C- ( 
 
 < 
 
 . ( 
 
 cr 
 
 <- ^ c 
 
 <- 
 
 < <r <r 
 
 I 
 
 o< c <: J \ 
 
 f C r ( 
 
 < < <: 
 
 - < 
 
 < < 
 
 <: 
 
 t C 
 
 c 
 
 ( C 
 
 < f 
 
 c <: 
 
 -r 
 
 
 c < 
 
 ccc <r 
 ccc c 
 
 c 
 
 Q 
 
 
 
 OCC < 
 
 Ccc C 
 
 CCC C 
 
 CCC 
 
 c < 
 
 ^ ( 
 C (C C 
 C ^c C 
 
 c< c C. 
 cc c C. 
 
 C< C 
 C 
 
 < ( 
 ( C 
 c C 
 
 LIBRARY OF TUE 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN 
 
 GEORGE VERNADSKY 
 
 COLLECTION OF 
 RUSSIAN HISTORY 
 
 c 
 
 < < 
 
 <- C 
 
 C 1 c 
 
 
 <Tt 
 
 d 
 
 C c 
 
 c c 
 
 c <7 
 ^ C 
 
 c 
 
 c 
 
 C c 
 
 V,S 
 
 ^S> 
 < c 
 
 ! C C~ < 
 
 /^ cv r 
 
 ^ C o. r 
 
 cC c* c 
 
 ' ( 
 
 <; c 
 C 
 
 ^ 
 
 c 
 
 C- 
 
 < 
 
 <r 
 
 c 
 
 ^ 
 
 " 
 
 < c 
 
 c 
 
 o c 
 
 < < 
 
 c 
 < < 
 
 
 
 I C <CX C 
 
 ~< f( S 
 
 c (. <k 
 
 c c c: < 
 
 C C <5t , 
 
 < , <?< ^ 
 
 (Q 
 
 <c 
 
 <c 
 
 <r < 
 
 <C c 
 
 C < 
 
 <. ( 
 
 < 
 
< r< C" c ^ 
 
 c c c cc 
 
 cr < 
 
 cc cc cc< 
 
 Cr CC :. 
 T< rr ^C 
 
 Cl 
 
 c r 
 
 C 1C 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 cere 
 
 - c 
 
 CXc c 
 .CXc C 
 
 CTC 
 
 ' ' - 
 
 i c 
 
 -' 
 
 o 
 
 ^H9C? 
 C^ <r<^- 
 , c ' 
 
 ' <: 
 
 c CO 
 
 < ' f 
 
 C( 
 
 c? 
 
 / i 
 
 
 c<; c c: 
 
 <r< c 
 
 cr c 
 
 cr. 'c'<r.. 
 
 <T C' c 
 " c < c 
 
 :' <' < < 
 : < < 
 
 _ 
 
 <I Cc < < 
 
 c <3 
 
 
 : 
 
UNIVCRSITY OF ILLINOIS BULLETIN 
 
 Vol. XI October 13, 1913 No. 7 
 
 laas matter December 11, 1912, at the post office at Urbana, 
 Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912.] 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES 
 
 IN THE 
 
 SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 VOL.. II. NOS. 2 AND 3 
 
 OCTOBER. IBIS 
 
 The West in the Diplomacy of the 
 American Revolution 
 
 BY 
 
 PAUL CHRISLER PHILLIPS, Ph.D. 
 
 Assistant Professor of History in the University of Montana 
 
 PRICE $1.25 
 
 SHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 \ \ 
 
ITY OF ILLINOIS STI NOES 
 
 fi: 
 
 V. FAH: 
 
 [LAI 
 
 The "' "f .Illinois Studies in tin 
 
 hing 
 
 mon< nared hy members of the faculty or grad- 
 
 uate students in the departments of 
 political 
 
 Numbers will be published quarterly, so as t nite 
 
 an annual volume of about (100 d mono- 
 
 graphs iu these subjects ha 1900 been published in 
 
 a miscellaneous . known y Snid 
 
 which will continue to be ]niblished independently; but it 
 seem bring the growing number of the mono- 
 
 graphs in these allied departm. .'Iher in a separate 
 
 The following numbers of the "University Studies" 
 already published fall within this group: 
 
 Morgan, R. P. Th. 'f the commerce of the port of Xe~v York. 
 
 Vol. i, No. 2. 1901. 
 
 :/ to King Charles I. Vol. I, No. 4. 1902. 
 
 1870. Vol. i, No. 6. 1904. 
 
 Paine, A. E. The Granger movement in Illinois. Vol i, No. 8. 1904. 
 Dickerson, O. M. The Illinois constitutional cor: J. Vol I, 
 
 9. 1905. 
 Herron, B. M. The progress of labor organizations anioi: 
 
 Vol. i, No. 10. 1905. 
 
 Moore, B. F. The history of cumulative voting and minority representa- 
 tion in Illinois, 1870-1908. Vol.]- 1909. 
 
 Paetow, L. J., The arts, course at medieval universities, zvith special refer- 
 ence to grammar and r IQIO. 
 
 of the land grant act of l \ T o. I. 
 
 <x>. 
 
 Price 
 75 cents. 
 
 . 4. Price So cents. 
 
 ats. 
 
 Communications concerning the Studies should be a 10 the 
 
 Edit ;' Illinois, Urbana, 111. 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES 
 
 IN THE 
 
 SOCIAL SCIENCES 
 
 VOL. 11. NOS. 2 AND 3 OCTOBER, IBIS 
 
 The West in the Diplomacy of the 
 American Revolution 
 
 BY 
 
 PAUL CHRISLER PHILLIPS, Ph.D. 
 
 Assistant Professor of History in the University of Montana 
 
 PRICE $1.26 
 
 PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 URBANA 
 
COPYRIGHT 1913 
 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 
PREFACE 
 
 In this essay I have tried to show to what extent and in 
 what respects the Mississippi Valley was a subject of diplo- 
 matic negotiations in the American Revolution. Altho 
 many different views have been advanced on this question, 
 I do not believe that any American scholar has, as yet, made 
 any considerable use of the material available in this coun- 
 try and Europe for the purpose of getting at the exact 
 truth. Doniol did not appreciate the importance of the 
 West in the diplomacy of the American Revolution, and, 
 altho he quotes many important documents bearing on the 
 subject, he omits many of the most valuable, and in no 
 sense does he attempt to explain the whole question. 
 
 This study is written almost entirely from the sources 
 and some of its conclusions differ from those commonly 
 accepted, while in other cases, I believe additional light has 
 been thrown upon facts already established. Altho Spain's 
 ambition to get control of the lands bordering on the Gulf 
 of Mexico and the Mississippi is well known, I do not think 
 that the definite purpose back of her tortuous and appar- 
 ently vacillating policy has ever been properly explained. 
 Vergennes's professions of friendship for the United States 
 and his opposition to their claims to the West have been 
 regarded too long as proof of his duplicity. Vergennes him- 
 self did not regard his policy towards the West as un- 
 friendly to his ally, or as inconsistent with the terms of 
 the treaty of alliance, and, at no time, did he attempt 
 to conceal his views. The evidence shows beyond doubt 
 that he was conceding to the United States all he thought 
 they had a right to claim. The main outlines of British 
 policy are already well understood, but the efforts of Shel- 
 burne to detach the Americans from the French alliance 
 have not received the attention they deserve. The greatness 
 of Franklin as a diplomat appears in a new light when it 
 
 3 
 
4 PREFACE [114 
 
 is understood that, but for the obstinacy of Jay and Adams, 
 he would have obtained for his country the richest parts of 
 Canada. 
 
 To establish the facts herein set forth, the archives 
 of Washington, London, and Paris have been searched in 
 addition to a careful reading of all available printed ma- 
 terial. I regret that I could not go through the archives of 
 Spain; but I found, in the French foreign office, copies of 
 many Spanish documents obtained by the French ambas- 
 sadors and agents during the years from 1774 to 1783. 
 
 For assistance in preparing this study I am indebted 
 to Professors Evarts B. Greene, Guy Stanton Ford, and 
 Laurence M. Larson of the University of Illinois. I desire 
 also to express my thanks to Mr. Waldo G. Leland of Wash- 
 ington, D. C., for much valuable help and advice while I 
 was working in the archives of Washington and Paris. 
 
 To Professor Clarence W. Alvord of the University 
 of Illinois I must acknowledge my greatest obligations. 
 While I was working on this investigation he carefully and 
 painstakingly w r ent over all the material with me, and gave 
 me his time to discuss and analyze every point ; and during 
 my study with him he offered many valuable suggestions 
 and helpful criticisms which have added much to the 
 thoroughness of my work. 
 
 Notwithstanding my efforts and the assistance of my 
 friends, I realize that there are many weak spots in the 
 study as here presented. On some points the material 
 is not absolutely conclusive, and there are doubtless many 
 valuable documents which I have not unearthed. I hope, 
 however, that in spite of many defects, this essay has added 
 something worth while to our knowledge of the West in 
 the diplomatic negotiations of the American Revolution. 
 
 P. C. P. 
 
 Missoula, Mont, May, 1913. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Abbreviations 6 
 
 Chapter I The Origins 7 26 
 
 Chapter II Vergennes and Spanish Diplomacy 27 57 
 
 Chapter III The Question of the West 58 68 
 
 Chapter IV The French Alliance 69 90 
 
 Chapter V Florida Blanca and the Convention with France 91 107 
 
 Chapter VI Development of a Congressional Policy toward 
 
 the West 108130 
 
 Chapter VII Vergennes and the Allies of France 131 149 
 
 Chapter VIII Luzerne and the Pretensions of Spain 150 172 
 
 Chapter IX Triumph of the Anti-Gallican Party 173 188 
 
 Chapter X The close of the War 189202 
 
 Chapter XI Vergennes and the Negotiations for Peace 203 215 
 
 Chapter XII Peace 216 227 
 
 Bibliography 228 238 
 
 Index 239 247 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 Arc. Aff. Etr. Archives des Affaires Etrangeres. 
 
 Am. Hist. Rev. American Historical Review. 
 
 Angre. Angleterre. 
 
 Arc. Col. Archives des Colonies. 
 
 Bt. Trs. British Transcripts. 
 
 C. O Colonial Office. 
 
 Dip. Cor. Diplomatic Correspondence. 
 
 Esp. Espagne. 
 
 E. U Etats Unis. 
 
 F. O. Foreign Office. 
 
 L. C. Library of Congress. 
 
 Nou. Acq. franc. Nouvelles Acquisitions franchises. 
 
 P. R. O. Public Record Office. 
 
 S. M. C. or Sa. Maj. Chr Sa Majeste Chretienne. 
 
 S. M. Cath Sa Majeste Catholique. 
 
 U. of W. University of Wisconsin. 
 
 ( ) manuscript illegible. 
 
 [ ] word supplied. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE ORIGINS 
 
 For more than a century before the American Revolu- 
 tion the Mississippi Valley was an object of interest to the 
 colonizing nations of western Europe, and to their subjects 
 who were scattered along the shores of North America. 
 Spanish adventurers had wandered northward from the 
 Gulf of Mexico ; and, from the region of the Great Lakes, 
 French missionaries and traders penetrated to the heart of 
 the continent; while, from the headwaters of the James 
 and Potomac rivers, enterprizing Virginians descended the 
 western slopes of the Alleghanies to claim a share of this 
 rich country. 1 The colonizing efforts of the French and 
 English, and their bitter rivalry during the first half of the 
 eighteenth century, foreshadowed the struggle for the 
 Mississippi ; but the ownership of the country between that 
 river and the Alleghanies was ^not decided until the 
 last French and Indian war witnessed the triumph of the 
 English. 
 
 With the Treaty of 1763 eighteenth century diplomacy 
 begins a new development. In Europe and America alike, 
 the close of the Seven Years' War marked "the end of an 
 era, the beginning of an era." France and Spain were both 
 reduced to the rank of second rate powers, 2 while Great 
 Britain, with undisputed supremacy on the ocean, stood 
 forth the arbiter of European politics. In Prussia, Freder- 
 ick the Great smarted under the sense that he had been 
 
 1 Alvord and Bidgood, The First Explorations of the Trans-Alleghany 
 Region by the Virginians, 1650-1674, is a convenient and valuable account 
 of the beginnings of English colonization in the Mississippi Valley. 
 
 2 Vergennes recognized this as a fact. "The deplorable peace of 1763," 
 he informed Louis XVI., "the partition of Poland, and in fact other 
 causes equally disastrous, have struck the greatest blows to the respect for 
 your crown". Doniol, Histoire, I, 13. 
 
 7 
 
8 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [118 
 
 sacrificed to Hanoverian intrigue, and looked with pleasure 
 on any danger which threatened his former ally. 3 Of the 
 Bourbon powers, Spain was willing to accept her fate if 
 she were given peace and an opportunity to recuperate her 
 wasted fortunes, 4 but the tarnished glory of French arms 
 called loudly for vengeance. "The humiliation of Britain ! 
 The prestige of France !" 5 These were the phrases most 
 often on the lips of French statesmen in the decade fol- 
 lowing the Peace of Paris. To their minds the first was 
 the means to the second. To realize their ambition, the 
 wisest of them knew that, in addition to the old coalition 
 of the Pacte de Famille, they must raise up a new foe to 
 Great Britain. The shrewd and crafty Choiseul saw, in the 
 liberty loving English colonies in America, the latent power 
 needed for this purpose. Ever alert for advantages abroad, 
 he carefully nourished national resources at home 8 until 
 France should be ready to strike. To the capable and ener- 
 getic Vergennes was left the task of building up the new 
 coalition, of guiding its forces against the common enemy, 
 and finally of apportioning the spoils between his greedy 
 
 8 "Ici 1'administration envisage comme tres probable une guerre de la 
 France et de 1'Espagne avec 1'Angleterre. Je crains qu'ils ne considerent 
 1'independence des colonies comme devant etre une consequence de cette 
 guerre, et ils se flattant d'avoir a y gagner beaucoup." Elliott, British min- 
 ister to Berlin, to Lord Suffolk (without date). Translation in Circourt, 
 
 HI, 293- 
 
 4 "L'ambition n'animait pas Charles III., il amait la paix." (Doniol, 
 Histoire, I, 293.) Ossun, the French minister to Spain, wrote to Vergennes, 
 December n, 17/5, that Charles declared he had no desire to acquire new 
 territory. Esp. 578, no. 70. Later (December 28) Charles urged that Spain 
 had much to lose and nothing to gain by war. (Ibid., no. 74.) 
 
 B Before the conclusion of peace in 1763 France was planning for a 
 new war with England. She wished to repair her losses, and be ready 
 to strike at the first opportunity. Memorial of the Due de Broglie, 1762. 
 (Archives de la Marine, 84, 135, fol. 4-6.) Choiseul had the same ideas in 
 mind. See account of his schemes in Perkins, France in the American 
 Revolution, 22-32. "Rappelez-vous Monsieur, que j'ai toujours etabli en 
 principe qu'en nous occupant a humilier 1'Angleterre. . . . elle est 
 necessaire dans la balance de 1'Europe." Vergennes to Montmorin, Sep- 
 tember 21, 1779. (Circourt, 111,317.) 
 
 Perkins, France in the American Revolution, 24. 
 
119] THE ORIGINS 9 
 
 allies. The British conquests of the Seven Years' War 
 became once more a bone of contention, this time between 
 the jarring nations in alliance with France, and around 
 them twined the intricate negotiations of the American 
 Revolution. The Floridas, Canada, and the strip of land 
 lying between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi called 
 by the French "Eastern Louisiana," lacked the population 
 to give them- a title role in the drama of a world struggle, 
 but their position made them of vital importance in the 
 settlement of peace. The United States desired them as a 
 guarantee against powerful neighbors, while Spain feared 
 the danger to her colonial possesions of a strong, inde- 
 pendent nation in the New World. 7 Upon the reconcilia- 
 tion of these divergent interests depended the success of 
 the new French diplomacy, and upon this problem Ver- 
 gennes was to spend many thoughtful years, only to find 
 its solution wrought out by other men, working on prin- 
 ciples strange to his ideas, and with forces unknown to his 
 reasoning. 
 
 With the expulsion of France from the New World all 
 fears of the enemy which, for so many generations, had 
 harassed the English colonies, passed away. The treaty of 
 1763 portended the establishment of the United States, for 
 it left the English colonies free to set their autonomous 
 views against the British imperial policy. Altho the Eng- 
 lish and American viewpoints were essentially different 
 there were but few to see the necessity of reconciling their 
 antagonistic principles. 
 
 7 See plan of treaty drawn up by Congress in September, 1776. Journals 
 of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), V, 770. In the early discussions of 
 peace the chief American argument for extended boundaries was the 
 necessity of keeping foreign powers at a distance. Luzerne to Vergennes, 
 June 8, 1781. (E. U., XVII., no. 145, new 17.) So fearful was Spain of 
 American power that she insisted that Great Britain be guaranteed pos- 
 session of Canada and Nova Scotia, and suggested that she be allowed to 
 keep certain places in the states, as New York or Boston. Montmorin, 
 French minister to Madrid, to Vergennes, October i, 1778 (Esp., 591, no. 
 61) and again on October 15 (ibid., no. 33, new 61). 
 
10 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [120 
 
 In regard to the unoccupied lands of the West the 
 British ministry had two policies before it. One was to 
 throw them open to settlement and allow the inhabitants 
 of the Atlantic seaboard to establish homes there; the 
 other was to keep them in wilderness, inhabited only by 
 Indians and traders. The first of these plans naturally 
 received the support of the Americans, and their chief 
 advocate was Franklin. 8 The ministry was undecided what 
 course to take but at first, under the lead of Lord Shel- 
 burne, 9 appeared willing to favor the American desires. 
 For several years there was much discussion of the matter, 
 but no definite policy was adopted. 10 
 
 The tendencies of British politics, however, were be- 
 coming more and more imperialistic, and in the develop- 
 ment of this new imperialism, three acts of vital import- 
 ance for the West were promulgated. These were the 
 
 8 As early as 1754 Franklin suggested a "plan for settling the western 
 colonies in North America with reasons for the plan". (Works (Smyth 
 ed.), HI, 358.) At an early date he also urged the advantages of a settle- 
 ment in the Illinois country. (Ibid., IV, 462; V, 46.) January 3, 1760. he 
 wrote, "I am therefore by no means for restoring Canada. If we keep 
 it all the country from the St. Lawrence to the Mississippi will, in another 
 century be filled with British people." (Ibid.^V, 4.) 
 
 'Shelburne became president of the board of trade in 1763. Altho 
 deficient in education and superficial in thought, his brilliant imagination 
 conceived a grand imperial policy for America. At the same time his 
 friendship for the Americans led him to favor colonial development. Fitz- 
 maurice, Life of Shelburne, gives a good account of his work. The be- 
 ginning of British activity in the West dates back to 1748 with the forma- 
 tion of the Ohio Company. See Alden, New Governments West of the 
 Alleghanies before 1780. November n, 1761, the Board of Trade estab- 
 lished the principle of buying lands of the Indians before settling them, but 
 did not annul any former grant. Charles Townshend had been president 
 of the Board of Trade, and possibly was the author of the first attempt 
 to form a western policy. He early favored a limitation of colonial rights. 
 Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, says that he wished to leave fifteen regi- 
 ments in America. 
 
 10 Alvord, Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763. (Mich. Hist. Col., 
 XXXVI, 23. "> 
 
121] THE ORIGINS 11 
 
 Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 
 in 1768, and the Quebec Act of 1774. n The first of these 
 was but a temporary arrangement until a consistent west- 
 ern policy could be worked out. It established an arbitrary 
 government for the Floridas and Quebec, but promised 
 popular representation as soon as their "state and cir- 
 cumstances" would permit. The southern boundary of 
 Quebec was drawn from the south end of Lake Mpissing 
 to the intersection of the forty-fifth parallel with the St. 
 Lawrence Eiver, and the northern boundary of West 
 Florida was placed on the thirty-first degree of north lati- 
 tude. The intervening territory, bounded on the east by 
 the Alleghanies, and on the west by the Mississippi, was 
 reserved "for the present" in possession of the Indians. 
 The proclamation forbade any governor or commander-in- 
 chief "to grant Warrants of Survey, or pass Patents for 
 any Lands beyond the Heads or Sources of any of the 
 Rivers which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the West 
 or North West," altho provision was made for the pur- 
 chase by the government, of the lands which it had closed 
 to its subjects. 
 
 In spite of the restrictions of the king's proclamation 
 the Americans at once began to push their settlements 
 westward. 12 It was not long, however, before trouble arose 
 between the Indians and the frontiersmen and soon became 
 so serious that the British ministry was again obliged to 
 interfere. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix, opened to settle- 
 ment the upper valleys of the Ohio and Tennessee Rivers 
 and into these regions frontiersmen quickly pushed their 
 way. So rapid was their immigration that by the outbreak 
 
 "For the first of these see Canadian Archives Report, 1906, p. 119; 
 for the second, Alvord, The British Ministry and the Treaty of Fort, 
 .Stanwix (Proceedings of State Hist. Soc. of Wisconsin for 1908, pp. 165- 
 183) ; for the third, Coffin, The Province of Quebec and the Early Amer- 
 ican Revolution (U. of W. Bulletin, I, no. 3, 1896). 
 
 12 For discussion of American attempts to establish themselves west of 
 the Alleghanies see Alden, New Governments West of the Alleghanies 
 .before 1780. 
 
12 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [122 
 
 of the Revolution the forests of Kentucky and Tennessee 
 contained a population large enough to dispute British 
 claims to ownership. 
 
 In regard to the lands north of the Ohio a different 
 (rule was followed. Settlements were persistently dis- 
 couraged, and throughout its whole extent, this region was 
 peopled only by Indians and a few hundred French "hab- 
 itants" gathered together in drowsy, ancient villages. 13 
 Across its prairies roamed fur traders of English, French, 
 and Spanish nationality, knowing no law but their own 
 wills. Altho this country was not open to settlement, it 
 was still regarded as belonging to the thirteen colonies 
 until, in 1774, their titles were swept away. The Quebec Act 
 of that year incorporated the country north of the Ohio 
 and west of the Alleghanies with the province of Quebec, 
 and to the English colonists it appeared that they were 
 to be forever barred from the vast regions behind them. 
 By this act half of the back countries was definitely separ- 
 ated from the influence of Anglo-Saxon institutions and 
 intrusted to the arbitrary rule of a military governor under 
 French law. Protests were unavailing, but the enforce- 
 ment of the act, together with other unpopular measures of 
 the royal government, was fast driving the colonies to 
 rebellion. 14 
 
 These acts of the British ministry divided the con- 
 quests of the Seven Years' War into four districts, each of 
 which was to be a distinct issue in the diplomacy of the 
 Revolution. Canada, with its distinctive population and 
 institutions, was not in sympathy with the ideals of the 
 English colonies; but the ultimate possession of it was, to 
 the end of the struggle, a matter of doubt. The old North- 
 west, as yet unpeopled, was still claimed, under their 
 charters, by the seaboard colonies. Eastern Louisiana was 
 
 13 The chief centers of French settlement were Vincennes on the 
 Wabash, and Cahokia and Kaskaskia on the Mississippi. The Cahokia 
 Records and the Kaskaskia Records of the era of the Revolution have 
 been edited by C. W. Alvord, but the material relating to Vincennes has 
 never been satisfactorily arranged. 
 
 14 Van Tyne. American Revolution, 23. 
 
123] THE ORIGINS 13 
 
 held under the same title, and with less contradiction, by 
 Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The Floridas on the 
 south, like Canada on the north, formed a colony, distinct 
 in character and government. 15 
 
 Beyond the Mississippi stretched the unexplored 
 domains of Spanish Louisiana. Only a few years before, it 
 had been the pride of the French colonial empire, but had 
 since been ceded to Spain as compensation for her losses 
 in the Seven Years' war. New Orleans was its most im- 
 portant post, and controlled the commerce of the Missis- 
 sippi. Other Spanish villages were scattered up the river 
 as far as St. Louis, which had become a refuge for the 
 French who desired to escape the rule of the British across 
 the river. It was the natural outlet for the trade of the 
 Illinois country and had become a serious menace to British 
 influence in that region. So strong were the French in 
 this region, that, in 1769, the commander of Fort de 
 Chartres complained that, in spite of all the efforts of 
 British traders, backed by their country's soldiers, they 
 carried off all the trade, and influenced the Indians against 
 the English to such an extent as to threaten another Indian 
 war. 16 
 
 15 The population of West Florida was largely French and Spanish, 
 and was held in subjection by powerful garrisons of English troops. In 
 addition there was a considerable number of English traders along the 
 Mississippi. The chief centers of British influence were Pensacola, Mobile, 
 and Natchez. Hamilton, Colonial Mobile. 
 
 ^"Notwithstanding the immense sums spent on taking post at Ft. 
 <ie Chartes, and the length of time we are said to be in possession of the 
 
 Illinois, the French still carry away all the trade They go up our 
 
 rivers, introduce French manufactures in the Country, and influence 
 
 the Savages against us by which means, unless these parts are 
 
 established as represented, we shall soon be embroiled in another general 
 Indian War." Lt. Col. Wilkins, commander at Fort de Chartres, to the 
 secretary of war. December 5, 1769. (Colonial Office 5, 88, p 175.) The 
 Proclamation of 1763 was not able to stop the Pontiac War, and the 
 Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 did not allay all discontent among the 
 Indians. It was only when the Revolution broke out that the Indians took 
 the side of the English as less dangerous to their interests than the 
 Americans. 
 
14 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [124 
 
 Altbo the French people still possessed an active 
 interest in their ancient empire, their rulers had given up 
 all thought of regaining it. Louis XV regarded New 
 France and Louisiana as irretrievably lost, and wished to 
 oppose Great Britain with the old system of continental 
 alliances, and there were many to support this view. 17 Al- 
 tho there is no evidence that Choiseul aimed at the 
 restoration of the French empire in the New World, it is 
 apparent that he did regard America as the most easy and 
 most natural ground on which to work out the humiliation 
 of the ancient rival of the House of Bourbon. With the- 
 British in command of the seas he looked to America a* 
 tb'e battle ground on which to dispute this supremacy. 
 He was not alone in realizing the dangers of dissension 
 within the British Empire, 18 but the blindness of Geor^i? 
 III in provoking war aroused in his mind the greatest 
 astonishment. 19 
 
 Choiseul was convinced also that the terms of the 
 Treaty of Paris meant revolution in America, and he re- 
 solved to keep himself informed regarding conditions there. 
 Secret agents were sent into the English colonies with 
 
 17 Perkins, France in the American Revolution, 20. I have looked 
 through the documents in the French archives but I find no mention by 
 a responsible member of the government of any wish to regain the old 
 dominions of France, altho there are several memorials presented to the 
 ministry at various times which urged the retrocession of Louisiana or at 
 least a French protectorate over it. (See p. 17, note 26.) It is probable 
 that public opinion would have favored this action. The Memoir e sur la 
 Louisiane par Vergennes which advocated the retrocession of both Louis- 
 iana and Canada is undoubtedly a forgery. See p. 30, note n. 
 
 "Vergennes told Stormount, the British ambassador to Paris : "I was 
 at Constantinople when the last peace was made. When I heard the con- 
 ditions I told several of my friends there, that I was persuaded it would 
 not be long before England would have reason to repent of having re- 
 moved the only check that could keep the Colonies in awe." Stormount to 
 Rochford, October 31, 1775. (F. O., France, 542, no. 19, Stevens, Facsimiles, 
 XIII, 306; Circourt, III, i.) 
 
 "Wharton, Dip Cor., I, 371, note. 
 
125] THE ORIGINS 15 
 
 instructions to report every indication of discontent, 20 and 
 even French naval officers in American waters described 
 conditions for the eager ears of the French minister. 21 The 
 writings of prominent Americans and even the sermons 
 of New England ministers were carefully searched for 
 evidences of disaffection, and American merchants in 
 French ports were interviewed in regard to the attitude of 
 the colonists. 22 London, too, furnished the latest intelli- 
 gence. In the French archives are bundles of reports con- 
 cerning America, gathered from every source. 
 
 Choiseul did not limit his interest to the English 
 colonies, but gave attention as well to the old French 
 provinces of Canada and Louisiana. The French Canadians, 
 however, were well satisfied with British rule and not at all 
 disposed to rebellion. 23 Louisiana, on the other hand, 
 was a hotbed of discontent and disaffection; this was sys- 
 tematically reported to Paris, and the discontented element 
 probably received encouragement from Choiseul's agents. 
 The knowledge of the cruelty and tyranny of Spain was 
 public property in France, and led to a strong demand for 
 the retrocession of this province 24 to its former mistress 
 
 20 Kapp, Life of Kalb, 43. Choiseul sent over Pontleroy in 1764 on a 
 tour of observation and he returned in 1766. In 1767 Kalb was sent to 
 America to learn the intentions of the people and their needs in case of 
 war. He was instructed to learn the strength of their fortified places, 
 their facility in securing supplies, their plans, the character of their lead- 
 ers, and any other information likely to prove useful. Kalb made several 
 reports, the first in January, 1768. (Kapp, 46-55.) 
 
 21 See memorial entitled "D'Estaing propose la liberte de la Louisiane 
 sous le protectorat de la France," March 10, 1769. (Margry Collections, 
 Nou. Acq. Frangaises, 9309, fol. 8.) 
 
 22 Kapp, Life of Kalb, 45. 
 
 28 Kalb's report of January 20, 1768, Kalb reported that the French 
 Canadians were no longer in sympathy with the mother country. They 
 were becoming prosperous under British rule and were intermarrying 
 with the English population. Kapp, Kalb, 67. 
 
 24 The cruelties of the Spanish governor, O'Reilly, who became gov- 
 ernor of New Orleans in 1769, aroused great indignation in France and 
 there were urgent demands that France interfere. Gayarre, Louisiana. 
 
16 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [126 
 
 or at least that it be declared under the protection of the 
 government at Versailles. The French archives during 
 this period contain many documents on the subject, of 
 which the most important one is generally attributed to 
 Admiral D'Estaing. 23 The author describes in glowing 
 terms the climate and resources of Louisiana which, he 
 declares, extends as far as "the Ilinois, and is capable of 
 supporting an immense population." The Mississippi Val- 
 ley, argues the author, is of vital importance to Spain for 
 the protection of Mexico. How could this barrier be made 
 more effective? Not by reducing it to the full control of 
 Spain, under whose government the population would re- 
 main scattered and restless, and ready to submit to the 
 more liberal rule of Great Britain. A better way, insists 
 the writer, is to allow the people of Louisiana to govern 
 themselves under the protection of France and Spain. The 
 reason for this revolutionary proposal is explained in the 
 memorial. The example of a free republic in the Mississippi 
 Valley, it was argued, would encourage the English col- 
 onists to revolt, and France could then enjoy the commerce 
 of all America without the expense of maintaining colonies. 
 Furthermore, while Louisiana was dissatisfied she would 
 offer no opposition to British aggression, but if granted her 
 
 w'D'Estaing propose la liberte de la Louisiane sous le protectorat de 
 la France" (Margry Collections, Nou. Acq. Francoises, 9309, 8) Other 
 documents on this subject are the "Memoir de Poterat tendant a mettre 
 la Louisiane sous le protectorat franfais." ..(Memoires et Documents, Aff. 
 Etr. Fond Divers, Amerique, II.) There is also a letter from a M. 
 Francis, dated October 21, 1763, describing Lord Egremont's plans regard- 
 ing "Accadia, Canada, and the Floridas." (Arc. Aff. Etr. Angleterre, 481, 
 fol. 103.) This name suggests the J. B. Lazarus Francis, the agent of 
 Beaumarchais in America. There is also a letter from a M. de Neyon, a 
 French officer at Fort de Chartres, to Loftus, conceding to the English 
 permanent possession of the Illinois. (Arc. Col. Louisiane, 44, div. 2 
 i8b.) There was also mention of a M. Larnier who was in the Illinois 
 in the early seventies. (Arc. Aff. Etr. Angleterre, 501, fol. 320.) Another 
 important document is a "Memoir que regarde la Louisiane," dated 1763. 
 (Arc. Col. Louisiane, vol. 43.) 
 
127] THE ORIGINS 17 
 
 independence she would make every effort to preserve it. 26 
 The many suggestions regarding Louisiana probably 
 received consideration from Choiseul, altho it is un- 
 likely that they were officially discussed in the cabinet. 27 
 The mercurial mind of the French minister had already 
 
 26 L'Evenement singulier; .... arrive a la Nouvelle Orleans 
 <leviendra s'il est saise legerme heureux de ( ) administration de 1'Empire 
 Britannique aider 1'Amerique Sepentrionale a s'en separer accroitre le 
 desire qu' elle parait en avoir, montrer a ses colons qui veulent etre libres 
 qu'euse ; leur faire voir sous leurs yeux le spectacle interressant de deux 
 Potentates qui pardonnent, qui protegent, et qui daignent de concert pro- 
 ferer le mot de paussant de liberte. ce serait faire plus que econguerir une 
 <les provinces anglaises de 1'Amerique. Le choc de la guerre ne servirait 
 qu a rafermer les liens qui attachent encore ces countrees a la metropole, 
 c'est a I'example ( ) bonheur a les entrainer vers le but ou elles tenent 
 -deja. c'est par la confiance qu'elles oseront plus et plus tot : mais cette con- 
 fiance en des Monarques que des prejuges populaires leurs ont fait regarder 
 comme des despottes, ne peut s'acquirer que par une preuve incontestable, 
 il n'en peut exister une plus persuasions que la liberte de la Louisiane .... 
 ... les citoyens de la Louisiane gouvernir par eux memes mais avec le(s) 
 lois donnees par la parmission de 1'Espagne et sous la guarentee de la 
 France, ne dependraient que de leur intelligences pour tout ce que 
 regardirait les details de la justice de 1'administration, et de I'accroissement 
 qui devrait etre le point de vue unique de leur regime, mais des com- 
 missaires soutenus, et authorises par les deux puissances veuleraient a ce 
 <que 1'ambition des particulaires ne causera point de secousses dans les 
 fibres naissants de cette petite republique .... Les colons naturalises 
 Espagnoles par la cession, et frangais par leur origin, conserve les droits 
 de commerce . . . . un territoire salubre dont la population est 
 presque aussi prompte que cette du Canada, fertile dans tous les genus 
 commestibles, qui s'etend jusqu'aux Illinois .... C'est je repete, 
 armer leur Amerique centre eux memes." D'Estaing propose la liberte de 
 la Louisiane sous le protectorat de la France, Versailles March 10, 1769. 
 (Margry Collections, Nou. Acq. Franqaises, 9309, 8.) Bancroft gives 
 extracts from this document but attributes it to Choiseul. United States, 
 V, 339- 
 
 27 I can find no traces in the French archives of a cabinet minute 
 relating to the West during this period. Bancroft says that Choiseul sent 
 the memorial described above (note 26) to Du Chatelet. the French minis- 
 ter to London. (United States, V. 339.) He is probably right, altho 
 Choiseul may not have intended the memorial to express his own opinions. 
 Bancroft also quotes Chatelet as approving the ideas of the memorial. 
 (Ibid., 340.) It is probable that the whole question excited lively interest 
 at the French court altho no official action was taken. 
 
18 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [128 
 
 turned to other schemes for the humiliation of England, 
 and the old king Louis XV. was sunk too deep in debauch- 
 ery and disease to care. 28 Choiseul's investigations had 
 piled up a mass of documents, but they did not result in a 
 definite policy either to promote insurrection in America, 
 or to leave the colonies alone. 20 The vacillating minister 
 dropped his schemes before they could bear fruit, and ere 
 a successor could develop anew the policies of interven- 
 tion, the War of Independence was well under way; and 
 the course of events had carried it beyond the control of 
 French diplomacy. 
 
 With the abandonment of French activities in the 
 Mississippi Valley, the whole territory was left to the 
 English and Spanish. Spain held the west bank of the 
 river and within her domains were the important posts of 
 St. Louis and New Orleans, the latter of which gave her 
 control of the river's mouth. On the lower Mississippi the 
 British balanced the strategic positions of Mobile and 
 Natchez against New Orleans, but in all the wilderness 
 north as far as the Illinois posts of Kaskaskia and Cahokia 
 there was not a single British stronghold. In the year* 
 between 1763 and 1774 the population of Spanish Louisiana 
 increased at the expense of the Illinois country. 30 British 
 
 28 Perkins, France in the American Revolution, 32.. 
 
 29 In his efforts to conquer Corsica, Choiseul lost sight of America. 
 When Kalb returned from his mission to America, Choiseul refused to see 
 him and declared that he wanted to hear nothing more of America. Soon 
 after this, however, he announced that in retaliation for English aid to the 
 Corsicans, he would assist the Americans. (Kapp, Kalb, 72.) He was soon 
 threatening to involve France in war with Great Britain over the Spanish 
 claim to the Falkland Islands, when he was dismissed. Perkins, France in 
 the American Revolution, 31. 
 
 30 Immediately after the treaty of 1763 many of the French living ins 
 the Illinois country crossed to the western bank of the Mississippi. Pro- 
 fessor Alvord believes that as soon as the British actually occupied the 
 country this migration stopped. Cahokia Records, Introduction. (Illinois 
 Historical Collections, II.) In 1787 an investigation by Congress showed 
 fewer than 600 inhabitants in the Illinois, of whom 50 were Americans, 
 about 250 slaves, and the remainder French and English. Journals of the 
 Continental Congress (MSS.), XLVIII, fols. 48-52, 165. Bancroft gives 
 the population of the Illinois in 1768 as 1358. United States, III, 319. 
 
129] THE ORIGINS 1^ 
 
 traders, however, came with British soldiers to the old 
 Northwest and entered into competition with the French 
 and Spanish across the river. At first the newcomers were 
 helpless against the skill and influence of their rivals, 31 
 but within a few years they controlled the trade of the 
 Illinois. 32 
 
 During the years before the outbreak of the American 
 Revolution the British and Spanish along the Mississippi 
 were mutually distrustful. There were many points of 
 dispute between the two nations, and it seemed that at any 
 time there might be an outbreak of war. 33 Both sides saw 
 the importance of the Mississippi Valley, and both made 
 preparations to preserve and, if possible, to extend their 
 influence there. The Spaniards strengthened their defenses 
 along the west bank of the river, and the British, ever alert, 
 prepared to checkmate them. 34 Orders were given that, 
 in the event of war, British troops should at once seize New 
 
 31 Col. Wilkins to secretary of war, December 5, 1769. See above,, 
 p. 13, note 16. 
 
 32 Gayarre, History of Louisiana, III, 106. In 1783 the Canadian 
 merchants protested vigorously against the surrender of the Northwest 
 Territory because "it cuts off all the trading Posts, and almost all the 
 Indian Nations, the trade with whom was the grand object of the Com- 
 mercial Intercourse between Great Britain and the Province of Quebec." 
 Representation of Canada Merchants to Lord Shelburne, January 31, 
 1783. (Shelburne MSS. in Lansdowne House ; E. L. S., 72, fol. 459. Copy" 
 in Peace Trs., Lib of Congress, XIII.) The extent of British trade is 
 shown by the fact that in one month in 17/6 the governor of Louisiana cap- 
 tured fifteen British trading vessels. See p. 65. The French archives 
 also contain frequent references to merchants ruined by British competition. 
 
 33 In 1770 there was a dispute between the two countries over the 
 Falkland Islands which threatened war. Perkins, France in the American 
 Revolution, 31. In 1774 there was a dispute between Spain and Portugal 
 "de leurs limites sur le Rio St. Pedro et vers 1'Uruguay." Doniol 
 Transcripts Nou. Acqs. Franc. 6482, 36. France supported Spain, Great 
 Britain Portugal. Ibid., 31, 39. 
 
 34 "The proceedings of the Spaniards in the different Posts they are 
 forming on the Western side of the Mississippi cannot be too narrowly 
 watched." Hillsborough to Gen. Gage, September 28, 1770. (C. O. 5, 88,. 
 no. 35, fol. 277.) 
 
20 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [130 
 
 Orleans and get possession of Louisiana. 35 For several 
 years the two nations preserved an armed peace along the 
 Mississippi. New questions of dispute arose, 86 and at 
 the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, war was still 
 threatening. The court of Madrid, however, was anxious 
 for peace, 37 and, with the beginning of insurrection in the 
 colonies, the British commander felt it safe to withdraw 
 the troops in the Northwest for service in the East. 88 Spain, 
 however, was not satisfied and the disputes between the 
 two countries were allowed to drag on until they led to war. 
 Events in the East soon directed all eyes toward Bos- 
 ton, but at the same time the importance of the outlying 
 districts increased. The control of the Floridas, of Can- 
 ada, and of the Mississippi Valley became at once a matter 
 of vital interest, for if they could be brought into rebellion 
 British power in America would receive a staggering blow. 
 In none of these provinces was the population large enough 
 and sufficiently homogeneous to organize an independent 
 revolt, but the American insurgents were anxious to get 
 their assistance. There were many reasons, however, to 
 prevent both the Floridas and Canada from following the 
 lead of the English colonies. In the southern province 
 
 35 Hillsborough to Gage, January 2, 1771. (C. O., 5, 88, no. 89, fol. I.) 
 
 S6 The question of the boundary between the possessions of Spain 
 and Portugal in South America. See note 34. 
 
 37 "S. M. Cath ne m'a pas dit qu'elle desirait une mediation mais vrai- 
 semblablement, que si la France d'accord avec 1'Angleterre 1'offrant a ce 
 Monarque il 1'accepterait, car il est certain qu'il desire sincerement le 
 maintien de la paix." Ossun, French ambassador to Madrid, to Vergennes, 
 December 5, 1774. (Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Franc., 6482, 49.) 
 See also p. 8, note 4. 
 
 8 "Lord Dunmore has sent me a provincial major by the name of 
 Conoly, in whom his Lordship puts great Confidence to Impart a Project 
 of raising the People of Detroit and other Settlers in the interior Coun- 
 try, who with the Indians and the two Companys of the i8th Regiment 
 at the Ilinois might make a diversion on the Frontiers of Pensylvania 
 
 and Virginia I will do all I can to promote its success 
 
 I have sent .... Lord Dunmore Letters .... for Capt. Lord of 
 the 18 th Regiment, ordering him to move the Companys of said Regiment 
 from the Ilinois to Detroit . . . ." Gage to Dartmouth, September 
 20, 175. (C. O. 5, 92, no. 37, fol. 568-569.) 
 
131] THE ORIGINS 21 
 
 the restless spirits who favored revolt were overawed by 
 the strong garrisons which the British maintained to pro- 
 tect the country from the Indians and Spaniards, while 
 the great mass of the population sympathized with Great 
 Britain. Concerted action with the insurgents was fur- 
 thermore made impossible by the unexplored wilderness 
 to the north. Under such conditions, the conquest of the 
 Floridas by the Americans was possible only with foreign 
 assistance. Spain, however, had not forgotten her ancient 
 possession of them, and regarded them of the utmost im- 
 portance in maintaining control of the Gulf of Mexico. 39 
 Due to these circumstances American projects against the 
 Floridas were destined to prove abortive, and in spite of 
 every effort, these provinces were to serve only as a pawn to 
 tempt the greed of Spain. 
 
 In the minds of many Americans, Canada held a place 
 of greater importance than the Floridas, altho there 
 were equally serious difficulties in the way of union. The 
 natives were of alien race, and twelve years before had 
 fought desperately against the men who would now call 
 them brothers. Their difference in religion had only recent- 
 ly been emphasized in the bitter dispute over the Quebec 
 Act, and the French Canadians, long accustomed to 
 paternal government, looked with indifference on the New 
 England ideas of liberty. They were well satisfied with the 
 improvements which the English had made in their con- 
 dition, 40 and the pleas of insurgent agitators found no re- 
 sponse in their minds. French civil law was still main- 
 tained, and the Koman Catholic religion virtually estab- 
 lished, 41 while the annexation of the territory north of the 
 
 39 See p. 80, note 37. 
 
 40 Kalb's report to Choiseul, 1768. Kapp, Life of Kalb, 65-70. 
 
 41 For description of the organization of the province of Quebec see 
 Coffin, "The Province of Quebec and the Early American Revolution. 
 Kalb wrote in 1768 that the Canadians would not unite with the other 
 colonies in revolt. Kapp, "Life of Kalb, 68. 
 
22 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [132 
 
 Ohio flattered the pride of the Canadians 42 and gave them 
 a practical monopoly of the fur trade. 43 
 
 The measures favoring the French in Canada aroused, 
 among the English of that province, a spirit of disaffection, 
 which held out to the revolting colonies a promise of union. 
 The governor-general was alarmed at the threatening atti- 
 tude of the English Canadians and took measures to repress 
 insurrection. 44 The Continental Congress, on the other 
 hand, was anxious to bring all British America under its 
 sway, and in October, 1774, adopted resolutions urging the 
 Canadians to unite with them in opposition to the measures 
 of the British government. 45 In the February following 
 agents of Congress arrived in Montreal, where they held a 
 "meeting of Merchants and most of the English, Scotch, 
 and Irish of Montreal at the Coffee House .... and 
 [these] were urged by the New Englanders to send 2 del- 
 egates to Congress at Philadelphia." 46 These agents re- 
 ported that Canada was not in condition to resist attack, 
 that the English population was ready to revolt, and that 
 the French would remain inactive. 47 
 
 Congress, thereupon, determined to send a military 
 expedition against Canada, in the hope of inducing it to 
 
 42 Kingsford, History of Canada, V, 251. 
 
 43 .... "it [the treaty of 1783] cuts off all the trading Posts and al- 
 most all the Indian Nations, the trade with whom was the grand Object of 
 the Commercial Intercourse between Great Britain and the Province of 
 
 Quebec Consequently the whole trade with the Indians must be 
 
 entirely cut off from the Province of Quebec." Representation of the 
 Canada Merchants to Shelburne, January 31, 1783. (Shelburne MSS., E. L. 
 S., 72, fol. 459; copy in Peace Transcripts, XIII.) 
 
 44 Carleton, the governor-general of Canada, wrote Dartmouth, Jan- 
 uary 12, 1775, of "endeavours being made by certain of his Majesty's British 
 subjects to kindle in the Canadians the spirit that reigns in Massachu- 
 setts, and seems to run through most of the other colonies." P. R. O., Col. 
 Cor., Quebec, n, 24. Quoted in Stephens, Chronological Index. 
 
 ^Journal of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), I, 62. 
 
 "Extract of letter from Montreal, April 6, 1775. (P. R. O., Col. Cor 
 Quebec, n, 48; quoted in Stephens, Chronological Index:) 
 
 47 Kingsford, Canada, V, 251. 
 
133] THE ORIGINS 23 
 
 join the rebellion. Washington agreed to this, and believed 
 also that the movement would be of strategic value. 48 To 
 this expedition he gave much time and thought, for he felt 
 that it would have a "decisive effect on the public interests." 
 If the Continentals should conquer Canada, he was certain 
 that the plans of the British ministry would fail. 49 
 
 Governor Carleton was greatly alarmed at these ef- 
 forts of Congress to win over the Canadians. He admitted 
 that the Americans were "only too successful" in their 
 efforts "to debauch the minds of the Canadians and In- 
 dians." He complained that the people in general seemed 
 "to think it their interest that these Wretches should be- 
 come Masters of the Country, though the Gentlemen, 
 Clergy and most of the Bourgeois, have manifested great 
 Zeal and Fidelity for the King's service." Carleton was in 
 despair. He declared that the whole country was "on the 
 eve of being overrun and subdued." 50 Gage was more opti- 
 mistic, however, and felt that, unless the whole body of the 
 
 ^Washington, Works (Ford ed.), Ill, 238. 
 
 * 9 Ibid., Ill, 120. The colonial assemblies had early sent detached 
 expeditions towards Canada, and Washington resolved to bring these 
 together in a systematic invasion. On August 20, 1775, he wrote to 
 General Schuyler communicating a plan of attack by way of the Kennebec 
 River to Quebec. He hoped this would make a diversion and prevent 
 General Carleton from defending both Montreal and Quebec. (Ibid., 124.) 
 He instructed Arnold to do all in his power to win the good will of the 
 Canadians "by just and honorable conduct," and to treat them and the 
 Indians as friends and brothers. He, himself, issued a proclamation 
 urging the Canadians to join in the revolt. (Ibid., 126.) He also suggested 
 to Congress that the Canadians be invited to send delegates to that body. 
 (Ibid., 238.) In accord with Washington's ideas Montgomery urged the 
 Canadians to form "a provincial convention to maintain the civil and 
 religious rights of the colonies." (Ibid., 239.) 
 
 5 *Carleton to Gage, Montreal, September 16, 17/5. Carleton went on 
 to state :".... I had great hopes of holding out for the Year, 
 tho' I seemed abandoned by all the Earth, had the Savages remained firm ; 
 I can not blame these poor People for securing themselves, as they see 
 
 Multitudes of the Enemy at Hand [and] no succor from any Part " 
 
 C. O. 5, 92, fol. 673; copy in Bt. Trs., 123, fol. 405, L. C. 
 
24 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [134 
 
 Canadians went over to the provincials, the American 
 expedition must fail. 51 
 
 News of the fall of Montreal further alarmed the 
 British commanders and aroused a corresponding elation 
 among the Americans. Many of the Canadians went over 
 to the side of the insurgents, and for a time it seemed that 
 the whole province would take the side of Congress. In 
 the revolting colonies great importance was attached to the 
 expedition against Quebec, and Washington wrote that, 
 upon its outcome, would probably depend the issue of the 
 whole war. 52 The failure of Montgomery and Arnold was 
 a bitter disappointment to him, and he felt that the colonies 
 had lost a great chance for a speedy and decisive victory, 
 and that now the struggle must be long and bloody. 53 For 
 a time, however, he did not give up hope of affecting the 
 conquest of Canada, 54 but military events in other colonies 
 became more serious, the American forces were withdrawn, 
 and the province of Quebec was lost to the Revolution. 
 
 Only the West, then, offered opportunities for expan- 
 sion. In this direction population naturally flowed, and, 
 altho without legal sanction, frontiersmen had already 
 spread over the region south of the Ohio, and established 
 settlements in its rich valleys. To these settlements, as 
 well as to the territory north of the river, the colonists laid 
 claim by right of their charters. 55 Against these charters 
 was the legal force of various Indian treaties and the 
 Quebec Act. Furthermore, in the Northwest the British 
 held a quasi-military authority which the colonists were 
 in no position to dispute. The country south of the Ohio, 
 however, did not offer so difficult a problem. The British 
 had no military control within its limits, and there was no 
 one to dispute the claims of Virginia and North Carolina. 
 
 "Gage to Dartmouth, September 20, 1775. (C. O. 5, 92, no. 38, fol. 
 
 571.) 
 
 "Washington, Works (Ford ed.), Ill, 381. 
 
 "Ibid., IV, 47, 103, 108, 174, 
 
 "Ibid., IV, 195, 218. 
 
 55 Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 939. 
 
135] THE ORIGINS 25 
 
 Altho settlers were pouring in, the outbreak of war had, 
 as yet, prevented the organization of a -government. 56 It 
 was not long, however, until the inhabitants of Tennessee 
 and Kentucky demanded some organization, and estab- 
 lished the Watauga Association and the County of Ken- 
 tucky. 
 
 During the early days of the Revolution, the West re- 
 'Ceived scant consideration from the leaders of the rebel- 
 lion. Congress concentrated its armies in the East and 
 the West was left to shift for itself. In no sense, however, 
 did the colonies abandon their claims to the valley of the 
 Mississippi. Washington, Franklin, and Jay all main- 
 tained the right of the Americans to the West, 57 and there 
 probably could be found no one among the patriots who 
 -did not regard the back countries as a part of the colonial 
 dominions, and this very unanimity doubtless forestalled 
 discussion. 
 
 The British, however, were the first to see the import- 
 ance of the West in the war and were quick to take ad- 
 vantage of it. General Gage planned to raise the set- 
 tlers of the Northwest to assist the Indians and some reg- 
 ular troops from the Illinois in an attack on the frontiers 
 of Pennsylvania and Virginia. 58 Supplies were to come 
 from Pensacola up the Mississippi and Ohio, and with the 
 cooperation of Lord Dunmore in Virginia, Gage planned to 
 -cut the colonies in two and restrict the area of rebellion to 
 New England. This plan was never carried out, but the 
 
 66 See Alden, New Governments West of the Alleghanies before 1780; 
 Turner, Western State Making during the Revolution, in American His- 
 torical Review, I, 20, 70. 
 
 67 In July, 1775, Franklin drew up a plan of confederation to include, 
 not only the thirteen colonies and Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas, 
 but the West Indies and Ireland as well. (Works (Smyth ed.), VI, 425.) 
 This plan was presented to Congress but never acted upon. Altho no 
 specific mention was made of the West it is evident that Franklin thought 
 it unnecessary to discuss it. Jay declared that he had long believed that 
 Congress should grant Spain the navigation of the Mississippi below "our 
 territories." History of the Spanish Mission; Jay, Life of Jay, I, 100. 
 
 58 Gage to Dartmouth. See p. 20, note 38. 
 
26 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [136 
 
 British were successful in keeping Detroit and the posts 
 along the Great Lakes and the Mississippi, which, with the 
 control of the Floridas, enabled them to threaten contin- 
 ually the vast regions between. 
 
 Thus conditions at the outbreak of the war limited 
 the area of rebellion and threw the conquests of the Seven 
 Years' War once more into the jackpot of world diplomacy. 
 These conquests were now divided into four zones, each of 
 which presented a distinct problem. The Floridas were 
 definitely included within the scope of Spanish diplomacy, 
 while the claims of Spain and the United States to the 
 territory south of the Ohio made impossible an alliance 
 between these two powers. The old Northwest was of vital 
 interest to the new republic, while Canada, as the last 
 stronghold of British power in America was sure to receive 
 great attention. Each, then, was a distinct issue in the 
 diplomacy of the American Revolution, and the outcome 
 was made still more uncertain by the policy of Vergennes, 
 who, through the humiliation of Britain, was seeking to 
 brighten the prestige of his beloved France. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 
 
 The accession of Louis XVI to the throne of France 
 gave renewed life to the worn out diplomacy of Versailles. 
 The nominal head of the new ministry was the aged and 
 dissolute Maurepas, but the real leadership fell to the 
 astute and energetic minister of foreign affairs, Charles 
 Gravier, comte de Vergennes. 1 Vergennes had spent his 
 active life in diplomacy and was called to the foreign office 
 from an embassy to the court of Sweden. He had none of 
 the characteristics of the supple Choiseul, but was a man 
 of resolute purpose, blunt and direct in speech, and cold 
 and haughty in manner. His temper, when once aroused, 
 was violent; but his anger was soon appeased; and he was, 
 in general, patient and courteous. Particularly noticeable 
 was his lack of that vivacity and optimism so general 
 among Frenchmen; and his appearance gave the impres- 
 sion of one laboring under a load of responsibility and 
 anxiety. He was, however, a man of clear understanding 
 and definite aims, and one who would pursue unhesitatingly 
 to the end a policy upon which he had once decided. 2 
 Altho not a great man, he had an infinite capacity for 
 taking pains, and would often labor at his desk from early 
 in the morning till late at night. He has been described, 
 and perhaps justly, as having for his trump cards "subtlety, 
 
 1 Turgot was the only serious rival of Vergennes and the latter always 
 carried his point over the advice of the minister of finance. Doniol has 
 the same view of the position of Vergennes. Histoire, I, 249. 
 
 2 "Whether the policy which he [Vergennes] pursued was the boldest 
 which he could have adopted no man now possesses the means of judging. 
 .... But having adopted it, it is but justice to this minister to admit that 
 he pursued it with singular equanimity, firmness, and temper." North 
 American Review, XXXIII, 471. Wharton attributes this article to 
 Edward Everett. Dip. Cor., I, 243 et seq. 
 
 27 
 
28 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [138 
 
 wiliness, cleverness, and sagacity," 3 but, at the same time 
 bis honesty and loyalty were beyond suspicion. Narrow 
 in outlook, his one passion was patriotism, and he gave to 
 France a life of single-hearted devotion. His was not a 
 lovable character, but his uprightness and ability gained 
 for him the respect and friendship of such opposite char- 
 acters as the frivolous Marie Antoinette, the dull Louis 
 XVI, and the shrewd and philosophic Franklin. 4 
 
 When Vergennes took up the slackened reins of power, 
 France was reduced to irnpotency in the councils of Europe. 
 The new minister saw clearly the depths to which his coun- 
 try had fallen and felt keenly her degradation. "The de- 
 plorable peace of 1763," he informed his king, "the parti- 
 tion of Poland, and in fact, other causes equally disastrous, 
 have struck the greatest blows to the respect for your 
 crown." 5 Great Britain, he complained, had gained most 
 from the misfortunes of France, for she had conquered 
 Canada, Louisiana, and other important possessions of the 
 Bourbons. To retrieve the fallen glory of his country he 
 would strike at the British Empire. To restore French 
 prestige through the humiliation of England was the key- 
 stone of his policy, and it was this which led him to suggest 
 that encouragement and aid be given the British colonies 
 in their opposition to the mother country. 6 It was this 
 idea, also, which led him in 1778 to recognize the inde- 
 
 3 Hale, Franklin in France, II, 80. 
 
 4 This characterization of Vergennes is drawn from his letters and 
 despatches. Franklin had a high appreciation of his character. In 1781 
 he wrote of "the sincerity of this upright minister, who never promised 
 to me any thing which he did not punctually perform". (Works (Smith 
 d.),.yill, 302.) At the news of Vergennes's death Franklin again 
 wrote : "So wise and good a man, taken away from the station he filled 
 is a great loss, not only to France but to Europe in general, to America 
 and to mankind." (Ibid., IX, 575.) For a common idea of Vergennes 
 see Jay's characterization in Magazine of American History, XIII, 31. 
 
 translation. Doniol, Histoire, I, 13. 
 
 Hale declared that Vergennes's object was to weaken Great Britain, 
 "to make good, in a measure, the territorial losses of the Seven Years' 
 War, that is Canada . . . ." Franklin in France, II, 44. 
 
139] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 29 
 
 pendence of the United States, and at the same time to 
 make every effort to keep the alliance and friendship of 
 Spain. 7 
 
 From accounts of conditions in America, Vergennes 
 was sure that a rupture was at hand. He was not satisfied 
 with De Kalb's report ; and, to make his information more 
 exact, he determined to send over an agent of his own. 8 
 His choice fell upon a gentleman named Bonvouloir who 
 was sent secretly and with no credentials. Vergennes rec- 
 ognized the jealousy felt by the colonists of French influ- 
 ence and their fear of aggression, and he instructed his 
 agent to inform them that France had no designs on Can- 
 ada. 9 This promise Vergennes doubtless made in good 
 faith, for he cared nothing for wide colonial dominions 
 which would bring only trouble and expense. 10 His chief 
 interest was in small and productive colonies and in ad- 
 vantageously situated commercial ports. 
 
 The revolt of the American colonies gave to the New 
 World an international importance such as it had never be- 
 fore possessed. Always before, it had been a minor factor in 
 great European struggles, but now it became the center of 
 a new conflict, fought out on different lines. In previous 
 
 7 Doniol, Histoire, I, 13. 
 
 8 "Quoiqu'on ait voulu faire honneur a M. le due de Choiseul d'avoir 
 prepare cette revolution je dois dire avec verite sans pretendre enlever 
 rien a sa gloire qu'il n'y a en aucune part. . . . Bn de Kalb qui apres la 
 paix avait voiage de son ordre dans les Colonies angloises n'avoit d'autre 
 commission qui de reconnoitre les dispositions de ces peuples. La cor- 
 respondance qui j'ai Sous ma main n'announce pas meme des decouvertes 
 fort importantes." Vergennes (in his hand) to the king, 1776. Vergennes 
 went on to explain that new conditions had arisen and it was necessary 
 to have some one on the ground to report new developments. Aff. Etr. 
 France, 446, no. 33, Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Francs., 6494, 55. 
 
 9 Wharton, Dip. Cor., I, 333. 
 
 10 "La France a des colonies dans la proportion qui convient a sa popu- 
 lation et son Industrie. Plus seroit une charge plus tost q un benefice. 
 Si la perte du Canada lui a etc sensible elle doit la moins regretter depuis 
 que labandon quelle a etc obligee d en faire est devenu le signal de 
 revolte des provinces angloises sur le continent." Vergennes to Aranda, 
 April 26, 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 40.) 
 
30 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [140 
 
 wars it was merely a question of whether Great Britain or 
 the Bourbons should extend a colonial empire, but now the 
 matter in hand was the birth of a new nation. Defeated in 
 the past in every struggle with a united Britain, France 
 now saw in a divided empire her opportunity for vengeance. 
 It was no longer a contest over Canada and Louisiana ; the 
 reconquest of these did not enter the dreams of Vergennes; 
 he looked for triumph over Great Britain in the destruction 
 of her commerce, in the dismemberment of her empire, and 
 above all, in forming her richest provinces into a new na- 
 tion that would be forever a check on British aggression. 
 
 The outbreak of open war in America formed a crisis 
 in the diplomacy of France. The moment had come for 
 which Choiseul had waited in vain and towards which 
 Vergennes had pointed his policy. The report of battle on 
 the commons of Lexington warned him that the time for 
 action was at hand. While it was clear that France had 
 a great interest in the revolt, there still arose in the mind 
 of Vergennes many questions. Would the colonies declare 
 their independence? If they did, would they fight with 
 determination to maintain their declaration? Should 
 France offer them aid ; and, if so, what should be its char- 
 acter? Would Spain join in a war to free rebellious 
 colonies? What recompense should the two crowns expect 
 for their assistance? With these questions in mind Ver- 
 gennes began to formulate a definite policy. 
 
 In two memorials written at this time may be read 
 the fundamentals of his decision to which he clung through- 
 out the succeeding years. 11 The first is headed "Reflexions 
 
 "There is a third memorial entitled "Menwire Historique et Politique 
 sur la Louisiane" par M. de Vergennes, ministre de Louis XVI, and pub- 
 lished in Paris in 1802. This memorial declared that the war then going 
 on in America was of vital interest to France and Spain, and that the two 
 countries ought to unite on a policy regarding the struggle. The Ameri- 
 cans, if successful, were likely to seize the American possessions of Spain 
 and become the dominant power on the continent. The only means of 
 preventing this, continued the memoir, was to restore Canada, Louisiana, 
 and Eastern Louisiana to France. The Indians and Canadians wouM 
 
141] VEEGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 31 
 
 Sur la Conduite qu'il convient a la france de tenir a 1'egard 
 des Colonies Angloisses, par M. Gerard de Kayneval," and 
 was prepared in the latter part of 1775 for the use of 
 Vergennes. 12 The second bears the title "Considerations 
 sur 1'affaire des Colonies anglois de PAmerique," and was 
 drawn up by Vergennes himself. 13 The first of these de- 
 scribes in general terms conditions in America, and the 
 interest of France in the struggle; the second sets forth, 
 
 then be able to balance the ambition of the Americans. Louisiana was 
 useless to Spain, it argued, and that power ought to be glad to surrender 
 it to France in return for a guarantee of her other possessions. It was 
 also necessary for the protection of French commerce. Whatever the out- 
 come of the war between England and her colonies, reasoned the memorial, 
 Europe must intervene. In that case France would be in position to re- 
 claim her ancient possessions in Canada. 
 
 This memorial has received importance from the use Professor Turner 
 makes of it in his "Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the 
 Period of Washington and Adams." (Am. Hist. Rev., X, 249.) There is 
 good reason to believe, however, that the whole memoir is a forgery. Tur- 
 ner admits that there was some suspicion of it, but attempts to establish its 
 authenticity by the assertion that "the subsequent actions of Vergennes are 
 entirely consistent with the view that he was the author." He attempts 
 to prove this assertion by reference to Oswald's letter to Shelburne of 
 September 17, 1782, regarding Rayneval's mission to London, and by 
 Godoy's declaration in his memoirs that Vergennes tried "to induce 
 Spain .... to give to France her ancient colony." The publication of Ray- 
 tieval's report to Vergennes (Doniol, Histoire, V, 135) shows that his 
 mission had nothing to do with the western territories. Godoy's account 
 can not be accepted as decisive. During the Revolution he was but a 
 child and he was hardly more than a youth when he assumed office in 
 1792. He could have had no first hand information of any such attempt 
 as he describes. He did not publish his memoirs until many years later 
 (1832) when his memory could not have been accurate and he probably 
 confused some French efforts after the Revolution to obtain Louisiana 
 with the name of Vergennes. As will be shown in the course of this 
 study, the policy laid down in this memoir was not in accord with the 
 policy of Vergennes as stated in his authentic papers. He made no attempt 
 
 12 In hand of Rayneval. (Etats-Unis, Mentoires et Documents, I, no. 
 4, fol. 59; Stevens, Facsimiles, XIII, 1310; Doniol, Histoire, i, 243 et seq.) 
 
 "Dated March 12, 1776. (Etats-Unis, Memoires et Documents, I, no. 
 9; Stevens, Facsimiles, XIII, 1316; Doniol, Histoire, I, 278 et seq.) 
 
32 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [142 
 
 in detail, the confused state of English politics, and argues 
 for a policy unfriendly to Great Britain. 
 
 Vergennes and his chief assistant were alike convinced 
 that the rebellious colonies would declare their indepen- 
 dence; but the position France should take offered many 
 problems, for a move in any direction was threatened with 
 danger. They were willing to allow both combatants to- 
 exhaust themselves without offering any interference, but 
 they foresaw great hazards from a consistent policy of 
 non-intervention. Both declared that, whatever the out- 
 come of the war in America, it would surely lead to an- 
 other struggle between the Bourbon powers and Great 
 Britain. If the latter power should conquer the insurgents, 
 they argued, she would seek indemnity for her expenses in 
 an attack on the colonies of France and Spain ; if defeated, 
 she would but have an additional motive to cover the 
 humiliation by a blow at her ancient rivals. The Bourbon 
 powers could not hope to save themselves by maintaining- 
 their neutrality, for no matter how carefully they ab- 
 stained from interference in the war, the British would 
 still accuse them of aiding the rebels, and use this as a pre- 
 
 to obtain territory in America and often disclaimed even to Louis XVI 
 any desires in that direction. 
 
 There is other evidence of forgery. The style is not that of Vergen- 
 nes. Page after page is taken up with historical and geographical details 
 of which we find little in the authentic papers of Vergennes, and there 
 is no part that bears the ear marks of a state paper. The paper also 
 shows an ignorance of political and geographical conditions during the 
 Revolution which can not be attributed to Vergennes. The plainest 
 example is found on page 26 of the memoir. It states that the English 
 will soon get possession of Louisiana and that then "Florida will fall of 
 itself." Vergennes frequently discussed the question of Florida but he 
 never committed the mistake of supposing that it belonged to Spain during 
 the period of the Revolution. 
 
