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YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Bought with the income
of the
WILLIAM C. EGLESTON FUND

FIGURES FROM AMERICAN HISTORY

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
BY
LOUIS HOWLAND

FIGURES FROM AMERICAN HISTORY
Now Ready
THOMAS JEFFERSON
By David Saville Mu2zey
JEFFERSON DAVIS
By Armistead C. Gordon
STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
By Louis Howland
ALEXANDER HAMILTON
By Henry Jones Ford
Further volumes will follow at short intervals, the
Ust induding WASHINGTON, LINCOLN, WEB
STER, GRANT, LEE, CLEVELAND, and others.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, PUBLISHERS

FIGURES FROM AMERICAN HISTORY

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS

BY
LOUIS HOWLAND

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1920

COPTKIGHT, 1920, BY
CHAKLBS SCRIBNER'S SONS

Published April, 1920

TO
C. H. H.

PREFACE
This is the story of an interesting man who lived
in an interesting and fateful time. By his con
temporaries Douglas was thought to stand even-
shouldered with the greatest of the men with whom
he was associated. Those of the succeeding genera
tion ranked him far below his deserts. He was in
part the sport of forces that no man could control
or much influence, and in part himself a force that
helped to mould the destiny of the nation. The
author has striven to tell the truth, and to give such
interpretations as seemed necessary to help the
reader to reach a just verdict concerning one of the
most remarkable men whom the country has pro
duced. It is hoped that they are free from the de
fect that marks so many interpretations, namely
over-ingenuity. The author's indebtedness, which is cheerfully
acknowledged, will appear on almost every page.

CONTENTS

CHAFTEB

F,i,OIl

I. Early Years  1
II. Congressman  32
III. War and Politics  58
IV. Freedom or Slavery  83
V. The Great Compromise  106
VI. Compromise and Fugitive Slaves .... 132
VII. President-making  147
Vni. Pierce's Surrender  170
IX. Popular Sovereignty  190
X. War in Kansas  224
XI. Freedom versus Slavery  249
XII. Douglas Breaks with the Administration 280
XIII. The Lincoln-Douglas Debate  299
XIV. The Gathering Storm  328
XV. Douglas the Patriot  345
Index  373

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
CHAPTER I
EARLY YEARS
Tecere are many men who have played, if not a
great, at least a conspicuous part in the history of
this nation, who have been treated, if not unfairly,
at least imgenerously both by contemporaries and
later generations. Years ago I read with delight
Theodore Parker's terrible sermon on Daniel Web
ster, and beheved with the preacher that Webster,
when he made his Seventh of March Speech, had
"paltered with eternal God for power." Yet a few
years later, Abraham Lincoln, as President, a man
enshrined in the reverent affection of the American
people, made the Webster policy his own when he
declared that his object was to save the Union, and
that he would save it even at the cost of continuing
slavery. His devotion, like that of the great Mas
sachusetts senator, was first of all to the Union.
Stephen A. Douglas, a much less great man, has
suffered from the same extreme of contemporary
criticism. He too sought the presidency, he too
was ambitious. In truth, it is not easy to beheve
that his judgment and action were not, in certain
1

2 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
crises, swayed, if not controlled, by personal con
siderations. But this was by no means always the
case. We cannot think of Douglas without at the
same time thinking of Lincoln, and the juxtaposi
tion is most unfortunate for the former. It as to
be remembered that in much less trying times than
those in which Douglas Uved, men whose patriot
ism, intellectual honesty, and moral integrity have
never been questioned, have been known to com
promise, and forswear what were believed to be
their deepest convictions. If we give these the bene
fit of the doubt, it seems no more than fair that
we should show the same measure of justice to those
who served greatly in the past, and are no longer
able to speak for themselves, or to guard their own
fame. The present writer confesses to a strong
bias against those extremists who find it easy and
pleasant to condemn human weakness and failure,
and difficult, if not impossible, to award praise even
where praise is due. Life, especially poHtical life,
is much less simple than they suppose. Human
motives are seldom unmixed.
Stephen Arnold Douglas was bom in the town
of Brandon, Vt., April 23, 1813. He came of free
dom-loving stock on both sides. The Douglases,
as the name indicates, were Scotch, though the
great-grandfather of the subject of this sketch was
bom in this country. The grandfather was a sol
dier in the Revolutionary War. He was with the

EARLY YEARS 3
Continental army during the terrible winter at
Valley Forge, and was present at the surrender of
Cornwallis. Through his grandmothers, Stephen
A. Douglas traced back to the Arnolds of Rhode
Island, one of whom was an associate of Roger Wil
liams. The son of this Arnold was governor of the
Rhode Island colony by appointment of Charles
Second. Bom in Vermont, descended from men
who fought for both civil and religious liberty, reared
in the democratic atmosphere of the town meeting,
Douglas could never in his heart have believed in
the right of one man to enslave another. All his
antecedents were Northern. His father, Doctor
Stephen A. Douglas, was bom at Stephentown,
Rensselaer County, N. Y. Instead of migrating
to the West, he turned his face eastward and settled
in Brandon, where he married Sarah Fisk, and where
his son was born. Doctor Douglas was a graduate
of Middlebury College, and a physician of some
distinction. Within less than three months after
the birth of his famous son he died very suddenly
of heart disease. The bereaved family, consisting
of mother, son, and an elder daughter, was for many
years cared for by a bachelor brother of Mrs.
Douglas. The subsequent marriage of this brother,
and the birth of a child, made it clear to young
Douglas that he could never hope for the college
education to which he had looked forward. Up
to his fifteenth year he had attended the district

4 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
school in Brandon during the winter months, work
ing on his uncle's farm in the summer. After his
uncle's marriage he apprenticed himself to a cabinet
maker at Middlebury, becoming very proficient in
the trade, at which he worked for two years. En
tering the Brandon Academy, he pursued his studies
for a year, when his mother married again, and the
whole family moved to Canandaigua, N. Y., where
the young man continued his studies for three years
at the excellent academy at that place, devoting
himself specially to the classics. It was at this time
that he began the study of the law. James W.
Sheahan, in his well-known life of Douglas, says:
"Some idea may be formed of his proficiency in
the classical course, and of the energy with which
he pursued his studies, from the fact that, while
the laws of New York at that time required a course
of seven years to entitle a student to be admitted
to practise law, four years of which might be occu
pied in classical studies, Mr. Douglas, on a thor
ough examination upon his whole course of study,
was allowed a credit of three years for his classical
attainments at the time he commenced the study of
the law, leaving four years only as the period which
he would be required to continue as a law student
to entitle him to be admitted to the bar of that State.
He kept up his collegiate course, however, during
the whole time he was studying law, so that when
he removed West in June, 1833, he had mastered

EARLY YEARS 5
nearly the entire collegiate course in most of the
various branches required of a graduate in our best
universities." His youthful dream was thus in
effect reaUzed. He had a college education, knew
something of farming, and was master of a trade.
Life had forced on him the necessity of supporting
himself, and yet there had been up to his twentieth
year Kttle of that hardness that has so often marked
the youth of great Americans, notably that of the
great man who was to be the rival of Douglas —
Abraham Lincoln. Douglas was well equipped for
the battle of life. He had worked industriously,
studied hard, and improved his time to the utter
most. His advantages also were greater than those
of many who have won a higher place in the world's
esteem. Of grinding and sordid poverty he had
known httle or nothing. His association had for
the most part been with educated and intelhgent
people. He grew up, not in the wilderness, but in
a settled community, and one with great tradi
tions. What would have been Douglas's attitude toward
slavery had he continued to reside either in Ver
mont or New York, one can hardly say. Probably
he would have continued to be a stanch Democrat,
and have felt that it was essential to the nation's
welfare to keep his party in power. For he was
from his youth a great admirer of General Jackson,
and in his early manhood was a defender both of

6 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
him and his policies. It certainly is impossible to
believe that he would ever have been an abolitionist.
Indeed, abolitionism was no more popular in New
England and New York in the early days of the
last century than it was in Illinois at the time of
Douglas's migration. It was in 1833, when he was
twenty years old, that the young man heard the
call of the West. What he sought was a wider op
portunity and a freer life. It may be said that he
foimd both. The story of his wanderings is inter
esting, but it has Uttle bearing on his character or
career. After brief stops at Cleveland, Cincinnati,
and Louisville, he reached St. Louis before the close
of the year. There he made the acquaintance of
Edward Bates, candidate before the convention
that nominated Lincoln, and attorney-general in
Lincoln's cabinet. His stay was short, for November
of the same year found him in Jacksonville, HI.,
friendless, unknown, and practically penniless. He
had cut loose entirely from his base of supplies,
and was determined to make his own way in the
world. He was, however, not long friendless, for
he soon won the regard, respect, and confidence
of his neighbors. The West that had called him
satisfied him. He early acquired its spirit and point
of view. It was pioneer territory, and Douglas
was a pioneer. He foimd inspiration in the prairie
landscape which to many is so unpicturesque and
unimpressive. Speaking of Kansas, Walt Whitman

EARLY YEARS 7
says: "Under these skies resplendent in September
beauty — amid the pecuhar landscape you are used
to but which is new to me — ^in the freedom and vigor
and sane enthusiasm of this perfect Western air
and autumn sunshme — ^it seems to me that a poem
would be almost an impertinence. But if you care
to have a word from me, I should speak it about
these very prakies. I have been most impressed,
and shall remain the rest of my life impressed with
that feature of the topography of your Western
central world — ^that vast Something, stretching out
on its own unbounded scale, unconfined, which
there is in these prairies, combining the real and
ideal, beautiful as dreams. I wonder indeed if the
people of this continental inland West know how
much of first-class art they have in these prairies —
how original and all your own — ^how much of the
influences of a character for your future humanity,
broad, patriotic, heroic, and new? How entirely
they tally on land the grandeur and superb monotony
of the skies of heaven, and the ocean with its waters ?
How freeing, soothing, nourishing they are to the
soul? Then is it not subtly they who have given
us our leading modem Americans, Lincoln and
Grant? — ^vast-spread average men — their fore
grounds of character altogether practical and real,
yet (to those who have eyes to see) with finest back
grounds of the ideal, towering high as any. And
do we not see m them the foreshadowings of the

8 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
future races that shall fill these prairies? . . . This
favored central area of (in round numbers) 2,000
miles square seems fated to be the home both of
what I would call America's distinctive ideas and
distinctive realities." Perhaps the "Something"
of which the poet speaks is, considered poUtically,
nationahty. It is certain that in this section there
has never been that intense loyalty to the State
that has prevailed — and still prevails — ^in the East
and South. The nation comes first. Long before
Whitman wrote, Douglas felt the charm of the
prairies, and responded to it. There was a remark
able correspondence between the transplanted New
Englander and his new environment. The people
liked and trusted him, and followed his leadership.
He understood them and their "ways," and never
lost his hold on their affections. Bom a pohtician,
young Douglas found himself at home among men
of whom it may almost be said that poHtics was
their chief business. Great questions were under
consideration — banking, currency, internal improve
ments, the relations of the States to the Union and
to one another, and, most vital of all, slavery. It
was the day of joint debates, often informal and
neighborhood or street-comer affairs, and again
attended by thousands of people. Campaigns ex
tended over seven and eight months. Every lawyer
was a pohtician. The orator was highly esteemed,
and the man who could make a speech was a hero.

EARLY YEARS 9
Perhaps the interest in pubhc questions was no
greater than now, but it seems to have been more
direct, intense, and personal. Issues were discussed
face to face rather than through newspapers, of
which there were few. It was in such a society that
Douglas made his home. Unable to find work at
JacksonviUe, and with his money almost all spent,
he pushed on to Winchester, the county-seat of
Scott Coimty, where he obtained employment as
a school-teacher, in which capacity he served for
three months. The employment afforded him a
hving, and left him sufficient time to continue his
legal studies. Though he had not then been ad
mitted to the bar, the young man practised in the
justice-of-peace courts, thus adding somewhat to
his income, and getting a practical experience that
was not without value. He made many friends,
and wielded no small influence in the life of the httle
town. It was during the Winchester period that
his power in debate was first exhibited, and recog
nized. This, probably more than anything else,
commended him to the people. President Jack
son's war on the United States Bank was not pop
ular in Illinois, and many of the Democrats accepted
it solely on the authority of the President, and were
quite unable to answer the arguments of the Whigs.
Douglas gave them reasons and arguments to justify
the Jacksonian pohcy, ammunition which they
used with good effect against their political op-

10 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ponents. Whether the reasons were good is not
the question. It is enough that Democrats were
able to discuss the issues, and were no longer forced
to fall back on the infallibility of Andrew Jackson.
Douglas promptly took the offensive, and by his
boldness encouraged others to do so. Thus before
he was twenty-one he showed something of the
quaUties that later marked him as a great party
leader. As a boy in Vermont, and later in New
York, he had taken — as far as a boy could take —
an active part in poHtics. At Winchester his career
may be said to have begun. From that time he
moved steadily and swiftly forward. In ten years
after his coming to Illinois he was a national figure.
Probably never did the capacity for arguing serve
a man to better purpose. In March, 1834, Douglas
removed to JacksonviUe, where he was admitted
to the bar, and opened a law-office. At once he
was drawn into — or plunged into — ^pohtics, again
as the champion of the Jackson administration and
its bank policy. The situation was the same as at
Winchester, and it was met in the same way. The
Democrats needed leadership, and they foimd it
in the young lawyer. A mass-meeting of Democrats
was called to decide whether the administration
should be supported or abandoned by those who
had put it in power. The leading men in the move
ment were Douglas and S. S. Brooks, editor of the
Jacksonville News. There were many who were

EARLY YEARS 11
doubtful of the wisdom of the action, so strong was
the opposition to the President. Douglas, who
had not attained his majority, presented the reso
lutions indorsing the President, and supported them
m a speech which greatly impressed and stirred
his audience, and won for him the sobriquet of
"Little Giant," which he bore through life. The
resolutions were enthusiastically adopted, and the
Democratic status of Morgan County was fixed
for years. The position of Douglas was established,
and from this time on he was a real leader in the
pohtical life of Illinois. Nor did he ever lose his
hold on the people, though it was in after years
subjected to severe strain. The next few years
showed that he was as shrewd and resourceful in
pohtical organization and management as he was
eloquent and convincing in argument. He gave
unsparingly of his time and energy to the service
of his party, not for reward — at least not primarily
so — but because he loved "the game," and believed
in Democratic principles. But reward came in full
measure, nor is there any reason to think that it
was imwelcome. Douglas, by his services, put the
Democratic party of Illinois under heavy obligation
to him, an obligation that it fully and gladly dis
charged. If ever a man earned political preferment
by pohtical services — if such a thing is possible-
Douglas did. He was first of all a party man.
The first honor that came to him was the State's

12 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
attorneyship of the first judicial district, to which
he was elected by the legislature in January, 1835.
His election was the result of a pohtical manoeuvre
to which Douglas was a party, though he insists
in his autobiography that he was not prompted
by ambition, and was without selfish motive, and
denies that there was a deal. The inspiration was
the desire to legislate out of office John J. Hardin,
who had two years to serve. The moving spirit
was John Wyatt, a member of the legislature, to
whose influence Hardin was said to have been in
debted to some extent for his office. Two other
men had also helped Hardin. All three were op
posed by him when they were candidates for re
election. The Douglas account follows: "Captain
Wyatt was the only one of them who succeeded in
his election, and was so indignant at Hardin for
what he called his ingratitude, that he determined
upon removing him from office at all hazards. The
opposition having succeeded in electing their candi
date for governor, there was no hope from that
quarter; and the only resort left was to repeal the
law conferring the appointment upon the governor,
and making the office elective by the legislature.
At the request of Captain Wyatt, I wrote the bill,
and on the second day of the session ... he in
troduced his bill, and also another bUl written by
myseK making the county recorders' election by the
people instead of being appointed by the governor.

EARLY YEARS 13
I felt no peculiar interest in these biUs any further
than I thought them correct in principle, and de
sired to see them pass because my friends warmly
supported them. Both the bflls were violently op
posed by the opposition (the Federal party) and
advocated by a large majority of the Democrats,
and finaUy passed by a small majority. When sent
to the Councfl of Revision (composed of the governor
and judges of the Supreme Court) for approval,
they were both vetoed; the former as unconstitu
tional, and the latter because it was inexpedient.
Then came a desperate struggle between the friends
and opponents of the bflls, and especiaUy the State's
attorney bill. The opposition charged that its only
object was to repeal Hardin out of office in order
to elect myself in his place, and that the whole move
ment had its origin in Wyatt's malice and my selfish
ness and ambition. I wiU here remark, and most
solemnly aver it to be true that, up to the time this
charge was made against me, I never had conceived
the idea of being a candidate for the office, nor had
any friend suggested that I could or ought to receive
it. But from that moment forward, the friends of
the biU declared that, in the event they passed the
bfll over the heads of the councfl, I should be elected
to the office. At this time I did not desire to be a
candidate, for I had no reason to suppose I could
be elected over so formidable an opponent who had
for a long time been a resident of the State, had

14 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
fought in the Black Hawk War, and was weU ac
quainted with the members. My short residence
in the State, want of acquaintance, experience in
my profession and age (being only twenty-one years
old) I considered insuperable objections. My friends,
however, thought differently, passed the bill, and
elected me on the first ballot by four votes majority."
When a man vrrites and champions a bill of which
he later becomes the beneficiary, it is not easy to
make others beheve in his entire disinterestedness.
Nor when legislation is enacted the confessed pur
pose of which is to remove one individual from office,
is it much easier to make it appear that regard for
the public interest was the controlling motive. It
is probably true, however, that Douglas went into
the campaign against Hardin for pohtical rather
than personal reasons. Wyatt's motive, of course,
was purely personal — ^he wished to punish Hardin.
This specimen of Illinois politics at that early day
may not be uninteresting to those of our own day
who are not strangers to gufle. However, the youth
ful State's attorney was faithful, intelligent, and
efficient in the performance of his duties. One in
cident, that of the indictments in which the name
of a county was thought to be misspelled — as was la
ter proved to be the case— is important only because
of the principle that Douglas deduced from it. He
says: "This smaU incident, although of no con
sequence in itself, has been an instmctive lesson

EARLY YEARS 16
to me in the practice of the law ever since, to wit:
Admit nothing, and require my adversary to prove
everything material to the success of his cause.
Every lawyer's experience teaches him that many
good causes are saved and bad ones gained by a
strict adherence to this rule." Douglas never de
parted from it in pohtics, or, so far as is known, in
the practice of the law. In later years he did not op
pose, if he refused to defend, certain "bad causes."
He did not "admit" that slavery was wrong, though
in 1860 he refused, in response to the demand of
the Southern radicals, to say that it was right, though
had he done so he might perhaps have had the presi
dential nomination, and possibly the presidency
itseff through the support of a united Democratic
party. The man who adopted this principle before
he was twenty-two years of age was certainly of a
very practical turn of mind. Yet he was not with
out ideals, or wholly unattended by visions, as will
appear later in the story. Evidently he had a con
viction that he would play an important part in
pubhc affairs. It came to him very early in his
life. There are to-day few men of twenty-three
years of age — Douglas's age when he was elected
to the nUnois legislature in 1836 — as deeply grounded
as he was in a knowledge of the country's history
and institutions. In speaking of the debate between
himself and Josiah Lambert at Winchester, which
took place before he was twenty-one years old,

16 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Douglas says: "I was then familiar with all the
principles, measures, and facts involved in the con
troversy, having been an attentive reader of the
debates in Congress and the principal newspapers
of the day, and having read also with great interest
the principal works in this country; such as the
debates in the convention that formed the Constitu
tion of the United States, and the conventions of
the several States on the adoption of the Constitu
tion, the Federalist, John Adams's work denominated
a defense of the American Constitution, the opin
ions of Randolph, Hamilton, and Jefferson on the
constitutionality of the Bank, and the history of
the Bank as pubHshed by Gales & Seaton, Jeffer
son's Works, etc."
One cannot read even his youthful speeches with
out feeling that he had not only read widely and
deeply, but had mastered what he had read. Prob
ably it was to his knowledge as much as to his
personahty, and fluency of speech, that he owed
his rapid advancement. Whether he in all cases
drew the correct conclusions from the facts and
principles with which he was famihar is a question
that need not now be considered. Douglas worked
hard for the success that came to him, and built
up his career on an honest foundation. It is not
surprising that he should at once have assumed a
position of leadership in the legislature which met
in December, 1836. He had taken an active part

EARLY YEARS 17
in the campaign, which was conducted almost whoUy
on national issues. Morgan County was thoroughly
canvassed by Douglas for the Democrats, and John
J. Hardin for the Whigs, the Democrats carrying
the county, and electing five out of six legislative
candidates, Mr. Hardin being the only Whig chosen.
The State cast its electoral vote for Martin Van
Buren, giving him a smaU plurahty over General
Wifliam Henry Harrison, the Whig candidate.
The great subject before the legislature was that
of internal improvements. It is not surprising that
the people should have been deeply and passionately
interested, since they were cut off from the rest of
the world, and largely indeed from one another.
Douglas favored the completion of the Illinois and
Michigan canal, and the construction of a north
and south and east and west railroad. But the
moderation of this plan was its condemnation. He
opposed the more extravagant projects, and espe
ciaUy the pohcy of making the State a partner in
them. The bfll finaUy passed was a compromise
measure prepared in part by Douglas. The best
that can be said for it is that it was less objectionable
than other measures that might have gone through.
The following extract from the autobiography throws
hght on the man's pohtical phflosophy: "When
it was ascertained from my conversation, speeches,
and resolution that I would oppose the mammoth
biU, its friends procured me to be instmcted by my

18 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
constituents to go for it. It must be remembered
that at that day the people were for the system —
almost en masse. So strong was the current of pop
ular feeling in its favor that it was hazardous for
any politician to oppose it. Under these circum
stances it was easy to obtain instructions in favor
of a measure so universally popular, and accordingly
the friends of the bill got up instructions, which,
from my known sentiments in favor of the doctrine
of instmction, I did not feel myself at hberty to
disobey. I accordingly voted for the bUl under
these instructions. That vote was the vote of my
constituents and not my own."
There could, of course, be nothing "hazardous"
to a "pohtician" in voting as he thought right except
such a loss of influence as might imperil, if not termi
nate, his pohtical career. Nor is there any way in
which a representative — if he is tmly such — can
delegate to his constituents his right to vote, and
so escape responsibihty for legislative folly. Ed
mund Burke has shown once and for all the entire
viciousness of "the doctrine of instmction," though
it is still held and proclaimed by eminent men of
our own day who have denounced those who dis
regard instructions as "embezzlers of power." The
vote of Douglas was his ovm, and he could not make
it other than his own by saying that it was that of
his constituents. It was also the vote of a pohtician
ambitious for preferment.

EARLY YEARS 19
Being responsible for his vote, he, with the others
who acted with him, was responsible for the dis
astrous consequences that foUowed. The legislature
had hardly adjourned in March, 1837, before a panic
broke over the country. It caught the State of
Illinois with an enormous debt, which for years
was a vexation and burden. Suspension of specie
payments was general throughout the country.
The Illinois State Bank and its branches coflapsed,
and the State lost practically aU it had subscribed.
The notes of the banks depreciated tiU they were
worth not more than forty or fifty cents on the
dollar. The State banks never renewed specie pay
ments, and a few years later aU charters were re
pealed, and Illinois was without banks untfl under
the new constitution, adopted several years later,
a general banking law was passed. The whole scheme
of internal improvements went down in the wreck.
Not often has vicious legislation so promptly worked
out in its inevitable results. One can readfly under
stand why this legislature was one of the most im
portant that Illinois ever knew, since its evil in
fluence lasted for many years. None of the men
who bowed to the storm seems to have suffered
either in reputation or influence — certainly Douglas
did not.
In April, 1837, he was appointed by President
Van Buren to be register of the land-office at Spring
field, the home of Abraham Lincoln. The paths

20 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of the two men had crossed before this time, as both
were members of the internal improvement legis
lature, and both had voted for the legislation.
Shortly after Douglas took up his residence in Spring
field he and Lincoln met in joint debate. The Van
Buren administration, which assumed office March
4, 1837, soon found itself face to face with a terrible
financial crisis. The President's party was in control
of both branches of Congress, and had for eight years
held the presidency. There was, therefore, no ques
tion of a panic inherited from an opposition ad
ministration, or of divided responsibUity. The
panic, as far as it was the result of party pohcies,
was whoUy Democratic. Such, at any rate, was
the feeling of the people. They turned fiercely on
the President, who was deserted by his pohtical
friends in Congress and throughout the country.
The situation in Illinois was desperate. The State's
representatives in the national house of representa
tives, aU Democrats, refused to support the Presi
dent's subtreasuiy scheme, and the Democratic
governor of Illinois openly denounced the President.
When the legislature met in special session in July
the Democratic members were in an almost worse
state of panic than the country was, and several
of them actuaUy allied themselves with the Whigs.
The President adhered to the Jacksonian pohcy
of breaking the connection between the government
and the banks, and at the special session of Con-

EARLY YEARS 21
gress in April he had urged the estabhshment of a
subtreasury. That it was powerless to prevent
panics later generations were to learn. But the
pohcy was that of the administration, and Douglas
was called on to defend it. His first move was to
give to the party an organization. It was possible
for him to point to the success of the convention
system which had been adopted, largely as the re
sult of his efforts, in Morgan County several years
before. There had never been a State convention in II-
hnois, or a State central committee. Probably no
party ever needed an effective organization more
sorely than the Democratic party of Illinois did in
1837. When in July of that year the legislature
met in special session at Vandalia, a meeting of the
Democratic members was called to consider party
affairs. Douglas was not a member, but he attended
the meeting, and took — as usual — a leading part.
These men issued a caU for a State convention to
meet in December at Vandaha to nominate a State
ticket, choose a committee to prepare an address
to the people of the State dealing with the issues
of the day, and create a State central committee.
The address — Douglas being a member of the com
mittee that drafted it — was a bold defense of the
presidential policies, and it did much to check the
drift away from the Democratic party. But the
battle had just begun. All through the smnmer,

22 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and aU over the State, the issues were debated,
Douglas, of course, bearing his full part. He was
nominated for Congress, again under the convention
system, in November, his opponent being John T.
Stuart. They began their formal canvass in March
of the foUowing year, and spoke, from the same
platform, every day, except Sundays, tiU the night
before the election in August. Douglas was defeated
by 35 votes in a total poU of 36,000. The Demo
cratic State ticket was elected in the midst of a
Democratic panic. That the campaign made by
Douglas did much to strengthen his party cannot
be doubted. The organization, for which he is en
titled to much of the credit, also played an important
part. Douglas, before he was twenty-five years of
age, had proved himself to be a great party leader.
He had served as State's attorney, member of the
legislature, register of the land-office, and had been a
candidate for Congress. That is a record of achieve
ment that it would not be easy to paraUel. The
environment was certainly favorable to a develop
ment of the man's powers and talents.
After his defeat for Congress, Douglas formed a
law partnership, and announced that he would
henceforth devote himself exclusively to the prac
tice of his profession. But his passion for pohtics
was so strong, and the demand for his services so
imperious, that he found it impossible to divorce
himself from political life. Nor was it difficult in

EARLY YEARS 23
those days to combine law and politics, as most
pohticians were lawyers, and most lawyers politi
cians. Douglas was employed in a case involving
the right of the Democratic governor to remove
the Secretary of State and to appoint his successor.
The Senate refused to confirm the nomination of
John A. McClernand on the ground that there was
no vacancy. A suit was brought before Judge Breese,
of the Circuit Court, to try the title to the office,
and the right of the governor to remove and ap
point was sustained. An appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court, Douglas being one of the counsel
for McClernand. Associated with him were James
Shields and John A. McClernand, both of whom in
later years won national prominence. The lower
court was reversed, and the right of the Secretary
of State to his office was upheld. This decision had
important consequences for the court that made
it. Thus the matter stood tiU the meeting of the
new legislature, which was Democratic in both
branches, when the secretary retired. Mr. Douglas
was appointed in his place. He had favored the
taking from the governor the right to appoint State's
attorneys, and was elected to the position vacated
as a result of a bfll that he had helped draw. He
had argued that the governor had — and should
have — the right to appoint the Secretary of State,
and the governor appointed him. The decision of
the Supreme Court was the inspkation of a move-

24 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ment to reorganize it, a movement that derived
further force from the court's known attitude —
though it rendered no decision — on the right of
unnaturaUzed aliens to vote. As most of these were
Democrats, Douglas and his party friends were
alarmed. They took the ground that the general
government had no right to withdraw a privilege
conferred by the State, and which it was within
the power of the State to confer. The regulation
of suffrage was, it was contended, wholly a State
affair. It was for Illinois to say whether unnatural
ized aliens ought to vote. That there was a prin
ciple involved is clear. It cannot be said, however,
that the Democratic interest in the case was whoUy
based on principle, or indeed that the Whigs were
much alarmed by the votes of unnaturaUzed aliens
as such, but rather by their practice of voting against
the Whig candidates. We have travelled far since
those days, since all now realize that there ought to
be some power — where we do not greatly care— to
withdraw from unnaturalized aUens the right to
vote. We have seen the federal government confer
the right of suffrage on the blacks, and it is proposed
that the women be enfranchised by constitutional
amendment. But the Illinois Democrats saved the
votes of these men for the election of 1840, and they
greatly needed them. There was a good reason
for reorganizing the Supreme Court, for it exercised
not only judicial but legislative and executive func-

EARLY YEARS 25
tions. It shared with the governor the veto power,
and as councfl of revision it was able to thwart the
will of both governor and legislature, in the interest
of the legislative minority. But the two cases — that
involvmg the Secretary of State and that concern
ing the right of unnaturahzed ahens to vote, in both
of which Douglas was employed — ^brought matters
to a head. The number of judges was increased
from four to nine, and the circuit courts were abol
ished, the supreme judges being required to sit as
circuit judges. The legislature appointed five new
judges, one of whom was Douglas, the others being
Sidney Breese — the judge whom the Supreme Court
had overruled in the Secretary of State case — S. H.
Treat, Thomas Ford, and Walter B. Scates. The
combination of law and pohtics seems on the whole
to have worked very weU. The politicians of that
time could not have learned much from those who
are to-day practising the gentle art.
All this followed the great campaign of 1840.
It began in November, 1839, the Whigs having
nominated their presidential electors, with a joint
debate at Springfield between Cyras Walker, repre
senting the Whigs, and Douglas. Lincoln was caUed
in by the Whigs, and the debate continued tfll mid
night between Lincoln and Walker on the one side
and Douglas on the other. Both parties were ap
parently satisfied with the result. The Democratic
State Convention met in December, and in the

26 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
foUowing March General Harrison was nominated
as the Whig candidate for the presidency. The
campaign that foUowed was one of the hottest and
most picturesque that the country ever went through,
marked by more than the usual amount of dema
gogy. Party spirit ran high, and the enthusiasm was
great. It was the "hard-cider and log-cabin" cam
paign. The people were urged to vote for "Tippe
canoe and Tyler too," and were assured that "Little
Van was a used-up man." The tide ran strongly
against the Democrats from the start. The ad
ministration was unpopular, and the President's
party was held responsible for the panic. General
Harrison, on the other hand, was a popular hero.
Nowhere was there a fiercer stmggle than in Illinois.
The Democrats of that State went into the fight as
though they expected to win it. For seven months
Douglas canvassed lUinois, meeting aU opponents,
and boldly discussing the issues. At the August
election the Democrats carried the legislature and
elected their State ticket. The stmggle went on,
Douglas speaking tiU the day of the election in No
vember, when the State cast its vote for Van Buren.
The Democrats carried only six other States, and
but one other Northern State — New Hampshire. In
the nation Harrison received 1,275,017 votes as
against 1,128,702 cast for Van Buren, Harrison's
plurality being 146,315. Harrison's electoral vote
was 234 as against 60 for Van Buren. It is evident

EARLY YEARS 27
that Ilhnois was in those days firmly rooted in the
Democratic faith. Yet except for the leadership of
Douglas it is not probable that the State could have
been saved to the Democrats. Never was his power
more clearly demonstrated. He was not only a great
debater but a leader of inspiring personahty, who
had the abihty to impart his courage and confidence
to his followers. It was in his favor, too, that he had
thus far been almost uniformly successful, even his
defeat for Congress, so hopeless did the race seem,
and so smaU was the pliirality against him, having
been looked on by his friends as a victory. It is
undoubtedly true that to him was due most of the
credit for the Democratic success in an election
in which his party as a national organization was
almost wiped out. In January foUowing the elec
tion he was appointed Secretary of State, and on
Febraary 15, 1841, he was elected by the legislature
to the supreme bench, and shortly afterward re
moved to Quincy, where it was necessary for him
as judge to reside. It is not probable that he was
caUed on to decide any very important cases. He
was not a great judge or a great lawyer. His pro
fession had hardly been more than a "side-line."
Moreover, he was not quite twenty-eight years old
when elevated to the bench. But he seems to have
performed his duties acceptably.
Though the court had been reorganized, it had
not been stripped of its functions as Councfl of Re-

28 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
vision, though Douglas and his friends had objected
to its exercise of such power. As member of the
council, however, the influence of Douglas was
strongly exerted against aU legislation the object
of which was to free men from the necessity of pay
ing their debts. Against all such laws Douglas
remonstrated, and as judge declared them uncon
stitutional whenever it was possible for him con
scientiously to do so. It should be said further that
he used his influence with the legislature, though
not at the time a member of it, to prevent the State
from repudiatuig its debt, a thing which lUinois
refused to do. It would have been easy for a man
who was a mere demagogue to tempt a heavUy bur
dened people into a betrayal of its own honor. But
Douglas was a man of integrity, with a keen sense
of responsibUity. He was a shrewd and not always
a sensitively scrupulous politician, but he was also
a true man, with some statesmanhke quaUties. His
career as judge was neither notable nor protracted.
In December, 1842, he came within five votes of
being elected United States senator, though he was
at the time under the senatorial age of thirty. On
the nineteenth ballot Judge Breese was chosen, his
vote being 56, and that of Douglas 51. In June of
1843 he was nominated for Congress to represent
a district composed of Jersey, Green, Macoupin,
Calhoun, Pike, Brown, Schuyler, Adams, Marquette,
Fulton, and Peoria counties. The State had been

EARLY YEARS 29
redistricted — and of course gerrymandered — and
was entitled to seven representatives. Mr. Douglas's
opponent was Orvflle H. Browning, one of the lead
ing lawyers of the State, and later honorably prom
inent in the nation as successor in the United States
Senate to Douglas after the latter's death in 1861,
and as Secretary of the Interior in President John
son's administration. The redistricting of the State
had been done by a Democratic legislature, and
the result was a gerrymander of the most approved
type. Douglas's nomination may not have been
planned so far in advance, but the fifth district as
newly created, and in which he resided, can hardly
be said to have been hopeful ground for the Whigs.
The convention, composed of forty members, met
at Griggsvflle June 5. It was machine-made and
machine-controUed. Judge Douglas was nominated
on the second baUot. An effective party organiza
tion was created, extending down into the precincts.
The party was firmly united in support of its candi
date, whose popularity was perhaps greater than
it had ever been. The campaign was brief — for
those days — but spirited. The sectional issue was
not raised, and apparently only one national issue,
the Oregon question, was discussed. Douglas was
elected by a plurahty of 461. Here closes the first
stage in the remarkable career of an extraordinary
man. His ten years in lUinois had been full and busy
ones. He had been State's attorney, register of the

30 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
land-office. Secretary of State, judge of the Supreme
Court, an unsuccessful candidate for the House
of Representatives and the Senate, and finaUy a
member of Congress, and aU by the time he was
thirty years old. On his way to Washington Douglas
stopped off at Cleveland to visit the friends that he
had made in that city ten years before, and spent
some time at Canandaigua with his mother, from
whom he had been so long separated. He had made
his way in the world, relying whoUy on his own
resources, and had established himself. It was not
the home-coming of a prodigal, for the wanderer
had brought his sheaves with him. That he had
high hopes for the future, one may readUy beUeve.
He had been tried and tested and knew his powers.
Never lacking in self-confidence and courage, Doug
las had learned by experiment that the one was
justified and the other a great power. But there
were weaknesses in his character, as wUl later ap
pear, which his ten years of education and training
in lUinois had done Uttle or nothing to cure. But it
may fairly be said that he was weU equipped for the
distinguished part he was to play in pubhc affairs.
The story of his life from now on is almost entirely
the story of the great stmggle over slavery. For
the next seventeen years no issue that was presented
could be considered apart from slavery. So one
chapter of the man's life closes and another opens.
The future was fuU of promise, and yet it was not

EARLY YEARS 31
without menace, not to the pohtical success of Doug
las, but to his fame, and also to national unity.
His breathing-speU was short. In December, 1843,
he took his seat in the House of Representatives,
which consisted of 232 members. It was the first
session of the Twenty-eighth Congress. John W.
Jones, of Virginia, was speaker of the House, and
W. P. Mangum, of North Carolina, president pro
tem of the Senate, Vice-President Tyler having
succeeded to the presidency on the death of General
Harrison one month after his inauguration in 1841.
Douglas was now fairly launched on his life voyage,
and a stormy one it proved to be.

CHAPTER II
CONGRESSMAN
The history of the American people for the next
seventeen years proves incontestably the futUity
of compromise when questions of principle are in
volved. This is not to say that the great men, Henry
Clay being pre-eminent among them, were wrong
in their poUcies, and certainly they are not to be
condemned for their actions, nor are their motives
to be questioned. It may even be said that some
of their measures were right ui the sense that they
were the best possible at the time. The Missouri
Compromise, to take one case, undoubtedly served
to quiet for a tune a very dangerous agitation against
national unity. Though it did not stop discussion,
or create a condition in which other subjects might
be dealt with apart from slavery, it did check the
spread of slavery and soften somewhat the sectional
feeling. In his Ufe of Henry Clay, Carl Schurz
says: "It seemed good statesmanship to hold the
Union together by a compromise, and to adjourn
the final and decisive struggle on the slavery ques
tion to a time when the Union feehng should be
strong and determined enough to maintain the in
tegrity of the repubUc, if necessary, by force of arms,
32

CONGRESSMAN 33
and when the free States should be so superior in
men and means to the slaveholding section as to
make the result certain."
There was grave peril of disunion. Not only
were the slavery men prepared to break up the
Union, but many of the antislavery men were wiUing
that they should do so. Few at that time thought
of the possibflity of using force to prevent secession.
Even John Quincy Adams approved the Missouri
Compromise, though he suggested "a new Union
of thirteen or fourteen States unpolluted with
slavery." "If," he said, "the Union must be dis
solved, slavery is precisely the question upon which
it ought to break."
There was httle of the national feehng that later
developed as a result of the Civfl War. Even the
most patriotic men thought first of their States
and section. There were many exceptions, it is
true, such as Henry Clay and Daniel Webster.
When a disregard for the supposed rights and in
terests of one section, or even of one State, was met
by the threat of secession, the lovers of the Union
may weU have felt that compromise was a necessity.
When Douglas entered Congress the Missouri Com
promise had been in effect for twenty-three years.
Under it Missouri had, in 1820, been admitted as
a slave State, with the provision that slavery should
be forever excluded from aU territory north of 36
degrees and 30 minutes, this being the southern

34 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
boundary of the State. Benton says in his Thirty
Years in the United States Senate that the compromise
was of Southern inspiration, but it was not satis
factory to either side. The North did not relish
the creation of another slave State. The South,
then having reached the conclusion that slavery
was moraUy right, could not see why it should be
excluded from any part of the Union. The legisla
tion established the constitutional doctrine that
Congress had the right to exclude slavery from the
Territories, a doctrine that was later hotly disputed;
and it was also an acknowledgment that Territories
might be admitted subject to conditions. This
latter principle was later denied by many, including
Douglas, who insisted that it was for the Territories
themselves to say whether they would or would
not permit slavery. So neither side was pleased,
though aU were glad to have escaped the immediate
peril. Slavery, it should be remembered, had grown
to be much more than an "institution," and had
become an interest, and a very large one. The value
of slaves had trebled in thirty years, and the cotton
crop, cultivated by slave-labor, had enormously
increased. We do not need to go back to those days
to find men whose views of right and wrong were
powerfully influenced by material considerations.
Many of those who once thought that slavery was
wrong, or were at least doubtful about it, easUy
foimd arguments to convince themselves that it

CONGRESSMAN 35
was right, and even of divine institution. With
the exception of the abolitionists, and the few who
held their views, though not indorsing their methods,
Northern men generaUy did not press the moral
argument. "Business," as usual, was indifferent,
when not truckhng. So the Compromise went
through. It temporarfly saved the situation, and
for a time it seemed as though a real settlement
had been reached. Indeed, the Missouri Com
promise, taken together with the cession of Texas
to Spain by the treaty of 1819, finally proclaimed
in 1821, almost seemed to have put slavery in process
of ultimate extinction. By the former, slavery was
excluded from the North; by the latter, aU territory
out of which new slave States might be carved had
been abandoned. The nation's title to Texas under
the Louisiana purchase was doubtful, and the effect
of the treaty with Spain was to quiet her title in
exchange for Florida. Such was the situation, as
far as concerns slavery, when Douglas took his seat
in the House of Representatives. With the presi
dential election of 1844 just ahead, and war with
Mexico even then threatening, the old issue soon
again became prominent.
The first speech of the new representative was
dehvered January 7, 1844. It is not of much in
terest or importance now, though one cannot read
it without feeling the power of the speaker. The
question was on the passage of a biU to remit a fine

36 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of $1,000 imposed by Judge Hall, of New Orleans,
on General Jackson, who had been held for contempt
of court in connection with the measures taken by
Jackson for the defense of the city against the Brit
ish. The speech was, however, more than a denun
ciation of the judge, and a eulogy of the general,
for the speaker went into the legal and constitutional
phases of the subject, and discussed the relation
of the military to the civU authority. Douglas did
not ask for a mere acquittal on the score of the
services rendered by Jackson to the nation, but
rather for a vindication on the ground that his ac
tion was right, and entirely within constitutional
hmits. It is tme that he went further and said that
he did not care "whether his proceedings were legal
or illegal, constitutional or unconstitutional, with
or without precedent, if they were necessary for
the salvation of that city." Douglas clearly was
at that time no narrow constructionist. But he
rested his case on the law, and was, as General Jack
son later said, the first man to make it clear that
the proceedings could be justified under the Con
stitution. The speech created a very favorable
impression, and showed the quality of the new rep
resentative. The bill subsequently became a law.
"An eloquent, sophistical speech, prodigiously ad
mired by the slave Democracy of the House," was
the verdict of John Quincy Adams. Professor
Johnson truly says that these were "words of high

CONGRESSMAN 37
praise, for the veteran statesman had httle patience
with the style of oratory affected" by the new
member. There was, however, more than oratory
in the speech — namely, power of statement and
vigor of reasoning. It is not surprising that the
House shoifld have been impressed. Those who
remembered the speech must later have wondered
at the extreme deference of Douglas to constitu
tional limitations, and his denial to Congress of the
power under the Constitution to legislate with ref
erence to slavery in the Territories.
An important question which Douglas had to
face shortly after he had taken his seat was that
of his re-election. It was the year of a presidential
election. Everything pointed to the nomination of
Henry Clay by the Whigs, and he was the most
popular man in the country, and the greatest poht
ical leader of his time with the possible exception
of Andrew Jackson, who was an old man, hving
in retirement at the Hermitage. But he was still
a power — ^his name has not even yet lost its magic.
The Derhocratic party was falhng more and more
under the control of the slave power, and that divi
sion that later wrecked it was beginning to make
itself felt. The Whig party was even nearer dis
solution. There were slavery and antislavery men
in both organizations, and the question for politicians
and statesmen was one, not only — ^perhaps not
primarily — of preserving the Union but of main-

38 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
taining party unity. Benton shows in great detail
the efforts that were made to nominate John C.
Calhoun as the Democratic candidate. He charges
that the whole movement for the annexation of
Texas by treaty, which was defeated in the Senate,
was in the interest of Calhoun, whose friends were
as anxious to defeat Van Buren as they were to
nominate the great South CaroUnian. The plan
was to form a union of the Southern States that
should annex Texas if the old Union should refuse
to do so. Secession as a poUcy was openly avowed.
The practice had been to admit slave and free States
in pairs. When the question of admitting Oregon^
a free State — ^was presented, there was no natural
slave territory left out of which States could be
made. Douglas made two other speeches before
Congress adjourned, both of which involved prin
ciples of constitutional construction. It need not
be claimed that his purpose was to strengthen him
self with his party and to insure his re-election, but
undoubtedly such was the effect. Four States had
elected twenty-one representatives, seventeen of
them being Democrats, on general tickets, although
the federal statute prescribed that they should be
chosen by districts. The question as to their right
to their seats was referred to a committee of nine —
six Democrats and three Whigs — of which Douglas,
who wrote the report, was a member. One cannot
read the report of the majority, which was in favor
of seating the members, without detecting its fal-

CONGRESSMAN 39
lacy. It was admitted that Congress might make
such regulations as it had made, but that there was
no power to "compel State legislatures to make
such change." There was no question of compelling
the States to do anything, but simply of saying
whether men chosen in other ways than those pre
scribed by Congress were entitled to seats. Little
seems to have been made of the point that Congress
is the judge of the qualifications of its own members.
Douglas was finaUy driven to deny to Congress
the power to district States. The result was to
retain for the Democrats control of seventeen seats.
The Douglas report was supported by reasons that
were ingenious and plausible for action that could
hardly have been whoUy unprompted by partisan
motives. He showed the same power that he had
shown in his youth when he defended the bank policy
of Jackson and Van Buren. It was the power of
the advocate, and exercised in strict accordance
with the principle that he adopted when he was
State's attorney — ^namely to "admit nothing, and
require my adversary to prove everything material
to the success of his cause." "Every lawyer's ex
perience," he had said, "teaches him that many
good causes are saved and bad ones gained by a
strict adherence to this rule." But he had rendered
an important service to his party, and proved that
he was much more than a mere speech-maker. The
people of his district were no doubt impressed.

40 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
But it was as necessary then as it is now for a
congressman to "do something" for his constituents,
and then as now river and harbor appropriations
were found very useful. It is to be said for Douglas
that he did have a national vision, and that he al
ways showed a great interest in the development
of the West — not for the West's but for the nation's
sake. In one of his well-known speeches he showed
his abUity to think imperially of this nation, and
rebuked the narrow sectionalism of both Easterners
and Southerners. But it is not easy to see how the
Illinois River could be thought to sustain any vital
relation to the great subject of internal improve
ments, or how Douglas's plea for an appropriation
for its improvement could be reconciled with his
theory of national power. But here again the speaker
made a very plausible argument designed to show
that he was not departing from the Democratic
faith. We need not seek to convict him of incon
sistency, nor is it important that the point should
be made against him. The effort faUed, and the
appropriation for the IlUnois River was stricken
from the bUl. But the representative had done his
best, and perhaps his speech was as helpful to him
in a pohtical way as the appropriation would have
been. Indeed, it may have been that he needed
no help of this sort. For his campaign for renomina-
tion had already made great headway, the influential
papers of the district and the organization being

CONGRESSMAN 41
friendly to him. In May, 1844, he was unanimously
renominated as candidate for representative for
the fifth district. In August he was re-elected by
a plurality of more than 1,700.
The Calhoun men, though they did not reahze
all their hopes, did succeed, by the adoption of the
two-thirds rule, in defeating Van Buren with James
K. Polk, of Tennessee. Douglas took an active
part in the campaign, which resulted in the election
of Polk over Clay. Ilhnois gave Polk a majority
of 12,392, Douglas's district voting for the winning
candidate. Clay reaUy defeated himself by his
concessions on the question of the annexation of
Texas. For the effect was to strengthen the Liberty
party, whose candidate was James G, Bimey. Polk
carried New York by a plurahty over Clay of only
5,080 votes. Birney received 15,812, of which more
than half would have been cast for Clay but for
his fatal letter. With New York he would have
had a majority in the electoral coUege. By so narrow
a margin did this great man miss the goal of his
ambition. The great issue in the campaign was
the annexation of Texas, to which pohcy Polk was
clearly and strongly committed. The Democratic
convention adopted a resolution urging "the re-
occupation of Oregon and the re-annexation of Texas
at the earhest practicable period," as great Amer
ican measures. The Whigs strove to keep the issue
out of the campaign, but the defeat of Van Buren,

42 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
who was opposed to annexation, in the Democratic
convention, made this impossible. There was in
tmth no other issue. On the other once great ques
tions, the tariff and the bank, there was practically
no difference between the parties. With the elec
tion of Polk, the annexation of Texas, war with
Mexico, and further aggressions on the part of the
slavery interest, became certainties. The election
of 1844 was, therefore, one of the most important
in the history of the country, for it put the govern
ment under the control of the slave-power, and sub
jected the Democratic party to the same bhghting
influence. The period between 1844 and 1860, though one
of the most interesting, is also one of the most
depressing, in our history. It was an era of com
promise, not only as to poUcies but as to convic
tions. Whether one condemns or idealizes the
aboUtionists one must admit that they, and the
radical proslavery men, were the only ones who
said at all times just what they thought, and who
refused to make concessions. The Whig leaders
found it necessary to yield much in order to placate
the Southern members of the party, while in the
North there were many Democrats who at least
disliked slavery, and resented the radical and violent
talk of the Southerners. Probably there never was
a time when it was so difficult to maintain party
unity. The unity of the nation, indeed, was in

CONGRESSMAN 43
serious jeopardy. Conditions were such as to de
velop in an extraordinary degree the art of the
pohtician. LoweU has painted the type, in colors
that wfll never fade:
" TeU 'em thet on the slavery question
I'm RIGHT, although to speak I'm lawth;
This gives you a safe pint to rest on,
An' leaves me frontin' South by North."
This is not a trae picture of the great men of the
day, not even of Douglas. But the words accurately
describe many of the lesser men, whose only thought
was of "keeping the party together" and getting
office. From this time on the question with the
South was not one of preserving slavery but of
extending it. The institution was not menaced
in the States where it aheady existed, for aU men
and parties agreed that Congress had no power to
interfere with slavery in the States. But the South
saw that extension of the system was necessary to
its preservation. It was even claimed by some who
denied that Congress had power to exclude slavery
from the Territories that it had power to establish
it therein. So strong was the pressure from the
South that Douglas deemed it necessary to sound a
note of warning to extremists on both sides. Later
in a speech in the Senate he said: "It is the
speeches of Southern men, representing slave States,
going to an extreme, breathing a fanaticism as wfld

44 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and as reckless as that of the senator from New
Hampshire [Hale], which create abolitionism in the
North." Denounced by those to whom he specially
spoke, he continued: "In the North it is not ex
pected that we should take the position that slavery
is a positive good — a positive blessing. If we did
assume such a position, it would be a very pertinent
inquiry: Why do you not adopt this institution?
We have moulded our institutions at the North
as we have thought proper; and now we say to
you of the South, if slavery be a blessing, it is your
blessing; if it be a curse, it is your curse; enjoy
it — on you rest aU the responsibUity ! We are pre
pared to aid you in the maintenance of aU your
constitutional rights; and I apprehend that no man.
South or North, has a more consistent disposition
to do so than myself."
There can be no doubt that at this time the
Southern leaders, with few exceptions, not only
preferred slavery to union, but looked on the main
tenance of the Union as a detriment to slavery.
That there had for a long time been a plan on
foot to annex Texas, which had declared its inde
pendence of Mexico, and whose independence we had
acknowledged, is made clear by Benton in his great
speech. It is impossible to read his argument with
out being convinced that there was an intrigue,
extending over many years, of the most disgraceful
character. A treaty of annexation was submitted

CONGRESSMAN 45
to the Senate prior to the conventions in 1844, and,
under the inspiration of Benton, was defeated. But
after the election the scheme was brought forward
again, which was natural, as the Democratic party
had declared for annexation, and Polk, the new
President, was known to favor it. Our government
had been warned by Mexico that any steps looking
to annexation would mean war. Benton and others
had denounced the pohcy, and had said that an
nexation of Texas would mean the annexation of a
war. In his last message President Tyler said that
"a controlling majority of the people and a large
majority of the States " had voted for annexation,
and that Congress had been instmcted to that ef
fect. It is doubtful whether a treaty could have
been got through the Senate, so it was decided to
proceed by joint resolution, which would require
only a majority vote of the two houses. Such a
resolution was passed by the House on January
25, 1845, with an amendment offered by Mr. Douglas
providing that the Missouri Compromise hne should
be extended through the new territory. The effect
of this would have been to prohibit slavery north
of latitude 36 degrees and 30 minutes, and to permit
the formation of four slave States south of that
line. It is humihating to reflect that the transfer
of territory from Mexico to the United States should
have brought most of it under the curse of slavery.
AU the Whigs, with the exception of eight from the

46 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
South, voted against the resolution. In order to
insure the passage of the resolution in the Senate,
an amendment was added giving the President the
power to submit the annexation resolution to the
Texan Government, or, if he pleased, to begin new
negotiations for an annexation treaty, the assump
tion being that Mexico would also be consulted.
There was no opposition to annexation in itself,
but only to a war of conquest to make annexation
good — to annexation by conspiracy and intrigue.
Benton says that it was understood that the sub
ject would be left to the new President to deal with,
and that he had been assured that President Tyler
and Mr. Calhoun, his Secretary of State, would
not have the "audacity" to carry through the pro
gramme in the closing hours of the administration.
Polk, it was understood, would negotiate for a treaty.
But if there was such an agreement, it was not carried
out. The joint resolution after it had, in its amended
form, been passed by both houses, was signed by
the President on March 3, and a messenger was at
once despatched to offer annexation to the Texan
Government. Texas had, in the meantime, through
the mediation of Great Britain and France, made
peace with Mexico. In the treaty, which was rati
fied by the Mexican Congress, there was a recogni
tion of the independence of Texas, and a pledge that
Texas should not be annexed to any foreign power.
This treaty and our resolution of annexation were

CONGRESSMAN 47
submitted to the Texas Congress in Jime, which
rejected the treaty and adopted the annexation
resolution. So there was again war between the
two governments, and annexation made it our war.
But actual hostflities did not break out tiU a year
later, though there were occasional colhsions. War
might possibly have been avoided but for the Amer
ican claim to territory vastly larger than ever had
been admitted by Mexico to belong to Texas. At
best it was disputed territory, that between the
Rio Grande and Nueces rivers. The resolution
of annexation referred only to "territory properly
included within, and rightfuUy belonging to, the
repubhc of Texas," and contemplated "an adjust
ment by this government of aU questions of bound
aries that may arise with other governments."
Having annexed Texas, it was necessary to de
fend it, and this was done by sending troops under
General Taylor into the disputed territory, an act
which Mexico held to be an act of war. A year
later Texas was admitted into the Union, and formal
war followed. There is reason to think that the
surrender of the administration on the Oregon ques
tion was due to its unwiUingness to risk a contest
with Great Britain that might interfere with its
war on Mexico. By treaties between Great Britain
and Russia, and Russia and the United States, the
southern boundary of Russian territory was fixed
at 54 degrees and 40 minutes, while by our treaty

48 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
with Spain the northem boundary of Spanish pos
sessions was the forty-second parallel. All between
was a sort of No Man's Land, held in joint occupa
tion by Great Britain and the United States. The
Democratic party was committed to the extreme
northem Une, its convention having declared that
"our title to the whole of the territory of Oregon
is clear and unquestionable." "Fifty-four Forty
or Fight " was the slogan of the Democrats. Douglas
was strongly in favor of asserting and maintainiag
our utmost claim, if it could be caUed a claim. The
same administration that pressed for war with
Mexico negotiated a treaty with Great Britain com
promising the Oregon question, and fixing our north
em boundary at the forty-ninth paraUel. Douglas,
who was one of the leaders of the ultras, was much
disappointed, and considerably embarrassed, since
he had pledged the faith both of himself and his
party to 54-40 or fight. But the warlike spirit
quickly subsided. Benton, in opposing the Mexican
plot, asked: "Why not march up to fifty-four forty
as courageously as we march upon the Rio Grande?
Because Great Britain is powerful and Mexico
weak," and he added that the administration
"wanted a small war just large enough to make
mUitary reputations dangerous for the presidency."
In the course of his speech defending the Mexican
war, which is perhaps the strongest statement that
was made on that side, Douglas was embarrassed

CONGRESSMAN 49
by" questions as to the very point made by Benton.
He could not — at least he did not — say anything
to discredit the administration. But he did say
that he woifld never have yielded on the Oregon
question. He said: "To me our country and aU
its parts are one and indivisible. I would rally xmder
her standard in the defense of one portion as an
other — the South as the North; for Texas as soon
as Oregon. And I wfll here do my Southern friends
the justice to say that I firmly beheve, and never
doubted that, if war had arisen out of the Oregon
question, when once declared, they would have
been found shoulder to shotdder with me as firmly
as I shaU be with them in this Mexican war."
When John Quincy Adams said that he "under
stood the gentleman some time ago, whfle standing
on 54-40, to teU his Southern friends that he wanted
no dodging on the Oregon question," Douglas re-
phed: "I did stand on 54-40; I stand there now,
and never intend by any act of mine to surrender
the position. I am as ready and willing to fight
for 54-40 as weU as for the Rio del Norte. My
patriotism is not of that kind which would induce
me to go to war to enlarge one section of the Union
out of mere hatred and vengeance toward the other.
I have no personal or pohtical griefs resulting from
the past to embitter my feelings and inflame my
resentment toward any section of the country. I
know no sections, no divisions."

