/ i n £ tin 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
 
 IN REPLY TO 
 
 MR. CURRY, OF ALABAMA, 
 
 ON 
 
 POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, 
 
 AS AVOWED BY 
 
 JUDGE DOUGLAS. 
 
 <> rs / 
 
 3 * * 
 
 an h 
 
 fv j {t S 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 29, 1 360, 
 
 The House being in the Committee of the "Whole on the state of the Union—Mr. 
 
 MONTGOMERY said: 
 
 Mr. Chairman: Some days since, at a time when I was absent from this Ilonse, the gen' 
 tleman from Alabama (Mr. Curry) delivered a speech in which he discussed the question 
 of popular sovereignty, and especially the views of Judge Douglas on that question, i 
 regret that I was not present to hear the remarks of the honorable gentleman ; because, 
 when he speaks, I am always an attentive and instructed listener, and because I would 
 have at once sought the floor to have replied. Since then I have been unremitting in my 
 efforts to secure the floor for that purpose, and this is the earliest day at which I could 
 succeed. 
 
 The honorable gentleman is an able reasoner and an elegant writer. He is generally 
 well prepared before he attempts to speak, and often writes out his remarks in full, in terse 
 old English; and he reads and speaks with a force and clearness which give Him an influ¬ 
 ence and popularity which his talents and industry richly merit. This very popularity, if 
 nothing more, requires that his remarks should be replied to. And this duty seems espe¬ 
 cially to be demanded from me. I am one of the delegates at large from the great State of 
 Pennsylvania, which recently, at the Reading convention, reasserted its unshaken faith in 
 the doctrine of non-intervention by Congress in the legislation of the Territories. And, in 
 addition, I am one of the northern Democratic Representatives that has invariable agreed 
 with Judge Douglas in the views he has held, and holds now, on that question. I there¬ 
 fore, on my own responsibility, and in self-defence, deem it my duty to reply to the remarks 
 of the honorable gentleman from Alabama. I sincerely deprecate this discussion. I regret 
 that the gentleman from Alabama has thought proper to drag our little party differences 
 into discussion on the floor of Congress. This is not the place in which those differences 
 can be adjusted. Nor is this the time, when an active, vigilant, powerful enemy is in the 
 field seeking our overthrow, to stir up civil war in our ranks. The voice of every friend 
 of the party and of the country should now be raised in snpport of harmony, concession, 
 and united action. I regard this discussion as unwise, ill-timed, and impolitic. It is an 
 act of treason to the best interests of the party, and gives aid and comfort to the enemy. 
 All such differences should be referred to the great national council of the party, which, 
 will soon assemble at Charleston, for the adjustment and determination of such questions. 
 But the gentleman from Alabama has thought proper to refuse to submit the controversy 
 to that tribunal. He risks the consequences, and lias given the first blow ; and justice to 
 ourselves demands that we should return it. 
 
 The gentleman from Alabama has fairly made the issue on which the presidential nom¬ 
 ination is to be determined. Vie do not seek to disguise it; on the contrary.we proclaim 
 it, and mean to stand by it. Judge Douglas would scorn to obtain the Presidency on. 
 false pretenses. He stands now where he has stood for the last ten years—unchanged ar.d 
 unchangeable. He has inscribed on his banner the great doctrine of “non-intervention 
 
 Printed by Lemuel Towers, at $1 00 per hundred copies. 
 
2 
 
 by Congress in the legislation of a Territory.” All his opponents, on the contrary, with¬ 
 out exception, have inscribed on theirs ‘‘intervention by Congress to establish and"protect 
 slavery in the Territories.” That is the issue; and we are willing to meet it here, as we 
 will meet it at Charleston. I desire delegates from the northern States to remember, that 
 this is the issue — the only issue — to be met in the national convention. I am resolved 
 that gentlemen shall not misrepresent nor misunderstand this matter. Judge Douglas 
 alone of all our candidates maintains the doctrine that Congress shall nor interfere in the 
 legislation of a Territory, either for or against slavery. All his competitors take the 
 ground that Congress has the right, and it is its duty, to intervene to protect slavery in 
 the Territories wherever the Territorial Legislatures neglect or refuse so to do. 
 
 Permit me to explain what is meant by Congressional intervention. The honorable 
 gentleman from Alabama, and those who agree with him, hold that, under the Constitu¬ 
 tion of the United States, tke slaveholders of the South have a right to emigrate into the 
 Territories, and take their slaves with them. And he and they hold, further, that if the 
 people of the Territory do not want slavery, and if their Territorial Legislature shall 
 neglect or refuse to pass laws to protect such slave property, or if they pass laws either 
 to abolish or to discourage slavery, in any of these cases it is the bounden duty of Con¬ 
 gress to pass laws to protect slavery in such Territory. If this principle is adopted, every 
 Territory will be given up to slavery. There will not be one inch of common soil left to 
 freedom. 
 
 Congressional interventionists are of two kinds. They differ only in the kind of inter¬ 
 vention they demand, but not in the principle. The Republican party is composed of in¬ 
 terventionists. They contend that it is the bounden duty of Congress to intervene in the 
 affairs of a Territory to prohibit slavery. The Southern interventionists contend that it 
 is the duty of Congress to intervene to protect and encourage slavery in the Territories. 
 These two parties agree in most respects. The}’ both agree that it is the duty of Congress 
 to legislate on the subject of slavery. They both agree that Congress should legislate on 
 tbs subject, against the wishes of the people of a Territory. 
 
 The Republican interventionists contend that if the people of a Territory want slavery , 
 and if their Legislature passes laws to establish and protect slave property, that it is the 
 bounden duty of Congress to intervene and abolish slavery. The Southern intervention- 
 ' ists, on the contrary, contend that when the people of a Territory have refused to have 
 slavery , that it is the duty of Congress to intervene to protect and establish slavery in 
 such Territory. They thus, both alike, legislate against the will of the people. The one 
 party would have Congress make all our Territories free; the other would have it make 
 them all slave. Judge Douglas, on the contrary, would have Congress to neither interfere 
 for or against slavery; but “would leave the people of the Territory perfectly free to 
 form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way.” Judge Douglas 
 stands by the principles enunciated in the compromise resolutions of 1850, and in the Kan- 
 sas-Nebraska act, which were indorsed and approved by tlie Cincinnati convention in 
 1S56. “This is the head and front of his offending,” and the grounds of opposition to him. 
 
 Mr. CURRY. I did not advocate an act of Congress “to establish slavery;” nor does 
 any other Southern man. We only ask Congress to pass laws to protect it in the Territories. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. That is a mere play on words. If Congress did not interfere 
 the Territorial Legislature might drive it out, and it would not exist; but where Congress 
 interferes it establishes slavery—by 'protecting it—for if it were not for protection it would 
 cease in the Territory. I look to the effect, and not to the claim set up. We must call 
 things by their right names. And an act to protect slavery in the Territory would most 
 effectually establish it. For protection is only asked where the people are hostile to 
 slavery, and where it would not be allowed to remain if Congress did not protect it. 
 
 What is the issue between us? The gentleman from Alabama contends that the power 
 to legislate on the subject of slavery was not given to the Territorial Legislatures^ by either 
 the compromise resolutions of 1850, or bv the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854. I, on the 
 contrary, contend that the full power to legislate both for o.nd against slavery, was given 
 to the Territorial Legislatures by both of those acts. That such was incontestably the 
 intention at the time those acts were passed; that the views of Judge Douglas on that sub¬ 
 ject were fully, clearly, and unequivocally expressed at that time; and that he stands now 
 precisely where he stood then. This is the issue. “Now to the law and the testimony.” 
 
 • The slavery question had been permitted to sleep from the date of the Missouri com¬ 
 promise until after Texas was annexed, which was shortly afterwards followed by the ac¬ 
 quisition of Utah, New Mexico, and California. A party then sprung up in the North, 
 which was led by Hon. David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, who insisted on annexing a pro¬ 
 viso to the acquisition of all these Territories, by which slavery should be forever excluded 
 from them. This celebrated proviso was several times passed in the lower House of Con¬ 
 gress, but was defeated in the Senate. 
 
 Against this proviso the South earnestly protested; and every expedient which the 
 rules of legislation permit were then resorted to to defeat the attempt of David lYilmot 
 and his party. In 1848, Judge Douclas moved in the Senate that this vexed question 
 
3 
 
 should be forever settled by extending the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific oc^an. 
 But this laudable and praiseworthy effort to restore peace and harmony between the North 
 and the South was defeated. The excitement grew alarming; the hearts of the people, 
 North and South, were alienated from each other; and the two sections were arrayed in 
 open hostility on this alarming question. The friends of the Union trembled when they 
 thought of the Consequences that might ensue. This state of affairs culminated in 1850; 
 and the good and great men of all parties came together in that memorable year to make 
 some safe and satisfactoi’y adjustment of this vexed and dangerous question, b} r which its 
 discussion might be forever withdrawn from the floor of Congress. 
 
 The great and glorious Clay had gone home to spend the evening of his days in peace 
 and quiet at his own loved Ashland ; but he heard the call of his country in her agony, and 
 he came back to the Senate Chamber to unite his voice and influence with Webster and 
 Cass, and Douglas and Benton, and a host of other “immortal names that were not born 
 to die,” to secure some safe, satisfactory, and permanent adjustment of the slavery agita¬ 
 tion. The result of their counsels was the celebrated compromise resolutions of that year. 
 And I now propose to show that, by those resolutions, the full power to legislate not only 
 for, but against slavery, was committed to the Territorial Legislatures; and for that pur¬ 
 pose I will invite the attention of the committee to some of the various amendments 
 proposed and discussed at the time. Remember, however, that I am now attempting to 
 prove that the intention of Congress was to give the full power to legislate on the ques¬ 
 tion of slavery to the Territorial Legislatures. 
 
