This year’s political issue in National affairs SHALL WE LEGISLATE INTO EXISTENCE A * solidated Bank-Credit and Money Trust- \ TRUST OF TRUSTS An Exposure of the Scheme Concealed in the “McCleary Bill; This Bill has been Agreed to by the Leaders in the House, and All the Republican Nominees are Pledged to it. Wall Street is Trying to Prevent its Discussion Before the People. all the smaller bankers are against it, and so is EVERY MANUFACTURER, TRADESMAN, FARMER - AND WAGE-EARNER WHO EXAMINES % THE PROPOSED LAW. ' V : - — .% %% George h. Shibley 'y of the American Institute of Money and Prices; * / author of “The Money Question.” Y , '.fl HOWARD & WILSON PUBLISHING CO. CHICAGO, ILL. Farmer’s Reading Circle Library, No. 25. Quarterly, $2.00 per year. October 15, 1898. Entered at Chicago Postoffice as second-class mail matter. •^1*1 CP rtf fhlQ Nlimhpr • Sin § le c °P ies > 5 cents ! per dozen, postpaid, 15 cents; I iU - U1 llild lNuiliUCr • per hundred, postpaid, 75 cents; per thousand to indi- idual addresses, postpaid, §6.00; express F. O. B., Chicago, $5. 00. Of the Proposed Banking Law now reported in the House and ready for passage in case a Republican Congress is elected, Ch airmail Walker of the Committee on Banking and a Republican, says: “ The Bill is very bad economics T It would result in “one great bar k with 10,000 branches “ No independent local bank, managed by its citizens , can be esta b- lished in the town , and if one is there it must go out of business. In times of political excitement , “the agent of the parent bank knows the politics of his city employer T “ 6,000,000 Republicans are more or less suspicious or opposed to national banks T Photographic reproductions of the above are given below, page j TABLE OF CONTENTS. Introductory. page I. Fundamental Principles 5 II. The Existing System. (a) The average of prices is controlled by those who control the volume of bank credits , except as the President of the United States uses his discretionary power to counteract their will ... 6 (b) The machinery whereby the bankers control the average of prices 6 III. The Remedy: The Discretionary Power of the Presi- dent of the United States to be changed so that he will work under Fixed Pules 7 IV. Result of President’s Discretionary Power: (a) Fach campaign a fight for the control of aver- age prices 8 (b) Defeat of Blame , Hancock , Hill and Bryan . . 8 v. What the Bankers have Accomplished 8 VI. How the Producing and Trading Classes can Conquer 9 VII. The Existing System. (Continued.) (c) Analysis of personal profits of speculators, bankers and creditors 9 (d) Illustrations of how the controlling banks have secured personal profits. (1) In general 10 (2) National bankers' 1 panic of 1881 10 (3) National bankers' 1 panic of 1832-31}. ( His- tory by Prof. Sumner of Yale; Jackson's Prophecy ) 10 (4) Defeat of the restoration of silver, 1878 . . . 11 (5) Bankers' panic of February, 1881} 11 (6) Nationalbankers' panic of 1893 11 (7) The second act in the great conspiracy in 1893: The destruction of the greenbacks. 14 (8) International control of average prices ... 14 (9) Philadelphia manufacturers coerced in 1896 17 VIII. The Existing Bank Credit and Money Trust. (a) The organization 17 (b) Motive and past history 17 (c) Comparative strength of bankers , 1878, 1895 and 1898 18 (d) Bankers act through an Executive Council .... 18 IX. The Proposed Law for Extending the Privi- leges of the Banking Trust and Further Consolidating it: (a) Control of average prices: Voters to give paper money to the Bank Trust to issue and with- draw at pleasure 19 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS. PAGE (b) President commanded to issue gold bonds 20 (c) Tremendous discretionary power of comptrollers. 20 (d) Gold standard of falling prices continued 20 (e) Suspension of specie payments not improbable . . 20 (f) $34-6,000,000 of bonds or taxes 20 (g) $800,000,000 of paper money to be given to the bankers 21 (h) Gold certificates withdrawn 21 (i) Usury laws to be evaded 21 (j) Taxes to be evaded 21 (k) United States bonds to be sold; bank depositors ’ security lessened 21 (1) Consolidated Bank=Credit and Money Trust: One Bank with 10,000 Branches. (1) Effect of “Branch Bank” system 21 (2) Admissions 22 (3) The fallacy in bank trusts’ argument . ... 22 (4) A trust of trusts 22 (5) Effect of a Consolidated Bank Credit and Money Trust 22 X Congressional Campaign is a “still Hunt:” Conspiracy to Further Enslave the People. (a) Proof 23 (b) The power of the conspirators 23 (c) Conspirators are thoroughly organized and at work with millions of money 23 (d) Wall Street is relying upon stealth to oxcomplish that which cannot be secured if discussion is had 23 (e) Non-partisan co-operation 24 (f) Old-time Bepublican sentiments 24 Appendix: Photographic Reproduction of Extracts from Minority and Majority Reports on Bill for Bank Trust 25 Reprint of Leading Sections of Proposed “Bank Trust” Law: Consolidated bank-credit and money trust 27 Voters to create money and give it to the bank trust. . 27 Greenbacks to be retired — Bank trust to be given two for one 28 A special privilege : 28 Bank trust to pay 6% annually for last 20 per cent of possible issue 28 People to pay interest on the guaranty fund 28 Gold bonds without limit 28 Tremendous discretionary power of comptrollers 28 United States not liable for bank money 29 Bank trust to issue and withdraw at will the paper money and bank credits. Statement 29 Opinions of Blaine, Logan, Garfield, Jefferson . Benton, Chase, Greeley, and Lincoln 30 Sentiment of Republican Press up to Feb., 1898. 30 To-day the Republican Press is Silenced 31 Political Outlook, Oct. 8th 32 SHALL WE LEGISLATE INTO EXISTENCE A TRUST OF TRUSTS? In case an Anti-Greenback Congress is elected there will be enacted into law the bill on Banking which now stands on the calendar in the House ready to be voted upon. If this law is passed it will result in a Trust of Trusts, in other words, a Con- solidated Banking and Money Trust. Its powers will be more far-reaching than the mind can readily grasp. To make it clear, so far as is possible, I shall, before attempting to describe it, set forth the exist'ng system under which the big speculators control the average of prices and thereby “fleece” the small- er speculators and disorganize all pro- ductive and trading enterprises. PART I. FUNDUMENTAL PRIN- CIPLES. The Price of anything is the amount of money which it exchanges for. On the one side is money, and on the other is the commodity. The Average of Prices in the United States changes through the different pe- riods of time. This “average of prices,” that is to say, the relation between mon- ey on one side and on the other “the things against which it exchanges,” IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE VOT- ERS through their representatives in Con- gress. It is this way: By increasing the volume of money sufficiently, the aver- age of prices is raised, and it can be lowered by withdrawing a sufficiently large quantity of money. The voters then control the average of prices in the United States. This is the great underly- ing principle which we should recognize. If it is claimed that “greenbacks” and other forms of paper currency are not “money,” then we have only to add to the above formula the words “or paper currency,” that is to say: By increasing the volume of money or paper currency sufficiently, the average of prices is rais- ed; and vice versa. But in this article I shall include in “money,” all that which is a legal tender, either in whole or in part, and therefore include “greenbacks” and “bank-notes.” The second principle to which I call your attention is that fluctuations in the average of prices are a serious evil to society. And thirdly, fluctuations in the “aver- age of prices” are unnecessary, for the voters through the laws which they cause to be enacted, eontfql the average of prices. All that is required is a law de- claring that, "stability in the average prices promotes the general welfare” and which shall set up the machinery where- by this stability shall be attained with- out further legislation. This is practica- ble as will be shown and it would re- move the money question from politics. Modern Invention for Measuring Aver- age Prices. It is practicable because of the mod- ern invention for measuring the average of prices. This is simple and yet it is comparatively new. It is the system of Index Numbers. It was not generally known in the “greenback” days of 1865 to 1879, and many of the veterans in that fight have not yet grasped its import- ance. Now that the invention for measuring the average of prices is known, the estab- lishment of a system which shall keep this average practically stable, is as sure to follow as was the discarding of the stage coach for the improved methods of travel. This fact is sensed by those who oppose a stable average of prices and they carefully refrain from referring to index numbers except occasionally in dealing with wages. Let us turn to the monetary system that is in force. It produces fluctuations in the average of prices because of the selfish interests of a powerful class. To explain this system, the motives of its beneficiaries, their methods, and their present scheme for extending their pow- er through a Consolidated Banking and Money Trust, is the object of this arti- cle. PART II. THE EXISTING SYSTEM It has been shown that the average of prices is controlled by the volume of mon- ey: Increasing the volume of money suffi- ciently will raise the average of prices, and this average will be lowered if a sufficiently large quantity of money is withdrawn from use. But the average of prices is affected by factors other than the volume of money, one of the most important of which is Bank Credits. If the volume of bank credits expands, it will raise the average of prices; if the volume of money and other conditions remain the same, and on the other hand if bank credits collapse or are wilfully withdrawn, they lower the average of prices unless these changes are counter- balanced by changes in the volume of money or other factors. Now in the United States this condition exists; Our Jaws are such that 6 THE AVERAGE OF PRICES IS CON- TROLLED BY THOSE WHO CONTROL THE VOLUME OF BANK CREDITS, EXCEPT AS THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES USES HIS DIS- CRETIONARY POWER TO COUNTER- ACT THEIR WILL. In the words of Prof. Taylor of the University of Michigan in a paper read before the American Economic Associa- tion, December, 1895, showing the need of an elastic volume of money: “In both England and the United States, the vic- tory has remained with the advocates of a ‘safe,’ rather than an elastic curren- cy. In the recent revival of agitation on this matter, expert opinion has almost without exception declared for elasticity. Yet in this case, as in the former contro- versies, the idea has not been able to gain for itself legislative approval. * * * Bankers are private citizens in quest pri- marily, of their own interests.” If those who control the Bank Credits, have controlled the average of prices, ex- cept as the President has exercised a dis- cretionary control of it, the question arises in each person’s mind, What is the Machinery whereby the Bankers have op- erated, and what is their Motive? THE MACHINERY WHEREBY THE BANKERS CONTROL THE AVERAGE OF PRICES. Under our monetary and banking sys- tem and those which have always been used in this country, Bank Credits have, over periods of time varying from two days to several years, risen and fallen without being offset by changes in the volume of money except in rare in- stances, and as a result THERE HAVE BEEN CYCLES OF RISES AND FALLS IN THE AVERAGE OF PRICES. The exceptions have been when the President of the United States has occasionally stepped in and put money into circulation. The Defect. The particular point which I make is that the law has prescribed a maximum of bank credits but it does not declare that when the bank credits collapse or are wilfully withdrawn by the money power there shall come forth another me- dium of exchange — money— to take its place. I will express it another way: The history of bank clearings shows that the maximum of bank credits which the law permits has been attained only for brief periods and at other times it has fluctuated between the high point and lower points WITHOUT BEING COUN- TERBALANCED by changes in the vol- ume of money. Here is an example: In 1893 bank credits were contracted so that the vol- ume during the first week of December was but % of what it was during the first week in March while the volume of money in circulation decreased very greatly, there being a “plethora” of mon- ey in the banks. In other words, the bank loans shrunk 3714 per cent of their volume while the volume of money used in trade also decreased. The result was that the average of prices was much lower during the first week of Decem- ber than it was during the first week of March. But had the law been such that the tendency to contraction of bank credits would have been offset by the ex- pansion of another medium of exchange, namely the issuance of money in ex- change for government bonds, the ten- dency to a fall in the average of prices would have been counterbalanced. Cycles of Rising and Falling Prices. Now why is it that we have had cy- cles of rising and falling prices when we could have had stable ones? Who has profited by keeping the law so that the changes in bank credits were not coun- terbalanced? Prof. Taylor, of Michigan State University, has answered it and I have quoted to you his verdict. It is that an elastic currency has failed to se- cure legislative approval because “the bankers are private citizens in quest pri- marily of their own interests.” It is the bankers who have fought all bills which have proposed to put in the hands of the government the control of the average of prices under fixed rules. Power of the Bankers. Under our monetary and banking sys- tem the changes from periods of expand- ing bank credits to those of contracting credits, and vice versa, are brought about by the banks; and a few of the large banks of New York “set the pace.” They fix the bank rate in the United States except as the President of the United States interferes by putting money into circulation or withdrawing it. These controlling banks are largely owned in Europe. While the banks are not always able to expand their credit when they de- sire owing to other conditions being at times capable of deterring business en- terprises, they certainly have the power to CONTRACT THEIR LINES OF CREDIT WPIENEVER THEY CHOOSE TO DO SO and history shows that FOR THIS PURPOSE THEY COMBINE WHENEVER IT PAYS THEM TO DO SO. The combination may be only of the great banks or it may be a widespread combination, instances of which I shall shortly give to you. Here however I wish to set forth the usual method where- by an undue expansion of bank credits is checked. Method of Checking