m--^ ^*i"m "Ml ^ '^ : 'Ih ^' L I E> R.ARY OF THL U N I VERSITY Of ILLI NOIS // THE MACHINERY OF PARLIAMENTAEY LEGISLATION BY SIR THOMAS EESKINE MAY K.C.B., D.C.L. Reprinted from THE EDINBURGH REVIEW of January 1854 WITH A LETTER FROM THE AUTHOR 23rd March 1881 LONDON LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. 1881 LONDON : PRINTED BY 8P0TTI8W00UE AND CO., NBW-STEKBT SQUARH AND PARLIAMENT STREET House of Commons, 23rd March, 1881. Dear Mr. Eathbone, Much as I was flattered by your proposal to reprint an article written by me so far back as 1854, I was disposed to doubt its application to the circumstances of the present time. But on reading it again, after an interval of many years, I am surprised to find how many obstacles to effective legislation then prevailed, and how few measures have since been taken to correct acknow- ledged imperfections and abuses in the old system of Parliamentary procedure. It is no new complaint that Parliament too often finds itself unequal to the discharge of its many arduous duties. Committees have been appointed, year after year, to consider changes of practice adapted to the requirements of modern times ; but their labours have been curiously sterile. The embarrassments and short- comings of Parliament have been exposed, again and again ; but all parties have hitherto recoiled from bold and effectual remedies for evils which none are able to deny. In the present Session, the House of Commons has been forced, by a grave emergency, to invite the Speaker to frame new rules for its guidance, which it had never ventured to make itself. When so exceptional a course has been adopted, the occasion seems favourable for reviewing, once more, the general arrangements of the House for the transaction of its important business. I have long been persuaded that adequate results cannot be obtained from the abounding talents, industry, and public spirit of so numerous a body as the House (iv) of Commons, without a careful division of labour among its members. To this principle I first adverted in 1854 ; and I have since enforced it, on numerous occasions, before Committees of Inquiry. Should this principle be effectively carried out, the House could relieve itself from that excessive pressure of public affairs which tends to impair its credit and efficiency ; while its members, instead of being wearied with tedious debates, and irk- some walks through the division lobbies, would find scope for their special talents in labours more congenial to their own tastes, and more conducive to the public good. ' What ought to be a most honourable service,' said tlie late Lord Ossington, ' has become almost intolerable slavery ' ; and such is the present feeling of a great number of members now suffering from the vexations and dis- appointments of Parliamentary life. The House of Commons having renounced the trial of election petitions, and the pressure of private Bill legis- lation having lately become less severe, the experiment of delegating other business to committees may now be tried, without making unreasonable demands upon the services of its members. In offering you my personal acknowledgments for the compliment you have paid me in reprinting this article, I hope I may be allow^ed to express my sense of the value of your own labours in a cause which we have both striven to promote. I am. Yours very truly, T. EESKINE MAY. William Rathbone, Esq., M.P. &c. &c. &c. . uiuc Z '- / THE MACHINEEY OF PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION. While Cabinet Councils, the Press, and the Public are dis- cussing improvements in our representative system, we will venture to solicit attention to another question of public policy — of less political importance, it is true, yet scarcely less con- cerned in the good government of this country — we^ mean the machinery of legislation. The first political object to be desired in a free country is the best practicable constitution of the Legislature ; the second is its successful operation, as shown by good laws, wise councils, fruitful inquiries, and practical efficiency. It is not sufficient to provide for the election of the fittest representatives of the people : but, having been brought together, they must be set to work so as to become efficient * 1. Report from the Select Committee on the Office of Speaker ; together with the Proceedings of the Committee^ Minutes of Evidence, (Sac. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 12th May, 1853. 2. Returns of the Sittings of the House of Commons, 1852-53; of the Divisions of the House ; Public Bills ; Private Bills ; Public Com- mittees ; and Election Petitions. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 16th August, 1853. 3. A Practical Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings, and Usage of Parliament. By Thomas Erskine May, Esq. Second Edition. London: 1851. 4. The Rules of Proceeding and Debate in Deliberative Assem- hlies. By Luther S. Gushing. Boston : 1853. B 2 Tke Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. instruments of legislation. Organisation is not less essential in a Senate than in a factoiy ; and in both alike, however skilful may be the 'hands,' their several parts must be nicely adjusted, in order to realise the full results of their combined exertions. Under a well-ordered system much may be done, even with bad materials. If, according to Home Tooke's cynical suggestion, a rope were drawn round the market-place for representatives of the people, political drilling would not be without its benefits. The roughest recruits become in time good soldiers ; and HuUah's pupils, though no musicians, elicited the highest praise of the great Duke, who had never seen ' such discipline in his life.' What, then, may not be expected from the organised and well-directed energies of the chosen men of our Senate — enlightened, capable, and ambitious ? And truly there is enough for them to do ! Never were so many important functions combined in a deliberative assembly as in the British Parliament. Our legislation has become the most difficult and complicated of human labours ; and the utmost facilities which experience can suggest will merely afford a slight alleviation of its pressure. Happy were our German ancestors in their simple assemblies 1 A few of their leaders made short speeches, to which their audience responded in a manner very significant, but, according to our notions, some- what disorderly. ' Si displicuit sententia, fremitu adspernantur : sin placuit, frameas concutiunt.' Weary debates, from night till morning, under the glare of Bude lights, are amongst the discoveries as well as penalties of modern civilisation. So many circumstances have contributed to enlarge the powers and increase the activity of Parliament, that of late years it has been continually working at ' high pressure.' A vast arrear of legislation had long been accumulating upon us. After a century of inaction, and three-and-twenty years of war, the statesmen of our own time have had to do the work of many generations — to unmake as well as to make laws — to detect and expose abuses — to break down monopolies — to bear up against corrupt interests — to resist prejudices which had long been sanctioned by our laws — and to adopt higher principles and a wiser policy. But much as they have had to accomplish — and however The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 3 speedily and well it has sometimes been done — the necessities of our age and country have still been in advance of their utmost endeavours. A new life has grown up in the British Empire and people. In population, wealth, enterprise, and commerce, in science and the arts, in political enlightenment, in moral and social advancement, our progress has been without a parallel in the history of the world. And while the requirements of an advancing society have demanded the aids of sound legislation, our popular institutions and a free press have caused an extra- ordinary strain upon the Legislature. And well and wisely, on the whole, has Parliament met the increasing demands upon its energies. The history of England since the Peace, not written by Alison, or any pseudo-philosopher of his school, is creditable to the sagacity of our statesmen, and the enlightened wisdom of the Legislature. Generally keeping pace with the spirit of the times — sometimes being even in advance of it, as in the repeal of the Catholic disabilities — they have, at the same time, resisted changes, however strongly urged, which were not consistent with the general policy of our institutions. Satisfactory as we must pronounce the general results of our legislation to have been ;* yet, when we observe, from day to day, the process by which they are practically wrought out, we cannot help wondering that they should ever have been accomplished. The political difficulties of legislation in a popular assembly are sufficiently great ; but when to these are added a defective organisation, an insufficient division of labour, and indefinite facilities for obstructive debate, they can only be overcome by such struggles and sacrifices as ought not to be exacted of those who devote themselves to the public service. The process of legislation has not kept pace with its increasing requirements. ' We have outgrown our forms,' said Sir John Pakington, in the last Session ; and we trust that Parliament will subscribe to his opinion. The antiquity of our Parliamentary forms, and the almost unvarying steadiness with which they have been observed for at * For a summary of the Recent Progress of Legislation see the Edinburgh Review^ No. cxciii. Art. 3. B 2 4 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. least three centuries, is a remarkable feature of our Constitution. Precedents for most of the proceedings of both Houses may be found in the very first volumes of their journals, recorded in a language now quaint and obsolete ; but outliving, by the mere force of usage, our written laws, and passing unscathed through civil wars and revolutions. There is a dignity as well as merit in this force of ancient custom, which secures a more willing and reverential obedience than any modern rules or byelaws. In the House of Commons the cry of ' Order ! ' has a prescriptive authority, while in other assemblies it is more often the signal for confusion. But this reverence for custom is not without its evils. Politicians of every shade had long agreed in regarding the British Constitution with pride, until the venera- tion of many had degenerated into fanaticism. It was ' holy ground,' and all around and about it was holy. And everything seemed to be near it and to concern it. To disfranchise a corrupt borough, to reform a corporation, to repeal the duty on corn, or to leave off hanging men for sheep-stealing, were all * inroads upon our glorious Constitution,' until the phrase could scarcely be repeated without a smile. And thus has it been with our Parliamentary customs, which are a part of the Con- stitution. We have been proud of them — and with good cause. We have seen them adopted — often to the very letter — in every deliberative assembly in the world ; in France, Belgium, the United States of America, and all the British Colonies. Their adoption elsewhere is partly due to their own proved excellence, and partly to the prestige attaching, in every free country, to British institutions. But here again, the true faith has not been unmixed with idolatry ; and to discontinue an old form was to cast down an idol. With the exception of the daily distribution of the printed Votes and Proceedings, for which we are mainly indebted to the zeal of the late Mr. Rickman, we cannot recall a single change, of any importance, in Parlia- mentary practice, before the Reform Act. In matters of form the Commons had almost exposed themselves to Napoleon's sarcasm upon the Bourbons : ' lis n'ont rien appris — ils n'ont rien oublie.' An example of this continued reluctance to change may be The 3{achinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 5 found in the Eeport on the Office of Speaker, which we have placed at the head of this article. In 1606, the House, having suffered inconvenience from the absence of their Speaker, ap- pointed a committee to search for precedents, ' thereby the better to direct themselves what were meet to be done here- after, upon all occasions of the Speaker's absence, by sickness or otherwise.' The Speaker, however, recovered; and the Committee of 1853 express their regret 'that the Committee (of 1606) which had been appointed to consider the very same matters which, after a lapse of nearly 250 years, have now been referred to your Committee, made no report to the House.' That is to ray, for 250 years nothing had been done to prevent the recurrence of an evil, which, during that time, had frequently been experienced. And, true to the instinct of the House of Commons, the Committee now approach the subject with ' great caution ' and ' apprehension ' ; offering, as one of their reasons for recommending the least possible change, ' the reluctance apparently entertained by the House, in former times,' to do anything that was necessary in the matter. And sq it has been on other occasions. Some statesmen have been foremost in opposing changes in the procedure of Parliament, while others have regarded them with indifference ; caring little to understand them, and under- valuing their political importance. Of all our public men who have concerned themselves with this department of Parliamentary Eeform, the present Speaker stands pre-eminent. Fitted by his talents, and qualified by his previous training and acquirements, Mr. Shaw Lefevre was marked out for the high office to which he was elected. An active county member, an experienced and