 The bill to provide temporary government for Utah and New Mexico had been amended 
 by the insertion of a proviso that such “Legislatures should pass no laws to interfere with 
 the primary disposal of the title to the soil, nor in respect to African slavery .” Southern 
 men did not consider this clause sufficiently explicit; and, on the 5th of June, 1850, Mr. 
 Berrien moved to amend the bill by striking out “in respect to,” and inserting “establish¬ 
 ing or prohibiting;” which was carried by a vote of 30 to 27. (See Senate Journal, p. 
 376.) The bill, as it there stood, clearly prohibited the Territorial Legislatures from leg¬ 
 islating on the subject of slavery. Subsequently, however, a different view of the subject 
 prevailed ; and it was resolved to give the full power of legislation to the Territorial 
 Legislatures, and thereby to remove forever from the Halls of Congress this perplexing 
 question. On the 31st of July, 1850, Mr. Norris, of New Hampshire, moved to amend the 
 bill, line ten, section six, by striking out the words “nor establishing or prohibiting Afri¬ 
 can slavery ;” which was carried by a vote of 32 to 20. 
 
 Thus, it will be seen that the restriction which was intended to prevent the Territorial 
 Legislatures from “establishing,” as well as prohibiting slavery, was stricken out of the 
 bill. Against this amendment, the southern Senators generally voted. It had been a 
 long and hard-fought contest. The whole subject had been fully examined and discussed 
 during its progress. Some of the southern Senators had been most reluctant to concede 
 this important principle in regard to establishing and prohibiting slavery; but they 1 ad 
 to yield to the force of superior numbers. But I must go back over the discussion to 
 show that the subject was fully discussed and clearly understood. 
 
 When the bill came up for action on the 15th of May, Mr. Davis, of Mississippi, said : 
 
 “I offer (lie following amendment: to strike out, in the sixth line of the tenth section, the words ‘in 
 respect to African slavery,’ and insert the words ‘ with those rights of property growing out of the institu¬ 
 tion of African slavery as it exists in any of the States of the Union.’ The object of the amendment is to 
 prevent the Territorial Legislature from legislating against the rights of property growing out of the insti¬ 
 tution of slavery. * * * * “ It will leave to the Territorial Legislatures those rights 
 
 and powers which are essentially necessary, not only to the preservation of property, but to the peace of 
 the Territory. It will leave the right to make such police regulations as are necessary to prevent disorder, 
 and which will be absolutely necessary with such property as that to secure its beneficial use to its owner. 
 With this brief explanation, I submit the amendment.” 
 
 Mr. Clay, in reply to Mr. Davis, said: 
 
 “If the object of the Senator is to provide that slaves may be introduced into the Territory contrary to 
 the lex loci , and, being introduced, nothing shall be done by the Legislature to impair the rights of owners 
 to hold the slaves thus brought contrary to the local laws, I cerfainly cannot vote for it. In doing so 1 shall 
 repeat again the expression of opinion which I announced at an early period of the session.” 
 
 Here we find the line distinctly drawn between those who contended for the right to 
 carry slaves into the Territories and hold them in defiance of the local law, and those who 
 contended that such right was subject to the local law of the Territory. 
 
 Pending the discussion which ensued, Mr. Davis, at the suggestion of friends, modified 
 his amendment from time to time, until it assumed the following shape: 
 
 “ Nor to introduce or exclude African slavery : Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be con¬ 
 strued so as to prevent said Territorial Legislature from passing such laws as may he necessary for the 
 protection of the rights of property of every kind which may have been, or may be hereafter, conformably 
 to the Constitution of the United Sfcutes, held in or introduced into said Territory.” 
 
 To which, on the same day, Mr. Chase, of Ohio, offered the following amendment: 
 
 “ Provided further. That nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing or permitting the 
 introduction of slavery or the holding of persons as property within said Territory.” 
 
 Mr. LAMAR. What became of these amendments \ 
 
! 4 
 
 Sir. MONTGOMERY. They were both lost. 
 
 Sir. LASIAR. I thought so. 
 
 Sir. MONTGOMERY. Yes, they were lost; and this shows that Congress gave up the 
 whole subject of legislation to the Territorial Legislatures. 
 
 I have now shown incontestably that, by the clearest language, the right not only to 
 establish, but to prohibit slavery, was conferred on the Territorial Legislatures by the com¬ 
 promise measures of 1850. I have shown it by the language of the act; by the amend¬ 
 ments offered; and also from the lips of Clay and Davis. But I will not slop there. I 
 will show, further, that Judge Douglas then maintained precisely the same doctrines he 
 maintains now; that he has not changed in the slightest particular. Pending these 
 amendments Judge Douglas said : 
 
 “ The position that I have ever taken has been, that this, and all other questions relating to the domestic 
 affairs and domestic policy of the Territories, ought to be left to the decision of the people themselves; 
 and that we ought to be content with whatever way they may decide the question, because they have a 
 much deeper interes, in these matters than we have, and know much better what institutions suit them 
 than we, who have never been there, can decide for them. I would, therefore, have much preferred that 
 that portion of the bill should have remained as it was reported from the Committee on Territories, with 
 no provision on the subject of slavery, the one way or the other. And I do hope yet that that clause will 
 be stricken out. I am satisfied, sir, that it gives no strength to the bill. I am satisfied, even if it did give 
 strength to it, that it ought not to be there, because it is a violation of principle—a violation of that prin¬ 
 ciple upon which we have all rested our defence of the course we have taken on this question. I do not 
 see how those of us who have taken the position we have taken—of non-intei .ention—and have argued 
 in favor of the right of the people to legislate for themselves on this question, can support such a provision 
 without abandoning all the arguments which we used in the presidential campaign in the year 1843, and 
 the principles set forth by the honorable Senator from Michigan, (Mr. Cass) in that letter which is known 
 as the “ Nicholson Letter.” We are required to abandon that platform ; we are required to abandon those 
 principles, and to stultify ourselves, and to adopt the opposite doctrine—and for what? In order to say 
 that the people of the Territories shall not have such institutions as they shall deem adapted to their con¬ 
 dition and their wants. I do not see, sir, bow such a provision can be acceptable either to the people of 
 the North or the South.” 
 
 Upon the question, bow many inhabitants a Territory should contain before it should 
 be formed into a political community with the rights of self-government, Mr. Douglas 
 said: 
 
 “ The Senator from Mississippi puts the question to me as to what number of people there must be in a 
 Territory before this right to govern themselves accrues. Without determining the precise number, I will 
 assume that the right ought to accrue to the people at the moment they haveLnough to constitute a gov¬ 
 ernment; and, sir, the bill assumes that there are people enough there to require a government, and 
 enough to authorize the people to govern themselves.” * * * “ Your bill concedes that a representa¬ 
 tive government is necessary—a government founded upon the principles of popular sovereignty and the 
 right of a people to enact their own laws; and for this reason you give them a Legislature composed of 
 two branches, like the Legislatures of the different States and Territories of the Union. You confer upon 
 them the right to legislate on ‘ all rightful subjects of legislation,’ except negroes. Why except negroes? 
 Why except African slavery? If the inhabitants are competent to govern themselves upon all other sub¬ 
 jects, and in reference to all other descriptions of property; if they are competent to make laws and deter¬ 
 mine the relations between husband and wife, and parent and child, and municipal laws effecting the rights 
 and property of citizens generally, they are competent also to make laws to govern themselves in relation 
 to slavery and negroes.” 
 
 With reference to the protection of property in slaves, Mr. Douglas said; 
 
 “I have a word to say to the honorable Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. Davis.) lie insists that I am 
 not in favor of protecting properly, and that his amendment is offered for the purpose of protecting pro¬ 
 perty under the Constitution. Now, sir, I ask you what authority he has for assuming that? Do I not de¬ 
 sire to protect property because I wish to allow the people to pass such laws as they deem proper respect¬ 
 ing their rights to property without any exception ? lie might just as well say that I am opposed to pro¬ 
 tecting property in merchandise, in steamboats, in cattle, in real estate, as to say that I am opposed to pro¬ 
 tecting property of any othvr description; tor I desire to put them all on an equality, and allow the peo¬ 
 ple to make their own laws in respect to the whole of them.” 
 
 If these extracts are not sufficient, I will produce others. I can show that at least six 
 times in that discussion Judge Douglas reiterated these same sentiments. The gentleman 
 from Alabama has sneeringly called Judge Douglas’s position “ a new dogma,” It is at 
 least ten years old. And it is as old as the acts of Congress which first conferred the 
 power of legislation on the Territorial Legislatures. It began then, and has been con¬ 
 sistently maintained by him ever since. I defy any man to show that he has ever wavered 
 or faltered in its support, or that there is the slightest contradiction in his sentiments. 
 
 In 1852, after the passage of the compromise resolutions, the Democratic national con¬ 
 vention assembled at Baltimore and heartly and cheerfully indorsed the whole series of 
 compromise measures. The Whig national convention did the same. We went into the 
 contest, and elected Pierce and Kmg on that very platform. We were all committed to 
 it then; and we stand committed to it now. 
 
 In 1854 the principle of non-intervention, as declared by the compromise resolutions, 
 was extended by the acts to organize territorial governments for Kansas and Nebraska. 
 Let southern gentlemen reflect, before they ask us to abandon this important principle, 
 what sacrifices the North made to procure its adoption. By the Missouri compromise* 
 the South had relinquished all right to carry slave property into either Kansas or Ne¬ 
 braska. Both these Territories, by that agreement, were to be forever free. 
 
 You will tell me that the compromise was unconstitutional. Be it so. Yet it was a 
 compromise, and even Mr. Calhoun had avowed his willingness to carry it out. It was a 
 
5 
 
 I 
 
 compromise, and you had received Missouri and Arkansas as your share of it. We had 
 not got ours. But when we could not extend that compromise line to the Pacific Ocean, 
 and when we saw and felt the dreadful and dangerous influences of sectional slavery agi¬ 
 tation, we gave up these Territories to secure the adoption of the important principle of 
 non-intervention by Congress in favor or against, slavery in the Territories. We did it 
 because we believed it right. We did it because the best interest of the nation demanded 
 that the slavery agitation should be withdrawn from the Halls of Congress. We did it 
 to restore peace and harmony to a distracted country. Yet now our generosity and sac¬ 
 rifices are forgotten by a little body of men in the South who claim that it shall be made 
 slave territory so long as it remains in a territorial condition. “This is not in the bond.” 
 We will not consent to it. We will carry out the compromise and the principle as wc 
 made them; and the little band of ten or fifteen interventionists at the South can neither 
 drive nor frighten us from our position. We act in good faith in support of these estab¬ 
 lished principles, and we ask the same in return. 
 
