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 L I B R.AFLY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UN IVLRSITY 
 
 or ILLINOIS
 
 ¥:mM "■
 
 sensible man, would admit that the present system of Local 
 Taxation is unsound— that it is wholly opposed to every 
 principle of justice, common sense, and political economy ; 
 that it is unjust in principle, impolitic in practice. He 
 asked no favour, claimed no privilege. He pleaded for 
 equity and equality. He protested against a vicious and 
 indefensible system. This is not a party question, nor a 
 question between town and country — ^both are equally 
 interested, both realise the truth of those memorable words 
 of the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Gladstone) in 1853, 
 ** The exemption of one man, of one class, or of one pro- 
 perty, is the undue taxation of another." He contended that 
 income, from whatever source, ought to be the test and 
 measure of ability, and ought to form the basis of compul- 
 sory contributions towards all National objects. Parlia- 
 ment, for imperial purposes, recognises the liability of all 
 to contribute, according to means and ability, in the inci- 
 dence of income tax. He contended that the same principle 
 of universal hability ought to be made compulsory for all 
 National obligations and Christian duties. What have 
 been the great principles which have guided our legisla- 
 tion for the last fifty years? You have removed all 
 inequalities and anomalies ; you have abolished all privi- 
 leges and prescriptions; justice and equality have been 
 your guiding principles. To your recognition and appre- 
 ciation of those principles^ he now earnestly and anxiously 
 appealed, and he asked the House of Commons to extend 
 those principles of equity and justice impartially to all 
 classes, all interests, and every description of property, and 
 not only to widen the present basis, and enlarge the present 
 area of assessment for National pm-poses, but radically to 
 reform, revise, and readjust, on more just and equitable 
 principles, the whole system of our Local Taxation.
 
 ? ^.^JL^lr . Vc^^ _ ^^:^ 
 
 THE 
 
 ARMY BILL OF 1871 
 
 ^ 
 
 COISTSIDERED. 
 
 BEING A REPRINT OF CRITICISMS 
 
 From the "Pall Mall Gazette'' 
 
 PUBLISHED BY REQUEST. 
 
 LONDON: 
 HARRISON, 59, PALL MALL, 
 
 187L 
 [Price Sixpence.']
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 It has been represented to the author of the following 
 papers, which originally appeared in the Pall Mall 
 Gazette, that their republication in a collected form might 
 assist towards the formation of sounder views upon a 
 measure about which at present much ignorance and 
 misapprehension prevail. He has been so far influenced 
 by these representations, as to allow them to outweigh 
 the objections which attach to the republication of 
 a number of newspaper articles. The importance of 
 contributing, in however small a degree, to the breakiag 
 of the crust of popular ignorance which overlays this 
 subject, appears to the author to more than compensate 
 for the disadvantages which attend the reprinting of 
 criticisms such as these, criticisms neither complete or 
 exhaustive in themselves, and which, when thus brought 
 together, are obviously wanting in compactness and many 
 other qualities which are necessary to make them tho- 
 roughly effective. Newspaper articles are not generally 
 written with a view to republication, and these articles 
 are no exception to the rule; nor has it been possible for 
 the author to undertake the task of revising or recasting 
 these papers, so as to render them more suitable for re- 
 appearance. They are therefore reprinted almost verba- 
 tim. 
 
 It is in the highest degree important that before this 
 Bill passes into law it should undergo considerable — almost 
 radical— modification. It is too much to expect that it can 
 ever be converted into an effective measure of Army reform, 
 so that, as Mr. Disraeli observed, the " indications and dis- 
 positions of Her Majesty's Government, which are now 
 only faintly adumbrated, may, by the encom-agement 
 and interference of the Committee, be brought out in sub-
 
 stantial legislation." But it is, perhaps, not too much to 
 hope that the injustice which the Bill as it stands would 
 inflict upon a large number of officers, may be mitigated, 
 that some of the sources of present discontent and pro- 
 spective agitation with which the Bill abounds may be 
 removed, and that the declared intention of Her Majesty's 
 Government to deal perfectly fairly with the officers may 
 be actually realised. It is also to be earnestly desired that 
 some alternative scheme of retirement should be submitted 
 to the House, and that the machinery by which the hazard- 
 ous expedient of promotion by selection is to be carried on, 
 should be disclosed, considered, and perfected before the 
 present system of promotion and retirement is swept 
 away. It is surely not too much to ask that Parliament 
 should, before consenting to the vast outlay which the 
 abolition of the purchase system will entail, require of the 
 Government more precise information than has yet been 
 afforded as to the system which is to replace it. It is 
 necessary also to face and master the details of this intri- 
 cate subject, and observe their bearing upon the interests 
 of those concerned-:— of the officers of the Army on the one 
 hand, and the comitry on the other. If the country has 
 really made up its mind to set the abolition of purchase 
 before all other measures of military reform, and to spend 
 from eight to sixteen millions upon it, it is surely import- 
 ant to effect the change in the way which will secure the 
 maximum of advantage with the minimum of evil. The 
 following papers were originally written with a view to 
 impressing these considerations upon the public, and to 
 throwing some light into the recesses of the subject. 
 They are now reprinted mth the same object. Those who 
 will take the trouble to read them may perhaps discover 
 in them some justification of the author's anxiety that the 
 Bill should not pass into law in its present form. 
 
 April, 1871. 
 
 ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 , UIUC ^
 
 I. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 ARMY SCHEME.* 
 
 The principles enunciated by Mr. Cardwell on Thursday 
 last were so sound and comprehensive, and his statement 
 was in some respects so satisfactory, that there is great 
 danger of the country swinging from one extreme to the 
 other — fi'om the extreme of dissatisfaction with our military 
 system into an extreme of complacent acquiescence in that 
 which is and is to be. Mr. Cardwell's prmciples were 
 broad enough to cover the most complete scheme of 
 military reorganization which could be desu'cd, while many 
 of his figures were of a character to dispel the uneasiness 
 which has prevailed for some time past. Did he not tell 
 us that we have — or shall have in a few months — a home 
 army of nearly half a million men ? Have we not intro- 
 duced the 35-ton gun — " the most powerful weapon known 
 in the world," — together with the 16-pounder gun, "which 
 is, of its kind the most powerful weapon known ;" to say 
 nothing of the Martini-Henry rifle — " the best rifle known ?" 
 a-nd are we not recruiting as fast as we did during the 
 Crimean war ? Surely, if we have half a million men 
 armed with the best weapons known to the military 
 world, and if recruits are plentiful, our case cannot be so 
 very desperate after all ? This is one view of the case — 
 Mr. Cardwell's view — the ofiicial view. It is a view which 
 leaves out of sight the fact that only about one-fifth of the 
 half-million men are trained and disciplined troops ; that 
 the first and second class army reserves, and some portions 
 even of the army itself, are still far below their nominal 
 strength ; that the Militia have not all yet been raised, 
 while those who are now enrolled cannot by any stretch 
 of imagination be called efficient soldiers ; and that the 
 Volunteers as a body do not even pretend to such a 
 measure of efficiency as is considered requisite for, al- 
 though it is far from being attained by, the Militia. It is 
 
 * Pall Mall Gazette, February 23rd, 1871.
 
 a view which also leaves out of sight the fact that of the 
 vaunted 35-ton guns we have but a single specimen, 
 which specimen, we believe, has not yet left the proof- 
 ground ; that of the 16-pounders there exist only two, 
 with which preliminary trials are still in progress ; that 
 the adoption of the Martini-Henry rifle was officially re- 
 commended only a fortnight ago, and that the manufacture 
 of these rifles cannot commence for many months. Details 
 such as these Mr. Cardwell contented himself with merging 
 in sonorous generalities. But the circumstance that these 
 comforting assurances as to our material strength will not 
 bear too close an examination naturally suggests the im- 
 portance of comparing Mr. Cardwell's army-reforming 
 principles with their proposed application. If a half- 
 million of men fade upon closer scrutiny into a little over 
 100,000 trustworthy troops without any trustworthy 
 reserves, if our magnificent armaments prove to be merely 
 the armaments of the future, and not the armaments of 
 the present, it becomes interesting to inquire whether 
 Mr. Cardwell's principles of army reform have any fall, 
 present, actual application, or whether they merely embody 
 visionary conceptions of a military system towards which 
 the Government Bill may advance, but which it does not 
 realize. 
 
