ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVtY
 
 No. 18101— AT LAW 
 
 IN THE 
 
 Circuit Court of Champaign 
 County, Illinois 
 
 THE PEOPLE OP THE STATE OP^ 
 ILLINOIS, ex rel. VASHTI McCOLLUM, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 va. 
 
 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL 
 DISTRICT NUMBER 71, CHAMPAIGN 
 
 COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 
 
 Defendant, 
 
 ELMER C. BASH and ALICE J. BASH and 
 WANDA I. BASH, a Minor, by ELMER 
 
 C. BASH, her father and next friend, 
 
 Intervenors. 
 
 Before the 
 Honorable 
 
 Frank B. Leonard, 
 Grover W. Watson, 
 >■ and 
 
 Martin E. Morthland, 
 
 Judges of the 
 
 Sixth Judicial 
 
 Circuit of Illinois. 
 
 BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND 
 INTERVENORS 
 
 JOHN L. FRANKLIN, 
 
 First National Bank Building, 
 Champaign, Illinois, 
 
 Attorney for Defendant. 
 
 ECKERT & PETERSON, 
 
 135 South LaSalle Street, 
 Chicago 3, Illinois, 
 
 Attorneys for Intervenors. 
 
 Barnard & Miller, 33 S. Market St., Chicago. Fra nklin 0562
 
 Bnl.l 
 
 A 
 
 
 T/ 1. 
 
 u / v 
 
 IN THE 
 
 CIRCUIT COURT OF CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, 
 
 ILLINOIS 
 
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,^ 
 ex pel. VASHTI McCOLLUM, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 vs. 
 
 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 NUMBER 71, CHAMPAIGN COUNTY, ILLI- 
 NOIS, 
 
 Defendant, 
 
 ELMER C. BASH and ALICE J. BASH and 
 WANDA I. BASH, a Minor, by ELMER C. 
 BASH, her father and next friend, 
 
 Interveners. y 
 
 > 
 
 Before the 
 Honorable 
 
 Frank B. Leonard, 
 Grovep W. Watson 
 
 and 
 Martin E. Morthland, 
 
 Judges of the 
 
 Sixth Judicial 
 
 Circuit of Illinois. 
 
 BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND INTERVENORS 
 
 May it Please the Court: 
 
 We have now arrived at a point in this case at which 
 the cool light of reason may be substituted for the heat 
 of emotionalism which militant atheism has directed 
 against religion. The bitterness of the relator's com- 
 plaint, the scorn and contempt of her witnesses for the 
 religious beliefs of others, the rancor of her advocate 
 are stilled. We may now examine the record that has 
 been made. We may study the pleadings and the allega- 
 tions that they contain and compare them with the facts 
 that have been established. We may compare the law as
 
 it has been asserted by relator to be with the law as it 
 has been decided to be. 
 
 Because we feel that there has been confusion and 
 bitterness with resultant change of emphasis and theory 
 as the case has progressed, from allegation, through 
 proof, to argument, we will analyze the pleadings as 
 briefly as possible and state the facts developed by the 
 evidence as clearly and succinctly as may be. 
 
 Analysis of Pleadings 
 
 The Petition: 
 
 The petition of the relator, Mrs. McCollum, filed in 
 the name of the People of the State of Illinois, asserts 
 that she is a resident of the school district and a tax- 
 payer; that she brings her suit on behalf of all others 
 similarly situated; that she is an atheist believing in the 
 doctrines set forth in an exhibit attached to the peti- 
 tion, which exhibit asserts that religious worship is a 
 chronic disease of the imagination contracted in 
 childhood, that religion is born of fear, ignorance 
 and superstition, that religion is a racket advanced 
 by unscrupulous preachers, that the Bible con- 
 tains so much that is bad, so little that is good, 
 and little or nothing that is true that it is unfit for our 
 youth to read, that the principles and attitude of Christ 
 are hateful and selfish, that we need to write and use a 
 "twentieth century bible" based upon rationalism glori- 
 fying man and science and giving an account of all re- 
 ligious beliefs that man has held and setting forth its 
 own moral code of ethics, that the delinquency of youth 
 and adults in America is attributable to economic rea- 
 sons and not moral ones and that they may be solved by 
 a twentieth century bible and by the erection of com- 
 munity parks and recreation centers.
 
 The petition further asserts that she desires that her 
 children shall not be indoctrinated in any religious belief 
 contrary to her own ; that James Terry McCollum is her 
 son and is by requirement of law attending the public 
 schools of the defendant ; that instructors in religious 
 education enter the school buildings maintained by the 
 defendant and teach religion for 30 minutes in each week 
 during the time said schools are in session ; that this has 
 continued for more than three years and taken place in 
 the classroom in which James Terry receives his secular 
 education; that there is thereby lost 30 minutes of sec- 
 ular education in each week, that children are admitted 
 to these classes upon permission of the parents of the 
 children participating; that the purpose of these classes 
 is to induce a belief in God and religion as approved 
 by the teacher; that one of the instructors teaches spe- 
 cific doctrinal beliefs such as that God is a divine and 
 supernatural being; that there is a relationship between 
 God and man, and that all men are dependent upon God, 
 etc. 
 
 Her petition further alleges that this teacher of re- 
 ligious education is employed and paid by "Inter- 
 Churchmen's Council, a voluntary and private organiza- 
 tion, and is subject to the control and supervision of this 
 organization and not the defendant", that this teacher 
 induces in her pupils a reverence for God and causes 
 them to exercise worship of Him ; that an establishment 
 of religion is grafted onto public education and proselyt- 
 ing is practiced among little children of rationalists and 
 of small denominations not participating; that children 
 not participating are deprived of their desks and ap- 
 paratus during these classes, that children not partici- 
 pating are required to be present during these classes 
 in religious education or are compelled to leave while 
 they are in progress; that their going and coming is
 
 obvious and may incite curiosity or unfavorable criti- 
 cism and ridicule of the child's or bis parents' views; 
 that when James Terry was not enrolled in religious 
 education, his religious difference was noted, his school- 
 mates' good will and esteem for him was injured, he was 
 shunned by thorn and denied enjoyment of their society 
 and friendship, and he was laughed at, hated, and 
 despised and looked upon with childish contempt by 
 fellow pupils; that by reason of said segregation, ostra- 
 cism, ridicule, hostility and embarrassment, and the in- 
 fluence and prestige of said adult religious instructor 
 and the desirability of obtaining her personal attention 
 in the presence of other children, and by reason of other 
 social pressures, all as aforesaid, James Terry was sub- 
 jected and is subjected to coercion and compulsion to 
 seek the relator's permission to participate in said 
 classes, and the relator likewise to grant said permis- 
 sion; that said religious instructor exercises preference 
 for the King James version over the Douay version of 
 the Bible and the Christian, Protestant Bible over the 
 Mohammedan Koran, the Zoroastrian Zend-Avesta, the 
 Hindu Veda and all other ancient holy writs, and the 
 Christian, Protestant creeds and doctrines over those 
 relating to Allah, Ormuzcl, Brahma and other gods; that 
 the Bible is not taught in its entirety or in sequence but 
 paragraphs and selections are used in accordance with 
 the sectarian views of the teacher; and that pupils are 
 given statements which require them to select between 
 various sectarian doctrines. 
 
 The petition of the relator also alleges that the defend- 
 ant Board of Education does not fix the salaries of the 
 religious education instructors, does not appoint them, 
 does not determine the branches of study to be taught, 
 nor the textbooks to be used, does not secure for all 
 children between the ages of six and twenty-one
 
 years the right and opportunity to an equal education, 
 that it provides education for children of parents 
 with certain religious views, but does no so pro- 
 vide for children of parents with other religious 
 views or children of atheists; that a Catholic 
 priest regularly gives instruction to children of 
 his own faith and dresses in his characteristic priestly 
 garb; that school buildings are not equally available to 
 the relator for teaching the anti-religious tenets of athe- 
 ism or to unteach the teachings of the religious education 
 instructors ; that atheists and teachers of small religious 
 denominations are not employed; that cards for use in 
 the religious educations courses are printed and dis- 
 tributed through the office of the superintendent of the 
 defendant and pass through teachers' hands while en- 
 gaged in their professional duties; that the buildings 
 of the defendant are furnished with heat, light, and fur- 
 niture and with janitor service without charge, that the 
 school buildings are under the control and supervision 
 of the defendant, whose duty it is to adopt and enforce 
 rules and regulations for the management and govern- 
 ment of said public schools; that the relator has often 
 protested to defendant and its agents against such re- 
 ligious education and has served a written demand upon 
 the President and Secretary of defendant, a copy of 
 which is attached, said copy being signed by the relator 
 and other persons on behalf of the Chicago Action Coun- 
 cil and "Civil Liberties"; that the defendant has failed 
 and refused to adopt any rule or regulation prohibiting 
 instruction in religious education in said public schools. 
 
 In addition, the relator sets forth certain constitu- 
 tional and statutory provisions which she alleges have 
 been violated by the Board of Education. 
 
 The petition concludes with the prayer that the court 
 issue a writ of mandamus ordering the defendant to im-
 
 mediately adopt and enforce rules and regulations pro- 
 hibiting all instruction in and teaching of religious edu- 
 cation in all public schools and buildings under its juris- 
 diction. 
 
 The Answer: 
 
 To this Petition the defendant, Board of Education, 
 filed its Answer, in which it admits all of the allegations 
 of the Petition except that either by denial or by alleging 
 lack of knowledge it requires strict proof of the fol- 
 lowing by the relator: 
 
 1. That the relator is entitled to bring this action 
 on behalf of other taxpayers and in the name of 
 the People of the State of Illinois. 
 
 2. That the relator has set forth correctly her beliefs 
 with reference to religion and that she does not 
 desire her children indoctrinated with religious 
 beliefs contrary to her own. 
 
 3. That any of the acts of defendant complained of 
 violate any of the statutory or constitutional pro- 
 visions of the State of Illinois or of the United 
 States. 
 
 4. That 30 minutes or any other period of public 
 school education is lost in each week as a result 
 of the religious education classes. 
 
 5. That children harass or annoy their parents for 
 admission to religious education classes or that 
 the purpose of said classes is to induce belief in 
 religion or God in children participating therein 
 in accordance with the beliefs of the religious edu- 
 cation teachers. 
 
 6. That any sectarian beliefs or doctrines are taught. 
 
 7. That an establishment of religion is grafted onto 
 public education and that church and state are 
 united or that proselyting of atheists and others 
 is practiced. 
 
 8. That children are denied the use of their class- 
 rooms or apparatus or that classrooms are used 
 for religious education when used or required 
 for secular instruction.
 
 9. That children not participating in the courses are 
 required to remain while the classes are conducted 
 and that such children are rendered obvious by so 
 doing. 
 
 10. That James Terry McCollum was noticed by his 
 classmates when he did not participate, and that 
 the good will and esteem of his classmates was 
 injured, or that he was shunned by them and he 
 was denied enjoyment of their society and friend- 
 ship, and that he was laughed at, hated, and 
 despised or looked upon with childish contempt 
 by them. 
 
 11. That James Terry McCollum has been subjected 
 to segregation, ostracism, ridicule, hostility, and 
 embarrassment by reason of the existence of said 
 classes or his failure to participate therein. 
 
 12. That James Terry McCollum or the relator have 
 been subjected to any coercion or social pressure 
 to participate or grant permission to participate 
 in said classes. 
 
 13. That the religious education instructor mentioned 
 in the petition teaches her own secular views. 
 
 14. That the instruction in said religious education 
 classes supports the religious tenets or beliefs of 
 one religious sect or another. 
 
 15. That the defendant does not secure to all children 
 between the ages of six and twenty-one years the 
 equal right and opportunity for education and that 
 it provides religious education for the children of 
 some parents and not of all. 
 
 16. That the school houses and property of the de- 
 fendant are not equally available for the teaching 
 of atheism or of small religious denominations. 
 
 In addition, the Board of Education makes the follow- 
 ing affirmative allegations in its answer: 
 
 1. The relator is not entitled to bring this action on 
 behalf of anyone other than herself and as to her- 
 self, only as to such alleged private rights as may 
 be set forth in her petition, if any such there are, 
 and that the relator is not entitled to the aid of
 
 8 
 
 this court in enforcing or procuring the protection 
 of any alleged rights of herself or the public gen- 
 erally. 
 
 The instructors in religious education do not in- 
 terrupt or interfere with the regular secular 
 classes or instruction therein, nor do they give 
 instruction in religious education to pupils en- 
 rolled in the public schools during the required 
 attendance of said pupils in the public schools or 
 the classes thereof, but such instruction in re- 
 ligious education is given only to pupils who have 
 been released, excused or dismissed from the pub- 
 lic school and instruction therein for the purpose 
 of attending said religious education classes. 
 
 The religious education classes have been main- 
 tained in the public school buildings of the District 
 for a period of approximately five years, have 
 been solely under the control and jurisdiction of 
 the Champaign Council of Religious Education, 
 a voluntary association of representatives of the 
 Jewish, Roman Catholic and Protestant faiths; 
 that during said time the defendant has made 
 available to said Religious Education Council and 
 each and every faith represented thereby the free 
 and equal use of certain rooms of the school build- 
 ings of said District while not otherwise in use for 
 school purposes and for a period not to exceed 
 in case of a particular pupil 45 minutes in any 
 one week; that none of the books, materials and 
 supplies used in connection with said courses is 
 furnished at public expense; that pupils are ad- 
 mitted to said classes only upon the written re- 
 quest of their parents or guardians and then only 
 to classes conducted by the faith designated by 
 such parents or guardians ; that at all times the 
 defendant has been willing to grant its permission 
 for the similar free and equal use of rooms in its 
 public school buildings, when not in use for school 
 purposes, to any faith or other group, if any there 
 be, which desires to make use of the school rooms 
 belonging to the defendant for instruction bv such 
 other faith or group; that no resident of the 
 School District other than the relator has ever
 
 objected to the religious education classes or to 
 the action of the defendant in permitting said re- 
 ligious education classes to be conducted in the 
 classrooms of the School District. 
 
 4. That none of the apparatus or desks of the school 
 rooms in said District belong to or are the prop- 
 erty of the pupils or any of them and that the 
 pupils in said School District not participating in 
 said religious education classes are, as are all 
 other pupils in said School District, subject to 
 the control and direction of the defendant and meet 
 in different classrooms at different times for the 
 purpose of taking different classroom work and 
 that none of said pupils has any property right 
 or interest in the particular classroom in which 
 he may be engaged from time to time. 
 
 5. That no person or pupil residing in this School 
 District, including the relator and her son, James 
 Terry McCollum, has ever requested that the holy 
 writs of any of said other religions, namely the 
 Mohammedan Koran, the Zoroastrian Zend- 
 Avesta, the Hindu Veda, be taught in the religious 
 education courses. 
 
 6. The instruction in said religious education courses 
 is controlled by the various faiths participating 
 in said religious education program and not by 
 the Board of Education. 
 
 7. The school houses and property of the District are 
 equally available to all organized religious or anti- 
 religious groups whose teachings are consistent 
 with good public morals and the safety and peace 
 of the people residing in said District. Many so- 
 called minority denominations are represented 
 among the pupils and parents thereof who have 
 voluntarily elected to participate in said religious 
 education classes during the five years last past 
 and that during the school year just past 31 differ- 
 ent faiths or denominations were so represented. 
 
 8. Whatever expense is incurred for heat, light and 
 janitor services, if any, would nevertheless be 
 incurred whether or not said religious education 
 classes were conducted in said rooms.
 
 10 
 
 9. The defendant has never made any appropriation 
 or paid from any public fund whatever aiwthing 
 in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, nor has 
 it made any grant or donation of land, money or 
 other personal property to any church or for any 
 sectarian purpose. 
 
 10. The defendant has the power and discretion to 
 determine the hours to be spent under the jurisdic- 
 tion of the teaching- staff of the defendant and for 
 what purposes pupils may be excused from attend- 
 ance at classes or study rooms. 
 
 To this sworn answer no reply or further pleading 
 has been filed by the relator and these affirmative allega- 
 tions stand admitted in the record except to the extent 
 that any allegations of relator's petition conflict there- 
 with. 
 
 By leave of this Court, Elmer C. Bash and Alice J. 
 Bash and Wanda T. Bash, a minor, by Elmer C. Bash, 
 her father and next friend, filed an intervening petition 
 and were admitted to the suit as parties defendant. 
 
 The Intervening Petition: 
 
 The intervening petition alleges that Elmer C. Bash is 
 a citizen and taxpayer residing in School District No. 
 71, Champaign County, Illinois; that Alice J. Bash is the 
 wife and is likewise a citizen residing in said School Dis- 
 trict, and that both are adults and citizens of the State 
 of Illinois and of the United States of America. 
 
 It further alleges that they are the parents of two 
 children, Shirley L, Bash, age 16, and Wanda I. Bash, 
 age 13, who reside with their parents in said School 
 District and who are likewise citizens of the State of 
 Illinois and the United States of America; that the 
 adult intervenors are members of the University Place 
 Christian Church of Champaign, Illinois, and are de-
 
 11 
 
 sirous that their children shall have the opportunity for 
 religious education under the jurisdiction of the Cham- 
 paign Council of Religious Education, being the course 
 referred to in the petition of the relator, Vashti Mc- 
 Collum. 
 
 The intervening petition further alleges that Shirley 
 L. Bash has taken religious education courses in the sev- 
 enth and eighth grades of the school attended by her and 
 that Wanda I. Bash has taken the courses in religious 
 education in the sixth, seventh and eighth grades and 
 desires to continue to take the work in the school year 
 1945-1946, in accordance with the plan heretofore in 
 operation and effect. It is further alleged that said chil- 
 dren are entitled freely to attend said course in religious 
 education without interference from the relator or any 
 persons whom she purports to represent; that the adult 
 intervenors have the right to direct the education of 
 their children insofar as the exercise of such right does 
 not interfere with public morals and general welfare and 
 that under the Constitution of the State of Illinois and 
 the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States they are entitled to have the 
 petitioner, Wanda I. Bash, continue her course in re- 
 ligious education without interference from the relator 
 or the persons whom she purports to represent; that the 
 intervenors are of the opinion that the well being, educa- 
 tion and character of the petitioner, Wanda I. Bash, will 
 be benefited by a continuance by her of her study of 
 religious education in the manner referred to and that 
 they adopt as their own the answer of the defendant, 
 Board of Education of School District No. 71, Cham- 
 paign County, Illinois. 
 
 The petition concludes with a prayer that the petition 
 of the relator be dismissed at her cost.
 