50 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Then he turned on Mr. Adams and asked him
if he would not be wiUing to apply to Mexico as
well as to Oregon the principle of Frederick the
Great — which Mr. Adams had approved in a speech
— "Take possession first, and negotiate afterward."
Here, of course, is an unwitting admission that the
Mexican policy, favored by Douglas, was based
on the teaching of one of the greatest robbers known
to history. As for Douglas's demand that there
be no dodging, he must have felt that the President
himself had been guUty of that very thing. The
tmth, of course, is that the men interested in the
admission of Texas as slave territory cared httle
or nothing about Oregon, since they knew that
slavery never could exist in that part of the coun
try. Probably they were quite willing to relinquish
any right the nation may have had to the territory
north of the forty-ninth paraUel, since out of that
several free States might have been carved. Slavery
thus, it wUl be seen, was at the bottom of both these
controversies, which were closely related. Douglas
was not, at least not consciously, the instrument
of the slave-power. He was a man of broad national
views, an expansionist, and a beUever in "manifest
destiny." Many of his utterances have a jingoistic
sound, but they reflect an honest faith and a tme
patriotism, and, as we can see now, were by no means
always wide of the mark. It was certain that Texas
would sooner or later come into the Union — ^that

CONGRESSMAN 51
is plain to-day. Indeed, there are some who think
that if the northem states of Mexico were annexed
to the United States it would be better for aU con
cerned. The speech of Douglas on the Mexican
war is, in parts, somewhat more than plausible.
Its defect consists in its ignoring many important
facts, as wiU appear when it is read in connection
with the great speech of Benton on the Mexican
intrigue. It is probable that the senator from Mis
souri went too far when he said that there was a
scheme to use annexation as a means of breaking up
the Union, though he knew much more about what
was going on in Washington at the time than those
who to-day doubt his theory. But he is much
nearer the tmth than Douglas, who not only favored
the admission of Texas but defended all the steps
that had been taken to bring it about. Benton's
speech reflects and is inspired by a sound and high
pohtical and national morality, and that is some
thing that cannot be said of the speech of Douglas.
It is able and shrewd, but it is neither frank nor
high-minded. One again thinks, when reading it,
of the principle adopted by him in his youth: "Ad
mit nothing, and require my adversary to prove
everything material to the success of his cause.
Every lawyer's experience teaches him that many
good causes are saved and bad ones gained by a
strict adherence to this rule." Few things in our
history are more disgraceful than the correspondence

52 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of Calhoun, then Secretary of State, with the British
foreign minister in regard to a supposed conspiracy
of the British Government to control Texas in the
interest of freedom. That there should have been
such an issue is bad enough, but it is much worse
that Calhoun should have embodied in one of his
despatches an elaborate defense of slavery, thus
blazoning the nation's shame to the world. There
is no possibUity of defending the pohcy of the Polk
and Tyler administrations in regard to Mexico.
It was most warmly championed by those interested
in slavery, and the holders of Texas scrip. Luicola,
a member of the houses, voted for a resolution de
claring that the war with Mexico was "unneces
sarily and unconstitutionaUy begun by the President
of the United States." In this view Webster con
curred, though his opposition to the war was largely
the result of his feeling, shared by many of the people
of the East, that no more territory should be an
nexed. "We want no extension of territory," he
said. "We want no accession of new States. The
country is already large enough." Years later, in
one of his speeches in the debate with Douglas,
Lincoln said: "I was an old Whig, and whenever
the Democratic party tried to get me to vote that
the war had been righteously begun by the Presi
dent, I would not do it. But when they asked money
or land warrants, or anjrthing else to pay the sol
diers, I gave the same vote that Douglas did." In

CONGRESSMAN 53
a letter to his old partner, Wilham H. Herndon,
who evidently favored the war, written Febmary 1,
1848, Lincoln said: "You fear that you and I dis
agree about the war. I regret this, not because
of any fear we shall remain disagreed after you have
read this letter, but because if you misunderstand
I fear other good friends may also. That vote affirms
that the war was unnecessarily and unconstitution
aUy commenced by the President; and I wiU stake
my life that if you had been in my place you would
have voted just as I did. Would you have voted
what you felt and knew to be a he? I know you
would not. Would you have gone out of the house
— skulked the vote? I expect not. If you had
skulked one vote, you would have had to skvdk
many more before the end of the session. Richard
son's resolutions, introduced before I made any
move, or gave any vote upon the subject, make
the direct question of the justice of the war; so
that no man can be sflent if he would. You are
compeUed to speak, and your only alternative is
to teU the truth or a he. I cannot doubt which you
would do." It is fairly clear that Douglas took
the side that was popular in lUinois. There was
in that State none of the feeling against expansion
that there was in the East, nor was the antislavery
sentiment strong. In 1840 and 1844 the State had
cast its vote for the Democratic candidates. Lin
coln's course, which was altogether right, evidently

54 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
gave his friends some concern. Having received
a paper containing an "oration on the occasion of
the celebrating the battle of Buena Vista," in which
it was maintained that there had been no aggres
sions on the part of the United States, Lincoln wrote
to the orator, the Reverend J. M. Peck, pointing
out many acts of aggression. "I own," he said,
"that finding in the oration a labored justification
of the administration on the origin of the Mexican
war disappointed me, because it is the first effort
of the kind I have known made by one appearing
to me to be intelUgent, right-minded and impar
tial." After setting forth the facts that proved
his case, the writer continued: "If you deny that
these are facts, I think I can furnish proof which
shaU convince you that you are mistaken. If you
admit that they are facts, then I shaU be obUged
for a reference to any law of language, law of States,
law of nations, law of morals, law of reUgions, any
law, human or divine, in which an authority can
be found for sajdng those facts constitute no 'ag
gression.' Possibly you consider those acts too
small for notice. Would you venture to so consider
them had they been committed by any nation on
earth against the humblest of our people? I know
you would not. Then I ask, is the precept, 'What
soever things ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them' obsolete? of no force? of
no appUcation?" Douglas was much less careful

CONGRESSMAN 55
about his facts than Lincoln, and he was quite in
capable of rising to the heights of idealism reached
by the latter. Indeed, we have seen men in our
own day sneer at the proposed apphcation of the
Golden Rule — to which Lincoln appealed — ^in pohtics
or international relations. It is curious that two
Southem-bom men, one of whom was a slaveholder,
Benton and Lincoln, should have opposed the pohcies
of the Polk administration, and that a New-England-
born man, who was not a slaveholder, should have
supported them. Pohtics no doubt had something
to do with it, though Benton was a Democrat. Yet
the Whigs were doubtful about the wisdom of op
posing the war, and some of them supported it.
Lincoln, as has been seen, was forced by some of
his party associates to defend himself. Many Demo
crats of the North were opposed to annexation, this
being tme generaUy of the Van Buren following.
There was one man, however, Ralph Waldo Emer
son, who, though he did not approve the methods
used, nevertheless did think that the ultimate result
was so certain, and also so desirable, as to make
the methods of comparatively minor importance.
James Ford Rhodes gives the following extract
from Emerson's diary of 1844: "The question of
the annexation of Texas is one of those which look
very different to the centuries and to the years.
It is very certain that the strong British race, which
have now overrun so much of this continent, must

56 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
also overrun that tract and Mexico and Oregon
also; and that it will in the course of ages be of small
import by what particular occasions and methods
it was done." It is remarkable that such words
should have been vmtten in the heat of the stmggle
by a man who loved Uberty, and who knew the na
ture of the conspiracy. "Emerson," says Mr.
Rhodes, "had remarkable foresight." It is un
doubtedly tme that men to-day think little of the
motives or actions of the men who brought Texas,
New Mexico, and California into the Union, and
that they wiU think less as time passes. Never
theless, Mr. Rhodes is right when he says that "in
pondering the plain narrative of these events, more
reason for humUiation than pride wUl be found,"
and that "the story of the annexation of Texas
and the conquest of New Mexico and CaUfomia
is not a fair page in our history." The territory
would have fallen to us sooner or later, had we only
waited, but slavery could not wait. The story of
the war itself need not be told, since it is not related
to the Ufe of Douglas, though there was talk of ap
pointing him "Brigadier-Major" of Illinois volun
teers. Douglas indeed asked to be appointed, but
when the President said to him that he could best
serve the country in Congress, he withdrew his ap
plication. The declaration of war was passed with
only two dissenting votes in the Senate and fourteen
in the House. The war, as every schoolboy knows.

CONGRESSMAN 57
was brilKantly fought. In a speech in the House
of Representatives on January 12, 1848, Lincoln
said that "our arms have given us the most splendid
successes, every department and every part, land
and water, officers and privates, regulars and volim-
teers, doing aU that men could do, and hundreds
of things which it had ever before been thought
men could not do."

CHAPTER III
WAR AND POLITICS
The war, however, figured largely in the pohtics
of the year 1846, when a new Congress was elected. .
Douglas was renominated in January by a conven
tion composed of 19 delegates. There was no op
position. His attitude on the Oregon question
and his support of the war both strengthened him
with the people of his district. He was elected by
a plurahty of more than 2,700, carrying every county
except one. But the Democratic party suffered a
serious reverse, and that in the midst of a war of
its making. Its majority of more than 60 votes
in the House was turned into a minority of 8. This,
says Mr. Schurz in his life of Henry Clay, "was
strange, but not inexpUcable." "Although," he
continues, "the buUetins from the theatre of operar
tions reported victory after victory, the popular
conscience, at least in the North, was uneasy, and
the shouts of triumph could not sUence its voice,
which said that the war was unjust in its origin,
and that slavery was its object. Moreover, the
shufiEling character of Polk's diplomacy, and his
apparent consciousness of guUt, urging hiTn inces
santly in his pubUc utterances to defend the govem-
ss

WAR AND POLITICS 59
ment as to the causes of the war, repeUed the pop
ular heart; and thus an administration victorious
in the field was defeated at the baUot-box." The
party that coifld have been beaten by the Whigs
in that year must have been pitiably weak, for the
Whigs had failed to maintain any logical or con
sistent attitude toward the war. They had rightly
opposed it, then had practicaUy all voted for it,
¦and then had continued their opposition whfle the
straggle was on. Clearly they won on the weakness
of their adversary rather than their own strength.
The slavery men in Congress did much during the
summer of 1846 to sohdify Northem sentiment.
They began a movement looking to peace, which
showed that they cared more for additional slave
territory than for victory. After hberal appropria
tions had been made for the prosecution of the war,
the President asked for $2,000,000 to be used ni
negotiations with Mexico, the hope being to end
the war and to get the territory that was wanted.
Then it was that David Wihnot, a Pennsylvania
Democrat, offered an amendment to the $2,000,000
appropriation bfll providing that slavery should
be forever prohibited in aU territory that might
be acquired from Mexico. The amended biU passed
the House but was defeated in the Senate. Douglas
voted against the proviso. It was he who moved
the amendment to the act admitting Texas by which
the Missouri Compromise line was extended through

60 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
the new territory. Under this act four States be
sides Texas could have been created, slavery being
permitted in those south of the Une and forbidden
in those north of it. But these negotiations for
peace in the midst of a victorious war, coupled with
the defeat of the amendment forbidding slavery in
the new domain, did much to weaken the Demo
cratic party by seeming to justify the Whig theory
of the war. There was, too, a suspicion that the
administration was jealous of the two Whig generals
— Scott and Taylor — ^who were so briUiantly suc
cessful. At any rate, the Whigs were victorious.
In IlUnois, however, the Democrats elected their
State ticket, and carried every congressional dis
trict except the seventh, from which Abraham Lin
coln was returned.
As chairman of the committee on territories,
Douglas was practicaUy the leader of his party in
the House. For that was the most important com
mittee at that time, since it had to do with a subject
that could not be considered apart from slavery,
which menaced the very life of the nation. Men
were beginiung to reaUze this, and the leaders in
Congress— Webster, Clay, Benton, and Douglas-
did everything they could to mioimize it and to
keep it in the background. It is certainly fair to
assume that then- motives were good, since the danger
was real. For Douglas it is to be said that for the
next seven years he traveUed in close company with

WAR AND POLITICS 61
Henry Clay, supporting his compromise measures
wholeheartedly and not going beyond them. Be
tween the two men there seems to have been the
closest sympathy. Clay, however, had condemned
slavery, and had compromised with it only to ward
off a greater evfl — disunion. This Douglas had not
yet done, and was not to do for many years. His
attitude was rather one of indifference toward it.
In his debate with Lincoln he said that he did not
care "whether slavery was voted up or down," a
statement of which Lincoln made much. Clay's
attitude was almost precisely that taken by Lincoln
a few years later. One has only to read the Lincoln
and Douglas debate to see how wide was the gap
between Douglas and Lincoln. Yet these three men
were alike in having no sympathy with abohtionism.
At the session of Congress immediately foUowing
the election of 1846, the Mexican question was still
the leading one. The Whigs attacked the adminis
tration, and Douglas led in its defense. Again it was
proposed, in accordance with the recommendation
of the President, to negotiate with the Mexican
Government, an appropriation being advised to
pay for any territory that might be acquired. This
pohcy had the approval of Douglas. When the
biU was brought up in the House, Wflmot again
moved to attach his proviso, and his motion was
carried by a majority of nine. The Senate stmck
it out, and the House receded, and passed the bill

62 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
as it came back from the Senate. The sectional
Une was drawn more clearly and sharply than ever
before. All the Whigs and many of the Democrats
from the free States voted for the proviso, whUe
all the members from the slave States, with the ex
ception of the one from Delaware, voted against
it. Though negotiations had been authorized, the
war went on in the most vigorous way throughout
the year 1847. General Scott captured Mexico City,
and New Mexico and California were conquered.
Early in the year the legislature of IlUnois elected
Douglas to the Senate, and he was immediately
made chairman of the committee on territories.
Professor AUen Johnson in his life of Douglas
says: "It was then a position of the utmost im
portance, for every question of territorial organiza
tion touched the pecuhar interests of the South.
The varying currents of pubhc opinion crossed in
this committee. Senator Bright of Indiana is weU
described by the hackneyed and often misapphed
designation, a Northern Democrat with Southern
principles; Butler was Calhoun's coUeague. Clay
ton of Delaware was a Whig and represented a border
State which was vaciUaticig between slavery and
freedom; while Davis was a Massachusetts Whig.
Douglas was placed, as it appeared, in the very
storm-centre of pohtics, where his weU-known fight
ing qualities would be in demand. It was not so
clear to those who knew him that he possessed the

WAR AND POLITICS 63
not less needful quahties of patience and tact for
occasions when battles are not won by fighting.
Still, life at the capital had smoothed his many httle
asperities of manner. He had learned to conform
to the requirements of a social etiquette to which
he had been a stranger, yet without losing the hearti
ness of manner and genial companionableness with
aU men which was, indeed, his greatest personal
charm. His genuineness and large-hearted regard
for his friends grappled them to him and won re
spect even from those who were not of his pohtical
faith." It was in this year, shortly after he became
senator, that Douglas married Miss Martha Deimy
Martin, the daughter of a South Carohna planter
and slave-owner. There is no doubt that this mar
riage had a great influence on his hfe — ^perhaps even
on his opinions. It represented a sort of personal
alhance between the North and the South at a time
when the sections were drifting farther and farther
apart. Douglas must have been charmed by the
graciousness of Southern hospitahty. Also he saw
slavery at its best. As a result of it all he no
doubt acquired a Southern point of view such as he
had not before had. Such a man would naturaUy
be greatly influenced, even if unconsciously, by
his friends. The young woman who became his
wife was endowed with charm of manner and
keenness of mind. It was, if there ever was one,
a love-match.

64 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Southem society was in the highest degree con
servative, and Washington was largely Southem.
Its conservatism was the conservatism of aristoc
racy. The people were satisfied with the status
quo. Many of them felt that they were caUed to
defend, not so much slavery, as a social order, of
which slavery was only a part, though a very im
portant part. The aboUtionists were looked on,
not as champions of freedom but as enemies of
society, disturbers of the peace, and intruders in
the domestic affairs of a people. It was into this
atmosphere that Douglas was ushered by his mar
riage. His father-in-law. Colonel Martin, was him
self a slaveholder. It was impossible that the young
senator could have seen any resemblance between
him and the terrible portrait of the slaveholder
drawn by the aboUtionists. The fact that Douglas
had never experienced any moral revolt against
slavery made it all the easier for him to be influenced.
When later his wife inherited her father's slaves
it became stiU more difficult for Douglas to con
demn as a whole the class which she then entered.
Douglas himself refused to take charge of the plan
tation, though asked by Colonel Martin to do so,
as he did not wish to own slaves. When three years
later he was charged with being a slaveholder, he
gave the facts, as set out above, to the world, and
said in a letter to a friend: "It is true that my wife
does own about 150 negroes in Mississippi on a

WAR AND POLITICS 65
cotton-plantation. My father-m-law m his life
time offered them to me and I refused to accept
them. This fact is stated in his wiU, but I do not
wish it brought before the public as the pubhc have
no business with my private affairs. ... It is our
intention to remove aU our property to lUinois as
soon as possible." The slaves would then have
been free.
Douglas was justffied in beheving that his course
so far was approved by the people of Illinois. For
he had been elected three times to the House of
Representatives, each time by an increased ma
jority, and finaUy promoted to the Senate. No
one knew better than he that the State was prac
ticaUy untouched by the abohtion sentiment. It
had voted twice for Jackson, twice for Van Buren,
and had proved its loyalty to the Democratic party
in what may be said to have been a supreme test —
when it voted for Polk in 1844 as against Henry
Clay. lUinois had stood fast even in the "Log Cab
in and Hard Cider" campaign of 1840. There was,
therefore, nothing in the situation at home to rouse
in Douglas any interest in slavery as a practical
pohtical issue. Illinois had been settled largely
from the South, and it was not — as yet — greatly
concerned over the fate of the negro. Very early
what has since been known as the "moderation"
of the Middle West began to manifest itself. View
ing conditions solely from the immediately practical

66 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
angle Douglas could hardly have helped feeling
that he was on the right track. He was, however,
destined to receive, if not a shock, at least a jar in
the near future. There came a time when he
had to face the problem not only of preventing
a dissolution of the Union but of keeping his party
together in lUinois. During the last ten years of
his life he cannot be said to have been inspired by
whoUy unmixed motives. But at the present stage
of his career, happily married, a member of the
United States Senate, and possessing the confidence
of his people, few pubUc men in the country were
more fortunately placed.
The Senate in which Douglas took his seat in
December, 1847, was a very strong body. Among
its members were Webster of Massachusetts, Cal
houn of South CaroUna, Dix of New York, Reverdy
Johnson of Maryland, Benton of Missouri, Mason
of Virginia, Cass of Michigan, Houston of Texas,
Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, Corwin of Ohio,
BeU of Tennessee, Crittenden of Kentucky, and
others hardly less notable. Calhoun had been Vice-
President and Secretary of State, Webster, Secre
tary of State, while Cass and BeU were later to be
candidates for the presidency, and Jefferson Davis
became President of the Confederacy. Clay was
not a member, he having retired a few years be
fore, as he thought permanently. Two years later
he returned and served tiU the end of his hfe. Per-

WAR AND POLITICS 67
haps never in our history was the Senate as mfluen-
tial as in those days. The great men of the nation
almost seemed to gravitate to it by a natural law.
It had been so from the beginning of the govern
ment. Whfle he was by no means the equal of the
acknowledged leaders, Douglas was nevertheless re
spected and trasted by them, and wielded a strong
and steadfly growing influence. He soon became a
national figure and the recognized leader of his
party. There can be no questioning the power of
a man who was able to win distinction in competi
tion with such associates.
One of the important questions that pressed
in the winter of 1847-1848 was that of winning
the presidential election of the latter year. It
was not an easy one. The position of many men
on the slavery issue was determined almost wholly
by pohtical considerations. When Texas was ad
mitted to the Union, the nation annexed not only
a war with Mexico but, as any one can now see,
the Civfl War. The problems were of the most
difficult character, and they aU had their pohtical
side. As a result of the war. General Zachary Taylor
became a national hero. Two years before, or im
mediately after Taylor's great victories of Palo
Alto and Resaca de la Pahna, certain of the Whig
leaders, in a tentative way, launched the Taylor
"boom." The general had never voted, and he
cared nothing and knew httle about politics. In-

68 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
deed, he himself had said, in a letter that was made
public, greatly to the discomfiture of his supporters,
that he had only "crude impressions on matters of
policy." In the beginning he expressed the opinion
that the movement in his interest was absurd. But
it spread, and graduaUy Taylor changed his mind,
and soon allowed himself to become at least a "re
ceptive candidate." His determination to be the
people's candidate rather than the candidate of a
party did not arouse much enthusiasm among the
Whigs. But pubhc meetings had been held in many
sections of the country, participated in by many
who were not Whigs, demanding the nomination
of Taylor. Perhaps he was right in appealing for
general support. Clay stUl hoped to be nominated,
and he expected that if he were chosen by the Whig
convention. General Taylor would retire. But in
two letters written in April, 1848, one addressed
to the pubhc and the other to Clay himself, the
general said that having been nominated by "the
people caUed together in primary assembUes in sev
eral of the States," he considered himself "in the
hands of the people, and would stay in the field
no matter what the Whig convention might do."
Thus the Whigs got a candidate whom they prob
ably did not want, though they would have taken
any one with whom they might win; and the Demo
crats found aU the pohtical capital that they looked
for as a result of the war in the hands of their oppo-

WAR AND POLITICS 69
nents. The Whig convention met in June, 1848, and
on the fourth baUot nominated General Taylor, his
vote being 171 to 32 for Clay. A month before the
Democrats had nominated Lewis Cass. There was
great dissatisfaction in both parties. The Whigs
adopted no platform, though never was one more
needed, since no one knew the views of their can
didate. There were several antislavery resolutions
offered, but aU were voted down. On the other
hand, the Democrats refused to indorse Calhoun's
view that Congress had no power to exclude slavery
from the Territories. The Whig leaders hoped to
hold the Southem members of the party, whfle the
Democrats sought to keep in line the Democrats
of the North. Clay was bitterly disappointed, not
whoUy for personal reasons, and he refused to take
any part in the campaign. Webster denounced
Taylor's nomination as "one not fit to be made,"
though he did, after his anger had subsided, later
in the campaign, advise his friends and neighbors
to vote for Taylor. To make matters stfll worse.
General Taylor, shortly before the election, accepted
a nomination from a Democratic convention held
in South Carolina by men who distmsted General
Cass because he was a Northern man. There had
been schisms in both the great conventions, the
seceders in both cases being antislavery men. The
Bambumer wing of the Democratic party met in
convention at Utica and nominated Martin Van

70 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Buren as its candidate for the presidency, and con
demned the extension of slavery into the Territories.
In August a great antislavery convention was held at
Buffalo, attended by antislavery men of aU parties.
The candidates were John P. Hale, an antislavery
Democrat, who had been nominated the preceding
autumn by the Liberty party, and Martin Van Buren,
who was chosen by the Buffalo convention. Nothing
could have been more insincere than the campaign
that foUowed. Taylor was supported by the South
em Whigs because he was a Southem man, and
was said to be "safer" on the slavery question than
General Cass, while the Northem Whigs took much
comfort in the fact that their candidate was de
clared to be in favor of the WUmot proviso. Both
parties denounced the Free-SoUers, and both were
thoroughly dishonest in theh attitude toward the
great questions of the day. The Buffalo convention
helped Taylor at the expense of Cass, the Whigs
carrying fifteen States, eight of them being Southem
States. lUinois continued tme to the Democratic
party, giving Cass a plurahty of a httle more than
3,000. Van Buren, however, received 15,774 votes
in lUinois, a vote sufficiently large to indicate a
decided growth in aggressive antislavery sentiment.
Such, in brief, was the situation as it existed or was
swiftly developing ui the year 1848. The country
was waking up to the great evU of slavery, and,
more than that, it was beginning to see that the

WAR AND POLITICS 71
old methods of deahng with it would no longer serve.
Yet the leaders in pubhc life, including Douglas,
continued those methods almost up to the outbreak
of the Civil War. The Whig party never won an
other victory, and never deserved to.
In the midst of afl this manoeuvring, in Febmary,
1848, a treaty of peace with Mexico was signed.
It was approved by the President, and later ratified
by the Senate. Under its provisions Upper Cah-
fomia and New Mexico became American terri
tory. New Mexico included the present State of
that name, practicaUy all of Utah and Nevada,
and aU of Arizona except the southem part which
came in five years later under the Gadsden purchase.
Upper California was substantially the California
of to-day. Here was a vast territory to be straggled
over. Douglas, it wiU be remembered, had sug
gested that the Missouri Compromise should be ex
tended through Texas. The issue was first raised
over Oregon, which had been long waiting for a terri
torial government. The lUinois senator had also
favored extending the hne of the Compromise to the
Pacific Ocean. Others favored the attachment to the
Oregon biU of a slavery-exclusion clause resembling
the now famous Wflmot proviso. Such an amend
ment was offered by John P. Hale to the biU pre
sented by Douglas. Three bflls had been introduced
for the organization of Oregon. The fourth was in
troduced by Douglas, January 10, 1848. No one be-

72 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Ueved that slavery could ever exist in the new Terri
tory, but one side was endeavoring to create a
precedent that would be useful in future argument
in favor of the power of Congress to legislate with
regard to slavery, and the other was fearful that
the precedent might be created. The slaveiy men
were thinking of the territory acquired from Mexico.
Many compromises were offered, Douglas again
proposing to extend the Missouri Compromise to
the Pacific, the effect of which would have been
to permit slavery in New Mexico, Arizona, and
the southem half of California. The biU as passed
was identical •with the first one introduced by Doug
las in the House, and organized Oregon with the
restrictive clause of the Ordinance of 1787 forbid
ding slavery. Here, indeed, was a precedent of a
rather formidable character, and it was one that
must have embarrassed Douglas considerably when
he came to deny, or felt forced to deny, the power
of Congress to legislate either for or against slavery
in the Territories. For in the Oregon case Congress
certainly did legislate on the subject, and did ex
clude slavery. It was in connection with the Oregon
controversy that the squatter-sovereignty doctrine
originated, and not with Douglas. Cass had the
year before expressed the opinion that it was the
business of Congress to frame governments for the
Territories, permitting the people to order their
internal affairs as to them seemed best. In the

WAR AND POLITICS 73
Oregon debate Dickinson of New York took the
same view, and held that the right to regulate their
affau^ was inherent in the people. This was squat
ter sovereignty. It was rejected in the Oregon
case. It was at this time also that the theory that
the Constitution foUows the flag originated. It
was evolved by Calhoun in the interest of slavery.
The territory acquired from Mexico was free, and
the Mexican Government had asked that it con
tinue free under the American Government. Mr.
Rhodes says: "An incident in the negotiation of
the treaty displayed whither was our drift in
obedience to the behest of the slave power. . . .
During the progress of the negotiations, Mexico
begged for the insertion of an article providing that
slavery should not be permitted in any of the Terri
tories ceded. Our commissioner rephed that the
bare mention of the subject in a treaty was an utter
impossibflity; that if the territory should be in
creased ten-fold in value, and, besides, covered aU
over a foot thick with pure gold, on the single con
dition that slavery should be excluded therefrom,
he could not then even entertain the proposition,
nor think for a moment of communicating it to the
President. The 'invincible Anglo-Saxon race' could
not hsten to the prayer of 'superstitious Cathoh-
cism, goaded on by a miserable priesthood,' even
though the prayer was on the side of justice, progress,
and humanity." So we paid thousands of hves and

74 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
$15,000,000 for the purpose of widening the bounds
of slavery. Calhoun argued that the Constitution
went with the fiag, and that it carried slavery -with
it, since slavery was by imphcation recognized in
the Constitution. Benton denounced this new
doctrine "of the transmigratory function of the
Constitution, and the instantaneous transportation
of itself and its slavery attributes into aU acquired
territories." If this dogma had prevaUed slavery
would have existed to-day in the H^aiian Islands,
the PhUippines, Porto Rico, Alaska, the Panama
zone, and the Virgin Islands. Webster denounced
it and showed its utter falsity. But Calhoun and
his f oUowers were interested, not in the Constitution
but slavery, and they endowed it with the quaUty
of self-extension and self-perpetuation, denying not
only that the government had power to exclude it
but that even the people of the Territories "could say
whether they wanted it or not. These men were
as strongly opposed to squatter sovereignty, except
when they saw that they could win by it, as to the
WUmot proviso.
However, the Oregon question was disposed of,
the Territory having been organized under the Doug
las biU. But Congress adjourned without takmg
any action in regard to the Mexican cession.
Nothing was done during the short session of 1848-
1849, though several attempts were made. Again
the issue was between the friends and the opponents

WAR AND POLITICS 75
of the Wflmot proviso. The question, of course,
was how much the friends of freedom could barter
away by compromise without utterly surrendering
the principle. No one knew just what would be
the attitude of President Taylor. But it was
soon learned that he was a patriot, and as de
voted to the Union as Jackson had been. President
Polk, just before his retirement, had urged territorial
governments for New Mexico, and favored the ex
tension of the Missouri Compromise hne. The only
important feature of the session was the debate
between Webster and Calhoun in which the former
combated, and with entire success, the claim that
the Constitution recognized slavery except as a
local institution, protected by local laws. That
indeed was the great issue, and it continued to be
such tiU it was settled by the Civfl War. It is easy
enough now to see that there was no possibflity
of compromise, but the situation was far from clear
at the time. The great object of the slavery men
was to extend slavery, whfle the object of the com
promisers was to prevent the dissolution of the Union,
a possibflity which many of the Southem leaders
viewed with perfect equanimity. Manifestly they
occupied the stronger position, for they were re
solved on winning at any cost. But there was a
price which the compromisers were unwiUing to
pay. The Southemers had, from their point of
view, everything to gain and nothing to lose.

76 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
In Congress the Southern men were becoming
increasingly aggressive under the leadership of Cal
houn, ably seconded by some of the newer men,
notably Jefferson Davis. From the North men were
beginning to appear in Congress who were strongly
opposed to slavery, as Seward of New York, who
was elected to the Senate in 1849. Theodore Roose
velt, in his life of Thomas H. Benton, insists that
the aboUtionists did Uttle or nothing that contributed
to the abohtion of slavery. The Southem men of
the time were not of that opinion. It is something
to keep a great issue before the people, to state it
clearly and courageously, and to agitate it. King
Ahab when he met the prophet Ehjah, said: "Art
thou he that troubleth Israel?" The prophet re
phed: "I have not troubled Israel, but thou and
thy father's house." The slavery men undoubtedly
thought that the aboUtionists had greatly troubled
their Israel, and such was the fact. Had they not
felt so they would not have excluded abohtion
pamphlets from the South, or denied the right of
petition to Congress. Prophets do not often cut
a great figure in pohtics, but they do stir the con
sciences of men. Such men as Garrison, PhilUps,
and Parker exerted an influence of which statesmen
and politicians were not conscious tiU they saw the
tide begin to rise, or — to change the figure — ^felt
the ground quaking under their feet. It is their
great and lasting distinction that they and their

WAR AND POLITICS 77
fellows were for years the only ones who appealed
straight to the conscience of the American people.
Doubtless they were not "practical," but they did
not pretend to be. For years they and the extreme
slavery men were the only people in the country
who said exactly what they thought. A nation
in which the pohtical spirit widely prevails, and in
the life of which compromise necessarily plays an
important part, can iU afford to lose out of that
hfe the spirit that prompted these words of WiUiam
Lloyd Garrison : " I am in eamest. I wiU not equivo
cate; I wfll not excuse; I wiU not retreat a single
inch; and I wfll be heard." The language, at any
rate, was such as the South could understand. Of
course there were other influences at work. The
arrogance and aggressiveness of the slavery advo
cates playedan important part in rousing the friends
of freedom, and they reacted strongly. Northern
pohticians began to see that they could not win
elections, or get offices for themselves, by truckhng
to slavery. But this was because the people were
roused against slavery, and certaiifly the abohtionists
had something to do with rousing them. Even
now one feels a sense of refreshment in turning from
the speeches of even the greatest men — such as
Webster and Clay — ^to the poems of Whittier and
LoweU and the writings of Garrison. These men
at least saw that sooner or later truth and error
would have to stand face to face, and that com-

78 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
promises were bound to faU. Compromises neither
saved the Union nor destroyed slavery. We can
give fuU credit to the men who honestly and labor
iously strove to accompUsh the impossible without
depreciating the influence of the men who were
mobbed and martyred because of their passionate
devotion to the great cause of Uberty and humanity.
Those are sad days for any nation in which there
is no "open -vision." Prophets are not always law
givers or statesmen, but even so they serve a useful
purpose. The prophetic is not the least important
element in the life of nations or individuals.
Douglas was quick to sense a change of condi
tions, though it cannot be said that his course was
greatly affected by it. The vote in lUinois fo*r Van
Buren, the Free-SoU candidate, was certainly a
danger-signal. The Whigs made a large gain over
the vote of 1844, whUe the Democratic vote showed
an actual falling off, though there had been a heavy
increase in the voting population. The people of
Ilhnois had supported the Mexican War, approved
Douglas's speech in defense of it, and returned him
to the House, later sending him to the Senate. In
1837 the legislature had adopted a joint resolution
condemning abohtionism as "more productive of
evU than of moral and pohtical good." There was
a modffied form of slavery in the State under the
indenture system when it was admitted to the Union.
But the coming of New Englanders into the northem

WAR AND POLITICS 79
part of the State, and later of the Germans, wrought
a great change in sentiment. In 1840 the Liberty
party poUed only 160 votes, which increased to
3,469 four years later. In 1848 the Free-Sofl party,
as has been seen, poUed 15,774 votes, and they were
practicaUy aU drawn from the Democratic party.
Shortly after the election of 1848, the legislature,
which was supposed to be strongly Democratic, and
which elected a Democratic speaker, adopted the
foUowing resolution: "Resolved, That our senators
in Congress be instmcted, and our representatives
requested, to use aU honorable means in their power
to procure the enactment of such laws by Congress
for the government of the countries and territories
of the United States, acquired by the treaty of peace,
friendship, limits, and settlement, with the repubhc
of Mexico, concluded Febmary 2, A. D. 1848, as
shaU contain the- express declaration that there shaU
be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in said
territories, otherwise than for punishment for crime,
whereof the party shaU have been duly convicted."
Fifteen members who had voted for the Democratic
candidate for speaker, also voted for this resolution.
The action was constmed, and naturally, as a re
buke to Douglas, who had opposed the Wflmot
proviso that would have kept slavery out of this
new Territory, and suggested the extension of the
Missouri Compromise to the Pacific coast, the effect
of which would have been to throw open a large

80 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
part of the Territory, including the southem part
of California, to slavery. Men of aU parties voted
for the resolution of instmction, whUe it was op
posed solidly only by the Democrats of the Southem
counties. Clearly the immediate task of Douglas
was not to maintain the Union but to keep his
party together in lUinois. He did not resiga, as
many thought he would be forced to. He did obey
the instmctions, though protesting that his vote
was not his own, but a mere reflection of the wiU
of his constituents, thus remaining true to the theory
adopted by hun in his youth, when, in the legislature,
he voted for internal improvements. But he did
at once begin to look for a way out, and he found
it in squatter, or popular, sovereignty. He would not
exclude slavery from the Territories, but he would
give the people the right to say whether they would
have it or not. The appeal went home in Illinois,
for its people were, and for years had been, firm be-
Uevers in the doctrine of local seK-govemment.
This feeling was strengthened by the coming into
the State of people from New England who had
Uved under the tovm-meeting system.
But the situation was ominous. There was danger
not only of a spht in the Democratic party of IlU
nois but of a sectional division separating the
northern from the southem part of the State.
Douglas had to feel his way. He reahzed that his
people would oppose any poUcy that contemplated

WAR AND POLITICS 81
the extension of slavery, or even seemed to permit
it. The question was whether they would be con
tent with not forcing slavery on the Territories,
but leaving their people to decide whether they
wanted it or not. Douglas's interest in popular
sovereignty seems to have developed largely, if
not whofly, out of a purely local situation.
The Free-Sofl party, both in lUinois and the na
tion, soon disappeared, the men who had gone into
it returning to their old pohtical affiliations, and
for a time it seemed as though the pohtical life of
the nation were to continue on the old lines. Doug
las was again master in Illinois, and, though his lead
ership was several times chaUenged, he maintained
his hold on his party tfll the end of his hfe. But
no one beheved that the slavery menace had dis
appeared, or that any solution of the problem was
in sight. On the contrary, there were the gravest
apprehensions. The older men, Webster, Clay, and
Calhoun, recognized the peril, and did not conceal
from themselves or others their behef that the Union
itself was in jeopardy. Douglas does not seem to
have been greatly disturbed, nor were the younger
men, broadly speaking, much alarmed. Probably
the pohticians felt that, with the dissolution of the
Free-Sofl party, the old party organizations would
continue much as they had been, and that to them
would faU the task of carrying on the nation's busi
ness. Yet the old issues were mostly dead. The

82 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
country had greatly prospered under the tariff of
1846, and there was no disposition to change it.
Indeed, it continued in force tiU 1857, when it was
considerably lowered. The battle over the bank
had long ago been fought out. There were loose
and close constructionists of the Constitution in
both parties. PracticaUy the only issue was slavery,
and that was not partisan but sectional, both parties
being divided on it. Both also had trifled with it.
The Whig party, though it had its President in the
White House, was practicaUy dead, though it did
not know it. The Democratic party carried but
two more elections, and never won another one tUl
1884.

CHAPTER IV
FREEDOM OR SLAVERY
General Taylor was inaugurated as President,
and Mfllard Fillmore as Vice-President, March 5,
1849, March 4 falhng on Sunday. The President's
inaugural was brief, and couched in the most general
terms. Having sworn to "preserve, protect and
defend" the Constitution, he said: "For the inter
pretation of that instrument I shaU look to the de
cisions of the judicial tribunals estabhshed by its
authority, and to the practice of the government
under the earher Presidents, who had so large a
share in its formation. To the example of those
iUustrious patriots I shaU always defer with rever
ence, and especiaUy to his example who was by so
many titles 'the Father of his country.' " Refer
ence was made to the revolutionary movements in
Europe, coupled with a reaffirmation of Washing
ton's warning against entangling alliances. The
President pledged himself to promote efficiency both
in the military and civfl service, and promised to
"make honesty, capacity and fidehty indispensable
requisites to the disposal of office, and the absence
of either of these quahties shafl be deemed sufficient
cause for removal." "Chosen by the body of the
83

84 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
people," the President said, "under the assurance
that my administration would be devoted to the
welfare of the whole country, and not to the support
of any particular section or merely local interest,
I this day renew the declaration I have heretofore
made, and proclaim my fixed determination to mam-
tain to the extent of my abihty the government in
its original purity, and to adopt as the basis of my
pubhc pohcy those great RepubUcan doctrines which
constitute the strength of our national existence."
The closing paragraphs pointed to compromise,
moderation, and peace. "I shaU," the President
said, "look with confidence to the enhghtened
patriotism of that body [Congress] to adopt such
measures of concUiation as may harmonize confiict-
ing interests, and tend to perpetuate the Union
which should be the paramount object of our hopes
and affections. In any action calculated to promote
an object so dear to the heart of every one who truly
loves his country, I wiU zealously unite with the
co-ordinate branches of the government. In con
clusion, I congratulate you, my feUow-citizens,
upon the high state of prosperity to which the good
ness of Divine Providence has conducted our common
country. Let us invoke a continuance of the same
Protecting Care which has led us from small be
ginnings to the eminence we this day occupy, and
let us seek to deserve that continuance by prudence
and moderation in our councils; by weU-directed

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 85
attempts to assuage the bitterness which too often
marks unavoidable differences of opinion; by the
promulgation and practice of just and hberal prin
ciples, and by an enlarged patriotism which shafl
acknowledge no limits but those of our own wide
spread repubhc." The President, at least, made it
clear that he did not regard the preservation of
slavery as paramount to the maintenance of the
Union. He could not wefl have gone further with
out rousing, at the very beginning of his adminis
tration, those passions which he sought to aUay. His
words must have had a special significance as com
ing from one who was a citizen of Louisiana and a
slaveholder. General Taylor was shortly called on
to prove his devotion to the Union, and he did it
in impressive and unmistakable fashion. But no
one could tefl from his address whether he was a
Whig or a Democrat. He was sincere in thinking
of himself not as the representative of any party
but as the servant of all the people.
The new cabinet was a compromise cabinet. Of
the seven members, four were Whigs from the slave-
holding States, Crawford of Georgia, the Secretary
of War, being the only representative of the extreme
proslavery faction. Of the three Northem Whigs,
CoUamer of Vermont, postmaster-general, was known
as an antislavery man. In the closing days of the
Polk administration attempts had been made to
settle the status of the new Territory, attempts

86 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
in which Douglas played a leading part. It was
proposed to extend the Missouri Compromise hne,
to admit the Territories, leaving the question of
their free or slave status to be determined by the
judiciary, to admit— this was Douglas's plan— New
Mexico and California forthwith as States in the
hope that they would decide their own destiny.
All these plans faUed. Douglas then proposed to
divide California, and admit the western part of
the State, and to admit California and New Mexico
as two States. But he met with no better success.
Douglas was not interested in the slavery question
as it affected the issue, but he did earnestly desire
to provide a government of some sort for the people
of the new Territory, and was speciaUy interested
in California. His programme was entirely fan* to
the South. But the tmth was that the extreme
slavery men were in control, and they did not
wish any more free territory •svithout compensation.
This was made very clear. The session closed in
disorder almost amounting to riot. There were in
the House of Representatives two personal en
counters which resulted in bloodshed. Everything
pointed to the necessity of compromise, unless there
was to be war.
The compromisers began their work at the next
session, which met in December, 1849. But before
that time the new President had taken an important
step. He gradually revealed himself, if not as a

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 87
Whig, at least as an opponent of the extension of
slavery. "The people of the North," he said, in
a speech dehvered in Pennsylvama in August, "need
have no apprehension of the further extension of
slavery; the necessity of a third party organization
on this score would soon be obviated." The Presi
dent's chief adviser in New York was not Vice-
President FiUmore but WiUiam H. Seward, lately
elected to the Senate. The situation was develop
ing in such a way as greatly to alarm the slavery
men, who felt that any limitation of slavery menaced
its existence. It was no longer enough that they
be "let alone"; they insisted that the bars should
not be put up anywhere, and that the people should
not have the right to legislate against slavery in
their own communities. In April, 1849, President
Taylor sent a special representative to California,
T. Butler King, a Whig congressman from Georgia,
to co-operate in the work of forming a State govern
ment. Under the leadership of the mihtary gov-
emor. General Rfley, the movement had already
been begun. The constitutional convention met
on September 1, 1849, and on October 13 submitted
to the people a constitution containing a prohibi
tion of slavery. The convention voted unanimously
for the constitution, though fifteen of its members
had come from slave States. The people ratified
the constitution by a vote of 12,066 to 811. It was
hoped by the President that the people of New

88 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Mexico would take a simUar course. His plan was
to submit to Congress territorial organizations as
accomphshed facts.
Hardly a legislature met that did not express
itseU on the great issue, those of the Southem States
declaring that the exclusion of slavery was in deroga
tion of Southern rights, whUe every Northern legis
lature except one adopted resolutions favoring the
Wihnot proviso. A meeting held at Jackson, Miss.,
in May, 1849, declared in favor of calling a State
convention to devise methods to protect the rights
and interests of the South. The convention met,
issued an address to the people, and proposed that
a general convention be held in June of the foUow
ing year at Nashville. By this time matters had
gone so far that some Southern men had come to
the conclusion, though, as Mr. Schurz says, "re
gretfully," that "the dissolution of the Union was
necessary to the salvation of slavery." Such was
the state of affairs when Congress came together
in December, 1849. Though California had adopted
a free constitution it divided when it came to elect
ing senators, sending John C. Fremont, who was
opposed to slavery, and WiUiam M. Gwin, who
was proslavery. Henry Clay was a member of
the new Senate, and of course the great leader in
the compromise movement, though Douglas was
hardly less prominent. The refusal of Joshua R.
Giddings, and other Free-SoUers, to vote for Robert

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 89
C. Winthrop of Massachusetts as speaker of the
House resulted m the choice, after a struggle lasting
three weeks, of Howefl Cobb of Georgia, of whom
Horace Mann said: "He loves slavery; it is his
pohtics, his pohtical economy, his rehgion." Mann
voted for Winthrop as "the best man we could pos
sibly elect." There were those scenes of violence
that had almost come to be usual, the Southern
men being most arrogant and aggressive.
The storm that broke over the election of a
speaker gathered force rapidly. Southem Whigs
and Democrats alike denounced as unconstitutional
the action of the President in suggesting to the
people of New Mexico and Cahfomia that they
form State governments, and charged the President
with being a traitor to the South. Toombs and
Stephens of Georgia, both Whigs, were violent in
their sectional appeals. The message of the Presi
dent, though mfld and pacific in tone, gave fresh
cause of offense. He informed Congress that Cali
fornia had adopted a constitution, and would shortly
apply for admission to the Union. He recommended
favorable action on the application. The people
of New Mexico would, he was advised, take a similar
course. Congress, the President suggested, would
do wefl to wait tfll they had acted, and in the mean
time "abstain from the introduction of those ex
citing topics of a sectional character which have
hitherto produced painful apprehensions in the

90 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
pubUc mind." But Clay and those who acted with
him felt that delay was impossible, that the prob
lems must at once be solved, and that they could be
solved only through compromise. On January 29
the Kentucky senator brought before the Senate
a series of resolutions which he hoped and beUeved
would serve as the basis for an adjustment. It was
proposed to admit Cahfomia as a free State; to
establish territorial governments in the territory
acquired from Mexico without any reference to
slavery since it was not likely that slavery would
ever be introduced there; to determine the boundary
between Texas and New Mexico, and pay the bona-
fide debt of Texas if she would relinquish her claim
to any part of New Mexico; to aboUsh the slave-
trade in the District of Columbia, though not to
aboUsh slavery except with the consent of Mary
land and the people of the district, and compensa
tion to the owners of slaves; to strengthen and make
more effective the fugitive-slave law; and to commit
Congress to the doctrine that it had no power to
interfere with the slave-trade between the States.
Clay supported these resoluticfns in a speech of great
power. Manifestly concessions would be required
from both sides, but the speaker thought that they
were concessions "not of principle but of feeling,
of opinion in relation to matters in controversy
between them." The South was asked to yield
in regard to California, though it had no ground

FREEDOM. OR SLAVERY 91
to stand on, since the people had adopted a con
stitution, as they had a right to do. As for the North,
it was pointed out that it would gain nothing from
a formal exclusion of slavery from the Mexican
territory since slavery did not exist there, and prob
ably never would. "What," Clay asked, "do you
want who reside in the free States ? You want that
there shall be no slavery introduced into the terri
tories acquired from Mexico. WeU, have you not
got it in Cahfomia aheady, if admitted as a State ?
Have you not got it in New Mexico, in aU human
probabihty also? What more do you want? You
have got what is worth a thousand Wflmot provisos.
You have got nature herself on your side." This
was the view of Webster and Douglas. Webster
appealed to "the law of nature, of physical geog
raphy, the law of the formation of the earth," as
effectively excluding slavery. Speaking of the pos
sibflity of slavery in New Mexico and Utah, Douglas
said: "There is no ground for apprehension on this
point. If there was one inch of territory in the
whole of our acquisition from Mexico, where slavery
could exist, it was in the vafleys of Sacramento and
San Joaquin, within the limits of the State of Cali
fornia. It should be borne in mind that chmate
regulates this matter, and that climate depends
upon the elevation above the sea as much as upon
paraUels of latitude." California, he said, "is now
free by law and in fact, it is free according to those

92 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
laws of nature and of God, to which the senator
from Massachusetts aUuded, and must remain for
ever free. It will be free under any bUl you may
pass, or without any bUl at all." Douglas argued
that the Ordinance of 1787 had not excluded slavery,
since it had existed in the Territory covered by it;
that slavery was not excluded by the Missouri Com
promise, or by the Oregon act; in aU these cases
it had disappeared because it was opposed to pubhc
sentiment, and incapable of adaptation to physical
conditions. The difficulty, of course, was in know
ing just what paraUels of latitude or what elevation
above the sea would be necessary to protect the
people who beUeved in freedom. But it is c^ain
that slavery could not have continued to endure
in any industrial and progressive community. Doug
las was not serving the cause of slavery. On the
contrary, he may have proved too much in the eyes
of the Southemers. He assuredly approached the
subject from the side of freedom. He spoke of Cal
houn's "error of supposing that his particular sec
tion has a right to have 'a due share of the terri
tories' set apart and assigned to it," therein agreeing
with Webster, who, in a very con-vincing speech,
showed that slavery was sectional and local, and
freedom universal. "We aU," continued Douglas,
"look forward with confidence to the time when
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Mis
souri, and probably North Carolina and Tennessee,

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 93
wiU adopt a gradual system of emancipation. In
the meantime we have a vast territory, stretching
from the Mississippi to the Pacific, which is rapidly
filhng up with a hardy, enterprismg, and mdustrious
population, large enough to form at least seventeen
new free States, one-half of which we may expect
to see represented in our body during our day. Of
these I calculate that four wiU be formed out of
Oregon, five out of our late acquisitions from Mexico,
including the present State of Cahfomia, two out
of the Territory of Minnesota, and the residue out
of the country upon the Missouri River, including
Nebraska. I think I am safe in assuming that each
of these wiU be free Territories and free States
whether Congress shaU prohibit slavery or not.
Now, let me inquire where are you to find the slave
Territory with which to balance these seventeen
free Territories or even any one of them?" Un
doubtedly this was -the feeling of many men — and
it was wholly justified — ^who were wilhng to com
promise with slavery. They bargained with it
not for the purpose of saving it but in the sure con
fidence: that it would die a natural death. Nor can
there be any question that the slavery men felt
that slavery was in perfl from the very natural and
pohtical forces on which Webster, Clay, and Douglas
so largely relied. Had they not been they would
not have been so feverishly eager to buttress it,
and to acquire new territory to which they hoped

94 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
it might spread or be carried. What they feared
was not the abohtion of slavery by law but its
disappearance through colUsion with the forces
tmsted to by Douglas.
There was not the sUghtest reason to fear that
the general government would interfere with slavery
in the States. Men of aU parties, always excepting
the aboUtionists, were opposed to any such policy,
and denied that Congress had any power to inter
fere. Nor was there any thought of such a thing
tiU, in the midst of the CivU War, Lincoln decided
to emancipate the slaves as a war measure. The
fears of the Southem men were proofs of their reaUza-
tion of the weakness of the institution and of the
social order based on it. That is why they attempted
to deny to the people — and largely succeeded in
doing so — ^the right to petition Congress on the
subject, and demanded the exclusion of abolition
Uterature from the maUs. What they dreaded — at
least this is tme of the extreme men — ^was not dis
solution of the Union but dissolution of Southem
society through internal strife, and even insurrec
tion. Nothing, in other words, could be free where
men were not free. Great Britain's emancipation
of slaves in her American possessions, and every
where, was felt to be a blow at American slavery.
There was strenuous objection to granting the
privileges of the floor of the Senate to Father
Mathew, the apostle of temperance, because he

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 95
had years ago signed, with Daniel O'ConneU, an
antislavery appeal. This state of mind was the
natural product of existing conditions. The fears
of CaUioun and his followers were abundantly justi
fied. But they served to make the work of com
promise much more difficult. For the slavery men
felt that any concessions on their part might be
construed as an admission by them that slavery
was wrong, and have the effect of stiU further
weakening it.
Such was the situation that Clay faced when he
offered his resolutions which were the result of his
efforts to hit upon "some comprehensive scheme
of settling amicably the whole question in aU its
bearings." Beheving — and with reason — ^that the
Union was in danger, his great object was to save
it. There can be no question as to the sincerity of
his motives, or the patriotism that prompted him.
He was an old man, with nothing to look forward
to in pohtics. He was not greatly interested in the
Whig party, or in any pohcy the purpose of which
was to "keep it together." His aim was wefl set
out in the preamble to the resolutions, which were
declared to be "for the peace, concord, and harmony
of these States, to settle and adjust amicably aU
existing questions of controversy between them
arising out of the institution of slavery, upon a fair,
equitable and just basis." The bargain offered
seems to-day to be exceedingly fair, but it was not