 The principles, we have said, are sound and wide 
 enough. They may be summed up under three heads : — • 
 First, that it is necessary to make the whole of our military 
 forces eflective ; second, that it is necessary to establish a 
 system of effective and sufficient reserves, available for 
 action on the shortest notice ; third, that it is necessary to 
 bring all our forces under one organization. These prin- 
 ciples were laid down very clearly and decisively by 
 Mr. Cardwell, and as they really embody the cardinal 
 articles of belief of the most advanced and thoroughgoing 
 army reformers, we have no wish to quarrel with them. 
 But it is one thing to enunciate abstract truths, and 
 another to carry those truths into practice. And the 
 practical question for us is, not so much whether Mr. Card- 
 well's principles are wise and beneficent, as whether, 
 admitting then- wisdom and beneficence, he has really 
 and efl'ectively applied them. A sufficient answer to 
 this question will probably be afi'orded by the enumera- 
 tion of the more salient omissions in the Government 
 scheme. In the first place, the scheme will certainly not 
 give us an effi3ctive Militia. We have before pointed out 
 that this constitutes a fatal blot in the measure. As far 
 as we can gather, the only increased efiectiveness of the
 
 Militia will result from the appointment of the colonels on 
 the staff to the supervision of sub-districts, from the occa- 
 sional assistance which may be rendered by line officers in 
 drilling the Militia, and from the extension of the period 
 of Militia recruit drill from 14 to 2S days. Each of these 
 things is good in itself, but the sum of them will not suffice 
 to transform the militiaman into a soldier. It is of course 
 an advantage that the Militia recruit should receive 14 days 
 more drill than at present ; but as he really requires at the 
 very least about 365 days extra to train him effectively, 
 the additional fortnight which Mr. Cardwell proposes will 
 scarcely make any sensible difference one way or the other. 
 And if Mr. Cardwell's measure fails signally — as we hold 
 it must do — to give us trained Militiamen, its failure to 
 give us trained Militia officers must be equally conspicuous. 
 Indeed we do not gather that any provision whatever has 
 been made under this head. The bare fact of removing 
 the patronage from Lords-Lieutenant will not accomplish 
 the improvement, in a military sense, of the Militia officers. 
 The fact is that Mr. Cardwell's scheme is in the main 
 destructive. It has stopped a long way short of a bold 
 constructive reform. He has cleared the way for an im- 
 portant measure, but the measure itself is not forthcoming. 
 Thus we have the abolition of purchase, and nothing 
 in its place ; the destruction of the existing system of 
 retirement, and nothing in its place; the destruction of 
 the present system of promotion, and no complete 
 machinery in lieu of it ; we have the removal of the Lords- 
 Lieutenants' patronage, but we have no new system of 
 officering the Militia ; the appointment of a new class of 
 officers, but no new method of training them. 
 
 Passing on to other omissions, we notice that notwith- 
 standing Mr. Cardwell's admirable principles we have no 
 real fusion of the Line and Militia ; no reciprocatmg action 
 established between the two. We cannot discover any 
 proposition for a flow of soldiers from one force to the 
 other, nor is there any arrangement for an interchange of 
 officers. Why Mr. Cardwell limited himself to promising 
 commissions in the Line to subalterns of Militia, instead of 
 going on to the establishment of a system by which 
 experienced Line officers would pass into the Militia, we 
 are at a loss to understand. It is clear that the Secretary 
 of State for War has not shaken himself free from the 
 fatal error of supposing that the Militia officer ma}^ safely 
 be an inferior military being to the Line officer. Precisely 
 the contrary is the case. Of the two, the Militia officer 
 ought to be the more skilled soldier, as he has to deal with
 
 8 
 
 soldiers who are wholly untrained ; but for this portion of 
 our force no provision of trained officers appears to be 
 made in the Government scheme. And this brings us to 
 another serious omission in the scheme — viz., that it makes 
 no provision for the utilization of our half-pay and rethed 
 officers, whose services in training the home defensive 
 forces would be invaluable. Until we have all the details 
 before us, we cannot say whether the formation of an 
 adequate Army Reserve is contemplated. If we are to 
 draw our conclusions from Mr. Card well's statement, we 
 should say that no such reserve is provided. The Militia, 
 as we have shewn, will not constitute an effective reserve, 
 and it is not clear that any other considerable reserve 
 force is provided — money being taken only for 9,000 first- 
 class Army Reserve men. Mr. Cardwell said nothing 
 about the formation of reserve battalions, nor so much as 
 hinted how the annual training of his handful of reserve 
 men is to be carried on. The scheme is notably defective 
 in the absence of artillery reserves wherewith to fill up the 
 cadre batteries lately created. Mr. Cardwell spoke magni- 
 ficently of a depot of artillery " so organized as to admit 
 of the immediate expansion of that branch of the corps 
 which may be needed for active service ;" but we believe 
 that the artillery depot is to consist only of about 2,000 
 men, while at least three times that number would be 
 needed to bring the batteries up to their war strength, to 
 say nothing of India, which has to be recruited from the 
 same source. And, even if we grant the sufficiency of the 
 artillery depot for the expansion of the existing batteries, 
 it is quite clear, on Mr. Cardwell's own showing, that 
 those batteries are not numerous enough for our require- 
 ments. A force of 336 field-guns is the proportion for 
 112,000 men. But Mr. Cardwell keeps on assuring us 
 that we shall have between 400,000 and 500,000 men. 
 Even if we divide this number by two, we should 
 still have to double our field artillery to give us the 
 requisite force of guns. So that it is clear that Mr. Card- 
 well's scheme not only fails to give us an effective MiUtia 
 and effective reserves, but it signally fails to give u^ an 
 effective force of field artillery. Nor, going another step 
 forward, does the scheme give us any satisfactory organi- 
 sation — any subdivision of our military forces into corps 
 dJarmee^ each corps complete and self-contained, having its 
 staff, its fightmg men, its artillery, its transport, its supplies, 
 its various civil branches. The work of decentralization, 
 which must be carried out before our military system can 
 be satisfactory, is scarcely approached. Those modes of
 
 military training which have done perhaps more than any- 
 thing else to promote the efficiency of the Prussian army, 
 do not seem to be even proposed by Mr. Cardwell — at least 
 no money is taken on this account. And while informing 
 the House that he intends further to reduce the period of 
 army service, Mr. Cardwell altogether omitted to explain 
 in what way he proposes to overcome the radical difficulty 
 of a short-service system, viz., the carrying out of the 
 Indian reliefs. No attempt is made to deal with the diffi- 
 cult question of promotion in the non-purchase corps, 
 whether as regards the corps which are now suffering from 
 serious stagnation, or prospectively as regards the whole 
 army when purchase shall have been abolished. The 
 question of the improved professional education of officers, 
 especially of officers of the scientific corps, is not faced at 
 all, and the recommendations of a recent Committee on 
 this subject appear to be altogether ignored. 
 
