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JNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN 
 
 Issued Weekly 
 
 ol. XVI 
 
 December 30, 1918 
 
 No. 18 
 
 ntered as second-class matter December 11, 1912, at the post office at Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 
 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3. 
 1917, authorized July 31, 1918.] 
 
 Terrk^M Problems of the 
 
 f 
 
 Baltic Basin 
 
 BY 
 
 LAURENCE Mf" LARSON 
 
 Professor of History 
 
 PRICE TEN CENTS 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE WAR COMMITTEE 
 OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 URBANA 
 
TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS OF THE BALTIC BASIN. 
 
 In these days we often think of seas, rivers, and other waterways as 
 natural boundaries separating nations and peoples, and affording a 
 certain security against attack and invasion. But in earlier centuries, 
 in the age before strategic railways, this was not the prevailing belief. 
 Three generations ago the seas were not regarded as barriers: they were 
 connecting influences that served to bind states and regions together. 
 The sea has always been important as the great highway of commerce, 
 and it has also facilitated the exchange of beliefs and ideas. In the 
 past, nations have therefore been peculiarly interested in the seas that 
 washed their shores, and also in the other shores that were touched by 
 the same waters. 
 
 In spite of changed conditions of travel and transport, the interest 
 in waterways has persisted. Italy seems anxious to control both 
 shores of the Adriatic; and England feels that she must control the 
 entire circuit of the Irish Sea. No nation at present can hope to make 
 the Baltic Sea its own; but such ambitions have been cherished in the 
 past and at times almost realized. Four hundred years ago Denmark 
 was the greatest power on the “Eastern Sea.” In the seventeenth 
 century Sweden developed an even more complete hegemony in those 
 waters, but was forced to surrender it to the Russians early in the 
 eighteenth century. In recent years Germany has dominated the 
 Baltic, and for a year after the Russian collapse the shores and the ship- 
 ping of the entire sea was at her mercy. 
 
 It should be noted that Sweden has all her sea coast on these inland 
 waters, that Denmark and Prussia have a number of important ports 
 on the Baltic, and that in 1914 Russia, too, had a long “window” look- 
 ing out upon this same sea. Economically speaking, the Baltic region 
 is to a great extent a unit. In the years before the outbreak of the 
 Great War the exports of Russia were directed chiefly toward Germany, 
 from which country she also drew more than half of her imports. The 
 commerce of Sweden has always traveled chiefly eastward and south- 
 ward, to Russia and to Germany. It is therefore quite natural that 
 the peoples occupying the shores of this great waterway should be 
 interested in every important change that appears in any other part of 
 the basin. 
 
 There was great anxiety in Sweden when the Tsar began to mobil- 
 ize, and the Danes trembled when the Kaiser drew the sword But 
 now there is chaos in Russia and turmoil in Germany. And out of 
 
 2 
 
9V7. V 
 
 ■ 
 
 / 
 
 the confusion that prevails along the eastern and southern shores of 
 the Baltic basin have arisen a series of intricate territorial problems, 
 some of which appear to be almost incapable of satisfactory solutions. 
 
 North Sleswick 
 
 English and American writers have recently referred to a problem 
 of Sleswick-Holstein, to a Danish Alsace-Lorraine, the restoration of 
 which is said to be stoutly demanded in Denmark. It happens, however, 
 that there is no problem of Sleswick-Holstein, and the Danish Alsace- 
 Lorraine is a much smaller area than is usually described by those who 
 write on territorial peace problems. For a period of four hundred years 
 the kings of Denmark were also counts or dukes of Holstein; but Hol- 
 stein was never Danish either in race, language, or sentiment, and was 
 never a part of the kingdom of Denmark. 
 
 Sleswick, on the other hand, at one time actually did belong to 
 Denmark and it is a question whether it was not still a part of the 
 kingdom, when the German powers seized the two duchies, Sleswick and 
 Holstein, in 1864. There are Danes at present who wish to claim the 
 greater part or even the whole of Sleswick on historic grounds, but this 
 desire is not general. With the passing of % time the southern part of 
 the old duchy has become German in speech and sentiment, and the 
 Danish people do not care to annex or even to reannex territory the 
 population of which is of an alien nationality. 
 
 The case of North Sleswick is wholly different; this region has been 
 Danish and Danish only for more than a thousand years. The same is 
 true of parts of Mid Sleswick where both the German and the Danish 
 nationality are strongly represented. The Danes were glad in 1864 to 
 sever the old connection with Holstein; they yielded South Sleswick 
 with great reluctance; but the separation from North Sleswick has ever 
 since been a source of national grief. 
 
