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 ■*i
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF THE 
 
 RIGHT HON.W.E. GLADSTONE, 
 
 II ?. FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, 
 
 ON THE 
 
 WAR AND THE NEGOTIATIONS, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 IIOrSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 On the 3rd of August, 1855. 
 
 REVISED AND CORRECTED BY HIMSELF. 
 
 rUBLISHED AT THE EMPIRE OFFICE, Uo, FLEET STREET; 
 AND SOLD BY ALL BOOKSELLERS. 
 
 1855. 
 
 Price Threepence.
 
 SPEECH 
 
 Mr. Speaker, 
 
 It appears to me, Sir, that the motion which you have put from, the 
 chair, and which may be regarded as the immediate subject of debate, is a 
 matter of small account. So far as regards that motion, I entirely agree 
 with the right honourable gentleman (Sir G. Grey) who has just sat down, 
 and who illustrated and enforced his opinion at some length, that the grant- 
 ing of these papers is a matter for the judgment of her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, and that the honourable member who has raised this debate would act 
 unwisely if he attempted to force the Government, should they in the exercise 
 of their discretion decline to produce them. Waving, therefore, all reference 
 to that motion, I come to the speech of my right honourable friend ; and 
 again, with regard to that speech, I must distinguish the opinions and 
 views of my right honourable friend from the statement of facts and cir- 
 cumstances which he gave us in relation to the late negotiations. 
 
 As respects the opinions of my right honourable friend, they appear to 
 me to be moderation itself. Passing beyond the mere generalities in which 
 perhaps we are all too apt to indulge — protesting, on the one hand, that we 
 are deeply sensible of the evils of war, and, on the other hand, that we will 
 not stoop to buy peace with dishonour — passing over these vague gene- 
 ralities, which are bandied to and fro without any sort of profit between 
 persons ranged on different sides of this question, my right honourable 
 friend has told the House, if I understood him rightly, that limitation 
 itself — the limitation of the Russian forces in the Black Sea — was not to 
 be regarded absolutelv as a s«»<? quel non of peace in negotiations which 
 may hereafter arise. My right honourable friend has made that, which I 
 think an important communication, considering the character of the person 
 from whom it comes, and from what high station it is uttered. Moreover, 
 while he has told us that limitation of the Russian fleet is not to stand 
 before the world in the character of an absolute condition of peace, he has 
 told us of no other absolute condition of peace which is to come into its 
 place. The effect of his speech, therefore, as far as it goes, is to restrict 
 the scope of the objects and terms for which the Government is contend- 
 ing ; for he appears to have withdrawn from the catalogue one of the 
 objects on which, at a certain stage, so much has turned, and with such 
 fatal consequence, and to have inserted nothing in its place. But then, it 
 appears to me, that the right honourable gentleman, with all the modera- 
 tion of his views and opinions, has only made more glaring the false posi- 
 tion in which he stands ; for what are the Government about .'' They are 
 prolonging a war which costs the allies in money not less than one hun- 
 dred millions per annum, together with a loss of life which will, I think, 
 not be very greatlv overstated at 1000 a day for all the parties to the war 
 taken together. To justify the prolongation of such a war, in defiance of 
 
 A 2
 
 the weight, as I think, of reason — but at any rate, and beyond all dispute, 
 of authority, which is marshalled against it — requires, I think, stronger 
 opinions than my right honourable friend has expressed, and larger and 
 wider objects than his. Indeed, while we are called upon to make efforts 
 so gigantic, and sacrifices so tremendous, I have the utmost difficulty in con- 
 ceiving what image of an end is in his mind, and what he proposes to himself 
 as an adequate purpose of the war, to give warrant to the extraordinary steps 
 that we have taken, and to the extreme courses in which we are en^affcd. 
 
 And now, with respect to the statement of facts made by my right 
 honourable friend. Here I am at issue with him on every point. If my 
 honourable friend, the member for Wick, wanted any justification for 
 raising this discussion, he would, I think, find it in the confused and per- 
 plexed state in which the narrative of these events yet stands before this 
 House and the world; for well may they find it impenetrably obscure, when 
 I can undertake to show that the speech of a man in the position, and with 
 all the knowledge, ability, and integrity of my right honourable friend, 
 presents a distorted view of those facts, and does not at all raise the issues 
 upon which this House will have definitively, and I trust before any very 
 long time, to judge. If we were to take our views from the speech of the 
 right honourable gentleman, those who have listened to it might believe 
 that the whole case before us turned upon the difference between the two 
 projects of counterpoise and limitation ; but I will show that it is no such 
 thing. And, again, it might be supposed, from the speech of my right 
 honourable friend, that there had not been proposed to us, or not proposed 
 to us in due time, by Austria any set of terms on the rejection of which by 
 Russia she would go to war. And this I understood to be a capital point 
 in my right honourable friend's speech. I think he thus represented to us 
 the case, that when a proposal was made at the end of April, it was 
 rejected by the allies ; and it consequently gave to Austria no opportunity 
 of going to war to enforce it ; and that when the proposal of limitation 
 was made in June, Austria declared, as he states, that she would not go 
 to war for the sake of that proposal, if Russia should reject it. 
 
 Now, Sir, I shall have to contest the general representation of the facts 
 as they have been stated by my right honourable friend ; but before I go 
 to the consideration of those facts, I must say how deeply I feel that an 
 accumulated and peculiar responsibility in this matter must rest upon the 
 head of her Majesty's Government. It is not purely the responsbility, 
 although, God knows, that it is great enough, of having chosen the alterna- 
 tive of war, and rejected the alternative of peace ; for I will admit there 
 would have been, under the present circumstances, an equal responsibility 
 in making an opposite choice ; but it is the position they have assumed, 
 and the proportionate share they have had in bringing about this result, 
 which has made them, and us through them, the principals, and all other 
 parties only in a manner secondary and accessory, in the prolongation of 
 the present war. 
 
 My noble friend, the member for the City of London (Lord J. Russell), 
 who was also the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain in the Conferences at 
 Vienna on the 18th of April, transmitted a proposal of Austria, which was 
 approved of by my noble friend, not, perhaps, upon its abstract merits, but 
 rather, I apprehend, with reference to the circumstances of the case, and 
 the whole interests involved in the decision. That proposal was also 
 
 oi
 
 approved by the Plenipotentiary of France. It was, moreover, approved, 
 or at the very least favourably received, if not formally and definitively 
 approved, by the Plenipotentiary of Turkey; and, in the last place, it was of 
 course entirely approved by the Plenipotentiary of Austria. This proposal 
 was sent home by the noble lord, who was the organ of the Government, 
 and not only the organ of the Government, but a member of the Govern- 
 ment ; who, moreover, as the organ of the Government, was entitled to 
 something more than the ordinary consideration of a plenipotentiary, from 
 his high station, from his distinguished abilities and career, and especially 
 from the fact that he had been all along cognizant of the views of the 
 Administration, and had shared its counsels at every stage of this difficult 
 and momentous question. That noble lord made in writing a formal 
 request that the consideration of this proposal should, if it were not 
 accepted, at any rate be reserved until after he came home. Well, what 
 was the course taken by the Cabinet upon the receipt of that request? 
 My noble friend's despatch was written on the 1 Sth of April ; it was 
 received on the 21st; and on that same 21st goes forth from the Foreign 
 Office a despatch of great ability and detail, written by Lord Clarendon, 
 expressing the surprise and regret with which he had received, through 
 Count CoUoredo, from Count Buol that very same proposal, and condemn- 
 ing it without reserve, from the first line to the last. By such an act as 
 that, it must be admitted, the Cabinet have incurred a heavy and peculiar 
 responsibility. 
 
 But my noble friend came home. I am not sure of the precise date of his 
 arrival; but when he came home, not daunted by what had occurred — if, 
 indeed, he were at this time so much as cognizant of it — he made his proposal 
 to the Cabinet of which he was a member. My noble friend, in his speech 
 in this House on the IGth of July, appeared to be restrained by imperious 
 considerations from explaining the nature of the transactions that occured 
 during a particular and most eventful week, which my noble friend defined 
 chronologically, if I remember right, as the week which began on the 30th 
 of April, and ended on the 5th of May. We were only given to under- 
 stand, that circumstances occurred during the course of that week, which 
 influenced the British Government in the rejection of that proposal of the 
 Austrian Government. For myself, as I can do no more than echo the 
 popular construction of certain oracular phrases that have been used, and 
 state what the public out of doors understood by these mysterious circum- 
 stances, there can be no reason why I should use reserve in the matter. 
 The public understood that it was already the decision of the French 
 Government to reject the Austrian proposal ; that that decision formed a 
 new fact in the case, and had either wholly or in great part led to its 
 corresponding rejection by the Cabinet of Great Britain, liut. Sir, I am 
 bound to say, that in my behef it was not to the French Government, but 
 to ourselves, that the responsibility of that rejection is mainly and sub- 
 stantially due. There arc signs and tokens, that are not to be mistaken, 
 in proof of this opinion of mine ; because there was published in a Belgian 
 newspaper an account of the resignation of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which 
 reappeared in Paris in the columns of the Monitcur — a journal of which the 
 contents are understood to have, in the strictest sense, an official authority ; 
 so that it is not too much to say that the direct sanction of the Govern- 
 ment was, by that publication, given to the statements in that letter.
 