 We have by no means exhausted the list of omissions 
 in the Government army scheme. But we have pointed out 
 enough defects to justify our disappointment with the 
 scheme as a whole, and our surprise at the unqualified 
 satisfaction with which the majority of our contemporaries 
 have hastily accepted it. The scheme contains, as we 
 have before stated, much which is good; but it leaves 
 undone very much, which is necessary — so much that we 
 say distinctly that it leaves unsolved the* problem of 
 military reconstruction. It fails, in short, to give practical 
 effect to the principles upon which it professes to be based. 
 The consideration of the proposed abolition of purchase, 
 and of the introduction of a system of promotion by 
 selection, must form the subject of separate articles. 
 
 11. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 ARMY SCHEME (continued): 
 
 * 
 
 The question of the probable efficiency of the Militia 
 under the new Government scheme is a very important 
 one. If Mr. Cardwell can give us a really efficient Militia, 
 he will have added about 150,000 effective soldiers to oiu- 
 army, and the point of one of the most destructive criticisms 
 which have been directed against his Bill will be blunted. 
 Some of our contemporaries have discussed the question 
 under the impression that it is intended to give all Militia 
 recruits a full three months' preliminary training ; indeed, 
 
 * Pall Mall Gazette, February 27th, 1871.
 
 10 
 
 the Times of Saturday states that the period of training 
 has been extended by the Bill to six months. We can 
 discover nothing in the estimates or in the Bill to support 
 this view. On the contrary, the explanatory statement 
 issued with the estimates states, (p. 4) " The period of 
 prelimmary drill for all recruits has been increased from 
 fourteen days to twenty-eight days, prior to training." 
 Another passage states that " such additional men as may 
 be raised will be trained as recruits at the local depots for 
 varying periods not exceeding three months." The Bill 
 (clause 10) says that recruits may be subjected to pre- 
 liminary instruction " for a period of not more than six 
 months." The fact is that these limits of time are the out- 
 side limits which Mr. Cardwell proposes to legalize, not 
 those which he proposes to adopt. He has not taken money 
 for giving six months' preliminary training, as the Thnes 
 supposes, nor has he even provided for giving all recruits 
 so much as three months' preliminary training. All that 
 he has provided — according to the Estimates — seems to be 
 that in no case during the present year shall the preliminary 
 instruction extend beyond three months. It will hardly be 
 contended by the most determined supporters of the Bill 
 that three months will be sufficient to give the Militia 
 recruits the requisite instruction. If the Bill had laid down 
 that preliminary instruction should in no instance be for a 
 less period than six months, this part of Mr. Cardwell's 
 scheme, although still falling short of our requirements, 
 would have been more acceptable. 
 
 But there is another point of great importance. This 
 preliminary instruction, such as it is, is for recruits only, 
 and leaves the existing Militiamen absolutely untouched. 
 Is Mr. Cardwell satisfied with the efficiency of the Militia 
 as it now stands ? If so, he is probably the only person 
 who is. If not, why does he take no steps to increase 
 that efficiency ? Even if we could assume that his measure 
 would provide the Militia with well-trained recruits, it is 
 obvious that it makes no pretence to convert the existing 
 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, into efficient 
 troops. It retains for them merely the old one month's 
 drill — a period utterly inadequate ; and thus, after all that 
 has been said on this subject, the Militia, as a body, are to 
 be left for another year in their normal condition of 
 inefficiency.
 
 11 
 
 III.— PROMOTION BY SELECTION.^ 
 
 Next to the proposed abolition of purchase, the most promi- 
 nent feature of the Government army scheme is the contem- 
 plated introduction of a system of promotion by selection. 
 This point is one which it is important to look at calmly 
 and carefully. The change involved by the introduction of 
 promotion by selection constitutes a radical change in our 
 military system. It is a change which will affect every 
 officer of the army for good or ill, and which for good or 
 ill must ultimately penetrate through the whole fabric of 
 the army. It is the more important to examine this point 
 carefully because, as Mr. Cardwell explained, it constitutes 
 an outwork of the position of those who take their stand 
 upon the abolition of purchase. " If you abolish purchase," 
 he said, " you must accept the principle of selection," and 
 two Royal Commissions (those of 1854 and 1857) have 
 reported to the same effect. The connection between the 
 abolition of purchase and the introduction of a system of 
 promotion by selection is easily discerned. It was put very 
 clearly by the Duke of Somerset's Commission : " If the 
 purchase system were to be abolished and promotion by 
 seniority should become the rule of the service, the whole 
 Army would either be reduced to the condition in which 
 the Ordnance Corps were placed in the wars subsequent 
 to the peace of 1815, or, what is more probable, an unau- 
 thorised practice would arise — a sum of money would be 
 subscribed in the regiments, or pecuniary influence would 
 be in some way employed to induce officers to retire ; 
 thus, even after the abolition of the purchase system, 
 much of the hardship and of the evils incident to that 
 system would recur." In other words, if purchase were 
 abolished and promotion by seniority were established, 
 the result would be either a stagnation of promotion, 
 unless enormous sums were spent for retirements, or the 
 reintroduction of purchase in the form of the purse or bonus 
 system; — either officers would accept the stagnation 
 inevitable to a promotion not artificially accelerated, 
 or they would themselves supply the means of accele- 
 ration. Therefore it has generally been held that if 
 you abolish purchase you must also introduce some 
 system of promotion other than that of simple senio- 
 rity; and the alternative system generally suggested 
 is that of selection, which does, in fact, effect an artificial, 
 
 * Pall Mall Gazette, February 27th, 1871.
 
