m^\
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF ILLINOIS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 33Z 
 
 Q815
 
 SUBSTANCE 
 
 TWO SPEECHES, 
 
 MADE BY 
 
 THE RIGHT HON. N. VANSITTART, 
 
 On the 7th and 13th of May, 1811, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 TO WHICH THl KEPORT OF THE BULLION COMMITTEE WAS 
 HEFEKREI). 
 
 AN APPENDIX, 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 The Resolutions moved by Francis Horner, ETsq. and 
 
 the Right Hon. N. Vansittaktj 
 
 The Amendments moved by F. Horner, Esq. 
 
 AND 
 
 Various Accounts referred to in the Speeches, 
 
 Hontion: 
 
 PRINTED FOR J. HATCHARD, 
 
 B')OKSELI.ER TO HER MAJESTY, 
 
 mo. IQO, OPPOSITJB ALBANY-HOUSE, PICCADJI,LT. 
 1811.
 
 SPEECH, 
 
 J\Iav 7, 1811, 
 
 ox THE 
 
 rp:solutions moved by f. horner, esq. 
 
 Mil. LUSlllXLiTOX, 
 
 NoTM iTiiSTAXDixG the evitlciit fatigue of 
 the House, in which I fully sliarcd, when I ad- 
 dressed you at a late hour last night, it was not 
 witliout some rehictance that I could forego the 
 earliest possible opportunity of expressing my 
 astonishment at the extraonhnary manner in 
 which this important discussion lias been brought 
 forward. 
 
 It was, indeed, with no less sur})risc than regret, 
 that I first found that the Bullion Committee, 
 composed of men so sagacious, so m ell informed, 
 so conversant in business, so respectable in every 
 point of view, had formed conclusions so different 
 from those which the evidence before them, as well 
 as the public and well-known state of things, 
 vrould have pointed out to me. I was a<»ain sur- 
 
 * See Appendix, No. I, 
 £
 
 prised to find that my Learned and Honourable* 
 Friend, the Chairman of that Committee (Mr. 
 Horner), should, after an interval of reflection, 
 of near a twelvemonth, during which time, an 
 active and intelligent controversy had been con- 
 stantly carried on, respecting their Report, still 
 feel his confidence so undiminished, as to pro- 
 pose to make it, without further inquiry, the 
 ground of a legislative proceeding of the utmost 
 importance. But above all, was I astonished 
 last night, to find that the Learned Chairman, 
 after recommending to the House, in a speech 
 of unusual eloquence and ability, to adopt and 
 record upon its Journals, all the principles and* 
 reasonings of the Bullion Committee, should 
 propose to stop short there, and to postpone the 
 only practical conclusion to which those prin- 
 ciples and reasonings were designed to lead. 
 The last Resolution is the substantial practical 
 recommendation of the Bullion Committee. The 
 other Resolutions are only explanatory and in- 
 troductory, and might, if they were well founded 
 in fact and law, be admitted, and placed on the 
 Journals, with perfect innocence, but perfect 
 uselessness. The Learned Chairman, however, 
 wishes to establish his premises, but he hesi- 
 tates about his own conclusion. He asserts the 
 existence of an enormous evil, for which he 
 says, we have a safe and certain remedy in our
 
 hands ; yet be desires us to recognise tlic exist- 
 ence of tlie evil, but to postpone the remedy. 
 
 I can only see one method of accounting for 
 such conduct, consistently with the known ta- 
 lents and character of the Committee ; namely, 
 that they are not serious in the Propositions they 
 have brought forward; that they either suspect 
 some latent fallacy in their own doctrines, or 
 tliink them inapplicable to practical purposes. 
 M'hile they feel desirous of saving the credit of 
 the theory, they shrink from the hazard of its 
 application; and we now see those gentlemen 
 trembling on the brink of the precipice to which 
 they have led the nation, under the delusive 
 hope of safety, and afraid either to advance or 
 to recede. 
 
 But this suspicion, that the Committee are 
 already fearful of the practical effects of their 
 own doctrines, is strongly indeed confirmed by 
 two other circumstances observable in their late 
 conduct. 
 
 The first of tliese is, that the Learned Gentle- 
 man has not thought proper to introduce his 
 motion for a repeal of the Bank Restriction 
 liill, by a previous motion for a repeal of the 
 laws which prohibit the melting and exportation 
 of our current coin. It is, indeed, very remark- 
 able, that the Conmiittee have in the Report 
 shown great caution and reserve on this sub- 
 ject. They have not, usually, been so dijjidait; 
 B 2
 
 but on this point they rather hint at, tlian ex- 
 press, an opinion *. Thcj call it a law of cm- 
 cicnt, but doubtful policy ; of questiondblc policy ; 
 but they do not recommend its repeal, nor has 
 the Learned Gentleman proposed it. 
 
 Yet it is undeniably certain, that if that law- 
 can be efiectually enforced, the repeal of tlie 
 Bank Restriction must, upon all the principles 
 laid down by the Committee, aggnn-ate the 
 very evil for w hich they propose it as a remedy. 
 For it is evidently impossible for the Bank to 
 resume its payments mcash, without the import- 
 ation of a considerable supply of bullion for 
 the purpose of coinage. This importation must 
 depress the exchange to at least as great an ex- 
 tent as the purchase of any other article to an 
 equal amount, and we should thus, at a great na- 
 tional loss, only make our condition so much 
 worse. For the purposes of exchange it is per- 
 fectly indifferent whether the circulation of the 
 country consists of paper, or of coin whicli can- 
 not be exported. 
 
 The only mode in which a metallic currency 
 can have a favourable effect on the exchange, 
 is by its exportation. In that manner.it will 
 undoubtedly operate to the same extent as an. 
 equal quantity of bullion. And, therefore, an 
 abundant currency of coin, by furnishing a sup- 
 
 • See Bullion Report, page 0.
 
 |Jy for exportation, will produce an effect. But 
 if the exportation is prevented, no effect can 
 be produced. To foreigners it is indiftcrent 
 whether our internal payments are made in gold, 
 or by any other cotitrivance. 
 
 Do the Committee then mean that the law- 
 will be ineffectual, and that a real though clan- 
 destine exportation of coin will take place ? I 
 -will not do the Committee — I will not do the 
 , Learned Gentleman the injustice of suspecting 
 they can mean to countenance a system which 
 aivcs the i/Icaal a decided advantage ever the 
 J'air dealer, which habituates and hardens the 
 trader in the evasion and breach of the law; 
 nay, wliich is carried on by direct fraud and 
 perjury. 
 
 To repeal the law, would, on tlie contrary, 
 lay a fair foundation for iheir ftijutcin ; and that 
 they have not proposed to do so, affords to my 
 mind a strong presumption, that they feel a la- 
 tent doubt of its soundness or of its tendency. 
 
 Another circumstance not less remarkable, is 
 the conduct of those gentlemen with respect to 
 a measure which lately received the sanction of 
 the Legislature, and which is now carried into 
 execution (so far as I can leain), with the hap^ 
 piest effects— I mean the Act for the relief of 
 trade by an Issue of Exchc(|uer-bills. 
 
 Hie Learned Mover of the present (juestion 
 was indeed absent during the progress of tli;^
 
 Bill; t)ut most of the other members of the 
 Committee were present, and several of tliem 
 took a considerable share in the discussions' 
 upon it. 
 
 Yet not one of those Gentlemen opposed that 
 Bill, on account of its direct opposition to the 
 principles laid down in their Report, or indeed 
 voted against it on any occasion. The great 
 evil complained of in the Report, is a supposed 
 excess of the paper currency of the Bank. Now 
 what were the object and the effect of that mea- 
 sure? Its object was to afford relief to the em- 
 barrassments of the m.erchants and manufac- 
 turers, by an issue of paper; and its effect may 
 be, to increase our paper currency in a fe\V 
 weeks, more than the Bank has ever done iii 
 the course of several years. 
 
 Will it be said that these Exchequer-bills are 
 not a paper ciirrencii, when they are issued for 
 sums so small as twenty pounds, for the express 
 purpose of being passed in ordinary payments*; 
 and when it is obvious that the whole effect 
 and utility of the measure, depend on their be- 
 ing rapidly thrown into circulation, either di- 
 rectly in the way of payment, or indirectly by 
 means of sale or pledge to the Bank, or other 
 issuers of circulating paper? Or will it be 
 said that the Committee were taken by surprise, 
 and not aware of the nature and tendency of 
 thte nmeasure, when it appears from fheir Report,
 
 that they had the subject disthictly under con- 
 sideration, with reference to the former Act of 
 1793, and have reported a clear, and, as it 
 seems to me, an accurate opinion upon it? 
 ■ What says the Bullion Report itself? Advert- 
 ing to the circumstances of 1793, it contains 
 the following passage: — " In the year 1793, a 
 " distress was occasioned by a failure of confi- 
 *' deuce in the country circulation, and a conse- 
 " quent pressure upon that of London. The Bank 
 " of England did not think it advisable to enlarge 
 '' their issues to meet this increased demand; and 
 '•' their notes previously issued, circulating less 
 ** freely in consequence of the alarm that pre- 
 " vailed, proved insuiiicient for the necessary pay- 
 '•' ments. In this crisis, Parliament applied a re- 
 " medy very similar in its effect to an enlargement 
 " of the advances and issues of the Bank. A 
 " loan of Exchequer-bills was authorized to be 
 ■' made to as many mercantile persons, giving 
 •• good security, as should apply for them; and 
 " the confidence w hicli this measure diffused, as 
 " well as the increased means which it afforded, of 
 " obtaining Bank-notes through the sale of tlie 
 "' Exchequer-bills, speedily relieved the distress 
 " both of London and the country. Without oi'- 
 *' fering an opinion on the expediency of the 
 ** particular mo<lc in w hicli this operation was 
 '' effected, your Committee think it an important 
 " illustration of the principle, tliat an enlarged
 
 8 
 
 *' accommodation is the true remedy for that oc- 
 " casional failure of confidence in tlie country 
 *' districts, to whicli our system of paper credit 
 " is unavoidably exposed." 
 
 How then could those Gentlemen, feelinL'- and 
 expressing as they did, in common with others, 
 the obvious objections wdiicli presenef! them- 
 selves against the late creation of Exchequer- 
 bills, and knowing likewise thai ii was utterly 
 subversive of the doctrines of their Report, yet 
 concur in voting for tlie Bid, but that they en- 
 tertained so much doubt of the expediency of 
 carrying their own theories into practice, as to 
 give way to a measure, which the public opi- 
 nion seemed to call for, as required by the ex- 
 traordinary circumstances of our present situa-- 
 tion ? 
 
 I applaud this instance of their caution and 
 moderation, and it leads me to hope, that though 
 they have thought it necessary, for whatever 
 reasons, to propose the present most extraor- 
 dinary proceeding, they will not feel any disap- 
 pointment if they find the sense of the majority 
 against them. 
 
 My Leui ned Friend lias accused me of having 
 tdrawn the Propositions, which it is my inten- 
 tion to submit to the consideration of the 
 House, in case they shall concur with me in 
 rejecting his proposed Resolutions, in such a 
 manner, as to give no clear view of the priu-
 
 ciplcs for which I mean to contend. In the 
 first place, it is not my object to pledge Parliament 
 to the recognition of abstract principles, but to 
 record facts. I believe the British Parliament 
 to.be the most intelligent and enlightened body 
 of men in the world, and it is so happily com- 
 posed, that no subject either of science or of 
 practice can be introduced, which will not meet 
 with many adequate judges. But 1 by no means 
 think that it is in any large assembly, even so 
 composed, that abstract principles are best dis- 
 cussed and decided. 
 
 In the next place, it is not so much to the 
 principles of my Learned Friend's Resolutions, 
 that J object, as to the application of them ; I 
 perfectly agree in principles which he has ap- 
 plied to facts, to which, in my opinion, tlicy can 
 li;ive no reference, or which I think wholly un- 
 founded ; and this will be evident to any Gen- 
 tleman who will compare his Resolutions with 
 piine *. 
 
 I agree with him, for instance, when he says, 
 that he is desirous of reverting to the state in 
 tvhich our currency was, previously to \797 ; 
 and though I do not allow that my sixteenth 
 Proposition goes the length of admitting, that 
 cash payments are the onij/ security agaiust ex- 
 cess of circulation, I agree that it strongly 
 expresses an o])inion, which I strongly feel, that 
 
 * Sk« Appendix, No. I. and II. 
 c
 
 10 
 
 a circulation of cash, and of paper convertible 
 at pleasure into cash, is the most secure and ad- 
 vantageous to the public interests. But we dif- 
 fer about the means of returning to this state. 
 He is for attempting it positively and absolutely, 
 without regard to consequences, or even to 
 practicability : I am for waiting till a violent 
 and unnatural state of things shall have ceased, 
 during the continuance of which, our object 
 cannot be obtained, and the attempt would only 
 as^o-ravate the evil. 
 
 Another point on which we agree, is, that it 
 is inost importajit to preserve the assistance de- 
 rived from the Bank. But how does he pro- 
 pose to preserve it ? By reducing the Bank to a 
 situation of distress and ruin, by cramping its 
 operations, and making it a burden, instead of a 
 support, to the public. 
 
 I will not now dwell on a point to which I 
 must hereafter revert, but proceed to one on which 
 the Learned Gentleman has reasoned largely, 
 and with the greatest confidence, which has 
 been most strongly relied upon by those, who, 
 in this long controversy, have reasoned on the 
 same side of the question, and to which no fewer 
 than the fust seven of the proposed Resolutions 
 seem exclusively directed. I refer to the stand- 
 ard of value. AVe are told that our standard is 
 changed or lost, and triumphantly asked, where 
 we shall now lind it? One should suppose the'
 
 standard was something visible and tangible, 
 which liad been accidentally mislaid, and that we 
 ought to ofter a revvaid for bringing it back again. 
 Butlaftirm, that a standard in the sense used by 
 these Gentlemen, namely, a fixed and invariable 
 weight of the precious metals, as a measure of va- 
 lue, never existed jn this country. In order to af- 
 ford some ground for the aj-gument, the Learned 
 Gentleman is obliged, in his very first Proposi- 
 tion, to affirm, in direct contradiction to the 
 fact, that the " weight at which any such money 
 is authorized to pass current, is fuvcd" Now I 
 would ask, at what fixed weight silver money is 
 authorized to pass current? For any sum not 
 exceeding twenty-five pounds, it is a legal ten- 
 der at whatever weight; and certainly of pay- 
 ments made in actual cash, at least nine hundred 
 and ninety-nine in a thousand, arc for sums un- 
 der that value, and were so before the Bank Re- 
 striction; and can that be denied to be a true 
 standard of value, which is the actual measure of 
 payment in a vast majority of transactions? 
 ' The degree in which our silver coin is reduced 
 in wciglit is familiar to every one ; and a paper 
 4ately laid before tlie House shows the great in- 
 ' equality of that reduction in different coins. 
 'But they all continue to be equally a legal ten^ 
 der. A note for five pounds may be paid, either 
 'ill siher new from the Mint, and weighing, ac-
 
 lb, 
 
 oz. 
 7 
 
 dwt. 
 7 
 
 2; 
 
 or in 
 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 7; 
 
 or in 
 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 2; 
 
 or in 
 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 9; 
 
 or in 
 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 3. 
 
 
 cording to the average weight stated in that, 
 paper, 
 
 £0 crownsj weighing 
 
 40 half-crowns, weighing 
 100 shillings, weighing 
 flOO sixpences, weighing 
 
 The sum of twenty-five pounds may be Ie> 
 gaily discharged in sixpences, weighing five 
 pounds, five ounces, and fifteen pennyweights ; 
 but to pay twenty-five pounds and sixpence 
 would require no less than eight pounds and 
 fifteen pennyweights of the same coin. 
 
 Now I would ask my Learned Friend, which 
 of those different weights of silver, all of which 
 would be equally a legal tender, is the true 
 standard? 
 
 But in 1797, when my Learned Friend admits 
 tlie true standard to have existed, the case wa* 
 still stronger. The Act of 1774, by which the 
 legal tender of silver money was limited to 
 twenty-five pounds, a limitation then first in- 
 troducexl, had expired in 1783, and was not 
 revived till 1798. Therefore, at the very time 
 when our standard is supposed to have been 
 most perfect, silver money, of whatever weight, 
 jnight be tendered to any amount. The whole 
 interest of the national debt might have been 
 paid in crooked sixpences, if the Directors of
 
 the Bank had thought lit. It is said, that, iii 
 1745, they actually had recourse to sucli an ex»- 
 pedient for a temporary purpose, and it was per* 
 tcctly legal for them tor do so. 
 
 It is therefore evident, that, so far as relate* 
 to silver money, the first of my Learned Friend's 
 Propositions is wholly unfounded, and that witli 
 it the six next, and indeed all the remainder, 
 must fall to the ground. And as the silver coin 
 was, till within modern times, the only legal ten- 
 der in payments (Mr. Locke even contending that 
 no other substance was lit to be made the stand- 
 ard ol" value); and as it is still as much a stand- 
 ard in law, and more so in practice, than the gold 
 coin, I might be contented to rest my argument 
 here; but I shall say sometliing respecting the^ 
 gold coin. 
 
 In the first place, no limitation of the current 
 weight of gold coin existed down to the year 
 1774; and, tlierefore, all my reasoning with re- 
 spect to the silver coin applies with equal forc^ 
 to the gold coin down to that tiu.c; and this 
 ancient, estabiisJicd, invariable standaid so much 
 talked of, had no existence till within the 
 period of His present Majesty's reign. But 
 what was then made the standard ? Was it fiv$ 
 pennyweights nine grains and a half (the Mint 
 weight of a new guinea), for one pound and one 
 shilling, or five pennyweights eigi.t grains, thu 
 cuncnt u eight? The dlilcrcnce -is not great;
 
 14 
 
 but it destroys the principle of a fixed standard 
 as much as it it were. A fixed standard must 
 be sometiiing accurately defined, certain, and 
 invariable; and such a*^ standard the metallie 
 currency of this country has never been. 
 
 I am not inquiring whether on general prin- 
 ciples of policy we ought not to seek to esta!- 
 blish such a standard, but I am contending that 
 the Learned Chairman's llesclutions are false in 
 fact, and his complaints groundless ; for we 
 cannot liave lost v\4iat we never possessed. 
 
 This discussion is not only important in it- 
 self, as overturning the basis of the Learned 
 Chairman's proposed Resolutions, but it is closely 
 .connected vvith the leading doctrine of the. 
 .Bidlion Report, that of the depreciation of 
 Bank-notes. He says that my Propositions ar6 
 lin evasion of the question, and that I ought 
 distinctly either to admit or deny the j^c^, thai 
 Barik-7wlcs ha've lost their standard value. No\v, 
 I do not conceive myself bound either to admit 
 or to deny, tliat Bank-notes have lost a value 
 wlfich they never possessed, and which the 
 legal coin of the country never possessed, 
 namely, a value estimated by a fixed weight of 
 gold or silver bullion. They never had any 
 other than a current value founded on the public 
 confidence in the Bank, and this value I firmly 
 believe, and have distinctly stated in my third 
 Proposition, that they possess as much as ever."
 
 IS. 
 
 Even in current coins, as I liave sliown, in 
 tlie instance of the silver coins, the current 
 value is by no means regulated by the intrinsic 
 or metallic value, and this applies as nuich to 
 the purchase of bullion as to any other trans- 
 actions. And I contend that, for all legal and 
 authorized transactions within tlie kingdom, 
 even such purchases of bullion, Bank-notes are 
 considered and accepted as equivalent to legal- 
 coin. My Learned Friend, indeed, denies them 
 to be equivalent to coin in public estimation. 
 Now, I should like to know in how many cases 
 lie has himself found them not equally available 
 for all die purposes to which coin would have 
 been applied } 
 
 But before I proceed in this discussion, I should 
 be glad to put a question to an Honourable Gen- 
 tleman opposite (Mr. Huskisson), a leading mem- 
 ber of the Bullion Committee, who has written 
 with great ability on this subject, and which, 
 though a little irregular, he will, perhaps, have the. 
 goodness to answer, as it may save much time, 
 viz. in what sense the term Depreciation, as used 
 by the Committee, is to be understood? For 
 it appears to me, that, in this controversy, the 
 word dcprccialioH is used by those who assert its 
 existence, in different and even incompatible 
 senses. 
 ' They sometimes appear to mean that Bank- 
 notes have lost a pajt of their current value as
 
 compared with the legal coin which they rcprc* 
 sent ; and this is the ohvious and popular mean- 
 ing of the word, and tlie only one which is in- 
 telligible to the greater part of mankind. But 
 sometimes the meaning seems to be, that Bank- 
 notes, although passing current at an equal rate 
 with the legal coin, have lost a part of their 
 value as compared with all articles of purchase. 
 I hope the Honourable Gentleman will answer, 
 that the word is to be understood in the latter 
 sense, because he has told the public, " that the 
 value of the gold contained in a guinea, in its state 
 ef coin, and xchen used as currenci/, is only one 
 twentieth more than that of a pound note * ;" and 
 if so, I shall not only think it less neces- 
 sary to enter into a length of discussion, but» 
 which is of much more consequence, I shall 
 consider it as a very important point decided in 
 favour of the public credit of the country. 
 
 Jf the Honourable Gentleman cannot be in- 
 duced at present to giv^ an answer to my ques- 
 tion, I must trouble the Committee by arguing 
 the case both ways. It cannot, indeed^ be ex- 
 pected that I should bring direct proof of the 
 negative. It is for the Connnittee to prove the 
 depreciation of our currency, iu whichever way 
 they choose it to be understood,* and if they 
 liK^an it in the first and obvious sense, nanieh% 
 
 '^ Question stated, p.. 9£>,
 
 17 
 
 fluit Bank-notes are become of less value; 
 than legal money in ordinary transactions, it 
 seems particularly reasonable to hold them to 
 strict proof of the fact, because it is not only 
 most important and alarming, but because, in 
 the first instance, it strikes me as contrary to 
 every day's experience, and it seems to be a fact 
 which, from its nature, cannot be doubtful or 
 concealed. When wc are told that a Bank-note 
 of one pound is only worth sei^enteen shillings, 
 it seems obvious to answer, that no man has ever 
 hesitated to give us twenty shillings for it, 
 either in money or in goods. Yet the only 
 proofs of this important fact attempted by the 
 Conmiittee, rest on intricate and abstruse rea- 
 soning, and are entirely drawn from circum- 
 stances attending the exchange. 
 
 They produce a calculation to show, that the 
 id\\ of the exchange has considerably exceeded 
 the expense and risk of sending gold bullion to 
 Hamburgh; and they also show, by a calcu- 
 lation of the prices of bullion here and abroad, 
 that there is a similar difference between the 
 actual rate of exchange, and the comparative 
 prices at which gold bullion could be sold in 
 the one country, and bought in the other ; and 
 this coincidence they state as a ikmonslration of 
 the depreciation of our currency. 
 
 It seems unnecessary, for our present purpose, 
 to detain the House with any criticisms on tb« 
 
 D
 
 calculations themselves, or even to enter into 
 the abstract reasoning on which the supposed 
 demonstration is founded; for one thing is in- 
 disputably clear, viz. that Bank-notes could not 
 be depreciated while they were convertible at 
 any time into their nominal amount in cash ; and 
 therefore that whatever circumstances attended 
 the course of exchange, while they w ere so con»- 
 vertible, they could not be occasioned by the de- 
 preciation of Bank-notes. And it evidently fol- 
 lows, that if the same circumstances which oc- 
 cur at present can be shown to have taken place 
 while the Bank continued to pay in cash, their 
 existence now is so far from a demonstration, that, 
 it does not even afford <iny presumption^ of such 
 a depreciation. Among many instances, I shall, 
 only cite two or three, and leave it to the cool con-. 
 sideration of the Bullion Committee to reconcile 
 them to their theories as they can. And I am 
 the less inclined to take up the time of the 
 House with any detail on this subject, as my 
 Right Honourable Friend the Treasurer of the 
 Navy has entered into it so fully, and as it. 
 seems unnecessary to multiply examples of a 
 circumstance which occurs so frequently, as that 
 of a rate of exchange, much exceeding the ex-^ 
 pense and risk of the transportation of oold from 
 one country to another*. 
 
 In January 1 760, for instance, the exchange 
 between London and Hamburgh was near eight 
 
 * See Appendix, No, IV.
 
 p^r cent, in favour of London. The expense 
 and risk of importing gold from Hamburgh to 
 England, could not at that time have much ex- 
 ceeded three per cent; so that, according to the 
 principles laid down by the Committee, this fact 
 amounted not to 'd presumption — not to a graimd 
 of i)iference only — but to a (kmonstratiGu, that 
 the currency of llandjurgh was depreciated. 
 Yet it is well known, that no paper currency 
 Avas then, or has ever been issued by the Bank of 
 Hamburgh; and it is as little possible that the 
 eft'ect can have been produced by any debasement 
 of the metallic currency of Hamburgh, because 
 all bills of exchange are paid there in Bank 
 money, which represents a deposit of fine silver 
 by zveight. 
 
 The very same yeai", however, the exchange 
 varied so much, that in November it was six per- 
 cent, against England. This therefore was, ac-^*' 
 cording to the arguments of the Committee, a 
 dcmonstratmi of a depreciated currency in Eng- 
 land. Yet there was at that time and long af- 
 terwards, no paper currency in England, but 
 what was immec' lately convertible into cash at 
 the will of the holder. 
 
 One later instance, however, deserves particu- 
 lar notice, from the peculiarity of the time when 
 it happened, which was that of the restriction 
 of cash payments at the Bank. This, as most 
 of us must remember, at first produced a great 
 D 2
 
 alarm, and was considered as a formidable crisis 
 of public and private credit. Among other ef- 
 fects, a great fall of the exchange was confi- 
 dently, and, I will allow, not unreasonably ex- 
 pected from it. Yet, after the first intelligence, 
 the exchange continued gradually to rise ; and 
 within a few months, in November 1797, became 
 more favourable than it has ever been known ; 
 being above thirteen per cent, in favour of Eng- 
 land; and this at a time when the expense and 
 risk of sending gold from Hamburgh to Eng- 
 land amounted to about three and a half per 
 cent, only, and when the circulation of Eng- 
 land was principally carried on in a paper cur- 
 rency, which might have been supposed to 
 have suffered some diminution of its credit, hy 
 the novel and extraordinar}^ circumstance of its, 
 "being Jio longer convertible at pleasure into 
 cash, and when there was at Hamburgh no 
 paper currency whatever. 
 
 . So far as the supposed demonstration rests 
 \ipon calculations respecting the price of gold 
 bullion, I will venture to say, that its variations 
 have been too irregular to afford any certain 
 ground of reasoning whatever. 
 . In England, for instance, it has usually hap- 
 pened, that when the exchange became unfa- 
 vourable, the price of gold rose ; and when the 
 exchange has been favourable, that it has fallen 
 (;though by no means in any certain and assign-
 
 able proportion) ; and this is intcliigible, aud 
 consistent with theory. 
 
 But in Hamburgh the very reverse has been 
 the case : — the price of gold continued to lisa 
 from January to September IH09, though the 
 exchange was growing more favourable the 
 whole time; it then fell^ without any material 
 variation of the exchange, and contiimed at 
 the lower rate when tlie exchange became less 
 favourable. 
 
 But what is more remarkable, tlie price of gold 
 at all the places respecting which tlie Committee 
 seem to have made any inquiiy, at Hamburgh, 
 Amsterdam, and Paris, luis considerably exceeded 
 the par price. At Amsterdam, it has been no less 
 tlian seventeen and a half per cent, above par, 
 which exceeded the highest price in London *. 
 Now, if the higli price in London be a proof of 
 the depreciation of our paper currency, the 
 high price at all those j)hices must be equally 
 a proof of the depreciation of their paper. But 
 at no one of those places does any paper cur- 
 rency exist, excepting the notes of the Bank of 
 France, w hich are inconsiderable in their anjount^ 
 and payable in cash. 
 
 Instances are also mentioned iu tlie Report 
 itself, in which gold has been sold in England, 
 previously to the restriction of the Bank pay- 
 ments, at eight, ten, arid even twelve per cciit. 
 
 ♦ See Mr. Rulherfui'd's Hints from Holhni.
 
 above the Mint price f. In these cases, as well 
 as in the foreign cases I have mentioned, and 
 in many others which might be referred to, tlie 
 effect could not arise from the depreciation of 
 paper currency. It must have had some other 
 cause ; and why should not the same effect be 
 now ascribed to the same cause, whatever it 
 may have been, which produced it in these dif- 
 ferent instances ? 
 
 The Committee are unwilling to admit 
 the fact of a general scarcity of gold. I can 
 only sa}', that the rise of prices in coun- 
 tries in which the exchange is favourable, ast 
 'Well as where it is unfavourable, seems to afford 
 a presumption either of scarcity, or of a gene- 
 rally increasing demand. But I do not affirm 
 the fact, I am not assigning a cause for the 
 high price of gold. It is for the Committee 
 to prove, that it can have no other cause than 
 that which they assign, and in this proof they 
 have completely failed. 
 
 I have already observed, that the burden of 
 proof ought to rest on those who assert the 
 depreciation of Bank-notes. We who deny it, 
 need only appeal to common observation and 
 opinion. And it is difficult to have stronger evi- 
 dence of the general opinion, than the Appendix 
 to the Report contains. One gentleman only, 
 of whom (as he is not named) we know nor- 
 thing more, than that he resides abroad, and 
 ' See Bullion Report, page 4.
 
 33 
 
 therefore has not had the means of forming his 
 jadgnient on the spot, states an opinion, that, 
 *'as he vahied every thing by hulUon (a mode of 
 vahiation wholly different from that which we 
 are now discussing), he conceived the paper cur- 
 rency of this country to be depreciated to tlie 
 full extent of fifteen to twenty per cent. ;" but 
 that " he never heard the solidity of the Bank 
 of England doubted either at home or abroad;" 
 while every one of the other witnesses (some of 
 the most consideiablc bankers and merchants '\t\ 
 England) states most positively, that Bank- 
 notes are noi depreciated. I do not refer to 
 tliese testimonies as decisive of the fact, but as 
 proof of a concurrence of opinion among per- 
 sons extensively engaged in business. But I 
 think we have something like (li?'ect proof to 
 offer, in contradiction of the fact of deprecia- 
 tion, and that of a very simple and very decisive 
 nature. 
 
 It is well known, that, as the law now standsj 
 Bank-notes are not a legal tender. A person of- 
 fering them in payment, is indeed protected 
 from arrest upon mesne process; but the credi- 
 tor may refuse to accept them, and proceed to 
 judgment and execution, either against his per- 
 son or effects, until pyment is obtained in law- 
 ful money. Now in nearly fourteen years that 
 this law has subsisted, I know of no instance of 
 such a i)rocccding, It may be said, that ia 
 *mall pa} meats the expense and inconvenience
 
 24 
 
 cf a law-suit woKid have exceeded the advan- 
 tage. But this cannot be said of large sums — 
 large mortgages, for instance. 
 
 A hint seems to be given me by a Learned 
 Friend (Mr. IMorris), that some such instances 
 will be produced. They have certainly escaped 
 my inquiries, and, I think, must be few and ob- 
 scure. But I should not allow any such in- 
 stance to prove the depreciation of Bank-notes, 
 without fully considering its circumstances. It 
 may have taken place in transactions notoriously 
 Hlegal, or connected with the clandestine ex- 
 portation of coin ; it may have been the result 
 of malice and vexation ; or it may have origi- 
 nated in mere caprice, perhaps in a wager or 
 some such motive. 
 
 Such a proceeding might indeed be considered 
 as severe and oppressive. But is there no such 
 thing as a rigorous creditor to be found ? Are 
 men universally, and without exception, so scru- 
 pulous in enforcing their legal rights to the ut- 
 most? But I will suppose they have been re- 
 strained by the fear of censure and of loss of 
 reputation; and I desire no better argument; 
 for in a m.atter, which, after all, is completely a 
 question of opinion^ to show that the general 
 €pimon and JeeUrig of mankind is with us, is to 
 gain the cause. Bank-notes, then, are establish- 
 ed as equivalent to cash, not by law, but by the 
 general concurrence and agreement of the na- 
 tion ; while iu other couutries, the law has fre-
 
 25 
 
 quently attempted to fix a value upon paper 
 currency, wliich opinion and practice refused 
 to it 
 
 Accordingly, it is not even asserted, that any 
 difference is made between cash and Bank-notes, 
 in any bargain or transaction whatever. I know 
 of no illegality in such a bargain. A trades- 
 man may lawfully say, " The price of such an 
 article is six pounds, but I will take five gui- 
 neas in gold ; the price of such another is one 
 pound, but I will take seventeen shillings in 
 silver ;" yet no instance of such a practice has 
 been produced. 
 
 A few instances of this sort of dealing, would 
 indeed be of no great importance. A small pre- 
 mium has long been given by bankers and others 
 to collect silver coin, for their small payments, 
 even in the present degraded state of silver mo- 
 ^^y '} yet it was never considered as a proof of 
 the depreciation of guineas ; and similar mo- 
 tives of convenience might lead persons to col- 
 lect cash for a particular purpose, without any 
 idea of its being generally of superior value to 
 Bank-notes. 
 
 But if no such practice has in fact been in- 
 troduced, it is impossible to have a stronger 
 practical proof that Bank-notes are not in a 
 state of depreciation. 
 
 On this subject we find a curious inconsist- 
 ency in the reasonings of those who mahitain 
 J--
 
 26 
 
 the depreciation of our currency. We are told 
 at one time, that Bank-notes have really lost 
 their value in the public opinion, and that if 
 they still pass current at their nominal value 
 (which no one has been bold enough to deny, 
 though it is a fact destructive of their argu- 
 ments), it is only owing to the force of law, 
 and the fear of prosecutions. Yet we are told 
 by the same persons, that it is utterly impossible 
 to support, by the force of law, a paper cur- 
 I'ency which has lost its value in the public 
 opinion, and that any attempt to enforce its 
 currency, would be more likely to hasten than 
 to retard its depreciation. 
 
 In this latter opinion I am much inclined to 
 coincide. Such at least has been the result of 
 experience in those countries, the paper curren- 
 cies of which have by the Bullion Committee 
 been so strangely compared with that of the 
 Bank of England. 
 
 These are the American paper money, the 
 French assignats, and the Austrian government 
 paper. Abundance of other instances, just 
 equally applicable, might be adduced, for they 
 want almost every circumstance of similarity. 
 The profusion with which, in those cases, 
 the currency was multiplied, would alone 
 take away any ground of fair comparison. 
 The American paper began with an issue 
 •of 3,000,000 of dollars in July 1775; in
 
 27 
 
 one year tliey were increased to 20,000,000 ; 
 yet they still circulated without any consider- 
 able depreciation. In December 1777, they 
 were multiplied to 70,000,000 ; and were then 
 fallen to half their nominal value. Yet the issue 
 still went on, and in October 1779 there were 
 200,000,000, passing at ninety per cent, loss; 
 and in the next year the issue ceased, as they were 
 no longer accepted at anj^ value whatever. 
 
 The progress of the assignats was similar. 
 In April 1790, the first issue took place to the 
 amount of 400 millions of French money. In 
 September 1791, they had been multiplied to 
 near 1500 millions ; and in fifteen months more 
 to 2300 millions ; r.nd the issue continued with 
 increasing rapidit}^ till they were totally dis- 
 credited. 
 
 Of the amount of the Austrian paper money 
 I cannot speak with any precision ; but from 
 some late proceedings of the government it may 
 be inferred to be not inferior to mil/ of the sums 
 I have mentioned. 
 
 Now if the notes of the Bank of England had 
 been multii)lic(l in the same manner, I cannot 
 doubt they would l"ia\e shared the same fate; but 
 when I see that they have in fourteen years in- 
 creased only about twelve millions (of w hich only 
 three millions and a half" arc in notes exceeding 
 d£,'l value), and can distinctly trace the causes of 
 every step of that increase, I cannot fbrbcarasking
 
 28 
 
 the Gentlemen of the Committee, whether it 
 was just, or wise, or beneficial, to make such an 
 invidious comparison? 
 
 The amount, though a siriki?ig, is, however, 
 by no means the o?2lj/ circumstance of distinction. 
 The paper money alluded to, was in every instance 
 a new paper, issued by a government already 
 involved in debt and discredit, and struggling 
 for an immediate resource — the notes of the 
 Bank have for a century been established in full 
 credit as issued by a corporation of the highest 
 reputation for ' wealth and punctuality, and 
 known not to be debtor, but creditor, to an 
 immense amouiit, both to government and to 
 individuals, 
 
 The paper of those countries was issued, not 
 with any view to profit, but to supply the exi- 
 gencies of war, and measured in its amount, 
 not by any views of commercial advantage 
 or public convenience, but by the necessities of 
 bankrupt governments. The Bank never issues 
 its paper but for value received, and for a certain 
 profit, and regulates the amount of it by the 
 demands of public accommodation. — Thei?' paper 
 was forced upon the people by the authority of 
 ; government, though notoriously passing at a 
 discount in transactions of all kinds — the notes 
 of tlic Bank are no legal tender, but pass freely, 
 and have not been discredited in any instance. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell further upon this 
 
 I
 
 29 
 
 cotiipaiison, but I must sliortl}- touch upon a 
 case which arose near home. 
 
 I liave been alhided to as a member of a Com- 
 mittee, which, in the year 1804, examined the 
 gtate of the exchange with Ireland, and which 
 was of opinion that the notes of tlie Bank of 
 Ireland were in some degree depreciated at that 
 time. I certainly was a member of that Com- 
 mittee, and concurred in their opinion ; but the 
 circumstances proved before us were too different 
 from the present to afford any fair ground of 
 argument from analogy in this discussion. 
 
 It appeared not only that the current coin was 
 publicly sold at a premium, but that an esta- 
 blished difference of price existed between pay- 
 ments in coin and in Irish paper, while the paper 
 of the Bank of England produced the same 
 premium as guineas. But if, from those cir- 
 cumstances, I infer that the Irish paper was 
 depreciated, 1 think it doubtful whether that 
 depreciation was owing to any excess of issue, 
 although it appeared that the paper, both of the 
 Bank of Ireland and of private banks, had been 
 rajjidly increased, and that an immense number 
 of notes for very small sums, called silver notes, 
 had been introduced into circulation. I rather 
 believe that, from the apprehensions naturally 
 remaining, in consequence of the rebellion in 
 1798, and from some recent circumstances of 
 alarm, u degree of suspicion and discredit at'
 
 so 
 
 taclied itself to all paper issued in Ireland, and 
 had extended itself from the notes of tlie private 
 banks to those of the Bank of Ireland itself. 
 But from whate\er cause the state of the Irish 
 currency at that time might arise, no inference 
 with respect to the notes of the Bank of England 
 can be fairly drawn from it, unless the circum- 
 stances of the case were similar. 
 
 I cannot leave this first and most important 
 part of the case, without reminding the Com- 
 mittee that I am not bound to prove a negative 
 — that the Committee have undertaken to prove 
 the fact (a most alarming fact, if it be true) of 
 the depreciation of our currency, and that they 
 have produced no proof but vi'hat is, in the high- 
 est degree, vague, inconclusive, and fallacious. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance in this discus- 
 sion to keep the consideration of the two kinds 
 of depreciation completely distinct, and it is by 
 confounding them that the Bullion Committee 
 appear to me to have puzzled their readers, and 
 (if I may be excused for saying so) to have some- 
 times puzzled themselves. I shall, therefore, 
 take the liberty of distinguishing them, by call- 
 ' ing the one a depreciation from discredit, the 
 'other, a depreciation from excess. A deprecia- 
 tion from discredit can only take place in paper 
 or other representative currency, and not in that 
 which has an intrinsic value, and it would un- 
 doubtedly liave the consequences attributed to
 
 it, by the Cominittee, of producini^ an unfa- 
 Tourable exchange, and raising the price of bul- 
 lion. It would also have other most injurious 
 effects, for it has scarcely ever happened with- ■ 
 out leading to national bankruptcy ; and I am 
 not afraid of pronouncing that terrible word, 
 because our situation is completely different 
 from that of any country in which such a cala- 
 mity has ever taken place. 
 
 But a depreciation from excess ma}^ equally take 
 place in metallic currency; and though, when 
 it arises from an increase of paper currency, it 
 is always dangerous, because it has a constant 
 tendency to produce discredit, yet, so long as it 
 only shows itself in a general rise of prices, its 
 effects will be of a totally different nature. Ex- 
 perience indeed has shown, that great variations 
 may exist in the amount of circulating currency 
 without producing that immediate effect upon 
 prices, M-hich the Committee represent as inva- 
 riably and necessarily following even small and 
 local changes. 
 
 In this age of Revolutions, in which rlie most 
 tremendous experiments have been made on the 
 structure of society and the happiness of man, 
 great experiments have, among the rest, been tried 
 np(>n currency. When the French Revoitition 
 broke out, the circulation of that country was 
 almost wholly metallic, and abundant in amount. 
 A paper-money was then introduced, and rapidly
 
 32 
 
 augmented. But the price of commodities by 
 no means increased in proportion to that aug- 
 mentation, nor indeed varied much, till that pa- 
 per became discredited. In the confusion which 
 ensued a considerable rise took place. After 
 some years the paper, being totally discredited, 
 disappeared, and metallic money again took its 
 place — at first in scanty proportions, and after- 
 wards in greater abundance. Yet the price of 
 articles did not fall in proportion to the scarcity 
 of currency, but continued, and still continues, 
 much higher than before the revolution, when 
 coin was much more plentiful. 
 
