\n 
 
 'f'f vers n r or rcc rTvo^^ 
 
 j ON THE RELATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY TO OTHER 
 ! SCIENCES. 
 
 1 A S has been pointed out by Herbert Spencer, the growth 
 of scientific knowledge is no exception to the laws of 
 evolution. Human sciences, as well as human industries, 
 have undergone a continuous differentiation. To the mind 
 of primitive man the shock of an electric discharge and the 
 ravages of cerebral disease were alike manifestations of spirit¬ 
 istic volition. Even when the hypothesis of animism had for 
 centuries been abandoned by philosophic observers, Lucretius 
 sought in one work to expound the theory of all known phe¬ 
 nomena . 1 But in recent years the increase of knowledge has 
 brought with it a host of ‘ologies,’ the specialist in any one 
 of which is often quite ignorant of all others. 
 
 Nowhere has this differentiation of the sciences been shown 
 more clearly than in psycho-physical problems. The work now 
 
 ( done in psychological laboratories was begun by physicists 
 and physiologists. A physicist made the first known measure¬ 
 ment of the least noticeable difference of light , 2 and an as¬ 
 tronomer discovered the personal equation . 3 
 
 When the laboratory at Leipzig was founded, the ground was 
 broken for the separation of psychological problems from those 
 purely physical and physiological. Apparently not feeling sure 
 of his position, Wundt called the new science 4 physiological 
 psychology,’ and devoted the first volume, in which its exposi¬ 
 tion was undertaken, principally to physiological questions. But 
 though at first an unwelcome appendage to physiology and 
 physics, the new psychology has now asserted her right to recog¬ 
 nition as a science separate and distinct from other sciences, and 
 that too at times with such vigor as to disclaim all relationship 
 ^ to them. Thus Professor Titchener objects to the use in psy- 
 
 m 1 De Rerum Natura. 
 
 1 2 J. H. Lambert, Photometria , 1760. 
 
 mt 8 According to Wundt, Bessel {Physiolog. Psychologies 4. Aufl., Bd. II, p. 320). 
 
49 ° 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 
 
 [VOL. V. 
 
 chology of anthropometric methods , 1 and Professor Fullerton 
 pleads for the complete separation of psychology and physiology . 2 
 
 It would, however, be misleading to consider the relations 
 of the sciences only from this point of view. The progress 
 of science is marked not only by increasing specialization, but 
 also by a corresponding unification. 
 
 Physiology is largely dependent on physics for the laws of 
 arterial pressure and electrotonus; and secretion and meta¬ 
 bolism are on their face complex chemical processes. Optics, 
 acoustics, and the other branches of physics were in Newton’s 
 time quite independent of one another; they are now united 
 in the endeavor to explain all phenomena as transformations 
 of energy. Chemical reactions can no longer be considered 
 merely transformations of matter, for the principle of conser¬ 
 vation of energy has been applied to atomic combinations as 
 well as to molar and molecular phenomena. A few years ago 
 botany, zoology, and physiology had little in common ; they 
 are now taught as branches of biology. 
 
 In psychology, perhaps, more than in any other science, 
 this unifying tendency is manifest. In spite of the increasing 
 recognition of the new science, psychological literature bristles 
 with technical terms of physics and physiology. If we survey 
 the problems now under investigation, we shall find that even 
 when the aims and methods of psychological research are sui 
 generis , the theoretical interpretation of its results is often ini 
 terms of the biological sciences. When psychological meth-l 
 ods are inadequate, the student of mind is often driven to 
 biology for the explanation of mental phenomena. The study 
 of the range and quality of sensations leads inevitably to the 
 physics and physiology of nerve stimulation ; fatigue is a 
 function of consciousness, but it is also a function of muscle 
 and nerve ; space perception may be due to psychic synthesis, 
 but such synthesis would be impossible without sensory data, 
 and these data depend upon the motor mechanism of the eye ; 
 association can no longer be considered an ultimate psychic 
 