 6 
 
 And does that letter bear out the belief entertained by many, that we 
 rejected the proposal of my noble friend because the French Govern- 
 ment had already decided upon its rejection ? Why, what did the 
 Government of France, through its own official organ, say — and, as j 
 think, say wisely — on this subject ? These are the words of the statement 
 in the Moniteur (I am obhged to cite them in English, as they were 
 rendered in English journals, for I have not seen the original French) : — 
 
 " It is certain that the English Government decided on rejecting it (the Austrian 
 proposal) . The Emperor, therefore, had the same motives for refusing it ; that is 
 to say, that it did not offer such a peace as would give sufficient guarantees to the 
 Powers which had made so many sacrifices to defend and seciu-e Eiiropean right. 
 His Majesty had, moreover, a desire to mamtain m all its integrity and force the 
 alliance with England ; and the feeling of that Government on the question being 
 already kno^^^^ had, beyond any doubt, a certain weight with him." 
 
 Therefore, upon the authority of the French Government, it is published to 
 the world — and, if it be a merit, let the Cabinet have the full credit of it, 
 for it is an answer to the charges made by the right honourable gentleman 
 opposite (Mr. Disraeli), to the effect, that the British Government was about 
 to conclude a peace, when it was checked by the refusal of the Emperor of 
 the French to concur — I say, it stands recorded before the world, by the 
 declaration of the French Government, that it was the anterior decision of 
 the British Government to reject the proposal of my noble friend, the 
 member for the City of London, which had naturally influenced the Emperor 
 in his decision. Here then, I say, is another proof of a heavy and peculiar 
 responsibility resting upon the Government. 
 
 Nor, Sir, is even this all, though it is much; for, when the House of 
 Commons was invited by the publication of the Protocols to give its opinion 
 on the negotiations, we were not put in possession of all the facts ; but the 
 Government of this country placed us in a peculiar and disadvantageous 
 position. I think it will not be disputed that, wlien at the end of May and 
 the beginning of June we debated the question of the war, it was not only 
 upon imperfect, but even upon garbled, information with reference to the 
 most important points at issue. I myself, standing in this very place, and 
 many other members of this House in different parts of it, argued upon the 
 case as likelv to occur, that, if the negotiations should be broken off, they 
 would at any rate be broken off by the Western Powers, with Austria upon 
 their side ; and, further, that there was no alternative presented to our 
 choice, as the means of escaping from the war, but one or the other of 
 the two proposals of Russia. And now at length it appeared, that 
 with regard to both of these fundamental propositions, we were entirely 
 mistaken ; and although the information that would have undeceived us 
 was then in the possession of the Government, we were called upon 
 to vote a solemn declaration — not, indeed, in the shape of an address 
 to the Crown, but yet a deliberate announcement at the least — of our 
 intention to support the Crown in the prosecution of the war, we 
 being entirely in the dark, or rather being wholly misinformed and 
 misled, as to the terms upon which peace might then have been obtained, 
 and as to the parties by whom those terms were proposed and supported. 
 All these things point to the same conclusion, namely, that an extraordi- 
 nary responsibihty rests on the heads of her Majesty's advisers ; and that, 
 if they have been right in the decision at which they have arrived, and to 
 which they have been the chief and pecuUar means of bringing Europe,
 
 then they are entitled to claim the exclusive fame and glory of that deci- 
 sion ; but, if they have been wrong, they are as highly and peculiarly 
 responsible : and they cannot plead the French alhance, and the fear 
 of offending France, as an excuse ; for the French have already, with 
 great judgment and sagacity, put on record that what they did was 
 done for fear of offending us ; so that they leave the burden resting upon 
 the advisers of the Crown. But, if there be this peculiar responsibility upon 
 the heads of the Government, then, as they are responsible to the House 
 of Commons, it is upon us, the members of the House of Commons, that it 
 must ultimately fall. And now, Sir, I may observe, that great praise has 
 been given to my noble friend, the Foreign Secretary, on account of the 
 despatches on the Eastern question which have recently been presented to 
 Parliament : this, we are told, is the tone required by the honour of the 
 country. My right honourable friend who preceded me in the debate even 
 thought it worth while to quote the expressions of approbation of their 
 spirit and energy which have fallen from members of this House, in proof 
 that the policy of the Government has been approved by the House of 
 Commons and the country. I accord most freely to Lord Clarendon, as 
 the representative of the Government, all the praise with regard to those 
 despatches that can belong to the highest degree of ingenuity, of force of 
 fact, and of temper ; it is impossible for the abihty of the advocate to con- 
 tribute more efFectuaUy to the success of his cause ; but I lack in those 
 despatches what I confess I wished to find. I lack the true tokens of such 
 a desire for peace as its inestimable value should inspire ; I lack in them 
 the spirit in which I do not hesitate to say the noble lord, the member for 
 London, would have written ; and I find in them, on the other hand, a 
 proneness to raise every possible objection against pacific proposals — to 
 anticipate, and by anticipation to stop the way against, eveiy reasonable 
 hope of a settlement — to place facts and opinions in such an order, and to 
 handle them in such a manner, as, if possible, to show a case for the 
 carrying on of the war. In speaking thus of the tone of the papers, I do 
 not, of course, suppose that my noble friend would not be the first to 
 embrace the hope of an honourable peace, if he could satisfy himself upon 
 the terms ; but I speak of the attitude into which his mind has uncon- 
 sciously and not unnaturally been thrown. 
 
 Now, let us come to the facts before us ; and, in examining them, there 
 are two points to be kept in view. In the first place, would the objects of 
 the war have been sufficiently accomphshed by the acceptance of any of the 
 proposals of peace which have been at our command ? In the second 
 place, even if those objects w'ould not have been achieved in the degree 
 which we think desirable, have we, notwithstanding, good reason to believe 
 that it would have been wiser to take the comprehensive view which was 
 taken by my noble friend, the member for London, at Vienna; and, bearing 
 in mind the importance of maintaining the great combination with which 
 we have been acting, to come to an accommodation .'' As respects the 
 means offered you for securing the objects of the war, you have had an 
 extraortbnarily copious collection of alternatives before you. Those ol)jects 
 were defined by what are well known as the four points or bases ; but it is 
 unnecessary to detain the House with the consideration of the first, second, 
 or fourth of the points, or with the first portion of the thn-d ; because the 
 first and second, with the first part of the third, were settled at Vienna ;
 
