THREE SCOTCH RHETORICIANS OF THE 
 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
 KAMES, CAMPBELL, AND BLAIR 
 
 By 
 
 GORDON RANDOLPH CRECRAFT 
 
 A. B. Miami University, 1918 
 
 THESIS 
 
 SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
 FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN ENGLISH 
 IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 1922 
 
 URBANA, ILLINOIS 
 

 \°J L \* ** 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF COUTE1JTS . 
 
 Pages. 
 
 Chapter I. The Revival of Letters in 
 
 Eighteenth-Century Scotland ------ 1 - 12 
 
 Cliapter II. Karnes and his Element s of 
 
 Criticism . -------------- IS- 4 3 
 
 Chapter III. Blair and his Lectures ------ — 44-68 
 
 Chapter IV. Campbell and his Phi lose \A-~j 
 
 of Rhetoric . ------------- 69-87 
 
 Chapter V. Recapitulation and Interpretation.- - - 88-95 
 
 Bibliography --------------------94-95 
 
THE REVIVAL OE LETTERS III El GHTEEITTH- 
 CEiTTURY SCOTLAND . 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 In this year, 1754, I remember nothing remarkable in 
 the General Assembly. But this w as the year in 'which the Select 
 Society was established, which improved and gave a name to the 
 literati of this country, then beginning to distinguish them- 
 selves. (1) 
 
 oo states the Reverend Dr. Alexander Carlyle in his 
 Autobiography. The italics of the word literati are Dr. Carlyle T s 
 own; but they must do double duty and serve as mine, also, for 
 it is toward this word literati that I wish to direct attention. 
 
 The place is Edinburgh, Scotland. The time, the 
 middle of the eighteenth century. The dramatis personae are self- 
 confessed literati . Eor some hundreds of years past, Scotland has 
 had her men of literature, law, and divinity, but the app earance 
 of this new species, these literary cognoscenti, ’’then beginning 
 to distinguish themselves”, is a new phenomenon, inviting scrutiny, 
 ’.'/hence came they? Who are they? bhy do they appear now, and not 
 until now? A survey of Scottish literature up to this point would 
 scarcely lead us to anticipate their advent. As Hr. Gregory Smith 
 expresses it: 
 
 The Scottish Muse lias been charged with three serious 
 breaches of "decorum", each serious enough to damn her higher hopes 
 
 (1) Ed. I860, r. 296. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2015 
 
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 of Parnassus. She has been called provincial, by which is ne ant 
 no mere contrast with English or other standards, but a certain 
 frumpishness or village -habit that goes badly with her national 
 pretence. It has been said of her that often in taste and lan- 
 guage she shows an unblushing defiance of the graces and propriet- 
 ies. She has been blamed for being tediously reminiscent of 
 family matters and neighbor- folk, of living' too much in the 
 past and in her own past. Briefly, the indictment is that she is 
 provincial (even parochial), rough mannered, and antiquarian. (1) 
 
 How certainly these are no qualities from which we 
 might expect the formation of a Select Society of literati . Yet 
 "Jupiter” Carlyle was not claiming for himself and his contempora- 
 ries of Edinburgh a title refused to them by the rest of the re- 
 public of letters. The mid-eighteenth century found the literary 
 reputation of Edinburgh decidedly ” loo king- up " . And although 
 the capital of Scotland took unto herself and appropriated to 
 her own glory most of the talent and genius of her dominions, yet 
 11 Scotland shared to an extent in the revival of letters. Glasgow 
 and Aberdeen aspired in their own right to honorable mention among 
 the centers of culture; and if Edinburgh boasted of her Robertson, 
 her Smith, and her Hume, Glasgow pointed with pride to her Si ms on, 
 (2), her Leechman, (S), and -- greater than either of these -- her 
 Hutcheson, "whose fame" as Carlyle tells us, "had filled the Col- 
 lege with students of philosophy." (4) As for Aberdeen, she had, 
 among others, her Principal George Campbell, whose Philosophy 
 
 (l) Scottish literature, Character and Influence, 1919. 
 
 { - ) Robert Sims on. Professor of Mathematics at Glasgow, Vide 
 Carlyle’s Autobiography . 
 
 (5) William Leechman, Professor of Divinity at Glasgow, and after- 
 wards head of the University. 
 
 (4) Aut ob i ogr a phy , p. 82. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
standard 
 
 of Rhetoric has lasted almost down to our own times as a 
 text, and has been called "by far the most valuable contribution 
 to criticism which came from Scotland during the century"; (l) 
 though of that, more later. 
 
 But — to return to our original question -- whence 
 came this new breed of cognoscenti? The answer is that Scotland 
 (inveterate borrower that she has always been!) has been again to 
 London -- and for the third time. On her first visit in the 
 person of the first Janes she borrowed ban Chaucer, and from her 
 delighted disciple ship to this master there cane the Golden Age of 
 Scottish Poetry. Later, when this impulse had died out and the 
 Scottish Muse strove mightily, yet f all her striving attained 
 but feeble expression, there came a new breath of life from the 
 south; and Scottish bards tunned Elizabethan court poets, tile 
 Scottish prose gave ground end melted before the Anglicani zing 
 influence from within and without. 
 
 How for the third time Scotland has been to London; 
 and this time she has returned home "Augustan" . She has brought 
 bad: with her. Pope, Addison, an! Swift ; she lias breathed- in the 
 atmosphere of the eighteenth century, and has carried home the 
 passion for explaining things; yea, more, she might have made a 
 clean sweep of it and carried off Dr. Samuel Johnson, himself, 
 
 ( 1 ) J. H. Millar, .1 Literary History of Scotland , 1901, p.S58. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4- 
 
 we are, of course, still ini nr our metaphor — had not that 
 
 worthy proved so erratic and. unceremonious in his dealings with Scots, 
 that some were cowed into mingled respect and fear, while others 
 were goaded into saying with Lord Monboddo that he was "neither a 
 scholar nor a man of taste." (l) Yet for all this, Samuel did 
 patch up a truce with the Scots, and after a time, possibly grown 
 curious about the spread of classicism among them, lumbered off to 
 Edinburgh to see abo ut it. 
 
 The Union of the British and Scottish Parliaments (1707) 
 marks the beginning of the peaceful invasion of England by Scottish 
 adventurers. Professional and business men, unable to find adequate 
 opportunities for their abilities at home, , armed down upon London 
 and competed with the Englishman in his own fields. Lawyers, 
 doctors, men of letters, publishers, — there was scarcely an oc- 
 cupation which escaped invasion. Add to this the fact that Scots 
 in increasing numbers began attending English schools and universities 
 (£) and it will be apparent that the union of the two countries 
 could not long remain a union in government only. The Scot was 
 eager, proud, assertive; but he was also awed. It his pro- 
 
 vincialism keenly, and partly as a matter of pride, partly as a 
 
 (1) James Burnett, Lore Monboddo, C r 1 B 7 a , 
 
 1789, g f p. 271. 
 
 (E) Erancis Jeffery and Adam Smith, among others. Hume advised tint 
 
 his nephews should be sent to Eton, chiefly to 
 avoid the risks of contracting Boots accent. 
 
-o- 
 
 matter of policy, lie 
 there was no question 
 As might he 
 lead in this national 
 
 set about he 
 of England's 
 expected, the 
 determination 
 
 task of becoming English, since 
 becoming Scottish. 
 
 Scottish Universities tools the 
 to be as English as the Engl is 
 
 h 
 
 Says Professor Millar in his Scottish Prose of the seventeenth mx 
 eighteenth centuries : 
 
 mother phenomenon in the Scottish aufkl&rung, if the 
 dantic expression may be pardoned, is the emerging of out 
 U niversities from a condition of comparative obscurity into 
 the full blaze of European celebrity. A condition precedent 
 of this fortunate transition was the establishment of the 
 professorial monopoly which in the following century was to be 
 so fiercely attached. It was the same alihe in Arts and sciences. 
 The chairs were filled by first-rate men whose lectures, it 
 was a, pleasure to listen to, and who exerted an influence which 
 extended far beyond their respective classrooms. 
 
 But, he adds, the movement was by no means confined to the uni- 
 versities : 
 
 The awakening of the Universities, too, was but one 
 manifestation of the general, revival of intellectual interest 
 among the educated classes. It is difficult for us to under- 
 stand the enthusiasm with which grown-up men flung themselves 
 into the struggle for knowledge, and debated in quasi- social 
 gatherings vexed questions of philosophy and metaphysics. 
 
 Eor was the zeal for improvement confined to merely spequ. - 
 lative matters. Art, manufactures, and agriculture partook 
 handsomely of the benefits which the mental activity of the age 
 brought in its train, lien of considerable powers and marked 
 aptitude for academic discussion devoted their leisure to 
 planting trees, and to making two blades of corn grow where 
 only one had brown before. fl) 
 
 (1) pp. 176 - 177 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- ci- 
 
 In this general revival of letters, arts , and sciences, 
 the most important point for consideration here, is the complete 
 abandonment of the Scottish dialect as the language of the learned, 
 and the substitution of -English. Through a determination to write 
 and speak nothing but the King*s English, these Scottish li ter at i 
 were led to an unceasing study of the "best English models.' 1 Hot 
 satisfied with this alone, they felt impelled to try their hands 
 at reformulating the critical canons thus obtained, and out of 
 these efforts came, among others, the three works which are treat- 
 ed at some length in succeeding chapters of this paper. The 
 efforts of Karnes, flair and Campbell (l) have been selected for 
 this special treatment, not because they are more typical of 
 this movement, but because they are the most ambitious and formal 
 attempts to treat fully of rhetoric and criticism. Furthermore, 
 there is apparent in these three a direct kinship. To what 
 Karnes laid down as the e lenient s of criticism, Blair and Campbell 
 acquiesced; £ind although the int nts and purposes of the two 
 latter are certainly divergent, they owe a common debt to the 
 Elements of Critic ism (2), in which, it is scarcely too much to 
 say, they have their origin. 
 
 (1) Henry Home, Lord Karnes, 1696 - 1782; Life by A. Eraser Tytle i 
 2 vols . 1807. Hugh Blair, minister of High Church and first pro- 
 fessor of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres, University of Edinburgh, 
 1718 - 1800; Life by John Hill', IS'-A ; also Life by Einlayson, 
 appended to 31a i r 1 s S e rrn ons , London, 1801, vol. b. George Camp- 
 bell, Principal of Uarischal College, Aberdeen, 1719 - 1796. 
 
 Life in L ic ti onary of Rational Biography . 
 
 (2) 1762, Henr 77 Home. Lor/ If^e s . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7- 
 
 Postponing for a time oar consideration of these three, 
 let us note the activities of some of their contemporaries. 
 
 The first thing which strikes the student is the intense eager- 
 ness of all professions to acquaint themselves and their brethren 
 with the principles of English composition and criticism. Lawyers, 
 philosophers, historians, political-economists, preachers, and 
 printers -- all try their hands at it. D a vid Hume displaying 
 his philosophic acuteness and his erudition at one and the same 
 time, composed an Essay on Tragedy . Lor his own benefit and that 
 of his friends he compiled a list of Scotticisms to be carefully 
 avoided. (1) Adam Smith (remembered for his Wealth of ITati ons ) 
 as early as 1746 gave a course of lectures in Edinburgh upon 
 English Literature; a private speculation of his own which met 
 with a large measure of success. A paper on Johnson T s Dictionary 
 in the ill-fated Edinburgh Review of 1755 (2) is further indica- 
 tive of his interest in the English language, and bits of his 
 literary criticism found their way into his Theory of Moral 
 Sentiments (1759) (5). James Beattie, author of The Minstrel 
 and usually associated with Reid and Oswald in the "Common S e nse" 
 school of philosophers, is responsible for an anonymous little 
 volume, published in 1787, on Scotticisms . arranged in alpha — 
 
 ( lT Vide Hume, Philosophical Works, ed Green and Grose, 1875, 4 p. 
 
 461 . 
 
 (2) But two numbers appeared. 
 
 (Z) Wordsworth planes him with Hume as a critic, and summarily 
 disposes of the claims of both. V id e , Wo r d swo r t h T s Literary 
 Cri t ici srn , ed. H. 0. Smith, London, 1905, p 178, Ho te 2. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 8 - 
 
 betical order , designed to correct improorieti es of speech and 
 writ ina . ( 1 ) 
 
 Nor are the literati content with the mere conquest of 
 English prose. Not only will they write histories, law-books, 
 philosopies, and rhetorics, hut to the great perturbation of some 
 of their own number they will write plays, and worse still, will 
 produce them at Edinburgh. There are few more amusing incidents 
 of this period than the furor that beset the church party when 
 John Home’s Douglas was acted ih the old Scottish capital. ,T Jupiter 
 Carlyle relates the matter with great gusto, and it is clear that 
 he extracted much enjoyment from the ludicrous discomfort of some 
 of his "belletristic” friends who scrupled not to treat "elegantly" 
 of the drama in criticism, but dared not show their faces within 
 a theatre. (2) 
 
 There is great temptation to linger over the many ac- 
 counts of the lives and doings of the polished society of old 
 Edinburgh. No period in any literature has been better served 
 
 (1) J. H. Millar, Literary History of Scotland , p 519. 
 
 (2) Autobiography , p 525; "Lrs. Hobertson andBlair, though they 
 both visited this great actress (Mrs. Siddons) in private, often 
 regretted to me that they had not seized the opportunity which 
 was given them, by her superior talents and unexceptionable 
 character, of going openly to the theatre, which would have put 
 an end to all future animadversions on the subject. This condrnt 
 of theirs was keeping the reserve of their own imaginary irnporr— 
 
 "fence to the last; and their regretting it was very just, for by 
 that time they got no credit for their abstinence, and the 
 struggle between the liberal and the restrained and affected man- 
 ners of the clergy had been long at an end, by my having finally 
 stood my ground, and been well supported by so great a majority 
 in the Church.” 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-9- 
 
 by its annalists. (l) 
 
 But enough lias been said to prepare us for consideration 
 of our subject proper; the formal treatment of rhetoric and 
 1 it e r a ry criticis m in the \ /or k s o f Karne s , .3lai r and Campb el 1 . ( 2 ) 
 
 The history of Bhetoric from Aristotle to the eighteenth 
 century is a record of interpretations, re- interpretations , mut- 
 ilations, subversions -- and sometimes, in the Aristotelian sense 
 of the term (B) -- almost anihiliation. Briefly, the tendency 
 has been to divorce composition from what Aristotle had held to be 
 
 (1) Besides Carlyle’s Autobi ograpliy there are the I.lemoirs of Hume, 
 
 Beid, Robertson, and Dug ild - art . Th Tytler* emoirs 
 
 of Kames and Herr’s Memoirs o f Karnes ’ s printer, Mr. William Smellie, 
 etc . 
 
 (2) Some mention should be made of James Burnett, lord Monboddo 
 (1714-1790). A man of deep and extensive learning, with pro- 
 round acquaintance with, the classics and metaphysics, he was 
 nevertheless so eccentric in his likes and dislikes, and so un- 
 compromising’ in devotion to certain pet theories, that he was 
 seldom taken seriously by his own contemporaries. His Origin 
 and Progress o f Language , 6 volumes, appeared in 1789. The 
 primary idea of this work was that, for all philosophic truth, 
 
 we must go back to Plato and Aristotle. It opens with an accou t 
 of the origin of Ideas (according to Plato and Aristotle) next 
 of the origin of Human Society, and next of language, language, 
 it is maintained, is a human invention; man was originally an 
 animal without speech or reason or affection. Orang-outangs are 
 asserted to be not specially distinct from men, and on the author- 
 ity of the traveller's tales, Monboddo vouches for the existence, 
 in Ms day, of men with tails; he insists that all the higher 
 attainments of the human race were the mere results of long ex- 
 perience, continuous struggle, and artifice. After his history 
 of the ’’rise and progress” of languages in general and critical 
 comparisons of various languages, he devotes his sixth volume 
 to the subject of rhetoric. The work was intended to rival the 
 Elements o f Criticism , by Karnes, but it goes a great deal farther; 
 there is a curious anticipation of the Darwinian theory of evolu- 
 tion. This last idea of man monkeys seems to have shocked his _ con- 
 temporaries more than any one other eccentricity of His lordship. 
 

- 10 - 
 
 the soul of Rhetoric , its speculative and philosophic character. 
 
 The art of thinking was forgotten in the art of sp eaking. Rhetor- 
 ical devices, tropes, figures, mere ornaments of style, received 
 undue attention; were standardized, in fact. Every one who has 
 written upon the subject has quoted Hud i bras (l) upon the value 
 of such practice. Sir Thomas Wilson's .'art o f Rhetoric (1552) af- 
 fords instance of this mechanical scheme for avoiding the fatigue 
 of thinking; he advocates "a gorgeous beautifying of the tongue 
 with borrowed words and change of sentence.” Figures, he tells 
 us, should not be "equally sparioled about the whole oration, but 
 so dissevered and parted as stars stand in the firmament, or 
 flowers in a garden, or pretty devised antiques in a cloth of 
 Arras . " 
 
 This preoccupation with diction lasted in England well 
 up to the eighteenth century. It was not to be expected, then, 
 that o c otland should wholly escape it, and for the further reason 
 that we have seen how anxious was all Scotland concerning correct 
 English diction. Happily, however, another consideration operated 
 to prevent undue extravagances in this direction, at least upon 
 the part of those who laid down the rules for their brethren . 
 