Credit Expansion* Under our monetary and banking sys- tem when the bank credits of the gold- price world are expanding, there is no way whereby it is usual to counterbal- ance this expansion by withdrawing money, and as the expansion of bank credits cannot go on indefinitely it fol- lows that the bankers must stop it. This is done by the “controlling banks.” Undue Advantage of Bank Directors. The directors of these banks, shaping as they do the policies of their respective institutions, KNOW OF THE CHANGES IN CREDITS IN ADVANCE OF THE BUSINESS WORLD. As the changes in credits result in changes in prices, except 7 as counterbalanced through the Presi- dent of the United States putting money into circulation or withdrawing it, it fol- lows that the directors of these control- ling banks have an advantage over those who are not on “the inside.” Result of Bankers’ Control of Average Prices. But this advantage over other specula- tors is of no consequence as compared with the direful effects upon production and distribution which flow from the fluctuations in average prices. “Falling prices” espeeially are a most terrible en- emy to all human beings who are not speculators, creditors or have “fixed in- comes.” “Rising prices” while much bet- ter than falling prices, are not so good for society as a stable average provided the falls in prices have been restored somewhat. PART III. THE REMEDY. The remedy for fluctuations in the av- erage of prices is very simple: The vot- ers have only to change the law so that the bank directors shall no longer con- trol the average of prices. To do this it is only necessary that the discretion- ary power of the President of the Unit- ed States be changed so that he will work under Fixed Rules. But to this the great speculators and big creditors object. The Objections of the Big Speculators and Great Creditors. In the words of Prof. Laughlin in a debate before the Sunset Club of Chica- go, December 6th, 1894 (Page 90 of its pro- ceedings), “THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ISSUE NOTES (paper money), because it puts it in the danger- ous position of INFLUENCING AND CONTROLLING PRICES AND THE MONEY MARKETS.” Here he “lets the cat out of the bag;” I ask to whom is it dangerous that the government should directly control the average of prices? Especially when it is proposed to keep the average of prices stable through a system which is auto- matic in so far as voters and congress are concerned. Is it dangerous to the producing and trading classes who are injured by fluctuations in the average of prices? Or is it dangerous to the unholy profits secured by the controlling bank- ers through their control of the average of prices? The money question is simply this: Which is the better way to issue the paper money; shall the law be such as to keep a practically stable average of prices or shall the law be framed with the object of delegating to one class the control with the certainty that the result will be cycles of rises and falls in average prices with all the evils to society which this implies? It would be no innovation for the gov- ernment to to keep the average of prices stable Direct Governmental Control of Average Prices Is No Innovation. Our government has repeatedly put forth paper and metallic money to ease the money market and thus keep the average of prices from falling and it has also kept money piled up in the treasury when it could have put it into circula- tion. By keeping money out of circulation it has forced down the average of prices. I will quote a few examples: Only last month the government paid interest on bonds, months in advance of the time it is due in order to get money out of the treasury and into circulation. The government is also purchasing bonds in order to put money into circulation, and to the extent of twenty-five million dollars. In 1890 similar occurrences took place. In the words of President Harrison in his annual message to Congress “The ef- forts of the Secretary to increase the vol- ume of money in circulation, by keeping down the Treasury surplus to the lowest practicable limit, have been unremitting and in a very high degree successful. * * * The increase of money in circu- lation during the 19 months has been in the aggregate 93 million dollars or about one dollar and a half per capita, and of this increase only 7 million dol- lars was due to the recent silver legisla- tion.” In 1881 the bankers by concerted action withdrew credits and forced a panic and the government fought them, to some ex- tent, by putting money into circulation through the purchase of bonds. In the words of Appleton’s Annual for 1881, page 189, “The national bankers of New York City acting in concert, brought Wall Street to the extreme verge of a panic. The tone of the money market was only partially restored by an order of the Sec- retary of the Treasury for the redemp- tion of 25 million dollars of bonds on presentation.” In 1893 the bankers attempted to force a panic to secure legislation and they were not foiled by the President — he chose to help them. President Should Work Under Fixed Rules. Now, why should this discretion be left with the President of the United States'? Why shouldn’t there be Fixed Rules for the exercise of this tremendous power? We ask that there be a rule command- ing the President through his Secretary of the Treasury to daily tabulate the prices of specified commodities in speci- fied markets and that the sum total of these prices be kept practically stable. When credits are being withdrawn, the volume of money should be expanded by purchasing bonds, and when the reverse occurs in the volume of credits, the mon- ey should be withdrawn by reselling some of the bonds. In other words, we ask that the DISCRETION of the President to manipulate the average of prices shall be done away with, and that he be COM- MANDED to keep a stable average. Senator John Sherman on the floor of the Senate in 1868 declared that “the con- trol of the currency should not be left to the discretion of any single officer.” (Blaine’s Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. II., page 331.) PART IV. RESULT OF PRESI- DENT’S DISCRETIONARY POWER, Each Campaign a Fight for the Control of Average Prices. To leave to the President a discretion in the matter, makes the nomination of candidates for that office a fight for the control of the average of prices, and after the selection of candidates is made, in case one of them is not favorable to Wall Street, he is fought by them, tooth and nail. Examples, both as to the fight over the nomination and the election, are as follows: Defeat of Blaine, Hancock, Hill and Bryan. The nomination of Blaine was fought by Wall Street in 1876, in 1880, and 1884. They defeated his nomination twice and after he was nominated in 1884 they de- feated his election. The data to show this I have put forth in a book. In 1880 the election of Hancock was defeated by Wall Street. This is shown in a letter from Garfield to Sherman written soon after Hancock’s defeat occurred: “The distrust of the Solid South and of ad- verse financial legislation have been the chief factors in the contest,” wrote Gar- field. New York State’s electoral vote was cast for Garfield, but in 1884 New York was carried against Blaine through the efforts of Wall Street. In 1896 the con- test over the nomination of the Demo- cratic candidate was terrific, and as the nominee, Mr. Bryan, did not favor Wall Street interests he was defeated. The year before this occurred the president of the New York State Bankers’ Asso- ciation in a speech before the Bankers’ Club of Chicago, gloated over the power of the bankers in legislation and poli- tics and concluded with this statement: “The politician, high or low, who to-day turns from the straight course of sound money and the gold standard, stabs dead once for all his every chance for politi- cal success, ESPECIALLY IF HE WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT.” How long, oh my countrymen, will you permit the selfish interests of the big speculators and great creditors to control the average of prices? How long will you permit them to “fleece” you while you have in your hand the ballot and are permitted to cast it and have it count- ed? Mark well the query “while you are per- mitted to cast it and have it counted.” PART V. WHAT THE BANKERS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED. Presidential Elections. Blaine was elected in 1884, but the bal- lots were not counted that way. Murat Halsted, in a magazine article, testifies that he went to New York in Blaine’s interest and advised him that HE WAS ELECTED BUT THE REBELLIOUS POWER WAS SUCH THAT IT WOULD BE USELESS TO OPPOSE IT. At the next national election both of the nomi- nees were satisfactory to Wall Street: The 1888 platform of the Republican par- ty specially invited back “the men who abandoned the Republican party in 1884.” Four years later the fight opened in New York State over the nominations. On this point we are fortunate in having some “inside” history. “Inside” History. Banker Salomon of New York City, a member of one of the leading Interna- tional banking houses in New York City, in an article in the July Forum, 1895, admits what every voter should know. He tells us that the nomination and elec- tion of Governor David B. Hill would have resulted in free silver, that is to say, the restoration of the average of prices and a fixed par of exchange in international trade. To prevent the free coinage of silver, says Banker Salomon, “was what inspired vast numbers of men to go into the party organization to con- test the nomination of Mr. Hill.” They furnished the “sinews of war!” as he terms it, which defeated the nomination of Gov. Hill and placed Grover Cleveland at the head of the ticket. Wall Street “Punch and Judy” Show. Banker Salomon’s admissions further show that the campaign as between Cleveland and Harrison was a Wall Street “Punch and Judy” show, for he declares, and I quote his words, “It was well understood that a Reform of uie Tariff was to be the Nominal Issue of the Campaign and that all the changes were to be rung on that theme.” There you have it: That is the way the American voters are handled when Wall Street can control both of the parties. But when it cannot do so it fights. And the way it fought in 1896 is present in the mind of each of you. The $16,000,- 000 campaign fund furnished by the mem- bers of the Bankers’ Trust with Mark Hanna as chief dispenser, will never be forgotten by men who believe in a free ballot and a fair count. Do not feel sure then that you can read- ily wrest from Wall Street the control of the average of prices. Remember the history which I have related and which demonstrates their tremendous power and unscrupulous disregard for popular gov- ernment. The Threats of 1896. During the campaign of 1896 the threat was made repeatedly, that in case there should be elected and seated a president 9 and a congress pledged to the overthrow of the existing monetary system, that nevertheless the overturning of this sys- tem would not occur. Banker Clews bold- ly proclaimed this in a written statement which was intended for publication and which was published tnroughout the length and breadth of the land. The New York Sun said the same thing but in a more covert way. This was copied in the Chicago Tribune, at least. Harper’s Weekly also put forth a similar state- ment in a more veiled manner than the New York Sun had done. Mr. Lauter- back, Chairman of the Republican Com- mittee in New York City, boldly declar- ed “We may not submit” and Theodore Roosevelt is reported to have made a statement nearly as bad. Many people believe that the rule of the Majority is a thing of the past. The following is an illustration: Professor Plelin’s Despair. “We must remember that we are at- tempting to maintain a democratic form of government at a time when THE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO DE- MOCRACY HAVE LONG GONE BY. We can, therefore, only expect class rule in every direction, through democratic forms.” Thus spake Dr. Carl C. Plehn, Assistant Professor of History and Po- litical Science, University of California, in a letter to the writer, October 19th, 1897, and in which he gave permission to publish. And he further said: “I should infinitely prefer to see our Professors dominated by the trustees of our Amer- ican colleges to having them pander in any way to the ignorance and passion of ‘ye multitude’ or of their chosen repre- sentatives.” PART VI. HOW THE PRODUCING AND TRADING CLASSES CAN CONQUER. In my opinion it is not true that “The conditions favorable to democracy have long gone by.” Popular Government is not so badly throttled as it was at the close of the last century. The Year 1 800 Compared. “Just one hundred years ago, under the presidency of John Adams, a Sedition bill was passed by Congress, allowing the arrest, fine and imprisonment of any man who criticised the acts of the party in power. Under this Act a dozen of the ablest editors of the United States were imprisoned; one Congressman, stumping for re-election, was arrested for criticis- ing the President, and held for four months in a cold guard house, where his 'health was seriously damaged, besides being compelled to pay a fine of $1,000. It was the culmination of an era of strug- gle, on the part of autocracy and aris- tocracy, to get entire control of the new- born republic. Free suffrage was held to be well enough, provided all the votes were cast for the select few, who by edu- cation and wealth held themselves to be “the Best.” Thomas Jefferson put an end to all of this, by organizinig the common people into a great party, which in 1800 elected him president.” (E. P. Powell in “The New Unity,” Sept. 29, 1898.) And to-day we are at the culmination of anoth.er era of autocracy. Now it is the owners of aggregated wealth who op- pose the equality of opportunity upon which Progress is based. But the power of wealth, tremendous as is its control of the producing and trad- ing classes, must and will bow in acquiescence to their verdict WHEN- EVER THEY GET TOGETHER IN A COMPARATIVELY SOLID PHALANX. And if they but agree that stability in the average of prices is just, they can put that principle into execution in spite of the opposition of the big speculators and great creditors who profit by a fluc- tuating and sinking price level. If the producing and trading classes will but agree upon the principle, that stability in the average of prices is just and there- fore that to the president shall no longer be left the discretion to regulate it as he may see fit, the great clouds of im- pending catastrophe which overhang the land, will be dispersed, and civilization will not be destroyed by aggregated wealth. I am an optimist and believe that the people will catch glimpses of the truth through the latticed fallacies with which wealth is fighting the truths concerning itself. We cannot at this time consider these fallacies, but shall