THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF ILLINOIS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 332 
 
 ■B8T6 
 
 V.9
 
 mMmmm.'m::^:

 
 FINANCIAL REMARKS,
 
 n 
 
 \ 
 
 DEMONSTRATION; 
 
 FINANCIAL REMARKS: 
 
 OCCASIONAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
 political 0tmttmtts* 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANCIS PERCEVAL ELIOT, ESQ. 
 
 *' Dicenda^ demonstranda, explicanda sunt Omnia.^^ 
 
 Cicero. 
 
 JLonlion: 
 
 PRINTED FOR 
 JOHN CAWTHORN, NO. 5, CATHERINE STREET, STRAND, 
 
 Bookseller to Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales. 
 1807.
 
 T. COLLINS, PRINTER, HARVEY's BUILDINGS, STRAND.
 
 
 FINANCIAL REMARKS, 
 
 IN the present state of European policy, when 
 the contest is not so much that of men as of 
 money, and at a moment when the superior opu- 
 lence of the British Empire enables it not only to 
 assert its own independence, but to afTord, with a 
 liberal hand, to others the means of recovering 
 what they, unhappily, have lost; it is, perhaps, 
 almost unnecessary to offer any apology to the 
 public for expatiating on that, concerning which 
 although so much has already been said and writ- 
 ten, it is hardly possible to say or write a word 
 too much, provided that word can in any way 
 tend to elucidate a subject so complicated in its 
 nature, and so difficult to understand; yet so vi- 
 tally essential to the prosperity of our country to 
 be thoroughly understood. I trust, however, that 
 in perusing the following pages it will be found
 
 [6] 
 
 that the facts therein discussed, have been regarded 
 with an eye not very inattentive to the import- 
 ance of the question^ or to the correctness of the 
 unavoidably minute, dry, and, to most readers, te- 
 dious details, into which I am necessitated to enter, 
 in order to render my view of the matter clear 
 and intelligible to those who have not had either 
 time or opportunity to wade through the mass of 
 calculation it has been my task to encounter in 
 the course of my pursuit. Finance is, perhaps, 
 of all subjects that in which the hrevis esse Jahoro is 
 in most danger of the obscurus jio; and the time 
 which has been employed to obtain decision, can 
 never be stigmatised as useless delay, unless it can 
 be proved that the object was matter of non-es- 
 sential form; the discrimination between which 
 and the essential spirit of any question whilst it 
 draws the boundary line betwixt talent and dul- 
 ness, at once serves to distinguish the man of 
 business from the mere plodder. In the present 
 discussion, the absolute necessity of bringing for- 
 ward the positive proof of mathematical demon- 
 stration, step by step, as we proceed, is too 
 self-evident to require any further apology for 
 minuteness or apparent prolixity. 
 
 In considering certain positions advanced by 
 Dr. Price, in his observations on the National 
 Debt, which for want of sufficient clearness in the 
 manner of their being stated, seemed to me to
 
 en 
 
 wear a prima facie appearance of paradoxical in- 
 correctness, I attempted to lay down for my own 
 assistance and information some ascertained and 
 general rule for calculating the operations of the 
 sinking fund in the reduction of loans, under all 
 those varied circumstances which may be expected 
 to attend the liquidation of a public debt to any 
 amount. In the accomplishment of this deside- 
 ratum I was greatly assisted by a very able officer* 
 of my department; on whose skill in aiilhnietic, 
 and mathematical correctness I had reason, from 
 my official experience, to place more dependence 
 than on my own. The produce of our joint la- 
 bours is exemplified in the Formula A, Appendix 
 No. 1 ; and having tried it in a great variety of 
 operations, 1 can with perfect confidence recom- 
 mend it to general use, as a simple, clear, satis- 
 factory, and unfailing method of computing the 
 period necessary for the extinction of any loan, 
 at any given price of stock, at any rate of interest, 
 with any proportion of allowance by way of sink- 
 ing fund, and at any number of equal and perio- 
 dical reductions in the year. To this are added, 
 in the same Appendix, the rules B, for ascertain- 
 ing the total sum paid by the borrower for the 
 stock capital and interest, during the period of 
 
 * Mr. Englebach, late assistant.commi=;sary on the Con- 
 tinent, and in Egypt.
 
 [8] 
 
 liquidation ; C for finding the total cost of the 
 sterling amount of the last mentioned sum ; and 
 D for giving the same, allowing for the additional 
 cost of the difference occasioned by the excess of 
 the average rate of redemption above that of in- 
 vestment. 
 
 By the above rules was constructed the Table of 
 Results, Appendix No. 2, exhibiting by twenty- 
 five (selected out of upwards of fifty), different 
 operations, (which may by the same Jormiil^ be 
 varied ad infinitum^, the period required for the 
 redemption of 1 oo/. stock, under as many distinct 
 proportions of interest, sinking fund, and average 
 prices of investment and redemption ; with the 
 total proportional cost of redeeming 1 oo/. sterling 
 under the same correspondent conditions. 
 
 From an attentive reference to the above-men- 
 tioned table, were drawn the following general, 
 and I think, incontrovertible conclusions : 
 
 First, That loans invested and reduced in the 
 several funds at s, 4, and 5 per cent, interest, at 
 a stock price proportioned in both respects to the 
 different rates of interest, but all bearing the 
 same rate of annual allowance for redemption by 
 way of sinking fund, will take a longer time for 
 liquidation, and cost the public a larger sum in 
 the aggregate for capital and interest, proportion- 
 ably to the higher rate of the latter; supposing 
 as before mentioned the stock price to be at all
 
 [9] 
 
 times proportionably higher according to the 
 rate. 
 
 In proof of which see Table, Examples 1 , 8, and 
 17; or 2, 9, and 1 8, compared with each other. 
 
 Secondly^ That the same sums invested and re- 
 deemed in the several funds at the same propor- 
 tionate prices as before stated and bearing the 
 like proportions of interest, but with an annual 
 allowance of sinking fund proportioned by the 
 sterling value of the sum borrowed, will be re- 
 deemed in precisely the same period of time and 
 will cost exactly the same sum to the public the 
 one as the other, whether invested in a 3, 4, or 5 
 per cent, stock. 
 
 For which see Examples i , l o, and 19; or 2, 
 11, and 20. 
 
 Thirdly, That loans invested in one and the same 
 fund, but at different prices, provided they are 
 redeemed at the original price of their several 
 investments, will cost nearly the same sum to the 
 public ; but will take a longer time in reducing, 
 proportioned to the higher price of the stock, 
 though imposing a smaller annual burthen on the 
 nation during that period. 
 
 As vide Examples 1 and 3 ; or 4 and 16. 
 
 Fourthly, That if several loans of equal amount 
 are invested in the same stock at the same price 
 of investment, and of redemption, but with dif- 
 B
 
 [10] 
 
 ferent allowances for sinking fund, those carrying 
 the higher proportion of sinking fund will be re- 
 deemed at an earlier period and at a smaller 
 expence to government, in the aggregate ; though 
 requiring a larger annual expenditure for the 
 time. 
 
 As vide Examples 4 and 6 ; 9 and 1 1 ; 1 7 and 1 9. 
 
 Fifthly, That the monied men prefer the ad- 
 vancing of sums on loans in a s per cent, stock to 
 any other; as well on account of a great expected 
 rise on capital in time of peace as because of 
 thereby avoiding the danger of a reduction of 
 interest or of being paid off at par, to both of 
 which a 4 per cent, stock is liable, and one at 
 5 per cent, still more so; all of which causes 
 operate in favor of the 3 per cents, and make 
 them bear a higher price at all times, cseterk pari- 
 bus, in proportion to the supposed greater degree 
 of security. 
 
 But that it would be greatly in favor of govern- 
 ment so to equalize the different stocks, as to 
 have the option of funding in one with the same 
 powers of redemption as in the others ; which is 
 at present prevented by the reasons stated to exist 
 in the first of these conclusions. 
 
 Sixthly, That the results exemplified in the 
 third conclusion sufficiently prove the great neces- 
 sity of being enabled to avoid all violent and sud- 
 den fluctuations in the stock price of capitals;
 
 [11 ] 
 
 either by a great fall as prejudi'^ial to ceconomical 
 investment, or by a rise of equal magnitude as 
 retarding the period of redemption ; exclusively 
 of the consideration due to the shocks, which must 
 unavoidably be given to public credit and national 
 security, by every abrupt alteration in the value 
 of the circulating medium. 
 
 Seventhly, That therefore all wild ard precipi- 
 tate schemes for the total extinction, or even 
 partial liquidation, to any considerable amount, 
 at one time, of the national debt would be unwise 
 and dangerous. 
 
 Eighthly, That it would nevertheless be greatly 
 desirable for the minister of finance to have at all 
 times in his power the ability to take a discreet 
 and seasonable advantage of peaceful times, by 
 placing the government of his country in as fair 
 a state of relation to its creditors, as the private 
 debtor is enabled to put himself into, with regard 
 to those who have heretofore given him credit. 
 
 Ninthly, That this can only be done by funding 
 in a stock bearing a high rate of interest; which 
 from its superior value of capital and earlier ex- 
 ceeding of the par price may enable him to offer 
 to the proprietors an alternative of receiving a 
 lower rate of interest, or of being paid off at par. 
 
 Tenthly, That in order to afford this facility to 
 the option of funding in any of the stocks with
 
 [12] 
 
 equal advantage, it is necessary to give an equal 
 power of redemption in the whole. 
 
 Eleventhly, That the only bar to this at present 
 appears evidently to arise from the same annual 
 allowance of sinking fund being given to a 3 per 
 cent, stock bearing a sterling value* of about 60/. 
 as to a 4 per cent, worth 76/. or to a 5 per cent, 
 valued at 96/.; thereby protracting the period of 
 redemption, and enhancing the total cost of the 
 two latter; as already proved by Examples 1, 4, 
 and 12; or 2, 5, and 1 3 ; and that therefore it 
 would be highly beneficial to remove such impe- 
 diment from the future system of liquidation. 
 
 Twelfthly, That in compliance with the discre- 
 tion recommended in the sixth of these conclu- 
 sions, it would be safer to leave the existing debt 
 to the undisturbed operation of the present rapidly 
 accumulating sinking fund, particularly as the 
 far larger proportion of the debt already funded is 
 in the stock bearing an interest of 3 per cent.; 
 which in its present state carries the same sinking 
 fund as it would do under the system to be recom- 
 mended. 
 
 Thirteenthly, That in order to introduce^ a 
 prospective remedy for this radical defect in the 
 higher clas§ of capitals, it would be expedient to 
 
 * January, 1807.
 
 [13] 
 
 bring in a bill for transferring in all future loans 
 the proportion of annual allowance to be raised 
 by way of sinking fund, from the capital created 
 to the capital borrowed; that is to say, that from 
 the passing of such act, a sum not exceeding 4^. 
 in every pound sterling, or £ .\ \3s. 4d. for every 
 JOO/. sterling so borrowed, over and above the 
 interest to be paid thereon, shall together with 
 the interest redeemed thereby be inviolably ap- 
 propriated to the liquidation of the same, at 
 compound interest. 
 
 Fourteenthly, That this highly beneficial ad- 
 vantage may be gained by the proposed measure, 
 without any addition to the present burthens, but 
 will be attended with considerable profit to the 
 public in the end. As thus : supposing a loan 
 of 1 2 millions to be required for the service 
 of the ensuing* year: under the present arrange- 
 ments of the sinking fund, it would most pro- 
 bably be funded for the sake of speedier liquida- 
 tion in the 3 per cents, at an investment price of 
 60 per cent, thereby creating a stock capital of 
 20 millions, bearing an interest of 600,OOo/. and 
 J?00,000/. sinking fund, making an aggregate 
 annuity of 800,000/. to be paid by the public; 
 whilst the same loan funded in the 5 per cents f 
 
 * Written iu January, 1807. 
 + I am well aware of the arguments to be brought forward
 
 [14] 
 
 at par would create only i 2 millions of stock, 
 bearing also the same sum of 600,000/. for in- 
 
 against the assumed price of investment in the higher class of 
 stocks ; and that as long as the 3 per cents, and 5 per cents, 
 are set in competition against each othci- in the market, the 
 money price will always run in favor of the former; but this 
 can never extend so far as to arrive at any thing near a 
 balance to the great saving of paying off 5 per cents, at par, 
 or reducing the interest. For instance: Invest 1 million of 
 money in the 3 per cents, at a price as high as 70, (though 
 there is little probability of any loan being obtained on such 
 terms,) and supposing the war to terminate in the next year, 
 the average price of redemption might, and probably would, 
 rise to 95. 100^. sterling invested in the 3 per cents, at 70, 
 with a sinking fund of 1 per cent, on the stock capital and 
 redeemed at 95, by half-yearly liquidations, would take 44 
 years and 138 days to be extinguished, and would cost the 
 public at the rate of .^.253 7*. l^d. for that sum, or 
 .^.2,533,552 1*. 8f/. in the aggregate. Fund another mil. 
 lion at the same time in the 5 per cents, as low as 95, 
 (equivalent to the 3 per cents, at 57 instead of 70,) and 
 redeem it at par, with a proportionate sinking fund of 
 ^.1 lis, Sd, on the stock capital, and, cceteris paribus^ 
 the period of redemption, and total cost of the capital and 
 interest will be as follows: viz. every 100/. sterling will re- 
 quire 29 years and 145 days to be redeemed, and will cost 
 the public .^.203 14*. lid. or <^.2,037,052 1*. 8(/. per 
 million, making a saving in the total cost of the latter sum, 
 of nearly 500,000/. or almost one half of the original loan ; 
 exclusive of its liquidation being completed in less than 30 
 years, instead of upwards of 44; though certainly at a higher
 
 [15] 
 
 terest, and 200,000/. sinking fund: (supposing 
 the latter to be regulated by the sterling amount 
 of the loan, or capital borrowed, and not by the 
 
 rate of interest for the time, though at a much smaller extra 
 
 charge in the whple. 
 
 Thus... 1,000,000^ 
 
 in 3 per cents. > 42,854'. 3^. ^d. or 4/. 5;. i\d. per cent, per ann. 
 at 70 pays j 
 
 And. ...1,000,000^ 
 
 in 5 per cents. > 52,666/. ly. ^d. or 5/. 5;. ^d.6 Ditto, 
 at 95 pays ) 
 
 Annual balance in > _ o / ,., ^j »; nu t-»-.^ 
 
 favorofformerj ^'^'^'^ '°'- °'^- °' °'- '9^- ^^'^- °'"«- 
 
 But 1,000,000 in- ^ 
 vested in 3 perV 
 
 cents at 70, andS. 2,533,552/. is. Sd. or 253/. js. i^. percent, 
 redeemed at 95,\ 
 will cost ■' 
 
 Whilst 1,000,000 "^ 
 
 g5,^^edeemS;l^=^'°37,05^^■ --Si. or 20^1. t^s. i^d. Ditto. 
 par, costs only ) 
 
 Leaving balance in ) ^ , , , , . r^- 
 
 favoF of latter J 49&,50ol. Os. od. or 49/. ,3,. o^ Ditto. 
 
 And in the next place we are to consider that by getting 
 by degrees into the habit of funding in a 5 per cent, stock, 
 we shall at last simplify the entire system of finance, by 
 converting the whole of the national debt into one and the 
 same species of stock, which must at length settle into its 
 proper value in the market; and the temporary apparent 
 evil, (which, it must be recollected, has been all along an 
 imaginary one, for the real balance of ojconomy, arising 
 from the lighter cost of redemption, is greatly in favor of the 
 higher stock throughout the whole piriod,) will at l;i-t 
 entirely subside, even in appoaraiice.
 
 C 16 ] 
 
 Stock amount, or capital created,) in both of 
 which cases, supposing the loans to be redeemed 
 at the original price of their investment, they 
 will be liquidated in equal time and at an equal 
 cost to the public, as already proved by reference 
 to Examples 1 and 14, as in the second con clu-* 
 sion. 
 
 Fifteenthly, That it is further to be observed 
 that although the 3 per cent, loan will advance 
 with equal rapidity to a state of liquidation during 
 the time of war, yet from the moment of return- 
 ing peace, the advantage is wholly on the side of 
 the 5 per cents, by the power of paying off at 
 par, or reducing the interest. 
 
 Sixteenthly, That as loans are seldom, if ever, 
 redeemed at an investment price, the same obser- 
 vations that occurred in the two last conclusions 
 will apply with additional force to loans in their 
 advanced state of price, by referring to Examples 
 2 and 20. 
 
 Seventeenthly, That in order to meet the ob- 
 jection which may be started of the unwillingness 
 of monied men to advance their capital on loans 
 in a 5 per cent, stock, at a price proportionably 
 equal to a 3 per cent, stock at 60, it is proposed 
 to take the former at 95, (being something 
 lower than their present* proportionate rate,) 
 
 * In January, 1807.
 
 C 17 3 
 
 and then with reference to Example 2 and 21, it 
 will be seen that by taking the benefit of paying 
 off at par, the public will yet obtain a considerable 
 advantage both in time and cost, by funding in 
 the higher stock. 
 
 Eighteenthly, That whatever backwardness may 
 be, at first, evinced by the candidates for the 
 loan, to fund at 5 per cent, it is not to be 
 imagined that large sums accumulated for that 
 purpose can be easily directed into other channels 
 at once; but that the influx of wealth, and the 
 necessity of its appropriation by its owners, in 
 some profitable mode of applying it, though not, 
 perhaps, attended with quite so much emolument 
 as heretofore under the accustomed system, will 
 in a reasonable time contribute to smooth this 
 difficulty, and occasion the 5 per cents, to find 
 their proper level. 
 
 Lastly, That, amongst other advantages, though 
 certainly not the most material in its practical 
 consequences, will be that of avoiding, as much 
 as possible, the creation of fictitious capital; and 
 the confusion arising often from wilful misrepre- 
 sentation, wliich now takes place in the different 
 modes of estimating the capital of the national 
 debt. For instance: Let 3 80 millions be funded 
 in the cour.s« of a war; of which lOO millions 
 C
 
 [18] 
 
 in 5 per cents, at par, lOO millions in 4 per 
 cents, at 80, and the remaining 180 millions in 
 3 per cents, at 60; one man will convert the 
 whole into 4 per cents, as a medium stock, and 
 call the debt 475 millions, whilst another will 
 estimate it as s per cents, and swell the amount to 
 633i millions, though the real aggregate is in 
 fact but 3 80 millions, subject only to the daily 
 fluctuations of stock value in the market. 
 
 To bring the whole tendency and bearing of 
 the foregoing deductions into as small a compass 
 as possible, it may be laid down as a general 
 maxim, that as a primary step towards establishing 
 the most oeconomical mode of proceeding, as well 
 in the liquidating of the national debt, as in all 
 financial operations, one of the first things to be 
 attended to is to prevent, as much as possible, 
 all great and violent fluctuations in the money 
 market, and their inevitable consequence the 
 prejudicial depreciation of the circulating medium; 
 and that such moderate and natural level, the best, 
 because the least coercive, remedy against specu- 
 lative gambling in the funds, is most likely to be 
 attained and preserved by funding in a stock 
 bearing as high a rate of public interest, as the 
 legislature will allow of in the pecuniary transac- 
 tions of private individuals. 
 
 It was under this conviction, that the before-
 
 [19] 
 
 mentioned tables and observations were commu- 
 nicated (January, 1807) to Lord Grenville, then 
 at the head of the Treasury; and in a conference 
 with which he honoured me on the subject;, I had 
 every reason to be satisfied with his approbation 
 of the whole of my statements; the only possible 
 objection started, then by his lordship, or subse- 
 quently by Mr. Wickham, as likely to intervene 
 in practice, arising solely from the opposition 
 that might be made by the monied men, against 
 the funding in a stock which certainly does not 
 open so wide a field for speculation, or for pro- 
 fits so enormous as have heretofore been acquired 
 in times of greater public distress, and more 
 immediate necessity. It is hardly necessary for 
 me to assert the impossibility, in any pecuniary 
 transaction, of improving the situation of one 
 party, without deteriorating that of the other; 
 and it is, probably, equally needless to put the 
 question to the public, whether the interests and 
 welfare of the nation at large, or the immediate 
 advantage and profits of a few individuals are to 
 predominate; more especially, as after all, in 
 submitting it to the practical test of experiment, 
 the whole must finally resolve itself into the well 
 known question of product and demand; — if the 
 public necessities are pressing, and the loan to 
 be contracted for larger than the market can con- 
 veniently supply, the minister must submit to
 
 [20] 
 
 the contractors terms; but if, as is every day 
 more likely to be the case, the demands of go- 
 vernment are smaller than the monied men are 
 prepared to meet, the terms will be proportiona- 
 bly more favourable for the public, and less usu- 
 riously profitable for those from whom they are to 
 be obtained. I therefore strongly pressed upon 
 the attention of both the before mentioned lords 
 of the Treasury, the propriety of funding the 
 ensuing loan in a 5 per cent, stock, and the ne- 
 cessity of regulating the proportion of sinking 
 fund by one sixtieth part of the capital borrowed, 
 instead of one hundredth part of the capital cre- 
 ated; that is to say at 4-d. in the pound sterling 
 instead of l/. per cent, stock. This would give 
 the power without enforcing the putting of it in 
 execution. Of the superior advantage of funding 
 in a high priced stock there was but one opinion ; 
 and on the question of expediency, the grand 
 objection, (or rather hesitation, for it did not 
 amount to resistance of the principle,) seemed 
 to arise from the unfortunate experiment of the 
 loyalty loan, (as it was called,) in 1797; but 
 this, I asserted, could hardly be brought forward 
 as a case in point unless the same fatal concur- 
 rence of adverse circumstances that then existed 
 should again recur, of which, I trusted, there 
 was little fear or probability ; but that with the
 
 [21] 
 
 great and striking dissimilitude of features in the 
 present countenance of national resources, the 
 ground on which the Treasury had to take its 
 stand against the contractor, would enable it to 
 assume a much loftier tone and more decisive 
 language. In 17 97 with a net produce of perma- 
 nent taxes arising to about l4i millions, we w^ere 
 reduced to negotiate loans to the amount of 3Q{ 
 millions, being in the proportion of about \^ of 
 our income ; whilst the present loan of 12 mil- 
 lions with a permanent income of* 33 j is not 
 quite so much as fg, or rather better than a com- 
 plete reverse of the disadvantageous proportions. 
 In the former period, the sinking fund did not 
 quite amount to 3i millions, and this year it will 
 exceed 9. In 1797 the 3 per cents, consols were 
 
 * Net produce of taxes for the year ending 5th January, 
 1807. 
 
 Customs 4,063,598 4 8| 
 
 Excise 13,829,170 14 3 
 
 Stamps 3,057,877 19 3 
 
 Duties for 1803, 4, 5 & 6, and sur-^ q«. 1 1 11 r 
 
 plus of other duties \ 6,905,985 14 Hi 
 
 Incidents 5,092,399 7 8 
 
 Total permanent 33,549,032 91 
 
 War taxes 14,821,252 10 ^ 
 
 Total produce 4S 370.28 4 17 0^
 
 [22] 
 
 SO low as 47|j, and the interest of the public 
 money £ .Q 6s. lod. per centum sterling; whilst 
 in January*, 1807, the same stock was at 61, and 
 the public rate of interest under 5 per cent, with 
 every prospect of further amelioration. There 
 were many other untoward and afflicting circum- 
 stances in existence at the former period which 
 though not strictly financial, were obviously de- 
 pressive of the whole system of finance; but 
 which, thank God, are no longer to be appre- 
 hended, and therefore may pass su6 sikntio. But 
 taking into consideration the whole complexion 
 of the two periods as to their comparative bear- 
 ings on the point in question, I could not help 
 pressing the admirable fitness of the present sea- 
 son for making a second trial of the experiment, 
 with so much of the auspicium melioris asvi in our 
 
 * In April the consols are at 62|, and the loan has been 
 contracted for rather under the rate of £A 14*. l\d. per 
 cent, as follows, viz. 
 
 For every .a^.lOO sterling the contractors have 
 
 £. s. d. £. s. d. 
 70 £ 3 per cent, consols at 62| 43 i8 6 or 2 2 o per An. 
 70 £ 3 per cent, reduced at do. 4318 6\)r 2 2 o per An 
 10 12 in 5 per cents, at ... 95I 10 3 o or o lO 7J 
 
 Total *— 98 o o 4 14 7| 
 
 Which is the utmost at which it could be valued in the mar- 
 ket.
 
 [23] 
 
 favor. I am no friend to half measures, and 
 should therefore have preferred meeting the evil 
 boldly, and funding the whole loan in 5 per 
 cents; because I am most decidedly of opinion 
 that it is greatly for the interest of the nation to 
 get rid of all low priced stocks as soon as possi- 
 ble, being convinced that the more the minister 
 temporizes with the contractors, so much the 
 longer does he hold out to them the means of 
 opposition, and that any temporary depression 
 of the 5 per cents, in the first year of funding in 
 them would be fully repaid by the more ample 
 means of liquidation they afford; however, as 
 there seemed to be more timidity than I think 
 there was any occasion for, I recommended, as 
 the next best mode, to offer the contractors, for 
 every /'•lOO borrowed*, 75 in the reduced, 25 
 in the consols, and to make a bidding for the 
 remainder in 5 per cents, which I estimated as 
 follows, viz. 
 
 
 
 £■ 
 
 £ 
 
 J. 
 
 d. 
 
 75 reduced 
 
 at 61 
 
 45 
 
 15 paying 2 
 
 5 
 
 per an. 
 
 25 consols 
 
 at6i 
 
 15 
 
 5 ditto 
 
 >3 
 
 per an. 
 
 41 10 6^ in 5 per cents, 
 
 , at95 
 
 39 
 
 ditto 2 
 
 1 
 
 o|.5peran. 
 
 Total St. 141 10 6^ Total sterl. 100 O Total 5 t o|5int. 
 
 * The greater quantity of the reduced was stipulated in 
 order to endeavour at equalizing the total capital of each sort 
 of 3 per cents, so as to afford equal means of redemption in 
 the different quarters of each year, which is certainly an ob- 
 ject to be kept in view.
 
 [ 24 ] 
 
 This, when the terms of the actual contract came 
 to be published, I found modified in the manner 
 set forth in the note at the bottom of the prece- 
 ding page — and containing a much smaller pro- 
 portion of 5 per cents, than I had proposed— yet 
 certainly paying rather less interest than the above 
 proportions; because until the present prejudi- 
 cial preference given to the 3 per cents, is done 
 away, that difference must always continue to 
 exist — ^but according to the prices of the actual 
 contract, the bidding on the 5 per cents, even 
 according to my proposed proportions, would 
 not have exceeded 3 7|; (owing to the more fa- 
 vourable state of the market;) and the interest 
 thereon, being £.1 l7s. 1\(L added to the £.3 on 
 the consols and reduced, would only have risen 
 to ^A ITS. l\d. about ss. higher than the actual 
 contract per cent, in the whole. But the great 
 benefit would ultimately have been found in the 
 reduced cost of redemption. 
 
 Within a very few days after the foregoing 
 communication. Lord Henry Petty presented* 
 his statement of Finance (of which I was not at 
 all aware at the time of framing my calculations,) 
 to the House of Commons; and the nation was 
 called upon to decide, by the voice of its repre- 
 sentatives, on a plan which, whilst it contained 
 
 * 29th January, 1807.
 