 (1) Canto I. part I., 11 89 - 90; — "For all a rhetoricians rules 
 
 Teach nothing but to name his tools". 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 11 - 
 
 Emphasize diction most of them did, hut after the manner of phil- 
 osophers. The taste for metaphysics and philosophy seems to he the 
 3cot3 T heritage; and partly because the task was so thoroughly 
 enjoyable to them, partly because they recognized its true v; lue , 
 they set about grounding their canons of criticism upon"true 
 principles of taste." Philosophy, so long divorced from 
 Rhetoric, was re- wedded to it. Hot that the two always enjoyed 
 the happiest wedlock. Sometimes (as has been asserted in the 
 case of Karnes ( 1 ) ) Philosophy seemed to assert claims to the great- 
 er half of the partnership. -But on the whole the re- 
 sult was desirable. 
 
 But from another danger which has beset the art of Rhet- 
 oric from its later infancy, these B 0 otch Rhetoricians were not 
 so successful in saving it. Rhetoric was not considered by its 
 founder, nor should it be considered by anyone, as being iden - 
 tieal with literary appreciation . Aristotle wrote upon the art of 
 Poetry as well as upon the art of Rhetor ic . Of this distinction 
 
 (1) Professor Saintsbury, History of Briticism 2. p 465; -- "Of 
 course this excellent Boots lawyer and ingenious ’Scotch meta- 
 physician 1 had strong precedents to urge for making a muddle 
 of Moral Philosophy and Literary Briticism, it has been pointed 
 out that Aristotle is not a little exposed to the same imputa- 
 tion." 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 > 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 12 - 
 
 I shall have frequent occasion to remind the reader hereafter. 
 Sufficient for the moment to remark that of the three men treated 
 in succeed:' , a hell alone seems to have this c ' bine-' 
 
 tion clearly in mind, (l) Sanies, indeed makes no pretense to 
 treating formally or singly of the art of rhetoric ; the nature 
 of his task, as we shall see, led him naturally to a considera- 
 tion of literature as a fine art. But in -Blair T s lectures upon 
 his profession subject. Belles - lettres quite overshadow Rhetor i c 
 and the Aristotelian Art is as effectually swallowed up by 
 literary appreciation, as the most ardent disciple of the latter 
 c ould wi sh . 
 
 
 (1) Bor which, along with general praise for Ms other excellen - 
 cies,he receives mild blame from Professor Saintsbury. As I 
 shall refer constantly to Professor Saintsbury, it may well be 
 stated "in the deep calm of a footnote" that in the opinion of 
 the present writer, the Professor's criticisms are often vitia - 
 ted to a certain extent, by his determination to bring about an 
 exact coincidence between literary appreciati on and rhetoric . 
 
 It may be all very well for a man to dislike and distrust the 
 speculative and philosophical character of the art of Rhetoric 
 but that is a matter of opinion. Certainly his opinion should 
 not blirn him to the fact, 1 t, if in i totle there appears 
 a union of literary and philosophic material, Aristotle was 
 probably aware of it, and intended it so. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
miES AND HIS ELEMENTS OE CRITICISM. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Among the li terat i of the eighteenth- cent "ary 
 Edinburgh, we scarce may find a more interesting and striking 
 figure than that of Henry Home, Lord Kanes. (1) The limits pre- 
 scribed for this discussion will restrict consideration of his 
 work in great measure to his place in the history of rhetoric 
 and literary criticism. Yet in so doing, we must add that we 
 are considering but one side of a many-sided man; nor is this 
 statement, in spite of its apparent triteness, unnecessary. It 
 is precisely because Karnes, more than most of his contemporaries, 
 was so many-sided, that his rhetorical and critical speculations 
 acquire special interest. Lawyer, moral philosopher, historian, 
 experimental and practical agriculturalist, he could not write 
 upon the subject of criticism, or indeed upon any other subject, 
 without bringing to his work something from each of his many 
 characters. H, as has been said, "he occupied eveiy department 
 of human thought for his province," (£) we should be greatly 
 
 ( 1 ) Memoirs , by Alexander Eraser Tytler, 2 vols. 1807. 
 
 ( 2 ) Scottish Prose of the seventeenth and e ighteenth 
 
 Centuries, by J. H. Millar, 1912. 
 
-14- 
 
 surprised if his omnisc ience were not a basis for his critical 
 opinions. 
 
 Henry Home was born at Karnes, in the county of 
 Berwick, in 1696. Descended from a family whose name had been 
 highly honorable in the history of Scotland, and whose estate 
 had once been considerable, he found little to inherit from his 
 fat lie r , George Home, except the family name. This gentleman, 
 a country magistrate, had never attended University, nor had he 
 been educated for any profession. Little wonder, then, consider- 
 ing the state of higher learning in the country at that time, 
 that George Home saw no necessity for burdening himself with his 
 son's education, further than to engage for him a private 
 tutor, and when this course of training was completed, to ap- 
 prentice him in 1712 to a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh. 
 
 This training was to have prepared young Home for the 
 profession of a writer, or solicitor, before the Supreme G 0 urt, 
 but his ambitions grew as he realized how much more affluence 
 and honor might be his if he were to become a successful advocate . 
 Immediately he turned his attention to acquiring the equivalent 
 of a University education. His Latin and Greek studies, begun 
 under his former tutor, .V ingate, were resumed. Independently of 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 » 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-15- 
 
 any tutor, he applied himself to French, Italiaa , Mathematics, 
 natural Philosophy, Logic, ethics, and Metaphysics. He labored 
 to good purpose, and in 1724 was admitted to the bar. 
 
 But admittance to the -Bar was not an earnest of 
 success. There is a dry humor in Tytler’s statement (l) that 
 "in the first years of Mr. Home T s attendance at the bar, he 
 found abundant leisure to store his mind with miscellaneous 
 learning, as well as to increase his knowledge of law." It v/as 
 not until Home had brought himself into some prominence by the 
 publication of a folio volume of the Benia r liable Decisions o f the 
 Court of Session , (1728), "that" — to quote again from Tytler 
 (2) -- "we find him enjoying' even a moderate share o f practice 
 as a barrister." The reasons assigned for this initial failure 
 will prove of interest when we cone to consider his Elements of 
 Criticism . They will be spoken of in that connection. 
 
 Success, if slow in coming, did finally arrive. 
 
 The publication in 1752 of a volume of Assays upon law, seems to 
 have lifted him into the ranks of the foremost advocates of the 
 time. With the professional prominence thus achieved, came 
 
 (1) Memoirs . p 60. 
 
 (2) Memoi rs . p 65. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-16- 
 
 social recognition. It was the fashion of the gay young men of 
 the time to seek out and attach themselves socially to those 
 men who had achieved distinction in science and philosophy. Such 
 a circle formed around Karnes. (l) Their names mean little to the 
 casual reader of today, yet they represent the fashionable and 
 literary elite of the time, — the- precursors of those sturdier 
 figures which were to he associated with Karnes in the latter half 
 of his life. The Select Society was not formed, it mil he re- 
 membered, until the year 1754, and Karnes was a man in the prime 
 of life when such men as Blair, Robertson, and Hume were but be- 
 ginning their careers. 
 
 Meanwhile, he met Hume. Tytler gives 1757 as the 
 probable date. It was in the latter half of this year that • 
 
 Hume went to London for the first time to secure the publication 
 
 (1) Tytler mentions (pp. 84-85) "Colonel Forrester, author of a 
 valuable little tract entitled, -he Polite Philosopher . and of 
 whom Dr. Johnson emphatically said, 
 
 *He was himself -‘he Great Polite he drew! T 
 Lord Binning, who wrote some of the mo: t tender and eloquent of the 
 Scottish songs; Hamilton of Languor, whose poetical merits have 
 deservedly assigned him to a place among the British Classics; and 
 the Club of ..'its who frequented Balfour 1 s Coffeehouse ,( the : 
 of Will’s or Button’s) in the early part of the eighteenth century. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
 of his Treatise on Human Nature , the principal doctrines o: wl ich 
 were to receive further elaboration in his Philosophical Essays . 
 The importance of the accua intanceship thus eel, and of Karnes’s 
 
 subsequent study and animadversion upon these doctrines of 
 Hume’s, cannot be overestimated when we- come to our consideration 
 of the Elements of ^ritl cism . Por it was upon the doctrines which 
 he maintained in direct opposition to Hume, that Karnes based not 
 only his philosophy of life, but his philosophy of literature 
 and literary criticism. The two chief points of dispute may be • 
 stated here. 
 
 To the theory of Hume, that Utility is the chief 
 foundation of morals, Karnes objected. He contended that Hume had 
 fallen into that error common to most philosophers: the error of 
 
 attempting to simplify the objects of their research, by advanc- 
 one or two general laws, to which they endeavor to reduce 
 all phenomena of our moral nature. Karnes insists that man is 
 a complicated being, motivated by innumerable passions and 
 emotions, and influenced not by any one of them alone, but by all 
 of them working in co-operation or in restraint of each other. 
 
 The many springs of emotion and passion thus insisted upon here in 
 a professedly moral treatise, we shall find recurring in the 
 Elements, as the basis not alone of morals, but of taste. To thus 
 
 * 
 
-le- 
 
 as signing a common origin to morals and taste, Professor Saints bury 
 takes great exception in his Hi story of Cyiti cism . It is not my 
 present purpose to defend either of the two great views as to ah at 
 shall constitute the province of criticism. It is here noted, 
 merely, that the critical theories of Karnes are founded upon those 
 same principles from which arose his theory of morals; of this 
 more vail be said 3a ter. 
 
 The second great point of dispute between Karnes 
 and Hume was the doctrine of the latter which questions the 
 reality of the connection between cause and effect. The alarm of 
 Karnes here was occasioned by the fact that this doctrine tended 
 to invalidate every argument to be dram from a study of 
 natural religion, for the existence of God. He attacked it 
 upon these grounds. Admitting that the connection of cause and 
 effect CcJinot be demonstrated by reason, he insists, nevertheless, 
 that we are assured of its reality by an inner conviction, an 
 innate principle, whose authority is final. -he insistence of 
 Karnes upon the reality of certain inborn principles of man iiich 
 must be regarded as final causes for his thoughts and actions, is 
 here proclaimed in the service of moral philosophy. It is later to 
 
-19- 
 
 be insisted upon with no less vigor in the Elements , as the 
 ultimate basis of taste in the fine arts. 
 
 The remainder of ICames's life will be sketched 
 hurriedly. He was married, in 1741, to Miss Agatha Drummond of 
 Blair-Drummond . In 175 2 he was elevated to the bench; he re- 
 tained his seat and discharged his duties up until a few days 
 before his death in 1782. The formation of the Select Society 
 in 1754 (1), brought him into closer touch with those men of 
 eminence who had grownup around him in his middle life, and it 
 is tempting to linger over an account of this unusual club in 
 which were assembled the wit and wisdom of the old Scottish 
 capital. Karnes was a charter member of this "insti tuti on, intend- 
 ed partly for philosophical inquiry, and partly for the improve- 
 ment of the members in public spesking," and he contributed greatly 
 to those "debates, where the dignity of the speakers was not 
 lowered by the intrigues of policy, or the intemperance of 
 faction; and where the most splendid talents that have ever 
 adorned this country were roused to their best exertions, by the 
 liberal and ennobling discussions of literature and philosophy. "( 2 ) 
 
 (1) Hull account of the formation of this society is given in a 
 note written by hr. Alexander c a rlyle, and preserved by hugald 
 Stewart as the first of the ITotes and Illustrations appended to 
 Stewart's Life of Kobertson; in -L'he collected Works of lupald Stewart 
 
 TTSbhT voI.lO, ‘ 
 
 (2) Stewart's Life of Robertson. Collected dorks, 10, p 110. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
 But this must pass with mere mention; as must likewise the famous 
 Poker Club of 1762, with which Karnes was heartily in sympathy, but 
 which the consideration of his office and station prevented his 
 joining. 
 
 It would be delightful to dwell upon his association 
 with such men as Blair, for whom he secured appointment as lecturer 
 on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres at the University of Edinburgh; 
 
 David Hume, with vhom he remained on terms of intimacy in the midst 
 of their philosophic bickerings; our own Benjamin lklin, with 
 whom he became acquainted in the autumn of 1759 upon the occasion 
 of Eranklin’s visit to Scotland, and with whom he corresponded 
 later concerning the Elements of Grit ici sm . 17 or i s it amiss to 
 mention his friendship for his own printer, Mr. William Smellie, 
 to whose volunteered criticism of the Elements, he made grateful 
 reply , and with whom he corresponded from time to time on terms 
 of mutual esteem. (l) 
 
 : = bters, however, interesting as they may be, 
 must keep us no longer from our consideration of Karnes’s critical 
 work. The Elements of Criticism appeared in 1762. It purposes to 
 be far more than a work upon mere rhetoric , or even upon the belles- 
 lettres , The entire province of the fine arts is to be examined 
 
 (1) V id e Lmoirs of the Life . ■•ri tings . and G o r r e s no nd e nc e o f 
 William EmeTTTe. by Robert Kerr. Edinburgh. 1611 . 2 vols . 1. p.545 
 
 if. 
 
- 21 - 
 
 with purpose "to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, 
 as well as those that are naturally disagreeable; and by these 
 means to discover, if we can, what are the genuine principles of 
 the fine arts." (1) Truly an ambitious undertaking, and one in 
 
 which the author, in spite of his "omniscience” and his usual 
 
 * 
 
 dogmatic utterance, seems to have had some misgivings; for he adds 
 the following as a note to his Introduction: 
 
 The Elements of G ri ti c i sm , meaning the whole , 
 is a title too assuming- for this work. A number of these 
 principles or elements are here unfolded: but as the 
 author is far from imagining that he 1ms completed the 
 list, a mo re humb le title is p ro pe r , s ue h a s may e xpr ess 
 any number of parts less than the whole. This he thinks 
 is signified by the title he lias chosen, vis. Element s of 
 Grit i ci sm . 
 
 In the Elements . as Tytler notes, Karnes is entering 
 upon a field of research. Other authors, from Aristotle down, 
 had made some attempt to list those passions and. emotions to which 
 the artist might profitably appeal. Karnes purposes to go farther. 
 By a study of man T s nature, he hopes to arrive at those basic 
 principles which must be taken as the ultimate caus.es for his 
 emotional reactions. In other words, psychology is to be brought 
 into the service of criticism. Rhetoric, if understood in the 
 Aristotelian sense of the art of public ress, we shall not find. 
 Karnes, himself, /as not eloquent in the sense in which that word 
 
 (1) lements . v 1, p 6, sixth edition, Edinburgh, 1785 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
 v;as used by the rhetoricians of the Universities. We have hinted 
 before that the reasons assigned by Tytler for his initial failure 
 as a barrister would have special importance in our consideration 
 of his theory of composition. Ty^tler says: 
 
 His first appearance may have given evidence of 
 his talents as an ingenious reasoner; but as he never pos- 
 sessed those shining powers of oratory which have frequently 
 raised into notice, and brought into high employment, young 
 men who were much his inferiors in solid abilities, it was 
 not till after the publication of his first work on law, that 
 we find him enjoying even a moderate share of practice as a 
 barrister. (1) 
 
 It is hazardous to attempt a guess as to how much 
 influence this natural inaptitude for public address may have had 
 upon Hames in determining the direction which his studies were to 
 take. But certain it is that these studies are concerned scarcely 
 at all with that eloouence ^ which Professor Millar designates as 
 the bane of eighteenth- century Scotland. (2) IT or is Zanies pr inari - 
 
 (1) Memoir s . p 60. v i. 
 
 (2) L Literary History of Scotland, p 321. ,T It was in the Scottish 
 Universities, however, that the^s^tdvin'g after eloquence was product- 
 ive of most mischief. The word i‘S~~always cropping up in the de- 
 scription of enhnent professors, franc is Hutcheson, when enforcing 
 the moral virtues and duties, is said to have ’displayed a "fervid 
 and persuasive eloquence which was irresistible. 1 Dugald Stewart 
 tells us of the el of uence with which Maclaurin, the famous mathema- 
 tician, ’knew how to adorn the most abstracted subjects.’ The’ Strid- 
 ing and impressive eloquence’ of Dugald Stewart himself 'riveted the 
 attention of ^ven the most volatile student' according to Scott, etc . T 
 To which may be added the fact that in the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
 
 of George Campbell , which we shall consider in another chapter, the 
 term e loquence is used as synonymous with, and in preference to, 
 the term rhetoric. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
-23 
 
 ly ooncerned with written composition. We find this same friendly 
 critic (Tytler) complaining that Karnes seemed TT to have no just 
 conception of what constitutes the chief heauty of rhetorical 
 composition: a variety in the structure of the periods, "both 
 with respect to their length, and the order of their component 
 parts, so as to excite pleasure by the contrast; while each is 
 so framed, as separately by its melody to satisfy and fill the 
 ear.” (l) 
 
 Karnes, although he takes due notice of diction and 
 sentence structure in a long chapter entitled Beauty of Lan guage 
 is busied for the most part with cy. ite another matter; namely, 
 that (of finding by a study of man 1 2 s own nature, those principles 
 which are the foundation of the fine arts, and then insisting that 
 the fine arts must "hold the mirror up to nature” — or forfeit 
 their title. In such an inquiry, although not primarily concerned 
 with mere rhetoric, Karnes was most certainly well within the 
 classic tradition. Aristotle had pointed the way. Cicero had 
 reiterated that the orator must be versed in all knowledge, and 
 particularly in an understanding of human nature. (2) Thus, if 
 
 (1) I.Iemoirs . v IT. p 214. 
 
