60th Congress 1 SENATE 
 
 1st Session J 
 
 f Document 
 l No. 433 
 
 THE SECOND 
 
 
 HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 
 
 BY 
 
 
 DAVID JAYNE HILL 
 D’ESTOURNELLES DE CONSTANT 
 JAMES BROWN SCOTT 
 
 Members of the Conference 
 
 
 ? i - A 
 
 
 PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE 
 
 APRIL 14, 1908. — Ordered to be printed 
 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1908 
 
341 
 
 M 55s 
 
 \ 
 
 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BRANCH. 
 
 Nicholas Murray Butler. 
 Richard Bartholdt. 
 Lyman Abbott. 
 
 James Speyer. 
 
 Richard Watson Gilder. 
 Stephen Henry Olin. 
 Seth Low. 
 
 Andrew D. White. 
 
 2 
 
iv r vu\ 
 
 
 The Net Result at The Hague. 
 
 By David Jayne Hill. 
 
 [Reprinted from the Review of Reviews, December, 1907.] 
 
 There are two widely accepted theories with regard to the pacifica¬ 
 tion of the world would tend to belittle the value of The Hague Con¬ 
 ferences. One is that permanent peace between the nations is intrin¬ 
 sically impossible, because their vital interests and purposes are in 
 essential conflict, and the love of domination is so strong in human 
 nature that war is certain always to recur in the future as it has in the 
 past. The opposing theory is that universal peace is at once attain¬ 
 able by the mere resolution to abolish war, and that governments have 
 only to agree to maintain peace by referring all their differences to 
 third parties for settlement, binding themselves to abide by their de¬ 
 cisions, whatever they may be. 
 
 Those who hold the first theory regard international conferences 
 like those that have been held at The Hague as nugatory and super¬ 
 fluous, for the reason that such congresses can add nothing to the 
 motives to refrain from war or to the power to prevent it. On the 
 other hand, those who accept the second theory regard as sterile and 
 derisory all discussions and agreements that do not go to the root of 
 the matter and by one decisive act render war impossible. 
 
 Between these two ways of thinking, The Hague Conferences have 
 been saluted with contempt on the one hand, and satire on the other; 
 and have found their friends chiefly among those who consider that 
 education, the perception of the practical value of law, and the 
 gradual subjection of impulse to reason are progressive elements of 
 national development under the laws of social evolution; and who, 
 therefore, simply ask that, as in other spheres of political growth, 
 there may be found in international relations a reasonable rate of 
 ^progress toward the realization of the great ideals of peace, coopera¬ 
 tion, and good will. 
 
 Leaving aside the merely theoretical aspects of the subject, let us 
 modestly inquire what are the results of the Second Peace Conference 
 at The Hague? 
 
 It is not without significance that, for the first time in the history. 
 of the world, the representatives of forty-five independent powers — 
 diplomatists, jurists, and experts in military and naval science—have 
 been able to meet together in a friendly manner and to discuss with¬ 
 out animosity some of the most delicate international questions dur¬ 
 ing more than four months without a rupture of personal or national 
 amity. When it is considered that the Second Peace Conference at 
 The Hague has included nearly every sovereign state — and all of the 
 greatest importance — that in many instances the truth has been 
 
 3 
 
 p 31.105 
 
 / 4 l 
 
 
4 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFEKENCE. 
 
 spoken clearly, earnestly, and sometimes with vivacity; that some of 
 the delegates were but recently arrayed against each other in the heat 
 of battle on sea and land, that others held or represented opinions 
 diametrically opposed, that they were all largely occupied with com 
 sidering what they might or might not do to one another in the event 
 of a future struggle in which 'their lives and those of their country¬ 
 men would be the pawns, the courtesy, the reasonableness, and the 
 agreement of these gentlemen regarding certain great principles pre¬ 
 sent a commentary on our contemporary civilization and an exposition 
 of its tendencies most gratifying to the moralist and the philanthro¬ 
 pist as well as to the jurist and the publicist. 
 
 But what has the Second Conference done? It has demonstrated, 
 first of all, not only that a universal congress of this character is pos¬ 
 sible, but that certain great principles—or postulates of constructive 
 action, as we may call them—are now beyond dispute. Among these 
 are the propositions that peace is the normal and war the abnormal 
 condition of civilized nations; that the relations of sovereign states 
 are properly based on principles of justice, and not upon force; that 
 really sovereign states should have equal rights before the bar of in¬ 
 ternational justice, independently of their size or military strength; 
 that disputes between governments should be settled, as far as possi¬ 
 ble, by judicial methods, and not by war; and that war, if inevitable, 
 is an evil whose disastrous consequences—especially as regard neu¬ 
 trals, noncombatants, the sick and the wounded—should by general 
 agreement be reduced to a minimum. 
 
 What then has the conference done to give practical effect to these 
 principles ? It has concluded thirteen conventions, made two declara¬ 
 tions, passed one resolution, emitted five voeux —which the irreverent 
 characterize as “ pious wishes ”■—and offered one special recommen¬ 
 dation. 
 
 As the conventions have not yet been ratified, and the action which 
 the different governments may take regarding them is unknown, it 
 would not be appropriate for a recent delegate to do more than de¬ 
 scribe them in the most objective manner. It is impossible, therefore, 
 at this time and in this article to attempt an analysis of the motives 
 and policies of the different governments—interesting as this might 
 be—in fixing the limitations that have been imposed. It is important 
 to note, however, that, whatever may be the fate of these treaties as 
 respects ratification and subsequent execution, they accurately register 
 the degree of progress which an international conference, seriously 
 and conscientiously aiming at the task of pacification, is now ready to 
 accept. 
 
 The work of the conference not only serves to indicate the exact stage 
 that has been reached in international development—which has a 
 considerable value for students of the subject—but it renders apparent 
 what remains to be done in order to carry forward the movement of 
 which it forms a part. That movement can not be promoted by heap¬ 
 ing reproaches upon those powers whose conservatism has prevented 
 a further advance in making definite engagements. Each sovereign 
 state has its own peculiar problems of government, is the rightful 
 judge of its own interests and responsibilities, and can not justly be 
 placed in the pillory of public condemnation for the attitude which it 
 regards as appropriate to the discharge of its obligations to its con¬ 
 stituents. It is by solid argument and by good example, and not by 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 5 
 
 censure, therefore, that international progress is to be promoted. 
 However dear our theories and ideas may be to us as individuals or as 
 nations, the first principle of all harmonious international develop¬ 
 ment is that no sovereign state is to be coerced, and that each shall be 
 permitted to act freely in the light of its interests and responsibilities 
 as it sees them. Progress, therefore, can be made no faster than the 
 powers will consent to make it; and that consent will depend in the 
 future, as it has depended in the past, upon educational influence and 
 wise diplomacy. What, then, is the stage of progress actually attained 
 by the Second Peace Conference? 
 
 The first convention is a careful revision of the treaty of 1899 for 
 the pacific settlement of international disputes. With regard to good 
 offices and mediation, a slight step forward was taken by the accept¬ 
 ance of the American proposition that the initiative of powers foreign 
 to the controversy in offering them is not only “ useful ” but “ desir¬ 
 able.” Greater precision has been given to the operation of commis¬ 
 sions of inquiry, whose great utility has already been tested, but it was 
 decided that the functions of such commissions should be confined to 
 a determination of facts and should not extend to fixing responsibility. 
 As regards arbitration, while it was reasserted that “ in questions of a 
 legal character, and especially in the interpretation or application of 
 international conventions, arbitration is recognized by the contracting 
 powers as the most efficacious and at the same time the most equitable 
 .means of settling differences that have not been adjusted by diplo¬ 
 macy,” and, “ in consequence, it would be desirable that, in contentions, 
 of this character, the powers should resort to arbitration,” it was not 
 found possible to render this resort an obligation. 
 
 It is necessary to state, however, that while unanimity upon this 
 proposal was not obtainable—even for a convention that omitted all 
 questions affecting “ the vital interests, independence, or honor ” of 
 the contestants and included only a meager list of mainly unimportant 
 subjects—32 powers voted in favor of it, only 9 were opposed, and 3 
 abstained from voting. As practical unanimity Avas held to be neces¬ 
 sary for the inclusion of a convention in the final act, even this very 
 moderate attempt at obligatory arbitration was unfruitful. Still, as 
 this strong manifestation of a disposition to make a definite engage¬ 
 ment could not conveniently be nullified without being in some meas¬ 
 ure recognized, it was resolved, With four abstentions, that the first 
 commission was: 
 
 Unanimous (1) in recognizing the principle of obligatory arbitration; and (2) 
 in declaring that certain differences, notably those relative to the interpretation 
 and application of conA’entional stipulations, are susceptible of being submitted 
 to obligatory arbitration without restriction. 
 
 Regarding this resolution as a retreat from the more advanced posi¬ 
 tion that had been taken by 32 powers, the head of the American dele¬ 
 gation clearly explained its attitude and refrained from voting. 
 
 It must, in justice, be added that some of the powers voting against 
 an obligatory arbitration convention probably did so chiefly for the 
 purpose of avoiding the isolation of others, and that some of the pow¬ 
 ers most earnest in opposing the project not only have negotiated 
 special treaties of obligatory arbitration, but declare their intention of 
 negotiating many more. The state of the question, then, is this: All 
 accept the principle of obligatory arbitration in certain classes of 
 
6 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 cases, 32 powers are prepared to make definite engagements with all 
 the rest, 9 prefer to make them only with states on whose responsi¬ 
 bility they can rely, and 3 decline at present to commit themselves. 
 
 The second convention relates to the limitation of the employment 
 of force for the collection of contractual debts. The form which 
 this American proposition finally took is sufficiently shown by citing 
 the text of its first article: 
 
 The contracting powers are agreed not to have recourse to armed 
 force for the recovery of contractual debts claimed of the govern¬ 
 ment of one country by the government of another country as due 
 to its nationals. 
 
 Nevertheless, that agreement will not be valid when the debtor 
 state refuses or leaves without reply an offer of arbitration, or, in 
 case of acceptance, renders impossible the conclusion of a protocol, 
 or, after arbitration, fails to comply with the judgment rendered. 
 
 It is also provided that the judgment shall determine the question 
 whether or not the claim is well founded, the amount of the debt, and 
 the time and mode of payment. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to point out that this convention is not only 
 a very substantial gain in the process of substituting justice for force 
 in international dealings, but demonstrates a spirit of conciliation 
 and regard for equity in the treatment of the weak by the strong 
 that promises well for the future. Its deep significance for the 
 financial credit and the political security of the smaller states, espe¬ 
 cially on the American continents, does not require emphasis. Al¬ 
 though accompanied with several reserves by certain states which 
 hold that force should in no case be employed for the collection of 
 debts based on contract, and the abstention of six of the smaller 
 European states, the proposition was adopted by the conference by 
 39 votes with 5 abstentions. 
 
 The third, fourth, and fifth conventions relate to the opening 
 of hostilities, the laws and customs of war on land, and the rights 
 and duties of neutral powers. The provisions are, in general, in 
 the interest of humanity, and a wider recognition of the world’s 
 brotherhood. The sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth conventions 
 relate to the prosecution of naval warfare. 
 