 [25] 
 
 much immediate benefit, was certainly too com- 
 plicated to be understood by many, and embraced 
 too comprehensive a period of prospective legis- 
 lation, to be entirely coincided in by men of 
 sober judgment or much financial experience; to 
 either of these qualities I do not put in my claim; 
 undoubtedly not to the latter; but, having weighed 
 the merits of the question with an attentive and 
 impartial hand, I certainly did suggest to some of 
 the framers of the plan, before it was submitted 
 to Parliament, that although the advantage to be 
 gained by the relief from additional taxation, held 
 out by the system for the three first years, and 
 the almost incalculable impression it would make 
 both at home and abroad, as to our powers of 
 carrying on the contest, must in my opinion re- 
 commend it very strongly for trial for the above 
 period, or perhaps a short time longer; yet that 
 the extending of the experiment to any thing 
 near a series of fourteen years, and much more 
 for twenty, must turn the scale very materially 
 against the plan proposed; how well founded was 
 my* opinion, may be seen by reference to the 
 
 * Since so fully confirmed by the very able statement of 
 my right honourable friend (Mr. Long) in his admirable 
 little pamphlet, entitled "Short Remarks on recent Occur, 
 renccs, &c." 
 
 D
 
 C 26 J 
 
 Appendix, No. s, from which it will appear that, 
 taking the war expenditure at 32* millions; of 
 which 21 millions are to be defrayed by the war 
 taxes, and the remainder by loans raised either, 
 to the amount of 1 1 millions annually, according 
 to the system adopted by Mr. Pitt, of imposing 
 taxes at the rate of 3 per cent, for interest, and 
 1 per cent, for sinking fund, on a stock capital 
 invested at an assumed average price of 60 ; or 
 according to the statement of Lord Henry Petty, 
 by loans of l 2 millions each for the three first 
 years, 1 4 millions for the fourth, and 1 6 millions 
 for each of the last ten years of a series of four- 
 teen; (after which a second, or revolving series 
 is to commence de novo, on the same terms as the 
 former) and by pledging certain annual portions 
 of the war taxes, at the rate of 10 per cent.f 
 
 * This estimate is certainly too small, even if we were to 
 adopt the erroneously selfish predilection of Mr. Fox and his 
 followers for separating our interests from those of the con- 
 tinental powers, and abandoning instead of assisting them in 
 the great struggle, which involves not only their immediate 
 existence, but ultimately our own honour, dignity, and 
 safety. 
 
 + It is to be observed, that, by fixing the aggregate an- 
 nuity, to be paid for interest and sinking fund, at 10 per 
 cent upon each loan, it is intended to establish the counter. 
 acting principle of setting off the gain on investment in every 
 subsequent loan, against the loss on redemption occasioned
 
 [27] 
 
 upon the money capital, for interest and sinking 
 fund of the principal loans; replacing those por- 
 tions by supplementary loans, and raising taxes 
 for the interest and sinking fund of the latter at 
 4 per cent, on the stock capital thereby created; 
 and supposing the whole, in both cases to be in- 
 vested at 60, and redeemed at 7-5, (which is pro- 
 bably the fairest assumption of average that can 
 be made for a 3 per cent, stock, taking as many 
 years of peace at 90, as of war at 6o) the whole 
 cost of liquidating the debt created in the three 
 first years of the series, (vide Appendix, No. .3. 
 A.) 
 
 By pursuing the old system will be .^.77,284,5 25 
 And by adopting the new, pro- 
 posed by Lord Henry Petty . . . 66,33Q,2^5 
 
 Balance in favor of the latter . 10,95 2,300 
 
 in every preceding one by the rise of stocks ; as whatever is 
 saved from the rate of interest is added to that of sinking 
 fund, the efficacy of which principle, and the extent to Avhich 
 it may be relied on, will be investigated in a subsequent par 
 of this pamphlet. But why not extend some part of the be- 
 nefits of the counteracting principle to the supplementary 
 loans also, by making their sinking fund likewise bear a pro- 
 portion to the money price of the capital borrowed. This 
 was an unaccountable error — which I pointed out in an 
 early stage of the plan.
 
 [ 28 ] 
 
 Extend the comparative systems 
 
 to five years, and by the same 
 
 mode of computation, (Vide 
 
 Appendix No. 3, B.) it will 
 
 be found that the total cost of 
 
 liquidation for the debt created 
 
 to the end of that period, will 
 
 be under the accustomed 
 
 mode ^.128,807,708 
 
 Ditto by the new plan only . . 116,304,375 
 
 Leaving a balance favorable to 
 
 the latter of ». 12,503,333 
 
 In the next or sixth year the old 
 
 system would cost .... ^.154,569,250 
 And the new 143,846,875 
 
 (Vide Appendix No. 3, C.) Re- 
 ducing the favorable balance 
 of the latter to 10,722,375 
 
 Again in the seventh year, (Vide Appendix 
 
 No. 3, D.) 
 The former rises to .... ^180,330,781 
 And the latter to 173,597,607 
 
 Reducing the balance still lower 
 
 down to ... . . . 6,733,174
 
 [29] 
 
 Proceed to the total debt of the eighth year, 
 
 (same Appendix, E.) 
 The original process would be . ^.206,09 2,333 
 And the proposed would amount to 205,495,476 
 
 Almost annihilating the balance 
 
 by reducing it to .... 596,857 
 
 Take one step further, and at the 
 
 close of the ninth year it will 
 
 be seen that the usual method 
 
 will only be ■^.23 1,853,875 
 
 Whilst Lord Henry Petty's will 
 
 mount up to 239,540,474 
 
 Leaving in favor of Mr. Pitt's sys- 
 tem, (Vide Appendix ditto F.) 7,686,599 
 
 And lastly, pursue the compari- 
 son to the final close of the 
 complete series of fourteen 
 years, and the total cost of both 
 systems will be, (by the same 
 Appendix, G.) old method . <€. 360,661, 583 
 
 And under the proposed arrange- 
 ment 441,972,475 
 
 Ascertaining a loss to the public, 
 by departing from Mr. Pitt's 
 svstem of no less amount than 8 1,3 10,392
 
 [30] 
 
 Having thus determined that the actual balance 
 of gain or loss on the aggregate cost of capital 
 and interest, weighs considerably in favor of the 
 new plan for the three first years; and still more 
 so to the close of the fifth year; but in the sixth 
 begins to turn, by declining rather below the 
 gain of the third; at the end of the seventh has 
 lost above a third part of its amount; in the 
 eighth has dw^indled to so small a sum as scarcely 
 to be taken into account in deciding the preference 
 in favor of either plan; after the ninth year has 
 transferred the balance to a considerable amount, 
 on the side of the original system ; and at the 
 end of the complete series of fourteen years gives 
 no less than eighty-one millions, or about 20 per 
 cent, on the aggregate amount in favor of the 
 simple and substantial system established by Mr. 
 Pitt: let us now inquire how far the question of 
 expediency, as to the temporary convenience of 
 cessation from additional annual burthens, may 
 be relied on as a set-ofF against this very heavy 
 loss on capital created by the greater quantum of 
 loans required under the proposed arrangement. 
 And this relief from immediate taxation is, without 
 doubt, the most favorable point of view in which 
 the plan can be presented to the public eye; 
 for, without listening for a moment to all the 
 nonsense that has been uttered about dilapidated
 
 [31 ] 
 
 resources, or exhausted treasures, so industriously 
 circulated after the decease of that illustrious 
 statesman, whose memory is immortalized by the 
 practical simplicity of his financial operations, 
 and excluding every idea of the difficulty of finding 
 fresh objects of taxation, there can be but one 
 opinion as to the propriety of endeavouring to 
 obtain a temporary relief from making any addi- 
 tion to the heavy, though not intolerable, burthens 
 of our long protracted state of warfare. It will 
 be necessary to premise that in considering the 
 comparative benefits of either plan as to the 
 pressure of annual burthens, I shall equally exclude 
 from both sides of the question, any contingent 
 aids arising either from expiring annuities, or 
 available excesses of the sinking fund, which 
 may be expected to supply the j)!ace of additional 
 taxes, either in bearing the interest, or carrying 
 on the operation of liquidating the capital of the 
 debt incurred during the period of comparison ; 
 because in the first place, as I do not look on the 
 estimate of 32 millions as sufficient for our real 
 ex; cnditure, those contingent supplies will most 
 prijl)ably be required for other purposes ; and 
 secondly, in the suppcsilion that they should not 
 be so required, the comparison would not be af- 
 ected, on account of their being equally appli- 
 cableto either of the two arrangements.
 
 [32] 
 
 By reference to Appendix No. 4, 
 column D, it appears that the 
 quantum of taxes to be raised, 
 in addition to the war taxes, 
 under the old arrangements to 
 the end of the third year would 
 
 be ^.2,199,999 
 
 And according to that of Lord 
 
 Henry Petty, ditto column P . 279,999 
 
 Making the burthen of the latter 
 
 lighter by ....... 1,920,000 
 
 In five years the addition to the 
 annual burthen, (Vide Appen- 
 dix No. 4, Columns D and P 
 as before,) according to the 
 old system is £.3,666,666 
 
 And by the new plan only . . 519,999 
 
 Balance as before 3,146,667 
 
 In six years, (by the same refer- 
 ences, ) the old system appears 
 to be loaded with . . . . ^.4,399,999 
 
 And the new with no more than . 733,333 
 
 Balance on the same side . . . 3,666,666
 
 [33] 
 
 In seven years, the former . . £.5,\ss,S3^ 
 And the latter 1,053,333 
 
 Balance again 4,080,000 
 
 In eight years, the first is . . . ^..5,8 66,666 
 The second 1,4-79,999 
 
 Continuing on the same side . , 4,3 8 6,667 
 
 In nine year^, the former , . . ^.6,599,999 
 The latter 2,913,333 
 
 In favor of the last 4,586,666 
 
 In ten years, the first .... •^.'7, 333, 333 
 The second ^2,653,333 
 
 Increasing the balange to . . . 4,680,000 
 
 Old system ^.8,066,666 
 
 New ditto . . ; " 3,399,999 
 
 Which balance in the eleventh 
 
 year declines to 4,666,667 
 
 And at the final close of the series 
 
 of fourteen, the old svstem has 
 
 imposed an additional aggregate 
 
 of ^.10,266,666 
 
 Whilst the new arrangement has 
 
 only required 6,379,995 
 
 Leaving apparently an annual ba- 
 lance in favor of the new, of . 3,886,671 
 
 E
 
 [34] 
 
 But in order to comprehend the whole of this 
 complicated, yet interesting question, we must 
 take into consideration that, in the system founded 
 on Mr. Pitt s plan no part whatever of the war 
 taxes would be pledged for a single day beyond 
 the conclusion of the current year at the termina- 
 tion of the war, but that the whole would be 
 released at the moment of returning peace; 
 whilst under Lord Henry Petty 's arrangement, 
 (supposing the war to last for fourteen years, 
 and so in proportion for any shorter duration of 
 hostilities, ) the whole amount, being twenty-one 
 millions, will be pledged for about three* years 
 from the restoration of peace; and then for thir- 
 teen years more, deducting only in every subse- 
 quent year of the thirteen, such progressive 
 portionf , as answers to the tenth part of the loan 
 for which it was originally pledged, according to 
 the progress of liquidation. 
 
 To this contemplation must also be added 
 another of considerable import, as affecting the 
 regulating of the money price of stock in the 
 market, arising from the different quantum of 
 
 Supposing the war loans to be redeemed according to Ap- 
 pendix No. 2, Example 25. 
 
 f Vide Appendix No. 9 and 10.
 
 [35] 
 
 loans to be negotiated, under the one or other of 
 the foregoing systems; as follows: viz. 
 
 
 MR. PITT. 1 
 
 LORD H 
 
 PETTY. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Annual. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Annual. 
 
 Total. 
 
 1st 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 12,200,000 
 
 12,200,000 
 
 2d 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 22,000,000 
 
 13,400.000 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 3d 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 33,000,000 
 
 14,600,000 
 
 40,200,000 
 
 4th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 44,000,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 56,200,000 
 
 .'3th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 55,000,000 
 
 17,600,000 
 
 73,800,000 
 
 6th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 66,000,000 
 
 19,200,000 
 
 93,000,000 
 
 7th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 77,000,000 
 
 20,800.000 
 
 113,800,000 
 
 Sth 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 88,000,000 
 
 22,400,000 
 
 136,200,000 
 
 9th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 99,000,000 
 
 24,000,000 
 
 160,200,000 
 
 JOth 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 110,000,000 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 185,800,000 
 
 nth 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 121,000,000 
 
 27,200,000 
 
 213,000,000 
 
 12th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 132,000,000 
 
 28,800,000 
 
 241,800,000 
 
 13 th 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 143,000,000 
 
 30,400,000 
 
 272,200,000 
 
 14th 
 
 11.000,000 
 
 154,000,000 
 
 32,000,000 
 
 304,200,000 
 
 By this comparative statement the market appears 
 to be doubly loaded by the new plan, on an 
 average of the whole series of fourteen years ; 
 and nearly trebly so in the latter part of that 
 term ; which, on account of the assumed conti- 
 nuance of the war, must always be the most 
 depressed and difficult period for negotiating the 
 necessary supplies by way of loan. 
 
 In referring to the several additional Tables in 
 the Appendix, marked 5, g, and , 7, which are 
 calculated merely to ascertain how far the coun- 
 teracting principle may be relied on in setting 
 off the gain on investment against the loss on re- 
 demption occasioned by the rise of stocks, or the 
 contrary; it will be seen, that 210 millions bor-
 
 [36] 
 
 rowed in fourteen years and invested in 3 per 
 cents, at various prices from 60 to lOO, will at 
 the end of that period, leave an unliquidated 
 stock capital (excluding all contingent assistance 
 which may be brought equally on either supposi- 
 tion in aid of its appropriate sinking fund) of 
 rather better than isoi millions, which being at 
 par is equal to a money debt of the same amount ; 
 that the same aggregate of loans invested in the 
 same stock remaining stationary at 60, will at the 
 close of the same period leave a stock debt of 
 rather better than 194| millions, which, however, 
 converted into money at 60 per cent, will not 
 much exceed 1 1 6i millions, and that the same sums 
 borrowed and invested in a 5 per cent, stock, the 
 first year at 95, and the remaining years at lOO, 
 will leave a final debt of not quite 1 1 si millions, 
 which being at par is equal to money. But it 
 should be taken into consideration, that there is 
 little probability in the first instance (Table 5) of 
 the 3 per cents, rising so high as par in seven 
 years of continued war and correspondent invest- 
 ments, or that they should remain at the same 
 price during an additional seven years of pro- 
 tracted warfare and consequent loans — (though I 
 very readily admit that the war price is likely 
 to be higher than it has ever yet been known to 
 be.) In regard, then, to the stationary s per
 
 [37] 
 
 cents, the sio millions thus invested will, (ac- 
 cording to Table 6) leave a final stock debt of 
 194'i, which, at the stock price of 60 will only 
 equal a money capital of rather better than 1 1 6i 
 millions ; against this, however, we have to set the 
 probable rise of stocks supposing the war to cease 
 at the expiration of the first series of fourteen 
 years — and this rise may fairly be taken at an addi- 
 tional third, assuming 80 as the lowest possible 
 average price of the remaining liquidation — and 
 this would swell the real debt to a little more 
 than \5 5i millions; assuming this last considera- 
 tion, therefore, the counteracting principle, may 
 be allowed to have exerted its influence favorably. 
 Let us now consider the comparative merits of 
 the 5 per cent, stock in which there is certainly 
 less need of hypothetical assumption, and more 
 plain and practical inference to bear us out — the 
 aggregate 210 millions invested in this fund will 
 (by Table 7) leave us at the end of fourteen 
 years war burthened with a debt of 11 si millions, 
 which being already at par, may always be re- 
 deemed at the same price — for allowing the con- 
 tractors, the equitable privilege of an irredeema- 
 ble stock until the expiration of a certain number 
 of years, or the redemption of a specific quantity 
 of s per cents. — the whole powers of the sinking 
 fund will, of course, be applied during that time
 
 [38] 
 
 to the last mentioned stock, until the 5 per cents, 
 becoming redeemable, may be liquidated without 
 loss.— The more, therefore, that the subject is 
 considered, and into the greater variety of lights, 
 that it is thrown, the more clearly will the supe- 
 riority of the 6 per cents, be evinced, and the 
 more imperiously were the framers of the pro- 
 posed Plan of Finance called upon to adopt that 
 proposition which affords the best remedial pow- 
 ers for obviating the principal objections which 
 might be, and were started against it. N. B. 
 Table 8 is a rough sketch of the inferior advan- 
 tages of borrowing 210 millions by equal loans of 
 15 millions each for fourteen years, instead of 
 taking the method proposed in the Plan, by 
 which Table it will appear that the whole supple- 
 mentary debt created by such substitution would 
 exceed that in the proposed Plan by 6| mil- 
 lions — the former being 100,745,041/. and the 
 latter only 94,200,000/. The total cost of the 
 former .€.235,940,688 6s. id. and of the latter 
 only 220,612,475/. making an ultimate saving of 
 upwards of 15 millions. 
 
 And thus, by tracing, step by step, slowly indeed, 
 and, perhaps, rather too tediously for the impa- 
 tience of most readers; but cautiously, and, I am 
 bold to say, correctly, as the importance of the 
 question demands, the comparative merits of the
 
 [39] 
 
 two systems^, throughout the whole progress of the 
 first series, beyond which it is not necessary, in- 
 deed I cannot but think it would be absurd, to 
 attempt to extend the analysis; and by throwing 
 the comparison into every possible view and shape 
 from which any degree of light or information 
 could be obtained, I feel myself very decisively 
 enabled to pronounce an opinion on the merits of 
 the proposed plan equally remote from the blind 
 partiality of its enthusiastic admirers as from the 
 unqualified prejudices of its determined opposers. 
 Before the delivery of that opinion, however, 
 I think it necessary, in vindication of my appa- 
 rent minuteness and prolixity, to assert that it is 
 perfectly impossible for any man to render him- 
 self a competent judge of its correctness, without 
 separating the question into the distinct consider- 
 ations of total cost; of annual burthen, and that 
 again subdivided retrospectively and prospectively 
 into taxes paid, and taxes pledged to be paid, 
 at the conclusion of the war; of the period of 
 liquidation; and of the eflTects on the circulating 
 medium, through the fluctuations of the money 
 market; by the separate analysis of every one, 
 and combined comparison of the whole of which, 
 and by no other process, can any person be ena- 
 bled to judge of the real merits or defects of a 
 system so extremely complicated. For the term.
 
 [40] 
 
 then, of five years, if the war should last so long, 
 I am clearly of opinion that the statement pro- 
 posed by Lord Henry Petty should be tried in 
 preference to any other which has hitherto been 
 proposed — because I am certain that for that 
 period the gain will be considerably greater, as 
 well in point of present relief from additional 
 taxation, (the impression of which, at this criti- 
 cal juncture, would probably be as far beyond the 
 delineation of the statesman, as it is incapable of 
 receiving the demonstrative proof of the mathe- 
 matician,) as in the lighter cost of redeeming the 
 quantum of debt created during that time; and 
 because the portion of war taxes pledged to the 
 end of that period does not exceed the limit* 
 which leaves an unrestricted option of charging 
 the liquidation of the principal loans either upon 
 the property tax, or the other war duties, as may 
 be rendered most expedient by the existing cir- 
 cumstances of the moment. But beyond that time 
 I would not continue it for a single day; because 
 from the instant of closing the fifth year of the 
 experiment, every favorable circumstancef at- 
 
 * Of the 21 millions, 11^ are taken for the produce of 
 the property duty, and 9§ for the remaining war taxes, of 
 which 6,600,000 would be pledged in five years according 
 to Lord Henry Petty's statement. 
 
 + Vide Pages 25 to 32.
 
 [ 41 ] 
 
 tending it begins to decline; nevertheless whilst 
 I recommended the benefits of Lord H. Petty *s 
 plan for fiv6 years, I wish it to be clearly under- 
 stood that I am a declared enemy to restriction by 
 positive enactment, for any term whatever, be- 
 yond the loans of the current year; though I am 
 very much inclined to believe that it will be 
 found the best plan for subsequent adoption year 
 by year for the four next also — but for fourteen, 
 and much more for twenty, it would be a degree 
 of speculative insanity to prolong the adopting of 
 it, particularly by restrictive enactment. Recol- 
 lecting the principles on which the illustrious 
 founder of our financial prosperity framed his 
 commutation act in 1784, I cannot but agree 
 completely with Mr. Long* in regard to the im- 
 policy of pledging the war duties on teas and 
 spirits to be continued in time of peace for the 
 liquidation of loans, on account of their per- 
 nicious effect in encouraging the smuggling of 
 the articles on which they are levied, and their 
 unproductiveness in consequence, and I always 
 did think that the giving up of the property tax, 
 the fairest and most productive of all impositions 
 
 ■^ Short Remarks on recent Political Occurrences, page IS. 
 F
 
 [42] 
 
 when* properly enforced, merely because it is 
 not popular, had too much of the captandum 
 vu/gus for men of sound financial judgment to be 
 led into. Nor is my opinion less concun-ent with 
 his in regard to the use proposed to be made 
 of the excesses of the sinking fund, a measure I 
 cannot but deprecate very strongly, at least dur- 
 ing the war, which is certainly not the time for 
 breaking in upon that sacred deposit of national 
 credit and responsibility ; but I am not at all 
 prepared to admit that ani/ proper period can be 
 assigned for such an innovation. The public 
 faith to its creditors is in my view like the esta- 
 blished religion; break down but one barrier 
 from either, and no man can say what defences 
 shall be permitted to remain standing. How dif- 
 ferent might have been the situation of Europe at 
 this moment if the wild theories of the Emperor 
 Joseph had not led him, in his intemperate zeal 
 for reform, to dismantle the frontier towns of the 
 
 * Several alterations, however, are wanting in this act; 
 amongst others one of the most prominent desiderata is the 
 removal of the absurd distinction between income arising 
 from dividends, and annuities charged upon dividends; for 
 want of which, there is now within my own knowledge a 
 family of eight orphans, the children of an old and deserving 
 officer, whose property does not exceed .^.100 per annum 
 for the whole family ; and yet because it is not an annuity, 
 pays the whole deduction of 10 per cent.
 
 [43] 
 
 Low Countries, and lay open the empire to the 
 irruptions of the modern Alaric. 
 
 But whatever plan of finance may be adopted, 
 I must most strenuously contend for the regulation 
 of the sinking fund by the capital borrowed, 
 or money capital ; and not by the capital created, 
 or stock capital; as well as for the funding in 5 
 per cents, instead of threes; the latter desideratum 
 is the sine qua non of oeconomical liquidation; 
 and the former indispensably requisite towards the 
 adoption of the latter. And it must always be kept 
 in mind, that a million funded in 5 per cents, 
 at par, with a sinking fund of ^.1 6,666 iss. ^d, 
 or 4;d. in the pound sterling, being one-sixtieth 
 part of the capital borroxzed, will put the nation to 
 the same expense in prime cost and annual bur- 
 then, as the same loan invested in s per cents, at 
 60 with a sinking fund of l per cent, on the 
 capital created; but will take considerably less 
 time, and much smaller ultimate cost to redeem 
 it; as may be seen from the comparison exhibited 
 by Examples 2 and i o, in Appendix, No. 2. 
 
 Having said in a preceding page that I approve 
 the adoption of Lord H. Petty's system for the 
 present, and smgulis amiis for each of the four 
 succeeding years, in preference to any other plan 
 which has yet been proposed, I think it but 
 justice to that mentioned in the pamphlet already
 
 [44] 
 
 alluded to to say, that the plan therein proposed 
 for that period, by my right honourable friend, 
 is so nearly a medium between the advantages and 
 defects of the two already discussed, that I see 
 no objection whatever to its being made use of, 
 according to existing circumstances, in any one 
 of the four next years instead of either of the 
 others, as may be seen by the comparative state- 
 ment of the three plans in Appendix, No. 11, 
 Table A, by which it appears that for five years 
 the debt created thereby would be nearly as much 
 less than Lord H. Petty's, as it would be more 
 than Mr. Pitt's — that the amount of additional 
 taxes imposed would be considerably lighter than 
 the old system, and something heavier than the 
 new; that the portion of war taxes pledged at its 
 close would exceed Mr. Pitt's by upwards of 3| 
 millions, being the w^hole amount of such por- 
 tion, and be little more than one half of Lord H. 
 Petty's, but would be in pledge for about twice 
 the duration of time to come; — that the total 
 cost of redemption would be nearly the same 
 as under the old system, and consequently incur 
 about the same excess of extra charge above 
 the new. 
 
 In the same Appendix, under the letters B and 
 C, the comparison is for the sake of illustration 
 prolonged to the complete series of fourteen
 
 I 45 ] 
 
 years, but it must be kept strictly in recollection 
 that my right honourable friend guided by that 
 chaste and sober discrimination, which was ma- 
 tured under the eye of the ilkistrious Pitt, never 
 had an idea of wandering so far into speculative 
 theory as to think of extending it beyond the 
 term at first proposed, after which he very judi- 
 ciously recommends a pause, for the adoption of 
 any other system more adapted to the existing 
 circumstances of the time; and the final result of 
 the real cost at the end of the fourteen, proves 
 the correctness of his judgment. 
 
 I am still, however, of my original opinion, 
 that for the first five years the statement proposed 
 by the late chancellor of the exchequer is rather 
 to be preferred to any hitherto submitted to the 
 public; on account of the breathing time allowed 
 by the respite from additional taxation, and that 
 at lighter ultimate cost than any other plan ; but 
 after that period, unless the circumstances of the 
 moment should authorize some other more expe- 
 dient varation, I must, under my present impres- 
 sions, and according to the best information I can 
 at this instant make myself master of, most 
 strongly recommend a return to the simple and 
 substantial system under which our resources have 
 arrived at a point of elevation and an extent, 
 unequalled in the annals of the most prosperous
 
 t46] 
 
 and mighty nations: — A system, the offspring of 
 the most enlightened comprehension and the 
 chastest judgment that ever inhabited a mortal 
 frame; the fruit of his unwearied exeitions, whose 
 living labours and whose dying thoughts were 
 equally bent and concentrated on the salvation of 
 his beloved country. 
 
 '' Idem sentire de republica," says Mr. Burke, 
 " was with the best patriots of the greatest com- 
 " mon wealths, a principal ground of friendship 
 " and attachment; nor do I know any other 
 " capable of forming firmer, dearer, more pleas- 
 '' ing, more honorable, and more virtuous habi- 
 '' tudes;" — and to me it will afford a never failing 
 source of proud and pleasing recollection, that 
 for upwards of twenty years before the decease 
 of that unequalled statesman, my most serious 
 attention to the many important measures of his 
 administration, scarcely ever failed of bringing 
 home to my understanding and my feelings the 
 entire conviction of their perfect propriety; — 
 few, very few indeed were the variations of my 
 judgment in regard to public transactions from 
 his; enough only to mark those shades of opinion 
 which must ever exist between every two men 
 who dare to think and decide for themselves ; but 
 far unlike that determined opposition of public 
 principle which, strange as it seems, is sometimes
 
 L 47 ] 
 
 seen to lead to the most unlooked for coalitions, 
 and which was witnessed more than once in the 
 political career* of Mr. Fox. For my part, I 
 confess that the word coalition is as much out of 
 the sphere of my comprehension, as it is beyond 
 the range of my feelings; and as little suited 
 to my feeble understanding as the language of 
 those gentlemen who told us at and before the 
 decease of Mr. Pitt, that we were on the verge 
 of ruin, at the eve of national bankruptcy ; and 
 yet in one short year or less, could find out that 
 our resources were so fruitful as to make it pos- 
 sible to carry on a war establishment, on the 
 same extensive scale of expenditure, without the 
 imposition of a single additional tax for three 
 years to come, with a very moderate addition of 
 annual burthen for the two next, and without any 
 further increase of imposition beyond that, for 
 the remaining fifteen years of twenty to which 
 
 * The admirers of Mr. Fox's political consistency will 
 probably not wish to recollect his being one of the tellers 
 for the majority upon negativing a motion to obtain an 
 account of pensions and increased salaries in 1769. " A 
 " strong proof," as Mr. Rose observes, " how differently 
 " Parliament, as well as the individual alluded to, thought 
 " at that time, from what they do at present," (Obscrva- 
 tions on Civil List Debt, 1802, page 8,) " respecting the 
 " propriety of investigating matters of this sort, whore 
 " grants of the public money are called for."
 