able magistrate, he soon became known as an unrivalled chairman of Parliamentary Committees. Here he displayed the conspicuous talents, judgment, tact, and urbanity, for which he has since been distinguished on a wider and more honourable field. His eminent services in the chair are universally acknow- ledged. The Commons are justly proud of the Speaker of their choice, and respect his authority with a willing obedience ; but few of them are aware of his unceasing exertions, behind the scenes, to facilitate their proceedings, and smooth the numerous G The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. difficulties by which they are beset. With a genius for active business, he was not long in discovering where the Commons * had outgrown their forms.' Having mastered the dry techni- calities of Parliamentary procedure, so as never to be at fault, he watched their practical operation with a critical eye ; and with singular judgment, prudence, and sagacity, has striven to introduce every practical improvement. More useful changes have been made during the fourteen years of his Speakership, than in the time, we will make bold to say, of any three of his predecessors. And here we would observe that, in such matters, the Speaker's position is one of considerable delicacy. In expounding and giving effect to existing rules, his authority is paramount ; but new rules can only be made by the House, in which, strange as it may appear, though Speaker, he has himself no voice. It is only by his personal influence with other members, and by the weight attached to his opinions, whether expressed in private, or stated in evidence before Committees, that he is able to promote any change which he may think desirable. Hence he is con- strained to a cautious reserve in committing himself to opinions, which he pronounces without authority, and the adoption of which he is unable further to advocate. Moreover, upon questions of this description the Grovernment is ordinarily passive ; and the House, being left without any moving power, is languid and indifferent. Nor is it usual to press forward any proposition of the kind, except with the general concurrence of experienced members on both sides of the House. Sometimes, also, it is advisable to ascertain the feeling of the House of Lords before any change is proposed, and even to induce them to originate it. Thus while proposals, to which he stands com- mitted, are exposed to numerous chances of failure, the Speaker is often deprived of the credit of having himself suggested acceptable improvements. But none of these discouragements have deterred Mr. Speaker Lefevre from promoting all reasonable amendments in the proceedings of Parliament, with unwearied perseverance, until, sooner or later, he has succeeded in carrying them into effect. To some of these successful experiments we shall have occasion to allude, in reference to other beneficial The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 7 changes, by which we hope the remaining years of his Speaker- ship will be signalised. In order to estimate the importance of an efficient organisa- tion of the labours of Parliament, it will be necessary to pass them under review, to point out their extent and variety, and to explain the arduous duties and engagements of its members. As the main burden of public business falls upon the House of Commons, our attention will be more particularly directed to its proceedings. Of its labour! and endurance the last Session will supply numerous illustrations. The Parliament was assembled on the 4th November, 1852, and was prorogued on the 20th August, 1853. The leaves of autumn had not fallen when it met ; the leaves of another summer had begun to fall before it had concluded its laborious sittings. The Session extended over a period of 290 days; during which the House of Commons sat, for despatch of business, 160 days, and was occupied 1,193 hours. 14 minutes; of which, 133 J hours were after midnight. The average of each day's sitting was rather less than 7^ hours; but a glance at Mr. Brotherton's detailed return* will fall upon a column, showing that upon numerous occasions, during the last two months of the Session, the House continued sitting for upwards of 15 hours out of the 24 ! For example, on the 5th July, the House met at 12 o'clock, and adjourned on the following morning at a quarter before 4, having divided no less than five times after midnight, upon Mr. Keating's ill-timed motion on Dockyard Promotions. And on several other days the House met at 12, and, with a suspension of business for two hours only in the afternoon, adjourned between 3 and 4 o'clock on the following morning. The bare statement of these unseasonable hours suggests feelings of weariness and exhaustion. What Court could administer justice, with temper, for fourteen hours? Where are the men of business who could usefully confer upon their own affairs for so many hours ? Even the poor literary drudge, writing for his daily bread, would fail under labours so long * Sittings of the House, 1852-53, No. 945, of Sess. 1853. 8 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. sustained. Yet members of Parliament are found to endure them, month after month, and the public rarely hear of their sufferings. Occasionally, however, a voice breaks forth beyond their walls, and reveals the secrets of the prison-house. Let it tell its own tale. On the 28th July: The Clerk was proceeding at half -past one o'clock to read the remaining orders of the day, twenty-eight in number, when — Mr. Brotherton, amid cheering from all sides of the House, rose and moved that the House do now adjourn. He protested against going into the consideration of new Bills at that time of night. He had abstained of late from interfering to move the adjournment of the House, because he considered that he might as well attempt to stop the tide. He had for twenty years perseveringly endeavoured to bring the House to observe reasonable hours. The attempt was now beyond his strength : but he really hoped that next Session some measure would be adopted to prevent a repetition of such late sittings. The House had now been sitting thirteen hours and a half. This might be done now and then; but when, as had frequently happened of late, the House sat fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen hours, the labour was beyond what human nature could endure. (From the Times^ 29th July, 1853.) The Members cheered, the Clerk read the next order of the day, and the House, not profiting by the counsels of their faith- ful monitor, continued sitting till a quarter past three in the morning ! Again, on the 5th of August, in Committee of Supply, at nearly one in the morning : Mr. Wilkinson appealed to the Government not to press them so hard. The House ought really to strike for shorter hours of labour. Mr. Hume said he must insist on the motion for reporting pro- gress. He was obliged to leave the House last night at one o'clock. He could stand it no longer ! Nor was the last Session exceptional and unprecedented. The Session of 1 847-48 exceeded it in length by three days, and still more in the number and duration of its sittings ; the House having sat on 170 days and for 1,407 hours, or ten days and 214 hours more than in the last Session. And even in The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 9 other Sessions, less remarkable for their duration, it will be found that the sittings of the House have been not much less protracted. For example, in 1834, the House sat on 140 days and for 1,187 hours ; in 1842, on 125 days and for 1,008 hours ; in 1845, on 119 days and for 1,026 hours; and in 1850, on 129 days and for 1,104 hours. In these four, and some inter- mediate Sessions, the average duration of the daily sittings exceeded that of the last Session, amounting to between eight and nine hours. Long and heavy Sessions have become the rule, and Sessions of even moderate length the rare exception. The Committee on the office of Speaker calculate the sittings of the House during the present Speakership as upwards of 13,000 hours, of which 1,196 have been after midnight; and conclude, from an examination of the journals, that already more business has been transacted in his time than during the entire period of any previous Speaker. Assuredly the Speaker will be able to give a good account of his stewardship. If the late Session had been even longer than it was, its pro- tracted sittings would have been justified by the extraordinary number and importance of its measures ; but, generally, the length of the Session is no criterion of the business transacted. On the contrary, in the House of Commons, as elsewhere, idle- ness being ' the root of all evil,' sets loose every tongue, and encourages unprofitable, if not mischievous, discussion. The more there is to do, the less will time be wasted : and no ex- pedient can be suggested, so efficacious in restraining the abuses of Parliamentary debate, as a large budget of measures sub- mitted, at an early period, by the Grovernment, and distributed equally over the entire Session. And while a feeble and inert Government provokes opposition, a strong and active Grovern- ment quells it in Parliament, and discourages it in the country. A strong Grovernment, therefore, is equally desirable for facili- tating practical legislation, as for other political objects ; and the fruitful Session of 1853 was due to an Administration com- bining every political and personal element of strength, and using its power for the best and most practical purposes. But with all political facilities for good legislation, can it be necessary that Parliament should be occupied so large a pro- 10 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. portion of every year, straining to do its appointed work, and yet leaving mucti undone ? Is it fitting that the Legislature of an old country, with long-established institutions and defined principles of law, should be as much engaged, year after year, in deliberating upon new laws, as if it were the Constituent Assembly of a Model Eepublic, having institutions and laws to create out of political chaos ? Here there is little to construct, though much to repair, improve, and finish. And to do this work, Parliament has at its command the most advanced political science, enlightened public opinion, and all the practical ability and experience of the nation. With these aids to legislation, a strong Grovernment, apart from political obstacles, ought to experience little difficulty in the enactment of good laws. No facility should be conceded, if inconsistent with the fullest publicity and ample means of discussion ; but expedients may be devised for simplifying the process of legislation, and, at the same time, improving its character. On account of the great length of some of the Parliamentary debates, it is very commonly supposed that discussion, followed by small results, forms the main business of the House of Commons ; whereas by far the larger part of its business is transacted with little or no discussion. In the last Session, there were 11,378 entries in the Votes, of orders made. Bills read, committees appointed, and other proceedings of the House ; and probably not more than a twentieth part of them were debated. Many of them could scarcely have been suffi- ciently considered, while hundreds of questions, proposed for consideration, failed to obtain a hearing. The Votes and Proceedings of a single day have sometimes amounted to a volume. On the morning of the 20th of April last, the Votes and Supplementary Papers delivered to members extended to no less than 84 folio pages — being equal to an octavo volume of 168 pages; and again, on the 23rd July, they contained 80 folio pages, or 160 octavo pages. On turning to the list of business appointed for each day, the hopelessness of attempting to dispose of it is immediately apparent. To select a few of the most remarkable days : on the 21st July, there were 33 orders of the day, and 79 notices of The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation, 11 motions ; on the 22nd, 23 orders of the day, and 72 notices of motions; and on the 29th, 25 orders of the day, and 73 notices of motions. It should, perhaps, be explained to the uninitiated, that orders of the day have already been appointed for con- sideration by the House itself; and that notices are given by individual members, with a vain hope of being able to submit to the House propositions of their own. On some days, in addition to an extraordinary list of business for the House itself, there were no less than 30, 32, and even 33 committees sitting for four or five hours in the morning ; and in which upwards of 200 members were engaged. The pressure of committee business upon the members of the House was unusually severe during the last Session. There were no less than 49 Election Committees, consisting of five members, which sat, upon an average, for 5\ days each. Of these, the Chatham, the Cork, and the Clitheroe cases each occupied 14 days, and the Liverpool case 21. There were 51 Public Committees, consisting generally of about 15 members, but, in many instances, of a much greater number. As many as 31 members served on the Irish Tenant Eight Committee, and 38 on the Committee on Indian Territories. The latter sat 46 days, the Eailways Committee 40 days, and the Committee on Public Petitions 87 days. There were also 44 committees on opposed Private Bills, many of which were occupied for several weeks, as well as 119 committees on unopposed Private Bills. The aggregate number of these committees amounted to 263. The assembling of these numerous committees, and of the crowds repairing to them, is a stirring sight. It should be viewed in Barry's noble octagon Hall, which may be termed the political centre of the British Empire. Midway between the two Houses, and common to them both, it is the central chamber whence all the communications of the vast Palace of Westminster diverge. Straight through it, the Queen on her throne, in the House of Peers, may see the Speaker in his chair in the House of Commons ; and, as if to illustrate the quick pulsations of our political system, here is the electric telegraph, reporting events as they occur within these busy precincts, and speeding them far and near with its magic wires. 