*Wvl^
 
 L I B RA FlY 
 
 OF THL 
 
 U N I VER.5ITY 
 
 or 1 LLl NOIS
 
 My^. 
 
 ON 
 
 NATIONAL PROP! RTY, 
 
 Wiit ^rogpects! 
 
 PRESENT ADMINISTRATION 
 
 THEIR SUCCESSORS. 
 
 C'Vst moi qui nomme les miiiistres, mais c'est In nnlioii qui li-s renvoie." 
 
 Louis XV. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 LONDON : 
 B. FELLOWES, LUDGATE-STREET 
 
 MDCCCXXXV.
 
 U. C1,AY, PRINTER, BREAD-STREET-HIM.. 
 
 UIUC '
 
 ON 
 
 NATIONAL PROPERTY, 
 
 The subjects of our title-page may appear, at 
 first sight, to be totally distinct. It will be found, 
 however, that they are intimately connected. The 
 nation has now arrived at one of those periods 
 which recur in the history of every free and 
 progressive community, at which traditionary 
 routine ceases to be a guide ; — when the file 
 affords no precedent, and we must either submit 
 to act from mere impulse and guess, or must 
 recur to the first principles On which the theory 
 of government is founded. 
 
 The great object and the great difficulty in 
 government is the preservation of individual pro- 
 perty. All the fraud and almost all the violence
 
 which it is the business of government to prevent 
 and repress, arise from the attempts of man- 
 kind to deprive one another of the fruits of their 
 respective industry and frugality. Among savages 
 these attempts produce robbery and theft. To 
 these simple modes of unjust appropriation 
 civilized nations add the less palpable forms of 
 monopoly, combination, and privilege; abuses 
 which, when of long standing, it is not easy to 
 detect and expose, and which it is still more diffi- 
 cult to remedy, without occasioning much imme- 
 diate injury to individuals. But the most revolting, 
 and perhaps the most mischievous form of robbery, 
 is that in which the government itself becomes an 
 accomplice ; when the property of whole classes 
 of individuals is swept away by legislative enact- 
 ments, and men owe their ruin to that very insti- 
 tution which was created to ensure their safety. 
 It is highly honourable to the honesty and saga- 
 city of the people of England that they have 
 guarded against this evil with almost superstitious 
 care, and have allowed every individual to oppose 
 bis own interests to those of the public to the 
 utmost extent to which, with any resemblance to
 
 decency, they can be urged. It may be a ques- 
 tion, indeed, whether they have not often gone 
 beyond this point, and allowed pleas of well- 
 founded expectations, or, as they are usually 
 termed, vested interests, to impede the general good 
 to an unnecessary, and, therefore, a mischievous 
 degree. But with all our anxiety, and it is a very 
 proper anxiety, to hold the balance even between 
 individuals and the public, or to lean rather 
 towards the weaker party, there are two landmarks 
 which we have never transgressed : — the indi- 
 vidual interests which, whether in possession or 
 in expectation, we have considered as property, 
 even when inconsistent with the public welfare, 
 and therefore either left untouched or bought up 
 at an ample price, have been in the first place 
 lawful, and, secondly, capable of valuation. 
 
 No interest, however definite and vested, 
 can be respected if it be unlawful. No 
 voice has ever been lifted up in defence of 
 the vested interests of paupers in poor-law 
 abuses, or of vestrymen and overseers in paro- 
 chial jobbing. So far, indeed, has this been 
 carried that a profit, based on an illegal act,
 
 is not held entitled to mere ordinary protec- 
 tion against an equally unlawful aggression. 
 The printer who pirated Lord Byron's "Cain," 
 was allowed to plead his own wrong in his 
 own defence ; to maintain, and to maintain 
 successfully, that " Cain " being an unlawful 
 publication, was not property, and therefore 
 could not be the subject of plunder. 
 
 Nor can any interest, however lawful, be consi- 
 dered property as against the public, unless it be 
 capable of valuation. And for this reason : — If 
 incapable of valuation it must be incapable of 
 compensation, and therefore, if inviolable, would 
 be an insurmountable barrier to any improvement 
 inconsistent with its existence. If a house is to 
 be pulled down and its site employed for public 
 purposes, the owner receives a full compensation 
 for every advantage connected with it which can 
 be estimated. But he obtains no pretium affec- 
 tionis. He is not paid a larger indemnity because 
 it was the seat of his ancestors, or endeared to 
 him by any peculiar associations. His claim on 
 any such grounds for compensation is rejected, 
 because, as the subject matter is incapable of
 
 valuation, to allow it would open a door to an 
 indefinite amount of fraud and extortion : nor is 
 he allowed to refuse the bargain offered to him by 
 the public, because such a refusal would be in- 
 consistent with the general interest of the com- 
 munity. The mere hope of public employment, 
 founded on no contract, express or implied, affords 
 another instance of a lawful expectation, too 
 vague to admit of compensation. If such a 
 claim had been allowed, no incumbrance on the 
 public revenue could ever have been removed, 
 or even diminished. The army could not have 
 been reduced, because many who hoped for 
 commissions must have been disappointed. All 
 improvement must have been stopped if it had 
 been admitted that such expectations are pro- 
 perty. 
 
 Of course we do not mean to affirm that every 
 lawful interest which is susceptible of valuation 
 is property, and therefore entitled to be either 
 compensated or left undisturbed. In legislation 
 we are constantly forced to choose between 
 motives acting in opposite directions, and to 
 purchase general advantage at the expense of
 
 8 
 
 particular inconvenience. It is an evil that any 
 fair expectation should be disappointed. But 
 there are cases in which the public welfare 
 requires this evil to be submitted to. The good- 
 will of a shop is a lawful interest, and, as it is a 
 frequent subject of sale, is obviously capable of 
 valuation. But the public recognizes it as pro- 
 perty only under peculiar circumstances. It is 
 not protected in any degree against competition. 
 No one is prevented from injuring or even abso- 
 lutely destroying it by establishing a rival shop 
 at the next door. Even the injury which it 
 may receive from legislative acts, is left uncom- 
 pensated if the shop itself is allowed to exist. 
 The shop-keepers and landlords of Bond Street 
 were not compensated for the loss occasioned to 
 them by the erection of Regent Street, though 
 the opening of that street was a public mea- 
 sure. It was felt that the admission of a 
 claim for compensation for the injury arising 
 from competition would produce greater evils 
 than those which, from time to time, arise from 
 the destruction of the fair expectation of a 
 profitable local trade. If, however, the public
 
 9 
 
 interest requires a shop to be removed, the teuoi'^ 
 receives the value of its good-w^ill, though that 
 good-will w^as previously at the mercy of any of 
 his rivals in trade. The number of occasions 
 on whichi such a claim can be made is not 
 so great as to be a serious obstacle to public 
 improvements ; 'and the objection to its admis- 
 sion is therefore at an end. The hope of 
 eventually succeeding to an estate, the present 
 possessor of which is seised in fee, or, in other 
 words, has the absolute property, is an instance 
 of a lawful interest capable of estimation, and 
 even of alienation, but utterly unprotected. It 
 is left exposed to the extravagance or caprice 
 of the tenant in fee simple. It has recently, 
 and in many thousand instances, been taken 
 away by the legislature, and without com- 
 pensation. Until the 1st of January, 1834, no 
 person could inherit the freehold property of 
 his lineal descendants. On the death of a 
 person possessed of such property, intestate, and 
 without issue, leaving a father or mother, or 
 more remote lineal ancestor, it went over to his 
 collateral relatives. In 1833, this law was
 
 10 
 
 totally altered. In such cases the property 
 now goes to the father or mother, or remoter 
 lineal ancestor, in preference to the collaterals. 
 In many instances this must defeat expectations, 
 not merely well founded, but approaching to 
 certainties. The brothers, uncles,* nephews, and 
 cousins of lunatics, or of minors in such a state 
 of health as to be very unlikely to reach the age 
 at which they would be capable of making a will, 
 had, until the 3d and 4th Will. IV., cap. 106, 
 was passed, prospects of succession so definite, 
 that in many cases they would have sold for 
 considerable prices. All these interests, though 
 lawful and capable of valuation, have been swept 
 away without compensation. And it was neces- 
 sary that this should be done : the old law was 
 obviously inconvenient, and to have attempted to 
 compensate all those who, if the principle of 
 compensation had been admitted, must have been 
 held entitled to it, would have involved such an 
 expense as to have rendered the alteration of the 
 law impracticable. We afhrm, not that every 
 lawful interest which is capable of valuation is 
 inviolable, but that no interest can be held in-
 
 11 
 
 violable as against the public unless it be capable 
 of valuation. 
 
 All property, so far as it has no lawful in- 
 dividual proprietor, must belong to the nation 
 collectively, or, in other words, to the State. 
 This is the case with respect to the fee-simple 
 of all that property which is held in mortmain. 
 The estates of Bishops and Chapters, of the 
 Universities, and their colleges and halls, and 
 generally speaking, of all Corporations, have 
 no owners beyond the life interests of the 
 existing bishops and members of chapters and 
 corporations. Those life-interests the State is 
 bound to protect; to affect them without the 
 consent of their owners, would be, as we have 
 already stated, spoliation in one of its most 
 odious forms. But subject to those life-inte- 
 rests, the State is not only justified, but ab- 
 solutely bound, to employ the property in the 
 way most conducive to the public interest. In 
 many, indeed in the vast majority of cases, 
 the existing application, or at least an application 
 the same in kind, is on the whole the best that 
 can be adopted. Few measures could be more
 
 12 
 
 mischievous tnan a diversion of the revenues of 
 the Universities from the purposes of education. 
 Some modifications, indeed, of the statutes of the 
 different colleges are necessary to enable them to 
 perform still better their important offices ; but no 
 one who is aware of the extent of their present 
 usefulness would think for an instant of making- a 
 total change in their destination. The same may 
 be said of tfeie episcopal and chapter property in 
 England, and of the benefices, the advowsons of 
 which do not belong to individuals, and which 
 are therefore public property. A better distribu- 
 tion might perhaps be made of their revenues, 
 but there is no mode in which they could be 
 more beneficially employed, than as an ecclesias- 
 tical endowment. With many persons long habit 
 has blunted the sense of the advantages which are 
 produced by an endowed church : and there are 
 others who, though aware of the extent of those 
 advantages, or rather, perhaps, in consequence of 
 their knowledge of the benefits conferred by an 
 endowment, are so anxious to increase those bene- 
 fits, and to make the endowments of the church as 
 useful as possible, that their attention is more
 
 13 
 
 earnestly fixed on the faults and deficiencies of our 
 existing system, than on its far more important 
 merits. But all whose minds are not blinded by 
 party or sectarian spirit must admit that an 
 endowed church is among the most valuable parts 
 of our political inheritance. 
 
 But while, on the one hand, we deny the expe- 
 diency of diverting the estates of the Universities 
 from educational, and those of the se^s and chap- 
 ters and benefices in question from ecclesiastical 
 purposes; while we affirm that such a diversion 
 would be short-sighted and barbarous folly ; on 
 the other hand we equally deny that, supposing 
 the existing life-interests to be untouched, and 
 that the diversion could be proved to be expe- 
 dient, it would be an injustice. In other words, 
 if the expediency can be proved, we affirm the 
 right. 
 
 And not only must the expediency, on which 
 alone the right is founded, be clearly proved, 
 but it must be an expediency with reference to 
 the nation as a permanent body. A violation 
 of this last rule appears to be the only mode 
 in which a nation can commit an injustice,
 
 14 
 
 although no assignable individual has a right 
 to consider himself as unjustly treated. A 
 nation, though it may act with the utmost im- 
 prudence or folly, cannot be said to be unjust 
 to the whole of its existing members, any more 
 than a man, however absurd, can be said to be 
 unjust to himself. But if the existing members 
 of the nation sacrifice the welfare of their suc- 
 cessors to their own immediate interest, they 
 may be said to be unjust to their successors ; 
 just as a man who wastes his inheritance, or 
 sells it, and lays out the price in an annuity on 
 his own life, is said to be unjust to his children. 
 And this is a species of injustice to which every 
 country is most mischievously tempted. It is 
 as dangerous for a nation as it is for an indi- 
 vidual, to have the power of promoting its own 
 apparent immediate interests at the expense of 
 those who are not yet in existence, with whom 
 therefore it cannot sympathise, and who have 
 no assigned protectors. Few countries, therefore, 
 have been able to withstand the temptation. 
 Almost every government has, to a certain extent, 
 sacrificed posterity wherever an immediate gain
 
 15 
 
 has appeared attainable. One of the most 
 striking instances was the funding system 
 adopted in this country during the revolu- 
 tionary war. We do not mean to affirm that 
 it was inconsistent with the permanent welfare 
 of the state, and therefore, in our sense of 
 the word, unjust, to raise bv loans a por- 
 tion of the expense of that war. But the 
 mode in which the greater part of those 
 loans was raised produced a slight immediate 
 advantage, at the expense of a great and per- 
 manent evil. They were principally raised by 
 the creation of a three per cent, stock, at a time 
 when the real interest of money was from five 
 to seven per cent. For every 70/. or 60/., or 
 sometimes even for a smaller sum really paid 
 to the Exchequer, the nation acknowledged a 
 debt of 100/. A slight abatement of interest 
 was thus obtained. If the nation had acknow- 
 ledged itself a debtor for only the sum really 
 borrowed, it would have had to pay, during 
 the war, a rather larger interest. In some cases, 
 five per cent, instead of four and a half In others 
 perhaps six per cent, instead of five and a half,
 
 16 
 
 or perhaps even more. But, at the termination 
 of the war, the national debt, instead of amount- 
 ing to between seven and eight hundred millions, 
 the greater part of it bearing an interest of only 
 three per cent., but redeemable only by the 
 payment of the nominal principal sum, would 
 not have exceeded four or five hundred millions, 
 bearing, indeed, a higher rate of interest, some 
 part of it six, or perhaps even seven per cent., 
 but redeemable at the expense of four or five 
 hundred millions. The interest of the whole 
 might have been reduced, and a portion of 
 the principal paid off, without any injustice to 
 the public creditor, who would have received 
 every shilling that he bargained for, and at 
 this instant we should probably be subject to 
 not more than one half of the debt which inter- 
 feres with our internal prosperity and external 
 force, and endangers, more than any other single 
 cause, the stability of our institutions. 
 
 Now, even supposing that it could be shown that 
 it would be expedient, as far as the present genera- 
 tion is concerned, to dispose of the fee simple in 
 reversion of all the national property, and apply
 
 17 
 
 the produce for purposes of temporary utility, 
 it is certain that such a conduct would not be 
 expedient as respects our posterity. The re- 
 venue derived from property held in mortmain 
 is a revenue, and it is the only revenue so cir- 
 cumstanced, which, though it is received by 
 the country, or by those who are trustees for 
 the country, no individual can be said to pay. 
 No assignable individual is the poorer because 
 the beautiful valley in which Dulwich College 
 is situated belongs to a corporation. The revenue 
 arising from that splendid property is, without 
 doubt, employed less beneficially than it might 
 be ; but in all probability, more beneficially, and 
 most certainly not less so than if Allen, instead 
 of founding a college, had founded a family. 
 Of this revenue the existing generation is only 
 tenant for life. It is our right and our duty to 
 manage and apply the income, but to preserve 
 the inheritance. The inheritance belongs to our 
 successors. If, by Act of Parliament, the property 
 of Dulwich College were sold, subject to the ex- 
 isting life interests, and the produce applied in aid 
 of the supplies of the year, the present generation
 
 indeed would not be injured, but our posterity 
 would be deprived of a revenue of which we 
 at present make little public use, but which 
 they may apply to the noblest purposes of im- 
 provement. 
 
 A general conviction of the mischief that would 
 arise from the dissipation, for purposes of imme- 
 diate utility, of the fee simple of mortmain pro- 
 perty, and of the temptation to which a government 
 is exposed, particularly in unsettled times, to give 
 present relief, and obtain, or confirm, present 
 power, and temporary popularity, by perpetrating 
 this mischief, has induced persons who were not 
 aware of the real grounds on which it ought to 
 be opposed, to support their opposition by all 
 sorts of fallacious arguments. They confound 
 the right which clearly does exist, to deal with the 
 income, with the right, which does not exist, to 
 waste the fee simple ; and by endeavouring to 
 prove what is false, have failed in establishing 
 what is true. 
 