 Another instance took place in Prussia. In 
 that countr}', previously to the French invasion, 
 money was in considerable plenty, and yet prices 
 were generally low. It has since been drained 
 by the exactions of the French to such a degree, 
 as to occasion general poverty, and a great 
 scarcity of cash, yet the price of most articles 
 is higher than formerly. 
 
 I certainly do not mention these cases with a 
 view of contradicting the general proposition, 
 that an increase of currency will occasion an 
 increase of prices, but to show that it is capable 
 of some modification, and is rather to be under- 
 stood as applying to the general system of na- 
 tions, connected with each other by commerce, 
 than to a particukir nation, and still less to par- 
 .;ticular districts in the same country.
 
 S3 
 
 Assuming, for the present, that within tlic 
 two last years, in which the exchange has fallen 
 so reniarkahly, the prices of all articles have 
 risen proportionally in this country (a fact which 
 I shall presently examine), I take upon myself 
 to affirm, that such a circumstance not only 
 would not have the effect ascribed to it of 
 lowering the exchange, but would have an effect 
 directly contrary. I affirm this not only on 
 what appears to me a clear principle of reason- 
 ing, but on an authority to which I should have 
 expected the Bullion Committee to pay some 
 deference — that of the late Sir Francis Baring. 
 And I am happy that this reference to his evi- 
 dence affords me the opportunity of joining in 
 that tribute of regret for his loss, and respect 
 for his memory, which was paid by my Right 
 Honourable Friend (Mr. Rose). 
 
 To Sir Francis Baring the following question 
 \vas proposed in the Committee : — *' Suppos- 
 " ing the excess of the circulation of paper to be 
 " in a degree such as to increase the price of com- 
 " modities, would that increase of price prvKluce 
 *' any effect upon the foreign excliange, until it 
 " arrived to a degree so as to check the export- 
 ** ation < f merchandiser" Sir F. Baring replied: 
 " — " An excess of paper circulation will, no 
 *' doubt, affect and raise the price of the whole 
 *' of the productive labour and industry of the 
 " country. The proportion that is exported will 
 
 F
 
 34 
 
 *' participate to tlic extent of its value ; and as the 
 " necessary consequence of high prices is a reduc- 
 *• tion on the demand, it must operate decisively 
 *' on the foreign exchanges, unless they are sup- 
 " ported, or the fall counteracted, by an export of 
 "bullion. But until the demand or exportation 
 *' is checked, an increase of price will produce a 
 " beneficial effect on foreign exchanges." 
 
 This opinion, independent of the weight it 
 must derive from the sagacity and experience of 
 a person so distinguished among commercial 
 men, seems to rest on the most evident reason ; 
 for I think it easy to prove, that if our currency 
 had in fact become of less value, this circum- 
 stance could not possibly have occasioned a fall 
 of the exchange. If indeed, in consequence of 
 a rise of prices, a diminished exportation should 
 take place, the exchange might eventually, and 
 after a time, be lowered ; but till a diminutioi> 
 happened (the contrary of which the Committee 
 assert), it is clear that the effect of a rise of 
 prices must be to 7^aise, not to depress, the ex- 
 change : because any given quantity of goods 
 exported would represent a greater amount iti 
 value, and therefore have a great tendency to 
 turn the balance of payments in our favour. 
 
 It may indeed be said that the foreign con- 
 sumer will not consent to give more for British 
 goods on account of any enhancement of their 
 value at home, and thiit the British exporter will 
 be obliged to supply him at the former prices;
 
 35 
 
 but if this be the case, it is obvious that any 
 change of prices, or, to express it otherwise, 
 any alteration of the vahie of currency at home, 
 can have no effect upon tlie foreign market, nor 
 consequently alter the balance of payments, or 
 affect the exchange. But this can only take 
 place in cases in which the foreign consumer can 
 raise or procure from other quarters similar ar- 
 ticles, so little inferior to the British in quality 
 and cheapness, as to make it more advantageous 
 to him to substitute them, than to submit to the 
 increased price demanded by the British mer- 
 chant. 
 
 It appears then, that a diminution of the 
 value of currency at home, maj/ have the eflfect 
 of improvbig the exchange, but cannot by possibi- 
 lity depress it; and therefore the whole of this 
 part of the reasoning of the Conmiittee is erro- 
 neous. 
 
 But though the Committee have chosen to 
 assume the fact of a general and recent rise of 
 })rices, for the sake of drawing from it the infer- 
 ence of a depreciation of currency, they have 
 neglected to bring any proof of the fact itself. 
 Tiiey seem to have made no inquiry on the sub- 
 ject, and have stated the comparative prices of 
 no one article except bullion. Now the price 
 of bidlion depends on causes peculiar to itself, 
 and lias no connexion with the general prices of 
 other commodities.
 
 36. 
 
 It may be, indeed, at fust sight, supposed, 
 that when the price of" every thing else rises, 
 that of bulHon will rise too ; but this is not the 
 case, and for vcr}'^ simple reasons. 
 
 The price of gold bullion in the market must 
 depend, like tliat of other articles, on the compa- 
 rison between the supply and the demand, either 
 for use at home, or for foreign exportation ; but 
 the demand for both is of a peculiar kind. The de- 
 mand for use at home is two-fold^ — either for ma- 
 nufacture, or for coinage. The quantity of gold 
 used in manufacture is too small to have any 
 sensible effect upon the price : and as at present 
 the price of gold which can be sworn off^" for 
 exportation, is higher than that of gold not ex- 
 portable, it is clear that whatever quantity may 
 be wanted for manufacture, will be taken 
 from such gold as cannot legally be exported. 
 It is also a convenience to the goldsmith to make 
 u&e of such gold as has passed through the Mint; 
 because he is sure it is of the exact standard fine- 
 ness ; while, if he uses fbreign gold, he must 
 incur some expense and trouble in the refine- 
 ment and assay. And though the manufacturer 
 is prevented by law from melting coin of the 
 current weight for his use, he is under no such 
 restriction with respect to that v. liich has lost 
 its currency by being worn below the legal 
 weiglit.
 
 57 
 
 Tlie demanci for gold for the purpose of coin- 
 age must tliereforc regulate the price of bul- 
 lion, so far as depends upon lionie consumption. 
 This may be considered as a demand unlimited 
 in point of amount; for the Mint is legally bound 
 to recei\c antl strike whatever quantity of gold 
 may be brought to it. But it is evident, that 
 this demand, as it must always prevent the price 
 of bullion from falling materially below the Mint 
 price, so it cannot, in any ordinary case, raise it 
 above the Mint price; for no man will carry 
 gold to the Mint to be returned to him in a less 
 valuable state than it was before. I say, in any 
 ordinary case, because I am aware that the 
 Bank has sometimes been obliged to purchase 
 gold for coinage at a considerable loss. But this 
 has always iiappened in consequence| of the fo- 
 reign demand for gold, occasioned by an unfa- 
 vourable exchange, draining away our coin by 
 clandestine exportation ; and has, therefore, no 
 connexion with the demand at home, of which 
 only I am now speaking, and I do not see that 
 it can ever happen from any other cause. 
 
 Now, upon both these branches of the domestic 
 use of gold, it is evident that a rise in the price 
 of other articles can have no effect. It could 
 not vary the demand for manufacture, and the 
 Mint price would continue to regulate coinage; 
 unless indeed, in consequence of any supposed 
 excess of circulating money, tlic Mint should
 
 35 
 
 be stopt by order of Government, which would 
 of course lower the price of bullion. 
 
 But that which puts it out of all question, 
 that the present rise in the price of bullion is 
 owing to a foreign, and not a domestic demand, 
 is a circumstance before adverted to, viz. that 
 the price of gold which is legally exportable, 
 is about five per cent, higher than that which is 
 not so. 
 
 Now, the demand of bullion for exportation 
 must arise principally out of the state of the 
 exchange; and the price will be regulated by 
 the .rate at which bills can be obtained. Some- 
 times, indeed, an accidental scarcity of gold in 
 some country abroad may occasion it to be sent 
 there, although a remittance by bills may ap- 
 pear, on calculation, more favourable; and in a 
 few instances, foreign importers may, for par- 
 ticular reasons, refuse payment of any other 
 kind, as is said to have been lately the case with 
 some of the importers of corn, and occasionally 
 to h'dye happened wdth contraband dealers in 
 other articles. 
 
 But the regular and principal demand of bul- 
 lion for exportation, arises from its being a more 
 advantageous mode of remittance than bills, 
 when the exchange is unfavourable. As soon 
 as this is the case, gold bullion, which we will 
 'Suppose to have been kept till then at the Mint 
 price by the demand at home, begins to be
 
 39 
 
 sought after for exportation ; exportable gold 
 rises hia;Her than that which cannot be legally 
 exported, and is first sent abroad. A clandes- 
 tine or fraudulent exportation of coin, or in- 
 gots produced from coin, soon follows ; and the 
 price will continue to fluctuate with the varia- 
 tions of exchange (not, however, preserving an 
 exact proportion), but remaining such as to af- 
 ford, in general, some small advantage in remit- 
 tance by bullion in preference to bills. 
 
 Now, neither in this case, nor in the occa- 
 sional exceptions I have mentioned, can any 
 alteration in tlie value of domestic currency, 
 shown by a variation in the prices of commo- 
 dities, produce any effect on the price of bul- 
 ]ion, except by affecting the course of ex- 
 change : and as it has been already shown, that 
 a general rise of prices has a tendency to im- 
 prove, not to depress, the rate of exchange, it 
 is clear that it must have a corresponding ten- 
 dency to lower the price of bullion, and not to 
 enhance it. 
 
 It is indeed clear, that the price of bullion, 
 which is always convertible into money, and 
 which is principally used for that purpose, has 
 a much closer connexion with the value of the 
 current coin than with that of commodities; 
 and therefore, that a general lise ol" the prices of 
 articles of trade, which iiulicatcs a diminutiou 
 of the value of money, nmst tend to depress, 
 and not to raise the value of bullion, and would
 
 40 
 
 .actually do so if not counteracted by the regu- 
 lations of the Mint. 
 
 The price of bullion, therefore, affords no true 
 test of the general scale of prices; and the Com- 
 mittee having given us no other, I have endea- 
 voured to ascertain the fact by an extensive in- 
 quiry. 
 
 I have not only procured abstracts of th.e cur- 
 rent prices of the principsjUarticles of trade for 
 several years past, but have obtained extracts 
 from the books of Greenwich Hospital, the 
 Foundling Hospital, and some other charitable 
 institutions, with the view of tracing the prices 
 of the ordinary articles of necessary consump- 
 tion *. 
 
 I will not trouble^ the House uith a dry 
 detail of the accounts, but state what appears 
 to me to be the general result. 
 
 The general scale of prices had been progres- 
 sively but slowly advancing for many years pre- 
 vious to the Bank restriction, and does not ap- 
 pear to have been affected by that event. But 
 the scarcity in 1800 and 1801 produced a great 
 and permanent effect, particularly on the price 
 of labour. Since that period, the same gra- 
 dual augmentation has taken place, as before 
 it ; and it has been so far from being remaikable 
 in the two last years, that though the price of 
 provisions has been high, from causes sufficiently 
 
 * See Appendix^ No. V. VI. and YU.
 
 41 
 
 Notorious, that of most articles of merchandise 
 is considerably reduced. Tlie last period of 
 tliree or four years, is indeed remarkable for 
 great and sudden fluctuations of the prices of 
 merchandise, corresponding with the extraordi- 
 nary aiid violent changes which have taken 
 place in commercial poHcy; but the present state 
 of prices is so far from justifying the opinion of 
 a currency depreciated from its excess, that it 
 would rather lead to a contrary inference, if it 
 were not easy* to be accounted for by obvious 
 causes *. 
 
 I think, therefore, that the Bullion Commit- 
 tee have as little foundation in fact for asserting, 
 that our currency has lost its value in compa- 
 rison with other articles, as for stating (if they 
 mean to state it, which I am still unable to ascer- 
 tain), that the notes of the Bank of England are 
 depreciated in comparison with our legal money. 
 The question is indeed of much less. importance; 
 and the fact, if true, would, as I have endea- 
 voured to show, have produced effects wholly 
 different from, and even contrary to, those attri- 
 buted to it in the Report. 
 
 So much stress, however, is laid on thfe state • 
 of the exchange, that I think it necessary to 
 recall your attention to it. 
 
 To any one who peruses tlie evidence and ac- 
 counts laid before the Committee, without a 
 
 * See Appendix, No. V. 
 G
 
 42 
 
 disposition to seek for occult causes, there will 
 appear no diliiculty in ascribing the unfavourable 
 state of the exchange, to circumstances noto- 
 rious and undisputed. 
 
 All the witnesses examined attribute the fall 
 [ of the exchange to the balance of payments 
 being turned against this country, by the large 
 importations from the Ualtic, and of grain from 
 i France and Holland, by the operation of the 
 French decrees, and of the American embargo, 
 at once rendering exports difficult, and pre- 
 venting the adjustment of accounts and re- 
 mittances, and by the great expenditure of Go- 
 vernment abroad, in subsidies, and military and 
 naval services. 
 
 To go into the .particulars of these account* 
 would lead to a tedious detail of figures ; and 
 upon the last head, one of the most important, 
 the Committee confess their information to be 
 imperfect. These circumstances also, were 
 so abl}^ discussed by my liight Honourable 
 Friend (Mr. Rose) last night, as to render it 
 less necessary to examine them in detail. 
 
 The effect of the American embargo I shall,, 
 -however, touch upon, as I do not recollect that 
 he explained that part of the subject; but it 
 is so clearly stated in the evidence, as to re- 
 quire little elucidation. It there appears, that 
 the Americans, v;ho were uniformly debtors to- 
 Great Britain for manufactures exported to a
 
 43 
 
 much larger extent than the value of their pro- 
 duce received in return, were also creditors to 
 the continent of Europe to a considerable 
 amount, and that their debt to England was 
 usually discharged in part by bills on the Con- 
 tinent, which, of course, had the same effect 
 on the exchange, as an export of British goods 
 of the same value. 
 
 Our importations from the Baltic usually 
 much exceed our exportations to the countries on 
 its shores, and this is more especially the case 
 in time of war, on account of the increased con- 
 sumption of naval stores. The indirect mode 
 of payment by means of the American bills, 
 was therefore particularly valuable; and when 
 it was stopped, an effect was produced equal to 
 the loss of a great export of our own. The 
 evil was also much increased by the sudden and 
 unexpected nature of the interruption. 
 
 The same mode of remittance would also have 
 been important, with reference to the importa- 
 tions of corn from France and Holland, many of 
 which are stated to have been paid for in actual 
 cash, from the impossibility of making any 
 other return, and wliich might have been dis- 
 charged by the American bills. 
 
 But even if I had not been able to assign 
 
 any ordinary and well-understood causes for 
 
 the present state of the exchange, and to show 
 
 that they were capable of producing such ef- 
 
 u 2
 
 44 
 
 fects hy reference to former experience, I 
 should not have admitted any circumstances at- 
 tending the exchange at the present time to be 
 satisfactory evidence of the state of our internal 
 currency. For I cannot allow that principles 
 and reasonings fairly applicable to the pheno- 
 mena of exchange, in ord'mary cases, have any 
 application to a state of things so novel and 
 ex'traordhiary as that which nov/ exists. The 
 adjustment of exchange is, perhaps, the nicest 
 and most artificial part of the conimercial sys- 
 tem. By a complicated arrangement of the 
 various money transactions of all commercial 
 countries, it finally determines the mode of pay- 
 ment most advantageous to each, and least 
 chargeable upon the whole. It abounds, there- 
 fore, even beyond all otl;er mercantile trans- 
 actions, in distant prospects i^nd intricate com- 
 binations, and far more than any other depends 
 upon freedom of intercourse, and activity of 
 correspondence. It is, therefore, in a peculiar 
 maimer liable to derangement from those mea- 
 sures of rigorous exclusion, by which the Ruler 
 of tlie Continent has attempted to cut ofl' all 
 communication between us and the countries 
 under his control, fie has destroyed the mo- 
 dern improvements and refinements of trade j 
 and in a great degree thrown it back to the 
 practices of barbarous ages and uncivilized na.- 
 tions. Vv'c now trade with tlie Continent, by
 
 43 
 
 means of fortified stations and armed depots, as 
 we formerly did with the savages of Aliica and 
 America, Trade may be carried on by mere 
 barter; and may even be lucrative and exten- 
 sive in that form. And where the power of 
 despotism is exerted to prohibit intercourse, 
 j^arter is ahnost the only form wliich trade can 
 assume. But remittances by exchange do not 
 form part of such a system of trade. They are 
 the offspring of credit and settled correspond- 
 ence. 
 
 J^ven under the present difficulties, excliange 
 as well as trade has continued to exist; 
 but, like trade, it has been hazardous, preca- 
 nous, and interrupted ; and in consequence ex- 
 posed to great losses, and productive, when suc- 
 cessful, of unusual profit. It seems, indeed, 
 to have been owing only to the high character 
 ■pf the merchants of England for good faith as 
 well as property, that the operations of ex- 
 change have gone on at all ; but amidst all the 
 .fluctuations of the Continent, reliance, was 
 placed on the ultimate security of the drawer 
 or acceptor resident here. Now it is only ne- 
 cessary to suppose an extraordinary profit to 
 have been charged on bills drawn upon Engr 
 land to account for all those appearances which 
 the Committee rely upon as so decisively proving 
 the depreciation of our currency. And can 
 jt be said that the supposition of such an in-
 
 40 
 
 crease of profit on bills of exchange is inad- 
 missible, when we consider how much the inter- 
 ruption of correspondence placed the British 
 nierchant at the mercy of his correspondent; 
 and find in evidence that the prohibitory decrees 
 have produced such difficulties of communica- 
 tion, as to occasion some articles of trade to sell 
 at a profit of two or three hundred per cent.? 
 
 In times of regular and settled intercourse, 
 indeed, irregularities to a considerable extent 
 may sometimes be observed. The exchange 
 with the South of Europe has often been favour- 
 able to Great Britain, while it has been unfa- 
 vourable with the North — favourable as to Ame- 
 rica, and unfavourable as to Europe, at the 
 same time; and this at periods when no suppo- 
 sition of a derangement in our internal currency 
 could have existed. 
 
 It is somewhat singular that the Bullion 
 Committee should rest on such vague and un- 
 satisfactory proof of the excess of our paper 
 currency as could be derived from the state of 
 the exchange, even if no sufficient reasons of 
 such a state could be pointed out, when they 
 had before them the accounts in which that ex- 
 cess, if it existed, must have appeared. And 
 before I proceed to a particular examination of 
 the resolutions proposed by the Learned Gen- 
 tleman, I shall make a few observations on those 
 accounts.
 
 47 
 
 But I must first notice an argument often 
 urged, and which has, I believe, made consi- 
 derable impression on the public out of doors, 
 if not in this House. Whence, it is said, do 
 those extraordinary profits arise which the Bank 
 appears to have shared among its proprietors 
 of late years, if it lias only gone on in its accus- 
 tomed course of business? 
 
 Without any inquiry into the internal manage- 
 ment of the Bank, I think a satisfactory answer 
 may be given from such sources of information 
 as are open to every one. It is notorious, that 
 the command of money is attended with much 
 greater advantage in time of war than of peace. 
 Since the Bank Ilestriction Bill, and for some 
 time previous to it, has been a time of continued 
 war, and in part of this period an unusual scar- 
 city of money prevailed; several instances occur- 
 red, in which a profit might be made upon Go- 
 vernment securities of twelve or fifteen percent. 
 and some instances of even greater profit ; it be- 
 ing stated by the Honourable Gentleman near 
 me (Mr. H. Thornton), in his evidence bel-bre 
 the Committee of the House of Lords, as occa- 
 sionally rising to eighteen per ceiit. Now, can 
 it be supposed that the Bank, by far the great- 
 est dealer in Government securities, did not par- 
 ticipate in these prolits, and in tlie other advan- 
 tages which great monied proprietors at that 
 time possessed r
 
 48 
 
 But not only have the times been linusuallj 
 favourable to an advantageous emjDloyment of 
 the great trading capital of the Bank, but that 
 trading capital has been increased, in a remark- 
 able manner. It appears from the second Report 
 of the Committee on Public Expenditure (1 808), 
 that the average increase of Government balances 
 in the hands of the Bank since 1797, was not less 
 than from seven to eight millions. I would desire 
 Gentlemen to consider what any private banking 
 company would make of a floating balance to sucli 
 an extent. Within the last three years an ar- 
 rangement has, indeed, been made with the 
 Bank, by my Right Honourable Friend the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer, by which the 
 public have obtained a fair participation in the 
 profits to be derived from that source : but be- 
 fore that arrangement wrs made, they belonged 
 entirely to the Bank. And though I believe 
 the Directors to have been moderate and cau- 
 tious in all their transactions, they would have 
 been wanting in their duty to their proprietors 
 if the.y had not made a fair commercial use of 
 their advantageous situation ; and let it be re- 
 collected, that however large the profits of the 
 Bank m.ay have been, they were a direct and 
 positive accession of national wealth derived 
 from sources injurious to no one, but, on the 
 contrary, eminently useful both to the govern- 
 ment and every individual concerned.
 
 49 
 
 The question is not, whether tlie Bank has 
 made large profits, which it had a fair right to 
 do, and which have been advantageous to the 
 {3ubhc interests as well as its own, but, whetlicr 
 it has increased the issue of its notes beyond what 
 the public convenience required, with a view to 
 profit, and knowing that it could not be called 
 npon to pay them in specie. 
 
 It is certainly true, that since the restriction 
 has been imposed on the Bank, the amount of 
 its notes has been greatly increascyJ; but I beg 
 leave to ask, whether our metallic currency has 
 not diminished in an e(|ual or greater degree? 
 The increase of Bank-notes has been gradual and 
 moderate, and can, in every instance, be ac- 
 counted for by an adequate and obvious cause. 
 
 From the time of the restriction to the year 
 1800, the increase was small. In ISOO and 
 ISOl, the amount of notes was considerably in- 
 creased, because great quantities (/f specie were 
 sent out of the kingdom for the purchase of corn ; 
 and from that period their amount has been kept 
 up, because the exchange has never become sufii- 
 ciently favourable to bring back any large pro- 
 portion of the treasure sent abroad. l]ut from 
 1802 to 1809, the increase did not exceed 3 or 
 400,000/.; and I would ask, whether this 
 showed any disposition on the part of the Bank 
 Directors, to avail themselves, improperly, of 
 n
 
 <50 
 
 the Act of 1S04, by which the restriction ha J 
 been continued during the war? 
 
 Since 1809, a further depression of the ex- 
 change lias taken place, and a greater quantity 
 of coin has gone out of the country, and the 
 consequence has undoubtedly been a consider- 
 able addition to the amount of Bank-notes. But 
 will any individual venture to affirm, from his 
 own observation, that this addition has been 
 greater than the public necessity required ? An 
 increase took place last summer, when the failure 
 of several country banks occasioned a demand 
 for Bank-notes for tlie country circulation. That 
 demand has since lessened, and a corresponding 
 diminution has taken place. But, if the natural 
 and obvious effect of an excessive issue of paper 
 be (as it is contended, and which I by no means 
 deny), to increase the price of every article, I 
 must ask how it happens, that the price of the 
 Government floating securities, and of the pub- 
 lic funds, has not been increased by the in- 
 creased issue of Bank-paper last summer ? In 
 fact, instead of increasing, they have diminished 
 in price, which seems to me to afford a decisive 
 answer to the allegation of excess ; and that 
 there is rather a scarcity than a superabundance 
 of the circulating medium seems further proved 
 by the beneficial effects produced by the recent 
 issue of the Commercial Exchequer-bills. 
 
 I now, Sir, come to the particular review of 
 
 I
 
 the Resolutions proposed by my Learned rricnd, 
 and it is unnecessary for me to trouble you by- 
 discussing them at any considerable length, hav- 
 ing already examined the leading principles upon 
 which they depend *. 
 
 To the tirst I object, that it is erroneous in 
 fact and law; and I have already stated my rea- 
 sons for denying that any precise standard of 
 the weight of our current coin exists, or ever 
 has existed, in this country. 
 
 If I am right in this opinion, it is clear that 
 not only the first Resolution must be rejected, 
 but that the six immediately following, must 
 fall with it, as they depend upon the same as- 
 sumption of a fixed standard of the current 
 weight of coin, and arc wholly nugatory and 
 unmeaning without it. 
 
 The eighth is true in point of fact, and is in- 
 deed substantially the same with m^' second 
 Proposition; but being introductory to succeed- 
 ing Resolutions, which I think equally un- 
 founded in fact, and dangerous in their conse- 
 quences, I cannot assent to it in the place ami 
 inannci iifiW proposed. 
 
 The ninth Resolution is also tme i.i fact, and 
 perfectly innocent; but it is of so nugatory and 
 (if I may be pardoned for the expression) so 
 childish a nature, that I cannot think it would 
 
 * Sec Appendix, No. I. 
 M 2
 
 52 
 
 become the gravity of Parliament to place it on 
 the Journals. 
 
 The tenth Ilcsokition I most decidedly object 
 to. It proposes to Parliament, to declare that 
 which is not, and never has been, true ; and the 
 declaration of which must have the most alarm- 
 ing effects. It either means that Bank-notes 
 have lost tlieir relative value compared with the 
 current coin which they represent— a proposi- 
 tion which I have already shown to be unfound- 
 ed ; or it means that the value of Bank-notes 
 should be measured by the price of bullion; and 
 this is equally untrue. Bank-notes never have 
 been the representatives of any thing but the 
 legal money of the realm, and this they conti- 
 nue to be for every legal and honest purpose, 
 as effectually as ever. 
 
 To the eleventh Resolution, so far as it re- 
 spects the Dank of England, I equally object, 
 for reasons which I have aheady assigned ; but 
 upon that pait of it, wliich respects the country 
 banks, I nuist say a few words. 
 
 I admit that great inconveniencies have been 
 occasioned by the mismanagement of country 
 banks, and the excess to which some of them 
 have attempted to extend their circulation of 
 i)apei\ i\Iuch indisidua,! distress h^as arisen from 
 the facilities v;-liich have been given to rash 
 speculations, and particularly from the tempta- 
 tion which tl-.e partners in sucli-banks have had, 
 by depending for siipj^ort upon tlic credit of
 
 the bank, to engage in commercial adventures 
 far beyond eitlicr their skill or capital. JMnch 
 •evil has been the consequence, but it is not an 
 evil of the nature described in the Resolutions. 
 It is not a depreciation of the notes of the Bank 
 of England, nor a general excess of paper cir- 
 culation. But it is the attempting to supply the 
 place of a perfectly secure and sound paper cir- 
 culation by one which cannot maintain its credit. 
 The consequences have been frequent bank- 
 ruptcies, and sometimes extensive distress. 
 
 I am far from saying, that the system of 
 country banks does not requiie regulation, or 
 that evils such as these do not call for the inter- 
 ference of Parliament. But it is a point of con- 
 ^idcrable diificulty, and one upon which Parlia- 
 ment should interfere with caution. 
 
 The most plausible regulation which occurs 
 to me would be, to prohibit bankers, Avho issue 
 notes, from engaging in any other commercial 
 concerns ; but this regulation has been tried in 
 Ireland, and found so liable to evasion, that it 
 produced no materially beneficial effect. I can- 
 not, therefore, recommend its adoption, and I 
 am not prepared with any other which I could 
 recommend as both safe and effectual. I wish 
 only to call the attention of Parliament to the 
 subject generally, as one however in which there 
 is much more to be apprehended from precipita^ 
 tion than delay.
 
 54 
 
 In order to support tlicir general theory of 
 the excess of paper currency, tlie Bullion Com- 
 mittee choose to assume, that the notes of the 
 country banks hear a fixed proportion to those 
 of the Bank of England, and are increased at 
 the same time: " the foundation (say they) being 
 enlarged, the superstructure admits of a pro- 
 portionate extension." I should have thought 
 that there were members of the Committee, 
 who would have been convinced from their 
 own experience in business, that this assumption 
 is so far from the truth, that the very contrary is 
 often the fiict, and that an increase of the one of 
 these two species of currency is frequently the 
 consequence of a diminution of the other. This 
 was exemplified in the course of last summer, 
 when the failure of several country banks, and a 
 general diminution of country bank paper, occa- 
 sioned thereby, produced an increased issue of 
 Bank of England notes to the extent of nearly 
 three millions. 
 
 On this point, the Committee had not only 
 the experience of their own members to resort 
 to, but had direct evidence before them, 
 
 They examined ]\lr. Stuckey, a respectable 
 gentleman, with whom (not in his capacity of 
 a country banker, but in an official situation 
 which he holds) I am well acquainted; and 
 then, with their usual felicity in contradicting
 
 65 
 
 tlieir endence, report an opinion directly tlie 
 reverse of his statement. 
 
 He is asked *, " Is it not your interest as a 
 " banker, to check the circulation of Bank of 
 *' England notes? and with that view do you not 
 " remit to London such Bank of England notes 
 " as you niay receive, beyond the amount whicli 
 " you may think it prudent to keep as a deposit 
 "in your coffers?" 
 
 He answers, " U?igiiesiionah/i/." 
 ** What is the principle by which you regu- 
 *' late tlie issue of your notes ?" 
 
 " We always keep assets enough in London, 
 " consisting of sioch; E.vchequer-bills, and other 
 " comertible property sufficient to pay the whole 
 " of our notes in circulation." 
 
 " Supposing that the amount of the notes oi 
 " the Bank of England were to be materially di- 
 " niinished, is it your opinion that the notes of 
 *' country banks would take their place?" 
 
 " As a matter of opinion, I should imagine, 
 " that in thoae parts o/' Englaful wlicre Bank of 
 " England notes circulate, if they were to be 
 " uithdraiin, their places zuould be immediately 
 ^^ filed up by tlie notes of country banks ; and I 
 *' would illustrate this opinion, by the example 
 *' of the county of Lancaster, where the notes of 
 '* tlie Bank of England are the chief circulation 
 " for small payments." 
 
 '^ Rige 130;
 
 " Is it your opinion that a country bank re- 
 ** gulates its issues in proportion to its deposits 
 ** of Bank of England notes or specie ?" 
 
 " We regulate ours by the assets we have in 
 ** London (as I have before stated) to pay them, 
 ** mthout muck reference to the quantity of Bank 
 " of England notes or specie which we have, al- 
 *' though we always keep a quantity of both of 
 " the latter in our coffers to pay occasional de- 
 **■ mands made in the country/' 
 ■ Such is the evidence of Mr. Stuckey. But 
 what is the conclusion drawn by the Commit- 
 tee? No other than this — "That so long as 
 *' the cash payments of the Bank are suspended, 
 *' the whole paper of the country bankers is a 
 " superstructure raised upon the foundation of 
 " the paper of the Bank of England." 
 
 I proceed to tlie twelfth Resolution, and ad- 
 mit, as every one must, the general truth of the 
 fact which it affnms, though I must observe, 
 that the words, *' a considerable period of time" 
 are too vague, and ought to be made more defi- 
 mtidj if it could be proper to admit the Resolu- 
 tion. But forming a part of a series of propo- 
 vsitions, such as we have before us, it is impos- 
 sible for me to agree to it, and standing alone, 
 it would be nugatory and unmeaning, and 
 -therefore unfit to be placed upon the Journals. 
 
 The thirteenth Resolution is really a most ex-
 
 57 
 
 tiaordinary composition. Pressed by the force 
 of undeniable facts, tbe Lcuined Cicntleuiun 
 cannot avoid admitting, tbat " the adverse cir- 
 " cumstances of our trade, to<»,etiier with tlie 
 *' large amount of our military expeijditure 
 " abroad, majf liave contributed to render our ex* 
 " changes with the continent of Europe unfa- 
 *' vourable." This concession to fact ant I com^ 
 mon sense is indeed made with great caution 
 and evident reluctance; but it amounts very 
 nearly to giving up the question. My thir* 
 teenth and iifteenth Prv-positions are little more 
 than an expansion of this part of the Learned 
 Chairman's Resolution. 
 
 Admitting, as he does, the effect, upon the 
 exchange, of the circumstances alluded to, by 
 what scale can he measure the precise degree 
 of their operation, or avoid agreeing with me, 
 that they may have produced the whole of th^ 
 depression we observer No, says tlie remaining 
 part of the Resolution; *' the extraordinary de- 
 " gree, in which the exchanges ha\e been de- 
 " pressed for so long a period, has been in a great 
 '* measure occasioned by tlie depreciati m w hich 
 *' has taken place in the relative value of the 
 •' currency of this country, as compared witli the 
 " money of foreign countries." 
 
 Here then is a completely new sense given to 
 the word dcprcciatioti. 1 have already troubled 
 I
 
 5^ 
 
 you, Sir (I fear too long), on two krnds of de- 
 preciation ; a depreciation, compared with legal 
 coin, and a depreciation compared with commo- 
 dities: these two kinds both take place at home; 
 but now we have one which happens abroad — a 
 depreciation compared with the money of foreign 
 countries. This is never hinted at in the Report, 
 which dwells largely upon one or the other, or 
 both of tlie two senses which I have mentioned. 
 The Bullion Committee are resolved to have de- 
 preciation; give them but depreciation, no matter 
 what it means. But what is the real meaning 
 of a deprtf'iation compared zvith the money of fo- 
 reign countries ; and has it (I ask with all sub- 
 mission) any meaning at all? No man ever sup- 
 posed English Bank-notes were exchangeable 
 for foreign money abroad, or before this Resolu- 
 tion thought of ^^ng they were depreciated 
 because not so excnano-eable. The same thine: 
 is equally true of English guineas. 
 
 It may indeed be said, that when the exchange 
 with Hamburgh, for instance, is at thirty-six, 
 the money of Hamburgh loses \^hen compared 
 with the money of England; an#|hat when the 
 exchange tli^ at thirty, the money of England 
 loses when compared with the money of Ham- 
 burgh; and this loss is, I suppose, what the 
 Resolution calls depreciation. If this is the 
 meaning of the phrase, and I can extractno 
 other from it, it amounts to
 
 59 
 
 than a diflferent expression for an unfavour- 
 able exchange ; and for sucli a definition of 
 exchange I need only refer to the Honourable 
 Gentleman near n^ie (Mr. H. Thornton) : 
 "What," said that Honourable Gentleman, "do 
 " we mean by the rate of the exchanges ? We 
 " mean the rate at which the circulating me- 
 " dium of this kingdom passes in exchange for 
 " the circulating medium of other countries." 
 The true sense of this bugbear Resolution is 
 then only this, that part of the fall of the 
 exchange is owing to causes, about which 
 we are perfectly agreed, and to which indeed, 
 I, in common with the witnesses, attribute the 
 M'iiole of it ; but that in great part it is pro- 
 duced by nothing but the fall of the exchange it- 
 self : a mode of reasoning, which I am sure 
 the Learned Cliairman of the IkiUion Commit- 
 tee is too good a logician, dehberately to de- 
 fend, though he may have been inadvertently 
 led into it by tlie indistinctness of his own ex- 
 pressions. 
 
 With regard to the fourteenth Resolution, I 
 should think the ambiguity of it, a sufficient 
 reason for its rejection. It imposes a solenm 
 duty on the Directors of the 13aiik ; but instead 
 of letting them know what that duty is, it 
 leaves them to guess at it as they can. It di- 
 rects them " to advert to the state of the f(»- 
 " Jfign exchanges, as well as to the price of bul-
 
 *' lion, with a view to regulate the amount of 
 " their issues;" but it does not tell them, whether 
 in any given case (suppose when the excl)ange 
 falls), they are to diminish or to increase their 
 issues. Now a precise direction was the motfe 
 necessary, because the Governor and Peputy 
 Governor of the Bank tell you in their evi- 
 dence, that, in their opinion, the issues of thte 
 Bank have no effect upon the exchange. And, 
 indeed, I can trace no connexion between then; 
 in examining the accounts upon the table. Wfe 
 have seen^the course of exchange both rise and 
 
 I fall, when'.there was an increased issue of Bank- 
 notes; we: have seen the sarne circumstances 
 
 itake place when the issue was diminished; 
 therelbre, if the exchange is affected, whicli may 
 he doubtful, by the issue of Bank-notes, it is 
 certainly not governed by it. I should, how- 
 ever, equally object to the Resolution, if it were 
 made, as it ought to be, distinct and imperative; 
 Ijiecause, by taking from the Bank Directors that 
 discretion which they are best able to exercise, 
 we should run the risk of doing great mischief 
 in the pursuit of an object, which experience has 
 shown to be unattainable. Tliere are, undoubt- 
 edly, reasons, connected with the concerns of 
 the Bank, why the Directors should attend to 
 the course of exchange ; but they are not such 
 as uniformly to Icoid either to an increase or dr- 
 iiiiaution of issues. As long as the management
 
 .61 
 
 ©f the Affairs of the Bank is left m their hancl$ 
 .uncontrolled!, they will apply their judgment 
 to the circumstances of each case, as it maf 
 arise, and act under a sense of responsibility td 
 Parliament and to tli^e public, as well as to their 
 own corporation. But this Resolution would 
 tSike that responsibility from them, and where 
 would it place it? To whom are the Director* 
 to apply for instructions in a case of doubt? Td 
 Parliament? Parliament may not be sitting. — 
 To the Treasury? I believe no man who wishe$ 
 well to public credit, would desire to place tli6 
 Bank under the control of the Treasury. . And 
 who will say that either Parliament or the Trea- 
 sury can be so well acquainted with the com- 
 plicated details which enter into the considera- 
 tion of a question of this kind, as the Di* 
 rectors themselves ? Perhaps the Learned Ghair- 
 pan may say, that no such reference can be ne- 
 cessary ; that his rule is meant to be invariable, 
 and that in all cases whatever, when the ex- 
 change falls, the issues of the Bank should be 
 contracted. To prove his mistake, it is only 
 necessary to read a sentence of his own Bullion 
 Report * : *.* Your Committee are clearly of opi- 
 V nion, that although it ought to be the general 
 -" policy of the Bank Directors to diminish their 
 ■ * paper, in the event of a long continuance of a 
 
 * Pagf 36.
 
 6Z 
 
 *' high price of bullion, and a very unfavourable 
 *' exchange, yet it is essential to the commercial 
 *^ interests of this country, and to the general fuU 
 " filment of those mercantile engagements which 
 " a fiee issue of psper may have occasioned, that 
 " the accustomed degree of accommodation to the 
 " merchants should pot be suddenly and materi- 
 ** ally reduced; and that if any general and serious 
 " difficulty or apprehension on this subject 
 *' should arise, it may, in the judgment of your 
 f* Committee, be counteracted without dan- 
 *' ger, and with advantage to the public, by a 
 '' liberality in the issue of Bank of England pa- 
 .*' per proportioned to the urgency of the parti- 
 " cular occasion." 
 
 I also object to this Ptesolution as implying a 
 censure on the Directors of the Bank, which, 
 in my opinion, their conduct has not deserved, 
 but vvhich, if supposed to be merited, ought to 
 Jiave been so distinctly expressed as to be capable 
 of a direct answer. 
 
 On the fifteenth Resolution I shall only say, that 
 I am ready, in the fullest manner, to admit the 
 great importance of the legal convertibility of 
 our circulating paper into coin, not because I 
 think it the only security against an excess of 
 paper, but because it is the only adequate re- 
 medy for public alarm. It is impossible to foresee 
 to what extent public alarm may go, or what its 
 consequences may be, in a country in which
 
 b3 
 
 the circulating medium possesses no intrinsic 
 value. For this reason I admit the convertibiUty 
 of paper into coin to be of the greatest import- 
 ance, although, while no alarm exists, and cre- 
 dit is entire, it seems to me indifferent of which 
 our circulation maj' consist, as either will equally 
 answer all the purposes of currency. 
 
 But tliough I agree thus far with my Learned 
 Friend, I disapprove of his Resolution, as di- 
 rectly leading to that last Resolution which he 
 lias at present (so strangely I think) withdrawn 
 from our consideration. Without that Resolu- 
 tion, it is utterly useless — with it, it would be 
 dangerous and injurious. It is easy to see the 
 evils of our situation, but at present we unfor- 
 tunately have not the means of applying a re- 
 medy. I am sure the plan of the Bullion Com- 
 mittee proposed in these two last Resolutions, 
 would not operate beneficially. 
 . Let us consider the efiect of an immediate 
 resumption of cash payments. It would intro- 
 duce the use of gold in our internal transactions, 
 a circumstance desirable, no doubt; but is the 
 attainment of that object worth the risk which 
 must be encountered? No improvement of the 
 exchange could take place unless our coin weie 
 exported, a measure whicii even tlie Bullion 
 Committee have not ventured to recommend, 
 however clearly arising out of their principles. 
 But supposing those principles carried to their
 
 ^4i 
 
 titmost extent, and the free exportation of ouf^ 
 gold Coin permitted, who can doubt that the 
 drain of it would be so great as to force Us to 
 have recourse, from direct necessity, to a fresh 
 restriction, under circumstances still more mi- 
 favourable and alarming than the present? The 
 whole effect of the attempt would be to destroy. 
 our credit, and increase our danger. 
 