12 The MacMnery of Parliamentary Legislation, Here, then, let us take our stand, and watch the moving groups as they pass on. They form a panorama of English society, in which representatives of every class are exhibited. Among the members are many whose names are ' familiar as household words': but they are soon lost in the pressing throng. There are counsel, attorneys, and civil engineers — mayors, aldermen,' town-councillors, and town-clerks — directors, secretaries, and shareholders — clerks and shorthand writers — election agents, publicans, and incorruptible voters — pilots and harbour-masters — general officers and Parsee merchants — digni- taries of the Church and dissenting ministers — farmers and cotton-spinners. But when will they all have passed under review ? Their numbers and variety proclaim the imperial attributes of Parliament, which has gathered them together. Various as these groups are the jurisdiction and inquiries of the committees whose sittings they are about to attend. The rooms in which they assemble are approached by a corridor upwards of 600 feet long ; and every room, throughout its length, has its Court of Inquiry and its audience, or eager ex- pectants outside its doors. In one, the government of our Indian Empire is investigated ; in another, the clauses of a Turnpike Bill discussed. The largest principles of public policy, and the most petty details of local administration — subjects for the deliberations of a Cabinet Council, and of a parish vestry — are here alike considered. At the same time, judicial inquiries are proceeding, by which public and private interests, and often the character of the parties concerned, are more largely affected than by the decisions of all the Judges in Westminster Hall. Day after day the members of committees are occupied with these absorbing duties, in addition to their laborious attendance upon the sittings of the House itself. A few minutes before four o'clock they are released from the committee rooms by the welcome announcement that ' Mr. Speaker is at prayers,' and hasten to the meeting of the House. And now begins the proper business of the day, which is as remarkable for its variety and miscellaneous character as for its extent and duration. Petitions are presented, reports brought The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 13 up, private Bills advanced a stage, and sometimes discussed, returns ordered, notices given, and lastly, before the commence- ment of the debates of the evening, questions are addressed to Ministers of the Crown. This political catechism has become one of our popular institu- tions. Without the formality of a debate, every matter supposed to be of public interest is brought under notice, and the opinions of the Government promptly elicited. While it is of the highest value in awakening the attention of the House and public opinion, it increases the responsibility and strengthens the hands of the Executive. But questions put merely to satisfy curiosity or attract personal notice are so frequent, that the advantages of the interrogatory privilege are apt to be overlooked. It would seem to be the chief amusement of some members diligently to read the newspapers in the morning, and to ask Ministers of State in the afternoon if they have read them too, and what they think about them. And in order to be prepared to answer such questions (often fitter for the club window than the Senate) the Minister must devote himself to newspaper literature as well as to State papers. The happy facility with which Lord Palmerston would turn the laugh against his questioners has often formed an agreeable prelude to the graver and more wearisome business of the evening. When all questions are exhausted, the House proceeds to the regular business appointed for the day, often of a character as miscellaneous as the questions. No classification of subjects is attempted. When Government measures are entitled to pre- cedence, they are, indeed, arranged with a view to facilitate the general progress of business ; but at other times, the arrange- ment is literally left to chance, the precedence of motions being determined by ballot. Nor is Government business always free from the intrusion of other debatable topics ; for whenever the Committee of Supply is appointed to sit, it challenges the proposal of a medley of chance motions. The 2nd of August last affords a good illustration of this practice. The business appointed for that day was the Committee of Supply ; but in the Votes appeared twelve different notices of motions, or amendments to be pro- posed before going into committee. They related to ' the Dublin 14 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. Hospitals,' ' the Kafir War,' ' arterial drainage in Ireland,' ' the Koyal Greographical Society,' ' the Norwich election petition,' ' the annexation of Pegu,' ' the Metropolitan Police,' ' the diocese of Bath and Wells,' ' the Postal arrangements at Stoke-upon- Trent,' 'the Parsee merchants, Jevangee Merjee and Pestongee Merjee,' ' the state of the Metropolitan Bridges,' and ' the conduct of the East India Company towards the Carnatic stipendiaries.' The multitude of minor subjects, introduced independently of the general business of legislation, cannot fail to have been noticed. The columns of advertisements in the daily papers are scarcely more diversified than the columns of Parliamentary debates. A cabman at Bow Street, a pauper at Lewisham, a maniac at Colney Hatch — each in their turn — within a week occupied the attention of the ' Grrand Inquest of the Nation.' Like the elephant's trunk, which, having uprooted a forest- tree, can pick up a pin, this potent and flexible instrument of popular government, having provided for the government of India, demands fair play between Mr. Serjeant Adams and the termagant who had called the policeman at Clerkenwell ' a pig-' Many evils result from this confusion of subjects and this absence of classification. The Grovernment measures are re- tarded, not so much by the discussion to which they naturally give rise, as by the continual intrusion of other subjects of debate. This delay is often a serious inconvenience, more particularly in regard to financial and fiscal questions which require a speedy determination ; and as the cause is in constant operation, it at length effects so many measures, that the general business of the Session is unduly postponed. The Grovernment Bills are con- tending with one another for advancement, and some are kept waiting for months, without making any progress. And while the Government are thus embarrassed, the members who have contributed to the delay are themselves exposed to continual disappointment. Week after week the motions they have been anxious to bring forward are postponed, until speeches composed for the occasion are forgotten, or dressed up again for some other debate. The more pertinacious endeavour to obtain an The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 15 irregular hearing on motions for adjournment, or on going into Committee of Supply, and thus increase the general delay; while those who value the convenience of the House more than their own voices throw up the game with as good a grace as may be. For any member, unconnected with the Grovernment, to succeed in passing a measure of his own, has long been regarded as nearly hopeless. These difficulties are aggravated by the rmequal pressure of business upon the House of Commons. Often when that House is sitting night and day, to the distress of Mr. Brotherton, it has been observed by an irreverent wit that the Lords sit scarcely long enough to boil an egg. This inequality arises, in some measure, from the privileges of the Commons, by which all Bills are required to originate with them which impose a burden upon the people ; and it is much to be desired that some arrangement could be made by which a larger proportion of Bills might originate in the House of Lords. With this object, a partial relaxation of their privileges was agreed to by the Commons in 1849 ; and the propriety of making some further concessions is worthy of their consideration. At the aame time, it must be confessed that the ill-advised attempt of the Oppo- sition Peers to amend the Succession Duty Bill — in open viola- tion of the undoubted privileges of the Commons — does not encourage such concessions. But political causes contribute more to this unequal pressure upon the two Houses than the stumbling-block of privilege. On the 14th of April, 1 848, Lord Stanley, after adverting to the inconveniences arising from the inaction of the House of Lords in the early part of the Session, and the undue pressure upon it at the conclusion, encouraged a relaxation of the privileges of the Commons with a view to the introduction of a greater number of Bills into the House of Lords ; but at the same time he added : He had remarked that, as a general rule, Bills originating in their Lordships' House were not always received with great favour by the other branch. He had observed that, whether from the non-publica- tion of their Lordships' Papers, or the scanty attendance of their Lordships not attracting public attention, undoubtedly it often hap- 16 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. pened that measures which passed that House with apparent una- nimity, and without exciting any objection out of doors, were made the subject of severe contest and strong animadversion when they reached the other House. He would, therefore, as a general rule, infinitely prefer that Bills should come in the first instance from the House of Commons, believing that the more proper function of their Lordships was to control, amend, and revise the legislation of the House of Commons. Sir Robert Peel, we believe, entertained the same opinion ; and it can scarcely be doubted that, whether the Commons should ever think it prudent to relax their privileges or not, the great burden of legislation will inevitably continue to press upon the most powerful and popular branch of the Parliament. The representative body is in close communication with the people, and gives expression to public opinion ; its proceedings are observed with universal interest ; and, being the dominant power in the State, its views of public policy are ordinarily decisive. The Upper House, on the other hand, though abound- ing in men of the highest talents and individual popularity, is constitutionally independent of public opinion : it has no recognised modes of communication with constituencies and the people; and, its political weight being inferior to that of the Commons, its voice is less potential in regard to the ultimate success of measures discussed in Parliament. For these reasons, the Commons must generally be the originating and motive, and the Lords the controlling, power in the State ; and the pressure upon the former is a political necessity, to be reckoned among the difficulties of every succeeding Session. As the end of the Session approaches, the result of accumu- lated delays becomes conspicuous. It seems as if all the work of the Session were still to be done. Everyone has been harassed and overtasked ; but when will the Session be over ? On Monday, the 8th of August last, when Parliament had been sitting for nine months, there were still forty-seven public Bills before the Commons, in different stages, to be considered before the Session could be brought to a close. And so it has been in former years, until the evil has become chronic, and, under the present system, incurable. The Bills which have thus accumu- The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 17 lated are either hurried through at last, without proper con- sideration, and sent up in the last fortnight to the Lords, who had been sitting for months with folded arms ; or, after having occupied much time, and given occasion to numerous debates, are ultimately abandoned. Both these inconveniences have been constant subjects of complaint, particularly in the House of Lords. The Grovernment of India Bill, in the last Session, having been nineteen days under discussion in the House of Commons, between the 4th of June and the :i9th of July, at length reached the House of Lords, where the second reading was appointed for the 6th of August. On that occasion. Lord Malmesbury complained that there were ' 42 Bills before their Lordships, and 31 coming up from the House of Commons — making 73 Bills to be considered during a fortnight'; and as regards the India Bill itself, he said that it had reached the Lords at a time 'when it was physically impossible for any other party, except that of the Grovernment, to collect a suffi- cient number of Peers to discuss the question as it ought to be discussed.' To these observations Lord Aberdeen replied : Now, my Lords, as to the period of the Session at which this Bill comes before you, 'I must confess that long as I have been a member of this House — and I have been a member longer than any of your Lordships now present — this is a complaint that I have never ceased to hear at the close of every Session. I admit that, on many occasions, that complaint has been made with great truth and justice. Nor is Lord Aberdeen the only