 8 
 
 while no obstacle was offered, or expected to arise, on the part of Russia, 
 to the settlement of the fourth. Well then. Sir, you have had no less than 
 seven different plans for what is termed the solution of the second part of 
 the third point. The first was the plan of neutralisation referred to by my 
 right honoui'able friend, which never saw the light, but remains in the hmbo 
 of things that have but half existed ; because, at a preliminary meeting of the 
 Plenipotentiaries of the Allies in April last, it was agreed that unless Austria 
 ioined in supporting it, which she proved to be unwilling to do, it should 
 never be proposed. Then came the plan of mv noble friend, which was sent 
 home by him on April 16. That plan consisted partly of territorial provi- 
 sions relating to the territory both east and west of the Black Sea, and partly 
 of provisions as to the actual force to be maintained in the waters of the Black 
 Sea, founded on the principle, not of limitation, but of counterpoise. I do 
 not seek to make use of it as an argumcntum ad hominem — and I know the 
 noble lord attaches much value to the territorial stipulations — but so far as 
 the waters of the Euxine are concerned, the plan is identical in principle 
 with the second Russian proposal. However, I will not dwell upon that 
 plan, for, like the first, it never became the subject of practical discussion. 
 Then we had the plan of the Alhes — a strict and definite limitation, which 
 was proposed and supported by them, and rejected by Russia. Then came 
 the two plans of the Russian Government — the first founded on the basis 
 of open straits, with a power, in certain cases, of closing- them ; the second 
 founded on the basis of closed straits, with a discretionary power of opening 
 them, whenever Turkey might think her security menaced. I still, after all 
 that has been said and done, cannot think that the second of these two plans 
 of Russia, although it was Russian — or rather because it was Russian — 
 offered a bad basis on which to proceed. It seems to me that it would have 
 been wiser, taking that proposition as the starting point of your arrange- 
 ment, to introduce into it the improvements of which it was susceptible, 
 than to reject it as it was rejected. Those five plans, however, are entirely 
 gone by ; but they — or, indeed, three or four at most from among them 
 — were the only plans of which the House had any knowledge at the time 
 of our former discussions on this great question. Since that period, there 
 have come to hght the two plans which may be called the Austrian plans, 
 although, if I follow my right honourable friend in giving them that name, 
 it must not be used ad invidiam. The first of them proceeded on the principle 
 of counterpoise, and the second on the principle of limitation together with 
 counterpoise. They were not, however, original conceptions of Austria, but 
 were partly founded on actual suggestions from, and in other points had 
 the approval of, the representatives of England and France. What, then, 
 were these two plans, upon which the justification of my honourable friend, 
 the member for Wick, in raising the present debate must rest ? The first 
 proposal, that of the ISth of April, was founded on these two bases — first, 
 that there should be a guarantee of the territory of Turkey by all the 
 Powers ; next, that, in case Russia should at any time increase her fleet in 
 she Black Sea beyond the strength it had attained in 1853, such increase 
 thould constitute a casus belli on the part of all the Allies. Now, my right 
 honourable friend almost entirely confined his speech to that proposal, in a 
 great degree overlooking the fact that another proposal was subsequently 
 made by Austria, entirely diflerent in character, which was only brought to 
 the knowledge of the Conference at its last meeting, on the 4th of June.
 
 The latter proposal was to this effect : — that the crigiiuil parties to the 
 quarrel, Russia and Turkey, should in the first instance agree between 
 themselves, and should subsequently propose to the Conference, the amount 
 of force which they were each to maintain in the Black Sea. Primd facie, 
 this proposal was founded on the principle of limitation ; and it is obvious 
 to remark, that if that principle be as valuable as on our side has been 
 contended, we thus had the means given us of obtaining the recognition of 
 it. But long before the proposition was actually made, her Majesty's Go- 
 vernment had anticipated it, and had barred its adoption by the most hostile 
 comments. They had said as early as on the 24th of April, by the pen of 
 Lord Clarendon, that the plan of settlement by collateral agreement, sug- 
 gested by the French Plenipotentiary, would not do ; that they knew what 
 it meant when embodied in a treaty, because in a similar case — and they 
 instanced the treaty of Vienna — R ussia, supported by the Northern Powers, 
 had held that an incorporation of that kind amounted to only registration. 
 In consequence, 1 suppose, of this argument — at least no other ground is 
 alleged — we refused even to take into consideration the second Austrian 
 proposal at the Conference of the 4th of June, and chose rather to put an 
 end to the negotiations. Now, what is the responsibility we have incurred 
 with respect to these two proposals ? The first proposal, founded on the 
 principle of counterpoise, was made with the authority of all the Pleni- 
 potentiaries at Vienna ; with the authority of the noble lord the mem- 
 ber for London ; with the authority of the French Plenipotentiary, who 
 attested the sincerity of his convictions by resigning his office ; and, if my 
 noble friend did not take a similar step, it was because he thought — rightly 
 or wrongly — that high political exigencies demanded from him the sacri- 
 fice of the views he had so strongly entertained and urged ; further, the 
 Turkish Plenipotentiary had given that proposal a favourable reception ; 
 and it had become at that time the proposition of Austria itself. Now, 
 Sir, I venture to say, w^ithout fear of contradiction, that, long as this war 
 may last (and doubtless it may last long), you never will overcome the 
 significance and importance of this fact — that all the Plenipotentiaries of 
 all the Powers (Turkey included) assembled at Vienna, the Austrian, 
 French, and English Plenipotentiaries being likewise either chief Ministers 
 or high Ministers of their respective Sovereigns, with one mind and one con- 
 sent urged that proposal upon their own Governments respectively. You will 
 never get over the weight and moment of that fact ; and it is vain for you 
 after this to think of regaining the opinion of Europe. That opinion can- 
 not be upon your side, in defiance of such a weight of evidence, of a kind 
 so palpable in its nature to the general apprelicnsion, as that one fact 
 brings to bear upon the reasonableness and righteousness of the proceed- 
 ings of the respective parties at Vienna. 1 say then. Sir, without a 
 moment's doubt, that even the first jjroposal should have been accepted ; 
 but, turning to the second, 1 confess that I have been astounded upon dis- 
 covering how cavalierly it was dealt with. 'J'his second proposal offered 
 you the alternative of limitation, and of limitation together with counter- 
 poise ; because it did not stop with providing that the Powers should 
 themselves propose an arrangement as to their respective naval forces that 
 should become an integral part of the treaty, but it likewise gave Turkey 
 the right to open the fctraits in case of danger. And, although I do no»^ 
 think tb*' terms in which this power was reserved to Turkey were quite 
 
 B
 
 10 
 
 satisfactory or large enough, yet, taken in connection with the comment of 
 Count Buol, I find it was, beyond all doubt, intended that they should be 
 made effective, so as to enable the Porte to call in the aid of its Allies when- 
 ever it deemed its security to be menaced. And why. Sir, do I say that 
 this proposal was entitled to a formal consideration in the Conferences ? 
 Upon this account — that it had already been declared by the Plenipoten- 
 tiaries themselves to be preferable to the other proposal, to which other 
 proposal they had formerly given their assent. If you refer to page 1 1 of 
 papers No. 15, you will see that at a meeting of the Plenipotentiaries on 
 the 1 7th of April, it was determined that this course should be adopted in 
 t!ie Conferences ; that they should propose to Russia, first of all, the strict 
 limitation desired by England and France ; next, the plan which sometime 
 afterwards became the second Austrian proi)Osal ; and, lastly, the plan 
 which very shortly afterwards became the first Austrian proposal. Now 
 these plans were at that time arranged in the order in which they were 
 considered to stand upon their respective merits ; and, therefore, the pro- 
 position of counterpoise and Umitation received the sanction of the four 
 Plenipotentiaries, even in a higher degree than the project of counterpoise 
 alone. Yet that plan, when brought before her Majesty's Government, 
 nay, even before it was regularly submitted to them, was summarily 
 rejected ; and the members of the Conference, when they met on the 4th 
 of June, were not even allowed to discuss it. 
 
 And now let me advert for a moment to the argument that you cannot 
 trust to a limitation which is effected by a collateral agreement. Why 
 cannot you trust to such a limitation ? Because, you say, there were 
 certain engagements of this class collaterally introduced into the treaty 
 of Vienna, of which Russia, with the other Northern Powers, considered 
 the insertion in the treaty as only having the effect of a record or regis- 
 tration. "Well, what could be easier than for us to provide that the 
 incorporation of such an instrument should not be a mere registration, 
 but should render it, as, indeed, the Austrian proposal in distinct words 
 declared, an integral part of the treaty? First of all, then, we have 
 rejected the opportunity of making peace upon the first Austrian pro- 
 posal, because we thought the difference between counterpoise and 
 limitation so great that, while we might accept limitation, we could not 
 accept counterpoise ; and next, when we had the offer of counterpoise and 
 limitation combined before us, the limitation, however, being reduced to a 
 form that saved the honour of Russia, without of necessity raising any diffi- 
 culty on our side as to its mere degree, we absolutely refused that pro- 
 posal. Therefore I say that my right honourable friend is entirely wrong, 
 and that his speech w'ill altogether mislead the House if it induces it to 
 infer that — wretched as I should consider such a plea by way of justifi- 
 cation of the war — the object for which this contest is prolonged is the 
 maintenance, with reference to the forces of Russia in the Euxine, of hmita- 
 tion as against counterpoise. 
 