 The Committee themselves have not, however, 
 ventured to recommend an immediate resump- 
 tion of cash paj-ments. They propose it after 
 the expiration of two years : and I am parti cu-^ 
 larly desirous to turn the attention of the Plouse 
 to the interval between the determination that 
 the Bank should resume its cash paymentSj and 
 the actual commencement of those payments. 
 This would be a most important period, and 
 pregnant with the utmost danger. The Bank 
 would be under the necessity of collecting a 
 large quantity of bullion, in order to answer the 
 demands which would of course be made upon 
 it, and that necessity would make the rate of 
 exchange still more unfavourable to us, because 
 the price of bullion would augment every where 
 in proportion to the supposed wants of so great 
 a purchaser ; and the effect upon the exchange 
 Avould, from the peculiar nature of the article, 
 be still greater than would be occasioned by thfr 
 purchase of other commodities. 
 
 The bullion so collected would remain locked
 
 65 
 
 up in the Bank without behig of the smallest 
 use, (luring the interval, to any person what- 
 ever. It is indeed contended, in the Bullion 
 Report, that the knowledge of the approaching 
 resumption of cash payments would of itself 
 increase the public confidence; but this I deny, 
 because its tendency to produce that effect would 
 be much more than counterbalanced by the otlier 
 consequences which must result from it, one 
 of which is, that the Bank would be forced, 
 from motives of self-preservation, to circum- 
 scribe its issues of paper, in order to lessen the 
 demands which might be made upon it when the 
 period of cash payments arrived, and at the 
 same time to collect, by every possible method, 
 all the gold which could be met with. 
 
 Now I wish the House to consider the situa- 
 tion in which the government, the merchant, 
 and indeed every class of men, would be placed, 
 if the issues of Bank-notes were greatly dimi- 
 nished, while gold was even scarcer that at pre- 
 sent. It would be a situation which cannot 
 be contemplated without the most serious alarm. 
 What other currency can be substituted when 
 both coin and Bank-notes shall have disappeared? 
 It is possible, and indeed probable, that the ex- 
 tremity of the evil might produce a remedy, 
 by forcing the notes of country banks into 
 general circulation, as has been pointed out in the 
 evidence of Mr. Stuckey, which I have quoted. 
 
 K
 
 66 
 
 In which case the remedy proposed by the Com- 
 rnittee for an excess of paper would end in the 
 mere substitution of a paper less secure, and of 
 inferior vahie. 
 
 But what would be the other alternative ? I 
 beg to state it in the words of an Honourable 
 Friend of mine, a leading Member of the Bul- 
 lion Committee (Mr. Henry Thornton), on his 
 examination before the Secret Committee of the 
 House of Lords in 1797. 
 
 He was asked, " If any considerable propor- 
 ** tion of the Bank advances to Government had 
 " been repaid in the course of the last two years 
 " (suppose to the extent of four or five millions), 
 " are you of opinion that a reduction in the quan- 
 " tity of Bank-notes to that extent could have 
 " been made without occasioning great public dis- 
 " tress ?" — " I am clearly of opinion, that a reduc- 
 " tion of Bank-notes to the extent of 5,000,000/. 
 ** less than their hitherto existing amount, would 
 " either producc^ the substitution of some other 
 " paper, nearly to the same, or perhaps to a still 
 " greater amount; or, assuming no such substitu- 
 " tion to take place, that it would produce very 
 " general, if not universal failures, in the metro- 
 " polis." 
 
 For this opinion he then gives his reasons, 
 which appear to me perfectly clear and satis- 
 factory. Now, I would ask the Honourable 
 Gentleman — I would ask the House, whether
 
 67 
 
 if, in 1797, while our metallic currency was still 
 abundant, the diminution of Bank-notes to the 
 amount of five millions, would have produced a 
 general bankruptcy in London, what the effect 
 of a proportionate diminution would he7iow? 
 I would ask them further, whether they are so 
 confident of the success of the plan of the Bul- 
 lion Committee, so impressed with its benefits, 
 as to think the attempt worth the risk of a ge- 
 neral bankruptcy ? Of bankruptcies- we have 
 had enough — enough to make the heart ache— 
 and great indeed must be my opinicm of the 
 advantages of any measure, deep my conviction 
 of its necessity,, before I can consent to run any 
 hazard of extending them further. 
 
 Having taken this brief review of the Reso- 
 lutions proposed by my Learned Friend, I shall 
 shortly touch on those Propositions which it is 
 my intention to ofler to the consideration of the 
 House, in the event of the rejection of them. 
 
 The general object of my Propositions is, to 
 show, by a deduction of historical facts, thafj 
 there is nothing in our present situation with 
 respect to foreign exchanges, and the price. of 
 bullion, new in its nature ; though in degree, from ^r>^ 
 the concurrence of a variety of extraordinary 
 circumstances, it may exceed what has fornterly 
 taken place. It is not, as I have already said, 
 my wish to pledge the Hou.sc to a recog- 
 nition of abstract principles, but to record lucts, i
 
 6S 
 
 and from them to draw this only inference, that 
 it would be unwise to endeavour, by an altera- 
 tion in our internal currency, which is m itself 
 impracticable or highly dangerous, to remedy 
 inconveniencies which we have no sufficient 
 reason to believe the state of our internal cur- 
 rency has produced. 
 
 In the place of the first seven Resolutions of 
 the Learned Gentleman, I mean to propose a 
 general Resolution, stating the right of the So- 
 vereign to regulate the legal current coin of the 
 kingdom. In opposition to his doctrine of a 
 fixed and invariable standard of current coin, I 
 am prepared to prove the prerogati\e of the 
 Crown to regulate the standard, by a reference 
 to the soundest legal authorities, and the re- 
 peated and acknowledged practice of ages. I 
 must, however, guard against a misrepresenta- 
 tion, in which I find the Chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer is involved, as well as myself; as if / 
 had intended toreconimcnd, and (Mhich would be 
 much more important) as if he had insinuated 
 an intention of proposing, an alteration in the 
 standard of our money. With respect io the 
 Right Honourable Gentleman, I believe J may 
 venture to affirm, that the idea is utterly un- 
 founded ; and with regard to myselt^ I can as- 
 sure the House that I should be a most deter- 
 jnined adversary to any such proposition. 
 
 Purinjg the existence of a public debt, the 
 
 I
 
 69 
 
 alteration of the standard of money would be 
 an act of bankruptcy, and a direct fraud on the 
 public creditor as well as every private creditor; 
 and if tiuie admitted of going into the discus- 
 sion, I could prove it to be an act of useless 
 and unprofitable injustice, productive of no ad- 
 vantages whatever to the state. 
 
 My second Proposition is intended to correct 
 an error of my Learned Friend, respecting the 
 nature of the promissory notes issued by the 
 Bank. He has attempted, without the slightest 
 foundation, to establish an opinion, that the 
 value of Bank-notes was to be measured by the 
 price of standard bullion. I propose, in answer 
 to this opinion, to declare, that they are repre- 
 sentatives of legal coin, and of nothing else — 
 not more of bullion than of any other commo- 
 dity. But it is also due, in justice to the Bank, 
 to declare, what is perfectly true, that it was for 
 a century always ready strictly to execute its 
 engagements, and has been prevented from con- 
 tinuing to do so, not by any act of its own, 
 but by the interposition of the Legislature. For 
 it must be recollected, that the restriction of 
 cash payments was a measure ot* public policy, 
 not a favour to the Bank. It was originally 
 imposed, and has been since continued, for rea- 
 sons connected with the safety of the state, and 
 fiot upon any application of that corporation. 
 And there is nothins; in this or anv other Reso-
 
 70 
 
 lution which I shall propose, which can have 
 the effect of preventing Piirliament from re- 
 moving the restriction, whenever it may be com- 
 patible with the public safety to do so. 
 
 I now come to the third Proposition, on which 
 my Learned Friend has already thought fit to 
 touch, and on which, as it involves the prin- 
 cipal point of difi'erence between the Commit- 
 tee and me, I cannot but expect much discus- 
 sion whenever it may come form.all}^ before the 
 House. 
 
 My first object in it is, to come to a clear and 
 distinct understaiidiiig of the question with those 
 Gentlemeji who maintain the depreciation of 
 Bank-notes. In the controversy which has 
 taken place, the depreciation of Bank-notes has 
 been talked of in such a variety of senses, that 
 thv":gh I am sure liie phrase is extremely mis- 
 chievous, and has done great injury to public, 
 credit, because I am certain that it is commonly 
 understood, both at hom.e and abroad, in one 
 sense ciil}', and that the most alarming of 
 any, I do not know but that I may think the 
 real meaniiig affixed to it by many of those who 
 assert its existence perfectly innocent, and even 
 by possibility, may agree with them. 
 
 I have, therefore, so framed the Resolution, 
 that every Gentleman may, and ought to vote 
 for it, who does not believe that Bank-notes 
 have lost their value in ordinary and legal trans-
 
 71 
 
 actions as compared with the current coi.: of 
 the realm which they represent. Iho^e who 
 contend for the depreciation of Bank-notes in 
 any of the other fanciful senses which I have 
 before had occasion to discuss, ought all to vote 
 with me upon this question. And in that num- 
 ber I cannot but hope to find the nicmbersof the 
 Bullion Committee, who have by no means ex- 
 pressed a clear opinion in their Report that Bank- 
 notes have lost their relative value with reference 
 to coin. But particularly I look for the support 
 of the Honourable Gentleman who some time 
 ago declined answering my question (Mr. Hus- 
 kisson), as he has distinctly told the public *, 
 that " the experience of our own as well as of 
 "all other countries, has placed beyond the reach 
 ^' of controversy, the proposition, that if one part 
 " of the currency of a country' (provided such 
 currency be made either directly or virtually a 
 legal tender, according to its denomination, 
 which he contends Bank-notes are) " be depre- 
 " ciated, the whole of that currency^ whether paper 
 " or coin, must be equally depreciated." Now, 
 if guineas be as much depreciated as Bank-notes, 
 Bank-notes arc of as much value as guineas ; and 
 that is certainly all which tl,e Proposition aiiirms. 
 I am so far from making this appeal with any iu- 
 iiidious view, that I seriously declare, that I tlxiuk 
 
 • Question stated, Preface, p. vii.
 
 72 
 
 the concurrence of those Gentlemen in this Re- 
 solution would be a remedy for that mischief, 
 of which, so contrary to their wishes and in- 
 tentions, tlieir Report has been the cause. 
 
 I have, however, another object in this Pro- 
 position. On a question so long- and so warmly 
 contested, I think Parliament ought not to stop 
 at the niere rejection of a measure proposed 
 to it, but to pronounce a distinct opinion, and 
 that an opinion so pronounced will do much to- 
 wards setting the question itself at rest. I wish 
 the House to pledge itself to the belief that Bank- 
 notes still are, as they have always been, equi- 
 valent to legal coin for the internal purposes of 
 the country, the only purposes to which they 
 ever have been applicable. 
 
 An opinion so declared will have an effect 
 similar to that of an association to support the 
 credit of the Bank. Many Members will re- 
 collect the effect produced by tlie association 
 of the merchants and bankers in 1797- It in- 
 j»tantaneously dispelled all doubt and alarm, and 
 restored credit and confidence. I believe the 
 merchants and bankers are now quite as ready 
 to renew such an association. Perhaps, indeed, 
 it is not necessary ; for their opinions are suffi- 
 ciently known. It is not on the Royal Ex- 
 change that the depreciation of Bank-notes is 
 talked of. But this Resolution, uniting the 
 
 I
 
 73 
 
 sense of Pailiament in tlic same cause, will givo 
 weight and strength to their declared ojDinion. 
 
 I have introduced into the Resolution, since 
 it was first drawn up (as has been observed), 
 the words, " in public estimation,'" with a view 
 of obviating any supposition that I meant to 
 affirm that Hank-notes had a legal equivalency 
 to coin. I never had any idea of doing so : and 
 it would be peculiarly improper to propose to 
 the House any declaration on this subject at 
 present, wlien the Judges actually have under 
 their consideration a criminal case, in which 
 their decision may turn on this very point. 
 
 The following Propositions, down to the 
 fourteenth, contain a comparison of the cir- 
 cumstances at present afiecting our relations 
 with foreign countries with those which have 
 existed in former times, and show by his- 
 torical deduction, that we have no reason to 
 attribute the present depression of the exchange 
 to the state of our paper circulation, because 
 similar depressions have formerly taken place 
 when no paper circulation existed, or no other 
 than what was convertible at pleasure into coin ; 
 and that the degree and duration of the present 
 dep;ression may be accounted fjr by the extraor- 
 dinary circumstances of our )nilitnry, political, 
 and commercial .situation ; and tiii.s conclusion 
 is distinctly drawn in the fifteenth Proposition. 
 
 The facts contaiaed iu these Propositions I 
 
 L
 
 74 
 
 believe to be unquestionably true, and I am 
 prepared to prove them whenever it may be 
 proper to do so, by reference to the documents 
 on the Table of the House, and other authentic 
 information. 
 
 At present I shall only observe, that the ana- 
 logy of former instances would lead us to 
 ascribe tlie depression of the exchange princi- 
 pally to the combination of a great military ex- 
 penditure abroad, with a high price and large 
 importation of grain. When either of these 
 circumstances has occurred, the exchange has 
 usually become unfavourable ; when they have 
 been united, it has never failed to do so- 
 These are circumstances wholly unconnected 
 with our internal currency ; and circumstances 
 probably unavoidable, and not imputable to any 
 blamable conduct whatever. 
 
 In our military expenses, we are paying the 
 price, a heavy and inconvenient price I admit, 
 of a glorious struggle not only for our own in- 
 dependence, but for the liberty and independ- 
 ence of the human race at large, now threatened 
 with universal subjugation. On the principle 
 of supporting such a struggle with our utmost 
 efforts, I have heard no dissentient voice, and, 
 as to all details respecting the means, of doing 
 it, it is not now the time to enter upon them. 
 
 Still less can any doubt be entertained with 
 respect to the propriety of the importations of
 
 7S 
 
 grain which have taken place in a season of 
 dearth, in which the price has approaclied 
 to that of the greatest scarcity. The Right 
 Honourable Vice-President of the Board of 
 Trade has explained the reasons which induced 
 the Privy Council to give encouragement to 
 these importations, and they were reasons of 
 cogent and imperious necessity. 
 
 The Council were not unaware, that, by so 
 doing, they were likely to aggravate the evils of 
 an unfavourable exchange ; but the subsistence 
 of the people was, as it ought to be, an object 
 superior to all considerations of commercial con- 
 venience. 
 
 Great, however, as the effects, upon the ex- 
 change, of our military expenses combined with 
 the importation of grain must have been, tliey 
 could neither have been so great nor so lasting,, 
 had the freedom of commercial intercourse 
 existed as in former times. In this the real 
 novelty of our situation consists. For though I 
 do not carry the doctrine of commercial equi- 
 valents so far as the Honourable Gentleman op- 
 posite (Mr. Huskisson), I admit that there is a 
 continual tendency in an unfavourable exchange 
 to correct itself by checking importation and 
 encouraging exportation, and that, though for 
 a time it may be overpowered by political emer- 
 gencies, or by pressing calls for articles of un- 
 avoidable necessity; yet, if freedom of trade 
 L 2
 
 76 
 
 exists, it will usually prevent any excessive in-r 
 equality, and in no long time restore the ba- 
 lance. 
 
 The fourteenth Proposition is intended to 
 show, that on account of the extension of 
 trade, and tlic great inciease of our public re- 
 venue and expenditure since 1797, a more abun- 
 dant currency is necessary to carry on the bu- 
 siness of the country, and that we should have 
 no reason to conclude that our currency was ex- 
 cessive if it should appear considerably to ex- 
 ceed in amount what then existed. This, how- 
 ever, I believe to be so far from the fact, that 
 the diminution of coin is, perhaps, fully equal 
 to the increase of paper circulation. 
 
 I am now arrived at the last and most im- 
 portant Propositions, those wliich respect the 
 removal of the Bank restriction. On the fif- 
 teenth Proposition, which declares " that it is 
 *' highly important, that the restriction should be 
 *' removed whenever tlie political andcommercial 
 " relations of the country shall render it compa- 
 " tible with the public interest," 1 need say no- 
 thing, as the Gentlemen against whom 1 have 
 been arguing, entirely concur in the same opi- 
 nion, and I believe that a difference on this 
 point scarcely any where exists. 
 
 Nor shall I think it necessary to dwell long 
 upon the last Proposition, so much of the rea-: 
 soning w hich I have applied to other points.
 
 havins: a direct lefercncxj to tliis. If I have 
 succeeded in sliouing the fallacy of tliose ar- 
 gLimeiits hy which it is attempted to prove the 
 excess and depreciation of our currency, I need 
 say no more to estabhsh the inexpediency of 
 taking a step vhich all admit to be attended 
 A\ ith danger, rs a remedy to an imaginary evil. 
 I have ai5>o, as J think, shown that the removal 
 of the Bank restriction would not have the effect 
 of restoring a favourable course of exchange. 
 
 But my great objection to the removal of the 
 restriction at the end of the proposed period of 
 two years, is, that unless a change of circum- 
 stances, contrary to all probability, should take 
 place in the mean time, the resumption of cash 
 payments at the period proposed, would be 
 wholly impracticable. The very Report of the 
 Bullion Committee states the impracticability of 
 an immediate, or very early, resumption of cash 
 payments. " Your Committee," it says, " are of 
 " opinion that if peace were immediately to be ra- 
 " tified, in the present state of our circulation it 
 " would be most hazardous to compel the Bank to 
 "pay cash in six months, and would be found 
 " wholly inipracticable." They are, therefore, it 
 further says, " of opinion that even if peace 
 "should intervene, two years should be given to 
 " the Bank for resuming its payments ; but that,, 
 " even if the war should be prolonged, cash pay-
 
 78 
 
 " ments should be resumed by the end of that 
 " period." 
 
 Do the Committee then mean to contend that 
 there is no difference between war, such a war 
 as the present, and peace? Do they think that 
 peace would give no additional security and fa- 
 ■ cility to the Bank, in preparing for the resump- 
 ; tion of cash payments ? Are they of opinion 
 that it would atibrd no advantages to the Go- 
 vernment in so arranging its pecuniary con- 
 cerns, as to be independent of assistance from 
 the Bank — that it would give no stability to 
 commercial credit in general ? Will they affirm 
 that their Chairman is entirely mistaken in 
 admitting in his fifteenth Resolution, that 
 " the adverse circumstances of our trade, 
 " together with the large amount of our niili- 
 " tary expenditure abroad, may have contributed 
 " to render our exchanges unfavourable?" or 
 to what miraculous aid do they look for re- 
 moving these unfavourable circumstances, and 
 making it indifferent whether we have war or 
 peace ? 
 
 It would really appear that they thought it 
 inchfferent, from the mode in which regret is 
 expressed in the Report *, " that the suspension 
 " of cash payments has been continued so long ; 
 " and particularly that by the manner in which 
 
 * Page 38.
 
 79 
 
 " the present continuing Act is framed, the 
 "cliaiacter should have been given to it of a 
 " permanent war measure." 
 
 That the suspension has, from necessity, been 
 continued so long, we must all regret. Once, 
 and once only, there appeared a prospect of a 
 change of circumstances which might admit of 
 its removal, and the Directors of the Bank, it 
 ought to be remembered, immediately took 
 measures which proved the sincerity of their 
 desire that it might be removed. In the year 
 1798, and the early part of 1799, the course of 
 exchange was remarkably favourable, and the 
 Bank, in consequence, as a prelude to a general 
 resumption of cash payments, obtained per- 
 mission, pursuant to a clause in the Restriction 
 Act, to pay sums under live pounds in cash. 
 Under this permission, large sums, much larger 
 than the public ate generally aware of, have ac- 
 tually been paid. The reneual of war on the 
 Continent, and still more the failing harvests 
 of 1799 and 1800, destroyed our hopes, and I 
 will venture to say there has never been a mo.» 
 ment since, in which the restriction could safely 
 have been removed;. 
 
 With respect to the present continuing Act, 
 1 am not ashamed, however it may expose me 
 to the censure of the Bullion Committee, to de- 
 clare my adherence to the opinions of the Par- 
 liament of 1804, and the Administration by
 
 ^0 
 
 whom that Act was proposed. Of that Admi- 
 nistration, after such a b.pse of time, and so 
 great a change of circumstances, I mean to 
 speak historically only wheii I say, that, on the 
 most careful review of their measures, political, 
 military, and financial, I see no reason to think 
 them inferior either in judgment, foresight, or 
 vigour, to any, either of their predecessors or 
 successors. 
 
 With respect to this particular measure, I 
 think it an instance of their judgment and fore- 
 sight. It was certainly meant as a pevmanent 
 war measure — not as an ordinary war measure, 
 but one which the peculiar circumstances of the 
 present war would render necessary during its 
 continuance; subject undoubtedly to the revision 
 of Parliament, if, contrary to appearances then 
 existing, the character of the war should so 
 change as to admit of its being dispensed 
 with. 
 
 Have then the circumstances of the war so 
 changed since that time, as to show that this 
 opinion was ill-founded ? Have they not, on the 
 contraiy, from year to year assumed a character 
 still more decidedly confirming \t} 
 
 It is um;ecessary to go into a detail of par- 
 ticulais where the general result is so clear as 
 to force conviction on the mind ; but if there 
 has never since been a moment at which the 
 restriction could §afely have been removed-r-
 
 84 
 
 ii"", on the contrary, circumstances have arisen, 
 which woukl have imperiously required its im- 
 |jositioij, had it not been aheady in force — if the 
 appearance of our present circumstances be such, 
 as more than ever to enforce its necessity, and 
 to place the possibility of its reuioval in doubt 
 and distance, shall we impeach the judgment 
 and foresii>-ht of those who, foresccinij: the o-e- 
 neral state of things, though not the particular 
 events, provided in time for the emergenc}'? 
 
 They knew that the conclusion oi' peace must 
 make an important difference in our situation. 
 Whether in that event the Bank restriction can 
 safely be removed, after so sliort a period as 
 six months, it is impossible, as yet, to judge, be- 
 cause we cannot foresee the circumstances under 
 which peace may be concluded. liut Parliament 
 has wisely fixed the shortest term in any degree 
 probable, because it will be nmch easier to ex- 
 tend it, if necessary, than to contract it. 
 
 Let us, however, consider the additional 
 means of mercantile accommodation which 
 peace will aflord. A debt from Ciovernment 
 to the Bank of no less than seven millions and 
 a half will become payable : the liquidation of 
 the other parts of the unfunded debt, and the 
 general rise of the public funds, will give great 
 facility to individual credit — above all, a sink- 
 ing fund of twelve millions will then U' poured
 
 into the money-market without being counter- 
 acted by new loans. 
 
 Such means of supplying additional capital no 
 country ever possessed. Some inconveniences 
 may perhaps, in process of time, even arise from 
 their abundance ; but of these it is not now ne- 
 cessary to speak. My object is only to justify 
 the Parliament of 1 804, in fixing the resumption 
 of cash payments at the period of peace. 
 
 That Parliament also felt, what I think the 
 Bullion Committee are a little apt to forget, that 
 the Bank-restriction is not a thino- to be trifled 
 
 o 
 
 with, nor without public inconvenience to be 
 brought into frequent discussion. 
 
 I think the Committee must forget this, be- 
 cause, after all, they propose their measure as an 
 experiment. They speak * of the " possible 
 " occurrence of political circumstances, which 
 " may be thought hereafter to furnish an argu- 
 ^' ment in favour of some prolongation of the pro- 
 " posed period of resuming cash payments, or even 
 " in favour of a new law for their temporary re- 
 *' striction after the Bank shall have opened." For 
 tliis experiment, which they are conscious may 
 fail — which / think rash, desperate, and wholly 
 impracticable, what do they risk ? They risk, 
 as we are told by one of their most distinguished 
 
 * Report of Bullion Committee, page 35.
 
 83 
 
 members (Mr. Henry Thornton), a general bank- 
 ruptcy in London. Such is the danger to indi- 
 viduals. And what will be the consequences to 
 the Government.'* We have heard the Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer complain of the incon- 
 venience occasioned by the delay of this ques- 
 tion. Whether he is provided with a system of 
 measures to be proposed to Parhament in the 
 event of its acceding to the recommendation of 
 the Bullion Report, I do not know : but I know, 
 that, if he is, they must be measures wholh^ new 
 and discordant from the financial systems of 
 many years past. 
 
 To carry on the operations of the war for the 
 next two years, not only without the accommo- 
 dations afforded by the Bank, not only under 
 the inconvenience of a forced repayment of the 
 Bank-advances, but under the pressure of a cir- 
 culation so contracted and cramped, as it neces- 
 sarily must be, is a task which no minister has 
 yet been compelled to attempt, and which, if it 
 can be any way effected, can be accomphslied only 
 by a pressure upon the people far greater than 
 they have yet experienced. I suspect that it 
 could not be effected at all, and that if we were 
 not compelled to sue for peace, we should at 
 least be obliged to recall our forces from abroad, 
 and abandon the continental war, just at the 
 moment when the concurrent opinion appears to 
 M 2
 
 be, that taiicr prospects than we have yet 
 known are opening. 
 
 This is no vague and declamatory statement, 
 but founded lipon experience, as well as reasoning. 
 The /)/// experience of such a situation as ours 
 would be under the system of the Bullion Com- 
 mittee, we have never indeed had ; but we have, 
 in two preriods referred to by them for other 
 purposes in their Report, felt the efl^cts of a 
 restricted circulation. In 1783 the issues of 
 the Bank of England were considerably reduced ; 
 and though peace had then been concluded, the 
 3 per cent, funds were at 5G, Naw Bills were at 
 from 1^ to CO per cent, discount, and the ge- 
 neral depression of property so great, that the 
 resources of the country were by many supposed 
 to be irrecoverably ruined. In 179G the Bank 
 again reduced fts issues, and the effects were 
 similar. The public funds were even lower, 
 falling at that time to 4v'i». I do not contend 
 that the diminution of the issues of the Bank 
 alone produced these eticcts ; but if fhe othey 
 circumstances existing at t,hose two periods 
 be compared with those of our pnosent si- 
 tuation, I am afraid the advantage will be 
 hy no means in cur favour.. In two most 
 important points how great is the dlifferencer 
 In one of ike.se cases the freedom of trade was. 
 complete — in the othp\ it existed to a consi- 
 derable degiec — in bothy a plentiful metallic cur-
 
 8J 
 
 reucy coiilinued in circulaliun. I need rot 
 point out our present situation in both those 
 respects. Nor shall I attempt to estimate what 
 the revenue might amount, to \\]\l'u every man, 
 wlio did not wish to pay his taxes, might say, 
 vsith apparent tiuth, tliat lie coukl obtain no 
 money of any kind to discharge them; and 
 those wlio were wilhng to pay, might be under 
 a real impossiI)ility of doing so. 
 
 I camiot indeed, whatever may be the deci- 
 sion of Parliament, pretend to penetrate the 
 ilarkness of futurity — to foresee whether our arms 
 will be successful or unfortunate — whether the 
 Continent will break its fetters, or remain in sub- 
 jection — whether commerce will recover freedom 
 and activity, or vemain palsied by tlje frown of 
 a despot; but I am anxious that the arm of 
 Government should be strengthened ratlier than 
 crippled, and that we sliould not give up the 
 chances of success, and the means of availing 
 ourselves of any favourable events which Pro- 
 vidence may grant us. 
 
 I think we shall best preserve them by ad- 
 liering calmly and firmly to the system which I 
 recommend — not on my own authority, but that 
 of Parliament, by which it has already been 
 established; and by not suiiering ourselves to be 
 liurried into precipitate measures by our ftnpa- 
 tience of some ineonveniencies, galling no doubt.
 
 86' 
 
 but from whicli we cannot at present he freed i 
 while the plan proposed by the Committee would, 
 without effecting the object they have in view, 
 do more than eitlier the decrees or the victories 
 of Buonaparte, to execute his designs for our de- 
 struction.
 
 SPEECH 
 
 ON MOVING CEBTAIN 
 
 RESOLUTIONS 
 
 SESPBCTIKG 
 
 MONEY, BULLION, AND EXCHANGES, 
 On the 13th of May ISIJ. 
 
 3m. LUSHINGTON, 
 
 The Resolutions proposed by the Learned 
 Chairman of the Bullion Committee having 
 been rejected by the House, it is now my duty 
 to bring under their consideration those of 
 -vvhicli I have given notice, and wliich have 
 for' some time been printed. I shall think it 
 imnecessary to enter at much length into the 
 discussion of general principles which have 
 been so fully debated, and upon which I have 
 the satisfaction to find the opinion of a great 
 majority of the House conformable to my own. 
 And the course of proceeding adopted with 
 great candour by the Learned Gentleman, en- 
 ables me to dispense with that minute proof 
 which I am prepared to give, by a reference to 
 authentic documents, of the trutli of the facts
 
 stated in my proposed Resolutions. V/ith a 
 \\cw to fair and convenient discus.^i9n, lie lia-4 
 prepared a series of Amendments, fit which he 
 has specifically pointed out those facts alleged 
 by me, which he disputes, and has brought 
 forward such others as he thinks may destroy, 
 or materially weaken, the impression of the 
 chain of histoiical evidence which I have ad- 
 duced. 
 
 I shall, therefore, consider myself as jus- 
 tified in arguing upon every fact to which he 
 has made no objection in those Amendments, as 
 admitted ; and only call the attention of the 
 House to the proof of those which he thinLs 
 capable of being refuterl or explained. 
 * But, before I enter upon this discussion, I think 
 it nccessriry to remove a few misapprehensions 
 which have occurred, and notice, some of the 
 argtiftients which Imve been adduced in the 
 CQui^sie of this long-protractc^d debate. For in 
 pwo^Oftion as tiie sopporters of tl:ie Bullian Re- 
 port 'har^'e fcviiiKl themselves pressed on the ma- 
 «»ria] ^ointK of the case, tliey have wandereii; 
 ilitG 'ejtti-Tuieio^iis topics, and had recourse to 
 s<5me- artiftces of debate which it is no-t unne- 
 C^msvy' to point out. 
 
 ■ foithe first place it Ixas been observed, with 
 a mBw cf weakening thfi effect of my Resoki- 
 mrL% that they liave g'one through i/iree edi- 
 mm: . If ttbis mure iirae^aiid if the alter^tioi?^ Z
 
 89 
 
 liad rrfade had been consitlcrable, I should liave 
 done no more tlian would have been both my 
 right and my duty if I had fallen into any errors 
 at first. The fact, however, is merely this : 
 
 On the 11th of April, my Learned Friend 
 commanicated to the House the general sub- 
 stance of his intended Resolutions: on the 22d 
 they were presented in their present form, and 
 ordered to be printed. On Friday the £6th, my 
 Resolutions were presented, and ordered to be 
 printed. The discussion being then fixed as 
 early as the Monday following (the 29th), T 
 took the liberty of requesting that the printer 
 might send a proof copy of my Resolutions 
 not only to mc, but to those Gentlemen whom 
 I thought likely to take a leading part on the 
 opposite side in the discussion ; and this mark 
 of my attention and respect, to which they are 
 so fully entitled, is now sarcastically called a 
 Jirst edition. On IVIonday the 29th, the Reso- 
 lutions came from the printer, and Vv'ere deli- 
 vered to the Members in general; and this 
 makes the second edition. The debate beincr 
 
 o 
 
 postponed for a few days, and accounts having 
 been presented during the interval which en- 
 abled me to state more exactly a few of the 
 sums mentioned in the Resolutions, and to 
 bring some of them down to a more recent 
 date than I had done before ; instead of 
 making such corrections, and a few others 
 
 N
 
 nievely verbal, when the Resolutions were tto 
 be actually proposed, I desired, for the sake 
 of general convenience, that they might be 
 reprinted: — and this forms the third edition; 
 and if any Gentleman will take the trouble ot" 
 comparing the three, which I think those who 
 have made the observation cannot have done^ 
 tliey will find that no one fact or argument has 
 been altered, with the exception of the sums I 
 have mentione4. I s^tate this, not because I 
 should have been unwilling to confess any error 
 -into which 1 mig-lit have fallen^ or should now 
 feel a repugnance to admit any Amendments 
 w Inch could render the Resolutions more strictly 
 accurate, but to show to what expedients those 
 are driven who wish to raise a doubt either of 
 their truth or their importance. 
 
 On another point, I feel more anxiety -not 
 to be misunderstood. I have been supposed to 
 use strong language in speaking of the procecd- 
 nigs of the Bullion Committee, and even to 
 have insinuated that they countenanced a sys- 
 tem of fraud and pcrjuiy, 3.ly known respect 
 for all the Members of tbt- Committee, and 
 the intimacy and friendship wilb which I am 
 honoured by several of them, will, I trust,, 
 secure me from any suspicion of using, un- 
 less through mere inadvertcucc, any expression, 
 which coukl fairly bear such an mterpretation. 
 If my aigument had not been misunderstood, - 
 it would have been perceived to have a directly
 
 5)1 
 
 contrarj^ meaning;. I argued, that the Coni- 
 iiiittee could not seriously mean to reconimefid 
 the repeal of the Bank Restriction Act, in the 
 vieu^ of improvinpr tlic course of exchange, 
 ^nthout previously moving for the repeal of tiie 
 laws which prohibit the exportation of our coin, 
 because, while those laws subsisted, our money 
 could only be sent abroad by a system of fraud 
 and perjury, which it was impossible to suppose 
 the Committee could intend to countenance; and 
 without such exportation, no beneficial eifect 
 on the exchang-c could be produced. But 
 I have thought myself bound to avow the opi- 
 nion 1 entertain, that tiie publication of their 
 Keport has, although most contrary to their 
 intentions, produced cftTects not beneficial but 
 injunous to this countr}-. For what other pur- 
 pose has it been translated, circidatcd, and 
 commented upon by the partisans of France in 
 every country in Europe? Wliat other use has 
 been made of it in America? 
 
 It is not often that I think it neccssar\^ or 
 bccomins: in a Member of Parliament to state 
 the private motjvcs which induce him to take 
 the part which he thinks it proper to do in a 
 particular discussion. But there arc some cases 
 in which those motives are connected with the 
 (juestion itself, and may serve to illustrate it; 
 and I shall, therefore, take the liberty to men- 
 tion the circumstances which have led nic to 
 X 2
 
 92 
 
 come forward, as I have done, en this occa- 
 sion. 
 
 Several months ago, while in a state of mind 
 the least inclined, and the least adapted to po-r 
 litical inquiries, I received a sort of reference 
 from one of the ablest men on the continent of 
 Europe, desiring my opinion of the Report of 
 the Bullion Committee, which had just fallen 
 into his hands. He observed, that if the opi- 
 nions of the Committee were well founded, all 
 his ideas of the resources and prosperity of Eng- 
 land would be overturned J " Toutes mes idees 
 seront bouleversees," was his expression. I ap- 
 swered him, that I thought the Committee had 
 fallen into great errors, chiefly by applying §ound 
 and just principles of political economy to facts 
 which did not support them ; ancj that their 
 opinions, if adopted by Parliament, woidd pro- 
 duce great injury to the public ; and I very 
 shortly stated some reasons for thinking so. 
 Subsequent reflection and inquiry confirmed me 
 in the judgment I had formed at first ^ and I 
 found so large a portion of the public enter- 
 tained the same sentiments with myself, that 
 when my Learned Friend (Mr. Horner) first 
 gave notice of a motion on the subject of the 
 Report of the Bullion Committee, I really be- 
 lieved it was his intention to move that it 
 should be referred back to a Committee, for a 
 further investigation of the subject In this
 
 OS 
 
 case I entertained a hope that, if I sliouhl be 4 
 member of that Committee, 1 should be able to 
 propose such a course of inquiry, ?s might 
 either induce them to retract some of the opi- 
 nions formed last year, or lead me tp poncur 
 with thein upon sincere conviction. Thp an- 
 swer of my Learned Friend, that he thought no 
 further investigation necessary, destroyed those 
 hopes, and left me, so far as I can judge of my 
 duty to the public, no other alternative than that 
 pf stating firmly and distinctly, though I hope 
 Avith becoming respect, my sentiments in oppo- 
 sition to those of the Committee. 
 
 In the many long and able speeches, in which 
 the opinions of tl)c BuUioij Committee, with 
 jespect to the removal of the Bank restriction, 
 were supported by the Learned Chairman and 
 some of his colleagues, it is extraordinary that 
 the practicability of carrying their recommend- 
 ation into effect, was scarcely touched upon. 
 But, indeed, the same want of inquiry into 
 this most important point appears in the pro- 
 ceedings of the Committee. They called the 
 iGovernor and Deputy Governor of the Bank 
 repeatedly before them, and examined them at 
 great length as to many other points of mere 
 opinion; but they neither asked of them, or of 
 any other witness, a single question as to the 
 praclkubilitif of restoring the ca§h payments of 
 the Bank in two years. If they thought the 
 opinions of Bank Directors too old-fashioned
 
 9-^ 
 
 and erroneous to be deserving of any attention, 
 how could they propose to leave to them the 
 uncontrolled execution of so delicate and dif- 
 ficult an operation ? On another point, that 
 of the limitation of the issue of notes, the Com- 
 mittee were not sparing of their inquiries as to 
 the opinion of the Governor and Deputy Go- 
 vernor. A considerable part both of their Re- 
 port and of their speeches, has turned upon 
 it. Two of my Honourable Friends (Mr. H, 
 Thornton and Mr. Wilberforce) have assigned 
 that opinion as one of their principal reasons for 
 supporting the Resolutions proposed by tlie 
 Learned Chairman. I must say that I think the 
 Governor and Deputy Governor have been rather 
 harshly treated on this occasion, when so much 
 stress has been laid on what I admit to be a 
 liasty and inconsiderate answer at the close of 
 a long and severe cross-examination (which 
 answer, howevei', is supported by the authority 
 of Adam Smith*, and has been fully explained 
 by such of their colleagues in the Bank direc- 
 tion as are Members of this House — Mr. S, 
 Thornton and Mr. Baring). 
 
 But if the Committee were destitute of any 
 evidence respecting the practicability of the 
 measure they so earnestly recommend, nt are 
 not without such evidence. /Fe have had the 
 
 * See Wealth of Nations, book ii. chap, ii, vol. i. p. 455.- 
 edit. 1784.
 
 95 
 
 advantage of heaiiiig- a Gentleman (Mr. Baring"), 
 hiniselt" a Member of the Bullion Conmiittee, 
 himself a Bank Director, and therefore com- 
 bining an intimate acquaintimcc with the in- 
 ternal aifairs of the Bank with tlie most exten- 
 sive knowledge of conuncrcial atiairs in general 
 He has told us, in a speech full of informatioa 
 and profound research into subjects of finance 
 and political economy, that the proposed re- 
 sumption of cash payments is positive/j/ cuid ab- 
 xolukly unpraclicabk. 
 
 This it may, however, be said, is only evi- 
 dence of opinion, though an opinion entitled 
 to the gicatest weight from the talents and si- 
 tuation of him who gave it. But the same 
 Gentleman gave us evidence of a fact. He 
 told us that his house, one of the first mercan- 
 tile houses in tlic world, carrying on the most 
 extensive correspondence, possessing unbounded 
 credit in both the hemispheres, could not tww 
 procure ten thousand ounces of gold, if they icould 
 give for it a premium of ffty per cent. 
 
 Oh 1 that he had raised his warning voice in 
 the Committee as he has done in this House ! 
 It would tlien have been impossible fur them 
 to have made such a Report as they have done : 
 the House would have avoided this long and 
 painful discussion, aiid the public would have 
 been spared many months of anxious suspense 
 and uncertain credit. 
 
 Could the Committee, after sucli a statement.
 
 96 
 
 liav^ affinr.ed in their Report; could the Learned 
 Chairman have repeated in his speech, that 
 there was no real scarcity of gold? Yet such 
 is the foundation upon which all their fabric 
 rests. 
 
 But another assertion of the Learned Chair- 
 man is, if possible, still more extraordinary. 
 He tells Us the Committee only propose a mea^ 
 sure of experiment ; and, if it fails, there is 
 no harm done. Oh! how the love of tlieor}^ and 
 system can blunt the keenest intellect, and 
 cloud the brightest understanding! 
 
 No harm done by an experiment which, whe- 
 ther it succeeds or fails, may occasion a general 
 bankruptcy in London ! This is no visionary 
 apprehension of mine, but the deliberate evi- 
 dence given before the House of Lords by his 
 colleague and supporter (Mr. H. Thornton). 
 That Honourable Gentleman now tells us it 
 will do mischief, but it will establish a principle, 
 A principle of irkat? The great principles of 
 religious and moral truth are fixed and unal- 
 terable, and to them we ought to sacrifice every 
 other consideration : but what are called prin- 
 ciples of political econorrij^ are no more than 
 maxims of prudence collected from observation 
 and experience. 'Such a principle, whenever 
 its application is rnischicvous, is, in that case, 
 false, however true and important it may be in 
 other cases apparently, but not really fnialogous; 
 and, in such a case, to adhere inflexibly to the
 
 .97 
 
 principle, is not wisdom or firmiicss, hut blun- 
 dering pedantry. The great talent of political 
 prudence lies in the discernment and discrimi- 
 nation of such cases. 
 
 The Committee cannot say that the resump- 
 tion of cash payments can be canied into effect, 
 without such a reduction of the Bank issues as 
 might, according to the Honourable Gentle- 
 man's evidence, produce such an effect. Not 
 only the obvions reason of the case sliows that 
 a great reduction ^vould be necessary, and it 
 was so stated in the evidence of" the Governoi' 
 and Deputy Governor of the Bank, but the 
 Committee themselves avow the reduction of 
 Bank paper to be their great object. 
 