 12 
 
 however arbitrary, acceleration of promotion. Now, we 
 are free to admit that promotion by selection is theo- 
 retically the best system of promotion which conld be 
 devised, jnst as we are free to admit Sydney Smithes 
 definition of the best form of government, " An angel 
 from Heaven and a despotism." It is obvious not only 
 that a zealous, hard-working, active, able officer deserves 
 advancement more than his comrade who is idle, ignorant, 
 and incapable, but that his advancement is more conducive 
 to the public interests. Thus promotion by selection 
 satisfies theoretically the two fundamental principles 
 upon which all promotion ought to be based — justice to 
 the individual and justice to the State. Promotion by 
 selection presents also, as we have seen, the incidental 
 advantages of neutralizing to some extent the efiects of 
 any stagnation by securing the frequent elevation of young, 
 active, capable men, and of interfering efiectually with 
 the establishment of any system of pecuniary regimental 
 acceleration. These are naturally regarded by those who 
 wish to see purchase abolished as important advantages, 
 and what is there to be said against the system which 
 introduces them ? This — that the fundamental and ad- 
 mitted difficulty of promotion by selection is the avoid- 
 ance of favouritism and partiality. This is the objection 
 which at once suggests itself directly promotion by selec- 
 tion is mentioned, and it is an objection of so substantial 
 and important a character that unless it can be removed 
 it will outweigh all the advantages which a perfect 
 system of selection would be calculated to secure. In 
 short, whoever proposes to introduce a system of promo- 
 tion by selection must be prepared before his proposition 
 can be accepted to show that he has designed a machinery 
 which completely eradicates this fatal objection and pro- 
 duces a system free from this flaw. " Before any system 
 of selection is extensively introduced in the British Army 
 there should be a general confidence that the power of 
 selection will not be misused" were the words of the 
 Duke of Somerset's Commission upon this point. Upon 
 the report of this Commission Mr. Cardwell professes to 
 have in great measure based his scheme. From this 
 report he quotes and argues. How far has he acted upon 
 the important principle here laid down, that confidence in 
 the perfect purity of the proposed system should be 
 'established before the principle of selection is extensively 
 applied? How far has he preceded his proposition to 
 mtroduce promotion by selection with a scheme for carry- 
 ing on such .promotion without a suspicion of partiality
 
 13 
 
 and favour? The answer to these questions is that 
 he has argued elaborately before the House in favour 
 of promotion by selection, and announced the intention of 
 the Government to introduce the system — not in one 
 rank merely but in all ranks — not in the regular Army 
 alone but in the auxiliary forces ; but he " will not enter 
 into details upon the mode in which security is to be 
 afforded to the Army for the impartiality and fairness of 
 promotion, because the matter is still being carefully 
 considered by some of the most eminent officers in 
 the army." In other words, while accepting the prin- 
 ciple of promotion by selection, and recommending 
 its application, the Government has prepared no 
 machinery whatever for carrying this principle into safe 
 and effective practice. While professing to act upon the 
 recommendations of the Duke of Somerset's Commission, 
 Mr. Cardwell flagrantly violates what may be termed the 
 fundamental guiding principle of that Commission — for he 
 not only fails to suggest any arrangement for establishing 
 " a general confidence that the power of selection will not 
 be misused " before introducing the system, but he proposes 
 to introduce it on the most extensive scale possible, and 
 without any exception or qualification. It is important 
 that there should be no misunderstanding upon this point, 
 and we therefore repeat, that while he has neglected to 
 do that which every one who has thought about the 
 subject knows must be done before the selection system 
 can be safely applied, Mr. Cardwell has put forward a 
 scheme which, though announced as substantially that of 
 the Duke of Somerset's Commission, is practically opposed 
 to the whole sense and tenor of the report of that Com- 
 mission. The Commissioners only proposed to abolish 
 purchase and introduce selection after the rank of Major, 
 and they say, " We are thus cautious in introducing the 
 principle of selection, fi-om an earnest desire that its ap- 
 plication should be faii'ly tested by experience. ... . . 
 
 Until the effect of the change above recommended shall have 
 been tried and its practical results approved^ it would be, in our 
 opinion, injudicious to interfere further with the usual course 
 of regimental promotion,'^ This is the report by which 
 Mr. Cardwell seeks to justify the wholesale abolition of 
 purchase, and the universal application of the principle of 
 selection. The essence of the Commissioners' recom- 
 mendations is a most cautious, tentative, partial applica- 
 tion of the abolition of purchase and the selection principle ; 
 the essence of Mr. Cardwell's scheme, which professes to 
 be based in great measure on those recommendations, is a
 
 14 
 
 most incaTitious and wholesale abolition of purchase, mth 
 a correspondingly incautious and wholesale introduction 
 of the system of selection. Anything wider apart than 
 the two proposals it would be impossible to imagine. This 
 fact seems to call for the serious consideration of Parlia- 
 ment. If the Duke of Somerset's Commission was right, 
 Mr. Cardwell must be wrong. On which side does the 
 error lie ? 
 
 Very little consideration will, we think, satisfy every 
 unprejudiced person that the Royal Commissioners had 
 good grounds for approaching this question cautiously and 
 tentatively. Before promotion by selection can be con- 
 fidently introduced, a vast number of questions have to 
 be determined, and a vast number of safeguards provided. 
 Mr. Cardwell answers none of these questions, and he has 
 no machinery ready for the application* of the necessary 
 safeguards. Among the questions to be answered. Lord 
 Palmerston's pertinent query, " What is merit ? " stands 
 first. And assuming this question to be answered, how are 
 we to ensure that no other influences besides the considera- 
 tion of pure merit will be brought to bear, especially in 
 times of peace ? Who is to exercise the selection ? Are we 
 confident that personal considerations, family influences, 
 social qualifications, or accidental advantages of an inferior 
 kind, will not contribute to push up one officer and 
 to keep back another? Take the case, for example, of 
 two officers, one of whom has happened to see active 
 service, while the other has not. Is this fortunate 
 chance on the part of one of the candidates for promotion 
 to determine his selection ? Is a short campaign in 
 Abyssinia, for instance, to place an officer at once over 
 the heads of others who have had during that campaign 
 to perform routine home duties ? And if once so selected 
 is he to remain for ever after his rival's senior, notwith- 
 standing the services Avhich the latter may subsequently 
 perform. One officer, again, remains at the base of opera- 
 tions, another goes forward into the field. Of the two 
 the former may have actually performed the more import- 
 ant although less brilliant service. Who is to decide as 
 to the relative claims of these men ? One officer is present 
 at the assault of an important position, another has to 
 remain behind in the trenches : which of the two is the 
 more meritorious ? How are we to provide against 
 brilliant services outweighing less conspicuous services ot 
 perhaps a more substantial kind? Is pushing merit to 
 have the advantage over retiring merit and modesty ? A 
 score of illustrations will occur to every one who bestows
 
 15 
 
 the least thought upon the subject ; the evidence taken 
 by the Duke of Somerset's Commission bristles with them. 
 Again, is there no danger of destroying the esprit de corps 
 of a regiment and of keeping the whole army in a state of 
 continual ferment and agitation by the introduction of 
 strangers to the command of regiments ? What machinery 
 has Mr. Cardwell prepared to meet these difficulties ? 
 His answer is, Simply none as yet. That part of the sub- 
 ject — the difficult part of the subject — is still unsolved, 
 still under consideration. Again, the question of possible 
 favouritism is a very serious one, so serious that the Royal 
 Commission of 1854 went the length of accompanying 
 their recommendations with suggestions intended as far as 
 possible to defeat the influences of private friendship and 
 of political preference. With this view they proposed 
 that whenever appointments were made out of the regular 
 coui'se of army promotion the services of the officer 
 selected should be detailed for public information. In 
 short, the difficulties in the way of a safe system of 
 selection, especially, as we have said, in times of peace, 
 and the possibilities of abuse which such a system 
 opens out, are positively overwhelming. We do not 
 say that these difficulties are insoluble. And we admit 
 that once thoroughly solved, the selection principle 
 would be the best that could be adopted. But we say 
 that the burden of proof rests upon Mr. Cardwell of show- 
 ing that he has devised a machinery for effecting such a 
 solution and for avoiding those innumerable possible 
 abuses ; and that until he is prepared with his machinery, 
 which he himself admits he is not, and until that machi- 
 nery has been subjected to the full light of public criticism, 
 his proposal to introduce a wholesale system of promotion 
 by selection is inadmissible. Equally inadmissible is his 
 claim to have based his propsal on the report of the Duke 
 of Somerset's Commission, which, as we have seen, recom- 
 mended a course directly contrary to that wliich Mr. 
 Cardwell now contemplates. The words of that Com- 
 mission wliich we have already quoted contain the key to 
 our objection to this part of the immature Government 
 scheme : — "Before any scheme of promotion by selection 
 is extensively introduced in the British Army, there 
 should be a general confidence that the power of selection 
 will not be misused."
 