 (2) Be Or a tore . (See discussion of qualifications of orator in 
 
 Book I.) 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 24 - 
 
 clii e fly concerned with the mere business of appreciative criticism 
 
 Kames nevertheless went to the root of all criticism, and undertook 
 a task of equal interest to the rhetorician and to the exponent 
 of belles-lettres . His researches were vital to both fields. His 
 findings and methods proved of value to such widely differing 
 v. r orks as Blair 1 s Lectures and Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric . 
 
 Ho better commentary upon Karnes’s manner can be 
 found than his treatment of rhetorical figures. Hot as mere 
 parts of the mechanism of composition are they of interest to him, 
 but because in their origin anduse, he can trace the workings-out 
 of certain previously discovered principles of human nature. He 
 says : 
 
 The endless variety of expressions brought 
 under the head of tropes and figures by ancient critics 
 and grammarians , makes it evident that they had no pre- 
 cise criterion for distinguishing tropes and figures from 
 plain language. It was accordingly my opinion that little 
 could be made of them in the way o f rational critic ism : 
 till, discovering by a sort of accident, that many of them 
 depend on pr inci pie s formerly explained . I gladly embrace the 
 opportunity to_ sh ow the inf luenc e of these principles where i t 
 woul d least be expected . Confining myself therefore to such 
 figures, I am luckily freed from much trash; without dropping, 
 as far as I remember, any trope or figure that merits a 
 
-25- 
 
 proper name. (1) 
 
 So essential to the grounding of all criticism, did Karnes’s 
 contemporaries consider the Elements, that both Campbell and 
 Blair clearly acknowledge their debt to, their master; and it is 
 almost certain that neither of them would have written as he did 
 had it not been for the work of one who was neither a rhetorician 
 nor exponent of poetics . in the strict sense of the words; but who 
 more than either Blair or Campbell could lay just claim to the 
 title of Critic . 
 
 Volume I of the El ements of Criticism is composed of 
 seventeen chapters; for purposes of analysis it might well be 
 thrown into three main divisions. Chapters I and II will stand 
 for the first two of these three major parts; they are Perceptions 
 and Ideas in a Train , and Passions and Emotions . The remainder of 
 Volume I, Chapters III — XVII inclusive goes tO' make up the third 
 division, and might be thrown under a general heading lifted from 
 
 (1) Elements . v II, p. 227 (the underlining is my own). Apropos of 
 Karnes’s treatment of the figures. Professor Saintsbury (History of 
 Criticism, 2 p. 468) says: -- "They enjoy a space which, without 
 
 being surprised at it, one grudges.” The inference here, if the 
 present writer can judge from Professor Saintsbury’ s context, is 
 that since it was the fad and foible of the age to main much of the 
 classi c-stock-in- trade of the rhetorician, we must not oe surprised 
 if we find Karnes trailing along with the herd. If such inference 
 was intended, it is unjust — and w hat is more, entirely beside 
 the point. Karnes’s words belie this. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 
 
 
-26- 
 
 the text itself; An Inquiry into ,T such attributes , relations ana 
 circumstances . as in the fine arts are c hie fly employe d to raise 
 agreeable motions . " (l) It should be added that although Karnes 
 
 here and elsewhere, professes to establish principles upon which 
 to base a judgment in the matter of the fine arts as a whole, his 
 attention directs itself chiefly towards literature, (2) 
 
 It is an article of faith with Karnes that to attain 
 respectability as a critic, one must approach an understanding of 
 the whole nature of man. We may find faults with his results; his 
 methods may seem antiquated; his psychology may be faulty; but 
 surely in spirit and intent, his work could scarcely be more 
 relevant to the business of criticism: "to trace the rules of 
 
 criticism to their true principles in the constitution of the 
 
 (1) Elements I, p 195 
 
 (2) Professor Saints bury, in Ins History of Criticism , has laid 
 it down that "much" of Volume I is "irrelevant" to the subject of 
 criticism, and offers as the only fitting title for the book, 
 "Literary Illustrations of Morals." This last is scarcely fair. It 
 is assuming that to Karnes morals and taste were synonymous terms. They 
 were not. He asserted merely that the one was as capable of reasoned: 
 
 analysis as the other, and that both sprang from certain fixed 
 principles of human nature. If these principles were, as he stated, 
 to be found in human nature, they could be arrived at only by a 
 minute and care fill analysis of human nature. A moralist ay study 
 the emotions and passions of mankind to determine their ethical im- 
 port. surely a critic of letters may study these same emotions and 
 passions to see if they be faithfully and naturally delineated in 
 the literature which he must criticise. And if the preliminary ob- 
 servations in both instances, have uch in common, is there anything 
 remarkable or "irrelevant" in the fact? It is human nature which is 
 analysed in both instances. Small wonder if the processes duplicate 
 each other. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 27 - 
 
 the human mind, and the nature of the passions and affections.” (1) 
 
 Chapter I, Percept ions and Ideas in a drain, accompli sh- 
 es a brief survey of the characteristics of the purely intellectual 
 functions of the seat of consciousness. The theme is the associatioi 
 of ideas; the inspiration is Locke. It is pointed out that vhile 
 to a certain extent our chains of ideas rnay be formed involuntari- 
 ly , yet the links of the chain are logically related by associa- 
 tion; there is, moreover, in man the power to ive closer logical 
 connection to his thoughts at will; that this power is based upon 
 our perception of the law of cause and effect, and upon our innate 
 relish for order and connection. This latter principle, our relish 
 for order and connection, is fundamental to all the enjoyments of 
 the intellect, whether it be logic, science, or literature. Since 
 it is thus fundamental to all intellectual pleasure, it is as far 
 as we can go with our analysis. It remains only to test the 
 truth of the principle by an appeal to experience, and then apply 
 it as a standard of judgment to the specimen to be criticised. 
 
 Karnes makes the test and the application thus: 
 
 (1) Tytler , I, p 378. 
 

 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 28 - 
 
 The principle of order is conspicuous with 
 respect to natural operations; for it always directs our 
 ideas in the order of nature; thinking upon a tody in 
 motion, we follow its natural course; the mind falls with 
 a heavy body, descends with a river, and ascends with flame 
 and smoke; in tracing out a family, we incline to begin at 
 the founder, and. descend gradually to the latest posterity: 
 on the contrary, musing on a mighty oak, we begin at the trunk 
 and mount from it to the branches: as to historical facts, 
 
 we love to proceed in the order of time; or, which comes to 
 the same, to proceed along the chains of cause and effect y (1) 
 
 How, for the application of this principle to criti- 
 cism. He says: 
 
 Every work of art that is thus conformable to the 
 natural course of our ideas, is so far agreeable; and. every 
 work of art hat reverses that course, is so far disagreeable. 
 Hence, it is required in every such work, that, like an organ- 
 ic s stem, its parts be orderly arranged and mutually con- 
 nected, bearing each of them a relation to the whole, some 
 more intimate, some less, according to their destination: 
 when d.ue regard is lad to these particulars, we have a 
 sense of just composition, and so far are pleased with the 
 "composition. (2) 
 
 He then subjects Homer, Pindar, and. Horace, to the 
 test by this canon, and finds that in spite of their genius they 
 are censurable on this score; as likewise are Virgil and Sallust. 
 Episodes in narrative poems, he allows a greater latitude than he 
 will give to parts of exposition or argument; but he insists that 
 
 (1) Element s . v I,p25. 
 
 ( 2 ) Elements , v I , p 27 . 
 

 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 29 - 
 
 their introduction “be graceful and natural. He instances as a 
 violation of this principle the descent of Aeneas in Hell, which 
 employs the sixth hook of Aeneid. 
 
 If it he objected that all this is wasting a 
 prodigious amount of words to tell us what we already know and 
 agree to perfectly; namely, that a composition should he coherent, 
 I reply that such is not at all the case. Karnes is giving us 
 a j ustification for our love of coherence in composition; namely, 
 that the mind demands and always will demand coherence in any in- 
 tellectual process, and that this demand is based upon the lav; of 
 order and association of ideas which governs our thought pro- 
 cesses. And this is quite a different thing from the charge 
 brought in the criticism above. 
 
 Chapter II . Emotions and Passions . is a long and 
 labored attempt to analyze the character of our emotional pro- 
 cesses. It Is this chapter, above all others in the Elements . 
 that has laid Karnes open to the scoffers. There is no denying 
 that his success is far from complete. Strive as he may, labor- 
 ing valiantly through his Inductions, he cannot make a system 
 rise out of his scattered and multitudinous observations. He 
 
 himself recognized his difficulties, for he said: 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3 0 - 
 
 Human nature is a complicated machine, and is 
 unavoidably so to answer its purposes. The public indeed 
 have Ions- been entertained by many systems of human nature 
 that flatter the mind by their simplicity: according to 
 
 some writers, man is entirely a selfish being; according 
 to others, universal benevolence is his duty; one founds 
 morality upon sympathy solely; and one upon utility. If 
 any one of these systems were copied from human nature, 
 the present subject might soon be discussed. Ait the 
 variety of nature is not so easily reached: end for con- 
 
 futing such Utopian systems without the fatigue of reason- 
 ing, it appears the best method to take a survey of human 
 nature, and to set before the eye, plainly and candidly, 
 facts as they exist, (l) 
 
 nevertheless, he makes the attempt to bring some 
 order out of his notes and observations. The terms emotion and 
 passion are first examined to see if they be synonymous, and he 
 finds that they are distinguished by the fact that passion is 
 emotion plus desire(2); he notes the causes of emotion in general; 
 objects of sigbtand sound (3); the causes of the emotions of joy 
 and sorrow in particular (4); the fact that in many instances one 
 emotion is productive of another (5); and so on and so forth for 
 some one hundred and forty odd pages. As has been said, the 
 system refuses to erect itself. The processes of induction seem 
 to get little farther than the gathering of material. The material, 
 /hen gathered, appears so diverse and intractable that it will not 
 combine. Perhaps he succeeds as well as most such attempts do. 
 
 ( 1 ) Elements , 1 , p 34 . 
 
 ( 2l Elements . 1, p 41. 
 (3/ Elements . 1. p 52 
 
 ( 4 ) Eleme nt s , 1 , p 57. 
 
 (5) Elements , 1, p 66. 
 

 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 31 - 
 
 At least lie strikes out a great many single instances of various 
 shades and degrees of emotion, and hastens in each instance to 
 illustrate his point hy references to passages from literature. 
 
 It is this constant practice, this exemplification of his observa- 
 ins by reference to the classics, which seem to have suggested 
 to Professor S a intsbury his title of "Literary Illustrations of 
 Morals." It is only fair to note in this connection that the 
 device is as truly an attempted testing of the worth of the 
 literature, as it is an illustration of Karnes's contentions. I 1 he 
 particular canons of judgment are first derived from Karnes's own 
 observation, and then, and only then, are they sought for in 
 literature. He may indeed feel some satisfaction in finding his 
 points corroborated by other testimony, but he is, after all, 
 applying the truth as he knows it to literature as he finds it. 
 
 And that is my understan ing of the business of criticism. Observe 
 the following example: 
 
 Instinctive anger is frequently raised by bodily 
 pain, by a stroke for example upon a tender part, which, 
 ruffling the temper and unhinging the mind, is in its tone 
 similar to anger: and when a man is thus disposed before- 
 
 hand to anger, he is not nice or scrupulous about an object; 
 the person who gave the stroke, however accidentally, is by 
 an inflammable temper held a proper object, merely for hav- 
 ing occasioned pain. It is still more remarkable that a 
 stock or a stone by which I am hurt, becomes an object of 
 my resnntment: I cm violently inclined to crush it to 
 
 atoms, d'he passion indeed in that case can be but a single 
 flash; for being entirely irrational, it must vanish with 
 the first reflection. ITor is that irrational effect con- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-52- 
 
 fin ed to bodily pain; internal distress, when excessive, 
 may be the occasion of effects equally irrational; per- 
 turbation of mind occasioned by the loss of a dear friend, 
 will, in a fiery temper, produce momentary sparks of anger 
 against that very friend, however innocent: thus Shakes- 
 
 peare, in the Tempest, 
 
 Alonzo . . . Sit down and rest. 
 
 Ev’n here I will put off my hope, and keep it 
 ITo longer for my flatterer; he is drown’d 
 Whom thus we stray to find, and the sea, mocks 
 Our frustrate search on land. Well, let him go. 
 
 Act 5, Sc. 5. 
 
 The final wo rds , JelJL, let him go , are an expression 
 of impatience and anger at Ferdinand, whose absence great- 
 ly disturbed his father, dreading that he was lost in the 
 storm. This nice operation of the human mind is by Shakes- 
 peare exhibited upon another occasion, and finely painted: 
 etc. (l) 
 
 For lack of space this one example of Karnes’s method 
 must suffice here. It sufficiently illustrates the point that he 
 could find good critical use for his observations upon the nature of 
 passions and emotions. 
 
 The remainder of Volume I, that part which might be 
 termed Part III will not lend itself to detailed and complete 
 analysis much more readily than did the discussion of Passion and 
 Emotions . The author busies himself with a study of sense im- 
 pressions, particularly of sight and hearing. The immediate objects 
 of his observations are "attributes, relations, and circumstances” 
 of the objects of consciousness. These attributes etc . ar 
 
 (1) Elements , 1, p 85. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 55 - 
 
 into chapters under such headings as, beauty . Grandeur and Sublimity 
 l~o velty , Resemblance and P iss imilitude . etc. The typical method of 
 investigation is as follows: Karnes observes that beaut:; , for ex- 
 
 ample, invariably gives rise to emotions characterized by " sweet- 
 ness and gaiety”; that is, beauty operating alone upon the mind, 
 its resultant emotions uninfluenced by the operation of any other 
 considerations .( 1 ) Very well, then; if by beauty we may secure 
 emotions of "sweetness and gaiety", how may we analyze beauty? Con- 
 sideration tells him that there are two kinds of beauty; intrinsic 
 and relat ive . 
 
 Intrinsic beauty is an object of sense merely; to 
 perceive the beauty of a spreading oak, or of a flowing 
 river, no more is required but singly an act of vision. 
 
 The perception of relative beauty is accompanied by an 
 act of the understanding and reflection; for of a fine 
 instrument or engine, we perceive not the relative beauty, 
 until we be made acquainted with its use and destination. 
 
 In a word intrinsic beauty is ultimate; relative beauty 
 is that of means relating to some good end or purpose. (£) 
 
 How although he has just called intrinsic beauty 
 "ultimate" he goes on to analyze it. A tree, for instance , may be 
 beautiful in sever ' ways; for its color, shape, size and motion. 
 Each of these beauties is susceptible of analysis or explanation. 
 
 An example of his analysis of the beauty of shape or figure will 
 suffice . 
 
 A circle and a square are each of them perfectly 
 regular ^ being equally confined to a precise form, which 
 admits not the slightest variation, (thus both are pleasing 
 or beautiful and their beauty may be traced to the 
 
 (1) Elements, v 1. n. 197 
 
 (2) Elements , 1. p. 197 
 
-54 
 
 inherent love of the mind for regularity and order, 
 as explained above* ) But, "a square is less beautiful 
 than a circle. And the reason seems to be that the at- 
 tention is divided among the sides and angles of a square; 
 whereas the circumference of a circle, being a single 
 object, makes one entire impression. And thus simplicity 
 contributes to beauty; which may be illustrated by 
 another example; a square, tho T not more regular than a 
 hexagon or octagon, is more beautiful than either; for 
 what other reason, but that a square is more simple, 
 the attention less divided? This reasoning will appear 
 the more conclusive when we consider any regular polygon 
 of very many sides; for of this figure the mind can never 
 have any distinct impression. (l) 
 
 So much for the method. As to the truth and value of 
 
 the results, opinions may differ. Yet the present writer noted not 
 long ago -- he cannot reme ber where, and of course is highly cen- 
 surable for introducing anonymous testimony into a paper of this 
 character -- an article of contemporary art criticism in which these 
 same methods were employed in attempted analysis of the comparative 
 beauty of straight and curved lines. Perhaps no one ill ever be 
 able to tell us why beauty is beautiful; perhaps there is no ans- 
 wer. But fames attempts it, and the at i t, regardless of its 
 success or ft ilure, seems not quite ” irrelevant" to the business 
 of criticism. 
 
 Volume II of the Element s opens with a chapter entitled 
 Beauty of Language . The chapter is a long one; one hundred and 
 eighty- two pages. As might be expected from a study of Volume I, 
 Karnes is not interested alone in giving us examples of beautiful 
 language, and stating the rules of composition which may enable us 
 
 (l) fie meat s . 1. p. 108. 
 
to imitate it. He wants to go farther. He wishes to ground the 
 rules themselves upon human nature; and by this time we have seen 
 enough of our- author to know that by human nature he means chiefly 
 the sensitive powers of man. examples of choice literature, he 
 does give in abundance, and for the most part quite excellent ones. 
 Rules he does lay town; and they are not copied slavishly from 
 the theories of the time, (l) But beyond all rules and examples 
 lies a reason. This reason or cause is the goal of Karnes’s study. 
 