 12 
 
 Reply to Intervening Petition: 
 
 To this intervening petition the relator has filed her 
 reply, neither admitting nor denying the allegations of 
 said intervening petition and praying for strict proof 
 thereof, except that the relator denies that said Wanda 
 I. Bash is entitled to attend said course in religious edu- 
 cation during the coming school and that the Court ought 
 not to interfere with such alleged right and also denying 
 that the intervening petitioners have any rights under 
 the Constitutions of the State of Illinois or the United 
 States of America to have AVanda I. Bash continue any 
 study in any course in religious education during the 
 coming school year or any other school year in the public 
 schools. 
 
 Motion of the Defendant at the Conclusion of the Evi- 
 dence of the Plaintiff to Dismiss the Petition or in the 
 Alternative to Strike: 
 
 At the conclusion of the evidence introduced by the 
 relator the Board of Education filed its motion (in which 
 the intervenors joined) to dismiss the petition of the 
 relator, or in the alternative to strike certain allegations 
 thereof, and as grounds therefor stated: 
 
 1. That the evidence affirmatively shows that no 
 alleged private right of the relator is involved but 
 only alleged public rights. 
 
 2. That the evidence affirmatively shows that this is 
 a moot case so far as the same concerns auy Con- 
 stitutional guarantees of the State of Illinois or 
 of the United States with reference to freedom of 
 religion or worship, for the reason that the plain- 
 tiff and her son have testified that they have no 
 religion, do not believe in any God and are athe- 
 ists, and for the further reason that the relator 
 has stated that she has no objection to the par-
 
 13 
 
 ticipation of her child in the religious education 
 classes which are the subject of her petition and 
 no religious conscientious scruples against his 
 participation therein and for the further reason 
 that it affirmatively appears that the relator and 
 her son have not been interfered with, hindered, 
 prevented from or embarrassed in their profes- 
 sion, practice or exercise of any religion or re- 
 ligious belief and have not been coerced or caused 
 to profess or worship or practice any religious 
 belief or exercise and have not been embarrassed 
 in connection therewith. 
 
 3. That it affirmatively appears that the relator has 
 voluntarily permitted and directed her said child, 
 James Terry McCollum, to participate in said re- 
 ligious education classes and that she has thereby 
 waived any ground for complaint herein and is 
 estopped from objecting- thereto. 
 
 This motion was denied without prejudice to being re- 
 newed later and it was renewed at the conclusion of all 
 the evidence by the Board and by the intervenors. The 
 motion was taken by the Court with the case and is 
 before it now for decision. 
 
 The Questions of Fact. 
 
 From the foregoing analysis of the pleadings, we sub- 
 mit that the following questions of fact are the only 
 ones put in issue by the pleadings and are therefore here 
 for decision: 
 
 Is any period of public school education lost as a 
 result of the existence of the courses in religious 
 education? 
 
 Do children harass or annoy their parents for 
 permission to participate in the religious education 
 classes? 
 
 Is the purpose of the courses to induce in children 
 participating therein the religious beliefs of the 
 teachers?
 
 14 
 
 Are the teachings in the religious education courses 
 sectarian in nature? 
 
 Are the children of atheists or adherents of small 
 denominations proselyted? 
 
 Are the religious beliefs of children not partici- 
 pating in these courses made obvious or noticeable? 
 
 Are children not participating in the religious 
 education courses shunned by their classmates, de- 
 nied the enjoyment of their society and friendship, 
 laughed at, hated, and despised, looked upon with 
 childish contempt, or otherwise ostracized or em- 
 barrassed as a result of their failure to participate? 
 
 Is James Terry McCollum or the relator subjected 
 to social pressure or coercion to participate or to 
 grant permission to participate in the classes? 
 
 Are the school buildings and property of the 
 Board equally available to the relator and adherents 
 of all religious sects? 
 
 Are any cards printed at public expense or other 
 expenses incurred on behalf of the Board as a result 
 of or in aid of said religious education classes? 
 
 The facts established by the record relating to the 
 above questions will be treated in the opening portion 
 of our argument. In doing so, we shall restate the ques- 
 tions in the same sequence as they appear here. 
 
 Questions of Law 
 
 Relator's attorney has in his brief a very large number 
 of subdivisions dealing with law points supposed to be 
 involved in this case. We think they actually boil down 
 to just three: 
 
 First: Does the Defendant, Board of Education, 
 have the statutory power to excuse pupils from at- 
 tendance for a period of 30 or 45 minutes each week 
 to attend religious education classes? 
 
 Second : Does the existence of these voluntary re- 
 ligious education classes violate any right of re- 
 ligious freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment
 
 15 
 
 to the Constitution of the United States or by Ar- 
 ticle II, Section 3, of the Constitution of the State of 
 Illinois? 
 
 Third : Has the defendant made ' ' any appropria- 
 tion" or paid "anything in aid of any church or 
 sectarian purpose, or to help support or sustain any 
 school * * * controlled by any church or sectarian 
 denomination", or has it granted or donated any 
 "land, money, or other personal property" "to any 
 church or for any sectarian purpose" in violation 
 of Article VIII, Section 3, of the Constitution of the 
 State of Illinois, or of Chapter 122, Section 15-14, 
 Illinois Revised Statutes of 1945? 
 
 These questions of law are treated at length in our 
 argument following our discussion of the facts.
 
 16 
 Points and Authorities. 
 
 I. 
 
 The Defendant Board of Education has the Statutory 
 Power to Excuse Pupils from Public School Attend- 
 ance for a Period of from Thirty to Forty-five Minutes 
 each week to Attend Religious Education Classes. 
 
 111. R.S. 1945, c. 122, Sec. 6-25. 
 
 111. R.S. 1945, c. 122, Sec. 26-1. 
 
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 69 L. 
 ed. 1070. 
 
 Carl Zollman, "The Relation of Church and 
 State". 
 
 Trustees of Schools v. The People ex rel. Van 
 Allen, 87 111. 303. 
 
 Board of School Inspectors of the City of Peoria 
 v. People ex rel. Henry Grove, 20 111. 526. 
 
 People v. City of Chicago, 278 111. 318. 
 
 Segar v. Board of Education, 317 111. 418. 
 
 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 
 156 N.E. 663; affirming 127 Misc. Rep. 135, 
 215 N.Y. Supp. 632; 219 App. Div. 233, 219 
 N.Y. Supp. 189. 
 
 II. 
 
 The Existence of these Voluntary Religious Education 
 Classes does not Violate any Right of Religious Free- 
 dom Guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Con- 
 stitution of the United States or by Article 2, Section 
 3 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois. 
 
 Federal Constitution, First Amendment. 
 
 Federal Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, 
 Section 1.
 
 17 
 
 Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article II, 
 Section 3. 
 
 Beason v. Davis, 133 U.S. 333, 33 L. ed. 637. 
 
 People v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 111. 132. 
 
 Webster's New International Dictionary (Un- 
 abridged) — ' ' Religion ' '. 
 
 Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 51 L. ed. 415. 
 
 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 59' L. ed. 
 390. 
 
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 84 L. ed. 
 1213. 
 
 People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 
 111. 334, discussed. 
 
 Nichols v. School Directors, 93 111. 61. 
 
 Reichwald v. Catholic Bishop, 258 111. 44. 
 
 McCormich v. Burt, 95 111. 263. 
 
 Millard v. Board of Education, 121 111. 297. 
 
 North v. Board of Trustees of the University 
 of Illinois, 137 111. 296. 
 
 III. 
 
 The Defendant Board of Education has Not Made "Any 
 Appropriation" or Paid "Anything in Aid of any 
 Church or Sectarian Purpose", Nor has it Granted 
 or Donated any "Land, Money, or other Personal 
 Property" "To any Church or for any Sectarian Pur- 
 
 poses." 
 
 Constitution of the State of Illinois, Article 
 VIII, Sec. 3. 
 
 Illinois R,S. 1945, c. 122, sec. 15-14. 
 
 Nichols v. School Directors, 93 111. 61. 
 
 Illinois R.S, 1945, c. 122, "Schools", sec. 6-43. 
 
 Lagow v. Hill, 238 111. 428. 
 
 11 American Jurisprudence, 660. 
 
 Ordinance of 1787, Article 3.
 
 18 
 
 The Law in Its Relation to Religion, by Edwin 
 C. Goddard, 10 Michigan Law Review, 161, 
 166. 
 
 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
 457, 36 L. ed. 226. 
 
 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 
 34 L. ed. 478. 
 
 Wilkerson v. City of Rome, 152 G-a. 762, 110 
 S. E. 895, 20 A.L.R. 1334. 
 
 Reichwald v. Catholic Bishop, 258 111. 44. 
 
 Nichols v. School Directors, 93 111. 61. 
 
 Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School, 280 111. 613. 
 
 Dunn v. Addison Manual Training School, 281 
 111. 352. 
 
 Trost v. Ketteler Traming School, 282 111. 504. 
 
 St. Hedwig's School v. Cook County, 289 111. 
 432. 
 
 Opinions of Attorney General of Illinois, (1919- 
 1920), pp. 699, 700. 
 
 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 219 App. Div. 
 233, 219 N.Y. Supp. 189. 
 
 North v. Board of Trustees of the University 
 of Illinois, 137 111. 296. 
 
 34 American Jurisprudence, 847.
 
 19 
 
 Argument 
 
 To the task of helping the Court to reach a correct 
 decision of this case we address ourselves with the 
 humility and deep sense of responsibility which its im- 
 portance demands. As the record discloses, the con- 
 tinued welfare of approximately 800 boys and girls, each 
 year, in this school district will be directly affected by 
 the outcome of this case. Also, the effect of the decision 
 will be felt by millions of the future citizens of America 
 in 1850 school systems scattered through 46 states from 
 coast to coast which the testimony shows now have some 
 form of week-day religious education on released school 
 time. 
 
 Relator's counsel has been unable to cite any case 
 where any court anywhere has yet disturbed or inter- 
 fered with a voluntary system of religious education 
 such as the one here involved. We know of no such case. 
 This Court is now asked so to decide this case as to 
 put an end to this aspect of the education of the youth 
 of America and in doing so to overrule the decision of 
 public policy which has been made by the elective public 
 body here involved, as well as by the' Boards of Educa- 
 tion in almost two thousand other school systems of the 
 country. 
 
 Nevertheless, the law dictates that if there is a clear 
 violation of a positive constitutional prohibition or statu- 
 tory inhibition, this phase of the education of our chil- 
 dren must cease. But as lawyers and judges, as well as 
 men, we will demand that the facts, justifying the relief 
 sought, be proven in accordance with the law which is 
 invoked and that the law, which is said to demand so 
 severe a remedy, be clearly demonstrated.
 
 20 
 
 It is our happy conclusion, from an examination and 
 sifting of the record and an analysis of the applicable 
 legal authorities that not only have the requisite facts 
 not been so proven, but that the law of this state would 
 not warrant the relief prayed, even if the facts were as 
 asserted by the relator. 
 
 In order that the Court might have a full view of the 
 case, we filed an answer and thus made certain of a full 
 presentation of all of the facts. Having done so, we 
 enter upon an analysis of the evidence to determine what 
 facts have been established, and shall attempt to answer 
 in sequence the issuable questions of facts as stated on 
 pages 13 and 14, above. 
 
 Is any period of public school education lost as a result 
 of the existence of the courses in religious education f 
 
 The only evidence upon this point, other than the 
 patent and legally irrelevant fact that children taking 
 religious education courses are in attendance at school 
 30 minutes less each week than those who do not, was 
 that of Mrs. Lakie Munson, principal of the Dr. Howard 
 School, who was called as a witness by the relator. She 
 stated that teachers lost no teaching time as a result of 
 the religious education classes, that teaching in the 
 Champaign schools, in line with best modern educational 
 practice, is applied to the individual pupil and not to the 
 class as a group, and that teachers try to divide their 
 time between the individual members of the class accord- 
 ing to the pupils' requirements. In pursuance of this 
 plan the teacher, while the religious education classes 
 are in progress, gives those children who do not par- 
 ticipate her individual attention, and is then free to 
 devote more of her later time to the children participat- 
 ing in such classes. In other words, the public school
 
 21 
 
 teacher has so many minutes in the school day and her 
 division of her time among the pupils and her full eim 
 ployment of it is not impaired by the fact that some of 
 the pupils devote 30 minutes a week to the study of re- 
 ligious education. 
 
 Mrs. Munson also testified that the school day, as 
 scheduled prior to and since the institution of religious 
 education classes, had a ten-minute period available for 
 opening exercises which is not so used and that this pro- 
 vides fifty minutes of extra time in each week, only thirty 
 of which are used for religious education. That is, even 
 with the thirty minutes taken out, which is devoted to 
 religious education, there are still twenty minutes more 
 time in each week than is required for the teaching of the 
 usual school subjects. 
 
 Mrs. Munson 's testimony stands wholly uncontradicted 
 and since she was the relator's witness, the relator is 
 bound thereby. Finally, the relator did not even make 
 an effort to prove that the time actually devoted to the 
 teaching of the usual public school subjects was not 
 more than is required by either the law or sound public 
 policy. 
 
 The relator has wholly failed to carry this issue of 
 fact. 
 
 Do children harass or annoy their parents for permission 
 to participate in the religious education classes? 
 
 On this issue there is only the bare statement of the 
 relator that James Terry McCollum asked for permis- 
 sion to attend the religious education class and that she 
 permitted him to do so during one semester. No word of 
 harassment or annoyance is suggested and there is not 
 a syllable to suggest that any other parent suffered any 
 experience capable of such characterization.
 
 22 
 
 The record shows that twenty per cent of the pupils in 
 the grade schools and eighty per cent of the pupils in 
 the junior high school did not take these courses. There 
 were available, therefore, literally hundreds of parents 
 who did not elect that their children take these classes. 
 If the relator's allegation of parents being harassed and 
 annoyed was not merely gratuitous and imaginative, why 
 were not at least one, or two, or more, of these parents 
 called as witnesses? Why this gulf between allegation 
 and proof? Simply because the allegation of annoyance 
 and harassment is not true. 
 
 75 the purpose of the courses to induce in children par- 
 ticipating therein the religious beliefs of the teachers? 
 
 Nothing whatever was introduced to support this alle- 
 gation, the only evidence on the subject being Miss Mae 
 Chapin's testimony that she did not mention her own 
 church affiliation or teach or refer to the doctrinal be- 
 liefs of the Presbyterian or of any other church and 
 Sarah Grace Jorgenson's positive testimony that she 
 teaches the contents of the Bible without personal in- 
 terpretation or the teaching of doctrines of any par- 
 ticular church. 
 
 Are the teachings in the religious education courses sec- 
 tarian in nature? 
 
 The evidence on this issue flies in the very teeth of 
 the allegation. Actually, what the religious education 
 teachers, Miss Chapin and Mrs. Jorgensen, testified was 
 that they taught no creed, dogma, or doctrine of any 
 church and did not give their own or any other interpre- 
 tation of Biblical material, but simply taught the content 
 of the Bible, leaving the children to place whatever 
 interpretation, if any, they desired upon the Biblical 
 passages. They further testified that discussions of the
 
 23 
 
 beliefs of different churches were not held and that 
 reference to the differences between sects and religious 
 faiths was avoided. The emphasis was upon the sim- 
 ilarities between religions and the good common to all 
 religions; not upon dissimilarities between religions or 
 between sects or upon differences in dogma. The evidence 
 further was that lesson materials and curriculum were 
 selected and passed upon by a representative, democrat- 
 ically chosen, interdenominational committee with a view 
 to avoiding any teaching or reference that might be ob- 
 jectionable to any religious group. Participation in the 
 Champaign Council of Religious Education was at all 
 times open to every church and denomination. No evi- 
 dence whatever was offered with reference to the content 
 of the Catholic or Jewish teachings except that the 
 Catholic children received religious and moral instruc- 
 tion in accordance with the Catholic religion. As they 
 were part and parcel of his interfaith program, it must 
 be presumed that these teachings were similarly unob- 
 jectionable. 
 
 In her desperation relator called to the stand a num- 
 ber of ministers and adherents to different religious 
 faiths in an effort to show that what was taught in these 
 classes was not believed by all. This evidence was heard 
 by the court subject to our objection, which was founded 
 upon our contention that relator's counsel, in his exam- 
 ination of them, misstated the testimony of the religious 
 education instructors regarding what they taught. We 
 believed then and believe now that the record shows that 
 Miss Chapin and Mrs. Jorgensen said they taught the 
 content of the Bible without comment or interpretation 
 and without expressing their own belief or attempting to 
 influence the belief or interpretation of the pupils. But 
 the other witnesses called by the relator were questioned 
 on the hypothesis that beliefs were urged and interpre-
 
 24 
 
 tations made. As a result a Jehovah's Witness, a Chris- 
 tian Scientist, and a Unitarian expressed a different 
 view of some of these matters, but we submit that this 
 was wholly incompetent and irrelevant because the 
 hypothesis upon which it was based was not supported 
 by the evidence, so that this evidence should now be dis- 
 regarded and our objections to it sustained. 
 
 It may be argued, and indeed the only contention that 
 may be made is, that the courses are sectarian because 
 the Protestant classes use the King James version of the 
 Bible, the Catholics the Douay version, and the Jewish 
 classes their own version. But this falls flat because there 
 are extensive portions common to all. Further, there are 
 additional and perhaps greater portions not common to 
 all, which contain nothing inconsistent with or inimical 
 to the others. For instance, even the story of the birth, 
 life and death of Jesus Christ itself, while not a part of 
 the teaching of Judaism, is not inconsistent with it or 
 sectarian as to it. For this we have the testimony of the 
 relator's own witness, Rabbi Golclin, who asserted that 
 Jews do not deny the story of Christ and have nothing 
 to say as to Christianity, just as Christianity has noth- 
 ing to say as to Judaism. They are separate ways of life, 
 each recognizing the good that is in the other and finding 
 it unnecessary to deny the other or to controvert or quar- 
 rel with the other's teachings. 
 
 Teaching becomes sectarian only when it urges belief 
 in a particular creed or doctrine. For all that this rec- 
 ord discloses, it would be equally tenable to accuse a 
 public school teacher who reads to her classes Ingersoll 
 or Confucius of being sectarian. 
 
 Finally, overshadowing everything else, there is the 
 consideration that the program under attack here is 
 a living, breathing, interfaith movement, in which Cath- 
 olic, Jew and Protestant join hands in friendship, under-
 
 25 
 
 standing and brotherhood in a common undertaking in 
 which every religious group and faith is at liberty to take 
 part. The whole spirit of the plan is non-sectarian. The 
 relator's contention that the teaching is sectarian is de- 
 nied by the very existence of the plan under attack. 
 