 [48] 
 
 their speculation was to extend ; — how any men 
 could possibly be brought to stultify themselves 
 before the tribunal of the public so completely, 
 appears a matter so wonderfully unaccountable as 
 to leave them in my opinion no other alternative 
 but the confession either of perfect ignorance in 
 regard to the subject of their discussion, or of 
 wilful misrepresentation of the result of their 
 inquiries, from party motives: in either case 
 then, are such men to be looked up to as efficient 
 statesmen; and yet this is the dilemma to which I 
 have no hesitation in affirming that the followers 
 of Mr. Fox have reduced themselves. But I am 
 willing to take the more charitable side of the 
 question, and to attribute it to their want of 
 infoi-mation; and that principally because I have 
 very strong reasons for believing that most of the 
 beneficial parts of the lately proposed statement 
 of finance originated with a gentleman* whose 
 abilities had been long known, and duly appre- 
 ciated by Mr. Pitt ; and who had been introduced 
 into a more prominently useful situation by him 
 a very short time before his decease. 
 
 It is a curious, and not altogether uninstructive, 
 certainly not unentertaining, subject of review, 
 to bring together all, or at least the principal 
 part of the difterent plans that have been offi^red 
 for the easier liquidation or reduction of the 
 
 * George Harrison, Esq. of the Navy.
 
 [49] 
 
 national debt. Lord Stanhope proposes to con- 
 vert the 3 per cents, into fours; and Gale, (a 
 writer of considerable ingenuity) on a greater 
 extension of the same principle, recommends the 
 conversion to be into 5 per cents. Sir John 
 Sinclair on the other hand proposes that 160 mil- 
 lions of the 3 per cents, should be declared re- 
 deemable at 75 per cent, by putting into a bal- 
 loting box, half-yearly, the names of all the 
 creditors agreeing to such redemption, and paying 
 off one-tenth as they come up ; and on this plan 
 he thinks it would be beneficial to convert all the 
 4 and 5 per cents, into 3 per cents. ; thus reversing 
 the two former propositions. Of these three 
 schemes I am very decidedly in favor of Gale's, 
 supposing it necessary to adopt either ; and I am 
 rather inclined to think that after the adoption of 
 Lord H. Petty's plan for five years, it might not 
 be amiss for the sixth, to raise the loan, probably 
 nineteen millions or such part of it as might be 
 practicable, by converting about 5 7 millions of 
 3 per cents, into fives, by making a call on such 
 holders of the former as should consent to sub- 
 scribe into the latter at about 3 3 per cent, which 
 would be a sufficient bonus*, as the relative pro- 
 
 * Dr. Price in proposing his plan of conversion of 3 per 
 cents into 4, in the year 1786, says, that as the market 
 G
 
 [50] 
 
 portion ought to be at least 40 per cent ; a pro- 
 vision being made at the same time for advancing 
 the sinking fund to the sixtieth part of the sterling 
 value of the whole^ in order to ensure the princi- 
 pal benefit of the scheme in the ultimate cost of 
 liquidation. — In regard to Sir John Sinclair's plan, 
 I am not at all aware of its merits, and can very 
 clearly see many inconveniencies attending it^ not 
 to speak of the violation of faith in making any 
 stock whatever redeemable below par — and above 
 all it goes to increase the very disadvantage I am 
 most desirous of removing, the certain loss at- 
 tending the rise on a low rated stock during the 
 process of liquidation. 
 
 Mr. Crawford in his Doctrine of Equivalents 
 proposes, as what he calls the most perfect system 
 of finance, that all loans should be borrowed on 
 long annuities; — but the fallacy of this is too evi- 
 dent, almost, to need refutation, as the price of 
 investment, or actual rate of borrowing must 
 necessarily vary with the temporary value of 
 
 difference of price between the two stocks was upwards of 
 20, it was reasonable to expect that the holders would 
 eagerly have taken them in exchange at 18^. If 2 per cent, 
 therefore, was held by so good a calculator to be a sufficient 
 bonus, the temptation of 7 held out by my proposition 
 must be still more likely to induce compliance; not forgetting 
 however that his plan went only to convert 3 per cents, to 
 lours, whilst mine extends the conversion into fives.
 
 [51] 
 
 annuities in the market, as much as any redeem- 
 able stock; with the additional disadvantage of not 
 being redeemable at the option of the borrower; 
 and is therefore the dearest of all possible modes 
 of borrowing, as thus: ,^.100 invested at 56* 
 will create £.17 B lis. 5(1. stock, will require 
 £.1 l5s. Sjd.s sinking fund, will pay ^.5 7s. lid.8 
 interest, making a total annuity of ^.7 2s. lOid.6 
 for thirty-five years and 48 daysf in which time it 
 will be redeemed at an average price of 7-5; and 
 will then have cost the public ^.2.50 18s. 4id. in 
 all for capital and interest; (whereas Mr. Craw- 
 ford erroneously rates it at ■j^.3 54 15s. ) and a long 
 annuity for ^.lOO on the following terms, as 
 recommended by Mr. C. would cost, 
 
 70 years at 5| = ^.3 85 *\ 
 
 Ditto at 5l = 367 10 f 
 
 €5 years at 5| = 3 57 10 C 
 
 Ditto at 5|= 341 5^ 
 
 Average . . 362 16 s 
 Perpetual 3 per cents. . . 250 18 4i 
 
 Balance . . ill 17 io| 
 or rather better than the whole of the original 
 sum borrowed. 
 
 * The price assumed by Mr. Crawford, vide Doctrine of 
 Equivalents, page 158. 
 
 + It is to be recollected that all the redemptions throng''-
 
 C 52 ] 
 
 Of the three plans submitted to Mr. Pitt by Dr. 
 Price in 1786, there is considerable merit in 
 every one; and if the system established by that 
 able financier most resembled the least efficacious 
 of the number*, it is to be recollected that he did 
 not adopt any scheme without the most serious 
 and mature consideration of the circumstances of 
 the public resources, which were at that time 
 hardly in a situation to bear any very violent 
 innovation on the accustomed modes of raising 
 the annual supplies; and that it was his intention, 
 as subsequently appearedf, to make more sub- 
 stantial improvements in the financial operations 
 
 out this publication are calculated upon the assumption of 
 half-yearly liquidations, because all interests are payable 
 every six months ; but by the advantage of purchasing into 
 other stocks indiscriminately, the commissioners gain every 
 quarter a small advantage, about equivalent to the broken 
 periods. 
 
 * For a confirmation of this opinion, see the very able 
 reasoning of Mr. Vansittart in his Inquiry into the Finances, 
 &c. in answer to Mr. Morgan's Facts. Page 27 et infra. 
 
 + By the act for establishing a sinking fund on the self, 
 extinguishing principle, of adding 1 per cent, above the 
 interest, for liquidating all loans contracted for, after the 
 6th of January, 1793.
 
 [ 53 ] 
 
 of his ministry. The offer of these* plans to 
 Mr. Pitt was made by Dr. Price in consequence, 
 (as Mr. Morgan informs us in his review of Dr. 
 Price's writings,) of the minister's communicat- 
 ing to him a scheme which had suggested itself 
 for reducing the national debt, by converting 
 IOTt millions of the 3 per cents, into 74l mil- 
 lions, (nearly,) of 5 per cents, by changing each 
 lOO/. stock in the former, which bore an interest 
 of s/. into a capital of ^.69 \0s. in the latter, 
 bearing an interest of £.3 9s. 6d. This, Mr. 
 Morgan observes, would have produced an addi- 
 tional expence of 510,000/. per annum nearly, 
 which was to have been deducted from the million 
 surplus intended to be annually applied for the 
 purpose of redemption; and vthe remaining sum 
 of 490,000/. was to have been employed in dis- 
 charging the principal of this 5 per cent, stock. 
 
 * By the first of these plans the million surplus was to be 
 aided by the falling in of the temporary annuities, life annu- 
 ities, expenses of management, and the converting of 60 
 millions of 3 per cents, into fours, by providing in the first 
 5 years 600,000/. per annum for paying the difference of 
 interest. The second was to have all the same aids except 
 the conversion of stock, and to have the 600,000/. added to 
 the million surplus, instead of being required for diflerence 
 of interest. And the third was neither to have the assistance 
 of the conversion of stock, nor of the additional 600,000/. 
 per annum.
 
 [54] 
 
 But this, which was only a crude idea thrown out 
 by Mr. Pitt, and in the outset of his financial 
 career, was on revision, given up for the simple 
 application of the annual million with the grow- 
 ing dividends, at compound interest; till the year 
 179 2, when his experience of its beneficial effects 
 induced him to bring in his admirable bill for the 
 speedier reduction of all future loans by enacting 
 that after the 5th January, 1793, an addition of I 
 per cent, should be raised for the sole purpose of 
 liquidation, over and above the accruing divi- 
 dends redeemed thereby at compound interest ; a 
 plan which by the simplest*, speediest, and most 
 
 * When I make use of the term speediest., I mean most 
 practicably speedy ; I am well aware that the 10 per cent, 
 sinking fund assumed by tlie proposed statement of 1807, is 
 not only much speedier, but even much cheaper, for a cer- 
 tain time ; as I have already proved in a preceding part of 
 this pamphlet; and Dr. Price was certainly so far correct, 
 when he stated that on the self-extinguishing principle it was 
 cheaper to pay a high than a low rate of interest for any sum, 
 as applicable to the dtbts of an individual, where the value 
 of the capital is always the same ; but wrong when he applied 
 it to the public debts, the stock valuation of which varies 
 with the real or imagined advantages attending them from 
 time to time. Mr. Vansittart, in the very able publication 
 before alluded to, has said with great practical correctness 
 of discrimination, " The calculators of plans for reducing 
 " the national debt, never attend to any thing but the 
 *^ quickest possible means of payment. As calculators they
 
 [55] 
 
 unfailing method possible, reduces every loan 
 into an annuity of about 61. per cent, (varying 
 slightly according to circumstances) to be paid 
 for about thirty-five years (supposing the invest- 
 ment price to be averaged at 60, and that of 
 reduction at 75.) I cannot, nevertheless, avoid 
 lamenting that this plan did not receive the most 
 efficient assistance of which it was capable, in the 
 regulating of the proportion of sinking fund by 
 the capital borrowed instead of the capital created; 
 
 " do right; but when they arraign ministers of dogmatical 
 " haughtiness for not following their systems, it is proper 
 " to ask if an enlightened minister has not some other 
 " considerations to attend to. The national debt is indeed 
 " in one point of view a charge upon the general mass of 
 " national property, which is defrayed by deducting a cer- 
 " tain portion of every man's income by means of taxation ; 
 " in another^ it constitutes the property and furnishes the 
 •' income of a great and respectable class of the inhabitants 
 " of the country ; in a third., it is a deposit for capital 
 " not otherwise employed. The extinction of the debt is 
 " not, however, by any means the only purpose which the 
 " redeeming fund is found to answer ; it regulates in a con- 
 '' siderable degree the ordinary rate of interest, and the 
 " general state of credit, as well private as public. By 
 " producing a regular and steady supply of money in the 
 '' market, it prevents great and sudden fluctuations; and 
 *' counteracts fraudulent combinations to influence the price 
 " of stock. All great objects," as Mr. Vansittart very 
 properly observes, " in a great commercial country."
 
 [56] 
 
 the good effects of which strike me more forcibly 
 every time it comes in contemplation, nor can I 
 easily comprehend how an improvement so simple 
 in itself yet so efficacious in its operation, should 
 have escaped the accurately discriminative powers 
 of Mr. Pitt. 
 
 By this system of liquidation, however, as it 
 stands encumbered by the above defect, has the 
 national debt, (which in May, 1 806 amounted to* 
 7 ] 9i millions, exclusive of an unfunded debt of 
 nearly 37 millions) been reduced, on the 1st 
 February, 1807, jiagrante bdlo, by the annual 
 million 63,156,410, by the l percent, on loans 
 54,425,442, by the sale of land tax 22,716,205, 
 and by the 1 per cent, on imperial loans 73 4,604, 
 making an aggregate of 141,03 2,667; and having 
 a sinking fund to expend of about 2| millions 
 
 * Total amount of public funded debt of 
 
 Great Britain, 1st of Feb. 1806. . . ^.640,752,103 
 
 Additional stock created by loans of 1806. 29,880,000 
 Public funded debt of Ireland, to 1st of Feb. 
 
 1806 38,398,000 
 
 Ditto added by loans of 1806 3,320,000 
 
 Ditto on account of imperial loans. . . 7,502,633 
 
 Total stock debt. . 719,852,736 
 
 Vide papers printed by order of House of Commons, 14th 
 of July, 1806, No. 199.
 
 [57] 
 
 Sterling quarterly, or 9 millions per annum, in- 
 creasing rapidly* at the end of every quarter. 
 
 With these prospects before us there is little 
 need to shrink from the contest we are eno-ag-ed 
 in; and from our perseverance in which alone, 
 with redoubled energy on our own part, and 
 rather more liberal encouragement of our allies 
 
 * From the quarterly account of the commissioners for 
 liquidating the national debt, the increase on the 1st of 
 May, 1807, appears thus: 
 
 Quarterly Re. 
 \st Feb. 1807. 1st May, 1807, dcmptioncf Stock. 
 
 Redeemed by an- 
 nual million . <€.63,156,410 64,281,828 1,125,418 
 
 Ditto by 1 per 
 
 cent, in loans 54,425,442 56,629,084 2,203,642 
 
 Ditto by sale of 
 
 land tax . . 22,716,205 22,816,930 100,725 
 
 Ditto by 1 per 
 cent, on impe- 
 rial loans . . 734,604 766,758 32,154 
 
 Total . . 141,032,667 144,494,600 3,461,939 
 
 And the sura to be expended in the 
 
 ensuing quarter is .... ^.2,521,048 lis. lOJ. 
 Whereas the preceding quarter 
 
 had only to expend that of . .^.2,100,558 5s. bd. 
 
 £. 410,490 6.y. 5d.
 
 C 58 ] 
 
 than has been lately afforded, is the freedom of 
 enfettered Europe to be expected. " Nam ne quies 
 gentium sine armis; neque arma sine stipendiis; 
 neque stipendia sine tributis liaberi qiieunt" 
 
 And now, having considered the statement of 
 finance proposed by the late administration, with 
 an attentive, and I think I may venture to assert, 
 with an impartial judgment; having fairly given it 
 credit for the merits it really does possess, within 
 certain limits; and pointed out, on the other hand, 
 the fallaciousness of extending it beyond the 
 boundaries assigned by reason and practical dis- 
 cretion ; having brought it in every possibly 
 demonstrative manner to the test of arithmetic; 
 which as Mr. Rose has so correctly observed* 
 " has neither eloquence to persuade, nor sophistry 
 " to mislead ;" I shall take my leave of the sub- 
 ject with repeating my confirmation of the opi- 
 nion before expressed, that for each of the five 
 next years, (including the current one) the plan 
 proposed by Lord Henry Petty is to be preferred; 
 and after that a return to the system established 
 by Mr. Pitt; taking care in both to adopt the 
 improvement of regulating the sinking fund by a 
 portion not less than one sixtieth part of the 
 money capital borrowed, instead of one hundredth 
 
 * Observations on the civil list debt.
 
 [59 ] 
 
 of the stock capital created; and to fund^ as much 
 as possible, in a stock bearing 5 per cent, interest; 
 and this, I must strenuously recommend as the 
 most simple, clear, and practically efficient mea- 
 sure of ceconomy that can be adopted. 
 
 I cannot, however, conclude without noticing, 
 in a summary way, some of the principal events 
 which have taken place since the decease of that 
 ever to be regretted statesman, who in the labo- 
 rious, but successful, effort to save his beloved 
 country, certainly sacrificed his own health, and 
 hastened his own dissolution; who exchanged a 
 short existence for an endless reputation; and 
 only died to live more permanently in the grateful 
 remembrance of his fellow subjects. 
 
 With what an eager rush to power, every path 
 and avenue to public employment was instantane- 
 ously seized by Mr. Fox and his hungry adherents 
 at the moment of Mr. Pitt's death, is too well 
 known to be repeated; as well as the cautious care 
 with which every post was guarded against the 
 admittance of any man, however great or able he 
 had shewn himself in the discharge of his official 
 duties, who had unfortunately gained the good 
 opinion of the deceased minister in the exercise 
 of the functions with which he had been entrusted; 
 and thereby obtained a certain exclusion from 
 that galaxy of genius, that monopoly of talents.
 
 [ 60 3 
 
 which shutting out from the pale of political sal- 
 vation every friend and adherent of the illustrious 
 Pitt, with a sweeping clearance, even in the lowest 
 offices, beneath all former precedent, was to admit 
 alone within the purifying embrace of its magic 
 circle, the impeachers of Warren Hastings; the 
 persecutors of Lord Melville; the accusers of 
 Marquis Wellesley ; the managers of* bankrupt 
 Theatres; the editors of factious Chronicles, 
 the stale dregs and acrimonious sediments of the 
 Whig Club f ; those who could raise the majesty of 
 the people upon the insulted dignity of the sover- 
 eign, or borrowing that lamentable obliquity of 
 political vision which debased the talents of Mr. 
 Fox, could see in the wretched depravities and 
 
 * A statesman Portland never wou'd respect. 
 But with Athenian dignity reject ; 
 No cabinet for Sii — r — d — n, no trust. 
 Whilst England in her statesmen dares be just. 
 
 Epistle from Kion Long. 
 
 + When wc recollect the names that were withdrawn from 
 this society at the breaking out of the French revolution, 
 (why were they ever placed in such* company!!?) what man 
 of common sense or common prudence, would risk his con- 
 stitution, his very existence, by submitting io drain the poi- 
 sonous tartarizcd incrustations at the bottom of the flask, 
 after the vinous spirit of the liquor had evaporated. 
 
 * " 'Tis meet that noble minds keep ever with their likes." 
 
 JuHtJS C/tSAK,
 
 [61] 
 
 miserable distortions of the French revolution, 
 '' a fabric erected by human integrity to human 
 happiness;" nor discerned, whilst blindly worship- 
 ping at the shrine of freedom, that the palladium 
 was displaced, and the golden statue of the god- 
 dess supplied by a cast of licentiousness, but 
 rudely modelled in Corinthian brass, and maimed 
 and mutilated in every feature. 
 
 Yet such were, in general, the characters that 
 succeeded to place and power after the dissolution 
 of Mr. Pitt's last administration ; and few, very 
 few, were the exceptions; Lord Grenville and 
 two or three of his immediate friends*, are the 
 insulated instances of variation. And never shall 
 
 * Lord Sidmouth also was admitted into the cabinet, on 
 account of the weight attached to the acknowledged personal 
 regard entertained for him by his gracious master ; and, ichen 
 found convenient, had the honor of being consulted ; on the 
 subject of the Catholic question it ZlUs not convenient, be- 
 cause of his known respect for the opinion and conscience of 
 his Protestant Sovereign. His lordship had also read Mr. 
 Burke, and recollected the following quotation from his Re- 
 flections on the French Revolution, " Metaphysic rights cn- 
 " tering into common life, like rays of light which pierce 
 " into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature, refracted 
 " from their straight line." 
 
 Mr. Vausittart, whose abilities are universally ackno\v- 
 Icdgcd, was moreover allowed to exhibit at the Treasury the 
 shadow of his former consequence. 
 
 " Stat magni nominis umbra.'^
 
 [62] 
 
 1 cease to wonder how such a mind as his could 
 associate with men so opposite in principle, so 
 miserably inferior in ability; men who could 
 never love him, because they could never forget 
 his determined resistance to their factious line of 
 speech and conduct during the whole of his friend 
 and relations first ministry, before ne had forgot- 
 ten that illustrious connexion, or disclaimed that 
 truly honorable friendship: men who, when, as 
 much to their surprise as to the astonishment of 
 all his former associates, they saw him come into 
 place as the second, and* almost equal, of the 
 great advocate of democracy, the personal friend 
 of the Corsican, the reserver of his high consider- 
 ation and entire esteem for the ex-bishop of 
 Autun, could hardly credit the evidence of their 
 eye-sight, or believe him to be the same states- 
 man on whom the poet had passed the eulogium 
 of, 
 
 " The grave Grenville, with a patriot's end 
 " Who dared to sink the rival in the friend; 
 " Content to quit the Commons and the chair, 
 " To breathe with lords a more convenient air;" 
 
 when they saw him now consenting to take a part 
 in an arrangement, which, under the falsely as- 
 
 * " If," said Mr. Byng, at the meeting of the Middlesex 
 Freeholders, " Mr. Fox have that preponderance in his Ma-
 
 [63] 
 
 sumed title of a broad *^ or comprehensive admi- 
 nistration, (or according to the vulgar appella- 
 tion o^ All the Talents,) was to exclude, without 
 one solitary exception, every friend and associate 
 of that illustrious minister whose decease alone 
 could have afforded his successors the smallest 
 chance of obtaining the power so long and eagerly 
 sought after; for it is well known that Mr. Pitt 
 was never so firmly seated in the opinions, both 
 
 " jesty's councils, which he has a right from his transcendant 
 *' abilities to expect, and which I think he does possess," &c. 
 
 " Talibus et aliis longum sermonibus illi 
 
 " Implevere diem." This was the common cry of 
 
 the party, 
 
 * I have always entertained an opinion (which may, per- 
 haps, be not a very popular one, but as yet I have not seen 
 any reason to depart from it,) in regard to what are generally 
 called broad bottomed administrations, which is that no ar- 
 rangement composed of such heterogeneous particles can 
 either last long, or benefit the country Avhilst it does hold to- 
 gether ; and the late short administration confirms me very 
 strongly in it. But having assumed the title, it was their 
 duty to avoid all party exclusion. 
 
 The best that can be expected from such a mixture is, that, 
 like an alkaline draught, the opposing drugs may neutralize 
 each other, and so by a negative sort of virtue prevent mis- 
 chief; from which quacks expect wonders, whilst wise men 
 laujh, trust nature, and take no physic.
 
 [64] 
 
 of his sovereign and of his fellow subjects*, as at 
 the instant of his irreparable loss. 
 
 It was thus that the late ministers made their 
 very entrance into office, the first step of a system 
 of fallacy; let us now see how far the same prin- 
 ciple was continued to be acted on, in the suc- 
 ceeding measures of this political phenomenon, as 
 Lord Howick has been pleased to denominate f the 
 administration of himself and his colleagues. 
 
 On the death of Mr. Pitt, and the succession of 
 his great political rival, with a cabinet which left the 
 only man who could oppose him in it, with any hopes 
 of success, as to equality of talent, in a decided J 
 
 * All power of recollection must, I think, fail me before 
 I cease to remember the general gloom, the unaffected sorrow, 
 that seemed to hang on every countenance in the metropolis 
 on the day that followed the night of that great man's decease ; 
 when every bosom seemed filled, to use the beautiful words 
 (Osi sic oinniaH !) of one of his parliamentary antagonists, 
 on another subject, 
 
 " With patient woe that loves the lingering tear ; 
 
 " With thoughts that mourn, nor yet desire relief j 
 
 " With meek regret, and fond enduring grief; 
 
 " With looks that speak, he never shall return." 
 
 + In his address to the freeholders of the county he for- 
 merit/ represented. 
 
 X It is impossible to bring political opinion, like financial 
 criticism, to the sober test of demonstration by mathematics;
 
 [ 65 ] 
 
 minority;, it was easy to foresee that the first op- 
 portunity for concluding a peace with France, 
 
 but it may, perhaps, not be entirely without use in the for- 
 mation of our judgments, to attempt an analysis of the first 
 cabinet, in which All the Talents of the nation, like the jew- 
 els of the crown, were deposited. Arranging it thus, or 
 most probably nearly thus, in regard to the classification of 
 the several gems which it contained, and the different uses to 
 which they were likely to be applied ; on the side of the just 
 and constitutional exercise of prerogative at home, and of 
 firm and dignified resistance to the French usurper abroad, 
 1 should have expected to see the first lord of the Treasury 
 standing singly, as opposed to the secretary for the foreign 
 department, the chancellor of England, the chancellor of the 
 Exchequer, the first lord of the Admiralty, and probably 
 the master general of the Ordnance; but generally supported 
 on all domestic questions by the lord privy seal, and chief 
 justice of England, though not quite so certainly on points 
 of war or peace ; whilst the president of the council, and the 
 secretary for the war department might, perhaps, be set 
 down for such complete neutrals as to leave either party but 
 little room to speculate on material or permanent assistance. 
 Of the secretary for the home department I have not made 
 any mention, because, considering the different administra- 
 tions to which the noble lord has lent his support, it is not 
 very easy, (notwithstanding his truly respectable character,) 
 to find sufficient data whereon to ground any decisive opinion ; 
 and setting off the close connexion with the house of Caven- 
 dish on one side, against his very able and satisfactory naval 
 administration, in conjunction with Mr. Pitt, on the other, 
 he also, may be classed amongst the neutral squadron. 
 I
 
 [ 66 ] 
 
 whether auspicious or otherwise, would be seized 
 on with an enthusiastic eagerness leaving no time 
 to weigh the real interests of the country, or to 
 bestow a thought on a subject of so little import- 
 ance as the balance of continental power; and 
 we, accordingly, find that so early as the 20th 
 February, 1806, being something less than one 
 month after the decease of his illustrious prede- 
 cessor, Mr. Fox begins to coquet with his friend 
 Talleyrand, by informing him of a projected at- 
 tack on the sacred person of the virtuous Napo- 
 leone; in consequence of which, on the 5th of 
 
 From a cabinet thus constituted, and thus divided on fun- 
 damental points, what had the noble lord at the Treasury to 
 expect on the retention of his original principles of action ; 
 and if he gave them up for the sake of unanimity, to what 
 had the public to trust, against the prevalence of rash expe- 
 riment and impracticable theory, with which the opinions of 
 his new associates were so well known to be infected, both 
 in domestic legislation and continental policy. Yet such was 
 the dilemma to which the noble statesman had reduced himself 
 by his new connexions ; to what side of the alternative his 
 measures leant, let those measures for themselves pronounce. 
 I shall only add that such is still my respect for the friend and 
 relation of the immortal Pitt, as to give me confident trust 
 that the one great name of Grenville will yet be redeemed 
 with honor; — though I confess that the last fatal measure of 
 the late administration seems to present almost insuperable 
 difficulties.
 
 C67] 
 
 the next month, the religious bishop assures the^- 
 courteous secretary that his imperial master sees in 
 this a fresh instance of the great mind of Mr. Fox; 
 at the same time taking the intended hint, by 
 
 * I thiakmyself not wholly destitute of either feeling or hiu 
 manity, having no particular taste for boxing, cock-fighting, 
 or bull-baiting; and when at the head of a regiment, having 
 very rarely indulged myself in the martinet amusement of flog- 
 ging soldiers in order to improve the polish of their shoes, or 
 the greasing of their hair — but I do confess that this maudlin 
 kind of morality towards our enemies, and more especially to 
 the enemy of the whole human race, is not be found in the 
 catalogue of virtues I have been used to acknowledge as manly 
 and legitimate ones — it seems rather to be of the sort recorded 
 by the historian de la Grandeur des Roraains, et de leur 
 Decadence, when he says, " Entre mille exeraples, (de cette 
 " lachete, cette paressc, cette molesse des nations d' Asie,) 
 " je ne veux que Phillippicus, general de Maurice, qui, etant 
 " pret de donnerbataille, se niit a pleurer dans la considera- 
 " tion du grand nombre de gens qui alloient etre tues." 
 
 I beg leave, however, to deprecate the most distant idea of 
 encouraging either assassins or assassination; though I cer- 
 tainly do not concur in any unnecessary interference to save 
 the murderer of the princely d'Enguien from the fate he so 
 justly merits at other hands, any more than I should have 
 contributed to rob the gibbet of Sixteen String Jack ; or have 
 joined the knight of la Mancha in rescuing the galley slaves. 
 There is a manly, rational benevolence, widely different 
 from the false, affected, cosmopolitic philanthropy of the 
 modern school ; the first I love, the latter is as contemptible, 
 as it is to be detested.
 