Premier who has made such admissions. In 1848, Lord Stanley pointed out, very forcibly, the extent of the inconvenience, and proposed, as a remedy, to enable the Lords to suspend a Bill from one Session to another, and, in the meantime, to refer it to a competent legal adviser. A Bill to effect this object was brought in by his lordship, to which the Lords agreed, though not without the suggestion of several objections. In the Commons, however, not being very favourably received, it was allowed to drop. Propositions of this kind, indeed, are to be viewed in their political bearings, c 18 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. rather than as matters of Parliamentary form. Lord Campbell had pointed out that ' the proposed change might be sometimes employed as a strong argument in the hands of an Opposition for the postponement of a measure which it might be of the utmost importance to pass speedily; and it was obvious that there might be great change of circumstances in the interval between one Session and another.' Pretexts for delay are generally plausible, and, to timid minds, much more acceptable than direct objections to the merits of a measure itself. And thus, if the forms of the House permitted it, a subtle opponent might be able to unite a majority in agreeing to the postpone- ment of a measure, where he would fail in an attempt to secure its rejection. So long as the business of a Session is accomplished at last — no matter with what inconvenience and confusion — it may be said that the public interests do not suffer. The work is done, and we need not concern ourselves with the manner of doing it. Nothing can be further from the truth. Every Session witnesses many important measures necessarily abandoned by the Grovern- ment for want of time. This sacrifice, which has been facetiously described as ' The Massacre of the Innocents,' had become so frequent under Lord Melbourne's Administration, that Lord Lyndhurst was able to vex the Grovernment and delight the Opposition with a long list of the victims, whose untimely fate he wittily described at the end of every Session. A still greater number of measures are withheld, lest they should impede the progress of those which have been already intro- duced. It is true that they are, for the most part, merely post- poned until another year ; yet, admitting the philosophy of the maxim, that no good law is ever propounded which does not, sooner or later, take effect, such postponements are incon- venient and often hazardous. It is surely desirable to legislate for our own times rather than for posterity ; but a generation is sometimes allowed to pass away before a measure, of which the principle has been favourably regarded, is successfully carried into effect. The Charitable Trusts Bill, originally proposed by Lord Brougham in 1816, has at length become law in 1853 ; and Lord John Kussell, in adverting to this circumstance, The Machinei^y of Parliamentary Legislation. 19 observed, with as much truth as humour, that this was ' about the ordinary period for bringing any considerable measure to maturity.' The justice of his remark is also exemplified by the history of the Bills for establishing County Courts and the Eegistration of Assurances. The long delay of such measures is doubtless to be ascribed to other causes — as, for example, to an unformed or inactive public opinion, and the opposition of powerful interests — as well as to obstacles of a more formal character. Each succeeding Session, however, has its own pressure of political questions, by which measures of inferior public interest are set aside, until changes of Grovernment — changes in the constitution of the House itself — and new subjects to occupy the minds of the people, may endanger the success of good laws, which, with better opportunities, might sooner have been brought to maturity. Nor is the enumeration of evils arising from the chance- medley of Parliamentary business yet exhausted. The pressure of the work is so great and so long continued that, towards the conclusion of the Session, when the greater part of the business still remains to be done, an irritable impatience is apt to take possession of the calmest minds, and steady judgment gives way to haste and indifference. Hence many of the grave defects which are found in our Statutes, to the injury of the public and the discredit of the Legislature. How can it be otherwise ? The Bills must be passed, somehow or other : the Session advances, but they make no progress, till at length the time arrives when, in the words of Sir Francis Baring, ' any man who occupies the time of the House is a public enemy ' ; and then they are hustled through, with amendments hastily made or impatiently rejected. To pass a Bill at all is now the object ; and the form in which it passes is of little moment. And this, after sitting several months for eight hours a day, with numerous committees aiding the House in its labours, and all the ablest practical minds in the country brought together for the public good ! If Parliament were assembled for no more than a month, this journey-work, with such materials, would scarcely be excused. How much longer, then, is it to be borne, with a 2 20 The Macldnery of Parliamentary Legislation. Parliament having naore than sufficient time, not shrinking from its task, and working with abundant means at its command ? The defective organisation, of which we complain, amounts to a grave political evil, the practical correction of which would be a worthy achievement for the first statesmen of our age. The postponement of measures to the very end of the Session is attended with this further evil, that it becomes no longer possible to obtain the true sentiments of Parliament. The London season is over, and the centrifugal force of pleasure and fashion has become irresistible. The Continent, the watering- places, and the moors, have thinned the senatorial ranks, and left the field in possession of the Grovernment and a small body of volunteers. The House, it is true, now becomes more manageable, the few skirmishers being rarely a match for the regular forces of the Grovernment. Yet no reliance is to be placed upon the result of a division in a thin House ; and it may be well to notice that the only two defeats sustained by the Grovernment in passing their India Bill occurred on its last stages, at the end of July. All the inconveniences we have enumerated, as well as some others which we will not pause to notice, have long been acknowledged by those who are conversant with the practical working of the Parliamentary system. But it may be asked — are they not inseparable from the very nature of our free Parliament, and the plain result of its freedom of speech and imlimited jurisdiction? That the practical administration of affairs, in so popular an assembly, will always be exposed to many difficulties, is not open to dispute ; but the particular evils under consideration are independent, in great measure, of the political constitution of Parliament, and are susceptible, if not of cure, at least of considerable mitigation. So much advantage has already been derived from changes of procedure which have attracted little attention, that sanguine anticipations may be formed of future improvements. It is understood that, in the approaching Session, a committee will be appointed to consider every practical suggestion for facilitating the despatch of business; and we should be glad to see its deliberations antici- The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 21 pated by a general expression of public opinion in favour of the adoption of a more effective machinery for legislation. A detailed examination of the experiments already made, and of further improvements suggested, would scarcely be acceptable to the readers of this Journal ; but, without exhausting their patience, we may venture to indicate the principles which, in our opinion, ought to be carried into effect, and at least to glance at several specific recommendations which seem more particularly worthy of consideration. No man of business will dispute the maxim, that, in conduct- ing affairs, we should first settle what is to be done, and then proceed to do it. In practice, however, this maxim had been so continually disregarded in the House of Commons, that it became absolutely necessary to secure its more general recognition. No long time ago, every order of the day was subject to the interposition of irrelevant motions and debates. This irrational practice was subjected to considerable restriction in 1837 ; but it was reserved to the present Speaker to make the reading of an order of the day by the Clerk like the calling on of a cause in Court. No sooner is it read, than it is entered upon without any interlocutory discussion being permitted. The principle of this rule has been carried out, at his suggestion, with such signal advantage in the case of committees of the whole House, as to require particular mention. Until 1 849, whenever the House was about to resolve itself into committee upon a Bill or other matter, obstructive amendments could be interposed, and debates renewed, again and again, upon questions already affirmed by the House. This abuse, whicli was at variance with the spirit and intention of Parliamentary rules, has been corrected ; and now, when any matter has once been considered in committee, and stands for further consideration, the Speaker forthwith leaves the chair, with an alacrity that evinces his appreciation of the rule to which he is giving effect. The value of this rule may best be elucidated by a recent example. Our readers will not soon forget Mr. Grladstone's ' Budget ' of 1853. Introduced by a speech of five hours' dura- tion, which established his position in the first rank of Ftatesmen and debaters, its great financial and fiscal schemes demanded an 22 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. entire Session for their development. No less than twenty-seven distinct measures were founded upon it, which, by the rules of the House, were required to be first considered in committee. No ordinary Session would have been sufficient to bring such a code of laws to maturity, if, day after day, the going into com- mittee for their consideration could have been retarded by incidental discussions. But, dexterously availing himself of the protection afforded by the new rule, Mr. Gladstone secured the appointment of one committee for the consideration of the ' Customs, &c.. Acts,' on which the greater part of his measures were founded ; and no sooner had this committee once entered upon its labours, than its repeated sittings were free from further interruption. No better illustration is wanting of the political importance which may attach to a technical rule. Never were statesman-like views of public policy wrought out with more inflexible resolution than by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Eeady at all points — never at fault either for facts or argument — seizing upon every opportunity to press forward the work he had undertaken— he would yet have been powerless against the formal obstructions to which, under other circumstances, he might have been exposed. He had difficulties enough to con- tend with ; and, in his race against time, any further obstacles would have been fatal. Either a part of his Budget must have been ultimately abandoned, or else other more important mea- sures of the Grovernment, which were continually thwarting him with unexpected delays, must have been postponed until another year. In either case, the political success of the last Session would have been rendered less complete, by a cause so insignificant, that it would scarcely have been detected by many of the statesmen who would have suffered from its operation. An exception to this wholesome rule has still been retained, as regards the Committees of Supply and Ways and Means; and we have already noticed the heterogeneous collection of motions and amendments for which these committees are conse- quently responsible. Day after day, when the proper business of the House is to consider the revenue and expenditure of the country, these frivolous questions are forced upon its notice, against the will of nine-tenths of its members. And this anomaly The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 23 has been permitted in deference to the constitutional maxim — with which it is supposed to have some connection — that the redress of grievances is to precede the grant of subsidies to the Crown. It is scarcely necessary to observe that this principle was first asserted when Parliaments were summoned for no other purpose than the levy of taxes upon the people, and were dismissed as soon as the subsidies had been granted. The redress of grievances, therefore, could only be pressed upon the notice of the Crown at the first assembling of a Parliament. To have parted with their money first, and then to have demanded favours, would indeed have been an odd method of striking a bargain : and the sagacity of our ancestors, sharpened by experience, led them to get whatever they could for themselves before they agreed to be stripped of their ' brief authority ' by the grant of a subsidy. Nor was the principle less vital to our Constitu- tion, in later times, when a perpetual contest was waged between the Crown and the Parliament. We may be said to have bought our liberties with hard cash. When the Crown was not reduced by its necessities to demand a subsidy, no Parliament was summoned ; when it could hold out no longer, this dreaded power was again called into activity, and, purse in hand, it wrung from unwilling and treacherous kings the liberties of the people. Even now the same principle secures, with a force greater than that of any