 Of those who are guilty of this error, some 
 deny the right of the State to deal with the 
 meome of property held in mortmain, on the
 
 19 
 
 ground that, what they call the church, as 
 distinct from the existing clergymen, is the owner 
 of what they call church property ; that the epis- 
 copal lands belong to the bench of bishops, not for 
 the lives of the existing bishops, but for ever; and 
 that to declare that no bishop shall in future be 
 appointed, and that the revenues of the sees as 
 they become vacant shall be applied to the sup- 
 port of hospitals, would be an act of spoliation, 
 even although it could be demonstrated that such 
 an application would be more useful, not only at 
 present, but permanently, than the present one. 
 The answer to these reasoners is, that to every 
 spoliation there must be two parties, the spoiler 
 and the person despoiled. Now who, under these 
 circumstances, would be the persons despoiled ? 
 Our posterity? No: for the argument assumes 
 that they would be benefited. The existing 
 bishops? No : for they are untouched. The per- 
 sons who now have the power to appoint bishops? 
 Their consent must of course be obtained. If the 
 bishopric of Sodor and Mann had still belonged 
 to the Athol family, their right to appoint a bishop 
 could not have been suppressed without compen-
 
 20 
 
 sation. But, in the present case, the persons who 
 have the right to appoint bishops are the govern- 
 ment, and their consent is presupposed. The 
 persons w^ho might hope to be made bishops? 
 They have no vested interest susceptible of valu- 
 ation; and, therefore, on the grounds already laid 
 down, cannot be heard. They have no more right 
 to protest against the suppression of bishoprics 
 than subalterns have to oppose a reduction of 
 the number of field-officers. Bishoprics no more 
 belong to the church, as an imaginary entity, 
 distinct from the existing churchmen, than pay 
 and allowances belong to the army, as an equally 
 imaginary entity, distinct from the existing 
 soldiers. 
 
 Others again contend that this property, having 
 been originally given to ecclesiastical purposes, 
 cannot be diverted from them without improperly 
 violating the wills of those deceased persons who 
 so dedicated it. In Scotland, where a right of 
 perpetual entail is admitted, this argument might 
 have some plausibility. In England and Ireland, 
 where the law " abhors perpetuities," it is almost 
 too absurd for refutation. Our ancestors have
 
 21 
 
 had their full swing of posthumous power. Their 
 wills have been obeyed for centuries ; in some 
 cases, without doubt, most beneficially ; in others, 
 more or less mischievously. And will any one, out 
 of a sentimental regard to their memory, maintain 
 that we have not now the right, or that, having 
 that right, we are not now bound to inquire, 
 how far this obedience is now beneficial, how 
 far it is mischievous ? or that we have not now 
 the right, or that, having that right, it is not 
 our duty to make such changes as may augment 
 the benefit and remove the mischief? 
 
 If this argument were successful, the land 
 would indeed belong not to the living, but to the 
 dead. Every successive generation would find 
 itself more and more confined by testamentary 
 enactments ; in many instances the result of vanity, 
 caprice, or ignorance ; in others, framed to meet 
 he wants of an obsolete state of society, but in 
 all cases immutable as the laws of the Medes 
 and Persians. One testator might direct his estates 
 to lie fallow for 10,000 years ; another that they 
 should be cropped alternately in thistles one cen- 
 tury, and in nettles the next ; and a third might
 
 22 
 
 order, as indeed has been done, that the successive 
 life-owners should for ever be chosen by lot. 
 
 It cannot be necessary formally to prove that 
 the right of a person, who is in possession of 
 a piece of land, to direct what shall be done 
 with it after his decease, does not belong to 
 that class of rights which have been called 
 natural, but is altogether the creation of law. 
 In some nations, as was the case throughout 
 Europe at the commencement of the feudal 
 system, no such right exists. In others, such as 
 France, it exists, but within very narrow limits. 
 The Scotch law denies testamentary power, unless 
 by means of an evasion, but allows a power of 
 perpetual entail by deed. The English law upon 
 the subject is full of inconsistencies. It allows 
 property to be settled on individuals, either by 
 deed or will, for the lives of persons in being at 
 the execution of the deed, or the death of the 
 testator, and for 21 years afterwards, being an 
 average period of rather less than 70 years, but 
 no longer. It absolutely prohibits devises in 
 mortmain, and subjects conveyances in mortmain, 
 to restrictions intended, and very skilfully framed,
 
 23 
 
 for the express purpose of diminishing their fre- 
 quency : and by a strange anomaly, it ordains that 
 those mortmain appropriations, which it allows 
 still to be made, and those devises which were 
 made before the prohibition was enacted, and 
 which belong therefore to a class which it has 
 expressly stated to be mischievous, shall exist 
 for ever, unaltered in their objects and their 
 machinery. But all laws are of course intended 
 for the advantage, not of passed, but of pre- 
 sent and future generations. The wills and 
 conveyances of the dead, are, to a certain ex- 
 tent, to be respected, not because our obedience 
 or neglect will benefit or injure those whom the 
 grave has rendered unsusceptible of either ; but 
 partly because a testamentary power is an in- 
 ducement to industry and frugality ; and partly 
 because it is supposed, at least in this country, 
 that property is likely to be more beneficially 
 distributed by a testator, than by the general 
 rules of an Act of Parliament. 
 
 The former ground has nothing to do with the 
 present question. Industry and frugality would 
 not be sensibly diminished if all power to become
 
 24 
 
 the founder of a corporation were taken away. 
 The latter ground becomes obviously less appli- 
 cable as the period of posthumous power is 
 extended. A testator may be the best person 
 to decide how his former property shall be 
 enjoyed for twenty, or forty, or even seventy years 
 after his decease ; but we can scarcely conceive 
 his prescience to extend beyond a century. We 
 can scarcely conceive that we, who are now 
 living, are not better judges what application of 
 the revenues of a given estate will be best suited 
 to the wants of the present generation, than the 
 person who happened to possess that estate 500 
 years ago. The only plausible ground for giving 
 to a person, who gives or devises his estate to a 
 corporation, power to direct the specific appli- 
 cation of its revenues for a longer period than 
 when he settles it on individuals, is to promote 
 settlements in mortmain. It is said, that if we 
 interfere with such settlements at any period, 
 however remote from the decease of the testator, 
 they will cease to be made. But why, then, is 
 the Mortmain Act left unrepealed ? The pre- 
 amble of that act is in the following words : —
 
 25 
 
 *' Whereas alienations of lands, tenements, and 
 " hereditaments in mortmain are prohibited or 
 " restrained by Magna Charta, and divers other 
 " wholesome laws, as prejudicial to and against 
 " the common utility ; nevertheless this public 
 " mischief has of late greatly increased." For 
 remedy of which it absolutely prohibits devises 
 in mortmain, and subjects settlements in mortmain 
 to very strict regulations, all intended, and most 
 of them successful, in destroying the practice. 
 A greater absurdity cannot be imagined than to 
 submit to inconvenience, in order to encourage 
 dispositions in mortmain, and at the same time 
 to prohibit, or impede them by statute. 
 
 In the cases to which we have just alluded, 
 the existing individual interests are lawful. A 
 bishop has precisely the same right to the re- 
 venues of his see, which a landlord has to those 
 of his estate. But there are cases in which the 
 existing individual interests are unlawful : in 
 which the advantages derived by the owners for 
 the time being, are a breach or an evasion of 
 the law. 
 
 This is the case with respect to those corpora- 
 
 D
 
 26 
 
 tions, the members of which, though mere trustees 
 for the public, yet in violation of their duty, turn 
 their offices to their private advantage. Property 
 so abused belongs to the State, not merely in 
 reversion, subject to the existing life interests, 
 but in possession. The existing owners are 
 wrong-doers, and the injustice would consist not 
 in arresting, but in permitting, their unlawful 
 gains. 
 
 We have stated these principles at some length, 
 because it appears to us that an emergency has 
 now arrived at which they must be acted on, and 
 that in three different instances. 
 
 I. With respect to the Established Church of 
 Ireland. 
 
 II. With respect to Municipal Corporations. 
 
 J II. With respect to the Claims of the Dissen- 
 ters to Admission to the Universities. 
 
 We will consider these important subjects 
 separately. 
 
 I. With respect to the Established Church 
 of Ireland,
 
 27 
 
 When the property now possessed by the 
 Protestant Episcopal Church of Ireland was 
 appropriated to ecclesiastical purposes, the reli- 
 gion, the professors of which were thus en- 
 dowed, was the religion of the whole of the 
 population. The endowment was ample, but 
 not perhaps excessive. Our predecessors in Eng- 
 land and Ireland knew that religion was not one 
 of those things which may be safely left to be 
 regulated by the ordinary principles of demand 
 and supply. They knew that the religious in- 
 struction which is afforded only so far as it is 
 paid for, is not likely to be the best of its kind ; 
 that the priest who is to live by supplying 
 information and advice, is likely to sell that 
 information and that advice which are most to 
 the taste of his customers ; to flatter their pre- 
 judices, inflame their animosities, and prescribe 
 those conventional duties and observances, which 
 soothe the consciences and gratify the spiritual 
 pride of his hearers, but leave their worst 
 passions uncontrolled. And they felt, also 
 that as religious instruction, though necessary 
 to all, is most necessary, or to speak more
 
 y 
 
 28 
 
 correctly, is necessary in a greater amount, to 
 the poorest classes of the community, they 
 ought not to be exposed to the alternative of 
 going without it, or paying for it the same 
 price as is paid by their wealthier neighbours. 
 They felt that of all modes of taxation, a poll- 
 tax is the least equitable ; and that a clergy 
 living by the sale of their services, must, in 
 fact, be supported by a sort of poll-tax ; that 
 is, by a contribution bearing no reference to 
 the ability of the contributors. Wisely, there- 
 fore, and justly, they gave to the religious 
 instructors of the people an ample endowment ; 
 an endowment which enabled the teachers to 
 speak with authority and independence, and 
 the parishioners to demand their aid without 
 feeling that spiritual improvement was to be 
 obtained only at the sacrifice of wants less 
 important, but more obvious and more urgent: 
 and they supplied this endowment from the only 
 sources which at that early period were dis- 
 posable; partly by means of land, and partly 
 by tithes. To the bishops and chapters, who 
 were comparatively few, they gave large estates,
 
 29 
 
 which they could manage by their agents, and 
 yet derive a considerable revenue. Bat such an 
 endovi^ment was unfit for the parochial clergy. 
 At the early period to which we refer, farmers 
 and rent were almost unknown. Every estate was 
 cultivated at the expense and for the benefit of 
 its proprietor ; unless it was large enough to 
 support the expense of a bailiif or a steward, 
 he was forced to manage it himself. The num- 
 ber of the parochial clergy was necessarily so 
 large, that if each priest had had his estate, 
 it must have been too small to have been 
 managed by any body but himself, and its 
 management would have required his whole 
 time. Instead of estates, therefore, they en- 
 dowed the clergy with a portion of the produce 
 of the soil, to be taken by them free from the 
 expense of cultivation. In all this they followed 
 the plan which was adopted, and for nearly one 
 thousand years, retained over the whole of 
 Europe. 
 
 During the course, however, of centuries of 
 ignorance, the Christianity of the gospel was de- 
 formed and distorted by a mass of superstitions.
 
 30 
 
 Atnono- the most mischievous of these were the doc- 
 trines, that orthodox believers only are to be saved, 
 and that it is the duty of government to force all 
 its subjects to adopt that belief which it assumes 
 to be the true one. And these were among the 
 errors not detected by the early reformers. They 
 were as intolerant as their adversaries ; and, where 
 they had the power, propagated their own opi- 
 nions by persecution, as fiercely and as conscien- 
 tiously as the church of Rome. In England this 
 conduct was successful. The Reformation began 
 with the crown, and the people conformed to its 
 will. The property of the church was placed in the 
 hands of the professors of the reformed religion ; 
 and, as only a small minority rejected these doc- 
 trines, the endowments ot the church of England 
 were still devoted to their original purposes — 
 the religious instruction of the mass of the people. 
 The same course was attempted to be pursued 
 in Ireland. The sees and the benefices were 
 filled exclusively with Protestants ; protestant 
 forms of worship were enforced, and it was with- 
 out doubt expected that the doctrines of the 
 establishment would be adopted by the people.
 
 31 
 
 So preposterous an arrangement as a splendid 
 endowment for the smallest of the three sects that 
 divide the country, a very moderate endowment 
 for the next in point of numbers, and none at all 
 for the vast majority, was not contemplated by 
 those who established the present church ot Ire- 
 land ; and indeed never could have been seriously 
 contemplated by any judicious — we might say, 
 by any sane — legislator. 
 
 The experiment, however, failed ; and probably 
 failed in consequence of the very measures which 
 were devised for its attainment. The protestant 
 episcopal religion, associated in the minds of the 
 people with defeat and taxation, instead of the 
 progress for which it seems destined wherever 
 it. meets Catholicisni on the fair field of reason, 
 has lost ground day by day since its establish- 
 ment. It was then supposed to be embraced by 
 a third of the people : it is now probably con- 
 fined to about one seventh. Even Presbyterianism, 
 though of much more recent growth, probably 
 exceeds it ; and Catholicism has probably a 
 larger body, of educated believers, in Ireland, 
 than in any other portion of Europe.
 
 32 
 
 If, however, mere failure had been the only 
 result, although that failure had been, as it was, 
 most signal; if the attempt to bribe, or force, or 
 starve the Catholics into Protestants, had merely 
 ended in strengthening the religion which it was 
 intended to check, and discouraging that which 
 it meant to promote ; if these had been the only 
 results, it is probable that they would have at- 
 tracted little attention in England. If Ireland had 
 contained a well-paid protestant church, and a 
 contented catholic population, we might have 
 been struck by the anomaly, but should have made 
 no exertions to get rid of it. But it was not in 
 human nature that this should be the case. The 
 Catholics are suflferino^ both an insult and an in- 
 jury. The injury is, that of all the three denomi- 
 nations, Catholics, Protestant Episcopalians, and 
 Presbyterians, the Catholics alone, though by far 
 the most numerous, and by far the poorest, class, 
 are forced to support, and chiefly out of the low 
 earnings of labourers and cottiers, their own reli- 
 gious teachers. The insult is, that while their 
 own church is left totally without a provision, 
 a large endowment is employed to support a
 
 33 
 
 religion which they are taught to despise as 
 false, and to hate as that of their conquerors. 
 And, as is usual where there is both an insult 
 and an injury, their attention is so fixed on the 
 insult that they seem to have forgotten the in- 
 jury. They declaim against the protestant esta- 
 blishment, as if its mere presence did them harm. 
 As if the country would be the better for the 
 removal of tjhe only body of educated men who 
 can be forced by law, and by a law which has not 
 even the appearance of hardship, to inhabit it. 
 As if tithes were not a mere deduction from 
 rent, and as if they really belonged not to 
 the nation but to the landlords. They say little 
 of the absence of a catholic establishment, though 
 the great mass of the people must every day suffer 
 from the want of one. But, though this strange 
 state of things afforded such matter of agitation, 
 we heard little of it while the Catholics were de- 
 prived of political power. The instant that was 
 acquired, and in proportion as more and more of 
 it was acquired, their complaints became louder 
 and more successful. Their struggle for admis- 
 sion to the elective franchise, took more than a 
 
 E
 
 34 
 
 century ; but the instant that was done, any 
 political prophet might have safely predicted 
 the concession, not only of the claims which 
 they then made, but of all that they were 
 entitled to make. In about thirty years from 
 that time they became admissible to parliament, 
 subject to exclusion from the greater number of 
 boroughs by a franchise vested exclusively in 
 protestant corporators. In three years' time 
 that fence was removed, and Catholics formed, 
 for the first time since the days of Philip and 
 Mary, a real party in the English House of Com- 
 mons. They then complained that tithes are an 
 inconvenient mode of raising a revenue, and Lord 
 Stanley, as Irish Secretary, promised in parliament 
 their extinction. Emboldened by this success they 
 proceeded more directly to their real subject of 
 irritation ; and Mr. Ward, who, though perhaps 
 unconsciously, was virtually their organ for this 
 occasion, moved his celebrated resolution: "That 
 the protestant episcopal establishment in Ireland 
 exceeds the spiritual wants of the protestant 
 population ; and that, (it being the right of the 
 State to regulate the distribution of church
 
 35 
 
 property in such a manner as parliament may de- 
 termine,) it is the opinion of this House that the 
 temporal possessions of the Church of Ireland, as 
 now established by law, ought to be reduced." 
 