 The circumstances of the publication of the memoir are suspicious. 
 In the years from 1800 to 1803 Napoleon was concerned with Louisiana. 
 and the publication of this supposed work of Vergennes would help to 
 justify his conduct in the eyes of the world. On no ground can the 
 authenticity of this memoir be accepted. 
 
143] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 35 
 
 text for attack. No faith could be placed in the guarantees 
 of Great Britain, for, declared Vergennes: "L'experience 
 n'a que trop prouv6 quils croient juste et honorable tout 
 quils regardent comme advantageux a leur nation et 
 destructif pour ses rivaux." Vergennes went on to state 
 that there was already talk in England of a popular war 
 against France to allay domestic disputes and extinguish 
 the national debt. France, he declared, had little to fear 
 from an independent republic in the New World, for it 
 would be too exhausted to attempt any aggression for years,, 
 and its very organization as a republic would discourage 
 the spirit of conquest, while its people, devoted to industry 
 and commerce, would see the need of peace. 
 
 Eayneval urged, moreover, that his country had much 
 to gain from an independent America, for not only would 
 it weaken Great Britain but also increase proportionately 
 the power of France. England's commerce would suffer 
 an irreparable blow, and that of France would increase in 
 importance. Kayneval thought the opportunity favorable 
 also for France to recover some of her lost American pos- 
 sessions, particularly the fisheries of Newfoundland and 
 the Gulf of St. Lawrence. 14 In regard to the restoration 
 of the ancient French empire, he merely remarked: "On 
 ne parle pas du Canada." 
 
 No plan that Rayneval may have had for the 
 recovery of New France received any encouragement 
 from Vergennes, altho such a scheme was not con- 
 trary to the Bourbon traditions. He did not be- 
 lieve that a French empire in America was again 
 possible; and, if it w r ere possible, he argued, France 
 had already enough colonies for her resources and should 
 
 14 In discussing the advantages to France of aiding the Americans 
 Rayneval states : "elle nous presente comme tres probable le recouvere- 
 ment d'une partie des possessions que les anglois nous ont enleves en 
 Amerique comme la peche de terre-neuve, et du golfe de St Laurent, 
 1'Isle Royale &." Stevens, Facsimiles, XIII, 1310. Doniol writes instead 
 of "Peche de terre-neuve," "peche de terre." Histoire, I, 244. 
 
34 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [144 
 
 not seek more. 15 A course of aggrandizement in America 
 would arouse the fears of the colonists and they might 
 return gladly to their former allegiance. The suggestion 
 of commercial advantages he passed over likewise without 
 consideration and gave his whole attention to the lowering 
 of English prestige. He would prepare for war and at the 
 right moment strike a decisive blow strong enough to re- 
 duce England to the rank of a second class power, and 
 destroy the empire which she had built up with so much 
 "arrogance and injustice." 
 
 Vergennes did not think the time was yet ripe for 
 intervention. The warring powers should first be allowed 
 to exhaust themselves and not until the colonies declared 
 their independence should France intervene, for it was not 
 in accord with the king's dignity to ally himself with in- 
 surgents. On the other hand France could not delay too 
 long, for there was always the possibility of a reconciliation 
 or sudden collapse of the revolt. Vergennes felt it would 
 be well to encourage the insurgents "par quelques faveurs 
 
 15 "Au pis aller la crainte d une guerre malheureuse qui finiroit par 
 remettre la France en possession du Canada seroit le pouventail le plus 
 certain pour 1'Amerique ou le voisinage de notre religion et notre gouvern- 
 ment est extremement aprehende." Vergennes to Ossun, August 7, 1775 
 (Esp., 575, no. 15.) See also Vergennes to Guines of same date. (Doniol, 
 Histoire, I, 155.) Vergennes wrote to Aranda, March n, 1777, that since 
 the two crowns were content with their possessions and not ambitious for 
 new conquests, "reste done celui de cooperer a la foiblessement de la 
 puissance dont elles pourvient redouter la (c) croissement et ( ) quelle 
 seroit tentee d'un faire." (Esp., 583, no. 155.) A month later he expressed 
 the same idea. (Ibid., 584, no. 21.) Again he wrote: "Sa Mte n hesite 
 pas a declarer quelle ne connoit en Amerique coe en Europe aucun objects 
 asses seduisant d'acquisition pour compensir a ses yeux les hazards, les 
 calamities et 1'epuisement resultans dune guerre. La France a des colonies 
 dans la proportion qui convient a sa population et son industrie. Plus 
 seroit une charge plus [tost] q'un benefice." Vergennes to Aranda, April 
 26. 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 40.) In none of his despatches does Vergennes 
 admit any intention to obtain territorial gains in the New World; but he 
 frequently disclaims any such object. The decadence of Spain and the 
 dangers of Great Britain were, in his day, striking proof of the folly 
 of colonies. 
 
145] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 35 
 
 secretes et par des esperances vagues" until they should 
 declare their independence and the moment had come for 
 intervention. He would also conciliate the British and lull 
 their suspicions so they would not fear to embark on an 
 expensive campaign; but France must not be too humble 
 for the "Anglais ne respect que ceux qui peuvent se faire 
 craindre." 
 
 This was the program of Vergennes which he consist- 
 ently maintained in the face of all obstacles. He was not 
 animated by any feelings of sympathy for the "patriot 
 cause," altho his hatred of England doubtless inspired 
 a kindlier feeling for the Americans than he would have 
 entertained otherwise. Of far greater propelling power 
 was his desire to humiliate the old enemy of France. He 
 would not seek a pretext for war. It was enough that 
 Great Britain was dangerous, the natural enemy of France, 
 "avide, injuste, et de mauvaise foi," and that she had always 
 sought every means to injure the House of Bourbon. 
 Should not France then seize this opportunity to enfeeble 
 her rival? The humiliation of England; the prestige of 
 France; such was the policy of Vergennes. 16 He did not 
 
 16 This memoir of Vergennes is especially important as forming the 
 "basis of his whole policy regarding the interests of France. Doniol says 
 
 of the "Reflexions" : "Cette piece etait a vrai dire un programme 
 
 Le ministre etait desormais fixe a ce programme, et il devait letre avec le 
 conseiller veritable du roi le chef du cabinet. Le cours des choses on le 
 verra n'y changer a presque rien." Histoire, I, 249. 
 
 Vergennes submitted his memoir to Maurepas, Turgot, and St. Ger- 
 main, all members of the king's cabinet, and asked for their opinion. 
 (Doniol, Histoire, I, 279.) St. Germain replied three days later and 
 advised getting ready for war. Turgot's answer was not ready for nearly 
 a month. His paper of April 6 was a careful statement of the finances 
 of France. He pointed out the immense public debt of the monarchy, and 
 the miserable state of her exchequer, and argued that a war would make 
 impossible for a long time to come certain very necessary reforms. The 
 reply of Maurepas is not certainly known, but Doniol attributes to him a 
 short and concise memoir, a copy of which is found in the foreign office. 
 (Histoire, I, 286.) 
 
 There is no evidence that Vergennes allowed the opinions of his col- 
 leagues to affect his policy. The later discussions on the subject do not 
 
36 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION 
 
 seek to build up the old France, overloaded with colonies 
 to drain the life blood of the nation; that could be left to 
 the worn out empire of Spain and to the shattered might of 
 Britain. He would call into being a new nation, which 
 would be a friend and ally of the Bourbon throne, and a 
 constant menace to the maritime power of the British 
 Empire. 
 
 In his plans for wrecking England's power, Vergennes 
 counted on the help of Spain. The two powers had long 
 been in alliance and the Spanish court had not been behind 
 that of Versailles in its hatred of the common enemy. At 
 the outbreak of the Revolution the dispute between Spain 
 and Portugal over the boundaries separating Brazil and 
 Uruguay was unsettled and the governments of Versailles- 
 and Saint James were involved. The latter was actively 
 supporting Portugal, while the former, in accord with the 
 terms of the Pacte de Famille, was giving encouragement to 
 Spain. 17 Vergennes protested his desire to make even 
 stronger the union of the two crowns, 18 and the Spanish 
 minister, Grimaldi, declared in warm terms his gratitude- 
 
 appear in the records of the foreign office. Vergennes had, by this time, 
 become master of the ministry. Turgot did not long hold the favor of the 
 king, and with his retirement Vergennes was the only man of first rate- 
 ability in the cabinet. And Vergennes, when he had once determined on 
 a policy, was of a character to pursue it to the end. 
 
 "See page 19, note 33. Spain counted on French assistance in case 
 of war, and the British sent a fleet to Buenos Ayres on behalf of PortugaL 
 Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Francs, 6482, 39, 41. England offered to 
 mediate but Spain refused unless France should also be a mediator. 
 Ossun to Vergennes, December 5, 1774. (Ibid., 49.) 
 
 18 ". . . . je vous prie de ma cooperation et de mon empressement pour 
 le maintien de 1'union si desirable entre les deux monarques. Si M. le Mis 
 de Grimaldi se rapelle 1'epoque a laquelle nous residions ensemble aupres 
 du feu roy d'Angleterre peutetre se souviendra t'il que mon attachement 
 a 1'union ne date pas du Pacte de Famille qui nous en fait desormais une- 
 obligation." Vergennes to Ossun, July 22, 1774. (Doniol, Transcripts, 
 Acq. Francs., 6482, 6, 19.) 
 
147] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 37 
 
 and affection for France. 19 In the communications be- 
 tween the two countries before the middle of 1775, there 
 was much discussion of a war with Great Britain, but there 
 was no suggestion of using the rebellious colonies against 
 the mother country. Vergennes had not fully decided on 
 a course of action regarding America, and the Spanish 
 ministers had no sympathy with rebels. Each nation ex- 
 pressed the greatest sympathy for the other; but the ends 
 that each had in view were entirely different. Vergennes 
 was getting ready to strike hard at Great Britain, while 
 harles III was seeking anxiously for peace. 20 Kemem- 
 brance of the humiliating treaty of 1763 stirred the French 
 minister to thoughts of vengeance; it merely frightened 
 the old king at Madrid. 
 
 Events in America soon forced the hand of Vergennes. 
 The spread of the revolt made necessary the transport of 
 powerful fleets and large bodies of troops across the Atlan- 
 tic, and Spanish fears of British aggression changed to 
 certainty. 21 Grimaldi hastened to assure the British min- 
 istry of the peaceful intentions of his court, and demanded 
 guarantees that the troops then in America should not be 
 
 19 "I1 [Grimaldi] .... m'a charge de nous assures de sa gratitude et 
 <le la Constance des sentiments de consideration et d'amitie . . . ." Ossun to 
 Vergennes, December n, 1774. (Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Francs., 
 6482, 6, 8.) 
 
 20 Ossun, the French minister to Madrid, frequently enlarged on the 
 anxiety of Charles for peace. See his letter to Vergennes, December u, 
 1775. (Esj>., 578. no. 70.) Doniol explains the case exactly: Histoire, I, 
 293. See p. 8, note 4. 
 
 21 "Le voisinage quil y a entre les Colonies Angloises de 1'Amerique et les 
 possessions 1'Espagnoles dans cette parte du Monde ne permit pas de 
 voir sans inquitude tant de forces de Mer et de Terre qui s'y rassemblent, 
 .... malgre cela il est notoire que 1'Espagne n'a pas fait passer dans 
 cette partie le plus petit transport de Troupes et des Vaisseux . . . ." Spain 
 further demanded assurances that "les dits armamens de 1'Angleterre ne 
 subsisteront en Amerique qu'aussi longtemps que 1'esprit de revoke des 
 Colonies . . . . et retourneront en droiture en Espagne aussitot que cet 
 motif aura cesse." Copy in Esp., 575, no. 231. (Aranjuez, April 25, 1775.) 
 
38 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [148" 
 
 used against the possessions of Spain. 22 The answer to 
 this demand was not satisfactory. Great Britain gave as- 
 surances that her intentions were peaceful, but at the same 
 time larger armaments were sent to America, the defences 
 of Gibraltar were increased, and a British fleet was sent 
 to watch the navy of Spain. 23 To add to the terror of the 
 Spanish court, credit was given to the rumor that twenty 
 thousand Russian troops and a large German army were 
 on their way to America. 24 
 
 Fear drove Grimaldi to seek counsel once more from 
 Vergennes. The latter had shown his disapproval of de- 
 manding guarantees from Great Britain and he maintained 
 that if France and Spain accepted her assurances they 
 would be bound to remain defenceless, trusting only to 
 the good faith of a treacherous enemy. 25 He denounced the 
 ambitions of the British ministry, which, he declared, had 
 in view a project to end the rebellion by uniting all parties 
 in an attack on the American possessions of the Bourbons. 
 26 To Charles III he directed a letter particularly designed 
 to arouse Spanish fears. He pointed out British interests 
 
 22 "Vous vous rapelleres aussi les assurances reiteres que je vous 
 ai donnees de 1'idee avantageuse et de la parfait confiance que le Roi 
 a dune les vues pacifiques du Gouvernment Anglois. Jajouterais que Sa 
 Mte est toujours dans la meme persuasion." Esp., 575, no. 231. 
 
 23 "M. d'Aranda est allarme des forces de terre qui les Anglois y font 
 passer." Ossun to Vergennes. (Esp., 576, no. 155; see also DonioU 
 Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Francs., 6482, 83.) 
 
 24 Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. Francs, 6482, 130, 136, 163. 
 
 25 " si nous acceptons une declaration rassurante de 1'Ange 
 
 nous nous engageons en quelque maniere a rester tranquilles sur la foi de 
 ses assurances, et il faudra ou renouncer aux precautions qui la prudence 
 conseille pour pourvoir nos possessions d'outre mer de tout ce qui peut 
 necessaire a leur conservation ou s'exposer a des reclamations sans fin 
 toutes les fois que nous ferons la moindre disposition pour leur procurer 
 une surete moins precaire que celle qui peut dependre de la bonne foi des 
 Anglois." Vergennes to Aranda, May 9, 1775. (Esp., 576, no. 20.) 
 
 26 ". . . . nous etions informes dupuis asses longtems M. qui cetoit une 
 opinion asses accredited dans 1'opposition et que cherchoit a rendre 
 populaire que le moyen de faire cesser la guerre de 1'Amerique seroit 
 de la declarer aux deux courrones." Vergennes to Ossun, August 7, 
 1775- (Esp., 575, no. 15.) 
 
149] VEBGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 39 
 
 in Porto Kico, San Domingo, and in the control of the Isles 
 of the Winds and the Gulf of Mexico, and argued the cer- 
 tainty of an attack upon some of them by the immense 
 British forces then in America. 27 
 
 The arguments of Vergennes were not without avail r 
 altho the Spanish king was still anxious for peace. 
 Grimaldi was at last convinced that Great Britain would 
 use her immense forces in America in an attack upon the 
 Spanish possessions. 28 Preparations were made to 
 strengthen the chief ports on the Caribbean Sea and the 
 Gulf of Mexico, and the armaments of Spain were greatly 
 increased. 29 
 
 While preparing for hostilities Grimaldi and his 
 master still hoped for peace. 30 They knew that Spain 
 was not ready for war, and had: no intention of doing 
 more than provide for the defense of her possessions. 
 It was recognized at both the Bourbon courts that Spain 
 had more to lose in a war with Great Britain than had 
 France. 31 Spanish colonies were widely scattered and 
 
 27 Vergennes to Charles III, August 7, 1/75. (Esp., 577, no. 15. Doniol, 
 Histoire, I, 125.) 
 
 28 Ossun informed Vergennes that the Spanish feared English aggres- 
 sion, whether the English conquered the Americans or failed. In the 
 first case, they could readily use their large army against the possessions 
 of the two crowns ; in the second, they would doubtless use it to make 
 up for their losses by conquering new colonies. October 30, 1775. (Esp. r 
 578, no. 59.) Also November 13, 1775. (Ibid., no. 62.) 
 
 29 The king of Spain informed Ossun that he would send two batal- 
 lions to Havana and two to Porto Rico to reinforce the garrisons there. 
 Ossun to Vergennes, November 13, 1775. (Esp., 578, no. 62, p. 179.) 
 Grimaldi wrote to Aranda that Spain would continue her preparations 
 with much "chaleur." February 26, 1775. (Ibid., no. 73.) See also 
 Doniol, Histoire, I, 161. 
 
 30 Charles said he would maintain peace even at the expense of some 
 sacrifice. Ossun to Vergennes, December u, 1775. (Esp., 578, no. 70, fol. 
 395-) 
 
 31 Ossun to Vergennes, December 28, 1775. He gives an account of 
 an interview with the Spanish court in which it was clearly brought out 
 that while France had only a few colonies Spain had a rich empire which 
 was almost defenseless. (Ibid., 578, no. 74, fol. 461.) Grimaldi to Ver- 
 gennes, November 5, 1775. (Ibid., 582, no. 69, fol. 161.) 
 
40 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [150 
 
 defenseless, while the few still left to France were strongly 
 fortified. In the schemes of Vergennes, espcially in the 
 establishment of an independent state in America, the 
 court of Charles III could have no interest. While the 
 .Spanish government recognized that an independent 
 nation in the New World would be a menace to the British 
 possessions, it did not overlook the danger to its own col- 
 onies. It was clear that the power that would be able to 
 check the British in Canada would be formidable to the 
 Spaniards in Louisiana. The interests of Spain could not 
 be realized merely by humiliating Great Britain. She was 
 anxious to recover her ancient possessions, particularly 
 Gibraltar, Minorca, and Jamaica, 32 but could see only dan- 
 ger from an independent nation in the New World. 
 
 It became then the task of Vergennes to win the Span- 
 ish ministers to his policy. Grimaldi did not have the 
 quality of mind to follow an independent course, and the 
 opposition of the French party at the Spanish court led 
 him to doubt the wisdom of his own reasoning. As a result 
 his actions were timid and vacillating, and the opposition 
 was encouraged to continue its endeavors to bring about 
 war with the British Empire. Again and again Ossun 
 pointed to the vast armaments which Great Britain was 
 sending to America, and as often declared that they would 
 ultimately be turned against the colonies of Spain. He 
 urged that the time had come to weaken England and de- 
 prive her of a part of the vast empire through which she 
 was seeking to control the world. The opportunity was 
 at hand, he urged, to ruin her commerce in the Mediter- 
 ranean, the Levant, and in Africa, and to build up the trade 
 of France and Spain on its ruins. 33 Vergennes found an 
 enthusiastic advocate in Aranda, the Spanish minister to 
 Versailles, who, to his own court, pictured the English as 
 the perpetual enemies of Spain, hostile because of rivalry 
 
 82 Grimaldi to Ossun, October 8, 1776. (Esp., 582, no. 21.) 
 "Memorial handed by Ossun to Grimaldi, July 8, 1776. (Ibid., 581, no. 
 15, fol. 42.) 
 
151] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 41 
 
 in interests, and the difference in the character of their 
 population. 34 In the past, he urged, England had over- 
 come her enemies by a sudden and unexpected attack, and 
 there was good reason to think that she was preparing to 
 do the same again. He was sure that the close of the Amer- 
 ican war meant an attempt to secure for Great Britain 
 some compensation for her losses by an attack on the pos- 
 sessions of France and Spain. Aranda showed himself par- 
 ticularly anxious for the provinces of San Domingo and 
 Louisiana, which, he asserted, were entirely unprotected. 35 
 The arguments of Vergennes and the pleadings of 
 Aranda were not without effect on the wavering mind of 
 Grimaldi, and he began to carry on more vigorously the 
 work of arming his country. 36 Plans were formed once 
 more for an attack on Gibraltar, Jamaica, and other col- 
 onies of the British Empire. 37 Grimaldi, however, did not 
 neglect preparations for defending the Spanish dominions. 
 He was particularly worried about San Domingo, which, 
 altho poorly fortified, would be of immense advantage 
 to England, and he urgently besought Vergennes to send 
 troops for its protection. 38 
 
 34 Translation in Esp., 579, no. 81. 
 
 85 "M. d'Aranda est allarme des forces immenses de terre que les 
 Anglois y font passer : considere qu'il est a craindre quelque soit 1'evene- 
 ment de la guerre des colonies, que les Anglois ne s'emparent de quelques 
 
 possessions considerables, espagnoles ou francoises M. d'Aranda 
 
 examine ensuite quelle seroit la conquete la plus aisee et la plus facile 
 que les Anglois pourroient entreprendre il se fixe a la Louisiane et a 
 1'isle St. Domingue, la premiere comme les mettant a portee de 
 s'emparer dans la suite du Mexique ; la seconde pouvant leur procurer de 
 grande richesses et augmenter considerablement 1'entendue de leur com- 
 merce. Get ambassadeur regarde cette conquete comme infallible si les 
 Anglois 1'entreprennent, il suppose que 1'Espagne a suffisamment pourvu 
 a la conservation de la Havane de Porto Rico, et des autres Colonies de 
 consequence et il conseille tres fort de pourvoir sans delai, a la defense 
 de la Louisiane et de St. Dominque." Ossun to Vergennes, April 25, 
 1776. (Ibid., 580, no. 57, new 31.) 
 
 "Grimaldi to Aranda, February 26, 1776. (Ibid., 579, no. 73.) Ossun 
 to Vergennes, August 19, 1776. (Ibid.) 
 
 "Archives de la Marine, 64, 30-41. 
 
 38 Ossun to Vergennes, July I, 1776. (Esp., 581, no. 57.) 
 
42 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [152 
 
 The belief that the close of hostilities between England 
 and her colonies meant an attack on the American posses- 
 sions of Spain gave the United States a new importance 
 in the eyes of that power. Her ministry saw a crisis ap- 
 proaching which, if properly utilized, might mean a vast 
 increase in the Spanish empire. It recommended measures 
 for a vigorous campaign formidable enough to overwhelm 
 the enfeebled state of Britain. 39 It promised a close alli- 
 ance with France but, at the same time, solicitiously re- 
 called that Spain must suffer the heavier losses in case 
 their plans should miscarry. 40 Grimaldi was convinced 
 that the war in America would soon end and then would 
 come the long dreaded attack. To withstand this onslaught 
 the Bourbon powers must be ready to strike at the critical 
 moment 
 
 The activities of Spain aroused British suspicions and 
 Lord Grantham, the British minister at Madrid, demanded 
 explanations. He assured Grimaldi of the peaceful inten- 
 tions of his court, and declared that the British armaments 
 were intended only to suppress the revolt in America. He 
 complained that the preparations of Spain and France 
 could be directed only against Great Britain. 41 
 
 Grimaldi was not fully satisfied with Grantham's as- 
 surances of good will. He replied that the preparations of 
 the Bourbon powers were made only in self defense and 
 that they desired peace above all things, but he also de- 
 clared that the armaments of Great Britain were too 
 dangerous to pass by unnoticed. 42 Spain therefore did not 
 
 **"Que si 1'Angelterre est maintenant foible, elle le sera d'avantage 
 dans deux ou trois mois par les pertes, qui lui aura cause la guerre 
 civile". Grimaldi to Ossun, October 8, 1/76. (Esp., 582, no. 21.) 
 
 40 "Enfin que dans cette guerre 1'Espagne risque mtiniment plus que 
 la France en egard a ses vastes et riches possessions." Grimaldi to Os- 
 sun, October 8, 1776. (Ibid.) 
 
 41 Ossun to Vergennes, November 21, 1776. (Ibid., 582, no. 132, new 
 106.) 
 
 42 Grimaldi to Aranda, November 29, 1776. (Translation. Ibid., 
 582, no. 137.) 
 
153] VEEGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 43 
 
 cease her efforts to strengthen her military position, and it 
 looked as if the Bourbon powers were rapidly drifting into 
 war. 43 
 
 The vacillating Grimaldi was not yet ready to proceed 
 to extremities, but wished to postpone war as long as pos- 
 sible. 44 An attack by the Bourbon powers upon Great 
 Britain, he urged, would produce a reconciliation between 
 the combatants in America, and a combined attack upon 
 the Spanish colonies. 45 On the other hand, he argued, a 
 recognition of the United States would imperil Spanish 
 interests by encouraging revolt among her American pos- 
 sessions. He further suggested that the two powers should 
 plan to begin war early in 1778, but that, in the meanwhile, 
 they should try to reconcile England and her colonies. 46 
 
 The objects of French and Spanish diplomacy were 
 fundamentally different. Vergennes wished to enfeeble 
 -Great Britain in order to readjust the balance of power 
 in favor of France. Spain, on the other hand, accepted 
 with resignation her loss of influence in Europe, and her 
 statesmen were looking only to an extension of colonial 
 power. Grimaldi declared that if his country should enter 
 into war with Great Britain, her plans would in no wise 
 concern themselves with the American conflict. The ob- 
 jects of Spanish policy would be, first of all, to conquer 
 Portugal, or at least a part of her dependencies, to destroy 
 British commerce in the Mediterranean, and to reconquer 
 Gibraltar and some of the other lost colonies of the ancient 
 Spanish empire. 47 While Vergennes wished to act in con- 
 junction with the Americans, Grimaldi insisted upon an 
 independent course of conquest. Vergennes wished to raise 
 
 43 Grimaldi urged France to get ready for war. Ossun to Vergennes, 
 
 November 26, 1776. (Esp., 582, no. 193, new 117.) 
 
 44 Grimaldi suggested that if France would disarm England would 
 
 doubtless do likewise. Ossun to Vergennes, November 26, 1776. (Ibid.) 
 45 Grimaldi to Aranda, February 4, 1777. (Ibid., 583, no. 70.) 
 ^Memoir of the Court of Spain, July, 1776. (Ibid., 585, no. 100.) 
 47 Memoir of Court of Spain sent July 26, 1776. (Ibid., 585, no. 100, 
 
 fol. 185.) Grimaldi to Ossun, October 8, 1776. (Ibid., 582, no. 21.) 
 
44 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [154 
 
 up a nation in the New World as a friend to France and a 
 barrier to British aggression ; Grimaldi feared an independ- 
 ent state as a constant menace to the possessions of Spain. 
 With these conflicting aims there could be no sympathy of 
 action between the two crowns. 
 
 The conflicting ideas of France and Spain became first 
 apparent on the question of giving aid to the revolting 
 colonies. Both had furnished money and supplies for pro- 
 longing the war; but while the aid of France had been, 
 under the direction of Beaumarchais, steady and zealous, 
 the grants of Spain had been given grudgingly and only 
 at the urgent solicitations of her ally. Early in 1776 the 
 British navy succeeded in blockading many American ports 
 and Vergennes decided to seek new means of aiding the 
 colonies. He proposed that Louisiana should be used as a 
 base from which supplies could be furnished to the insur- 
 gents. Spain had good reason, he urged, to fortify and 
 provision this province, and, while doing this, it would be 
 easy to send provisions into the English provinces. 48 Grim- 
 aldi declined to fortify the mouth of the Mississippi, but 
 courteously offered Vergennes the privilege of using New 
 
 48 "Les avenues [to America] sont bien gardees quil sera desormais 
 tres difficile de percer par mer dans ce continent la route de la Louisiane 
 est presque la seule quoique bien plus longue, mais nous n'en avons plus 
 la possession et vous connoisses la repugnance des Espagnoles pour don- 
 
 ner acces aux Etrangers Les Anglois disent a la force de 1'Europe 
 
 quils manquent de vetements, d'armes et des munitions de guerre; c'est 
 indiquer ce quil seroit expedient de leurs fournir et ou pourroit ou mieux 
 leurs faire trouver leurs besoins qu'a Louisiane. L'Espagne a des grands 
 motifs pour fortifier et pour aprovisionner cette colonie : c'est lavant 
 [MS. illegible] du nouveau Mexique: que des choses sous ce pretexte ne 
 pourrait on pas y porter, dont a titre de commerce les insurgens pour- 
 roient traiter. A seroit leur affaire ensuite de les faire arriver au lieu 
 de la consummation. Les derrieres sont libre. ... les insurgens etant 
 sans numeraire et leur denrees netant pas propus a ce commerce il fau- 
 droit leur livrer a credit les efforts quon leur fourniroit sauf a les payer 
 ensuite par envoy de leur denrees dans les ports d'Espagne ; d'ailleurs 
 quelques millieurs de barrils de poudre ne sont pas un objet [MS illegible] 
 pour une aussi grande puissance que 1'Esp." Vergennes to Ossun, March 
 IS, 1776. (Esp., 579, no. 116, new no. n.) 
 
155] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 45 
 
 Orleans as a depot from which the French could aid the 
 colonists. New Orleans was of no use, he urged, for the 
 defence of the Gulf of Mexico, and no plausible pretext 
 couid be offered for fortifying it. No arms could be fur- 
 nished, he continued, for all those made in Spain bore the 
 royal insignia ; but, if France cared to despatch an expedi- 
 tion, Spain would pay a part of its expenses. 49 
 
 Vergennes declined the use of New Orleans on the con- 
 ditions offered by Grimaldi. He argued that while Spain 
 couid increase her forces there on account of the proximity 
 of the revolt, 50 French troops in the Mississippi Valley 
 
 49 "Ce ministre [Grimaldi] est convenu quil seroit desormais tres dif- 
 ficile de percer par mer dans le continent anglois de 1'Amerique septen- 
 trionale et que la route de la Louisiane, quoique bien plus longue, etoit 
 presque la seule par laquelle on put etre informe de ce qui se passeroit 
 dans le continent anglois; il a ajoute la permission de se rendre a la 
 Louisiane aux sujets que la France jugeroit a propos d'y envoyer pour 
 remplir d'objet desire. Ossun to Vergennes, March 28, 1776. (Esp., 579, 
 
 no. 145, fol. 24.) "M Grimaldi m'a dit que le Roi son Maitre n'y 
 
 trouvoit, d'autre difficulte que dansles moyens de 1'executer de maniere 
 a pouvoir le desavouer et avec le plus grand secret possible, que 1'Espagne 
 n'etoit pas dans 1'usuage d'envoyer souvent des batiments a la Louisiane: 
 que cette Colonie n'etant pas susceptible d'etre fortifee ni d'etre regardee 
 comme un poste interessant la conservation du Mexique ne seroit pas un 
 pretexte plausible; que toutes les armes que se font en Espagne protent 
 la marque des f abriques Royales : quil f audroit done que les effets dont il 
 s'agit pussent partir de France, destinees en apparance pour un de nos 
 Colonies mais reellement pour la Louisiane. Ossun to Vergennes, April 
 I, 1776. (Ibid., 580, no. 2, new 25.) 
 
 50 Vergennes to Ossun, April 22, 1776. (Ibid., 580, no. 46, new 7.) 
 Nous ne pensons pas differement de M. Grimaldi sur la commodite dont 
 peutetre la Louisiane pour y etablir un entrepost ou les insurgens trou- 
 verouent a s'aprovisionner des gendres qui peuvent leur manquer: mais 
 sil Espagne qui possede ce pays manque de motifs pour y envoyer 
 1'aliment de ce commerce, quil pretexte pourrions nous employes pour 
 couvrir 1'envoy que nous pourrions y faire de nos batimens, prevenir quils 
 ne fussent suspectes visites, et arrites?" Ibid. 
 
46 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [156 
 
 would at once arouse English suspicion. 51 Grimaldi, how- 
 ever, refused to change his attitude and the matter was al- 
 lowed 1 to drop. 52 
 
 At the close of 1776 new conditions arose to pull the 
 policies of the Bourbon powers still further apart. In 
 December, Benjamin Franklin arrived in Paris as the envoy 
 of Congress, and soon after the incompetent and vacillating 
 Grimaldi was succeeded by the able and aggressive Count 
 de Florida Blanca. Franklin at once made a most favor- 
 able impression on Paris and the French court. The mod- 
 eration of the American demands delighted Vergennes and 
 he was convinced that the time had come for France to- 
 recognize the new republic and take steps for the humilia- 
 tion of Great Britain. He assumed that Spain would still 
 act in harmony with his court, and arranged for a meeting 
 between Franklin and Aranda. 
 
 Aranda had already given himself to the cause of war. 
 He was the leader of the French party at the Spanish court 
 and devoted to the Family Compact. He had been a soldier 
 of Frederick the Great, an enemy of the clerical party, and 
 was a student and admirer of eighteenth centurv French 
 
 51 " . . . J'attendrai M. la conversation que M. le M. de Grimaldi vous 
 avoit promise sur 1'usuage quom poruoit faire de la Louisiane pour y 
 faire trouver aux Americans les munitions dont ils manquent. Nous 
 ne pouvons pas nous servir de cette voye ; des permissions particulieres 
 accordees a quelques de nos armateurs decleroient le but de ces envoys 
 et soumet troient nos batimens a etre detournes de leur route par les 
 Anglois. Les Espagnols ont au contraire un motif aparent pour couvrir 
 les envoys qui peuvent se faire dans cette partie. Le feu de la revoke qui 
 saproche de cette frontiere est une raison legitime pour y porter avec 
 abondance tous les moyens qui peuvent la faire respecter." Vergennes 
 to Ossun, April 12, 1776. (Esp., 580, no. 29, new 16.) 
 
 B2 M. Grimaldi .... a trouve forte justes les considerations qui etn- 
 pechent la France d'envoyer a la Louisiane des emissaires pour eclairer 
 ce qui se passe dans les Colonies Britainniques et d'engager des nego- 
 cians et des navigateurs francais a fournir aux besoins des Provinces 
 Angloises revoltes. Ce Ministre a senti que les memes motifs qui sus- 
 pendoient la prevoyance du Gouvernment Espagnol devoient 1'interdire 
 au Ministere Francois; aussi c'est une idee dont il ne sera plus ques- 
 tion." Ossun to Vergennes, May 6, 1776. (Ibid., 580, no. 76, new 35.) 
 
157] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 47 
 
 philosophy. He had driven the Jesuits from Spain but had 
 been unable to maintain his position at the court and had 
 retired as ambassador to Versailles. 53 Here he bent his 
 efforts to bringing about a war with Great Britain. He pic- 
 tured to his court the loss of Louisiana and the West Indies 
 unless a strong effort were made to save them, 54 and had 
 already convinced Grimaldi that another general war was 
 inevitable. 55 
 
 The hopes of Franklin to bring France and Spain into 
 alliance with the United States seemed near realization, 68 
 when all his plans were broken up by the overthrow of 
 Grimaldi and his party at the court of Charles III. Grim- 
 aldi was sent to Italy, and, altho Aranda was allowed to 
 retain his post, he lost all influence and was no longer en- 
 trusted with important negotiations between the two courts. 
 The tone of Spanish diplomacy changed in a night and 
 Vergennes found that the faith of kingdoms was no more 
 to be relied upon than the promises of republics. 
 
 "Bancroft, United States, V, 128. 
 
 "See p. 41, note 35. 
 
 "Grimaldi informed Aranda that he believed there were many ad- 
 vantages in beginning the war with Great Britain at once. He declared 
 his belief that this power would begin war without notice and use her 
 forces in America in an attack on some of the Spanish colonies. October 
 8, 1776. (Esp., 582, no. 21.) Spain sent a fleet to cruise in the waters of 
 the southern West Indies while the French maintained vessels off the 
 southern coast of North America to watch the British ships which might 
 attempt to enter the Gulf of Mexico. Archives de la Marine, &j t 128, 
 
 p. 194- 
 
 56 Grimaldi wrote to Aranda, February 4, 1777, regarding an alliance 
 with the Americans which he regarded as probable altho he felt no 
 enthusiasm for it and was fearful of treachery. (Esp., 583, no. 70. 
 See also Memoir of Spain, January 3, 1777.) In this Grimaldi set forth 
 the danger of an attack from England and suggested that Spain should 
 imitate the "celerite des Anglois''. As the war was "indispensable"" 
 Spain would not be the aggressor. (Ibid., 583, no. 42.) On January 27, 
 Ossun wrote Vergennes as if an alliance with the Americans were con- 
 cluded. (Ibid., no. n, fol. 8.) During the next month Grimaldi was 
 busied with projects of war and schemes for aiding the colonies. Grim- 
 aldi to Aranda, February 4, 1777. (Ibid., 583, no. 70.) Ossun to Ver- 
 gennes, February 29, 1777. (Ibid., 579., no. 77.) 
 
48 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [158 
 
 The successor of Grimaldi, Don Jose Monino, Count 
 de Florida Blanca, was an able and ambitious man and sub- 
 servient to the wishes of the king and to the interests of 
 Spain. Grimaldi had negotiated the Family Compact of 
 1761 and was willing to stand by it, but Florida Blanca 
 cared nothing for the alliance. The rule of the foreigner 
 in Spain was at an end, and a Spanish ministry began the 
 formation of a Spanish policy. 57 The new minister was 
 intensely jealous of French influence, and proceeded to lay 
 out a policy calculated to make Spain independent and 
 France a suppliant. No longer did the Spanish ministry 
 look to Vergennes for guidance, but her aid was henceforth 
 to command its price and a price increasingly exorbitant. 
 An intense royalist, Florida Blanca hated the new republic 
 across the Atlantic, 58 and refused to accept Vergennes's 
 plan for a triple alliance. A strong imperialist, he hoped 
 to recover the ancient dominions of his king. His imperial- 
 ist and royalist principles combined made him oppose the 
 recognition of the United States, and led him to seek in 
 every way to restrict the boundaries of the new republic. 
 Such was his dislike of the United States that he refused 
 to receive its representatives as long as possible ; and, when 
 he did receive them, it was with coldness and reserve. Flor- 
 ida Blanca was a most skilful diplomat. In every point 
 he succeeded in overreaching Vergennes, and throughout 
 the war and during the negotiations for peace he was the 
 most resourceful and determined enemy of the American 
 cause. No longer was Vergennes able to discuss freely and 
 with assurance the future of the new republic; he must 
 consider always the opposition of Florida Blanca. 
 
 With Florida Blanca was associated Galvez, minister 
 for the Indies, who included among his duties the manage- 
 ment of colonial affairs. Like his chief he was sincere and 
 single-minded in his patriotism; but he did not show the 
 
 "Bancroft's excellent characterization of Florida Blanca is borne 
 out by the documents. United States, V, 137 et seq. 
 
 58 Montmorin to Vergennes, December 23, 1777. (Esp., 587, no. 125.) 
 
159] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 49 
 
 same subserviency to the wishes of Charles III. He often 
 opposed the measures of the prime minister regarding the 
 policy of Spain, and showed an active sympathy for the 
 American insurgents. In his hatred for the enemies of his 
 country he sometimes showed himself as radical as 
 Aranda. 59 Such aid as the Americans received from Spain 
 was largely due to his favor. 
 
 The ideas of Florida Blanca differed from those of 
 Tergennes in every important detail. The Spanish minister 
 liad determined upon a policy of peace, and as the price of 
 peace he expected to gain large accessions of territory in 
 the New World. Furthermore, he showed no inclination 
 to give recognition to the United States in their struggle for 
 freedom. He felt no love for the British Empire, but he 
 dreaded more the growing power of the young nation in 
 America. He regarded it as already a rival to Spain for 
 the possession of the Floridas, and a dangerous contender 
 for the vast territories west of the Alleghanies. 
 
 Florida Blanca had a definite policy in view; he 
 planned to hold the balance of power between Great Britain 
 and her enemies, and to take whatever position would offer 
 the best opportunity for an increase of Spanish influence. 
 He believed he could attain his ends without involving 
 Spain in w r ar; but he realized that, if his country should 
 have any weight in the final settlement, it must be prepared 
 for any emergency. He did not know, too, at what moment 
 his schemes might fail, and a British fleet fall upon the ex- 
 posed colonies of the empire and reduce them to subjection. 
 From the nature of his policy, the course of Florida Blanca 
 could not fail to impress outsiders as timid and vacillating, 
 "but the inconsistencies of his actions gave his policy its only 
 chance of success. 
 
 "We do not need to undertake war in order to augment 
 our power, for whatever the outcome of the struggle be- 
 tween England and her colonies, our power will be in- 
 
 89 Ossun to Vergennes, December 9, 1776. (Esp., 582, no. 163, new 
 112; Bancroft, United States, V, 136.) 
 
50 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [160 
 
 creased," 60 wrote Florida Blanca soon after assuming di- 
 rection of affairs. To Vergennes he explained himself less- 
 clearly. "The two inonarchs," he urged, "will not swerve 
 from their principle of moderation, if they wish to profit, 
 by some happy opportunity to recover, by way of negotia- 
 tion, some of the territories which legitimately belong to- 
 them, or which have been usurped from them by violence." 61 
 
 Against these ideas Vergennes protested vigorously. 
 There were no territories either in Europe or America, he 
 declared, tempting enough to compensate for the hazards, 
 "les calamites, et 1'epuisement resultans dune guerre." 
 France had all the colonies she needed, for the interest of 
 her industry, he urged, and more extensive possessions 
 would be but a burden. Even the loss of Canada ought to 
 be regretted less, he declared, since its abandonment has- 
 been the signal for the revolt of the English provinces. He 
 admitted the interest of France in the Newfoundland fish- 
 eries, but he wrote of the matter with no enthusiasm. 62 
 
 These radically different views of the two ministers 
 could admit of no compromise. Florida Blanca cared 
 nothing for the Newfoundland fisheries or for the commerce 
 of the United States. His policy was one of territorial 
 aggression, while Vergennes opposed all conquests. Against 
 the French minister's idea of war to enfeeble the British 
 Empire, Florida Blanca set up the plan of Spanish aggran- 
 dizement by peaceful negotiations. 
 
 In spite of his pacific intentions, however, Florida 
 Blanca continued his preparations for war. He knew that 
 the game of diplomacy could be successful only when sup- 
 ported by arms; and he saw a real danger to the Spanish 
 
 Florida Blanca to Aranda, April 7, 1777. (Translation in Esp., 584,. 
 no. 14, new 31.) 
 
 6l Quoted by Vergennes in note to Aranda, April 26, 1777. (Ibid., 584, 
 no. 40.) 
 
 2 See Vergennes to Aranda, April 26, 1777. "Si la perte du Canada", 
 he continued, "lui a etc sensible, elle doit la moins regretter depuis que- 
 1'abandon qu elle a etc obligee d'en faire est devenu le signal de revoke 
 des provinces angloises." (Esp., 584, no. 40. See p. 34, note 15.) 
 
161] VERGBNNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 51 
 
 empire in the cupidity of Great Britain. He felt that Spain 
 should prepare to defend herself and particularly her 
 American colonies. For this purpose he was glad to con- 
 tinue to act in cooperation with France. The naval head 
 of the two nations had already formed plans for patroling 
 the west Atlantic, and commanders of ships were ordered 
 to watch carefully the movements of English vessels, espec- 
 ially those trying to enter the Gulf of Mexico or the waters 
 of the West Indies. The instructions further ordered that 
 the commanders of both nations were to aid each other, and 
 to guard equally the interests of the two crowns. 63 Besides 
 these arrangements Florida Blanca provided for the mili- 
 tary defense of the Spanish colonies. An army corps was 
 sent to San Domingo, and additional troops were des- 
 patched to Havana, Vera Cruz, and Porto Rico. 64 Special 
 attention was given to Louisiana on account of its proxim- 
 ity to the British possessions. Spanish fears were increased 
 by the great number of English Loyalists who were fleeing 
 from the Atlantic provinces and settling along the east 
 bank of the Mississippi. The Spanish officials at New 
 Orleans had already I'ecornmended that v the colony be 
 placed in a state of defense against the English, who coul'dj 
 easily come from Pensacola or Mobile, or even from Can- 
 ada, by way of the Mississippi and Ohio. 63 
 
 While preparing to defend Spanish colonists against 
 Great Britain, Florida Blanca could not ignore the new 
 nation across the ocean. Its representatives were already 
 in Paris and one of them was seeking admission to the- 
 Spanish court. 66 Frenchmen were enthusiastic for the 
 
 6S The Spanish were to guard the Gulf of Mexico and the approaches 
 to New Orleans, while the French were to watch the West Indies. 
 Project d' Instructions correspondantes a cette de la cour d'Espagne .... 
 (Archives de la Marine, 64, 128, p. 194.) Florida Blanca frequently urged 
 the necessity of getting ready for any emergency. Ossun to Vergennes, 
 February, 1777. (Esp., 583, no. 118, new 21; ibid., no 127, new 24.) 
 
 84 Ossun to Vergennes, February 27, 1777. (Ibid., 583, no. 127, new 24.) 
 
 65 Fortier, Louisiana, II, 25-33. 
 
 66 Franklin and Deane were in Paris, and Arthur Lee started in the 
 spring of 1777 for Madrid. 
 
52 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [162 
 
 independence of the new republic. Aranda at Paris and 
 the friends of France in Spain kept urging Florida Blanca 
 to join with the court of Versailles for another struggle 
 against the common enemy. 67 
 
 Altho Florida Blanca had no intention of recognizing 
 the independence of the United States, he believed it for 
 the best interests of Spain that the war should continue. 
 Great Britain already suspected the Spaniards of aiding 
 the insurgents and a sudden collapse of the revolt would 
 mean the end of Florida Blanca's hopes to regain some of 
 the*former possessions of Spain, and might mean the loss 
 of others. To prevent such a danger he kept up the nego- 
 tiations with Vergennes and furnished aid for the Ameri- 
 cans. 68 
 
 Early in 1777, Arthur Lee had set out from Paris to 
 'Madrid to secure Spanish assistance for the American 
 ause. He was allowed to proceed no further than Burgos, 
 where Grimaldi met him. We know little of the interview. 
 Orimaldi apparently did not treat the mission seriously 
 and Lee's accounts are colored by his sense of personal 
 importance. 69 It is clear, however, that Lee was willing 
 
 87 Ossun repeatedly wrote of the earnest insinuations of Aranda to 
 treat with America and go to war with Portugal and Great Britain. 
 Ossun to Vergennes, January 23, 1777. (Esp., 583, no. 39, new 7.) 
 
 68 Ossun informed Vergennes that Florida Blanca was in accord 
 with France in regard to the war in America, that both powers desired 
 its continuance. March 3, 1777. (Esf>., 583, no. 136, new 28.) Florida 
 Blanca wrote the same to Aranda, and declared that it was important to 
 sustain the American colonies, for as long as the war continued both 
 sides would be weakened. March 5, 1777. (Ibid., 140, new i.) "M. de 
 floride blanca m'a assure Monsieur, qu'on avoit deja fait des remis 
 d'argent a M. Lee, et qu'il retournoit en France satisfait des secours 
 pecuniares qui luy avoient ete promis." Ossun to Vergennes, March 
 24, 1777. (Ibid., 583, lib. 184, new 39.) 
 
 "On March 3, Ossun wrote that Grimaldi had neglected for a long 
 time to give the Spanish court an account of his interview with Lee. 
 (Ibid., 583, no. 136, new 28; Bancroft, United States, V, 137.) Lee asserted 
 that he received encouragement from Spain and a promise that war 
 should be begun within a year. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 282.) There is no 
 evidence to support Lee's assertions. 
 
163] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 53 
 
 to offer, in return for an alliance, the assistance of the 
 United States in the conquest of the Floridas. 70 While 
 Spain was anxious for those provinces she would not enter 
 into negotiations with the United States until they had 
 given stronger evidence that they were able to maintain 
 their independence. Charles III declared that the offers 
 of Lee were premature. 71 Spain was willing to aid the 
 Americans secretly but would enter into no negotiations 
 with them which might mean a recognition of independ- 
 ence. 
 
 In spite of Florida Blanca's resolutions for peace, 
 preparations for war were rapidly increased. 72 Louisiana 
 would doubtless be the first object of attack in case of war, 
 and would afford an excellent depot of supply for the 
 insurgents as long as Spain cared to aid them. Galvez, 
 the president of the Council of the Indies, sent over as 
 governor of Louisiana, his nephew, Bernardo de Galvez, 
 an energetic and ambitious man, full of sympathy for 
 American independence. The younger Galvez entered with 
 vigor on his administration and prepared to begin the 
 struggle along the Mississippi. For several years the 
 British had, controlled the trade of the river, but their 
 monopoly was now at an end. The Spanish governor at 
 
 70 Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 290. "J'ai 1'honneur de vous informer 
 qu'une des propositions que le M. Lee a faites a 1'Espagne pour 1'exciter 
 a venir au secours de Colonies Angloises, a etc qu'elles s'engageroient a 
 prendre Pensacola conquete facile selon M. Lee et a remettre immedi- 
 atement cette place au pouvoir de Sa Majeste Catholique. Je sais que 
 cette Monarque a repondu qu'il. verroit avec beaucoup de plaisir les 
 Insurgens faire cette acquisition mais qu'il n'en accepteroit la cession que 
 lorsque leur independence seroit assuree. C'est en traivaillant avec M. de 
 Calves que le Roy Catholique a dicte cette reponse, mais j'ai lieu a 
 croire que 1'avis de M. le Comte de floride blanca seroit que 1'Espagne 
 acceptat 1'offre des Colonies a titre de depot en attendant la decesion de 
 la guerre qu'elles soutiement. Je doute que son sentiment soit adopte." 
 Ossun to Vergennes, March 24, 1777. (Esp., 583, no. 184, new 39.) 
 
 71 "Le Roi d'Espagne a seulement daigne me dire .... qu'il avoit fait 
 connoitre a ce Depute [Lee] qu'il les [propositions] regarderoit comme 
 prematures." Ossun to Vergennes. (Ibid.) 
 
 72 Vergennes to Ossun, May 2, 1777. (Ibid., 584, no. 48, new 30.) 
 
54 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [164 
 
 once seized all the British vessels within reach and ordered 
 the confiscation of all that should enter the port. In one 
 day, soon after his arrival, eleven English vessels, laden 
 with rich cargoes, were captured and condemned by his 
 orders. 73 
 
 The belligerent attitude of the Bourbon powers 
 alarmed the British court. The British ambassadors, 
 Stormount at Paris and Grantham at Madrid, were in- 
 structed to demand explanations regarding the immense 
 military and naval demonstrations in America. Both de- 
 clared that the intentions of the British court were peace- 
 ful, and! they offered a British guarantee of the Spanish 
 possessions in America. 74 
 
 To the British representations, both Vergennes and 
 Florida Blanca gave the same answer. They declared that 
 it was necessary to guard Spanish interests in America, 
 and Florida Blanca added, by way of explanation, that a 
 strong force was needed to hold in subjection the Spanish 
 colonies which were being seduced by the example of the 
 British provinces. 
 
 The protests of Great Britain was a step towards the 
 success of Florida Blanca's policy. Her alarm convinced 
 him that she was ready to concede much for the sake of 
 peace. France was seeking Spain's alliance and the Amer- 
 icans were bidding high for her assistance. With French, 
 Britons, and Americans seeking favors from Spain, Flor- 
 ida Blanca felt strong enough to assume an independent 
 attitude. He informed) Ossun that Spain had much to 
 lose and nothing to gain from war with Great Britain, 75 
 but that the two crowns could settle the troubles in Amer- 
 ica and receive valuable concessions as the price of neu- 
 trality. 70 Charles III again and again declared his wish 
 
 "Fortier, Louisiana, II, 56-57. 
 
 74 Vergennes to Ossun, May 2, 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 48, new 30.) 
 Ossun to Vergennes, May 19, 1777. (Ibid., no. 80, new 60.) 
 
 75 Ossun to Vergennes, May 15, 1777. (Ibid., 584, no. 75, new 58. See 
 also p. 39, note 31.) 
 
 76 Vergennes to Ossun, June 21, 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 140, new 38.) 
 
165] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 55 
 
 to end his days in peace, and Spain was committed to a 
 policy of masterly inactivity. Florida Blanca had lost 
 much of his fear of British aggression, but he greatly 
 distrusted France. He wished to recover the old empire 
 and influence of Spain, but he did not believe that Ver- 
 gennes would aid him in his efforts. Spanish diplomacy 
 was still in the shoals; but its pilot felt that if he would 
 bide his time, the warring nations must allow his country 
 to regain some part of the vast influence she had wielded 
 under Charles I. 
 
 The defection of Spain did not cause Vergennes to 
 despair. He still favored sustaining the Americans and 
 still counted on the assistance of Florida Blanca. He 
 made no protest against the action of the Spanish court, 
 but declared that its measures were in full accord with 
 his own policy. 77 He agreed that the continuance of the 
 war was beneficial to the Bourbon powers, and was glad 
 to get Spanish aid for the Americans. He was anxious, 
 however, about the future policy of Florida Blanca, 78 but 
 hoped to persuade him to unite with France in recognition 
 of the United States. To this end and doubtless at his 
 instance, Franklin wrote directly to the Spanish ambas- 
 sador, asking for an alliance, and offering to assist Spain 
 in the conquest of Pensacola, if only the use of its port, 
 together with the free navigation of the Mississippi should 
 be granted to the Americans. 79 
 
 "Florida Blanca to Aranda, March 5, 1777. (Translation in Esp., 
 583, no. 140, fol. i.) Ossun asserted the same thing to Vergennes. 
 March 3, 1777. (Ibid., no. 136, fol. 28.) "Les principes d'apres lesquels 
 la Cour de Madrid a dirige ses responses au M. Lee sont entierement 
 conformes a ceux que nous avons adopte a 1'egard des insurgens et que 
 nous continuerons de suivre jusqu'a ce que les circonstances nous par- 
 oisent en exiger d'autres.'' Vergennes to Ossun, March 25, 1777. (Ibid., 
 no. 1 86, new 23.) 
 
 78 "Je vous prie M surtout de nous mander quelle somme d'argent 
 
 ce Pee s'est determine de luy Congress accorder Je vous prie M. 
 
 de nous informer exactement que le Roi Cque fera parvenir . . . ." (Ibid.) 
 
 79 Franklin to Aranda, April 7, 1777. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 304.) 
 
56 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [166 
 
 Vergennes made quick use of Franklin's offer to 
 Spain. He had previously asserted that neither country 
 had use for conquests; but now he began to dangle before 
 the hungry eyes of the Spaniards rich conquests as the 
 reward for their services. He spoke, not only of the Flor- 
 idas, but even suggested the conquest of the rich sugar 
 islands. 80 He pointed out again the danger which Spain 
 must encounter if she allowed a settlement of the struggle 
 in which she had no part. Such an outcome, he declared, 
 would endanger the whole colonial empire of the two 
 crowns. 81 
 
 Altho Vergennes was willing to concede much to 
 the ambition of Spain, he still asked nothing for France. 
 To Louis XVI he argued that the only interest of the mon- 
 archy was the enfeeblement of Great Britain. This could 
 best be accomplished by breaking up the British empire 
 in America. With Canada in the hands of the English, 
 he argued that the United States must necessarily hold 
 close to France for their own safety, and thus French 
 prestige would be increased. 82 
 
 That part of British America not in revolt, he would 
 leave in possession of its rightful sovereign. He hoped in 
 this way to ensure a constant rivalry between the two 
 Anglo-Saxon powers which would hold the United States 
 in dependence on France. Vergennes would make the 
 United States an independent nation as a barrier to Brit- 
 ish aggression. It was of no interest to France to create 
 a great and extensive republic, whose boundaries could be 
 extended only by the cost of much blood, and money. He 
 would ensure the limits of the United States as he con- 
 ceived them to be; but to his mind, Canada and the Mis- 
 sissippi Valley, the ancient possessions of France, had 
 never been a part of the English colonies, and he would not 
 
 80 Vergennes to Aranda, April 10, 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 21.) 
 81 Vergennes to Ossun, April 12, 1777. (Ibid., no. 22, new 26.) 
 * 2 Memoire au Roi, July 23, 1777; marked "approve". (Esp., 585, 
 no. 56.) 
 
167] VERGENNES AND SPANISH DIPLOMACY 57 
 
 make an effort to obtain them for the new republic. Here 
 was the bone of contention. Spain wished the east bank of 
 the Mississippi to insure her control of the Gulf of Mexico ; 
 the United States claimed it by right of their ancient char- 
 ters; while Vergennes, anxious to maintain the balance of 
 power in America, preferred that Great Britain should 
 keep it. He wished to establish the United States as a 
 menace to British power; Florida Blanca feared the new 
 nation as a danger to Spanish power. To bring Spain and 
 the United States to the point of view of Vergennes was 
 the problem of French diplomacy and) its solution was to- 
 give the French minister many thoughtful hours. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE QUESTION OF THE WEST. 
 
 In the policy of Vergennes America was but a club 
 for the humiliation of Great Britain. It was his plan to 
 build up a nation in America with sufficient strength to 
 check British aggression, but not powerful enough to be 
 independent of French influence or to threaten the balance 
 of power in the New World. 1 The disintegration of the 
 British Empire in America was rapidly going on, and 
 Vergennes felt that, with Spanish aid, he could control 
 the result. The forces of colonial hatred were at his ser- 
 vice; could he also command the strength of Spain's jeal- 
 ousy and ambition? 
 
 The ambitions, the hopes, and the plans of the Ameri- 
 cans beyond their mere desire for independence were un- 
 known to Vergennes, or at best he discerned them but 
 vaguely. In the development of his policy the French min- 
 ister showed little interest and less knowledge of the con- 
 ditions and purposes of the revolting provinces. From the 
 time of Bonvouloir's mission until the surrender of Bur- 
 goyne, neither France nor Spain had any representatives 
 in America. Both countries had! felt the need of more 
 information; but neither had regarded the matter as im- 
 portant enough to command immediate action. 2 
 
 l Memoire au Roi (Esp., 585, no. 56.) "Si elle [independence] s'acheve 
 par notre moyen, elle doit en abaissant L'Angleterre relever d'autant la 
 france, et la remettre a son rang." Reflexions [unsigned], January 7, 1777. 
 (E. U., II, no. 16, new 28; Doniol, Histoire, II, 118.) 
 
 2 In July, 1777, Vergennes suggested to Spain that each country should 
 have some one in America "wise, sensible, and discreet, who, without 
 character, or ostensible mission" should investigate conditions there. 
 (Esp., 585, no. 45, new 53.) For the duties of this position he thought a 
 merchant best fitted. To Ossun, August 25, 1777. (Ibid., no. 51, new 
 
 58 
 
169] THE QUESTION OF THE WEST 59 
 
 During the years from 1770 to 1777 France paid 
 little attention to the Mississippi Valley. The only inter- 
 est she showed in this territory was purely commercial. 
 In the foreign office there are some memorials on the to- 
 bacco of Louisiana, and Ossun recommended that it take 
 the place of the Virginia tobacco, which could hardly be 
 obtained'. 3 There was no suggestion, however, that France 
 should attempt to recover her political power in Louisiana. 
 
 To the mind of Vergennes it is probable that the 
 question of who should control the West never occurred 
 until it was forced upon him by the issues of the war. 4 In 
 
 137.) In November, Florida Blanca informed Ossun that he already had 
 an agent in America, a man named "Edouard" who had been in the col- 
 onies before on matters of business and was regarded as possessing the 
 prudence and skill necessary for a difficult mission. Ossun to Vergennes, 
 November 8, 1777. (Ibid., 586, no. 139; Doniol, Histoire, II, 578.) What 
 became of Edouard we do not know. There is no further mention of him 
 in the documents in the foreign office in Paris, and when Gerard, the 
 French minister, landed in America in 1778, Spain was represented by 
 Miralles. (E. U., IV, no. 23, new 97.) Vergennes still delayed. He gave 
 as his reason the difficulty of finding a suitable agent. In November he 
 declared that he had in mind one who, he thought, would be admirable, 
 and who should go at once by way of San Domingo. (Esp., 587, no. 17; 
 Doniol, Histoire, II, 580.) At the same time he asked the Spanish gov- 
 ernment to transmit to him any information which it might receive. 
 Vergennes finally sent a man named Holker, though it is probable that his 
 original choice was B'eaumarchais. (Doniol, Histoire, II, 615.) Holker's 
 instructions were given verbally, but there is a minute of them in the 
 French foreign office. November 25, 1777. (E. U., II, no. 144, new 266.) 
 In this document there is every evidence that Vergennes knew nothing 
 of the desires of the Americans. Holker was to learn of the situation of 
 affairs in America and report them at once. He was to represent to the 
 Americans their need for some power to protect them from Great Britain 
 and to suggest that France might aid them. 
 
 *Es(>., 583, no. 70. Ossun to Vergennes, January 27, 1777. (Ibid., 
 no. 52.) 
 
 4 When the question of the Mississippi Valley was brought to his at- 
 tention in 1778, and he was informed of the American demands regarding 
 the navigation of the Mississippi, Vergennes wrote, " . . . . je vous assure 
 qu'il me paroitroit etonnant qu'on refusat a cette demande. Cependant 
 il peut y avoir pour la negative des considerations locales que J'ignore, 
 et qui peuvent meriter quelque attention." Vergennes to Gerard, October 
 28, 1778. (E. U., V, no. 43, new 105.) 
 
60 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [170 
 
 his geography, however, the West was not a part of the 
 American colonies. It was the ancient Canada and East- 
 ern Louisiana over which the French and Indian Wars 
 had been fought; and altho the Frenchman had lost all 
 in the struggle, he could not be compelled to rewrite his 
 geography. The English also, in the "Quebec Act," had 
 followed more closely French ideas of geography than 
 those of their colonies. Thus it was that in 1778 a French 
 officer describes the United States as bounded on the north 
 by Canada, and on the west "still by Canada and the 
 Indian tribes as far as the Mississippi." 5 
 
 There is no evidence that Vergennes had ever con- 
 sidered the question of the navigation of the Mississippi 
 until called upon to defend the seizure of English vessels 
 in 4he Mississippi by Galvez in February, 1777. Vergennes 
 learned of this action of the Spanish governor through the 
 newspapers about the first of October. At that time he did 
 not know that the English would complain, but he declared 
 that any protest could not be founded on the common 
 law of America, where each nation reserved to itself its 
 exclusive navigation and its own commerce. He held that 
 the English had no more right to carry on commerce on the 
 right bank of the Mississippi than the French had to trade 
 along the coasts of North America, where all French ships 
 were arrested and seized. 6 It is clear from this that Ver- 
 gennes had not come to the Spanish view of the exclusive 
 navigation of the Mississippi, for he described! the Spanish 
 rights to the right bank by an argument which would give 
 the English control of the left bank. Later when the 
 Spanish ministry sought to deprive the Americans of the 
 right to navigate the Mississippi, Vergennes expressed his 
 surprise. 7 
 
 Spain did not in any way commit herself on the sub- 
 ject of the navigation of the Mississippi until, as pre- 
 viously noticed, the governor of Louisiana seized the Eng- 
 
 8 Archives de la Marine, 64, 144, 23. 
 
 Vergennes to Ossun, October 3, 1777. (Esp., 586, no. 105, new 63.) 
 
 T Vergennes to Gerard, October 28, 1778. (E. U., V. no. 43, fol. 105.) 
 
171] THE QUESTION OF THE WEST 61 
 
 lish ships in the river. Just what instructions the min- 
 istry had given the governor is not certain, but it has al- 
 ready been shown that his act was in accord with the pol- 
 icy of Galvez, the president of the council for the Indies. 
 In October, 1777, Ossun wrote to Vergennes that Spain 
 held to the opinion that England did not have the right 
 to navigate the Mississippi or to deposit merchandise at 
 its mouth. 8 Spain further maintained that the silence 
 with which the English received the news of the seizure 
 of their ships gave grounds to believe that they acquiesced 
 in her position. 
 
 Canada and! the Floridas offered problems distinct 
 from that of the West proper. American efforts to annex 
 the former have already been described, and they did not 
 cease until the close of the Revolution. Great Britain had 
 no intention of surrendering this province, and France 
 had no interest in helping the United States to take it. 
 The Floridas offered still less difficulty. It was recognized 
 by all that Spain was anxious to recover them, and the 
 Americans were willing to aid this project in return for 
 recognition and assistance. 
 
 The Declaration of Independence brought the ques- 
 tion of % the extent of the new republic at once to the front, 
 and with the problem of boundaries is connected every 
 diplomatic negotiation of the American Revolution. On 
 September 17, 1776, Congress resolved on a plan of treaty 
 to be proposed to the king of France, Article IX of which 
 provided? that "the most Christian King" shall never in- 
 vade nor under any pretense attempt to possess himself 
 of Labrador, New Britain, Nova Scotia, Acadia, Canada, 
 Florida, or any other part of North America. It further 
 declared its intention to annex these territories to the 
 United States, 9 but assured Spain that it had no designs 
 on her possessions, and would in no case molest them. 10 
 
 8 Ossun to Vergennes. (Esp., 586, no. 138, new 118.) 
 8 Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.) f V. 770. 
 "Instructions to agent at court of France. (Ibid., 816.) 
 
62 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [172 
 
 At the same time Congress elected Benjamin Frank- 
 lin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee as American commission- 
 ers to France, and appointed a committee to draft instruc- 
 tions for them. This committee reported that if France 
 would aid the United States in reducing Nova Scotia, 
 Newfoundland, and Cape Breton, the French people 
 should be allowed equal rights of fishing there with the 
 Americans to the exclusion of all others. The commis- 
 sioners were also to offer France half of Newfoundland 
 provided the remainder of the Island, with Nova Scotia 
 and Cape Breton, were annexed to the United States. If 
 necessary to get French aid the commissioners were to 
 assure "his most Christian majesty that such of the British 
 West India Islands as, in the course of the war, shall be re- 
 duced by the united forces of France and the United States 
 shall be yielded in absolute property to his most Christian 
 majesty." The committee also suggested the advisability 
 of getting Spain into the alliance, and that, in return for 
 her aid the United States would assist her in the reduction 
 of Pensacola, if to them should be left "the free and unin- 
 terrupted navigation of the Mississippi and the use of the 
 harbour of Pensacola." 11 Nothing was said of the West, 
 but it was not long before a claim to it was set forth. The 
 West was not considered a subject for negotiation, for it 
 was held to be already a part of the union of states. These 
 instructions were the first declaration by Congress of its 
 attitude regarding that part of British America not in 
 rebellion. 
 
 Of the commissioners chosen by Congress only Frank- 
 lin was of first rate ability. He was undoubtedly the great 
 statesman of the Revolution. He had done much for his 
 country before becoming commissioner to France, but it 
 was in Paris that he was to accomplish the great work of 
 his life. A man of broad experience and wide attainments, 
 he soon made himself master of the situation. His ver- 
 satility and genial sympathy made him fit easily into the 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress, VI, 1057. 
 
173] THE QUESTION OF THE WEST 6# 
 
 distinctive characteristics of French life. The best; known 
 of all Americans, not only in politics but in philosophy 
 and science as well, from the moment of his arrival he svas 
 a person to venerate and respect. 
 