Statute, the annual meeting and unin- terrupted deliberations of Parliament. The supplies are granted by annual votes, and are never finally appropriated to the service of the year till the very last day of the Session. How, then, would this principle — which is, in truth, the foundation of Parliamentary Government — be endangered by restrictions upon the untimely discussion of matters wholly unconnected with either grievances or finance ? It is not pro- tection against the Crown that is wanting, but protection for the House of Commons against its own members. The only result of the present license of debate is, that less vigilance is exercised in controlling public expenditure than is devoted to the scrutiny of a private Bill. The voting of the supplies is postponed till the very end of the Session ; and is at last hurried over by the few remaining members, in whom a sense of public 24 The MacMnery of Parliamentary Legidation. duty has not given way before the pressure of fatigue and private convenience. We would, therefore, apply the same rule to the Committees of Supply and Ways and Means as to other committees. Let them be appointed to sit at convenient times, and permit no interruption to their sittings. This change, how- ever, should be accompanied by the concession of other facilities for bringing on motions at more convenient times. To complete the prohibition of interruptions to the appointed business of the day, one further regulation will be necessary. For many years past, Saturday has been observed as a day of rest for the House and its committees — a Parliamentary Sabbath, as it were, for its overtasked members. It is not broken in upon more than two or three times in the course of a Session. Yet because it was formerly the custom to sit on Saturday, except by a special adjournment, the formal motion to adjourn from Friday till Monday has still been continued. On such a question there is not likely to be any difference of opinion ; nor, indeed, can anything be said about it ; but an obsolete form is rarely without its mischief, and accordingly it has become the occasion for an irregular debate upon every conceivable topic ex- cept the adjournment to which it professes to relate. This abuse has met with so much discouragement from the present Speaker, that it is no longer so flagrant as we remember it to have been ; but it should be prevented altogether. The remedy is obvious. Let the House resolve to sit on Saturday when necessary ; and, at other times, let the adjournment be a matter of course. Mr. Bouverie was about to make this proposition at the end of last Session, but desisted, lest it should give rise to a debate, which at that time was, above all things, to be avoided. When, by these changes, the certainty of the appointed busi- ness being considered at the proper time has been ensured, precautions should be taken to secure the debates which follow from unseasonable interruptions. It was suggested by the Speaker, in 1848,* that questions of adjournment should be decided without debate, and that a repetition of such questions, within an hour after a decision of the House, should be pro- * Report of Committee on Public Business. Minutes of Evidence. The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 25 hibited. And as even divisions alone, without debate, are very vexatious when persisted in by a small minority, he proposed that they should not be allowable, unless demanded by at least twenty-one members. As the rules of the British Parliament were adopted in the United States and in France, it is not without instruction to observe the modifications which the experience of these countries has suggested. So early as 1794, the American House of Eepresentatives had discovered the inconveniences arising out of debates upon questions of adjournment ; and the prohibition of them,* which was then found necessary, has ever since been acquiesced in. In like manner, the House of Representatives, having found by experience that the power of a small minority to insist upon a division is objectionable, will not permit any division to take place, unless one-fifth of the members present concur in requiring it.f The experience of the French Chamber of Deputies had led them to a similar conclusion ; and a scrutin secret could only be insisted upon (except in certain cases) by the requisition of twenty members.:}: It will be for the House of Commons to consider how far restrictions of a shnilar cha- racter are necessary or desirable. These foreign assemblies were also obliged to resort to mea- sures for preventing the undue protraction of their debates ; and, assuredly, not without sufficient cause. The debates in the American Congress have sometimes been of almost fabulous duration. One is recorded which continued without inter- mission from Saturday morning till Monday morning § ; and, with less extraordinary sittings, many other debates, from day to day, have lasted for periods unknown in our own Parlia- mentary annals. In the French Chamber of Deputies, debates occasionally lasted for a fortnight, and even for twenty days.|| It is not surprising, therefore, that in both countries a remedy should have been provided for an evil, at once so great and so * Rules of the House of Representatives, No. 48. t Ibid, No. 4. t R^glements 34, 35. § Report on Public Business, 1848. Evidence of Mr. Curtis, Questions 252, 253. II Ibid. Evidence of M. Guizot, Questions 312, 313. 26 The Machinery of Parliainentary Legislation. ridiculous. In America, by means of the ' previous question,' and in France by ' la cloture^ the majority were empowered to determine, by a vote, that a debate should at once be brought to a conclusion. This coercion of the minority into silence has been quietly submitted to in America from 1789 to the present time ; and in France it was borne with equal patience from 1814 until Louis Napoleon imposed silence upon majorities as well as minorities, by a cowp d'etat. In 1848, serious apprehensions were entertained that the debates of the House of Commons would become as obnoxious as those of our French and American contemporaries ; and the adoption of similar modes of repression, under improved forms, was under consideration ; but latterly there has been less cause for alarm. The debates on Mr. Disraeli's House-duty, and on the second reading of the India Bill, which were the longest of the Session, each occupied four nights only ; nor can we call to mind any recent occasion on which such a power as that of la cloture could reasonably have been exercised. The wholesome corrective of public opinion has restrained our representatives from such excesses as would have rendered more imperative re- strictions unavoidable ; and unless there should hereafter be an urgent necessity for interference, it is not probable that the House will consent to this limitation of its debates. In case, however, the question of la cloture should come under consider- ation, we are able to offer — what will be much more persuasive with the House of Commons than any argument — a precedent. On the 9th of May, 1604, ' upon Sir Eowland Litton's offer to speak in this matter, resolved no more should speak.'* The Americans finding that even the ' previous question,' and some other rules of the same description, were an insufficient protection against the length of their debates, established, in 1841, the 'one hour rule,' by which every member was restricted to a speech of one hour. No exception is permitted, even in favour of the proposer of any question ; and it is said that the rule has not only been successful in shortening the debates, but that it has improved their character. The Sessions * Commons' Journals, vol. i. p. 968. The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 27 have been shorter, the legislation equally good, and the speeches decidedly better, and more to the purpose. The ' one hour rule ' is not without its advocates in this country ; the veteran debater, Mr. Hume, being of the number, who, though himself the most frequent of speakers, would rarely suffer from the restriction he proposes for others. But unless long speeches should come more into fashion, there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for interfering with the discretion of individual members in one of their most important functions. Frivolous and obstructive debates, raised upon formal questions, ought not to be endured, in spite of the political strategy occasionally connected with them ; but bona fide debates, upon questions fairly submitted to the deliberations of the House, are deserving of indulgence, even when their length becomes inconvenient. In America the ' one hour rule ' had been tried on particular occasions for twenty years before it was generally adopted ; and if the experiment were deemed, worthy of a trial, an occasional enforcement of the rule would be the best method of testing its efficacy. There are many Bills on which the speeches might be limited to a quarter of an hour in committee ; and the Wednesday morning sittings would also afford a good oppor- tunity of initiating the experiment. We believe that the House would be willing to acquiesce in any reasonable restrictions upon its debates. Nothing that has liere been suggested approaches, in severity, the prohibition imposed some years since upon debates on presenting petitions. The presentation of a petition had long been a popular mode of raising a debate upon the subject to which it referred ; but at length the evil of such irregular discussions, interfering with the appointed business of the House, and leading to no practical results, became intolerable ; and members very generally acqui- esced in their absolute prohibition. Yet, as regards petitions, it was plausibly contended that not only were the rights of mem- bers infringed, but also tlie rights of the people, as petitioners. Necessity, in this case, justified a departure from an ancient and popular custom ; and tlie same overruling plea will more readily be admitted in restraining mere abuses which have never enjoyed any popular sanction. 28 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. Among the expedients which have been suggested for bring- ing the Session of Parliament to a close at an earlier period of the year, are a November meeting, and an alteration of the financial year. Prior to the union with Ireland, in 1801, the ordinary time for the meeting of Parliament (though not without numerous exceptions) was in the month of November. From about 1805 until 1820 it became the more general practice for Parliament to be assembled after Christmas ; but the Session usually commenced between the 1 4th of January and the end of the month. Since 1 820 the more ordinary time of meeting has been in the first week of February. The time for assembling Parliament has thus been getting later, and meetings before Christmas less frequent, while the amount of business to be transacted has been continually on the increase. If it were thought advisable to revert to the practice of November meetings, it would be attended with much less in- convenience than in the last century. To travel from Belfast or Inverness in winter is scarcely more tedious now than the journey from Bath or Cheltenham sixty years ago. But a meeting of Parliament before Christmas involves almost a double Session ; and recent experience of its effects is very discouraging, as the latest as well as the longest Sessions have been those which commenced in November. The period before Christmas is too limited for any effectual progress in important measures ; and unless some portion of the necessary business of the Session can be cleared off, the result obtained is not worth the imdeniable inconvenience of an early meeting. The better course would seem to be a meeting not later than the 15th of January, which would enable Parliament to dispose of all the preliminaries of a Session, and to enter upon the consideration of some of the principal Grovernment measures before the time at which it is usually assembled. If these measures have been carefully prepared, and be pressed forward with little interrup- tion, a considerable part of the effective work of the Session might be accomplished before Easter. Until 1832 the financial year had been dated from the 1st of January ; but in that year the Government first submitted esti- mates for one quarter to the 31st of March, and subsequently TJie Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 29 the annual estimates from the 1st of April, 1832, to the 31st of March, 1833. The grounds upon which this alteration was made were explained by Lord Althorp on the 13th of February; and the debate on that occasion may throw some light upon the proposition, which has lately been made by Mr. Drummond, for reverting to the arrangements which it was then thought fit to change. Lord Althorp said : By the course hitherto taken, the estimates had been proposed after a certain amount of the money had actually been expended; and of course that expenditure must have been made without the previous sanction of Parliament, It seemed to him an anomalous mode of pro- ceeding that they should vote the supplies for the service of the year on estimates, although at the time the estimates were submitted to them a part of the expenditure had actually been made. With the view of avoiding that anomaly, he thought it more consistent with the privileges of that House, and with the theory of the Constitution, that the estimates should be submitted for the ensuing year pre- viously to the supplies being voted, and before the Government had spent any of the money. Sir Eobert Peel observed that, ' if the plan now proposed could be effected without inconvenience, it would undoubtedly remove a great anomaly' ; but he remarked