJiargS, though far from friendly to Spain, believed that Godoy was honest; and he hastened to notify Armstrong. Armstrong had no doubt that all was well, and lost no time in consulting Talleyrand, Avho had every motive to feel sure of success. The Spanish imbroglio seemed on the verge of a friendly settlement. Suddenly occurred one of the scenes of melodrama to which the Emperor's servants were accustomed. When Talleyrand brought Vandeul's despatch to his master. Napoleon broke into a passion. Rebuking Talleyrand sharply for haA'ing pressed the matter in its first stages, he threatened to degrade and punisli Vandeul ; and he ordered Talleyrand not only to reprimand his subordinate in the severest manner, but himself to meddle no more with, the subject. ^ His orders were instantly followed with the blind obedience which marked the Emperor's service. Vandeul was still congratulating himself on his suc cess, and Avaiting for a letter of approval from Paris, when a despatch arrived which shivered his diplo- 1 Armstrong to Madison, Oct. 10, 1806; MSS. State Depart ment Archives. 384 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. matic triumph. Without a word of explanation, Talleyrand administered the reproof he had been ordered to give. Vandeul was told that he had gone altogether beyond his instructions : ^ — " To cause the negotiations of these two Governments to be opened under his Majesty's eyes would be to asso ciate him in all their quarrels and to render him more or less responsible for the results. He will see with pleasure the return of a good understanding between the two countries ; but they alone can judge what means of reconciliation suit their respective interests." A few days afterward came another and sharper reprimand : ^ — " In deraanding that the negotiation should take place at Paris, in making overtures to the United States minis ter while he has not even receiA'ed instructions from his Government, in leading the Prince of Peace to believe that everything would be done under the mediation of France, — you exceed the instructions marked out for you ; and such is the effect of one false step, that it inevitably draws others after it before the system which has been forsaken can be resuraed. That Spain and the United States should seek a reconciliation is to be de sired ; but leave to them the opening of negotiation, and take onlj' such steps as are marked out for you, — such are his Majesty's orders. The United States and Spain wUl communicate their intentions to each other. You cannot charge yourself with the always embarrassing 1 Talleyrand to Vandeul, July 3, 1806; Archives des Aff. Jitr., MSS. " Talleyrand to Vandeul, July 12, 1806; Archives des Aff. ttT., MSS. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 385 functions of an intermediary without being formaUy au thorized to do it ; for the Government alone can know whether this step is consistent with its interests of the moment and with the general plan it has formed for itself." That the words of this despatch were taken frora the Emperor's lips is more than likely. Talleyrand's notes always repeated as nearly as possible the exact expressions of his master ; and the expressions of this note Avere Napoleonic even in their confusion of facts and ideas. Above all, the concluding sentence, which was probably as mysterious to Talleyrand as to the Americans, marked the proceeding with the pecul iar stamp of Napoleon's mind. No one but himself should judge whether the cession of Florida was " consistent with his interests of the moment and with the general plan he had formed for himself." Probably for the first time, July 12, 1806, Talley rand learned that Napoleon had a general plan which was inconsistent with complete reconciliation between Spain and the United States ; yet he could no longer doubt that the same general plan had controlled the Emperor's conduct at least as far back as May 1. From this reticence he might infer that his own fall approached. Another proof that his credit waned came in a form more gracious, but not less couA'in- cmg. Napoleon conferred on him an ItaHan princi pality. The Ex-Bishop of Autun became Prince of Benevento. Had Armstrong been allowed to know every de- voL. in. —25 386 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.]6. tail of this transaction, he could not have penetrated Napoleon's secret ; but for weeks he was kept in dense ignorance. Aware that the Prince of Peace had consented to negotiate, informed that Izquierdo had received powers and was authorized to proceed, Armstrong still found an invisible barrier across his path, — frivolous difficulties of form and unmeaning references to Madrid, — which no effort of his could remove. At a hint from Talleyrand he went to Marshal Duroe, a man of high character and abili ties, AA'ho stood as near as the nearest to the Em peror, and who was conducting with Izquierdo the Spanish negotiations which Napoleon had taken from Talleyrand. Duroc seemed well disposed toward America ; and through him Armstrong succeeded in putting into Napoleon's hands the project of a treaty between the United States and Spain. After read ing it attentively, the Emperor quietly returned it, without a word. Foiled again by this impenetrable mystery, Arm strong dreamed of forcing the Emperor's hand. He could at least, by an official note, compel Talleyrand and Izquierdo either to act or to explain their inac tion ; but from this step he was dissuaded by Tal leyrand and Duroc, who reasoned that precipitancy might do harm, but could do no good. Meanwhile Talleyrand wrote a despatch ^ to Tur reau at Washington ; and if Turreau understood its 1 TaUeyrand to Turreau, July 31, 1806; Archives des Aff. £tr., MSS. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 387 meaning, his insight was clearer than that of the Prince of Benevento himself. The tone of this in struction varied between a caress and a threat ; but the threat came last, and was most significant : — "His Majesty would be pained to remark that the United States, to Avhose prosperity France has at all times contributed, — tbat Spain, in whom she takes a like interest, — should revive in Ameriea quarrels that are beginning to slumber in Europe. The United States, which owe their fortune to coramerce, are interested in peace ; they bave reason to wish it with their neighbors ; and if, comparing their force with that of a colony, they can promise themselves success at flrst, they can also hear in mind (reconnaltre) that the colonies are not alone, and that Europe has always gone to their aid. Take care, sir, to maintain the United States in the views of conciliation with which the news of the events of the last carapaign may have inspired thera. A sense of their true interests would sufl3ce to make them true to tbis dis position, even though they had not bound theraselves to it by the demand they have made on his Majesty the Emperor to intervene in their discussions with Spain, and to employ his good offices for the re-establishment of a perfect harmony between the two Powers. His Majesty, without putting himself forward as raediator iu circura stances where other interests, which directly concern his empire, ought to fix his whole attention, will regard whatever the United States and Spain may do toward a reconciliation as an evidence of friendship toward himself." Sept. 25, 1806, the Emperor returned to Germany to begin a war with Prussia which was to lead him 388 HISTORY' OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. far. His departure put an end to whatever hopes Armstrong still cherished, while it left the United States in a mortifying attitude. After having been defied by Spain, Jefferson found himself deluded by France. No imagination could conceive "the purpose for which Napoleon meant to use the United States government ; but that he had some scheme, to which President Jefferson must be made subservient, was clear. Armstrong tried in vain to penetrate the mystery. Whatever it might be, it was as yet hidden in the recesses of Napoleon's mind. No sooner had the Emperor left Paris than the American minister, September 30, Avrote a note of inquiry to Izquierdo, who replied in substance that his powers had been suspended or recalled. Nothing remained but for Armstrong to inform the President of all the facts connected Avith the failure of his nego tiation, and then to wait at Paris, with what patience he could command, for the moment when Napoleon should consent to reveal the meaning of these mj^- terious manceuvres. Yet in diplomacy as in war, nations were commonly lost when they allowed Napo leon to take the initiative, and to choose his own timp and place for attack. The United States government had every reason to be on its guard. Napoleon reached the battle-field of Jena Oct. 14, 1806, and crushed the Prussian army. October 27 the conquering French battalions made a triumphal entry into Berlin. November 25, — the day so fre quently occurring in the story of Burr's conspiracy, 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 389 when Jefferson received General Wilkinson's de spatch, and when Wilkinson himself reached New Orleans, — the Emperor Napoleon left Berlin for Poland and Russia. Before leaving Berlin he signed a paper destined to become famous throughout the world under the name of the Berlin Decree. This extraordinary mandate, bearing the date of Nov. 21 , 1806, began by charging that England disregarded the law of nations. She made non-combatants prison ers of Avar ; confiscated private property ; blockaded unfortified harbors and mouths of rivers, and consid ered places as blockaded though she had not a single ship before them, — even Avhole coasts and empires. This monstrous abuse of the right of blockade had no other object than to raise the commerce and industry of England on the ruin of the commerce and indus try of the Continent, and gave a natural right to use against her the same weapons and methods of Avar- fare. Therefore, until England should recognize and correct these violations of law, it Avas decreed — (1) That the British Isles were in a state of block ade ; (2) That all intercourse with them was pro hibited ; (3) That every Englishman found within French authority was a prisoner of war ; (4) That all British property, private as well as public, was prize of war ; (5) That all merchandise coming from England was prize of war ; (6) That half the product of such confiscations should be employed to indem nify merchants Avhose property had been captured by British cruisers ; (7) That no ship coming from 390 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 16. England or her colonies should be admitted into any port ; (8) That every vessel trying to elude this rule by means of false papers should be confiscated. This decree, which cut the roots of neutral rights and of American commerce with Europe, was pub lished at Paris in the "Moniteur" of Dec. 5, 1806. At the same time news arrived that Hamburg, and nearly all the north coast of Germany along the Ger man Ocean and the Baltic, had fallen into Napoleon's hands, or was certain soon to become his prey. When Armstrong, watching with keen interest the rapid progress of French arms, took up the " Moniteur " Avhicli contained the Berlin Decree, he might well have started to his feet with the cry that at last he understood what the Emperor would be at. A part of the enigma which had perplexed diplomacy Avas explained, and what was not yet revealed might vaguely be divined. December 10 Armstrong wrote to Decrfes, the Min ister of Marine, to ask of him, in Talleyrand's ab sence, an explanation of the decree. For some days no answer was receiA'ed. " Much is said here," he Avrote to Madison, " of qualifications which are to be given to thc arr^tS of November 20 [21], and which Avould indeed make it very harmless ; but these are rather to be hoped for than believed in." When Decrfes' reply arriA'cd, dated December 24, it went far to confirm Armstrong's fears, by avoiding deci sive and official explanation.^ 1 Armstrong to Madison, Dec. 24, 1806; State Papers ii. 805. 1806. THE BERLIN DECREE. 391 " I consider the imperial decree of the 21st of Novem ber last," wrote Decries, " as thus far conveying no modi fication of the regulations at present observed in France with regard to neutral navigators, nor consequently of the convention of Sept. 30, 1800, with the United States of America ; . • . but it will be proper that your Excellency should communicate with the Miuister of Exterior Rela tions as to what concerns the correspondence of citizens of the United States with England. ... It will not es cape General Armstrong that my answers cannot have the development which they would receive frora the Min ister of Exterior Relations, and that it is naturally to hira that he ought to address hiraself for these explanations, which I am very happy to give him, because he wishes them, but upon which I have much less positive informa tion than the Prince of Benevento." With this explanation, such as it was, Armstrong was obliged to content himself; and the year 1806 closed, leaving President Jefferson at the mercy of battles soon to be fought in the most distant corner of Germany, where the Emperor Alexander of Russia was gathering his forces for a conflict more terrible than Europe had yet seen. CHAPTER XVII. While Armstrong coped with Napoleon in Paris, Monroe enjoyed a brief moment of sunshine on the other side of the Channel. After his diplomatic dis asters he might think himself happy, though he only threw from his own shoulders upon those of Arm strong and Bowdoin the Florida negotiation which had thus far injured the reputation of every man con nected with it ; but he had double cause of rejoicing. He not only escaped from Talleyrand and Godoy, but also from William Pitt, whose body he saw carried amidst the pompous mournings of London in funeral state to Westminster Abbey, and left in solemn gran deur by the side of his great father. Pitt died Jan. 23, 1806, exhausted by the anxieties of office. At last Fortune smiled upon Monroe with caresses more winning than any she had shown since her last sudden appearance before his eyes under the outward semblance of Barb^ Marbois in LiAdngston's garden on the "Boulevard Montmartre. Old King George, know ing no Tory competent to succeed Pitt or capable of controlling Parliament, summoned Lord Grenville and submitted to Charles James Fox. Grenville be came First Lord of the Treasury ; Fox took charge of 1806. MONROE'S TREATY 393 the Foreign Office ; Erskine became Lord ChanceUor ; Sidmouth, Lord Privy Seal. The union of different party chiefs was so general as to give the Ministry the nickname of All the Talents. By February 7 the revolution was completed. Monroe was greatly pleased, as well he might be, for his position in England had been hitherto far from comfortable. To soothe the Tories, — who were prejudiced against him not only as American min ister, but also as haA'ing when minister to France actively sympathized with the French Directory in hostflity to England,— -Monroe had thought himself obliged to shun the society of the Whigs, and had been restricted to such social relations as Pitt's friends would supply, which under the best of cir cumstances were neither extensive nor amusing. Fox made amends for this self-denial. His statesmanship was broad and liberal, his manners charming, and he had the quality, most rare in politics, of entire frank ness and truthfulness. In a few days Monroe Avrote home that he had enjoyed his first interview Avith the new secretary, " who in half an hour put me more at my ease than I have ever felt with any person in office since I have been in England." ^ Fox said little, but held out hopes ; and Monroe had so long been left without even hope to nourish him that he gladly fed upon the unaccustomed "diet. Neverthe less, more than a month passed before he ventured ' Monroe to Madison, Feb. 12, 1806; MSS. State Department Archives. 394 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. to make formal application ^ for an order to suspend the seizure and condemnation of American vessels under the rule established by Pitt and Sir William Scott. At length, April 17, at the Queen's drawing- room Fox took the American minister aside and announced himself ready to begin negotiation, and to pursue it without delay till it should be concluded.^ He said that no trouble need be feared about the colonial trade, but that there would be objections to making payments for property already taken ; mean while the seizures and condemnations were to be stopped. The 1st of May arrived. Three months had passed since the new Ministry took office, yet nothing had been publicly done to satisfy the United States. The reason was well known. Fox was obliged to OA'er- conie many kinds of opposition both in and out of the Cabinet. The West Indian colonies, the royal navy, the mercantile shipping interest, the Tory coun try gentlemen, and the Court were all opposed to concessions, and only the Treasury favored them. To increase Fox's difficulties, news began to arrive from the United States of the debate in Congress on the Non-importation Act, of the loose talk of Con gressmen and the vaporings of the press ; and to crown all came the story that the mob of Ncav York had taken the punishment of Pierce's manslaughter into its own hands. The English people honestly 1 Monroe to Madison, April 3, 1806; State Papers, iii. 115. ^ Momoe to Madison, April 18, 1806 ; State Papers, iii. 116. 