state the ex- isting order of things. Its main features are so broadly apparent that there is no mistaking them. PART. VII. THE EXISTING SYS- TEM (CONTINUED). Analysis of Personal Profits of Specula- tors, Bankers and Creditors. The criterion whereby business is con- ducted is Personal Profit. And this is the motive of those who control the banks and through them have controlled the average of prices. These “Personal Profits” include: The interest which is made from put- ting forth the paper money which the voters through their representatives fur- nish to the banks for loaning out at in- terest. A second source of personal profit is the higher rate • of interest which they are able to secure .on all their loans ow- ing to the destruction of capital through the disorganization of industry which follows upon the heels of falling prices. One reason that Postal Savings Banks are fought is that they would tend to lower the interest rate through the ac- cumulation of wealth. A third source of personal profit is to creditors. Since 1873 the net increase in the purchasing power of money has been nearly 100 per cent; in other words, the average prices of products have been made to fall 50 per cent. The profits from speculation in stocks, bonds, produce and other property is an- other source of profit to those who con- trol the average of prices. A fifth source of profit is from the con- trol of legislation. This includes the 10 keeping of the special privileges already secured and the obtaining of further spe- cial privileges. The foregoing is in addition to the prof- its which flow from legitimate banking. ILLUSTRATIONS OF HOW THE CONTROLLING BANKS HAVE SECURED PERSONAL PROFITS. There are many notable examples of how, under the existing system the vol- umes of bank credits have been controll- ed by the great banks for the purposes of speculation, high interest, and the securing of legislation itself. I shall not mention cases where it was simply a master of speculation as they occur ev- ery year, and in most cases are almost unnoticed even by business men. The Influencing of Legislation, however, is a more grave indictment and I bring forth some of the evidence: NATIONAL BANKERS’ PANIC OF 1 8S1 . Early in 1881 a bill detrimental to the interests of national banks had passed the House, was concurred in by the Sen- ate with unimportant amendments and sent back to the House. Then there oc- curred a concerted withdrawal of cred- its by the national banks. They not only withdrew credits but withdrew $18,000,- 000 of money from circulation and depos- ited it with the treasury. Commenting upon this fact, Secretary of the Treas- ury Windom in his annual report recom- mended that the national banks be pro- hibited from withdrawing their circula- tion, except after giving timely notice. President Arthur in his annual message concurred in the recommendations saying: “Such legislation would seem to be justi- fied by the recent action of certain banks on the occasion referred to in the Secre- tary’s report.” NATIONAL BANKERS’ PANIC OF 1832 - 34 . Professor Sumner, of Yale, in his His- tory of American Currency, says: “In 1832 the National Bank petitioned for a renewal of its charter, which was to ex- pire in 1836. * * * The bill passed both Houses, and was vetoed by the President on the 10th of July. It being now evi- dent that the bank must expire unless some influence could be brought to bear to change the President or win two- thirds of Congress, A VIOLENT WAR- FARE WAS BEGUN BY THE BANK. The power of its interest at the same time is attested by any amount of evi- dence. * * * It is certain that the banks paid no more heed to the laws of the State than they did to the laws of pru- dence or of banking science, and that they paid very little heed to either.” During 1832 “the motion to sell out the public shares wfis LOST, 102 to 91, THROUGH THfj | NJFUTJUNCE OF THE BANK, which, as they afterward dis- covered, had a large number of debtors, attorneys and stockholders in the House. * * * “After Congress adjourned, Septem- ber 22, 1833, President Jackson ordered Mr. Duane, the Secretary of the Treasury, to remove the public deposits rrom the United States Bank. He refused to do so, and was displaced by Mr. Taney, who did it. “THE WAR WAS NOW IN FULL BLAST. The bank had circulated docu- ments during the canvass of the previous year, showing its services and merits. Against this proceeding I see no valid objection. The documents were ‘polit- cal’ because the question of the bank’s existence had become political. It was justified in defending itself. But in Au- gust, 1833, it altered its policy. IT RAP- IDLY CONTRACTED ITS LOANS, giv- ing as a reason the necessity of provid- ing for the transfer of the deposits, A REASON WHICH THE FACTS DID NOT WARRANT. “On the assembling of Congress, De- cember, 1833, the message announced the step taken, giving as grounds the miscon- duct of the bank IN ATTEMPTING TO CONTROL THE ELECTION, and the unsoundness of the institution. The President also charged the bank with now creating AN ARTIFICIAL STRIN- GENCY IN ORDER TO MAKE ITSELF APPEAR NECESSARY TO THE COM- MUNITY. * * * “The recharter of the bank being now definitely refused (winter of 1833-34), a number of small banks were organized to take its place. But before they could get into operation the contraction of the bank had time to operate upon the market. Many deputations came up to Congress to complain of distress, and many memorials were sent up. The ex- citement was great throughout the coun- ; try. It was asserted, however, on the other side, that ALL THIS DISTRESS WAS MANUFACTURED BY THE BANK ITSELF, IN ORDER TO GAIN A RECHARTER, AND THAT LOANS WERE REFUSED TO SOME AND GRANTED FREELY TO OTHERS, WHO USED THEM TO CHARGE USURIOUS RATES. Benton asserts that two cases were discovered, one in which a broker received $1,100,000 to use in this way, for which he charged 2V 2 per cent per month.” The foregoing are the statements of Prof. Sumner of Yale, one of the most prominent advocates of bank money. Jackson on National Banks. Following the above occurrences, Pres- ident Jackson in his annual message to Congress said: “Circumstances make it my duty to call the attention of Con- gress to the Bank of the United States. Created for the convenience of the Gov- ernment, THAT INSTITUTION HAS BECOME THE SCOURGE OF THE PEOPLE. Its interference to POST- PONE THE PAYMENT OF A PORTION OF THE NATIONAL DEBT, that it might retain the public money appropriat- ed for that purpose to ptrengtheq it ip 11 a political contest, the EXTRAORDI- NARY EXTENSION AND CONTRAC- TION OF ITS ACCOMMODATIONS to the ®ommunity, its corrupt and partisan loans, its exclusion to the public direc- tors from a knowledge of its most im- portant proceedings, the unlimited au- thority conferred on the President TO EXPEND ITS FUNDS IN HIRING WRITERS and procuring the execution of printing and the use made of that au- thority, the retention of the pension money and books after the selection of new agents, have through various chan- nels been laid before the Congress. THEY WERE SUBSTANTIALLY A CONFES- SION THAT ALL THE REAL DIS- TRESSES WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND THE COUNTRY HAD ENDURED FOR THE PRECEDING SIX OR EIGHT MONTHS HAVE BEEN NEEDLESSLY PRODUCED BY IT WITH A VIEW OF AFFECTING. THROUGH THE SUF- FERINGS OF THE PEOPLE, THE LEGISLATIVE ACTION OF CON- GRESS.” Again he declares in the same mes- sage: President Jackson’s Prophecy. “Events have satisfied my mind, and I think the minds of the American peo- ple, that the mischief and dangers which flow from a national bank far overbal- ance all its advantages. The bold effort the present bank has made to control the Government, the distress it has wanton- ly produced, the violence of which it has been the occasion in one of our cities famed for its observance of law and or- der, ARE BUT PREMONITIONS OF THE FATE THAT AWAITS THE AM- ERICAN PEOPLE SHOULD THEY BE DELUDED INTO A PERPETUATION OF THIS INSTITUTION, OR OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANOTHER LIKE IT. It is fervently hoped that thus admonished, those who have heretofore favored the establishment of a substitute for the present bank will be induced to abandon it, as it is evidently better to incur any inconvenience that may be rea- sonably expected than to CONCEN- TRATE THE WHOLE MONEY POWER OF THE REPUBLIC in any form what- soever or under any restrictions.” DEFEAT OF THE RESTORATION OF SILVER, 1878. Late in 1877 the House, by a two-thirds vote, suspended the rules and passed a free-coinage bill. Early in the follow- ing year, while this proposed law was before the Senate, the following boast was made in the New York Tribune of Jan. 11: “The machinery is now furnished by which in any emergency the financial corporations of the East can act together at a single day’s notice and with such power that NO ACT OF CONGRESS CAN OVERCOME OR RESIST THEIR DECISION.” The result of this bankers’ combination was that in the Senate the question of the free coinage of silver W a 9 pot even voted upon, and the bill passed by it, perpetuating the gold standard of fall- ing prices, when it was sent over to the House, was considered but one hour and then passed. Thus was a return to the bimetallic standard of prices defeated. Jackson’s caution against giving over to banks the control of average prices had not been observed— the money power had been concentrated in a system of na- tional banks. BANKERS’ PANIC OF FEBRUARY, 1884. After the election in 1880 Secretary of the Treasury Sherman, in a letter to Gen- eral Garfield, said: “I could at any mo- ment by issuing silver freely bring a crisis.” Four years later, with the addi- tional quantity of silver in use, it is evi- dent that a much graver crisis could be brought on. In February, 1884, the sub- treasurer of the United States at New York gave the opportunity for a crisis, and the bankers did the rest. The object was to influence legislation, namely, to prevent the restoration of sil- ver and to give added privileges to na- tional banks. The result was that silver legislation was headed off, but the banks did not get an increase of privileges. The panic of May, 1884, was in a measure the result of the February panic. NATIONAL BANKERS’ PANIC OF 1893. “Inside History.” William Salomon. “A member of the firm of Speyer & Company, one of the leading international banking houses of New York City,” in an article in the July Forum, 1895, shows how Governor David B. Hill, a bimetallist at that time, was defeated for the democratic nomina- tion for president in 1893, and in his place was put Grover Cleveland. Because of the difference in their views on the mon- ey question, says Banker Salomon, “A LARGE NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL MEN IN NEW YORK CITY and the State FELT OBLIGED TO EXERT ALL THEIR ENERGIES FOR THE NOMI- NATION OF MR. CLEVELAND and the defeat of Mr. Hill.’ 6 J After Mr. Cleveland’s nomination, “WHAT PRODUCED ‘THE SINEWS OF WAR’?” continued Banker Salomon, “was the conviction that the triumphs of the democratic party, WITH MR. CLEVELAND AT ITS HEAD, WOULD MEAN A REPEAL OF THE PURCHAS- ING-CLAUSE OF THE SHERMAN ACT. THE WORK OF THESE MEN, HAPPILY, WAS WELL REWARDED, first, in the National Convention in Chi- cago, and subsequently in Congress BY A REPEAL OF THE PURCHASING- CLAUSE OF THE SHERMAN ACT.” Immediately after the election of Mr. Cleveland a cable from London announc- ed that it was thought that his election meant the repeal of the silver-purchase law. That Mr. Cleveland had agreed with the representatives of London and pther 12 bankers is now a matter of history— see Banker Salomon’s boastful admissions above quoted, and there is other evidence, some of which I shall quote. Soon after the election the bankers be- gan their work. I have elsewhere set forth the different steps; here I can only mention the more striking instances: European Bankers’ Panic of December. 1893. They started in to give an “object les- son” to Congress and to the people. Dec. 15th, when the business world was not expecting it, they suddenly withdrew their loans, raided the gold reserve and exported gold when the exchange rate was above the shipping point. Wagers were also offered that gold would go to a premium over silver money during 1893. The next day a New York Special in the Chicago Tribune said: It is unfortunate that yesterday’s calling in of loans was done in exactly such manner as would most seriously embarrass and agitate the security market, because this has given rise to charges of INTERNATIONAL DISTURBANCE OF PRICES. December 20th a New York market re- port to the Chicago Inter-Ocean said: “Call loans declined to 4 per cent. It is now evident the flurry in the money mar- ket yesterday WAS DUE LARGELY TO MANIPULATION. * * * These facts were made so clear that specula- tive sentiment on the stock exchange underwent a complete change. Prices ad- vanced sharply and there were no reac- tions worthy of the name at any hour of the day.” The Motive. December 16th Bradstreet’s weekly review spoke of “The steady reduction of the treasury’s available balance of spe- cie,” and the report continued: “Wall Street is now forced to regard the pos- sibility of a slight premium on gold or the appearance of the treasury as a bor- rower for the purpose of replenishing its gold reserve and maintaining the sil- ver certificates at a parity with gold. The general opinion is that IN SUCH AN EVENT THE REPEAL OR SUSPEN- SION OF THE SHERMAN ACT WULL BE FACILITATED, It is not strange, therefore, that a flurry in the loan mar- ket with a sharp drop in stock prices has been the feature of the last two weeks.” And on the following day, Dec. 17th, a New York Special in the market report of the Chicago Tribune said: “As for the money market, the best that can be said is that the week’s ex- periences are ‘BANK SCARES,’ aggra- vated by several unlucky coincidences. The existing incidents of this week have certainly HASTENED THE REMEDY (i e., unconditional repeal).” Bankers’ Panic of February, 1893. During the winter of 1892-93 two more attempts were made to force the uncon- ditional repeal of the silver purchase law, and there were two more failures. Dur- ing each attack the bankers gave “ob- ject lessons,” and the big speculators, knowing in advance when the “squeezes” were coming, “milked” the stock and produce markets. The way the smaller speculators “got onto the curves” is thus described in the Bankers’ Magazine of New York, March, 1893: “The tumble in the stock market during February had for one of its causes, un- loading of stocks as fast as anyone would buy them, in anticipatiq*n that the gold reserve would not be replenished and that an extra session would be called early, and an attempt made TO COERCE its members into repealing the silver pur- chasing act unconditionally.” Big Panic Advised. But no extended coercion was attempt- ed, as President Harrison, whose re-elec- tion was defeated by Wall street, would not have co-operated