 It is well known how opposed the ministers of 
 the time were to the bringing forward this reso- 
 lution ; — some, because they were opposed to 
 the principle so obscurely enunciated in Mr. 
 Ward's parenthesis, " it being the right of the 
 State to regulate the distribution of church pro- 
 perty in such manner as parliament may deter- 
 mine ;" others, because they wished for clearer 
 and more trustworthy information respecting the 
 assumed excess of the protestant episcopal 
 establishment ; and all because they knew that 
 no measures founded on it could then be car- 
 ried through the House of Lords. But, not- 
 withstanding the opposition of the government, 
 including as it did Lord Stanley and his friends, 
 and the devoted resistance of Tories and High 
 Churchmen of every denomination, it was gene- 
 rally believed that the resolution would be carried 
 or defeated by so small and reluctant a majority 
 as to render certain its subsequent success in
 
 36 
 
 some slightly varied form. The government, 
 therefore, or rather those members of the then 
 government who approved of the principle in- 
 volved in Mr. Ward's parenthesis, though, in 
 the existing state of parties, and with our imper- 
 fect information as to the facts of the case, they 
 foresaw nothing but evil in the immediate adop- 
 tion of his resolution, issued a commission to 
 inquire into the relative numbers of the Pro- 
 testants and Catholics; and by means of this 
 commission, ensured the rejection of the reso- 
 lution. 
 
 Little is yet known of the result of the labours 
 of that commission ; but the little which we 
 have heard leads us to suspect that, as far as 
 the parochial establishment is concerned, it 
 exceeds the spiritual wants of the protestant 
 population in a less degree than is commonly 
 supposed. We suspect that a scattered protes- 
 tant population will be found in most parts of the 
 country, and that if the protestant establishment 
 is to be eventually suppressed only so far as it 
 is now needless, and the present parochial boun- 
 daries are to be maintained, the proportion of
 
 37 
 
 parishes in which it will be got rid of cannot be 
 large. But the episcopal establishment, even re- 
 duced as it has been, is obviously excessive. The 
 extent of a bishop's labours depends, in some 
 measure, on the number of the population under his 
 care. Now, each of the single dioceses of Chester 
 and London comprises a population of which the 
 portion that adheres to the Church of England 
 probably equals the whole protestant episcopalian 
 population of all Ireland. Yet we hear no 
 complaint of the inability of the bishop of either 
 of these sees to perform fully all the duties of his 
 office ; indeed, the two eminent prelates now filling 
 those sees, each of them devote much time and 
 attention to other subjects of great importance, 
 but unconnected with the business of their sees. 
 
 The number of benefices rendered necessary 
 by the irregular manner in which the protestant 
 population is dispersed, and the arduous nature 
 of episcopal duties in the present state of Ireland, 
 are grounds for assigning a greater number of 
 bishops to Ireland, than would be necessary for 
 the superintendance of an equal number of 
 English episcopalians. But it is not probable
 
 A 
 
 38 
 
 that it is necessary to have fourteen times as 
 many. 
 
 It must be recollected, however, that we 
 are speaking of Bishops as they now exist in 
 England and Ireland : men of high civil rank, 
 exercising considerable civil power, and enjoy- 
 ing large revenues : — revenues, far exceeding 
 those annexed to almost any civil offices. Of 
 functionaries such as these, we maintain that 
 there is now an excess in Ireland. And such 
 seems to be the opinion of many of the present 
 bishops, or they would not be so frequently 
 absent from Ireland, nnd to have been the 
 opinion of the Tories when in office, or they 
 would not have raised to the episcopal bench 
 so many inefficient persons. We are far from 
 affirming, or from believing, that it would 
 not be advisable to retain the present, or 
 even to appoint a greater number of bishops, 
 for ecclesiastical purposes only. But for such 
 purposes it is not necessary that they should 
 possess the revenues or hold the civil station 
 of the present bishops. Indeed, those revenues 
 and that station raise them so much above
 
 39 
 
 their clergy, as to prevent that familiar inter- 
 course which would enable them to afford 
 constant and useful advice and superintendence. 
 If the dioceses were diminished in extent, 
 and therefore trebled or quadrupled in num- 
 ber^ and the best living that is at the dis- 
 position of the government in each diocese 
 were annexed to the bishopric, a portion only of 
 the present episcopal endowment would provide 
 a far more useful episcopal establishment : and 
 two archbishops would be enough to represent 
 in Parliament the Protestant episcopalian church 
 of Ireland. 
 
 It appears clear, therefore, that Mr. Ward's 
 first proposition is true, and that the present 
 endowment of the protestant episcopalian church 
 of Ireland exceeds the sum necessary for the 
 spiritual wants of its members. And those 
 must be little aware of the feelings of the 
 people of this country who believe that, when 
 a palpable misapplication of the national pro- 
 perty has been exposed, it can be allowed to 
 remain unredressed. No ministry can stand 
 that resolves to maintain for ever, and in their
 
 40 
 
 full integrity, the revenues of the Established 
 Church in Ireland. It may be said, how- 
 ever, that the surplus v^hich v^ill accrue from 
 the prospective reduction of the episcopal reve- 
 nues may be applied to purposes of education. 
 Undoubtedly it may, and we trust that it will, 
 be so applied. But it must be to the educa- 
 tion of the great body of the people, not to 
 the education of a small minority. The great, 
 the apparently insuperable difficulty of provid- 
 ing a religious and moral education — and no 
 other system of instruction can be called edu- 
 cation — in which both Catholics and Protestants 
 can participate, has been solved by the appoint- 
 ment of the present Education Board — a bless- 
 ing for which Ireland is indebted to a Whig 
 ministry, and which, from the admirable man- 
 ner in which it has already worked, even in 
 its infancy, and counteracted by every form 
 of factious and fanatical opposition, appears 
 likely to be the greatest instrument of improve- 
 ment that she has as yet received from the 
 imperial government. But this, or any other 
 application of the surplus revenue in question,
 
 41 
 
 to purposes not exclusively protestant, is obvi- 
 ously a fundamental change in its present des- 
 tination. It can be defended only on the 
 principle which we have stated at so much 
 length, that subject to the existing vested and 
 lawful interests, mortmain property is national 
 property, and that it is the right, and even 
 the duty of the legislature, to provide that it 
 shall be used in the mode most conducive to 
 the general welfare of the community. 
 
 II. The next subject to which this principle 
 must be applied, is that of Municipal Corporations. 
 Our readers must be aware that corporate bodies 
 exist in every part of the kingdom, created and 
 endowed, not for the benefit of the corporators 
 for the time being, but for purposes of local 
 administration and improvement, coupled fre- 
 quently with the distribution of charity. In 
 many cases the objects contemplated in the ori- 
 ginal foundation have become, in the lapse of 
 time, wholly or partially useless ; and in many 
 others, in consequence of the absence of control 
 and superintendence, the funds are misapplied, 
 sometimes to promote the pecuniary interests of 
 
 F
 
 , 42 
 
 the governing body in the corporation ; some- 
 times to augment their local influence, especially 
 in the election of members of the house of com- 
 mons ; and sometimes by an expenditure which, 
 though not absolutely corrupt, is positively or 
 comparatively inexpedient. Until the Reform Bill 
 had passed, these evils v^^ere irremediable. The 
 povrer of the corporations in the House of Com- 
 mons, and the sympathy which exists between all 
 those who profit by abuses, even when different in 
 kind, rendered hopeless the attempt to correct, or 
 even fully to expose, any mal- administration, 
 however glaring. A stronger proof could not 
 be given than the case of the corporation 
 of Leicester. Now, however, that power has 
 changed hands, and that the House of Com- 
 mons again consists of the representatives of 
 the people, the sympathy of that house runs in 
 an opposite direction. The majority of any 
 house that can be elected, until the Reform Act 
 has been repealed, must be constituted, not as 
 formerly of the friends to abuses, but of those 
 who are willing, and indeed eager, to remedy 
 them. The country requires, and the House
 
 43 
 
 of Commons will demand, that the Corporation 
 Inquiry be completed, and the results of that 
 inquiry acted on; and that the large property 
 and extensive powers possessed by the corpora- 
 tions shall be employed in the modes which, 
 after a full investigation, shall appear most con- 
 ducive to the real welfare of those for whom 
 they are trustees. 
 
 III. A third point in which the State is 
 now required to interfere in the application of 
 mortmain property, respects the claims of the 
 Dissenters, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, 
 to admission to the Universities. At Cambridge, 
 they are now tacitly permitted to enter, and even 
 to be examined for degrees, but not to take them. 
 At Oxford, they are not allowed to enter. The 
 Dissenters require that parliament should inter- 
 fere, and render them capable of taking degrees 
 at Cambridge, and of entering, being examined, 
 and taking degrees at Oxford. They do not 
 require that it should be imperative on the 
 heads of houses in either University to receive 
 them. They merely ask for such an alteration 
 in the statutes of the two Universities, as may
 
 u 
 
 enable them to receive the benefit of the instruc- 
 tion and degrees which those bodies supply, so 
 far as the heads of houses may think fit to 
 receive them. It is admitted that compliance 
 with this request would be no diversion of the 
 revenues of the Universities from their original 
 purposes. The Universities were in fact founded 
 for the benefit of Catholics ; and so were the 
 greater part of the colleges. To compel those 
 colleges which were expressly founded for 
 the benefit of the Church of England to admit 
 persons of any other persuasion, would no 
 doubt be such a diversion; but no such com- 
 pulsion is proposed. All that is asked is, an 
 alteration of the statutes, not of the colleges, 
 but of the Universities. It is admitted that the 
 Universities themselves could do this, which of 
 course they could not do, if it were a change 
 of the purposes to which their revenues were 
 destined by their founders. But they will not 
 do it. The interference of parliament is there- 
 fore necessary. It is refused because it is an 
 invasion of corporate rights : because, in the 
 words of Mr. Secretary Goulburn, it would be
 
 45 
 
 an absolute violation of the laws of pt'ope?'ty : 
 because the Universities are irresponsible bodies, 
 with the application of whose revenues the 
 legislature cannot interfere, even though the 
 object of that interference be to forward the 
 purposes of the original institution. 
 
 This is carrying the rights of corporations 
 further than they ever were carried before. It 
 is not merely a denial of the principle that the 
 property of corporations is the property of the 
 State, but it is an affirmation of the monstrous 
 proposition that their endowment is their own, 
 as fully as Blenheim is the property of the Duke 
 of Marlborough : that it is their own for all 
 purposes but actual sale. 
 
 On this point also the opposition will fail. 
 The Bill for the admission of Dissenters to the 
 Universities was carried in the House of Com- 
 mons by a majority, second only to those obtained 
 on the Poor Law Amendment Bill. It cannot 
 often be rejected by the House of Lords. When 
 a powerful party requires an act of mere justice, 
 all experience shows that it will succeed. 
 
 We have considered together these three ques-
 
 46 
 
 tions: — the application of tlie surplus revenue of 
 the Established Church in Ireland, the reform of 
 Municipal Corporations, and the opening of the 
 Universities to Dissenters, both because they all 
 involve the admission or rejection of the great 
 principle, that property in mortmain is the pro- 
 perty of the State, and because they are among 
 the first measures with which Sir Robert Peel's 
 government must deal. 
 
 If he refuses them, he will have the support of 
 the Ultra-Tories ; and, on one of these points only, 
 of Lord Stanley and his friends. But he will be 
 opposed by every other party in the house. He 
 will fail, and fail under the weight of an over- 
 whelming majority ; a majority which will force 
 him to resign. The hostile majority of the new 
 house may perhaps, and it is only a perhaps, be 
 somewhat diminished in numbers ; but it will 
 still be amply sufficient to force his resignation. 
 At the lowest computation, it cannot be less than 
 a majority of 100; and that majority will be far 
 more vehemently hostile than the late one. The 
 late house consisted in a great measure, of dis- 
 ciplined troops, accustomed to the courtesies of
 
 47 
 
 civilized warfare. The opposition, though differ- 
 ino- in many points from Sir Robert Peel, respected 
 his character, his knowledge, and his talents. The 
 majority, for it will be a majority, that will be 
 arrayed against him in the present house, will 
 contain many more men of violent opinions and 
 violent manners; men who will add personal to 
 political enmity. — In the late house, he must 
 have failed, if he had attempted to act on Ultra- 
 Tory principles ; but his failure after the dis- 
 solution will be more painful in its progress, 
 and less remediable in its consequences. And 
 he will have subjected the country not merely 
 to the ordinary evils of a premature dissolution 
 and election, but to an election in a period of 
 popular excitement ; when, as the friends of the 
 ministry themselves complain, the voice of sober 
 reason is least heard. An election at such a crisis 
 must fill the House of Commons with precisely 
 those persons who are least fitted to perform their 
 high functions ; persons from the two extremes. 
 The dissolution will have the effect which almost 
 always follows when great public measures are 
 intended to gratify the caprice or the interests of
 
 48 
 
 individuals, that of materially increasing the 
 difficulty of carrying on the government, to 
 whatever hands confided. But its consequences 
 will fall, as they ought to do, in the first instance, 
 and most severely, on the authors and the accom- 
 plices of the mischief. 
 
 But it is supposed by some that Sir Robert 
 Peel will support all these measures; that he will 
 reform the Irish Church, and the municipal cor- 
 porations, and throw open the Universities. 
 
 We have no such expectation. 
 
 In the first place, we believe Sir Robert Peel 
 to be an honourahle man. We believe that when 
 he proclaimed the injustice as well as the inex- 
 pediency of applying any portion of the revenues 
 of the Established Church in Ireland, to any pur- 
 pose but that of the spiritual instruction of the 
 members of that church, when he trusted that 
 the people of this country would always contend 
 for the inviolability of the revenues of the Irish 
 Church, he expressed his real sentiments. We 
 believe that when he declared that no modifica- 
 tion which the bill for enabling the admission of 
 the Dissenters to the Universities, might or could
 
 49 
 
 receive, would reconcile him to the principle 
 recognized by it, he spoke from real conviction. 
 And it is obvious, that in consistency with these 
 opinions he must maintain the impropriety of 
 parliamentary interference with any corporate 
 property whatever. In the second place, we 
 believe him to be a prudent man. He must be 
 aware that no man can with impunity appear 
 twice^ and upon important questions, to change 
 his opinions in favour of his interests. It is 
 possible, and Sir Robert Peel is a signal instance 
 of its possibility, that such conduct may for once 
 be susceptible of explanation, or at least of for- 
 giveness ; but woe to the politician, or to the 
 man, who hazards it ao;:ain ! 
 
 It is unnecessary, nowever, to speculate further 
 on Sir Robert Peel's intentions, if his own 
 declaration of them is to be trusted. He has 
 treated all these questions in his recent address 
 to the electors of Tamworth. The language 
 which he has used is, indeed, vague — probably 
 intentionally so ; but it is sufficiently explicit 
 to indicate his views. As the least urgent ques- 
 tion, he begins by municipal corporations, and 
 
 G
 
 50 
 
 promises— to consider it. Le Roi s'avisera. The 
 admission of the Dissenters to the Universities 
 he opposes, but in order to diminish the evil of 
 denying them degrees, he proposes to destroy 
 the exclusive value of those degrees. " As to 
 *' the great question of Church Reform," he 
 proceeds, *' I have no new professions to make. 
 I cannot give my consent to the alienation of 
 " church property in any part of the United 
 ** Kingdom from strictly ecclesiastical purposes. 
 " I repeat now the opinions that I have already 
 " expressed in Parliament in regard to the 
 " Church Establishment in Ireland, that if by 
 " an improved distribution of the revenues of 
 " the Church, its just influence can be extended, 
 " and the true interests of the established religion 
 *' promoted, all other considerations shall be made 
 " subordinate to the advancement of objects of 
 " such paramount importance." By strictly eccle- 
 siastical purposes, of course, are meant the pur- 
 poses of the Established Church. Sir Robert Peel 
 adheres, as all but his personal enemies, if he 
 have any, must have hoped, "to the opinions that 
 he has already expressed in Parliament in regard
 
 51 
 
 to the Church Establishment in Ireland ;" that is 
 to say, he adheres to the inviolability of its re- 
 venues. And adhering to them, he must cease 
 to be a minister within two months after the meet- 
 ing of the House of Commons. 
 
 But let us admit, merely for purposes of argu- 
 ment, that all this is mere trick, — that the 
 address to the electors of Tamworth is a coun- 
 terpart of the Letter to Dr. Curtis, — and that in 
 the course of the next two months, Sir Robert 
 Peel will discover the justice, or at Isast the 
 expediency, of carrying all that he now declares 
 he cannot consent to. 
 
 It may seem that this is all which those who 
 are not partisans, those whose object is good 
 government, without caring from whom they 
 receive it, can require ; and, therefore, that 
 although such an attempt would deprive Sir 
 Robert Peel of the aid of the Tories and of Lord 
 Stanley's friends, it ought to give him that of all 
 the independent members of the house. The 
 obvious objection to this view, and it appears to 
 us a decisive objection, is, that it would counte- 
 nance a degree of political immorality, which in
 
 52 
 
 no state of society it would be safe, and in our 
 own it would be fatal, to sanction. 
 