 The fact that Sleswick was not all German was recognized in the 
 treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866), by which the emperor of Austria, 
 yielded his rights in the conquered duchies to the king of Prussia. This 
 treaty stipulated that the inhabitants of “the northern districts of 
 Sleswick” should be allowed to decide by referendum whether their 
 country should continue a part of Prussia or be returned to Denmark. 
 No such referendum has ever been allowed. In 1878 Austria released 
 Prussia from this obligation; but the Danes of Sleswick insist that the 
 pledge is still a binding one and that the right of decision belongs to 
 them. 
 
 3 
 
The problem of North Sleswick is, therefore, not whether a certain 
 territory shall be restored to Denmark, but whether the inhabitants of 
 that region shall be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination 
 which was promised them more than fifty years ago. 
 
 Time and again the Danish members in the Reichstag have risen to 
 demand a referendum with refusal as the invariable result. During 
 the present war German opinion seems to have become more favorable 
 to the cause of the inhabitants of North Sleswick, who for more than 
 half a century have fought to maintain their nationality; but the policy 
 of the government has been more repressive than ever before: it was a 
 criminal act even to mention the Sleswick question in the public press. 
 To discuss the matter at a public meeting was also forbidden. 
 
 But early in Octo'ber, 1918, the citizens of North Sleswick were in- 
 formed by their representative in Berlin that the Prussian regime was 
 doomed and that the throne itself was tottering. A week later certain 
 important steps were taken preparatory to another demand for a ref- 
 erendum. When the German government announced that it was 
 willing to accept President Wilson’s peace program, the Sleswick Danes 
 felt that their day had arrived, and on October 23 the question of their 
 future status was brought up in the Reichstag. The secretary for 
 foreign affairs, Dr. Solf, denied vigorously that Denmark had any claim 
 on any part of the old duchy, but privately he informed the Sleswick 
 Danes that the government was disposed to grant their request. 
 
 A few days after the armistice had become a fact and Germany was 
 still in the throes of the revolution, the Sleswick Danes took action to 
 bring their case before the peace conference. The Electoral Union, 
 the political organ of the Danish part of the population, at a meeting 
 in Aabenraa (November 16) adopted a series of resolutions in which a 
 referendum was demanded and certain conditions laid down of which 
 the following are the most important: 
 
 (1) The southern boundary of North Sleswick is defined as a line 
 beginning at a point a few miles north of Flensborg and drawn in a 
 general westerly and slightly northwesterly direction across the penin- 
 sula. It is desired that the area north of this boundary shall vote as a 
 unit. 
 
 (2) It is also demanded that such adjacent districts in Mid Sleswick 
 as may wish to vote on the question of reannexation to Denmark shall 
 be permitted to do so. 
 
 (3) All men and women of the age of twenty or above who are 
 residents of the districts concerned (except Germans who have lived 
 
 4 
 
less than ten years in the country) shall be allowed to participate in 
 the referendum. Former residents who have been exiled by the Prus- 
 sian authorities shall also be allowed to vote. 
 
 The Danish government has been requested to present the case of 
 North Sleswick to the Allied powers and has consented to do so. It 
 seems extremely probable that the peace conference will take favorable 
 action. That North Sleswick will cast an overwhelming vote for reun- 
 ion with Denmark is beyond question. The referendum, if held, will 
 add at least 150,000 persons to the Danish population; if Mid Sleswick 
 is also allowed to participate, the number may exceed 200,000. It was 
 argued at the Aabenraa conference that the present anarchic conditions 
 in Germany are likely to influence the voters of Mid Sleswick very 
 strongly in the direction of a choice of allegiance to Denmark. But 
 the conference was also agreed that “we must not demand more than 
 what is really ours.” 
 
 The Kiel Canal 
 
 It has been urged by certain influential English editors and states- 
 men that not only the Danish-speaking part of Sleswick but the entire 
 province of Sleswick-Holstein should be transferred to Denmark. The 
 origin of this suggestion lies in an effort to find a satisfactory solution 
 for the problem of the Kiel Canal. For there seems to be a strong 
 feeling in certain quarters that Germany must be deprived of the con- 
 trol of this waterway. 
 