 1 Titcbener, Philosophical Review, March, 1893. 
 
 2 Fullerton, Psychological Review , January, 1896. 
 
No. 5.] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 
 
 491 
 
 function, now that pathology has demonstrated its neural 
 basis ; attention is either another ultimate activity of mind, 
 or else an associative reflex phenomenon ; volition and move¬ 
 ment cannot be separated from the automatism of all living 
 matter ; psychogenesis can now be studied only from the bio¬ 
 logical standpoint ; mental diseases are no longer explained 
 on the purely psychological theory of obsession ; the super¬ 
 stitions of the illiterate can be interpreted only by anthropo¬ 
 logical methods ; and even those that adopt the psychological 
 theory of suggestion to explain hypnotic phenomena, feel called 
 upon to deduce their theory from physiological principles . 1 
 
 The laws of mental phenomena thus seem to be so en¬ 
 tangled with those of living matter, that it would seem impos¬ 
 sible to say where one science ends, and the other begins. 
 But does the converse relation hold ? Is physiology similarly 
 dependent on psychology ? Let us consider the history of 
 the science. In its early development physiology was as 
 independent of physics and chemistry as psychology was 
 independent of physiology. But since the application to vital 
 phenomena of the principle of conservation of energy and the 
 successful preparation by synthesis of organic compounds, a 
 knowledge of physics and chemistry has been essential to the 
 physiologist. It is yet to be seen whether physiology will be 
 equally indebted to mental science ; but, inasmuch as mental 
 phenomena accompany human life as certainly as do chemico- 
 physical phenomena, we may infer that they also may be found 
 to be necessary links in the physiological chain of causation. 
 But apart from the question of the ultimate relation of mind 
 and body, the physiologist has been, and is now, dependent 
 upon psychology for one important method of investigation ; 
 for but a small part of what little is known of the functions 
 of the brain and sense organs is got without the use of intro¬ 
 spective methods . 2 
 
 Thus, in the present ignorance of cerebral processes, the 
 physiologist is by his use of psychological methods forced to 
 
 1 Cf. Lehmann, Die Hypnose. 
 
 2 Cf. Fullerton, op. cit., for an analysis of Foster’s Physiology from this point 
 of view. 
 
492 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 
 
 [Vol. V. 
 
 become also a psychologist; for the facts he has to observe are 
 psychical facts. As we know nothing of the ultimate relations 
 of mind and body, the only resource left the philosophical 
 investigator is the observation of the phenomena of organic 
 life in their totality. Since conscious processes are inseparable 
 from human life, the physiologist cannot but consider these 
 processes as parts of a connected whole. He has no right to 
 assume that any one group of organic phenomena has no 
 connection with other organic phenomena. 
 
 I even see no good reason why conscious phenomena should 
 not be admitted provisionally as causes and effects of bodily 
 processes. If a sensation follows the excitation of a nerve, or 
 if a muscular contraction follows a volition, the state of con¬ 
 sciousness may be assumed to be part of the causal chain. It 
 matters not whether there are other unknown links in the 
 chain. The states of consciousness, being in whole or in part 
 antecedents or consequents of physiological processes, must be 
 considered in a comprehensive view of such phenomena. It 
 may be argued that the concept of cause and effect cannot be 
 applied in this way. But since the time of Hume, science has 
 had no right to speak of cause and effect with ontological 
 implications. To deny to the physiologist the right to intro¬ 
 duce sensations and volitions into his causal series, would be to 
 deny to the psychologist the right to assume material processes 
 as causes of sensation ; yet this he is obliged to do, since we 
 know nothing of a mental counterpart of the stimulus. The 
 mental counterpart may exist, but experience gives us no clue 
 of its existence. Consequently science, being the systematiza¬ 
 tion of experience, must neglect it until there is other than 
 a metaphysical reason for admitting it in the causal series. 
 Even the advocates of parallelism assume the physical causa¬ 
 tion of sensation implicitly, if not explicitly. Fechner holds 
 that all matter has a psychical substratum, but speaks of the 
 “ bodily causes of sensations .” 1 Wundt , 2 Bain , 3 and others use 
 
 1 Fechner, Elemente der Psycho-Physik, 2. Aufl., Bd. I, p. 18. 
 
 2 Wundt, op. cit.y vol. I, p. 334. 
 
 3 Bain, The Senses and the Intellect , 4th ed., p. 101. 
 
No. 5 .] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 
 
 493 
 
 similar expressions. Klilpe distinguishes between the cause of 
 a physiological process and the condition of a psychical process, 
 but admits that the physiological concept of cause includes the 
 psychological concept of condition . 1 Hoffding, it is true, criti¬ 
 cises the doctrine of physical causation of psychic states, but 
 fails to tell us what mental processes take the place of the physi¬ 
 cal stimulus . 2 They are, therefore, an unknown hypothetical 
 factor. But that is to give them up for purposes of scientific 
 explanation. 
 