 From such a reduction they expect a melio- 
 ration of the course of exchange. That it 
 would produce such a melioration, I have, on a 
 late occasion, expressed my doubts. I have 
 since been triumphantly told by a Right Ho-, 
 nourable Gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning), 
 that the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks 
 -differently from me on this point. It is true 
 that he appeared to me to make a concession 
 beyond what tiic case rcciuired. He admitted 
 that a great reduction of the issues of the Bank 
 would imjrove the exchange, but he objected 
 to it on account of the danger with which, iu 
 other res pei:ts, it might be attended. I am fat 
 from denying the general tendency of a reduc-
 
 &8 
 
 tioii of currency, whetlieu metallic or repre* 
 sentativcy to increase its value, and, in conse- 
 quence, to diminish imports, and increase ex- 
 ports, and therefore gradually, and by a slow 
 process, to improve the rate of exchange. But 
 though I agree thus far with the Right Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman, I think that he over- 
 looked one of the principal elements of all cal- 
 culation respecting the intercourse of nations, 
 the effect of which is not the less real from its 
 not being capable of arithmetical estimate; I 
 mean confidence.. 
 
 Supposing the diminution of our currency to 
 have the effect which he agrees \\ ith me ami 
 with the Honourable Gentleman near me (Mr. 
 H. Thornton), in thinking it would have, that 
 of occasioning great commercial distress and 
 numerous bankruptcies, the injury done to con- 
 fidence abroad might produce an tmjavourable 
 effect on the exchange more powerful and more 
 rapid than the beneficial operation of a reduction 
 of currency could counteract. Commercial em- 
 barrassments would occasion a f:ill in the value 
 of Government securities^ and particularly of 
 the funds; foreign stock-holderSj as well as 
 ether foreigners possessing property here,: would 
 take the. alarm, and would be desirous of with- 
 drawing their capitals, even at some loss, anil 
 bringing home their property ; and thus the ge- 
 neral balance of payments, and consequently the 
 exchange, uiightbecon^e still more unfavQurable,,
 
 99 
 
 frotwit'hstaiKrmg some improvenieiit of the course 
 orf trade abstractedly considered. 
 
 On this point, also, we have, to V certain ex- 
 tent, the evidence of tacts. In 1783 and \79G 
 and 7, the issues of the Bank were considerably 
 reduced : not, indeed, to that degree which 
 must be the effect of an approacliing renewal 
 t)f cash payments, yet sufficient!}- to produce 
 much mercantile distress, notwithstanding the 
 abundance of metallic money then circulating- 
 But was this reduction productive of any benefi- 
 cial effect on the exchange ? Far from it. ITie 
 excliange continued unfavourable till rectified by 
 other causes; in the first case, by the peace; ia 
 the other, by the peace Ijetv^ecn Austria and 
 France, and by the return of plenty after a period 
 of dearth ; and in both cases the improvement of 
 the exchange was accompaiiied (but I admit not 
 produced) by a rapid increase of the issues of the 
 13ank. 
 
 In discussing this question, an Honourable 
 Gentleman opposite (Mr. Iluskisson), and my 
 Honourable Friend near me (Mr. H. Thornton), 
 laid considferable stress on the example of the 
 Bank of France, which they recommend to our 
 imitation, as another Honourable Gentleman 
 (Mr. Sharpe) has <lone the conduct of Holland 
 and Hamburgh. Before I can attach any im- 
 portance to this case, I sliould recjuire some 
 greater security for an exact Jttaleinciit of thf 
 o S
 
 100 
 
 facts^ than an official Report made to the French 
 government, respecting transactions in which 
 the conckict of that government itself was in- 
 volved *. The Report certain Ij^ is very wellj 
 written, and ingenions ; hut an account is cir- 
 culated in common rumour respecting the causes 
 'of the embarrassments of the Bank of France, 
 in 1806, nmch shorter, and more simple, than 
 that of Mr. Dupont, It is said, that the 
 French Emperor, when about to take the field 
 against Austria and Russia, in the autumn of 
 1805, found it convenient to possess himself of 
 the cash reserved by the Bank of France, for 
 which he gave the security of bills accepted by 
 the receivers of the revenue : that the Banl^ 
 was, in consequence, obliged to stop payment 
 for four months ; but that the victorious event 
 of the campaign, and the contributions extorted 
 from Germany, enabled the Emperor, after that 
 term, to replace the sums advanced, and the 
 Bank resumed its ordinary operations^ I can- 
 not answer for the truth of this account, but 
 it carries no improbability o\\ the face of it ; an(i !! 
 the earnest manner in which Mr.. Dupont de- si 
 prccates all interference or connexion between t 
 the Government and the Bank, naturally leads f 
 to a suspicion that some such story may be well j 
 founded. \ 
 
 * Vide Mr. Dupout's Report. ;
 
 iOl 
 
 . But admitting his- representation of the case 
 to be exactly true, to wliat does it amount? 
 Pirst, that to restore its payments in casli, the 
 Bank of France was obliged to reduce its issues 
 from ninety miUions of French money (some- 
 thing more than three millions and a half ster- 
 ling) tp fifty-four jnillions, and soon after- 
 wards to less than forty millions, or sixteen 
 hundred thousand pounds. 
 
 Secondly, that this diminution, so trifling in- 
 its amount in the vast empire of France, plen- 
 tifully supplied with metallic money, and so 
 little depending upon paper circulation, yet pro- 
 duced numerous bankruptcies, and, to use Mr. 
 Dup/)nt's own words, most fatal effects 2(pon cotn- 
 mtrcc. 
 
 Thirdly, it is evident that the depreciation 
 of the notes of the Bank of France, which took 
 place while it was obliged to suspend its cash 
 payments, was a depreciation from discredit^ 
 and not a depreciation from e.vccss. For it ap- 
 pears, that at the time when cash payments 
 were stopped, the a^nouut of notes in circulation 
 was less than it had been before, and the stop- 
 page immediately foll6wcd a large advance 
 made to the government, through the medium 
 (as stated by INlr. Dupont) of merchants, who 
 took as security the bills of the Recei\crs Ge- 
 neral, and gave their own bills to the Bank. It 
 is not extraordinary, that at this proceeding,
 
 ]f>2 
 
 wliich, rvcu b}' IVlr. Dupont's account, was no- 
 thing like a fair mercantile transaction, but 
 nearly resembled ^liat we call accommodation 
 b'dh, and which, pcrliaps, as indeed appears by 
 the other accounts circulated, was exao-gerated^ 
 the holders of notes took tlic alarm. A run upon 
 tlie Bank followed, and a stoppage of payment 
 •Was the consequence. 
 
 But, for the sitke of those Honourable Gen- 
 tlemen who hold Mr. Dupont's authority so 
 high, I sliall take tiie liberty of citing a short 
 passage :— " i\iany persons," says he, " struck 
 '^ with the inconveniences of even a temporary 
 " excess of notes, have thought, that we ought 
 " to lim.it the amount which the Bank sliall 
 " issue : to keep the tree a dwarf, that it may 
 *^ afford less hold to the wind. We (speaking 
 ** in the name of the Chamber of ConunerceV 
 " do not partake of that opinion." 
 
 Mr. Dupont tells us, that when he wrote (in 
 1806), the notes of the Bank of England were 
 really depreciated to the extent of three or four 
 per cent, but that this depreciation was almost 
 imperceptibk both at home and abroad. Now, 
 this is a most valuable discovery for those Gen- 
 tlemen who are so fond of depreciatm?, because 
 that to those who have faith enough to believe 
 in this new imperceptible kind, it obviously i^. 
 iitterly impossible to prove the contrary. 
 
 But there is ^another passage to which I
 
 103 
 
 should desire Mot oiil\- their attention, but tliat 
 of tlie House in general. Speakinir of putiliu 
 credit, lie says, it is at present the sole sup- 
 port of Great Britain. 
 
 I perfectly agree w ith tlie Learned Cliairman 
 in one part of his most able and eloquent rej^Iy ; 
 that in \\ liich lie commented on the conduct 
 (^though, indeed, too nuieh countenanced by the 
 mode of proceeding hrst suggested by himself) 
 of those (Jentlemen, who, agreeing in all the 
 principles of the Committee, and supporting 
 all his Resolutions, except the last ; yet pro- 
 posed to stoj) short, and merely to record the 
 existence of the depreciation of our currency, 
 without applying any remedy to so great an 
 evil. If the fact were indeed true, I am sure 
 this House would be greatly wanting in its 
 duty to the country, and would justly become 
 the laughing-stock of all Europe, if it were to 
 rest satisfied with the discovery and publication 
 of our situation, without taking any measures 
 to prevent the impending ruin of our public 
 credit. 
 
 Such a proceeding is justly exposed to the 
 comments of the Learned Cliairman, and can- 
 not be defended by the arguments of the Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman near me (Mr. H. Thorn- 
 ton), or even by the wit and eloquence of tliQ 
 Right Honourable (Gentleman opposite (^fr. 
 Canning.) It is impossible not to remark the 
 singular compliment paid by that Right Ho*
 
 104 
 
 Jiouiable Gentleman to the Learned Cliairman, 
 whose reasonings and whose Report lie defends. 
 He offered to vote for the two last of the Re- 
 solutions I am about to propose, on condition 
 that I would accede to the first seven Reso- 
 hitions of the Learned Cliairman. However 
 justly I should value the support of the Right 
 Honourable Gentleman, I cannot accept it on 
 the conditions of recommending to this House 
 Resolutions which I think erroneous both in 
 fact and law, and of depriving my own prac- 
 tical Resolutions of that chain of facts which 
 appears to me to form their natural and proper 
 support. In the Learned Chairman's Resolutions 
 I did not, indeed, see any very strict and logical, 
 connexion^ but I never thought of passing so 
 bitter a sarcasm upon them as the Right PIo- 
 nonrable Gentleman has done, who thinks that 
 they are premises which will equally lead to 
 contradictory conclusions : — that having been 
 drawn up by the Learned Gentleman for the pur- 
 pose of proving that tlie Bank ought to pay in 
 cash, they will serve rather more conveniently to 
 prove that it ought not to do so. 
 
 Tliose Gentlemen, indeed, tell us, that these 
 Resolutiims will serve as a guide to the Directors 
 of the Bank, who, they say, have the power of 
 controlling the excliaiige, though the Directors 
 tliemselves deny that they have any such 
 power. 
 
 We read in Rasselas of an unfortunate philb-
 
 105 
 
 sopher, who, by intense meditation on the most 
 abstruse theories, so bewiklered his understand- 
 ing, that he fancied himself intrusted vvitli the 
 direction of the winds and weather, and was 
 worn with continual care and anxiety in the 
 management of this imaginary charge. Such, 
 but nnich worse, would be the situation of the 
 Bank Directors under the control of the Bul- 
 lion Committee. This poor astronomer was, 
 indeed, harassed with visionary cares and use- 
 less solicitude ; but lie could do no real harm, 
 he could not parch the fields oi" his neighbours 
 with drought, or blast their crops with mildew; 
 and he had the satisfaction of fancying him- 
 self beneficially employed. But the Directors 
 of the Bank would be compelled, in the pur- 
 suit of an object which they knew to be equally 
 chimerical, to inflict real and substantial evils 
 on their country; to cramp the resources of the 
 state; to fetter the exertion of the national 
 power; and to spread distrust, alarm, and bank- 
 ruptcy around them. 
 
 I should trespass too long on the attention 
 of the House, if I were to pursue these general 
 topics, wliich I consider, indeed, as having 
 been practically and substantially decided by 
 the House, in rejecting the Resolutions moved 
 by the Learned Gentleman. I shall proceed, 
 therefore, to the more immediate business of 
 this evening, the discussion of the Resolutions
 
 \06 
 
 I am about to propose. In this (as I before 
 observed), tl.c candour of my Learned Friend 
 has brouglit tlic question of fact to a distinct 
 issue, and a much narrower compass, by stating 
 his objections to my Resoh.iiions in the form of 
 /tmenchnents ''. 
 
 Before I proceed to examine tliem in detail, 
 •I must beg tlie House to recollect that these 
 •ate the oi//i/ objections which tlie acuteness and 
 •industry of the j.earned Gentloman and his col- 
 leagues have met with to the facts stated in 
 'those Resolutions, wliicli, >,h(nt and simple a.s- 
 :they appear, comprise no less tJian a review of 
 •the- linancial and commercial history of the 
 country so far as relates to the subjects of 
 ■money and exchanges, for upwards of a cen- 
 tury, and that these Auiendments point out 
 110 positive error. I might admit the whole of 
 them without giving up one fact in the Reso- 
 iutions. The force of the reasoning* deduced 
 'from these facts, might be varied in respect of 
 extent and degree, and some of them might 
 receive a difierent explanation from that which 
 J liave given, but not one of tliem is contra- 
 dicted. I need not repeat, that I should wil- 
 lingly adopt <my moditlcations b}' which the 
 Resolutions niiglit be made to give a mOrc. cor- 
 rect view of the case, and, untler the circum- 
 stances I have mentioned, I should think, that 
 
 * Vide Appendix, No. III.
 
 •107 
 
 even after acceding* to all tlie.se Amendments, 
 I should leave suiiicient ground for the pro- 
 ceeding I am about to propose to tlie House; 
 but I am compelled to observe, that the Amend- 
 ments appear to me so inaccurately drawn as 
 in every material point to be completely erro- 
 neous. 
 
 The first Amendment* refers to the fourth 
 of m^' proposed Resolutions, and is as follows: 
 
 ** Tliat, prior to the restriction of cash pay- 
 ^* ments, the exchanges were never more un- 
 *' favourable to Great Britain, for any length 
 **'of time, than from ilve to se\'en per cent, be- 
 " low par, the depression appearing to haTe 
 *' never exceeded the whole expense of trans- 
 *' mitting specie abroad; except during a de- 
 ■*' basement of the coins of the realm. 
 
 " That, prior to the said restriction, the 
 " market price of standard gold in bars never 
 " rose above the Mint price more than 1^ per 
 ♦' cent, and tlmt only for a very sliort interval ; 
 " except in 17C0, the year of the famous South 
 " Sea sch.cmc, when it rose to 41. l.s*. (nl. per 
 " ounce; and during the periods when the coins 
 ^' of the realm have been debased. 
 
 ** That, in periods subsecjuent to the said re- 
 " striction, and particularly of late years, the 
 ** exchanges have been unfavourable to Great 
 
 * Vide Appendix, No. II. and IH. 
 P 2
 
 *' Britain much below the hmit marked by the 
 ** whole cost of transmitting 5;pecie abroad, an4 
 " have contiijued so for a considerable time to- 
 " gether, being at prese:it, and having been for 
 *' a considerable time, more than twenty-fiv6 
 " per cent, below par ; and, in the same man- 
 " ner, the market price of standard gold in bars 
 *' has been, and still is, more than twenty-five 
 " per cent, above the Mint price." 
 
 In this statement, the periods in which the 
 coin has been debased, are expressly excepted ; 
 and this debasement is, in the next Amendment, 
 stated to have existed during the wars of WiU 
 Jiam the Third, until the recoinage, and also 
 during the seven years way, and until the year 
 1774. 
 
 On the two periods thus excepted I shall hava 
 gomethingto say, in speaking of the next Amend- 
 ment, because I suspect that, with regard to both 
 of them, the Learned Gentleman, as well in his 
 Amendments as his Report, has mistaken the 
 effect for the cause; and that it was not the de- 
 basement of ovir money which occasioned the 
 unfavourable exchange, but an unfavourable 
 exchange which produced the debasement of our 
 money. 
 
 But I shall now limit my attention to the 
 two periods selected in the lirst Amendment, 
 namely, from the recoinage in 16'97, to the
 
 109 
 
 commencement of the seven years war in 1756; 
 and from 1774, to the Bank restriction. 
 
 The difference between the Learned Chairman 
 and me, with respect to this Amendment, is 
 this, that he denies that at any time during the 
 periods lie has selected, the depression of the 
 exchanges exceeded the whole expense of trans- 
 mitting specie abroad, and that the price of 
 standard gold ever rose above the Mint price 
 more than Ij percent, excepting during tlie 
 year of the South Sea scheme. 
 
 I affirm, on the contrary, in the fifth Resolu- 
 tion, that on the only occasions on which, from 
 political and commercial circumstances, such an 
 effect was to be expected within the periods al» 
 hided to, namely, during the wars of Queen Ann, 
 and during part of the American war, a depres- 
 sion of the exchange, and a rise of the price of 
 bullion, actually took place ; and I am prepared 
 to show, from documents on your table, that 
 they took place to such a degree as to furnish 
 a complete practical proof of the fallacy of 
 the leading doctrines of the 'Bullion Report 
 I say, these were the only occasions when 
 such an effect was to be expected, because, 
 from the termination of the wars of Queen Ann 
 by the treaty of UtrechJ^ till the end of the 
 earlier period, in 1 7o6', was a time of peace and 
 extraordinary commercial prosperity, with the 
 exception of the dcrtuigemcnt occasioned by the
 
 no 
 
 ^outh Sea st-heme (wliich is admitted in the 
 Amendment), and the war terminated by tho 
 peace of Aix la Chapeile. These hostilities, 
 though they produced some effect on the 
 ^xcliange, do not appear to have much de- 
 pressed it. And I am so far from supposing 
 any great fluctuations in the course of ex- 
 change and in the price of bullion to be 
 likely to take place dining a period of peace 
 and commercial prosperity, that, if they had ac- 
 tually occurred, I should have found great diffi- 
 culty in accounting for them. 
 
 And I must not omit to mention here one cir- 
 cumstance which, for more than half of the last 
 century, greatly crvntributed to render the ex- 
 changes favourable to England. During the 
 Avhoie of that j)eriod our growth of corn consi- 
 derably exceeded our consumption. The export 
 of wheat between 1700 and 1763, exceeded the 
 import ])y move than thirty-tv\'o millions and a 
 half; of quarters, benrg, on the average, more 
 than half a million a-year. 
 
 The ] egular periodical accounts of the course 
 •£ exchange and the price of buUion, printed 
 Vy orxier of the House, do not extend back so 
 lax as the reign of Queen Ann ; but their place 
 is. jsuiificiently supplied for our present purpose 
 by an import<nit <locument furnished by the 
 Comptrollers of Arn)y Accounts. From this it 
 ajipexirs, that m ] 703 thg exchange with Flan-
 
 'll'l 
 
 ilers was at tlie rate of ten auildcis eleven 
 stivers for the pound sterling, beino- a loss to 
 Kiigland of above 112 per cent. From 1703 
 to 17 11, the accounts of the exchange with 
 ]• landers arc wanting; but, from the well-know a 
 circumstiinces of the war, as well as some othcr.s 
 which I shall presently mention, it is highly 
 improbable that any favourable change took 
 place in that interval, especially as it apjx'ars^ 
 in 17 10, to have been at 1 !■§ per cent, loss with 
 Cienoa. In 1711, the exchange varied from 
 ten guilders eight stivers, to ten guilders ten 
 stivers, being a loss varying from ISj per 
 cent, to something less tlian 12. In 1712, it 
 was ten guilders eighteen stivers, about 9i per 
 cent., in 1713, eleven guilders, about 84. per 
 cent, loss, and in ITl-K ten guilders eigliteea 
 stivers, or y^. In 1712, it was at 13^ per eeiit. 
 loss .with Dunkirk. 
 
 It is certain, that, during the whole ofthii 
 period, the expense of sending gold coin to 
 . rianders could not amount to three per cent, 
 and probably could not exceed two per cent. ; 
 . and therefore we have, llu- eleven years toge- 
 ther, an example of a circumstance taking jylace, 
 Vvhich the liuliion Committee positively pro- 
 nounce to be i/fipos-siblc. namely, a depression 
 of the course of exchange beyond the total ex- 
 pense of the coincyance of sfjccie from onei 
 country to tlie other, without aiiy depreciation 
 of the currenev.
 
 112 
 
 Nor is tlie Lertrned Gentleman's Amendmeilt 
 more correct witli respect to the price of bul- 
 lion. On this point the evidence is not, indeed, 
 so direct, but I think it not less conclusive. 
 
 It appears, by accounts on the table, tliat 
 from 1702 to 1709, the Bank bought no bul- 
 lion. Now, as that corporation always buys 
 bullion when it can be procured at, or but little 
 above, tlie Mint price, it is evident they could 
 not at that time obtain any at such a price. In 
 1709, some gold was actually purchased at four 
 pounds per ounce, and from that time the pur- 
 chases continued. 
 
 This, according to the Learned Gentleman's 
 next Amendment, would appear to be under 
 tlie Mint price, which he computes at 41. Is. 7(1. 
 -stating, that from the reformation of the coin 
 in the reign of King JVilliam, to the fourth of 
 George the Firsts the guinea passed by law for 
 twentij-two shillings. 
 
 Here he has fallen into another mistake ; tlie 
 guinea nerer passed by law for twenty-two shil- 
 lings. It was struck as a twenty-shilling piece, 
 and valued accordingly in the Mint inden- 
 tures. The Mint price of gold should, therefore, 
 be reckoned at 3/. 14*. 2rf.; but not being made 
 a legal tender, it passed at a higher rate by 
 common consent; and, for a short time, about 
 1696, as high as thirty shillings. On the 
 10th of April WjQ, all persons were forbidden, 
 h^ Act of Parliament, to pay or receive
 
 US 
 
 ^^uineas at a higher rate than twenty-two 
 3hillin(».s, but they were not made current 
 money at that rate. They soon after Icll to 
 twenty-one sliiUings and sixpence; and, on the 
 U>th of February 1098, a Resohition explana- 
 tory of the Act of \G9G passed the House of 
 Commons, declaring- tliat no person is obliged 
 to take the guinea for more than twenty-one 
 shilhngs and sixpence, and the receivers of, 
 taxes were instructed to take it at that rate. It 
 generally passed at the same value till 1717,- 
 wlien it was reduced, by Proclamation, to 
 twenty-one shillings, and made current at that 
 rate. The customary value of gold in coia 
 was, therefore, at the time v.'c are speaking of,, 
 3/. I9s. 8|(/. per ounce, but the real Mint price 
 (as I befcAre ^aid) 31. 14s. 'Zd. 
 * These circumstances I should think sufficient 
 to establish the fact that the price of gold from 
 1702 to 1709, when it could be procured ut all, 
 must, have exceeded four pounds per ounce; but 
 it is abundantly confirmed by the accounts 
 from the Mint. It appears, that in some years 
 of that period, the Mint stood still entirely for 
 want of bullion. In the whole tern; of sevenv 
 years, from 1702 to 1709, no more than 391,000/.' 
 was coined in gold, aud 433,000/. in silver, which 
 latter was chietly procured from the Scottish' 
 money recoined at the Union, and from the 
 prizes taken at Vigo.
 
 114 
 
 The Mint accounts furnish, indeed, one of 
 the "most certain proofs of the plenty or scarcity 
 of bullion, as it is evident from the state of our 
 lii\vs respecting coinage and other well-kiiown 
 circumstances, that money will always Ikj 
 struck when bullion can be obtained at the Mint 
 ])rice. 
 
 in the lafer years, in which the accounts dis- 
 tinguish between the coinage tVom light gui- 
 neas and that from foreign gold, the criterion 
 is still more perfect,* because the Bank has fre- 
 tjuently been obliged to purchase foreign gold 
 for coinage at prices considerably exceeding the 
 Mint price, when light guineas could not be 
 procured, which they always can be when the 
 general price of gold does not materially exceed 
 that of the Mint. 
 
 I ' have thus shown, that in the former period 
 iitiuded to in the Learned Gentleman's Amend- 
 ment, namely, from ]696 to 1756, the fact is 
 ciomp'letely at variance with the assertions of 
 the Amendment in both its branches, as well 
 as with the theories of the Comiuittec. 
 
 Nor is the Amendment better founded with 
 j*espcct to the latter peiiod, from 1774 to 1797. I 
 am far from denying that the reformation of the 
 gold c'.iin which took place about the yeai* P?*?*^ 
 might have a 'tendency to raise the exchange ; 
 blit, it *must be remembered, that this was a 
 season of peace, and that the exchange might 
 iiave became favourable from causes merely
 
 115 
 
 commercial. But it docs not appear from tTie 
 accounts, that any such effect took place. Tlie 
 recoinage which commenced in 1773 was not 
 completed till 1777, and the exchange witU 
 Hamburgh, which, in the year 1773, previously 
 to the new regulations respecting the coin, va- 
 ried from 34.6 to 36, was, in the year 1777, 
 from 33.2 to 32.1, being not a rise, as by the 
 tlieory it should have been, but a dq)rcmon of 
 about seven per cent. 
 
 This was, however, a season of peace, and it 
 could not be expected, tliat the exchange could 
 be depressed to any great degree, or for any 
 long continuance, except iai the case of scar- 
 city. 
 
 But towards the end of the American war, 
 from the year 1780 till some time after tlie 
 restoration of peace, the exchange with Ham- 
 burgh continued from five to eight per cent, 
 against England, though the expense of scud' 
 ing specie to Hamburgh could not have been 
 more than about three per cent. At the same 
 time the price of foreign gold rose about six: 
 percent, and that of silver bullion no less thau 
 t'ightcen per cent, above the Mint price. 
 
 It is stated in the Amendment, that the price 
 of standard gold in bars did not exceed the 
 >lint price in any one year of the American 
 war. Whether the Learned Gentleman means 
 <>nc 'xilwlc year or not, does not aj)pcur; but 
 a £
 
 no 
 
 even in this sense, his Amendment is erroneous^ 
 as it exceeded that rate from May 1783 to May 
 1784. But the price of foreign gold exceeded 
 the Mint price for tkree whole years, from 
 April 1781 to April 1784, and exceeded four 
 pounds per ounce, fi'om July 1782, to Sep« 
 tember 1783. These returns do not, however, 
 give a complete view of the case, for it is a com- 
 mon practice in making up the price-lists, to con- 
 tinue the last price when few or no sales appear 
 to have taken place ; so that, when a scarcity 
 of bullion exists, the prices returned in the lists 
 are often nominal rather than real. And this 
 is particularly the case with respect to the 
 3tandard bullion produced from light guineas, 
 which cannot legally be exported, and which 
 the Bank is always ready to purcliase at the 
 Mint price, or very near it; for which reason, 
 the price of foreign gold is usually a fairer cri- 
 terion of the real state of the market. And it 
 is evident, from other circumstances, how great 
 tlie scarcity of gold bullion must have been at 
 that time. It was even proved before the Com- 
 mittees in 1797, that the treasure in the Bank 
 was then reduced considerably lower than it was 
 when the restriction on cash payments was im- 
 posed. 
 
 In 1780, the Mint was entirely unemployed, 
 
 and, for three years succeeding, the amount of 
 
 coinage did not, on an average, exceed 600,000/. 
 
 From 1784, till the Bank restriction, was
 
 117 
 
 again (except in tlie last four years) a period 
 of peace, dui lug which it is so far from being 
 extraordinary, that the exchanges should be fa- 
 voiiraMe, and the price oi' bullion low, that 
 those effects were rather to be expected upon 
 common mercantile principles. 
 - It will be more convenient to reserve any 
 discussion of the circumstances of those last^ 
 four years till we come to the next Amendment, 
 in which they are again alluded to. 
 
 But in what has been said, I tliink that I 
 have completely proved, that both in the earlier 
 and the later period to which the Learned 
 Chairman has referred, the statement in his 
 Amendment is wholly unfounded, both as it 
 regards the course of exchange and the price of 
 bullion. 
 
 The J^earned Gentleman's second Amend- 
 ment refers to the fifth Resolution, apd I iiave 
 already answered that part of it which relates 
 t^ the price of gold during the American war*. 
 
 The greater ])art of the remainder relates to 
 the war- of King Wdliam the Third, a peri(j(l 
 upon which the Committee in thcjr Report, as; 
 M'cll as the Learned Chairman in his speech, 
 appear particularly fond of dwelling. It is, 
 liowever, most unfortunately selected for their 
 purpose, for the Amcnduient begius witlj an 
 extraordinary blunder. 
 
 * See Appendix, No. II. and III.
 
 118 
 
 It states, that immediately after tlie reform- 
 ation of the coin, the market price of gf)ld fell 
 to the Mint price, gnd the exchanges rose nearly 
 to par, allhcugh the circumstance.^ of the war and 
 fke foreign e.vpcnditure continued unaltered. 
 
 It is evident, that the whole purpose for 
 which the Committee and their Learned Chair- 
 jnan have dwelt so much on this portion of our 
 history, rests entirely on this part of their state- 
 ment; for it never can he proved that the de- 
 pression of the exchange during the war ter- 
 tninated hy the peace ot" Ryswick, was occa- 
 sioned, not hy the war itself, hut by the depre- 
 ciation of our currency, unless it can be shown 
 that the restoration of a. favourable course of 
 exchange was owing, not to the peace, but to 
 tlie reformation of our coin. 
 
 To show how impossible it is for them to 
 lestablish this position, it is only necessary to 
 jjtatc a few dates. 
 
 On the 14th of December 1695, the House of 
 Commons voted an Address to King William, 
 to stop the currency of clipped money. On 
 the 4th of January following, the King returned 
 an answer, that he would issue his Proclama^ 
 tion accordingly. On the 21st of January, a 
 pill for remedying the ill state of the coin re- 
 i^eived the royal assent. Other Acts passed for 
 the encouragement of persons bringing buUiou 
 to the ISlint, Thp ^oiaage was carried on with
 
 119 
 
 aotivitv : [md before the 28th of November 
 }69G, about 2,400,01)0/. of tJie iiewr luoney liad 
 been issued into circulation. Here, theii, we. 
 should expect to see the improveuicnt of the 
 exchaiii^e if it had been produced by the rc- 
 tbniiation of the coin. But the remittances to 
 Flanders, on account of Ciovernment, whick 
 in May 1695 were made at the rate of tea 
 o^uilders for the pound sterling, or 20 per cent. 
 wndcr par, were in September iGQd, after a 
 considerable quantity of the new coin had been 
 issued, at nine guilders, or 25 per cent, loss ; 
 and, so hite as January 1696-7, at nine guilder* 
 five stivers, or about 23 per cent. 
 
 But Louis the Fourteenth, whose resources 
 were as much exhausted as those of Great Bri- 
 tain (for, as Burnet observes, in 1696, *' the 
 *^ common scarcity of money kept both armie* 
 ** quiet"), had before this time turned his 
 thoughts seriously to peace. He signed a treaty 
 of peace with the Duke of Savoy on tlie Q9tb 
 of August 1696, and made overtures to tlie 
 other confederc-vtcs, of which King Williain: 
 took notice in his speech ou opening the Parlia- 
 ment on the 20th of October. Tiie prcUminarie* 
 were agreed upon on the iDth of February 
 1696-7, but without a suspension of hostilities.; 
 The neg( tiation^x:ontinued all the winter ,an4 
 the following summer, and the peace of Rys- 
 wick was signed on the £Uth of September 1697.
 
 120 
 
 The effects of tlic approach of pejice were soon 
 observable in the rate of exchange. 1 he re- 
 irifttanccs were made in April 1697 at 9i^2 per 
 Gent, loss; in July, at IS^j and in August and 
 Sep tern ber^ at 12^. 
 
 ' These rates are taken from the original mP 
 Butesof the Treasury, which I desired leave to* 
 corlstllt, on account of some references made to 
 them in a publication highly worthy of atten- 
 tion for its perspicuity and force of argument — 
 I mean the Rcciew of the Bullion Controversy *i 
 r This simple statement seems to me sulhcient 
 to overthrow the Learned Gentleman's Amend- 
 ment ; but so much misappiehension has pre-» 
 vailed respecting this interesting part of our 
 financial history, that it will not be without 
 its use to look back a little further, aiul endea- 
 vour to trace the causes and progress of that 
 degradation of the coin, which,; at that time, 
 occasioned so great an alarm, and; was reme-r 
 died, at so heavy an expense to the nation. ; ; io 
 In this retrospect we shall derive great a$H> 
 sJstance from the Journals of Parliament. ;As 
 early as the 9th of April 1690, a petition was 
 presented: to the House of Commons by:. the 
 working goldsmiths of London, complaining of 
 8l great scarcity of silver, of large exportations 
 of silver, and of the melting down of plate and" 
 
 ,\\j, * Printed for Budd.
 
 «-iver money (wliich was then tlie only lew-al 
 tender), whcreljy (as tliey state) ''for six niontlis 
 " past not wily tlie petitioners in their trade, 
 " but the Mint itself hath been stopped from 
 " coining." 
 
 This Petition was referred to a Committee, 
 who reported, " that the complaints of the pe- 
 " titioners were very just, aiid the inconve- 
 " niences to the kingdom very great, but that 
 " they coukl not agree of a way for pre\'enting 
 " the same, and recojnmended the subject to 
 " the furtlier consideration of the House." 
 
 On the 1 7th of November iCmh a IJill for 
 " discouraging the exportation of bullion, and 
 " encouraging the importation thereof, and 
 '' converting the siune into the coin of this 
 *• rcahii," pa8se<l the House of Commons, but 
 appears to have been lost in the House of 
 Lords. 
 
 The evil continuecl to increase, and encou- 
 raged a practice which so early as the reign of 
 Jlenry the Fifth, ami afterwards in that of 
 Queen Elizabeth, had been prohibited under 
 rile ])enaltics of high treason — the practice of 
 clipping the silver coin. / 
 
 It must be recolUicted, that the onl}- legal 
 tender in the time of King AViiliam, was in 
 silver coin, and that this coin was of two kinds, 
 milled and hammered money. The milled 
 n!one\', of which a few beautiful specimens had 
 u
 
 122 
 
 been struck under the Commonwealth, was 
 first made current in \663. But the largest pro- 
 portion of the coin in circulation before the re- 
 coinage in 1696, consisted of hammered money 
 very broad and thin. 
 
 From this sort of coin it was easy to cut off 
 a circle round the edge, and the remainder con- 
 taining the stamp passed current as readily as 
 before it was thus diminished. To so great an 
 extent was this practice carried, that Davenant 
 estimates the clippings, thus procured and ex- 
 ported, as equal to one fourth of the total 
 amount of our silver coin existing at the Revo- 
 lution. 
 
 Early in the year 1694, a Committee of the 
 House of Commons was appointed to receive 
 proposals how to prevent the clipping of the 
 coin and the exportation of silver, which re- 
 ported on the 10th of March. Though their 
 Report was not acted upon during tlie remain- 
 der of that Session, the subject was resumed at 
 tlic meeting of Parliament, in November 1694, 
 and an Act passed to prevent clipping the coin 
 of this kingdom (6 and 7 W. III. c. 17). By 
 this Act penalties were enacted against pei^ons 
 giving more for silver money than the current 
 value — against persons buying and selling clip- 
 pings, or having them in their possession ; and 
 the export of silver bullion, except under strict 
 regulations, was prohibited.
 
 123 
 
 These circumstances, I think, prove that the 
 degradation of the coin was a consequence of the 
 demand for bulHon occasioned by the dilHiculty 
 of defraying the expenses of the war abroad, 
 as we find the petition of the goldsmitiis re- 
 specting the exportation and scarcity of silver 
 coin preceded an}' complaints of tlie clipping of 
 the coin. This opinion is confirmed by the 
 statement of Davenant, in a long IMemorial, 
 dated November 1695, and preserved among 
 the Harleian MSS. in the British Museum. He 
 tells us that, "the opinion, which all along pre- 
 *' vailed, that peace was near in view, made us 
 " imprudent. First, the foreign coin and bul- 
 *' lion went ; then foreign commodities, our 
 *' own country goods, and bullion obtained by 
 " clipping." His statement is confirmed by the 
 no less competent authority of Gregoiy King, 
 who estimates the decrease of the coined silver 
 in 1695, to be from 8,5()(),()0()/. to 4,500,000/.; 
 and that of the uncoined, from 500,000/. to 
 100,000/. 
 
 The opinion of the Bullion Committee, name- 
 ly, that, in the case we are considering, the fall 
 of the exchr.ngc ^\ as occaskncd bij the dcpixxiu' 
 /ion of' the coin, rtmst, therefore, be tlic reverse 
 of the fact, since it ap})ears, on the contrary, 
 that the niilitary expenses abroad producing 
 an uujavourabk e.vchange, and an exportation of 
 H 2
 
 V24i 
 
 Hullion, ^ere the cause of the depreciation of the 
 coin. 
 
 In 1695, the difliculty was increased to such 
 a degree, as to occasion a general controversy 
 as to tlie measures which ought to be adopted. 
 Three different plans were suggested : 
 
 The first, supported by Mr. Locke, was in 
 favour of an immediate recoinage at tlie pub- 
 lic expense, and at the fall weight and fineness 
 then estabhshed by the Mint indentures. 
 
 The second, maintained by ]Mr. Lowndes, 
 the Seci-etary of the Treasury, Avas for a re- 
 coinage at a reduced weight as a temporary ex- 
 pedient during the war; or, which was also sug- 
 gested by many other writers, and recommended 
 by the Committee in l()S/4, an increase of tlie 
 current value of the coin. 
 
 The third, which is proposed by Davenant 
 in the Memorial I have alluded to, opposes both 
 these plans, and suggests some temporary ex- 
 pedients, the most considerable of which is the 
 raising a loan in Holland. 
 
 The opinion of Mr. Locke prevailed. On the 
 10th of December \695, the Resolutions of a 
 Committee of the House of Commons, recom- 
 mending the recoinage of the clipped money, 
 were reported to the House, and, with some 
 Amenchnents, agreed to. 
 
 Gn the 14th of December, an Address was 
 voted by the House, praying the King to stop
 
 \'25 
 
 the currency oi' clipped money ; and on tlic 4tli 
 of Junuiuy following, His ^lajesty returned au 
 answer j)roniising to issue a Proclamation ac- 
 cordingly. 
 
 On the 21st of January 1695-6, an Act for 
 remedying* the ill state of the coin, received the 
 royal assent. Other Acts passed in the same 
 Session *, for the encouragement of persons 
 bringing plate to the Mint, and for reducing 
 the rate at which guineas (which were then no 
 legal tender) shoidd be allowed to pass, first to 
 twenty-six shillings, and afterwards to twent3'- 
 two shillings. One of these Acts (7 and 8 
 \V. III. c. 19.) contains a provision, which is 
 curious, as it shows the trifling expedients to 
 which the distress of those times compelled the 
 State to have recourse. It prohibits the use of 
 any silver plate, except spoons, in taverns and 
 public-houses, in order to obtain for the Mint 
 the miserable resource of the plate belonging to 
 such places. 
 
 The coinage thus ordered, was carried into 
 execution with vigour and activity, and before 
 the 28th of November, above 4,636,000L in 
 talc of clipped money had been melted for re- 
 coinage ; and about 2,400,000/. of the new 
 coin, amounting to nearly the same weight of 
 
 * 7 and 8 W. III. c. 1. 7 and 8 W. III. c. iO. 7 and 
 8 W. III. c. 13. 7 aud 8 W. III. c. 19. 7 and 8 W.III. 
 C.30.
 
 125 
 
 silver, had been paid into the Exchequer, or 
 issued to the public. 
 
 The circumstances attending this memorable 
 recoinai2[e undoubtedlv throw some li^rht on the 
 principles laid down by the Bullion Committee, 
 but seem to me much better calculated to im- 
 peach, than to confirm, the validity of those 
 principles as applied by them. 
 
 In the first place, it is clear that the calling 
 in of the hammered money, must, until the 
 new coin came into circulation, have occasioned 
 a great diminution of the circulating currency ; 
 and that it did so in fact, to a degree producing 
 extreme public inconvenience, appears from the 
 numerous petitions from the principal trading 
 towns (no less than eighteen in number), which 
 were presented at the next meeting of Parlia- 
 ment, complaining of the difficulties and embar- 
 rassments of trade caused by the want of the 
 means of circulation *. 
 
 This diminution of currency ought, on the 
 principles of the Committee, to have had a great 
 effect in raising the exchange; but this was so 
 far from being tlie case, that the course of ex- 
 
 * See petitions from Coventry, Birmingham, Norwich, 
 the clothiers of Blackwell Hall London, the merchants of 
 London, the clothiers of Devizes, from Soulhwark, Grant- 
 ham, Peterborough, Bodmin, Chester, Derby, "Wootten- 
 tjnder-Edge, Bishop's Castle, Leicester, and Exeter. — Journals 
 ^ the -House of Covimons, Vol. XI,
 
 127 
 
 change became still more unfavourable in I696 
 than it had been in ]695, and continued at 
 nearly the lowest depression till the preliminaries 
 of peace were actually agreed upon. 
 
 Another circumstance observable, is, that the 
 distress arising from the want of a medium of 
 commerce forced a representative currency into 
 use. At this very time Exchequer-bills were 
 first introduced, and struck for sums as low as 
 five pounds, for the purpose of general circula- 
 tion. By these, and by Exchequer-tallies, 
 Bank-notes, and the notes of private bankers, 
 or goldsmiths, the necessities of the public 
 were supplied, and aa absolute stagnation of 
 business prevented. " During the recoinage of 
 " our silver (says Davenant), all great dealings 
 *' were transacted by tallies, Bank-bills, and 
 " goldsmiths* notes. Paper credit did not only 
 " supply the place of running cash, but greatly 
 *' multiplied the kingdom's stock, for tallies 
 *' and Bank-bills did to many uses serve as well, 
 " and to some better, than gold and silver : and 
 " this artificial wealth, which necessity had in- 
 " troduced, did make us less feel the want of 
 " that real treasure which the war, and our 
 " losbcs at sea, had drawn out of the nation'*." 
 And here we have a striking illustration of 
 the eil'ects which miglit be expected from the 
 
 * Discourses on the public Revenues and Trade of Ejigkipd,
 
 128 
 
 execution of the plans of the Bullion Com- 
 mittee. Bank-notes might, indeed, be with- 
 drawn from circulation, but the notes of pri- 
 vate bankers would, after much inconvenience 
 had been suffered, take their place. This 
 would, certainly, be a much less evil than 
 a general bankruptcy ; but is it an end which 
 the Committee would recommend to us to pur^ 
 sue with sucli risk and difficulty ? 
 