 I will now proceed to show that the doctrine of non-intervention , as advocated by 
 Judge Douglas in 1S50, was extended and incorporated in the Kansas-Nebraska act of 
 1854. The committee, by whom that bill was imported to the Senate, in their report, say ; 
 
 “The principal amendments which your committee deem it their duty to commend to the favorable ac¬ 
 tion of the Senate, in a special report, are those in which the principles established by the* compromise 
 measnres of 1S50, so far as they are applicable to territorial organizations, are proposed to be affirmed and 
 carried into practical operation within the limits of the new Territory. The wisdom of those measures is 
 attested, not less by their salutary and beneficial effects in allaying sectional agitation and restoring 
 peace and harmony to an irritated and distracted people , than by the cordial and almost universal 
 approbation with which they have been received and sanctioned by the whole country. 
 
 “In the judgment of your committee, those measures were intended to have a far more comprehensive 
 and enduring effect than the mere adjustment of the difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition of 
 Mexican territory. They were designed to establish certain great principles, which would not only fur¬ 
 nish adequate remedies for existing evils, but , in all time to come, avoid the perils of a similar agitation, 
 by withdrawing the question of slavery from the Halls of Congress a/nd the political arena, and com¬ 
 mitting it to the arbitrament of those who were immediately interested in and alone responsible for its 
 consequences. With a view of conforming their action to the settled policy of the Government, sanctioned 
 by the approving voice of the American people, your commiitee have deemed it their duty to incorporate 
 and perpetuate, in their territorial bill, the principles and spirit of those measures.” 
 
 Here we have the intention clearly avowed by the committee that they intend, by the 
 bill they have reported, “in all time to come, to avoid the perils of a similar agitation, 
 (that of 1850,) by withdrawing the question of slavery from the Halls of Congress and the 
 political arena, and committing it to the arbitrament of those who ivere immediately inte¬ 
 rested, and alone responsible for its consequences Nor is this all; for Judge Douglas, as 
 , if to remove all doubt on the subject, and to place the question beyond the possibility of 
 controversy or cavil, moved the following amendment to the bill: 
 
 “ That the Constitution, and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have 
 the same foTce and effect within the Territory as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth 
 section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March 6,1S20, which, 
 being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Ter¬ 
 ritories, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the ‘compromise measures,’ is hereby 
 declared inoperative and void—it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery 
 into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to 
 form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the 
 United States.” ' • 
 
 This amendment was adopted; and it should forever silence those who contend that it 
 was not the intention of the Kansas-Nebraska act to commit the whole subject of slavery 
 legislation in the Territories to the Territorial Legislatures. Look at tlie language, and 
 see how convincingly clear it is: “It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to 
 legislate slavery into any State or Territory.” The word is legislate. No such miserable 
 language as that when the people come to adopt a constitution. Nothing of the kind. 
 “ That is a new dogma;" the contemptible subterfuge of wily, designing, ambitious politi¬ 
 cians, aspiring to the Presidency, and making bids for southern votes. Congress was 
 speaking of not legislating slavery into or out of a Territory ; and they used the word 
 which conveyed their intention. Congress would not legislate for or against slavery ; but 
 they would leave the people of the Territory perfectly free to legislate for themselves in 
 relation to their own domestic institutions, slavery included. 
 
 Mr. CRAWFORD. As the gentleman seems to be discussing this subject in a spirit of 
 fairness and candor, I desire just at this point to submit iny understanding of the power 
 given by the Kansas act to the people of the Territory, so that he may answer it. When 
 the bill first came from the Territorial Committee, the words used were, that they might 
 “form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way;” and under that clause 
 it was insisted by some that the Legislature had the constitutional power to exclude sla¬ 
 very from the Territory ; # by others, that they had no such power ; and as there existed 
 this difference of opinion touching the right under the Constitution, and all sides being 
 willing to be governed by that instrument, it was agreed to insert the words, “subject 
 to the Constitution of the United States.” Now, since the passage of that act, our con¬ 
 stitutional rights have been defined by the Supreme Court; and being ascertained, we 
 
6 
 
 hold that they ought to be recognized and observed. It is very clear that if they had 
 then been known, the words “subject to the Constitution” need not to have been incor¬ 
 porated in the bill; but no w that they are settled by the decision in the Dred Scott case, 
 we think it strange that this difference between our statesmen should still exist, and that 
 it should be insisted upon that the Territorial Legislature has a power which is unequivo¬ 
 cally denied. All we ask or want are our constitutional rights. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. It is true, as the honorable gentleman from Georgia says, the 
 words “subject only to the Constitution of the United States” were inserted because, du¬ 
 ring the debate, it was contended by some southern statesmen that, under the Constitution 
 of the United States, slavery could not be abolished by the Territorial Legislatures. And 
 it is also true that another section of the Kansas and Nebraska act gives a right of appeal 
 to the Supreme Court of the United States in all cases involving questions of personal 
 freedom of slaves. But all this incontestably shows just what I contend for—that Con¬ 
 gress intended, when these acts were passed, to give the whole power of legislation on 
 the subject of slavery to the Territorial Legislatures, “subject only to the Constitution 
 of the United States.” 
 
 But the honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Crawford) contends that the Supreme 
 Court has decided, in the Dred Scott case,' that a Territorial Legislature has not the power 
 to abolish slavery. With all respect to the honorable gentleman, I deny it. No such 
 question arose in the Dred Scott case ; and it could not be decided. But 1 deny that the 
 court ever gave a dictum in that case which would show that they held any such opinion. 
 The Supreme Court never have so decided, and I tl(ink they never can so decide. 
 
 But if 1 were to admit that the Supreme Court had so decided, it would only show 
 how uncalled for the speech of the honorable gentleman from Alabama was against Judge 
 Douglas. If this question has been settled and determined, what difference what the 
 views of Judge Douglas may be? He cannot change it, nor reverse it. 
 
 Mr. LAMAR. I will tell "the gentleman why we need to speak upon this question. It 
 is because Judge Douglas has said that no matter what the court may say, the right of 
 the people to exclude the institution of slavery vas perfect and complete. That is what 
 we complain of; that after he had pledged himself here that he would abide the decision 
 of the court, upon the hustings of Illinois he declared that no matter what the court 
 might decide, the right of the people is perfect and complete, by unfriendly legislation, 
 to exclude the institution. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I assure the honorable gentleman from Mississippi he is entirely 
 mistaken ; Judge Douglas never made any such statement. Judge Douglas has consis¬ 
 tently and uniformly said that he would submit to and faithfully carry out the decision 
 of the Supreme Court—not only on that subject, but on all others. He is far too true a 
 patriot and too good a citizen to utter any such sentiment. I will read the gentleman 
 what Judge Douglas has said, and now says, on that subject. In his rejoinder to Judge 
 Black, he says, on page 6: 
 
 “ "Whenever a case shall arise under those or any other territorial enactments, affectina: slave property 
 or personal freedom in the Territories, and the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide the ques¬ 
 tion, I shall feel myself hound to respect and obey the decision , and assist in carrying it into ef'ect in 
 yoodfaith ” 
 
 That is his pledge ; and my word for it, he will carry it out. He never yet has broken 
 his plighted word, and he never will. 
 
 Mr. LAMAR. That is from his article, but in a speech in Illinois he said the right of 
 the people was perfect and.complete, no matter what the coitrt decided. 
 
 Mr. ROBINSON, of Illinois. What speech ? 
 
 Mr. LAMAR. In his Freeport speech. He pledged himself in the Senate of the United 
 States to abide by judicial decision ; but when he went before the Free-soilers of Illinois, 
 he told them that the right of a Territory was perfect and complete. 
 
 Mr. HINDMAN sought the floor. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I must decline positively to yield further—not from any dis¬ 
 courtesy’ to the gentleman, but because I have not time. If the committee will extend 
 the time, I am ready to discuss the matter for a week, if gentlemen wish it. 
 
 Now, sir, without any discourtesy to the gentleman from Mississippi, there is a dif¬ 
 ference of opinion between us. 1 say he can produce no such speech made by r Judge 
 Douglas, which was ever published by the Democratic party. It may be that some per¬ 
 son has published a speech, in which such language has been put in Judge Douglas’s 
 mouth ; but I assure the gentleman, Judge Douglas never uttered sucli a sentiment in his 
 life. He stands upon the decision of the Supreme Court; and I say that the Supreme 
 Court never did, and I believe they never will, decide any such doctrine as that for which 
 the gentleman from Alabama, and those who agree with him, contend. 
 