 The root idea of the whole chapter is that expressed 
 by Karnes in his discussion of beauty in "Volume I, above cited; 
 
 namely that there is intrinsic and a relative beauty. Relative 
 beauty is exemplified in composition when the separate members, bo Hi 
 large and snail, are well adapted to the immediate end. Mere 
 perspicuity is a beauty in this sense, because of the intellectual 
 character of the composition as distinguished from its appeal to 
 sense. But quite aside from this relative beauty, this adaptation 
 of means to an end, there is purely a sensuous beauty of language. 
 Under the section headed Beauty of Language with respect to Bound 
 
 (1) His opinion concerning rhyme (and by rhyme he means particular- 
 ly the heroic couplet) is not at all orthodox for his times. He 
 ends his attack upon the couplet by the statement that "rhyme, in 
 Great Britain, will in time be forc'd to abandon its unjust con- 
 quests, and to confine itself within its proper limits." 
 
 (Elements, 2. p. 176) Which limits, he who cares to read Karnes 
 will find, are a direct challenge to the school of Pope. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
 
 Kames begins: "This subject requires the following order. The 
 
 sounds of the different letters come first; next these sounds as 
 united in syllables; third syllables united into words; fourth, 
 words united in periods; and in the last place, periods united in 
 a discourse. (1) 
 
 I shall not follow Karnes in his discussion of these 
 various phases of composition. He is for the most part just and 
 sensible. The point to be made is this. Karnes grounds his scheme 
 upon direct appeal to the experience of sense. He would teach 
 composition by teaching the truths of what is agreeable to the 
 ear. How many classes in composition today ever have their at- 
 tention drawn to the reasons for the rules which they are com- 
 pelled to follow; or rather, the rules which are offered for 
 their guidance? In the mere matter of vowel and consonant combina- 
 tions, let the instructor ash his class to distinguish between the 
 effects produced by the first and last stanzas of Poe's poem. The 
 Bells . The answers he will get should be illuminating. 
 
 But to return to the Elements : — a comparatively short 
 chapter on Comparisons . a much longer one upon figures , and five 
 more of approximately the same length, Barra ti on and Description . 
 
 Epic and Dramatic Oompo sit ion . The Three Unities . Gardening and 
 Architecture . together with an appendix. Terms Defined and Explained . 
 complete the work. Here too, Karnes is constantly giving rules and 
 
 (1) Elements . 2. p. 6. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-57- 
 
 examples — unusually distinguished for their good sense and propri- 
 ety. Seldom are his precepts slavishly adopted from the school of 
 pseudo-classicism; he dares deny the ordinances of the gods, 
 and supports his denials by good and stout reasons, as in his 
 attacks upon the superstition of the three unities. (1) It is in 
 exemplifying the reasons behind the rules, that Karnes takes chief 
 delight. This is the avowed intent and purpose of his whole work, 
 and In this he lays claim to originality. One more example of his 
 methods will suffice. As noted earlier in this paper, Karnes spoke 
 of the springs of human action as being extremely numerous and 
 complex. The final action or emotional response, he asserted, was 
 the result of many tendencies working in hanaony or in opposition. 
 This final example illustrates the union of two principles. It 
 occurs in the chapter entitled Res emb lane e and Kissimili tude in 
 Volume I, but its special application is made in the chapter on 
 Comparisons . Volume II, where, indeed it is cited (2) after a con- 
 sideration of certain phenomena calculated to support his conten- 
 tion inductively, Karnes says: 
 
 Whatever is found more strange or beautiful than 
 was expected, is judged to be more strange or beautiful than 
 in re lity? Hence a common artifice, to depreciate before- 
 hand what we wish to make a figure in the opinions of others. 
 
 The comparisons employ’d by poets and orators, are 
 of the kind last mentioned; for it is always a known object 
 
 (1) Elements 2, p. 414. "Modem critics, who for our drama pretend 
 to establish rules founded on the practice of the Greeks, are guilty 
 of an egregious blunder." (Karnes) 
 
 ( 2 ) Kleme nt s . v I , p . 29 2 . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
 
 that is to be magnified and lessened. The former is effected 
 by likening it to some grand object, or by contrasting it 
 with one of the opposite character. To effectuate the lat- 
 ter, the method must be reversed; the object must be con- 
 trasted with something superior to it, or likened to some- 
 thing inferior. The whole effect is produced ux-)on the 
 principal object, which by that means is elevated above 
 its rank, or depressed below it. 
 
 In accounting for the effect that any unusual 
 resemblance or dissimilitude hath upon the mind, no cause 
 has been mentioned but surprise : and to prevent confusion 
 
 it was proper to discuss that cause first. But surprise 
 is not the only cause of the effect described; another con- 
 curs, which operates perhaps not less powerfully, namely, 
 a principle in human nature that lies still in obscurity, 
 not having been unfolded by any writer, tho 1 its effects 
 are extensive; and as it has not been distinguished by a 
 proper name, the reader must be satisfied with the follow- 
 ing description, Every man who studies himself, mm t be 
 sensible of a tendency or propensity in the mind, to 
 complete every work that is begun, and to carry things to 
 their full perfection. There is little opportunity to 
 display that propensity on natural operations, which are 
 seldom left imperfect; but in the operations of art, it 
 hath great scope : it impells us to persevere in our own 
 
 work, and to wish for the completion of what another is 
 doing’; we feel a sensible pleasure when the work is 
 brought to perfection; and our pain is no less sensible 
 when we are disappointed. Hence our uneasiness when an 
 interesting story is broke off in the middle, when a 
 piece of music ends without a close, or when a building or 
 garden is left unfinished. The same propensity operates in 
 making collections, such as whole works, good and bad, of 
 any author. A certain person attempting to collect prints 
 of all the capital paintings, succeeded except as to a few. 
 
 La Bruyers remarks, that an anxious search was made for 
 these; not for their value, but to complete the set. 
 
 We need not lose time to describe the co-operation 
 of the foregoing propensity with surprise, in producing the 
 effect that follows any unusual resemblance or dissimilitude. 
 Surprise first operates, and carries our opinion of the 
 resemblance or dissimilitude beyond truth. The propensity 
 we have described carries us still farther; for it forces 
 upon the mind a conviction that the resemblance or dis- 
 similitude is complete. We need no better illustration 
 than the resemblance, that is fancied in some pebbles to 
 a tree or an insect; which resemblance, however faint in 
 reality, is conceived to be wonderfully perfect. 
 

 
 
 » 
 
 • • 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-S9~ 
 
 So much for the concurrence of two principles in the 
 literary artifice of cornua ris on . Now for an example of direct ap- 
 plication of all this to criticism? I have purposely chosen a 
 faulty application, for it will not only illustrate the method, 
 hut will point out its dangers and limitations; it may moreover 
 tend to corroborate Tytler's estimate of Karnes's taste. (1) Most 
 of the illustrations in Karnes's text are not open to this fault, 
 hut occasionally he blunders badly; usually from a blind atten- 
 tion to some particular "principle”, and a mechanical application 
 of it. Karnes reaffirms in the chapter on comparisons that "it 
 hath no good effect to compare things by way of simile that are of 
 the same Kind; nor to compare by contrast things of different kinds 
 An example of the first fault is given. It is just. Then he says: 
 
 The next shall be of things contrasted that are of 
 different kinds. 
 
 Queen . What, is my Richard, both in shape and mind 
 
 Transformed and weak? Hath Bolingbroke depos'd 
 Thine intellect? Hath he been in thy heart! 
 
 The lion thrusteth forth his paw 
 
 And wounds the earth, if nothing else, with rage 
 
 To be o'erpowered: and wilt thou, pupil-like. 
 
 Take thy correction mildly, kiss the rod. 
 
 And fawn on rage with base humility? 
 
 (Richard II, Act. v. Sc. I.) 
 
 (1) Tytler, v 1, p. 445. He asserts "that the general correctness 
 of the author's taste was more the result of study and attention, 
 than in any extraordinary sensibility in the structure of his mind 
 to the emotions excited by the production of the fine arts." 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 40 - 
 
 This comparison has scarce an y force: a man 
 
 and a lion are of different species, and are therefore proper 
 subjects for a simile; but there is no such resemblance be- 
 tween them in general, as to produce any strong effect by con- 
 trasting particular attributes or circumstances. 
 
 What is wrong here? Surely it takes but little of 
 natural taste to realize that while the comparison may not be of 
 the highest order, it is not actually censurable. I think we can 
 best answer Karnes by an appeal to his own system. He admits that 
 a man and a lion are "proper subjects for simile"; he might have 
 added "metaphor". Intent upon his first canon, that dissimilar 
 objects afford no basis for contract . he is utterly blind to the 
 fact that in the passage quoted, a prince and a lion have been 
 identified by the boldest of all devices, an implied metaphor. 
 
 By this implied identification the two are placed in a situation 
 where the queen may justly reproach the "lion" for belying his 
 nature, and " fawning with base humility." Of course accidents will 
 happen; but it is highly suggestive that this man who can tell 
 us exactly why a simile or metaphor has its effect, is yet not 
 capable of appreciating that effect in a striking example. 
 
 I’he fault is after all not so much with the method as 
 with the man. He can appreciate the effect of a given figure, be- 
 cause his intellect tells him that the effect should follow. But 
 where the effect of one figure, as in the instance above, depends 
 
; ' ■ 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-41- 
 
 up on appreciation of a preceding figure, he copies to grief unless 
 he has noted that preceding figure. This he failed to do. He has 
 missed a link in the chain, and will come out in error with math- 
 ematical certainty. Tytler has given other examples of this fai ling. 
 ( 1 ) 
 
 It remains only for us to take notice of Karnes’s 
 conclusions u on the standard of taste in the fine arts. It is much 
 easier to point out his failure in determining this standard, than 
 it is to correct his error. His entire work has led us to believe 
 that within each of us are those final and ultimate principles which 
 will guide our judgment infallibly. Indeed, we might all expect to 
 arrive at the same standard of judgment, and all set up for critics 
 in our own right. What is to hinder? Hoes he not expressly state 
 that "However languid and cloudy the common sense of mankind may 
 be as to the fine arts, it is notwithstanding the only standard in 
 these as well as in morals?” 
 
 But, alas, he no sooner says this than he begins to 
 qualify. We cannot all be critics all at once; for, "those T «vho 
 depend for food on bodily labor, are totally devoid of taste; of 
 such taste at least as can be of use in the fine arts. This con- 
 sideration bars the greater part of mankind; and of the remaining 
 part, many by a corrupted taste are unqualified for voting." The 
 
 (1) Memoirs . I. p. 451. 55 
 

 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 ■ ' jl 
 
 
 
 
 ♦ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 42 - 
 
 exceptions to these two classes, he adds, must decide matters. In 
 other words, falling into that fallacy knoim to logicians as 
 petitio principii . he says in effect: "Those only have good taste 
 
 who — have good taste.” The standard by which he excludes the 
 greater part of mankind as the judges of taste, is his own pre- 
 conceived idea as to what is in accordance with good taste. His 
 taste may be right; but if it be formed upon those unchangeable , 
 fixed principles which are common to mankind, why are not all other 
 men in accord with him? 
 
 I think we shall have to agree finally that Karnes 
 has chosen his title wisely : -Elements of Criticism , and not The 
 
 Elements, it truly must be called. He makes a brave attempt, an 
 original attempt, and in many ways an extremely valuable attempt, 
 to sound the human mind. But it is not complete. Certainly some 
 very important elements escaped him in his main treatment of the 
 theme, and are suggested to him only at the close of his work. He 
 turns from them hastily as though too tired to go on -- as perhaps 
 he was. If he had not made a complete system, he had struck out 
 many individual canons and standards which served well as measur- 
 ing sticks for particular passages of literature. If to the 
 spirit and inspiration of literature as a whole, he had not been too 
 attentive, one man cannot do it all. Credit is due him that he did 
 so well as a critic, with so little natural taste; that he 
 escaped so well from the idols of his time, with so little chance 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 43 - 
 
 of escaping them. To a boot, English was almost a foreign tongue; 
 English literature, a foreign literature. He is no unworthy critic 
 who can master an unfamiliar language and literature so thoroughly 
 that he can make some pretence of teaching those to whom it is 
 native . 
 
 And above and beyond all this, he has the greater 
 claim to our attention, that although neither an exponent of 
 rhetoric nor a professor of belles lettres in the strictly classic 
 sense of both words, he nevertheless did yeoman service in both 
 fields, and laid down a method which proved of equal, value to those 
 two men whose work I shall consider in the following chapters. 
 

 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
BLAIR AND HIS LECTURES. 
 
 CHAPTER III . 
 
 Following close upon ICames, and building upon the 
 foundations laid by him in the Elements of Criticism , comes the 
 Reverend Dr. Hugh Blair (l) minister of the High Church, and Pro- 
 fessor of Rhetoric and Belles lettres in the University of Edinburgh. 
 His Lectures first appeared in their present form in 1785, but por- 
 tions of them had been read to classes as early as 1759, the year 
 which began his connection with the University of Edinburgh. So 
 well were these Lectures received at that early date, that in 1762 
 a Chair of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres was installed and endowed by 
 royal decree. This chair Blair continued to hold until the year 
 1785. 
 
 Unlike Karnes, Blair laid little claim to omniscience. 
 
 He was first a divine, and second a critic of letters. A detailed 
 study of his life adds little of value to our appreciation of his 
 critical worth. Much more to the point are the crisp, vivid 
 characterizations given of him in "Jupiter” Carlyle* s Autobiography. 
 (2) Contrasting his character with that of his friend and fellow 
 
 (1) A Short Accoun t of the Life and Character of Dr. Hugh Blair, 
 by James Finlay son, I). D. in Blair’s Sermons. London. 1801. vol.'*5. 
 
 (2) P. 291. ff. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 45 - 
 
 minister, Dr. Robertson, Carlyle says: 
 
 Dr. Diair was a different kind of man from Dr. 
 Robertson, and his character is very justly delineated by 
 Rinlayson as far as he goes. Robertson was most sagacious, 
 Blair was most naif. Neither of them could be said to have 
 either wit or humour. Of the latter, Robertson had a small 
 tincture — Blair had hardly a relish for it. Robertson 
 had a bold and ambitious mind, and a strong desire to make 
 himself considerable; Blair was timid and unambitious, 
 and withheld himself from public business of every kind, and 
 seemed to have no wish but to be admired as a' preacher, 
 particularly by the ladies. His conversation was so in- 
 fantine that many people thought it impossible, at first 
 sight, that he could be a man of sense or genius. He 
 was as eager about a new paper to his wife’s drawing room, 
 or his , own, new wig , as about a new tragedy or a new epic 
 
 __ _ _ _ 3^ >|C ^ 
 
 poem# 
 
 Robertson had so great a desire to shine himself, 
 that I hardly ever saw him patiently bear anybody else's 
 showing off but Dr. Johnson and Garrick. Blair, on the 
 contrary, though capable of the moost profound conversation 
 when circumstances led to it, had not the least desire to 
 shine, but was delighted beyond measure to show other 
 people in their best guise to his friends. TT Did I not show 
 the lion well today?” used he to say after the exhibition 
 of a remarkable stranger. Ror a vain man he was the 
 least envious I ever knew. He had truly a pure mind, 
 in which there was not the slightest malignity; for though 
 he was of a ipuick and lively temper, and apt to be warm 
 and impatient about trifles, his wife, who was a superi- 
 or woman, only laughed, and his friends joined with her. 
 
 I think that within this succint characterization of 
 Blair, the student of his Lectures will find most of what is need- 
 ful for an understanding of their merits and defects. To the 
 modesty of the man is due the lack of that dogmatic utterance and 
 assurance which characterised Karnes's work; to the impetuosity 
 
 and liveliness of his disposition — qualities usually at variance 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-46- 
 
 with sober judgment -- may we ascribe his championship of the 
 claims of Ossian; in his timidity we may find an explanation of 
 that curious vacillation between his own instinctive judgments *- 
 and the "rules Tt of pseudo-classicism: a conflict which I hope 
 
 to make apparent in this chapter. As to the lack of humor at- 
 tributed to him by Carlyle, and its effects upon some of his crit- 
 ical judgments, I have some personal opinions of interest to my- 
 self: but as they are far from orthodox, and would ta he time and 
 
 space which I can ill afford for their justification, I have 
 judged them of too little relative importance to include here. 
 