 At the meeting of Parliament, on the ^Oth of 
 October 1696, when, as I have mentioned, the 
 King communicated to Parliament the overtures 
 for peace made by the French King, the mea- 
 suies necessary for completing the recoinage 
 were immediately resumed. 
 
 Hammered money was made current only by 
 weight; and, a short time afterwards*, was 
 wholly prohibited, and various other regulations 
 respecting the coinage were enacted ; and, at 
 the next meeting of Parliament (3d of Decem- 
 ber 1697), the King announced the signature of 
 a general peace from the throne. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be observed, in answer to 
 me, that as the improvement of the exchange 
 wfts, in fact, subsequent to the recoinage, it 
 may have been really occasioned by the re- 
 coinage, although it happened that the con- 
 
 * See 8 \V. III. c. 2. 8 W. III. c. 1. 8 and 9 W. Ill, 
 c.^e. 9W.III, c. 2.
 
 129 
 
 elusion of peace took place about the same 
 time. 
 
 A MS. Memoir of Davenant to the Lords of 
 the Treasury, somewhat later than that wliich 
 I before quoted, and dated 15th of July 1G96', 
 will furnish a reply to this observation. 
 
 He says, " Notwithstanding the com is altered^ 
 ** the remitting sucli large sums yearly to Flan- 
 " ders makes the exchange to Holland continue 
 " so hard upon us, that in spite of all laws made, 
 " or to be made, the species will be carried 
 " over. The Dutch are already so overstocked 
 " with all kinds of our manufactures, that we 
 " have no hopes to pay the troops by the re- 
 " turns arising from the sale of goods there, 
 " which must put the exchange yet in a worse 
 " condition and more to our disadvantage ; and 
 " this great sum, which we remit, docs not 
 " only influence the exchange in Holland, but 
 " also at Hamburgh, in Spain, and Italy, and 
 " well nigh all the parts to which we deal, and 
 " is so heavy a load on our trade, that we must 
 " quickly sink under the burden." 
 
 I shall beg leave to call the attention of the 
 House to one or two otlicr passages in this Me- 
 moir, though less immediately relative to the 
 point now before us. 
 
 He asks a cjuestion, not yet, I hope, appli- 
 cable to our present situation, but well de- 
 serving, from its importance, to be borne in 
 s
 
 130 
 
 mind in the present discussion: '* Has not the 
 " loss of credit made peace difficult, and war 
 ** impossible ?" 
 
 Another soon follows more immediately bear- 
 ing upon the plans of the Bullion Committee : 
 " Could it be wise in the heat of a war, by so 
 " many ways to make the people unable to pay 
 " future taxes, and at once to pull down both 
 "money and credit, the pillars that supported 
 " the king and his subjects? 
 
 " Upon the whole matter," says lie, "the ma- 
 " nagers should not have disturbed what was 
 *' quiet. They imagined two millions of bul- 
 " lion, to repair the coin, might be as easily sent 
 " from Spain as a tun of wine." 
 
 The same collection of the Harleian MSS. 
 affords another authority completely decisive of 
 the question, how far the loss upon the ex- 
 change is to be ascribed to the depreciation of 
 currency, and in what degree to the circum- 
 stances of the war. It appears, that the con- 
 tracts between the Treasury and the Bank for 
 remittances to Flanders were made upon va- 
 rious conditions at different times. Sometimes 
 the Bank agreed to accept Exchequer-tallies, or 
 other Government securities, in payment for 
 their remittances ; in which cases the real loss 
 by the exchange may be, in some degree, con- 
 founded with the discount upon the advances, 
 or with the depreciation of the clipped money
 
 131 
 
 In one instance, a license to export 700,000 
 ounces of silver, notwithstanding the general 
 prohibition, was granted to the Bank ; and this 
 license Lord Godolphin speaks of as equivalent 
 to a premium of 20 per cent. Yet this very 
 contract for remittance was made at the rate of 
 ten guilders per pound sterling, or 16* per cent. 
 Joss, and with a farther allowance to the Bank 
 of ^ per cent, for management. And at other 
 times the Bank stipulated for payment in new 
 Mint money, or in guineas. 
 
 In some of these latter cases, the Govern- 
 ment was unable to fulfil its engagements, and 
 a claim was made upon the Treasury, in 169<5, 
 by the Directors of the Bank, for a compen- 
 sation for the losses which that corporatioa had 
 sustained in 1695 and 1696, by being obliged 
 to receive clipped money in payment, when 
 they were entitled to guineas, or Mint money 
 of full weight. 
 
 The Memorial of the Bank was referred by 
 the Treasury to Lord Ranelagh, the Paymaster- 
 general, and his Report is preserved among the 
 Harleian MSS. I have already quoted. 
 
 He did not admit the full extent of compen- 
 sation claimed by the Bank, but he recom- 
 mended an allowance of 13:^ per cent, for the 
 loss upon the clipped money, exclusive of a loss 
 of about 20 per cent, on the exchange. Here, 
 then, we have a distinct recognition of a lois 
 s 2
 
 132 
 
 by exchange of 20 per cent, clear of every 
 other consideration which might aftect the ac- 
 count; and another evident example of what 
 the Bullion Committee pronounces to be im- 
 possible — a loss upon the exchange greatly ex- 
 ceeding the expense of the transportation of 
 bullion, which could scarcely at this time ex- 
 ceed 2 per cent, to the ports of Flanders or 
 Holland. And this loss, as in the instance of 
 the wars of Queen Ann, which I lately men- 
 tioned, continued during a period of several 
 years. 
 
 I must next notice that part of the Amend- 
 ment in which it is stated, " that, during the 
 " seven years war, and until the year 1774, the 
 *' gold coin of the realm was in a state of de- 
 *' basement." 
 
 That the gold coin was, towards the close of 
 this period, reduced in weight to the extent 
 of four or five per cent, is, indeed, true ; and, 
 as I have stated nothing on this subject in the 
 Resolutions, I might pass by this observation of 
 the Amendment without any remark. 
 
 I think, however, it may not be useless to 
 observe, that, as in the former instance in the 
 time of William the Third, there is sufficient 
 reason to conclude that the fall of the exchange 
 was the cause, and not the conseque?ice, of the 
 depreciation of our currency, there are many 
 indications that this was the case in this latter
 
 133 
 
 instance also, though I will not venture here 
 to state so decided an opinion. 
 
 I mean that there is reason to helicve, that 
 even after the foreign expenses of the seven 
 years war had ceased, the balance of payments 
 might be unfavourable to this country. 
 
 First, I should observe that we then, for the 
 first time, began to import corn for our subsist- 
 ence, instead of having a large surplus for export- 
 ation. From the beginning of the eighteenth cen- 
 tury to 1758, we had an average exportation of 
 above 500,000 quarters of wheat; but from 1764 
 to 1774, we had an average importation of 
 113,000. 
 
 Secondly, -.there was, during that period, a 
 continued transfer of capital to America and the 
 West Indies. The official value of the exports 
 to North America, in ten years, from 17G4 to 
 1774, compared with the ten years preceding, 
 increased on an average from 1,700,000/. to 
 2,553,000/. The imports fell considerably short 
 of that amount ; but there is reason to believe 
 that the balances, instead of being discharged 
 by bullion, or other remittances, formed, for 
 the most part, an actual transmission of capital 
 from the one country to the other. 
 
 In the third place, it appears that the general 
 balance of trade with all countries, except Ame- 
 rica, was nuich less favourable during the pe- 
 riod which I'ollowed the seven years war, than 
 during any preceding part of the century. The
 
 134 
 
 official balances in the Custom-house books for 
 ten years, ending in 1774, compared with the 
 tew years preceding, show a considerable dimi- 
 nution of the balances in favour of Great Britain, 
 although the general amount of the trade was 
 much increased. 
 
 I am aware that the Custom-house books 
 aiford an imperfect criterion of the real state 
 even of commercial payments ; but in periods 
 so near to each other, they may at least be de- 
 pended upon as bearing a nearly equal propor- 
 tion to the real values in each of the two pe- 
 riods, and therefore showing the comparative 
 general result with sufBcient certainty. And I 
 think it may be fairly inferred, that if the ba- 
 lance of payments, purely commercial, was in 
 the period succeeding the seven years war in any 
 degree favourable to Great Britain, it may not 
 have been so, in a degree sufficient to counter- 
 balance the dividends paid to foreign stock- 
 holders, and the remittances made to British tra- 
 vellers or residents abroad. And though during 
 the war the balance of trade had been more fa- 
 vourable to us, it was then counteracted by large 
 subsidies and great naval and military expenses. 
 
 If these conclusions are well founded, the 
 long course of unfavourable exchanges will be 
 accounted for at once, and may fairly be sup- 
 posed to have produced the depreciation of our 
 gold coin in the same manner as I have just 
 shown that of our silver coin to have taken place
 
 135 
 
 daring tlie wars of King William. The scarcit}^ 
 and high price of bullion would soon occasion 
 an exportation of coin ; and as, the currency of 
 the gold coin was not then restricted to any 
 fixed weight, the heaviest pieces would always 
 be selected for exportation ; and thus a pro- 
 gressive depreciation of the coin would take 
 place, and the attempt to counteract it by a 
 fresh coinage, always carried on at a great ex- 
 pense, would be in vain, as the new coin would 
 disappear as fast as it came into circulation. 
 
 I shall dwell no longer upon this point, l^e- 
 cause, whatever diiference of opinion there may 
 be between the Learned Gentleman and myself, 
 I do not think the evidence sufficiently clear to 
 justity us in aftirming any thing positive in a 
 Resolution of the House. 
 
 The next point touched upon in this Amend- 
 ment is the price of gold during the American 
 war, which is said never to liave exceeded the 
 Mint price in any one year of the war; but 
 I have had occasion, in speaking of the last 
 Amendment, to show this assertion to be com- 
 pletely mistaken. 
 
 What follows respecting the state of the ex- 
 changes in the period iunnediately preceding 
 the Bank restriction, will be more conveniently 
 discussed in sneaking of the Amendment on the 
 tenth Resolution, in which the san^c circum- 
 stances are stated more at large. 
 There remains only the statement, " tha^
 
 136 
 
 *' there was 7io rise in the price of standard gold 
 ** in bars immediately prior to the 26th of Fe- 
 " bruaiy 1797, nor for a considerable number 
 " of years before." This is a point of some 
 consequence, as ail the circumstances attending 
 the restriction on the Bank must be important 
 in a discussion of this kind ; but never was a 
 more complete fallacy disguised under a slender 
 veil of evidence. 
 
 It is true that in the printed Tables no higher 
 price of standard gold in bars appears than 
 31. I7s. 6d. per ounce. But the Learned Gen- 
 tleman has omitted to inform us in his Amend- 
 ment, that for eleven months out of the eighteen 
 immediately preceding the restriction, 7io price 
 of standard gold is given, because there was none 
 in the market, and that for tuw years preceding 
 the restriction, no price of foreign gold is given, 
 except for one month only. 
 
 Independently, however, of this evidence from 
 the very Tables from which the Amendment it- 
 self is taken, I should think it impossible to be- 
 lieve that the Directors of the Bank could have 
 been so devoid of common sense, as well as of re- 
 gard to the public interest, as to suffer their trea- 
 sure to be drained away to a degree which filled 
 them with alarm, as appears from their correspond- 
 ence with Mr. Pitt, laid before the Committees 
 of both Houses of Parliament in 1797, while they 
 could have replenished it by purchasing what- 
 ever quantity of gold they found necessary.
 
 137 
 
 without any loss. The cvitlcnco taken hefore 
 the Committees of hoth Houses ot" Parliament, 
 gives a very rlifterent view of their concluet. 
 It shows their extreme anxiety to preserve, or 
 to restore, tlie treasure of the Bank hy all tlie 
 means in their power. To this evidence, which 
 IS in the hands of every Memher, I shall, in 
 order to save the time of the H<juse, beg leave 
 to refer, in a general manner, and only to 
 trouble them with one or two answers of Air. 
 Newland, the Cashier, to the Connnittee of the 
 House of Lords. 
 
 " I belieye," says he, " that gold within the 
 " last two years has been at a higher price than 
 " 4/. 4.SV per ounc€, which is a great induce- 
 "' meiit for persons to melt the guineas which 
 " are circulated at 31. 17s. lO^f/." 
 
 He is asked, " Does the Bank ever pay more 
 " in their purchase of gold for it than the Mint 
 " price?" He answers, " Frequent I if." 
 
 " What is the highest price you ever knew 
 " the Bank pay for gold, per ounce?"' He an- 
 swers, " 4/. 1*. — 4/. Qs. — 4/. 6.S. and as high as 
 " 4/. 8*. ; but very seldom at those prices." 
 
 *' State to the Committee at what time the 
 " Bank gave so large a price as 4/. 8*..-" — *' I bc- 
 " lieve," says he, " it was about two years since 
 " the Bank gave about 4/. S.v. per ounce for 
 •gold; it A\as but a small (juantit}', it was 
 " soon sto])ptd on account of its price," 
 T *
 
 13^ 
 
 With this evidence I shall leave the assertioii 
 of the AiBeiulment, that there was no rise in 
 the price of gold before the r^estriction on the 
 Bdfik, ajul pass to tJip next Amendment, that 
 on the sixth Resolution, which states, " That 
 '' taking the issues of Bank-notes in circulation, 
 *' not at tlieir amount on a particular day, but 
 " on a fair average antecedent to any alteration 
 *^ of the exchanges and price of bullion, it does 
 •' not appear, from the information which has 
 " been procured, that the price of gold has 
 " been highest and the exchanges most unfa- 
 " vourable when the issues of Bank-notes had 
 *' been considerably diminished, and have been 
 " restored to their ordinary rates subsequently 
 " to those issues being increased. 
 
 " That since the said restriction, the price of 
 " bullion has been highest, and the exchanges 
 • ' have been most unfavourable, at times subse- 
 " quent to the periods in which the issues of 
 '* Bank-notes have most increased." 
 
 This is no answer to my argument, and pro- 
 ceeds upon a misunderstanding of the object of 
 the Ptesolution. What I affirm is, that th6 
 price of bullion h'dsfieque}?tli/ been highest, and 
 the exchanges most unfavourable, at periods 
 when the issues of Bank-notes have been con- 
 siderably diminished. The Honourable Gentle- 
 man's Amendment denies; that it has been so; 
 taking a comparison of averages and not of pa^-
 
 139 
 
 ficular days. If lie means, that, upon a compa- 
 rison of averages, it never appears to have been 
 so (which would be necessary to support tlie 
 theory of the Committee), lean abundantly prove 
 that the fact is against liim. liut if he means 
 only to deny that it lias been uniformly so, my 
 argument will remain untouched. ]\Iy object is 
 to show, that the issues of Bank-notes have 
 produced no apparent effect on the exchanges 
 and the price of bulb on, in opposition to the 
 theory of tlie Committee, who contend, that an 
 increased issue of notes necessarily occasions an 
 unfavourable state of the exchange, and a re- 
 duction of notes as uniformly corrects it. This 
 theory cannot be well founded if any instances to 
 the contrary can be produced. I have already 
 mentioned several, but I will add another of 
 more recent date. It appears by t)ie accounts 
 lately printed, that the amount of Bank-notes 
 in circulation since January last, has been from 
 two to three millicms less than it was in the 
 preceding summer, yet the exchange has since 
 fallen 10 or 12 per cent. Or, as the Learned 
 Gentleman seems to think the question is 
 most fairly to be tried by a comparison of pe- 
 riods of considerable length, I would desire 
 him to examine the accounts contained in the 
 Report of the Bullion Committee respecting 
 the amount of Bank-notes and the rates of ex- 
 changes, from 1 SOU to 1 805. If the increase of 
 
 T *
 
 140 
 
 Bank-notes depresses the exchange, and thfc 
 d nil inution of Bank-notes raises it, the exchange 
 onght to have fallen, instead of rising, between 
 1803 and 1804, and to have risen, instead of 
 falling, from 1804 to 1806. But for the same 
 reasons an uniform issue of Bank-notes must 
 occasion a steady exchange, and an invariable 
 price of bidHon. In that period of seven years 
 the amount of Bank-notes was, liowever, in- 
 creased only from seventeen millions to seven- 
 teen millions and a half, or less than 3 per cent, 
 and the intermediate variations were not consi- 
 derable. But the exchange varied about 1 1 
 per cent. ; the price of foreign gold, about 
 •8r percent.; that of standard silver, about 10; 
 and that of dollars, ISi per cent.* 
 
 'Years. 
 
 Average Amount 
 
 Exchange with 
 
 . Price of 
 
 Piicc of Foreign 
 
 of Bank-nofes. 
 
 Hamburgh. 
 
 Standard Gold. 
 
 Gold. 
 
 ISO'2 
 
 17,054,000 
 
 32 to 34 
 
 41. 3S. (Jd. 
 
 None. 
 
 1803 
 
 l(i,847,000 
 
 34 to 35 
 
 None, 
 
 None. 
 
 1804 
 
 17,345,000 
 
 34. 8 to 35. 10 
 
 J None till ' 
 1 June, 41. 
 
 f None till 
 I June, 41. 
 
 J 805 
 
 17,241,000 
 
 35.8 to 32. 9 
 
 41. 
 
 41. 
 
 1806 
 
 17,135,000 
 
 34.8 to 33.3 
 
 None. 
 
 41. 
 
 180/ 
 
 17,405,000 
 
 34. 10 to 34. 2 
 
 None. 
 
 41. 
 
 1808 
 
 17,543,000 
 
 35.3 to 32. 4 
 
 None. 
 
 41. 7s. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Price of Standard Silver. 
 
 Price of Dollars. 
 
 1802 
 
 5y 1 1 irf to 5s dd. 
 
 5s. gd. to 5s. S^d. 
 
 1803 
 
 .5s. (5d. to 5s. Sd. 
 
 5s. 3\d. to 5s. 5^d. 
 
 1804 
 
 5s. 8';d. to 5s. 5d. 
 
 5s yd. to 5s. lid. 
 5s. 7 id. to 5s. Id. 
 
 1S05 
 
 5s. lOd. 
 
 1806 
 
 None. 
 
 5s. t-^d. to 5s. Sd. 
 
 1807 
 
 5.V. 6d. to 5s. 6d. 
 
 &s. 6{d. to 5?. 5d 
 
 lSf!8 
 
 None. 
 
 5s. :hL
 
 341 
 
 ' The Amendment proposed on the seventh Re- 
 solution, turns entirely on a question of degree, 
 and, it" adniitieii, would not aftect the accuracy, 
 thougii it niighr lessen the ibrce and import- 
 ance, or tiie Resolution. But I have, however, 
 already had occasion to show, that in all the 
 material parts it is unfounded in point of fact. 
 
 I now proceed to the Amendment on the 
 eighth Resolution, the principal object of 
 which appears to ])e to substitute an average ac- 
 count of the amount of Bank-notes during pe- 
 riods of several months for their amount on par- 
 ticular days, and to enter into a more minute 
 detail of tlie variations of the exchange durinsr 
 the years 1782-3-4. I had selected such dates 
 as appeared to me to point out in the most 
 striking manner, the fallacy of the principles 
 assumed by the Committee, and the Learned 
 Gentleman has made no objection whatever to 
 the accuracy of tlie statement; but I am so 
 convinced that in any lair view of the case, 
 "whether taken on a comparison of averages, or 
 of single days only, the result will be equally 
 favourable to my argument, that I am willing 
 to substitute for the eighth Resolution, a new 
 one in wliich the fluctuations of the exchange 
 are pointed out more minutely, which I beg leave 
 to read tf) the House, viz. 
 
 " That the amount of Bank-notes outstanding 
 "on tlielirst of January 1781, was 6,79%6'iOi. 
 " and was reduced on the first of October, to
 
 142 
 
 " S,9^7,790L during which time the exchange 
 " fell from 34. 1 to 32. 2, and the price of fo- 
 " reign gold rose from 31. ]7s. 6d. per ounce, 
 " to 3/. ]9s. 6d.; and dollars (which on the se- 
 " cond of March were at 5,y. 4^cl. per ounce) to 
 ^' 5.9. 9i;d. : that in the beginning of March 
 " 1782, the amount of Bank-notes was in- 
 " creased to 9,160,000/. and that the exchange 
 " was then 32. 10, foreign gold 3/. I9s. and 
 ** dollars 5s. S^d.: that in the beginning of De- 
 " cember 1782, the amount of Bank-notes was 
 " reduced to 5,995,000, and that the exchange 
 ** was then 31.10, foreign gold 4A 0^. Irf. and 
 "dollars 5s. Il^d. : that in June 1783, the 
 ** amount of Bank-notes was 6,970,000/. and 
 *' the exchange 31. 5, foreign gold 4/. Qs. od. 
 " and dollars 5s. Sj;d. : that in June 1 784, the 
 *' amount of Bank-notes was 6,717,000/. and 
 " the exchange had risen to 34. 4, and gold had 
 " fallen to the Mint price, and dollars to 5s. Sd. 
 " and that the exchange continued at 34. 6, gold 
 ** at 31. \7s. 6d. and dollars at 5s. \^d. in Fe- 
 " bruary 1787, the amount of Bank-notes being 
 " then increased to 8,688,000/." 
 
 If the Learned Gentleman does not choose 
 to accept my offer, I must adhere to the ori- 
 ginal Resolution, in which he has not pointed 
 out the slightest inaccuracy. 
 
 To proceed to the Amendment on the ninth 
 Resolution, which is, " That of the sum of 
 ** 10,704,000/. stated to have been coined in
 
 143 
 
 ** gold from February 1787 to February 1791, 
 " the sum of 8,084,982/. was a recoiiiage from 
 " the light guineas of the realm," 
 
 It is true, as stated in the Amendment, that 
 of the sum of 10,740,000/. coined in four years, 
 from 1787 to 1791, no less than 8,053,000/. were 
 recoined from light guineas. But this fact is so 
 far from invalidating the force of the Resolution, 
 that it rather confirms an argument I have be- 
 fore had occasion to use. I have observed, that 
 when tlie exchanges were favourable for any 
 considerable period, the coin which was become 
 too light for currency, has been usually re- 
 turned to the Mint for recoinage, because no 
 profit could be obtained by the exportation of 
 it ; but that when the exchanges were unfa- 
 vourable, the hght coin was clandestinely ex- 
 ported as bullion, and the Mint supplied by fo- 
 reign gold, imported at a considerable loss. 
 
 The period from 1787 to 1791, was one of 
 great commercial prosperity and favourable ex- 
 changes, succeeding an expensive war and an 
 unfavourable course of exchange. In conse- 
 quence, a large quantity of British coin which 
 had been sent abroad during the war, returned 
 to this country, and was sent to the Mint for 
 recoinage. This supposition is confirmed by 
 the well-known fact, that some time after the 
 (zonclusion of peace, large quantities of guineas 
 came back from America, and by the great pro- 
 portion which the recoinage of light guineas.
 
 144 
 
 during the period we are speaking of, bore to 
 that of the periods both preceding and sub- 
 sequent to it. 
 
 In nine years, from 1778 to 1787, the sum 
 recoined from light guineas amounted to 
 3,190,000/. or, on an average, to 354,000/. only 
 in each year; in four years, from 1787 to 1791, 
 to 8,850,000/. or 2,021,000/. in each year ; in 
 six years, from 1791 to 1797, to 4,000,000/. or 
 666,0001. in each year. 
 
 My object was to show, that between 1787 and 
 1791, a large addition was made to the amount of 
 our current coin ; and it is indifferent whether 
 fliis addition was made by the recoinage of light 
 guineas, or the importation of foreign bullion, 
 unless it could be shown tliat those guineas 
 became light, and were thrown out of circula- 
 tion, during the same period. Upon the degree in 
 wliich this might have taken place, every man 
 will form his own judgment ; but that in so 
 short a term it was great, would be utterly in- 
 credible, even if their return to the Mint were 
 not easy to be otherwise accounted for by the 
 circumstances I have stated. 
 
 The Amendment on tlie tenth Resolution, 
 like that on the eighth, does not impute any in- 
 accuracy to the Resolution, but traces several 
 intermediate variations of the exchange, which 
 1 have not thought it necessary to notice. 
 Nor shall I now trouble the House with a mU 
 pute investigation of these trifling cii'cum*.
 
 145^ 
 
 stances, because any Gentleman wlio may have 
 a curiosity on the subject may easily satisfy 
 himself, by a reference to the accounts upon 
 the table, that during this period no visible 
 connexion can be traced between the amount 
 of Bank-notes in circulation, and the course of 
 the exchange *. 
 
 
 
 Exchange 
 
 
 
 Exchange 
 
 •>795- 
 
 Bank Notes. 
 
 with 
 
 i?96. 
 
 Bank Notes. 
 
 whh 
 
 
 
 Hanibiirgli.' 
 
 
 
 Hambursh. 
 
 Jan. 31 
 
 12,716,000 
 
 36. 
 
 Jan. 29 
 
 10,746,000 
 
 33. 
 
 Feb. 28 
 
 14,017.000 
 
 35. 10 
 
 Feb. 27 
 
 10,617,000 33. 2 
 
 March 2S 
 
 10,444,000 
 
 35. 4 : 
 
 March 26 
 
 10,287,000 34. 6 
 
 April 24 
 
 12,040,000 
 
 34. 4 1 
 
 April 30 
 
 11,661,000 33. 10 
 
 May 30 
 
 10,316.000 
 
 33. 6 i 
 
 May 28 
 
 10,303,000 34. 
 
 June 27 
 
 10,661,000 
 
 32. 10 ^ 
 
 June 25 
 
 9,882.000, 33. 7 
 
 July 24 
 
 11,420,000 
 
 32. 4 ( 
 
 July 30 
 
 9,7Sii,(JOO] 33. 11 
 
 Aug. 29 
 
 11,176,000 
 
 32. 6 : 
 
 Aug. 27 
 
 0,427,000! 33, 7 
 
 Sept. 26 
 
 10,775,000 
 
 32. 10 i 
 
 Sept. 24 
 
 9,-109,000 34. 
 
 Oct. 31 
 
 11,082,000 
 
 32. 10 jlOct. 29 
 
 0,744,000 34. 7 
 
 Nov. 28 
 
 11,503,000 
 
 33. 2 I'Nov. 26 
 
 9,914,000 34. 6 
 
 Dec. 24 
 
 11,496,000 
 
 32. 7 Dec. 31 
 
 9,204,000 35. 6 
 
 
 Exchange 
 
 1797- 
 
 Bank Notes. 
 
 with 
 Hambursh. 
 
 Jan. 28 10,024,000 
 
 35. 1 
 
 Feb. 25 8,640,000 
 
 34. 9 
 
 March 24; 10,501,000 
 
 36. 8 
 
 April 29 1 13,049,000 
 
 36. 
 
 May 2? j 10,880,000 
 
 36. 4 
 
 June 23 | 10,284,000 
 
 3G. 6 
 
 July 29 
 
 11,233,000 
 
 36. 8 
 
 Aug. 26 
 
 10,564,000 
 
 38. 
 
 Sept. 30 
 
 11,834,000 
 
 .'^7. 7 
 
 Oct. 27 
 
 12,448,000' 39. 
 
 Nov. 25 
 
 ll,20/i,000! 38. 2 
 
 Dec. 30 
 
 11,276,0(X) 38. 2 
 
 N. B, The rnte of exchange is stated as it appears on the first ihy 
 rnc-ntioned in the account subsequent to that on which the amount 
 ©f Bank-notes is given. 
 
 U
 
 146 
 
 The only remaining Amendment (that on 
 the fourteenth Resolution) I have already an- 
 ticipated by inserting in the Resolution the 
 sums taken from an account presented with- 
 in these few days to the House, instead of those 
 "which I had before placed in it from an earlier 
 and less complete account. 
 
 1 have now gone through this tedious, but 
 necessary part of my statement ; and I beg 
 the House to recollect that the points I have 
 been discussing are the only objections which 
 the talents and industry of the Bullion Com- 
 mittee have been able to raise against the facts 
 stated in my proposed Resolutions. I am of 
 opinion, that I have given a complete answer 
 to each of them ; but if the Learned Gentle- 
 man thinks they can be supported, he has now 
 the opportunity of doing so; and if I have 
 still left any thing unexplained, I shall be able, 
 in the course of the debate, to supply the de- 
 ficiencies which may have occurred in my 
 statement. 
 
 Assuming, till I hear the contrary, that I 
 have satisfied the House of the complete his- 
 torical accuracy of the Resolutions submitted 
 to them, I must now call their attention more 
 particularly to such of them as demand the 
 judgment of the House on questions of liti- 
 gated o})inion, or of practical effect. 
 
 In the discussion of these points, I now
 
 147 
 
 stand upon ground of much greater advan- 
 tage than when I addressed you some days 
 since, not only from the rejection of the Re- 
 solutions moved by the Learned Chairman, but 
 from the estabhshed accuracy of the series of 
 historical Resolutions, now under consideration, 
 the objections to which I think I have refuted. 
 
 I know not, indeed, whether I am at liberty 
 to claim this admitted accuracy as applying to 
 the first Resolution. It is a Resolution decla- 
 ratory of law, as well as of historical fact ; but 
 ecjually capable of being combated by an 
 Amendment, pointing out its inaccuracy if any 
 exists. If I have laid down the prerogative 
 of the Crown erroneously, why are not the 
 statutes, the declai-ations of Parliament, the 
 authentic documents of any kind, which prove 
 my error, embodied in an Amendment to op- 
 pose me? I should, therefore, be entitled to 
 assume, that no solid ground of objection 
 could be found. 
 
 But as I am desirous, if possible, to avoid 
 troubling the House a third time, and as many 
 comments of various kinds have been made on 
 this Resolution, and on the subject of the 
 standard of money connecti^d with it, I think 
 it may be proper to say something respecting it, 
 before I call upon the House in form to adopt 
 it. 
 
 u S
 
 148 
 
 I have been charged by the Right Plonour- 
 able Gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning) with 
 rejecting " altogether the established doctrine 
 " of a fixed standard of the currency of the 
 " realm ; and with bending and accommodating 
 " the fundamental principles of our money 
 " system, to the state of our currency, such as 
 *' I happen to find it." 
 
 I answer, that neither in this Resolution, 
 nor in what I have said on a late occasion, re- 
 specting the standard of money, have I re- 
 ferred at all to the present state of our currency, 
 as consisting chiefly of paper, but to the legal 
 metallic money of this kingdom. What I af- 
 firm is, that a fixed and invariable equivalency 
 between our legal money and bullion, never 
 has been established by our laws. I have 
 proved it in practice by showing, that very 
 different weights of silver money are, and al- 
 ways have been, equally current as a legal 
 tender. It is not less easy to prove in theory, 
 that, until our laws are altered, it is impossible 
 this equivalency should be preserved. So long- 
 as the exportation of our coin is prohibited, 
 the merchant who wants to send gold abroad 
 must be contented to give more for such bul- 
 lion as may be legally exported, than its 
 weight in legal money. This is not a law of 
 recent date — not an attempt to bend and accam- 
 modaic the principles of cur money system to the
 
 149 
 
 state of our currency. It is what the Bullion 
 Committee themselves call the ancient policy of 
 our law. They call it, indeed, doubtful and 
 {questionable policy (and such I too think it); 
 but it is a point on which they do not hazard 
 an opinion — they do not recommend its repeal. 
 Yet they contend, that Bank-notes are depre- 
 ciated because they have not an equivalency, 
 •which our legal coin never had, and, till 
 our laws are altered, never can have. The 
 value of our money may not only fall short of 
 bullion, but may, under different circumstances, 
 exceed it. That this might happen while a 
 seisrnoraffe was taken on our coins, as it does 
 in other countries where that is the case, is 
 obvious ; but we have a more recent instance 
 of a different kind. 
 
 - It is well known, that any person may carry 
 gold bullion to the Mint, and is entitled to 
 have it returned in coin, free of expense, the 
 charge of coinage being borne by the public, 
 ^^1lile this is the case, gold bullion can never 
 be materially cheaper than its weight in coin; 
 or, in other words, can fall but little below the 
 Mint price ; that is, no more than may be equi- 
 Yalent to some trouble, and a small loss of in- 
 terest occasioned by the delay. The same law 
 subsisted with respect to the silver coin, till 
 a few years ago ; and, therefore, standard 
 silver bullion could never fall much below
 
 150 
 
 the Mint price of 5^. 2^/. an ounce. But in 1797, 
 an Act was passed, prohibiting silver coinage ; 
 and since that time, standard silver has fallen 
 as low as 5s. Now will the Right Honourable 
 .Gentleman deny, that, at such a time, a pound 
 .weight of standard silver bullion might have 
 -been purchased and paid for in legal silver coin, 
 >vorn down to no more than eight ounces weight? 
 /or will he, in such a case, affirm the exact equi- 
 valency of coin to bullion, and say, as some 
 who maintain the same opinions have said, 
 that a pound of silver is, and always must be, 
 a pound of silver, and nothing else, all the world 
 over? 
 
 , The Right Honourable Gentleman tells us, 
 that " a pound sterling is either If of a pound 
 " of standard silver, or *° of a guinea weigh- 
 " ing not less than five penny-weights, 
 ,■* eight grains. This is the simple, and the 
 ■*' only definition, which the practice of our 
 .*' ancestors recognises, and the law of the 
 ^* country allows." 
 
 Let us now consider what the practice of 
 •pur ancestors has really been, and what the law 
 4^eal)y is. We shall find, that, in the practice 
 of our ancestors, the weight of silver, of the 
 present standard fineness, contained in a pound 
 sterling, has varied from eleven ounces, five 
 |?enny-weights, to no more than seventeen 
 |;edn^-w^ight3. With respect to the law, w©
 
 151 
 
 know that the greater part of our sliver current^- 
 now passes legally current, not at It of a pound 
 weight, but If or U- to the pound sterling. I 
 beg not to be understood as defending the de- 
 basement of our money, which has, at various 
 times, taken place ; or as contending that the 
 present state of our silver coin is not an evil. 
 Neither am I discussing the true principles of 
 legislation with respect to currency, or in- 
 quiring whether it might not be wise, by some 
 reo-ulations like those of the banks of Amsterdam 
 and Hamburgh, or in some other way, to esta- 
 blish an equivalency of value between money 
 and bullion. The Right Honourable Gentle- 
 man appeals to fact and law, and I am showing 
 that fact and law do not support him. Upon 
 these grounds alone am I reasoning, and on 
 these alone the Resolution turns. 
 
 I have hitherto been speaking of the silver 
 coin, M'hich, till within modern times, was the 
 only legal measure of value. Not only Mr. 
 Locke, but a much later writer, Mr. Harris, in 
 his sensible and useful work on coins, published 
 so late as in 1757, contends that it is the true 
 and only measure which can be properly esta- 
 blished. But all I have said applies equally 
 to the gold coin at any time previous to 1 774, 
 and the period from that time to the present 
 has not only been much too short to consti- 
 tute an Mistance of settled and established po- 
 licy, but has been throughout a period of dc-
 
 152 
 
 liberation and suspense with respect to a revi- 
 sion of our monetary system, which temporary 
 circumstances have always prevented from be- 
 ing completed and carried into effect. And it 
 is observable, that it seems to have been in 
 contemplation in 1774, when the current weight 
 of the guinea was first fixed, to have limited 
 the current weight of the silver coin also, as the 
 same Act which provided for the fabrication of 
 weights and scales, for the gold coins, directed 
 weights to be prepared for the silver coins also, 
 although no limitation of their current weight 
 was, in fact, estabhshed. 
 
 Thus far I have spoken of the weight only 
 of our coins ; but the Resolution is purposely 
 so drawn as to assert the prerogative of the 
 Crown to regulate their fineness also, in all 
 cases not settled by Act of Parliament. I am 
 aware that some respectable authorities may be 
 adduced to controvert this position, at the head 
 of which is that of Sir Edward Coke. But 
 when I find it laid down as incUspiitable by so 
 great a lawyer as Sir Matthew Hale, and af- 
 firmed, after an elaborate and able review of 
 the question, by Lord Liverpool, I cannot 
 doubt on which side the weight of authority 
 prevails. But above all, when I find that, in 
 the course of ages, the legality of this preroga-, 
 tive appears never to have been questioned in 
 any parliamentary or public document, though
 
 15S 
 
 the mode of its exercise has been frequently 
 and justly complained of, I cannot hesitate in 
 recommending this Resolution to the Plouse as 
 a just exposition of the law. 
 
 In the course of this debate, the statute of 
 the 25 Edward the Third, chapter 13, has been 
 quoted as controlling this prerogative ; and Sir 
 AVilliam Blackstone seems inclined to consider 
 it in that view. But if this interpretation is to 
 be put on that statute, and it is to be consider- 
 ed as applying to gold coin, every guinea which 
 has ever been struck has been a violation of if, 
 and it has never, in any instance, been obeyed 
 since the time of Charles the Second. For 
 since that time, no gold money has ever been 
 struck of the old standard of 23J carats fine. 
 Yet I do not find that the introduction of this 
 new standard (as it was called) of twenty-two 
 carats fine by Henry the Eighth, or that of the 
 inferior standard he also introduced of twenty 
 carats fine*, or even the enormous debasement 
 of the silver coin in the leign of Edward the 
 Sixth, was ever considered as illegal, however 
 justly condemned as mpolUic and injurioitft. 
 Nothing is more easy, but nothing more falla^ 
 cious, than to argue from the abus^, against the 
 use; and to contend, that a prerogative does 
 not exist, because, if unwisely or <^orruptly ex- 
 
 ♦ These three different standards of gold coin are distin^ 
 ^lished by the names of avgel gnld, crown gold (which it the 
 ftaiKlard now in use), and sovertign gold. 
 7i
 
 J5i 
 
 ^icised, it may produce consequences "injuiiotie 
 to tile public. Power must, in every govera- 
 ,inent, be lodged somewhere. And every pre- 
 rogative is \ested in the Crown for the benefit 
 of tlie people, subject to the responsibility of 
 ?the advisers of the Crown, and to the superin- 
 tendence of Parliament. What prerogative cau 
 be more important or more dangerous to the 
 public than that of war and peace, and what 
 other security than those I have mentionecl, 
 has the nation against unjust and impolitic 
 wars ? 
 
 Among the artifices of debate which have 
 been resorted to on this occasion, one of the 
 most common has been the introduction of great 
 names as authorities in the question ; but when 
 the opinions of the great men so ostentatiously 
 mentioned come to be examined, they will be 
 found either to have no reference to it, or aii 
 effect contrary to that for which they were 
 brought forward. 
 
 I might have been terrified with the itjtro- 
 duction of Lord Liverpool as an authority 
 against my opinions, if I had not known th^t 
 tliat Nobleman states the royal prerogative very 
 nearly in the same words as I have used ii) my 
 Jlesolution : and even that a great part of his 
 valuable work is taken up in discussing the 
 mode in which that prerqgative, which, follow- 
 ing Sir Matthew Hale, he trerts as indisputable, 
 ought to be exercised.
 
 15S 
 
 I should still more have shrunk frorh th* 
 weight of a yet greater name, that of Sir Isaac 
 Newton, if I had not recollected that his Re- 
 port, instead of confirming the purpose for 
 which it was cited by the Honourable Gentle- 
 man, in reality destroys it. It was produced 
 to support the doctrine of an invariable standard 
 of currency; but, unfortunately for the aigu- 
 ment, Newton concludes by recommemling an 
 alteration of the current value of the guineas 
 froiTi i2Lv. 6d. to 2U. 
 
 This recommen<lation was actually carried 
 intoeftect; and it is observable that the Parlia- 
 ment, in 1717, was so sensible, that this was a 
 subject properly belonging to the prerogative of 
 the Crown, and so cautious of interfering with 
 it, that, instead of proceeding by Act of Parlia- 
 ment, both Houses addressed the King to issu6 
 his Proclamation. 
 
 I recollect only one other circumstance con- 
 nected with the subject of this first Resolution, 
 to which I think it necessary to call the atten- 
 tion of the House. It is that of a proposition, 
 first, I believe, brought forward by the Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman opjK)site (Mr. Huskisson), 
 in his able publication on the Bullion Report, 
 and since repeated both by him and his Riglit 
 Honourable Friend (Mr. Canning) in their 
 speeches, to allow the circulation of guineas, 
 *r at least of such guineas as ai e below the cur- 
 X 2
 
 156 
 
 rent weight, at whatever value they might find 
 in the market. On this I must observe, in the 
 iirst place, that light guineas are already a mar- 
 ketable commodity, they are no longer current 
 money, but mere bullion, and may be lawfully 
 bought and sold as such, though not for the 
 purpose of exportation. But what a curious 
 measure of value would those Honourable Gen- 
 tlemen introduce by means of a currency which 
 would have no fixed value in itself; when, in 
 every purchase, there must be a double bargain, 
 first, for the commodity, and next for the ratei 
 at which the money shall be received, which 
 must, in all cases, be weighed with the greatest 
 exactness ! — a measure subject to daily variation, 
 to continual dispute, and every species of fraud 
 and imposition ; for how are the peasantry of 
 the country, for instance, to know and follow 
 the fluctuations of the bullion market in Lon- 
 don, and always to carry with them exact 
 weights and scales? We should, indeed, pos- 
 sess metallic money, on which those Gentle- 
 men lay so much stress, but divested of every 
 quality which makes money valuable as an in- 
 strument of commerce. 
 