 Franklin had long thought of the problems relating: 
 to the territories beyond the limits of the thirteen states,, 
 and the experience of years reinforced his ideas. \s early 
 as 1754, shortly after the Albany Convention, he Imd 
 drawn up a plan for the settlement of the western colonies 
 and had presented a strong argument why this plan should 
 be carried out. 12 Again in 1760, during the struggles of 
 the last French war, he had urged! the importance of this 
 section. "I have long been of the opinion," he wrote, "that 
 the foundations of the future grandeur and stability of the 
 British empire lie in America; and altho, like other 
 foundations, they are low and are little seen, they are, nev- 
 ertheless, broad and strong enough to support the greatest 
 political structure human wisdom ever has created. I am 
 therefore by no means in favor of restoring Canada. If 
 we keep it, all the country from the St. Lawrence to the 
 Mississippi will, in another century, be filled with British 
 people." 13 Thus, as early as 1760, Franklin had a juster 
 view of the West then did the leaders of the nation thirty 
 years later. With a breadth of vision, greater than that 
 of any other man of his day, Franklin saw the grandeur 
 of the West. In a paper on the "Interest of Great Britain" 
 he asserted that "while our strength at sea continues, the 
 banks of the Ohio, in point of ease and expeditious convey- 
 ance of troops, are nearer to London than the more remote 
 parts of France and Spain to their respective capitals ; and 
 much nearer than Connaught and Ulster were in the days 
 of Queen Elizabeth." 14 To Franklin's appreciation of the 
 West and its resources, and to his foresight and watchful- 
 ness dluring the years of his residence in France, is due, 
 
 12 Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), Ill, 358. 
 is lbid., IV, 4. 
 14 Ibid., IV, 72. 
 
64 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [174 
 
 more than to any other cause, the preservation of Ameri- 
 can domination in the Mississippi Valley. 
 
 Franklin arrived at Paris in the middle of December, 
 1776, and on the twenty-third he, with Deane and Arthur 
 Lee, addressed a note to Vergennes, informing him of their 
 mission and requesting an audience. The request was 
 granted, the commissioners were courteously received, and! 
 they submitted to the French minister a sketch of the 
 treaty suggested by Congress. The commissioners also 
 urged upon Vergennes that France and Spain unite with 
 the United States to deprive Great Britain of her West 
 India possessions. They also offered to guarantee the pos- 
 sessions of France in the West Indies and such other con- 
 quests as she might make there. France was also to have 
 a favorable commercial Treaty, by which her ports were 
 to receive the trade which formerly flowed into British 
 markets. In return, the Americans asked' only that France 
 should renounce all claims to the mainland of North Amer- 
 ica. They also urged a treaty of recognition and com- 
 merce. 15 
 
 Altho Vergennes returned no answer to the American 
 overtures, he was surprised and pleased at their modera- 
 tion. He felt no objection to giving the United States a 
 free hand in North America, and he was gratified at the 
 offer to guarantee French possessions in the West Indies, 
 altho he declared the faith of a republic was little to be 
 relied upon. He believed, moreover, that a favorable com- 
 mercial treaty would give France all the advantages of col- 
 onies without the trouble and expense of governing them. 16 
 
 During the next few months the Americans presented 
 in greater detail the desires of Congress. Deane submitted 
 a memorial to Vergennes urging a treaty with France for 
 the "common security" of the two countries. He urged 
 that the whole British Empire in America be conquered, 
 
 15 Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 239-246. 
 
 16 Vergennes to Ossun, January 4, 1777. (Esp., 583, no. 6, new 2. Same 
 to same, January 12. (Ibid., no. 20, new 53.) 
 
175] THE QUESTION OF THE WEST 65 
 
 France to get the West Indies and a share of the New- 
 foundland fisheries, while all the remainder was to go to 
 the United States. 17 
 
 It is probable that this proposal of Deane did not re- 
 ceive any serious consideration from Vergennes, for he 
 soon came to the conclusion that it was necessary to keep 
 Canada in the hands of the British in order to maintain 
 the balance of power in America, and to make the United 
 States dependent upon France. 18 It is not unlikely, how- 
 ever, that Vergennes was willing to allow the United States 
 to make such conquests as they could in the West, the 
 Floridas, and even a part of Canada, but he would never 
 consent to use French blood in extending the boundaries 
 of the republic. Since France, herself, had no intention 
 of adding to her dominions, it was a matter of little mo- 
 ment to her what became of the British Empire when it 
 fell. 19 
 
 The Americans were willing to surrender their claims 
 to the Floridas in return for Spanish assistance. 20 Frank- 
 lin early discerned, however, the wide stretch of Spanish 
 -ambition; and 1 , before it could declare itself, he demanded 
 from Florida Blanca an express acknowledgment of the 
 
 17 Deane to Vergennes, March 18, 1777. (E. U., II, no. 72, fol. 131.) 
 Deane had written to Jay, December 3, 1776, that articles such as he here 
 .proposed had been shown to him (Sparks, Dip. Cor., I, 70), but it is 
 probable that he meant he had suggested them himself, which is the truth. 
 Deane was fertile with suggestions regarding the West. In December, 
 1776, he suggested to Congress the formation of a state north of the Ohio 
 (Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 203), and in March, 1777, he proposed to desig- 
 nate, as security for a loan, three thousand square miles (he writes three 
 thousand miles square) of the most fertile land on the rivers Ohio and 
 Mississippi, one acre of land to be given as security for each livre sub- 
 scribed. (E. U., II, no. 75, fol. 135.) 
 
 18 Memoire au Roi, July 4, 1777. See p. 58, note I. It is possible that 
 Vergennes informed the king that Canada should remain British in order to 
 allay the fear which that monarch had of republics, for later he showed 
 himself willing to aid the Americans against Canada. 
 
 19 Vergennes to Aranda, March n, 1777 (Esp., 583, no. 155) ; April 
 ao (ibid., 584, new 21). 
 
 20 Lee made this offer on his mission to Spain. See p. 53, note 70. 
 
66 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [176 
 
 right of the Americans to the free navigation of the Mis- 
 sissippi River. 21 Thus was the issue between Spain and 
 the United States raised. The demand for the right to 
 navigate the Mississippi could mean only that the United 
 States had in mind to claim the left bank of the river, and 
 thus come in contact with the Spanish colony of Louis- 
 iana. All the fears which the Spanish ministers had en- 
 tertained had now become threatening. The new republic 
 would be a constant menace to Louisiana, and would likely 
 either seduce it into rebellion or conquer it. With such a 
 belief the Spanish ministry felt it necessary to do every- 
 thing possible to limit the boundaries of the new republic; 
 and this led to an effort to hold as much of the east bank 
 of the Mississippi as it could lay claim to. Here lay the 
 root of a vital antagonism between the two countries, and 
 a rivalry which did not cease until Spain was driven off 
 the American continent. 
 
 Spain had a strong commercial interest in maintain- 
 ing control of the Gulf of Mexico. The English had used 
 their right to navigate the Mississippi and! their control 
 of Mobile and Pensacola to carry off much of the trade 
 of the Mississippi Valley. Spain now saw that if she were 
 to remain the dominant power in the lower Mississippi 
 she must cut off every source of competition. This meant 
 that the Floridas and the control of the river must be the 
 objects of Spanish diplomacy in America, and with these 
 in the possession of Spain, the Gulf of Mexico would be- 
 come a Spanish lake. 22 
 
 While the West was becoming the subject of European 
 diplomacy, its possession by the United States was held by 
 Congress to be beyond! question. Other questions of terri- 
 torial right, however, were constantly engaging the atten- 
 tion of this body. The project for annexing Canada was; 
 
 "Franklin, Writings (Smyth ed.), VII, 40. 
 
 22 This phase of the subject did not come up till later, but Florida 
 Blanca doubtless long held it in mind. See p. 80. 
 
177] THE QUESTION OF THE WEST 67 
 
 always before it. 23 Plans of attack were prepared and 
 many schemes for obtaining assistance were urged. 
 
 The Floridas claimed equal attention, but they were 
 thought of as only an inducement to get the help of Spain. 
 The original intention of Congress to annex them to the 
 United States was soon lost sight of in the need for for- 
 eign assistance, and at the close of 1776 the American com- 
 missioners were authorized to pledge the help of the na- 
 tion in conquering them for Spain. 24 To this promise,, 
 however, was attached the proviso that the free navigation, 
 of the Mississippi and 1 the use of the harbor of Pensacola 
 should be accorded the citizens of the United States. 
 
 It is possible that some concessions on the part of 
 Congress were induced partly by the efforts of the Spanish 
 agent, Don Juan de Miralles, who came from Havana to 
 the United States some time in 1777 as a secret and un- 
 accredited agent of Spain. He spent some time at Charles- 
 ton, where he was active among the revolutionists. Later 
 he went to Philadelphia, where he became acquainted with 
 several members of Congress and apparently secured their 
 confidence. He tried to get the support of Congress for 
 a combined expedition of Americans and Spaniards which 
 he and Governor Henry planned to send to conquer the 
 West, 25 
 
 The great aim of Miralles, however, was to secure the 
 claims of Spain to the Floridas and to the exclusive navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi River. Beyond that he wished 
 to extend) Spanish authority as far as possible. 26 Spain 
 had carefully prepared the way for her agent by showing 
 new favors to the Americans and by furnishing them wth 
 supplies. Galvez, who became governor in January, 1777, 
 promised that he "would go every length possible for the 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), Dec. 30, 1776; ibid. r 
 VI, 1056 (Dec. 2, 1777) ; ibid., IX, 985. 
 2 *Ibid., VI, 1057. 
 "Gerard to Vergennes, July 25, 1778. (E. U., IV, no. 41, fols. 142-147.) 
 
8 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [178 
 
 interest of Congress." 27 Under his administration, New 
 Orleans became a depot for supplies for the American 
 troops. Oliver Pollock, the agent of Congress, was allowed 
 to carry on operations unchecked, and Spain and the 
 United States seemed already in alliance. 28 
 
 The question of the West, however, was still unsettled. 
 Spain's designs were, as yet, not fully known ; but the navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi had already become an issue. The 
 great Southwest was soon to become the subject of dispute, 
 and the Northwest was as yet unwon. Great Britain still 
 held Detroit and other important posts, and these must be 
 captured before the States could make good their claims. 
 Congress had practically abandoned all claims to the Flor- 
 idas, and Canada was still untaken. The outcome was 
 uncertain, and experience was to show that it depended 
 upon two things hard fighting and shrewd diplomacy. 
 
 "Oliver Pollock to Congress, September 18, 1782. (Papers of the Con- 
 tinental Congress, no. 50, no. I, fol. I.) In August, 1776, Gov, Unzuga 
 granted a "Batteaux load of the King's Powder." Ibid. 
 
 2B Ibid.; E. U., IV, no. 41, fol. 142. The aid given by Galvez to the 
 Americans was not unknown to the British. In the Public Record Office 
 are numerous accounts of this. According to one the Americans were 
 given a public guardhouse in New Orleans, and were permitted to sell 
 openly plunder taken from the British. They were also allowed to fit out 
 armaments and Spanish ships were furnished to take supplies up the 
 river. Memorials of Alexander Graydon, Robert Ross, John Campbell. 
 (C. O., 5, 117.) 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE FRENCH ALLIANCE. 
 
 The year 1777 was full of unrest in the politics of 
 Europe. It was characterized by the tortuous policy of 
 Florida Blanca, the double dealing of Vergennes, and the 
 suspicion and distrust felt by British statesmen for their 
 neighbors. Vergennes was constantly trying to bring Flor- 
 ida Blanca into a war which he had resolved to avoid, and 
 the Spanish minister was seeking to force concessions by 
 a system of ever-changing threats and promises. Great 
 Britain was swayed between her need for peace and her 
 indignation at the Unfriendly attitude of the Bourbon pow- 
 ers. 
 
 Vergennes was still unacquainted with the vastness 
 of Spain's ambition, but he realized that he had a gigantic 
 task in bringing her into the struggle against Great Brit- 
 ain. Florida Blanca frequently declared his anxiety to 
 maintain the alliance with France, and often expressed 
 his willingness to go to war, but in every crisis he found 
 some pretext which enabled him to avoid fulfilling his 
 promises. 
 
 The Bourbon powers, however, were constantly in- 
 creasing their preparations. Vergennes was in deadly ear- 
 nest, and Florida Blanca knew that if he were to win any 
 concessions a show of force at least was necessary. 1 Under 
 these circumstances there were advanced many projects of 
 war. Altho the two countries had stationed fleets in 
 the West Indies, they still thought it necessary to make 
 
 1 Florida Blanca wrote to Aranda, March 3, 1777, that while Spain 
 desired peace, it was necessary to get ready to carry on a vigorous war. 
 (Esp., 583, no. 140, new I.) He also informed Ossun of his intention to 
 strengthen Spanish defenses. Ossun to Vergennes, March 3 (ibid., no. 
 136) ; February 27 (ibid., no. 127, new 24). 
 
 69 
 
70 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [180 
 
 other plans to protect their interests. 2 The extreme weak- 
 ness of the naval equipment of the two countries in the 
 West Indies was regarded as dangerous to the safety of 
 Bourbon possessions there, for it was believed that the end 
 of the American war meant an attack upon them. The 
 plans of the naval heads of the two countries were to carry 
 on a defensive naval war, until, if their undertakings should 
 prosper, they would be in position to attack some important 
 places, such as Jamaica, Gibraltar, and Grenada, and pos- 
 sibly make a descent upon England or Ireland. 3 
 
 Both Vergennes and Florida Blanca declared that 
 their policies were in complete accord. 4 But in spite of 
 their assertions this agreement was only on expedients and 
 was not on anything fundamental. They saw that the 
 continuance of the war in America was beneficial to their 
 interests, and so they were willing to support the insur- 
 gents. Here their agreement ended. 
 
 On the fundamental question of the policy to be pur- 
 sued there was a wide difference. The belief of the Spanish 
 minister that he could attain all the ends of his country 
 while keeping the peace has already been explained. Ver- 
 gennes was very skeptical of the success of such a policy, 5 
 and insisted strongly on the necessity of war as the only 
 outcome. 
 
 ^Archives de la Marine, 84, 128-131. 
 
 Ibid., 135. 
 
 4 "Les principes d'apres lesquels la Cour de Madrid a dirige ses 
 reponses au M. Lee sont entierement conformes a ceux que nous avons 
 adopte a 1'egard des insurgens . . . ." Vergennes to Ossun, March 25, 
 1777. (Esp., 583, no. 186, new 23.) Florida Blanca said that the two 
 crowns were in accord on the "fondamental principes." To Aranda, 
 March 5, 1777. (Ibid., no. 140.) 
 
 B Vergennes to Ossun, June 21, 1777. (Esp., 584, no. 140, new 38.) 
 Vergennes urged Ossun to press Florida Blanca for his memoir advo- 
 cating the belief that it is possible for the two crowns to intervene in 
 America without taking part in the war. "If he has in his familiar con- 
 versation any opinions on this subject, please inform me; altho I do not 
 hold it impossible that the minister should have an outlook more extended 
 than my own." 
 
181] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 71 
 
 The political situation was further complicated by 
 the suspicious attitude of Great Britain. At the beginning 
 of the American insurrection the good will of France was 
 taken by British statesmen as practically assured. 6 Before 
 the close of 1775, however, the court of London was becom- 
 ing suspicious. Accusations were made freely that French 
 aid was given the rebels. "Your Lordship will not think 
 that I am of such easy credulity as to believe that they 
 do not connive at Succours being sent from this country to 
 America," wrote Stormount from Paris. ". . . . This, 
 however, My Lord, I never pretend to see, but always seem 
 to be entirely satisfied with the assurances they give me." 7 
 
 Throughout the years 1776 and 1777, Stormount was 
 busy protesting against French violations of neutrality. 
 He suspected that Vergennes had gone so far as to sign a 
 convention with the Americans, and often threatened war. 8 
 Spain also was credited with hostility to Great Britain, 
 and at the close of 1777 Stormount summed up his conclu- 
 sions as follows : "I have not a shadow of doubt that this 
 court and that of Madrid are combined against us and have 
 long been preparing and still continue to prepare for the 
 execution of some insidious design." 9 
 
 With Great Britain suspicious and Spain defiant, the 
 problem of Vergennes was a delicate one. Grimaldi had 
 
 6 St. Paul, charge d'affaires at Paris, to Earl of Rochford, Secretary 
 of State for the South, September 30, 1775. (F. O. France, 541 ; Stevens, 
 Facsimiles, XIII, 1303.) Stormount, British ambassador to France, to 
 Rochford, October 31. (Circourt. III. I.) 
 
 7 Stormount to Weymouth, December 6, 1775. (F. O. France, 542; 
 Stevens, Facsimiles, XIII, 1307.) Stormount goes on to say, "There is 
 every reason to believe that if Choiseul came into power he would instantly 
 take a decided step against us ... ." 
 
 Correspondence of Stormount with British foreign office. (F. O. 
 France, 545; Stevens, Facsimiles, XIV.) Stormount wrote, March 26, 
 1777: "I have tried to get direct proofs of this duplicity and have used 
 every endeavor to discern if there exists any treaty or written agreement 
 between this court and the rebels. I can find no traces of any such con- 
 vention .... I am assured that the ministers here wish nothing in 
 writing." (F. O. France, 547; Stevens, Facsimiles, XV, 1497.) 
 
 9 F. O. France, 551. 
 
72 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [182 
 
 long since declared his willingness for war, and just before 
 his retirement from office had asked only that it be post- 
 poned until the Spanish treasure ships should come in. 
 The fleet had long since arrived with all its stores of wealth, 
 but still Spain hesitated. To the urgings of the French the 
 Spanish ministers replied that they were not yet ready. 
 
 The year 1777 was allowed to wear itself out with 
 fruitless bickerings between the two powers. Vergennes 
 continued his policy of urging Spain to war, sometimes 
 with bright prospects of success, more often with com- 
 plete defeat. At times Florida Blanca would talk in tones 
 of undoubted belligerency; but when he had almost com- 
 mitted himself he would find some pretext on which to 
 draw back. 10 
 
 Meanwhile Vergennes was getting into more serious 
 difficulties with Great Britain. He had gone too far to 
 retrace his steps> and war for France had become an abso- 
 lute necessity. French aid had been given almost openly 
 to the insurgents, 11 and a powerful fleet sent to America. 12 
 
 10 Florida Blanca suggested in August, 1777, a plan to combine against 
 England as soon as the treasure fleet should arrive, and the fishermen 
 should return from Newfoundland. Ossun to Vergennes, August 21. (Esp., 
 
 585, no. 131, new 93.) He declared that the treasure ships could not 
 return before the next May. (Ibid., no. 106.) Vergennes agreed to wait 
 and be very careful, for he declared that England would seize the ships 
 which carried fifty million piastres on the slightest pretext. Vergennes 
 to Ossun, August 22. (Ibid., no. 137, new 51.) In September Florida 
 Blanca arranged with France to send troops to America. (September i, 
 ibid., 586, no. 3.) He declared his approval of French measures and de- 
 clared he would begin war if France were attacked. Ossun to Vergennes, 
 September 8. (Ibid., no. 33, new 103.) The next day he declared in favor 
 of the continuation of the American war, but urged a pacific policy for 
 the Bourbon crowns. Paper handed to Ossun, October 17, 1777. (Ibid., 
 
 586, fol. 226.) From this time on Florida Blanca would say nothing in 
 favor of war. 
 
 "Stormount to Weymouth, January u, 14, 19, 21, 22. (F. O. France, 
 552.) Wentworth to Eden, December 28, January i, 6. (Stevens, 
 Facsimiles, III, 322, 327.) 
 
 "Vergennes to Ossun, September 19, 1777. (Esp., 586, no. 58, new 
 147 ; September 26, ibid., no. 59, new 147.) 
 
183] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 73 
 
 British and French recognized alike that peace could not 
 long be preserved. 13 Vergennes himself declared that the 
 position of France every day became more critical and the 
 duration of peace more uncertain. 14 
 
 The surrender of Burgoyne meant to Vergennes that 
 the crisis had come. He knew that the time was at hand 
 for France to strike; to humiliate her ancient enemy and 
 to regain her former position in the family of nations. He 
 declared that France could now extend her commerce and 
 fisheries without interference, and could assure the peace- 
 ful possession of her islands without the danger of British 
 aggression. 15 "We must now either support the colonies or 
 abandon them," he argued. "We must form the alliance 
 before England offers independence, or we will lose the 
 benefit to be derived from Amrica, and England will still 
 control their commerce." 16 Independence was felt to be so 
 important that France must recognize it even without the 
 support of Spain. 
 
 Before Vergennes began war, however, he wished to 
 secure the active cooperation of Spain. News of the sur- 
 
 13 Stormount wrote October I, 1777, that France would interfere 
 within three or four months. (F. O. France, 550; Stevens, Facsimiles, 
 XIX, i/io.) De Noailles, French ambassador to London, wrote, January 
 31, that he saw hostile intentions in London. (Ibid., XIV, 1421.) Stor- 
 mount's protest were couched in threatening tone. See note n. 
 
 14 Vergennes to Noailles, August 30, 1777. (Stevens, Facsimiles, 
 XVIII, 1666.) 
 
 15 "Les avantages qui resulteroit de la [intervention] Sont 
 innombrables nous humilierons notre enemi naturel, un ennemi perfide 
 qui ne sont jamais respecter ni les Traites ni les droits des nations nous 
 de tournerons a notre profit une des principales sources de son opulence 
 nous ebranleons Sa puissance, et la reduirons a sa juste valeur nous 
 etendions notre commerce, notre navigation, notre peche, nous assurerons 
 la possession de nos Isles, Enfin nous retablerons notre consideration et 
 nous reprendrons parmi les Puissances de 1'Europe la place qui nous 
 apartient." "Consideration upon the necessity of France declaring at once 
 for the American colonies." (Angleterre, 528, fol. 88; Stevens, Facsimiles, 
 XXI, 1835.) Unsigned ; but the style is that of Vergennes and the opin- 
 ions set forth are in strict accord with his policy. 
 
 iVergennes to Montmorin, January 23, 1778. (Esp., 588, no. 17, new 
 m.) 
 
74 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [184 
 
 render of Burgoyne reached Paris on the night of December 
 7, 1777. 17 Four days later Vergennes sent a despatch to 
 Montmorin, the new minister to Spain, asking for a Span- 
 ish alliance. He declared he would ask nothing hard of 
 the Americans, only a treaty of commerce and the guar- 
 antee of French possesions in America; and he expected 
 that Spain would ask nothing more. 18 Evidently he feared 
 this would not be satisfactory to Spain, for on the thir- 
 teenth he wrote again : "Perhaps Spain still regrets the loss 
 of Florida which gives to the English an easy access to the 
 Gulf of Mexico." He doubtless knew that Arthur Lee 
 had offered Florida to the Spaniards, but he cautiously 
 continued: "I do not know what the Americans think in 
 regard to this .... but it is natural to suppose that they 
 would not hold very strongly to a thing they do not pos- 
 sess, and which, it seems to me, is not of much importance 
 to them." 19 Vergennes had not yet seen the importance 
 of the territorial question in the war. He was bidding for 
 the help of Spain, but it did not occur to him to offer more 
 of North America than the Floridas. 
 
 Montmorin sought out Florida Blanca, and asked for 
 an alliance with the Americans. He presented the dangers 
 of reconciliation and an attack by Americans and English 
 combined upon Spanish America. He offered the Floridas, 
 but the Spanish minister was unaffected. He declared that 
 the Spanish fleet was poorly prepared for battle and would 1 
 fall an easy prey to the English. To excuse his attitude 
 he blamed the French for not going to war when he was 
 ready. He further maintained that there was no danger 
 of reconciliation; and, under no circumstances, would the 
 king treat with rebels. 20 
 
 In spite of the refusal of Florida Blanca, Montmorin 
 
 "Esp., 587, no. 92. 
 
 "December u. Ibid., 587, no. 99. 
 
 19 Ibid., 587, no. 103. 
 
 20 Montmorin to Vergennes, December 23. (Ibid., 587, no. 125.) 
 
185] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 75 
 
 believed that if France should enter the war Spain would 
 be bound to follow. 21 His efforts, however, led to further 
 rebuffs. At an interview on January 4, Florida Blanca 
 declared angrily that there was neither object in be- 
 ginning war nor plan in conducting it. 22 The aims of 
 the Spanish minister, however, soon became apparent. 
 To Aranda he wrote that France had much to gain 
 from war, while for Spain there was nothing to gain 
 #nd much to lose. France was looking to the conquest 
 of the rich sugar isles, he continued, and possibly the 
 fisheries of Newfoundland; but these could have no in- 
 terest for Spain. The Spanish monarchy could have no 
 other object, he insinuated, than the recovery of some 
 of the "shameful usurpations" of Great Britain, "Gib- 
 raltar, Minorca, and to drive the English from the Gulf 
 of Mexico, the Bay of Honduras, and the coast of 
 Campeche." 23 Here was the program of Spain. It meant 
 that she aimed not only at the Floridas in North America, 
 but at the control of the Mississippi River, with both its 
 "banks as well. To this policy Florida Blanca adhered, 
 and he did not enter the war until he had some assurance 
 that it would be successful. 
 
 The British also were becoming aroused over the ques- 
 tion of the territories. The debates in Parliament were 
 long and bitter. Shelburne contended that if the rebel- 
 lious colonies were to secure their independence they would 
 not stop at that. He expressed his high opinion of the 
 moderation of the American people, but dieclared that 
 Congress looked further and was likely to inspire them 
 with hopes of conquest and extent of dominion. "Should 
 this be the case," he exclaimed, "the remainder of America 
 must fall." He declared that the demands of the Ameri- 
 
 21 Esf>., 587, no. 125. 
 
 22 "Dans la chaleur d'une de nos conversations il m'a dit votre Cour 
 ^eut trailer avec les Americains la guerre resulterset elle n'a ni objet en 
 la commencement ni plan pour le faire." Montmorin to Vergennes, Jan- 
 uary 5, 1778. (Ibid., 588, no. i, new 7.) 
 
 "Florida Blanca to Aranda, January 13, 1778. (Ibid., 588, no. 21.) 
 
76 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [186 
 
 cans would ultimately lead to the loss of the West Indies 
 and even of Ireland. 24 
 
 Altho the British were determined to continue the 
 war, if necessary, for the sake of peace, they were willing 
 to offer any concession short of independence. To this end 
 Hutton, chief of the Moravian Brethren in England and 
 America, and a friend of both George III and Franklin, 
 was sent to Paris. Franklin would 1 consider no terms un- 
 less independence were granted; and he appealed to the 
 magnaminity and good will of the British nation for a just 
 settlement. "You should not only grant such as the neces- 
 sity of your affairs may evidently oblige you to grant," he 
 urged, "but such additional ones as may show your gen- 
 erosity and may thereby demonstrate your good! will. For 
 instance, perhaps you might, by your Treaty, retain all 
 Canada, Nova Scotia, and the Floridas. But if you would 
 have a real friendly, perhaps able ally in America, and 
 avoid all occasions of future discord, which will otherwise 
 be continually arising on your American frontiers, you 
 should throw in those Countries. And you may call it if 
 you please, an Indemnification for the needless and cruel 
 burning of their Towns, which Indemnification will other- 
 wise be sometime demanded." 25 
 
 In spite of the hesitancy of Spain, Vergennes pushed 
 his plans for war. It was clear that peace could no longer 
 continue, and English and French were expecting the out- 
 break of hostilities at any moment. 26 Vergennes was 
 afraid that if France did not take part in the war in Amer- 
 
 24 Parliamentary Register, X, 380. B'enj. Vaughn to Franklin, April 
 28, 1778. (Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), VII, 151.) 
 
 "Franklin, Works (Smyth ed.), VII, 100. The visit of Hutton cre- 
 ated quite a stir in Paris and there was fear that he would succeed in 
 affecting a reconciliation. 
 
 28 Garnier, the French ambassador at London, wrote that England 
 regarded herself as already at war; and on February 2, Sartine, the min- 
 ister of marine, asked for an embargo on English ships in French harbors. 
 Doniol, Histoire, II, 747. English statesmen knew of the proposed treaty 
 on January i. Wentworth to Eden, January I. (Stevens, Facsimiles, 
 HI, 327.) 
 
187] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 77 
 
 ica England would succeed' in bringing about a reconcilia- 
 tion with her colonies and would then attack France. 27 On 
 January 7 at a meeting of the cabinet, the whole situation 
 was gone over. Vergennes presented a long memorial to 
 the king in which he urged immediate war. "England," 
 he declared, "must soon seek peace. She must grant inde- 
 pendence, and will then seek compensation in a coalition 
 with the United States for an attack on the two crowns." 
 He declared that England would keep New York, and with 
 that base could easily conquer the possessions of France 
 and Spain, while the insurgent privateers would harry 
 their commerce. The Americans, he urged, "will easily be 
 led to go further by the bait of the riches of New Spain, 
 sufficient to relieve both states of the burden of their debts. 
 The exclusive navigation of the Mississippi which will 
 make the possesion of Mexico precarious will, in itself, be 
 a powerful inducement for the Colonies, and they will 
 willingly undertake anything, because they will have noth- 
 ing to fear on their continent from the vengeance of the 
 two Crowns." Such an issue, he declared, would be real- 
 ized at once if England would recognize the independence 
 of America, and he urged war before it should be too late. 28 
 The will of Vergennes prevailed and war was decided 
 upon. Gerard de Rayneval Vergennes's secretary, was 
 commissioned to treat with the Americans. Rayneval, 
 like his master, strongly suspected the Americans of a wil- 
 lingness to be reconciled with the mother country, and his 
 suspicions were heightened at his first interview with their 
 representatives. Accordingly he lost no time in assuring 
 them that the king would recognize their independence at 
 once and make a treaty with them. He declared that France 
 had in view no aggression, and wished only to enfeeble her 
 enemy. He then urged the Americans not to be seduced! 
 by promises from England. To Franklin's query Rayneval 
 
 "Vergennes to Montmorin, January 16, 1778. (Esp., 588, no. 23.) 
 28 Vergennes : Paper submitted to the king and marked by him 
 "approve," January 7, 1778. (Ibid., 588, no. 10, new 13.) 
 
78 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [188 
 
 replied that France would not begin war until every other 
 means of securing independence were exhausted. Franklin 
 then stated that an immediate treaty alone would bar the 
 Americans from negotiations with the British. This 
 alarmed the French agent, and he assured Franklin that 
 France would begin the negotiations at any time. 20 
 
 The treaty of alliance between France and the United 
 States was drawn on the lines agreed to by Rayneval and 
 Franklin. It provided for mutual aid in the war, and de- 
 clared that all conquests made on the continent of North 
 America should belong to the United States, and France 
 formally renounced all claims to any part of the former 
 New France or Eastern Louisiana. In return for this re- 
 nunciation she was to have all conquests made among the 
 islands of the West Indies. 30 
 
 The provisions regarding the territories were in ac- 
 cord with the instructions of the American Congress and 
 did not, at any point, antagonize the policy of Vergennes. 
 He still insisted that all France desired was the independ- 
 ence of the United! States and the consequent enfeeblement 
 of Great Britain. 31 The American commissioners were like- 
 wise satisfied, and wrote to Congress that the terms were 
 such as they might readily have agreed to, if the United 
 States were in a condition of full prosperity and estab- 
 lished power. 32 
 
 This treaty of alliance meant war. On March 10, 
 Vergennes wrote to the French embassy at London enclos- 
 ing a copy of the articles. The messenger arrived at his 
 
 29 Rayneval said of the king "qu'elle etoient exempte de toute vue 
 d'ambition et d'aggrandissement qu'elle ne vouloit qu'oper irrevocablement 
 et completement 1'independance des Etats Unis qu'elle y trouveouir 
 1'interest essential d'affoibler son enemi natural . . . ." Narrative 
 of Conference with American Commissioners, January 9, 1/78. (E. U., 
 Memoirs et Documents, I, no. 17; Stevens, Facsimiles, XXI, 1831.) 
 
 *Treaties and Conventions, 242. 
 
 "Vergennes to Montmorin, March 17, 1778. (Esp., 588, 150, fol. 25.) 
 
 "Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 490. 
 
189] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 79 
 
 destination on the 13th and on the 17th Great Britain de- 
 clared war. 33 
 
 When Vergennes signed the treaty of alliance with 
 the United States he had good reason to think that Spain 
 would soon accede to it. The historic kinship and union 
 of the two crowns, their longstanding hatred of Great 
 Britain, and their common interest in humiliating her, all 
 induced Vergennes to expect a united front against the 
 common foe. Furthermore, Spain had promised) to aid 
 France if Great Britain attacked her, and had often ex- 
 pressed her willingness for war. Altho during the few 
 months preceding the treaty between France and the 
 United States Spain had looked coldly upon the very sug- 
 gestion of war, still, French statesmen thought she would 
 join in the struggle as soon as it began. 34 Spain is anxious 
 to recover some of her former possessions, they argued; 
 and, if she will join with France, she will have an oppor- 
 tunity to make many rich and valuable conquests. 
 
 In spite of the urgings of the French, Florida Blanca 
 still hesitated. France expected to gain much, he argued, 
 in commercial advantages and prestige from a war with 
 the British Empire, while Spain had only to calculate the 
 probability of loss. She could expect nothing from the 
 trade with the United States, and could gain no influence 
 in European diplomacy if she allowed France to map out 
 her policy. France could look to the conquest of English 
 islands and the Newfoundland fisheries, he argued, and 
 could hold them by her naval power; Spanish possessions 
 were in great danger from the English navy, and it would 
 be difficult to attain the objects of Spanish ambition : the 
 recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca, and the expulsion of 
 the British from the Gulf of Mexico. 35 
 
 83 Doniol, Histoire, II, 822. 
 
 84 Montmorin wrote to Vergennes, March 30, 1778, that he did not 
 doubt that, if France had any success, Spain would have her cupidity 
 aroused and make an attempt to recover Florida and above all Gibraltar. 
 (Esp., 588, no. 175, new 21.) 
 
 **Ibid. Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1778. (Ibid., no. 175, 
 new 21.) 
 
80 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [190 
 
 There is no doubt but that the enmity of Spain for 
 Great Britain was genuine and deep. The whole Spanish 
 policy had been hostile to the British court. Spain had 
 protested vigorously against the great armaments which 
 England was sending to America and was correspondingly 
 increasing her own ; but in spite of this the Spanish mon- 
 archy was bent on peace. There were several reasons for 
 this. Spain was mortally afraid of losing her colonies 
 before the overwhelming power of the British navy. She 
 realized that her finances were not in condition for war, 
 and that they would' be further crippled by cutting off the 
 supply of precious metals from her American possessions. 
 And then, as Florida Blanca declared, "between England 
 and America there is a sort of equality of enmity that 
 makes it difficult to desire that either side win." 36 He did 
 make it clear, however, that the proper concessions 
 might make Spain enter the war. The sine qua non of any 
 arrangement, however, must include the Floridas. The 
 Spanish were particularly dtesirous of this territory, be- 
 cause it controlled the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico 
 which they wished to make a Spanish lake. It was a source 
 of great annoyance to them that their ships could not get 
 from New Orleans to the ocean without almost touching 
 the coasts of an English province. 37 The Spanish desire 
 to control the Gulf of Mexico made inevitable an attempt 
 to get possession of the Mississippi Valley. 
 
 News of the conclusion of a treaty of alliance between 
 the United States and France aroused in the mind of Flor- 
 ida Blanca the greatest apprehension. Spain had long 
 
 sa Montmorin to Vergennes, February 2, 1778. (Esp., no. 80, new n.) 
 S7 "M. le Cte de Floride Blanche me disoit dernierement qu'il aimeroit 
 mieux qu'on cut cede la moitie de 1'Amerique que la Floride en effet il 
 ne peut rien sortir du golfe du Mexique, sans presque raser les cotes de 
 cette province Quant a un etablissement a Terre Neuve, je crois qu'il 
 souffririot bien des difficultes: vous pouvez etre sur, M que ces deux 
 points formeront la baze des demandes de 1'Espagne, si elle entre en 
 negociation avec les Americains." Montmorin to Rayneval, February 
 2, 1778. (Ibid., 588, no. 11.) 
 
191] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 81 
 
 faeen the friend 1 of France and he realized that it would be 
 exceedingly difficult to maintain neutrality. "You believe 
 that the actual circumstances are most happy for the two 
 crowns," he cried to Montmorin; "I regard them as most 
 fatal for Spain." Charles III listened patiently and cour- 
 teously to Montmorin's explanations; but he declared that 
 the situation was most critical and demanded the greatest 
 caution. 38 Charles and his minister both believed, how- 
 ever, that Great Britain would 1 soon attack the possessions 
 of Spain and thus make war inevitable. 
 
 Vergennes maintained throughout a moderate attitude 
 in his expectations for both France and Spain. He repeat- 
 edly declared that the sole desire of his country was to 
 humiliate Great Britain and to raise her own prestige. He 
 ared to add nothing to the colonial dominions of his coun- 
 try, but he was willing to bid* high for the support of Spain. 
 He had already suggested Florida as a suitable compensa- 
 tion for Spanish assistance, but he was soon convinced that 
 he must offer more, and expressed his willingness to in- 
 clude Jamaica. 39 This was the beginning of a long series 
 
 38 "Le lendemain . . . . j'ai etc au Pardo communiquer a M. le 
 comte de F. Blanche. Quoique j'eusse amene par differents preliminaires 
 <lont j'eusse a lui faire de la chose principale, je vous rendrait difficilement 
 les different impressions que lui fit la lecture de votre depeche. Tous 
 les sentiments dont il etait affecte se peignaient sur son visage et dans 
 ses gestes. Je le voyais qui faisait inutilement des efforts sur lui meme 
 pour se contraindre, tremblait de tout son corps, et il avoit toutes les 
 peines du monde a s'exprimer .... vous croyez que les circom- 
 stances actuelles sont le plus heureuse pour les deux couronnes, et moi, 
 je les regarde comme les plus fatales pour 1'Espagne, ce join me 
 paroitroit le plus beau de ma vie si Sa Majeste Catholique me permettoit 
 <le me retirer et d'aller finir mes jours tranquilement." Florida Blanca 
 went on to blame Aranda for his part in the trouble but declared that 
 the king would never consent to go to war. The king was much affected 
 and declared "croyez-moi .... les circomstances sont bien critiques, 
 et il faut bien de la prudence. II n'en est pas de 1'Espagne comme 
 de la France." Montmorin to Vergennes, January 28, 1778. (Ibid., 588, 
 no. 58, new 9.) 
 
 39 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 27, 1778. (Esp., 588, no. 173, 
 new 26.) 
 
82 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [192 
 
 of ever-increasing bids on the part of France to be answered 
 only by the ever-increasing demands from Spain. 
 
 In addition to making promises, Vergennes sought to 
 show to the Spanish ministry the advantages of war. He 
 urged that neutrality was dangerous, for England already 
 had designs on Spanish America. With Great Britain 
 mistress of all North America, she would always prove 
 a dangerous neighbor, while there was nothing to fear 
 from the United States, which would "remain quiet with 
 the inertia that is characteristic of all constitutional 
 democracies." 40 All these arguments, however, were un- 
 availing. Spain maintained her policy of peace, and Ver- 
 gennes turned his attention more towards the support of 
 his new allies; but he did not give up hope of ultimately" 
 securing the cooperation of Spain. The instructions which 
 he gave to Gerard, the first French minister to the United 
 States, looked to the interests and ambitions of the Span- 
 ish court. Altho Gerard was not to speak for Florida 
 Blanca, he was to use his influence with the Americans to- 
 get them to concede the Floridas, or at least Pen- 
 sacola and those parts of the coast which would be of most 
 "convenance" to Spain. 41 
 
 The instructions which Vergennes issued to Gerardr 
 were not designed merely to serve Spanish ambition, but 
 were in accord with the fundamentals of French policy. 
 In recognizing the United States of America, Vergennes- 
 believed that he was erecting a powerful barrier against 
 the dominance of the British Empire, while weakening it 
 by lopping off an important member. He early recognized 
 the impossibility of obtaining territories in America on 
 account of the jealousy of the new republic, and he felt 
 that France had no use for colonies which would drain 
 the mother country of her population and wealth. Altho 
 he did not seek any conquests in America, at the same 
 time he did not wish to turn over all the British possessions 
 
 40 Vergennes to Montmorin, April 3, 1778. (Esp., 589, no. 4, new 27.) 
 "March 29, 1778. (. U.. Ill, no. 77, fol. 159.) 
 
 
193] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 83 
 
 there to the United States. He had recognized the new re- 
 public as a step in the downfall of Great Britain; and, in 
 order to insure the permanency of his work, he felt that 
 his ally must be kept in a state of permanent dependence. 42 
 
 In the light of this belief Vergennes issued his instruc- 
 tions to Gerard. In regard to the propositions of the 
 American commissioners that France should aid in the 
 conquest of Canada, Nova Scotia, and' the Floridas, he de- 
 clared that the king considered "the possession of these 
 three countries, or at least of Canada, by England would 
 be a useful cause of disquietude and vigilance to the Ameri- 
 cans, which will make them see all the more the need 
 which they have of the friendship and alliance of the king, 
 and which it is not to his interest to destroy." He was 
 not, however, wedded to the idea of limiting the boundaries 
 of the United States. Gerard was left much discretion in 
 this matter, and he was instructed that by all means he 
 was to keep the good will of Congress. If that body pro- 
 posed any conquests, he was to assure it of the friendship 
 of the king, but was not to enter into any formal engage- 
 ment to effect its desires. If the republic became too press- 
 ing, Gerard was not to refuse to cooperate, but he was to- 
 make it understood that the retention of such conquest 
 need not be a condition of the next peace. In no case, how- 
 ever, was he bound by hard and fast rules, but was to use 
 his discretion. That he did so is amply proven by the 
 history of his career in America. 
 
 When Gerard arrived' in Philadelphia, he found that 
 the Spanish agent, Don Juan de Miralles, had preceded 
 him. The two soon became confidential friends. Altho 
 Miralles did not show his instructions to the French repre- 
 sentative, he soon made evident the expectations of his 
 court in regard to the West. He exerted himself to show 
 the advantages which France might reap from the con- 
 quest of Canada, and declared the right of Spain to all the 
 other territory which the English had acquired by the 
 
 42 See p. 99, note 34, 
 
84 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [194 
 
 treaty of 1763, and also to the exclusive navigation of the 
 Mississippi River. 43 The suggestion that France should 
 conquer Canada made no impression on Gerard; but he 
 attempted to combat the ambitions of Miralles regarding 
 the navigation of the Mississippi. He argued that the 
 Americans already had claims to the back countries, and 
 that in offering Pensacola to Spain they were intending 
 to make good) their claims to the West. He urged that 
 Spain should not advance her demands at this time for by 
 so doing she would merely bring on a dispute that might 
 cause much trouble. 44 Miralles consented to postpone the 
 issue and the matter of the territories was allowed to rest. 
 To Congress the treaty of alliance and the promise of 
 French aid brought renewed hopes of the conquest of Can- 
 ada. Washington had always been eager to get the British 
 possessions along the St. Lawrence ; and the failure of the 
 early expeditions had not discouraged him. Gerard had 
 promised the Americans both military and naval aid, and 
 this was counted on to help in the expedition. Ad'miral 
 D'Estaing arrived in America with a powerful fleet in 
 July, 1778, and at once communicated with Gerard. He 
 was planning to get St. John's or preferably Newfoundland 
 
 43 "I1 [Miralles] a parle tres affirmativement de la bonne volonte de 
 1'Espagne et du secours immediat de la france II s'est efforce d'etablir 
 qu'il falloit que la france conquit le Canada et 1'Espagne tout ce que les 
 Anglois ont acquis par le traite de 1763 en floride et sur le Mississippi. 
 . . . . il se livroit a toutes les speculations que la possession des florides 
 et la navigation exclusive du Mississippi peuvent suggerer. J'ai etc fache 
 de le voir meler dans ses raisonnements la persuasion que les americains 
 
 seroient bientot les ennemis de 1'Espagne J'ai combattu cette 
 
 persuasion par des motifs, Monseigneur que vous avez plusieurs fois 
 discutes et j'ai observe qu'il paroitroit sage d'eviter au moins de les 
 necessiter a le devenir immediatement. Je 1'ai persuade de representer 
 a sa cour que jamais le congres ne consenteroit de plein gre a renouncer 
 a la navigation du mississipi necessaire pour servir de debouche aux 
 etablissements immenses que les americains se proposent de faire sur 
 1'Ohio et autres rivieres affluentes." Gerard to Vergennes, July 25, 1778. 
 <. U., IV, no. 41, p. 142.) 
 
 HIWK, 
 
195] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 85 
 
 on account of its fisheries. He declared, however, that he 
 saw no chance of satisfying Spain, which was "possessed 
 of a territorial mania and always felt herself ill used unless 
 the compass of her territory was as large as the map." He 
 suggested that the easiest solution would* be to turn over 
 St. John's and Newfoundland to the Americans and seek 
 compensation for Spain and France elsewhere. 45 Gerard 
 thought the proposition was worth serious consideration, 
 and submitted it to Vergennes. 46 
 
 Long before the project of invading Canada was for- 
 mally considered Gerard* was aware that it was likely to 
 come up. On July 16 he wrote Vergennes of the whole 
 affair, and described American apprehension of the dan- 
 gers to the United States, if Great Britain were allowed to 
 keep both Canada and the Floridas. He did not believe, 
 however, that the Americans would d'emand the assistance 
 of French troops in any conquest that they might afr 
 tempt. 47 
 
 In the fall of 1778 Washington began to prepare for 
 his long cherished conquest of Canada. He expected to 
 begin the invasion as soon as the British could be driven 
 from their posts in the north. He considered the expedi- 
 tion of prime importance, but he was not very sanguine of 
 success. 48 Lafayette also conceived a plan of his own for 
 the invasion of Canada. He hoped to get enough assist- 
 ance from France to make possible an attack by way of 
 Detroit, another by Niagara, and still another up the Con- 
 necticut River, while the French fleet should sail up the 
 St. Lawrence. 49 To his friend 1 D'Estaing he wrote, "I can 
 think of nothing but the happiness of being with you, of 
 Halifax surrendering, of St. Augustine taken, of the Brit- 
 ish Islands on fire, and all confessing that nothing can 
 
 Ct. d'Estaing to Gerard. (E. U., IV, no. 22, fol. 95.) 
 
 "Gerard to Vergennes, July 15. (Ibid., no. 20, fol. 90.) 
 
 47 Gerard to Vergennes, July 16, 1778. (Ibid., no. 23, fol. 97.) 
 
 "Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VII, 192-198. 
 
 40 Memoires, Correspondence et Manuscrits des Lafayette. I, 208. 
 
86 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [196 
 
 withstand the French." 50 This was but an outburst of 
 patriotic enthusiasm and was entirely opposed to the plans 
 of Vergennes; but it was successful in arousing the inter- 
 est of D'Estaing. Congress, too, was so carried away by 
 the young Frenchman's enthusiasm that it gave favorable 
 consideration to his plan, and ordered it transmitted to 
 Franklin for submission to the minister of foreign af- 
 fairs. 51 The Americans regarded the conquest of Halifax 
 and Quebec as objects of the greatest importance, and in 
 order to get the aid of France in this undertaking, they 
 were willing to concede her a share in the fisheries and fur 
 trade of that country. They reasoned that such an ar- 
 rangement would give their frontiers greater safety and 
 add two new states to the union. 52 To American inquiries, 
 Gerard replied vaguely that the king had the greatest good 
 will for the success of the Americans, but did not pledge 
 the cooperation of his country. To Vergennes he expressed 
 the belief that the expedition would not be undertaken, for 
 he knew that Washington could not spare the troops. 
 
 The attack on Canada was soon abandoned, tho for 
 other reasons than those given by Gerard. Admiral 
 D'Estaing issued a proclamation to the Canadians urging 
 them to rise against the common enemy and to unite with 
 their neighbors to the south. 53 The proclamation suc- 
 
 s Towers, Lafayette, II, 14. 
 
 61 Journals of the Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XII, 1042. 
 
 62 G. Morris carried on the negotiations with Gerard. He offered to 
 give the French Newfoundland, if they would aid in the conquest of 
 Halifax and Quebec. He pointed out that without the possession of 
 Newfoundland France could never hope to get possession of the fisheries ; 
 and he promised that, if France would aid them, the Americans would 
 attack at the same time all the points from the river of the Illinois to 
 'Quebec. Gerard hesitated from his knowledge that Washington must 
 depend for his troops on the British evacuation of New York. Morris 
 was distrustful of Spanish influence and observed that as long as Great 
 Britain kept Canada she must be friends to the United States. In this 
 he opposed the French argument that the British occupation of Canada 
 ~was necessary to insure the friendship of the United States for France. 
 Gerard to Vergennes, October 20, 1778. (E. U., V, no. 33, fol. 68.) 
 
 ^Archives de la Marine, 64. 
 
197] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 87 
 
 ceeded in creating a feeling of uneasiness among the Cana- 
 dians, but it gave a bad impression of French motives to 
 Washington and Congress. 54 Washington at once wrote 
 to Congress disapproving the whole scheme, as the army 
 was not in condition to undertake it. 55 There were, how- 
 ever, other than military reasons why he wished to aban- 
 don this plan. In a personal letter to Laurens he gave as 
 an insurmountable objection the "introduction of a large 
 body of French troops into Canada, and putting them into 
 possession of the capital of that province, attached to 
 them by all the ties of blood, habits, manners, religion, and 
 former connection of government. I fear this would be too 
 great a temptation," he wrote, "to be resisted by any power 
 actuated by the common maxims of national policy." He 
 feared that France in possession of Canada would become 
 the most powerful maritime state of Europe, and joined 
 by Spain in possession of New Orleans would make her- 
 self dictator of all America. If France should get pos- 
 session of Canada no pledges could induce her to leave 
 it; and she would drive the English from the seas and 
 make the English speaking world her subjects. 56 
 
 The opposition of Washington gave the death blow to 
 the project of conquering Canada. Congress at once 
 voted the expedition impractical and informed Lafayette 
 of that fact, 57 
 
 Vergennes regarded this proposed expedition as de- 
 void of military significance. It may be of value as a mili- 
 tary demonstration, he admitted, but France can not lend 
 her weight to the annexation of Canada by the United 
 
 "Kingsford, Canada, VI, 330. 
 
 "Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VII, 240. 
 
 Ibid., 261. 
 
 57 Journals of the Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XII, 1190-91. 
 
88 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [198 
 
 States. 58 He wished to maintain the policy toward Can- 
 ada which he had outlined) in his first instructions to 
 Gerard. He still preferred that England should keep it; 
 but if the United States insisted on some acquisition he 
 would give them Nova Scotia. In no case would he consent 
 to make such conquests an excuse for continuing the war. 
 "We think that peace ought not to depend on secondary 
 matters," he wrote, "and that the only point important to 
 the United States is the recognition of their independence. 
 We do not hesitate to stipulate in favor of Great Britain 
 for the preservation of her actual possessions in North 
 America." As to the proposal of Miralles that France 
 should seize Canada, Vergennes replied decidedly in the 
 negative. Such a course, he argued, would arouse distrust 
 of France and bring about a rapprochement between Great 
 Britain and America which would make futile the whole 
 war. 59 
 
 Vergennes was not to show himself determined against 
 the American occupation of Canada. He knew, however, the 
 jealousy which Spain felt toward the United States, and 
 he did not wish to take any stand that would arouse her 
 displeasure. In February, 1779, he wrote to Gerard de- 
 claring that the question of Canada could not be deter- 
 mined until the close of the war; but in the meantime he 
 was to "urge the Americans to make every effort in their 
 poAver against the common enemy. It does not matter in 
 what point," he continued, "but let them do all the harm 
 they can. If they succeed in taking Quebec and Halifax, 
 
 68 "Je ne sais si les americains forment seriusement le projet d'attaquer 
 
 le Canada mais dans ce cas je doute qu'ils y reussissent Cependant 
 
 les Americains auront raisin de faire des demonstrations propres a faire 
 
 prendre le change a la Cour de Londres 1'opinion de 1'Espagne 
 
 est qu'il conviendra de conserva le Canada et 1'acadie a la grande Bretagne. 
 
 Mais je le repete, c'est aux circonstances a consolider ou a 
 
 modifier notre plan et nos vues." Vergennes to Gerard, November 18. 
 (. U., V, no. 7, fol. 78.) 
 
 "Vergennes to Gerard, October 26. (E. U., V, no. 43, fol. 105.) 
 
199] THE FRENCH ALLIANCE 89 
 
 well and good; and if this becomes a condition of peace, 
 we can find other measures to reassure the court of 
 Madrid." 60 
 
 On the question of Canada, Washington and Ver- 
 gennes held almost identical views. Both saw the diffi- 
 culties of allowing France to get possession of the coun- 
 try, and both saw the injustice of asking the French to aid 
 in a conquest for which they were to receive no compensa- 
 tion. Both realized the power which the possession of 
 Canada would give to France, and both knew that with 
 the French established on their northern borders the 
 United States would inevitably return to the protection of 
 Great Britain. 
 
 Of more vital importance to the United States was the 
 question of the West. With it, in the minds of Spanish 
 statesmen, were connected the Florid'as, but these latter 
 did not offer so difficult a problem. The United State* 
 had offered them to Spain in return for her assistance, but 
 without success. Vergennes had dangled the possession 
 of them before the hungry eyes of Spanish ministers, but 
 his efforts were unavailing. It was tacitly understood, 
 however, that Spain might have them any time she was 
 willing to go to war with Great Britain. The Americans 
 planned in the early part of 1778 to conquer the Florida^ 
 in the interest of Spain, 61 and 1 there seemed to be no differ- 
 ence between the two countries regarding their disposition. 
 
 The West, however, was to prove a fertile ground for 
 dispute. Florida Blanca had expressed his fear and hatred 
 of the Americans, and had given this as the reason for not 
 
 "Nous devons respecter 1'opinion de 1'Espagne, et elle n'est pas 
 
 favorable aux desirs du Congres " Vergennes urged Gerard "vous 
 
 borner a exhorter les Americains a faire tous les efforts qui sent en leur 
 pouvoir pour faire a 1'ennemi commun n'emporte dans quel point, tout le 
 mal qu'il sera possible. S'ils reussissent a s'emparer de Quebec et Halifax 
 il faudra bien de leur laisser, si la paix devoit dependre de cette condition : 
 on pourra au pis aller prendre d'autres mesures pour rassurer la cour de 
 Madrid." Vergennes to Gerard, February 19. (E. U., VII, no. 101, fol. 
 250.) 
 
 "Gerard to Vergennes, July 16. (Ibid., IV, no. 23, fol. 97.) 
 
$0 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [200 
 
 joining in the war which would bring them independence. 
 He was not content with mere inactivity. He felt that if 
 Spain was to maintain her position in the New World she 
 must do something to check the growing power of the 
 .young nation which was seeking to establish itself there. 
 For this purpose he had suggested that the British be 
 guaranteed the possession of Canada. To this end lie had 
 sought the title to the Floridas, but even this did not satisfy 
 him. Spain should control the Gulf of Mexico and the 
 Mississippi River. This meant that the Americans must 
 l>e barred from the whole area of the West. 
 
 On the question of the West, Vergennes did' not at 
 once commit himself. He recognized his obligations to his 
 new allies and was anxious to get the assistance of Spain. 
 He did not wish to offend the United States by an apparent 
 favoritism to Spanish diplomacy, and he wished to get the 
 confidence of Florida Blanca. Any arrangement which 
 would be agreeable to the two powers, he was willing to 
 accept. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 FLORIDA BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 France alone was unequal to the struggle with Great 
 Britain. For generations the two powers had been at war ; 
 .and in every contest the final victory had lain with the 
 island kingdom. It was difficult to believe that now, with 
 the puny aid of a few revolting provinces, the Bourbon 
 throne could blot out the defeats and humiliations of the 
 past and triumph over its ancient rival. When Vergennes 
 signed the treaty that called into life a new nation, the 
 memory of 1763 directed his mind and the spirit of revenge 
 guided his hand. 1 His rashness was self-evident. France 
 was exhausted by a century of misrule at home and defeat 
 abroad. Her finances were in wretched condition. Reform 
 was urgent. Turgot declared that peace alone could work 
 a cure. 2 Her navy, ruined in the Seven Years War, had 
 never recovered its prestige and could not hope to fight the 
 Britons on equal terms, and! this was to be a naval war, 
 a struggle on many seas. 
 
 Alliance with Spain was the hope of France. Their 
 united fleets might well match that of Great Britain, and 
 their combined resources were comparable to those of the 
 enemy. Altho Spain had not approved the treaty of alli- 
 ance, Vergennes felt he could count on her aid. The 
 friendship of the Bourbon powers was of long duration, 
 and sealed by treaties and family compacts. Together they 
 had borne the humiliations and losses of many wars, and! 
 now Louis asked the cooperation of his Spanish cousin in 
 
 1 "I1 paroit en effet que la providence a marque cette epoque pour 
 1'humiliation d'une Puissance orgueilleuse, in juste, et avide, qui ne connoit 
 jamais d'autre Loi que celle de son interit." Vergennes au Roi, marked 
 ""approve," Jan. 7, 1778, (Esp., 588, new 22.) Doniol, Histoire, II, 765. 
 
 2 Doniol, Histoire, I, 285. 
 
 91 
 
92 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [202 
 
 what promised to be a Bourbon triumph. Spain wished 
 to recover her ancient colonies; and it was a source of 
 great humiliation to her that British guns guarded the 
 gates of the Gulf of Mexico and the Mediterranean. A few 
 months before, Florida Blanca had declared his readiness 
 for the struggle, and had promised to back France when 
 it should begin. 3 Altho the tone of Spain's communications 
 had since grown cold, Vergennes felt that there were suf- 
 ficient reasons to overcome her hesitancy and push her 
 into war. 
 
 Spain, however, had other ends in view. War or peace, 
 each promised great rewards. War, and France assured 
 her magnificent conquests ; peace, and she might exact from 
 Great Britain even greater concessions. Friendship for 
 France and hatred for Great Britain both urged her to war. 
 But casting aside the motives of hatred and friendship 
 there stood the solid advantages and rosy expectations 
 of peace. In war Spain was open to attack from all sides. 
 Her extended colonies were an easy prey to the powerful 
 navy of England, which in the preceding struggle had 
 made rich prizes of Havana and far-off Manila. The loss 
 of her colonial possessions was a fear ever present to Spain, 
 and she was determined to take no action that would en- 
 danger them. As Florida Blanca declared; "Spain has 
 a vast empire unprotected by sea, which will be in great 
 danger from British aggression." 4 
 
 To Spanish statesmen there appeared still another 
 danger in fighting for the cause of rebellious colonies. 
 Even recently the colonies of Spain had been in rebellion. 
 Only a few years before, Louisiana, just across the river 
 from the Americans, had been ablaze with revolutionary 
 ideas, and had broken forth in open revolt. The rebellion 
 had been sternly repressed ; but what effect would the suc- 
 cess of English insurgents have on the restless inhabitants 
 
 Ossun to Vergennes, September 6, 1777. (Esf>., 587, no. 33, new 113.) 
 *Montmorin to Vergennes, January 28, 1778. (Ibid., no. 9, new 58.) 
 Florida Blanca to Aranda, January 13. (Ibid., no. 21.) 
 
203] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 93 
 
 of Spanish America? King Charles, himself, feared that 
 recognition of the new republic would set a dangerous ex- 
 ample to his own possessions. 5 Still another question was 
 whether the American states would be more peaceful 
 neighbors as dependencies of the British Empire or as an 
 independent nation. Florida Blanca feared that if they 
 became independent they would be animated by a spirit 
 of aggression which would be dangerous for Spain. Be- 
 tween Great Britain and the Americans there was, he de- 
 clared, "a sort of equality of enmity which makes it diffi- 
 cult to prefer either of them." 6 If the colonists should suc- 
 ceed in their efforts, he expressed the hope that they be 
 placed in dependence on the Bourbon crown and' kept in 
 a state of anarchy such as existed in Germany. 7 It was in 
 vain that Vergennes pointed out the danger of an increase 
 of British strength in the New World; it was useless to 
 plead that such was the constitution of the new republic 
 that it would more likely fall a prey to internal quarrels 
 than become a danger to its neighbors. 8 Vergennes's argu- 
 ments that there was a placid "inertia which is character- 
 istic of all constitutional democracies" and which would 
 inhibit the spirit of conquest d'id not convince the Spanish 
 minister. 
 
 When Vergennes found he could not convince Florida 
 Blanca of the advisability of war, he changed his tactics 
 and began to try to push him by easy stages into taking 
 a hostile attitude towards England. He offered the Span- 
 ish minister the use of ten vessels to protect Spanish com- 
 merce, but the offer was curtly refused. 9 He offered to 
 entrust Gerard with any mission which Florida Blanca 
 
 5 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1779. (Esp., 593, no. 68, new 
 25.) 
 
 6 Montmorin to Vergennes, February 2, 1778. (Ibid., 588, no. 80, new 
 n.) 
 
 7 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 20, 1778. (Ibid., no. 157, new 19.) 
 
 8 Vergennes to Montmorin, April 3, 1778. (Ibid., no. 4, new 27.) 
 
 Ibid., 588, no. 157; Wharton, Dip. Cor., II, 491. 
 
94 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [204 
 
 might wish him to perform in the United' States. 10 His 
 efforts seemed to offer some prospect of success, when in 
 April, 1778, after the Mexican fleet had arrived with all its 
 treasure, the Spanish ministry became belligerent in 
 speech. 11 Altho Florida Blanca expressed his defiance of 
 Great Britain, he resisted all French overtures. To Mont- 
 morin's insinuations that France was not seeking any con- 
 quests from the war, he replied that Vergennes was acting 
 not from motives of prudence but of hate. 12 
 
 The vacillating policy of Florida Blanca convinced 
 Vergennes that he must buy the help of Spain. He had 
 already offered her Jamaica and the right of fishing off 
 the banks of Newfoundland, and had suggested that the 
 Americans would be glad to help conquer the Floridas. 15 
 This offer did not satisfy Florida Blanca. He no longer 
 seemed 1 interested in these conquests, but began plotting 
 for the recovery of Gibraltar, and placed that as an essen- 
 tial condition of Spain's participation in the war. 14 
 
 Vergennes was not yet ready to concede so much ; but 
 he instructed Montmorin to find what else might be a fa- 
 vorite conquest for Spain. 15 To this query Florida Blanca 
 gave no satisfactory answer. Vergennes then informed 
 the Spanish minister that D'Estaing's fleet was ready to 
 cooperate with the Spanish forces in an effort to seize 
 Jamaica, Pensacola, the control of the Gulf of Mexico, 
 or the Newfoundland fisheries. 16 
 
 In regard to the Newfoundland' fisheries, Florida 
 Blanca answered curtly that by the treaty of 1763 Spain 
 
 loyergennes to Montmorin, March 27, 1778. (Esp., 588, no. 173, new 
 26.) 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, April 30, 1778. (Ibid., 589, no. 50, fol. 
 
 I43-) 
 
 "Doniol, Histoire, II, 795. 
 
 "See pp. 74, 89. 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, February 13, 1778. (Esp., 588, no. 175, 
 new 21.) 
 
 "Vergennes to Montmorin, April 10, 1778. (Ibid., 589, no. 13, new 
 29.) 
 
 l *Ibid., 588, no. 173, new 26. 
 
205] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 95 
 
 had renounced her pretentious to that region ; and that she 
 would not consider them again. As to the Floridas, he 
 declared that the United States had offered them to the 
 Catholic King two years before. He cfid not accept the 
 offer of Vergennes to permit Gerard to look after the inter- 
 ests of Spain in America, because, he declared, Spain had 
 nothing to contest with the United States, for the boundary 
 between the two countries was marked by the Mississippi,, 
 which was definite enough. In short, Florida Blanca ob- 
 jected to everything France had done and disd'ained every 
 offer France could make. 17 
 
 Vergennes was bitterly disappointed at Spain's inac- 
 tivity, and to disappointment was added alarm for fear 
 that Great Britain might succeed in affecting a reconcilia- 
 tion with the insurgents. Reports had! come to him that 
 the British had offered the Americans full possession of 
 the Floridas in return for a guarantee of their other prov- 
 inces. 18 He foresaw that such an offer would be like "une 
 pomme de discorde" between Spain and the United States. 
 He was willing for the British to keep Canada, but he 
 
 17 "ce ministre me repondit que 1'Espagne avoit renounce par le traite 
 de Paris de 1/63 a ses pretensions sur Terre neuve qu'ainsi il n'y falloit 
 plus penser. Sa reponse fut apeupres la meme lorsque je lui fis part des 
 instructions de M. Gerard. II me dit que 1'Esp n'avoit pa rien a demeler 
 avec les Americains, sur ceque lui repliquai que je croijois que les pos- 
 sessions d'Amerique Meridonale pouvoient avoir quelques relations avec 
 ceux qui etoient les maitres de I'Amerique Septentrionale, il me repondit 
 que les limites etoient fixees par le Mississipi et que c'etoit une ligne de 
 frontier assez decidee. Je parlai de la reocupation de la Floride qui ne 
 pouvoit avoir lien qu au moyen d'une convention prealable avec les Etats- 
 Unis de I'Amerique. il dit que cet objet avoit deja ete offert a 1'Espagne 
 il y avoit deux ans. En un mot M. le parti etoit pris dans cette premiere 
 conversation de blamer tout ce qu'avoit fait la France de dedoigner toutes 
 les offres qui pouvoient venir d'elle." Montmorin to Vergennes, April 
 10, 1778. (Esp., 589, no. 15, new 23.) 
 
 "Frances to Vergennes, April 26, 1778. (E. U ., Ill, no. 103, foL 
 224.) Frances was a secret agent of Vergennes in Paris. Vergennes was- 
 willing for the English to keep Canada, for this would forever bind the 
 United States to France. 
 