96 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
thought to be so by the Southern senators, who
were in the beginning of the debate the principal
opposers of the plan. Jefferson Davis declared
that there was no concession in the plan to the
South, and demanded the extension of the Missouri
Compromise line, the effect of which would have
been to make the southem part of California slave
territory. Even that did not satisfy him, for he
demanded that the old Compromise be amended
so as positively to establish slavery in all territory
south of the Une. It was in answer to Davis that
Clay said: "Coming from a slave State as I do,
I owe it to myself, I owe it to the truth, I owe it
to the subject, to say that no earthly power could
induce me to vote for a specific measure for the in
troduction of slavery where it had not before existed,
either south or north of that line."
Clearly Davis, in demanding that Congress estab-
Ush slavery, admitted that it had a right to legislate
on the subject, and if it had that right, it had the
right to exclude it. The question then would have
been not as to the existence of a power but as to
the way in which it should be exercised. What
Davis meant was that governments should be set
up in certain territory under which slavery should
be estabhshed as a matter of right. To men of this
way of thinking Douglas's plan to leave the matter
indifferent, and to permit the people freely to choose
between freedom and slavery, was quite as objection-

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 97
able as the programme forbidding slavery. For
there was the chance that they might choose wrongly
— ^from the Southem point of view. The great sen
sation of the debate was, of course, the speech of
Webster, dehvered on March 7. In it the speaker
accepted cordially the plan proposed by Clay, de
clared that the Wflmot proviso (which he had al
ways advocated) was not needed to keep slavery out
of New Mexico, condemned the abohtionists, and
professed an entire willingness to support an effec
tive fugitive-slave law. Probably no man in our
history was ever so bitterly denounced as Webster
was because of this speech. He was charged with
an utter abandonment of principles for which he
had always stood, and with making a bid for the
presidency. It is hardly probable that personal
ambition influenced Webster in the shghtest de
gree. For he must have known that his speech
would be an affront to a very formidable sentiment
in the North, as it proved to be. The people were
expecting a bugle-blast for freedom, and they got
an argument for compromise, and an argument
that conceded much to the slavery men. But his
friends ralhed to his support, and it was soon reahzed
that the most violent criticism came from the aboh
tionists, whom Webster himself had condemned.
The Springfield Republican undoubtedly spoke
for many people when it said : " We regard the speech
as a whole as strictly Websterian — ^broad, patriotic,

98 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and honest. We beUeve that it wiU have a good
effect, not only upon the fiery South in soothing
disunion agitation, but upon the North, in impress
ing upon it its constitutional obUgations. We
are among those, however, who wish it had been
more than it is." Posterity has been kinder than
his contemporaries to this great man. Viewing
the situation through the clouds of civU war, all
can now see that Webster's fears of war and dis
union were enough and more than enough to ex
plain any apparent surrender that he may have
made. It is clear now that he was not unduly
alarmed, not frightened by mere spectres. Nor
was he, as were the younger men, such as Seward
and Chase, wiUing to accept the altemative of war.
His watchword had always been "hberty and Union,
one and inseparable." Regarding dissolution of the
Union and slavery as alike evfls, he thought that
the former was the more dreadful. George S. Mer-
riam, the biographer of Samuel Bowles, whose hand
no doubt penned the words quoted above from the
Spring field Republican, very truly says: "Webster
and his f oUowers were far other than the mere apos
tates to freedom which they seemed to be to the
men possessed by the passion of antislavery. Web
ster was identified with a subUme idea — the idea
of American nationahty. He wrought a supreme
service in the earUer days, when in his duels with
Calhoun he overmatched the acute logic which

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 99
claimed for each of the States an independent sover
eignty, by maintaining with equal acumen an organic
national unity, and evoking in its defense a grander
and mightier sentunent. No American of the first
half of this century did so much to root the love
of the Union in the minds and hearts of the people
as did Webster. It was that love, more than hos-
tihty to slavery, which animated the North in the
war which established the Union and destroyed
slavery. Webster failed to measure the evil of
slavery, and the abohtionists f afled no less to measure
the evfl of disunion. Each of them was devoted
to one great idea; and the two ideas, which conflicted
for a whfle, were destined to blend at last into a
harmonious and irresistible force. The highest
distinction of the radical antislavery men was that
they gave disinterested service, in which they had
nothing to gain and much to lose; while in the forces
which opposed them patriotism had its alhes in
the ambition of pohticians, the timidity of churches,
and the selfishness of commerce." The parallel
which Mr. Rhodes draws between Webster and
Burke is a tme one. Of the former he says : "Party
passion has so affected opinions about Burke that
it has remained for the present generation of Eng-
hshmen to measure fairly the worth of their greatest
statesman. ... It is quite certain that we shall
not be less generous in the estimate of our great
conservative. Untfl the closing years of our cen-

100 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tury, a dispassionate judgment could not be made
of Webster; but we see now that, in the war of the
secession, his principles were mightier than those of
Garrison. It was not 'No Union with slaveholders,'
but it was ' Liberty and Union, ' that won. Lincoln
caUed the joint names his watchword, and it was
not the Uberty or aboUtionist, but the Union party
that conducted the war."
There were other speeches made in the debate
that are of great historic importance. Those of
Seward and Chase in particular reflected the moral
sentiment that was developing. For the first time
the men of the South were confronted by men from
the North who were unwiUing to compromise.
Hitherto only the abohtionists and Pree-SoUers
had stood firmly on the moral ground. But Seward
and Chase were Whigs in good standing, and in
no sense aboUtionists. Seward was quite as willing
as Webster and Clay to let slavery alone in the
States in which it existed, but he would not run the
risk of extending it through compromise.
He declared himself opposed to aU legislative
compromises that were not absolutely necessary,
and as in this case the only necessity for compromise
was that growing out of the danger to the Union,
and as Seward did not beUeve that there was any
such danger, he could not admit the rightfulness
of the proposed compromise. Clay and Webster
undoubtedly had the clearer -sdsion, and read the

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 101
situation more correctly. Seward was wrong in
thinking that there was no real perfl of disunion.
If he had felt as Webster and Clay felt, he might
have seen, as they did, that there was a necessity
for compromise. Calhoun's scheme for preserving
a permanent equihbrium between free and slave
States, Seward declared to be impossible, since it
woifld involve the control of a majority by a minor
ity. No fugitive-slave law, he said, could be en
forced, since it was opposed to the moral convictions
of the North, and the one proposed deprived the
fugitive of aU the safeguards of hberty. If the con
stitutional provision for the return of slaves were
carried out — and he thought that it should be —
it would be necessary to soften the rigors of the
law. "Has any government," he asked, "ever suc
ceeded in changing the moral convictions of its sub
jects by force? But these convictions imply no
disloyalty. We reverence the Constitution, although
we perceive this defect, just as we acknowledge the
splendor and power of the sun, although its surface
is tamished with here and there an opaque spot.
Your Constitution and laws convert hospitality to
the refugee from the most degrading oppression on
earth into a crime; but aU mankind except you
esteem that hospitahty a virtue." The part of the
speech that created the greatest sensation was that
in which he dealt with the relation of the general
government to the pubhc domain. "The national

102 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
domain is ours," he said; "it was acquired by the
valor and with the wealth of the whole nation. We
hold, nevertheless, no arbitrary power over it. The
Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Con
stitution devotes the domain to Union, to justice,
to defense, and to Uberty. But there is a higher
law than the Constitution, which regulates our
authority over the domain, and devotes it to the
same noble purposes. The territory is a part of
the conamon heritage of mankind, bestowed upon
them by the Creator. We are His stewards, and
must so discharge our tmst as to secure in the highest
attainable degree their happmess. ... I cannot
consent to introduce slavery into any part of this
continent, which is now exempt from what seems
to me so great an evU, or to compromise the ques
tions relating to slavery, as a condition of the ad
mission of California." Seward was not the first
man to appeal to "the higher law," though one
would think so in reading the denunciations of the
doctrine. The South had appealed to it when it
appealed to the Bible and the law of God as au
thorities in support of slavery. Thornton Kirkland
Lothrop, the biographer of Seward, quotes the fol
lowing from a speech made by Jefferson Davis a
few days before Seward spoke: "It is the Bible and
the Constitution on which we rely, and we are not
to be answered by the dicta of earthly wisdom or
earthly arrogance when we have those high author-

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 103
ities to teach and to constme the decrees of God."
But it was intolerable that there should be an ap
peal to "the higher law" in the name of freedom.
There was, after aU, a higher law, not overriding
the Constitution, but one in accordance with which
it was to be constmed, and with which it was later
brought into alignment. The words rang through
the nation. When everything else in the speech
was forgotten, they were remembered. The speech
was known as " the higher law " speech. But Seward
did not ignore the great arguments of Clay and
Webster that compromise was necessary to save
the Union. He had of course heard the threats, but
he was not impressed by them "because they are
uttered under the influence of a controlling interest
to be secured, a paramount object to be gained;
and that is an equflibrium of power in the republic."
"The question of dissolving the Union," he said,
"is a complex question; it embraces the fearful
issue whether the Union shaU stand, and slavery,
under the steady, peaceful action of moral, social,
and political causes, be removed by gradual, volun
tary effort, and with compensation; or whether
the Union shaU be dissolved and Civfl War ensue,
bringing on violent but complete and immediate
emancipation. We are now arrived at that stage
of our national progress when that crisis can be
foreseen, when we must foresee it. . . . I feel as
sured that slavery must give way " and that " emanci-

104 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
pation is inevitable." " AU measures," he continued,
"which fortify slavery, or extend it, tend to the
consummation of violence; aU that check its ex
tension and abate its strength tend to its peaceful
extirpation." He told the Southemers that they
could not have "the surrender of fugitives from
labor" "because you cannot roU back the tide of
social progress." He concluded by saying that
"there wiU be no disunion and no secession." Such
language as this the South had not been accustomed
to hear.
The speech made little impression in the Senate
except on the slavery men, whom it infuriated.
Webster sneered at it. Clay was indignant at the
blow that it seemed to strike at his compromise,
and in a letter to a friend spoke of it as " Seward's
late abolition speech," which had "eradicated the
respect of almost all men from him." The speech
that weighed in the debate was Webster's, which,
next to Clay's skUful management, did more than
an5i;hing else to get the compromise through by
winning support for it from the Northem Whigs.
The choice, as the older men saw it, was, to quote
Mr. Schurz, "between an impossibUity on one side
and a horror on the other." The younger men were
prepared to make the choice, and for them the
time for compromise had forever gone by. Douglas
did not commit himself in advance to the Clay res
olutions, but he did commend "the self-sacrificing

FREEDOM OR SLAVERY 105
spirit which prompted the venerable senator from
Kentucky to exhibit the matchless moral courage
of standing undaunted between the two great hostfle
factions, and rebuking the violence and excesses of
each, and pointing out their respective errors, in a
spirit of kindness, moderation and finnness, which
made them conscious that he was right." "The
Union," Douglas said, "wiU not be put in perfl;
California will be admitted; governments for the
Territories must be estabhshed; and thus the con
troversy wfll end, and I tmst forever." Yet four
years later Douglas himself reopened the con
troversy with his Kansas-Nebraska biU. . . .

CHAPTER V
THE GREAT COMPROMISE
On April 18 the Senate adopted a resolution of
Senator Foote of Mississippi, to refer the President's
message and aU resolutions concerning slavery,
including Clay's, to a select committee of thirteen
senators to be elected by the Senate. This com
mittee was composed of Cass of Michigan, Dickin
son of New York, Bright of Indiana, Webster of
Massachusetts, Phelps of Vermont, Cooper of
Pennsylvania, King of Alabama, Mason of Vir
ginia, Downs of Louisiana, Mangum of North
Carolina, BeU of Tennessee, and Berrien of
Georgia. Clay was chairman, a sort of neutral be
tween the factions. The Whigs, though in a minor
ity in the Senate, had a majority of the committee.
But the issue was not partisan, but sectional, and
the sections were equaUy represented, there being
six members from the slave States and six from the
free States. The senators to whom this great piece
of work was intmsted were moderate men, there
being only two extremists, Phelps of Vermont on
one side and Mason of Virginia on the other. There
was trouble at the very beginning, due to the Presi
dent's opposition to any compromise involving
106

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 107
California. The administration openly antagonized
the programme. When the so-caUed "Omnibus
Bfll" was reported, of which something wiU be said
later, the President said to a senator who announced
his mtention to oppose it: "Stand firm, don't yield;
it means disunion, and I am pained to learn that
we have disunion men to contend with." When
faced with the threat of rebellion if the Wflmot
proviso were passed. President Taylor told the men
making it that he would sign any constitutional
law passed by Congress, and that he himself would,
if necessary, take the field to enforce laws of the
nation, and that if the men who made the threat —
Alexander H. Stephens and Robert Toombs,
Southem Whigs — ^were taken in rebeUion he would
hang them as he had hanged spies and deserters
in Mexico. Zachary Taylor, who had once said to
his son-in-law, Jefferson Davis, that the South must
stand firm agamst Northem encroachments, now
looked on Davis and other Southern leaders as con
spirators against the Union. He ordered the mih
tary governor of New Mexico to resist by force any
movement of the Texas mflitia against him in the
disputed territory, and said that he would, if neces
sary, take command. These were the words not
of a fire-eater or radical but of a patriot, and one
who was willing to go far on the path of compromise.
But he clearly thought that there was a point be
yond which it was impossible to yield without bring-

108 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ing on the nation the very peril that it was sought
by compromise to avert. He was not a man whom
it was easy to frighten. Perhaps if there had been
more of his spirit in Congress the history of the
United States would have taken a different turn.
As it was, the great Whig leader in the Senate and
the sturdy Whig President were at outs concermng
one of the most important measures ever brought
before Congress. But in the midst of the straggle
the President died, respected, honored, and lamented
by all except the extreme proslavery men. It is
possible that, had he Uved, the compromise might
have faUed. Another event contributed to the suc
cess of the movement, and that was the mUdness
and comparative faUure of the NashvUle convention
that, it may be remembered, had been caUed the
year before. There was Uttle interest in it, the
Southern Whigs mostly opposing it.
It might have befeh thought that the proof af
forded by the convention that there was considerable
Union sentiment in the South would have deprived
Clay and his foUowers of the argument that com
promise was necessary to save the Union. But it
seems rather to have discredited the extreme South
emers, and thus to have weakened Southem opposi
tion to the compromise. There can be no doubt
that Clay's attitude and the speech of Webster
made a powerful appeal to Southern Whigs, most
of whom were opposed to dissolution of the Union,

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 109
and some of whom no doubt hoped for another party
victory. The growing approval of Webster's speech
in the North and the evident fear of what we should
now caU "Big Business" lest commercial interests
suffer and trade be lost played their part in bring
ing about a better feeling. The new President,
Mfllard Fillmore, was a man of mild disposition.
Clay and Webster both beheved that he would favor
the compromise, and events proved that they were
right. The President appointed Webster Secretary
of State, in which place he was of great service,
being able to array the whole power of the adminis
tration on the side of the compromise measures.
Four of the members of the new cabinet came from
slaveholding States, but they were men of moderate
views. The President himseff was a man in whom
the pohtical instinct was strongly developed. In
deed, he had told President Taylor that, if the vote
in the Senate should be a tie, he would, as presid
ing officer, vote for the Clay programme. Thus
the way was paved for success, though it was not
achieved tfll after a bitter stmggle. That there
was on the part of the Senate a hope and desire
for success is proved by its refusal to place extreme
men on the committee.
Douglas, though not a member of the committee
of thirteen, played an important part in getting
the legislation through. Before the special com
mittee was agreed on, namely, on March 25, he, as

no STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
chairman of the committee on Territories, had re
ported two bills, one providing for the admission
of California and the other "to estabhsh the terri
torial governments of Utah and New Mexico, and
for other purposes." These, with the various reso
lutions, went, of course, to the committee of thirteen.
Douglas was chiefly interested in the admission
of California. The territorial biU, which left the
question of slavery open, was designed to placate
the South, and to get votes for the California bUl,
which, he was assured, would be strongly opposed
unless Congress would pledge itself to leave the
people of the two Territories to frame Constitutions
with or without slavery as they might choose.
Mr. Clay, on the day before his committee reported,
told Douglas that the report would recommend
the union of his two bUls. Douglas suggested that
Clay himself unite them, and present them as part
of the report of the committee, but the Kentucky
senator did not think this would be fair to Douglas.
Sheahan teUs the story thus: "Mr. Douglas then
said: 'I respectfully ask you, Mr. Clay, what right
have you, to whom the country looks for so much,
and as an eminent statesman having charge of a
great measure for the pacification of a distracted
country, to sacrifice to any extent the chances of
success on a mere punctUio as to whom the credit
may belong of having first written the bUls? I,
sir, waive all claim and personal consideration in

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 111
this matter, and insist that the conunittee shall
pursue that course which they may deem best calcu
lated to accomphsh the great end we aU have in
view, without regard to any interest merely personal
to me.' Mr. Clay (extending his hand to Mr. Doug
las): 'You are the most generous man living. I
wfll unite the bflls and report them; but justice
shafl nevertheless be done to you as the real author
of the measures.' The next morning Mr. Clay
presented his report, and also reported the bfll sub
sequently known as the Omnibus Bfll, being a biU
consisting of Mr. Douglas's two bflls attached
together by a wafer. . . . Trae to his promise,
Mr. Clay subsequently bore honorable testimony
to the abflity, fairness and patriotism of Mr. Doug
las throughout that long and memorable session."
The next day, May 8, 1850, the Clay committee
made its report. The Douglas bills for the adnns-
sion of California and the territorial organization
of New Mexico and Utah, without any prohibition
of slavery, were recommended for passage as one
measure. The committee advised that the admis
sion of any new States that might be formed out
of Texas be postponed tfll such time as they should
ask to be received into the Union, when it should
be the duty of Congress to admit them. A west-
em and northem boundary was fixed for Texas,
excluding the whole of New Mexico, Texas to have
a money equivalent. A more effective fugitive-

112 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
slave law was recommended, and the abolition of
the slave-trade, though not of slavery, in the Dis
trict of Columbia was advised.
There was no minority report, though five mem
bers, including the two radicals, one on each side,
dissented from some of the views expressed in the
report. The administration was strongly opposed
to Clay's "comprehensive plan of adjustment."
It was by President Taylor that the combination
of Douglas's measures had been dubbed "The Om
nibus BUl." But General Taylor died on July 9,
in the midst of the stmggle. His death not only
removed an obstacle but insured to the compromise
a friend in the White House and in the office of
Secretary of State, and greatly weakened Seward's
influence in the Senate. There was one very im
portant change made in Douglas's territorial bill.
He had left the territorial legislatures free to vote
on slavery as they chose. In the bUl as reported
the legislatures were forbidden to legislate at aU
on slavery. This was, of course, a sort of Wihnot
proviso, since under the biU the people could not
have estabhshed slavery. Also it was in violation
of the Douglas theory of squatter or popular sover
eignty. There were many amendments offered,
including the WUmot proviso, Douglas voting for
the latter every time it was proposed, in obedience
to instmctions — or what were conceived by him
to be such — from his constituents. The Utah biU

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 113
was amended so as to permit the people to adopt
a slave or a free Constitution as to them seemed
best. This amendment was carried by a vote of
38 to 12, Douglas, of course, voting for it, as did
Clay, Webster, Benton, and Cass. The prmciple
was in entire accord with Douglas's views. In his
discussion of the subject he expressed his great sur
prise that it had ever been questioned, and then
went on to explain his votes for the Wflmot proviso,
and though his words merely reaffirm his youthful
opinion, they are not without interest: "I have
always held that the people have a right to settle
these questions as they choose, not only when they
come into the Union as a State, but that they should
be permitted to do so whfle a Territory. If I have
ever recorded a vote contrary to that principle,
even as apphcable to Territories, it was done under
the influence of the pressure of an authority higher
than my own wiU. Each and every vote that I
have given contrary to that principle is the vote
of those who sent me here, and not my own. I have
faithfuUy obeyed my instmctions, in letter and
spirit, to the fuUest extent. They were conflned
to the prohibition of slavery in the Territories while
they remained Territories, and leaving the people
to do as they please when they shaU be admitted
into the Union as States. The vote which I am now
about to give is entirely consistent with those in
stmctions. I repeat that, accordmg to my view

114 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of the subject, all these vexed questions ought to
be left to the people of the States and Territories
interested, and that any vote which I have given,
or may give, inconsistent with this principle, will
be the vote of those who gave the instructions, and
not my own." Mr. Douglas had, however, more
than once moved to extend the Missouri Compromise
line straight through to the Pacffic coast. Had
that been done slavery would have been excluded
from aU territory lying north of it, and the people
living in that territory would have been deprived
of the right " to settle these questions as they choose."
The people south of the line could have had slavery
or not as they pleased; those north of it would have
been forced to accept a status fixed by Congress.
Yet this poUcy was favored by Douglas.
Nothing would be gained by attempting to foUow
this legislation through its many vicissitudes. There
were many amendments offered, some of which
were adopted only to be rejected on subsequent
votes. What is important is the attitude of Douglas
toward the more vital of them. GeneraUy he wUl
be found to have voted with Webster and Clay.
Partisan pohtics hardly figured at aU; the divisions
were mostly sectional. Jefferson Davis offered an
amendment to the Omnibus BiU — that is, the biU
made up of the two Douglas bUls, one admitting
California and the other organizing Utah and New
Mexico — forbidding the people of the Territories

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 115
to legislate at aU concerning slavery, and providing
that nothing in the act should prevent the territorial
legislatures from passing "such laws as may be
necessary for the protection of rights of property
of any kind which may have been, or may hereafter
be, lawfuUy introduced into said territory." The
amendment was rejected. Davis admitted the
right of the Territories to legislate on slavery or
anything else, but only after they had been organized
as a political body. "The difference," he said, "be
tween the senator from Ilhnois and myself is the
point at which the people do possess and may assert
this right. It is not the inhabitants of the Terri
tory, but the people as a political body — ^the people
organized — ^who have the right, and on becoming
a State by the authority of the United States,
exercising sovereignty over the territory, they may
estabhsh a fundamental law for aU time to come."
This meant, of course, that the people could not
exclude slavery tfll they had a government, and
that they could not have a government except on
the condition of tolerating at least the possibflity
of slavery.
In reply Douglas said: "I have a word to say to
the honorable senator from Mississippi [Mr. Davis].
He msists that I am not in favor of protectmg prop
erty, and that his amendment is offered for the
purpose of protecting property under the Constitu
tion. Now, sir, I ask you what authority he has for

116 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
assuming that ? Do I not desire to protect property
because I wish these people to pass such laws as they
deem proper respecting their rights in property with
out any exception ? He might just as weU say that I
am opposed to protecting property in merchandise,
in steamboats, in cattle, in real estate, as to say that
I am opposed to protecting property of any other
description; for I desire to put them aU on an equal
ity, and aUow the people to make their own laws
in respect to the whole of them. But the difference
is this: 'he desires an amendment which he thinks
wfll recognize the institution of slavery in the Terri
tories as now existing in this country. I do not
beUeve it exists there by law. I beheve it is pro
hibited there by law at this time, and the effect,
if not the object, of his amendment would be to in
troduce slavery into a country from which I think
a large majority of this Senate are of opinion it is
now excluded, and he caUs upon us to vote to mtro-
duce it there. The senator from Kentucky, who
brought forward this Compromise, teUs us that he
can never give a vote by which he wUl introduce
slavery where it does not exist. Other senators
have declared the same thing to an extent which
authorizes us to assume that the majority of this
Senate vrill never extend slavery by law into terri
tory now free. What, then, must be the effect of
the adoption of the provision offered by the senator
from Mississippi? It would be the insertion of a

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 117
provision that must infalhbly defeat the bfll, de
prive the people of the Territories of government,
leave them in a state of anarchy, and keep up ex
citement and agitation in this country. I do not
say, nor would I intimate, that such is the object
of the senator from Mississippi. I know that he
has another and a different object — an object which
he avows. That object is to extend the institution
of slavery to this territory; or rather, as he believes
it to be already carried there by law, to continue
its legal existence. ... I do not beheve, sir, that
the Senate can agree upon any principle by which
a biU can pass giving governments to the Territories
in which the word 'slavery' is mentioned. If you
prohibit — ^if you establish — ^if you recognize — ^if you
control — ^if you touch the question of slavery, your
bifl cannot, in my opinion, pass this body. But
the bifl that you can pass is the one that is open
upon these questions, that says nothing upon the
subject, but leaves the people to do just as they
please, and to shape their institutions according
to what they may conceive to be their interests
both for the present and the future." Obviously
the question was not one of the protection of
property but of the government that should pro
tect. Davis demanded that Congress should do
it, whfle Douglas would have left the protection
in the hands of the people. There was also the
question as to what was and what was not property.

118 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Davis feared that the people of the new Territories
would not recognize slaves as property, whUe Doug
las was sure that they would not. He was quite
right in saying that the object of Davis was to "ex
tend the institution of slavery." The words quoted
give a very fair idea of the position of the lUinois
senator at the time. Clay finaUy joined with Doug
las in eliminating the clause forbidding legislation
on slavery, thus restoring the bUl to its original
form. It was found, as Douglas predicted, to be im
possible to pass the Omnibus BUl. AU that related
to California was stricken out by a vote 34 to 25,
and the same fate overtook the provisions in regard
to Texas and New Mexico. Thus there was nothing
left of the famous Omnibus BUl but Utah, the people
of that Territory being left free to legislate as they
chose on slavery.
The Senate at once proceeded to consider the
various biUs separately, and passed them aU by
substantial, and sometimes large, majorities. The
Texas boundary biU was passed August 9, the Cali
fornia bUl August 13, and the bUl organizing New
Mexico on August 15. The house promptly ratified
the action of the Senate. On September 16 the
Senate passed the biU abolishing the slave-trade—
though not slavery — in the District of Columbia,
having previously passed the fugitive-slave biU
without a division, in a form much more unfavorable

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 119
to the negro than had been originaUy proposed,
since it deprived fugitives of the right of trial by
jury. After the defeat of the Omnibus Bfll, Clay
assumed that the whole Compromise was lost.
Moved by sorrow, disappointment, anger, and ex
alted patriotism, he, on the day foUowing his re
verse, said: "I stand here in my place, meaning to
be unawed by any threats, whether they come from
individuals or States. I should deplore, as much
as any man hving or dead, that arms should be
raised against the authority of the Union, either
by individuals or States. But if, after aU that has
occurred, any one State, or the people of any State,
choose to place themselves in mihtary array against
the government of the Union, I am for trying the
strength of the government. Nor am I to be alarmed
or dissuaded from any such course by intimations
of the spflling of blood. If blood is to be spflt by
whose fault is it to be spflt ? Upon the supposition
I maintain, it wfll be the fault of those who raise the
standard of disunion and endeavor to prostrate
this government; and, sh, when that is done, so
long as it please God to give me a voice to express
my sentiments, or an arm, weak and enfeebled as
it may be by age, that voice and that arm will be
on the side of my country, for the support of the
general authority, and for the maintenance of the
power of this Union. . . . The honorable senator
speaks of Virginia being my country. This Union

120 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
is my country; the thirty States are my country;
Kentucky is my country, and Virginia, no more
than any other of the States of this Union. She
has created on my part obligations and feehngs
and duties toward her in my private character which
nothing upon earth would induce me to forfeit or
violate. But even if it were my own State — ^if my
ovm State lawlessly, contrary to her duty, should
raise the standard of disunion against the residue
of the Union — I should go against her; I would
go against Kentucky in that contingency, much
as I love her." The long stmggle had greatly over
taxed his strength, and he must have felt that all
the concessions — some of them amounting to sacri
fices — had been in vain. Broken and disheartened
he abandoned the task, and went away ^to rest.
When he returned he found that his whole com
promise had been put through in snbstantiaUy its
original form. Douglas had a great part in it, and
voted for every biU except the fugitive-slave bUl.
He explained his faUure to do this by saying — ^what
was the tmth — that he was unavoidably absent.
There could be no suspicion of dodging in his case.
As to the Compromise, it must be said that it was
unsatisfactory to the extremists on both sides, which
is usually the case with aU compromises. Jefferson
Davis said: "WhUe gentlemen are dividing the
honors that result from the passage of these biUs,
either in a joint or separate form, I have only to

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 121
say that, so far as I am concerned, tney are welcome
to the whole. I do not represent that pubhc opinion
which required the passage of them, either jointly
or separately. If any man has a right to be proud
of the success of these measures, it is the senator
from Ilhnois [Mr. Douglas]. They were brought
before the Senate by the committee, which it is
claimed has done so much for the honor of the Senate
and the peace of the country, merely stuck together
— the work of other men, save and except the httle
biU to suppress the slave-trade in the District of
Columbia. I merely wish to say that, so far as the
pubhc opinion of the community which I represent
has been shadowed forth in pubhc meetings and
in the pubhc press, it has been whoUy adverse to
the great body of these measures. I voted for one —
that which the senator from Virginia originated,
and which was modified in the Senate tiU I thought,
as far as we could make it so, it became efficient
for the protection of our rights. That was the only
one which met my approval." Indeed, the Com
promise was no triumph for the South, for what it
speciaUy objected to was the bill admitting Cah
fomia as a free State. That was, of course, a direct
blow at slavery. As for slavery in the Territories
acquired from Mexico, the contention of Clay, Web
ster, and Douglas was that it did not exist there,
being forbidden by the Mexican law. These men
further believed that it never could exist there.

122 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
This, it has been seen, was the opinion of Webster,
Clay, and Douglas. It was because he believed
thus that Webster gave up the WUmot proviso.
What the South wanted was additional slave terri
tory to counterbalance a free CaUfomia. It was
very doubtful whether this could be had. The right
of the people of New Mexico to exclude or permit
slavery was left for the Supreme Court to deter
mine. Even the fugitive-slave law was not new,
for there had been such a law since 1793. What
the South got was a considerable strengthening
of that ancient statute.
Yet the North was by no means pleased, and
was certainly conscious of no victory. The fugitive-
slave law provoked an angry outburst. The prin
ciple underlying it was odious to a steadUy growing
number of people. The statute itself was very severe
in its terms. Under it the negro claimed as a fugitive
slave could not testify in his own behalf. There
was, as has been said, no provision for a jury trial.
AU good citizens were commanded to co-operate
in enforcing the law, and the harboring of fugitives
was made a crime. There was a recognition of the
Southem claim that slaves were property, a claim
that was in contravention of the law of every North
ern State. It was felt too that Congress had acted
on the theory that it had no power to exclude slavery
from the Territories, for it was felt that if it had
the power, and agreed that it had, it would have

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 123
exercised it. Mr. Douglas uideed said m his speech
m Chicago, a few weeks later, which he made in
defense of his action, that there was no triumph
for any section or faction. "The South," he said,
"has not triumphed over the North, nor has the
North achieved a victory over the South. Neither
party has made any humihating concessions to
the other. Each has preserved its honor, whfle
neither has surrendered an important right, or sacri
ficed any substantial interest. The measures com
posing the scheme of adjustment are beheved to
be in harmony with the principles of justice and
the Constitution." That, of course, was the view
of the leaders of the movement, who were one and
aU satisfied with their work. Clay's thought was
that the compromise was "rather a triumph for
the Union, for harmony and concord." "No man
and no party," said Douglas, "has acquired a
triumph, except the party friendly to the Union."
Webster experienced a great sense of relief. "My
part is acted," he said, "and I am satisfied. It is
a day of rejoicing here such as I never witnessed.
The face of everything is changed. You would
suppose nobody had ever thought of disunion. AU
say they always meant to stand by the Union to
the last." Perhaps they did; perhaps men of Web
ster's way of thinking were unnecessarily alarmed.
No doubt the great Massachusetts senator felt that
he had been vindicated, since the settlement was

124 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
on the lines of his 7th of March speech. The coun
try as a whole accepted the Compromise in good
spirit, almost, it may be said, with enthusiasm.
The principal dissatisfaction was in the South,
though even in that section there was something
more than acquiescence. Even a truce under condi
tions such as then existed was very weU worth
whUe. Nothing else could have been gained — as is
now clear enough — since no compromise was pos
sible that did not involve an ignoring or a slurring
over of the moral issue, and there never can be
any permanent settlement on that basis. Even the
fugitive-slave law, and it was pecuUarly odious, was
at first accepted by the North, though there were
many protests. But the attempts that soon fol
lowed to enforce the law roused the people as noth
ing else had done, and gave the aboUtionists their
chance — and nobly did they use it. There can be
no question of the sincerity of the men who en
gineered the Compromise. Had the South been
less insistent in its demand for the fugitive-slave
law — and there were men in the South who both
thought and said that it was not necessary — and
the North less yielding it is possible that, with that
odious feature eliminated, the Compromise might
have survived as long as the Missouri Compromise
had done. It was not tUl the federal government
commanded Northern men to become man-catchers
that their consciences were roused against slavery.

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 125
Douglas himself was forced to defend before his
own constituents the fugitive-slave law. When,
shortly after the adjoumment of Congress, he re-
tumed to Chicago, then the city of his residence,
he was received not as a conqueror but as a traitor.
The people were greatly excited over the fugitive-
slave law, and violent in their denunciations of those
who had supported it. The city councfl had adopted
resolutions characterizing the act as in violation
of the Constitution and of the law of God. Here
was an appeal to Seward's "higher law," the first
of many that were to be made. In the resolutions
those who had supported the bill, as well as those
"who basely sneaked away from their seats and
thereby evaded the question," were denounced as
"fit only to be ranked with Benedict Amold and
Judas Iscariot." Here was a double drive at Doug
las, who was known to be in favor of the measure,
but who had not been present when the vote was
taken. But that he did not "sneak away" he had
no difficulty in showing. Dodging, he truly said,
was never a part of his pohtical tactics. Nor did
he dodge now. On the contrary, he attended a
mass-meeting that had been caUed to indorse the
action of the councfl, took his seat on the platform,
and informed the audience that he would on the
next night defend the whole Compromise, includ
ing the fugitive-slave law. This appeal for fair
play did not go unheeded, and the meeting adjourned

126 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
without taking action in order to give Douglas a
chance to present his side of the case and to make
his defense. The audience, it should be said, was
distinctly and almost vehemently hostUe. But it
was wUling to hear the other side, and was juster
to Douglas than the law that he was to defend was
to the fugitives from slavery.
In his speech the foUowing night he dealt with
his audience fairly and frankly, shirking no point
that was raised, and answering aU questions that
were asked. The main objections to the statute
were that it denied to the fugitive the right of trial
by jury and the privUege of habeas corpus. Doug
las replied that the law was in these respects pre
cisely like the old statute enacted in 1793, and that
both were sUent on these subjects. He urged further
that trial by jury and habeas corpus were guaran
teed by the Constitution, and that therefore no
one could be deprived of them. He pointed out
that whatever trial was necessary was provided
for, and would and should be held in the State from
which the fugitive fled, and that the only function
of the Northern magistrate was to determine the
identity of the fugitive. Of course, every one must
have known that a trial in the State from which
the man or woman was supposed to have fled would
have been the merest farce, for in the South the
black man was not a man, but a chattel. But the
argument of Douglas was plausible, and was most

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 127
shrewdly put. He cafled attention to the fact that
the Constitution provided for the retum of fugitive
slaves, and asked his hearers whether they were
prepared to stand by, and uphold, the Constitution.
In such a hearing as that provided for, the evidence
— having to do only with the identity of the
prisoner — ^was necessarily ex parte. When he was
asked whether one section of the bfll that forbade
"aU molestation of said person or persons by any
process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or
other person whomsoever," a writ of habeas corpus
being a "process," did not amount to a denial
of the writ, Douglas answered that whfle the writ
might not be issued for the purpose of "molesta
tion," it might be granted for the purpose of de
termining whether the claimant of the fugitive fiad
the certificate required to be issued, whether it was
in due form of law. "Upon the return of the writ
of habeas corpus," said Douglas, "the claimant
wfll be required to exhibit to the court his authority
for conveying the servant back; and if he produces
a 'certificate' from the commissioner or judge in
due form of law, the court will decide that it has
no power to 'molest the claimant' in the exercise
of his rights imder the law and the Constitution.
But if the claimant is not able to produce such
certificate, or other lawful authority, or produces
one which is not in conformity with the law, the
court wfll set the aUeged servant at liberty, for the

128 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
very reason that the law has not been comphed
with. The sole object of the«writ of habeas corpus
is to ascertain by what authority a person is held
in custody; to release him if no such authority be
shown; and to refrain from any molestation of the
claimant if legal authority be produced." Yet no
judge could issue such a writ and enforce it without
being guUty of "molestation," whUe the limita
tion of the power of the court grantmg the writ
would have made it of little or no value. As to trial
by jury, Douglas said that this was not and could
not be denied, but that it must be had in the State
from which the fugitive was supposed to have come.
The rest of the speech was devoted to answering
questions practically none of which went to the
real issues. The weakness of the argument was
largely in what was not said. The law was retro
active, and under it men and women who had lived
for years in a Northem State might be seized and
carried away from their homes back into slavery.
The process was summary. United States com
missioners were clothed with the largest powers
over colored men and women seeking freedom, and
even over those who might have enjoyed it for years.
The defendant was not permitted to testify in his
own behalf. AU good citizens were commanded
to aid in the prompt execution of the law, includ
ing the capture of fugitives. United States marshals
who permitted recaptured fugitives to escape from

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 129
their custody were hable for the full value of the
slave, whfle those who harbored or concealed fugi
tives were punishable by fine and imprisonment.
The law was, in short, odious. Its only effect was
to bring the evfl of slavery close home to the hearts
of the Northem people, who refused to be enhsted
against their wfll in the great army of man-catchers.
The speech is important as being perhaps the
best defense of the fugitive-slave law that was ever
made, and also a demonstration of the power of
Douglas. It must be said further that he divined
the real nature of the opposition to the statute.
And the remarkable thing is that he was able to
overcome objection based on this ground. "The
real objection," he said, "is not to the new law,
nor to the old one, but to the Constitution itself.
Those of you who hold these opinions do not mean
that the fugitive from labor shafl be taken back.
That is the real point of your objection. You would
not care a farthing about the new law or the old
law, or any other law, or what provisions it con
tained, if there was a hole in it big enough for the
fugitive to shp through and escape. Habeas cor-
puses — ^trials by jury — records from other States —
pains and penalties — the whole catalogue of ob
jections would be afl moonshine, if the negro was
not required to go back to his master. TeU me
frankly, is not this the trae character of your ob
jection?" Many admitted that it was, whereupon

130 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Douglas cited the constitutional provision, and
declared that it was the duty of aU men to uphold
the Constitution. Then he offered a set of reso
lutions embodying his views, and they were adopted
without a dissenting voice, as was a resolution re
pudiating the action of the councU. The next night
the councU met, and, by a vote of 12 to 1, rescinded
its resolutions condemning Douglas and others and
declaring that it would "not require the city pohce
to render any assistance for the arrest of fugitive
slaves." It was a great victory for Douglas, and
the result was stUl further to strengthen his hold
on the people. The issue, however, would have
been extremely doubtful if the councU had had
a champion on that eventful night — say Lincoln
or Seward. For after aU but one side of the ques
tion was heard. Even the questions asked from
the floor Douglas was able to turn very shrewdly
to his own account, and it was impossible — as it
always is in such cases — for the questioner to ad
vance any argument in support of his position.
Nevertheless, it was a great triumph for Douglas,
for he won a verdict from a hostUe audience, and
in a community that had been greatly outraged.
Before the lines were drawn on a pohtical question,
Douglas would compromise to the Umit, and refrain
from forcing the issue; but when the issue was pre
sented he invariably met it directly and courageously.
He defended the fugitive-slave law precisely as he

THE GREAT COMPROMISE 131
had, almost twenty years before, defended the bank
pohcy of Jackson and Van Buren when no one in
lUinois supposed that there was anjrthmg to be
said for it. So the great Compromise came into
being. Up to this time it cannot be said — and this
is an important thing to remember — that Douglas
had shown any special consideration to the South,
or to slavery. His position was identical with that
taken by Webster and Clay and other Whigs. In
deed, the sneer of Jefferson Davis directed at Doug
las as the man entitled to the chief credit for legis
lation which in no way, as Davis said, benefited
the South, may perhaps be taken as the opening
of the rift that was later to spht the Democratic
party, and to make impossible the realization of
the ambition of Douglas to be President. The time
was soon to come when he would be forced to choose
between the South and the nation. Meanwhfle,
the mancEUvring went on. But the slavery question
would not down, though Douglas held that the
Compromise was a final settlement, and declared
that he would never speak again in Congress on
the slavery question.

CHAPTER VI
COMPROMISE AND FUGITIVE SLAVES
But the Congress that enacted the compromise
legislation did not whoUy neglect other matters.
It is a pleasure to turn from the efforts to maintain
the Union by political action to the effort to bind
the people — rather than the States — together by
the construction of a great North and South rail
road from Chicago to the GuK. For several years
Douglas had been greatly interested in the con
struction of what was later known as the lUinois
Central RaUroad. ' As a member of the Senate he
had introduced a biU authorizing a grant of pubhc
lands to the State of IlUnois to aid in the buUding
of the road. The bUl was passed in the Senate,
only to meet with defeat in the House. There were,
of course, constitutional objections, and these, with
the jealousy of the States without pubhc lands,
and the opposition of the old States to the new,
were sufficient to prevent the passage of the bfll.
Douglas realized that he would have to give the
scheme a truly national aspect if he hoped to suc
ceed. He realized that lUinois was almost as sec
tional as the Union itself was, a truth that was im
pressed on him when he removed to Chicago in 1847.
132

FUGITIVE SLAVES 133
What he first sought, therefore, was unity in his own
State, and a development of real State consciousness.
Those of us to-day who reahze what a great part the
raihoads have played in eliminating the perils of
sectionahsm must credit Douglas with a large vision.
Indeed, the national sense was strong in him. The
behever in squatter sovereignty believed in the
nation too, and in the national idea. He certainly
had a broader vision than many New Englanders
who were fifled with apprehension at every exten
sion of the national boundaries.
But Douglas needed votes, and he went about
getting them in a very practical way. He looked
to the East and the South for them, not of course
neglecting other sections of the country. He offered
to the officials of the Mobfle Road to include in
his bfll a grant of lands to their road as part of the
system of the Ilhnois Central in return for the votes
of the senators and representatives of Alabama and
Mississippi. When Douglas presented his Illinois
Central bfll in the Senate, Senator King of Ala
bama offered an amendment — said to have been
prepared by Douglas — ^providing for simUar land
grants to his State for the purpose of continuing
the lUinois Central to Mobfle, an amendment which
was adopted without division. There were hints
of tariff concessions to win Eastern support, but
Douglas is authority for the statement that what
won the support of New England, New York, and

134 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Pennsylvania was the promise of Eastern connec
tions with the North and South line. The amended
biU easUy passed the Senate, and was agreed to
by the house on the day of the passage of the
last of the compromise measures. There was un
doubtedly a bargain, but it was for a great object.
There was "nothing in it" for Douglas except in
creased popularity, but there was much in it for the
nation. "Nationahty," said Douglas, "had been
imparted to the project." The thought was not
simply of the exchange of commodities as between
the two sections, and buUding up trade between the
North and South, but of bringing the people them
selves closer together, and of making it possible for
them to intermingle. "As it is to connect the North
and South so thoroughly," said Senator Shields,
Douglas's colleague, "it may serve to get rid of even
the WUmot proviso, and tie us together so effectu-
aUy that the idea of separation wUl be impossible."
If the road has not reaUzed the anticipations
that its projectors had of it as a sort of melting-
pot, it, nevertheless, has played an important part
in the hfe of the nation. The fact that Douglas
and the others entertained such an idea is of itself
proof that they were animated by no sordid motive.
A North and South trade was quickly built up, and
the road was of great service to the Union during
the Civil War. But it did not make "the idea of
separation impossible." And before many years

FUGITIVE SLAVES 135
the Wihnot proviso, in the form of the Emancipa
tion Proclamation, was apphed to the whole na
tion. The reply of Douglas to Webster is not all
buncombe or bombast: "There is a power in this
nation greater than either the North or the South
— a growing, increasing, swelling power, that wiU
be able to speak the law to this nation, and to execute
the law as spoken. That power is the country known
as the Great West — ^the VaUey of the Mississippi,
one and indivisible from the Gulf to the Great Lakes;
and stretching on the one side and the other, to
the extreme sources of the Ohio and Missouri —
from the AUeghanies to the Rocky Mountains.
There, sir, is the hope of this nation — the resting-
place of the power that is not only to control, but
to save the Union. We furnish the water that makes
the Mississippi, and we intend to foUow, navigate
and use it untfl it loses itseff in the briny ocean.
So with the St. Lawrence. We intend to keep open
and enjoy both these great outlets to the ocean,
and afl between them we intend to take under our
special protection, and keep and preserve as one
free, happy and united people. This is the mission
of the great Mississippi VaUey, the heart and soul
of the nation and the Continent." It reads much
hke the meditations of those of our day who have
just discovered the Middle West.
Douglas, says Mr. Rhodes, "was a great friend
to the material development of the West, and espe-

136 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ciaUy of his own State, having broad views of the
future growth of his section of the country." That,
of course, is tme, but his feeling in regard to the
West was not sectional, but national. What he
saw, at a time when it was sparsely settled, or not
settled at all, was its destiny. Its value to the na
tion, and its influence on its hfe — these were the
things that interested him. Back of his "Manifest
Destiny" doctrine, even in its most jingoistic and
foohsh form, was a reaUzation of the power of the
nation. Perhaps it was because of this feeling-^
that is that the West was, or would be, truly na
tional — that he was con-vinced that slavery could
find no lodgment in its territory. It seems strange
to us to-day, who have seen the West control a presi
dential election, that other men should have been
so bUnd to the future, or that it should be thought
remarkable that Douglas should have been so trae
a prophet. Yet short-sightedness is the commonest
of human faUings, and the inabiUty of one section
of as vast a country as this to understand other
sections has by no means disappeared. From the
day that he first set foot on the soU of Illinois Doug
las seems never to have been unattended by the
vision of the future greatness of the West. Prob
ably the facts have not gone beyond his dream.
He was no romanticist or visionary, and, certainly
he was quite without imagination in the poetic sense
of the word. But he was clear-sighted and impres-

FUGITIVE SLAVES 137
sionable, which is more than can be said for some of
his contemporaries, even those who were far greater
than he. So though there may have been a deal
in connection with his railroad bifl, there was much
more. Douglas always showed a keen interest in the
people residing in the unorganized Territories. Even
his vehemence in the assertion of our supposed claims
in Oregon was in part the result of his feeling that
the people should have some form of government,
and the protection of the law. Others thought that
they might be left to themselves, and to get along
as best they could. There were some who even
felt that Oregon was not part of the Union — or at
least that it ought not to be. It was suggested that
the people should be protected only tfll they were
prepared to form a repubhc of their own. The men
of those days were great behevers in what they spoke
of as the laws of nature. By those laws it was said
by Webster, and Douglas also, that slavery would be
excluded from the territory acquired from Mexico.
Others argued that there were "natural" barriers
beyond which we could not go without jeoparding
the Union. Oregon lay beyond those barriers, and
hence the suggestion that it should form its own
government without any relations, but those of
friendship, with Washington. This, to Douglas, was
nothing more nor less than disunion. He argued
that the logic of this argument would lead inevitably

138 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
to the estabhshment of many repubUcs. But at
that time most of the country west of the Mississippi
was known as the Great American Desert, and Ore
gon was farther away from Boston and New York
than the centre of China is now. But it was not
so far from lUinois, and Douglas himself had been
a pioneer. He knew something of the hardships
endured by the emigrants, and of the perils by which
they were surrounded. Indeed, he recognized no
barriers to American expansion on this continent.
"I would," he said, "blot out the lines on the map
which now mark our national boundaries on this
continent, and make the area of hberty as broad
as the continent itself."
Later, as we shaU see, he argued strongly for the
elimination of British influence in Central America,
opposed the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and demanded
its denunciation. Here, of course, a question of
foreign policy was involved, but the attitude of
Douglas was the same as that assumed by him in
the case of Oregon. As he desired no joint occupa
tion in the latter case, he was opposed to any partner
ship with Great Britain in the former. Indeed,
but for its rather flamboyant oratory, the speech
does not read unlike those delivered a few years
ago in connection with the same treaty, and with
our right to fortify the canal. He no doubt foresaw
that the treaty subjected this government to limi
tations from which it would one day desire to be

FUGITIVE SLAVES 139
free, as has proved to be the case. He was for break
ing through them even at the cost of war. But in
the back of his mind was the feeling that this con
tinent ought to be aU-American. He was right
about Texas, but wrong in defending the methods
by which it was won; right about Oregon, though
wrong in insisting on the 54-40 boundary, again
at the cost of war. What he did not see was that
this Northern Hemisphere might be in a very real
sense American without the assertion of American
political supremacy over Canada. Not even the
detractors of Douglas can deny that he was broadly
and aggressively national and American, and was
never afraid of an expansion which aU can now see
was as desirable as it was inevitable. Nor did he
beheve that there was anything national in slavery,
or ever could be.
It was during the session of Congress that passed
the compromise bills, namely April 22, 1850, that
President Taylor transmitted to the Senate the
treaty agreed on between his Secretary of State,
John M. Clayion, and the British Minister, Sh
Henry Lytton Bulwer. It was before the Senate
for just one month, and was the subject of a debate
that was no doubt very interesting. But as the
session was executive, there is no record of the
speeches. On May 22 it was ratified by a vote of
42 to 11. The eleven who voted against it were
Atchison of Missouri, Borland of Arkansas, Bright

140 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of Indiana, Clemens of Alabama, Davis of Missis
sippi, Dickinson of New York, Douglas of lUinois,
Turney of Tennessee, Walker of Wisconsin, Whit-
comb of Indiana, and Yulee of Florida. Among
those voting for ratification were BeU of Tennessee,
Berrien of Georgia, Cass of Michigan, Chase of
Ohio, Clay of Kentucky, Corwin of Ohio, Foote
of Mississippi, Hale of New Hampshire, King of
Alabama, Mangum of North Carolina, Seward of
New York, Shields of lUinois, and Webster of Mas
sachusetts. There was no sectional or party divi
sion. It is evident that the weight of the Senate,
and not merely numerical strength, was for ratifica
tion. Douglas enroUed himself with a comparatively
insignificant minority. He had declined to serve
on the committee on foreign relations because he
disapproved of the pohcy of the majority. Later
he made the ground of his opposition sufficiently
plain, when the issue was raised in another way— in
such a way, as he thought, as to free him from any
obhgation to observe secrecy. Within httle more
than a month after the ratification of the treaty
President Taylor died, and was succeeded by Mfl
lard Fillmore, Daniel Webster becoming Secretary
of State in place of Mr. Clayton.
Congress reassembled in December, 1850, and
Ustened to a message from President FUhnore
warmly commending the compromise legislation.
The measures, he said, "were adopted in a spirit
of conciliation and for the purpose of concUiation.

FUGITIVE SLAVES 141
I beheve that a great majority of our feUow-citizens
sympathize in that spirit and purpose, and in the
main approve, and are prepared, m aU respects,
to sustain, these enactments." The Southern mem
bers were not slow in making known their point
of view. Ten Northem and thirty-four Southem
members signed a pledge binding them to withhold
support for any office from any man "who is not
known to be opposed to the disturbance of this settle
ment, and to the renewal, in any form, of agitation
upon the subject of slavery." The Northern Demo
crats' and the Northem Whigs for the most part
accepted the settlement. Even the Seward Whigs
agreed that the measures were the law, and that
even the fugitive-slave law should be obeyed, though
they demanded its repeal. For a time it looked as
though peace had settled down over the land. But
it was only a truce, as will soon be seen. The trouble
arose over attempts, successful and other, to enforce
the fugitive-slave law. As the enforcement of that
law was held by the South to be essential to the
success of the Compromise, and as the North was
soon in revolt against the law, the bitter feeling
between the two sections was greatly intensified.
Even those who favored the Compromise — that is
those in the North — soon came to feel that what
had been proclaimed as such a triumph of states
manship might be foimd to be of httle or no value
as a factor in preserving the imity of the nation.
But the peace did not long endure. Indeed, there

142 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
was an apparent nervousness back of aU declara
tions that the settlement was permanent, such as
that signed by those who pledged themselves to
oppose for any office any man who should reopen
the vexed question. Very early in the session Clay
spoke with great emphasis of the peace and quiet
that prevaUed throughout the country, and ex
pressed the behef that the session would be undis
turbed by discussions of slavery. The Whig Almanac
for 1851 announced "as yet all seems quiet in the
capitol, and there is a prospect of a quiet and useful
session. May that hope be reahzed!" But aU
such pious hopes were disappointed. For early
in the session Joshua R. Giddings in the House of
Representatives denounced certain action that had
recently been taken under the fugitive-slave law,
whUe Clay in the Senate opened up the whole ques
tion by presenting petitions caUing for a more effec
tual suppression of the slave-trade, and introduced
a resolution demanding legislation forbidding the
use of American vessels in that trade. This action
of the chief of the compromisers was aU the more
remarkable in view of the fact that he had only
a few days before signed the declaration above re
ferred to, and had expressed the hope and behef
that there would be no discussion of the subject.
Did he, deep down in his heart, believe that there
had been any real settlement ? But the storm broke
when news came of the rescue of the negro Shad-

FUGITIVE SLAVES 143
rach, who had in Boston been taken and held as a
fugitive slave. There had been trouble even before
this. Two negroes, known to be fugitives, had been
taken from Boston to England — ^where, of course,
they at once became free. A Virgmia slaveholder
had only with the greatest difficulty and at much
expense succeeded in securing the retum of one
of his negroes from Pennsylvania. In Detroit it
was necessary to caU out the troops in order to queU
a mob bent on the rescue of a fugitive. Although
there were said to be 15,000 fugitives in the free
States only four or five had been reclaimed under
the law.
But the rescue of Shadrach created as much ex
citement as a declaration of war on the United
States would have done. Indeed, the act was con
stmed as an act of war — ^war on the law, the Con
stitution, and the authority of Congress. The Presi
dent issued a proclamation caUing on aU good citizens
to observe the law, and on aU officers, civfl or mfli-
tary, to queU aU unlawful conspiracies, and to aid
in the arrest of aU who should violate the law. Five
men were indicted, but as it was impossible to get a
jury to convict them, they were freed. Yet Boston
was by no means radical on the slavery issue. In
deed the people of Boston had, almost twenty years
before, mobbed Wflliam Lloyd Garrison, They
had, too, as a whole stood by Webster after his 7th
of March speech. They showed their comparatively

144 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
moderate temper a few weeks later when another
fugitive, Thomas Sims, was arrested. The man did
have a fair trial, and it was proved that he was
a fugitive. He was taken to the ship that was to
carry him South by 300 poUcemen, and the mihtia
was put under arms. But there was not the shghtest
disturbance. The President's proclamation was
obeyed. When it was proposed to hold a meeting
of protest a few nights later, the use of Faneufl Hall
was denied to the remonstrants. But these two
incidents had a great effect on pubhc opinion in
Boston. Two meetings were held, one addressed
by Henry WUson and Thomas Wentworth Higgin-
son, and the other by WUliam Lloyd Garrison.
Theodore Parker and WendeU PhUUps also spoke
to large audiences on the day of the arrest of Sims.
It was at least made clear that in Boston the sur
render of fugitive slaves would not be a mere matter
of form. In this crisis the city was neutral, as far
as it was represented by its authorities, who a few
days later denied the use of FaneuU Hall to the
Whigs and Democrats who wished to tender a pub
Uc reception to Daniel Webster.
But the Southern representatives in Congress
began to see that it would be no easy matter
to reconcile the North to the fugitive-slave law.
Whigs and Democrats joined in condemning afl
attempts to nullify the law. Douglas spoke with
his usual vehemence, refusing to regard the rescue

FUGITIVE SLAVES 145
of Shadrach as trivial, for it was a conspiracy against
the government. He said that there was an or
ganization in many States the object of which was
to defy the law and thwart its execution, and he
was right. For abolitionism was growing popular,
hberty societies were springing into hfe, and the
Underground Raflway soon began to do a very ex
tensive business. But, nevertheless, the feeling in
both sections was stiU generaUy favorable to the
Compromise, and the leaders of both parties were
anxious to minimize the slavery issue, in the hope
that it might graduaUy disappear.
In the Senate Clay labored strenuously for peace,
and was measurably successful in calming the ap
prehensions of the South. He spoke of the many
cases in which there had been no difficulty in secur
ing the return of slaves, although he added there
must be difficulty in enforcing such a law as this.
It was not easy to secure the fuU and complete en
forcement of any law. The President, he was sure,
would do his fufl duty, since both he and his cabinet
were fuUy committed to the enforcement of the
statute, as to the whole Compromise, which had,
he thought, "worked a miracle." There was no
more agitation about the Wflmot proviso, Cah
fomia, or slavery in the District of Columbia. In
his opinion the South ought not to be too exacting,
since it had fared so wefl, and the country as a whole
had benefited so greatly from the Compromise. Clay

146 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
said that he would be wUUng to dispense with the
proclamation now required, and authorize the Presi
dent to caU out the mihtary power whenever there
was reason to expect a disturbance in connection
•with the arrest of a slave. The whole speech was
designed to buttress the Compromise and to win
support for it in the South. He said that the trouble
was caused not by the people of the North as a whole
but by the aboUtionists— who, it may be said, were
forced to carry many burdens, aU of which did not
rightfuUy belong on their shoulders. Southern
senators generaUy took Clay's view, though there
were those who insisted that the law would never
be enforced tUl the people of the North accepted
it "cordiaUy." The antislavery senators, on the
other hand, did not assent to Clay's remarks — ^they
knew that the law would never be accepted "cor
dially." But peace was restored, and the judiciary
committee to which the President's message was
referred reported that no change in the law was
advisable or necessary. Clay, beheving that the
trouble was over, said that he "would be extremely
delighted if the subject of the tariff of 1846 could I
be taken up in a hberal, kind and national spirit."