 16 
 
 IV. THE ABOLITION OF THE PURCHASE 
 
 SYSTEM.* 
 
 " Purchase is doomed." That is what we commonly hear 
 now — not merely from men who are hostile to the system, 
 but from those who are unfavourable to its abolition. It 
 is contended that the system has been so much written 
 against, spoken against, reported against, as to render its 
 retention impossible. The Government has now placed 
 its abolition in the first rank of army reforms, and such a 
 shock, it is said, or such a succession of shocks, even a 
 very strong system might hardly sustain. But the pur- 
 chase system is admittedly not strong ; it abounds with 
 joints and points of weakness ; it is theoretically inde- 
 fensible. So " purchase is doomed." This statement of 
 the case appears to suggest at least four important ques- 
 tions : First, why is purchase doomed ? second, how are 
 we going to replace it ? third, what will its abolition cost ? 
 fourth, is the Government Bill so framed as to reduce the 
 hardship to the officers concerned to a minimum, and to 
 raise the resulting advantages to a maximum ? 
 
 To the first of these questions it is very difficult to 
 give a satisfactory answer. The answer which we have 
 already indicated — that there has been an explosion of 
 popular opinion against purchase, which opinion has found 
 embodiment in the Government Bill— can hardly be ac- 
 cepted as satisfactory, for the simple reason that the 
 system is one of which, although the defects are patent, 
 the advantages are only properly appreciated by those few 
 persons who are intimately acquainted with its working. 
 The Duke of Somerset's Commission summed up the case 
 against purchase as follows : — " It is said to restrict the 
 number of those from whom officers can in the first in- 
 stance be obtained ; it deadens the feelings of emulation 
 and the eagerness to acquire military knowledge ; and it 
 renders men eligible for the highest command without 
 taking any security that they are fitted for such a position." 
 It is obvious, however, that of these three classes of 
 objections, the third, if not the second, depends in a great 
 measure upon the standard of professional or educational 
 efficiency which may be imposed at the entrance of each 
 rank, and that such standard is really independent of the 
 question of purchase or non-purchase. But we do not 
 desire to lay any particular stress upon this point, because 
 other objections may be added, and because the recent 
 * Fall Mall Gazette, February 28tli, 1871.
 
 17 
 
 agitation has been based mainly upon other grounds than 
 those here adduced — upon the injustice to the non-pur- 
 chasers, the officers who are passed over, upon the impoHcy 
 of giving officers a proprietary interest in their commis- 
 sions, upon the difficulty of fusing all parts of our 
 military system into one whole so long as different 
 systems of promotion obtain. It is not necessary to 
 argue these points at length, because w^e fully admit that 
 the system is open to grave objections and is theoretically 
 indefensible, and we are anxious to press forward to more 
 practical considerations. Among these stands prominent the 
 statement of the Duke of Somerset's Commission, that the 
 system of purchase, whatever its disadvantages, does 
 " facilitate the retirement of officers, and thereby accele- 
 rates promotion in the army, which would otherwise 
 stagnate during a period of continued peace : also, it is 
 said to afford to officers a security against the influence of 
 favour, enabling each officer to obtain his promotion by 
 his own means, without being dependent on the goodwill 
 of the Government or on the patronage of the higher 
 authority." The second of these points we have con- 
 sidered at some length in connection with the proposition 
 to substitute a system of promotion by selection. The first 
 point brings us to the consideration of the question. How are 
 we going to replace purchase? And here we touch what 
 seems to us an extraordinary defect in Mr. Cardwell's 
 scheme. He has no proposition whatever for replacing 
 purchase. Only a prophet, he said, could say what amount 
 of retirement will have to be provided. We hold that it 
 is impossible to accept this view. It was clearly the 
 duty of the War Minister, before proposing to expend 
 about £8,000,000 in the destruction of a system which has 
 existed since the Army was first created, and which, with 
 all its disadvantages, has given us probably the best 
 regimental system in the world, and the cheapest system 
 of retirement, to have formed some sort of opinion 
 of what he would substitute for it. The one conspicuous 
 advantage of purchase is, as stated by the Duke of 
 Somerset's Commission, that " it facilitates the retire- 
 ment of officers, and thereby accelerates promotion in 
 the army." Now, stagnation of promotion — such as is 
 paralyzing the non-purchase Ordnance Corps — is merely 
 another name for actual or prospective inefficiency. And 
 in laying out £8,000,000 on the abolition of purchase, 
 and in getting rid of the disadvantages which belong to 
 that system, we may be buying a good thing too dear — 
 we may be merely expending so much money for the 
 
 c
 
 18 
 
 privilege of passing from one set of evils to another. We 
 say distinctly that nnless Mr. Cardwell can ensure us 
 against that stagnation of promotion through the army 
 which is the normal condition of non-purchase corps, his 
 £8,000,000 will have been ill spent. In short, before we 
 abolish purchase we ought to have a reasonable notion 
 of the system of retirement which is to replace it, and 
 of its probable cost. But Mr. Cardwell makes no pre- 
 tence to any ideas upon the subject. His one single 
 idea is to abolish purchase — to take a leap into space, 
 and then when he finds a footing — if he ever does find 
 one — to look about him. Not having any definite ideas 
 as to the system of retirement to be adopted when 
 purchase is destroyed, Mr. Cardwell is of course equally 
 in the dark as to the probable or possible cost of 
 that retirement. It is doubtful whether £8,000,000 will 
 really cover even the first cost of abolishing purchase. 
 What the permanent charge upon the nation ^vill be in the 
 shape of retiring allowances Mr. Cardwell has not even 
 considered. In the case of the Royal Artillery and Engi- 
 neers, one scheme after another for putting the corps hito 
 a healthy state has been abandoned on account of its cost. 
 Does Mr. Cardwell suppose that the difficulty will be less 
 when he has the whole army to deal with, instead of a 
 fraction of it? The fact is that Mr. Cardwell has not 
 dared to look beyond the present moment. A permanent 
 extra charge of half a million, a million, or a million and a 
 half, may be entailed upon the country by this measure. 
 But that is a matter not for Mr. Cardwell, but for his suc- 
 cessors. He leaves this legacy to posterity. He grasps 
 at the unknown and cries , " Apres moi le deluge ! " 
 
 Just as in the matter of promotion by selection, 
 Mr. Cardwell has no machinery ready for giving eftect to 
 his proposition, so he has no machinery at hand for re- 
 placing purchase, and he professes himself unable to 
 estimate even the probable cost or nature of the machinery 
 which he does not deny will be required. But the complete 
 uncertainty which prevails as to the future does not daimt 
 him. He complacently suggests the present expenditure of 
 ^8,000,000, and a prospective and permanent expenditure 
 of some unknown but certainly heavy amount to get rid 
 of a system of promotion and retirement which he knows 
 not how to replace. At the same time, he cannot find 
 money to put the Militia into an effective condition, or to 
 re-establish the national defences upon a sound footing. 
 This is the economical reforming measure which has ex- 
 torted so much praise from our liberal contemporaries.
 