18116. MONROE'S TREATY. 395 believed the Americans to be cheating them in the matter of the colonial trade ; they suspected that their Yankee cousins were shrewd, and they could plainly see that Jefferson and Congress were try ing to hide behind the shadow of Napoleon. Non importation and commercial restriction had no other object than to give England the alternative of sur rendering either to France or to America what she believed to be the price of her existence without the chance of fighting for it. Two thirds of the Brit ish people understood the Non-importation Act as a threat, — as though the Americans said, " Surrender to us your commerce and your shipping, or surrender your liberties to France." Whatever were the faults or sins of England, they Avere at least such as Americans could understand. Her Government was guided, as a rule, by interests whicii were public, permanent, and easily measured. The Aveight of interests which had driven Pitt into his assault on American commerce was not lessened by tbe death of Pitt or by the return of Lord Gren ville to power. On every side Fox found these in terests active in opposition and earnest in pressing arguments against concession. Englishmen were used to giving and receiving hard blows. Seldom long at peace, they had won whatever was theirs by creating a national character in which personal courage was as marked a quality as selfishness ; for in their situation no other than a somewhat brutal energy could have secured success. They knew what to think of war, 396 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. and could measure with some approach to exactness its probable costs and returns, but they were quite unused to being conquered by peace ; and - they Hs tened with as much contempt as anger to the Ameri can theory that England must surrender at discretion if Americans should refuse any longer to buy wool len shirts and tin kettles. Englishmen asked only Avhether America would fight, and they took some pains to make inquiries on that point ; but. it hap pened that of all the points in question this, which to Englishmen was alone decisive, could be answered in a syllable : No ! Anierica would not fight. The President, Congress, the press of both parties in the United States agreed only in this particular. John Randolph's speech on Gregg's Resolution was re printed in London with a. long preface by James Ste phen, and proved conclusively that America would submit. Merry came as near to a laugh as his, gravity would permit in expressing his contempt for the idea of war, and in urging his Government to resent the Non-importation Act ; and althougk Fox probably thought poorly of Merry's judgment, he could not but show his despatches to the Cabinet if the Cabinet wished to read them. After the slaughter of Pierce, when the Federalist newspapers in New. York : and the irresponsible mob of seamen clamored for warlike measures, the only effect of the outcry upon England was to stimulate the anti-American prejudice and to embarrass the well-meant efforts of Fox, until his chief newspaper, the " Morning Chronicle," in. a 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 397 moment of irritation plainly told the Americans that they were much mistaken if they thought a war would be so very unpopular in England ; and if they knew this, they would not hector or bully so much. Even the poAverful interests directly engaged in trade with the United States made no attempt to protect them selves ; they did not see that the British nation was ready and eager to cut its own throat in its des perate anxiety to save its own life. The contest with France had made all Europe violent and brutal ; but England could boast that at the sound of British cannon the chaos had beconie order, that the ocean had been diA'ided from the land, and as far as the ocean went, that her fleets made law. Two Powers only remained to be considered by Great Britain, — Russia and the United States. Napoleon showed an evident intention to take charge of the one ; England thought herself well able to give law to the other. Against such pubUc inclination toward measures of force Fox struggled as he could, without united sup port even in the Cabinet. Men like Lord Sidmouth were little inclined to risk the fate of the new Admin istration by concessions to America ; and the Tories, led by Canning and Spencer Perceval, profited by evei-y English prejudice in order to recover their con trol of the government. Fox could carry his point only by adopting half-measures. Instead of procur ing a new judicial decision or issuing an Order in Council, as had been done in previous times, for re placing American commerce in its old privileges, he 398 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Cn. 17. caused Government to adopt a measure intended to produce the same effect, but resting on a principle quite as objectionable to Americans as the Rule of 1756 itself had ever been. May 16, 1806, the minis ters of neutral Powers were notified that the King had ordered a blockade of the whole French and German coast from Brest to the river Elbe, but that this blockade was to be strict and rigorous only be tween Ostend and the Seine ; while elsewhere neutral ships should not be liable to seizure in entering or leaving the blockaded ports except under the usual conditions which made them seizable in any case. Under this blockade an American ship laden in Ncav York with sugar, the product of French or Spanish colonies, might sail in safety for Amsterdam or Ham burg. Monroe wrote : ^ "It seems clearly to put an end to further seizures on the principle which has been heretofore in contestation." English statutes, like English law, often showed peculiar ingenuity in inventing a posteriori methods of reaching their ends; but no such device could be less satisfactory than that of inventing a fictitious blockade in order to get rid of a commercial prohibi tion. Interminable disputes arose in the course of the next few years in regard to the objects and legality of this measure, Avhicli came to be known as Fox's blockade, and as such became a point of honor with England ; but its chief interest was its reflection of the English mind. To correct a dangerous principle by 1 Monroe to Madison, May 17, 1806; State Papers, ui. 124. 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 399 setting an equally dangerous precedent; to concede one point by implication, and in doing so to assert another not less disputed ; to admit a right by appear ing to deny it ; and to encourage commerce under the pretence of forbidding it, — was but admitting that the British government aimed at illegitimate objects. America had always contested the legality of paper blockades as emphaticaUy as she had contested the Rule of 1756, and could no more submit to the one than to the other, although in this case the paper blockade was invented in order to conciliate and satisfy her. The measure was intended for a temporary ex pedient pending negotiation ; yet such Avas the condi tion of England that Fox's blockade became six years afterward one of the chief pretexts under Avhich the tAVO countries entered upon a war. Another fortnight elapsed, but Monroe made no further progress. Whenever he saw Fox the subjects in dispute were discussed ; but news arrived that the Non-importation Act had passed both Houses of Con gress, and the difficulty of obtaining favors was in creased by the attempt at compulsion. Fox showed less and less willingness to concede principles, although he did not, as Monroe feared, declare that the Act re- licA'cd him from any promises he might have made or from the fulfilment of any hopes he might have held out. Thus the matter stood, balanced almost equally between opposite chances, when. May 31, 1806, news arrived from America that Monroe's powers were su perseded by the appointment of a special mission, in 400 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. whicli he was to be associated with William Pinkney of Maryland. The blow to Monroe's pride was great, and shook his faith in the friendship of Jefferson and Madison. Three years had elapsed since he had himself been sent abroad to share Livingston's negotiations, and he had the best reason to know how easily the last comer could carry aAvay the prizes of popularity. The nomi nation of a colleague warned him that he had lost influence at home, and that Jefferson, however well disposed, no longer depended on him. This was in substance the truth; but other and graver troubles Ayere revealed in part to Monroe's eyes when William Pinkney arrived in London June 24, bringing with him the new instructions Avhich were to become the foundation of the treaty. These instructions^ began by treating the Non importation Act as at once a domestic and a foreign regulation, a pacific and a hostile act, a measure with which England had no right to be angry, and one which was calculated to anger her, — strictly amica ble and at the same time sharply coercive. After this preamble, in which the threat was clearer than the explanation, followed an order precluding the pos sibility of successful negotiation. Monroe was to begin by imposing an ultimatum. The British gov ernment must expressly repudiate the right and forbid the practice of impressment, or not only could no 1 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; State Papers,, iii. 119. 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 401 treaty he made, but the Non-importation Act should be enforced. " So indispensable is some adequate pro vision for the case that the President makes it a neces sary preliminary to any stipulation requiring a repeal of the Act shutting the market of the United States against certain British manufactures." Besides this condition precedent, the instructions prescribed as another ultimatum the restoration of the trade with enemies' colonies on its old founda tion and indemnity for the captures made uiider Sir William Scott's late decisions. Three ultimata, there fore, Avere fixed as conditions Avithout which no treaty could receive the President's assent or procure a repeal of the Non-importation Act. The numerous requests to be further made upon Fox concerned many differ ent points in dispute, — contraband, blockade, discrimi nating duties, immunity of neutral waters. East and West Indian trade, and trade with Nova Scotia ; but these Avere matters of bargain, and the two negotiators might to some extent use discretion in dealing with them. Yet every demand made by the United States required a corresponding concession from England, for which no equivalent could be offered by the American negotiators except the repeal of the Non importation Act. Monroe knew that Jefferson had ever strongly op posed any commercial treaty Avith Great Britain, and that he never spoke of Jay's treaty except with dis gust and soniething like abhorrence. Again and again Jefferson had said and Avritten that he wished for no VOL. III. — 26 402 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch; 17. treaty ; that he preferred to rely on municipal legis lation as his safeguard against attack ; and tkat he would not part with this weapon in order to obtain the doubtful protection of an agreement which Eng land could always interpret to suit herself. Pinkney could add that Jefferson, as.CA'ery one in Washington was aware, had been unwillingly driven into the pres ent negotiation by the Senate, and that as the measure was not his its success would hardly be. within his ex pectation ; that it would embarrass his relations with Napoleon, endanger if not ruin the simultaneous nego tiation for Florida, and exalt Monroe, the candidate of Randolph, at the expense of Madison, who was al ready staggering under the attacks of his enemies. Monroe was well informed of the efforts made to raise or to depress his own fortunes at Washington^ and could see how easily his rival, the Secretary of State, might play a double part. Nothing could be simpler than such tactics. Madison had only to im pose on Monroe the task of negotiating a treaty under impossible conditions. H the treaty should fail, the blame would fall upon Monroe ; if it should succeed, the credit would be divided with Pinkney. No one could suppose that Madison would make any great effort to secure the success of a negotiation when success might make the negotiator the next President of the United States. Monroe could not doubt the President's coldness toward the treaty ; he could not fail to see that the secretary's personal wishes were rather against than 1806. MONROE'S TREATY^ 403 for it ; and when he studied the instructions he could not but admit that they were framed, if not Avitli the intention, at all events with the effect, of making a treaty impossible. No harder task could well have been imposed than was laid upon Monroe. Not even when he had been sent to Madrid in defiance of Talleyrand and Godoy, to impose his own terms on two of the greatest Powers in the world, had his chance of success been smaller than when his Gov ernment required him to obtain from England, after the battle of Trafalgar, concessions which England had steadily refused when she was supposed to be drawing almost her last gasp. For a British ministry to abandon the Rule of 1756 Avas to challenge oppo sition ; to throw open the colonial trade was to invite defeat ; but to surrender the so-called right of im pressment was to rush upon destruction. No minis ter that had ever ruled over the House of Commons could at such a moment have made such a treaty without losing his place or his head. If America wanted such concessions she must fight for them, as other nations had done ever since man kind existed. England, France, and Spain had for centuries paid for their power with their blood, and could see no sufficient reason why America should take their hard-won privileges without a challenge. Jefferson thought otherwise. In his opinion, all the three Powers would end by conceding American de mands, not as a matter of abstract right but for fear of throwing the United States into the arms of an 404 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. enemy. The instructrons to Monroe rested on this idea ; and that no doubt might remain, Jefferson wrote to Monroe a private letter which expressed the doctrine in set terms. " No two countries upon earth," said the President,' "have so many points of comraon interest and friend ship ; ancl their rulers must be great bunglers indeed if with such dispositions they breali them asunder. The only rivalry that can arise is on the ocean. England may by petty-larceny thwartings check us on that ele ment a little ; but nothing she can do will retard us there one year's growth. We shall be supported there by other -nations, and thrown into their scale to make a part of the great counterpoise to her navy. If, on the other hand, she is just to us, conciliatory, and encourages the senti ment of family feelings and conduct, it cannot fail to befriend the security of both. We have the seamen and materials for flfty ships of tbe line and half that number of frigates ; and were France to give us the money and England the dispositions to equip them, they would give to England serious proofs of the stock from which they are sprung and the school in which they have been taught, and added to the efforts of the immensity of sea-coast lately united under one Power would leaA'e the state of the ocean no longer problematical. Were, on the other hand, England to give the money and France the dispositions to place us on the sea in all our force, the whole world, out of the continent of Europe, might be our joint monopoly. We wish for neither of these scenes. We ask for peace and justice from all nations, and we will remain uprightly neutral in fact." 1 Jefferson to Monroe, May 4, 1806; Works, v. 12. 