 The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (usually called the Kiel Canal) begins 
 at Brunsbiittel at the mouth of the Elbe River and terminates at Halte- 
 nau on the Baltic Sea, two or three miles north of Kiel. Brunsbiittel 
 is in Holstein, while Haltenau is just within the boundary of Sleswick. 
 For a distance of twenty miles or more (between Rendsborg and Halte- 
 nau) the canal runs very close to or along the border separating the two 
 old duchies; for a short distance it cuts through what has always been 
 Sleswick territory. 
 
 The annexation of the entire province would consequently place the 
 Danes in possession of the entire canal. The annexation of Sleswick 
 alone might, perhaps, be sufficient, as it would make the canal an inter- 
 national waterway. Such an arrangement would leave the Germans in 
 possession of the greater part of it, but the Danes would control the 
 Baltic terminal, and they would also share to some extent in the control 
 of the traffic on the canal because of its character as a waterway on the 
 boundary. Shortly after the armistice had been proclaimed a writer 
 
 5 
 
in the London Times suggested that the real problem in Sleswick is not 
 North but South Sleswick. Though he realized that objections would 
 be raised to the plan, he argued that the necessities of the situation de- 
 mand that Denmark should assert her right to all of ancient Sleswick. 
 South Sleswick might be given a large measure of political and cultural 
 autonomy, but it should become an integral part of the Danish king- 
 dom. The writer added that the annexation of the whole of Sleswick 
 would give Denmark a strategic boundary, of which that country 
 seems to be in real need. 
 
 There are, however, several excellent reasons why such a transfer of 
 territory should not be made, any one of which should be sufficient to 
 defeat the project. 
 
 (1) It violates the principle of nationalism: what is Danish should 
 be Danish; what is German must be permitted to remain German. A 
 lasting peace cannot be built on the disregard of this principle. If 
 South Sleswick should declare her willingness to renew the old allegiance, 
 that would be another matter; but such a decision is quite unlikely. 
 
 (2) The Danes do not desire to renew the old relationship with 
 Holstein. From its very beginning this connection was a source of 
 trouble and even of danger. The revolt of 1848 and the calamities of 
 1864 can be traced directly to the plottings of the intellectuals and the 
 junkers of Holstein and German Sleswick. But complete annexation, 
 such as is suggested at present, would be far more dangerous to Denmark 
 than was the old personal union, for it would mean the addition of a 
 German element numbering nearly 1,500,000 to a Danish population 
 counting a little more than 2,700,000. It is quite clear that Denmark 
 could not accept a gift of this sort without endangering the peace of 
 the kingdom and the future of the Danish nationality. 
 
 (3) The Danes have scarcely sufficient military strength to be 
 entrusted with the guardianship of so important a waterway as the 
 Kiel Canal. It has been argued that in time of war it could easily be de- 
 stroyed, if the Danes should find themselves unable to hold it. The 
 Kiel Canal was, indeed, built for military purposes chiefly; but it is also 
 of great commercial value, and it is to the interest of the world that it 
 be kept intact. In the past it has been used mainly by German ships, 
 but it has also been utilized to some extent by those of other nations. 
 
 (4) It is not possible to find a strategic boundary for Denmark 
 that would be of any particular value. Perhaps the most satisfactory 
 would be the old “Danework” line between the Sley inlet and the 
 Trene River; but this would leave the Kiel Canal wholly within German 
 
 6 
 
territory. It should be noted that Denmark is broken up into frag- 
 ments, all of which can be readily isolated. Real strategic boundaries 
 are therefore impossible in this case. 
 
 If the Kiel Canal is to be taken away from the Germans, some form 
 of international control will have to be devised. This is by no means 
 an ideal arrangement, but it seems likely that the peace conference will 
 find many other problems, especially where waterways are in question, 
 that will admit of no other solution. 
 
 Finland 
 
 By the treaty of Brest-Litovsk (signed March 3, 1918) the Bolshevik 
 government formally surrendered a broad strip of territory lying along 
 the western frontier of the Russian empire from the Arctic regions to 
 the Sea of Azov. In parts of this great area nationalistic movements 
 had been in active progress for some months or years; in others the 
 demand for separation from Russia appears to have been artificially 
 created to promote the plans of the Pan-Germanists. 
 
 When the armistice was agreed upon last November, one of the 
 conditions laid down by the Allies was that the German government 
 should repudiate the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Technically, therefore, 
 Russia may be said to have recovered her territorial rights in the west 
 and southwest, except in the case of Finland, the independence of 
 which was recognized by the Bolsheviki at Brest-Litovsk early in March, 
 1918. But the facts and conditions are not what they were in the earlier 
 months of 1918; governments have been set up in the various units 
 surrendered at Brest-Litovsk, five or six in all; and some of these are 
 likely to receive recognition at the peace conference. 
 