 And what then will become of all their ar- 
 guments respecting a fixed, invariable standard, 
 in commenting upon which, I have been obliged 
 to trouble the House so long ? 
 
 But suppose the rate at which this new" 
 currency, the light guineas, shall pass, to be
 
 157 
 
 regulated by public autliority, by Proclamatloti, 
 or by Resolution of the House of Commons, it' 
 it is thought right, as their arguments seem to 
 imply, to take this branch of the prerogative 
 from the Crown, are all light guineas to pass 
 at an equal vat€ — is one which lias lost twenty 
 grains of its current weight to be equal to ano- 
 ther which has lost only one, or is the value to 
 be regulated by weight? In this case, we re- 
 turn to the inconveniences of continued weigh- 
 ing, and all the tricks which may attend it- 
 Awd v^hat security is there that the Resolution, 
 which fixes the value of coin this week accord- 
 ing to the price of the bullion market, may not 
 vary from it the next, and the boasted equi- 
 valency of money and bullion be again as much 
 lost as it is at present? 
 
 After all, what is such a suggestion but 
 a proposal to debase the standard of' monai/, bif 
 raising the denomijiation of the coin — an idea at 
 which those very Gentlemen express so much 
 horror as to exclaim against a Resolution ac- 
 knowledging the prerogative of the Crown, be- 
 cause they tliii)k it may possibly be understood 
 to imply that some such measure is in contem*- 
 plation, though it has been most distinctly dis- 
 avowed both by the adv isers of the Crown, and 
 tlie framer of the Resolution himself. 
 
 But this proposition is particularly ludicrous 
 as coming from that Right Honourable Gentle- 
 man after the ridicule with which he, like some
 
 158 
 
 other Gentlemen, lias treated the additional' 
 value lately given to the Bank dollar tokens. I 
 am far from commencHng that measure in the^ 
 itianner in which it was carried into execution ; 
 but it is liable to no one objection to which th© 
 Right Honourable Gentleman's proposal is not- 
 exposed, and it is free from the most im- 
 portant. 
 
 The dollar token bears no public authority, 
 but is a mere silver note of the corporation of 
 the Bank of England, and receives its value 
 from their engagement to make it good at a cer- 
 tain rate. If they were to choose, for whatever 
 cause, to undertake to pay eleven pounds for 
 every ten pound note issued before a certain 
 day, I know not who could have any right to 
 complain of them. And if the Bank were to 
 issue golden tokens, though, for other reasons, I 
 might think such a plan objectionable, I should 
 not complain of tlieir want of weight, though 
 as light as any of the Right Honourable Gen^ 
 tleman's proposed money. But the light guinea, 
 according to his plan, would be issued by public 
 authority, and with all the circumstances at- 
 tending a legal coin, and would, therefore, h& 
 neither more nor less than a debasement of the= 
 standard. 
 
 On the second Resolution it is unnecessary^ 
 tb dwell; I therefore pass to the third, which 
 has substantially been the great subject of our^ 
 long debate so far as opinion is concerned^ .
 
 159 
 
 • It calls upon the House to pronounce its dis- 
 tinct judgment of the falsity of those opi- 
 nions, which maintain the notes of the Bank of 
 England to be depreciated in the ordinary and 
 popular sense of that word, that is, in the sense 
 of their having lost their value compared with 
 the legal coin of the country. 
 
 This Resolution has already been the subject 
 of much wit, much ridicule, much loose and 
 far-fetched argumentation ; but, I think, of 
 very little sound reasoning or distinct evidence, 
 on the part of those who oppose it. 
 
 My first appeal was to facts, because, in a 
 case referring to the daily business and habits 
 of life, facts cannot be wanting. In opposi- 
 tion to the daily evidence of the equivalency of 
 Bank-notes and cash with which every mans 
 experience must have furnished him, all the 
 industry and research employed on this occa- 
 sion have only supplied two or three instances, 
 not of an established difference of price, but of 
 single private transactions, all of them resting 
 on hearsay (though I do not mean to dispute 
 their truth), all of them attended by some cir- 
 cumstances which would lead to a suspicion of 
 an intended illegal exportation of the coin. 
 
 With a view to place the question upon the 
 ground of facts more authenticated and of greater 
 .notoriety, I referred to the absence of all legal 
 proceedings on this subject. It was immd-
 
 1(>0 
 
 tliatcly hinted to me that such proceedings had 
 taken place *. My Learned Friend (Mr. Morris) 
 has since produced his instance ; and if ever a 
 ttile was proved by its exception, it is the rule 
 which I have laid down of the equivalency of 
 Bank-notes to cash. The case produced is that 
 of Grigsby and Oakes, in 1800, of which I 
 probably must have heard at that time, though 
 it had escaped my recollection when he alluded 
 to it. 
 
 In this case an action w^as brought by a gen- 
 tleman against a country banker who offered 
 payment for some of his own notes in notes of 
 the 33ank of England. This payment was re- 
 jected by the plaintiff, who demanded that a 
 five pound note should be paid in guineas ; and, 
 on the refusal of the banker, brought his ac- 
 tion. He obtained a verdict under the direc- 
 tions of the Learned Judge, and it was con- 
 firmed by the unanimous opinion of the Court 
 6i' Common Pleas, who determined that Bank- 
 ilotes were not a legal tender. 
 
 This case, therefore, proves that my statc- 
 hent of the law a few days ago was correct, 
 and that eleven years since it was solemnly ad- 
 judged and publicly known, that Bank-notes 
 kre iiot a legal tender ; and if, from that time 
 to the pressnt, they have passed generally cur-» 
 fcnt, and no other action has been brought, can 
 
 ♦ See page 24,
 
 161 
 
 a stronger Instance be given that they continue 
 to be supported by public opinion (as is at- 
 firmed in the Resokition) without the force of 
 law. 
 
 There were some circumstances attending the 
 original trial which I have learnt from an eye- 
 witnessj and which seem to me not undeserving 
 of the attention of the House. The Learned 
 Judge (Mr. Justice Heath), in the first instance, 
 recommended to the Jury, to find a verdict for 
 the plaintiff. After a few minutes consultation 
 the jury, however, brought in a verdict for the 
 dtftndant. ^Mr. Justice Heath, deeming the 
 verdict an improper one, refused to take it, and, 
 after explaining to them how he understood the 
 law to stand, recommended to them to recon- 
 sider their verdict. They again consulted, and, 
 after a short time, the foreman turaicd about, 
 and said, " ^ly Lord, we find for the de- 
 '^JhidantJ' Nor was it till after a serious ad- 
 monition fiom the Learned Judge, that it was 
 their bounden duty, under the oath they had 
 taken, to sacrifice their honest feelings to the 
 strict law of tlic case, that they could be pre- 
 vailed upon to return a conditi(mal verdict for 
 the plui/ili If] subject to the opinion of the Court 
 on the point of law. 
 
 Nothing can more strongly prove tjie state oi 
 pjblic opinion at that time, than the circum- 
 >.t'ances of this trial ; nor is it possible to have 
 y
 
 more conclusive evidence of its continuance, 
 than that from 1 800 to this day, no fresh action 
 has been brought, notwithstanding so clear and 
 authoritative a declaration of the law. 
 
 A Right Honourable Gentleman opposite 
 (Mr. Canning), in commenting on this Resolu- 
 tion, treated with great ridicule the idea which 
 be supposed me to entertain, that public estima- 
 tion could be the true standard measure of the 
 value of a currency ; and the common measure 
 of the two parts of a currency, as compared with 
 each other. I beg to remind the Right Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman, that I never hinted, 
 much less stated in a formal Resolution, that 
 the value of a legal currency was to be mea- 
 sured by public estimation. But of the value 
 of a paper currency, a currency purely repre- 
 sentative, public estimation is the true and only 
 measure. By what other measure would the 
 Right Honourable Gentleman try the deprecia- 
 tion of Bank-notes? Whether he infers tliat 
 depreciation from a comparison of notes with 
 legal money, with bullion, or with any other 
 article, public estimation is still the rule which 
 ascertains their comparative value. 
 
 The legal coin has a specific value affixed 
 to it by law. The notes of the Bank of 
 England profess to have the same value ; but 
 whether they actually possess it, must be de- 
 cided by the public opinion. That opinion i.<
 
 163 
 
 proved, and proveil incoiitestably, by tlie ge» 
 iieral and acknowledged j)ractice in ordinary 
 transactions. This is my answer to the ques- 
 tion put to me, by what measure the equiva- 
 lency of Bank-notes and cash was to be tried ; 
 and it agrees in substance with that given by 
 the Noble Lord opposite to me (Lord Castle- 
 reagh), who referred to the equal value allowed 
 for each in the purchase of commodities as the 
 test of their equivalency. Among commodities 
 I certainly include bullion ; but the question 
 would be less fairly tried by an inquiry into 
 dealings in bullion than in any other article, 
 on account of the temptation which must always 
 occur to convert the gold coin into bullion of 
 superior value by illegally melting it down. 
 The comparison ought, therefore, in this case, 
 to be made between purchases of bullion paid for 
 in Bank-notes and in silver coin, with respect to 
 which the same temptation does not exist. 
 
 Upon this subject, the Right Honourable 
 Gentleman and his friends are very willing to 
 talk largely, but not equally willing to come to 
 a definition. I took the liberty of asking the 
 Gentleman next him, in what sense he used the 
 word Depreciation, because, both from his ge- 
 neral accuracy, and the peculiar attention which 
 "wc all know he has paid to the subject, I 
 thought him the most likely to give me a clear 
 answer.
 
 164 
 
 He ga^»e me no answer at the time; and 
 though he afterwards answered, not m}- <jues- 
 tiofi, but my speech, at great length, and, as 
 usual, with great ability and information, he 
 really at last left me at a loss to know Vvdiat he 
 meant upon this simple point. 
 
 The Right Honourable Gentleman, liowever, 
 afterwards took the place of his friend, and 
 gave an answer to my question : " Tlie alleged 
 ''-depreciation of Bank-notes consists," says he, 
 " in this, that whereas they did, in fact, lepre- 
 " sent heretofore the real as well as the ?!ominnl 
 " value of the coin which constitutes our lawful 
 " money, they now represent its jiomijud value 
 " only." If by real value the Right Honour- 
 able Gentleman means the value of the metal 
 contained in the coin considered as bullion, and 
 hynomlnal \ii\i\e the legal current y?i\ue of the 
 coin, according to its denomination (and I can- 
 not give any other intelligible sense to his 
 words), he may safely vote for my Resolution, 
 for I only affirm that Bank-notes are equivalent 
 to the legal cm^rent value of the coin ; and the 
 only difference between us will be, tliat he af- 
 firms that they heretofore did represent the bul- 
 lion value of the metal, which I deny. 
 
 I affirm, on the contrary, that they have re- 
 presented sometimes more and sometimes less 
 than that bullion value; na}^, sometimes both 
 more and less at the same time; and even that
 
 iG5 
 
 they represent both more and less at this very 
 moment. This may seem paradoxical; but I 
 beg the House to remember, that if Bank-notes 
 are of less value than the gold contained in the 
 gold coin whicii they represent, they are of 
 much mo!e value than the silver contained in 
 the silver coin which they ecjually represent, 
 and which is equally leg.d money. 
 
 If the Right Honourable Gentleman contends 
 that they are depreciated ei^rhteen or twenty per 
 cent, because' they are of so much less value in 
 the bullion market than a quantit}^ of standard 
 gold equal in weight to their denominative value 
 in gold coin, I have an equal right to affirm, 
 that they are at a premium of tvvelve or fifteen 
 per cent, because they are worth so much more 
 than the silver contained in an equal denomi- 
 native value of our present silver coin. 
 
 The argument is equally good in both cases, 
 but, indeed, in my opinion, little better than 
 trifling in either. For the Right Honourable 
 Gentleman forgets that when an ingot has pass- 
 ed through the Mint it loses the character of 
 bullion, and can never legally resume it. The 
 price of bullion bought with money, as it was 
 before the Bank restriction, varies, therefore, 
 as frequently as when bought with Bank-notes. 
 Instead of its remaining fixed and invariable at 
 the Mint price, we find by the accounts upon 
 tlie table, that in seventy-eight years previous
 
 1(?6 
 
 to the restriction, gold bullion was at, or under, 
 
 the Mint price only twenty -eiglit years and a 
 half, and silver bullion po more than three years 
 and two months. Yet it is now contended that 
 Bank-notes are depreciated because they do not 
 preserve an equivalency to bullion, which, ex- 
 cept at short and uncertain intervals, our coin 
 never did. That equivalency is absohitely pre- 
 cluded by the laws which prohibit tlie melting 
 down and exportation of our coin as bullion. 
 
 I am not arguing iii defence of the policy of 
 those laws, though it is much easier to see their 
 defects, than to devise a system which shall be 
 free from inconvenience- The Bullion Com- 
 mittee, who have not ventured to recommend 
 the repeal of those laws, and have not even en- 
 tered into any formal discussion of their opera- 
 tion and tendency, or suggested any other mea- 
 sures which might be substituted for them, bujt 
 wlio merely — 
 
 " Just hint a fauU, and hesitate dislike ;" 
 
 yet, as well as the Right Honourable Gentle- 
 man, constantly argue as if no such laws existed, 
 or as if they were totally obsolete, and had no 
 operation whatever. The fact is, that those 
 laws have a real and not inconsiderable, though 
 by no means an effectual operation; and it is 
 precisely this state of things which constitutes
 
 167 
 
 one of inj' principal objections to tlie resump- 
 tion of cash payments. 
 
 If the exportation of coin were free and law- 
 ful, the Bullion Committee could not recom- 
 mend the removal of the Bank restriction, un- 
 less gold could be obtained sufficient both for 
 our internal use and for exportation ; and the 
 moment the}^ could prove that such was the 
 case, I should most willingly concur in tlieir 
 recommendation. 
 
 On tht other hand, if the exportation of coia 
 could be effectually prevented, I should see 
 nmch less objection than I do to the removal of 
 the restriction, because I do believe it to be 
 possible, though at a considerable sacrifice, to 
 procure as much gold as might be sufficient to 
 supply our internal circulation; and I should 
 think the object worth a considerable sacrifice 
 tliough w hether to the extent which might be 
 necessary, would require a careful examination. 
 
 But, in the present state of the law and the 
 circumstances attending it, the real effect of the 
 removal of the restriction could only be (and 
 the real object of many of those who are cla- 
 morous for it, however they may have concealed 
 their views from the Committee, I have no doubt 
 is) merely to throw upon the Bank the loss 
 arising from the purchase of bullion at the pre- 
 sent advanced rate, in order to profit by the 
 illegal exportation of the coin produced from it.
 
 In this object they would, for a time, succeed, 
 though commonly at the expense of perjury to 
 themselves, and always of embarrassment and 
 stagnation to trade in general, while the pro- 
 fessed and ostensible objects of the measure 
 would be entirely frustrated. 
 
 I am unwilling to revert to the argument for 
 the depreciation of our currency, drawn from 
 the state of the exchanges, having, on a former 
 night, troubled the House for a considerable 
 time, upon that subject, and not thinking that 
 my arguments have received any answer which 
 calls for a reply on my part. I cannot, how- 
 ever, omit to notice an important admission 
 made by the Learned Chairman in his reply; 
 an admission which, indeed, flowed so evi- 
 dently from the principles which lie assumes, 
 that his sagacity could not fail to observe, and 
 his candour to state it. 
 
 He admitted that the unfavourable state of 
 the exchange would afford no presumption of 
 the depreciation of our currenc}^ unless the de- 
 pression were general ; and that, if there were 
 any country whatever to which the depression 
 did not extend, its existence in other cases 
 might be inferred to arise from other causes, 
 and not from the state of our currency. 
 
 What then will he say if I am able to name 
 a country, a rich country, a commercial coun- 
 try, and one with which we have extensive v^-
 
 l69 
 
 lations of trade, the exchange with which haa 
 not only not become unfavourable, but has con- 
 siderably improved during this supposed depre- 
 ciation of our currency ? 
 
 That country is India. The computed par of 
 exchange between Calcutta and London is 
 2s. 6(1 for the sicca rupee, and, as at least 
 twelve months interest must be allowed upon a 
 bill at six months sight drawn from such a dis- 
 tance, the par of bills drawn at Calcutta may be 
 about Qs. Sd. and of bills drawn at London 
 about 2s. 4(1. The actual course of exchange 
 for bills drawn at Calcutta from 1800 to 1808, 
 was Qs. 8d. for the sicca rupee. In 1808, it 
 fell to 2*. 7d. ; in 1809, to 2s. 6d.; in May 1810, 
 to 2s. 5d. ; and about December last, to 2s. AdJ^ 
 
 * The average Excliange, Calcutta on London, annuaUy : 
 For the year 1800j 2s. 3d. per sicca rupee, at six months sight. 
 
 1801, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1802, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1803, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1804, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1305, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1806, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 ] 807, ditto 
 
 
 
 ditto 
 
 1808, 2s. 7d. 
 
 per sicca 
 
 , rupee. 
 
 ditto 
 
 1809, 2s. 6d. 
 
 per sicca 
 
 ; rupee. 
 
 ditto 
 
 1810, May, 25 
 
 . 5d. pes 
 
 sicca rupee. 
 
 ditto; 
 
 and the quotations of November 
 
 and December lower it to 
 
 2s. Ad. per sicca rupee. 
 
 
 
 
 N. B. Calcutta being the chief India presidency, the ex- 
 
 •hanges from Madras and Bombay, 
 
 Sec. may be 
 
 coiTsidercd as
 
 1:70- 
 
 I am awaFe, that the high value set, in the course 
 of exchange, on the sicca rupee arises from a 
 seignorage paid at the Indian Mints, and that its 
 intrinsic bullion value does not exceed 2*. \(L 
 This, however, was long ago the case under the 
 Mogul go vernmen t, the Min t regulations of w h ich 
 have never been altered. In Sir Isaac Newton's 
 Table of Assays, the value of the rupee is stated 
 at no more than its actual intrinsic value ; but from 
 that time to the present, its value in exchange has 
 been estima.ted at 2^. 6d. It is accordingly so 
 estimated in a collection of tables of weights 
 and coins which I have now in my hand, and 
 which was printed in 1749. i shall consider 
 myself as dispensed from discussing any tlieo- 
 retical question as to the propriet}/ of estimating 
 the par of exchange with reference to any 
 seignorage taken upon the coin, by the autho- 
 rity- of Adam Smith, whose words I beg leav$ 
 to read : 
 
 " In, some countries, the expense of coinage 
 ^' is defrayed by the go\'ernment ; in others, it 
 " is defrayed by the private people, who carry 
 " their bullion to the Mint, and the govern- 
 *' ment even derives some revenue from the 
 *' coinage. In England, it is defrayed by the 
 
 regulated by it ; and there exists, in fact, a corresponding re- 
 duction to the above, in the rates of exchange from thosp 
 places. .,. ;
 
 17J 
 
 " i^oveniincnt, and if you carry a potind wefght 
 " of standard silver to the IMint, yon fijet back 
 " sixty-two sluiling-s, containing a ponnd 
 " weight of tiie like standard silyer. In 
 " France, a duty of eight per cent, is deducted 
 " for the coinage, which not only defrays the 
 " expense of it, hut affords a small rcvenile to 
 " the government. In Englcind, as the coinage 
 " costs nothing, the current coin can never be' 
 " much more valuable tlian the quantity of bul- 
 " lion which it actually contains. In France, • 
 " the workmanship as you pay for it, adds to 
 " the value in the same manner as to- that of 
 " wrought plate. A sum of French money, 
 '•'therefore, containing a certain weight of pure 
 " silver, is more valuable than a sum of Eng- 
 '* lish money, containing an equal weight of 
 " pure silver, and must require more bullion,' 
 " or other commodities to purchase it. Though 
 " the current coin of the two countries, there- 
 " fore, were equally near the standards of theii^ 
 " respective Mints, a sum of English money 
 " could not well purchase a sum of French 
 " money, containing an equal number of ounces 
 " of pure siher, nor consequently a bill upon 
 " France for such a sum. If, for such a bill, 
 " no more additional money was paid than what 
 " was sufhcient to compensate the expense of 
 " the French coinage, the real excliange might 
 z 2
 
 17S 
 
 "be at par between the two countries; thus- 
 " debts and credits might mutually compensate 
 " one another, while the computed exchange 
 " was considerably in favour of France. If 
 " less than this was paid, the real exchange 
 " might be in favour of England, while the 
 " computed was in favour of France */' 
 
 This celebrated writer, indeed, lays down the 
 rule somewhat more extensively than I think 
 strictly accurate, as it appears to me to be sub- 
 ject to some modifications into which I shall 
 not now enter, as they do not apply to the pre- 
 sent case. And I think it the less necessar}^, 
 as it appears to me much more important to 
 show that the exchange has iniproi-ecl than that 
 it is 7ijct\i2i\\y favour abk. For it appears to me 
 impossible that any country should at the same 
 time have an improving exchange and a currency 
 progressively depreciated ; and, from the Learned 
 Gentleman's admission, it is clear, tliat he is of 
 the same opinion. Now, it is undeniable that 
 the exchange with India has improved above 13 
 per cent, during the very pericKl that our cur- 
 rency is supposed to have been depreciated from 
 20 to 25 per cent. 
 
 I cannot avoid figuring to myself what the 
 Bullion Committee would say \vere they now 
 sitting at Calcutta, and reporting the result of 
 
 ♦ Wealth of Nations, book iv. c. 3. vel. ii. p, 2l6. edit. 
 3784.
 
 179^ 
 
 their iiiquiiies to the government of India. Tt 
 Vv^ould be clearly proved to them, that for the last 
 three years the exchange had gradually been fall- 
 ing, in a degree exceeding the expense of sending 
 bullion abroad, and that, in fact, it was notori- 
 ously exported. *'The case is clear," the Commit- 
 tee would say ; " you have an excessive paper 
 '* currency, which is become depreciated." The 
 Indian government might then take the liberty 
 humbly to represent, that this must be a mis- 
 take, as there really was in India no paper cur- 
 lency whatever. The Committee would then 
 be completely at a loss, and, after an infinite 
 number of conjectures, might be forced to con- 
 cur with the merchants of Calcutta in thinking 
 that these unfavourable appearances were really 
 owing to internal peace, a reduction of public 
 expenses, and an abundant sinking fund, which 
 had enabled the government to reduce the inte- 
 rest of the public debt. 
 
 So various are the causes to which, in cases 
 of this kind, effects may be traced, and so much 
 are those liable to error who direct their views, 
 exclusively to a single point of the subject. 
 
 I think it unnecessary to detain the House 
 longer on this question of depreciation, be- 
 cause I consider it as already decided by a 
 great majority in the rejection of the Learned 
 Chai^mun's thirteenth Kesoiutioo. We are now
 
 174 
 
 ^iscviS^ing iiot so tii«ch whether Bank-notes 
 are actually deprediatecl^ as whether it is' 
 proper for the House to declare that' tliey are 
 nxit; 90 far, I Tnean, as -it may be proper to^ 
 settle that point <in' tliis general debate, iiV 
 which tiie fu'st Resolution tm\y is regularly, be-' 
 fore us. Among- th6se vvlio agree with me 
 iipon the qoestion itself, 1 t^iiuk -there can be 
 no great doubt of the propriety of soleihnly re- 
 cording the opinion "of the House. For if any 
 effect is to be produced on public credit by the 
 decision of Parliament ; if the impression occa- 
 sioned -by the Report of the Bullion Committee 
 i^ to be counteracted by a solemn and delibe- 
 rate judgment of the House at large, these con-' 
 sequences can only follow in proportion as that 
 Judgment is disthiCt and imequivocal. To pro- 
 irounce no opinion, would be to leave it in per-' 
 petnal doubt what the sentiments of Parliament 
 really were, and whether th<t rejection of tho 
 Learned Gentleman's Resokitioris t^tts'notthe 
 effect of some difficulty of mere form, or, at 
 most, of a doubting/ hesitating, uncertain opi- 
 nion, to which the HoTise did riM •iehoose to 
 stattd distinctly comiriitted. Accordingly, I 
 iiave heard no Gentleman express a doubt of the 
 expetliency of voting-some such Resolution ay 
 I propose, except those who have thought the 
 liesolution itself erroneous in point of fact.
 
 175 
 
 Whether the precise form in which it tiow. 
 stands is tlie best which can be adopted, will 
 be a question herealter wljen the Resolution 
 comes regularly before us. lam not anxious! 
 for any particular words, so long as the opinion 
 of the House is clearly, fully, and unequivocally 
 expressed. But here I must say, that no Gen- 
 tleman who has not objected to the substance 
 of the Resolution, has hitherto offered any cri- 
 ticism on its form. 
 
 On the remaining Resolutions, it cannot be 
 necessar}' that I should comment at much 
 length, as their accuracy in point of fact is ad- 
 mitted, with the exception of the objections 
 -stated in the Learned Chairman's proposed 
 Amendments, which I have already discussed 
 and, I hope, suiliciently refuted- 
 
 The ten following Resolutions, from the 
 fourth to the fourteenth, are occupied in a re- 
 view of the most remarkable facts relating to 
 money and exchanges, which have taken place- 
 since the Rex'oJution, and comprise that chain 
 of historical evidence upon which my own opi- 
 nion has been forme<l, and which I desire the 
 House deliberately to weigh in their decision 
 of tl>e great practical questions arising out of 
 this discussion. 
 
 I might have taken a still longer retrospect, 
 but, in proportion as we recede from the pre-r 
 swat pmes, our materials become more scanty
 
 176 
 
 and imperfect, especially with regard to subjects 
 which have usually been little noticed by the 
 general historian. The period of the Revolu- 
 tion is, perhaps, the first in which the political 
 and commercial affairs of Europe, and especially 
 those of our own country, assumed the aspect 
 they have borne in modern times, by which I 
 mean those which immediately preceded the 
 terrible convulsions, through which it is now 
 our duty to assist in guiding the state. It is 
 ^Iso a period, to which the Bullion Committee 
 have thought fit to call the attention of the 
 House in a particular manner, and which, there- 
 fore, it would have ill become me to neglect in 
 discussing the opinions they have advanced ; 
 and it is not an unimportant circumstance, that 
 about this very period, the Bank of England, 
 on whose operations so much of our question 
 turns, first took its origin. 
 
 It is upon an impartial and accurate compa- 
 rison of the events which have occurred (so 
 far as they relate to our present subject), from 
 the Revolution till the Bank restriction, with 
 those that have happened since that measure 
 took place, that I wdsh the House to form their 
 decision ; and I have endeavoured, in these ten 
 Resolutions, to draw into the smallest possible 
 compass the principal materials of such a qpm- 
 parison. Those Gentlemen who may be in- 
 cliaied to go into more minute detail, will find
 
 177 
 
 abundant matter for research in tl)e papers on 
 the table, and some other documents to which 
 I have had occasion to refer; and I shall be 
 ready, so far as I have been able to make my- 
 self.master of so extensive an inquiry, to go 
 with them into the examination. 
 
 But the general result of such a comparison 
 appears to me to be, that, from the Revolution 
 to the Bank restriction, the course of exchange 
 has never suffered any material derangement 
 from any cause arising M'ithin the realm, except 
 the scarcity and dearth of grain, and the con- 
 fusion occasioned by the South Sea scheme. 
 The mode in which a dearth of grain operates on 
 the exchange, is too obvious to require any 
 observation ; but the effects of the South Sea 
 projecL have been noticed by the Leariied Gen- 
 tleman in one of his Amendments, and are 
 worthy of a few minutes' attention, not as sup- 
 porting, but as overturning, the ideas of the 
 Bullion Committee. The effects of .the imagi- 
 nary and fictitious wealth, and the prodigious 
 rapidity of circulation produced in the king- 
 dom by that project, must, while the delusion 
 lasted, have been the same as those of a great mul- 
 tiplication of paper currency. It ought, therefore, 
 according to the ideas of the Committee, to have 
 occasioned a considerable fall of theexchange, and 
 a rise of the price of bullion. This, however, 
 
 A A
 
 m 
 
 was not the case. The exchange continued sfiS- 
 tionary, or rather became more favourable, while 
 the price of South Sea stock was rising; but 
 when it fell from 8()0 per cent, to 150, and our 
 visionary treasures vanished like a dream, the 
 exchange fell HkeM'ise about 7 per cent. aiKl 
 the price of bullion rose, and continued consi- 
 derably above the Mint price for a twelve- 
 month. 
 
 This, according to the Bullion Committee, 
 may perliaps be impossible. It is, neverthe- 
 less, the fact, as appears by the accounts on 
 the table. And upon the vulgar mercantile 
 principles of credit and confidence, it is easily 
 explained. While the delusion lasted, fo- 
 reigners were anxious to obtain a share of our 
 imaginary mines of wealth, and poured their 
 capitals into this country ; but as soon as the 
 bubble burst, and despondency took the place 
 of presumption, they were anxious to save v/hat 
 they could from a country Avhose affairs seemed 
 to be failing into inextricable confusion.. 
 
 But while the course of exchange seems to 
 have been uninfluenced by intenml causes, ex-^ 
 cept in the cases I have mentioned, it has felt 
 the operation of causes arhhig abroad in every 
 histaiice in which their effect could reasonably 
 have been expected to be considerable. In the 
 wars of King William it was depressed in a de- 
 gree fully equal to the present; and, indeed. 
 
 i
 
 >79 
 
 vlic diiTicuItles of that period appear, in some 
 t)t]icr respects, to have borne a near riscnihlance 
 to those which we now feel. 
 
 In the wars of Queen Anne, tlie fall of the ex- 
 changes was considerable, and entirely unac- 
 countable upon the principles of the Conuiiit- 
 t-ee, as the coin was then in an excellent state. 
 The depression was not, however, etpial to wha^ 
 it had been before the peace of Uyswick, th^ 
 «-overnment being more firmly settled, and public 
 credit better established. 
 
 After a long interval of peace, we were again in- 
 volved in war, and military operations were carried 
 on abroad about the year 1740. The accounts 
 relating to this period had not been presented 
 to the House when the Resolutions, now luidcT 
 <iiscussion, were prepared. They have since 
 hccn produced ; and it appears, that the course 
 of exchange was affected by these hostilities, 
 tliough, as might l>e ex})ected, in a much 
 smaller degree than in either of the formei* 
 cases. The British tratle had been greatly ex- 
 Unded, and become better able to bear tlie pres- 
 fiure of the foreign expenses of the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 After an interval of eight years, from the 
 peace of Aix la Chapelle, tlie seven years war 
 commenced ; and this war is admitted by tlie 
 learned Gentleman, in his Amendments, to have 
 bti-n attended with a depression of the exchange 
 A A 2
 
 180 
 
 \vhic'h he can only account for by the supposition 
 of a depreciation of our gold coui. I have already 
 assigned my reasons for thinking that the depre- 
 ciation of the gold coin which began during this 
 \var,and continued till the recoinage in 1774, was 
 (like that of the silver coin before the peace of 
 Ilysvvick) not the cause but the effect of an un- 
 favourable course of exchange, and have en- 
 deavoured to point out the real causes which 
 occasioned its continuance after the return of 
 peace. To what I liave already said respecting 
 this period, I shall only add a remarkable cir- 
 cumstance which appears on the accounts from 
 the Mint, namely, that in the whole term of 
 thirteen years from 1760 to 1773, only 54,600/. 
 in light guineas were carried to the Mint, while 
 8,758,000/. were coined from foreign gold pur- 
 chased at an advanced price. So considerable 
 were the sacrifices which it was found necessary 
 -to make to supply the continual drain of our 
 coin by an unfavourable exchange. 
 
 AVe are now arrived at the period of the 
 American war, which I have before had occa- 
 sion to discuss, and iipon which, therefore, I 
 shall only remind the House, that the pressure 
 upon our currency became so great as nearly 
 to have occasioned the necessity of a restriction 
 on cash pa^-ments, or some similar measure, the 
 treasure in the Bank having been reduced, in
 
 181 
 
 1783, even lower than it was when tlie restric- 
 tion actually took place. 
 
 From this time till within four years of the 
 Bank restriction, was a period of peace and un- 
 usual commercial prosperity ; but the renewal 
 of war, in 1793, was accompanied by a consi- 
 derable failure of mercantile credit. Th.it, in- 
 deed, was not of long continuance ; but the in- 
 creasing amount of our military expenses abroad, 
 and of the demands of our allies, produced a 
 considerable drain of our currency ; and though 
 •the exchange recovered itself after the British 
 armv was witlidrawn from the continent, and 
 the pecuniary assistance given to our allies was 
 reduced within narrower limits; yet, from a 
 succession of unfortunate events, credit re- 
 ceived a sliock which rendered the effects of any 
 alarm extensive and formidable, and at length 
 made it necessary to impose the restriction on 
 the Eank in consequence of an attack upon our 
 coast too feeble and desultory to have been of 
 any importance in times less critical. 
 
 Let us now compare the events of which I 
 have given this hasty sketch, with those which 
 ha\ e taken place since the restriction ; and if 
 we lind the same causes existing, and the same 
 effectii produced, can we hesitate to acknow* 
 ledge the connexion between them, and to 
 ascribe the efl'ects to the operation of tlie 
 pauses!^
 
 182 
 
 About the time of tlie Bank vestnctioiij peace 
 was restorecl upon the continent, our foreign ex* 
 penses were greatly reduced, and the exchange 
 became favourable to an extraordinary degree, 
 a degree, I believe, never equalled. Yet thi$ 
 >vas precisely the period of the substitution of a 
 paper circulation for metallic currency, and also 
 of a great addition to this paper circulation, the 
 average amount of Bank-notes, in 1798, ex- 
 ceeding, by four millions, their amount when 
 the restriction was imposed. 
 
 In 1799, the continental war was renewed, 
 and oiir foreign expenditure increased in a va- 
 riety of ways by military exertion*. But a ca- 
 lamity awaited us much more seriously affecting 
 the state of our currency. The failure of tw^o 
 successive crops raised the price of grain to au 
 unprecedented height, and compelled us to 
 avert a famine by an expense in the importation 
 of corn of at least twenty millions. The combi- 
 nation of these circumstances produced a fall hi 
 the exchange between January 1799 and Ja- 
 nuary 1 80 1 , of a})ove 20 per cent. Can any 
 jnan doubt that these were the true causes of 
 the fall? During the wars of King William, the 
 exchange fell to an equal degree, though 
 not so rapidly ; but though the military exer- 
 tions ef our ancestors at that time were, per- 
 
 * See Appendix, No. II. Resolution 11.
 
 183 
 
 haps, even more burdensome, compared with 
 tlie resources of the nation, than tliose of the 
 present day, can they be supposed to countcr- 
 bahmce the additional calamity of such a scar- 
 city r If, however, a doubt could still be suggest- 
 ed, the events which immediately followed must 
 remove it. In 1801 and 1802, we were blessed 
 with favourable harvests, and peace was signed ; 
 and before December 1802, the exchange had 
 risen 13 per cent. ; the Bank restriction still con- 
 tinuing in force, and the amount of Bank-notes 
 in circulation having progressively and consider- 
 ably increased. 
 
 This recovery of the exchange, under such 
 circumstances, appears to shake the confidence 
 of my Honourable Friend near me (Mr. H, 
 Thornton), in his own principles. lie acknow- 
 ledges that it gives him some hope for the fu- 
 ture, and lie seems unable to point out any dis- 
 trnctioii between tl>at case and the present, ex- 
 cept that the depression is now somewhat 
 greater, and has continued longer. The greater 
 tlftgree of depression is easily accounted for by 
 the difierence of circumstances distinctly state(F 
 in the twelfth and thirteenth llesolutions ; and 
 with regard to its continuance, I Ixig my Ho- 
 nourable Friend to recollect, that in 1801, ti^e- 
 depression continued till its causes were re- 
 moved, by the retuin of plenty, and the signa- 
 ture of the preliminaries of peace. If the jjccu-
 
 184 
 
 liar causes wliich have prodticed the pffeserit 
 still more unfavourable state of things were re- 
 movecl, I entertain not only a sanguine hope, 
 but a firm conviction that their effects would 
 quickly disappear. If in this expectation I 
 shall hereafter appear to be mistaken, then, and 
 then only, I may allow the reasonings of the 
 Bullion Committee to be well founded. 
 
 That the peculiar and unprecedented circuoi- 
 stances pointed out in those Resolutions are suf- 
 ficient to account for the greater and more last- 
 ' ing depression under which we now suffer, I 
 think no man who impartially considers the ex- 
 perience of former times, can entertain a serious 
 doubt. We have seen great and lasting depres- 
 sion produced merely by military expense 
 abroad ; we have seen the still greater and more 
 rapid effects produced when foreign military ex- 
 pense was combined with a dearth of provisions, 
 and we now suffer under the effect of botli of 
 those causes, not indeed singly operating to so 
 great a degree as in some former instances, but 
 acting with combined force, and aided in their 
 effect by a state of things unknown and scarcely 
 conceivable before, and which so embarrasses 
 the operations of exchange, and obstructs the 
 course of trade, as to render it wonderful how 
 they exist at all. 
 
 Could it be foreseen in au}' former time, that 
 the whole continent of Europe would be placed
 
 18<5 
 
 Uncter the sway of one potentate, and that po- 
 tentate a despot, so violent, arbitrary, and un- 
 fftehng, as to count the sufferings of his own 
 subjects and dependants as nothing in the efforts 
 which he makes for our destruction ? Could it 
 be foreseen that the Ruler of Europe, reigning 
 over so many states once wealthy, powerful, 
 and flourishing, through the means of tnule, 
 would deliberately settle, and systematically 
 execute, a plan for the annihilation of commerce, 
 in the sole view of depriving us of our share of 
 its advantages? Could it be foreseen that we 
 should, at the same time, be debarred from the 
 trade of the most commercial part of the 
 New World, by a system of exclusion, little 
 short of hostility ? And if these thin;^s 
 could have been foreseen, would it not have 
 been expected, that, so far as relates to the cir- 
 cumstances we complain of, our situation would 
 have been even worse than actually it is ? 
 Could it have been supposed that any trade, or 
 course of exchange, could exist .at all, or any 
 means of carrying on our foreign expenditure 
 beyond the limited stock of the precious metals 
 which the country might still be able to supply? 
 I have thrown out these few reflections rather 
 as a specimen of the sort of rcasouiug to which 
 the scries of facts before us seems to me na- 
 turally to lead, than as an exposition of the in- 
 ferences arising from them, and which it would
 
 18^' 
 
 "cany me much beyond tbe limits of my presenft 
 Address to the House to pursue to their full 
 -extent. 
 
 We are now arrived at the fourteenth Reso- 
 hition, in wliich I have endeavoured to show^^ 
 by a comparison of the revenue, the public e:jv- 
 ^penditure, and the trade of Great Britain itn- 
 -mediately before the Bank restriction, with their 
 |)resent amount, that a large increase of cur- 
 rency must be necessary to carry on a circula- 
 tion so greatly extended. I have not attempted 
 'to show the total amount of our currency in 
 'cither period, because I think the data on 
 which eitlier the amount of coin or of country 
 Bank-notes in circulation, at any time, can be 
 calculated, are too vague to be greatly depended 
 upon even in argument, and, therefore, much 
 more unfit to be made the subject of a Resolu- 
 tion of the House. 
 
 We have, however, sufficient reason to con- 
 clude that they cannot exceed a certain sum ; 
 and several aHempts have been made to estimate 
 their amount by gentlemen of great experience 
 and knowledge of these subjects. I sball lay no 
 stress on an observation which yet I think 
 both just and im}x)rtant, namely, that the pe- 
 riod immediately preceding the Bank restriction 
 was one in which we felt the evils of a contracted 
 circulation; tliat the amount of currency theli 
 circulating^ was confessedly mu<;h less than tlje
 
 187 
 
 wants of the public (lemaiuletl, and that inaM^ 
 schemes were proposed for supplying its tlefi- 
 ciency. We know, in fact, tiiat the ordinary 
 amount of Bank-notes was considerably lessened 
 during- the latter part of this period, and that 
 the credit of the country banks not having 
 completely recovered the shock it received in 
 1793, their notes in circulation were reduced 
 (according to the evidence given before the 
 Committee of the Lords, in 1797) in the j)ro- 
 portion of seventy-eight to ninety. This obser- 
 vation I am willing to pass over, because, taking 
 the present amount of paper currency of all 
 kinds at the highest, and the diminution of me- 
 tallic money at the least which has been sup- 
 posed by any Gentleman who has attempted to 
 estimate them, I am convincetl that we have 
 more reason to be surprised at the smallness oi' 
 tlui augmentation of our currency, than alarmed 
 at its magnitude. 
 
 My principal object in now calling the atten- 
 tion of the House to the increase of our trade, 
 and of our public income and expenses, is, how- 
 ever, to make an obscr\ at ion on a part of the 
 able speech of an Honourable Alendjcr whom I 
 some time ago alluded to, as bearing a most im- 
 portant testimony to the impracticabilitj^ of re- 
 suming the cash payments of the Bank (Mr. 
 Baring). That Honourable Member Ueiitccl tl\e 
 Bank restriction as a measure proposed by Mr. 
 