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 405 This was masterful not to say dictatorial language ; for it came in support of categorical claims Avliich, however just, were vehemently opposed by every con servative interest in England. The claims Avhicb Monroe Avas to make as ultimata could not be conceded liy England Avithout opening the door to claims more sweeping still. In the same breath Avitli Avhich the President threatened England Avith fifty ships of the line in case she Avould not abjure the right of im pressment and the Rule of 1756, he added : — " We begin to broach the idea that Ave consider the whole Gulf Stream as of our waters, in Avhich hostiUties and cruising are to be frowned on for the present, and prohibited as soon as either consent or force will per mit us. We shall never permit another privateer to cruise within it, and shall forbid our harbors to nation al cruisers. This is essential for our tranquillity ancl commerce." These Avere bold Avords, but not well suited to Mon roe's task or likely to encourage his hopes. President Jefferson was not only bent upon forcing England to abandon by treaty the right of impressment and the control of the colonial trade ; he not only asked for liberal favors in many different directions, which required the Avhole fabric of British legislation to be reconstructed, Avithout equivalent on the part of the United States, — but he had also "begun to broach the idea" that he should dictate where England's line-of-battle ships might sail upon the ocean. Mon roe knew how such language Avould sound tu English 406 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. ears strained to hear the distant thunders from Trafal gar, and how such words would look to English eyes, dim with tears, as they watched their hero borne through the shrouded streets of London to rest in his glory beneath the dome of St. Paul's. That Eng land was inflated with her triumphs, mad in her pre tensions, intolerable in her arrogance, Avas true. A people that had swept the ocean of enemies and held the winds and waves for subjects could hardly fail to go mad with the drunkenness of such stormy gran deur. The meanest beggar in England was glorified with the faitli that his march was o'er the moun tain waves and his home upon the deep ; and his face would have purpled with rage at the idea that Jefferson should dare to say that the squadrons of England must back their topsails and silence their broadsides when they reached the edge of the Gulf Stream. With this picture before his eyes, Monroe could feel no great confidence either in his own success or in the good faith of the President's instructions, which tied him to impossible conditions. Neverthe less he accepted the task ; and as he had gone to Spain with the certainty of defeat and mortification, he remained in London to challenge a hopeless con test. As though to destroy his only chance of suc cess, on the very day of Pinkney's arrival Pox fell ill. His complaint was soon known to be dropsical, and his recovery hopeless. Two months passed, while the American envoys waited the result. Aug. 20, 1806, 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 407 Fox, being still unable to do business, appointed Lord Holland and Lord Auckland to carry on the negotia tion in his place. No better men could have been selected. Lord Holland especially. Fox's favorite nephcAV and the most liberal of all Whig noblemen, was warmly disposed to make the negotiation a suc cess ; but much invaluable time had been lost, and Napoleon was on the eve of Jena. The negotiation began in earnest August 27, but proA'cd to be long and arduous. The two British commissioners, though courteous and friendly, stood in constant fear of the charge that they had surren dered vital English interests under Anierican threats. They were especially hampered by the Admiralty, the atmosphere of which, as Lord Holland coinplained,i made those who breathed it shudder at anything Hke concessions to the Americans ; Avhile the Treasury', though naturally still less yielding, listened Avillingly to every expedient that offered hope for the revenue. September 1 began the struggle over impressments ; and from the outset Monroe saw that the American claira had no chance of success, while the case of the West Indian trade was almost equally desperate. Only one serious discussion had taken place Avlien the death of Fox, September 13, produced a new delay of several weeks ; and on resuming the negotiation, MoiiKjc and Pinkney were required to deal with a new Foreign Secretary, — Charles Grey, Lord Howick, — to be better known in English history as Earl Grey. 1 Memoirs of Lord HoUand, U. 98-103. 408 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. Such a change boded no good to the Americans. All Fox's influence could not counteract the Tory instincts of Parliament ; and what Fox could not do when the Whigs were strong could much less be done by Lord Howick when the Ministry was every day tottering to its fall. November 11 the American negotiators wrote home that they had decided to disregard their instructions and to abandon impressments, — accepting, instead of a formal article on the subject, a note in whicii the British commissioners pledged their government to exercise the strictest care not to impress American citizens, and to afford prompt redress should injury be inflicted while impressing British seamen. Having thus made up his mind to violate instructions on the chief point of negotiation, Monroe found nothing to prevent his doing so in other respects. His prog ress under William Pinkney's influence was rapid ; his good nature, in the face of Lord Holland's diffi cult position, was extreme ; and at the end of a few weeks, Dec. 31, 1806, Jefferson's favorite diplomatic agent set his name to a treaty which, taking its omissions and admissions together, surpassed Jay's treaty in outraging Jefferson's prejudices and express desires. That a people, like an individual, should for a time choose to accept a wrong, like impressment or rob bery, without forcible resistance implied no necessary discredit. Every nation at one time or another had submitted to treatment it disliked and to theories 1806. MONROE'S TREATY^ 409 of international law which it rejected. The United States might go on indefinitely protesting against belHgerent aggressions while submitting to them, and no permanent evil need result. Yet a treaty was a compromise Avhich made precedent ; it recorded rules of laAV which could not be again discarded ; and aboA'c all, it abandoned protest against AA'rong. This Avas doubtless the reason why Jefferson wished for no treaties in the actual state of the world ; he Avas not ready to enforce his rights, and he Avas not willing to compromise them. The treaty signed by Monroe and Pinkney Dec.31, 1806, Avas remarkable for combining in one instru ment every quality to Avhich Jefferson held most strenuous objections. The three ultimata Avere all abandoned ; impressments were set aside under a diplomatic memorandum Avhicli rather recorded the right than restrained its exercise ; no indemnity was obtained for the ravages made on American com merce in 1805 ; and in regard to the colonial trade, a compromise was invented which no self-respecting government could admit. Article XI. of the treaty imposed the condition that West Indian produce, com ing frora French or Spanish colonies, and bond fide the property of United States citizens, might be ex ported from American ports to Europe on condition that it should have paid to the United States custom house a duty of not less than two per cent ad valorem, which could not be returned in drawback ; while European merchandise might in the same Avay be re- 410 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.17. exported from the United States to the West Indies, provided it paid not less than one per cent ad valorem in duties to the American Treasury. This provision Avas only to be compared with Article XII. of Jay's treaty, in which Lord Grenville insisted and Jay agreed that the United States should export no cotton. Even Pitt had never proposed anything so offensive as the new restriction. He had indeed required that the American merchant whose ship arrived at Baltimore or Boston Avith a cargo of sugar or coffee from Cuba should unload her, carry the hogsheads and cases in to a warehouse, and pass them through all the forms of the American custom-house ; after which he must turn about and stow them again on shipboard, — an operation which was usually reckoned as equivalent, in breakage, pilfering, and wages, to a charge of about ten per cent on the value of the cargo ; but he had not ventured to levy a duty upon them to be paid to the United States government. One step more, and — as a clever London pamphleteer suggested — -the British government would require the American stevedores to Avear the King's livery .^ Had it been stipulated that the custom-house payments should be taken as full proof of neutrality and complete protection from seiz ure, the American merchant might have found a mo tive for submitting to the tax ; but the trea,ty further insisted that both goods and vessel must be . in good faith American property, — a condition which left the door open as AAddely as ever to the arbitrary seiz- 1 Oil without Vinegar, Medford, London, 1807. 1806. MONROE'S TREATY. 411 ures of British cruisers and to the equally arbitrary decisions of admiralty courts. " We flatter ourselves," wrote Monroe and Pinkney to Madison,^ "that the sum agreed to be paid wUl not be felt as a heavy one by our merchants, wliose patriot ism wUl be gratified by the recollection that the duty which they pay will redound to the advantage of their country." Mercantile patriotism was proverbially elastic ; yet in the present instance not so much the merchants' gratification as that of the President was to be con sidered, — and Jefferson's patriotism could hardly ap prove this tax for the protection of British shipping and produce, which would on the one hand excite the anger of Napoleon, while on the other it conferred ad vantages merely during the period of Avar; Another objection existed Avhich in Jefferson's eyes was fatal. He believed implicitly in the efficacy of commercial restrictions ; he thought the Non-importation Act a better guaranty of good treatment than the best treaty ever made, and was quite ready to try the experiment of such a measure against England. Yet Article V. of Monroe's treaty pledged him for ten years to abstain from every attempt to discriminate against British commerce. The smaller points conceded by Monroe and Pink ney Avere not less likely than the greater ones to disturb Jefferson's temper. The British commission- ' Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807; State Papers, iii. 145. 412 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17, ers refused to remove the export duty of two and a half per cent on British manufactures which Ameri cans paid in excess of what was paid by European consumers. Trade with the British East Indies was restricted to ships which should sail directly from Anierica and return directly thither, — a provision less favorable than Jay had secured. The trade with the British West Indies was a subject so deHcate in Parliament that the two Englishmen refused to touch it, saying that any sanction of this trade, coupled with their sanction of the neutral trade with French and Spanish colonies, would endanger the treaty. They would enter into no arrangement of the trade Avith Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada. They also refused to accept Madison's ideas in regard to blockades. Bad as all this was, and contrary to Madison's in structions and Jefferson's private letters, it was not yet the worst. After Monroe had violated his orders, — had abandoned the ultimata and accepted the cora mercial restrictions which the President disliked, — when the four commissioners were about to sign the treaty, Monroe and Pinkney were startled to hear that the two Englishmen meant to append an explanatory note to their signatures. News of the Berlin Decree had reached England, and its gravity was at once recognized. The British negotiators formally notified Monroe and Pinkney that unless the American gov ernment, before ratification, should give security that it would not recognize the decree, his Majesty George 1806. MONROE'S TREATY'. 413 III. would not consider himself bound by the signa tures of his commissioners.^ Signature under such a condition seemed rather the aet of a suppliant people than of one which had not yet so much as bought thc sword it should have used. Nevertheless Monroe signed. Monroe was o^ten called a very dull man. He Avas said to follow the influence of those who stood near him, and Avas charged by different and opposed poli ticians with having a genius for blunders ; but either Jefferson or Madison might be excused for suspecting that no man on whom they implicitly relied could violate instructions, sacrifice the principles of a life time, and throw infinite embarrassments on his Gov ernment without some ulterior motive. They could not be blamed for suspecting that Monroe, in signing his treaty, thought more of the Federalist vote than he did of Madison's political promotion. Monroe afterward defended his treaty in writings more or Jess elaborate, but his most candid account of his diplomacy in these years was giA'en in a letter to Colonel Taylor of Caroline, written in the year 1810. Of the British treaty, he said : ^ — "The f. allure of our business with Spain and tbe knowl edge of the renewal of the negotiation and tbe manner of it, which were known to every one, were sensibly felt in our concerns with England. She was not willing to yield ' American State Papers, iii. 151. " Monroe to Colonel Taylor, 10 Sept., 1810; Monroe MSS., State Departinent Archives. 414 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 17. any portion of what she called her maritime rights, under the light pressure of the non-importation law, to a Power which had no raaritirae force, not even suflficient to pro tect any one of its ports against a small squadron, and which had so recently submitted to great injuries and indignities from Powers that had not a single ship at sea. Under such circumstances, it seemed to me to be highly for the interest of our country and to the credit of our government to get out of the general scrape on the best terms we could, and with that view to accommodate our differences with the great maritime Power on what might be called fair and reasonable conditions, if such could be obtained. I had been slighted, as I thought, by the Ad ministration in getting no answers to my letters for an unusual term, and in being subjected to a special mis sion, nothwithstanding my remonstrance against it on a thorough conviction of its inutility, and by other acts which I could not but feel ; yet believing that my service in England would be useful there, and by means thereof give aid to the Administration and to the Republican cause at home, I resolved to stay, and did stay for those purposes. The treaty was an honorable and advanta geous adjustment with England. I adopted it in the firm belief that it was so, and nothing has since occurred to change that opinion." CHAPTER XVIII. Monroe was singularly unfortunate in diplomacy. His disasters came not in any ordinary form of occa sional defeat or disappointment, but in waves and torrents of ill-luck. No diplomatist in American history, except Monroe and Pinkney, ever signed a treaty in flagrant contradiction to orders, and at the same time submitted to be told that the opposite party to the contract reserved a right to break it ; but if any other man had taken such a step it would have an swered for a lifetime, and his mortifications would have ended there. No one could assume that the British ministry would care to do more, pending the ratification of its own treaty. Fox's successor, one of the raost liberal Whig noblemen, haA'ing imposed on the United States terms which would have been hard as the result of war, with the addition that even these terms were conditional on a declaration of hos tihties betAveen the United States and France, the liberal Whigs might be supposed willing to wait for some new pretext before publicly tearing their own treaty to pieces. If Monroe flattered himself that he had for the moment checked British aggression, he quickly 416 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. learned his error. The treaty had been signed barely a Aveek when a new Order in Council appeared, which surpassed any belligerent measure of the Tories.^ Beginning Avith the premise that Napoleon's Ber lin Decree " Avould giA'e to his Majesty an unques tionable right of retaliation, and would warrant his Majesty in enforcing the same prohibition of all commerce with France which that Power vainly hopes to effect against the commerce of his Maj esty's subjects," the order added that King George felt himself bound " to retort upon them the evfls of their OAvn injustice," and therefore " ordered that no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, both Avhich ports shall belong to, or be in the possession of, France or her allies." In other Avords the Whig ministers, ignoring their fresh treaty with the United States and even the note appended to it, declared that they would not wait for America to resent the Berlin Decree, but that United States vessels must in future, as a retort for that decree, be deprived of the right to sail from one European port to another. The cus tom had hitherto prevailed among American shippers of seeking a market according to ruling prices, partly perhaps at Bilbao or Bordeaux, partly at some other French or Mediterranean port. Lord Howick's order of Jan. 7, 1807, which cut short this coasting privilege, was a blow to American commerce sharper ^ Order in Council, of Jan. 7, 1807; American State Papers, in. 267. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY, 417 than the famous decision of Sir William Scott in the case of the " Essex." Its apparent effect was to double the cost and risk of neutral commerce, while incidentally it asserted a right to prohibit such trade altogether. Unfortunately more remained behind. The new order was not only an act of violence ; it Avas, accord ing to the Tories, also one of meanness. On its- face it purported to be a measure of retaliation, taken in order to retort upon France the evils of Napoleon's injustice. In the Parliamentary debate four weeks afterAvard, when the order Avas attacked, all parties argued it as a matter of retaliation. The King's ad vocate. Sir John Nicholls, who defended it, took the ground that for the moment no severer retaliation was needed ; while Spencer Perceval and Lord Castle reagh held that Napoleon's decree should have been retaliated in full. " You might turn the provisions of the French decree against themselves," said Perceval ; ' " and as tbey have said that no British goods should sail freely on the seas, you might say that no goods should be carried to France except they flrst touched at an English port. They might be forced to be entered at the custom-house, and a certain entry imposed, which would contribute to advance the price and give a better sale in the foreign market to your own commodities." Sir John Nicholls replied : ^ — 1 Cobbett's Debates, viii. 632. 2 Cobbett's Debates, vin. 635. VOL. III. — 27 418 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. " It was not denied that some steps in retaliation were necessary ; and the question was how far the steps that had been taken were adequate. ... It was necessary to allow a fair trial to what rainisters had adopted." All this seemed clear and frank ; it A\'as equivalent to saying that the rules of international law were henceforth to be laid aside, and that the doctrine of retaliation was to be the measure of England's rights. Yet this was not the form in which Lord Howick addressed President Jefferson. " His Majesty," wrote Lord Howick to Erskine,- ' ' Avitli that forbearance and raoderation which have at all times distinguished his conduct, has determined for the present to conflne himself to the exercise of the power given him by his decided naval superiority in such a man ner only as is authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations." In Parliament the measure was represented as an extra-legal act, justified by the illegality of the Berlin Decree. In diplomacy it was represented as an act " authorized by the acknowledged principles of the law of nations." The reason of the self-contradiction was evident. Only a week before this letter was written, the ministers had concluded a treaty with the United States involving the rights of neutrals, and had attached to it a note to the effect that if the United States failed to resist the Berlin Decree Eng land would acquire the right to retaliate, but had not 1 Howick to Erskine, Jan. 8, 1807; Cobbett's Debates, x. 558. Erskine to Madison, March 12, 1807; American State Papers, iii. 158. 1807. REJECTION OF :M0NR0E'S TREATY^ 419 hinted that retaliation was intended until the case of acquiescence should happen. As the matter stood, the British gOA'ernment had no right to retaliate, but was bound to wait for America to act ; and Lord Howick's order, from that point of view, could not be defended. From every other point of view the Order was equally indefensible ; and within a year the Whigs Avere obliged to take the ground that it Avas not an act of retaliation at all, but an application of the Rule of 1756. Strange to say, this assertion was probably true. Unlikely as it seemed that Earl Grey, Lord Holland, and Lord GreuAille could be parties to a transaction so evasiA'c, their own admissions left no doubt that Napoleon's Berlin Decree was the pretext, not the cause, of Lord Howick's order ; that Lord HoAvick's true intention was to go one step further than Pitt in applying the Rule of 1756 against United States coramerce ; that he aimed only at cutting off the neutral trade at one end of the voyage, as Pitt had cut it off at the other. This criticism of the Whig ministry was made not so much in America as in England. The Whigs never offered an intelligible defence. Lord Grenville and Lord Howick argued at much length in Parlia ment, but convinced no one that their argument was sound ; even the " Edinburgh Review " was ashamed of the task, and became unintelligible when it touched upon this party measure.^ Whether the conduct of ^ Edinburgh Review, xxu. 485. 420 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. Lord Grenville's administration was, as a vigorous Tory pamphleteer said,^ a piece of chicanery of which an attorney's clerk would have been ashamed, was a matter for English historians to decide. In Eng land at that day none but a few merchants or Repub licans believed in the honor or honesty of the United States government or people ; but in this instance it Avas not the honor or honesty of Americans that the English critics denied : it was, on the contrary, the good faitli of their own most distinguished and most trusted noblemen, — Lord Grenville and Lord Sidmouth, Earl Grey and Lord Holland, Lord Erskine and Lord Lansdowne, Lord Ellenborough and Earl Fitzwilliam; and in the light of such conduct and criticism, Americans could not be greatly blamed if they refused to admit the ground on Avliich these Eng lish gentlemen claimed a better reputation for truth or honesty than they were willing to allow Napoleon. Robbery against robbery, the EngHsh mode of pil lage seemed on the whole less respectable than the French. The Whigs were liberal by tradition and instinct ; well disposed toward peace and commerce with all nations, they knew that neutral ships alone could carry British manufactures to a European market. Every impediment put in the way of neutral com merce was an additional burden on British produce ; every market closed to neutrals was a market closed 1 T. P. Courtney's Additional Observations on the Anierican Treaty, London, 1808, p. 89. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 421 to England. From a Whig point of vicAV Lord How ick's order violated the rules of political economy and common-sense ; not to be defended or excused, it equalled in violence the aggressions of Pitt, and in bad faith rivalled the deceptions of Napoleon. Yet this measure was the last act of a Ministry more liberal than England was destined to see again for twenty years. Hardly had Lord Grenville made this concession to Tory prejudice Avhen the old King, nearly blind and on the verge of insanity, clinging to his prejudices with the persistence of age, seized thc pretext of some small concession to the Roman Catholics and turned the Whigs out of his councils. March 26, 1807, Lord Grenville and Lord Howick an nounced to the two Houses of Parliament their dis missal frora office. If the friendly Whigs, after imposing on the United States such a treaty, had thought them selves still obliged to lop off another main limb of American commerce, which Pitt had spared, the Tories wcre not likely to rest until they had put an end to Araerican neutral commerce altogether. This result was foreshadowed by Spencer Perceval and Lord Castlereagh in their speeches on Lord Howick's order, and was the end to whieh the legislation and public opinion of England had pointed for years. The time for negotiation had gone by, and nothing reinained for the United States but a trial of strength. For this final test Jefferson was ready. Congress 422 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. had placed in his hands poAvers which in his opinion Avere ample to protect American interests abroad and at home. On sufficient provocation he could exclude British ships-of-Avar from American waters, and if they should refuse to depart he niight enforce the Non-importation Act against British commerce. His conduct proved that he felt neither fear nor hesi tation. He had never expected a satisfactory treaty from England, and he had good reason to know that Monroe's treaty, if Monroe should succeed in making one, must be worse than none. Early in February, 1807, arriA'ed the despatch from Monroe and Pink ney announcing that the two envoys had decided to depart from their instructions and to abandon the impressment ultimatum. Madison replied,^ February 3, that no sueh treaty would be ratified, and that it would be better to let the negotiation quietly termin ate, leaving each party to follow an informal under standing ; but that if such a treaty should have been signed, the British commissioners should be candidly apprised of the reasons for not expecting its ratifica tion. That Monroe's treaty, if he made one, would be rejected and returned without ratification to the British government was certain long before it reached America. On that point, as on the inflexibility of England, no doubt could exist. President Jefferson and Secretary Madison were as determined, in case of necessity, to ^ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, Feh. 3, 1807; State Papers, iii. 153. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 42o attack British manufactures as Spencer Perceval and George Rose Avere bent upon cutting off American trade ; but although the Americans fully meant to use conunercial Aveapons against British aggression, they earnestly Avished for a good working ai-rangement under which, Avithout a treaty, peace and commerce could be secure. So far from challenging a rupture, they were anxious only to encourage cordial relations. Throughout the winter of 1806-1807 Jefferson made of his attachment to England a foundation for all his policy at home and abroad. Congress, vmder the security of Fox's friendship, left foreign affairs alone, and quarrelled only about domestic matters ; while General Turreau's temper was made more iiTitable by the attentions lavished upon David Montague Erskine, tho new British minister, who, Nov. 4, 1806, put an end to the adventures of Merry at Washington, and began the easy task of wirming popularity. The winter of 1805-1806 had been favorable to Turreau, who saw France control American policy toward Spain and St. Domingo ; while a stringent Act of Congress prohibiting the importation of Brit ish manufactures brought Avithin his sight the chief object of French diplomacy in America, — a war betAveen the United States and England. The winter of 1806-1807 promised to undo this good work, and even to bring the United States to the verge of war with France. The first measure recommended by the President and adopted by Congress — the suspen sion of the Non-importation Act — annoyed Turreau. 424 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. Monroe's treaty was signed in London December 1 ; at Washington Turreau wrote, December 12,^ soon after Congress met, — " If I am to judge by the talk and countenances of the great people, this Congress wUl be more favorable to England than the last was ; aud already its leader, under the President's own invitation, shows a benevolent dispo sition toward the British government. I had the honor to see Mr. Jefferson the evening before Congress met, and to say to him, on the subject of Spanish differences, that probably all the negotiations entered into by the Government with that Power, as well as with England, would succeed. ' Really,' replied the President, ' I haA'e reason to think that the English are going to make an arrangement with us, and that it would be already done if Mr. Fox's death had not interrupted negotiation. Per haps we shall even obtain,' he added, ' the right to ex tend our maritime jurisdiction, and to carry it as far as tbe effect of the Gulf Stream makes itself felt, — Avhicb would be A'ery advantageous both to belligerents and to neutrals.' " To persons who knew that Jefferson was then angry with Napoleon for his faithless conduct in preventing the new Florida negotiation, this assur ance of English friendship gave a measure of the President's diplomacy. He was willing to irritate and alarm the French minister, and he succeeded. Turreau took refuge in speculations and sharp criticisms : — 1 Tnrreau to Talleyrand, Dec. 12, 1806 ; Archives des Aff. Etr., MSS. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 425 "I know not whether to attribute this flrst effectof pronounced favor in regard to England to the last des patches of the two envoys negotiating at London, or to the first overtures of Mr. Erskine, who arrived bere a few days ago, ancl with whora they seera already infatu ated (tres engoue) ; . , , or, finally, whether it may not be the result of some hints from Alexander, — for whom the Federal government, and particularly Mr. Jefferson, have an admiration wbich borders on delirium. Ancl your Excellency may recall that last spring the President talked of m.aking overtures to the Russian sovereign relatixe to a plan of unarmed maritime confederation, which Avas then his great object, ancl which, as he as sured me in our last interview, he has not given up, — making, as his custom is, a grand eulogiura of Alexander and his savages." Madison, CA'cn in prosperous times ncA'cr a faA'orite with General Turreau, managed as usual to draw upon himself the chief Aveight of diplomatic suspicion and Avrath. " The unexpected change in the views of the Federal gOA'ernment," continued Turreau, "is such that the secre tary's bearing toward me is deranged by it. Not that he lias renounced his system of attentions (prevenances) toward the minister of France, whora he does not love. and whom, as I have unfortunately good reason to know, he distrusts ; not that he has weakened his protestations, reiterated to satiety, of personal attachment to tbe in terests of France, ancl of the Government's constant wish to maintain and strengthen the friendly relations which unite it with that Power, — but the Secretary of State has forgotten that at the beginning of this year 426 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. is. [1806], and particularly after the event of Austerlitz the only subject of our private conversations was com plaint of England, and the flxed resolution of the Federal government to stop the course of her wrongs either by repression or reprisals. He has forgotten that the steps taken by the Executive to obtain from Congress the famous Non-importation Bill, now suspended, were so marked and ill-concealed that John Randolph called attention to them, and flung severe, or rather humUiatino-, taunts at the agents of ministerial influence. Now Mr. Madison no longer talks to me about England ; he tries to keep out of our conversations whatever relates to that Power, and far from making complaints of her, the Federal government ' has to congratulate itself that the ministry of Mr. Fox, though unfortunately too short, has nevertheless sufficed to bring the Cabinet of St. James to raoderate sentiments.' " Neither Jefferson nor Madison took direct notice of Napoleon's conduct in regard to Florida, but they led Turreau to think that England was their favorite ; and Turreau's dislike of America and Americans be came in consequence more decided. He hoped for Burr's success in order to relieve the pressure upon him : ' — " It seems to rae that Burr's success cannot be con trary to the interests of France, although I am convinced that England will favor him, — doubtless with other hopes ; but if we had to-day the Fioridas, the importance of which I have felt it my duty to recall to you, I think I 1 Turreau to TaUeyrand, Jan. 12, 1807; Archives des Aff. ttr., MSS. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 427 can guarantee that New Orleans would be ours if we only showed a Avisli for it. All reports, and I have had such, both oflicial ancl positive, agree as to the regrets ex pressed by the great majority of inhabitants at not living under French rule." In the middle of February, at a moment when Americans expected daily the arrival of a British treaty marked by generous concessions. Napoleon's Berlin Decree reached the United States. Coinmerce was instantly paralyzed, and merchants. Congress men, Cabinet, and President turned to Turreau anx iously inquiring what was meant by this blockade of the British Islands by a Power which could not keep so much as a frigate at sea. Turreau could give them no answer. " Your Excellency will readily belicA'c," he wrote home,i " that this circumstance does not put us in a better position here." The influence of France in the United States was ncA-er lower than at the moment when England turned Lord GrenviUe and Lord Erskine out of power, in order to install Spencer PerccA'al and Lord Eldon at the head of a Tory reaction. Jefferson's objections to a British treaty would haA'e had no weight with the Senate if the treaty had been tolerable ; the Berlin Decree and the Emperor's conduct in regard to Florida would have reconciled Madison to almost any British alliance. Turreau was so well aware of the danger that he exerted himself in remonstrances and semi-threats, > Turreau to TaUeyrand, Feb. 23, 1807 ; Archives des Aff. hr., MSS. 428 HIS'TORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18. and told ^ one member of the Cabinet after another that " at a moment when Europe, leagued together against the maritime tyranny of England, was labor ing to throw off the yoke of that Power and to secure for all navigating nations freedom of commerce and the seas," it was particularly improper for the United States to accept any treaty which did not expressly secure all disputed points, and that no treaty Avould be observed by England unless made under the aus pices and by the guaranty of Napoleon. In vicAV of the recent fate that had overtaken Powers like SAvitzerland and Venice, which had put themselves under the auspices of Napoleon, this argument produced no conviction. Turreau raight better have left to the English the task of repairing Napoleon's mistakes ; but these mistakes had accumu lated until it depended upon England alone Avhether the United States should join her in the war. Not only had the Emperor offended Jefferson and Madison by his peremptory stoppage of the Florida purchase, — he had also declared war upon American coramerce in a decree which Jefferson and Madison could not but suspect to be in some mysterious way connected with his sudden change of front toward Spain and Florida ; while in the face of these difficulties he left his own minister at Washington in such discredit that Turreau was reduced to beg sixty thousand dollars from the American Treasury to meet consular expen- 1 Turreau to Talleyrand, April 1, 1807 ; Archives des Aff. £tr., MSS. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 429 ditures at a moment when he should have been press ing complaints about the frigate " Inip^tueux," de stroyed by the English Avithin American jurisdiction, and when he should have been threatening the most fatal consequences if President Jefferson should sign any treaty Avhatever with England.^ In this temper all parties waited for the news from England, which could not long be delayed ; until March 3, 1807, the last day of the session, a rumor reached tbe Capitol that a messenger had arrived at the British legation with a copy of the treaty negotiated by Pinkney and Monroe. The ncAvs was true. No sooner did Erskine receiA'e the treaty than he hurried with it to Madison, " in hopes that he would be induced to persuade the President either to detain the Senate, Avliich he has the power by the Constitution to do, or to give them notice that he should convene them again." Unlike Merry, Erskine was anxious for a reconciliation between England and America ; he tried honestly and over-zealously to bring the tAvo governments into accord, but he found Madison not nearly so earnest as himself : " The flrst question he asked was, what had been de termined on the point of irapressraent of searaen, clairaed as British, out of American ships ; and when I informed liim that I had not perceived anything that directly re ferred to that question in any of tbe Articles of the copy of the treaty which I had received, he expressed the ¦ Turreau to TaUeyrand, May 15, 1807 ; Archives des Aff. litr., MSS. 430 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. greatest astonishment and disappointment. . . . The note which was delivered in to the American commis sioners, previous to the signature of the treaty, by Lords Holland and Auckland, relative to Bonaparte's decree of November 21, particularly attracted his attention; and he observed that the note itself would have prevented, he was convinced, the ratiflcation of the treaty, even if all the Articles of it had been satisfactory, and all the points settled upon the terms that had been required by their commissioners." ^ At ten o'clock the same night the two Houses of Congress, when ready to adjourn, sent a joint com mittee to wait upon the President, who was unwell, and unable to go as usual to the Capitol. Dr. Mitchill, the senator from New York, a member of this committee, asked the President whether there would be a call of the Senate to consider the treaty .^ " Certainly not," replied Jefferson ; and he added that " the only way he could account for our minis ters having signed such a treaty under such circum stances was by supposing that in the first panic of the French imperial decree they had supposed a war to be inevitable, and that America must make common cause with England. He should, however, continue amicable relations with England, and con tinue the suspension of the Non-importation Act." The senators received this rebuff with ill-concealed annoyance. Jefferson's act in refusing to consult 1 Erskine to Howick, March 6, 1807 ; MSS. British Archives. '^ Diary of J. Q. Adams, i. 495. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY". 431 them about a matter so important as a British treaty — and one which from the first had been their own rather than the President's scheme — was another instance of the boldness which sometimes contradicted the theory that Jefferson was a timid man. To ordi nary minds it seemed clear that the President needed support ; that he could not afford single-handed to defy England and France ; that the circle of foreign eneraies Avas narrowing about him ; and that to sup press of his own will a treaty on Avhich peace and war raight depend, exposed him to responsibilities under which he might be crushed. Although the treaty was not yet published, enough had been said to make senators extremely curious about its contents ; and they were not pleased to learn that the President meant to tell them nothing, and cared too little for their opinion to ask it. Of all the sena tors the most formidable intriguer Avas Samuel Smith of JIaryland, who Avrote the next day confidentially to Wilson Cary Nicholas a letter full of the fresh impres sions whicii gave life to Smith's private language : ^ " A copy of the treaty arrived last evening. The President is angry with it, and to Dr. Mitchill and Mr. Adams (who carried the last message) expressed his anger in strong, very strong terms, telling in broad lan guage the cause of bis wrath. He requested the doctor to teU the senators his objections. If the doctor repeated correctly, then I must be pennitted to think there was > S. Smith to W. C. Nicholas, March 4, 1807 ; Nicholas .MSS. 432 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. not a little of the heightening. He said the President was at present determined to send the original back the moment it shall be received, without submitting it to the Senate. He was sick, it is true, — vexed and worried ; he may think better of it, for Madison (expecting less than he had) differs with him as to calling the Senate, and R[obert] S[mith] concurs in opinion with M[adi- son] .... I stopped here, and I have seen the President and Mr. M[adison]. It seems the impressment of sea men was a sine qua non in the instructions. The P[resi- dent] speaks positively that, without full and formal satisfaction shall be made thereupon, he avUI return the treaty without consulting the Senate ; and yet he admits the treaty, so far as to all the other points, might be acceptable, — nay, that there are but few exceptions to it in his mind. I fancy the mercliants would be perfectly pleased therewith. If then in all other points it would please, will the responsibility not be very great on him should he send it back without consulting the Senate? M[aclison] in answer to this query said, 'But if he is determined not to accept, even should the Senate ad vise, why call the Senate together?' I could give no answer to this question. If by his unusual conduct the British continue or increase their depredations (which he cannot prevent), wbat will be the outcry? You may advise him. He stumped us by his positive manner. . . . Will not M[onroe] and P[inkney] both conceive themselves insulted, and return to make war on the Administration? The whole subject ought, I conceive, to have been treated as one of great deUcacy." In another letter, written the same day. General Smith rehearsed the story in a few words, which 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 433 proA'cd that Smith had a full share of the shrewdness that was lacking in Jefferson. He saw the future as clearly as politicians often saw what philosophers overlooked ; but his jealousy of Jefferson appeared in every word : ^ — "The Senate, agreeably to the first construction (given by General Washington and his Administration, of which Jefferson was one, — given, too, iraraediately after the knowledge of wbat was the intention of the convention that framed it), did tmanimousl-y advise the President to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain. The Senate agreed to his nomination of tbe negotiators. A treaty was effected. It arrives. It is well known that he was coerced by the Senate to the measure ; and he refuses to subinit it to their approbation. What a responsibUity he takes ! By sending it back he disgraces his rainisters, and Monroe is one. Monroe and Pinkney corae horae, and in justiflcation publish the treaty. It raay appear good to the eyes of aU unprejudiced raen, — I suspect it Avill. By a refusal to accede to it the British con tinue their depredations, to tbe araount perhaps of their whole systera of ' Y''ou shall not trade in time of war where you are refused in time of peace ; ' the impress ment is carried to an excess bounded only by their power ; immense losses are sustained ; a general outcry will ensue ; all will say, ' If Monroe's treaty had suc ceeded, those losses would not have happened ; why was it refused?' Jealousy of Monroe, and unreasonable an tipathy by Jefferson and Madison to Great Britain ! — this wiU be said, this wiU be believed. And Monroe wUl be brought forward ; new parties will arise, and those » S. Smith to W. C. Nicholas, March 4, 1807 ; Nicholas MSS. VOL. III. — 28 434 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. is. adverse politically will be brought together by interest. . . . Shall we put all to jeopardy because we have not got all we ask? WUl we go to war? No! What will we do to coerce ? More non-importation. Will Congress under such circuinstances consent to continue their non importation ? I suspect not ; I cannot believe they wiU. Then where shaU we be? J. Randolph wiU take his stand and ask, ' Shall we hazard everything for a set of men who, etc.? What, put the landed interest to such inconvenience ! The fair merchant is satisfled ; tbe country is flourishing,' etc. But I have not time to raake a speech. Monroe wUl be called a martyr, and the martyr wUl be the President. And why? Because he has done right, ancl his opponent has advised wrong. The people care little or nothing about the seamen." The more closely the subject was studied the more clearly it appeared that Monroe had to all appearance knowingly embarrassed the Administration by sign ing a treaty in contravention of the President's or ders ; but Jefferson added unnecessarily to his embar rassment by refusing the treaty before he read it. Tacit abandonment of impressments was the utmost concession that the President could hope from Eng land, and even this he must probably fight for ; yet he refused to consult the Senate on the merits of Monroe's treaty for a reason which would have caused the withholding of every treaty ever made with Eng land. That the public should be satisfied with this imperious treatment was an extravagant demand. No act of Jefferson's administration exposed him to more misinterpretation, or more stimulated a belief in 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 435 his hatred of England and of commerce, than his re fusal to lay Monroe's treaty before the Senate. Perhaps the President would have been less decided had he knoAvn at first how faulty the treaty was. Not untfl it had been studied for Aveeks did all its faults become CAident ; and not until it Avas read in the light of Lord Howick's Order in Council did its character admit of no more doubt. When news of this order reached Washington, about ten days after the treaty, Madison wrote to Erskine a letter 1 which showed an effort to treat the new re striction of neutral trade as though it might have some shadow of legality in the background, and as though it were not directed solely against America ; but the truth soon became too evident for such mild treatment, and Madison was obliged ten days after ward to interrupt his study of Monroe's treaty in order to tell Erskine that the operation of the new order " Avould be a proceeding as ruinous to our com merce as contrary to our essential rights." ^ To Monroe the President wrote with the utmost forbearance and kindness.'^ Instead of reproaching, Jefferson soothed the irritation of his old friend, contradicted newspaper reports which were calcu lated to wound Monroe's feelings, and pressed upon him the government of New Orleans Territory : " It is the second office in the United States in importance, > Madison to Erskine, March 20, 1807 ; State Papers, iii. 158. 2 Same to same, March 29, 1807 ; Ibid., 159. « Jefferson to Monroe, March 21, 1807; Works, v. 52. r r 436 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18. and I am stfll in hopes you will accept it ; it is im possible to let you stay at home while the public has so much need of talents." In regard to the treaty he said little ; but Avhat he did say was more severe than any criticism yet made to others, " Depend on it, my dear Sir, that it Avill be considered as a hard treaty when it is known. The British commission ers appear to have screwed every Article as far as it would bear, — to have taken everything and yielded nothing." He urged Monroe, if nothing better could be got, "to back out of the negotiation" as well as he could, letting it die insensibly, and substituting some informal agreement until a more yielding tem per should rise. Next the President wrote privately to Bowdoin, his wandering minister to Spain, to whom Armstrong had shut the doors of the legation at Paris for betraying its secrets, and who in return was abus ing Armstrong with recriminations. If a quarrel should arise with England, it might at least be made to bring Florida again within reach. " I have but little expectation," wrote the President to Bowdoin,^ "that the British government will retire from their habitual wrongs in the impressment of our seamen, ancl am certain that without that we wUl never tie up our hands by treaty from the right of passing a non-importation or non-intercourse Act to make it her interest to become just. This may bring on a war of commercial restrictions. To show, however, the sin cerity of our desire for concUiation, I have suspended 1 Jefferson to Bowdoin, April 2,. 1807 ; Works, v. 63. 1807. REJECTION OF MONROE'S TREATY. 437 the Non-importation Act. This state of things should be understood at Paris, and every effort used on your part to accommodate our differences with Spain under the auspices of France, with whora it is all important that we should stand in terms of the strictest cordiality. In fact we are to depend on her ancl Russia for the estab lishment of neutral rights by the treaty of peace, among which should be that of taking no persons by a bellige rent out of a neutral ship, unless they be the soldiers of an enemy. Never -jlid a nation act toward another with more perfldy and' injustice than Spain has con stantly practised against us ; and if we have kept our hands off of her tUl now, it has been purely out of respect to France, ancl from the value we set on the friendship of France. We expect, therefore, from the friendship of the Eraperor that he will either compel Spain to do us justice or abandon her to us. We ask but one raonth to be in possession of the city of Mexico." In reality Jefferson needed somewhat more than a month to be in possession of Mexico, although the Spaniards might without much difficulty have reached New Orleans in less time. Had the Federalist press been able to print the letter to Bowdoin, with its semi-admissions of intent to wage a commercial war against England in dependence upon Napoleon in order to gain the Fioridas, the scandal Avould have been as great as that caused by the famous letters to Mazzei and Paine ; but in truth this flighty talk had no influence or importance, and the time was close at hand Avhen Jefferson Avas to become helpless. 