CHAPTER VII
PRESIDENT-MAKING
The summer of 1851 saw the launching of many
presidential movements. Douglas, despite his youth,
had been "mentioned" m 1848, but he probably
did not think of himself as a serious quantity.
But now he did — as did many others. That he
was a national figure, and a man of influence and
power, was everywhere recognized. He had, too,
popular quahties and undoubted " magnetism." His
record in Congress had brought him prominently
before the people, and his work in that body had
been generafly approved. Indeed, it was thought
by many in 1851 that he had the best chance of
winning the Democratic nomination. Both parties
seemed disposed to let the slavery question slumber,
as was natural with a presidential campaign just
ahead. The Whigs were not prepared to force the
moral issue lest they offend the Southem members
of the party, while the Democratic leaders sought
to concfliate the Northern Democrats. But there
was nevertheless some excitement over several futfle
attempts to enforce the fugitive-slave law and to
punish those who defied it. Among these latter
were men of the highest character, such as Gerrit
147

148 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Smith, an old aboUtionist, who actively led in the
rescue of a supposed fugitive. In one of these af
fairs a slave-owner was kiUed and his son wounded.
Not one of the accused men was convicted. Mr.
Smith defied the courts to bring him to trial, and
openly avowed his part in the proceedings. The
challenge was not accepted. Thus within less than
a year after the passage of the law it had become
clear that its enforcement was practically impos
sible in the North. Once again it was demonstrated
that laws could be of no force unless upheld by pubhc
sentiment. It was also clear that the Northem
people could not be brought to accept the Southem
view that men, even though black, were merely
property. As Professor Sunrner would have said,
the fugitive-slave law was in conflict with Northem
mores. But the remarkable thing about it afl is
that the South did not seem to be much excited.
On the contrary, there was during the year 1851
a strengthening of Union sentiment. The Southern
Rights Association, which met at Charleston, S. C,
in May, had declared in favor of secession, and was
supported in its decision by twenty-eight out of
thirty prominent newspapers. The people of South
Carolina were prepared to take this step even though
they had to take it alone. But in the election of
delegates to a State convention, which took place
in October, two-thirds of the delegates chosen were
opposed to secession without the co-operation of

PRESIDENT-MAKING 149
other States, which meant that they were for the
Union. In Mississippi, which was hardly less rad
ical, Senator Foote and Jefferson Davis were candi
dates for govemor, the former of the Unionist, and
the latter of the States' rights party. The canvass
was thorough, and the issues were exhaustively
discussed. Foote was elected by a majority of
1,009. The verdict was not impressive, but it was
nevertheless against secession. The State conven
tion, delegates to which had been elected prior to
the election of govemor, committed the State to
the Compromise, and declared that the right of
secession was not sanctioned by the federal Con
stitution. The situation was clearly improving.
Little was expected of the Congress that met Decem
ber 1, 1851. Every one felt that it would be httle
more than a President-making body. Benton was
no longer a member of the Senate, having been de
feated, after a gaUant fight, by the proslavery men
of Missouri because he would not yield his convic
tions on slavery. Chase of Ohio, Seward of New
York, and Hale of New Hampshire, strong opponents
of slavery, were reinforced by Benjamin F. Wade
of Ohio, and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts,
who sat in Webster's seat. AU these men had an
uitense hatred for slavery, and they were not slow
to show it — especiaUy Wade and Sumner. The
latter soon proposed a repeal of the fugitive-slave
law, the oifly effect of which Douglas thought would

150 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
be to "fan the flames of discord that have so
recently divided this great people." The Illinois
senator soon plunged into a debate over the old
issue, chaUenged, as he thought, thereto, by Foote
of Mississippi, who on the day after the session
opened offered a resolution declaring the compromise
measures "a definite adjustment and settlement."
The Compromise stUl needed much buttressing, espe
ciaUy as the Southem men made it clear that they
regarded the fugitive-slave law as the crux of the
whole situation. Douglas, feeling that his consis
tency, was impeached by the charge that he had not
voted for the law, felt that it was necessary for him
to defend himself. He gave the same explanation
for his faUure to do so that he had given ia his
Chicago speech a few weeks before, and it was suffi
cient. But he had also been charged with having
voted for the Wihnot proviso, which was of course
the fact. He showed that he had voted against the
proviso several times, and that whenever he had
voted for it it had been in obedience to instractions
from his constituents. He had always declared that
those votes were not his own, but those of the peo
ple whom he represented. "Notwithstanding these
instmctions," he said, "I wrote the bills and re
ported them from the committee on Territories with
out the prohibitions, in order that the record might
show what my opinions were; but, lest the trick
might faU, a Free-SoU senator offered an amend-

PRESIDENT-MAKING 151
ment in the precise language of my instmctions. I
knew that the amendment could not prevafl, even
if my coUeague and myself recorded the vote of
our State m its favor. But if I resigned my place
to an abohtionist, it was almost certain that the
bills would fafl on their passage. After consulting
with my coUeague and with many senators friendly
to the bflls, I came to the conclusion that duty re
quired that I should retain my seat. I was prepared
to fight and defy abohtionism in aU its forms, but
I was not willing to repudiate the settled doctrine
of my State in regard to the right of instmction."
Presumably he would have resigned had he known
that his vote would have carried the proviso —
though he did not say so.
It was fortunate for Douglas that he had so clear
an argument, and one supported by a record that
had from his early manhood been entirely consistent
with it. For the situation was exceedingly critical.
He was an avowed candidate for the presidency,
and was appealing to the country to support the
Compromise, and to rally to him as one of its prin
cipal authors and chief defenders. The issue, he
foresaw, would be one of the most important ones
in the campaign that was soon to open. Indeed
Douglas was already sounding the people, and plan
ning his campaign for the nomination. Was Foote's
speech designed to cripple him, and if so did he speak
for any considerable element in the South? The

152 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
blow, whether maUciously designed or not, was
shrewdly struck. The South had been bitterly op
posed to the Wihnot proviso, and it had been sur
rendered by Webster and Clay in order to placate
that section, and win its support for the Compromise.
On the other hand, the fugitive-slave law was held
to be an essential part of the Compromise, and was
beUeved by many to be the only thing that the South
got out of it. Nothing worse, therefore, from a
pohtical point of view, could be said of a presiden
tial candidate than that he had voted for the Wfl
mot proviso, and had not voted for the fugitive-
slave law. There was nothing for Douglas to do
but set matters straight. In doing so he greatly
strengthened his position, and won the approval
of his party associates. Referring to his Chicago
speech he said: "This was the first pubhc speech
ever made in a free State in defense of the fugitive-
slave law, and the Chicago meeting was the first
pubUc assemblage in any free State that determined
to support and sustain it. At Chicago the reaction
commenced. There rebeUion and treason received
their first check, the fanatical and revolutionary-
spirit was rebuked, and the supremacy of the Con
stitution and laws asserted and maintained. I claim
no credit for the part I acted. I did no more than
my duty as a citizen and a senator. I claim to have
done my duty, and for that I was entitled to exemp
tion from the repeated charges by the special organ

PRESIDENT-MAKING 153
of the administration, and other partisan prints,
of having dodged the question. I never dodge a
question. I never shrink from any responsibihty
which my position and duty justly devolve upon
me. I never hesitate to give an unpopular vote,
or to meet an indignant community, when I know
I am right. My pohtical opponents in my own
State have never made such a charge against me,
and I feel that upon this point I can appeal to the
Senate with perfect safety for a unanimous verdict
in my favor." "The Democratic party," he said,
"is as good a Union party as I want, and I wish to
preserve its principles and its organization and to
triumph upon its old issues. I desire no new tests,
no interpolations into the old creed." He declared
it to be his purpose never to address Congress again
on the subject of slavery. The defense served its
purpose, though there must have been some who
wondered whether the casting of a popular vote un
der instmctions was not equivalent to refusing to
cast an unpopular vote. A Southem senator many
years later refused to vote, hi obedience to instruc
tions, for a financial policy which he disapproved;
he voted his convictions, and tendered his resigna
tion — ^which was not accepted. Perhaps the same
method would have served in this case. However,
Douglas made it clear that he was, and always had
been, opposed to the Wihnot proviso, and a friend
to the fugitive-slave law. There could have been

154 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
no doubt in any mind on those points. Though it
might stiU have been asked whether, in a crisis,
he would hold his convictions above any instrac
tions he might receive. Coming from a Northern
State, there could be no telling what his people might
demand of him. There were some signs of growing
distmst of him in the South, of which the sneer of
Jefferson Davis in "crediting" him with the com
promise legislation was one of the first. But he
had paved the way very satisfactorily for his cam
paign. In writing to a friend on December 30, 1851,
he said: "Things look weU, and the prospect is
brightening every day. AU that is necessary now
to insure success is that the Northwest should unite
and speak out." This was one week after the de-
hvery of his apologia.
Little seems to have been expected from Con
gress, with a presidential campaign in the immedi
ate offing. There were two "possibUities" in the
Senate — Douglas and Cass. But without regard
to candidates each party was anxious for victory.
The Democrats, no more than the RepubUcans of
our own day, could think of their party as being
out of power except as the result of an accident,
and they were hungry for place. Doubtless the
Whigs were quite as anxious to show that their vic
tory of 1848 was not mere luck. Each member of
Congress had his own personal ambitions, and so
all were interested in saying and doing nothing that

PRESIDENT-MAKING 155
might spofl their chances. The Northem Demo
crats, under the leadership of Douglas, were specially
anxious to keep things quiet. Perhaps that is one
reason why Douglas was so quick to deprecate
Foote's efforts to open up the slavery question. It
was, in short, a President-making session. "A poh
tician does not sneeze," said an observer, "without
reference to the Presidency."
"The Democratic party," Douglas had said, "ia
as good a Union party as I want, and I wish to pre
serve its principles and its organization and to
triumph upon its old issues." It was indeed as good
a Union party as there was — quite as good as the
Whig — but it was not easy to say what "the old
issues" were. The senator from lUinois does not
seem to have been whoUy content with them, for
he sought to inject himseff into the campaign as
the representative of progressive principles. Dfli-
gently he and his friends labored to make it appear
that they stood for what would later have been
cafled "a new deal," and for the retirement of the
"Old Fogies." The doctrine of an intense and rather
demagogical nationahsm was strenuously preached,
accompanied by many manifestations of the jingo
spirit. Of course there was nothing new in aU this,
for it was hardly more than a revival of the old
"Manifest Destmy" doctrine or spirit. The pur
pose was not so much to commit the party to any
thing new — indeed, Douglas, as has been seen, ex-

156 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
pressly disclaimed any such purpose — as to "fire
the hearts of the masses." The Democrats were
not greatly in need of issues, for it was generally
agreed that if the status quo were maintained they
were almost certain to elect their presidential candi
date. The Compromise had seriously divided the
Whig party, whUe it had rather tended to bind then*
opponents more closely together. With the growth
of the antislavery sentiment it was inevitable that
the antislavery party should become increasingly
sectional. The Northem Whigs had made their
utmost concession to the Southem members of the
organization when they accepted the Compromise.
In the first month of the session a Whig caucus had
been caUed to consider a resolution declaring the
Compromise a finality. Not more than fifty of the
eighty-six members attended, and of these one-
third voted to table the resolution. Another caucus
was held in April for the purpose of fixing the time
and place for the national convention, and at this
caucus such a resolution was actuaUy laid on the
table. Several members left the meeting, and later
eleven Southem Whigs issued an address in which
they said that they would support no candidate who
did not openly accept the Compromise as they did.
However, the Democrats were not without troubles
of their ovm. For when the house in April voted
on a simUar resolution, 74 members voted against
it as against 103 for it. Among the 74 who refused

PRESIDENT-MAKING 157
to declare that the Compromise was a final settle
ment were 26 Northem Democrats (including two
Free-Soflers), 28 Northern Whigs, 19 Southern
Democrats and one Southem Whig. Twenty South
em Whigs voted for the resolution, and only 7
Northem Whigs did so. Thus there was a division
in both parties. But part of the Democratic op
position was from the extreme slavery men, includ
ing the whole delegation from South Carolina. It
seemed safe to assume that these men would stand
by their party in a national election, rather than
take their chances with a party that numbered a
Seward and a Sumner among its adherents. Thus
the Compromise worked very strongly for Demo
cratic success. Webster and Clay must have realized
that, whether or not they had kept the Union to
gether, they had certainly dismpted their own party,
and cemented the opposing organization. Nat
uraUy, therefore, Douglas was for the old issues,
and his effort was to rouse the people on them, and
for himself. Indeed, he went clear back to the
palmy days of Jackson when he wrote: "I shaU
act on the rule of giving the offices to those who
fight the battles." Several articles appearing in
the Democratic Review drew the picture of the ideal
candidate, a portrait that bore a striking resemblance
to Stephen A. Douglas. They were attacks, at least
by inference, on the other candidates, and are sup
posed to have injured Douglas. At any rate he

158 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and his supporters were quick to disclaim respon
sibUity for them. But there can be no doubt that
Douglas beUeved that the party and the nation
needed a man of the present rather than the past,
and "a tried civiUan, not a second and third rate
general." Here was a direct drive at General Cass.
It is amusing to recaU that the convention nominated
"a third-rate general," and that it went to New
Hampshire, and not to the boundless West, for him.
But the campaign of Douglas went bravely on, and
he had every reason to feel hopeful. "Prospects,"
he wrote, "look well and are improving every day.
If two or three Western States wiU speak out in
my favor the battle is over. Can anything be done
in Iowa and Missouri? That is very important."
He very naturaUy looked to the West, nor had he
any reason to think that the South was not, as a
whole, friendly to him. He had, too, appealed
strongly to the national feehng, had been an ex
pansionist, holding it to be the nation's duty to
acquire, not only Mexico, but Cuba and Central
America. Young himself — ^he was only thirty-nine
— and caUing for new blood in poUtics, Douglas
might well have thought that the young men would
have ralhed to his support. But the old-timers,
unfortunately for him, were in control of the ma
chinery, and the convention proved that it was
one that was susceptible to management, and that
it could not be mshed. It met in Baltimore June 1.

PRESIDENT-MAKING 159
The leadmg candidates were Cass, Buchanan, Marcy,
and Douglas, not one of whom — as had been fore
seen before the convention met — would be able to
command a two-thirds vote. The "wise ones,"
understanding this, had several months before started
a movement for Franklin Pierce, though they re
solved not to present his name tiU it was clear that
the leading candidates were disposed of. On the
first baUot Cass received 116 votes, Buchanan 93,
Marcy 27, Douglas 20, and the field 25. Douglas
got only 2 votes from the South. His strength
rapidly increased, and on the twenty-ninth baUot
he had 91 votes, Buchanan receiving 93, and Cass
27. It was on the next baUot that the name of Pierce
was presented, but on the forty-eighth baUot he
received only 55 votes, whfle Cass had 73, Buchanan
28, Douglas 33, and Marcy 90. On the next baUot
the break came, and Pierce was chosen, his vote
being 282 as against 6 for all other candidates. Wil
ham R. King of Alabama was nominated for Vice-
President. Douglas was greatly disappointed at
the poor showing he made in the West. Cahfomia
cast her vote for him on the first baUot, but only
15 of his 20 votes came from the West, and of these
11 were from Illinois. He got no votes from In
diana. Yet Douglas and Cass were the strongest
in the West, and Buchanan in the South. It was in
the Middle West that the lUinois senator's greatest
weakness was shown. But he drew support from

160 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
aU sections of the Union. The interpretation of
statistics is never easy. There are some authorities
who hold that the Baltimore convention showed
that Douglas would, if he were to be a formidable
factor in the future, have to win a larger foUowmg
in the South, and they interpret every act from
then on to his reaUzation of that need. Others hold
that he had much to hope from the West and the
East, and that — ^the words are those of Professor
Johnson — "to attribute to Douglas, from this time
on, as many writers have done, a purpose to pander
to the South, is not only to discredit his pohtical
foresight, but to misunderstand his position in the
Northwest and to ignore his reiterated assertions."
Certain it is that his subsequent action was bitterly
displeasing to the North. Perhaps he had no idea
that it would be — and did not mean it to be. The
tmth is that though his support was widely scattered,
it was not of commanding strength anywhere. He
took his defeat in good spirit, and sent the usual
congratulatory telegram to the successful candidate,
in which he said: "I congratulate the Democratic
party upon the nomination, and Illinois wiU give
Franklin Pierce a larger majority than any other
State in the Union." The only important planks
of the platform are those deahng vrith the slavery-
question, which are as foUows: "Resolved, that
Congress has no power under the Constitution to
interfere -with or control the domestic institutions

PRESIDENT-MAKING 161
of the several States, and that such States are the
sole and proper judges of everything appertaining
to them own affairs, not prohibited by the Constitu
tion; that aU efforts of the abolitionists or others
made to induce Congress to interfere with questions
of slavery, or to take incipient steps in relation there
to, are calculated to lead to the most alarming and
dangerous consequences; and that all such efforts
have an inevitable tendency to diminish the hap
piness of the people, and to endanger the stabflity
and permanence of the Union, and ought not to
be countenanced by any friend of our political in
stitutions. Resolved, that the foregoing proposition
covers, and was intended to embrace the whole
subject of slavery agitation hi Congress; and, there
fore, the Democratic party of the Union, standing
on this national platform, wiU abide by and adhere
to a faithful execution of the acts kno-wn as the Com
promise measures settled by the last Congress, 'the
act for reclaiming fugitives from service or labor'
included; which act, being designed to carry out
an express provision of the Constitution, cannot,
¦with fidelity thereto, be repealed, or so changed
as to destroy or impair its efficiency. Resolved,
That the Democratic party -wfll resist all attempts
at renewing, in Congress, or out of it, the agitation
of the slavery question, under whatever shape or
color the attempt be made." So once again the
Compromise was declared to be "a permanent settle-

162 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ment." Did any other piece of legislation receive
so many and so frequent ratifications? The Whig
convention also met in Baltimore, on June 17. It
is chiefly remarkable as marking the final and crash
ing defeat of the ambition of Daniel Webster. The
candidates were President FiUmore, Webster — ^his
Secretary of State — and General Scott. The Presi
dent had a large number of pledged delegates, and
was popular in the South because of his enforce
ment of the fugitive-slave law. Patronage was
used in his behalf. He had the support of Clay.
On the first ballot he received 133 votes, to 131 for
Scott, and 29 for Webster. On the fiftieth baUot
the South turned to Scott, and he was nominated
on the next baUot, his vote being 159 to 112 for
FUlmore. There might have been a combination
by the conservative Whigs on either Fillmore or
Webster, between whom the relations were most
cordial, and the President did write a letter author
izing the withdrawal of his name, but it was not
made pubhc. Probably, however, the South would
not have voted for Webster, though it would have
supported Fillmore. Webster had only 6 votes out
side of New England, every New England State
except Maine giving him votes.
Strange as it may seem, Webster had been con
fident of success, and with Clay out of the way there
was indeed no one in the Whig party that could on
the score of merit contest the nomination with him.

PRESIDENT-MAKING 163
Xo be beaten by another Mexican war hero, and
beaten with a terrible decisiveness, must have been
humihating to him. But the South would have
none of him, feeling that it had got from him aU that
it could hope for. The supporters of General Scott,
on the other hand, were mostly men who had op
posed the Compromise. The friends of the Com
promise in the South were mostly for the nomina
tion of President FUlmore. The result was the nom
ination of a man supposed to be hostfle to slavery on
a platform that favored the Compromise. Webster
refused to support General Scott, and openly ad
vised his friends to vote for General Pierce, on the
ground that the Whigs were hopelessly divided,
while the Democrats were unanimously determined
to resist any further agitation of slavery. It is hardly
necessary to consider his action from the ethical
point of view. Yet it may be said that the Whig
party was hardly more divided after the convention
than it was before when Webster sought a nomina
tion at its hands, and probably no more divided
under the leadership of Scott than it would have
been under that of Webster. The great man was
sorely disappointed — and also he might honestly
have despaired of the future of the Whig party,
which was, as the election showed, practically dead
in 1852. The slavery plank is as foUows: "The
series of acts of the 31st Congress, commonly known
as the Compromise or adjustment (the act for

164 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
the recovery of fugitives from labor included), are
received and acquiesced in by the Whigs of the
United States as a final settlement, in principle
and substance, of the subjects to which they relate;
and so far as these acts are concerned, we -wUl main
tain them, and insist on their strict enforcement,
imtU time and experience shall demonstrate the
necessity of further legislation to guard against the
evasion of the laws on the one hand, and the abuse
of their powers on the other, not impairing their
present efficiency to carry out the requirements of
the Constitution; and we deprecate aU further
agitation of the questions thus settled, as dangerous
to our peace, and wiU discountenance aU efforts
to renew or continue such agitation, whenever,
wherever, or however made; and we wUl maintain
this settlement as essential to the nationality of
the Whig party and the integrity of the Union."
As "the nationaUty of the Whig party" could be
maintained only by holding its Southem members,
the leaders found it necessary to commit their party
to a position practicaUy identical with that taken
by the Democrats. So the national character of
the party was preserved for what it was worth at
the cost of its moral character. The Whigs could
hardly have had any hope of success. "The North,
the free States," Seward wrote, "are divided as
usual, the South united. Intimidation, usual in
that quarter, has been met, as usual, by concession.

PRESIDENT-MAKING 165
and so the platform adopted is one that deprives
Scott of the vantage position he enjoyed. I antic
ipate defeat and desertion. When wiU there be
a North?" Later in the summer he said: "I stiU
remam strongly inclined to give up this place and
pubhc life. If the State Whig convention adopt
the platform, I thmk I shaU be justified in resigning
at once." Yet Scott suffered because it was sup
posed that he would be dominated by Seward. So
strong was this feeling that Mr. Seward felt con
strained to write and make public a letter in which
he said that he would neither ask nor accept "any
pubhc station or preferment whatever at the hands
of the President of the United States, whether that
man were Winfield Scott or any other man." Seven
Whig representatives from the South, including
Toombs and Stephens, publicly declared that they
would not support Scott because he was "the favor
ite candidate of the Free-Sofl wing of the Whig
party." There was in tmth disaffection everywhere.
The Free-Soflers had a ticket of their own, having
met at Pittsburgh in August and nominated John
P. Hale of New Hampshire, and George W. Julian
of Indiana as their candidates for President and
Vice-President. The platform declared for "free
speech, free sofl, free labor, and free men." The
party served as a refuge for discontented Whigs,
and paved the way for the Republican party four
years later. Indeed there was significant movement

166 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
from both sides to the Free-SoU party. Charies
Francis Adams, Henry Wilson, and Joshua R. Gid
dings, who were Whigs, voted for Hale, as did Sal
mon P. Chase, a Democrat. On the other hand,
WiUiam H. Seward, Horace Greeley, and Benjamin
F. Wade supported Scott. The rift, that was soon
to become a chasm, was opening. The campaign
as a whole was humUiating. There were many per
sonal charges brought against the candidates, most
of which were false. General Scott made a speak
ing tour which did him no good, and only served
to discredit him as a candidate -with thoughtful
men. Douglas, of course, made many speeches,
none of the shghtest importance. Though he had
said several months before that he would "act on
the mle of giving the offices to those who fight the
battles," he boasted in one of his campaign speeches
that "there had never been a Democratic admkiis-
tration in this Union that did not retain at least one-
third of their political opponents in office," and,
after Pierce had been elected, he said that Demo
crats should have the offices. "The best men,"
he said, "should be selected, and everybody knows
that the best men voted for Pierce and King."
Though a Democratic -victory was looked for, no
one anticipated such a landslide as took place. Pierce
received 254 electoral votes as against 42 for Scott,
and carried twenty-seven States as against four
carried by Scott. Pierce's popular majority was

PRESIDENT-MAKING 167
202,008 m a total vote of 3,126,378. Only Vermont,
Massachusetts, Kentucky, and Tennessee gave their
votes to the Whig candidate. In Illinois the Whigs
mcreased their vote over 1848 by 11,719, and the
Democrats by 24,968, the Democratic majority
rising from 2,414 to 15,663. The Free-Sofl vote
shrank from 15,804 to 9,966. The Democrats had
evidently profited from the Whig compromise, for
they won largely because the people, who were weary
of the slavery agitation, believed that the Demo
cratic party was more strongly committed than its
rival to the compromise. The feeling undoubt
edly was that the end of the long, painful, and
dangerous controversy had at last come. Nat
uraUy, therefore, there was a feeling of elation at
the overwhelming triumph of the party which was
supposed to stand for national peace and stabflity.
The people were soon to be rudely awakened by
Douglas with his Kansas-Nebraska bfll, which re
opened the whole controversy, and brought freedom
and slavery face to face in free territory. But in
November, 1852, there was a great feehng of rehef,
and the people could not reahze — ^perhaps could
not have been expected to reahze — that it was a
mere breathing spell.
Both Clay and Webster died before the election,
the former on June 29, and the latter on October
23. The passing of these great men was itself part
of the change that was coming over the nation.

168 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
The day of the compromisers was closing, and new
men were coming to the front — Seward, Sumner,
Wade, Chase, Giddings, and others of less promi
nence — ^who were strangers to their methods, and
who felt very strongly that the limit of concessions
had been reached. It was soon seen that the land
was not "settling to its rest."
As had been predicted, the session of Congress,
which lasted tiU August 31, transacted no business
of importance. Perhaps the most interesting in
cident was Sumner's attack on the fugitive-slave
law. Early in the session the Massachusetts sena
tor had proposed the repeal of the law, and been
rebuked by Douglas for so doing. Later he sug
gested that the judicary committee consider the
expediency of repeal, but his motion to that effect
received only 10 votes. Five days before the close
of the session he returned to the attack, and dis
cussed the question in his first formal speech. But
the only effect was to bring on himself the denuncia
tion and ridicule of the extreme slavery men — for
which he cared nothing — and to prove how firm
was the hold that the Compromise then had on the
country. Only four senators — Chase, Hale, Sumner,
and Wade — ^voted for his resolution. The fight from
now on, as far as the South was concerned, was to
make slavery national, for every one could see that
if it did not expand it would die. Webster, too,
had argued that freedom was national, and slavery

PRESIDENT-MAKING 169
pecuhar, exceptional, municipal, and sectional.
Sumner's appeal, however, was not to the Senate,
but to the conscience of the nation and to the
future. It was not unresponded to. Slavery had
more to fear from him at that time than from any
other one man.

CHAPTER VIII
PIERCE'S SURRENDER
As far as Douglas was concemed, the election of
1852 was in every way satisfactory. He was, if
anything, more strongly intrenched than ever in
the confidence of the people. He had taken a veiy
conspicuous part in the compromise legislation that
had been approved by the country, and had indeed
shared the credit for it -with Clay and Webster. He
was recognized throughout the country as the leader
of his party. His State had given Pierce a handsome
majority, and he could claim the credit of "carry
ing it." Douglas had accepted his defeat in the
convention manfuUy, and had thro-wn himself into
the national campaign -with aU his vigor. There
was, of course, no doubt of his re-election to the
Senate, nor was there a cloud in his pohtical sky.
Even his losing campaign for the presidential nomi
nation had helped him, for he had made a good
showing. Both he and his constituents had every
reason to be content with the present, and to look
to the future with high hopes. The Whig party
was visibly going to pieces, whUe the Democratic
party never seemed to be stronger. That man would
have been thought insane who should have pre-
170

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 171
dieted in 1853 that the election of 1856 would be
the last one carried by the Democratic party tfll
1884. There was no end in sight — at least not to
the superficial observer — to the Democratic party's
control of the government. The Illinois legislature
met in January, 1853, and re-elected Mr. Douglas
to the Senate by a vote of 75 to 20. The period
covered by this his last fuU term was one of the most
exciting and turbulent in our national history. But
when he went back to Washington in December,
1852, he must have felt a sense of security and ela
tion both in regard to himseh and his party. He
began his second term in the Senate before he had
reached his fortieth birthday. Trade was good
and the country in a highly prosperous condition,
so much so that there was a demand that the low
tariff of 1846 be reduced — a demand that was heeded
five years later. Yet Douglas soon saw difficulties
ahead of the administration, though not one of them
spoken of by him had any relation to slavery.
He must have reahzed that the parties had been
divided on no real question of principle. Both had
indorsed the compromise legislation, the only ad
vantage that the Democrats had being the credit
that the people gave them for greater sincerity.
Such as the issue had been, the general behef was
that it had disappeared — ^this certainly was at the
time the behef of Douglas. He may not have de
liberately sought to bring new issues to the front,

172 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
but he probably reaUzed that a party must have
policies as well as principles. There can be no doubt
that he was thinking of the presidency, though he
later wrote that he did not think that he would be
wiUing to have his name used in that connection.
"The party," he said, "is in a distracted condition,
and it requires aU our wisdom, prudence, and energy
to consolidate its power and perpetuate its princi
ples." The administration, he thought, "has diffi
culties ahead," as indeed it had, but not such as
Douglas dreamed of. His thought was of tariffs,
revenue, surplus, rivers and harbors, and Pacific rafl-
roads. " These," he said, " are the main questions."
At any rate, shortly after the election, he gave out a
statement of Democratic poUcies, as he conceived
them, and in that he reverted to his old doctrine
of "Manifest Destmy." "Whenever," he said,
"the people of Cuba show themselves worthy of
freedom by asserting and maintaining independence,
and apply for annexation, they ought to be annexed;
whenever Spain is willing to seU Cuba, with the
consent of its inhabitants, we ought to accept it
on fair terms; and if Spain should transfer Cuba
to England or any other European power, we should
take and hold Cuba anyhow." This doctrine was
pleasing to the slavery men who had long looked
on Cuba as good slave territory. There was in it
too an appeal to " the popular heart." Douglas took
the same tone in his discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 173
treaty. He had, it may be remembered, been op
posed to the treaty at the time of its ratification
three years before, but had not given his reasons
since he could not do so without violating the secrecy
of an executive session. By this convention, the
United States and Great Britain had covenanted
to further the constmction of a ship canal through
Nicaragua, and to guarantee its neutrality, and
also the neutrahty of any other regions through
which a canal might be buflt. Further Great Brit
ain had renounced any "dominion over Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast or any part of Cen
tral America." The question was — and it was raised
by the rumor that Great Britain had established
a new colony in Honduras — as to whether the Brit
ish Government had abandoned its claim to a
protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. Before the
ratifications were exchanged, Bulwer, the British
minister, informed Secretary of State Clayton, that
he had been instmcted to insist on an explanatory
declaration that the provisions of the treaty did not
apply to British Honduras, long recognized as a
British colony. Mr. Clayton asked Wilham R.
King, at the time chairman of the committee on
foreign relations, who had been elected vice-presi
dent on the ticket with Pierce, what had been the
understanding of the Senate when the treaty was
ratified, and King said that "the Senate perfectly
understood that the treaty did not include British

174 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Honduras." Thus the Secretary of State who nego
tiated the treaty, and the chairman of the committee
that recommended its ratification, seem to have had
no doubts about what was intended, and the latter
is authority for the statement that the Senate was
clear on the matter. British jurisdiction over the
Mosquito strip was maintained, -without objection
from our government, till a few years ago, when it
was voluntarily renounced. And the Clayton-Bul
wer treaty lasted till the negotiation of the treaty
under which we built the canal, and which gave us
full control of it. So that all that Douglas demanded
was finally brought to pass. But he was for bringing
it to pass at once, and by war, if necessary. When
a British man-of-war fired on an American steam
ship for refusing to pay port dues on entering the
harbor of Grejdiown the issue was raised, and Doug
las made the most of it.
Many of the points made by him against the
treaty must be admitted to be sound in the light
of later experience. When this country was ready
to begin the constmction of the canal it at once
sought relief from the restrictions imposed by it.
Our government was unwiUing to become a partner
with Great Britain in the work, or to enter into an
international agreement for the maintenance of
neutrahty of the canal or on the isthmus. What
was desired was an American canal, and one that
should be fortified. Such in substance was the argu-

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 175
ment of Douglas. There is much in his speech that
is not argument, much that hardly rises above
demagogism. His distrust of England, if not hatred
of her, was profound. The sphit that he showed
in this discussion was the same as that manifested
in his discussion of the Oregon boundary question.
Our concessions in regard to Oregon were, he had
held, in -violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Such,
he argued, would be the effect of any recognition
by this government of British influence on the isth
mus, much more any admission of her right to par
ticipate in the biulding of the canal, or in a guaranty
of neutrality. Yet there were British colonies in
that region, as there are to-day such colonies on
this side of the Atlantic, and the Monroe Doctrine
itseh bound us not to interfere in any way -with
such possessions. But Douglas did discriminate
here, since he agreed that colonies existing at the
time of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine
were not forbidden by it. What he had in mind
was the supposed attempt of Great Britain to estab
hsh a new colony in the bay of Honduras. "I am
unwiUing," said Douglas, "to enter into any treaty
stipulations -with Great Britain or any other Euro
pean power in respect to the American continent,
by the tenns of which we should pledge the faith
of this repubhc not to do in aU coming time that
which in the progress of events our interests, duty
and even safety may compel us to do. I have al-

176 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ready said, and now repeat, that every article, clause,
and provision of that treaty is predicated upon a
virtual negation and repudiation of the Momoe
declaration in relation to European colonization
on this continent. The article in-dting any power
on earth vrith which England and the United States
are on terms of friendly intercourse to enter into
similar stipulations, and which pledges the good
offices of each, when requested by the other, to aid
in the new negotiations with the other Central Amer
ican States, and which pledges the good offices of
aU the nations entering into the 'alUance' to settle
disputes between the States and governments of
Central America, not only recognizes the right of
European powers to interfere with the affairs of
the American continent, but in-\ates the exercise
of such right, and makes it obligatory to do so in
certain cases. It estabUshes, in terms, an alhance
between the contracting parties, and invites all
other nations to become parties to it." Gro-wing
more bitter as he proceeded, he launched into an
attack on Great Britain, denied the possibiUty of
any firm and lasting friendship between her and the
United States, and later in the debate, repl}Tng to a
senator who spoke of what we owed to English hter-
ature and science, he said: "Is he not aware that
nearly every English book circulated and read in this
country contains lurking and insidious slanders and
Ubels upon the character of our people and the in-

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 177
stitutions and pohcy of our government?" He de
manded that we insist on an immediate withdrawal
of the British from the islands they were supposed
to have seized — ^which seizure, if there had been
one, was in violation of the very treaty denounced
by Douglas — and immediately annul the treaty.
Nothing came of afl this. Indeed, the appeal was
to the country rather than to the Senate. The treaty
was ably defended by Seward, former Secretary
Clayton, who had just been re-elected to the Senate,
and Edward Everett. Yet the situation that exists
on the isthmus to-day is precisely the one that
Douglas would have created. His speech, however,
showed him at his worst. He proved himself to
be the prototype of another American senator who
years afterward asked: "What have we got to do
with abroad?" Of his visit to Europe shortly after
the inauguration little need be said. He went with
a mind fifled -with prejudice, firmly convinced that
Europe had nothhig to teach us except by way of
warning. Though he is said to have "spent several
months in personal observation of the various gov
ernments of Europe," the most important thing
about his trip, if one may trust his biographer, Shea
han, was the opportunity to teach Europe a lesson
in democracy. "He was," says Sheahan, "pre
sented to the Emperor of Russia, and was not pre
sented to the Queen of England." Court dress
was required, and Douglas refused to make any

178 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
concessions, though the American Minister, Mr.
Buchanan, found no difficulty in doing so. But
in Russia the rule was dispensed with, and Douglas
was told that he was right in his attitude, the au
thority being Count Nesselrode. Sheahan says:
" The emperor was at the time celebrating, at some
distance from St. Petersburg, a great Russian nsr
tional festival, and was reviewing the national army.
Accompanied by Baron Stoeckle, Mr. Douglas pro
ceeded in an imperial carriage and under an imperial
escort to the neighborhood of the camp, where he
left the carriage and proceeded on horseback toward
the position on the field occupied by the emperor.
At a proper distance he was met by officers of the
imperial staff and conducted to the emperor. He
was the only American present at that magnificent
display of the power and wealth of the empire; rep
resentatives from aU quarters of the world were pres
ent to witness one of the grandest festivals of Rus
sia, graced by the presence of the imperial house
hold and of all the most distinguished individuals
of the empire, and yet into this scene of royal mag
nificence Mr. Douglas was admitted and welcomed
with a frank cordiality by the emperor, in the same
black suit of cloth in which, juSt before his departure,
he had visited Franklin Pierce." Thus was won
another -dctory for democracy. It was ,exceUent
campaign material, nor is the incident without value
historically as throwing some Ught on the character

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 179
of the man. He did not retum, says Professor John
son, "a larger man either mteUectuaUy or morally."
There was of course no doubt as to the attitude
of the new administration. Frankhn Pierce was a
man of respectable abflity, a good lawyer, and a
prominent figure in his own State. He entered the
Mexican war as a private, and came out a brigadier-
general, -with a good record. He was the fourth
candidate, and the second president to be graduated
from that war. Ambition was not one of his fail
ings, as he had refused an appointment as attorney-
general in the Polk administration, and had de
clined his party's nomination as its candidate for
governor. Nor had he any special desire to be
President, though he must have kno-wn, and per
haps participated in the efforts of his friends. At
least he would have been quite happy had the choice
faUen on another. There is no reason to think that
the humihty that he showed in his inaugural address
was assumed. He spoke of himseK as having been
"borne to a position, so suitable for others rather
than desirable for myseh." "You have," he said,
"summoned me in my weakness; you must sustain
me by your strength." Only two features of the
address caU for special comment. After speaking
of the strength that the government showed in the
days of its physical weakness, and of the justifiable
fear of the fathers that the acquisition of new terri
tory might prove disastrous, the President said:

180 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
"The actual working of our system has dispeUed a
degree of solicitude, which, at the outset, disturbed
bold hearts and far-reaching inteUects. The ap
prehension of dangers from extended territory,
multiplied States, accumulated wealth, and aug
mented population, has proved to be unfounded.
The stars upon your banner have become nearly
threefold their original number; your densely pop
ulated possessions skirt the shores of the two great
oceans; and yet this vast increase of people and
territory has not only shown itseU compatible with
the harmonious action of the States and federal
government in their respective spheres, but has
afforded an additional guaranty of the strength and
integrity of both. With an experience thus sugges
tive and cheering, the pohcy of my administration
will not be controUed by any timid forebodings of
e-vil from expansion. Indeed it is not to be dis
guised that our attitude as a nation, and our posi
tion on the globe, render the acquisition of certain
possessions, not within our jurisdiction, eminently
important for our protection, if not, in the future,
essential for the preservation of the rights of com
merce and the peace of the world. ... It is not
your pri-\Tlege as a nation to speak of a distant past.
The strUiing incidents of your history, replete -with
instmction, and furnishing abundant grounds for
hopeful confidence, are comprised in a period com
paratively brief. But if your past is Umited, your

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 181
future is boundless." These words must have glad
dened the hearts of "Young America," and won
the unbounded approval of Douglas. Whether the
President was thinking of Cuba, the isthmus and
the future canal, or of Mexico, is not a matter of
much importance. It was enough to know that he
was an expansionist, and also that any territory
acquired under his administration that was suitable
for slavery would have been dedicated to slavery.
The address was in this particular httle more than
a pohshed and pohte echo of the speech of Douglas
on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty less than three weeks
before. But of course the greatest interest was in
the President's attitude toward slavery. It was
aU that could have been desired by the South. In
his discussion of the great issue Mr. Pierce said
that he was "moved by no other impulse than a
most earnest desire for the perpetuation of that
Union which has made us what we are, showering
upon us blessings, and conferring a power and in
fluence which our fathers could hardly have antic
ipated, even with the most sanguine hopes directed
to a far-off future." "My own position," he con
tinued, "upon this subject was clear and unequivocal,
upon the record of my words and acts, and it is only
recurred to at this time because my sflence might
perhaps be misconstraed." After further dflating
on the glories of the Union, the President proceeded
to indicate the policy that was necessary to save

182 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
it: "Every measure tending to strengthen the fra
ternal feelings of all the members of our Union,
has had my heartfelt approbation. To every theory
of society or government, whether the offspring
of feverish ambition or of morbid enthusiasm, cal
culated to dissolve the bonds of law and affection
which unite us, I shall interpose a ready and stem
resistance. I beUeve that involuntary servitude,
as it exists in different States of this confederacy,
is recognized by the Constitution. I beUeve that
it stands Uke any other admitted right, and that
the States where it exists are entitled to efficient
remedies to enforce the constitutional pro-risions.
I hold that the laws of 1850, commonly caUed the
'compromise measures,' are strictly constitutional,
and to be unhesitatingly carried into effect. I be
Ueve that the constituted authorities of this repubhc
are bound to regard the rights of the South in this
respect, as they would any other legal and con
stitutional right, and that the laws to enforce them
should be respected and obeyed, not with a reluc
tance encouraged by abstract opinions as to their
propriety in a different state of society, but cheer
fully, and according to the decisions of the tribunal
to which their exposition belongs. Such have been
and are my con-\rictions, and upon them I shaU act.
I fervently hope that the question is at rest, and
that no sectional, or ambitious, or fanatical excite
ment may again threaten the durabUity of our in-

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 183
stitutions, or obscure the hght of our prosperity."
It would have been impossible for the President to
go further. Those who loved hberty were spoken
of as the victims of "feverish ambition or of morbid
enthusiasm," and the love of hberty itself was
classed -with "abstract opinions" as to the prefera
ble social order. The President demanded that aU
laws protecting slavery, softened dovra by him into
"involuntary servitude," including the fugitive-slave
law, should be "respected and obeyed," and "cheer-
fuUy." Otherwise the Union might be dissolved.
It was, in short, a strong proslavery speech.
But the Democrats were again in power, and they
were more than satisfied -with the situation, and
the country too, it must be admitted, was content.
The Democrats of that day felt much as many Re-
pubhcans feel to-day. The foUo-wing state of mind,
as described by Mr. Rhodes, has its counterpart
in our own time: "The enthusiastic cheers and noise
of cannon which greeted the President when he
closed his address was typical of the joy of Demo
crats aU over the country on their restoration to
power. In tmth, they had always felt, since the
first election of Jackson, that the duty of administer
ing the government belonged rightfully to them,
and that in their hands only were the interests of
the whole people properly protected. Aristocratic
cabals and money combinations certainly fared
better at the hands of the Whigs, but a party whose

184 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
support was largely derived from these elements
did not, the Democrats thought, deserve popular
success. The Whigs had t-wice elected a President,
but it was by means of the trick of playing upon
the universal fancy for mihtary prestige. It was
now the general Democratic feeling that the instaUa-
tion of Pierce into office was a restoration simply
of the power and patronage justly due the Demo
crats." However, the inaugural address was well
received except by the aboUtionists — who were
gro-wing in numbers — and the Free-SoUers. Un
doubtedly the country longed for peace and quiet.
The cabinet was as foUows: WUUam L. Marcy
of New York, Secretary of State; James Guthrie
of Kentucky, Secretary of the Treasury; Jefferson
Davis of Mississippi, Secretary of War; James C.
Dobbin of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy;
Robert McClelland of Michigan, Secretary of the
Interior; James CampbeU of Pennsylvania, Post
master-General; Caleb Gushing of Massachusetts,
Attorney-General. These men were none of them
afflicted with any "abstract opinions" as to the
right and wrong of slavery. Marcy had opposed
the Free-SoUers in his own State; Gushing was
lacking in con-\dctions of any sort; whUe Da-vis had
made his opinions very plainly known. He was,
or was soon to be, the leader of the South and of
the slavery men.
Perhaps the greatest tragedy in our history was

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 185
the faflure of many of our political leaders to recog
nize and support the strong Union sentiment in
the South, and it had been very strong. There were
men in that section who, whatever they might have
thought of slavery, held that the question of pre
serving the Union was far more important. These
men got practicaUy no encouragement from Presi
dent Polk, and they were to receive as httle from
President Pierce. In his Political History of Slavery,
Wilham Henry Smith says: "The President in
constituting his cabinet invited dissensions in the
party. He unfortunately feU under the influence
of the extreme States'-rights leaders of the South,
although he had it in his power to strengthen the
Union sentiment in the South by thro-wing the in
fluence of the administration with the majority,
and, by strengthening it there, to strengthen it every
where, and so to secure to a conservative Democratic
party the confidence and cordial support of an irre
sistible preponderance of the American people."
The Union cause, Mr. Smith recalls, triumphed in
the contests in Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi
in 1850-51. There were secessionists in those States,
but Da-vis, who was one of them, though he rather
resented the imputation when he came to write of
The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,
says that a desire to destroy the Union was "enter
tained by few, very few, if by any in Mississippi,
and avowed by none." This is a manifest exaggera-

186 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tion. But it is true, as another authority says, that
when the issue of secession was "presented clearly
and distinctly to the people of Mississippi, it was
clearly and distinctly repudiated." This was the
sentiment that triumphed, but the President utterly
faUed to recognize it. There was plenty of material
to work -with, and yet he took Da-vis into his cabi
net, a man who had been the pohtical associate
of such secessionists as Yancey and Quitman, a
man on whom had faUen the mantle of Calhoun.
Thus President Pierce's policy seems to have been
to save the Union by surrendering to those who
were prepared to destroy it if they could not have
their own way, and abandoning those who were so
strongly for the Union that they were prepared to
support it even against their own interests. "Were
not," Mr. Smith asks, "the Unionists of Georgia,
Alabama and Mississippi justified in regarding them
selves as under the condemnation of the adminis
tration?" What could the people as a whole think
of the policy of supporting the compromise of 1850
by appointing to a cabinet position a man — Jeffer
son Da-vis — who had, on the floor of the Senate,
boasted that he had voted for but one of the biUs,
and had said that "so far as the pubhc opinion
of the community which I represent has been
shadowed forth in pubhc meetings and in the
pubhc press, it has been whoUy adverse to the
great body of these measures"? So fatuous does

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 187
this pohcy seem that it is difficult to believe that
it was honestly adopted or pursued. Naturally
the friends of liberty in the North were greatly
distressed, aU the more so because the people for
a time seemed to be satisfied — as "business"
certainly was. Seward said: "I look around me
in the Senate and find all demorahzed. Maine,
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and
Vermont! AU, all in the hands of the slave
holders; and even New York ready to howl at my
heels if I were only to name the name of freedom,
which they once loved so much." Wade may
well have asked whether freedom or slavery was
to be national. Certain it is that during the Pierce
administration the nation sank to the lowest level
it ever touched, except under Buchanan. What
ever may have been the purpose of the President,
his pohcy clearly indicated that he was firm in the
behef that the Union could be saved only by a sur
render to slavery. The surrender was made, but
the Union was not saved by any such means.
Nevertheless, the pohtical situation was, from the
Democratic point of view, all that could have been
desired. The party was strongly intrenched in the
confidence of the people. It had administered the
affairs of the country for many years, with only
two interregnums. By many it was looked on as
the only tme national party. Every one -wished
the new admmistration weU. "The prosperity,"

188 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
says WUliam Henry Smith, "everjrwhere prevalent,
the marvellous gro-wth of new communities, the ab
sorption of thought and energy in the development
of agriculture, commerce, and mining, rendered
the people indifferent to the discussion of pohtical
subjects. They confidently looked to the President
for a continuance of good times, and would most
cordially give support to a pohcy having for its
purpose the promotion of pure Democratic prin
ciples in the practical administration of the busi
ness affairs of the government. The winning manners
of the President insured the good-wiU of those who
had intercourse -with him. He was fortunate also
in having the support of both Houses of Congress
by decided majorities, as it was, therefore, possible
to carry out any party poUcy that might be adopted.
No preceding administration began under more
favorable auspices." The party had just won a
tremendous victory. There were probably few
people who beUeved that the Whig party would
ever again be able to offer any effective opposition.
No political party in our history ever had a better
right than had the Democratic party in 1852 to be
satisfied -with the status quo. The people asked
only for peace and a good business administration.
Yet the leaders, Douglas among them, with the
sympathy and support of the President, within
less than a year plunged the party and the country
into the bitterest strife by re-opening the slavery

PIERCE'S SURRENDER 189
question, which Douglas had said in 1850 he would
never again discuss in Congress, and they did it
by striking at the Missouri Compromise, which
had since 1820 been regarded by the people as per
manently defining the status of the territory to
which it apphed. What is the explanation?