96 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [206 
 
 wished to make them surrender Halifax. 19 To avoid the 
 dangers of a reconciliation, Vergennes once more urged 1 
 Florida Blanca to accept the American offer of the Flor- 
 idas and recognize the new government before it was too 
 late to reap the credit. 20 
 
 Florida Blanca declared once more in favor of peace. 
 He fell there were too many difficulties in the way of con- 
 quering Gibraltar; while as to the Floridas, altho he felt 
 that Spain ought to have them to keep the English out of 
 the Gulf of Mexico, yet he would be content with the pos- 
 session of Mobile and Pensacola. This much and even all 
 the coast of Florida, he argued/, should be granted his 
 master without war. He was planning to mediate between 
 the combatants and felt that, if he gave all Canada and 
 perhaps other colonies to Great Britain that power would 
 surely reward him handsomely. 21 
 
 The policy of Florida Blanca was supported by 
 Charles III, because that monarch sincerely desired peace. 
 He felt also the danger to which his old time ally was ex- 
 posing herself in the war with the British Empire, and 
 strove his best to lead her back to peace. The efforts of 
 Spain to effect a conciliation were encouraged by the 
 British crown, which wished to keep that country neutral 
 as long as possible; and it is by no means improbable that 
 the first advances for mediation came at the suggestion 
 of the court of London. 22 The French had no confidence 
 in the new Spanish diplomacy, but, in order to keep the 
 good will of the court of Madrid, they felt it necessary to 
 encourage the negotiations. Thus with both belligerents 
 indicating their willingness for mediation, Florida Blanca 
 made his first suggestions for a settlement on the basis of 
 independence for the United States and some minor con- 
 
 19 Vergennes to Montmorin, May i, 1778. (Esp., 589, no. 54, new 32.) 
 
 20 Consideration on the projects of Spain in case of war in America. 
 In hand of Vergennes, June 20, 1778. (Ibid., 589, no. 127, new 42.) 
 
 21 Montmorin to Vergennes, June 22, 1778. (Ibid., 589, no. 135, new 
 34, fol. 335-) 
 
 22 Doniol, Histoire, III, 473. 
 
207] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 97 
 
 cessions for France. 23 So certain was Charles III that 
 these conditions would receive the assent of Great Britain 
 that he asked the French to keep their fleet at home until 
 a truce could be declared ; 24 but it was not long until fresh 
 English aggressions on Spanish commerce convinced King 
 Charles that his efforts were futile. 25 
 
 Vergennes had foreseen the failure of Spanish media- 
 tion and was prepared to make the most of it. At the first 
 sign of British trifling, Montmorin came forward' with a 
 demand for action, guaranteed by the terms of the Pacte 
 de Famille, and intimated that an unfavorable response 
 would mean the dissolution of the alliance. 26 Charles III 
 was deeply wounded by the failure of his efforts, and se- 
 verely disappointed at not receiving the Florid : as, which 
 he regarded as his due; and, while in this state of mind, 
 he began to listen favorably to the pleadings of the French 
 ambassador. Montmorin felt exultant at his success and 
 wrote Vergennes that if France would guarantee Gibraltar 
 and the Floridas, the alliance was secure. 27 
 
 The British were alarmed at the new drift of Spanish 
 policy and at once revived the idea of mediation. 28 This 
 time Charles was wary and insisted that he would not again 
 offer his good offices unless the court of London formally 
 requested him to do so. This the British government agreed 
 to do, 29 and Charles decided to try again. Montmorin had 
 previously declared that the British were merely trying to 
 amuse Spain, and now he wrote that they had succeeded. 
 Vergennes, on his part, agreed' at once to the proposition 
 of mediation; for he wished to maintain a character for 
 
 23 Montmorin to Vergennes, July I, 1778. (Esp., 590, no. 2, new 36.) 
 24 Doniol, Histoire, III, 472. 
 Ibid., 509. 
 
 26 Vergennes to Montmorin, August 7, 1778 (Esp., 590, no. 72, new 
 32) ; August 15 (ibid., no. 87, new 53.) 
 -''Ibid., no. 89, new 49. 
 28 Montmorin to Vergennes, August 31, 1778. (Ibid., 590, no. 49, new 
 
 121.) 
 
 29 Doniol, Histoire, III, 513. 
 
98 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [208 
 
 disinterestedness. 30 The French were soon convinced, 
 however, that Charles III decidedly favored their views 
 as to the terms of settlement, and that he would oppose 
 leaving the British in possession of any important strong- 
 hold near the American possessions of the two crowns. 31 
 With this assurance Vergennes was satisfied, and Spain 
 entered upon her office of mediation. 
 
 At the request of Charles III Vergennes drew up a 
 statement of the terms which he would insist upon as the 
 necessary conditions of peace. The first requirement was 
 the recognition of independence for the United States, 
 with which must be included New York, Long Island, and 
 Rhode Island, and such other parts of the original colonies 
 as were in the hands of the British. France asked no col- 
 onies in North America, but declared her willingness to 
 allow Great Britain to keep Canada, while the Florida* 
 should go to Spain. 32 
 
 All these suggestions were agreeable to Florida 
 Blanca. He particularly desired that the English should 
 keep Canada. He argued that they were so enfeebled by 
 the war that they would no longer be dangerous to the 
 two crowns, while their possession of that country would 
 prove a constant source of friction between them and the 
 United States and keep the latter loyal to France and 
 Spain. 33 
 
 In regard to the new republic, Vergennes did not hesi- 
 tate to express himself clearly. "All my correspondence- 
 for several months," he wrote, "has proven to Florida 
 
 80 Vergennes to Montmorin. (Esf>., 590, no. 51, new 48.) 
 81 Montmorin to Vergennes, September 29. (Ibid., 590, no. 188, foL 
 458.) Charles indicated that he would approve the chief French demands ; 
 the independence of the United States and the expulsion of the English 
 from Dunkirk. Montmorin did not doubt that Spain would seek to get 
 the British out of the way of their commerce but he thought she would 
 leave them Canada. 
 
 S2 Vergennes to Mcntmorin, October 8, 1778. (Ibid, 591, no. 62.) 
 83 Montmorin to Vergennes, October 19, 1778 (ibid., 591, no. 33, new 
 61) ; October 15 (ibid., no. 22, new 60). 
 
209] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 99 
 
 Blanca that we do not differ from him in principles. 
 .... We ask only independence for the thirteen states 
 of America, without including any of the English posses- 
 sions which have not taken part in the rebellion. We do 
 not desire that a new republic shall arise which shall be- 
 come the exclusive mistress of this immense continent." 
 Such a case, he feared, would make the new republic a 
 hard taskmaster for the other nations of the world. He 
 agreed, too, that it was best to leave Canada in possession 
 of the English to make the Americans perceive the neces- 
 sity of having "des garants, des allees, et des protecteurs."" 
 The Floridas, or at least West Florida, Vergennes thought 
 should go to Spain, as they were in no sense connected with 
 the other provinces. 34 
 
 On this much, Spain and France agreed; but here 
 the likeness ends. With France, independence for the- 
 United States was the prime condition of the war; with 
 Spain, an extension of her empire was the chief aim. Ver- 
 gennes regarded the United States as a friend and ally to 
 
 34 "Nous ne demandons 1'independance que pour les treize Etats de 
 1'Amerique que seront unis entre eux, sans y comprendre aucune des 
 autres possessions angloises qui n'ont point participe a leur insurrection. 
 Nous ne desirons pas a beaucoup pres que la nouvelle Republique que 
 s'eleve demeure maitresse exclusive de tout cet immense continent. Bientot 
 suffisant seule a ses besoins, les autres nations seroient dans le cas de 
 compter avec elle, parceque pouvant se passer de toutes, elle leur feroit 
 
 tres certainment une loi tres dure Neamoins, il n'en 
 
 est pas moins intc-ressant que les Anglois demeurent maitres du 
 Canada et de la Nouvelle Ecosse, ils feront la jalousie de ce peuple, qui 
 pourroit bien se retourner ailleurs et de lui faire sentir la necessite d'avoir 
 des garants des allees, et des protecteurs. Quant au partage que M. le 
 comte de floride blanche desiroit qui fut fait des Florides dont 1'occidentale 
 devroit revenir a 1'Espagne, vous vous rappelerez M. quels ont etc notre 
 vue et notre interet, et que ne pouvoit pas stipuler pour cette Couronne 
 nous avons pose dans 1'acte separe du traite d'alliance une preuve d'attente 
 sur laquelle elle pourroit edifier un jour." Vergennes thought that the 
 dominant spirit of the Americans was that of trade, and this, he thought, 
 would be less dangerous to their neighbors. Vergennes to Montmorin, 
 October 30, 1778. (Esp., 591, no. 43, new 67; Circourt, III, 310; Doniol, 
 Histoire, III, 561.) 
 
100 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [210 
 
 be treated generously ; Florida Blanca regarded them as a 
 rival and enemy, to be restricted in boundaries and subject 
 to the restraints of Spanish ambition. He preferred to 
 leave the British in possession of New York or other strong- 
 holds from which they might annoy the American repub- 
 lic. 35 
 
 While Vergennes was willing that Canada should 
 remain in British hands he would by no means consent to 
 the Spanish demand that such a settlement should be guar- 
 anteed. 36 He favored rather the pushing northward of the 
 American boundaries. On the question of allowing the 
 British to keep some posts within the limits of the thirteen 
 colonies he took a decided stand. "We can not think," he 
 wrote, "of letting any of the states, either New York or 
 Khode Island, remain in dependence on Great Britain with- 
 out contradicting our first principles ;" and he firmly main- 
 tained that if this was not agreed to he would not make 
 peace. 37 
 
 "Florida Blanca declared that the question of these posts demanded 
 much reflection. It would be difficult, he reasoned, to get the Americans 
 to consent to such terms and "il fut persuade que les Anglois n'en tireroient 
 jamais aucune utilite, ces places devenant entre leurs mains a piu pres ce 
 que sont les presides d'Afrique dans celles des Espagnoles." Montmorin 
 to Vergennes, October 19, 1778. (Esp., 591, no. 33, new 61.) 
 
 36 Florida Blanca insisted that such an arrangement should be made. 
 Montmorin objected that with the English in possession of Halifax they 
 could prey upon the commerce of the United States and threaten the 
 possessions of the two crowns. He also feared that the United States 
 would not consent to such an arrangement. The Spanish minister replied 
 that after the war the English would be too feeble to be dangerous, and 
 they would be still less so if they could arouse between them and the 
 Americans some permanent sources of division. For this reason Canada 
 and Acadia must be left to the British. As to the United States, he 
 declared they had need of peace and must accept whatever was given 
 them. Montmorin declared that he feared greatly the prosperity and 
 progress of the Americans. Montmorin to Vergennes, October 19, 1778. 
 (Ibid.) 
 
 S7 "I1 faudra renoncer a la paix, monsieur, si les Anglois mettoient 
 pour condition qu'ils conserveroient New-York ou telle autre place ou 
 territoire dependant des treize Provinces unis de I'Amerique." Vergennes 
 to Montmorin, October 17, 1778 (ibid., 591, no. 25, new 63; Circourt, III, 
 307) ; November 2, 1778 (Esp., no. 68, fol. 118). 
 
211] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 101 
 
 In spite of these differences Vergennes did not cease 
 his efforts to involve Spain in the war. He ridiculed the 
 idea that the United States would ever become dangerous 
 as neighbors of Spain, and declared that the Spanish mon- 
 archy had much more to fear from the aggressions of Great 
 Britain. 38 His efforts, however, were unavailing, and he 
 decided to guarantee Canada and Nova Scotia to Great 
 Britain and the Floridas to Spain. 39 
 
 Other causes were forcing Spain to the position 
 of France. Great Britain had treated with contempt the 
 offers of Charles III to mediate, even after she had made 
 the first suggestion. Florida Blanca was convinced that 
 the English were merely seeking to gain time, and that 
 their intentions were hostile. 40 New reports arrived of 
 British aggressions in America. In the Gulf of Honduras 
 and the Bay of Campeche, they were becoming more inso- 
 lent ; and they were suspected of trying to incite an upris- 
 ing in Louisiana. 41 There was no prospect that Great Brit- 
 ain would surrender the Floridas, and the ever-increasing 
 fleets that hung around Gibraltar was an added source of 
 irritation. 
 
 The condition of France was becoming desperate. 
 D'Estaing had suffered reverses in America and the insur- 
 gents were driven out of Rhode Island. The French treas- 
 ury could with difficulty stand the strain and it was evi- 
 dent that something must be done at once. Vergennes de- 
 
 S8 "C'est gratuitement quon voit dans ce peuple nouveau une race de 
 conquerans." Vergennes to Montmorin, October 19, 1778. (Doniol, His- 
 toire, III, 559.) 
 
 39 Vergennes sent sketch of proposed treaty to Spain, October 17, 
 1778. (Esp., 591, no. 25, new 63.) 
 
 40 "M. de Florideblanche .... pense comme vous que les Anglois 
 ne cherchent qu'a gagner du terns et qu'il faut nous preparer ensemble 
 a la guerre pour le prentems .... II est sans aucune confiance dans 
 la negociation pour la paix . . . ." Montmorin to Vergennes, November 
 12, 1778. (Esp., 591, no. 52; Doniol, Histoire, III, 575.) 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, November 4. (Esp., 591, no. 54, new 
 67.) 
 
102 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [212 
 
 cided that he must accept the Spanish conditions, for as- 
 sistance was indispensable. 42 
 
 Altho Florida Blanca still feared war, he thought 
 its dangers were no longer as great as were those of peace. 
 He declared his willingness still to negotiate; but he said 
 it must be on terms honorable to the two crowns. 43 He 
 spoke of war with "la chaleur et 1'espece d'enthousiasme" 
 and Montrnorin was convinced that there would be no fur- 
 ther difficulty. 44 
 
 Altho Florida Blanca was expecting war, he wished 
 to wring a few more concessions from his ally before com- 
 mitting himself. Vergennes had consented to assist the 
 Spaniards to recover Gibraltar, Minorca, Jamaica, and 
 Florida, and to help drive the English from Honduras and 
 ainpeche, 45 but this did not satisfy the minister of Charles 
 III. He could ask no more gains in territory, so he turned 
 his efforts to crippling the United States. News had ar- 
 rived at Madrid in June, 1778, that the Americans had 
 captured two British forts on the Mississippi and were 
 threatening Florida. 46 This information doubtless in- 
 creased the cupidity and jealousy of the Spanish court, for 
 its tone became immediately more hostile to the Americans. 
 Soon afterwards rumor credited the Americans with com- 
 plete success in Florida, 47 and Vergennes again urged 
 Florida Blanca to recognize the United States while there 
 was yet an opportunity to reap some advantages. News 
 
 42 Vergennes to Montrnorin, November 2. (Esp., 591, no. 68, fol. 118.) 
 43 "Dans le courant du mois prochain nous verron clair si on veut nous 
 amuser, ou si Ton desire reelement la paix. dans le second cas, il faut 
 faire la paix, mais honorablement et utilement pour les deux Couronnes." 
 Montmorin to Vergennes, on interview with Florida Blanca, "ses propres 
 paroles," October 26, 1778. (Ibid., 591, no. 52; Circourt, III, 309.) 
 
 44 En un mot, Monsieur, je suis convaincu que le mois prochain ne se 
 passera pas sans nous ayons commence a concerter le plan que nous 
 executerons au printems prochain." Esp., 591, no. 52. 
 
 45 Vergennes to Montmorin, December 24, 1778. (Ibid., 591, no. 154.) 
 48 Galvez reported this to the Spanish court. Montmorin to Vergennes, 
 June i, 1778. (Ibid., 589, no. 98, new 30.) 
 
 47 Vergennes to Montmorin, July 6. (Ibid., 590, no. 12, new 45.) 
 
213] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 103 
 
 soon arrived, however, that the Americans were repulsed 
 and had retreated to Louisiana. This confirmed the poor 
 opinion which the Spaniards held of the insurgents, but 
 placed them also in a difficult position with reference to 
 the British court. Galvez refused to surrender the fugi- 
 tives 48 and the English became threatening. They built 
 a fort at Manchac on the Mississippi, which not only pro- 
 tected the Floridas but threatened New Orleans as well. 49 
 
 Vergennes pointed out the danger of the English move- 
 ments, but Spain still held back. Florida Blanca was now 
 thoroly alarmed, however, and resolved to get ready 
 for war. 50 In spite of his hatred of the British, he declared 
 that his master would never enter into an alliance with 
 the Americans, nor even recognize them, 51 for they were 
 likely soon to become an enemy. 52 Neither English nor 
 Americans, he asserted, should come near Spanish terri- 
 tory, and he announced his determination to drive them 
 both from the Mississippi Valley. 53 
 
 Altho Vergennes regarded the Spanish demands 
 as "gigantesque," he agreed to all of them except the pro- 
 posal to give to Spain the Mississippi Valley. He said 
 nothing to Florida Blanca of the West, but to Gerard he 
 
 48 Montmorin to Vergennes, July 6. (Esp., no. 14, new 38.) 
 
 4Vergennes wrote of this : "suivant les renseignments qu'on me donne 
 il a le double objet de couvrir la Floride Occidentale et de chasser les 
 Espagnoles de la droite de cette riviere en cas de guerre." July 17. (Ibid., 
 590, no. 36, new 47.) Aranda pointed out the same danger to his court, 
 July 20. (Ibid., no. 45.) 
 
 BO Montmorin to Vergennes, November 29. (Ibid., 591, no. 72, new 67.) 
 
 "Florida Blanca declared that Charles III could never extend recog- 
 nition to rebels. Montmorin to Vergennes, August 17, 1778. (Ibid., 590, 
 no. 89, new 49.) 
 
 S2 Same to same, November 12. (Ibid., no. 70.) 
 
 * a lbid. "M. de Floride-Blanche veut reprendre la Floride : il veut 
 chasser les Anglois et les Americains des deux rives du Mississipi." Same 
 to same, November 20. (Ibid., new 72; Doniol, Histoire, III, 585.) 
 
104 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [214 
 
 expressed his astonishment at Spanish greediness. 54 Ver- 
 gennes also insisted that the prime object of the war should 
 be the independence of the United States, and to this the 
 Court of Madrid refused to give its assent. Florida Blanca 
 argued that such a clause in their agreement was out of 
 place and useless; out of place because Spain could make 
 her own arrangements with the United States, and useless 
 because the independence of that country w r as the first and 
 only cause of the war. 55 
 
 The discussion of a convention between the two coun- 
 tries dragged on during the early months of 1779. Florida 
 Blanca, in rejecting the plan submitted by Vergennes, 
 promised to draw up one himself, but had 1 offered excuse 
 after excuse for delay. He complained that the Americans 
 were not aggressive enough in conducting the war. He 
 feared that they would seek to annex Canada, and it was 
 desirable that this province should remain in English 
 hands. To all these objections Vergennes returned the 
 strongest assurances of his willingness to meet the desires 
 of Spain and declared that his minister to Congress would 
 labor to deter the Americans from an invasion of Canada 
 and would urge them to a more vigorous policy against 
 Great Britain. 56 Florida Blanca objected that France was 
 less anxious for the advantages of Spain than for the in- 
 dependence of the United States. Vergennes had declared 
 that this independence was the prime object of the war, but 
 in order to satisfy Spanish pride he offered to express the 
 two clauses in the same terms. 57 Spain still dallied with 
 
 "Regarding the demand of the United States for the right to navigate 
 the Mississippi and the objections of Spain, Vergennes wrote : "et je vous 
 assure qu'il me paroitroit etonnant qu'on refusal a cette demande." October 
 26, 1778. (E. U., V, no. 43, fol. 119.) 
 
 "Vergennes proposed a convention, article 4 of which declared that 
 war should continue until the independence of the United States was 
 secured. (Esp., 592, no. 105.) Florida Blanca complained because inde- 
 pendence was made more definite than the other objects of the war. Mont- 
 morin to Vergennes, February 28, 1779. (Ibid., no. 140, new 14.) 
 
 "Vergennes to Florida Blanca, March 18, 1779. (Ibid., 593, no. 33, 
 fol. 81.) 
 
 "Doniol, Histoire, III, 634. 
 
215] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 105 
 
 the terms of the convention and the attitude of Vergennes 
 became daily more importunate. He wrote letter after let- 
 ter to Montmorin explaining the pressing needs of France 
 and the necessity of immediate aid from Spain. 58 
 
 To the offer of Vergennes to express in the same terms 
 the articles on the advantages to be given Spain and that 
 on the independence of the United States, Spain interposed 
 another objection. Florida Blanca insisted that Spain 
 could never recognize the independence of the American 
 republic until England had done so, for fear that such rec- 
 ognition would set a bad example to the Spanish colonies 
 in America. He declared he could go no farther than to 
 give secret aid to Congress. 59 
 
 To this argument Montmorin replied that the recogni- 
 tion of independence would not be so bad an example as 
 the giving of secret aid. The maneuvres of Spain aroused 
 in the mind of Vergennes the greatest indignation, and he 
 wrote bitterly of a "minister who most often puts caprice 
 in place of reason." He likewise denounced the objections 
 of Spain to recognize the independence of the United 
 States. "Nothing is gratuitous on the part of Spain," he 
 wrote. "We know that she wants concessions from the 
 Americans, as well as from us." He did not oppose this, 
 but he regarded it as absurd that France should guarantee 
 possessions to a nation so powerful as Spain. He vigor- 
 ously declared that France would not lower her honor or 
 dignity by entering into a convention nullifying the treaty 
 of February, 1778, and that if Spain joined France she 
 must do so with that understanding. 60 
 
 Spain had exhausted her objections to the alliance 
 and finally in April began to formulate her demands. Her 
 first proposition was that the two powers should agree not 
 to lay down arms until the English had surrendered Gib- 
 raltar. All other conquests, however, were to be subject 
 
 58 Doniol, Histoire, III, 634. 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1779. (Esp., 593, no. 68, new 
 25, fol. 157.) 
 
 *Es{>., 593, no. 41. Doniol, Histoire, III, 672. 
 
106 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [216 
 
 to the fortunes of war. This project did not definitely rec- 
 ognize the independence of the United States, but made it 
 a subject of negotiation (Art. 4). Article five granted the 
 same advantages to France as had the convention previ- 
 ously submitted by Vergennes. It provided for the aboli- 
 tion of the articles of the peace of Utrecht, restricting 
 France from fortifying Dunkirk and such other places as 
 she wished to fortify; the expulsion of the English from 
 Newfoundland, the possession of St. Domingo, and Sene- 
 gal, besides various commercial advantages. Article seven 
 proposed for Spain the recovery of Gibraltar, the posses- 
 sion of Mobile and the restitution of Pensacola and 1 the 
 coast of Florida along the "Bahama Canal" so that no 
 foreign power could get any foothold there, the expulsion 
 of the English from Honduras and Campeche, and the res- 
 titution of the isle of Minorca. 61 
 
 In the discussion of this convention Montmorin ex- 
 pressed his surprise at Spain's demand for the restitution 
 of Minorca, for before this she had apparently attached 
 little importance to it. Florida Blanca replied' to his ob- 
 jections that this acquisition would be of little importance 
 if the others were granted. To the extent of the coast of 
 Florida desired by Spain Montmorin objected. Before this 
 Florida Blanca had asked only for Mobile and Pensacola, 
 T)ut now he desired all the shore around the south end of 
 the peninsula and some distance up the east coast. The 
 Spanish minister, however, insisted that all this was essen- 
 tial to assure the navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. 62 From 
 the negotiations preceding this convention Montmorin de- 
 cided that it did not seriously sacrifice the interests of 
 France and accepted Florida Blanca's suggestion that 
 they sign at once. 
 
 ei Montmorin to Vergennes, March 30, 1779. (Esp., 593, no. 68, new 
 25, fol. 157.) Text of this convention in Doniol, Transcripts, Nou. Acq. 
 Francs., 6488, 189; Doniol, Histoire, III, 803. 
 
 2 Montmorin to Vergennes, April 13, 1779. (Esp., 593, no. 112, new 
 31, fol. 255.) 
 
217] BLANCA AND THE CONVENTION WITH FRANCE 107 
 
 The articles relating to America did not contradict 
 the previous understanding as to the settlement of affairs 
 in the New World. Congress had already offered Spain 
 the Floridas and could not object to the article in the con- 
 vention regarding them. There was nothing in the conven- 
 tion to imply Spanish control over the Mississippi river 
 and valley, and no limitations on the boundaries of the 
 United States. The provision that France should not lay 
 down arms until the restitution of Gibraltar was secure^ 
 has been most criticized 63 on the ground that it bound the 
 United States to continue a war in the interests of Spain. 
 The treaty between the United States and France provided 
 that neither power should make peace until independence 
 was secured, and no treaty was to be signed without the 
 consent of both nations. There is no evidence that France 
 ever sought to use this clause to further her own or Spain's 
 ambitions, and she never held the United States bound to 
 help regain Gibraltar. Nor did the Americans have the 
 means to aid in such a project, as they could act only on 
 the defensive and with the expulsion of the English they 
 ould do nothing more. 
 
 France herself received no adequate compensation for 
 the concessions she made to secure the alliance of Spain. 
 The right to fortify Dunkirk was no equivalent for the 
 guarantee of Gibraltar, and the other promises that the 
 crowns made to each other bore almost the same degree of 
 relative importance. Vergennes, however, approved the 
 signing of the convention, and looked eagerly forward to 
 the time when the French navy, reinforced by that of Spain, 
 should sweep the English from the seas. Florida Blanca 
 began hostilities at once, and commenced with vigor the 
 first campaign, which he believed would end the struggle. 
 Across the Atlantic the new republic was striving not only 
 for independence from Great Britain, but was also labor- 
 ing to protect its integrity from the grasping ambition of 
 Spain. 
 
 "Bancroft, United States, V, 308; Van Tyne, American Revolution, 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF A CONGRESSIONAL POLICY 
 TOWARD THE WEST. 
 
 News of the signing of the treaty of alliance with 
 France produced throughout the United States a feeling of 
 joy and hope. There were some who objected to receiving 
 aid from the ancient enemy of the English race, but there 
 Was almost universal expression of satisfaction. The inter- 
 vention of France, however, was to prove the source of a 
 new anxiety to patriotic Americans. It meant that Con- 
 gress must work out a policy in regard to the disposition of 
 the West. What should be the western boundaries of the 
 new nation? Should it have the right freely to navigate 
 the Mississippi River? These questions were closely con- 
 nected and presented themselves together. Great Britain 
 and Spain as well as the United States had interests there. 
 Within Congress there were hostile factions, each with a 
 very definite view of the question ; and upon these factions 
 the adroit and ingratiating Gerard played with varying 
 success. 
 
 Gerard had definite instructions regarding Canada 
 and the Floridas; but he had not been given a line as to 
 what attitude France would take respecting the ownership 
 of Eastern Louisiana or the navigation of the Mississippi 
 River. He could only act upon his instructions to look 
 after the interests of Spain. If that country would be bene- 
 fited by the complete control of the Mississippi Valley, 
 Gerard might well argue that he should work to this end. 
 On the other hand, he was to do nothing to incur the ill will 
 of Congress, and so he could not feel at liberty freely to 
 oppose the designs of the Americans towards the West. 
 
 Thus Gerard felt compelled to play a double game. 
 When Miralles proposed the extension of Spanish power 
 
 1 08 
 
219] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 109 
 
 over the West, he opposed it as unreasonable, and declared 
 that Congress would never consent to such an arrange- 
 ment; but to his own court he suggested that if Spain 
 would seize the course of the Mississippi below the mouth 
 of the Ohio, the negotiations would be much simplified. 1 
 
 The scheme of Miralles was based on the idea of re- 
 stricting the territory of the United States and thus mak- 
 ing them dependent on the good will of the two crowns. 
 He considered the Americans as dangerous as the British, 
 and believed they would show their hostility at the first 
 opportunity. 2 Gerard assured his friend of the good dispo- 
 sition of the Americans and suggested to Congress that, in 
 order to reassure Spain, it should pass a resolution declar- 
 ing an enemy of the Confederation any state which should 
 seek to extend its borders beyond "certain limits." 3 Gerard 
 informed Morris, the secretary of Congress for foreign af- 
 fairs, that Spain was afraid of the great numbers of Eng- 
 lish who had established themselves on the Mississippi, and 
 also of the Indians who had been driven westward by the 
 Americans. They were a serious menace, he declared, to 
 the Spanish frontier, and a cause of constant jealousy, 
 while the designs of Congress upon the Floridas had 
 
 *. U., V, 35- 
 
 2 Miralles proposed to Gerard that France should seize Canada and 
 Spain should have the West and the Floridas. He gave as his reasons 
 that the United States would soon become the enemies of Spain. Gerard 
 opposed his opinions on this score, but declared that Congress never would 
 consent to the Spanish terms. He pointed out the American expeditions 
 to the West, and advised Miralles that if he hoped to realize his ambitions 
 he must not place the Americans in a position to formulate their demands. 
 Gerard to Vergennes, July 20, 1778. (Ibid., IV, no. 41, fol. 97.) 
 
 3 Gerard stated that several members of Congress approved this sug- 
 gestion and that one offered to make a motion to that effect. He expressed 
 high opinions of the fairness and justice of Congress, and of its desire 
 to satisfy Spain. Same to same, September n. (Ibid., no. 114, fols. 311- 
 3i6.) 
 
110 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [220 
 
 aroused in the Spanish court great anxiety and alarm. 4 He 
 suggested that Congress should give some guarantee to 
 Spain of its moderation, and should formally renounce in 
 her favor St. Augustine, Mobile and Pensacola, together 
 with the navigation of the Mississippi. 
 
 Gerard was gradually led to this position by the ur- 
 gency of Miralles and the indifference of Morris. There was 
 nothing in the instructions of Vergennes to warrant such 
 a stand, but the American secretary was willing to agree 
 to the full demands of the Spanish court. Morris admitted 
 that the anxiety of Spain was founded on reason as far as 
 some sections of the country were concerned, but asserted 
 that there were no grounds to fear the Confederation as a 
 whole. He confided that he and several of his colleagues 
 were impressed with the necessity of establishing a law of 
 concendo imperio which would prevent any additions to 
 the states already in the union. If Spain had the exclusive 
 navigation of the Mississippi, he argued, the immense 
 population which would form along that river and the 
 Great Lakes could more easily be held in subjection to the 
 East. On the other hand, if this population should hold 
 control of the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence, he ex- 
 pressed the belief that it would soon dominate both the 
 United States and Spain. As for the Floridas, Morris 
 declared that Congress would cede them to Spain for a 
 money compensation; for he urged that there was also 
 great danger of southern aggression. In Canada, however, 
 he showed great interest, and used every effort to get 
 France to assist in its conquest. 5 
 
 4 Gerard carefully refrained from admitting any knowledge of the 
 wishes of Spain and claimed to speak only from general conditions. He 
 thought that Spain had good reason to fear the American spirit of adven- 
 ture, and pointed out the dangers to Spain of the American western policy. 
 Gerard to Vergennes, October 20. (E. V '., V. no. 33, fols. 68-84.) 
 
 B Gerard to Vergennes. (Ibid.) Morris urged that unless the English 
 were driven out of Canada the French could never hope to have any share 
 in the fisheries, and he offered to help put Newfoundland into French 
 hands. He declared that with Canada in British hands the United States 
 must remain dependent on the British Empire. 
 
221] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 111 
 
 Gerard objected to Morris that there were many Amer- 
 icans who insisted upon the right to navigate the Missis- 
 sippi, and suggested that there might be many difficulties 
 in turning it over to Spain. To this the secretary for for- 
 eign affairs replied, that those who held to such demands 
 were actuated by their financial interests, and that if the 
 matter were presented in its true light to Congress he 
 could hope for much. It is noteworthy that in all this 
 discussion Gerard did not once suggest that Spain should 
 be given Eastern Louisiana. Against the wishes of the 
 Spanish court and without any support from the Ameri- 
 cans he was willing to leave this territory to the new repub- 
 lic. But with the consent of Congress, Spain should have 
 the Floridas and the exclusive navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi River. 
 
 Until the fall of 1778 Vergennes had taken no position 
 regarding the West. He admitted that he did not under- 
 stand the question. His attitude towards the United 
 States was not illiberal. When he heard of the Spanish 
 claims to the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi he 
 expressed his surprise. He left the decision as to the atti- 
 tude of France in this dispute to Gerard, who should un- 
 derstand the claims of both parties. If it appeared to the 
 latter that Spain could justly maintain her pretention, he 
 was to win over Congress; but if it appeared that the 
 Americans had the right to navigate the river, he was to 
 urge their claim on the court of Madrid. 6 
 
 Vergennes expressed no objections to the American 
 possession of the West, but protested against any project 
 
 e "je veux parler de la navigation du Mississipi ; . . . . je juge par 
 la situation des lieux que les Americains insisteront sur la liberte de la 
 navigation du Mississipi a cause des etablissements qu'ils propose de former 
 sur 1'Ohio, et je vous assure qu'il me paroitroit etonnant qu'on refusat a 
 cette demande. Cependant il peut y avoir pour la negative des considera- 
 tions locales que j'ignore et peuvent meriter quel qu'attention . . ." Ver- 
 gennes to Gerard, October 26. (E. U., V, no. 43, fol. 105 ; Doniol, Histoire, 
 HI, 569.) 
 
112 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [222 
 
 of giving Spain anything except the Floridas. 7 When he 
 received Gerard's account of his negotiations with Morris, 
 he gave his approval of the action of the French represent- 
 ative. He believed that the United States never should and 
 never would undertake any conquests , and he urged 
 Gerard to persuade Congress that it was not for the inter- 
 est of the republic to extend its possessions. Any aggres- 
 sion, he declared, would arouse jealousies and would for- 
 feit the protection of the powers, who alone could guaran- 
 tee to the United States their political existence. 8 The 
 chief end of the war, he contended, was American inde- 
 pendence; and when that was attained the question of 
 territories could easily be decided. 9 
 
 Gerard sought to carry out the instructions of his mas- 
 ter. He urged Congress to pacific measures toward Spain, 
 and begged it to renounce all idea of conquest except such 
 as it could make from the English, and to be content with 
 the territory it already had. 10 Between Spain and the 
 tfnited States he urged that there should be an estab- 
 lished line of separation. He declared that all Europe was 
 suspicious of the new nation, and urged Congress to make 
 clear its pacific intention. His efforts were not in vain, 
 for several members of Congress agreed with him, and 
 
 7 "Cet agent [Miralles] croit qu'il seroit d'une bonne politique que nous 
 serassions les colonies par le Nord tandisque 1'Espagne les serreroit par 
 
 le Sud. Vous savez que nous sommes d'une opinion contraire " 
 
 (E. U., V, no. 43, fol. 105.) 
 
 8 Vergennes to Gerard, November 18. (Ibid., V, no. 78, fol. 179.) 
 ""le seul point qui importe aux Etats-Unis c'est de faire reconnoitre 
 leur independance par la Grande Bretagne." October 26. (Ibid., no. 43, 
 fol. 105.) 
 
 10 "qu'il me sembloit en general qu'il convenoit qu'ils se hatassent de fixer 
 d'une maniere positive et authentique aux yeux de tout 1'univers le 
 caractere paisible qui doit etre inherent a une republique telle que la leur; 
 qu'en marquent un desir permanent de la paix et une resolution arretee de 
 renouncer a toute conquete et de se contenter de leur territoire et des 
 conquetes qu'ils pourroient faire sur les Anglois." Gerard to Vergennes, 
 December 12. (Ibid., V, no. 46, fols. 301-316.) 
 
223] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 113 
 
 some even declared that their country was already too 
 large to be well governed. 11 
 
 While the discussion of the disposition of the West 
 was being carried on, the Americans were trying to make 
 good their rights by force of arms. Already they had 
 established themselves in Kentucky and Tennessee, while 
 the British were confined to a few posts along the Great 
 Lakes and some of the rivers of the Northwest. 12 So strong 
 were the Americans that they were able to repulse a num- 
 ber of raids led by the British into this country and to bid 
 defiance to any attempts to conquer them. 
 
 In the Southwest Galvez, the Spanish governor of 
 New Orleans, had been from the first a friend to America 
 and an enemy to Great Britain. He allowed Captain 
 Willing of Philadelphia to establish military headquarters 
 in New Orelans, where he could fit out expeditions, recruit 
 men and issue seditious proclamations to the English set- 
 tlers in Florida and along the Mississippi. Galvez openly 
 furnished ships to carry supplies up the Mississippi, and 
 aided all sorts of plans against the British in the West. 13 
 He even furnished money and supplies to Willing for an 
 -expedition against Mobile. 14 
 
 The expedition of Major Willing against the Floridas 
 attracted much attention. Galvez wrote in glowing terms 
 of the bravery and success of the Americans. Gerard re- 
 ported the undertaking less favorably as led "by a young 
 fool, who in a commercial expedition has drawn the Eng- 
 lish from a great part of the Mississippi." 15 In Europe, 
 
 11 "Le President et un delegue de Virginie convenrent de la justesse 
 de mes remarques, et que leur empire etoit deja trop grande, pour esperer 
 qu'il put etre bien gouverne." Gerard to Vergennes, December 22. (E. U., 
 V, no. 47, fol. 349.) Account of interview with a committee of Congress. 
 
 12 Van Tyne, American Revolution, 280. 
 
 18 For accounts of the activities of Galvez see memorials in Public 
 Record Office. (C. O., 5, vol. 117.) See also relation of Pollock to Con- 
 gress. (Papers of the Continental Congress, no. 50, fol. I et seq.) 
 
 14 Montmorin to Vergennes. (Esp., 588, no. 98, new 30, fol. 248.) 
 
 "Gerard to Vergennes, July 16. (E. U ., IV, no. 23, fols. 97-102.) 
 
114 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [224 
 
 also, the move aroused much speculation. Vergennes was 
 much alarmed for fear that this invasion would cause 
 trouble between the United States and Spain. The expedi- 
 tion, however, accomplished nothing and it was left to 
 Galvez to conquer the Floridas. 
 
 Of more vital importance was the expedition of George 
 Rogers Clark sent out in 1778, largely through the support 
 of Virginia. He captured a number of posts in the North- 
 west and gave the United States a real basis on which to 
 maintain their rights to this country. Gerard wrote that 
 the "success of Colonel Querk in the country of the Illinois 
 presents the Americans with a new apas." 1Q Great interest 
 was aroused in America and Europe alike by this attempt 
 to get possession of the West. In Europe it was reported 
 that a great body of Americans had driven the English out 
 of Illinois. 17 The British still held Detroit and the Great 
 Lakes; but the region south of it was clear and the best 
 title to it rested with the United States. 
 
 With the success of Clark in the West, there devel- 
 oped a new interest in Congress for its preservation to the 
 republic. At an interview between Gerard and a commit- 
 tee of Congress in December, 1778, the whole situation was 
 again gone over. Gerard declared that he succeeded in 
 convincing Jay and a delegate from Virginia of the wis- 
 dom of renouncing all conquests, whereupon the member 
 from New York became angry. 18 This was the beginning 
 
 "Gerard wrote to Vergennes that Virginia and South Carolina cared 
 nothing for the conquest of the Floridas. "Ces etats," he continued,, 
 "aiment mieux diriger 1'emploi de leur forces centre ce qu'on appelle 
 Backountries. Les succes du Major Querk dans le Pays des Illinois leur 
 presentent un nouvel apas. On croit que les Anglois sont totalement 
 chasses des rives de 1'Ohio et du Mississipi." December 19, (E. U., V,. 
 no. 47, fols. 349-358.) 
 
 11 'Arc. Nat. C., 13; Colonies, Correspondence General, nos. 14-16. 
 
 18 Gerard to Vergennes, December 22. (E. U., no. 47, fol. 349.) It is- 
 not improbable that R. H. Lee was the Virginia member of this committee,, 
 for he held views at that time very similar to those described by Gerard. 
 See his letter to Patrick Henry, November 15, 1778. (Letters of R. H. Lee f 
 I, 452.) 
 
225] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 115 
 
 of a long series of bitter disputes between Gerard and 
 some members of Congress which was to lead to the failure 
 of all his schemes regarding the West. 
 
 Gerard soon came to the realization that there were 
 many influential men interested in the Mississippi Valley, 
 and he saw that the question must be handled carefully. 
 The western interests, he wrote, were centered in three 
 regions, the Illinois and two great projects for the settle- 
 ment of the Ohio, and all these, he thought, would unite 
 at the first suggestion of giving up any part of the West. 19 
 Against this party Gerard held control of the committee 
 of foreign affairs, which was instructed to do nothing with- 
 out his advice. 20 
 
 The party opposed to Gerard increased greatly in 
 strength, but the French minister still thought he had a 
 majority of Congress with him. The "anti-Gallicans" de- 
 clared that the right to navigate the Mississippi was indis- 
 pensable to the development of the West, and maintained 
 that there were involved the interests not only of the peo- 
 ple of the Illinois, but those in the Southwest as well. 
 These people formed a part of the American nation, they 
 argued, and must not be abandoned. 21 Thus was the issue 
 squarely drawn. Gerard had urged Miralles not to give 
 the Americans an opportunity to formulate their demands ; 
 but in spite of his cunning they had now declared their 
 right to the whole West. With this party the French min- 
 ister at once came into conflict. 
 \ 
 
 19 "les proprietaires des Terres des Illinois et de deux etablissements 
 immenses projettes et commences sur 1'Ohio n'epargneroient rien pour y 
 susciter des obstacles, et ils auroient bien des moyens pour former un 
 parti puissant." December 22. (E. U., V, no. 47, fol. 349.) 
 
 20 Gerard to Vergennes, January 28, 1/79. (Ibid., VII, no. 52, fols. 
 129-135.) 
 
 21 "d'autres croyent que la conservation de la navigation du Mississipi 
 
 est absolument indispensable. Ces se fondent sur les interets 
 
 de la population qui s'est etablie sur 1'Ohio vers la riviere des illinois dans 
 le Pays des Natchez dans la floride occidentale, ils disent quils ne peuvent 
 abandonner leurs compatriots qui se sont formes en corps de nation et 
 qui demandent a etre admis a la confederation americaine." Gerard to 
 Vergennes, January 28, 1770. (Ibid.) 
 
116 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [226 
 
 Gerard had never before suggested to the Americans 
 that they should give up their claims to the Mississippi 
 Valley. To Morris he had talked only of the navigation 
 of the Mississippi River. He wished to look after the in- 
 terests of Spain, and when he found the Americans so 
 yielding he naturally concluded that they would surrender 
 their whole title to the West. To Congress he now de- 
 clared that this territory no more belonged to the United 
 States than to Spain if that country should wish to con- 
 quer it. The rightful boundaries of the United States, he 
 argued, were those they had possessed as colonies, and the 
 proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act had forever de- 
 prived them of the West. The pretentious of Congress, he 
 insisted, were contrary to the spirit of the alliance with 
 France, whose king would not prolong the war a single day 
 in order to maintain them. Such a course, he urged, would 
 also incur the enmity of Spain, so that when the time for 
 peace came they would find themselves crushed between 
 British hatred and Spanish jealousy. The honor and in- 
 terests of the United States, he added, were opposed to 
 conquest. "Already your territory is unwieldy," he insin- 
 uated, "and how much more so will it become by this enor- 
 mous addition of dominion." 22 
 
 Gerard was not prepared, however, to fight for the 
 claims of Spain. Altho his conduct thus far had re- 
 ceived the approval of Vergennes, the foreign minister 
 
 22 " .... j'ai ajoute que les Etats-Unis n'avoient aucune sorte de droit 
 sur les possessions du Roi d'Angleterre qui n'apartient egalement 
 au Roi d'Espagne, quand il seroit en guerre avec 1'angre. Que 
 leur droit se bornoit au Territoire qu'ils possedoient comme 
 Colonies Angloises." He continued that the United States had claimed 
 to be thirteen states "et fondee [a nation] sur les moyens les plus 
 legitimes, et que rien ne seroit plus dangereux pour leur honneur leur 
 consideration la Constance de leurs principes et la confiance dans leur 
 bonne foi, qu'ils se sont envisages euxmemes comme une republique 
 commerqante qui ne pourroit pas meme conserver une armee permanente ; 
 qu'ils eprouent deja combien 1'etendue de leur territoire rendoit une 
 administration utile et active difficile a etablir." Gerard to Vergennes, 
 January 28. (E. U,, VII, no. 52.) 
 
227] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 117 
 
 had shown no desire to support the extreme demands of 
 Spain for possession of the West. Vergennes had never 
 opposed the claims of the Americans to this territory, 
 but had condemned the Spanish pretensions as "mon- 
 strous." 23 He had expressed his acceptance of all the 
 Spanish demands, however, except their claim to control 
 the Mississippi Valley. He had also instructed Gerard not 
 to oppose the American demands. Under these circum- 
 stances the minister to the United States could not go 
 to extremities, and began to conciliate. He urged that it 
 would not be well to make of Canada a fourteenth state, 
 but suggested that much might be expected of the gener- 
 osity of the King of Spain if he were conceded Florida. 
 
 The propositions of Gerard drew more closely party 
 lines in Congress. His friends were at first better organ- 
 ized and he felt that his policy would triumph. He was 
 definitely promised the Floridas for Spain and thought 
 he would soon win the West. 24 He believed that he had 
 seized the critical moment, when the party of expansion 
 was weakest, to deprive the United States of lands which 
 they regarded "as the patrimony for their overflowing 
 population." He was sure that the Americans must yield 
 because of their desire for peace and their despair of 
 making further conquests. 25 
 
 23 Vergennes stood for the idea of giving the Floridas to Spain and 
 allowing Great Britain to keep Canada. See p. 08. Altho he might in- 
 clude in Canada much of the old Northwest still the implication would 
 be that he conceded the West to Congress. He had spoken without com- 
 plaint of the American occupation of the Ohio and Illinois regions, but 
 had opposed the claims of Spain. 
 
 2 *Gerard reported that he had good information that the committee 
 of foreign affairs would cede the Floridas to Spain if the Americans con- 
 quered theru and would renounce all pretensions that could give offense 
 to that crown. Gerard to Vergennes, January 29. (E. U., VII, no. 533, fol. 
 136.) 
 
 25 "Peutetre 1'esperance de la paix et le desespoir de faire aucune 
 conquete rendra les Americains moins difficiles sur cet objet." Gerard to 
 Vergennes, February 15. (Ibid., no. 89, fols. 215-219.) 
 
118 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [228 
 
 Altho Gerard doubtless had a strong following, the 
 anti-Gallican party was rapidly organizing. It not only 
 insisted upon possession of the West and the freedom of 
 the Mississippi, but began to agitate for an extension of 
 the northern frontier. 26 They showed also considerable 
 hostility to Spain and Gerard had a new cause of worry. 
 He tried to get them to suspend discussion of the northern 
 boundary, and demanded renewed assurances that Spain 
 should have the Floridas. 
 
 Altho checked for a time, Gerard did not give up his 
 policy. To the members of Congress he maintained that 
 the court of Madrid should be conciliated and its friend- 
 ship sought. He disclaimed any intention to push the in- 
 terests of Spain, and declared that he sought only her 
 alliance. That nation was content with her possessions, 
 he affirmed, but she might take a more friendly attitude 
 towards the American cause if Congress would offer the 
 possession of Pensacola and the exclusive navigation of 
 the Mississippi. On the north he argued that the British 
 held Canada so firmly that they could be dislodged only 
 after a "most fortunate war." For this reason he urged 
 that Congress should be willing to make peace without 
 seeking any additions of territory. France, he said, 
 desired nothing but the independence of the United States, 
 and asked only that her ally should work to this end. 27 
 
 The words of Gerard produced different effects on the 
 different members of Congress. Most of them were willing 
 to surrender all claims to Pensacola but the proposition 
 to give Spain the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi 
 aroused much angry discussion. Gerard skilfully built 
 up his party once more to the acceptance of his views. 
 He worked shrewdly on the jealousies of the eastern dele- 
 gates to secure their aid and even made an impression on 
 
 I8 La difficulte la plus reelle et la plus facheuse que les Americains 
 pourroient clever seroit celle qui regarderoit les limites de leur territoire 
 vis-a-vis de 1'Angre." (E. V., VII, no. 89, fols. 215-219.) 
 
 "Gerard to Vergennes, February 17 (ibid., VII, no. 98, fol. 233) ; 
 Pebruary 18 (ibid., no. 100, fol. 244). 
 
229] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 119 
 
 those from the south. Some of the Virginia and North 
 Carolina members admitted their fear that the West was 
 being rapidly settled by a lawless class which would prove 
 dangerous to the older governments. These people would 
 become equally hostile to the Spanish power, they agreed, 
 and some way must be devised to restrain them. To ac- 
 complish this they were willing to hand over to the court 
 of Madrid complete control of the navigation of the Mis- 
 sissippi and of the Gulf of Mexico. Some of the Gerard 
 party, however, contended for a depot or place of deposit 
 at the mouth of the river, 28 altho they sought first of all 
 the alliance of Spain. 
 
 On the question of pushing the northern boundary 
 further into Canada Gerard took a decided stand. Wash- 
 ington had declared the conquest of Canada imprac- 
 ticable; and the French minister felt he could urge the 
 same. Accordingly he asked Congress once more to re- 
 nounce all pretensions to this territory. It has not 
 been in rebellion, he argued, and has no claim to help. 
 This is not a war of conquest, but only to attain inde- 
 pendence for the United States; and when this is accom- 
 plished, we are ready to make peace. 29 
 
 Gerard soon felt that his policy was again in the open 
 and he prepared to make the most of his opportunities. He 
 was sure of the Floridas and felt convinced that he could 
 get the control of the Mississippi for Spain, provided the 
 western settlements were conceded a port on the Gulf. 
 Spain, however, was expected to reward this concession 
 with a large sum of money. 30 
 
 The projects of Gerard furnished the issue for a great 
 battle in Congress. On one side were the New Englanders 
 who insisted on the acquisition of Nova Scotia and the 
 
 28 Gerard to Vergennes. (E. U., VII, no. 98, f ol. 233 ; no. 100, fol. 244.) 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 >Gerard to Vergennes, March I. (Ibid., VII, no. 123, fol. 244.) 
 
120 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [230 
 
 fisheries necessary for their prosperity and safety. 81 On 
 the other side was the southern and western party which 
 gave preeminence to the question of the navigation of the 
 Mississippi and American influence in the West. Gerard 
 was the center of all controversy and his house became 
 the committee room of Congress. Here came his partisans 
 to discuss the situation and to fortify themselves with 
 arguments. Here came the opponents of his policy to 
 argue with him and to present the claims of their country. 
 Among the former Gerard lists Gouveneur Morris and 
 John Jay. His most determined foes were the Adams 
 family and the Lees. These two families had formed 
 a sort of alliance termed the "Junto", and they were 
 untiring in their opposition to the measures of France. 
 Gerard declared that the purpose of the opposition was to 
 maintain the war until the British could send a new com- 
 mission which they thought would offer liberal terms of 
 peace. 32 
 
 A special commission of five appointed by Congress 
 to consider the foreign affairs of the country reported on 
 February 23. It urged that Canada should be restricted 
 to the boundaries contended for by Great Britain in 
 the Seven Years War, which meant that the United States 
 should control the Great Lakes on the north and extend 
 westward to the Mississippi. The southern boundary it 
 placed as tAe northern line of Florida. The committee 
 also maintained the right to the free navigation of the 
 
 31 "Les 4 Etats de la nouvelle Angre ont fortement represente la 
 necessite de cette stipulation." E. U., VII, no. 123, fol. 244. After 
 March I, Gerard could not count so strongly on the help of a party, but 
 he depended more on a sort of personal following which he was building 
 up, particularly among the smaller states. Jenifer of Maryland was the 
 most important of these men. 
 
 82 The position of many members of Congress is very puzzling. Lee 
 favored the ideas of Gerard toward the West during the fall of 1778 (see 
 p. 119). The next spring he led the opposition. Jay was counted as a 
 friend of the Spanish policy. His later opinions are well known. Gerard 
 declared that Samuel Adams wished to continue the war to save his im- 
 portance, and that that was the purpose of his coalition with the Lees. 
 March 4. (Ibid., VII, no. 133, fol. 328.) 
 
231] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 121 
 
 Mississippi and to the fisheries of Newfoundland. It 
 recommended the conquest of the Floridas which should 
 be sold to Spain and also the occupation of Nova Scotia. 
 The discussion of this report occupied many days, 33 and 
 from the despatches of Gerard we get an idea of the bitter- 
 ness aroused. The report of the committee embodies two 
 sets of ideas ; those of the East and those of the South. The 
 party of the East looked for an extension of boundaries 
 far into Canada, with the conquest of Nova Scotia and the 
 freedom of the Newfoundland fisheries. The party of the 
 South held to the possession of the Mississippi Valley 
 with the freedom to navigate that river. Gerard opposed 
 the efforts of both. He conferred with one of his friends 
 in Congress, and they agreed that a simple and fair ar- 
 rangement for the western boundary would be to take the 
 line marked off by the proclamation of 1763. 34 
 
 The plan of Gerard received no serious consideration 
 from Congress. The debates, however, covered a wide 
 range of matter. In them the whole history of British 
 colonization and diplomacy was gone over. The trend of 
 the discussion soon convinced Gerard that the claim to 
 Nova Scotia would be abandoned, but the question of the 
 northwest boundary was more difficult to settle. The ad- 
 vocates of expansion justified the claim to the Northwest 
 Territory, not only on historical grounds but likewise on 
 
 33 This committee represented well the different sections of the coun- 
 try : it included S. Adams of Massachusetts, G. Morris of New York, 
 Witherspoon of New Jersey, Smith of Virginia, and Burke of North 
 Carolina. In its report it urged the interests of every section and thus 
 threw the whole question into Congress. Journals of Continental Con- 
 gress (Ford ed.), XIII, 241-243. 
 
 34 "L'un des delegues m'a montre le plan qu'il a redige pour les [limitesl 
 fixer Quoique cette matiere ne me soit pas assez connue dans ses details 
 pour fixer mon jugement ce plan a beaucoup soulage 1'aprehension ou 
 j'etois que quelque grand Proprietaire du Sud ne se chargeat de ce travail. 
 On propose de determiner ces limites en prenant le Traitee de Paris d'une 
 main et 1'autre la Proclamation [of 1763] cette methode m'a paru 
 simple et facile et je n'ai pu m'empecher d'y applaudir." Gerard to Ver- 
 gennes, March 3. (E. U., VII, no. 67, fol. 131.) 
 
122 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [232 
 
 grounds of conquest and occupation. They further con- 
 tended that the surrender of this region would mean the 
 acknowledgment of the validity of the Quebec Act, which 
 was one of the causes of the Revolution. 
 
 The debates on the question of the boundaries and the 
 navigation of the Mississippi continued from the 1st of 
 March to the 19th. On the question of the Mississippi 
 important interests in the West and South united to de- 
 mand the right of navigation. Those interested in the 
 Northwest Territory pictured the great advantages to the 
 South of controlling the trade of this region. If our people 
 do not get this trade, they argued, the English will get it, 
 and thus become powerful in a region where it is to the 
 interest of both Spain and the United States to keep them 
 out. 35 
 
 So powerful did the opposition to giving up the Mis- 
 sissippi become that Gerard felt it necessary to interfere. 
 Through one of his partisans he learned that the western 
 party proposed to treat directly with the British crown 
 for the navigation of the Mississippi. Gerard protested 
 vigorously against this scheme as vicious and dangerous 
 in its purpose and unjust in its tendencies and declared 
 that Congress acted as if it wished to dictate first to Spain, 
 then to Great Britain. He remarked that Spain had no 
 contract with the United States and was under no obliga- 
 tion to them, and that the Spanish king would never con- 
 sent to surrender his rights over the Mississippi, and on 
 this question the king of France would probably take his 
 part. He observed that it seemed strange that Congress 
 should think of treating with England to despoil Spain 
 and that it appeared that America would soon be at war 
 with the Spanish monarchy. 36 This interview with Gerard 
 was skillfully used by his friends, who believed that they 
 had a majority against the proposition. They desired, 
 however, to win over the important state of Virginia. They 
 
 35 Gerard to Vergennes, March 8. (E. U., no. 135, fol. 339.) 
 "Ibid. 
 
233] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 123 
 
 expected to bring the question to a vote on March 11, but 
 in the meantime the delegates from South Carolina were 
 recalled and some time was necessary to rebuild their ma- 
 jority. 37 The final vote on the question of making the 
 right to navigate the Mississippi an ultimatum was taken 
 on March 24. Only one state favored the motion. Two 
 were divided and the others voted no. 38 
 
 The debate on the boundaries was milder and there 
 was from the beginning greater unanimity of sentiment. 
 Several of those opposed to the policy of Gerard informed 
 him that they would not demand conquests beyond what 
 really belonged to the thirteen states. 39 There was consid- 
 erable fear that if Canada were left to Great Britain she 
 would prove a dangerous neighbor. Gerard reassured 
 them with the promise of the unfaltering support of 
 France, who would never allow them to sink back under 
 the power of her rival. He also suggested that the whole 
 quesiton of boundaries be left until after the peace for set- 
 tlement; but this plan received no support at all in Con- 
 gress. 40 The debates on the acquisition of Nova Scotia 
 convinced the New England delegates that it would not 
 carry, and they substituted a demand for the right of fish- 
 ing on the banks of Newfoundland, which was carried by a 
 close vote. 41 
 
 On March 19 Congress decided on the boundaries it 
 would demancj. as an ultimatum. This boundary ran ir- 
 regularly to the south end of Lake Nipissing, thence to 
 the source of the Mississippi, down the middle of that river 
 to the thirty-first parallel, thence along the northern boun- 
 dary of Florida to the Atlantic. 42 This vote was a compro- 
 mise. It did not grant the demands of New England for 
 
 37 Gerard to Vergennes, March 10, 17/9. (E. U., no. 143, fol. 367.) 
 BS Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XIII, 369. 
 39 Gerard to Vergennes, March 8. (E. U., VII, no. 135, new 339.) 
 40 Gerard to Vergennes, March 12, 1779. (Ibid., no. 144, fol. 375.) 
 41 Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XIII, 372; Gerard to 
 Vergennes, March 18, 1779. (E. U., VII, no. 159, fol. 407.) 
 
 42 Journals of Continental Congress, (Ford ed.), XIII, 339-341. 
 
124 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [234 
 
 the possession of Nova Scotia, but laid claim to the whole 
 region of the Great Lakes. At the same time the South and 
 West received no promise of the navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi or the possession of the Floridas. In this contest the 
 partisans of Gerard had not yet showed their full strength. 
 They felt sure of a majority in favor of the French policy, 
 but were confronted by the untiring opposition of Lee. 
 Such was the changing character of Congress that no pol- 
 icy could well be assured; and the partisans of Gerard 
 were waiting until the time when they could carry their 
 measure "by such a majority that Mr. Lee would find him- 
 self the only one in opposition." 43 
 
 The vote of Congress in March on the question of the 
 boundaries and the Mississippi had satisfied no one. On 
 the question of the fisheries the anti-Gallican party had 
 been active. 44 New England was not content with the idea 
 of having the English on its northern boundaries and re- 
 newed its proposal to conquer Canada. 45 Gerard was tire- 
 less in his opposition to this plan and urged upon Congress 
 the futility of continuing the war for this purpose. 46 While 
 he admitted that the treaty of alliance did not define the 
 limits of the states whose independence was guaranteed, 
 he still insisted that the guarantee could not be made to 
 apply to territories not in the possession of the United 
 States. 47 
 
 By July Gerard had come to feel that his policy with 
 regard to the boundaries was triumphant. He had built 
 up a large party in and out of Congress, but he had lost 
 his influence over the leading men. He depended on men 
 of minor caliber, like Jenifer of Maryland, who sided with 
 the French policy and favored limiting the boundaries of 
 the United States as much as possible. 48 
 
 43 Gerard to Vergennes. (E. U., VIII, no. to.) 
 
 "Doniol, Histolre, IV, 1/5. 
 
 45 Gerard to Vergennes, March 14. (E, U., VIII, no. 48, new 83.) 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 47 Gerard to Vergennes, March 21. (Ibid., no. 59, new 88.) 
 
 4B Ibid., IX, no. 17, new 103. 
 
235] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 125 
 
 On the 12th of July Gerard held a conference with 
 Congress in committee of the whole, in which he reviewed 
 the whole history of French intervention and declared that 
 the world was convinced that the war had no object of con- 
 quest but only to secure the independence of the United 
 States. In this conference he urged also that Congress 
 should seek the favor of Spain by the offer of such mod- 
 erate terms as would incline His Catholic Majesty to the 
 American interests. 49 
 
 As a result of his management Gerard believed that 
 he held the affair of boundaries well under control. He 
 did not flatter himself that Congress would renounce all 
 its former pretentious, but he believed it would make no 
 objection to the cession of the Floridas to Spain and would 
 tacitly let go the navigation of the Mississippi. He even 
 expressed his belief that if necessary it would willingly 
 abandon Georgia. 50 
 
 The partisans of Gerard had postponed the final vote 
 on the boundaries until a time when they could hope to 
 carry their plan by an overwhelming majority. On July 
 18 Gerard wrote that the committee of foreign affairs stood 
 eight to four in favor of his measure, and that his party 
 worked unceasingly to win over votes. One of the most 
 active supporters of this policy was John Jay, the presi- 
 dent of Congress. Gerard, who himself took an active part 
 in the campaign, thought that it w r as time to bring the 
 question to a vote and to pass some measures favored by 
 the opposition in return for their support on the boun- 
 daries. He felt that the strength of the anti-Gallicans was 
 weakened by the failure of England to offer favorable 
 terms of peace ; but if the opposition should carry the vote 
 in Congress, he proposed to attack its validity on the 
 ground that the Articles of Confederation provided that 
 every state must ratify a treaty. 51 
 
 49 'Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XIV, 829-835. 
 50 Gerard to Vergennes, July 20, 1779. (E. U., IX, no. 46, new 109.) 
 51 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 221-222. 
 
126 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [236 
 
 In the meanwhile the "Junto" opposing the policy of 
 Gerard was very active. Its organization and workings 
 are obscure, but it suddenly attained great power in Con- 
 gress. Its strength was unknown to Gerard, who declared 
 that the influence of Lee in Virginia was destroyed and 
 the opposition was confined to New England. 52 
 
 On the question of the boundaries and the treaty with 
 Spain several plans were laid before Congress. Gerard 
 favored a plan to outline the boundaries as vaguely as 
 possible and to leave their final settlement until after the 
 peace. On the question of cessions to Spain he felt there 
 would be no difficulty. 33 
 
 In spite of his words of assurance, however, Gerard 
 feared the power of the "Junto." He learned from his con- 
 fidants that it would ask Congress to demand as an ulti- 
 matum an extension of boundaries as far north as 46. The 
 opposition declared openly that the justice of the king 
 would never refuse these conditions so essential to the 
 safety of the United States. 54 
 
 Early in August the battle in Congress openly began. 
 On the 5th, M'Kean moved that, if Great Britain persisted 
 in the war, Congress should seek to conclude treaties with 
 both France and Spain providing for the conquest of Can- 
 ada, Nova Scotia, and Bermuda. Spain and France were 
 to be offered for their aid equal rights in the fisheries. This 
 resolution was made in the interests of the northern states ; 
 but the southern delegation secured an amendment pro- 
 viding for the conquest of the Floridas and demanding the 
 "free navigation of the Mississippi." 55 
 
 * 2 Gerard to Vergennes. (. U., IX, no. 100, new 116.) 
 
 **Ibid. The actual disposition of Congress, Gerard wrote, is "to re- 
 nounce the Floridas and tacitly to give up the navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi, of which the two banks belong to that crown [Spain] provided they 
 are given a free port for exporting their goods and importing merchan- 
 dise." 
 
 "Doniol, Histoire, IV, 222. 
 
 "Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XIV, 924-926. 
 
237] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 127 
 
 This resolution was an open defiance to Gerard. It 
 repudiated all his advice and outlined a new policy of con- 
 quest. It is doubtful, however, if it was put forth seriously 
 as a plan of action. More likely it was intended as a feeler 
 to test the strength of the anti-Gallican party in Congress. 
 The motion was not voted upon, but it threw open for de- 
 bate the whole question of the territories and of the navi- 
 gation of the Mississippi. Both sides understood that this 
 was the last card of the game. Gerard, however, felt that 
 he would win, for he controlled the committee of foreign 
 affairs, and through it transmitted his arguments and 
 threats to Congress. 
 
 In the meantime a special committee had been ap- 
 pointed to draw up terms of peace. It had done its work 
 in consultation with Gerard, and on August 14 presented 
 its report. The terms were more moderate than the de- 
 mands of the anti-Gallicans. Florida and Canada were to 
 be given up, but the northern boundary was to extend as 
 far as Lake Nipissing. 56 Several reasons were back of this 
 decision. News had just reached America of the alliance 
 between France and Spain ; and it was seen that the latter 
 power would make strong demands for the Floridas. 57 
 
 The entrance of Spain into the war was made the 
 occasion for new propositions of a treaty of alliance. On 
 this question the extreme anti-Gallicans maintained their 
 fight. On September 9 they introduced a resolution pro- 
 viding for an alliance with Spain whereby that power was 
 to assure to the United States the possession of Canada, 
 Nova Scotia, Bermudas, and the Floridas, as well as the 
 navigation of the Mississippi. This motion provided, how- 
 ever, that if Spain should insist upon it, the United States 
 would cede to her the Floridas and the exclusive naviga- 
 tion of the Mississippi below the thirty-first parallel. The 
 character of this resolution clearly revealed the weakness 
 of the extreme position, and it was tabled at once to make 
 way for a more moderate one. After several days of debate 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XIV, 956-967. 
 87 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 205. 
 
128 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [238 
 
 it was resolved that if Spain would accede to the treaty of 
 alliance, Congress would make no objection to her acquir- 
 ing the Floridas, provided that the "United States shall 
 enjoy the free navigation of the river Mississippi into and 
 from the sea." 58 
 
 On information furnished by Gerard that England 
 would probably soon seek peace, Congress resolved to send 
 a representative to Europe who should be on the ground 
 when the first advances were made. There were two lead- 
 ing candidates named, Jay and John Adams. Gerard and 
 his partisans favored Jay as being more moderate in his 
 views, while the anti-Gallicans gave their support to 
 Adams. 59 After several days of delay the vote was taken 
 on September 27 and Adams was elected minister plenipo- 
 tentiary to negotiate a treaty of peace with Great Brit- 
 ain. 60 At the same time Jay was elected minister plenipo- 
 tentiary to negotiate a treaty of alliance with Spain. On 
 the next day instructions for Jay were decided upon, which 
 in regard to the Floridas and the Mississippi were identical 
 with those agreed to on the 9th. 61 On October 13 Wither 
 spoon moved that Jay be allowed to recede from the claim 
 of a free navigation of the Mississippi below the thirty-first 
 parallel, if such were necessary in order to obtain the alli- 
 ance with Spain, but this motion was promptly defeated. 62 
 The instructions to Adams were the same as those agreed 
 upon on August 14. 
 