with them. It was, however, claimed by the editor of the Commercial Bulletin and by others of “the best financial writers of New York,” says the Bankers’ Magazine, that “the quickest, if not the only way to repeal the silver purchase law is to precipitate a panic upon the country, AS NOTHING SHORT OF THIS will convince the sil- ver men of their error and arouse public opinion to a point which will COMPEL THE NEXT CONGRESS TO REPEAL THE SHERMAN LAW WHETHER IT WANTS TO OR NOT.” A further spur to the bankers to bring on a panic, if it should be necessary in order to secure a repeal of the silver pur- chase law, was an article by Professor Francis Walker, in the March issue of the Journal of Political Economy. He said: “Fight Without Giving Quarter.” The “free coinage of silver * * * * is to be met by defiance and uncompro- mising resistance. It is to be met, not as it was in 1890, but as it was in 1891 and 1892. It should be FOUGHT FROM THE START, ON THE LINE; FOUGHT TOOTH AND NAIL; FOUGHT TO THE DEATH. * * * The only good policy in dealing with financial crazes is to FIGHT THEM FROM THE WORD GO, WITH- OUT ASKING OR GIVING QUARTER.” Events Precediug the Panic. President Cleveland was inaugurated March 4th, 1893, and he named for the Secretary of the Treasury, John G. Car- lisle, and thereafter they worked togeth- er for the unconditional repeal of the law which was adding each year to the vol- ume of money an amount equal to 54,- 000,000 dollars. Space will not permit the presentation of all the steps taken by President Cleve- land and hi.s secretarj- to shake the con- fidence of the people in such a way as to force the unconditional repeal of the silver purchase law T , and I proceed to the culmination period: Early in April President Cleveland ap- pointed a new Sub-Treasurer at New York City, his bonds were approved on the 20th, and important events soon fol- lowed in rapid succession. He held re- peated interviews with the leading na- 13 tional bankers of New York and flitted back and forth to Washington— matters were of such a character that communi- cations in writing were dispensed with. Mr. Shucker gives the details of these movements in his “History of the Panic of 1893.” On the evening of April 23rd an import- ant conference took place between the Sub-Treasurer and certain national bank presidents “at a private house up-town,” a»d during the next day there came to the Sub-Treasurer’s office for conference, nearly all the presidents of the leading New York banks, including the repre- sentatives of Rothschild & Sons of Lon- don, and other European banking houses. Three days later President Cleveland and his party, including Secretary Car- lisle, arrived in New York to assist in the celebration of Columbus Day. Carlisle’s Conference with Wall Street Bankers. On the day following the celebration, Secretary Carlisle was, say's the New York Times, driven to the private resi- dence of one of the bank presidents, where there were present nine presidents of national banks and the Sub-Treasurer for New York. The New York Times further says that: “The Secretary indicated his opposition to at present building up a gold reserve by a bond issue. * * * The principal ob- jection was that IT WOULD TEND TO DELAY A REPEAL OF THE SILVER PURCHASE LAW. Beginning with the repeal of that act, a thorough revision of the currency laws will be a good thing.” Advice and Opinions as to a Bank Panic. On the morning of the day on which the above conference took place, a Wash- ington dispatch to the New York Herald — presidential and Wall Street organ — said: “If the silver law cannot be re- pealed without a bitter fight, there are many reasons why IT WILL BE AS WELL TO ‘HAVE IT OUT NOW’ as later on, and there is at least one reason why it would be better. THIS IS WHAT PUBLIC MEN SAY HERE.” On the morning after the conference, the New York Times in an editorial de- clared that the repeal of the silver pur- chase law can be secured, “IF it is de- manded with SUFFICIENT ENERGY.” Two days after the New York confer- ence, a Special from New York, publish- ed in The Chicago Evening Post, said: “Secretary Carlisle made a very favor- able impression on the New York bank- ers at the conference held on Thursday last. The clearness of his views as ex- pressed at that time and the indications of A DETERMINATION on the part of the President and himself TO TrtEAT THE MATTER OF THE CURRENCY HEROICALLY went far and changed the feelings of the financial community to- ward him.” During the same day a New York cor- respondent in a Special to The Chicago Tribune declares: “Mr. Carlisle said the country might as well understand now as at any time that it is suffering from a vicious silver law, and he believed the only way to bring the silver-favoring community to a realization of the evil that is contain- ed in that law IS TO PERMIT THEM TO HAVE AN EXPERIENCE WITH THE BUSINESS DEPRESSION that it is bound to cause. * * * And the bank- ers seemed to think that MR. CARLISLE DID NOT REGARD A LITTLE EXPE- RIENCE OF HARD TIMES AS AN UN- MITIGATED EVIL JUST NOW.” On the day preceding this, i. e., Friday, April 28th, Work, Strong & Co.’s market letter from New York to a Chicago house thus speaks of Secretary Carlisle’s con- ference with the bankers: “It defines the policy of the present Administration on the financial questions now before the Country. IF AS SUGGESTED, nothing will be done to help the present condi- tion, and CONGRESS HAS TO BE CO- ERCED into a repeal of the silver bill, we must look for a period of dull and uncertain times. Still THE END MAY JUSTIFY THE MEANS. To-day’s mar- ket is a dull one.” The next day, Dick Bros. & Lawrence’s telegram from New York to Valentine & McAvoy, Chicago, said: “It seems to be believed that the Administration will simply let matters drift, maintaining gold payment but using the reserve, and BY INCREASING THE SCARk. PUT THE SCREWS ON MONEYED PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, HOP- ING TO INDUCE PROPER LEGISLA- TION. Money is working closely but no special squeeze is feared. The same day Dominick & Dickerson telegraphed to Chicago: “Conservative men are preparing for bad times and tight money.” The Bankers' Direct Assault and the In- action of the Chief Executive, The conference between the Bankers in New York— Bankers who besides acting for American capital, represent the Eu- ropean Banking Houses— and the Presi- dent through his Secretary and Sub- Secretary, ended Thursday night, April 27th. Friday and Saturday nothing es- pecial happened, except that Wall Street brokers as we have shown, were cogni- zant that trouble was brewing and warn- ed their customers, and from other sources it appeared that banks were “buying no commercial paper to speak of and rates were very high,” whereas for Wall Street purposes the stock mon- ey ruled easy. It would not do for the bankers to openly carry on a Financial "War too soon after the conference, so Friday, Saturday and Sunday were passed over. Monday morning, May 1st, the bankers began a direct assault against the Com- mercial interests of the country as dis- tinguished from the stock market: in the stock market for Monday, prices fell somewhat and money on call was for a time “up around eight per cent,” but this, though, said the market report for the day, “REFLECTS NOTHING OF THE SITUATION IN THE FINANCIAL 14 WORLD OUTSIDE OF THE STOCK MARKET, and “even upon stock ex- change collateral lenders are looking for advance only when the securities placed are thoroughly gilt-edge.” The next morning E. A. Driver tele- graphed Baldwin & Farnum, Chicago: “The editorial writers in the New York morning journals take a very gloomy view of things. Money is close. The contin- ued agitation • of the silver question has scared the bulls off into the swamps and woods, and the bears simply have to raid a stock to knock it silly, THE ONLY WAY IS TO KEEP OUT.” The following day “The extreme de- cline in stocks varied from 7 points in su- gar stocks and 13 points in Chicago gas to 6 V 2 points in Western Union, and 15 points in national cordage. The over- whelming breaks bore unmistakable signs of forced liquidation (i. e., exhaus- tion of margin) and were at once for- warded by rumors of Wall Street fail- ures. While the excitement was at its height commission houses unconnected with the larger pools, threw over heavy blocks of stock and hastened the de- cline. * * * The next day prices fell still lower. Work, Strong & Co.’s Wall Street letter to Schwartz, Dupee & McCormick of Chi- cago, said : “Prices in many cases are lower to- day than they have been at time during this state of depression, and IF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION SEEKS TO GIVE TO THE SILVER MEN AN OBJECT LESSON using for such a pur- pose the misery and misfortunes of the money borrowing community, THEY HAVE MET WITH GREAT SUCCESS.” During the day (Wednesday) bulletins were issued representing that President Cleveland was about ready to order bonds to build up the reserve. Mr. Alla- way, the stock market reporter in Wall Street, called on the Presidents of per- haps a dozen prominent banks. They said that AN ORDER TO ISSUE SUCH BONDS “WOULD STOP THE PANIC WHICH HAS JUST BEGUN.” Up to Thursday night there had been for six consecutive business days declines in the stock market; for the last four days very heavjr declines. The next morn- ing the English market was higher, but during the day a further onslaught was made upon' stocks in New York, and with the suspension of a heavy operator the price of sugar certificates dropped 23 points; national cordage preferred, 22; general electric, 22; Chicago gas, 11, and others of the group in almost equally se- rious proportions. The bidding up of money rates to 40 per cent— though the rate within an hour fell again to 6— aggravated the situation. * * * As con- fidence returned such of the traders as were left unhurt joined in the buying on the rise. Investment purchases in heavy single blocks again supplied their part. Tn the last hour as the belief in a reac- tion spread, the movement grew into one of those stamped always familiar after a temporary panic, and in not a few of the best known stocks prices rose far above yesterday’s closing prices.” Thus did those “on the inside” make princely fortunes by “breaking” and “bulling” the market. In the meantime the life of business in the Commercial World was being choked out until a surrender should be secured in the form of an unconditional repeal of the silver purchase law. The Bankers’ Combine: The Panic Circular. The following circular shows how the widespread panic of early May and the succeeding months was forced by the bankers. They practically all belong to the American Bankers’ Association, and through the Executive Committee decide as to policies and then act together. The executive committee is said to have mailed to each member of the Associa- tion the following letter; that a letter of this character was sent out, has been admitted by many of the bankers who received it; “Dear Sir: THE INTERESTS OF NA- TIONAL BANKERS REQUIRE IMME- DIATE FINANCIAL LEGISLATION BY CONGRESS. Silver, silver certifi- cates and Treasury notes must be re- tired, and the national bank notes, upon a gold basis, made the only money. This will require the authorization of from $500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000 of new bonds as a basis of circulation. YOU WILL AT ONCE RETIRE ONE-THIRD OF YOUR CIRCULATION AND CALL IN ONE- HALF OF YOUR LOANS. Be careful to make a money stringency felt among your patrons, especially among influen- tial business men. Advocate an extra session of Congress for the repeal of the purchase clause of the Sherman law, and act with the other banks of your city in securing a petition to Congress for its unconditional repeal, per acompanying form. Use personal influence with Con- gressmen, and particularly let your wishes be known to your Senators. The future life of national banks as fixed and safe investments depends upon immediate action, as there is an increasing senti- ment in favor of government legal-tender and silver coinage.” Comment upon the foregoing cannot add to its hideousness. Read it again and then peruse the following: Ex-Governor David B. Hill in a speech in the United States Senate, August 25, 1893, said: Senator Hill Scores Wall Street. “SOME PORTION OF THE PRESENT PANIC MAY BE TRACED TO A CON- CERTED EFFORT ON THE PART OF NUMEROUS MONOMETALLISTS TO PRODUCE IT IN ORDER FURTHER TO DISCREDIT SILVER AS THE STANDARD MONEY OF THE COUN- TRY. With ghoulish glee they welcome every bank failure, especially in the Sil- ver States, little dreaming that such fail- ures would soon occur at their own dodrs. They encourage the hoarding of money; they inaugurated the policy of REFUS- ING LOANS TO THE PEOPLE EVEN UPON THE BEST OF SECURITY; AND ATTEMPTED IN EVERY WAY TO 15 SPREAD DISASTER BROADCAST THROUGHOUT THE LAND. These dis- turbers— the promoters of the public per- il— REPRESENT LARGELY THE CREDITOR CLASS, THE MEN WHO DESIRE TO APPRECIATE THE GOLD * DOLLAR IN ORDER TO SUBSERVE THEIR OWN SELFISH INTERESTS, men who revel in hard times, men who drive harsh bargains with their fellow- men regardless of financial distress and men wholly unfamiliar with the true principles of monetary science.” The Remedy, The panic for money in 1893 could not have occurred had the law been such as to have changed the President’s discre- tion into an imperative duty to maintain a stable average of prices through the volume of money. The Bankers’ False Prophecies. The great speculators and big creditors secured through their banks the uncon- ditional repeal of the silver purchase law. It was consummated Nov. 1st, 1893. They and their hired men and dupes promised that with the repeal of this silver pur- chase law there would be ‘‘good times” to the producing and trading classes. Those who opposed the creditors and speculators, pointed out that to shut off a volume of new money amounting to 54,000,000 dollars each year, would tend ' to lower the average prices, and that with falling prices production becomes disor- ganized, profits fall or are more than wiped out, the unemployed increase, and wages fall. Which prophecy proved true? History shows that the prophecy of the bimetal- lists was correct: By spring there were armies of unemployed men and during the summer there were strikes and dis- turbances which amounted to Civil War. The average of prices continued to fall until the spring of 1895, at which time they were forced up by the banks for po- litical effect, as we shall show. THESECOND ACT IN THE GREAT CONSPIRACY OF 1893: THE DESTRUCTION OF GREENBACKS. Inception of the Conspiracy. At the Conference in New York be- tween the great money loaners and Secre- tary of the Treasury Carlisle, April 27th, 1893, they are reported to have agreed that: ‘‘Beginning with the repeal of the silver purchase act, a thorough revision of the currency laws would be a good thing.” This from the bankers’ standpoint meant that