 I have been drawn from my line of argument by r the repeated interruptions with 
 which I have been assailed, and I must go back and take up the thread of my discourse 
 where I left off. 1 have now shown that the principle of non-intervention adopted by 
 the compromise resolutions of 1S50 was embodied, enlarged, and extended by T the Kansas- 
 
 k 
 
7 
 
 Nebraska act. I have shown that Judge Douglas then declared his intention to give the 
 power of legislation on this subject of slavery to the Territorial Legislatures alone; that 
 Congress gave up all right over the subject; and that this amendment was supported by 
 almost a united South, and especially by the Representatives from Alabama. Before I 
 leave that subject I propose to discuss a clause in the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The lan¬ 
 guage: is that the “Territorial Legislature shall have legislative ‘power over all rightfu.1 
 subjects of legislation , subject only to the Constitution of the United States.” The Terri¬ 
 torial Legislatures had power to legislate then “ on all rightful subjects of legislation." 
 Has slavery not been deemed a rightful subject of legislation? Was it ever denied that 
 a legislative bod} 7 could either establish or abolish slavery? I think not. If slavery is 
 not a “rightful subject of legislation,” then all our acts abolishing slavery are void, and 
 slavery still exists in all the northern States. And if slavery is a rightful subject of leg¬ 
 islation, then, incontestably, it was the intention of Congress to give the power not only 
 to establish, but to abolish slavery in the Territories. Will any man contend,that south¬ 
 ern Representatives, when thqy voted for that bill, did not know that slavery was always 
 admitted to be “a rightful subject of legislation?” I think no one would stultify himself 
 by denying it. If, then, this was known, it can admit of no contest, that it was the in¬ 
 tention of Congress to give the full and entire power over the subject of slavery to the 
 Territorial Legislatures. Nor does the proof cease here. In 1856, the great Democratic 
 national convention which assembled at Cincinnati indorsed and approved this doctrine 
 of non intervention in language so clear and unequivocal that it leaves no possibility- of 
 doubt on the subject. .The resolution is as follows: 
 
 “ The American Democracy recognized and adopted principles contained in the organic laws establish¬ 
 ing the Territories of Kansas and [Nebraska as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the ‘slavery 
 question,’ upon which the great national idea of the people of this whole country can repose in its deter¬ 
 mined conservatism of the Union— non-interference by Congress with slavery in State and Territory , o-r 
 in the District of Oohtmbia. ’ 
 
 “ That this was the basis of the compromise of 1850, confirmed by both the Democratic and Whig parties 
 in national conventions—ratified by the people in the election of 1852—and rightly applied to the organi¬ 
 zation of the Territories in 1854; that by the uniform application of this Democratic principle to the organ¬ 
 ization of Territories, and to the admission of new States, with or without domestic slavery as they may 
 elect, the equal rights of all will be preserved intact—the original compacts of the constitution maintained 
 inviolate—and the perpetuity and expansion of this Union insured to its utmost capacity of embracing in 
 peace and harmony any future American State that may be constituted or annexed with a republican form 
 of government ” 
 
 To that resolution the whole Democratic party was bound, North and South. Yv r e in 
 Pennsylvania stood pledged to it; you in Alabama and Georgia and Mississippi were 
 pledged to it. We in Pennsylvania, a few days since, declared our “unalterable devo¬ 
 tion to, and faith in,” that platform. Why cannot Alabama do the same? Who has 
 changed? Certainly we have not; we stand now -where we stood then. I leave the 
 gentleman from Alabama to solve that question. 
 
 But I am unwilling to permit this subject to pass from rue until I show that southern 
 members have not only been committed to this doctrine of non-intervention; by the ac¬ 
 tion of national conventions, and by their votes for Pierce and King, and Buchanan and 
 Breckinridge; but I will go further, and show that they have been committed to it by 
 their votes for officers of Congress for years past. On the 12th day of January, 1856, a 
 contest was going on in this House for the election of Speaker. Mr. Richardson and Mr. 
 Banks were the rival candidates. On that day, Mr. Bingham, of Ohio, propounded cer¬ 
 tain interrogatories to Mr. Richardson. The third interrogatory was as follows: 
 
 “ Am I right in supposing that his theory is, that the Constitution of the United States does not carry 
 slavery to, and protect it in, the Territories of the United States? That in the territory acquired from 
 Mexico and France (including Kansas and Nebraska) the Missouri restriction was necessary to make the 
 territory free, because slavery existed there under France at the time of the acquisition; but that the Kan¬ 
 sas and Nebraska bill, which repeals that restriction, but neither legislates slavery into those Territories 
 nor excludes it therefrom, in liis opinion, leaves those Territories without either local or constitutional Jaw 
 protecting slavery ; and that therefore the Kansas and Nebraska bill promotes the formation of slave States 
 in Kansas and Nebraska.” 
 
 To which Mr. Richardson responded as follows: 
 
 “ The Constitution does not, in my opinion, carry the institutions of any of the States into the Territories; 
 but it affords the same protection there to the institutions of one State as of another. The citizen of Vir¬ 
 ginia is as much entitled, in the common territory, to the protection of his property, under the Constitution, 
 as the citizen of Illinois; but both are dependent upon the legislation of the territorial government lor 
 laws to protect their property, of whatever kind it may be. Thus, it will be seen, that though there may 
 be upon this point a difference theoretically—involving questions for judicial decision—yet there is none, 
 praciically, among the friends of non-intervention by Congress, as the practical result is to place the deci¬ 
 sion of the questions in the hands of those who are most deeply interested in its solution, namely: the 
 people of the Territory, who have made it their home, and whose interests are the most deeply involved 
 in the character of the institutions under which they are to live.” 
 
 There now is popular sovereignty for you—broad, clear, and unequivocal. Yet after 
 he gave this answer, the entire Democratic delegation from Alabama, and 1 believe from 
 the South generally, voted, and continued to vote for Mr. Richardson. Popular sover¬ 
 eignty was not then considered a “ new dogma" Southern men were not alarmed at these 
 doctrines, as they feign to be now. 
 
8 
 
 Mr. BARKSDALE. I was a member of that Congress, and voted for Mr. Richardson, 
 of Illinois, for Speaker, after he avowed these sentiments; and I would like the gentle¬ 
 man to tell whether he is to be understood as saying that, by voting for Mr. Richardson, I 
 indorsed these sentiments? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I have stated these facts, and I have drawn my inferences. 
 The gentleman has heard them. If the avowal of the popular sovereignty doctrines by 
 Mr. Richardson then was not sufficient grounds for him to oppose Mr. Richardson for 
 Speaker, I cannot see how the avowal of the same doctrines by Mr. Douglas will consti¬ 
 tute good grounds for the honorable gentleman to oppose Judge Douglas now. 
 
 Mr. BARKSDALE. The gentleman himself has this session voted for Mr. Bocock for 
 Speaker, who repudiates squatter sovereignty, or, as the gentleman calls the doctrine, 
 popular sovereignty. He voted for Mr. Bocock, who holds that it is the duty of all the 
 departments of the Government, Executive, legislative, and judicial, to protect slave 
 property in the Territories, whenever it may be necessary to do so. When you voted 
 for him, did you indorse those sentiments? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Bocock never expressed these sentiments, that I am aware 
 of. I never heard them expressed by him, and the gentleman from Mississippi, therefore, 
 must be speaking upon private information, which nobody else has. 
 
 Mr. BARKSDALE. At any event, Mr. Bocock denies to a Territorial Legislature the 
 power to legislate against slavery. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Bocock is present, and can speak for himself. I deny the 
 right of the gentleman from Mississippi to speak for him. He cannot say that before I 
 voted for him for Speaker he expressed the sentiments attributed to him by the gentle¬ 
 man from Mississippi. 
 
 Mr. McQUEEN. By permission of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I desire to say 
 that I was in the galleiy, and heard the gentleman read some interrogatories which were 
 propounded to Mr. Richardson, in the contest between him and Mr. Banks, for the Speak¬ 
 ership, in 1856, by some gentleman on the other side of the House, and Mr. Richardson’s 
 answer: “and that every southern Representative on the floor of the House voted for 
 him after that answer.” Now, I recollect very well that interrogatories were propounded 
 to Mr. Richardson in that contest; and upon his answer I cast off from him, and did so 
 for three days, until Mr. Richardson drew his bow again, and explained it away, when I 
 again cast my vote for him. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I am glad my friend from South Carolina has 
 made the correction ; for I would very much regret to do him injustice. I will make the 
 gentleman from South Carolina an exception. But I think it makes my position stronger, 
 for it shows that the language was well understood and considered at the time, and was 
 not thought objectionable to any other southern Representative than the honorable gen¬ 
 tleman from South Carolina. 
 
 Mr. HINDMAN. I would like to put a question to the gentleman. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. The House must acknowledge that I have been very liberal. I 
 have been interrupted at every step of my argument by questions. When the gentleman 
 from Alabama was upon the floor, those of us who differed from him kept our seats and 
 allowed him to go on without interruption. I must decline to yield further. I have not 
 the time to spare. (Cries from the Democratic benches of “That’s right!” “Go on! ” 
 and “We will give you more time! ”) 
 
 Mr. BURNETT. I want to say this: I hope the gentleman will be allowed to proceed 
 without further interruption. I must object, however, to any extension of his time be¬ 
 yond that which was taken from him by interruptions. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I am obliged to the House for its courtesy and kindness. And 
 I will now proceed. 
 
 But I am not done with this matter yet. I cannot let the honorable gentleman from 
 Alabama escape so easily. I now desire to show that he, bv his vote, has virtually in¬ 
 dorsed and approved the doctrine of unfriendly legislation , about which so much has been 
 said in the public prints recently. The honorable gentleman from Alabama came into 
 Congress when I did. At the first session of the last Congress Colonel Orr, of South Car¬ 
 olina, was a candidate for the office of Speaker of this House. I will now invite the at¬ 
 tention of this House, and the honorable gentleman, to the views of Colonel Orr on the 
 subject of “ unfriendly legislation .” On the 11th day of December, 1856, Colonel Orr 
 said, in reply to Hon. Humphrey Marshall, of Kentucky: 
 
 “I sav, although I deny that squatter sovereignty exists in the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska by 
 virtue of thi3 bill, it is a matter practically of little consequence whether it does or not; and I think I shall 
 he able to satisfy the gentleman of that. * The gentleman knows that, in every slaveholding community of 
 this Union, we have local legislation and localpolice regulations appertaining to that institution, without 
 which the institution Avonld not only be valueless, but a curse to the community. Without them the slave¬ 
 holder could not enforce his rights when invaded by others; and if you had no local legislation for the pur¬ 
 pose of giving protection, the institution would be of no value. I can appeal to every gentleman upon this 
 floor who represents a slaveholding constituency, to attest the truth of what I have stated upon that point. 
 
 “Now, the legislative authority of a Territory is invested with a discretion to vote for or against laws. 
 We think they ought to pass laws in every Territory, when the Territory is open to settlement, and slave- 
 
9 
 
 holders go there, to protect slave property. But if they decline to pass such laws, what is the remedy? 
 None, sir. If the majority of the people are opposed to the institution, and if they do not desire it ingraft¬ 
 ed upon their Territory, all they have to do is simply to decline to pass laws in the Territorial Legislature 
 for its protection, and then it is as well excluded as if the power was invested in the Territorial Legislature, 
 and exercised by them, to prohibit it. Now, I ask the gentleman, what is the practical importance to re¬ 
 sult from the agitation and discussion of this question as to whether squatter sovereignty does, or does not, 
 exist? Practically it is a matter of little moment.” 
 