 [ 68 ] 
 
 informing him that peace may be obtained on the 
 basis of the peace of Amiens ; after which follow 
 several communications as to the real construction 
 of that almost inexplicable treaty ; and at last Mr. 
 Talleyrand plainly says that of three possible me- 
 thods of negotiating, the first in a congress of all 
 the continental powers, secondly with those in alli- 
 ance with England, and thirdly with England alone, 
 the last is the only one which France can possibly 
 consent to adopt ; at the same time gently hinting 
 that, as Britain is the undoubted ruler of the 
 ocean, so also is France a great continental pow- 
 er; or in the straight forward language of two 
 house-breakers, " Do you take the jewels whilst I 
 seize the plate." And thus, in this indefininite 
 style of diplomatic flirtation, is an unofficial cor- 
 respondence protracted through the months of 
 March, April, and May; the very season of the 
 year when every energy of the country ought to 
 have been exerted to procure an active and early 
 campaign on the continent, instead of slumbering 
 over the various constructions of the provisions 
 of Amiens, or the possible limitations of an Uti 
 Possidetis, or a Status quo: till, on the 13th June, 
 we find Lord Yarmouth, (who was by this time 
 accredited to conduct a regular negotiation,) 
 stumbling in limine, into the toils of the arch- 
 deceiver Talleyrand, by misconstruing the speci-
 
 [69] 
 
 fic expression of " Nous ne vous la demandons," 
 (respecting Sicily,) into " Nous ne vous deman- 
 dons rien" or a complete and perfect Uti Possi- 
 detis. But we shall soon see that this was not the 
 only misconstruction of the phrase, for so early 
 afterwards as the 19th of the same month, the 
 French minister, availing himself af the mental 
 reservation of his original character, brings for- 
 ward a dispatch, said to be just received from 
 Giuseppe Buonaparte, (so/ disant Roi des Siciles, ) 
 purporting that Naples is found not to be tenable 
 without the possession of Sicily; and that, there- 
 fore, it is wished to set off Hanover against it; 
 (although the latter had been expressly stipulated 
 to be reserved as a complete exception to the 
 Uti Possidetis. Here then arises a new construc- 
 tion of the phrase supposed to contain the so often 
 alluded to basis of negotiation; and '''Nous ne 
 vous la demandons," is to be taken in the present 
 tense, " we are not asking it of you at present, 
 but we mean to have it shortly ; and although the 
 British negotiator appeared to be so completely 
 duped, the future prince of Benevento had actu- 
 ally the extreme forbearance not to demand it for 
 a whole week; and then, finding that Hanover 
 would not be placed against it as a set off, thp 
 French government, with its usual rapacity of 
 spoliation, on the 1st July offers in exchange^
 
 • [70] 
 
 not a province of France, or any integral part of 
 its own country, nor even any of its colonial pos- 
 sessions, but nothing less than the whole territory 
 of fheir peaceful and neutral neighbours the 
 Hanseatic merchants. Thus far for the boasted 
 Uti Possidetis. And now to the Russian treaty. 
 On the 9th of the same month (July), Lord Yar- 
 mouth mentions the promise made by Talleyrand, 
 and since repeated by him both to his lordship and 
 to Mr. D'Oubril, that if peace were made, Ger- 
 many should experience no further change; but 
 that all the arrangements, then in contemplation, 
 in regard to that country should be entirely drop- 
 ped. But on the 19th, at twelve at night. Lord 
 Yarmouth sends off a dispatch to say that D'Oubril 
 is determined to treat, although he has certain 
 intelligence that the German arrangements were 
 actually concluded on the 17th at night; and at 
 ten o'clock the following evening ( 20th) he writes 
 again to say that the Russian negotiator had actu- 
 ally signed his separate treaty ; the principal pro- 
 visions of which were, the immediate evacuation 
 of Germany by the French, the integrity of the 
 Ottoman Empire, and the desisting from all at- 
 tempts on Swedish Pomerania; in addition to 
 which, by a secret article, Russia promised to 
 obtain the exchange of Sicily for Majorca, Mi- 
 norca, and Ivica; and to restore peace between
 
 [71] 
 
 France and England. By this time the Corsican 
 was beginning to reap the fruits of his confede- 
 rate's diplomatic duplicity, in having lulled Eng- 
 land so completely to sleep as to prevent her 
 affording any impediment to the plans now ripe 
 for execution on the continent ; where we were 
 perfect neutrals, as to any active co-operation, 
 and the energies of Russia Were entirely paralysed, 
 for a time, by the signature of a treaty, which, 
 whether it should be ultimately ratified or not, 
 answered all the temporary uses of disunion and 
 distrust, and of preventing timely assistance to 
 Prussia, whom he had now got completely in his 
 toils, and ready for the destruction which he meant 
 to pour upon her devoted head. It was now, 
 therefore, time to change the scenery and intro- 
 duce another puppet on the stage of diplomacy; 
 Talleyrand was summoned to attend his brother 
 fiend to more active and extended scenes of human 
 devastation; and general Clarke was instructed 
 (24th July) to offer fresh terms to the following 
 effect; England to receive back Hanover; (Hoya 
 and Fulda being ceded to Prussia ; ) to retain in 
 full sovereignty the Cape and Malta ; (the former 
 being made a free port, and the order to be dis- 
 solved in the latter;) the Ottoman Empire and 
 Sweden to remain entire ; and Portugal the same, 
 except that a demur was made to the word par-
 
 I 72 ] 
 
 tout, which was afterwards explained by suggest- 
 ing that some part of its foreign possessions might 
 be yielded Xo Britain ; (doubtless for rialue re- 
 ceived:) France to regain Pondicherry, St. Lucia, 
 Tobago, Surinam, Goree, Demerara, Berbice, and 
 Essequibo ; the Corsican's family to be recog- 
 nized in all its branches, as well as the giriger- 
 hread monarchs of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, &c. &c. 
 The signature of D'Oubril's treaty, and the pal- 
 pable deceptions practised on Lord Yarmouth, be- 
 gan now to give serious alarm even to the pacific 
 secretary at home ; accordingly on the 26th July, 
 Mr. Fox informs his lordship that he is apprized of 
 the Russian treaty ; the terms of which had not 
 been accurately represented to the British nego- 
 tiator. " The King" he says, " was most parti- 
 " adarly struck with the great differeiice which was 
 " perceived between the actual arrangement made 
 '* respecting Sicily, and that which has been de- 
 " scribed to your Lordship." And adds the follow- 
 ing very expressive words, " It is necessary for me 
 *' to say frankly, it would have been more satlsfaC" 
 *' tory to His Majesty's servants if your lordship had 
 " waited to know the impression zvhich this event had 
 *' made here before you produced your full powers ;" 
 Ihat *' the Uti Possidetis as* proposed by themselves, 
 
 * The different constructions of this phrase put me in
 
 [73] 
 
 " with the exception of Hajiover, was to have been 
 " reverted to before the full powers were to be pro- 
 duced;" and '' that by producing them the very day 
 " after the signature of the Russian treaty, he had 
 '' created aji unfavorable iinpression ;" concluding 
 with a hint of the necessity of joining with him 
 another negotiator with full instructions ; and in 
 two days afterwards ( 28th July) Mr. Fox informs 
 him that the Earl of Lauderdale is nominated for 
 
 mind of the grammatical effect of varying, the emphasis on dif- 
 ferent words in the following sentence. 
 
 /will not walk to Hampstead to-day — but_^oM may. 
 
 I will not walk to Hampstead to-day— nor shall you make 
 me. 
 
 I will not zcalk to Hampstead to-day — but I will ride there. 
 
 I will not walk to Hampstead to-day-^— but to Richmond. 
 
 I will not walk to Hampstead to-da^ — but to-morrow. 
 
 Nous ne vous la demandons ; fVe do not ask it of you — 
 but brother Joseph. 
 
 Nous ne vous la demandons; We do not ask it of i/ou — 
 but of Kitig Ferdinand. 
 
 Nous ne vous la demandons ; We do not ask that of you — r 
 but will have something better. 
 
 Nous ne vous la demandons ; We do not ask it of you nozo 
 — but will have it shorilij. 
 
 Now would it not be difficult after this to decide the palm 
 of sophistry, between the secularized bishop of Autun, and 
 the " unfrocked grammarian " of Purley ; and may not the 
 UtiPossidetis of the one be classed amongst the Bina irreposvra, 
 of the other ? 
 
 K
 
 [74] 
 
 that office, and cautions his lordship not to commit 
 himself before his arrival. From this part of the 
 correspondence we have sufficient information 
 how well satisfied the several parties were with 
 each other; and the succeeding documents* af- 
 ford additional proofs, if any were wanting, of 
 the determined system of duplicity with which the 
 French government first commenced, and invaria- 
 bly continued to spin out this fallacious negotiation 
 for more than half a year, or the whole of tlie 
 proper season for military exertion. For on the 
 9th of August the Lords Lauderdale and Yarmouth 
 write to Mr. Fox that General Clarke in his first 
 conference with our town negotiators, had in- 
 formed this constellation of talents, these gemini 
 of the diplomatic zodiac, that every thing which 
 had hitherto passed in nearly three months of 
 grave and serious conference between Lord Yar- 
 mouth and the French minister for foreign affairs, 
 in attempting to fix the slippery basis of the 
 Uti Possidetisj was to be regarded only as " des 
 *^^ romans politiqueSy" the romantic reveries of 
 politicians; of no more real consideration in 
 practical diplomacy, than the extempore ravings 
 
 * It is to be remembered that the whole of this precis of 
 the negotiation is faithfully extracted from the official docu- 
 ments presented by the late ministers themselTCS, therefore 
 no ejcj)ar/e statement.
 
 [75] 
 
 of an Italiah Impromsatore, or the dilettante con- 
 versations of a London Society of Blue Stockings;. 
 — but that, on the contrary, " It never could 
 " have entered into the head of his master to take 
 " the Uti Possidetis as the basis of negotiation " 
 and that, " he is directed to declare that His 
 **■ Majesty, (meaning Buonaparte,) considers as 
 " a disgrace the very idea of a negotiation founded 
 '' on the Uti Possidetis." This we must allow, 
 (if we allow any thing,) to have been tolerably 
 explicit, as to the basis of negotiation, and ac- 
 cordingly, on the 14th of the same month, Mr. 
 Fox announces to Lord Yarmouth, His Majesty's 
 gracious intention to release his lordship from all 
 further fatigue in attempting to translate either 
 the latin or gallic phrases into plain English; and 
 that Lord Lauderdale will, in future, be allowed 
 to negotiate without his assistance. From this 
 date to the determining of this uselessly pro- 
 tracted negotiation in the beginning of October, 
 many epistles passed to and fro, full of the 
 amantium irce, and redintegrationes amoris of 
 these languishers after pacification; of which it is 
 only necessary to notice one of the 3 0th of 
 August, from Lord Lauderdale to Mr. Fox, in 
 which he says, " that in his first renewed con- 
 " ference, of that day, he finds the French had 
 *' wonderfully relaxed; and that Mr. Champigny, 
 '' the new Gallic plenipotentiary, expresses his
 
 [76] 
 
 " entertaining reasonable hopes that in a little 
 " time, the differences which now separated them 
 " might vanish." And another, of the 4th of 
 September, from Lord Spencer to Lord Lauder- 
 dale, which accounts for the altered tone of 
 France by communicating the important intelli- 
 gence of the non-ratification of D'Oubril's treaty. 
 On the 18th Lord Lauderdale informs Lord 
 Spencer of his having received the news of Mr. 
 Fox's death, and of his having been visited by 
 Talleyrand, whilst confined to his bed by sickness; 
 and on the l9th, of his having received a second 
 visit from him, in which he says, " I immediately 
 perceived his plan was to exhibit extreme civility, 
 '' which no one knows better how to execute;" the 
 fact most probably being, that the death of Fox 
 seemed to open so fair a prospect for the re-r 
 sumption of real British energy, as to render the 
 French minister anxious to make the most of his 
 time whilst he had yet one of his school to treat 
 with. At the latter end of the month. Lord 
 Ho wick informs Lord Lauderdale, that the King 
 sees with regret, after six months of negotiation, 
 France still hesitating on primary points; and 
 that a definitive answer must be required; soon 
 after which the mission was broken up, and Lord 
 Lauderdale recalled. And thus, after nearly a 
 seven months tedious exhibition of iniquitous 
 deception on the one side, and complete dupery
 
 [77] 
 
 on the other, terminated a negotiation which the 
 great Chatham would have put an end to in one- 
 tenth of the time ; and fondly, and affectionately 
 as I revere the memory, and lament the irre- 
 parable loss of his unequalled son, (whom, on 
 the whole, I cannot but regard as the superiorly 
 useful statesman, the Jilius patre magno major,) 
 I must, in this instance, prefer the high chivalric 
 spirit of the father, as most suitable at all times 
 to the dignity of a country ranking so highly in 
 the scale of nations as Britain ; and most generally 
 conducive to the interests of any country at any 
 time; but, at all events, I am perfectly prepared 
 to pronounce the whole of the transaction at pre^ 
 sent in question, to have been highly injurious to 
 the honor of this nation, and prejudicial to the 
 general interests of Europe, whether considered 
 as to the time of commencing, or the mode of 
 conducting it. '' Nemo jiisi victor pace bellum 
 " mutavit," is a maxim that will never be for- 
 gotten by sound politicians, however the language 
 of Grotius may be out of fashion with modern 
 publicists. And it was not at the moment when 
 the sinking energies of the continental powers 
 required every possible assistance both personal 
 and pecuniary that England, the triumphant mis- 
 tress of the seas, unhurt in her fleets and armies, 
 and unexhausted in her almost inexhaustible 
 resources, should have shewn a dastardly inclina-
 
 [78] 
 
 tion to forsake the contest ; the successful com- 
 pletion of which, alone, can ensure either her 
 safety or her honor ; to the advocates for both of 
 which the pursuit was equally interesting: " Tarn 
 " quibus salus, quam qiiibus gloria carissima est.'* 
 Happy, at all times, to change the tone of cen- 
 sure for the language of praise, it affords mc most 
 sincere pleasure to contribute thus publicly my 
 mite of approbation to the measure which I think 
 takes the lead before all others effected by the late 
 administration in point of m.erit; the abolition of 
 that abominable traffic in human misery, the slave 
 trade; a species of commerce authorized by no 
 principle of equitable legislation on earth ; and 
 sanctioned by no precept of that divine ordinance, 
 to which all mortal governments should bow with 
 reverence, and conform in practice. It is impos- 
 sible for any man to have less of the heated ima- 
 gination of a religious enthusiast in his composi- 
 tion than myself ; but never could I bring my 
 mind to believe, that an all-wise and all-benevo- 
 lent Creator should have predestined different 
 shades of complexion to serve as the distinguishing 
 marks of correspondent degrees of happiness or 
 infelicity ; or that human legislators could, on any 
 principle of justice, lay down geographical limits 
 for the law of nations ! and by a statute of West- 
 minster enact a perpetual and legal depopulation 
 Coongo or Senegambia.
 
 [79] 
 
 In this measure, therefore, T concur most com- 
 pletely ; but, giving to His Majesty's late minis- 
 ters the credit, they well deserve for an enactment 
 so truly laudable, let us not forget where this most 
 wholesome reformation in our statutes, originated, 
 still keeping in mind that it was under the admi- 
 nistration of the illustrious Pitt, that sincere friend 
 to real and rational freedom, this question was 
 first agitated ; and that though unavoidable rea- 
 sons of expediency obliged him to content himself 
 with occasional gradations towards the desired at- 
 tainment, it was nevertheless an object of which 
 he never lost sight; and that, above all, it was, 
 most probably, those gradual advances which, by 
 practical demonstration of their unfoundedness, 
 removed the main arguments of its opposers, and 
 enabled the last administration to complete the 
 abolition. To Mr. Pitt and his colleagues, there- 
 fore, for their preparatory measures, as to Lord 
 Grenville and his friends for their perfecting 
 enactment, I am disposed to yield equal admira- 
 tion and grateful acknowledgement, for expunging 
 a stain so foul, and hitherto so indelible, from the 
 statute books of our beloved country, which may 
 now, indeed, be boasted as the only practical de- 
 pository of that genuine liberty, which I shall 
 never cease to venerate, with an energy propor- 
 tioned to that by which I measure my abhorrence 
 and detestation of licentiousness. But independ-
 
 [80] 
 
 ently of any question of either moral or religious 
 tendency, I am clearly convinced that the owners 
 of West India property will, in the end, find it a 
 measure of considerable oeconomy to themselves ; 
 as well as the means of security to their fortunes 
 and their lives; and therefore, an arrangement of 
 great political expediency. It is not, however, by 
 any means my intention to anathematize every one 
 who thinks otherwise ; I am convinced that many 
 very able and honourable men, of all parties, 
 have differed from me on this head ; and am ready 
 to give them all due credit for the purity of their 
 motives ; though I cannot consent to see with their 
 eyes when my judgment has never entertained a 
 doubt upon the subject. 
 
 It is not, perhaps, necessary to enter into ob- 
 servations of any great length on the Bill, as first 
 introduced into the House of Commons, by a 
 learned gentleman late one of the law-officers of 
 the crown, for rendering freehold estates liable to 
 become assets for the payment of simple contract 
 debts ; the mischievous tendency of which was so 
 immediately apparent, as to alarm the whole 
 landed interest of all parties, and to induce the 
 house on the very able suggestions of the Master 
 of the Rolls, (whose great professional knowledge, 
 and generally acute discrimination, at once per- 
 ceived and pointed out the insidious attack medi- 
 tated against the whole aristocracy of the country)
 
 [81] 
 
 not to endure it for a moment ; and it was accord- 
 ingly rejected by a considerable majority, though 
 originating from the ministerial benches ; and con- 
 sequently expecting the support of ministerial in- 
 fluence ; and another bill was substituted, which 
 very properly, goes only to secure the estates of 
 persons trading within the scope of the bankrupt 
 laws, for the benefit of their creditors; who might 
 otherwise be defrauded by the vesting of mercan- 
 tile capital in freehold property. The latter bill 
 is a good one ; except that it yet wants the very 
 necessary discrimination of exempting all such 
 estates as come by inheritance and are not of the 
 bankrupts own acquiring ; because the hardship 
 still remains hanging over the inheritors in the 
 next generation as in the original bill, if the per- 
 son seized shall choose to become a partner in a 
 banking firme, or any other mercantile speculation 
 subject to a commission of bankruptcy, although 
 the estate may have descended through a long line 
 of ancestry ; but at all events the bill at first in- 
 tended for enactment, may be but too plainly 
 traced to the same spring from whence the attacks 
 upon the Test and Corporation Acts, and on the 
 religious establishment of the kingdom have de- 
 duced their origin ; and it is well known that both 
 the Freehold Assets Bill, and that for extending 
 1.
 
 [ 82] 
 
 the Catholics privileges^ were to have been fol- 
 lowed up by stronger and more dangerous mea- 
 sures. 
 
 The learned fraraer of the original proposition 
 argued most fallaciously, although it seems to 
 form a very plausible argument taken in the ab- 
 stract, when he asked whether it were just that one 
 description of men should be permitted to hold 
 their property untouched by law, above the reach 
 of a creditor's equitable claim, whilst another 
 class should be obliged to deliver up the whole of 
 their effects to their creditors, and in failure 
 of that incur the penalty of personal impri- 
 sonment; but the learned gentleman omitted 
 to point out that the former were only tenants 
 for life in an estate, which ought to descend to 
 their heirs, as free and unincumbered as it came 
 to them; and that the men who trusted them, did 
 it periculo suo, with their eyes open, incurring a 
 voluntary risk; and generally at a proportionate 
 profit; whilst the latter are persons trading on a 
 capital, often a fictitious one, of their own con- 
 structing5 and requiring from the very nature of 
 their concerns an extensive and precarious credit, 
 affording no other security than that very capital; 
 which, if converted by the trader himself, into 
 real property, on which the creditor should have 
 no lien, might certainly open a door to much
 
 [83] 
 
 fraud and injustice; this alters the case materially, 
 and places it on a very different footing from the 
 naked abstract question of obliging one man to 
 pay his debts, and allowing another to evade 
 them. It was also further demanded, whether 
 they were friendly to the aristocracy who could 
 seriously maintain that its consequence depended 
 on its members not paying their just debts? I 
 should have thought it impossible for any man 
 seriously to ask such a question; — but being put, 
 the answer is rendered sufficiently easy and sim- 
 ple by the substitution of another question to the 
 learned proposer of the former one; are they 
 their owti debts, or those of their predecessors, 
 who had no equitable right to rob them of their 
 inheritance by so burthening them, which they 
 were called upon by this bill to discharge; the 
 incumbrances which they themselves had created, 
 for a certain value received either in pleasure or 
 profit; or were they such as their predecessors 
 had enjoyed the fruits of, and left them to sustain 
 the penalties? Could the luminous mind of Sir 
 William Grant ever have been brought to listen 
 to such logic? Let us hear no more of it. 
 
 In the arrangements made by the late secretary 
 for the war department, for ameliorating the con- 
 dition of the soldier, that right honourable gen- 
 tleman seems to me to have done right on a wrong 
 principle; for he does not appear to have con-
 
 [84] 
 
 templated the feelings of the man, the only mo- 
 tive which ought to have actuated him^ with any 
 regard to propriety, but merely to have consider- 
 ed it as a mode of more speedily recruiting the 
 army. Now it always did strike me, when iiT the 
 line myself, that it was highly incumbent on the 
 legislature to emancipate the only slaves in a free 
 country, by doing away the perpetuity of military 
 service; but it never could have entered into my 
 imagination to propose it as a measure of benefit 
 to the recruiting service; but, on the contrary, 
 as requiring some counteracting arrangement to 
 set off against the deficit it must occasion in our 
 ranks, and the additional expence it must neces- 
 sarily give rise to in replacing the men so liberat- 
 ed. But upon what principle, pither of equity or 
 expedience, can we reconcile to our feelings the 
 odious and invidious distinction made between 
 the officjers of the regular and militia forces, by 
 excluding the latter from the advantages of in- 
 creased subsistence granted to the former? — Is it 
 the paltry oeconomy of a few thousands per an- 
 num to be saved thereby, at the expense of 
 adding to the disgust already occasioned by render- 
 ing them drill Serjeants for the line? For however 
 necessary the volunteering from the militia might 
 be; and I am ready enough to admit the necessity 
 in moments of emergency, it must always be a 
 matter of disgust. Are we to suppose that a mili-
 
 [85] 
 
 tia officer possesses a less potent appetite than a 
 regular of the same rank; andean, therefore, be 
 supported on a smaller daily pittance? Or are we 
 to rely on the flimsy compliment, that, as an 
 officer of militia must, by the qualification laws, 
 be in possession of a certain quantum of private 
 fortune, he must, therefore, be less in need of 
 advanced pay, and has the more honorable dis- 
 tinction of receiving a smaller remuneration for 
 his services; but upon this principle it would be a 
 still higher compliment to rob him of his pay 
 altogether, and let him offer his gratuitous servi- 
 ces at the pure shrine of unadulterated patriotism 
 — the sober fact, however, really is, (and I speak 
 from personal knowledge, having had the honor 
 of commanding a militia regiment during the 
 greatest part of the present and last wars,) that 
 the qualified gentlemen have been so completely 
 disgusted with the idea of crimping for the line, 
 that they have almost universally quitted the mili- 
 tia ; and that a very small proportion of qualified 
 officers are now serving. But at any rate the 
 measure in question was both unjust and injudi- 
 cious. Of the same nature was the dreadfully 
 dangerous impolicy exemplified in the contemp- 
 tuous and degrading treatment of that invaluable 
 species of force the volunteer establishment; to 
 which, alone, I am certain that this country can 
 at the present moment, attribute its singularly
 
 [ 86 ] 
 
 triumphant escape from the universal wreck of 
 nations in the abyss of modern revolution. Had 
 they not stood forward' as they did, or having 
 once come forth, had they in the earlier stages of 
 the gallic anarchy retired in disgust, I am con- 
 fident that no endeavours, whatever, of the other 
 forces could by any possible exertion have rescued 
 us from the common ruin, with which we were 
 threatened by the eruptions of the revolutionary 
 lava, when like the fiery torrents of Vesuvius, 
 they over-ran and laid waste the fairest and most 
 fertile plains of Europe. 
 
 Another measure pregnant with ruin to those 
 bulwarks of the British Empire, the naval and 
 commercial interests, was the act commonly cal- 
 led the West India Intercourse Bill ; an arrange- 
 ment for which no possible necessity could be 
 adduced in proof; which, after all, left the prac- 
 tice, and must necessarily leave it, exactly where 
 it was found; but went, in point of form, to sys- 
 tematize and legitimate prospectively what before 
 had been only the cause of occasional suspension, 
 and subsequent indemnity, according to existing 
 and unavoidable circumstances. And on no other 
 plea to be allowed than that of the ultimse neces- 
 sitatis. It is difficult to account for the obstinacy 
 with which all attempts to elucidate the subject* 
 
 * The evidence to be adduced would have proved, that
 
 [87] 
 
 by evidence was so contemptuously rejected by 
 the framers of the bill^ when the arguments in 
 favor of so doing were so unanswered, ("except 
 by general assertion supported by no fact what- 
 ever,) and indeed so unanswerable. It is well 
 known that so convinced was the comprehensive 
 
 from the year 1789 to 1801, the comparative proportion of 
 foreign tonnage, employed in our trade, to that of British, 
 which in the former period was only as 8 to lOO, had in. 
 creased as high as that of 68 to 100 ; and the absolute in- 
 crease of foreign shipping employed, which in 1791 was 
 3165 ships, measuring 479,630 tons, and navigated by 
 28,120 men, had in 1801 mounted up to 11,123 ships, 
 1,585,035 tons, and 82,934 men. Whilst the British vessels 
 belonging to the West India Islands had from 1791 to 1804 
 decreased from 935 ships, 110,900 tons and 6,567 men to 
 167 ships, 19,535 tons, and 1,860 men. That in December, 
 1802, the total number of ships building in the River Thames 
 was 33, viz. 11 for the King's service, 17 for the East India 
 Company, only 4 for the merchants service, and 1 for the 
 fisheries ; and that, at the same time there were not less than 
 100 with the broom at mast-head for sale. If such were the 
 blessed effects on our naval system from temporary and occa- 
 sional infractions of the Navigation Act, what were to be 
 expected from a systematized and legitimate suspension. And 
 here the rejection of evidence appears in its worst shape, 
 because as long as the entries at the Custom House, aud the 
 payment of duties, whether on produce brought home in 
 Foreign or British vessels, continued the same, so as not to 
 occasion any defalcation of revenue, the general prosperity 
 appeared untouched; and the decay of the shipping interest 
 remained unnoticed, becau'^o not publicly recorded.
 
 C 88 3 
 
 mind of the illustrious Pitt on this subject that it 
 was his absolute determination, in his last, and 
 unfortunate for his country, but too short* return 
 to power, to do away by degrees all necessity, 
 (excepting only on sudden and unforeseen emer- 
 gency, when it would be impossible for any colo- 
 nial governor, under any legislative restriction 
 whatever, to wait for legal authority,) for having 
 recourse to the intervention of foreign shipping 
 in the supply of the West India Islands. And this 
 could have been only on the most mature consi- 
 deration of the facts, for those who are in the 
 habits of political recollection, will remember 
 that it was that great statesman himself who, when 
 chancellor of the exchequer in Lord Shelburne's 
 administration, actually framed a bill for the same^ 
 or nearly the same purposes as the act in question; 
 but then it must also be remembered that this 
 was just after the close of the American war, 
 
 * " Quoi done, la duree des projets les plus utiles tient 
 " it la stabilite d'un homme, ct cet homme lui-meme, un 
 " souffle le fait disparoitre! Triste et profonde reflexion, 
 " qui rend vaines tant de pensees, et qui etiendroit le cou- 
 " rage, si I'entreprise du bien public ne ressembloit pas a la 
 " recherche de ces secrets de la nature, vers lesquels on fait 
 " quelques pas; d'ou Ton s'eloigne ensuite, pour s'en rap- 
 " procher encore; mais qu'on decouvre enfin, et qui sem- 
 " blent se rendre a I'opiniatrete de I'esprit humain, et a la 
 '' succession des lumieres." 
 