 The resolutions of August and September in regard 
 to the boundaries and the Mississippi mark the formation 
 of a definite policy by Congress. This policy was a com- 
 promise between the East and the South, between the 
 French party and the anti-Gallicans. While Gerard was 
 not entirely satisfied with the conditions laid down, he felt 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.) f XV, 1042-1046. 
 
 "Doniol, Histoire, IV, 209. 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XV, 1113. 
 
 **Ibid., 1116. 
 
 * 2 Ibid., 1168. 
 
239] CONGRESSIONAL POLICY TOWARD THE WEST 129 
 
 that they were not unfavorable to France. 63 He regarded 
 the appointment of Jay as a decided step towards "con- 
 ciliation" with Spain, and as a bid for the friendship of 
 Charles III. 
 
 The work of Gerard as minister to the United States 
 was finished. He had long been laboring under a severe 
 malady attributed to the climate of Philadelphia and had 
 struggled heroically against disease while upholding the 
 interests of France and Spain. The Chevalier de la Lu- 
 zerne, his successor, had already arrived in the United 
 States and was in close touch with him. Congress regarded 
 his departure with regret. In spite of his interference in 
 American politics he retained his popularity till the last. 
 Congress had his picture painted for its council chamber 
 and wrote Louis XVI a flattering letter describing his loy- 
 alty and ability. 
 
 The mission of Gerard was unfortunate from the 
 standpoint of both his own country and the United States. 
 To Vergennes he gave a one-sided picture of conditions in 
 the United States, and led him to believe that the great 
 body of sober-minded, intelligent citizens favored restrict- 
 ing the boundaries of their country, and that the opposi- 
 tion was made up of a few narrow and bigoted fanatics. 
 His meddling in the politics of Congress and his forma- 
 tion of a faction around himself led to serious results. It 
 made the opponents of the French policy more determined 
 and aggressive and aroused, in the minds of many, sus- 
 picion of the honesty and friendship of the French mon- 
 archy. This interference of Gerard alienated the ablest 
 men in Congress, men like Jay and Morris, who had hon- 
 estly favored the policy he advocated. As a result of his 
 course of action the diplomacy of the United States was 
 entrusted to his enemies and thus to men who looked with 
 distruct on any policy advocated by Frenchmen. John 
 Adams was elected minister plenipotentiary by an anti- 
 French party and against the will of Gerard. Jay had 
 
 83 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 211. 
 
130 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [240 
 
 long been associated with the French policy, but his change 
 of heart was probably known to his colleagues before his 
 election as minister to Spain. Gerard had carried out his 
 policy without direction and without consultation with 
 the French foreign office. After his first instructions, 
 which directed him to look after the interests of Spain 
 and to restrain Congress from all attempts at conquest, he 
 acted nearly always on his own initiative. The result was 
 a lack of harmony between the representations of Gerard 
 in Philadelphia and the promise of Vergennes at Paris. 
 The course of Gerard received the approval of Vergennes 
 and considerably modified the general policy of the French 
 court; and upon his reports were based the instructions to 
 his successor Luzerne. Thus arose a serious divergence 
 between the views of Congress and those of Vergennes, 
 which was in turn to lead to mutual jealousies and sus- 
 picions; and to the conduct of Gerard is due in a large 
 measure the irritation which later broke out between the 
 French minister of foreign affairs and the envoys of the 
 United States. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE. 
 
 The alliance between France and Spain did not win 
 a friend for the United States. While it added another 
 to the list of those fighting the British Empire, it divided 
 the councils of her enemies; for the ambitions of Spain 
 were unalterabty opposed to the interests and aims of the 
 United States. Florida Blanca had long feared the growth 
 of a powerful rival in the New World, and he had urged 
 that Great Britain be allowed to keep Canada as a check 
 on the power of the new republic. Altho it was not stipu- 
 lated in the convention, it was tacitly understood between 
 France and Spain that no further effort would be made 
 to conquer the British possessions north of the thirteen 
 states. 1 Spain had made exorbitant demands for terri- 
 tories which the United States also claimed. To her pos- 
 session of the Floridas there was no objection; but her 
 demand for the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi 
 aroused much opposition, and her claim to territory east of 
 that river did not receive the slightest support in Congress. 
 
 Back of Spain's purpose to keep the United States 
 a weak and dependent nation was the desire to build up a 
 powerful empire around the Gulf of Mexico. Cuba, Mex- 
 ica, and Louisiana formed three quadrants of this circle, 
 and the possession of Eastern Louisiana and the Floridas 
 would complete it. If, on the other hand, the vast regions 
 to the east of the Mississippi should become peopled by a 
 
 a Florida Blanca wrote to Montmorin, April 2, 1779 : "dans la cas ou 
 la paix se feroit il convient de ne pas chasser les Anglois du Canada, 
 cependant dans le cas contraire il seroit a mon avis, necessaire de porter 
 les vues des Americains de ce cote la ce qui serviroit a leur donner un 
 objet d'occupations a prevenir leurs discorde intestines . . ." Esp., 593, 
 no. 77, new 180. Vergennes wrote to Florida Blanca, March 18, that 
 while the Americans were anxious for Canada he would seek to induce 
 them to give up such an undertaking. Ibid., no. 33, new 81. 
 
132 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [242 
 
 powerful and alien race, Spain would confront a new dan- 
 ger when frontiersmen, seeking an outlet to the sea, should 
 come down and overwhelm her dominions. To avert this 
 already apparent danger, the United States must be kept 
 to the Atlantic seaboard, and her possessions hemmed in 
 by Great Britain. The power and ambitions of the British 
 Empire were known; but the formation of this strange 
 republic on the outskirts of civilization filled the ministers 
 of Charles III with strange and tempestuous terror. 
 
 Hardly had the ink dried on the signatures of the con- 
 vention uniting France and Spain in the war when Florida 
 Blanca proposed fresh restrictions on the growth of the 
 United States. He suggested that Great Britain be left 
 in possession of all posts in America which she was able 
 to hold at the time of the ratification of the treaty of peace. 
 This would mean that New York, Long Island, the greater 
 part of Connecticut, and Rhode Island, including the city 
 of Newport, most of Georgia and a part of Virginia should 
 probably be left to the British Empire. 2 
 
 It is to Vergennes's credit that he gave an absolute 
 refusal to Spain's proposition. He declared that such a 
 course would make it appear as if France had abandoned 
 her allies, and would provoke their suspicion and enmity. 
 It would be an open violation of the treaty of alliance, 
 and as such would bring dishonor on the crown of France. 3 
 This decided stand on the part of the French ministry put 
 an early end to the plan of a settlement of American affairs 
 
 2 Florida Blanca argued that the Americans needed peace so badly 
 that they must accept any conditions. He maintained that by this ar- 
 rangement the United States would always be menaced by Great Britain 
 and consequently would become more attached to France. Montmorin 
 to Vergennes, April 26, 1779. (Esp., 593, no. 137, new 320.) 
 
 3 Montmorin pleaded against the schemes of the Spanish minister 
 that France had engagements with the Americans which bound her to 
 a different policy. He declared that Congress would never consent to 
 any such arrangement. (Ibid.) Vergennes also opposed the idea. May, 
 1779- (Ibid., 593, no. 147, new 320; ibid., 593, no. 157, new 343; ibid., 
 594, new 192.) 
 
243] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 133 
 
 on the basis of uti possidetis and assured to the United 
 States a geographical unity. 
 
 The Floridas, however, were subject to conquest, and 
 to this point the Spanish arms were at once directed. Spain 
 was anxious to have the help of the United States in this 
 undertaking, and altho she would give no recognition to 
 them, Florida Blanca asked Vergennes to have them send 
 an expedition into Florida from the north while Spanish 
 troops attacked it from the Mississippi. 4 Vergennes prom- 
 ised to do what he could, and instructed Luzerne to pro- 
 pose the matter to Congress. 5 The mind of the Spanish 
 minister however, soon took another turn; he gave up the 
 idea of cooperation with the American troops, and in June 
 sent orders to Galvez to attack the British possessions in 
 America, and ordered other Spanish governors to help 
 him. 6 
 
 While Spain was definitely planning the conquest of 
 the Floridas, Vergennes was worrying about the attitude 
 of Congress on the question of boundaries. He could learn 
 nothing from Franklin, but he feared the demands of the 
 republic would be excessive. He was determined, however, 
 in the negotiations for peace, to insist on no more than the 
 integrity of the thirteen states. 7 
 
 The attitude of Spain was also a source of uneasiness. 
 Montmorin had intimated that negotiations between that 
 
 4 I1 seroit bon cependant que les Colons cherchassent a entrer dans la 
 Floride ou de notre cote nous ferons une forte diversion par le Missis- 
 sippi." Florida Blanca to Vergennes. (Ibid., 594, no. 36, new 80.) 
 
 5 May and June, 1779. (Ibid., 594, no. 40, new 263; no. 41, new 267.) 
 To Florida Blanca. (Ibid., 594, no. 68, new 171 ; no. 73, new 180.) 
 
 It appears that Florida Blanca became suspicious of Congress. He 
 lost interest in St. Augustine and proposed to leave it to the Americans. 
 Montmorin to Vergennes, May n. (Ibid., 594, no. 40, new 76; ibid., no. 
 120, fol. 288.) For orders to other governors see Don Juan Baptiste 
 Bonet, governor of San Domingo, to Gonzales de Castegon. (C. O. 5, 131, 
 fol. 7: letter book of intercepted correspondence.) 
 
 7 Vergennes to Bretuel, June 29. (Esp., 594, no. 151, fol. 350.) 
 
134 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [244 
 
 country and the United States must be bandied carefully. 8 
 Vergennes knew that Spain had no regard for the interests 
 of the United States, and from her projects on the Missis- 
 sippi he felt that his two allies were in danger of clashing. 9 
 
 In spite of the importunities of Vergennes, 10 Florida 
 Blanca was slow to formulate his demands. He had re- 
 alized that he could not obtain a settlement on the basis of 
 uti possidetix, but he hoped that Great Britain could keep 
 Canada and East Florida. West Florida with Pensacola 
 and Mobile he was determined to have for Spain in order 
 to exclude all foreigners from the Gulf of Mexico. To this 
 end also he insisted upon the exclusive navigation of the 
 Mississippi River, and intimated that this was a point he 
 would not yield. All Spanish America, he maintained, 
 must be closed to British and Americans alike. 11 
 
 Vergennes was soon relieved of his anxiety on this 
 score by the report from America that Congress would 
 probably surrender its claims on Canada and the Floridas, 
 as well as the right to navigate the Mississippi River. At 
 the same time he was informed of the strong feeling among 
 the eastern delegates and their proposal to treat directly 
 with Great Britain for the navigation of the Mississippi. 
 In the light of this information Vergennes prepared the 
 instructions to Luzerne, Gerard's successor, and it is evi- 
 dent that he wrote in a spirit of hostility to the United 
 States. He believed that there was a strong English party 
 in America, and if such could exist at this time he argued 
 that no dependence could be placed on the permanent 
 friendship of the republic. 12 
 
 8 He asked that the United States send an envoy of a character supple 
 and conciliatory; one with firmness combined with sweetness and patience. 
 Montmorin to Vergennes, June 3. (Esp., 594, no. 85.) 
 
 Vergennes, "Instructions to Luzerne," July 18. (. U., IX, no. 41, 
 new i.) 
 
 10 Vergennes asked often for the views of Spain. He declared his 
 unwillingness to cross her policy unless it were absolutely necessary. 
 EsP-, 594, no. 201. 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, July 31. (Ibid., 594, no. 220, new 491.) 
 
 12 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 97. 
 
245] VERGEXXES AXD THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 135 
 
 With this view of the attitude of the United States, 
 Vergennes opposed their position on every point of dispute, 
 the western boundaries, the navigation of the Mississippi, 
 and the Floridas. Just what was the western boundary 
 he did not attempt to decide; but he feared the danger of 
 a dispute between the United States and Spain over the 
 lands from which the English might be driven. He accord- 
 ingly urged Luzerne to get Congress to fix a definite boun- 
 dary to their claims on the West, and especially did he 
 fear the aggressions of the southern states. 13 
 
 On the question of the navigation of the Mississippi, 
 Vergennes was still more unfriendly to the claims of the 
 United States. He had before this expressed himself favor- 
 ably to the American demand ; but now he declared that it 
 was shown to his satisfaction that the Americans had no 
 right to it. Before the Kevolution, he said, the boundaries 
 of the United Provinces in no place extended to the Mis- 
 sissippi; and it was absurd to claim the rights of Great 
 Britain, whose authority they had abjured. 14 He instructed 
 Luzerne to demand from Congress the renunciation of all 
 pretentions to the right to navigate the river, and the prom- 
 ise to limit themselves to soliciting the favor of the king of 
 Spain. 
 
 13 Vergennes wrote that it was the greatest interest of Congress to 
 fix "d'une maniere claire, precise, et invariable les limites et les pretentions 
 des Etats-Unis dans cette partie [the West] et surtout en prennent les 
 precautions les plus effkaces pour prevoir les empietemens et pour 
 empecher les Provinces du Sud de se laisser aller a 1'esprit de conquete." 
 "Instructions to Luzerne," July 18, 1779. (E. U., IX, no. 41, new I.) 
 
 14 "A 1'egard de la navigation sur le Mississipi, il est a peu pres 
 demontre que les Americains n'y ont aucun droit puisqu'au moment de 
 la revolution les limites des 13 Etats-Unis ne s'etendoient point jusqu'au 
 Fleuve et qu'il Seroit abuser de leur part de reclamer les droits de 1'Angre, 
 c'est a dire d'une Puissance dont ils ont abjure la domination. II convient 
 done que le Congres s'explique categoriquement sur cette matiere en 
 declarant que les Etats-unis ne forment aucune pretention a la Navigation 
 du Mississipi et en se bornant a solliciter de la bonne volonte du Roi 
 d'Espagne les faveurs que son interet lui permettra d'accorder aux Ameri- 
 cains." Ibid. 
 
136 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [246 
 
 To the Floridas also Vergennes declared that the 
 United States had no right. As a peaceful British colony 
 they were still open to the conquest of Spain. They were 
 of no value to the United States, whereas Spain had a 
 double reason for their conquest. In the first place they 
 had formerly been a part of the Spanish empire, and in 
 the second they were essential to the commercial interests 
 of Spain and to her control of the Gulf of Mexico. 15 
 
 Three separate kinds of considerations dictated these 
 instructions : dislike of the anti-Gallican party in Congress, 
 and a fear that it would lead the country into a policy 
 unfavorable to France ; a desire to win better support from 
 Spain; and lastly a belief that many Americans favored 
 these terms. Just how strong each of these considerations 
 was it is impossible to say. For the first and third he had 
 ample reason in the reports of Gerard; but he seemed 
 never to have had much at heart the ambitions of the court 
 of Madrid. 
 
 The Spanish government had given orders for the con- 
 quest of the Floridas and had authorized Don Juan de 
 Miralles to plan in concert with the Americans a joint 
 attack on these provinces. Before deciding on any further 
 military operations, however, it was necessary to wait for 
 news from D'Estaing, who had been instructed to make a 
 naval demonstration in support of the Spanish attack. 16 
 In spite of these measures Spain still showed no disposi- 
 tion to aid the cause of the independence of the United 
 States. She was willing to grant them subsidies, but these 
 were to be used only in an expedition against the Floridas. 
 As month after month passed with no news of the success 
 of its projects the anxiety and ambition of the Spanish 
 court increased. The king felt that the conquest of Pen- 
 sacola was the object in America nearest his heart and 
 
 15 La Floride ne rendra les Etats-unis ni plus riches ni plus puissans 
 et sa position geographique n'augmentera point leur surete exterieure." 
 E. U., IX, no. 41, new i. 
 
 18 Montmorin to Vergennes, September 27, 1779. (Esp., 595, no. 165, 
 fol. 438.) 
 
247] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 137 
 
 urged that every effort be put forth to effect it. 17 Plans 
 were hurriedly rushed through to send reinforcements from 
 Havana and the Americans were to be urged more vigor- 
 ously to aid the expedition. 18 So fearful did Florida Blanca 
 become of the fate of the Spanish forces that he finally 
 entreated France to send assistance 19 and promised that if 
 Vergennes would furnish troops and ships for the attack 
 he would pay all their expenses. 20 To this proposal Ver- 
 gennes at once agreed and declared that the French would 
 be ready at any time with their contingent. 21 He thought, 
 however, that it would not be advisable to speak of this 
 project to the Americans for fear of offending them. At 
 the end of December news came of the success of Galvez 
 on the Mississippi and his proposed attack on Mobile and 
 Pensacola; 22 and Florida Blanca at once began to hedge 
 on the project of accepting French aid in the conquest of 
 Florida. He felt that if victory could be assured by the 
 efforts of the Spanish troops alone, it would be folly to 
 pay for French assistance. To Montmorin he intimated 
 that Spain did not wish to attack Pensacola, and that she 
 would not subsidize the French troops prepared for the 
 expedition, 23 but suggested that the united forces make a 
 descent on England. 
 
 News of this change of plan aroused much indigna- 
 tion in the mind of Vergennes, who declared that the surest 
 and quickest way to finish the war was to push it in Amer- 
 
 17 Montmorin to Vergennes, November 8, 17/9. (Esp., 596, no. 76, 
 fol. 179.) 
 
 16 Ibid., 596, no. 8, new 21 ; ibid., 596, no. 95, fol. 224. 
 19 Montmorin to Vergennes, November 22. (Ibid., 596, no. 108.) 
 20 Montmorin to Vergennes, December 13. (Ibid., 596, no. 167.) 
 21 Vergennes to Montmorin, December 17. (Ibid., 596, no. 183, fol. 407.) 
 
 22 Montmorin to Vergennes, December 13, 1779. (Ibid., 596, no. 215, 
 fol. 468.) 
 
 28 Florida Blanca to Aranda, January 9, 1780, enclosed with Mont- 
 morin's despatches of same date. (Ibid., 597, no. i, new 22, fol. 51.) 
 
138 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [248 
 
 ica. 24 He felt sure that Florida Blanca was unreliable in 
 his promises and would present all sorts of excuses for not 
 keeping them, 25 and henceforth there was little sympathy 
 manifested between the two courts, and the efforts of 
 France became directed almost entirely to the preservation 
 of the independence of the thirteen states. 
 
 At the beginning of 1780, Jay and Adams arrived in 
 Europe with instructions on the views of Congress relative 
 to the boundaries and the navigation of the Mississippi. 
 Jay had been friendly to the plans of Gerard and was re- 
 garded very favorably by that minister, who believed he 
 would consent to the Spanish pretensions, but Jay had 
 become suspicious of French policy before he left America 
 and he had imbibed a still deeper distrust of the ambitions 
 of Spain. With him to think was to act; and he had 
 thought deeply on the claims and pretensions of the Span- 
 ish monarchy to the Floridas and the Mississippi Valley. 28 
 He had come, however, to secure the alliance of Spain and 
 the recognition of the rights of the United States; and no 
 sooner did he land than he began preparations to carry 
 out his instructions. On his arrival at Cadiz he sent his 
 secretary, William Carmichael, ahead to Madrid to sound 
 the Spanish minister on his intentions towards the United 
 States, with instructions to do justice to the interests of 
 
 24 "Je serois bien fache que M. Le C. de floride blanche renoncat a 
 son enterprize sur Pensacola : je puis me tromper mais ie pense qu'en 
 poussant vigoureusement la guerre en amerique nous arriverons plus 
 surement et plus promtement a la paix que par toute autre route." Ver- 
 gennes to Montmorin, January 13, 1780. (Esp., 597, no. 35, fol. 106.) 
 25 Same to same, January 29. (Ibid., 597, no. 77, fol. 219.) 
 
 26 Gerard to Vergennes, September 9, 1778. Jay wrote that " 
 
 both Mr. Gerard and Mr. Miralles .... had shown me every mark of 
 civility and attention, though I have reason to think both of them held 
 higher opinions of my docility than were well founded." "When Spain 
 afterwards declared war for objects that did not include ours, and in a 
 manner not very civil to our independence I became convinced that we 
 ought not cede to her any of our rights, and of course that we should 
 retain and insist upon our right to the navigation of the Mississippi." 
 Ibid. Jay, "On Navigation of the Mississippi," Correspondence and Public 
 Papers, I, 328-331. 
 
249] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 139 
 
 Virginia and the western countries near the Mississippi, 
 and to represent to the Spanish court that it would be ages 
 before these extensive regions would be settled. He also 
 asked him to find out the intention of Spain in regard to 
 the Floridas and the country along the Mississippi. 27 From 
 these instructions it is clear that Jay thoroughly un- 
 derstood the ambitions and intentions of Spain. His in- 
 formation had come to him, when as the friend and com- 
 rade of Gerard and Miralles, he had spent long evenings 
 talking over an alliance with Spain and the concessions 
 her king would exact as the price of his help. 28 He knew 
 also that the conditions he had to offer were not such as 
 Spain would wish and that she would likely refuse to ac- 
 knowledge the independence of the United States unless 
 her terms were acceded to, but to her demands he had re- 
 solved not to agree. 
 
 Jay did not know that Spain was the dictator in her 
 alliance with France, 29 and he had no idea that Vergennes 
 was exerting all his power to bring about an understand- 
 ing between his allies, and that it was Spain who wished 
 to restrict the power of the United States, and who was to 
 prove herself a thorn in the flesh to all efforts to secure 
 the territorial integrity of his country. Franklin had long 
 been silent on the question of the West. Vergennes had 
 not chosen to enter into negotiations with him on the sub- 
 ject, and Congress had sent him no instructions in regard 
 to it; but Franklin, ever awake, had perceived the drift 
 of Spanish policy, and its hostility to his country; and he 
 understood full well that there was no sentiment in the 
 Spanish ministry favorable to an alliance with the United 
 
 27 Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 266-268. 
 2 *Ibid., 327. 
 "Ibid., 266. 
 
140 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [250 
 
 States. 30 Franklin knew too, that Congress had at last 
 decided on a policy and he was ready to work loyally with 
 Jay in carrying it out. Henceforth the representation of 
 the United States in Europe was vigorous and aggressive, 
 while Vergennes was compelled to play the role of peace- 
 maker between his allies. 
 
 Florida Blanca proved to be more hospitable than Jay 
 had hoped. He wrote a friendly note to Jay, inviting him 
 to court, but at the same time informing him that he could 
 not be received as the minister of an unacknowledged 
 power. 31 Carmichael, in company with Gerard, was re- 
 ceived kindly by the French ambassador, who furnished 
 him much information about the disposition of the Spanish 
 king. 32 He learned that several months before Miralles 
 had been instructed to enter into engagements with Con- 
 gress to conquer Florida, and he regarded this as signifi- 
 cant for the prospects of a treaty of alliance. 
 
 The politeness of Florida Blanca did not convince 
 Jay of the good intentions of Spain. He felt sure that the 
 message of the Spanish minister meant that independence 
 would be acknowledged only if the United States acceded 
 to his terms. Back of the Spanish king he thought he per- 
 ceived the power and influence of France. 33 Jay, however, 
 returned a polite answer to Florida Blanca's note 34 and 
 
 30 "But I own, too, that my expectations of great aids from that 
 nation are not much stronger than yours. As yet they know us too little, 
 and are jealous of us too much; their long delay in entering into a treaty 
 with us .... is to me a mark of their not being over fond of a con- 
 nection with us." Franklin to Carmichael, January 27, 1780. (Wharton, 
 Dip. Cor., Ill, 476.) 
 
 "Florida Blanca to Jay, February 24, 1780. (Ibid., Ill, 515.) 
 82 Carmichael to Jay, February 15, 1780. (Ibid', III, 496-7.) 
 33 "There are many reasons which induce me to suspect that France 
 is determined to manage between us so as to make us debtors to their 
 influence and good correspondence with Spain for every concession on her 
 part, and to make Spain hold herself obligated to their influence and good 
 correspondence with us for every concession on our part." Jay to Con- 
 gress, March 3, 1780. (Ibid., Ill, 530.) 
 
 84 Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 276. 
 
251] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 141 
 
 the two soon entered, into a discussion of the resources of 
 the United States with the apparent purpose of forming 
 an alliance. 35 It was not until May 11 that they held a 
 discussion on the main points of difference between the 
 two nations. In this conversation Florida Blanca plainly 
 intimated that the great obstacle to the alliance was the 
 claim of the United States to the right to navigate the 
 Mississippi River. He urged also that they settle the ques- 
 tion of the boundaries and expressed a desire to obtain 
 such concessions that the English would be entirely ex- 
 cluded from the Gulf of Mexico. Jay reminded Florida 
 Blanca that many of the states had for their western boun- 
 dary the Mississippi and were interested in its navigation ; 
 but he expressed the opinion that they would be willing to 
 adopt any reasonable precaution against the carrying of 
 contraband. The Spanish minister courteously expressed 
 his desire for an amicable adjustment and the interview 
 closed. Jay reported to Congress that if it remained firm 
 there would be little doubt of the outcome. 36 
 
 Equally anxious with Jay for an understanding be- 
 tween Spain and the United States was Vergennes ; but far 
 better than Jay, he understood the aims of Spanish diplo- 
 macy. He knew its dislike of the new republic, and its 
 fear that the example of a successful rebellion would have 
 a dangerous effect on the extended colonies of Spanish 
 America; and finally he understood from long experience 
 its utter selfishness and greed. 37 At the same time he felt 
 that, in order to hold Spain to the war, he must further all 
 her projects as agreed to in the convention, and in accord- 
 
 35 Florida Blanca wrote to Jay, March 9, desiring, before entering into 
 a discussion on terms of alliance, to know the civil and military condition 
 of the United States. (Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 277.) 
 Jay replied in a lengthy memorial on April 25. (Ibid.) 
 
 86 Jay, "Notes on Conference with Florida Blanca taken immediately 
 after the conversation." (Wharton, Dip. Cor., Ill, 722 et seq.) 
 
 37 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 13, 1780. (Esp., 598, no. 37, new 
 106.) Vergennes frequently expressed his opinion of Spanish policy as 
 selfish and unreasonable, with no regard for the rights of other nations. 
 
142 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [252 
 
 ance with this policy he proposed attacks on Florida, 38 
 Jamaica, Gibraltar and other English possessions. 39 In 
 fact the French ministry displayed more zeal and energy 
 in these undertakings than did the Spanish court. Of all 
 the campaigns inaugurated by Florida Blanca only that 
 of Galvez in Louisiana was carried out with vigor, and he 
 was unsupported by the other Spanish governors. 40 While 
 Spaniards were congratulating themselves on their victo- 
 ries on the Mississippi,, their French allies were urging 
 them to perfect their control of the Gulf of Mexico, by an 
 attack on Mobile and Pensacola, and even to attempt the 
 conquest of Jamaica. 
 
 In March Montmorin reported to Vergennes his sus- 
 picions that Spain had begun through the Count of Lisbon 
 negotiations for peace with England. These negotiations 
 were a source of much uneasiness to the French ministry ; 
 and it was felt necessary to take part in them so as to 
 assure the principal object of the war, the independence of 
 the United States. 41 Montmorin at once began representa- 
 tions to Florida Blanca of the danger of allowing the 
 United States to return to the dominion of England, to 
 which the latter replied that he would provide a source of 
 constant quarrels and divisions between the two. 42 Ver- 
 gennes saw at once that if these negotiations were allowed 
 to continue the interests of the United States would be 
 sacrificed and France humiliated. So serious was the situ- 
 ation that Louis XVI wrote directly to Charles III urging 
 that the two powers should continue to act together. 43 To 
 this the response was favorable and Charles declared that 
 he would never "compromise either the dignity of his 
 crown or its sacred engagements." 44 Florida Blanca gave 
 
 38 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 13. (Esp., no. 38, new 108.) 
 39 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 13. (Ibid., fol. 181.) 
 40 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 13. (Ibid., 599, no. 41, new 76.) 
 41 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 13. (Ibid., 598, no. 42, new 125.) 
 42 Montmorin to Vergennes, April 14. (Ibid., no. 160, new 413.) 
 "Doniol, Histoire, IV, 551-554. 
 44 Ibid., 456, note. 
 
253] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 143 
 
 some rather lame excuses for the presence of a British 
 agent in Spain and the affair was allowed to drop. 
 
 This incident convinced Vergennes that it was neces- 
 sary to give Spain additional concessions if she were to 
 maintain an interest in the war. In order to allay Span- 
 ish suspicions, he prepared a memorial on the benefits of 
 an alliance with the United States in which he maintained 
 that there was no danger to the possessions of the Spanish 
 monarchy so long as the United States were dependent 
 upon the two crowns for protection and that this depend- 
 ence would exist as long as England held Canada and 
 Ohio. 45 Thus it appeared that Vergennes would not insist 
 on the American claims to the Northwest. Montmorin in- 
 formed him that the great obstacle to an agreement be- 
 tween the United States and Spain was the navigation of 
 the Mississippi, 46 and on this account negotiations were 
 proceeding slowly and likely to continue to do so. He 
 expressed to Vergennes the belief that it would be well 
 to inform Spain of the terms of alliance between France 
 and the United States, to which the latter replied that the 
 best explanation of the relations between the two coun- 
 tries was the text of the treaty of alliance. "Independ- 
 ence," he wrote, "is the first of all; it is the basis of our 
 common treaty and ought to be for the negotiations of 
 peace. The guarantee of the domains of the United States 
 is contingent, their extent will be determined only by a 
 future pacification." 47 He was still determined, however, 
 
 45 Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, April 26, 1780: "Si les premiers 
 [the United States] doivent a 1'influence et a la protection des deux 
 couronnes leur independance et que les autres [the British] conservent 
 ce dont il nest que . . . possible de les priver la nouvelle Ecosse, le Can- 
 ada, et L'Ohio, dans Cette position les Americains auront toujours besoin 
 des deux couronnes pour contenir et en imposer a un voisin qui sans 
 entreprendre sur leur liberte deverrue constitutionelles ne cessera 
 d'empieter sur leur territorie. (Esp., 399, no. 35, new 8.) 
 
 M Ibid., 599, no. 51, new 119; ibid., 599, no. 60, new 85. 
 
 47 Vergennes to Montmorin, June 12, 1780. (Ibid., 599, no. 44, fol. 
 282.) 
 
144 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [254 
 
 to drive the English out of all territory* which was an inte- 
 gral part of the thirteen states. 48 Vergennes himself ap- 
 peared to be confused as to just what were the claims and 
 rights of the United States. 
 
 In June, 1780, news reached Spain of the capture of 
 Mobile by the army of Galvez. The court and nation gave 
 way to the liveliest expressions of joy, 49 and the feeling 
 arose that the Spanish army could defeat the English 
 without any foreign assistance. The effect was disastrous 
 to the work of Jay, who found Florida Blanca henceforth 
 more arrogant and exacting, and more unfavorable to the 
 claims of Congress. 50 After his conference with Florida 
 Blanca in May, Jay was unable to get any further propo- 
 sitions from him on the subject of a treaty. He always 
 avoided any mention of giving aid to the American cause 
 and to the notes of Jay on the subject he had returned no 
 reply. Bills kept coming in for Jay to pay, and finally in 
 desperation he went to Montmorin for help. The French 
 minister promised to do what he could; and early in Sep- 
 tember Florida Blanca sent his secretary Gardoqui to re- 
 open negotiations with the American commissioner. 
 
 The conferences with Gardoqui began on September 
 3, and the first question that came up was the payment 
 of bills drawn on Jay. Gardoqui remarked that if the 
 United States expected any help from Spain they must 
 be prepared to offer some consideration in return. He 
 hinted that, among other things, the renunciation of the 
 right to navigate the Mississippi would be most acceptable 
 to his court. 51 To this suggestion Jay replied that the 
 Mississippi could not come in question as a consideration 
 for a hundred thousand pounds. He declared, furthermore, 
 that the American nation regarded this river as the natural 
 outlet to the vast and fertile regions of the West, and that 
 without it the settlers beyond the Alleghanies could never 
 
 48 Vergennes to Montmorin, (Esp., 599, no. 120.) 
 * 9 Ibid., 599, no. 65, 66; ibid., no. 194. 
 60 Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 386. 
 "Jay to Congress. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 64.) 
 
255] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 145 
 
 hope to get their products to the sea. To these arguments 
 Gardoqui observed that the Americans would not need 
 this navigation during their generation and that future 
 generations could care for themselves. 
 
 Jay was much discouraged at the progress of his nego- 
 tiations in Spain and wrote in a despairing tone to Frank- 
 lin. 52 He felt that little help could be expected from Spain, 
 altho he was again convinced of the friendship of France. 53 
 Franklin, however, was more optimistic and urged Jay to 
 continue his efforts. He agreed with him, however, that 
 the United States should never give up the right to the 
 free navigation of the Mississippi. 54 
 
 On the evening of the 23rd Jay was admitted to a con- 
 ference with Florida Blanca on the points at issue between 
 the two countries. During the conversation Jay once 
 more brought up the question of an alliance; but Florida 
 Blanca replied that there was no occasion to hurry, and 
 Jay would have time to obtain instructions from Congress 
 on the articles to be proposed. He then brought up the 
 question of the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi and 
 its importance to Spain, which nation, he declared, would 
 hold to her rights. He observed that "unless the Spaniards 
 could exclude all nations from the Gulf of Mexico, they 
 might as well admit all," that it was one of the principal 
 objects of the war and of greater importance even than 
 Gibraltar. If they could obtain this, he said, it would be a 
 matter of indifference whether or not Spain obtained any 
 
 62 Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers, I, 395. 
 
 8 *"When I consider on the one hand that France was our first, and is 
 still our best and almost only friend, that she became an ally on terms 
 of equality, neither taking nor attempting to take ungenerous advantage 
 of our situation, . . . gratitude and generosity forbid me to solicit a 
 further tax on her generosity." Jay to Congress, September 22, 1780. 
 (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 65.) 
 
 54 "Poor as we are yet, I know we shall be rich. I would rather agree 
 with them to buy at a great price the whole of this right on the Missis- 
 sippi than sell a drop of its waters. A neighbor might as well ask me to 
 sell my street door." Franklin to Jay, October 2, 1780. (Ibid., IV, 75.) 
 
146 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [256 
 
 other cession. 65 This interview convinced Jay that there 
 was no hope of an immediate treaty with Spain, and he 
 turned his attention to other matters. 
 
 Altho Spain had given the fullest assurance of loyalty 
 to France, she continued her negotiations with England. 
 France was aware of her actions, but was in no position 
 to interfere. The war in America had produced no bril- 
 liant victories; the treasury was depleted j 56 and the king, 
 grown despondent, was anxious for peace. The fears of 
 Louis were further increased by the constant demands of 
 the Spanish court for a general pacification. Vergennes 
 also was anxious for peace, but he had resolved to obtain 
 it only on terms honorable to his king and in accordance 
 with his promises to the United States. 57 What disturbed 
 him most was the Spanish insistence upon the uti possidetis 
 in America, which would leave England in possession of 
 New York and the two most southern states. 58 He urged 
 Montmorin to sound Florida Blanca again to see if he 
 would consent to the recognition of the United States with 
 all their possessions, for he held that this was the only 
 honorable course for all concerned. 
 
 Florida Blanca continued his negotiations with Great 
 Britain, on the basis of the cession of Gibraltar to Spain 
 and of leaving that country in possession of all other terri- 
 tory then held by her arms. 59 This would have given Spain 
 
 55 Jay to Congress, November 6. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 146.) 
 
 6 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 487. 
 
 57 Ibid., 488; Vergennes to the king, September 27, 1780. (Archives 
 Nationales, 164, no. 3.) 
 
 58 Vergennes to Montmorin, September 27. (Esp., 601, no. 17, new 38.) 
 
 B9 Vergennes wrote to Montmorin that "Either the outcome of the war 
 will be most happy for England or that power will suffer great misfor- 
 tunes; in the first case Spain will redouble her efforts to make peace with 
 least disadvantage to herself and probably with greatest disadvantages to 
 us ; in the second case the court of London will make the most liberal and 
 most appropriate offers 'to seduce Spain; she will show herself disposed 
 to cede Gibraltar, Pensacola, and Mobile, and perhaps a part of the fish- 
 eries of Newfoundland, providing the Americans should be abandoned 
 and France forced to break her agreement with them." September 27, 
 1780. (Esp., 601, no. 155.) 
 
257] VERGEXXES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 147 
 
 possession of all she wished in Florida and have left the 
 United States at the mercy of their neighbors; but it was 
 a policy to which Vergennes would not agree. Florida 
 Blanca had asserted that the United States were still at- 
 tached to England and would prove ungrateful allies to 
 France; 60 but his arguments did not appeal to the French 
 minister, who reasoned that with England in possession of 
 Canada, there could be nothing but perpetual hostility 
 between the two nations. 61 
 
 It was apparent that Spain would continue her efforts 
 to make peace on the basis of uti possidetis, and the French 
 court feared that it might have to accede to these terms. 
 In order, however, to obtain for the United States as much 
 of their territory as possible, Montmorin proposed to trans- 
 fer the seat of war to America, and endeavor to drive the 
 British out of New York and their position in the south. 62 
 This proposition received serious consideration from Ver- 
 gennes, who saw that the Spaniards were trying to confine 
 the United States to the interior, and to leave England in 
 possession of all their seaports, 63 an outcome which he 
 was resolved to prevent. Spain had no sympathy for Eng- 
 land, but she disliked revolting colonies and she wished to 
 make this rebellion a terrible example to her own posses- 
 sions. No other motive could have led her to demand such 
 hard conditions as the price of recognition of the United 
 States, and to demand such conditions against the wishes 
 of her old time friend and ally, France. 
 
 Vergennes was now firmly convinced that the only 
 aim of Spain was to get all she could out of the war even 
 at the sacrifice of the interests of the United States and 
 
 'Montmorin to Vergennes, November 20. (Esp., 115, no. 142.) 
 "Vergennes to Montmorin, December 8. (Ibid., go, no. 1/2.) 
 
 2 Montmorin to Vergennes, October 30, December 20, 1780. (Ibid., 
 no. 100; ibid., no. 101 ; ibid., no. 219.) 
 
 93 Vergennes to Montmorin, November 20. (Ibid., no. 155, fol. 385.) 
 
148 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [258 
 
 the honor of France. 64 As late as March, 1781, Florida 
 Blanca had shown his objections to recognizing the inde- 
 pendence of the United States. He suggested, however, 
 that it would be a great concession if their independence 
 could be assured with such territory as they then held, 
 while the British should be left in possession of all that 
 was occupied by their troops. 65 He intimated also that 
 Spain desired to control the navigation of the Mississippi 
 and to obtain the ancient province of Eastern Louisiana 66 
 in addition to the Floridas. On these questions Vergennes 
 took no stand, for he felt that they could be settled at the 
 time of the peace negotiations between the two interested 
 powers. 67 At the same time he declared that the United 
 States must be recognized as an independent nation with 
 all the territories that were a rightful part of their domin- 
 ions. 
 
 France was anxious for peace and was ready to make 
 many concessions to obtain it. The national treasury was 
 empty and there were constant demands upon it, not only 
 to supply French needs but also those of her allies. The 
 war had, on the whole, been unsuccessful, and reports of 
 victory were infrequent. Before seeking peace, however, 
 Vergennes resolved to make one more attempt to drive the 
 English entirely out of the United States and thus secure 
 for them territorial unity and a real independence. If this 
 attempt should succeed, France could then enforce an hon- 
 orable peace; "if we fail," he wrote, "we ought not, at least, 
 to be blamed for having neglected anything in our power 
 
 6 *"Never lose sight of the fact that Spain is devoted to her own inter- 
 ests before all else and that she will subordinate to them all other condi- 
 tions of peace, that she will interest herself very little in the Americans, 
 whose independence she would see with grief." Vergennes to Montmorin, 
 January 22, 1781. (Esp., 602, no. 47.) 
 
 65 Montmorin to Vergennes, March n, 1781. (Ibid., no. 16, fol. 303.) 
 66 Marbois to Montmorin, October 17, 1780. (Ibid., 601, no. 63, fol. 
 
 I35-) 
 
 67 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 12, 1781 (ibid., 602, no. 18, fol. 
 310.) Vergennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781 (Ibid., 603, no. 25, fol. 
 57.) 
 
259] VERGENNES AND THE ALLIES OF FRANCE 149 
 
 to procure it." 68 The efforts of the French forces were to 
 be directed equally in the interests of Spain and of the 
 United States. De Grasse was sent with a powerful fleet 
 to America, 69 and large sums of money were given to 
 Washington with which to equip new troops. 70 At the 
 same time preparations were made for a new expedition 
 against Pensacola. 71 Soon after this Vergennes wrote to 
 Luzerne that the king w r as in accord with the policy of 
 Congress to uphold the territorial rights of the union, but 
 warned him that the fortunes of war were such that some 
 sacrifices might be necessary for peace. 72 The tone of this 
 message displayed a spirit of fairness and cordiality to- 
 wards the United States, in striking contrast to the arro- 
 gant demands of Spain. 
 
 During the past year Spain and France had drifted 
 farther apart, having moved along different lines of action. 
 Spain wished to abandon the United States in return for 
 concessions from England; France insisted that independ- 
 ence should be the first condition of peace and that other 
 advantages should be sought only after this was recog- 
 nized. This was a policy France had consistently main- 
 tained ; and in the face of military reverses and an impover- 
 ished treasury and in opposition to the entreaties and 
 threats of her Spanish ally, she remained the loyal and 
 unfaltering friend of the nation she had called into life. 
 
 68 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 544. 
 69 Esf>., 602, no. 137. 
 70 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 587. 
 7l Esj>., 603, no. 80. 
 72 E. U., XVII, no. 155, new 19. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN. 
 
 The independence of the United States was with Ver- 
 gennes the prime object of the war, and continued through- 
 out the first aim of his policy. To him this meant the in- 
 dependence of the thirteen states with all the territories 
 belonging to them. The extent of their dominions he did 
 not know, and his idea of it varied from time to time. He 
 did not, however, consider at any time either Canada or 
 the Floridas as a part of the republic, for these provinces 
 had never joined in the rebellion, and throughout the war 
 remained peaceful subjects of Great Britain. If they still 
 were a part of the British Empire it followed naturally 
 enough that they were legitimate subjects of conquest for 
 any nation at war with the mother country. Canada the 
 French minister had resolved to leave to the British crown ; 
 but Spain looked with greedy eyes upon the Floridas, and 
 he saw no reason why she should not have these provinces. 
 
 There yet remained the question of the West; the 
 control of the Mississippi Valley and of the river that 
 bears its name. Vergennes had been slow to express his 
 opinion on the subject, for he had no knowledge of the 
 merits of the dispute, and was compelled to depend on the 
 reports of his agents and the representations of Florida 
 Blanca. From the former he learned of the conflicting 
 opinions in Congress and of the large number of men there 
 who were willing to surrender all claims to the West ; from 
 the latter he heard only assertions of Spain's right to this 
 domain and demands that it be acknowledged. 1 
 
 Political considerations also doubtless influenced Ver- 
 gennes. He was anxious to hold Spain to the war and felt 
 it necessary to make many concessions to keep her in good 
 humor, and, on the other hand, he identified the party in 
 
 1 See Vergennes's instructions to Luzerne, July 18, 17/9, pp. 133, 134. 
 
 ISO 
 
261] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 151 
 
 Congress opposed to Spanish pretensions with the anti- 
 Gallican party. Under the influence of these impressions, 
 he drew up instructions for Luzerne in July, 1779. It was 
 here that he first took a definite stand on the great ques- 
 tions at issue, and his decision was against the United 
 States. On the navigation of the Mississippi he upheld the 
 contentions of Spain and he gave no encouragement to the 
 hopes of the Americans to extend their authority over the 
 West. It is possible that he did not understand the full 
 extent of Spanish claims in the Mississippi Valley, but 
 when those claims were defined, France had already com- 
 mitted herself to the Spanish position. 2 
 
 Luzerne arrived in America at a time when Congress 
 was most anxious for an alliance with Spain and was will- 
 ing to make many concessions to obtain it. 3 The new min- 
 ister landed in Boston and spent some time investigating 
 the attitude of New England. He quickly came to the 
 conclusion that the people of this region still desired the 
 annexation of Canada ia order to control the fisheries, and 
 if they could not get all of Canada they would at least in- 
 sist upon Nova Scotia. 4 The efforts of Gerard to induce 
 
 2 Vergennes's instructions to Luzerne, July 18, 1779. In these instruc- 
 tions Vergennes spoke of the West in a very vague way. At the most 
 he thought of leaving only the lower Mississippi in Spanish hands, while 
 the Northwest was unsettled. Some time later he wrote that it was 
 hardly possible "de les [English] privers la nouvelle Ecosse, le Canada, 
 et L'Ohio . . . ." Vergennes to Montmorin, April 26, 1780. (Esp., 599, 
 no. 35, new 8.) 
 
 3 "On [Congress] a aussi delibre sur le Traite a proposer a 1'Espagne; 
 On a conclu qu'on lui offriroit la guarantie des Florides mais on n'est 
 pas encore convenue definitivement si on contribueroit a lui conquete." 
 Gerard to Vergennes, August 8, 1779. (E. U., IX, new 83.) 
 
 4 Luzerne wrote that the conquest of Canada lay near the hearts of 
 the New Englanders because they regarded that country as a safeguard 
 to their independence, but if they were compelled to choose between the 
 two they would take Nova Scotia on account of the fisheries. September 
 3, 1779. (Ibid., X, no. 4.) 
 
152 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [262 
 
 this section of the country to give up all idea of conquest 
 had proved fruitless. 5 
 
 The Floridas, however, did not offer so difficult a 
 problem. Congress had practically decided on a policy 
 by which they were to go to Spain on condition that the 
 right to navigate the Mississippi and the use of a port on 
 the Gulf be given the United States. 6 To the Southern 
 delegates, according to Gerard, the use of a port on the 
 Gulf was of more importance than the right to navigate 
 the river. 7 Gerard wished Spain to take possession of the 
 Floridas at once, and suggested that the question of the 
 ownership of Eastern Louisiana and the navigation of the 
 Mississippi be left to future settlement. 8 
 
 Both Spain and the United States, however, were in- 
 sistent upon their claims to the Southwest. The points at 
 issue were further complicated by the conflicting demands 
 of the several states. Virginia and other states laid claim 
 to vast regions, in virtue of their ancient charters, while 
 the landless states held that dominion won by the common 
 efforts should be the property of all. 9 These contentions 
 
 B "je me suis vivement recrie Mgr. centre 1'idee de conquerir ainsi 
 d'un trait de plume une des possessions plus importantes de 1'Angre .... 
 J'ai observai qu'il n'y auroit que trop de peine a obtenir 1'independance 
 et la restitution san equivalent des Territoires conquis par les armes de 
 Gde Bretagne." Gerard to Vergennes, March i, 1779. (E. U., VII, no. 
 67, new 123.) 
 
 6 See page 128. 
 
 7 Gerard wrote to Vergennes, September 25, that Congress would offer 
 Spain the guarantee of the Floridas up to the thirty-first degree of lati- 
 tude and even promise assistance in conquering them, on condition that 
 Spain would grant the United States the free use of the Mississippi, and 
 give them a port south of the thirty-first degree of latitude. (E. U., X, 
 no. 37, new 125.) 
 
 8 Gerard to Vergennes, September 7. (Ibid., no. 20, new 122.) 
 
 9 " . . . il est bien a craindre Monseigneur que ces avantages memes 
 ne soient une cause de desordes dans la Republique americain et que la i ere 
 conquete de leur armees reunie ne repande parmi eux de nouveaux germes 
 de disunion. Les delegues des fitats Limitrophes pretendent y avoir des 
 droits incontestables en virtu de leurs Chartes . . . ." Gerard to Ver- 
 gennes, November 8, 1779. (Ibid., X, no. 9. new 8r.) 
 
263] LUZERNB AND THE PRETENSIONS OP SPAIN 153 
 
 gave Spain a decided advantage in the negotiations, an 
 advantage which she pressed to the utmost. 
 
 For some time Miralles had taken little part in the 
 discussions concerning the West, and, apparently without 
 the authority of his court, had left the interests of his 
 country to the care of Luzerne. When in November, 1779, 
 Florida Blanca instructed his agent to seek the aid of Con- 
 gress in the conquest of the Floridas and the lower Missis- 
 sippi, 10 Miralles at once asked the help of Gerard. The 
 forces of the United States had already penetrated the 
 West, and it was plain that pressure must be brought to 
 bear if Spain were to make good her pretentions there. 11 
 
 Luzerne proceeded cautiously in this work. He did 
 not explain to Congress the full purport of Miralles's in- 
 structions, but spoke at length of the necessity of coopera- 
 tion between the United States and Spain. The conquest 
 of the Southwest he represented as merely a combined at- 
 tack upon the possessions of Great Britain, and he said 
 nothing of the ultimate ownership. 12 
 
 Congress was perfectly agreeable to the project of let- 
 ting Spain have the Floridas, but it showed a determina- 
 tion to maintain American claims to the West. 13 Luzerne 
 
 10 After speaking of the Floridas, Miralles said to Luzerne : "Je suis 
 aussi charge d'inviter 1'honorable Congres a entreprendre la conquete du 
 territoire et de possession occuper par les Anglois au Nord Est de la 
 Louisiane et comme le Gouvernment de cette province par ses lumieres 
 peut contribue infiniment au succes d'une pareille entreprise il desire de 
 connoitre le plan d'operation auquel le Congres s'arreter dans cette 
 partie." September 25, 1779. (Papers of Continental Congress, no. 195, 
 vol. I, fol. 21 : Letters of Luzerne.) 
 
 "Le succes le plus complet a accompagne cette entreprise et les 
 Etats unis se trouvent aujourd'hui tant par le droit de conquete que par 
 1'emigration totale des habitans possesseurs d'une vaste et fertile contree." 
 Luzerne to Vergennes, November 8. (E. U., X, no. 9, new 81.) 
 
 ^Papers of Continental Congress, no. 95 ; Letters of Luzerne, vol. I, 
 fol. 25. 
 
 "Congress referred the matter of the Floridas to Washington, who 
 agreed to approve the expedition as soon as the British were driven out 
 of the Southern states. Luzerne to Vergennes, December 17, 1779. (E. U,, 
 X, no. 118, new 337; Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.) 
 XV, 1331-2; ibid., 1387.) 
 
154 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION* [264 
 
 hesitated to press the matter for he saw many difficulties 
 in the way and did not dare offend the United States. Vir- 
 ginia claimed all the country westward to the Mississippi 
 and was busy conquering it. 14 Under these circumstances 
 Luzerne saw no way for Spain to get possession of this 
 territory unless she could seize it before the Americans 
 could further occupy it. After some effort, however, he 
 got several members of Congress to admit that this region 
 was not a part of the thirteen states, and as such was open 
 to conquest by any enemy of Great Britain. They were 
 careful to state, however, that the United States had an 
 equal right to conquer this country; and as Americans al- 
 ready held Kentucky and Tennessee, and the success of 
 George Rogers Clark seemed assured, this admission 
 amounted to little towards forwarding the plans of Spain. 15 
 
 14 "M. de Miralles auroit desire que jappuyasse ses demandes d'une 
 maniere plus articulee que je n'ai pas fait .... Non obstant ses in- 
 stances j'ai cru devoir me borner a des simples insinuations .... Vous 
 remarquerez cependant que dans la reponse que M. le President me fait 
 au nom du Congres il garde le Silence Sur la requisition dont lui a fait 
 part M. de Miralles d S'occuper de la conquete des parties de la Louisiane 
 et dependance dont les Anglois Sont en possession Sans ajouter pour le 
 compte de qui cette conquete doit etre fait. J'ai lieu de presumer que 
 les interets de quelques fitats et leurs vues d'agrandissement sont cause 
 de ce silence autant que I'Ultimatum dont M. Adams est charge. En effet 
 la Virginie poursuit ses Enterprises contre les parties du territoire britan- 
 nique qui Se trouvent comprises entre les anciennes limites de cet Etat 
 et le Mississipi et pretend que Sa charter lui donner des droit incontes- 
 tables sur ses territoires D'un autre cote 1'incertitude qui a subsiste avant 
 la paix de 1763 touchant les anciennes limites de la Louisiane, et les lettres 
 du Gouverneur de la havane a Don Juan paroissent a quelques egards 
 indiquer que la Cour de Madrid a des vues Sur ces memes territoires, et 
 qu'on invitant les Etats-unis a enfaire la conquete, elle supose qu'ils les 
 lui cederont de la meme maniere que la floride orientale 1'etre, en cas 
 qu'ils puissant la conquerir." Luzerne to Vergennes, December 17, 1779. 
 (E. U., X, no. 18, new 118.) 
 
 15 " .... il est vraisemblable qu'il ne se determinera pas aisement a 
 vendre ou a ceder ce qu'il aura conquis. Ainsi Monsiegneur, Si la Cour 
 [of Madrid] a reelement des projets Sur ces territoires et qu'il ayent 
 1'aprobation du Roi, il seroit convenable que cette Cour s'occupat de leur 
 execution, ou du moins la preparat pas des insinuations faites au Congres 
 tandis qu'il en est encore terns. Un nombre assez considerable de Delegues 
 
265] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 155 
 
 With the bright prospects for success in the West, 
 Congress assumed a more independent attitude towards 
 Spain, and even threatened to hold no more communication 
 with Miralles, unless he were officially accredited from his 
 court. 16 They spoke boldly of Clark's conquests, and treated 
 the interests and claims of Spain with contempt, while, 
 even France received less courtesy than formerly. 
 
 Canada again came in for a share of attention, this 
 time doubtless through the influence of the New England 
 delegates. 17 Washington now approved its conquest but 
 Luzerne opposed the measure strenuously. 18 When a dele- 
 gate asked for the cooperation of the French fleet, he de- 
 clared that the most important duty was to drive the Brit- 
 ish from the states and then it would be honorable to offer 
 freedom to the Canadians. 19 In this project Luzerne could 
 see nothing but jealousy of the North towards the plans of 
 the Southern states, and he declared that New England was 
 ready to sacrifice the rights of her neighbors for the sake 
 of the Canadian fisheries. 20 
 
 The pretensions of Congress did not meet the approval 
 of Yergennes. He declared that the guarantee of France 
 
 envisagent ces Countrees comme apartenantes reelement a 1'Angleterre en 
 virtu du Traite de Paris et non obstant les termes des differentes chartres 
 ils sont disposes a reconnoitre le droit de la puissance enemi de la Grande 
 Bretagne qui enfera la conquete. En attendant un officier des Troupes de 
 Virginie comme sous le nom du Colonel Clark, homme d'un genie actif 
 et audacieux fait dans 1'Ouest des courses qu'on considera un jour comme 
 des conquetes et Ton m'assure d'une maniere positive que sans egard aux 
 Stipulations du Traite du Paris cette officier s'est avance de 1'autre cote 
 du Mississipi a une distance tres considerable, et a pris possession au nom 
 de 1'Etat qu'il Sut . . . ." E. U., X, no. 18, new 118. 
 
 17 Washington, Writings (Ford ed.), VIII, 138-141. 
 
 18 Luzerne to Vergennes, December 13. (E. U., X, no. no, new 317.) 
 
 19 Luzerne to Vergennes. (Ibid., XI, no. 33.) 
 
 20 Luzerne wrote to Vergennes in January, 1780, that the north had 
 no disquietude for the dangers of the South, but feared more its rivalry 
 and resources. He declared that it would without regret abandon the 
 southern states to their fate if they thought this would help them get 
 Canada. (Esp., XI, no. 33, new 107.) 
 
156 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [266 
 
 was for the independence of the United States with such 
 possessions as they held at the end of the war. This guar- 
 antee, he maintained, did not in any sense bind the guaran- 
 tor to aid in making conquests beyond the legal boundaries 
 of the original states. 21 Vergennes had not changed his 
 mind regarding Canada, nor had he changed his opinion 
 of the West since issuing his first instructions to Luzerne. 
 He felt that those who insisted upon the conquest of this 
 territory were the enemies of peace and were seeking to 
 embarrass Congress. The changed attitude of France was 
 made manifest in the position of Luzerne on Spain's propo- 
 sition for a settlement on the basis of uti possidetis. He 
 declared that such an arrangement was not unfair, and 
 urged Congress to use every effort to drive out the British 
 before beginning negotiations for peace. 22 It is very im- 
 probable, however, that he had any serious thought of 
 abandoning to the English any part of the union as he 
 understood it, 23 and it is certain that Vergennes would not 
 have consented to any such arrangement. 
 
 The opinions of Luzerne were duly reported to Con- 
 gress, where they became the signal for many bitter 
 speeches. Congress no longer boasted of the able men who 
 had adorned its meetings in other years; but its members, 
 altho narrow and resentful, were determined to thwart 
 the purposes of Spain, and in this they received popular 
 
 21 "I1 n'en resultera autre chose sinon que le roi est actuellement et 
 definitivement garant de leur independance et que sa garantee pour leurs 
 possessions et conquetes n'est que eventuelle, c'est a dire dependantes des 
 evenements de la guerre . . . ." Vergennes to Luzerne, September 25, 17/9. 
 (E. U., X, no. 2, new 38.) 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVI, 88; E. U., XI, 
 no. 36. 
 
 28 Luzerne wrote to Vergennes, June 24, 1780, that the British were 
 trying to persuade the people of South Carolina that their fellow states 
 had abandoned them ; and he suggested that the British were also trying 
 to form a new colonial empire out of the Carolinas, Georgia, the Floridas 
 and the Bahamas. Luzerne felt that, in spite of its dissensions, Congress 
 would not consent to sacrifice any of the states. (. U., XII, no. 118, 
 new 396.) 
 
267] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 157 
 
 support. 24 They declared that it was the purpose of the 
 Bourbon powers to break up the union; and they started 
 an opposition to the influence of them both which did not 
 subside during the war, and which made agreement between 
 the United States and Spain impossible. The feeling in 
 Congress was intensified by further attempts of Luzerne 
 in behalf of Spanish pretentious. Spain had presented an 
 "ultimatum" to Great Britain, and in the discussion of 
 this with Congress Luzerne had asked that body to explain 
 itself on four questions at issue. These were the western 
 boundary of the United States; the navigation of the Mis- 
 sissippi; possession of the Floridas; the lands on the left 
 or eastern bank of the Mississippi. 25 - Before giving Con- 
 gress an opportunity to answer Luzerne proceeded to state 
 the contentions of Spain. He argued, in her behalf, that 
 the boundaries of the United States extended no farther 
 to the west than the headwaters of the streams flowing 
 into the Atlantic, and for this he cited the royal proclama- 
 tion of 1763. If this were true the United States would 
 nowhere border on the Mississippi and hence had no claim 
 to navigate that river. This proclamation also cut off the 
 Floridas from the United States according to the Spanish 
 contention. None of this territory, Luzerne maintained, 
 was part of the original colonies, and so could not be a 
 part of the United States. 20 
 
 These proposals aroused considerable surprise and 
 much indignation among the members of Congress. The 
 delegates argued that they had a just claim to all the lands 
 as far as the Mississippi, not only by right of conquest but 
 by the grant of the colonial charters. They declared fur- 
 ther that the treaty of 1763 had assured the right to 
 Great Britain of the free navigation of the Mississippi, 
 and they claimed the same right for themselves. They 
 
 24 Les Articles de I'Ultimatum .... commencent a etre connu dans 
 les Etats de 1'Est et la fermentations qu'ils excitent parmi le peuple dans 
 les villes de Commerce Seroit d'un nature inquietude." Luzerne to Ver- 
 gennes, January 16, 1780. (E. U., XI, no. 25, new 18.) 
 
 26 Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVI. 114. 
 
 z *Ibid. 
 
158 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [268 
 
 would agree to restrict the navigation to merchant vessels, 
 but they insisted upon the right to trade. Nothing was 
 said of the ownership of lands along the lower Mississippi, 
 for this question was included in the larger question of 
 boundaries. To Spanish control of the Floridas no objec- 
 tion was made. 
 
 The discussion of the Spanish proposition extended 
 over many days and gave rise to much bitterness. The pos- 
 session of the West had never before been questioned in 
 Congress, and Luzerne himself had not been aware of 
 Spain's ambitions until Miralles had communicated to him 
 the instructions which he had received the preceding No- 
 vember. Luzerne knew the hopes of Congress from the 
 instructions to Jay; but, nevertheless, he spoke to several 
 members of the desires of Spain, from none of whom he 
 received a favorable reply. He found that the delegates 
 from the Southern and Middle states were firm in the 
 persuasion that "the lands which extend from the Atlantic 
 to the Mississippi in parallel lines from the equator belong 
 to them, either in virtue of their charters or of divers acts 
 of possession. 27 Some of the Eastern delegates were more 
 moderate and recognized that if the Spanish should drive 
 the English out of any part of this territory it would be 
 difficult to get them to surrender it, but this view was not 
 the prevalent one in Congress. 
 
 As the discussion continued, the indignation of the 
 southern members increased to white heat. Burke of 
 North Carolina exclaimed, "I know the force and the ex- 
 tent of our charters and of our rights, and if those of my 
 constituents in the territories in question are not clear and 
 certain, our rights on the Atlantic coast are equally ob- 
 scure and doubtful, for they emanate from the same 
 source." 28 
 
 "Luzerne to Vergennes, January 25. (E. U., XI, no. 27, new 33.) 
 28 "J'ai trouve ceux du Sud et du Centre dans la ferme persuasion que 
 les terres qui s'etendent dequis la mer atlantique jusqu'au Mississipi 
 [belong to them] soit en virtu de leurs Chartres, soit en virtu de divers 
 
 actes de possession " Luzerne to Vergennes, February n. (Ibid., 
 
 no. 30, new 53, fol. 190.) 
 
269] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 159 
 
 The committee of Congress which had been designated 
 to treat with Luzerne based the claim of the United States 
 to the West on four acts : the colonial charters, the treaty 
 of Paris of 1763, the proclamation of the king of England 
 in the same year, and the terms of the treaty of alliance 
 with France. 29 
 
 The arguments were long and tedious and revealed 
 a fundamental difference in the views of the two sides. 
 In regard to the Treaty of Paris, Luzerne pointed out that 
 it had ceded Eastern Louisiana and its dependencies, not 
 to the colonies, who could not enter into a treaty, but to 
 the king of England. Before this time France had pos- 
 sessed this territory and it had never been incorporated 
 with the colonies; now Spain was merely trying to recon- 
 quer it from a nation with which she was at war. In a 
 case of this kind, he argued, possession was the best title 
 and Spain held it in virtue of her forces already in the 
 country. The ambition of Great Britain, he held, had 
 forced France and Spain .again to take up arms ; and as a 
 result the whole treaty of Paris was subject to modifica- 
 tion. 
 
 This argument did not convince the committee, which 
 insisted that Great Britain had never acknowledged the 
 claims of France to this country, and had gone to war 
 and won her contention. They argued that the position 
 of France on this question had been from the beginning 
 a mistaken one and that the West had always belonged to 
 the colonies in virtue of their charters. 
 
 The charters presented a difficult problem and one 
 on which there was destined to be no agreement. Luzerne 
 declared that there could be no binding force in such 
 documents unless they were backed by actual possession. 
 He remarked that they had been carelessly drawn, and in 
 many cases contradicted each other so that there was no 
 
 . - 9 E. U., XI, no. 30, new 53, fol. 190. The account of Luzerne of his 
 discussions with this committee is the only one I have seen and this states 
 in the merest outline the arguments of those who wished to keep the 
 West. 
 
160 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [270 
 
 agreement among the states as to just what they meant. 
 With such a condition of affairs, he asked if a foreign 
 power could be expected to accept them when they violated 
 claims founded upon actual possession. 
 
 In regard to the proclamation of 1763, Luzerne re- 
 marked that he did not see how the colonies could claim 
 any territory which was not legally theirs even under the 
 English government. He pointed out that by this procla- 
 mation the royal governors were forbidden to make any 
 grants west of the head waters of the rivers flowing into 
 the Atlantic. 
 
 The Americans replied that this provision was the 
 source of many protests and almost universal discontent 
 and was not accepted by the colonies. They pointed out 
 also the provision in the proclamation that the act should 
 not contradict the grants of the colonial charters. The 
 reservation, they declared, was for the protection of the 
 Indians, and was not a limitation of the rights of the 
 colonies. Congress would likely pursue the same policy, 
 they asserted, and it had the right which previously be- 
 longed to the British government to buy these lands to 
 the exclusion of any other power. 30 
 
 The fourth point of the argument of the committee 
 that the treaty of alliance with France guaranteed to the 
 United States the possession of the West was met by a 
 flat denial from Luzerne. In this he was acting in accord 
 with Vergennes's interpretation of the treaty : that France 
 guaranteed the United States as they actually were at that 
 time with such other territory as they could conquer. 31 To 
 this contention the Americans made no objection and the 
 matter was allowed to drop. 
 
 These arguments produced no results and the opinions 
 of each side remained unchanged. Luzerne claimed that 
 the United States had no right to these territories, be- 
 cause they had never held possession of them, and could 
 
 80 It is curious that the members of this committee did not point out 
 the provision of the proclamation which declared that the reservation was 
 "for the present." 
 
 31 See Vergennes's instructions to Luzerne, p. 151. 
 
271] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 161 
 
 make no claim in virtue of the sovereignty of Great Brit- 
 ain, a sovereignty which they had renounced. 32 Spain, 
 however, went further, and demanded that the states re- 
 frain from all settlements or conquests in the West, and 
 leave the whole Mississippi Valley to her possession. 33 
 
 The questions of the Floridas and the lands along the 
 lower Mississippi were put into the background by the 
 great contention over the West, and even the navigation 
 of the Mississippi received little attention. The Floridas 
 Congress was willing to concede to Spain; and it could 
 offer little objection to Spanish conquests on the lower 
 Mississippi. Galvez had already gained possession of 
 Natchez, and the Spaniards hoped he would extend his 
 conquest farther to the north. Luzerne was beginning to 
 discuss the purchase of these territories when news of the 
 victories of Galvez arrived. 34 Congress realized that the 
 United States could not drive Spain from territories which 
 she had conquered, and all claim to West Florida was 
 given up. 
 
 Only one matter connected with the Floridas aroused 
 any difference of opinion. Congress had fixed the boun- 
 dary of the Floridas in accordance with the proclamation 
 of 1763; but Spain wished to extend it farther north. The 
 question, however, remained an open one until after the 
 Revolution was over. 35 
 
 Luzerne himself admitted that his arguments had not 
 produced a great impression on Congress, and he advised 
 
 82 This whole argument is reported in Luzerne's letter to Vergennes of 
 February u. E. U., XI, no. 30, new 53, fol. 190. 
 
 zz Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVI, 115. 
 