the greenbacks should be de- stroyed and the bankers placed more completely in control of the average of prices, and production and trade. The Assault on the Greenbacks. A forward movement in this second stage of the conspiracy was begun about one year after the repeal of the silver purchase law. Space will not here per- mit the cunningly devised methods where- by President Cleveland and Secretary Carlisle assisted Wall Street in the fight. Numerous ‘‘object lessons” were given Congress and the people in an endeavor to create a sentiment which would re- sult in a law for the destruction of the greenbacks. In another place I have collected the facts and here must be content to set forth only one or two lead- ing ones: Three Administration bills were pushed forward in the House at three different times, and Wall Street co-operated by bombarding business through raids upon the gold-reserve and the forcing down of the average of prices. The third time the advance was made upon the Greenbacks by the bankers and the President, the latter refused to build up the gold reserve and sent a message to Congress asking that it retire the greenbacks. During the day that Con- gress received the message, the action of the bankers was such that ‘‘the Treasury was confronted by the prospect of an ac- tual crisis and the country by ANOTH- ER AND WORSE PANIC THAN THAT WHICH HAD JUST SUBSIDED (1893).” The quoted words are those of. the edi- tor of Bradstreet, in the July ‘‘Review of Reviews,” 1895. Policy of Retiring the Greenbacks. The Wall Street bankers and President Cleveland, their co-operator, failed to se- cure the retirement of the Greenbacks. The policy of retiring the greenbacks was in 1896 one of the tenets of Gold Democ- racy, of which President Cleveland was the principal leader. The Republican party did not advocate the retirement of the greenbacks, and thereby championed their retention. But to-day the Gold Dem- ocracy have given up their party organ- ization, for its members, including Wall Street, have captured the Republican party; every nominee for Congress on the Republican ticket is pledged to the re- tirement of the greenbacks and the ex- tension of privileges to the great specula- tive bankers. Cannot the old-time Re- publicans see that their party machinery has been captured? INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF AVERAGE PRICES. The Cause of “Good Times” in 1895. After the defeat of the efforts to retire the greenbacks in January, 1895, the mon- eyed interests changed their tactics and endeavored through good times to counteract the increased sentiment against national banks and the gold standard. The bankers built up the gold reserve under a private contract with President Cleveland, in which it was agreed that 31,000,000 in gold should be imported, and no gold exported before October, at which time it would be held to move the crops. Furthermore, the Directors of the Bank of Germany began issuing paper money, reducing their coin reserves, and expand- ing credits. This bank increased the mon- ey in use $101,000,000 by October 1st. The 13 order all along the line was to expand credits, and of course the average of prices rose. Commodities at wholesale rose five per cent on the average, and “good times” to the producing classes re- turned to a considerable extent. During this time President Cleveland and the Wall Street bankers and their employes were on “the money question,” conducting a “campaign of education,” as they termed it. With each increase in prosperity, due to rising prices, they shouted, “The Free Silver Craze is kill- ed!” And it was allayed, so long as the improvement continued, for what the people asked for was being given, name- ly, a cessation of falling prices and a slight restoration of prices. Russian Bear Interferes with Bankerse Plans. But Russia played havoc with the bankers “pie.” It reached out and in a single week swept $79,000,000 of gold into its war chest.. This resulted in a ces- sation of rising prices and a fall in prices which nearly lost the bankers the elec- tion in 1896. International Manipulation of Average Prices, 1879-80 and ’87. Rising prices, similar to those institut- ed in 1895, were put in operation by the bankers during the latter part of 1879. The data I have compiled and published in “The Money Question.” The motive of the manipulators was political and commercial; through the rising prices and good times to the producing and trading classes they kept their tools in power both in Europe and the United States, and they also reaped great fortunes from “speculations,” i. e., they knew the di- rection of prices in advance of the aver- age speculator and business man, and so “fleeced” them. Loaded dice are no worse. Furthermore, they deceived the public as to the cause of the “good times.” In Germany and France, where protective tariffs had recently been instituted, the public were made to believe that these tariffs had caused the good times, and in the United States it was claimed that the “resumption of specie payments” was the cause. In 1887 the same operation, practically, as in 1879, was gone through with and practically the same results were at- tained. Internationai Control of Average Prices, December, 1895. The Aggregated Wealth with which President Cleveland contracted for bonds in February, 1895, is thus described by the editor of Bradstreet in “The Review of Reviews,” July, 1895: “It is probably the greatest financial syndicate ever organized. It is practical- ly a blind pool with several hundred members in the United States and abroad (besides the London and New York houses of the Rothschilds and Morgan), WHOSE TOTAL WEALTH IS PROBABLY NOT LESS THAN $600,000,000. An illustration of the way in which the great moneyed interests operate to se- cure legislation and at the same time reap large profits from “speculation” is the following instance: President Cleveland delivered his “Vene- zuela Message” at a time when the gold reserve was down to about 70 millions of dollars and when every effort was being made to retire the greenbacks. As to what followed the President’s threat of war with England, is thus described in the columns of the daily papers: The second day after the message was given to the public a cablegram stated that there was a meeting in London of the leading moneyed men, and the ques- tion under discussion was, “Shall all English houses withdraw their credits from the United States?” The Assauit. On the morning following this confer- ence the prices of American stocks in London tumbled as if a military war had been declared, and when the New York stock market opened a panic was soon “on.” During two days, first-class stocks like the N. J. Central, fell 17% points; Rock Island, 16%; Pullman, 15%; St. Paul, 15%; Lake Shore, 14%; Burlington, 14%; N. Y. Central, 101%; 111. Central, 10. The moneyed interests forced down prices by selling great quantities of stocks and bonds AND SHUTTING OFF THE SUPPLY OF MONEY AND CREDITS; the aggregate European sales were $13,542,000, and in New York “none of the moneyed institu- tions would renew loans at less than 4 per cent, and many of them WOULD MAKE NO RENEWALS AT ANY ADVANCE. To carry stocks along, mon- ey was frequently lent at as high a fig- ure as 75 per cent before 2 o’clock Fri- day.” This action by the banks was taken in the face of the fact that “the surplus reserve amounted to $20,000,000.” All this occurred when nothing new in the con- troversy between the United States and England had occurred since the preceding Tuesday. The moneyed interests simply TOOK THAT OPPORTUNITY TO “WORK” THE STOCK MARKET. AND what was, evidently of far more import- ance to them, INFLUENCE LEGISLA- TION FOR THE RETIREMENT OF THE GREENBACKS. For at this time the gold reserve was down to about 70 millions, and it was understood that PRESIDENT CLEVELAND WOULD NOT ISSUE MORE BONDS UNTIL CONGRESS SHOULD REFUSE TO RE- TIRE THE GREENBACKS. And during the afternoon of Friday President Cleve- land fulfilled his part of the program by not advertising a bond issue but send- ing instead a message to Congress, say- ing: “I ask at the hands of Congress such prompt aid as it alone has the pow- er to give.” This was what he in effect said. He also asked the retirement of the greenbacks, and expressed “the earn- est hope” that it would not take a recess from its labor” before considering the 17 recommendations submitted in the mes- sage. Result of the Assault. In the House two bills were framed, one providing- for additional revenue from import duties and the second providing for 3 per cent coin bonds to replenish the reserve, and further providing that THE GREENBACKS PRESENTED FOR RE- DEMPTION SHOULD NOT BE REIS- SUED. Thus did the leaders in a Re- publican house show that they were working in the interests of the moneyed classes. Speaker Reed made this “bid” for support by the moneyed interests, for a presidential nomination was at hand. The Republicans from the West and South refused, of course, to vote for the measure, and it was amended by striking out the clause which forbade the reissue of the redeemed greenbacks. The bill, however, could not have passed the Sen- ate, and because of this, no determined attempt was made to force its passage in the House. In conclusion, as to the international control of prices, I quote from one of America’s greatest students of finance, Henry C. Carey: International Control of Average Prices, 1783 to 1853. “At intervals of half a dozen years our monetary bag has been inflated from abroad, the balloon then rising TO BE SUDDENLY COLLAPSED AT THE •WILL OF FOREIGN BANKERS, with ruin to all who have been led to go in debt, leaving them and their families to starting in the world anew, with the stain of bankruptcy clinging to them in all the future.” PHILADELPHIA MANUFACTUR- ERS COERCED. The Result of Existing System. Early in the year of 1896 a delegation of Philadelphia manufacturers went over to Washington to ask for the restora- tion of bimetallism. The dispatches from Washington printed at the time state the claims which they made as to the tieed for the remedy. After the capture of the Republican party by the gold standard and anti- greenback people, and the bolt from it by Senator Teller and others, many of the Philadelphia manufacturers decided to bolt, also, and to support the party advo- cating the restoration of bimetallism. The bankers “got wind” of it and inform- ed them, it is said, that NOT ONE OF THEM COULD CONTINUE IN BUSI- NESS IF HIS LINE OF BANK CRED- ITS WERE CUT OFF. This they had to admit, and the bankers further de- clared, it is claimed, and on high author- it and from several sources, that IF THEY SUPPORTED THE DEMOCRAT- IC TICKET THEY (THE BANKERS) WOULD RUIN EVERY ONE OF THEM. The manufacturers “lay down.” Let us turn from the illustrations of -how the bankers control the average of prices to secure Personal Profits, and consider the Existing Bank and Money Trust. PART VIII. THE EXISTING BANK AND MONEY TRUST. The Organization. In the early 70’s the American Bankers’ Association was organized. The re- sult of the combination was a promotion of the bankers’ inter- ests, and the organization grew: “Since 1884,” said the President of this association in his annual address in 1895, “numerous state associations have been formed, until now there are 30 of them, with a total numerical strength of near- ly 3,700 members.” There are also sub- organizations termed Groups. The anar- chists of Chicago were so minutely or- ganized that they, too, had “groups,” and in “Caesar’s Column” there are also “groups.” Motive and Past History. The President of the Association in the annual address above mentioned, said: “Growing out of the agitation begun in the conventions of the association, has followed the abolition of days of grace in many states, twelve having already adopted the reform (?).” “There can be no necessity for a revis- ion of our declaration of principles, but the growth and development of our com- mon country and the concurrent growth of the banking business have created a necessity for smaller local or- ganizations, and since 1884 numerous state associations have been formed, un- til now there are thirty of them, with a total numerical strength of nearly 3,700 members. THESE ASSOCIATIONS ARE CAPABLE OF AND DO EXERT A POWERFUL INFLUENCE IN THE LO- CALITIES IN WHICH THEY EX- IST. * * * “We cannot hope to change our politi- cal system, but we can and should util- ize all the agencies at our command TO INCREASE OUR OWN WELFARE and usefulness. * * * WE ARE ORGAN- IZED FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT. * * * This cannot be successfully accomplished by a national organization, EXCEPT THROUGH AUXILIARY BODIES CLOSELY IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL LEGISLATURES. It is probable that measures ini'iated by this body which re- quire changes in the laws of the various states would be much more likely to come to fruition if committed to the state associations than if undertaken by the as- sociation itself. Already these associa- tions are doing splendid work and achiev- ing excellent results, WHICH COULD BE GREATLY EXTENDED by affiliat- ing them more closely wfith this, organi- zation. “It was entirely through the efforts of the Bankers’ Association of the State of Illinois that two important reforms (?) in the laws of that state were accom- plished last winter, the effect of one of which at least w r ill be appreciated by ev- ery BANKER who has any business in IS that state. And there is work enough to do. It is conceded by every intelligent man that usury laws on the statute books of nearly every state are relics of barbarism and that the community would be greatly benefited (?) were they abolished (?)