 The acceptance of the American proposition for the immunity 
 of private property of belligerents at sea—which received 21 favor¬ 
 able votes in the fourth commission against 11, and 1 abstention— 
 would, no doubt, have radically affected the substance of this group 
 of conventions; but, being opposed by several of the most important 
 naval powers, it was impossible to obtain for it the necessary support. 
 
 As several of these conventions rest upon no general principle 
 whatever, but consist merely of concessions based upon the maritime 
 interests of the powers, no attempt will be made to explain them 
 here; for, in order to comprehend them, it is necessary to refer to 
 the text of articles as interpreted by the proces-vevbaux of the con¬ 
 ference. The sixth and seventh conventions the American delega¬ 
 tion did not sign, partly because they seem to be more oppressive 
 to the rights of private property than the present customary law 
 of nations, and partly because they appear to affect the rights of 
 self-defense, which the United States, as a peaceful nation, has 
 always maintained as correlative to customs of naval warfare which 
 have not yet been abolished. If, on the other hand, the restrictions 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 7 
 
 upon submarine mines do not seem to humanitarians as radical as 
 they would desire it, it must be remembered that nations with long 
 and distant coast lines exposed to the attacks of powerful navies 
 can not safely forego the right of self-protection even at considera¬ 
 ble risk to peaceful commerce. As respects the bombardment of 
 unfortified places by naval forces, the ninth convention prohibits 
 such forms of attack, except when they contain military material 
 for which surrender has been demanded and refused. 
 
 The tenth convention applies the principles of the revised Geneva 
 convention to maritime warfare. The eleventh exempts from cap¬ 
 ture all postal correspondence, official or private, found at sea on any 
 vessel, neutral or belligerent, as well as the boats of fishermen. The 
 twelfth establishes an international prize court, to which appeal may 
 be made from the decision of a belligerent prize court, under certain 
 conditions, either by a neutral power, a neutral private person, or 
 even a private individual belonging to a belligerent power, if the 
 decision of the national tribunal concerns merchandise carried by 
 a neutral ship. The thirteenth convention presents a code of thirty- 
 three articles concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in 
 case of maritime war. It has not been signed by the American pleni¬ 
 potentiaries, for the reason that it imposes upon neutrals obligations 
 which it might be practicable for them to discharge. 
 
 Such are the conventional engagements which the second peace 
 conference at The Hague has proposed to the nations. In addition, 
 it has adopted by 28 votes to 8, with 7 abstentions, a declaration pro¬ 
 hibiting the throwing of projectiles and explosives from balloons. 
 In a resolution stating that it is “ highly desirable ” to see the gov¬ 
 ernments take up the serious study of the continued increase of mili¬ 
 tary charges, it has merely absolved itself from the. discussion of a 
 question which it would be powerless to settle, and has thrown the 
 responsibility for examining it upon the separate governments. As 
 no one of them has made a definite proposition to diminish its mili¬ 
 tary strength, it is difficult to see how the conference could take any 
 other than this purely advisory attitude. 
 
 There remains the voeux. These unfulfilled aspirations are con¬ 
 fessions that the conference has had hopes that it could not realize. 
 Foremost among them is the proposed adoption of an elaborate proj¬ 
 ect for the establishment of a court of arbitral justice, not to super¬ 
 sede but to supplement the present tribunal of arbitration. Originally 
 suggested in the instructions of the American delegation, its present 
 form is due to the collaboration of the delegates of the United States, 
 Great Britain, and Germany. It is appended textually to the final 
 act, and requires for completion nothing but an agreement for the 
 choice of judges. The serious labor expended upon it is not lost, 
 though its fruits may be late in maturing. It only remains for the 
 powers to take up the project at the proper time through diplomatic 
 channels, and thus carry to completion a great international insti¬ 
 tution. 
 
 The second voeu invites the competent authorities, in case of war, 
 to consider it a special duty to assure and protect pacific relations 
 between the populations of belligerent states and neutral countries. 
 The third proposes that the situation of strangers established in the 
 territory of the powers with regard to military burdens be made the 
 subject of special conventions. The fourth urges the elaboration of 
 
8 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 a code regarding the laws and customs of naval warfare by the next 
 conference. Finally, the Third Peace Conference at The Hague is 
 foreshadowed in the recommendation that, after an interval similar 
 to that which has elapsed between the preceding and the recent meet¬ 
 ing, a date be fixed for another by common agreement between the 
 powers, that a sufficient notice be given in advance, and that two years 
 before it is convened a special committee shall prepare its programme, 
 and be charged with the proposal of its mode of organization and 
 procedure. 
 
 Until that time the promotion of the peace and good understanding 
 of the nations will probably be left to the methods of diplomacy. If 
 the task remains difficult and delicate, it should certainly be less so 
 than it was before the Second Peace Conference convened; but the 
 experience of that assembly has made it more clearly evident that, 
 as the work of schools and churches does not consist chiefly in educa¬ 
 tional and ecclesiastical congresses but in the steady, careful, and 
 faithful performance of duty by the rank and file of the teachers 
 and the clergy, so international conferences in the interest of peace 
 and justice owe their fruits mainly to the care, the fidelity, and the 
 competency of statesmen and diplomatists who maintain the daily 
 relations between sovereign states. That this is, in truth, a serious 
 business, affecting the welfare of all mankind, is becoming more 
 evident as the interests of great nations are more and more closely 
 intertwined by the growth of individual and commercial intercourse. 
 Without the previous preparation for the recent conference by the 
 action of the eminent Secretary of State of the United States, and the 
 ripe experience and high prestige of the ambassadors whom the 
 President sent to The Hague to head the American delegation, it 
 would have been difficult to hold the place there which that delega¬ 
 tion has held. If the results of the conference do not seem brilliant, 
 it is not because noble ideals were not held steadily aloft, but because 
 it is the function of an international conference simply to register the 
 general average of progress that .has been attained. However, this 
 may be estimated, it represents the materials with which the diplo¬ 
 macy of the future has to deal. 
 
The Results of the Second Hague Conference. 
 
 By Baron d’Estournelles de Constant. 
 
 [Reprinted from The Independent, November 21 , 1907.] 
 
 During the first two months of the conference I was continually 
 saying ancl writing that it would be a great deception, that it would 
 consecrate the largest portion of its time to the amelioration rather 
 than to the prevention of war. In this way I tried to recall to the 
 conference the requirements of public opinion; it was my duty and 
 it was in the interest of our work. The conference had, in fact, 
 begun with the discussion of things relatively secondary, in accord¬ 
 ance with the instructions the delegates had received from their gov¬ 
 ernments. But, later on, during the last two months, it awoke, eman¬ 
 cipated itself, was in every respect worthy of admiration—this justice 
 I am bound to render to it. Gradually its ambition was aroused, 
 and at length it devoted its energies spontaneously to the second part 
 of its task—that is to say, to the principal programme, which it had 
 not anticipated and which it was now obliged to improvise in its 
 conscience. In order to arrive at this stage it was necessary that it 
 should become, in some sort, a new assembly, a more independent 
 assembly, a true moral person, living not only by virtue of the orders 
 which each delegate received from his distant government, but also 
 living its own proper life; it was necessary that it should become not 
 solely an assembly of official representatives from all the states, but 
 the collective representation of humanity. 
 
 I can not in a few lines explain this important phenomenon. I 
 have spoken elsewhere of the potent and benevolent action exercised 
 by M. Leon Bourgeois. I shall have something more to say of it, 
 but to-day I can only direct attention to the fact that certain func¬ 
 tionaries, certain ambassadors who had attained the summit of their 
 career, found at The Hague an opportunity of rising still higher and 
 of bettering and improving one another by the most generous and 
 fruitful of rivalries. And for this very reason, after four months of 
 intense and often excessive and ungrateful labor, all the delegates 
 separated with a mixture of joy and sorrow, glad to be free to see 
 again their country and their homes, but deeply affected by the 
 thought that they were leaving a field of new action in which the 
 seed had been so well sown. The seed, it is true, is still under ground, 
 to the great satisfaction of the skeptics, but it will germinate even 
 quicker still than that which was a subject of such mockery in 1899, 
 and which did not at that time appear to have a better chance of suc¬ 
 cessful growth. 
 
 The general deception of public opinion is explained by two mo¬ 
 tives, both to the honor of the conference. 
 
 9 
 
10 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 First, it was not able to discuss the limitation of armaments. This 
 question was not, in fact, on its programme. The conference could 
 not study it, and no international assembly will ever be able to study 
 it until it is the object of preliminary and national study in all the 
 countries interested. A national study first, an international discus¬ 
 sion afterwards. I have never ceased for a moment to insist on this, 
 and notably in my report to the Interparliamentary Conference of 
 London in 1906. If the conference had gone beyond this natural 
 order it would have come to nothing; it therefore did well to recall 
 to governments their duty and then pass on to other questions. 
 
 I will add that, whatever may be said to the contrary, the discus¬ 
 sion on this question of limitation has not been useless, and, as far as 
 I am concerned, my conscience is tranquil on this subject, for the 
 more it is discussed, as long as it is declared that arbitration must 
 first be organized, the more must the cause of international justice be 
 necessarily served; it is a means of emphasizing more strongly the 
 urgency of this organization. If the conference had not been obliged 
 to put aside the limitation of armaments it would have been less ener¬ 
 getic, perhaps, in seeking a compensation in the study of arbitration. 
 
 Secondly, the conference lasted four months, and yet the results 
 it has achieved have been hardly apparent. That is its greatest merit. 
 An assembly representing the world must surely be congratulated on 
 having preferred the ungrateful preparation of durable solutions to 
 delusive immediate solutions. Who is there, then, that can believe 
 this labor of four months to be lost labor? The conference has pre¬ 
 ferred the satisfaction of duty accomplished to the eulogies of the 
 press, always on the lookout for sensational news, and, in the present 
 case, disappointed. Its confidence in the future was so well assured 
 that it did not fear to dictate to the governments themselves the line 
 of conduct they should have to follow. Enlightened by the difficul¬ 
 ties of its own task, it has given them its experience as an example. 
 It declared by a solemn decision that it limited its role to an action 
 purely transitory, and that a Third Conference was necessary, and 
 that after the Third Conference many others should ensue. Thus, 
 of its own volition, it transformed its exceptional reunion into a 
 simple session—the normal, regular, automatic session of a parlia¬ 
 ment of humanit}^. It did not fear to add to this declaration a recom¬ 
 mendation not less essential—it demanded that the next sesion should 
 be prepared at least two years in advance. 
 
 Is not this a brilliant testimony of confidence ? A step forward on 
 the road of universal progress? 
 