CHAPTER IX
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
TmsKE can of course be no question as to the mo
tives of the Southem men who favored the Kansas-
Nebraska bill, the effect of which was to repeal the
Missouri Compromise, and to open to slavery, if
the people should choose to adopt it, the territory
of Nebraska, which comprised what are now the
States of Kansas, Nebraska, Montana, the two
Dakotas and parts of Colorado and Wyoming. This
land had been t-wice dedicated to freedom, under
the Ordinance of 1787 and the Missouri Compromise.
Now the proposition was to remove the barriers,
and give to the people the privUege of estabUshing
slavery if they cared to do so. What the South
wanted was more slave territory. What did Douglas
want ? His interest in the West has been sho-wn, and
it has been shown also that it was sincere. As early
as 1844 he had introduced a biU for the organization
of Nebraska, and this was foUowed by other bflls
in 1848 and 1852. But Congress treated them with
scant consideration. The East was not interested,
and the South was tmwilUng to create States — or
even to take the preUminary steps — that must under
the law of the land be free. "It looks to me," said
190

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 191
Douglas on one occasion, "as if the design was to
deprive us of everythmg like protection in that vast
region. ... I must remind the Senate again that
the pointuig out of these objections, and the sug-
gestmg of these large expenditures show us that we
are to expect no protection at aU; they evince direct,
open hostflity to that section of the country." He
felt that this middle section had been neglected,
and that if it were properly organized, and adequate
protection were assured, people would flock into it.
Probably too he reahzed that it would be impossible
to get through Congress any bifl deahng with the
subject in which there were not some concessions
to the South. And of course the only concessions
that the South cared about were those in the in
terest of slavery. The question was how far Douglas
could go. He went very far, much further, one can
not help thinking, than he would have gone had his
motive been solely his desire to pro-vide for the wel
fare of Nebraska.
It was on January 4, 1854, that Douglas, as chair
man of the committee on Territories, made his fa
mous report on the Nebraska question. The bifl
accompanying it pro-vided that the territory of Ne
braska, or any part of it, when admitted as a State
"shafl be received into the Union with or without
slavery, as their Constitution may prescribe at the
time of their admission." There has been much dis
cussion as to whether Douglas at the outset in-

192 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tended to repeal the Missouri Compromise which ex
cluded slavery from the territory. It is certain that
the North had no doubt as to the meaning of the re
port and the original bill. Yet Douglas — ^for the re
port was his — declared that there was grave doubt m
the minds of many whether slavery was prohibited
in Nebraska by "vaUd" enactment — ^that is, there
was doubt as to the vaUdity of the Missouri Com
promise. The report favored the incorporation in
the biU of the provisions of the compromise of
1850 under which the people of New Mexico and
Utah had been permitted to settle the slavery ques
tion for themselves. Very naturally the friends of
freedom were alarmed, and with good reason. Doug
las was quite right when he said later in answer to
criticism that " the biU in the shape in which it was
first reported as effectuaUy repealed the Missouri
restriction as it afterward did when the repeal was
put in express terms." He could have had no other
idea, since his whole argument was that the adop
tion of the compromise measures of 1850 had in
principle repealed the Missouri restriction, and
therefore the adoption of the principles of the com
promise in connection with Nebraska must have
repealed the restriction. But the Southemers in
sisted on making the matter clear beyond dispute.
An amendment was offered by Dixon, a Whig, and
successor of Henry Clay, which formally and in
express terms repealed the Missouri Compromise.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 193
This was more than Douglas was looking for. Per
haps he felt that the point had already been covered,
and that the success of the biU might be jeoparded
by the amendment. Perhaps his purpose was to
make a concession to the South which was no real
concession, and to leave the North in a state of un
certainty, such as he admitted in his report to exist.
But there can be no doubt that after he had con
sented to the Dixon amendment he adopted the view
that it did not alter the nature of his bill, which
was from the beginning, as he then insisted, a repeal
biU. While Douglas had in his measure declared
for the principle of non-intervention in the Terri
tories Dixon insisted that legislation was needed
to make the declaration good. The fact that Doug
las did not yield easfly — though he did completely
— ^may possibly be taken to indicate that he pre
ferred to leave the matter indefinite, and even that
he did not desire to seem to repeal the Missouri
Compromise, since he had committed himself
strongly to it. In his report he had said that the
"committee are not prepared now to recommend
a departure from the course pursued on that
memorable occasion [the adoption of the com
promise of 1850] either by affirming or repealing
the Eighth section of the Missouri act, or by any
act declaratory of the meaning of the Constitution
in respect to the legal points in dispute." In a very
rhetorical and overstrained statement to Dixon,

194 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Douglas pledged himseK to incorporate the amend
ment in the bUl. The country was greatly stirred,
the people of the North having Uttle doubt of the
effect of the bUl. It was felt that a good deal of
management might be necessary to get it through
the House, as proved to be the case. The adminis
tration seemed disposed to hold aloof, the President
doubtless being fearful of disturbing the peace and
repose that he had less than a year before pledged
himseK to maintain. But after a conference partic
ipated in by the President, Secretary of War Davis,
and Senator Douglas, it was decided that the ad
ministration should throw its influence in support
of the bUl, which finally emerged in the form of two
bUls, for the organization of Kansas and Nebraska
respectively. There was some question as to whether
it should be declared that the Missouri Compromise
was "superseded," or had become "inoperative."
The latter word was decided on, and it was declared
that the Missouri Compromise "being inconsistent
with the principle of non-intervention by Congress
with slavery in the States and Territories, as recog
nized by the legislation of 1850 (commonly caUed
the compromise measures), is hereby declared in
operative and void, it being the tme intent and
meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any
Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but
to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form
and regulate their domestic institutions in then:

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 195
own way, subject only to the Constitution of the
United States." The bfll passed the Senate by a
vote of 29 to 12, on March 2, and on May 22 it passed
the House, after a bitter controversy, by a vote of
113 to 110. The President signed it on May 30.
It is often dangerous to accept the contemporary
view of pubhc men and the/ir actions, but in this
case it can hardly be denied that contemporary
opinion, which was unfavorable to Douglas, was
largely right. Douglas undoubtedly beheved that
there never would be slavery in either Kansas or
Nebraska, but had he any warrant for thinking
thus? This was not the opinion of the Southern
men, for they notoriously expected to capture Kan
sas, as indeed they tried to do. There can be no
denying the fact that the legislation gave slavery
another chance, and that this was understood by
the South. Senator Brown of Mississippi said in
the course of the debate: "If I thought in voting
for the bfll as it now stands, I was conceding the
right of the people in the Territory, during their
Territorial existence, to exclude slavery, I would
withhold my vote." The very division of the Terri
tory into two States seemed to point to a purpose
to recur to the old precedent of admitting slave
States and free States in pairs. In 1850 Douglas
had not been prepared to abandon the theory that
the national government had supreme control over
the Territories. It seems strange to-day that any

196 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
one at any time should have held any other theory.
But Douglas was also on record in regard to the
Missouri Compromise. Only four years before,
when the compromise measures were under con
sideration, he had said that the Missouri Compromise
wa^'^anonized in the hearts of the American people
I as a sacred thing, which no ruthless hand would
\ ever be reckless enough to disturb." There was then
no suggestion from him, or any one else, that it had
been repealed by the Clay compromise legislation.
It was absurd to argue, as Douglas did, that the
refusal of Congress to extend the Missouri restric
tion to territory to which it did not apply, and never
had applied, was equivalent to a repeal of it as to
territory to which it did apply. Congress had said
that there should never be slavery in any part of
the Louisiana purchase north of 36-30. That it
had the power so to order could not be disputed.
Nor could it be denied that Congress had a right
to repeal the statute. But the point is that it was
repealed by Congress in 1854, and not by the Con
gress of 1850 in enacting the compromise measures.
Douglas argued that in adopting those measures.
Congress had not merely settled an immediately
pressing question, but had estabhshed a prmciple
— ^namely, popular sovereignty. But Senator Chase
and others showed very clearly that this was not
the case. "What rights," he asked, "are precious
if those secured to free labor and free laborers in

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 197
that vast territory are not ? " There was no declara
tion of a general prmciple, but only the prescribing
of conditions under which certam Territories should
be orgamzed. The men who refused to extend the
Missouri Compromise to the Pacific when the effect
would have been to increase the area of slave terri
tory which was at the time free, could not be said
to have favored the abrogation of the compromise
when it guarded free territory. The Appeal of the
Independent Democrats, which was given to the
country just prior to the mtroduction of the Kan
sas-Nebraska bfll, told the tmth, though perhaps
with unnecessary heat and fervor. It denounced
the bifl as "a gross -^dolation of a sacred pledge; as
a criminal betrayal of precious rights." "Not a
man," the signers declared, "in Congress or out of
Congress, in 1850, pretended that the compromise
measures would repeal the Missouri prohibition.
Mr. Douglas himself never advanced such a pre
tence untfl this session. His Nebraska bfll, of last
session, rejected it. It is a sheer afterthought. To
declare the prohibition inoperative, may, indeed,
have effect in law as a repeal, but it is a most dis
creditable way of reaching an object. Wfll the
people permit their dearest interests to be thus made
the mere hazards of a presidential game, and de
stroyed by false facts and false inferences?"
Whether the last charge is trae or not — and it is
difficult either to prove or disprove, since it relates

198 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
to motive — it is beyond dispute that the theory
of a conflict between the Missouri Compromise and
that of 1850 was an "afterthought." In the course
of the debate Seward said, and -with perfect truth,
that not a representative from a non-slave-holding
State would have voted for the compromise of 1850
if he had believed that it repealed the Missouri Com
promise either directly or by implication. Certainly
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster would not. It
may be doubted whether Douglas himself would
have done so, since he had at the time said that the
Missouri legislation was "canonized in the hearts
of the American people as a sacred thing, which no
ruthless hand would ever be reckless enough to
disturb." Douglas further argued that neither
the Ordinance of 1787 nor the Missouri restriction
had kept slaves out of the territory supposed to
be protected by them, and that therefore they were
of no help to the North and no harm to the South.
If that was so, why repeal the compromise? Why
should the slavery people have demanded its re
peal? If it was harmless there does not seem to
be any reason why such a stir should have been
made over it. The South did not take that view.
Senator Atchison, proslavery senator from Missouri,
said that he had always said that the first great
error in our political history was the Ordinance of
1787 making the Northwest territory free, and the
second was the Missouri Compromise. "But," he

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 199
continued, "they are both irremediable. We must
submit to them. I am prepared to do it. It is evi
dent that the Missouri Compromise cannot be re
pealed." Those words were spoken in 1853. It is
hardly necessary to summarize the arguments of
Douglas — the statement of his points is sufficient.
Yet his speech closing the debate was admitted,
even by those who had most strongly opposed him,
to be a great one. He threw into it all his powers,
speaking, one would think, as he could not have
spoken had he not been sincere. His bfll, he said,
repealed both a guaranty and a prohibition, both of
which were wrong in principle, unconstitutional, and
opposed to sound principle. Yet it had taken thirty
years to discover that a great statute, under which
the country had hved, which most men had ac
cepted as final, and which Douglas only four years
before had said was "canonized in the hearts of
the American people as sacred," and "which no ruth
less hand would ever be reckless enough to disturb,"
was unconstitutional. Douglas, with a curious t-wist
in logic, argued that the Missouri Compromise was a
restriction on the liberties of the people of the North,
since it forbade them to hold slaves, whfle it gave
that right to the people of the South. "It was,"
he said, "a restriction which in terms and effect
discriminated against the inteUigence and capacity
of the Northem people." What they looked on
as a protection, and as a great charter of freedom,

200 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Douglas construed as a denial of rights. "The legal
effect of this bUl," he continued, "is neither to legis
late slavery into these Territories nor out of them,
but to leave the people to do as they please. If
they wish slavery they have a right to it. If they
do not want it they -wiU not have it, and you should
not force it upon them." The bUl did not indeed
legislate slavery into the Territories, but it did legis
late into them the possibUity of slavery, from which
they were under the compromise free. The Illinois
senator throughout his speech made no distinction
whatever between slavery and freedom, but treated
them as equaUy entitled to consideration and pro
tection. His speech is utterly without moral quality.
Yet one cannot read it to-day -without feeling its
plausibility and being impressed by its power.
Seward interrupted Douglas long enough to say:
"I hope the senator wiU yield for a moment, be
cause I have never had so much respect for him as
I have to-night."
To this speech we may apply Macaulay's charac
terization of Boyle's answer to Bentley's demons
tration of the spuriousness of the Epistles of Phalaris:
"A most remarkable book it is, and often reminds
us of Goldsmith's observation that the French would
be the best cooks in the world K they had any
butcher's meat, for that they can make ten dishes
out of a nettle-top. It reaUy deserves the praise,
whatever that praise may be worth, of being the

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 201
best book ever written by any man on the wrong
side of a question." Seward, Sumner, Wade, Chase,
and Edward Everett aU spoke, and spoke weU.
Everett showed -with the greatest clearness that the
principle of non-intervention on the part of Con
gress was not enacted by the legislation of 1850,
and said that it was "a mere begging of the question
to say that those compromise measures adopted
in this specific case amount to such a general rule."
Sumner welcomed the issue as one which, because
it was moral, would now have to be faced. Old
questions, he said, "have disappeared, leaving the
ground to be occupied by a question grander far.
The bank, subtreasury, the distribution of pubhc
lands, are each and aU obsolete issues. And now,
instead of these superseded questions, which were
fiUed for the most part -with the odor of the doUar,
the country is directly summoned to consider face
to face a cause which is connected with aU that is
di-vine in rehgion, -with all that is pure and noble
in morals, and with aU that is truly practical and
constitutional in pohtics. Unhke the other ques
tions, it is not temporary or local in its character.
It belongs to afl times and to afl countries. Though
long kept in check, it now, by your introduction,
confronts the people, demanding to be heard. To
every man in the land it says, with clear, penetrat
ing voice, 'Are you for freedom or are you for
slavery ? ' And every man in the land must answer

202 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
the question when he votes." Here was a prophecy
that was fulfilled to the letter.
There has been a disposition to soften somewhat
the contemporary judgment of Douglas, which
was that he was playing pohtics, and dihgently
seeking the presidency. Much has been made of
his statement in a letter written in the preceding
November in which he said: "I see many of the
newspapers are holding me up as a candidate for
the next presidency. I do not wish to occupy that
position. I do not think I -will be wiUing to have
my name used. I think such a state of things wfll
exist that I shall not desire the nomination. Yet
I do not intend to do any act which -wiU deprive
me of the control of my o-vm action. I shaU remain
entirely non-committal and hold myseK at Uberty
to do whatever my duty to my principles and my
friends may require when the time for action ar
rives. Our first duty is to the cause — ^the fate of
individuals is of minor consequence. The party
is in a distracted condition and it requires aU our
wisdom, prudence, and energy to consoUdate its
power and perpetuate its principles. Let us leave
the presidency out of view for at least two years
to come." But that is a very mild disclaimer, and
may be considered merely as an expression of behef
that it was too early to "launch his boom." Be
sides Douglas had been a candidate in 1852, an ac
tive and aggressive one. And he must have known

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 203
that his name would almost certainly be presented
to the next convention, as indeed it was. He was
not the man to do anything that he thought might
injure him pohticaUy. Though he had undoubted
personal courage, he was yet a politician. But could
he have felt that he would be helped by the Kansas-
Nebraska bfll? Of this there can be little doubt,
for he beheved — and said so — that it would help
solidify and strengthen his party, which he thought
to be "in a distracted condition." "We shall pass
the Nebraska bill," he -wrote, "in both Houses by
decisive majorities and the party will be stronger
than ever, for it wiU be united upon principle."
That it would please the South he could not have
doubted. He was equally sure that it would be " as
popular at the North as at the South when its pro-
¦visions and principles shall have been fully developed,
and become well understood." He relied wholly on
the principle of popular sovereignty or local self-
govemment. It had served him well in the past,
and it was to serve him in the future. Those -writ
ing of past events and historic characters have a
very natural distrust of contemporary testimony
-with reference to them. But that testimony has
its strong as well as its weak points. Men who are
parties to great controversies are usually violently
partisan, and almost always prejudiced, and are
quick to impute motives. The mere fact that they
may not happen to hke the one whom they judge

204 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
is a disturbing factor. Rarely are they capable of
taking a broad view. It is weU known that many
such judgments have been reversed. Often memoirs
or confidential correspondence come to Ught that
put an entirely different face on the subject. But
contemporaries, on the other hand, have a much
more intimate knowledge of the movements of their
time, and of the men who participated in them, and
through their closer relationship and acquaintance
with those men, are better able, except for their
prejudice, to appraise them. The law furnishes a
paraUel. AppeUate courts are very reluctant to
disturb the verdict of a jury in a criminal case on
the weight of evidence, holding that, as the jury had
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
bearing of the prisoner and the -witnesses, its con
clusion is entitled to great respect. The paraUel
is not exact, but it makes the principle clear. The
opinions of Douglas's associates, and of the people
of his day, cannot be set aside. It was altogether
unfavorable. When this judgment is affirmed by
so competent a historian as Mr. Rhodes it must,
it is to be feared, stand. Mr. Rhodes says: "The
motives which actuate men who alter the current
of their time are ever an interesting study; and m
this case no confidential letters or conversations
need be unearthed to arrive at a satisfactory ex
planation. We may use the expression of the In
dependent Democrats in Congress and say that the

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 205
dearest interests of the people were made 'the mere
hazards of a presidential game'; or we may employ
the words of John Van Buren, an astute pohtician
who was in the secrets of the party, and ask, ' Could
anything but a desire to buy the South at the presi
dential shambles dictate such an outrage?' And
this trae statement and the inference from the
trenchant question explain the motives prompting
Douglas to this action. Even those who were very
friendly to the measure did not scrapie openly to
express this opinion. One wrote that Douglas had
betrayed 'an indiscreet and hasty ambition'; an
other granted that the object of Douglas 'was to
get the inside track hi the South.' The defenses
made by Douglas and his friends at the time and in
succeeding years, when his political prospects de
pended upon the justification of his course, are
shuffling and delusive. None are satisfactory, and
it may -with confidence be affirmed that the action
of the Illinois senator was a bid for Southern sup
port in the next Democratic convention. In tmth
Douglas might have used the words of Frederick
the Great when he began the unjust war against
Austria for the conquest of Silesia: 'Ambition, in
terest, the desire of making people talk about me,
carried the day, and I decided' to renew the agita^
tion of slavery." It should not be forgotten that
the doctrine of popular sovereignty was brought
forward by Douglas seven years before to save the

206 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
situation created in lUinois by his opposition to
the WUmot proviso. In both cases there was a
personal interest involved. This is not to say that
Douglas did not believe in the principle — since it
was thoroughly Democratic — ^but that he went far
in applying it when it was useful to him. He easily
overcame his scruples when it came to voting aid
to internal improvements. Nor need it be beheved
that he worked for or desired the extension of slavery,
or deliberately planned to introduce slavery into the
Northwest. What can be said is that he was in
different to slavery, without any feehng of moral
revolt against it, and that he was willing to mn a
great risk, and to -wipe out the last legal restriction
for political and personal reasons. The great mo
tive that inspired Webster and Clay — a desire to
save the Union — ^was not present in this case. The
Union was in no danger, and there was no pretense
that it was. President Pierce had in his inaugural
congratulated the people only a few months before
on the better feehng that prevaUed throughout the
nation. Douglas himself made no claim that there
was any such necessity as that which was believed
to have dictated the compromise of 1850. On the
contrary he had professed to beUeve that the slavery
question was a dead issue, and had said that he would
never discuss it again. There was not even any
demand for the legislation tiU Douglas created it.
Instead of calming the strife it brought such a storm

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 207
on the country as it had never known before, and
was never to know again except in the days of the
Civfl War. Two things, it is believed, have con
tributed to the toning down of the contemporary
verdict. One is the natural disposition of historians
to take the charitable and kindly view, which is
much to their credit. And it is true, too, that Doug
las fairly deserves some measure of protection against
the extreme harshness of some of his critics, for he
was an honest man and a patriot. In the second
place, he did much to redeem his fame in the last
years of his life, when he broke with his party on
one of the issues that rose out of this very Kansas-
Nebraska legislation, and by the vigor of his cam
paign as the candidate of the Union Democracy,
contributed in no small degree to the election of
Abraham Lincoln. It may be said of him as
Macaulay said of Sir Robert Walpole: "It was
only in matters of pubhc moment that he . . . had
recourse to compromise. In his contests for per
sonal influence there was no timidity, no shrink
ing." When a man with presidential ambitions
adopts a course that he has reason to beheve will
concihate one section of the country, and, when
understood, be popular in the other section, it does
not seem unfair or unkind to say that personal mo
tives influenced him to a considerable extent. He
was not, as we have seen, above playing politics,
but he did it boldly and as a master.

208 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Douglas could hardly have been surprised at the
fury roused by his biU. For he is reported by Dixon
to have said when he agreed to accept the Dixon
amendment: "The repeal, K we can effect it, wiU
produce much stir and commotion in the free States
of the Union for a season. I shall be assaUed by
demagogues and fanatics there, without stint or
moderation. Every opprobrious epithet -wiU be
applied to me. I shall probably be hung in effigy
in many places. It is more than probable that I
may become permanently odious among those whose
friendship and esteem I have heretofore possessed.
This proceeding may end my political career. But,
acting under the sense of duty which animates me,
I am prepared to make the sacrffice." The prophecy
was fulfiUed to the letter. Benton, who has not
received the honor that is his due as a man of in
dependence and courage, spoke of the bUl as "a
bungUng attempt to smuggle slavery into the terri
tory, and throughout aU the country, up to the Cana
dian line and out to the Rocky Mountains," and
denounced the attempt as an outrage. He certainly,
though a Southem man, a Democrat, and a slave
holder, spoke for the North. Mass-meetings were
held everywhere to protest against what was char
acterized as a crime. A memorial signed by 3,000
New England clergymen protesting against the
legislation as a breach of faith was presented to
Congress. A simUar protest, signed by 500 clergy-

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 209
men of the Northwest, was presented in the Senate
by Douglas himself. Great meetmgs were held in
New York and Boston and adopted resolutions
condemning the bifl and its author. The Whig
papers, and many of the Democratic papers, were
-vigorous in their denunciations of it. In Ilhnois
but one paper favored it. The five Chicago papers,
one of which Douglas had helped to estabhsh, were
opposed to it. Legislatures all over the North
adopted resolutions against the bill, that of Illinois
being an exception, since it reluctantly, and under
pressure, approved, though the affirmative vote
in both branches was less than one-half the legis
lature. Sheahan was greatly outraged by the atti
tude of the clergymen, people, and papers of Chicago.
He says: "He had no paper in Chicago to defend
the bill or himself. He was exposed to constant
warfare from all quarters, and had no means of de
fense. AU the Chicago papers were open to con
demn, none ventured a word in his behalf. It was
his home; it was the great city of the Northwest.
There, in preference to aU other places, he needed
defense, yet there he was left alone to meet the
storm which falsehood, private and political malice,
disappointed ambition and open knavery, were
fast gathering to meet him on his retum." It does
not seem to have occurred to the amiable biographer
that about the worst thing that can be said of a
man is that there is no one in his home town to de-

210 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
fend him. Nor did he see that he was charging aU
the clergymen, aU the people, and all the papers
of Chicago with "falsehood, private and pohtical
malice, disappointed ambition and open knavery"
in order to exculpate a man who could find no one
to take his part. "Traitor," "Benedict Arnold,"
"Judas," were among the mildest epithets hurled
at him. In one Ohio town he was presented with
thirty pieces of silver. When he returned to Chicago
he announced that on September 1 he would ad
dress the people. Flags were hung at half-mast on
the shipping, beUs were tolled as the hour for the
meeting approached. When Douglas appeared on
the platform he faced an angry audience which
greeted him vrith hisses. In spite of his utmost
efforts he could not get a hearing, and after a two
hours' struggle he gave it up. It has been said that
the opposition was organized, but there was no
need for organization. Wherever Douglas went
in the State in his canvass — an election for congress
men and State Treasurer being on — ^he was treated
in much the same fashion. "Burning effigies,"
says Sheahan, "effigies suspended by ropes, banners
with aU the -vulgar mottoes and inscriptions that
passion and prejudice could suggest, were displayed
at various points."
AU this was not a mere outburst of wrath against
one man, or of opposition to an act of Congress —
it was rather the awakening of the North. It had

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 211
become clear to aU men — as it had been to the aboli
tionists and Free-Soflers for years — ^that the pohcy
of compromise and concession would no longer serve.
This was the view of Benton, who said that hence
forth it would be necessary to oppose the extension
of slavery by every constitutional means, and de
clared that it was an outrage to propose to extend
the domain of slavery by repealing afl that part of
a compromise measure that worked against it, after
the South had had aU the advantage of such parts
of the law as worked in its favor. "We have never
known," said the Richmond Whig, "such unanimity
of sentiment at the North upon any question affect
ing the rights of the South as now prevails in opposi
tion to the Missouri Compromise repeal." The
Springfield Republican, which had been exceedingly
moderate and conservative in its tone, and had
stood by Webster even after the Seventh of March
Speech, and had welcomed the compromise measures
of 1850, said: "The North had acquiesced in these
compromises; it sustained and abided by them.
But the South and its Northem political allies have
broken the peace of the country. They make fresh
and monstrous demands. These demands wfll arouse
the whole nation; they wfll widen and deepen the
antislavery feeling of the country as no other con
ceivable proposition could. The signs are unmis
takable. No mere party or faction -will array itself
against this Nebraska scheme. The whole people

212 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
are against it. The moral force of the North — ^the
influence, the learning, the wealth, and the votes
of the North — are against it, and -wiU make them
selves effectively heard ere the agitation, now re
opened by the insanity of the slaveholding interest,
and in behaK of the schemes of ambitious partisans,
shall have ceased. The South and its aUies have
so-wn the wind — -will they not reap the whirlwind?"
The utterances of Southerners in defense of the
Kansas-Nebraska biU served to strengthen the
North in its opinion that the whole campaign was
one for the extension of slavery. Doubtless injustice
was done to Douglas, for it would be hard to prove
that he had any such purpose. But there can be
no doubt as to the aim of the slavery men. Though
they distrusted Douglas, and were somewhat slow
in comprehending the benefits that would come to
them as a result of his bUl, they were not long in
accepting it as whoUy in their interest. "The
South," said a South CaroUna newspaper, "are
united for a removal of the Missouri restriction."
There were men in the Southem States who thought,
not only that slavery was a blessing, but that free
dom unmixed -with servitude was an e-vil. In dis
cussing the raihoad riots at Erie in 1853, Represen
tative Boyce of South Carolina, addressing the
Northem members, said: "It is one of the nusfor-
tunes to which you are exposed by having your
whole population made up of freemen." "At the

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 213
North and in Western Europe," said the Richmond
Enquirer, "by attempting to dispense with a natural
and necessary and hitherto universal institution of
society, you have thrown everything into confusion.
In dispensing with domestic slavery you have de
stroyed order, and removed the strongest argument
to prove the existence of Deity, the author of that
order. They inculcate competition as the hfe of
trade and essence of morahty. The good order,
the peace, the protection and affectionate relations
of society at the South, induce the behef in a de
signer and author of this order, and thus 'hft the
soul from nature up to nature's God.' The chaotic
confusion of free society has the opposite effect."
Another Richmond paper said: "But the worst of
aU these abominations is the modem system of free
schools, because the cause and prolific source of
the infidehties and treasons that have turned her
cities into Sodoms and Gomorrahs, and her land into
the common nesting-places of howling Bedlamites."
AU of which reads very much like the outgivings of
the Pan-Germanists in glorification of Teutonic kul-
tur. The battle was between two types of culture,
with the Southern type, as it had been for years, on
the aggressive. When men began to talk of human
slavery as necessary to the preservation of order,
and to denounce the free schools, it certainly is not
surprising that the lovers of freedom should have
taken alarm. But Douglas had established his

214 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
great principle of popular sovereignty, and it soon
became necessary to find a sovereign in Kansas to
exercise the conferred power. But before we come to
that something should be said of the immediate effect
of the action of Congress, under Douglas's leader
ship, on politics. The Whig party was in a moribund
condition, and party lines generaUy were dismpted.
Many of its members drifted into the American
or Know-Nothing party, since there did not seem
to be any other place to go. The anti-foreign and
anti-Catholic principles of the Know-Nothings were
fiercely denounced by Douglas and many others.
Gradually the friends of freedom came together-
Whigs, Free-SoUers, Anti-Administration Democrats
and Americans — into what was kno-wn as the Anti-
Nebraska party. This party in Michigan on July
6, 1854, christened itseK the RepubUcan party, and
this name was adopted a week later by the Anti-
Nebraska people in Ohio and Wisconsin. The Ger
mans of the Northwest deserted the Democratic
party in large numbers. There was in the elections
of 1854 no effective opposition party, and the people
had to find as best they could a means of expressing
their opinion. Douglas had, however, done much
to consolidate the opposition, for, as the New York
Times said, " the repeal of the Missouri Compromise
has done more than any event of the last ten years
to strengthen antislavery sentiment in the free
States." The IlUnois senator plunged into the cam-

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 215
paign of 1854 in Illinois with his usual -vigor. Lyman
TrumbuU, an old Democrat, was the Anti-Nebraska
leader. The election was of special importance
since the new legislature would be caUed on to choose
a successor to Senator Shields, whose term was about
to expire. Of course the question of vindicating
Douglas was involved.
The legislature had been heavfly Democratic,
and it was felt that if the hold-overs continued to
be Democrats, there would be httle difficulty in
securing the re-election of Senator Shields. The
speaking campaign of Douglas lasted for two months.
On October 3 he met Lincohi in joint debate in
Springfield. Lincoln had lost his interest in pohtics
tiU the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, so Doug
las was responsible for bringing hun back into polit
ical life. The Democrats, though they elected their
candidate for State Treasurer by a greatly reduced
plurality — 2,915 as against more than 15,000 for
Pierce two years before — ^lost the legislature, and
the Umted States senatorship. When the legisla
ture met in January, it was found that it was con
troUed by the Fusion forces. It was suggested that
Shields withdraw, the assumption being that he was
objectionable because of his Irish birth. That also
was Douglas's theory as to the result of the election,
but he refused to consider the question of withdrawal.
"Our friends," he said, "should stand by Shields
and throw the responsibihty on the Whigs of beating

216 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
him because he was bom in Ireland. The Nebraska
fight is over, and Know-Nothingism has taken its
place as the chief issue in the future. If therefore
Shields shaU be beaten it wUl be apparent to the
people and to the whole country that a gaUant sol
dier and faithful pubUc servant has been stricken
down because of the place of his birth." But the
Nebraska fight was not over; it was only beginning.
Douglas would have been glad to change the issue,
but he could not do so. It lasted till the firing on
Fort Sumter. Shields was beaten. On the first
ballot he received 41 votes, 3 other Democratic
votes being cast for as many other candidates; Lin
coln received 45 votes, and Lyman TrumbuU 5,
with 5 scattering. The Anti-Nebraska vote was
55, and the Democratic vote 44. On the tenth baUot
TmmbuU was elected, recei-ving 51 votes. The
congressional delegation which had consisted of
five Democrats and four Whigs was, as a result of
the election, changed into one consisting of four
Democrats and five Anti-Nebraska men. The
Democrats were returned by reduced pluraUties.
In the Sixth district, however, in which Douglas
made his strongest fight, his friend Harris was elected
over Yates. The result was certainly not encourag
ing to the Democrats. Even Douglas, optimistic
as he was, admitted that "the heavens were par
tially overcast." The attempt to explain the de
feat as due to Know-Nothingism was not successful.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 217
as every one knew that the real issue was the Ne
braska bfll. This was made clear by the general
result, even in districts and States where there was
a large foreign population. Out of the 42 men of
the North who had voted for the Kansas-Nebraska
bifl only 7 were re-elected. In the House of Repre
sentatives the Democratic representation shrank
from 159 to 79, and the Democratic majority of
84 over aU became a Democratic minority of 75.
There is no other construction to put upon the re
sult than that it was a tremendous rebuke to the
national admimstration and to Douglas. The Fu-
sionists carried Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan by very
large majorities. Maine, Rhode Island, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Iowa, all of which had given
Pierce majorities in 1852, were lost to the Demo
crats. Clearly the immediate result of the Douglas
pohcy was not to strengthen his party. Nor was
that its ultimate result, although it won another
national election. He had met defeat for the first
time in his life, even his own State, which he had
apparently held in the hollow of his hand, having
turned against him. But he faced it bravely, never
for one moment weakening, never giving up the
fight. Not only had his party lost political power
as a result of the revulsion of feeling; it had raised
up a permanent opposition to itself that could be
neither quelled nor cajoled. Northern men who
formerly repudiated with indignation the charge

218 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
that they were aboUtionists were beginning to get
at least a glimmer of the truth that there could be
no peace or assured unity till slaver^ was wiped
out. And everything that happened during the next
six years strengthened that opinion, and for much
of what happened Douglas was responsible. The
Kansas CivU War — for it amounted to that — the
Dred Scott decision, the Lecompton Constitution
which forced Douglas himseK into the opposition,
the John Brown raid, and the growth of the Re
publican party, were all acts in the great drama
which ended only with Appomattox — and hardly
then. Something of the sentiment of the aboli
tionists was permeating the whole body of the North
ern people. Douglas was either unable to reaUze
this, or unwilUng to admit it. He said that the whole
trouble was caused by the abohtionists, but he did
not see that even K there were no more abolitionists
than there had been, there was a good deal more
abohtionism. Men did not beUeve that it was neces
sary to choose between the Union and freedom, but
they had pretty well made up their minds that the
time had come for a choice between freedom and
slavery. When, therefore, they were told that in getting
one compromise they had bartered away another —
and an infinitely more important one — ^they naturally
were alarmed. Sumner was entirely right when he
said that the Kansas-Nebraska biU "is at once the

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 219
worst and the best biU on which Congress ever acted.
It is the worst bill, inasmuch as it is a present vic
tory of slavery. ... It is the best bifl, ... for
it prepares the way for that 'All hail hereafter,'
when slavery must disappear. It annuls all past
compromises, and makes all future compromises
impossible. Thus it puts freedom and slavery face
to face, and bids them grapple. Who can doubt
the result?"
The country had not been without its prophets,
but now every one was beginning to prophesy. The
new note is easily discernible. But Douglas was
deaf to it. He was angered rather than enlightened.
It was plain that he had utterly misread the pre-
vafling opinion, and now he misinterpreted the de
feat that had come to him and his party. When
twitted on the subject by his victorious enemies,
he said: "The fact is, and the gentleman knows
it, that in the free States there has been an alhance,
I wfll not say whether holy or unholy, at the recent
elections. In that alliance they had a crucible into
which they poured abolitionism, Maine liquor-
lawism, and what there was left of Northem Whig-
ism, and then the Protestant feeling against the
Cathohc, and the native feehng against the for
eigner. AU these elements were melted down in
that crucible, and the result was what was called
the Fusion party." He was specially bitter toward
TmmbuU, the newly elected senator from Illinois,

220 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
whom he regarded as a renegade. "When he was
elected," Douglas said, "he received every abohtion
vote in the legislature of lUinois. He received every
Know-Nothing vote in the legislature of lUinois.
So far as I am advised and believe, he received no
vote except from persons alUed to aboUtionism or
Know-Nothingism. He came here as the Know-
Nothing-Abohtion candidate, in opposition to the
united Democracy of the State, and to the Demo
cratic candidate." Amid the shKting of the foundar
tions of political power Douglas could see only the
triumph of a conspiracy engineered by shrewd and
unscrupulous political leaders. Many men far more
removed from greatness than he was were far less
blind. He was almost wholly lacking in imagina
tion, and knew Uttle history except that of his own
country. He had all the limitations of the prac
tical man, of the pohtician absorbed in the imme
diate task. Such men are, and always have been,
pitiably helpless in those days when the universe
seems to be changing front. Nevertheless, it would
be doing him a grssve injustice to put him in that
class. For something more than political shrewd
ness was necessary to enable him to recover from
the blow — ^for recover he did. Even in these dark
days he was recognized as the leader of the Demo
cratic party, and he retained the leadership of the
Northern -wing of it to the last. Mr. Rhodes says,
and with perfect truth: "Douglas had the quality

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 221
of attaching men to him; he was especially fond of
young men, and they repaid his complaisance by
devotion. No American statesman but Clay ever
had such a personal foUowing. . . . Since Andrew
Jackson, no man has possessed the influence, re
ceived the confidence, or had the support that it
was the lot of Douglas to enjoy from the Democrats
in the Northem half of the Union. From 1854 to
1858 he was the centre of the pohtical history of
the country; from 1858 to 1860 he was the best-
known man in the United States; but after the
contest with Lincoln in 1858 it became apparent
that the 'Little Giant' had met his match in that
other son of Illinois." Of no man who did not have
many of the elements of greatness could such words
be truthfuUy spoken, and they are true in this case.
But, nevertheless, he was dwelling in the past, at
least the past of 1850. He got out of step with the
march of events, lost touch with the movements
of the time. Nothing showed it better than the
changed attitude toward the fugitive-slave law.
The people had almost become reconcfled to it, or
at least resigned, for they believed that slavery was
in process of extinction. There had, as we have
seen, been troubles attending its enforcement, but
these were not serious, and had roused no great
feeling at the North. The attempted rescue of the
fugitive Bums in Boston, while the Kansas-Nebraska
bifl was being driven through Congress by Douglas,

222 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
revealed the situation in its true Ught. The lead
ing citizens of Boston — ^Theodore Parker, WendeU
PhilUps, and Thomas Wentworth Higginson (who
was wounded in an assault on the prison) — were
the leaders. When the fugitive was awarded to
his owner he was marched to the ship that was to
take him south under the guard of the city police,
twenty-two companies of the Massachusetts national
guard, a company of cavalry, a United States ar-
tiUery battalion, one platoon of United States ma
rines, a civU posse of 125 men specially guarding
the fugitive, a field-piece and two platoons of marines
guarding it. Fifty thousand people witnessed the
march and greeted it with hisses and groans. The
cost of recovering Burns is said to have been, ac
cording to different authorities, between $40,000 and
$100,000. The whole city was in an uproar. As
has been said the mob — ii it may be called that —
was made up of the leading citizens, whUe the mar
shal's deputies were dra-wn from the lowest classes.
The Richmond Enquirer said: "We rejoice at the
recapture of Burns, but a few more such -victories
and the South is undone." Burns was the last
fugitive slave removed from Massachusetts. The
legislature later passed a personal Uberty act which
was in direct conflict with the fugitive-slave law.
Another case arose in Wisconsin, in which a man
was arrested and charged with ha-ving been party to
the rescue of a fugitive — as he was. An associate

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 223
justice of the State Supreme Court discharged him
in habeas-corpus proceedings, holding that the
fugitive-slave law was unconstitutional. This judg
ment was subsequently affirmed by the entire bench.
In Massachusetts a judge was removed by the gov
emor for enforcing the law; in Wisconsin the highest
tribunal of the State declared the law unconstitu
tional. Surely there could, after these happenings,
be no mistake as to the temper of the people.
They felt that they had been betrayed, that the
repeal of the Missouri Compromise by the Kansas-
Nebraska bfll was an altering of the terms of the
bargain they had made in the interest of peace and
union.

CHAPTER X
WAR IN KANSAS
There was, of course, no hope for such a party as
the Know-Nothing party. It began to go to
pieces, indeed, shortly after the elections of 1854.
Douglas was mercUess in his assaults on it, chal
lenged its principles even in locaUties where they
were most strongly held, and denounced those who
would proscribe a man because he happened to be
bom abroad or to be a member of the Roman
Cathohc Church. Here he took high and strong
ground. It was not with him a question of win
ning the Irish vote or the German vote, but of true
Americanism. Nor can there be any doubt that
his attitude had much to do with maintaining unity
at the North, and commending to its new citizens
their government in its trae Ught. Undoubtedly
the Know-Nothing party served as a refuge for
many men who could find nowhere else to go, and
was used as a means for making effective the op
position to the Kansas-Nebraska pohcy and the
party that was responsible for it.
Congress met December 4, 1854, the last session
of the Thirty-first Congress. In the President's
message there was no reference to slavery, or to
224

WAR IN KANSAS 225
the Kansas-Nebraska question, though there was
a hinting at them in the foUo-wing pious gener-
ahties: "We have to maintain in-violate the great
doctrine of the inherent right of popular self-govern
ment ; to reconcfle the largest hberty of the individual
citizen with complete security of pubhc order; to
render cheerful obedience to the laws of the land,
to unite in enforcing their execution, and to fro-wn
indignantly on all combinations to resist them."
The problem of finding a sovereign in Kansas was
rapidly taking shape. Prior to the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska bill there was not one white man
la-wfuUy in the vast territory. There was no trouble
about Nebraska, since every one admitted that it
woifld be a free State. That there was trouble over
Kansas — and of the gravest sort — ^was due to the
fact that an effort was made — and vigorously re
sisted — ^to make it a slave State. Douglas had con
ferred popular sovereignty on a territory in which
there was not one person legally quahfied to exercise
it. AU other laws had pro-vided that only actual
residents, otherwise quahfied, at the time of the
passage of the laws, should vote. The present law
simply demanded actual residence. It did not de
fine what residence was, or when it should date
from. It was impossible to make a qualification
of residence at the time of the passage of the law,
for there were at that time no residents in Kansas.
Thus at the very outset was laid the basis for dis-

226 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
pute and contention. Apparently any one who
came to Kansas after the passage of the law could
vote. So the stmggle that had been raging through
out the country was transferred to the prairies of
Kansas. The battle that had been fought between
the North and the South over the enforcement of
the fugitive-slave law was now to be fought by men
with arms in theh hands. The inteUectually and
morally hostile elements were at last brought into
-violent contact, the conflicting currents were to
come into collision.
It is to-day hard to see how anything else could
have been looked for, except on the theory that the
North was not in eamest, or that, if it was, it would
yield, as it had so often done before. AU Douglas's
eloquent talk about popular sovereignty as apphcable
in this case must have sounded very hoUow to aU
who realized that the sovereignty was to be con
ferred on a vacuum. Douglas's idea was that
the country would soon fiU up when it was known
that it was to have an organized government.
Here he was right. It is said that ten or fifteen
thousand people of Missouri waited on the border
for the opening of the territory, though there was
some disappointment in the South over the num
ber of bona fide settlers from Missouri. How
ever, bona fide settlers were not needed to con
trol Kansas in the interest of slavery. In July,
1854, the Emigrant Aid Society of New England,

WAR IN KANSAS 227
organized by Eh Thayer, sent its first party to Kan
sas, the avowed object of the society being to make
Kansas a free State. There was a large exodus from
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. From Kentucky a
company of seventy went out, provided with every
convenience, including several ready-made houses,
the members paying all their o-wn expenses, and all
being free-State men. These latter, before they
left home, framed a Constitution and by-laws to
which they severaUy subscribed. Thayer, it should
be said, was, hke Douglas, a behever in popular
sovereignty. He was also sure that the cause of
freedom would win in Kansas. Emigration, except
from Missouri, was mostly from the free States,
and it sweUed rapidly. The census of Febraary,
1855, gave Kansas a population of 8,600, of whom
196 were slaves.
As we annexed a war when we annexed Texas,
we made war sovereign when we decreed popular
sovereignty for Kansas. The South had assumed
that the State would be a slave State, while the
North had resolved that it should not be. The issue
was vital to the slaveholding interest, at least that
was the opinion of the slavery leaders. The Mis-
sourians were mo-ving into the State, and organizing
themselves into Blue Lodges, secret organizations
the purpose of which was to extend slavery into
the new State. This was in October, 1854. But
this was not the first attempt to organize the

228 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
sovereignty of the State. The New England Emi
grant-Aid Company had been formed in July. On
June 20, nineteen days after the opening of the terri
tory, the "Platte County SeK-Defensive Associa
tion" assembled at Weston, and declared that "when
caUed upon by any citizen of Kansas, its members
would hold themselves in readiness to assist m re
moving any and aU emigrants who should go there
under the aid of Northem emigrant societies" — a
pledge that these men afterward attempted to make
good. It was not tiU October that the new Govemor,
Andrew H. Reeder, reached the territory. He was,
of course, appointed by President Pierce, and a
thorough beUever in Douglas's popular sovereignty
— and a proslavery man. That he was a man of
character and abUity, and disposed to be fair, is
generaUy agreed. The govemor caUed an election
for territorial delegate for November 29. Seventeen
hundred and twenty-nine Missourians came across
the line to vote, though their votes were not needed,
since their candidate, Whitfield, would have been
elected without them, the free-State people taking
Uttle interest in the election. The delegate was
seated without any objection. But the battle was
only postponed. The antislavery men made no
move tiU the time came for electing a territorial
legislature, March 30, 1855. Every effort was made
by the govemor to guard against fraud or -violence,
and to secure an honest declaration of the wUl of

WAR IN KANSAS 229
the people. But the task was beyond his powers.
Here the issue was directly presented, for it was
through the legislature that the boon of popular
sovereignty, that Douglas had conferred on the
territory, would be exercised. Three-fourths of
the vote was cast by organized and armed invaders
from Missouri. The election judges were mostly
proslavery men. Those who were not were either
awed by the mob, or driven away from the polls.
It is not necessary to go into detafl in regard to the
frauds and outrages, but it is important that the
reader should have a picture of popular sovereignty
in Kansas. Governor Reeder knew, and said, that
the election was iflegal. Mr. Rhodes says : "The
scene in the executive chamber when the governor
canvassed the returns was an apt illustration of
the result of the Douglas doctrine, when put in
force by a rude people in a new country, and
when a question had to be decided over which the
passions of men were excited to an intense degree.
The thirty-nine members who, on the face of the
returns, were elected were seated on one side of the
room, the Governor and fourteen friends on the
other. AU were armed to the teeth. Reeder's pis
tols, cocked, lay on the table by the side of the papers
relating to the elections. Protests of fraud were
received from only seven districts. Although the
Governor did not assume to throw out members
on account of force and fraud, he did set aside,

230 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
on technicalities, the elections in those districts
and ordered new elections. To the others he
issued certificates, so that the proslavery party
was largely in the ascendancy in the legislature."
Such was popular sovereignty in Kansas. The
North and South divided over the question, each
maintaining that the representatives of the other
were the aggressors. Into that matter it is not
necessary to go, further than to say that the
Northern men stood for freedom. There were
acts of violence on both sides, and many innocent
people suffered. The attempts to make the Emi
grant-Aid Society the justification for the lawless
ness of the Missourians, in which the President
joined, were certainly not impressive. The Presi
dent subsequently endeavored to persuade Reeder
to resign, and failing in this, removed him.
But Kansas was before long to have two sover
eigns. The proslavery legislature met at Pawnee,
the place designated by the Govemor, in July, 1855,
and at once adjourned to Shawnee Mission. It
enacted a code of laws that would have disgraced
a community of savages. In order to insure the
slavery of the blacks they imposed slavery on the
whites. The laws fiUed a volume of 823 pages. The
death penalty was provided for all raising or as
sisting to raise " an insurrection of slaves, free negroes
or mulattoes," and also for any person who by
speaking, writing, printing, or circulating any book.

WAR IN KANSAS 231
paper, magazine, or circular for the purpose of sth-
ring up insurrection among the slaves, free blacks, or
mulattoes. For enticing a slave to run away, or
harboring a slave the penalty was death or ten years'
imprisonment. One who refused to become a slave-
catcher was to be fined in the sum of $500. Even
to declare, whether oraUy or in writing, that slavery
did not legally exist in Kansas subjected the citizen
to imprisonment for not less than two years. No
man might hold office or practise in the courts un
less he took an oath to support the fugitive-slave
law. It was unlawful even to deny the right to hold
slaves. No man could sit on a jury in a case under
the fugitive-slave law who was conscientiously op
posed to holding slaves, or who would not admit that
it was right. Nor could any one vote who refused
to take an oath to sustain the fugitive-slave law —
a clear disfranchisement of the Eastern immigrants.
Such was popular sovereignty. It was nothing
more than government by a minority, as subsequent
events were to prove. The free-State people, to
whom former Governor Reeder had joined himself,
held a constitutional convention at Topeka, October
23, 1855. Though nineteen of the thirty-four dele
gates were Democrats, and a majority favored the
Douglas pohcy, the convention adopted a Consti
tution prohibiting slavery, and provided for its sub
mission to the people. The proslavery legislature
was repudiated; Charles Robinson, leader of the

232 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
free-State movement, was elected governor; and
former Govemor Reeder was chosen as delegate to
Congress. Kansas was now blessed vrith two gov
ernments, and two sovereigns. On December 16 the
Topeka Constitution was ratffied by the people by
a vote of 1,731 to 46. On January 15, 1856, there
was an election at which Robinson was chosen for
governor, and a legislature was elected. But prior
to that there had been actual war. The slavery
men found a pretext for attacking Lawrence, the
headquarters of the Emigrant-Aid Company. A
free-State man had been murdered by a slaveiy
man, and the friends of the former sought revenge.
One of those said to have been loudest in his threats
was arrested by a proslavery sheriff. The man was
rescued by his friends, who were heavUy armed,
¦without resistance on the part of the sheriff. Here
was the chance that had been looked for. The sheriff
summoned help from Missouri, and a column of
1,500 invaders marched on Lawrence. But the
people were prepared, and armed with rifies sent
from Boston. They acted strictly on the defensive,
and finally the Missourians withdrew, one free-State
man having been kUled. Several buUdings were
burned, and there was some piUage. The new Gov
ernor, Shannon — a proslavery man — acted as media
tor, and the result was a treaty that deprived the
invaders of all legal standing. But there were many
affrays. When a proslavery man was kiUed, his

WAR IN KANSAS 233
death was avenged by such organizations as the
Kickapoo rangers. Popular sovereignty had de
veloped from rule of the minority into, first, a dual
government, and, second, civfl war. Such was the
situation which Congress faced when it met on De
cember 3, 1855, with a presidential election looming
in the immediate foreground. It looked very much
as though Congress would, after afl, have to decide
who or what was sovereign in Kansas, in what or
ganization sovereignty was lodged. The country
was more excited than it had ever been. Never
were the two parties more determined. Each had
seen that -violence was possible, for they had seen
that in Kansas it was actual. The Douglas plan
had been bad for the nation, for Congress, for the
Democratic party. It did not bring on the Civfl
War, but it certainly hastened its coming.
Of course one of the effects was to bring Douglas
again into the arena. Congress, which met in De
cember, 1855, went through a prehminary fight over
the speakership, the details of which have no rela
tion to the present subject. There were no clear-
cut party divisions in the House. Probably our
government approximated the group system more
nearly than at any other time in its history. Richard
son, the man through whom Douglas had worked
in the House to put through the Kansas-Nebraska
bifl, was the Democratic candidate. Gradually
the anti-Nebraska men concentrated on Nathaniel

234 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
P. Banks, of Massachusetts, a Democrat who had
opposed Douglas's bUl, and had been re-elected as
a Know-Nothing. Only shortly before he went
over to the Republican party. He favored con
gressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories,
and the re-enactment of the Missouri Compromise.
The stmggle lasted for two months, and finaUy on
February 2, 1856, Banks was elected. The result
was a clear victory for freedom. It also made plain
the issue on which the new Republican party would
go to the country. After waiting three weeks for
the House to organize. President Pierce sent in his
message on the last day of the year. Mr. Pierce's
academic discussion of the slavery question is with
out interest to-day, except that it showed that he
was drifting more and more to the Southern side.
Its temper is sufficiently indicated by one extract:
"It has been a matter of painful regret to see States
conspicuous for their services in founding this re
pubhc and equally sharing its advantages disregard
their constitutional obligations to it. Although
conscious of their inability to heal admitted and
palpable social evUs of their ovm, and which are
completely within their jurisdiction, they engage
in the offensive and hopeless undertaking of reform
ing the domestic institutions of other States, whoUy
beyond their control. In the vain pursuit of ends
by them entirely unattainable, and which they may
not legaUy attempt to compass, they perU the very

WAR IN KANSAS 235
existence of the Constitution and all the countless
benefits which it has conferred. Whfle the people
of the Southern States confine their attention to
their o-wn affairs, not presuming officiously to inter
meddle -with the social institutions of the Northern
States, too many of the inhabitants of the latter are
permanently organized in associations to inflict in
jury on the former by wrongful acts, which would
be cause of war as between foreign powers and only
fail to be such in our system because perpetrated
under cover of the Union." Yet for years it had been
plain that the South could maintain its "domestic
institutions" only by spreading them to new terri
tory, and by forcing the North to recognize property
in slaves that came under their jurisdiction. Only
a few months before several thousand Missourians
had attempted by force, not to maintain "the do
mestic institutions" of Missouri, but to extend them
to Kansas. But the President was already, to all
intents and purposes, proslavery. He commended
strongly the Kansas-Nebraska legislation. It was
plain that Douglas was to have the full back
ing of the administration. Three weeks later Mr.
Pierce reviewed the events in Kansas in a special
message, and recognized the legislature elected by
the Missourians, which had enacted the slave code,
as regular and legal, on the ground that it was im
possible to go behind the retums. The Topeka
convention was held to be iflegal. Undoubtedly

236 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
regularity was with the legislature and the govemor.
But little was gained by affirming the proposition,
since it was clear that the people of Kansas would
not fail to resist attempts to fasten slavery on them.
It might be tme, as the President said in his Decem
ber message, that the Kansas-Nebraska bifl "was
the final consummation and complete recognition
of the principle that no portion of the United States
shall undertake through the assumption of the powers
of the general government to dictate the social in
stitutions of any other portions," but it is quite as
true that the people of the North, and the majority
of the people of Kansas believed that Congress had
the power to prohibit slavery in the Territories,
and that it was a power that should be exercised.
Even Douglas himself had said during the debate
of the compromise measures of 1850: "I am not,
therefore, prepared to say that under the Consti
tution we have not the power to pass laws exclud
ing negro slaves from the Territories," though he
added that it was his behef that "the whole subject
should be left to the people of the Territories." This
right, he thought, shoiUd be "conceded to the Terri
tories the moment they have governments and legis
latures estabhshed for them." It is hard to see how
there could be any question of the power. As to
conceding sovereignty to them after the people had
estabhshed a government, it was conceded to Kan
sas before it had either government or inhabitants.

WAR IN KANSAS 237
The question stfll was as to the wisdom of Douglas's
plan. The President closed his message by recom
mending that a bfll be passed "providing that when
the inhabitants of Kansas may desire it and shaU
be of sufficient number to constitute a State, a con
vention of delegates, duly elected by the qualified
voters, shafl assemble to frame a Constitution, and
thus to prepare through regular and lawful means
for its admission into the Union as a State." It
never occurred to the President that he could have
set aside both the constitutional convention and
the fraudulent legislature, and have used the power
in his hands to see that the will of the people was
honestly expressed. Indeed, he disclaimed the right
to use any such power. No power, apparently, was
constitutional that might interfere with the plans
and purposes of the slavery leaders, with Jefferson
Da-vis, who was in the complete confidence of the
President, at their head.
Douglas, just recovering from a protracted fllness,
did not reach Washington till after the President's
special message had been sent in, but when he came
he took fuU charge of the situation. But before he
acted, the President issued a proclamation in re
gard to Kansas, calling on the people to maintain
order and obey the law, and putting the mflitary
force of the government at the disposal of Governor
Shannon, though he was not to use it unless neces
sary to maintain the peace and enforce the law.