 I have spoken especially of physiology, but we may easily 
 extend our conclusions to the other biological sciences. Physi¬ 
 ology, the science of function, and morphology, the science of 
 structure, are but parts of a connected whole. The structures 
 of plants and animals have been determined by evolution, and 
 the process of evolution is a physiological process. It may 
 seem absurd to conclude that psychology and anatomy overlap, 
 but the Lamarckian theory assumes consciousness as a determin¬ 
 ing cause. As mental phenomena undoubtedly occur in the lower 
 animals and are clearly related to those of man, the zoologist 
 cannot avoid trespassing on psychological ground. Even bot¬ 
 any cannot be wholly separated from mental science, for who 
 can draw the line between plant and animal ? Protoplasm was 
 discovered in vegetable cells, and botanists are acquainted with 
 many cases of instinct in plants. 
 
 That the methods of psychology are often those of anthro¬ 
 pology, and conversely, is well known. If the psychologist 
 would know the phenomena of mind, he cannot content himself 
 with observing simply those of his own individual mind. That 
 great errors and misunderstandings may arise from the failure 
 to use the anthropological method is known to all who are 
 acquainted with the fact of individual differences in mental 
 imagery. Yet the first exact examination of this fact was 
 made by an anthropologist . 3 It has even been claimed that 
 great systems of epistemology owe their character to the'se 
 individual peculiarities . 4 Anthropometric methods are not 
 
 1 Kiilpe, Psychologie, p. 81. 
 
 2 Hoffding, Outlines of Psychology , English translation, p. 65. 
 
 3 Galton. 4 Fraser, American Journal of Psychology , IV, p. 2. 
 
494 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 
 
 [VOL. V. 
 
 always as exact as those of a psychological laboratory; but 
 these methods are the only ones by which a vast range of 
 psychological problems may be investigated. One crying need 
 of the psychology of to-day is a more definite knowledge of 
 individual constants and their relations. 
 
 Even in the present embryonic stage of the development of 
 psychology, it has many points of contact with the inorganic 
 sciences. In his study of sensation the psychologist has to call 
 upon the physicist, for the relations of stimulus and sensation 
 can be understood only when we know what the stimulus is. 
 It is to physical science that we owe the demonstration to a 
 high degree of probability of that stupendous truth that sensa¬ 
 tions and their stimuli are qualitatively different, and that there 
 exists a whole series of physical phenomena that have no coun¬ 
 terpart in consciousness . 1 
 
 That the physicist is in his turn forced to become psychol¬ 
 ogist is shown by his discussion of color theories, after images, 
 contrast, and space perception . 2 Though starting with the 
 assumption of common-sense realism, the physicist is forced to 
 conclude that the assumed correspondence of sensation to stim¬ 
 ulus is illusory. As his aim is knowledge of objective phenom¬ 
 ena, he cannot but consider the relation of such phenomena to 
 his perceptions. The investigation of such relations is a physi¬ 
 cal as well as a psychological problem. The physicist studies 
 the effects of certain physical phenomena, whereas the psychol¬ 
 ogist has for his problem the physical causes of these psychic 
 effects. Thus, psychology and physics unite in psycho-physics. 
 
 The debt of physics to mental science may even be greater. 
 The more physical science has reduced objective phenomena to 
 transformations of matter and energy, the greater the difficulties 
 in the mechanical interpretation of nature . 3 All such phenom¬ 
 ena were once ascribed to matter and its properties, but now 
 we are told that energy is an objective reality, and, like matter, 
 indestructible. Energy is transmitted through the ether, a 
 
 1 I refer, of course, to different forms of ether waves, actinic and electromagnetic. 
 The Rontgen rays might here be included. 
 