 ££2
 
 188 
 
 Pitt in consequence of views of profound, but 
 dangerous policy, which led him to attempt to 
 support the enormous expenses of the war by 
 introducing an artificial system of circulation, 
 and that the apparent growth of our wealth and 
 resources since that time, was consequently ficti- 
 tious. 
 
 Tiiis is a remark sometimes made here, and 
 frequently by continental writers, with little 
 thought or meaning, and either arises from na- 
 tional animosity, or an endeavour to account, 
 J)y mere empty phrases, for what they do not 
 understand ; but, with the Honourable Gentle- 
 man, it is undoubtedly the result of deep, 
 though, I think, somewhat inaccurate, reflection 
 upon the subject. 
 
 To pursue the question to the extent which 
 it well deserves, would lead to discussions of 
 political economy ill suited to the time and con- 
 venience of the House. I think, however, it is 
 possible to give a solid and satisfactory answer 
 to the observation, without any deep inquiry 
 into principles. 
 
 In the first place, as respects the conduct of 
 Mr. Pitt, I am fully convinced that the Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman is wholly mistaken in the 
 fact; and that all Mr. Pitt's confidential friends 
 will confirm the testimony of tiie Right Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman opposite (Mr. Canning), 
 tliat tli^ meiisuje of the Bank restriction was ii^
 
 T8P 
 
 no respect theresiilt of any premeditated system 
 in the Government, or, I may add, in the Bank} 
 but that it was forced upon both, by circum- 
 stances extremely alarming to them, and which 
 they could neither foresee nor control, and was 
 adopted most reluctantly as a mere temporary 
 expeilient during the crisis of danger. So much 
 as to the origin of the restriction ; and with re- 
 spect to its efllects in introducing an artificial 
 system, I can by no means admit that the 
 wealtii and resources, either of the public or of 
 individuals, arc now artijicial in any other 
 sense than they alwa}'s have been so, or than 
 the wliolc fabric of civilized society necessarily- 
 must be. 
 
 So far as relates to the resources of the state, 
 I think a circumstance pointed out by the Ho- 
 nourable Gentleman himself sufficient to decide 
 the question. He reasoned with great justice 
 and force on the importance of equalizing the 
 income and expenditure of the state. In this 
 argument I perfectly concur with him, and no 
 man has laboured more than I have done, in pro- 
 portion to my means of influence, to carry this 
 principle into full eifect. But this argument 
 shows that the Honourable CJentleman concurs 
 -with me in thinking, that a system which 
 equalizes the income and expenditure of the 
 state, and provides for expenses as they arise 
 by supplies actually drawn from the people, and
 
 190 
 
 rot by Siny resources depending on the credit 
 of the Government, ^yhether in the shape of 
 loans or of any circulating security, cannot, by 
 possibiHty, be '^l fictitious system. 
 
 I am ready to admit that further steps ought 
 still to be taken for equahzing the income and 
 expenses of the nation ; but it cannot be denied 
 that since the Bank restriction much has been 
 done to effect this great object. Upon an ave- 
 rage of three years previous to tliat time, the 
 sum raised by loan was nearly equal to the total 
 revenue paid into the Exchequer; on an average 
 of the tlnee last years it has scarcely exceeded 
 one iifth of it; in the course of the first term of 
 three years, the increase of the national debt 
 was nearly seventy millions; in the last three 
 years, it has been less than ten millions. It is 
 true, that, in the first of these terms, the loans 
 were raised almost entirely in three per cent, 
 funds, and, in the latter period, chiefly in live per 
 cent, stock", but this difference will not materially 
 affect the comparison. It is obvious, that the 
 nature of the currency employed as the medium 
 of payment in either case is of no consequence, 
 provided the payments of the Government arc 
 made in the same medium which it receives 
 from the subject. In fact, the greater part by 
 far of the receipt and expenditure of the Gor 
 yernment was carried on in Bank-notes previa 
 *o»sly tp the Bank restriction. Suice that tixm
 
 ms 
 
 a' still larger proportion Iws been so leceivcd 
 and paid ; and this is the only diiicrence which 
 has taken place. }]ut, supposing the greatest 
 possible difl-bi*ence to have occnrred; supposing, 
 that, previously to the restriction, the whole bu- 
 siness had been transacted iiii coin, and that 
 now, from the dcficiencj^ of coin, the whole re- 
 venues of the state were actually levied in the 
 prcKluce of the soil, and in articles of manufac- 
 ture, and that the same articles were issued by 
 the Government in payment, and found sufli- 
 cient to carry on all the necessary services ; who 
 could say that the resources of the state were 
 less real, though certainly less convaiient, in the 
 latter case than the former ? The difterence be- 
 tween such a state of things and our actual si- 
 tuation is this, that instead of a cumbrous and 
 inconvenient payment in kind, the business is 
 transacted by the intervention of a symbol, 
 wliich both the government and the subject are 
 willing to receive as of equivalent value with 
 actual ])roduce, and by means of which the ex- 
 chaiige of values is carried on with a degree orf 
 •facility and convenience unattainable in trans- 
 fers, not only of produce, but of metallic mo- 
 ney. Of what nature this symbol may be, i«- 
 immaterial, so long as its equivalent value is 
 preserved ; and it is obvious how strongly tl)e 
 system, adopted since the Bank restriction, of 
 raising the supplies within the year, by means
 
 192 
 
 of war-taxes, tends, when once established, to 
 preserve the value of money fixed and inva- 
 riable. Previously to that time the expenses of 
 the war being defrayed by loans, a considerable 
 amount of stock was cieated in each year,^ 
 which might not improperly be called a ficti- 
 tious addition to the capital of the nation, inas- 
 much as it consisted, not of any new wealth 
 acquired by the nation, but of the value of an 
 annuity formed by a deduction from property al- 
 ready subsisting, and continuing, notwith- 
 standing the deduction, to preserve its former 
 nominal value. Thus, if, at any time, the total 
 property of the kingdom were worth, suppose 
 two thousand millions, and one hundred mil- 
 lions were added to the national debt, all other 
 property preserving its former price, it is clear 
 that the total amount would then be two thou- 
 sand one hundred millions, which yet would 
 only represent the same real property of all 
 kinds as before, the hundred millions possessed by 
 the new stock-holders being, in fact, the value 
 of an annuity charged upon every other kind of 
 property. But so far as the supplies are raised 
 within the } eur, which they now are in a great 
 degree, though not yet so much as is desirable, 
 this accumulation of artificial capital, and the- 
 tendency which it must i.ecessarily have to lower 
 the valLiC of money, will be couateractcd.
 
 i9t} 
 
 In proportion, therefore, as our present na- 
 tional income approaches nearer to the public 
 expenditure than it did when the Bank restric- 
 tion took place, in tlic same proportion have we 
 advanced from a fictitious system towards one 
 of perfect solidity and security. 
 
 The Honourable Gentleman seems to have 
 been struck, as many others have been, with 
 tlie prodigious numerical amount of the increase 
 of our trade and national income, and to sup- 
 pose that it nnist be unreal and fictitious, be- 
 cause its magnitude appears to exceed credibi- 
 lity. I admit, that so far as any sum of money 
 has lost its value in the purchase of labour or 
 commodities, since the period of the restriction, 
 in that proportion is the increase of our wealth, 
 so far as it is to be shown merely by money 
 statements, fictitious. But it must not be sup- 
 posed that the whole, or the most considerable 
 part, of the rise of prices which has taken place 
 since that time, is owing to any change in the 
 value of money. The scarcity of 1 799 and 1 800, 
 occasioned, indeed, a great temporary rise of 
 prices, and this rise has, in part, perpetuated 
 itself by giving an additional real value to la- 
 bour, and the necessaries of life. But the prin- 
 cipal reason which produced that remarkable 
 increase of prices whicli has subsisted from that 
 time without any extraordinary variation, was 
 the great additional mass of taxes imposed while 
 c c
 
 194 
 
 the effects of the scarcity were passing a\va}% 
 and prices returning towards their former level. 
 It may serve the purpose of ilhistration to men- 
 tion a particular instance. The price of beer 
 had, among other articles, been considerably 
 advanced during the scarcity. In the spring of 
 1802, the price of malt having fallen, that of 
 beer was reduced ; but a tax was soon after im- 
 posed by Parliament to the exact amount of the 
 reduction. The price was accordingly raised 
 ao'ain, and lemained the same to the con- 
 sumer as during the scarcity. This, however, 
 clearly appears, in this instance, not to be the ef- 
 fect of any change in tlie value of mone^'^, but of 
 a division of the prjce between the state and the 
 brewer ; and the same observation applies to 
 almost every other article, as all have been ex- 
 posed, either directly or indirectly, to the ef- 
 fects of increased taxation. Of this taxation, 
 the state itself pays a considerable share in the 
 enhanced price of all articles purchased, and 
 services performed for it; and, to this extent, 
 the increase of revenue certainl}^ is inefficient, 
 and may be called nominal ; but it bears only a 
 small proportion to the total increase. And 
 though it adds nothing in effect to the resources, 
 of the state, it is not, therefore, fictitious, but 
 really consists of a sum of taxes, at once re- 
 ceived and paid by the government, an ar- 
 rangement not convenient or advantageous, but
 
 J95 
 
 which iinavoidably aiises out of our present 
 system of taxation. 
 
 Another cause of the rise of prices not 
 less distinct from any change in the value of 
 money, though likewise often confounded with 
 it, is the increase of consumption. Not only 
 does our population appear to be increasing 
 with considerable rapidity, but tiie consumption 
 of an equal number of people has been, from 
 a variety of causes, considerably augmented. At 
 the same time, the means of supply, by import- 
 ation, have been uncertain and interrupted. 
 This observation may also be illustrated by a 
 familiar instance. There is scarcely any ar- 
 ticle, of which the price has lately risen so much 
 as that of butter, a circumstance which has been 
 chiefly owing to the interruption of the usual 
 supply from Holland. 
 
 Most of what I said respecting the growing- 
 wealth of the state, will equally apply to that 
 of individuals. To that proof of it, indeed, 
 which is afforded by the increase of foreign 
 trade, no observations respecting the change of 
 prices apply at all ; for the comparison is made 
 between ojjieial values, in which no change is 
 made, and which, therefore, represent not sumi 
 of money, but quantities of commodities. In 
 this fair and incontrovertible mode of comparison, 
 our foreign trade has increased in the proportion 
 of forty-eight millions to seventy-seven. In what 
 c c 2
 
 196 
 
 proportion our internal trade has augmented, 
 does not admit of so accurate an estimate ; but 
 in what part of the country can we move with- 
 out seeing the proofs of its increased activity ? 
 Where do not new canals, and other works for 
 the accommodation of trade, meet our view ? 
 Nor are the proofs of the improvement of our 
 cultivation in any respect inferior to those of 
 the increase of trade. When lias the inclosure 
 of wastes gone on so rapidly, and at what time 
 have the skill and capital of the farmer in ge- 
 neral been so remarkably improved? 
 
 It is not in the extension of this great me- 
 tropolis that I should look for the proof of the 
 growth of our national resources, if it were not 
 accompanied b}^ so many undeniable proofs of 
 public prosperity. But, as it only appears to 
 keep pace with similar improvements in every 
 direction, we may look with pleasure to the dis- 
 play of opulence around us. in this point of 
 view, I have been struck by some recent pro- 
 ceedings of Parliament as very remarkable. 
 
 Foi- many ages, and till within the memory of 
 persons now living, owe bridge was thought 
 sufficient for the accommodation of the metro- 
 polis. A second was then undertaken by Par- 
 liament, as a great national work, and executed 
 at the public expense. About thirty years later, 
 hi a time of great national glory and prosperity, 
 the corporation of London erected a third ; after
 
 197 
 
 wiiich it was supposed that few of the great 
 cities of Europe could vie with that in which we 
 reside iu this species of useful and niaguificent 
 decoration. But Parliament has recently been 
 called upon, not to contribute any public aid for 
 the lurther accommodation of the city in which 
 it meets, but simply to grant its sanction to in- 
 dividuals who have undertaken, at their own risk 
 and expense, to erect t/n'ee new bridges for the 
 convenience of the public. 
 
 To say that these improvements are JictitiouSy 
 would be an outrage to common sense. To say that 
 they are owing to any particular system pursued 
 by the Government, beyond the general encou- 
 ragement which the constitution of our state al- 
 ways gives to honest industry, would be to pay to 
 the Government a compliment, which, in my 
 opinion, it does not deserve ; and to trace them 
 to their causes, if I were capable of doing it sa- 
 tisfactorily, of which I am far from confident, 
 would lead me to too "-reat a leno-th. }>ut one 
 tiling may safely be pronouncHid, that tliese im- 
 provements could not have taken place if Par- 
 liament had tampered with our currency, in the 
 manner now proposed, and subjected us to the 
 embarrassments of a contracted circulation. 
 
 These reliections naturally lead me to the 
 consideration of the two concluding Resolutions 
 (the fifteenth being only an inference drawn 
 from the facts ^\'hich have been already consi-
 
 198 
 
 dered) ; and for them, as the substance of ifty 
 practical recommendation to the House, I can- 
 not but feel a more than ordinary degree of an- 
 xiety. I have, however, the satisfaction of 
 knowing, that the Learned Gentleman's Pro- 
 position, the reverse of mine, has been rejected 
 by a majority of nearly double the proportion of 
 Members which negatived his preceding Reso- 
 lutions ; and, therefore, I may reasonably infer 
 that the sense of the House is still more de- 
 cidedly in my favour as to the course to be pur- 
 sued, than as to the reasoning upon which it 
 has occurred to me to recommend it. 
 
 What I propose is merely to refrain from any 
 interference with the system of currency already 
 established by Parliament, until a change shall 
 take place in the circumstances which have ren- 
 dered it necessary ; not, however, without 
 placing on the Journals a recorded opinion of 
 the House, that it is highly important to revert 
 to the former system whenever more favourable 
 events may render it possible to do so, without 
 endangering the safety of the state. 
 
 To this point the whole of the reasoning 
 which I have addressed to the House, both on 
 this and a former day, has been directed ; and 
 I hope I have been fortunate enough to make 
 its application so distinct, that it is unnecessary 
 for me to trespass on the patience of the House 
 by farther illustration.
 
 199 
 
 I shall, perhaps, be asked whether I mean to 
 rest satisfied with a mere negative recommenda- 
 tion, and have nothing to suggest by wliich the 
 evils wliich we all feel may be remedied or alle- 
 viated ? And to this question I w ill give an an- 
 swer before I sit down. 
 
 If the question were merely commercial, I 
 should certainly remind the House of the advice 
 of the French merchants to Colbert, " Laissez 
 " nousfairc,'' and deprecate any interference on 
 the part of Parliament or the Government. I 
 should trust to the constant tendency of the 
 course of trade to equalize itself, and to correct 
 any inequalities which political circumstances 
 may have occasioned, and also to the impossi- 
 bility which has always been experienced of 
 opposing effectual obstacles to the intercourse 
 of nations. A system of despotism which in- 
 terferes with the interests, the habits, and even 
 the necessary wants of whole countries, cannot 
 long be enforced. Regulations which every in- 
 dividual has an interest and a wish to elude, will 
 be eluded, at first, with secrecy and caution, 
 afterwards more openly and boldly. And though 
 the terrors of severity may, for some time, re- 
 press these attempts, the very restraint itself 
 will increase the temptation, and the desire to 
 renew them. That these oppressions, or any 
 oppressions, will provoke open resistance on the 
 continent, I do not, indeed, expect during the
 
 200 
 
 present dread of tlie French arms, and the ha- 
 bitual subjection of the few princes who are yet 
 suffered to reign. But, I believe, that in pro- 
 portion to the continuance of the system of 
 coercion, the means and facilities of evasion 
 will be multiplied by connivance and combina- 
 tion, and that the decay of internal industry 
 under a rule so arbitrary and oppressive, will 
 ultimately render the continental nations more 
 rather than less dependant upon us for the supply 
 of their wants. 
 
 But even during the first impression of rigour, 
 and the immediate pressure of the coercive sys- 
 tem, I have no doubt that the exchange would 
 recover itself considerably, and most of our pre- 
 sent evils soon disappear, if the constant neces- 
 sities of our military expenditure did not coun- 
 teract any improvement. 
 
 Independently of any relaxation of the con- 
 tinental system, we should find its continuance 
 become less injurious to us. Substitutes would 
 be found for the articles we have been used to 
 receive from the countries now shut against us ; 
 new sources of trade would be opened in those 
 to which our naval superiority still commands 
 access, and the industry of our manufacturers 
 would be diverted into new channels* 
 
 But the difficulty which really presses upon 
 us, and which it will require our utmost efforts 
 to surmount, is that of providing for the fo-
 
 20 J 
 
 reign expeiiditure of the Government during the 
 struggle to wliich ourcomuiercc is exposed, and 
 until it either shall recover some degree of free- 
 dom, or settle into a new course. 
 
 It does crecHt to tlie manly cliaracter of the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer that he lias not at- 
 tempted to disguise this ditliculty, or to keep 
 out of sight the degree in which the evils we 
 sulfer are to he traced to the necessity of carry- 
 ing on a vigorous and expensive war on the con- 
 tinent. 
 
 It will he seen, from much that I have said, 
 that I think the most eftectual remcd}^ for 
 those evils would be peace, if suck a peace, as 
 alone we ought to seek for, or accept, could be 
 obtained. ]hit it may also have been observed, 
 and I am not unwilling distinctly to avow, that 
 I think such a peace not only unattainable at 
 present, but placed at a distance which I cannot 
 ])retend to measure. 1 can neither foresee any 
 probability of such success as may decide the 
 contest in our favour, or of such a reverse as to 
 compel us to receive the law from our enemy ; 
 and, except in the one case or the other, it does 
 not appear to me that any pacific arrangement 
 could take place with the smallest prospect of 
 permanency. 
 
 Next to a general peace, the most effectual 
 relief we could obtain would be by coucUiatmi 
 with America. On this point I must be cau« 
 
 D D
 
 202 
 
 tious not to be misunderstood. By tondlidtiion 
 with America, I do not mean concession to Ame- 
 rica. On the contrary, I am convinced, that, 
 in the present temper of a part of America, and 
 that now the ruhng part, any concession upon 
 points in which we have a clear right, and an 
 evident interest, would only be received as a 
 proof of weakness, and not accepted as an indi- 
 cation of good will. 
 
 But I mean, that in our language, our man- 
 ner, and the general tone of our proceedings, 
 we should not only avoid any thing irritating, 
 but mark a strong sense of common interest, 
 and a disposition to cordial union. We should 
 avoid all difficulties of etiquette ; and especially 
 we should avoid all such language as is fre- 
 quently heard out of this House, and sometimes 
 liieets with too much counteiiance within it; 
 language, wiiich appears to assert claims of some 
 exclusive rights, founded on the greatness of 
 our maritime p )\vcr, which we would not ac- 
 knowledge in other nations; or, which I still 
 more condemn, language which would imply 
 that the lawless and unprincipled conduct of the 
 enemy had set us also iVee from the obligations 
 of the general law of nations, and left us at li- 
 berty to pursue any course of conduct towards 
 neutial states which we might think most suited 
 to our own views of interest or convenience. 
 
 Of all claims of this kind, wherever urged, I
 
 203 
 
 must express the iiiojst decided disapprobation. 
 I am convinced, that all enlightened views of 
 policy no less than the obligations of justice re- 
 quire of us to support the authority of the an- 
 cient and established law of nations, as well by 
 our example as our arms. I know of no symp- 
 tom in the profligate policy and the depraved 
 manners of recent times, more fatal in itself, and 
 more ominous of general luin, than the sys- 
 tematic disregard which, of late, we have seen 
 sometimes slightly disguised, and sometiuies 
 shamelessly avowed, of the principles of this 
 law. It has been the just boast of this country 
 generally to have obeyed its precepts, and al- 
 ways to have acknowledged its obligation ; and 
 to any deviation from such a system of conduct, 
 I must profess the most determined and perse- 
 vering opposition. But I hope, that not only 
 no claim will be pressed upon America, to which 
 we have not a clear right, but that her interests 
 and her feelings will be consulted in cases in 
 which, though our right may be clear, the po- 
 licy may be doubtful, or of no great import- 
 ance, provided that the right itself shall not 
 suffer from our iorbearance to enforce it, and 
 that there shall be on the side of America some 
 apparent disposition to meet our advances with 
 reciprocal good will. 
 
 I cannot easily believe that such measures will 
 iail ill their etl'ect upon Amuric;*. Where the 
 
 D D 2
 
 504 
 
 mutual interest is so great, where the ties of 
 amity are so various and so strong, I cannot 
 easily understand what demon of discord can so 
 pervert the understandings, as well as embitter 
 the hearts of men, as to stir up enmity between 
 countries so connected. I see many proofs that 
 there exists, in a great part at least of the people 
 of America, that just veneration for our insti- 
 tutions, from which their own are derived, that 
 sort of filial regard for the land of their ancestors 
 which is natural and reasonable ; and I cannot 
 but think that every symptom of an inclination 
 on the part of our government, cordially to cul- 
 tivate their friendship, will cherish and encou- 
 rage these dispositions. 
 
 I must desire not to be understood as imply- 
 ing, in these remarks, any distrust of the wishes 
 of His Majesty's Ministers to conciliate America. 
 I know of no reason to doubt the sincerity of 
 the professions they have always made of such a 
 disposition as I recommend. But I wish, on this 
 occasion,, to point out its connexion with the 
 subject of our present deliberation, and its im- 
 portance towards restoring our commercial 
 transactions to their natural and favourable 
 course. 
 
 In considering difficulties in which the most 
 prominent feature is the scarcity and w^ant of 
 the precious metals, it is natural to look for 
 relief to the countries, of which the precious
 
 205 
 
 nietals are the native produce. The accounts 
 which reach the public, of the state of the 
 Spanish colonies are too uncertain and contra- 
 dictory to enable us to form any distinct 
 judgment of their real situation; and I can, 
 therefi)re, only hint in general terms to the 
 members of the Government, the propriety 
 of inquiring, whether, in the way of loan or 
 some other mode, a supply of bullion may 
 not be obtained from Mexico, or some other 
 part of America. The Spanish government 
 would be bound by the strongest motives of 
 interest as well as gratitude, to lend all the 
 assistance in its power to the execution of such 
 a plan ; and its application might be exclusively 
 directed, as indeed it would naturally be des- 
 tined, to the support of the war in the Pe- 
 ninsula. 
 
 There are other arrangements more imme- 
 diately of an official nature, by which the exe- 
 cutive government may, in some degree, be able 
 to relieve the pressure of our foreign expenses 
 upon the course of exchange. I shall not at- 
 tempt to go into any detail on tliis head, be- 
 cause such arrangements will be best settled be- 
 tween the Board of Treasury and the diirerent 
 departments of expenditure. There is, per- 
 haps, no one in which something may not be 
 done, either to fnul some resource abroad, or to 
 provide at home supplies which arc usuall pro- 
 cured from foreign countries. And, in a state
 
 205 
 
 of things so extraordinary as the present, it 
 may be advantageous, in many cases, to change 
 the course of proceeding which has, in ordinary 
 times, been found the best adaptf^d to the 
 pubhc service. I am sensible tiiat there is al- 
 ways some difficulty and inconvenience in 
 changing the routine of business; but, in an 
 emergency like the present, all subordinate con- 
 siderations must be sacrificed, and the most un- 
 remitted vigilance exerted to find even occa- 
 sional expedients. 
 
 I am aware that ideas, such as I have last 
 mentioned, may probably have occurred to 
 other Gentlemen who have paid attention to 
 this subject, and may, perhaps, have been 
 anticipated by measures already taken by the 
 Government; but I thought them worth men- 
 tioning, not only from the chance of their sug- 
 gesting some useful step, but in order to show, 
 that I am not without hopes of our having some 
 means of relief in our power. 
 
 What, however, I am principally anxious to 
 impress upon the House is, that as our diffi- 
 culties arise, not from any radical defect in our 
 ©wn system, but from a violent and unnatural 
 state of things operating abroad, in conjunction 
 with other causes, of which we have, in for- 
 mer times, often felt the effects; it is not in 
 any change of our internal arrangements, that 
 we must seek for the remed3^ So far as these
 
 207 
 
 difficulties arise from the coercive system of the 
 enemy, it is a consolation to us to know from 
 experience, that such measures of oppression 
 have never been long executed with success. 
 And so far as they may originate from causes 
 known and experienced on former occasions, we 
 have some means of judging of their nature and 
 extent, and have reason to look for relief to the 
 same counteracting principles which have for- 
 merly been found elhcacious. 
 
 It seems to me at present to be the office of 
 Parliament to calm the agitation of the public, 
 which has been in a great degree excited by the 
 proceedings of its Committee, by declaring its 
 decided and deliberate opinion, that our situa- 
 tion is still sound, and that any attempt to dis- 
 turb it in the hope of improvement, would only 
 be productive of injurious consequences. 
 
 With a view to such a declaration, and at the 
 Same time to record the facts which appear 
 to me most material as forming the ground- 
 work of sucii an opinion, I submit the Reso- 
 lutions in my hand, to the judgment of the 
 House. I cannot but hope tliat when tlic facts 
 recorded in them siiail be brought belbre the 
 pubhc in so short and clear a form, thcv will add 
 much to the impression which the deliberate 
 judgment of the House, pronounced, after a 
 length of discussion almost unexampled, cannot 
 fail to make. I wish to show, not only to this
 
 20S 
 
 country, but to the world at large, that the de- 
 cision of Parliament has not been founded upon 
 any fear of meeting our difficulties fairly, or any 
 wish to disguise our real situation, much less 
 on any yiews of political advantage to any divi- 
 sion of this House, but upon a calm appeal to 
 reason and experience ; and for this purpose the 
 long and patient investigation in which we have 
 been engaged, will be eminently useful. And 
 it adds not a little to the firmness of my convic- 
 tion of the propriety of the proceeding I have 
 taken the liberty to recommend, to find, that the 
 most laborious research at last brings us back 
 to the same conclusion, to which daily observa- 
 tion, and plain common sense, at once conducted 
 the body of the naticn. 
 
 In the course of this long debate, several of 
 the Gentlemen, from whom I have the misfor- 
 tune to dissent, and whose arguments I have 
 been obliged to combat, have thought it proper 
 to disavow all motives of party feeling, or poli- 
 tical partiality. I am ready to give the most 
 perfect credit to their professions, for I cannot 
 willingly believe that any jMember of this House 
 would suffer himself to be guided by party feel- 
 ings, in a question which involved the danger 
 of a national bankruptcy, in which all distinc- 
 tions of party would be swallowed up in the 
 general ruin ; and, I may add, that the part 
 which many Gentlemen have taken, on this oc- 
 casion, different from that of their usual poll-
 
 <209 
 
 tical connexions, is an lionourabic proot" of the 
 sincerity of those professions. But since so 
 much lias been said upon tliis subject, I may be 
 pardoned for reminding tlic House, that these 
 Resolutions are proposed to them by a man who 
 can have no party ol)jccts in view ; who has re- 
 ceived nuich kindness from all parties, and fa- 
 vours from none ; and who can have no other 
 motive, in the part he has taken, th.'in the hope 
 that one of his days of mourning may not have 
 been spent in vain. 
 
 J£ K
 
 I
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 No. I. 
 
 Resolutions proposed by Francis Horner , Esq. in a 
 Committee of the whole House of Commons, May 
 6lfi, 1811 ; and negatived, JMay {0th. 
 
 J. Xhat the only money which can be legally ten- 
 dered in Great Britain, for any sum above twelve-nence 
 in the whole, is made either of Gold or Silver ; and that 
 the weight, standard, and denomination, at which any 
 such money is authorized to pass current, is fixed, under 
 His Majesty's prerogative, according to law. 
 
 2. — ^That since the forty-third year of the reign of 
 Queen Elizabeth, the indentures of His Majesty's Mint 
 have uniformly directed that all silver used for coin 
 should consist of eleven ounces and two penny-weights 
 of fine silver, and eighteen penny-weights of alloy, in 
 each pound troy, and that the said pound troy should 
 be divided into sixty-two shillings, or into other coins 
 in that proportion. 
 
 3. — That since the fifteenth year of the reign of King 
 Charles the Second, the indentures of His Majesty's 
 Mint have uniformly directed, that all gold used for 
 coin, should consist of eleven ounces of pure goM, and 
 one ounce of alloy, in each pound troy ; and tiiat the 
 said pound troy should be divided and coined into forty- 
 XB a
 
 212 
 
 four guineas and one half-guinea, or into other coins in 
 that proportion. 
 
 4. — That by a Proclamation of the fourth year of the 
 reign of King George the First, it was ordered and di- 
 rected, that guineas and the several other gold coins 
 therein named, should be current at the rates and values 
 then set upon them ; viz. the guinea at the rate of 
 twenty-one shillings, and other gold coins in the same 
 proportion : thereby establishing, that the gold and silver 
 coins of tlie realm should be a legal tender in all money 
 payments, and a standard measure for ascertaining the 
 value of all contracts for the payment of money, in the 
 relative proportion of 157SW0 pounds weight of sterling 
 fiilver to one pound of sterling gold. 
 
 . 5. — That by a statute of the fourteenth year of the 
 reign of His present Majesty, subsequently revived and 
 made perpetual by a statute of the thirty-ninth year of 
 his reign, it is enacted, that no tender in payment of 
 money made in the silver coin of this realm, of any sum 
 exceeding the sum of 25/. at any one time, shall be re- 
 puted in law, or allowed to be a legal tender, within Great 
 Britain or Ireland, for more than according to its valiie 
 by weighty after the rate of ^s. zd. for each ounce of 
 silver. 
 
 6. — That by a Proclamation of the sixteenth year of 
 the reign of His present Majesty, confirmed by several 
 subsequent Proclamations, it was ordered and directed, 
 that if the lueighi of any guinea shall be less than five 
 penny- weights and eight grains, such guinea shall cease 
 to be a legal tender for the payment of any money within 
 Great Britain or Ireland ; and so in the same proportion 
 for any other gold coin. 
 
 '). — That under these laws (which constitute the
 
 213 
 
 cstablislied policy of this realm, in regard to money) no 
 contract or undertaking for the payment of money, sti- 
 pulated to be paid in pounds sterling, or in good and 
 lawful money of Great Britain, can be legally satisfied 
 and discharged, in gold coin, unless the coin tendered 
 shall weigh in the proportion of 1° parts of five penny- 
 weights and eight grains of standard gold for each pound 
 sterling, specified in the said contract; nor in silver 
 coin, for a sum exceeding 25/. unless such coin shall 
 weigh in the proportion of |§ of a pound troy of 
 standard silver for each pound sterling specified in the 
 contract. 
 
 8. — That the promissory notes of the Bank of Eno-- 
 land are stipulations to pay, on demand, the sum in 
 pounds sterling, respectively specified in each of the said 
 notes. 
 
 9. — ^That when it was enacted by' the authority of 
 Parliament, that the payment of the promissory notes 
 of the Bank of England in cash should for a time be 
 suspended, it was not the intention of Parliament that 
 any alteration whatsoever should take place in the value 
 of such promissory notes. 
 
 10. — ^That it appears, that the actual value of the 
 promissory notes of the Bank of England (measuring 
 such value by weight of standard gold and silver as afore- 
 said) has been, for a considerable period of time, and 
 still is, considerably less than what is established by the 
 laws of the realm to be the legal tender in payment of 
 any money contract or stipulation. 
 
 II. — That the fall which has thus taken place in the 
 value of the promissory notes of the Bank of England, 
 and in that of the country bank paper which is exchange- 
 able for it, has been occasioned by too abundant issue of
 
 214 
 
 paper currency, both by ihe Bank of England, and hv 
 the country banks ; and that this excess has originated 
 from the want of that cneck and con:")! on the issues of 
 the Bank of England, which existed before the suspen- 
 sion of cash payments. 
 
 12. — That it appears, that the exchanges with fo- 
 reign parts have, for a considerable period of time, been 
 unfavourable to this country, m an extraordinary de- 
 gree. 
 
 13. — ^That, although the adverse circumstances of 
 our trade, together with the large amount of our mili- 
 tary expenditure abroad, may have contributed to render 
 our exchanges with the continent of Europe unfavour- 
 able j yet the extraordinary degree, in which the ex- 
 changes have been depressed for so long a period, has 
 been, in a great measure, occasioned by the deprecia- 
 tion which has taken place in the relative value of the 
 currency-of this country as compared with the money of 
 foreign countries. 
 
 14 — ^That during the continuance of the suspension 
 of cash payments, it is the duty of the Directors of the 
 Bank ot England to advert to the state of the foreign ex- 
 changes, as well as to the price of bullion, with a view 
 to regulate the amount of their issues. 
 
 15. — That the only certain and adequate security to 
 be provided, against an excess of paper currency, and 
 for maintaining the relative value of the circulating me- 
 dium of the realm, is the legal convertibility, upon de- 
 mand, of all paper currency into lawful coin of the 
 realm. 
 
 16. — That in order to revert gradually to this security, 
 and to enforce meanwhile a due limitation of the paper 
 of the Bank of England as well as of all the other bank
 
 ^15 
 
 paper of^the country, it is expedient to amend the Act 
 which suspends the cash payments of the Bank, by al- 
 tering the time till which the suspension sliall continue, 
 from six months after the ratification of a definitive 
 treaty of peace, to that of two years from the present 
 time. 
 
 No. II. 
 
 Resolutions respecting Money y Bullion, and Ex^ 
 cliangeSj moved by the Right Hon N. Vun- 
 sittart, in a Committee of the ivhole House 
 of Commons, 1 3/A May^ and agreed to by the 
 Housej 1 4th and i5th May, 1811. 
 
 I. Resolved, 
 
 That the right of establishing and regulating the 
 legal money of this kingdom hath at all times been a 
 royal prerogative, vested in the Sovereigns thereof, who 
 have, from time to time, exercised the same as they 
 have seen fit, in changing such legal money, or altering 
 and varying the value, and enforcing or restraining the 
 circulation thereof, by Proclamation, or in concurrence 
 with the estates of the realm by Act of l\'\rlianient ; and 
 that such legal money cannot lawfully be defaced, racltcd 
 down, or exported. 
 
 a. Resolved, 
 
 That the promissory notes of the Governor and 
 Company of the Bank of England, arc engagements t«
 
 216 
 
 pay cer Jain sums of money in the legal coin of this 
 JciDgdomj and that for more than a century past, the 
 .aaiti Governor and Company were at all times ready tt> 
 •disoharge such promissory notes in legal coin of the 
 realm, until restrained from so doing on the 25th of 
 February 1797, by an Order of Council, confirmed by 
 Act of Parliament, 
 
 3. Resolved y 
 
 That the promissory notes of the said Company 
 have hitherto been^ and are at this time, held in public 
 €9tln>ation to be equivalent to the legal coin.of the realoi, 
 and generally accepted as such in all pecuniary trans- 
 actions to which such coin is lawfully applicable. 
 
 4. Resolved f 
 
 That at various periods, as well before as since 
 the said restriction, the exchanges between Great Bri- 
 tain and several other countries have been unfavourable 
 to Great Britain j and that during such periods, the 
 prices of gold and silver bullion, especially of such gold 
 bjillion as could be legally' exportedi have frequently 
 risen above the Mint price : and the coinage of money 
 at the Mint has been either wholly suspended or greatly 
 diminished in amount : and that such circumstances 
 have usually occurred, when expensive naval and mili- 
 tary operations have been carried on abroad 5 and in 
 times of public danger or alarm ; or when large import- 
 ations of grain from foreign parts have taken place. 
 
 5. Resolved J 
 
 That such unfavourable exchanges, and rise in 
 the. price of bullion, occurred to a greater or. less degree
 
 217 
 
 ■3\itlng the wars carried on by King William the Third 
 and Queen Anne; and also during part of the .seven 
 years war, and of the American war ; and during the 
 v^ar and scarcity of grain in 1795 and 1796, when the 
 difficulty of procuring cash or bullion increased to sucK 
 a degree, that on the 25th of February 1797, the Bank 
 of filngland was restrained from making payments in 
 cash hv an Order of Council, confirmed and continued to 
 the present lime by divers Acts of Parliament : and the 
 exchanges became still more unfavourable, and the price 
 of bullion higher, during the scarcity which prevailed for 
 Iwo years previous to the peace of Amiens, 
 
 6. Resolved, 
 
 That the unfavourable state of the exchanges, 
 and the high price of bullion, do not, in any of the in- 
 stances above referred to, appear to have been produced 
 by the restriction upon cash payments at the Bank of 
 England, or by any excess in the issue of Bank-notes; 
 inasmuch as all the said instances, except the last, oc- 
 curred previously to any restriction on such cash pay- 
 ments; and because, so far as appears by such informa- 
 tion as has been procured, the price of bullion has fre- 
 quently been highest, and the exchanges most unfa- 
 vourable, at periods, when the issues of Bank-notes have 
 licen considerably diminished, and they have been after- 
 wards restored to their ordinary rates, although those 
 issues have been increased. 
 
 7. Resolved, 
 
 That during the period of nearly scvcnty-ei(xht 
 years, ending with the 1st of January 1796, and pre- 
 vious to the aforesaid restriction, of which period ac-
 
 2 Id 
 
 cptmts are before the House, the price of standard gold 
 in bars has been at or under the Mint price twcnty-eight 
 years and five months} and above the said Mint price 
 forty-eight years and eleven months j and that the price 
 of foreign gold coin has been at or under 3/. 185. per 
 ounce, thirty-six years and seven months, and above 
 the said price thirty-nine years and three months ; and 
 that during the remaining intervals no prices are stated. 
 — And that during the same period of seventy-eight 
 years, the price of standard silver appears to have been 
 at or under the Mint price, three years and two months 
 only. 
 
 8. Resolved, 
 
 That during the latter part, and for some time 
 after the close of the American war, during the years 
 1781, 1782, and 1783, the exchange with Hamburgh 
 fell from 34. i to 31.5, being about eight per cent, j 
 and the price of foreign gold rose from 3/. 17^. 6f/. to 
 4I. 2s. c;c?. per ounce, and the price of dollars from 
 ^s. ^^d. per ounce, to 5,9. ii|.t?. j and that the Bank- 
 notes in circulation were reduced between March 1782 
 and December 1782, from 9,160,000/. to 5,995,000/. 
 being a diminution of above one third, and continued 
 (with occasional variations) at such reduced rate until 
 December 1784: and that the exchange with Hamburgh 
 rose to 34. 6, and the priee of gold fell to 3/. 1 js. 6d. 
 and dollars to 55. i^d. per ounce, before the 25th of 
 February 1787, the amount of Bank-notes b;.iog then 
 increased to 8,688,000/. 
 
 9. Resoluedf 
 
 That the amount of Bank-notes in February 
 1787, was 8,688,000/. and iiv February 179?,,
 
 ^19 
 
 il,6gg,oool.', and that during the same period, t^e 
 slim of 10,704,000/. was coined in gold ; and that the 
 exchange with Hamburgh rose about three per cent. 
 
 10. Resolved, 
 
 That the average amount of Bank-notes in the 
 year 1795, was about 11,497,000/.; and on the 25th 
 of February 1797, was reduced to 8,640,000/. during 
 which time the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 36 
 to 35, being about three per cent, and the said amount 
 was increased to 11,855,000/. exclusive of 1,542,000/. 
 in notes of one pound and two pounds each, on the ist 
 of February 1798, during which time the exchange rose 
 to 38.2, being about nine per cent. 
 
 11. Resolved, 
 
 Th.-^t the average price of wheat, per quarter, 
 iu England, in the year 1798, was 505.3c?.; in 1799, 
 676.5^.; in 1800, 1135, 7^.; in i8or, 1185. 36?. j 
 and in i8o2, 6js. ^d. 
 
 The amount of Bank-notes, of five pounds, and up- 
 wards, was 
 
 
 About 
 
 And under 5/. 
 
 Makinc together 
 
 in 1798, 
 
 10,920,400/. 
 
 1,786,000/. 
 
 12,706,400/. 
 
 in 1799. 
 
 12,048,790/. 
 
 1,626,110/. 
 
 13,674,906/. 
 
 in 1600, 
 
 13,421,920/. 
 
 1,831,820/. 
 
 15,253,740/. 
 
 in 1801, 
 
 13,454,370/. 
 
 2,715,180/. 
 
 16,169,550/. 
 
 in 1S02, 
 
 13,917,9S0/. 
 
 3,130,4/0/. 
 
 17.054,450/. 
 
 That the exchange with Hamburgh was, in January 
 1798, 38.2; January 1799, 37.7; January 1800, 32.; 
 J;mu:ir\ 1801, 29.8; being in the whole a fall of above 
 22 per cent. — In Januarv 1802, 32.2 ; and December 
 1802, 34.; being in the whole a rise of about thirteen 
 per cent. 
 
 F F a
 
 £20 
 
 12. Resolved, 
 
 That during all the periods above referred to, 
 previous to the commencement of the war wiih France 
 in 1793, the principal states of Europe preserved their 
 independence, and the trade and correspondence thereof 
 \vere carried on conformably to the accustomed law of 
 nations ; and that although from the time of the inva- 
 sion of Holland by the French in 1795, the trade of 
 Great Britain with the Continent was in part circum- 
 scribed and interrupted, it was carried on freelv with 
 several of the most considerable ports, aad commercial 
 correspondence was maintained at all times previous to 
 the summer of 1807. 
 