 Necker de Tadministration des Finances.
 
 [89] 
 
 when the United States had but recently obtained 
 their emancipation from British dependence; and 
 when it was necessary to accustom the island 
 colonies, who had hitherto received their supplies 
 from those who were then their fellow-subjects^ 
 by degrees to look to other channels for assist- 
 ance on that head. But even this bill, which in 
 its first promulgation had the concurrence and 
 support of Mr. Burke, was subsequently with- 
 drawn, by the same advice*, as impolitic and 
 unnecessary. Upon the present occasion the most 
 respectable and opulent amongst the merchants 
 and ship-owners of the metropolis, had pledged 
 themselves to the constant and regular supply of 
 the islands on all common occasions; and for 
 extraordinary contingencies of what avail could it 
 be to give to ministers by law a power of which it 
 
 * To those who wish for more minutely detailed informa- 
 tion on this subject, it is earnestly recommended to peruse 
 two very accurate and excellent Reports drawn up, the one 
 in 1784, and the other in 1791, by Lord Liverpool, then 
 president of the committee of privy council for trade; in con- 
 formity with which very able and important representations; 
 Mr. Pitt continued to confine the supply to British vessels, 
 until the beginning of the French war, when he consented 
 to partial relaxations ; of which latter conduct, however, 
 he so plainly felt the bad effects as to return to his former 
 strictness on this point, during his last administration. 
 M
 
 [90] 
 
 was impossible they should make any discreet use; 
 for they could have no other alternative but that, 
 of either doing too much by laying open the ports 
 at all times, and striking vitally at the naval 
 strength and supremacy of the empire, or too 
 little by not acting at all till they had received 
 information of the danger, which must by that 
 time have passed over so as to render intervention 
 useless and unnecessary, or fallen so heavily as to 
 make relief impracticable; and it is clear that the 
 responsibility could never rest so safely as with 
 the governors on the spot, who the more danger- 
 ously they were situated by their temporary in- 
 fractions of the lav,'s, would be so much the more 
 likely to avoid the incurring of such responsibility, 
 by any wanton or avoidable frequency. This en- 
 actment, therefore, could only choose between 
 the extremes of mischief or nullity, and I really 
 feel at a loss to account for the motives of its 
 introduction; for I can v/ith difficulty be brought 
 to imagine that it was hurried on with a precipita- 
 tion so indecorous, merely because a right ho- 
 norable secretary for that department had, three 
 monihs before, with his usual theoretical rapidity 
 of unguardedness, issued a circular letter to the 
 West India governors, authorising a general sus- 
 pension, and promising in the name of the legis- 
 lature to grant an indemnity.
 
 [ 91 ] 
 
 In the measures taken for the better examination 
 and audit of the public expenditure, there is such 
 a mixture of good and evil, of judgment and 
 injudiciousness, that it is difficult to say whether 
 it is most likely to prove beneficial or injurious 
 in its effects; nevertheless I am well convinced 
 that, on the whole, a much better arrangement 
 might have been made. In the present state of 
 the public accounts, and the heavy arrear which 
 has accumulated in consequence of the great 
 increase of business in every department of the 
 state, 1 am not at all prepared to say that less 
 than ten commissioners, exclusive of the army 
 comptrollers, (who are very properly separated 
 from the board of audit,) the West India commis- 
 sioners, and those for examining the barrack 
 accounts, would have been found sufficient; I am 
 rather inclined to think that a smaller number 
 would not have sufficed; and in the selection of 
 the persons appointed much care was certainly 
 taken to nominate only such as, either from great 
 professional knowledge, or from considerable 
 practical experience in this or other public 
 departments, were eminently qualified for the ar- 
 duous functions they were called to the exercise 
 of; and to their zealous and attentive discharge of 
 those duties, the writer of this can bear ample 
 testimony from his personal knowledge; but it is
 
 [92] 
 
 *. 
 
 also equally certain that their abilities and atten- 
 tion might have been more advantageously em- 
 ployed for the public service, under a more 
 judicious arrangement. One of the fundamental 
 errors of the present establishment is the creation 
 of a general board, at v;hich all the members 
 of rhe three subdivision (or subordinate boards) 
 are assembled once a week, or oftener as occasion 
 may require; now it is well known to every 
 practical man of business, that dispatch can only 
 be obtained in small assemblies; and that though, 
 perhaps, it may not always be right to let the de- 
 cision of an important or intricate question rest 
 on the mere ipse dixit of any one man, yet all the 
 real and useful advantages of deliberation may be 
 obtained in a council of three; allowing, there- 
 fore, for the absence of one member at a time, 
 no board should, in the whole, consist of more 
 than four coiamisiioners; and I am of opinion 
 that such board should sit as often as three times 
 at least in each week, to determine judicially 
 all doubtful questional, arising in the examina- 
 tion of accounts by the chief clerks (or inspectors;} 
 to whom I am dicposed to think such duty would 
 
 * Still retaining a general superiti ten dance of a particular 
 department each, but Ieavi>;g the morj mechanical process of 
 examinatioii to the clerks.
 
 [93] 
 
 be better entrusted than to the commissioners 
 themselves, as is done under the present arrange- 
 ment. And I cannot but believe that it would 
 have been much better if the whole of" the public 
 accounts had been divided, not into ordinary and 
 extraordinary, but into civil and military depart- 
 ments; the latter comprehending every disburse- 
 ment, of every kind, either ordinary or extra- 
 ordinary, belonging to the navy and army; and 
 the former including all other sources of public 
 expenditure whatever. To each of these depart- 
 ments of audit, a board consisting of a chairman 
 and three other commissioners should iiave been 
 appointed; keeping them as perfectly independent 
 of, and unconnected with, each other, as the dif- 
 ferent services, for which the disbursements en- 
 trusted to their respective examinations were incur- 
 red, would have been in their natures and effects. 
 This, I am clear, would be infinitely better than 
 one general board, where the opinions of ten com- 
 missioners, delivered ser/c?///;z, must necessarily oc- 
 casion much delay ; exclusive of that still more fre- 
 quent and serious one, of continual reference, 
 and delivery of papers from one board to another ; 
 the whole of which would have been avoided by 
 keeping separate those offices which the discrimi- 
 native mind of Mr. Pitt, (to whom it had before 
 been suggested,) could never bear the idea of
 
 [94] 
 
 consolidating; well knowing that whatever might 
 be gained in uniformity of practice, (which after 
 all is generally mere matter of non-essential form, 
 the very " leather and prumlla" of official cos- 
 tume, though very convenient when attainable 
 without the sacrifice of more substantial points,) 
 would be greatly outweighed by the loss of time 
 in point of dispatch; and, indeed, when the 
 great difference in the nature of civil and military 
 expenditures is considered, it does not appear 
 that such uniform mode of examining the accounts 
 of disbursements so essentially different, as well 
 in the mode of issuing the necessary supplies of 
 money, as in the ascertaining of the very various 
 species and degrees of authority to be required 
 in support of the charges to be allowed against 
 the public, can lead to any indispensably requisite 
 advantage in practice. Having thus established 
 two permanent boards of audit, the one civil and 
 the other military, consisting of four commis- 
 sioners each, it seems to me that the remaining 
 two commissioners of the present number, joined 
 with the two appointed to examine General 
 Delancey's accounts, might, very beneficially, 
 have been formed inio a third temporary office, 
 for the sole purpose of bringing up the arrear, 
 including every account, of whatsoever nature, 
 of a date prior to the renewal of hostilities in
 
 [95] 
 
 1803— that is to say, all accounts terminating on 
 or before the 3) St of December, 1802; beginning 
 with the barrack master general's accounts, from 
 the first establishment of his office to the ap- 
 pointment of his successor, (whose accounts are 
 now under examination in the office of audit ; ) 
 and so travelling* backwards; beginning with 
 those of the most recent date, as the most capable 
 of receiving complete investigation and satisfac- 
 tory statement ; and reserving to the last those of 
 the oldest existence; where from the death, 
 insolvency, or local distance, of the parties, and 
 
 * This to be taken, however, rather as a general principle 
 than a specific rule ; and must be subject to many qualifica- 
 tions in practice, at the discretion of the auditors; — one 
 striking exception may be particularized amongst many 
 others, in regard to the paymaster general's accounts, of 
 which although the last declared is for the year 1782, the 
 whole of the remaining years up to the present moment 
 remaining unaudited ; yet as such arrear, though apparently 
 so enormous, is occasioned by the non.settlemcut of the 
 regimental accounts for those years at the war oflice; (from 
 ■whatever cause arising,) it is evident that no other course 
 than that of the regular annual succession can be taken v. ita 
 the examination of the pay-otfice accounts, for want of the 
 proper documents. This however shows, very clearly, the 
 necessity of considering the paymaster genera! of th& forces, 
 as Mr. Rose so correctly observed, merely as the military 
 banker, and in such capacity only requiring him to exhibit 
 a cash account of the army expenditure for the last year,
 
 C 96 ] 
 
 the difficulty of obtaining any external evidence 
 in support of that afforded by the accounts them- 
 selves, it is hardly possible that any longer lapse 
 of time before they are settled should place them 
 in a state of greater uncertainty than what they 
 were found in. 
 
 I am strongly inclined to think that more prac- 
 tical utility would be experienced from this 
 arrangement than from the one adopted; and feel 
 the more disposed to decision on this pointy from 
 the certainty that the existing defects are innate 
 to the establishment, and by no means the fault 
 of those entrusted with the execution of its 
 duties; who have given it the fairest trial that 
 zeal and attention could possibly afford. 
 
 In that act* itself there are many excellently 
 useful provisions in regard to tiie mode off 
 rendering and^j; attesting accounts; of charging H 
 
 authorized by the royal warrant for the issue, and vouched 
 by the receipts of the parties for the actual payment of the 
 several sums ; — the detailed disbursement, or service acccount, 
 of which, would appear afterwards in the regimental and 
 other specific accounts. By this means the pay-ofl&ce 
 account of the whole military expenditure of the country 
 might be before the public soon after the end of every 
 year — certainly before the close of a second one, 
 
 * 46 Geo. 3, cap. 141. + Section 8. 
 
 + Section 9. 1 Section 14.
 
 [97] 
 
 sums improperly expended, against the persons 
 authorizing such improper expenditures, instead 
 of those by whom they were actually disbursed 
 under their authority; of calling* for and ex- 
 amining accounts of stores, provisions, or any 
 other articles of public property; and of valuing f 
 and charging against the several accountants, all 
 the deficiencies arising therein by embezzlement, 
 waste, or wilful neglect. There are provisions, 
 also, for enabling the auditors]; to allow sums 
 not exceeding lOO/. in accounts of expenditures 
 incurred previously to the date of this act, nor 
 going beyond sol. in those of subsequent dis- 
 bursements, though without vouchers where they 
 are convinced of the propriety of the charge; 
 and forgiving themU power to allow, in accounts 
 of any date, sums where the voucher is produced, 
 but is imperfect for want of some accompanying 
 document; which are both good as far as they go, 
 but are not very clearly expressed as to the 
 connective construction of the two clauses; nor 
 as to the degree of proof, nor in regard to the 
 specific nature of the statement upon oath, 
 required- from the accountant, in lieu of the 
 
 * Sections 17 & 18. t Section 19. 
 
 X Section 15. f Section 16. 
 
 N
 
 [98] 
 
 vouchers or documents wanting, to satisfy the 
 commissioners as to the propriety of making 
 such allowances; neither does the extent of power 
 granted by these clauses go far enough to enable 
 the auditors to grant a sufficiency of equitable 
 relief in point of form to honest accountants. 
 There seems also to be some explanation wanting 
 as to the limits of the authority, given to the 
 treasury in section 11, of 25 Geo. 3, cap. 5£, 
 and of the jurisdiction of the court of exchequer, 
 referred to in the 23d section of the same act, so 
 as to prevent their clashing; the provisions of 
 both these clauses remaining undisturbed, but 
 also undefined, by the new act of the 46th of the 
 King, cap. 141. Though I confess that I am not 
 friendly to any increase of legislative restrictions, 
 (or enactments of any kind,) in this department, 
 where it can possibly be avoided ; being sensible 
 that the auditors hands are already too much 
 bound by legal forms, to the great hindrance 
 of dispatch, and the unavoidable prevention of 
 decrease in the heavy arrear of unaudited 
 accounts. 
 
 It is impossible, however, to quit this subject 
 without lamenting the extreme unguardedness of 
 the late chancellor of the exchequer, in being 
 betrayed, at the time of introducing his new bill, 
 into language, which certainly stamped an im~
 
 [99] 
 
 pfession on the public mind, that a sum equal 
 to the sterling value of the whole national debt 
 had been paid away without any attempt to ac- 
 count for a sum so enormous ; whilst the pru- 
 rient imagination of the noble lord, heated with 
 all the enthusiasm of reform, gave birth to a 
 creation of flagrant abuses and flagitious mal- 
 versations, which for the most part existed only 
 in the day-dreams of the Whig Club ; or the 
 lucubrations of Home Tooke, and the frantic 
 reveries of his insane pupil. The successor of 
 such a man as Mr. Pitt, ought to have felt it his 
 duty not to lead an uninformed multitude astray, 
 by confounding unaudited with unaccounted-for 
 expenditures. It is well known by those who 
 have the best opportunity of judging, that, though 
 some abuses may have existed, and some accounts 
 been loosely or incorrectly made up, that the 
 far greater proportion of the unaudited issues 
 have been fairly and properly expended; and 
 that the class of honest accountants out-numbers, 
 very greatly indeed, the list of public defaulters; 
 although their accounts have not yet, from the 
 pressure of increased business, and other causes, 
 received the last forms of official discharge. 
 
 I should obsers e, in regard to the division of 
 accounts into civil and military departments, that 
 in order to render this division perfect, it is
 
 [100] 
 
 absolutely necessary, that the paymaster-general 
 of the forces should not issue money for any 
 civil purpose whatever; but confine his advances 
 to services purely military — as those of the trea- 
 surer of the navy should be to naval ones; and 
 that every sum requisite for the services of the 
 civil department of public expenditure should be 
 issued either from the exchequer or the bank, 
 so as not to occasion any unnecessary delay, by 
 reference from the civil and military departments 
 to each other. 
 
 With the advantages of such an arrangement, I 
 am convinced that the arrear might be brought 
 up, and prevented from recurring ; under the 
 present I am equally clear it never can. 
 
 The proposition for improving the judicial 
 system of North Britain, appears to me, to par- 
 take in a great degree, of the mixed nature of 
 the last mentioned measure. The lords of session 
 being no less than fifteen in number, the division 
 of this learned crowd, (as they have, very pro- 
 perly, been termed,) into* three distinct cham- 
 
 * If it can be necessary that Scotland should have so many 
 as fifteen judges, exclusive of the barons of the exchequer, 
 whilst England only requires .eight. A very able and learned 
 member of the court of session, (the late Lord Swinton,) 
 has said two courts of five judges each, if acting separately 
 and independenfli/, would suffice.
 
 [101] 
 
 bers is excellent; but by a kind of fatality, which 
 seemed to neutralize ail the most beneficial pro- 
 ceedings of the late administration, they at once 
 counteract all the good they had proposed by 
 erecting a general court of revision ; in which, 
 (as the acute conductors of the Literary Review 
 of the Northern Metropolis have very accurately 
 expressed themselves, ) '' It is impossible to set 
 " fifteen men a talking upon any subject, on which 
 " they are ultimately to vote, without producing a 
 " considerable eagerness of opposition ; and altering, 
 " in S07ne degree, the tone of judicial discussion to 
 " that of polemical debate." In this, therefore, they 
 have fallen into the same fundamental error*, as 
 
 * In speaking of either of these truly respectable bodies, 
 the court of session in Scotland, and the board of audit in 
 England, I must beg leave to quote the words of the follow, 
 ing passage in a very able tract, generally ascribed to the 
 then Lord Advocate, and since president of the first men- 
 tioncd court, in which the learned author says (and I think 
 his argument will apply equally to ten commissioners at one 
 board, as to fifteen judges at one bench.) " I hope no one 
 " will mistake me so far as to suppose that the most distant 
 " insinuation is meant against the purity and honor of so 
 " respectable a body of men. I know the judges individu- 
 " ally to be men of as great worth as any who exist, and of 
 '* the most eminent ability in their profession. But this I 
 " must be permitted to say, that the present established 
 " mode of conducting business in that court, oicing chiefly
 
 [ 102 ] 
 
 in constituting a general board of audit. How 
 far the extension of the trial by jury, which at 
 present is confined to criminal indictments and 
 revenue questions, (that is, to all causes, whether 
 
 " to the number of its judges, has a tendency to produce 
 " those mischiefs, and will in time do so, if an effectual 
 " remedy be not applied. It is obvious that a numerous 
 " body of judges is better calculated for debate than deci- 
 *' sion. The dignity of the character is lessened in propor- 
 " tion to the number, not only in their own feeling, but in 
 " the eyes of the world; and they are less sensible of respon- 
 " sibility than the same men would otherwise be. We have 
 " been told that the fifteen judges with difficulty overtake 
 " their business, and therefore that a smaller number cannot 
 " be sufficient. To those who are unacquainted with the 
 " practice this may seem a plausible argument; but it ought 
 " not to have been used by gentlemen who have access to 
 ^' know how the fact really stands. The smallest reflection 
 '' must satisfy every one that the number of judges does no 
 " way tend to distribute the labour so as to make it easier 
 *' to each individual, for they must all read the whole papers, 
 " and hear the whole argument; they must all judge at the 
 " same time; and the case is by no means similar to that of 
 " carrying a load, when in proportion to the number, the 
 '■' burthen is heavier or lighter to each. On the contrary, 
 " adding to the number of judges increases the weight, and 
 " makes it more cumbersome, owing to the debate it occa- 
 " sions. I maintain therefore that not only are fourteen or 
 " fifteen judges sitting in a body unnecessary, but the num- 
 '' ber does harm, and therefore ought at all events to be 
 " abridged."
 
 [103] 
 
 criminal or civil, wherein the crown is a party, ) 
 may be beneficially applied in every case, I am 
 not at all prepared to decide ; it is a measure 
 which, as a very material innovation on the estab- 
 lished usage should, at any rate, be well weighed 
 and maturely considered in all its probable effects, 
 before it is adopted. But it is of some conse- 
 quence to know, that eleven of the fifteen Scotch 
 judges were against it. 
 
 Upon the last and most important proposition 
 of the ex-ministers, that to which the late change 
 in His Majesty's councils is to be attributed, I 
 feel no difficulty whatever in pronouncing a very 
 decided opinion. There appears on this point, 
 most clearly and unequivocally, to have been no 
 other alternative left to the Sovereign, but either 
 to dismiss his ministers or to become their 
 prisoner at discretion. Now, whether this really 
 were the case or not, let us try to determine, 
 not by the prejudiced voice of party, not by the 
 cry* of popular opinion, but by the sober test 
 
 * It has been said that " a beastly cry of, " No Popery^'" 
 has been raised against the late miuisters;" — but I think the 
 orator who thought proper to adorn his harangue with this 
 elegant expression, will find the noise more resembling the 
 roar of the British lion than the howl of any inferioranimal. 
 
 " Ubi se sajva; stimulavit rerbere caudae, 
 
 " Ei-exitque jubas, vasto grave murmur hiatu 
 ••' Infrerauit. — "
 
 [ 104 ] 
 
 of Reason^ and the impartial and incontrovertible 
 voice of Truth. It is, I believe, an admitted 
 fact, uncontradicted by the assertion of any man, 
 or set of men, that by the coronation oath im- 
 posed on the Sovereign at the revolution in 168 8, 
 he is sworn " to maintain the true Protestant 
 " RELIGION OF THE Church OF England,*" and by 
 the Act of Union with Scotland, '' The settle- 
 
 " MENT of the church EXISTING AT THE TIME OF 
 
 " THE Union." I think, also, that no man can be 
 found so hardy as to tell me that the lately pro- 
 posed act for extending the political privileges of 
 the Catholics did not, by granting such an 
 extension of power to its antagonists, tend to 
 weaken that establishment* which the Sovereign 
 
 * " I give you opinions which have been accepted amongst 
 " us from very early times to this moment, with a continued 
 " and general approbation, and which indeed are so worked 
 " into my mind, that I am unable to distinguish what I have 
 " learned from others, from the results of my own mcdita- 
 " tion. It is on some such principles that the majority of 
 "the people of England, far from thinking a religious na- 
 " tional establishment unlawful, hardly think it lawful to be 
 " without one. This principle runs through the whole of 
 " their polity. They do not consider their church establish. 
 *' mentas convenient, but as essential to their state; not as 
 " a thing heterogeneous and separable ; something added for 
 *' accommodation, which they may either keep up or lay 
 *' aside, according to their temporary ideas of convenience.
 
 C 105 ] 
 
 had solemnly sworiij in the face of his people^ to 
 defend and protect against all encroachment; 
 and the intended act either did grant such exten- 
 sion of power^ or the advocates for the measure 
 took nothing by their motion ; and the act itself 
 must in the latter case be as useless as it was 
 mischievous; but the fact is that it did actually 
 go to a very considerable extension of Catholic 
 power, and must have been followed up by still 
 more dangerous grants of privileges. Nor will 
 it be useless, in proof of this assertion, to trace 
 the practical effects of such enactments in their 
 different stages. The advocates for concession, 
 or as it is idly called, emancipation*, will not 
 
 " They consider it as the foundation of their whole constitu- 
 " tion, with which, and with every part of which, it holds 
 '' an indissoluble union. Church and State are ideas insepa- 
 " table in their minds, and scarcely is the one ever mentioned 
 '' without mentioning the other." — Burke. 
 
 * " Where the chief advisers or managers of public affairs, 
 " have inclined to alterations, which the established rules 
 •' have not countenanced, they durst not cause the laws to be 
 ^' put in execution, for fear of turning the force of them 
 •' upon themselves ; so their next refuge has been to observe 
 " no discipline or government at all." — " Thus the church of 
 " England, put to nurse, as it were, sometimes io such as 
 " have been inclined to popery, and sometimes to other socts, 
 " and sometimes to men indiflFerent (o all religion hath been in 
 O
 
 [ 106 ] 
 
 alarm the public feelings by insisting on too 
 much at once ; but, after telling you that all men 
 living under, and contributing to the support of 
 any government, have an equal and indefeasible 
 right to partake of its benefits, and to share in 
 its emoluments, they will yet, as a proof of their 
 moderation, only propose the grant of holding 
 certain subaltern commissions in the army and 
 navy; now mark to what a practical absurdity 
 does this partial degree of accommodation lead : 
 to the senior and more highly trusted officer, 
 him in whom you repose your confidence, and on 
 whose longer tried fidelity and more experienced 
 talents you rely for the command and control of 
 his juniors, you deny that option of religious 
 faith which you readily grant to the latter, who 
 may revel in all the pomps of the Romish ritual, 
 
 '' danger of being starved or overlaid by all of them ; and the ill 
 *' consequence has redounded not only to the members of that 
 *' communion but to all the professors of Christianity itself." 
 " Whoever have ventured to give warning of these wicked 
 " designs and practices, have been rendered as persons of ill 
 " temper and very bad affections. They that have been in 
 " credit and authority, have been frequently inclined to be 
 " favourable to the men complained of ; it has been offered 
 " on their behalf, that their intentions were good ; and that 
 " it was ever the interest of the government to cover their 
 *' principles, whatever might be the consequences of them." 
 
 Clarendon.
 
 [107] 
 
 and riot in the security of plenary indulgence 
 for all their sins ; whilst the captain must be con- 
 tent to find his way to salvation by the narrow 
 thorny paths of the reformed establishment; al- 
 though upon their own principle of argument 
 every man has an equal, native, and inherent 
 right to his share of power and privilege. This 
 absurdity, therefore, must at all events be got 
 rid of; but how will they propose to avoid it; 
 why, only by plunging into a greater one; for 
 now they will recommend, that the extension 
 shall go to every thing short of the chief command 
 of an army or a fleet, to which they think the 
 legislature is not as yet sufficiently prepared* to 
 
 * Or as a noble lord would term it, sufficiently enlight- 
 ened from the intellectual mists of the dark ages ; that is to 
 say, those foggy days that reared the noble fabric of the 
 British constitution, ecclesiastical as well as civil. 
 
 I beg it to be observed, that I have carefully avoided 
 throughout this discussion, the charge of any premeditated 
 deception on the part of the late ministers towards their so- 
 vereign, confining myself strictly to the question of inexpedi- 
 ency, and the dangerous consequences of the proposed ar- 
 rangement. I cannot bring myself to imagine the existence 
 of any deceptious motive in the mind of such a man as Lord 
 Grenville. — His head and heart have too much affinity to 
 those of his immortal relative — and, however I may lament his 
 later acts, I can never venture to criminate his springs of 
 action .
 
 C 108 ] 
 
 accede. Be it so then, the extension is adopted, 
 and now to practice : an army is sent on an 
 important and distant expedition, commanded by 
 a Protestant general, under whom are two lieu- 
 tenant and four major-generals, who may be 
 under the extended privilege, all Catholics; 
 (for prospective legislation must take in things 
 ill posse, as well as in esse ;) but seethe danger 
 to which this plausible benevolence of theory 
 leads in its practical application ; in the heat of a 
 critical and decisive engagement, a cannon-shot 
 takes off the Protestant commander*, and by 
 the law, even extended as it then would be, the 
 men are not bound to obey any one of the sur- 
 vivors, for no Catholic can take the command of 
 an army in chief. — Now is not this monstrous, and 
 does not the argumentum ad absurdiim apply to 
 it in full force. Or will you take another eman- 
 cipating stride, and by way of avoiding this 
 heterogeneous arrangement, adopt the dangerous 
 expedient of granting unlimited naval and military 
 command to those of the Catholic persuasion ; 
 but, then, neither can you deny them access to 
 the cabinet, or the possession of any other the 
 
 * Perhaps the case may be put still more strongly by stating 
 the second in command only as a Catholic and his juniors Pro- 
 testants ; thus opening the door for a disputed succession to 
 the post of commander-in-chief.
 
 [ 109 ] 
 
 highest civil employment ; but must at once 
 abrogate, and do away, the Test and Corporation 
 acts, and prepare yourselves for being reduced to 
 the dilemma of seeing a Protestant monarch 
 the insulated slave in his dominions, reisrnino; 
 over sixteen millions* of free Catholics, or of 
 removing the* only remaining <=^tumbling block of 
 consistency, by annulling the Reformation, the 
 Act of Supremacy, the Revolution, the Bill of 
 Rights, the Act of Union with Scotland, the 
 Statute which consolidating the United Kingdoms 
 of Great Britain and Ireland, united also and con- 
 
 * My arguments do not go to the assertion that a nation of 
 Catholics, a republic of Presbyterians, or even an empire of 
 Mussulmen, may not, cceteris paribus^ be as happy and as 
 flourishing as a kingdom of episcopal Protestants, but they 
 do go to prove that religious conformity of some sort in the di- 
 recting organs of any country is essentially necessary to its 
 happiness and its tranquillity. — And I shall not hesitate to ask 
 the Catholics themselves whether the employment of the Pro- 
 testant Sully, one of the ablest and most virtuous ministers that 
 ever existed, did not tend to inflame the jealousies of the esta- 
 blished church as to the sincerity of Henry's conversion to the 
 Romish faith, and ultimately assist to sharpen the assassinat- 
 ing dagger of Ravaillac. Possibly, also, they may be able 
 to inform me, for I protest I know not, for what additional 
 duration of dominion, what protracted period of existence the 
 unfortunate Louis stands indebted to the ministry of the he- 
 retic Necker, all skilful as he was supposed to be in the ma- 
 nagement of the French finances.
 