upon the practical difficulties that would be experienced in voting all the supplies before the 1st of April. These difficulties were fully admitted by Sir James Graham, on the part of the Grovernment ; but the ' change when effected would, he was sure, be found invaluable, and, if the House chose to enforce it, would secure that real control of the House over the expenditure which he desired to see established.' This new financial year, approved by the Government, and adopted with the general concurrence of all parties, it is now again proposed to alter. The objects supposed to be attain- able by reverting to the 1st of January are an earlier Budget and measures consequent upon it, as well as earlier votes in the Committee of Supply, the postponement of which, under present arrangements, unquestionably tends to the prolonga- tion of a Session. The maintenance of our land and sea forces being dependent upon annual votes, early measures 30 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. for that purpose are indispensable : and thus far the consti- tutional object of the change of 1832 has been reasonably well carried out. Although the army and navy estimates have not usually been voted, in detail, before the 31st of March, the most important votes, necessarily involving the aggregate estimate of expenditure, have always been taken before the Government expended any money on the army and navy for the ensuing year. The same principle might readily be followed out in regard to the civil services. The salaries and other expenses, payable out of the grants of the preceding year, are discharged on the 31st of March; and the first payment out of votes of the current year is not due until the 30th of June. Here then are three months for the consideration of the civil service estimates — a time amply sufficient for ensuring the maintenance of the principle that no money shall be expended by the Government until it has been voted by Parliament. Then why is it not done ? Simply because, according to the present rules of the House, it is more difficult even to approach the Committee of Supply than to bring any other business to a conclusion. If irrelevant motions on going into committee were prohibited, all the army and navy estimates, without any exception, could be voted before the 31st of March, and the civil service estimates before the 30th of June. And thus two important results would be secured by one simple regu- lation, the advantage of which, on other grounds, has been already noticed. The constitutional principle would be main- tained, and the financial measures so far advanced as to ensure an earlier termination of the Session. That such results should be attainable by so small a change of practice, is an illustration of the political importance of mere forms, and of the necessity of regarding them with the eye of a statesman. A more important question than any which has hitherto been considered is whether essential changes might not be made, with advantage, in the interior organisation of Parliament. The two Houses comprise upwards of 1,100 members. Genius, learning, rank, ambition, industry, common sense, and practical experience, are all largely represented there. But are these numbers, and these various talents, so employed as to produce The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 31 adequate results ? Is there a sufficient division of employments in the work of legislation ? Do many labour where the well- directed energies of a smaller number would be more effectual ? Is the same work done again and again ; and is it, at last, done well ? These are questions worthy of grave consideration. The political uses of numbers in the constitution of a Legis- lature are the representation of every opinion, interest, and party, and the weight which is consequently attached to its determinations. A small legislative body would be overborne by clamour and cabals, like a council of ministers ; but a numerous body is strong enough to resist every influence but the popular will ; and even that it is often able to withstand for a time. Abstractedly, a thousand men will not arrive at juster conclusions than ten; and the ultimate judgment of the thousand is directed by a very small proportion of these numbers ; yet, in a free State, the leading men would be powerless, unless supported by a numerous following of rank and file. It is power, rather than wisdom, that is the characteristic of numbers. The conclusions deducible from these considerations are these — that it is the proper function of the whole body to disouss and de- termine the principles, and direct the general policy of legislation ; while, under its directions, and subject to its approval, a smaller body, with delegated powers, should be charged with the office of elaborating the details. This principle, though recognised in many of the proceedings of Parliament, is very imperfectly carried out. For many purposes the agency of committees is constantly resorted to ; but rarely for the relief of the whole body, in the performance of legislative functions. Every public Bill is considered on at least four distinct occasions in each House, and its several provisions are also discussed by what is nominally a committee of the whole House, but which is, in fact, the House itself without its Speaker. Even when a Bill has been referred to a Select Committee, it is afterwards submitted to a committee of the whole House. In the passing of laws the House does everything, and its committees nothing ; and this, we think, is a defective organisation of the means at its disposal. A committee of the whole House affords no relief whatever 32 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. to the House itself: it occupies the attention of all its members, and no other business can proceed during its sitting. A Select Committee consists of a small number of members, generally not exceeding fifteen; and, though well calculated for purposes of inquiry, does not sufficiently represent the opinions of the House in deliberating upon any question of public policy. The determination of so small a body, arrived at without any public discussion, has comparatively little influence in restrain- ing subsequent debates upon the same questions in the House itself. No other committee of an intermediate character, com- bining the numbers and representative constitution of the com- mittee of the whole House, with the independent action of a Select Committee, is, at the present time, acknowledged amongst the institutions of Parliament. The Grrand Committees of ancient times for religion, for grievances, for courts of justice, and for trade, were kept alive, for form's sake, for many years after they had ceased to be anything more than a name ; but even their formal appointment has been discontinued since 1832. And the Committee of Privileges, which was of a similar con- stitution, still exists, indeed, but in a state of suspended anima- tion. To revive committees which by common consent have been abandoned would be a futile experiment ; but the prin- ciple upon which they were originally established may be applied to a new organisation of committees. Committees of the whole House may be retained for the consideration of all matters involving taxation and other important questions specially referred to them ; but Grrand Committees should also be constituted, for settling the clauses of public Bills, and for initiating various proceedings which now originate in commit- tees of the whole House. Tlie organisation of such a plan might be attempted in the following manner. The House should be divided into six Grand Committees, consisting of about 110 members each, to whom would be added 1 5 or 20 Ministers and other leading members, who would be nominated to serve upon all the Grrand Com- mittees. The members would be distributed by a Committee of Selection, subject to approval by the House, in such a man- ner as to secure an equal representation of political parties, The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 3S interests, and classes in all the committees^ and, at the same time, to maintain in eacb a preponderance of members more par- ticularly conversant with its peculiar department of business. Thus the Grand Committee for Trade would comprise a large proportion of merchants and of the representatives of com- mercial constituencies ; and the Committee for Courts of Justice an ample complement of 'gentlemen of the long robe.' The constitution and functions of these several committees would be different; but all would be political representatives of the larger body from which they are drawn, and little Parliaments, as it were, in themselves. The province of one would probably be Keligion and Ecclesiastical Affairs ; of another, Law and Courts of Justice ; of a third, Trade, Shipping, and Manufactures ; of a fourth, Local Taxation and Administration ; of a fifth. Colo- nial and Indian Possessions ; and, of a sixth, Education and Greneral Purposes. The first function of these committees would be to consider the provisions of every public Bill referred to them ; and, for that purpose, their proceedings should be assimilated to those of a committee of the whole House. Each committee should have assigned to it a chamber, arranged so as to admit of the distribu- tion of parties, and to afford facilities for debate. It would be a novel experiment to admit the public and reporters to the deliberations of a committee ; but this would be an essential part of the proposed plan. The main object in view is to invest the deliberations of these committees with as much importance as possible, and to delegate to them the discussion, and, as far as possible, the decision, of questions which now devolve wholly on the House. If this could be accomplished, the labours of the House would be, to that extent, diminished. Perhaps the number of days in the week on which the House would sit might be diminished ; at all events the length of the sittings might be curtailed, and the two or three hours after midnight, which now inflict so much fatigue and inconvenience upon busy members, might be often spared. The tendency of such an arrangement would be to make the House a Court of Appeal, as it were, from its Grand Committees, rather than a Court of Primary Jurisdiction, in all legislative matters, as it is at D 34 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. present. It would determine the questions fit to be referred to its committees, and would revise their decisions if necessary, instead of undertaking to settle the details, as well as resolving the principles, of all legislation. Other incidental advantages may be anticipated from the reference of Bills to Grand Committees. At present the discus- sion of the clauses of a Bill is regarded, by the majority of members, as a wearisome interruption to the more proper business of the House. Few members take part in it ; and those who attend are impatient to proceed to other matters, in which they are more interested. The Bills are, therefore, hastily amended, while members who would be competent to assist in their revision meet with little encouragement in offering suggestions to an impatient audience. In a Grand Committee, whose deliberations offered no impediment to the progress of business in the House, and whose proper duty it was to discuss the clauses of a Bill, a more careful revision of them might reasonably be expected. The majority of the members would, probably, be interested in the subject of discussion ; and those who desired to offer their opinions would be heard without impatience. A Grand Com- mittee, indeed, would be an admirable school for members, in which many excellent men of business, who are rarely heard in the House itself, would be able to render efficient service, and to gain distinction for themselves, by their knowledge and prac- tical judgment. In each Grand Committee the Government would be represented by its official members who had charge of any Bill, and by independent members co-operating with them : and the Opposition and other parties would have equal opportunities of advancing their own opinions. If their debates were published, the public would also be fully informed of their proceedings, and prepared to influence the ultimate decision of the House, when their reports should come under consideration. The quorum of these committees need not exceed twenty, or at the utmost twenty-five, which would be sufficient for the transaction of ordinary business, while questions of importance would attract a full attendance of members. Their sittings might be conveniently held in the largest of the New Committee Rooms, which could be fitted up for their accommodation, and, The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 35 if necessary^ enlarged by an encroacliraent npon adjoining rooms, many of wbicli are of unnecessary dimensions. They would sit on certain days of the week, in the morning, and, like other committees, adjourn on the assembling of the House. It can scarcely be objected that a Orand Committee would be too limited to represent, with fairness, the general sentiments of the House, so long as 40 members out of 654 are held to be sufficient for all purposes of legislation. Nay, by the present rules of the House, even 20 members, though opposed by 19, may bind the whole House to an irrevocable vote. Nor, in less exceptional cases, does the final judgment of the House depend upon the aggregate numbers in a division. For example, in the last Session, Lord Robert Grrosvenor^s Attor- neys' Certificate Duty Bill had been brought in by a consider- able majority in a House consisting of 391 members: it was rejected, on the second reading, in a House of 293 members only. And again, the fate of the