 Among those that will probably survive is the new state of Finland. 
 From 1808 to 1917 the Finns were counted among the subjects of the 
 Russian Tsar. Constitutionally Finland was an independent grand 
 duchy united with Russia in the person of the emperor; practically this 
 meant merely that the grand duchy occupied a privileged position 
 amon£ the many dominions of the Tsar. During the last twenty-five 
 years of the union the Russians were actively seeking to obliterate all 
 traces on Finnish independence and to “Russify” the country. This 
 led to determined opposition on the part of the Finns, and when the 
 Great War broke out the young men of Finland left their homes in large 
 numbers, stole across the Baltic to Sweden, and ultimately found their 
 way into the German army. 
 
 When tsardom collapsed, early in 1917, the Finns seized the opportu- 
 nity to assert their independence. They contended that the union 
 
 7 
 
with Russia was wholly personal and that when the imperial office was 
 abolished, all connection with the Russian government automatically 
 terminated. After a period of civil war between the Bolshevik elements 
 and the more conservative classes, the middle class groups with the 
 assistance of German forces were able to organize a government of the 
 conservative type and with leanings toward Germany. A monarchical 
 form of government was agreed upon and the crown was offered to a 
 Hessian prince, a brother-in-law of the Kaiser. Then came the German 
 collapse with serious results for the plans of the Finnish monarchists. 
 A change in government became inevitable and the country is at present 
 administered by a senate counting seven monarchists and six republi- 
 cans. It is significant that the new regent, General Mannerheim, tele- 
 graphed his acceptance of the office from London. 
 
 Thus far the French government alone of the Allies has recognized 
 the new state. A vigorous propaganda has been carried on to prevent 
 further recognition and to induce France to rescind her action; but this 
 is not likely to be successful. The probabilities favor the general recog- 
 nition of an independent Finland at a reasonably early date. 
 
 The Finnish problem at the peace conference is chiefly one of bound- 
 aries. Finland as a political unit is a product of Swedish imperialism. 
 The Swedes began their career of conquest east of the Baltic in the 
 twelfth century, and they held the grand duchy continually to the 
 earlier years of the nineteenth century. But they never came into 
 control of all the regions inhabited by Finns: east of their borders lived 
 a considerable number of that race (Karelians) who had accepted 
 Russian rule and civilization and were adherents of the Greek Orthodox 
 church. 
 
 During the past year the government at Helsingfors has asked 
 that all eastern Karelia be transferred to Finland, and that the limits of 
 that country be extended eastward to Lake Onega and northward to 
 the Arctic Ocean. This suggestion naturally found no favor at Moscow. 
 The Bolsheviki, in whom the passions of national feeling and patriotism 
 are not strong, might conceivably be induced to surrender the territories 
 between Finland and the great lakes; but the great peninsula north of 
 the White Sea they will scarcely be willing to yield. The Murman 
 (Norman) coast and Kola peninsula are almost without economic value 
 and resources; they comprise a vast frozen area almost uninhabited 
 except for a few nomadic Lapps and roving Karelians. But the Mur- 
 man coast has an ice-free harbor, and Russia has lost more ports than 
 she can afford to lose. 
 
 8 
 
About sixty miles east of the Norwegian frontier on Kola Bay lies 
 Alexandrowsk (Catherine Harbor) where ships may enter and leave at 
 almost any time of the year. In 1915 the serious military situation (the 
 Baltic and the Black Sea were both closed by the enemy) forced Russia 
 to carry out an old plan which called for a railway from Petrograd to 
 Catherine Harbor. If the claims of the Finnish state are allowed, Rus- 
 sia will lose Catherine Harbor and about one hundred and fifty miles of 
 the Murman railway. She will have but one remaining port on the 
 Arctic: Archangel, which is ice-bound nine months of the year. 
 
 The conflict between Helsingfors and Moscow thus involves two 
 separate problems: eastern Karelia and the Murman coast. The Kare- 
 lians outside Finland number about 350,000; most of them live between 
 the Finnish boundary and the Murman railway. In this case the 
 principle of nationalism may perhaps come into collision with the 
 principle of self-determination. Being of the same racial stock as the 
 western Karelians, they ought, it would seem, to take gladly to the 
 suggestion that their country be joined to Finland. But if they are 
 allowed to decide by referendum it is not at all sure that they will vote 
 to separate from Russia. The civilization of Finland is Swedish and 
 the religion is of the Lutheran type; while in eastern Karelia the faith 
 and the civilization of Russia have ruled the minds for at least six cen- 
 turies. 
 