 C no ] 
 
 firmed irrevocably the established churches of the 
 sister islands, and the Coronation Oath which 
 contains the essence of the whole of them; and 
 so absolving the Sovereign likewise from his con- 
 finement to the Protestant confession of faith, 
 return at once to the happy tolerating days of the 
 gentle pious Mary, and the sainted James of 
 canonized and blessed memory It is not neces- 
 sary for me to say another word on this subject; 
 on the grounds already stated I am completely 
 prepared to assert that there is not a possible 
 medium whereon consistency can set its seal ; but 
 that the line can only be drawn either at the one 
 or other end of the scale; the whole must be 
 granted, or you must stop precisely at the boun- 
 dary including every possible latitude of religious 
 toleration, so as to leave the worship of the 
 Creator completely free and unconfined at the 
 option of the worshipper, neither denying him 
 a single concession in any way conducive to 
 absolute individual freedom, or perfect personal 
 comfort, but excluding every degree, however 
 small, of power, both civil and military. And 
 on this principle I am ready to affirm, that it would 
 have been better, if the Irish Act of 1793 had 
 never been granted; and fondly and enthusi- 
 astically, with all the energies of my heart and 
 mind, as I venerate the memory, and revere the
 
 [Ill] 
 
 almost infallible judgment of the unequalled 
 statesman we have lost, I never was afraid to 
 declare that, on this head, I differed, (and he 
 knew it,) even from him. 
 
 On the foregoing reasons*, and the right con- 
 tended for by the late ministers to bring the 
 subject forward again, whenever they should find 
 a favorable opening, I ground a full and complete 
 vindication of our beloved Monarch, who in the 
 long course of h;> i.iild, just, and equitable reign, 
 has never relied on the naked exercise of that 
 prerogative with which the constitution has so 
 wisely entrusted the British sovereign in the abso- 
 lute and uncontroled appointment and exchange 
 
 * It would be offering an insult to the manly sense of 
 Englishmen to go, at any length, fnto the puerile and falla- 
 cious argument that tends to convert the sovereign of a free, 
 though limited monarchy, into a mere man of straw, " a king 
 of shreds and patches," by denying him the exercise of free 
 agency, and reducing him to the puppet-show state of .an Au- 
 tomaton moved by wires and packthread. The constitution 
 has, wisely indeed, rendered his sacred person inviolable, by 
 guaranteeing him from any responsibility for the measures of 
 his ministers, in the declaration that those counccUors are to 
 be answerable for the executive operations of their ministry ; 
 but will common sense bear us out to say, that they themselves 
 are to be the only advisers of their own removal? What set 
 Prince Prettyraan to kill Prince Prettyman ? Indeed, in- 
 deed, Mr. Bayes, this out-herods Herod ! — 
 " .'/ causa persa parole assui^
 
 [ 112 ] 
 
 of his confidential servants, but has, invariably, 
 on all such changes taking place, made that solemn 
 appeal to the voice of a free people, which, by 
 enabling them also to exchange their representa- 
 tives int" the great council of the nation, gives 
 them an opportunity of expressing, in the most 
 decisive manner, their opinion of the greater 
 change above. And seldom has that opinion been 
 so decidedly expressed as on the late occasion; 
 for let it be carefully observed, and with equal 
 care be treasured in our recollection, that it was 
 not alone in the elections for small places; of 
 what are called c/ose, or, in the language of Home 
 Tooke and his pupils, rotten, boroughs, that this 
 expression was so strongly marked, as in the 
 representation of the great counties, where mi- 
 nisterial influence has so little weight or power; 
 and from whence the free and unbiassed voice of 
 the independent yeomanry has driven the ex-mi- 
 nisters, almost without an exception*, to shelter 
 themselves in little family boroughs, and under 
 the very wings of that aristocratical patronage, 
 which most of them, whilst in the ranks of oppo- 
 
 * Mr. Grenville was re-elected for the county of Buck- 
 ingham ; but I liave yet hopes of the Grenville family ; their 
 eyes will some day be cleared from the filmy cataracts, which, 
 of late, have seomed to obscure the organs of political vision.
 
 [ "3 ] 
 
 sition to Mr. Pitt's administration took every 
 opportunity of reviling and of deprecating the 
 effects of — so much for the popularity of the late 
 ministers ; and never, perhaps, were there any 
 set of men so desirous of courting, or who had 
 gone such lengths in the practical pursuit of po- 
 pular favor, so fatally experiencing the " Breves 
 et infaustos populi Romajii Amores." 
 
 That the Catholic question was the immediate 
 cause of the late change there does not appear to 
 me to exist a solid doubt; and that the sovereign 
 had nothing else in view when he dismissed his 
 late servants I am equally conlidcnt; though, 
 when the whole of their measures both legislative 
 and executive, but particularly the* latter, are 
 taken into consideration, I could find in my own 
 judgment, ('and I think a very considerable majo- 
 rity of my fellow subjects would go with me in 
 the verdict, ) abundant cause to pronounce them 
 totally inefficient, and unequal to their situations. 
 On the statement already drawn out, let us strike 
 a balance between the abolition of the slave-trade, 
 and the meritorious part of the plan of finance 
 on the one side, against the ill begun and worse 
 continued negotiation — the attack upon the land- 
 
 " * Courage to think, is infinitely more rare than courage to 
 " act ; and yet the danger in thefrst case is generally iviuginary, 
 " i-n the last real." 
 
 P
 
 [114] 
 
 ed interest in the intended Freehold Assets Bill — 
 the wretched attempt to improve the military 
 system — the unwise extension of the financial 
 arrangements to an impracticably prospective 
 length of calculation, and the dangerous and 
 destructive attempt upon the established church; 
 and we shall find a surplusage on the side of 
 demerit, of weight enough to substantiate a deci- 
 sive* charge of disqualification against them as 
 
 * It has been the fashion of late to complain of the heat of 
 party dispute, and of the acrimonious warmth of language 
 with which the attack and defence of the late administration 
 has bf'en carried on (on bo'h .sides) in the senate — and it has 
 been more than hinted that in their personal retorts their coun- 
 try has been forgotten and is undeservedly, left to suffer by 
 both parties. 
 
 " Sed quid loca grata, quid urbes 
 ^' Peccavere mecB? quod crimen dixit in illis." ? 
 But I am not at all aware of the justice of the accusation, 
 nor prepared to believe that they are most likely to serve the 
 country who dream over its interests — he who feels strongly 
 will necessarily deliver himself with energy in the expression 
 of his sentiments; — neither does it follow of course that be- 
 cause he paints in glowing colours the folly of a proposition, 
 that he must consequently impute premeditated guilt to the 
 proposer of the arrangement; upon this principle all investi- 
 gation must cease and the freedom of parliamentary debate be- 
 come a non-entity. In regard to my own task in the present 
 publication I feel with the noble historian of the first Charles, 
 that, '' We are entering on a time iht- representation and 
 " description zchcreof tn list, needs be the most unpleasant and
 
 [115] 
 
 the ministers of such an empire, at a period so 
 alarmingly critical in its fearful and portentous 
 threatenings. But when we throw, also, into the 
 scale, the shameful neglect of our allies, in suc- 
 cours both personal and pecuniary — the total 
 want of either capacity or* experience in the 
 
 '* ungrateful to the reader^ in respect of the subject matter of 
 " it, and the most unagreeable and difficult to the writer, in 
 *' regard that he shall, probably, please very few who acted 
 " then upon the stage of business; but must give very se- 
 " vere characters of the persons, and severely censure the ac- 
 " tions of many rvho wished very xzell, and had not the least 
 *' thought of disloyalty or infidelity; a time in xchich want of 
 " discretion and mere folly, produced as much mischief as the 
 " most barefaced villainy could have done. But I am too far 
 " embarked in this sea already, and have jrroceeded isith too 
 " much simplicity and sincerity loith reference to things, and 
 '''■persons, and in the examination of the grounds, andover- 
 '•' sights of counselc, to be novo frightened with the prospect of 
 " those materials, which muft be comprehended within the re- 
 •' lation of this yearns transactions.'" 
 
 * These gentlemen seem to have been chosen on the prin- 
 ciple of the Luaia a non lucendo, diplomatists untried in the 
 forms of diplomacy, and scorning acquaintance witli the an- 
 cient uses of projets, contre projets, the primary basis, afid 
 conclusive ultimatum; the Uli Pus -idctis as \we\\ a.s the Status 
 Quo: 
 
 '■' Questa, ed altrc prammatiche, rtscrilti. 
 " Leggi, dichiarazion, statu ti, patti, 
 " Decreti, aw in, manifesti, editti, 
 " Noti/icazion, proclami, ed altri atti 
 " lyautorita svvranu, ed usi varj 
 " In pandetti ridotti, ed in glossarj."
 
 [ 116 ] 
 
 greater part of the ministers employed to regiilate 
 our important concerns at the few remaining 
 friendly courts of Europe; — the degrading and 
 impolitic concessions to America — the shocking 
 ingratitude exhibited in the treatment of the con- 
 querors of Maida, the Cape, and Buenos Ayres — 
 the peevish, silly, and illiberal abuse of that nurse 
 of national valor and heroic enterprize, the 
 Patriotic Fund. When this is done, tell me my 
 countrymen, if it demand a moment's hesitation 
 to decide between such men, and the chosen 
 friends and pupils of the immortal pilot, whose 
 great example taught them how to steer the 
 wearied bark through many a threatening wave; 
 the undaunted shipmates ^vho with him had waked 
 over the nightly compass, and endured the 
 morning watch; and who, if we assist them 
 through the voyage, will yet, I trust, safely 
 conduct the gallant vessel to her peaceful 
 moorings. 
 
 For my own part, I can safely and conscien- 
 tiously assert, that however strongly I may have 
 spoken, I have been moved by one consideration 
 
 It Avas not so in the days of Lord Grenviile''s presidency 
 over the P'oreign department, when the names of Whitworth, 
 Malmesbury and St. Helens, adorned the catalogue of the 
 Corps Diplomatique. But then neither was it our melancholy 
 task to say of Mr. Pitt, lyith the emphatic brevity of the 
 Romans, Vixit.
 
 [117] 
 
 alone throughout the whole of this little tract. 
 And the undoubted genius, and gentlemanly and 
 scholastic acquirements, as well as the urbane 
 manners and amenity of temper in private life*, of 
 Mr. Fox, would have raised him equally high in 
 my contemplation with his illustrious rival, had I 
 considered his political opinions, and his public 
 measures, as equally conducive to the honour 
 and welfare of our beloved country. 
 
 " QUAMOBREM Q.U1DQUID IN HAC CAUSA MIHI 
 " SUSCEPTUM EST, ID OMNE ME REIPUBLIC^E r\USA 
 " SUSCEPISSE CONFIRMO." 
 
 * I have always laboured to distinguish, and to keep dis- 
 tinct in ray contemplation, the noisy, bustling, impetuous, 
 (must I add factious) demagogue of Palace Yard — the, ha- 
 ranguer of a Westminster mob, from the honorable Charles 
 Fox, the deliglitand ornament of polished society. — But who 
 can avoid lamenting that a mind so capable of relishing, and 
 so thoroughly acquainted with the beauties of the G recian 
 bard should have preferred in public life the character of his 
 Gsptrii rji ay.ptrou.'s&os to that of his OSya-rja,, An [j.7Jriv araXavroy.
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 " Ornari res ipsa negaf, contenta doceri.
 
 PREFACE 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 IN submitting the following tables to the public 
 eye, I am not insensible of the very small degree 
 of invitation held out by them to the generality of 
 readers, who would rather kill time than conquer 
 difficulty — and am perfectly aware of the scanty 
 gleanings of popular favor I am likely to acquire 
 after the abundant harvests of The Talents and 
 The Blocks; for one man who sits down to prove 
 the correctness of a complex calculation there are 
 a hundred ready to join in the animated cry of 
 sportive and fashionable satire. 
 
 But because I feel the dry and unentertaining na- 
 ture of my discussion, I am not, for this, the less 
 tenacious of the useful dignity of my subject. And 
 Mr. Burke, whose vivid imagination could take as 
 bold a flight in the regions of poetic fancy, as the 
 liveliest and most erratic reader could desire, and 
 whom no man will accuse of being a dull writer, 
 Q
 
 IV 
 
 though many may think him an eccentric or an 
 unequal one; he whose wisdom, however mixed at 
 times with baser matter, is nevertheless, always 
 of high import, and like the golden one, of sterU 
 ing value ; " e oro di miniera, mischiata con rozza 
 " terra, ma sempre e oro," he also entertained the 
 highest opinion* of the dignity and usefulness of 
 speculative as well as of practical finance. 
 
 Of the importance of the subject, at all times, 
 but especially at (he present moment, there can 
 be little doubt; and however minute or even 
 
 * " The revenue of the state is the stale. In effect all de- 
 ^' pends upon it, whether for support or reformation. 
 " Through the revenue alone the body politic can act in its 
 *' true genius and character ; and therefore it will display 
 " just as ranch of its collective virtue, and as much of that 
 *' virtue which may characterize those who move it, and are, 
 '' as it were, its life and guiding principles, as it is possessed 
 " of a just revenue. For from hence, not only magnanimity, 
 '' and liberality, and beneficence, and fortitude, and provi- 
 '^ dence, and the tutelary protection of all good arts, derive 
 " their food, and the growth of their organs but continence 
 " and self-denial, and labour, and vigilance, and frugality ; 
 '^ and whatever else there is in which the mind shews itself, 
 '' above the appetite, are no where more in their proper ele- 
 " ment than in the provision and distribution of the public 
 " wealth. It is therefore not without reason that the science 
 " of speculative and practical finance, which must take to its 
 *' aid so many auxiliary branches of knowledge, stands high 
 " in the estimation not only of the ordinaiy sort, but of the 
 " wisest and best men."
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 tedious, my manner of treating it in detail may 
 appear to* impatient readers, I am convinced 
 that it was not possible for me to establish the 
 truth of my positions in the minds of those who 
 are willing to undergo the labour of enquiry, 
 by any shorter or less circuitous method. It was 
 necessary for me to point out the correctness of 
 the investigation, in order to substantiate my 
 right to the assumption, and I cannot but think 
 that in the endeavour to generalize the application 
 of a specific discussion, I have in some measure 
 succeeded in pointing out, and by mathematical 
 demonstration establishing, certain general prin- 
 ciples both of investment and of liquidation, which 
 may, at all times, be found useful in the negotia- 
 tion of public loans. It is to this facility of pro- 
 viding for enormous and unforeseen expenditures, 
 that Britain owes her superiority of rank in the 
 scale of nations, as much as to the heroic valor of 
 her troops, and the irrisistible intrepidity of her 
 squadrons. Of the indispensable necessity of 
 strict attention to the resources of the country, 
 in the present awful state of Europe, who can 
 entertain a doubt ; and, what mind can think of 
 finance, without the involuntary tribute of recol- 
 lecting that rare example of financial knowledge 
 
 * " Scire volunt omnes, mercedem solvere nemo.''''
 
 vi 
 
 and unimpeachable integrity, exhibited in the per- 
 son of William Pitt. 
 
 In regard to the arrangement of the following- 
 Tables in their order of succession, it will be seen 
 that a method is* first offered for calculating the 
 time and cost required for the liquidation of loans 
 in general — next the result of such operation, 
 exemplified in af Table, exhibiting twenty-five 
 different calculations of the length of time requir- 
 ed for the liquidation of £.100 stock under as 
 many various assumptions of price of investment, 
 average price of redemption, rate of interest, 
 allowance for sinking fund, and number of re- 
 demptions in the year, and of the proportionate 
 cost of liquidating £^.100 sterling under the same 
 circumstances. The next Table J points out the 
 comparative merits in point of ultimate cost to 
 the public between Mr. Pitt's system and that in- 
 troduced by Lord Henry Petty for a series of 
 14 years. After thisH is a comparison of the 
 quantity of loans to be borrowed, and of the in- 
 terest and sinking fund (or annuity) to be paid 
 thereon for 14 years under the two systems 
 already mentioned, and under a third framed on 
 the principles suggested by Mr. Long for 5 
 years, and here extended to 14 years. The Ta- 
 
 * Appendix, No. 1. t Appendix, No. 2. 
 
 + Appendix, No. 3. H Appendix, No. 4.
 
 PREFACE. Vli 
 
 bles 5, 6, and 1, which follow, (accompanied 
 by their details, 5 B, 6 B, and 7 B, ) are cal- 
 culated to ascertain the reliance on the coun- 
 teracting principle of gain or investment, as a 
 set-off against loss in redemption, by taking the 
 loans either in stationary s per cents, the same 
 stock gradually rising from 60 to par; or in a 5 
 per cent, stock, verging only from 95 to par. — 
 The eighth points out the gain*, by raising 210 
 millions in 3 times 12, once 14, and lo times 
 16 millions, instead of 14 even loans of 15 mil- 
 lions each. — The ninth ascertains the quantity of 
 war taxes pledged, and the time they may be 
 expected to remain unredeemed, by each year's 
 loan, under the system of Lord H. Petty for a 
 series of 1 4 years. — And the tenth and eleventh 
 exhibit a complete analysis of the whole burthen 
 of taxation under all the three systems, divided 
 into their retrospective, prospective, and aggre- 
 gate effects, for the same term. These are all 
 
 the Tables applicable to the investigation of Lord 
 Henry Petty's Plan of Finance, as compared 
 either with the original or the medium systems; 
 but the annual Finance accounts of the kingdom, 
 printed by order of the House of Commons, 
 having been delivered since this publication was 
 commmittedto the press, I have given the substance 
 
 * 6| millions.
 
 via PREFACE. 
 
 of them in the following additional Tables, — No. 
 12. Exhibiting an analysis of the public income, 
 which proves the correctness of my assumption* 
 of 33i^ millions for the net permanent revenue 
 of Great Britain for 1S06; the total being 
 £.35,25^,273 48. Hid. from which deduct 
 £.1,751,663 OS. 4-d. for the interest of Irish 
 loans, and the remainder will be exactly 
 £.33,500,610 4s. 7i. — No. 13. Shewing the total 
 expenditure for the same year, specified under 
 the several general heads of services. — No. 14. 
 Proves the correctness of the general estimates 
 and returns of income and expenditure, by shew- 
 ing that ;C.171,185 5s. sid. the actual surplusage 
 of cash and credits at the exchequer, above the 
 outstanding demands of every kind against them, 
 is precisely equal to the surplus of ways and means 
 voted, above the supplies for miscellaneous ser- 
 vices, granted, &:c. for the same year — No. 15. 
 Furnishing a complete state of the national debt, 
 on the 1st Feb. 1807, with the different propor- 
 tions of British, Irish, and Imperial Loans ; sub- 
 divided again into 3, 4, and 5 per cent, stocks; 
 the portions of redeemed stock included under 
 each of the above heads; and the unredeemed 
 remainder of the whole; and (in a note at the 
 bottom of the Table,) the sterling value at which 
 
 21.
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 the remaining stock capitals may be estimated 
 according to the market price of their respective 
 funds. To this Table, also, is subjoined an 
 account of the unfunded debt, by which it 
 appears, that the aggregate debt, funded and 
 unfunded, of the United Kingdom, (including 
 the imperial loans, but exclusive of any annuities, 
 to which, being self-extinguishing and irredeem- 
 able in any other way, no estimate of capital can 
 correctly attach,"! might on the same day be cal- 
 culated as a money debt of 419| millions: and 
 the annual sum applicable to the reduction of 
 this debt being at that time y;. 8, 96 1,67 8 or nearly 
 9 millions, would, on the original system estab- 
 lished by Mr, Pitt, but allowing every shilling of 
 interest redeemed subsequently to that day to be 
 released, extinguish the whole of the then 
 existing debt, in little better than 45 years, Qt simp/c 
 interest; but when we recollect the prodigious 
 helps to be brought in aid of this by the accruals 
 of redeemed dividends, acting under the opera- 
 tions of compound interest, it is sufficiently evident 
 that the liquidation must necessarily proceed 
 with much greater rapidity of pace, and be 
 accomplished in a much shorter period. — And 
 lastly. No. I6. Being a precis of the commercial 
 state c'rthe kingdom: containing, 1st, Official 
 value of imports, (distinguishing those from
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 East Indies and China,) for 1805 and I8O6 com- 
 pared: 2dly, Exports for the same years, distin- 
 guishing British produce and manufactures from 
 foreign merchandize: sdly, Number of vessels, 
 with their tonnage, built in several ports of 
 British empire, in 1806: 4thly, Vessels, (British 
 and foreign,) with their tonnage and men, en- 
 tered inwards and outwards in the several ports 
 of England and Scotland, (distinguishing each) 
 in 1806. 
 
 To these Tables, forming (in my opinion) a 
 complete expose of the financial situation of the 
 kingdom, I am not aware that it would be in my 
 power to add any further proof of its unequalled 
 opulence, unexhausted resources, and unbroken 
 strength. They are sufficient to ascertain that, 
 even in the present eventful state of Europe, we 
 have nothing to fear with common prudence, and 
 common unanimity in regard to that point, with 
 which I sincerely believe that, in the hour of 
 danger, no distinction of party would, on any 
 side, be allowed to interfere — the defence of our 
 beloved country. But in order to preserve this 
 necessary degree of accordance, even in funda- 
 mental principle, (which I think has nothing to 
 do with the common verbal bickerings of parties 
 either on men or measures,) it is essentially re- 
 quisite to put away the hoary iniquity that can 
 teach, as well as the youthful folly which caii be
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 prompted, to suggest imaginary grievances, and 
 unexisting oppressions. — Whether to the seaman, 
 the soldier, or the artizan — Englishmen, in their 
 several orders and degrees, are freer and more 
 happy, (in proportion to the inevitably imper- 
 fect state of all human happiness,) than any 
 people existing; and their Island-fortress is richer 
 in every natural and acquired advantage, and less 
 assailable by an enemy, than any other country in 
 the universe. Let him who knows a better to 
 reside in, place his had upon the globe, and 
 pointing to the spot, cry, " Ecco hi Behold 
 " it!"^ There is none such. 
 
 Should any errors be fo'ind in the following fables ; of 
 which the author is not aware, having bestowed considerable 
 care on their correction ; he has to plead in his excuse, that 
 they are the produce of leisure hours after a daily attendance 
 on official dnties ; (with which this work has never interfered) 
 that he has not received the smallest assistance from any other 
 hand ; (except in the composition of the Formula A, Ap- 
 pendix, xVo. 1, as already mentioned ;) and that almost every 
 line in each table has required a separate calculation. 
 R
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 66, Line 26, instead of one read once. 
 Page-j^, Line n, instead of town read twin.
 
 APPENDIX, No. 1, 
 
 PROBLEM (A.) 
 
 To find in what Time the Application of any Annual 
 Sum appropriated as a Sinking Fund, by any Number 
 of equal and periodical Investments in the Year, to- 
 gether with the Interest redeemed thereby, will at 
 Compound Interest extinguish any Loan, at any Average 
 Price of Stock, and at any Rate of Interest ? 
 
 FORMULA. 
 
 Divide tlie lo- 
 garithm of a 
 
 quantitv 
 by . 
 
 found 
 
 rAddiug to a fraction, (whose numerator is the 
 rate of interest of the stock in which the loan 
 is invested, and whose denominator is the pro- 
 duct of the average redemption price of the 
 same stock, multiplied by the number of re- 
 demptions of interest in each year,) first one, 
 and then the one-hundredth part of a product 
 found by multiplying the rate of annual 
 allowance for a sinking fund, (expressed by 
 the denominator of the fractional proportion 
 it bears to the nominal stock valuation of the 
 original debt,) by the rate of interest. 
 By the loga. 4 The same fraction, with only the first one added 
 
 rithm of 
 
 From the quo- J 
 tient . . . S, 
 
 i to it. 
 
 f Subtract one, and divide the remainder by the 
 I number of redemptions of interest in each 
 year; to the quotient whereof add the portion 
 of a year allotted for one redemption, and you 
 have the exact period, (expressed in years and 
 decimal parts,) required for the complete ex- 
 t tinction of the whole debt.
 
 APPENDIX, (No. 1,) Continued. 
 
 OPERATION. 
 
 DATA. 
 
 Let 
 
 P rr Averaije redemption price of stock. 
 
 R 1= Rate of interest of ditto. 
 
 N nz Rate of annual allowance for sinking fund, 
 
 F zzz Portion ofayearallottedfor each redemption 
 
 DESIDERATUM. 
 To find . . X rr The period of redemption. 
 
 FORMULA. 
 
 R N X R 
 
 + 1+ 
 
 P X F 100 
 Logarithm of-( 1 -^ F + F 
 
 P X F 4- 1 
 
 PROBLEM (B.) 
 
 To find the whole Sum paid by the Borrower for Capi- 
 tal and Interest during the Period X. 
 
 .R = 
 
 .et . . . ^ N = 
 
 (X:= 
 
 DATA. 
 
 R rr Rate of interest. 
 
 Allowance for sinking fund. 
 The period of redemption. 
 
 To find 
 
 DESIDERATA. 
 
 A zr The aggregate annuity of interest and 
 I sinking fund. 
 
 )S = The aggregate sum paid by borrower for 
 capital and interest of stock.
 
 APPENDIX,, (No. 1,) Continued. 
 
 FORMULA. 
 
 Then . . R + N = A 
 
 And again . A X X n: S 
 
 PROBLEM (C.) 
 
 To find tiie total Sum paid, at the End of the 
 Period of Redemption, for the Sterling Amount of 
 any Loan. 
 
 DATA. 
 
 /■ P rr Average redemption price of sfock. 
 1 S zn Aggregate sum paid for capital and interest 
 Let . . .< of ditto. 
 
 I M = The sterling amount of any loan. 
 T = The aggregate sum paid for ditto. 
 
 FORxMULA. 
 P : M : : S : T 
 
 PROBLEM (D.) 
 
 Where Loans are redeemed at an Average Price, 
 differing from that at which they were originally 
 invested, to find the total Cost of their Redemption, 
 allowing for any such Variation of Price. 
 
 DATA. 
 
 Let 
 
 S z= Total cost of capital and interest of stock. 
 
 I =r The original price of investment. 
 
 B = .€.100 :,tock. 
 
 M= ^.100 sterling. 
 
 DESIDERATUM. 
 
 CC 3z Stock valnation of caG. 100 Sterling, 
 c L nr Total cost of redeeming ditto.
 
 APPENDIX, (No. 1,) Continued. 
 
 
 OPERATIONS. 
 
 As . . 
 
 . I : B : : M : C 
 
 And as . 
 
 . B : S :: C : L 
 
 
 EXAMPLE. 
 
 DATA. 
 
 P z= 75. R — 3. N = 1. F = 2. A r= 4. J rz 60. 
 
 Stock. Sterl. 
 
 B = 100. M r= 100 
 
 DESIDERATA. 
 To find . . X, S, T, C, and L? 
 
 OPERATION. 
 3 3 2 
 
 4- 1 = 1.02 + 
 
 73 X 2 150 100 
 
 Logarithm of 
 
 ^ 100 X 3 
 
 = 4.02 = 0.604226 
 
 100 
 
 Divided by lo- ^ J_ ^ _!_ ^ _!_ _^ i ^ 1 02 :=: 0.008600 
 garithmof • -^75x2 150 100 
 
 5= 70:2588 — 1 =: 692.588 -^ 2 = 34.6294 
 ;juoUent . •^ _|_,5— 35.i294or35years&47.4135days = X 
 
 £. s. d. 
 Then . . 35.1294 = X X 4 = A =: 140 10 4{ = S 
 
 Again as 
 
 £. £. £. s. d. 
 
 |75 == P : 100 = M : : 140 10 4} = S 
 ) £. s. d. 
 . 187 7 2 = T 
 
 £. Stock. Sterl. £. s. d. 
 