 There, now, is the doctrine of “ unfriendly legislation ” which the gentleman from Ala¬ 
 bama so religiously detests in Judge Douglas. Yet, notwithstanding this open avowal of 
 opinion, the honorable gentleman from Alabama not only voted for the election of Colo¬ 
 nel Orr for Speaker, but lie voted for him in caucus as his first choice as candidate for 
 that office. That was a little better than two years since. Yet, at this session, the hon¬ 
 orable gentleman utterly refused to vote for Colonel McClernand, because he held pre¬ 
 cisely the opinions avowed by Colonel Orr. Why was this? Who has changed ? The 
 Democratic party voted for Colonel Orr then, and elected him. The mass of the Demo¬ 
 cratic party voted for Colonel McClernand this session; but the honorable gentleman 
 refused to vote with us. I ask who has changed? Who is it that is advocating “a new 
 dogma?” 
 
 Mr. CURRY. Does the gentleman speak by authority when he says Colonel Orr and 
 Colonel McClernand entertain the same sentiments on this subject? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I have quoted the views of Colonel Orr, and 
 whilst I will not say that I speak by authority, I will say that I think I know the views 
 of Colonel McClernand, and I think he entirely concurs in the sentiments expressed by 
 Colonel Orr in 1856. 
 
 I might go on to read from the speeches and writings of other southern statesmen; and 
 I might show that a very large number of their most distinguished men have held the 
 sentiments, in whole or in part, as avowed by Judge Douglas ; but I have neither the 
 time nor the disposition to do so now, nor do I esteem it necessary. 
 
 But I intend now to show that the South has always, in the Territories, practiced on 
 and acknowledged the doctrine that the full power to legislate on the subject of slavery 
 was committed to the Territories. What was done in Kansas? Was not the whole 
 difficulty in that Territory created by the contest for the election of the Territorial Legis¬ 
 lature? The slave State men struggling to get possession of the Legislature, that thej T 
 might enact laws to establish and protect slavery; and the free State men to get posses¬ 
 sion of the Legislature, to prohibit and abolish slavery. We all know that was the con¬ 
 test, and the cause of the controversy. The slave State men got possession of the Legis¬ 
 lature, and we all know that their first work was to pass stringent laws establishing and 
 protecting slave property. Now, if the power to legislate on the subject of slavery was 
 not conferred on the Territorial Legislature, all this legislation was void and illegal. Did 
 any southern statesman then aris^ in Congress and propose to arrest this illegal exercise 
 of legislation? I need not say not one. If you had not conferred on the Territorial Legis¬ 
 lature full power to legislate on the subject of slavery, why were so many thousand dol¬ 
 lars spent by emigrant aid societies, North and South, to send emigrants there to control 
 the election of the Legislature? If the Territorial Legislature had not the power to 
 abolish slavery, you might just as well have let the free State men had possession of that 
 bod}’; for they could do nothing to infringe }’our rights. Yet, blood was shed, civil war 
 raged, and battles were fought, and men murdered, and homes made desolate, to maintain 
 this fruitless power of legislating. Ah, gentlemen, let us be candid. This new dogma of 
 
 congressional intervention” had not been thought of then. It is an after thought. You 
 have changed your tactics; and, whilst we admit your right to change, you must not de¬ 
 nounce us because we do not change along with you. Again: if the Territorial Legisla¬ 
 tures have not the power to legislate on the subject of slavery, why does not the honor¬ 
 able gentleman from Alabama move, here in Congress, to declare the act establishing 
 slavery in New Mexico unconstitutional and void? 
 
 Mr. JENKINS. Do I understand the gentleman to say that the Territorial Legisla¬ 
 ture has the power to protect slavery if it choose? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. Certainly.* 
 
 Mr. JENKINS. I understand the gentleman to say also that Congress has not the 
 power to protect slavery in the Territories. If # Congress has not the p >wer, under what 
 clause of the Constitution does the gentleman ilnd the power under which the Territorial 
 Legislature can protect slavery ? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I find it in the act organizing them into a territorial govern- 
 ernment; and it is precisely because Congress cannot legislate to protect slavery that the 
 Territorial Legislature has the power to do so. If Congress had that power, and if it 
 was made the duty of Congress to protect slaveiy, then Congress could not give it away, 
 but must exercise it. I have been striving to prove this fact that Congress intended to 
 give full power over the subject of slavery to the Legislatures, because it has been denied 
 that such was the intention when the Kansas-Nebraska act was passed. But 1 contend 
 that, without any such legislation, that power is inherent in the people of the Territory; 
 
10 
 
 and so soon as Congress confers on them a territorial government, they can exercise it, 
 I will explain my understanding. 
 
 It is admitted that the right of legislation is inherent in the citizens of each State. 
 Now, I desire to inquire, when a citizen emigrates from a State into a Territory, where 
 does he lose “his inherent right" of self-government? At what boundary line does it 
 drop from him ? We read in Bunyan that Christian’s sins clung to his back like a knap¬ 
 sack; but, at last, as he ascended a hill, the load fell off. I would like to know whether 
 the inherent right of self-government, drops from our own emigrant in the same way. 
 And I would like, too, to know at what precise point the power, which shrouds him like 
 a mantle in the States, falls from his shoulders when he emigrates to a Territory. The 
 advocates of congressional intervention can see how the rights of a citizen to his negro 
 journey with him from the State where he resides to the Territory to which he emigrates; 
 but the same gentlemen are entirely at a loss to see how the heaven-born right of self- 
 government accompanies a man on the same journey. The truth is, that the right in a 
 slave seems to be the onlj" right which they consider sacred. I maintain that the right 
 of self-government is inherent; and that so soon as Congress recognizes a body of emi¬ 
 grants in a Territory as a government, their right of self-government comes into action, 
 and can be exercised. And even without any such act, necessity may demand its ex¬ 
 ercise. This right of self-government in the people was directly recognized in the case 
 of California. These are my views. But I was proceeding on with my proof that Con¬ 
 gress desired to confer on the Territorial Legislatures the full power of legislation over 
 the subject of slavery. And I will now resume my line of argument on that point. 
 
 Mr. MILES. I dislike to interrupt the gentleman, but I understand his time has been 
 indefinitely extended. My only object is to call his attention to this point. It is true, as 
 the gentleman says, that the Territories have all the power of legislation which Congress 
 can confer upon them. None of u's deny that. And it is also true, that each State has 
 the entire control over its own institutions. It has the right to place whatever features 
 it may choose upon them. None of us deny for a moment that it may exclude slavery 
 forever; but we do contend that a Territorial Legislature, that the legislative power of 
 a Territory—which is the creature of Congress, w'hich is the common property of all the 
 States—shall not do that which we claim the Congress of the United States cannot do. 
 "VVe do claim that it is impossible for the inferior to exercise a right of supremacy, when 
 such right of supremacy does not exist in the superior. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I certainly thank the gentleman for his admission. It is a very 
 important one. He admits that the Territories have all the powers of legislation which 
 Congress can confer upon them. This is admitted in the presence of all his southern col¬ 
 leagues, and none of them dissent from it. It is an admission that the power of legisla¬ 
 tion was fully and unequivocally given to -the Territorial Legislature by Congress in their 
 acts organizing temporary governments. I am glad the gentleman has admitted this. 
 It is the first time the admission was ever made by an advocate of congressional inter¬ 
 vention, to my knowledge. Hitherto, indeed, it has been uniformly denied by them. 
 The honorable gentleman from Alabama, speaking on that subject, sa}’s: 
 
 “ If, on any subject, the will of the Territory is not supreme, slavery is not the exception; for the great 
 expounder of this new dogma asserts that a ‘ Territorial Legislature can lawfully exclude, slavery, either 
 by non-action or unfriendly legislation.’ This power is variously derived—from the illegal inherent power 
 of self-government, existing in every distinct political community, and from the Kansas-Nebraska bill, as 
 indorsed by the Cincinnati platform. To the first derivation I have no answer to make beyond the state¬ 
 ment that it is in entire consistency with the first great experiment of squatter sovereignty—the creation 
 of the State of California, whose admission into the Union, under the circumstances, was the most un¬ 
 paralleled outrage ever perpetrated on a people pretending to be free. 
 
 “To the second source of power , I reply that , if found there, the South teas most miserably duped in 
 that famous measure for silencing agitation. Whatever may have been the purpose of the framer of 
 that bill—and he says, in his contribution to Harper, that it was to remove any obstacle to the free exer¬ 
 cise of popular sovereignty—it was supported at the Soutli because of its repeal of the Missouri restric¬ 
 tion, and because we thought we had secured a safeguard against territorial unfriendly legislation, by the 
 provision rendering all such legislation subject to the Constitution of the United States, and by the further 
 provision giving.an appeal to the courts of the UAted States, in all cases where property in slaves was in¬ 
 volved. If we were mistaken, this power to eafilude slavery by unfriendly legislation—this squatter 
 sovereignty covered, up) under ambiguous language in the Kansas bill, after the repeal of the Missouri 
 restriction—is but a refined imitation of the barbarity of the petty Celtic tyrant, who fed his prisoners on 
 salted food tili they called eagerly for drink, and then let down an empty cup into the dungeon, and left 
 them to die of thirst.” 
 
 The gentleman from Alabama declares that if such power is found in the Kansas-Ne¬ 
 braska bill, “ the South was most miserably duped by that famous measure.” But the gen¬ 
 tleman from South Carolina, with a candor which is his distinguishing characteristic, ad¬ 
 mits that Congress did give all the power it could give, and therefore the Kansas-Nebraska 
 bill was not such “ a miserable cheat,” after all. And if Congress intended to give all 
 that power, surely it intended the Territorial Legislatures should exercise it, and that 
 they could exercise it. Your denunciations, if any are due, should be bestowed on Con¬ 
 gress, and not on Judge Douglas. 
 