 As the opinion which we have just expressed 
 involves the question, under what circumstances, 
 and how far, political inconsistency is a sufficient 
 ground for rejecting the services of a public man, 
 it may be worth while to examine that subject at 
 some length. When a statesman supports a 
 measure which he formerly opposed, his conduct 
 may be accounted for on any one of the three 
 following suppositions : — 1. An intervening 
 change in public affairs. 2. Error. 3. Interest. 
 It may happen, and indeed must happen fre- 
 quently, that such a change has occurred in 
 public affairs, since the period of his opposition, 
 as to render beneficial what would previously 
 have been injurious. When no such change 
 in the circumstances of the case has occurred, 
 the supposed alteration of conduct must neces- 
 sarily be attributed to mere personal causes. 
 It must be attributed either to Error, or to 
 Interest. He may admit that his former oppo- 
 sition was a mistake, and that he has been sub- 
 sequently convinced, by facts of which he was
 
 53 
 
 not then aware, or by arguments which he had 
 not then sufficiently considered. But if this 
 explanation be not offered, or be not accepted, the 
 only remaining solution is, that interest, (using 
 that word as comprehending not only pecuniary 
 interest, but the acquisition or retention of power, 
 or fame, or popularity, or the gratification of 
 party friendship, or of party enmity,) was the 
 motive, either of the former opposition or of the 
 present advocacy. 
 
 A chano:e of conduct, which is accounted 
 for by the first of these three suppositions, 
 namely, by a change in the circumstances of 
 the case, cannot be called an inconsistency. 
 The real inconsistency would lie in persisting 
 in a course for which the motive had ceased. With 
 respect to the second supposition, the degree 
 in which a public man's reputation, for know- 
 ledge and intelligence, ought to suffer from his 
 defending his present conduct, by acknowledging 
 that he was formerly mistaken, is subject to no 
 general rule. If the matter was not one of such 
 importance as to have required his earnest 
 attention, or the facts or reasonings which now
 
 54 
 
 show him to have been in error were not then 
 before the public, he is readily excused. Lord 
 Grenville did not sink in public estimation when 
 he confessed that the support which, during the 
 whole of his political life, he had given to loans 
 for the purpose of supporting a Sinking Fund, 
 was founded in error. That it was so founded 
 has been demonstrated ; but it was not suspected 
 by any one, when that most absurd system 
 of finance was first adopted. But if the ques- 
 tion at issue was of great importance, and if all 
 the facts and arguments, necessary for its 
 decision, were notorious, a statesman who is 
 forced to acknowledsre that he erred from io-no- 
 ranee of those facts, or neglect or incapacity of 
 understanding those reasonings, may make a 
 useful subaltern, but can scarcely maintain the 
 post of a leader. The last of the three sup- 
 posable causes, namely, that the measure in 
 question was formerly opposed, or is now sup- 
 ported, from interested motives, is one which few 
 men will venture to avow. In a sound state of 
 public morality, such conduct would exclude 
 from confidence and from power every person
 
 55 
 
 convicted of it. In the present state of feeling 
 in England such an imputation, though always 
 felt as an objection to the man who is stained 
 by it, is not considered a decisive objection, 
 unless the matter with respect to which it 
 occurred was one of great public importance. 
 So much latitude is allowed to faction, there is 
 so much sympathy with party affection and 
 party hatred, so little of public spirit is hoped 
 for from public men, that in comparatively 
 trifling measures, when introduced by a political 
 adversary, to have knowingly opposed what was 
 right, is considered a venial offence. But loose 
 as our morality is, we have not yet gone so far 
 as to sanction such conduct with respect to those 
 few questions on the right decision of which the 
 welfare of the community depends ; and as 
 public morality is, on the whole, improving, 
 we believe that it never will be sanctioned. 
 If our belief were otherwise, we should indeed 
 despair of the prospects of the country. The 
 conduct which only disgusts in a demagogue 
 would be ruinous in a minister. 
 
 We will now endeavour to apply these prin- 
 ciples to the subjects immediately before us.
 
 56 
 
 The great questions which we have been consi- 
 dering, are matters of the utmost importance, 
 not only to the welfare, but to the existence of 
 the empire. No event has taken place since 
 they were last before parliament in the slightest 
 degree affecting them. Nothing new has been 
 discovered respecting either the facts of the 
 case, or the inferences to be deduced from them. 
 If Sir Robert Peel should now support those 
 measures which, in the last session, he so 
 resolutely resisted, he cannot plead, in justifi- 
 cation, that the circumstances of the case are 
 changed, or, in mitigation of punishment, that 
 he was formerly mistaken. He had before him 
 all the materials for coming to a right deci- 
 sion, and no one imputes to him intellectual 
 deficiency. It must be admitted, tacitly or 
 expressly, that either his former resistance, or 
 his subsequent concession, was founded on 
 interest ; that he knowingly and intentionally, 
 and on matters of the utmost importance, sacri- 
 ficed the country to his party or to himself. 
 And we repeat, that to sanction such conduct 
 would be fatal. 
 
 It would sanction the opinion that, in poli-
 
 57- 
 
 tical warfare, faith is not to be kept with the 
 country, with enemies, or even with friends : that 
 even amons; the leaders, on one side at least of 
 the house, the debates are a solemn show, in 
 which the adores fabulce wear the dresses and 
 repeat the speeches which the nature of the plot, 
 and the rules of the stage, require ; but as 
 soon as a new piece begins, have nothing to 
 do with the characters which they supported 
 in the former one. It would proclaim, that a 
 man making the strongest protestations of his 
 sincerity, may oppose, as a sacred duty, measures 
 which he knows to be not only expedient, but 
 essential; may drive, by his opposition, a part of 
 the country to the brink of civil war; and, the 
 instant he has succeeded in turning out the pro- 
 posers of those measures, may introduce them 
 himself, and then receive, and from the very per- 
 sons whom he has forced out, support and power as 
 his reward. No nation could hope for public 
 spirit, or even common honesty, from its servants, 
 if it were thus to remunerate falsehood and 
 faction. 
 
 But another contingency seems to exist. It 
 
 H
 
 5S 
 
 seems possible that the present government, 
 though not venturing to give assistance, or even 
 consent, to these measures, may yet determine, 
 and be permitted, to hold office while they are 
 passed, and after they are passed ; in short, 
 that we may recur to the system of " the Tories 
 in place and the Whigs in power ;" the Treasury 
 benches filled by his Majesty's ministers, and 
 the measures carried by his Majesty's opposition. 
 This would be possible, if the majority of the 
 Lords sympathized with the majority of the 
 Commons. But it is well known, that on these 
 points, as, indeed, on many others, the two 
 houses are directly opposed. The consequences 
 of this opposition, and the mode by which it 
 must be got rid of, we shall consider in a sub- 
 sequent part of this Essay. It is sufficient for 
 our present purpose to state, that while this 
 opposition between the two houses continues, 
 the House of Commons will be unable to effect 
 any liberal measures without the active aid of 
 the ministry for the time being. To bring in, 
 discuss, commit, amend, recommit, and pass a 
 bill for the reform of the Irish Church, with the
 
 59 
 
 absolute certainty of its scornful rejection as soon 
 as it had passed the lobby, would be a mere 
 waste of time and irritation. The system of 
 government to which we have referred never was 
 good ; but with the Reform Bill it ceased to oe 
 practicable. Unless the Commons are ready to 
 throw the country, bound hand and foot, before 
 the present Ultra-Tory majority of the Lords, 
 they must insist on the appointment of a ministry 
 willing and able to control that majority. 
 
 But even supposing none of these insurmoun- 
 able objections to exist, and the new ministry 
 to be personally unexceptionable, there are cir- 
 cumstances connected with their appointment 
 which must deprive them of the support of those 
 who wish to consult the permanent interests 
 of the country. 
 
 It has for many years been admitted, that a 
 minister, though appointed by the Crown, and 
 nominally subject to be dismissed jnero motu 
 regis, without warning or explanation, really 
 holds his office at the will, not of the Crown, 
 but of the two houses of parliament. He might 
 be disliked by the court, he might be unpalatable
 
 60 
 
 to the king, it might be his duty, indeed, to 
 take steps which would necessarily produce one 
 or both of these results ; but while he retained the 
 confidence of the houses of parliament, he was, 
 according to the doctrine which prevailed until 
 the 15th of last November, secure. And the ne- 
 cessity of this principle is obvious. If a minister 
 held office at the caprice of the court, the court, 
 not parliament, would be the field on which 
 the battles for power would be fought. The 
 arts which succeed in courts, and the measures 
 which please courts, would be the arts and the 
 measures adopted. Despotic governments and 
 constitutional governments have each their pecu- 
 liar merits and their peculiar inconveniencies ; but 
 this would be a mode of uniting the faults of 
 both : the slow and cumbersome machinery of the 
 one, and the ignorance, prejudices, corruption, 
 and vacillation of the other. Even in despotisms, 
 where public opinion has acquired any force, 
 deference to that opinion prevents any capricious 
 change. " C'est moi," said Louis XV., " qui 
 nomme les ministres, mais c'est la nation qui 
 les renvoie.''
 
 .6] 
 
 Those whom tliis reasoning does not convince, 
 may, perhaps, yield to the authority of Mr. Burke. 
 That acute observer, after dwelling on the neces- 
 sity that a minister should be connected not 
 only with the interests, but with the sentiments 
 and opinions of the people, adds, in words which 
 we might now adopt, " These are considerations 
 " which, in my opinion, enforce the necessity of 
 " havino;- some better reason in a free country 
 *• and a free parliament for supporting the minis- 
 " ters of the crown, than that short one, ' That 
 " the King has thought proper to appoint them.^ 
 " There is something very courtly in this ; but 
 " it is a principle pregnant with all sorts of 
 " mischief, in a constitution like ours, to turn 
 " the views of active men from the country to 
 " the court. Whatever be the road to power, 
 " that is the road which will be trod. If the 
 " opinion of the country be of no use as a 
 *' means of power or consideration, the qualities 
 " which usually procure that opinion will be no 
 " longer cultivated. And whether it be right in 
 " a State so popular in its constitution as ours, 
 *' to leave ambition without popular motives, and
 
 62 
 
 '' to trust all to the operation of pure virtue in 
 " the minds of kings, and ministers, and public 
 " men, must be submitted to the judgment and 
 " good sense of the people of England. — When 
 ** a ministry rests upon public opinion, it is not 
 " indeed built upon a rock of adamant ; it has, 
 " however, some stability : but when it stands 
 " upon private humour, its structure is of stubble, 
 " and its foundation is on a quicksand. I repeat 
 " it again — he that supports every administration 
 " subverts all government. The reason is this : 
 *' the whole business in which a court usually 
 " takes an interest goes on at present equally 
 " well in whatever hands, whether high or low, 
 " wise or foolish, scandalous or reputable ; there 
 " is nothing, therefore, to hold it firm to any 
 " one body of men, or to any one consistent 
 " scheme of politics. Nothing interposes to pre- 
 " vent the full operation of all the caprices, and 
 " all the passions of a court upon the servants of 
 " the public. The system of administration is open 
 " to continual shocks and changes upon the prin- 
 " ciples of the meanest cabal, and the most coti- 
 " temptible intrigue Nothing can be solid or
 
 63 
 
 " permanent. All good men at length fly with 
 " horror from such a service. Men of rank and 
 " ability, with the spirit which ought to animate 
 " such men in a free State, while they decline the 
 " jurisdiction of dark cabal on their actions and 
 " their fortunes, will, for both, cheerfully put 
 " themselves upon their country. They will trust 
 " an inquisitive and distinguishing parliament, be- 
 " cause it does inquire and does distinguish. If 
 " they act well, they know that in such a parliament 
 *' they will be supported against any intrigue : if 
 " they act ill, they know that no intrigue can 
 " protect them. This situation, however awful, 
 " is honourable. But in one hour, without any 
 *' assigned or assignable cause, to be j)i'ecipitated 
 ^^ from the highest authority to the most marked 
 " neglect, is a situation full of danger, and des- 
 " titute of honour. It will be shunned equally 
 " by every man of prudence, and every man of 
 " spirit."* 
 
 It is to be added, that if ihis principle is to be 
 abandoned ; if the king is to be at liberty, merely 
 
 * Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents. — 
 Burke's Works, Vol. II. Pp. 265—326.
 
 64 
 
 because he thinks his own opinion better than 
 that of the nation speaking through its represen- 
 tatives, to dismiss a government which enjoys the 
 full confidence of the House of Commons ; if he 
 is at liberty to do this at his own personal plea- 
 sure; this absurdity follows, that his Majesty can 
 act without a responsible adviser in one point, 
 and on one point only, that point being the most 
 important one which he ever can have to consider. 
 The question, who is responsible ? — for some one 
 must be responsible — for the sudden and total 
 dismissal of a ministry, has not been decided 
 since our constitution assumed its present form, 
 because in fact it has not been necessary to raise 
 it. A parliamentary vote or a resignation has 
 preceded every previous change. It has now 
 been raised, and painful as the discussion is, 
 it must be decided. It must be decided not 
 with reference merely to the present emergency, 
 not as a party or temporary question, but as one 
 of permanent constitutional law. 
 
 The king of course is not responsible. Royal 
 responsibility is inconsistent with monarchical 
 o^overnment. Of course, too, it would be absurd
 
 65 
 
 to fix the responsibility on those persons who may 
 be supposed to have had private access to his 
 Majesty's ear. The country does not recognize 
 such advisers, either for good or for evil. The 
 domestic comfort and privacy of the sovereign 
 require that those who, filling no political office, 
 are familiarly about his person, should be consi- 
 dered to be, as in reality it is their duty to be, 
 unconnected with politics. The only persons, 
 on whom this responsibility can naturally, or 
 usefully, or even practically, fall, are those who 
 are to profit by the act in question, the im- 
 mediate successors of the dismissed adminis- 
 tration. If it be once understood that, whether 
 really consulted or not, they are to oe considered 
 as having advised the measure which, by their 
 acquiescence, they have adopted, and that no 
 administration, for whom a vacancy has been 
 made by a court intrigue, or Dy mere personal 
 predilections or dislikes, or by caprice, or, in 
 short, on any ground of which parliament 
 does not recognize the sufficiency, however per- 
 sonally eligible, will receive parliamentary sup- 
 port, we shall return to our esiablished system, 
 
 1
 
 66 
 
 and the events of last November will be only a 
 warning. 
 
 If, on the other hand, the present attempt 
 is acquiesced in, it will be a precedent, and 
 a precedent of more than even its apparent 
 force. It will be a precedent which will at least 
 begin by bringing us back to the times of the 
 Stuarts. The organs of the present ministry 
 have been forced to speak out on this subject : 
 they have been forced to declare, that " although 
 " before the Reform Bill, the House of Commons 
 " did in practice apparently exercise a veto upon 
 " the appointment of the ministers of the Crown, 
 " the Reform Bill," (by diminishing the influence 
 of the Crown and the aristocracy in the House 
 of Commons,) " has brought us back to the 
 *' theory of the constitution, the power of the 
 " King in choosing his advisers as imrestrained 
 " as that of the House of Commons in arranging 
 ** the order of its proceedings — the reciprocal 
 " independence of the three branches of he 
 ** legislature."* 
 
 This, then, is the manner in which the 
 * Standard, Monday, Jan. 12, 1836.
 
 67 
 
 Tories propose to work the Reform Bill. This 
 is Sir Robert Peel's " final and irrevocable 
 " settlement of a great constitutional ques- 
 " tion." The influence given to the people 
 in the House of Commons is to be neu- 
 tralized, indeed, much more than neutralized, 
 by depriving that house of all control over the 
 other branches of the legislature. The King is 
 to have the same unrestrained, unquestioned 
 power of appointing, dismissing, and changing 
 the whole body of public functionaries, which 
 the House of Commons has of decidincr whether 
 it will take motions or petitions for its twelve 
 o'clock sittings. We are to return to the reign 
 of prerogative. The King is, of course (for that 
 is equally within the forms of the constitution), 
 to refuse his assent to any bill which may dis- 
 please him. The Commons (for that is also the 
 theory of the constitution) are to commence the 
 session by a statement of their grievances, and 
 postpone the grant of supplies until his Majesty 
 has been pleased to redress those grievances. The 
 three branches are to act independently. The 
 great edifice of parliamentary government, which
 
 68 
 
 it has taken centuries to build up, and which we 
 fondly thought that the Reform Bill had rendered 
 complete, but which even without that bill, was 
 supposed to be, at least, secure, is to be destroyed, 
 because that bill has diminished the influence 
 of the Crown and the aristocracy in the House 
 of Commons. When the anti-reform majo- 
 rity of the House of Lords allowed, by their 
 secession, that bill to pass, the country little 
 thouo^ht what was their mental reservation. 
 Without relying much on their prudence, it still 
 did not suspect them of so insane a scheme as 
 that of making amends for the Reform Bill by 
 setting up prerogative against the people, and 
 throwing us back, by a recurrence to what they 
 choose to call the theory of the constitution, to 
 the state of things which preceded the events 
 of 1643. 
 