238 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
The people of the South and the Northern Demo
crats were greatly pleased by the proclamation.
The House had resolved by a close vote that the
Missouri Compromise shoiUd be restored. The
House also voted, one week after Douglas made his
report, to send a committee of three to Kansas to
look into the trouble, and especiaUy to investigate
election frauds. By this time it was sufficiently
evident that the whole subject would figure largely
in the presidential campaign. The Douglas report
was made on March 12. It is hardly more than an
amplification of the President's messages. There
is one point in it, however, that is of special interest,
since the question came up again in coimection with
the discussion as to the relation of the Phihppines
to this government. It involves the constmction
of the clause of the Constitution which pro-vides
that "Congress shaU have power to dispose of and
make aU needful rules and regulations respecting
territory or other property belonging to the United
States." "The language of this clause," Douglas
said in his report, "is much more appropriate when
appUed to property than to persons. It would seem
to have been employed for the purpose of conferrmg
upon Congress the power of disposing of the pubUc
lands and other property belonging to the United States,
and to make all needful rules and regulations for
that purpose, rather than to govern the people who
might purchase those lands from the United States

WAR IN KANSAS 239
and become residents thereon. The word ' territory '
was an appropriate expression to designate that large
area of pubhc lands of which the United States had
become the owner by virtue of the Revolution, and
the cession by the several States. The additional
words, 'or other property belonging to the United
States,' clearly show that the word 'territory' was
used in its ordinary geographical sense to designate
the pubhc domain, and not as descriptive of the
whole body of the people, constituting a distinct
pohtical community, who have no representation
in Congress, and consequently no voice in making
the laws upon which afl their rights and hberties
woifld depend, if it were conceded that Congress
had the general and unlimited power to make 'all
needful rules and regulations concerning' their in
ternal affairs and domestic concerns. ... In view
of these considerations, your committee are not
prepared to affirm that Congress derives authority
to institute governments for the people of the Terri
tories from that clause of the Constitution which
confers the right to make needful rules and regula
tions concerning the territory or other property of
the United States. ... Is not the organization of
a territory eminently necessary and proper as a
means of enabling the people thereof to form and
mould their local and domestic institutions, and
estabhsh a state government under the authority
of the Constitution, preparatory to its admission

240 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
into the Union? If so, the right of Congress to pass
the organic act for the temporary government is
clearly included in the provision which authorizes
the admission of new States. . . . The orgamc act
of the territory, deriving its validity from the power
of Congress to admit new States, must contain no
provision or restriction which would destroy or
impair the equality of the proposd State -with the
original States, or impose any Umitation upon its
sovereignty which the Constitution has not placed
on aU the States," but "must leave the people en
tirely free to form and regulate their domestic in
stitutions and internal concerns in their own way,
subject only to the Constitution of the United States,
to the end that when they attain the requisite pop
ulation, and estabhsh a State government in con
formity with the Constitution, they may be admitted
to the Union on an equal footing with the original
States in aU respects whatsoever" — that is, with an
equal right to hold slaves.
Thus Douglas traced his popular sovereignty to
the Constitution itseK. He amplified somewhat the
President's theory that "whUe all the States of
the Union are united in one for certain purposes,
yet each State, in respect to everything which affects
its domestic pohcy and internal concerns, stands
in the relation of a foreign power to every other
State." To such an extreme -view had Douglas
been forced. His report upheld the governor and

WAR IN KANSAS 241
legislature of Kansas, not only on the ground of
regularity, but also on the ground that the emigrants
from New England had been at least as guflty as
the other party. Indeed, he traced most of the
trouble to the Emigrant-Aid Company, whose mem
bers were denounced as revolutionists. "If these
unfortunate troubles," the words are from the re
port, " have resulted as a natural consequence from
unauthorized and improper schemes of foreign inter
ference with the internal affairs and domestic con
cerns of the territory, it is apparent that the remedy
must be sought in a strict adherence to the principles
and rigid enforcement of the orgamc law." The
President's discussion of the subject was commended,
and leave was asked to report a bfll in accordance
with his suggestion, providing for the admission of
Kansas as a State -with such Constitution as it might
see fit to adopt, when she should have a popula
tion of 93,420 inhabitants. It seems strange that
men to-day should have argued at such length over
such subjects. Douglas was yet to find his sovereign
in Kansas. Indeed, he came perflously near ad
mitting that there was none when he said in his
report: "The sovereignty of a territory remains in
abeyance, suspended in the United States, in tmst
for the people, until they shaU be admitted into the
Union." If that was trae, was not the sovereignty,
after aU, in Congress, even though it held it in trast?
This report was signed by four members of the com-

242 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
mittee; but there was a minority report signed by
Senator CoUamer of Vermont. This upheld the
Topeka convention, and demanded the repeal of
the Kansas-Nebraska act. If Congress should be
un-wilUng to do this, it should "declare aU action
by the spurious foreign legislative assembly utterly
inoperative and void, and direct a reorganization,
providing proper safeguards for legal voting and
against foreign force." It was suggested also that
Kansas might be admitted as a free State under
the Topeka Constitution. After the reports were
read Senator Sumner declared that "in the ma
jority report the true issue is smothered; in that
of the minority, the tme issue stands forth as a pillar
of fire to guide the country." Douglas argued as
a lawyer pledged to maintain a theory, and was
utterly untouched by the moral issues. Even yet
he did not appreciate the intensity of the popular
feeling on the subject. It was fitting that Sumner
should speak a word in defense of the Emigrant-
Aid Company which had, by the President and
Douglas, been ranked in the moral scale below the
Border Ruffians from Missouri. Douglas spoke
on his biU March 20, and his speech is admitted
by aU to have been a great one, and certainly it
made a profound impression. Yet he travelled
over old and famUiar ground, advancing no new
arguments. What he said was exactly in line with
his report. The best comment on it is that of Har-

WAR IN KANSAS 243
riet Beecher Stowe, who heard it from the Senate
gaUery. Admitting its power, and the power of
the man, Mrs. Stowe said: "His forte in debating
is his power of mystifying the point. With the most
offhand assured ahs in the world, and a certain ap
pearance of honest superiority, hke one who has a
regard for you and wishes to set you right on one
or two httle matters, he proceeds to set up some
httle point which is not that in question, but only
a famfly connection of it, and this point he attacks
with the very best of logic and language; he charges
upon it horse, foot, and dragoons, runs it down,
tramples it in the dust, and then turns upon you
with — 'Sir, there is your argument ! Did not I tell
you so? You see it is all stuff'; and if you have
aUowed yourself to be dazzled by his quickness as
to forget that the touted point is not, after aU, the
point in question, you suppose aU is over with it.
He contrives to mingle up so many stinging aUusions
to so many piquant personalities that by the time
he has done his mystification a dozen others are
ready to spring on their feet to repel some direct
or indirect attack, aU equally wide of the point.
His speeches, instead of being hke an arrow sent
at the mark, resemble rather a bomb which hits
nothing in particular, but bursts and sends red-hot
naUs in every direction." That is a very shrewd
and very true characterization of Douglas's method.
In this case, for instance, it was Douglas's theory

244 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of popular sovereignty that was on trial, rather
than Kansas, the Emigrant-Aid Company, or the
Missourians. Senator CoUamer met the issue when
he demanded the repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska
biU. Douglas evaded it when he argued that the
biU would have worked well except for the fraud
and violence that marked the election, which were
the direct results of the application of the Douglas
theory. One of the results of this debate in which
Sumner and Douglas were guUty of using the most
•violent language — Sumner in particular — ^was the
assault of Preston Brooks, a representative of South
CaroUna, on the Massachusetts senator on May 22.
The provocation was an attack by Sumner on Sena
tor Butler of South CaroUna, a relative of Brooks.
Why Butler should have been speciaUy smgled out
for attack is not clear, since he had been rather more
moderate than others in his speeches. However, he
had broken off personal relations with Sumner, and
had reflected on him personally. It was a case of
shattered friendship. But nothing could justify
the cowardly assault of Brooks on Sumner, made
in the Senate Chamber, after that body had ad
journed, when Sumner was writing at his desk. It
narrowly missed being fatal. It was not tiU four
years later that Sumner was able to resume his sena
torial duties, and he never fuUy recovered his health
and strength. A committee of the Senate reported
that the assault was a breach of the privUeges of

WAR IN KANSAS 245
that body, but that the House alone had jurisdic
tion over Brooks. The House vote on a resolution
to expel Brooks was 121 to 95, the resolution fafl-
ing as a two-thirds vote was required. Brooks was
later elected to succeed himself, oifly 6 votes in the
whole district being cast against hun. It should
be said that Douglas was one of the first on the
scene after the attack had been made, and he was
criticized severely for not coming to the assistance
of the stricken man. Feeling that a defense was
necessary, he said that he was in an antechamber
of the Senate at the time, and his first impulse, on
being informed of what was taking place, was to
do what he could to put an end to the "affray."
But fearing that his motives might be misconstrued,
he did not yield to the impulse. The bratal assault
was fiercely denounced in Congress, and by none
more fiercely than by Anson Burhngame, represen
tative from Massachusetts, later minister to China,
a man of the highest character and greatest courage.
Brooks, he said, had acted in violation of "that
fair play which bulhes and prize-fighters respect."
The speech brought a chaUenge from Brooks, which
Burhngame very promptly accepted, appointing,
through his second, a meeting-place on the Cana
dian side of Niagara Falls. This was unsatisfactory
to Brooks, who said that he could not travel in safety
to Canada through an "enemy" country. This af
fair did as much as anything else to intensify public

246 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
feeling, and to di-vide the country. The issue raised
by it was as sectional as the slavery question itself.
"The blows that feU on the head of the senator
from Massachusetts have," said Seward, "done
more for the cause of human freedom in Kansas
and in the Territories of the United States than all
the eloquence — I do not caU it agitation — ^which
has resounded in these haUs from the days when
Rufus King asserted that cause in this chamber,
and when John Quincy Adams defended it in the
other House, untU the present hour." Popular
sovereignty was working out into strange results,
and there were more to foUow. As has been seen
there was practical ci-vU war in Kansas. While
Congress was debating, and -witnessing scenes of
-violence, the two sovereigns in Kansas were strug-
glmg for the supremacy. The North was beginning
to send rifles as weU as men. Emigration was or
ganized and assisted in both sections. Only the
day before the attack on Sumner, the town of Law
rence, the headquarters of the Emigrant-Aid Com
pany, was piUaged and partly destroyed by the
slavery men. It was in revenge for this that John
Brown, his four sons, his son-in-law, and two other
men, kiUed five proslavery men in the most cruel
manner. Out of all the lawlessness, -violence, and
murder, was bom a spirit that pointed directly to
ci-vil war. The Brown massacre was denounced
in Kansas by men without distinction of party.

WAR IN KANSAS 247
The free-State leaders, Reeder, Robinson, and Lane
were indicted for treason. It was even proposed
to arrest former Govemor Reeder whfle he was
engaged in examinmg a witness before the congres
sional investigating committee, which had reached
Kansas in April. Governor Shannon refused to
send federal troops to protect the free-State men,
or to defend Lawrence. Both sides armed, and
there was the wfldest sort of gueriUa warfare aU
over the territory. There was no more popular
sovereignty, in the true sense of the words, in Kan
sas than there was in Russia under the so-caUed
government of the BolshevUd. It was not proving
an easy task to find a sovereign. The congressional
committee made its report on Kansas affairs on
July 1, declaring that the territorial elections were
fraudulent, that the territorial legislature was il-
legaUy constituted, that neither Whitfield nor Reeder
had been legally elected as congressional delegate,
and that under present conditions a legal election
in Kansas was impossible. In this report, which
was signed by two of the three members of the com
mittee, it was found that the Constitution framed
by the Topeka — or free-State — convention repre
sented the wfll of the majority of the people. From
this it would seem that the Topeka convention had
at least cafled a sovereign — the majority of the
people — into being. The minority member of the
committee, Ohver, dealt mainly with the John

248 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Bro-wn massacres, into which he said that his as
sociates refused to go on the ground that they had
no authority to deal with events that had taken
place since the appointment of the committee. The
Oliver report was excellent campaign material, but
for some reason Uttle use was made of it by the
Democrats. There was nothing in either report
that could be used as an argument in favor of the
Douglas theory of popular sovereignty. That is
all that concerns us in this discussion. If not the
provocation of the numerous atrocities, it at least
paved the way for them, and, one may almost say,
insured and guaranteed them. Congress found it
necessary to do something about Kansas, supposedly
sovereign, but what should it be?

CHAPTER XI
FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY
The year 1856 is an important one in our history
for many reasons, one of them being that it saw
the first Repubhcan national convention. Indeed,
there were two such conventions. One was held
at Pittsburg on February 22 on the caU of the State
comjnittees of Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts,
New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan,
and Wisconsin. This convention served practicaUy
as a sort of national committee. Twenty-three
States were represented by delegates. In an ad
dress, prepared by Henry J. Raymond, and adopted
by the convention, it was demanded that aU laws
permitting the introduction of slavery "into Terri
tories once consecrated to freedom" be repealed,
and the new party was pledged to "resist by every
constitutional means the existence of slavery in
any of the Territories of the United States." Sup
port was promised to the friends of freedom in Kan
sas, and the convention declared "in favor of the
immediate admission of Kansas as a free and in
dependent State." "It is," said the address, "a
leading purpose of our organization to oppose and
overthrow the present national administration."
249

250 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
A caU was issued for a national convention to meet
in PhUadelphia June 17 — ^Bunker HUl day — for
the purpose of nominating candidates for President
and Vice-President. WUson, in his "Division and
Reunion," says of the new RepubUcan party: "It
got its programme from the Free-SoUers, whom it
bodUy absorbed; its radical and aggressive spirit
from the Abohtionists, whom it received without
liking; its liberal -views upon constitutional ques
tions from the Whigs, who constituted both m num
bers and in influence its commanding element; and
its popular impulse from the Democrats, who did
not leave behind them, when they joined it, their
faith in their old party ideals." The convention
met on the determined date, and nominated John
C. Fremont for President, and WUUam L. Dayton
for Vice-President. It is worthy of note that on
the informal baUot Abraham Lincoln received 110
votes for Vice-President. Seward was not a candi
date, and Chase had withdra-wn his name. Judge
McLean was Fremont's rival. The attitude of the
party toward slavery is sufficiently indicated by
the following extracts from the platform: "As
our Republican fathers, when they had abolished
slavery in all our national territory, ordained that
no person should be deprived of Ufe, liberty, or
property without due process of law, it becomes
our duty to maintain this provision of the Consti
tution against aU attempts to -violate it for the pur-

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 251
pose of estabhshing slavery m any territory of the
United States, by positive legislation prohibiting its
existence upon or extension therein. The Constitu
tion confers on Congress sovereign power over the
Territories of the United States for their govern
ment, and in the exercise of this power it is both
the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in
the Territories those t-win relics of barbarism —
polygamy and slavery. The dearest constitutional
rights of the people of Kansas have been fraudu
lently and -violently taken from them — their terri
tory has been invaded by an armed force — spurious
and pretended legislative, judicial, and executive
officers have been set over them, by whose usurped
authority, sustained by the mihtary power of the
government, tyrannical and unconstitutional laws
have been enacted and enforced — the rights of the
people to keep and bear arms have been infringed
— test oaths of an extraordinary and entangling
nature have been imposed as a condition of exercis
ing the right of suffrage and holding office," and
so on through the whole category of crimes. "AU
these things," the platform declared, "have been
done with the knowledge, sanction, and procure
ment of the present administration, and for this
high crime against the Constitution, the Union,
and humanity, we arraign the administration, the
President, his advisers, agents, supporters, apologists,
and accessories, either before or after the facts, be-

252 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
fore the country and before the world, and it is our
fixed purpose to bring the actual perpetrators of
these atrocious outrages, and their accomplices to
a sure and condign punishment hereafter." The
immediate admission of Kansas as a free State under
the Topeka Constitution was demanded. The Re
publicans clearly welcomed "Bleeding Kansas" as
a campaign issue.
The Democrats were first in the field, their con
vention having been held at Cincinnati June 2.
The sole question was as to what man would be
most likely to hold the Northem wing of the party
in line, since any one of the possibUities was satis
factory to the South. The President hoped for a
renomination, and Douglas of course was a candi
date. Pierce was, perhaps, the South's favorite,
-with Douglas a close second. And it might have
been thought that, -with the Kansas-Nebraska biU
the principal issue, one of the two men — ^preferably
Douglas — ^would have been chosen. The vote of
Pennsylvania was indispensable, and so the party
turned toward James Buchanan, a citizen of that
State. He had been out of the country when Doug
las's biU was passed, serving as Minister to Great
Britain. His orthodoxy on the Kansas question
was proved by a letter written by him to ShdeU in
London, six months before, in which he said that
the Missouri Compromise was gone for ever, and
that the principle of popular sovereignty as apphed

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 253
to Kansas must be upheld and maintained. On
the first baUot Buchanan received 135 votes. Pierce
122, Douglas 33, and Cass 5. One hundred and
three of the Buchanan votes came from the North,
and 32 from the slave States. On the succeeding
baUots Douglas gained at the expense of the Presi
dent, Buchanan recei-ving a majority on the tenth,
the result being 168 for Buchanan and 118 for Doug
las. After the sixteenth ballot, which showed no
change, Buchanan being stfll short of the necessary
two-thirds, Richardson, chairman of the Illinois
delegation, read the foUowing despatch from Doug
las: "If the withdrawal of my name wfll contribute
to the harmony of our party or the success of our
cause, I hope you wiU not hesitate to take the
step. ... If Mr. Pierce or Mr. Buchanan, or any
other statesman who is faithful to the great issues
involved in the contest, shall receive a majority
of the convention, I eamestly hope that afl my
friends wiU unite in insuring him two-thirds, and
then making his nomination unanimous. Let no
personal consideration disturb the harmony or en
danger the triumph of our principles." Buchanan
was then unanimously chosen. John C. Brecken-
ridge, of Kentucky, was nominated for Vice-Presi
dent. The convention declared itself opposed to the
principles of Know-Nothingism, and denounced
"the crusade against Cathohcs and foreign-bom"

254 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
as "neither justffied by the past nor the future,
nor in unison with our spirit of toleration or en
lightened freedom." The convention resolved that
Congress had no power to interfere with slaveiy
in the States, and that "aU efforts to induce Con
gress to interfere -with questions of slavery ought
to be discountenanced, as they lead to dangerous
consequences." The compromise of 1850 was in
dorsed, and the principles of the Kansas-Nebraska
biU were approved. Sectionalism was repudiated,
and non-interference by the general government
with slavery was accepted as good Democratic doc
trine. Thus the issue was drawn. Again threats
of secession in case of Fremont's election were
heard. It was contended that the RepubUcan party
was sectional, and indeed it had no strength m the
South. Many men were undoubtedly held by the
Democrats on that argument. Rufus Choate, the
great Massachusetts la-wyer and Whig, declared
for Buchanan, and made a powerful argument in
his behaK. The situation was further complicated
by the nomination of Fillmore by the American
party, who was later indorsed by a Whig convention.
With the candidates and their principles before the
country, it is necessary to turn again to the efforts
of Congress to solve the Kansas problem. The
best bUl offered was that of Toombs, the Southem
Whig. It was accepted by Douglas, though it was
later amended in a way that was thought to reflect

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 255
on the Ilhnois senator. The Democrats felt that
something would have to be done in an affirmative
way, but the Republicans were satisfied to let things
drift. They distmsted, and with reason, the ad
ministration, and were not sorry to have such an
issue as that presented by Kansas. The Toombs
bill passed the Senate but was defeated in the House,
which voted to admit Kansas under the Topeka
Constitution. On August 18, Congress adjourned
without action. Having faded to pass the army
appropriation, it was cafled together in extraordinary
session August 21, passed the army bfll without
the objectionable Kansas amendment ten days
later, and adjourned.
So the issue was left to the people. For the first
tune there was a party in the field that was not
afraid to draw the line sharply between freedom and
slavery. The Republican party drew to itself the
support of the great moral influences of the North.
Men graduaUy began to realize that it might be
possible to get rid of slavery and save the Union
without making any further surrenders to slavery.
The rehgious press was practically solid against
Buchanan, and it fairly represented the feeling that
prevaUed in the churches. Clergymen, college pro
fessors — it was not tfll later that Repubhcan orators
sneered at "pale-faced professors" — school-teachers,
hterary men were among the strongest and most
active supporters of Fremont. Emerson, Long-

256 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
fellow, Bryant, George WiUiam Curtis, and Wash
ington Irving all spoke for the Republican ticket.
Perhaps even the scomers of Victorianism wiU re-
caU Whittier's lines to Fremont:
" StiU take thou courage I God has spoken through thee,
Irrevocable, the mighty words, Be free !
The land shakes with them, and the slave's duU ear
Turns from the rice-swamp stealthily to hear.
Who would recall them now must first arrest
The -winds that blow do-wn from the free North-west,
RufSing the gulf or like a scroU roll back
The Mississippi to its upper springs.
Such words fulfil their prophecy, and lack
But the full time to harden into things."
The RepubUcans pressed the Kansas issue with
the utmost vigor, and the Democrats did not seem
even to try to meet it. Yet they had good material
in the Oliver report, but apparently they did not
realize its importance. The initiative, enthusiasm,
and dash were aU -with the new party. Douglas
was one of the most conspicuous leaders on the
Democratic side, contributing liberally to the cause,
and speaking with his usual effectiveness, mostly
in the doubtful States, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
lUinois, and Indiana. He gave -with special liberahty
to the Pennsylvania campaign, as that was Bu
chanan's own State, and its vote was necessary to
the election of the Democratic ticket. Everything
that he could do he did for the success of his party.

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 257
The Democratic party, however, was stiU strong,
and stfll national. Its appeal to the men who feared
that Fremont's election woifld break up the Union
was powerful. Business, always timid, was not
easfly roused by the Repubhcan war-cry. There
were no doubt many men hke Choate who did not
believe that Buchanan's election would fasten slavery
on the country, but who did fear that secession might
foUow a Republican victory. Buchanan, too, had
a creditable record in pubhc affairs, and was much
respected, while Fremont had no reputation as a
statesman. Had he been elected, and had secession
foUowed, one does not even at this late day hke to
think of what would have happened. At any rate
Buchanan was elected, carrying every slave State,
and the great doubtful States of the North — New
Jersey, Pennsylvama, Indiana, Ilhnois, and Cah
fomia. His total vote was 1,837,337 to 1,341,812
for Fremont; Fillmore was a good third, polling
873,055 votes. On the popular vote Buchanan
was a minority President. FiUmore carried Mary
land. Buchanan's electoral vote was 174 as against
114 for Fremont, and 8 for FiUmore. Douglas could
hardly have -viewed the result in lUinois -without
grave misgivings. In the October election the Demo
cratic candidate for govemor — Richardson, the man
who had helped the Kansas-Nebraska biU through
the House — ^was beaten by the candidate of the
anti-Nebraska forces, a Democrat who had refused

258 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
to sanction the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.
In November Buchanan had indeed a plurahty of
9,159, but four years before Pierce's plurahty had
been in excess of 15,000. Buchanan's vote was
105,348; that of Fremont 96,189; and that of FiU
more 37,444. The aggregate vote of the opposition
was 133,633, or 28,285 in excess of that given to
Buchanan. Douglas had anticipated the loss of
the State in October, and had only hoped for -vic
tory in November. Disappointed he no doubt was,
but hardly surprised. But on the whole he might
well have claimed that the country had indorsed
his popular sovereignty doctrine. His party had
championed it, and his party had won. . . .
We have a startling picture of these times from
the pen of Walt Whitman, who has shown that for
years the North had been quite as responsible as
the South for slavery. "For twenty-five years,"
says Whitman, "prior to the outbreak, the con-
troUing Democratic nominating conventions of our
repubhc — starting from their primaries in wards
or districts, and so expanding to counties, powerful
cities, States, and to the great presidential nominat
ing conventions — were getting to represent and be
composed of more and more putrid and dangerous
materials. Let me give a schedule or list of one of
these representative conventions for a long time be
fore, and inclusive of that which nommated Bu
chanan. . . . The members who composed it were.

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 259
seven-eighths of them, the meanest kind of bawhng
and blowing office-holders, office-seekers, pimps,
mahgnants, conspirators, murderers, fancy-men, cus
tom-house clerks, contractors, kept editors, spaniels
weU-trained to carry and fetch, jobbers, infidels,
disunionists, terrorists, mafl-riflers, slave-catchers,
pushers of slavery, creatures of the President, crea
tures of would-be Presidents, spies, bribers, com
promisers, lobbyers, sponges, rained sports, expeUed
gamblers, pohcy-backers, monte-dealers, duelhsts,
carriers of concealed weapons, deaf men, pimpled
men, scarred inside -with vile disease, gaudy outside
with gold chains made from the people's money and
harlots' money twisted together; crawling men,
serpentine men, the lousy combings and bom free-
dom-seUers of the earth. And whence came they?
From back-yards and bar-rooms; from out of the
custom-houses, marshals' offices, post-offices, and
gambling hells: from the President's house, the
jafl, the station-house; from unnamed by-places
where devihsh disunion was hatched at midnight;
from political hearses, and from the coffins inside,
and from the shrouds inside of the coffins; from
the tumors and abscesses of the land; from the
skeletons and skuUs in the vaults of the federal alms
houses; and from the running sores of the great
cities. Such, I say, formed, or absolutely controUed
the forming of the entire personnel, the atmosphere,
nutriment and chyle of our municipal. State, and

260 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
national poUtics— snbstantiaUy permeating, han
dling, deciding, and wielding everything — ^legislation,
nominations, elections, 'pubUc sentiment,' etc., whUe
the great masses of the people, farmers, mechanics,
and traders, were helpless ia their grip. These con
ditions were mostly prevalent in the North and
West, and especiaUy in New York and PhUadelphia
cities; and the Southem leaders (bad enough, but
of a far higher order), struck hands and affihated
with them. Is it strange that a thunder-storm fol
lowed such morbid and stifling cloud strata? . . .
The sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth terms
of the American presidency have shown that the
¦viUainy and shaUovmess of rulers (backed by the
machinery of great parties) are just as ehgible to
these States as to any foreign despotism, kingdom,
or empire — ^there is not a bit of difference. History
is to record those three Presidentiads, and especiaUy
the administrations of FiUmore and Buchanan, as
so far our topmost warning and shame. Never
were pubhcly displayed more deformed, mediocre,
snivelling, unreUable, false-hearted men. Never were
these States so insulted, and attempted to be be
trayed. AU the main purposes for which the govern
ment was established were openly denied. The
perfect equahty of slavery with freedom was flaunt-
ingly preached in the North — ^nay, the superiority
of slavery. The slave-trade was proposed to be
renewed. Everywhere frowns and misunderstand-

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 261
ings — everywhere exasperations and humfliations."
There may be some exaggeration, but there can be
no doubt that in those disheartening days American
pohtics sank to a disgracefully low level. It was soon
shown, and in such a way as to make it clear even
to those who were most hopeful for freedom, that
Buchanan's election was a victory for slavery. When
the new President was inaugurated a third govemor
was trying to estabhsh popular sovereignty in Kan
sas. The administration of Shannon had come to
be such a scandal as to be a burden in the campaign,
and so he was removed in August, 1856, after having
incurred the enmity even of the proslavery faction.
In his place was appointed J. W. Geary, a man of
good character. Peace in Kansas was, he said, neces
sary if Buchanan was to be elected. And he did
much to restore peace, and probably would have
succeeded but for the proslavery men. It is a note
worthy fact that Democrats and Southem men of
inteUigence and character almost invariably took
the side of freedom when they were caUed on as
residents of new States and Territories to frame
Constitutions for them. It had been so in Cah
fomia. It was so in the case of the Topeka Conven
tion. And now we find Governor Geary, who had
maintained entire impartiality, opposed by the
radical slavery interest. Govemor Reeder, another
proslavery man, met the same fate. Geary was able
to say -within a month after his arrival in Kansas that

262 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
"peace now reigns," and "confidence is being grad
uaUy restored." In a speech delivered after the
October victory in Pennsylvania, Buchanan said:
"Peace has been restored in Kansas. ... We
shall hear no more of bleeding Kansas. There wiU
be no more shrieks for her unhappy destiny." Things
continued to go well, and the report of the govemor,
who had won the confidence of the free-State people,
made m November, was very encouraging. Presi
dent Pierce in his last message congratulated the
coimtry on "the peaceful condition of things in
Kansas," and praised "the -wisdom and energy of
the present executive." But it soon appeared that
Pierce cared more for the good-wiU of the slavery
interest than for the welfare of Kansas. It is pos
sible that the Kansas problem might have been
solved by Geary had he been supported by either
Pierce or Buchanan. But he had offended the slavery
men by his faimess, and was hampered m every
way possible by federal officers in Kansas. His
removal was demanded. Finding that there was
no intention on the part of Washington to deal hon
orably vrith the matter, Geary, feehng that he could
accompUsh nothing, resigned on March 4, the day
of the inauguration of Buchanan.
In his inaugural address the new President
radiated good-wiU. "The voice of the majority,"
he said, speaking of the recent election, "speaking
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, was

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 263
heard, and instant submission followed. Our own
country could alone have exhibited so grand and
striking a spectacle of the capacity of man for
self-government." From this not whofly origmal
generahzation Mr. Buchanan drew the foUo-wing
moral: "What a happy conception, then, was it
for Congress to apply this simple rule, that the wfll
of the majority shall govern, to the settlement of
the question of domestic slavery in the Territories !
Congress is neither 'to legislate slavery into any
territory or State nor to exclude it therefrom, but
to leave the people perfectly free to form and regu
late their domestic institutions in their o-wn way,
subject only to the Constitution of the United
States.' . . . The whole territorial question being
thus settled upon the principle of popular sover
eignty — a principle as ancient as free government
itself — everything of a practical nature has been
decided. No other question remains for adjustment,
because all agree that under the Constitution slavery
in the States is beyond the reach of any human
power except that of the respective States wherein
it exists. May we not, then, hope that the long
agitation on this subject is approaching its end, and
that the geographical parties to which it has given
birth, so much dreaded by the Father of his Coun
try, wfll speedfly become extinct? Most happy
¦wfll it be for the country when the pubhc mind shall
be diverted from this question to others of more

264 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
pressing and practical importance. . . . This ques
tion of domestic slavery is of far graver importance
than any mere pohtical question, because should
the agitation continue it may eventuaUy endanger
the personal safety of a large portion of our country
men where the institution exists. In that event no
form of government, however admirable in itself,
and however productive of material benefits, can
compensate for the loss of peace and domestic secur
ity around the famUy altar. Let every Union-loving
man, therefore, exert his best influence to suppress
the agitation, which since the recent legislation of
Congress is without any legitimate object." Two
days later came the Dred Scott decision, of which
something will be said later, which roused the na
tion as it had never been roused before. What we
are concemed with now is the new administration.
Little need be said of the President, who was simply
a weak, weU-meamng man, surrounded by others
of much greater force who knew exactly what they
wanted. Four members of the cabinet came from
slave, and three from free. States. Lewis Cass of
Michigan, Secretary of State, a survivor of the old
compromise days, was in his seventy-fifth year.
The attorney-generalship fell to Jeremiah S. Black
of Pennsylvania, a man of character and abihty.
The other Northern man was Isaac Toucey of Con
necticut, who was Secretary of the Navy. But
Toucey was so strongly Southem in his sympathies

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 265
as to have ahenated from himself the support of
his constituents. His term as senator from Con
necticut had just expired. The strongest man in
the new cabinet was Howefl Cobb of Georgia, Secre
tary of the Na-vy. In 1850 he had been known as
a Unionist, and was thought to be conservative.
Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the
Interior, was an extreme States' rights man. John
B. Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of War, was not
known to have any special qualifications for high
place. The postmaster-general was Aaron V. Brown
(rf Tennessee. From such a President and cabinet
the foes of slavery had nothing to hope. Indeed
as events showed the trae friends of popular sover
eignty were betrayed by them, for it soon developed
that the administration thought it more important
that the decision of Kansas should be "right" from
the slavery point of Ariew than that it should be
the decision of the people. The Kansas question
immediately began to press for consideration. Gov
emor Geary, as has been said, resigned on the day
of Buchanan's inauguration. He had quarreUed
with the slavery men over the election held in
October, 1856 — ^in which the free-State men had
refused to participate — ^for territorial delegate, and
members of the legislature. The govemor was de
nounced by the proslavery faction, and even threat
ened -with assassination. A delegation headed by
John Calhoim, surveyor-general of the territory,

266 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
-visited Washington to bring about the removal of
the govemor. It was necessary to find a new gov
emor, since the legislature chosen in October, 1856,
had fixed the third Monday in June, 1857, as the day
for the election of delegates to the constitutional
convention. After much persuasion Robert J,
Walker consented to undertake the thankless job.
He was a Democrat, of course, a Mississippian, and
friendly to slavery. Also he was a man of good
character, and fine abUity. He had served as Secre
tary of the Treasury under President Polk, and as
senator, and was the author of the famous Walker
tariff of 1846. Douglas strongly urged hiTn to ac
cept the governorship of Kansas. But before he
went, the Supreme Court had handed do-wn the
Dred Scott decision, which had a very important
bearing on Kansas affairs. In that famous opmion
of Chief Justice Taney much was decided beside
the point at issue, which was whether the court had
jurisdiction of the case. The court held that a negro
descended from slave parents was not a citizen of
the United States, and so could not sue in its courts.
If the court had stopped there, little would have
been heard of the ruling. But, ambitious to settle
the slavery question, the court held further that the
Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, and
therefore that the master's property right in his
slave could not be extinguished in any territory.
Probably no more far-reaching decision was ever

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 267
handed down by the Supreme Court. Its bearing
on the pohtics of the day is clear enough. If the
chief justice was right there were thousands of
negroes scattered over the country who had been
for years citizens of the States in which they re
sided who were not citizens of the United States.
The decision amounted to a declaration of the un
constitutionality of the new Repubhcan party, the
fundamental doctrine of which was that Congress
had the power, and should exercise it, to prohibit
slavery in the Territories. The majority opinion
was hardly more than a judicial declaration of the
old Calhoun theory that slavery was self-extending,
and was taken everjTvhere by the Constitution.
But the bearing of the decision on Douglas, and on
the situation in Kansas is what chiefly interests us.
The lUinois senator, strangely enough, looked on
it as an indorsement of his theory of popular sover
eignty. The right which the court had said was
lodged in the master to take his slave into any part
of the country, and hold him in servitude, was, said
Douglas, "a barren and worthless right, unless sus
tained, protected and enforced by appropriate police
regulations and local regulations, prescribing ade
quate remedies. These regulations and remedies
must necessarfly depend entirely upon the wiU and
¦wishes of the people of the territory, as they can
only be prescribed by the local legislatures." And
he concluded that "the great principle of popular

268 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
sovereignty and seK-govemment is sustained and
firmly estabhshed by the authority of this decision."
In other words, a right enjoyed by an American
citizen under the Constitution of the United States
was of no value since the people of a territory might
lawlessly set it aside, or refuse to enforce it. Great
constitutional rights are not to be left to the local
police to enforce. One cannot but wonder whether
Douglas really beUeved that the court had upheld
popular sovereignty, or whether he was merely try
ing to make the best of a bad case. He was to
use the argument set out above many times, pressing
it very hard in his debate with Lincoln. In a sense
the North "accepted" the decision, for it could do
nothing else. There was a raising of the old ques
tion as to the respect due the courts. Many ex-
ceUent lawyers held that the decision was not bind
ing on the people in its broad scope, since, as they
held, all of it deaUng -with the constitutional ques
tion was obiter. This was the view of Justice Cur
tis, who delivered the dissenting opinion, which was
affirmed later by the Emancipation Proclamation
and Appomattox. "I do not consider," said Justice
Curtis, "it to be within the scope of the judicial
power of the majority of the court to pass upon
any question respecting the plaintiff's citizenship
in Missouri, save that raised by the plea to the juris
diction; and I do not hold any opinion of this court
or any court binding when expressed on a question

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 269
not legitimately before it. The judgment of this
court is that the case is to be dismissed for want
of jurisdiction, because the plaintiff was not a citizen
of Missouri, as he aUeged in his declaration. Into
that judgment, according to the settled course of
this court, nothing occurring after a plea to the
merits can enter. A great question of constitutional
law, deeply affecting the peace and welfare of the
coimtry, is not, in my opinion, a fit subject to be
thus reached." The South was enthusiastic over
the decision, recognizing it for what it was — one
of the most formidable blows ever stmck in behalf
of slavery. Southem men laughed at Douglas's
theory that the decision maintained his doctrine
of popular sovereignty. "It is obvious," said Judah
P. Benjamin, later holder of three positions in the
Confederate cabinet, "that since the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Dred
Scott case, it is decided that from the origin all this
agitation of the slavery question has been directed
against the constitutional rights of the South; and
that both Wflmot provisos and Missouri Com
promise lines were unconstitutional." The slavery
men reahzed the extent of their victory. They saw
in it, too, a -victory, not only over the Missouri Com
promise, but over popular sovereignty as wefl. For
if Congress could not prohibit slavery how could
a territorial legislature do so? Afl that popular
sovereignty under the new conditions could mean

270 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
was that the people might vote whether they would
have slavery or not, but that only the votes for
slavery would count. The court in effect adopted
the theory that since the negro was inferior to the
white man he was rightfuUy and forever doomed
to slavery. The negroes, said the chief justice, "had
for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit
to associate -with the white race, either in social
or pohtical relations; and so far inferior that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect, and that the negro might justly and law
fully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was
bought and sold, and treated as an ordinaiy article
of merchandise and traffic, wherever a profit could
be made by it. The opinion was at that time fixed
and universal in the civUized portion of the white
race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as
weU as m pohtics, which no one thought of disput
ing, or supposed to be open to dispute; and men
in every grade and position of society daUy and
habituaUy acted upon it in their private pursuits,
as weU as in matters of pubhc concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this
opinion." It is hard to imagine a chief justice of
the United States gi-ving expression to such views.
Douglas eamestly, and with apparent enthusiasm,
defended the decision. He, too, made much of the
argument based on the negro's inferiority, and re-

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 271
joiced that the country was to continue to enjoy
white supremacy and be spared negro equahty.
With a quotation from Lincoln, who declared that
m his opmion the decision was wrong, the considera
tion of it wfll be brought to a close: "There is a
natural disgust in the minds of nearly aU white
people to the idea of an indiscriminate amalgama
tion of the white and black races ; and Judge Douglas
e-vidently is basing his chief hope upon the chances
of his being able to appropriate the benefit of this
disgust to himself. If he can, by much dramming
and repeatmg, fasten the odium of that idea upon
his adversaries he thinks he can straggle through
the storm. He therefore clings to this hope, as a
drowning man to the last plank. He makes an oc
casion for lugging it in from the opposition to the
Dred Scott decision. He finds the Repubhcans in
sisting that the Declaration of Independence in
cludes all men, black as weU as white, and forth
with he boldly denies that it includes negroes at
aU, and proceeds to argue gravely that aU who con
tend it does, do so only because they want to vote,
and eat, and sleep, and marry with negroes! He
wfll have it that they cannot be consistent else.
Now I protest against the counterfeit logic which
concludes that, because I do not want a black woman
for a slave I must necessarfly want her for a wife.
I need not have her for either. I can just leave her
alone. In some respects she certainly is not my

272 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
equal; but in her natural right to eat the bread
she eams ¦with her own hands without asking leave
of any one else, she is my equal, and the equal of
aU others. . . . The RepubUcans inculcate, with
whatever of abihty they can, that the negro is a
man, that his bondage is crueUy wrong, and that
the field of his oppression ought not to be enlarged.
The Democrats deny his manhood; deny, or dwarf
to insignfficance, the wrong of his bondage; so far
as possible, cmsh aU sympathy for him, and culti
vate and excite hatred and disgust against hun;
compUment themselves as Union-savers for doing
so; and call the indefinite outspreading of his bond
age ' a sacred right of seK-govemment.' The plainest
print cannot be read through a gold eagle; and it
wUl be hard ever to find many men who wiU send
a slave to Liberia, and pay his passage, whUe they
can send him to a new countiy — ^Kansas, for in
stance — and seU him for fifteen hundred doUars,
and the rise."
The issue between Douglas and Lincoln is here
clearly presented. It was fundamentaUy moral.
Lincoln recognized slavery as an institution in the
States that were cursed ¦with it, and one with which
the federal government had no constitutional right
to interfere. But he also saw in it a great e^vU, the
spread of which the federal government had the
power, and was under solenm obhgation, to pre
vent. Douglas looked on it as a matter of indiffer-

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 273
ence, and did not care whether the people chose
slavery or not as long as they were permitted to
have a choice. Indeed he held that it was an abridg
ment of the people's rights to say that they should
not have slavery if they wanted it. It was to him
much as it would be to-day to aUow the people of
a territory to say whether they preferred the direct
primary or the convention system.
When Govemor Walker — to retum to Kansas —
reached the scene of his labors he might have thought
that it was a matter of unimportance whether the
slavery men or the free men won, since under the
Dred Scott decision the territory would, as most
men beheved, be slave territory. But the effect
of the decision does not appear till later. For the
present the stmggle was to go on with the new gov
emor doing everything in his power to see that both
sides had fair play. It should be said that he had
as a coadjutor Frederick P. Stanton of Tennessee,
a man of high character and exceptional talent,
who had been appointed secretary of the territory.
Walker arrived m Kansas May 26, 1857, and his m-
augural address, which had been approved by the
President and Douglas, was pubhshed next day.
These men shared the opinion, generally prevalent
in the South, that the free-State settlers were the
disturbers, but hke Govemor Reeder and Governor
Geary, they soon changed their ¦views. It was clear
to WaUser that Kansas was destined to freedom,

274 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and that, though he would have preferred to see
it admitted as a slave State, the slavery men could
never -win honestly. What he hoped was that Kan
sas could be saved to the Democratic party. He
found that a majority of the Democrats was favor
able to freedom. His effort to bring the Democrats
together faUed, as it could only have been done on
the basis of freedom. The case is typical of what
foUowed throughout the nation. But there seemed
to be a chance of peace. The free-State men agreed
to abandon their proceedings imder the Topeka
Constitution, which certainly was irregular, to say
the least. He promised them that, K the constitu
tional convention shortly to be held, should refuse
to submit the Constitution to the people, he would
join them in opposing that course. He also pledged
— as far as this was possible — ^the President to sub
mission. President Buchanan wrote confidentiaUy
to Walker saying: "On the question of submitting
the Constitution to the bona fide residents of Kan
sas, I am wUling to stand or fafl." On June 15,
1857, the election for delegates was held. The free-
State men refused to vote, and the result was that
out of 9,250 registered voters, only 2,200 voted.
Here was proof conclusive that Kansas was for free
dom. The election was peaceable, and in conform
ity with the law. The fruit of its work was the
Lecompton Constitution, framed at the to-wn of
that name, of unsavory fame, which did as much

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 275
as any other one thing to spht the Democratic
party by driving Douglas into opposition. Be
fore the convention began its work, there was
an election on October 5 for members of the legis
lature and delegate to Congress. The free-State
men changed their pohcy, and participated in the
election, which was probably the first fair election
ever held in Kansas up to that time. The free-
State men chose a majority of both branches of
the legislature and elected their candidate as dele
gate to Congress by a majority of 4,089. The slavery
men did not yield -with good grace. They exhibited
to the govemor what purported to be poll books
from several precincts showing enough votes which
would, if counted, change the complexion of the
legislature. These palpably fraudulent retums were
rejected by the govemor, who gave certificates to
the free-State candidates, and issued a proclamar
tion, in which he said:
"The consideration that our own party by this
decision ¦wfll lose the majority in the legislative as
sembly does not make our duty in the premises
less solemn and imperative. The elective franchise
would be utterly valueless and free govemment
itself would receive a deadly blow, if so great an
outrage as this could be shielded under the cover
of mere form and technicalities." The proslavery
people, both in Kansas and throughout the nation,
raised a cry against the govemor. Leaders in Con-

276 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
gress, headed by Jefferson Da'vis, denounced him,
and Democratic conventions in the South adopted
resolutions censuring him. As late as JiUy the Presi
dent had seemed disposed to stand by him, for it was
in that month that the letter just referred to was
written. Here it is that the Dred Scott decision
enters in. The President had, by August, discovered
that Kansas was already a slave State. "This
point," he said, "has at last been finaUy decided
by the highest tribunal kno-wn to our laws. How
it could ever have been seriously doubted is a mys
tery. If a confederation of sovereign States acquire
new territory at the expense of their common blood
and treasure, surely one set of partners can have
no right to exclude the other from its enjoyment
by prohibitmg them taking into it whatever is recog
nized to be property by the common Constitution."
Yet the President himseK had held only a few weeks
before that the people of Kansas had a right to say
whether they would have slavery or not. Now he
had reached the conclusion that it was "a mys
tery" how any one, including himseK, had ever
thought so. When the Southem leaders learned
that the Lecompton convention would be controUed
by their friends they began to demand that it adopt
a proslavery Constitution and ask admittance to
the Union. Such in fact were the instructions from
Washington, though the President was not in the
plot. The convention met for business October 19,

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 277
1857, representmg but one-fourth of the registered
voters of the territory. It did its work under the pro
tection of United States troops, but for which its
members would have been driven from the Territory.
The convention very promptly adopted a proslavery
Constitution, and pro"vided for a submission to the
people in an election to be held December 21, which
was reaUy no submission at aU. When Govemor
Walker -visited Washington in November, he found
that he had lost the favor of the administration,
and won the hatred of the Southem Democratic
leaders. There was nothing for him to do but re
sign, which he did in. a letter declaring his opposi
tion to the Lecompton Constitution, which, he said,
was also opposed by an overwhelming majority of
the people of Kansas. In his absence Secretary
Stanton had, in response to the requests of the free-
State men, summoned a special session of the legis
lature, which called an election at which a fair vote
might be had on the Constitution adopted by the
Lecompton convention. Thus two elections were
to be held — ^that ordered by the convention on De
cember 21, and that ordered by the free-State legis
lature on January 4, 1858. For his action in calling
the legislature together Stanton was promptly re
moved, and Denver was appointed in his place.
By this time it was clear to all that no man who
conducted himself -with courage, faimess, and honesty
could be satisfactory to those who were bent on

278 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
making Kansas a slave-State. The Lecompton
trick is perfectly transparent. The people were
asked to vote, not for or against the Constitution,
but for the Constitution -with or without slavery.
In either case the vote would have been one for the
Constitution. And even K it had been favorable
to the Constitution without slavery it would have
ratffied the foUo^wing provision: "The right of prop
erty is before and higher than any constitutional
sanction, and the right of the o-wner of a slave to
such slave and its increase is the same and as in-
-violable as the right of the owner of any property
whatever." It was further pro-vided that the Con
stitution could not be amended in any particular
tUl after the year 1864, and never amended so as
to "affect the right of property in the o-wnership
of slaves." To this had popular sovereignty come.
At the December election the vote was for the Con
stitution with slavery, 6,226; for the Constitution
without slavery, 569. It was later proved that
2,720 of these votes were fraudulent. In the January
election, the vote was for the Constitution with
slavery, 138; for the Constitution without slavery,
24; against the Constitution, 10,226. Here is clear
proof that the State was hea-vUy hostUe to slavery.
But no better proof could be asked than the un
willingness of the slavery conspirators to give to
the people an honest chance at a fair election to
express their will. The proslavery men both in
Kansas and Washington knew perfectly well that

FREEDOM VERSUS SLAVERY 279
the people of Kansas were opposed to slavery. That
is the reason why it was found necessary to cheat
them out of their rights by a dastardly trick. Gov
emor Walker denounced the proposed "submission
of the question as a vfle fraud, a base counterfeit,"
and said : " I wiU not support it, but I -wfll denounce
it, no matter whether the administration sustains
it or not." This was hi response to the statement
of John Calhoim, surveyor-general of the territory,
and president of the convention, that the programme
"was the programme of the administration," though
he admitted that he had no letter from the Presi
dent. There are good reasons for behe-ving that
Buchanan was not a party to the conspiracy, though
it undoubtedly centred in Washington. The Presi
dent, however, supported the conspirators after they
had put through their scheme. The whole question
was now transferred to Congress, and in the great
drama that foUowed Mr. Douglas played a leading
part, and a part that did him infinite credit. He
saw that his popular sovereignty programme had
at last been ditched, and that he himself had been
betrayed, and, what was worse, had been the im-
conscious instrument in the betrayal of the people of
Kansas. The necessity for a break -with the slavery
interest was now forced on him. Had he been brave
enough or great enough to break completely the
history of the country might have been very dif
ferent from what it actually was. . . .

CHAPTER XII
DOUGLAS BREAKS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION
In his message of December 8, 1857, President Bu
chanan said that Congress in passing the Kansas-
Nebraska act had declared it to be "the true intent
and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into
any territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom,
but to leave the people perfectly free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their o-wn
way." He held that the question of the existence
or non-existence of slavery must be submitted to
the people, but that there was no reason why the
whole Constitution should be so submitted. That
he would have preferred that method he made clear.
But as Constitutions had been adopted -without
a direct vote of the people on them, and as — so Mr.
Buchanan argued — the Kansas-Nebraska biU did
not pro-vide for or require such submission, he held
that it was not necessary. AU that was necessary
was that the people should be allowed to vote on
the slavery question. Douglas must have been
profoundly astonished by this presidential burk
ing of popular sovereignty in the interest of, and
at the demand of, the slave-power. But before the
message he had been alarmed at the prospect of the
280

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 281
success of the Lecompton trick. In an interview
¦with the President shortly after his arrival at
Washington, Douglas discovered that there was a
wide difference between them. When Mr. Buchanan
said that he would advise the adoption of the
pohcy of the slave-power, Douglas said that he
would denounce and fight it in the Senate. Thus
war was declared, a war that probably kept Doug
las out of the White House, and banished the
Democratic party from power for a quarter of a
century. After the reading of the President's mes
sage, Douglas moved that it be prmted, and said
that he dissented from "that portion of the message
which may fairly be constmed as an appro-ving of
the proceedings of the Lecompton convention."
The next day he addressed the Senate on the sub
ject in a speech of great power. As this is Douglas's
declaration of independence, a somewhat extended
summary of it seems necessary. Mr. Douglas said:
"The President, after expressmg his regret, and
mortification, and disappointment that the Con
stitution had not been submitted to the people in
pursuance of his instractions to Govemor Walker,
and in pursuance of Govemor Walker's assurances
to the people, says, however, that by the Kansas-
Nebraska act the slavery question only was required
to be referred to the people, and the remainder of
the Constitution was not thus required to be sub
mitted. He acknowledges that, as a general mle,

282 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
on general principles, the whole Constitution should
be submitted; but, according to his understanding
of the organic act of Congress, there was an impera
tive obhgation to submit the slavery question for
their approval or disapproval, but no obhgation to
submit the entire Constitution. In other words,
he regards the organic act, the Nebraska biU, as
ha-ving made an exception of the slavery clause,
and pro-vided for the disposition of that question
in a mode different from that in which other domestic
or local affairs, as contradistinguished from federal
questions, should be decided." After suggestmg
that the President was not famUiar -with the sub
ject, as he was out of the country at the time, serv
ing as Minister to Great Britain, Mr. Douglas con
tinued: "What was the principle enunciated by the
authors and supporters of that bUl when it was
brought forward? Did we not come before the
country and say that we repealed the Missouri re
striction for the purpose of substituting and cariy-
ing out as a general rule the great principle of seK-
govemment, which left the people of each State
and each territory free to form and regulate their
domestic institutions in their ovm way, subject
only to the Constitution of the United States? In
support of that proposition, it was argued here,
and I have argued it wherever I have spoken in
various States of the Union, at home and abroad,
everywhere I have endeavored to prove that there

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 283
was no reason why an exception should be made
in regard to the slavery question. . . . The very
first proposition in the Nebraska biU was to show
that the Missouri restriction, prohibiting them
from deciding the slavery question for themselves,
constituted an exception to a general mle, in viola
tion of the principle of self-govemment; and hence
that that exception should be repealed, and the
slavery question, like aU other questions, subnutted
to the people, to be decided by themselves. That
was the principle on which the Nebraska bfll was
defended by its friends. Instead of making the
slavery question an exception, it removed an odious
exception which before existed. . . . We repealed
the Missouri restriction because it was confined to
slavery. That was the only exception there was
to the general principle of seK-govemment. That
exception was taken away for the avowed and ex
press purpose of making the mle of seh-govemment
general and universal, so that the people should
form and regulate aU their domestic institutions in
their own way." Douglas's purpose had been to
enable the people to legislate directly on slavery
as on all other questions. Now the President held
that they could not be aUowed to pass on anything
else than slavery. There can be no doubt of the
tmth of the statements of Douglas or the soimdness
of his logic. What he did not or could not see, or,
if he did see, would not admit, was that the only

284 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
reason why the slavery leaders favored the repeal
of the Missouri Compromise was that they beUeved
that the effect would be to give them a chance to
get slavery into Kansas. They cared for popular
sovereignty only as a means to accomphsh then-
end. But Douglas went on to show that under the
Lecompton scheme there was no real chance to
vote even on the slavery issue. He said: "The
President teUs us in his message that the whole
party pledged our faith and our honor that the
slavery question should be submitted to the people,
without any restriction or quaUfication whatever.
Does this schedule submit it -without quaUfication?
It qualffies by saying, 'You may vote on slavery K
you wiU vote for the Constitution, but you shaU
not do so without doing that.' That is a very im
portant quaUfication — a quaUfication that controls
a man's vote, and his action, and his conscience,
if he is an honest man — a quaUfication confessedly
in -violation of our platform. We are told by the
President that our faith and our honor are pledged
that the slavery clause should be submitted with
out any quahfication of any kind whatever; and
now am I to be caUed upon to forfeit my faith and
my honor in order to enable a smaU minority of
the people of Kansas to defraud the majority of
that people out of their elective franchise? Sir, my
honor is pledged; and before it shall be tamished
I -wUl take whatever consequences personal to my-

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 285
self may come; but never ask me to do an act which
the President in his message has said is a forfeiture
of faith, a violation of honor, and that merely for
the expediency of saving the party. I wfll go as
far as any one of you to save the party. I have as
much heart in the great cause that binds us together
as any man li-ving. I wifl sacrifice anjrthing short
of principle and honor for the peace of the party;
but if the party -wifl not stand by its principles,
its faith, its pledges, I wiU stand there, and abide
whatever consequences may result from the posi
tion. ... If this Constitution is to be forced down
our throats, in -violation of the fundamental prin
ciple of free govemment, under a submission that
is a mockery and an insult, I will resist it to the
last. I have no fear of any party associations being
severed. I should regret any social or pohtical
estrangement, even temporarily; but if it must
be, if I can not act with you and preserve my faith
and my honor, I wfll stand on the great principle
of popular sovereignty, which declares the right
of afl people to be left perfectly free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own
way. I -wifl foUow that principle wherever its logical
consequences may take me, and I wfll endeavor
to defend it against assault from any and afl quar
ters. No mortal man shall be responsible for my
action but myself. By my action I wifl compromit
no man."

286 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
The speech created a great sensation. Douglas
had always been known as a strict party man —
as indeed he was — and a great beUever in party
regularity. At the time he thus chaUenged the
national administration he was the leader of his
party, and the most powerful man in it. His at
tack on the President was none the less -vigorous
for being couched in courteous language, and in
ferential rather than direct. "Henceforth," wrote
Seward, "Douglas is to tread the thorny path I
have pursued. The administration and the slave-
power are broken. The triumph of freedom is not
only assured but near." Northem papers, both
Democratic and Repubhcan, praised the speech.
"What can equal," Seward wrote again, "the ca
prices of politics ! The triumph of slavery [in 1850]
would have been incomplete, indeed it could not
have occurred, had it not been for the accession
to it of Stephen A. Douglas. By that defection
he became soon, and has, untfl just now, continued
(under the favor or fear of successive administra
tions) legislative dictator here, intolerant yet ir
resistible. . . . Yesterday he broke loose from
aU that strong host he had led so long, and although
he did not at the first bound reach my position, as
an aUy, yet he leaped so far towards it as to gain
a position of neutrality altogether unsafe and inde
fensible." Unlike some other Repubhcans Seward
welcomed aU accessions from the opposing party

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 287
to the anti-Lecompton forces. He wrote: "Since
Walker, Douglas, and Stanton have been converted,
at least hi part, we are sure to hear the gospel
preached (though ¦with adulteration) to the Gen-
tfles." Seward contmued: "God forbid that I
should consent to see freedom wounded, because
my own lead, or even my own agency in serving
it, should be rejected. I wfll cheerfully co-operate
with these new defenders of this sacred cause in
Kansas, and I wifl award them all due praise for
their large share of merit in its deliverance." There
was, however, considerable distmst of Douglas's
motives. The Repubhcans were very glad to see
the Democratic party spht, and quick to recognize
and improve to the utmost the opportunity that he
had given them. In the East there were some who
favored a union on Douglas in Iflinois by the friends
of freedom as their candidate for United States
senator. Later there was talk of making him the
presidential candidate of the Republican party.
But there was in the West little sympathy with
these plans. Nor can it be said that Douglas made
any attempts to concfliate his old foes. He was
stUl for popular sovereignty, stfll indifferent to the
moral aspect of slavery. But there does not seem
to be any reason to question the sincerity of his
motives. It is trae that his term as senator was
about to expire, and that his constituents had made
clear their opposition to the Lecompton scheme.