438 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.18. Between the will of England and France on one side and the fixed theories of Virginia and Pennsylvania on the other, Jefferson's freedom of action disappeared. Madison, Avho rarely accepted either horn of a di lemma with mueh rapidity, labored over new instruc tions to Monroe which were to make the treaty toler able, and called Gallatin and General Smith to his aid, with no other result than to uncover new and insuperable difficulties. April 20 he wrote to Jeffer son at Monticello : ^ — " The shape to be given to the instructions to our com raissioners becoraes more and more perplexing. I begin to suspect that it may eventually be necessary to limit the treaty to the subject of irapressraents, leaving the colonial trade, with other objects, to tbeir own course and to the influence which our reserved power over our imports raay have on that course. In practice the colo nial trade and everything else would probably be more favored than they are by the Articles forwarded, or would be by any remodiflcations to be expected. The case of irapressraents is raore urgent. Soraething seems essential to be done, nor is anything likely to be done without carrying fresh matter in the negotiation. I am preparing an overture to disuse British seamen, in the form of an ultimatura, graduated from an exception of those who have been two years in our navigation to no exception at all other than such as have been naturalized." A fcAv days later news arrived that the Whigs had been driven from office, and a high Tory ministry had 1 Madison to Jefferson, April 20, 1807 ; Jefl'erson MSS. 1807. REJECTION OF JIONROE'S TREATY. 439 come into poAvcr. Madison Avas more than ever per plexed, but did not throAV aside his treaty. "A late arrival from London," he wrote again, ^ April 24, " presents a very unexpected scene at St. James's. Should the revolution stated actually take place in the Cabinet, it will subject our affairs there to new calcula tions. On one hand the principles and dispositions of the new Ministry portend the most unfriendly course. On the other hand, their feeble and tottering situation aud the force of their ousted rivals, who will probably be more explicit in maintaining the value of a good understanding with this country, cannot fail to inspire caution. It may happen also that the new Cabinet will be less aA'erse to a tabula rasa for a new adjustraent than those who forraed the instruraent to be superseded." Jefferson's reply to these suggestions shoAved no anxiety except the haunting fear of a treaty, — a fear which to Monroe's eyes could have no foundation. " I am more and more convinced," the President wrote April 21,^ " that our best course is to let the negotiation take a friendly nap ; " and May 1 he added : ^ " I know few of the characters of the noAv British Administration. The few I know are true Pittites and anti-American. From them we have nothing to hope but that they will readily let us back out." In view of George Canning's character and antecedents and of Spencer Perceval's speeches, Jef ferson's desire to be allowed to back out of his 1 Madison to Jefferson, April 24, 1807 ; Jefferson MSS. 2 Jefferson to Madison, April 21, 1807: Works, v. 69. 8 Jefferson to Madison, AprU 21, 1807; Works, v. 74. 440 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 18. treaty was superfluous. That Canning and Perceval would make any effort to hold him to his bargain was quite unlikely, but that they would let him back out was still more so. They had in view more expe ditious ways of ejecting him. Nevertheless Madison was allowed to perfect his new instructions to Monroe and Pinkney. May 20 they were signed and sent. Before they reached London a British frigate had answered them in tones which left little chance for discussion. CHAPTER XIX. March 30, 1807, in a room at the Eagle Tavern in Richmond, Aaron Burr was brought before Chief- Justice Marshall for examination and commitment. Although Burr had been but a few days in the toAvn, he was already treated by many persons as though he had conferred honor upon his country. Throughout the United States the Federalists, who formed almost the whole of fashionable society, affected to disbelieve in the conspiracy, and ridiculed Jefferson's sudden fears. The Democrats had never been able to per suade themselves that the Union Avas really in danger, or that Burr's projects, whatever they were, had a chance of success ; and in truth Burr's conspiracy, like that of Pickering and Griswold, had no deep roots in society, but was mostly confined to a circle of well-born, well-bred, and well-educated individuals, Avhose Avant of moral sense was one more proof that the moral instinct had little to do with social dis tinctions. ^ In the case of Burr, Jefferson himseK had persistently ignored danger ; and no one denied that if danger ever existed, it had passed. Burr was fight ing for his life against the power of an encroaching government ; and human nature was too simply or- 442 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. ganized to think of abstract justice or remote princi ples when watching the weak fight for life against the strong. Even the Deinocrats Avere more curious to see Burr than to hang him ; and had he gone to the gallows, he would have gone as a hero, like Captain Macheath amidst the admiring crowds of London. BetAveen Captain Macheath and Colonel Burr Avas more than one point of resemblance, and the " Beg gar's Opera " could have been easily paralleled Avithiii the prison at Richmond ; but no part of Burr's career Avas more humorous than the gravity with whicii he took an injured tone, and maintained Avith success that Jefferson, being a trivial person, had been de ceived by the stories of Eaton and Wilkinson, until, under the influence of causeless alarm, he had per mitted a wanton violation of right. From the first step toward commitment, March 30, to the last day of the tedious trials, October 20, Burr and his coun sel never ceased their effort to convict Jefferson ; until the acquittal of Burr began to seem a matter of secondary importance compared with the President's discomfiture. Over this tournament the chief-justice presided as arbiter. Blennerhassett's island, where the overt act of treason was charged to have taken place, lay within the chief-justice's circuit. According as he might lean toward the accused or toward the government, he would decide the result ; and therefore his leanings were a matter of deep interest. That he held Feder- 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 443 alist prejudices and nourished a personal dislike to Jefferson Avas notorious ; but apart from political feelings he had given no clew to his probable legal bias except in his recent decision upon the case of Bollman and Swartwout. In discharging these tAvo agents of Burr on the ground that no overt act of levying war was alleged against them, Marshall had taken occasion to define the law of treason as a guide to the attorney-general in the coming indictment of Burr : — " It is not the intention of the Court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crirae who has not ap peared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, — that is, if a body of men be actually asserabled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose, — all those who perforra any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general con spiracy, are to be considered as traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for tbe treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war." On the strength of this opinion, the attorney-general undertook to convict Burr of treason for the acts committed under his direction at Blennerhassett's island, although at the time when these acts were committed Burr himself was in Kentucky, two hun dred miles away. The task was difficult, and Burr's experience as a lawyer enabled him to make it more difficult still. He retained the ablest counsel at the bar. First of 444 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. these was Edmund Randolph, prominent among the older Virginia lawyers, who had been attorney-general and Secretary of State in President Washington's Cabinet. Edmund Randolph's style of address was ponderous, and not always happy ; to balance its de fects Burr employed the services of John Wickham, another Virginian, whose versatility and A\'it were remarkable. A tlurd Virginian, Benjamin Botts, was brought into the case, and proved a valuable ally. Finally Luther Martin was summoned from Balti more ; and Martin's whole heart was with his client. ¦in defending Justice Chase, Luther Martin had made I great name ; but hatred for the Democrats and ;heir President became a secondary passion in his breast. His zeal for Burr was doubled by a sudden idolatry which the sexagenarian conceived for Burr's daughter Theodosia, who came to her father's side at Richmond. The government was represented by no one of equal force with these opponents. John Breckui- ridge, the Attorney-General of the United States, died in December, 1806. Jan. 20, 1807, President Jeffer son appointed Caesar A. Rodney to the post. Al though Rodney's abilities were respectable, he could hardly have wished to be confronted at once by the most important and difficult State prosecution ever tried under Executive authority. Rodney's duties or his health prevented him from attendance. He barely appeared at Richmond in the preliminaries, and then left the case in the hands of the district- 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 445 attorney, George Hay, who took his orders directly from Jefferson, with whom he was in active corres pondence. To assist Hay the President engaged thc services of WiUiam Wirt, then thirty-fiA'c years old, and promising to become an ornament to the bar; but in the profession of the law age gave weight, and Wirt, though popular, conscientious, admired, and brilliant in a florid style of oratory, suffered as a lawyer from his youth and his reputation as an orator. He was hardly more capable than Hay of conducting a case whicii drew upon every resource of personal authority. The third counsel, Alexander McRae, Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, was infe rior both in ability and in tact to either of his associates. His teinper irritated Hay and offended the Court, while his arguments added little streng-th to the prosecution. The first object of the government was to commit Burr for trial on the charge of treason as well as of misdemeanor ; but Marshall promptly checked all hopes of obtaining aid from the court. April 1 the chief-justice delivered an opinion on the question of commitment, and took that opportunity to give the district-attorney a warning. Declining to commit Burr for treason without evidence stronger than the affidavits of Eaton and Wilkinson, Marshall blamed the Executive with asperity for neglect of duty in providing proof of treason : — " Several months have elapsed since this fact did occur, if it ever occurred. More than flve weeks have elapsed 446 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. since tbe opinion of the Supreme Court has declared the necessity of proving the fact if it exists. Why is it not proved? To the Executive government is intrusted the important power of prosecuting those whose crimes may disturb the public repose or endanger its safety. It would be easy in much less time than has intervened since Colonel Burr has been alleged to have assembled his troops, to procure aflSdavits establishing the fact." Accordingly Burr was committed only for misde-4 meaner, and five securities immediately offered them selves on his behalf. At three o'clock on the after noon of April 1 he was again at liberty, under bonds for ten thousand dollars to appear at the next circuit court. May 22, at Richmond. Marshall's reproof of Executive slowness was not altogether respectful to the co-ordinate branch of government. No doubt treasonable assemblages had taken place in December, and affidavits could have been brought from Marietta or Nashville within six or eight weeks had the government known precisely what would be needed, or where the evidence Avas to go ; but no judge could reasonably require that the Executive should within five weeks obey a hint from the Supreme Court whicii implied a long correspond ence and inquiry at spots so remote as Blenner hassett's island, Lexington, Nashville, Fort Massac, and Chickasaw Bluffs. Jefferson was naturally in dignant at being treated with so little courtesy. He wrote with extreme bitterness about Marshall's " tricks to force trials before it is possible to coUect the evi- 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 447 dence." i He returned threat for threat, with some thing in addition : — " In what terms of decency can we spe.ak of this? As if an express could go to Natchez or tbe mouth of the Cumberland and return in flve weeks, to do which has never taken less than tAvelve ! . . . But all the principles of law are to be perverted which would bear on the favorite offenders wbo endeavor to overturn this odious republic ! . . . All this, however, Avill work well. Tbe nation will judge both the offender ancl judges for them selves. If a meraber of the Executive or Legislature does wrong, the day is never far distant when tlie people will remove him. Tbey will see then and araend the error in our Constitution which raakes any branch independent of the nation. They will see that one of the great co-ordinate branches of the governraent, setting itself in opposition to the other two and to the coraraon-sense of the nation, proclairas irapunity to that class of offenders which endeavors to overturn the Constitution, and are protected in it by the Constitution itself ; for impeach ment is a farce which will not be tried again. If their protection of Burr produces this amendraent, it will do more good than his conderanation would have done ; . . . and if his punishraent can be commuted now for a useful amendment of the Constitution, I shall rejoice in it." In substance Jefferson said that if Marshall should suffer Burr to escape, Marshall himself should be re- moA-ed from office. No secret was made of this inten tion. The letter in which Jefferson announced the threat was written to the Virginia senator Wflliam 1 Jefferson to W. B. GUes, April 20, 1807; Works, v. 65. 448 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. B. Giles, who had been foremost in every attack upon the Judiciary, and would certainly lead the new one ; but Giles was not the confidant of a secret, — the idea was conimon, as Marshall knew. The little society that swarmed in the court-room and in the streets of Richmond could- see without an effort that the Presi dent courted a chaUenge from Marshall, and that the chief-justice on his side, for a second or third time, welcomed a trial of skill and address with the President. If Marshall was in truth the gloomy and malignant conspirator that Jefferson imagined him to be, he might easily excuse or justify the President's intended course. Punctually, May 22, the next act began. The ques tion of commitment had been a niatter of no great consequence ; that of indictment was vital. Burn must be indicted, not merely for misdemeanor, butl for treason ; and to leave no doubt of success, the] governnient summoned a cloud of witnesses to appeal* before the grand jury. The town swarmed with con spirators and government agents. The grand jury — containing some of the most respected citizens of Virginia — was sworn, and the court instructed the clerk to place John Randolph as foreman. A long delay ensued. General Wilkinson, the most impor tant Avitness for government, was on his way from New Orleans ; and while waiting his arrival from day to day, the grand jury took evidence and the court listened to the disputes of counsel. The district- attorney moved to commit Burr on the charge of 1807. BURRS TRIAL. 