 There is no evidence of sectarian teaching within 
 either a strictly legal or an ordinary common sense defi- 
 nition of the term. 
 
 Are the children of atheists or adherents of small 
 denominations proselyted? 
 
 There was no evidence whatever, either that the re- 
 lator, her son, or any other person was proselyted or 
 that any such attempt was made. The closest that the 
 relator came even to touching this issue was in James 
 Terry's statement that Mrs. Bessie Taylor had encour- 
 aged 100% participation by the class. This testimony 
 was obviously a childish error as it was flatly denied by 
 the teacher concerned and by two children in his class, 
 including Elwin Miller, who James Terry said was pres- 
 ent at the time of one of the conversations. "What James 
 Terry referred to was undoubtedly the War Stamp drive 
 in which Mrs. Taylor had asked 100% participation. 
 
 The suggestion made by Mrs. Taylor that the boy 
 join the religious education class so as to have as many 
 things in common with the other children as possible 
 was a suggestion made by her to the relator and not to 
 the boy. The relator did not in her testimony criticize 
 or take exception to this suggestion in any way. She 
 recognized in her testimony that it was a well-intentioned 
 effort on the part of Mrs. Taylor to help the relator adjust 
 her son to the other children. It was the same type of 
 thing as her suggestion that he participate in cub scout 
 activities. In no way was it coercive nor was it proselyt- 
 ing in any sense, as relator's counsel would now lead 
 the court to believe.
 
 26 
 
 In her brief, the relator now takes occasion to attack 
 the motives and methods of Mrs. Taylor and tries to 
 twist her well-meaning and well-directed attempts to 
 help in adjusting James Terry to his classmates into 
 willful and malicious coercion to participate in the re- 
 ligious education classes. There is no basis for this 
 charge. One thing sticks out like a sore thumb through- 
 out this record and that is that James Terry was a prob- 
 lem to his mother and to his teachers. The mother 
 came to the teacher for advice and she received what 
 were apparently kindly, patient and thoughtful sugges- 
 tions. Because of the mother's slavish and exaggerated 
 devotion to a misinterpreted political principle, she did 
 not choose to follow the teacher's advice. No amount of 
 fancy juggling of words or impugning can turn Mrs. 
 Taylor's actions into coercion. 
 
 The next three questions of fact arising on the plead- 
 ings may best be treated together and accordingly we 
 do so: 
 
 1. Are the religious beliefs of children not participat- 
 ing in these courses made obvious or noticeable? 
 
 2. Are children not participating in the religious edu- 
 cation courses shunned by their classmates, denied the 
 enjoyment of their society and friendship, laughed at, 
 hated, and despised, looked upon with childish contempt, 
 or otherwise ostracized or embarrassed as a result of 
 their failure to participate? 
 
 3. Is James Terry McCollum or the relator subjected 
 to social pressure or coercion to participate or to grant 
 permission to participate in the classes? 
 
 The evidence introduced on these issues was, to say 
 the least, anti-climactic. In view of the extravagant 
 language of the allegations of the relator's petition, it 
 might have been supposed that the relator would have 
 at least shown some embarrassment to her son, but the
 
 27 
 
 record does not disclose any. Here the evidence is that 
 James Terry was from his early school experience an 
 unsocial and nervous problem-child. So marked was this 
 that it excited his mother's comment and induced her 
 to place him in the care of a child psychiatrist. He was 
 unable to get along with other boys and girls, spat in 
 their faces, kicked and teased them and started fights 
 with them. Even participation in cub scouting was not 
 to his liking and when he joined the religious education 
 class during the second semester of the fourth grade, 
 no perceptible improvement took place. Claustrophobia 
 was among his idiosyncrasies. Even the boy does not 
 attribute his difficulties to the fact that some of his 
 classmates attended the religious education class while 
 he did not. In or out of it, with or without it, he found 
 that he did not fit in with his fellows. For this state of 
 affairs, no one/ will censure this bright-eyed youngster. 
 But in justice to the program of religious education, here 
 under attack, the wisdom of the parents whose children 
 participated in it, the soundness of the judgment of the 
 defendant Board of Education which permitted it, and 
 the good sense and social consciousness of the churches 
 which have organized it, a comparison of the results of 
 atheism and religion in action as shown by this record 
 is in order. 
 
 James Terry, so the record discloses, has been taught 
 (apparently more by his grandfather, Arthur Gr. Crom- 
 well, than by his mother) to ridicule the belief of his 
 fellows in the Deity and his own home training has left 
 him with a feeling of contempt for their intellectual 
 processes. The values that they place upon their rela- 
 tionship with God, he scoffs at. He is proud of his athe- 
 ism, finds it fun to be an atheist — non-conformity is a 
 position to which value has been attached in his mind — 
 where is his embarrassment? Does he say he was em- 
 barrassed? Does he say his fellows shunned him because
 
 28 
 
 lie was an atheist? No, he does not even suggest that 
 his atheism was ever mentioned before this suit was 
 filed, except by children to whom he needlessly volun- 
 teered his disbelief. 
 
 On the contrary, classmates in both of the schools in 
 which he has been enrolled testified that not only had 
 they never heard any reference to his unbelief but that 
 in fact they had never even heard the word atheist until 
 this suit was started. 
 
 Thirteen children, selected largely from those who did 
 not participate in the religious education classes, a ma- 
 jority of them being his own classmates — all testified 
 that they had not felt or observed any pressure on any- 
 one to attend the classes. Those who had not attended 
 the classes testified that they had never been questioned 
 regarding their own non-participation. Now it is argued 
 that this was because many of these witnesses belonged 
 to large churches. What a shallow suggestion. Would a 
 Methodist, Baptist or Presbyterian, who must feel some 
 obligation to or interest in religion, feel less embarrass- 
 ment at shirking or denying this obligation and interest 
 than an atheist who felt neither? 
 
 These witnesses testified that no one ever questioned 
 them as to their reason for not participating. The fact 
 that they were members of churches was not widely 
 known — certainly not self-evident from looking at them. 
 They were not called upon to assign any reason for not 
 electing to attend religious education classes. The fact 
 that these witnesses were church members surely does 
 not discredit that testimony. If James Terry volunteered 
 to anyone that the reason he did not attend the classes 
 was because he was an atheist, that was not induced or 
 required by the purely voluntary system of religious edu- 
 cation, and no results should be visited upon a whole 
 system because of it. The information that James Terry
 
 29 
 
 McCollum was an atheist was given by him because he 
 was proud to be different from other boys his age in 
 matters of religion and not because the mere existence 
 of religious education classes compelled him to disclose 
 that he was an atheist. He testified from the witness 
 stand that he sort of enjoyed being different from other 
 people in reference to this matter of God. He also tes- 
 tified that he was proud of the position in which he is 
 put by not believing in God. 
 
 The evidence is overwhelming that no one, not except- 
 ing James Terry, has ever felt any embarrassment or 
 social pressure or coercion by reason of these courses. 
 They are entirely voluntary in fact as well as in name. 
 
 Are the school buildings and property of the Board 
 equally available to the relator and adherents of all 
 religious sects? 
 
 The uncontradicted evidence is that the school board 
 has fully recognized and implemented its statutory duty 
 to permit full, free, and equal access to its facilities by 
 all persons, groups and creeds. The uncontradicted evi- 
 dence of Superintendent E. H. Mellon is that no religious 
 organization or anti-religious organization has ever made 
 application for use of the property of the District and 
 met with refusal. Even Jehovah's Witnesses, who were 
 induced in the very course of the trial to make an oral 
 application to him in the court room itself, were not re- 
 fused, but were invited to make application at the office 
 of the superintendent. Far from showing any inclina- 
 tion to refuse, the evidence is that the Superintendent 
 had previously granted the Jehovah's Witnesses the use 
 of a school swimming pool for baptismal purposes. The 
 relator, in her brief, finds that it suits her purposes to 
 refer to Mr. Mellon as a dictator and to the defendant,
 
 30 
 
 Board of Education, as a fascist. Her use of these 
 vilifying terms will hardly substitute for the "Reason" 
 which she terms her God. AVe do not choose to join in 
 this juvenile game of name-calling, and we simply sug- 
 gest that in the discharge of his public duties, Mr. Mellon 
 would be remiss if he did not inquire, in connection with 
 an application for use of the school buildings in his 
 charge, the nature and extent of the use proposed. 
 
 It will be soon enough to cry wolf, if the wolf shoHild 
 ever appear. 
 
 Are any cards printed at public expense or other ex- 
 penses incurred on behalf of the Board as a result of 
 or in aid of said religious education classes? 
 
 Again, on this final issue, not a penny of public ex- 
 penditures in aid of these classes was found, notwith- 
 standing a thorough combing of the witnesses available 
 to the relator. In fact, so dismal was her failure that 
 she was reduced to coining up with a complaint about a 
 few mimeographed cards which, upon further inves- 
 tigation, it turned out were paid for at regular rates 
 and in the usual course of business. Finally, the last 
 straw was clutched — relator complained that inquiries 
 from churches and school officers regarding the religious 
 education courses were answered by letters prepared at 
 the expense of the defendant Board. Does the relator's 
 animus against religion require that correspondence of 
 churches or inquiries regarding religious education must 
 go unanswered? 
 
 The record shows that there is widespread interest in 
 this program and that almost two thousand school boards 
 permit week day religious education in some form. This, 
 of course, means that some inquiries will be received 
 here. Superintendent Mellon worked out a form of an-
 
 31 
 
 swer that his secretary sends. Common courtesy de- 
 mands an answer to such inquiries. Is the relator's posi- 
 tion in this case so absurd that it leads to the ridiculous 
 conclusion that these inquiries must go unanswered, lest 
 public moneys be expended in aid of a sectarian purpose? 
 
 • Nothing- further was developed, not even an incidental 
 or indirect expense — let alone a " payment", an "ap- 
 propriation", a "grant" or a "donation". The uncon- 
 tradicted evidence was that the buildings and classrooms 
 of the District had to be heated and lighted from 8:30 
 a. m. until 4:00 p. m. and that rooms were cleaned once 
 a day without regard to whether or not use was made 
 of them for the religious education courses. No change 
 was made in the method of operation in these particu- 
 lars after the religious education classes were authorized. 
 No additional expense whatever was attributable to the 
 slight use made by religious education classes within a 
 portion of the clay during which these services are all 
 necessarily rendered for the convenience and health of 
 the public school teachers and pupils. 
 
 There was uncontradicted, unequivocal evidence from 
 the person best fitted to know the facts — Supt. E. H. 
 Mellon — that no public moneys are expended directly or 
 indirectly by the Board of Education .because of the 
 religious education classes. This is a question of fact 
 on which the relator had the affirmative and there was 
 an entire failure of proof of this issue on her part. 
 
 The relator's brief substitutes supposition, conjecture 
 and surmise, for the necessary proof that any public 
 funds are used for the promotion or holding of these 
 voluntary religious education classes. We know the court 
 will not be misled into overlooking the positive evidence 
 in favor of the Board on this important issue. 
 
 In addition to these disputed facts which were all
 
 32 
 
 determined in favor of the defendant after the taking of 
 evidence, the facts affirmatively alleged in the sworn 
 answer of the defendant and not denied in the pleadings 
 of the relator stand admitted by her. These are tabu- 
 lated above under our analysis of the pleadings. 
 
 We are now ready to state the case as it is in contra- 
 distinction to what it was alleged to be. In doing so we 
 clarify the atmosphere for the consideration of the law 
 and place in their positions of relative importance the 
 propositions upon which the relator relies and, we re- 
 spectfully suggest, thereby also may be of aid to the 
 court in preparing "Findings of Fact" which are a 
 necessary and important foundation for the decision of 
 this case. 
 
 These facts are: 
 
 In the fall of 1940, following a local increase in juvenile 
 delinquency and as a measure intended to combat it, the 
 Champaign Council of Religious Education, a voluntary 
 association of Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant 
 faiths, was formed, and immediately sought of, and se- 
 cured from the defendant Board of Education permis- 
 sion to offer classes in religious education in grades 7 
 through 9 (later expanded to grades 4 through 9) 
 throughout the Champaign school system. The plan 
 envisaged the furnishing of instructors (having educa- 
 tional background and experience at least equal to the 
 standard established by the Board for its own teachers) 
 and all materials and books, as well as incidental ex- 
 penses, at the expense of the Council. Children were to 
 be admitted to these classes only upon the express 
 written request of parents and then only to classes des- 
 ignated by the parents. They were to be excused by the 
 Board from attendance in the grade schools (grades 4, 
 5 and 6) for 30 minutes and from the Junior High School
 
 33 
 
 (grades 7, 8 and 9) for a period of 45 minutes in each 
 week, for participation in the religious education classes. 
 Classes were to be scheduled so as not to interfere with 
 the regular public school classes after consultation with 
 the public school teacher. Each faith, Catholic, Jewish 
 and Protestant, was to have its separate instructional 
 classes and no expense in connection with the classes 
 was to be borne by the Board. Additional groups, even 
 atheists, were to be freely permitted to participate upon 
 the same terms. Lesson materials and curriculum were 
 to be selected by a committee representative of all groups 
 participating and in a manner to avoid any offensive, 
 doctrinal, dogmatic or sectarian teaching. The teaching 
 was to be of the content of the Bible without interpre- 
 tation, or attempt at influencing belief in the doctrines 
 or creeds of any church. 
 
 So popular did this program become that in the latest 
 year of its operation 80% of the pupils in the grade 
 school classes participated, 31 different faiths and de- 
 nominations were represented by participating pupils, 
 and in five years no resident of the school district other 
 them the relator, voiced any complaint regarding it. 
 
 The son of relator, James Terry McCollum, now ten 
 years of age, enrolled in the fourth grade at South Side 
 School in the fall of 1943, and along with five others 
 did not participate in the religious education class during 
 the first semester. During the second semester, how- 
 ever, he did participate, procuring his mother's written 
 permission therefor. In the fall of 1944 he transferred 
 at his mother's request and enrolled in the fifth grade 
 in Dr. Howard School and with one other youngster, 
 Elwin Miller, did not attend the religious education class 
 the first semester. During the second semester he was 
 alone in not participating therein.
 
 34 
 
 During all of his school life he was viewed by his 
 teachers and by his mother, the relator, as a maladjusted 
 problem-child who got along poorly with his fellows. 
 In Dr. Howard School where he got a fresh start among 
 pupils who were not acquainted with him, he frequently 
 teased and fought with his classmates, often starting the 
 fights himself and spitting in their faces and kicking 
 them. 
 
 When the other members of his class were attending 
 the religious education classes he continued his regular 
 studies in the music room under the supervision of his 
 regular teacher and on one occasion was placed at a 
 desk in the hall, where he was teased by passing children 
 who apparently thought he was being punished. There is 
 no pretense that they teased him about not attending re- 
 ligious education classes, as they did not even know that 
 this class was in session. Upon complaint of his mother, 
 this practice was promptly and permanently discon- 
 tinued, as was the one of placing him in the music room 
 when his mother complained that he was a victim of 
 claustrophobia. He was thenceforward placed with an- 
 other division of the fifth grade during these periods 
 of religious education and no further complaint was 
 made by his mother. His teacher, Mrs. Taylor, testified 
 that her reason for not sending him to the other division 
 in the first instance was that the boy might disturb the 
 other class by seeking to attract attention to himself. 
 She did not wish to visit this distracting influence on an- 
 other teacher. He did not complain of any embarrass- 
 ment or coercion in connection with the religious edu- 
 cation courses, nor did he contend that he was ques- 
 tioned, except by one boy who did not take the class 
 himself, regarding his non-participation therein or teased 
 regarding his religious beliefs or unbelief. Neither did
 
 35 
 
 he attribute his failure to get along with his fellows 
 to the existence of the religious education course. 
 
 Both he and his mother are atheists and while he ex- 
 pressed curiosity regarding religion, his mother testified 
 that she is unwilling to have him participate in the 
 classes as they conflict with her interpretation of a 
 political doctrine denominated "separation of church 
 and state" which she believes forbids the voluntary 
 Champaign program above described. She denies any 
 religious scruples against the teaching of religious edu- 
 cation and expresses her willingness to see it continued 
 if the Court decides her interpretation is faulty. 
 
 The relator has other children, one of whom attends 
 a private school which is opened with recitation of the 
 Lord's Prayer, scripture reading and sacred hymn sing- 
 ing. She enrolled James Terry in a model demonstration 
 class at the University of Illinois during the summer of 
 1945 where similar opening exercises were held and in 
 which he participated. She has no scruples or objection 
 to her children taking part in these exercises. 
 
 This suit was started by her, following a written de- 
 mand that the defendant Board of Education adopt rules 
 and regulations excluding religious education instruction 
 from the school buildings, which demand was signed by 
 herself and certain unidentified persons, not residing in 
 the district, who purport to represent unidentified or- 
 ganizations denominated, "Chicago Action Council" and 
 "Civil Liberties". None of these unidentified persons 
 appeared as witnesses on the trial of this case. 
 
 It is these established facts to which the law is to 
 be applied — not the distorted and fanciful statement of 
 supposed facts set out in the relator's brief. 
 
 We will not extend unduly our brief by referring to 
 all of the errors with which relator's brief is replete,
 
 36 
 
 but will simply point out without extended argument the 
 more important errors. 
 
 We list these errors, references being to pages of re- 
 lator's brief: 
 
 Page 2. "* * * the Champaign Council of Eeligious 
 Education, an organization of ministers and others of 
 the Protestant faith". The record shows that Council 
 is made up of all faiths — Catholic, Protestant and 
 Jewish. 
 
 Page 2. "A Catholic priest * * * teaches the religion 
 of the Catholic faith * * *". The record shows simply 
 that he gives Catholic students whose parents consent 
 to their attending the class religious and moral instruc- 
 tion in conformity with the Catholic religion. 
 
 Page 2. "The Jews * * * during the past two school 
 years did not participate". The record simply shows 
 that they participated for three years and that the wit- 
 ness called by the relator did not know whether they 
 participated during the past two years while the witness 
 was absent from town. 
 
 Page 3. "* * * these children are deprived of one- 
 half hour of secular education each week. The portion 
 of the salary paid the secular teacher for this one-half 
 hour is wasted". The record shows, as above stated, that 
 the public school teachers devote their time during the 
 full teaching day to giving their personal attention to the 
 individual members of the class, each child receiving the 
 same amount of teaching time whether or not he is en- 
 rolled in the religious education class, and each teacher 
 devoting the same amount of time to her teaching duties 
 since the religious education courses were initiated as 
 before. Not a moment of her time is wasted or lost. 
 