*** The remedy for these conditions is to be found through proper legislation (by “proper legisla- tion” as here used is meant that legis- lation which benefits the banker) AND PROPER LEGISLATION CAN BE HAD if it is sought for with courage and persistence.” Here it is confessed that the bankers of the United States are organized into 30 different bodies, besides the national and city organizations, and that they are “organized for mutual benefit,” i. e., “to increase our own welfare and useful- ness.” This, the President said, “cannot be successfully accomplished except through bodies closely in touch with lo- cal legislatures,” and for the securing of national laws, a close touch with the national legislature. In twelve states the days of grace on promissory notes have been abolished through the efforts of the bankers. What do our people think of this? And the bankers here tell us that they are working diligently for the repeal of the usury laws. What do our people say to this? But this is “small game” to what is well along to- ward completion and which I shall ex- plain soon. Do you think there is any truth in the statement made by Thomas Jefferson that “the banking institutions are more dangerous to our liberties than standing armies”? Comparative Strength of Bankers, ISIS 1895 and 1898. A comparison of the strength of the banking interest was set forth by the President of the New York State Bank- ers’ Association in an address to the Bankers Club of Chicago, April 27th, 1895. The subject was “Bankers and Leg- islation.” Mr. Cornwell said: “If in 1875-6-7 and 8, the bankers and the sound money men had been organized, as they are organized now, and had spoken out as they are speaking out now; had start- ed out on a campaign of education as they are starting out now, THE GREEN- BACK WOULD LONG AGO HAVE BEEN WIPED OUT.” Since the above was uttered, and since the foregoing address by the President of the American Bankers’ Association was put forth, the work of the Associa- tion has been greatly extended. The Bankers’ Magazine in its August Num- ber of this year in announcing the annual meeting of the Bankers said: “The work of the Association HAS BEEN GREATLY EXTENDED during the past three or four years, SINCE THE ADOPTION OF A MORE AG- GRESSIVE POLICY IN ADVANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE BANKING COMMUNITY. * * * Th®. day will not be far distant when there will be very few banking institutions in the United States which will not recognize the im- portance of belonging to the Association. ITS POWER TO BENEFIT THE BANKING COMMUNITY WILL IN- CREASE with the positive and aggres- sive policy it is now pursuing. Through experience of the benefits of co-operation THE BANKERS WILL LOSE THAT FEAR OF EXCITING POLITICAL AT- TENTION that for many years made it a prevailing sentiment in the Conven- tions to refrain from making the most necessary DEMANDS ON CONGRESS.” An Aggressive Policy. This aggressive policy was advocated by the President of the New York State Bankers’ Association in a speech before the Bankers’ Club of Chicago, April 27th, 1895. He said : “What ought bankers to do about leg- islation? “This, it seems to me, is the most im- portant thing for us to-night, or for any body of bankers in this country to con- sider at once. * * * “It is time to tear off disguise. Inter- national bimetallism is a traitor in the camp. It is a false fraud. * * * The fight is on; this is War for Education and ALL DISGUISE SHOULD BE THROWN OFF. * * * IT IS TIME FOR AGGRESSIVE ACTION. “The banker has a large influence. He is a confidential adviser of thousands and thousands of business men. The labor- ing element comes closely in contact with these business men.” Mr. Cornwell then declares what would be the result, name- ly, “a new sentiment would blaze from one end of the land to the other, a senti- ment which once established would mean QUICK LEGISLATION in the right di- rection and a satisfactory settlement of the currency question in the United States for all time.” And in conclusion he declared: “The politician, high or low, who today turns from the straight course of sound money (bank money) and the gold standard, STABS DEAD ONCE FOR ALL HIS EVERY CHANCE FOR POLITICAL SUCCESS, ESPECIALLY IF HE WANTS TO BE PRESIDENT.” I now turn and point out the Method whereby the bankers “act as one man” when they consider that their Personal Interests require such action: Bankers Act Through an Executive Council. The following is a copy of a circular letter sent out by the American Bank- ers’ Association, and it appears in the Congressional Record of May 27th, 1896. Senator Butler of North Carolina had it read by the Clerk of the Senate and thus preserved it in the national archives: “The American Bankers’ Association, 2 Wall Street and 90-94 Broadway. New York, March 23, 1896. To the Bankers of the United States: At a meeting of the Executive Council of the American Bankers’ Association, held in this city on March 11, 1896, the following declaration was made by unani- mous vote: “The Executive Council of the Amer- ican Bankers’ Association declare un- equivocally in favor of the maintenance of the existing gold standard of value (prices) and recommend to all bankers 10 and to the customers of all banks THE EXERCISE OF ALL OF THEIR INFLU- ENCE as citizens in their various states TO SELECT DELEGATES TO THE PO- LITICAL CONVENTIONS OF BOTH THE GREAT PARTIES who will declare unequivocally in favor of the main- tenance of the existing gold standard of value (prices). “Your influence is earnestly requested to give PRACTICAL EFFECT to this action. Eugene H. Pullen, President. James R. Branch, Secretary. Joseph C. Hendrix, Chairman Executive Council.’' This circular letter, in addition to show- ing the method whereby the bankers’ trust operates, proves also that the bank- ers use their organization TO CONTROL BOTH OF THE LEADING POLITICAL PARTIES. In short, the combined mon- eyed interests are organized for political work. How long can this organization be allowed to grow and the Republic stand? The power of the banking and moneyed class is greatly extended in a bill which they have framed and which has been recommended by the Banking Committee of the House. Its essential points are as follows: PART IX. THE PROPOSED LAW FOR EX- TENDING THE PRIVILEGES OF THE BANKING TRUST AND FURTHER CONSOLIDATING IT. The McCleary bill, which has been re- ported favorably from the House Com- mittee, and now stands on the Calen- dar ready for passage, has in it the fol- lowing provisions: (l) CONTROL OF AVERAGE PRICES. The Greenbacks are to be destroyed (section 13), and the Government is not to issue any more paper money, direct. But THE GOVERNMENT SHALL FUR- NISH PAPER MONEY TO THE BANKS TO ISSUE WHEN AND HOW THEY MAY CHOOSE. All restriction as to the withdrawal of the paper money issued by the banks is to be repealed (section 44). This enlargement of the bankers’ con- trol of the volume of paper money makes more complete the present control which they exercise through the volume of bank credits. Bankers’ False Claim Exposed. Mr. McCleary, in the Omaha debate, was asked by Hon. George Fred Williams of Massachusetts, “who, under the Mc- Cleary bill, would control the volume of money?” To this Mr. McCleary replied: “Under our system the Government will continue to control the volume of money.” Mr. Williams — “In other words, is it yoUr position that the government shall continue to control the volume of metal- lic money and that the issue of paper money shall be on private account?” Mr. McCleary— “The government shall continue to allow free coinage of gold; the coining of silver will be on govern- ment account. The issue of paper is purely a private transaction.” (Applause by Bank Money advocates.) There you have it. THE ISSUE OF PAPER MONEY BY THE BANK “IS PURELY A PRIVATE TRANSAC- TION,” says the advocate of the bankers’ plan. But let me state some of the pro- visions of the proposed law: The paper money is first authorized by the voters— the government— then printed by the government (section 15), and “every national banking association formed or existing under this Act SHALL TAKE AND RECEIVE AT PAR, inA- TIONAL BANK NOTES, OR NATION- AL CURRENCY NOTES issued by any lawfully organized national banking asso- ciation.” This is “legal tender” and the result is “money.” The volume of mon- ey is prescribed by the law, i. e. given quantities are authorized, and anyone who, without authority, publishes or cir- culates that wh.ch purports to be a bank- note, is guilty of a felony and liable to a heavy fine. And yet the bankers’ ad- vocate says that “The issue of paper is purely a private transaction”! Mr. Williams presented to Mr. Mc- Cleary in writing twenty-six questions, and asked that he answer them after he had considered them sufficiently. Mr. McCleary took them but did not attempt to answer them— he stood mute. To have attempted to answer the questions would have exposed the whole scheme, except as to branch banks. The proposed law had not been seen by Mr. Williams, nor uy any of us who took part in the debate. Some of the questions propounded are as follows, and they are so framed that either way they should be answered would make the bankers’ plan appear un- satisfactory to the business interests: Those Troublesome Questions. Question No. 6 — Will a sustained export of gold be an indication of an overissue of bank notes and the necessity of bank- note contraction? Question No. 7 — Will the issue or re- tirement of bank notes affect prices? Question No. 8— A. If they will not by what methods will exports of goods be stimulated to take the place of gold ex- ports? Question No. 8— B. If note issues will affect prices will not the whole general price range of commodities be regulated by the banks? The answer to these questions is that the banks will control the average of prices under their proposed law, and con- trol them more thoroughly than at pres- ent. ^Upon this point the following ad- vice is timely: Professor Foxwell’s Advice. Prof. Foxwell of Cambridge University, England, and a specialist in monetary history, has written me the following and 20 later gave permission that it be made public: “But I warn you in the United States, whatever you do, not to give fresh power of issue to the banks. I see they have been asking for this on the false but spe- cious plea that they want to prevent un- due restriction of the currency. What they want, and what all the gold bugs want, all the world over, is so to arrange the currency that they may be able to PULL ALL THE WIRES, AND MAKE IT SHRINK OR EXPAND, BUT ESPECIALLY SHRINK, AS MAY SUIT THEIR OPERATIONS AND INTER- ESTS.” ( 2 ) Discretionary Power of President. In the pending bill the discretionary power of the President as concerns the maintenance of the gold standard of fall- ing prices is changed into a Fixed Rule. He, through the Secretary of the Treas- ury, is COMMANDED TO ISSUE GOLD BONDS as often and to the extent re- quired to keep prices down to whe're gold will circulate; (seotion 4). The other of the President’s discretion- ary powers over the average of prices is left in operation, and to a Board of Comptrollers of the Currency is given tremendous discretionary powers: (3) Discretionary Power of Comptrollers This Board, which is to be confirmed by the Senate, have a 12-year term of office, and not removed except by the Senate and upon written charges (section 1), is given discretionary power to retire $346, - 000,000 of paper money, and discretionary power also to re-issue a like amount in exchange for gold (section 20). ( 4 ) Gold Standard of Falling Prices. The power given to the Board oi» Comp- trollers to issue $346,000,000 of paper money for gold, at their discretion, is one of the means whereby prices are to be kept down to where gold will circulate. But the gold is to be piled up and let out just as the Wall Street appointees may deter- mine. Payment in gold may be suspend- ed if the bankers choose to overstep the law. (5) SUSPENSION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS. Provisions of the Bill. The banks are authorized to issue in paper money 80 per cent of their capital stock. The only thing to keep down the volume of paper money to where gold will circulate alongside it, is a limited amount of bank capital and the provision in t*ne law that 50 per cent of the bank reserves shall be in gold, and that 5 per cent of the paper money shall be represented' by gold in the United States treasury^ Bankers Have Broken the Law. But so long as the bankers elect the of- ficers in control of the government, the bankers will experience no difficulty in overstepping the law if they choose to do so. In 1836-7 they suspended specie payments and “NEARLY ALL THE BANKS MADE MONEY OUT OF THE SUSPENSION AND PAID LARGE DIV- IDENDS DURING THE YEAR.” This statement is taken from a “History of American Currency,” written by one of the banks’ most able champions— Profes- sor Sumner of Yale University. In December, 1862, the banks suspend- ed specie payments, and made great profits. The Suspension in 1893. In 1893, during the course of the panic, and when the banks had suspended not only specie payments, but the payment of paper money as well, “a resolution was introduced in the Senate of the Unit- ed States calling upon the Secretary of the Treasury to inform the Senate wheth- er or not the banks of New York were obeying the laws. Senator Hoar of Mas- sachusetts arose in his seat and asked the Senate to lay that resolution on the table, stating that if it were passed by :he Senate it would be construed by the country to mean a command to the Sec- retary of the Treasury to see that the New York banks were compelled to obey the law, in which case the terrors of the panic which was then raging would be augmented and general ruin to the busi- ness of the country would be inevitable. The resolution was consequently laid on the table.” (Editorial in Senator Stew- art’s paper.) “A Daw Unto Themselves.” Furthermore, “there is great danger,” says Professor C. S. Walker of Massa- chusetts Agricultural College, “that bankers, with a thousand millions of dol- lars in their hands of the people’s money, to expand or contract as they see fit, will be a law unto themselves: that with this great money power they would hire law- yers to instruct the judges how to inter- pret the law, and elect congressmen to pass amendments to the law to suit them. This great danger was seen in Jackson’s time, and led to the overthrow of the National Bank. The attitude of the bankers toward the government in Lincoln’s day was one factor which led to our present national banking system. The dictatorial power of the bankers of Europe toward the control of peace and war and national policy is notorious.” (Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1898.) (6) 88346,000,000 of Bonds or Taxes. According to the banker’s plan the $346,- 000,000 of greenbacks are to be burned af- ter they have been exchanged for inter- est-bearing bonds, or for capital wrung from the people by taxation. Three hun- dred million is now in the treasury from bond sales and taxation and the war tax is being kept up. By an indirect process the greenbacks are exchanged for bonds or the proceeds of taxation. It is this way: The gov- ernment is to make a new paper money and pass it out to the banks $2 for each dollar of greenbacks handed in, and th en one-half of this new money is to be re- tired by bonds or the proceeds of taxa- tion. . 