 Again, Sir, in another point, and another point too which I hold to be of 
 capital importance, my right honourable friend's narrative absolutely demands 
 explanation, because he gives us to understand that we could in no case have 
 secured the military aid of Austria. I am sorry to say, the great confusion 
 in which the history of these transactions is presented to us — it may be from 
 the fault of nobody, but probably from the necessity of the case, owing to
 
 11 
 
 the number of the parties concerned, and the way in which the communi- 
 cations have been carried on in different places at the same time — lias 
 obviously quite bewildered and deceived even my right honourable friend ; 
 for I can show you that Austria did give you an absolute pledge, in a 
 certain event which it was placed within your power to bring about, that 
 she would go to war. I here state that boldly and broadly, and I challenge 
 contradiction, of w^iich I know perfeclly well the case does not admit. 
 The facts were these : — Austria made two proposals. The first of them 
 having been rejected by the British Government at the cominencement, 
 namely, of the month of May, the question of Austria's going to war in 
 regard to it never could arise, because that result was made to depend on 
 refusals by Russia only. Austria then brought forward another proposal 
 in the Conference, after her first one had been rejected by the Western 
 Powers ; and mv right honourable friend leaves it to be supposed that, 
 when she made that second proposal, she distinctly intimated that she 
 would not go to war if Russia refused to accept it. That is the case of my 
 right honourable friend ; and it is the truth, but not the whole truth. I 
 admit it ; she made the first proposal in April, and the case of her going 
 to war did not arise. She made, that is, she made formally and finally, 
 her second proposal in June, and she said she would not go to war if 
 Russia refused it. But this is not all ; my right honourable friend has 
 omitted from his view that upon which the whole merit of the question 
 turns, and that which is now proved beyond the possibilitv of doubt — viz., 
 that in the interval between these two proceedings a communication came 
 from Austria which involved a junction of the two proposals, upon the 
 collective rejection of which she was prepared to go to war. Austria did 
 not offer to go to war for either proposal singly, but she said this : — " Let 
 us propose to Russia these two plans jointly, and if she rejects them both 
 we will then draw the sword." (" Hear, hear," from Lord John Russell.) 
 Mv right honourable friend indeed made a faint allusion to this part of the 
 Austrian communications, and said it was made after the decision had been 
 taken by her Majesty's Government. After what decision ? Why, after 
 the decision to reject the first Austrian proposal, but before the Conference 
 at which the second proposal of the same Power was rejected. Before 
 that Conference, and therefore, while evei-ything was still open, her 
 Majesty's Government received from Austria the communication from 
 which I shall read a very brief extract; and, with this document in their 
 hands, they sent fresh orders to the Conference, or allowed orders pre- 
 viously sent to operate there, which absolutely closed the door against a 
 settlement. The passage which I shall quote has alreadv been referred to 
 by my honourable friend (Mr. Laing); but, as it is of such deep import;mce 
 in this controversv, and as the matter has really been so much obscured bv 
 the inadequate and misleading statement of details which has been made bv 
 my right honourable friend — himself, as 1 have shown, misled — I mav be 
 forgiven if I read a few lines from it to the House. The words in question 
 are contained in a letter from Count Buol to Count CoUoredo. Mv right 
 honourable friend said something about the want of direct communication 
 with our Government on the part of Austria. I trust that he does not 
 intend to take his ground upon that distinction. The distinction between 
 limitation and counterpoise is, I think, narrow enough as a ground for war. 
 I hope we shall not add to it some other distinction between a direct com-
 
 12 
 
 niunication from Austria, and a communication through Count Colloredo, 
 the Minister of Austria. This letter, which I shall now quote, was 
 addressed by Count Buol to Count Colloredo, and was communicated by the 
 latter directly to Lord Clarendon. In his hands it was left on the part of 
 the Austrian Government ; whose entire authority it therefore carried, and 
 upon whom its contents were thus absolutely binding. The words are these: — 
 
 •' As to the thu'd prmciple, wc have proposed to our allies, at the same time 
 binding ourselves, in ease of need, to support it by force of arms, a solution which 
 it is our firm con\'iction would be eftectual, complete, and agreeable to European 
 interests." 
 
 Something has been said about these words referring to a casus belli occur- 
 ring hereafter, if Russia increased her fleet beyond her strength in 1853. 
 The paragraph which follows entirely disposes of such a construction, for 
 it at least indisputably applies, not to any contingency to arise hereafter, 
 but to an immediate participation in the war now raging : — 
 
 " If Russia, being placed in a position to agree to one or other of these proposals 
 of the ultimatum, had rejected both of them, we should then have had proof that 
 she will decidedly not give her assistance to the complete realisation of the third 
 guarantee, in so far as its object is to put an end to llvissian preponderance in the 
 Black Sea. It being impossible, therefore, to do else than consider as exhausted 
 the means of conciliation for bringmg about such a peace as the interests of Europe, 
 and ours in particular, require, the Emperor, our august master, decided to have 
 recourse to arms as a means of obtaining this peace." 
 
 Mr. Wilkinson : "What is the date of that document ? 
 
 Mr. Gladstone : It is dated Vienna, May 20. We do not know the 
 precise date at which it was communicated to Lord Clarendon, but it is 
 clear it must have been before the 2nd of June, for on that day Lord 
 Clarendon writes to Lord Westmoreland on the subject of it ; and it was 
 not till the 4th of that month that the second proposal itself was 
 formally submitted to the Conference, and the door closed upon negotia- 
 tion by the direction of the Government of England, acting, I presume, 
 in conjunction with that of France. Therefore, having the promise 
 of Austria to make a double proposal to Russia, involving two 
 alternatives — the one counterpoise alone, and the other counterpoise, 
 with limitation by collateral agreement ; and having also her promise 
 to go to war in the event of the rejection of both proposals — the 
 Government refused to agree to that suggestion of Austria, and deter- 
 mined in preference on the continuation of the war ; and, while I am 
 speaking, my right honourable friend (Sir J. Graham) reminds me that 
 this very idea of proposing a plurality of plans to Russia, and making the 
 alternative of war to depend on the rejection of the whole — an idea 
 evidently conceived in a pacific spirit — owes its origin, so far as we are 
 aware, to the noble lord the member for London, who closed his letter on 
 the 18th of April with words to this effect : that, if her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment decided on accepting any one of the three proposals made at the 
 Conference, he thought they ought to insist upon Austria making the 
 rejection of all three by Russia a casus belli. So much then. Sir, for the 
 plans of accommodation which we have refused ; and I must confess that 
 I can hardly express my feelings when I consider that we are making war, 
 and that, too, a gigantic war, on account of such paltry differences as those 
 which can alone be even colourably alleged between what was proposed to 
 us and what we had ourselves proposed.
 
 13 
 
 No doubt, there is in this country a strong war party, and a strong feel- 
 ing in favour of the prosecution of the war ; but neither the party nor the 
 feeling is that to which my right honourable friend, the Secretary of State, 
 belongs. There are persons entertaining more extended views ; they have 
 feeUngs of far greater exasperation, requiring much more to allay them : 
 they look to European changes ; they look to revolutionary struggles ; they 
 look to effecting what they consider to be progress — and true progress, by 
 pacific means, we all desire to see accomphshed ; they look to efFecling 
 progress, in the sense of their opinions, by means of the sword. Others, 
 without proceeding to such lengths, have vague, and, as I think, somewhat 
 visionary, views of humbling our enemy ; but there are, I may venture 
 to say, none that look for limitation instead of counterpoise, or that con- 
 sider such a difficulty as that (which difficulty, however, we are no longer 
 entitled to say exits) in the arrangement of terms of peace to constitute a 
 justification for the continuance of the war. I recollect, indeed, that my 
 honourable friend, the member for Kidderminster (Mr. Lowe), has expressed 
 a good opinion of limitation ; he has even made a motion in this House upon 
 it. Does he recollect the fate of that motion ? How many persons adopted 
 that doctrine of limitation — a limitation which was to be the hinge of peace 
 and war ? I doubt whether the Government would find, upon a vote, ten 
 adherents in this House to the particular view which they have adopted ; 
 and yet it is for that view that we are at war. But my right honourable 
 friend says, and says truly, limitation was a proposal which we, who belonged 
 to the Cabinet in February, were bound to make to Russia ; we had agreed 
 to it, as a proposal to be made, as a condition we were desirous to obtain ; 
 but we had not agreed to it as an ultimatum ; we had not agreed to make 
 — and it appears to-night that my right honourable friend will not now bind 
 himself to make — this condition of limitation the hinge of peace or war. 
 