 "Luzerne to Vergennes, February u. (E. U., XI, no. 30, fol. 53) ; 
 March 13 (ibid., no. 33, fol. 79) ; March 18 (ibid., no. 35, fol. 87.) 
 
 35 "La Cour de Madrid desira peutetre de leur donner plus d'etendiie au 
 nord audela du trente unieme degre de latitude; mais le Congres est 
 d'opinion que Sa Mte Cathe trouve d'autant plus d'avantage dans la Fixa- 
 tion presente que les florides ne s'etendoient du cote du nord est sous la 
 domination Espagnoles que jusqu'a la Riviere St. Jean tandis que la 
 proclamation leur assignoit la Riviere St. Marie pour limite actuelle." 
 Luzerne to Vergennes, February u, 1780. (Ibid., XI, no. 30, new 53, 
 fol. 190.) 
 
162 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [272 
 
 that if Spain wanted the territory in dispute she had better 
 seize it. Within a month news reached Philadelphia that 
 Spain held all the lower Mississippi and Miralles had this 
 report published in the papers with the intimation that 
 Spain would hold it. 5G This report still further aroused 
 indignation in America. It was objected that the conquest 
 of a small corner of a vast region did not give a just claim 
 to the whole extent of territory. If such an argument 
 should be conclusive, it was urged, the conquest of Clark 
 had already given the United States title to the whole 
 valley. 37 
 
 There were also other sources of indignation. Many 
 people held grants of land in this region, and they com- 
 plained that they were being robbed. 38 This complaint 
 gave Congress a new ground on which to base its conten- 
 tions. It now came forward with the claim that the title 
 of the United States was good by right of conquest and 
 occupation. This occupation went back several years and, 
 it was urged, gave the republic a priority of claim over 
 the Spaniards. Luzerene attempted to evade this reason- 
 ing by stating that the settlements were made by the au- 
 thority of the British crown, and as such were still subject 
 to conquest. 39 
 
 36 Luzerne to Vergennes, March 13. E. V., XI, no. 33, fol. 79.) 
 
 37 "Le Cicl veuille nous preserver . . . . de 1'idee d'une contestation 
 avec 1'Espagne, mais vous conviendrez que pour avoir conquis un angle 
 de terre voisin des bouches du Mississipi et de la Riviere Iberville cette 
 Puissance n'est pas en droit de dire qu'un Pais de cinq cent lieus d'enten- 
 dire est tombe ausson pouvoir et de s'en attribuer la Souveranete. J'ai 
 deja entendu parler de donner des renfort au Colonel Clarke pour la 
 mettre en etat de conquerir de son et vous voiez lesconsequences de ce 
 sisteme." Luzerne's account of a statement by Mathews, a delegate. Ibid. 
 
 38 Land had been granted by the several states, and there were com- 
 panies organized to exploit these grants. Ibid. 
 
 39 Luzerne answered that the American occupation did not give any 
 more right to the subjects of the thirteen states than it would have given 
 to France, to Poland, or to Germany, if after the Peace of Paris the 
 French, the Poles, or the Germans had settled in that part of ancient 
 Louisiana. Ibid. 
 
273] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 163 
 
 Miralles was greatly worried by the tone of Luzerne's 
 negotiations, and began to doubt the influence of his friend. 
 Luzerne had suggested that the two proceed boldly to 
 force through the wishes of Spain, but Miralles would not 
 agree to this. He ridiculed the claims of Congress but 
 insisted that he must wait for further instructions. He 
 finally asked Luzerne to take no further part in the nego- 
 tiations, for "it would pain him to see an affair of particular 
 interest to the king treated by another than himself." 40 
 Soon after this the Spanish agent died, begging Luzerne 
 not to interfere again in the relations of his country with 
 Congress. 41 
 
 When the report of Luzerne on his conference with 
 the members of Congress reached Yergennes, the latter re- 
 plied in a way notable for its moderation. He spoke highly 
 of the justice of Congress in leaving the Floridas to Spain 
 and ordered Luzerne not to give any ministerial views of 
 the points in controversy. He expressed great fear that 
 the question might cause much trouble between the two 
 countries, and asked Luzerne to be careful of the feelings 
 of both allies of the king. Altho he still felt that Spain 
 had a right to conquer the territory in question, he ad- 
 mitted that the Americans had some cause to be angry. 
 He hinted that the question would likely be settled by the 
 forbearance of Spain, who would, probably of her own 
 free will, surrender all claim to the lands east of the Mis- 
 sissippi, and would also allow the Americans some right 
 to navigate the river. He felt that if the Americans would 
 only be easy with Florida Blanca, they would likely get 
 what they wanted. 42 
 
 *E. U., XI, no. 33, fol. 79- 
 
 "Luzerne to Montmorin, May 7. (Esp., 599, no. 16, new 25.) Luzerne 
 says that Miralles had explained his motives to the court of Spain. What 
 these motives were can probably be learned only froir the Spanish 
 archives. 
 
 42 "Ce n'est pas a nous a decider cette question et la prudence nous 
 fait un devoir d'autant plus stricte de ne pas articuler d'opinion a cet 
 egard. Sans etre provoque que si 1'Espagne veut conserver les terreins 
 
164 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [274 
 
 Luzerne ceased formal negotiations with Congress 
 early in 1780 ; but he could not refrain from private efforts 
 on behalf of Spain. He first approached the president of 
 Congress, Samuel Huntington of Connecticut, and his 
 friends. He succeeded in arousing their jealousy of the 
 West by calling attention to the great immigration which 
 would inevitably set in from the East to these fertile val- 
 leys. He declared that the possession of the Mississippi 
 Valley would never be a source of strength to the United 
 States, but would cause constant friction with Spain. 43 
 He used again the arguments against the legality of the 
 American claims, and felt that he had gone far towards 
 winning support for his favorite project. He tried next 
 the delegates from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
 and Delaware. These states had little interest in the west- 
 ern lands, and he felt he could count on their support. He 
 found them in a state of indifference but unwilling to take 
 a decided stand against the wishes of the other states. 
 Even Virginia showed no great hostility to the projects of 
 Luzerne, for the County of Kentucky had just declared its 
 independence, and in this they thought they saw the be- 
 ginning of the dissolution of the states. 44 
 
 contestes Elle donnera certainment de 1'ombrage aux Americains tan- 
 
 disque cette Puissance prendre de 1'humeur Si je suis bien informe 
 
 le Ministre espagnol n'est pas tres eloigne d'abandonner aux americains 
 les rives orientales du Mississipi au dela des florides et meme de leur 
 accorder une navigation quelqonque sur ce fleuve." Vergennes to Lu- 
 zerne, June 3, 1780. (E. U., XII, no. 7, fol. 61.) 
 
 43 Luzerne to Montmorin, May 12. (Esp., 599, no. 49, new 106.) 
 44 Luzerne to Vergennes, June n, 1780 (./., XII, no. 54, new 74.) 
 "Dans mes intretiens avec les Individus qui les composent ceux du Xord 
 se sont montres asses raisonables et sont convinus du principe que 
 1'ancienne Louisiane orientale etant actuellement entre les mains de 
 1'angleterre, les apartances ayant etc cedees a la paix de 1763 1'Espagne 
 avoit le droit incontestables d'en faire la conquete. Cette verite si claire 
 est egalement reconnue par le Congres general et plusiers Membres de 
 1'Etat du New York " In regard to Virginia he said that she ap- 
 peared less attached than formerly to holding the West. "Ce changement 
 est peutetre du a une circonstance .... c'est que les habitans des parties 
 de cet Etat, qui sont eloignees du Siege du Government annonce dans 
 
275] LUZERNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OP SPAIN 165 
 
 Maryland was pronounced by the French minister to 
 be the best disposed of all the states to the desires of Spain. 
 She had no interest in the West, and at least one of her 
 delegates, Jenifer, was intensely jealous of the power of 
 the larger states. He not only admitted the rights of 
 Spain to conquer as much of the West as she could, but 
 declared that she had a perfect right to conquer any of 
 the states if she found them in British hands. 45 Here was 
 a man who could perform valuable services for the Spanish 
 cause, and Luzerne enlisted him at once and through him 
 urged his arguments upon Congress. 
 
 There was, however, a strong opposition to the schemes 
 of Luzerne. The old Junto had broken up, but the lead 
 had been taken up by the vehement and zealous Burke of 
 North Carolina. The two had constantly held opposite 
 opinions and had not infrequently clashed. His opposition 
 was of a character to arouse fear in the mind of the French 
 minister and his fiery denunciations had doubtless terri- 
 fied Miralles into silence. Burke denounced the ambitions 
 of Spain as overbearing and unjust, as prejudicial to the 
 rights of the states, and contrary to their happiness and 
 tranquillity. Luzerne greatly feared that he would seize 
 a favorable opportunity to sweep all Congress to his side 
 and arouse it to lay claim to the Floridas as well as to the 
 West. 46 Henceforth there were two well defined parties 
 
 ce moment des vues d'independance et le projet de former un etat par- 
 ticulier." This incident, he declares, makes them fear "1'inconvenient des 
 possessions distantes et trop etendues et la danger d'un dismemberment 
 ou d'une dissolution de 1'Etat." E. U., XII, no. 54, new 74. 
 
 45 Le Maryland est 1'Etat dont les sentimens sur cette matiere sont 
 les plus raisonnables et les mieux articules Un delegue de cet Etat, homme 
 qui jouit d'une grande influence n'hesite point a dire que non seulement 
 1'Espagne peut sans aucune contradiction faire cette conquete mais que 
 n'ayant pris aucun engagement avec le Congres si aujourd'hui elle enlevant 
 aux Anglois 1'Etat de la Georgie que est entre leurs mains." Ibid. 
 
 46 "M. Burke homme ardent et obstine quoique d'ailleurs bon Citoyen 
 regarde les projets de 1'Espagne comme injustes contraires aux droits 
 des Treize Etats et prejudiciables a leur bonheurs et a leur tranquilite 
 
1G6 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [276 
 
 in Congress, the French and Spanish party with Jenifer 
 for spokesman, and the opposition under the radical lead- 
 ership of Burke. 
 
 The ability and enthusiasm of Burke won many dele- 
 gates who had previously been friendly to the ideas of 
 Spain. One delegate from New York told Luzerne that 
 he could, without any complaint from his constituents, 
 renounce in favor of France Canada and Nova Scotia be- 
 cause they were not included in the charters of the states; 
 but if he should vote to surrender Eastern Louisiana, he 
 would expose himself to the charge that he had sold the 
 interests of the southern and middle states for money, 
 and of having violated the sacred laws of the union in 
 sacrificing some states for the gain of others. 47 
 
 Still Luzerne did not give up his efforts. He urged 
 that the United States could never conquer the western 
 territories on account of the power of Spain. He again 
 besought Congress to trust to the generosity of His Cath- 
 olic Majesty ; but the only promise he could gain was that 
 nothing should be done until Jay's report should arrive. 
 Luzerne was not satisfied with this, for he feared that the 
 report of Jay's mission would produce more ill feeling, and 
 he did all he could in advance to discount itjg effects. But 
 while he was urging the Americans to conciliation, he was 
 trying to get Spain to conquer the West. 48 
 
 In the midst of these discussions the project for the 
 conquest of Canada was revived. This time there was a 
 coalition between the North and South, for New England, 
 
 et si les relations de M. Jay donnent lieu au Congres de faire quelque 
 alteration a son ultimatum, je crains toute de la vehemence de ce 
 Delegue." E. U., XII, no. 54, new 74. 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 * 8 "Dans cette etat des choses je crois que la Cour de Madrid ne peut 
 mieux faire que de poursuivre la conquete qu'elle a commencee et d'exercer 
 sur les Pais nouvelement soumis a sa Domination tous les Actes de 
 souverainete de Jurisdiction et de possession qu'elle jugera les plus propres 
 a detruire, dans 1'esprit des Americains 1'espoir chimerique qu'ils ont 
 conqu de les conquerir sur 1'Angleterre ou du moins de les acquirer par 
 le Traite de paix." Ibid. 
 
277] LUZEBNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 167 
 
 in the hope of getting some part of Canada, was willing 
 to support the southern pretentious. As a result of this 
 combination Luzerne was left without the support of any 
 section. 
 
 The British aided Luzerne in his efforts to break this 
 coalition between the two sections. They slfowed great 
 harshness towards the North and prepared to defend Can- 
 ada against any assault. 49 The southern states were the 
 object of their concern and they sought to win them over 
 by the charge that their northern compatriots had deserted 
 them. It was their aim to hold the three southern states 
 even tho the others should succeed in maintaining their 
 independence. These southern states were in the hands 
 of the British army and it appeared impossible for Con- 
 gress to recover them. 
 
 In spite of the fact that their states were in the hands 
 of the enemy, the southerners kept up their representation 
 in Congress; and many, expelled from their homes, came 
 to Philadelphia to get assistance against the enemy. Lu- 
 zerne thought this a favorable moment to get them to yield 
 their claims in return for Spanish assistance and sought 
 to push his measures regardless of the position of Con- 
 gress. 50 He called first on Governor Rutledge of South 
 Carolina, who, he found, had no suspicion of the ambitions 
 of Spain. He was totally ignorant of the points of differ- 
 ence betwen Congress and the court of Madrid, but it had 
 never occurred to him to surrender the western lands. 51 
 When he learned that Spain laid claim to the east bank 
 of the Missisippi and had already attempted to possess it, 
 
 49 Luzerne to Vergennes, June 24. (E. U ., XII, no. 118, fol. 306.) 
 50 Luzerne to Montmorin, July II. (Esp., 599, no. 182.) 
 51 Rutledge asked Luzerne if Spain did not want the Mississippi as 
 far as the thirty-first parallel, but spoke with great confidence of her good 
 intentions. He said that the Spanish governor at New Orleans had 
 replied to a request for help in a way to convince the Carolinians of the 
 sincere interest which His Catholic Majesty had in the preservation of 
 their independence. Luzerne to Vergennes, August 3. (E. U., XIII, no. 
 90, fol. 224.) 
 
168 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [278 
 
 his attitude became at once suspicious and even hostile. 
 He insisted that the southern states would never agree to 
 any such conditions; and that if Spain attempted to ex- 
 tend her sovereignty over these regions, she would expose 
 herself to perpetual war. "Congress cannot see without 
 jealousy," he exclaimed, "another nation in possession of 
 this territory with power to incite the savages against us 
 and to expose our frontier to continual invasion." If such 
 principles were just, he argued, Spain would have a right 
 to conquer Canada as well in spite of the danger it would 
 bring to the United States. 52 
 
 The discussions between Rutledge and Luzerne fol- 
 lowed the lines usual in the debates on this subject. Lu- 
 zerne made more emphatic the loss of population which 
 the older states must surely suffer if the West were incor- 
 porated into the union. He declared that the balance of 
 power would surely shift beyond the mountains and finally 
 the government itself would be directed from the banks 
 of the Mississippi. Rutledge replied that there was no 
 danger, for the West should be formed into separate states, 
 entirely independent of the East or confederated with the 
 older states on terms of equality. 
 
 The attitude of Rutledge is typical of the state of pub- 
 lic feeling among patriotic Americans. He did not realize 
 that Spain had any interest in the West, nor did he believe 
 that she had any right to it. Eastern Louisiana had been 
 for many years recognized as a part of the colonial do- 
 main, and it seemed incredible that another power could 
 have any claim to it. The feeling of the country was being 
 reflected in Congress, and this body took a definite stand 
 on the question of the West in its instructions to Jay. 
 
 Against the historic belief of the American states was 
 opposed the jealousy and greed of Spain. Greed and jeal- 
 ousy both were there; that insatiable greed for land and 
 wealth that had been the curse of the Spanish monarchy; 
 jealousy that feared the rise of a new power which might 
 
 . U., XIII, no. 90, fol. 224, 
 
279] LUZERXE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 169 
 
 attain a degree of prosperity and strength that would 
 rival her own. Jealousy in this case was stronger than 
 greed, but perhaps it was a jealousy not unmixed with fear. 
 Spain had no need for the fertile plains of Eastern Louis- 
 iana, while across the river were boundless regions of her 
 own territories, still undeveloped and as yet hardly touched 
 by cultivation. The east bank of the Mississippi was be- 
 ginning to show traces of improvement under the labors 
 of the hardy frontiersman; but there was not yet enough 
 to tempt the cupidity of Spain. It was jealousy that sought 
 to coop the new republic between the Alleghanies and the 
 sea. It was jealousy that opposed the independence of the 
 United States, that had dictated the proposed mediation 
 by the terms of which Great Britain was to hold the ports 
 that controlled the ingress and egress from the country, and 
 it was this same jealousy that opposed the union of Canada 
 to the young nation. This passion assumed many forms. 
 Now it was the fear of the example of rebellion before the 
 Spanish colonies ; again it was the menace of a new power 
 on her frontiers; then it was the desire to recover the his- 
 toric empire of France; and finally it was the pretense of 
 rendering justice to the British crown. 
 
 Vergennes had long understood this feeling of the 
 Spanish court, 53 and it was one of the chief objects of his 
 diplomacy to render it harmless. After the convention of 
 1779 he sought to bring his allies into a new triple alliance 
 against the power of the British Empire. The prime object 
 of the war, as he often declared, was to secure the inde- 
 pendence of the United States without sacrificing any part 
 of them. This was a big guarantee and Spain insisted upon 
 and enforced the principle that she should be given equal 
 
 53 Vergennes repeatedly expressed his lack of confidence in the justice 
 of Spain. In 1780 he declared that the principle of personal interest 
 directs the conduct of Spain towards the United States. (Esp., 598, no. 
 37, new 106.) He declared that it was useless to try to convert Florida 
 Blanca to a more reasonable view, but that France must maintain her 
 position with firmness. April 12, 1781. (Ibid., 603, no. 25, new 57.) 
 Montmorin also held this opinion. (Ibid., 598, no. no, new 321.) 
 
170 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [280 
 
 advantages. From the first Vergennes had found his task 
 a trying one; and altho he was frequently the dupe of 
 Spain, he strove faithfully to fulfil his obligation to both 
 his allies. The exclusive navigation of the Mississippi was 
 immensely valuable in the eyes of Spain in order to insure 
 her control of the Gulf of Mexico; but Vergennes did not 
 see how the right to navigate this river could be of any 
 use to the sparsely populated regions of the West. His 
 wish to restrain the Americans from a spirit of conquest in 
 the West can in no sense be taken as a decision against 
 the rights of the states to their western boundaries. It 
 did not mean that he was seeking to give this region to 
 Spain, for at the same time he asked for his other ally only 
 the province of West Florida which was guaranteed to her 
 by the treaty of alliance. 
 
 The acts of Luzerne can not be taken as representing 
 the will of his court. Vergennes knew nothing of the West 
 and as a result he sometimes fell a victim to misrepresenta- 
 tions. Luzerne had been instructed to look after the inter- 
 ests of Spain, and he attempted to do so with more ardor 
 than discretion. In these instructions he found reference 
 to some "lands on the Mississippi conquered by the Eng- 
 lish" and directions to "prevent encroachments," 54 which 
 seemed to fit into the purpose of Miralles and he acted 
 accordingly. In this matter Luzerne plainly exceeded his 
 instructions which did not authorize him to do anything 
 contrary to the wishes of Congress; and Vergennes later 
 
 "Vergennes wrote that as there were some lands on the Mississippi 
 conquered by the English, of which they would probably be dispossessed, 
 their occupation would likely cause contentions between Spain and the 
 United States. On this account he asked Luzerne to try to get the boun- 
 dary fixed in a "maniere claire, precise, et invariable." Also he asked 
 him to use his influence with Congress to get it to "Empecher les Provinces 
 du Sud de se laisser aller a 1'esprit de Conquete." These instructions 
 clearly refer to the lands along the lower Mississippi which Spain was 
 preparing to conquer. In regard to the whole question he wrote, "that he 
 was ignorant of the rights of the states." Vergennes to Luzerne, July 18. 
 1779- (. U., IX, no. 41.) 
 
281] LUZEKNE AND THE PRETENSIONS OF SPAIN 171 
 
 instructed him definitely not to push the ambitions of 
 Spain. 55 
 
 When the contest over Eastern Louisiana became 
 acute, Vergennes again refused to interfere more than to 
 advise the Americans to appeal to the generosity of the 
 king of Spain. He frankly admitted that he did not know 
 the merits of the case but expressed his satisfaction with 
 the liberality of the Americans in leaving the Floridas to 
 Spain. 56 As a matter of law he expressed the belief that 
 Spain had a right to conquer Eastern Louisiana from the 
 British ; but he urged his minister not to interfere or even 
 to express an opinion on the subject. He realized that it 
 was a delicate question, and that if France wished to keep 
 the good will of both her allies she must not take part in 
 their disputes. All he authorized Luzerne to do was to try 
 to persuade Congress of the justice of the Catholic King. 57 
 All the privately expressed opinions and public despatches 
 of Vergennes indicate a strong interest in the welfare of 
 the American republic. 58 He was willing to reward Spain 
 for her services, but he never offered her more of the 
 
 85 See p. 163. That the policy of Miralles was new to him and a com- 
 plete surprise, he was frank to confess and he might well have assumed 
 that his master was as ignorant as he of the wishes of Spain. 
 
 M He urged that the Americans could get more out of Spain if they 
 said nothing of their rights, and in this he was probably not mistaken. 
 Vergennes to Luzerne, September 25, 1779. (E. U., X, no. 38, fol. 126.) 
 
 "See p. 163, note 42. After the death of Miralles left the care of 
 Spanish interests in the hands of Luzerne, Vergennes wrote, ". . . . mais le 
 reserve que je vous recommende M. ne doit pas vous empecher de profiler 
 des occasions que Ton fournir pour porter le Congres a prendre confiance 
 dans le Roi Cath. et a trailer Sans prevention la question relative aux 
 terreins situes sur le Mississipi." August 7, 1780. {Ibid., XIII, no. 8, 
 fol. 101.) 
 
 B8 An example of Vergennes's care for the interests of the United 
 States is shown in a particular project to Lafayette in which he advised 
 him of the course America should take. He suggested helping Spain 
 conquer the Floridas, but he urged that the Americans should drive the 
 enemy as far as possible from their borders. He declared that there 
 would be great danger to the republic if Great Britain were left in 
 possession of any part of America. And still he asked nothing for 
 France. Doniol, Histoire, IV, 318. 
 
172 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [282 
 
 American continent than the Floridas. On the other hand 
 lie always insisted upon as the first fruits of the war, the 
 independence of the United States in their fullest extent. 
 To justify to Vergennes the American right to the Mis- 
 sissippi was to insure his best efforts to secure it, and so 
 it was with other questions. And this determination to 
 secure the full rights of his ally remained his to the end. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLIC AN PARTY. 
 
 The efforts of Luzerne had left Congress in a state of 
 indecision and the direction of further negotiations at 
 Philadelphia hung upon the success of Jay. If Spain 
 showed a favorable demeanor towards the new nation, her 
 agents could hope for many concessions; if she frowned 
 upon its ambitions, the work of bringing about an agree- 
 ment must be begun again. Under these conditions all fac- 
 tions waited anxiously for news from Spain. Some hoped 
 for a message recording failure ; but the more moderate ele- 
 ment in Congress expected an account of mutual conces- 
 sions. Luzerne feared that nothing would be accomplished 
 and did his best to prepare Congress for such intelligence. 
 He knew from Miralles that the American demands could 
 not be granted, and he feared that Spain would reject all 
 overtures for an alliance. 
 
 The dispatches of Jay, giving an account of his activi- 
 ties during the spring of 1780, reached Philadelphia in 
 August 1 , and were not so unfavorable as Luzerne had 
 feared. The demands of Florida Blanca for the exclusive 
 navigation of the Mississippi were not unexpected, and his 
 suggestion for the settlement of the western boundaries 
 appeared so vague that no one could understand them, al- 
 tho the intention of Spain did not go beyond securing 
 enough of the eastern bank of the Mississippi to control 
 the navigation. He had mentioned Cape Antoine and an- 
 other cape with the name blank 2 . Where Cape Antoine 
 was no one knew; and there were various opinions as to 
 what the other cape might be. No one could say in what 
 direction the line was to be drawn, but Luzerne suggested 
 that it was a meridian drawn as far as Spain should wish 
 
 'Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVII, 727, 737, 749. 
 2 Jay to Congress, (Wharton, Dip. Cor., Ill, 724.) 
 
 173 
 
174 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [284 
 
 to prolong it 3 , and this was the occassion of much more dis- 
 cussion. If the line extended as far as Lake Michigan, it 
 was declared that all the western possessions of the south- 
 ern states would be cut off and their boundaries greatly 
 reduced. 
 
 The prospect of such an arrangement aroused once 
 more the southern delegates. Even those who had shown 
 friendliness to the plans of Luzerne went over to the other 
 side. Among these was Jones of Virginia, who had pre- 
 viously informed the French minister that he regarded the 
 ambitions of his state as a "cause of feebleness and ruin." 
 He now complained that the greed of Spain would deprive 
 his state of the richest part of her patrimony, and to that 
 he declared he would never submit. Furthermore, Spain 
 could never control this territory, he asserted, for the peo- 
 ple who live there would never endure her yoke. Jones de- 
 clared that Cape Antoine was fifteen leagues above the 
 mouth of the Ohio, and that if Spain should get this con- 
 cession, "our most beautiful territory will be threatened 
 with invasion ; we shall see ourselves despoiled of the lands 
 washed by the Ohio and the rivers Cherokas [Tennessee] 
 and Cumberland which flow through and water the richest 
 country of the continent [we shall see ourselves despoiled 
 of] the numerous population who possess it; and those 
 
 3 "On a cherche le premier cap. Quelques delegues etoient d'opinion 
 qu'il s'agessoit de la pointe la plus occidentale de PIsle de Cube, et dans cette 
 hypothese le Congres a cherche a donner diverses interpretations a une 
 designation aussi obscure. L'on a demande dans quelle direction la ligne 
 seroit suree et lorsqu'il a etc compris quelle devoit former une medidienne, 
 on a recherche jusqu'a quelle hauteur 1'Espagne entendoit la prolonger si 
 c'est jusqu'au lac Moschigan. Tous les Etats du Sud seroient reduits, a 
 Ton dit a des sacrifices qu'ils ne feront jamais, et la Virginie, le plus puis- 
 sant et le plus ambitieux de tous perdroit le plus a cette arrangement aussi 
 cette opinion a etc rejetee bien loin." Luzerne to Vergennes, August 25, 
 1780. (E. U., XIII, new 150.) According to Lieutenant Ross's map (pub- 
 lished in London, 1772) Cape Antoine was situated on the west bank of 
 the Mississippi River, about fifty miles above the mouth of the Ohio. I 
 have this information from Professor C. W. Alvord. 
 
285] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 175 
 
 whose labors have made it valuable, will be forced to 
 abandon it." 4 
 
 On the question of the navigation of the Mississippi 
 Jones showed himself equally obstinate. His personal feel- 
 ings, he admitted, favored conceding it to Spain, but the 
 instructions of his state were different and he must obey 
 them. This river and the St. Lawerence were the only nat- 
 ural outlets to the Mississippi Valley, he declared, and the 
 people settled there had so long enjoyed the use of both 
 that they would not consent to be deprived of them. 
 
 Luzerne, however, resolved once more to take up the 
 cudgels for the court of Madrid. He declared that since 
 Spain held both banks of the river there was nothing for the 
 people of the West to do but to submit. As for the bound- 
 aries, Spain had as good a right to conquer this part of the 
 British Empire as had the states. He advised, however, 
 that if Congress wanted anything it had better throw itself 
 on the generosity of the Spanish King. 5 
 
 Jones was not at all satisfied with the position of the 
 French minister and sought to argue against it. He ob- 
 served that, if Spain had a right to conquer the western ter- 
 
 4 After this plea Jones became more defiant and continued : "Nous 
 n'avons pas la force necessaire pour obliger ces colons a s'expatrier d'une 
 terre defrichee par leurs mains et arrosee de leur sueur. E. U., XIII, 
 new 150. 
 
 B "J'ai objecte .... que 1'occupation seule ne constituoit pas de droit que 
 la Cour d'Espagne mettroit, lorsquil lui plairoit un frein aux excursions 
 de ces Colons, quelque nombreuse que fut leur population qu'elle avoit 
 conquis les forts Anglois sur le Mississippi qu'elle en avoit elle meme 
 eleve d'autres et qu'elle commanderoit tellement la navigation du Mississip- 
 pi que tout leurs efforts ne pourroient la leur faire partager ; Qu'il ne fal- 
 loit done pas songer a s'en emparer comme d'un droit meme a la demander 
 comme une condition necessaire que de pareilles pretentions ne feroient 
 qu' indisposer la Cour d' Espagne tandis qu'en lui demandant cette lib- 
 erte de naviguer comme une faveur et avec les restrictions necessaires 
 pour empecher la contrabande on devoit esperer de la generosite de Sa 
 M. Cathe quant aux limites de 1'Ouest qu'il voyoit comme moi que 1'Es- 
 pagne etoit en droit de s'emparer de tout ce qui apartinoit a 1'Angleterre 
 en virtu du Traite de Paris que je ne pouvois dire avec precision quelles 
 etoient ses vues actuelle mais que je pensois qu'elles ne pouvoient 
 s'entendu au dela de ce que nous avons posside au du posseder a la rive 
 gauche du Mississipi." Ibid. 
 
176 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [286 
 
 ritories of the country, it had an equal right to attack any 
 place then in possession of the English, such as Georgia, 
 South Carolina, or New York. 
 
 To this view Luzerne fully agreed, but replied that the 
 friendship of Spain was such that she would make no un- 
 just demands. He returned, however, to his suggestion 
 that Spain would probably want the east bank of the Mis- 
 sissippi and he urged that Congress should grant the re- 
 quest, relying only on the generosity of His Majesty to do 
 what was just to the United States. 
 
 With the demands of Luzerne there came a division 
 between him and the French party in Congress, and there 
 came also a closer drawing of issues. Before this, Congress 
 had been unwilling to refuse the more extreme demands of 
 Spain; but it now felt independent and began to suspect 
 the intentions of France. 
 
 At this time Jenifer was absent and his aid was sorely 
 needed by the French minister. With the defection of 
 Jones there was no one on whom to rely and he was com- 
 pelled to go in person to learn the designs of the anti- 
 Gallicans. The committee told him that the instructions 
 to be given to Jay on the question of the Mississippi would 
 be such as Spain would accept ; but the members refused to 
 commit themselves regarding the boundaries. 6 Luzerne 
 was not content and went to other members, whom he found 
 agreeable enough in conversation, but who persisted in op- 
 posing his plans in Congress. 7 At the same time there was 
 apparent a movement among the northern members to sup- 
 port the pretensions of the South, and Luzerne conjectured 
 that they were planning another attack on Canada. This 
 belief soon become a certainty and Luzerne learned that 
 that country was to be sought as a pledge for the evacuation 
 of the southern states. He did not believe, however, that 
 the English would be willing to make the exchange, and he 
 
 6 Luzerne to Vergennes, August 25, 1780. (E. U., XIII, no. 73, new 
 150; Esf>., 600, no. 8, new 108.) 
 'Ibid. 
 
287] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 177 
 
 thought they would attempt to unite the South with the 
 Floridas to form a new colony. 8 
 
 Deprived of any active assistance from the Americans, 
 Luzerne enlisted the services of his secretary Marbois and 
 the two planned to curb any radical policy that should get 
 free rein in Congress. The two found it difficult to get 
 definite information, and Congress itself, torn by the fear 
 of losing the assistance of Spain and the desire to hold 
 the Mississippi, was undecided what course to take. It 
 soon became clear, however, that this body would not yield. 
 A delegate one day informed Luzerne that Congress was 
 disposed to grant Jay greater discretion in regard to the 
 Mississippi river; but on further discussion he revealed 
 that this discretion would allow only a more systematic 
 regulation of contraband. 10 
 
 On the question of the disposition of the western ter- 
 ritories there were numerous opinions. Many members 
 thought the report of Jay was so vague that they could 
 take no action on it and wished to wait for further ad- 
 vices. 11 Luzerne regarded this delay as favorable to the 
 Spanish interests ; and he and his secretary strained every 
 nerve to win over a majority of Congress. In these nego- 
 tiations he labored under a great disadvantage in having no 
 precise instructions from Spain and in not knowing the 
 exact limit of her pretensions. Eagerly he searched the pa- 
 pers of Miralles, left in the hands of the dead Spaniard's 
 secretary, but he found no trace of instructions from Flor- 
 ida Blanca. Anxiously he awaited the arrival of a new 
 Spanish agent, who could furnish definite information. 12 
 The legal status of the West also claimed the attention of 
 the learned Marbois. With members of Congress he 
 
 8 . U., XIII, no. 74, new 152. 
 
 *Ibid., XIII, no. 80, new 186. 
 
 10 1 bid., no. 78, new 176. 
 
 "Luzerne to Vergennes. (Ibid.) Marbois to Vergennes. (Ibid., XIV, 
 no. 88, new 14.) 
 
 12 Luzerne to Vergennes, September 19, 1780. (Ibid., XIII, no. 80, 
 new 186.) 
 
178 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [288 
 
 went over the charters of the different states, compared 
 them and pointed out that they were "contradictory, in- 
 consistent and ridiculous." In them he found imaginary 
 boundaries and designations of countries that never ex- 
 isted. Under his logic and ridicule the claim of imme- 
 morial right was abandoned and Congress took its position 
 on the ground of occupation and possession. 13 
 
 Borne down by the arguments of the Frenchman, several 
 members of Congress indicated their willingness to accept 
 a compromise. They suggested the cession to Spain of the 
 lands between the Mississippi and the right bank of the Ap- 
 palachicola, as far north as the river Tennessee. 14 In these 
 overtures Luzerne had little faith; for they were bitterly 
 attacked by the southern states, which raised the cry that 
 Spain was seeking their dismemberment, and many north- 
 ern delegates, anxious to gain Canada, supported their con- 
 tentions. One member brought to memory an old resolu- 
 tion that the thirteen states were indissolubly united, and 
 argued from this that Congress must maintain the right of 
 the states to all their possessions and in no case could it 
 allow any diminution of territory. 15 He demanded that 
 it declare in precise fashion the exact limits of the various 
 states and draw up a mutual guarantee to maintain them. 
 Another delegate, in his anger, proposed that, in case the 
 Spanish court did not admit the American claims, Jay 
 should be ordered to break off negotiations and quit the 
 country. Wiser counsels prevailed and neither of these 
 propositions passed. Congress did not wish to lose the aid 
 of Spain by displeasing her but it put faith in Jay's sugges- 
 tion that if it remained firm she would "finally be content 
 with equitable regulations. 18 
 
 13 Marbois to Vergennes, September 30, 1780. (E. U., XIII, no. 85, 
 new 211.) 
 
 14 Luzerne to Vergennes, September 8, 1780. (Ibid., XIII, no. 78, 
 new 176.) 
 
 is lbid. Luzerne states that these were the motives but they are not 
 given in any of the published journals of Congress. 
 
 "Wharton, Dip. Cor., Ill, no. 725. 
 
289] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 179 
 
 The decision in regard to new instructions to Jay hung 
 fire until the beginning of October. Every day was ex- 
 pected to bring a letter giving fuller and more definite ex- 
 planation of Spain's proposed boundary. Congress itself 
 appeared to the French embassy hopelessly divided on the 
 question. Some wished to follow Jay's advice to remain 
 firm ; others insisted that the states should make reasonable 
 sacrifices for the common good. So opposed were the opin- 
 ions that many would not discuss them at all for fear of 
 violent and bitter debates. 17 
 
 Jay had asked for definite instructions, and at last 
 Jenifer insisted that they be given him. "Decency, the re- 
 gard due to Spain, and the interests of the states," he said, 
 "demand that we should consider this affair without de- 
 lay." 18 He then moved that Jay be instructed to promise 
 Spain satisfaction on the points in dispute, 19 and defended 
 his proposition in a lengthy speech, describing the failures 
 of the last campaign and the necessity of help from Spain if 
 independence were to be secured. 20 Many speeches were 
 made in answer to his argument and the whole question of 
 the boundaries and the navigation of the Mississippi was 
 again gone over. Jenifer's opponent's discoursed on the 
 sacred sanction of the charters, and declared the necessity of 
 conserving the rights of the states if unity and prosperity 
 were to be attained. They spoke of the generosity and 
 fairness of the king of France in contrast to the ambition 
 of Spain and her evident intention of taking advantage of 
 their distresses. One speaker claimed that "if Spain had 
 the right to make the conquest of all that belonged to the 
 king of Great Britain, His Catholic Majesty, by virtue of 
 this principle, would form claims on Georgia and South 
 Carolina which were then in the hands of the British." 
 Others asserted that if they abandoned their fellow citi- 
 
 17 Barbe de Marbois to Vergennes, October 10, 1780. (E. U., XIV, 
 no. 88, new 14.) 
 
 l Ibid. The published journals of Congress do not give this motion. 
 20 The whole debate is described in Marbois to Vergennes. (Ibid.) 
 
THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [290 
 
 zens, Spanish rule would prove so oppressive that revolu- 
 tion would soon break out. Especial emphasis was also laid 
 on the duty of Congress to protect the interests of the states 
 that were then invaded, and it was heralded about that if 
 the southern delegates assented to the cessions demanded 
 "they would answer for it with their heads." 21 The argu- 
 ments of Jenifer were feebly supported by the other mem- 
 bers and the motion was finally lost. 
 
 On October 4 Congress unanimously 22 passed resolu- 
 tions to adhere to its former instructions and two days 
 later appointed a committee consisting of Madison, Sulli- 
 van, and Duane to draft a letter to Jay. 23 Of this com- 
 mittee Marbois judged Madison to be the most moderate, 
 but he was bound by instructions and could not recede from 
 the pretensions of his state. 24 He was willing, however, to 
 talk over the question with the French envoy, who at- 
 tempted in every way to get him to tone down the letter to 
 Jay. Madison was conciliatory in his attitude towards 
 France, but he remained firm on the policy approved in 
 Congress. 25 
 
 After the resolutions of October 4, there aJppears to have 
 been only one advocate of concession in Congress, Daniel of 
 St. Thomas Jenifer, who had for nearly two years been a 
 most earnest supporter of the Spanish alliance and had 
 throughout shown entire willingness to grant any sacrifice 
 to obtain it. Before he had come to represent his state at 
 Philadelphia he had, as president of the senate of Mary- 
 land, attracted the notice of Gerard and the two had be- 
 come firm friends. 26 Upon entering Congress in November, 
 1778, he at once identified himself with the French party 
 
 21 E. U., XIV, no. 88, new 14. 
 
 2Z Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 900. Mar- 
 bois says that Congress passed this resolution by a plurality of six votes. 
 E. U., XIV, no. 88, fol. 14. 
 
 23 Marbois to Montmorin, October 17. (Esp., 601, no. 10, new 63.) 
 24 Marbois to Vergenes, October 21. (E. U., XIV, no. 92, new 29.) 
 To Montmorin. (Esp. 601, no. II, new 71.) 
 
 25 Marbois to Montmorin, October 17. (Esp., 601, no. 10, new 63.) 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Ford ed.), XII, 1141. 
 
291] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLJCAN PARTY 181 
 
 and soon became its most active and radical member. When 
 the designs of Spain to get control of the West became 
 noised about and it became apparent they received the sup- 
 port of the French minister, many of the old adherents of 
 Gerard, men like Jay and Gouverneur Morris, determined 
 upon an independent course. Not so with Jenifer. He be- 
 came an ardent enthusiast for any concession that would 
 help to gain Spanish assistance or would please the king of 
 France. His views do not appear to have been regarded 
 as unpatriotic by his constituents at home or his colleagues 
 in Congress. He became the center of opposition to the 
 combination of Samuel Adams and the Lees to push New 
 England interests in Canada and Virginian ambitions in 
 the Mississippi valley. He was the first representative of 
 the small states party and drew to his side all factions 
 jealous of the dominance of the "Junto." 
 
 Maryland had no interest in a colonial policy and 
 dreaded the dominance of her southern neighbor. The nav- 
 igation of the Mississippi and the control of its valley 
 meant no increase in her resources but only an added ex- 
 pense to conquer them. Delaware, Pennsylvania, New 
 York, and New Jersey were likewise circumscribed in their 
 limits and never displayed much enthusiasm for acquisi- 
 tions to the territory of their sister states. At the behest 
 of Gerard, Jenifer had led the fight against the demands of 
 Congress for the right to navigate the Mississippi as ex- 
 pressed in Jay's first instructions. In the winter of 1779-80 
 when Luzerne and Miralles were urging acquiescence in 
 Spain's pretentious to the ownership of Eastern Louisiana, 
 Jenifer had been their spokesman and had continued the 
 advocate of Spain during the second struggle over the 
 policy of Congress towards the West. 
 
 Not at all daunted by his defeat in the resolutions of 
 October 4, Jenifer planned with Marbois 27 to renew the 
 fight when the committee should report its draft of the let- 
 ter to Jay. 28 They sought to influence the members of Con- 
 
 27 Luzerne had left Philadelphia on his vacation. 
 
 "Marbois to Vergennes, October 10. (E. U., XVI, no. 88, new 14.) 
 
182 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [292 
 
 gress both by private conferences and by arguments de- 
 livered before the whole assembly. They were still handi- 
 capped, however, by their inability to speak authoritatively 
 on the position of Spain. The secretary of Miralles had 
 been left as charg6 d'affaires in Philadelphia and he had 
 only a vague notion of the desires of his court. 20 He was 
 frightened, however, at the stand of Congress and begged 
 Marbois to exert his influence in behalf of more moderate 
 measures. With different members of Congress different 
 arguments were employed. To the more radical there was 
 pointed out the need of an alliance with Spain and the dan- 
 ger of displeasing her if the claims of Congress were based 
 on pretensions of right. To them it was urged that the 
 United States should throw themselves on the magnanimity 
 and generosity of the Catholic king. 30 To those who were 
 very friendly to the French king and yet suspicious of 
 Spanish ambitions,' Marbois urged concession because it 
 would please His Majesty, and this argument he thought, 
 had a powerful effect. Throughout the whole war there 
 were frequent expressions of gratitude for French aid ; and 
 on these the French representatives, tho often disappointed, 
 depended for substantial acts of gratitude. In this case 
 however, Marbois received more than ordinary encourage- 
 ment and felt confident of success. Samuel Huntington 
 himself, the president of Congress and a New Englander, 
 expressed alarm at the prospect of incurring the enmity of 
 Spain and promised to urge moderation in the new instruc- 
 tions to Jay. 31 
 
 At the solicitation of Marbois and with his help Jenifer 
 undertook to prepare a memoir which should set forth the 
 pretensions of Spain in the most favorable light and answer 
 all the arguments of the opposition. 32 The result of his la- 
 bors is the clearest and most convincing exposition of 
 
 29 Marbois to Vergennes, October 17, 1780. (. (/., XIV, no. 91, new 
 23.) Marbois to Montmorin, October 17, 1780. (Esp., 601 no. 10, new 63.) 
 
 S1 lbid. 
 "Ibid. 
 
293] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 183 
 
 Spain's position that appeared during the revolution. 33 He 
 goes over all the old questions of the validity of the char- 
 ters, the treaty of 1763, the necessity of a well-defined 
 frontier, such as the Mississippi, and all the legal and diplo- 
 matic questions involved. In this document the Maryland 
 delegate argued that those interested in the question ought 
 to have no voice in the decision ; but no state would consent 
 to remain defenseless while its claims were set aside. The 
 most powerful point of his argument, however, was for con- 
 cessions to win the alliance of Spain. 34 
 
 His legal analysis, keen tho it was, could have little 
 effect on a body of revolutionists who held it their duty to 
 obey the wishes of their constituents. Alliance with Spain, 
 however, had become a vital question. Gates had been igno- 
 miniously defeated in South Carolina 33 and the interior of 
 the whole region as well as the cities along the coast were 
 in the possession of the British. 36 The patriot party in the 
 South was broken up and such of its leaders as were alive 
 and free had fled to the north. It was the time of greatest 
 discouragement for the American cause. The American 
 army was unpaid and unprovided for and the French king 
 had refused to grant another subsidy or to send more troops 
 and the French navy had for a long time rendered no serv- 
 ice. 37 In the midst of this general distress, news of Ar- 
 nold's treason added to the all-pervading spirit of gloom. 38 
 
 It was a fitting time to urge any concession to secure 
 the help of Spain, and Jenifer made the most of his oppor- 
 tunity. In contrast to the reverses of the Continental 
 army, Spanish troops were victorious on the Mississipi; 
 and it was believed they would soon overrun the whole ter- 
 
 88 The title of this memoir was "Observations on the points contested 
 in the present negotiations between Spain and the United States." Copies 
 were enclosed to Vergennes and Montmorin with the dispatches of 
 October 17. 
 
 3 *. 13., XIV, no. 91, new 25. 
 
 3S " Observations" etc. with dispatch of October 17, (Ibid.) 
 
 30 Ibid. Van Tyne, American Revolution, 301. 
 
 37 Marbois to Vergennes. (E. U., XIV, no. 91, new 23.) 
 
 38 Van Tyne, American Revolution, 306. 
 
184 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [294 
 
 ritory in dispute. Why not then, he argued, make a virtue 
 of necessity and in return for the Spanish alliance grant 
 that which we can never hope to conquer? 30 With the help 
 of Spain he held that success was assured; without it fail- 
 ure was inevitable. Under the existing conditions he be- 
 lieved that the war carried on by Spain was more harmful 
 than helpful to the American cause, for Spanish demands 
 were a drain on the resources provided for by France. With 
 the Spanish troops to attack from the south and the Ameri- 
 cans from the north, he argued the British would be be- 
 tween two fires and would soon be driven out of the coun- 
 try. 40 
 
 How are we to secure this needed assistance? he asked. 
 There was only one way possible: to grant the Catholic 
 King Eastern Louisiana and the exclusive navigation of the 
 Mississippi. In this opinion he was backed up by the pow- 
 erful influence of the French embassy and he felt that Con- 
 gress must agree to make the concession. 41 
 
 The opposition to surrendering American interests in 
 the West, strangely enough, was led by New England, 
 while the southern states were rather inclined to give up 
 their claims. The eastern delegates argued that since Jay 
 was on the ground his opinion should be followed and they 
 were for remaining firm. Marbois, however, thought there 
 were other reasons for their stand. The eastern states had 
 never been amenable to French influence and had been the 
 hot-bed of the anti-Gallican party. Their attitude had often 
 before been attributed to hostility to the French alliance, 
 and Marbois thought that this hostility was more bitter in 
 its opposition to Spain. In these states the British power 
 was considered broken and he believed that their leaders 
 wished to continue the war in order to conquer Canada and 
 Nova Scotia. 42 Still another reason, he suggested, might be 
 
 89 Van Tyne, American Revolution, 306. 
 
 ""Observations" etc., with dispatch of October 17. (. U., XIV, no. 
 91, new 26.) 
 "Ibid. 
 "Ibid. 
 
295] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 185 
 
 that they feared, if the ultimatum on the western bound- 
 aries was set aside, the southern states would desert them 
 on the issue of the northern limits. 
 
 The attitude of the middle states was more moderate. 
 New York held strongly for the former instructions on the 
 western boundary but was willing to surrender the naviga- 
 tion of the Mississippi. Marbois believed that she hoped, if 
 the right to use this river were prohibited, her citizens 
 could then control the western trade by the way of the 
 Lakes and the Hudson. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- 
 ware, and Maryland appeared for the most part indifferent 
 to the West and strongly anxious for the favor of the King 
 of France and the alliance with Spain. Marbois thought 
 that when the question came up for final decision they 
 would all vote in favor of his projects. 43 Virginia, led by 
 Madison, was inflexibly opposed to any concession. The 
 delegates from the three southern states expressed to Mar- 
 bois their opinion that Spain should be conciliated, but de- 
 clared they must not vote to make any sacrifices of the 
 rights of their states. 44 
 
 On October 17 the committee submitted its draft of a 
 letter to Jay explaining the "reasons and principles" on 
 which the resolutions of the 4th were founded. 45 This letter 
 was prepared by Madison 46 and is in his handwriting. 47 It 
 presents a masterly defense of the principles agreed upon 
 two weeks before and answers in detail the memoir of Jen- 
 ifer with a breadth of view never attained by the mem- 
 ber from Maryland. It states simply and concisely the po- 
 sition of Congress, and then passes to a discussion of the 
 
 4S E. U., XIV, no. 91, new 26. 
 
 "Ibid. 
 
 48 Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 935. 
 
 46 "Mr. Madison, charged by his colleagues to show in memoir the 
 state of the question of the navigation of the Mississippi and the posses- 
 sion of the lands situated on the left bank of that river, has communicated 
 to me this writing . . . . " Marbois to Vergennes, October 21, 1780. 
 (E. U., XIV, no. 92, new 29) ; to Montmorin (Esp., 601, no. n, new 
 
 70. 
 
 "Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 947- 
 
186 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [296 
 
 questions involved. In his contention for the Mississippi 
 as the western boundary Madison ignores the obsolete de- 
 limitations of the charters and bases his arguments on the 
 cession by the treaty of 1763. "It is sufficient that by the 
 definition of the treaty of Paris, of 1763, article seventh, all 
 the territory now claimed by the United States was express- 
 ly and irrevocally ceded to the king of Great Britain, 
 and that the United States are, in consequence of the revo- 
 lution in their government, entitled to the benefits of that 
 cession." 48 The sovereignty of this territory, he contended, 
 was vested in the king of Great Britain by virtue of his po- 
 sition as king of the people of America. Consequently, 
 when this sovereignty over the thirteen states was over- 
 thrown, it returned to the people. "From these princi- 
 ples," he asserted, "it results that all the territory lying 
 within the limits of the states, as fixed by the sovereign 
 himself, was held by him, for their particular benefits, and 
 must equally with his other rights, and claims in quality 
 of their sovereign, be considered as having devolved on 
 them, in consequence of their resumption of the sovereignty 
 to themselves." In answer to the Spanish claim of right of 
 conquest, Madison replied that these conquests did not ex- 
 tend farther north than Fort Natchez, while the remain- 
 der of the territory had been conquered and was held 
 by American arms. He furthermore insisted that the 
 United States, as an idependent nation, could not permit 
 another power to conquer territory contained within its 
 limits. 49 He defended the rights of the United States 
 to this territory on the grounds of a national boundary 
 and its settlement by American citizens. The right to navi- 
 gate the Mississippi river Madison based on arguments 
 the same as those advanced for the possession of the west- 
 ern territories, and the right of passage through the Span- 
 ish possessions he supported by appeal to the law of na- 
 tions. 50 The document as a whole shows much learning and 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XVIII, 936. 
 Ibid., XVIII, 938. 
 *Ibid., 945. 
 
297] TRIUMPH OF THE ANTI-GALLICAN PARTY 187 
 
 a thoro understanding of the principles of international 
 law. It is clear in exposition and expresses the most subtle 
 ideas in a simple and concise manner. In spite of the fact 
 that Marbois considered the pretensions of the United States 
 as set forth in this document as too ambitious, 51 the letter 
 was accepted by Congress, with the belief that it would 
 convince Spain of the justice of the American position. 52 
 According to Marbois, however, Jay was left much dis- 
 cretion as to insistence on the resolutions of Congress. He 
 was not to present them as an ultimatum, and was author- 
 ized to retract as circumstances and prudence suggested. 
 
 Altho the French representatives did not approve the 
 stand of Congress, they recognized a spirit of moderation 
 that promised a reasonable settlement. Marbois wrote that, 
 if Spain acceded to the conditions laid down by Congress,, 
 her action would cause general satisfaction in America. He 
 was not, however, sanguine of such a concession, and sought 
 to prepare Congress for harder terms. He was handicapped 
 in his efforts by ignorance of the full extent of Florida 
 Blanca's demands 33 and felt constrained to inform Con- 
 gress of his lack of definite knowledge. 
 
 The decision of Congress in these instructions to Jay 
 marks the end of the personal diplomacy of the French min- 
 isters. Upon the gratitude of Congress and personal coun- 
 sel to individual members of Congress Gerard and Luzerne 
 had built up a powerful machine in the x interests of the 
 Spanish ambition. One by one the members of this organ- 
 ization had fallen away, and after the debate of October 
 several months elapse before Jenifer's name appears in the 
 
 "Marbois to Vergennes, October 21. (E. U., XIV, no. 92, new 29.) 
 52 "The president of Congress has said that he believes an impartial 
 power will find the new instructions satisfactory for the court of Madrid." 
 Ibid. 
 
 63 He believed, however, that Spain "had demanded of Congress at 
 this moment that part of Louisiana which in the atlas of Damible is 
 comprised between the Mississippi on the west, the Floridas on the south, 
 the river Athbamnus or Appalachicola on the east, and a line drawn from 
 the sources of these rivers to the mouth of the Ohio in the Mississippi." 
 Ibid. 
 
188 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [298 
 
 votes of Congress. 54 With his departure the last partisan 
 of the old French party disappears and the diplomacy at 
 Philadelphia begins to assume the character of interna- 
 tional relations. 
 
 This effort of Luzerne and Marbois also marks their 
 last attempt at active intervention in behalf of Spain. Gar- 
 doqui, the successor of Miralles, had arrived and he neither 
 gave information to the French representatives nor sought 
 their confidence. Henceforth there is no intimation that 
 French and Spaniard are hand and glove and Gardoqui is 
 left free to pursue his aims. Another reason for this with- 
 drawal from the Spanish affairs may be found in the in- 
 structions of Vergennes. He had previously declared his 
 ignorance of American rights in the West and his fears of 
 incurring the distrust of the United States; 53 and in conse- 
 quence, he now directed his representative to cease inter- 
 fering and to urge nothing against the will of Congress. 
 
 Thus by the close of 1780 the United States had re- 
 ceived recognition in spirit as previously in fact and was no 
 longer a mere protege" of the French monarchy. It was ac- 
 knowledged that Congress could judge of its own rights and 
 interests and was not to be dominated by notions of senti- 
 ment. Spain must seek her ends through the channels of 
 ordinary diplomacy and the United States were henceforth 
 permitted to work out their own destiny. 
 
 64 He is not recorded as voting until April, 1781. 
 05 See above, p. 170, note 54. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE CLOSE OF THE WAK 
 
 Congress proceeded to the exercise of its ne\v found 
 freedom with moderation. Marbois had expressed the be- 
 lief that the shifting membership of this body would sooner 
 or later cause a change in its policy; 1 and within a few 
 months this opinion was apparently justified. In October 
 Congress had unanimously agreed to resolutions demand- 
 ing widely extended boundaries, but these resolutions did 
 not express the ideas of all the members, and many of 
 them assured Marbois that they would be satisfied with 
 narrower limits, but that it was necessary to present a 
 united front. 
 
 There were many considerations, however, that 
 pointed to the necessity of concession. Cornwallis now 
 held Georgia and South Carolina and had advanced north- 
 ward far enough to proclaim North Carolina a conquered 
 province; 2 and it appeared that without more effective 
 aid these three states would be lost to the union. In the 
 north Washington was inactive, and no additional help 
 was then expected from the French. Still another danger 
 menaced the republic; the danger that Spain would make 
 a separate peace with Great Britain; and early in 1781 
 came a letter from Jay which aroused still greater doubts 
 as to Spanish designs. Jay had learned of Spain's neg(> 
 tiations with a British agent, and of her disavowal of any 
 purpose to treat independently; 3 but the agent still re- 
 mained. "If they have rejected all overtures of Britain, 
 
 iMarbois to Vergennes, October i, 1780. (E. U., XIV, no. 92, 
 new 29.) 
 
 2 Van Tyne, American Revolution, 324, 
 3 See p. 143. 
 
 189 
 
190 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [300 
 
 why is Mr. Cumberland still here," asked Jay; 4 and his 
 suspicions found an immediate echo in Congress. 
 
 The Americans had abandoned their claim to any ter- 
 ritory by charter right, and now realized that their pre- 
 tensions, in order to be effective, must be maintained on 
 other grounds. They understood at last that when they 
 came to treat for peace the enemy would surrender terri- 
 tory in their possession only for adequate compensation. 
 This truth had been urged by Vergennes; and he had in- 
 sisted that the first aim should be to expel the enemy from 
 their borders, 3 but nothing had been accomplished. Now 
 with the British in possession of the southern states and 
 the Spaniards active along the Mississippi, Congress re- 
 solved to retrieve itself and proposed two plans of action : 
 an effective military campaign, and renewed efforts to 
 obtain help from the Court of Madrid. Washington was 
 entrusted with the military plans and prepared for en- 
 ergetic measures. Once more he turned his eyes towards 
 Canada and succeeded in convincing the reluctant Lu- 
 zerne of the advisability of its conquest. Luzerne ad- 
 mitted the desire of his court to free the French in Can- 
 ada as it had freed the Anglo-Saxon colonies, and declared 
 its eagerness to attempt any measures for the humiliation 
 of Britain ; he also wrote to Vergennes that he thought the 
 invasion would be "practical and of great utility." 7 Ver- 
 gennes lent a favorable ear but urged that the British 
 should first be expelled from the United States. After this 
 should be accomplished, he declared his willingness to 
 
 *November 6, 1780. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 148.) Cumberland was 
 the name of the British agent. 
 
 5 See p. 191, note 9. 
 
 6 Luzerne to Vergennes, November 3, 1780. (E. U., XIV, no. 49, 
 new 213.) 
 
 T Au defaut du Siege de New York, qui paroit devoir etre au dessus de 
 nos moyens au moins pour la plus grande partie de la Campagne, une ex- 
 pedition contre le Canada Sera la plus agreable aux Etats de la nouvelle 
 Angleterre, et je crois qu'elle est a la fois practicable et d'une utilite in- 
 finee." Luzerne to Vergennes, April 29, 1781. (E. U., XVI, no. 62, 
 new 137.) 
 
301] THE CLOSE OP THE WAR 191 
 
 support the expedition, for he regarded it as necessary 
 for Halifax and Penobscot at least to belong "either to 
 us or to the Americans." 8 The project was continually 
 discussed in Congress 9 but military events forbade its un- 
 dertaking. The advance of Cornwallis to the north threat- 
 ened the central states, and thus ended the last attempt 
 against Canada. 
 
 In the Mississippi Valley, American power was equally 
 precarious, altho in the regions of Kentucky and Ten- 
 nessee settlers from the states had occupied the land and 
 it seemed that possession there was secure. The expedi- 
 tion of Clark had given the Americans a claim to a large 
 part of the territory north of the Ohio; but the British 
 still held posts on the Lake Shore, such as Niagara, De- 
 troit, and Mackinac, and these commanded an extensive 
 region. Washington felt that it was essential to reduce 
 these posts, but he did not have the necessary military 
 strength to do so alone, and suggested that Virginia should 
 furnish additional aid. 10 
 
 The Spaniards in this region had aroused the fears 
 of the Americans. Their designs on Eastern Louisiana 
 were well known, and their expeditions along the Mis- 
 
 8 Vergennes to Luzerne, October 22, 1780. (E. U., XIV, no. 32.) 
 9 This measure was chiefly fostered by the New England delegates 
 who insisted that their states would never be secure as long as Great Brit- 
 ain held Canada. Luzerne to Vergennes, April 29. (E. U., XVI, no. 62, fol 
 137.) "Le penchant des delegations du Nord pour une expedition centre le 
 Canada se manifeste de plus en plus et M Samuel Adams qui vient de 
 partir pour 1'Etat de Massachussett est toujours plein de cette idee. Les 
 Delegues du Sud qui sentent combien il importe de ne donner lieu a au- 
 
 cune division en Congres sur la matiere importante ont cru devoir 
 
 se montrer faciles sur les pretentions de leurs Colleagues .... mais ils 
 ont memes tems annonce qu'ils s'opposeroient de tout leur pouvoir a toute 
 operation centre Quebec ou les autres parties Septentrionales du Canada 
 
 aussi longtems qu'une parti des Treize Etats seroit invadie " May 12, 
 
 1781. (Ibid., no. 75, new 139.) 
 
 "Washington to Jefferson, December 28, 1780. (Writings (Ford ed.), 
 IX, 81.) 
 
192 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [302 
 
 sissippi were of an alarming character. 11 Galvez had early 
 captured the British posts on the lower Mississippi without 
 protest; but when in 1781 the Spanish commander at St. 
 Louis sent an expedition across the Illinois country which 
 captured St. Joseph, there was a cry of alarm among pa- 
 triotic Americans. 12 It is probable that Spain did not 
 have any designs on the territory north of the Ohio, but 
 her intrigues to obtain that south of this river convinced 
 many that she was trying to get possesion of the whole 
 Mississippi valley. 
 
 In harmony with Washington's ideas, and possibly 
 at his suggestion, two expeditions were planned against 
 the Northwest. One was to be composed of French "hab- 
 itants" along the Mississippi, under the leadership of La 
 Balme; the other was to be made up of troops from Vir- 
 gina and Kentucky commanded by Colonel Clark. 13 La 
 
 11 Geo. Rogers Clark wrote to John Todd in March, 1780: "I am not 
 clear but that the Spaniards would fondly suffer their settlements in 
 the Illinois to fall with ours for the sake of having the opportunity of 
 retaking both." (John Todd Papers: Chicago Historical Society Collec- 
 tions, IV, 326.) 
 
 "See E. G. Mason, "March of the Spaniards across Illinois." (Maga- 
 zine of American History, XV, 457.) This account merely reflects the 
 contemporary American fears without any real knowledge of facts. Frank- 
 lin was very much alarmed at the Spanish project, fearing it was an at- 
 tempt to restrict the republic to the Appalachian mountains. (Franklin 
 to Livingston, April 12, 1782. Writings, Smyth ed., VIII, 425.) Jay 
 wrote to Congress on March 12, that the Madrid Gazette after describ- 
 ing the expedition speaks of its importance as preventing the English 
 from attacking St. Louis and compelling the Indians to remain neutral in 
 the war. (Wharton, Dip. Cor. V, 364.) Luzerne did not know what motive 
 the Spaniards had in undertaking this conquest. He described it as of 
 little use and very hard to defend. He describes fully the alarm felt 
 among the Americans. Luzerne to Vergennes, August 9, 1782. (E. U., 
 XXII, no. 8, new 24.) 
 
 13 La Balme was a French cavalry officer who was one of the many 
 sent over by Deane in the winter of 1776-7. Deane to Congress, October 17, 
 1776. (Sparks, Dip. Cor., I, 42.) He was granted a passport by Vergennes 
 and took the quality of a merchant. Lenoir to Vergennes, January 28, 1779. 
 (E. U., II, no. 32, new 54.) In granting the passport Vergennes wrote: 
 "Le gouvernment ne pouvant avouer leur que veulent aller tenter fortune 
 dans cette partie de 1'Amerique ne peut absolument donner un titre qui con- 
 
303] THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 193 
 
 Balme was the first to start. He aroused the French 
 settlers at Kaskaskia, and with a small force started to- 
 wards Detroit. 14 Before they could reach their destination 
 
 stiterois quil a connoissance de leur projet. Vergennes to Lenoir, Jan- 
 uary 29, 1777. (E. U., II, no. 33, new 55.) In May Congress conferred 
 upon La Balme the title of Lieutenant colonel of horse (Journals of 
 Continental Congress, (Ford ed.) VII, 385) and in July he was made in- 
 spector general. (Ibid., 539.) In October he resigned (ibid., IX, 797), 
 and spent several months in trying to get his pay adjusted. Just how 
 La Balme got back into the American service is not clear, for in February 
 1778, the committee on foreign applications informed him that it would 
 have no further use for his services. (Ibid., X, 157.) We next find men- 
 tion of him in the West "provided with a commission of inspector gen- 
 eral of all the cavalry in America and with a letter of recommendation 
 dated June 25, 1780, addressed to the suppliants by Mr. Fowler who was 
 formerly our commandant . . . ." Petition to governor of Virginia by inhab- 
 itants of Kaskaskia, May 4, 1781. (Kaskaskia Records, 237.) His activities 
 here aroused suspicions among the Americans that he was in the employ 
 of France (ibid, 169), but he began his work at Kaskaskia. There he 
 found the Kaskaskians full of hatred towards the "Virginians," who, they 
 claimed, had despoiled and were oppressing them. La Balme skilfully 
 appealed to their patriotism as Frenchmen, and promised them redress from 
 Congress. (Ibid., 181.) He sympathized with them, but since they were 
 subjects of the United States he did not feel at liberty to make a formal 
 request in their behalf and contented himself with speaking privately to 
 various members of Congress. La Balme raised a force of Frenchmen 
 which started against the fort at Detroit but was ambushed and slain. Lu- 
 zerne to Vergennes, May 12, 1781. (E. U., XVI, no. 75, new 139.) La 
 Balme's expedition was of no importance in itself; it derives an interest 
 from the fact that there was then and has been since some suspicion that 
 he was acting to further some ambitious plans of France. (Turner, in 
 American Historical Review, X, 235.) There seems to be no evidence for 
 this assumption, and there is much to urge against it. In the French ar- 
 chives there is no mention of La Balme except the perfunctory one of 
 granting him passports. Luzerne apparently did not know him, for he 
 spoke of him in a disinterested sort of way and did not even make mention 
 of his death. Most important of all is the fact that Vergennes did not 
 have any designs on the Mississippi Valley. 
 
 14 "Une colonie de Francois etablie sur les bords du Mississippi dans le 
 Pays des Illinois au poste des Kaskaskias a cru recemment pouvoir tenter 
 une enterprise centre les Fort du detroit et sous la conduite de M La 
 Balme : Us ont remonte L'oubache et se sont empares du poste des Mi- 
 amis." Luzerne to Vergennes, May 12, 1781. (E. U., XVI, no. 75, new 139.) 
 
194 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [304 
 
 they were ambushed and La Balme and most of his little 
 band were slain. 
 
 Clark was instructed to collect a force at Fort Pitt and 
 to make ready for an attack on Detroit. He was then to 
 march east and capture Niagara and after that to join with 
 other forces in an effort to capture Quebec. 15 He was slow 
 in raising his troops, however, and before he could start 
 events were hurrying the war to a close and the expedition 
 never set out. 
 