 How is it possible, moreover, not to admire, as a true revelation, 
 the fact that three hundred delegates from all the states of the world 
 have been able to discuss during four months the gravest, the most 
 delicate questions, questions which no one ventures to touch upon even 
 in a national assembly, and which for this reason were absolutely 
 new? Yet they discussed them in all their details, discussed them 
 thoroughly, with all the vivacity, all the passion, which such subjects 
 entailed, but, nevertheless, without at any time the slightest disorder, 
 the slightest difficulty arising during the discussion. What a clinch¬ 
 ing argument this is to the objections of those so-called statesmen 
 who claim that the greatest interests of the world are exactly those 
 which must be most carefully excluded from public discussion! 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONEEKENCE. 
 
 11 
 
 But, outside the great moral and preparatory results of the Second 
 Conference of The Hague, I could cite a very large number of im¬ 
 mediate results that are appreciable. Among the fourteen conventions 
 elaborated and finally signed will be found very numerous dispositions 
 tending to render war at once rarer and more difficult, and at the same 
 time less inhuman. That is something, and I will return to it some 
 other day. 
 
 The plan of a court of arbitration was studied at great length and 
 finally elaborated. In the course of the discussion an entirely new 
 principle, that of the moral equality of states, was brought forward. 
 Now, it must surely be admitted that this principle would of itself 
 have merited the examination of a peace conference. If it has not 
 been entirely resolved, it is, at least, of great consequence that it has 
 been freely and openly discussed. The governments will in their turn 
 have to study it and, as a logical result, to name the judges of the 
 court. The conference could not and ought not to take upon itself the 
 solution of this problem. It has laid it down in all its terms; the gov¬ 
 ernments will, in their turn, have to take action. 
 
 As to obligatory arbitration, is it nothing, then, to have affirmed its 
 principle as an incontestable progress discussed only in its applica¬ 
 tion? And does anyone think that this solemn affirmation is to re¬ 
 main negligible in the eyes of the world, and that the different peoples 
 will not have it recorded, so that they may be able to recall it to their 
 governments at the proper moment? And, besides, as to the question 
 of application itself, thirty-five states out of forty-four have declared 
 themselves ready to favor a general treaty of obligatory arbitration. 
 Quite a mechanism of admirable simplification has been provided and 
 accepted which permits all the states to be inscribed on a central 
 tableau, and to replace by this simple formality an entire inextricable 
 multitude of treaties, all differing from one another. This alone con¬ 
 stitutes an innovation in every way worthy of the twentieth century. 
 Who, then, will dare to claim that this agreement of the thirty-five 
 liberal states of the world is without importance, on the pretext that 
 a minority of the conference refused to accept it, or, at least, to affirm 
 it by a general convention which that minority would alone have re¬ 
 frained from signing? 
 
 What does this prove? Simply this fact: The majority exists; it 
 reckons more than three-fourths of the states. The minority took 
 upon itself to prevent this agreement, but, in doing so, it has em¬ 
 phasized and strengthened it; on the other hand, it has laid bare the 
 opposition of some states—or, more correctly, of a single state, Ger¬ 
 many—dragging along with it in its resistance a great power, Austria, 
 with Turkey, Boumania, Greece, Bulgaria, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
 and Switzerland. 
 
 Yet, and I wish to repeat it, the representative of Germany was 
 careful to state that he stood apart only with regard to the applica¬ 
 tion, but that, as to the principle, he was a partisan of obligatory 
 arbitration. 
 
 Thus the world was divided into two camps of very unequal impor¬ 
 tance. On one side was the mass of the states of the world, great and 
 small, representing progress; on the other, Germany, representing 
 the opposition, but an opposition already hesitating and pleading ex¬ 
 tenuating circumstances. If we recall the Germany of 1899 and if 
 we note its progress since that epoch, we shall not be very much mis- 
 
VI THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 taken in predicting that, between now and the Third Conference, its 
 progress will be even still more rapid and remarkable. Certainly, 
 Germany has advanced very far from her position in 1899; she is still 
 backward in relation to the other powers, but she will soon wish to 
 catch up with the majority. This will be the result of the Conference 
 of 1907, and particularly the work of the majority, which will have 
 determined the general progress. But for it we should be absorbed in 
 the platonic adoration of the memories of 1899. To-day we have 
 thirty-five states out of forty-four demanding the convention of obli¬ 
 gatory arbitration which we have drawn up and voted, and which we 
 have only to sign. Even that is something, is it not ? 
 
 The Americans, in that fine and peaceful discussion of several 
 months, have been splendid, and the youngest of all was certainly my 
 eminent friend, Mr. Choate, who defended, with all the force of his 
 authority and talent, the work of the majority against the criticisms 
 of Baron Marschall. x He lost his case, say the ignorant, since the 
 opposition triumphed. Not so; he won it, since he reduced the op¬ 
 position to its simplest expression, not to say to a simple question 
 of ciphers. “ We are thirty-five,” he said, “ and you? I could count 
 your numbers on a single hand.” These words told and will remain. 
 Humanity will not let itself be stopped by a minority of a few votes; 
 or, rather, the minority will be converted. 
 
 General Porter, as a faithful soldier, has fought valiantly also: “ I 
 have enlisted for the w T ar,” said he, “ and I will go on even to the end.” 
 He had the satisfaction of obtaining an almost unanimous vote from 
 the conference and of preventing governments from having recourse 
 henceforth to force for the recovery of debts from a state. It is a 
 result that reflects much honor on the United States and that must 
 give satisfaction to everybody. 
 
 I should have liked to say something of the services of Mr. Scott, 
 Mr. Hill, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Butler, and also of the able representa¬ 
 tives of the other republics of America—Mexico, Brazil, Peru, Chile, 
 Argentina, etc., but time does not permit it. I must content myself 
 with declaring that America, as I have been constantly predicting 
 for many years, has, beyond any doubt, saved the conference. But 
 for America the conference was lost, cut in two, or, rather, would 
 never have existed. 
 
 Thanks to America, a very important article was voted—article 
 48, which authorizes governments, in case of disputes, to address the 
 bureau of The Hague directly and demand or propose arbitration. 
 This mechanism has not been even noticed by the press, and yet it 
 will be amply sufficient to put all the resources of arbitration in 
 motion. Previously, when two states had a ground of quarrel, they 
 were obliged to agree together to submit the question to arbitration, 
 and such an agreement between two governments whose relations 
 have become envenomed is almost impossible. To-day it is in the 
 power of one of them to make its offer openly and thus force the sec¬ 
 ond state to accept or decline that offer in presence of public opinion. 
 It is a very great progress, although it may appear almost impercep¬ 
 tible, and henceforth a state that sincerely wishes to avoid war can 
 reply to its aggressor: “ I appeal to the judges of The Hague! ” 
 
 Do you believe that the aggressor will be able to answer, “ I care 
 nothing for justice,” without raising against him the entire public 
 opinion of the world? 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 13 
 
 To conclude with a brief summary, the Second Conference of The 
 Hague lasted four months, not because it did not effect anything, 
 but because it found an immense field of labor before it. It has been 
 a simple session between the First and Third Conferences, and it is 
 the very modesty of its role that in my eyes constitutes the grandeur 
 of its work. It has been only the continuation of the First Confer¬ 
 ence and the preparation for the Third. It has, in fine, demon¬ 
 strated the possibility of creating a universal parliament by its own 
 life and by the very length and regularity of its action. 
 
 Paris, France. 
 
 COUNCIL OF DIRECTION FOR THE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INTER¬ 
 NATIONAL CONCILIATION. 
 
 Lyman Abbott, New York. 
 
 Charles Francis Adams, Boston. 
 
 Edwin A. Alderman, Charlottesville, 
 Ya. 
 
 Charles H. Ames, Boston, Mass. 
 Richard Bartholdt, M. C., St. Louis, 
 Mo. 
 
 Clifton R. Breckenridge, Arkansas. 
 William J. Bryan, Lincoln, Nebr. 
 
 T. E. Burton, M. C., Cleveland, Ohio. 
 Nicholas Murray Butler, New York. 
 Andrew Carnegie, New York. 
 
 Edward Cary, New York. 
 
 Joseph H. Choate, New York. 
 
 Richard H. Dana, Boston, Mass. 
 Arthur H. Dasher, Macon, Ga. 
 
 Horace E. Deming, New York. 
 
 Charles W. Eliot, Cambridge, Mass. 
 John W. Foster, Washington, D. C. 
 Richard Watson Gilder, New York. 
 John Arthur Greene, New York. 
 
 James M. Greenwood, Kansas City, Mo. 
 Franklin H. Mead, Chicago, Ill. 
 William J. Holland, Pittsburg, Pa. 
 Hamilton Holt, New York. 
 
 James L. Houghteling, Chicago, Ill. 
 Morris K. Jesup, New York. 
 
 David Starr Jordan, Stanford Uni¬ 
 versity, California. 
 
 Edmond Kelly, Paris, France. 
 
 Adolph Lewisohn, New York. 
 
 Seth Low, New York. 
 
 Clarence H. Mackay, New York. 
 
 W. H. Mahony, Columbus, Ohio. 
 Brander Matthews, New York. 
 
 W. W. Morrow, San Francisco, Cal. 
 George B. McClellan, Mayor of New 
 York. 
 
 Levi P. Morton, New York. 
 
 Silas McBee, New York. 
 
 Simon Newcomb, Washington, D. C. 
 Stephen H. Olin, New York. 
 
 A. V. V. Rayomnd, Schenectady, N. Y. 
 Ira Remsen, Baltimore, Md. 
 
 James Ford Rhodes, Boston, Mass. 
 Howard J. Rogers, Albany, N. Y. 
 
 Elihu Root, Washington, D. C. 
 
 J. G. Schurman, Ithaca, N. Y. 
 
 Isaac N. Seligman, New York. 
 
 F. J. V. Skiff, Chicago, Ill. 
 
 William M. Sloane, New York. 
 
 Albert Iv. Smiley, Lake Mohonk, N. Y. 
 James Speyer, New York. 
 
 Oscar S. Straus, Washington, D. C. 
 Mrs. Mary Wood Swift, San Francisco, 
 Cal. 
 
 George W. Taylor, M. C., Demopolis, 
 Ala. 
 
 O. H. Tittman, Washington, D. C. 
 
 W. H. Tolman, New York. 
 
 Benjamin Trueblood, Boston, Mass. 
 Edward Tuck, Paris, France. 
 
 William D. Wheelwright, Portland, 
 Ore. 
 
 Andrew D. White, Ithaca, N. Y. 
 
The Work of the Second Hague Peace 
 Conference. 
 
 By James Brown Scott. 
 
 [Reprinted from the American Journal of International Law for January, 1908.] 
 
 The Second International Peace Conference, like its predecessor 
 of 1899, endeavored to humanize the hardships necessarily incident 
 to war and to substitute for a resort to arms a pacific settlement of 
 international grievances, which, if unsettled, might lead to war or 
 make the maintenance of pacific relations difficult and problematical. 
 The conference of 1907, no more than its immediate predecessor, 
 satisfied the leaders of humanitarian thought. War was not abol¬ 
 ished, nor was peace legislated into existence. Universal disarma¬ 
 ment was as unacceptable in 1907 as in 1899, and some few nations 
 were still unwilling to bind themselves to refer all international 
 disputes not involving independence, vital interests, or national honor 
 to a court of arbitration. 
 