 I must, however. Sir, press it upon the House, that, if we confine our- 
 selves to considering the details of these proceedings, however clear and 
 however strong our views and convictions may be, we do injustice to them. 
 There is a deeper question at issue than the particular conditions offered 
 and refused, or than the difference between those particular conditions. 
 How are the aggressive tendencies of Russia to be effectually restrained ? 
 "What is the war into which we have plunged .'' It is a war in defence of 
 Turkey. How is Turkey to be effectually defended ? Sir, in my opinion, 
 having obtained tl.e great and essential objects — the abolition of Russian 
 rights over the Principalities, and the destruction of Russian claims upon 
 the Greek Christians of the Ottoman empire. — I do not hesitate to say, the 
 best plan will be, not that which looks best upon paper — not even that which 
 in the abstract may have the best claims to our approval — but that which 
 will command the united support of Europe. It is to the support of Europe 
 that we must look, if we are to think of restraining Russia. Great as is the 
 power of England and France, I defy you for any length of time to fight 
 effectually against the fixed law of Nature and course of events. You can- 
 not, by the efforts of the two Western Powers, control the paramount laws 
 which must determine from age to age the destinies of Russia. You may, 
 by gigantic and unheard-of efforts, succeed for a moment — I grant that, 
 although, when I consider all that it involves, I cannot regard even that as 
 free from doubt — in effecting your purpose ; but your success will be 
 bought lit a fearful price, and it will be the success of a moment onlv. It
 
 14 
 
 is impossible to contemplate as a normal state of things that union and 
 identification of the whole West, which is the first condition of such 
 success ; but, even if that could be relied on, the thing itself is impossible 
 to be done. As Mr. Burke said, when discussing the chimerical proposition 
 of representation for the American colonies, " You have the ocean with 
 its 3000 miles against you;" opposuit natiira ; so now we have, if not 
 the Great Atlantic, yet the ocean with 3000 miles of sea against us. 
 There is bat one way of maintaining permanently what I mav presume 
 to call the great international policy and law of Europe — but one way of 
 keeping within bounds any one of the Powers possessed of such strength as 
 France, England, or Russia, if it be bent on an aggressive policv, and that 
 is, by maintaining not so much great fleets, or other demonstrations of phy- 
 sical force, which I believe to be really an insignificant part of the case, but 
 the iTioral union — the effective concord of Europe. Now, what course has 
 been pursued here ? We are told that Russia is a power from whom we 
 are not to expect the observance of treaties ; you cannot trust to her good 
 faith. We are not told that from an unauthoritative source ; but her Ma- 
 jesty's Government, on a former night, put up their Attornev-General, who 
 expended his unsurpassed ingenuity in a detailed demonstration, amidst 
 the cheers of this House, that it is impossible to bind Russia bv treaties. 
 Now, Sir, I am not about to claim any peculiar sanctity or purity for the 
 policy of Russia — 1 am not ready to assert that for our own pohcy — especially 
 I am not preparecf to claim it for our policv such as it has too commonly been 
 in the East — still less, or at any rate quite as little, am I prepared to assert 
 it for Russia. I am ready — if this really be the opinion of her Majesty's 
 Government, that the observance of plighted faith is not to be expected 
 from Russia — to accept that doctrine. I have mvself recently heard that 
 there is at St. Petersburg a considerable partv of persons who hold lan- 
 guage such as this : " What folly in our Government not to have accepted 
 the terms offered by the Allies ; they should have acceded to anv plan ; 
 peace would have been made, the vicissitudes of politics would shortly have 
 separated England and France, and then we could have set at nought the 
 stipulations of the treaty." I am told that there is a party which holds 
 that doctrine ; but, on the other hand, I am also told that there are people 
 in Russia, as in other countries, who look upon that doctrine as the height 
 of villany, and who desire that no peace should be made which involves dis- 
 honour to their countrv. I am about to show, however, the glaring contra- 
 riety of the courses pursued bv the Government, with the arguments they 
 employ. Thev say, through the Attorney General, " We cannot trust 
 Russia in regard to the observance of any terms ;" but, if we cannot trust 
 her, what is the alternative ? What should we do ? Why, we ought cer- 
 tainly not to relv on wretched stipulations, which we ourselves declare to 
 be worthless for the purpose of binding her, but rely on the maintenance of 
 that union — that combination of the moral and the material strength of 
 Europe — which you found available for the purpose two years ago, and 
 which, but for your own acts, might be available to you hereafter. U you 
 cannot trust to treaties, trust to something independent of and more trust- 
 worthy than treaties ; trust to the enlightened sense of the general interest 
 in the peace of Europe ; for it is by that union and that common senti- 
 ment alone that Russia, or that any Power of the first order, can be perma- 
 nently coerced. But, no; the Government have indeed declared treaties
 
 15 
 
 to be worthless ; and yet, for the sake of a stipulation in a treaty which 
 nobody outside the Cabinet thinks worth anything, which even the Secre- 
 tary of State tells us is not a sine qud non, and which the Attorney-General 
 proves to us Russia will not observe — yet, for the sake of it, they will dis- 
 solve the combination of Europe ; they will break the last link which unites 
 us to Germany ; they will reduce us to a state of comparative isolation ; 
 they will turn the favourable current of European opinion ; and, madly 
 pressing on the conflict, which they are now doing all in their power to 
 render desperate, they reject the golden opportunity which the mercy of 
 Providence has placed in our way to enable us to restore peace to Europe. 
 Now, Sir, with respect to the great Powers of Austria and Russia, I 
 confess I am not among those who are apt to sympathise with Russian or 
 Austrian views on the mode of managing the domestic affairs of the States 
 of Europe. I have but Httle name in the Courts of Vienna and St. 
 Petersburg, but that little is, I fear, a bad one ; for I am not supposed to 
 admire the pohcy which those powers, if they do not practise it themselves, 
 have been, I think, too apt to countenance and support in other quarters. 
 But that is not the question now before us. We have now to consider what 
 our position relatively to Austria was and is. What was it ? It has been idly 
 said that we reaped no advantage from the Austrian alliance. I reply, we 
 had various and great advantages. Austria neutralised the action of 
 •300,000 Russian troops, of whom the first fruits are now finding their way 
 to the plains of the Crimea, and who will soon be, if they are not already, 
 among the ranks of our adversaries. Again, as long as we had the Austrian 
 alliance, her occupation of the Principahties had quite a different character 
 to that which it now bears. I cannot regard that or any foreign occupation 
 as being in itself otherwise than a serious evil. I have often been asto- 
 nished, during the course of this controversy, when the occupation of the 
 Principalities — first by Russia, and then by Austria — has been discussed, 
 month after month, day after day, entirely as a question of the payment of 
 some £40,000 a year to Turkey, or as a violation of her rights as suzerain 
 of the country ; but never in reference to the happiness, the well-being, the 
 freedom, or the peace of the millions of inhabitants of those Principalities. 
 The occupation of the Principalities by Austria was, however, useful for the 
 primary purposes of the war. You endured it because she formed a 
 barrier against Kussia in that quarter. I do not know now against whom 
 she forms a barrier, or whether she will hereafter practically occupy the 
 Principalities more for us than against us. Well, Sir, these things have 
 changed in regard to Austria, and I must say I look on the change that 
 has been brought about as most serious with regard to the occupation of 
 the Principalities. I think it still more serious in another point of view. 
 After the feeble policy of Prussia, it was on the support of Austria alone 
 you could rely to keep up anything like an European combination — that 
 character which entitled us to use the lofty language Lord Clarendon, 
 not unbecomingly employed in the autumn, when he dechned to dispute 
 the case with Russia, as between parties standing in the view of the 
 world on a level with each other. He said, and he was entitled to say, 
 that Europe had pronounced on the respective positions of the parties. I am 
 doui)tful whether he can now^ renew that lofty claim to represent Europe 
 in the quarrel, or to act under her sanction ; and I am afraid that we shall 
 not find the change in our relative positions stop there. I think, after the
 
 16 
 
 refusal which Austria has received from us to her proposals, and after she 
 lias been told, as I see it stated is the case, that the Russian Government 
 was ready to accept her most recent proposition, we must look to a gradual 
 widening of the interval which now separates us from that power ; and it 
 is not a little remarkable, if the common sources of information mav be 
 trusted, that, following immediately upon the diplomatic rupture, we find 
 Austria first strii)ping her Polish and Russian frontier of troops, and 
 diminishing her army on that side the Alps, while at the same moment we 
 hear that she is strengthening her garrisons in Italy. These are, indeed, 
 circumstances full of meaning ; and tliev are circumstances of which we 
 begin to feel the magnitude and the weight, when we recollect all the 
 special pleading we have bestowed on the diff'erences between counterpoise 
 and limitation. 
 