 The problem of the Murman coast is essentially economic. It 
 means that the Finns are determined to secure an outlet on the Arctic,, 
 which they have never had. As long as Finland promised to remain 
 under German influence, the neighboring states of Norway and Sweden 
 were reluctant to see Finland extend her territories to the frozen sea; 
 but as the situation is at present they are not likely to interpose any~ 
 objections, provided that their own territories be left intact. 
 
 The Aland Islands 
 
 Finland has long been a land of strife. Recently it was the bour- 
 goisie against the Bolsheviki; earlier it was the Finn contending against 
 the Russian; still earlier it was Turanian Finn against Swedish Fin- 
 lander. The Swedish element in Finland is not great numerically: 
 about 400,000 in a population of about 3,250,000. But it controls to a 
 large extent the wealth of the country; in earlier days the Swedes were 
 the ruling class, and even at the present day their political influence is. 
 far out of proportion to their numbers. 
 
 9 
 
The Swedes probably entered Finland by way of the Aland archi- 
 pelago. The Alands are a group of rocks and small islands lying across 
 the entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia; only one (Aland) is of any appre- 
 ciable size. They approach to within twenty miles of the Swedish coast 
 and form a natural series of stepping stones to the FinnisTi mainland. 
 Geographically they may be regarded as fragments of the Finnish land 
 mass; but they have been inhabited by Swedes as long as their history 
 can be traced. There is at present a strong, almost unanimous senti- 
 ment on the islands in favor of a reunion with Sweden. 
 
 The material value of the Aland Islands is very slight. The inhabi- 
 tants (about 15,000 in number) are chiefly farmers, sailors, and fisher- 
 folk, subsisting on what they can wrest from a thin soil or gather from 
 the waters about them. The importance of the islands in European 
 diplomacy is due to their strategic position with reference to the capi- 
 tals of Sweden, Finland, and Russia. The harbor facilities are good 
 and the islands possess real possibilities as a military stronghold. The 
 Russians soon came to see the advantage of a naval station at Aland and 
 erected fortifications at Bomarsund, which were destroyed by the Eng- 
 lish and the French in the Crimean War. On the request of Sweden, 
 Russia agreed not to rebuild the fortifications, and Aland remained 
 unfortified until some time after the outbreak of the Great War. 
 
 As Stockholm is only seventy-five miles distant, any plan to build a 
 naval establishment on the Alands is sure to produce uneasiness in 
 Sweden. For similar reasons Finland and Russia are anxious that the 
 archipelago shall not fall into the hands of the Swedes. Soon after 
 the outbreak of the Finnish revolution a Swedish force landed on the 
 islands ostensibly to maintain order; but they were sdon displaced by 
 German garrisons. At Brest-Litovsk it was agreed that the islands 
 should belong to Finland, but also that they should never be fortified 
 and that the shipping conditions in the waters about them should be 
 regulated by a special agreement among the nations most interested: 
 Germany, Sweden, Finland, and Russia. 
 
 . The efforts of Sweden to gain control of the archipelago and the evi- 
 dent desire of the inhabitants to be reunited with the mother country 
 has caused much uneasiness and resentment among the Finns. The 
 feeling that the Alands must remain a part of Finland is shared by the 
 Swedish Finlanders as well as by the Turanian Finns. The former 
 have organized a separate political party the object of which is to secure 
 Swedish nationalism in Finland and they call loudly to their brethren 
 
 10 
 
'on the islands not to desert them but to remain with them and help 
 them in the struggle that is sure to come. 
 
 The program recently published by the Swedish party in Finland 
 does not promise a wholly peaceful development in the new state. It 
 calls for equal rights for the two languages, Swedish and Finnish, and 
 for equal opportunities for each in the schools of the land. It also 
 calls for the creation of new administrative areas in order that the 
 regions occupied by Swedish Finlanders may be formed into compact 
 ’territorial units. For these units an extensive autonomy is demanded 
 and it is also suggested that the Swedish churches should be grouped 
 into a separate diocese. The Swedes also demand what virtually 
 amounts to a distinct organization for their part of the army and the 
 navy. But these demands (some of them, at least) are sure to meet 
 ^strenuous opposition from the Turanian Finns. 
 