 Soas . . . 60= I: lOOziiB :: 100 = M : 166 13 4 — C 
 
 Stock. £. s. d. £. s. d. 
 
 =r S :: 166 13 4 = C: 
 
 And lastly, as 
 
 234 
 
 ^Stock. £. s. d. 
 
 SlOO=i:B : 140 10 4^ 
 ) £. s. d. 
 V 234 3 11 z= L
 
 APP] 
 
 TAB] 
 
 
 ONE HUNDRED POUNDS STOCK. | 
 
 
 1 
 
 A. 
 
 B. 
 
 C. D. 
 
 E. 
 
 
 Price of 
 Invest- 
 
 Price of 
 Redemp- 
 
 Rate Annual Albw- 
 oj ance for 
 
 Aggregate 
 Annuity. 
 
 St 
 
 f 
 
 1 
 
 ment. 
 
 tion. 
 
 Interest Sinking Fund. 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 J. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 Y 
 
 
 1 
 
 60 
 
 60 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 60 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 75 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 76 
 
 76 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 4l 
 
 5 
 
 76 
 
 95 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 76 
 
 76 
 
 4 
 
 1 5 4 
 
 5 5 4 
 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 76 
 
 95 
 
 4 
 
 1 5 4 
 
 5 5 4 
 
 
 7 
 
 s 
 
 80 
 
 SO 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 SO 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 80 
 
 SO 
 
 4 
 
 1 6 8 
 
 5 6 8 
 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 SO 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 I 6 8 
 
 5 6 8 
 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 96 
 
 96 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 96 
 
 120 
 
 5 
 
 1 C 
 
 6 
 
 .24 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 96 
 
 96 
 
 5 
 
 1 12 
 
 « 12 
 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 96 
 
 120 
 
 5 
 
 1 12 
 
 6 12 
 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 17 
 
 IS 
 
 100 
 
 125 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 IS 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 100 
 
 125 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 11 8 
 
 6 118 
 
 4 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 .59 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 -. 6 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 .09 
 
 24 
 
 2.5 
 
 60 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 .49 
 
 25 
 
 N.B. 1 
 
 !'he Redemption. 
 
 . are calculated half-yearly in this table,jy,g commis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 sioners i 
 
 or 

 
 APPENDIX, N^ 2. 
 
 TABLE OF RESULTS. 
 
 '^ 
 
 ONE HUNDRED POUNDS STOCK. \ 
 
 Period \ 
 
 ONE HUNDRED POUNDS STERLING. \ 
 
 
 ■'A. 
 
 B. 
 
 C. 
 
 D. 
 
 E. 
 
 G. 
 
 H. 
 
 I. K. 1 
 
 l^ 
 
 Price of 
 Invest- 
 mit. 
 
 Price of 
 Redemp- 
 tion. 
 
 Rate 
 
 r '^ 
 
 Interest 
 
 Sinking Fund. 
 
 yiggregate 
 Annuity. 
 
 Rede 
 
 of 
 mption. 
 
 Rate 
 of 
 
 Interest. 
 
 Annual Allow- 
 ance for 
 Sinking Fund. 
 
 Aggregate 
 Annuity . 
 
 Total Cost 
 
 of 
 LOAN. 
 
 1 
 
 £. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 Years, 
 
 Days. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 £ s. d. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 £. s. d. 
 
 J 
 
 60 
 
 60 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 28 
 
 72 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 13 4 
 
 187 19 61 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 60 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 35 
 
 48 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 234 3 11 
 
 2 
 
 s 
 
 75 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 36 
 
 48 
 
 4 
 
 1 6 8 
 
 5 6 8 
 
 187 7 ]| 
 
 3 
 
 i 
 
 76 
 
 76 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 31 
 
 30 
 
 5 5 3.6 
 
 1 6 31.157 
 
 6 11 6|.75 
 
 204 9 7 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 76 
 
 9b 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 37 
 
 348 
 
 5 5 3.6 
 
 1 6 31.157 
 
 6 11 6|. 75 
 
 249 13 10| 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 76 
 
 76 
 
 4 
 
 1 5 4 
 
 5 5 4 
 
 27 
 
 201 
 
 5 5 3.6 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 18 7.6 
 
 190 18 3i 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 76 
 
 95 
 
 4 
 
 1 5 4 
 
 5 5 4 
 
 34 
 
 86 
 
 5 5 3.6 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 18 7.6 
 
 236 14 4i 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 80 
 
 SO 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 32 
 
 252 
 
 5 
 
 1 5 
 
 6 5 
 
 204 6 3' 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 270 
 
 5 
 
 1 5 
 
 6 5 
 
 254 10 4 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 80 
 
 80 
 
 4 
 
 1 6 S 
 
 5 6 8 
 
 28 
 
 72 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 187 19 6| 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 1 6 8 
 
 5 6 8 
 
 35 
 
 48 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 234 3 11 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 96 
 
 96 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 34> 
 
 340 
 
 5 4 1|,99 
 
 1 10 
 
 6 4 11|.99 
 
 218 6 2i 
 
 12 
 
 13 
 
 96 
 
 120 
 
 5 
 
 1 C 
 
 6 
 
 43 
 
 194 
 
 5 4 1^.99 
 
 I 10 
 
 6 4 111.99 
 
 272 6 .24 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 96 
 
 96 
 
 5 
 
 1 12 
 
 « 12 
 
 27 
 
 249 
 
 5 4 li.gg 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 17 5|.99 
 
 171 6 9| 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 96 
 
 120 
 
 5 
 
 1 12 
 
 6 12 
 
 34 
 
 175 
 
 5 4 1A.99 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 17 5|.99 
 
 237 5i 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 288 
 
 4 
 
 I 
 
 5 
 
 203 18 11| 
 
 16 
 
 17 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 36 
 
 128 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 218 3 9| 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 100 
 
 125 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 45 
 
 119 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 271 11 2i 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 28 
 
 72 
 
 5 
 
 I 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 187 19 6| 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 100 
 
 125 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 35 
 
 48 
 
 5 
 
 1 13 4 
 
 6 13 4 
 
 234 3 11 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 1 11 8 
 
 6 118 
 
 29 
 
 145 
 
 5 5 3.624 
 
 I 13 4 
 
 6 18 7,6 
 
 203 14 1|. 4 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 lO 
 
 14 
 
 105 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 142 17 5 '.59 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 13 
 
 47 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 131 5 7|. 6 
 
 23 
 
 a 
 
 100 
 
 100 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 256 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 15 7 3 .09 
 
 24 
 
 '•' 
 
 60 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 17 
 
 253 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 176 18 8 .49 
 
 25 
 
 ^•8. The Redemptions are calculated half-yearly in this table, occasioning thereby a small variation from the quarterly purchases of the commis- 
 sioners for liquidating the national debt.
 
 APPENDIX, No. 3. 
 
 COST OF REDEMPTION COMPARED. 
 Old System. A. New System. A. 
 
 35 millions sterling invested in three 36 millions, invested in 3 years, 
 years in 3 per cents, at 60, and re- in 3 per cents, at 60, and redeemed 
 deemed at an average of 75, by a at 75, by a sinking fund of 5 per 
 sinking fund of 1 per cent, on the cent, on the money capital, in 17 
 stock capital, in 35 years and 48 years and 253 days, will cost the 
 days, will cost the public at the public at the rate of .^1 76 \Hs. 8d. 
 rite oi£.234> 3s. lid. for every per .^.100 sterling. (Vide Ap- 
 ^.100 sterling. (Vide Appendix, pendix, No. 2, Example 25.)— 
 No. 2, Example 2-) Making in the aggregate — ^.63,696,000 
 
 From which deduct the portion 
 
 supplied by war taxes — 7,200,000 
 
 Extra cost of principal loans - 56,496,000 
 
 To which add ^.4,200,000 sup- 
 plementary loans invested and 
 redeemed according to the old 
 system in 35 years and 48 days 
 at ^.234 3s. lid. per cent, 
 sterling, equal to — — 9,836,225 
 
 Total cost in 3 years — — 66,332,225 
 
 Balance in favor of new system 10,952,300 
 
 And in the aggregate ^.77,284,525 
 
 .^.77,284,525 
 
 B. B. 
 
 55 millions for 5 years, invested and 66 millions for 5 years, redeemed 
 redeemed as before, at^23 4 35.11^. as before at the rate of 
 per ^£.100 sterling. £.176 I8s. Sd. per cent, ster- 
 
 ling — — .^.116,776,000 
 
 Deduct supplied by war taxes 18,800,000 
 
 Net cost of principal loans — 97,^76,000 
 
 Add for supplementary loans 
 .^.7,800,000 as before, at 
 £.234- 3s. lid. — — 1 
 
 Total extra cost of 5 years — 1 1 
 Balance in favor of new plan — 1 
 
 8,328,375 
 
 6,304,375 
 2.503,333 
 
 Cost in the whole ^.128,807,708 
 
 .i?. 128,307,708
 
 APPENDIX, No. 3, continued 
 c. ^ c. - 
 
 66 millions for 6 years, as before, at 82 millions for 6 years, as be- 
 £.234! 3s. 1 id. per cent, sterling, fore, at £.176 IQs. sd. per cent. 
 
 sterling - - — ^.145,085,333 
 
 Deduct for war taxes — 27,000,000 
 
 Net cost of principal loans 1 18,085,333 
 
 Add 11 millions for supplemen- 
 tary loans, at ^.234' 3s. \\d. 
 percent. _ _ - 25,761,542 
 
 Will cost for redemp- 
 tion - — ^.154,569,250 
 
 Total extra cost in 6 years - 143,846,875 
 Balance in favor of new system 10,722.375 
 
 ,^.154.569.250 
 
 D. D. 
 
 77 millions for 7 years, at 98 millions for 7 years, at 
 
 ^234 3s. Ud. per cent, sterling,^ £'"^-76 18J. 8^. per cent.sterling,€l 73,394,666 
 
 Deduct for war taxes - - 36,800,000 
 
 Will cost the public ,^.180,330,781 
 
 Extra cost of principal loans \S6^59'i!,666 
 
 Add for supplementary loans , |i 
 
 ,^15,800,000, at^234 3s. lid. 
 
 - 37,002,941 
 
 - 173,597,607 
 6,733,174 
 
 <gg. 180,330,781 
 
 per cent. — - 
 
 Total cost in 7 years 
 Balance in favor of new 
 
 88 millions for 8 years, at 114 millions for 8 years, at 
 
 ,^.234 3s. 1 Id. per cent, sterling, ^ £.176 iSs. sd. per cent. sterling^SOl , 704,000 
 
 Deduct for war taxes - - 48,200,000 
 
 Aggregate cost 
 
 - 206,052,333 
 
 Net cost of principal loans - 153,504,000 
 Add for supplementary ditto, 
 
 ,5^22,200,000 at ,^234 3s. lid. 
 
 percent. - _ _ - 51,991,476 
 
 Total cost in 8 years 
 Balance in fayor of new 
 
 - 205,495,476 
 596,857 
 
 £.206,092,333
 
 APPENDIX, No. 3, continued. 
 
 F 1. F2. 
 
 99 millions in 9 years, 130 millions for 9 years, at 
 
 at ^234 3s. lid. per .^.176 18s. 8d. per cent, sterling 230,013,333 
 
 cent sterling, Deduct for war taxes — 01,200,000 
 
 Will cost the public .^.231,853,875 
 
 Balance in favor of old Net cost of principal loans - 168,813.333 
 
 system — - 7,686,599 Add for supplementary ditto, 
 
 ^.30,200,000, at ^234 3j. lid. 
 percent. — — - 70,727,141 
 
 Total cost in 9 years .^.239,540,474 . — ^.239,540,474 
 
 G 1. G 2. 
 
 154 millions in 14years, 210 millions in 14 years, at 
 
 at .^234 3j, 11^. per ^.176 18s. 8^. per cent. sterling.g^3 7 1^500,000 
 
 cent, sterling, Deduct for war taxes - 150,200,000 
 
 Total cost — — 3«0,661,583 
 
 Balance in favor of old Extra cost of principal loans 221,360,000 
 
 system — — 81,310,892 Add for supplementary ditto, 
 
 ^94,200,000 at .^234 3s. lid. 
 percent. — -- - 220,612,475 
 
 Total cost in 14 years ^.441,972,475 - ^441,972,475 
 
 I 
 
 I"

 
 o ?d^ 
 
 a a s 
 
 S B^ 
 
 lif 
 
 si § 
 
 5 P 
 
 « 3 
 
 3 Qt--i 
 — 3 
 
 3 a-- 
 S £ 
 
 
 "* O 
 a Q 
 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 
 O 3 
 
 O 
 
 3 
 o 
 
 ^ 
 p 
 
 o 
 
 0^ 
 
 w 
 
 Oi o 
 
 O tn 
 
 00 o 
 
 Co 
 
 ^ H- 
 
 JO 
 
 JDco 
 
 ^ 
 
 o~o 
 
 o 
 
 O o 
 
 JD 
 
 •PS' 
 
 Q 
 
 O o 
 
 
 
 o 
 
 o O 
 
 o o 
 o o 
 o o
 
 5- a 
 
 I 2. s 
 
 i:i 
 
 ill I J^l I 
 
 li . il 
 
 if= I 
 
 '1-1. I 
 
 s I. 
 
 9 -SB' 
 
 ill 
 
 » 11, 
 
 
 §|3 
 
 i I I 
 
 I 'I f I 
 
 s 5| ? ny^ «l ^ iMi" 5 III .^ »««! Ill ^ ""« 5 "I i"!-: "I "" ^ :. 
 I i 1 A^ I I .zz I I .ill I I .^^ I I ^ Jl I " S 
 
 s^^g. s- i 
 
 I I 
 
 1 1 
 
 I I 
 
 S5 1 r g
 
 ., NO. 4. 
 
 il millions to ini"gl^"""'°" 
 cording to thef 3 F'-cent. for 
 
 ', By pledgir^e same amount 
 terest and Sii^e rate.— And 
 rapital borrow«^^^' ^"^^ ™'^'"S 
 
 K. 
 Total 
 tr rowed. 
 
 ,733.333 
 
 ,199,999 
 ',400,000 
 
 ,333,333 
 i, 000,000 
 
 ,399,999 
 ',533,333 
 1,399,999 
 2,000,000 
 ),333,333 
 9,399,999 
 9,199,999 
 9,733,333 
 3,999,999 
 
 Tota/ 
 
 R. 
 
 Total 
 
 Annuity 
 
 rrowed. 
 
 7^200,000 
 
 1,613,5 
 
 :,60o,ooo 
 
 200,000i 
 
 3'4oq"'200,000 
 4400'('800,000 
 
 n'o82c>,«00,000, 
 
 n'Q03'3,ooo,ooo, 
 
 A'^io'^ ,800,000. 
 
 3982^^'^00,000 
 
 ^'^;;'^^,200,000 
 
 1,213,333 
 2,506,666 
 3,880,000 
 5,413.333 
 7,120.000 
 8,933,333 
 10,837,333 
 12,863,999 
 14,997,333 
 17,237,333 
 19,583,999 
 00,037,333 
 24,597,333 
 27,263,999
 
 APPENDIX, NO. 4. 
 
 War Expenditure, for 14 years, taken at 32 millions per annum, of which 21 millions to be defrayed by War Taxes, and the remaining 11 million 
 submitted to comparison for raising in the three following ways, viz. 1st, According to the old system of imposing taxes at the rate of 3 percent, for 
 
 interest and 1 per cent. Sinking Fund on a stock capital valued at 60/. 2dly, By pledging annual portions of the War Taxes to the same amount, 
 
 replacing those portions by supplementary loans and imposing taxes for the interest and Sinking Fund of the latter only, at the same rate. And 
 
 Sdlv, By pledging the War Taxes at the rate of 10 per cent, upon the money capital borrowed, replacing the same by supplementary loans, and raising 
 ta-xes for the interest and Sinking Fund of the latter a.t£.6l per cent. 
 
 1st. or Old System. 
 
 2d. or Medium System. | 
 
 3d. or LORD H. 
 
 PETTY's System. \ 
 
 A. 
 
 B. C. 
 
 D. 
 
 E. 
 
 F. 
 
 G. 
 
 H. 
 
 K. 
 
 L. 
 
 M. 
 
 N. 
 
 o. 
 
 P. 
 
 R. S. 
 
 Annua/ 
 
 Annuity Total 
 
 Total 
 
 Annual 
 
 Annuity 
 
 Sufipletnen. 
 
 Annuity 
 
 Total 
 
 Total 
 
 Annual 
 
 Annuity 
 
 Supplemen- 
 
 Annuity 
 
 Total Total 
 
 Loan. 
 
 on Ditto. Borrowed. 
 
 Annuity. 
 
 Loan. 
 
 on Ditto. 
 
 tary Loan. 
 
 on Ditto. 
 
 Borrowed. 
 
 Annuity. 
 
 Loan. 
 
 on Ditto. 
 
 tary Loan. 
 
 on Ditto. 
 
 Borrowed. Annuity. 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 ■ 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 733,333 
 
 48,888 
 
 11,733,333 
 
 782,222 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 1 ,200,000 
 
 200,000 
 
 13,333 
 
 12.200,000 1,213,333 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 : 22,000,000 
 
 1,466,666 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 1,466,666 
 
 97,777 
 
 24,199,999 
 
 1,613,332 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 1 ,400,000 
 
 93,333 
 
 25,600,000 2,506,666 
 
 111,000,000 
 
 733,333 33,000,000 
 
 2,199,999 
 
 1 1 ,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 2,199,999, 146,666 
 
 37,400,000 
 
 2,493,333 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 
 
 2,600,000 
 
 173,333 
 
 40,200,000 
 
 3,880,000 
 
 '11,000,000 
 
 733,333 44,000,000 
 
 2,933,333 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 2,933,333 
 
 195,555 
 
 51,333,333 
 
 3,422,222 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 l,400,n00 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 133,333 
 
 56,200,000 
 
 5,413.333 
 
 !i 1.000,000 
 
 733,333 55,000,000 
 
 3,666,666 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 3,666,666 
 
 244,444 
 
 66,000,000 
 
 4,400,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1 ,600,000 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 106,666 
 
 73,800,000 
 
 7,120.000 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 : 66,000,000 
 
 4,399,999 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 4,399,999 
 
 293,333 
 
 81,399,999 
 
 5,426,666 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 3,200,000 
 
 213,333 
 
 93,000,000 8,933,333 
 
 11.000 000 
 
 733,333 , 77,000,000 
 
 5,133,333 
 
 11.000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 5,133,33S 
 
 342,222 
 
 97,533,333 
 
 6,502,222 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 4,800,000 
 
 320,000 
 426,666 
 533,333 
 
 113,800,000, 10,837,333 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 ' 88,000,000 
 
 5,866,666 
 
 1 1 ,000,000 
 
 733,333 
 
 5,866,666 
 
 391,111 
 
 114,399,999 
 
 7,626,666 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 
 
 6,400,000 
 
 136,200,000 12,863,999 
 
 11.000,000 
 
 733,333 99,000,000 
 
 6,599,999 
 
 11,000,000, 733,333 
 
 6,599,9991 400,000 1132,000,000 
 
 8,760,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1,600,000; 8,000.000 
 
 160,200,000' 14.997,333 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 110,000,000 
 
 7,333,333 
 
 11,000,000; 733,333 
 
 7,333,333 488,888 
 
 150,333,333 
 
 9,982,221 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1 ,600,000, 9,600,000 
 
 640,000185,800.000^ l/,ii3/,yii:i| 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 121.000,000 
 
 8,066,666 
 
 11,000,0001 733,333 
 
 8,066,566 bVJll 
 
 169,399,999 
 
 11.293,331 
 
 16,000,000 1,600,0001 11,200,000 
 
 746,666 
 
 213,000,000, iy,as3,'^yy 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 132,000,000 
 
 8,799,999 
 
 11,000,0001 733,333 
 
 8,799,999 586,666 
 
 189.199,999 
 
 12,613,330 
 
 16,000,000' 1,600,000; 12,800,000 
 
 853,333 
 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733,333 143,000,000 
 
 9,533,333 
 
 1 1,000,000 1 733,333 
 
 9,533,3331 635,555 '209,733,333 
 
 13,982,218 
 
 16,000,000) 1,600,000 14,400,000 
 
 960,000 
 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 733.333 154,000,000 
 
 10,266,666 
 
 11,000,000! 733,333 
 
 10,256,666! 684,443 |230,999,999 
 
 15,399,994 
 
 16,000,0001 1,600,0001 16,000,000 
 
 1,066,666 
 
 304,200,000, 27,2b3,999|
 
 Progress of 3 per Cents, at prices varying 
 from 60 t(tto in 14 ditto, ditto ditto ditto. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Loaock redeemed 
 of in each 
 each \ Year, 
 
 Unredeemed Money Capital 
 Stock Debt at of Debt at 
 close of each close of each 
 Year. y^ar. 
 
 
 1807 
 
 12,00( 1,000,000 
 
 19,000,000 
 
 11,400,000 
 
 
 1808 
 
 12,0OC 2,050,000 
 
 36,950,000 
 
 22,170,000 
 
 
 1809 
 
 12,00C 2,824,591 
 
 51,268,266 
 
 35,887,786 
 
 
 1810 
 
 14,00C 4,144,522 
 
 67,123,744 
 
 46,986,620 
 
 
 1811 
 
 16.000 5,031,877 
 
 82,091,867 65,673.493 
 
 1 
 
 1812 
 
 16,000 5,825,682* 94,043,962 84,639,565 
 
 1813 
 
 16,000 6,537,884 103,506,078 
 
 103,506,078 
 
 1814 
 
 16,000 7,854,020 
 
 111,652,058 
 
 111,652,058 
 
 1815 
 
 16,000 9,209,640 
 
 118,442,418 
 
 118,442,418 
 
 18)6 
 
 16,000. 10,605,929 
 
 123,836,489 
 
 123,836,489 
 
 1817 
 
 16,000, 12.044,106 127,792,383 
 
 127,792,383 
 
 
 1818 
 
 16,000, 13.525,429 130,266,954 
 
 130,266,95^ 
 
 I 
 
 1819 
 
 16,000, 15,051,191 1 131,215.763 1 131,215,763 j 
 
 1820 
 
 16,000,' 16,662,726 1 130,593,037 2.30,593,03 
 
 7\
 
 APPENDIX 5, (A.) 
 
 Progress of Liquidation on 98 Millions invested in 7 Years in 3 per Cents, at prices varying 
 from 60 to 100 per Cent, continued to ditto on 210 ditto, ditto in 14 ditto, ditto ditto ditto. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Loan 
 each Year. 
 
 Price 
 of 
 
 Stock. 
 
 Rate of 
 Interest. 
 
 Rate of 
 
 Sinkine 
 Fund^ 
 
 Stock created 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Total 
 
 Stock Debt 
 
 in each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Slock redeemed 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Unredeemed 
 
 Stock Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Money Capital 
 
 of Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 1807 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 1 ,000,000 
 
 19,000,000 
 
 11,400,000 
 
 1808 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 39,000,000 
 
 2,050,000 
 
 36,950,000 
 
 22,170,000 
 
 1809 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 70 
 
 4.285 
 
 5.715 
 
 17,142,857 
 
 54,092,857 
 
 2,824,591 
 
 51,268,266 
 
 35,887,786 
 
 1810 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 70 
 
 4.285 
 
 5.715 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 71,268,266 
 
 4,144,522 
 
 67,123,744 
 
 46,986.620 
 
 1811 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 80 
 
 3.75 
 
 6.25 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 87.123,744 
 
 5,031,877 
 
 82,091,867 
 
 65,673,493 
 
 1812 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 90 
 
 3.333 
 
 6.666 
 
 \7,m,m 
 
 99,869,644 
 
 5,825,682 
 
 94,043,962 
 
 84,639,565 
 
 1813 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 110,043,962 
 
 6,537,884 
 
 103,506,078 
 
 103,506,078 
 
 1814 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 119,506,078 
 
 7,854,020 
 
 111,652,058 
 
 111,652,058 
 
 1815 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 127,652,058 
 
 9,209,640 
 
 118,442,418 
 
 118,442,418 
 
 1816 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 134,442.418 
 
 10,605,929 
 
 123,836,489 
 
 123.836,489 
 
 1817 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 139,836,489 
 
 12,044,106 
 
 127,792,383 
 
 127,792.383 
 
 1818 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 143,792,383 
 
 13,525.429 
 
 130,266,954 
 
 130,266,954 
 
 1819 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000.000 
 
 146,266,954 
 
 15,051,191 
 
 131,215,763 
 
 131.215,763 
 
 1820 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 16,000.000 
 
 147,215,763 
 
 16,662,726 1 130,593,037 
 
 130^93,037 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 d 
 
 
 
 
 
 J
 
 APPE> 
 
 Progress of Liquidation on 98 Millions 
 tinued to ditto on 210 ditt 
 
 Year. 
 
 Loan 
 
 of 
 each Year. 
 
 Price 
 
 of 
 Stock. 
 
 Rate of 
 Interest. 
 
 Rate of 
 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 Stock 
 in • 
 Yt 
 
 1807 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,0 
 
 1808 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,0( 
 
 1809 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,0( 
 
 1810 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 23,3i 
 
 1811 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,6( 
 
 1812 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,6( 
 
 1813 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,6( 
 
 1814 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,6t 
 
 1815 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,66 
 
 1816 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 26,66 
 
 1817 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,66 
 
 1818 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,66 
 
 1819 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,66 
 
 1820 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,66
 
 APPENDIX e, (A.) 
 
 Progress of Liquidation on 98 Millions invested in 7 Years in 3 per Cents, at 60 con- 
 tinued to ditto on 210 ditto, ditto in 14 ditto, ditto at ditto. 
 
 Year. 
 
 1 
 
 Loan 
 
 of 
 each Year. 
 
 Price 
 
 of 
 Stock. 
 
 Rate of 
 Interest. 
 
 Rate of 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 Stock created 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Total 
 
 Stock Debt 
 
 in each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Stock redeemed 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Unredeemed 
 
 Stock Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Money Capital 
 
 of Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 1807 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 ' 
 
 5 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 1,000,000 
 
 19,000,000 
 
 11,400,000 
 
 1808 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 39,000,000 
 
 2,050,000 
 
 36,950,000 
 
 22,170,000 
 
 |1809 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 20,000,000 
 
 56,950,000 
 
 3,152,500 
 
 53,797,500 
 
 32,278.500 
 
 !l8lO 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 23,333,333 
 
 77,130,833 
 
 4,476,958 
 
 72,653,875 
 
 43,592,325 
 
 |,.n 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 99,320,541 
 
 6,034.138 
 
 93,286,403 
 
 55,971,841 
 
 l,..2 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 119,953,070 
 
 7,669,178 
 
 112.283,891 
 
 67,370,334 
 
 1813 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 138,950,558 
 
 9,385,970 
 
 129,564,587 
 
 77,738,752 
 
 1814 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 156,231,254 
 
 11,188,601 
 
 145,042,652 
 
 87,025,591 
 
 1815 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 171,709,319 
 
 13,081,365 
 
 158,627,954 
 
 95,176,772 
 
 1816 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 185,294,621 
 
 15,068,765 
 
 170v225,856 
 
 102,135,513 
 
 1817 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 196,892,522 
 
 17,155,545 
 
 179,736,977 
 
 107,842,186 
 
 1818 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 206,403,644 
 
 19,346,646 
 
 187,056,997 
 
 112,234,198 
 
 1819 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 213,723,644 
 
 21,647,311 
 
 192,076,352 
 
 115,245,811 
 
 1820 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 26,666,666 
 
 218,743,019 
 
 24,063,010 
 
 194,680,009 
 
 116,808,005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 i i|i§ 
 
 i ilii 
 
 i I 
 
 8 a 
 
 'fislg 
 
 
 
 
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 ^ «= o' 1 ^•■ 
 
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 I- to -^ 
 
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 s § 1 S 
 
 
 s 
 
 « <o .ji 
 
 <o g g j; 
 
 
 t^ § Uf 
 
 -t 
 
 
 
 = "=, "^ 
 
 
 
 1= O O 
 
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 =»,o 1 = 
 
 
 
 ^g 3 
 
 g S § 1 g 
 
 ^' 
 
 o'o" n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 S >°, tfi. 
 