 Page 3. "The teachers direct the children to take the
 
 37 
 
 cards to their parents for the purpose of obtaining per- 
 mission * * to take the course in religious education 
 *". The record does not disclose any such direc- 
 tion or any such purpose on the part of the public school 
 teachers. The record shows that in some instances the 
 cards have been distributed to the pupils with the state- 
 ment that if thev are to attend the religious education 
 class the card must be signed by the parents and re- 
 turned. 
 
 Page 4. "If parents refuse to give permission * * * 
 the children are excused from being present when re- 
 ligious education is taught, but are not excused from the 
 school property, nor from the supervision of the secular 
 teachers, so that the child is required under compulsion 
 and coercion of the rules * * : to attend either the re- 
 ligious education class or to do secular work, and be- 
 tween these two forms of compulsion the child is re- 
 quired to choose, and he may not be excused from com- 
 pulsory secular education except on the condition that 
 he participate in a class of religious education; and, 
 thereby, compulsory religious education is substituted 
 for compulsory secular education * * *". 
 
 The record shows that parents are not called upon to 
 "refuse to give permission" but are tendered the free 
 opportunity of electing that their children shall be re- 
 leased from attendance upon their public school classes 
 for the purpose of attending the religious education 
 classes. If they do not so elect, that ends the matter. 
 The record further shows, not that pupils "are excused 
 from being present when religious education is taught", 
 but that upon written request of their parents they are 
 permitted to take part therein. Still further, there is 
 not a syllable in this record to substantiate the conten- 
 tion that pupils are only released from school for at-
 
 38 
 
 tendance at religious education classes. The custom is 
 a universal one, of which the Court will take judicial 
 notice, that parents frequently have their children ex- 
 cused from public school classes for music lessons, danc- 
 ing classes, elocution lessons — even for travel — and for 
 necessary work around the home. Saying that religious 
 education classes are compulsory because if not elected, 
 the pupil continues with his public school classes, is a 
 mere play upon words. If relator's quoted statement 
 were correct, one might as truly say that when a child 
 is excused from school to go with his parents on a week's 
 vacation in Florida, that the vacation is compulsory. 
 
 There is not a scintilla of evidence that the religious 
 education classes are compulsory. They are in fact as 
 well as in theory purely voluntary. 
 
 Page 4. "The public school teachers adjust their sec- 
 ular work to the accommodation of the private teacher." 
 The record shows no such thing. It does not show, as 
 relator states, that the religious education teacher spends 
 the greater part of one day in one building. Neither does 
 it show that the public school teacher accommodates 
 herself to the convenience of the religious education 
 teacher. Just the reverse appears. The evidence is that 
 the religious education teacher goes to the principal of 
 each school and the teachers of classes and after con- 
 f erring with them, fits her schedule into the work of the 
 public school so as not to cause any interference. There 
 is not a syllable in the record to substantiate any other 
 conclusion. 
 
 Page 5. "The foregoing and many other doctrines and 
 beliefs are taught to pupils * * *." This, together with 
 other inferences contained on this page, are erroneous. 
 As the religious education teachers called by the relator 
 as her witnesses repeatedly stated, they do not teach
 
 39 
 
 doctrines and they do not teach beliefs, but only Bible 
 content. As pointed out elsewhere, they do not even 
 place interpretations upon these words of the Bible but 
 leave each child to make his own interpretations, based 
 upon his own religious beliefs and those of his parents. 
 Page 6. ' ' There during the first semester only he and 
 one other pupil of his class were denied permission by 
 their parents to take the course in religious education 
 * * *." As a matter of fact, the record shows no such 
 thing. It is not even suggested that James Terry made 
 application to his mother for leave to take the courses 
 at this time and Elwin Miller testified that he did not 
 desire to take the courses as he had special study to 
 do in connection with arithmetic in which he felt he was 
 behind. What is there to suggest that the parents of 
 either child denied permission to take the courses'? 
 
 Page 7. "During the second semester, the secular 
 teacher did not leave the classroom during the period 
 of religious education, but remained in the classroom 
 merely as an observer herself." The record shows that 
 Mrs. Taylor kept in contact with James Terry while he 
 was studying in the music room and attended upon him 
 at least as often as each ten minutes and that he was 
 left alone only because he worked better when there were 
 no others about to distract his attention. 
 
 Page 7. " * * * he became a kind of public exhibit to 
 teachers and occasional students using the corridor." 
 As we have discussed earlier, the record shows that he 
 was placed there for the purpose of studying at a reg- 
 ular desk and with no thought whatever of making of 
 him an "exhibit". 
 
 Page 7. "* * * James was placed alone in an empty 
 room, usually with the door closed, which treatment he 
 accepted as a kind of solitary confinement." There is
 
 40 
 
 nothing whatevei in the record to substantiate this char- 
 acterization of his use of the music room. He does not 
 say so; neither does the relator. What the relator con- 
 tends is that he was, unknown to Mrs. Taylor, afflicted 
 with claustrophobia. As soon as this was brought to 
 Mrs. Taylor's attention, the practice was discontinued. 
 Surely no normal child would have found working in the 
 music room for 30 minutes a week akin to any form of 
 punishment, least of all "solitary confinement". Else- 
 where in the relator's brief she freely characterizes the 
 music room as being " actually an empty ante-room to 
 the teachers' wash room". The record shows that the 
 entrance to the music room and the entrance to the 
 teachers' rest room were ?iear to each other. This fact 
 in no way makes the music room "an ante-room to a 
 teachers' wash room". Whatever the room was, it was 
 apparently the one in which music classes were regularly 
 held. Is James Terry so sensitive a child that the 
 proximity of the room in which he studied to the teach- 
 ers' rest room is another cause of embarrassment of 
 which his mother must complain? 
 
 Page 7. "James called himself an atheist but tried 
 to keep the matter secret from other students, although 
 it appeared he was unsuccessful in doing so altogether." 
 The record does not substantiate the contention that 
 James tried to keep his atheism secret from other stu- 
 dents or that he w T as unsuccessful therein. All that there 
 is on this subject is to be found in James Terry's state- 
 ment that after this suit was filed everyone knew he was 
 an atheist. James did not relate a single instance where 
 any child called him an atheist or where he was taunted 
 regarding his unbelief. Apparently even had such ref- 
 erence been made, it would not have troubled Terry. 
 Like his mother, he is militant in his atheism, proud of 
 the supposed intellectual superiority which it indicates
 
 41 
 
 and his non-conformity is a source of pleasure to him. 
 From the standpoint of this lawsuit, the important thing 
 is that the existence of the religious education classes 
 had nothing to do with any of Terry's troubles with 
 other children. 
 
 Page 9. "The purpose of the religious education 
 courses is to sell religion to children who may grow to 
 become church members and contributors, and who will 
 lend the strength and prestige of increased members to 
 the religious doctrines of those who promote the religious 
 education courses. ' ' Why this is included under the head- 
 ing "the Facts" is a little difficult to understand. There 
 is not one word in the record either directly or by indi- 
 rection which sustains any such thought. Its only im- 
 portance is to emphasize the enmity toward religion and 
 religious-minded people winch seems to have prompted 
 the relator in every phase of this case. Since there is 
 nothing in the evidence to substantiate it, we do not be- 
 lieve that the court will go out of its way to similarly 
 impugn or vilify the motives of the citizens of Cham- 
 paign who have had a part in carrying on these courses. 
 
 Page 9. "Persons who voluntarily contribute funds 
 and services to religious education of public schools do 
 so for the advancement of the religion of the donors 
 only.' ' The record is similarly silent upon this point 
 except that the impelling motive for starting these courses 
 was the solution of the problem of juvenile delinquency, 
 which was becoming more menacing in the community 
 at the time the courses were instituted. 
 
 We now turn from the facts in the case to a discussion 
 of the law applicable thereto.
 
 42 
 
 I. 
 
 The defendant Board of Education has the Statutory 
 Power to Excuse Pupils from Public School Attend- 
 ance for a Period of from Thirty to Forty-five Min- 
 utes each week to Attend Religious Education Classes. 
 
 The question of the Board of Education's statutory 
 power must be approached without confusing it with the 
 extravagant claims based upon supposed constitutional 
 rights, which claims honeycomb the relator's brief. 
 
 It is contended by the relator, at least by inference, that 
 the defendant Board of Education has no power to excuse 
 students from their public school work for a period of 
 from thirty to forty-five minutes a week in order to 
 attend classes in religious education. Great emphasis is 
 laid in relator's brief on the fact that students attending 
 the religious education classes do not receive the equiva- 
 lent amount of public school education because they are 
 not required to make up the time said to be lost by at- 
 tending such classes. Running through the brief there 
 is a supposition, rather than any outright statement, that 
 in some way the pupils attending the religious educa- 
 tion classes are thus deprived of something which the 
 statute requires them to receive in the way of public 
 school education. 
 
 At the outset it should be remembered that the students 
 attending the religious education classes are excused 
 from public school classes at the request ot their parents. 
 These parents are not complaining that their children 
 are not required to "make up" any public school work 
 which the relator may believe such children miss. It 
 is axiomatic that the relator has no right to make the 
 complaint for such other parents. If they are satisfied
 
 43 
 
 that the religious education class justifies excusing their 
 children for the time necessary to attend such class, the 
 relator has no cause or legal ground to interfere with 
 the decision of such parents. 
 
 It is made the duty of the defendant Board of Educa- 
 tion by Section 6-25 (111. R. S. 1945, c. 122) "to establish 
 and keep in operation for at least eight months in each 
 year, and longer if practicable, a sufficient number of 
 free schools for the accommodation of all persons in 
 the district over the age of six and under twenty-one 
 years and to secure for all such persons the right and 
 opportunity to an equal education in such schools". 
 
 It is to be noticed that no hours are specified. School 
 authorities traditionally have the power to determine the 
 hours of school sessions and the grounds for excusing 
 attendance during such school hours. 
 
 The statute apparently relied upon by the relator (111. 
 R. S. 1945, c. 122, Section 26-1) is the so-called "truancy 
 statute", which requires, with certain exceptions, that 
 "whoever has custody or control of any child between the 
 ages of seven and sixteen years shall cause such child 
 to attend some public school in the district wherein the 
 child resides the entire time it is in session; * * *". 
 Children attending private or parochial schools meeting 
 certain qualifications are excepted and among the other 
 exceptions are "any child over twelve and under four- 
 teen years of age while in attendance at confirmation 
 classes". 
 
 This statute has not been construed, but obviously is 
 directed not to the Board of Education to compel it to 
 keep the public schools in session any particular length 
 of time, but is directed to persons having custody or 
 control of children to compel attendance . during the 
 entire time that the schools are in session. We have
 
 44 
 
 seen that the only instructions to a board of education 
 are to maintain schools "for at least eight months in 
 each year, and longer if practicable", without specifying 
 the hours. Neither the truancy statute nor the school law 
 purports to direct boards of education as to the number 
 of hours of school that they shall provide, nor to control 
 their discretion in that matter in any way. It is obvious 
 that the truancy statute, containing as it does, penalties 
 addressed only to the parents, was intended to apply to 
 parents and not to boards of education. Certainly both 
 statutes were passed in the light of well-recognized cus- 
 toms of excusing children at the request of parents for 
 activities deemed by the parents sufficient to justify such 
 excuse, as, for example, music lessons, dancing classes, 
 play practice, and even travel. 
 
 The law is that parents have the right to control and 
 direct the education of their children so long as it does 
 not interfere with the education of others. The United 
 States Supreme Court has held that this right to control 
 and direct the education of children is protected against 
 infringement by state action by the Fourteenth Amend- 
 ment to the Federal Constitution. 
 
 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 69 L. ed. 
 1070, frequently referred to as the "Oregon school case", 
 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a statute of 
 the State of Oregon requiring all children from 8 to 16 
 years of age to attend the public schools, thus, in effect, 
 abolishing all private and parochial schools. In its 
 opinion, the Court held (p. 534) that the statute "un- 
 reasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
 guardians to direct the upbringing and education of chil- 
 dren under their control". 
 
 Continuing, the court said (p. 535) : 
 
 "As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaran-
 
 45 
 
 teecl by the Constitution may not be abridged by 
 legislation which has no reasonable relation to some 
 purpose within the competency of the state. The 
 fundamental theory of liberty upon which all gov- 
 ernments in this Union repose excludes any general 
 power of the state to standardize its children by 
 forcing them to accept instruction from public teach- 
 ers only. The child is not the mere creature of the 
 state ; those who nurture him and direct his destiny 
 have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recog- 
 nize and prepare him for additional obligations." 
 
 This language is the subject of comment by an author- 
 ity on Church law, Carl Zollman, who in his work, "The 
 Relation of Church and State", says of this decision: 
 
 "This language is not limited in terms to such 
 as choose to send their children to some parochial 
 school. It may well apply to all parents in the land, 
 even those who send their children to a public 
 school. The statement by the court that the state 
 may not standardize its children by forcing them 
 'to accept instruction from public teachers only' 
 seems to fit the part-time religious day schools which 
 are now coming into existence. * * * Is it not en- 
 tirely reasonable to expect that it will hold that a 
 state cannot by a compulsory education law exclude 
 its public school children from part-time religious 
 day schools! Both systems of schools, each within 
 its own particular sphere of action, aim to accom- 
 plish the same purpose. The religious day schools 
 merely aim to take over part of the education of 
 the child which the public school system cannot per- 
 form in this country." 
 
 Laying to one side, as we must in considering the 
 present point, the fact that religious education classes 
 are held in the school buildings, the above authorities are 
 ample support for the absolute right of parents to direct 
 the excusing of their children from public school classes 
 to attend religious education classes. 
 
 If a parent has the money and the inclination he may
 
 46 
 
 without interference from the state send his child to a 
 private or parochial school where religion is taught. If 
 the state does not interfere with the parent's decision to 
 give his child a full time education of that type, how 
 may it interfere with the parent's decision to have his 
 child take thirty minutes or forty-five minutes a week 
 of religious instruction? The greater includes the lesser. 
 
 The Illinois Supreme Court is equally emphatic, as 
 the Supreme Court of the United States, in giving the 
 parent control of his child's education so long as it does 
 not interfere with the rights of others. 
 
 In Trustees of Schools v. The People ex rel. Van Allen, 
 87 111. 303, a case decided in 1887, the Supreme Court 
 held that high school authorities had no right to exclude 
 an applicant for admission on the ground that he could 
 not pass a satisfactory examination in grammar. The 
 boy's father brought a mandamus action to compel the 
 trustees to admit his son to the high school. He had 
 forbidden his son to study grammar and desired that 
 his son in high school should pursue no study which 
 necessitated previous knowledge of grammar. After re- 
 viewing the statutory powers and duties of school trus- 
 tees with respect to high schools, the Illinois Supreme 
 Court, in language peculiarly applicable to the present 
 relator's attempt to exclude the children of other parents 
 from the benefits of religious education classes, said (p. 
 307) : 
 
 "No parent has the right to demand that the 
 interests of the children of others shall be sacrificed 
 for the interests of his child; and he can not, con- 
 sequently, insist that his child shall be placed or kept 
 in particular classes, when by so doing others will be 
 retarded in the advancement they would otherwise 
 make; or that his child shall be taught studies not 
 in the prescribed course of the school, or be allowed 
 to use a text-book different from that decided to
 
 47 
 
 be used in the school, or that he shall be allowed 
 to adopt methods of study that interfere with others 
 in their studies. The rights of each are to be enjoyed 
 and exercised only with reference to the equal rights 
 of all others." 
 
 Turning to the case before it, the court continued (p. 
 308) : 
 
 "But no attempt has hitherto been made in this 
 State to deny, by law, all control by the parent over 
 the education of his child. Upon the contrary, the 
 policy of our law has ever been to recognize the 
 right of the parent to determine to what extent his 
 child shall be educated, during minority — presuming 
 that his natural affections and superior opportuni- 
 ties of knowing the physical and mental capabilities 
 and future prospects of his child, will insure the 
 adoption of that course which will most effectually 
 promote the child's welfare. The policy of the school 
 law is only to withdraw from the parent the right 
 to select the branches to be studied by the child, to 
 the extent that the exercise of that right would inter- 
 fere with the system of instruction prescribed for 
 the school, and its efficiency in imparting education 
 to all entitled to share in its benefits." 
 
 It is apparent from the foregoing quotations that the 
 right of a parent to have his child released for the pur- 
 pose of taking a religious education course is a lawful 
 right so long only as it does not interfere with the rights 
 of others. The fact that such religious education classes 
 may prevent the students who elect, with their parents' 
 permission, to attend such classes from spending pre- 
 cisely the same amount of time on their public school 
 work as that spent by pupils not electing to attend such 
 classes is no concern of the latter. The fact that the 
 former group of students is not required to make up 
 the time supposedly lost in the religious education classes 
 is not a matter about which the relator in this case may 
 complain.
 
 48 
 
 The intervenors (Mr. and Mrs. Elmer C. Bash and 
 their daughter Wanda), all of whom appeared as wit- 
 nesses on the trial of this case and are represented by 
 counsel in the presentation of this brief, respectfully 
 insist that they have the Constitutional right, which the 
 relator lias no right to thwart, that Wanda attend the 
 religious education classes in accordance with her own 
 wishes and the approval of her parents. 
 
 The self-governing functions of a board of education 
 and the broad discretion vested in it have been recog- 
 nized by the Illinois courts from the earliest days. As 
 early as 1858, in Board of School Inspectors of the City 
 of Peoria v. People ex rel. Henry Grove, 20 111. 526, the 
 Supreme Court of this state held (pp. 531-532) : 
 
 ' ' The Board of Inspectors are vested with a large 
 discretion in the performance of their important 
 duties, and the courts will not attempt to control 
 its exercise except in a palpable case, where a 
 plain violation of the law is manifested." 
 
 In the case cited the court held that the school board, 
 then known as the "Board of School Inspectors", had 
 the right to lay the district out into subdivisions and 
 require persons residing in such subdivisions to attend 
 the schools assigned thereto. There has been no devia- 
 tion by the courts in the allowance of wide discretion 
 to boards of education: 
 
 People v. City of Chicago, 278 111. 318, 326; 
 
 Segar v. Board of Education, 317 111. 418. 
 