 Various judgments have been passed upon the value of 
 Blair’s work as a critic and rhetorician. Indeed, the same author- 
 ities have at different times contradicted themselves concerning 
 him. I offer as one instance of this, two estimates by Professor 
 Millar. In his Literary History of Scotland. . (1902) , he says: 
 
 Into the enormities perpetrated in the pulpit 
 it is needless to enter. _ It is enough to refer to 
 the egregious sermons of Lr . Hugh Blair, which in 
 popularity had almost no competitor, and which seem 
 to recapitulate into themselves all the most serious 
 characteristic faults to which the prose writing of 
 the eighteenth- century had become liable. (1) 
 
 And a little later in the same volume he adds: 
 
 The author whom his contemporaries most over- 
 rated was probably Lr. Hugh Blair .... YYe have al- 
 ready referred to his Sermons as typical of the worst 
 sort of eighteenth- century prose, and his Lectures 
 (1783) on his professional subject are not much better, 
 though they have some value as an indication of what 
 
 (1) pp. ?19-£20 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-47- 
 
 it was thought proper to think about literature at 
 the date of their delivery. Blair's fault is that 
 he can not say a plain thing in a plain way; nor 
 is he comparable for originality and suggestiveness 
 of view to Principal George Campbell, of Aberdeen 
 (1719-96) whose Philo soph}/ of Rhe t or i c . though some- 
 what discursive, is by far the most valuable contribu- 
 tion to criticism which came from Scotland during the 
 Century. (1) 
 
 The foregoing are pretty flat condemnations of 
 Blair’s pretensions to any worth. But in his volume entitled 
 Scottish Pro se of the seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries . ( 1912) 
 Professor Millar seems to have suffered a change of heart. He 
 reiterates his remarks about the general worthlessness of the 
 sermons, though in far less vehement manner than that whieh 
 characterized his earlier utterances; but he adds: "His Lectures 
 
 appear to be more worthy of c onsideration. ,T He "owns" -- the word 
 of an advocate and not an accuser -- "that they do not open too 
 auspiciously," but once we have passed the beginning sentences, 
 he asserts that we "come to better stuff; something much more 
 manly and bracing." As one pursues the text, his wonder grows 
 as to just how far Professor Millar had passed the beginning sen- 
 tences in his work of 1903; at the end we come to this complete 
 about-face : 
 
 Once we admit that it (codification of criticism) 
 is a legitimate operation, we shall find little difficulty in 
 
 (1) pp. 357-558 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-48- 
 
 assigning a high place among its practicioners 
 to Blair, etc. (1) 
 
 As to the ill-fated Sermons which Professor Millar per- 
 sists in condemning for their prose style, it may be remarked in 
 passing that they pleased Dr. Johnson mightily. This, in itself, 
 is no surety of their worth, to be sure. But I do not think that 
 the reader of today will find them as bad as they are painted. 
 Platitudinous they may be. In sentiment they lend themselves to 
 the efforts of those who have delighted to extract choice morsels 
 from moral essays, and foist them upon the public as "Beauties". 
 
 (a) Yet for all their gentle platitudes, their style seems scarce- 
 
 y 
 
 ly to merit the charge of egregiousness. I have found much more 
 of this nature to condemn in the Lectures themselves; — ■ though not 
 an over amount there. 
 
 I have hinted that in these lectures the student will 
 find a conflict between Blair's own natural taste, and the neo- 
 classic standards of taste to which he feels he must conform. Be- 
 fore going on to the Lectures . we may note this conflict exemplified 
 in his Dissertat ion upon Qssian . Lever did man come to more grief 
 than did the good Doctor in his labors to justify a "romantic" 
 pleasure, by pseudo-classic criticism. It was not the epic 
 structure of Ossian that entranced him. Of this we have ample 
 
 (1) Scottish Prose., p* 224. 
 
 (2) I have before me a curious little volume entitled, "The 
 Beauties of Blair," Boston, 1828. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-49- 
 
 proof in those beauties upon which he dwells when he dees not feel 
 that he is defending Ossian. It was the passages of "sublimity" 
 that thrilled and pleased him; the gloom and obscurity of the 
 pictures; the melancholy of the emotions called forth. But accord 
 ing to the pseudo-classic creed of "hind", all the beauties in the 
 world will not save a piece if it be not true to the "rules". 
 
 Bo Blair justifies Ossian by showing how he conforms to the rules. 
 
 The absurdity of all this was mercilessly pointed out 
 some years later by "Christopher North" (John Wilson), in a re- 
 view entitled Have You Head Ossian ? (1) "Crusty, rusty, musty, 
 fusty Christopher," as Tennyson named him, was a fine tantrum and 
 laid about him with lusty blows ; but he hit the mark. Having 
 amiably designated Blair as "the simplest of all professors that 
 ever lectured on Rhetoric and 3elle s Lettres," he laughs the 
 Dissertation out of countenance, as indeed it deserved to be. I 
 quote the following only to comment upon the bare possibility that 
 in 1903 Professor III liar may have oeen better acquainted with 
 "Christopher North" than with Hugh Blair. Liston to Christopher; 
 
 "What if all this, prodigious nonsense as it now 
 appears to us, be true? Hugh Blair is a far higher name 
 than Christopher North — and his Sermons, though not 
 proper readings for Sundays, are not to be sneezed at, 
 though they may be blamelessly yawned over; but his 
 Lectures, they are indeed words of power to charm the 
 couch of the wakeful, ’tired nature's sweet restorer, 
 balmy sleep.'" 
 
 (1) Blackwood' 3 Edinburgh Magazine, November, 1839 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 50 - 
 
 After reading this last paragraph, one familiar with Christopher 1 s 
 methods and disposition, can only wonder who it was that told him 
 that "Hugh Blair is a far higher name than Christopher north." 
 
 But to proceed to the Lectures . Professor Millar, as 
 we have seen, compares them with the work of Principal Campbell and 
 pronounces them distinctly inferior in "originality and suggestive- 
 ness of view," Comparisons are always dangerous. Particularly 
 are they so when uttered without due regard as to whether the works 
 are fit subjects for comparison. It is difficult to see how just 
 comparative estimate can. be made so readily in the case of two 
 works so widely different in aim and spirit as are the Lectures and a 
 the Philosophy of Rhetoric . The first, although designated as 
 dealing with Rhetoric and Belle s Lettres . concern themselves almost 
 wholly with Bel le s Lettres ; or rather with the larger division of 
 which Belles Lettres is a part. I refer to the ancient classical 
 designation "Poetics". Campbell, on the other hand, concerns 
 himself with Rhetoric proper, as understood by the Creeks and 
 Romans. The aims and interests of the two men differ almost as 
 much as do the problems of the teacher of literature and the 
 teacher of public speaking today. Both Blair and Campbell are in- 
 debted to Karnes for their philosophic and psychological grounding. 
 This they have in common; but from this common starting point they 
 

 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-51- 
 
 tread diverging paths. So far as I can discover, there is no re- 
 cognition of this fact in the treatment which the two have hereto- 
 fore received. 
 
 The hectares of Blair are divided into five parts, 
 dealing respectively with taste, language, style, eloquence (he 
 lists the title and spends a prodigious amount of space upon it, 
 but scarcely in the spirit of Campbell) and lastly a critical 
 examination of the most distinguished species of composition both 
 in prose and verse. In his Introduction, Blair follows hard upon 
 the heels of Karnes in announcing that criticism is a rational pro- 
 cess, subject to the dictates of reason. 
 
 Sure, (he says) it is equally possible to apply the 
 principles of reason and good sense to this art, as to any 
 other that is cultivated among men? If the following 
 Lectures have any merit, it will consist in an endeavor to 
 substitute the application of these principles in the 
 place of artificial and scholastic rhetoric; in an endeav- 
 or to explode false ornament, to direct attention more to- 
 wards subject than show, to recommend good sense as the 
 foundation of all good composition, and simplicity as es- 
 sential to all true ornament. (1) 
 
 He then proceeds to define taste In art as "the power 
 of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and of art." The 
 ensuing discussion is founded upon Karnes, although it attempts to go 
 beyond and correct him. 31air could not but be conscious that 
 Karnes load left taste somewhat in a muddle. He does not want to agree 
 
 (1) • Lectures . p. 10. Sixth American Edition, 1871. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-52- 
 
 \ 
 
 with Karnes 1 s packed jury of judges. He is sure with Karnes that 
 taste is based upon principles of human nature (1); that its bases 
 are the ultimate sense likes and dislikes (2); with Karnes he as- 
 serts that taste may be improved by the aid of reason (3); but 
 like Karnes he sees that not all men are equal in critical discern- 
 ment (4). In view of this last then, what shall be the standard of 
 taste? He selves the difficulty to his own satisfaction by assert- 
 ing that time will solve the difficulty. "To the ultimate sense 
 of mankind the ultimate appeal must ever lie in all works of 
 taste," is a statement that must be qualified by the added as- 
 surance that in spite of the distractions of the moment and the 
 warping influences of prejudice and ignorance, "in the course of 
 time, the genuine taste of human nature never fails to disclose 
 
 / 
 
 itself." 
 
 Hqw this has a specious appearance of solving the 
 difficulty; I very much doubt if it does more than appear to solve. 
 How, it may be asked, can the mere passage of time improve the 
 taste of the vulgar? It is by a growth of reason, in the individual 
 that he experiences a growth of taste. The vulgar of one genera- 
 tion are not the elect of the next. They die off and are re- 
 placed by new vulgarians whose discrimination in matters of taste 
 
 (1) Lectures , p. 16. (2) Ibid, p. 17. 
 
 (3) ibid, p. 19. (d) Ibid, p. 17. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 55 - 
 
 is woefully in need of the aid of reason as was their forebears'. 
 The intellectuals of one generation, those whose taste is admitted- 
 ly discriminating, may indeed be freed from the prejudices which 
 blinded the elect of a preceeding age; but the standard of taste 
 is still in the keeping of the cognoscenti . The vulgar in any 
 generation will come to the appreciation of genius, I am afraid, 
 with no more readiness than did the vulgar of that generation in 
 which the genius appeared. The man of the streets and the Loan of 
 the soil would be in an overwhelming majority in any census of 
 critical opinions of today. To neither would the literary critic 
 turn for a judgment of Homer. 
 
 This very difficulty with his own solution of the 
 question seems to have occurred to Blair, although he does not 
 suffer it to appear in company with his theory. He allows several 
 hundred pages to go by before he permits the troublesome objection 
 to show its head. Hear him: 
 
 It i s vain to allege, that the reputation of the 
 ancient poets and orators, is owing to authority, to 
 pedantry, and to the prejudices of education, transmitted 
 from age to age. These, it is true, are the authors put 
 into our hands at schools and colleges, and by that 
 means we have an early prepossession in their favour; 
 but how came they to gain the possession of schools and 
 colleges? Plainly, by the fame which these authors 
 had among their own contemporaries. Por the Greek 
 and Latin were not always dead languages. There was 
 a time when Homer, and Virgil, and Horace, were viewed 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-54- 
 
 in the same light as we now view Dryden, Pope and 
 Addison. It is not to the commentators and univer- 
 sities that the classics are indebted for their fame! 
 
 They become classics and school boohs in consequence of 
 the high admiration which was paid them by the best 
 judges in their own country and nation. (1). (2). 
 
 Alas for the good Doctor! He is fighting here only 
 the battle of the ancients and the moderns — but with such 
 spirit that he quite fails to notice the blows he is showering 
 upon his earlier statements about the universal taste of mankind. 
 
 How indeed did the classics get into the colleges! And how, we 
 may add, did Dryden, Pope, and Addison get there? The Doctor has 
 told us. They were put there "in consequence of the high admira- 
 tion which was paid them b£ th e_ - e!3 ~k judges in their own country 
 and nation." And so the question goes bach to where Karnes left it. 
 Who has taste? Why -- "the best judges;" or they — who have 
 taste! Ho one who reads this paper will, I venture to judge, 
 disagree with Blair in his contention that Horner should be in the 
 college curriculum. The point is: that nine tenths 
 
 (1) Lee ton es . p. 389. 
 
 (2) Vide Durham , p. 129; John Dennis, speaking concerning Taste in 
 Poetry gives expression to this same view. Says he: -- "He who 
 writes for the few today, writes for the many of tomorrow." This, 
 in my opinion, is utterly false in so far as it means that the 
 "best" things of this age wi. 11 be any surer of recognition by the 
 day-laborer of a century hence, or any number of centuries hence, 
 than they are by the day-laborer of today. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-55- 
 
 ox mankind do not care a twopence that he is there; or if they hatfe 
 a care, it is that they may never have to read him* 
 
 From the intricacies and subtleties of his remarks 
 upon the nature of taste in general, -Blair emerges for a space to 
 give us a sample of his own taste. It is here that v/e note again 
 the perplexity of the Professor, torn between his own judgment and 
 the "rules’', His timidity makes him compromise. The subject of 
 his criticism is Bhakespeare: 
 
 Shakespeare pleases, not by his bringing the 
 transactions of many years into one play; not by his 
 grotesque mixture of tragedy and comedy in one piece, 
 nor by the strained thoughts and affected witticisms, 
 which he sometimes employe. These we consider as blem- 
 ishes, and impute them to the grossness of the age in 
 which he lived. But he pleases by his animated and 
 masterly representation of characters, by the liveliness 
 of his descriptions, the force of his sentiments, and his 
 possessing, beyond all writers, the natural language of 
 passion; beauties which criticism no less teaches us to 
 place in the highest rank, than nature teaches us to feel.(l) 
 
 With what relief he is able in that last sentence to justify 
 
 "nature” by "criticism” I 
 
 Let us not be too harsh upon Blair for this pandering 
 to the rules. It cannot be recalled too often that he was a Boot, 
 and that the literature he criticised was English. Hr. Johnson 
 
 was down at London, and unless one remembered that Samuel had turn- 
 ed and rent his own litter in that memorable preface which exploded 
 the three unities, — unless one happened to remember this, I say, 
 
 (1) Lectures, p. 29. 
 
 II II — — g— WWW — — — 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-56 
 
 lie might scarcely suspect Samuel of having done it. On the whole, 
 it must have seemed reasonable that the English should know the 
 genius of their own language and literature. End Scotland was 
 desperately trying to be English, There is some excuse for Blair 
 if he rather helplessly submits to rules which torture his ingen- 
 uity to justify his own taste. It is a point in his favor that 
 he somehow or other got his admiration for Shakespeare recorded. 
 
 Yet in spite of all this, one turns back with relish to Karnes, 
 who threw the whole matter of the unities unceremoniously into 
 the dust -bin. 
 
 following hard upon this criticism of Shakespeare, 
 Blair treats us to an analysis of Sublimity in Kames T s best manner. 
 Sublimity, he tells us, has a tvo-fold aspect for the subject of 
 criticism: Sublimity in Objects . and Sublimity in Writin g. Of 
 
 the former, he lists the elements. l*hey are vastness, great power 
 and strength, terror, obscurity, darkness, disorder, magnanimity, 
 and heroism. After some further observations he arrives at the 
 conclusion that the sin e qua non of the objective sublimity seems 
 to be "mighty force or power, whether accompanied by terror or 
 not . " ( 1 ) 
 
 (1) Lectures , p. 57 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-57- 
 
 Thence he passes to the sublime in writing. Here he 
 warns us to be on our guard against the false sublime, or "sublime 
 style." This he pronounces "for the most part a very bad style." 
 But, "wherever a great and awful object is presented in nature, or 
 a very magnanimous and exalted affection of the human mind is dis- 
 played; thence if you can catch the impression strongly, and 
 exhibit it warm and glowing, you may draw the sublime.” As an in- 
 stance of the true sublime he gives us: M G-od said, let there be 
 
 light, and there was light." As an instance of the false sublime 
 style he quotes: "The soverign arbitrer of nature, by the 
 
 potent energy of a si ngle word, commanded the light to exist." 
 
 Very good. Would that diair could always follow his 
 own precepts. 1 Professor Millar has accused -Blair of writing ex- 
 ecrable prose. He gives the following example, which, although not 
 typical of Blair's style by any means, is reduplicated far too often 
 particularly in the Lectures . When Blair wishes to say that a good 
 writer may be a bad man, he puts it thus: "Elegant speculations are 
 sometimes found to float upon the surface of the mind, vhile bad 
 passions possess the interior of the heart." (l) It is extremely 
 difficult to see how a man who could criticise the one instance of 
 the false sublime quoted above, could be guilty of the other. 
 
 (1) Literary History of Scotland , p. 558. v. 1. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-58- 
 
 There follows this discussion of the sublime in Blair, 
 mother typical Kamesian discussion of Beauty. The chapter affords 
 but one passage of interest to us, and that of an incidental nature. 
 I refer to Blair’s remarks upon gardening, which show that he was 
 not thoroughly imbued with eighteenth- century English ideas. 
 Witness his remarks: 
 
 A straight canal is an insipid figure, in 
 comparison with the meanders of rivers. Cones and 
 pyramids are beautiful; but trees growing in their 
 natural wildness, are infinitely more beautiful than 
 when trimmed into pyramids and cones. The apartments 
 of a house must be regular in their disposition, for 
 the conveniency of its inhabitants; but a garden 
 which is designed merely for beauty, would be ex- 
 ceedingly disgusting, if it had as much uniformity 
 and order in its parts as a dwelling house. (1) 
 
 Next Blair enters upon a subject dear to the eight- 
 eenth century heart: a history of the rise and progress of 
 
 language from Adam to the eighteenth century. There is little to 
 claim our attention till we come to the tenth lecture, a treatment 
 of style. Here Blair wrestles with the problem of defining style. 
 
 He recognizes that it is almost impossible to separate it from 
 substance, yet he tries it. Insofar as it may be treated separate- 
 ly, its qualities "may be ranged under two heads, perspicuity and 
 ornament." Perspicuity is absolutely essential, and must be 
 
 (1) Lectures . p. 51 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
-59- 
 
 secured by attention both to single words and to their union into 
 sentences. He will have it that there are no true synonyms, and 
 his insistence upon the right word in the right place is suggest- 
 ive of the care that Ruskin was to recommend; though perhaps 
 Ruskin was more concerned v/ith the connotative value of a word, 
 than with its mere accuracy. 
 