 The problem of the Aland Islands, though in large part a military 
 consideration, is involved in the nationalistic conflict between Swedes 
 and Finns. The Swedish Finlanders cannot afford to weaken their 
 ^strength by surrendering the islands to Sweden. The Finns on their 
 -side are anxious to prevent the Swedish boundary from approaching 
 the Finnish mainland. 
 
 The Esthonians and the Letts 
 
 South of the Gulf of Finland lie the Baltic Provinces, a broad strip 
 of coast land extending to the frontiers of Prussia. There are three 
 provinces in this group: Esthonia, Livonia, and Courland. Their com- 
 bined area is about 36,000 square miles, and they have a total popula- 
 tion of approximately 3,000,000. There is scarcely any other region in 
 Europe that offers more serious problems than this strip of coast on the 
 cast side of the Baltic. 
 
 All the great states in the Baltic basin have at some time or other 
 held possessions on the eastern shore. In the thirteenth century the 
 .^greater part of the Provinces was held by the Danes. Later in the 
 same century came the Teutonic Knights, a crusading order that was 
 looking for a new field for their military and religious activities. Dur- 
 ing the sixteenth and the seventeenth century the Swedes came into 
 possession of Esthonia and Livonia, while Courland (1561) was united 
 to Poland. Ultimately the whole region was annexed to Russia. Ex- 
 cepting the Danes, whose occupation was for a brief period only, these 
 conquering peoples have left deep traces on the history, the intellectual 
 ..life, and the civilization of these three little states. 
 
 11 
 
The earliest known inhabitants of this region were the Letts, an 
 ancient people closely related to the Lithuanian stock. The Letts and 
 the Lithuanians must have come into this part of Europe long before 
 the arrival of either the German or the Slav; their language is very 
 ancient: it is said that “almost any Lithuanian peasant can understand 
 simple phrases in Sanskrit” (the language of ancient India). 
 
 Soon after the beginning of the Christian era the Finns entered the 
 country from central Russia. The Letts and the Finns are still the 
 dominant races in the Baltic Provinces. The Letts occupy the country 
 from the Gulf of Riga eastward: Courland and the southern half of 
 Livonia. The Finns (Esthonians) inhabit the remainder of the Prov- 
 inces: Esthonia and the northern half of Livonia. There is no longer 
 a Livonian people. 
 
 Scattered throughout the three Provinces are small groups of other 
 peoples, Germans, Slavs, Swedes, Jews and mixed races. Of these the 
 German element is the most important and also the most ancient, 
 dating, as it does, from the time when the Teutonic Knights controlled 
 the land. Until quite recently the German nobility was the land- 
 owning class in the rural districts; the German merchants controlled 
 the trade in the cities; German scholars manned the institutions of 
 higher learning; and German clergymen of the Lutheran faith directed 
 the affairs of the church and the primary schools. The Germans com- 
 prised only from five to ten per cent of the total population; but their 
 importance in the public life of the Letts and the Esthonians was very 
 great. 
 
 In the treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenine and his associates were com- 
 pelled to surrender the Baltic shore-land. It is not known just what 
 the Prussians intended to do with the Provinces, but it is clear that 
 they planned to organize them in such a way as to bring them into 
 some sort of a vassal relationship to the German empire. The Prussian 
 expansionists realized that it would be unwise to add extensive alien 
 elements to the German citizenship; but they believed it possible to 
 annex the Baltic lands (with other neighboring regions) to the economic 
 system of the Fatherland without seeming to impair their national 
 rights. The extension of the German strategic railway system from 
 the east Prussian border to the Gulf of Finland, perhaps even to some 
 port on the Arctic, and the admission of the Baltic states to the project- 
 ed Mid-European tariff union would give the commercial interests of 
 Germany an unassailable position on the east coast of the Baltic Sea. 
 
 Economic dependence naturally carries with it a certain measure of 
 
 12 
 
political vassalage. Military alliances and the election of German 
 princes to Baltic thrones were also important items in the Pan-German 
 program. During the summer of 1918 several princelings from the 
 lesser German states held themselves in readiness to accept crowns or 
 coronets in the conquered lands. It was reported at one time that the 
 Kaiser thought seriously of assuming the title duke of Courland. 
 