 Since the evidence in the present case was heard, the 
 relator's counsel filed a petition for mandamus in the 
 Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, in behalf of 
 Ira Latimer, executive director of the Chicago Civil 
 Liberties Committee, (who signed the written "de- 
 mand" in paragraph 48 of the petition in the present 
 case) against the Chicago Board of Education, praying
 
 49 
 
 that the rule permitting the releasing of public school 
 pupils to attend religious education courses in nearby 
 churches be expunged. The Board of Education made a 
 motion to strike the petition on the ground that the 
 action of the Board in passing the rule was lawful. On 
 November 17, 1945, Judge Ulysses S. Schwartz, a very 
 able trial judge, granted the motion and dismissed the 
 petition. His ruling is persuasive on the first branch 
 of the present case and if followed effectually disposes 
 of the relator's contention that the present defendant, 
 Board of Education, has no power to release pupils 
 from the public school work to attend religious educa- 
 tion classes. 
 
 The compulsory education statute of the State of New 
 York is much like our own statute. The highest court 
 of that state held that the board of education had the 
 power to excuse pupils upon condition that they go to a 
 nearby church to receive religious instruction. The case 
 of People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N. Y. 195, 156 
 N. E. 663, bore the same title in the trial court and is 
 reported in 127 Misc. Rep. 135, 215 N. Y. Supp. 632. 
 
 Before the Appellate Division it is reported in 
 219 App. Div. 233, 219 N. Y. Supp. 189. It is significant 
 that the trial court consisting of one judge, the Appel- 
 late Division consisting of five judges, and the Court of 
 Appeals of New York, the highest court of that state, 
 consisting of seven judges (including the late Benjamin 
 N. Cardozo) were unanimous in denying an application 
 for a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the State 
 Commissioner of Education to order the school authori- 
 ties of the City of White Plains to discontinue a school 
 regulation whereby public school children were excused 
 one-half hour in each week, at the request of their 
 parents and before the termination of the regular school 
 period, to enable them to receive religious instruction in 
 church schools.
 
 50 
 
 As is frequently the case, the opinion of the court of 
 last resort is less elaborate than the opinions of the 
 court below and we shall in this brief in certain instances 
 refer to all three opinions. 
 
 Section 621 of the Education Law of the State of New 
 York, there involved, required that every child within 
 the compulsory school age in proper physical and mental 
 condition "should regularly attend upon instruction for 
 the entire time during which the schools of said city 
 or district are in session" (Consolidated Laws of N. Y., 
 chap. 16, sec. 621). 
 
 In the trial court the petitioner asserted that although 
 the hours of opening and closing the schools was not 
 fixed by law, the mandate of the statute requiring at- 
 tendance upon instruction "for the entire time during 
 which the schools shall be in session" was absolute (215 
 N. Y T . Supp. 635). The trial court overruled this conten- 
 tion in the following language (215 N. Y. Supp. 632, 
 at p. 637) : 
 
 "The intent and purpose of the Compulsory Edu- 
 cation Law was to require instruction in the specific 
 subjects for a school term of minimum school days, 
 and enforce attendance, subject to the exceptions of 
 the law, during the time schools shall be in session. 
 If attendance is had for the required time, subject 
 to and within reasonable regulations of the school 
 authorities, and instruction is adequately and ap- 
 propriately given, there is a compliance with the 
 law. 
 
 "The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
 those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
 the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize 
 and prepare him for additional obligations. Pierce 
 v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus 
 and Mary, 45 S. Ct. 571, 268 U. S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 
 39 A.L.K 468. 
 
 "The board of White Plains, or any school board,
 
 51 
 
 and the commissioner, in their exercise of discre- 
 tion, in the determination that a rule, which accedes 
 to the request of parents to excuse their children 
 30 minutes a week for religious instruction, consti- 
 tutes an absence not amounting to irregular attend- 
 ance in the fair meaning of the term, may properly 
 give consideration for their guidance and sound 
 judgment to the utterance of the United States Su- 
 preme Court, above referred to, and to the appeal- 
 ing weight of the following propositions: 
 
 "That the right of the parent to direct the train- 
 ing and nurture of the child is a fundamental right ; 
 that the obligations of citizenship require the pro- 
 motion of a spirit of patriotic and civic service and 
 the fostering in children of moral as well as intel- 
 lectual qualities; that religious conscience, convic- 
 tion, and accountability are the least dispensable 
 foundations for good citizenship and patriotism; 
 that moral growth and intellectual growth go hand 
 in hand to make the essential elements of char- 
 acter and good citizenship; that the right of the 
 state to enforce school attendance does not mean 
 that the mental and moral development of all chil- 
 dren must be limited to a common mold and that all 
 children must be standardized; that the regulation 
 does not create a union between church and state, or 
 teach any sectarianism in the schools, or invade the 
 religious freedom or conscience of any individual." 
 
 In the Appellate Division the petitioner renewed his 
 contention that the compulsory school law required at- 
 tendance during every hour that school was in session, 
 and the Appellate Division likewise rejected said conten- 
 tion, saying in part (219 N. Y. Supp. 189, at p. 194) : 
 
 "It would be a narrow construction that required 
 every child, physically able, aged from 7 to 14 years, 
 to attend a public school every hour of every day 
 the school was in session. It would impose upon chil- 
 dren of tender years conditions as drastic and rig- 
 orous as those of military law and discipline. In 
 some localities, with insufficient school accommoda- 
 tions, there are double sessions for different chil-
 
 52 
 
 dren each day. The construction contended for 
 would require all children to attend both sessions. 
 There are occasions when it is imperative that the 
 parents have their children home for assistance. 
 There are other occasions when they require their 
 absence from school because of church or civic cele- 
 brations, or purely for pleasure, that the family 
 may be gathered together. It is to the credit of 
 school authorities that children are readily excused 
 on such occasions, and no one has deemed it a vio- 
 lation of the law." 
 
 The holdings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals 
 which made the significant remark (156 N. E. 663, at p. 
 664): 
 
 "Practical administration of the public schools 
 calls for some elasticity in this regard and vests 
 some discretion in the school authorities. Neither 
 the Constitution nor the law discriminates against 
 religion. Denominational religion is merely put in 
 its proper place outside of public aid or support. 
 As a matter of educational policy, the commissioner 
 doubtless may make proper regulations to restrict 
 the local authorities when the administration of the 
 plan of week-day instruction in religion or any plan 
 of outside instruction in lay subjects in his judg- 
 ment interferes unduly with the regular work of the 
 school. ' ' 
 
 There are some differences between the Constitution 
 of the State of New York and the Constitution of the 
 State of Illinois which differences it will be necessary 
 to notice later in passing upon other contentions 
 by the relator. The school laws, however, are so similar 
 that the decision of the highest court of the State of 
 New York that the matter of excusing pupils to take 
 religious instruction is a matter for the sound discre- 
 tion of the school board should clear the atmosphere in 
 the present case of the inference and implication that 
 somewhere, lurking in the statute, is a requirement that
 
 53 
 
 pupils must attend public school classes every minute 
 of every day that school is in session. 
 
 There is no statute attempting to control the discretion 
 of the board of education to whom matters of school 
 administration are wisely committed and we have con- 
 fidence that the Court will not undertake to substitute 
 its judgment for that of the elective board of education. 
 
 II. 
 
 The Existence of these Voluntary Religious Education 
 Classes does not Violate any Right of Religious Free- 
 dom Guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Con- 
 stitution of the United States or by Article 2, Section 
 3 of the Constitution of the State of Illinois. 
 
 A great deal is said in the relator's brief about the 
 "separation of church and state". This is a term which 
 has the great advantage of meaning exactly what the 
 user intends it to mean. However, for the same reason 
 it lacks accuracy. In no event is it a rule of legal 
 decision. To determine what sort of separation the state 
 
 asm 
 
 has from the church we must examine the constitutional 
 provisions, Federal and State, relating to the church. 
 As we point out in the first part of Point III of our 
 argument which follows, there is no justification for say- 
 ing that religion and government are inimical each to 
 the other. The separation is a separation of institutions 
 or organizations and not a separation of religious be- 
 liefs or practices from the state. 
 
 The shibboleth "separation of church and state" must, 
 therefore, be viewed with suspicion. It must be viewed 
 with suspicion not because any of us disagrees with 
 what we believe the term to connote, but because ideas 
 foreign to the term may by plays upon words distort the 
 true meaning of the doctrine.
 
 54 
 
 To determine what the doctrine means as applied to 
 the present case we must examine the constitutional pro- 
 visions which implement the theory of separation of 
 church and state. If the present program does not vio- 
 late these constitutional provisions, — and we assert with 
 confidence that it does not — then the program is law- 
 ful and the court must not interfere with it. 
 
 The relator charges by her complaint and argues with 
 vehemence in her brief that the existence of voluntary 
 courses in religious education given in the Champaign 
 school buildings violates her constitutional rights of re- 
 ligious freedom. It is well at the outset to examine care- 
 fully not only the facts in the present case to see whether 
 they constitute any actual violation of religious freedom, 
 but also the language of the constitutional provisions 
 claimed to be violated. 
 
 The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
 being part of the Bill of Rights, provides: 
 
 "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab- 
 lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer- 
 cise thereof; * * *" 
 
 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con- 
 stitution of the United States provides in part: 
 
 "* * * No State shall make or enforce any law 
 which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
 the citizens of the United States ; nor shall any State 
 deprive any person of life, liberty or property, 
 without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
 within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
 laws. ' ' 
 
 The relator attempts by a play upon the words, " re- 
 specting an establishment of religion", to enlarge the 
 religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution of 
 the State of Illinois, but we shall show that the free-
 
 55 
 
 dom of religion guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 
 is no greater and is of no different quality than that 
 guaranteed to the citizens of the State of Illinois by 
 Article II, Section 3, of the Constitution of Illinois 
 which provides : 
 
 "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious 
 profession and worship, without discrimination, 
 shall forever be guaranteed; and no person shall 
 be denied any civil or political right, privilege or 
 capacity on account of his religious opinions ; * * *. 
 No person shall be required to attend or support any 
 ministry or place of worship against his consent, 
 nor shall any preference be given by law to any 
 religious denomination or mode of worship." 
 
 At the outset the question naturally arises, how can 
 one who espouses no religious belief, who denies the 
 existence of a Supreme Being and who places her re- 
 liance upon a political principle, namely, separation of 
 church and state rather than upon religious scruples, 
 invoke a guaranty of religious freedom? We first ad- 
 dress ourselves to the solution of that question. 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States in Beason v. 
 Davis, 133 U. S. 333, 33 L. ed. 637, has defined religion 
 as follows (p. 345) : 
 
 "The term 'religion' has reference to one's views 
 of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations 
 they impose of reverence for his being and char- 
 acter, and of obedience to his will. It is often con- 
 founded with the cultus or form of worship of a 
 particular sect, but is distinguishable from the 
 latter." 
 
 The Supreme Court of Illinois in a case involving 
 freedom of religious institutions from taxation, People 
 v. Deutsche Gemeinde, 249 111. 132, said (p. 136-137) : 
 
 "While religion, in its broadest sense, includes 
 all forms and phases of belief in the existence of
 
 56 
 
 superior beings capable of exercising power over 
 the human race, yet in the common understanding 
 and in its application to the people of this State it 
 means the formal recognition of God as members 
 of societies and associations. As applied to the 
 uses of property, a religious purpose means a use of 
 such property by a religious society or body of per- 
 sons as a stated place for public worship, Sunday 
 schools and religious instruction." 
 
 Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 
 defines religion as follows: 
 
 "The service and adoration of God or a god as 
 expressed in forms of worship, in obedience to 
 divine commands, esp. as found in accepted sacred 
 writings or as declared by recognized teachers and 
 in the pursuit of a way of life regarded as in- 
 cumbent on true believers; as ministers of religion." 
 
 These definitions, which excludes atheism as religion, 
 will require little further authority for their support in 
 view of the relator's adoption of the definition at pages 
 27-28 of her brief where she says, perhaps unwittingly, 
 (as unwittingly as her swearing to the complaint in this 
 case after alleging that she did not believe in Almighty 
 God): 
 
 "Religion, generally and briefly, is belief in exist- 
 ence of God or Gods, and belief in relationship be- 
 tween mankind and God, or gods, which believed 
 relationship involves dependence, worship, duties, 
 etc., on the part of man. Religion is not synonymous 
 with law, morality or ethics and the believed rela- 
 tionship is not the same as relationship between man 
 and man. Webster's Dictionary 'religion', 'ethics', 
 'morality' and 'law'. 
 
 " 'The term "religion" has reference to one's 
 views of his relation to his Creator, and to the obli- 
 gations they impose of reverence for his being and 
 character and of obedience to his will.' Davis v. 
 Beason (1890), 133 U.S. 333 at 342."
 
 57 
 
 We accept her definition and believe that as that defi- 
 nition is applied here it does not, as she must suppose 
 in quoting it in her brief, advance her case, but that, in 
 fact, it destroys it. 
 
 If one denies the existence of such a relationship be- 
 tween God and man, as does the relator, he has no re- 
 ligion and obviously cannot be impaired in the free exer- 
 cise thereof. As well might a person without property 
 complain that he has had it taken without due process. 
 The first thing that a citizen must do who desires to have 
 the government protect his property is to acquire some 
 for it to protect and likewise the first thing that a person 
 must do who desires to invoke the government's pro- 
 tection of his religion is to acquire one. This Mrs. Mc- 
 Collum has failed to do. So far as Mrs. McCollum is 
 concerned, she is seeking to protect an interest — religious 
 freedom — when she has no religion. How can one with- 
 out religion complain of lack of religious freedom? Is 
 she not, like her son, influenced too much by the bellig- 
 erent man (her father) who said from the witness stand 
 that the President of the United States was a coward 
 in asking the American people to offer prayers of thanks- 
 giving for our victory? 
 
 As stated by the Supreme Court in Hatch v. Reardon, 
 204 U.S. 152, 51 L, ed. 415, at p. 160: 
 
 "* * * unless the party setting up the unconsti- 
 tutionality of the state law belongs to the class for 
 whose sake the constitutional protection is given, 
 or the class primarily protected, this court does 
 not listen to his objections, and will not go into 
 imaginary cases, notwithstanding the seeming logic 
 of the position that it must do so, because if, for any 
 reason, or as against any class embraced, the law is 
 unconstitutional, it is void as to all."
 
 58 
 
 The Court further said in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 
 U.S. 610, 59 L. ed. 390 (at p. 621) : 
 
 "Only those whose rights are directly affected 
 can properly question the constitutionality of a state 
 statute, and invoke our jurisdiction in respect 
 thereto." 
 
 Even though it were conceded that unbelief in religion 
 is a religion itself, which is a hit too indigestible to 
 stomach, this case is still moot for here she com- 
 plains, not upon religious, but upon political grounds. 
 Lastly, the relator has wholly failed to show any in- 
 fringement of her rights. No one has impaired or inter- 
 fered in any way with her freedom to be an atheist. 
 She was one before the religious education classes were 
 instituted. She is one now. The same is true of James 
 Terry. No one requires her or her son to enroll in these 
 classes. If they enter, no one tells them atheism is 
 wrong. No one seeks to change their belief. Except as 
 their unbelief may be dispelled by being exposed to 
 the words of the Bible, it remains the same. Is their 
 unbelief so shallow, so unsure, so frail, that it will not 
 stand before acquaintanceship with the Bible? If so, 
 they are under no compulsion to expose themselves to 
 the light. 
 
 But she says my son and I, we are the victims of 
 social pressure. What a baseless, unfounded charge! 
 What social pressure? The record shows one in five 
 in grade school and four in five in Junior High School 
 resisted this supposed social pressure last year. Not 
 one of those who testified in this case, and for all that 
 appears, not one of the whole number who did not par- 
 ticipate, felt the slightest coercion to participate or 
 embarrassment at not participating. Those who do not 
 participate are motivated by many reasons. Most are
 
 59 
 
 church members. Some do not attend because there are 
 other elective subjects which appeal to them more. 
 Some get all the knowledge of religion which they wish 
 from other sources. Some are too interested in, or be- 
 hind in, their regular subjects to spare the time. One, 
 namely, James Terry, is an atheist and desires to avoid 
 exposure to the courses because of his atheism. The 
 bare statement of these facts discloses how unsubstan- 
 tial is the claim that social pressure is exerted by the 
 existence of the courses. Boys and girls who do not 
 enroll in the courses fall into a conglomerate mass. 
 Failure to participate stamps no one an atheist, dis- 
 closes no religious scruples, assigns no reason. 
 
 If either the relator or her son has felt anything which 
 they interpreted as social pressure, it must have been 
 the still small voice of conscience or the result of their 
 own proclamations of their unbelief. It was not the 
 result of the presence of the classes in the school build- 
 ing, but the fact that they chose to make a parade and 
 display of their atheism. The law cannot protect people 
 against the social consequences of their atheism. What 
 it can and does protect against is discrimination by the 
 law and the government. When that duty is fulfilled, the 
 social consequences of pursuing a course belong just as 
 certainly to the individual as does the right in the first 
 instance to make a choice between atheism and religion. 
 
 In her brief the relator attempts to enlarge the con- 
 stitutional prohibition against restriction of religious 
 freedom by contending that the word "establishment" 
 as used in the First Amendment to the Federal Consti- 
 tution refers to the creation or formation of a belief, 
 rather than to an institution (Brief, pp. 28-29). Having 
 argued that this is the meaning of the word, she insists 
 that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Com
 
 60 
 
 stitution has made the First Amendment binding upon 
 the state so that anything which the state does itself or 
 through its agency to recognize religion (not limiting 
 herself to any sect of religion) is unconstitutional. 
 
 Obviously, the First Amendment to the Federal Con- 
 stitution uses the term, " establishment of religion", as 
 referring to an institution as distinguished from a mental 
 process. The makers of the Constitution were familiar 
 with the political battle in England over the attempt to 
 dis-establish the Anglican Church as the Church of 
 England. 
 
 The meaning to be given to the First Amendment was 
 decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 84 L. ed. 1213. 
 That case was a prosecution for violation of a state stat- 
 ute requiring licenses of persons soliciting money or 
 other valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable 
 or philanthropic cause. The defendants were members 
 of a group known as Jehovah's Witnesses. The Su- 
 preme Court of the United States, speaking by Mr. 
 Justice Roberts, said (p. 303-304) : 
 
 ''We hold that the statute, as construed and ap- 
 plied to the appellants, deprives them of their lib- 
 erty without due process of law in contravention of 
 the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental con- 
 cept of liberty embodied in that Amendment em- 
 braces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amend- 
 ment. The First Amendment declares that Con- 
 gress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
 of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
 The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legis- 
 latures of the states as incompetent as Congress to 
 enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of 
 legislation on the subject of religion has a double 
 aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion 
 by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice 
 of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
 
 61 
 
 freedom to adhere to such religious organization 
 or form of worship as the individual may choose 
 cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it 
 safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of 
 religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two con- 
 cepts, — freedom to believe and freedom to act. The 
 first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
 second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regu- 
 lation for the protection of society." 
 