288 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Perhaps he could not have been elected if he had
favored it. But he might have kept stUl, and voted
against it quietly and with regret. And he might
well have thought that he could go back to lUinois
and meet the people bravely, as he had done four
years before, and win them to his support. The
thing might have been impossible, since the feeling
against slavery had grown much more intense. But
he might very easUy have felt that the ¦victory could
have been won. On the other hand, he knew that
by his speech he had won the undying opposition of
the administration, and that it would not only faU
to support him, but actively oppose him in his cam
paign for re-election — which it did. He could not
have faUed to reaUze that he had put the presidency
forever beyond his grasp. The case is well summed
up by WUliam Henry Smith in his Political His
tory of Slavery : " Mr. Douglas's senatorial term
was about expiring, and he had to consider what
effect his support of the Lecompton s-windle would
have on his chances of bemg returned. To break
with the administration woidd be to invite his
deposition as a leader, even his expulsion from the
party. In times past the resentment of the Presi
dent had been fatal to any Democratic independent.
By keeping terms -with the administration Doug
las's nomination at Charleston was almost certain
to foUow in 1860, and his election -with the help of
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Call-

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 289
fomia, and Oregon was probable. Instead of hav
ing the opposition of the administration in his sena
torial canvass in 1858, he would have had its power
ful support, and his success does not admit of a
doubt. The devotion of his friends was the same
devotion that made Jefferson and Jackson party
heroes despite occasional vagaries. We must con
clude that there was a consideration of greater
moment than the presidency, of importance in con
nection -with a retum to the Senate. Douglas was
too deeply compromised in the Kansas-Nebraska
legislation safely to renounce what he had pro
claimed, as it were, from the housetops as the great
principle of popular sovereignty and to defend a
flagrant fraud even if his soul did not revolt from
it. When he threw down the gage to the President
he denounced the wrong -with characteristic -vigor
and with apparent sincerity. He was enhsted on
the side of morahty, and the consciousness of that
fact gave a subhme effect to his -vindication of his
course. He was first of afl a leader of men, and
the possession of that power was greater than the
presidency. The session of the Senate closed -with
Douglas the hero of the debate, and he retumed
to Illinois accompanied by the plaudits of the ma
jority of his own party, of the conservative Whigs
and of many influential Republicans who favored
his re-election to the Senate." No one knew better
than he the power of party, especiafly of such a

290 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
great and historic party as the Democratic party
then was, which had hardly known defeat. Doug
las, then, it seems fair to say, performed a great
and patriotic pubhc service, from motives as near
unmixed as often inspire men, and showed himseK
on a very trying occasion to be both a patriot and
a statesman. He withstood enormous pressure,
endured the bitterest detraction, and was for the
rest of his IKe fiercely fought by the ruling influences
in his party. But he never wavered. Nothing hap
pened to him as a result of his action that he did
not foresee. Indeed, the President had warned
him that he would be "cmshed." Under such cir
cumstances it is unfair and ungenerous to go poking
round for a mean motive when a noble one stands
out so clearly.
On February 2, 1858, the President transmitted
the Lecompton Constitution to Congress. The
new govemor, Denver, hke his predecessors, under
stood the situation, and ad-vised the President against
the course he was about to take. Even Govemor
Wise of Virginia sided -with Douglas and Walker.
"If Congress," he said later, "adopts that Lecomp
ton schedule. Democracy is dead; and the adminis
tration can save it now; it cannot after that act."
His theory was that the disunionists were trying
to drive all the Northem Democrats away from
Buchanan. The Constitution, it wUl be remem
bered, had been rejected by a crushing majority

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 291
at the January election. But the President had by
this time surrendered abjectly to the slave-power.
His message was hardly more than an amplification
of the regular message of December. The Presi
dent re-viewed the troubles in Kansas in a way wholly
favorable to the slave-State men, condemned the
free-State men as revolutionists, and declared that
the Lecompton Constitution had been regularly
adopted. He elaborated the theory that it was
enough to aUow the people to vote for or against
slavery, apparently obhvious of the fact that they
could not vote even on that narrow issue without
taking an oath to sustain the fugitive-slave laws.
The whole territory had by Mr. Buchanan's friends
and masters been organized on a slave basis. But
there is one paragraph in the message that deserves
special consideration: "It has been solemnly ad
judged by the highest judicial tribunal known to
our laws that slavery exists in Kansas by ¦virtue
of the Constitution of the United States. Kansas
is therefore at this moment as much a slave-State
as Georgia or South Carolina. Without this the
equahty of the sovereign States composing the Union
would be -violated and the use and enjoyment of a
territory acquired by the common treasure of all
the States would be closed against the people and
the property of nearly half the members of the Con
federacy. Slavery can therefore never be prohibited
in Kansas except by means of a constitutional pro-

292 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
¦vision, and in no other manner can this be obtained
so promptly, if a majority of the people desire it,
as by admitting it into the Union under its present
Constitution." If Kansas was indeed already a
slave State there surely could have been no point
in permitting the people to vote for the Constitu
tion either with or without slavery, since a vote
against slavery would have had no effect, as slavery
aheady existed. In July of the preceding year the
President had -written to Govemor Walker thus:
"On the question of submitting the Constitution
to the bona fide resident settlers of Kansas I am
willing to stand or faU. In sustaining such a prin
ciple we cannot faU. It is the principle of the Kan
sas-Nebraska biU, the principle of popular sover
eignty, and the principle at the foundation of aU
popular govemment. The more it is discussed the
stronger it wiU become." Here is no suggestion
that only a part of the Constitution — the slavery
part — should be submitted, much less any intima
tion that Kansas was already a slave State. But
in the next month he had arrived at the conclusion
that slavery was a fact in Kansas beyond the power
of the people to alter. So he shKted more and more
to the slavery side, untU in December he said that
it was enough to give the people an opportunity
to vote on slavery, though they could not vote either
for or against it without voting for the Constitu
tion. And finally m a formal and official way he

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 293
announced to Congress, the country and the world,
that "Kansas is at this moment as much a slave
State as Georgia or South Carolina." Thus he aban
doned the principle on which he had said in the
preceding July he was "-willing to stand or faU, the
principle of popular sovereignty, and the principle
at the foundation of aU popular government." The
old Calhoun theory, which had been scouted by
pretty nearly every one when it was announced
by the great South Carolinian, and which had been
demolished by Webster, was now solemnly pro
claimed by a President of the United States. Does
Whitman's characterization of the Buchanan "Presi-
dentiad" seem, after aU, to be overly severe? Un-
parhamentary it may be, but one can hardly ques
tion its accuracy.
The message was referred to the committee on
Territories, which already had under consideration
a bfll introduced by Douglas authorizing the people
of Kansas to frame a Constitution prehminary to
admission into the Union. On the President's recom
mendations three reports were made. The only one
that interests us is that of Douglas. In it the Le
compton Constitution was denounced as not being
"the act of the people of Kansas," or embodying
"their wfll." He referred to "the trickery in the
mode of submission" by which "a large majority,
probably amounting to three-fourths of all the legal
voters of Kansas, were disfranchised and excluded

294 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
from the poUs on December 21," whUe at the Jan
uary election "a majority of more than 10,000 of
the legal voters rejected the Constitution." There
is Uttle or nothing new in the debate that followed.
It was heated and intense. Douglas was bitterly
attacked by the slavery men, one of them saying
that but for him "there would not have been a ripple
on the surface." He was assaUed as a traitor and
renegade. But he again showed that he was amply
able to defend himseK, and even to carry the war
to his enemies. The whole power of the adminis
tration was thrown against him. It is doubtful
whether there ever was a more shameless use of
patronage in behalf of a piece of legislation. " When
ever," Douglas said, "the time comes that the Presi
dent of the United States can change the aUegiance
of senators from the States to himseK, what be
comes of the sovereignty of the States? When the
time comes that a senator is to account to the execu
tive and not to his State, whom does he represent ?
If the wiU of my State is one way and the wUl of
the President the other, am I to be told that I must
obey the executive and betray my State, or else
be branded as a traitor to the party, hunted down
by aU the newspapers that share the patronage of
the govemment? and every man who holds a petty
office m any part of my State to have the question
put to him, 'Are you Douglas's enemy?' if not 'your
head comes off.' Why? 'Because he is a recreant

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 295
senator; because he chooses to foflow his judgment
and his conscience, and represent his State instead
of obejdng my executive behest.' I should hke to
know what is the use of Congress; what is the use
of Senates and Houses of Representatives, when
their highest duty is to obey the executive in dis
regard of the -wishes, rights, and honor of their con
stituents? What despotism on earth would be
equal to this, if you establish the doctrine that the
executive has a right to command the votes, the
consciences, the judgment of the senators and rep
resentatives, instead of their ovm constituents?
... Is it seriously intended to brand every Demo
crat in the United States as a traitor who is opposed
to the Lecompton Constitution? If so, do your
friends in Pennsylvania desire any traitors to vote
with them next faU? We are traitors if we vote
against Lecompton, our constituents are traitors if
they do not think Lecompton is right, and yet you
expect those whom you caU traitors to vote -with
and sustain you. Are you to read out of the party
every man who thinks it wrong to force a constitu
tion on a people against their wiU? If so, what
will be the size of the administration party in New
York? What wiU it be in Pennsylvania? How
many wfll it number in Ohio, or in Indiana, or in
Illmois, or in any other Northem State? Surely
you do not expect the support of those whom you
brand as renegades ? Would it not be well to aUow

296 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
aU freemen freedom of thought, freedom of speech,
and freedom of action?" Thus Douglas had at
last learned that there could be no freedom of any
sort where slavery was concemed. "Neither the
frowns of power," he continued, "nor the influence
of patronage wUl change my action, or drive me
from my principles. I stand fiimly, immovably
upon those great principles of seK-govemment and
State sovereignty upon which the campaign was
fought and the election won. I stand by the time-
honored principles of the Democratic party, Ulus-
trated by Jefferson and Jackson — ^those principles
of State rights, of State sovereignty, strict constmc
tion, on which the great Democratic party has ever
stood. I wUl stand by the Constitution of the United
States, -with all its compromises, and perform all
my obligations under it. I -wUl stand by the Amer
ican Union as it exists under the Constitution. If,
standing firmly by my principles, I shall be driven
into private hfe, it is a fate that has no terrors for
me. I prefer private Ufe, preser-ving my own seK-
respect and manhood, to abject and servUe sub
mission to executive wUl. If the altemative be
private IKe or ser-vUe obedience to executive -wiU,
I am prepared to retire. Official position has no
charms for me when deprived of that freedom of
thought and action which becomes a gentleman and
a senator." This speech raised Douglas high in
the opinion of the country. It did not remove aU

BREAKS WITH ADMINISTRATION 297
doubt as to his motives or his sincerity. This was
too much to expect, since he had traveUed long in
company with the slavery men, and had always
been kno-wn as a narrow and strict partisan. But
the speech did convert many, as weU it might have
done. For it meant a complete break with the ad
ministration, and an open fight between him and
the controUing influences in the Democratic party.
On the next day the Senate passed the bfll by a
vote of 33 to 25, having previously rejected the
Crittenden amendment pro-viding for the admission
of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution, on
the condition that it again be submitted to the
people. Only three Northem Democrats, Bro-
derick of Cahfomia, Pugh of Ohio, and Stuart of
Michigan, voted -with Douglas against the bifl. Two
Southemers, Bell of Tennessee, and Crittenden of
Kentucky, members of the American party, also cast
their votes against the biU. When the biU came be
fore the House an amendment, practically the same
as that presented by Crittenden in the Senate, was
offered, and agreed to. The Senate refused to ac
cept the amendment. Out of the dispute, neither
House being wflhng to yield, came the bfll offered
by Representative WiUiam H. Enghsh of Indiana.
By this bifl the govemment agreed to donate to
Kansas a large tract of government land; ff this
grant was accepted by popular vote, Kansas would
be admitted under the Lecompton Constitution;

298 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
K it were rejected, the State would have to wait
for admission tiU it had population equal to the
unit of representation required for the House of
Representatives. This bUl became a law. Douglas
voted against it. Many of his foUowers left him,
feehng sure that the people of Kansas would refuse
the bribe, as they indeed did. But Douglas stood
fast, refusing to accept "a way out." The biU, he
said, "is intervention -with inducements to control
the result. It is intervention -with a bounty on the
one side and a penalty on the other." The bUl
passed the Senate by a vote of 31 to 22, Pugh going
over to the enemy, and Douglas, Broderick, and
Crittenden maintaining their position. The House
adopted it by a vote of 120 to 112. In the foUowing
August the people of Kansas refused the grant,
11,300 votes out of a total of 13,088 being against
it. Thus ends the war over the Lecompton Con
stitution. Kansas, to anticipate somewhat, was
finaUy admitted as a free State in January, 1861,
before the expiration of Mr. Buchanan's term.

CHAPTER XIII
THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE
Douglas had a much wider interest in pubhc affairs
than might be supposed by those who have seen
how completely he was absorbed in the slavery
question. One of the first gifts that the Univer
sity of Chicago received was ten acres of land
from Douglas. He was greatly interested in the
Smithsonian Institution, and one of its regents.
But for the precipitation of the battle over
slavery by his introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska
biU it is possible that Douglas might have
worked out a system of intemal improvements that
would forever have saved the nation from the shame
and disgrace of "pork-barrel" legislation. No man
favored more strongly than he the disposition of
the pubhc lands in such a way as to promote im
migration, and stimulate the development of the
country. He was a strong behever in internal
improvements wisely undertaken and honestly
prosecuted. In this he was opposed by the slavery
men, who did not care to see any increase of free
territory or of population within it, and by many
Easterners, who showed a strange indifference to
the West, and even a fear that we might expand
299

300 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
too rapidly. He favored the placing of works of
art on the free list, saying: "I wish we could get
a model of every work of art, a cast of every piece
of ancient statuary, a copy of every valuable paint
ing and rare book, so that our artists might pursue
their studies and exercise their skUl at home, and
that our hterary men might not be exUed in the
pursuits which bless mankind." It has been said
that Douglas had no imagination, but that he had
-vision. Perhaps there was something of both in
the man when he got away from the slavery ques
tion. Certainly he saw this nation, not solely as
it was, but as it was one day to be. To him there
was nothing unreasonable in the memorial of an
inventor, which he presented and supported in the
Senate, asking for aid in making experiments -with
dirigible balloons. Years afterward, and in our
own time. Professor Langley was ridiculed in Con
gress when he asked for similar help in developing
flying machines. Douglas was an earnest and per
sistent advocate of a Pacffic raihoad, favoring every
biU authorizing that enterprise, and introducmg
one of his own immediately foUowing the end of
the Lecompton controversy. Not the least of the
tragedies connected with slavery was the hindrance
that it interposed to national development. But
for slavery Douglas might have rendered far greater
ser-vice to the nation — and this is tme of all the men
of the tune — ^than any that can be credited to him.

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 301
Lincoln was right when he said m his speech ac
cepting the Repubhcan nomination for the senator-
ship, on June 16, 1858: "We are now far into the
fifth year since a pohcy was initiated -with the
avowed object, and confident promise of putting
an end to the slavery agitation. Under the opera
tion of that pohcy, that agitation has not only not
ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my
opinion, it wfll not cease untfl a crisis shall have
been reached and passed. 'A House di-vided agamst
itself cannot stand.' I beheve this government
cannot endure haff slave and hah free. I do not
expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect
the house to fafl — but I do expect it wfll cease to
be di-vided. It wfll become aU one thmg or aU the
other. Either the opponents of slavery wfll arrest
the further spread of it, and place it where the pubhc
mind shaU rest in the behef that it is in the course
of ultimate extinction; or its advocates -wifl push
it forward tifl it shaU become ahke lawful in aU the
States, old as weU as new — ^North as weU as South."
This speech marks the opening of the great debate
between Douglas and Lincoln, and nothing received
more attention from Douglas than the declaration
that "a house di"vided against itseff cannot stand."
The senator had been warmly received by his con
stituents, who were in complete accord with him
on the Lecompton question. The Democratic State
convention, which met in April, indorsed Douglas,

302 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and condemned, at least inferentiaUy, the adminis
tration for its repudiation of the Cincinnati plat
form. Douglas had carried his State with him
in his war on the Buchanan administration. That
administration accepted the chaUenge, and exerted
itseK to the utmost to defeat the man who had
defied it. The "crushing" process was ruthlessly
put into effect. Douglas's friends were swept out
of office, and his enemies appointed in their place.
There was an attempt to set up an opposition
ticket, and every effort was made to di-vide the
Democratic vote for senator. Every federal officer
in the State was an agent of the administration,
and an active and aggressive one, in the campaign
for the defeat of Douglas. On the 9th of July,
1858, the senator arrived in Chicago and was re
ceived as a conqueror. In his speech on the eve
ning of that day he re-viewed the Lecompton con
troversy, declared again his adherence to the pop
ular sovereignty doctrine — ^which he said had been
•vindicated — and spoke of his own unwUlingness
to compromise or betray Democratic principles.
Then he took up the speech of Lincoln — ^who was
in the audience — dehvered on June 16 to the con
vention that had nominated him for senator. "I
take great pleasure," said Douglas, "in saying that
I have known personaUy and intimately, for about
a quarter of a century, the worthy gentleman who
has been nominated for my place, and I wUl say

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 303
that I regard him as a kind, amiable, and mtelhgent
gentleman, a good citizen and an honorable op
ponent; and whatever issue I may have ¦with him
wifl be of principle, and not invol-ving personah-
ties." From this the speaker proceeded to an at
tack on "the house di^vided against itself" state
ment. This the speaker took to be a plea for uni
formity in local institutions, invol^ving war by one
section on the other to make the whole nation either
free or slave. Lincoln was charged with favoring
such a war. Douglas declared himseK hostfle to
such uniformity, saying that it was neither "de
sirable nor possible." Lincoln would have com-
pulsoiy uniformity; Douglas would not have uni
formity at afl. "Uniformity," he said, "in local
and domestic affairs would be destructive of State
rights, of State sovereignty, of personal liberty and
personal freedom." Douglas defended the Dred
Scott decision from Lincoln's criticism on two
grounds: First, it was the law of the land declared
by the highest tribunal in the country, and one
from which there could be no appeal to a "town-
meeting"; and second, it was right, since the negro
was not and could not be a citizen, as "this govem
ment of ours is founded on the white basis." The
negro, it was insisted, "should have afl the rights,
privileges and immunities which he is capable of
exercising consistent with the safety of society."
But it was for each State to decide what those rights

304 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
should be. Yet K it denied him aU the rights of a
human being — such must be the logic — ^the general
govemment could not object. No State, apparently,
could clothe him with the right of citizenship. So
the debate opened — ^thus far at long range. Lincoln
rephed the next night in the same place. He very
truthfuUy said that in the speech criticized by Doug
las he did not say that he "favored" making the
Union all free — or all slave — but had only made a
prediction that things could not continue as they
were — a prediction that has certainly been fulfiUed.
"I only said," he declared, "what I expected would
take place." Douglas's labored essay in defense
of variety, which he assumed was attacked by Lin
coln, certamly seems rather far-fetched to-day.
At any rate we aU beUeve now that there should
be umformity in connection with freedom. Speak
ing of Douglas's white-man theory, Lincoln feU
back on the Declaration of Independence. "Those
arguments," Lincoln said, and his words have a
strange timeliness to-day, as prophetic words are
likely always to have an apphcation far wider than
intended, "those arguments that are made, that
the inferior race are to be treated with as much
aUowance as they are capable of enjoying; that
as much is to be done for them as their condition
will aUow — ^what are these arguments? They are
the arguments that kings have made for enslaving
the people ui all ages of the world. You wiU find

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 305
that aU the arguments in favor of kingcraft were
of this class; they always bestrode the necks of
the people — ^not because they wanted to do it, but
because the people were better off for being ridden.
That is their argument, and this argument of the
judge is the same old serpent that says: 'You
work and I eat, you tofl and I will enjoy the
f raits of it.' " So the debate ran along. Douglas
spoke at Bloomington, Springfield, and other places,
always to large crowds, and amid great enthusiasm.
On July 24 he retumed to Chicago, where he re
ceived a letter from Mr. Lincoln suggesting that it
would be better if they discussed the issues from
the same platform. The challenge was accepted,
and it was arranged for them to appear, beginning
August 21, at Ottawa, Freeport, Jonesboro, Charles
ton, Galesburg, Quincy, and Alton, the debate to
end at the latter town October 15. This great dis
cussion soon drew to itself the attention of the whole
nation. We can hardly even imagine what interest
it roused and what excitement it stirred in Ilhnois.
Vast throngs assembled to hear the two men,
both of whom were masters of the art of debate.
The straggle was of national importance, and was
so recognized. Douglas, of course, was wefl known,
and Lincoln hardly known at afl outside of Illinois;
the assumption was that the senator would have
an easy ¦victory. But he himself was not so sure —
certainly he did not underestimate Lincoln. "I

306 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
shaU," he said, "have my hands full. He is the
strong man of his party — ^fuU of wit, facts, dates —
and the best stump speaker, -with his droU ways
and dry jokes, in the West. He is as honest as he
is shrewd; and K I beat him, my -victory wUl be
hardly won." Th^e was much questioning of each
candidate by the other for the purpose of entrapping
him into admissions. It should be remembered
that this great tournament was not altogether a
discussion of principles, ha-ving solely for its pur
pose the establishment of the tmth. Party interests
and personal ambitions were involved, and very
directly. Both Douglas and Lincoln were after
votes, both -wished to be senator, and both eamestly
desired a party -victory. In a very real sense the
greatest issue of aU, the one that underlay aU others,
was whether the government was to be controUed
by the Repubhcan or the Democratic party. On
the answer to that question every one could even
then see that a great deal depended. NaturaUy
therefore there was some shrinking on both sides,
some unwiUingness to push the argument to its
logical extreme. Lincoln made it perfectly clear
that he thought slavery -wrong, whfle Douglas clung
to his old attitude of indifference to the moral
aspect of the case — did not "care whether slavery
was voted up or do-wn." His great interest was m
seeing that the people should have the right to
adopt either slavery or freedom as they saw fit.

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 307
He would have them free to hold slaves. On the
moral issue the verdict must be awarded to Lin
coln. It is a mistake, however, to think of this debate
as whofly a contest over principles, for it was also
a battle of wits. Nor is it quite true to say, as many
do, that Lincohi had the easier task, since he was
championing the right cause. For he had to present
that cause so as to ¦win the support of men who by
no means thought ahke — abohtionists, moderate
Repubhcans, Americans, and old-line Whigs. He
felt it to be necessary — as indeed it was — to re
pudiate any suggestion that he himseK was an aboli
tionist. Lincoln had not even been a Free-Soiler,
but a foUower of Henry Clay. He was not such a
Repubhcan as Seward. The more radical Repub
hcans, especiafly of the East, were for a time op
posed to him, and others were lukewarm. The ut
most pains was taken to make it clear that he did
not favor social equahty. There was even danger
of offending the Democrats, since there was reason
to beheve — or at least to hope — ^that many of them
would vote for Lincoln. Douglas, on the other hand,
very naturafly feared opposition in his own party,
and he was greatly weakened by the antagonism
of the national administration. He, too, reached
for votes on the other side of the party hne. There
was a strong feeling in his favor among the Repub
hcans, though this was most marked in the East.

308 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
The chance of winning Repubhcan votes was too
good to be thrown away. But no one could suspect
Douglas of favoring social equahty as between the
whites and blacks, of opposition to the Supreme
Court, or of abohtionism. Perhaps, on the whole,
it was an even thing. There was not a thing said
or a question asked that was not designed to em
barrass and weaken the adversary. One answer
to Douglas's criticism of Lincoln's "House-di-vided-
against-itseK speech" is so admirable, and shows
such a knowledge of pohtical phflosophy, that it is
worth setting out in fuU: "The great variety of
the local institutions in the States springing from
differences in the soU, differences in the face of the
country and in the climate, are bonds of union.
They do not make 'a house di-vided agamst itseK,'
but they make a house united. If they produce
in one section of the country what is caUed for by
the wants of another section, and K this other sec
tion can supply the wants of the first, they are not
matters of discord, but bonds of union — tme bonds
of union. But can this question of slavery be con
sidered as among these varieties in the institutions
of the country? I leave it to you to say whether,
in the history of our government, this institution
of slavery has not always f aUed to be a bond of union,
but an apple of discord, and an element of di-vision
in the house ? " Such, of course, was the fact. These
words were used in the first debate, the one at Ot-

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 309
tawa. On that occasion Douglas asked a series of
searching questions based on resolutions supposed
to have been adopted by a Repubhcan convention
at Springfield in 1854, but which proved to be a
forgery. Lincoln, however, answered the questions
in his next speech at Freeport, with cleamess and
exphcitness — ^and adroitness. He said that he was
not in favor of the repeal of the fugitive-slave law,
though he thought it should be amended; that
though Congress had the power to abohsh slavery
in the District of Columbia, it should do this only
graduaUy, in a way satisfactory to a majority of
the voters of the district, and with compensation
to the owners of slaves; that he was not opposed
to the honest acquisition of slave territory; and
that Congress ought to prohibit slavery in the Terri
tories. In his answer to the fifth question, whether
he would oppose the admission of a new State with
whatever Constitution the people chose to adopt
he skirted Douglas's popular sovereignty rather
closely: "In regard to the other question, of whether
I am pledged to the admission of any more slave
States into the Union, I state to you very frankly
that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put
in a position of ha-ving to pass upon that question.
I should be exceedingly glad to know that there
would never be another slave State admitted into
the Union; but I must add that K slavery shaU
be kept out of the Territories during the territorial

310 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
existence of any one given territory, and then the
people shaU, ha-ving a fair chance and a clear field,
when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such
an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Con
stitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of
the institution among them, I see no altemative,
if we own the coimtry, but to admit them into the
Union." President Buchanan had held that though
slavery existed in Kansas the people could, after
the State had been admitted, aboUsh it by con
stitutional enactment. WhUe Mr. Lincoln argued —
and we can imagine that he made the concession
with the greatest reluctance — that though Con
gress might, and ought to exclude slavery from the
Territories, those Territories would have to be ad
mitted by Congress as States even with slave con
stitutions. In other words, they had a right to
order their local institutions and affairs as they
pleased — ^which is not far removed from the Doug
las doctrine. At Freeport Lincoln was the ques
tioner, ha-ving first answered the Douglas interroga
tories. Only one of the questions is of importance,
since the answer to it brought out the statement
of a theory to which Douglas clung throughout the
debate, and which indeed he had advanced m his
speech in the Senate in which he attempted to recon-
cUe the Dred Scott decision -with the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. Lmcoln asked whether the
people of a Territory can, " m any la-wful way, agamst

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 311
the -wishes of any citizen of the United States, ex
clude slavery from its limits prior to the formation
of a State Constitution." If Douglas said no, there
would be an end of popular sovereignty; K he said
yes, he would offend the slavery leaders, who held
that the people coifld do no such thing. Here is
Douglas's answer: "I answer emphaticaUy, as Mr.
Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from
every stump in lUinois, that in my opinion the people
of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery
from their hmits prior to the formation of a State
Constitution. ... It matters not what way the
Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the ab
stract question whether slavery may or may not
go into aTerritory under the Constitution, the people
have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude
it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot
exist a day or an hour anywhere unless it is supported
by local pohce regulations. Those pohce regulations
can only be established by the local legislature;
and K the people are opposed to slavery, they -wifl
elect representatives to that body who wfll by un
friendly legislation effectuafly prevent the intro
duction of it into their midst. If, on the con
trary, they are for it, their legislation -wfll favor
its extension. Hence, no matter what the de
cision of the Supreme Court may be on that ab
stract question, stiU the right of the people to
make a slave territory or a free territory is perfect

312 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
and complete under the Nebraska bUl. I hope Mr.
Lincohi regards my answer satisfactory on that
point." It was not satisfactory to Lincohi, nor
wUl it be to any fair-minded man. This theory of
the power of a local legislature to nuUKy and over
ride a decision of the Supreme Court was one of
those afterthoughts for which Douglas was famous,
brought forward to save his doctrine of popular
sovereignty against the consequences of the Dred
Scott decision. At Jonesboro, on September 15,
Lincoln said: "The Supreme Court of the United
States has decided that any congressional prohibi
tion of slavery in the Territories is unconstitutional;
that they have reached this proposition as a con
clusion from their former proposition that the Con
stitution of the United States expressly recognizes
property in slaves, and from that other constitutional
provision that no person shaU be deprived of property
without due process of law. Hence they reach the
conclusion that as the Constitution of the United
States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and
prohibits any person from being deprived of property
without due process of law, to pass an act of Con
gress by which a man who owned a slave on one side
of a Une would be deprived of him on the other side,
is depri-ving him of that property -without due process
of law. That I understand to be the decision of the
Supreme Court. I understand also that Judge
Douglas adheres most firmly to that decision; and

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 313
the difficulty is, how is it possible to exclude slavery
from the territory unless in -violation of that de
cision." The question manifestly was not in any
sense "abstract"; it was a question of property
and property rights. Lincohi further showed that
Douglas had said in the Senate only two years before
that "whether the people should exclude slavery
prior to the formation of a Constitution or not was
a question for the Supreme Court." "I maintain,"
said Lincoln, "that when he says, after the Supreme
Court have decided the question, that the people
may yet exclude slavery by any means whatever,
he does -virtuafly say that it is not a question for
the Supreme Court. He shKts his ground. I ap
peal to you whether he did not say it was a question
for the Supreme Court? Has not the Supreme
Court decided the question? When he now says
the people may exclude slavery, does he not make it
a question for the people? Does he not -virtually
shKt his ground and say that it is not a question
for the court, but for the people ? This is a very
simple proposition — a very plain and naked one.
It seems to me that there is no difficulty in deciding
it. In a variety of ways he said that it was a ques
tion for the Supreme Court. He did not stop then
to teU us that whatever the Supreme Court decides,
the people can by withholding the necessary 'police
regulations' keep slavery out. He did not make any
such answer. I submit to you now whether the

314 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
new state of the case has not induced the judge
to sheer away from his original ground? Would
not this be the impression of every fair-minded
man?" The logic seems remorseless. Lincoln
further showed that slavery could exist, and had
existed under poUce regulations of an unfriendly
character. Dred Scott himseK had been held as a
slave in Minnesota. He finaUy argued that every
man elected to a legislature was sworn to uphold
the Constitution of the United States, which had
been held to uphold slavery, and also that Con
gress is bound to give legislative support to any
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Douglas,
however, adhered to his theory, and in his reply
said that "you cannot maintain slavery a day in
a territory where there is an unwUUng people and
unfriendly legislation," and that "K the people are
opposed to it our right is a barren, worthless, useless
right; and K they are for it, they wiU support and
encourage it." Douglas strove hard to prove that
Lincoln was an abohtionist, and denounced his party
as "the Black Repubhcan party." Each man was
greatly concerned to prove that the other had been
inconsistent, and that each was bound by platforms
of the past by which he was not now -wUhng to stand.
Both pressed these points with the utmost -vigor.
It is surprismg that so httle was made of the Le
compton issue. Douglas had httle to say of it, and
Lincoln did not press it, though he might have made

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 315
much of the schism between the senator and the na
tional administration. Douglas, of course, was not
interested in the matter, since it was his pohcy to
maintain, as far as he coifld, party unity. Though
Lincoln did not make as much of the question as
he might, he did not neglect it. Probably he thought
that the Lecompton, or administration, Democrats
could safely be left to take care of Douglas, as far
as this issue was concerned. As for Douglas, he
held that there was nothing on which the Repub
hcans coifld agree except the anti-Lecompton pohcy,
and as that was settled and at an end the situation
reverted to its former status. Besides, there was
no issue between Douglas and Lincoln on the Le
compton question. A word should be said, however,
in regard to the Freeport_speech in which Douglas
had advanced his theory that, despite the decision,
of the^Supreme Court, the people of a State could
exclude slavery through unfriendly pohce regula
tions. The Repubhcans charged that this was
treason to Democratic doctrine, and the slavery
leaders made the same claim. The doctrine, as
has been sho-wn, was not new, nor was it the special
property of Douglas. But the charge had much
weight, and Douglas felt it necessary later to de
fend himseK against it, by showing that he had
made the statement many times, and also that
Southem men, including James L. Orr, of South
Carolina, had, m 1856, held and expressed precisely

316 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
the same opinion. Such was the "Freeport treason,"
together with the defense of Douglas. But the
cry of treason did not die out; it was, as Sheahan
says, "continued from mouth to mouth, untU, some
time in the dog-days of 1859, it was heard for the
last time in very feeble echoes, somewhere in the
remote neighborhood of Grass VaUey, CaUfomia."
The matter is not one of much importance, since
Douglas was aheady out of favor in the South, and
was viewed every day with more and more distrust.
As a matter of fact his doctrine of the impossibUity
of extending slavery to States that did not want
it was enthely out of harmony -with the Southem
-view of the Dred Scott decision. And that was
aU that Lincoln cared to show. His shrewdly
framed question, therefore, accomphshed its purpose.
The opposition to him in his o-wn party became
increasingly active. The "Freeport treason" was
doing its work. The President's organ at Washing
ton denounced him as a renegade whom no loyal
Democrat should support. John SUdeU of Louisiana
was actively at work agauist him. The Danites,
as the Buchanan Democrats were caUed, were very
busy. Vice-President Breckenridge refused to speak
in his behaK, though he ventured to say that he
would prefer Douglas to Lincohi. At Galesburg
Douglas dwelt on the sectionahsm of the Repub
lican party, and on what he held to be the conflict
between the statements of Lincoln, dehvered in

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 317
different parts of the State, in regard to negro
equahty. Lincoln siuns up this Galesburg debate
in his answer to Douglas: "A very large portion
of the speech which Judge Douglas has addressed
to you has previously been dehvered and put in
print. I do not mean that for a hit upon the judge
at afl. If I had not been interrapted, I was going
to say that such an answer as I am able to make
to a very large portion of it had aheady been more
than once made and pubhshed." Douglas held
that negroes did not come within the pro-visions of
the Declaration of Independence, whfle Lincoln
argued that even K they were not citizens they were
entitled to the rights enumerated therein. There
is, however, one thing in Douglas's reply that is
somewhat interesting. He had said that he did
"not care whether slavery was voted up or dovra,"
and Lincoln had declared that he himself did care;
that only to a man who beheved that there was no
moral quahty involved could the position of Doug
las be logical. In this Galesburg speech the senator
seems to have been somewhat nettled by the use
that Lincohi had made of his remark, for he said:
"I hold, and the party with which I am identified
hold, that the people of each State, old and new,
have the right to decide the slavery question for
themselves; and when I used the remark that I
did not care whether slavery was voted up or do-wn,
I used it in the connection that I was for allowing

318 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Kansas to do just as she pleased on the slavery ques
tion. I said that I did not care whether they voted
slavery up or down, because they had the right to
do as they pleased on the question, and therefore
my action would not be controUed by such con
sideration." The explanation is a tme one, and
yet it may be taken as indicating in this coimection
that Douglas was gro-wing somewhat sensitive on
the subject of slavery. But he did not go further,
and say that though he did not care — in the sense
of the words given above — ^whether slavery was
voted up or down, he would personaUy rejoice if
the people of a State, ha-ving a free choice, should
prohibit slavery. In the debate which took place
at Quincy, Lincoln pressed the moral phase of the
subject. Judge Douglas, he said, "has the high
distinction, so far as I know, of never ha-ving said
slavery is either right or wrong. Almost every
body else says one or the other, but the judge never
does. ... If you wiU examine the arguments that
are made on it, you wUl find that every one care
fully excludes the idea that there is anjrthing wrong
in it. . . . So I say again that in regard to the
arguments that are made, when Judge Douglas
says he 'don't care whether slavery is voted up or
voted down,' whether he means that as an indi-vidual
expression of sentiment, or only as a sort of state
ment of his -views on national policy, it is alike true
to say that he can thus argue logicaUy K he don't

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 319
see anything wrong hi it; but he cannot say so log
icaUy K he admits that slavery is wrong. He can
not say that he would as soon see a wrong voted
up as voted down. . . . When he says that slave
property and horse and hog property are ahke to
be aUowed to go into the Territories, upon the prin
ciples of equahty, he is reasoning truly, K there is
no difference between them as property; but K
the one is property held rightfully, and the other
is -wrong, then there is no equahty between the right
and the wrong; so that, turn it in any way you
can, in afl the arguments sustaining the Democratic
pohcy, and in that pohcy itseK, there is a careful,
studied exclusion of the idea that there is anything
wrong in slavery. Let us understand this. I am
not, just here, trying to prove that we are right,
and they are wrong. I have been stating where
we and they stand, and trying to show what is the
real difference between us; and I now say that
whenever we can get the question distinctly stated,
can get all these men who beheve that slavery is
in some of these respects wrong, to stand and act
with us in treating it as a wrong — then, and not
tUl then, I think we -wfll in some way come to an
end of this slavery agitation." In his reply Douglas
merely said that the reason he refused to discuss
the right or wrong of slavery was that "under the
Constitution of the United States, each State of
the Union has a right to do as it pleases on the sub-

320 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ject of slavery." "I do not," he said, "choose to
occupy the time aUotted to me in discussmg a ques
tion that we have no right to act upon." In this
same speech Douglas gave Lincoln another point.
After refusing to say whether he thought slavery
right or wrong, Douglas said: "Let each State stand
firmly by that great constitutional right, let each
State mind its own business and let its neighbors
alone, and there -wiU be no trouble on this question.
If we wUl stand by that principle, then Mr. Lm
coln wUl find that this repubhc can exist forever,
di-vided into free and slave States, as our fathers
made it and the people of each State have decided."
In his rejoinder Lincohi said: "I -wish to retum to
Judge Douglas my profound thanks for his pubhc
annunciation here to-day, to be put on record, that
his system of pohcy in regard to the uistitution of
slavery contemplates that it shaU last forever. We
are getting a httle nearer the tme issue of this con
troversy, and I am profoundly grateful for this one
sentence. Judge Douglas asks you, 'Why cannot
the institution of slavery, or rather why cannot the
nation, part slave and part free, continue as our
fathers made it, forever.' " To such a conclusion
had Douglas been driven, and thus was Lmcob
justffied in making in June, against the ad-vice of
his friends, the declaration that "a house di-vided
against itseK cannot stand." Lincohi, as the de
bate drew to a close rose steadily toward the moral

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 321
issue, whfle Douglas continued on the plane of strict
legahsm — ^which was not always legahsm, even.
In the last debate, that at Alton on October 15,
Douglas discussed his quarrel with the administra
tion, and justified his attitude and course. "Most
of the men," he said, "who denounced my course
on the Lecompton question objected to it, not be
cause I was not right, but because they thought it
expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the
party together, to do -wrong. I never knew the
Democratic party to -violate any one of its prin
ciples, out of pohcy or expediency, that it did not
pay the debt with sorrow. There is no safety or
success for our party uifless we always do right,
and trast the consequences to God and the people.
I chose not to depart from principle for expediency
on the Lecompton question, and I never intend
to do it on that or any other question. . . . You
saw the whole power and patronage of the federal
govemment wielded in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsyl
vania to re-elect anti-Lecompton men to Congress
who voted against Lecompton, then voted for the
English bfll, and then denounced the English bifl,
and pledged themselves to their people to disregard
it. My sin consists in not ha-ving given a pledge,
and then in not ha-ving afterward forfeited it. For
that reason, in this State, every postmaster, every
route agent, every coUector of the ports, and every
federal office-holder forfeits his head the moment

322 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
he expresses a preference for the Democratic candi
dates against Lincohi and his abohtion associates.
A Democratic administration which we helped to
bring into power deems it consistent -with its fidehty
to principle and its regard to duty to wield its power
in this State in behaK of the RepubUcan aboUtion
candidates in every county and every congressional
district against the Democratic party. AU I have
to say in reference to the matter is that K that ad
ministration has not regard enough for principle, K
they are not sufficiently attached to the creed of
the Democratic party, to bury forever their personal
hostffities in order to succeed in carrying out our
glorious principles, I have. I have no personal dK-
ficulty -with Mr. Buchanan or his cabinet. He chose
to make certain recommendations to Congress, as
he had a right to do, on the Lecompton question.
I could not vote in favor of them. I had as much
right to judge for myseK how I should vote as he
had how he should recommend. He undertook to
say to me, 'If you do not vote as I tefl you, I -wUl
take off the heads of your friends.' I rephed to
him, 'You did not elect me. I represent Ilhnois,
and I am accountable to lUinois, as my constituency,
and to God; but not to the President or to any
other power on earth.' " Lincohi got closer and
closer to the real issue, and gathered courage as he
proceeded. The real issue, and the whole debate,
is thus summed up by him: "You may turn over

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 323
everything in the Democratic pohcy from beginning
to end, whether in the shape it takes on the statute
book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott de
cision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the
shape it takes in short maxim-hke arguments — ^it
everywhere carefuUy excludes the idea that there is
anything wrong in it. That is the real issue.
That is the issue that wiU continue in this coimtry
when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and
myseK shaU be sUent. It is the eternal struggle
between these two principles — ^right and wrong —
throughout the world. They are the two principles
that have stood face to face from the beginning
of time, and 'will ever continue to straggle." This
line of argument Douglas was whoUy powerless to
meet. It represents Lincoln at his best. The
reply of Douglas, with which the debate closed,
was in the old vein.
Before lea-ving this subject something more should
be said of the effect of the debate on Douglas's fu
ture. AU of Lincoln's biographers make much, and
rightly, of the question as to whether the people of
a Territory could in any lawful way, against the wish
of any citizen, exclude slavery from the Territory
prior to the formation of a Constitution. The
dflemma is ob-vious, as has been pointed out. We
have seen how Douglas answered the question. He
said that they could exclude it by refusing to legis
late in its behaK. A negative answer would have

324 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
antagonized the people of Illinois, and an affirmative
answer would have angered the South, which looked
on the Dred Scott decision as making the nation
wholly slave. In "Lincoln the Lawyer," by Fred
erick Trevor Hffi, is this: "The RepubUcan poh
ticians of lUinois were not so astute as Douglas; stUl
they foresaw that he would give a plausible answer
to the question which would satisfy the local voters,
and they begged Lincoln to -withdraw the inquiry.
But the far-sighted lawyer who framed it was deaf
to their entreaties. 'Then you wUl never be sena
tor ! ' was the angry warning of one of his ad-visers.
'If Douglas answers,' responded Lincoln calmly,
'he wiU never be President.' The fatal question
was therefore left as Lincoln had phrased it, and
at the first opportunity Douglas answered by stat
ing that the Territories were stiU free agents. . . .
As soon as he had uttered it, Douglas must have
seen that his answer involved a gross blunder in
law. . . . But, Ulogical as it was, this faUacy caught
the popular fancy, and Douglas, seeing that it satis
fied his constituents, held to it and was elected to
the Senate. Nevertheless, as Lincoln anticipated,
his blunder in law cost him the presidency, and
not long afterward Judah P. Benjamin, one of the
most ardent and able representatives of the South,
arraigned him as a renegade and traitor. 'We ac
cuse him for this,' he thundered, 'that having bar
gained with us upon a point upon which we were

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 325
at issue, it should be considered a judicial point;
that he would abide the decision, and consider it
a doctrine of the party; that ha-ving said that to
us here in the Senate, he went home, and, under
the stress of a local election, his knees gave way;
his whole person trembled. His adversary stood
upon principle and was beaten; and lo! he is the
candidate of a mighty party for the presidency of
the United States. The senator from Iflinois fal
tered. He got the prize for which he faltered; but
the grand prize of his ambition to-day shps from
his grasp because of his faltering in his former con
test, and his success in the canvass for the Senate,
purchased for an ignoble price, has cost him the
loss of the presidency of the United States ! ' Thus
two years after Lincoln's question was put and an
swered Douglas was repudiated by his Southem
friends, the Democratic party was spht, three candi
dates instead of one were nominated against the
Republicans, and the lawyer whose skifl had pre
cipitated this result was triumphantly elected at
the polls." The result was as Lincoln predicted.
The Repubhcans carried the State — as Douglas
had in his anti-Lecompton speech in the Senate
predicted they would do, the Lincoln legislators
recei-ving a popular majority of 16,000, their vote
being 190,000 as against 174,000 for the avowed
Douglas candidates. The majority for the Re
pubhcan candidate for Secretary of State was 3,821.

326 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
But Douglas had the advantage of 12 hold-over
Democratic senators, and the apportionment, hav
ing been made before the large increase of popula
tion in the Northern part of the State, was also
in his favor. When the legislature met in January,
54 votes were cast for Douglas and 46 for Lincohi.
The elections generaUy were a rebuke to the ad
ministration — as was of course the -victory of Doug
las. The RepubUcans carried Pennsylvania, the
President's o-wn State, though there the new tariff
and the financial panic had their effect. New York,
Ohio, and lUinois were aU carried by the Repubhcans,
as Douglas had predicted. In Indiana the head of
the Democratic ticket was elected by a plurahty
of only 2,851; but the legislature was composed of
75 RepubUcans, 68 Democrats and 7 anti-Lecomp
ton men. The RepubUcan representation in the
federal Senate rose from 20 to 25, and that of the
Democrats from 38 to 39, there ha-ving been an
increase of two in the membership of the body. In
the new House of Representatives there were 113
RepubUcans as against 92 in the old; and 93 ad
ministration and 8 anti-Lecompton Democrats,
whereas in the old House there had been 116 ad
ministration and 11 anti-Lecompton Democrats.
The defeat was not serious in itseK, but it assuredly
was signfficant. The spht between the adminis
tration and Douglas — the recognized leader of the
Northem Democrats — ^was obvious. As to the
debate, it served to make the breach wider, brought

THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE 327
Luicoln to the front as a national character — ^though '
this was not at once reahzed — and brought the whole'
question of slavery before the country in such a
way as to make it clear to most thoughtful men
that there could be no peace, safety, or union until/
it was disposed of. It was becoming clearer and;
clearer that " a house di-vided against itself can not
stand," and that the nation must at some time be-;
come all slave or all free. Douglas was for a time'
the hero of the straggle. The honors were thought '
to be with him, partly because he won the immediate
prize, and partly because of the assumption before
the debate began that he was Lincoln's master.
Even those who regretted the defeat of Lincoln
took comfort in the thought that Douglas would
be very useful as an instrument for the destruction
of the Democratic party — as proved to be the case.
The Repubhcans were very glad to see President
Buchanan rebuked in Illinois. Douglas's triumph
was personal. His rival was content. He said of
the debate: "It gave me a hearing on the great
and durable question of the age which I could have
had m no other way; and though I now sink out
of view and shall be forgotten, I beheve I have made
some marks which -wfll tell for the cause of ci-vil
hberty long after I am gone." He apparently had
no thought of the presidency, though the idea was
in the mmds of his Ilhnois friends. But the men of
the day rated Douglas far above Lincohi.

CHAPTER XIV
THE GATHERING STORM
In the closing days of the campaign Mr. Sew
ard dehvered at Rochester, N. Y., his famous
"irrepressible conffict" speech. In it he but re
stated the principle enunciated by Mr. Lincohi
in his "House-di-vided-against-itseK" speech. But
what Seward said carried much further, since
he was a great national figure, and also because
he spoke with an eloquence and passion not shown
by Lincoln. He indicted the Democratic party as
local and sectional, deri-ving its power whoUy from
the slave States. As for the slavery stmggle, he
said that "it is an irrepressible conffict between
opposing and enduring forces, and it means that
the United States must and -wiU, sooner or later,
become enthely a slaveholding nation or entirely
a free-labor nation." Thus the two men who were
destined less than two years later to contest for
the Repubhcan nomination for the presidency stood
on the same platform. Yet, though everything
pointed to the necessity for a decision of the issue,
one way or the other, there were many, even in
the Repubhcan party, who thought that the solu
tion was to be found in Douglas's popular sover-
328

THE GATHERING STORM 329
eignty, and there were not a few who favored
nonunating Douglas himseK as the Repubhcan
candidate for the presidency. Several of the East-
em papers thought that Seward's speech was un
wise. With Kansas free, and with no other disputes
impending, the agitation graduaUy diminished, and
for a time it was thought that the election of 1860
might be fought on other issues. The Southem
men were not so shortsighted, nor were they at any
special pains to conceal their -views. Shortly after
the election Douglas made a tour through the South.
Though his object was recuperation, he could not
keep clear of pohtics. In the speeches that he made
he clung firmly to his doctrine. His reception was
hardly more than pohte. The Southem leaders
and people could not be made to believe that the
local authorities might exclude slavery from terri
tory in which the Supreme Court had said it had
a right to exist. It was with slavery, as it had been
for several years, a question of extending or dying.
With Seward and Lincoln talking of an "irrepres
sible confhct," and Jefferson Da-vis saying that
"the abohtionists have at length forced upon us
a knowledge of our trae position, and compefled
us into union, a union, not for aggression, but for
defense," there was not much reason to hope longer
for a peaceful settlement. Da-vis, it shoifld be re
membered, regarded most Repubhcans, and Seward,
Lincoln and Chase in particular, as abohtionists.