 2 Cf. Ganot’s Physics , pp. 605 et seq Barker’s Physics , pp. 472-6. 
 
 3 Cf. Stallo, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics , 1885. 
 
No. 5 .] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 
 
 495 
 
 second immaterial reality. As electricity is not energy, but is 
 indestructible, it is considered a third immaterial reality . 1 
 Matter is reduced to atoms, but these atoms are such stumbling- 
 blocks that some would deny their existence altogether , 2 and 
 others consider them to be vortex rings of ether . 3 But this 
 ether, on which science lays so heavy a burden, has properties 
 that seem to be contradictory, and is therefore, it may be 
 argued, inconceivable. But if the objective universe should 
 prove unintelligible on the mechanical theory, it is not improb¬ 
 able that physical science may have to abandon its time-honored 
 realism and assume mind as the final reality. That such a sup¬ 
 position has some basis of fact is shown by the attitude of such 
 men as Balfour Stewart , 4 Tait , 4 and Lodge . 5 According to the 
 reports of the Society for Psychical Research, we may have to 
 admit the existence of phenomena subject to laws apparently 
 contradictory of the axioms of mechanics, and determined by 
 conscious processes . 6 
 
 We have seen that psychology and her sister sciences are 
 often greatly indebted to one another for results as well as for 
 methods. But is this integration of the sciences limited to an 
 assimilation of methods and results ? At first sight it would 
 seem that the differentiation of problems has increased in pro¬ 
 portion to this assimilation of methods and results. In physics, 
 for example, the problems seem quite distinct from those of 
 other sciences, since the physicist, as physicist, studies only 
 transformations of energy. But if mental processes should be 
 found to be conditions of physical phenomena, the explanation 
 of such phenomena would be psychological as well as physical. 
 
 In biological science we find many problems that are identical 
 with problems of psychology. The nature and origin of instinct, 
 mental evolution, and heredity are obviously psychological 
 
 1 This appears to be the most recent view. Cf. Barker, Physics , p. 538. 
 
 2 Ostwald, quoted by Remsen, Science , III, p. 59. 
 
 3 Sir William Thomson. See Clerk Maxwell, Article “ Atom,” Encycl. Brit. 
 
 4 Stewart and Tait, The Unseen Universe , London, 1895. 
 
 5 See Lodge and Richet in Journal of the Society for Psychical Research , March 
 and April, 1895. 
 
 6 Cf. Myers, “ The Experiences of W. Stanton Moses,” Proceedings of the 
 S. P. R., pt. XXV, vol. IX, and pt. XXVII, vol. XI. 
 
496 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 
 
 [Vol. V. 
 
 problems. They are, however, but parts of a larger whole, but 
 special cases of more general problems that belong to biology. 
 Again, the relations of mind and body are problems of psychol¬ 
 ogy, but they are also problems of physiology and pathology. 
 This is evident if the conclusions be admitted as to the right 
 of the physiologist to consider conscious processes as causally 
 related to other activities of living matter. That the problems 
 of psychology and pathology are sometimes identical, is known 
 to all who are interested in what is called ‘abnormal psychology,’ 
 but which is after all but a branch of pathology. The mental 
 phenomena of disease and degeneration are but parts of the 
 psychic totality, which it is the business of psychology as the 
 science of mind to systematize and explain. Moreover, what is 
 termed the ‘ normal mind ’ is but an ideal of popular psychology. 
 The weaknesses and eccentricities of the normal man are quali¬ 
 tatively akin to the morbid feelings and impulses of mania, and 
 the delusions of paranoia. Alienists cannot draw the line 
 between sanity and insanity; much less can psychologists draw 
 the line between the normal and the abnormal. But if we can¬ 
 not distinguish between the normal and the abnormal, we cer¬ 
 tainly cannot differentiate the problems of ‘ normal ’ and ‘ ab¬ 
 normal’ psychology. 
 
 That the problems of anthropology and those of psychology 
 are often the same, may also be shown. Many of the most 
 common mental phenomena, from the feelings and beliefs of 
 civilized man to the play activities of the civilized child, can be 
 interpreted only as survivals from prehistoric ages. The expla¬ 
 nation of such or any other mental phenomena is of course a 
 problem of psychology ; but it is also a problem of anthropol¬ 
 ogy, since that science has to do with all activities of man as a 
 member of the human race. Language and religion, social 
 customs and ethical ideals, — all had their being only by virtue 
 of psychological laws. Their explanation is therefore a psy¬ 
 chological problem. That this problem also comes within the 
 province of anthropology is shown by the space given to it in 
 treatises on the science. In fact, comparative psychology might 
 well be called ‘ psychological anthropology.’ 
 
i'i?ivri5f;rTv or ff.f.rr:off? 
 