 In justice to our adversaries, we must admit 
 that this desperate defence is forced upon them. 
 They would have much preferred that, instead of 
 addressing the King " on the exercise of his 
 undoubted prerogative," they had had no such 
 congratulations to offer. They felt the danger of
 
 69 
 
 assuming such a position, and evaded it, as long 
 as evasion vi^as possible, by every sort of artifice 
 and falsehood. First, they declared that Lord 
 Melbourne resigned, then that he admitted the 
 impossibility of going on, then that, at least, 
 he confessed that his administration was falling 
 to pieces through internal dissensions. And 
 it is only when all these pretences have been 
 swept away, that they take refuge in the Gothic 
 citadel of prerogative, and turn against the 
 country, and in the nineteenth century, the wea- 
 pons forged by the Tudors and the Plantagenets. 
 
 It may be asked then, what was the Duke 
 of Wellington to do when he was summoned 
 from the hunting-field at Strathfieldsay, and 
 the King threw himself on his loyalty? Was 
 he to refuse to aid the King in his diffi- 
 culties ? 
 
 Unquestionably it was his duty so to refuse. 
 
 It was his duty to say, not in words, but in 
 substance, " Four months ago, your Majesty 
 appointed Lord Melbourne your minister. The 
 country approved of the choice, and nothing 
 has occurred to diminish its approbation. I
 
 70 
 
 cannot be a party to any change which has 
 even the appearance of having originated in 
 intrigue, or caprice, or in any personal feelings 
 whatsoever." 
 
 It will be the duty of the houses of par- 
 liament to say " We will not bind on our 
 necks, and on those of our posterity, a yoke 
 from which the country has worked itself 
 free. We will not abandon the trust which 
 the practice of the constitution has reposed 
 in us of deciding by what party the govern- 
 ment shall be carried on." 
 
 It is now the duty of the electors, since 
 Sir Robert Peel is blind enough to appeal 
 to them, to proclaim, '^ We will return those 
 men, and those men only, who will maintain 
 their station as representatives of the people. 
 We have not broken the chains of an oligarchy 
 to put on those of a court. We will not 
 sanction a single step towards a return to 
 those unhappy times, when the sovereign was 
 the real minister, and placed and displaced 
 at pleasure, the puppets who bore the name." 
 
 It appears, therefore, that, under any combi-
 
 71 
 
 nation of circumstances, the present adminis- 
 tration cannot stand. It can stand only on 
 these suppositions. First, that the present 
 ministers are willing to sacrifice all the reputa- 
 tion and the self-respect which alone can 
 render the toils of office endurable : secondly, 
 that the country is willing to sanction a degree 
 of political profligacy, which even the tools of a 
 despotism would not venture : and, thirdly, that 
 the monstrous doctrine is to be admitted, that 
 no one is responsible for the most dangerous 
 of all possible exertions of the Royal prerogative, 
 the unforeseen and total, and, unless indeed its 
 popular measures w^ere the provocation, the un- 
 provoked, dismissal of a popular administration. 
 Any one of these objections would be fatal : 
 What then must be the effect of their combi- 
 nation? The arduous question is, therefore, 
 forced upon us, On what terms are their 
 successors to take office ? 
 
 It is obvious that they cannot accept it sim- 
 pliciter, without pledge or condition, subject to 
 be summarily ejected, while apparently possess- 
 ing the full confidence of the crown, and of the
 
 72 
 
 people, without even a pretext that will bear a 
 moment's discussion. Some pledge must be 
 given, and it must be more than a mere nominal 
 pledge: it must consist of something more than 
 mere words, which four months after may be for- 
 gotten or explained away, or disavowed. It 
 must be a pledge, deriving its force, not from 
 the giver, but from the thing given. It must be 
 a pledge, not merely promising the means of 
 good government, but actually affording them. 
 
 Our readers must at once acknowledge that 
 only one such pledge is possible, and that is, 
 a majority in the House of Lords. It is now 
 admitted, indeed it has long been obvious to 
 every impartial observer, that ever since the 
 passing of the Reform Bill the hostile majority 
 in the lords has been the great obstacle to mea- 
 sures of improvement, and even of safety. While 
 that majority continues virtually impregnable, 
 it is the master of the administration, the House 
 of Commons, and the country. Even Sir R. 
 Peel, at the late Mansion-house dinner, promised 
 the redress of only those abuses which can 
 be remedied, " consistently xvith the independent
 
 73 
 
 action of the House of Lords'' Of what use is 
 the expensive farce of elections, debates, and 
 votes, if a small, compact, irresponsible, and 
 practically unalterable body, can oppose, and 
 for ever maintain, a peremptory veto? if the 
 House of Lords is the ultimate court of appeal, 
 not only on civil but on political matters, before 
 whose tribunal the Commons are allowed indeed 
 to debate every question, but without power to 
 influence the judgment ? 
 
 It may be said, perhaps, that such a state of 
 things cannot be fundamentally wrong, since it 
 is, in fact, the ancient constitution of the country; 
 the constitution under which we have prospered 
 for centuries. It may be said that the mutual 
 independence of the two houses is so thoroughly 
 of the essence of our institutions, that there is 
 only one instance on record, in which it has been 
 broken in upon, and the submission of the lords 
 avowedly forced by a creation of peers. 
 
 The answer is, that since the time that parlia- 
 mentary, instead of monarchical, government be- 
 came the real constitution of this country, no such 
 mutual independence has existed. The lords have
 
 74 
 I 
 
 in fact been independent of the commons, because 
 the commons have been dependent on the lords. 
 The influence of the lords in elections was so 
 preponderating, that they were virtually repre- 
 sented in the commons : and the majority of the 
 commons expressed the opinions not of the body 
 of the people, but of an assembly partly elected 
 by the people, or rather by a small portion of 
 the people, and partly nominated by the peers. 
 On some insulated points, such as the grantinor 
 offices in reversion, and catholic relief, the two 
 houses differed, but as to the general manage- 
 ment of affairs, they coincided. The spectacle 
 of one party omnipotent in one house, and 
 its opponents in the other, was never exhibited. 
 Such a state of things would have been in- 
 compatible with good government, while it lasted, 
 and if permanent, with any government whatever. 
 The theory of three powers, each acting inde- 
 pendently and mutually controlling one another, 
 or in Sir W. Blackstone's own words, " Two 
 " houses naturally drawing in two directions of 
 *' opposite interest, and the prerogative in another 
 " still different from both," is perhaps a good
 
 74 
 
 subject for school-boys' themes, but is totally in- 
 applicable to the affairs of a great nation. 
 
 The Reform Bill gave independence to the 
 House of Commons, and by doing so, destroyed 
 its sympathy with the existing House of Lords. 
 It produced two hostile assemblies ; one recog- 
 nizing Lord Althorp, and the other the Duke of 
 • Wellington, as its leader. It is useless to deplore 
 this result ; it is useless to lament that it has 
 changed the old constitution. It has been done, 
 and it cannot be undone. The only course for a 
 prudent statesman is, to turn it to the greatest 
 possible good ; or, if that expression is preferred, 
 to the least possible evil. 
 
 If it be true, as must have been predicted, a 
 priori, and as has been proved by experience, 
 that good government cannot be the result of two 
 equal and clashing authorities ; each irresistible 
 in defeating, and therefore each powerless in 
 carrying the measures on which our safety 
 depends ; it is clear that one must be made prac- 
 tically subordinate to the other ; that the general 
 management of affairs and the ultimate decision 
 of all fundamental questions, must rest with the
 
 76 
 
 one, and that the other must be confined to the 
 improving of details, and the suspending, but not 
 the definitively rejecting, of important enactments. 
 It is clear also that these subordinate functions 
 cannot be assigned to the House of Commons. 
 Nothing could be more true than the prophecy 
 of the opponents of the Reform Bill, that in a 
 House of Commons, elected by the people, the 
 real government of the country must reside. 
 Sir Robert Peel avows that he " considers the 
 " Reform Bill a final and irrevocable settlement 
 " of a great constitutional question ; a settlement 
 " which no friend to the peace and welfare of 
 " this country would attempt to disturb, either by 
 " direct or by insidious means." But he omits to 
 state what the great constitutional question was, 
 which has thus been finally and irrevocably 
 settled. We shall supply this omission. The 
 question, which after two years' debate, after 
 a solemn appeal to the country, after an 
 opposition of which the resoluteness was pushed 
 to obstinacy, and the courage to temerity, 
 was finally and irrevocably settled, was whe- 
 ther the empire should be governed by the
 
 77 
 
 lords influencing the commons, or by the 
 commons influencing the lords. This is the 
 answer to the Duke of Wellington's celebrated 
 question, " How will the government be con- 
 ducted with a parliament such as will be re- 
 turned by this bill?" It will be conducted by 
 making the lords and the commons change 
 places; by rendering independent that branch 
 of the legislature which was formerly subordi- 
 nate, and rendering subordinate that which was 
 previously paramount. 
 
 But how is this change to be eflfected ? Of 
 coiirse, in the first instance, by the use of that sole 
 safety valve now afforded by the constitution — the 
 creation of peers. It may be said, that such a 
 creation, though it might relieve our present 
 difficulties, would create a permanent evil by 
 the large increase of the titled aristocracy. The 
 obvious remedy is, that the new peers, or a 
 portion of them, should be created only for life. 
 It is strange that a peerage, not of inheritance, 
 should be considered an anomaly, or even a 
 novelty. Without recurring to the cases of 
 the Scotch and Irish peers, or to the English
 
 78 
 
 spiritual peers, who sit only while bishops, we 
 may recall to the reader's recollection the case 
 of the Irish bishops, who sit only in every sixth 
 session. Express creations of English peerao-es 
 for life occur in our earlier history ; and it 
 appears that they may be legally created for 
 even a shorter period. When a peerage is created 
 by writ, it is said, indeed, to confer, by law, 
 an estate of inheritance ; but when it is created 
 in the usual mode by patent, the duration of the 
 grantee's interest depends not on any general 
 rule of law, but simply on the words of the grant. 
 If a peerage be granted to a man and his heirs, 
 it will descend to any of his relatives male or 
 female, lineal or collateral. If it be granted, 
 like the Devon earldom, to him and his heirs 
 male, it will embrace all his relatives, lineal or 
 collateral, of male descent. If it be given to 
 him and the heirs of his body, it will vest in 
 any of his posterity, male or female ; or if it be 
 given in what is now the more usual form, to 
 him and the heirs male of his body, it will 
 descend only to his male posterity. If it be 
 given to him indefinitely, without any mention
 
 79 
 
 of his heirs, it will cease with his life. And 
 it has been laid down in the House of Lords, 
 and by the highest legal authority, that if a 
 peerage be granted to a man during the life of 
 another person, it will cease on the death of that 
 other person. 
 
 Such a grant as the last, indeed, would be 
 obviously inconvenient ; but it appears to us, 
 that peerages for the life of the grantee would be 
 useful, not only in the present emergency, but as 
 a permanent usage. They might be taken by 
 many persons eminently fitted to serve the public 
 in the House of Lords, who cannot accept, with 
 prudence, hereditary honours. And the fact can- 
 not be disguised, that it is only by enlarging the 
 field of selection, and thus opening its doors 
 to men eminent for character, knowledge, and 
 talents, though unaccompanied by great wealth, 
 that the House of Lords can preserve that degree 
 of public respect which is essential to its utility. 
 Its boroughs are gone, its comparative wealth has 
 diminished, and is diminishing; it has in a great 
 measure lost its claim to the reverence which 
 accompanies illustrious descent ; its influence
 
 80 
 
 must hereafter depend mainly on the personal 
 merit of its members. 
 
 It may be objected, however, that if the 
 example of a large creation is once set, as each 
 successive ministry will create its ow^n majority, 
 we shall in no long time be encumbered by an 
 assembly too numerous for useful deliberation. 
 We see no reason foi that fear. The example 
 once set, will not be followed, for it will not again 
 be necessary. When once the supremacy of the 
 House of Commons has been established ; when 
 once it has been acknowledoed that the mi- 
 nister who has the confidence of the Commons 
 is to be recognized by the Lords, and to be 
 free, not only from factious resistance, but from 
 that systematic opposition, which is fair and 
 even beneficial in the Commons ; there will be 
 no more need of merely political creations. The 
 hostile majority, if there be one, will act as it was 
 at last forced to act on the Reform Bill ; it will 
 abstain from giving votes of which the ultimate 
 result must be its own destruction as a ma- 
 jority. 
 
 We may be asked, what will be the use of a
 
 81 
 
 House of Lords, nominally independent, but with 
 no real function except to register the decrees of a 
 superior? We might perhaps say, that we are 
 not bound to answer this question ; that we are 
 proposing not the institution of a House of Lords, 
 but means by which a House of Lords may, in 
 the altered state of the country, be prevented 
 from doing harm. But we will answer it. A 
 House of Lords, though practically subordinate 
 to the House of Commons, will be eminently 
 useful by improving details, by suggesting amend- 
 ments, by positively suspending the enactment of 
 some measures, and by forcing the reconsideration 
 of all. Under any circumstances, a House of 
 Lords is expedient, but it is absolutely neces- 
 sary with the present constitution of the House 
 of Commons, influenced as that body m.ust be, 
 by the passions and prejudices of the people. 
 All history teaches the mischief of a sole elective 
 assembly. The experiment, often as it has been 
 repeated, has always signally failed. It is be- 
 cause we value a House of Lords, because we be- 
 lieve its existence to be absolutely essential, that 
 we are anxious to make that change, if it can 
 
 L
 
 82 
 
 be called a change, in its constitution which is 
 necessary to ensure, or rather to permit its per- 
 manence. If its ill-advised friends allow it to 
 encounter the House of Commons, it will break 
 like glass in the collision. 
 
 One objection, however, may be made to our 
 plan, which would be formidable, if the means 
 of obviating it were not at hand. The promotion 
 to the peerage of a considerable number of distin- 
 guished commoners might deprive the people for 
 ever of the power of electing many of those who 
 might have been its best representatives, and 
 deprive the House of Commons for ever of many 
 of its most useful members. This inconvenience 
 might be palliated by selecting the new peers 
 from that laro^e class of men of real merit who, 
 from the want of local connexion, or from aver- 
 sion to the arts by which many of the reformed 
 constituencies, deteriorated as they are by the 
 preservation of some of their old corrupt materials, 
 must still be influenced, are unable to make their 
 way into the House of Commons. But a more 
 effectual remedy would be, to get rid of that 
 senseless regulation which prohibits art English or
 
 83 
 
 a Scotch peer from sitting as a commoner. We 
 term this a senseless regulation, because we cannot 
 discover on what pretext of utility it is founded. 
 It arose probably, as far as English peers are con- 
 cerned, from accident. It has been continued 
 principally, without doubt, because no serious 
 attempt has been made to get rid of it, and 
 perhaps partly from the desire of the principal 
 commoners to monopolize the seats in their own 
 house, and partly from the contempt in which 
 the peers of ancient times held the inferior 
 assembly. But even at present its inconvenience 
 is palpable. Who is there, even among Tories 
 not blinded by faction or ambition, who does 
 not anxiously wish that it were possible to retain 
 Lord Spencer in that house in which his influence 
 was so powerful and so beneficial ? or to restore 
 Lord Brougham to the field in which he was 
 so long the champion of improvement ? On what 
 possible ground, not of fanciful analogy, or legal 
 fiction, but of real convenience, is the choice of 
 the people restricted ? Of course we do not wish 
 to expose a peer to the rule which nominally 
 requires every one who is elected to serve ; nor
 
 84 
 
 would we allow him to vary his character at 
 pleasure, and to pass and repass in the same 
 session from house to house. We would require 
 him, if chosen a member of the House of Com- 
 mons, and willing to serve, to declare himself a 
 commoner for that parliament. And we believe 
 that this trifling sacrifice of custom to reason 
 would more than compensate for the subtraction 
 of that number of commoners whose promotion is 
 necessary in order to give to the next adminis- 
 tration a majority in the House of Lords. 
 