 Luzerne heartily approved of the attempt of Congress 
 to get possession of the Northwest. He called the measure 
 a piece of "sound politics" for "if it succeeds," he wrote, 
 "it will assure the frontiers of the thirteen states to the 
 north." He recognized that the possession of the Great 
 Lakes would place the Americans in a much better position 
 to negotiate with great Britain. 16 The failure to conquer 
 these posts resulted as Luzerne had foreseen ; and with the 
 British in possession of them they long remained a fruitful 
 cause of trouble. 
 
 The desperate condition of American affairs in the 
 last months of the war inclined Congress once more to seek 
 Spanish aid, and some of the southern delegates confided 
 to Luzerne their intention to reopen negotiations regard- 
 ing the West, 17 They had decided to offer Spain in return 
 for her help "one hundred miles of land on the left bank of 
 
 15 Plan for an attack on Quebec. (Papers of the Continental Con- 
 gress, 25, I, fol. 37-) 
 
 18 une expedition centre les Forts de Niagara et du detroit a etc 
 
 secretement resolue. Elle doit etre enterprise par le Colonel Clarke avec 
 quelques forces quil tierara de la Virginie et avec les milices du district 
 de Kentucke. Si elle reussit elle assurera la frontiere des Treize Etats au 
 Nord Elles les rendra maitres de deux postes importantes et des lacs mich- 
 igan, Huron, Erie et Ontario qui sont dans 1'etendiie des limites quils se sont 
 Fixes et cette possession leur donnera les moiens de Negocier sur un pied 
 beaucoup plus avantageux avec la grande Bretagne." Luzerne then de- 
 scribes the difficulties in the way which were great enough to make him 
 doubt of the success of the expedition. Luzerne to Vergennes, May 12, 
 1781. (E. U., XVI, no. 75, new 139.) 
 
 1T Luzerne to Vergennes, November 26, 1780. (E. U., XIV, no. 89, 
 fol. 337.) 
 
305] THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 195 
 
 the river" [Mississippi]. 18 On this question there was the 
 same old alignment of parties; the New England states 
 and Virginia opposing any concession, while a majority 
 of the other delegates favored it. After much discussion 
 a compromise resolution was passed, which authorized Jay 
 to give up the claims of the United States to navigate the 
 Mississippi below the thirty-first parallel, provided that 
 the right of navigation above this line was recognized. 19 
 No concession of territory in the Mississippi Valley was 
 made, and it was apparent that Virginia and New England 
 would concede no more. 20 Congress felt that these terms 
 were most liberal and did not doubt that Spain would 
 accept them. 21 Luzerne himself believed that now Spain 
 would accede to the treaty of alliance, if she were given 
 control of the mouth of the Mississippi, and he ceased 
 urging concessions upon Congress. 22 
 
 The resolutions of Congress agreeing to relinquish 
 the navigation of the Mississippi gave new life to the nego- 
 tiations at Madrid. In January Florida Blanca had de- 
 manded this as the sine qua non of forming an alliance 
 with the United States; but Jay had not felt at liberty to 
 grant it and Franklin had approved his stand. 23 In all 
 his efforts Jay had been counseled by Montmorin, and 
 after the ultimatum of Florida Blanca both agreed that 
 
 18 Luzerne to Vergennes, December 15. (E. U., XIV, no. 108, new 120.) 
 
 19 Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 257; Journals of Continental Congress 
 (Hunt ed.), XIX, 153. 
 
 20 Luzerne thought there was a deal by which the northern states were 
 to support Virginia's pretentions to the West in return for that state's 
 support of the New England claim to an extended northern boundary. 
 (Esp., 601, no. 191.) 
 
 "Congress to Jay, May 28, 1781. Journals of Continental Congress, 
 XX, 555. A resolution to allow greater concessions was unanimously 
 defeated on August 10. Secret Journals, II, 468. 
 
 22 Luzerne to Montmorin, May i, 1781. (Esp., 603, no. 61.) 
 
 23 Franklin to Jay, January 27, 1781. (Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 
 202.) 
 
196 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [30$ 
 
 nothing more could be done before the general settlement 
 of peace. 24 
 
 When Jay received instructions allowing him to relin- 
 quish the navigation of the Mississippi below the thirty- 
 first parallel, he attempted to reopen the negotiations with 
 the Spanish minister. He did not reveal his instructions 
 at once, altho he strongly suspected that the Spanish min- 
 ister knew all about them. He was still opposed to the 
 cession of the right of navigation and resolved to make one 
 more effort to conserve it. After all, he reasoned, Spain 
 will fight as well in our cause without a treaty as with one 
 To Florida Blanca he declared that "Congress views the 
 speedy accomplishment of this union as very important to 
 the common cause; and therefore, if Spain would consent 
 forthwith to come into it, in that case they would gratify 
 His Majesty by ceding to him the navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi below their territories on reasonable terms." Florida 
 Blanca showed no inclination to agree to these conditions, 
 and argued that the whole question could better be ad- 
 justed in a general peace. 25 
 
 Jay then went to Montmorin, who advised him to con- 
 tinue his efforts, and declared that the exclusive navigation 
 of the Mississippi ought to satisfy Spain. 26 Jay acted on 
 the suggestion, but to all his communications Florida 
 Blanca returned no answer. He excused himself on the 
 plea of illness and finally asked Jay to submit in definite 
 terms the demands of Congress in regard to the Mississippi 
 and the boundaries. Jay then sent a project of a treaty 
 of alliance which followed exactly the conditions laid down 
 by Congress in regard to both questions. He dwelt at 
 length on the sacrifices which the loss of the navigation of 
 the Mississippi would entail on the inhabitants of the West, 
 and begged that the generosity of the king would give them 
 
 24 Jay to Congress, October 3, 1781. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 739.) 
 Luzerne wrote to Vergennes that Jay counted little on the success of his 
 attempts to treat with Spain before the peace. July 6. (Esp., 604, no. 21, 
 new 44.) 
 
 25 Jay to Congress. Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 738-747- 
 28 Montmorin to Vergennes, July 6. (Esp., 604, no. 21.) 
 
307] THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 197 
 
 some relief. 27 This was practically the end of the negotia- 
 tion with Spain on the question of an alliance and the dis- 
 putes over the Mississippi, for the Spanish minister never 
 could find time to discuss the question until after Jay had 
 departed from Spain. 
 
 To Montmorin Florida Blanca expressed the most hos- 
 tile views towards the United States. He dwelt much on 
 the perfidy of the Americans who, he declared, were still 
 devoted to Great Britain. He reiterated his fears of aggres- 
 sion by the new nation, and gave this as the principal rea- 
 son why he would not enter the alliance. He acknowledged 
 that independence was assured, but hoped that the Ameri- 
 can republic would always remain feeble. He attempted 
 to revive the old scheme of uti possidetis and planned to 
 leave Great Britain in possession of New York, Charleston, 
 -and Chesapeake Bay. This he felt would keep the states 
 in dependence on their allies. 28 
 
 Montmorin opposed this view decidedly and firmly. 
 He ridiculed the idea that a people who had fought as sav- 
 agely as the Americans could bear any love for their old 
 foe; and he declared that the policy of Spain would make 
 them dependencies of the common foe and thus render 
 fruitless the whole war. If Great Britain should keep 
 these important posts, he argued, American independence 
 will not be absolute, and American commerce will be a prey 
 to the caprice of England. He pointed out that, if Spain 
 wished the new nation to be weak, her wish was assured 
 by the very constitution of the confederacy. 29 These argu- 
 ments had no effect upon Florida Blanca and he remained 
 obstinately set against the recognition of American inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 27 Jay to Congress, October 3, 1781. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., IV, 766 et 
 seq.) A copy of this projected treaty is in the French foreign office. (Esp., 
 ^4, no. 187.) Through some error Van Tyne asserts that "Jay never 
 revealed these instructions." (American Revolution, 312.) Both Jay and 
 Montmorin assert the contrary. 
 
 28 Montmorin to Vergennes, March 12, 1781. (Esp., 602, no. 18, new 
 .310.) 
 
198 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [308 
 
 The failure of Jay's negotiations widened the breach 
 between the United States and Spain. Spain had never 
 desired an alliance and hated the Americans as rebels. 
 She had aided them only out of hostility to Great Britain, 
 but at the same time had tried to cripple them as a nation. 
 Her offers of assistance had been only for the accomplish- 
 ment of some of her own immediate ends, and had never 
 looked towards independence. She assisted in the conquest 
 of the Floridas, when they were to be for her own posses- 
 sion; but she insisted that they must include the whole 
 Mississippi Valley. When Congress refused this exorbitant 
 demand, Spain decided to seek the realization of her ambi- 
 tion in other ways, and henceforth treated the pretentious 
 of the new republic with scornful indifference. 
 
 In Congress the failure of Jay's negotiations increased 
 the feeling of hostility and distrust towards Spain. The 
 measure surrendering the navigation of the Mississippi had 
 been forced through with difficulty, and when Spain hesi- 
 tated to accept the terms offered, the opposition increased. 30 
 When news reached Philadelphia of Jay's complete failure, 
 many members of Congress demanded that all negotiations 
 be broken off. They felt that they had conceded too much 
 under the strain of adversity ; and now that Yorktown had 
 gone into history, they wished to take back this concession. 
 Many schemes were suggested. One member advanced the 
 idea of offering Russia an establishment in Eastern Louis- 
 iana as a check to Spanish aggression and a guarantee of 
 peace in the West. 31 Congress contented itself, however,, 
 with a resolution introduced by Madison that "the limita- 
 tion affixed by him [Jay] to the proposed surrender of the 
 navigation of the Mississippi in particular corresponds 
 
 80 Luzerne to Montmorin, September i. (Esf>., 605, no. 119.) 
 31 "Ce Ministre [Livingston] est porte a croire aussi que le Congres 
 que cette puissance voit avec inquietude 1'elevation d'une Republique dont 
 elle craint que le voisinage ne lui devienne dangereux . . . Parmi les idees 
 deraisonnables que ces conjunctures ont fait .... II n'en est point de 
 plus bizarre que celle d'offrir a la Russie un etablissment dans la Louis- 
 iane orientale pour la rendre favorable aux Etats-Unis .... "Luzerne to 
 Vergennes, May 10, 1782. (E. U., XXI, 236, new 48.) 
 
309] THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 199 
 
 with the views of Congress; that they observe not without 
 surprise and concern, that a proposition, so liberal in itself, 
 and which removed the only avowed obstacle to a connec- 
 tion between the United States and his catholick majesty, 
 should not have produced greater effect on the councils of 
 the latter." 32 Congress further resolved that the conces- 
 sion was offered for the immediate aid of Spain and that 
 every delay detracted from the reason for the sacrifice. It 
 declared that no more liberal terms would be offered and 
 with this the question of the navigation of the Mississippi 
 passed out of the Revolution. 
 
 The jealousy and ill will of the Spanish court did not 
 escape the knowledge of the watchful Vergennes. He had 
 been irritated at its refusal to recognize the United States, 
 and its grasping ambition had angered him. He had hoped 
 for a more liberal policy but he was at last convinced of 
 Spain's hostility to his American allies. 33 He believed that 
 Florida Blanca would never accede to the alliance, and 
 that the whole question would have to be threshed out at 
 the time of the settlement of peace. By his advice all 
 efforts to induce Spain to sign the treaty of alliance were 
 discontinued ; and for the remainder of the war Vergennes 
 sought to obtain such harmony of action as the conditions 
 would permit. 
 
 Vergennes realized that the difference between the two 
 countries was fundamental and might lead to serious con- 
 sequences. He had never brought up the question of the 
 West in his communications with the Spanish court, but 
 he knew from the reports of Luzerne the extent of its 
 claims, and shrewdly surmised that these conflicting pre- 
 tentions kept Florida Blanca from treating with Congress. 
 
 * 2 Secret Journals, III, gg; Charles Thompson to Montmorin, May 24, 
 1782. (Esp., 607, no. 99.) 
 
 33 "I1 y a longtems, Monsieur, que je suis convaincu que M le comte 
 de Florida Blanche a des principes errones a 1'egard de TAmerique qu'il 
 est secretement contraire a 1'independance les Etats-unis et qu'il 
 nous causera autant qu'il sera en son pouvoir des embarras lorsqu'il sera 
 question de traiter cette matiere vis-a-vis de la Grande Bretagne." Ver- 
 gennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781. (Esp., 606, no. 159; Circourt, III r 
 
200 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION* [310 
 
 His best hope of a successful issue was to keep all disputes 
 under cover until the war was finished ; and so he refused 
 to commit himself on the question and enjoined his subor- 
 dinates to do the same. 34 
 
 The closing years of the war pressed no less heavily 
 upon France than upon the United States. The French 
 government had unflinchingly borne the expenses of many 
 campaigns, but the strain was beginning to tell. Vergennes 
 was not the first to complain. There were others at the 
 court who felt that France had already gone beyond her 
 strength. In September, 1780, Maurepas informed the king 
 that the finances were in such a state that peace was im- 
 perative. Vergennes even then did not withdraw from his 
 position but forced his leading opponents out of office. This 
 did not relieve the finances, however, and Vergennes him- 
 self was compelled to take measures looking towards peace. 
 
 Vergennes found his chief difficulty in satisfying the 
 demands of Spain. He had promised her Minorca, Ja- 
 maica, and Gibraltar ; but only the first had fallen and the 
 others seemed impregnable.* 5 i It appeared likely that 
 Spain could not get the territories she wanted, and now 
 she was clamoring for indemnity in other regions. Florida 
 Blanca felt that his country could get more by a settlement 
 on the basis of uti possidetis, which would give her Mi- 
 norca and the Floridas with some minor concessions, and 
 which would leave New York and the three southern states 
 in the hands of the British. Under these terms also Spain 
 might have claimed Eastern Louisiana, for she maintained 
 that it had been conquered by Galvez ; and the Northwest 
 would have remained in British hands. 
 
 Military reverses, financial difficulties, and the de- 
 mands of Spain were all sources of anxiety to the French 
 minister. He knew that France could not much longer 
 continue the strua^le, but he felt that the royal honor de- 
 manded independence for all the states. He refused to dis- 
 
 34 Vergennes thus instructed Luzerne, August 12, 1781 (E. U., XXII, 
 no. 17, new 38) ; to Montmorin (Esp., 603, no. 25). 
 
 35 Lecky, American Revolution (Woodburn ed.), 428. 
 88 Doniol, Histoire, IV, 498. 
 
311] THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 201 
 
 cuss the proposition of uti possidetis, and insisted that 
 France would stand by her alliance with the Americans. 37 
 At the same time he realized that unless the allied forces 
 should achieve a striking success it would be impossible 
 to force the British to surrender their recent conquests; 
 and so he instructed Luzerne to "familiarize" Congress 
 with the idea that some sacrifice might be necessary. Ver- 
 gennes, however, was resolved to maintain the principles 
 of his alliance with the United States above all other con- 
 ditions. 38 
 
 In order to maintain the principles of the alliance, 
 Vergennes resolved on aggressive military action, and 
 urged Spain to attack East Florida and Jamaica. The 
 Florida campaign he planned as a help to the Americans. 39 
 He strengthened the forces around Gibraltar and projected 
 another invasion of Canada. He sent De Grasse back to 
 American waters and prepared for a strong campaign. 
 This, he felt, must be his last effort; and, if he failed, he 
 must yield to British terms; but, if he triumphed, the alli- 
 ance would be maintained in all its provisions. The attack 
 on Jamaica was not made; Gibraltar did not fall; but 
 Yorktown solved the problem, and Vergennes declared that 
 the independence of the whole of the United States was 
 assured. 40 
 
 The question of the boundaries presented to Vergennes 
 a most serious dilemma. On the north there was little 
 difficulty. He did not feel that the Americans could claim 
 all Canada but he was anxious for them to have Halifax 41 
 
 "Vergennes declared that the propositions of Spain would be advan- 
 tageous to France on account of the conquests she had made, but he main- 
 tained that it did not enter into his plan of settling the future of America. 
 To Luzerne, September 7, 1781. (. U., XVIII, no. 69.) 
 
 38 "Le Roi tient a Ses obligations par principe comme par sentiment, et 
 que son propre interet leur est garant de la fidelite avec la quelle il est 
 resolu de les remplir, mais vous aurez soin en meme terns de les famil- 
 iariser insensiblement avec les hypotesis qui en se realizant rendroient 
 un Sacrifice quelconque indispensable. ..." Vergennes to Luzerne, June 
 30, 1781. (E. U., XVII, no. 19, new 55.) 
 
 89 Vergennes to Montmorin, September 6, 1781. (Esp., 605, no. 129.) 
 40 Vergennes to Luzerne, July 27, 1781. (. U., XVII, no. 142.) 
 41 Vergennes to Luzerne, October 22, 1780. (Ibid., XIV, no. 32.) 
 
202 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [312 
 
 to avoid the danger of British aggression. The boundaries 
 between the United States and the Spanish possessions 
 were the source of greatest difficulty, and, as to the justice 
 of the case, Vergennes professed himself totally ignorant. 42 
 The only indications that he gave of his sympathies are his 
 bitter protests against Spanish cupidity, and his praise of 
 the moderation of Congress. 43 
 
 Thus it was that the opposing claims of Congress and 
 the Spanish court entangled Vergennes into a policy that 
 appeared weak and vacillating, and has led to the charge 
 of insincerity. Yet there is no evidence that he made a 
 promise he did not try his best to keep, or that he gave 
 countenance to measures he was unwilling to support ; and 
 throughout he showed a willingness, unusual in statesmen 
 of any time, to sacrifice French claims to the cupidity of his 
 allies. In no sense was he responsible for the breach be- 
 tween Spain and the United States. While he made many 
 concessions to the court of Charles III, he promised noth- 
 ing that interfered with any claim which Congress had set 
 up. He guaranteed to the United States independence 
 and such conquests as they might make and this guarantee 
 he faithfully maintained. The question of the West and 
 the Mississippi did not come within his purview until 
 forced upon him by outside events, and he did not profess 
 to know on which side justice lay. He tried to reconcile 
 contending views and to harmonize differences until the 
 close- of the war when the question could be settled on its 
 merits; and it was in this spirit that Vergennes entered 
 upon the negotiations for peace. 
 
 42 " .... nous pouvons juger .... que selon toutes aparances les 
 deux parties auront bien peine a s'accorder sur le partage des territoires qui 
 sont a 1'Est du Mississipi et du 1'Ohio. Nous garderons le silence le plus 
 absolue jusqu' a ce que nous soyons invites a prendre connoissance de la 
 discussion et a en dire notre sentiment ; vous voudrez bien .... a en 
 faire autant de votre cote." Vergennes to Luzerne, August 12, 1762. (. [/., 
 XXII, no. 38, new 55.) He had previously refused to discuss the subject 
 because it was not "sufficiently clear." Vergennes to Luzerne, September 
 7, 1781. (Ibid., XVIII, no. 60.) 
 
 43 Vergennes to Montmorin, April 12, 1781. (Esf>., 603, no. 25.) To 
 Luzerne, September 17, 1781. (E. U., XVIII, no. 69.) 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR 
 PEACE 
 
 The close of the war did not bring any compromise 
 between the claims of Spain and those of the United States, 
 nor did it enlighten Vergennes on the rights of either coun- 
 try. He had succeeded in postponing the question until 
 all were ready to treat for peace, but with the assurance 
 of pacification the rancor and obstinacy of the opposing 
 forces became more insistent. Congress, united by the land 
 cessions of the larger states into a common interest, 1 and 
 relieved of the dangers and anxieties of invasion, at once 
 returned to its former pretensions. Spain, foiled in her as- 
 saults on Gibraltar, and maddened by her misfortunes in 
 the West Indies, clamored for compensation on the Missis- 
 sippi. 
 
 Congress was the first to act. During the preceding 
 
 years its pretensions had varied with its membership from 
 
 a claim to all British America down to a proposal to accept 
 
 merely the Atlantic seaboard. When it appeared that the 
 
 war would soon be over, Congress adopted the suggestion 
 
 a The struggle between the landless states and the landed ones had 
 been bitter. Virginia had claimed not only Kentucky but the country north 
 of the Ohio, and the small states which had no hopes of conquest com- 
 plained bitterly against carrying on a war for her aggrandizement. This 
 had been the stay of the French party in Congress. Luzerne to Vergennes, 
 January 4, 1781. (E. U., XV, no. 8, new 112.) Tom Paine wrote a 
 pamphlet in his most caustic style assailing the pretentions of the large 
 states and especially those of Virginia. (Copy with above despatch.) As 
 a result of the opposition of the smaller states, some of the states claim- 
 ing lands in the West agreed to abandon their claims and allow the lands 
 to be sold for the benefit of the soldiers. These cessions gave a new 
 strength to the confederacy by stopping petty jealousies and hatreds, and 
 by giving a common interest in this vast domain. It probably had much 
 to do with the collapse of the French party. 
 
 203 
 
204 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [314 
 
 of Luzerne and began to formulate once more its claims for 
 the consideration of the negotiators. 2 Vergennes was insist- 
 ent that the views of Congress be drawn clearly and pre- 
 cisely; and to accomplish this a committee was appointed 
 to draw up instructions for the American envoys. 3 It was 
 agreed without difficulty that the treaty of alliance with 
 France should be the basis of the demands of Congress; 
 but in addition it was necessary to determine the boun- 
 daries. 4 
 
 On June 6 the committee presented its report and the 
 debates on the boundaries to be claimed by Congress were 
 renewed and continued for more than a week. On the 15th 
 it was agreed to instruct the envoys that "As to the dis- 
 puted boundaries . . . we refer you to the instructions 
 formerly given Mr. Adams, dated 14th August, 1779." This 
 was to serve only to explain the views and hopes of Con- 
 gress ; but as the instructions declared, "we think it unsafe 
 to tie you by absolute and peremptory instructions." The 
 envoys were to "make the most candid and confidential 
 communications upon all subjects to the ministers of our 
 generous ally, the king of France ; to undertake nothing in 
 the negotiations for peace . . . without their knowledge 
 and concurrence, and ultimately to govern yourselves by 
 their advice and opinion . . ." 5 
 
 The provisions regarding the boundaries were not 
 agreed to without much debate and discussion; but there 
 seems to have been no opposition to the clause requiring 
 the commissioners to act only with the knowledge and con- 
 currence of the king. Throughout the war Congress had 
 explained all its intentions to the French minister. Altho 
 
 2 Luzerne to Congress, May 26, 1781. (Journals of Continental Con- 
 gress, Hunt ed., XX, 561.) 
 
 3 "Vous voudrez bien en attendant presser cette assemblee d'adresser 
 a Sou plenipre des instructions claires et precisses, afin que les matieres 
 puissant etre prepares d'avantage avec luy et que lorsque les negociateurs 
 seront entamees serieusement." Vergennes to Luzerne, July 27, 1781. 
 <. U., XVII, no. 20, new 142.) 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XX, 616. 
 
 8 /&td., 606, 617. 
 
315] VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 205 
 
 he had often frankly opposed them, he had never betrayed 
 the confidence reposed in him. There was no reason to 
 think that France was unfriendly to the interests of the 
 United States, and no reason why this confidence should 
 not continue. Luzerne had definitely stated that the king 
 would insist upon independence for all the United States, 
 and would not treat on the basis of uti possidetis France 
 had also advanced large sums of money and had given 
 promise of further aid. 
 
 On the question of the boundaries, however, there was 
 a wide diversity of opinion. Some wished to demand widely 
 extended frontiers with permission to the negotiators to 
 yield as it became necessary, or to leave the settlement of 
 the question until after the peace. 7 Luzerne opposed any 
 extreme demands and reminded Congress how absurd it 
 was to insist upon conquests with the enemy in possession 
 of much of their own territory. The old arguments were 
 gone over without result, 8 and finally Luzerne suggested to 
 the committee that "some discretion be left the envoys." 
 Another suggestion was a line of demarkation between the 
 United States and the British possessions, and this Luzerne 
 approved, but the committee refused to present it to Con- 
 gress. 9 This discussion brought out the ideas which Lu- 
 zerne held regarding the boundaries of the United States. 
 Vergennes had expressed the wish that Congress should not 
 set up "indefensible pretensions," but he had declared that 
 he would not dictate. 10 Luzerne interpreted this to mean 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XX, 677. 
 
 ''Ibid., 608-609. Luzerne to Vergennes. (E. U., XVII, no. 17, new 
 
 145.) 
 
 8 See p. 175 et seq. The question of the charters and the proclamation 
 was again gone over. See Luzerne to Vergennes. (Ibid.) 
 
 9 "Un delegue me dit qu'il croyait que Si Ton prenoit pour ligne de 
 demarckation celle que la france vouloit tracer avant la guerre de 1756 on 
 ne pourroit donner une plus grande marque de moderation puisque ce 
 Seroit abandonner a 1'Angleterre d'immenses territoires qu'Elle reclamoit 
 au droit de Ses Colonies." This suggestion received the approval of 
 Luzerne. (Ibid.) 
 
 10 Quant au reglement des limites de quelques Etats nous ne nous 
 melerons point mais nous desirons que les Americains n'entravint pas les 
 negociations par des pretentions ensoutenables, leurs continents n'est pas 
 trop vaste pour leur population, et ils seront longtems sans avoir besoin 
 
206 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [316 
 
 that his master favored a restricted boundary, when the 
 sense of his instructions pointed only to the necessity of 
 peace. Accordingly he spoke favorably of the plan to re- 
 strict the United States to the boundaries which France 
 had demanded before 1756. 
 
 The reports of Luzerne reveal three interests opposed 
 to his policy : those of the large states like "Virginia and 
 Massachusetts" which had western claims that they were 
 anxious to maintain; those who feared to have the British 
 too near their frontiers ; and those who desired the continu- 
 ance of the war for profit. Those who out of hatred for 
 Great Britain desired to keep her as far as possible from 
 the American frontiers were mostly small state men, and 
 to these Luzerne devoted his greatest efforts. They believed 
 that the vast regions of the West would soon fill up, and 
 they felt it to be to the interests of their country to keep 
 the new states in the Confederacy. To them Luzerne urged 
 that no matter how extended their boundaries, they must 
 still have neighbors. 11 He felt that if lie could win over 
 this class, the party of moderation would triumph. 
 
 There were so many contrary ideas in Congress that 
 an agreement on definite instructions was next to impos- 
 sible. The ideas of Luzerne were discussed but were bit- 
 terly opposed by Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, 
 with New York not voting. Nothing was hoped from this 
 latter state for its delegates were "even less tractable than 
 the Virginians on the extent of the boundaries which they 
 
 de S'etendu pourquoi done preferoient-ils a la paix future [un] contingent 
 qui ne fera ni leur bonheur ni celui de leurs arrieres neveux? Vergennes 
 to Luzerne, June 28, 1782. (E. U., XXI, no. 103, new 35.) 
 
 n ". . . le parti que je me suis le plus attache a persuader est celui 
 des gens Sages et moderes, mais que par haine pour 1'Angleterre et par 
 crainte de son ancienne influence vouloient la tenir a une grande distance 
 des Etats-unis." Among these was the president of Congress. Luzerne 
 to Vergennes, June 8, 1781. (E. U., XVII, no. 145, foL 17.) Luzerne 
 spoke of the rapid settlements of Illinois and Kentucky and the danger 
 this would be to the older states whose inhabitants they would entice 
 away by the promise of cheap lands. Ibid. 
 
317] VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOE PEACE 207 
 
 wish to fix for Canada in the West." 12 The large state party 
 was insistent upon the pretentious ultimatum of 1779 ; but 
 most of the delegates were willing to accept the Ohio River, 
 while a few more were inclined to take the watershed sepa- 
 rating the East from the West. 13 Virginia was most aggres- 
 sive and demanded first the line running from the mouth of 
 the Miami to the headwaters of the Illinois, thence down 
 that river to the Mississippi. When she found no support 
 for this, she framed as her ultimatum that her northern 
 boundary should be the Ohio, while the territory beyond 
 must remain neutral. 14 Many delegates supported this 
 proposition, but Luzerne declared himself against precise 
 instructions and the motion failed. Yorktown was not yet 
 taken, and so great was the discouragement in Congress 
 that Luzerne believed that it would make almost any sacri- 
 fice for peace, even to accepting the Alleghanies as the west- 
 ern boundary. He recognized, however, that such an ar- 
 rangement would cause universal complaint and arouse in- 
 tense hostility to France. 15 
 
 12 Luzerne to Vergennes, June n, 1781. (E. U., XVII, no. 27, new 
 I47-) 
 
 ^Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.) f XX, 612, 613. 
 
 15 Le trosieme article laisse aux Plenipotentaires la plus grande lati- 
 tude sur tous les autres points. Le premiere qui se presente est de deter- 
 miner se qui constitue le Territoire des treize Etats. II y a eu trois 
 opinions differentes sur ce sujet dans le Congres. Quelques Delegues 
 vouloient qu'on ne se departit point des limites fixees en 1779 et qu'on 
 n'innovat rien a cet egard leur opinion n'a point prevalu. D'autres de- 
 manderent qu'on designat L'Ohio dans rultimatum. Us observoient que 
 c'etoit la limite la plus naturalle la plus sure, la moins Sujette a varier 
 et il y avoit tant d'opinions en faveur de cette motive qu'il auroit dependu 
 de moi de la faire passer mais j'ai trouve des inconvenient a engager le 
 Congres a rien determiner sur cette matiere ---- J'ai pense qu'il valoit 
 mieux ne rien fixer avec precision ..... Je me suis contente de m'assurer 
 si 1'Ohio forme cette limite les treize Etats ne se plaindront point qu'ils 
 se croiront meme obliges au Roi. ... si les circonstances necessitent de 
 plus grandes concessions que cette paix sera moins agreeable . . . Je crois 
 .... que si les circonstances forcoient a adopter pour limites les mon- 
 tagnes qui separant les Rivieres qui se jettant dans 1'atlantique de celles 
 qui content a 1'Ouest la paix seroit encore accepte et ratifee mais qu'elle 
 
208 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [318 
 
 Altbo the resolutions of Congress were agreeable to 
 Luzerne they did not meet the points at issue and they 
 were not in harmony with the desires of Vergennes, who 
 had asked for definite instructions. The northwest boun- 
 dary was vaguely outlined, while the possession of the 
 Southwest, which was complacently assumed by Congress 
 and tacitly agreed to by Luzerne, became at the very begin- 
 ning of the negotiations the great point at issue. Vergennes 
 had refused to interfere in the dispute and had even pro- 
 fessed ignorance of the merits of the question and the 
 silence of Luzerne is no less striking. 
 
 Altho there was much dissatisfaction with the instruc- 
 tions agreed to by Congress, the efforts to change them met 
 with no success. 16 Livingston, however, explained fully to 
 the peace commissioners the ambitions of the states and 
 urged them to endeavor in every way to extend the western 
 boundary to the Mississippi. 17 He felt strongly the danger 
 of being surrounded by Great Britain, and it was in accord 
 with his advice that the commissioners began their negotia- 
 tions. It is remarkable that in all these discussions noth- 
 ing was said of the pretensions of Spain, either by Luzerne 
 or by the Americans. 
 
 In spite of the forgetfulness of Congress and the 
 French minister, Spain had not given up her pretensions 
 and her greed for territory was no less devouring than be- 
 fore. Eastern Louisiana was still an object of great inter- 
 est, for she still was anxious to control the Gulf of Mexico 
 without any one to dispute her claim, and to do this she 
 must control the mighty Mississippi. Spain could then 
 "make the law" for the settlers in the upper Mississippi 
 
 occasioneroit des plaintes generates qu'elle refroidirot nos partisans et qu'il 
 seroit difficile a persuader aux Americains que leurs interets n'ont pas 
 etc sacrifics." Luzerne to Vergennes, June 13, 1781. (E. U., XVII, no. 
 148, new 33.) 
 
 a 'The opposition proposed to reopen the whole question on the return 
 of the New York delegates. Luzerne to Vergennes, July 14. (E. U., XVII, 
 no. 106, new 158.) Virginia revived her claims by a resolution of June 
 29. Journals of Continental Congress (Hunt ed.), XX, 713. 
 
 "Livingston to Franklin. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., V.) 
 
319] VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 200 
 
 Valley by the control of their commerce, or could force 
 immigration into her own territories by the grant of special 
 privileges. 18 
 
 At the beginning of the negotiations Spain did not 
 make any claim to the possession of Eastern Louisiana, 
 but asked merely for the conquests promised her by the 
 convention of 1779, with special emphasis on the guarantee 
 of Gibraltar. 19 In addition to this she presented a demand 
 for the Bahama Islands ; but this was peremptorily refused 
 by Vergennes, who declared he could sustain no claim be- 
 yond what he had agreed to by his convention with the 
 court at Madrid. Spain did not insist upon this condition 
 but maintained her claim to the "conservation of her con- 
 quests around the Gulf of Mexico." 20 Rodney's victory 
 in the West Indies made impossible the conquest of Ja- 
 maica, which had been promised her; but in spite of the 
 destruction of the fleets besieging Gibraltar, she still in- 
 sisted upon its restitution. 
 
 To Spain as to the United States, Vergennes had al- 
 ways sought to keep his promises; and, tho realizing the 
 weakness of his position, he set loyally to work to obtain 
 the cession of Gibraltar to his ally. The failure of the siege 
 of this stronghold made necessary the offer of some com- 
 pensation. The negotiations on this point were long and 
 tedious and nothing came of them. 
 
 In his desire to recover Gibraltar, Vergennes had sent 
 his secretary Rayneval to London to interview Shelburne, 
 who had recently come to power. Rayneval did not accom- 
 plish his purpose, but lie opened up a series of discussions 
 with Shelburne on the terms of peace. 21 Little was said 
 regarding the boundaries in America, altho Shelburne im- 
 
 18 See a "note on the new advantages which favor the commerce of 
 Louisiana." Anonymous. (Transcript, Margry Collections, Documents 
 inedits sous Louisiane, Nou. Acq. franc., 9309.) 
 
 19 Florida Blanca to Aranda, August 25, 1782. (Esp., 668, no. 166.) 
 Montmorin summed up the claims of Spain as that which was stipulated 
 in the convention. (Ibid., no. 15, new 31.) 
 
 20 Montmorin to Vergennes, September 20. (.Esp., 608, no. 244.) 
 
 21 Doniol, Histoire, V, 104. 
 
210 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [320 
 
 plied that the West was not included within the bounds of 
 the original colonies. Rayneval, however, refused to com- 
 mit himself. Shelburne then let it be known that "the 
 Floridas with a district up to the neighborhood of New 
 Orleans, joined to the east territories which lie between 
 the Mississippi and the Lakes, and the western frontiers 
 of America, might form a proper equivalent for Gibral- 
 tar." 22 This idea did not please Vergennes, who feared 
 the rivalry of Spaniards and British on the Mississippi, 
 and it is doubtful if Shelburne meant it seriously, 
 
 Altho the mission of Rayneval was unsuccessful, Ver- 
 gennes did not cease his efforts to keep his pledge to Spain, 
 and offered to compensate Great Britain out of the pos- 
 sessions of France. 23 News of the signature of the prelim- 
 inary articles of peace between the British and American 
 negotiators, however, made Shelburne's demands so high 
 that France determined to renew the war to keep her honor 
 with Spain, and was preparing for another struggle when 
 the British ministry and the Spanish court unexpectedly 
 came to terms. 
 
 Vergennes was equally determined to keep faith with 
 the United States, and in spite of a strong dislike for 
 Adams, his friendship for the new nation was earnest and 
 sincere. In every way he had pressed American interests 
 at Madrid and had always urged Congress to vigorous ac- 
 tion. 24 He had guaranteed independence to the United 
 States and had maintained the war at great hardship in 
 order to save the honor of France. As he refused to sup- 
 port Spanish claims to the Bahamas, so he declared also 
 
 "Vergennes to Montmorin, October 6, 1782. (Esp., 609, no. 22, new 
 81.) Montmorin urged the proposition upon Florida Blanca as a barrier 
 to the Americans; but the Spanish minister refused to consent to give 
 the British a port [Pensacola] on the Gulf of Mexico, and also refused 
 to cede any territory around the city of New Orleans. Montmorin to 
 Vergennes, November 23. (Ibid., no. 129, new 94.) 
 
 28 Doniol, Histoire, V, 230. 
 
 24 His statement to Montmorin that "the future of America is of equal 
 interest to Spain and to us" sums up his efforts to secure recognition for 
 his ally. (Esp., 606, no. 159, new n.) 
 
321] VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 211 
 
 that he would not support any extravagant pretensions on 
 the part of Congress. 25 
 
 On the question of the western boundaries France was 
 at last compelled to declare herself through the insistence 
 of Jay. He had been called to Paris by Franklin, and ar- 
 rived there under the impression that he was to continue 
 the negotiations in which he had not succeeded at Madrid. 26 
 He at once began a discussion with Aranda relative to the 
 disposition of the Mississippi Valley, but the difference 
 between them soon became apparent. Vergennes did not 
 presume to interfere, altho Rayneval expressed surprise at 
 the extent of Jay's demands, 27 and submitted a memorial 
 explaining the principles on which the two countries ought 
 to act. 28 To the territory south of the Ohio, Rayneval as- 
 serted, neither nation had any title except that of conquest ; 
 for before the treaty of 1763, he argued, it was owned by 
 France, and after its cession to Great Britain, it was never 
 incorporated with the colonies. Neither country, he urged, 
 had conquered it, and so, by way of settling the dispute, 
 he suggested a division by which the land south of the Ten- 
 nessee should be under the suzerainty of Spain, and that 
 to the north under the protection of the United States. As 
 to the navigation of the Mississippi, Rayneval expressed 
 the hope that some arrangement could be made by which 
 
 25 "le roi ne sera pas moins exacte a les tenir de son cote . . . il n'en 
 existe aucune dans nos traites qui 1'oblige a prolonger La Guerre pour 
 soutenir les pretentions ambitieuses que les Etats unis peuvent former 
 soit par raport ... a 1'Etendue des Limites." He goes on to say that 
 "je serai toujours a terns de venir a leur Secours car je prevois qu'ils 
 auront plus d'une difficulte a vaincre et meme tres grandes s'ils persistent 
 dans leurs premieres pretentions." This does not show a spirit of hos- 
 tility. Vergennes to Luzerne, November 23. (E. U., XXII, no. 43, fol. 
 138.) Before this Vergennes had written Montmorin that if the Ameri- 
 cans would unite more thoroly they would be able to drive the British 
 from the continent. (Esp., 606, no. 159, new n.) 
 
 28 Doniol, Histoire, V, 108; Jay, Life of Jay, I, 137. 
 
 "Vergennes declared that he would keep silence the most absolute 
 until he was asked to express his opinion. See p. 200. 
 
 2i Rayneval said he was acting at Jay's request, and submitted this 
 memorial as his personal ideas. Doniol, Histoire, V, 159. 
 
212 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [322 
 
 the Americans could be given the right, subject to proper 
 regulation. As to territory north of the Ohio, he held by 
 the same reasoning that it was a part of Canada, and as 
 such a fit object of negotiation between the Americans 
 and British. 20 
 
 This memorial was submitted merely as an opinion 
 on the merits of the question. It w r as fortified by histori- 
 cal and legal allusions, against which the Americans could 
 urge only their charter rights. It asserted that both 
 Americans and Spaniards must base their claims on the 
 right of conquest. It attempted to apportion to each 
 power the territory which each held or had conquered, and 
 tried to divide the unoccupied lands as equally as pos- 
 sible. 30 
 
 Altho Vergennes still held to his determination not 
 to interfere in the dispute between his allies, 31 he held to 
 the belief that the domains west of the mountains were 
 legally the property of Great Britain, subject only to the 
 fortunes of war. He did not think that the charters were 
 of any force, and maintained that whatever the Americans 
 got out of the contest must be gained by war or diplomacy. 
 He was willing to make good his guarantee of the inde- 
 pendence of the United States with all their possessions, 
 but he would not continue a war to make additional con- 
 quests. To neither Spain nor the United States would he 
 
 29 Rayneval entitled this memorial an "Idea on the manner of deter- 
 mining and fixing the boundaries between Spain and the United States 
 on one side of the Ohio and towards the Mississippi." (E. U., XXII, no. 
 57, new 200.) 
 
 80 Spain held Fort Natchez and all posts on the west banks of the 
 river, from which she could make incursions into the disputed territories, 
 and on this Rayneval based her claims to both banks of the river. As 
 Fort Natchez was the only post to the Southwest, it was argued that the 
 possession of it gave her claim to the whole of the territory. Doniol, 
 Histoire, V, 159. 
 
 81 "Au reste M. ces notions sont pour vous seul." Vergennes to Lu- 
 zerne, October 14, 1782. (E. U., XXII, no. 40, new 115.) 
 
323] VEEGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 213 
 
 concede anything more than he had already promised, for 
 he felt that peace was essential. 32 
 
 The stand of Vergennes was due not to unfriendliness 
 to the United States but to the desire for peace. He re- 
 alized the importance of the West to the American nation, 
 and wished it to take measures to extend its rights there. 33 
 In no way did he interfere with the negotiations between 
 Aranda and Jay ; nor did he attempt to control the Ameri- 
 can envoys in their efforts to get all they could. He re- 
 pressed both Spain and the United States because his coun- 
 try needed peace; and when, without consulting him, the 
 American envoys won more than he thought possible, he 
 still applauded their ability. 34 Altho his willingness 
 to aid the Americans received no returns, he showed noth- 
 ing more than a momentary anger. 
 
 Vergennes was not alone in regarding the American 
 claims to the West as without support. Shelburne had 
 ridiculed the pretensions of Congress, and had declared 
 that the Mississippi Valley had never been a part of the 
 
 32 ". ... a present dans la discussion Subsistante entre M. de Cte 
 d'Aranda et M. Jay que les deux parties reclament des countries sur les 
 quelles aucune d'Elles n'a de droit acquis et qu'il sera a peu pres impossible 
 de les accorder." (E. U., XXII, no. 40, new 115.) 
 
 33 "il a etc remis a M. Jay une notte confidentielle par la quelle il est 
 a peu pres demontre que les limites des Etats-unis au Sud de 1'Ohio se 
 bornent aux montagnes en suivant le versant des eaux et que ce qui est 
 au Nord de cette riviere nommement les lacs a autrefois fait parti du 
 Canada." Vergennes to Luzerne. (Ibid.) Vergennes had gained this 
 idea doubtless from the memorial of Rayneval, and this is the first time 
 he expressed it. In spite of this purely legal view of the question Ver- 
 gennes wrote, "Nous pensons comme les Americains, M. sur 1'importance 
 de 1'etablissement des anglois a Oswego, cette station en meme tems 
 qu'elle en impose aux Sauvages met les Anglois en mesure de troubler 
 les derrieres de la province de Newyork." Ibid. 
 
 34 "Si les Commissioners americains sont exacts dans les comptes qu'ils 
 rendent a leurs Commitans ils ne Se plaindront pas que nous cherchons a 
 influenc et a les gener dans leur negociations." Vergennes to Luzerne, 
 November 23. (E. U., no. 43.) After the peace he wrote : "Vous aplaud- 
 irez surement M. aussique moi aux avantages tres Etendus que nos allies 
 les americains doivent recuiller par la paix." December 19. (Ibid., no. 
 45.) 
 
214 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [324 
 
 colonies. 35 Virginia, the most aggressive of all the states, 
 had insisted upon nothing more than the Ohio as the boun- 
 dary; but Congress did not have courage enough to insist 
 upon even this much. 36 Even after Yorktown some of the 
 most aggressive Americans offered to leave all the disputed 
 territory in the West to the Indians under the joint pro- 
 tection of Spain, France, Great Britain, and the United 
 States, 37 and several states agreed to accept the mountains 
 as the western boundary. 38 
 
 Military conditions also seemed to forbid the preten- 
 sions of Congress to extensive territories. The British still 
 held the posts on the Great Lakes and continued to do so 
 for many years. Parts of the South as well as the city of 
 New York and other important posts were still in the hands 
 of the enemy. Under these conditions it seemed that Ver- 
 gennes was right in his declaration that Congress had no. 
 claim whatever to the wide regions of the West. 
 
 In spite of all these discouragements Vergennes stood 
 ever ready to help the ambitions of his American allies. 
 Altho he condemned the extravagance of the American 
 claims, he never tried to get his allies to demand less, but 
 offered rather to assist them to the best of his ability. 39 In 
 spite of the unconcealed dislike of Jay and Adams, and 
 his own dislike of them, Vergennes showed himself through- 
 out a loyal friend to the United States. Even when he 
 found his counsels disregarded and the pledges made to 
 him badly broken, he showed no trace of jealousy or mean- 
 ness. For the ability of the American diplomats he showed 
 
 85 Doniol, Histoire, V, 133. 
 
 88 See page 207, note 14. 
 
 37 They told Luzerne that "si Ton assuroit aux Sauvages la possession- 
 des Pays contestes sous la garantie de la France, de 1'Esp de 1'Angleterre 
 et des Etats-unis ce parti accomodiroit peutetre tout le monde." Luzerne- 
 to Vergennes, September 12, 1782. (E. U., XXII, no. 271, new 68.) 
 
 88 Luzerne mentions Maryland as willing to accept this. (Ibid., no.. 
 89, new 275.) 
 
 S9 Vergennes to Luzerne, November 23, 1782. (E. U., XXII, no. 160,. 
 new 43.) See also p. 211, note 25. 
 
325] VERGENNES AND THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE 215 
 
 the greatest respect, and their success not only surprised 
 him but aroused in him the liveliest admiration. 40 
 
 To Vergennes America owes a great debt of gratitude 
 for the preservation of its independence. In spite of the 
 fact that he entered the war for a selfish purpose, from 
 which he never entirely escaped, the years of common trials 
 and efforts, the enthusiasm of the French people, and the 
 personality of Franklin, infused his cold heart with some- 
 thing like enthusiasm for the nation he had called into 
 existence, and for whose protection he devoted the best 
 efforts of many years. We may give great praise to the 
 foreign heroes who fought and died in defense of American 
 liberties, but among all the friends of the new republic, no 
 one can show a higher title to loyalty, not even the lovable 
 and chivalrous Lafayette, than the care-worn and thought- 
 ful statesman, Vergennes. 
 
 *Vergennes wrote of the American envoys that they were "no less 
 practised than the English in the art of drawing indefinite lines and of 
 making them a title and a right." Vergennes to Luzerne, November 23. 
 (E. U., XXII, no. 160.) He further declared that the English bought 
 peace rather than made it. McLaughlin, Confederation and Constitution 
 30. In order to show his good will he made the Americans a new grant 
 of six million livres immediately after the articles were signed. Doniol, 
 Histoire, V. 269. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 PEACE 
 
 Peace, the goal towards which Vergennes had so pa- 
 tiently toiled, came at last; but it came through negotia- 
 tions unknown to him, and by a diplomacy which over- 
 reached his own. During the early years of the war Ver- 
 gennes had often expressed astonishment at British stupid- 
 ity in alienating the colonies, 1 and he felt that he was scor- 
 ing a triumph in winning them to France. With the over- 
 throw of the North ministry, however, the accession to 
 power of Shelburne, first, as secretary of state for the col- 
 onies, then as prime minister, all this was changed. Shel- 
 burne at once inaugurated a new policy, a policy of con- 
 ciliation towards an independent republic, and, instead of 
 humiliating America, he bid high for her friendship, and 
 carried off the prize for which Vergennes had already paid 
 so dearly. 
 
 With this plan in mind Shelburne had, early in the 
 spring of 1782, sent Richard Oswald, a Scotch merchant, 
 to Paris to sound Franklin on the conditions which the 
 Americans would ask for peace, and to suggest a treaty 
 separate from the one with France. To this idea of a sepa- 
 rate treaty Franklin at once objected; but he was ready 
 enough to suggest the terms of peace which he regarded 
 as suitable. 2 Oswald talked much of conciliation and, with 
 this idea in mind, Franklin declared that in order to con- 
 ciliate, Great Britain should cede Canada to the United 
 States, as an evidence of her good will. 3 This suggestion 
 did not meet any objection from the British agent, who 
 asked permission to submit it to his government, and the 
 
 a See page 14. 
 
 2 Franklin's Journal, Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 463. 
 
 *Ibid., 472. 
 
 216 
 
327] PEACE 217 
 
 American envoy consented. A few days later Oswald in- 
 formed Franklin that he thought the "affairs of Canada 
 would be settled to [your] satisfaction," but he asked that 
 it be not pressed until near the end of the negotiations. 4 
 
 The negotiations dragged slowly on until midsummer, 
 when Franklin became more active; and, on July 10, he 
 outlined to Oswald a definite plan of a treaty, which made 
 as a necessary article "a confinement of the boundaries of 
 Canada to what they were before the last act of Parlia- 
 ment, I think in 1774, if not to a still more contracted state 
 on an ancient footing," and which declared that the cession 
 of all Canada was advisable. 5 Oswald submitted these 
 conditions to Shelburne, who in the meantime had become 
 prime minister, and had left Townshend to direct negotia- 
 tions with the Americans. Townshend followed Shelburne's 
 liberal policy and agreed to the withdrawal of British 
 forces from the states, and promised also a part of the 
 "ungranted lands to be annexed to each province in return 
 for the restoration of the loyalists." 6 
 
 In the meantime negotiations were going on rapidly 
 in Paris, and early in August Franklin and Vergennes 
 united in demanding a "treaty that no one would break." 7 
 Shortly after this Franklin plead with Oswald to grant 
 the Americans a permanent peace on such conditions as 
 not "to force them into the hands of other people," and he 
 explained that in order to ensure such a peace the United 
 States must have Canada. 8 From the drift of the negotia- 
 tions and the avowals of Oswald the experienced American 
 saw the British ministry was willing to sacrifice much for 
 peace, and still more to win the friendship of the United 
 States. Oswald complained that the French proposals 
 were exorbitant and appealed to Franklin to check them ; 9 
 
 4 Franklin, Writings (Smyth ed.), VIII, 486. 
 
 5 Oswald to Shelburne, July 10, 1782. (F. O., France, 2a, fols. 42-44.) 
 
 Dated July 25, 1782. (Ibid., 2a, fols. 87-92.) 
 
 7 Oswald to Townshend, August 7, 1782. (Ibid., 141.) 
 
 8 Oswald to Townshend, August 13, 1782. (Ibid., 152-161.) 
 
 ^Oswald to Townshend, August 15, 1782. (Ibid., 2a, 173.) 
 
218 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [328 
 
 but that wily statesman pressed his advantage so strongly 
 that the British agent was compelled to advise the accept- 
 ance of his demands. 10 
 
 The British government acted before receiving Os- 
 wald's communication, and on September 1 acceded to the 
 full extent of Franklin's ultimatum of July 10. By this 
 it agreed to recognize, first of all, independence. The third 
 article provided for the restriction of the boundaries of 
 Canada to what they were before 1774 ; the fourth granted 
 the freedom of fishing on the banks of Newfoundland ; and 
 another clause added that: "His Majesty will also waive 
 collection of debts before 1775 and also claims of refugees 
 for losses." 11 
 
 Here was granted all that the Americans could hope 
 to obtain and more than was to be ultimately conceded 
 them. It had been the aim of the Shelburne ministry to 
 detach the United States from France and these conditions 
 were well calculated to effect it. The genius of the mighty 
 Franklin had triumphed. 
 
 On September 5, Oswald wrote Franklin that he had 
 received definite information as to the views of the British 
 ministry in regard to the terms of the treaty, and was then 
 ready to begin formal negotiations. 12 Franklin replied 
 three days later, asking for a copy of Oswald's instruc- 
 tions, 13 and it appeared that the terms would soon be satis- 
 factorily settled. 
 
 These instructions, however, were never submitted to 
 Franklin. Jay had arrived at Paris some time before and 
 
 10 Oswald strongly urged the cession of that part of Canada added by 
 the act of 1774. "If not granted," he wrote, "this will cause much diffi- 
 culty, especially on the western frontier, and a refusal would occasion a 
 particular grudge as a deprivation of an extent of valuable territory, the 
 several provinces have always counted upon as their own." He advised 
 also that a right to the fisheries be granted to avoid quarrels with New 
 England. Oswald to Townshend, August 29, 1782. (F. O., France, 2a, 
 fol. 234.) 
 
 "Townshend to Oswald, September i, 1782. (Ibid., 2a, 101.) 
 12 Oswald to Franklin, September 5. (Wharton Dip. Cor., V, 699.) 
 "Franklin to Oswald, September 8. (Ibid., V, 712.) 
 
329] PEACE 219 
 
 begun an aimless negotiation with Aranda which led to 
 nothing, because the two could not agree on the exchange 
 of their commissions. 14 Franklin had been sick since June 
 and was willing to entrust the burden of affairs to his 
 young associate, who was only too glad to undertake the 
 more congenial task. Jay was a far different man from 
 Franklin. He was young and comparatively inexperienced 
 in the management of men, and he possessed neither the 
 reputation nor the personality that gave such weight to the 
 words of his aged compatriot. Jay had come to Paris dis- 
 gusted with the Spaniards, but he soon came to dislike the 
 French more, and he hated the British as a patriotic Ameri- 
 can should. 
 
 The attitude of Jay at once made it impossible to con- 
 tinue the negotiations; for, on reading the commission of 
 Oswald, he found that it did not recognize the independ- 
 ence of the United States and refused to treat until a new 
 commission was framed with form more to his liking. 
 Franklin protested, but in vain. Oswald was compelled to 
 write for a new commission and the negotiations were held 
 up for several weeks; it was not until September 28 that 
 the two were ready to renew the discussion of terms of 
 peace. 15 
 
 In the meantime Jay had found fresh causes of suspi- 
 cion against the French court. Vergennes had advised him 
 to continue the negotiations and to allow Oswald to act 
 under his old commission, and this had convinced him that 
 "this court chooses to postpone an acknowledgement of 
 our independence by Britain, to the conclusion of a general 
 peace in order to keep us under their direction." The Brit- 
 ish had transmitted to him a copy of an intercepted letter 
 from Marbois which opposed American claims on the fish- 
 eries, 16 and the memorial of Rayneval on the terms of set- 
 
 14 Jay to Livingston, September 18. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., V, 740.) 
 
 15 Jay to Adams, September 28. (Ibid., 778.) 
 
 "Jay to Livingston, September 18, 1782. (Wharton, Dip, Cor., V, 
 740.) It is doubtful if this letter of Marbois' is authentic, as the French 
 envoy always wrote in cipher. 
 
220 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [330 
 
 tleinent between Spain and the United States had angered 
 him. With these feelings he was sure to be alarmed at any 
 unforeseen move on the part of the French court. Jay at 
 once became suspicious of Rayneval's mission to London, 
 and decided to despatch an agent to Shelburne to counter- 
 act any intrigues of the French secretary. Benjamin 
 Vaughn, a friend of America, was selected for this purpose, 
 and he was instructed to show the ministry that it was 
 "the obvious interest of Britain, immediately to cut the 
 cords which tied us to France," and to propose a settlement 
 with Great Britain with this undertaking as a basis. 17 
 Vaughn proceeded to London, had several interviews with 
 Shelburne and convinced him that the United States were 
 willing to break away from France. 
 
 Oswald's new commission arrived on the 27th and he 
 and Jay at once drew up a proposed treaty on the basis of 
 the instructions of September I. 18 The first article pro- 
 vided for the boundaries asked by Congress in 1778, and 
 included, besides what was later assigned the United 
 States, the Great Lakes and the territory south of Lake 
 Mpissing. 19 In this treaty, as in all subsequent projects, 
 there was a provision for the free navigation of the Mis- 
 sissippi. 
 
 Altho Townshend had authorized these terms, he dis- 
 avowed the treaty. The reason is obvious. He had offered 
 these concessions in order to separate the United States 
 
 17 Jay to Livingston. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 29.) 
 18 Jay to Livingston. (Ibid., 47.) 
 
 19 "The said states are bounded north by a line drawn from the 
 north-west angle of Nova Scotia, along the highlands which divide those 
 rivers which empty into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall 
 into the Atlantic Ocean, to the northermost head of the Connecticut river, 
 thence down along the middle of that river to the 45th degree of north 
 latitude .... thence due west to the northernmost side of the river St. 
 Lawrence .... thence straight to the south end of Lake Nepissing, and 
 thence straight to the source of the Mississippi." On the west the United 
 States were to be bounded by the Mississippi and on the south by the 
 Floridas. (Ibid., V, 806; F. O., France, 29, 305.) 
 
331] PEACE 221 
 
 from French influence, 20 but the mission of Vaughn showed 
 him that this end was already accomplished. Before this 
 time the British put forth, as the chief aim of their policy, 
 conciliation; and it was with this understanding that 
 Franklin and Oswald had carried on their negotiations, 
 and upon it Franklin had based his demands. To Great 
 Britain, however, conciliation did not mean so much friend- 
 ship to her as enmity to France; and when the Shelburne 
 ministry perceived that the councils of their enemies were 
 divided they withdrew their bids for friendship. 
 
 Jay was deeply disappointed at the failure of his 
 efforts. He felt that he must strive against all Europe and 
 even against his fellow negotiator. "I think we have no 
 rational dependence except on God and ourselves," he 
 wrote, "nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has 
 either wisdom, virtue or magnanimity enough to adopt a 
 perfect and liberal system of conciliation." 21 His disap- 
 pointment was the keener for the assurances of Oswald 
 had convinced him that there would be no objection to the 
 treaty as drawn up. He now showed the greatest indigna- 
 tion towards Oswald and even resorted to threats of break- 
 ing off the negotiations. 22 
 
 However much Jay felt anger at the duplicity of Brit- 
 ain, he gained no love for France. 23 His suspicion and 
 distrust of her policy increased and soon after the arrival 
 of Adams in October, the two resolved to keep secret from 
 her all knowledge of their negotiations and forced the aged 
 and enfeebled Franklin to agree. 
 
 20 Shelburne wrote to Carleton and Digby, June 3, that independence 
 was offered "with the view of showing America that farther war was only 
 in the interest of France and Spain, and to detach her from France." 
 (C. O. 5, Vol. 178, fol. 439.) 
 
 21 Jay to Livingston, November 17. (Wharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 49.) 
 
 22 Jay replied that in the case of the refugees nothing could be done; 
 and that if Great Britain broke off negotiations on that account, the 
 United States would present claims against her for unnecessary destruc- 
 tion in war." Oswald to Townshend, November 6. (F. O., France, 29, 
 fol. 340.) 
 
 23 Wharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 47. 
 
222 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [332 
 
 From this time on, however, the British conducted 
 their negotiations in a different spirit. Hitherto they had 
 talked of conciliation, and even of federal union ; but now 
 they began to push more vigorously their material advant- 
 ages. Oswald had served well enough when conciliation 
 was the end, and he still remained at Paris, where his 
 frankness and sincerity were a valuable asset. To push 
 the claims of the empire, however, a different man was 
 necessary; and the shrewd and determined Strachey was 
 sent to look after the boundary question and the disposi- 
 tion of the loyalists. 24 
 
 Strachey began his efforts with vigor. No longer were 
 there projects of ceding Canada, but in place of this there 
 was a demand that the country north of the Ohio be used 
 to found a colony of loyalists. 25 Nothing had been said of 
 this in the previous negotiations, but now Strachey added 
 a restriction of the right to fish on the banks of the New- 
 foundland. Of the arguments used to beat down the new 
 demands of Britain we know little; but Adams and Jay 
 were determined men and resolved to surrender nothing. 
 
 On the north the Americans offered the choice of two 
 lines. The first provided a boundary running from the in- 
 tersection of the forty-fifth parallel with the Connecticut 
 river due west to the Mississippi. The second ran west on 
 the same parallel to the St. Lawrence, thence through the 
 middle of the Great Lakes to the sources of the Missis- 
 sippi. 26 Both provided that in case Great Britain should 
 keep Florida the southern boundary should run through 
 the mouth of the Yazoo due west to the Applachicola, and 
 both provided also for the free navigation of the Missis- 
 sippi. Strachey had been borne down by the superior skill 
 and determination of his adversaries, but he refused to do 
 
 24 Townshend to Oswald, October 23, 1782. (F. O., France, 2a, 328.) 
 Of Strachey Adams wrote, "He is artful and insinuating. He pushes and 
 presses every point as far as it could possibly go; he is the most eager, 
 earnest, pointed spirit" 
 
 "Wharton, Dip. Cor., VI, 113. 
 
 26 /&tU, V. 856. Strachey to Townshend, November 8, 1/82. (F. O., 
 France, 2a, 363; C. O. 5, 8.) 
 
333] PEACE 223 
 
 more than transmit the proposed treaties to Townshend for 
 his consideration. Neither of them was in accord with the 
 instructions sent out by the British ministry, but the 
 Americans had pronounced this their ultimatum. 27 
 
 The provisions regarding the Floridas were the result 
 of Jay's efforts and grew out of his dislike for Spain and 
 perhaps also of a desire to embarrass Vergennes. Jay had 
 formerly been very hostile to Great Britain; but this had 
 changed under the genial frankness of Oswald and through 
 the suspicious attitude of his allies into a feeling of friend- 
 ship. 28 During the early days of September, while Oswald 
 was waiting for his new commission, Jay often talked in- 
 formally with him of the Floridas, and in these conversa- 
 tions, the British envoy often expressed the desire that if 
 Great Britain should keep them their boundary might be 
 pushed still further to the north. Jay met the suggestion 
 kindly and declared that since the proclamation of 1763 
 the boundary had been moved northward by another proc- 
 lamation. 29 
 
 With this the matter was allowed to drop, but Jay 
 brought it forward again when he took up the negotiations 
 with Oswald, and suggested that the British forces in 
 New York be sent on an expedition to seize these prov- 
 inces. 30 He declared that he did not want to leave in the 
 hands of the Spaniards authority over the Gulf of Mexico 
 and with it control of the western trade; and he main- 
 tained that any agreement regarding this region would not 
 be a violation of the alliance with France. 31 Jay argued 
 
 27 Wharton, Dip. Cor., V, 856; F. O., France, 2a, 363; C. O. 5, 8. 
 
 28 Until the middle of August Oswald believed that nothing could be 
 expected of Jay. Oswald to Townshend, August 7. (F. O., France, 2a, 
 125.) Later he wrote, "Jay is more friendly." (Ibid., 162.) 
 
 "Oswald to Townshend, September n. (F. O., France, 23, 332.) This 
 was the proclamation of 1767. 
 
 "October 2. (Ibid., 271.) 
 
 31 "The employment of these troops [in America] against Spain would 
 not infringe on the treaty with France, Jay says, for the states are not 
 bound to Spain." (Ibid.) "Jay again insists that for the common good 
 Florida shall not be left in the hands of the Spaniards." (Ibid., 280.) 
 
224 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [334 
 
 that the province was rich in itself and would be of addi- 
 tional advantage to the British in giving them control of 
 both outlets to the Mississippi Valley; the Gulf and the 
 St. Lawrence, by which they could hold all the trade they 
 had ever possessed. As a final argument he urged that the 
 retention of the Floridas would go far to win the friend- 
 ship of the Americans. He became every day more earnest 
 and finally offered to write General Washington asking 
 him to permit the peaceable evacuation of New York and 
 Charleston by the British troops. 32 Oswald was convinced, 
 from Jay's earnestness, that he could carry the boundary 
 of West Florida far to the northward. 33 
 
 Townshend did not take kindly, however, to the efforts 
 of Jay. He was suspicious of the whole transaction, but 
 he believed that capital might be made of it if France 
 should learn the details. 34 Oswald was anxious for the 
 arrangement, and urged that if it had no other merit it 
 would at least please the Americans. 35 Jay was afraid 
 of the effect of his suggestions, and when the provision re- 
 garding the Florida boundary was inserted he "scored it 
 out" but "admitted it in addition at the bottom as a sepa- 
 rate article." 36 Jay himself was not proud of his tactics, 
 and altho he dwelt with pride on the early negotiations 
 with Oswald with which he had nothing to do, he never 
 found occasion to discuss the part he took in the Florida 
 boundary arrangement. 37 
 
 In the later negotiations Franklin took little part and 
 their success may be attributed to the vigor and determina- 
 tion of Jay and Adams. The man, who had won for the 
 United States the aid of France and who had overreached 
 the diplomacy of Britain, was now worn with disease, and 
 was pushed out by his younger associates. He found his 
 
 32 Oswald to Townshend, October 7. (F. O., France, 2&, 302.) 
 "October 8. (Ibid,, 310.) 
 
 "Townshend to Oswald, October 26. (Ibid., 330.) 
 35 Oswald to Townshend, December 4. (Ibid., 489.) 
 36 Oswald to Strachey, November 8. (Ibid., 388.) 
 "Compare letters of Adams to Livingston on this question. (Whar- 
 ton, Dip. Cor., V, 856.) 
 
335] PEACE 225 
 
 advice overborne in their councils, and his suggestions 
 disregarded ; but to preserve harmony he still signed their 
 despatches and forebore any opposition. Altho his shrewd 
 mind must have seen clearly the contempt with which 
 Adams and Jay regarded him, 38 he bore the humiliation 
 patiently, and at last with hearty goodwill made their 
 peace with the irritated Vergennes. 39 
 
 The firmness of Jay and Adams was not due to any 
 knowledge of the negotiations of their allies but to their 
 own personal convictions. At that time, however, Florida 
 Blanca and Shelburne were deadlocked over the question 
 of Gibraltar; and unless terms were speedily arranged 
 with the Americans, the allied powers might renew the 
 war. 40 Under the circumstances Shelburne chose to give 
 the United States favorable terms and detach them from 
 the Bourbon alliance and then refuse the demands of 
 Spain. 
 
 The work of Jay and Adams made it impossible for 
 the Spanish court to realize its hopes. The Bourbons had 
 offered Guadaloupe and San Domingo for Gibraltar and 
 expected to settle on these terms. When Shelburne heard 
 of the agreement with the Americans, however, he raised 
 his price so high that it could not be accepted and, even 
 after the preliminaries between Great Britain and the 
 United States were signed, France threatened to renew 
 the war. 41 
 
 Shelburne was anxious for peace and made a last ef- 
 fort for conciliation. He offered to cede Spain the Flor- 
 idas and Minorca provided she would surrender her pre- 
 tensions to Gibraltar; and Spain seeing the helplessness 
 of her position accepted these terms. 
 
 There remained the question of the navigation of the 
 Mississippi. The British had conceded it to the Ameri- 
 
 38 See Adams's Journal for his opinion of Franklin. 
 3 9Wharton, Dip. Cor., V, 857. 
 
 ^"Correspondence of Fitzherbert," who was negotiating with France 
 and Spain. (F. O., France, 7, 797, et seq.) 
 41 Doniol, Histoire, V, 228-231. 
 