 But the honorable gentleman from South Carolina insists that, as Congress has not the 
 power to abolish slavery, therefore it cannot confer that power on the Territorial Legis- 
 
 0 
 
11 
 
 latures. “That,” as lie says, “the inferior cannot exercise a right of supremacy, when 
 such right of supremacy does not exist in the superior.” 
 
 I have already stated that I claimed that the right of self-government was inherent in 
 every citizen of every State ; and that it travelled with such citizen wherever he went; 
 and that the power to abolish slavery sprung from such right of self-government. My 
 object in showing that the power of legislation on the subject of slavery was intended to 
 be conferred by Congress when the Kansas-Nebraska bill was passed, was to prove that 
 this was not a “ nev) dogma" and “ that the South was not miserably cheated; but that the 
 whole subject was fully and clearly understood, and that Judge Douglas maintained the 
 same views then that he does now. But I have the fact that it was the intention to con¬ 
 fer such power admitted now, and I will elaborate that branch of the subject no further. 
 
 The honorable gentleman from Alabama maintains that— 
 
 “ The Constitution of the United States discriminates specially in favor of slave property ; provides for 
 its increase, for its permanency, for its security, and for its representation in this body. It recognizes 
 property in slaves; and the Supreme Court has affirmed our right to emigrate to, and occupy with slaves, 
 the common territory; and from this recognition and guarantee, protection is an inevitable sequitur. From 
 the premises, the sequence cannot be resisted, that the powers of the Government are due to its security.” 
 
 I must confess I cannot understand what the honorable gentleman means by this. If 
 he means that the Constitution establishes slavery in the Territory, I must quote Judge 
 Black in reply, who says, “that nobody ever thought or said so.” If he merely intends 
 to assert that the Constitution of the United States recognizes slaves as property, 1 admit 
 it. If he means, however, to say that the Constitution places property in slaves higher 
 than other property, I deny it, and defy the proof. The gentleman, however, assures us 
 that because the Constitution recognizes property in slaves, that it follows as an inevita¬ 
 ble sequitur from the premises, that the powers of Government are due to its security. I 
 deny this “ inevitable sequitur .” The Constitution recognizes property of every kind in 
 every State and Territory of the Union. But it by no means follows that the powers of 
 the Government are due to the protection of such property. If that were true, the Gov¬ 
 ernment of the United States would have plenty of work on its hands. If because the 
 Constitution recognizes property, we must legislate to protect it, I know of no s'pecies of 
 property which we would not be bound to protect. And if the duty of legislation to pro¬ 
 tect propert} T is imposed on Congress by the Constitution, we must pass laws to protect 
 property in the States as well as in the Territory. We have but one Constitution, and if 
 it imposes the duty on Congress to protect property, -we must protect it wherever it exists. 
 The claim is not that we should protect it because it is in the Territory , but because it is 
 property , recognized as such in the Constitution. The gentleman’s constitutional power 
 is very greatly too broad for his purposes. B^t it may be replied, that it is the duty of 
 Congress to protect property in the Territories/ because the Territorial Legislatures can¬ 
 not do so. That will not do; for the gentleman is constrained to admit that the Territo¬ 
 rial Legislatures can protect slave property; and that the slave laws of Kansas and New 
 Mexico are valid; and if they can protect slave property, they can protect all other kinds. 
 
 The honorable gentleman from Alabama is a State-right Democrat, and contends for a 
 strict construction of the Constitution. He can claim no power for Congress which is not 
 expressly granted. Now, where is the grant of power to Congress to pass laws to protect 
 slave property ? I say it can nowhere be found. There are three clauses in the Consti¬ 
 tution on the subject of slavery. The first provides for the rendition of fugitive slaves, 
 and certainly confers no power of legislation to protect slave property in the Territories. 
 The second clause relates to the apportionment of representatives to Congress on the 
 three-fifths of the slave population of the slave States. It will hardly be claimed that 
 this clause gives the power of legislation for the Territories. The third and last clause 
 on the subject, provides for the abolition of the slave-trade—and could not be so distort¬ 
 ed as to give legislative power over the Territories. There, now, are all the clauses 
 which in any way relate to slavery. Will the friends of intervention oblige me by 
 pointing out on which of them they will risk an argument to sustain their claim of con¬ 
 gressional legislation? 
 
 The Constitution of the United States provides only for national legislation. No power 
 to pass laws in relation to the domestic institutions was incorporated in it. That kind of 
 legislation belongs exclusively to the States, and cannot be exercised by Congress. It is 
 folly to talk about it; any man who knows the first principles of the Constitution, knows 
 that such a power has no existence. I will now pass to the objections to the exercises of 
 this power by the Territories themselves. 
 
 But it may be said that Territorial Legislatures have no power to abolish slavery, or to 
 destroy or depreciate slave property, for the reason that as the Constitution recognizes 
 property in slaves, the Territorial Legislature cannot take it away. And that is in fact 
 the point to which the advocates of congressional intervention are driven. And a more 
 groundless position was never assumed. What is the position? It is that an act abolish¬ 
 ing slavery, passed by a Territorial Legislature, is a violation of the Constitution of the 
 United States. Let me ask those who make this assertion, to point out the clause and sec- 
 
12 
 
 tion of the Constitution which such an act violates. What provision or feature of that 
 instrument prohibits such a law being passed? We all claim to be in favor of a strict 
 construction of the Constitution, and surely nothing is in violation of that instrument un¬ 
 less it is in contravention of some of its provisions. Now, if such a law violates the Con¬ 
 stitution, the clause and section can surely be found. Yet although the assertion has often 
 been made, the section has never been pointed out; and what is more, never will be point¬ 
 ed out. If there is a clause in the Constitution which prohibits the abolition of slavery, 
 it is just as applicable to a State as a Territory. We have but one Constitution, and its 
 provisions apply to all parts of the country; and what would be unconstitutional in a 
 Territory, must be unconstitutional in a State; and if any provision of the Constitution 
 prohibits the passage of a law to abolish slavery, then all those laws which have been 
 passed in the free States are null and void, and slavery exists in every one of them. 
 
 Mr. MILES. I dislike to interrupt the gentleman, but I think he does not see the point 
 I made a short time since. lie does not make the distinction between a mere act of legis¬ 
 lation and an act of sovereignty. The fact of abolishing slavery is an act of sovereignty 
 which every sovereign State has the right to exercise; but it is not a rightful subject of 
 legislation, which can be conferred upon a territorial government. It is an act of sover¬ 
 eignty. and no Territorial Legislature is invested with the powers of sovereignty. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I assure the honorable gentleman I perfectly comprehend the 
 point he has made. Bat I will show him that it has no weight. In short, that it is a high- 
 sounding phrase, which is not at all understood, and only leads to confusion. 
 
 Let me explain the matter. The allegation is, that an act of a Territorial Legislature, 
 abolishing slavery, is in violation of the Consttitution of the United States. And the last 
 vestige ot argument left to sustain it is, that a Territorial Legislature is not a sovereignty , 
 and that nothing less than a sovereign power can abolish slavery. Now, if I were to ad¬ 
 mit what the honorable gentleman asserts, how would that prove that such a law is in 
 violation of the Constitution of the United States? If the gentlemen would argue that 
 such a law was void , for want of authority to pass it, there might be some plausibility in 
 it. But how he can manage to believe it unconstitutional, I cannot conceive. But is such 
 a law void? Certainly, the gentleman says, because it must be passed by a sovereign 
 Legislature. By sovereignty, as I understand it, is meant the supreme legislative power 
 of a State or Territory. Sovereignty is of two kinds, absolute and qualilied. There is 
 no such thing as an absolute legislative sovereignty in our country. The States are all 
 qualified or limited sovereignties, because they are in subordination to the Constitution of 
 the United States. The General Government is a limited sovereignty, because its powers 
 are limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States; and the legislative 
 sovereignty of the Territories is limited and restricted in a peculiar manner. A Territory 
 lias as extensive a legislative sovereignty as a State, on all domestic affairs. It has, how¬ 
 ever, no national legislative power or sovereignty. It gains that power by admission. It 
 gains the privilege of sending Senators and Reprseutatives to Congress; it gains the right 
 to participate in the election of a President of the nation; the organic act ceases to limit 
 or restrict it; but it gains no additional legislative power in regard to its domestic insti¬ 
 tutions. State sovereignty is exclusively domestic. So is the legislation of a Territory; 
 and, in that respect, a Territory gains nothing by admission. The idea that a Territory 
 gains the power of domestic legislation by admission into the Union, is simply absurd. 
 The General Government is the creature of the States; was made by them for national 
 purposes only, and it never had the slightest power over the domestic legislation of the 
 States. How, then, let me ask, does the General Government confer this power of domes¬ 
 tic legislation on a new State when it never had it to confer? Judge Douglas tell us that 
 the sovereignty of a Territory is held in abeyance by the General Government, in trust 
 for the Territory. By which he clearly means those powers which a State acquires by 
 admission, which is the right to participate in the national Legislature, &c. 
 
 Gentlemen talk of State constitutions as though some additional power of legislation 
 was gained from them. It is not indispensably necessary that a State should have a con¬ 
 stitution. Rhode Island had no constitution until within the last few years. A constitu¬ 
 tion is a limitation on the legislative power of the Legislature, imposed by the people for 
 their own security. England has no written constitution; therefore Parliament is said to 
 be omnipotent, and is the greatest legislative body on earth. All that is necessary to disa¬ 
 buse the minds of gentlemen, is to reflect on the nature of the subject under consideration. 
 
 There is another term introduced into the discussion on this question which really has 
 no meaning in the connection in which it is used. Judge Black, in his article, talks of an 
 act abolishing slavery as confiscating property. I defy Judge Black, or any other man, to 
 produce any respectable legal authority that has ever defined a law abolishing slavery an 
 act of confiscation. But to please the Attorney General, and those who agree with him, 
 suppose, for the sake of argument, we call it “confiscation.” What then? Will it there¬ 
 fore follow that it is a violation of the Constitution of the United States to pass such a 
 law? Certainly not. Such an act, when passed by a Territorial Legislature, would be 
 no more unconstitutional than a similar act would be when passed by a State Legislature. 
 