 19 
 
 This is the outcome of all that has been said and written 
 on the subject of military reorganization. We do not 
 wish to be misunderstood as supporting the purchase 
 system, but we say that it is not the most conspicuous of 
 our sources of military weakness. If Mr. Cardwell had 
 begun at the other end — if he had first repaired all our 
 other flaws — if he spent some of the money which he is 
 now going to devote to the abolition of purchase in placing 
 our Militia and reserves and all om* armaments in a 
 thoroughly healthy condition — if he had first shown us 
 that he could deal effectively witli the difficulties of 
 non-purchase in those corps where non-purchase now 
 exists — if he had told us how he proposed to carry on 
 promotion by selection, and what scheme of retirement 
 he would adopt when purchase had been abolished— 
 then his proposition to do away with purchase might 
 have been fitly put forward. But he has done none 
 of these things. He has begun, according to our view, 
 exactly at the wrong end and in exactly the wrong way. 
 He has alleged, it is true, that until purchase has been 
 abolished no satisfactory military reorganisation could 
 be commenced. But there is not one of the things which 
 Mr. Cardwell proposes to effect Avith his Bill which could 
 not be effected just as well while purchase is in full 
 force. Other advocates for the abolition of purchase have 
 accompanied their propositions w4th a scheme calculated 
 to give us the fall benefits of such abolition and of the 
 money which it will cost. Not so Mr. Cardwell. The 
 beginning and end of his scheme is practically and as 
 far as his revealed intentions go, the abolition of pur- 
 chase. None of liis other propositions are more than 
 hesitatmg and partial palliatives unconnected with pur- 
 chase. Therefore we say, before this the salient and most 
 costly point of the Government Bill is accepted, let us be 
 informed more fully than we have yet been what precise 
 advantages we are to derive from it, and let us see our 
 way more clearly than is possible at present to a satis- 
 factory and reasonably economical machinery for carrying 
 on retirement and promotion when purchase has dis- 
 appeared. We do not expend £8,000,000 every day on 
 Army Reform, and it is not too much to ask that we 
 should be quite clear as to the character and bearing of 
 the reform before we embark upon it. 
 
 Another very important point remains to be considered 
 in connection with this subject. Are the Government- 
 propositions, if adopted, calculated to minimise the hard- 
 ship to the officers of the army which so extensive a
 
 20 
 
 change of system is calculated to inflict ? This question 
 we must discuss in a separate article. 
 
 v.— THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE (continued)* 
 
 We have shown that Mr. Cardwell's proposal to abolish 
 purchase in the army, whether such a proposal in the 
 abstract be regarded favourably or unfavourably, fails in 
 two important particulars : — First. It contains no definite 
 suggestion for a system of retirement to take the place of 
 purchase. Second. It makes no sort of estimate of, but 
 absolutely ignores and disregards, the probable cost of 
 such a retirement scheme as will sooner or later become 
 necessary. But we have still to consider two other points 
 of importance. Assuming that the system is bad and that 
 it ought to be got rid of, assuming that despite the ab- 
 sence of any alternative system, and notwithstanding 
 the enormous present and prospective cost of its abolition, 
 assuming that the country, through its representatives, is 
 really content to continue with all its other and more patent 
 deficiencies uncorrected, and to lavish eight millions in 
 turning Mr. Trevelyan's flank — assuming, in short, that it 
 is decided to abolish purchase, it is important to carry out 
 its abolition in the way which will entail the least possible 
 injustice on the officers concerned, and which will secure 
 the maximum of advantage to the country. It is im- 
 portant to carry out the abolition on these principles, not 
 in any class interest, but because no more destructive 
 blow could be levelled against our military efficiency than 
 the establishment of a deep abiding sense of injury among 
 the officers of the Army. We approach this part of the 
 subject the more readily because we willingly credit the 
 Government with a sincere desire to be liberal and just 
 to those who may be affected by the abolition of purchase, 
 and because the regulations of the service which forbid 
 concerted action among the officers of the Army prac- 
 tically go a long way towards forbidding the effective 
 expression of whatever remonstrances they may wish to 
 urge. In the first place, the Government Bill provides 
 that officers retiring from the Army shall receive back 
 their regulation and over-regulation money. But there is 
 no provision for repaying this money or the interest there- 
 upon until an officer actually retires. So long as he 
 remains in the army, his private capital — as represented 
 
 * Fall Mall Gazette, Marcli 1st, 1871.
 
 21 
 
 hj his regulation and over-regulation payments — will 
 remain locked up in the State coffers. With regard to 
 this arrangement it is to be observed, first, that it com- 
 pletely neutralizes one of the main objects to accomplish 
 which it is proposed to abolish purchase. Among other 
 objections, it is urged against purchase that it gives an 
 officer a pecuniary or proprietary interest in his com- 
 mission, which is hardly compatible with the best 
 interests of the service. But by not repaying the 
 officer the capital or interest of his purchase-money 
 until he quits the service, you practically leave him 
 in full enjoyment of those proprietary rights to which you 
 now object ; and you really postpone for an indefinite 
 number of years the realization of one of the chief advan- 
 tages which you are professedly going to spend eight 
 millions to attain. But you do more than this by not 
 repaying the purchase-money as soon as the purchase 
 system is done away with — you commit an actual and a 
 very serious injustice. You keep from the officer a sum of 
 money which he has advanced on the faith of a system 
 which it is proposed to destroy. It is sometimes argued 
 that if an officer has paid j61,800 to become a captain, and 
 if he has actually attained that position, his money has 
 done all which it was expected to accomplish — that with 
 the payment of the £1,800 on the one hand ajid the pos- 
 session of the captain's commission on the other, the 
 transaction is at an end. This argument is based upon 
 the popular fallacy that the purchase of commissions is 
 like the purchase of articles over a counter, where the 
 purchaser pays his money, receives his goods, and goes 
 away. The fact is, however, that the purchase of com- 
 missions bears no real analogy to the purchase of goods 
 in a shop. To say nothing of the fact that no amount of 
 money would enable a subaltern who was not professionally 
 qualified to abtain a captain's commission, there is this 
 great difference between the two cases — the officer who 
 buys his commission really advances a certain sum of 
 money to accomplish three objects: — 1st, To secure him- 
 self against supersession ; 2nd, to secure a commission in 
 the rank to which he aspires ; 3rd, to contribute to a fund 
 by means of which, if he continues his contributions, he 
 must eventually rise to the command of his regiment. 
 But by abolishing purchase and introducing a system of 
 promotion by selection, you remove the first and third of 
 these objects, for you destroy the guarantee which exists 
 against the officer's supersession, and you destroy the 
 guarantee under which he would otherwise have risen to
 