 However, Sir, it is quite true that we still retain certain allies. First of 
 all, Turkey is our ally. Is that ally really an addition of strength ? I have 
 been reproached for having used at a former time disparaging language in 
 respect to Turkey. If my object had been to disparage Turkey, I could 
 have said much more, and could have referred to the history of former 
 periods, and to the part which the Turkish race had played, and the rela- 
 tions it had borne to Christendom. But my object was very different : it 
 was the simple fulfilment of what I thought an imperative duty. Seeing 
 that we were coming nearer and nearer to the likelihood of war, I was 
 desirous, in the little I ever said on this subject, that that little should tend 
 not to blind, but to open the eyes of, the people of England, and to give 
 them to understand what calculations it was reasonable thev should make, 
 and what reliance they could justly place on the strength and resources of 
 Turkey to aid them in the war. It appears to me that our alliance with 
 Turkey may be one of a similar character to that mentioned in ancient 
 story, of the land that the Ottoman power now rules. When ^-Eneas 
 escaped from the flames of Troy, he had an ally. That ally was his father, 
 Anchises ; and the part which ^neas performed in the aUiance was to 
 cairy his ally upon his back. He addressed his parent in these appropriate 
 words — 
 
 " Ergo age, care pater, cervici iniponere nostra^ ; 
 Ipse subibo hvimeris, nee me labor istc gravabit." 
 
 I commend these words, and the meaning of these words, to her Majesty's 
 Government, and especially to my right honourable friend the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer, for he is the particular Minister to whom, I think, will 
 belong the duty and honour which these words may imply. And, Sir, if 
 unluqjpily this result shall ensue, it will be from no want of honesty on the 
 jjart of Turkey, but from the fact that her Mahomedan institutions are 
 decrepit ; that the youthful and vigorous elements of European Turkey are 
 underneath, and tiiat the antiquainted and worn-out elements of society there 
 are situated above those which are intrinsically more fit to rule. And is it 
 not the fact that she wants, in a great degree, the ordinary organization 
 and machinery of government .'' Is it not the fact that, in order to raise 
 her revenues in odinary times, Turkey has to trust, in a great degree, in 
 many of her provinces, to the agencv of military force, which, of course, is 
 now concentrated and aljsorbed in the camps wliich she has formed for the 
 purposes of the war against Russia ? Her revenues, therefore, cannot be 
 fully raised ; and the habit of not paying taxes, I need hardly say, is both one
 
 17 
 
 ■which forms itself with great facility (a laugli), and one which, when once 
 formed, is extremely difficult to uproot. But, with regard to our ally, 
 Turkey, I am hound to say, that in my belief the greatest of all the manifold 
 dangers of this war is, that the prolongation of it must bring about the 
 very evils which we undertook the war in order to avert. There is no plan 
 that the Emperor of Russia could have devised, so sure and effectual for his 
 purpose of exhausting Turkey, and leaving her an easv prey for the first 
 convenient opportunity, as the plan which, though you have not devised it, 
 you are now, it would seem, prepared to act upon, namely, that of an 
 indefinite prolongation of the war, without objects either clear or adequate. 
 Every month, every week, and every day for which you continue the war, 
 makes more intense, more obvious, and less capable of remedy, the decre- 
 pitude and exhaustion of Turkey. I am not now about to discuss afresh 
 the merits of the Turkish loan ; but I protest on my own behalf, and 1 am 
 certain I may add on behalf of my right honourable friends near me, that 
 the reasons which led us to go the length of recording our votes in oppo- 
 sition to it were not pecuniary and financial, but were strictly political 
 reasons ; had references to the very alliances you sought to promote ; and, 
 above all, to our anxiety lest we should forfeit the attainment of the objects 
 of this war. The very principle of guaranteeing money to Turkey is fatal, 
 inasmuch as it creates in her a state of political dependence. You have gone 
 to war to secure the integrity and independence of the Turkish empire, and 
 then, in order forsooth to prosecute the w'ar, you induce Parliament to pass 
 a measure which will leave Turkey in the position of a slave. If we want 
 a fair test of the political effects of this guarantee, let us ask ourselves 
 what we should have thought if the arrangements we have just made had, 
 under different circumstances, been concluded between Russia and Turkey 
 — if Russia had been guaranteeing to Turkey, with many kind words, a 
 loan of £5,000,000. I venture to say that such an arrangement, and its 
 accompanying mortgages, would have furnished ground for a fifth point at 
 Vienna ; and we should have declared it to be totally inconsistent wdth the 
 independence of Turkey, under her peculiar circumstances, that her loans 
 should be raised under the guarantee of a great European Power. 
 
 So much for Turkey ; and now with respect to Sardinia. I, for one, 
 have the highest opinion of the honour and intelligence of that countrv, 
 and of its Government. Though the pressure on her finances is severe, 
 she has gallantly borne up against it, and she has made every financial 
 exertion becoming a nation in the 1 ighest state of civilisation. She has 
 maintained a just balance, though with difficulty, between her revenue and 
 her expenditure ; but it is impossible to suppose that she can contribute in 
 any sensible proportion to such gigantic burdens as this war will entail. 
 Moreover, I must confess I begin to feel some compunction with respect to 
 Sardinia. The invitation we gave to her to join us might be right or wrong ; 
 but it was bom i fide presented by us under the belief that she was to be one 
 in an European combination, representing the united sentiment of Europe; 
 and now, having got Sardinia into that combination, we immediately 
 proceed to change its character, and render it no longer a comprehensive 
 European combination, but an isolated alliance only of certain Powers 
 among themselves. I confess. Sir, that I am not without apprehension 
 that we may be found to have incurred a deep responsibility with respect 
 to Sardinia, if, in carrying on this war beyond its original and proper
 
 18 
 
 purposes, we make her an adjunct merely in promoting a French and 
 English policy. 
 
 And now, further, with respect to France itself: is there any doubt 
 of the tendency and leaning of the great and gallant people of France 
 in reference to this war ? I believe the French people did originally 
 appreciate the objects of the war, and were ready to make all reasonable 
 sacrifices for those objects ; but I protest utterly against the construction 
 put by some writers on the great operations we have seen recently taking 
 place in reference to the loans which have been raised in France for 
 the purposes of the war. In my opinion, nothing is more groundless 
 than to connect the avidity with which great sums have been subscribed 
 with any general enthusiasm, or with any enthusiasm whatever, for 
 the pursuit of this war. If you ask for an explanation of the facts, I am 
 quite sure that any gentleman connected with the city of London could 
 at once afford it. The phenomenon is of the very simplest and most 
 ordinary kind. The rate of interest offered by the French Government, 
 and the terms of subscription were so high, and so pecuUarly favourable 
 for all persons having monev to invest, that this investment competed 
 advantageously with every other kind of investment. But let us look to 
 the other side of the question, and consider the position of the debtor — 
 that is to say, of the State and people of France. Hardly any one with 
 whom I have had the opportunity of speaking appears to have realised what 
 has taken place. In sixteen short months of war, France has added to her 
 public debt, speaking in round numbers, 100,000,000 of pounds sterhng. 
 She has offered to the creditor very nearly five per cent, interest — in sheer 
 interest — besides an immense bonus, w-liich, on the return of peace, he will 
 obtain by the improvement of the capital value of his stock. It is pretty 
 obvious that the French people are not likely to go on adding £100,000,000 
 to their public debt once in every sixteen months, either for the objects of 
 a remote and purely general policy, or for any such differences (did they 
 still exist) as the difference between counterpoise and limitation. If you 
 want to be intelligible to the masses in France, you must use other lan- 
 guage — language such as associates itself with the former glories and 
 mihtary traditions of the country. Depend on it, there is danger and 
 apprehension in that quarter connected with the prosecution of your 
 present policy ; and those who are wise and earnest in a desire to promote 
 the French alliance, not as an occasional, but as a stable and permanent, 
 connection, will be of opinion that it would be best promoted by the 
 acceptance of such terms as those to which I have referred. 
 