13 
 
 If a Territorial Legislature does not possess the power to divest the title of property, 
 our Territories are in a sad condition. It has been decided that a man has a property in 
 his wife. And he can maintain an action to recover possession of her person. Yet the 
 Territorial Legislatures, indisputably, can grant a divorce, and divest his title. The Ter¬ 
 ritorial Legislatures create city corporations. These corporations all exercise the power 
 of eminent domain and divest the titles of owners of lands taken for streets, public high¬ 
 ways, and public buildings. Yet, if the doctrine contended for by the congressional in¬ 
 terventionists is correct, all these divorces are void, and all these streets, highways, and 
 public buildings are the property of the land-owners. A thousand illustrations equally 
 as clear might be given to show the folly of such reasoning. 
 
 But if we were to admit all that is contended for, it only presents a legal question. 
 The contest is, whether an act of a Territorial Legislature, abolishing slavery, is a viola¬ 
 tion of the Constitution of the United States or not. This is, therefore, purely a legal 
 question, which the courts alone can determine. Fifty centuries of legislation could not 
 alter the Constitution, nor determine the question. Why, then, should the gentleman 
 from Alabama drag this controversy before this House ? We have no power to pass upon 
 nor to determine it. Judge Douglas has declared his willingness to submit the question 
 to the determination of the courts, and to abide by and carry out the decision which may 
 be made. What grounds has any one to complain of his position ? If the Judges of the 
 Supreme Court were elected by a vote of the people, and Judge Douglas were a candidate 
 for a judgeship, his legal opinions might be regarded as important. But he is not likely 
 to get on the supreme bench. And he might even be mistaken on a law question without 
 shaking our confidence in his Democracy. But suppose the doctrine of congressional in¬ 
 tervention were established by the Supreme Court: there is not a single Territory wheie 
 such a law is now demanded. There is no such law pending, nor is there the least pros¬ 
 pect that it will ever be necessary to propose such legislation. How visionary and ab¬ 
 stract this question is. Yet the honorable gentleman from Alabama expects it to convulse 
 the nation North and South, to divide the Democratic party, wreck the hopes of Judge 
 Douglas, and control the Charleston Convention. The dream is worse than Utopian. 
 
 The gentleman from Alabama is not wdlling to submit the question to the courts. But 
 let him speak for himself: 
 
 “It may be said that these are judicial questions and mere abstractions, which can be safely left to the 
 future, to be determined as exigencies may arise. In a late memorable case, appeals have been made 
 from the Supreme Court to popular prejudice and passion, and interpretations of the decision form parts 
 of political platforms. History is full of instances of judicial subserviency, and political opinion very often 
 control judicial conduct. The famous Somersett case, the direful spring of unnumbered woes, was decided 
 under circumstances that reflect no credit on the moral courage of the eminent judge. The proposition of 
 Senator Seward, to put the Supreme Court on the side of freedom, is fearfully admonitory of the influence 
 of popular excitement on the judiciary. If I could lift my voice so as to be heard ; if she would heed the 
 admonition of a loyal son, in tones of earnest entreaty, I would beseech her not again to commit the fatal 
 mistake of yielding to party necessity what may he essential to future safety; not- to concede a principle, 
 which, however apparently abstract or impracticable, may, in the hands of hostility or fanaticism, prove a 
 potent engine of mischief or destruction.” 
 
 The gentleman is unwilling to submit this question, because “in a recent memorable 
 case appeals have been made from the Supreme Court to popular prejudice and passion.” 
 This was all very wrong, doubtless; but pray what has that to do with the election of 
 Judge Douglas to the Presidency? Is it pretended that if, for instance, Colonel Davis, of 
 Mississippi, were elected President, that such “appeals to popular prejudice and passion” 
 would not be taken? The honorable gentleman expresses the greatest abhorrence to 
 dragging the decisions of the courts into the political arena, and taking “appeals from the 
 legal determinations of the Supreme Court to popular prejudice and passions,” yet he hesi¬ 
 tates not to arraign Judge Douglas for entertaining a legal opinipn; and instead of refer¬ 
 ring the question to the Supreme Court for adjudication, he appeals to the popular preju¬ 
 dices and passions of a slaveholding people. “Oh, consistency, thou art indeed a jewel! ” 
 
 The truth is, the gentleman evidences clearly his unwillingness to trust the court with 
 the question, Perhaps more political capital could be made if this question were not de¬ 
 termined. The committee will judge of the motive which prompts the refusal of the 
 opponents of Judge Douglas to submit this vexed question to adjudication. 
 
 Before I have done, I must give the committee the gentleman from Alabama’s “slave- 
 code” He informs us: 
 
 “Slavery exists in the State where the owner dwells, exists out of the State, exists in the Territories, or¬ 
 iels everywhere, until it comes within the limits of a sovereignty which prohibits it. The Constitution, as 
 that profound lawyer and statesman, Judge Berrien, argued, recognizes slavery in a free State ; speaks of 
 it, in such free State, as an actually subsisting debt of service or labor, and prohibits the discharge of the 
 
 slave.” 
 
 I think this will rather take the legal portion of this House by surprise. It is evident, 
 if this definition is correct, that slavery is universal. Law is divided into two kinds—the 
 laws of God, and the laws of man. If the gentleman’s doctrine is correct, slavery exists 
 by virtue of the law of^God; and, if that i3 true, he may bid defiance to every attempt 
 to abolish it, for man cannot repeal the law of God. 
 
14 
 
 Mr. BARKSDALE. Do you contend that the Territorial Legislature cannot divest the 
 
 title to a horse? 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. If the owner obtains his title from God, certainly not. 
 
 Mr. BARKSDALE. Then you differ with Judge Douglas. 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY. I think not. But I care not who I differ with. I am correct. 
 
 The gentleman from Alabama next informs us what we should fight for. Hear him: 
 
 “Mr. Chairman, for what is the Democratic party contending? Is it for spoils and patronage, or for 
 principle? Is this immense'array of means, this combination of agencies, this drilling lor the strife, but 
 to win a victory, barren and fruitless and I’yrrhan ? Are we to struggle for a President, merely to dispense 
 executive patronage and feed a greedy swarm of leeches? This is of no avail, is mischievous, unless ac¬ 
 companied by practical results, by a triumph of principle.” 
 
 I agree with him entirely that we fight for principles. But I have always found it of 
 highest importance in such battles to have men to carry out the principles for which we 
 contend. If we cannot elect our men, how can we carry out our principles? To nomi¬ 
 nate a man who is certain to be defeated, is to sacrifice our principles, and to lose the 
 control of the Government. But such are the expedients to which those who oppose the 
 nomination of Judge Douglas are driven. They admit his great popularity; they admit 
 that his nomination is equivalent to an election. But they raise the cry that he holds 
 some erroneous principles on abstract and legal questions. In short, that he is not a good 
 lawyer. Why did not the gentleman from Alabama march boldly up to the mark, and 
 tell this House that he preferred the election of Mr. Seward to that of Mr. Douglas; for 
 that is the true meaning of the paragraph which I have just quoted. I am constrained 
 to differ with the honorable gentleman. I am for Douglas and victory; and so, I think, 
 are the southern people. 
 
 [Mr. Montgomery’s time having expired, a debate ensued as to extending it, in which 
 Messrs. Lovejoy, Conkling, Underwood, and Burnett participated. It was unanimously 
 agreed to permit Mr. Montgomery to proceed.] 
 
 Mr. MONTGOMERY". I am duly sensible of the kindness the House has done me, and 
 I assure you, Mr. Chairman, and my fellow-members, that I am profoundly grateful. 
 
 The honorable gentleman tells us that Alabama will not submit to the nomination, un¬ 
 less we indorse the doctrine of congressional intervention.’ I am persuaded the delegates 
 from Alabama will not withdraw from the convention. But if they do, and, if that is 
 agreed upon and settled, I for one would say that they should not be permitted to take 
 seats in that body. I recognize the right of no set of men to go into a convention by 
 whose action they are not willing to be bound. That is'not Democracy. But if they 
 are admitted, and if they do not withdraw, and Judge Douglas is nominated,—and I as¬ 
 sure the gentleman from Alabama that he will be nominated as certainly as that the con¬ 
 vention assembles—he will still carry Alabama at the election; and not only Alabama, but 
 every other southern State. The hearts of the people of this country are with him. And 
 such a shout of joy will go up over his nomination as has never gone up since the nomi¬ 
 nation of General Jackson. I have heard it said that some of the delegates from Ala¬ 
 bama would not withdraw; and I have heard it said further, that although all those dele¬ 
 gates will carry out, in good faith, their instructions, yet, that after all hope of nominating 
 their candidate has been relinquished, some of them would support the nomination of 
 Judge Douglas. 
 
 I am well aware of the game of brag.,which i3 being played by those who oppose-the 
 nomination of Judge Douglas. Small politicians and professional place Seekers assure 
 their friends that their favorite candidates will certainly succeed. With an air of pro¬ 
 voking wisdom and self complacency, one of these men will assure you that his candidate, 
 who has carried just half a State , is as certain of the nomination as if he had it; another, 
 with prophetic fervor, Announces that his candidate, who lost his own State and has car¬ 
 ried no other, will become so popular at Charleston, that the presidential mantle will by 
 common consent be cast upon his shoulders. These are the little tricks of paltry office- 
 seekers, and are believed by nobody, and can deceive nobody. The man who has no pop¬ 
 ularity but such, as he acquires at Charleston would be a sorry candidate for the Democratic 
 party. The man who is nominated should bring his nomination from the people, who 
 stand above the delegates, and we should shun conspiracies and combinations as-we would 
 shun the leprosy. This is the Government of the people, and the people shall and will 
 rule. Your- delegates may conspire and combine to make nominations, but what is the 
 advantage of a nomination when it only brings defeat and dishonor? 
 
 There can be no mistake about the popular feeling on this question ; all men know it. 
 To attempt to disobey it is to invite defeat. When I hear a delegate say that he “intends 
 to keep his mind suspended until he gets to Charleston,” 1 set him down as a man who is 
 ready to enter into a conspiracy to betray the people he represents. For I know that he 
 knows that there is to be no intellectual bonfire at Charleston to enlighten his under¬ 
 standing as to the proper choice of a candidate. Such a man knows all about the candi¬ 
 dates now; but he intends to await his chance to betray. When I hear a man say he 
 will support a certain candidate if he finds the South will submit, I set him down as a poor ? 
 