 At the conclusion of the recent armistice it was stipulated that the 
 Germans should withdraw the forces that were still being kept in regions 
 formerly belonging to Russia. When this became known the inhabi- 
 tants of the Provinces began to look forward to national independence. 
 There was already a working governmental organization among the 
 Esthonians, and late in November the Letts proclaimed a republic in 
 Riga to be known as Lettland. It was announced that it was to be a 
 state primarily for native Letts and that no German Balts were to be 
 admitted to office in the ministry. At the same time one Karl Kull- 
 mann (or Ullmann) was appointed prime minister; if his name is an 
 indication, the new regent of Lettland is surely not innocent of Teuton- 
 ic ancestry. 
 
 When the German forces began to retire, the Letts and the Esthon- 
 ians suddenly found themselves facing a new danger from the east. 
 On the heels of the retreating- Teutons came the hosts of the Bolsheviki, 
 who had seized the opportunity to begin a vigorous campaign of recon- 
 quest. In the neighborhood of Narva the Red army met a decisive 
 defeat, however, and the invasion seems, at this writing, to have been 
 checked, though perhaps only temporarily. The Finns apparently 
 came to the assistance of their Esthonian kinsmen and the Swedes ap- 
 pear to have shown some interest in the cause of the Letts. But the 
 situation remains very precarious: the Russian forces are evidently 
 undisciplined and inefficient; but they are strong in numbers and it is 
 doubtful whether the Baltic levies can defeat another offensive. 
 
 The future of this region is therefore extremely uncertain. There 
 are no indications as to how the controlling minds at the peace con- 
 ference regard the problems of the old Russian frontier; consequently, 
 all that can be done at present is to indicate a few of the more probable 
 solutions. 
 
 (1) The Provinces may be restored to Russia. There seems to be 
 a Bolshevik element in the Baltic lands which naturally favors some sort 
 of a reunion with the great neighbor to the east. In the earlier days of 
 the Lenine regime, the “people’s commissioners” depended largely on 
 the military services of the “Lettish guard,” a force of Lettish soldiers 
 
 13 
 
with strong revolutionary tendencies. But this element is probably! 
 not a numerous one, as the population of the Provinces is chiefly agri- 
 cultural, and the problem of the land has been to some extent solved by 
 the extension of a system of peasant proprietorship. 
 
 There is, indeed, something to be said for reunion with Russia. The 
 war has left Russia in great need of commercial outlets. The best 
 ports on the Black Sea have been seized by the Ukrainians; and in the 
 Baltic region a single port remains: Petrograd, which is ice-bound for 
 several months of the year. Practically the only ice-free port remain- 
 ing within the borders of Russia is Catherine Harbor on the Arctic 
 coast. The Bolshevik mind may be deficient in patriotism but it no 
 doubt understands the importance of commercial outlets and the 
 economic value of ice-free ports. In the Baltic Provinces there are at least 
 six fair harbors, all of which have a longer period of navigation than 
 Petrograd. Of these the best known is Riga, though it is less important 
 than Libau, which is open for navigation every month in the year. 
 
 It is quite evident that Russia needs the Baltic ports, but it is also 
 clear that these ports are in real need of Russia. Their prosperity has 
 in large measure been built up on the commerce of the vast plain to 
 the east and if means should be found to divert this trade to another 
 series of ports, there would be economic distress along the whole shore 
 from Libau to Narva. 
 
 (2*) They may be allowed to torganize themselves into two inde- 
 pendent states (as appears to be their desire), in which case the common 
 boundary would probably be the Salis River, a small stream that ap- 
 proximately separates the Esthonian settlements from those of the 
 Letts. It is a grave question whether these two peoples have sufficient 
 strength and resources to maintain a self-respecting existence. At the 
 highest the population of the proposed Lettland will not exceed 2,000,- 
 000, while that of Esthonia will be less than 1,000,000. It would 
 seem that such an arrangement must mean serious difficulties in the 
 future. 
 
 (3) Esthonia may decide to join Finland. Recent years have seen 
 the development of a strong national feeling among the Esthonians, but 
 being, after all, a branch of the Finnish race, they ought to be able to 
 live in reasonable happiness with their brothers in a greater Finland. 
 If the Finns are permitted to annex Karelia to the east and Esthonia 
 to the south, their country will have a population of approximately 
 5 , 000 , 000 . 
 