 13. Resolved, 
 
 That since the month of November 1806, and 
 especially since the summer of 1807, '^ system of exclu- 
 sion has been established against the British trade on 
 the continent of Europe, under the influence and terror 
 of the French power, and enforced with a degree of 
 violence and rigour never before attempted ; whereby ai^/ 
 trade and correspondence between Great Britain and ihe 
 continent of Europe has (with some occasional excep- 
 tions, chiefly in Sweden and in certain parts of Spain 
 and Portugal) been hazardous, precarious, and expen- 
 sive, the trade being loaded with excessive freights to 
 foreign shipping, and other unusual charges : and that 
 the trade of Great Britain with the United States of 
 America has also been uncertain and interrupted j and 
 that in addition to these circumstances, which have 
 greatly afl'tcted the course of payments between this 
 country and other nations, the naval and military ex-» 
 penditnre of the United Kingdom in foreign parts has 
 lor three years past been very great; and the price of
 
 £21 
 
 grain, owing to a deficiency in the crops, Ingher than 
 at any time, whereof the accounts appear hefore Par- 
 liament, except dining the scarcity of 1800 and 180IJ 
 and that large quantities thereof have been imported. 
 
 14. Resolved, 
 
 That the amoiuit of currency necessary for car- 
 rying on the transactions of the country, must bear a 
 proportion to the extent of its trade and its pubhc re- 
 venue and expenditure J and that the annual amount of 
 the exports and imports of Great Britain, on an average 
 of three years, ending 5th of January 1797, was 
 48, 73?, 651/. official value; the average amount of re- 
 venue paid into the Exchequer, includmg monies raised 
 by lottery, 18,759,165/.; and of loans, 18,409,842/. 
 making togctlicr 37,169,007/. ; and the average amount 
 of the total expenditure of Great Britain, 42,855,111/.; 
 and that the average amount of Bank-notes in circulation 
 (all of which were for five pounds, or upwards) was about 
 10,782,780/.; and that 57,274,617/. had been coined 
 in gold during His Majesty's reign, of which a large 
 sum was then in circulation : 
 
 That the annual amount of the exports and imports 
 of Great Britain, on an average of three years, ending 
 5lh of January 181 «, supposing ihe imports from the 
 Last Indies and China, in the year ending 5th of Ja- 
 nuary 1811, to have been equal to their amount in the 
 preceding year, was 77,971,318/. ; the average amount 
 of revenue paid into the Exchequer, 62,763,746/.; and 
 of loans, 12,673,548/. making together 75,437,294/. j 
 and the average amount of the total expenditure of Great 
 Britain, 82,205,066/. ; and that the average amount of 
 Bank-notes, above five pounds, was about 14,265,850/. 
 and of notes under five pounds, about 5,283,330/. ; and
 
 252 
 
 tfsat the aniaunt of gold coin in circulation was greatly 
 diminished. 
 
 15. Resolved, 
 
 That the situation of this kingdom, in respect 
 of its political and commercial relations with foreigti 
 countries, as above stated, is sufficient, without any 
 change in the internal value of its currency, to account 
 for the unfavourable state of the foreign exchanges, and 
 for the high price of bullion. 
 
 i6. Resolved, 
 
 That it is highly important that the restriction 
 on the payments in cash of the Bank of England^ should 
 be removed, whenevtir the political and commercial re- 
 lations of the country shall rendcK it compatible with the 
 public interest. 
 
 J 7. Resolved f 
 
 That under the circumstances affecting the po- 
 Itilxisi and commercial relations of this kingdom with 
 foreign countries, it would be highly inexpedient a'lid 
 dkiigeronsi now to fix a definite period for the removal 
 of the i^estrrction of cash payments at the Bank of Eng- 
 land, prior to the term already fixed by the Act 44 ' 
 Geo. III. c I. of six months after the conclusion of a 
 dcfihi'tlve treaty of peace.
 
 No. III. 
 
 Amendments proposed bij F. Horner, Esq. on ths 
 Resolutions respecting Money ^ Bullion, and 
 Exchange.^, and negatiied, on the \blh of May 
 ISll. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution IV. — See p. 2i6. 
 
 That, prior to the restriction of cash payments, the 
 exchanges were never more unfavourable to Great Bri- 
 tain, for any length of time, than from five to seven per 
 cent, below par, the depression appearing to have never 
 exceeded the whole expense of transmitting specie 
 abroad j except during a debasement of the coins of the 
 realm. 
 
 That, prior to the said restriction, the market-price of 
 standard gold in bars never rose above the Mint price 
 more than i^- per cent, and that only for a very shorj 
 interval; except in 1720, the year of the famous Soutlv 
 Sea Scheme, when it rose to 4.I. ii\ 6d, per ounce ; and' 
 during the periods when the coins of the realm have been 
 dobaicd. 
 
 That, in periods subseqiient to the said rcstrictiotv, 
 and particularly of late years, the exchanges have bc(t» 
 unfavourable to Great Britain much below the liuut 
 marked by the whole cost of transmitting specie abroad, 
 and have continued so for a considerable lime together, 
 beitig at present, and having been for a considerabio. 
 time, more than twenty- five per cent, below par; anj; 
 in the same manner the market price of standard gold in
 
 224 
 
 bars has been, and still is^ more than twenty- five (twenty) 
 percent, above the Mint price. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution V. — Seep. 216. 
 
 That, during the wars carried on by King William 
 III. the exchanges did fall below the limit fixed by the 
 expense of transmitting specie, and the price of gold 
 bullion did rise very considerably, viz. during the de- 
 based state of the silver coin of the realm; but, imme- 
 diately after the reformation of the coin, the market 
 price of gold fell to the Mint price, and the exchanges 
 rose nearly to par, although the circumstances of the war 
 and the foreign expenditure continued 7maltered, 
 
 That, between the reformation of the coin in the reign 
 of King William, and the fourth year of the reign of 
 King George the First, the guinea passed by law for 
 225. ; during which period, therefore, the Mint price of 
 gold was 4/. 15. ']d. 
 
 That, during the seven years war, and until the year 
 1774,, the gold coin of the realm was in a state of de- 
 basement. 
 
 That the price of standard gold in bars never exceeded 
 the Mint price, in any one year of the American war. 
 
 That the exchange with Hamburgh, which had been 
 lather unfavourable to this country, during part of the 
 year 1795, ceased to be so in March 1796, became 
 more favourable in the month of October, and continued 
 favourable till the 26lh of February 1797, when the re- 
 striction took place, and for some lime afterwards. 
 
 That there was no rise in the price of standard gold 
 in bars immediately prior to the 26lh of February 1797, 
 Sior for a considerable number of years before. 
 
 Thai the state of the exchanges, and of the price of
 
 iiulUon, for tiuo years previous to the peace of Amiens j 
 was subsequent to the said restriction. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution VI. — See p. 217. 
 
 That, taking the issiies of Bank-notes in circulation, 
 ^ot at their amount on a particular day, hut on a fair 
 average antecedent to any alteration of the exchanges and 
 price of iuUion, it does not appear, from the information 
 ichich has been procured, that the price of gold has been 
 highest, and the exchanges most unfavourahle, when the 
 issues of Bank-notes had been considerably diminished, 
 and have been restored to their ordinary rates subsequently 
 to those issues being increased. 
 
 That, since the said restriction, the price of bullion has 
 been highest, and the exchanges have been most unfavour- 
 able, at times subsequent to the periods in which the issues 
 of Bank-notes have most increased. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution VIT. — See p. 217. 
 
 That, with regard to the period of seventy-five vears 
 ending with the first of January 1796, from the year 
 J721 to 1758, the market price of gold never at any one 
 time exceeded the Mint price by more than is. ild. per 
 ounce, and seldom by more than half that sum ; from 
 1758 to the recoinage of the gold in 1773, the market 
 price of standard gold, in bars, was always above the Mint 
 price, and sometimes exceeded it by a> much as 3,?. bd. 
 per ounce, being (except during) the period during which 
 the coins were in a debased state; from the recoinage in 
 1773 to the 25^/i of February 1797, the date of the re- 
 striction, the market' price if standard gold i?i burs never 
 exceeded the Mint price, except for part of the years 1783 
 and 1784, when it rose ild. above the Mint price i since
 
 22() 
 
 tfic year 1804, the price of standard gold in bars ha* 
 been always very considerably above tht: Mint pricc_, and 
 from the end of the year 1808 to the present time, has 
 been progressively rising, with occasional fluctuations, 
 till it has been as high aS the unprecedented price of 
 4/. iSs. (4Z. 145.) per ounce, as appears from Weten- 
 hall's Tables. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution VIII. — Seep. 218. 
 
 That, taking the average of Bank-notes in circulation, 
 in the vears 1782 and 1783, from their amount in the be- 
 ginning of the months of January, March, June, October, 
 and December, in each year, and that of 1784, from their 
 amount in the beginning of the months of March, June, 
 October, and December (whicli are the returns before 
 the House), it appears as follows : 
 
 1782 - - 7o99>57o^- 
 
 1783 - - 6,583,560/. 
 
 1784 - - 6,209,855/. 
 
 That the exchanges with Hamburgh, and the price of 
 foreign goUl, durii'sg the sam^ periods, were as follows : 
 
 
 i-;^z. 
 
 
 i78v 
 
 
 '7?4- 
 
 
 
 Excli. forG. 
 
 Exch. 
 
 for G. 
 
 Exch.. 
 
 
 forG, 
 
 January - 
 
 ?i. Q. ,£'.3 'S 6 
 
 3-- /■ 
 
 ^■■.4 I 
 
 
 
 
 March - - 
 
 iz. 10. -3.90 
 
 32. 5. 
 
 - 3 19 
 
 33- 9- 
 
 ^•3 
 
 18 
 
 June — - 
 
 32. 7. - 3 J9 6 
 
 3«-5- 
 
 - 4 - 3 
 
 
 - 3 
 
 17 lof 
 
 October - 
 
 3--3- -420 
 
 
 - 3 19 6 
 
 34- 7. 
 
 - 3 
 
 17 10-1 
 
 December 
 
 31. 10.-4 ° 1 
 
 3^"s; 
 
 - 5 19 6 
 
 i4- 10 
 
 - 3 
 
 17 ic^ 
 
 That the exciiange with Hamburgh between the end 
 of December 1784, and Llie 25lh of February 1787, fell 
 from 35. 6 to 34. 6. 
 
 Amendment to Resolution IX. — See p. 218. 
 
 That of the sum of 10,704,000/. stated to have been 
 foined in gold from February 1787 to February 1791,
 
 oq7 
 
 the sum of 8,084,982/. was a rccolnagc from the li^ht 
 guineas of the realm. 
 
 Amendment 10 Resolution X. — See p. 219. 
 
 That the average amount of Bank-notes in circula- 
 tion during the months of January and February 1795, 
 was 12,452,451/. and the average amount from. the ist 
 of January to 25th of February 1797, was 9,566.430/.; 
 making a difference of 2,886,021/. 
 
 That this reduction in the amount of Bank-notes was 
 principally effected between the middle of the month of 
 May 1796, and the 25th of February 1797. 
 
 That the exchange with Hamburgh fell from 36 to 
 32. 4 (its lowest depression during the period in ques- 
 tion) between the 3d of February and the 4th of August 
 1795, during which time the average amount of Bank- 
 notes in circulation was 11,464,143/. having been oc- 
 casionally during the time as high as 14,071,850/. and 
 even 14,876,580/. 
 
 That between the 4th of August i795>, and the ist of 
 January 1796, the exchange with Hamburgh rose from 
 32.4 1032.7, during which period the average amount 
 of Bank-notes in circulation was 11,415,653/.; and, 
 from the ist of January to the 3d of June 1796, the ex- 
 change with Hamburgh rose from 32. 7 to 34, during 
 which period the average amount of notes waij 
 10,874,316/. 
 
 That from the 3d of June 1796 to the 25th of Fe- 
 bruary 1797, during which period the amount of Bank- 
 notes was gradually reduced to the sum of 8,640,^150/. 
 the exchange with Hamburgh rose to 35 ; and in the 
 few months following the last reduction, rose gradually 
 Xo 3Ji.
 
 £28 
 
 Amendment to Resolution XIV.— See p. 221. 
 
 That the average amount of Bank-notes in circulation, 
 of Jive pounds, and upwards, for three years, ejiding the 
 ^th of January 1797, was 10,782,780/.; and for the 
 years 1808, 1809, and 18 10, was 14,265,850/. 
 
 That the average amount of notes for five pounds, and 
 upwards, in the year 1796, was 10^240,125/.; and in 
 1810, tvas 15,421,310/. 
 
 N. B. The passages omilted when the Amendments 
 were moved by Mr. Horner, on the Report of the Reso- 
 lutions, on the 15th of May, are printed in italics, and 
 the words then inserted are printed between brackets.
 
 An ACCOUNT of BANK- 
 COINJGE. 
 
 Year. Month. 
 
 BANK-NOTJ 
 
 Above 5/. I Uiv
 
 229 
 
 APPENDIX, No. IV. 
 /• ACCOUi\T of B^m-NOTES., HAMBURGH EXCHANGE, FOREIGN EXPENDITURE, 
 COINJGE, between the Years IjGl and J8I \ .—Compiled from different Accounts laid before 
 
 GRAIN IMPORTED, and GOID 
 
 the House of Commons. 
 
 
 Vest. 
 
 Month. 
 
 BANK-NOT lis. 
 
 EXCHANGIi ON HAMBURGH. 
 
 ^ ^ ^j 
 
 FOREIGN EXPENDITURE. 
 
 GRAIN IMPORTED. 
 
 
 GOLD COINAGE. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 Above 5/. ■• • • 
 
 Uiilcr 5(. 
 
 J.TOuaty. 
 
 Apnl. 
 
 July. 
 
 October. 
 
 
 Value. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Bullion brought to 
 
 the Mint. Total Amomtj 
 
 
 
 .76, 
 
 Janu.r)- ,st. 
 fuly 1st. 
 
 6,001,810 
 
 5,93 I, OOB 
 
 : : : :} 
 
 i. d. 
 32 
 
 J. d. 
 
 32 
 
 .1. <J. 
 
 32 8 
 
 Paid for subsidies for foreign 
 tioopi; and military Expenses on 
 
 ^. 
 
 From Guineas. 
 
 ^rom foreign 
 
 Gold. 
 
 Year. 
 
 
 
 
 £. 
 
 ^. 
 
 d^. 
 
 
 
 1762 
 
 January 
 July 
 
 6,130,770 
 6,167,120 
 
 : : : :} 
 
 32 II 
 
 34 
 
 34 8 
 
 35 
 
 (he Continent, from 1757 to 
 1767, on account of the war 
 
 
 From 
 the year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1763 
 
 lanuary 
 
 «.,889,68o 
 
 - - - - "1 
 
 3+ 2 
 
 33 " 
 
 3+ 3 
 
 
 ending 1 763, 20,626,997/. 8ee 
 
 
 176010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 uly 
 
 6,357,520 
 
 
 34 8 
 
 Reports respecting the Bank, 
 
 
 1772, 
 both in- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1783 
 
 anuary 
 fuly 
 
 6,707,540 
 6,761,730 
 
 
 32 7 
 
 32 5 
 
 31 6 
 
 32 7 
 
 '797- 
 
 
 clusive, 
 in 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .784 
 
 January 
 uly 
 
 6,39373= 
 6,797,240 
 
 I I I 1} 
 
 33 6 
 
 34 4 
 
 34 4 
 
 34 7 
 
 
 
 yeais, 
 1773 
 
 54,600 
 1,010,336 
 
 8,757,961 
 943.131 
 
 8,819,417 
 '.317.645 
 
 
 
 1785 
 
 anuary 
 uly 
 
 5.953.7 '0 
 6,544.430 
 
 I I I 1} 
 
 35 
 
 35 5 
 
 35 6 
 
 35 3 
 
 
 
 1774 
 1775 
 
 4.747,984 
 
 3.5". 578 
 4,610,709 
 2,7'6,74J 
 
 Nil. 
 1,577.168 
 
 4,685,623 
 4,901,218 
 
 
 
 .7S6 
 
 fanuary 
 July 
 
 6,753.050 
 7,342,010 
 
 . . - -1 
 
 34 10 
 
 34 II 
 
 34 3 
 
 34 5 
 
 
 
 1776 
 '777 
 
 305,226 
 72,969 
 
 5,006,256 
 3,680,995 
 
 
 
 1787 : 
 
 sr 
 
 8,895,400 
 
 '.'.'.'.} 
 
 34 5 
 
 34 6 
 
 34 8 
 
 34 I' 
 
 
 
 .778 
 1779 
 
 33''°7i 
 225,061 
 
 190,239 
 1,122,267 
 
 350,437 
 ',696,1.7 
 
 
 
 17S8 
 
 anuary 
 luly 
 
 9.254.800 
 9,607,360 
 
 \ \ '. \] 
 
 35 ■ 
 
 35 5 
 
 35 I 
 
 34 II 
 
 
 
 1780 
 1781 
 
 Nil. 
 293,528 
 
 Nil. 
 556.957 
 
 Nil. 
 876,794 
 
 
 
 17S9 
 
 9,864,250 
 10,172,930 
 
 " ' " "\ 
 
 34 10 
 
 35 5 
 
 35 7 
 
 35 3 
 
 
 
 17S2 
 1783 
 
 514,202 
 110,976 
 
 .76,718 
 125,067 
 
 698,074 
 227,883 
 
 
 
 1790 Yanuary 1 
 
 9,852,250 
 10,966,440 
 
 '....} 
 
 35 
 
 35 4 
 
 35 7 
 
 35 8 
 
 
 
 ,74 
 178? 
 
 449,201 
 582,329 
 
 426,562 
 1,989,789 
 
 822,126 
 2,488,106 
 
 
 
 1791 
 
 ter'^ 
 
 10,689,510 
 11,543,760 
 
 
 35 6 
 
 35 9 
 
 35 '0 
 
 35 5 
 
 
 
 1786 
 1787 
 
 684,297 
 3.403-965 
 
 57<,525 
 o57'°o^ 
 
 1,107,382 
 2,849,056 
 
 
 
 1792 
 
 '^''' 
 
 10509,420 
 11,496,190 
 
 - - - -jj 
 
 34 6 
 
 34 5 
 
 34 5 
 
 34 6 
 
 
 
 .78H 
 1789 
 
 2,715,652 
 '.318,378 
 
 892,589 
 786,643 
 
 3,664,174 
 1,530,711 
 
 
 
 1793 
 
 ranL.ry 
 uly 
 
 anuary 
 uly 
 
 :;r 
 
 anuary 
 
 n, 142,71s 
 12,713,510 
 
 . . . .| 
 
 35 4 
 
 37 6 
 
 37 2 
 
 35 9 
 
 2,785,2321 || 
 8.335.59* I'^.g 
 1 1,040,236 s " 
 io,649,9i6j 2 5 
 
 
 '79° 
 1791 
 
 1,184,985 
 1,025,321 
 
 896,492 
 1,416,985 
 
 2,660,521 
 
 2,747.430 
 
 2,558,894 
 
 493,416 
 
 464,680 
 
 2.000,297 
 
 
 
 179+ 
 '795 
 1796 
 
 10,850,340 
 io,43i>,i30 
 10,773,060 
 9,643.830 
 10,631 430 
 
 ; "- 
 
 
 35 9 
 34 6 
 32 7 
 
 36 5 
 35 4 
 34 6 
 
 35 6 
 
 32 10 
 
 33 7 
 
 35 5 
 32 10 
 34 
 
 1,983.856 
 1.535-672 
 3.926,484 
 
 1792 
 1793 
 '794 
 
 :;,'! 
 
 ■797 
 
 863,073 
 944. ^43 
 563,822 
 333.114 
 270.229 
 108,470 
 
 93,684 
 
 2,343,005 
 
 1,426,771 
 
 255.721 
 
 72. '79 
 
 «,486.4io 
 
 
 
 1797 
 
 uly 
 
 anuary 
 uly 
 
 9'579»9°o 
 
 9 264,500 
 9,-56.320 
 
 92:,78o}: 
 1,051,620 ■>! 
 .,9>5,8fco): 
 1,651,420.' 
 i,50c,36o| 
 1,632,150: 
 1,777.610 1 
 2.27^,2901^ 
 -A6oi,oio]- 
 2,7^1,0501 
 3.088,410 1 
 
 35 6 
 
 36 8 
 
 36 6 
 
 37 7 
 
 
 
 1798 
 1799 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 302,405 
 
 2,718,425 
 271,846 
 Nil. 
 
 2,967,504 
 
 1^83 
 
 1 
 
 
 ^79^ 
 
 anuary 
 uly 
 
 10,228,240 
 9.927.740 
 
 38 2 
 
 37 S 
 
 37 10 
 
 37 8 
 
 
 
 1801 
 1802 
 
 673,002 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 Nil. 
 
 450,2401 
 43 7.0 1 81 
 
 
 •799 
 
 1800 
 
 ^\L 
 
 10,41 ',4°o 
 10,981,900 
 it,b65,i6o 
 12,572,650 
 13,018,790 
 
 37 7 
 
 37 4 
 
 36 
 
 31 6 
 
 
 8,755.995 
 10,149,098 
 
 ;S 
 
 599.890 
 612.S7 
 
 Nil. 
 
 410,168 
 232,766 
 
 596.444 
 718,396 
 54.6.5 
 
 ^Nfr^ 
 
 
 
 Jannary 
 uly 
 anuary 
 
 32 
 
 31 
 
 32 6 
 
 32 
 
 
 tj. 
 
 Nil. 
 Nil. 
 
 
 
 29 8 
 
 31 5 
 
 31 6 
 
 31 8 
 
 
 1807 
 
 Nil. 
 
 
 
 "!y.„.. 
 
 ■ 2,439=550 
 
 12,^^02,970 
 14,005-600 
 
 
 
 
 2,155.794 
 
 
 Nil. 
 Nil. 
 
 140,603 
 
 37'.74j 
 298, 94e 
 
 
 .«03 ran.., 
 
 32 2 
 
 32 7 
 
 33 3 
 
 33 5 
 
 
 
 1809 
 
 to i+°h 
 Feb. 
 1811. 
 
 430.944 
 
 
 12,476,080 
 10,979,070 
 
 3. '7 5.6901 
 3,311,500] 
 
 34 
 
 34 8 
 
 34 4 
 
 34 5 
 
 2,460,000! 
 
 « 
 
 1,164,592 
 
 1 ». 
 
 188,059 
 
 316,93 
 
 
 1804 January 
 July 
 
 12,602.430 
 12,402,090 
 
 4.55M50-1 
 
 4.57'.4"oj- 
 
 34 10 
 
 35 8 
 
 35 8 
 
 35 7 
 
 3,461,000 
 
 S 
 
 2,855.333 
 
 J 
 
 
 
 
 .805 
 
 lanuary 
 July 
 
 13,164,940 
 M,34>,740 
 
 4,085,030 1 
 4.333.'^30 f 
 
 35 6 
 
 35 5 
 
 35 8 
 
 34 
 
 5,495,000 
 
 ^ ^ 
 
 3.754,831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .806 
 
 January 
 July 
 
 1 1,962,830 
 12,389,6,0 
 
 4,33^.370^ 
 4.'7V,89oJ- 
 
 33 3 
 
 34 4 
 
 34 5 
 
 34 
 
 6,635,000 
 
 M 
 
 1,106,540 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .80, 
 
 i;r^ 
 
 11,879,900 
 12,067,46c 
 12,623,06c 
 13,240,05c 
 
 4,124,7601 
 1 4,000,780] 
 
 34 8 
 
 34 10 
 
 34 3 
 
 34 4 
 
 6,616,000 
 
 u 
 
 ,,878,521 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 180S 
 
 &" 
 
 3.99«'.'8o\ 
 > 3,979.260 
 
 1 2"^ * 
 
 34 6 
 
 35 3 
 
 33 
 
 9,552,000 
 
 ^ 
 
 336,460 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1809 January 
 
 13,232. 820- 4,164,7301 
 i4,o9,.«9c 4,720,270 \ 
 M,994."7o 5,675,250-, 
 15,830.400 6,306,140 J 
 
 1 ^' ^ 
 
 31 
 
 28 6 
 
 29 
 
 10,235,000 
 
 g 
 ^ 
 
 2,705,496 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1810 lanuary 
 
 I'-^'y 
 
 29 6 
 
 31 
 
 30 2 
 
 3. 6 
 
 12,372,080^ 
 
 cq 
 
 7.077,885 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 181 1 January 
 
 1 M.y4H>._ 
 
 16.481,230 7,i77,22n.,l 
 16,620,017 7,365,110 ul ^ " 
 
 24 
 
 4.hMay 
 
 
 
 
 L 
 
 
 
 rr,T 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 H H 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 STATEMEr^'
 
 APPENDIX, No. V. 
 
 STATEMENT of the PRICES CURRENT in London, ofthc following GOODS, imported. 
 
 of each of the last Ttvclvc Years. 
 
 d exported, at corresponding Periods 
 
 ihoa 
 1 801 
 iSoi 
 1803 
 1S0+ 
 1805 
 1806 
 1807 
 
 1809 
 
 106 10 
 
 'Spring 1051 
 Fall 64. 
 
 96 
 
 99 
 
 7:} 
 
 Per Ton 
 
 /;• 
 
 140 
 149 
 •49 
 
 M4 
 
 56 6 
 
 60 I 
 
 87 10 
 
 79 o 
 
 73 3 
 
 79 o 
 
 95 7 
 
 io6 2 
 
 J. d.' 
 
 1 6 
 
 I 2 
 
 ' 5 
 
 o 9 
 
 o 9 
 
 57 4 
 
 5; 4 
 
 49 4 
 
 40 I 
 
 rears. 
 
 H;dcs. 
 
 Indigo. 
 
 Iron, Bar. 
 
 Lead. 
 
 (Briush.) 
 
 Linseod. 
 
 Logwood. 
 
 Nanlieens. 
 
 Nutmegs. 
 
 Oil. 
 
 Pepper, 
 
 B. Ay-es. 
 
 W India 
 
 E. India. 
 
 Spanish. 
 
 B;i!ish. 
 
 Russian. 
 
 Swedis . 
 
 Ordinary 
 Olive. 
 
 Train. 
 (Brilish Fishery.) 
 
 
 Per Pound. 
 J. 
 
 .1 
 1^ 
 
 Per Hound. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 I'tr 1 on. 
 
 P., Ton. 
 
 Per Ton. 
 
 Per Ton. 
 
 PerQuarter 
 
 Per Ton. 
 
 Per Piece. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 Per Tun. 
 
 Per Tun. 
 
 Per round. 
 
 
 Ai 
 
 
 1. d. 
 
 £. s. 
 
 /. '. 
 
 £. '. 
 
 /. ^• 
 
 £• '• 
 
 /. s. 
 
 J. ./. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 £■ ^■ 
 
 £■ -f- 
 
 /. ,/. 
 
 iSoo .... 
 iSot .... 
 iSoz .... 
 .803.... 
 
 4 6 
 
 10 I 
 
 .8 5 
 
 17 15 
 
 
 
 45 * 
 
 19 18 
 
 
 
 66 10 
 
 28 
 
 
 4- 
 
 6 4 
 
 8 8 
 
 18 10 
 
 18 2 
 
 21 7 
 
 23 4 
 
 49 8 
 
 19 8 
 
 7 " 
 
 12 7 
 
 59 '5 
 
 36 9 
 
 ■ 3 
 
 4 
 
 7 8 
 
 9 2 
 
 20 
 
 20 10 
 
 20 17 
 
 2; 
 
 ^r; 
 
 16 8 
 
 6 8 
 
 12 8 
 
 58 15 
 
 40 
 
 ' 3 
 
 s. 
 
 7 9 
 
 8 7 
 
 18 
 
 iS 2 
 
 18 10 
 
 32 10 
 
 12 19 
 
 6 
 
 12 7 
 
 49 8 
 
 29 
 
 II 
 
 H 
 
 7* 
 
 7 5 
 
 9 6 
 
 19 10 
 
 18 2 
 
 19 10 
 
 3' '9 
 
 62 
 
 
 6 8 
 
 
 57 7 
 
 35 ° 
 
 10 
 
 1804 .... 
 
 '! 
 
 6^ 
 
 9 * 
 
 9 9 
 
 17 
 
 .6 13 
 
 19 17 
 
 31 "9 
 
 56 6 
 
 17 6 
 
 9 9 
 
 9 4 
 
 55 19 
 
 32 
 
 9 
 
 1805 .... 
 
 yi 
 
 
 II 2 
 
 
 17 10 
 
 16 II 
 
 
 
 66 2 
 
 18 8 
 
 
 18 10 
 
 68 5 
 
 
 
 j8o6 
 
 H 
 
 b 
 
 6 9 
 
 12 I 
 
 18 10 
 
 17 12 
 
 ■9 5 
 
 37 5 
 
 65 3 
 
 '3 8 
 
 5 ° 
 
 26 8 
 
 6? 18 
 
 30 5 
 
 75 
 
 'o°Z ■••• 
 
 7 
 
 6^ 
 
 4- 
 
 7 3 
 
 10 s 
 
 15 10 
 
 .6 3 
 
 '7 '5 
 
 30 14 
 
 63 3 
 
 
 3 4 
 
 ig 8 
 
 63 8 
 
 24 10 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 5 .3 
 
 9 2 
 
 15 10 
 
 16 8 
 
 17 15 
 
 36 .? 
 
 9; 9 
 
 >3 '7 
 
 7 2 
 
 '7 7 
 
 67 18 
 
 31 10 
 
 
 .809 .... 
 
 7 
 
 4- 
 
 4 8 
 
 7 9 
 
 15 10 
 
 16 6 
 
 >7 7 
 
 34 8 
 
 83 ' 
 
 14 10 
 
 6 6 
 
 16 4 
 
 62 17 
 
 4t 10 
 
 I 
 
 
 9 
 
 H 
 
 7 7 
 
 9 >i 
 
 15 .0 
 
 16 6 
 
 ■7 7 
 
 3416 
 
 62 7 
 
 22 7 
 
 5 3 
 
 '5 7 
 
 5b .7 
 
 4^ 3 
 
 II 
 
 
 
 
 
 Silk. 
 Bengal 
 
 Sugar 
 
 Raw. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Wood. 
 
 
 Years. 
 
 Raisins. 
 
 Rum. 
 
 S.ltpetre. 
 
 
 Tallow. 
 
 Tar. 
 
 Tea. 
 
 T,n. 
 (British.) 
 
 Tobaeco. 
 
 Turpentine 
 
 (Por 
 
 .) 
 
 
 Wool. 
 (Spanish.) 
 
 Briris.i 
 PlanlaMon. 
 
 Foreign 
 Plantation. 
 
 Deals. 
 
 Fir 
 Timher. 
 
 
 Per twt. 
 
 'ei tiallon. 
 
 Per Cwt. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 Per Cwt. 
 
 Per Cwt. 
 
 Per Cwt. 
 
 Per Barrel. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 Per Ion. 
 
 Pet Pound 
 
 Pet Cwt. 
 
 Per Tun. 
 
 Per rao. 
 
 Per Load. 
 
 Per Pound. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 /. d. 
 
 J. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. J. 
 
 5. d. 
 
 /. d. 
 
 J. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 i- '. 
 
 J. d. 
 
 s. ,/. 
 
 /. 
 
 s. 
 
 £. u 
 
 £. s. 
 
 
 '799 
 
 24 7 
 
 2 6 
 
 
 .6 7 
 
 63 4 
 
 6; 2 
 
 
 
 32 8 
 
 3 \ 
 
 95 
 
 61 
 
 '9 5 
 
 «2 
 
 10 
 
 '3 H 
 
 1 * 
 
 4 9 
 
 1800 
 
 28 7 
 
 3 6 
 
 66 2 
 
 ■7 5 
 
 68 8 
 
 51 2 
 
 58 6 
 
 23 8 
 
 3 >^ 
 
 100 
 
 ° 5 
 
 i6 II 
 
 92 
 
 10 
 
 13 4 
 
 6 9 
 
 5 
 
 180. 
 
 34 ' 
 
 
 58 2 
 
 ,8 
 
 5° ' 
 
 48 10 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 103 
 
 ° 5= 
 
 18 5 
 
 89 
 
 .3 
 
 15 14 
 
 5 7 
 
 5 2 
 
 1802 
 
 36 
 
 3 4 
 
 
 22 9 
 
 .36 ^ 
 
 36 , 
 
 60 
 
 ■9 5 
 
 3 '^ 
 
 109 
 
 4z 
 
 12 5 
 
 7' 
 
 18 
 
 10 II 
 
 4 13 
 
 4 ti 
 
 1803 
 
 3° 3 
 
 3 I 
 
 
 
 
 42 2 
 
 65 
 
 21 9 
 
 2 1 1 
 
 109 
 
 4j 
 
 '9 3 
 
 94 
 
 9 
 
 17 12 
 
 5 10 
 
 5 5 
 
 .804 
 
 28 c 
 
 ^ 5 
 
 59 7 
 
 17 8 
 
 53 ' 
 
 47 2 
 
 68 
 
 24 2 
 
 3 ° 
 
 109 
 
 5i 
 
 14 4 
 
 89 
 
 10 
 
 II IS 
 
 3 'S 
 
 5 " 
 
 .«oq 
 
 23 2 
 
 2 8 
 
 
 18 2 
 
 
 46 6 
 
 66 
 
 25 8 
 
 3 ' 
 
 I 12 
 
 6i 
 
 13 5 
 
 82 
 
 9 
 
 13 '7 
 
 4 9 
 
 5 5 
 
 i8ob 
 
 34 3 
 
 ^ 5 
 
 61 11 
 
 15 10 
 
 
 
 66 
 
 
 3 3 
 
 120 
 
 6 
 
 " 3 
 
 8<> 
 
 9 
 
 15 6 
 
 b 13 
 
 ^ t 
 
 i«07 
 
 25 3 
 
 2 6 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 57 
 
 24 8 
 
 3 4 
 
 iiS 
 
 6i 
 
 17 2 
 
 iV 
 
 '9 
 
 12 16 
 
 6 13 
 
 5 6 
 
 
 50 9 
 
 3 4 
 
 69 8 
 
 28 . 
 
 37 7 
 
 31 6 
 
 88 6 
 
 38 5 
 
 3 3 
 
 114 
 
 ' 3 
 
 51 ^ 
 
 <'4- 
 
 9 
 
 24 6 
 
 II 14 
 
 
 7,t 
 
 27 8 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 46 4 
 
 36 10 
 
 116 
 
 40 8 
 
 3 5 
 
 114 
 
 I C5 
 
 31 4 
 
 V^ 
 
 9 
 
 36 '5 
 
 12 13 
 
 6 7 
 
 . 34 8 
 
 ^ 10 
 
 76 3 
 
 33 ^ 
 
 49 4 
 
 3? 4. 
 
 72 
 
 35 8 
 
 3 f^ 
 
 '43 '0 
 
 sh 
 
 15 to 
 
 114 
 
 9 
 
 25 5 " '9 
 
 Custom House, 
 , iQlh Feb. 181 1 
 
 WILLIAM IRVING.
 
 5, i«ir. 
 
 An ACCOUNT of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 er C 
 lb. p 
 
 Stockings 
 per Fair.. 
 
 Ha.s 
 each. 
 
 
 
 Flesh 
 
 Bread Viour 
 
 j 
 
 iLU 
 
 
 Year. 
 
 p.r Cwt. 
 
 per II;. p T Suck. 1 
 
 )cr 
 
 -1 s. d. \ 
 I 9 
 
 J. d. 
 2 8 
 
 
 
 I. J. ff. t 
 
 /. cz. 
 
 ', s. d. 1 
 
 . 
 
 T" 
 
 
 1729 
 
 I 5 8 
 
 I for 10/^, 
 
 — 
 
 
 3 
 
 4i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 
 1730 
 
 t 5 8 
 
 I for iji 
 
 — 
 
 
 O 
 
 q 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 3 
 
 
 '735 
 
 16 IX 
 
 I for i2| 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 
 
 
 1740 
 
 I 8 
 
 I for 9f3 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 5, 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 
 
 
 1745 
 
 I a a 
 
 I for 15A 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 ?! 
 
 X 6 
 
 2 
 
 
 lyqj 
 
 c 4 6 
 
 I for 13I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^t 
 
 I 8 
 
 2 
 
 
 '7';5 
 
 I 7 9^ 
 
 X for i4-«_ 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 5i 
 
 I 8 
 
 2 
 
 
 .76c 
 
 I XI 6 
 
 I for 13I 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 5; 
 
 1 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 
 176s 
 
 1' I ^ 
 
 I for 9| 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 li 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 
 177c 
 
 |, 8 6 
 
 I for 11^ 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 I 4 
 
 2 2 
 
 
 •775 
 
 ii 13 5 
 
 r for 9^5 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 2 
 
 
 17801 12 6 
 
 , for 11-,% 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 
 fcv^ 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 
 i785|- '7 H 
 
 I for \el 
 
 •— 
 
 
 
 
 fcl 
 
 X 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 
 17QO I 16 10 
 
 — 
 
 ^ 3 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 (}l 
 
 X 6 
 
 a 3 
 
 
 17951 a 10 
 
 — 
 
 3 ,^ 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 I 6 
 
 2 3 
 
 
 18003 4 4 
 
 — 
 
 4 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hi 
 
 2 2. 
 
 3 
 
 
 i8c(j3 4 
 
 — 
 
 4 2 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 ::! 
 
 z a 
 
 3 
 
 
 i8c&|3 1 
 
 — 
 
 3 y 
 
 6| 
 
 
 
 2 z 
 
 3 
 
 
 .8o7|-, 3 
 
 — 
 
 3 3 
 
 8^ 
 
 i 
 
 :i 
 
 a 2 
 
 3 
 
 
 ,80813 3 
 
 — 
 
 3 9 
 
 loi 
 
 I 
 
 2 2 
 
 1 7, 
 
 
 180J3 6 6 
 1810I3 12 
 
 ""~ 
 
 4 5 
 4 8 
 
 4 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 
 1 2 e 
 
 I3 
 
 • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MITIJ, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 the Che 
 
 cl 

 
 231 
 APPENDIX, No. VI. 
 
 Royal Hospital, Greenwich, March 29, 181 r.. 
 An ACCOUNT of the CONTRACT PRICES of the following Articles of PROVISIONS, c^'c for the several Years respectivehj meniiomd. 
 
 1719 t 5 S I for 10,'; 
 
 1 7_;o I 5 
 350 16 
 
 ■7451I » 
 
 i7i;uU 4 
 
 •7>5;i 7 
 
 1760 I II 
 
 17651 7 
 
 :77ot« 8 
 
 '775i' 13 
 
 17801 11 
 
 1785'; 17 
 
 i7Q0^i 16 10 
 
 1795'* a 10 
 1 8cc 344 
 
 1 8c ^ 3 o 4 
 
 18CP3 I o 
 
 1807 ? 3 o 
 
 ,8r.¥^3 3 o 
 
 i8oai3 6 6 
 
 1810.3 '^ P 
 
 I for gfl 
 
 I for i5-,\ 
 
 1 for 13I 
 
 I for i4y' 
 
 I for 13I 
 
 I for 9I 
 
 I for 1 1^ 
 
 I for g-f 
 
 6 1 1 for ii-i^ 
 6i I for ie| 
 
 3 
 <; 
 
 16 
 4 2 
 3 9 
 3 3 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 S 
 
 .oi 
 
 1. ,1. 
 4 o 
 
 19 2i 
 
 «4 I*! 
 9 5 
 
 3 ID O 
 
 3 13 H 
 
 3 16 i^ 
 
 4 4 5^ 
 4 4 5 
 
 3 " 
 ? 4 
 2 15 
 
 5 6 
 
 6 13 
 
 7 7 
 [6 1 5 
 
 6 II 
 6 7 
 5 '9 
 4 12 
 
 \° 7 ?■ 
 
 :t Day. 'per Day 
 
 ' 9i 
 
 ' 3i 
 
 7 6 8017 o 
 
 
 4 6 
 
 5 3 
 
 5 6 
 
 6 o 
 6 2 
 
 10 7 
 10 3 
 9 10 
 
 ■4 5i 
 
 Mops I Siocxings [ 
 each, j ptr I'air.. j 
 
 "i 
 
 II. SMITH, 
 Clerk of the Chcd
 
 ICCOUNT of the PRICES of PROPISI
 
 APPENDIX, No. Til. 
 ^iCCOUNT of the PRICES of PROVISIONS and oiler ARTICLES of CONSUMPTION contracted for and in BETHLEHEM HOSPITJL in the Sist>/ Y:;,rs f.-ic': 
 
 t 
 
 5..4''- 
 
 V' 
 
 4 
 
 4 f' 
 
 i 
 
 .804 V. 
 
 7,/.to4r,8.; 
 
 1^: 
 
 1805I 
 
 1 
 
 + + 
 4 (> 
 A 6 
 
 4 4 
 
 5 
 
 N.B. The London 1 
 
 --" ..">., Cnmpnny sminlicd ihc Hotpital wiiS P-md, from ihe iS:h of Mav iSoi, to i;tS ..t" lone iSo», at the above Pi icei; and from 15'h of 
 
 /, 5.. per Saik, mA ixnij a Baker 6. per Nick for Ixiking, which tread si.«d the Hospital 1 .. * U. .1. i I.V. ii.U . .. V P« H.;r Peek. a. per jbove Arcount. Icm J.Hyi 
 ■ior the very ben Bteid, the Price charged to the Public, after » Diicount otty. per Cent, deducted from their BdU oo the Amc uni »hca the HiU Peck u at w. or nigiier. 
 
 ,8«. ,o30.h of D«cmber.9«. -he "">*'' P^u'tr^'d'tl^/p^c.^
 
 I