 In the language quoted, the Court interprets the pro- 
 visions of the First Amendment relating to "the estab- 
 lishment of religion" as meaning that "it forestalls 
 compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or 
 practice of any form of worship". As thus interpreted, 
 the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution raises 
 no other or different question than the freedom-of-wor- 
 ship provision of the Illinois Constitution. 
 
 In connection with this discussion of the rights of the 
 relator it is interesting to compare the supposed injury 
 which the relator suffers before any relief is granted her, 
 with the injury to other members of the community, 
 should the relief which she seeks be granted. 
 
 Now, her son is exposed to the opportunity of studying 
 religion in the public school he attends. This, so she 
 says, submits him to social pressure to participate, 
 which if he yields will result in converting him to a 
 belief in religion, which she wishes to avoid. If on the 
 other hand the relief she seeks . is granted, at least 800 
 pupils, who now desire to study religion on an educa- 
 tional level, will be deprived of this opportunity. In 
 other words, to protect one person without religion from 
 temptation to partake of it, it is proposed to prevent 800 
 persons, who do have a religion, from practicing it. That 
 is a strange application indeed of the constitutional guar- 
 antees of religious freedom. To such lengths does par- 
 tisanship lead.
 
 62 
 
 It is an indication of the weakness of the relator's 
 position that in all of her search for authority, not one 
 case in point has been found. Rather, she has grasped 
 at the Ring case (People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Edu- 
 cation, 245 111. 334) and relies almost entirely upon it. 
 Her attorney admitted on the trial that the complaint 
 was patterned after that case — no doubt the reason that 
 the actual facts in the present case do not conform to 
 the allegations of the complaint. Because so much re- 
 liance has been placed upon it, we will discuss it at 
 length. 
 
 The case arose in Scott County, Illinois, in 1910. In 
 accordance with the practice then generally followed, the 
 school in question was opened with religious exercises 
 which consisted of scripture reading from the King 
 James version of the Bible, repetition of the King 
 James version of the Lord's Prayer while standing with 
 bowed heads, and the singing of Protestant hymns. 
 All of this was conducted by the public school teacher, 
 while the children were enrolled in and attending the 
 public school. Participation in these exercises was com- 
 pulsory. Five parents who were Roman Catholic com- 
 municants and who had children attending the school 
 filed a petition for mandamus. The contention was 
 made that the exercises were unconstitutional for the fol- 
 lowing reasons: 
 
 1. The compulsory participation of the pupils de- 
 prived them of the freedom of worship guaranteed 
 by the Constitution. 
 
 2. The exercises were sectarian in nature and being 
 an integral part of the school program, violated 
 the constitutional prohibition against payment of 
 public funds for sectarian purposes. 
 
 The Court, in an extremely argumentative, 19 page 
 opinion, including much dicta not necessary to the de-
 
 63 
 
 cision, arrived at what we deem to be a correct decision 
 on the facts before it. However, as stated, the Court 
 voiced its opinion upon a great many matters not before 
 it and not argued by counsel. This dicta, of course, does 
 not serve as any guiding rule for this Court. In order 
 to separate the wheat from the chaff that is the part 
 of the decision which is a binding precedent from that 
 which is mere obiter dicta,. — we point out the following 
 differences between the Ring case and our case : 
 
 In the Ring case : 
 
 1. The relators were mem- 
 bers of an organized 
 church, professing be- 
 lief in a religion. 
 
 2. The exercises com- 
 plained of were part of 
 the school program car- 
 ried on while the chil- 
 dren participating were 
 in attendance at the 
 public school. 
 
 3. The exercises com- 
 plained of were con- 
 ducted by teachers em- 
 ployed by the school di- 
 rectors at public expense 
 and all expenses con- 
 nected therewith were 
 paid directly from pub- 
 lic funds. 
 
 4. The exercises com- 
 plained of were actual- 
 ly worship services in- 
 cluding repetition of the 
 Lord's Prayer and sing- 
 ing of hymns. 
 
 In our case : 
 
 The relator is a member 
 of no church, professes 
 belief in no religion and 
 is in fact an avowed 
 atheist. 
 
 The religious education 
 classes here attacked 
 are unconnected with 
 the school program and 
 the pupils are excused 
 from attendance at the 
 public school while at- 
 tending the classes. 
 
 The religious education 
 classes are conducted by 
 teachers employed by 
 the cooperating churches 
 and all expenses in con- 
 nection therewith are 
 borne by the churches. 
 
 The religious education 
 courses are on an edu- 
 cational level, are not 
 worship services, and do 
 not include prayers or 
 singing of hymns.
 
 64 
 
 5. Participation in these 5. Participation in the re- 
 exercises was compul- ligious education classes 
 sory. is wholly voluntary. 
 
 6. Embarrassment and so- 6. Embarrassment and so- 
 cial pressure on non- cial pressure are affirm- 
 participants was pre- atively shown not to 
 sumed. exist. 
 
 The comments of the court in the Ring case to the 
 effect that even a voluntary system would invade re- 
 ligious liberty because it would set apart those not 
 participating obviously referred to a compulsory sys- 
 tem from which pupils might be excused. The court 
 was not in its comments referring to a purely volun- 
 tary system in which participation is limited to those 
 who elect to participate and under which no excuses 
 for non-participation are required or expected. 
 
 When one says that the two cases, the one here to be 
 decided and the Ring case, both are mandamus actions 
 and both involve schools and religion, their actual, 
 similarities are fully stated. From there on the cases 
 are chiefly notable for their differences. Clearly noth- 
 ing that is said in the Ring case about the rights of 
 members of organized churches or religions with ref- 
 erence to religious freedom, religious exercises as a 
 part of the public school program, expenditure of pub- 
 lic money for sectarian purposes, the impropriety of 
 worship services being held in the public school, and 
 compulsory participation in such services, has any ap- 
 plication to our case, because none of these elements 
 are present in our case. Just as clearly nothing that the 
 court said regarding voluntary participation in such 
 exercises or the rights of atheists constitute any part 
 of the precedent established by the decision, for these 
 matters were not involved in the Ring case and were 
 purely obiter dicta.
 
 65 
 
 Nevertheless the relator wants to take this case, which 
 was different on every material point, and extend its 
 effect so far that what was forged as buttress and 
 armor for religious people in the practice and profes- 
 sion of their religion would become a sword in the hands 
 of an atheist to cripple them in such practice and pro- 
 fession. It will not stretch so, but will break and crumble 
 in her hands. 
 
 The unsoundness of the position of the relator in 
 contending that the presence of these courses in the 
 public school building is a violation of her own and her 
 son's religious liberty, which she says arises from the 
 fact that religious differences are thus pointed out 
 and segregation, ostracism and embarrassment result, 
 is demonstrated by the ridiculous conclusion to which 
 this line of argument leads. 
 
 There are many other activities in connection with the 
 operation of a school which have always been recognized 
 as finding their proper place in the school and without 
 which the function of education could hardly be car- 
 ried on, which much more pointedly underline and mark 
 religious differences. 
 
 For instance, it is the almost universal practice to 
 inculcate respect for the nation's flag and respect for 
 and acquaintance with the nation's anthem by flag exer- 
 cises and singing of the Star Spangled Banner, as well 
 as America and God Bless America. The Supreme 
 Court of the United States has recently held that per- 
 sons such as Jehovah's Witnesses having religious ob- 
 jections to saluting the flag must be excused therefrom. 
 This constitutes a reversal of the courts' previous hold- 
 ings and an extension or new application of the right 
 of religious liberty so far as the United States Su- 
 preme Court is concerned, but it simply amounts to hold-
 
 66 
 
 ing that the court was correct in the Ring case in hold- 
 ing that a compulsory exercise contrary to the religious 
 scruples of some might not be imposed upon them. 
 But are we to suppose that if a boy or girl of the 
 Jehovah's Witnesses sect or some other holding re- 
 ligious scruples against flag saluting objects thereto 
 that the court will not only say that they must be ex- 
 cused from the flag saluting exercises, but that the flag 
 exercise itself must be removed from the school to pre- 
 vent those not participating from having their religious 
 differences noted and being exposed to supposed segre- 
 gation, ostracism and embarrassment? 
 
 Further, are we to cease permitting, and in fact 
 encouraging, the singing of the national anthem and 
 America and God Bless America in our schools because 
 children of atheists will wish to be excused from doing 
 so, because these songs recognize the existence of God 
 and attribute to Him the blessings which we enjoy? 
 If we do not ban these songs from the school, the re- 
 lator's child and others like him will, according to the 
 relator, have their religious differences noted and will 
 be subjected to segregation, ostracism and embarrass- 
 ment. 
 
 Even the school cafeteria, an institution almost in- 
 separably tied up with our modern educational system, 
 must be eliminated for similar reasons because the Jew 
 must always refuse pork and the Catholic must fre- 
 quently, on Fridays and holy days, refuse all meat. 
 The question arises, must we eliminate all meat from 
 the menu to avoid putting children of Jewish and Cath- 
 olic religious beliefs to the embarrassment of declining 
 meat, or must we eliminate the entire cafeteria? 
 
 In all of these analogies which we suggest for the 
 Court's consideration, the failure to participate is al-
 
 67 
 
 most, if not wholly and always, upon religious grounds. 
 At any rate, it is much more often upon religious grounds 
 than is non-participation in the religious education 
 courses. And yet, even the relator will not be willing 
 to go as far with these analogies as the inexorable con- 
 sequences of her position and argument naturally and 
 certainly lead her. 
 
 The applicable Illinois authorities are sufficient to 
 destroy the relator's claim that the purely voluntary 
 system existing in Champaign is a denial of religious 
 freedom or is compulsory attendance at or compulsory 
 support of religious worship. 
 
 In Nichols v. School Directors, 93 111. 61, the com- 
 plainant sought an injunction to restrain defendants 
 from allowing the school house to be used as a religious 
 meeting house. The complainant contended that per- 
 mission granted to hold stated meetings in the school 
 house compelled complainant as a taxpayer to aid in 
 supporting a house of worship, and that the statute 
 permitting the temporary use of school houses for re- 
 ligious meetings was unconstitutional as a violation of 
 Article 2, Section 3 and of Article 8, Sections 2 and 3, 
 of the Illinois Constitution. 
 
 The Court held (p. 63) : 
 
 "It seems to us a very strained interpretation 
 to attempt to bring the present case within the 
 reach of either one of the above constitutional 
 
 provisions 
 
 ? ? 
 
 The court also said, in language which is peculiarly 
 appropriate here (pp. 63-64) : 
 
 "In what manner, from the holding of religious 
 meetings in the school house, complainant is going 
 to be compelled to aid in furnishing a house of 
 worship and for holding religious meetings, as he 
 complains in his bill, he does not show. We can
 
 68 
 
 only imagine that possibly, at some future time, 
 he might as a taxpayer be made to contribute to 
 the expense of repairs rendered necessary from 
 wear and use of the building in the holding of re- 
 ligious meetings. A single holding of a religious 
 meeting in the school house might, in that way, 
 cause damage in some degree to the building, upon 
 the idea that continual dropping wears away stone, 
 but the injury would be inappreciable. As re- 
 spects any individual pecuniary expense which might 
 be in this way involved, we think that considera- 
 tion may be properly disposed of under the maxim 
 de minimis, etc. 
 
 ''The thing contemplated by the constitutional 
 provision first above named was a prohibition upon 
 the legislature to pass any law by which a person 
 should be compelled without his consent to con- 
 tribute to the support of any ministry or place of 
 worship. 
 
 "Such a matter as the subject of complaint here, 
 we do not regard as within its purview. 
 
 "Religion and religious worship are not so placed 
 under the ban of the constitution that they may not 
 be allowed to become the recipient of any inci- 
 dental benefit whatsoever from the public bodies or 
 authorities of the State. That instrument itself con- 
 tains a provision authorizing the legislature to 
 exempt property used for religious purposes from 
 taxation; and thereby, the same as is complained 
 of here, there might be indirectly imposed upon 
 the taxpayer the burden of increased taxation, and 
 in that manner the indirect supporting of places 
 of worship. In the respect of the possibility of en- 
 hanced taxation therefrom, this provision of the 
 constitution itself is even more obnoxious to ob- 
 jection than this permission given by the school 
 directors to hold religious meetings in the school 
 house. There is no pretense that it is in any way 
 in interference with the occupation of the building 
 for school purposes. 
 
 >> 
 
 This case has been cited and followed by the Illinois 
 Supreme Court after the decision in the Ring case and
 
 69 
 
 therefore is the law of this state: Reichwald v. Catholic 
 Bishop, 258 111. 44, discussed and quoted under Point 
 III, below. 
 
 In McCormick v. Burt, 95 111. 263, decided by the 
 Supreme Court of Illinois in 1880, the court held in 
 favor of the defendants in a damage suit brought by a 
 pupil because of his suspension from the school for 
 refusal to obey a rule requiring maintenance of quiet 
 during fifteen minutes opening exercises every morning 
 when the teacher was permitted by the rule to read a 
 chapter from the King James version of the Bible. No 
 one was required to be present at or participate in 
 such exercises unless he chose to do so, but while such 
 exercises were being conducted every pupil present was 
 required to lay aside his books and remain quiet. The 
 plaintiff alleged that he was a Catholic and that the rule 
 was void as interfering with his religious convictions 
 and that he had been suspended for pursuing his usual 
 studies, without noise or disturbance, during the exer- 
 cises. The Court held that in the absence of an allega- 
 tion of wanton and malicious conduct, the plaintiff could 
 not recover and that a demurrer was properly sus- 
 tained to plaintiff's complaint. Although basing its de- 
 cision on that ground, the Court did not in any way 
 intimate any criticism of the rule. The case is valuable 
 for that reason and also as showing the actual practice 
 of a board of education in a district located in Liv- 
 ingston County, Illinois, as early as sixty-five years ago. 
 
 In Millard v. Board of Education, 121 111. 297, decided 
 in 1887, plaintiff brought a bill to enjoin the defendant, 
 Board of Education, from renting the basement of a 
 Catholic Church for use as a school. The evidence showed 
 that the Board had hired members of the church ex- 
 clusively as teachers, that the children of Catholio
 
 70 
 
 parents and the teachers were required to assemble in 
 the church on all school days by eight o'clock a. m. and 
 have mass said to them by the priest of the congrega- 
 tion until half past eight o'clock; that the pupils and 
 teachers then went to the schoolroom in the basement 
 and engaged in religious instruction until nine o'clock 
 a. m., when common school exercises were commenced 
 and continued until twelve o'clock when the Angelas 
 prayer was said by pupils and teachers. The Court 
 held (p. 302), that since it was not claimed that re- 
 ligious instruction in the schoolroom or the attendance 
 at church before school convened was directed, ordered 
 or required by the Board of Education, such portion of 
 the bill stated no ground for relief. In this connection 
 the Court said significantly (p. 302) : 
 
 "Nor is it claimed that complainant's children 
 are required, against his will or desire, to attend 
 any religious or sectarian instruction in the school." 
 
 As to the allegation that the Angelus prayer was said 
 by pupils and teachers at noon, the Court commented 
 (p. 302) that "so far as appears, it is a mere voluntary 
 matter among teachers and scholars, which in no man- 
 ner injures complainant." 
 
 The injunction prayed by the complainant that the 
 school board be enjoined "from in any manner main- 
 taining, supporting or conducting a public school in 
 such church basement, or expending any of the school 
 funds of said district for that purpose" was denied. 
 
 In North v. Board of Trustees of the University of 
 Illinois, 137 111. 296, decided in 1891, the Supreme Court 
 of Illinois denied a writ of mandamus sought by a 
 former student of the University to compel his read- 
 mission to the university without requiring him to obey 
 a rule that all students attend chapel each morning. It
 
 71 
 
 appeared from the petition that it was the daily practice 
 in chapel services for one of the members of the faculty 
 to read a portion of the New Testament and repeat the 
 Lord's Prayer. There was also the singing of religious 
 hymns, and occasionally a brief morning talk. It fur- 
 ther appeared that while a student, the complainant had 
 refused to attend such chapel services on the ground 
 stated by him to the faculty that compulsory attend- 
 ance was prohibited by the Constitution of the State of 
 Illinois, that he had no objection to attending chapel 
 except the religious services, but that the ''legitimate 
 business of the chapel meetings" was so connected with 
 those religious services that it was impossible to attend 
 the one and not the other. The faculty refused to accept 
 such statement as an excuse and called upon him to sign 
 a written request to the faculty to be excused from 
 chapel exercises stating that such exercises were re- 
 pugnant to his convictions and in violation of what he 
 conceived to be his rights of conscience. He declined to 
 sign the petition because as he then stated: "I have no 
 religious convictions whatever for the chapel exercises 
 to be repugnant to; and second, because by signing it I 
 would be admitting that the faculty has the legal right 
 to compel attendance upon chapel services, which I 
 deny. ' ' 
 
 He offered an argument, also, to the effect that the 
 rule was in violation of Article 2, Section 3, of the Illi- 
 nois Constitution. Thereafter he was expelled from the 
 university and four years later he filed an application 
 for readmission, which was denied. Thereupon he 
 brought the mandamus suit. The Court held that peti- 
 tioner's contention that he was compelled to attend a 
 place of worship was untenable. In the course of its 
 opinion the court said (pp. 304-305) : 
 
 "It certainly will not be insisted that the rule
 
 72 
 
 requiring students to attend chapel exercises is 
 unreasonable or unlawful as applied to those who 
 are willing to obey it. The legality of the rule is 
 questioned on the sole ground that it violates that 
 clause of section 3 of article 2 of the constitution of 
 this State which says, 'No person shall be required 
 to attend or support any ministry or place of wor- 
 ship against his consent.' It is* not pretended by 
 the petitioner that the exercises at the chapel meet- 
 ings were sectarian, and therefore objectionable, but 
 the only objection to those exercises was and is, 
 that they were in part religious worship, within the 
 meaning of the above quoted language of the con- 
 stitution. In the view we take of the case that fact 
 may be conceded. The real question on this branch 
 of the case is, was it a violation of that constitu- 
 tional provision for respondents to adopt the rule, 
 and require obedience thereto by those attending the 
 university, unless excused therefrom. There is cer- 
 tainly nothing in this section of our constitution 
 prohibiting _ this and like institutions of learning 
 from adopting reasonable rules requiring their stu- 
 dents to attend chapel exercises of a religious na- 
 ture, and to use at least moral suasion andall argu- 
 mentative influences to induce obedience thereto. It 
 is a well known fact that such institutions do gen- 
 erally adopt similar regulations, and that, with rare 
 exceptions, those attending them yield cheerful 
 obedience thereto, regardless of their personal views 
 on the subject of religion. Many esteem it a priv- 
 ilege to be allowed to attend such exercises. Parents 
 placing their children in colleges and universities 
 often desire that they shall be brought under such 
 influences. Shall a court say such a requirement is, 
 in and of itself, a violation of said constitutional 
 provision, merely because some one or more stu- 
 dents attending the university may object to obeying 
 it? More especially, should this be done when, as is 
 here shown by the answer, the rules expressly pro- 
 vide that for good cause students may be excused 
 from obedience to such regulation? We have said 
 in construing this section of the constitution: 'Re- 
 ligion and religious worship are not so far placed 
 under the ban of the constitution that they may not
 
 73 
 
 be allowed to become recipients of any incidental 
 benefit whatever from the public school bodies or 
 authorities of the State.' (Nichols v. School Di- 
 rectors, 93 111. 61.)" 
 