226 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [336 
 
 cans but their concessions were valueless. In the final 
 negotiations Vergennes was to show again his friendship 
 for the United States. If Great Britain had surrendered 
 the right to navigate the Mississippi to Spain the Ameri- 
 cans would have had no recourse. If she had fixed the 
 boundaries of the Floridas in her treaty with Spain, 
 American claims would have been weakened. Spain was 
 anxious to obtain these advantages; Great Britain had no 
 interest in refusing them; and to Vergennes alone must 
 be given the thanks for thwarting Spanish ambition. 42 
 
 The preliminaries of peace between Great Britain and 
 the United States were agreed upon on November 20, 1782 ; 
 between Great Britain and the Bourbon powers on Janu- 
 ary 20; and the question of the West passes out of the 
 American ^Revolution. 
 
 The navigation of the Mississippi and the boundaries 
 of the Floridas were still fruitful causes of dispute. Flor- 
 ida Blanca accepted the western boundary as agreed upon 
 by the British and American negotiators, and began at 
 once negotiations concerning the Mississippi. 43 Montmorin 
 and Aranda recommended that New Orleans be made a 
 free port; but this advice was too liberal for the Spanish 
 minister. 44 Vergennes expressed similar views, 45 altho he 
 
 42 "Je suis informe d'une maniere assez possitive que ce dernier [J. 
 Adams] a mande en amerique que nous avions cherche a les centre carrer 
 en angre relative aux limites et . . . Des imputations de cette nature sont 
 si absurdes qu'elles se detruisent parelles-memes cependant comme j'ai 
 lieu a croire qu'elles ont quelques adherents en amerique et comme M. 
 Adams doit y retourner incessament, je pense se devoir a tout evenement 
 vous metter en etat de les refuter." Vergennes to Luzerne, September 7, 
 1783. (E. U., XXV, no. 52, new 144.) 
 
 "Montmorin to Vergennes, February 18, 1783. (Esp., 610, no. 67.) 
 Vergennes wrote that the great trouble between the United States and 
 Spain was the navigation of the Mississippi. (Ibid., no. 80.) 
 
 44 Montmorin to Vergennes, March i, 1783. (Ibid., no. up.) 
 
 "Vergennes declared that Spain would not adopt his sentiments on 
 account of contraband. (Ibid., no. 149.) ... la conduite de 1'Espagne a 
 1'egard des Etats-unis etablit une sisteme d'eloignement entre les deux 
 nations. Vergennes to Luzerne, December 20, 1782, (Ibid., XXII, no. 46, 
 new 188.) 
 
337] PEACE 227 
 
 realized that they were futile. At the same time he urged 
 moderation upon the Americans in their dealings with 
 Spain, 46 and preserved to the last his r61e of harmonizer. 
 
 In America news of the peace was received with joy, 
 altho there were many who complained that the boundaries 
 of the country were too much restricted. 47 Spain raised 
 no complaint, and Vergennes was happy that, in keeping 
 the faith as an honest man, he had at last wrought the 
 humiliation of England and glorified the prestige of his 
 beloved France. 
 
 "Vergennes to Luzerne, December 20, 1782. (E. U., XXII, no. 118.) 
 47 . . . . au milieu de cette agitation un petit nombre de delegues se 
 ( ) montrent deja inquiets a 1'egard des limites . . ." Luzerne to 
 
 Vergennes, February 8, 1783. (E. U., XXIII, no. 51, new 154.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 GUIDES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES 
 
 Andrews, Charles McLean. Guide to the Manuscript Materials for th* 
 History of the United States to 1783, in the Public Record Office, London. 
 Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1912. This work is thoro and 
 systematic and is indispensable to all who have occasion to work in the 
 Public Record Office. 
 
 and Davenport, Frances G. Guide to the Manuscript Materials 
 
 for the History of the United States to 1783, in the British Museum, in 
 Minor London Archives, and in the Libraries of Oxford and Cambridge. 
 Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1908. As carefully prepared as the 
 Guide to the Public Record Office. It does not, however, have as much. 
 to do with material valuable for this study as does the former. 
 
 Canada. Report on the Canadian Archives. 26 vols. in 23. Ottawa, 
 1882-1905. Contains much material of interest regarding British policy 
 and American conditions. 
 
 Catalogue des livres, recueils, cartes, etc., relatifs a la guerre de 
 I'independance de I'Amerique et a I'etablissement de la republigue des tats- 
 Unis de I'Amerique du Nord. Amsterdam, 1888. Of little value. 
 
 Perez, L. M. Guide to the Materials for American History in Cuban 
 Archives. Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1907. 
 
 Shepherd, William H. Guide to the Materials for the History of the 
 United States in Spanish Archives (Simancas, the Archivo Nacional, and 
 Seville). Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1907. 
 
 United States. Bureau of Rolls and Library, Bulletin, No. i. Wash- 
 ington, 1893. This gives a good summary of the documents in the Depart- 
 ment of State. 
 
 Van Tyne, Claude Halstead, and Leland, Waldo Gifford. Guide to the 
 Archives of the Government of the United States in IVashington. Car- 
 negie Institution, Washington, 1904. This is a very useful manual 
 and covers completely the archival material in Washington. 
 
 MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 
 FRANCE. 
 
 A. Archives Nationales. Paris. The materials found in the 
 French National Archives fall into four groups : Archives des Colonies,. 
 Canada; Archives des Colonies, Louisiane, 44, division 2; Archives de la 
 Marine, B. 4, cartons 125-402 ; Correspondance de Vergennes, series K, 164.. 
 
 228 
 
339] BIBLIOGRAPHY 229 
 
 (This classification was taken from Doniol, and, altho the present arrange- 
 ment is somewhat different, a request calling for the old numbers brought 
 the works desired.) 
 
 Archives des Colonies, Canada, contain little material of the period 
 of the Revolution, and most of the earlier material which I saw related 
 mostly to questions of administration. 
 
 Archives des Colonies, Louisiane. These are largely of the same 
 character as the former but they contain a few documents of a political 
 character and some of first-rate importance. 
 
 fitat Sommaire des Archives de la Marine Anterieures a la Revolution, 
 B 4, cartons 125-402. These contain plans of naval and military operations 
 from 1774 to 1783, many of them of such a character as to reveal the trend 
 of French diplomacy, and also many documents of great political import- 
 ance. This division is worthy of careful and exhaustive study. 
 
 Correspondance de Vergennes, series K, 164 I found little of im- 
 portance in this. 
 
 B. Bibliotheque Nationale, Division des Manuscrits. Paris. The 
 Division of Manuscripts in the National Library is much better conducted 
 than the National Archives ; it is comparatively easy to learn what it 
 contains and it is not difficult to gain access to any desired documents. 
 Only the Doniol Transcripts and the Margry Collection were used. 
 
 1. Doniol, Henri. Histoire de la participation de la France a 1'etab- 
 lissement des fitats-Unis d'Amerique. Copies et epreuves de I'imprime. 
 Paris. Impri. Nationale, 5 t. in 4, 1888-1892. Don de 1'auteur, H. M. 
 Doniol, directeur de 1'Imprimerie nationale. 34 vols. in mss. and proofs. 
 Nouvelles Acquisitions franchises, 6464-6497. The volumes of these tran- 
 scripts are classified as follows : 
 
 I-VI. Affaires Etrangeres, Angleterre, 1774-1783. 
 VII. Biblioteques et Archives anglaises, 1775-1782. 
 VIII-XVII. Affaires Etrangeres, fitats-Unis, 1775-1782. 
 XVIII. Affaires Etrangeres, fitats-Unis, Supple, 1765-1789. 
 XIX-XXIX. Affaires Etrangeres, Espagne, 1774-1782. 
 
 XXX. Affaires Etrangeres, Prusse, Vienne, Russie, Hollande, et 
 Suede, 1776-1782. 
 
 XXXI. Archives et Biblioteques nationales, documents divers, 1774- 
 
 1795- 
 
 XXXII. Archives de la Marine, 1776-1782. 
 
 XXXIII-XXXIV. Archives dr. la Guerre, Correspondance de Roch- 
 ambeau, 1799-1781. 
 
 These documents were, for the most part, well copied, and they were 
 very useful when the original was illegible. They were also useful as a 
 guide to the documents in the National Archives, the Foreign Office and 
 in other places. 
 
 2. Margry, P. Documents inedits sous la Louisiane, etudes sous le 
 titre d'histoire des cessions de la Louisiane. Nouvelles Acquisitions fran- 
 
230 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [340 
 
 c.aises, 9309 et seq. Has a great number of transcripts of documents 
 collected from many sources ; many of these are very interesting. 
 C. Ministere, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres. Paris. 
 
 1. Angleterre. Vols. 500 et seq. The documents in this series do not 
 reveal much of French policy, as Vergennes did not take the ambassa- 
 dors to England fully into his confidence. The series has nothing regard- 
 ing the West. 
 
 2. Espagne. Vols. 570-610 (1774-1783). This contains the 
 sources for all the diplomatic negotiations between France and Spain 
 during the Revolution, the correspondence between Vergennes and the 
 French ambassadors to Spain, between these ambassadors and the Spanish 
 court, and minutes of cabinet meetings, the decision of which might involve 
 Spain, copies of many Spanish documents relating to the American Revolu- 
 tion, and other documents of importance. On account of the close rela- 
 tions of the two countries we find here the fullest account of Spanish 
 and French policy regarding the territories at stake in the Revolution. 
 
 3. France. Vols. 410 et seq. (1774-1783). These volumes con- 
 tain some documents of great importance, but comparatively few by men 
 who were directing affairs. 
 
 4. tats-Unis. Vols. 1-25 (1778-1784). These volumes contain 
 the diplomatic communications between Vergennes and the French 
 agents in America. With the series Espagne they give the whole policy 
 of France toward the American Revolution. They also give much infor- 
 mation concerning the resources of the country, the internal conditions 
 in the United States, and politics both within and without Congress. The 
 accounts of Gerard and Luzerne, of Washington, Gouverneur Morris, Jay, 
 Madison, John and Samuel Adams, and the Lees, represent them in quite 
 a different light from that commonly accepted, and give new information 
 on the lapses of some of them. 
 
 The Archives des Affaires Etrangeres have a double system of number- 
 ing the documents contained therein. They were first numbered consecu- 
 tively as they were filed, and Doniol referred to these numbers alone. 
 Since then the documents have been in part renumbered according to an- 
 other system; in the text references are made to both systems, the old 
 and the new. 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 A. British Museum. London. Auckland Papers, 34415-34419. 
 
 B. Public Record Office. London. 
 
 I. Colonial Office Papers 5, Nos. 7-264. Letters of the secretaries of 
 state, orders in council, minutes of council meetings, abstracts of letters, 
 Indian affairs, petitions, military dispatches, war office papers, commissions 
 to colonies, peace commissions, Pelham correspondence, and a great quan- 
 tity of miscellaneous matter. The Colonial Office is rich in materials 
 
 concerning the activities of the British in the Mississippi Valley, their plans 
 
341] BIBLIOGRAPHY 231 
 
 and their methods of carrying them out, and it also contains personal 
 papers that shed light on the subject. 
 2. Foreign Office. 
 
 a. America and West Indies, Vol. 290. Letters on Spanish support 
 to the rebels on the Mississippi (1776-1778). 
 
 b. France, Nos. 2-10. Advices and intelligences, correspondence of 
 Thomas Walpole, Richard Oswald, Alleyne Fitzherbert, Thomas Grenville, 
 Duke of Manchester, William Strachey, Thomas Townshend, and the Earl 
 of Shelburne (1782-1783). This series describes all the negotiations be- 
 tween England and the allies from the British viewpoint, and reveals quite 
 fully the plans and purposes of the British ministers. 
 
 c. Miscellaneous. 
 
 No. 8. American duplicates, 1782-1783. 
 
 No. 468. Foreign minister's letter book, 1782-1783. 
 
 No. 535. American negotiations in Paris, 1782-1783. This is a collection 
 of transcripts of the most important papers describing the negotiations at 
 Paris. I had no opportunity to see this number as it was, at the time when 
 I was in London, withdrawn from the use of the public. 
 
 d. Spain. No. 85. Miscellaneous dispatches of small importance for 
 this subject. All the documents described above in the Public Record 
 Office, except that otherwise noted, were used in the preparation of this 
 study. Many more were consulted, but, as they proved of no value for 
 my purpose, they are not described. No attempt is made, however, to give 
 a full description of these documents, for they are fully and carefullv- 
 described in Andrews' Guide to the Public Record Office. 
 
 UNITED STATES. 
 
 A. Department of State. Washington. 
 
 i. Papers of the Continental Congress. 
 
 No. 5. Secret Journals of Foreign Affairs, November 29, 17/S-Sep- 
 tember 16, 1778. 3 vols. folio. These have been published in the 
 Journals of the Continental Congress. 
 
 No. 18. Foreign letters of R. L. Livingston. 
 
 No. 79. Letters of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and of R. L. 
 Livingston, secretary for foreign affairs. 3 vols. and appendix. Vol I, 
 letter book of the committee of foreign affairs and of R. L. Livingston, 
 1776-1782. Vols. II and III, letters of R. L. Livingston. Appendix, letter 
 book of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, 1776-1781. Many of these 
 have been published in Wharton. 
 
 No. 82. Letters of Franklin to the President of Congress and to R. L. 
 Livingston, secretary for foreign affairs. 3 vols. folio. Many or 
 perhaps all of these are published in Smyth's edition of Franklin's Works. 
 
 No. 85. Letters of the Joint Commissioners for the negotiations of 
 peace, i vol. folio. Published in Wharton. 
 
 No. 95. Letters of de la Luzerne. 2 vols. folio. These are im- 
 
232 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [342 
 
 portant in showing the methods by which the French attempted to influ- 
 ence Congress. 
 
 No. 101. Transcripts of letters of Franklin and Adams, 1781-1783. 
 
 No. 105. Transcripts of letters of joint commissioners of the United 
 States, I777-I779. 
 
 No. 106. Transcripts of letters of joint commissioners for the nego- 
 tiations of peace. 
 
 No. no. Letters of Jay, 1779-1784. Published in Correspondence and 
 Public Papers of John Jay. 
 
 No. in. Communications made by Monjr Gerard, Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary of His Most Christian Majesty to the United States of America. 
 Letter book. 
 
 No. 114. Record of Correspondence with Foreign Ministers, 1778-1779 
 
 2. Franklin Papers. 
 
 No. i. Records of the United States' legation at Paris, 1777-1780. 
 
 No. 2. The same, 1779. 
 
 No. 3. The same, 1779-80. 
 
 Nos. 8 and 8a. The same and records of the Peace Commission, 
 1780-1783. 
 
 No. 12. Oswald's Journal (transcripts), 1782. 
 
 No. 13. Franklin's Journal, 1782. 
 
 These papers furnish abundant information regarding the part Frank 
 lin had in American diplomacy. 
 
 B. Library of Congress, Division of Manuscripts. Washington. 
 
 i. Papers of the Continental Congress. 
 
 No. 4. Secret Journals of Congress, Foreign and Domestic, from 
 October 18, 1780, to March 29, 1881, folio. 
 
 No. 7. Journal of Congress called the "more secret journal," June 6. 
 I78i-August 8, 1782. Pamphlet, original and letter book. 
 
 Nos. 4 and 7 have been published in the Journals of the Continental 
 Congress. 
 
 No. 13. Letter books of the Presidents of Congress (Henry Laurens) 
 containing official letters from November i, 1777, to December 8, 1778. 3 
 vols., folio and index. 
 
 No. 14. Letters of the Presidents of Congress (John Jay and Samuel 
 Huntington), December n, 1778-May 19, 1780. 
 
 No. 18. Letter books (A and B) of Charles Thomson, secretary of 
 Congress, containing the record of official letters from November 20, 
 1779, to May i, 1789. 2 vols. folio. 
 
 No. 25. Reports of committees relating to the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs from 1776 to 1788. 2 vols. folio. Each volume has two parts. 
 
 These four numbers show the efforts of Congress to work out a policy 
 towards the West. With these and the letters of Gerard and Luzerne 
 we have a full account of this policy. 
 
 No. 41. Memorials addressed to Congress from 1775 to 1778. 15 vols. 
 folio and index. 
 
343] BIBLIOGRAPHY 233 
 
 No. 48. Memorials of the inhabitants of Illinois, Kaskaskia, and 
 Kentucky, 1780-1785. I vol. folio. 
 
 No. 50. Letters and papers of Oliver Pollock from 1772 to 1782. 2 
 vols. folio. With them is a bundle of letters relating mostly to the pur- 
 chase of slaves. 
 
 These three numbers give important information in regard to the 
 state of public feeling in the West, and from the letters of Pollock much 
 information can be gathered regarding Spanish aid to the Americans. 
 
 No. 166. Letters and papers relating to Canadian affairs, to General 
 Sullivan's expedition in 1779, and to the northern Indians. It also gives 
 an account of Lafayette's proposed expedition of 1778. Folio. 
 
 2. Stevens, Benjamin Franklin (compiler). Catalogue Index of 
 manuscripts in the archives of England, France, Holland, and Spain, re- 
 lating to America, 1763-1783. 50 vols. Chronological index to same. 100 
 vols. Alphabetical index to same. 30 vols. (London, 1870-1902). The 
 180 volumes are in manuscript in the Library of Congress. The work 
 is still very useful, but since its preparation the documents in the Public 
 Record Office in London and in the Foreign Office in Paris have been re- 
 numbered so that the references in Stevens's work are now incorrect. To 
 one who wishes to know what is contained in the archives of Europe 
 relating to America, Stevens is useful. 
 
 3. Transcripts of documents in European archives relating to 
 
 America, 1763-1783. About 200 cartons. Not complete on the sub- 
 ject of the West. 
 
 4. Transcripts of documents relating to the French alliance, 
 
 1778-1784. 19 boxes. Documents transcribed from the French For- 
 eign Office, principally correspondence of Vergennes with the French 
 ministers in America, office minutes, taken mostly from the Archives des 
 Affaires Etrangeres, fitats-Unis, III-XXVII. 
 
 5. Peace transcripts, 1782-1783. 18 vols. These are tran- 
 scripts from foreign archives relating to the treaty of peace. 
 
 6. British transcripts. Transcripts from the British Museum, Bodle- 
 ian, Cotton, Egerton, Hargrave, Harleian, King's Hyde, Lansdowne, and 
 
 Sloane libraries, and from the Public Record Office. 248 boxes. 
 
 This collection has, as yet, added very little to our knowledge of the 
 Revolutionary period. 
 
 PRINTED SOURCES 
 
 Adams, John. Works, edited by Charles Francis Adams. 10 vols. 
 Boston, 1850-1856. 
 
 Alvord, Clarence Walworth. Cahokia Records, 1778-1790: "Collections 
 of the Illinois State Historical Society," Vol. II : Virginia Series, Vol. I 
 Springfield, 1907. 
 
 . Kaskaskia Records, 1778-1790: Collections of the Illinois 
 
 State Historical Society, Vol. V : Virginia Series, Vol. II. Springfield. 1909. 
 
234 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [344 
 
 Chicago Historical Society. Collections, Vol. IV. Contains Rocheblave 
 Papers and John Todd Papers, edited by E. G. Mason. Chicago, 1890. 
 
 Force, Peter. American Archives in Six- Series. Series one, two. and 
 three were never published. Series four and five were published under 
 authority of an act of Congress. Washington, 1837-1853. Of considerable 
 value, but now largely superseded. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin. Writings, edited by Albert Henry Smyth. 10 
 vols. New York, 1905-1907. Franklin understood diplomacy better 
 than any other American of his time, and he fully appreciated the im- 
 portance of the West. As a result, his works possess great value for a 
 study of the diplomacy of the Revolution. Smyth's edition is good but 
 there are additional documents in the Papers of the Continental Congress 
 and some letters of considerable value in the French foreign office. 
 
 Hay, H. Miner. Calendar of the Papers of Benjamin Franklin in the 
 Library of the American Philosophical Society. 5 vols. Philadelphia, 1908. 
 
 Jay, John. Correspondence and Public Papers, edited by Henry P. 
 Johnston. 4 vols. New York, 1891. The selections are good, and 
 the work as a whole well edited. There are no papers, however, that show 
 Jay's early attitude on the question of the West, or of American relations 
 with France and Spain. 
 
 Lafayette, General. Memoires et correspondance du General Lafay- 
 ette. 6 vols in 8. Paris. 1838. Valuable for Lafayette's point of 
 view, but they reveal nothing of French diplomacy or the plans of the 
 French court. 
 
 Lee Richard Henry. Letters, edited by James Curtis Ballagh. New 
 York, 1911. Of use in tracing the politics of Congress. 
 
 Madison, James. The Papers of James Madison, Purchased by Order 
 of Congress, Being His Correspondence and Reports of Debates during 
 the Congress of the Confederation, and His Reports of Debates in the 
 Federal Convention. Published under the superintendency of Henry D. 
 Gilpin. 3 vols. Washington, 1840. 
 
 Malloy, William M. (Editor). Treatises, Conventions, Interna- 
 tional Acts, and Protocols betiueen the United States and Other Pozi'ers, 
 1776-1909. 2 vols. Washington, 1910. 
 
 Mlem-oire lustortque et politique sur la Lou-isiane par Vcrgcnney), 
 Paris, 1802. A forgery; see above pp. 31-32. 
 
 New York. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State 
 of New York, Procured by J. R. Brodhead. Vols. I-XI edited by E. B. 
 O'Callaghan; vols XII-XV edited by B. Fernow. 15 vols. Albany, 
 1853-1883. 
 
 Sparks, Jared. The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American 
 Revolution. 6 vols. Washington, 1857. Now superseded by Whar- 
 ton's work. 
 
 Stevens, Benjamin Franklin. Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European 
 Archives Relating to America. 1773-1783. London, 1889-1898. The only 
 
345] BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 publication that contains a fairly complete set of documents on the Euro- 
 pean side of the diplomacy of the American Revolution. 
 
 Thomson, Charles. The Thomson Papers, 1765-1816: New York 
 Historical Society Collections, 1878. 4 vols. New York, 1879. 
 
 United States. Journals of the Continental Congress, Vols. I-XV 
 edited by Worthington Chauncey Ford, vols. XVI-XXI edited by Gaillard 
 Hunt, from the original records in the papers of the Continental Congress. 
 21 vols. now published. Washington, 1904. The journals are here excel- 
 lently edited and the foot-notes are valuable for their explanations of the 
 policy of Congress. 
 
 . Secret Journals of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress 
 
 from the first meeting thereof to the dissolution of the Confederation by 
 the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. 4 vols. Boston, 
 1820. Vols. II and III relate to foreign affairs. This work has been 
 superseded in part by the Journals of the Continental Congress (Ford ed.). 
 
 . Treaties and Conventions concluded betiueen the United 
 
 States of America and other powers since July 4, 1776, edited by the 
 Department of State, Hamilton Fish, secretary. Washington, 1871. 
 
 Walpole, Horace. Journals of the Reign of King George the Third 
 from the Year 1771 to 1783, edited by Dr. Doran. 2 vols. London, 1859. 
 
 , Last Journals of Horace Walpole during the Reign of 
 
 King George the Third from 1771 to 1783, edited by Dr. Doran. 2 vols. 
 London and New York, 1910. 
 
 . Letters of Horace Walpole, Fourth Earl of Orford, edited 
 
 by Mrs. Paget Toynbee. 16 vols. Oxford, 1903-1905. 
 
 Washington, George. Writings, edited by Worthington Chauncy 
 Ford. 14 vols. New York, 1889-1893. 
 
 Wharton, Francis. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of 
 the United States, Washington, 1889. A useful collection of the most im- 
 portant documents found in the archives at Washington. 
 
 HISTORIES, BIOGRAPHIES, AND SPECIAL TREATISES 
 
 Alden, George Henry. New Governments West of the Alleghanies 
 before 1780. Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, Economics, Polit- 
 ical Science, and History' Series, II, No. I. Madison, 1897. 
 
 Alvord, Clarence Walworth. "The British Ministry and the Treaty 
 of Fort Stanwix :" Proceedings of Wisconsin Historical Society. Madison, 
 1908. 
 
 , "Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763:" Michigan Historical 
 
 Collections, XXXVI. Lansing, 1908. 
 
 These two studies by Professor Alvord contain many interesting 
 suggestions regarding British policy toward the West in the years pre- 
 ceding the outbreak of the American Revolution. 
 
 , and Bidgood, Lee. The Explorations of the Trans-Alle- 
 
 ghany Region by the Virginians. 1650-1674. Cleveland, 1912. 
 
236 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [346 
 
 Bancroft, George. History of the United States of America from the 
 Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. New York, 1882. Altho this work 
 has many errors of detail, it shows a breadth of view and an appreciation 
 of actual conditions that make it one of the most valuable accounts of 
 the diplomacy of the American Revolution. Bancroft knew better than 
 most American historians the characters and aims of the men of this 
 period, and he was able to express his knowledge in clear and vigorous 
 language. He undoubtedly knew much of the French sources, and 
 writes with apparently first hand knowledge. Altho the French archives 
 were not open to his inspection, in some way, possibly through his 
 acquaintance with French diplomats, he gained a wide knowledge of 
 their contents. He wrote with honesty and great ability, but often he 
 expressed his ideas with too much patriotic fervor. 
 
 Beer, George Louis. British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765. New York, 
 1907. This is a valuable survey of British colonial policy during the 
 period treated, but it has little regarding the West 
 
 Channing, Edward. A History of the United States. 3 vols. New 
 York, 1905-1912. Vol. Ill gives one of the best surveys of the period 
 from 1763 to 1789 that has yet been written. Channing's account cf the 
 diplomacy is fair minded and carefully written. His account of the aims 
 of French diplomacy, however, does not bear evidence of careful research, 
 and he is too much biased by the views of early American statesmen. 
 
 Circourt, Adolphe Marie Pierre, Comte de. Histoire de I'action 
 commune de la France et de I'Amerique four I'independance par George 
 Bancroft .... traduit et annote .... accompagne de documents inedits. 
 3 vols. Paris, 1876. Vols. I and II are a rather free translation of a part 
 of Bancroft's history. Vol. Ill, Documents originaux inedits is made up 
 of documents relating to the diplomacy of the American Revolution gath- 
 ered from the archives of France, Spain, Great Britain, Prussia, and 
 other countries. These documents are freely translated into modern 
 French and are poorly edited. 
 
 Coffin, Victor. The Province of Quebec and the Early American 
 Revolution: Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin. Madison, 1896. 
 Valuable for its presentation of certain phases of British policy toward 
 the West during the years preceding the outbreak of the Revolution. 
 
 Doniol, Henri. Histoire de la participation de la France a Fetablisse- 
 ment des tats-Unis d'Amervque. 5 vols. Paris, 1885-1892. This work 
 has a store of valuable documents not otherwise easily accessible. The 
 narrative is too controversial in character to be particularly useful, and 
 the account of American conditions is especially one-sided. Altho Doniol 
 drew extensively from the French archives, he had no knowledge of the 
 American or English sources. In his completed work Doniol gave little 
 attention to the West, altho his notes, known as the "Doniol Transcripts" 
 and now preserved in the National Library at Paris, contain much of the 
 material used in this study. 
 
 
347] BIBLIOGRAPHY 23T 
 
 Everett, Edward. Review of Sparks' Diplomatic Correspondence of 
 the American Revolution: North American Review, XXXIII. 
 
 Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond. Life of William, Earl of Shelburne, 
 with Extracts from His Papers and Correspondence. 3 vols. London, 
 1875-1876. This is an admirable work. The narrative is clear and to 
 the point, and the documents are well selected. The whole work is 
 scholarly and is written with a fairness unusual in works of this character. 
 The new edition appeared after this study was completed. 
 
 Fortier, Alcee. A History of Louisiana. 4 vols. New York, 1904. 
 A good narrative account containing many details of curious interest. 
 
 Gayarre, Charles. History of Louisiana. 4 vols. New Orleans, 1903. 
 
 Hale, Edward Everett, and Hale, Edward Everett, Jr. Franklin in 
 France. From Original Documents Most of Which Are now Published 
 for the First Time. 2 vols. Boston, 1887-1888. This biography is very 
 friendly to Franklin, but the biographers depended upon the accounts of 
 Adams and Jay for their knowledge of Franklin's activities and thus 
 fail to do justice to the greatness of the man whose work they attempt 
 to portray. 
 
 Hamilton, Peter Joseph. Colonial Mobile. Boston and New York, 
 1897. Interesting but of little value for this study. 
 
 Howard, George Elliott. Preliminaries of the Revolution. (American 
 Nation Series, VIII.) New York, 1905. 
 
 Jay, William. Life of John Jay, with Selections from His Corre- 
 spondence and Miscellaneous Papers. 2 vols. New York, 1883. Inter- 
 esting from its point of view, but one-sided. As a source it has been 
 superseded by Johnston's edition. 
 
 Kapp, Friedrich. Leben des amerikanischen Generals Johann Kalb. 
 Stuttgart, 1862. Translated into English as the Life of John Kalb, Major 
 General in the Revolutionary Army. New York, 1884. This is a work 
 of great value, little known but reliable and scholarly in every respect. 
 In it are copies of many documents not elsewhere known but those 
 which I have been able to compare with the original are accurately copied. 
 
 Kingsford, William. History of Canada. 10 vols. London, 1887- 
 1898. A dry and commonplace style is the worst fault of this work. It 
 is a mine of information and its attitude is fair toward all parties. 
 
 Lecky, William Edward Hartpole. History of England in the 
 Eighteenth Century. 8 vols. London, 1883-1890. 
 
 McLaughlin, Andrew Cunningham. The Confederation and the Con- 
 stitution. 1783-1789. (American Nation Series X.) New York, 1905. 
 Written in a spirit of fairness. The first chapter on the negotiations 
 for peace is the only one bearing on this study. It attempts to reconcile 
 the conventional American view with Doniol, but the result is not a just 
 view. Bancroft's treatment of the subject is more accurate. 
 
 Mason, E. G. "March of the Spaniards across Illinois" : Magazine 
 of American History, XV, 457. The conclusions of this account are mere 
 surmises without any foundation of fact. 
 
238 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [348 
 
 Ogg, Frederic Austin. Opening of the Mississippi. New York, 1904. 
 Of little value for this study. 
 
 Parton, James. Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. 2 vols. Bos- 
 ton, 1867. 
 
 Perkins, James Breck. France in the American Revolution. Boston 
 and New York, 1911. A semi-popular account based largely on Doniol. 
 
 Raynal, Abbe. The Revolution in America. Philadelphia, 1782. Of 
 little value. 
 
 Rives, William Cahill. History of the Life and Times of James 
 Madison. 3 vols. Boston, 1859-1868. One sided; gives little information 
 on the politics of Congress. 
 
 Roosevelt, Theodore. Winning of the West. 4 vols. New York, 
 1894-1896. Gives no information on the subject of this study. 
 
 Tower, Charlemagne. The Marquis de La Fayette in the American 
 Revolution. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1901. An interesting story but one- 
 sided. Taken largely from Doniol. 
 
 Turner, Frederick Jackson. "Policy of France toward the Mississippi 
 Valley during the Administration of Washington and Adams:" in Ameri- 
 can Historical Review, X, 255 et seq. See above pp. 31-32. 
 
 Van Tyne, Claude Halstead. The American Revolution. (American 
 Nation Series, IX.) New York, 1905. An excellent general account. 
 The work is fair in spirit, but its account of the diplomacy of the Revolu- 
 tion is not based upon extensive research outside the archives at Wash- 
 ington. It attempts to maintain a balance by combining the accounts 
 of Doniol with those of American writers ; but this method does not 
 always lead to the exact truth. 
 
 Winsor, Justin. The Westward Movement. Boston, 1897. Accepts 
 as true all the suspicions which American statesmen felt toward France; 
 of no value for the diplomatic phases of the westward movement. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Acadia, 81. 
 
 Adams, John, in Congress, 120; minister for negotiations of peace, 128; 
 attitude towards France, 129, 138; arrives in Europe, 138; arrives at 
 Paris, 221 ; American commissioner for negotiations for peace, 221, 
 223, 225. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, attitude toward France, 181. 
 
 Africa, 40. 
 
 Albany Convention, 62. 
 
 Alleghanies, 7, n, 49, 169. 
 
 Alliance between France and Spain, 127. See also France, Spain. 
 
 Alliance between France and United States, 78, 108, 159, 160. See also 
 France, United States. 
 
 America, center of world diplomacy, 20. See also United States, Congress. 
 
 American commissioners for negotiation of peace, appointment of, 128; 
 resolve to keep secret their negotiations with Great Britain, 221 ; ulti- 
 matum of, 223; position of, 225. See also Adams, Franklin, Jay. 
 
 American commissioners to France, 62 ; ask treaty with France, 64 ; wil- 
 ling to surrender the Floridas, 65 ; make treaty of alliance, 78. See 
 also Alliance between France and United States. 
 
 American Revolution, 18. 
 
 Anti-Gallican party, 115, 118, 124, 125, 127, 151, 184. See also Junto, 
 Parties in Congress, Congress. 
 
 Aranda, Comte de, supports French policy, 40; character and influence of, 
 46, 47; negotiations with Jay, 211. 
 
 Arnold, Benedict, failure of expedition to Canada, 24; treason of, 183. 
 
 Bahama Canal, in convention between France and Spain, 106. 
 
 Bahama Islands, demanded by Spain, 209. 
 
 Beaumarchais, 44. 
 
 Bonvouloir, sent to U. S., 29; mission of, 58. 
 
 Boundaries of U. S., question of, 61, 138, 196, 201, 204; discussed by Jay 
 and Florida Blanca, 141; opinions concerning, 118, 120, 123-126, 133, 
 174, 179, 185, 204, 205, 211, 212. See also United States, West, Canada. 
 
 Bourbons, 14, 39, 43, 69, 93. 
 
 British, 18, 19; trade of Mississippi, 19; attitude of concerning West, 10, 25; 
 disaffection of in Canada, 22; power of in Northwest, 24; see import- 
 ance of West, 25 ; distrust by France, 35 ; suspects Spain, 42 ; right to 
 Mississippi, 60; aroused over territories, 74; offer concessions to the 
 Americans, 76; suggest Spanish mediation, 97; policy of, 167; hold 
 Northwest posts, 214. See also Great Britain. 
 
 British Empire, 62. See also Great Britain. 
 
 British ministry, policy of, 10. 
 
 British politics, character of, 10. 
 
 239 
 
240 THE WEST IX THE REVOLUTION [350 
 
 British traders, 13. 
 
 Burgoyne, Gen., surrender of, 59, 73, 74. 
 
 Burke, Thomas, of North Carolina, attitude of, 165, 166. 
 
 Cahokia, 18. 
 
 Campeche, Bay of, 101, 106, 107. 
 
 Canada, 9, 12, 15, 17, 61, 76, 83, 87, 88, 95, 96, 98, 100, no, 117, 120, 121, 124, 
 126, 127, 131, 134, 143, 150, 155, 167, 168; importance of, 21; American 
 attack upon, 24; plans to conquer, 67, 86, 166, 184, 190; proposed attack 
 upon abandoned, 86; in negotiations for peace, 217. 
 
 Canadians, French, satisfied with British rule, 15, 21 ; D'Estaing's procla- 
 mation to, 86; uneasiness among, 87. 
 
 Cape Antoine, 173. 
 
 Caribbean Sea, 39. 
 
 Carleton, Sir Guy, alarmed at American designs on Canada, 23. 
 
 Carmichael, William, secretary to Jay, 138, 140. 
 
 Carolinas, claims of in West, 13. 
 
 Charles III, king of Spain, 97, 98, 101, 142; desires to maintain peace, 
 37, 38, 55, 96; opposes recognition of U. S., 53; fears Great Britain, 
 81 ; fears United States, 93. 
 
 Choiseul, Etienne-Frangois, Due de, interest in America, 8, 14, 15, 17; 
 loses interest, 18. 
 
 Clark, George Rogers, expedition of, 114, 154, 191-194; conquests of, 155. 
 
 Colonial charters, force of, 157, 159, 168, 183; character of, 1/8; ignored by 
 Madison, 186; views of Rayneval as to, 211. 
 
 Congress, 112, 139; desires Canada, 22; and question of boundaries, 61, 
 81, 173; elects commissioners to France, 62; proposes treaty with 
 France, 62; seeks alliance with Spain, 62, 194; position on Floridas, 67, 
 T 53; territorial policy of, 67; demands right of navigation of Mis- 
 sissippi, 67; instructions of, 78; policy of, 84, 128, 145, 156, 157, 189. 
 190, 198, 199; plans invasion of Canada, 86, 87, 176; policy towards 
 West, 108, 178, 187; fear of West, 119; factions in, 108, 115, 117-124, 
 126, 165, 166, 176, 178, 179, 180, 195, 206; character of, 124; committees 
 of, 121 ; attitude of, 133, 134, 155, 157; position of, 177, 187; instruc- 
 tions to Jay, 179, 180, 195; opposes policy of France, 187; indepen- 
 dence of, 188; anger of at Spain, 198; sounded by Luzerne, 201; de- 
 mands of, 203 ; instructions of for negotiation of peace, 204, 208 ; 
 views of, 214. See also United States. 
 
 Considerations, 31. 
 
 Convention between France and Spain, 104, 106, 107 ; character of, 107. 
 
 Cornwallis, Charles, 191, in South, 189. 
 
 Cumberland, British agent in Spain, 190. 
 
 Deane, Silas, elected American commissioner to France, 62; asks treaty 
 with France, 64; proposes terms of alliance. 65. See also American 
 commissioners. 
 
 Declaration of Independence, 61 ; and question of boundaries, 67. 
 
351] INDEX 241 
 
 D'Estaing, Charles, Comte; memorial of, 16; arrives in America, 84; 
 plans of, 85, 86; proclamation of to Canadians, 86; to act with Spanish 
 fleet, 94; reverses of, 101 ; supports Spanish attack, 136. 
 
 Detroit, 26, 85, 114, 191. 
 
 Dunkirk, provision regarding in convention between France and Spain, 
 106; importance of this provision, 107. 
 
 Dunmore, Lord, in Virginia, 25. 
 
 East, 20, 25. 
 
 East, party of, 121. 
 
 Eastern Louisiana, desired by Spain, 9, 13, 60, 108, 116, 168-169, 184, 208, 
 209; demanded by Spain, 148. 
 
 Family compacts, 8, 46. 
 
 Finances of France, 101, 200. 
 
 Fisheries (Newfoundland), 74, 79, 85, 94, 121, 123, 124; question of, 218; 
 demands of Great Britain respecting, 222. 
 
 Florida Blanca, prime minister of Spain, succeeds Grimaldi, 46; changes 
 policy of Spain, 47; character of, 48; efforts to maintain peace, 49, 70, 
 75, 79', policy of, 49, 72, 80, 92, 94, 133, 134; seeks to recover former 
 colonies of Spain, 50, 75, 79; prepares for war, 51; attitude towards 
 "United States, 52, 93, 104, 144, 148, 197; wishes Revolution to con- 
 tinue, 52; justifies Spanish armaments, 54; desires concessions from 
 Great Britain, 55 ; distrusts France, 55 ; fears Great Britain, 79 ; 
 blames France for war, 74; fears United States, 93, 103; dislike of 
 for United States, 93; diplomacy of, 102; demands of, 102, 103, 147, 
 195; and French aid, 137; distrusted by Vergennes, 138; negotiations 
 with Jay, 140, 141 ; sends Gardoqui to treat with Jay, 142 ; negotia- 
 tions with England, 146; propositions for peace, 147; ends negotia- 
 tions with Jay, 196; mentioned, 69, 70, 96, 98, 142, 150. 
 
 Floridas, The, 9, n, 13, 61, 65, 66, 67, 74, 76, 81-83, 96-98, 101, 102, 106, 
 no, 112, 113, 117-121, 124-128, 131, 134, 138-140, 150, 160, 170, 200; 
 claimed by Spain, 26, 61, 80, 106, 148; offered to Spain, 65, 94, 
 95; attacked, 133, 136; importance of, 152; boundaries of, 161 ; desired 
 by Great Britain, 210; in treaty of peace, 223, 224. 
 
 Fort de Chartres, 13. 
 
 Fort Stanwix, treaty of, n. 
 
 France, expulsion of from New World, 9; weakness of, 7, 28, 91, 148, 200; 
 desires to humiliate England, 30; policy of, 43, 99, 100, 149, 150; 
 plans to aid Americans, 43 ; cooperates with Spain, 91 ; alliance with 
 Spain, 107 ; alliance with United States, 78, 108 ; urges attack upon 
 Floridas, 142; desires peace, 146, 200; withdraws support from Ameri- 
 cans, 183; attitude of towards United States, 205; on boundaries, 211; 
 mentioned, 9, 15, 30, 32, 33, 44, 47, 58, 59, 61, 73, 75, ?8-88, 91, 99, 101, 
 106-108, 116, 136-139, 149, 181. 
 
 Franklin, Benjamin, views regarding West, 10, 25, 62, 139; arrives at Paris, 
 46; influence at French court, 46; seeks alliance with Spain, 55; char- 
 acter, 62 ; demands right to navigate Mississippi, 66, 145 ; his interview 
 with Hutton, 76; insists upon independence, 76; asks indemnification, 
 
242 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [352 
 
 76; insists upon immediate treaty with France, 78; refuses to reveal 
 his plans, 133; supports Jay, 140; summons Jay to Paris, 211; begins 
 negotiations with Oswald, 210; proposes settlement of boundaries, 
 217; negotiations with Oswald, 217-219; illness of, 219; part in later 
 negotiations, 224; conciliates Vergennes, 225. 
 
 Frederick the Great, 7. 
 
 French agents in America, 15, 16. 
 
 French diplomacy, 9. 
 
 French habitants, in Illinois, 12. 
 
 French, in West, 13. 
 
 French interest in America, 14, 18, 52. 
 
 French party in Cpngress, 187, 188. 
 
 Gage, Gen. Thomas, plan to arouse West and to cut rebellion in two, 25. 
 
 Galvez, minister for the Indies, 48; character of, 49; friendship for 
 America, 49. 
 
 Galvez, Bernardo de, governor of Louisiana, 53 ; seizes British vessels in- 
 Mississippi, 54, 60; aids Americans, 68, 103, 113; attacks the Floridas, 
 133; success on Mississippi, 137; campaign, 142; captures Mobile, 144; 
 conquests of, 161 ; policy of, 192. 
 
 Gardoqui, secretary of Florida Blanca, negotiations with Jay, 144, 145 ;. 
 position of, 188. 
 
 Gates, Gen. Horatio, defeated in the South, 183. 
 
 George III, 14. 
 
 Georgia, 13, 132, 176, 200; held by Cornwallis, 189. 
 
 Gerard de Rayneval, Conrad, referred to in text as Gerard, minister to- 
 United States, 82; instructions of, 82; promises of, 84; attitude on 
 invasion of Canada, 85; diplomacy of, 118; opposes Congress, 124; 
 relations with Congress, 125; ends mission to United States, 129; 
 character of his work, 129; mentioned, 86, 108, 109, in, 112, 114-116,. 
 121-123, 127, 130, 138-140, 152. 
 
 Gerard de Rayneval, M. See Rayneval. 
 
 Gibraltar, British defense of, 38, 40; desired by Spain, 75, 79, 104; diffi- 
 culties of conquering, 96; France agrees to help conquer, 102, 106; 
 demanded by Spain, 209; question of, 225; mentioned, 97, 101, 107. 
 
 Grantham, British ambassador to Spain, 41, 42, 54. 
 
 Grasse, Comte de, sent to America, 149, 201. 
 
 Great Britain, influence of in America, 21, colonial empire of, 7, 30; 
 hostility of France to, 32, 33, 35, 41 ; and Portugal, 36 ; and Spain, 38, 
 42. 96, 98, 146; increases her armaments, 38; suspects Spanish policy, 
 41, 52, 54; and Spanish aid to Americans, 68; distrusted by Florida 
 Blanca, 49; and France, 54, 71, 210; declares war against France, 79; 
 and Vergennes, 88, 95; rejects Spain's offer of mediation, 101 ; and the 
 West, 108, 214; attitude of Spain towards, 132, 147, 148, 157, 197; 
 rights of discussed, 143, 159, 186, 211; policy of, 167, 221, 222; and 
 navigation of the Mississippi, 226. 
 
 Great Lakes, 26. 
 
353] INDEX 
 
 Grenada, 70. 
 
 Grimaldi, Marquis de, friendship of for France, 36, 37; and Great Britain, 
 38, 42; character of, 40; prepares for war, 41; and France, 41, 45; 
 desires peace, 43; succeeded by Florida Blanca, 46; mentioned, 71. 
 
 Halifax, 86, 88, 96. 
 
 Havana, Spain despatches troops to, 51. 
 
 Henry, Patrick, governor of Virginia, 67. 
 
 Holker, M., agent of Vergennes in U. S., 39. 
 
 Honduras, Gulf of, 101, 102, .106, 107. 
 
 Hutton, chief of Moravians, interview with Franklin, 76. 
 
 Huntington, Samuel, president of Congress, 164; urges moderation, 182. 
 
 Illinois, mentioned by D'Estaing, 16; loss of population, 18; trade of, 19; 
 Clark in, 114; American interest in, 15; Spaniards in, 192. 
 
 Independence of U. S. recognized by France, 77; Oswald's instruc- 
 tions, 219. 
 
 Indians, and the West, II, 12, 109. 
 
 Ireland, 70. 
 
 Jamaica, desired by Spain, 40, plans to conquer, 70, 81, 102. 
 
 Jay, John, attitude of regarding West, 25, 114; and French interests, 120, 
 125; elected to negotiate treaty with Spain, 128; alienated from 
 French, 129, 181 ; arrives in Europe, 138; negotiations with Spain, 
 138, 140, 141, 144, 145, 195, 196; dispatches of, 173, 189; -instructions 
 to, 176, 179, 181, 185, 186, 195; failure of his mission, 198; arrival of 
 at Paris, 211 ; negotiations of with Aranda, 211 ; and Oswald, 218, 219, 
 223, 224; character of, 219; and Europe, 219; distrusts French designs, 
 219-221 ; and Rayneval's mission, 220; and the Floridas, 223, 224. 
 
 Jenifer, Daniel of St. Thomas, and French policy, 124; attitude of, 165, 
 166, 176, 180, 181 ; on instructions to Jay, 179; memorial of, 182, 183. 
 
 Jesuits, driven from Spain, 46. 
 
 Jones, Joseph, of Virginia, opposes claims of Spain, 174, 175. 
 
 Junto, in Congress, found, 120; opposes Gerard, 126; broken up, 165. 
 
 Kalb, Baron de, mission to America, 15, 18; reports of, 29. 
 
 Kaskaskia, 18, 193. 
 
 Kentucky, County of, 25; Americans in, 113; declares independence, 164; 
 mentioned, 154. 
 
 La Balme, 192, 193, 194. 
 
 Labrador, 61. 
 
 Lafayette, Marquis de, plan of for invasion of Canada, 85, 87. 
 
 Lake Nipissing, boundary of Quebec, n. 
 
 Lee, Arthur, seeks aid of Spain, 52, 53 ; mentioned, 74. 
 
 Lee, R. H., opposition of to French plans, 122, 126. 
 
 Lees, family of, 120, 181. 
 
 Lexington, report of battle of, 30. 
 
 Livingston, Robert R., views on boundaries, 208. 
 
 Louis XV, 14, 18. 
 
244 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [354 
 
 Louis XVI, importance of accession to the throne, 27; writes to Charles 
 III, 142. 
 
 Louisiana, 13-15, 17, 18, 20; preparations to defend, 51; threatened with 
 attack, 53 ; rebellion in, 92 ; British in, 101 ; Americans retreat into, 
 103; importance of to Spain, 131; Galvez governor of, 142. 
 
 Loyalists, British, 51. 
 
 Luzerne, Chevalier de la, minister to U. S., 129, 151 ; negotiations 
 of, regarding West, 153, 154, 157, 164, 166; opposes conquest of Can- 
 ada, 155; friendship of for Spain, 157, 167, 168, 170, 172, 175, 176; 
 opposes claims of U. S., 159, 168, 173; attacks anti-Gallicans in Con- 
 gress, 177; mentioned, 130, 133, 149, 187, 190, 195; approves conquest 
 of Northwest, 194; promises of, 205; views on boundaries of U. S., 
 205-207. 
 
 Madison, James, writes instructions to Jay, 180, 185-187; views of on 
 West, 180, 185, 186. 
 
 Manchac, 103. 
 
 Marbois, M., opposes radicals in Congress, 177, 184; attitude of on West, 
 178, 185, 187; on opinions of Madison, 180; relations with Congress, 
 182, 189; letter of, 219. 
 
 Marie Antoinette, and Vergennes, 28. 
 
 Maryland, position of on the West, 165, 181. 
 
 Maurepas, Comte de, prime minister, 27; asks for peace, 200. 
 
 "Memoire Historique et Politique sur la Louisiane," 30. 
 
 Mexican fleet, arrives in Spain, 94. 
 
 Mexico, Gulf of, 39, 68, 80, 96, 106. 
 
 Michigan, Lake, 174. 
 
 Minorca, desired by Spain, 40, 106. 
 
 Miralles, Don Juan de, negotiations with Congress, 67; seeks exclusive 
 navigation of Mississippi for Spain, 67 ; relations with Gerard, 83, 88 ; 
 opposes American policy, 108-111; Spanish instructions to, 140; nego- 
 tiations of regarding West, 153; alarmed at policy of U. S., 163; 
 mentioned, 115, 136, 139, 162, 170, 177, 181. 
 
 Mississippi River, navigation of, 60, 61, 66-68, 77, 84, 108-111, 113, 115, 116, 
 118-128, 131, 134, 135, 137-139, 141, 143-145, 148, 150-152, 157-161, 163, 170, 
 173, 175, 176, 181, 184-186, 100, 191, 195, 196, 199, 220, 225, 226; plans 
 to fortify, 44; views of Rayneval, 211 ; boundary of U. S., 95; British 
 on, 102; Spain desires, 103; American interest in, 115; control of, 
 208, 209; mentioned, 7, 121, 202, 210. 
 
 Mississippi Valley, desired by Spain, 80; question of, 213; mentioned, 
 16, 19, 45, 121, 192, 195, 198. 
 
 Mobile, 18, 51, 66, 96, 137. 
 
 Montgomery, Gen., failure in Canada, 24. 
 
 Montmorin, Comte de, French ambassador to Spain, 74, 94, 97, 105, 106, 
 133, 146, 226; asks alliance of Spain, 74; explains French policy, 81 ; 
 and Spanish negotiations with Great Britain, 142 ; and U. S., 147 ; 
 advises Jay, 195 ; and Florida Blanca, 197. 
 
355] INDEX 245 
 
 Montreal, 22; fall of, 24. 
 
 Morris, Gouverneur, and Gerard, 109, no, 112, 116; attitude regarding- 
 
 West, no; a partisan of France, 120; alienation of from France, 181. 
 Natchez, 18. 
 
 New England, and the West, 184. 
 New Englanders, 22, 62, 106. 
 Newfoundland, 62, 106. See Fisheries. t 
 
 New France, 14, 33. 
 
 New Orleans, 13, 17, 18, 87, 210; a depot for American supplies, 68. 
 New York, 98, 100; and West, 185. 
 North America, 60. 
 North Carolina, 24. 
 North ministry, downfall of, 216. 
 Northwest, and the colonial charters, 12; British traders in, 19; troops 
 
 withdrawn from, 20; British control of, 24, 25; Americans in, 113; 
 
 boundary, 121 ; British in, 191 ; importance of, 194. 
 Nova Scotia, 61, 62, 76, 83, 88, 121, 123-127. 
 Ohio County, settlement of, n, 115. 
 O'Reilly, Spanish governor of Louisiana, 15. 
 Ossun, Marquis de, French ambassador to Spain, urges Spain to prepare 
 
 for war, 40; and Florida Blanca, 54; to Vergennes, 61. 
 Oswald, Richard, negotiations with Franklin, 216; position regarding 
 
 Canada, 217; instructions of, 218; writes for new commission, 219; 
 
 agrees to treaty with U. S., 220. 
 Pacte de Famille, the, 36, 97. 
 Paris, treaty of, 9, 14. 
 
 Peace, negotiations for, 216, 217 et seq. ; treaty of, 226. 
 Pennsylvania, 25. 
 Pensacola, 51, 66, 96, 137. 
 Pollock, Oliver, at New Orleans, 68. 
 Pontleroy, French agent in U. S., 15. 
 Porto Rico, 39, 51. 
 
 Portugal, Spain desires to conquer, 43. 
 Proclamation of 1763, n, 157, 159, 160. 
 Quebec, government of, n; conquest of, 86, 88. 
 Quebec Act, n, 60, 116, 122; influence of in French opinion, 60. 
 Rayneval, M. Gerard de, Reflexions of, 31 ; desires to recover French 
 
 colonies, 33; treats with American commissioners, 77; mission to 
 
 London, 209, 210; his views on boundaries of U. S., 21 1, 212. 
 Rhode Island, 98, 100. 
 
 Rodney, Admiral, victory of in West Indies, 209. 
 Roman Catholic religion, in Quebec, 21. 
 Russia, and territorial expansion in America, 198. 
 St. Augustine, 85. 
 St. Domingo, 39, 41, 106. 
 
246 THE WEST IN THE REVOLUTION [356 
 
 St. Lawrence River, II, 84, no. 
 
 St. Louis, 13, 1 8. 
 
 Senegal, 106. 
 
 Seven Years War, /, 9, 12, 13, 91. 
 
 Shelburne, Earl of, president of board of trade, 10; fears Americans, 75; 
 interview of with Rayneval, 209, 210; demands of for peace, 210; 
 policy of, 216, 218; sends Oswald to Paris, 216; concedes terms of 
 U. S., 225; offers terms to Spain, 225. 
 
 South, party of the, 121 ; attitude of the, 167; disasters in the, 183; British 
 successes in, 190. 
 
 South Carolina, 123 ; Rutledge governor of, 167-168. 
 
 Southwest, contentions over, 152. 
 
 Spain, 15; claims the Floridas, 21, 26, 66; her policy of peace, 20, 82; 
 dispute with Portugal, 36; fears Great Britain, 37; unprepared for war, 
 39J opposes French plans, 40; fears U. S., 40, 44, 169; diplomacy of, 
 43, 167, 168; refuses to treat with Lee, 53; willing to aid Americans 
 secretly, 53, 67 ; claims Mississippi Valley, 57 ; claims exclusive navi- 
 gation of Mississippi River, 61, 167, 226; ambitions of, 65; position on 
 boundaries of U. S., 66; interests in Gulf of Mexico, 66; hatred of 
 for Great Britain, 80; and West, 90, 116, 150, 186, 191, 192; wishes to 
 recover colonies, 92; policy of, 09-101, 105-107, 117, 131, 132, 141, 149, 
 174, 179, 180, 198, 200, 203, 208, 209; opposes independence of U. S., 
 105, 130; declares war against Great Britain, 107; contention cf with 
 France; 107; alliance of sought by U. S., 119; and U. S., 128; nego- 
 tiations of with Great Britain, 142, 146; victories of on Mississippi, 
 183, 190; expedition across Illinois, 192; failure of her plans, 225; 
 accepts terms of peace, 225; demands Bahama Islands, 209; mentioned, 
 15, 108, 112, 114, 122; see Mississippi, Floridas, Florida B'lanca. 
 
 Spanish, 18, 19; mediation of, 96-98. 
 
 Stormount, Lord, British ambassador to France, suspects Vergennes of 
 aiding Americans, 71 ; expects war, 73. 
 
 Strachey, British minister for negotiations of peace, character of, 222. 
 
 Tennessee, n, 12, 113, 154. 
 
 Territories, an issue in the Revolution, 26. 
 
 Townshend, Thomas, policy of, 217; disavows treaty with U. S., 220; 
 opposes American position on the Floridas, 224. 
 
 Treaty of 1763, 7. 
 
 United States, desires West, 9; claims the Mississippi, 57; treaty of alli- 
 ance with France, 79, 108 ; opinions concerning, 82, 83 ; boundaries of, 
 83, loo, 109, 116-127, 132, 133, 135, 139, 143, 150, 157, 178, 186, 208, 
 210, 217-220; and Vergennes, 88; independence of, 96, 98, 99, 142, 
 150, 202; policy of regarding the West, 108, 112, 117, 157, 158; claims 
 to West, 113, 152, 154, 159, 190, 203; and Spain, 114, 162; and the 
 Floridas, 157; and navigation of the Mississippi, 157; and the several 
 states, 181 ; disasters of, 183; parties in, 206; and treaty of peace, 210; 
 position of, 214; boundaries of proposed by Strachey, 222; views on 
 peace, 227. 
 
-357] INDEX 247 
 
 Uti possidetis, 132-134, 156, 196, 200, 205; urged by Spain, 146, opposed 
 by France, 147. 
 
 Utrecht, treaty of, 106, 107. 
 
 Vaughan, Benjamin, sent to London by Jay, 220. 
 
 Vera Cruz, 51. 
 
 Vergennes, Charles Granier, Comte de, minister of foreign affairs, 8, 
 27; character of, 27; policy towards Great Britain, 28; favors rebellion 
 in America, 28, 33; sends Bonvouloir to America, 29; opposed to co- 
 lonial expansion of France, 29, 33, 50, 74; policy towards America, 
 32, 58, 65, 81, 148, 169, 1/2; program of, 33-36; suspects Great Britain, 33, 
 38, 39, 44, 55, 60, 96; declines use of New Orleans, 45; defends 
 French armaments, 54; suggests conquests for Spain, 56; and British 
 colonies, 56, 74; urges Spain to form alliance with U. S., 57, 140, 141, 143 ; 
 his knowledge of America, 58; opinions of on West, 60, 65, 90, 104, 
 in, 139, 151, 163, 170, 185; and navigation of Mississippi, 60, 226; 
 and U. S., 65, 134, 136, 144; desires war, 69, 70, 72; decides on war, 
 73, urges war, 75; aids Americans, 72; seeks cooperation of Spain, 
 73, 74, 82, 91-93; fears reconciliation of British and Americans, 77; 
 and Canada, 87, 88; policy of, 97-99, 105, 116, 117, 129, 130, 139, 140, 
 150, 170-172, 190, 199, 201, 202; and Spanish demands, 103, 104, 170-172; 
 offers treaty to Spain, 104; and Spain, 105, 132, 137, 169, 209; and 
 convention with Spain, 107; alarmed at American conquests, 114; 
 instructions of to Luzerne, 135, 136, 157; distrusts Spain, 137, 138; 
 and independence of U. S., 143, 146; on terms of peace, 147, 213; and 
 policy of U. S., 155, 156, 188; difficulties of, 200, 204; and boundaries, 
 201, 202, 205, 210, 212, 213; friendship of for U. S., 210, 214, 215; and 
 treaty of peace, 216, 217; advice of, 219. 
 
 Versailles, Court of, 16, 36, 52. 
 
 Virginia, 13, 24, 120, 122, 191; tobacco of, 59; interest of in West, 139, 164; 
 claims West, 152, 154; demands of, 207, 214. 
 
 Washington, George, attitude towards West, 24, 25 ; plans to attack Can- 
 ada, 23, 84-86; and attack on Canada, 87, 89, 153; receives money from 
 France, 149; plans of, 189, 190, 192. 
 
 Watauga Association, 25. 
 
 West, The, British policy towards, 10; claims of different nations to, 24, 
 26 ; in. early Revolution, 25 ; opinions regarding, 25, 60, 63, 65 ; Frank- 
 lin's opinion of, 25, 63, 84, 177 ; Vergennes's opinion of, 60, 65 ; 
 Miralles's opinion of, 84; Gerard's opinion of, 84; disputes over, 89; 
 claims regarding, 163, 168; position of, 184; question of, 199, 202, 210; 
 mentioned, 66-68, 108-111, 113-117, 120-124, 131, 139, 150, 153, 154, 
 157-159, 164-168, 173, 174, 178, 196, 226. See United States, Spain, 
 Mississippi. 
 
 West Indies, 47, 51, 69, 70. 
 
 'Willing, Capt, at New Orleans, 113. 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 
 THE STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
 Urbana 
 EDMUND J. JAMES, Ph.D., LL.D., PRESIDENT 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING DEPARTMENTS: 
 
 The Graduate School 
 
 The College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (Ancient and Modern 
 Languages and Literatures ; History, Economics and Account- 
 ancy, Political Science, Sociology; Philosophy, Psychology, 
 Education; Mathematics; Astronomy; Geology; Physics; 
 Chemistry; Botany; Zoology; Entomology; Physiology; Art 
 and Design; Ceramics) 
 
 The College of Engineering (Architecture; Architectural, Civil, 
 Electrical, Mechanical, Mining, Municipal and Sanitary, and 
 Railway Engineering) 
 
 The College of Agriculture (Agronomy; Animal Husbandry; Dairy 
 Husbandry; Horticulture and Landscape Gardening; Veteri- 
 nary Science; Agricultural Extension; Teachers' Course; 
 Household Science) 
 
 The College of Law (Three years' course) 
 The School of Education 
 
 The Courses in Business (General Business; Banking; Account- 
 ancy; Railway Administration; Insurance) 
 The Course in Journalism 
 
 The Courses in Chemistry and Chemical Engineering 
 The Courses in Ceramics and Ceramic Engineering 
 The School of Railway Engineering and Administration 
 The School of Music (Voice, Piano, Violin ; four years' course) 
 The School of Library Science (two years' course) 
 The College of Medicine (in Chicago) 
 The College of Dentistry (in Chicago) 
 
 The School of Pharmacy (in Chicago; Ph.G. and Ph.C courses) 
 The Summer Session (eight weeks) 
 
 Experiment Stations : U. S. Agricultural Experiment Station ; En- 
 gineering Experiment Station; State Laboratory of Natural 
 History; State Entomologist's Office; Biological Experiment 
 Station on Illinois River; State Water Survey; State Geolog- 
 ical Survey; Mine Rescue Station 
 
 The library collections contain (December I, 1913) 286,000 volumes, 
 including the library of the State Laboratory, of Natural His- 
 tory, the Quine Medical Library, and the library of the School 
 of Pharmacy. 
 For catalogs and information address 
 
 THE REGISTRAR 
 
 Urbana, Illinois 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 
 Following is a partial list of the publications issued at the Univer 
 I. The University Studies. A series of monographs on miscellaneous 
 subjects issued five or six times a year. Volume I contains ten numbers, 
 
 '.mie II, 5 volume III, 624 pages. 
 
 ;ty of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences is a special group 
 of studies in this general series. A series of monographs in Ir 
 econ. -sued quarterly. Th: 
 
 per year. 
 
 1 he Jou it/lish am v Philology, published quar- 
 
 terly. Three dollars per year. 
 
 3. The Bulletin . Experir .-port 
 
 of th rk in the Engineering Experiment Sta- 
 
 he bulletin, of the Agricultural Experiment Si,: 
 
 5. The Bulletin .Moratory of \utnral i 
 
 6. The Bulletin of the State Geol(>: 
 
 / the Sti:- 
 8. Report of Entomologist. 
 
 -y, including the I .log, and the 
 
 circulars of the undergraduat' the Graduate School, the Colleges 
 
 of Law a; :ne, the Schools of Dentistry, Pharmacy, Education, 
 
 the C< \dministr ' and the Sum- 
 
 ion. 
 
 10. The Bulletin of the Illinois Association of Teachers of E;; 
 
 11. The Bulletin of the School of Edm\: 
 
c 
 
 ^ 
 
 C c < 
 
 < t: ( < 
 <rrc - , c V 
 
 c < c: c c~ 
 
 c 
 
 c <r cc 
 
 <r 
 
 
 S' c 
 
 <: ' c 
 
 C' ( 
 
 <i c 
 
 r c c 
 
 1 c < *C 
 
 / c' * 
 
 VV ^ ' 
 
 < 
 
 C^_ <J. 
 
 </<^ 
 
 c <r cr 
 
 r c 
 
 
 . 
 
 <^ <- c 
 c 
 
 cc c 
 
 <' f 
 
 r -- ; 
 
 < <c 
 
 c c C 
 
 C C 
 
 C C 
 
 c < 
 
 c c 
 
 < < 
 c 
 
 < < ( 
 
 *j,-< < 
 
 <: c c 
 
 <: < c 
 
 C 1 f 
 
 * 
 
 f < 
 
 / 
 
 < <C 
 
 C c 
 C C 
 
 -5 ' ' 
 < f. ' cc 
 
 < <* < CC 
 
 d" < < - 
 d> ^ cc 
 
 s. . 
 
 " c ' < 
 <T ' 
 
 <c 
 
 
 
 ( 
 Cc C 
 
 c 
 
 < 
 
 <t ^ 
 
 
 
 r ( 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 ' <" 
 
 , 
 c- c 
 
 < 
 
 C C 
 
 c7 c <: < 
 
 C <: <T < 
 
 c C d 
 
 Cc C <1 <^ 
 
 ' 
 
 o c : < c 
 c c 
 
 r c L 
 
 < r <: c c 
 
 f d < c 
 
 c c C.. < 
 
 C C " 
 
 c 
 
 c c C 
 
 <: 
 
 . 
 
 I 
 
 c C Cx^ 
 
 C C 
 c <^ ^d 
 
 < < 
 
 ' -c 
 
 Vc -d- 
 
 c< C 
 
 <?.<.-: jc 
 <c <- -<T 
 
 < <: < 
 
 c C <- 
 
 <r C! 
 < < <iCl 
 < 
 
 i 
 
:> 
 > 
 
 
 
 > '>> 
 >> 
 
 > > 
 >3> > 
 
 > > 
 
 > 
 ' > 
 
 > > 
 
 J> .> 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 > 
 
 > 
 
 ' 
 
 ,\ ; *^ ' 
 , \ ^ > 
 
 ^ v> ^ 
 
 > ) 
 
 ' > i 
 
 ^- 
 
 9 
 
 > > 
 
 > > 
 
 > > 
 
 > > 
 
 > o 
 
 " "5" 
 fe 
 
 ^> 
 
 > * 
 > 
 
 > I 
 
 > > 
 - > 
 
 ' > 
 > ) 
 
 v>o 
 
 > > 
 
 > o 
 
 >J 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 > ' 
 
 > 
 
 > s 
 
 > > 
 
 > -> 
 
 > 0> 
 
 J > 
 * > 
 } :> 
 
 > 
 > 
 
 > > 
 
 "> > 
 
 .. 
 > 
 
 , > 
 
 > :> 
 
 >' 
 
 i 
 > 
 
 > > 
 * *>