 22 
 
 command. It may be urged that this would practically 
 occur only in the case of incompetent officers. But to 
 to this the answer is, that the new system of selection is 
 mainly directed against incompetent officers : if there are 
 no such officers the system will be inoperative ; if such 
 officers exist, they may certainly claim to have their rights 
 respected. They may say, We entered the army under a 
 system which you established ; we paid our money on the 
 faith of that system ; you now turn round on us and deny 
 us all further prospect of promotion. Give us back our 
 money which you have obtained under false pretences. 
 To this the Government in effect answer, Leave the 
 service and you shall have your money. The reply would 
 be, Why should we leave the service? We have done 
 nothing to discredit it. We are not more incompetent 
 now than when you admitted us— nay, we are less so, for 
 we have gained military experience. You do not venture 
 to take our commissions from us ; but yet you retain our 
 money, while by your own arbitrary act you have swept 
 away the system on the faith of which that money was 
 paid, and under which alone our money could benefit us. 
 There is a breach of agreement on your part, and we claim 
 to have our part of the agreement cancelled as well as 
 yours, and at the same time. This point was discussed at 
 some length in the cross-examination of Sir Charles Tre- 
 velyan by the Duke of Somerset's Commission. Sir Charles 
 contended that the proposed arrangement, which would 
 deprive officers who wished to purchase of the right to do so, 
 would merely amount to '^ a revision of the terms of service." 
 On this Mr, Carr Glyn asked, "Can you make a new arrange- 
 ment with a man who has entered the service under a 
 different system ? " A. ^- Otherwise the army must always 
 remain as it is," " No; you can repay them all their money." 
 (Q. 4777, 4778). The grievance to the officers not retiring 
 is a substantial one. An ensign has paid £450 for his 
 commission. To-morrow a junior ensign is appointed 
 under the new system of non-purchase. Both officers 
 remain in the service ; but the senior is actually a poorer 
 man than his junior by about £25 a year — the interest on 
 his £450. In the case of lieutenant-colonels commanding 
 regiments who have obtained the full and final advantage 
 advantage which they anticipated the grievance would 
 not exist. But the right of all the junior ranks to receive 
 back the purchase-money, or at any rate the interest upon 
 it, appears to us indisputable. The argument as to an officer 
 who has by means of his money already purchased over 
 other men's heads, would hold good only in the compara-
 
 23 
 
 tively rare instances of supersession, and in such cases 
 might be met, if thought necessary, by only repaying the 
 officer who had so advanced himself a portion of his 
 purchase-money — only, let us say, the regulation sum — 
 reserving the over-regulation until he retires. In any 
 case the retaining of the whole of an officer's private 
 fortune which he had paid on the faith of a system of 
 promotion which it is proposed to destroy, together with 
 his right of exchange, Avhich formed an integral part of 
 that system, cannot be equitable. 
 
 Another point of importance is this ; — The Royal 
 Warrant under which all officers are now serving, pro- 
 vides that a non-purchase officer in a purchase regiment 
 shall receive £50 for each year's home service, and £100 
 for each year's foreign service, if he desires to retire 
 before he has attained twenty years' service ; after 
 twenty years' service he is entitled to the full value of 
 the commission which he holds. But Mr. Card well's Bill 
 at once cuts short all his future prospects. An illustration 
 will best serve to show the practical eftect of this. An 
 officer has served, when the Bill passes, eighteen years ; 
 he is a major in his regiment, his service is of the value of 
 £1,350 (nine years home, nine years foreign), he remains 
 on for two years, and becomes a lieutenant-colonel by non- 
 purchase. He then wishes to retire." By Mr. Cardwell's 
 Bill he will receive £1,350 (for his eighteen years) plus 
 £200 ( for two years more foreign service) — total, £1,550. 
 But if the Bill had not been introduced, he would have 
 received both the full regulation value of his commis- 
 sion from the Government and the over-regulation value 
 from the regiment, or £2,550, plus about £4,500 ; total, 
 £7,050. The difference between £7,050 and £1,550 repre- 
 sents the injury inflicted upon this officer by the Bill. 
 Several other illustrations could be given of the same sort. 
 The effect of this will be that the non-purchase officers, m 
 whose interest this Bill professes to have been in great 
 measure framed, will be among the heaviest sufferers 
 by it. 
 
 Another point calling for notice is the limitation of 
 sales in any one year to the maximum number of officers 
 who retired in any one of the five preceding years. This 
 provision may operate in some cases very hardly. An 
 officer who under the present system might have retired 
 on the failure of his health, or for some other cause, may 
 be compelled to remain on because the maximum number 
 of retirements has been reached. Before an opportunity 
 of retiring comes he may die, and the whole of his money
 
 24 
 
 ^vill in that case be lost ; or if lie does not die, he "will 
 certainly be performing a compulsory service of the worst 
 kind — serving against his will and with his money locked 
 up in a concern which he desires but is not permitted to 
 quit ; a concern from which he can derive no fm-ther 
 advantages or equivalent whatever. The effect on the 
 regiment which this officer may perhaps command can 
 hardly be otherwise than most prejudicial. The fact is 
 that to take the number of retirements in past years as 
 the measure of the possible number of retirements under 
 a totally new, and, to some officers, less favourable system 
 is unfair. The mere sensation of restraint — the doubt 
 and uneasiness as to the possibility of having an oppor- 
 tunity of retiring when you wish — the novelty of the 
 whole position, present and prospective, will probably 
 urge many officers to send in their papers who would not 
 under existing arrangements have thought of leaving the 
 service. And we do not see by what arguments it is 
 possible to justify an arbitrary arrangement, in the intro- 
 duction of which the officers have no voice whatever, by 
 which an officer would be denied his money so long as he 
 remained in the service, while he is denied the right of 
 retiring from the service and realizing his fund when he 
 wishes. These are among the more conspicuous blots of 
 detail in that part of the Government Bill which deals 
 with the abolition of purchase. Although far from exhaust- 
 ing the criticism to which this part of the Bill is open, 
 the objections which we have urged will show that, if 
 passed in its present shape, it will inflict gross injustice 
 upon the officers of the Army; and this quite apart from its 
 general inexpediency. It appears that we are not only 
 going to spend £8,000,000 on the least pressing of the 
 many needed arrangements for strengthening the Army, 
 but that we are going to spend it in the very worst possible 
 way. 
 
 TL— THE DEBATE ON THE ARMY BH.L.* 
 
 The debate which is to commence to-night is of so grave 
 a character that we shall make no apology for taking this 
 opportunity of again calling attention to the more important 
 of the considerations involved. The main question at issue 
 may, for all practical purposes, be stated as follows : — For 
 some time public opinion has declared itself very decidedly 
 
 * Fall Mall Gazette, March 6th, 1871.
 