 The court further concluded (p. 307) : 
 
 "His expulsion was the result of his own wrong. 
 Neither the respondents nor the faculty have been 
 guilty of a violation of law or the doing of any 
 wrong." 
 
 The cases just cited are ample authority for the volun- 
 tary system of religious education attacked here. 
 
 III. 
 
 The Defendant Board of Education has Not Made 
 "Any Appropriation" or paid "Anything in Aid of 
 any Church or Sectarian Purpose", Nor has it 
 Granted or Donated any "Land, Money, or other 
 Personal Property" "To any Church or for any Sec- 
 tarian Purposes." 
 
 The relator contends that the incidental use of the 
 school buildings by the religious education classes con- 
 stitutes a violation of Article VIII, Section 3 of the 
 Constitution of the State of Illinois and of Chapter 122 
 Section 15-14, Illinois Revised Statutes 1945, which con- 
 stitutional provision and statute are as follows: 
 
 Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Illinois: 
 
 "Neither the general assembly nor any county, 
 city, town, township, school district, or other pub- 
 lic corporation, shall ever make any appropriation 
 or pay from any public fund whatever, anything 
 in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to 
 help support or sustain any school, academy, semi- 
 nary, college, university, or other literary or sci- 
 entific institution, controlled by any church or 
 sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
 
 74 
 
 grant or donation of land, money, or other per- 
 sonal property ever be made by the state or any 
 such public corporation, to any church, or for any 
 secta rian purpose. ' ' 
 
 Illinois R. S. 1945, Chap. 122, Sec. 15-14: 
 
 "No county, city, town, township, school dis- 
 trict or other public corporation shall make any 
 appropriation, or pay from any school fund, anything 
 in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, or to 
 support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, 
 college, university or other literary or scientific 
 institution controlled by any church or sectarian 
 denomination; nor shall any grant or donation of 
 money or other personal property be made by any 
 such corporation to any church or for any sectarian 
 purpose. ' ' 
 
 There is not a syllable of evidence in the whole record 
 that a single cent has been "appropriated" or "paid" 
 or a single cent, a single item of personal property, or 
 a single parcel of land "granted" or "donated" to 
 any church or in aid of any sectarian purpose. What 
 then is the complaint on this score? What started out 
 as a charge that the property of the relator w T as being 
 taken without due process of law and that her son was 
 similarly deprived of his, has become a plaintive un- 
 documented cry that the churches are guilty of "petty 
 pilfering". A more lawyer-like reference is made in the 
 Nichols case, above, 93 111. 61, to the use of school prop- 
 erty by religious groups, when it says that the incon- 
 sequential and unmeasurable wear on the desks, equip- 
 ment and buildings is covered by the legal maxim, " de 
 minimis non curat lex" — the law does not take notice of 
 trifles. 
 
 Sound public policy dictates that public buildings, 
 be tliey schools which are common to all portions of 
 the state, or community centers which are found but
 
 75 
 
 in a few, should be used as widely as possible, so 
 long as the primary purpose for which they were built 
 is not impaired. Are we to deny the use of buildings 
 to religious groups and permit it to irreligious or un- 
 religious groups? The relator's position leads to the 
 absurdity that the communist agitator and the atheist 
 provocator may hold their meetings in the school build- 
 ings, but that the Christian and the Jew may not hold 
 a meeting of their religious groups there. 
 
 In discussing this branch of the case, and in fact 
 in discussing any part of it, one's eye must be kept on 
 the precise problem before the court. The relator shifts 
 almost imperceptibly from the discussion of what the 
 defendant has the power to do under the law, which is 
 the sole question here involved, to a discussion of public 
 policy, which is not our concern at all, except that 
 once it has been determined by the proper body, namely, 
 the defendant, it is not to be lightly cast aside or de- 
 feated by the courts. A very large part of her brief is 
 concerned in furthering her attack upon religion and in 
 arguing the supposed ill effects flowing from the pres- 
 ence of these classes in the school buildings. With all 
 respect, we submit that these are not for the Court 
 to pass upon. Competent educators and duly elected 
 public officials have these matters in charge and have 
 decided them. 
 
 An effort is made by the relator to distinguish be- 
 tween the right of the Board of Education to allow the 
 use of the school property when school is not in session 
 and the right to allow the use while school is in session 
 in parts of the building. 
 
 The statute granting the board of education the 
 right to permit use of its property for educational and 
 religious meetings, "when not occupied by schools" or
 
 76 
 
 "when not otherwise needed" (Chap. 122, Sec. 6-43, 
 111. R. S. 1945) does not mean "when none of its 
 property or building is in use," but when the particular 
 room so permitted to be used "is not occupied by" or 
 "is not otherwise needed." 
 
 Lagow v. Hill, 238 111. 428, was a suit to restrain the 
 school directors from renting to a fraternal organiza- 
 tion the second floor of the school house on an annual 
 basis and the contention was that the statute only per- 
 mitted "temporary" use of the building for other than 
 school purposes. The Court held that the use made 
 was temporary and that where the board of education 
 determined that a portion of the school was not neces- 
 sary for school purposes, it might permit use by other 
 organizations. This is authority for the proposition that 
 such use as is made of school property in this case 
 is within the power and discretion of the school di- 
 rectors, being only temporary and for only a part of 
 the school building. It, of course, also disposes of the 
 relator's contention that uses of the school building, 
 other than for public school purposes, may only be made 
 when the school is not in session. 
 
 The question here is — is the use made of the buildings 
 and desks of the defendant prohibited by the constitu- 
 tion? If so, every similar use, regardless of whether 
 or not the use is made during the school day, is equally 
 obnoxious because equally a use of public property. 
 But for at least 71 years, since 1874, our statutes 
 have recognized the right of school boards to grant 
 the use of school buildings for religious meetings and 
 the universal custom of our people has been to conduct 
 church services and Sunday Schools in them regularly 
 and the practice has received judicial sanction in case 
 after case in our Supreme Court. To this the relator 
 says, but such uses do not interfere with the use of
 
 77 
 
 the schools for school purposes. We answer, neither 
 do the religious education courses. And the record 
 fully supports us in that answer. And we say further 
 that the constitutional provision involved by the relator 
 does not specify that sectarian purposes may be served 
 by day and not by night and consequently the decisions 
 permitting religious meetings to be held at any time 
 give legal sanction for all time. And we say also that 
 the constitutional provision does not apply alone to 
 schools but to all public bodies and hence the decisions 
 giving legal sanction to religious meetings in one public 
 building gives it equally in all. 
 
 The relator in this branch of her argument con- 
 cerning the supposed violation of Article VIII, Sec- 
 tion 3, of the Constitution falls into two fundamental 
 and related errors. First, she supposes that every bene- 
 fit or advantage which government confers upon re- 
 ligion, notwithstanding that it may be one shared by all 
 religion and all sects or denominations, is prohibited. 
 Second, she supposes that every benefit which flows to 
 religion directly or indirectly from the government is 
 barred by the Constitution. Both of these are demon- 
 strably erroneous. 
 
 Constitutional rights and prohibitions are to be inter- 
 preted to meet new conditions arising in connection with 
 progress of the community. As well stated in 11 Amer- 
 ican Jurisprudence 660 : 
 
 "A Constitution usually announces certain basic 
 principles to serve as the perpetual foundation of 
 the state. It is not intended to be a limitation on 
 its healthful development nor an obstruction to its 
 progress. Accordingly, the courts are not inclined 
 to adopt such a technical or strained construction 
 as will unduly impair the efficiency of the legis- 
 lature to meet responsibilities occasioned by chang- 
 ing conditions of society. It is proper to assume
 
 78 
 
 that a Constitution is intended to meet and be 
 applied to new conditions and circumstances as 
 they may arise in the course of the progress of 
 the community. The courts in this country have 
 shown a determination to give our written Constitu- 
 tions, by interpretation, such flexibility as will bring 
 them into accord with what the courts believe to 
 be public interest. Their terms and provisions are 
 being constantly expanded and enlarged by con- 
 struction to meet the advancing and improving 
 affairs of men." 
 
 The Illinois constitutional provision must be read 
 against the background of American history which in- 
 dicates that this is a religious nation. The constitu- 
 tional provisions are directed not against religion, but 
 against sectarianism. So long as all faiths are treated 
 alike it cannot be said that whatever incidental aid the 
 cause of religion receives is a violation of the consti- 
 tutional provision. 
 
 The Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to 
 the Constitution of the United States, and the Pre- 
 amble to the Constitution of the State of Illinois, all 
 recognize the existence of the Deity and express grati- 
 tude for His blessings. 
 
 The Ordinance of 1787, Article 3, provided : ' ' Religion, 
 morality, and knowledge being necessary to good gov- 
 ernment and the happiness of mankind, schools and 
 the means of education shall be forever encouraged." 
 
 The Federal Constitutional Convention was not anti- 
 religious. As stated by Professor Edwin C. Goddard in 
 "The Law in Its Relation to Religion." (10 Mich. 
 Law Rev. 161, at p. 166) : 
 
 "Every one of its members was a believer in God, 
 and in future reward and punishment, and most of 
 them, including the presiding officer, Washington, 
 were church members. Of all its members Franklin
 
 79 
 
 has been regarded as least orthodox. And yet, dur- 
 ing its deliberations, when it seemed impossible to 
 harmonize the varying opinions, Franklin offered 
 his celebrated resolution, in which he moved that 
 'Henceforth prayers imploring the assistance of 
 heaven and its blessings upon our deliberations 
 be held in this assembly every morning before we 
 proceed to business, and that one or more of the 
 clergy of the city be requested to officiate in that 
 service.' " 
 
 The Supreme Court of the United States declared 
 in Holy Trinity Church v. United 'States, 143 U. S. 457, 
 36 L. ed. 226, that this is a religious nation and that 
 the Constitution and statutes are to be interpreted upon 
 the supposition that nothing inimical to religion is 
 intended. 
 
 In Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 34 
 L. ed. 478, the court held that polygamy was contrary 
 to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization 
 which Christianity has produced in the western world. 
 The court clearly indicated that the tenets of religion 
 were part and parcel of American civilization. 
 
 Without prolonging this argument, we call attention 
 to the discussion in the Holy Trinity Church case, and 
 also the scholarly review of the history of American 
 constitutional law in relation to religion in the case 
 of Wilkerson v. City of Borne, 152 Ga. 762, 110 S. E. 895, 
 20 A.L.R. 1334. The latter case held that a city ordi- 
 nance requiring some portion of the King James version 
 of the Bible to be read and prayer to be offered daily 
 in the public schools did not infringe a constitutional 
 provision securing to every person the right to wor- 
 ship according to the dictates of his own conscience 
 or a constitutional provision that "no money shall 
 ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
 
 80 
 
 indirectly, in aid of any church, sect, or denomination 
 of religionists, or of any sectarian institution." 
 
 The legislature of the State has long recognized that 
 benefits to religion may be conferred so long as no 
 advantage is given to any particular sect or denomina- 
 tion. 
 
 The very plain language of the constitutional pro- 
 vision which is invoked clearly states that it is " dis- 
 crimination" and "preference" which is banned and is 
 plainly a guarantee of religious freedom implemented 
 by the prohibition against discrimination. If only one 
 church were permitted the use of the school building 
 and others were excluded, the constitutional provision 
 would be applicable, but of this the relator can not 
 complain on tins record for here, as the pleadings admit, 
 every sect and creed, including atheism, may have 
 the same full and equal enjoyment of the property in 
 the custody of the defendant Board. There is not one 
 word of "discrimination" or "preference" for any re- 
 ligion, church or creed in the whole of this record. 
 
 Further, the relator assumes, without a word of evi- 
 dence to sustain her position, that the churches par- 
 ticipating in this program are benefited by. the program. 
 As elsewhere in her brief she displays an unwholesome 
 bitterness toward churches and religious people gen- 
 erally by stating that the motive of the churches co- 
 operating is "selfish" and that they are seeking to 
 enhance their numbers and their financial support by 
 these classes and not attempting to raise the moral tone 
 of children participating or to deal with the problem 
 of juvenile delinquency. 
 
 That is a position not based upon anything in the 
 record, but rather flies in the face of everything that 
 is in the record. Further, it is utterly inconsistent
 
 81 
 
 with the whole plan, which is to admit every church 
 to participation. How T , for instance, does it benefit 
 Protestant churches from a selfish standpoint to take 
 part in a program in which Catholics are invited to 
 and do participate equally and fully? How does it bene- 
 fit Christianity if considered selfishly to cooperate in 
 a program in which Judaism takes part equally and 
 fully! Finally, how does it benefit the Presbyterian or 
 Baptist church or any other to participate in a pro- 
 gram to which all Protestant children are admitted and 
 the teachings in which are utterly non-doctrinal and non- 
 creedal? 
 
 The fact is that there is not the slightest indication 
 in the record that any sect has received any benefit or 
 aid by this program, nor is there the slightest indi- 
 cation that any benefit or aid for the church was in- 
 tended. The relator's partisanship and animosity toward 
 religion in general leads her to impugn the motives of 
 her neighbors who believe in a Supreme Being. But we 
 can not suppose that the Court will indulge in any such 
 presumption in the absence of evidence in the record to 
 substantiate it. And since the record does not substan- 
 tiate it, the whole argument of the relator that Article 
 VIII, Section 3, of the Illinois Constitution has been 
 violated by a benefit being conferred upon a church 
 or sectarian purpose falls to earth. 
 
 Finally, the relator confounds the application of the 
 doctrine of separation of church and state, which she 
 adopts as her thesis, in supposing that every indirect 
 or incidental benefit to a church or sectarian purpose 
 runs afoul of the Constitution. If a public body such 
 as the defendant Board of Education can not permit 
 the use of its buildings by a church for an admittedly 
 sectarian purpose such as holding religious meetings 
 or services, as expressly authorized by statute, what
 
 82 
 
 distinction in logic applies to permit the fire depart- 
 ment to use its man power and equipment in extin- 
 guishing a blaze in a church? Does the relator say 
 that if one of the community's churches which is co- 
 operating in this program catches fire, the fire depart- 
 ment must not extinguish the blaze? In oral argument 
 she has said that the fire department may do it because 
 the government may protect religion, but must not foster 
 it. If that is her contention, it leads her to say that 
 while the church is being constructed policemen may not 
 guard it from thieves ; that while a congregation is con- 
 vening or dispersing traffic policemen may not give it 
 special police and traffic protection. 
 
 The truth is that the government is not atheistic or 
 unfriendly or even neutral toward religion as a whole. 
 It not only protects, but it fosters religion, as it has 
 the right to do as the arm of a religious people. What 
 it does not do and may not do is to establish one religion 
 or several religions at the expense, detriment, or dis- 
 advantage of others. It must not be guilty of "dis- 
 crimination" or "preference". However, what it does 
 without discrimination or preference, even though it be 
 a benefit or an aid to religion or churches, is not pro- 
 hibited by the Constitution. 
 
 Countless examples of the friendship of government 
 with religion could be cited : 
 
 Legislative sessions, both State and Federal, are 
 opened with prayer. 
 
 The Army and the Navy furnish chaplains at 
 government expense so that the religious needs of 
 the men in the military services may be filled. 
 
 The State provides for chaplains in penitentiaries 
 and directs them to perform religious services. 
 
 Property used for religious purposes is exempt 
 from State taxation.
 
 83 
 
 Many similar examples will occur to the Court. It is 
 our position that the constitutional provision is not 
 violated by appropriations for religious purposes just 
 so long as they are in aid of religion as a whole and 
 without preference and are not in aid of a sectarian 
 purpose. 
 
 The Reichivald case which we now refer to is ample 
 authority for this conclusion. 
 
 In Reichivald v. Catholic Bishop, 258 111. 44, previously 
 mentioned, the Supreme Court of Illinois held (p. 47) : 
 
 "The constitution does not absolutely prohibit 
 the exercise of religion, but, on the contrary, pro- 
 vides that the free exercise and enjoyment of re- 
 ligious profession and worship, without discrimina- 
 tion, shall be forever guaranteed." 
 
 We lay great emphasis upon that case, which was 
 decided in 1913, after the date of the Ring case. It was a 
 bill by a taxpayer of Cook County to enjoin the Catholic 
 Bishop of Chicago and others, including the Board of 
 Commissioners of Cook County, from erecting a chapel 
 for Catholic services on the County poor farm. The 
 expense of erecting the building was to be borne by 
 the church, the plans were to be approved by the County 
 architect, and the title to the building upon its erection 
 was to vest immediately in the County. The Illinois 
 Supreme Court, speaking through the same justice (Mr. 
 Chief Justice Dunn) who wrote the opinion in the Ring 
 case so greatly relied upon by relator, held that the 
 demurrer to the bill was properly sustained and the bill 
 properly dismissed without the hearing of evidence. 
 