 As to the structure of sentences, he will have us 
 give regard to clearness and precision; unity; strength; and 
 harmony. To secure strength in a sentence, we are instructed to 
 "prune it of all redundant words” and to "contract the round- 
 about expression. Here a severe eye should be employed; and we 
 shall always find our sentences acquire more vigor and energy 
 when thus retrenched: provided always that we do not run into 
 
 the extreme of pruning so very close , as to give a hardness and 
 dryness to the style. Hor here, as in all other things, there is a 
 due medium. Some regard, though not the principal, must be had to 
 fulness and swelling of sound. Some leaves must be left to sur- 
 round and shelter the fruit." (l) 
 
 (1) Lectures . p. 125 
 
 It must be under this last proviso that Blair wrote that sent- 
 ence concerning "elegant speculations". Or the following sentence: 
 "The expressions which come warm and glowing from the mind, during 
 the fervour of pronunciation, will often have a superior grace or 
 energy to those which are studied in the retirement of the closet." 
 Or: "Infinitely better it is, to venture into the pulpit v/ith 
 thoughts arid expressions which have occurred to themselves, though 
 of inferior beauty, than to disfigure their compositions by borrow- 
 ed and ill-sorted ornaments, which to the judicious eye, vail al- 
 ways be in hazard of discovering their own poverty. " ? L e c tur e s . 
 p. 521; and p. 525.) 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 60 - 
 
 Blair, here, is engaged with co nr. osition . which is 
 certainly disputed ground between rhetoric and poetics . being ob- 
 viously indispensable to both, Uor con we lay it down with certain- 
 ty, as in some instances is possible, which of these two departments 
 is more emphasized in his treatment. Her when he comes, after 
 some further comments upon style, to a detailed examination of 
 chosen specimens of composition, can we pronounce with any more 
 certainty whether his observations are more pertinent to the 
 useful art or the fine art. He condemns Shaft sbury*s extreme 
 artificiality; praises Addison's prose style highly, and subjects 
 four of his Spectator Papers to ’'sound, if somewhat meticulous" (1) 
 examination; style is discussed as being diffuse or concise, 
 feeble or nervous, dry, plain, neat, elegant, and flowery; and 
 then he plunges into his treatment of eloquence and does not eusxge 
 short of one hundred and twenty-six pages. 
 
 Such an amount of space, ostensibly devoted to the 
 needs of the orator and evidently intended to meet in some sort 
 the desires of his classes in "eloquence", would at first seem 
 inconsistent with the statement that ^lair is not directly cons ern- 
 ed with rhetor ic . But even a cursory study of the nine lectures 
 mailing up this division will show that Blair advances very little 
 
 (1) The words are Professor Baintsbury's. History of Criticism. 
 
 2. p. 463. 
 
! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! * - ‘ 
 
 
 ; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 « 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Gl- 
 
 int o the field. (His treatment of Elocution is primarily concerned 
 with the matter of diction, and his various ie ctures upon oratory 
 do little more than repeat his previously uttered injunctions as 
 to perspicuity, fluency, and elegance of style ^ The classic 
 element of invent io . or gathering and arranging of material, which 
 occupies such great place in the traditional rhetorical training; 
 the insistence that the orator shall occupy the whole province of 
 knowledge, which Cicero expounds (1); all this is scarcely touched 
 upon by Blair. It is further noteworthy — though in this he is 
 more pertinent to the subject than was Aristotle — that but one 
 lecture out of the nine is devoted to dlivery. Of that lecture 
 the less said the better. (2) 
 
 Emerging from his treatment of oratory (which, then, 
 was less a consideration of oratory than a reapplication of his 
 
 (1) he Oratore, Book I. 
 
 (2) The Story of The Univ e rsity of Edinburgh , oir Alexander Grant 
 ( 1884] v. II. p. S57: —^Admired as Blair was as a preacher, his 
 sermons were better in print than when delivered by him; for he 
 had no graces of delivery, and ’independently of a very strong 
 provincial accent, his elocution was but indifferent from a defect 
 in the organ of pronunciation.' He appears to have been singularly 
 deficient as an extempore speaker , and on this account declined to 
 be made Moderator of the General Assembly, hr. Carlyle smiles at 
 the idea of someone having written to ask Blair to instruct him in 
 the art of preaching." 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-62- 
 
 remarks upon diction and style) 31air is happy to return to avowed 
 matters of literary criticism; but, alas, he lias largely spent 
 himself, end has little new material — certainly little material 
 of value — to give us. In rules of composition he was often 
 happy; usually just. He now discusses in the following order: 
 
 Comparative Merit of the Ancients and the 
 Moderns: Historical Writing: Philosophical Writing -- 
 
 Dialogue, Epistolary 'Writing, Fictitious History; 
 
 Uature of Poetry, Its Origin and Progress, Versifica- 
 tion; Pastoral Poetry, Lyric Poetry: Didactic Poetry, 
 
 Descriptive Poetry; The Poetry of the Hebrews: Epic 
 
 Poetry, Homer, Virgil, Voltaire, and Milton: Dramatic 
 
 Poetry, Tragedy, Greek Tragedy, French Tragedy: Comedy 
 
 -- Greek, Homan, French and English. 
 
 Here indeed is a wealth of title; but observe the character of the 
 
 titles; — they are ’’kinds” . Blair promises that in his discussion 
 
 of these subjects he will "freely deliver {his) opinion: regarding 
 
 authority no farther, than it appears to (him) founded on good 
 
 sense and reason." There is something ominous in these last words-- 
 
 "good sense and reason." One gets a sudden foreboding that B]air 
 
 may confuse his own good sense and reason with that of the English 
 
 Augustans. It is to be feared that he does so. 
 
 It is rather a dreary journey to the end of the 
 volume. We know what to expect, for example, when Blair enters 
 upon his discussion of the origin and progress of poetry. He 
 had said it all before in his history of the rise and progress of 
 
 language. In his discussion of the heroic couplet he shows us how 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 - 
 
 uninspired he can really he. Says he: 
 
 The present form of our English heroic rhyme 
 in couplets is a modem species of versification -- 
 Waller was the first who brought couplets into vogue; 
 and Dryden afterwards established the usage. Waller, 
 first smoothed our verse; Dryden perfected it. Mr. 
 
 Pope’s versification has a peculiar character. It is 
 flowing and smooth in the highest degree: far more 
 
 laboured and correct than that of any who went before 
 him. He introduced one considerable change into her- 
 oic verse, by totally throwing aside the triplets, or 
 three lines rhyming together, in which Mr. Dryden 
 abounded. Dryden ’s versification, however, has very 
 great merit; and like all his productions, has much 
 spirit mixed with carelessness. If not so smooth and 
 correct as Pope’s, it is however more varied and easy. 
 
 He subjects himself less to the rule of closing the 
 sense with the couplet; and frequently takes the liberty 
 of making his couplets run into one another, with some- 
 what the freedom of blank verse. (1) 
 
 How all this may be very true, tho gh as to its being 
 Waller who " first smoothed our verse," — there be those who doubt. 
 But if it is all true, what of it I Vie want to know what Dr. Blair 
 would have to say anent the liberties which Dryden took with the 
 "rules". Does Dr. Dp sir approve of Pope’s having' ’’thrown, aside the 
 triplets, in vhich Mr. Dryden abounded?" It is by answers to these 
 questions that Dr. Blair should reveal himself fully. But Dr. Blair 
 is silent. He says that Pope achieved a maximum of correctness in 
 his verse. Does he mean to imply disapproval of Mr. Dryden for not 
 
 (1) Lectures , p. 455. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-64- 
 
 having done the same? I am afraid he does. The admission that 
 "Mr. Dryden f s verse, however , has great merit," bears suspicious 
 resemblance to diair's "blemish- saved-by-beauty" criticism of 
 Shakespeare. 
 
 A genuine and almost- just tribute to Milton in the 
 discussion of Lpio Poetry (1) revives our hopes for a time, ani 
 when in the discussion of Tragedy we arrive at the following, we 
 take decided heart. I give this long quotation in full to show 
 how he build, s up our hope for him, along with his own mounting 
 courage . 
 
 "All that I have hitherto said, relates to 
 the unity of dramatic action? In order to render the 
 unity of action more complete, critics have added the 
 other two unities of time and place. The strict ob- 
 servance of these is more difficult, and, perhaps, not 
 so necessary. The unity of place requires that the 
 scene slhould never be shifted; but that the action of 
 the play should be continued to the end in the same 
 place where it is supposed to begin. The unity of time, 
 strictly taken, requires that the time of action be no 
 longer than the time that is allowed for the representa- 
 tion of the play; though Aristotle seems to have given 
 the poet a little more liberty, and permitted the action 
 to comprehend the thole time of one day. 
 
 "The intention of both these rules is, to over- 
 charge as little as possible, the imagination of the 
 spectators with improbable circumstances in the acting 
 01 the play, and to bring the imitation more close to 
 reality. Vie must observe that the nature of dramatic 
 exhibitions upon the Greek stage subjected the aa ci ent 
 tragedians to a more strict observance of those unities 
 than is necessary in modern theatres. I showed that Greek 
 
 (1) Lectures . pp. 505-506 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-65- 
 
 tragedy was one uninterrupted representation from 
 beginning to end. There was no division of acts; 
 no pauses or intervals between them; but the stage 
 was continually full, occupied either by the actors 
 or the chorus. Hence no room was left for the 
 imagination to go beyond the precise time and place 
 of the representation; any more than is allowed dur- 
 ing the continuance of one act on the modern theatre. 
 
 "But the practice of suspending the spectacle 
 totally for some little time between the acts, has 
 made a great and material change; it gives more lat- 
 itude to he imagination, and renders the aicient 
 strict confinement to time and place less necessary. 
 
 While the acting of the play is interrupted, the spectator 
 can, wi thout any great or violent effort, suppose a few 
 hours to pass between every act; or can suppose himself 
 moved from one apartment of a palace to another; and 
 therefore, too strict an observance of these unities, 
 ought not be preferred to higher beauties of execution, 
 nor to the introduction of more pathetic situations, 
 which sometimes cannot be accomplished in any other way, 
 than by a transgression of these rules." (1) 
 
 At length Blair has led us by a gradual ascent to 
 
 the position attained by Karnes in a single bound. But now observe 
 
 how he lias lifted us up only to dash us down. The unhappy man 
 
 can not escape "the rules." (l) They plague and haunt him; 
 
 (1) Professor Willard Higley Durham, editor of Critical Assays o f 
 the eighteenth century . takes occasion to remonstrate against the 
 tendency to pigeon-hole the eighteenth century as the age of "rules' 
 He says (p. XI)"For the really thoroughgoing classicist or ration- 
 alist in criticism it is necessary to go to the preceding century. 
 If by pseudo-classic is meant the type of mind which carries its 
 admiration for the ancients to the point of idolatry, to the point 
 of inculcating a slavish imitation of the Greeks and Latins and of 
 censuring departure from their methods, we can best find it in 
 Thomas Ryner." 
 
 Durham thinks it unfair to say that such a theory was dominant 
 in the eighteenth century. It is true that side by side with the 
 left-over ideas of the seventeenth century we find the .juster pro- 
 nouncements of Johnson in his Preface to Shakespeare (before noted) 
 and again in The Rambler (Ho. 151). True, also, that John D e nnis 
 ridiculed Addison's unity of place in Oato ( The Impartial Critick . 
 Spingarn' s Crit ical Assays of the seventeenth century . A. pp.148 - 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 66 - 
 
 They plague and haunt him; he must relinquish ail that he has 
 tried to save. He has used the rules to a purpose they will not 
 serve. He must retract; or at least hedge: 
 
 But though it seems necessary to set modern 
 poets free from a strict observance of these dramatic 
 unities, yet we must remember that there are certain 
 bounds to this liberty. Frequent and mid changes of 
 time and place; hurrying the spectator from one distant 
 city or country to another; or making several days or 
 weeks pass during the course of the representation, are 
 liberties which shock the imagination, which give the 
 performance a romantic and unnatural appearance, and 
 
 (Footnote to page 65, continued) 
 
 197) True that Addison himself denies the rigidity of the ruins in 
 The Spectator . (Ho. 592). 
 
 But it is equally undeniable that the adoration of 
 the unities was dying hard with the critics in general. Addison 
 when he came to write, had followed the unities. Strong French 
 influence was felt in England, and Voltaire had planted himself 
 squarely for the "rules" in his Discours sur la Tragedie . a iiylord 
 Bolingbroke (prefixed to Brutus , 1751 ) . 
 
 It may be true, then, that Blair was awake to the 
 opposition to the rules; but he was equally awake to their defense. 
 Such an admission only blackens the case still more for the Doctor. 
 
 "Hurrying the spectator from one distant city or 
 country to another," and "making several days or weeks to pass dur- 
 ing the course of the representation, *'''** cannot be allowed in 
 any dramatic writer who aspires to correctness," says Blair. "It 
 is rarely observed that minds, not prepossessed by mechanical 
 criticism, feel any offense from the extension of the intervals 
 between the acts; nor can I conceive it as absurd or impossible, 
 that lie who can multiply three hours into twelve or twenty- four, 
 might imagine, with equal ease, a greater number," says Dr. John- 
 son (The Rambler, Ho. 156). 
 
 It is only taking Blair's excuse away from him, to 
 admit that from English critics he might have drawn the truth. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-67- 
 
 therefore cannot be allowed in any dramatic v.Titer who 
 aspires to correctness. In particular we must observe 
 that it is only between acts, that any liberty can be 
 given for going beyond the unities of time and place. 
 
 During the course of each act, they ought strictly to 
 be observed; that is, during each act the scene should 
 continue the same, and no more time should be supposed 
 to pass than is employed in the representation of that 
 act. This is a rule which the French tragedians regular- 
 ly observe. To violate this rule, as is too often done 
 by the English; to change the place and shift the scene 
 in the midst of one act, shows great incorrectness, and 
 destroys the whole intention of the division of a play 
 into acts. Mr. Addi®n*s Cato is remarkable beyond most 
 English tragedies, for regularity of conduct. The 
 author lias limited himself in time, to a single day; 
 and in place, has maintained the most rigorous unity. 
 
 The scene is never changed; and the whol e action passes 
 in the hall of Cato^ house, at Utica. (1) 
 
 After this final relapse on the part of the patient, 
 there is little need of considering his case further. If we can 
 catch him when his fears of the proprieties are in abeyance, we 
 can often get something of value from him; something of more value, 
 at least, than praise of a tragedy because of its "regularity of 
 conduct." The phrase is a delicious one. It is an almost irresist- 
 ible invitation to a pun. There was some real and abiding merit 
 in what he had to tell us concerning diction and sentence structure. 
 
 Moreover, he could usually set us the example in his own composi- 
 tion. One must search for the horrible examples of "eloquence" 
 quoted early in the chapter. But it is clear that he has nothing 
 more for us. We shall only be pained at each fresh instance of his 
 
 (1) Lectures , p. 518. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 68 - 
 
 
 
 vacillation. Let us pass on. 
 
CAl.jp 3ELL AUD HIS PHILOSOPHY OP RHETORIC. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Tlie third, and last, writer whom I have to consider, 
 is Dr. George Campbell, Principal of the Marischal College, 
 
 Aberdeen. His Philosophy of Rhetoric . which appeared in 1776, has 
 received high praise from all those who have treated the subject 
 of rhetoric and criticism. I have already quoted from Professor 
 Millar concerning the value of his work; (1) to this acclaim 
 3e t there be added the voice of Gregory Smith, who speaks of him 
 as "surpassing Blair." (2) And, if we may add one more testimonial 
 let it be that of Professor Baintsbury, who lays it down that the 
 Philosophy of Rhetoric . "however much we may disagree with occasion- 
 al expressions in it, remains the most important treatise on the 
 Hew Rhetoric (criticism) that the eighteenth century produced." (3) 
 
 How, if one comes to the study of Campbell with this 
 idea of his importance, he will certainly be struck by this singular 
 circumstance; that although critics and literary historians are of 
 one voice in acclaiming the high place of the Principal, they are 
 also curiously of one disposition in their avoidance of treat irg 
 
 (1) Vide sup ra, p. 35 
 
 (2) Scottish Literature , p. 199 
 
 (3) A History of Critic ism . 2. p. 470. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-70- 
 
 him in any detail. Gregory Smith, indeed, is circumscribed by the 
 limits of his undertaking, and has little space either for Blair 
 or for Campbell. Yet within that space, the two men receive 
 curiously unequal treatment. There are five separate and 
 distinct references to -Blair. The name of George Campbell appears 
 but once, and that in a statement that he surpassed Blair. 
 
 Professor Millar, v/ho it will be remembered called the Philosophy 
 of Rhetoric . "the most valuable contribution to criticism which 
 came from Scotland during the century,” contents himself in that 
 instance with a mere statement of the fact. Lest it be pleaded that 
 here too, the limits and purpose of his work forbade any fuller 
 treatment, let us turn to his later and more expanded consideration 
 of this period. In his Scottish Prose of the Seventeenth and 
 Eighteenth Centuries . we find twenty- four pages dev ted to Karnes, 
 (four of them dealing particularly with Karnes as a critic) (1); 
 almost fourteen pages are devoted to an examination of Blair and 
 his Lectures (2); but when we come to look for Campbell, we fiid that 
 he has been given less than a full page, with the excuse that his 
 work "goes too much into detail on many points to admit of profit- 
 able summary here.” (5) 
 
 Professor Saints bury, it would seem at first sight, 
 
 (1) Scottish Prose . pp. 190 ff. 
 