15 
 
 i 
 
 miserable “dough-face,” who, instead of choosing the candidate his own people want, will 
 let others dictate his vote and control his influence by their threats and violence. When 
 I hear that certain delegates will refuse to obey the instructions given by their Slate con¬ 
 vention, I am satisfied that they’ know their price, and have found a purchaser. But woe 
 betide the recreant traitor who betrays and insults his people. Their curses, hissing hot, 
 shall follow him through life, and roll like lava over his grave when life is done. Con¬ 
 spirator* may plot, combinations may be formed, and nominations may be made, in viola¬ 
 tion of public sentiment and the papular will, but the day of election will be a day of 
 rebuke, disaster, and irretrievable defeat. But I hope’for better things. I will not be¬ 
 lieve the rumors of knaves and impostors. Men, whose names stand high on the roll of 
 fame, will not bring down on themselves an eternity of infamy by the polluting touch of 
 disgraceful conspiracies. I will not believe it ; such things dare not be done. Our dele¬ 
 gates are not marketable commodities. They are all honorable men, and will do their 
 duty. The will of the people will be regarded. The nomination of Judge Douglas is a 
 foregone conclusion, and gentlemen may as well prepare to meet it. • “Coming events 
 cast their shadows before,” and the shadow of his overwhelming popularity is now 
 upon us. 
 
 • ■ The gentleman from Alabama could not close his remarks without dragging up the 
 
 ghost of the Lecompton constitution. I thought that question was put forever to rest. 
 We buried both Lecompton and anti-Lecompton over at the Heading convention, and we 
 are not willing that their grave shall be disturbed. Wisdom requires that we should for¬ 
 get our past differences, and that every one of us should contribute his whole influence to 
 bring the whole force of the party to act together. We must unite the party for the sake 
 of the union of States. We must unite the party to repress “the irrepressible conflict.” 
 The Republicans should feel profoundly grateful to the honorable gentleman from Ala¬ 
 bama, for his effort to distract and divide the party on an abandoned issue of the past. 
 I can assure the gentleman that he has been doing Mr. Seward yeoman’s service by his 
 efforts to alienate the hearts of one portion of the Democracy from the other. Look 
 around you to-day on the vacant seats which that unfortunate question has made in this 
 Hall. Where are the noble and true men from the North, who two years since came at 
 every call of danger, and stood like a wall of fire between the South and her Republican 
 enemies? They have gone down under the load of odium attached to the miserable at¬ 
 tempt to force a constitution on an unwilling people. These vacant seats have a inoral as 
 well as a history. Let us profit by the one and not forget the other. 
 
 Intelligent.men all over the land are now billing to admit the folly of that unfortunate 
 . movement; and thousands of men, South as well as North, agree with Senator Hammond, 
 of South Carolina, in saying that “ the South, herself should have kicked that constitution 
 out of Congress,” thrust upon it as it was all “ reeking with blood and fraud.” The whole 
 attempt was a miserable failure, an undoubted mistake. And now, when the people of 
 Kansas have repudiated that constitution by a majority of nearly ten thousand; and 
 after we have seen the Democratic party defeated throughout the whole North except in 
 Illinois, on account of it; and when wise and conservative men in all sections of the Union 
 look back to that controversy with regret and shame, I think it was well that the honora¬ 
 ble gentleman should assure us that amidst this general change of opinion he still stands 
 firm for old Lecompton. We might else have considered that the general feeling had pen¬ 
 etrated his breast, and that he too now wished it had been “kicked from the Halls of 
 Congress.” The Lecompton constitution cannot now ever come back to this House to be 
 legislated upon. It is as foreign from all present political issues as the United States 
 Bank; but the gentleman introduced it into this discussion, because he thereby hoped to 
 arouse sopie of the old southern prejudice on that question. 
 
 Is it not strikingly singular that in this Had we hear almost every day denunciations of 
 Judge Douglas by the Republicans, because, as they say, he has always betrayed the 
 North for the benefit of the South. Yet in this same Hall we hear southern Representa¬ 
 tives denounce Judge Douglas, because he has done too much for the North and not 
 enough for. the South. “Truth” in this, as in most cases, “lies in the golden, mean.” 
 Judge Douglas, in his long and honorable career in Congress, has betrayed neither side; 
 but has been true to all sections. Like every great, intelligent patriot and statesman, he 
 has legislated for the nation, and not for particular sections. lie loved Illinois much; but 
 he has loved America more. Let Alabama read his history, and point to the time when 
 he ever betrayed her interest or proved false to his Democratic principles. 
 
 •There were traits of character developed in Judge Douglas during that, contest—now 
 that the controversy is forever ended—which give him new claims on the hearts and af¬ 
 fections of the people, and which inspire his friends with a confidence in his honesty and 
 integrity greater than all the acts of the rest of his life beside. In 1857, when the Le¬ 
 compton controversy arose, the nomination of Judge Douglas, after the expiration of Mr. 
 Buchanan’s term, was a fact that seemed to admit of no contest. The presidential mantle 
 was ready to fall upon his shoulders. When that question arose, he found arrayed on one 
 side of it the southern Democracy, with whom lie had done battle in so many years of the 
 
 I 
 
16 
 
 past; lie found an Administration in the zenith of its power, with all its patronage and 
 influence ready to strike him down if he dared to resist; he saw the bright prize of the 
 Presidency, which before seemed so near, ready to be forever withdrawn from hirfi, unless 
 he would sacrifice his honor and prove recreant to the high principles of his life, yet he 
 never hesitated nor faltered for a moment. He displayed no wavering nor time-serving. 
 He knew well the fearful nature of the contest in which he was about to engage; yet, on 
 the very day on which the President sent his message to the Senate, and before the sounds 
 of the Clerk’s voice had died away in the Senate Chamber, he arose and entered bi3 manly, 
 bold, and decided protest against it. Throw aside your political prejudices; cease to re¬ 
 member your Lecompton partisanship, and behold and admire the sublimity of moral 
 heroism in the man. 
 
 We had known and loved him before. But then we saw that he was indeed one of 
 “nature’s noblemen”—a “hero from the hand of God.” We knew that for seventeen 
 years he had originated the political issues on which parties were divided and Presidents 
 made; we knew that in every contest he had led our forces to battle, and won our proud¬ 
 est victories; we had seen his firmness of soul when he was burned in effigy in Boston, 
 and when he was insulted by a mob in Chicago, because he advocated the passage of the 
 fugitive slave law; we had been lost in admiration, after the city councils of Chicago had 
 passed resolutions denouncing him as a recreant and unfaithful representative, and the 
 fugitive slave law as unconstitutional and tyrannical, when he boldly demanded a hear¬ 
 ing, and invited his assailants to meet him in discussion in that infuriated city ; we had 
 never ceased to wonder at the matchless power of reasoning which enabled him to con¬ 
 vince, not only Chicago, but the nation, that the fugitive slave law was not only consti¬ 
 tutional, but just and proper; we knew that when he spoke, thousands filled the galleries 
 and crowded the avenues to the Capitol, and that even the ladies, in their eagerness to 
 hear “the winged words” as they fell from his lips, invaded the Senate Chamber and 
 drove the gallant Senators from their seats; we knew that when lie spoke all men were 
 silent; we knew that when he arose his enemies trembled, for they knew he was covered 
 all over in impenetrable armor, and that liis battle-axe would strike down the greatest of 
 his foes; we knew he was the king of the Senate, and the greatest living debater; we 
 knew that then, as now, when the Democratic party was assailed, las shield always was 
 interposed to receive the blow; but we did not know that he would sacrifice the brightest 
 hopes of his life, rather than desert a principle; and that he would rather he right than to 
 he President! This was all shown in the Lecompton controversy; and men love and 
 admire him for it, and will confide the Government of the nation to his hands, because 
 he is incorruptibly honest, as well as capable. He is the hero of the people—“ the blue¬ 
 eyed man of destiny.” The paths of right and principle, which once seemed to carry 
 him away from the Presidency, are found, at last, to lead to the White House door, and 
 to its inner chambers. And he who \va3 once the cabinet-maker’s boy will soon himself 
 be the maker of Cabinets. 
 
 Of all the Presidents who have ruled over this nation, I think General Jackson has the 
 deepest hold on the popular heart. That enduring fame, that wealth of love which at¬ 
 taches to his memory, does not arise from his great military services. It does not spring 
 from his veto of the United States Bank, nor from any one act of his administration; but 
 from a glorious principle which underlaid all the acts of his public life, and is embodied 
 in those emphatic words, “The Federal Union: it must and shall be preserved.” That is 
 the sentiment which makes the people love and worship him, and makes his grave a Mecca, 
 to which the heart of the nation turns in every day of clanger to pray that our ruler may 
 have the spirit of the glorious Jackson. Over that grave a golden haze lingers like a 
 halo, and on its arch is written, in letters of flame, the “Federal Union : it must and shall 
 be preserved.” Yes, General Jackson was true to bis country; and wherever treason 
 and disunion reared their front, his hand and his voice were against them. Since his 
 death secession and disunion have grown bold, both North and South. But I do thank 
 God that no disunionist, in either section of the land, is in favor of the nomination of 
 Judge Douglas. They are men who disguise their opposition under the pretext of “con¬ 
 gressional intervention.” Refusing themselves to be bound by the action of Democratic 
 conventions, they yet claim the right to dictate our principles and control our nominations. 
 They are weak in numbers but loud in their denunciations. They hope to appear strong 
 by assuming airs of confidence and boldness. We know that their yells will go up against 
 Judge Douglas at Charleston; but they will find that they cannot frighten the delegates 
 from the discharge of their duty. We will meet them there, as we meet them here, and 
 bid defiance to their power and their influence. The whole public life of Judge Douglas 
 has been devoted to strengthen and preserve the Union. His motto has ever been, “My 
 country, may she ever be right; but right or wrong , my country /”