Advertisement Duty affords a still more striking instance of the reversal of decisions by smaller numbers than those by which they were originally agreed to. On the 14th of April, after one of the very best speeches of the Session, Mr. Milner Gribson carried a resolution for the repeal of the Advertisement Duty in a full House of 374 members (the respective numbers being 202 and 171). The Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, at a subsequent period, instead of adopting this vote as the expression of the will of the House, proposed a reduction of the duty from eighteenpence to sixpence. This compromise was not accepted by Mr. Milner Gibson and his friends; and on the 1st of July the battle was renewed. The Government at first succeeded in carrying their proposition by a majority of 10 only, in a House of 213 (the numbers being 111 and 101), and reversed, for a time, the previous decision of 374 members. Their triumph was brief. It was the night of a State ball at Buckingham Palace. The supporters of the Government hastened from the division lobby to the ball-room ; while their sturdier opponents, resolute of purpose and not much given to dancing — even if invited to dance — continued the fio-ht in a thin House of 136 members. It was now too late to rescind the previous vote directly ; but being well skilled m D 2 36 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. fence, they succeeded in affirming, by a majority of 9 (the numbers being 72 and 63), that the future advertisement duty should be £0. Os. OcZ. ! After much consideration, the Govern- ment resolved not to disturb this determination ; and we are indebted to 72 members and a Queen's ball for our present complete exemption from a tax which nearly one-third of the House had previously failed in repealing. The luckless attor- neys were the only class who suffered in this contest ; for Mr. Gladstone, in surrendering the sixpence on advertisements, begged hard for the Certificate Duty, as an equivalent ; and for this sixpence the opponents of 'taxes on knowledge ' consented to the sacrifice of their legal friends. On numerous occasions, in every Session, the members present at a division are considerably less than one hundred ; and a division with so many as three hundred is comparatively rare. To refer again to the last Session for examples : out of 257 divisions, there were 20 of less than 100 members ; 142 of more than 100, and less than 200 ; o'i of more than 200, and less than 300 ; and 39 only exceeding 300. The average numl)er present in all the divisions was 201. In the presence of these statistics, it will hardly be contended tliat Grand Committees will afford an inadequate representation of the whole body of members. In the House, nothing can be more irregular and capricious than the attendance of members even when great questions are to be decided without further appeal ; and it is notorious that the Houfc is occasionally liable to clandestine surprises and ambuscades. The Grand Com- mittees might possibly be exposed t^ similar irregularities ; but every vote would be open to revision by the House ; and their minutes of proceedings and di\ision lists would show how far they had paid attention to their duties, and were entitled to support. If the experiment of Grand Committees should prove suc- cessful in the case of Bills, it might be extended to other descriptions of business with equal, if not greater advantage. Bills relating to religion or trade, for instance, which are now required to originate in a committee of the whole House, as well as other Bills, might more conveniently be initiated in The Machinery of Parliameatary Legislation. 37 these committees ; by which means the House would be relieved of many preliminary discussions. With what alacrity would the House refer the questions of Maynooth and the Nunneries to the Grand Committee of Eeligionl how gladly consign intricate questions of Law Reform to the Grrand Committee on Law and Courts of Justice I And while much pressure might thus be transferred from the House, many members would have an opportunity of submitting their motions to Grand Committees who now wait hopelessly for a hearing in the House itself. Care would naturally be taken to prevent committees from withholding any matters from the consideration of the House. They would merely decide upon questions specifically referred to them, and their votes would be subject to reversal. Nor would Ministerial responsibility be diminished by this system. If the committees were taken indiscriminately from the body of the House, the Government for the time being would ordi- narily have a majority in each committee ; and if occasionally outvoted there, would assemble their forces in the House, and refuse to adopt the report of the committee. The examples of France and America are of little avail in estimating the importance of this experiment. The French Chamber of Deputies was divided into nine bureaux oi 51 members each. The distribution of the members into bureaux was not arranged upon any principle of selection, but was determined by lot. Every month the names of all the members were put into a box, and drawn out by the President ; and each list of 51 names, drawn in succession, constituted the nine bureaux* Brought together by chance, shuffled and dealt out like a pack of cards, and again separated at the end of a month, the members of a bureau could scarcely be expected to evince any unity of purpose or effective organisation for busi- ness. Nor were such qualifications essential to the object they were intended to serve. A projet de loi, or other proposition, was referred to all the bureaux at once, and discussed by all. * After the Revolution of 1848, the National Assembly, being a more numerous body than the Chamber of Deputies, was divided into fifteen bureaux. 38 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation, The Minister, to whose department any measure related, ex- plained its objects and policy to the bureau of which he chanced to be a member ; and a conversation, rather than a debate, ensued amongst its members, sitting round the table. No reporters were present, and the discussions were ordinarily unknown to the public ; but occasionally, when it served the purpose of a popular Minister or member of the Opposition — like M. Thiers — to give early publicity to his opinions, a speech delivered privately in the bureau would find its way to the newspapers. When the discussion was concluded, the bureau proceeded — not to vote for or against the proposition — not to agree to any report to the Chamber — but simply to nominate one of its members to serve upon a commission. Of course this member represented the opinions of the majority of the bureau ; and consequently the nine members, of whom the commission was composed, became a fair representation of the entire Chamber. The object of the bureau^ therefore, was to bring to a focus, as it were, the various opinions and suggestions elicited by nine independent discussions, in which every member of the Chamber had an opportunity of taking part. The com- mission again discussed the projet de loi, and appointed one of their members to be ' the reporter,' by whom an elaborate report was prepared, for presentation to the Chamber, explana- tory of the views of the commission. Notwithstanding the complication of this machinery, the system of bureaux has found so much favour in France that, whether under King or President, it has continued to be a national institution ; but, after all, it would seem to arrive, by a troublesome process, at results attainable by the simpler method of debating questions in the House, and deciding them, at once, by a majority. In the American House of Eepresentatives there are twenty- eight standing committees, twenty-two of which consist of nine, and six of five members each. With these committees originate nearly all the Bills which are introduced to the notice of Congress. A member may move for leave to bring in a Bill ; but if his motion be agreed to, it is immediately referred to one of the standing committees, or to a select committee specially The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 39 appointed for the purpose. Thus, Bills never come under dis- cussion in the House until after they have been prepared or examined by a committee, when they may be presumed to be in a fit state for consideration ; and, in this respect, the American system resembles that of the proposed Grand Committees. But the standing committees of the United States have other functions ; as, for example, the examination of the revenue and expenditure of the current year, and military and foreign affairs, which, in this country, would be inconsistent with executive responsibility. Nothing of this description would be referred to the Grand Committees ; but the example of America is useful as showing the extent to which the agency of committees has been made available in the work of legislation. We now approach a question of acknowledged importance connected with practical legislation. Complaints have so fre- quently been made in Parliament, from the bench, the bar, and the press, of the hasty and ill-considered provisions of the public Statutes — of their loose and illogical arrangement, their obscure and often inaccurate phraseology, and their legal blunders — that our readers may claim to be spared any illustra- tion of them. The modern Statutes are not quite so bad as they are popularly supposed to be ; but they are susceptible of very great and systematic improvements. Next to an epic poem, we believe an Act of Parliament to be the most difficult of all compositions. One mind, indeed, is rarely equal to the preparation even of a perfect d,raft, still less of a final legislative measure. Keady learning, patient study, practical knowledge, an appreciation of all conceivable circamstances amounting to imagination, logical discrimination, and the most critical nicety of language, are all essential to the due performance of the task. An Act of Parliament is not criticised like other works of art. Learned critics vie with one another to discover some hidden meaning in a chorus of ^schylus, which to common under- standings has none at all ; while the most subtle minds are striving to make unintelligible the language of Statutes which, in any other composition, would be plain enough. No human skill will always be proof against such an ordeal ; but by the present system of passing Bills, a Statute is exposed to so many daugers 40 The Macliinery of Parliamentary Legislation. before it attains maturity, that we have often wondered, not that it should contain some obvious bUmders, but by what happy chance it has escaped the enactment of sheer nonsense, in very bad grammar. However carefully it may have been originally prepared, no sooner is it out of the hands of the draftsman than its ' unities ' are set at nought. A word omitted here, a clause added there, terms already used in one sense inserted elsewhere in another — make such havoc in it, that its author would scarcely recognise his own work. Nor is he present to advise and assist in the amendment of his draft. It has been given over to the care of a Minister or member, who, though well informed as to the general policy of the measure, has borne no part in the unthankful labour of its composition. To conciliate one member and make another hold his tongue, he would break the heart of the patient lawmaker, who has pon- dered over every word before he wrote it down. The sudden thought of a conversational debater has more weight than the well-advised judgment of the learned draftsman. And should he be again consulted, it may be too late wholly to correct the errors of others. Amendments have been agreed to which can- not be withdrawn with good faith, or have been voted by the House, whose decision may not be lightly set aside ; and so the legislative patchwork is permitted to take its chance, with other performances of the same description. The evil of thus disconnecting the lawmaker from the Legislature is one that obviously needs a remedy. Bentham, impressed with the inconveniences of the present system of passing laws, went so far as to propose that a Statute, having been prepared by official lawmakers, should be adopted by Parlia- ment without amendment, or else rejected altogether. A proposal which gives Parliament only a veto upon the work of the draftsman cannot be seriously entertained ; and even as an expedient for ensuring improvements in the mechanical part of legislation, it has little to recommend it. The lawmakers and the Legislature would still be unconnected ; and laws drawn up in the study, without the aid of public discussion, would rarely be ht for adoption without amendment. Lord Brougham, the first of modern law-reformers, has The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation, 41 repeatedly called attention to the defects of our legislative pro- cesses. He, too, attaches great importance to the functions of the lawmaker, and deprecates the inconsiderate amendments too often made in his work by the Legislature. In speaking of the treatment of his own digest of the Bankruptcy Laws, by a committee of the House of Commons, he says : No committee can undertake with advantage the minute con- sideration of the terms in which provisions agreed upon as to their substance shall be couched. Confidence must of necessity be placed in the learning, skill, and diligence of those who have prepared the digest.