 We have now stated the grounds on which 
 we believe that the present ministry cannot stand ; 
 and we have also stated the condition on which 
 their successors, whoever they may be, must 
 accept office. We proceed to give a short out- 
 line of some of the measures which we think 
 must be carried by the next administration. 
 
 We will begin with two subjects which are of 
 less importance than those to which we must 
 subsequently allude, merely because they are con- 
 nected with the matter which we have just been 
 discussing — parliamentary usage. 
 
 The first parliamentary change which we have
 
 85 
 
 to propose respects the admission of men in office 
 to the House of Commons. Under the old con- 
 stitution of that house, the rule, that the acceptor 
 of an office under the Crown, even though it be 
 a mere change from one office to another, forfeits 
 his seat, was productive of little real inconveni- 
 ence : a nomination seat was always at hand 
 to supply the loss of an elective one. But, 
 under the present system, the minister who, on 
 his acceptance or change of office, is rejected 
 by his former constituents, must remain excluded, 
 in all probability, during the session; perhaps 
 during the parliament. 
 
 One necessary consequence is, to throw an 
 undue proportion of offices into the House of 
 Lords. Another is, to fix, before the commence- 
 ment of a parliament, the cast of characters, 
 and to preserve them, as much as possible, 
 unchanged, however the public service may 
 lequire alteration. A third is, when a change 
 must take place, to select for the vacant offices 
 not the men that are best fitted, but those that 
 are most likely to be re-elected. A fourth is, 
 the depriving the whole country of the parlia-
 
 86 
 
 nientary services of perhaps an important public 
 officer, if the temporary alienation of his consti- 
 tuents, arising perhaps from jealousy, or caprice, 
 or interest, or from some more justifiable, but 
 yet private cause, prevents his re-election. These, 
 are consequences, but certainly not beneficial 
 consequences, of the Reform Bill. The electors 
 of Cambridge were the proper persons to decide 
 who should be the member for Cambridge : they 
 knew the wants of their own town. They were 
 not the proper persons to decide who should 
 be the Colonial Secretary ; but they did decide 
 it, and in fact decided it twice over. When it 
 became necessary to appoint a successor to Mr. 
 Stanley, the question whether Mr. Spring Rice 
 should or should not be so appointed, depended 
 on the opinions manifested by the ten-pounders 
 and freemen. If the borough had shown an 
 intention to reject him, it is not likely that he 
 would have accepted the Colonial Seals ; and if 
 it afterwards had actually rejected him, it is very 
 doubtful whether he would have been able to 
 retain them. It is not easy to conceive a means 
 by which a more important question could be
 
 87 
 
 subjected to a more utterly incompetent tribunal. 
 It depended perhaps on the Vice Chancellor's 
 gardener, who should be the real governor of the 
 vast colonies of Eno^land. 
 
 Four remedies may be suggested. 
 
 I. To give to a certain number of ministers, 
 seats and votes ex officio. 
 
 II. To give them seats and the right of speak- 
 ing, but not votes unless elected. 
 
 III. Simply to repeal the law by which a mem- 
 ber accepting office vacates his seat. 
 
 IV. To repeal that law so far as respects a 
 mere change of office, allowing the acceptance 
 of office by a person not previously in office to 
 occasion a vacancy. 
 
 The principal objection to the first plan is the 
 addition that it would make to the already 
 excessive number of members. Its principal 
 advantage, as compared with the second, would 
 be, that it would render practicable a further 
 regulation, that no minister should represent a 
 constituency. The influence of a constituency 
 on a minister is often as mischievous as its 
 influence on a mere representative is beneficial.
 
 S8 
 
 It has a constant tendency to warp his public 
 measures. How deeply must Sir R. Peel, how 
 deeply even must the country lament, that he ever 
 was the representative of Oxford ! 
 
 The second plan, if generally adopted, would 
 be open, to a certain extent, to the same objection 
 as the first ; namely, that of increasing the 
 number, not indeed of voters, but of speakers, 
 in the House of Commons. If not generally 
 adopted, it would create an invidious distinction 
 between the ministers having and not having 
 votes. The comparison would have a tendency 
 to exhibit the latter in the character of retained 
 advocates, supposed to speak rather their instruc- 
 tions than their convictions. But admitting the 
 force of these objections, we are inclined to 
 think that if the first plan, to which we give 
 the preference, should be considered too great 
 an innovation, it would be wise to adopt the 
 second. 
 
 Either plan would cure the great and growing 
 inconvenience of which we are complaining. 
 
 Either plan would also palliate another still 
 greater inconvenience, that arising from the
 
 89 
 
 small number of persons from among whom 
 those who are to fill the hio-her offices of state 
 are now taken, and, what is a necessary con- 
 sequence, the frequent absence among those who 
 are selected, of an appropriate education. The 
 inferior and comparatively unimportant and easy 
 duties of government are generally performed 
 by persons specially trained and instructed 
 for those purposes ; the superior and difficult 
 ones are not. It seems to be supposed that 
 a knowledge of politics, the most exten- 
 sive and most difficult of all sciences, is a 
 natural appendage to persons holding a high 
 rank in society, or may be acquired at intervals 
 snatched among the bustle and the occupa- 
 tion of laborious and engrossing professions. 
 
 In despotisms, the principal evils arise partly 
 from the ignorance, and partly from the bad 
 passions of the rulers : in representative govern- 
 ments they arise principally from ignorance. 
 And this must continue to be the case, as long 
 as the holders of considerable offices are selected 
 only from among the peers, or those whose 
 incomes enable them to sit in the House of 
 
 M
 
 90 
 
 Commons. Why have we never any want of 
 good physicians, or lawyers, or engineers, but 
 the greatest difficulty in finding competent 
 ministers ? Because the most important of all 
 businesses is not made a profession, and cannot 
 be made one while the performance of its duties 
 implies a peerage or a fortune. It is to be 
 observed, that both the economical reforms of 
 late years, and the Reform Act itself, however 
 beneficial in themselves, have tended to augment 
 this evil. The first, by destroying many sine- 
 cures, and other provisions which diminished 
 the imprudence of selecting political employ- 
 ment as a means of subsistence. The second, 
 by abolishing the nomination boroughs, through 
 which, men without the property or the leisure 
 to obtain parliamentary influence, could yet 
 obtain seats. We never can calculate on being 
 well governed for a continuance while this worst 
 kind of oligarchy continues ; not the merely 
 allowing to men of property great political influ- 
 ence, for that they ought to have, but the entrust- 
 ing to them exclusively, the actual management 
 of affairs. If office of itself gave a seat in the legis-
 
 91 
 
 lature whether with or without a vote, the first 
 advantage would be, that we might select the 
 holders of eminent offices from among all the edu- 
 cated persons in the kingdom instead of being 
 confined, as we now are, to the members of two 
 assemblies, comprising, together, about one thou- 
 sand persons. The second advantage would be, 
 that, as the expenses of Parliament would no 
 longer swallow up half a salary, prudent men 
 might follow the public service as a profession. 
 
 The third plan, that of merely repealing the 
 law by which acceptance of office vacates a seat, 
 though a less eflfectual remedy for the evils in 
 question, would be a great diminution of them ; 
 and it would probably meet with less opposition 
 than either of the plans which we have pre- 
 viously discussed. The present practice is an 
 instance of that semi-barbarous jealousy on the 
 part of the country, both towards the crown and 
 towards its own representatives, which, while 
 it gives apparent power to the people, really 
 benefits only a narrow oligarchy; and what- 
 ever may have been the original grounds for 
 such a custom, they have now passed away.
 
 92 
 
 Now that the constituencies have the power 
 in their own hands, they are not likely to 
 elect men who can be bribed by office into a 
 sudden dereliction of their principles. Nor are 
 those offices which vacate a seat, but are tenable 
 with one, sufficiently numerous, or valuable, or 
 permanent, to be the source of much parlia- 
 mentary corruption. The bribes to which men 
 yield, are not those against which the rule is 
 directed, but military or naval, or ecclesiastical 
 or legal promotion, for themselves or for their 
 friends, or provisions in the administrative 
 departments for their dependents. The present 
 law is not more efficient than a prohibition of 
 bribery by means of sovereigns would be, 
 leaving bank notes untouched. 
 
 The fourth plan would be a half measure. 
 Though it would diminish the present incon- 
 venience, it would not remove it, and yet it 
 would sacrifice the principle for the sake of 
 which that inconvenience is submitted to. It 
 might to a great extent be evaded by splitting 
 offices, and appointing persons, while out of 
 parliament, to small offices, in order to enable
 
 93 
 
 them to accept more important ones, and yet 
 retain their seats. A stronger objection is, that 
 it would give to existing placemen a monopoly 
 of office. Nor would it at all diminish the 
 tendency of the present system to force a disso- 
 lution on every change of ministry. If we now 
 suffer that inconvenience, it is probably owing 
 to the fears of the present ministry, that some 
 of their important members might not have been 
 re-elected by their late constituencies. They prefer 
 the chances, poor as they are, of success at a 
 general election to the danger of defeat in a few 
 boroughs, which would, in fact, have been able 
 to prohibit their meeting the late parliament. 
 
 With these remarks we shall dismiss the 
 question of the admission of ministers to the 
 House of Commons, repeating our conviction 
 of the absolute necessity of finding some means 
 to obviate an inconvenience, the magnitude of 
 which will every day force itself more and 
 more into notice. 
 
 The other constitutional change which appears 
 to us to be necessary, respects the dissolution 
 of parliament on the demise of the crown.
 
 94 
 
 By the old law, the death of the king was 
 the dissolution of parliament. And this was a 
 natural custom when a parliament formed no 
 part of the ordinary government, but was merely 
 assembled from time to time as occasion required. 
 As it was not clear that the successor would want 
 its advice or aid, the parliament separated on the 
 death of the person who had convoked it. When 
 the existence of a parliament had become the 
 rule instead of the exception, the obvious incon- 
 venience of a dissolution at the instant of an 
 accession occasioned the Acts of the 7 and 8 
 William III,, and the 6 Ann, to be passed, which 
 enacted that the parliament in being should con- 
 tinue for six months after the demise of the 
 Crown, unless sooner prorogued or dissolved by 
 the successor. 
 
 It is not easy to suppose any real grounds on 
 which the duration of parliament was not made 
 independent of the death of the king, instead 
 of being prolonged for only six months. It could 
 not have been intended for the benefit of the 
 successor, as it is, in fact, a restriction on his 
 prerogative. Such an enactment would be rea-
 
 95 
 
 sonable only under the supposition that he had 
 no power of dissolving. It could not have been 
 intended to give the people an opportunity of 
 choosing new men to represent them in a new 
 state of things, since, both according to the 
 theory and practice of the constitution, a demise 
 of the crown, if unaccompanied by a change 
 of the parliament, would produce no alteration. 
 At no time is a change of ministry less pro- 
 bable, or less to be wished for, than immediately 
 after an accession. And the tendency of a 
 forced dissolution to produce such a change is 
 one of the objections to it. It was this law 
 which, in fact, occasioned the downfal of the 
 Wellington administration in 1830. That down- 
 fal may or may not have been desirable, but 
 it would have been better if it had been owing 
 to any other cause than the hazard of an election 
 at a time of popular excitement. 
 
 The great object of legislation, indeed of the 
 greater part of human conduct, is to narrow the 
 empire of chance. It is only by forcing, as far 
 as it is possible, events to pursue a fixed train, 
 we can regulate our own conduct. To make
 
 96 
 
 a law for the express purpose of leaving to 
 accident so important an event as the termina- 
 tion of a parliament, is a voluntary destruction 
 of one of the means of good government. It is to 
 enact an inconvenience. 
 
 It is some objection also that it so much 
 increases the speculation and discussion about 
 the health of the existing monarch. It is not 
 decorous, or in any respect advisable, that on 
 every rumour as to the kino;'s health, there 
 should be two or three hundred thousand of 
 those constituents, who consider an election as 
 a mere source of bribery and riot, anxiously 
 exaggerating every unfavourable statement ; or 
 that while the king is living, there should be 
 forty or fifty candidates actively canvassing on 
 the anticipation of his death. 
 
 Objections, however, to both these changes 
 may be made on grounds which must be admitted 
 to be plausible. It may be urged that the neces- 
 sity of taking the greater part of the holders of 
 office from among the members of the House 
 of Commons, the vacating a seat on every 
 acceptance of office, and the dissolution of
 
 97 
 
 parliament on every demise of the Crown, though 
 highly inconvenient whenever we enjoy a good 
 government, and partially so even under a bad 
 one, are yet, on the whole, beneficial, as increas- 
 ing the power of the people. It may be said, 
 that if these checks were removed, a desperate 
 faction having possessed itself of the influence 
 of the Court, and through the Court wielding the 
 House of Lords, might, by a fortnight of bribery 
 and intimidation, pack a House of Commons, 
 and, without any possibility of interruption, 
 subject the country, for seven years together, to 
 every form of legal misgovernment. The answer 
 to this reasoning is, that if the assumed danger 
 exists, the supposed remedy is a most inadequate 
 and inconvenient palliative. It resembles the trick 
 of jockies, who when a horse is sore in one foot, 
 drive a peg into the other, to force him to stand 
 evenly on both. To perpetuate a great evil in 
 order to diminish a still greater, can be right 
 only when it is shown to be the only available 
 resource. The obvious course is to endeavour to 
 remedy both. Unhappily we have inherited a 
 theory with respect to the executive government, 
 
 N
 
 98 
 
 1 
 
 which is incompatible with wise constitutional 
 legislation. We have been taught to consider 
 the executive as necessarily having an interest 
 distinct from that of the great body of the people. 
 We have been taught this by the experience of 
 centuries. From the times of Henry III. until 
 our own, our internal history has been a length- 
 ened contest, in which the means of good govern- 
 ment, such as we now possess them, have been 
 extorted bit by bit from a reluctant minority. 
 But that struggle was supposed to have been 
 concluded by the Reform Bill. It was the 
 object of that bill to give power to the edu- 
 cated and independent portion of the people, 
 and to make it impossible for any ministry to 
 stand to whom that portion of the people, the 
 only persons capable of judging well on political 
 subjects, refuse their confidence. If that great 
 experiment has succeeded, it must be unwise to 
 fetter the executive by restraints which unfit it 
 for the due performance of its duties. If that 
 experiment has failed, let the causes of its failure 
 be ascertained and removed. If the scot and lot 
 voters, and freemen, and other corruptible mate-
 
 99 
 
 rials, which the enemies of reform forced into 
 the constituencies, leave us still open to bribery 
 and terrorism, let us adopt the means by which 
 bribery and terrorism can be rendered useless. 
 Let us take the steps, whatever they may be, 
 which experience shall show to be necessary to 
 ensure a House of Commons dependent on the 
 intelligent portion of the community, and an exe- 
 cutive dependent on that House of Commons, 
 and then frankly and confidently entrust that 
 executive with every power that can be proved 
 to be useful, and remove from it every restriction 
 which can be proved to be mischievous. 
 
 With respect to the administrative measures of 
 the next ministry, it is of course needless to 
 express our belief that it must undertake those 
 which we have described the country as resolved 
 to obtain. There are others, to which we have 
 not yet alluded, but which we need not dwell 
 on, as their necessity is universally admitted, and 
 the only points still undecided are their details. 
 Such are, the Commutation of Tithes, both in 
 England and in Ireland; the relieving the Dis- 
 senters from their scruples respecting the cele-
 
 100 
 
 bration of Marriage ; and, so far as justice 
 requires it, from the payment of Church Rates ; 
 the reform of the Ecclesiastical Courts, the im- 
 provement of the Law of Debtor and Creditor, 
 and the revision and amendment of our Criminal, 
 Fiscal and Commercial Codes. There are other 
 questions, the necessity of considering which 
 every one admits, but on which no party 
 seems as yet prepared with any plausible 
 scheme. These are, the promotion of the reli- 
 gious and moral education of the labouring 
 classes, and what is intimately connected with 
 it, and cannot be more fully stated than in 
 Sir R. Peel's own words : — " The removing 
 " every abuse that can impair the efficiency of 
 " the ecclesiastical establishment, extending the 
 " sphere of its usefulness, and strengthening and 
 " confirming its just claims upon the respect 
 " and affections of the people." These are tempt- 
 ing subjects, but far too extensive to be crowded 
 into a pamphlet. We doubt whether without 
 the aid of a commission there are any means 
 by which either of them could be properly pre- 
 pared for the consideration of the legislature.
 