 Deeply interested in the success of these projects, the great public 
 felt that their failure necessarily involved the failure of the con¬ 
 ference, notwithstanding that many wise and humanitarian measures 
 falling short of the goal were incorporated into the law of'nations. 
 But we should not in our disappointment, and perhaps bitterness of 
 soul, overlook positive and beneficent progress, and if we could not 
 take the advanced position outlined by the friends of peace, we should 
 nevertheless rejoice that many a milestone has been passed. We 
 must not forget that an international conference is different from a 
 parliament; that independent and sovereign nations are not bound by 
 majorities, and that positive results are obtained by compromising 
 upon desirable but perhaps less advanced projects. The aim of a 
 conference is to lay down a law for all, not for the many, much less 
 for the few; to establish a law which will be international because it 
 is accepted and enforced by all nations. 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 
 
 The work of the conference concerned the modification of exist¬ 
 ing international law; international differences of opinion and inter¬ 
 pretation were adjusted; doubt gave place to certainty, and, after 
 much consideration and reflection, principles of international law 
 were fortified, modified in part, or wholly discarded. A complete 
 code was not established—it is doubtful whether custom and usage 
 are ripe for codification—but important topics of international law 
 were given the symmetry and precision of a code. 
 
 It may be maintained that international law is law in the strict 
 sense of the word, or it may be contended that it lacks an essential 
 
 15 
 
16 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 element of law, because there is no international sheriff; that it is 
 international morality or ethics, or that finally a law of nations is 
 the occupation of the theorist and the hope of the dreamer. However 
 opinions may differ as to the nature of international law, there can 
 be no doubt of the existence of certain rules and regulations which 
 do by common consent control the conduct of independent nations; 
 nor can there be any reasonable doubt that enlightened people of all 
 countries take a deep and abiding interest in international law, and 
 share the hope of the dreamer, not only that greater precision may 
 be given to its principles, but that the principles themselves may be 
 developed and applied with the certainty and precision of a munici¬ 
 pal code. 
 
 From the cell of the cloister international law passed into the 
 study of the philosopher, the jurist, and the scholar; from the study 
 it entered the cabinets of Europe, and for two centuries and more a 
 recognized system of international law has determined the foreign 
 relations of nations; from the cabinet to courts of justice, where the 
 rights of nations as well as individuals have been debated and en¬ 
 forced, and, finally, from the court room international law has made 
 its way to the people, who, in last resort, dominate court and cabinet, 
 and enlist in their service scholar as well as priest. 
 
 It was a wise remark of Sir James Mackintosh that constitutions 
 are not made; they grow; for history demonstrates that unnatural 
 unions dissolve; that unnatural alliances have little permanency; that 
 constitutions struck off at the heat of a moment in times of excite¬ 
 ment disappear with the causes to which they owe their origin. Con¬ 
 stitutions are, in a large and broad sense of the word, codifications. 
 They put into written and permanent form the usages and customs 
 of the past, and they last because the spirit underlying these usages 
 and customs is wrapped up with the existence and destiny of the 
 people. The Constitution of the United States has lasted because 
 it was based upon the usages and customs of England, as modified 
 by the experience in the colonies, and the Constitution will last as 
 long as it answers the needs of its framers, and no longer. To under¬ 
 stand, however, the Constitution English customs and usages must 
 be studied, and to predict the lines of development we must interpret 
 the language of the Constitution in the light of its origin, as well as 
 in the concrete case under investigation. It is the same with law. 
 Law is not imposed as a system upon the people. Isolated usage 
 develops into habit; the habit becomes crystallized into custom, and 
 to custom there is given, consciously and unconsciously, the force of 
 law. 
 
 The common law of England is not due to the wisdom of any one 
 person or of any one age. It grew to meet a need; it changed with 
 that need, and disappeared when it could no longer subserve a useful 
 purpose. It is a growth, an organism, not a crystallization. 
 
 When, however, the process of development did not keep abreast 
 of the age, or when new and unsuspected needs required special treat¬ 
 ment, statutes made their appearance to supply the lack or to correct 
 the evil. The statute would be special if a special point were in¬ 
 volved. The statute would be general in its terms if the evil to be 
 corrected were general, or the need of the statute was of a general, 
 widespread nature. The more rapid the development of the country, 
 the greater and more diversified become the needs of an enterprising 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 17 
 
 and progressive community, and consequently the more frequent 
 would be and must be the resort to statutory enactments, in order to 
 safeguard the rights and interests created as the result of changed 
 conditions. Hence it follows that a system of law in its early stages 
 springs directly out of the needs of the people. If the needs be 
 simple, the law, of which custom is the very life, is simple. It is 
 said to be unwritten in the sense that no custom is at once the law 
 and the evidence, although in process of time the customs are natu¬ 
 rally reduced to writing by people learned in customary law, and 
 it is given precision by decrees of courts of justice. Complex situa¬ 
 tions give rise to a complex system of law, and the natural develop¬ 
 ment of custom not being sufficient, the legislature steps in by statute 
 to accelerate the development and to give to the system of law the 
 precision, the solidity, and the refinement necessary for a compli¬ 
 cated and progressive civilization. In this development, then, we 
 have the local usage, the custom, and the statute. 
 
 If we turn from the common law to international law, we find 
 that the course of development of the common law of nations has 
 been singularly like that of the common law of England. 
 
 We first have the usages of enlightened nations. These usages 
 spread, gain weight and influence by repeated application. We next 
 find that the usages have taken on the form of custom, and nations 
 from isolated or frequent usage regard the custom as binding upon 
 them. That which is claimed as a right on the one side becomes a 
 duty on the other, for right and duty are correlative. The demand 
 in itself is a consent to the rule of law. The yielding to the demand 
 is an acknowledgment of the rightfulness of the custom. 
 
 We thence have customary rules and regulations binding nations 
 in their mutual intercourse, because the nations, either by enforcing 
 the custom or yielding to the custom sought to be enforced, have 
 given to the custom the weight of law. But just as the common law 
 of England grew slowly, indeed imperceptibly, so have the usages 
 of nations developed slowly and imperceptibly. When nations had 
 little intercourse with one another, the need for a system of law regu¬ 
 lating such relations was of little moment. As nations have grown, 
 as they have come into closer contact, as no nation lives and can live 
 in the modern world in a state of isolation, it necessarily follows 
 that the usages and customs of nations must be developed in order 
 adequately to meet changed conditions. The independence of the 
 state is the very postulate of international law; but the solidarity of 
 interest has made itself felt to such a degree that nations have yielded 
 and must in the future yield something of their absolute liberty and 
 independence, just as a citizen yields his absolute freedom for the 
 benefit of society, of which he is a part. 
 
 We see, then, from this brief and imperfect sketch of the origin 
 and nature of the common law of one particular jurisdiction, an 
 analogy between the common law of nations, namely, the usages and 
 customs of many nations. We find, or at least we can assume, that 
 when only one nation existed there could be no international law. 
 Two nations existing would have comparatively little intercourse, and 
 the rules and regulations governing their intercourse would there¬ 
 fore be simple. As the two gave place to the many, and as inter¬ 
 course become very frequent, the need of a more elaborate code would 
 
 S. Doc. 433, 00-1 - 2 
 
18 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 become evident. Usage and custom would grow to meet the need, 
 and in the course of time, insensibly and imperceptibly, usage and 
 custom would take the dimensions of a code. But while that is en¬ 
 tirely true generally, it is true with much greater force in the present 
 and, indeed, in the immediate past; for the discovery of the New 
 World, North and South America, and the contest for the possession 
 of this world; the establishment of colonies with the various colonial 
 systems, and the conflicts of interest that necessarily arose, would re¬ 
 quire a system of law adequate to settle them; and when nation be¬ 
 came more closely connected, more intimately and frequently in¬ 
 volved, it followed that the simplicity of the earlier usages and cus¬ 
 toms would either give place to a more complicated code or would 
 themselves be developed in order to meet the growing needs. 
 
 CONGRESSES AND TREATIES. 
 
 Now, how could this be done? In this way. As nations became 
 more closely united or related, previous usage or custom was found 
 to be inadequate; but the spirit pervading the usage or custom was 
 discovered and developed, precisely as the spirit in the common law 
 was developed in order to meet a changed condition of affairs. Just 
 as in appropriate cases the municipal legislature stepped in and cor¬ 
 rected an abuse or covered a field by statute, conferences were held 
 between rulers, treaties were negotiated to regulate a specific con¬ 
 crete controversy, and finally congresses, usually not at the beginning 
 but at the end of the controversy, composed of many states, because 
 the interests of many were concerned, were convened in order that 
 that might remain settled in peace which had been established in 
 war. The conference or congress is, it would seem, not far removed 
 from an international legislature, whose acts are submitted ad refer¬ 
 endum to the participating nations. 
 
 We therefore find that treaties mark the first general step in the 
 development of the law of nations as between nations in recent years, 
 for it is only in the modern world that treaties have gone far to cor¬ 
 rect inequality and to establish a system of international relations. 
 The special or individual treaties will be comparatively simple in the 
 prinicples of law announced or defined, although complicated in 
 other respects. When the many were involved, a congress or con¬ 
 ference came naturally into being, with the result that in this con¬ 
 ference the questions causing the conflict would be considered and 
 regulated, in the hope to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. The 
 conferences and congresses were at the conclusion of a dispute. The 
 appeal was indeed to reason, but it was unfortunately belated. Inter¬ 
 esting examples of the post-mortem appeal to reason are furnished 
 by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Congress of Vienna (1814- 
 15), the Congress of Paris (1856), the Congress of Berlin (1878). 
 The Treaty of Westphalia was negotiated by representatives of the 
 states engaged in the Thirty Years’ War and the state of affairs estab¬ 
 lished was hoped to be durable. 
 
 Passing over the conference and treaties concluding the wars of 
 Louis XIV, of which the various treaties of Utrecht of 1713-14 
 were the most important and far-reaching in detail as well as in 
 prinicple, we come to the Congres of Vienna, which attempted, by 
 a rigid and thorough application of the principle of legitimacy, to 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 19 
 
 reconstruct Europe upon permanent lines after the crash of the 
 French Revolution and the downfall of Napoleon. The great powers 
 agreed among themselves and legislated for the rest of Europe. The 
 work, therefore, was largely political, but as all were concerned all 
 were present or bound by the determinations of the congress. It 
 was preeminently a war conference, but it established peace—a peace 
 which lasted for many years. At the same time its deliberations took 
 the form of a general statute concerning river navigation, the rank 
 of ambassadors, and the slave trade. Criticise the Congress of Vienna 
 as we may, its work was not only of fundamental importance, but 
 pointed the way to a better and brighter day. 
 
 Although it can not be denied that the Congress of Paris in 1856 
 was a war conference, its work was not wholly taken up with the 
 issues of war. The Declaration of Paris, for example, was much 
 more general and touched interests which, while involved in the con¬ 
 flict, were of wider importance than the immediate interests that led 
 to the war or were safeguarded by the conclusion of peace. It is also 
 true that the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, was a war congress, but it 
 dealt particularly and largely with the Balkan Peninsula and set up 
 a state of affairs which, while changed in part, is nevertheless the 
 basis of order in Eastern Europe. 
 