 - -v ; . ■ ■ . , vr:fi F t! r, 
 
 No. 5.] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 497 
 
 I have now discussed the relations of psychology and other 
 sciences from the historical or a posteriori point of view. We 
 have found that their problems as well as their methods are 
 often the same. We turn now to a brief a priori examination 
 of the question. As the relations of mental and physical phe¬ 
 nomena are included in those of mind and body, I shall only 
 discuss the theories of these relations. But first I shall endeavor 
 to show that these relations must be considered in all branches 
 of theoretical psychology. 
 
 The purpose of psychological investigation may be considered 
 to be the knowledge, first, of the qualities or attributes of 
 mental phenomena ; secondly, of the relations of such phenom¬ 
 ena to one another ; and thirdly, of their relations to conditions 
 which are apparently not mental. The method of investigating 
 the first of these groups of problems is primarily introspection. 
 
 Such knowledge may be quite independent of the objective 
 world. But knowledge of individual facts, uncoordinated and 
 unrelated, is not science. Only by understanding the relations 
 of phenomena can we make those predictions of phenomena 
 which should form the ideal aim of science. The investigation 
 of such relations leads, it may be shown, to the relations of 
 mind and body. For, when the psychologist fails to find in any 
 purely mental law the explanation of any phenomenon, he is 
 justified in looking for an explanation in the properties of living 
 matter. The other relations of mental phenomena are either to 
 the body or to the environment. The relations to the environ¬ 
 ment cannot be interpreted apart from bodily processes. Thus 
 psycho-physics leads to psycho-physiology. In all branches, 
 therefore, of theoretical psychology we may be confronted by 
 the problems of mind and body. 
 
 According to the theory of parallelism, as generally under¬ 
 stood, mental phenomena form an independent series superim¬ 
 posed upon a purely mechanical series. Even on the assumption 
 that the activities of the body may be explained on mechanical 
 principles, it is doubtful if psychology and other sciences could 
 remain independent. If there be complete parallelism, the 
 relations of the series would require investigation. But who, 
 
498 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. V. 
 
 if not the psychologist, should investigate these relations ? As 
 science is but classified knowledge, the knowledge of these 
 relations must come under the scope of some science. No one, 
 I think, would hesitate to call Fechner’s law a psychological 
 law, or deny that it has a place in a text-book of mental 
 science. Yet, as formulated by Fechner, the law gives the 
 relation of these very physical and psychical series. Then, too, 
 if there be complete parallelism, this parallelism must extend 
 into the inorganic world. If so, it is probable that the two series 
 are, as Spinoza believed, but modes of one and the same reality. 
 In fact, on the theory of parallelism it is difficult to hold to any 
 dualistic ontology. If the ultimate reality is mind, it is quite 
 possible that the physicist will some day look to psychology for 
 the solution of problems that his science fails to give. For 
 physical and biological science would then be, theoretically at 
 least, branches of psychology. If, on the other hand, the final 
 reality be matter, or other non-mental substance, it is clear that 
 psychological laws are not ultimate, but would have to be 
 deduced from physical laws. In that case, psychology and all 
 the biological sciences would be subordinated to physics and 
 chemistry. The differentiation of the sciences would be a 
 differentiation for convenience, not a logical necessity. 
 
 It is generally assumed in speaking of parallelism that all 
 physiological processes are mechanical, but of this we have no 
 proof. The most recent biological theories do not favor a 
 mechanical interpretation of life. Even if consciousness be 
 epiphenomenal, it is quite possible that the complete explana¬ 
 tion of vital phenomena will include other than mechanical 
 causes. We may therefore assume, as one form of the autom¬ 
 aton theory, that parallel series of mental and material phe¬ 
 nomena occur only in organic matter. Such parallelism may 
 hold for all activities of organic matter, or only for certain ones 
 of these activities. If the parallelism hold for all terms of the 
 two series, the conditions would be the same as those just dis¬ 
 cussed ; the relations of the series would require investigation 
 and these relations would be both psychological and biological. 
 Hence psychology and biology would have the same problems. 
 
No. 5 .] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 
 
 499 
 
 If the parallelism be incomplete, the psychologist and physiol¬ 
 ogist will seek to know at what point the mental series begins 
 and at what point it ends. Such knowledge would, however, 
 only open up the question why the mental series began or 
 ended at one point rather than at another, — a question both 
 physiological and psychological. 
 