* For the remedy of the evils of which he has so often com- plained, his lordship proposes the establishment of a board or court of learned and practised men —irremovable from office except upon the address of both Houses of Parliament — to revise the drafts of all Bills before they are introduced, and again after they have been amended. Such a board, resembling in its character and functions the Conseil d^Etat of the French, has much to recommend it ; but its constitution and its relations to Parliament would require grave consideration. Parliament has already within itself the means of ensiu'ing improved legislation with very little aid from without. Assum- ing that Grand Committees are to be appointed for the general consideration of Bills, a sub-committee, selected from each Grrand Committee, might be charged with their technical revision. The sub-committee, composed of a few of the most practical members, and including some lawyers, should be attended by the drafts- man, officer, or commissioners, who prepared the Bill, and by the Minister or member having charge of it. No Bill should be reported by the Grand Committee until it had undergone this revision : and if amendments were subsequently made by the House, the Bill might, if necessary, be again referred to the committee. This plan would bring into useful communication the lawmaker and the Legislature, and would unite the practised skill of the one with the political enlightenment and authority * Letter to Sir James Graham on the Making and Digesting of the Law, 1849, p. 5. 42 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. of the other. At present no responsibility is publicly attached to the draftsman. He works behind the scenes, like a news- paper writer, without personal credit or blame. The Govern- ment or member, by whom his work is adopted, enjoys the credit of success, and the disgrace of failure. He would now become responsible for his own defaults. His pen which drew the Bill would also draw the amendments, under the directions and subject to the approval of the committee. Many heads would co-operate in the revision ; but one hand only would hold the pen. Unity of design and expression would, at least, be secured by these means, and a competent lawmaker would generally be able to resist the introduction of unsuitable amend- ments. This simple plan, involving no charge upon the public, and little alteration in the existing practice of Parliament, would be productive of the best results. If, however, some official organisation were required for assisting in the revision of Bills, and for maintaining uniformity in the work of various hands and different committees, this object might be secured in connection with another important change of Parliamentary procedure, which we are about to propose. Many of the proposals we have hitherto made, though calcu- lated to relieve the House and improve its legislation, involve, at the same time, a considerable enlargement of the duties of committees. And it may be asked, Are there not already too many committees ? — and have they not more than enough to do ? Has it not been said that thirty-three committees have been sitting on a single day ? Then why add to the number ? Nothing can be further from our intention. There are already too many committees — they have too much to do — of necessity they do a great part of their business very ill — and we propose to relieve them of the most onerous and the least satisfactory of their duties. The large number of committees on private Bills has been noticed in our summary of the business of last Session. They form, indeed, a serious proportion of the engagements of mem- bers for about three months of every Session, and sometimes more. In 1846, there were no less than 123 committees on opposed private Bills alone, the aggregate sittings of which The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 43 amounted to the extraordinary number of 1,048 days. The work would have occupied one committee nearly four years, sitting from day to day I In 1847, there were 88 committees ; and their sittings extended to 720 days. During the seven years from 1846 to 1852, tliere have been 377 of these com- mittees ; and the annual average has amounted to 53, sitting for eight days each ; and this in addition to very numerous com- mittees on unopposed Bills. On the whole, it may be estimated that between 350 and 400 members are occupied, about 10 days each, by services in connection with private Bills. Of their duties in a railway committee we need say but little : they are too well known as difficult, laborious, responsible, and irksome, to need any illustration. But are they properly performed ? — and could they be performed better by a different tribunal ? In selecting the members to serve upon any committee, the principal qualification of the greater number has been that they had no pecuniary or local interest in the questions about to be considered by them ; or, in other words, that they happened not to be shareholders in any of the companies concerned, or landholders in the contested district. Their impartiality being thus assumed, they are appointed to try some of the most im- portant and difficult issues that can possibly come before any tribunal in the country. No judicial training or experience — no special aptitude for business, or familiarity with the matters on which they are about to adjudicate — are expected of any member of the committee, except perhaps the chairman. These are undoubted facts, which none will be found to deny ; but on the results of the system there is still little unanimity of opinion. By many it is said ' to work well ' — a dubious phrase — to secure, at least, a greater number of just than of unjust decisions, and to give fairer play to enterprise and the rivalry of capitalists than could be anticipated from the exertions of any permanent tribunal. From others we hear nothing but ridicule and contempt. There is a favourite story amongst practitioners, of a young member, who had been sitting for three weeks in judgment upon the engineering merits of two rival lines of railway, suddenly arousing himself to ask, ' Pray, what is a gradient ? ' And we have been assured by an eminent railway 44 The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. engineer that the following' conflict of decisions, upon the lead- ing principles of railway legislation, actually occurred in a single week. The question, to be tried by four different committees, sitting at the same time, and in adjoining rooms, was this : Which of two rival lines is to be preferred — the shortest and most direct, or the more circuitous, which accommodates a larger population, more towns, and a greater traffic ? The first committee pre- ferred the shortest line ; the second, the more circuitous ; the third would sanction neither of the lines; and the fourth decided in favour of both. And this anecdote, however exaggerated it may be, serves to illustrate one of the chief evils of the existing system. The committees may be individually just ; but how is it possible for them to carry out any uniform principle of legislation ? Another great evil is, that every Bill has to pass the ordeal of two select committees — one in the Commons, the other in the Lords. There is no security that the principles of decision adopted by both committees will be identical, and much pro- bability that they will be different. When an opposed Bill has passed the Commons, the opposition may be renewed in the Lords. After the expense of an opposition has been incurred before the Commons' committee, and the committee have re- ported in its favour, the Lords' committee may find that the preamble has not been proved ; and thus all the expenses of a successful contest before the Commons' committee are thrown away. The great railway companies, whose Parliamentary triumphs have generally conciliated their support of the system under which they have risen to greatness, are now beginning to calcu- late their past losses and estimate their future dangers. * A most competent witness,' says the committee of last Session on railways, 'has estimated the loss of money to the railway shareholders, unnecessarily incurred in obtaining Parliamentary authority for, and in constructing the railways now in existence, and in opposing rival schemes, at seventy millions ! ' Another witness informed the committee that two thousand miles of railway, involving an outlay of more than forty millions, have been sanctioned by Parliament, and afterwards abandoned by The Machinery of PaHiamentary Legislation. 45 the promoters, without any Parliamentary authority. If to these be added the numerous lines which have been relinquished under the sanction of Parliament, it would seem as if the mileage abandoned were about half as much as the mileage constructed, which amounted in June last to 7,512 miles in the United Kingdom. In other words, for every two miles of railway authorised, and sufficiently well selected to be ulti- mately made, one mile of railway was either so bad in itself, or so ill-supported by its promoters, as to be abandoned with loss to the greater part of the persons concerned. We will say nothing of the number of lines which have indeed been made, but much to the regret of shareholders, who heartily wish they had been abandoned. Their history is briefly told by the Share List. These are great national evils, but the blame of them is to be borne by railway speculators rather than by Parliament. If two litigious parties insist upon ruioing themselves in a Court of Justice, by endless suits, instead of adjusting their differences by arbitration or compromise, we blame not the Court but the suitors. But possibly they may be saved from themselves, and the various interests involved render the experiment a national object. The railway property in Grreat Britain alone amounted in 1851 to £248,240,897, and the gross revenue upon this capital to £15,000,000. We are persuaded that the aggregate capital invested in railways and other public undertakings sanc- tioned by Parliament, will soon be equal in amount to the National Debt, and this enormous property ought not to be endangered by the accidents and mischances to which it has hitherto been exposed. With this view Mr. Cardwell, after investigating the difficult question of railway legislation with great care and judgment, proposed an improved constitution of railway committees, which is to be tried in the ensuing Session. His plan is to secure the services of a small number of well- qualified members, who are expected to devote a considerable part of the Session to their laborious duties, and by frequent communication to maintain uniformity of decision. This was probably the best expedient that could then have been proposed, with any reason- 46 TJie Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. able prospect of immediate success. If more could have been done, Mr. Cardwell was not likely to shrink from the attempt ; but the failure of previous experiments, the jealous regard of Parliament for its own jurisdiction, and the apprehensions of the railway interest lest any considerable change should diminish their influence or affect their property, forbade the proposal of a bolder scheme. We regard it, however, as the first insertion of the wedge, which repeated blows will drive deeper and deeper, until the entire system is rent asunder. It is ' the beginning of the end.' The new experiment is to be applied to railway Bills alone ; all other private Bills, scarcely inferior in import- ance, being left, for the present, in their accustomed course. The system which has been condemned cannot be long con- tinued : and of the new scheme we entertain no very sanguine anticipations. Its pressure upon unpaid members of Parliament will be intolerable ; and we doubt if they will prove otherwise equal to the heavy responsibilities imposed upon them. The new committee of forty w^ill, sooner or later, be superseded by a more efficient tribunal, just as the Committee on Petitions for Private Bills, on the model of which it is founded, has long since given way to judicial officers of the House. Government Boards have been tried and found wanting ; and we hope to see the establishment of a Judicial Court within the walls of Par- liament, performing the same functions as committees on private Bills. This Court should be common to both Houses, to whom it should make its reports ; and thus the double inquiry, in Lords and Commons, now so vexatious and costly to the parties, would be avoided. Lord Brougham proposed a plan, founded upon this principle, in 1836; and the twenty-four resolutions submitted by him to the House of Lords embody, in forcible language, the reasons for the proposed change. The trial of this, or some analogous plan, may still be postponed for a few years, but we regard its ultimate adoption as inevitable. We have now adverted to the principal inconveniences experienced in the practical working of our Parliamentary Government, and have endeavoured to indicate the nature of the remedies which appear to be wanting. Tlie objects we have in view are not many, nor difficult of attainment. To limit the The Machinery of Parliamentary Legislation. 47 occasions for debate, without restricting its freedom ; to dis- courage irregularities, in order to increase the opportunities for grave discussion ; to organise the vast resources of Parliament, so as to diminish the labour and increase the efficiency of its deliberations — these are the ends to be accomplished. The means proposed are simple and free from hazard, founded upon existing practice, borne out by experience, and not trenching upon any constitutional principle. Without giving undue faci- lities to a Government, or embarrassing the legitimate tactics of an Opposition, they would conduce to the dignity of Parliament, the credit, utility, and comfort of its members, and the public good. LONDON : PRINTED BY SrOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STKHF-T SQUARE AND PARI-IAMKN'/ STRF.KT ^SjSwJ ^.1 WS^'