 (2) ibid, pp. 2^1 ff 
 (3.) Ibid, pp. 230-231. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-71- 
 
 had gone t o so me pa ins t o make a survey of th e Philosophy ck 
 Critic ism . His treatment of the wd ik. in his Hi story of Ori tici sm 
 occupies four pages, a generous allowance of space in so crowded 
 a volume. Professor Saintsbury is evidently bent upon establishing 
 the point that in Campbell we have the true fusion of the critic 
 and the rhetorician; or rather, that Campbell recognised that the 
 terms criticism and rhetoric were synonymous. (1) I must con- 
 
 fess that I cannot agree that such a fusion of criticism and rhet- 
 oric is any more apparent in Campbell than in Karnes and Blair. 
 Indeed, it might almost be said to be less apparent, though not 
 necessarily less real. Bor do I find that Professor Saintsbury 
 has supported his thesis by his treatment of Campbell’s work; a 
 treatment made up largely of statements of opinion, almost entirely 
 unsupported by reference. Direct reference, when given, is almost 
 always to those passages which the critic designates as ’’more ex- 
 crescent than properly episodic.” The passages which are thus 
 quoted as deviations from the theme and purpose of the work, are 
 so numerous and so extensive that just suspicion arises as to 
 Saintsbury 1 s estimate* 
 
 (1) "The Bew Rhetoric -- the Art of Criticism -- this is what 
 Campbell really attempts." Saintsbury (2. p. 470) 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 A direct comparison of the three works under consider- 
 ation in this paper, may serve to point out why Campbell has never 
 received adequate treatment. The first thing brought out by such 
 comparison is the great difference in organization and presentation 
 of material between Campbell on the one hand, and Karnes and Blair 
 on the other. Campbell is w r riting a text-book; Karnes and Blair 
 are writing essays. The one is preparing his material and advai c- 
 ing it in the form and order suggested by class need. Blair, 
 although making some shift to do this in the first half of his 
 Lectures, escapes from it eventually into the happier region of 
 literary appreciation. Karnes frankly addresses the understanding 
 of those who would criticise. Campbell is addressing those who 
 create. It is this text- bo ok arrangement and treatment — 
 which Professor Saintsbury may have had in mind when he spoke of’ 
 the "singularly businesslike character of Campbell's work" (1) — 
 that makes difficult any critical digest of the Philosophy of 
 Rhetoric . 
 
 Even metre than in the mere natter of arrangement and 
 presentation do the three men differ in their conceptions of the 
 subject to be handled. The Creeks, (as has been stated) had early 
 
 (1) History of Criticism . 2. p. 475. 
 

 1 , r >. > •! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 73 - 
 
 distinguished between two main branches of the literary art; the 
 useful , and the ornamental; or rhetoric and poetics . However 
 vague the boundaries between these two divisions might have been 
 in actual practice, and however much the lb rely useful branch of 
 the art had encroached upon the territory of the more purely 
 literary art, the distincti on was nevertheless important. The 
 province of the orator was that species of composition, the 
 purpose of which is to persuade or enlighten. His art was the art 
 of rhetoric. The more purely literary artist reserved for himself 
 the drama and the epic, together with those lesser compositions 
 best designated by the title lyric ; and his art was the art of 
 poetics . In this distinction we have found the means of interpret- 
 ing the work of Campbell;, and, indeed, of all three men. 
 
 Karnes was interested, chiefly, in finding those 
 basic principles in human nature which act as the ultimate and 
 universal standards of taste, ^rom the nature of his inquiry, he 
 was led into a consideration of those forms of literary expression 
 identified as poe tics . Hven his chapters on composition and word 
 values are concerned primarily with sense impressions. Scarcely, 
 if at all, does he invade the province of the more strictly useful 
 branch of the art. His study might justly be termed an essay on the 
 psychology of aesthetics. Blair, building upon Hames, re-affirms 
 his principles with but slight modifications. In neither his 
 remarks upon taste or his literary appreciations in the latter half 
 
-74- 
 
 of his Lectures does he encroach upon the province of the older 
 rhe toric . In his remarks upon style and his subsequent examination 
 of specimens of Swift, Addison, etc., he sL ips over the boundary 
 for a time. Particularly is this true when his emphasis is upon 
 mere matters of perspicuity and accuracy; his consideration of 
 style, in its more highly literary aspects, might justly be claimed 
 by either of the two arts, even as in practice the orator must 
 often avail himself of the art of poetics . 
 
 Campbell, however, approaches his task with the 
 Aristotelian distinction (l) clearly in mind. What Professor 
 Eaintsbury has chosen to designate as his "Aristotelian relapses" 
 (2), are, it seems to the present writer, far from "relapses". They 
 are in the main body of the work; integral parts of a plan most 
 strictly classic in its conception of rhetoric as being a useful, 
 rather than an ornamental, art. Hot that the Principal intends to 
 blind himself to the value of the art of poetics as a necessary and 
 
 ( 1 ) Aristotle on the art of Poetry , a revised text with critical 
 introducti on , translation , and c ommentary . by Ingram Bywater (1909) 
 p7"lT* ''Out subject being Poetry, I propose to speak not only of 
 the art in general but also of its species and their respective 
 capacities .... Epic Poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, -oithyrambic 
 poetry, and most flute-playing and lyre-playing, are all viewed as 
 a whole, modes of imitation." 
 
 T]ie_ rhetoric of Aristotle r translated wi th an analysis 
 and critical notes , by J. E. 0. Uelldon 11886), p. 10:"Hhetoric may 
 be defined as a faculty of discovering all the possible means of per- 
 suasion in any subject." 
 
 (2t History of Criticism , v. 11, p. 470. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-75- 
 
 uaefu.1 adjunct to the art of the orator. "Poetry," says he, 
 
 "is properly no other than a particular mode or form of certain 
 branches of oratory." (1) Poetics . he will admit as handmaiden of 
 rhetoric . but its subordinate position in his plan is intimated by 
 the words "certain branches of oratory." Uor do we have to remain 
 long satisfied with oere intimation. The Principal becomes explicit. 
 In acknowledging his own debt to .Karnes, he takes occasion to com- 
 pare his present aim with that of the Elements . and to point out 
 exactly where the two part company. In Karnes^ work, he says, 
 the various fine arts "are examined only on that side wherein 
 there is found a pretty considerable coincidence with one another; 
 namely, as objects of taste, which by exciting sentiments of 
 grandeur, beauty, novelty, and the like, are calculated to deLight 
 the imagination. In this view, eloquence comes no farther under 
 consideration than as a fine art, and adapted like the others above 
 mentioned, to please the fancy and move the passions. But to Treat 
 it als<o as a useful art, and closely connected with the understand- 
 ing and will, would have led to a discussion foreign to his pur- 
 pose." (2). That Campbell purposed to treat of eloquence as a use- 
 ful art, and that he kept faithfully to his purpose, is evidenced in 
 
 (1) Philosophy of Rhetoric , p. 18, American edition, 1871. 
 
 (2) Ibid, p. 21. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 76 - 
 
 eve ry page of Ms work, and I know not how Professor Saintsbury 
 could justly terra those passages "excrescent" , which are so clearly 
 the very workings-out of this program. (1) 
 
 Campbell has divided his treatise into three parts: 
 "The nature and foundations of eloquence; the foundations and es- 
 sential properties of elocution;” and, "the discriminating properties 
 of elocution." However well these divisions may have been adapted 
 to class presentation, they do not afford us the readiest means of 
 estimating his work. We shall therefore content ourselves with 
 noting them, -- and then forgetting them. In their place we shall 
 
 (1) It should be noted that my perplexity is not that Professor 
 Saintsbury should take exception to those passages which he mentions. 
 They are invariably passages in wMch Campbell indulges with Karnes 
 in attempts at analysing human nature. My wonder is that Professor 
 Saintsbury should have considered these as foreign to the purpose 
 of the Philos ophy of Rhetoric . The Professor’s objection to any 
 psychological basis for criticism is too well known to need much 
 comment. Being firmly of the opinion that ethics have nothing to 
 do with literature, he looks askance at any study vh ich has the 
 appearance of assigning a common origin to morals and emotions. 
 
 To the repeated assurances of Karnes and Campbell that they are not 
 confusing mo mis and taste he gives scant attention. Karnes has 
 already been quoted; let Oampoeil speak in his own defense: 
 
 "Are we then to class the virtues among the passions? By no 
 means (Yet) although not passions, they are so closely relat- 
 
 ed to them, that they are properly considered as motives to action, 
 being equally capable of giving an impulse to the will." 
 
 Object as he may to any consideration of virtue as applied to 
 literary criticism, surely Professor Saintsbury need not object to 
 the use of virtue as a main-spring of action in the art of oratory. 
 Kor would he object, in my opinion, had he firmly grasped the pur- 
 pose of the author of the Philosophy o f Rhetoric . 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
- 77 - 
 
 substitute three divisions of our om ; namely. convi ct ion , persuasion 
 and composition . The first two of these have always "been considered 
 as complementary elements in the art of the orator. Together, they 
 are said to comprise the art of argument . The last of the three 
 divisions, composit ion , lies upon the border-line between rhetoric 
 and poetics . It is pre-empted now by the one, now by the other, ac- 
 cording to whether the aim be to enlighten or to please. With 
 Campbell, the ultimate aim is always to enlighten, although he recog- 
 nizes the fact that to enlighten, one must often amuse, or at least 
 enlist the sympathies by interest. 
 
 Convict ion , as treated by all writers on oratory, is 
 said to deal with those matters which make their appeal to the under- 
 standing of man, as distinguished from his emotions. Its instrument 
 is logic. What says Principal Campbell? "The sole and ultimate 
 end of logic is the eviction of truth; one important end of 
 eloquence ***+ is the conviction of the hearers." (l) Therefore, 
 Campbell dwells at some length upon the reasoning processes of man. 
 But, he adds, "Rhetoric, as was observed already, not only considers 
 
 (1) Philosophy of Rhetoric . p. 54 
 
■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ♦ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-78- 
 
 the subject, but also the hearers and the speaker." (1) This is 
 a matter for persuasion . Consequently, the Philosophy of Rhetoric 
 has much to say concerning the passions and emotions which may be 
 enlisted in the service of the orator, finally, the importance of 
 composition and its relation to oratory is noted(2): "Eloquence 
 
 hath always been considered, and very justly, as having a particular 
 connexion with language . It is the intention of eloquence to od n- 
 vey our sentiments into the minds of others, in order to produce 
 a certain effect upon them, language is the only vehicle by which 
 this conveyance can be made. The art of speaking, then, is not 
 less necessary to the orator than the art of thinking." 
 
 So important does Campbell consider this art of 
 speaking, that fully two thirds of his volume are devoted to it. 
 
 In this v/ilderness of rules of grammar, diction, and verbal 
 criticism, a reviewer may well lose himself. Pull treatment, or 
 indeed, any adequate treatment, becomes as difficult as the task 
 of revi ewing any manual of composition. It would scarcely be a 
 greater feat to give a literary estimate of Woolley’s Handbook of 
 Composition. This may, indeed, be the best of excuses for its 
 neglect by certain chroniclers of literary history; but that the 
 
 (1 Philosophy of Rhetoric . p. 95 
 (fc) Philosophy of Rhetoric , p. 162. 
 

 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-79- 
 
 distinction of having compiled a good practical handbook of com- 
 position, is sufficient warrant for elevating Campbell into an 
 apostle of "the Hew Criticism" (whatever that may be), appears 
 doubtful to the present writer. Either Karnes or Blair would seem 
 to have better title to the appellation critic . 
 
 Beginning his work with the public speaker in mind, 
 Campbell makes preliminary division of the field into serious 
 or grave speaking, and the lighter or humorous manner. Sublimity, 
 vehemence, and pathos are listed as the weapons of the former type, 
 and their natures are investigated somewhat after the manner of 
 Karnes. Much more thoroughly in the spirit and manner of Karnes is 
 the discussion of wit, humor, and ridicule; herein Campbell ex- 
 amines into the causes of laughter, noting theories of Aristotle 
 and Hobbes, and professing himself in general accord with that of 
 Aristotle, while heartily opposed to that of Hobbes. (1) 
 
 Next fo Hows a discussion of the relation which 
 eloquence bears to logic and grammer, in the course of which 
 Campbell deals a lusty blow as the "scholastic art of syllogizing." 
 Speaking of this last. Professor Baintsbury says that in this 
 discussion Campbell "wrecks himself in a galley which he had not 
 
 (1) Philosophy of Rhetoric . pp. 50-54 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-80- 
 
 the slightest need to enter." (1) I am at a loss to know exactly 
 what is meant by this statement. If it he intended as a disagree- 
 ment with the findings of Campbell, that is a matter of opinion; 
 and against Professor Saintsbury’s judgment will he ranged not 
 only the judgment of Campbell, but of John Otuart Mill, whose 
 discussion of the syllogism is at many points in accord with that 
 of Campbell. (2) But if by "wrecking himself" Professor Saintsbury 
 intended to indicate only that Campbell had departed from his orig- 
 inal scheme and intention, the matter refers itself to that differ- 
 ence of opinion, before noted, as to what was the exact purpose and 
 plan of the Philosophy of Rhetoric . 
 
 (1) Hi story of Criticism , v. II, p. 471. 
 
 (2) Philosophy of Rhetoric . p. 88. Speaking of the fallacy of 
 
 petit io principii . which logicians have been at great pains to warn 
 against, and have designated as a sophism . Campbell says: "It is 
 
 surprising that this should ever have been by those artists styled 
 
 a sophism, since it is, in fact, so essential to the art, that there 
 is always some radical defect in a syllogism which is not chargeable 
 with this." 
 
 For Mill’s recognition of the fallacy of petitio principii im- 
 plicit in every syllogism considered as a means of argument to arrive 
 at a new truth (identical with Campbell’s objection to the syllogism 
 as a means of inference) see Mill’s Logic . pp. 122 and following. 
 (London 1906) 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-81- 
 
 Having treated of men as creatures of understanding, 
 and thus having disposed of convi ction . Campbell advances to treat 
 of man as a creature of emotion. This is a matter for persuasion, 
 and in his analysis of the subject, he perforce turns philosopher, 
 and calls into consultation such eminent practitioners as Abb 4 du 
 Bois (1), Fontenelle (2), Hume (£), and Hobbes (4). With none of 
 these is he in perfect accord, and he verts out for himself "in that 
 debatable ground between literature and Ethics" an explanation- of 
 various emotional processes of man, which are again Kamesian in 
 their method if not in their actual findings. 
 
 The reader has now arrived at that point where Camp- 
 bell begins his treatment of composition . A glance at the table of 
 contents (which is made up of such headings as: "Of the Qualities 
 of Style strictly Rhetorical; of Perspicuity; The Obscure — from 
 Defect, from Bad Arrangement, from Using the -Same Word in Different 
 Senses, from An Uncertain Reference in Pronouns and Relatives, from 
 Too Artificial a Structure of the Sentences, Etc. Etc.) will re- 
 assure the student that any complete treatment of this remaining 
 part of the work would be impracticable, unless as a revision of a 
 
 ( 1 ) P.6 flexions Critiques sur la Po6sie et sur la Pe injure . 
 
 (2) D~ei l£xi oris sur la Podtique ♦ 
 
 (5) Essay on Tragedy . 
 
 (4) Human Nature. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 \ I • 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 82 - 
 
 a manual of composition. Such a revision lies neither within the 
 purpose nor the power of the present writer. 
 
 Yet to suffer fully two thirds of the work to go 
 untouched would be embarrassing. Moreover, scattered throughout 
 the rules and their application, may be found such oo mmon- sense 
 and practical justification for their use, as in itself merits 
 attention. It is this just and logical defense of his rules, and 
 the undeniable acuteness and general correctness of his taste, which, 
 I tahe it, has commended Campbell particularly to those who have 
 praised him highly. A steady diet of Karnes, with his subtleties 
 which are not always certain, and his inductions which do not 
 uniformly induce, may we 11 make a man relish a generous dose of 
 the practical. In the latter part of his work Campbell abandons 
 to a great extent the abstruse and the philosophic, and calls in 
 common sense to enforce his precepts. Such is the defense which he 
 brings to the support of his nine canons of verbal criticism, vhich 
 Professor Saintsbury praises so highly, and which I append in a 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ♦ 
 
 .. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-83- 
 
 footnote. (1) After so often having been forced to take exception 
 to Professor Saint s bur y* s remarks, it is with the greater pleasure 
 that I find myself in accord with his opinion concerning tliese 
 canons, when he says that they are "in the main so sound and so 
 acute that they are not obsolete to the present day." (2) 
 
 (l) I. When use is divided as to any particular word or phrase, 
 and the expression used by one part hath been preoccupied, or is 
 in any instance susceptible of a different signification, and the 
 expression employed by the other part never admits a different sense, 
 both perspicuity and variety require that the form of expression 
 which is in every instance strictly uni vocal be preferred. 
 
 II. In doubtful cases regard ought to be had to the analogy of 
 the language. 
 
 III. When terms or expressions are in other respects equal , 
 that ought to be preferred which is most agreeable to the ear. 
 
 IV. In cases wherein none of the foregoing rules gives either 
 side ground for preference, a regard to the simplicity (in which I 
 include etymology when manifest) ought to determine our choice. 
 
 V. In the few cases wherein neither perspicuity nor analogy, 
 neither sound nor simplicity, assists us in the fixing our choice, 
 it is safest to prefer that manner which is most conformable to 
 ancient usage. 
 