 But alongside of these larger gatherings there were smaller meet¬ 
 ings that have profoundly influenced the future. For example, an 
 enthusiast in Switzerland interested countries in the treatment of sick 
 and wounded and produced the first Geneva Convention of 1864—the 
 Red Cross Convention, as we call it—to ameliorate the condition of 
 the sick and wounded upon the field of battle. The convention did 
 not come at the very end of a war; it was assembled by reason of the 
 horrors of the war of 1859 between France and Italy against Austria. 
 In 1868 the additional articles of the Convention of Geneva were 
 drawn up in conference, and there was no immediate war that had 
 caused the conference to assemble. The purport of these articles was 
 to apply to naval warfare the principles of the Geneva Convention of 
 1864. 
 
 In 1868 the Czar of Russia, Alexander II, called a conference in 
 order to consider whether or not the means of warfare might not be 
 humanized; whether the use of certain instruments in warfare, or 
 instruments of a certain kind, should be prohibited; whether bullets 
 of a certain weight, of a certain explosive quality, should not be pro¬ 
 hibited, and there was drawn up the Declaration of St. Petersburg. 
 It is true that the declaration contemplated but was not preceded by 
 war. 
 
 The conference that met in Brussels in 1874 upon the invitation 
 of the Czar, and which drew up a project of an international declara¬ 
 tion concerning the laws and customs of war, was not immediately 
 preceded by a war; and although the project was not adopted by the 
 powers represented, it was nevertheless the basis of the “ convention 
 dealing with the laws and customs of war ” framed by the First 
 Hague Peace Conference. The Brussels Conference undertook the 
 codification of the laws of war—and in so far it can not be con¬ 
 sidered a peace conference—but it furnished the precious precedent 
 of an international statute. 
 
 The various congresses and conferences referred to were sum¬ 
 moned by the rulers and nations of Europe, and both in their calling 
 
20 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 and in their results indicated an advance in public opinion. Public 
 opinion, however, was not content to intrust itself wholly to nations 
 and their rulers, but sought expression in individual and cooperative 
 lines. 
 
 In 1873 the Institute of International Law was established at 
 Brussels, composed of distinguished jurists and authorities on inter¬ 
 national law. Their purpose was not merely to study the problems 
 of international law, but to advance the science by an appeal to 
 reason. They considered the field of international law from the 
 standpoint of theory and sought by example and precept to aid the 
 codification of a rational system of international law. International 
 law had thus a society whose proceedings should appear annually. 
 It already had a journal, for in 1869 three enthusiasts, Rolin-Jaeque- 
 myns, Asser, and Westlake, established the Revue de Droit Interna¬ 
 tional et de Legislation Comparee. The institute met annually and 
 issued its annual. The Review discussed scientifically and at length 
 important questions of international law, and, little by little, the in¬ 
 fluence of the institute and the review extended beyond the immedi¬ 
 ate country of publication and beyond the language in which the pro¬ 
 ceedings and the articles were written. A great movement looking 
 toward advance in international lines was begun, and in reality the 
 call of the Czar for the great conference of 1899, the First Hague 
 Conference, was simply, paradoxical as it may seem, the substitution 
 of national or international effort for the individual or socialized 
 effort of the founders of the Institute of International Law. 
 
 FIRST HAGUE CONFERENCE. 
 
 In 1898 the Czar Nicholas called the First Peace Conference, 
 designed chiefly, it would seem, to free nations from the burden of 
 the constantly increasing armament by bringing about disarmament. 
 The circular astonished the diplomats; it was not favorably received 
 in many quarters. Thereupon a new circular was prepared enlar¬ 
 ging the scope, relegating disarmament to a less important position, 
 hut enlarging the scope of the programme, or of the invitation, by 
 including the consideration of various methods by which arbitration 
 might be advanced and the peaceful solution of international diffi¬ 
 culties made the rule. This second circular was much better received, 
 and on the 18tli day of May, 1899, the First Peace Conference of this 
 modern world, without a war as its immediate cause, met at the 
 House in the Woods at The Hague for the purely academic consider¬ 
 ation of very great and important international questions. 
 
 As an understanding of the work of the First Conference is neces¬ 
 sary to an appreciation of the recent Second Conference, the results 
 of the deliberations of the First Conference are briefly set forth. 
 
 The work, then, of this conference took shape in three great con¬ 
 ventions. The first was the convention for the peaceful settlement of 
 international conflicts, which convention established, first, the right 
 of nations to offer their good offices and mediation without having 
 the offer or mediation considered as an unfriendly act by either or 
 any of the contending parties; second, a commission of inquiry to 
 ascertain the facts of an international difficulty of great and serious 
 importance, so that the facts involved might be found impartially by 
 a commission composed of neutrals as well as nationals. We all re- 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 21 
 
 call the Dogger Bank incident in Admiral Rojesvensky’s remarkable 
 tour of the world. Japanese vessels were supposed to be lying in 
 wait in the North Sea. The Russian squadron opened fire. It is not 
 related that any Japanese vessels were sunk, but certain English fish¬ 
 ing smacks were injured and lives were lost. It is difficult to appre¬ 
 ciate the state of mind of the Russian admiral, because one would not 
 expect to find Japanese cruisers in the North Sea. or if one did find 
 such cruisers, the fact of their presence would be well known. How¬ 
 ever, the Russian authorities maintained that they felt the presence 
 of the enemy, whether through a mistake of signaling or not; fire 
 was opened and lives were lost. Were it not well established, this 
 would be unbelievable; but it happened. And the next step was not 
 an unbelievable one—the next step was war. Wars have arisen for 
 less cause than that. The national honor of both countries was in¬ 
 volved. Great Britain could not allow its subjects to be shot with 
 impunity; Russia could not well consent to discipline its naval au¬ 
 thorities without an investigation. Now, an investigation to be 
 valuable must be impartial, must be conducted more or less by neu¬ 
 trals, and for the first time the provisions of the convention for the 
 peaceful solution of international conflicts in the matter of commis¬ 
 sions of inquiry were used. A report was made by this board finding 
 the attack unjustified, and Russia settled the damages. Rulers of 
 nations and their responsible governments often seek to avoid war, 
 but are frequently unable to do so. Therefore this machinery was 
 a godsend by which a bitter dispute between two countries concerning 
 a matter of fact might be referred to an impartial board for examina¬ 
 tion and report. Without expressing any opinion, let me call your 
 attention to the causes, at least to an incident if it were not a cause, 
 which preceded the Spanish-American war—the blowing up of the 
 Maine in Habana Harbor. Was it blown up from within or without? 
 An international board never considered the question. An American 
 board did consider the question. The public passions were inflamed, 
 and we rushed headlong into war. If this international commission 
 had existed at that time, the President of the United States would 
 have been in an intrenched position, for he could have insisted that 
 this matter, being a question of fact, be submitted to a commission 
 of inquiry ready for constitution under rules of procedure accepted 
 by civilized nations. I can not say that the Spanish-American war 
 would not have taken place. I am not a prophet either as to future 
 events or as to events of the past, but I do maintain that those clauses 
 would have made the outbreak of war much more difficult, and that 
 therefore the establishment of a commission of inquiry is a great ad¬ 
 vance for the cause of peace. 
 
 Third, the convention for the pacific solutions of international con¬ 
 flicts provided a court of arbitration. Perhaps I would better say, 
 provided for a court of international arbitration, because that court 
 was to be created when the international controversy arose. Each 
 nation was to select and appoint and notify to a board created at 
 The Hague not more than four persons of good moral character and 
 competent in international law. In case of a conflict each party was 
 to select two from this list of judges. The judges were to elect their 
 umpire, their presiding officer, or the nations were to provide other¬ 
 wise for the selection of the umpire. In order that the tribunal thus 
 constituted might be of service and in order that litigants might 
 
22 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 know the exact procedure to be followed before it, an elaborate sys¬ 
 tem of procedure was drawn up and approved. Since the meeting 
 of the First Hague Conference four great and important cases have 
 been, submitted to The Hague Tribunal, have been adjudicated, and 
 the judgments cheerfully and promptly accepted by the litigating 
 nations. Nations appeared before the bar as suitors and resorted to 
 law instead of force. The court has not, however, been so successful 
 as its framers hoped, largely because it is not a court permanently 
 in session composed of judges or jurists acting under a sense of 
 judicial responsibility. The fear of partiality in a court constituted 
 by the suitors for a particular purpose, with judges chosen and paid 
 by the litigants, would seem to account for the partial success, if not 
 failure, of the institution. 
 
 The second great convention of the First Conference was the con¬ 
 vention for the adaptation of the Red Cross to maritime warfare. 
 That, of course, is a technical subject, but even the layman can see 
 what a great advance it was to have the humane principles of the 
 Geneva Convention of 1864 and the additional articles of 1868 
 applied to maritime warfare as well as land warfare. 
 
 The third great convention was the codification of the laws and 
 customs of land warfare, which, composed by experts, assumed the 
 proportions of an elaborate code. While based upon the laws and 
 customs of war adopted by the Conference of Brussels (August 27, 
 1874), the declaration of Brussels drew its life and spirit from Dr. 
 Francis Lieber’s Instruction for the Government of Armies in the 
 Field, known in army circles as General Orders, No. 100, of 1863. 
 The United States may therefore claim not a little proprietary 
 interest in this great convention of 1899. 
 
 Such is, in brief, the outline of the work of the First Hague Con¬ 
 ference. Misunderstood at the time, subjected to ridicule by reformer 
 as well as reactionary, the conference is now looked upon at once as 
 the starting point and the center of international progress. 
 
 TWOFOLD WORK OF SECOND CONFERENCE. 
 
 The work of the Second Conference, for which the year 1907 will 
 be remarkable, was twofold. First, it revised and enlarged the con¬ 
 ventions of 1899 in the light of experience, in the light of practice as 
 well as of theory, and put them forth to the world in a new and 
 modified form. In the next place the conference did not limit itself 
 to these subjects. To the three conventions of 1899, revised in 1907, 
 were added ten new conventions. This simple statement shows the 
 enormous field covered and the positive results achieved by the 
 Second Conference within the comparatively short period of four 
 months. Tried by the standards of results, the conference clearly 
 justified its existence, but it would have been a success had it demon¬ 
 strated nothing more than the possibility of the representatives of 
 forty-four nations to live in peace and quiet during four months. If 
 it had done nothing more than to bring these representatives into 
 close contact to learn to understand one another’s needs by under¬ 
 standing one another, the conference would have been a success. 
 
 But Ave can not content ourselves with a mere statement of results, 
 for the conference must rise or fall, not by the amount accomplished, 
 not by the number of conventions negotiated and signed, but by their 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFEKENCE. 
 