449 treason, Avhile Burr on his side moved for a subpoena duces tecum to be directed to the President, requir ing him to produce certain papers in evidence. This motion was evidently part of a system adopted by the defence for annoying and throAving odium on the Executive, — a system Avhich Burr's counsel rather avoAved than concealed, by declaiming against the despotism of gOA'ernment and the persecution of which Burr was a victim. Luther Martin, at the first mo- ment of his appearance in court, launched into an\ invective against Jefferson : — " The President has undertaken to prejudge my client by declaring that ' of bis guilt there can be no doubt.' He has assumed the knowledge of the Supreme Being himself, and pretended to search the heart of my highly respected friend. He has proclaimed him a traitor in the face of that country which has rewarded him. He has let slip the dogs of war, the hell-hounds of persecution, to hunt down my friend. And would this President of the United States, who has raised all this absurd claraor, pretend to keep back the papers which are wanted for this trial, where life itself is at stake?" A long argument followed. Hay, while admitting that the President might be generally subpoenaed as a witness, held that no need of a subpoena had been shown, and that in any case a subpoena duces tecum ought not to be issued. The chief-justice, after hearing counsel on both sides, read June 13 an elaborate decision, which settled the point in .Burr's favor. VOL. III. — 29 450 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. "If upon any principle," said he, "the President could be construed to stand exerapt from the general provisions of the Constitution, it would be because his duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national objects. But it is apparent that this demand is not unremitting ; and if it should exist at the time when his attendance on a court is required, it would be sworn on the return of the subpoena, and would rather constitute a reason for not obeying the process of the court than a reason against its being issued. ... It cannot be denied that to issue a subpoena to a person flUing the exalted station of the chief magistrate is a duty which would be dispensed with much raore cheer fully than it would be perforraed ; but if it be a duty, tbe court can have no choice in the case." Nothing could irritate Jefferson more sensibly than this decision. Only a few months before, in the trial of Smith and Ogden for complicity with Miranda, he had ordered his Cabinet to disregard the summons of the court. Luther Martin did not fail to fling reproach on him for this act. " In New York, on the farcical trial of Ogden and Smith, the officers of the government screened themselves from attending, under the sanction of the President's name. Per haps the same farce may be repeated here." To be insulted by Martin and to be ordered about the , country by Marshall, exasperated Jefferson beyond reason. He wrote letter after letter to Hay, filled with resentment : — "The leading feature of our Constitution is the inde pendence of the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary of ^8*'^- BURR'S TRIAL. 451 each other ; and none are raore jealous of this than the Judiciary. But would the Executive be independent of the Judiciary if he were subject to the cotnmands of the latter, and to imprisonment for disobecUenee ; if the smaller courts could bandy him from pilbar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south and east to west, and withdraw hira entirely from his executive duties?"! The Judiciary never admitted the propriety of this reasoning,^ which was indeed no answer to Marshall's argument. Unless the President of the United States vere raised above the rank of a citizen, and endowed'' Avith more than royal prerogatives, no duty could be. more imperative upon him than that of lending everyy aid in his power to the Judiciary in a case which in volved the foundations of civil society and govern ment. No Judiciary could assume at the outset that Executive duties Avould necessarily be interrupted by breaking Jefferson's long visits to Monticello in order to bring him for a day to Richmond. Consciousness of this possible rejoinder disturbed the President's mind so much that he undertook to meet it in advance : — " The Judge says ' it is apparent that the President's duties as chief magistrate do not demand his whole time, and are not unremitting.' If he aUudes to our annual retirement from the seat of government during tbe sickly season, he should be told that such arrangements are made for carrying on the pubUc business, at and between 1 Jefferson to Hay, June 20, 1807; Works, v. 102. » U. S. vs. KendaU, Cranch's Circuit Court Reports, v. 385. 452 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. the several stations we take, that it goes on as unremit tingly there as if we were at the seat of government." The district-attorney would hardly have dared tell this to the chief-justice, for he must have felt that Marshall would treat it as an admission. If arrange ments could be made for carrying on the public busi ness at Monticello, why could they not be made for carrying it on at Richmond ? Perhaps temper had more to do with Jefferson's reasoning than he imagined. Nothing could be better calculated to nettle a philosophic President who be lieved the world, except within his own domain, to be too much governed, than the charge that he himself had played the despot and had trampled upon private rights ; but that such charges should be pressed with the coarseness of Luther Martin, and should depend on the rulings of John Marshall, seemed an intoler able outrage on the purity of Jefferson's intentions. In such cases an explosion of anger was a common form of relief. Even President Washington was said to have sometimes dashed his hat upon the ground, and the second President was famous for gusts of temper. "I have heard, indeed," wrote Jefferson, ^ "that my predecessor sometiraes decided things against his Council by clashing and trampling his wig on the floor. This only proves, what you and I knew, that he had a better heart than head." 1 Jefferson to William Short, June 12, 1807; Works, v. 93. Cf. Jefferson MSS. ^S''^- BURR'S TRIAL. 453 Wigs were Federalist symbols of dignity and power. Republicans wore no wigs, and could use no such resource in moments of rage ; but had President Jefferson worn the full paraphernalia of Federalism, — wig and powder, cocked hat and small sword, — he would never haA'e slioAvn his passion in acts of violence or in physical excitement. His sensitive ness relieved itself in irritability and complaints, in threats forgotten as soon as uttered, or in reflections tinged with a color of philosophic thought. His first impulse Avas to retaliate upon Martin and thrust him into the criminal dock. He wrote to Hay, i — " Shall we move to corarait Luther Martin a.& particeps criminis with Burr? Graybell will flx upon him mispri sion of treason at least. Ancl at any rate bis evidence will put down this unprincipled and irapudent Federal bulldog, ancl add another proof that the most claraorous defenders of Burr are all his accomplices." To the attorney-general he wrote in the same Avords : ^ "I think it material to break doAvii this bulldog of Federalism." Jefferson's irritation rarely lasted long, and it evaporated with these words. Martin railed unmolested. No one fretted by personal feeling could cope with the Rhadamanthine calm of John Marshall. The President could not successfully strike back ; he Avas fortunate if he should succeed in warding off his ene mies' blows. In the midst of these controversies and 1 Jefferson to Hay, June 19, 1807; Worlds, v. 98. 2 Jefferson to Rodney, June 19, 1807; Jefferson MSS. 454 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19 irritations, June 15, General Wilkinson arrived. The audiences whicii in those days still crowded to the theatre and laughed at the extraordinary wit and morality of the " Beggar's Opera," found none of its possible allusions more amusing than the often- quoted Hne which seemed meant to point at James Wilkinson. " That Jemmy Twitcher should peach me, I own surprised me. 'Tis a plain proof that the world is all alike, and that even our gang can no more trust one another than other people." Wil kinson had not a friend ; even Daniel Clark turned against him. To break him down, to prove by his' own confession that he was a pensioner of Spain and an accomplice with Burr, was the known object of the defence ; but the disgrace of Wilkinson would also discredit the President and shake the Adminis tration which Wilkinson had saved. Whatever th^ consequences might be, Jefferson could not alloAv Wilkinson to suffer. When Major -Bruff, of the artillery, came from St. Louis to Washington early in March, 1807, three nionths before Burr's indictment, he made bitter com plaints to the Secretary of War, accusing the general, under whose orders he served, of being a spy of Spain and a traitor with Burr.i General Dearborn listened without contradiction, and replied that there had been a time when General Wilkinson did not stand well with the Executive, but his energetic measures at 1 Major Bruff's Teetimony, Burr's Trial; Annals of Congress, 1807-1808, pp. 598-600. 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 455 NeAV Orleans had regained him ExecutiA'c confidence, and the President Avould sustain hini ; that after tbe actual bustle Avas over there niight perhaps be an inquiry, but meanAvhfle Wilkinson must and would be supported. Attorney-General Rodney Avent even further. "What would be the result," be asked Bruff, " if all your charges against General Wilkinson should be proven? Why, just Avhat the Federalists ancl the ene mies of tbe present Administration wish, — it would turn the indignation of the people frora Burr on AYilkinson. Burr would escape, and Wilkinson take his place." Rodney did not add, what was patent to all the world, that if Wilkinson were to be couAicted, Presi dent Jefferson himself, whose negligence had left the Western country, in spite of a thousand warnings, at the General's mercy, could not be saved from the roughest handling. The President and his Cabinet shrank from Marshall's subpoenas because under the examination of Wickham, Botts, and Luther Martin they would be forced either to make com mon cause with the General, or to admit their own negligence. The whole case hung together. Diso bedience of the subpoena was necessary for the sup port of Wilkinson ; support of Wflkinson was more than ever necessary after refusing to obey the subpoena. The President accepted his full share in the labor. No sooner did he hear of Wflkinson's arrival, at the moment when his own subpoena was issued and defied, than he Avrote a letter cal- 456 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. culated to give the General all the confidence he needed : i — " Y'our enemies have filled tbe public ear with slanders and your mind with trouble on that account. The estab lishment of their guilt will let the world see what they ought to think of their clamors ; it will dissipate the doubts of those who doubted for want of knowledge, and will place you on higher ground in the public estimate and public confldence. No one is more sensible than myself of the injustice which has been aimed at you. Accept, I pray you, my salutations and assurances of respect and esteem." As an American citizen Jefferson had the right to respect and esteem whom he pleased, and need not even excuse his friendships. The world often loved and cherished its worst rogues, — its Falstaffs, Mac- heaths, and Burrs, — and Jefferson was not exempt from such weakness ; but that his respect and esteem ^ for Wilkinson should require him to retain a pen-' sioned Spanish spy and a confederate with Burr and Dayton at the head of the United States army during several years of extreme public danger, was a costly consequence to the people whose confidence Jeffer son claimed and held. John Randolph saw this point clearly, and his bloodhound instinct detected and fol lowed, without hesitation, the trail that led to the White House. Whether the chief-justice intended it or not, he never struck Jefferson a blow so mis chievous as when he directed the clerk to place } Jefferson to WUkinison, June 21,' 1807; Works, v. 109. l^**^- BURR'S TRIAL. 457 John Randolph as foreman of the grand jiiry.i Ran dolph's nature revolted from Wilkinson ; and if the President and the General could be gibbeted together Randolph Avas the man to do it. Such was the situation when the General was SAVorn and sent before the grand jury June 15, where his appearance, if his enemy could be believed, was abject. "Under exaraination all was confusion of language and of looks," Avrote Randolph to Nicholson.^ " Sucb a countenance never did I behold ; there was scarcely a variance of opinion araong us as to his guilt. Y''et this miscreant is hugged to the bosora of Government while Monroe is denounced." Randolph ardently wished to indict the General at the same time with Burr; and while he strained every nerve to effect this purpose in the grand- jury room. Burr and his counsel in the court-room moved for an attachment against Wilkinson for at tempting to obstruct the free course of justice by oppression of witnesses. The district-attorney re sisted both attempts with all his authority ; and June 24, to the disappointment of his enemies, Wil kinson escaped. "Yesterday," wrote Randolph, June 25,^ "the grand jury found bUls for treason and raisderaeanor against Burr and Blennerhassett una voce, and this day presented ' Wilkinson's Memoirs, ii. 6. 2 Randolph to Nicholson, June 28, 1807; Nicholson MSS. 8 Randolph to Nicholson, June 25, 1807; Nicholson MSS. 458 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. Jonathan Dayton, ex-senator, John Sraith of Ohio, Com fort Tyler, Israel Smith of New Y''ork, and Dayds Floyd of Indiana, for treason ; but the mammoth of iniquity escaped, — not that any man pretended to think him in nocent, but upon certain wire-drawn distinctions that I will not pester you witb. Wilkinson is the only man that I ever saw who was from the bark to the very core a vil lain. The proof is unquestionable ; but, my good friend, I cannot enter upon it here. Suffice it to say tliat I have seen it, and that it is not susceptible of misconstruction. Burr supported himself with great fortitude. He was last night lodged in the comraon town jail (we have no State prison except for convicts), where I daresay he slept sounder than I did. Perhaps you never saw human nature in so degraded a situation as in the person of Wil kinson before the grand jury ; and yet this raan stands on the very surarait and pinnacle of Executive favor, while Jaraes Monroe is denounced." In the debates of the next session, when Ran dolph followed up his attacks on Jefferson by trying to identify him with Wilkinson's misdeeds, a fuller account was given of the plea Avhich saved Wilkinson from presentment. " There was before the grand jury," said Randolph,i " a raotion to present General Wilkinson for misprision of treason. This motion was overruled upon this ground, — that the treasonable (overt) act having been alleged to be committed in the State of Ohio, and General Wil kinson's letter to the President of the United States hav- 1 Annals of Congress, Jau. 11, 1808; Session of 1807-1808, p. 1397. ^8°^- BURR'S TRIAL. 459 pg been dated, though but a short time, prior to that act, tliis person had the beneflt of what laAvyers would cafl a legal exception, or a fraud ; but I wiU inform the gentleman that I did not hear a single member of the grand jury express any other opinion than that which I myself expressed, of the moral, not of the legal, guilt of the party." In the evidence taken by a Congressional com mittee in 1811 regarding Wilkinsoii,i several mem bers of the grand jury were called to testify ; and their accounts showed that the motion to present General Wilkinson for misprision of treason Avas raade by Littleton W. Tazewell, and supported by Randolph ahd three or four other members of the grand jury. One witness thought that the vote stood 9 to 7. Narrow though the loophole might be, Wflkinson squeezed through it. The indictment of Burr was at length obtained. The conspirators, who had at first vehemently averred that Wilkinson would never dare to appear, and Avho if he should appear intended to break him down before the grand jury, were reduced to hoping for revenge when he should come on the witness-stand. Meanwhile, June 26, Burr pleaded not guilty, and the court adjourned until August 3, when the trial was to begin. Thus far the President had carried everything be- 1 Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Conduct of General Wilkinson, Feb. 26, 1811, pp. 281, 298, Cf. National InteUigencer, Aug. 3, 1807. 460 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. fore him. He had produced his witnesses, had sus tained Wilkinson, indicted Burr, and defied Marshall's subpoenas. This success could not be won Avithout rousing passion. Richmond was in the hands of the conspirators, and they denounced Jefferson publicly and without mercy, as they denounced Wilkinson and every other government officer. "As I was crossing the court-house green," said an eye-witness,^ " I heard a great noise of haranguing some distance off. Inquiring what it was, I was told it was a great blackguard from Tennessee, one Andrew Jackson, raaking a speech for Burr and daraning Jefferson as a persecutor." Hay wrote to the President, June 14 : ^ — "General Jackson, of Tennessee, has been here ever since the 22d, denouncing Wilkinson in the coarsest terras in every corapany. The latter showed rae a paper which at once explained the raotive of this incessant hos tility. His own character depends on the prostration of Wilkinson's." This paper was no doubt Jackson's secret denun ciation to Claiborne. Young Samuel Swartwout, who had some reason to complain of the ridiculous figure he had been made to cut, jostled Wilkinson in the street, and ended by posting him for a coward. John Randolph echoed Luther Martin's tirades against the President. Randolph was in despair at Jefferson's success. 