330 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
After a brief stay in Cuba — ^the question of annex
ing the island was to come before Congress — Doug
las retumed to this country. His reception in New
York and aU the Eastem cities that he -visited was
friendly and enthusiastic. But when he got to
Washington he found that he had been deposed
from the chairmanship of the committee on Terri
tories, a position that he had held ever since he en
tered the Senate. The war on him had begun. Just
as popular sovereignty seemed to be so firmly estab
hshed, it became necessary to deal with a very trouble
some situation in Utah where "Govemor Young," to
quote from the President's message, "issued his proc
lamation, in the style of an independent sovereign, an
nouncing his purpose to resist by force of arms the en
try of the United States troops into our own territory
of Utah." With this interesting problem we have
nothing to do, except as it is related to Douglas.
The same may be said of the Cuban question, which
the President discussed at considerable length.
There were the usual grievances, some of which,
Mr. Buchanan said, were enough to justKy war.
There was hardly a Central American country,
including Mexico, from which, according to the
President, we had not suffered wrongs. The mes
sage was favorable to the purchase of Cuba, and
to the establishment of a protectorate over the
Northern States of Mexico. All this territory was,
it need hardly be said, looked on with greedy eyes by

THE GATHERING STORM 331
the slave-power. In 1854, our ambassadors to France,
GreatBritain and Spain— Mason, Buchanan and Soule
— ^had met at Ostend, at the suggestion of President
Pierce, and issued the famous Ostend Mamfesto,
which was simply a declaration in favor of steahng
Cuba K Spain refused to seU it. Now the question
was up again. ShdeU introduced a biU appropriat
ing $30,000,000 as an advance payment to be made
immediately on the signature of a treaty with Spain.
It was charged that this money was a bribe to be
used in cormpting the Spanish officials — ^which is
quite hkely. The Southem leaders responded
promptly and enthusiasticaUy to the President's
recommendation, though they must have been
somewhat puzzled — and grieved — by Mr. Bu
chanan's statement that by acquiring Cuba we
should be better able to suppress the slave-trade,
as that island was "the only spot in the ci-vflized
world where the African slave-trade is tolerated."
However, the main thing was to "get" Cuba.
Before the introduction of this Cuba-purchase bfll,
Jefferson Davis had presented a resolution making
it the duty of the President to take possession of
the island and hold it tfll certain claims were paid,
and certain unsettled causes of complaint against
Spain were adjusted by her. Douglas supported
the bfll. As he had long favored the acquisition of
Cuba, it is hardly fair to say that he was prompted
by a desire to concihate the South and the slavery

332 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
interest, though that was charged against him. His
-views on the question were well kno-wn, and had
often been proclaimed. However, he must have
seen that in 1859 Cuba was chiefly desired as slave
territory, and because it would compensate some
what for the loss of Kansas. The bUl faUed, as did
a biU granting homesteads to actual settlers, the
former in the interest of slavery and the latter in
the interest of freedom. During the course of an
angry debate, in which the two bills were in coUision,
Wade of Ohio said, in answer to Toombs, that the
question was " ShaU we give niggers to the niggerless
or land to the landless?" Addressing the South
emers directly, he said: "When you come to nig
gers for the niggerless, afl other questions sink
into perfect insignfficance." Whatever may have
been Douglas's motive in supporting the Cuba biU,
he did not shrink when he was attacked by Brown
and Da-vis of Mississippi. Brown wanted to know
whether there was such a thing as the right of pro
tection to slave property in the Territories, and he
repudiated the doctrine of squatter sovereignty.
Douglas promptly repUed that there was none as
against the sovereignty of the people as their o-wn
la-wmaking power. "I know," he said, "that some
gentlemen do not like the doctrine of non-inter
vention as well as they once did. It is now becom
ing fashionable to talk sneeringly of 'your doctrine
of non-intervention.' Sir, that doctrine has been

THE GATHERING STORM 333
fundamental in the Democratic creed for years."
To repudiate it, he said, was to repudiate Democ
racy. "I teU you, gentlemen of the South, in aU
candor," he continued, "I do not beheve a Demo
cratic candidate can ever carry one Democratic
State in the North on the platform that it is the
duty of the federal govemment to force the people
of a territory to have slavery when they do not
want it."
Jefferson Davis foUowed with what was a -virtual
declaration of war on Douglas. "I have heard,"
he said, "many a siren's song on this doctrine of
non-intervention, a thing shadowy, fleetuig, chang
ing its color as often as the chameleon." "I trast,"
he went on, "it wfll be remembered that a few of
us, at least, have stood by the old landmarks of
those who framed the Constitution and gave us
our hberty; that we claim nothing more now from
the government than the men who formed it were
wiUing to concede. When this shall become an
unpopular doctrine, when men are to lose the great
States of the North by announcing it, I wish it to
be understood that my vote can be got for no candi
date who -wfll not be so defeated." What Da-vis
and the others wanted was protection for slave
property wherever carried. It was no longer a ques
tion of not interfering with slavery in the States,
or of the denial to Congress of the power to exclude
it from the Territories, but of permittmg its ex-

334 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tension through a guaranteed federal protection.
Douglas's -view was that of the North — and also
that of the men of the South, even the slavery men,
of a generation before — ^whUe the Da-vis view was
that of the South, and was sohdly supported by
the South. There never was from this time on any
chance of bridging the gap between the Northem
and Southem wing of the Democratic party. In
deed, Douglas showed no disposition to compromise
— on the contrary he seemed to take special dehght
in chaUenging the Southem faction. The issue
was made even sharper by the declaration of a prom
inent editor to the effect that there was a large party
in the South in favor of a limited re-vival of the slave-
trade as indispensable to the prosperity of that sec
tion. "No cause," said this man, "has ever gro-wn
-with greater rapidity than has that of the advocates
of the slave-trade." Later a Southern convention
meeting at Vicksburg resolved that "aU laws. State
and federal, prohibiting the African slave-trade,
ought to be repealed." Indeed this trade was re-
-vived "in a limited way." The crews of two vessels
engaged in this traffic were indicted, but federal
juries refused to con-vict, one indeed returning a
verdict of not guUty. There was no sentiment in
favor of enforcing the law. Douglas is reported to
have said in a private conversation that fifteen thou
sand negroes had been imported into the country
within the last year, and that he himseK had seen

THE GATHERING STORM 335
"three hundred of those recently imported miserable
beings in a slave pen at Vicksburg, Miss., and also
large numbers at Memphis, Tenn." Here was an
other issue that the Iflinois senator had to face,
and he met it bravely. In a letter written in August,
1859, to Colonel John L. Peyton of Virginia, he said:
"A compromise was effected and incorporated into
the Constitution by which it was understood that
the African slave-trade might continue a legitimate
commerce in those States whose laws sanctioned
it untfl the year 1808, from and after which time
Congress might and would prohibit it forever,
throughout the dominion and limits of the United
States, and pass aU laws which might become neces
sary to make such prohibition effectual. The har
mony of the convention was restored, and the Union
saved by this compromise, without which the Con
stitution could never have been made. I stand
firmly by this compromise and by all the other com
promises of the Constitution, and shaU use my best
efforts to carry each and aU of them into faithful
execution, in the sense and with the imderstanding
in which they were originaUy adopted. In accor
dance -with this compromise, I am irreconcflably
opposed to the re-vival of the African slave-trade,
in any form and under any circumstances." He
was even more positive in a letter to J. B. Dorr,
of Iowa, in response to an inquiry as to whether his
name would be presented to the Charleston con-

336 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
vention as a candidate for the presidency. After
setting out what seemed to be the tme Democratic
doctrines, he said that K the convention approved
them his friends would be at Uberty to present his
name. Then he went on: "If, on the contrary, it
shall become the pohcy of the Democratic party —
which I cannot anticipate — ^to repudiate these,
their tune-honored principles, on which we have
achieved so many patriotic triumphs, and K, in
heu of them, the convention shaU interpolate into
the creed of the party such new issues as the re-vival
of the African slave-trade, or a congressional slave
code for the Territories, or the doctrine that the
Constitution of the United States either estabUshes
or prohibits slavery in the Territories, beyond the
power of the people legaUy to control it as other
property, it is due to candor to say that, in such
an event, I could not accept the nomination if ten
dered to me." This letter created a most favorable
impression throughout the North, but it served
still further to ahenate the South. For the purpose
of further commending non-intervention to the
North Douglas contributed a long discussion of it
to Harper's Magazine of September, 1859. There
was nothing new in it. But the interested reader
wUl find in it a clear, painstaking, and moderate
statement of Douglas's views. The article was
really an argument against the Southern theory,
and the author pointed out that if that theory

THE GATHERING STORM 337
should prevail there would indeed be an "irrepres
sible conffict," and a "house di-vided against it
seK." The article produced a great sensation, and
caUed forth a reply from Attorney-General Black.
A war of pamphlets foUowed that accomphshed
httle except to add bittemess to the controversy.
After reading this discussion, in which the best
possible case was made for the Douglas doctrine,
Lincoln said: "Douglas's popular sovereignty, as
a matter of principle, shnply is: 'If one man would
enslave another, neither that other nor any third
man has a right to object.'"
Many times Douglas was compeUed to make his
position clear — ^perhaps it would be fairer to say
that he willingly did so. In the course of his
debate in Febraary -with Davis he was asked
whether he had not favored and ad-vised federal
intervention in Utah, and whether that was not in
-violation of popular sovereignty. He was able to
refer to a speech dehvered almost two years before
in which he had differentiated — or attempted to
do so — ^between the case of Kansas and that of
Utah. Briefly his theory was that in deahng with
Utah, we had to do -with what was -virtuafly a
foreign power, since most of its people were ahens,
bound by oath to support the govemment of
Brigham Young as against the United States, and
in revolt against the govemment of the nation. So
he would repeal the organic act creating it a Terri-

338 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tory. But he admitted that the Kansas-Nebraska
act might also be repealed, though that was based
on an agreement that the question as to the constitu-
tionaUty of property in slaves should be referred to
the Supreme Court. As to Utah he said that K evi
dence "shall estabUsh the facts which are beUeved to
exist it wiU become the duty of Congress to apply the
kmfe and cut out this loathsome, disgusting ulcer."
If the people had aU been citizens, U-ving under a
constitution of their own framing, and loyal to the
United States, it is hard to see how we could have
intervened against polygamy without denying to
the people the right to order their domestic affairs
as they pleased — ^which was the essence of popular
sovereignty. Douglas had reached the point where
he was un-wiUing to force slavery on the Terri
tories, or to aUow it to recruit itseK by a re-vival of
the slave-trade. As far as he was concemed, there
were to be no "niggers for the niggerless" brought
from overseas. The October elections of 1859
were generaUy favorable to the Repubhcans. Be
fore the November elections, namely on October
17, came John Bro-wn's raid which resulted in
the capture of the United States arsenal at Har
pers Ferry. Here was more trouble for the poh
ticians. The RepubUcans were quick to disclaim
all responsibUity for it, or any part in it. The
Democrats, on the other hand, saw in it nothing
but "Black Repubhcanism." The story need not

THE GATHERING STORM 339
be told here. Brown was captured and executed.
The best statement of the case is that of Francis
Lieber: "Brown died like a man, and Virginia fretted
like an old woman. The deed was irrational, but
it wiU be historical. Virginia has come out of it
damaged, I think. She has forced upon mankind
the idea that slavery must be, m her own opinion,
but a rickety thing." The main concem of men'
active in pubhc affairs was as to the effect of the
raid on the elections. The Repubhcans feared that
the Democrats would make capital out of it, as
they certahfly tried to do. However, the Repub
hcans made large gams. In New York they elected
most of their State ticket. New England was sohdly
Repubhcan. The Repubhcans carried Ohio, Penn
sylvania, and Iowa. The Democrats lost even
Maryland to the "Opposition," as they did New
Jersey. Indeed, there was an opposition in several
Southem States strong enough to defeat the Demo
crats. Minnesota and Wisconsin returned Repubh
can plurahties, whfle the Democrats were successful
in Nebraska, Oregon, and Cahfomia. When Con
gress met, December 5, 1859, John Brown had been
dead three days, ha-ving been hanged for treason on
December 2. The North was greatly stirred by
the affair, which probably had as much to do as
"Uncle Tom's Cabm" with rousing the fighting
spirit — ^K not a good deal more. Helper's book.
The Impending Crisis, and especially its mdorse-

340 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ment by leading Republicans, served stUl further to
inflame public sentiment. The comment of the
President, in his message, was as foUows: "I shaU
not refer in detaU to the recent sad and bloody
occurrences at Harpers Ferry. StUl it is proper
to observe that these events, however bad and
cmel in themselves, derive their chief importance
from the apprehension that they are but symp
toms of an incurable disease in the pubhc mind,
which may break out in stUl more dangerous out
rages and terminate at last in an open war by the
North to abolish slavery in the South." It is in
this message, by the way, that the famUiar words
"old pubhc functionary" occur. But K the "dis
ease" were indeed, as the President said, "incur
able" one cannot readUy understand how he
expected, as he said he did, the agitation to cease.
During this session of Congress, Douglas was
beset by enemies from every side. It was to the
Southem senators, however, that he devoted most
of his attention. The doctrine of his Freeport speech
was under constant attack. Practically the only
question discussed was slavery. The situation was
grave, and more threatening in the country as a
whole than in Congress. Perhaps both sides had
begun to reaUze that the nation was indeed facing
an "irrepressible conflict." Douglas spoke many
times in the Senate. In response to the taunts of
the Southem senators he said: "I am not seeking

THE GATHERING STORM 341
a nomination. I am wilhng to take one pro-vided I
can assume it on principles that I beheve to be
sound; but in the event of your making a platform
that I could not conscientiously execute in good
faith K I were elected, I wifl not stand upon it and
be a candidate. ... I have no grievances, but I
have no concessions. I have no abandonment of
position or principles; no recantation to make to
any body of men on earth." Da-vis spoke in his
usual arrogant style in support of resolutions offered
by him demanding federal protection for slave prop
erty in the Territories. The time had gone by
for concffiation. Yet another attempt was made,
this time by Abraham Lincoln in his great Cooper
Union speech on Febraary 27, 1860. That served
to bring Lincohi before the coimtry even more
than had his debate with Douglas. The speech
was a -vindication of the Repubhcan position,
and also a plea for harmony and good-will. It
has been said that Douglas waged war on both
factions. As there were no concessions to the
Southern leaders, there were none to the Repub
hcans. On January 16 he introduced a resolution
instracting the judiciary committee to report a
bfll "for the protection of each State and Territory
of the Union against invasion by the authorities
or inhabitants of any other State or Territory; and
for the suppression and punishment of conspiracies
or combinations in any State or Territory with in-

342 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
tent to invade, assaU, or molest the government,
inhabitants, property or institutions of any State
or Territory of the Union." Of course, this reso
lution was prompted by the John Brown raid. A
week later Douglas spoke at length in its behaK.
The govemor of Virginia had in the preceding Oc
tober asked for federal troops to protect the State
agamst conspiracies that had, as he said, been formed
in other States to rescue John Brown. "I am at
a loss," repUed the President, "to discover any pro-
-vision of the Constitution or laws of the United
States which would authorize me to 'take steps'
for this purpose." So Douglas proposed legislation
to remedy the defect.
That there should be such power in the federal
govemment is of course clear, and on this point
Douglas argued with great force, winning the ap
proval of such Repubhcans as Senator Fessenden,
who said: "I stated, and I beheve it was all I said
on that matter, that I was disposed to agree with
the senator in his -views as to the question of power;
and that, -with my -views, I should go very far — far
enough to accomplish the purpose — to prevent the
forming of conspiracies in one State to attack an
other." Douglas, however, had broadened his de
mand so as to include the prevention of conspiracies
to "run off" slaves, thus bringing up the question of
the fugitive-slave law. He charged that the Brown
raid was the direct result of Repubhcan teaching.

THE GATHERING STORM 343
a charge that was resented by the Repubhcan sena
tors. There was a glimmer of irritation in Doug
las's reply to Fessenden's reference to the declara
tion of the lUinois senator that he did not care
whether the people "voted slavery up or down";
perhaps the moral phase of the question was be
ginning to dawn on him. Yet he refused to go be
yond his old position of indifference. He said: "I
say this: K the people of Kansas want a slave State,
it is their business and not mine; K they want a free
State, they have a right to have it; and hence I do
not care, so far as regards my action, whether they
make it a free State or not; it is none of my busi
ness. But the senator says he does care, he has a
preference between freedom and slavery. How long
would this preference last if he was a sugar-planter
in Louisiana, residing on his estate, instead of li-ving
in Maine ? Sir, I hold the doctrine that a wise states
man -wiU adapt his laws to the wants, conditions and
interests of the people to be governed by them.
Slavery may be very essential in one climate and
totally useless in another. If I were a citizen of
Louisiana I would vote for retaining and maintain
ing slavery, because I beheve the good of the people
would require it. As a citizen of Ilhnois I am ut
terly opposed to it, because our interests would
not be promoted by it. . . . I have said and repeat
that this question of slavery is one of climate, of
pohtical economy, of seK-mterest, not a question

344 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of legislation. Wherever the chmate, the soU, the
health of the coimtry are such that it cannot be
cultivated by white labor, you wUl have African
labor, and compulsory labor at that. Wherever
white labor can be employed cheapest and most
profitably, there African labor wUl retire and white
labor wUl take its place. . . . But the senator thinks
it a great crime for me to say that I do not care
whether they have it or not. I care just this far: I
want every people to have that kind of govemment,
that system of laws, that class of institutions which
wiU best promote their weKare, and I want them
to decide for themselves; and so that they decide it
to suit themselves, I am satisfied, without stopping
to inquire or caring which way they decide it. That
is what I meant by that declaration, and I am ready
to stand by it." By this time the country had swung
past this principle. Lincoln had showed that it
could mean only that for aU practical purposes the
right was what the people had estabhshed. If the
people of Kansas had adopted polygamy Douglas
would have been bound by his principle to let them
have their way. The speech is important now only
as sho-wing that on the very eve of the national con
ventions the Illinois senator was stiU im-wUUng to
pass judgment on slaveiy. It was stUl a mere matter
of "pohtical economy." Looking back on those
times one cannot but marvel that Douglas was able
to mamtain his absolute neutrahty so long.

CHAPTER XV
DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT
Chakleston had four years before been selected
as the place for the meeting of the Democratic con
vention. It assembled on Monday, Aprfl 23. The
preliminary skirmishes revealed that there were
differences that were almost certam to prove irrec-
oncflable. Douglas had a practicafly sohd backing
from the West and Northwest. On January 4 the
State Convention of Illinois had met, elected dele
gates to the Charleston convention, instructed them
for Douglas, and adopted his slavery programme.
Later Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota,
and Michigan feU into hne. In other States in which
prevaUed the custom of choosing delegates by dis
tricts, simflar resolutions, and instractions for Doug
las, were adopted. The stmggle was plainly between
the South and the Northwest. New York, Pennsyl
vania, New Jersey, and even Tennessee, proclaimed
the Douglas doctrine, though they did not instract.
When the delegates met they soon leamed that, as
far as the platform was concerned, the choice was
between Douglas's non-intervention pohcy and Jef
ferson Davis's resolutions that had been offered in
the Senate calling for protection for slavery ui the
345

346 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Territories against unfriendly local legislation.
There was a feeling — soon dispeUed — that the
Northem Democrats would again jdeld, as they
had so often yielded hi the past. But the North
west was a new, and most determined, factor. It
was devoted to Douglas, and with good reason.
Moreover, the Northem men knew that it would
be impossible to carry a single Northem State on
the Da-vis platform. As the Southem leaders had
made up then mind to break up the Union K they
could not have their way, there was no reason to
look for any concessions from them.
What made the situation worse was the bitter
feeling of the South against Douglas personaUy.
The leaders from that section demanded not only
a platform that would express their -views, but one
on which Douglas could not possibly stand. A year
before Douglas had in the Senate warned Davis
and the others that no "Democratic candidate can
ever carry any one Democratic State of the North
on the platform that it is the duty of the federal gov
emment to force the people of a Territory to have
slavery when they do not want it." "When this,"
repUed Davis, "shaU become an unpopular doc
trine, when men are to lose great States of the North
by announcing it, I wish to be understood that my
vote can be got for no candidate who wiU not be
so defeated." Popular sovereignty was as hateful
to men of this class as "Black RepubUcanism " it-

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 347
self, and Douglas was as much dishked as Seward.
With the help of Oregon and Cahfomia the South
controUed the committee on resolutions, though it
did not control the convention. Having seventeen
States out of thirty-three, the South elected the
chahman, Caleb Gushing of Massachusetts. After
dehberathig for five days the resolutions committee
reported two platforms, that of the majority being
practicaUy a reaffirmation of the DaAds resolutions,
which were themselves nothing more than a reaf
firmation of the old CaUioun doctrine of the na-
tionahzation of slavery. The minority report — ^that
made by the Douglas members — was simply an in
dorsement of the Cincinnati platform of four years
before. After another attempt at reconcffiation, the
convention by a vote of 165 to 138 adopted the
Douglas platform. Only twelve Southem delegates
voted for it, and only thirty Northem delegates
against it. In the discussion of the platform, Yancey
of Mississippi at last stated with frankness the
Southem -view. Addressing the Northem, or Doug
las, delegates, he said: "You acknowledged that
slavery did not exist by the law of nature or by the
law of God — ^that it existed only by State law; that
it was wrong, but that you were not to blame. That
was your position, and it was -wrong. If you had
taken the position directly that slavery was right
and therefore ought to be you would have triumphed,
and antislavery would now have been dead in your

348 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
midst. But you have gone down before the enemy
so that they have put their foot upon your neck;
you wUl go lower and lower stUl, unless you change
front and change your tactics. When I was a school
boy in the Northem States abohtionists were pelted
with rotten eggs. But now this band of aboUtionists
has spread and gro-wn into three bands — ^the Black
RepubUcan, the Free-SoUers, and squatter-sover
eignty men — afl representing the common sentunent
that slavery is wrong. I say it in no disrespect, but
it is a logical argument that your admission that
slavery is wrong has been the cause of aU this dis
cord." Ha-ving aU his hfe refused to say that slavery
was wrong, Douglas and his friends were now asked
to say that it was right, and that it existed "by the
law of nature or the law of God." And they re
fused. "Gentlemen of the South," said Pugh, of
Ohio, "you mistake us — ^you mistake us; we -wiU
never do it." On the adoption of the Douglas plat
form the Alabama delegation withdrew from the
convention. It was announced that Mississippi,
Louisiana, South CaroUna, Florida, Texas, and
Arkansas would also secede. After taking 57 bal
lots, on the last of which Douglas received 145^
votes — 202 being necessary to a choice — the con
vention on May 3 adjoumed to meet again in
Baltimore on June 18. The seceders, after adopt-
mg a platform, adjoumed to meet in Richmond on
June 11. They met, and again adjoumed to re-

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 349
assemble in Baltimore the same day as the regular
convention, June 18. In the interval the Senate
was busy with the slavery question. It adopted
the Da-vis resolutions — ^which were the platform of
the slavery convention — by a decided majority, both
Northem and Southem Democrats votmg for them,
with the exception of Pugh, of Ohio, and Douglas,
who was not present. The discussion in the Senate,
in which Douglas and Davis were the leaders, was
marked by great bittemess. There was no yield
ing on the part of the lUinois senator. He charged
his opponents, Yancey in particular, with a purpose
to break up the Union, and said that such would
be the ine-vitable effect of their doctrines. Davis
was more arrogant and offensive than usual, de
scending to personahties, as when he referred to
Douglas's "swelling manner" and "egregious van
ity." Whfle this futfle debate was going on the
Repubhcans were engaged in the business of nominat
ing Abraham Lincohi for the presidency. Hamlin
of Maine was nominated for the vice-presidency.
The platform was shrewdly dra-wn. It declared
for the Union and State rights; denounced the John
Brown raid as "among the gravest of crimes"; con
demned the administration, and especiafly its forc
ing a Constitution on Kansas; denied that the
Constitution carried slavery into the Territories, or
that Congress could give it legal existence there;
condemned popular sovereignty; and of course de-

350 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
clared strongly against the revival of the slave-
trade. It was, in short, a moderate, or Lincoln, plat
form. When the two Democratic conventions met, the
delegates reaUzed that there was imperative need
for unity in order to avoid the election of a "Black
Repubhcan." Some of the seceders were -willing
to retum, the anti-Douglas men favoring their ad
mission, and indeed claiming that they could not
be excluded. This was opposed by the majority
of the convention. Contesting Douglas delegations
appeared from Alabama and Louisiana, and were
admitted. This action started a new secession,
Virginia, and most of the delegates from Ten
nessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and North Carohna
retiring. Douglas, reahzing that the fight was
speciaUy directed agauist him, t-vrice offered to with
draw his name, provided his platform stood, and
a "non-intervention, Union-lo-ving man" be nomi
nated. The men to whom these communications
were sent, rightly judging that Douglas and the
platform were inseparable, suppressed them. Caleb
Gushing, the chairman, ha-ving gone over to the
seceders, was succeeded by David Tod of Ohio.
On the second baUot, which was taken June 23,
Douglas received aU the votes cast except thirteen,
and was declared the nominee of the party. Senator
Fitzpatrick of Alabama was nominated for -vice-
president. When he later declined, the national

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 351
committee substituted Herschel V. Johnson of
Georgia. The seceders nominated John C. Brecken
ridge for president, and Joseph Lane of Oregon for
vice-president. The old Whigs and Americans had,
on May 9, met at Baltunore and nominated John
BeU of Tennessee for president, and Edward Everett
of Massachusetts for vice-president. If the Re
pubhcan party was, as had been charged, sectional,
there were now two Democratic parties, each of
which was sectional. The hne that was later to
divide the Union, untfl it was washed out m blood,
now di-vided the Democratic party. It was the
first -victim of the secession and disunion spirit.
In the campaign that foUowed Douglas was easily
the leading figure. He was the first candidate —
unless we except General Scott — ^to make a speak
ing tour. He spoke in every section of the country.
Almost from the outset of the campaign Lincoln's
election seemed to be assured. In September Doug
las said that Lincohi would be elected. The chief
argument against the Repubhcans, and it had weight,
was that K their candidate were chosen secession
would foUow. But men had made up theh minds
that the time had come to settle the issue. There
had been threats of secession before, and the more
optimistic refused to be terrified. Probably most
Northemers were sceptical. So though some were
influenced by the argument, it was, on the whole,
not convincing. For a tune Douglas was hopeful,

352 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
apparently honestly so. Soon, however, it developed
that he was losmg votes to Lincoln — and in some
cases to Bell — ^in the North, and to Breckenridge in
the South. There were attempts at fusion, some
of them successful, as far as local candidates were
concemed, though they were opposed by Douglas.
He continued his campaign, and with increasing
vigor, long after he was practicaUy certain that he
would be beaten. His purpose undoubtedly was
to prepare the people, particularly those of the South,
for the election of Lincoln, and to prevent secession.
When it was suggested that he, and the other Demo
cratic candidates withdraw, in order that another
might be nominated who would unite the party,
he said that he was "in the hands of his friends,"
but declared that the plan was not practical, as
the result would be to throw his support in the North
to Mr. Lincohi. Wherever he spoke he drew large
and enthusiastic crowds. At NorfoUi, Va., on Au
gust 25, he was asked whether the election of Lin
coln would justKy the South in seceding from the
Union. "To this," said Douglas, "I emphaticaUy
answer no. The election of a man to the presidency
by the American people in conformity with the
Constitution of the United States would not justKy
any attempt at dissol-ving this glorious confederacy."
When asked whether he would ad-vise resistance to
secession, he answered, in the spirit of Andrew Jack
son: "I answer emphaticaUy that it is the duty of

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 353
the President of the United States and of aU others
m authority under him, to enforce the laws of the
United States, passed by Congress and as the courts
expound them; and I, as in duty bound by my oath
of fidehty to the Constitution, would do aU in my
power to aid the govemment of the United States
in maintaining the supremacy of the laws against
aU resistance to them, come from whatever quarter
it might. . . . The mere inauguration of a Presi
dent of the United States, whose pohtical opinions
were, in my judgment, hostfle to the Constitution
and safety of the Union, without an overt act on
his part, without striking a blow at our institutions
or our rights, is not such a grievance as would justKy
revolution or secession." In North Carohna he
talked in the same strain, saying that he "would
hang every man higher than Haman who would
attempt to resist by force the execution of any pro-
-vision of the Constitution which our fathers made
and bequeathed to us." He then journeyed to
the Northwest, and every day he made it clearer
that he was animated, not by personal ambition,
but by deep love for the Union. Better than any
other man except those who were plottmg its
overthrow he realized the danger. "It is not,"
he said, "personal ambition that has induced me
to take the stump this year. I say to you who
know me that the presidency has no charms for
me. I do not believe that it is my mterest as an

354 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ambitious man to be President this year K I could.
But I do love this Union. There is no sacrffice on
earth that I would not make to preserve it." Hear
ing that the October States, Pennsylvania and In
diana, had been carried by the Repubhcans, he said:
"Mr. Lincoln is elected President. We must try
to save the Union. I wffi go South." And go South
he did. He faced threats of personal violence, al
ways speaking for the Union and against secession.
He was denounced as "a regular old John Adams
federahst and consoUdationist." His friends, among
them Senator Chngman, wamed him of his danger.
But he kept on in spite of everything. At Balti
more he anticipated — and denounced — ^the Con
federate doctrine, later formulated, and no doubt
stiU held by some men: "States that secede cannot
screen themselves under the pretense that resis
tance to their acts 'would be making war upon sover
eign States.' Sovereign States cannot commit trea
son. In my opinion there is a mature plan through
the Southem States to break up the Union. I be
heve the election of a Black Repubhcan is to be the
signal for that attempt, and that the leaders of the
scheme desire the election of Lincoln so as to have
an excuse for disunion." The results in Maine and
Vermont, and in the October States foreshadowed
the election of Lincoln. Douglas was in the South
when the news of the RepubUcan -victory reached
them. He continued his speech-making, his pur-

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 355
pose now being to urge the people to accept the
verdict. This was the message he dehvered at Vicks
burg. In the same stram he wrote to the busmess
men of New Orleans. Lmcoln received 180 electoral
votes, Douglas 12, Breckenridge 72, and BeU 39.
Douglas carried but one State — Missouri — ^and in
addition got 3 votes from New Jersey. Lmcoln
carried eveiy free State but New Jersey, from which
he got 4 votes. The popular vote was Lincoln
1,857,610; Douglas 1,291,574; Breckenridge 850,-
082; BeU 646,124. The combined Democratic vote
exceeded that cast for Lincohi by 930,170. In the
slave States Breckenridge lacked 135,057 of a ma
jority. Even in the GuK States, where there was a
poU of 330,000, Breckenridge's majority was a bare
14,000. Douglas and BeU, both of whom were for the
Union, poUed 690,000 votes between them as against
561,000 for Breckenridge. Even in the South, there
fore, the Union sentiment was triumphant. The
immediate problem confronting the country, and
the President-elect, was one of preventing secession,
and of holding together aU who were opposed to it,
or might be influenced to oppose it. Mr. Lincohi
was altogether concfliatory. In a speech at a meet
ing held at Galena November 20, to celebrate the
Repubhcan -victory, he said: "In aU our rejoicings
let us neither express nor cherish any hard feelings
toward any citizen who by his vote has dflfered
with us. Let us at aU times remember that aU Amer-

356 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
ican citizens are brothers of a common coimtry, and
should dweU together in the bonds of fraternal feel
ing." But, though he showed an entire reasonable
ness of spirit, and made many concessions, it be
came evident that he was of the opinion that there
could be no compromise on the slavery question.
But what he proposed to exclude from compromise
was, not slavery, but "the extension of slavery."
This he made clear in a letter to Alexander H.
Stephens, written December 22, 1860. By this time
South Carolina had seceded, and that action, taken
on December 20, raised an issue more important than
any question in regard to slavery — ^the question,
namely, whether there reaUy was such a thing as
the government of the United States. This is made
clear in a letter -written by Lincoln to J. T. Hale,
of Sprmgfield, IU., January 11, 1861: "We have
just carried an election on principles fairly stated
to the people. Now we are told in advance the
govemment shaU be broken up unless we surrender
to those we have beaten, before we take the offices.
In this they are either attempting to play upon us
or they are in dead eamest. Either way, K we sur
render, it is the end of us and of the govemment."
It is important that the attitude of Mr. Lincoln
be kept in mind in connection with the attitude of
Douglas toward him and his pohcies, and toward
the question of preserving the Union. Mr. Lincohi
merely at that time denied the right of States to

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 357
secede because a national election had gone against
them. But Mr. Lincoln was -wrong in saying that "Doug
las is sure to be again trying to bring in his 'popular
sovereignty.' " On the contrary, he very promptly
threw it overboard. From the day of Lincoln's
election to that of Douglas's death a few months
later, the two men worked together, in mutual con
fidence, for the preservation of the Union. No man
ever needed the support of the men who had voted
against him more than did the first Repubhcan
President. This support was loyally and ungrudg
ingly given by Douglas and his foUowers. Douglas,
it was tme, had much -wrong to undo, for he had
said much to strengthen the Southern people in
the behef that the election of a Repubhcan would
involve an attack on slavery in the States in which
it existed. He had said in January, 1860, that the
John Bro-wn raid was the dhect result of Repub
hcan teaching. But when the Union was in danger
he raUied to the support of the administration in
the constitutional govemment. When Congress
met in December, 1860, South Carolina was con
sidering in convention the question of secession, and
trying to define its relations "-with the Northem
States and the govemment of the United States."
And on December 20, the State passed an ordinance
of secession, though the South was still in control
of the executive department of the govemment and

358 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
of the army and na-vy, and had a majority in the
Senate. There were stfll, strange as it now seems,
hopes of compromise. Seward, now as always in
curably optimistic, -viewed the situation with much
equanimity. Douglas, however, was not deceived,
but even he clung to the last to the hope of saving
the Union by compromise. In his message Presi
dent Buchanan said that "the election of any one
of our feUow-citizens to the office of President does
not of itseK afford just cause for dissol-ving the
Union," and that "in order to justKy secession as
a constitutional remedy, it must be on the principle
that the federal govemment is a mere voluntary
association of States, to be dissolved by any one
of the contracting parties." "If this be so," he con
tinued, "the confederacy is a rope of sand, to be
penetrated and dissolved by the first adverse wave
of pubhc opinion." The federal govemment was,
he said, "a great and powerful government, in
vested with aU the attributes of sovereignty over
the special subjects to which its authority ex
tends. Its framers never intended to implant in
its bosom the seeds of its own destruction, nor were
they at its creation guilty of the absurdity of pro-
vidmg for its o-wn dissolution." But this "great
and powerful govemment" was not great and power
ful enough to prevent its own destruction — such
was the argument of the President. He found au
thority for enforcing the laws and protecting federal

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 359
property, but none for "coercing" a State. There
were many men in the North, and some newspapers,
that preached the same doctrine. The question
was new, and presented in startling form, and it is
not surprising that there should have been doubt
and hesitation. One Northem paper declared that
a Union held together by force was neither pos
sible nor desirable. Greeley of the Tribune held
that the right of revolution, which the President,
and indeed every one else admitted, was identical
with the right to secede, and the Tribune declared
that "whenever a considerable section of our Union
shafl dehberately resolve to go out of it we shaU
resist aU coercive measures to keep it hi." Yet K
there is a right to start a revolution, there must
be a right to suppress it. Such language as this
confirmed the South in its conviction that peaceful
secession was possible.
In the hght of Northem sentiment, there seemed
a fair chance for compromise, and to this work Doug
las devoted himseK. "Mr. Lincohi," he said, "hav
ing been elected, must be inaugurated in obedience
to the Constitution." He pleaded for a laying aside
of prejudice and bittemess, and asked aU to unite
with hun "in a common effort to save the country
from the disasters which threaten it." But the
Republicans were not favorably disposed to further
compromises, or attempt at them, whfle Southem
senators boldly proclahned the purpose of their

360 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
States to secede. Douglas, as has been said, did
not stand on his doctrine of popular sovereignty.
On the contrary, he agreed to a restoration of the
Missouri Compromise, which he had often denounced
as unconstitutional, and which the Supreme Court
had overthro-wn. This was proposed by Senator
Crittenden of Kentucky in a series of resolutions
which were referred to a special conomittee of thir
teen. Douglas was a member of the committee,
and voted for aU the resolutions. They were de
feated by RepubUcan votes, and the committee was
forced to admit the impossibffity of its agreeing.
"No adjustment," said Douglas, "wffi restore and
preserve the peace which does not banish the slavery
question from Congress forever and place it beyond
the reach of federal legislation. Mr. Crittenden's
proposition to extend the Missouri Compromise line
accomphshes this object, and hence I can accept it
now for the same reasons that I proposed it in 1848.
I prefer our own plan of non-mtervention and pop
ular sovereignty, however." Douglas supported the
plan to submit the Crittenden resolutions to a
popular referendum. But nothing came of this
proposition. ' The situation in no way resembled
that of 1850. Douglas was no longer bound even
by pride of opinion. "I have no hesitation m
saying," he declared, "to senators on aU sides of
this chamber, that I am prepared to act on this
question with reference to the present exigencies

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 361
of the case, as K I had never given a vote, or uttered
a word, or had an opinion upon the subject."
Early in January a steamer carrying arms, am
munition and men to reinforce the garrison at Fort
Sumter, was fired on. The secession of Missis
sippi was announced on the same day — January 9.
Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Texas foUowed.
Before this, Floyd, Secretary of War; Thompson,
Secretary of the Interior; and Cobb, Secretary of
the Treasury, had seceded from the President's
cabinet. Cass resigned as Secretary of State, dis-
appro-ving of the administration's pohcy of inaction.
Attomey-General Black was appointed in his place,
Ed-win M. Stanton becoming attorney-general.
Joseph Holt was appointed Secretary of War, and
John A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury — all Union
men. There was thus a total change in the atmos
phere of the White House, though there was httle
change in the pohcy. January 21 the senators from
the seceding States withdrew from the Senate. But
stiU attempts at compromise continued. Shortly
afterward Kansas was admitted as a free State.
A peace Congress was held, attended by delegates
from fourteen free and seven slave States. It
adopted an article of amendment to the Constitu
tion embracing seven propositions, very simflar
to those contained in the Crittenden resolutions.
When this article was presented to congress it was
found that it would not be acceptable to the dis-

362 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
unionists. FinaUy Douglas caUed on the President
elect and asked him in his inaugural to recommend
the caUing of a convention to amend the Constitu
tion; in this he was supported by Seward. Lincoln
asked for tune to consider the suggestion. A few
days later in his inaugural address he said: "I can
not be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and
patriotic citizens are desirous of having the national
Constitution amended. WhUe I make no recom
mendation of amendments, I fuUy recognize the
rightful authority of the people over the whole sub
ject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed
in the instrument itseK; and I should, under exist
ing circumstances, favor rather than oppose a fair
opportunity being afforded the people to act upon
it. I understand a proposed amendment to the Con
stitution — ^which amendment, however, I have not
seen — ^has passed Congress, to the effect that the
federal govemment shaU never interfere with the
domestic institutions of the States, including that
of persons held to service. To avoid misconstmc-
tion of what I have said, I depart from my purpose
not to speak of particular amendments so far as to
say that, holding such a pro-vision to now be impUed
constitutional law, I have no objection to its being
made express and irrevocable." Such an amend
ment had been indeed passed by Congress, only
such men as Sumner and Wade voting against it.
It is known that Lincoln changed his original pohcy.

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 363
which was hostfle to a constitutional amendment.
Douglas warmly praised the inaugural, saying that
it was "an emanation from the bram and heart of
a patriot." Mr. Lmcoln, he said, has "sunk the
partisan m the patriot." AU the way, clear through
to the fateful hour — and after it had strack — ^the
Illinois senator stood by the Illinois President. He
took great pains to show his friendship in every
possible way. Two days after the inauguration
President Lincohi sent for him and praised the speech
dehvered by him on March 6, saying that he was
in entire agreement with it. Douglas and his famfly
were on the most friendly social terms with the
White House famfly, and he occupied a front seat
at the inauguration ceremonies. Lincohi seems
to have trusted him and rehed on him in the great
crisis. In his effort to get an interpretation of the
President's inaugural address by Repubhcan sena
tors, the Illinois senator, toward the close of the
session, made a speech that had a strong partisan
ring, suggesting as it does that his purpose was to
make trouble between the President and his party.
But it is to be remembered in his favor that he was
as opposed as he ever had been to those whom he
caUed the "irreconcflables," and that he might
legitimately wish to know whether they would sup
port a President of their o-wn party who had just
dehvered what Douglas spoke of as "a peace-offer
ing rather than a war message." Finally the Presi-

364 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
dent decided to send supphes to the Fort Sumter
garrison, and on AprU 12 the fort was fired on. The
days of compromise were over. The South had
chosen war, and war it was to be. There is little
more to be told. The need for the support of Doug
las and his followers was greater than ever. This
was reaUzed by the administration. There was no
assurance at the outset that the North would be
united in support of war, whatever it might think
about slaveiy. Not long before prominent Re
publicans had favored the pohcy of aUowing the
seceding States to depart in peace. No one could
teU what had been the effect of their speaking
and writing on the people. That its effect in the
South had been deplorable aU agree. Indeed the
South had been taught for years to beUeve that
whatever it demanded it would receive, and that
there were no limits to the concessions of the North.
On the other hand, Northemers had been trained
in the school of compromise. The old Whig spirit
was by no means dead. Douglas, therefore, was a
great asset. Though the firing on Sumter had very
largely united the North, as events made clear,
Mr. Lincoln could not be sure how the people would
receive his caU for volunteers, which of course would
mean war. On the evening of the day that the news
of the firing on Sumter reached Washington, George
Ashmun of Massachusetts arranged for an inter
view between the President and Douglas. The

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 365
story is wefl told by Samuel Bowles in an obituary
notice of Ashmun printed in Bowles's paper on the
death of Ashmun m 1870: "By bemg master of
hunseK and superior to the reasons which influenced
his o-wn mind, it was that he became capable of
gi-ving the reasons which should influence the minds
of others. His career in public hfe is full of strik-
mg iflustrations of this great power of his. Probably
the most notable was the result of his interview -with
Stephen A. Douglas, directly after the rebels fired
on Fort Sumter, and the rebeflion was fully launched
upon the land. Such were his appeals, such the
force of the arguments he addressed to Douglas,
that the great lUhioisian rose up superior to par
tisanship, and took his stand with his country.
'Now,' said Mr. Ashmun, although it was very
late in the night, 'let us go up to the White House
and talk with Mr. Lincoln. I want you to say to
him what you have said to me, and then I want
the result of this night's dehberations to be tele
graphed to the country.' That interview at the
White House between these three men — Lincoln,
Douglas, and Ashmun — should be historical. Then
and there Mr. Douglas took down the map and
planned the campaign. Then and there he gave
in, most eloquently and vehemently, his adhesion
to the administration and the country. Mr. Ash
mun himseK briefly epitomized the story, and it
went by telegraph that night all over the country.

366 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
to electrify and encourage every patriot on the mor
row." The President submitted his caU for volun
teers, and Douglas said that he concurred in every
word, though he would make the caU for two hun
dred thousand rather than seventy-five thousand
men. "You do not know," he added, "the dis
honest purposes of those men as weU as I do." The
epitome of the interview, penned by Douglas, fol
lows: "Senator Douglas cafled upon the President,
and had an interesting conversation on the present
condition of the country. The substance of it was,
on the part of Mr. Douglas, that whUe he was un
alterably opposed to the administration in aU poUt-
ical issues, he was prepared to fuUy sustain the Presi
dent in the exercise of aU his constitutional functions,
to preserve the Union, maintain the government)
and defend the federal capital. A firm pohcy and
prompt action was necessary. The capital was in
danger, and must be defended at all hazards, and
at any expense of men and money. He spoke of
the present and future -without any reference to
the past." Speech after speech he made in support
of the govemment — and the administration. Men
in those days were not so careful to discriminate
between the two. Douglas knew what terrible bur
dens the President was carrying, and he conceived
it to be his duty to do everything he could to Ughten
them. "We must fight for our country," he said,
"and forget aU differences. There can be but two

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 367
parties — ^the party of patriots and the party of trait
ors. We belong to the fhst." Wherever he went
he dehvered the same message. Speaking to the
people of West Virginia — still a part of old Vhginia
— ^he showed the folly and madness of secession.
In his o-wn State, and especiafly in that part of it
most hkely to be tainted -with disunion sentiment,
he presented the issue squarely, and with the greatest
eloquence. At Springfield, the home of Lincoln,
and once his home, he said: "When hostile armies
are marching under new and odious banners against
the govemment of our country, the shortest way
to peace is the most stupendous and unanimous
preparation for war. ... If a war does come, it is
a war of seK-defense on our part. It is a war in
defense of the govemment which we have inherited
as a priceless legacy from our patriotic fathers, in
defense of those great rights of freedom of trade,
commerce, transit and intercourse from the centre
to the circumference of our great continent. . . .
I beheve hi my conscience that it is a duty we owe
to ourselves and to our chfldren, and to our God,
to protect this govemment and that flag from every
assaflant, be he who he may." He appealed for
an impartial verdict, and said that K he had in the
past leaned too far to the South as against the North,
he had at least "never pandered to the prejudice
and passion of my section against the minority sec
tion of the Union." Rather he had braved the

368 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
fiercest opposition and the most savage denuncia
tion because of the tendemess he was supposed to
have sho-wn to the South in his Kansas-Nebraska
legislation. His whole record served to reinforce
powerfuUy every plea he made for the Union and
for resistance to rebeffion. In a sense he was speak
ing against what many people beUeved had been
his o-wn side, and that gave his words added weight.
His manKest sincerity, deep feehng, and tremendous
earnestness carried con-viction to aU his hearers.
He rendered a great service, as did the hosts of
Douglas Democrats who stood by the Union, and
thronged into the Union's armies.
Douglas's campaign closed at Chicago with a
great meeting attended by men of aU parties. When
he had retumed to his home city after the passage
of the Kansas-Nebraska act he was met by an in
furiated people, and was not aUowed to speak. After
his break -with the administration over the Lecomp
ton question he was received there with the greatest
enthusiasm. Now he was to have his last triumph.
The scene was the Wigwam, in which Lincoln had
been nominated a year before. Facing an audience
bound together by the felt tie of a common citizen
ship, every member of which he must have known
to be his friend, Douglas could not but have been
conscious of an inspiration such as he had never
kno-wn before. He stood before the throng, not as
a partisan or a party leader, not as the champion

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 369
of any pohtical pohcy, but as a citizen and patriot.
"The present secession movement," he said, "is
the result of an enormous conspiracy formed more
than a year since. . . . The conspiracy is now
known. Armies have been raised, war is le-vied
to accomplish it. There are only two sides to the
question. Every man must be for the United States
or against it. There can be no neutrals in this war;
only patriots — or traitors." His work was done,
and the end crowned it. On June 3 he died, hteraUy
worn out. Almost his last words were words of
encouragement to the President.
Of the private hfe of a man who was so entirely
absorbed in pubhc affairs there is httle to be said.
Mr. Douglas was twice married. His first wKe, Miss
Martha Dermy Martin, died in 1853, lea-ving two
sons and a daughter, the latter dying in infancy.
She is said to have been endowed with beauty, in
teUigence, and charm of manner. In November,
1856, Mr. Douglas married Miss Adele Cutts, the
daughter of an old Maryland house, and a great
niece of DoUy Madison. That she was a woman of
rare beauty and culture all agree. In both marriages
Douglas found happiness in fuU measure. There were
two daughters by the second marriage. Outside of
his home Douglas had httle interest in anything
but politics. As has been shovm, he knew httle
of any history except that of his ovm country. If

370 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
he had any fondness for Uterature, or taste for it,
his speeches do not show it. They are free, not only
of quotations, but of hterary aUusiveness. It is
indeed said that he read hardly anything but law
and poUtics. And poUtics, not law, was his mis
tress. Douglas is said never to have quoted a Une
of poetry. There is in his speeches sUght evidence —
which is so strong in the speeches of Lincoln — of any
great famUiarity even with the Bible. He belonged
to no church, though he had many of the -virtues
which are regarded as the fruit of rehgion — kind
ness, charity, honesty, and love of his feUo-wman.
In him rehgious intolerance always met a deter
mined foe. As his hfe was pubhc, so it was mostly
on the outside. He had Uttle time, in the midst
of his stormy career which closed in his forty-ninth
year, for meditation, and probably no predisposi
tion that way. There was no trace of mysticism
in his character. But he was a brave and true man,
devoted to his friends, faithful to his duty as he
saw it, generous far beyond his means, and endowed
with a remarkable capacity to inspire affection in
his friends and foUowers.
Was he a statesman ? The question is important,
since it is as a pubhc man that he must be judged.
Yet there are few questions that are more difficult
to answer, so thin, often, is the line that di-vides
the politician from the statesman. Douglas was
certainly a great pohtical leader — one of the greatest

DOUGLAS THE PATRIOT 371
that the country has known. He was ahnost unin-
termptedly successful, and the whmer of several
battles that seemed hopelessly lost when he entered
them. He wielded great influence in Congress, even
in a Congress that numbered on its rofls such men
as Webster, Clay, and CaUioun. Ahnost from the
beginnmg of his Washington career he played a
leading part. In debate few men of his time ex-
ceUed him. His mind was powerful, and his wiU
imperious. Perhaps it may be said fahly that he
had many of the elements of greatness, without
being a great man. He was limited by his inabihty
to -view pohtics from the moral angle. His personal
integrity no one ever questioned. His pohtical
morahty was up to the level of the time — and often
higher. But his weakness seems to have been in
regarding pohtics as a game, rather than a conflict
of ideas. It has been said that a statesman some
times thinks of the next generation, whfle a pohtician
always thinks of the next election. Douglas was
always much concemed over the next election. But
nevertheless he rendered important ser-vice to the
repubhc. Up to 1854, his attitude on the slavery
question was that of Clay and Webster — ^that is,
it was the same as to the remedy to be apphed.
From 1858, after his break with President Buchanan,
he graduaUy rose to the Lincohi platform, and fin
ished as a warm supporter of the Repubhcan presi
dent. He fafled hi the Kansas-Nebraska crisis.

372 STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS
Even his action here has been explained by Lamon,
Lincoln's friend and biographer, as designed to aid
the Republicans in destroying the Democratic party.
But this does not help matters much. The Lincoln-
Douglas debate was not a mere sham battle. Doug
las was a lover of the Union, and a patriot. Though
he made mistakes they are forgiven because he
"loved much."

INDEX

Adams, Charles Francis, 166
Adams, John Quincy, 33, 36, 49 /.;
246
Antislavery Convention, 70
Astmmn, George, 364
Atcliison, Senator, 139, 198 /.
Banks, Nathaniel P., 234
Bates, Edward, 6
Battle of Buena Vista, 54
BeU, John, 66, 106, 140, 297, 351 /.
Benjamin, Judah P., 269, 324 /.
Benton, Senator, 34, 38, 44 /., 48,
51, 55, 60, 74, 113, 149, 208, 211
Bimey, James G., 41
Blacli, Jeremiah P., 264, 337, 361
Bowles, Samuel, 98, 365
Brecldnridge, John C, 253, 316,
351/.
Breese, Sidney, 25, 28
Bright, Senator, 62, 139
Brools, Preston, 244 /.
Brown, John, 246/., 338/., 342, 349,
357
Brown, Senator, 195, 332
Browning, OrviUe H., 29
Bryant, WiUiam Cullen, 256
Buchanan, John, 159, 178, 187,
252 /., 261 /., 273 /, 276, 279 /,
286, 288 /., 310, 322, 331, 340,
342, 358
Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton, 139
Burke, Edmund, 99
Burhngame, Anson, 245
Bums Case, 221 /.
Butler, Senator, 62, 244
Calhoim, John, 265, 279
Calhoun, John C, 38, 41, 46, 52, 66,
69, 73 /., 81, 92, 95, 98, 101, 186
California, 56; conquest of, 62;
question of slavery in, 86 /. ; con
stitution of, 87; slavery prolub-
ited m, 89 /., 110
Cass, Lewis, 66, 69 /., 72, 106, 154,
156 /., 253, 264, 361
Chase, Salmon P., 98, 100, 149, 166,
168, 196, 250, 329
Choate, Bufus, 254, 257

Clay, Henry, 32 /., 37, 41, 60, 61,
65 /., 68 /, 81, 88, 90 /., 93, 96 /,
100/., 103/., 108/., 119/., 122/.,
123, 131, 140, 142, 145 /., 157,
162, 167, 307
Ciajrton-Bulwer Treaty, 138 /., 172
/., 181
Clayton, Secretary of State, 139 /.,
140, 173, 177
Clingman, Senator, 354
Cobb, HoweU, 88, 265, 361
CoUamer, Senator, 85, 242, 244
Committee on Compromise, 106
Committee on Territories, 62/., 191
Compromise of 1850, 90, 104 /.,
119 /, 123 /, 131 /, 141. 145 /,
150 /., 161, 163, 168, 186, 192 /.
Crittenden, Senator, 66, 297 /., 360
Cuba, 172, 330 /.
Curtis, George William, 256
Curtis, Justice. 268 /.
Gushing, Caleb, 184, 347, 350
Cutts, Adele, 369
Davis, Jefferson, 66, 76, 96, 102,
107, 114 /, 117 /, 120, 131, 149,
154, 184 /, 194, 237, 329, 331 /.,
337 /, 346, 349
Dayton, William L., 250
Democratic Review, 157
Dix, J. A., 361
Dbcon, 192 /., 208
Douglas, Dr. Stephen A., 3
Douglas, Stephen A., birth, 2; child
hood, 3 ; education, 4 /, ; migration
to Ilhnois, 6; schoolteacher, 9;
success as debater, 10 /, ; admitted
to bar, 10; state attorney, 12;
elected to legislature, 15 /,; and
panic of 1837, 19/.; candidate for
House of Kepresentatlves, 22; as
counsel in McClernand Case, 23;
andcampaignof 1840,25; Lincoln-
Walker-Douglas debate, 25; as
judge, 27 /. ; elected to House of
Representatives, 29 /. ; first speech
In Congress, 35 /.; and intemal
improvements, 40; re-elected, 41;
and annexation of Texeis, 45 ; and

373

374

INDEX

Oregon question, 48 /, ; and Mex
ican War, 48 /.; re-elected, 58;
Chairman of Oommittee on Ter
ritories, 60; marriage, 63; pro
moted to Senate, 66; and "squat
ter sovereignty," 80 /, ; and " Om
nibus Bill," 111; and Compro
mise of 1850, 115 /, ; and fugitive-
slave law, 125 /, : and Illinois Cen
tral Eailroad, 132; as a Presiden
tial possibility, 147 /, ; and election
of 1852, 166 /,; and Kansas-Ne
braska bill, 167/, ; re-elected to Sen
ate. 171; in Europe, 177 /,; and
" Popular Sovereignty," 191/, ; and
repeal of Missouri Compromise,
198 /,; -Lincoln debates, 215 /,;
and Know-Nothing Party, 224;
and war in Kansas, 226 /,; and
Dred Scott Decision, 266; deser
tion of Buchanan. 281 /,; -Lin
coln debates, 301/, ; and " Doctrine
of Non-intervention," 332/,; and
Democratic Convention of 1860,
352 /,: against secession, 359 /,;
reconciliation with Lincoln, 363 /, :
campaign in support of Lincoln,
367 /.; triumph in Chicago, 368;
death, 369; family Ufe, 369; as
politician and statesman, 371 /.
Dred Scott Decision, 266 /. ; 271,
273, 276, 303, 310 /., 316, 323 /.
English, William H., 297
Emerson, Balph Waldo, 55 /,, 255
Election, of 1840, 41; of 1844, 69/;
of 1852, 156 /. ; of 1856, 249 /. ; of
1860, 349 /.
Everett, Edward, 177, 201, 351
Fessenden, Senator, 342 /.
FUhnore, Millard, 83, 87, 109, 140,
162 /, 254
Fisk, Sarah, 3
Fitzpatrick, Senator, 350
Floyd. John B„ 265, 361
Foote, Senator, 106. 140, 149 /.
Fort Sumter. 361, 364
Free-Soil Party, 78/,, 81, 100. 165/.
Fremont, John C„ 88, 250, 254 /.
Fugitive Slave Law. 90, 97, 101, 111,
118, 120 /, 124 /, 129 /, 141 /.,
147 /, 162, 231, 309
Garrison, WilUam Lloyd, 76/,, 100,
143/.
Geary. J, W„ 261 /, 266, 273
Giddings, Joshua, 88, 142, 166, 168

Great Britain; and Oregon Case,
46 /., 52; and emancipation of
slaves, 94; 138; and Nicaragua
affair, 173 /.
Greeley, Horace, 166, 359
Gwin, WiUiam, 88
Hale, John P., 41, 70, 140, 149,
165 /., 168
Hardin, John J., 12 /., 17
Harrison, WiUiam Henry, 17, 26, 31
Higginson, Thomas Wentworth,
144, 222
Hill, Frederick Trevor, 324
Holt, J„ 361
Illinois State Bank Case, 19
Irving, Washington, 256
Jackson, Andrew, 5, 9, 36/,, 65, 221
Johnson, Prof, Allen, 36, 62
Johnson, Herschel, 351
Jones, John, 31
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, 105, 167,
190, 194 /„ 200, 203, 207, 211 /,
216 /„ 221, 223, 225 /, 235 /,
244, 252, 254, 280 /,. 289, 292,
312, 338
King, Rufus, 246
King, Wmiam K„ 159, 173
Know-Nothing Party, 214, 220, 224,
234, 253
Lecompton Constitution, 274 /„
277 /„ 281, 284 /, 287 /, 290 /,
293 /,. 297 /., 314 /„ 321 /.
Liberty Party, 41, 70, 79
Lincoln, Abraham, 1, 5, 20, 25, 52/,,
60 /„ 94 /„ 207, 215 /., 250, 268,
271 /„ 301 /„ 329, 337, 341, 344,
349 /„ 364 /„ 362 /.
LongfeUow, Henry W,, 255
Lothrop, Thornton Kirkland, 102
LoweU, James R,, 43
McClernand Case, 23
Mangum, W, P„ 31, 106, 140
Mann, Horace, 89
Marcy, William L„ 159, 184
Martin, Col,, 64
Martin, Martha, 63
Mason, Senator, 106, 331
Merriam, George S,, 98
Mexico, war with, 35, 42, 44/,, 55/,,
62; peace with, 71; 73
Missouri Compromise, 32 /,, 45,
71 /, 79, 80, 92, 96, 114, 124,

INDEX

375

189 /„ 192 /„ 196/,, 211. 215. 223,
234, 238, 252, 283 /., 360
New England Emigrant Aid Com
pany, 226, 228, 232, 241 /., 244,
246
New Mexico, 56, 71; conquest of,
86 /. ; question of slavery in, 86,
90 /., 93, 97; 110
New York Times, 214
New York Tribune, 359
Omnibus Bill, 107, 111/., 118/.
Oregon, admission to Union, 38;
boundary question, 47 /., 58;
question of slavery in, 71 /.
Ostend Manifesto, 331
Parker, Theodore, 1, 76, 144, 222
Phelps, Senator, 106
PhilUps, Wendell, 76, 144, 222
Pierce, PrankUn, 159 /., 163, 166,
170, 179, 181 /., 205, 228, 230,
234 /, 252 /, 262
Polk, James K., 41, 45/., 52, 55, 58,
65, 75, 185, 266
Pugh, Senator, 297/., 348/.
Reeder, Andrew H., 228/., 247, 261,
273
Rhodes, James Ford, 55 /., 73, 99,
133, 183, 204, 220, 229
Richardson, 233, 257
Richmond Enquirer, 222
Richmond Whig, 211
Robinson, Charles, 231
Roosevelt, Theodore, 76
Schurz, Carl, 32, 58, 104
Scott, Winfield, 60, 62, 162/., 165/.
Seward, William, 76, 87, 98, 100 /.,
112, 125, 140, 149, 164 /, 177,
187, 198, 200, 246, 250, 286 /.,
307, 328 /., 347, 358, 362
Shadrach Case, 142 /, 145
Shawnee Mission, 230/.
Shields, Senator James, 23, 140,
215/.
Sheahan, James W., 4, 177
Sims Case, 144
Slave Trade, in District of Colum
bia, 118; 334/.
SUdeU, John, 252, 316, 331
Smith, Gerrit, 148
Smith, William Henry. 185 /., 188,
288

Southem Rights Association, 148
Spain, 35, 48, 172, 330 /.
Springfield Republican, 97 /., 211
"Squatter Sovereignty," 72/., 80 /.
Stanton, Edwin M., 361
Stanton, Frederick P., 273, 277, 287
Stephens, Alexander, 89, 107, 165,
356
Stowe, Harriet Beecher, 243
Sumner, Charles, 149, 168 /,, 201,
218, 242, 244 /., 362
Taney, Chief Justice, 266, 270 /.
Taylor, Zachary, 47, 60, 67 /., 75.
83 /, 106 /, 112, 139
Texas, ceded to Spain, 35; question
of annexation of, 38, 41 /., 44 /.,
67
Thayer, Eli, 227
Thompson, Jacob, 265, 361
Tod, David, 350
Toombs, Robert, 89, 107, 165, 254,
332
Topeka Constitution, 231 /.
Toucey, Isaac, 264 /.
Trumbull, Lyman, 215 /., 219 /.
Tyler, John, 26, 31, 45 /., 52
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 339
Van Buren, John, 205
Van Buren, Martin, 17, 19 /., 26,'
38, 41, 65, 69 /., 78
Wade, Benjamin, 149, 166, 168,
187, 332, 362
Walker, Cyrus, 25
Walker, Robert J., 266, 273 /., 281,
287
Washington, George, 83
Webster, Daniel, 1, 33, 52, 60, 66,
69, 74 /, 81, 91 /.. 97 /., 103 /,
106, 109, 122 /., 131, 140, 157.
162 /, 167 /.
Whitman, Walt, 8 /., 258, 293
Wihnot Proviso, 61 /., 70 /., 74 /,,
79, 88, 97, 107, 112 /., 122, 134 /.
Wilson, Henry, 144, 166
Wilson, Woodrow, 250
Wlntlirop, Bobert C, 88
Wise, Governor, 290
Wyatt, John, 12 /.
Yancey, W. L., 347 /.
Young, Brigham, 337

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