 101 
 
 We doubt indeed whether the imperial parlia- 
 ment, comprising persons of every shade of belief, 
 scepticism, and disbelief, some friendly, some 
 hostile, and some indifferent both to the Church 
 and to its doctrines, is the authority by which 
 the latter question ou^ht to be decided. While 
 the legislature consisted exclusively of Church- 
 men, it was perhaps proper that it should legis- 
 late for the Church. Now it has ceased to be 
 so, it seems fit that it should avowedly abdicate 
 that function, and allow the members of the 
 Established Church to enjoy a right which is 
 conceded to every other religious community, 
 whether Jews, Quakers, Anabaptists, or Me- 
 thodists, to manage their own strictly religious 
 affairs. To a certain degree indeed parliament 
 must once more interfere. It now possesses, 
 though, by having long disused, it seems to have 
 admitted that it ought not to possess, the power 
 of regulating the concerns of the Church. Its 
 last act, in this respect, ought to be to transfer 
 that power into hands in which the members of 
 the Church can repose confidence, and to define 
 its limits and prescribe the general outline of the
 
 102 
 
 means by which it shall be exercised. These 
 last are matters of general jurisprudence, and 
 involve no peculiarities of christian belief: the 
 purely spiritual concerns of a given church are 
 matters for the exclusive consideration of the 
 members of that church. 
 
 But there are two measures, perhaps equal 
 in importance and in urgency to any of those 
 to which we have adverted, which have as yet 
 attracted the serious attention of no party in 
 parliament, and of very few political writers. 
 These are, a provision for the Roman Catholic 
 clergy, — and the amendment of our system of 
 Secondary Punishments. We will devote to them 
 our few remaining pages. 
 
 Ireland has long been a political anomaly. 
 With a most fertile soil, a fine climate, an 
 admirable situation, an intelligent, and, when 
 they have any motive, an industrious population, 
 a free press, trial by jury, unrestricted commerce, 
 moderate taxation, and an enlightened govern- 
 ment ; — it is among the most poor and most dis- 
 contented portions of Europe. Its discontent 
 has been attributed to its poverty ; but there are
 
 103 
 
 other countries as poor as Ireland, yet attached 
 to their institutions and their governments. It 
 has been attributed to the difference in religion 
 between the government and the people ; but in 
 a large portion of Europe, the utmost harmony 
 subsists between subjects and kings, who are 
 yet opposed to one another in religion. The 
 catholic king of Saxony is popular among his 
 protestant, and the protestant king of Belgium 
 among his catholic, subjects. It has been attri- 
 buted to recollections of ancient independence 
 and defeat. But Wales was conquered under 
 much the same circumstances as Ireland; and 
 Wales exhibits no discontent. It has been attri- 
 buted to difference of language ; but Welsh again 
 differs from English as much as Irish can do. 
 We rejoice to think that these are not the causes 
 of the alienation which now exists in Ireland 
 between the government and the majority of the 
 people; for if they were, the case would be 
 hopeless, since none of them admit of any speedy 
 remedy, and some are incurable. The real cause 
 of the evil appears to us to be simple, and to be 
 remediable, as a remote cause, by a sinorle Act of
 
 104 
 
 Parliament ; though of course much time must 
 elapse between the removal of the original cause, 
 and the cessation of its effects. This cause is 
 the relation in which the Roman Catholic clergy- 
 stand towards the government on the one hand, 
 and towards the people on the other. 
 
 We have already stated that the endowment of 
 the protestant and the destitution of the catholic 
 church is both an insult and an injury, and that 
 the bulk of the Irish people, while furious under 
 the insult, seem insensible to the injury, and are 
 therefore merely anxious to demolish the protes- 
 tant church, without any wish to endow their 
 own. But the feelings of the priesthood are 
 very different. They have thought principally of 
 the injury. They have contrasted their uncertain 
 incomes, the price of constant labour, and yet 
 wrung with difficulty and contest from their 
 destitute population, with the ample, and, until 
 the late troubles, the secure revenue obtained 
 generally with little exertion, and often with 
 none, by their protestant rivals. And when they 
 have made that comparison, they reflect that the 
 ample and secure revenue was the former endow-
 
 105 
 
 ment of their own church ; and that their prede- 
 cessors were deprived of it for maintaining what 
 they believed, and what the present clergy believe, 
 to be the truth. It is impossible that a clergy in 
 this situation should be well affected towards the 
 government, which they hold, and hold justly, to 
 be responsible for its continuance. It is impos- 
 sible that their disaffection should not be propa- 
 gated among the people. We must recollect 
 that the connexion between the Irish catholic 
 priest and his parishioners is far more intimate 
 than that which exists between any other body of 
 religious teachers and those committed to their 
 care. The peasant depends on his priest for 
 masses, for absolution, for extreme unction ; in 
 short, for a variety of wants which are not the less 
 urgent for being, according to the belief of pro- 
 testants, founded on superstition. The priest is 
 dependent on the peasant for the actual means 
 of existence. Nor is the sympathy arising from 
 this mutual dependence weakened by any con- 
 siderable difference of birth, or early associations. 
 The priest is often the son of a cottier, born in 
 the same station, and reared with the same preju- 
 
 o
 
 106 
 
 dices as his flock. If the present state of the 
 catholic clergy in Ireland were productive of no 
 other consequence than its tendency to disseminate 
 disloyalty and hatred of the English connexion, 
 this alone would be more than a sufficient ground 
 for its immediate change. 
 
 But this is not the sole or even the principal 
 ground on which we advocate a provision for the 
 catholic clergy. In legislating for Ireland our 
 first duty is to remove the evils which press on 
 the Irish people ; removing those which affect 
 ourselves ought to be a secondary consideration. 
 It has long been suspected that the dependence 
 of the priests on the people has been the principal 
 cause of the misery and crime of Ireland. Mr. 
 Croly, the Roman Catholic priest of Ovens and 
 Aglis, has manifested, by the most abundant 
 evidence, the truth of this suspicion. 
 
 As his pamphlet, though recently published, is 
 not easily procured, we will extract some of its 
 most material passages. 
 
 " The revenue of the parish priest is derived 
 " from a variety of sources. There are con- 
 " fession dues, marriage dues, baptism dues.
 
 107 
 
 mass dues, and dues for anointing. He is 
 also paid at times for attendance at funerals. 
 Confession furnishes the most steady and con- 
 stant source of revenue. Twice a year he 
 collects confession money under the denomi- 
 nation of Christmas and Easter offerinsfs. The 
 mode of making this collection is not very 
 consonant to the spirit of religion. The priest 
 selects one or two houses in every plough-land 
 or neighbourhood, where he holds according to 
 appointment what are called ' stations of con- 
 fession ;' and it is required that the families all 
 about should meet him when he comes among 
 them, upon these occasions ; should make their 
 confessions, receive the Holy Sacrament, and 
 finally pay the customary dues. It sometimes 
 happens that this business is not transacted 
 quietly. If increased dues are demanded — a 
 thino; of occasional occurrence — disaorreeable 
 and sometimes scandalous altercations ensue. 
 Similar scenes occur when individuals attend 
 and crave time for payment ; while such as 
 absent themselves, unless they send the dues 
 as an apology, are generally made the subject 
 of public abuse and exposure."
 
 108 
 
 " Come we now to another item of eccle- 
 siastical revenue — marriage money. — The first 
 thing done, when there is question of marrying 
 a couple, is to make a bargain about the 
 marriage money. This sometimes causes a 
 considerable delay. The remuneration or sti- 
 pend prescribed by the diocesan statutes is 
 never thought of for a moment. Indeed all 
 statutes respecting money matters are a mere 
 dead letter. The priest drives as hard a 
 bargain as he can, and strives to make the 
 most of the occasion. — But this is only a 
 preliminary proceeding. Demands of money 
 are made upon such as are present at the 
 marriage — at least upon the male portion of 
 the assembly. This gives rise not unfrequently 
 to a new and unhallowed scene. The trans- 
 action may, by chance, pass off quietly ; that 
 is, when every one contributes according to 
 the wishes and expectation of the clergyman. 
 But this does not always happen. In general 
 the demands are considered unreasonable, and 
 the priest is disappointed in his expectations. 
 Some endeavour to evade the payment of any 
 contribution ; others give but little ; and the
 
 109 
 
 '* few that please the priest are mere exceptions 
 " to the general rule. What is the consequence ? 
 " The clergyman, after begging and entreating 
 " for some time to little purpose, gets at length 
 *' into a rage, utters the most bitter invectives 
 *' against individuals, abuses, perhaps, the vrhole 
 " company, and is abused himself in turn ; until 
 " at length the whole house becomes one frightful 
 " scene of confusion and uproar : and all this 
 " takes place at the administration of one of the 
 *' Sacraments of the Catholic Church — owing, 
 " too, to the present system of ecclesiastical 
 " finance. 
 
 " Baptism money, an item that helps not a 
 " little to swell the amount of church revenue, 
 " comes next to be considered. The general 
 *' rule is to baptize at private houses, or at the 
 " priest's house or lodgings, and under circum- 
 " stances not of a very hallowed description. 
 " One leading feature in the transaction, on the 
 " part of the priest, is to get in the customary 
 " offering, and to svvell, if possible, its amount. 
 " The father of the infant pays, as they say, for 
 " the baptism ; the gossip money is demanded
 
 no 
 
 " of the sponsors, who sometimes amount to four 
 ** in number and upwards, contrary to the canons 
 " of Trent, but not contrary to the pecuniary 
 " interests of the priest. This money is often 
 " demanded previous to the administration of 
 " the rite ; and if not promptly and satisfactorily 
 " paid, scenes of abuse and recrimination fre- 
 " quently ensue ; similar, indeed, to what takes 
 " place on occasion of marriages, only upon a 
 " smaller scale. 
 
 '' The custom of anointing is considered in 
 " this country to be of the last importance ; so 
 '' much so that no misfortune is accounted greater 
 " than for a poor mortal to depart this life with- 
 " out its reception. The poor family are quite 
 " happy if the deceased has been anointed ; but 
 " are quite unhappy if this should happen not 
 " to be the case. This rite is often administered 
 "under most distressing circumstances — amid 
 "sickness, lamentation, destitution, and want; 
 " yet money is demanded in most cases, parti- 
 " cularly in the country ; and instances occur 
 " of payment being demanded beforehand, and 
 " even of money being pocketed by the priest.
 
 Ill 
 
 which had been given as alms for the relief 
 of the dying. Often when the money is 
 not to be had, bitter words take place in the 
 very hearing and presence of the poor dying- 
 person. 
 " Masses, too, are priced like other rites 
 of religion. A person is said to get a mass, 
 or to have a mass said for him when spe- 
 cial mention is made of him by the cele- 
 brating priest, or when he is especially recom- 
 mended to the Almighty at a particular part of 
 the canon of the mass assigned for recommen- 
 dations of the kind. This is supposed to 
 produce great spiritual, and perhaps tem- 
 poral, benefit to the person so recommended. 
 This recommendation is also supposed to 
 benefit departed souls — that is, such as are 
 detained in the prison of purgatory ; and this 
 is the reason why it is said that the mass is 
 offered for the living and the dead. This 
 matter is particularly insisted on at a parti- 
 cular season of the year — the Commemoration 
 of All Souls — the second of November. Every 
 effort is then made to interest the faithful in
 
 112 
 
 " behalf of the souls in purgatory, in order to 
 " increase the customary contributions for mor- 
 " tuary masses. Doctrines are frequently ad- 
 " vanced on those occasions, prompted by cupi- 
 *' dity, not very consonant to reason or the Scrip- 
 " tures ; and the congregation is led into error in 
 " order to replenish the coffers of the priest." 
 
 " In short, the entire system at present pursued 
 " by the Irish catholic clergy as to money 
 " matters, or matters of church finance, is to 
 '* make the very most of their ministry in gross 
 " and in detail ; and, regardless of consequences, 
 " to render every part and parcel of religion, 
 " whether we regard the administration of sacra- 
 " ments or the celebration of divine worship, 
 " subservient to considerations of self-interest. 
 " Other bad consequences regarding the clergy 
 " themselves arise out of the present system of 
 " church support. They are constantly endea- 
 " vourins: to overreach and undermine one 
 " another. The consequence of all this is, that 
 " church revenue has become a mere scramble — 
 " every man striving to seize upon a larger 
 " share, and deciding for himself in the ap-
 
 113 
 
 ** propriation. This is a bad state of things ; 
 " it is a shameful state of clerical demoraliza- 
 " tion. Common honesty is out of the question. 
 " Nothing but lies, schemes, duplicity, false re- 
 " turns ; so that the simple and the honest 
 " become the prey of the cunning and the crafty. 
 " Does not this system of clerical dishonesty 
 " strike at the root of public morals ? The 
 " morals of the pastor must have an influence 
 " on the morals of the flock. Will a priest who 
 " has no regard to the sacred rights of property 
 " be earnest in exhorting the people to the prac- 
 " tice of justice and fair dealing? Or will not 
 " the contagion of his example stimulate the 
 " evil propensities of human nature, and spread 
 " infection among the whole flock ? Let us view 
 " the conduct of the Irish priests this time past 
 '• as instructors of their people. Have they in- 
 *•■ culcated the principles of the Catholic religion ? 
 " Their congregations every where have shown 
 " an utter disregard to law and to the constituted 
 *' authorities ; nothing among them but sedition 
 "and insubordination; burning and maiming; 
 *' murder and massacre — mob law, in short, the 
 
 p
 
 114 
 
 *' greatest of all curses, the order of the day. 
 " What did the priests — the guides and pastors 
 " of the people — do under these circumstances ? 
 "Did they set their faces against this unhappy 
 '* state of things ? Did they preach obedience 
 *' and subordination ? Did they inculcate sub- 
 " mission to the authority of law ; or aid in pre- 
 " serving the peace and tranquillity of society ? — 
 " all which they were bound to do as ministers 
 " of the gospel and priests of the Roman catholic 
 " church. This is a position that cannot be dis- 
 " puted. It has been always the boast of the 
 " Roman catholic church that she teaches her 
 " children to observe the laws, to respect the 
 " civil magistrate, and to do nothing inconsistent 
 " with the public peace, and with individual 
 " security. The Irish catholic priests have not 
 " this time past preached these doctrines to the 
 " people. It would be too much perhaps to 
 " say that the priests themselves were the 
 " original instigators of the misguided multitude. 
 " There is no doubt that many of them acted a 
 " prominent part in the business ; and the im- 
 '* pression on the minds of the common people
 
 115 
 
 " was and is that the priests gave it their full 
 " and unqualified sanction. But many of them 
 " yielded reluctantly to the torrent ; and appeared 
 " to give their approbation to that which thev in 
 " reality condemned. They went with the mul- 
 " titude instead of guiding the multitude ; and 
 " suffered religion and morality to be completely 
 " turned topsy turvy. What was the cause of 
 " all this ? Many causes, no doubt, may be 
 " assigned. National and religious prejudice 
 " might have had a share, sectarian hatred, 
 " cowardice, a general perversity of morals. But 
 '' can it be said that the Dreseni state of clerical 
 " dependence for support upon a capricious 
 " multititude had no share in determining this 
 " unbecoming conduct on the part of the Irish 
 " catholic priesthood ? The multitude held the 
 " strings of the clerical purse ; and woe betide 
 " the unfortunate priest who would set himself 
 " in opposition to their wishes. As a body they 
 " became all powerful in this respect. The 
 " common cry among them was, that they would 
 " not uphold any priest who would not back 
 " them in their proceedings ; and instances
 
 116 
 
 " could be produced where this threat was 
 " carried into execution ; and upright individuals 
 " of the clerical body were made the objects of 
 " every species of injustice and persecution. 
 " The dread of poverty and of being cast off by 
 " those to whom they looked for subsistence con- 
 " tributed powerfully to make the body at large 
 '* become mere time-servers, and overlook the 
 " obligations of their sacred ministry. It was a 
 " kind of general apostasy, arising from base 
 •' considerations of self-interest : accordingly, they 
 " either preached or countenanced lawless com- 
 ''■ bination." 
 
 Now can any one, Protestant or Catholic, 
 Orangeman or Repealer, contemplate this scene 
 of rapacity, fraud, and misery, and then calmly 
 and deliberately affirm that the system which 
 has created it ought to be continued ? — a system 
 which can turn religion into a poison, and the 
 priest into an accomplice of the incendiary and 
 the murderer. It may be said, that the picture 
 is exaggerated. In all probability it is so. Mr. 
 Croly's book bears indeed the stamp of perfect 
 sincerity and conviction, but there are few men,
 
 117 
 
 however sincere, who, when they have a strange 
 and painful picture to represent, as affording the 
 grounds for measures which they are anxious 
 to promote, can avoid unconsciously heighten- 
 ing its features. But if only one half of what 
 he relates be true, is not that half a sufficient 
 motive for our interference ? We are accus- 
 tomed, and justly, to treat with contempt or 
 indignation the grounds on which the repeal of 
 the union is demanded : but if the imperial 
 government refuses or neglects to inquire into 
 the truth of these statements, or, supposing their 
 truth to have been ascertained, to apply a 
 remedy, that question will assume a very diffe- 
 rent aspect. 
 