 Again, Sir, it is said that the great efforts which are now being made 
 by Russia must be intolerable to her ; but, for one, I am not prepared to 
 rely on the broken reed of mere speculation in this country as to the pro- 
 bable financial exhaustion of Russia. The noble lord at the head of the 
 Government told us on a recent occasion that the expenses of Russia in 
 this war amounted to £30,000,000 per annum. I do not know what 
 means my noble friend possessed of forming a judgment on that point. It 
 is not easy to understand how Russia can spend an excess of thirty millions 
 sterling over her peace establishment upon her armies only, and within her 
 own territory ; but even if she does spend thirty millions to match the hun- 
 dred milUons spent bv the Powers allied against her, I will not venture to 
 rely on that. I must, indeed, admit that at the present time I find it
 
 19 
 
 difficult to obtain information with respect to Russia. I believed, until 
 within the last few months, that we had a press in this country free, not 
 onlv legally but morally, and long habituated fearlessly to discuss every- 
 thing, and to trust to the strength of truth and right to give the victory ; 
 but 1 do not now know where to look in the English papers for Russian 
 documents, such as Count Nesselrode's note, of the 4th of June, to the 
 Austrian Government, communicating (as it seems) satisfaction at the 
 Austrian occupation of the Principalities, and readiness to respect it. I 
 believe that document has not been published in any English newspapers. 
 But do not let us build upon any such precarious and uninformed calcu- 
 lations with respect to Russia. As far as known facts go, we have no right 
 to reckon upon Russian exhaustion. There are certain tests which are 
 partial, but are sound and trustworthy as far as they go ; look to the state 
 of the exchanges — are they vitally affected .'' Is the price of commodities 
 imported from abroad materially raised } or is the price received for exports 
 at the place of exportation greatly reduced .'' Of course I do not refer to 
 corn, because I have no doubt that in many parts of Russia the price of 
 corn must have been immensely reduced ; but when we are speaking of 
 Russia with reference to the influences which bear upon her policy, we 
 ought not to speak so much of that vast space which is covered by the 
 territorial designation, as of those portions to which St. Petersburg and 
 Moscow form the central points. Those are the parts which are principally 
 to be regarded as affecting the policy of the Russian Government. I say, 
 then, that you are not in a condition with safety and prudence to speculate 
 upon the exhaustion of Russia as likely to overbear her presumed wishes 
 and resolutions in reference to the prosecution of this war. Then, with 
 respect to the spirit and feeling of the Russian people and of the Russian 
 army. I do not speak now of the Russian Government. In the mouths 
 of the Russian Government it may be that the phrases of patriotism and 
 religion are mere cant phrases ; but they are not, therefore, of necessity 
 such in the mouths of the Russian people, or even of the Russian army. 
 Let any honourable gentleman put himself in the place of the Russian sol- 
 dier, and act upon that rule, so salutary in all controversies whatever, of 
 endeavouring to take a survey of the case from the adversary's point of 
 view. Against whom is he fighting ? Against the Turks — against the 
 hereditary enemies of his race — against those whom he is taught to con- 
 sider the hereditary enemies of his religion — and, finally, and as respects all 
 the Allies, against the invaders of his soil. If there are two motives which 
 can act with overpowering might upon the human heart — if there are two 
 incentives which can draw forth out of a man all the power and energy of 
 which he is possessed, are they not these — first, that he is fighting against 
 the enemy of his religion ; and, secondly, that he is defending his own soil; 
 and are not these the very motives which the Russian soldiery and people 
 have at present to work upon them .'' Let me here relate to the House an 
 an anecdote which has lately reached rae — I think, on good authority. It 
 illustrates the spirit which the Russian Government is enabled to infuse 
 into its army, and it illustrates also, on the other side, with tremendous 
 force, all that we have been told of the losses which have been sustained 
 by the Russian army in this war. The House will at once see, from its 
 impartial bearings, that this is not a concocted anecdote, but that it bears 
 upon it the internal evidences of veracity. A corps of 40,000 men (I can-
 
 20 
 
 not name the corps) arrived at Perekop on their way to the Russian camp 
 in the Crimea ; the case was urgent, and the men were desired to march 
 onwards to their destination at the rate of thirty versts a day — which the 
 House will see is a forced march, somewhat under twenty miles a day. 
 The men said, " Do not impose upon us any fixed distance ; let us march 
 as far as we can." They reached the Russian camp — a distance of 120 
 miles — in the course of four days, but they lost on the way 10,000 men. 
 They left Perekop 40,000 strong- ; only 30,000 men reached the camp. 
 This tends to confirm, you will justly sav, all w^e have been told of the 
 enormous numbers which have perished in the Russian army during this 
 war ; and you will tell me that it is impossible for anv countrv long to with- 
 stand such a drain ; but is there not another aspect under which we ought 
 also to regard this anecdote ? What must be the spirit of that soldiery, 
 what its power of passive endurance, its devotion to the will of the Em- 
 peror, and what the strength of its sentiments of patriotism and religion, 
 when the zeal of the men outruns the orders of the commanders, and when 
 they are ready to make efforts such as those, even though with reason to anti- 
 cipate too surely that in the short space of four days, without a hand being 
 lifted against them, one man out of every four will have fallen ? I see that 
 an honourable gentleman smiles ; but I confess it appears to me that such a 
 fact as this is full of meaning with reference to the more remote prospects of 
 this war. Again, have you noticed w^hat took place in Sebastopol on the 20th 
 of June ? This, I am glad to say, we know through the medium of our own 
 papers. It is a Russian account, but it comes round to us through the 
 Ost-Deutsche Post, and has been copied into some English journals. 
 
 " On the 20th, the burial of the dead was continued, but towards evening the 
 flag of truce was removed, and the bombardment recommenced, but much more 
 feebly than before. The same day a Te Vettm was sung in the church of St. Ykuli- 
 mir in celebration of our happy success, and the soldiers who attended wore the 
 same clothes which they had worn in the struggle, and not a single coat was to be 
 seen there which was not dj'ed with blood. In the evening the whole gan-ison of 
 Sebastopol received the Sacrament. Osten Sacken, with his staff, received it first, 
 and the rest of the troops in succession." 
 
 You may say that this is fanaticism, but at any rate it is not hypocrisy ; or, 
 even if I must suppose it to be hypocrisy in those who lead, it is not such 
 in those who follow. It is a sign of that character, partly passive, but 
 capable of being roused by circumstances to a high and persevering activity, 
 which has enabled Russia to occupv so prominent a position in the affairs 
 of the world, which will never, I am convinced, enable her to become 
 formidable to you so long as vour cause is just, but which it must be worth 
 your while to consider when you begin to doubt of its justice. So much 
 for the position of Russia with regard to this war. 
 
 And now. Sir, before I sit down, I am bound to express my deep grati- 
 tude to the House for the patience with which it has heard me. When I 
 reflect that my right honourable friends and myself, who were parties to the 
 deliberate decision to enter into this war, at the very moment we come to 
 a clear conviction that it ought no longer to be pursued, are allowed to 
 express ourselves with entire freedom, and to utter the strongest sentiments 
 against the policy we thus condemn, I must say I never knew a more con- 
 spicuous instance of the length to which freedom of speech is not only in 
 theory but in practice given and exercised in this glorious country. We 
 cannot, indeed, under such circumstances, follow the dictates of our con-
 
 21 
 
 sciences without suspicion, %Yithout taunts, or without sneers. These 
 things are to be expected ; I do not for a moment murmur at them ; and I 
 fully admit that, if_ her Majesty's Government had accepted the proposals 
 recommended by my noble friend, the member for London, they would 
 have paid the forfeiture of place and power. They would have also paid a 
 heavier forfeit ; they would have been pelted by the storm of abuse, and 
 they would have suffered under what is harder to bear — a storm of ridicule. 
 We know something of what these things are, but they would have had to 
 bear them all in a greater degree, in proportion to the greater importance 
 of the service they would then have rendered to their country. I do 
 not complain of these things ; I admit that to a large portion of the 
 community it must be irritating and exasperating to see those who were 
 among the original counsellors of the war now endeavouring, and endea- 
 vouring strenuously, as I hope, to bring it to an end. I am doubly thank- 
 ful, therefore, to this House for the free permission it has given me to 
 express with earnestness, and even vehemence, all I feel on this important, 
 nay absorbing, subject. The House will feel that, if we are wrong, 
 our responsibility is strong indeed ; but we have had no choice ; with our 
 convictions, we, above all, are bound to endeavour to draw the country 
 forth from this great struggle on the earliest occasion, when we think it cau 
 be done with honour. I am not ashamed to say that I remain of my 
 original opinion as to the justice of this war at its commencement. There 
 are gentlemen who sit near me who think differently from me in that 
 respect, and who, I believe, nay I hope — for the supposition I am making 
 is only in harmony with the high spirit and principle they have shown, and 
 the consistent part they have acted from the first — were ready to have 
 censured us for entering into it. Between us and them, therefore, there 
 can be no suspicion of conspiracy or combination. I differ from them in 
 this : — I think we had cause to go into this war, while I admit the difficul- 
 ties of the question. I think that it was not only a just and necessary war, 
 with reference to its immediate occasion, but that probably, from deeply- 
 seated causes of a more general character, it could not long have been 
 avoided — that, in short, it had become absolutely necessary to cut the 
 meshes of the net in which Russia had entangled Turkey. At the same 
 time the war, into which I reluctantly but deliberately agreed to enter, was 
 a war the objects of which I can define ; they are to be found in the Four 
 Points. It was a war carried on by an united peoijle, in the name and 
 on behalf of Eurojje, into which we entered, backed by a European combi- 
 nation, and by tbe authority of what I may presume almost to term 
 European law. It was a war which we undertook, not only joined in 
 actual operations with France, but with Austria and Prussia (backward 
 though the latter has shown herself now for the last twelvemonth and 
 more) linked in a treaty with us to resist Russia by force of their 
 united arms, in case of certain events occurring, which were then well 
 known to be both probable and near. That was the nature of the war 
 into which we went, and it was perfectly obvious, from the nature of that 
 war, that certain general rules where applicable to it, to which we ought to 
 endeavour at least to conform. No doubt, the man who advises his 
 Sovereign to go to war cannot possibly give security for an escape at any 
 given time from the struggle which he begins ; but the very nature of this 
 war showed that, if possible, it ought to be short. Every war, the prose-
 