 25 
 
 as to the urgency of a comprehensive reorganization of our 
 military system, and its establishment on a solid and 
 enduring basis. It has come to be understood that the 
 Government could not avoid or postpone the task of bring- 
 ing in an Army Bill, however distasteful such a measure 
 might be to individual members of the Cabinet, or even to 
 the Cabinet collectively ; and the House will to-night be 
 called upon to say whether in its opinion the propositions 
 of the Government as embodied in the Bill which is now 
 presented for second reading do effectually and thoroughly 
 satisfy the reasonable requirements of the country in the 
 matter of Army reform. It is not enough — it is indeed 
 hardly to the point — to demonstrate, as may easily be done, 
 that the Government scheme falls short, in its thoroughness 
 or symmetry, of the hundred and one schemes which have 
 been set forth in pamphlets, in articles, in speeches. What 
 we have to do, is to consider what the country really 
 wants ; to set side by side with this what the Government 
 Bill promises to give us, and then to say whether this 
 promise is as full or as fair as we have a right to expect. 
 With regard to the military requirements of the country, 
 these are sufficiently expressed in general terms in the 
 principles which Mr. Cardwell enunciated in the speech 
 with which he introduced the Bill. These principles are, 
 broadly : — that it is necessary to make the whole of our 
 military forces effective ; that it is necessary*to establish 
 a system of effective and sufficient reserves available for 
 action on the shortest notice ; and that it is necessary to 
 bring all our forces under one organization. This is what 
 we want. Does the Government Bill give us any of these 
 things ? Does it contribute in any important degree to 
 the efficiency of any part of our military forces ? Does it 
 give us a reserve available for action at short notice ? 
 Does it bring all our forces under one organization ? It 
 will be for Mr. Cardwell to explain to the House in what 
 way his Bill accomplishes any of these things. It will be 
 for the House, when he points to the proposed abolition of 
 purchase and the introduction of promotion by selection, 
 to challenge him as to the direct bearing of these measures 
 upon the efficiency of our military forces ; to ask him 
 whether they contribute even indirectly towards the for- 
 mation of ready and trustworthy reserves ; and to inquire 
 in what way they tend to strengthen our military organi- 
 zation. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that 
 eight millions will be well spent in the abolition of pur- 
 chase, it will still have to be shown that the money could 
 not be better spent in carrying out other and more press-
 
 26 
 
 ing reforms. Is the regimental system of our regular Army 
 so bad that its reorganization is to be preferred to measures 
 for rendering the Militia efficient ; for using the Militia 
 and Line together ; for providing a strong reserve force ; 
 for the annual assembling of large bodies of our regular 
 and auxiliary forces for united instruction and manoeuvring 
 on a large scale ; for the utilization of the half-pay list ; 
 for the establishment of the corps darynee organization ; 
 for the formation of a sufficient artillery force ; for the 
 relief of stagnation in the ordnance corps ; for the estab- 
 lishment of a satisfactory system of transport and supply ; 
 for the strengthening of the material defences of the 
 country, and the erection of a central arsenal ; and for the 
 provision of ample stores of the various improved engines 
 of war which are now admitted to be esseutial to success ? 
 Is our regimental system so bad that all these important 
 requirements must be postponed to its costly reorganiza- 
 tion ? Is it commonly prudent, to use no stronger expres- 
 sion, at a time when there are so many vital breaches in 
 our line of defence, to spend all the money we can spare, 
 and to commit the country to a further permanent, indefi- 
 nite, annual expenditure, on the abolition of a system of 
 regimental retirement for which no satisfactory substitute 
 has yet been even suggested, and on the introduction of a 
 method of promotion which military authorities have de- 
 clared it will be almost impossible to carry out ? While 
 we have frequently admitted that our regimental system 
 is susceptible of great improvement, we have always 
 believed it to be one of the least vuluerable parts of our 
 lines of national defence. But now we are told, to the 
 surprise probably of every one who knows anything about 
 the subject, that this system is so rotten that it must, at 
 however great a cost, be forthwith swept away, and every 
 other reform must wait upon the accomplishment of this 
 one. Nor, be it remarked, is this said of the regimental 
 system of that part of our army which is generally con- 
 sidered the weakest— the auxiliary forces; it is said of the 
 regular army, the strongest and least inefficient part of 
 our whole military establishment. It is not, according to 
 this Bill, the officers of the Militia and Volunteers for 
 whose improvement there is the most urgent need, but 
 the officers of the regular Army. It is not the stagnant 
 promotion of the Ordnance corps which calls most loudly 
 for legislation, but the rapid and effectual rethement 
 system of the line. Mr. Cardwell cannot afford to spend 
 whatever money may be needed to bring the former into 
 a healthy state, but he has no hesitation about spending
 
 27 
 
 several millions in the destruction of the latter — without, 
 as he himself admits, any definite idea as to how or at what 
 cost he can replace it. Those who agree with these views 
 will perhaps find Mr. CardwelFs Bill acceptable. From 
 any other point of view we do not see how it can escape 
 emphatic condemnation. 
 
 Of that part of the Bill which provides for the applica- 
 tion of the ballot it is hardly necessary to speak, for two 
 reasons : 1st, because provision already exists in our 
 statute books for the application of the ballot : 2nd, 
 because Mr. Cardwell's Bill does not propose to apply the 
 ballot except "in case of great emergency," which in 
 these days of short wars and rapid concentration is prac- 
 tically merely a euphemism for a case in which the emer- 
 gency has passed away. That portion of the Bill Avhich 
 deals with army enlistment is merely a rechauffe of the 
 Act which was passed last session. The Militia it is pro- 
 posed to render efficient by the very vigorous measure of 
 giving the recruits a few weeks more drill ; and the 
 Volunteers are to be converted into soldiers by bringing 
 them under the Mutiny Act when they are pleased to go 
 out for training with other troops. Cut from this Bill the 
 purchase clauses, and what remains ? Will what remains 
 tend in any appreciable degree to satisfy the fundamental 
 requirements of national defence ? If this Bill should be 
 passed, will it enable us to put an extra corp^ cParmee^ or 
 for the matter of tliat an extra soldier, into the field ? 
 Will it enable us to despatch against an enemy such 
 troops as we possess more readily or more confidently 
 than at present ? Will it give us any one of those essen- 
 tials of Army reform for which we have been so long- 
 crying out ? If not, it is impossible to say that the Bill 
 can be accepted as even an approximately satisfactory 
 measure of military reorganization. 
 
 If ]\lr. Cardwell had called his Bill a Bill for the Aboli- 
 tion of Purchase, or a Bill for the better Regulation of the 
 Ballot, and presented it as professedly framed solely to 
 accomplish these objects, there would perhaps have been 
 more to be said for it. It would then, at any rate, have 
 been intelligible. But he has brought it forward as an 
 Army Reform Bill — as the remedy Avhich the Government 
 has to suggest for existing and admitted defects in our 
 military system. What would be said if it had been 
 shown that the Navy of this country was in a thorougly 
 unsatisfactory condition, that the ships were not numerous 
 enough nor powerful enough nor generally seaworthy, 
 that their armament left much to be desired, that the iron
 
 28 
 
 plating on their sides was too weak to resist hostile shot, 
 that a great part of the crews had had no training, that 
 the vessels had never been practised in combined man- 
 oeuvres, that the larger proportion of the sailors were not 
 sailors at all, but landsmen, who donned a nautical dress 
 for a few days or weeks each year, that there was a general 
 want of efficiency, and a total want of homogeneity in our 
 whole naval system — what, we ask, would be said in that 
 case of a proposition to spend more millions than would 
 suffice to put the whole navy in a proper condition on 
 revising the conditions of promotion and retirement 
 among the officers, supplemented with complicated pro- 
 visions for hurriedly forcing more untrained men on board 
 the ships " in case of a great emergency ? " Whatever 
 would be said to such a proposition applies equally to the 
 Army Bill now before the House of Commons. We hope 
 that no motions directed against isolated features of the 
 Bill will be allowed to stand in the way of the sense of 
 the House being taken on that broad question of the 
 efficiency of the measure which Lord Elcho's motion is 
 designed to raise. 
 
 Harrison and sons, printers in ordinart to her majesty, st. martin's LANfi.
 

 
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