 On the Cartesian theory we may assume matter and con¬ 
 sciousness to be causally related, or matter and mind, conscious 
 and unconscious. In either case psychology and the biological 
 sciences would overlap. We may even admit that the field 
 could be divided up so that the biologist and the psychologist 
 should each investigate his own series, the material or the 
 mental. But what of the point where they meet ? The inves¬ 
 tigation of this borderland would be physical, biological, and 
 psychological. But there may be in organic phenomena no 
 independent mechanical series ; all cellular activity may be 
 intelligible only from the subjective standpoint. In this case 
 the provinces of psychology and biology would be logically 
 undistinguishable. 
 
 From this examination of the hypothetical relations of mind 
 and body we conclude, then, that we cannot, by assuming any one 
 of these hypotheses, define the province of psychology as distinct 
 from those of other sciences. To attempt any arbitrary division 
 of the ground that is properly psychological and that which is 
 not, would from this point of view be absurd. Obviously, just 
 how far the domain of psychology extends into that of biology 
 and other sciences, depends upon the unknown relations of 
 mental and other processes. 
 
 The conclusions to which we are led are largely negative. 
 They may, however, be put into positive form : the problems 
 of psychology and other sciences may coincide ; the unity of 
 all science is not simply a unity of methods and results. The 
 extent of this unity cannot, however, be determined except by 
 experience. A priori reasoning leads to different results, 
 according as we make different ontological assumptions. 
 
 But, it may be said, are not these conclusions at variance 
 with our generalization as to the progressive differentiation of 
 
500 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 
 
 [Vol. V. 
 
 science ? This differentiation will continue if Spencer’s formula 
 of evolution is even an approximation to the truth. But the 
 differentiation will, I hold, be a differentiation with reference 
 to particular objects of cognition, rather than to the subjective 
 classification of our cognitions, or to the methods which we 
 employ. We will, perhaps, have a science of color rather than 
 three or four sciences that treat of the subject from different 
 points of view. The practical advantage, even now, of thus 
 examining a phenomenon from every point of view is shown by 
 the remarkable discoveries of Helmholtz in sciences before 
 considered quite independent . 1 Had Helmholtz not been a 
 great physicist he would not have been the physiologist and 
 psychologist that he was ; nor, had he avoided problems 
 other than physical, would he have solved the mystery of 
 timbre. 
 
 It may be claimed that the common ground of psychology 
 and other sciences is in many cases pure philosophy ; that 
 the relation of mind and matter, for example, is a problem for 
 philosophy, not for science. But no one doubts that we have 
 some scientific knowledge of the relations of mind and matter. 
 Just how far such problems may be solved we cannot say. 
 
 Then it is open to question whether the sharp Kantian 
 distinction between science and philosophy will be sustained. 
 Even now, with all his dislike of ‘guesswork,’ the man of 
 science cannot steer clear of metaphysical rocks. Thus physics, 
 the queen of sciences, has for its foundation-stone a highly 
 metaphysical principle. The speculations of modern mathema¬ 
 ticians on the fourth dimension are essentially metaphysical. 
 In biology the origin of terrestrial life and the evolution of 
 man are wrapped in such mystery that some would invoke 
 transcendental causes . 2 In mental science space perception, 
 association, and other processes are quite entangled with the 
 problems of epistemology ; and, if Myers 3 is right and retro- 
 
 1 An interesting exposition of Helmholtz’ services to psychology is given by 
 Stumpf, Archiv f Geschichte d. Phil., Bd. VIII, Heft 3, 1895. 
 
 2 Wallace, for example. 
 
 3 Myers, Proceedings of the S. P. R., pt. XXIX, vol. XI. 
 
No. 5 .] PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES. 
 
 501 
 
 cognition and precognition are facts, science may yet have to 
 consider the hypothesis of an immanent world-soul. Thus 
 objective science has to face the problem of ontology, and sub¬ 
 jective science also that of epistemology. And this is but what 
 we might expect. After all, the scientist and philosopher have 
 the ‘same object ; both seek truth, though they seek it by 
 different paths. 
 
 Harold Griffing. 
 
< 
 
0 
 
 V 
 
 i