21 (t) $800,000,000 of Paper Money to Be Given to the Bankers. In addition to the $346,000,000 of paper money coined for the banks and given them free of charge, practically, there is to be a replacement of the 200 and some odd million dollars paper money which the banks now have, and enough more to make 80 per cent of the capital stock of all the banking capital which may en- gage in the business— say 1,000 millions of dollars, except as redemption in gold may keep the amount down so that prices will be low enough for gold to cir- culate, and keep within the country about $300,000,000 in gold. THIS $800,000,000 OF PAPER MONET, or thereabouts, IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE BANKS BY THE VOTERS, AND THEN THE BANKS ARE TO TURN ABOUT AND LOAN IT BACK TO THE PEOPLE AT FROM 5 TO 15 PER CENT PER ANNUM. This will amount to at least $40,000,000 each year— enough for a National University, and in each neigh- borhood a Pubi c School of Economic Po- litical and Social Science. (8) Gold Certificates Withdrawn. A clause in the proposed law repeals the existing provision for the issuance of gold and currency certificates. As gold is too heavy for convenience, and people are leaving it in the banks, as they prefer paper money, the result of the repeal of the provision for gold certificates would be that all the gold would be left in the banks and the people would use the bank poper money. But the only money which, by this bill, is to be legal tender between individuals is gold, and it fol- lows that THE PEOPLE WOULD BE WITHOUT ANY LEGAL TENDER AS BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS, AND THE BANKS WOULD HOLD IT ALL, AND WOULD ALSO HAVE THE POWER TO CONTRACT, WITHOUT LIMIT, THE VOLUME OF PAPER MONEY AS WELL AS A LIKE POWER TO WITH- DRAW BANK CREDITS. To those who have read what the banks did in 1881, 1893, and at other times, the mere statement of the condition which would result from their proposed law needs no further comment. (9) Usury Laws to Be Evaded. Section 43 of the Bankers’ Proposed Law exempts them from the State laws against usury. It will be remembered that in the annual address by the Presi- dent of the American Bankers’ Associa- tion, he said: “It is conceded by every intelligent man that usury laws on the statute books of nearly every state, are relics of barbarism, and that the com- munity would be greatly benefited were they abolished.” In the proposed banking law the com- munity is not informed of the great ben- efit which is to be conferred upon it by the bankers through repealing the clause which protects the people from the bank- ers. The proposed law simply states that the banks, in addition to “discounting,” shall have power to “BUY AND SELL * * * promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt.” (lO) Taxes to Be Evaded. In the Bankers’ bill there is a provision for a very slight tax, and as taxes can- not be put upon the national banks by the states without express permission from Congress, it follows that the banks will escape taxation. This will not be an innovation. The bankers have repeatedly secured laws whereby they have escaped taxation; for example, at the opening of the Civil War when the law was passed levying a war tax, the bankers were specially favored. Manufacturers were taxed 3 per cent of their gross sales and were compelled to pay a license; and on promissory notes individuals had to pay a stamp duty. But THE LAW EXEMPTED THE BANK- ERS; bankers were allowed to keep put- ting more and more paper money into circulation, thus depriving the govern- ment of just that much revenue and this without paying any tax, and they were not required to obtain a license; and it was only the net proceeds of the banks which were taxed, thus exempting from taxation whatever salaries the bankers should charge up to themselves. This is set forth in a speech in the Senate by John Sherman, Jan. 8, 1863, and is published in his collected speeches. (11) United States Bonds to Be Sold: Bank Depositors’ Security Lessened. After four years the United States bonds now held by the government as security for the paper money issued to the banks, are to be gradually given back to the bankers, and they will throw them on the market. To the extent that the proceeds are poorly invested there will be that much less security to the holders of the paper money, but this is made up to them by a first lien on the assets of the bank. It diminishes, however, the se- curity of the depositors. (12) CONSOLIDATED BANKING AND MONEY TRUST: ONE BANK WITH 10,000 BRANCHES. Effect of “Branch. Bank” System. The crowning villainy in this proposed banking law is the provision for Branch Banks. It is an innocent-looking clause, but when we consider that the way the Meat Trust operates is to absorb what- ever territory it desires through the es- tablishment of branches which drive all others out of the business through under- selling for a time, it becomes clear what this “branch bank” clause means. It means that if this law is passed, the big speculators, great creditors and monopo- lists will get their final grip on the pro- ducing and trading communities of the United States and the Republic will be a thing of the past. Every small banker will be frozen out just as the small pro- prietors have beep frozen out in meat 22 markets, the petroleum business, in bak- eries, tanneries, cordage, distilling, brew- ing, the mining of hard coal and iron ore, sugar refining, the manufacture of glu- cose, railroad transportation, the tele- graph business, the telephone, the de- partment store and other industries too numerous to mention. Are the producing and trading classes ready and willing to legislate into exist- ence a trust which shall “back up” all the other trusts which may secure a rep- resentation in the Board of Directors in Wall Street, and which shall quickly ex- tend “trust methods” to all the fields not yet occupied? Admissions. That there is in the proposed law a pro- vision for the consolidated banking and money trust, is the statement of the Chairman of the committee which framed the bill. Chairman Walker in a minority report against the bill, states that the re- sult of the authorization of the Branch Banks will be “one great United States Bank, with ten thousand branches.” And the majority report in favor of the bill, written by Mr. McCleary, admits that Scotland with a branch bank system has only 10 banks, with 900 branches. And the “rolling up” of trusts in Great Britain is only just beginning; in London the morning paper of October 4 states that two of her largest banks have con- solidated. “Both of the constituent banks,” says the cable, “had numerous branches and sub-branches in London, as well as in several of the important towns and cities in Great Britain. Early in 1897 the London and Midland bank ab- sorbed the Channel Bank, Limited, and later the Heddersfield Banking Company was taken over.” In Boston nine national banks have decided recently to consolidate in a sin- gle institution. The citizens don’t like it, but that “cuts no ice.” Furthermore, Mr. McCleary in his re- port in favor of the proposed law, com- pares the system which would result from branch banks to “a connected sys- tem of tanks with open pipes between. This,” he says, “is the opposite of in- dependent banks,” and there is no doubt but that he is correct. But these admissions were “slips.” The argument advanced for the branch banks is as follows: The Fallacy in Bank Trusts’ Argument. In advocating Branch Banks the advo- cates of the system claim that the com- petition which it will engender will lower the rate of interest, give better accom- modations. etc. The fallacy is in the claim that it will result in a continued competition. The branches of the Meat Trust result in competition for a time, but it is an unfair competition in that it puts prices so low that the resident dealer gives up, or is ruined, and then the field is in the hands of the Trust. An era of trusts is upon us: in every possible direc- tion is competition being shut off. In the words of “The Economist” of Chicago in an editorial last month: “The conclusion is inevitable, from recent events, that the idea of combination is a dominant one among the best thinkers in the busi- ness field. They believe that the trust idea will be carried out in future years to an extent compared with which its present application will seem like child’s play.” A Trust of Trusts. The only thing needed to finish the trust process and thus destroy competition in practically all lines of business, is a law permitting the establishment of branch banks. It would soon result in one bank with 10,000 branches. The Board of Di- rectors with their office in Wall Street, would hold full sway in the business world, and the result would be somewhat as follows: Effect of a Consolidated Banking and Money Trust. Every business of any magnitude is de- pendent upon “bank accommodations.” In 1896 the refusal of bank accommoda- tions to the Philadelphia manufacturers who wished to support the Bimetallic ticket and Government Paper Money tick- et, resulted in their “lying down.” It would be much worse if there were but one banking institution in the United States. Then the trusts now in existence and represented in the Directory would experience no more trouble from com- petitors, and the unoccupied fields would soon be “trusted.” Then everyone who is now an Inde- pendent Voter would become a Serf, for even if he should be permitted a vote, his vote would not be counted unless it suit- ed the will of the central power. As to Employment, the blacklisting of railway employes is but a precursor of what will be the rule in a few years if the consoli- dated banking trust is effected. The co- ercion of railway and other employes in 1896 will be but a faint taste of the power which will be applied to the erstwhile sovereign will— the power will have been transferred from the citizens to the Board of Directors in Wall Street. If the control of bank credits and the volume of money is placed in the hands of the rulers of the existing trusts, the outcome must surely be in the direction pointed out, unless a successful revolu- tion shall occur. But this would not be probable, for with its amassed wealth and the control of the government, there could be hired plenty of men to fight the battles, while the wealthy churches and most of their followers w r ould be on the side of the rich party in power. At any rate, it is best to prevent consolidation of the banking interests and not give them the additional power which when once in their grasp may never be taken back. The formation of this mammoth trust is dependent upon legislation. Will the voters choose to elect Representatives and Senators who shall delegate the power asked for, or will the voters bestir themselves and elect men who are pledger! to retain the greenbacks? 23 PART X. CONGRESSIONAL CAM- PAIGN IS A “STILL HUNT:” CONSPIRACY TO FURTHER ENSLAVE THE PEOPLE. Proof. In most of the platforms of the party- pledged to the Bankers’ Scheme, NO PLANKS GIVE A HINT OF THE PLAN, and it is hoped that it will be kept out of the campaign— that the people will sleep on their right to thwart it at the ballot box. In' the words of the Bankers’ Magazine, September, 1898: ‘‘The excitement of the war has drawn the minds . of politicians to issues more full of interest than the financial ques- tion. With a period before the meeting of the next Congress for reflection, it is pot beyond hope that when the banking bill comes before Congress IT WILL GO THROUGH WITHOUT BEING MADE A POLITICAL ISSUE.” To divert attention, the platforms de- clare for Gold, and it is hoped that the reform parties will accept the challenge and argue about metallic money and overlook the scheme to retire the green- backs and organize a Trust of Trusts. A ‘‘still hunt” is necessary, for “6,000,000 REPUBLICAN VOTERS,” says the Re- publican Chairman of the Banking Com- mittee, “ARE MORE OR LESS OP- POSED TO NATIONAL BANKS,” and for the greenback the people have “a pe- culiar patriotic instinct; a greenback is associated in their minds with the preser- vation of the Union.” And every think- ing man adds, It has much to do with the preservation of the liberties of to- day: with the bank credit in the control of an all-powerful class, the situation is very bad, but when there is added to this the control of all the paper money and BY A SINGLE BOARD OF DIRECT- ORS, one’s soul shrinks in horror at the mere contemplation of the possibility of such an outcome. TIi© Power of the Conspirators. The Existing Banking Trust, i. e., the American Bankers’ Association with its auxiliaries, has been and is working for the retirement of the greenbacks. But it is certain that as rapidly as the individu- al members find out about the branch banks, and what it means to themselves, they, with the exception of a few big bankers, will turn in and fight Wail Street. The extent to which the Executive Committee of the existing bank trust and its auxiliaries is organized and is at work, is set forth in the following notices: Conspirators Are Thoroughly Organized and at Work with Millions of Money. The Times-Herald of Chicago, noted for the “inside” knowledge which it has of the bankers’ plans and the administra- tion doings, in an editorial in September, said: “CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS In many close districts are being made and Will continue to be made WITH SOLE REFERENCE TO THE CANDIDATE’S POSITION ON CURRENCY REFORM. “These contributions will be supple- mented by a great amount of HARD WORK AMONG the business men and REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUND MONEY INSTITUTIONS. “The sound money campaigners are THOROUGHLY ORGANIZED and do- ing EFFECTIVE WORK INDEPEND- ENT ENTIRELY OF THE EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEES OF THE RE- PUBLICAN ORGANIZATION. Currency reform legislation is ‘on the carpet.’ IT IS NEARER THAN MOST PEOPLE IMAGINE.” Here it appears that Wall Street cannot trust the men who compose the present “republican machine,” especially so since the Gold Democracy has captured it and given up their old organization. As a consequence, Wall Street has its own Election Bureau through which it is pour- ing its millions of money. Corroborative proof of the statements in the editorial of the Times-Herald is the following: “En route to Omaha for the purpose of crossing swords with representatives of the so-called Indianapolis Monetary Commission in a joint debate, Ex-Gover- nor Stone, George Fred Williams and Leon C. Bailey of Indiana met in Chi- cago. “In discussing this Indianapolis “Mone- tary Commission,” it developed that IT HAS AN IMMENSE ARMY OF CLERKS, AND OCCUPIES A WHOLE FLOOR IN ONE OF THE FINEST OF- FICE BUILDINGS IN INDIANAPO- LIS.” In addition to the above organization there is the National Sound Money League, with a committeeman for every state, the Sound Currency Committee of the Reform Club of New York, and sim- ilar organizations in Philadelphia, Bos- ton and other cities, and besides these the Father of All— the American Bankers’ Association, with its thirty or more state organizations, with sub-organizations termed Groups. Can the citizens overcome these or- ganized forces? Yes, if discussion is challenged and the question put before the voters in other ways. For Wall Street Is Relying Upon Stealth to Accomplish That Which Cannot Be Secured if Discussion Is Had. Proof of this is the omission from the political platforms of all direct mention of the retirement of the greenbacks and the bankers’ proposed law. And there is also the attempt to divert attention by bringing in the question of gold and sil- ver when it cannot be acted upon untl 1900. Further proofs that stealth is being re- lied upon is the action of Congressman MeCleary when questioned about the bill which bears his name, and also these further facts: The “sound currency” publications are not saying a word about the currency question being an issue in the campaign. 