 22 
 
 cution of which depends on alliance?, ought to be a short war — that is, 
 every effort should be used to make it short, and its objects should not be 
 such as are certain to make it long. It was not a distrust of France, as 
 my right honourable friend, the Home Secretary, would seem to think, 
 which probably led my honourable friend near me (Mr. Laing) to antici- 
 pate danger to the French alliance from a continuance of the war. It was 
 because it is the very nature of a war, when prolonged, from its vicissi- 
 tudes, from the sacrifices it requires, from the collision of interests and 
 feeling it entails, to endanger alliances ; and every war, therefore, which is 
 to be carried on by alUances, ought to be short, sharp, and decisive. 
 I may be told that this was has not been a short, sharp, and decisive war. 
 My answer is, that our war was a war for the Four Points .You mav con- 
 demn them, if you think fit. I am not not now defending them ; I am 
 speaking of what is historical — not of my own opinion of what ought to 
 have been, but of what, as indisputable and familiar records tell you, 
 actually was. It was a war for certain objects, defined in what are called 
 the four points or bases. Those objects have been, in our judgment, 
 attained ; and, they having been attained, thev, although the Government, or 
 the Parliament, or the country, whichever of them it may prove to have been, 
 may not have chosen to avail themselves of the offers which have been 
 made, is it inconsistency in us, with our views, to say that the war ought 
 to be brought to a close ? Would it not, on the contrary, have been the 
 most contemptible effeminacy of character, if a man in my position, who 
 feels that he has been instrumental in bringing his country into this 
 struggle, were to hesitate a single moment when he was firmly and fully 
 convinced in his own mind that the time had arrived when she might wiih 
 honour pass forth from it ? That was the war into which we entered ; 
 what the war is in which we are now engaged I do not profess to know. 
 I have not the remotest idea, nor, as I believe, has any other person, what 
 mav be the policy of the Government. I hope they have a policy. When 
 we began the war, we were called on to explain its objects ; but the objects 
 of the war, which is now being carried on are entirely unexplained. If I 
 refer to the speech of my right honourable friend, I should draw one con- 
 clusion ; if I turned to the speech of other members of the Government, I 
 might draw other conclusions. What was the upshot of the speach of the 
 Attorney- General .'' What the upshot of that of the right honourable 
 gentleman the Secretary for Ireland ? Something totally different from 
 anv admitted object of the war. Austria has recently declared, in the most 
 solemn language, that, if ever she renews negotiations, it shall be for the 
 purpose of giving effect to the four well-known guarantees. Austria uses 
 these words : — 
 
 " We shall await, in a firm attitude, the progress of events and the propitious 
 moment for renewing the negotiations for peace, to which, when that moment 
 arrives, we shall on our part only agree with the irrevocable resolution of making 
 them tend to the faithful, effectual, and complete realisation of the foiu- guaran- 
 tees." 
 
 That is the declaration of Austria. The declaration of England, as found 
 in the language of Lord Clarendon in answer to Lord Lyndhurst, is as 
 follows : — 
 
 " On the other hand, we have announced — I am still answering the inquiry 
 of ray noble and learned friend— that, as the four bases were to be maintamed in 
 their "entirety, and that, as the third basis has been rejected, and the responsibility
 
 23 
 
 of breakiiitj up the negotiations at Vienna does not rest upon us, but upon Russia, 
 we consider otirselves entirely disengaged from those bases." 
 
 The effect of that disengagement is, that the House of Commons remains 
 in a state of total ignorance as to the scope and object of this war. I have 
 spoken of the wide scope and visionary objects of the war that some per- 
 sons desire. I am bound to say, I do not beUeve that her Majesty's 
 Government would be inclined, or, even if they were inclined, that they 
 would venture knowingly, to plunge us into such a war as that ; but I say 
 that, so long as you continue a gigantic war of this kind for a small and 
 inadequate, or for unexplained and indefinite, purposes, you run a risk, 
 besides the other monstrous evils to which I have alluded, of having every 
 moment new objects forced upon you — objects of which you now disap- 
 prove — objects which would entirely change the character of the war, but 
 which you may hereafter have forced upon you, owing possibly to some 
 mysterious circumstances, such as those to which we know that you ascribe 
 your having once or twice alreadv given way. Perhaps I shall be told, 
 " What are we to do ? Can we leave the siege of Sebastopol ?" I fully 
 admit that a little more than three months ago you had an opportunity 
 which vou are not likely to have again. If you do not avail yourselves of 
 these golden opportunities when they come, you, who are not the masters 
 of events, cannot command their recurrence. Your position now is far 
 less favourable than it was then. As to the political attitude of the Powers 
 of Europe, the deterioration is palpable. As to the course of the war, you 
 are alreadv considering what are to be the military operations of 1856. 
 Three months have elapsed since that date ; but those three months have, 
 I fear, been, for military purposes, almost a year. You have achieved two 
 military triumphs, but they seem to have been more barren of results 
 than most of us — than I for one, certainlv. as to the Sea of Azoff — had 
 hoped. On the other hand, you have suffered, and for the first time in 
 the course of this war, a serious military reverse. (Cries of " No, no.") 
 Perhaps my language may be too strong. If I may be allowed to substi- 
 tute other words which will equally answer my purpose, you have for the 
 first time failed in an important military operation. (" No, no.") Well, 
 I won't continue a controversy upon words ; but I want to know whether 
 honourable gentlemen have really asked themselves, what is the object for 
 which we are contending ? It is a miserable thing, instead of making war 
 for justice, to be waiters upon success. But let that for a moment pass. 
 Let us suppose that there is no possibility of failure, and that everything 
 is to happen as you would have it. When you have got Sebastopol, what 
 are you to do with it ? Are you sure that the possession of it, as matters 
 now stand, will either practically improve our own position, or practically 
 damage the position of our adversary ? I recollect one instance in which 
 a great Minister of this country prolonged negotiations — deliberately ])ro- 
 longed them — with a view to the success of a military operation. It was 
 the case in which Lord Chatham prolonged or postponed the negotiations 
 which ultimately led to the peace of Paris, in order to render himself 
 master of Belleisle. But his object was distinct ; he wished to have 
 Belleisle, in order that he might give it back in exchange for Minorca. 
 In this case there is no such reason, no such plea. Now, we say that 
 you ought to have receded three months ago from before Sebastopol, 
 on the ground that you had obtained the political objects of the war ; and
 
 24 
 
 that, as the militai'v operations are only a means for the attainment of the 
 ])olitical objects, they should then have ceased. On the contrary, it seems, 
 at least of late, to have been considered by every one out of the Cabinet, 
 though it was so considered by no one in the Cabinet, that the capture of 
 Sebastopol was the great object of the war — that it ought to be pursued 
 at all costs — that it was an end in itself — a kind of principle of duty and 
 honour to persevere, under all circumstances, with that most memorable 
 siege. We protested against the doctrine, and protest against it still. I 
 sav that the doctrine, that you never ought to forego the accomplishment of 
 a great military operation, when the practical objects have been attained, 
 lest you should incur military odium, is both a novel and a retrogressive 
 doctrine — a doctrine which will not carry you forward and onward to the 
 furtherance of civilisation, but backward towards a state of savagery and 
 barbarism. Such are the feelings and convictions I entertain. I thank 
 the House again for the extraordinary indulgence with which they have 
 heard me on this as on former occasions. It is the future only that can 
 decide between us and those from whom we so widely differ. I hope, 
 however, for the sake of mankind at large — for the sake at least of 
 Christendom — that the time is near at hand which will bring to a defini- 
 tive issue this great and momentous question. For the present, deeply 
 grateful for the indulgence and freedom of speech which have been 
 accorded me, I remain content, in the belief that in endeavouring to recall 
 the Government from that course of policy which they are now pursuing, I 
 am following the course which is most conformable to the obligations of a 
 true patriot, a faithful representative of the people, and a loyal subject to 
 the Queen. 
 
 J. CLAYl-ON, rRIMKU, CBANE COURT, FI KET STREET.
 
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