 14 
 
(4) The Letts may be asked to join forces with their Lithuanian 
 kinsmen in a revived Lithuanian state. Six hundred years ago Lithua- 
 nia had a period of greatness, her area covering an extensive region east 
 of Poland between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Since then a consid- 
 erable part of the Lithuanian race has been absorbed into the Slavic 
 mass; there have also been strong currents of emigration from the 
 Lithuanian territories to Siberia and to other parts of Russia and even 
 to lands across the Atlantic. At present the Lithuanian popula- 
 tion in its native territories numbers less than 3,500,000. 
 
 The Lithuanian area is not extensive, perhaps not more than 30,000 
 square miles. The future of this region has not been much discussed; 
 the organization of a Lithuanian state has been urged and is within the 
 realm of the possible; but it is not a promising solution, especially if 
 the Letts should insist on establishing a separate state. 
 
 For several centuries the Lithuanians and in part also the Letts 
 were subjects of the king of Poland. It is possible that they might be 
 induced to renew this historic relationship, though it is doubtful, since 
 racially Poles and Lithuanians have nothing in common. They will, 
 however, have common rivals and perhaps enemies to the east and the 
 west, and such a union may in time be forced by circumstances, as it 
 was forced in the middle ages. An arrangement of this sort would add 
 considerably to the strength of Poland, and, what is more important, 
 it would give the Poles a satisfactory commercial outlet on the Baltic. 
 
 Danzig 
 
 As a result of the Great War and the consequent readjustment of 
 frontiers, several important European states are likely to find them- 
 selves deprived of direct access to the sea. These are German Austria, 
 Hungary, Bohemia (the republic of the Czechs and Slovaks), and 
 Poland. In the case of German Austria this condition may be reme- 
 died by the admission of the Austrian territories to the new German 
 republic; but for Bohemia and Hungary the only solution of this diffi- 
 culty appears to be an economic arrangement with some neighboring 
 state. 
 
 It is possible, as suggested above, that Poland may be able to reach 
 the sea through the lands of the Letts and the Lithuanians. The Poles 
 hope, however, to secure a shorter and more direct route by way of the 
 Vistula. Libau and Riga are, indeed, desirable ports; but from the Polish 
 viewpoint Danzig at the mouth of the Vistula is the natural outlet. 
 
 The Poles insist that the Vistula is a Polish river and should therefore 
 
 , 15 
 
be under their control throughout its entire course. It is true that 
 both banks of this river have a Polish population to a point some dis- 
 tance below Thorn or about one hundred miles from its mouth. Along 
 the lower course between Thorn and the Baltic, the Polish population 
 occupies a narrow tongue of land from twenty to fifty miles wide lying 
 along the west bank of the river, while the opposite bank is occupied 
 a’most exclusively by Germans. The Poles insist that this strip of 
 territory is not only essentially Polish, but is also necessary to their 
 economic life and to the successful defense of their country; they de- 
 mand, therefore, that it be included in the revived Polish state. 
 
 This area was for several centuries a part of the Polish kingdom but 
 was taken by the Prussians in the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth 
 century. To return what territory is still Polish in speech and senti- 
 ment, seems, therefore, a matter of justice merely. There are, however, 
 certain facts and conditions that must be taken seriously into account 
 before the left bank of the Vistula is definitely handed over to the 
 Polish state. 
 
 (1) The tongue of land in question lies wholly within the territory 
 of Prussia; if it is annexed to Poland that part of Germany east of the 
 Vistula will be separated completely from the rest of the Fatherlai^b 
 It is inconceivable that the Germans will remain satisfied with this 
 condition. The Poles are consequently likely to find that the pos- 
 session of this strip is a danger as well as an advantage. In case of 
 war with Germany it could not be successfully defended.' 
 
 (2) The territory, while largely Polish in population, is not exclu- 
 sively so; it has a strong German minority which in certain sections is 
 almost as strong as the Slavic majority. This is particularly true of the 
 cities where the Germans are, in places, even the more numerous element. 
 
 (3) The region would lose much of its economic value to Poland 
 unless Danzig were included. But Danzig is essentially a German 
 city, nine-tenths of the population being German in race and speech.* 
 Through most of its history Danzig has been German rather than 
 Polish; though for a long time it was counted as a part of the Polish 
 kingdom, its relationship to that state was almost wholly nominal, as 
 it enjoyed privileges which made it practically a self-governing republic. 
 
 At the same time it must be remembered that the prosperity of Dan- 
 zig is based largely on the great trade that flows toward it from the 
 valley of the Vistula. And it must not be forgotten that the disposal 
 of the tongue of land between Thorn and Danzig involves the political 
 fate of more than 500,000 Poles. 
 
 16