 VI. All words and phrases which are remarkably harsh and un- 
 harmonious, and not absolutely necessary, may justly be judged 
 worthy of this fate (i.e., of being dropped from use). 
 
 VII. When etymology plainly points to a signification different 
 from that which the word commonly bears, propriety and simplicity 
 both require its dismission. 
 
 VIII. When any words become obsolete, or at least, are never 
 used except at constituting parts of particular phrases, it is better 
 to dispense with their service entirely, and give up the phrases. 
 
 IX. All those phrases which, when analyzed grammatically , in- 
 clude a solecism, and all those to which use hath affixed a particu- 
 lar sense, but which, when explained by the general and established 
 rules of the language , are susceptible either of a different sense 
 or of no sense, ought to be discarded altogether. 
 
 (2f History of Criticism , v II , p. 472. 
 

 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 . 
 
 
-84- 
 
 As representative of the many instances of just and 
 sensible reasoning by the Principal, I shall produce his warning' 
 against silly and indiscriminate attempts to improve the lar guage. 
 He is speaking in particular against the practice of attempting to 
 eject old and established forms of words adapted from foreign 
 tongues, and to substitute in their places forms Y/hose only claim 
 is that they are closer approximations of the foreign word. 
 
 "Again: why this reformation should be confined 
 
 almost entirely to proper names, for my part I can discover 
 no good reason. Appellatives are doubtless entitled to a 
 share. Critics of this stamp ought, for example, boldly to 
 resolve, in spite of the inveterate abuses and plebeian pre- 
 judices, never, while they breath, either to write or to pro- 
 nounce the words, pope . popery , and popedom , but instead of 
 them pape . pape ry . and papedom ; since whether we derive 
 these words immediately from the French, the Latin, or the 
 Greek, still it appears that the o_ is but a base usurper 
 of a place which rightfully belongs to the a. The reason 
 assigned for saying Koran , and not Alcoran , is truly curious. 
 Al, say they, is the Arabic article, and signifies the : con- 
 sequently, if we should say the Alcoran , we should fall into 
 a gross perissology. It is just as if we said the the book. 
 
 A plain illiterate man would think it sufficient to reply. 
 
 What though al signifies the in Arabic, it hath no sig- 
 nification in English, and is only here the first syllable 
 of a name which use hath appropriated, no matter how, to a 
 particular book. But if ye who are such deep scholars and 
 wonderful improvers of your mother-tongue, are determined to 
 exclude this harmless syllable from Alcoran , act at least 
 consistently, and dismiss it also from alchymy . alcove . 
 alembic . algebra . almanac . and all the other words in the 
 language that are derived in the same way, and from the 
 same source. Indeed it is not easy to say where ye will 
 stop} for if ye attend to it, ye will find many words of 
 Latin or French origin which stand equally in need of re- 
 formation." (1) 
 
 (1) The Philosophy of Hhetoric . p. 200. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 86 - 
 
 .tfow that I have come to take leave of Campbell, I 
 note with mixed emotions that like all others vho have attempted to 
 treat his work, I have relatively slighted him in space. There is, 
 however, some source of satisfaction to me in that I have nowhere 
 committed myself as whole-heartedly to that exaltation of his im- 
 portance which lias embarrassed others when they came to treat of him. 
 As a teacher of composition he is, of course , far-and-away ahead of 
 Karnes; and in the detail and extent of his directions for compo- 
 sition, I suppose he excels Blair. If his importance be rated, 
 then, by his achievements in the field of pedagogy and composition, 
 
 I must agree that he overtops them. But I can see little reason 
 to enter into a relative estimate of the three men, if in this 
 estimate we do not clearly recognise the fact that their aims and 
 
 (Footnote to page 85, continued.) 
 
 standing (1) the proper use of the voice for expression of the 
 several emotions, i.e., when it should be loud or low or intermed- 
 iate; (2) the proper use of the accents, i. e. when the tone should 
 be acute or grave or intermediate, and (£) the rhythms suitable to 
 each emotion 
 
 ’’The art of declamation, when it comes, into vogue, 
 will produce the same effects as the histrionic art; the truth 
 
 is that a capacity for declaiming or acting is a natural gift, com- 
 paratively free from artistic regulations, although it may be re- 
 duced to an art in its application to style." The Rhetoric of 
 Aristotle . translated with an analysis and critical notes, by J. a. 
 G. Welldon, pp. 225-227, 
 
 Longinus and Cicero treat somewhat of delivery with 
 respect to action; but the present day treatises in which the 
 importance of delivery is greatly stressed not only as helpful orna- 
 ment for thought, but a a direct stimulus and formative influence 
 upon thought, are based upon a psychology unknown to the ancients. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 « 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 87 - 
 
 purposes were far from identical; and that the first two were in 
 spirit critics of the fine arts, whereas the last was first and 
 always an exponent of the useful art. 
 
RECAPITULATION AND INTERPRETATION. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Intimate and details d treatment of any subject is apt 
 to induce in the mind of the writer an exaggerated idea of the im- 
 portance of that subject. It would be folly to maintain that either 
 Names or Blair has exercised any great influence upon the progress 
 of rhetoric and criticism. Campbell has had better fortune . Less 
 popular originally than the others he, nevertheless, outlasted them. 
 The reasons in each case are fairly obvious. Names appealed to his 
 times by his speculative psychology; to this apical Blair added 
 that of ’’elegance”. Modem methods of research have rendered the 
 one antiquated; modern taste has pronounced the other "distasteful” 
 Campbell, on the other hand, though indulging with Names in sone ab- 
 stractions, by no means emphasizes speculative methods in the same 
 degree. _ I have noted that his treatment of composition (fully two- 
 thirds of his volume) is logical (1) rather than philosophic. Nor 
 was he as "elegant" a writer as Blair. The lach of those qualities 
 
 (1) Not in the same sense as the word has been applied to Whately's 
 Rhetoric . London, ( 18£8 ) . Campbell, indeed, was decidedly suspicious 
 of formal logic as treated by the scholiasts. He was logical , rather 
 in his methods of justifying his rules by appeals to common sense, 
 which some have thought to be the soul of true logic, and ai peri or 
 to most systems of logic. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 89 - 
 
 which might have endeared him to his own age, recommended him to the 
 next; and if his book has at length yielded to successors, his 
 theories of composition remain in the pages of the modern text. 
 
 But if few direct traces of Karnes and Blair remain to- 
 day, they were none the less prophetic of the coming aesthetic crit- 
 icism. A reasoned and rational aestheticism is the attempt of Karnes, 
 and, after him, of Blair. What Ao men like , and why do they like it? 
 Addison had done something of the sort before in his Pleasures of 
 the Imagination , but never to the extent to which the matter was car- 
 ried by these two Scots. If then I cannot claim for them that crown 
 of critical approbation, "influence", nevertheless I may accord them 
 a distinction second only, in academic circles, to "influence". They 
 were "significant". Let us summarize their signif icance . 
 
 Fired with the passion of explaining things, a passion 
 characteristic ■ of the times and of Boots in particular, Karnes pro- 
 poses to elucidate the grounds of all criticism. He will seek these 
 grounds or principles "in their true source," human nature. Although 
 he professes to deal with all the fine arts, his natural bent and 
 the prevalent absorbing interest in English language and literature 
 lead him to consider literature mainly. His method of procedure is 
 to be inductive, which means that he will gather facts of individual 
 preference and from these arrive at his general canons. This laud- 
 able resolve to confine himself to a posteriori reasoning suffers at 
 times, it is to be feared, from insidious encroachments of certain 
 

 
 
 ' 
 
 . 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-90- 
 
 a priori postulates. (1) But regardless of its success, the 
 
 attempt to ground criticism upon human nature is praiseworthy. 
 Rhetoric, "the art of ascertaining the available means of persua- 
 sion," though susceptible of treatment upon this basis, is slighted 
 by Karnes in his more immedi ate purpose of ascertaining the various 
 means of giving pleasure. He lays, then, a basis for either Rhetoric 
 or Poetics, but deals with the latter only. 
 
 Blair, assenting to Karnes 1 s element s of critical 
 judgment, applies them in some measure to the appreciation of lit- 
 erature. The words "in some measure" should be emphasized; for he 
 was influence^, in far greater degree than was Karnes, by what, in iiis 
 opinion, it was pro .er to think about literature. Rhetoric, the use- 
 ful art, received little attention from him. His lectures upon 
 elocution deal mainly with consideration of diction. In matters of 
 composition he taught wisely, ancj. , all things considered, his prac- 
 tice was not discreditable to his theory. 
 
 In Campbell we hark back to Aristotle, -- at least in 
 the union of persuasion and composition. The persuasive purpose of 
 Rhetoric is restated; its function as a useful art is reasserted. 
 
 (1) Elements, 1. p. 77, "I love my daughter less after she is mar- 
 ried, and my mother less after a second marriage; the marriage of 
 my son or my father diminishes not my affection so remarkably," 
 
 Taken with its context, this has a suspicious appearance of fitting 
 fact to the theory it is supposed to illustrate. 
 

 
-91- 
 
 In its study of persuasive methods the Biiiio sophy of Rhetoric is 
 directly inspired by the psychology of the Elements of Criti cisra ; 
 although this must not be taken as denying originality of thought 
 to Campbell, hot only did he adopt the method; he adapted it. To 
 the matter of co imposition . or diction, he gave it little application; 
 its value to the speaker lay in its determining what to say, not how 
 to say it. And finally, of both Blair and Campbell it should be said 
 that they were remarkably at one with Aristotle in this respect, — 
 although they were both teachers of public speaking, they taught any- 
 thing but speaking. (1) 
 
 But if Campbell harked back to the sources of Rhetoric 
 for his union of content and style, he was, nevertheless, so far in- 
 fluenced by the prevailing interest in diction as to reverse the 
 
 (1) In his realisation of the problems of the speaker as distinguish- 
 ed from those of the writer, Blair, although farther from the ancient 
 Rhetoric . is nearer than Campbell to modern teaching. Bays he 
 (Lectures, pp. 382-385); -- There is one observation which it isof im- 
 portance to make, concerning imitation of style of any favourite 
 ahthor, when we would carry his style into public speaking. We must 
 attend to a very material distinction between written and spoken 
 language . There are, in truth, two different manners of communicat- 
 ing ideas. A book that is to be read requires one style: a man that 
 
 is to speak, must use another. In books, we look for correctness, pre- 
 cision, all redundancy pruned, all repetitions avoided, language com- 
 pletely polished. Speaking admits a more copious easy style, an 
 less fettered by rule; repetitions may often be necessary, paren- 
 thesis may sometimes be graceful, the same thought must often be 
 placed in different views; as the hearers can catch it only from the 
 mouth of the speaker, and have not the advantage, as in reading a bool 
 of turning back again, and of dwelling on what they do not comprehend, 
 Hence the style of many good authors, would appear stiff, affected, 
 and even obscure, if, by too close an imitation, we should transfer 
 it to a popular oration." To all of which we cry "Bravo i" Yet we 
 note with sorrow, that content with this one note of warning, Blair 
 everywhere else treats of the style of written discourse. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 t , 
 
 
 
- 92 - 
 
 •< 
 
 Aristotelian distribution of form and substance. Two of the three 
 bo olis of the Philosophy of Rhetoric deal with composition : and — be 
 it noted — with written composition. Thus, in spite of his efforts 
 to treat of Rhetoric . he fell into the hands of those who would sub- 
 stitute for the art of persuasion, the mere mechanics of writing. 
 
 The modern tendency in Rhetoric . all such things as 
 "long expositions" and "long arguments" notwithstanding, has been 
 and continues to be a stressing of diction, sentence structure, — 
 and the paragraph. Such stress at some period is certainly essen- 
 tial to a mastery of language and discourse. Just what period shall 
 receive this stress, and in just what course students shall receive 
 instructions in thinking, continue to be the vexed questions. Per- 
 haps the modern Universities would answer the question after this 
 manner: that if the whole of knowledge is the province of the 
 
 orator, let him get his theory of thinking from a course in logic ; 
 let him practice his thinking in every other course; for his in- 
 struction in the rudiments of persuasion let him register in psy- 
 chology : and if he wo uld practice persuasion , let him enroll in a 
 
 class of argumentation . Is, then, the modern University after all a 
 school of training in Aristotelian Rhetoric? 
 
 In a very important , but a very limited sense, yes. 
 Modem specialization lias rendered easy a thorough grounding for 
 Rhetoric . but as knowledge does not necessarily make for wisdom. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
-93- 
 
 so the sum-total of university courses does not constitute Rhetoric . 
 Nothing was clearer to the founder of the art than the necessity for 
 instruction in the method of bringing all knowledge to bear upon per- 
 suasion . This instruction constituted the art of Rhetoric . How ever, 
 necessary and valuable the courses of composition may be, they are 
 not Rhetoric . It i s irony indeed, that Campbell -- the one man of 
 our three who really approached treating the art of the Stagirite — 
 should have given added impulse to the mistake of identifying 
 Rhetoric with compositi on . His treatment of diction was too good. 
 
 It quite overshadowed the other elements of his work in the minis of 
 those who followed. It is not suggested that courses in the mechan- 
 ics of writing should be eliminated; they are valuable so far as 
 they go; but "preoccupation with style is not the mood in 
 
 which either to teach or to learn the best lessons of Rhetoric." (1) 
 
 (1) C. S. Baldwin, article on Rhetoric . konroe's Cyclopedia 
 Education . 1913, vol. 5 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 _ 
 
 
 
 
 
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 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-94- 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 
 
 Aristo tie on the Art of Poetry , a revi sed text v/i th critical infcro- 
 duction, translation, and commentary. Ingram Bywater. Oxford. 
 
 1909. 
 
 Autobiography of Rev. Alexander Carlyle, Edinburgh , 1860. 
 
 Alexander Bain. English Ooaposit ion and Rhetoric . Hew York, 1887. 
 
 Hugh Blair, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belies Lettres . sixth American 
 edition, 1871. 
 
 Hugh Blair, Sermons . London, 1801, 5 volumes. 
 
 James Boswell, L i f e of Jo lins on . ed. George Birkbeck Hill, Oxford, 
 1887, 6 volumes. 
 
 James Burnett, Lord Monboddo, Origin and Progress of Language . 
 Edinburgh, 1789, 6 volumes. 
 
 George Campbell, Philosophy of Rhetoric . American edition, 1871 
 
 Gicero T s Dialogues de Oratore . ed. and translated, J. a. Watson, 
 
 Hew York, l692'J 
 
 Critical Essays of the seventeenth Century , ed. Joel E. Spingern, 
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 Critical E s says of the eighteenth century . ed Y/illard Higley Durham, 
 Yale Uni ve r si t y Pr e s s , 1 9 1 5 . 
 
 Cir Alexander Grant, The Btory of the University of Edinburgh . 1884. 
 
 Henry Home. Lord Karnes. Elements of Criticism, sixth edition. 
 Edinburgh, 1785. 
 
 William Knight, Lord Monboddo and his C ont empo rar i e s . London, 1900. 
 
 John atuart Mill, A By stem o f Logic . ed. London, 1906. 
 
 Jdhn Hepburn Millar, A Literary Hist 017/ of Scotland . Hew York, 1903. 
 
 John Hepburn Millar, Scottish Prose of the seventeenth and Eight eenth 
 Centuries . Glasgow, 1912. 
 
 Alexander Eraser Tytler , Mem 0 i r s of Lo rd Mam e s . Edinburgh, 1807. 
 
 3 volumes. 
 
 Robert Kerr, Memoirs 0 f the Life, Wri tings , and C or r e sp 0 nd e nc e of 
 William Smell i'e . Edinburgh. 1811, 2 volumes. 
 
-95- 
 
 George Saintsbury, A History of Criticism, Hew York, 1900-06, 3 
 volumes . 
 
 G. Gregory Smith, Scottish Literature . Character and inf luenc e . 
 Glasgow, 1919. 
 
 Dugald Stewart . Collected bonks . 1858, v. 10. 
 
 The Spectator, 59E, (Addison). 
 
 The Rhetoric of Aristotle . translated v;i th analysis and critical 
 not e s . J. A. c. Welldon, Cambridge, 1386. 
 
 The Rambler . 156, Samuel Johnson. 
 
 Scottish ho tes and queries . 
 
 Article on Rhetoric . C. 3 . Baldwin, Monroe* s Cyclopedia of Education . 
 
 19l5, v . 5 . 
 
 Article on Rhetoric . Sir Richard Glaverhouse Jebb, Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica, 11th edition, 1911. 
 
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus . The Three Literary Letters . ed. \7. Rhys 
 Roberts, Cambridge, 1901. 
 
 John Edwin Sandys, A History o f Classical Scholarship from the slut h 
 century 3, C. to the end of the Middle ^res . Cambridge, 1905, End ed 
 
 John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical scholarship from t he re- 
 rival of 1 earning t o the end of the e ighteenth c entury . E volsTT908. 
 
 Louis Vaucher, Etudes Critiques s ur le Trait de Sublime et sur le s 
 Ecrlts de Longin . 1851. 
 
 John Wilson, "Christopher Horth , " Have You Read Os si an? in Black- 
 v/ood T s Edinburgh Magazine . Hov • 1829. 
 
 V/ordsworth* s Literary Criticism , ed. H. C. Smith, London, 1905.