1 Parton's Life of Burr, u. 107. 2 Hay to Jefferson, June 14, 1807 ; Jefferson MSS. 180''. BURR'S TRIAL. 461 "My friend," he wrote to Nicholson, ' " I am standing on the soU of my native country divested of every right for whicfi our fathers bled. Politics have usurped the place of law, and the scenes of 1798 are again revived. Men now see and hear, and feel and tlnnk, politically. Maxiras are now advanced and advocated which would almost have staggered the effrontery of Bayard or the cooler impudence of Chauncey Goodrich when we were flrst acquainted." All this Avork was but skirmishing. The true struggle had still to come. So long as the President dealt only with grand jurors and indictments, he could hardly fail to succeed ; but the case was dif ferent Avhen he dealt directly with Chief-Justice Marshall and with the stubborn words of the Con stitution, that " no person shall be convicted of trea son unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." The district-attorney was ready with a mass of CA'idence, but the chief-justice alone could say whether a sylla ble of this evidence should be admitted ; and hith erto the chief-justice had by no means shown a bias toward the government. Hay was convinced that Marshall meant to protect Burr, and he wrote to the President on the subject i^ — " The bias of Judge Marshall is as obvious as if it was stamped upon his forehead. I may do him injustice, but 1 Randolph to Nicholson, June 25, 1807; Adams's Randolph, p. 221. 2 Hay to Jefferson, Aug. 11, 1807; Jefferson MSS. 462 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19.: I do not believe that I am, when I say that he is endea voring to work himself up to a state of f[irraness?] which will enable [him] to aid Burr throughout the trial without appearing to be conscious of doing wrong. He seeras to think that his reputation is irretrievably gone, and that he has now nothing to lose by doing as he pleases. His concern for Mr. Burr is wonderful. He told rae many years ago, when Burr was rising in the estimation of the Republican party, that he was as profligate in principle as he was desperate in fortune. I remember his words ; they astonished me. Yet when the grand jury brought in their bUl, the chief-justice gazed at him for a long time, without appearing conscious that he was doing so, with an expression of sympathy and sorrow as strong as the human countenance can exhibit without palpable emotion." August 8 the court opened its session and the trial began. Not until August 17 was the jury im panelled ; and meanwhile a new figure appeared at Burr's side. Blennerhassett arrived in Richmond August 4, and was brought before the court August 10. He began at once a priyate journal of the trial, which remained the only record of what passed among the conspirators. As each witness appeared, Blennerhassett told the gossip regarding him. " The once redoubted Eaton," ^ who was put flrst upon the stand, "has dwindled down in the eyes of this sar castic town into a ridiculous mountebank, strutting about the streets under a tremendous hat, with a Turkish sash over colored clothes, when he is not tippling in the * Blennerhassett Papers, p. 315. 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 4G3 taverns, where he offers up with his libations the bitter effusions of his sorrows." "Old sly-boots" Dayton,' he said, Avas lurking about corners. Wilkinson ^ " exhibited the manner of a sergeaut under a court-martial rather than the demeanor of an accusing officer confronted with his culprit. His perplexity and derangeraent, even upon his direct examination, has placed beyond all doubt ' his honor as a soldier and his fldelity as a citizen.'" These comments were sharp, yet the pages of Blennerhassett's diary were not so severe upon any of the witnesses for the government as they Avere up on Burr himself. Blennerhassett had wakened to the discovery that Burr was, after all, but a vulgar swindler. The coUapse of Burr's courage when con fronted by Cowles Meade and the Mississippi militia at Cole's Creek January 17 ; his desertion of Blen nerhassett and his flight toward Spanish territory ; the protest of the bills which he had drawn on pre tended funds in New York, and which Blennerhassett had indorsed under AUston's guaranty ; the evident wish of Allston to repudiate this guaranty as he had repudiated Burr ; and the ruin whicii had fallen on Blennerhassett's property at the island, — taught the Irishman how thoroughly he had been duped : ^ — 1 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 397. 2 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 422. ' Blennerhassett Papers, p. 373. 464 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. " The present trial cannot fail to furnish ample testi mony, if not to the guilt, at least to the defect of eA'ery talent under the assumption of which this giddy adven turer has seduced so many followers of riper experience and better judgment than rayself." Yet Burr's mastership in deportment, his super ficial dignity, his cheerfulness and sanguine tempera ment, and the skill with Avhich he managed legal tactics, made an impression on Blennerhassett's mind : — "As a jockey might restore his fame in the course after he had injured it on the tight-rope, so, perhaps, the little ' Emperor ' at Cole's Creek may be forgotten in the attorney at Richraond." ' For a few days the trial went on undisturbed, while the government put Eaton, Truxton, Peter Taylor, the Morgans, and a number of other Avitnesses on the stand to prove an overt act of treason at Blennerhassett's island ; but nothing short of Blen nerhassett's OAvn confession could place the matter in a clear light, and Burr's chief fear Avas evidently that Blennerhassett should turn State's evidence. To prevent this, Allston was persuaded to pay the more pressing demands against Blennerhassett, and Burr exerted himself to conciliate him. On the other hand, Jefferson seemed to hope that he could be won over.2 Duane, of the " Aurora," visited him in prison August 23, and offered to serve as an intermediary ' Blennerhassett Papers, p. 343. ^ Jefferson to Hay, Aug. 20, 1807 ; Works, v. 174. ^^07- BURR'S TRI.AL. 465 Avith thc government.! Had matters gone as the President hoped, something might have come of this manoeuvre; but before further pressure could be einployed, thc chief-justice struck the prosecution dead. August 19 Burr's counsel suddenly moA'cd to arrest the evidence. The goA-ernment, they said, had gone through all its testimony relating to the overt act charged in the indictment ; it admitted that Burr was hundreds of miles distant from the scene ; and as the district-attorney was about to introduce col lateral testimony of acts done beyond the jurisdic tion of the court, it became the duty of the defence to object. For ten days this vital point was argued. All thc counsel on either side exerted themselves to the ut most. Wickham's opening speech on the nature of treason was declared by as good a judge as Lyttleton Tazewell to be " the greatest forensic effort of the American bar."^ Luther Martin spoke fourteen hours, beginning with an almost passionate allusion to his idol Theodosia. William Wirt exhausted his poAvers of argument and oratory, and in the course of his address made the rhetorical display which became familiar to every Araerican, and whicii introduced a sort of appeal to Blennerhassett to turn against the more guflty crew who Avere trying to sacrifice him to save themselves : — 1 Blennerhassett Papers, p. 356. 2 Grigsby's TazeweU, p. 73. VOL. in. — 30 466 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES Ch. 19. " Who is Blennerhassett? A native of Ireland, a raan of letters, Avho fled from the storms of his own country to flnd quiet in ours." George Hay was neither so efficient nor so dex terous as Wirt, and either intentionally or by awk wardness succeeded in giAing the impression of threatening the court : i — " Mr. Bott says tbat we are now adA'Ocating opinions which on Fries' trial we condemned. ... I beg leave to assure the gentleraan that the censure which the judge dreAv on himself was not on account of his opinions, how ever incorrect they might be, but for his arbitrary and irregular conduct at the trial, whicb Avas one of the principal causes for which he was afterward impeached. He attempted to Avrest the decision from the jury, and prejudge the case before hearing all the evidence in it, — the identical thing which this court is now called on by tbese gentlemen to do." That Hay, knowing well Jefferson's thoughts and the magic that hung about the word " impeach ment," should have used these words inadvertently seemed hardly credible. If he did so, his clumsi ness was as offensive as the threat could have been, for the idea of impeachment was in the air of the court-house. Burr's counsel at once retaliated.^ " It was very kind of the gentleman to remind the court of the do.nger of a decision of the motion in favor of the prisoner." Hay protested that he had spoken innocently, and the chief-justice said 1 Burr's Trial, ii. 193. ^ Burr's Trial, U. 238. 180'- BURR'S TRIAL. 467 that the aUusion had not been taken as personal ; but the unpleasant impression remained. " The gen tleman plainly insinuated the possibility of danger to the court," persisted the defence ; and Luther Martin added,i — " I (1-0 not know Avhether it were intended by this ob servation that your honors should be appreliensive of an impeachment iu case you should decide against the wishes of the government. I will not presume th.at it was used Avith that view, but it is susceptible of being so misunderstood, however innocently or inadvertently it may have been raade." August 31 the chief-justice read his decision. Much the longest of Marshall's judicial opinions ; elaborately argued, Avith many citations, and Avitli less simple adherence to one leading thought than was usual in his logic, — this paper seemed, in the imagination of MarshaU's enemies, to betray a painful effort to reconcile his dictum in BoUman's case Avitli the exclusion of further evidence in the case of Burr. To laymen, Avho knew only the uncertainties of laAv ; Avho thought that the assemblage on Blennerhassett's island Avas such an overt act as might, Avithout A-i(dent impropriety, be held l)y a jury to be an act of levying war ; and aa'Ho conceived that Burr, although absent from the spot, Avas as principal present in a legal sense such as would excuse a jury in finding him guilty, — an uneasy doubt could not fail to suggest itself that the chief-justice, Avith an equal effort of 1 Bun's Trial, ii. 369. 468 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. ingenuity, might have produced equal conviction in a directly opposite result. On the other hand, the intent of the Constitution was clear. The men Avho framed that instrument remembered the crimes that had been perpetrated under the pretence of justice ; for the most part they had been traitors themseh'es, and having risked their necks under the law they feared despotism and arbitrary power more than they feared treason. No one could doubt that their sym pathies, at least in 1788, when the Constitution was framed, Avould have been on the side of Marshall's decision. If Jefferson, since 1788, had, changed his point of view, the chief-justice was not under obliga tions to imitate him. "If it be said that the advising or procurement of treason is a secret transaction which can scarcely ever be proved in the manner required by this opinion, the answer which will readily suggest itself is that the diffi culty of proving a fact will not justify conviction with out proof." At the close of his decision the chief-justice, with simple dignity Avhich still compels respectful admira tion, took up the gauntlet whicii the district-attorney had flung at his feet. As though turning from the crowd in the court-room to look for a moment directly into the eyes of the President, the threatened chief- justice uttered a feAV Avords that were at once ansAver and defiance : — " Much has been said in tbe course of the argument on points on which the Court feels no inclination to comment 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 469 particularly, but which may perhaps not improperly re ceive some notice. " That tbis Court dares not usurp power is roost true ; that this Court dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. No man is desirous of placing himself in a disa greeable situation ; no man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny ; no raan, raight he let the bitter cup pass frora hira without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottora ; but if he has no choice in the case, — if there is no alternative presented to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobriura of those who are denominated the world, — he raerits the conterapt as well as the indignation of his country who can hesitate which to embrace. . . . " No testimony relative to the conduct or declarations of the prisoner elsewhere and subsequent to the transac tions on Blennerhassett's island can be admitted ; because sucb testimony, being in its nature merely corroborative, and incompetent to prove the overt act iu itself, is irrel evant until there be proof of the overt act by two witnesses." On the following day, September 1, District- Attor ney Hay abandoned the case, and the jury entered a verdict of " Not guilty." Hay instantly reported to Monticello the result of his efforts, and added criticisms upon Marshall : i — " Wirt, who has hitherto advocated the integrity of the chief-justice, now abandons him. This last opinion has opened his eyes, and he speaks in the strongest terms of reprobation." 1 Hay to Jefferson, Sept. 1, 1807 ; Jefferson MSS. 470 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 19. September 4 Jefferson replied in the tone which always accompanied his vexation : i — " Y^ours of the 1st came to hand yesterday. The event bas been what was evidently intended frora tbe beginning of the trial ; that is tcKsay, not- only to clear Burr, but to prevent the evidence frora ever going before the world. But this latter case must not take place. It is now, therefore, more than ever indispensable that not a single witness be paid or perraitted to depart until his testiraony has been committed to writing. . . . These whole pro ceedings will be laid before Congress, that they may decide whether the defect has been in the evidence of guilt, or in the law, or in the application of the law, and that they may provide the proper remedy for the past and the future." Accordingly, although the trial for treason was at an end, the district-attorney pressed the indictment for misdemeanor; and until October 19 the chief- justice was occupied in hearing testimony intended for use not against Burr, but against himself. Then at last the conspirators were suffered to go their way, subject to legal proceedings in Ohio Avhich the gOA-ei'n- ment had no idea of prosecuting ; while the President, mortified and angry, prepared to pursue Marshall instead of Burr. The Federalists, who always over rated the strength of party passions, trembled again for the Judiciary ; but in truth nothing was to be feared. The days of Jefferson's power and glory had passed forever, while those of Marshall had barely 1 Jefferson to Hay, Sept. 4, 1807 ; Works, v. 187. Cf. Jeffer son MSS. 1807. BURR'S TRIAL. 471 begun. Even on the testimony, the President's case Avas far fi-Diu being so clear as he had hoped and expected. His chief Avitness, Wflkinson, could only with difficulty be sustained ; and the district-attorney, Avho began by pledging himself before the court to shoAV the falsity of the charges . Avhich had been brought against the; General, en^ed by admitting Iheir truth. " The declaration wbich I made in court in bis favor some time ago,";Wrote Hay to the' President at the close, ^ "was precipit.ate ; and though I have not retracted it, everybody sees) tbat t have not attempted the task which I in fact proraised to perforra. My confidence in hira is shaken, if not destroyed. I am sorry for it, on his own account, on the public account, and because you have expressed opinions in his favor ; but you did not know then what you wUl soon know, and what I did uot learn until after — long after ^ — my declaration above mentioned." The hint was strong. If Wilkinson were discred ited, Jefferson himself was in danger. To attack ^\h.e Supreme Court on such CAidence was to invite a worse defeat than in the impeachment of Chase, Meanwhile the country had graver dangers to think about, and enemies at its doors who were not to be curbed by proclamations or impeachments. 1 Hay to Jefferson, Oct. 15, 1807 ; Jefferson MSS. END OF VOL. I. DO NOT V CIRCULATE a39002 00U29'472b