 23 
 
 value and importance. As the various conventions, declarations, reso¬ 
 lutions, and voeux of the conference have been incorporated in the 
 Final Act and arranged in what seemed to the conference their order 
 of importance, it appears advisable to discuss the various results of 
 the conference in the order established by the Final Act. Perhaps 
 a word of explanation is necessary as to the Final Act itself. It 
 states the calling of the convention, enumerates the countries and 
 their delegates taking part in the conference. But the Final Act is 
 not a convention; it is rather a solemn statement of what was done, a 
 summary or resume of results indicated by the names and titles of 
 the conventions, to be followed by the text in separate form. 
 
 The preamble of the Final Act states: 
 
 “ The Second International Conference of Peace, proposed by the 
 President of the United States of America, having been, upon the 
 invitation of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, convoked 
 by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, met, on the fifteenth 
 day of June, nineteen hundred and seven, at The Hague, in the Hall 
 of Knights, in order to give a further and new development to the 
 humanitarian principles which served as a basis for the first confer¬ 
 ence of 1809. The powers hereafter enumerated took part in the 
 conference and designated as their delegates the following: Ger¬ 
 many (arranged according to the French names of the countries), 
 the United States of America,” etc. The Final Act then continues: 
 
 “ In a series of reunions held from the fifteenth day of June to the 
 eighteenth day of October, nineteen hundred and seven, in which the 
 delegates have constantly been animated by the desire to realize in 
 the largest measure possible the generous views of the august initia¬ 
 tor of the conference and the intentions of their Governments 
 * * * ,” the conference adopted “ to be submitted to the signatures 
 
 of the plenipotentiaries the texts of conventions and of the declara¬ 
 tion hereinafter enumerated and annexed to the present act.” 
 
 An examination of the text of the preamble of the Final Act 
 clearly indicates that the conference was called by President Roose¬ 
 velt. It is common knowledge that Russia was not in a position to 
 call the conference during two eventful years. Time was slipping 
 by and those who believed in conferences were anxious that a new 
 conference should meet in order to take up the work outlined but left 
 undone at the First Conference. Therefore President Roosevelt 
 sent a circular to the various powers outlining a programme and re¬ 
 questing an expression of opinion as to the advisability of such a con¬ 
 ference and assent to participation in it. The responses were favor¬ 
 able and it seemed not unlikely that the conference would meet under 
 the auspices of President Roosevelt. However, a representative of 
 Russia waited upon the President and requested that the initiative 
 be transferred from the United States to the Czar, inasmuch as the 
 Czar had called into being not merely the First Conference but the 
 idea of the conference. With that chivalry which is characteristic 
 of the President, he -immediately yielded the initiative to the Em¬ 
 peror of Russia, the “ august initiator,” as he is called, and the con¬ 
 ference was convoked by the Queen of Holland upon the invitation 
 of the Czar. The United States w r as, however, unwilling that only 
 a part of the world should be represented. Appropriate steps were 
 therefore taken for the admission of Latin America, and assent was 
 obtained by diplomatic correspondence. Two of the three conven- 
 
24 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 tions of 1899 were open; that is to say, the nonsignatory states were 
 invited to sign, and upon signing, to assume the obligations and ben¬ 
 efits under the conventions. The convention for the peaceful set¬ 
 tlement of international conflicts was a closed convention and the 
 assent of the powers was necessary in order that the Latin-American 
 States might be permitted to sign. The reason for this was that 
 while the powers represented at the First Conference were willing 
 to arbitrate and to enter into certain relations with the states rep¬ 
 resented at the First Conference, they were unwilling to contract 
 generally. As one of the delegates said at the second convention, 
 he was unwilling to open his door to any newcomer who chose to 
 knock. No objection was made, however, to the adhesion of the 
 Latin-American States, and on the 14th day of June, 1907, consent 
 to their adherence was formally given. 
 
 In all, forty-four states were represented at the conference and 
 forty-four states answered the roll call. Two states of Latin America 
 were not represented, Costa Rica and Honduras. The former ap¬ 
 proved of the conference and adhered to the conventions of 1899, but 
 was not represented. The absence of Honduras was explained by the 
 recent revolution, . which paralyzed its efforts. The restoration of 
 peace led to an application to be admitted and the application was 
 favorably acted upon. Delegates were appointed, but they did not 
 arrive in time to participate in the work of the conference. 
 
 FIRST CONVENTION. 
 
 Following then the order of the Final Act, the first is the conven¬ 
 tion for the pacific solution of international conflicts, the nature of 
 which has been sufficiently explained. 
 
 It should be said, however, that the commission of inquiry was 
 much enlarged in the light of the experience—experience gained .in 
 the Dogger Bank incident, previously referred to. The language of 
 the convention was carefully < revised, provisions were given greater 
 clearness, and a few sections added on summary procedure. The 
 great framework of 1899 was untouched; for the additions of 1907 
 do not change the nature of the structure, although the architects 
 of 1907 would doubtless pronounce the additions to be undoubted 
 improvements. 
 
 SECOND CONVENTION. 
 
 The second is the convention restricting the use of force for the re¬ 
 covery of contract debts. This was introduced by the American 
 delegation, loyally and devotedly seconded by Doctor Drago, who has 
 battled for the doctrine to which he has given his name. Without 
 the support of Doctor Drago, it is doubtful if Latin America—for 
 whose benefit it was introduced—would have voted for this very im¬ 
 portant doctrine. The proposition is very short; it consists of but 
 three articles, but we must not measure things by their size. In full 
 it is as follows: 
 
 In order to avoid between nations armed conflicts of a purely pecuniary 
 origin arising from contractual debts claimed from the government of one 
 country by the government of another country to be due to its nationals, the 
 contracting powers agree not to have recourse to armed force for the collection 
 of such contractual debts. 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 25 
 
 However, this stipulation shall not be applicable when the debtor state re¬ 
 fuses or leaves unanswered an offer to arbitrate, or, in case of acceptance, 
 makes it impossible to formulate the terms of submission, or after arbitration, 
 fails to comply with the award rendered. 
 
 It is further agreed that arbitration here contemplated shall be in conformity, 
 as to procedure, with Title IV, Chapter III of the convention for the pacific 
 settlement of international disputes adopted at The Hague, and that it shall 
 determine, in so far as there shall be no agreement between the parties, the 
 justice, and the amount of the debt, the time and mode of payment thereof. 
 
 . In commenting upon the convention. President Roosevelt wisely and 
 truly said that “ such a provision would have prevented much in¬ 
 justice and extortion in the past.” It is emphatically .a peace measure, 
 for the creditor renounces force and binds himself to submit his claim 
 to arbitration. Pressure is thus brought upon the debtor to accept 
 arbitration or take the consequences of a refusal. It should not be 
 overlooked that these three paragraphs will banish foreign fleets from 
 American waters, and American ports are not likely again to be 
 blockaded, as in the past, for the collection of contract debts due from 
 one government to citizens of the blockading nation. The Monroe 
 doctrine has made its first and formal entry into the public law of 
 Europe as well as America. 
 
 THIRD CONVENTION. 
 
 The third convention relates to the opening of hostilities and pro¬ 
 vides, in Article I, that the contracting powers recognize that hostili¬ 
 ties between them should not commence without notice, which shall be 
 either in the form of a formal declaration of war or of an ultimatum 
 in the nature of a declaration of conditional war. This is to protect 
 belligerents from surprise and bad faith. Article II is meant to 
 safeguard the rights of neutrals. The state of war should be noti¬ 
 fied without delay to neutral powers, and shall only affect them after, 
 the receipt of a notification, which may be sent even by telegram. 
 HoweA T er, neutral powers can not invoke the benefit of the absence of 
 notification if it* is established that the neutral powers know that war 
 actually exists. Those two articles mean that while the nations 
 should declare war, although they may perhaps rush into war with¬ 
 out notification, neutrals are not to be subjected to the burdens of war 
 until they have been fully notified and are, therefore, able to take the 
 proper steps and measures to preserve their interests. 
 
 FOURTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The fourth convention concerns the laws and customs of land war¬ 
 fare. This has been previously stated to be a revision of the conven¬ 
 tion of 1899. It is highly technical and codifies in a humanitarian 
 spirit the warfare of the present. 
 
 FIFTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The fifth convention attempts to regulate the rights and duties of 
 neutral powers and of neutral persons in case of land warfare. Short, 
 but important, its guiding spirit is expressed in the opening para¬ 
 graph of the preamble, namely, to render more certain the rights and 
 duties of neutral powers in case of warfare upon land and to regulate 
 the situation of belligerent refugees in neutral territory. The framers 
 
26 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 of the convention felt that although a fragment, it would at least de¬ 
 fine neutrality until it might be possible to regulate as a whole the 
 situation of neutrals in their relation to belligerents. The nature of 
 the convention is thus evident. Its further definition would involve 
 us in technical details. 
 
 SIXTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The sixth is the convention concerning enemy merchant ships found 
 in enemy ports or upon the high seas at the outbreak of hostilities. 
 Custom forbids the capture of enemy vessels within the port of the 
 enemy on the outbreak of hostilities and allows them a limited time 
 to discharge or load their cargo and depart for their port of desti¬ 
 nation. The attempt was made to establish this custom or privilege 
 as a right. The proposition, however, met with serious opposition 
 and, instead of the right, the convention states that it is desirable that 
 enemy ships be permitted freely to leave the port. The convention, 
 therefore, was restrictive rather than declaratory of existing inter¬ 
 national practice. The same might be said of another provision of 
 the convention concerning the treatment of enemy merchant ships 
 upon the high seas. It may be said that the expression of a desire is 
 tantamount to a positive declaration, but, strictly construed, the con¬ 
 vention is not progressive. It lessens rights acquired by custom and 
 usage, although it does, indeed,-render the privilege granted uni¬ 
 versal. The American delegation, therefore, refrained from signing 
 the convention. 
 
 SEVENTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The seventh convention deals with the transformation of merchant 
 ships into ships of war, and it must be said that the positive results 
 of this convention are of little or no practical value. The burning 
 question was whether merchant ships might be transformed into men- 
 of-war upon the high seas. As the transformation of merchant ves¬ 
 sels into war vessels upon the high seas caused an international com¬ 
 motion during the recent Russo-Japanese war, Great Britain and the 
 United States insisted that the transfer should only be allowed within 
 the territorial jurisdiction of the transforming power. Some of the 
 continental states, on the contrary, refused to renounce the exercise 
 of the alleged right. The great maritime states were thus divided, 
 and as the question was too simple and too plain to admit of com¬ 
 promise, it was agreed to drop it entirely for the present. In order, 
 however, that something might remain of the careful and elaborate 
 discussions of the subject, a series of regulations was drawn up regard¬ 
 ing the transformation of merchant ships into vessels of Avar, declara¬ 
 tory of international custom. For example: The vessel transformed 
 should be placed under the direct and immediate control and respon¬ 
 sibility of the power whose flag it bears; that the vessel must bear 
 the outward signs of a man of war; that the commander should be in 
 the service of the state and duly commissioned; that his name should 
 appear upon the list of officers of the navy; that the crew should be 
 submitted to military discipline; that the vessel in its operations 
 should conform itself to the customs of war, and that the transform¬ 
 ing nation should notify, as soon as possible, the transformation of 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 27 
 
 the merchant vessel. It will be seen that all reference to the place of 
 transformation was thus carefully eliminated and a series of unob¬ 
 jectionable and unquestionable resolutions declaratory of the inter¬ 
 national custom and practice was adopted. Indirectly, the rightful¬ 
 ness or wrongfulness of privateering was concerned, and inasmuch 
 as the United States would not consent to abolish privateering unless 
 the immunity of private property be safeguarded, the American 
 delegation abstained from signing the convention. 
 
 EIGHTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The eighth convention relates to the placing of submarine auto¬ 
 matic mines of contact, a subject of present and special interest to 
 belligerents; while the interest of the neutral is very general. War¬ 
 fare permits belligerents to attack and to destroy each other in order 
 to bring about a state of calm and repose which we call peace, but the 
 action of the belligerent should be confined to the belligerents them¬ 
 selves. Neutrals should be, as far as possible, unaffected. Mines 
 break from their moorings and endanger neutral life and property. 
 The conference, therefore, desires to regulate the use of mines in such 
 a way as not to deprive the belligerents of a recognized and legitimate 
 means of warfare, but to restrict, as far as possible, the damage to the 
 immediate belligerents. The following articles were therefore agreed 
 to: 
 
 Article 1. It is forbidden: (1) To use unanchored automatic contact mines, 
 unless they are so constructed as to become innocuous at the latest one hour 
 after control over them has been lost; (2) to place anchored automatic contact 
 mines which do not become innocuous on carrying away their moorings; (3) 
 to use torpedoes which do not become innocuous when they have missed their 
 target. 
 
 Art. 2. It is forbidden to place automatic contact mines in front of the coasts 
 and ports of the adversary with the sole object of intercepting commercial navi¬ 
 gation. 
 
 Art. 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are used, all possible precau¬ 
 tions should be taken for the safety of public navigation. 
 
 The belligerents engage, as far as possible, to provide that these mines shall 
 become innocuous after a limited period of time, and in case they cease to be 
 guarded, to give notice of the dangerous localities, as soon as military exigen¬ 
 cies permit, by a notice to shipping which will also be communicated to the 
 governments through diplomatic channels. 
 
 Art. 4. Any neutral power which places automatic contact mines in front of 
 its coasts must observe the same rules and take the same precautions as those 
 which are imposed upon belligerents. 
 
 The neutral powers must make known to shipping by previous notice, the 
 regions where automatic contact mines are to be moored. This notice must be 
 communicated speedily, as urgent, to the governments through diplomatic 
 channels. 
 
 Art. 5. At the close of the war, the contracting parties engage to do every¬ 
 thing in their power to remove, each for himself, the mines which it has placed. 
 
 As to anchored automatic contact mines which one of the belligerents has 
 placed along the coast of the other, their situation shall be indicated by the 
 power that has placed them to the other party and each power shall proceed in 
 the shortest possible time to remove the mines which are found in its waters. 
 
 Art. The signatory states which are not yet provided with improved mines, 
 .such as are required by this regulation, and which consequently can not actually 
 conform to the rules established by articles 1 and 3, agree to transform, as soon 
 as possible, their mines, so as to comply with the prescriptions mentioned above. 
 
 Art. 7. The stipulations of the present regulation are concluded for the 
 duration of seven years or until the end of the Third Peace Conference, if this 
 date is prior. 
 
28 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 The contracting powers engage to consider again the question of the use of 
 submarine automatic contact mines six months before the expiration of the 
 period of the seven years, in case it has not been again taken up and decided 
 by the Third Conference of Peace at a previous date. 
 
 In the absence of the stipulations of a new convention, the present regulation 
 shall continue in force, unless this convention is denounced. The denunciation 
 shall not take effect (with regard to the notifying power) until six months 
 after the notification. 
 
 It was sought, notably by Great Britain, to prevent any nation 
 from placing submarine mines beyond its territorial waters, namely, 
 the 3-mile limit. It was objected to this that while the offensive 
 use of mines .might be limited, it was inadvisable, perhaps unreason¬ 
 able, at the present time to limit the defensive use of mines. In one 
 case the mines would be used as a means of attack; in the second 
 place as a defense against aggression. The latter view commended 
 itself to the conference, and, after much discussion, it was agreed 
 not to introduce into the convention any provision upon the subject. 
 
 NINTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The ninth convention forbade the bombardment by naval forces 
 of undefended harbors, villages, towns, or buildings. The presence, 
 however, of military stores would permit bombardment of such 
 ports for the sole purpose of destroying the stores, provided they 
 were not destroyed or delivered up upon request. Notice, however, 
 should be given of the intention to bombard. In like manner, the 
 convention permitted the bombardment of such undefended places 
 if provisions were not supplied upon requisition to the naval force. 
 Bombardment, however, was not allowed for the collection of mere 
 money contributions. It should be said that unoffending property 
 was not to be bombarded or destroyed, and buildings and institutions 
 devoted to a religious, scientific, or charitable purpose were expressly 
 excluded from attack. 
 
 This convention will undoubtedly subserve a useful purpose and 
 clear up a doubt which seems to have existed. The weight of opinion 
 forbade the bombardment of undefended ports. The fear, however, 
 that such ports might be attacked and held in order to enforce sub¬ 
 mission, rendered a convention on this subject, even although declar¬ 
 atory of international usage and custom, of no little moment. We 
 all remember the Spanish-American war and the constant fear, how¬ 
 ever unfounded, that the Atlantic coast might be bombarded by the 
 Spanish fleet. 
 
 TENTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The tenth convention adapted to maritime warfare the principles 
 of the Geneva Convention of 1906. It is not necessary to describe 
 this admirable document in detail. We are familiar with the Red 
 Cross and its work, and there exists absolute unanimity of opinion 
 that the sick and wounded upon the battlefield or upon the high seas 
 should be cared for, irrespective of nationality. Humanity demands 
 it and this demand has been carefully complied with. A word of* 
 history may, however, be permitted. The first Geneva Convention, 
 dealing with land warfare, was drawn up in 1864. The additional 
 articles of 1868, extending the principles of land warfare to naval 
 warfare, failed of adoption. In 1899 the additional articles were 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 29 
 
 made the basis of a convention dealing with this question adopted at 
 the First Hague Convention. Warfare, however, had changed since 
 1864 and it was felt that the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 
 1864 should keep pace with the changed conditions, so in 1906 the 
 Geneva Convention of 1864 was revised and the present conference 
 adapted the provisions of this revised convention of 1906 to naval 
 warfare. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the importance of this 
 convention. We understand it and are proud of the progress it 
 marks, in succoring the sick and the Avounded and mitigating in 
 their extreme rigor the evils necessarily incident to war. 
 
 ELEVENTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The eleventh convention relates to certain restrictions in the exer¬ 
 cise of the right of capture in maritime war. It is a modest docu¬ 
 ment, but is all that was saved from the wreck of the immunity of 
 private property. The American delegation urged the abolition of 
 the right of capture of unoffending enemy private property upon the 
 high seas, but great maritime powers such as Great Britain, France, 
 Russia, and Japan were unwilling to relinquish this means of bring¬ 
 ing the enemy to terms. A convention negotiated by powers having 
 no great maritime interest might be a moral victory; it would not be 
 of practical importance except as embodying in conventional form the 
 advanced and radical views of this subject. But to return to the 
 present convention. Chapter 1 frees from capture mail upon a vessel 
 if not directed to or coming from a blockaded port. Chapter 2 frees 
 from capture fishing smacks devoted solely to coastal fishing and 
 small vessels engaged in local navigation. It is pleasing to note that 
 the conference made the basis of its action the decision of the Su¬ 
 preme Court of the United States in the well-known case of The Pa¬ 
 quette Habana , 1899 (175 IT. S., 677). Chapter 3 regulated the legal 
 condition of the crew of an enemy merchant vessel by providing that 
 subjects of neutral states were exempt from capture and that subjects 
 of the enemy state were likewise exempt from capture, provided they 
 gave an oath not to serve during the continuance of the war. These 
 provisions are indeed modest when we consider the vast subject in¬ 
 volved. They are, however, humanitarian, and therefore to be com¬ 
 mended. 
 
 TWELFTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The twelfth convention sought to establish an international court 
 of prize, and there only remains the ratification of this convention by 
 the contracting powers in order to call into being this great and 
 beneficent institution. For years enlightened opinion has protested 
 against the right of belligerents to pass final judgment upon the law¬ 
 fulness of the capture of neutral property, and it is a pleasure to be 
 able to state that the interests of the neutrals in the neutral prize 
 are henceforward to be placed in the hands of neutral judges with a 
 representation of the belligerents, in order that the rights of all con¬ 
 cerned may be carefully weighed and considered. 
 
 It is understood that Norway intended to present a project for the 
 establishment of a court of prize. It is a fact that both Germany 
 and Great Britain presented a project for the establishment of a 
 prize court at the first business session of the conference. # The proj- 
 
30 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 ects, however, were widely divergent. In one, the continental idea 
 prevailed; in the other, the Anglo-Saxon idea dominated. It was im¬ 
 possible to convince either of the advantage of the other plan. Mat¬ 
 ters were at a standstill, when the American delegation, through Mr. 
 Choate, proposed a basis of compromise which, accepted by both, 
 resulted in the establishment of the court. 
 
 The provisions of this convention are technical and detailed as 
 must be the case in which an institution is to be created and its juris¬ 
 diction and procedure defined within the compass of a single docu¬ 
 ment. It is impossible, therefore, to discuss it at any length, but it 
 would be an unpardonable omission if mention were not made of its 
 salient features. In the first place, national prize courts are to offi¬ 
 ciate as in times past. One appeal is allowed from a national court 
 to a higher court of the captor’s country. Thereupon, at the expira¬ 
 tion of two years an appeal may be taken directly from the national 
 court and the case transferred from the national court to the interna¬ 
 tional prize court at The Hague. This court thereupon becomes 
 seized of the law and the facts involved in the case and the decision 
 pronounced becomes final and binding upon the litigant parties. 
 
 It should be stated that while the prize court is chiefly a court for 
 nations instead of for individuals, still the individual suitor, unless 
 expressly prohibited by his country, may himself appeal and transfer 
 the case, should his country be indisposed to appear before the bar as 
 his representative. It may not be inappropriate to state that the 
 institution of the court is in itself a recognition of the fact that the 
 individual is not wdthout standing in modern international law. 
 
 In discussing the matter of the prize court, President Roosevelt 
 aptly said, in his recent message: 
 
 Anyone who recalls the injustices under which this country suffered as a 
 neutral power during the early part of the last century can not fail to see in 
 this provision for an international prize court the great advance which the 
 world is making toward the substitution of the rule of reason and justice in 
 place of simple force. Not only will the international prize court be the means 
 of protecting the interests of neutrals, but it is in itself a step toward the crea¬ 
 tion of the more general court for the hearing of international controversies of 
 which reference has just been made. The organization and action of such a 
 prize court can not fail to accustom the different countries to the submission of 
 international questions to the decision of an international tribunal, and we may 
 confidently expect the results of such submission to bring about a general agree¬ 
 ment upon the enlargement of the practice. 
 
 THIRTEENTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The thirteenth convention concerns and seeks to regulate the rights 
 and duties of neutral powers in case of maritime war. This is an 
 elaborate codification of the rights and duties of neutrals in which the 
 conference essayed to generalize and define on the one hand the rights 
 of neutrals and the correlative duties of the belligerents, and in the 
 second place to set forth in detail the duties of neutrals, thus safe¬ 
 guarding the rights of belligerents in certain phases of maritime 
 warfare. The belligerents are forbidden to commit hostilities within 
 the territory or the territorial waters of neutrals and are forbidden to 
 make a neutral port or neutral territory the basis of naval operations. 
 The neutral is likewise forbidden to permit such conduct; the belliger¬ 
 ent is forbidden to equip, provision, or to procure ammunition for a 
 warlike jmrpose within neutral ports, and the neutral is required to 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 31 
 
 prevent such use of its territory. The enemy men-of-war are forbid¬ 
 den to remain beyond a certain period in neutral harbors. If vessels 
 of the other enemy be present, the order in which the vessels shall 
 leave is prescribed, so that hostilities may not begin within neutral 
 jurisdiction. There are other and important provisions in the con¬ 
 vention which aim to codify existing custom, with the addition of 
 provisions thought to be necessary or highly desirable. The result, 
 however, was unsatisfactory to some of the larger maritime powers, 
 which prefer their present regulations on the subject of neutrality or 
 which were unwilling to accept the modifications proposed. The 
 United States was not satisfied with certain provisions of the conven¬ 
 tion and reserved the right to study the project in detail before ex¬ 
 pressing a final opinion. It therefore abstained from voting and 
 signing. 
 
 FOURTEENTH CONVENTION. 
 
 The fourteenth convention is a reenactment of the declaration of 
 1899 forbidding the launching of projectiles and explosives from bal¬ 
 loons. The original declaration was agreed to for a period of five 
 years, and as this period had expired the powers were without a regu¬ 
 lation on the subject. The reenactment provided that the present 
 declaration shall extend, not merely for a period of five years, but to 
 the end of the Third Conference of Peace. It is difficult to say 
 whether the declaration is important or not. It is, however, evidence 
 of the fact that the conference believed that land and water offer a 
 sufficient field for warfare without extending it to a newer element, 
 the air. 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE CONVENTIONS. 
 
 Such is, in brief, the content of the fourteenth convention, includ¬ 
 ing a declaration previously enumerated. The Final Act then passes 
 to the less formal results: “ The conference, inspired by the spirit of 
 compromise and reciprocal concession which pervades its delibera¬ 
 tions, adopted the following declarations which, reserving to each of 
 the represented powers the benefit of its votes, allows them to affirm 
 the principles which they consider as unanimously recognized. 
 
 It is unanimous: (1) In accepting the principle for obligatory arbitration; 
 (2) in declaring that certain differences, and notably those relating to the inter¬ 
 pretation and application of international conventional stipulations, are suscep¬ 
 tible of being submitted to obligatory arbitration without any restriction. 
 
 It was a matter of great regret to the 82 powers voting in behalf 
 of a general treaty of obligatory arbitration, against which there were 
 only 9 votes recorded, that the opponents of this great and beneficient 
 measure stood upon the rights of the minority to block the will of the 
 majority; but as Germany and Austria refused to yield to the ma¬ 
 jority, and as an attempt to sign a special convention dealing with 
 the subject, to be binding only on those who voted for it, would have 
 created bitterness of feeling within and without the conference, it was 
 deemed in the interest of international peace and good understanding 
 to adopt the principle in the abstract without seeking to incorporate 
 it in the concrete form of a convention. The future, however, is very 
 bright. There is no reason to prevent the 82 powers from negotiating 
 individual and separate treaties and thus accomplish indirectly and 
 
32 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 beyond the confines of The Hague what might and would have been 
 accomplished but for the determined opposition of two great but un¬ 
 converted powers. 
 
 RESOLUTION REGARDING MILITARY BURDENS. 
 
 In the next place, to continue the reading of the Final Act, the con¬ 
 ference adopted unanimously the following resolution: 
 
 Tlie Second Conference of Peace reaffirms the resolution adopted by the con¬ 
 ference of 1899 regarding the limitation of military charges, and considers that 
 these military burdens have considerably increased in almost all the countries 
 since the last date. The conference declares that it is especially to be desired 
 that the governments should undertake again the serious study of this question. 
 
 The friends of peace regarded the failure to limit the burden of 
 armaments as a misfortune. There is much, however, to be said for 
 the haste that makes slowly. The problem of disarmament or limi¬ 
 tation of armaments is a very serious one. It is much more serious 
 than the pacifists would have us believe. Shall all disarm at one and 
 the same time? If that were possible we could solve the question at 
 once; but the fear that some may not disarm while others do, and the 
 further fear that the large powers have not really lost the appetite 
 for the weaker, must make one pause. Germany consented to the 
 passage of the resolution, Great Britain supported it, and, in accord¬ 
 ance with direct instructions from the Secretary of State, the Ameri¬ 
 can delegation voted for the measure. 
 
 RECOMMENDATION OF ESTABLISHMENT OF COURT OF ARBITRATION. 
 
 The Final Act then proceeds to enumerate five recommendations, 
 the first and last of which should be discussed. 
 
 The conference recommends to the signatory powers the adoption of the 
 project hereunto annexed of a convention for the establishment of a court of 
 arbitral justice and its putting into effect as soon as an agreement shall have 
 been reached as to the choice of the judges and the constitution of the court. 
 
 The project referred to as annexed and made a part of the recom¬ 
 mendation is a careful convention consisting of thirty-five articles, 
 providing for the organization, jurisdiction, and procedure of a per¬ 
 manent court of arbitration, composed of permanent judges, versed 
 in the existing systems of law of the modern civilized world. The 
 conference was unable to agree upon the precise method of appoint¬ 
 ing the judges for the court, but recommended that this court be 
 established upon the basis of the project approved by it and annexed 
 to the recommendation as soon as the signatory powers should agree 
 upon the method of appointing judges. The number of powers 
 necessary is not specified, nor is the number of judges determined, 
 as in the court of prize. It therefore follows that any number of 
 powers may agree to make the project the basis of the court and the 
 court is established. It would thus seem that we are in the presence 
 of the realization of centuries of hope. 
 
 The fate of the court was long in suspense. The opposition to it 
 was bitter at times. It was more difficult to carry than the prize 
 court, because there was no international court of prize whereas there 
 is a permanent court of arbitration—-The Hague Court—although 
 permanent in name only and constituted from a list of judges for 
 
THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 33 
 
 each case submitted to it. The existence, however, of the permanent 
 court made it more difficult to establish the new one, and it was not 
 until the last day but one of the Conference that the project was 
 adopted and referred to the powers by the unanimous vote of the 
 nations present and voting. Perhaps it would be advisable to quote 
 the first paragraph of the project in order that the exact nature of the 
 court may be evident. It is as follows: 
 
 In order to further the cause of arbitration, the contracting powers agree to 
 organize, without injury to the permanent court of arbitration, a court of ar¬ 
 bitral justice, free and easy of access, composed of judges representing the 
 juridical systems of the world and capable o fassuring the continuity of arbitral 
 jurisprudence. 
 
 It is proper to state that the project was essentially an American 
 project, although presented conjointly by Germany and Great Britain, 
 and the establishment of the court in the near future will be an Ameri¬ 
 can triumph. President Roosevelt, in his recent message to Congress, 
 commented as follows upon this recommendation: 
 
 Substantial progress was also made toward the creation of a permanent judi¬ 
 cial tribunal for the determination of international causes. There was very full 
 discussion of the proposal for such a court and a general agreement was finally 
 reached in favor of its creation. The conference recommended to the signatory 
 powers the adoption of a draft upon which it agreed for the organization of the 
 court, leaving to be determined only the method by which the judges should be 
 selected. This remaining unsettled question is plainly one which time and good 
 temper will solve. 
 
 I believe you will search in vain for any work of a more far-reach¬ 
 ing nature accomplished within the past centuries. The dream of 
 Henry IY, the hope of William Penn, both of whom prepared projects 
 for a court of nations, seem, if not wholly to have been realized, within 
 the very grasp of our generation. 
 
 THIRD PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 The friends of peace and arbitration had wished to make the con¬ 
 ference at The Hague a permanent institution, meeting at regular and 
 stated intervals known in advance. The American delegation had the 
 honor to urge the adoption of such a resolution or recommendation 
 and succeeded in substance, although the language is not so clear and 
 crisp as one would like to see it. The exact wording of the recom¬ 
 mendation follows: 
 
 Finally, the conference recommends to the powers the reunion of a third peace 
 conference to take place within a period analogous to that which has elapsed 
 since the preceding conference (eight years) at a date to be fixed by common 
 agreement among the powers, and the conference call their attention to the 
 necessity of preparing the programme of the Third Conference far enough in 
 advance in order that its deliberations may take place with indispensable author¬ 
 ity and rapidity. 
 
 In order to reach this end, the conference considers it very desirable that two 
 years before the probable reunion of the conference a preparatory committee be 
 charged by the governments with the duty of collecting the different propositions 
 to be submitted to the conference, of discovering matters susceptible of future 
 international regulation, and of preparing a programme which the governments 
 shall determine so that it may be attentively studied in each country. This com 
 mittee shall propose a mode of organization and procedure for the conference. 
 
 The meaning of this recommendation is obvious. Whatever power 
 may call the conference, the interested governments are to prepare the 
 
 S. Doc. 433, 60-1 - 3 
 
34 
 
 THE SECOND HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE. 
 
 programme and devise rules for the organization and procedure of the 
 conference. In other words, the conference ceases to be Russian in 
 becoming international. 
 
 A LANDMARK IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 
 
 Enough has been said to show that this conference, which lasted 
 four months, and which was subjected to criticism in all parts of the 
 world and to misrepresentations in the journals, has not only justified 
 its calling, but that it is a landmark in international development. 
 
 Our great concern must be, as far as possibly," to humanize war as 
 long as war exists. The greater task is to removed the causes of war so 
 that nations may not be hurried into war, or that friction, developed 
 by the failure to solve or adjust conflicts, may not permit nations 
 slowly but surely to drift into war. 
 
 Leaving out minor matters, this conference did four things: 
 
 1. It provided for a meeting of a third conference within an 
 analogous period—namely, eight years, to be under the control of the 
 powers generally, instead of the control of any one of them. 
 
 2. It adopted a convention for the nonforcible collection of contract 
 debts, substituting arbitration and an appeal to reason for force and 
 an appeal to arms. 
 
 3. It established a prize court to safeguard neutrals, and 
 
 4. It laid the foundations of, if it did not put the finishing stone to, 
 a great court of arbitration. 
 
 O