 The language of the Court, stressing the voluntary na- 
 ture of the religious services and also stressing the fact 
 that the right to erect a building was open to all churches, 
 held that the use of County property for religious serv-
 
 84 
 
 ices, as contemplated by the plan, did not violate any 
 constitutional provision. The Court said in part (p. 47) : 
 
 "The constitution prohibits the county from giv- 
 ing the land to the church, but there is no prohibi- 
 tion against the church giving the building to the 
 county, and this is what the adoption of the reso- 
 lution by the county board provides for. There is 
 no question of any grant or donation by the county. 
 May the county permit the use of the building for 
 religious worship and funeral services? The con- 
 stitution does not prohibit poor persons who are un- 
 able to earn a livelihood and whose care and main- 
 tenance the county has assumed, from meeting to- 
 gether in some building or room on the poor farm 
 for the worship of God. In return for the care 
 given the body the State does not exact the sur- 
 render of all care for the soul. The constitution 
 is not violated if the county, at no expense to itself, 
 permits a priest or minister or layman to say a 
 prayer at a funeral, or if a friendless pauper is 
 allowed a burial with the religious ceremony usually 
 observed by civilized nations in the burying of the 
 dead. The constitution does not absolutely prohibit 
 the exercise of religion, but, on the contrary, pro- 
 vides that the free exercise and enjoyment of re- 
 ligious profession and worship, without discrimina- 
 tion, shall be forever guaranteed. No person can 
 be required to attend or support any ministry or 
 place of worship against his consent, and no pref- 
 erence can be given by law to any religious de- 
 nomination or mode of worship. This docs not mean 
 that religion is abolished." 
 
 l fe> J 
 
 The Court further stated (p. 48) : 
 
 "If the county board deems it advisable to es- 
 tablish a reading room or library for the county's 
 poor there is no constitutional limitation to pro- 
 hibit it. So a lecture room might be established. 
 If charitably disposed persons wish to hold re- 
 ligious services in the lecture room or reading room 
 occasionally or regularly, without expense to the 
 county, no constitutional right is interfered with.
 
 85 
 
 Religious privileges are brought to the inmates, 
 which may he availed of by each according to his 
 own wishes. No one can be obliged to attend or to 
 contribute, but no one has a right to insist that 
 the services shall not be held. The man of no re- 
 ligion has a right to act in accordance with his 
 lack of religion but no right to insist that others 
 shall have no religion. In Nichols v. School Di- 
 rectors, 93 111. 61, a law was held to be within the 
 constitutional power of the legislature which gave 
 to school directors the right to grant the temporary 
 use of school houses, when not occupied by schools, 
 for religious meetings and Sunday schools, for 
 evening schools and for literary societies, and for 
 such other meetings as the directors may deem 
 proper, and the action of school directors was sus- 
 tained giving permission to different church or- 
 ganizations to hold religious services in the school 
 house. That decision, in principle, justifies the 
 action of the board of commissioners, which, in 
 effect, grants permission, revocable at any time, for 
 having religious services in the building in ques- 
 tion." 
 
 The case is important here because the Court found 
 no objection to the use of County property for religious 
 services even after the title to the chapel vested in the 
 County. Furthermore, the citation, with approval, of the 
 Nichols case shows that that case is still the law of 
 this State. We call attention of this Court to the un- 
 doubted fact that the present case is much nearer to 
 the facts appearing in the Nichols case than to the facts 
 in the Ring case. Therefore, the decision in the Nichols 
 case, cited with approval after the decision in the Ring 
 case, should be applied here. It is a matter of passing 
 interest at least, that one of the attorneys for the 
 County Commissioners in the Reichwald case was the 
 Honorable Francis S. Wilson, now one of the justices 
 of the Illinois Supreme Court. 
 
 The Nichols case is authority for the proposition that
 
 86 
 
 incidental aid to a religious body, even though it be 
 sectarian, is not prohibited by the Illinois Constitution. 
 To the same effect is Dunn v. Chicago Industrial School, 
 280 111. 613, in which a taxpayer's bill was filed to 
 prevent payments to the Chicago Industrial School for 
 Girls, claiming that these payments were a violation of 
 constitutional provisions. The Court found that the 
 payments were less than the actual cost of food, cloth- 
 ing, etc., and at page 616 said: 
 
 "In the argument at the bar counsel contended 
 that under the constitution no w T ard of the State 
 can be committed to any institution where there 
 are religious services or where religious doctrines 
 are taught but all institutions to which they may be 
 committed must be absolutely divorced from re- 
 ligion or religious teaching. This is a clear mis- 
 apprehension of the attitude of the people toward 
 religion expressed in the constitution. In the pre- 
 amble expression is given to the gratitude of the 
 people of the State for the religious liberty which 
 they had been permitted to enjoy, and section 3 of 
 the bill of rights provides: 'The free exercise and 
 enjoyment of religious profession and worship, 
 without discrimination, shall forever be guaran- 
 teed. * * * No person shall be required to attend 
 or support any ministry or place of worship against 
 his consent, nor shall any preference be given by 
 law to any religious denomination or mode of wor- 
 ship.' Section 3 of article 8 of the constitution, 
 which particularly prohibits any preference to any 
 religious denomination or mode of worship, is as 
 follows: 'Neither the General Assembly nor any 
 county, city, town, township, school district, or other 
 public corporation shall ever make any appropria- 
 tion or pay from any public fund whatever, any- 
 thing in aid of any church or sectarian purpose, 
 or to help support or sustain any school, academy, 
 seminary, college, university, or other literary or 
 scientific institution, controlled by any church or 
 sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any 
 grant or donation of land, money, or other per-
 
 87 
 
 sonal property ever be made by the State or any 
 such public corporation, to any church, or for any 
 sectarian purpose.' The people not only did not 
 declare hostility to religion but regarded its teach- 
 ings and practices as a public benefit which might 
 be equal to the payment of taxes, and by section 3 
 of article 9 of the constitution provided that prop- 
 erty used exclusively for religious purposes may 
 be exempted from the burden of taxation, and the 
 General Assembly, by virtue of that provision, has 
 declared such exemption. In harmony with the pro- 
 vision for the free exercise and enjoyment of re- 
 ligious freedom and worship, the General Assembly 
 in the Juvenile Court act provided by section 17, 
 that 'the court in committing children shall place 
 them as far as practicable in the care and custody 
 of some individual holding the same religious belief 
 as the parents of said child, or with some association 
 which is controlled by persons of like religious faith 
 of the parents of the said child.' 
 
 "Not only have the people, by the constitution 
 and by their representatives in the General As- 
 sembly, recognized and provided for the enjoyment 
 of religious liberty, but the court has not adopted 
 any rule antagonistic thereto. 
 
 >> 
 
 Again the Court says (p. 618) : 
 
 "The whole religious world is divided into sep- 
 arate denominations distinguished from each other 
 by peculiarities of faith and practice, and what the 
 constitution prohibits is a preference given by law 
 to any denomination or mode of worship or aid to 
 any such denomination by an appropriation or pay- 
 ment from any public fund whatever. The con- 
 stitution guarantees absolute religious liberty, and 
 no discrimination, in law, can be made between dif- 
 ferent religious creeds and forms of worship. (Hoef- 
 fer v. Clogan, 171 111. 462.) It would be contrary 
 to the letter and spirit of the constitution to ex- 
 clude from religious exercises the members of any 
 denomination when the State assumes their control 
 or to prevent the children of members from receiv- 
 ing the religious instruction which they would have
 
 88 
 
 received at home. The constitutional prohibition 
 against furnishing aid or preference to any church 
 or sect is to be rigidly enforced, but it is contrary 
 to fact and reason to say that paying less than 
 the actual cost of clothing, medical care and at- 
 tention, education and training in useful arts and 
 domestic sciences, is aiding the institution where 
 such things are furnished." 
 
 To the same effect are the cases of Dunn v. Addison 
 Manual Training School, 281 111. 352, Trost v. Ketteler 
 Training School, 282 111. 504, and St. Hedwig's School 
 v. Cook County, 289 111. 432. In the latter case, the 
 Illinois Supreme Court said (p. 438) : 
 
 1 'In such a case the State or the municipality 
 does not pay the full price for the benefits or serv- 
 ices received by it and is the real donee. One who 
 pays less for benefits and services than the actual 
 cost of the same is not making a donation by such 
 a payment." 
 
 All of these cases are decided upon the proposition 
 that no " benefit " or "aid" is given an institution where 
 no profit results from the transaction with the' state. 
 Likewise, in our case, no "benefit" or "aid" is given 
 to the individual churches or to the interfaith religious 
 organization supervising the courses in religious educa- 
 tion because the most that is even argued for the relator 
 is that only an infinitesimal and unascertainable part 
 of the expense of the religious education program is 
 borne by the state. This does not profit or benefit the 
 organization or churches cooperating and is not under 
 the constitution an aid to a sectarian purpose. 
 
 During the incumbency of Edward J. Brundage as 
 attorney general of Illinois, the power of the school 
 board of Sterling, Illinois, to allow the Ministerial As- 
 sociation of that city to use the public school building
 
 89 
 
 for religious instruction was squarely raised. In an- 
 swer to the question : 
 
 "May the classes be held in the public school 
 buildings?" 
 
 he stated (Opinions of Attorney General, 1919-1920, p. 
 699, at page 700) : 
 
 "The second question is, May classes for religious 
 instruction be held in public school buildings! Our 
 Supreme Court has held that the temporary use 
 of a school house for religious meetings is not for- 
 bidden by the Constitution. (Nichols v. School Di- 
 rectors, 93 111. 61.) I think it is the general custom 
 to use school buildings for many lawful purposes 
 other than school purposes. I see nothing to pro- 
 hibit school boards from permitting the use of 
 school buildings for classes in religious instruction, 
 unconnected with the schools, provided the work of 
 the school is not interfered with and the privilege 
 of holding such classes is not exclusive but ex- 
 tended fairly and impartially to all religious sects 
 or denominations." 
 
 There is an intimation in relator's brief that the 
 passing out of parents' permission cards by the public 
 school teachers to the pupils is the use of public funds 
 for sectarian purposes. The Lewis case in New York 
 already mentioned effectively answers such contention. 
 The constitutional provision in New York is even 
 stronger than the Illinois provision, as it prohibits use 
 of public property, which will not be found in the Illi- 
 nois constitution. The Constitution of New York por~ 
 vides that "neither the state nor any subdivision thereof, 
 shall use its property or credit or any public money , 
 or authorize or permit either to be used, directly or 
 indirectly, in aid or maintenance, * * * of any school 
 or institution of learning wholly or in part under the 
 control or direction of m\\ religious denomination, or
 
 90 
 
 in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught". 
 (Article 9, sec. 4.) 
 
 In the case of People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 219 
 App. Div. 233, 219 X. Y. Supp. 189, the Appellate 
 Division effectively answered the relator's present con- 
 tention by saying (pp. 192-193): 
 
 "Here there was no property or public money 
 used in aid or maintenance of any denominational 
 school. Cards, not provided by the school, were 
 distributed, and the parents indicated thereon the 
 place they wished their children to go for instruc- 
 tion. It was entirely voluntary with the parent 
 whether the child was excused. There was some 
 'check up' afterward, to indicate whether the priv- 
 ilege should be withdrawn. All that the petitioner 
 can claim in regard to public expense is the time 
 spent by the teacher during school hours in thus 
 issuing and receiving the card, excusing the child, 
 and ascertaining, if possible, if the parent's direc- 
 tion has been obeyed. The acts of the teacher are 
 the same as when excusing a child to attend any 
 religious or secular ceremony at its parent's re- 
 quest. It is a part of ordinary school routine and 
 discipline. The Constitution is designed for prac- 
 tical purposes and deals with realities, not fictions 
 or conditions largely imaginary. It is intended to 
 operate benignly in the interest of the governed. 
 It should receive a broad, not a pettv, construction. 
 People v. Fancher, 50 X. Y. 288, 291, 295; Matter 
 of Broadway Widening, 63 Barb. 572, 593. Its 
 commands are not violated by acts so trivial and 
 remote. Sargent v. Board of Education of City of 
 Rochester, 76 App. Div. 588, 79 N. Y. S. 127, affirmed 
 177 X. Y. 317, 69 X. E. 722; State ex rel. Gilbert 
 v. DMey, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N. W. 999, 59 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 1182." 
 
 In summary, it is our belief that the theory upon 
 which the relator has attacked the action of the Board 
 of Education in permitting religious education courses 
 to be held in its buildings on released time of pupils
 
 91 
 
 of the public schools is unfounded and mistaken because 
 of the following errors into which she has fallen: 
 
 1. She erroneously believes that the political doc- 
 trine of "separation of church and state" is a self- 
 explanatory and self-executing truism of government 
 which may be applied in and by itself to the solution 
 of problems involving the co-existence of religion and 
 government. 
 
 2. She erroneously believes that because government 
 is disabled from uniting with or establishing any church, 
 it is utterly and completely divorced from religion 
 generally. 
 
 3. She erroneously believes that the mere presence 
 and availability of classes in religious education in the 
 public school buildings interferes with her own practice 
 or the practice of her son of religious freedom. 
 
 4. She erroneously believes that the constitutional 
 guaranty, protecting those who have a religion in the free 
 exercise thereof, applies to persons who have no religion 
 thus freely to exercise. 
 
 5. She erroneously believes that an indirect benefit 
 conferred upon all churches and sects, equally and with- 
 out favor, is a violation of the Constitution. 
 
 6. She erroneously believes that the religious edu- 
 cation courses here involved benefit or aid a church or 
 sectarian purpose. 
 
 7. She erroneously assumes that her son has been 
 embarrassed by the existence and availability of the 
 religious education courses. 
 
 With these errors her whole case falls. 
 
 We respectfully suggest to the court that while it 
 has no right to determine public policy or to overrule 
 the duly constituted public authorities in whose charge
 
 92 
 
 lies the determination of that policy, it does have a 
 right and indeed a solemn obligation not to defeat or 
 obstruct the carrying out of a public policy once it is 
 thus determined, unless for the most profound legal 
 reasons. The circumstance that religious education pro- 
 grams have been carried on in this state for over 25 
 years along the same lines as the one in effect in schools 
 in Champaign and the further circumstance that during 
 all of that time no individual or court has taken any 
 legal means to question the programs must be given 
 great weight in favor of the defendant. 
 
 We further respectfully urge upon the court that 
 while the fact that this is an attack upon religion does 
 not mean that the law shall not take its proper course 
 and that the case shall not be decided in accordance 
 with law, neither is the relator entitled to gain advan- 
 tage from her argument that churches and religion 
 generally will benefit by a decision in her favor. We 
 are not inclined to accept as genuine or sincere the 
 surprising and sudden solicitude of the relator for the 
 welfare of religion and religious-minded people. What 
 started as a vicious and vituperative attack upon people 
 who believe in God and a gratuitous and unnecessary 
 reference to them as "insane" and to their clergymen 
 as unscrupulous "racketeers" and other childish name- 
 calling has ended with a plea that this is not an attack 
 upon religion and that churches and religion will really 
 be better off if these religious education courses are 
 discontinued. We disclaim the solicitude of the relator 
 for the cause of religion. 
 
 It is not suggested anywhere that religious educa- 
 tion is a harmful thing for those who participate in 
 it and indeed the overwhelming voice of all mankind 
 joins in saying that a knowledge of and acquaintance
 
 93 
 
 with religion is an integral and vital part of the training 
 of growing boys and girls. This program is intelli- 
 gently designed to promote that end. Merely to make 
 it less available to her son whom she does not desire 
 to participate in it, the relator asks that the court bar 
 it entirely from the public school buildings and make 
 it less available, indeed unavailable, to the great ma- 
 jority who desire it. The evidence in this case is that 
 in this community buildings, other than school build- 
 ings, are not available for religious education classes, 
 except at great distance from the public schools. Wise 
 educators believe that it would be impracticable and dan- 
 gerous to transfer children from the school buildings 
 to churches or other places available for holding these 
 classes. Yet the relator asks this Court to impose that 
 impractical requirement upon the hundreds of children 
 participating in these classes. 
 
 It is our belief that the rights of relator with ref- 
 erence to this matter are so ephemeral and trivial as to 
 stamp this plea of hers as being without substance. We 
 do not believe that it is necessary to remove these 
 classes from the public school buildings fully to pro- 
 tect James Terry McCollum from any interference with 
 such rights of religious freedom as he may have or 
 to protect the relator from invasion of the constitu- 
 tional rights which she invokes. We do believe that 
 this record amply discloses that no substantial rights 
 of the relator or her son are involved and that this 
 suit is designed to advance political theories in aid of 
 atheism and not to advance religious rights. 
 
 The relator has not shown that clear right to the 
 writ of mandamus justifying its issuance: North v. 
 Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 137 111. 296. 
 
 As stated in 34 American Jurisprudence, 847: 
 
 To warrant the issuance of mandamus, not only 
 
 a\
 
 94 
 
 must there be a legal right in the relator, but, 
 owing to the extraordinary and drastic character 
 of mandamus and the caution exercised by courts 
 in awarding it, it is also important that the right 
 sought to be enforced be clear and certain, so as 
 not to admit of any reasonable controversy. The 
 writ does not issue in cases where the right is 
 doubtful or not complete, but merely inchoate, or 
 is a qualified one, or where it depends upon a fact 
 issue to be determined by the respondent, or when 
 there is a substantial defect in the proof of the 
 relator's right." 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 While the Court is not concerned with the wisdom of 
 the plan in operation in the Champaign schools, the 
 Court cannot have failed to observe that the religious 
 education program was a carefully considered, intelli- 
 gent effort on the part of leaders in the community to 
 gain for the children and young persons of the school 
 district the benefits of religious education without invad- 
 ing the religious freedom of anyone and without use 
 of public funds. 
 
 The modern school attempts to give a balanced view 
 of all of the worthwhile phases, activities and interests 
 of life and to prepare a child for participation therein. 
 Its curriculum is no longer limited to the three Ks. It 
 teaches hygiene, athletics, manual arts, hobbies and vari- 
 ous forms of recreation as well as subjects such as gram- 
 mar, mathematics, science, literature, history, etc., which 
 develop the mind and which broaden the knowledge of 
 the pupil. 
 
 To insulate the school from all contact with or knowl- 
 edge of religion is tacitly to deny that religion has 
 any place in life. In effect, it would convert the schools
 
 95 
 
 into pagan and atheistic institutions much more sec- 
 tarian in favoring unreligion than the present religious 
 education classes favor any faith or sect. 
 
 It seems clear that the present case is an effort to 
 place atheists at a distinct advantage in the propagation 
 of their unbelief over persons who espouse a religious 
 faith. Success of this effort would fly in the face of 
 the historical fact that we are a religious people and 
 that the very essence of democracy is the dignity of the 
 individual and reverence for God which religion alone 
 teaches. 
 
 We respectfully ask that the writ be denied. 
 
 John L. Franklin, 
 
 Attorney for Defendant. 
 
 Eckeet & Peterson, 
 
 (Abe R. Peterson and Owen 
 Rail, Of Counsel), 
 
 Attorneys for the Intervenors. 
 Champaign, Illinois, 
 
 November 20, 1945.