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 "^ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 = 
 
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 s 
 
 " 
 
 2" 1 2 
 
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 ~ 
 
 K§ 1 
 
 
 s:iii|3 1 
 
 iiiiii, 1 
 
 j 
 
 i I I I-; 
 
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 '^ B ^ I II 5 II II I" 
 
 F 38 
 
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 ■3 s 
 
 I I 
 
 I"' 
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 5 II II 
 "gg 
 
 III 
 - II I 
 
 
 •2 
 
 1 
 
 •S -a 
 
 'i -s 
 
 1 ^^ 
 
 'g. 
 
 •5 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 Hi 
 
 11 
 
 1 II 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 1. 
 
 1 2"- 
 
 I! 
 
 1 1^' 
 
 t 
 
 
 S 
 
 
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 a II II 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 »g 
 
 s§ 
 
 =g 
 
 gg 
 
 
 D 
 
 
 o 
 
 il 
 
 « 
 
 
 
 
 
 I" 1 II 
 
 I ! II ! I 
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 ^ ■§ ^ " 
 
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 gg - =g "^ gg 
 
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 I II
 
 APPENDIX 7, M.; 
 
 ^.Q^i-ess of Liquidation on 98 Millions invested in 7 Years in 5 per Cents. Irom 95 to 100 
 continued to ditto on 210 ditto, ditto in 14 ditto, ditto ditto ditto. 
 
 ar. 
 
 Loan 
 each Year. 
 
 Puce 
 
 of 
 Stock. 
 
 Rate of 
 Interest. 
 
 Rate of 
 Sinking 
 Fund. 
 
 Stock created 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Total 
 
 Stock Debt 
 
 in each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Stock redeemed 
 in each 
 Year. 
 
 Unredeemed 
 
 Stock Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 Money Capital 
 
 of Debt at 
 
 close of each 
 
 Year. 
 
 07 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 95 
 
 5.2632 
 
 4.7368 
 
 12,631,579 
 
 12,631,579 
 
 598,337 
 
 12,033,242 
 
 11,431,580 
 
 08 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 24,033,242 
 
 1,198,338 
 
 22,834,904 
 
 22,834,904 
 
 09 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 12,000,000 
 
 34,834,904 
 
 1,858.255 
 
 32,976,649 
 
 32,976,649 
 
 10 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 lOo 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 . 14,000,000 
 
 46,976,649 
 
 2,651,167 
 
 44,325,482 
 
 44,325,482 
 
 11 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 60,325,482 
 
 3,583,725 
 
 56,741,757 
 
 56,741,757 
 
 12 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 7%7i\,757 
 
 4,562,911 
 
 68,178,846 
 
 68,178,846 
 
 13 
 
 16,000,000 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 84,178,846 
 
 5,591,056 
 
 78,587,790 
 
 78,587,790 
 
 H 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 94,587,790 
 
 6,619,201 
 
 87,968,589_ 
 
 87,968,589 
 
 15 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 103,968,589 
 
 7,750,161. 
 
 96,218,428 
 
 96,218,428 
 
 816 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 112,218,428 
 
 8,937,669 
 
 103,280,759 
 
 103,280,759 
 
 S17 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 119,280,759 
 
 10,184,552 
 
 109,096,207 
 
 109,096,207 
 
 818 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 125,096,207 
 
 11,493,779 
 
 113,602,428 
 
 113,602,428 
 
 il9 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 129,602,428 
 
 12,868,467 
 
 116,733,961 
 
 116,733,961 
 
 ^20 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 132,733,961 
 
 14,311,890 
 
 118,422,071 
 
 118,422,071
 
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 a? 
 
 S" o 
 
 CO K) 
 
 o ^ 
 
 « 3 
 
 B era 
 
 It 
 
 S H^ 
 
 ^ to 
 
 
 O t) 
 
 OS s 
 
 ^(^ CO 
 
 C/3 
 
 o 
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 > 
 
 Id 
 
 ? 
 
 W 
 
 00 
 
 5 i 
 
 •^ 
 p 
 
 ♦0 v! 
 
 0^ JS 
 
 ts 
 
 H- »-' 
 
 lu 
 
 K5 ta 
 
 
 
 "o 
 
 "o"o 
 
 OS 
 
 o w 
 
 CO 
 
 c w 
 
 
 V. ^ 
 
 "lO 
 
 o to 
 
 •(^ 
 
 o ■*- 
 
 iS 
 
 I Q*^
 
 § 
 
 8 §5 
 
 I ^1 
 
 
 3 3 
 I 
 
 i ^^ 
 
 5 " 
 
 i •: 
 
 ■g ^ 
 
 'Zs o 
 
 ~« o'i» X CI o ffl 
 
 I 111 
 
 
 srss 
 
 
 £82
 
 * n 
 
 (5 
 
 
 o 
 
 o zr 
 
 r 3J 
 
 S 3 i D s 
 
 -: o d </) 3 
 
 "' ^ o' fo IT" 
 
 ;; o - < o 
 
 I § a- 3 3 
 
 1 pt 3 O "^ 
 
 ^ cr c c^ 
 
 I -a --J 
 
 tr - • cu < 
 
 rt r o o 
 
 C —1 
 
 2.5 
 
 o :i 
 
 ^ 2 3 
 
 jr ^ 3 
 
 
 
 
 000O00CO0OO30C O0COCOQ0O00C05 
 
 OOC0-viO0.4-Wt0-OCiC»-J 
 
 15,000,000 
 15,000 000 
 15JOOO,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 15,000,000 
 j 15^000,000 
 1 15,000,000 
 
 Loan in each 
 
 Year on 
 
 Credit of War 
 
 Taxes. 
 
 — C; *. c; ^ jO p ,K) ,W j« i^i .?= jp 
 
 1 ^ 1-, "0 1-. b 0, b "t^. b 'c> b "0. c. 
 
 ■ §§§8§8§§||§§o 
 
 ooooocooooooo 
 
 War Taxes 
 unpledged 
 
 and 
 applicable. 
 
 ^ 2 z 2: Z 2 ^^ z z ?. 2 z 1 
 
 
 
 [Excess appli- 
 cable accord- 
 ing to circum- 
 stances. 
 
 
 r. 
 
 oc ^ ^ 00 tc 
 
 z ^ z ^ 2; z z 2; Z,.^„J - ,g 
 
 ei CO ic 
 
 Interest 
 
 rising from 
 
 such 
 
 Excess. 
 
 2,625.000 
 3,806,250 
 3,496,562 
 1,671,390 
 1.754,959 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 1 Nil. 
 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 1,7-] 5, oil 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 6,. 500,000 
 
 8,000,000 
 
 9,500,000 
 
 11,000,000 
 
 12,500,000 
 
 14,000,000 
 
 15.500,000 
 
 1 7,000,000 
 
 5 -, a- a if 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 Nil. 
 
 1,745,041 
 
 6,745,041 
 
 13,245,041 
 
 21,245,04 
 
 30,745.04 
 
 4 1, 745, 01 
 
 54,245,04 
 
 68,245,04 
 
 83,745,04 
 
 100,745,04 
 
 Total Debt 
 
 created bjj 
 
 Supplementary 
 
 Loan. 
 
 1
 
 yr Of nuHotB
 
 APPENDIX, No. 9. 
 
 Quantity of War Taxes pledged at the Close of each Year under 
 the Arrangement proposed by Lord H. Petty, — and supposing the 
 principal Loans to be redeemed at an average Price of 75 by a 
 Sinking Fund of 5 per Cent, in Seventeen Years. 
 
 1st Year. A. 
 
 1,200,000 for 16 years 19,200,000 
 
 2d Year. B. 
 
 1,200,000 for 16 years 19,200,000 
 1,200,000 for 15 years 18,000,000 
 
 5tli Year. 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 
 1,400,000 for 15 years 
 1,200,000 for 14 years 
 1,200,000 for 13 years 
 1,200,000 for 12 years 
 
 E. 
 
 25,600,000 
 21,000,000 
 16,800,000 
 15,600,000 
 14,400,000 
 
 6,600,000 Total 
 
 93,400,000 
 
 2,400,000 Total 37,200,000 
 
 
 
 6th Year. F. 
 
 3d Year. C. 
 
 1,200,000 for 16 years 19,200,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 15 years 18,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 14 years 16,800,000 
 
 3,600,000 
 
 Total 54,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 
 1,600,000 for 15 years 
 1,400,000 for 14 years 
 1,200,000 for 13 years 
 1,200,000 for 12 years 
 1,200,000 for 11 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 24,000,000 
 19,600,000 
 15,600,000 
 14,400,000 
 13,200,000 
 
 8,200,000 
 
 Total 112,400,000 
 
 4th Year. D. 
 
 1,400,000 for 16 years 22,400,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 15 years 18,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 14 years 16,800,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 13 years 15,600,000 
 
 7th Year. G. 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 25,600,000 
 1,600,000 for 15 years 24,000,000 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 Total 72,800,000 3,200,000 Carried orer 49,600,000
 
 APPENDIX, No. 9. continued. 
 
 7tk Year. G. continued. 
 
 3,300,000 Brought for. 49,600,000 
 
 1, ($00,000 for 14 years 22,400,000 
 
 1,400,000 for 13 years 1 8,200^000 
 
 1,^00,000 for 12 years 14,400,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 11 years 13,200,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 10 years 12,000,000 
 
 9,800,000 
 
 Total 129,800,000 
 
 8th Year. H. 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 
 1,600,000 for 15 years 
 1,600,000 for 14 years 
 1,600,000 for 13 years 
 1,400,000 for 12 years 
 1,200.000 for 11 years 
 1,200,000 for 10 years 
 1,200,000 for 9 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 24,000,000 
 22,400,000 
 20,800,000 
 16,800,000 
 13,200,000 
 12,000,000 
 10,800,000 
 
 11,400,000 
 
 Total 145,600,000 
 
 9th Year. I. 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 
 
 1,600.000 for 15 years 
 
 1,6^0 000 for 14 years 
 
 1,600,000 for 1? years 
 
 1,600,000 for 12 years 
 
 1,400,000 for 11 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 24,000,000 
 22,400,000 
 20,800,000 
 19,200,000 
 15,400,000 
 
 9th Year. I. continned. 
 
 9,400,000 Brought for. 127,400,000 
 1,200,000 for 10 years 12,000,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 9 years 
 8 years 
 
 10,800,000 
 9,600,000 
 
 13,000,000 
 
 Total 159,800,000 
 
 10th Year. K. 
 
 1,600,000 for 16 years 
 1,600,000 for 15 years 
 1,600,000 for 14 years 
 1,600,000 for 13 years 
 1,600,000 for 12 years 
 1,600,000 for 11 years 
 1,400,000 for 10 years 
 1,200,000 for 9 years 
 1,200,000 for 8 years 
 1,200,000 for 7 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 24,000,000 
 22,400,000 
 20,800,000 
 19,200,000 
 17,600,000 
 14,000,000 
 10,800,000 
 9,600,000 
 8,400,000 
 
 14,600,000 
 
 Total 172,400,000 
 
 11th Year. L. 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,400,000 for 
 1,200,000 for 
 1,200,000 for 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 16 years 
 
 15 years 
 
 14 years 
 
 13 years 
 
 12 years 
 
 11 years 
 
 10 years 
 
 9 years 
 
 8 years 
 
 7 years 
 
 6 years 
 
 9,400,000 Carried over 127,400,000 ^g ^00 000 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 24,000,000 
 
 22,400,000 
 
 20,800,000 
 
 19,200,000 
 
 17,600,000 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 12,600,000 
 
 9,600,000 
 
 8,400,000 
 
 7,200,000 
 
 Total 183,400,000
 
 APPENDIX, No. 9. continued. 
 
 12th Year. M. 
 
 13th Year. N. continued. 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 16 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 11,800,000 Broughtfor. 160,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 15 years 
 
 24,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 8 years 
 
 12,800,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 14 years 
 
 22,400,000 
 
 1,400,000 for 
 
 7 years 
 
 9,800,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 13 years 
 
 20,800,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 6 years 
 
 7,200,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 12 years 
 
 19,200,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 5 years 
 
 6,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 11 years 
 
 17,600.000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 4 years 
 
 4,800,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 10 years 
 9 years 
 
 16,000,000 
 14,400,000 
 
 
 
 
 19,400,000 
 
 Total 
 
 200,600,000 
 
 1,400,000 for 
 
 8 years 
 
 11,200,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 7 years 
 
 8,400,000 
 
 
 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 6 years 
 5 years 
 
 7,200,000 
 6,0(}3,000 
 
 14th Year. 
 
 O. 
 
 17,800,000 
 
 Total 
 
 192,800,000 
 
 1,000,000 tor 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 lo years 
 15 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 24,000,000 
 
 
 
 
 14 years 
 
 22,400,000 
 
 
 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 13 years 
 
 20,800,000 
 
 13th Year. 
 
 N. 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 12 years 
 11 years 
 
 19,200,000 
 17,600,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 16 years 
 
 25,600,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 10 years 
 
 16,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 15 years 
 
 24,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 9 years 
 
 14,400,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 14 years 
 
 22,400,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 8 years 
 
 12,800,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 13 years 
 
 20,800,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 7 years 
 
 11,200,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 12 years 
 
 19,200,000 
 
 1,400,000 for 
 
 6 years 
 
 8,400,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 11 years 
 
 17,600,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 5 years 
 
 6,000,000 
 
 1,600,000 for 
 
 10 years 
 
 16,000.000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 4 years 
 
 4,800,000 
 
 .1,600,000 for 
 
 9 years 
 ried over 
 
 14,400,000 
 
 1,200,000 for 
 
 3 years 
 Total 
 
 3,600,000 
 
 11,800,000 Car 
 
 160,000,000 
 
 21,000,000 
 
 206,800,000
 
 Of THE 
 UKiVER&iTr Of tiuUNOIS
 
 ^'V^i 
 
 
 ITYof 
 
 ^IHOtS
 
 I||y?^i: 
 
 ?. Us a - 
 
 o o'c 
 
 •8SJ 
 
 888 
 
 fiiil 
 
 N II II II II II II II II II II II II II II' 
 
 giliiilliiiii 
 
 i lail 
 i 3|?> 
 
 s =• 3^ ? ? 
 
 xxxxxxxx: 
 
 I II II II II II nil II 
 
 . 0> VI X to § I 
 
 l_p fe S S p 5 
 
 II II Hi 
 
 5 —V 13 
 
 S <5 H. 
 
 
 -a _ 
 
 is?-; 
 
 
 flE 
 
 11=^^ 
 
 ?b r " 
 
 
 i I s ! 
 
 h> 2 1 o 
 
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 n I- = i 
 
 1 2 
 
 
 
 s- ?s 
 
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 S- 5 
 
 5' o 
 
 5" 2. ^
 
 5. >-< ^ « 
 
 ^ H 
 
 Oq 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 r> 3 
 
 a. « =1. 
 
 Deduct lor insn i.oan 
 
 Total Expenditureof Great Britain * jn .OWJlS 16 9^ 
 . lucludiug ^441.^70 15 Si for lutere.t paid o. In.pcrial Loan.
 
 
 =5 " o s -H r -?. 
 
 M 3 O 3 3 - 
 
 ^ ?: g- r ? 
 i 5- 1 ?• I o 
 
 
 ■J » i 
 I = ? 
 
 I I 
 
 a 3 
 
 I i 
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 11 
 
 3 g.-^ 
 
 1 = i 
 
 O ft 1 
 
 5 a; s^ 
 
 -'^ p J 
 
 '■O O) g. 
 
 J ? = " 
 
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 2 -■ 
 
 "CI 9r 
 
 ri 
 
 S o 
 
 ? 3 
 
 3 ■< 
 
 p s > 
 
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 b ^ 
 
 11 
 
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 un 
 
 i ^ 
 
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 ll 
 
 rf i 
 
 ; 1 
 
 1 ^ 
 
 Hi 
 
 . i 
 
 1^ 
 
 5 oi o ^. 
 
 If 
 
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 5 1 f 1 
 
 B 1 
 
 s" s- ? 
 
 * \ "^ £. 
 
 o s 
 
 a ra 
 
 
 s ' 
 
 " r o- 
 
 "I 
 
 Is 
 
 1? i 
 
 
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 ^1- 
 
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 -5 O O n- 
 
 3 "5 S 
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 i^#- 
 
 re" '^ ?■
 
 APPENDIX, No. 13. 
 
 Expenditure of Great Britain for Year ending 5th 
 January, 1807. 
 
 Interest on Unredeemed 
 Debt, including Aunu- 
 itie.>, and Charges of 
 Management for Great 
 Brita'ui, Ireland, and 
 Imperial Loan - -20,702,843 17 111 
 
 Sums applied to Reduc- 
 tion of National Debt 8,323,328 14 U 
 
 Total applied to Debt 29,026,172 12 0| 
 
 Interest on Exchequer 
 Bills 1,310,686 18 9 
 
 In all for Interest and Sinking Fund 30,336,839 10 9J 
 Civil List ... - £58,000 
 
 Other Charges on Con- 
 solidated Fund - - 624,572 2 8| 
 
 In all for both - - - 1,582,572 2 8| 
 Civil Government of Scotland - - - - 83,750 14 3^ 
 
 MiscellancousPayments 
 
 in anticipation of Ex- 
 
 quer Receipts _ - - - 5^4,261 11 
 
 IVavv — -- — — — 16,084,027 17 10 
 
 Ordnance ----- 4,511,064 1 7 
 
 f Ord.Services 9,282,491 
 ^'■'">' \ Extraord. ditto 5,828,999 7 8 
 
 In all for Army - 15,111,490 7 8 
 Loans, Remittances, & 
 
 Advances to other 
 
 Countries, (btjing all 
 
 for Ireland) L ^ - - 1,768,000 
 
 Miscella. / Athome 2,561,340 12 1 
 
 Services \ Abroad 205,352 8 lOj 
 
 In all fijr Miscellaneous Services 2,766,693 ll| 
 
 Grand Total — 72,778,718 16 9^ 
 
 Deduct for Irish Loan - 1,768,000 
 
 Total Expenditure of Great Britain* 71,010,718 16 9^ 
 * Including ^441-270 15 3^ for Interest paid on Imperial Loan.
 
 ttWVERSnr Of U4.IN0IS
 
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 „__ Hie Aggregate Amount of 
 
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 Exciil,3S8payments into the Exclie- 
 Stami9,777^^ ^.^ jg less than the 
 Land53^284^^^^ Aggregate Amount in 
 
 Is. 
 
 2,574Difference arises from the 
 e Hands of the Receivers 
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 s 
 
 T.X 
 
 .'V
 
 APPENDIX, N°. 12. 
 
 
 
 
 PUBLIC INCOME 
 
 of GREAT BRITAIN for the Year ended 5th JANUARY, 1807. 
 
 
 
 Rt-n-nuc. , 
 
 1 
 
 UiuKbacks, Uiscount.t, Charges vf Management, ifc. paid 
 out of the Gross Revenue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Irdinary Revenues 
 
 Permanent and 
 Annual Taxes. 
 
 A. 
 
 Gross Receipt 
 
 within the 
 
 Year. 
 
 B. 
 
 Total Sum to be 
 accounted for. 
 
 c. 
 
 Rate per Centum 
 
 for which theGross 
 
 Revenue was 
 
 collected. 
 
 D. 
 
 Re-pavments, Al- 
 
 lowances,D,scounts 
 
 Drawbacks, and 
 
 Bounties. 
 
 E. 
 
 Charges 
 
 of 
 
 Management. 
 
 F. 
 
 Total 
 Payments out of 
 the Gross Revenue. 
 
 G. 
 
 Net Produce appli. 
 cable to National Ob. 
 jects and to Payments 
 
 into the Exchequer. 
 
 H. 
 
 Rate per Centum for 
 
 which the Net Pro. 
 
 duceofthcReienue 
 
 was collected. 
 
 Payments out of the 
 Net Produce appli- 
 cable to National 
 Objects. 
 
 K. 
 
 Payments 
 
 into the 
 
 Exchequer. 
 
 
 ;ustoms - - 
 seise - - - 
 tamps . - - 
 jnd and Assess- \ 
 ed Taxes - -/ 
 ost Office - - 
 s. in the Potind-l 
 on Pensions & )■ 
 Salaries - -J 
 i. in the Pounds 
 on Pensions & > 
 Salaries - -J 
 lackney Coaches 
 lawkers&Ped-l 
 lars > 
 
 9,456,255 S ii 
 18,979,151 5 3 
 4,+2«,I98 ii 
 6,310,797 2 U 
 1,511,859 1! 
 53,827 18. 10 
 
 64,083 13 5i 
 25,776 10 
 14,405 17 2| 
 
 9,671,789 15 1| 
 19,188,542 S 111 
 4,61 -,691 1 Zi 
 
 6,721,544 1.2 5 
 
 1,674,310 7 8 
 
 57,715 U 2 
 
 64,084 4 6 
 29,169 2 10| 
 14,555 
 
 5 2 8 
 
 2 It 7 
 
 3 S .3 
 
 K*' * ^ 
 21 12 
 
 14 7 
 
 12 7 
 11 1 4 
 
 214 5 
 
 1,242,137 1 61 
 
 1,085,389 17 01 
 
 143,660 19 2 
 
 20,891 19 2 
 ISO 
 
 400 
 
 655,603 8 iOI 
 725,939 61 
 146,116 H 
 283,284 8 8} 
 361,682 4 51 
 421 4 10 
 
 404 15 U 
 3,089 4 
 
 1,897,710 10 41 
 
 1,811,328 17 71 
 
 289,777 13 2 
 
 283,284 8 81 
 
 382,574 3 71 
 
 551 4 10 
 
 804 IS 11 
 
 3,228 5 7| 
 3,0S9 4 
 
 7,774,049 4 9 
 17,377,213 11 41 
 4,328,913 8 01 
 6,438,260 3 84 
 1,291,736 4 01 
 57,164 6 4 
 
 63,279 8 7 
 25,940 17 31 
 11,465 19 S 
 
 6 4 3 
 
 3 2 2 
 
 4 8 
 28 
 
 14 9 
 
 12 9 
 12 8 10 
 26 18 10 
 
 419,299 14 101 
 139,5 19 19 91 
 
 9,0'JO 
 173,705 17 2 
 13,700 
 
 * 7,056,779 1 9J 
 
 * 16,990,855 16 5 
 
 * 4,132,, 16 7 11 
 » 5,815,989 6 6| 
 
 * 1,101,000 
 
 * 54,968 12 4 
 
 63,279 
 
 * 25,600 
 
 * 11,235 
 
 » Whenever the Aggregate Amonnt of 
 Payments out of the Net Produce, (Vide Co. 
 lumn I,) and of Payments icto the Exche- 
 quer, (Vide Column K,) is less than the 
 Sum set down as such Agsregite Amount in 
 Column G -the Difference arises from the 
 Balance left in the Hands of the Receivers 
 or Collectors for carrying on the Service of 
 the Current Year; as thus : 
 
 CUSTOMS, (OnniNART.) 
 Net Produce . . 7,771.049 4 9 
 
 rPema. "1 
 
 ^. , 1 nent and I 
 
 ) Annual f 
 
 40,841,355 6 5 
 
 42,040,402 4 
 
 4 5 
 
 2,492,609 16 11 
 
 f, 179,769 3 51 
 
 4,672,379 21 
 
 37,368,023 3 91 
 
 4 14 4 
 
 755,315 11 101 
 
 *35, 252,273 4 111 
 
 Payments out of ditto . 419,299 14 loi 
 Ditto into Excheguer . 7,056,779 1 9i 
 
 Duties -J 
 
 Aggregate of both . 7.476,078 16 8 
 
 
 60,+82 11 7 
 
 
 
 
 5,436 16 81 
 
 5,436 16 81 
 
 94,345 3 3 
 
 
 
 
 » 22,580 8 9 
 
 
 mil Branches oP 
 Hereditary Re- y 
 venue - - J 
 
 99,781 19 llj 
 
 
 
 '"'^^z:'":''} -^'- « ^ 
 
 Exlraordmary 
 Resources. 
 
 -Uitoms - - 
 Excise . - - 
 "operty Tax 
 
 2,923,728 10 11 
 6,260,039 1 lOJ 
 G,145,2S9 17 31 
 
 3,097,454 5 21 
 6,330,168 15 8i 
 6,145,259 17 SJ 
 
 
 
 318,209 10 2 
 73,138 6 41 
 
 8,521 6 1 
 162,045 7 91 
 
 318,209 10 2 
 81,659 12 5J 
 162,045 7 91 
 
 5,77jt244 15 01 
 6,24|509 3 H 
 J,9aA,214 9 51 
 
 
 
 z z z 
 
 * 2,677,034 10 41 
 
 * 6,193,211 16 5 
 5.983,214 9 5i 
 
 16,383 17 91 
 
 +5 9 6 31 
 
 and it is to be recollected, as a very material 
 Circumstance, that the Sums standing under 
 the different Heads of Revenue as paid into 
 the Exchequer in Column K, are clear of 
 all Expense of Collecting and Managing ; . 
 under thelatterof which Charges is included 
 the whole Establishment of their respective 
 Offices mihe Red Book—th^l bugbear of 
 weak, and tool of wicked men ; the object 
 of prudential ceconomy, and of eccasional 
 
 come Duty . / 
 rrears 6f Taxesi 
 r under Contri- I 
 'buy inn Ajj - — ' 
 
 ■ 
 
 >lal War Taxes 
 
 .prests repaid &^ 
 other Inciden.l. 
 tal Receipts -, 
 
 otal, independ-l 
 
 oans paid imol 
 xcheqLinclu-l 
 
 mg5,0O0,0fX)for | 
 
 Vrand Toul 
 
 16,8-'7 12 4i 
 471 15 Qi 
 
 16,S27 12 4| 
 471 15 0| 
 
 1 --- 
 
 391,347 16 61 
 
 443 14 7 
 12 8 9^ 
 
 443 14 7 
 12 8 91 
 
 1^383 17 9X 
 J459 6 SI 
 
 "~ ~ ~ 
 
 1,^,346,326 17 6 
 
 15,590,182 5 7^ _ _ — 
 
 171,022 17 3 
 
 562,370 13 91 
 
 15,027,811 11 91 
 
 _ _ _ 
 
 _ — — 
 
 . i 
 
 1 N B. The Excess of Sums in Column B, 
 
 2,513,691 16 1 
 
 2,513,694 16 1 1 — — — 
 
 2,239 6 
 
 19,600 
 
 21,639 6 
 
 2,5 11,455 10 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 2,511,455 10 1 
 
 [1 Balances in Hand brought forward from the 
 last Year. 
 
 58,761,859 U 7i 
 
 60,244,061 5 81 _ — — 
 
 2,865,305 3| 
 
 2,375,828 17 3 
 
 5,262,025 16 81 
 
 54,982,035 8 11 
 
 _ _ _ 
 
 787,830 16 5- 
 
 *52,639,013 5 11 
 
 t 
 
 ,19,699,263 12 1 
 
 19,699,263 12 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 19,699,263 12 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 19,699,263 12 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78,t61,123 3 8- 
 
 79,943,324 17 9| 
 
 ' — - — 
 
 2,865,305 3^ 
 
 2,375,828 17 3 
 
 5,262,025 16 8^ 
 
 74,681,299 1 
 
 i 
 
 787,836 16 5 
 
 i *T2,338,276 17 2 

 
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