24 And yet it is the question which is at is- sue. Not a word about it in the October number of “Sound Money,” the “Monthly Bulletin of the National Sound Money League,” nor is there in any of the week- ly sound money papers which I have looked over, a word about the election and . the currency question, except in the “Economist” a four liner, stating that “the friends of sound money have shown con- siderable anxiety in the past week or two respecting the results of the approaching elections.” Furthermore, and what is tremendously more important, is the fact that ALL THE REPUBLICAN DAILIES which have been exposing the shams of Wall Street have been silenced— aggregated wealth HAS SE- CURED THEIR SILENCE. These Repub- lican papers are not stultifying themselves by advocating the establishment of Wall Street’s scheme, but they are stultifying themselves by keeping silent. And there is this further proof of stealth: The Republican nominees are se- cretly pledged to vote for the bankers’ bill — they are not claiming that the greenbacks are an evil and the bankers’ bill a bless- ing. They may vaguely speak of “sound currency,” but they don’t dare to define what they mean. This is not honest and is not in keeping with American tradi- tions. Think of Lincoln or Washington doing such a thing! Every stump speak- er who uses the term “sound currency” should be asked to define it. I repeat it: This still hunt of Wall and Lombard Streets can be overcome by our citizens if discussion is challenged and the question is put before the voters in other ways. To do this THERE SHOULD BE NON-PARTISAN CO-OP- ERATION BY EVERY GOOD CITIZEN. Non-Partisan Co-operation. There are not ten men in the United States, outside of a few great specula- tors and creditors, who will have the hardihood to uphold the plan for placing IN THE HANDS OF A SINGLE BOARD OF DIRECTORS COMPOSED OF PRI- VATE INDIVIDUALS, THE CONTROL OF ALL THE BANKING AND MONEY INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. Work then in a non-partisan way for the overthrow of those candidates who are pledged to the proposed law which is to result in a single bank with ten thousand branches I say “non-parti- san,” for you can remain in the Republi- can party and mark off from your ticket all undesirable candidates . You can join with that old-time Republican, Chairman Walker, in scourging from the party all those who would sell their country and their countrymen. EVERY DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE FOR CONGRESS IS PLEDGED TO THE CHICAGO PLATFORM. WHICH DE- CLARES THAT THE PAPER MONEY SHOULD BE ISSUED BY THE GOV- ERNMENT DIRECT AND NOT THROUGH THE BANKS. VOTE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CAN- DIDATE FOR CONGRESS ON ELEC- TION DAY AND SAVE THE COUNTRY FROM THE RULE OF THE BANK TRUST. And in conclusion, weigh these senti- ments expressed by the greatest of Old Time Republicans: Old Time Republican Sentiments. The Money Question “should be ap- proached in no spirit of partisan bitter- ness. * * * Firmly attached to one po- litical party myself, firmly believing that parties in a free government are as healthful as they are inevitable, I still think there are questions about which parties should agree never to disagree; and of these are the essential nature and value of the circulating medium.” This was uttered by James G. Blaine, February 10, 1876, in the House of Rep- resentatives, in a speech in which he de- fended the greenback, and brought down upon himself the anger of the bankers and his own defeat for the presidency. Washington in his farewell address gave these parting words to his country- men: “Let me warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party. “This spirit, unfortunately, is insepar- able from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, con- trolled or repressed; but in those of the Popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy. * * * The common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the inter- est and duty of a wise people to discour- age and restrain it. * * * “It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the gov- ernment itself, through the channels of public passions. THUS POLICY AND THE WILL OF ONE COUNTRY ARE SUBJECTED TO THE POLICY AND WILL OF ANOTHER. * * * “There being constant danger of ex- cess, the effort ought to be by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.” Abraham Lincoln uttered this undying sentiment: “It is for us, the living, to be dedicated to the unfinished work, that government of the people, by the people and for the people shall not perish from the earth.” “God give us Men. A time like this de- mands Men who have honor— men who will not lie; Men who can stand before a demagogue And damn his treacherous flatteriugs without winking.” d APPENDIX. Mr. Walker, of Massachusetts, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, submitted the following VIEWS OF THE MINORITY. [To accompany H. R. 10289.1 The undersigned respectfully dissents from the views of the signers of the favorable report on bill H. ft. 10289, 7* X >C X I can see no conceivable relief from the present financial and banking conditions of the country, but on the other hand the certainty that it would be made worse by enacting any general bill referred to the com- mittee, excepting the Walker bill H. R. 10333, and the bills before the committee ,h &ge s teadily grown worse, culminating in theJElill-Fowler to the Committee on Banking and ^ 7 recognizes — muchTess_fearlessIy u and closely follows — any known lYincipie^o F^conomics or any recognized BRANCH BANKS. The Hill-Fowler bill authorization of branch banks is very bad economics as compared with encouraging the local independent bank, and still worse statesmanship. It finds no justification in the policy of our free banking system or in any amendment of it proposed in this bill. It is unwise to permit powerful city banks to establish branches in places of 4,000 inhabitants or less. The putting its local agent in a place with no interest in it other than the money he can make out of it for his nonresident employer, means that no independent local bank, managed Jby its__citizens^can be established in the town, and if one is kStgereiT m,gS£^o^5ES£^lsiness. ~ ^ In nine cases out of ten local banks in towns , are formed by public spirited citizens to get a fair return on the capital they put in the bank, but still more to build up the town, by assisting other citizens to 1 capital with which to do their business. The agent of the city bank may for a time loan money, in “ good times,” at rates to drive out the country bank, and in times of strin- gency the funds with this country agent will be sure to be immediately returned to .support the citvjaank, The customers of the country agency will be sacrificed to the necessiti es of the paren^ bank . 26 Generally there are two stores in a town, in times of excitement each is the headquarters of one political party. The agent of the nawm? bank knows the nollt ins jif his City employer, and agmnjbe bestowal of Ips favo ^ l^i^iltj e tp be infl uenced by hilCow n poTiEcsr ^''^ ‘■‘TJoTourc^^ one gre^t “ Ui support each, and thus all together make each secure stringency or in threatened or actual panic, as in the Walker bill. Mr. McCleary, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, sub- mitted the following * x x x x * xxxx^x Branch banking may be compared, in the fluidity which it gives to capital, to a connected series of tanks with onen nines between , while the possible borrowings of independent banks are more like a series of tanks whose pipes require to be opene mention that FOUR TIMES WITHIN TWELVE YEARS- namely: in 1884, 1890, 1893 and 1895— THE BANKS of this city DEFAULTED ON THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR DE- POSITORS, and that these depositors, in order to get currency with which to carry on their business, HAD TO SELL THEIR CHECKS TO WALL STREET BROKERS AT A CONSIDERABLE DISCOUNT. To vest in SUCH WEAK INSTITUTIONS, and in less responsible banks of the rural districts, THE EXCLUSIVE FUNCTION OF ISSUING PAPER MONEY IS AN ACT OF FOLLY WHICH OUR PEOPLE WILL NEVER COMMIT.’ ” To-day the Republican Press is Silenced. The foregoing utterances were put forth be- fore the opening of the war with Spain. Since then the scheme was hatched to cap- ture a Congress which would retire the greenbacks and give full sway to the great bankers. IT WAS NECESSARY that the Great Dailies of the Republican party at least SHOULD CEASE TO FIGHT THE SCHEME. And the promoters HAVE SUCCEEDED: NOT ONE REPUBLICAN PAPER CAN I FIND THAT IS FIGHT- ING THE PROMOTERS OF THE TRUST OF TRUSTS. This staggers one. We are tempted to suspect that aggregated wealth is going to prove too strong for civilization to with- stand, or else that it is hastening its own overthrow by its rapid enslavement of tbe producing and trading classes. Will it suc- ceed in its present campaign of steal b? Will it secure enough votes to legislate into existence the Consolidated Bank Credit and Money Trust— the Trusts of Trusts? ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES Republican Congressmen Whipped Into Line. Last December a canvass of the members of the House was made as to the proposal to retire the greenbacks and it was found, says the Chicago Tribune, that the Re- publicans from the Central and Western States were still opposed to the policy. But later the war occupied the public mind, and the Republican Congressmen were whipped into line through the multi- tudious forces which surround them. A canvass of the House last July, by the Washington Post, showed that THE RE- PUBLICAN MEMBERS WERE PRACTI- CALLY UNANIMOUS FOR THIS LAW which shall yield a “trust of trusts,” in ad- dition to its other evil features. Let us turn to the opposition: Democratic Congressmen Stand for the People. In the daily papers of Dec. 15, 1897, the following appears: The Democratic mem- bers of the United States House of Repre- sentatives held a caucus and resolved that “It is the sense of this caucus that the Democrats of this House OUGHT TO RE- SIST ALL EFFORTS, DIRECT OR INDI- RECT, TO RETIRE THE GREENBACKS AND THE TREASURY NOTES. “That we are opposed to and WILL RE- SIST ALL ATTEMPTS TO EXTEND THE PRIVILEGES OF NATIONAL BANKS, OR TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF THE TAXES THEY NOW PAY.” And the platform of the Regenerated Democracy is equally progressive: Platform of the Purified. Democracy. “Congress alone has power to coin and issue money, and President Jackson de- clared that this power cOq'd not be delegated to corporations or individuals. We there- fore denounce the issuance of notes, in- tended to circulate as money by National Banks as in derogation of the Constitution, and we demand that all paper which is SJf APPENDIX, made a legal tender for public and private debts, or which is receivable for duties to the United States, SHALL BE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED > SHALL BE REDEEM STATES, AND ABLE IN COIN. Furthermore, in nearly all the States the Democratic party stands for the extensio of the Referendum to Statutorv Law. Political Outlook October 8th. Dangerous for Producing and Trading Classes. “The excitement of the war has drawn the minds of politicians to issues more full of interest than the financial ques- tion. With a period before the meeting of the next Congress for reflection, it is not beyond hope that when the banking bill comes before Congress IT WILL GO THROUGH WITHOUT BEING MADE A POLITICAL ISSUE. ’’-The Bankers’ Maga- zine, September, 1898. The “Economist” of Chicago for Octo- ber 8th, says: “A week or two ago considerable anxiety was felt respecting the outcome of the fall elections and the consequent prospects re- specting the currency. The grounds for this anxiety have never been clear to people outside of practical politics, and THERE IS NOW LESS EVIDENCE THAN EVER OF ANY DANGER. IT APPEARS CER- TAIN THAT THE ELECTION WELL RE- SULT IN A TRIUMPH FOR THE SOUND MONEY PARTY, and that the senatorial elections will give that party a gain in, the Upper House, so that there will, be a CLEAR WORKING MAJORITY IN BOTH HOUSES.” Special to the Times-Herald. “New York, October 8.— Republican lend- ers of national prominence held a conference fraught with great import here to-day. The object was to ascertain, as nearly as possi- ble by close figuring, how the next Con- gress will stand in both branches. The conclusions reached were that these results will ensue from the balloting next month: The next United States Senate will be REPUBLICAN BY FROM SIX TO TEN VOTES. “The next House of Representatives WTLL HAVE A WORKING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY, but not so large a one as tho present majority of fifty-one votes. “As a sequel, the Fifty-sixth Congress will stand for CURRENCY -REFORM LEGIS LATION. Figures on the Senate. “There are thirty-four hold-over Repub- lican Senators,” said Chairman Babcock. McComas has already been elected in Mary- land, and a Republican Legislature to-day elected a Republican Senator in Oregon. In order to control the Senate the Repub- licans must elect ten of the twenty-six Sen a tors remaining to be elected. “Mr. Babcock then show'ed the followin' table of probabilities, showing who are tin Senators whose terms expire next year r th states placed as surely Republican, th' states surely Democratic, and those consid ered doubtful: Allen, Nebraska . . . Bate, Tennessee . . Burrows, Michigan Cannon, Utah .... Clark, Wyoming . . Cockrell, Missouri Davis, Minnesota . Faulkner, West Virginia Gray, Delaware Hale, Maine Hawley, Connecticut Lodge, Massachusetts Mantle, Montana .... Mills, Texas Mitchell, Wisconsin Murphy, New 'York Pasco, Florida .#. . . . Proctor, Vermont .... Quay, . Pennsylvania Rodch, North Dakota Smith, New Jersey Stewart, Nevada .... Sullivan, Mississippi Turpie, Indiana .... Wilson, Washington . White, California . . . Total Rep. Dem. Doubt V ■ Situation October 13th. OCTOBER 13th the Indianapolis Sentin said: Not a single republican paper in In diana (or in the United States) is arguin; in favor of the retirement of the greer backs. Not a single republican orator i advocating that proposition on the stunr And yet the republican party is commltte; to that measure by the declarations of th President and the Secretary of the Treas ury and by the terms of the Bill reporter to the House by the Committee on Ban" ing and Currency, to which, according t Mr. H. H. Hanna,, whose truthfulness n one who knows him will question, 150 repu’ lican members of Congress stand fully com mitted. Why don't the republican candi dates and speakers who are now before th people discuss this very important question Lithomount Pamphlet Binders Gaylord Bros. Inc. Makers Syracuse, N. Y.