 But the Irish people, it may be answered, do 
 not require a provision for their clergy ; the 
 clergy themselves would not accept one. Of 
 course the agitators make no such requisition. 
 They ask nothing which would weaken the 
 power which is given to them by the crimes 
 of their countrymen, or diminish the wealth 
 which is extorted from their ignorance and 
 folly. And it is only in the cries of the
 
 118 
 
 agitators, Catholic and Protestant, that for many 
 years the voice of Ireland has been heard. 
 To point out clearly the real cause of discon- 
 tent, and to suggest an effectual remedy, would 
 evidently be to spoil their trade. And to 
 expect them to do this, either designedly, out 
 of disinterested benevolence, or ignorantly, 
 through want of sagacity, would be to attri- 
 bute to them a very different character from 
 any which they have hitherto manifested. It 
 is possible that the fraud or violence of the 
 real enemies of the country might for a time 
 seduce or intimidate a portion of the priests 
 into the rejection of a national provision ; but 
 there can be no doubt that by far the greater 
 part of them would be eager to escape from 
 their present precarious subserviency. Any 
 other supposition imputes to them a mixture 
 of wickedness and self-devotion which is 
 scarcely conceivable. It supposes them willing 
 to remain in insecurity and degradation, for 
 the express purpose of continuing a system, 
 the consequence of which must become more 
 and more frightful every day. It supposes
 
 119 
 
 them willing to be martyrs to mischief; to 
 suffer, in order that evil may come of it. 
 Nor do we believe that they would practically 
 have the power to refuse. The taxation which 
 they now impose has every quality which can 
 render a tax oppressive. It is severe, arbi- 
 trary in amount, and irregular as to occurrence. 
 In the first edition of this Essay we proposed 
 that when the national provision should be 
 given, the exaction of dues on the part of the 
 priests should b prevented. And we had the 
 authority of some of the most eminent catholic 
 clergy, expressed in the evidence delivered 
 before the House of Lords in 1825, as to the 
 propriety both of our proposed provision, and 
 of the prevention, by some means, either civil 
 or ecclesiastical, of the exaction of all the more 
 onerous dues.* We have since, however, received 
 from Ireland, and from a person whose opinion 
 is entitled to great weight, the following letter 
 on the subject : — 
 
 * See particularly the evidence of Dr. Doyle, p. 232 ; Dr. 
 Murray, p. 260; Rev. J. Kiely, p. 334 (as printed for the 
 Commons).
 
 X 
 
 120 
 
 '* I doubt the expediency of any law to 
 " restrain Roman catholic priests (supposing 
 ** them otherwise paid) from receiving fees. In 
 *' the first place, you cannot make an effective 
 " law, because the fee may be called a present ; 
 " and I am persuaded that you would create, 
 " by such a law, a desire to eyade_.it — at least 
 '' in this unfortunate country. I think it would 
 " be wiser to trust the interests of the people 
 *' in this respect to the natural operation of 
 " the love of money. A law v^hich cannot be 
 " enforced should not be enacted, and much 
 ** less should it, if its enactment be likely to 
 " produce the eflect which the law would 
 " guard against. 
 
 " In the end matters will right themselves. 
 " In many districts the people have assembled, 
 " and agreed upon a lowered scale of dues to 
 " the priests ; their inclination to cut them 
 " down and finally annihilate them will be 
 " increased, when they are otherwise paid." 
 
 Most unquestionably, if the taxation which 
 we deplore can be got rid of without having 
 recourse to legal prohibition, it will be better.
 
 121 
 
 We proposed such a prohibition as likely to 
 accelerate its extinction. But, whether the ex- 
 action be prohibited or not, we have no doubt 
 that the parishioners will soon refuse to submit 
 to it, if a government provision has left it 
 without a pretext. On this point, as on all 
 other questions, as to the probable conduct 
 and feelings of the Catholics, both lay and 
 clerical, in Ireland, when they shall have been 
 placed in the same situation as they are in the 
 rest of Europe, we refer to the feelings and 
 conduct of the rest of the European Catholics. 
 In every part of Europe, excepting in Ireland, a 
 provision is made for the clergy, sometimes by 
 endowment, but generally out of the public 
 income ; and none of the evils to which we 
 have referred, exist. The government does not 
 complain of the disaffection of the clergy, nor 
 the people of their exactions. 
 
 Some persons, however, think that to make 
 a public provision for the Roman catholic 
 church would be morally wrong, because it 
 would encourage a religion which they believe 
 to be tainted by dangerous errors. We have 
 great respect for the conscientious feelings of 
 
 Q
 
 122 
 
 those who make this objection ; but we believe 
 that they do not perceive its consequences. 
 We must remind them that, although extreme 
 cases may be put, such as that of a religious 
 persecutor, in which a man may be morally 
 guilty, though he act conscientiously, yet, as a 
 general rule, it is morally right to follow the 
 dictates of conscience, and morally wrong to 
 oppose them. It follows that, if it be once 
 admitted that it is morally wrong to contribute 
 to the support of the teachers of an erroneous 
 religion, the moral guilt of each individual 
 contributor depends not on the question whether 
 the religion in question be or be not erroneous, 
 but on the ojnnion of the contributor that the 
 religion is erroneous. What right, then, have we 
 to force the Catholics to pay for the support of 
 the Protestant, or the Presbyterians for the sup- 
 port of the Episcopalian, Church ? If we should 
 incur moral guilt by making payments for the 
 support of the Catholic Church, not because it 
 is erroneous, for that is not the question, but 
 because we believe it to be erroneous, they are 
 compelled to incur equal guilt in supporting 
 Our Church, which they believe to be erroneous.
 
 123 
 
 Nay, we ourselves incur moral guilt by forcing 
 their consciences. Such a doctrine strikes at 
 the root of all establishments whatever. If we 
 are to act on it, we must, in the first place, 
 withdraw the annual grant from Maynooth, an 
 institution founded, not merely for the main- 
 tenance of the existing Irish Catholic priests, 
 but for providing a perpetual succession of them. 
 We must then put an end to the Roman Catholic 
 establishment in Lower Canada ; we must with- 
 draw the regium donum from the Presbyterians ; 
 we must exempt the Catholics and Protestant 
 dissenters from all contribution towards the 
 support of the Established Church in England 
 as well as in Ireland. In short, throughout 
 the British Empire, we must adopt what has 
 been called " The voluntary system," and aban- 
 don all provision out of the national property 
 for any religion whatever. 
 
 But the expense of a provision for the 
 Catholic clergy will be complained of; and, 
 in order to diminish it, it has been proposed 
 to employ, in its aid, the surplus, whatever 
 it may turn out to be, of the endowment 
 now enjoyed by the Protestant Establishment.
 
 124 
 
 We will confess that formerly we were in 
 favour of this plan, but subsequent events, and 
 subsequent reflection, have changed our opinion. 
 The violence of party, and the consequently low 
 standard of public morality in Ireland are such, 
 that every concession is, as a matter of course, 
 attributed, in the first instance, to intimidation. 
 The direct transfer of a portion of the revenue 
 now belonging to one church, to support another, 
 would not be treated as a mere measure of public 
 policy, as merely the most convenient mode of 
 effecting a desirable object, but as the triumph 
 of one party, and the defeat of the other. As 
 neither party would attribute it to justice, a word 
 which does not seem to be understood in Ireland, 
 it would excite among the Protestants a mixture 
 of anger and terror ; and among the Catholics, 
 contempt and exultation, rather than gratitude, 
 or even esteem. It might be considered as the 
 beginning of the complete restoration to the 
 Catholics of the whole protestant endowment ; 
 and in the present state of society in Ireland, it 
 is to be feared that means might be taken to 
 accelerate that restoration, by forcibly diminishing 
 the number of Protestants. If every parish in
 
 ,125 
 
 Ireland in which the number of Protestants shall 
 fall below one fourth of the whole population, 
 were thereupon, on the death of the existing in- 
 cumbent, to be given over to the catholic church, 
 we do not say that it would be setting a price on 
 the heads of the Protestants, but we are sure that 
 it would endanger their comfort and their pro- 
 perty : and without inquiring more narrowly 
 into the means that would be adopted, we are 
 sure that the number of parishes so circumstanced 
 would rapidly increase. And if this objection 
 could be got over, a considerable time must elapse, 
 unless even worse means than those to which we 
 have alluded should be resorted to, before any 
 large surplus can be available, even if a large 
 surplus exists. 
 
 But after all, would the expense be large, when 
 compared with the object to be effected? The 
 expense would be about 600,000/. a year, a sum 
 not exceedins: half the amount of the taxation 
 which, under the late ministry, was every year 
 remitted. The object is, the reconciliation of 
 Ireland and England, and the spiritual and 
 temporal welfare of six or seven millions of 
 persons. The mere saving in the subsequent
 
 126 
 
 expense of governing Ireland, would be more 
 than double the proposed expenditure. Troops 
 are more expensive than priests. It must be 
 added, that we are not proposing a new expen- 
 diture, an expenditure which is to divert the 
 I resources of the country from productive to what 
 have been called, unproductive, purposes, as is 
 the case when an increase is made in the army or 
 navy, or in any other of our public establishments. 
 The Catholic priests exist, and are paid. We 
 propose that their payment should be borne by 
 the whole nation, which would scarcely feel it, 
 instead of falling exclusively on a portion, and 
 that the very poorest portion, of the community, 
 whom it demoralis,es and crushes. 
 
 But we may be asked, would you then make 
 a public provision for the Dissenters? It is not 
 
 <I necessary to say whether we would or would not. 
 
 1 The two cases stand on grounds perfectly distinct. 
 The Dissenters either never had an endowment, or 
 had one from which they have voluntarily seceded. 
 The Irish Catholic Church had once an ample 
 endowment, which has been taken from it, under 
 circumstances vvhich could not have occurred if 
 the governments of England and Ireland had
 
 127 
 
 been separate. Every one must perceive the 
 difference between an act of liberality and an 
 act of justice ; betv^^een a gift and a restitution. 
 But, waiving the question of right, we are content 
 to rest the propriety of a provision for the Irish 
 Catholic Church on the simple ground of its 
 utility ; as a remedy for a great and growing 
 evil ; as a remedy for a state of society of which 
 the immediate effects are most mischievous, and 
 the inevitable consequences destructive. Let it 
 be shewn that evils or dangers, equal, or even 
 approaching to these, arise from the absence of 
 a provision for the Dissenters, and we will advo- 
 cate one, whatever be the sacrifice. 
 
 It is possible, however, that we may be told 
 that this measure, however right in itself, ought 
 to be opposed, because it will be made the foun- 
 dation of ulterior demands. Of all political 
 sophisms this is the worst. It is the tyrant's 
 plea in its naked deformity. If such an argu- 
 ment were admissible, no abuse could ever be 
 removed, or ever mitigated. For no concession 
 can ever be made without giving rise to a hope 
 of something more. On this ground Austria is 
 justified in refusing any amelioration to Italy,
 
 128 
 
 or even Turkey to her christian subjects. ^T'lThe 
 continuance of every oppression is justifiable 
 if mere fears of further claims are a justification. 
 The only vv^ise, the only moral conduct in an 
 individual or in a government, is to do all that is 
 right, and to resist all that is wronj. 
 
 We have not the least hope that the Catholics, 
 with their existent ignorance and exasperation, 
 will be immediately satisfied by the measure which 
 we propose. We do not believe that, in the 
 present state of their opinions and passions, they 
 would be satisfied by any thing short of the full 
 establishment of catholic ascendancy, as a most 
 grinding and vindictive system of tyranny. We 
 propose to give to them not all that they ask, but 
 all that they are entitled to ; and we believe that, 
 in time, they will acquiesce in an arrangement, 
 which will have been made neither grudgingly 
 nor timidly, but on intelligible principles of 
 equity and utility. When these principles are 
 the motives to a concession, they are also its 
 limits, and are felt to be so. But the con- 
 cessions to intimidation have no assignable limit 
 except the absolute exhaustion of their subject 
 matter. This was the reason why all the Duke
 
 129 
 
 of Wellington's concessions to the Catholics 
 were utterly fruitless for the purposes for which 
 they were intended. He has always practically 
 given them to understand that they are to hope 
 nothing from his justice^ but every thing from 
 his fea7\ To such a statesman it might be 
 said respecting Mr. O'Connell, as was said to 
 the Athenians respecting Philip, " If this one 
 *' should die, your policy will soon raise up 
 *' another in his place." 
 
 We are now arrived at the last subject to 
 which we proposed to advert in this Essay ; — the 
 amelioration of our system, if it can be called 
 a system, of Secondary Punishments. We shall 
 dispose of it, however, very briefly, both because 
 we have no specific enactments to propose, and 
 because the whole question is in much better 
 hands than our own. Those who can read the 
 jeports and evidence of the House of Commons 
 on this painful subject, and the two Letters of 
 Archbishop Whately, without being convinced 
 of its importance and urgency, will not be in- 
 fluenced by these pages. We will call the 
 attention of our readers to only one circum- 
 stance connected with it, and that merely be- 
 
 R
 
 130 
 
 cause it is of recent occurrence ; we mean the 
 influence of the Poor Law Amendment Act on 
 the temptations to crime. 
 
 One of the most striking results of the Poor 
 Law inquiry was the comparative scale of main- 
 tenance obtained by the independent agricultural 
 labourer, the pauper, the suspected thief, the 
 convicted thief, and the transported thief; a 
 scale rising from 122 ounces of food earned 
 weekly by the labourer, to 151 given to the 
 pauper, 181 to the prisoner before trial, 239 
 to the convict, and 330 to the transport. The 
 Poor Law Commissioners showed, that under the 
 late administration of the poor law, the pau- 
 per, in many districts, got an ample subsistence 
 at the price of little or nominal work, and they 
 inferred, as a necessary consequence, that the 
 independent labourer, who got rather less food 
 by hard labour, was in a less eligible situation 
 than that of the pauper ; and they further 
 inferred, that such a system must, in time, ruin 
 the industry of the labourers in those districts 
 in which it prevailed. This reasoning was 
 admitted by the legislature ; and therefore the 
 Poor Law Amendment Bill was passed, and the
 
 131 
 
 industry of our labourers protected from the 
 seductions of pauperism. But what is to become 
 of their honesty, if the convict, or even the 
 prisoner, is to take the place of the pauper as 
 the object of envy ; if the judge, instead of the 
 overseer, is to award relief; if it is felony, in- 
 stead of rags, that is to be the means of escaping 
 from honest industry? While the workhouse 
 was, as some of the witnesses termed it, a blessed 
 place, it afforded an asylum to those who, though 
 resolved not to work, preferred its rather scantier 
 fare, but comparative freedom, to the abundance 
 and restrictions of a prison. But what will be 
 our situation, if, while the allurements of the 
 workhouse are at an end, those of the gaol 
 continue ? Such a state of things would, in 
 one respect, resemble the Draconic system. 
 Death must practically be the only punishment, 
 when every thing else that bears that name ope- 
 rates rather as an incentive. And widely and 
 profusely, indeed, must that punishment be in- 
 flicted, if it is to supersede every other. An 
 amelioration of our present system of secon- 
 dary punishment is a necessary accompaniment, 
 we had almost said a necessary prelude, to every
 
 132 
 
 other measure intended to promote the improve- 
 ment of the labouring classes ; and particularly 
 so to the diminution of capital offences. Our 
 penal administration, even after all Sir Robert 
 Peel's amendments, remains a disgrace to an 
 European nation. It is sometimes revoltingly 
 cruel, sometimes mischievously lenient, always 
 enormously expensive and deplorably inefficient. 
 The penal law has already been made the subject 
 of a government inquiry. The mode in which 
 that law is applied demands inquiry far more. 
 We suspect that the gaols would furnish evidence 
 of weak and misguided benevolence, culpable 
 carelessness, timidity and indiscretion, quite as 
 striking as the workhouses. As for the penal 
 colonies, they show the rashness and obstinacy 
 of the successive governments which projected 
 them, in defiance of all reasoning, and which 
 have maintained them in defiance of all expe- 
 rience. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 •. CLAT, FBItilGa, BBEAD-STREET'HILL.
 
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